## 1. Biographical Sketch



The woman who is today most commonly known as Harriet Taylor or
Harriet Taylor Mill was born Harriet Hardy in London in October
 1807.[1]
 She married the pharmaceuticals wholesaler John Taylor on 14 March
1826; she was eighteen and he twenty-nine. The couple had three
children: Herbert, born in 1827; Algernon ("Haji"), born
in 1830; and Helen ("Lily"), born in 1831. John Taylor
died of rectal cancer in 1849, and in the spring of 1851 Harriet was
married again, this time to John Stuart Mill. She suffered from
various health problems affecting her nervous and respiratory systems.
In 1841, for instance, she lost much of the use of her legs for an
extended period (J. S. Mill, [TEL], 486-7). A tuberculosis
sufferer, as was John--it is possible that she caught
"consumption" from him (see Packe 1954, 360)--she
died of a respiratory failure on 3 November 1858.



Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill met for the first time in 1830.
Their meeting was arranged by the leader of Harriet's Unitarian
congregation, the Reverend W. J. Fox. The two young people very
quickly fell in love. Their conduct during the long period in which
Harriet was married to John Taylor would be scandalous by contemporary
standards, let alone Victorian ones. Early on, John Mill made almost
nightly visits to the Taylors' home, visits that John Taylor
would facilitate by going to his club. On the whole, John Taylor was
remarkably tolerant of the fact that his wife was on such intimate
terms with another man, but his tolerance did have some limits. In
1833, at his insistence, Harriet established a separate residence, and
she lived apart from her husband for most of the rest of his life,
seeing John at her convenience. (Helen lived with her, Herbert and
Haji with their father.) In 1848, John Taylor refused to allow John
Mill to dedicate *The Principles of Political Economy* to
Harriet, although the dedication was nonetheless inserted into special
copies of the book that they distributed to friends. When John Taylor
began to suffer from the cancer that would eventually take his life,
he asked Harriet to return home to care for him. She declined, on the
grounds that her first duty was to John Mill, who at the time was
himself suffering from an injured hip and temporary near-blindness.
While John Mill eventually mended, John Taylor's condition only
worsened, and at the end Harriet did dedicate herself to caring for
her husband. In fact, she rebuked John Mill very sharply for having
failed, while visiting her, to ask about her husband's health.
She upbraided him even more severely for having suggested that she
might write to him during an "odd time" when she might
find a "change of subject of thought a relief":
"Good God, sh[oul]d you think it a relief to think of something
else some acquaintance or what not while *I* was dying?"
(H. T. Mill, [CW], 360).



Harriet was widowed in 1849, and she married John Mill in 1851. The
Mills spent most of their married life in their Blackheath Park home,
with just Haji and Helen Taylor for company. They had already largely
withdrawn from society, perhaps due to the gossip that their
relationship generated. Real or perceived slights toward Taylor Mill
by Mill's mother and some of his siblings after their wedding
resulted in his estrangement from much of his family (on this see
Packe 1954, 349-57; Jacobs 2002, 117). The Mills did sometimes
interrupt their reclusion to travel, separately or together, to the
south of England or to the Continent in pursuit of a more healthful
climate. In late 1858, after Mill's retirement from the East
India Company, they set out for Montpellier, but Taylor Mill's
fragile health gave out in Avignon. Mill bought a small house there,
next to the cemetery in which she was buried, where he spent a
considerable portion of the remainder of his life. (He died and was
buried in Avignon in 1873.)


## 2. Contemporaries' Accounts of Taylor Mill



Had Taylor Mill produced a substantial body of philosophical work that
could uncontroversially be called her own, we would not need to
concern ourselves with what her contemporaries had to say about her
abilities; we could make our own assessment. Because she lacks such a
corpus, however, and because questions about what she might have
written or how much influence she might have had on Mill's
intellectual career are so difficult to answer on purely textual
grounds, the estimates of her intellectual powers formed by people who
knew her must be taken into account.


### 2.1 Praise from John Stuart Mill



Taylor Mill's contemporaries offer radically different
impressions of her. Mill's view is already fairly clear from the
lines from the dedication to *On Liberty* that were quoted
above, but the description of her in his *Autobiography* is
worth quoting in its entirety.



> 
> Although it was years after my introduction to Mrs. Taylor before my
> acquaintance with her became at all intimate or confidential, I very
> soon felt her to be the most admirable person I had ever known. It is
> not to be supposed that she was, or that any one, at the age at which
> I first saw her, could be, all that she afterwards became. Least of
> all could this be true of her, with whom self-improvement, progress in
> the highest and in all senses, was a law of her nature; a necessity
> equally from the ardour with which she sought it, and from the
> spontaneous tendency of faculties which could not receive an
> impression or an experience without making it the source or the
> occasion of an accession of wisdom. Up to the time when I first saw
> her, her rich and powerful nature had chiefly unfolded itself
> according to the received type of feminine genius. To her outer circle
> she was a beauty and a wit, with an air of natural distinction, felt
> by all who approached her: to the inner, a woman of deep and strong
> feeling, of penetrating and intuitive intelligence, and of an
> eminently meditative and poetic nature. Married at a very early age,
> to a most upright, brave, and honourable man, of liberal opinions and
> good education, but without the intellectual or artistic tastes which
> would have made him a companion for her, though a steady and
> affectionate friend, for whom she had true esteem and the strongest
> affection through life, and whom she most deeply lamented when dead;
> shut out by the social disabilities of women from any adequate
> exercise of her highest faculties in action on the world without; her
> life was one of inward meditation, varied by familiar intercourse with
> a small circle of friends, of whom one only (long since deceased) was
> a person of genius [Eliza Flower], of capacities of feeling or
> intellect kindred with her own, but all had more or less of alliance
> with her in sentiments and opinions. Into this circle I had the good
> fortune to be admitted, and I soon perceived that she possessed in
> combination, the qualities which in all other persons whom I had known
> I had been only too happy to find singly. In her, complete
> emancipation from every kind of superstition (including that which
> attributes a pretended perfection to the order of nature and the
> universe), and an earnest protest against many things which are still
> part of the established constitution of society, resulted not from the
> hard intellect, but from strength of noble and elevated feeling, and
> co-existed with a highly reverential nature. In general spiritual
> characteristics, as well as in temperament and organisation, I have
> often compared her, as she was at this time, to Shelley: but in
> thought and intellect, Shelley, so far as his powers were developed in
> his short life, was but a child compared with what she ultimately
> became. Alike in the highest regions of speculation and in the smaller
> practical concerns of daily life, her mind was the same perfect
> instrument, piercing to the very heart and marrow of the matter;
> always seizing the essential idea or principle. The same exactness and
> rapidity of operation, pervading as it did her sensitive as well as
> her mental faculties, would, with her gifts of feeling and
> imagination, have fitted her to be a consummate artist, as her fiery
> and tender soul and her vigorous eloquence would certainly have made
> her a great orator, and her profound knowledge of human nature and
> discernment and sagacity in practical life, would, in the times when
> such a *carriere* was open to women, have made her
> eminent among the rulers of mankind. Her intellectual gifts did but
> minister to a moral character at once the noblest and the best
> balanced which I have ever met with in life. Her unselfishness was not
> that of a taught system of duties, but of a heart which thoroughly
> identified itself with the feelings of others, and often went to
> excess in consideration for them by imaginatively investing their
> feelings with the intensity of its own. The passion of justice might
> have been thought to be her strongest feeling, but for her boundless
> generosity, and a lovingness ever ready to pour itself forth upon any
> or all human beings who were capable of giving the smallest feeling in
> return. The rest of her moral characteristics were such as naturally
> accompany these qualities of mind and heart: the most genuine modesty
> combined with the loftiest pride; a simplicity and sincerity which
> were absolute, towards all who were fit to receive them; the utmost
> scorn of whatever was mean and cowardly, and a burning indignation at
> everything brutal or tyrannical, faithless or dishonourable in conduct
> and character, while making the broadest distinction between *mala
> in se* and mere *mala prohibita*--between acts giving
> evidence of intrinsic badness in feeling and character, and those
> which are only violations of conventions either good or bad,
> violations which whether in themselves right or wrong, are capable of
> being committed by persons in every other respect lovable or
> admirable. (J. S. Mill, [ALE], 193-7)
> 



This passage and others like it lead Richard Reeves to describe Mill
as having a "lifelong mission to deify Harriet" (2007,
206-7).


### 2.2 Detractors



No one else who knew Taylor Mill personally spoke of her in anything
like these terms, as far as we know, and indeed several of her
acquaintances held her in low estimation. The Carlyles were admirers
initially, but they soon had changes of heart. Jane says that Harriet
was "a peculiarly affected body" who "was not easy
unless she startled you with unexpected sayings" and was even
"somewhat of a humbug" (quoted in Packe 1954,
325-6). Thomas comments that "She was full of unwise
intellect, asking and re-asking stupid questions" (quoted in
Packe 1954, 315). Harold Laski relates that "Morley told me that
Louis Blanc told him that he once sat for an hour with her and that
she repeated to him what afterwards turned out to be an article that
Mill had just finished for the *Edinburgh*.... If she was
what he thought, someone at least should have given us
indications" (quoted in Stillinger 1961, 24-5).



Those who argue that Taylor Mill was something less than what Mill
took her to be must explain how he was so misled. There is a tradition
of thinking that, in essence, he was psychologically unable to resist
her charms. According to Mill's friend and biographer Alexander
Bain, it was commonly held among their contemporaries that "she
imbibed all his views, and gave them back in her own form, by which he
was flattered and pleased" (1882, 173). Ruth Borchard says that
"Accustomed by training and experience to the acceptance of
ascetic, masculine values, he was completely overpowered by her
intensely feminine atmosphere" (1957, 46). And Laski speculates:
"I should guess that she was a comfortable and sympathetic
person and that Mill, brought up to fight Austin, Praed, Macaulay and
Grote, had never met a really soft cushion before." (*op.
cit.*). Some writers have even advanced the idea that after the
death of his domineering father James, Mill felt a need to invent
another parental authority in order that he might submit to it (e.g.,
Trilling 1952, 118; Mazlish 1975, 286-91).


### 2.3 A More Balanced Assessment



There is obviously a vast middle territory between these extremes.
Taylor Mill was not often described in judicious or balanced terms.
Nevertheless, Mill's brother George, who knew her reasonably
well, did relate to Bain that "Mrs. Taylor was a clever and
remarkable woman, but nothing like what John took her to be"
(Bain 1882, 166).


## 3. Taylor Mill as Author



Philosophical reputations are usually forged through producing a body
of written work. This section will discuss various works of which
Taylor Mill is or might be the author or at least a co-author,
including three significant works in whose creation Mill credits
Taylor Mill with playing a major role: *The Principles of Political
Economy*, *On Liberty*, and "The Enfranchisement of
Women."


### 3.1 Works Certainly Authored or Co-Authored by Taylor Mill



While there are several works of which it is possible to describe
Taylor Mill as an author or co-author with little fear of
contradiction, Menaka Philips observes that none of them constitute
what philosophers have traditionally regarded as a "great
text" (2018, 629). A handful of published pieces, such as some
poems, book reviews, and an essay on the aesthetic appreciation of the
seasons that were published in the *Monthly Repository* in the
early 1830s, when Fox was its editor, have minimal philosophical
content. *The Complete Works of Harriet Taylor Mill*, edited by
Jo Ellen Jacobs, contains various drafts of unpublished essays that
are in Taylor Mill's hand on ethics and social philosophy; their
topics include defenses of women's rights and tolerance and
criticisms of religion (Jacobs 1998). But while at points suggestive,
these pieces are also brief and indeed most are incomplete fragments.
Although these drafts share thematic similarities with the published
works described in this section, as well as other works by Mill such
as *The Subjection of Women* and "The Utility of
Religion," they do not correspond closely with particular
stretches of text in these published
 works.[2]
 While little has been written about these drafts, commentators have
offered conflicting assessments of their cogency and significance.
(Compare, for example, Michele Le Doeuff's (2003,
203-4) and K. C. O'Rourke's (2001, 60-1)
remarks on a draft of an essay on toleration and conformity, which is
circa five pages in length.)



In a bibliography that he compiled of his writings, Mill describes a
number of newspaper articles that appeared from the middle of the
1840s to the early 1850s--most comment on recent criminal
trials--as having been co-authored by himself and Taylor Mill
(MacMinn *et al.* 1945, 59-76). Frequently, he adds that
very little of the article was his. In a like manner, he says in the
entry for an 1853 pamphlet examining a proposed domestic violence bill
"In this I acted chiefly as an amanuensis to my wife"
(MacMinn *et al.* 1945, 79). One thread that runs through many
of these occasional pieces is the suggestion that the law is
excessively harsh where the security of property is concerned yet
excessively lax when dealing with those who do violence to other
persons, especially women and children. (For a detailed analysis of
the content of these articles, see Manning 2019.) A newspaper article
or short popular pamphlet is necessarily far from being a theoretical
treatise, but Philips (2018, 634) credits Taylor Mill with the
"gritty" detail in which these co-authored pieces depict
women's lived experience from a theoretically-informed
 perspective.[3]


### 3.2 *Principles of Political Economy*



Mill suggests that Taylor Mill was deeply involved in the composition
of three works of greater philosophical significance than those
discussed above. The earliest is the *Principles of Political
Economy*. The *Principles*' subtitle is *With Some
of their Applications to Social Philosophy*. At least a third of
the volume is concerned with topics that belong as much to philosophy
as to economics, including the portion of the work that Harriet did
the most to shape, a chapter titled "On the Probable Futurity of
the Labouring Classes" (J. S. Mill, [PPE], 758-96). This
chapter argues that when the laboring class has made sufficient moral
and intellectual progress, its members will refuse to settle for mere
wages any longer. They will instead insist first on profit-sharing and
later on employee ownership of firms. They will even experiment with
Socialist and Communist communities of the sorts depicted by
Saint-Simon, Fourier, Blanc, and Owen. Mill's
*Autobiography* states that



> 
> In the first draft of the book, that chapter did not exist. She
> pointed out the need of such a chapter, and the extreme imperfection
> of the book without it: she was the cause of my writing it; and the
> more general part of the chapter, the statement and discussion of the
> two opposite theories respecting the proper condition of the labouring
> classes, was wholly an exposition of her thoughts, often in words
> taken from her own lips. The purely scientific part of the Political
> Economy I did not learn from her; but it was chiefly her influence
> that gave to the book that general tone by which it is distinguished
> from all previous expositions of Political Economy that had any
> pretension to being scientific, and which has made it so useful in
> conciliating minds which those previous expositions had
> repelled.... The economic generalizations which depend, not on
> necessities of nature but on those combined with the existing
> arrangements of society, it deals with only as provisional, and as
> liable to be much altered by the progress of social improvement. I had
> indeed partially learnt this view of things from the thoughts awakened
> in me by the speculations of the St. Simonians; but it was made a
> living principle pervading and animating the book by my wife's
> promptings. ([ALE], 255-7)
> 



As Jacobs reads this passage, Mill is declaring the chapter "to
be written primarily by Taylor Mill" (2002, 207-8). This
gloss, though, seems to overlook his statement that "she was the
cause of my writing it." Moreover, the aforementioned
"forbidden dedication" of the volume refers without
qualification to Mill as the author.



> 
> To Mrs. John Taylor, as the most eminently qualified of all persons
> known to the author either to originate or appreciate speculations on
> social improvement, this attempt to explain and diffuse ideas many of
> which were first learned from herself, is with the highest respect and
> regard, dedicated. (J. S. Mill, [PPE], 1026n2)
> 



Even if the decision to put only Mill's name on the cover of the
*Principles* could be explained as an expedient to win greater
acceptance for the ideas within, there would have been little harm in
describing her as its co-author in this dedication if she were such,
especially once the decision was made only to paste it inside copies
of the *Principles* given to personal friends. On the other
hand, though, his annotated bibliography does describe the
*Principles* as a "joint production with my wife"
(MacMinn *et al*. 1945,
 69).[4]
 And Taylor Mill was actively involved in revising portions of the
later editions of the *Principles*. For example, the second
(1849) edition is considerably more favorable to Socialism and even
Communism, and the impetus for this shift seems to have been a change
in Taylor Mill's thinking. In a letter written to Taylor Mill
early in 1849, Mill points out that she now "had marked
dissent" from a passage in the first edition raising an
objection to Communism that "was inserted on your proposition
& very nearly in your own words." He continues, though,
that



> 
> This is probably only the progress we have always been making, &
> by thinking sufficiently I should probably come to think the
> same--as is almost always the case, I believe always when we
> think long enough. (J. S. Mill, [TLL], 8-9)
> 



Thus while we can be confident that one important chapter of the
*Principles* would not exist if not for Taylor Mill and that
she helped to edit other chapters, it is unclear whether her role in
the volume's composition was substantial enough to merit calling
her its co-author. It is not even entirely clear whether John thought
of her as such, and if he did, whether this was true from the start or
a retrospective judgment that he came to hold years
 later.[5]


### 3.3 *On Liberty*



This brings us to *On Liberty*, the celebrated defense of
individual freedom, which was published in the year after Taylor
Mill's death. The dedication of this essay, a portion of which
has already been quoted, says that "Like all that I have written
for many years, it belongs as much to her as to me," and in the
*Autobiography* Mill elaborates on Taylor Mill's role in
the essay's production.



> 
> The "Liberty" was more directly and literally our joint
> production than anything else which bears my name, for there was not a
> sentence of it that was not several times gone through by us together,
> turned over in many ways, and carefully weeded of any faults, either
> in thought or expression, that we detected in it.... With regard
> to the thoughts, it is difficult to identify any particular part or
> element as being more hers than all the rest. The whole mode of
> thinking of which the book was the expression, was emphatically
> hers.... The "Liberty" is likely to survive longer
> than anything else that I have written (with the possible exception of
> the "Logic"), because the conjunction of her mind with
> mine has rendered it a kind of philosophic text-book of a single
> truth.... ([ALE], 257-9)
> 



The entry for *On Liberty* in Mill's bibliography,
though, makes no mention of Taylor Mill (MacMinn *et al*. 1945,
92). Since he used the term "joint product" in the
bibliography for the *Principles*, it is somewhat curious that
he does not use it there for *On Liberty* as well. Mill's
letters to Taylor Mill and others also speak equivocally to the
question of *On Liberty*'s production. In January of
1855, Mill writes to Taylor Mill from Rome that he has decided that a
volume on liberty would be "the best thing to write &
publish at present" (J. S. Mill, [TLL], 294). He asks her to
look at an essay on the subject that he had written in the preceding
year to see if it could serve as the basis for one part of this
volume, and says that if her answer is yes and if his health allows
"I will try to write & publish it in 1856." In this
letter, he clearly suggests that he will be the one doing the writing.
(*On Liberty* in fact appeared in 1859.) In a reference to this
projected volume in a letter of the next month, though, he says that
"We must cram into it as much as possible of what we wish not to
leave unsaid" (J. S. Mill, [TLL], 332). In letters to others, he
refers to the essay as his and to himself as the one writing it (J. S.
Mill, [TLL], 539, 581).



In a recent article, Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Michael Schefczyk, and
Lily Osburg (2022) employ stylometric techniques to ascertain Taylor
Mill's role in composing *On Liberty*. This innovative
approach presupposes that authors have stylistic
"fingerprints" that can be identified via machine learning
algorithms, so that by comparing a text whose author is unknown to
others known to have been written by different "suspects"
(that is, potential authors) the former's author can be
identified. Their conclusion is that several passages of *On
Liberty* were written not by Mill alone but by either Taylor Mill
or the two of them jointly. One limitation of their method is that we
cannot be any more confident about their conclusions than we are about
their ascriptions of the texts that serve as inputs to the algorithms.
As they acknowledge, there is no consensus about some of these. For
instance, they assume not only that the chapter of the
*Principles* on the future of the working class was written
exclusively by Taylor Mill but that the remainder of the two-volume
work was written jointly--even the most "purely
scientific" portions. As with the *Principles of Political
Economy*, then, the evidence regarding Taylor Mill's claim
to be regarded as the co-author of *On Liberty* is
equivocal.


### 3.4 "The Enfranchisement of Women"



"The Enfranchisement of Women," published in *The
Westminster Review* in 1851, is the best candidate for a
significant philosophical work authored primarily or even solely by
Taylor Mill (H. T. Mill, [CW], 51-73). Occasioned by a series of
feminist conventions in the United States, it makes a case not merely
for giving women the ballot but for "equality in all rights,
political, civil, and social, with the male citizens of the
community" (H. T. Mill, [CW], 51). This essay contains many of
the same lines of argument as *The Subjection of Women*,
written by Mill and published in 1869, although it expresses a
somewhat more radical view of gender roles than the later essay (see
Rossi 1970, 41-5). It maintains that the denial of political
rights to women tends to restrict their interests to matters that
directly impact the family, with the result that the influence of
wives on their husbands tends to diminish the latter's
willingness to act from public-spirited motives. Further, it contends
that when women do not enjoy equal educational rights with men then
wives will impede rather than encourage their husbands' moral
and intellectual development. And it insists that competition for jobs
will prevent most of the problems that admitting women into the
workforce would putatively cause from materializing. All of these
points are common to "The Enfranchisement" and *The
Subjection*. The major point of difference between the two is that
while the *Subjection* rather notoriously suggests that the
best arrangement for most married couples will be for the wife to
concentrate on the care of the house and the children (J.S. Mill,
[TSW], 297-8), a position that Mill also takes in an early essay
on marriage written for Harriet (J. S. Mill, [OMA], 43), the
"Enfranchisement" instead argues for the desirability of
married women's working outside the home.



> 
> Even if every woman, as matters now stand, had a claim on some man for
> support, how infinitely preferable is it that part of the income
> should be of the woman's earning, even if the aggregate sum were
> but little increased by it.... Even under the present laws
> respecting the property of women, a woman who contributes materially
> to the support of the family, cannot be treated in the same
> contemptuously tyrannical manner as one who, however she may toil as a
> domestic drudge, is a dependent on the man for subsistence (H. T.
> Mill, [CW], 60-1).
> 



This difference is an important piece of evidence in favor of
attributing the essay to Taylor Mill (although Richard Krouse points
out that the essay leaves unanswered the question it raises about who
is to care for the home and the children; see 1982, 169). Still, not
all of the evidence is on this side. In 1849, Mill urges Taylor Mill
to finish a pamphlet that she was writing on the subject of women
([TLL], 13). Yet soon thereafter, in correspondence with the
*Westminster*'s editor about the
"Enfranchisement," he speaks of the article as if he is
its author, writing for instance that "If you are inclined for
an article on the Emancipation of Women, ... I have one nearly
ready... " ([TLL], 55-6, 65-6). In an 1854
letter, Mill rather ambiguously reminds Taylor Mill that when the
"Enfranchisement" is published in a projected collection
of his work it will be "preceded by a preface which will show
that much of all my later articles, and all the best of that one,
were, as they were, my Darling's" ([TLL], 190). If we can
draw any implication from this, it seems to be that while the
strongest arguments in the article were due to Harriet, Mill was still
the actual author. But the preface that actually appeared, in the
collection of Mill's writings published in his lifetime
(*Dissertations and Discussions*), suggests (albeit vaguely)
that his contribution was somewhat smaller than this; there he
describes the essay as "hers in a particular sense, my share in
it being little more than that of an editor and amanuensis" (J.
S. Mill 1882, 93-4). (He adds that the article's
authorship was "known at the time, and publicly attributed to
her.") In an 1851 letter to William Lloyd and Helen Benson
Garrison, Lucretia Coffin Mott writes that she had received a copy of
the essay from Harriet's son Herbert and adds "The writer
of it was a Mrs. Taylor a widow who has recently married J. S.
Mill.... Part of it is from his pen. Indeed, she says,
*he* wrote it--he says, *she* wrote it" (Mott
2002, p. 209).



Despite the conflicting evidence, today there seems to be a general
consensus that Harriet is the article's primary author. It
appears in the University of Toronto's *Collected Works of
John Stuart Mill*, but only in an appendix and under her name (H.
T. Mill, [EW]). John Robson, the editor of Mill's *Collected
Works*, says that "most of the evidence" favors
attributing it to her (Robson 1984, lxxv). Some commentators do
dissent from this view, however (for example, Himmelfarb, 183-6;
Warnock 1996, xxxv).


## 4. Taylor Mill's Influence on Mill



Whatever conclusions we reach about Taylor Mill's authorship of
the works discussed in the preceding section, she might also have made
important contributions to philosophy through changing the direction
of Mill's writing in consequential respects. This section
discusses some of the evidence for and against the proposition that
she did so.


### 4.1 John Stuart Mill's Account of the Mills' Collaboration



Mill himself speaks to the difficulty of separating his and Taylor
Mill's contributions to their collaboration in his
*Autobiography*:



> 
> When two persons have their thoughts and speculations completely in
> common; when all subjects of intellectual or moral interest are
> discussed between them in daily life, and probed to much greater
> depths than are usually or conveniently sounded in writings intended
> for general readers; when they set out from the same principles, and
> arrive at their conclusions by processes pursued jointly, it is of
> little consequence in respect to the question of originality, which of
> them holds the pen; the one who contributes least to the composition
> may contribute most to the thought; the writings which result are the
> joint product of both, and it must often be impossible to disentangle
> their respective parts, and affirm that this belongs to one and that
> to the other. (J. S. Mill, [ALE], 251)
> 



Here Mill implicitly acknowledges that his hand most often held the
pen, but he also suggests that Taylor Mill contributed numerous ideas
to works that he was solely or primarily responsible for composing.
"In this wide sense," he continues, "not only during
the years of our married life, but during many of the years of
confidential friendship which preceded it, all my published writings
were as much my wife's work as mine; her share in them
constantly increasing as years advanced" ([ALE], 251).



Mill does give some indication, though, of his and Taylor Mill's
relative strengths:



> 
> With those who, like all the best and wisest of mankind, are
> dissatisfied with human life as it is, and whose feelings are wholly
> identified with its radical amendment, there are two main regions of
> thought. One is the region of ultimate aims; the constituent elements
> of the highest realizable ideal of human life. The other is that of
> the immediately useful and practically attainable. In both these
> departments, I have acquired more from her teaching, than from all
> other sources taken together. ([ALE],
>  197)[6]
> 



In contrast, Mill says that his own greatest powers to lie in
"the uncertain and slippery intermediate region, that of theory,
or moral and political science," including "political
economy, analytic psychology, logic, philosophy of history,"
etc. Mill stresses both the reciprocity of their collaborative efforts
and their different manners of reaching conclusions:



> 
> The benefit I received was far greater than any which I could hope to
> give; though to her, who had at first reached her opinions by the
> moral intuition of a character of strong feeling, there was doubtless
> help as well as encouragement to be derived from one who had arrived
> at many of the same results by study and reasoning: and in the
> rapidity of her intellectual growth, her mental activity, which
> converted everything into knowledge, doubtless drew from me, as it did
> from other sources, many of its materials. ([ALE], 197)
> 



Mill acknowledges that Taylor Mill had very little to do with his
first major work, *A System of Logic* (first published in
1843), or with his discussions of the more technical aspects of
political economy. Her areas of interest, clearly, were moral and
social-political philosophy. Within these areas, though, Mill almost
seems to suggest that his entire project is that of systematizing
Taylor Mill's insights and incorporating them within a
utilitarian framework.



> 
> During the greater part of my literary life I have performed the
> office in relation to her, which from a rather early period I had
> considered as the most useful part that I was qualified to take in the
> domain of thought, that of an interpreter of original thinkers, and
> mediator between them and the public; for I had always a humble
> opinion of my own powers as an original thinker, except in abstract
> science ... but thought myself much superior to most of my
> contemporaries in willingness and ability to learn from
> everybody.... I had, in consequence, marked out this as a sphere
> of usefulness in which I was under a special obligation to make myself
> active: the more so, as the acquaintance I had formed with the ideas
> of the Coleridgians, of the German thinkers, and of Carlyle, all of
> them fiercely opposed to the mode of thought in which I had been
> brought up, had convinced me that along with much error they possessed
> much truth.... Thus prepared, it will easily be believed that
> when I came into close intellectual communion with a person of the
> most eminent faculties, whose genius, as it grew and unfolded itself
> in thought, continually struck out truths far in advance of me, but in
> which I could not, as I had done in those others, detect any mixture
> of error, the greatest part of my mental growth consisted in the
> assimilation of those truths, and the most valuable part of my
> intellectual work was in building the bridges and clearing the paths
> which connected them with my general system of thought. ([ALE], pp.
> 251-3)
> 


### 4.2 Skepticism About Taylor Mill's Influence on John Stuart Mill



Just as the people who knew Taylor Mill formed wildly divergent
conclusions about her abilities, so too have different interpreters
reached wildly different conclusions about the scope and significance
of her influence on Mill. Some of Mill's interpreters are
skeptical that Taylor Mill really made much difference to his
writings. H. O. Pappe, for example, questions whether Taylor Mill
introduced any substantial alterations whatsoever into the pattern of
Mill's thought.



> 
> [Taylor Mill's] early writings evince her dependence on Mill.
> For the later period of their partnership we have no valid evidence to
> show that Harriet turned Mill's mind toward new horizons or gave
> an unexpected significance to his thought.... Mill without
> Harriet would still have been Mill. Mill married to George Eliot (or
> to Mary Wollstonecraft--permitting the anachronism) might have
> been transformed. Mary Ann Evans might have given him something new by
> way of independent thought and deeper feeling. Yet, considering her
> equality of stature, there would have been no need for him in
> masochistic guilt to magnify her contribution. (1960, 47-8)
> 



Similarly, Francis Mineka says that "Neither he nor his recent
biographers have convinced us that she was the originating mind behind
his work ..." (1963, 306). More recently, Reeves writes
that "There is no reason to think that Mill's views would
have been substantially different had he ended up with, say, Lizzie
[Eliza] Flower--although his life certainly would have
been." (2007, 86), and Kinzer states bluntly that Taylor Mill
"did not decisively alter the course of" Mill's
development (2007, 111).


### 4.3 The Countervailing Assessment



Alice Rossi criticizes this "minimalist" approach to
estimating Taylor Mill's influence on Mill when she observes
that "one senses in Mill scholars an unwitting desire to reject
Harriet Taylor as contributing in any significant way to the vigor of
Mill's analysis of political and social issues unless it
included some tinge of sentiment or political thought the scholar
disapproved of, in which case the disliked element was seen as
Harriet's influence" (1970, 44-5). Some
commentators, however, have inclined toward a "maximalist"
stance. Chief among these is Jacobs, whose basic interpretative
approach is to take Mill's characterizations of Taylor Mill and
their collaboration at face value, although she departs from this
practice when she believes that there is evidence that Mill may not
have given Taylor Mill the full credit she was due. For example, in an
unpublished essay Taylor Mill writes that



> 
> There seems to be this great distinction between physical and moral
> science; That while the degree of perfection the first has attained is
> marked by the progressive completeness and exactness of its rules,
> that of the latter is in the state most favourable to, and most
> showing healthfulness as it advances beyond all classification except
> on the widest and most universal principles. The science of morals
> should rather be called an art.... (H. T. Mill, [CW], 141)
> 



Jacobs takes this comment to establish that Taylor Mill is the
originator of Mill's distinction between the logics of arts and
sciences at the end of the *System of Logic*, and she accuses
Mill of having in this case understated Taylor Mill's
contribution to one of his works (Jacobs 2002, 203n27; J. S. Mill,
[SOL],
 943-52).[7]
 And while Mill states that Taylor Mill learned almost as much from
him as he from her, Jacobs appears to think otherwise. In toting up
the advantages of the collaboration to each of them, she notes that
"Harriet administered Mill's daily life, nursed his ego,
and provided him with ideas." In return, according to Jacobs,
Mill gave Taylor Mill little more than Mary Ann Evans got for herself
by becoming George Eliot: she merely "acquired the freedom to
write provocative articles ... and to be heard as a man, with
seriousness and consideration" (Jacobs 2002, 129-31).



Conservative historian Gertrude Himmelfarb also credits Taylor Mill
with having made a very significant difference to Mill's
philosophical output, at least during one stage of his life. In
contrast to Jacobs, however, she maintains that this influence was
decidedly for the worse. She decries in particular Taylor Mill's
effect on Mill's views on liberty, arguing that it was only when
Harriet's influence on him was at its peak that Mill embraced a
simplistic liberalism grounded on his sweeping and absolute liberty
principle instead of a more nuanced political theory that treats
liberty as an important value but one that can be limited by other
values (Himmelfarb 1974, 208-72). (Himmelfarb's maximalist
reading clearly might be seen as a limit case of the approach that
Rossi challenges.)


### 4.4 The Middle Ground



To feel entirely confident about any judgment about how far Taylor
Mill influenced Mill, we would need not only access to her letters
which were destroyed but recordings from inside their home at
Blackheath. But as with the descriptions of Taylor Mill's
character and ability discussed above, there is a wide middle ground
between the minimalist and maximalist assessments. One intermediate
view is that of Bain, who suggests that just as Mill's friend
John Sterling "overflowed in suggestive talk, which Mill took up
and improved in his own way," so Taylor Mill might have done as
well (1882, 173-4). Robson comments that "[I]n what we
have of her writings, Harriet constantly has her eye on the future,
even when criticizing the present; she was a woman of dreams and
aspirations, and she must constantly have breathed into Mill a hopeful
and expansive view of human possibilities" (1966,
 178).[8]
 What Bain seems to be suggesting is that Taylor Mill's greatest
contribution to the Mills' collaboration, apart from any writing
that she did herself, was to turn Mill's attention to the
defense of a set progressive ideals and causes reflective of these
possibilities: Socialism, women's rights, individual liberty,
and above all a "utopian" view of humanity's
improvability. This is not necessarily to say that he held these
positions just because she did, which he explicitly tells us was not
the case with women's rights ([ALE], 253n). Nor must it mean
that she contributed little or nothing to the arguments by which he
defends them. Bain knew Mill extremely well, and even though he says
that his friend was under "an extraordinary hallucination as to
the personal qualities of his wife," and "outraged all
reasonable credibility in describing her matchless genius," he
is also adamant not only that Mill "was not such an egoist as to
be captivated by the echo of his own opinions" but also that he
would only have been stimulated by someone with "independent
resources" who had a "good mutual understanding as to the
proper conditions of the problem at issue" (1882,
173-4).



Recent work by feminist scholars also makes a strong case that Taylor
Mill may have influenced Mill's work in more subtle and less
direct ways than commentators usually consider. Helen McCabe suggests
that Taylor Mill helped Mill "develop an emotional language that
had previously been alien to him ... and made him acknowledge,
face up to, and express his emotions"; she describes this as
"the most profound influence anyone could have had" on
Mill, since it "made him into a much more human, sensitive and
empathetic philosopher than he would otherwise have been"
(McCabe 2017, 115). And Philips observes that Taylor Mill's own
experience of patriarchy meant that she brought knowledge to her
collaboration with Mill that he could never have acquired on his own
(Philips 2018).


## 5. Conclusion



No firm conclusions have been reached here as to what personal
qualities Taylor Mill possessed, what if any philosophical works she
authored or co-authored, or how much influence she exercised over
Mill's philosophical career. All that has been attempted is to
present the wide range of answers that have been given to these
questions. The available evidence may be too sparse and too
contradictory for us ever to arrive at definitive answers. Taylor Mill
may therefore be destined to remain an essentially contested figure in
the history of philosophy.