## 1. Life and Main Works



John Norris was born on January 2, 1657 in Collingbourne Kingston,
Wiltshire. His father was a minister, and Norris was the second of
four siblings. His early training was a Puritan one. In 1671, he began
a course of study at Winchester School, where he received a classical
education; the curriculum included Greek and Latin literature, and the
young Norris excelled at his studies. He matriculated at Exeter
College, at Oxford, spending the years from 1676 - 1680 studying
the Scholastic and ancient authors. In 1680, Norris was elected a
Fellow of All Souls College, a distinction he enjoyed for nine years
and would always recall fondly. He was ordained in 1684 and sometime
before 1688 he also discovered the works of Malebranche, who would
become one of his philosophical heroes.



It was during his stay at All Souls that Norris published several of
his most popular works. He published the first edition of *A
Collection of Miscellanies* in 1687, which would culminate in a
ninth edition printed in 1730. At this time he also published
"The Root of Liberty," a sermon in which he defended human
freedom by an appeal to the Augustinian concept of attention. In these
publications, Norris' own thought is pronounced; they exhibit an
independence from the heavy influence Malebranchean doctrine would
exert upon Norris' subsequent works. *The Theory and Regulation of
Love*, a piece characterizing love as the summons of God, was
published in 1688, and the first text in which Norris clearly adopted
Malebranchean arguments. Norris appended to this text his
correspondence with Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist. Finally in
1689, he published *Reason and Religion*, which would be
reissued seven times until 1724.



He resigned the fellowship in 1689, married, and began a two-year
occupation as rector at Newton St. Loe in Somersetshire. There, he
published one of his most popular texts, *Christian
Blessedness*, in 1690. One year later, Locke appealed to the Earl
of Pembroke on Norris' behalf; consequently, Norris assumed the duties
of rector at Bemerton near Salisbury. In general, he preferred study
and meditation, and found his duties as rector to impinge upon his
scholarly activities. Nonetheless, he maintained various
correspondences. He engaged in correspondences with Elizabeth Thomas
("Corinna"), Damaris Cudworth (Lady Masham), Mary Astell
and Locke, among others. In 1695, Norris published his correspondence
with Astell and entitled it, *Letters concerning the Love of God,
between the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies and Mr. John
Norris*. Moreover, he found the time to publish pamphlets and
treatises on a variety of topics including the Toleration Act,
Christian morality, the immortality of the soul, and the difference
between the Ideal Philosophy he endorsed and the enthusiasm of the
Quakers. Norris made clear these differences in an addendum to
*Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life* in 1691. Richard
Vickris, the Quaker, replied irately to this addendum. This generated
a heated reply from Norris, in which he further elucidated the
differences between the "divine light" of his own
philosophy and that of the Quaker doctrines. This work was entitled
*Two Treatises concerning the Divine Light* and was issued in
1692. Locke and Norris shared the objective of debunking the Quakers'
claim to direct enlightenment from God. But their differences far
outweighed their similarities.



In 1690, Norris issued criticisms of Locke's *An Essay concerning
Human Understanding*  the first edition of which was
published in December 1689. Norris' review, entitled *Cursory
Reflections upon a Book called An Essay concerning Human
Understanding*, prompted Locke to modify the second edition of the
*Essay* at 2.10.2. Otherwise, Locke did not reply publicly to
Norris' criticisms. It was only after Locke and Norris quarreled that
Locke published his estimation of Norris' works. Lady Masham had
entrusted a letter for Locke to Norris, but news reached Locke that
Norris had opened the letter. Locke suspected Norris in spite of his
protests, and from that time forward, which was the end of 1692, they
were not on friendly terms (Cranston 1957, 364-365). Shortly
thereafter (1693), Locke wrote *Remarks upon some of Mr. Norris'
Books, Wherein he asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of seeing all
Things in God and Examination of Malebranche*. Charlotte
Johnston has argued that the impetus and target for Locke's critical
evaluation of Malebranche's thought was Norris, whom he viewed as
reiterating Malebranche's thought (1958). In the *Cursory
Reflections*, Norris stated that he would soon publish a treatise,
in which he would present his own philosophy at length.



But it was not until 1701 that Norris completed the first volume of
his magnum opus, *An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or
Intelligible World*. The second volume was issued in 1704.
(Hereafter, *Theory I* and *Theory II*, respectively.)
Norris examines the divine nature in *Theory I* and in
*Theory II* he details the nature of creation, specifically the
nature of humanity and animals. These highly theoretical works did not
enjoy the popular success of his other writings. One of these, *An
Account of Reason and Faith, in Relation to the Mysteries of
Christianity*, was so well-read that it was issued in a fourteenth
edition as late as 1790. His last two theoretical works concerned the
nature of the soul: *A Philosophical Discourse concerning the
Natural Immortality of the Soul*, published in 1708, and *A
Letter to Mr. Dodwell concerning the Immortality of the Soul of
Man*, issued in 1709. It would seem that his many duties as rector
did not hinder him completely from engaging in his beloved
intellectual pursuits, as his publication record demonstrates. His
final publication within his own lifetime, *A Treatise concerning
Christian Prudence*, was printed just a year before his death. He
died in February of 1711, aged fifty-six years, at Bemerton, and was
interred there.



It is puzzling that a figure as popular and widely-read as Norris has
received such little recognition from intellectual historians of the
early modern period. Perhaps Norris has not been paid much attention
because his philosophical writings appear to contain an eclectic
mixture of many divergent, incompatible sources rather than a coherent
synthesis of those sources. Charles McCracken notes that Norris has
been dubbed in a variety of ways, but that the "English
Malebranche" seems most appropriate (179). Norris was heavily
influenced by Malebranche, and goes so far as advising his own
children that Malebranche's *Search after Truth* should
"always be read, studied, dwelt and fed upon till it be
digested, made your own, and converted as it were into the very
Substance of your Souls" (*Spiritual Counsel* 501).
Norris was also a follower of Descartes, whom Norris viewed as
constructing "the only intelligible Frame of Natural Science
that has yet appear'd in the World, and the only intire System that
deserves the name of *Philosophy*" (500). Norris also
draws liberally from his Scholastic background, and frequently uses
theoretical tools borrowed from the canonical thinkers taught at the
universities, such as Aquinas, Augustine and Suarez. His heavy
reliance on diverse intellectual sources, especially Descartes and
Malebranche, is apparent in his writings. Nonetheless, his arguments
are tremendously valuable for understanding better the debates of his
time. His rehearsal of Descartes' real distinction proof and his
evaluation of Locke's thinking matter hypothesis exposes some critical
Lockean assumptions, bringing into sharp relief the disagreements
between the rationalists and empiricists of that era. He also
influenced the views of other minor figures, most notably, Mary Astell
and Arthur Collier. Finally, Norris' adaptation and expansion of
Malebranche's twin doctrines of Vision in God and occasionalism are
also central to understanding the continuation of the Cartesian
project in late 17th and early 18th century
England.


## 2. God


### 2.1 The Intelligible World



The intelligible world is the realm of Platonic objects that
constitutes the source and grounds of human knowledge. Malebranche's
account of the intelligible world is incomplete according to
Norris:



> 
> *Malebranch* has ventured the farthest of any that I know upon
> the Discovery. He is indeed the great *Galileo* of the
> Intellectual World. He has given us the *Point of View,* and
> what ever farther Detections are made, it must be through his
> *Telescope...*But even this great *Apelles* has
> drawn this Celestial Beauty but half way, and I am afraid the
> excellent Piece will Suffer, whatever other hand has the finishing of
> it. (*Theory I* 4)
> 



Norris considers his *Theories I* and *II* to be the
completion of Malebranche's project. In *Theory I*, Norris
discusses the nature of God, and in *Theory II* he discusses
how creation is related to God. The most substantial expansion upon
Malebranche's thought occurs in the first part of this treatise, where
Norris spends a great deal of time arguing that God is truth. The
intelligible world is the mind of God, a "kind of *Terra
Incognita*, a more *Intellectual America*" (3).



Norris first argues for the existence of an ideal counterpart to
nature. Since the world is created, "it must of necessity
receive its Being from some other Being that was when it self was
not" (18). He considers the nature of a being that is capable of
bringing existence from absolute privation, and concludes such a being
must be infinitely powerful. Relying upon the premise that all action
is guided by thought, and that God could not have thought about the
world because it did not exist at the time, Norris concludes the ideas
that guided God's thought in the creation of the world and its
inhabitants must be "their essential Reasons and Natures before
they had any in this, nay even from all Eternity...and that there
is an *Intelligible* as well as a *Sensible* World,
truly representative and exhibitive of this," or " a fair
intelligible Mirrour" (26). The intelligible world is the
pattern or model of nature, "since it could no more be its own
*Exemplary* or *Formal*, than *Efficient*
Cause" (30).



His second argument for the intelligible world is from the existence
of natural kinds. Norris asks "Why is not the Body of one Man as
big as the Globe of the Sun, while that of another is too small to be
seen without a *Microscope*?" and answers "'tis not
according to the *Idea* of that Creature that he should be
either so big, or so little" (39). This stance marks a
noteworthy departure from Malebranche, who claims God does not have
particular ideas of bodies in *Elucidation 10* of the
*Search*. Norris' next argument begins with our understanding
of perfect, geometrical objects. Norris says when he views "a
globular Body I have naturally excited in me an *Idea* of a
perfect Globe or Sphere" (51). This implies the existence of an
ideal sphere because "the effect cannot have more perfection
than its Cause...because the Cause cannot give that to the effect
which it has not it self" (52). Norris concludes that human
thought of perfect circles proves an ideal circle exists as the cause
of thought because there are none in nature.



His fourth argument comes from the nature of truth. Norris considers
the skeptic's claim that there is no absolute truth and turns the
table on the skeptic. If the skeptic is right, then there is no truth,
which is itself an absolute truth. As such, the claim, 'There is
no truth', would be a necessary and eternal truth:



> 
> And besides when they go to prove this sceptical Position they must do
> it by pretending to lay the Grounds of it in Philosophic Principles
> and Maxims, which besides the Confession of such Principles would be
> to erect their scepticism as an Institution of Science, and then since
> all Science is of *Necessary* and *Immutable* things,
> and whatsoever is necessary and immutable is also Eternal, hence it
> follows yet farther that they will by consequence and must allow not
> only Truth in general, but also *Eternal* Truth, since both the
> Conclusion which they pretend to prove, and the Principles whereby
> they prove it, according to them must be such. (65)
> 



There are eternal truths, as even the skeptic must admit, so there are
also eternal relations of ideas because truth relates ideas. In
Norris' view, it is the divine ideas that are related. Truth is
grounded "upon this necessity of Union and Connexion of Ideas in
certain Propositions" (67). Norris adapts Suarez' view that all
relations are accidental, hence require a subject. Nonetheless, Norris
argues that the eternal truths "are *Real*, and have an
existence out of, and independent upon the understanding" (70).
The eternal truths derive their reality from the "Simple
Essences of things" and these are the eternal divine ideas,
which stand in Suarezian accidental relations to one another (71).
Norris' fifth argument for the existence of divine ideas is that there
are objective sciences concerning universals, such as metaphysics and
geometry. These disciplines concern necessary knowledge, "to
speak more conformably to the School-language, in a knowledge acquired
by *Demonstration*" (128-129). Since all science
concerns the necessary and unchanging, science cannot be about
contingent things, but about universals. These universals are the
intelligible objects, or the divine ideas.



Norris' final and sixth argument for the existence of the intelligible
world derives from the existence of God. Indeed, Norris views his own
work as the culmination of the project begun by Plato. A proper
reading of the *Timaeus* will reveal Plato meant "the
*Exemplaria rerum in mente Divina* to be the Original Forms or
Patterns of things in the divine Understanding" rather than the
standard interpretation, which is that the creator consult and not be
the locus of abstract objects (139). If God has the ideas, then the
intelligible world exists because God exists. God has the ideas in an
eminent manner ('eminent' is discussed further below), and
these ideas are the objects of His thought. Relying upon the principle
that all knowledge is knowledge of something, Norris concludes that
the divine ideas are real objects in the mind of God. These ideas are
"really Coessential with and indistinct from the Essence of
God" (155) so when God considers ideas, God considers himself.
God considers himself adequately and inadequately,



> 
> Again when he knows himself absolutely Speaking, he considers himself
> *adequately*, but in the knowledge of Creatures, or rather of
> himself in relation to Creatures, he considers himself inadequately,
> according to those degrees of Being or Perfection wherein his Essence
> is imitable or participable by them. (167)
> 



He concludes his arguments for the existence of the intelligible world
by stating that the ideal world is better known than the natural world
because it is necessary, eternal and immutable. As Descartes had
argued, the senses are part of the natural world and are designed to
assist in preserving the union of soul and body, or to keep one alive,
not for delivering knowledge. The nature and existence of the
intelligible world is discovered by intellectual activity; the highest
degree of intellectual activity is the clear and distinct
perception.


### 2.2 God's Simplicity



When one clearly and distinctly cognizes the nature of God, one
perceives God as simple, immaterial and infinite. In traditional
Christian doctrine, these attributes are of paramount importance. Any
philosophical theory compromising them must be rejected. Norris
explains:



> 
> The Truth and Necessity of these Attributes is so Unquestionably
> certain in the Nature of that Glorious and Adorable Being which we
> call God, that there needs no other Evidence of the Falshood of any
> *Hypothesis* how rational soever and well adjusted it may
> otherwise appear, than the Repugnance which it shall be convinc'd to
> carry in it to all or any of these Attributes. And therefore it is
> necessary to acquit our Theory of Ideas from that Inconvenience which
> on this side it may seem to lie open to, and which alone would be
> sufficient utterly to Silence and Overthrow it. And since it is
> *Necessary*, 'tis no little Satisfaction to me to find it
> so *Feasible*. (*Theory I* 293)
> 



Some critics, including Arnauld, had charged Malebranche with
Spinozism because he claimed God has the idea of intelligible
extension. Such critics reasoned that the only way for God to contain
extension is for God to be extended. Norris reconciles God's
possession of intelligible extension with the immateriality of God by
using the notion of eminent containment. There are two ways a thing
can be contained in another, formally or eminently. Norris notes
formal and eminent containment are usually discussed in the context of
causation. Generally, formal containment explains cause and effect
sequences amongst similar causes and effects. For example, the cause
of a child's fear might be the recollection of a frightening image.
The child's fear is formally contained in the recollection. Eminent
containment explains dissimilar causes and effects. When an architect
designs a building, and several months later the architect's vision is
realized in a physical structure, that physical structure was
eminently contained, or contained in a higher manner, in the mind of
the architect. All human actions, as long as they are planned, are
eminently contained in the human mind. Analogously, Norris states God
eminently contains extension as a divine idea just as the architect
eminently contains the building. Intelligible extension, then, is a
divine idea. Norris believes that the ideal philosophy can settle the
meaning of 'eminent containment', and thus settle the
dispute about intelligible extension. This view is found in
"*POSTSCRIPT, Concerning the Distinction of* Formaliter
*and* Eminenter, *as applied to the manner of the Perfection
of Things being in God*," appended to *Theory I*.



Norris derives the "divine ideality," or the divine ideas,
from the infinitude of God, and he derives God's infinity from the
divine ideas (Norris argues this is non-circular as we shall see
below):



> 
> And as his Ideality may be Demonstratively proved from his Infinity so
> his Infinity may be very Rationally collected from his Ideality, it
> being not Conceivable that any Being that is not Infinite in Being,
> should be *Omniform*, or have the Ideal Reasons of all things
> in himself. (297)
> 



One objection Norris raises concerns how the infinite can represent
the finite. His answer again relies upon the thought of Suarez, whom
Norris reread carefully before writing his *Theories I* and
*II*. Suarez had distinguished two ways of being finite. An
item can be finite according to its "*esse
formale*" or its "*esse reale*" (300). If
a thing is positively finite, it is limited in such a way that can
never be infinite. If a thing is negatively finite, it is finite
"though there be no repugnance in its having it [infinitude]
from elsewhere" (301-302, brackets added). A divine idea,
according to its *esse formale* is negatively finite whereas
according to its *esse reale* is infinite. Norris believes
"Ideas are really Identical with the Divine Nature, and so
partake of the same real Infinity and Incomprehensibility that
essentially belongs to it" (302). If each idea is identical to
God, then each idea is really infinite, and negatively finite. A
further consequence is that an idea can be called both infinite and
finite without contradiction. Norris also notes there is no
multiplication of infinities in God on his view. Here Norris diverges
from Malebranche's view as stated in the second dialogue of
*Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion* that God is
"infinitely infinite," which strikes the reader as
comparable to Spinoza's infinite attributes.



One might wonder how God's ideality could be proven from his infinity
and his infinity from his ideality because such an argument appears
circular. Norris explains why this need not concern us:



> 
> But now there is no more absurdity in proving the same by the same, if
> by the same be meant only really, not formally the same, than in
> proving one attribute of God by another, as his eternity, suppose,
> from the necessity or immutability of his being, which though really
> the same, yet being of a distinct formality, are allowed in all
> rational discourses about them to be considered and used as if really
> distinct, as to any consequence from one to the other. (406-407)
> 



Indeed, Norris proves the existence of God from the nature of truth,
which is another divine attribute. (See *A Metaphysical Essay*
193-207 in *Miscellanies*.) Norris also proves the many
attributes of God beginning with God's attribute of necessary
existence, revealed in His proclamation to Moses that He is "I
Am." In *Reason and Religion* Norris interprets this
proclamation as Being. These various demonstrations proceed by proving
"the same by the same" since any and all attributes are
"really the same" with one another, the attributes are
identical to God.



These arguments preserve the divine attribute of simplicity. If God is
simple, then proofs utilizing different attributes must be proofs that
utilize the same subject. The diversity of the attributes are
explained as various ways of cognizing the same divine essence:



> 
> ... this Divine Essence which in itself is one and the same
> general Perfection, does exert and display it self variously in its
> Operations, by reason of the Diversity of Objects, the Attributes of
> God are by us conceiv'd distinctly. Not that they are so in respect of
> God, with whom they are really one and the same, and consequently so
> also among themselves, but only with respect to our manner of
> conception. (*Reason and Religion* 33-34)
> 



Norris proceeds to explain how an attribute such as omnipotence can be
accounted for because it is "displayed according to the
diversity of objects" and "Modes of operation" (34).
In the mode of creating, God is the omnipotent Creator. The relevant
object here is all of creation. In the mode of legislator, God is the
Supreme Lawgiver, and the relevant object is the moral realm. The
diverse ways of considering the natural world are also the many ways
we can conceive of God's attributes. In the end, humanity has partial,
imperfect views of God according to his operations. A lesser being,
such as a human, can also be known under many operations. One might be
a parent, spouse, writer and teacher. But that person is defined in
those roles because of the objects that these titles refer to; in the
case of the teacher, the person is a teacher only with respect to the
students taught. One is a parent only with respect to the role played
towards offspring, but the person is "really one and the
same." Just as we might come to know an individual better and
better as we come to know more of the person's roles, so we come to
know God better by conceiving of his many attributes. Norris believes
that all attributes are one in God, differently conceived according to
the roles played and objects considered.



Furthermore, Norris reduces the eternal truths, which are the
accidental relations amongst the divine ideas to the ideas themselves,
and then reduces the ideas to God:



> 
> The Divine Ideas are really the same with the Divine Essence. But
> Eternal Truths are really the same with the Divine Ideas. Therefore
> Eternal Truths are really the same with the Divine Essence.
> (*Theory I* 332-333)
> 



So it is odd that, after laying out these arguments for the simplicity
of God, Norris states that the flaw in Descartes' account of
voluntarism is that Descartes had attributed to the divine will what
belongs to another attribute of God - the divine ideality. If
the attributes are all one, it is difficult to argue for a priority
amongst attributes. Nonetheless, Norris argues that Descartes was
correct to claim truth must depend on God alone, but incorrectly
believed God arbitrarily creates the eternal truth, for this renders
truth as mutable as any other creature. What Descartes missed,
according to Norris, was the distinction between God as
*intelligible*, or exhibitive, and God as *intelligent*,
or conceptive (*Miscellanies* 440, *Theory I*
357-358). To understand God as conceptive is to understand God
as a thinker, who reflects upon his own ideas. To understand God as
exhibitive is to understand God *qua* divine ideas. The
complexity arising from including ideas in the divine mind is a
further difficulty for divine simplicity. In the end, if Norris is to
be read as consistent, he must claim that the divine ideality is
another attribute of God. Norris might have taken Malebranche's lead,
who wrote, concerning divine simplicity, "I long stopped
worrying about problems that are beyond me" (qtd. in Schmaltz
2000 62). But it is noteworthy that Norris did not; concerning the
topic of divine simplicity, Norris advances the work of his
predecessors, in particular the work of Malebranche. In a passage
reminiscent of Thomistic analogical predication, Norris suggests that
God as *intelligent*, or as engaging in thought, must be
radically different from our experiences of cogitation:



> 
> And herein (if I rightly consider what is before me) the conduct of
> the infinitely wise God differs from that of men. They first form
> their design, and then deliberate about the means whereby they may
> accomplish it. And this makes men (who in all things are apt to
> measure God by themselves, though he himself tells us that his ways
> are not as our ways) inclinable to think that God does so too, that he
> first projects, and then consults his wisdom how to execute. This
> indeed is our way, but this cannot be God's way, because 'tis
> not the wisest way. (*Theory I* 44)
> 



The extent of humanity's knowledge of the essence of God is a problem
that has preoccupied many thinkers in the history of Western
philosophy. Unlike other areas of inquiry, questions concerning the
nature of God, even if they are unanswerable now, receive answers in
the next life. Although Norris believes that we can answer many
important questions about the divine essence, our view of the
intelligible world is dim indeed. He concedes that certain mysteries
are temporarily beyond our ken. Norris would agree with what Descartes
wrote in his *First Replies*:



> 
> Moreover, God cannot be distinctly known by those who look from a
> distance, as it were, and try to make their minds encompass his
> entirety all at once. This is the sense in which St. Thomas
> says...that the knowledge of God is within us 'in a
> somewhat confused manner'. But those who try to attend to God's
> individual perfections and try not so much to take hold of them as to
> surrender to them, using all the strength of their intellect to
> contemplate them, will certainly find that God provides much more
> ample and straightforward subject-matter for clear and distinct
> knowledge than does any created thing. (*Philosophical
> Writings*, 81-82)
> 



Humanity does have some reliable knowledge about some subject-matter,
and Norris offers an account of this partial enlightenment. Norris
believes, for example, that we know enough to clearly and distinctly:
1. Accept Descartes' real distinction proof and 2. Refute Locke's
thinking matter hypothesis.


## 3. Human Knowledge and Creation


### 3.1 The Structure and Content of Human Thought



Questions about the form and content of human thought occupied the
philosophers of the early modern period. One helpful way to draw the
line between the empiricists and the rationalists of this time period
is along issues concerning human cognition. Norris believes the object
of thought is always God and the structure of thought facilitates
objective, indubitable knowledge. For these reasons, he belongs
squarely in the rationalist camp.



Norris espouses a Cartesian theory of human thought, which he
delineates in *Theory II* and *Reason and Religion*.
Norris says that all thought exhibits a certain structure -
formal thought, which is the act of thinking, and objective thought,
which is the object of the thinking. Like Descartes, Norris claims all
thought is about some thing. Formal thought is always the same,
whether we are perceiving or "willing, desiring, loving, hating,
hoping, fearing...even *sensation* it self"
(*Theory II* 109). Thoughts differ based upon content. Like
Malebranche and unlike Descartes, the object of thought is always God,
and "'tis the diversity of this Ideal Object that makes all the
diversity and distinction that is to be found in our Thought, whether
Natural or Moral" (113). God's omniform essence is always the
content of perception, intellection and passion. Indeed, all knowledge
is always of God *qua* divine ideas. When perceiving the ideas,
we are viewing "the very same Divine Nature it self, as
'tis variously imitable or Participable *ad extra*,
according to such or such intelligible Degrees of Being or
Perfection" (*Theory I* 294). Hence, the sole object of
our perceptions, both intellectual and sensory, is God. When humans
think, we think and conduct proofs in mental propositions, but "
to Speak exactly 'tis not the mental Proposition that it [our
thought] *demonstrates*, but 'tis the mental Proposition
that demonstrates the real. The former belonging to the Act, as the
latter does to the Object of Science" (311, brackets added). Our
thoughts are always about the ideal propositions, constituted by the
divine ideas as they are related to one another.



When we think in propositions, we usually think directly; direct
thinking is everyday cognition such as knowing to proceed at green
lights or knowing dentists' chairs are frightening. All humanity
thinks directly, or in these ordinary ways, but some persons engage in
reflexive thought, or about the mind itself and its contents. In
reflexive thought, there is a return of the mind onto itself, or an
attending to the contents of the mind; such reflexive thoughts are
more attentive perceptions of the divine ideas, and these thoughts are
contemplations of the eternal truths. Norris states along with Locke
(*Essay* 4.3.2) that knowledge is perceiving "those
Relations of agreement or disagreement that are between Ideas, which
whoever clearly and rightly perceives, is truly said to
*know*" (*Theory II* 147-148). Knowledge of
the eternal truths, of course, is the highest grade of knowledge, or
*scientia*. By engaging in reflexive thought, we can align our
mental propositions with the ideal ones. The ultimate intellectual
goal is this alignment of our thought with the eternal truths.



Norris adopts the Malebranchean doctrine of Vision in God, which
states that all intellectual and sensory perception is perception of
God. Norris significantly augments neither Malebranche's account nor
argument for Vision in God with respect to sensory perception. Norris
limits himself to reproducing Malebranche's eliminative argument from
the *Search after Truth* for why our sensory perception must be
of ideas in God. The eliminative argument is found in chapters VII
through XI in *Theory II*. Yet Norris does offer a more
detailed account of abstract thought (which is an intellectual
perception of God) than does Malebranche. Norris meticulously conveys
how we come to have knowledge of the essences of created things. God
is revealed through degrees of being (i.e. divine ideas), such as the
degrees of being exhibited by bodies and minds, and we can come to
know their essences by attending carefully to our perceptions of
divine ideas. Careful attention requires thinking abstractly for
Norris, and Norris offers us a definition of abstraction:



> 
> So that in short, Abstraction, as 'tis a logical Affection of
> Thought, is the considering one thing without another, not
> *absolutely*, but in things that are not really one without the
> other, nor yet really deniable one of the other. For Abstraction is,
> as it were, the drawing away of a thing from it self. But where things
> are really separate or distinct, the considering them apart is not
> *Abstraction*, but only mere divided Consideration. (*Theory
> II* 174)
> 



Abstraction serves to make the intellect's "View of things more
clear and distinct. As Spectacles, tho' in him that uses them they
argue weakness of Sight, yet when used they do very much assist the
Act of Vision" (176-177). Abstraction is the key to
understanding how we come to know about minds and bodies. When
considering the ideas of body, we understand that



> 
> ...one and the same Substance, may have different Modes or Manners of
> being in *itself*, As the same Body may have Motion and Figure,
> or else different Figures...For tho' there be a real Identity
> between Modes and the thing modefied, yet as Figure suppose may be
> consider'd without Body, so Body may be consider'd without its Figure,
> or sometimes as having this Figure, sometimes as having that, just as
> it is in *Dimensions*. (22)
> 



This sort of abstraction Norris calls "modal abstraction."
Since we cannot imagine a body without some shape and some dimensions,
shape and dimensions are determinables, or modes, of extension. Shape
is not an independently existing thing, but is always a modification
of an independently existing thing. Since Norris holds that our clear
and distinct mental propositions track ideal propositions, we can
conclude that shape and dimensions are not substances, but modes.
Modal abstraction turns out to underscore Norris' rehearsal of real
distinction. His account is noteworthy because it offers an
alternative understanding of the real distinction proof. When we are
certain that the two items under consideration are not distinct by
modal abstraction, we can be sure the two items are really
distinct.


### 3.2 Cartesian Real Distinction and Lockean Thinking Matter



Another question preoccupying the early moderns concerned the
constitution of the human being. Is the human being a union of an
immortal soul and a mortal body? Or is the human being a mere body
with mentality somehow added? Descartes, in connection with the
version of the real distinction proof in the *Sixth
Meditation*, argues that we can know clearly and distinctly that a
human being is a union of two really distinct substances, a soul and a
body. Locke, at 4.3.6 of the *Essay*, states we might be bodies
with thought superadded. Norris perceives Locke's hypothesis as
contradicting Cartesian real distinction, so he reestablishes real
distinction in his *Theory II*. His reconstruction of
Descartes' proof begins with the realization that the distinction
between the mind and body is not at all like the distinction between
the body and shape:



> 
> And therefore from my being able to conceive a Thinking Being to be,
> tho' I should suppose extended Being not be, I conclude that the Ideas
> of these things are distinct not by modal Abstraction, as figured
> Substance and moveable substance, but really and intirely distinct
> from one another, and independent one upon another, and that because
> things whenever they are must be according to their Ideas.
> (29-30)
> 



The fact that we can clearly and distinctly conceive of the body
existing without the mind and vice versa entails that the body is
really distinct from the mind. Ontological relationships are reflected
in human thought when we are thinking clearly and distinctly, and if a
modal abstraction is present, we can be certain that the items under
consideration are the modes of a substance. On the other hand, when
one thing can be thought while considering the other as not existing,
the things are not modes after all, but really distinct substances.
Otherwise, there is no criterion of intelligibility, and for Norris
"all Truth is intelligible" (30). If we do not accept the
standard of clarity and distinctness, no standard for human judgment
remains.



In *Cursory Reflections*, Norris presses Locke about the nature
of an idea. Locke's account of ideas as originating in sensation and
reflection found at 2.1 of the  *Essay* is met by Norris with:
"These indeed are pretty *Smiling* Sentences. But before
we go a step further I would willingly know of the Author what kind of
things these Ideas are which are thus let in at the Gate of the
Senses" (22). Norris infers that Lockean ideas must be either
mental substances or modifications, and then presents difficulties for
either option. For Norris, the foundation of intelligibility can never
have an empirical basis. The foundation must be the true nature of
ideas:



> 
> What else *need*, and what else *can* be the immediate
> Object of our Understanding but the Divine Ideas, the *Omniform
> Essence* of God? This will open to us a plain intelligible Account
> of *Human Understanding* ...Here I can tell what an Idea
> is, *viz*. the Omniform Essence of God partially represented or
> exhibited, and how it comes to be united with my Mind. But as far for
> all other ways, I look upon them as desperate. (*Cursory
> Reflections* 31)
> 



In addition to the defense of real distinction, Norris questions
Locke's suggestion that we might be thinking matter. Norris, along
with many of his contemporaries, questions the mechanisms by which
matter could be endowed with thought. Mary Astell, with whom Norris
corresponded, is as confounded when she wonders whether God "may
*according to the good Pleasure of His Omnipotency*, give it [a
triangle] a good *speaking*, a *walking*, or a
*dancing Faculty*, and make it able to Eat and Drink"
(*Christian Religion* 254-255, brackets added). Astell's
assumption here is shared by Norris; things are what they are
according to their essences, which are determined by God's ideas.
Extended bodies cannot reveal mental states through walking and
dancing, only minds are capable of initiating such acts. Norris
utilizes this assumption in one of his arguments against the thinking
matter hypothesis:



> 
> In other words, If a Thinking Being and an Extended Being be really
> one Idea, that is...if the very same Being be in Idea both
> Thinking and Extended, however by us considered sometimes under one
> Formality, and sometimes under another, then the Production of a
> Thinking Being would be also the Production of an Extended Being, and
> so they could not be produced apart. But we suppose them separately
> produceable, and thence think we have reason to conclude that their
> Ideas are completely and intirely distinct Ideas, and not the same
> Idea incompletely considered. (*Theory II* 36-37)
> 



Since bodies are sometimes separately produced from minds, God does
not create them from the same idea. Body and mind are created from
different ideas; they have separate essences.



Whereas Locke argues that the human being might, for all we know, be
matter with thought superadded, Norris claims in no uncertain terms
that the human being is a substantial union. However, Norris can only
argue for his claim within his ideal philosophy, which Locke rejects.
But the grounds for rejection spring from the very view of
'idea' Locke espouses; an idea is generated and formed by
sensation and reflection. This debate concerns, fundamentally, the
ontological status of ideas, and how far ideas can guarantee a
correspondence to reality external to thought. In this debate, the
reader can fully appreciate one main difference between Cartesian
rationalism and Lockean empiricism in late 17th Century
England. For Locke, propositions about ideas are themselves mere
mental propositions. As such, their certainty does not guarantee
truth. For Norris, clear and distinct mental propositions reflect
ideal propositions. Certainty about mental propositions does guarantee
truth.



Norris offers an important insight into how the real distinction proof
depends on abstractive processes. However, like Malebranche, Norris
claims that we have no access to God's idea of the mind. The mind's
existence is known only by inner consciousness, or sentiment. This
raises the same problems for Norris that Malebranche has defending the
proof. (See Nolan and Whipple 2005.) If humanity is ignorant about the
essence of the soul, then there can be no proof using the essence of
the soul as a premise; we cannot know if the proposition, 'The
mind is a substance', is true or false. At best, it is
indeterminate. So, whether Norris can fully defend the proof is
questionable. Nonetheless, Norris argues for the immortality of the
soul in *A Philosophical Discourse concerning the Natural
Immortality of the Soul* in response to a work published by Henry
Dodwell. Dodwell held that all souls are material, and only a few
souls are granted immortality. Norris, relying upon the essence of the
soul as immaterial, draws a distinction between the indissolvible and
the imperishable (33-34). The soul is naturally indissolvible
because it is indivisible, but it is not imperishable. If God ceased
his constant creation, all things would immediately cease to
exist.



Norris dedicates a chapter in *Theory II* to the topic of
animals. Descartes and Malebranche had held that animals are mere
machines. Norris agrees there are good reasons to believe that animals
are machines, but it is possible that they have souls because
"'tis easy to err in the Dark." Norris discourages
"any practices of Cruelty, upon the Bodies of these Creatures,
which the Lord of Creation has...subjected to our Power."
He advises us to treat animals "with as much tenderness and
pitiful regard, as if they had all that Sense and Perception, which is
commonly...attributed to them" (100).


## 4. Religious, Practical and Political Views



A recurring theme in Norris' writings is the importance of solitude
and meditation. Christianity, for Norris, was a highly personal
relationship with one's God. Being a good Christian involves the
opening of one's mind to a comprehension of God. "For Passion is
the great Contrariety to Reason, and will draw a cloud over the
brightest Mind. The quiet and sedate Soul is most fit for the
Contemplation of Truth, as the calmest Weather is commonly the most
serene" (*Two Treatises* in *Treatises upon Several
Subjects* 353).



One truth the meditative Christian comes to understand is that God is
love. Norris believes love is a natural tendency of the soul, and
analogizes love to motion in *The Theory and Regulation of
Love*. There he writes: "So that upon the whole to speak
more *explicitly* the most general and Comprehensive Notion of
Love will be found to be, *a motion of the Soul towards
God*" (12). Regarding the objects of love, one can love the
general, universal good, viz. God, or particular goods, which reflect
the goodness of God, "For God having unfolded his Perfections in
the Creation with almost infinite Variety, and as it were drawn out
himself into a numerous issue of *Secondary* goods, our Love
becomes also Multiplied" (12). Regarding the act of love, one
can love with benevolence or with desire. Concupiscence, or loving
with desire, is a general tendency towards good. Benevolent love is
willing a specific good for a person. Benevolent love is further
divided into self-love and other-love, which Norris also calls the
"love of charity." All concupiscence proceeds from
indigence so it is rooted in self-love, whereas love of charity does
not have to proceed from self-love. He explains why God is a
narcissistic God: "For as GOD is to himself his own good, his
own Center and Beatifick Object, so the Love of GOD can be no other
than Love of himself" (*Letters* 226). Since God wants
nothing, God cannot exhibit concupiscence, but only love of charity
for humanity. The correct object of our love is also God, especially
given the occasionalism thesis that God is the genuine cause of all
the secondary goods we might desire. It is only in God that one finds
full satisfaction of desire, "he is also the true final Cause of
the Will of Man; which I take to be nothing else but that continual
Impression whereby the Author of Nature moves him towards
himself" (227). It is important to keep in mind that God is
infinite love; echoing again the Thomistic theme running throughout
Norris' works, it is impossible to understand exactly how God
loves.



Contrary to this Thomistic theme, the Socinians believed all Christian
doctrine should be comprehensible. Socinianism was advanced in John
Toland's 1696 *Christianity not Mysterious*. Socinianism
rejected inexplicable Christian doctrine, such as the divinity of
Christ as man. Norris believed Socinianism to be a dangerous view
because it leads to either deism or atheism. This threatening
entailment led him to respond to the doctrine in *An Account of
Reason and Faith*, which he published in 1697. In the piece,
Norris defines some truths as above reason, such as the existence of
the Trinity. Other claims are blatantly "Contrary to Reason when
we do positively comprehend that it cannot be" (117); these
claims should be rejected. However, there are many claims we should
not reject so quickly:



> 
> You know very well that in the great Problem of the Divisibility of
> Quantity there are Incomprehensibilities on both sides, it being
> inconceivable that Quantity should, and it being also inconceivable
> that it should not be divided infinitely. And yet you know again that
> as being parts of a Contradiction one of them must necessarily be
> true. Possibly you may not be able with the utmost Certainty and
> without all hesitation to determine which that is, but however you
> know in the general that One of them, indeterminately, must be true.
> (322)
> 



Neither option presents itself as true, but Norris proceeds to ask the
Socinian if he would accept it as an article of faith if God were to
reveal the correct option. Human ignorance does not entail falsity.
Moreover, human ignorance does not entail divine ignorance just as a
neophyte mathematician's inability to demonstrate "*the
Diameter of a Square is incommensurable to the Side*" does
not entail the lack of a demonstration (321). Norris concludes that
the Socinians improperly hold the human intellect to be the standard
for truth. Truth is understood and determined by God, who possesses an
infinite intellect. The fact that the Trinity is incomprehensible does
not warrant its rejection:



> 
> You have our leave to suppose it as incomprehensible as you please.
> But then you are to Consider...that this is a Revelation of God
> concerning *Himself*, and do you pretend to Comprehend the
> Nature and Essence of God? If you do, then your Understanding is as
> infinite as the Divine. But if you do not, then the
> incomprehensibility of this Mysterious Article ought to be no
> Objection with you against the Belief of it, since if it be, you must
> be driven to say that you Comprehend the Nature of God, which I hope
> you have too much Religion as well as Reason to affirm.
> (324-325)
> 



Reason is reliable, but limited. The Socinians have gone too far in
their support of reason. On the other hand, Norris believes that the
Quakers have gone too far in the other direction.



Norris was familiar with Roger Barclay and George Keith's expositions
of Quakerism, and argued against the view in *Reflections upon the
Conduct of Human Life*. The Quakers had an affinity for the ideal
philosophy because they believed the divine light that enlightens the
human mind supported their view. Norris delineates the many
differences between Quaker thought and his own, but perhaps the main
difference is: "The Quakers represent this light within as a
sort of *Extraordinary Inspiration* (whence they have the name
of *Enthusiasts*) whereas I suppose it to be a Man's
*Natural* and *Ordinary* way of Understanding"
(*Two Treatises* 365). Also, Norris identifies their
inspiration as limited to moral and spiritual truths. Norris also
concludes that the Quakers render the divine light a creature because
it cannot be God on the Quakers' view. God and creatures are the only
two possibilities for existing things, hence, the divine light of the
Quakers is a creature. Also, the divine light must be considered
material since it is described as a "*Vehiculum
Dei*" and it is "divisible into Measures and
Portions" (437). These attributes cannot be maintained;
divisibility and motion cannot "with any tolerable Congruity
agree to a Spiritual Substance, strictly so call'd" (438).
Finally, Norris argues that the Quakers' divine light is contingent
because it is a creature, so it cannot convey necessary and eternal
truths; only an infinite being can be the source of the eternal truths
(453-454). The proper way to live a good Christian life, morally
and intellectually, is to engage one's intellect, "the greatest
advantage of thinking is yet behind, that it improves our Morals as
well as our Intellectuals; and serves to make us Better, as well as
Wiser" (*Miscellanies* 151). The Quakers, by emphasizing
the passions, takes the Christian far from the intelligible world.



Norris also believed that the Quakers were guilty of the sin of
schism. Certain nonconformist Christian groups were exempted from
prosecution by the Toleration Act of 1689, and the Quakers were
amongst these. Norris firmly believed that schism from the Anglican
Church was a sin, and believed the Toleration Act merely removed the
earthly punishment. In *The Charge of Schism Continued*, Norris
cites *Ephesians* 4.3-6, and emphasizes St. Paul's words
to the Ephesians to preserve unity. God commands unity, and schism is
a sin where there is an established Church. Norris divides a law into
a preceptive and a punitive element. The basis of the punishment is
the rationale of a law, or the preceptive aspect of a law. The
Toleration Act merely removes the punitive aspect, leaving the
rationale of the law, which is God's commandment. Furthermore, the
justification of all human law lies in divine law, "If it be
further askt, whence has the Law-giver his Authority? I answer, if he
be a Creature, he has it from God, whom I suppose to be the sole
Fountain of all Power. But if the Law-giver be God, he has it
Originally and Independently in himself" (*The Charge*
312). Norris held the Toleration Act to be a violation of divine
law.



Other than his writings on toleration, his sole other published
political work is *A Murnival of Knaves* issued in 1683 against
the Parliamentarians. Norris was a Royalist, but he was not much
engaged in the volatile politics of his day. A poem in his
*Miscellanies* reveals his attitude towards politics:



> 
> NO, I shan't envy him whoe'er he be
>   
> 
> That stand upon the *Battlements* of State,
>   
> 
> Stand there who will for me,
>   
> 
> I'd rather be *secure* than *great*.
>   
> 
> Of being so *high* the *pleasure* is but *small*,
>   
> 
> But *long the Ruine* if I chance to *fall*. (29)
> 



The ruination of one's soul for the chance to achieve temporary
greatness runs against Norris' basic convictions, the foremost of
which was a life dedicated to the service of God focused upon the
afterlife. This dearth of political writings reveals a philosopher who
engaged in intellectual activity because it reveals an orderly
universe governed by the Christian God. Humility is also an important
virtue for the Christian, as Norris explains in *A Practical
Treatise concerning Humility* published in 1707. In Creation,
humanity has a humble role to play - to love and serve God.
Political and intellectual endeavors are tools to achieve that end.
All human thought and institutions should be utilized to serve God's
purposes. This theme is also reflected in Norris' 1705 *The
Distinction between High Church and Low Church, distinctly considered
and fairly treated*.


## 5. Concluding Notes



Norris integrates the thought of his predecessors--Descartes,
Malebranche, Suarez, Augustine, Aquinas and Plato--in a manner
centering on the Christian God. God is truth, love and the aim of all
religious and practical life. Norris' ambition of completing
Malebranche's project is reflected in his arguments to establish the
existence of the divine ideas and their locus in the mind of God, or
the intelligible world. His detailed discussion of the eternal truths
is a further expansion upon Malebranche's philosophy. The defense of
Descartes' real distinction proof is enlightening because it renders
transparent the assumption of abstractive knowledge that might have
aided contemporary readers' understanding of the proof. If Norris did
not venture further into the philosophical, political and scientific
debates of his own time, the explanation lies in his advice to never
study out of vanity. Worldly knowledge, such as knowledge of history
or languages, is a waste of one's time. Norris was dedicated to the
cause of knowledge for Christianity's sake, and he saw his own work,
as well as his predecessors', as attempting to realize fully knowledge
of the Pauline Doctrine, stated at *Acts* 17:28, that in God
"we live, move and have our being."