## 1. The Person and his Work



To date there is no reliable information on Petrizi's dates and
biography. According to older Georgian research, he lived in the
second half of the 11th century and the first half of the
12th century. More recent research, however, tends to date
him to the second half of the 12th century. The state of
research is aggravated by the lack of information on Petrizi. The
little personal information that is known about him stems from remarks
scattered through his works in which Petrizi briefly speaks about
himself. In his Proclus commentary--the *Interpretation of the
Elementatio theologica of Proclus*--and in the
*Postscript*, which is traditionally ascribed to him, the
author mentions his own cares and problems.



According to authoritative reports, Petrizi translated Nemesius of
Emesa's work *On the Nature of Man* into Georgian
(Petrizi, *Opera II*, p. 223). According to these accounts,
Petrizi encountered numerous difficulties and obstacles put in his way
by both Greeks and Georgians because of his work. Based on the current
state of research on his work and on his biography, together with a
detailed study of his Proclus Commentary, Petrizi can be characterized
as a 12th-century thinker. The character of Georgian
thought in the 12th century is manifested in his style of
philosophizing and in his manner of presenting arguments, in his
knowledge of ancient philosophy and in his intellectual interest in
maintaining ancient thought in its rightful place.



Petrizi names the philosophers whom he treated in his
*Interpretation*: Orpheus, Parmenides, Zeno, Plato, Aristotle,
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry and the Fathers of the Church
(Petrizi, *Opera I*, pp. XXVI-LII; Alexidse 1997). He
held Platonic philosophy in particularly high esteem. Its
representatives included in his view both Plato's predecessors
(Orpheus, Pythagoras, etc.) and the neo-Platonists. He calls Plato
'the philosopher of the day' (Petrizi, *Opera I*,
p. XXVII). When Petrizi speaks of the 'philosopher', he
means Proclus. By contrast, in the Latin middle ages, the designation
*philosophus* was reserved for Aristotle.



Among Plato's works, Petrizi refers to the dialogues
*Parmenides*, the *Laws, Phaedrus, Phaedo* and
*Timaeus.* Although he does not mention them, he also quotes
*Theaetetus* and the *Symposium* (Petrizi, *Opera
II*, pp. 34, 84). Petrizi also mentions various works of
Aristotle's, but not the pseudo-Aristotelian works used by
Scholastic philosophers (Iremadze 2004a, 57). It can be gathered from
his *Interpretation* that in addition to the *Elementatio
theologica* he also knew other works by Proclus (for example the
*Parmenides* and *Timaeus* commentaries as well as the
*Platonic Theology*) and drew on them as he saw fit in
commenting on the *Elementatio theologica* (Iremadze 2004a,
57).


## 2. Philosophy



Petrizi's commentary on Proclus's *Elementatio
theologica* consists of a Preface (Introduction) and the
commentaries to each chapter of this work. In Sh. Nutsubidze and S.
Kaukhchishvili's edition of Petrizi's *Proclus
Commentary*, these commentaries are followed by an epilogue.



In his Introduction to the *Elementatio theologica*, Joane
Petrizi reflects on the sense (the *intentio)* of this book,
and sees it in the proof of 'the much discussed One'
(Petrizi, *Commentaries*, p. 149). Then he briefly treats the
peculiarity of the One, which in his opinion is not identical with any
being. The pure and genuine One must be examined and proved in
accordance with the rules of syllogisms (Petrizi, *Opera II*,
p. 3). According to Petrizi's exegesis, this One is the crucial
concept in the overall process of grounding knowledge. If this
principle is not provable, there are no incontrovertible propositions
and the goal of gnoseology will not be reached. The One is the
principle that makes knowledge possible.



In the first chapter of his *Elementatio theologica*, Proclus
treated the One as the origin of all modes of multiplicity. Petrizi
follows this in his commentary to this proposition, presenting the
arguments for Proclus's approach in his own way. Petrizi adheres
primarily to the basic axiom that the chain of beings requires an
origin. Otherwise the universe would have its origin in an Other,
which for its part would have to be the One inasmuch as the first
principle (= the One) should comprise all entities of the cosmos
without exception. The One as the cause and origin of being as such is
deemed to be the better, and takes on no qualities from what it
causes. This One alone confers selfness to all other entities because,
as the generator and principle of everything that follows it, it is in
need of nothing.



The essential features of the One (goodness, unity) are visible in
each creature. If the one were of the same value as the rest of being,
then cosmic harmony and its order would fail; furthermore, it would
not be possible to distinguish between the *first* and the
*last* in the series (Petrizi, *Opera* II, prop. 1, p.
13). The universe would thus have no *first* and no
*last* reference point, no origin and no unities following it.
It is precisely on the impossibility of such an assumption that
Petrizi's ontological reflections were based. In Petrizi's
view, the One is identical with the Good. All Being presupposes the
first Good because all creatures of nature participate in this good
and only possess good qualities by virtue of their participation.
Being is not by its own nature the Good, but becomes a Good
subsequently, by participation in the One. Therefore, in
Petrizi's view a distinction must be made between the *Good
in itself* and good entities inasmuch as the former is above all
nature and is a pure good in itself. Therefore, it is also the goal of
all Being, which constantly strives for it inasmuch as each caused
thing reverts to the cause (Petrizi, *Opera II*, prop. 8, p.
33).



The Good is the archetype of Being as such, which, as its image, also
derives its status in the cosmos through participation in the Good.
This is so because of the identity of the Good with the One. Because
all entities only appear by virtue of participation in the One, and
because the One, taken in itself, is a pure Good, the Good is also
deemed to be the ultimate source and the super-simple reference point
of the universe. To characterize the Good, Petrizi adduces and uses
principles from Plato's *Phaedrus*, treating the various
degrees of goodness. The first Good heads the Good, and thereafter
follow the various levels of goodnesses. The good is also deemed to be
the principle of order and structuring of Being. That which is first
to be linked to it has traces of the *Good in itself*, and the
first monads also have such a nature. It is precisely in these first
entities that Beauty and the Good are found (Petrizi, *Opera
II*, prop. 8, p. 34).



In his *Proclus Commentary*, Joane Petrizi analyses the
dialectic hidden in the 'cause' and the
'caused' more thoroughly and in more detail than does
Proclus himself in the corresponding chapters of his *Elementatio
theologica*. In Petrizi's exegesis, the abstract,
mathematical style of this work is augmented in content with a wealth
of material. Petrizi operates very often with visually illustrative
examples, and is careful to illuminate the theorems set forth in the
*Elementatio theologica* by means of human experience. This
resulted from the goals of his *Interpretation*. It primarily
addressed a broad public and served the study of this significant work
from Greek antiquity.



Petrizi treats the problem of the cause and the caused from various
perspectives, for the treatment of this topic proved to be of
fundamental importance for the logical structure of his philosophical
project. In Proposition 30, he treats the traditional view of the
dialectic of causality in detail, examining the etymological meanings
of the terms characteristically used in Greek for this relationship
(Petrizi, *Opera II*, prop. 30, pp. 79-81). The dialectic
of causality becomes manifest in the process of the descent from the
One to the Many and the ascent from the Many to the One. The cause is
the phase within the entirety of emanation that generates, that which
thus has priority both in ontological and in axiological terms
vis-a-vis the caused inasmuch as in the neo-Platonic system of
generation the generator is better than the generated.



With regard to the problem of causality, Petrizi applied the criticism
of the Peripatetic doctrine of principles in critical discussion of
the Aristotelian concept of causes. In the realm of theoretical
philosophy, the system of four causes proved to be inadequate and
flawed. In this context, it seemed to Petrizi to be necessary to work
out a new conception of causality. He studied Proclus's
philosophy on the basis of Greek sources, and regarded it as
appropriate to his research goals to adopt the existing structure of
the system of causes. In this point, he worked in the same way as
Byzantine philosophers of the time such as Psellos and Italos, who
recognized the priority of Platonic philosophy on this issue.



In Proposition 75 of his commentary, Petrizi distinguishes five
different modes of *causa*, characterizing them *in
nuce.* He adds a fifth kind of *causa* to the traditional
system of causes. In addition to the material, formal, final and
efficient causes he conceives a creative cause (Petrizi, *Opera
II*, prop. 75, p. 136). It was, he claims, neglected in the
Aristotelians' theoretical work, who, in contrast to Proclus,
had underestimated the relevance of the creative cause. This applies
both to Aristotle and to his interpreters, above all Alexander of
Aphrodisias, whom Petrizi criticizes in this connection (Petrizi,
*Opera II*, prop. 11, p. 38).



One of the most important aspects of Petrizi's philosophy is his
epistemology. It has only recently been reconstructed and
systematically researched in the light of the medieval discussion of
the essence of thought (cf. Iremadze 2004a, 161-241). In his
epistemology, Petrizi emphasizes the productive power of (human)
reason, which is capable of the real positing of being as such and is
thus a determinative principle of being.


## 3. Historical Reception and Influence



Joane Petrizi is the most widely read Georgian philosopher.
Petrizi's *Proclus Commentary* with his Georgian
translation of the *Elementatio theologica* had a major
influence not only on Georgian philosophy and culture, but also
outside of Georgia. In 1248, the Armenian monk Svimeon translated
Petrizi's Proclus work into Armenian, thus contributing to the
dissemination of the philosophy of Proclus there. In the
17th century, Armenian philosophers devoted intensive work
to Proclus's thought, to which they attributed contemporary
relevance; in 1651, the Armenian bishop Svimeon Dshughaezi wrote
commentaries to facilitate the understanding of the *Elementatio
theologica*. The basis for his commentary was the
13th-century Armenian translation by the monk Svimeon of
Petrizi's Georgian translation.



In 1757, these commentaries, together with the Armenian version of the
*Elementatio theologica*, were translated into Georgian; they
have made a clear mark on Georgian culture. Thus, in the
18th century there were at least two different commentaries
on the *Elementatio theologica* in Georgian.



It must be emphasized that the thinkers of the Georgian Enlightenment
in the 17th and 18th centuries reacted to these
traditions in diverse ways. Some trenchantly criticized the Armenian
version with reference to its contents (see below on Anton
Bagrationi). But one point is certain: in the modern era in Georgia,
Proclus's philosophy was the subject of intensive consideration
and interest by virtue of Petrizi's works.



Let us here have a look at three important stages of the Georgian
reception of Proclus and Petrizi.



(1) Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani (1658-1726) integrates numerous
theorems from Petrizi's Proclus work into his *Georgian
Dictionary*. In the definition and discussion of the problem of
knowledge, he refers to the 20th proposition of the
*Interpretation* and determines reason as the simple, bodiless
knowledge of the known (Orbeliani, vol. I, p. 166, col. 1-2).
Other important philosophical definitions--for example the
determination of real being (Orbeliani, vol. I, p. 574, col. 1), of
production (Orbeliani, vol. II, p. 366, col. 2; p. 367, col. 1), of
causality (Orbeliani, vol. I, p. 480, col. 1-2), of motion
(Orbeliani, vol. I, p. 479, col. 2)--are taken from
Petrizi's *Proclus Commentary*. In his *Georgian
Dictionary*, Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani made equally intensive
reference to Petrizi's Georgian translation of the work *On
the Nature of Man* by Nemesius of Emesa.



(2) In his philosophical work *Spekali* (1752), the philosopher
and theologian Anton Bagrationi (1720-1788) refers to
Petrizi's *Interpretation*, adopting numerous theorems of
neo-Platonic origin from him. Anton Bagrationi took some chapters
devoted to Proclus's problem of knowledge almost verbatim from
Petrizi's work (Anton I., *Spekali*, pp.
327-331).



The last chapters of *Spekali* are devoted to Petrizi. In
chapters 148 and 149, Anton Bagrationi treats the topic of knowledge
on the basis of the propositions on *nous* in the
*Interpretation*. Following Petrizi, it is here claimed that
*reasoned* knowledge is different from the soul's mode of
knowledge. In its essence, the activity and the substance of reason
are a unity, whereas the nature of the *soul* shows itself to
be differentiated. The essence and the activity of the soul can be
distinguished inasmuch as knowledge is not the *primary*
quality of the soul. In its knowledge, the soul proceeds from one
being to another, that is, the acquired insights are deemed to be the
bases for the progress of knowledge. The knowledge of *reason*
has to be characterized differently, for its activity is grounded in
*eternal* knowing and can be seen as nothing other than this
activity. At this point it must be remarked that Anton Bagrationi made
intensive use of the *noetic* terminology of Petrizi's
*Proclus Commentary* to characterize his concept of knowledge.
His significant philosophical determinations of noetics were worked
out exclusively with reference to Petrizi.



Anton Bagrationi was trenchantly critical of the Armenian version of
the *Elementatio theologica* inasmuch as it did not represent
Proclus's or Petrizi's genuine doctrine. In his work
*Theology*, of which a critical edition has not yet been
published, he claims that true metaphysics was there combined with
false theories and thus disfigured. In his opinion, the old version
(that is, Petrizi's version) of the *Elementatio
theologica* should be studied rather than the new (Armenian)
version. Admittedly, he sided with Petrizi in this point:
Petrizi's interpretation of Proclus's philosophy should be
accepted rather than its arbitrary transformation by modern Armenian
and Georgian interpreters.



(3) In contrast to Anton Bagrationi, Joane Bagrationi
(1768-1830) mainly relied on the Armenian commentaries on the
*Elementatio theologica* in his main work, *Kalmasoba*,
which is written in dialogue form. In the determination of the One and
its dialectics, he quotes the first chapters of Proclus's work.
Furthermore, the chapters on *nous* (for example prop. 20) are
given adequate consideration in *Kalmasoba*. In this work,
Joane Bagrationi does not comment on all the chapters of the
*Elementatio theologica*; a total of 86 chapters were commented
on. It is remarkable that the author interprets or transforms some
passages of Proclus's and Petrizi's work in an original
manner; in the discussion of the problem of cause, he begins by
distinguishing three main kinds--God, nature and skill--and
emphasizes God's superiority to all other causes. Joane
Bagrationi made use of Svimeon Dshughaezi's commentaries,
attempting to interpret Proclus and Petrizi with their help.
Furthermore, Joane Bagrationi brought clarity to the noetics of the
*Elementatio theologica*, characterizing the various kinds and
functions of knowledge and designating the knowing soul as specific to
man.



Although Joane Petrizi's work received increasing attention in
the course of time and Georgian thinkers always emphasized his
intellectual heritage, a thorough-going scholarly treatment of
Petrizi's works only really began in the 20th
century. Without a doubt, the most important stage in Petrizi research
is represented by the publication of a scholarly edition of
Petrizi's philosophical works. The edition began in 1937 with
the publication of the second volume of Petrizi's Proclus
work--the *Intertpretation of the "Elementatio
theologica" of Proclus*. This volume was edited by Sh.
Nutsubidze and S. Kaukhchishvili; it includes a comprehensive and
valuable study of Petrizi's philosophy in which the teaching of
the Georgian philosopher is viewed as reflected by his contemporaries
and analysed with reference to Byzantine and Georgian medieval
thought.



The first volume of Petrizi's Proclus work (*The Elementatio
theologica of the Platonic Philosopher Proclus*) was published in
1940. This volume contains the Georgian translation of the
*Elementatio theologica* from the Greek. The editor was S.
Kaukhchishvili; M. Gogiberidze wrote an introduction to the volume. It
also contains a comprehensive vocabulary for both volumes, also
compiled by S. Kaukhchishvili. In the 20th century,
Petrizi's *Interpretation* was translated into Russian.
The Russian translation of 1984 with an introduction and annotations
by G. Tevzadze is of particular importance. After the publication of
scholarly editions of Petrizi's works, both philosophical and
philological problems of the Proclus commentary have been subject to
thorough-going research (for a detailed account of the state of
Petrizi research, cf. Iremadze 2004a, 13-27).