## 1. Life



Adam Wodeham [Goddam/Woodham] (c. 1295-1358) was born near
Southampton. He entered the Franciscan order at a young age.
Wodeham's earliest philosophical education was at the Franciscan
*studium* in London where he first studied under Walter Chatton
(c. 1317-1321) and then William of Ockham (1320-1324).
During this period of intense study, Wodeham collaborated with Ockham
on his massive *Summa logicae*, editing it and preparing it for
publication. After Ockham departed for Avignon in the summer of 1324,
Wodeham was sent to Oxford to complete his studies. At Oxford he
attended the sentential lectures of Richard FitzRalph
(1328-1329), and subsequently qualified to read the
*Sentences*.



Wodeham lectured on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard at the
London convent sometime in the 1320s, although his earliest lecture
notes have not survived. He later lectured at the provincial school in
Norwich sometime in the late 1320s, a work that is now referred to as
the *Lectura secunda* [LS]. Finally, Wodeham delivered the
Oxford lectures (referred to as the *Ordinatio Oxoniensis*
[OO]) between 1332 and 1334 (Streveler and Tachau 1995, 22-23,
n. 61). According to Thomas de Eccleston (Eccleston 1951, 57), Wodeham
was the 61st lector at Oxford, Greyfriars. As is the case
with many medieval philosophers, little is known about his latter life
after he completed is education. He apparently traveled to Basel in
1339, survived the plague in 1348-49, and died at the Franciscan
convent at Babwell in 1358 (Courtenay 1978, 181).


## 2. Writings



The extant writings of Adam Wodeham include: his two commentaries on
the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (the *Lectura* and the
*Ordinatio*); a prologue to William of Ockham's *Summa
logicae*; a short *quaestio* on the *continuum*; a
longer *Tractatus de indivisibilibus*; the *Tractatus
alphabeticus*, and perhaps the 51st chapter of part I
of Ockham's *Summa logicae* and the last question of book
IV of the same author's *Reportatio*.



Adam Wodeham's most significant philosophical and theological
works are his two commentaries on the *Sentences*. The
*Lectura* (c. 1320s) is the earlier of the two works and is a
loose commentary on the first 26 distinctions of the first book of the
Lombard's *Sentences*. The single manuscript of the
*Lectura* (Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, Ms 281 (674), ff.
105-250) has been published in a modern critical edition
(Gal and Wood 1990). The *Ordinatio* (1332-34),
Wodeham's most mature extant work, is a more expansive
commentary, treating all four books of the Lombard's
*Sentences* and extensively re-writing and re-organizing the
first 26 distinctions of the first book. A critical edition of the
*Ordinatio* is available at the
 Scholastic Commentaries and Texts Archive.



The shorter works of Wodeham comprise several collaborations with his
teacher William of Ockham. These include Wodeham's brief
introduction to Ockham's *Summa logicae*, which has been
edited in the critical edition. Further, Courtenay argues that Wodeham
is probably the disciple who wrote the 51st chapter of part
I of Ockham's *Summa logicae* (Courtenay 1978, 34). Both
of these short works were written between 1320 and 1324, as Wodeham
collaborated with the Venerable Inceptor. Finally, Gedeon Gal
also noted that in one of the manuscripts of Ockham's
*Reportatio* (Milan, Ambros. 281 inf., fol. 69rb) on
book IV of the *Sentences*, a marginal notation attributes the
final question of the work to Wodeham (Courtenay 1978, 34, fn.
61).



Wodeham's shorter works also include two tracts on the
*continuum* written against the indivisibilists or atomists and
the *Tractatus alphabeticus*. The shorter work on the
*continuum* (Murdoch and Synan 1966, 212-288), consisting
of a single *quaestio*, is an early redaction of the longer
work, the *Tractatus de indivisibilibus* (Wood 1988). Both of
the works were probably written between 1323 and 1331 (Wood 1998, 16).
The *Tractatus alphabeticus* considers the latitude of forms
and was written around 1333 (Wood 374).



Finally, the lost works of Adam Wodeham include Biblical commentaries
on the *Canticum canticorum* and the first book of
*Ecclesiasticus*. And, based on historical and textual
evidence, it is generally held that Wodeham wrote a set of
*Determinationes*, some of which were probably included in the
*Tractatus de indivisibilibus*.


## 3. Position in the History of Philosophy



Adam Wodeham's place in the history of philosophy remains
difficult to appreciate because of two related problems, here referred
to as: (1) the historiographical problem; and (2) the textual problem.
Historiographically, the field of medieval philosophy has been plagued
by various narrative accounts of the twelfth through fifteenth
centuries that characterize the period in which Wodeham flourished as
an age in which fideism, skepticism and scholastic decadence ruled the
day (Inglis, 1998). This basic historiographical approach to the late
medieval period has recently come under serious attack and scrutiny by
specialists working in the field, but a balanced picture of the
philosophers and theologians working during this period remains in its
infancy. Second, an accurate understanding of Adam Wodeham's
place within the history of philosophy is handicapped by the lack of
critical editions for Adam Wodeham, his immediate contemporaries, and
numerous medieval philosophers and theologians working in the late
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Regarding Wodeham, it is important
to recognize that a critical edition of any complete text of Wodeham
was not available until recently (Wood 1988; Gal and Wood
1990). Further, as already noted, an edition of Wodeham's most
mature and complete work, the *Ordinatio*, is only now
underway. As such, the place of Adam Wodeham within the history of
medieval thought is difficult to trace at present, and William
Courtenay's important study remains the most relevant point of
reference (Courtenay, 1978).



Based on the work of Courtenay, the first references to
Wodeham's place within medieval thought must begin by
considering his *socii* (or contemporary
*sententiarii*). Wodeham lectured on the *Sentences* at
Oxford in 1332-1334, and contemporaneous with his lectures there
were other bachelors lecturing on the *Sentences*
(*baccalarius sententiarius*) in the various other convents or
theological schools (Courtenay 1978, 89). Understanding who these
bachelors are is important because they often engaged with each
other's work. In the case of Adam Wodeham the list of
*socii* includes: Monachus Niger (Benedictine), Robert Holcot
OP, William Crathorn OP, Roger Gosford OP, Edmund Grafton OFM, Hugh
Grafton OESA, William Chiterne OFM, William Skelton: Mertonian,
Richard of Radford, and an unnamed Carmelite (Courtenay 1978,
89-111).



Beyond his immediate *socii*, Wodeham's influence between
1334 and 1346 is evident in England, Paris and Cologne. English
theologians, between 1334 and 1350, often do not cite contemporaries
by name. That said, there is substantial evidence that Wodeham's
contemporaries took his thought seriously. During these decades,
Courtenay lists the following English theologians as making either
implicit or explicit reference to Adam Wodeham's
*lecturae*: Thomas Bradwardine (Mertonian), Robert of Halifax
OFM, Roger Roseth OFM and Thomas Buckingham (Mertonian) (Courtenay
1978, 116-123). In contrast to the English authors discussed
above, the Parisian authors between 1342 and 1345 were much more
willing to cite a contemporary author (Courtenay 1978, 123). Thus, in
this period almost all of the Parisian theologians commenting on the
*Sentences* cite Wodeham: Gregory of Rimini OESA, Alphonsus
Vargas OESA and John of Mirecourt (Cistercian). These authors exhibit
a strong knowledge of Wodeham and all had some access to the Oxford
(*Ordinatio*) redaction of Wodeham's work (Courtenay
1978, 132). In particular one should note Gregory of Rimini's
extensive knowledge of the thought of Wodeham. The spread of
Ockham's philosophical and theological thought into Germany
(both directly and indirectly through the study of Wodeham) took place
between 1335 and 1350 and is evident in Cologne. This is perhaps due
to the fact that Wodeham traveled to Basel in the summer of 1339
bringing with him a copy of his *Ordinatio* (Courtenay 1978,
133 and 181). How long Wodeham remained in Germany, or where he
traveled, remains unknown. But, it is significant that in Cologne,
sometime before 1348, one theologian lectured on the *Sentences
secundum Adam* (Courtenay 1978, 133). This and other evidence
suggest that Wodeham was being studied seriously in Cologne before
1348.



In the aftermath of the Parisian condemnations of Nicholas of
Autrecourt in 1346 and John of Mirecourt in 1347, one may expect that
the influence of Wodeham would have waned in subsequent years. But,
Courtenay argues that the citations of Wodeham throughout this
turbulent period demonstrate that this was not the case (Courtenay
1978, 135). Evidence of Parisian masters engaging the thought of
Wodeham in the years after 1347 is evident in the works of: Peter
Ceffons O.Cist. and Hugolino Malabrancha of Oriveto OESA.



In the final four decades of the fourteenth century there is an
increase in the citations of the *moderni* as evidenced in the
extant commentaries. The list of commentaries that cite Wodeham
includes: the anonymous author of ms. Vat. Lat. 986, John Hiltalingen
of Basel OESA, James of Eltville O.Cist, Conrad of Ebrach O.Cist.,
Pierre d'Ailly, Henry Totting of Oyta, John of Wasia, Henry of
Langenstein, Nicholas of Dinkelsbuhl, Peter of Candia, John
Brammart O.C., Peter Plaoul, and Marsilius of Inghen. This period of
medieval philosophy remains understudied, but it is clear that there
was a strong interest in Wodeham at the close of the fourteenth
century. Further evidence of this is found in Henry Totting of
Oyta's *Abbreviato* of Adam Wodeham's
*Ordinatio* produced between 1373 and 1378 (Courtenay 1978,
147). Oyta's *Abbreviato* of Wodeham was influential in
the fifteenth century, as is clear from the number of extant
manuscripts spread throughout Europe.



The influence of Wodeham's thought in the fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries is a chapter of medieval philosophy and theology
that has yet to be written. There are citations of Wodeham in the
works of Arnold of Sehnsen O.C., Peter Reicher/Pirchenward, John
Capreolus, Gabriel Biel and John Mair (Major), although the evidence
at this point has yet to be analyzed in detail (Courtenay 1978,
150-156). What is certain is that Wodeham remained important for
philosophers and theologians in the long fifteenth century, and John
Mair eventually, in the sixteenth century, published an edition of
Oyta's *Abbreviato*. This has been both positive and
negative for Wodeham studies: positive, as Wodeham has remained
available to those who do not have access to the manuscript tradition;
and negative as it has meant that scholars often read and cite an
inferior text that significantly abbreviates the original work. More
attention should be given to the influence of Wodeham in this
period.



## 4. Psychology and Cognition



To the present day a significant part of Wodeham scholarship has been
focused on his philosophy of mind and the sequence of events from
sense impression to complex scientific judgment. Modern
scholarship's focus here is partly due to the fact that this was
a clear area of interest for Wodeham, to which he devoted significant
energy. But it is also a reflection of the availability of texts; the
contracted nature of the *Lectura secunda* has focused the
efforts of scholarship on book I and issues of cognition. In the
following section, we will try to give an overview of the general
consensus and debates of modern scholarship on the process of
cognition as it is currently found in the *Lectura
secunda*.


### 4.1 Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition



Wodeham turns first to the question of intuitive and abstractive
cognition: two concepts developed by John Duns Scotus and William of
Ockham. But while they identify the parallel notions of intuitive and
abstractive cognition proper to the sensitive and intellective souls
respectively, Wodeham distinguishes himself from his predecessors by
insisting that this parallel reduplication is redundant and violates
the principle of parsimony.



Regarding intuitive cognition Wodeham begins by stating that:
"every act of science naturally caused presupposes evidence of
some proposition or of the thing signified through the proposition.
Science (or a scientific act of assent) is caused by the mediation of
this evidence" (LS I:9, ll. 44-46).



The question is: what is the source of this evidence? The assumption
is that an evident proposition arises from, or is formulated from,
certain types of simple evident apprehensions, namely, intuitive
apprehensions. Wodeham, then asks: does the intellect require an
intuitive apprehension distinct from the act of sensation?



The definition of intuitive apprehension states that such an
apprehension must be sufficient for the intellect to make a judgment
about the existence of the object. Given this definition Wodeham
wonders why a second act of intuitive apprehension, beyond the
apprehension of sensation, is necessary in order for the intellect to
make this judgment. The fact that the present object in question has
been "sensed" ought to be sufficient for the intellect to
feel confident that such an object exists.



Wodeham's position is distinctive because he denies what was a
traditional distinction for Scotus and Ockham, namely, a distinction
between the sensitive and intellective soul (a real distinction in the
case of Ockham and a formal distinction in the case of Scotus). For
Wodeham, the assumption of two separate acts of intuition mandates
that a human being have either two souls or that the human has one
soul and also another vital power, separate from that soul. But,
drawing on the authority of Augustine, Wodeham identifies the notion
of two souls as a heresy to be avoided. Another option is to think
that the sensitive soul is not really a soul at all, but rather a
power distinct and separate from the one human soul. But this too is
unacceptable. To be a true sensitive potency, Wodeham insists that it
must be a living form (*viva forma*); if it were not, it would
not be able to receive "living" or vital acts, among which
apprehensive and appetitive acts are numbered. But if one admits that
the sensitive power remains a "living form", then two
souls are once more introduced into the single human being. This, at
least, is the case for Wodeham, who holds that to be a
"soul" is to be a "living form" (LS I:11, ll.
44-55). Thus, Wodeham is adamant that there can only be one soul
in the single human being, and the intuitive act of sensation alone is
sufficient for the simple apprehension "presupposed" by an
"evident assent" (LS I:9, ll. 44-48). However, by
denying this distinction, Wodeham must be willing to say that,
strictly speaking, the "intellect senses" because it is
the same intellectual soul that both senses and thinks. This was an
unsavory consequence for a thinker like Ockham, but one that Wodeham
was fully willing to accept (Wood 1990, 21\*; LS I:14-15,
ll.1-49).



Despite disagreeing with Scotus and Ockham on the nature of the
intellective and the sensitive soul, Wodeham affirms the formal
definition of intuition originally given by Scotus. This definition is
formulated in the third conclusion of the second question of the
prologue to the *Lectura Secunda*: "the incomplex act,
which is able to cause evident assent about a contingent truth of a
present object, and which naturally requires the existence and
presence of that object, is intuitive knowledge" (LS I, 37, ll.
69-72). The presence of the object is required and not just its
existence because intuitive cognition requires the object to function
as an efficient cause. The object, however, cannot function as an
efficient cause unless it is also present to the knower (LS
I:45-46, ll. 40-44).



With this definition Wodeham is also rejecting an important and
controversial part of Ockham's definition of intuitive
knowledge. For Ockham, not only was an intuitive knowledge able to
produce an affirmative judgment of the existence of an extant object,
but it was also able to affirm the non-existence of a non-extant
object. By insisting on the criteria of a present object for any kind
of intuitive knowledge, Wodeham denies that an intuition of a
non-extant, non-present object is possible. Here Wodeham offers an
illustrative example. He remarks that sometimes we can judge that
something does not exist as a consequence of having a positive
intuition. He gives the example of intuitively seeing the dead body of
Socrates and knowing that Socrates *does not exist.* While
acknowledging that such an example might be the inspiration behind
Ockham's controversial claim about an intuitive knowledge of
non-existents, he points out that in this example, we do not have an
intuitive knowledge of the same thing about which we are making a
judgment. Rather we are making an inference from our intuitive
knowledge of (and a judgment about) the existence of the dead body of
Socrates (LS I:38-39, ll. 4-15).



The difference, then, between intuitive knowledge and abstractive
knowledge is again taken from Scotus. Here, in Wodeham's sixth
conclusion, of the second question, the difference is attributable,
not to diverse objects of knowledge, but to the attitude that one can
take towards that object with respect to existence (LS I:45, ll.
22-26). Unlike intuitive knowledge, abstractive knowledge does
not require the existence or presence of the object to be known.
However, in this case "what is known" is indifferent to
the existence of that object and no judgment about that object's
existence can be made.


### 4.2 Skepticism and Aureoli



Wodeham's decision to identify the difference between intuitive
and abstractive knowledge with the presence or absence of an object,
as Scotus and Ockham did, meant that he shared with these two thinkers
a common opponent, namely Peter Aureoli. In response to Scotus's
definition of intuitive knowledge Aureoli identified several
experiences wherein a person appears to have a sensitive intuition of
a non-present object. Such experiences, according to Aureoli, were the
consequence of lingering sensitive images that remain even after an
object is no longer present. Such lingering images (sometimes called
*esse perspectivum* or *esse apparens*) were used to
explain all sorts of visual anomalies that do not correspond to
reality. Such experiences were enough for Aureoli to define intuitive
knowledge, not as the direct grasp of a present object, but as
*direct* knowledge (as opposed to knowledge arrived at through
a discursive reasoning process). Rega Wood explains:



> 
> 
> Abstract and intuitive cognition were distinguished by the manner in
> which their objects were presented. The objects of abstract cognition
> appeared in a quasi-imaginary mode (*quasi modo imaginario et
> absente*); intuitive cognition was direct rather than discursive,
> and it conveyed the impression that its objects existed and were
> actually present (Wood 1982, 216).
> 
> 
> 



In short, this meant that a direct grasp of a lingering appearance or
*esse apparens*, even after the object was no longer present,
could count as intuitive knowledge.



For those who came after Aureoli, his definition and his notion of
*esse apparens* raised a host of skeptical concerns. If
sensation produces an *esse apparens*, the intellect must also
produce a similar object, something Peter Aureoli called *esse
intentionale*. And if intuitive knowledge is a direct knowledge of
either the *esse apparens* or the *esse intentionale*,
and not of the object itself, from where does the certainty come by
which one can firmly and confidently state that "this thing
exists"? Aureoli's *esse apparens* opened up the
possibility of an experience, wherein what appears to be present,
might actually not be present or even in existence.



Ockham's answer to Aureoli's insistence on the need for an
*esse apparens* to explain certain strange and misleading
phenomena was to relocate the source of the error. The error does not
come from the impression of some non-existent object. On the contrary,
the naturally produced intuitive cognition does not lie. Instead, as
Wood paraphrases Ockham, "error arises when the observer infers
a proposition which does not follow formally from his
perceptions" (Wood 1982, 224). Ockham calls the intuition of
those appearances that cause apparitions "imperfect intuitive
cognition". In such cases, the immediate judgment of the
intellect is not "that the object represented exists", but
"that the object was impressed" (and, it would seem, that
this impression exists). The intellect errs, then, when it assents to
what the "imperfect" intuition does not warrant.



A central concern with Ockham's account, raised by Walter
Chatton and responded to by Wodeham, was the character of these
apparition causing "after-images". For Ockham, the after
images were not caused by the object, but by a lingering impression
distinct from the object or impression-causing species. For Chatton,
it could not be overlooked that these after-images appeared *as
if* they were the object, not *as if* they were some
left-over impression caused by the object. Thus, he argued that the
after-images are caused by the lingering of the representative species
of the object, even after the object is no longer present. Chatton was
therefore willing to admit that intuition of a non-present object was
possible, as long as its representative species lingered.



On this issue Wodeham takes sides with Ockham against Chatton. He
expressly attacks Chatton's description of the lingering species
as having a likeness sufficient to cause the observer to believe in
the existence of the original object. Wood writes of Wodeham's
position:



> 
> 
> In after-images only the remains of the form or species caused by the
> first act of perception are seen. But the belief that the principal
> object is seen when after-images are present is not caused by the
> first vision or even by the remains of the species imprinted during
> vision. It is caused by strong imagination which leads the observer to
> judge falsely that what he sees in an after-image is the same as what
> he saw when the principal object was presented (Wood 1982, 228).
> 
> 
> 



In short, against Chatton, Wodeham defends an Ockham-like position,
suggesting that the source of error is not the intuitive cognition of
something not actually there, but the fact that the intellect chooses
to make a judgment about the existence of something other than what
was intuited. In many ways, the case is similar to that inference made
about Socrates' non-existence, when Socrates' dead body is
intuitively grasped. The inference made from one intuitive cognition
is not always correct, even if the intuition itself remains
reliable.


### 4.3 Three Degrees of Evidence



What then does all this mean for the question of certitude and the
possibility of building a genuine and trustworthy science based on
these foundational impressions received from the natural world?
Wodeham defended the reliability of our immediate simple
apprehensions, but he also admitted the possibility that the
imagination can severely distort these impressions such that we are
inclined to assent to what the simple apprehension itself does not
warrant.



Wodeham discusses the question of evidence for a proposition which can
be built from these initial apprehensions in the sixth question of the
prologue. He says that the idea of "complex evidence" can
be understood in two ways: either as referring to the apprehension of
an evident proposition itself or to the so-called "evident
judgment" which has been caused by this evident proposition.



What Wodeham means by an evident proposition is complicated and
requires that we have a clear sense of the distinction between
apprehension and judgment, which are for Wodeham two distinct and
separate acts. An evident proposition for Wodeham can be of three
kinds. The first and lowest degree of evidence is identified with the
apprehension of the proposition (or what it signifies). Wodeham uses
as his example the proposition, "a stick submerged in water is
broken". The apprehension of this state of affairs has all the
trappings of an evident proposition, to such an extent that it
inclines us to perform the separate act of producing an affirmative
judgment. Nevertheless, this type of proposition is one that can still
be false, despite the fact that it has all the appearance of truth.
This lingering possibility, however, allows the intellect to suspend
its judgment on the basis of other experiences or reasons. Distinctive
of such propositions is their contingent nature. Though they can
appear true, it remains possible that they are false.



The second degree of certainty associated with evident propositions is
exemplified by a proposition that not only appears certain and
inclines the judgment to assent, but is also a proposition that cannot
fail to signify correctly. According to Wodeham all propositions of
this type are categorical and necessary. And, he distinguishes them
from those contingent types of propositions which may have every
appearance of being true but yet may turn out to be false (LS II:163,
ll.17-20).



Finally, Wodeham distinguishes this second type of evident proposition
from a third type of proposition which is also categorical and
necessary. This third type of proposition is the highest degree of
evidence, because, not only can it not fail to appear *and be*
true, but it also cannot be doubted. That is, it not only inclines to
assent, but necessitates the intellect to assent. For Wodeham, this is
distinct from the second and less-evident type of proposition. While
this second type cannot fail to be true, it nevertheless can still be
doubted owing to the fact that other conflicting propositions also
appear to be true. The third type cannot be doubted in this way, no
matter what other propositions appear to be true. If other evident
propositions are genuinely in conflict with (i.e., are inconsistent
with) the proposition in question, those propositions cannot be
evident in the highest degree. But nor can these conflicting
propositions be evident in the second highest degree since the second
and third types are both supposed to be necessary. Therefore they
cannot actually be in conflict, though it is still possible that they
may appear to be in conflict. For Wodeham, propositions of the third
and highest type can be known in themselves and are necessarily
*per se nota* (LS I:164, 36).


### 4.4 Evident Judgments



If this is how we can understand an evident proposition, what then
constitutes an evident judgment? Again, a judgment, for Wodeham, is
sharply distinguished from the distinct act of apprehension or the
mental proposition. It amounts to a mental nod of approval to the
correspondence between the apprehended proposition and the reality
signified. (See LS I, prol., d. 6, SS 20, I:176-178.)
Clearly, the first two types of propositions do not provide us with
absolute certainty. These propositions have all the appearance of
truth, but the judgment that follows from them cannot be called
evident as long as doubt remains, even if the judgment in question is
correct.



When it comes then to a truly evident judgment, propositions which are
*per se nota* can cause evident judgments because the truth of
those propositions can in no way be doubted. However, besides
propositions *per se nota* there are certain mechanisms through
which originally dubitable propositions can come to be evident in the
third degree, thereby necessitating assent and causing a truly evident
judgment.



The most obvious mechanism is the demonstrative syllogism, which leads
us finally to Wodeham's conception of a science and the
immediate object of this act of assent. In article two of question
one, he discusses whether a scientific act of knowing (the evident
assent given to the conclusion of a syllogism) has as its immediate
object "that which is signified by only one proposition, i.e.,
the conclusion" or "that which is signified by the
conclusion and the premises joined together at the same time through a
syllogism" (LS I:199, ll. 5-11). Wodeham's
conclusion is decidedly in favor of the latter; namely, in order for a
previously dubitable proposition to be elevated to the third degree of
evidence, whereby the intellect is necessitated to assent, it must
acquire that evidence from the force of the syllogism as whole. The
conclusion by itself is not *per se nota*. Thus, for a truly
evident judgment to take place, a single evident proposition cannot be
its cause, rather all three propositions of the syllogism must be
taken together in order for the concluding proposition to have the
evidence it needs to not only appear true, but to compel the
mind's assent (LS I:199-208). This requirement that
scientific assent be given to the syllogism as a whole (and cannot be
sustained if one of the premises is forgotten) is a position that will
be explicitly opposed by the later Parisian reader of Wodeham, Gregory
of Rimini (*Lectura*, I, Prol., q. 3, a. 1, Trapp I:107ff).


### 4.5 The Complexe Significabile



If there is a topic that has dominated Wodeham scholarship, it is the
*complexe significabile* or alternatively, that which is
signifiable in a complex way, i.e., through a proposition. This
mysterious entity was intended by Wodeham to function both as the
immediate object of propositional knowledge and as a genuine *via
media* between two extreme theories regarding the object of
knowledge offered by his contemporaries. Representing one extreme was
William of Ockham, who was thought by Wodeham to identify the terms of
a proposition as the actual object. This is sometimes referred to as
the anti-realist position. On the other hand there was Walter Chatton,
who argued that the object of propositional knowledge was the actual
entity signified by the subject term of the proposition. Wodeham, in
turn, rejected both these positions and stated that the object of
science was an actual state of affairs which could only be signified
through a complex or a proposition. Questions and puzzles have
continued to linger regarding the exact ontological status of these
states-of-affairs. While insisting that they have some real
ontological weight, they do not fit nicely under either of the
Aristotelian categories of real being, substance or accident. Thus,
within an Aristotelian framework, it is difficult to articulate
exactly how or in what way the *complexe significabile* is
actually real.



The legacy of the *complexe significabile* has a somewhat
involved history. We can find several examples of its use and
discussion throughout the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. However, for many years the idea was thought to originate
with Gregory of Rimini. Modern scholarship slowly discovered, albeit
not immediately, that this particular terminology was original to
Wodeham and only later adopted by Rimini. (The idea, however, has many
precursors evident in earlier debates over terms like *dicta*
or *enuntiabilia*. See Klima 1993; Nuchelmans 1973; Bermon
2007.) The most frequently cited misattribution in modern scholarship
has been Hubert Elie's "Le complexe significabile"
(Elie 1936). In the following generation, Gedeon Gal
(Gal 1977) discovered that Wodeham was actually the author of
this idea. Gal edited the first modern edition of the
*Lectura Secunda* dist. 1, q. 1, the traditional point of entry
into Wodeham's thought on the matter. Since Gal's
article, several studies have followed: Nuchelmans (1980), Tachau
(1987), Grassi (1990), Zupko (1994-1997), Karger (1995), and
Brower-Toland (2007). A frequent part of the contemporary discussion
involves distinguishing the genuine doctrine of Adam Wodeham from
later versions. Gal's initial characterization of
Rimini's position as a "mutilation" of
Wodeham's position has exerted its influence over the subsequent
scholarship (cf. Nuchelmans, and esp. Zupko). Most complaints stem
from the idea that Rimini gives too much ontological weight to this
mysterious entity or at least lacks the nuance of Wodeham, exposing
the doctrine to objections that could not be addressed to Wodeham
himself (cf. Zupko 1994-1997). Brower-Toland has recently
challenged this traditional reading. She suggests the "radical
nature of Wodeham's claims" have largely gone
unrecognized, and that his *complexe significabile* represents
a significant "ontological addition" to the Aristotelian
substance-accident framework (Brower-Toland 2007:600n7,
638-640).


## 5. Philosophical Theology


### 5.1 Proofs of God's Existence



Wodeham's approach to philosophical theology begins with a
traditional attempt to determine whether or not God's existence
can be philosophically and demonstratively proved.



In both the *Lectura secunda* and the *Ordinatio* his
strategy is structured by two proofs. The first is taken from and
explicitly attributed to Scotus. Of the Scotist proof, Wodeham remarks
that it seems very persuasive and more evident than any reason that
can be brought against it. The second argument appears to be original
to Wodeham.



The first proof taken from John Duns Scotus is found both in his
*Ordinatio* and *De Primo Principio*. The argument
follows from an initial disjunctive premise: there is either some
first uncaused cause or there is not. If the former, Scotus and
Wodeham argue that it is obvious that this is God. If the latter is
chosen then unacceptable consequences follow. The most notable is that
there would be an infinite series of caused causes without a
terminating point. Two reasons are offered for why such an infinite
series is impossible. The first is that, the whole of all
"essentially ordered" causes must have a cause, but if the
cause of this multitude comes from the totality of caused causes, then
this cause will be the cause of itself, which is impossible. The
second reason that an infinite series of causes will not work is this
would require that there are an infinite amount of causes acting at
the same time. This requirement is built into Wodeham's (and
Scotus's) conception of essentially ordered causes--which
Wodeham later sharply distinguishes from a series of accidentally
ordered causes.



Wodeham offers a second proof for the existence of God. Regarding this
proof he states that it is sufficient to incline the intellect to
assent, but he also acknowledges that it is still able to be doubted
by "shameful adversaries" (LS II:121; OO I, d. 2, a. 1).
According to Wodeham's description of different types of
evidence, it is clear that this "proof" is not able to
compel a truly evident judgment because the proof remains open to
doubt and thus only reaches the second degree of evidence.



The proof begins from another disjunctive proposition inspired by
Anselm's *Proslogion*. Either there is some most noble
being about which no more noble thing is able to be thought, or there
is no such most noble thing. Wodeham remarks that one possible
consequence that might follow is that there would be an infinite
succession of more noble things, thus permitting an infinity of
beings. This conclusion, he says, is unpleasant to the mind; that is,
the intellect is not able to admit an infinity of beings without
"grumbling" (*murmere*). For this option at least,
it is clear that the intellect can incline us to assent that God
exists, but it is still possible to doubt it, which is the
distinguishing mark of the second degree of evidence. The other
alternative is that there must be some most noble thing actually
existing (*in actu existens*), even though this is not the most
noble thing possible. Wodeham finds this alternative opposed by the
most evident of reasons--something akin to Anselm's
ontological argument: whatever is actually existing (*existens in
actu*) is *de facto* more noble than what is not in
existence. Thus, it is nonsensical to speak of something more noble,
which is only potentially existing (LS II:121, ll.13-15).


### 5.2 Proof of God's Unicity



From the philosophical proof of the existence of the highest being,
not always demonstrative, but evident in at least the second degree,
Wodeham turns to the question of whether there is one highest being or
many. The question found in *Lectura*, I, q. 1, a. 3, and the
*Ordinatio* I, d. 2, a. 2 is posed in an ambiguous way. It asks
whether it is *evidently probable* that something absolutely
uncausable is only one in number. The question is ambiguous because it
is not immediately clear whether Wodeham's intention is to show
that there is only one God or if he intends to evaluate the relative
degrees of evidence of the existing proofs of God's unicity or
multiplicity.



As the question progresses, it appears that Wodeham is primarily
interested in evaluating the evidence of both pro and con arguments.
Wodeham juxtaposes arguments of Scotus against counter arguments of
Ockham in order to argue that the unicity of God cannot be
demonstrably proven. Ultimately, he argues that its seems that natural
reason is not able to prove evidently the numerical unity of God (LS
II:144). He argues for the inconclusiveness of several arguments
including: the argument that proceeds from the belief that there
cannot be several total causes of the same effect (LS II:144); that
there cannot be more than one necessary being (LS II:159); and that
there cannot be more than one final cause (OO I, q. 2, a. 2, dubium
5). In the end, Wodeham is not interested in denying that there is
only one God, but he simply wants to show that the relatively strong
arguments for God's unicity do not reach the third and highest
degree of evidence.



Even when it comes to the specific unity of God, which is granted only
a brief discussion in the *Lectura secunda* and is left out of
the *Ordinatio* altogether, Wodeham shows some hesitation. He
writes: "I say that the argument of Scotus given above is
probably able to be persuasive" (LS II: 171). Thus he again
shows that even though it is his own opinion that God is specifically
one, it is possible for doubt to continue to linger.


### 5.3 Philosophy and the Trinity



Adam Wodeham's trinitarian theology is developed in the
*Lectura* (d. 2, d. 3 q. 5; d. 7; dd. 9-16; dd.
18-21; dd. 23-26) and the *Ordinatio* I, d. 3; d.
33 qq. 1-9. The two accounts, despite their various formal
placements in the two works, are often identical (e.g., LS d. 11, q.
un. and OO d. 33, q. 6). Wodeham, however, did substantially re-work
his discussion of the *imago Trinitatis* (LS d. 3, q. 5; OO I,
d. 3), focusing in the latter work on the writings of Richard
FitzRalph instead of Richard Campsall. Further, in the closing
discussion of distinction 2 of the *Ordinatio*, Wodeham tells
his readers that the discussion of the Trinity will be collected into
the numerous questions of distinction 33.



Wodeham's trinitarian theology has received little attention
from scholars. However, there are several notable exceptions. Hester
Gelber offers an analysis of *Ordinatio* I, dd. 33, qq.
1-3, concerning the formal distinction and formal non-identity
(q. 1) and the complex problem of trinitarian paralogisms (qq.
2-3) (Gelber 1974, 235-264, 629-648). Russell
Friedman treats the relationship between Peter Auriol and Adam Wodeham
in the *Lectura secunda*, d. 7 on the question: *utrum
potentia generandi possit communicari Filio* (whether the power to
generate can be communicated to the Son) (1997, 342-349). Olli
Hallamaa considers Wodeham's discussion of trinitarian
paralogisms within the context of other fourteenth-century Franciscans
(Hallamaa 2003). For our purposes Gelber's and Hallamaa's
analyses of trinitarian paralogisms are the most relevant
philosophically, as Wodeham debates the universality of Aristotelian
logic with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity.



Like many of his Oxford contemporaries, Adam Wodeham was particularly
concerned with solving the tension between Aristotelian logic and
trinitarian theology. In the *Lectura secunda*, Wodeham did not
address the problem in a substantial way (see LS III, 446-448),
although in the *Ordinatio* he devotes a specific question to
the problem of whether there is a "certain rule or art"
through which one can solve trinitarian paralogisms (OO I, d. 33, q.
3).



The problem of trinitarian paralogisms arises when one considers
certain syllogisms regarding the Trinity. God, according to Church
teaching, is one simple divine essence and three distinct divine
persons (Father, Son and Holy Spirit). And, when some valid syllogisms
are formulated according to Aristotelian rules, paradoxes arise in
which both premises are true and the conclusion is false. For
example:




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| This divine essence is the Father | *Haec essentia divina est Pater* |
| This divine essence is the Son | *Haec essentia divina est Filius* |
| Therefore, the Son is the Father | *Ergo Filius est Pater.* |



In this valid expository syllogism, both of the premises are true
according to Church teaching, but the conclusion is false. The
theologians of the first half of the fourteenth century developed two
strategies when confronting such syllogisms. First, some theologians
denied the universality of Aristotelian logic outside of the natural
order. This approach, which remained in the minority, can be found in
the author of the *Centiloquium theologicum* (*OPh* VII,
SS 56-59, 469-472) and in Robert Holcot's
commentary on the *Sentences* (Holcot 1518, q. 5) (albeit
Holcot's position changes in other parts of his corpus, cf.
Gelber 1974). In his commentary, Holcot remains ambiguous about his
eventual solution, although he writes that there are two logics: the
logic of faith (*logica fidei*) and the logic of the natural
order (*logica naturalis*). Second, and more moderately, most
theologians insisted that Aristotelian logic is universal--thus,
valid in both the natural and supernatural realms--but that the
trinitarian syllogisms in question are not valid syllogisms, despite
their seemingly valid form. This approach was shared by William of
Ockham and Adam Wodeham.



Adam Wodeham, in the first two questions of distinction 33, surveys
the traditional methods of solving the problem of trinitarian
paralogisms (Gelber 1974, 235-253), and in the third question
finally offers his own response. It is not possible to recount all of
Wodeham's methods for addressing such paralogisms, but it is
useful to consider the following syllogism:




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Every divine essence is the Father
 | *Omnis essentia divina est Pater* |
| Every divine essence is the Son  | *Omnis essentia divina est Filius* |
| Therefore, the Son is the Father  | *Ergo Filius est Pater.* |



In the above case, the two premises are universal. As such, the
syllogism should be governed by "all or none": meaning
that, with respect to a given subject and predicate, what is said of
all (*dici de omni*) of the subject (essence) must also be said
of the predicate (Father) (OO I, d. 33, q. 3, a. 2). In the above
argument, there is a fallacy of the figure of speech because not
everything said of the divine essence is predicable to the Father,
because the term *divine essence* (subject) supposits for the
Son and Holy Spirit while the term *Father* (predicate) does
not. Thus, the premise is not sufficiently universal and violates the
rules of a valid expository syllogism (Gelber 1974, 255-256).
This is one of Wodeham's methods for addressing trinitarian
paralogisms, and effectively captures his basic method and approach to
such problems. Further, it helps elucidate Wodeham's broader
approach to the role of Aristotelian logic within theology and his
characteristically "analytic" approach to questions of
philosophical theology.


## 6. Natural Philosophy



Adam Wodeham's *Tractatus de indivisibilibus* and
*Tractatus alphabeticus* establish him as one of the leading
representatives of the *theologia Anglicana*. This group of
thinkers, including the Oxford Calculators, was heavily influenced by
natural philosophy and its implications for a range of philosophical
and theological problems. Wodeham's discussion of the
*continuum* and the latitude of forms demonstrates his place
within this philosophical tradition.


### 6.1 The *Continuum*



Adam Wodeham, like many of his English contemporaries in the first
decades of the fourteenth century, was embroiled in the debate over
divisibilism and indivisibilism (atomism). Following William of
Ockham, Adam Wodeham was a divisibilist who argued in his
*Tractatus de indivisibilibus* against philosophical atomism
(indivisibilism). Wodeham cites extensively from the writings of
divisibilists and indivisibilists, such that his *Tractatus de
indivisibilibus* is a rich source for tracing the history of this
long and complex debate (Wood 1988, 14).



Aristotle, in the sixth book of the *Physics*, develops several
arguments against the idea that *continua* are composed of
atoms or indivisibles. The majority of medieval philosophers accepted
Aristotle's position, but by the end of the thirteenth century
there developed a minority opinion that supported indivisibilism. The
most famous proponents of indivisibilism were Robert Grosseteste (d.
1253), Henry Harclay (d. 1317), Walter Chatton (d. 1343), Gerard Odon
(d. 1349), William Crathorn (fl. 1330s) and Nicholas Bonet (d. 1360).
The divisibilists/indivisibilist debate in the fourteenth century was
concerned with the philosophical status of space and time.
Spacial-temporal reality, according to the traditional Aristotelian
view, was infinitely divisible. Thus, authors like Thomas Bradwardine
and Adam Wodeham follow Aristotle and Averroes in defending the view
that the *continuum* is composed of divisible parts without
end, and not of atoms. This view (divisibilism) is the one defended by
Adam Wodeham in his magisterial *Tractatus de
indivisibilibus*.



In response to the classical divisibilist position supported by
Aristotle, the indivisibilists held that there were
"indivisibles" which constituted the composition of
temporal and spatial *continua*, e.g., temporal instants and
lines respectively. Such "indivisibles", in the early
14th century, were understood to be an extended and simple
ontological unit, but not physical atoms *per se*. It is
helpful here to consider briefly an indivisibilist account, before
turning to the divisibilism of Wodeham.



Henry Harclay and Walter Chatton are two relatively well known
medieval philosophers who supported indivisibilism. Thinkers such as
Harclay and Chatton argued, in response to Aristotle, for the
possibility that a *continuum* is composed of indivisibles. The
individual components, or indivisibles, were generally held to be
extensionless regardless of whether or not the individual thinker
understood there to be an infinite (Harclay) or finite (Chatton)
number of indivisibles in a given *continuum*. But, as is well
know, such indivisibilists accounts were generally so defensive in
their posture--arguing for the mere possibility of
indivisibles--that it is difficult to ascertain the broader
philosophical motivations which grounded such arguments. John Murdoch
argues that there are perhaps two motives that can be gleamed for the
texts: (1) indivisibles may have been useful as a method of accounting
for the motion of angels; or (2) indivisibles may have been useful
when addressing the inequality of infinites (Murdoch 1982,
576-577). Although, he notes that such motivations are mentioned
only in passing and that a broader motivation could have simply been
that "the analysis of Aristotle's arguments against
indivisibilism uncovered loopholes in them" (Murdoch 1982,
577).



The *Tractatus de indivisibilibus* consists of five questions
and it is instructive to consider the content briefly.


1. In the first question, containing three articles, Wodeham
considers whether or not forms, or extended *continua*, are
composed of indivisibles. In the first article Wodeham develops twelve
arguments against the indivisibilists, anticipates responses to those
arguments, and rejects them (TI 35-93). In the second article,
he considers twelve arguments, from Henry Harclay and Walter Chatton,
in support of the thesis that forms are composed of indivisibles (TI
93-101). And, in the third article, Wodeham responds to the
arguments of Harclay and Chatton (TI 103-121). This first
article comprises about a third of the work, and the first article in
particular contains many of Wodeham's most significant
arguments.
2. In the second question, Wodeham treats the problem of whether or
not extended forms or objects are composed of indivisibles. In
response, Wodeham (following Ockham) argues in the first article
against the existence of points, lines or surfaces (TI 123-139).
And, as with the previous question, the second and third articles
consider arguments in defense of indivisibles and responses to those
arguments (TI 139-163).
3. The third question entertains seven doubts relating to the
divisibilist position. In the first four doubts Wodeham treats
Zeno's famous paradoxes (as reported by Aristotle in his
*Physics* VI) (TI 165-183), and in the last three doubts
he treats more contemporary arguments (TI 183-211).
4. The fourth question considers whether or not a *continuum*
is infinitely divisible. Thus, if a *continuum* can be divided,
why cannot it be infinitely divided? To this question Wodeham provides
an argument that a *continuum* cannot be divided (a. 1) (TI
213-225) and an argument to the contrary (a. 2) (TI
225-235).
5. The final question considers whether or not there are more parts,
of the same proportion, in a larger *continuum* than in a
smaller one. In three articles, Wodeham considers an argument for the
claim that there are more respective parts in a larger
*continuum* (a. 1) (TI 239-247), objections to this
argument (a. 2) (TI 247-261), and finally replies to the
objections (a. 3) (TI 261-273).



In the second doubt of question 3 (LT 171-175;
P13-20), as noted above, Wodeham considers the argument of
Zeno (recorded in Aristotle's *Physics*) against those
who argue that motion is compatible with the divisibility of a
*continuum*. This particular argument, familiar to all students
of ancient philosophy, is exemplary both of Wodeham's historical
approach to the questions posed by the *continuum* and his own
method of argumentation. Thus, it is instructive to consider the
argument in some detail. Wodeham records Zeno's argument as:



> 
> 
> If every continuum is infinitely divisible, then every movable object
> traversing any space will reach the middle of that [space] before the
> end, and consequently it will reach the middle of the second half
> before reading [the end] of the completing [part] of that half, and
> then [it will reach] the middle of that next fourth [before] its
> completing [part]. Therefore if such halves are infinite proportional
> [parts], and if it does not happen that [a moveable object] traverses
> infinitely many [parts] in a finite time, then it is impossible that
> any space be traversed in a finite time. And consequently, it is
> impossible that anything move locally (LT 172-173;
> P14).
> 
> 
> 



Wodeham, who is a divisibilist, offers a response to Zeno's
"paradox" because it is necessary to avoid the
*reductio ad absurdum* (i.e., there is no motion) posed by the
claim that an infinitely divisible finite space is not
traversable.



Wodeham begins by considering Averroes's argument that
Aristotle, in the *Physics* VI, contradicts the "words,
not the substance, of Zeno's discourse" (LT 173;
P15). But, Wodeham does not agree with Averroes's
interpretation of Aristotle, and he defends Aristotle's
argument. Wodeham argues that Aristotle recognizes that Zeno's
argument "supposes falsely" that it is "not possible
to traverse something infinite ... in a finite time" (LT
173; P16), although he also correctly recognizes that there is
more to be said in response to Zeno. Further, Wodeham argues that
Aristotle recognized that there is an equivocation with respect to the
term "infinite" as applied to a *continuum* of
space or time: infinite can be understood with respect to
"division", or with respect to "infinite
ends". That is, the term infinite can refer to the infinite
divisibility of a given finite *continuum* of space or time, or
the term can refer to the fact that space or time extends without end
or termination (LT 173; P17). Because of this equivocation, the
phrase "a moveable object may traverse infinitely many things in
a finite time" can be understood in two ways: either (1) as
stating that a moveable object traverses infinitely many things that
are extensively never terminated in a finite time; or (2) as stating
that a moveable object traverse infinitely many non-equal things (that
a given *continuum* is divided into) in a finite time (LT
173-175; P18). In the former sense the claim is false, in
the latter sense it is true. And, in this way, Aristotle solves
Zeno's "paradox" to Wodeham's
satisfaction.



Finally, Wodeham analyzes William of Ockham's
interpretation--in the *Expositio Physicorum* (OP V, ll.
49-56)--of Averroes's argument that Aristotle
addresses the words and not the substance of Zeno's argument.
Wodeham, recording Ockham's argument, implies that
Ockham's reading of Averroes is too "charitable",
concluding that "if [Averroes] did understand [the matter] in
the manner expounded here, both his exposition and what he expounds
are false" (LT 175; P175).



As demonstrated by this brief example, in the *Tractatus de
indivisibilibus* Adam Wodeham engages at length with the ancient
and medieval philosophical tradition. Further, throughout the work he
quotes extensively from William of Ockham's *Exposition
Physicorum* and his *Tractatus de quantitate*. Wodeham also
considers in detail the arguments of Henry Harclay and Walter Chatton,
all of which provides a useful historical record of this heated
debate. But, ultimately, the work remains a barrage of arguments
against the indivisibilist, or atomist, position as defended in the
early fourteenth century.


### 6.2 The Latitude of Forms



In his minor work, the *Tractatus alphabeticus*, Wodeham takes
up the question of qualitative change and offers a position that is
consistent with his overall opposition to atomism (cf. Wood 1990).
According to Sylla, there were three dominant views of qualitative
change that shaped the context of the discussion: the succession
theory, the addition theory, and the admixture theory (Sylla 1973,
230-232). The succession and addition theory distinguish
themselves from the admixture theory in that they are both committed
to the fact that qualitative forms themselves do not change in degree.
Rather it is the subject that changes in degree through the
acquisition of a new qualitative form (cf. Sylla 1973, 232; Wood 1990,
375). Wodeham, in relative concord with the views of Ockham and
FitzRalph and against the Mertonian Campsall and his usual nemesis
Walter Chatton, argues against the admixture theory. He claims that it
is impossible for one and the same quality to be changed while
retaining its identity. As Wood says: 



> 
> 
> Addition and succession of forms theorists agree on this issue; in no
> sense is it true that the same form undergoes remission or
> intension...strictly speaking it is the subject, not the form,
> which becomes more white, more hot or more charitable. (Wood 1990,
> 375)
> 
> 
> 



A helpful analog can be found in the case of numbers. When the number
9 is increased to 10, Wodeham understands the admixture theorist to be
claiming that the same form has been intensified, but he wonders how
this numerically identical form can really be said to retain its old
identity now that it has been increased to 10 and is no longer 9.



While the succession and addition theorist are united in their
opposition to any admixture, and while both believe that intension and
remission occur in the subject and not in the qualitative form, they
disagree about just how this intension and remission occurs. In the
*Tractatus alphabeticus*, Wodeham shows himself to be numbered
among the addition theorists. The key difference here is that the
succession theorist believes that when a quality increases a new form
of a given quality destroys and then replaces the old form. Wodeham
and the addition theorist disagree. They hold that when qualitative
change happens, a new form is indeed acquired, but it does not destroy
the proceeding form. On the contrary, the new form takes in the
preceding form as one of its parts. And here, the analogy of
quantitative change is again helpful. When 9 increases to 10, the
succession theorist argues that the old form of 9 is completely
destroyed and replaced by an entirely new form, where no part of the
old form of 9 contributes to the new form of 10. In opposition, the
addition theorist argues that when a quality increases, this is
analogous to the number 1 being added to 9, and through this addition,
the new form of 10 is created. In this case, the old form of 9 has not
been destroyed, but rather becomes a part of the new whole.



A critical underlying difference between the succession and addition
theorists is the question over whether forms are indivisible or can be
perpetually broken down into smaller parts. The succession theorist
thinks forms are indivisible and do not contain parts (Sylla 1973,
231). But Adam Wodeham, in harmony with his general anti-atomists
position, argues that forms can be infinitely divided. In this way,
there is no trouble in saying that, through addition, a new form is
created, which contains the old form as one of its parts.


## 7. Ethics


### 7.1 Moral Goodness



Since the *Lectura secunda* does not extend beyond book I, the
moral philosophy of Adam Wodeham found in book IV of the
*Ordinatio* has remained relatively unexamined. However, in
1981 Marilyn Adams and Rega Wood edited the tenth question of Book IV
of the *Ordinatio*, providing us with a glimpse into
Wodeham's moral philosophy.



Question ten concentrates on the moral worth or goodness of an action.
Here the philosophical debate is about whether the moral worth of
action resides in the choice of the will alone (in the manner of Kant)
or whether moral goodness can be ascribed to the performance of
actions themselves, independent of the intention of the agent.
Wodeham's discussion is embedded in a larger Franciscan
discussion, whose main players are Scotus and Walter Chatton on the
one hand, and Ockham and Wodeham on the other.



The discussion is grounded in the distinction between purely internal
acts (or volitional acts, acts within the power of the will) and
external acts (or acts that can only be indirectly controlled by the
will). In the case of the latter (an external act), the power of the
will is not sufficient, and another source of power is needed.
Scotus's position, as understood by Wodeham, states that while
an external act can only be good if it falls under the control of the
will (cf. Adams and Wood 1981, 9), the external and indirectly
controlled act can nevertheless contribute *an additional*
moral goodness beyond the moral value accrued through the act of
volition. The result is that while willing to do the right thing or
bad thing is in itself praiseworthy or blameworthy, executing and
performing that act can impute to the agent further praise or blame,
depending on how well one performs the willed act (cf. Adams and Wood
1981, 9).



Wodeham, like Ockham, finds this position rather confusing. If someone
performs a morally praiseworthy volition, but this volition is not
able to be executed, the only reason for this failure of performance
is some impotency within the agent. But Wodeham insists that no one
should be damned for not doing what is not in their power to do (OO
IV, 57-59, ll. 11-30; cf. Adams and Wood 1981, 14). Thus,
no one can earn more merit for simply having the potency to perform
the action that they willed meritoriously. Having or not having the
potency to execute that volition does not fall under the free power of
the agent, and, even for Scotus, only those acts that "are under
the free power of the agent" are imputable acts (Adams and Wood
1981, 9 and 14).


### 7.2 Morality, the Will, and the Nature of Faith



For Walter Chatton, Ockham and Wodeham's position on the amoral
status of external acts leads to unsavory consequences. Among other
things, Chatton is concerned about the implications of Wodeham's
position for the necessity of faith. Wodeham's reply not only
gives us a nice illustration of how his moral theory plays out in
concrete instances, but also provides us with a helpful introduction
to his position on the nature of belief and its connection to the
will.



Chatton is concerned that if one holds a position similar to the one
of Wodeham there will no longer be any need for faith or belief, but
only the desire to believe. Chatton has this concern because, for him,
the act of belief is not directly under the control of the will (cf;
OO IV 36, ll. 20-23). Wodeham responds by starkly distinguishing
between two kinds of faith. Infused faith, which appears to be a pure
act of the will and acquired faith which is not a direct act of the
will and is not required for salvation (OO IV 58, ll.13-14).
Presumably, this act of acquired belief is an act of the intellect and
a response to the relative evidence of a given proposition or an
entire syllogism taken together (see above *An Evident
Judgment*).



With this distinction in place, Wodeham uses his moral theory to show
that the act of acquired belief, described as the act of believing
calmly (*quiete*) and presumably without intellectual
hesitation or doubt, does not add any moral worth. This is the case
since, as we have already seen, if one wishes to believe, but is
prevented from doing so *by a lack of power*, the agent should
not be held responsible for this lack of power. Reasons for such a
lack of power include a melancholic disturbance, a passion, or sophism
(OO IV 58, ll. 15-18). He further concludes, it is quite
possible that the person who wishes to believe, but is not able to do
so calmly (*quiete*), may be more morally praiseworthy than the
person who intellectually believes "quietly" and is not
beset by doubt. Intriguingly, he critiques Lombard at this point,
saying: 



> 
> 
> If the Master means to say that in order to achieve salvation one must
> believe with something more than a perfect will, but must also have
> belief calmly (*quiete*), then he does think
> correctly ... . (OO IV 58, ll. 26-29)
> 
> 
>