## 1. The Basic Idea


### 1.1 Introduced



The term 'alienation' is usually thought to have comparatively modern
European origins. In English, the term had emerged by the early
fifteenth century, already possessing an interesting cluster of
associations. 'Alienation', and its cognates, could
variously refer: to an individual's estrangement from God (it
appears thus in the Wycliffe Bible); to legal transfers of ownership
rights (initially, especially in land); and to mental derangement (a
historical connection that survived into the nineteenth-century usage
of the term 'alienist' for a psychiatric doctor). It is
sometimes said that 'alienation' entered the German
language via English legal usage, although G.W.F. Hegel
(1770-1831), for one, typically uses
'*Entausserung*', and not
'*Entfremdung*' to refer to property transfer
(Hegel 1991a: SS65). (It is only the latter term which has an
etymological link to '*fremd*' or
'alien'.) Moreover, perhaps the first philosophical
discussion of alienation, at least of any sophistication, was in
French. In the *Second Discourse*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1712-1778) diagnoses 'inflamed' forms of *amour
propre*--a love of self (which is sometimes rendered as
'pride' or 'vanity' in older English
translations)--whose toxicity is amplified by certain social and
historical developments, as manifesting themselves in alienated forms
of self; that is, in the actions and lives of individuals who have
somehow become divided from their own nature (see Rousseau 1997, and
Forst 2017, 526-30).



There are limits to what can usefully be said about the concept of
alienation in general; that is, what can usefully be said without
getting involved in the complexities of particular accounts, advanced
by particular authors, or associated with particular intellectual
traditions. However, there is a basic idea here which seems to capture
many of those authors and traditions, and which is not unduly
elusive or difficult to understand.



This basic idea of alienation picks out a range of social and
psychological ills involving a self and other. More precisely, it
understands alienation as consisting in the problematic separation of
a subject and object that belong together.


### 1.2 Elaborated



That formulation of the basic idea is perhaps too abbreviated to be
easily intelligible, and certainly benefits from a little elaboration.
The characterisation of alienation offered here--as a social or
psychological ill involving the problematic separation of a subject
and object that belong together--involves three constituent
elements: a subject, an object, and the relation between them. It will
be helpful to say a little more about each of these in turn.



First, the *subject* here is a self; typically, but not
necessarily, a person, an individual agent. 'Not
necessarily' because the subject could also be, for instance, a
group of some kind. There seems to be no good reason to deny that a
collective as well as an individual agent might be alienated from some
object. For instance, as well as Anna being alienated from her
government, it might be that women or citizens find themselves
alienated from their government.



Second, the relevant *object* can take a variety of forms.
These include: entities which are not a subject; another subject or
subjects; and oneself. The object here might be an entity which is not
a subject; for example, Beatrice might be alienated from the natural
world, from a social practice, from an institution, or from a social
norm, where none of those entities are understood as agents of any
kind. In addition, the object might be an entity which is another
subject, another person or group; for example, Beatrice might be
alienated from her childhood friend Cecile, and Beatrice might also be
alienated from her own family. Lastly, the object here might be the
original subject; that is, there might be reflexive variants of the
relation, for example, in which Beatrice is alienated from
herself.



Third, the *relation* is one of problematic separation between
a subject and object that belong together. All of these elements are required: there has to be a separation; the separation has to be problematic; and it has to obtain
between a subject and object that properly belong together.



The idea of *separation* is important. Not all problematic
relations between relevant entities involve alienation. For instance,
being overly integrated into some other object might also be a
problematic or dysfunctional relation but it is not what is typically
thought of as alienation. Imagine, for instance, that Cecile has no
life, no identity, finds no meaning, outside of her family membership.
It is tempting, at least for modern individuals, to say that she has
an 'unhealthy' relationship with her family, but it would
seem odd to say that she was alienated from it. Alienation typically
involves a separation from something.



These problematic separations can be indicated by a wide
variety of words and phrases. No particular vocabulary seems to be
required by the basic idea. The linguistic variety here might include
words suggesting: breaks ('splits',
'ruptures', 'bifurcations',
'divisions', and so on); isolation
('indifference', 'meaninglessness',
'powerlessness', 'disconnection', and so on);
and hostility ('conflicts', 'antagonism',
'domination', and so on). All these, and more, might be
ways of indicating problematic separations of the relevant kind. Of
course, particular authors may use language more systematically, but
there seems little reason to insist that a specific vocabulary is
required by the basic idea.



The idea of the relevant separation having to be, in some way,
*problematic*, is also important. Separations between a subject
and object do not necessarily appear problematic. Relations of
indifference, for example, might or might not be problematic. For an
unproblematic instance, consider Daniela, a distinguished Spanish
architect, who--when it is brought to her
attention--discovers that she is unconcerned with, and apathetic
towards, the complex constitutional relationship between the Pacific
islands of Niue and New Zealand. Her indifference in this case looks
unproblematic. Less obviously perhaps, the same might be true of
relations of hostility; that is, that hostility also might or might
not be problematic. For an unproblematic instance, consider Enid and
Francesca, two highly competitive middleweight boxers competing in the
Olympics for the first time. It may well be that a certain amount of
antagonism and rancour between these two individual sportswomen is
entirely appropriate; after all, if Enid identifies too closely with
Francesca--imagine her experiencing every blow to
Francesca's desires and interests as a defeat for her
own--she is not only unlikely to make it to the podium, but is
also, in some way, failing qua boxer.



The suggestion here is that to be appropriately
problematic--appropriate, that is, to constitute examples of
alienation--the separations have to obtain between a subject and
object that *properly* belong together (Wood 2004: 3). More
precisely, that the candidate separations have to frustrate or
conflict with the proper harmony or connectedness between that subject
and object. Imagine, for instance, that both the indifference of
Daniela, and the hostility of Enid, now also take appropriately
problematic forms. Perhaps we discover that Daniela has become
increasingly indifferent to her lifelong vocation, that she no longer
cares about the design and construction issues over which she had
previously always enthused and obsessed; whilst Enid has started to develop feelings of loathing and suspicion for her domestic partner who she had previously trusted and loved. What makes these examples of separation (indifference and hostility) appear appropriately problematic is that they violate some
baseline condition of harmony or connectedness between the relevant
entities. (A baseline condition that does not seem to obtain in the
earlier examples of *un*problematic separation.) Alienation
obtains when a separation between a subject and object that properly
belong together, frustrates or conflicts with that baseline
connectedness or harmony. To say that they properly belong together is
to suggest that the harmonious or connected relation between the
subject and object is rational, natural, or good. And, in turn, that
the separations frustrating or conflicting with that baseline
condition, are correspondingly irrational, unnatural, or bad. (For
some resistance to this characterisation, see Gilabert 2020,
55-56.) Of course, that is not yet to identify what might establish
this baseline harmony as, say, rational, natural, or good. Nor is it
to claim that the disruption of the baseline harmony is
all-things-considered bad, that alienation could never be a justified
or positive step. (These issues are discussed further in sections 4.1
and 5.2, respectively.)


### 1.3 Modesty Of



This basic idea of alienation appears to give us a diverse but
distinct set of social and psychological phenomena; picking out a
class of entities which might have little in common other than this
problematic separation of subject and object. The problematic
separations here are between the self (including individual and
collective agents) and other (including other selves, one's own
self, and entities which are not subjects). So understood, the basic
idea of alienation seems to play largely a diagnostic or critical
role; that is, the problematic separations might indicate that
something is awry with the self or social world, but do not, in
themselves, offer an explanation of, or suggest a solution to, those
ills. 



On this account, the basic idea of alienation looks conceptually
rather modest. In particular, this idea is not necessarily committed
to certain stronger claims that might sometimes be found in the
literature. That all these social and psychological ills are
characterised by a problematic separation, for example, does not make
alienation a natural kind, anymore than--to borrow an example
associated with John Stuart Mill--the class of white objects is a
natural kind (Wood 2004: 4). Nor, for instance, need there be any
suggestion that the various forms of alienation identified by this
account are necessarily related to each other; that, for example, they
are all explained by the same underlying factor. Of course, particular
theorists may have constructed--more or less
plausible--accounts of alienation that do advance those, or
similar, stronger claims. For instance, the young Karl Marx
(1818-1883) is often understood to have suggested that one of
the systematic forms of alienation somehow explains all the other ones
(Wood 2004: 4). The claim here is simply that these, and other,
stronger claims are not required by the basic idea.



That said, the basic idea of alienation appears to require only a few
additions in order to extend its critical reach significantly.
Consider two further suggestions often made in this context: that
alienation picks out an array of non-trivial social and psychological
ills that are prevalent in modern liberal societies; and that the idea
of 'alienation' is distinct from that of
'injustice' on which much modern liberal political
philosophy is focused. These familiar claims are not extravagant, but,
so understood, the concept of alienation would appear to have some
critical purchase on both contemporary liberal societies (for
containing alienation) and contemporary liberal political philosophy
(for neglecting alienation). The implied critical
suggestion--that the concept of alienation reveals that something
significant is awry with both liberal society and liberal
understandings--looks far from trivial. (Of course, establishing
that those purported failings reveal fundamental flaws in either
liberal society, or liberal political philosophy, is rather harder to
accomplish.)



Particular theories of alienation typically restrict the range of
problematic separations that they are interested in, and introduce
more explanatory accounts of the extent and prognosis of alienation so
characterised. They might, for instance, focus on social rather than
psychological ills, and maintain that these are caused by certain
structural features--particular aspects of its economic
arrangements, for instance--of the relevant society. Such
explanatory claims are of considerable interest. After all,
understanding the cause of a problem looks like a helpful step towards
working out whether, and how, it might be alleviated or overcome.
However, these explanatory claims are not readily open to general
discussion, given the significant disagreements between particular
thinkers and traditions that exist in this context. Note also that
introducing these various restrictions of scope, and various competing
explanatory claims, increases the complexity of the relevant account.
However, these complexities alone scarcely explain the--somewhat
undeserved--reputation that the concept of alienation has for
being unduly difficult or elusive. It might be that their impact is
compounded--at least in the intellectual traditions with which
the concept of alienation is most often associated (Hegelianism and
Marxism)--by language and argumentative structures that are
unfamiliar to some modern readers.


## 2. Adjacent Concepts


### 2.1 Introduced



It may be helpful to say something about the relation of alienation to
what can be called 'adjacent' concepts. The two examples
discussed here are both drawn from Hegelian and Marxist traditions;
namely, the concepts of fetishism and objectification. Disambiguating
the relationship between these various concepts can help clarify the
general shape of alienation. However, they are also discussed because
particular accounts of alienation, both within and beyond those two
traditions, are sometimes said--more or less plausibly--to
conflate alienation either with fetishism, or with objectification. Even if some particular treatments of alienation
do equate the relevant concepts with each other, alienation is better
understood as synonymous with neither fetishism nor
objectification. Rather, fetishism is only one form that alienation can take, and not all objectification involves alienation.


### 2.2 Fetishism



The first of these adjacent ideas is fetishism.
'Fetishism' refers here to the idea of human creations
which have somehow escaped (we might say that they have
inappropriately separated out from) human control, achieved the
appearance of independence, and come to enslave or dominate their
creators.



Within Hegelian and Marxist traditions, a surprisingly wide range of
social phenomena--including religion, the state, and private
property--have been characterised as having the character of a
fetish. Indeed, Marx sometimes treats the phenomenon of fetishism as a
distinguishing feature of modernity; where previous historical epochs
were characterised by the rule of persons over persons, capitalist
society is characterised by the rule of things over persons.
'Capital', we might say, has come to replace the feudal
lord. Consider, for instance, the frequency with which 'market
forces' are understood and represented within modern culture as
something outside of human control, as akin to natural forces which
decide our fate. In a famous image--from the *Communist
Manifesto*--Marx portrays modern bourgeois society as
'like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers
of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells' (Marx
and Engels 1976: 489).



In order to elaborate this idea of fetishism, consider the example of
Christian religious consciousness, as broadly understood in the
writings of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872). (Feuerbach was a
contemporary of, and important influence on, the young Marx, amongst
others.) The famous, and disarmingly simple, conclusion of
Feuerbach's philosophical analysis of religious consciousness is
that, in Christianity, individuals are worshipping the predicates of
human nature, freed of their individual limitations and projected onto
an ideal entity. For Feuerbach, however, this is no purely
intellectual error, but is rather ripe with social, political, and
psychological consequences, as this 'deity' now comes to
enslave and dominate us. Not least, the Christian God demands real
world sacrifices from individuals, typically in the form of a denial
or repression of their essential human needs. For instance, the
Christian idea of marriage is portrayed as operating in a way that
represses and punishes, rather than hallows and satisfies, the flesh
of humankind (Leopold 2007: 207-210).



Religious consciousness, on this Feuerbachian account, looks to be a
case where alienation takes the form of fetishism. That is, there is
both a problematic separation here between subject and object
(individuals and their own human nature), and it takes the form of a
human creation (the idea of the species embodied in God) escaping our
control, achieving the appearance of independence, and coming to
enslave and dominate us. The same looks to be true, on
Marx's account, of production in contemporary capitalist
societies. Capital takes on the appearance of an independent social
power which determines what is produced, how it is produced, and the
economic (and other) relations between producers. Marx himself was
struck by the parallel, and in the first volume of *Capital*,
offers the following analogy: 'As, in religion, man is governed
by the products of his own brain, so in capitalistic production, he is
governed by the products of his own hand' (Marx 1996: 616).
However, rather than equating alienation and fetishism, fetishism is
better thought of as a particular form that alienation might take. (To
be clear, there looks to be no reason to think that Marx would, or
should, disagree with this claim.)



Note, in particular, that although Marx's discussions of
alienation often utilise the language of fetishism, not all of them
take that form. Consider, for instance, the problematic separation
sometimes said to exist between modern individuals and the natural
world, as the former think of themselves and behave as if they were
isolated, or cut off, or estranged, from the latter. The idea here is
reflected in the less 'Promethean' moments of Marx's
work, for example, in the suggestion that the appropriate relation
between humankind and nature would involve not our instrumental
domination of 'the other', but rather a sympathetic
appreciation of our complex interdependence with the natural world of
which we are, in reality, a part. Those moments are perhaps most
evident in Marx's discussion of contemporary
'ecological' threats--including deforestation,
pollution, and population growth--and typically involve his
'metabolic' account of the appropriate relation between
humankind and nature (Foster 1999). The inappropriate modern relation
between humankind and nature here looks like an example of
alienation--there is a problematic separation of self and
other--but certain central characteristics of fetishism would
appear to be absent. Most obviously, the natural world is not a human
creation which has escaped our control; not least, because
nature is not a human creation. Moreover, the impact on humankind
of this particular separation does not comfortably suit the language
of enslavement and domination. Indeed, if anything, our inappropriate
separation from the natural world seems to find expression in our own
ruthlessly instrumental treatment of nature, rather than in
nature's tyranny over us.


### 2.3 Objectification



The second of these adjacent ideas is objectification. The
concept in question is not the idea of objectification--familiar
from certain feminist and Kantian traditions--which concerns the
moral impropriety of systematically treating a human being as if she
were an object, thing, or commodity (Nussbaum 1995). That is a
distinct and important phenomenon, but it is not the one that is
relevant here. In the present context, objectification refers rather
to the role of productive activity in mediating the evolving
relationship between humankind and the natural world. This association
is most familiar from certain Hegelian and Marxist traditions, with
Marx often using the German term
'*Vergegenstandlichung*' to capture what is
here called 'objectification' (e.g., 1975: 272).



Humankind is seen as being part of, and dependent upon, the natural
world. However, nature is initially somewhat stingy with its
blessings; as a result, human beings confront the natural world from
an original position of scarcity, struggling through productive
activity of various kinds to change the material form of
nature--typically through making things--in ways that make
it better reflect and satisfy their own needs and interests. In that
evolving process, both the natural world and humankind come to be
transformed. Through this collective shaping of their material
surroundings, and their increasing productivity, the natural world is
made to be, and seem, less 'other', and human beings
thereby come to objectify themselves, to express their essential
powers in concrete form. These world transforming productive
activities, we might say, embody the progressive self-realisation of
humankind.



On this account, all productive activity would seem to involve
objectification. However, Marx insists that not all productive
activity involves alienation. Moreover, some other forms of
alienation--unrelated to productive activity--have no
obvious connection with objectification.



Marx maintains that productive activity might or might not take an
alienated form. For instance, productive activity in capitalist
societies is typically said to take an alienated form; whereas
productive activity in communist societies is typically predicted to
take an unalienated or meaningful form. Schematically, we might
portray alienated labour (characteristic of capitalist
society) as: being forced; not involving self-realisation (not
developing and deploying essential human powers); not intended to
satisfy the needs of others; and not appropriately appreciated by
those others. And, schematically, we might portray unalienated or
meaningful work (characteristic of communist society) as:
being freely chosen; involving self-realisation (the development and
deployment of essential human powers); being intended to satisfy the
needs of others; and being appropriately appreciated by those
others (Kandiyali 2020). Productive activity mediates the
relationship between humankind and the natural world in both of these
societies, but alienation is found only in the former (capitalist)
case.



For an example of a view which might be said to equate objectification
with alienation, consider what is sometimes called the
'Christian' view of work. On this account, work is seen as
a necessary evil, an unpleasant activity unfortunately required for
our survival. It owes its name to Christianity's embrace of the
claim that alienated work is part of the human condition: at least
since the Fall, human beings are required to work by the sweat of
their brows (see Genesis 31:9). On Marx's account, or something
like it, one might characterise this Christian view as mistakenly
equating objectification and alienation, confusing productive activity
as such with its stunted and inhuman forms. Indeed, one might go
further and suggest that this kind of confusion reflects the alienated
social condition of humankind, embodying an emblematic failure to
understand that material production is a central realm in which human
beings can express, in free and creative ways, the kind of creatures
that they are.



In addition, according to the basic idea defended here, equating
alienation and objectification fails to appreciate that certain forms
of alienation might have nothing at all to do with productive
activity. Their mutual hostility and undisguised contempt confirm that
Gillian and her sister Hanna are alienated from each other, but there
seems little reason to assume that their estrangement is necessarily
related to the world of work or their respective place in it. The
sisters' engagement in productive activity and the forms that it
takes, might well have nothing to do with the problematic separation
here. Imagine that the latter arose from a combination of sibling
rivalry, stubbornness, and a chance misunderstanding at a time of
family crisis involving the death of a parent. This possibility gives
us another reason not to equate alienation and objectification.



In short, neither fetishism, nor objectification, are best construed as identical with alienation. Rather than being synonymous, these concepts only partially overlap. Fetishism can be understood as picking out only a subset--on some accounts perhaps
a large subset--of cases of alienation. And there are forms of
objectification which do not involve alienation (the meaningful work
in communist societies, for instance), as well as forms of
alienation--outside of productive activity--with no obvious
connection to objectification.


## 3. Subjective and Objective Alienation


### 3.1 The Distinction Between Subject and Objective Alienation



The basic idea of alienation may not be unduly elusive or
difficult to understand. However, it obviously does not follow
that there are no complexities or slippery issues here, perhaps
especially once we venture further into the relevant literature.



Three interesting complexities are introduced here. They concern,
respectively: the distinction between subjective and objective
alienation; the need for a criterion identifying candidate separations
as problematic; and the relation between alienation and
value.



This section provides an introduction to, and some initial reflections
on, the first of these interesting complexities; namely, the division
of alienation into subjective and objective varieties (Hardimon 1994:
119-122). Not all theorists or traditions operate (either,
explicitly or implicitly) with this distinction, but it can be a
considerable help in understanding the diagnosis offered by particular
authors and in handling particular cases.



First, alienation is sometimes characterised in terms of how subjects
feel, or think about, or otherwise experience, the problematic
separation here. This can be called *subjective* alienation.
For instance, Ingrid might be said to be alienated because she feels
estranged from the world, because she experiences her life as lacking
meaning, because she does not feel 'at home [*zu
Hause*]' in the world--to adopt the evocative shorthand
sometimes used by Hegel--and so on (e.g. 1991a: SS4A,
SS187A, and SS258A).



Second, alienation is sometimes characterised in terms which make no
reference to the feelings, thoughts, or experience of subjects. This
can be called *objective* alienation. For instance, Julieta
might be said to be alienated because some separation prevents her
from developing and deploying her essential human characteristics,
prevents her from engaging in self-realising activities, and so on.
Such claims are controversial in a variety of ways, but they assume
alienation is about the frustration of that potential, and they make
no reference to whether Julieta herself experiences that lack as a
loss. Maybe Julieta genuinely enjoys her self-realisation-lacking
life, and even consciously rejects the goal of self-realisation as
involving an overly demanding and unattractive ideal.



Subjective alienation is sometimes disparaged - treated, for example,
as concerning 'merely' how an individual
'feels' about 'real' alienation. However, subjective alienation is better understood as a full-blown, meaningful, variety of alienation, albeit
not the only one. If you genuinely feel alienated, then you really are
(subjectively) alienated.


### 3.2 Diagnostic Schema



This distinction between subjective and objective alienation can give
us a useful diagnostic schema. Let us assume--no doubt
controversially--that all combinations of these two forms of
alienation are possible. That gives us four social outcomes to
discuss:



> 
> 
> 
> |  |  |  |
> | --- | --- | --- |
> | Social
> 
> Situation: | Subjective
> 
> Alienation: | Objective
> 
> Alienation: |
> | (i) | [?] | [?] |
> | (ii) | [?] | [?] |
> | (iii) | [?] | [?] |
> | (iv) | [?] | [?] |
> 
> 
> 
> Where: [?] = Absent and [?] = Present
> 
> 
> 


### 3.3 Applications



These various alternative combinations--numbered (i) to (iv)
above--correspond, very roughly, to the ways in which particular
authors have characterised particular kinds of social arrangement or
types of society. Consider, for example, the different views of modern
class-divided society taken by Hegel and Marx.



Marx can be characterised as diagnosing contemporary capitalist
society as corresponding to situation (i); that is, as being a social
world which contains both objective and subjective alienation. On what
we might call his standard view, Marx allows that objective and
subjective alienation are conceptually distinct, but assumes that in
capitalist societies they are typically found together sociologically
(perhaps with the subjective forms tending to track the objective
ones). However, there are passages where he deviates from that
standard view, and--without abandoning the thought that objective
alienation is, in some sense, more fundamental--appears to allow
that, on occasion, subjective and objective alienation can also come
apart sociologically. At least, that is one way of reading a
well-known passage in *The Holy Family* which suggests that
capitalists might be objectively but not subjectively alienated. In
these remarks, Marx recognises that capitalists do not get to engage
in self-realising activities of the right kind (hence their objective
alienation), but observes that--unlike the proletariat--the
capitalists are *content* in their estrangement; not least,
they feel 'at ease' in it, and they feel
'strengthened' by it (Marx and Engels 1975: 36).



In contrast, Hegel maintains that the modern social world approximates
to something more like situation (iii); that is, as being a social
world not containing objective alienation, but still containing
subjective alienation. That is, for Hegel, the social and political
structures of the modern social world do constitute a home, because
they enable individuals to realise themselves, variously as family
members, economic agents, and citizens. However, those same
individuals fail to understand or appreciate that this is the case,
and rather feel estranged from, and perhaps even consciously reject,
the institutions of the modern social world. The resulting situation
has been characterised as one of 'pure subjective
alienation' (Hardimon 1994: 121).



That Hegel and Marx diagnose modern society in these different ways
helps to explain their differing strategic political commitments. They
both aim to bring society closer to situation (iv)--that is, a
social world lacking systematic forms of both objective and subjective
alienation--but, since they disagree about where we are starting
from, they propose different routes to that shared goal. For Marx,
since we start from situation (i), this requires that the existing
world be overturned; that is, that both institutions and attitudes
need to be revolutionised (overcoming objective and subjective
alienation). For Hegel, since we start from situation (iii), this
requires only attitudinal change: we come to recognise that the
existing world is already objectively 'a home', and in
this way 'reconcile' ourselves to that world, overcoming
pure subjective alienation in the process.



Situation (ii) consists of a social world containing objective, but
not subjective, alienation - a situation that can be characterised as
one of 'pure objective alienation' (Hardimon
1994: 120). It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to think of
this situation as corresponding, very roughly, to one of the Frankfurt
School's more nightmarish visions of contemporary capitalist
society. (The Frankfurt School is the colloquial label given to
several generations of philosophers and social theorists, in the
Western Marxist tradition, associated--more or less
closely--with the Institute for Social Research founded in
1929-1930.) For example, in the pessimistic diagnosis of Herbert
Marcuse (1898-1979), articulated in *One-Dimensional Man*
(1964), individuals in advanced capitalist societies appear happy in
their dysfunctional relationships--they 'identify
themselves' with their estranged circumstances and gain
'satisfaction' from them (2002: 13). Objective alienation
still obtains, but no longer generates social conflict, since the
latter is assumed--not implausibly--to require agents who
feel, or experience, some form of hostility or rebelliousness towards
existing social arrangements.



That latter assumption raises the wider issue of the relation between
alienation and, what might be called 'revolutionary
motivation'. Let us assume that radical social change requires,
amongst other conditions, an agent--typically a collective
agent--with both the strength and the desire to bring that change
about. The role of alienation in helping to form that latter
psychological prerequisite--the desire to bring about change on
the part of the putative revolutionary agent--looks complicated.
First, it would seem that the mere fact of objective alienation cannot play
the motivating role, since it does not involve or require any feeling,
or thinking about, or otherwise experiencing, the problematic
separation here. It remains possible, of course, that a subject's knowledge of that alienation
might--depending, not least, on one's views on the
connections between reasons and motivations--provide an
appropriately psychological incentive to revolt. Second, the relation
between subjective alienation and motivation looks more complex than
it might initially seem. Note, in particular, that some of the
experiential dimensions of subjective alienation look less likely than
others to generate the psychological prerequisites of action here.
Feelings of powerlessness and isolation, for instance, might well
generate social withdrawal and individual atomism, rather than radical
social engagement and cooperative endeavour, on the part of the
relevant agents. In short, whether subjective alienation is a friend
or an enemy of revolutionary motivation would seem to depend on the
precise form that it takes.



Interestingly, situation (ii)--that is, the case of 'pure
objective alienation'--might also be thought to approximate
to the social goal of certain thinkers in the tradition of
existentialism (the tradition of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980),
Albert Camus (1913-1960), and others). Some interpretative
generosity may be needed here, but existentialists appear to think of (something like) objective alienation as a permanent feature of all human societies. Rejecting both substantive accounts of essential human nature, and the ethical embrace of social relations
that facilitate the development and deployment of those human
characteristics, they rather maintain that the social world will
always remain 'other', can never be a 'home'.
However, although this 'otherness' can never be overcome,
there do look to be better and worse ways of dealing with it. What is
essential to each individual is what they make of themselves, the ways
in which they choose to engage with that other. The preferred outcome
here seems to involve individuals embodying a norm of
'authenticity', which amongst other conditions--such
as choosing, or committing, to their own projects--may require
that they have the 'courage' to 'grasp, accept, and,
perhaps even affirm' the fact that the social world is not a
home for them (Hardimon 1994: 121).



This also clarifies that situation (iv)--which contains
systematic forms of neither objective or subjective
alienation--is the social goal of some but not all of these
authors (of Hegel and Marx, for instance, but not the
existentialists). Of course, (iv) might also be a characterisation of
the extant social world according to a hypothetical, and
over-optimistic, apologist for the present.


## 4. What Makes a Separation Problematic?


### 4.1 Criteria of 'Impropriety'



The second of the interesting complexities broached here concerns what
we can call the need for a criterion of
'impropriety' - that is, a criterion by which candidate
separations might be identified as problematic or not. Recall the
earlier suggestion that accounts of alienation require some benchmark
condition of harmony or connectedness against which separations might
be assessed as problematic or not.



Historically, this role--identifying whether candidate
separations are problematic--has often been played by accounts of
our essential human nature. However, motivated by suspicion of that
latter idea, theorists of alienation have sometimes sought
alternatives to fulfil that role.


### 4.2 Essential Human Nature



To see how the appeal to human nature works, imagine two hypothetical
theorists--Katerina and Laura--seeking to assess whether
alienation exists in a particular society. We can stipulate that the
institutions and culture of this particular society are
individualistic--in the sense that they systematically frustrate
cooperation and sociability--and that the two theorists share
many, but not all, of the same views. In particular, assume that our
two theorists *agree* that: alienation is a coherent and useful
concept; the account of alienation given here is, broadly
speaking, plausible; the only serious candidate for a problematic
separation in this particular society are those arising from its
individualism; and our essential human nature provides the
benchmark of 'propriety' for assessing separations. Simply
put, separations are problematic if they frustrate, and unproblematic
if they facilitate, 'self-realisation'. Self-realisation
is understood here as a central part of the good life and as
consisting in the development and deployment of an individual's
essential human characteristics. However, assume also that Katerina
and Laura *disagree* about what comprises human nature. In
particular, they disagree about whether cooperation and sociability
are essential human characteristics, with Katerina insisting that they
are and Laura insisting that they are not. It seems to follow that
Katerina will conclude, and Laura will deny, that this society is one
containing alienation. For Katerina, the widespread lack of
cooperation and sociability confirm that the basic social institutions
here *frustrate* our self-realisation. For Laura, the very same
widespread lack of cooperation and sociability confirm that the basic
social institutions *facilitate*, or at least do *not*
frustrate, our self-realisation.



Note that in sub-section 1.2, where the basic idea of alienation was
elaborated, various relations between subject and object were
distinguished, only one of which was characterised as reflexive.
However, in the light of the present discussion, we might now think it
more accurate to say that--on this kind of account, which
uses our essential human nature to identify alienation--only
one of them was *directly* reflexive, because there is some
sense in which all of those dimensions of alienation involve a
separation from some aspect of our own human nature. After all, this
is precisely what picks out the relevant separation as problematic.
For example, the separation of individuals from each other is, for
Katerina, indirectly also a separation from human nature, from the
cooperation and sociability that characterises our essential
humanity.


### 4.3 An Alternative Criterion



As already noted, this benchmark--by which candidate separations
are assessed as problematic or not--is often, but not always,
played by accounts of our essential human nature. Given the widespread
contemporary suspicion of such accounts--not least, by those
opposed to what is sometimes called 'essentialism' about
human nature--it might be helpful to sketch a recent account
of alienation which is not dependent on such assumptions (or, at
least, consciously strives to avoid them). There is also a potential
benefit here for those of us who do not fully share that suspicion,
namely, that such an example might provide some sense of the
diversity of available theories of alienation.



Rahel Jaeggi offers an account of alienation of this kind, and
situates it explicitly in the tradition of Critical Theory - the kind
of emancipatory theory associated with the Frankfurt School. On this
account, the idea of alienation has the potential to help us
understand and change the world, but only if it receives some
significant conceptual reconstruction. Alienation is still associated
with the frustration of freedom, with disruptions to something like
'self-realisation'. However, this account--unlike its
forerunners and associates--is said not to be fatally compromised
by a commitment to either 'strongly objectivistic'
theories of the good life or 'essentialist' conceptions of
the self (Jaeggi 2014: 40).



The crucial term of art here is 'appropriation', which
Jaeggi uses to refer to the capacity for, and process of, relating to
our own actions and projects in ways which engage 'something
like self-determination and being the author of one's own
life' (2014: 39). Appropriation is successful--and
alienation is absent--when 'one is present in one's
actions, steers one's life instead of being driven by it,
independently appropriates social roles and is able to identify with
one's desires, and is involved in the world' (Jaeggi 2014:
155). In contrast, appropriation is unsuccessful--and alienation
is present--when there is 'an inadequate power and a lack
of presence in what one does, a failure to identify with one's
own actions and desires and to take part in one's own
life' (Jaeggi 2014: 155). Alienation is thus identified with
systematic disruptions of the process of appropriation - in particular,
in those systematic disruptions which lead us to fail to experience
our actions and projects as our own. These disruptions are said
typically to take one of four forms: first,
'powerlessness' or the experience of losing control over
one's own life; second, 'loss of authenticity'
especially when one is unable to identify with one's own social
roles; third, 'internal division' where one experiences
some of one's own desires and impulses as alien; and fourth,
'indifference' or a detachment from one's own
previous projects and self-understandings.



This model fits happily enough with our basic idea of alienation as
consisting in a problematic separation between self and other
that belong together. However, the conditions for identifying
the relevant dysfunctional relation here are intended to be less
demanding and controversial than those involving claims about our
essential human nature. There is a kindred notion of freedom as
self-realisation, but it is said to be the realisation of a thin kind
of self-determining agency and not the actualisation of some thick
'pre-given' identity of an essentialist sort. A normative
dimension remains, but it is presented as expansive and broadly
procedural. It is expansive in that a wide range of actions and
projects might be included within its remit. And it is procedural in
that the benchmark for judging the success of these various actions
and projects is that they were brought about in the right kind of
self-determination delivering way, and not that their content reflects
a narrow and controversial account of what human beings are 'in
essence'.



Modern culture is said to recognise and value the kind of freedom at
the heart of this picture of appropriation. As a result, this account
of alienation can be presented as a form of *immanent
critique* - that is, as utilising a standpoint which judges
individuals and forms of life according to standards that those
individuals have themselves propounded or which those forms of life
presuppose. At the individual level, this critique might involve
identifying potential tensions between the conditions for treating
people as responsible agents, and the obstructions to such agency that
characterise alienated selves - for instance, the feelings of
powerlessness that prevent individuals from directing and embracing
their own lives. And at the social level, this critique might involve
identifying potential discrepancies between modern ideals of freedom
and their actual realisation in the contemporary world - for instance,
the existence of social or political roles that an individual can
never make their own (Jaeggi 2014: 41-42).



Of course, there remain questions about this account, and three are
broached here. First, one might doubt whether the contrast between
essentialist accounts of human nature, on the one hand, and a thinner
kind of self-governing agency, on the other, can either be sustained
or play the role intended. Second, one might wonder about the
ground(s) of normativity; after all, that the kind of subjectivity or
self-determination which appropriation embodies is recognised and
valued in modern culture does not in itself establish its ethical
worth. (More generally, it can seem easier to dismiss Hegelian
teleology, or Marxist perfectionism, than it is to find wholly
satisfactory replacements for them.) Third, one might be sceptical
about the degree of social criticism here, since both the sources of,
and solutions to, Jaeggi's paradigmatic examples of
unsuccessful appropriation ('powerless', 'loss
of authenticity', 'internal division',
and 'indifference') seem to focus on the
'thoughts and dispositions' of individuals rather than the
structures of particular societies (Haverkamp 2016, 69). Of course,
there might be plausible responses to these critical worries, some
of which could draw on Jaeggi's own subsequent work
(see espcially 2018). 


## 5. Alienation and Value


### 5.1 Negative Element



The third of these interesting complexities concerns the ethical
dimension of alienation. The connections between alienation and ethics
are many and diverse, and there is no attempt here to sketch that
wider landscape in its entirety. Instead, attention is drawn to two
topographical features: the claim that alienation is necessarily a
negative, but not a wholly negative, phenomenon, is elaborated and
defended; and the suggestion that some forms of moral theory or even
morality itself might encourage or embody alienation is briefly
outlined.



The claim that alienation is necessarily a negative, but not a wholly
negative, phenomenon can be addressed in two parts. Defending the
first part of that claim looks straightforward enough. Alienation, on
the present account, consists in the separation of certain entities
- a subject and some object--that properly belong together.
As a result, alienation always involves a loss or lack of something of
value, namely, the 'proper'--rational, natural, or
good--harmony or connectedness between the relevant subject and
object. 


### 5.2 Positive Element



It is the second part of the claim which looks less obvious: that
alienation is not a wholly negative phenomena, that is, that the loss
or lack here may not always be the whole story, ethically speaking.
Note, in particular, that some well-known accounts also locate an
achievement of something of value in the moment of alienation. The resulting ethical
'gains' and 'losses' would then need to be weighed and
judged overall.



In order to illustrate this possibility--that alienation can
involve the achievement of something of value--consider the
nuanced and critical celebration of capitalism found, but not always
recognised, in Marx's writings. One pertinent way of introducing
this account involves locating the moment of alienation within a
pattern of development that we might call 'dialectical' in
one sense of that slippery term.



The dialectical pattern here concerns the developing relationship
between a particular subject and object: the individual, on the one
hand, and their social role and community, on the other. By a
*dialectical* progression is meant only a movement from a stage
characterised by a relationship of 'undifferentiated
unity', through a stage characterised by a relationship of
'differentiated disunity', to a stage characterised by a
relationship of 'differentiated unity'.
There are no further claims made here about the necessity, the naturalness, or the
prevalence, of such progressions (Cohen 1974: 237).



The dialectical progression here involves three *historical*
stages:



First, *past* (pre-capitalist) societies are said to
embody undifferentiated unity. In this stage, individuals
are buried in their social role and community, scarcely
conceptualising, still less promoting, their own identity and
interests as distinguishable from those of the wider community.



Second, *present* (capitalist) societies are said to
embody differentiated disunity. In this stage, independence
and separation predominate, and individuals care only for themselves,
scarcely thinking of the identity and interests of the wider
community. Indeed, they are typically isolated from, and indifferent
or even hostile towards, the latter.



Third, *future* (communist) societies are said to
embody differentiated unity. In this stage, desirable
versions of community and individuality flourish together. Indeed, in
their new forms, communal and individual identities and communal and
individual interests presuppose and reinforce each other. It is
sometimes said that the contents of the first two stages (community
and individuality, respectively) have thereby been
'sublated'--that is, elevated, cancelled, and
preserved--in this third stage. 'Sublated' is an
attempted English translation of the German verb
'*aufheben*'and its cognates, which Hegel
occasionally uses to suggest this elusive combination of ideas (e.g.
Hegel 1991b: SS24A3, SS81A1).



In the present context, the crucial historical stage is the second
one. This is the stage of alienation, the stage of disunity which
emerges from a simple unity before reconciliation in a higher
(differentiated) unity (Inwood 1992: 36). This is the stage associated
with present (capitalist) societies involving the problematic
separation of individuals from their social role and community. In the
first historical stage (of past pre-capitalist societies) there is a
problematic relation, but no separation. And in the third historical
stage (of future communist societies) there is a separation but it is
a healthy rather than problematic one. In this second historical stage
of alienation, there is a loss, or lack, of something of value;
roughly speaking, it is the loss or lack of the individuals'
attachment to their social role and community. (More precisely, we
might say that they have lost a sense of, and connection to, the
community, and that they lack a healthy sense of, and connection to,
the community.)



However, this disvalue is not the whole of the historical story,
ethically speaking. In comparison with the first stage, the second
stage also involves a liberation of sorts from the object in which
subjects were previously 'engulfed' (Cohen 1974: 239). The
'of sorts' is a way of acknowledging that this is a rather
distinctive kind of liberation. The individual here is not necessarily
rid of the constraints of the other (of their social position and
community), but they do now at least identify and experience them as
such--that is, as constraints on the individual--whereas
previously the individual was engulfed by that other and failed to
think of themselves as having any identity and interests outside of
their social position. In short, the loss or lack of something of
value is not the only feature of the second stage of alienation. There
is also an important gain here, namely, the achievement of what we can
call 'individuality'. This significant good was missing in
the first pre-capitalist stage, and--freed from its present
distorting capitalist form--it will be preserved and developed in
the communist future of the third historical stage.



This claim goes beyond the familiar suggestion that alienation forms a
necessary step in certain Hegelian and Marxist developmental
narratives. The suggestion here is that internal to the second stage,
the stage of alienation, there is both a problematic separation from
community and a positive liberation from engulfment. Those who see
only the negative thread in alienation, and fail to see 'what is
being achieved within in and distorted by it', will miss an
important, albeit subtle, thread in Marx's account of the
progressive character of capitalism (Cohen 1974: 253).



There is a lot going on in this schematic discussion of historical
stages. The point emphasised here is that theorists--even
critics--of alienation need not assume that it is a wholly
negative phenomena, ethically speaking. Marx, for example, recognises
that the moment of alienation, for all its negative features, also
involves the emergence of a good (individuality), which, in due course
(and freed from the limitations of its historical origins), will be
central to the human flourishing achieved in communist
society.


### 5.3 Morality as Alienating



This claim--that alienation might not be a wholly negative
phenomenon--concerns the normative dimensions of alienation.
However, it is sometimes suggested that the concept of alienation
might provide a standpoint from which morality itself, or at least
some forms of it, can be criticised. This looks to be a very
different kind of thought.



The broad suggestion is that morality, or certain conceptions of
morality, might embody, or encourage, alienation. More precisely,
morality, or certain conceptions of morality, might embody or
encourage a problematic division of self and a problematic separation
from much that is valuable in our lives. Consider, for example,
accounts of the moral standpoint as requiring universalisation and
equal consideration of all persons (Railton 1984: 138). It could seem
that adopting such a standpoint requires individuals to disown or
downplay the relevance of their more personal or partial (as opposed to impartial) beliefs and
feelings. The picture of persons divided into cognitive and affective
parts, with the partial and personal relegated to the downgraded
sphere of the latter (perhaps conceptualised as something closer to
mere sentiment than reason) is a familiar one. In addition to that
problematic bifurcation of the self, such accounts might seem to cut
us off from much that is valuable in our lives. If these impersonal
kinds of moral consideration are to dominate our practical reasoning,
then it seems likely that an individual's particular
attachments, loyalties, and commitments will have, at best, a marginal
place (Railton 1984: 139). In aspiring to adopt 'the point of
view of the universe'--to use the well-known phrase of
Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) - there can sometimes seem to
be precious little security or space remaining for, say, friendship,
love, and family (Sidgwick 1907: 382). So understood, morality, or
certain conceptions of morality, are charged with embodying and
encouraging alienation in the form of both a divided self, and a
separation of self and world.



The weight and scope of these kinds of concerns about alienation
can obviously vary; that is, they might be thought to have more or
less critical purchase on a wider or narrower range of targets. There
are various possibilities here. These concerns might, for
example, be said to apply: first, only to certain kinds of personality
types inclined to adopt particular moral theories, and not to the
theories themselves (Piper 1987); second, only to certain ways of
formulating particular moral theories (the objections here being
overcome by a more adequate formulation of
the particular theories in question); third, only to particular
moral theories (such as act utilitarianism, certain forms of
consequentialism, or all impartial moral theories) to which they
constitute foundational objections (but not to morality as such);
and, fourth, as a foundational objection that counts
against 'the peculiar institution' of morality itself
(Williams 1985: 174). Given both that variety and the subject matter
of this entry, it may not be helpful to generalise much more here.
However, the point is hopefully made that the ethical dimensions of
the present topic extend beyond the normative assessment of the
relevant separations. Indeed, taking alienation seriously might lead
us to think more critically about some familiar moral standpoints and
theories.


## 6. Some (Unresolved) Empirical Issues


### 6.1 Content



The above discussion of the concept of alienation--clarifying its
basic shape, sketching some of its theoretical forms, and introducing
a few complexities--still leaves many issues unresolved.
These include many empirical and quasi-empirical issues. The
present section is concerned with some of the
empirical assumptions and claims that appear in what might be
called broadly philosophical accounts of alienation of the kind
discussed above. It is not directly concerned with the extensive
social scientific literature on alienation. That latter
literature is often preoccupied
with 'operationalising' the concept--for
instance, treating job satisfaction or absenteeism as proxies of
alienated work--in order to engineer predictive models in
disciplines (including education, psychology, sociology, and
management studies) dealing with a variety of real world contexts
(see e.g. Chiaburu *et al* 2014).



As an example of some of the empirical dimensions of broadly
philosophical accounts of alienation, consider Marx's
characterisation of capitalist society as characterised by
separations which frustrate self-realisation, especially
self-realisation in work. To come to a considered judgement about the
plausibility of his views on this topic, one would have to be in a
position to assess, amongst other issues, whether work in capitalist
societies is necessarily alienated. One would need to judge not only
whether existing work is rightly characterised as alienated (as
forced, frustrating self-realisation, not intended to satisfy the
needs of others, and not appropriately appreciated by those others),
but also, if so, whether it could be made meaningful and unalienated
without undermining the very features which made the relevant society
a capitalist one. (There are, of course, also many more
normative-looking issues here regarding that account of human
flourishing: whether, for example, Marx overestimates the value of
creative and fulfilling work, and underestimates the value of,
say, leisure and intellectual excellence.) Reaching anything like a
considered judgment on these empirical and quasi-empirical issues
would clearly require some complicated factual assessments of, amongst
other issues, the composition and functioning of human nature and the
extant social world.


### 6.2 Extent



A range of complex empirical and quasi-empirical issues also look to
be woven into Marx's views about the historical extent of
alienation. Consider the various claims about the
historical location and comparative intensity of alienation that can
be found in his writings (and in certain secondary
interpretations of those writings). These include: first, that
certain systematic forms of alienation--including alienation in
work--are not a universal feature of human society (not least,
they will not be a feature of a future communist order); second, that
at least some systematic forms of alienation--presumably
including the alienation that Marx identifies as embodied in religious belief --are widespread in pre-capitalist
societies; and third, that systematic forms of alienation are greater
in contemporary capitalist societies than in pre-capitalist
societies. There seems no good textual or theoretical reason to
lumber Marx with the view that less systematic forms of alienation--such as the hypothetical estrangement of Gillian from her sister Hanna (which arose from sibling rivalry, stubbornness, and a chance misunderstanding at a time of family crisis)--could never exist under communism.



Take the last of these assorted empirical claims attributed to Marx - the comparative
verdict about the extent or intensity of systematic forms of alienation in capitalist
societies. Its plausibility is scarcely incontrovertible given the
amount of sheer productive drudgery, and worse, in pre-capitalist
societies. Nor is it obvious how one might attempt to substantiate the
empirical dimensions of the claim. The empirical difficulties of
measuring subjective alienation look considerable enough (especially
given the limitations of historical data), but alienation for Marx is
fundamentally about the frustration of objective human potentials,
those separations that prevent self-realisation, perhaps especially
self-realisation in work. One suggestion, made in this context, is
that the scale of alienation in a particular society might be
indicated by the gap between the liberating potential of human
productive powers, on the one hand, and the extent to which that
potential is reflected in the lives actually lived by producers, on
the other (Wood 2004: 44-48). Whatever the appeal of that
suggestion, the social scientific details of how one might actually
apply that kind of measure in particular historical cases remain
unclear.


### 6.3 Prognosis



Related worries might also apply to claims about the prognosis for
alienation, in particular, about whether and how alienation might be
overcome. Consider, for instance, Marx's view that communist
society will be free of certain systematic forms of alienation, such
as alienation in work. Marx's view about communism rests crucially on the judgement that it is the social relations of
capitalist society, and not its material or technical arrangements,
which are the cause of systematic forms of alienation. For instance,
he holds that it is not the existence of science, technology, and
industrialisation, as such, which are at the root of the social and
psychological ills of alienation, but rather how those factors tend to
be organised and used in a capitalist society. (For present
purposes, just assume that a society is capitalist when its
economic structure is based on a particular class division - in
which producers can only access means of production by selling their
labour power--and when production, and much else, is driven
by a remorseless search for profit.) In volume one of
*Capital*, Marx writes approvingly of workers who, through time
and experience, had learnt 'to distinguish between machinery and
its employment by capital, and to direct their attacks, not against
the material instruments of production, but against the mode in which
they are used' (1996: 432). If this had not been his view, Marx
could not have, consistently, also suggested that communist society
- which, on his account, is similarly technologically advanced
and industrial--could avoid this kind of alienation. This
suggestion is, nonetheless, strikingly sanguine. Marx is confident,
for instance, that the considerable gulf between the gloomy results of
adopting machinery in the capitalist present (where it increases the
repetitiveness of tasks, narrows talents, promotes
'deskilling', and so on) and the bright promise of its
adoption in the communist future (where it will liberate us from
uncreative tasks, create greater wealth, develop all-round abilities,
and so on) is easily bridged. However, Marx's
'utopophobia'--that is, his reluctance to say very
much, in any close detail, about the future shape of socialist
society - prevents him from offering any serious discussion
about how precisely this might be done (Leopold 2016). As a result,
even the mildest of sceptics could reasonably worry that a range of
difficult empirical and other questions are evaded rather than
answered here.



This issue--whether, and to what extent, alienation can be
overcome in modern societies--is sometimes conflated with the
issue of whether, and to what extent, alienation is a historically
universal phenomena. To see that these are distinct questions,
imagine that alienation only emerges in economically developed
societies, that it is a necessary feature of economically developed
societies, and that economically developed societies never revert
voluntarily to economically undeveloped ones. These are not
implausible claims, but together they seem to entail that, although
only a subset of historical societies are scarred by
alienation, if you happen to live in an economically developed
society, then--involuntary Armageddon apart--alienation will
remain the fate of you and your successors.



My aim here is not to make significant progress in resolving any of
these empirical and quasi-empirical issues, but rather to
acknowledge their existence and extent. Since the concept of
alienation diagnoses a complex range of social ills involving self and
other, it is perhaps not surprising that a variety of such issues
are implicated in these various accounts of its proper
characterisation, its historical scope, and the possibilities for
overcoming it. Nonetheless, it remains important to acknowledge the
existence and complexity of these empirical and quasi-empirical
threads, not least because they are not always adequately recognised
or dealt with in the broadly philosophical discussions of alienation
which are the focus of the discussion here.