## 1. Introduction




In the introduction to *ha-Emunah ha-Ramah* (henceforth:
*ER*) Abraham Ibn Daud states that he decided to write his book
in order to solve the problem of free will. Scripture fails to provide
an unequivocal answer to this problem, since biblical verses on this
issue seem to contradict one another. Ibn Daud is convinced that
philosophy can help to distinguish between the verses that should be
understood literally and those that are in need of interpretation. In
his view, the problem in his day is that those who have begun to study
philosophy are unable to keep the lamps of philosophy and religion
burning simultaneously "for if the lamp of philosophy is
kindled, the lamp of religion goes out" (*ER* W 2; S
 3b-4b).[1]
 This is why certain people believe that it is better to steer well
clear of the study of philosophy. The consequence thereof is that many
Jews are at a loss when it comes to solving religious problems, such
as the problem of free will. According to Ibn Daud, this is because
they fail to investigate the principles of religion with the help of
philosophy and to search for the harmony between the two modes of
knowledge. His book intends to remedy this situation by showing
beginning students of philosophy how to establish such harmony.




Ibn Daud thus reveals himself to be a staunch advocate of the study
of philosophy and the use of reason to achieve the correct
interpretation of problematical biblical passages. In his view, the
fact that man is endowed with reason obliges him to use his
intellect. Throughout his treatise, he strives to demonstrate how
reason and Scripture are not at variance with each other and that
"true philosophy" is contained in Scripture.


## 2. Biography




The exact date of Ibn Daud's birth is unknown. It is commonly
assumed that he was born c. 1110 in one of the major centers of Muslim
Spain, perhaps Cordoba. He himself asserts that he received his
education from his maternal uncle, an uncle who is known to have been
active as both a teacher and a communal leader in Cordoba, where he
died in 1126. Although no further data are available, it is evident
from his works that this education must have been a combination of
"Greek wisdom" and traditional Jewish learning. Greek
wisdom in the cultural setting of Andalusia refers to the study of
classical science and philosophy as taught by Muslim scholars and
philosophers. Indeed, his writings testify to a thorough familiarity
with Greek philosophy and science as read by the Muslim philosophers
al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, as well as with rabbinic literature, Hebrew
poetry, and Jewish philosophy. He also appears to have had some
knowledge of the New Testament and Christian and Muslim polemical
literature. Later in life, Ibn Daud moved to Toledo, presumably as a
result of the Almohad invasion of Andalusia (1147), an event that led
many Jews to flee from Southern Spain. In any event it is in Toledo
that he wrote his two major works in defense of Judaism (circa
1160/61): the philosophical treatise *ER* and the historical
*Sefer ha-Qabbalah* (cf. below section 3). Ibn Daud is reported
to have died a martyr's death in Toledo c. 1180. The earliest
reference to this was made by the Toledan philosophic author Judah ben
Solomon ha-Kohen in his encyclopedia *Midrash ha-Hokhmah* (first
half of the 13th century).




Since 1954 scholars of Jewish and Latin philosophy have been intrigued
by M.T. d'Alverny's suggestion that Abraham Ibn Daud is the same
person as the twelfth-century Arabic-into-Latin translator Avendauth,
also known as "Avendeuth philosophus israelita", who
collaborated with Dominicus Gundissalinus in Toledo. Though appealing,
no indisputable proof could be provided for this
identification. Recent research on the Toledan Arabic-into-Latin
translation program, however, has provided strong support in favor of
d'Alverny's identity-suggestion. The new studies portray Avendauth as
the motive force (Bertolacci 2011:54) behind the Latin translations of
Ibn Sina.(D'Alverny 1954; Bertolacci
2011; Burnett 2009; Fidora 2011; Hasse 2006; Schwartz 2013;Freudenthal 2016).


## 3. Major Works




Ibn Daud's two major works are *Sefer ha-Qabbalah* (The
Book of Tradition) and *Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah*. Both books were
written around the same time (c. 1160). They are closely related in
the sense that they endeavor to defend rabbinic Judaism; the former
with the help of history and the latter with the help of
philosophy.

 The purpose of Sefer ha-Emunah ha-Ramah was to prove
the truth of the words of the prophets by philosophical means, while
Sefer ha-Qabbalah and related historical works were intended to
confirm the validity of the prophecies by demonstrating the
reliability of their transmission from one generation to the next



In *Sefer ha-Qabbalah*, which has become a classic in Hebrew
literature, Abraham ibn Daud provides a survey of Jewish and general
history and attempts to demonstrate the continuity of rabbinic
Judaism. According to G.D.Cohen this work also conveys an esoteric
message of messianic redemption in the near future, a thesis that was
challenged by E. Krakowski (2007) as well as by K. Vehlow, who
recently edited the two chronicles appended to *Sefer
ha-Qabbalah*: one on the history of the kings of Israel during the
Second Temple period, and the other on the history of Rome, which are
similarly polemical in nature (2013). The chronicles had a wide impact
on Protestant authors from the 16th century onwards.




His philosophical book was written in Arabic and entitled
*al-'Aqidah al-rafi'ah* (The Exalted
Faith). The Arabic original is no longer extant. Towards the end of
the fourteenth century, the work was translated into Hebrew twice: the
first time under the title *Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah* by Solomon ben
Lavi (c. 1370?), possibly at the instigation of the philosopher Hasdai
Crescas, and a second time under the title *Ha-Emunah
Nissa'ah* by Samuel ibn Motot. This second translation is
based on the first, but is less accurate (Eran 1996). Of this version
only one copy is extant, whereas of *Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah* 16
manuscripts are known (some of them are not complete). 




Ibn Daud is also reported to have written a book on astronomy, the
contents of which are unknown. The same applies to an anti-Karaite
polemical work, which he mentions himself. Moreover, K. Szilagyi has
discovered a fragment of an otherwise unknown work by Ibn Daud on
*Physics* in Arabic. 




In the introduction to *ER*, Ibn Daud mentions two earlier
Jewish philosophers: Saadya (often described as the first Jewish
philosopher, first half of the 10th century, Baghdad) and
the philosopher-poet Solomon ibn Gabirol (11th century,
Spain). However, he dismisses their writings claiming that they are
inadequate with respect to his goal, namely the study of philosophy in
order to examine the principles of religion. This statement reflects
Ibn Daud's awareness of introducing a new trend to Jewish
philosophy. Saadya's *Sefer ha-Emunot we-ha-De'ot* (Book
of Opinions and Beliefs) provides a rationalistic interpretation of
Judaism, but is influenced by the thought of the Muslim
kalam-theologians, which was considered outdated in Ibn Daud's
day, whereas Ibn Gabirol's *Meqor Hayyim* (known in Latin as
*Fons* *Vitae*) is a neo-Platonist work, which makes no
reference at all to Jewish sources. Indeed, Ibn Daud's book
constitutes a novelty in that it is the first attempt to
systematically introduce the Aristotelianism of the Muslim
philosophers Alfarabi (870-950) and Ibn Sina (980-1037) into Jewish
philosophy. His philosophical terminology and syllogistic reasoning
are derived from the works of these authors. His
"technical" approach has led Husik to observe that
"Ibn Daud leaves upon us the impression of a precise thinker,
cold and analytical. He exhibits no grace of style, eloquence of
diction or depths of enthusiasm and emotion" (Husik 2002:
198). This judgment of his style may be too harsh. Undoubtedly his
book must have made some demands on it readers, but it is only fair to
note that Ibn Daud attempts to liven up the monotony of his logical
arguments at regular intervals by using analogies and quotes from
poems.


## 4. Structure and Sources of *ER*


### 4.1 Structure




Ibn Daud's book consists of an introduction and three parts of unequal
length. In the introduction, Ibn Daud states that the problem of free
will, which prompted him to write his book, can only be solved after
the preparatory philosophical study of a variety of issues in the
field of physics and metaphysics. In what may be called a "table
of contents", he specifies the various topics to be discussed in
his book in his introduction; topics with which the beginning student
must become familiar. The first part (Weil 1852, 4-43) deals
with the basic principles of (Aristotelian) physics and
metaphysics. It opens with a logical section that treats substance and
the categories (I.1). This is followed by discussions on matter, form
and the elements (I.2), motion and infinity (I.3-5), the soul (I.6-7)
and the heavenly spheres (I.8). According to Ibn Daud, this
constitutes the minimum requirements for an investigation of the
Jewish religion. The "principles of religion" provide the
subject matter for the second part (Weil 1852, 44-98). Here Ibn
Daud is concerned with God's existence and unity (II.1-2), divine
attributes (II.3), cosmology and the heavenly intelligences (II.4),
prophecy and the defense of Mosaic Law (II.5), and, finally, angelology and the
problem of free will (II.6). The third and final part (Weil 1852,
98-104), deals with ethics. In this work, Ibn Daud thus offers a
comprehensive survey of the contemporary philosophical debate. Due to
the variety of topics covered, the book has been characterized as a
compendium or a "philosophical encyclopedia in miniature"
(Arfa 1954, 2).




In accordance with Ibn Daud's concern for the harmony between
revelation and reason, biblical exegesis occupies a prominent place in
the *ER*. Up to the section on prophecy (II.5), the discussion
of each and every philosophical topic is followed by a section in which
Ibn Daud provides biblical verses that are intended to point to or
demonstrate the truths of the philosophical teachings in the preceding
philosophical account. In this way Ibn Daud endeavors step by step to
prove that "true philosophy" does not contradict
revelation. From the chapter on prophecy onwards, however, biblical
passages are not provided in a separate section, but are instead
interwoven into the philosophical discussion; indeed they lie at the
heart of it.


### 4.2 Sources




The "true philosophy" that Ibn Daud expounds is the form
of Aristotelianism, which was articulated by the Muslim philosophers
Alfarabi and especially Ibn Sina. Ibn Daud refers to Alfarabi's
commentary on Aristotle's *Topics* and seems to have been
familiar with his commentary on the *Categories* as well. In
general, Ibn Daud was influenced by Alfarabi's thought as
presented in *as-Siyasat
al-madaniyya* (The Political Regime). Even more important for Ibn
Daud's system was Ibn Sina's thought. Many of the
demonstrations in the *ER* are based on works by this author,
in particular his encyclopedic works *Kitab
al-Shifa'* and *Kitab
an-Najat*. Most influential was Ibn Sina's psychology,
as well as his views of the Necessary Being, cosmology and the origin of
evil. Ibn Daud also drew on the work of the critic of these
philosophers, al-Ghazali (1058-1111) who summarized their teachings in
*Maqasid al-Falasifa* (The Intentions of the
Philosophers). It is most probable that Ibn Daud's book reflects
al-Najat in its purpose, organization, and language. Another source
of inspiration was the Muslim theologian and polemist Ibn Hazm, whose
anti-Jewish polemic inspired Ibn Daud's Biblical exegesis. As
for his Jewish predecessors, Ibn Daud built on
Saadya's *Emunot* and was certainly familiar with Judah
Halevi, although he does not explicitly mention him by name
(cf. section 5.7 below). Occasionally, one also comes across views
that he shares with Bahya ibn Paquda, Ibn Zaddiq, or Abraham ibn
Ezra.


## 5. Main Themes in *ER*


### 5.1 Substance, Accident, and Natural Philosophy




Ibn Daud's Aristotelian orientation is immediately evident in
his analysis of the notions of substance and accident, with which his
book opens. Everything that is, is either substance or accident.
Criticizing the neo-Platonic approach of Solomon ibn Gabirol, who held
that substance and accident are relative terms, so that the selfsame
thing can be a substance in one respect and an accident in another, he
insists that substance and accident are absolute terms and that a thing
is either a substance or an accident, but not both. The fact that
certain substances derive their existence from a cause, and that they
can be ordered hierarchically, does not detract from their
substantiality: ontologically all substances are alike. This initial
inquiry into the ontological constitution of existing things and the
correct understanding of "substance" as that which
constitutes the essence of a thing (and is thus more worthy of the term
"being" than is accident) is crucial to Ibn Daud. Besides
forming the point of departure for a systematic discussion of various
kinds of substances, corporeal and incorporeal, it allows him to prove
that the soul is a substance, not an accident. Moreover, the
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substances introduces the
reader to the existence of celestial intelligences; the incorporeal
simple substances that play a central role in his thought.




Ibn Daud's discussion of substance and accidents includes a
survey of the Aristotelian categories, which is largely based on the
accounts of the Muslim philosophers. After this initial exposition, the
categories are not given much further attention in the rest of the
book. For our purposes, however, it is important to note that this
overview of the categories is the first systematic presentation of the
subject or, for that matter, of any other logical work by Aristotle, in
Jewish philosophy.




The introduction on substance and accident leads Ibn Daud to a
discussion of the question of the sense in which form and matter, the
two constituents of physical beings, are substances, which allows Ibn
Daud to introduce the notions of potentiality and actuality. He then
proceeds to deal with other basic principles of Aristotelian
philosophy, such as motion and infinity. I will not go into detail
here, since Ibn Daud's exposition does not actually provide any
important new insights. Instead his aim is to introduce the beginning
student to Aristotelian physics and metaphysics. However, it is worth
noting that, while earlier Jewish philosophers, such as Ibn Zaddiq,
had dealt with substance and accident and other such principles, Ibn
Daud is the first to do so coherently and comprehensively from an
Aristotelian viewpoint. His proofs for the theses that every motion
requires a mover and that the existence of an infinite series in
actuality is impossible are two cases in point. The same can be said
of his expositions on the soul.


### 5.2 Soul




The soul is an important and central issue in the *ER*, related
as it is to Ibn Daud's treatment of the aforementioned
key-concepts of Aristotelian natural philosophy on the one hand, and
to his discussions of cosmology, prophecy and ethics on the
other. About one fifth of the book is devoted to an investigation of
the soul, its nature and faculties, its relation to the body and its
afterlife (*ER* W 20-41; S 54b-116b). Ibn Daud infers the
existence of something like the soul from the fact that different
natural bodies are characterized by various actions, which can only be
explained by positing the existence of an immaterial principle that is
added to their corporeality and from which these actions derive.
Following Aristotle, Ibn Daud defines the soul as the perfection of a
natural organic body that possesses life potentially. Elaborating on
the distinction between soul and accident, he maintains that the soul
is a substance (in the sense of form), refuting the view of the
"physicians" that it is a mixture, thereby dismissing all
other theories according to which the soul is an accident. In
contradistinction to earlier Jewish philosophers of neo-Platonic
orientation, Ibn Daud emphasizes the unity of the soul.




A key idea in Ibn Daud's detailed description of the various
functions of the vegetative, animal and rational faculties is the
notion that there is a hierarchy of soul-faculties, in which the lower
ones serve the higher. The speculative faculty of the human soul
occupies the highest position in this hierarchy. Thanks to this
faculty, which is directed towards the incorporeal world, man can
perfect his knowledge and apprehend the incorporeal beings that are
called angels in Scripture. It thus constitutes the link between man,
angels and God. This faculty is served by the practical faculty, which
is directed to the corporeal world, and governs man's conduct.
Although the soul is dependent on the body during the first stages of
the acquisition of knowledge when the intellect passes from
potentiality to actuality, it can exist separate from the body when it
has attained the stage of acquired intellect. The rational soul is,
therefore, immortal. According to Ibn Daud,



> 
>  ... the ultimate purpose of the creation of bodies in the
> physical world was that from the world of generation and corruption
> immaterial immortal substances would be purified. Such a substance is
> the human soul that is perfected by true knowledge and correct action
> (*ER* W 23-24; S 65b-66b).
>  




The importance of Ibn Daud's psychology does not lie so much in its
contents (that are largely based on Ibn Sina's psychology), but
primarily in its detailed treatment and in the manner in which he
employs and adapts Ibn Sina's theories so as to accommodate his own
purposes. The premise that the human soul is an incorporeal
substance is the key to the philosophers' promise that internalizing
the intellectual and eternal truths will grant eternal life. The
question of immortality is a sophisticated conversion of a theological
problem into a philosophical argument regarding the eternity of truth
and spiritual pleasures. It is based on Ibn Sina's discourse on this
issue, and in many cases quotes him word for word.


### 5.3 God and Divine Attributes




Ibn Daud deviates significantly from his predecessors since he does
not deduce the existence of God from creation. In fact, as we shall
later see, Ibn Daud has little to say on the issue of creation.
Instead, his two proofs are based on Aristotle's theory of
motion, which presents a novelty in medieval Jewish thought. The first
proof makes use of two theses that were proven in the sections on
motion and infinity respectively: firstly, there is no motion without a
mover, and secondly, the existence of an infinite series in actuality
is impossible. On the basis of these premises, Ibn Daud establishes the
existence of a first unmoved mover. Unlike Aristotle, however, he does
not base the incorporeality and infinity of this first mover on the
eternity of motion; an Aristotelian doctrine that he prefers to leave
unmentioned. The second proof is based on the distinction between
necessary and possible (or contingent) existents. The latter class of
existents derives their existence from a cause. Since an infinite
regress of causes is impossible, the series of contingent beings must
end with the existence of an uncaused being who is called the Necessary
Being and whose essence suffices for its existence. Evidently Ibn Daud
considered the second to be a better proof than the first given that it
yields a first principle of being, instead of merely a first principle
of motion. The contrast with earlier Jewish philosophers also comes to
the fore in Ibn Daud's designations of God, such as "the
first unmoved mover", "the necessary being" or
"the first cause" rather than "the Creator".
These appellations are wholly in line with his stated aim of guiding
the reader to a philosophical conception of God. However, at the same
time, it is evident that he identifies this first principle with the
God of the Bible, an equation for which he does not provide any
arguments.




This God is absolutely one, both in the sense of unique (God is
externally one) and in the sense of simple (God is internally one,or uncomposed).
God's unity implies that he cannot have essential or accidental
attributes since that would imply plurality in the divine
essence. Therefore, the attributes that are often ascribed to God,
such as that he is one, existent, true, mighty etc. etc. should be
interpreted either negatively, or as relations. According to Ibn Daud,
"the truest predicates or attributes of God are the negations
[...] and although they remove many doubts, they do not convey
anything" (*ER* W 51.9-12; S 131b15-131b3). To remedy
this, Ibn Daud interprets the negations as negations of something,
namely of similarity, that is, as expressions of incomparability. For
example, with regard to the predication of unity to God, he argues
that since among all essences nothing can be found that is like God,
"we know His unity in such a way that we know that His unity is
not like that of any other thing that is called
'one'" (*ER* W 52.25-27; S 133b1-3). As for
attributes understood as relations, Ibn Daud explains:



> 
>  Like someone can be described, for example, in that he is the son of
> a certain man, and the father of a second and the uncle of a third, the
> maternal uncle of a fourth, the friend of a fifth and the enemy of a
> sixth [...] this [kind of predication] is not impossible. Indeed
> multiple relations do not imply multiplicity in the essence of what is
> described by them. And in this way we can describe the Creator with
> many attributes since they are relations between Him and the other
> existents (*ER* W 54.29-35; S 136b8-14).
>  


### 5.4 Cosmogony and Intelligences




To explain how the plurality of the sub-lunar world can proceed from
this absolutely one God, Ibn Daud presents the theory of
"intermediaries", as he found it in the works of the Muslim
philosophers. This theory holds that there are secondary substances
(or: heavenly intelligences) that serve as intermediaries between God
and the lower world. His first step is to prove the existence of the
Active Intellect, the lowest in the series of heavenly intelligences.
His proof is based on the premise that the human intellect passes from
potentiality into actuality, which can only be due to an agent that
possesses the end of motion (that is, knowledge) in actuality. Ibn Daud
then proceeds to prove the existence of other incorporeal substances,
for which he likewise bases himself on the Aristotelian theory of
motion, an approach that is new to Jewish philosophy. Taking the
circularity of the motions of the heavenly bodies as a point of
departure, he argues that the souls of the spheres in their motions
pass from potentiality into actuality just as the human soul does. This
motion must be caused by the intellects of the spheres that are objects
of desire for their souls. The existence of heavenly incorporeal
substances thus having been established, Ibn Daud goes on to describe
how the lower proceeds from the higher, according to "the
philosophers". In their view, a first intelligence emanates from
the One, which is similarly incorporeal, but not simple, as it has a
cause, which involves composition in this entity. In a three-fold act
of cognition, this intelligence produces a triad of heavenly intellect,
sphere-soul and heavenly body, and this process is repeated until the
sphere of the moon to which the active intellect belongs. From the
various motions of the spheres, matter and forms emanate on the
sub-lunar world. The details of this process are not pertinent to our
current purposes. It is more relevant to note that Ibn Daud criticizes
the emanation-theory of the philosophers by claiming that there are no
demonstrative proofs for it. In his view, they invented their theory to
solve the problem of how many can come forth from one, yet, at the same
time, it seems to raise more questions than it actually solves. As he
puts it: "They escaped from one defamation but fell into
others" (*ER* W 67; S 159b).




Ibn Daud's own position, however, is far from clear. There is
no doubt that he accepts the notion of a hierarchical causal chain of
heavenly souls and intelligences that have an influence on the heavenly
world. However, he leaves his reader in the dark as to how they proceed
from God, claiming that the human intellect is too limited to grasp
this and that the philosophers err when they assume that the intellect
can know everything. More generally, he does never address the issue of (eternal)
emanation versus creation. Although he equates the God of the
philosophers with the Biblical Creator, he offers no arguments in
favour of creation. All that we hear is that "grand
things", such as the Ten Commandments, come directly from God.
However, he fails to explain how this should be reconciled with the
theory of emanation, according to which only one thing proceeds from
God directly and other things indirectly. Likewise, Ibn Daud tells us
in one passage that matter does not proceed from God directly; whereas
in another he bluntly states that matter is God's creation
without offering any argumentation for this last statement.




Ibn Daud identifies the intelligences, which are also referred to as
elevated, simple, separate or incorporeal substances, with the angels
in Scripture that are intermediaries between God and man. Indeed, it is
precisely their function as secondary causes that turn them into an
indispensable element in his thought. Firstly, he uses the angels to
avoid the unworthy notion that God should occupy himself with the
particulars of the terrestrial world, which would imply plurality in
divine knowledge. According to Ibn Daud, the angels are entrusted with
this task. Secondly, Ibn Daud needs the notion that the angels are
intermediaries for the interpretation of certain biblical texts that
seem to imply a change of will in God, which is tantamount to plurality
in his essence. His solution is that such verses refer not to God, but
to various classes of intermediaries instead. By this interpretation,
which is the outcome of philosophical reasoning, Ibn Daud also sought to
counter the charges of anthropomorphism that were made by the Muslim
theologian Ibn Hazm.


### 5.5 Prophecy




Prophecy is another important issue in Ibn Daud's thought, as it
is the prophet who is the link between the heavenly world and man. He
is the person who--thanks to his specific knowledge--must
guide man towards intellectual and moral perfection. Ibn Daud's
account of prophecy immediately follows his discussion of the
intelligences, since it is the Active Intellect that plays a crucial
role in the explanation of prophecy. This account has a twofold aim:
firstly, to provide a rational explanation of the phenomenon of
prophecy and, secondly, to defend the eternal validity of Mosaic Law
against Christian and Muslim claims to the contrary. Ibn Daud is,
however, not entirely consistent with regard to the first
objective. He begins his exposition by following the Muslim
philosophers in arguing that prophecy is a natural process that is
related to dreams. Basing himself on his psychology, he explains how
in certain circumstances someone can receive the overflow of the
Active Intellect on his imaginative faculty and intellect by which he
becomes a prophet. This goal can be pursued by people with a pure soul
through study and association with good people. It would thus seem
that anybody who meets certain requirements will automatically become
a prophet. However, in a manner reminiscent of Judah Halevi, Ibn Daud
then adds that the occurrence of this phenomenon is bound to certain
conditions of place, time and nation. Clearly these stipulations are
an attempt to safeguard the special character of biblical prophecy,
but at the same time they impinge on the universalistic character of
his psychological explanation of prophecy.




The defense of the eternal validity of Mosaic Law is directed
against Christians, whose major claim was that the Law of Moses was
replaced by the New Testament, as well as against Muslims, who believed
that the Law received by Moses was falsified throughout the course of
time. We do not need review his polemics here or his use of Islamic
theological arguments that prove that Moses is the only prophet who meets
the requirements of classifying as a "true prophet". What
is of interest for our purpose is that Ibn Daud structures his
arguments in a syllogistic framework, so as to adapt this polemical
chapter to the overall philosophical outlook of the rest of the
work.




As to the place of this chapter in Ibn Daud's book, Amira Eran
has suggested that the chapter on prophecy originally formed an
independent unit, which was later integrated into the *ER*
(Eran 1998: 263ff.).


### 5.6 Free Will




The topics that have been discussed thus far are all considered by Ibn
Daud to be necessary steps towards the solution of the problem of the
freedom of the human will. Towards the end of the book, he finally
addresses the issue within the context of a cluster of related
problems, such as God's knowledge, the nature of evil, causality
and providence. Ibn Daud's theory of physical evil is to a large
extent based on Ibn Sina's approach. It is impossible that God
should be the agent of evil. The evil that is found in nature is due
to matter. In fact, it is a privation, just as darkness is the
privation of light. As such it is not-being and cannot be brought
about by an agent. Moreover, what an individual considers to be evil
can be a benefit for mankind as a whole. In line with Ibn Daud's
conception of man as a microcosm, evil in man is likewise to be
ascribed to his matter and to the absence of knowledge. However, man
is able to free himself from matter by means of knowledge, that is, by
the actualization of his potential intellect with the help of the
intelligences so as to be able to discriminate between good and evil.
Another remedy for the resistance of evil lies in the Torah.
Man's choice to fight his evil inclination is neither necessary,
nor impossible, but possible. To explain this, Ibn Daud states that
God provided certain created things with possibility. However, the
"possible" can be divided into two kinds, the first being
the "possible" that is due to ignorance, for example that
the people of Spain do not know whether the king of Babylon died today
or whether he is alive. To them the matter is possible because of
their ignorance of what happens far away whereas in itself the matter
is not possible: one of the alternatives must necessarily be true
(*ER* W 96.11-16; S 205b11-14). With respect to the second kind
of the "possible" Ibn Daud says that it is
"possible"



> 
>  because God made it as "possible" and created it as
> something that admits of two contrary attributes, either this or that,
> just as it happened to be--as regards this [kind of possible]
> one cannot deny that God knows it as possible. And if someone would
> object by saying "does God not know the end of the
> matter?" we reply that this is not ignorance (*ER* W
> 96.21-25; S 206a5-9).
>  




Moreover, Ibn Daud makes use of a fourfold division of causes that
he found in Halevi (*Kuzari* V.20): besides necessary causes that God knows as
necessary, there are natural and incidental causes that are entrusted
to secondary causes. The fourth category consists of free causes or
"causes due to choice", thanks to which man is free to
choose between good and evil. In other words, God has no foreknowledge
as regards human action. This rather drastic conclusion is quite
unusual in Jewish philosophy; prior to Ibn Daud no Jewish philosopher
was prepared to limit God's knowledge to save the notion of free
will. In Ibn Daud's view, however, this position does not involve
ignorance in God.




Once man has made a choice with respect to moral conduct, the angels
assist him in carrying out his choice. Moreover, the providence
exercised by the angels is commensurate with man's own efforts.
In this way, the biblical verses that seem to convey that human action
is determined by God are to be explained: the "hardening"
of Pharaoh's heart (Ex. 7:3) means that the intelligences helped him to
persist in carrying out his own bad choices.




Ibn Daud's approach to the question of free will is not
without serious difficulties. Firstly, his conception of evil as
privation and as associated with matter conflicts with his initial
conception of matter as a substance. Secondly, on the one hand, Ibn
Daud argues that it is the intellect that chooses between good and
evil, yet he also claims that the choice is a matter of man's
heart, without explaining how these two notions relate. Finally, he has
nothing to say on the possibility of "repentance", which
seems to imply that man is determined as it were by his own first
choice.




Unsatisfactory as Ibn Daud's solution may be, he has
nonetheless succeeded in removing the contradiction between biblical
verses on the issue and thus in establishing harmony between philosophy
and religion. It was important for him to demonstrate this harmony with
respect to all the topics that led up to the question under
consideration, but it is essential with respect to free will, because
here philosophical speculation and religious practice intertwine. For
Ibn Daud, there is no point in leading a religious life when man is not
free to choose. This issue of free will therefore marks the transition
from philosophical speculation to practical philosophy, which is the
subject of the last part of *ER*.


### 5.7 Ethics and Religious Practice




Ibn Daud has developed a philosophic conception of God who is
absolutely one and acts through intermediaries. From this God only good
can proceed, whereas evil is to be attributed to matter and to
man's own bad choices. Once it has been established that man
indeed has free choice with regard to moral conduct and that evil does
not come from God, there is no impediment for man to opt for the good
life. In his practical philosophy Ibn Daud expounds his view of the
best life. His point of departure is a description of the ethics of the
philosophers, which is a combination of Platonic psychology with
corresponding virtues to the concupiscent, vital and rational soul and
the Aristotelian conception of virtue as the proper mean between two
extremes, a model that he borrows from Muslim philosophers.




He deviates, however, from the Platonic scheme by positing justice
instead of wisdom as the supreme cardinal virtue. Wisdom appears as
the virtue belonging to the theoretical intellect, but thanks to
justice, which in Ibn Daud's interpretation is a mean that gives
everything its due, man is able to attain bliss. Man can attain bliss,
the highest goal to which practical philosophy leads us, through moral
perfection, which consists in perfecting his character, and in leading
a good family and social life. Justice is the highest virtue for it
effects harmony between the various faculties of the soul in the
individual and forms the basis for man's social life. Not only is it a
philosophical virtue, but it is also a divine commandment, as can be
derived from Micah 6:8. Justice indeed appears to be a key-notion in
Ibn Daud's ethics, for it also provides the basis for man's relation
with God, and thus, the rationale for fulfilling the commandments of
the Torah. Ibn Daud's reasoning is as follows: once it has been
established that only good proceeds from God, it is a matter of
justice that man requites his benefactor by serving God. The choice to
serve God is consequent upon true knowledge of God, for such knowledge
automatically produces love in man, and love in turn requires action,
that is, divine worship which is achieved by accepting the
commandments of the Torah.




Love and knowledge thus appear to be interrelated for one cannot
love what one does not know. Intellectual love of God has fear of God,
in the sense of awe, as a corollary and automatically leads man to
divine worship. The Torah is the most perfect guide for leading a good
moral and religious life, for it contains commandments that help man to
constantly direct his actions towards God, as well as commandments that
teach moral and social virtues. Moreover, it includes the so-called
revelational commandments that call for obedience. Even though no
rational explanation can be found for them, man must accept them once
reason has established that they belong to a true revelation, which has
been brought by a true and morally perfect prophet.




This emphasis on religious practice in the last part of *ER*
is consistent with Ibn Daud's statement in his introduction that
the goal of study is practical philosophy (*ER* W 4. S 8b).
While the bulk of the book is concerned with philosophical speculation,
by the end of it practical philosophy comes to occupy center stage.
This shift from philosophical speculation to religious praxis gains
extra significance against the background of Judah Halevi's
attack on the philosophical worldview in *Kuzari* I.1. According
to Halevi, for the philosophers the highest good is conjunction with
the Active Intellect. Once man has attained this degree, it does not
matter which religion or which kind of divine worship he adopts.
Although Ibn Daud does not mention Halevi by name, it is clear that he
was familiar with and used his work. In fact, his work can be seen as a
direct response to Halevi. Whereas Halevi regards philosophy as a
threat to religion, for Ibn Daud it is indispensable for it, since the
study of philosophy induces man to accept religious commandments,
including those whose rationale is obscure. Therefore, despite the
extensive theoretical discussions, *ER* as a whole can be seen
as a work of practical philosophy. Moreover, one may argue that the book is a
defense of philosophy as much as it is a defense of religion.


## 6. The Reception of *Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah*




If Ibn Daud can be regarded as the pioneer of medieval Jewish
Aristotelianism, the question arises whether Maimonides, who, through
his *Guide* and his prestige turned it into the dominant
current in medieval Jewish rationalism, was familiar with the thought
of his predecessor. Husik goes as far as to state: "we feel
tempted to say that if not for Ibn Daud there would have been no
Maimonides" (Husik 2002: 198). However, Maimonides makes no
explicit mention of Ibn Daud in any of his works. Yet he seems to
allude to him in *Guide* I.71, when he refers to one of the
earlier Jewish Andalusian thinkers whose doctrine is approximately the
same as that of his own book, a description that fits Ibn Daud far
better than any other of Maimonides' Jewish predecessors. In spite of
the absence of a specific mention of Ibn Daud, it is highly probable
that Maimonides was familiar with Ibn Daud's work, as the large number
of similarities between the two works
 suggests.[2]
 To a large extent, these points of overlap are due to their
authors' common use of theories from Islamic sources, such as
the demonstrations for the existence of God. Other parallels,
however, cannot be attributed to these sources, such as parallels in
Biblical exegesis, in particular verses that relate to the doctrine of
angels, their interpretation of the term *elohim* and of the
terms *tselem* and *demut* in Gen.
 1:26.[3]




Other shared characteristics concern the general framework and the
intended audience: both works seek to guide Jews who are confused in
their traditional belief as a result of the study of philosophy.
Moreover, in some passages, Maimonides seems to implicitly criticize
or correct Ibn Daud, for example, in his doctrine of attributes where
Maimonides explicitly rejects the view that attributes that are
understood as relations can be ascribed to God (cf. section 5.3
above). Maimonides says that at first sight this kind of predication
may seem permissible, but more exact speculation proves that it is
incorrect, since there is no true relation between God and what is
other than God (*Guide* I.52, transl. Pines p. 120). In
general, one is tempted to assume that Ibn Daud's work served as
a model for Maimonides from which he drew inspiration on the one hand
and which he found to be in need of improvement on the other. 




Recent research suggests that Ibn Daud's thought has had more impact
on post-Maimonidian medieval Jewish philosophy than was previously
assumed. M. Zonta has argued that the renewed interest in *ER* in
the second half of the fourteenth century, as evidenced by the
production of two Hebrew translations, had to do with the emergence of
a 'Jewish Avicennism' during that period (Zonta
2002). Marginal glosses in several manuscripts of *ER* reveal
that the text was actually studied, perhaps even by a group of
students. Hasdai Crescas mentions Ibn Daud together with Ibn Sina and
al-Ghazali as an important pre-Maimonidean author (*Or ha-Shem*,
Introduction to Book I). Crescas's student Josef Albo seems to have
drawn on Ibn Daud's views (Ehrlich 2010). Y. Essudri has established
that also R. Ephraim al-Naqawah of Tlemcen (first half of the 15th
century) quoted from *ER*, whereas a late 15th century manuscript
contains a commentary on it that was perhaps intended for
teaching-purposes.


## 7. Conclusion




Abraham ibn Daud's importance lies in the fact that he was the
first to present a coherent systematic interpretation of Judaism
in light of the new challenge, namely Muslim Aristotelianism. The
sustained use of Aristotelian doctrines and logical reasoning clearly
distinguishes *ER* from the writings of earlier Jewish
philosophers. Moreover, the manner in which he incorporates his Muslim
(and to a lesser extent) Jewish sources in a carefully structured
system in order to solve a religious problem is noteworthy. His thought
develops along the following lines: substance--form -
motion and transition from potentiality into actuality--soul
- God--intelligences--prophet--freedom of
the will--correspondence between correct knowledge and correct
conduct--perfection.




Nonetheless, it should be noted that Ibn Daud's thought
contains a number of "loose ends"; the promised harmony
between religion and philosophy is certainly not always achieved. Cases
in point are his ambiguous position with regard to the origin and
status of matter and the way in which he skirts around the issue of
creation versus emanation. The inconsistencies and undetermined issues
in *ER* are partly the result of the influence of neo-Platonism.
The Aristotelianism of the Muslim peripatetics still contains an
appreciable number of neo-Platonic notions that have made an impact on
Ibn Daud. Arfa's evaluation of Ibn Daud's philosophic
activity "at the point where it has rejected neo-Platonism but
has not yet freed itself of many of its fundamental doctrines and
thought habits, and on the other hand has espoused Aristotelianism but
has not yet assimilated the full meaning of its world outlook"
hits the nail right on the head (Arfa 1954: 4).
For another part, the flaws in Ibn Daud's thought are due to his
conception of philosophical knowledge as the foundation on which
religion should be built. For all the importance he attaches to the use
of philosophical speculation, his bias is religious, which is why he
prefers to remain vague about or to omit Aristotelian doctrines like
the eternity of motion. When harmony between religion and philosophy
seems to be impossible, Ibn Daud shrinks from accepting the
consequences of Aristotle's doctrines and instead chooses to seek
refuge in the limitations of the human intellect, claiming that the
philosophers tend to overreach themselves. The weaknesses in his
thought notwithstanding, Ibn Daud's significance for the
development of Jewish philosophy can hardly be underestimated.