## 1. On the terms 'Ethics' and 'Morality'




The term 'ethics' is technically used by philosophers to
mean a philosophical study of morality--morality understood as a
set of social rules, principles, norms that guide or are intended to
guide the conduct of people in a society, and as beliefs about right
and wrong conduct as well as good or bad character. Even though
morality is the subject matter of ethics, it is most often used
interchangeably with 'ethics'. In spite of the
philosophical inquiries or analyses undertaken by individual
*moral* philosophers regarding morality (i.e., the morality of a
society or people)--analyses which often result in diverse positions or
conclusions--nevertheless, the basic features, the core elements
of the morality of a society, those moral principles and values that
actually guide and influence the lives of a people, remain pretty much
what they are or have been. What individual moral philosophers, through
their critical analyses and arguments, try to do is to explain,
clarify, refine, sharpen, or enlarge the understanding of the concepts
and issues of morality. Even though the moral beliefs and circumstances
of their own societies constitute the immediate focus of their
philosophical activities--for human experience is most directly
felt within some specific social or cultural
context--nevertheless, moral philosophers do not think or imply at
all that the results of their reflective activities are to be tethered
to their own societies as such. They believe, to the contrary, that, in the
light of our common humanity, which speaks to the common sentiments,
purposes, responses, hopes, and aspirations of all human beings in
respect of certain situations, the conclusions of their reflections
would, surely, have implications for the capacious community of humankind, for
the universal human family.




Thus, moral principles and rules may emerge from or evolved by a
particular human society; even so, they are principles that
can--and do--apply to all human societies inasmuch as they
respond to basic human needs, interests, and purposes. When the Akan
moralist maintains, for instance, that 'To possess virtue is
better than gold', or 'When virtue founds a town, the town
thrives and abides', he strongly believes that he is making a
moral statement--he is enunciating a moral principle--that
transcends his own community and applies not only to other towns in his
nation but, indeed, to all *human* societies, just as Socrates
surely intended his celebrated moral statement 'Virtue is
knowledge' (whether true or not) to apply to peoples and cultures
beyond Athens and Greece, even beyond fifth century Greece. Thus, the
moral intent of the morally-freighted proverbs (or maxims) discussed in this entry
is considered relevant to the moral life of the human being and, as
such, is purported to have universal application or reference.




After the reflective activities of the individual moral thinkers, the
beliefs and presuppositions of a people about right and wrong conduct,
good and bad character--all of which featured in the moral life
of the people prior to the activities of moral thinkers--remain
substantially or generally unscathed; they continue to constitute the
moral framework within which the members of the society
function. Thus, even though a theoretical (or, academic) distinction
can be made between morality as constituted by the moral beliefs and
principles that a group of people abides by in their daily lives (let
us refer to this kind of morality as morality1) and
morality or ethics as comprising the reflections of moral thinkers on
human conduct, on morality1 (let us refer to the reflective
enterprise regarding morality as morality2), nevertheless,
to the extent that morality2 provides a clarification and
better explanation and understanding of morality1, it can
be said that the two terms, morality and ethics, refer essentially to
the same moral phenomenon--human conduct--and, thus, can be
used interchangeably. Thus, in this entry, the term 'African
ethics' is used to refer both to the moral beliefs and
presuppositions of the sub-Saharan African people and the
philosophical clarification and interpretation of those beliefs and
presuppositions.




I take note of a view expressed by some philosophers on
Aristotle's ethics: Bertrand Russell observed that
"Aristotle's opinions on moral questions are always such as
were conventional in his day" (1945: 174). This view is re-echoed
by Hardie: "[Aristotle's] moral ideas and moral ideals are,
in some degree, the product of his time" (1968: 120); he also
asserts that "Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is at
least in part an interpreter of Greek experience" (W. F. R
Hardie, 1968: 123). In the same way, this entry present an
*interpretretation* of the moral ideas and values as found in the
African moral language, conceptions of society, conceptions of a
person, and so on.




Also, in this entry, 'African' refers to the salient
features or ideas of the African moral life and thought generally as
reflected in, or generated by, African moral language and social
structure and life. Many writers have made the observation that
despite the indisputable cultural diversity that arises from Africa's
ethnic pluralism, there are underlying affinities in many areas of the
African life; this is surely true in the African religious and moral
outlook. There are some features of the moral life and thought of
various African societies that, according to the cited sources, are
common or shared features. There are other features that can be seen
as common on conceptual or logical grounds. For instance, the claim
that the values and principles of African morality are not founded on
religion simply derives from the characterization of traditional
African religion as a *non-revealed* religion. (In the history
of the indigenous religion in African, it does not seem that anyone in
any African community, has ever claimed to have received a revelation
from the Supreme Being intended either for the people of the community
or for all humanity). This characterization makes African ethics
independent of religion and, thus, underlines the notion of the
autonomy of ethics in regard to African ethics. If a religion is a
non-revealed religion, then it is independent of religious
prescriptions and commands. The characterization of traditional
African religion would, thus, lead me to assert--to generalize on
logical grounds--that the moral system of each African
society--in the traditional setting--does not derive from
religion: thus, it is an autonomous moral system. Similarly, the claim
about the social (non-individualistic) morality of the African society
is closely related to the community and shared life of the African
people. And so on.




Thus, while Akan ethics is not a microcosm of African ethics, there is
nevertheless evidence, both empirical and conceptual, that indicates
that the values, beliefs, and principles of Akan ethics
reverberate *mutatis mutandis* on the moral terrains of other
African societies. Based on the qualifying expression *mutatis
mutandis* ('allowing for necessary variations and
adjustments'), it would be correct to say that the term
'African ethics' is appropriate. With all this said,
however, neither Akan nor African ethics would be unique among the
ethical systems evolved by the various non-African cultures of the
world.


## 2. African Words for Ethics (or Morality)




We would begin with an inquiry into African moral language, in
search specifically of the word for 'ethics' in a few
African languages. Such an inquiry will give some insight into the
basic conception and understanding of ethics or morality. It must be
noted right from the outset that a substantial number of Sub-Saharan
African languages do not have words that can be said to be
*direct* equivalents of the word 'ethics' or
'morality'. Here are some interesting results of inquiries
made from native speakers of a few African languages and how
statements about a person's ethical or moral conduct are expressed in
those languages, including two of the prominent languages in Ghana,
Akan (the author's native language) and Ewe.


1. When a speaker of the Akan language wants to say, "He has
no morals", or, "He is immoral", or "He is
unethical", "His conduct is unethical", he would
almost invariably say, "He has no *character*"
(*Onni suban*).
2. The statement, "He has no morals", or "He is
unethical", is expressed by a speaker of the Ewe language as,
*nonomo mele si o* (which means "He has no
character").
3. In Yoruba language and thought the word *iwa* means both
character and morality (it also means 'being' or
'nature').
4. In Igbo language of Eastern Nigeria, the word *agwa*,
meaning character, is used in such a statement as "he has no
morals" (*onwe ghi ezi agwa)*.
5. In Shona, the language spoken by a substantial majority of the
people of Zimbabwe, the word *tsika* means 'ethics'
or 'morality'. But when they want to say of a person that
"He has no morals", or "He is unethical", they
would often use the word *hunhu* which directly means
'character'. Thus, *Haana hunhu* means "He has
no character", "He is not moral", "He is
unethical".
6. In South Sotho, a language spoken widely in Lesotho and southern
Zimbabwe (Matebeleland), there are no words that are the direct
equivalents of 'ethics' or 'morality'.
References to the moral or ethical life or behavior are made using
words that mean behavior or character. Thus, moral statements such as
"he has no morals" or "his action is unethical"
will be expressed by words such as *maemo*--which means
character or behavior: thus, *maemo a mabe* means "he has
a bad character", "his behavior (action) is
unethical." When a person behaves (or acts) in ways that are
morally right, they would say "he has a good character",
using the words *lokileng* or *boitswaro*, both of which
mean good character or good behavior.




Thus, the inquiries into the moral language of several African
peoples or cultures indicate that in these languages the word or
expression that means 'character' is used to refer to what
others call 'ethics' or 'morality'. Discourses
or statements about morality turn to be discourses or statements
essentially about character. In Islamic moral philosophy the word used
for 'ethics', namely, *akhlaq,* means character. The
implication here is that ethics or morality is conceived in terms
essentially of character. It is noteworthy that the Greek word
*ethike,* from which the English word 'ethics'
derives means 'character.' (*ethos)* What we call
'ethics' Aristotle calls 'the study (or, science) of
character', *he ethike*. For the Greek, as for the
African and the Arab, the character of the individual matters most in our moral
life and thought. 


## 3. The Notion of Character as Central to African Ethics




There are of course other moral concepts in the African moral
language and thought. The concepts of good, bad (or, evil), right and
wrong feature prominently in African moral thought, as they do in the
moral systems of other peoples and cultures. In Akan, for instance,
*pa* or *papa* means good and *bone* means bad or
evil (see below). Thus, the expression *onipa bone* means a bad
person. A bad person is said to be a person with a bad character,
*suban bone*. When a person is known to be honest or generous or
compassionate, he would be judged by the Akan as a good person, by
which they mean that he has a good *character* (suban). A person would
be judged as having a bad *character* if he is considered
dishonest, wicked, or cruel. In most moral evaluations reference is
made to the character of a person; thus, character is basic--the
crucial element--in Akan, as it is in African, ethics generally.
*Iwa* (character) is, for the Yoruba, "perhaps the most
important moral concept. A person is morally evaluated according to
his/her *iwa*--whether good or bad" (Gbadegesin, 1991:
79). African ethics is, thus, a character-based ethics that maintains
that the quality of the individual's character is most
fundamental in our moral life.




Good character is the essence of the African moral system, the
linchpin of the moral wheel. The justification for a character-based
ethics is not far to seek. For, all that a society can do, regarding
moral conduct, is to impart moral knowledge to its members, making
them aware of the moral values and principles of that society. In
general, society satisfactorily fulfills this duty of imparting moral
knowledge to its members through moral education of various forms,
including, as in African societies, telling morally-freighted proverbs
and folktales to its younger members. But, having moral
knowledge--being made aware of the moral principles and rules of
the society--is one thing; being able to lead a life consonant
with the moral principles is quite another. An individual may know and
may even accept a moral rule, such as, say, it is wrong to cheat the
customs. But he may fail to apply this rule to a particular situation;
he is, thus, not able to effect the transition from knowledge to
action, to carry out the implications of his moral belief.




In the Akan and other African moral systems such a moral failure
would be put down to the lack of a good character (*suban pa)*.
In other words, the ability to act in accord with the moral principles
and rules of the society requires the possession of a good character.
Thus, in the context of the activities of the moral life--in our
decisions to obey moral rules, in the struggle to do the right thing
and to avoid the wrong conduct, in one's intention to carry out a
moral duty, the quality of a person's character is of ultimate
consequence. It is from a person's character that all his or her
actions--good or bad--radiate: the performance of good or bad acts
depends on the state of one's character. Wrong-doing is put down
to a person's bad character. Thus, the Yoruba maxim (proverb):
'Good character is a person's guard.'




African maxims are explicit about the formation of character:
character is acquired. A person is therefore responsible for the state
of his or her character, for character results from the habitual
actions of a person. An Akan maxim has it that "one is not born
with a bad 'head', but one takes it on from the
earth." The maxim means, among other things, that a bad habit is
not an inborn characteristic; it is one that is acquired. It would be
worthless to embark on moral instruction through moral proverbs and
folktales, as it is done in African societies, if our character or
habits were inborn. But the belief is that the moral narratives would
help the young people to acquire and internalize the moral values of
the society, including specific moral virtues, embedded in those
ethical narratives. The appropriate responses to moral instruction are
expected to lead to the acquisition of appropriate habits and their
corresponding characters. And, because character is acquired through
our actions, habits, and expected responses to moral instructions, it
can, according to African moral systems, be changed or
reformed.




Character is defined by the Akan thinkers in terms of habits, which
result from a person's deeds or actions: 'character comes
from your actions' (or deeds: *nneyee*), says an Akan
traditional thinker. Persistent performance of a particular action will
produce a certain habit and, thus, a corresponding character. To
acquire virtue, a person must perform good actions, that is, morally
acceptable actions so that they become habitual. The action or deed
that led to the acquisition of a newly good habit must be persistently
performed in order to strengthen that habit; in this way,virtue (or,
good character) is acquired. Over time such an acquired virtue becomes
a habit. This is the position of Akan ethics on the development and
acquisition of a good (or, bad) character, for this is what the Akan
people mean when they say *aka ne ho*, "it has remained
with him," "it has become part of him," "it has
become his habit." Character is, thus, a behavior pattern formed
as a result of past persistent actions. Thus, moral virtues
(excellences of character) or vices arise through habituation.




The logic of the acquisition of our character or habits is that the
original nature of the human being was morally neutral, neither good
nor bad. A person's original moral neutrality will in the course
of his life come to be affected, in one direction (the good) or the
other direction (the bad) by his actions and responses to moral
instruction, advice and persuasion. The original moral neutrality of a
human being constitutes the foundation of our conception of the moral
person, for it makes for--allows room for--choice, that is, moral
choice. Consequently, what a person does or does not do is most crucial
to the formation and development of his or her character, and, thus, to
becoming moral or immoral.


## 4. Moral Personhood



Let me start the analysis of moral personhood in African moral
philosophy with a statement made by Ifeanyi Menkiti, an African
philosopher from Nigeria:



> 
>  The various societies found in traditional Africa routinely accept
> this fact that personhood is the sort of thing which has to be
> attained, and is attained in direct proportion as one participates in
> communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined
> by one's stations. It is the carrying out of these obligations
> that transforms one from the it-status of early child-hood, marked by
> an absence of moral function, *into the person-status of later
> years, marked by a widened maturity of ethical sense--an ethical
> maturity without which personhood is conceived as eluding
> one*. (Ifeanyi Menkiti, 1984: 176)




Menkiti's statement adumbrates a conception of moral personhood, which
will now be discussed in some detail. The concept of a person in
African thought embodies ethical presuppositions. The word used for
"person" in the Akan language (undoubtedly the most widely
spoken language in Ghana) is *onipa*. But the word
*onipa* also means "human being" and the plural form
of it means "people". Thus, the word *onipa* is an
ambiguous word. In the Akan society, when an individual's conduct
very often appears cruel, wicked, selfish, ungenerous or unsympathetic,
it would be said of that individual that "he is *not* a
person" (*onnye onipa*).




In Yoruba language the word *eniyan* means a person. Even
though the word is used in a normative as well as non-normative (or,
ordinary) sense, "greater emphasis is placed on the normative
dimension of *eniyan*" (Gbadagesin, 1991: 27). It can be
said of some human individual that 'he or she is not a person'
(*Ki i se eniyan*). Such a comment is a "judgment of the
moral standing of the human being who is thus determined to fall short
of what it takes to be recognized as such" (Gbadagesin, 1991:
27).




The Akan statement *onnye onipa* and the Yoruba statement
*Ki i se eniyan* both underline a conception of moral
personhood. The two statements are significant in two ways. The first
is that, even though that individual is said *not* to be a
person, he is nonetheless acknowledged as a *human being*, not a
beast or fish. It is pretty clear that the statement implies a
distinction between the concept of a human being and the concept of a
person: *an individual can be a human being without being a
person.*




The second significant thing the statements imply is the assumption
that there are certain fundamental norms and ideals to which the
conduct of a human being, *if he is a person,* ought to conform,
that there are moral virtues that an individual has the capacity to
display in his conduct and ought to display them, if he is a person.
The reason for the judgment that an individual is not a person if he
behaves or does not behave in a certain way is that that
individual's actions and behavior are considered as falling short
of the ideals and standards of personhood. But it does not imply at all
that an individual considered "not a person" loses his
rights as a human being or as a citizen or that people in the community
should cease to demonstrate a moral concern for him or display the
appropriate moral virtues in their treatment of him; only that he is
not considered a morally worthy individual.




Now, the judgment that a human being is "not a person",
made in the wake of that individual's persistent unethical
behavior, implies that the practice of moral virtue is considered
intrinsic to the conception of a person held in Akan or Yoruba moral
thought. The position here is this: for any *p*, if *p*
is person, then *p* ought to display in his behavior the moral
norms and ideals of personhood. When the behavior of a human being
fails to conform to the acceptable moral principles or standards, or
when a human being fails to display the expected moral virtues in his
conduct, he is considered to be "*not* a
person."




The evaluative judgment opposite to the one we have been considering
is "he is a person" (*oye onipa*). This judgment is
not a descriptive judgment at all, even though it can be used
descriptively, as when in a forest one hunter made that judgment to his
colleague hunter who thought he saw a beast and was about to shoot it:
the judgment "he is a person" (*oye onipa*) would in
that context be used descriptively by the other hunter to distinguish a
human being from a beast. Thus, a descriptive use of that judgment
would be obvious and easily understood.




What I am concerned to point up in the present circumstance is the
*normative* form of the judgment. Used normatively, the
judgment, "he is a person," means 'he has a good
character', 'he is generous', 'he is
peaceful', 'he is humble,' 'he has respect for
others.' A profound appreciation of the high standards of the
morality of an individual's behavior would elicit the judgment,
"he is truly a person," (*oye onipa paa!)*. A rider
would be in place here: while children are actual human beings and are
members of the human community, they are not actual persons yet; they
are persons only potentially and will attain the status of personhood
in the fullness of time when they are able to exercise their moral
capacity and make moral judgments.




Now, the denial of personhood to a human being on the grounds that
his actions are not in accord with certain fundamental norms and ideals
of personhood or that that individual fails to display certain
virtues in his behavior is morally significant and worth noting. It
means that human nature is considered in Akan metaphysical and moral
thought to be essentially good, not depraved or warped by some original
sin; that the human being is capable of doing good. It does not mean,
however, that personhood, in this model of humanity, is innate but is
earned in the ethical arena: it is the individual's moral
achievement that earns him the status of a person. Every individual is
capable of becoming a person inasmuch as he has capacity for
virtue--for performing morally right actions--and should be treated (at
least potentially) as a morally responsible agent.




In this connection, let us pay some attention to the Akan belief
embedded in a maxim that says, "God created every human being
(to be) good" (*Onyame boo obiara yie*). The view
expressed in this proverb seems to be at variance with the notion of
the moral-neutrality of the human being discussed earlier in
connection with character (section 3). The meaning of the maxim
"God created every human (to be) good" is not too clear;
it may be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be taken as implying
that God created the human being actually to do good, that is, to
actually behave virtuously and to always make the appropriate moral
choices. Second, it may be interpreted as meaning that God made the
human being capable of moral choice, that is, that the human being was
merely endowed by his creator with the moral sense to distinguish
between good and evil, right and wrong. The first interpretation
implies that the human being has been determined to be
good--to actually pursue virtue: thus, the human being's
moral status is a settled matter. If the human being were created or
determined actually and always to do good, there would never have been
a concept of evil or vice (*bone*) in Akan moral language,
since no human being would, in that kind of moral context, commit a
vicious or evil act. In light of the evil and unethical actions of
individual human beings, the first interpretation which implies that
the human being is resiliently good cannot be accepted as the correct
meaning of the maxim, for it is plainly contradicted by our putative
moral experience. The first interpretation also subverts
moral-neutrality, a consequence that eliminates moral choice--basic to
the notion of a moral person.




The second interpretation of the view that the human being was created
good (or, to be good), implies that the human being merely has the
capacity for virtue: that is, could pursue good, but could also pursue
evil. This means that the human being is endowed with moral sense
and, so, has the capacity for both virtue and vice; his judgment on
some moral issue could go either direction: direction of the good or
direction of the evil. Thus, the notion of moral neutrality is
preserved. The human being can then be held as a moral agent: not that
his virtuous character is a settled matter, but that he is capable of
virtue, and hence, of moral achievement, and can, thus, achieve
personhood.




The correctness of the second interpretation of the view that the
human being was created good, as argued in the foregoing paragraphs,
can have an anchor also in the Akan notion of *tiboa*:
conscience, moral sense--a sense of right or wrong. This is a
conception of an inner urge relevant to moral practice. *Tiboa*
is held, among other things, as creating a sense of guilt in the
individual, convicting him or her of wrong deeds. Since response to a
moral rule is ultimately an individual or private affair, the notion of
*tiboa* (conscience) is of great importance to our moral life.
It is by virtue of *tiboa* that the notion of self-sanctioning
in moral conduct becomes intelligible. Because of its power to induce a
sense of guilt, *tiboa* is held to influence the
individual's moral choice, decision, response, and attitude. The
reality or phenomenon of moral choice is a rejection of the notion of a
fixed or settled moral character of an individual that derives from the
presupposition--albeit false--that the human being is born
*virtuous*. The activity of *tiboa* is in line with the
moral neutrality of the human being at birth. The activity of
*tiboa* assists moral achievement and, thus, moral
personhood.




Like the Akan people and others, the Rwanda (or, Ruanda) people also
have the concept of conscience. "The Rwanda word for conscience,
*kamera,* means something that is internally felt. It is
situated in the heart" (J. J. Maquet in Forde, 1954: 183). There
indeed are external social sanctions which are useful as deterrents
from prohibited behavior; but in moral motivation feelings of moral
guilt and shame are traceable also to *kamera* or
*tiboa*.


## 5. The Humanistic Foundations of African Morality




Observations have been made by a number of scholars that Africans
are a very--even a notoriously--religious people, that religion so
deeply permeates all spheres of their lives that it cannot be
distinguished from nonreligious aspects of life, that in the African
traditional life there are no atheists, and that the African cultural
heritage is intensely and pervasively religious. Historical evidence
indicates that many colonial administrators in their dispatches to
their colonial metropolis used to refer to Africans as 'this
incurably religious people.' Assertions about the religiosity of
the African people have led some scholars to maintain that there is a
connection between religion and morality in African ethics. That some
connection may exist between religion and morality is conceivable in an
environment that is widely alleged to be pervasively religious. But the
nature of the connection needs to be fully clarified.




The connection has been taken by most scholars to mean that African
moral values and principles derive from religion, implying that
African morality is, thus, a religious morality (Opoku, 1978: 152),
Danquah (1944: 3), Sarpong (1972: 41), Busia (1967: 16), Parrinder
(1969: 28-9), Idowu (1962: 146). The claim implies in turn that
the moral beliefs and principles of the African people derive from
those of religion, that religion provides the necessary justification
for moral values and beliefs, and that moral concepts, such as good,
bad, right and wrong, are defined (or, must be defined) in terms of
religious prescriptions or commands. However, there are other
scholars, such as Godfrey Wilson, Monica Wilson, Maquet, Wiredu, who
deny the religious basis of the moral systems of the societies they
studied. Kwasi Wiredu observed that "the Akan moral outlook is
thus logically independent of religion" (Kwasi Wiredu in
H. Odera Oruka and D. A. Masolo, 1983: 13). Godfrey Wilson wrote that
"Among the Nyakyusa the ideas of social behaviour are not
connected with religion, nonetheless they exist" and, after
mentioning the moral virtues of the Nyakyusa, he added that "But
the positive, ideal statement of these virtues is not made in
religious terms" (Godfrey Wilson in Ottenberg and Ottenberg
eds., 1960: 348). On the morality of the Rwanda, Maquet wrote that
'Thus the ethics of the Banyarwanda are not integrated on a
religious basis such as the will of God' (J. J. Maquet in Forde,
1954:184). In Mende ethics, "Wrongbehavior is regarded as a
breaking of some specific rule of conduct, not as the flouting of some
divine or absolute law of the universe" (Kenneth Little, in
Forde, 1954:134). These are unambiguous statements of the nonreligious
foundation of the morality of at least some African societies.




The claim, made by many scholars, that African morality is founded
on, or derives from, religion cannot, in my opinion, be upheld, if by
morality we are referring to social principles and norms that guide the
conduct of people in a society. One reason is that, unlike Islam or
Christianity, the traditional, that is, indigenous, African religion is
not a revealed religion whereby divine truth is revealed to a single
individual who becomes the founder. It is true that African religious
experience certainly features mystical or highly spiritual encounters
between human beings (that is, priests, priestesses, diviners, etc.)
and spiritual beings. Such encounters occur in divinations, spirit
mediums, communication with the dead, and other forms of the mystical
experience. But, it may be noted, such mystical or spiritual encounters
or contacts take place in an atmosphere that was *already*
religious; they are some of the manifestations of African religion, of
African spirituality.




I define spirituality as a *heightened* form of religiosity
reached by certain individuals in the community who have, or claim to
have, mystical contacts with the supernatural, the divine. It would be
correct to assert, however, that the encounters are the
*results*, rather than the sources, of religion in Africa in the
traditional setting. And, even though 'spiritual messages'
may be received by the practitioners of traditional African religion
through those mystical encounters part of which
('messages') may relate to moral conduct, nevertheless such
messages appear to be too few and far between to constitute an adequate
basis for a coherent ethical system. Moreover, the .moral character of
such 'messages' would, in a non-revealed religious context,
have to be judged by the people themselves on the basis of their own
moral insights. This is a telling point that implies the independence
(autonomy) of the moral attitudes of the people with regard to the
conduct of the spiritual beings. This is the reason why an eminent
Ghanaian sociologist observed that "The gods are treated with
respect if they deliver the goods, and with contempt if they
fail....Attitudes to [the gods] depend on their success [i.e., the
success of the gods], and vary from healthy respect to sneering
contempt" (K. A. Busia in Forde, 1954: 205). The moral
disapprobation of the people with regard to the actions--particularly
the unsuccessful actions--of the deities constitutes the ground for the
extinction of some of the deities from the Akan, possibly the African,
pantheon. The fact that the behavior of a supernatural being is thus
subject to *human* censure implies that it is possible for a
deity to issue commands that can be considered unethical by the
practitioners of traditional religion. All this implies, surely, that
it would be correct to assert that, rather than regarding African ethics
as religious (or, religious-based), it would be more correct to regard
African religion as *ethical.*




In a revealed religion, what is revealed is generally
elaborate and can be conceived to include moral principles and ideals
as part of the will of God thus revealed. A morality that is founded on
religion is thus a necessary concomitant of a revealed religion. Since
the indigenous African religion is not a revealed religion, there is no
way by which the people would have access to the will of God that
contains elaborate moral principles upon which a coherent moral system
can be erected. In the context of a non-revealed religion, then, to
make divine or supernatural commands the source of moral values and
principles would be conceptually impossible.




Now, how are the moral concepts of good, evil, right and wrong
understood or defined in African ethics? When put to traditional
sages (thinkers) of some Akan communities in Ghana the question, how do
we come to know that 'this action' is good and 'that
action' is evil? no one responded that an action is good or evil
because God (*Onyame*) had said so or that *Onyame* had
told us so. Thus, what is morally good or right is not that which is
commanded by God or pleasing to God or any spiritual being, or that
which is in accordance with the will of a spiritual being. The
responses revealed, on the contrary, an undoubted conviction of a
humanistic--a non-supernatural--origin of moral values and
principles, a conviction that provided insight into the Akan conception
of the criterion of moral value. According to the ethics of the
Banyarwanda, "That is good (or evil) which tradition has defined
as good (or evil)" (J. J. Maquet, *loc. cit*). In light of
the non-revealed nature of traditional African religion, it can be said
that the view regarding the non-religious (non-supernatural) origin of
moral principles and values would resonate on the moral terrains of
most other African communities. The sources of African morality in the
traditional setting, then, must be held as independent of religious
prescriptions or supernatural powers.




The views of the traditional thinkers indicate that what is
good is constituted by the deeds, habits, and behavior patterns
considered by the society as worthwhile because of their consequences
for human welfare. The goods would include such things as generosity,
honesty, faithfulness, truthfulness, compassion, hospitality,
happiness, that which brings peace, justice, respect, and so on. Each
of these actions or patterns of behavior is supposed or known to bring
about social well-being. In Akan moral system (or African moral system
generally), good or moral value is determined in terms of its
consequences for humankind and human society. All this can be
interpreted to mean that African morality originates from
considerations of human welfare and interests, not from divine
pronouncements. Actions that promote human welfare or interest are
good, while those that detract from human welfare are bad. It is, thus,
pretty clear that African ethics is a humanistic ethics, a moral system
that is preoccupied with human welfare. Referring to African morality
generally, Monica Wilson observed that "The basis of morality was
fulfillment of obligation to kinsmen and neighbors, and living in amity
with them" (1971: 98).

In African conceptions moral values originate from the
basic existential conditions in which human beings organize and conduct
their lives. McVeigh made the following observation:



> 
> Therefore, it is important to inquire concerning the African standard
> of judgment, what makes some things good and others bad. [Edwin] Smith
> replies that the norm of right and wrong is custom; that is, the good
> is that which receives the community's approval; the bad is that
> which is disapproved. The right builds up society; the wrong tears it
> down. One is social; the other anti-social (Malcolm J. McVeigh, 1974:
> 84).




In the ethics of the Lovedu, a South Bantu ethnic group of the
Transvaal:



> 
>  Right conduct is relative always to the *human* situation and
> morality is oriented not from any absolute standards of honesty or
> truth but from the *social good* in each situation. Conduct
> that promotes smooth relationships, that upholds the social structure,
> is good; conduct that runs counter to smooth social relationships is
> bad (J. D. and E. J. Krige in Forde, 1954: 78). 




And, regarding the basis of Bantu morality, Molema remarked:



> 
>  The greatest happiness and good of the tribe was the end and aim of
> each member of the tribe. Now, utility forms part of the basis of
> perhaps all moral codes. With the Bantu, it formed the basis of
> morality...it was utilitarian. This was the standard of
> goodness, and in harmony with, and conformity to, this end must the
> moral conduct be moulded. The effect of this, of course, was
> altruism (S. M. Molema, 1920: 116). 




Statements and references made in the immediately foregoing
paragraphs indicate the nonreligious foundation of African ethics. Now,
having removed African ethics from its alleged religious moorings,
where do we moor it? The answer, based on the foregoing references, is
that we moor it to the preoccupations of the African society with human
welfare and social harmony, to reflections on the existential
conditions in which human beings function.




Not being a revealed religion, traditional African religion can be
characterized as a natural religion, a religion that derives from the
peoples' *own* reflections on this complex world and their
experiences in it. The African metaphysic, to be sure, is a theistic
metaphysic; yet it does not nurture a theistic or supernatural ethic.
Just as it was their own reflections that led to the creation of a
natural religion, so it was their own reflections on living a
harmonious and cooperative life in a human society that led to the
creation of a 'natural' (a humanistic) ethic. Thus, side by
side with Africa's natural religion (or, theology) is a
'natural' ethic grounded in human experiences in living
together, a society-oriented morality that, thus, arises from the
existential conditions in which people conduct their lives. And so it
is, that the moral values of the African people have a social and
humanistic, rather than a religious, basis and are fashioned according
to the people's own understanding of the nature of human society,
human relations, human goals, and the meaning of human life with its
emotional features.




With all this said, however, it cannot be denied that religion plays
some role in the moral lives of people, such as African people, who
are said to be "incurably religious". Because God is held
by the African people not only to be the overlord of the human society
but also to have a superbly moral character, and because the ancestors
(ancestral spirits) are also supposed to be interested in the welfare
of the society (they left behind), including the moral life of the
individual, religion constitutes part of the sanctions that are in
play in matters of moral *practice.* Thus, religion cannot be
totally banished from the domain of moral practice, notwithstanding
the fact that the moral values and principles of the African society
do not derive from religion.




Humanism--the doctrine that takes human welfare, interests, and
needs as fundamental--constitutes the foundation of African ethics. It
is the warp and woof the African moral life and thought. Indeed,
African prayers and other acts of worship are brimful of, or
characterized by, requests to the supernatural beings for material
comforts, such as prosperity, health, and riches. And, even though the
African people do not consider God and other supernatural beings as the
sources of their moral values and principles, nevertheless, they are
ever aware of the powers of the supernatural beings and are ever ready
to exploit their munificence for the promotion of human welfare,
prosperity, and happiness.


## 6. Humanity and Brotherhood




These two concepts, humanity and brotherhood, feature prominently in
African social and moral thought and practice. They are among the moral
or human values that constitute the basic--perhaps the
ultimate--criteria that not only motivate but also justify human
actions that affect other human beings. In African terms, humanity is
not just an anthropological term; it is also a moral term when it comes
to considering the relations between members of the human species. The
term 'brotherhood' has come to refer to an association of
men and/or women with common aims and interests. But the notion of
brotherhood is essentially a moral notion, for it is about the
relations between individual human beings that make for their own
interest and well-being. There is some affiliation between humanity and
brotherhood in African ethical conceptions: if we are human, we are
(must be) brothers, in a capacious, comprehensive sense of the word
'brother' (to be discussed shortly).




We start our discussion with the Akan maxim:



> 
> Humanity has no boundary.  
> 
> (*Honam mu nni nhanoa*)
> 




The Akan maxim literally means: 'In human flesh there is no
edge of cultivation--no boundary' (*nhanoa).* The
maxim can be interpreted as meaning that 'all humankind is one
species', thus, that 'Humanity has no boundary.' When
the farmer cultivates his land, he does it up to a limit, an edge (in
Akan: *nhanoa*, edge, boundary) where he has to stop, otherwise
he would trespass on another farmer's land. There is, thus, a
limit to the area of cultivation of land. But this, the maxim invites
us to realize, is not so in the cultivation of the friendship and
fellowship of human beings; the boundaries of *that* form of
cultivation are limitless. For, humanity is of one kind; all humankind
is one species, with shared basic values, feelings, hopes, and
desires.




This is most probably the reason why in almost all the autochthonous
African languages (here I exclude African languages, like Hausa and
Swahili, that have borrowed a substantial number of Arabic words) there
is really no word for 'race.' There are, instead, the words
'person', 'human being', and
'people.' So that, where others would speak in terms of
'the black race' or 'the white race', Africans
would say, 'black people', 'white people', and
so on. And, instead of 'people of mixed race', they
would say, 'people of mixed blood.' The latter expression,
however, is somewhat vague, since it also describes people of dual
ethnic parentage in African societies. But, in terms of the African
perception of humanity, the important point is that the offspring of
any 'blood mixing' is a human being and therefore belongs
to the one human 'race' of which we are all a part. Thus,
even though the African people traditionally live in small communities
and are divided into different ethnic or cultural groups and into clans
and lineages with complex networks of relationships, nevertheless, they
perceive humanity to embrace all other peoples beyond their narrow
geographic or spatial confines, to constitute all human beings into one
universal family of humankind. Even though this family is fragmented
into a multiplicity of peoples and cultures, nevertheless, it is a
shared family--a shared humanity--the relationships among
whose members ought to feature a certain kind of morality: the morality
of a shared humanity




The common membership of one universal human family constitutes
(should constitute) a legitimate basis for the idea of universal human
brotherhood (or unity). This idea is depicted in, for instance, the
Akan maxim:



> 
> A human being's brother is a (or another) human being.  
> 
>  (Or, 'Man's brother is man.')  
> 
> (*Onipa nua ne onipa*)




The maxim asserts unmistakably that a human being can be related
*only* to another human being, *not* to a
beast. Implicit in the African perception of humanity is the
recognition of all persons, irrespective of their racial or ethnic
backgrounds, as brothers. This is the reason why in African cultures
the word 'brother' is used to cover various and complex
family relationships linked by blood ties. But the word is also used,
significantly, by persons between whom there are no blood ties; thus,
the word is used comprehensively. The comprehensive meaning given to
the word 'brother' in African cultures is intended,
indeed, to lift people up from the purely biologically determined
blood relation level onto the human level, the level where the essence
of humanity is held as transcending the contingencies of human
biology, race, ethnicity, or culture.




A practical translation of the idea of brotherhood leads to such
social and moral virtues as hospitality, generosity, concern for
others, and communal feeling. Several writers, including European
travelers to Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
have remarked upon these virtues as practiced in African social and
moral life. A Briton who spent about three decades in Central Africa
from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the early part of the
twentieth century made the following observation:



> 
> Hospitality is one of the most sacred and ancient customs of
> Bantuland, and is found *everywhere*. A native will give his
> best house and his evening meal to a guest, without the slightest
> thought that he is doing anything *extraordinary* (Dugald
> Campbell, 1922: 45, emphasis added).




And a contemporary African writer also notes:



> 
> One of the achievements of our [African] society was the universal
> hospitality on which they [i.e., members of the community and others]
> could rely (Julius Nyerere, 1968: 5).




Most people, including foreign visitors to Africa, often testify, in amazement, to
the ethic of hospitality and generosity of the
African people. That ethic is an expression of the perception of our
common humanity and universal human brotherhood.




As regards the African conception of the worth and dignity of the
human being, there is time to refer only to a couple of Akan maxims.
One such maxim is:



> 
> The human being is more beautiful than gold.  
> 
> (*onipa ye fe sen sika*)




In this maxim a human being is depicted as beautiful. That which is
beautiful is enjoyed for its own sake, not for the sake of anything
else. What the maxim is saying, therefore, is that a human being is to
be enjoyed for his or her own sake. To enjoy a human being for his/her
own sake means you should appreciate his value as a human being and
demonstrate that appreciation by showing compassion, generosity, and
hospitality. It means you should be open to the interests and welfare
of others and feel it a moral duty to offer help where it is needed. To
enjoy a human being also means you should recognize the other person as a
fellow individual whose worth as a human being is equal to yours and
with whom you undoubtedly share basic values, ideals, and sentiments.
Thus, the main intent of the maxim is to point out the worth of a human
being and the respect that ought to be given to her by virtue of her
humanity. Recognition of the worth of a human being is, according to
the maxim, more important than caring for wealth.




Kenneth Kaunda describes in some detail how the enjoyment of people
is expressed in practical terms: 



> 
> Our conversation is a good example of this [enjoyment of people]. We
> will talk for hours with any stranger who crosses our path and by the
> time we part there will be little we do not know about each other. We
> do not regard it as impertinence or an invasion of our privacy for
> someone to ask 'personal' questions, nor have we
> compunction about questioning others in like manner. We are open to
> the interests of other people. Our curiosity does not stem from a
> desire to interfere in someone else's business but is an
> expression of our belief that *we are wrapped up together in this
> bundle of life* and therefore a bond already exists between myself
> and a stranger before we open our mouths to talk (Kaunda, 1966:
> 32). 




The value of the human being is expressed also in the following
maxim:



> 
> It is the human being that counts: I call upon gold, it answers
> not; I call upon cloth, it answers not; it is the human being that
> counts.
> 
> 
> (*Onipa ne asem*: *mefre sika a, sika nnye so, mefre ntama
> a*, *ntama nnye so*; *onipa ne asem*.)
> 
> 
> 




The maxim says that it is *only* the human being that is of
real value, for in times of need or distress, if you appeal to gold and
other material possessions they will not respond; only a human being
will. For these reasons, the worth of the human being is of the
ultimate consequence and ought therefore to be given the ultimate
consideration. From such maxims one can appreciate why human welfare
and concern constitute the preoccupation of African ethics.


## 7. The Notion of the Common Good




The notion of the common good features manifestly in African ethics.
In Akan moral thought, the notion is expressed most vividly in an art
motif that shows a 'siamese' crocodile with two heads but a
single (i.e., common) stomach. The part of the motif
relevant to moral thought is the single stomach, and it is to the
significance of this that I wish to pay some attention. The common
stomach of the two crocodiles indicates that at least the basic
interests of all the members of the community are identical. It
can therefore be interpreted as symbolizing the *common good*,
the good of all the individuals within a society.




The common good is not a surrogate for the sum of the various
individual goods. It does not consist of, or derive from, the goods and
preferences of particular individuals. It is that which is essentially
good for human beings as such, embracing the needs that are
*basic* to the enjoyment and fulfillment of the life of each
individual. If the common good were the aggregate of individual goods,
it would only be contingently, not essentially, common and, on that
score, it would not be achieved in a way that will benefit all the
individuals in a society. If the common good is achieved, then the
individual good is also achieved. Thus, there should be no conceptual
tension or opposition between the common good and the good of the
individual member of the community, for the common good embraces the
goods--the basic goods--of all the members of the community. If
the common good were understood as the basic good--as human good--as
such, there would be no need to think of it as a threat to individual
liberty as touted by Western liberal (individualist) thinkers, for,
after all, individual liberty is held as one of the basic goods of the
members of the society. The contents of the common stomach, in the
symbolic art of the 'siamese crocodile', would not conflict
with the interests and needs of either of the crocodiles.




The good, as discussed in an earlier section, is defined by
the traditional thinkers of the Akan society in terms of peace,
happiness or satisfaction (human flourishing), justice, dignity,
respect, and so on. The common good embraces these goods and more.




There is no human being who does not desire peace, security,
freedom, dignity, respect, justice, equality, and satisfaction. It is
such a moral, not a weird, notion embracive of fundamental
goods--goods that are intrinsic to human fulfillment and to which
all individuals desire to have access--that is referred to as the
common good. The unrelenting support by people in a community for such
moral values as social justice and equality on the one hand, and the
spontaneous, universal denunciation of acts such as murder and cruelty
on the other hand, are certainly inspired by beliefs in the common
good.




Similarly, the institutions of various kinds--legal, political,
economic, moral and others--are set up in pursuit of certain
commonly shared values and goals, that is, a common good which a human
society desires to achieve for all of its members. The
institution of government or legal system is surely based on a common
understanding of the need for societal values of social order and
social peace. It is, thus, pretty clear that the common good is that
which inspires the creation of a moral, social, political, or legal
system for enhancing the well-being of people in a community.




The common good is a notion that is conceptually affiliated to the
notion of community and, thus, to the notion of human society as such.
The common good is an essential feature of the ethics espoused by the
communitarian African society. The pursuit of the good of all is the
goal of the communitarian society, which the African society is. A
sense of the common good--which is a core of shared values--is the
underlying presupposition of African social morality.


## 8. Social, Not Individualistic, Ethics




A humanistic morality, whose central focus is the concern for the
welfare and interest of each member of community, would expectably be a
*social* morality which is enjoined by social life itself. Such
is the nature of African morality. Social life or sociality is natural
to the human being because every human being is born into an existing
human society. A traditional Akan thinker asserted in a previously
quoted proverb that says that 'When a human being descends from
the heavens, he [or she] descends into a human town [or, a human
society].' The point of the maxim is that the human being is
social *by nature*. This view finds a variant in Aristotle's
celebrated dictum that 'The human being is *by nature* a
social animal', that is, that a human being is by nature a
member of a
*polis*, a human community. [The word *politikon* used in
Aristotle's dictum means 'social' rather than
'political'.] Being a member of the human community by
nature, the individual is naturally related or oriented toward other
persons and must have relationships with them. The natural sociality or
relationality of human beings would--and should--prescribe a
social ethic, rather than the ethic of individualism. Individualistic
ethics that focuses on the welfare and interests of the individual is
hardly regarded in African moral thought.




African social ethic is expressed in many maxims (or, proverbs) that
emphasize the importance of the values of mutual helpfulness,
collective responsibility, cooperation, interdependence, and reciprocal
obligations. Let me refer to a few of these, from the Akan
repertoire:



> 
>  The well-being of man depends on his fellow man.  
> 
> (*onipa yieye firi onipa*) 




The point of this proverb is, not that a person should always look
to another (or others) for his well-being and the attainment of his
goals, but that there are occasions when the demonstration by another
person (or other persons) of goodwill, sympathy, compassion, and the
willingness to help can be a great boost to a person's attempts
to achieve his goals, to fulfill his life. The dependency noted in the
foregoing proverb is to be put down to the limited nature of the
possibilities of the human individual. Human limitations are in fact
expressed in the following Akan proverb:



> 
> Man is not a palm-tree that he should be complete
>  (or, self sufficient).  
> 
> (*onipa nye abe na ne ho ahyia ne ho*)
> 




The proverb points up the inadequacies of the human being that make
it impossible for him to fulfill his life, socially, economically,
emotionally, psychologically, and so on. It is evidently true that in
the context of the society, in terms of functioning or flourishing in a
human society, the human individual is not sufficient, for her
capacities, talents, and dispositions are not adequate for the
realization of her potential and basic needs. It is only through
cooperation with other human beings that the needs and goals of the
individual can be fulfilled. With his self-sufficiency whittled away by
man's natural condition, the individual requires the succor and
relationships of others in order to satisfy his basic needs. A social
ethic that recognizes the importance of the values of mutual help,
goodwill, and reciprocity is the kind of ethic that will counter the
lack of human self-sufficiency in respect of talents and capacities and
in many ways help realize his basic needs.




Reciprocity and interdependence are forthrightly expressed in the
following Akan maxims:



> 
> The right arm washes the left arm and the left arm
> washes the right arm.  
> 
> (*wo nsa nifa hohorow benkum, na benkum nso hohorow nifa*)
> 




That the left arm cannot wash itself is of course a matter of
everyday experience. It is when the two arms wash each other that both
become clean: thus, the need for interdependence.



> 
> Life is mutual aid.  
> 
> (*Obra ye nnoboa*)
> 




The Akan word *nnoboa* means 'helping each other to
work on the farm'. In the farming communities of rural Ghana,
when a farmer realizes that work on the farm cannot be completed within
a certain time if he did it single-handedly, he would request the
assistance and support of other farmers in the community. The other
farmers would readily lend a helping hand to that farmer, who would, in
this way, achieve his productivity goals and do so on time. The same
request would, when necessary, be made by the other farmers on
different occasions. It is this kind of experience that led an Akan
traditional thinker to create this proverb which, because of the word
'life' (*obra*), has been made to cover other
spheres of the human life than the purely economic (or agricultural).
Refusing to offer help to others and consistently seeking one's
own good and disregarding the good of others will result in one's
being denied the help and goodwill that may be necessary to achieve
certain ends. Since you refused to help someone who needed your help or
someone who was in distress, you are likely to meet the same refusal or
denial when you need some help--perhaps more help at that. The
morality of a shared life, as in any community, thus demands mutuality
or reciprocity as a moral mandate in a world in which human beings,
weak and limited in many ways, are subject to vulnerable
situations. Mutual aid, then, becomes a moral obligation.




That a human being, due to her limitations, deserved to be helped is
expressed in the following maxim:



> 
> A human being needs help.  
> 
> (*onipa hia moa*)




The Akan word translated 'needs' is *hia*, which,
as used in this maxim, has a normative connotation; thus, it
does more than simply expressing a fact about human life or the human
condition. The real meaning of the maxim, then, is that a human being
deserves, and therefore ought, to be helped. It also means that a human
being must be regarded as an object of moral concern and should
therefore be entitled to help by others in the appropriate
circumstances. The reason why you should help someone in need is also
given in the following maxim, among others:



> 
> 
>  Your neighbor's situation is [potentially] your situation.  
> 
> (*Wo yonko da ne wo da*)




Two important things about this maxim need to be pointed out. One is
that the maxim is uttered in references only to the pitiable, miserable
or unfortunate situation of another person (referred to in the maxim as
"your neighbor"--*wo yonko*) or other people
(your "neighbors"). These unfortunate situations or
circumstances insistently call for the demonstration of sympathy,
compassion, and willingness to offer some help. The other important
thing about this maxim is that the word 'neighbor' in the
maxim does not necessarily refer to the person next door or in
one's community but to *any* other person in your
community and beyond: even in far-off places.




The basic or ultimate thrust of the maxim is that you should not
show insensitivity to people who are in pitiable situations, for one
day you might be in that situation *too* and would need the help
of others: thus, your neighbor's situation is potentially your
situation; every other person is basically you. Social morality thus
demands mutual reciprocity as a moral mandate in a world in which human
beings can easily be overcome--even overwhelmed--by the
contingencies of the human condition and existence. Altruism is, thus,
a fundamental moral value.




Insensitivity to the needs and hardships or suffering situations of
others is repudiated in Akan morality, as it is, indeed, repudiated in
the moralities of all human cultures. In Akan moral thought and
practice, a maxim that rebukes the lack of feeling for others is put
thus:



> 
> When it sticks into your neighbor's flesh,
> it is as if it stuck into a piece of wood.  
> 
> (*etua wo yonko ho a, etua dua mu*)
> 




"Sticking into your neighbor's flesh (or, body)" is
another way of referring to the suffering, misfortune, hardship, or
pain of another person. When something, such as a needle, sticks into
your own flesh or body, you feel the pain. If it stuck into another
person's--your neighbor's--flesh, you would not directly
feel the pain. Even so, you should not feel insensitive to the pain or
suffering of that person and shrug off your moral shoulders, for the
other person's body is certainly *not* a piece of wood that
cannot feel pain.




The foregoing maxims and many others similar to them in content and
purpose all underline a social morality. There are many African
folktales whose conclusions are intended to affirm the values of social
morality--the kind of morality that is centered on human
relations. The social character of morality requires that the
individual member of the society, ever mindful of his interests, adjust
those interests to the interests and needs of others. This requires him
to give due consideration to the interests and welfare of others.
Necessarily embedded in a human community, the individual person has a
*dual* moral responsibility: for him or herself as an individual
and for others as co-members of the community with whom she shares
certain basic needs and interests.


## 9. The Ethics of Duty, Not of Rights




African ethics, is a humanitarian ethics, the kind of ethics that
places a great deal of emphasis on human welfare. The concern for
human welfare may be said to constitute the hub of the African
axiological wheel. This orientation of African ethics takes its
impulse, undoubtedly, from the humanistic outlook that characterizes
traditional African life and thought. Humanism--the doctrine that
sees human needs and interests as fundamental--thus constitutes
the foundation of African ethics (see section 5 above).




Now, the natural sociality or relationality of the human being that
would prescribe social ethic (see preceding section) would also
prescribe the ethic of duty (or, responsibility). The natural
relationality of the individual immediately involves one in some social
and moral roles in the form of obligations, commitments, and duties
(or, responsibilities) to other members of his or her community which
the individual must fulfill. Social or community life itself, a robust
feature of the African communitarian society, mandates a morality that
clearly is weighted on duty to others and to the community; it
constitutes the foundation for moral responsibilities and
obligations.




There appears to be a conceptual tie--perhaps also a practical
tie--between the *social ethic* prescribed by the communitarian
ethos and the *ethic of duty* mandated by the same ethos.




A morality of duty is one that requires each individual to
demonstrate concern for the interests of others. The ethical values of
compassion, solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation, interdependence, and
social well-being, which are counted among the principles of the
communitarian morality, primarily impose duties on the individual with
respect to the community and its members. All these considerations
elevate the notion of duties to a status similar to that given to the
notion of rights in Western ethics. African ethics does not give
short-shrift to rights as such; nevertheless, it does not give
obsessional or blinkered emphasis on rights. In this morality duties
trump rights, not the other way around, as it is in the moral systems
of Western societies. The attitude to, or performance of, duties is
induced by a consciousness of needs rather than of rights. In other
words, people fulfill--and ought to fulfill--duties to others not
because of the rights of these others, but because of their needs and
welfare




It would be clear from the foregoing discussion that African ethics
takes a stand that would be against what are referred to as acts of
supererogation. A supererogatory act is defined as an act that is said
to be 'beyond the call of duty'; it is an act that is said
to be over and above what a person is required to do as a moral agent.
In much of the literature on Western moral philosophy, an act of
supererogation is held *not* as a strictly moral duty. Thus, it
is neither morally obligatory nor forbidden; therefore, it is not
wrong, so the argument concludes, to omit or neglect performing it,
even though it is good and commendable by virtue of its value and
consequences on others if it is performed. It is supposed to be a
meritorious act and yet optional, one that may be performed if the
spirit moves you, but need not be performed. Thus, a distinction is
made in Western literature between moral duty and a supererogatory act,
the former considered obligatory and moral duty 'proper'
and the latter nonobligatory and optional, not being a
'proper' moral duty.




Supererogationism is clearly an oxymoron: for, why should an act
that is good and morally commendable and will conduce to the well-being
of another person (or, other persons) fail to exact obligation or
compel performance? We would normally think that there is a moral
connection between 'good' and 'ought', and that
therefore a morally good act ought to be performed: if an act is
morally good, then it ought to be performed.




African morality, which is humanitarian, social, and duty-oriented
rather than rights-oriented morality, does not make a distinction
between a moral duty and a supererogatory duty--one that is beyond
the call of duty and so does not have to be performed. In the light of
our common humanity, it would not be appropriate--in fact it would
demean our humanity--to place limits to our moral duties or
responsibilities. Even though it is true that, as human beings, we are
limited in many ways and so are not capable of fulfilling our moral
duties to all human beings at all times as such, nevertheless, the
scope of our moral duties should not be circumscribed. African
humanitarian ethics would seek to collapse moral duty and moral
ideals--the latter being the basis of the so-called supererogatory
duty--into one capacious moral universe inhabited *both* by the
morality of duty 'proper', obligation, and justice
*and* the morality of love, virtue, compassion, benevolence, and
other "moral ideals". Such a capacious morality would make
no distinction between a morally obligatory act and a morally optional
act. It would insist that no act that is morally good in itself or that
will conduce to the well-being of some individual or group of
individuals should be considered morally optional, to be morally
shrugged off or unconscionably set aside, if we understand morality to
be something that serves (or, should) serve human needs. Thus, as the
second part of a previous quotation says,



> 
> 
> A native will give his best house and his evening meal to a
> guest, without the slightest thought that he is doing anything
> *extraordinary* (Dugald Campbell, section 6 above).
> 
> 




Thus, African ethics--an ethics that is weighted on duty, not on
rights--would, in principle, not consider moral duty of any kind
as extraordinary, optional, or supererogatory. The African humanitarian
ethic makes all people objects of moral concern, implying that our
moral sensitivities should be extended to all people, irrespective of
their cultures or societies.


## 10. Conclusion




African morality is founded on humanism, the doctrine that considers
human interests and welfare as basic to the thought and action of the
people. It is this doctrine as understood in African moral thought
that has given rise to the communitarian ethos of the African
society. For, ensuring the welfare and interests of each member of
society can hardly be accomplished outside the communitarian society.
The communitarian ethos is also borne of beliefs about the natural
sociality of the human being, expressed, for instance, in the Akan
maxim, previously referred to, that says that "when a human
being descends from the heavens, he descends into a human
town"(*onipa firi soro besi a, obesi onipa
kurom*). Social or community life is, thus, not optional to the
human being. Social life, which follows upon our natural sociality,
implicates the individual in a web of moral obligations, commitments,
and duties to be fulfilled in pursuit of the common good or the
general welfare.




Thus, African humanitarian ethics spawns social morality, the
morality of the common good, and the morality of duty that is so
comprehensive as to bring within its compass what are referred to as
moral ideals (such as love, virtue, compassion), which are considered 
supererogatory in Western ethics. But central or basic
to the African morality is character, for the success of the moral life
is held to be a function of the quality of an individual's
personal life. A moral conception of personhood is held in African
ethics, the conception that there are certain basic moral norms and
ideals to which the conduct of the individual human being, if he is a
person, ought to conform. The recognition in the African ethical
traditions of all human beings as brothers by reason of our common
humanity is indeed a lofty moral ideal that must be cherished and made
a vital or robust feature of global ethics in our contemporary world.
It is a bulwark against developing bigoted attitudes toward peoples of
different cultures or skin colors who are, also, members of the
universal human family called race.