## 1. Life and Works



Not a great deal is known of Robert Alyngton's life. Most of the
information about him comes from Emden 1957-59. From 1379 until
1386, he was fellow of Queens College (the same Oxonian college where
Wyclif started his theological studies in 1363 and Johannes Sharpe
taught in the 1390s); he became *Magister Artium* and, by 1393,
doctor of theology. He was chancellor of the University in 1393 and
1395. In 1382 he preached Wyclif's religious and political ideas
in Hampshire (McHardy 1987). He was rector of Long Whatton,
Leicestershire, where he died by September 1398. 



According to Emden 1957-59 and Ashworth & Spade 1992,
Alyngton was of considerable repute as a logician. Among his extant
works, the following can be mentioned (the most complete list of his
writings is found in Bale 1557-59 [pp. 519-20]):


* A commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*
(*Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*
[henceforward *In Cat*.]), partially edited in Conti 1993 (pp.
242-306). (All references are to the pages of this edition or,
for the unedited portions, to the ms. London, Lambeth Palace
393.)
* A treatise on the supposition of terms (*Tractatus de
suppositionibus terminorum*).
* A commentary on the *Liber sex principiorum*.
* A treatise on the genera of being (*Tractatus
generum*).


## 2. Being and Categories



The point of departure of every realist interpretation of the
*Categories* is the notion of being (*ens*) in its
relationship to the ten categories, as Realists considered the
categorial table to be a division of beings. Like Burley, Alyngton
affirms that (i) the division into categories is first of all a
division of things existing outside the mind, and only secondarily of
the mental concepts and spoken or written terms which signify them,
and (ii) things belonging to one categorial field are really distinct
from those belonging to another--for instance, substances are
really distinct from quantities, qualities, and relations, quantities
are really distinct from substances, qualities, and relations, and so
on (*In Cat*., cap. *de numero et sufficientia
praedicamentorum*, Conti pp. 251, 252-53).



Unfortunately Alyngton does not define being; yet, what he says about
(1) the subject of the *Categories* (the real categorial being
which can be signified by simple expressions, namely terms (*In
Cat*., cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum* ,
p. 252), and (2) analogy (*In Cat*., cap. *de
aequivocis*, ms. London, Lambeth Palace 393, fol. 70r-v)
seems to entail that, like Wyclif, he also thinks of being as a sort
of an extramental reality proper to everything (God and creatures;
substances and accidents; universal and individual items; things,
collections of things, and states of affairs) according to different
modes and degrees.



In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, all the realist authors,
with the only notable exception of Duns Scotus, regarded categorial
items as composed of two main aspects: the inner nature or essence,
and their peculiar mode of being or of being predicated (*modi
essendi vel praedicandi*). They maintained that the categorial
table divides categorial items according to their modes of being (or
of being predicated) and not according to their inner natures (or
essences). In particular, Thomas Aquinas (*Sententia super
Metaphysicam*, liber V, lectio 9) based his method of finding the
ten Aristotelian categories on the differences of modes of being
predicated, and recognized three fundamental modes of being
predicated: essentially, proper to substances, when the predication
indicates what a given thing is; accidentally, proper to quantities,
qualities, and relatives, when the predication indicates that
something inheres in a subject; and externally, proper to the
remaining six categories, when the predication indicates that
something which does not inhere in the subject nevertheless affects
it. On the contrary Albert the Great (*Liber de
praedicamentis*, tr. I, cap. 7) and Simon of Faversham
(*Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 12) based
their method of finding the categories on the differences of modes of
being. They admitted two fundamental modes of being: being by itself,
proper to substance; and being in something else, proper to the nine
genera of accidents. The latter was subdivided into being in something
else absolutely, proper to quantities and qualities, and being in
something else in virtue of a relation to a third thing (*esse ad
aliud*), proper to the remaining seven categories. Walter Burley,
whose last commentary on the *Categories* is, along with
Wyclif's *De ente praedicamentali*, the main source of
Alyngton's commentary on the *Categories*, recalled two
ways of deducing the ten Aristotelian categories, both based on the
various levels of similarity among their own modes of being. Alyngton
follows very closely Burley's first way of deriving the ten
categories. In his opinion, there are two fundamental modes of being
proper to things: being by itself, which characterizes substances, and
being or inhering in something else, which characterizes accidents.
The latter is subdivided into three less general modes: being in
something else in virtue of its matter; being in something else in
virtue of its form; and being in something else in virtue of the whole
composite. Something can inhere in something else in virtue of its
matter, form, and composite according to three different ways: from
inside (*ab intrinseco*), from outside (*ab
extrinseco*), and partially from inside and partially from outside
(*partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco*). If something
is in something else in virtue of its matter and from inside, then it
is a quantity; if from outside, it is a where; if partially from
inside and partially from outside, it is an affection. If something is
in something else in virtue of its form and from inside, then it is a
quality; if from outside, it is when (*quando vel
quandalitas*); if partially from inside and partially from
outside, it is an action. If something is in something else in virtue
of the whole composite and from inside, then it is a relation; if from
outside, it is a possession (*habitus*); if partially from
inside and partially from outside, it is a position (*In Cat*.,
cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp.
252-53).



Alyngton's choice implies an anti-reductionist approach to the
matter, which is confirmed by the solution of the problem of what
properly falls into the categorial fields. According to the standard
realist conception, not only the accidental forms, such as whiteness,
but also the compounds they cause when inhering in substances, such as
a white-thing (*album*), fall into the categories. Burley
thought that whilst the accidental forms properly fall into the
categories, the aggregates made up from a substance and an accidental
form do not, since they are beings *per accidens*, wanting in
real unity. In his opinion, such an aggregate may be said to fall into
a certain category, the category into which its accidental form falls,
only by reduction, in virtue of the accidental form itself. On the
contrary, Wyclif maintained that the aggregates built up by a
substance and an accidental form fall *per accidens* into both
the category of substance and the category which the accidental form
at issue belongs to (cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*,
cap. 1, pp. 3-4). Alyngton combines in an original way the two
slightly different opinions of Burley and Wyclif. He affirms that a
thing can be said to belong to a category in a threefold way: by
itself, by accident (*per accidens*), and by reduction (*per
reductionem*). Something is in a category by itself if and only if
the highest genus of that category is predicated by itself and and
directly (*in recto*) of it (*In Cat*., cap. *de
numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 259). In other words,
if and only if the highest genus of that category is one of the
constitutive elements of the essence of the thing at issue. Accidental
forms belong *per se* to the nine categories of accidents
(*In Cat*., cap. *de relativis*, p. 300). Something is
in a category by accident if and only if it is an aggregate from a
substance and an accidental form. Such aggregates belong per accidens
both to the category of substance and to the category in which its
accidental form is by itself (*In Cat*., cap. *de numero et
sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 259; and cap. *de
relativis*, p. 300). Something can be in a category by reduction
in two different ways: in a broad sense (*large*) and in a
strict sense (*stricte*). Something is in a category by
reduction *large* if and only if it is an aggregate, and the
highest genus of a certain category is predicated only indirectly of
it. Something is in a category by reduction *stricte* if and
only if it is not an aggregate, and, (a) like differences, it is a
component of the reality of a thing which is in a category by itself,
but the highest genus of that category is not predicated of it; or (b)
it is the privation correlated to a certain property which, in turn,
is in a category by itself; or (c), like extra-categorial principle
such as God, the unity, and the point, it somehow instantiates the
mode of being proper to a certain categorial field, but the highest
genus of that category is not one of the constitutive elements of the
essence of that thing (*In Cat*., cap. *de numero et
sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 259-60).



Fundamental to Alyngton's deduction of the categories and
solution of the problem of what falls into the categorial fields (and
how) is a close isomorphism between language (mental, written, and
spoken) and the world. Like Burley and Wyclif, he was firmly convinced
that our thought is modelled on reality itself, so that it reproduces
reality in all its elements, levels, and inner relations. Therefore,
one of the best ways of understanding the world lay for him in an
accurate investigation of our notions and conceptual schemes, as they
show the structure of the world. A logical consequence of this
conviction was his strong propensity towards reification: he
hypostatises the notion of being and considers equivocity, analogy,
and univocity not only as semantic relations between terms and things,
but also as real relations between extra-mental items (*In
Cat*., cap. *de aequivocis*, ms. London, Lambeth Palace
393, fols. 69v-70r).



According to the common interpretation of the opening passage of the
*Categories*, equivocal terms are correlated with more than one
concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing different
natures, whereas univocal terms are correlated with only one concept
and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing one and the same nature.
In his last commentary on the *Physics* (after 1324), Burley
had maintained that the term 'being' is at the same time
univocal and equivocal with respect to the categories, as a single
concept corresponds to it (broadly speaking univocity), but the
categorial items share it in different ways, according to a hierarchy
of value (broadly speaking equivocity)--see his *Expositio in
libros octo Physicorum*, lib. I, tr. 2, cap. 1, ed. Venice 1501,
fols. 12vb-13ra. In turn, Wyclif had admitted three main types of
equivocity: by chance (*a casu*), analogical, and generic, the
second of which applies to the relationship between being and
categories (*De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 2). Alyngton
recognises four main kinds of equivocity: by chance; deliberate (*a
consilio*); analogical; and generic. Equivocals by chance are
those things that just happen to have the same name, but with
different meanings and/or reasons for imposing the name. Those things
are deliberate equivocals which have distinct natures but the same
name, and are subordinated to different but correlated concepts. Those
things are analogical which share the nature signified by their common
name in various degrees and/or ways. Generic equivocals are those
things which share the same generic nature in the same way, but have
distinct specific natures of different absolute value (*In
Cat*., cap. *de aequivocis*, fol. 70r-v). So, within
Alyngton's system, what differentiates analogy from univocity is
the way in which a certain nature (or property) is shared by a set of
things: analogous things share it according to different degrees
(*secundum magis et minus*, or *secundum prius et
posterius*), univocal things share it all in the same manner and
to the same degree (*In Cat*., cap. *de univocis*, fol.
71v). Alyngton argues that being is not a sort of genus in relation to
the ten categories, since it does not manifest their essence, nor is
it predicated univocally of them; being is analogous in relation to
the ten categories. It is the basic stuff of the metaphysical
structure of each reality, which possesses it in accordance with its
own nature and level in the hierarchy of essences (*In Cat*.,
cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp.
255-56).


## 3. Universals and Predication



Among the many kinds of beings (*entia*) that Alyngton admits,
the most important set is that consisting of universal items.
Universals are among the most disputed topics in Medieval
philosophical literature. Like Wyclif and the other Oxford Realists,
Alyngton claims that universals fully exist outside the mind and are
really identical-to and formally distinct-from the individuals which
instantiate them. Like Albert the Great whom he quotes by name,
Alyngton recognizes three main kinds of universals:


1. *ante rem* or ideal universals--that is, the ideas in
God, the archetypes of all that is;
2. *in re* or formal universals--that is, the common
natures shared by individual things; and
3. *post rem* or intentional universals--that is, mental
signs of the formal universals.



The ideas in God are the causes of formal universals, and formal
universals are the causes of intentional universals. Furthermore, like
Burley and Wyclif, Alyngton holds that formal universals actually
exist (*in actu*) outside our minds, and not potentially only
(*in potentia*) as moderate realists thought (*In Cat*.,
cap. *de substantia*, p. 279)--even if, unlike Burley, he
maintains they are really identical with their individuals, for
otherwise it would be impossible to explain, against the Nominalists,
why and how individual substances show different and more or less
close kinds of similarity among themselves (*In Cat*., cap.
*de substantia*, pp. 267-68).



According to Alyngton, who depends here on Avicenna and Wyclif, formal
universals are common natures in virtue of which the individuals that
share them are exactly what they are--as the human species is the
form by which every man formally is a man. *Qua* natures, they
are prior, and so indifferent, to any division into universals and
individuals. Universality (*universalitas* or
*communicabilitas*) is as it were their inseparable property,
but not a *constitutive* mark of the nature itself (*In
Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, fol. 101v). As a consequence,
formal universals can be conceived of in two different manners: as
first intentions or as second intentions. In the former case, they are
natures of a certain kind and are identical with their individuals
(for example, man is the same thing as Socrates). In the latter case,
they are properly universals (that is, something that can exist in
many things and can be shared by them), and are distinct from their
individuals considered *qua* individuals, because of opposite
constitutive principles (*In Cat*., cap. *de
substantia*, p. 268). Therefore, universals are really
(*realiter*) identical to, but formally (*formaliter*)
distinct from their individuals. In fact, universals are formal causes
in relation to their individuals, and individuals are material causes
in relation to their universals. Thus three different kinds of
entities can be qualified as formal universals:


1. the common natures instantiated by individuals--which are
things of first intention;
2. the form itself of universality, which belongs to a certain common
nature when seen in its relation to the individuals--which is a
thing of second intention; and
3. the thinkability proper to the common nature, by which it is a
possible object of our mind--that is, the real principle that
connects formal universals with mental universals (*In Cat*.,
cap. *de substantia*, p. 277).



Alyngton accepts the traditional realistic account of the relationship
between formal universals and individuals, and, like Wyclif, improves
it by defining its logical structure more accurately, in order to
avoid the inconsistencies stressed by Ockham and his followers.
Alyngton thought that a universal of the category of substance could
directly receive only the predications of substantial forms more
common than itself. On the other hand, accidental forms inhering in
substantial individuals could be predicated only indirectly
(*essentialiter*) of the substantial form itself that those
individuals instantiate, predicated indirectly through and in virtue
of the individuals of that substantial form. So his description of the
logical structure of the relationship between universals and
individuals demanded a redefinition of predication. Alyngton was
probably the first to ameliorate Wyclif's theory of predication
by dividing predication into formal predication (*praedicatio
formalis*) and remote inherence (*inhaerentia remota*) or
predication by essence (*praedicatio secundum essentiam*).
Remote inherence is grounded in a partial identity between subject and
predicate, which share some but not all metaphysical constituents, and
does not demand that the form signified by the predicate term be
directly present in the entity signified by the subject term. On the
other hand, such a direct presence is needed by formal predication.
"Man is an animal" and "Socrates is white" are
instances of formal predication; "(What is) singular is (what
is) common" (*singulare est commune*) and "Humanity
is running" (*humanitas est currens*) are instances of
remote inherence, as according to Alyngton it is possible to attribute
the property of being running to the form of humanity if at least one
man is running. However, he makes sure to use as a predicate term a
substantival adjective in its neuter form, because only in this way
can it be made apparent that the form signified by the predicate term
is not directly present in the subject, but is indirectly attributed
to it, through its individuals (*In Cat*., cap. *de
substantia*, pp. 288-90).


## 4. The Theory of Substance



These remarks on the relations between forms and substances bring us
to the core of Alyngton's ontology: the doctrine of substance,
developed in the fifth chapter of his commentary on the
*Categories*. Alyngton's treatment can be divided into
two main parts. (i) The first attempts to clarify what characterizes
substance, and therefore what falls by itself into that category; (ii)
the second is concerned with the distinction between primary (or
individual) and secondary (or universal) substances.



Alyngton lists seven opinions about the nature and mode of being of
substance, the last of which he supports.


1. According to the first one, proper to grammarians, substance is
what the term 'substance' refers to when utilized in a
broad sense, that is, the quiddity (*quidditas*) or essence
(*essentia*) of anything. In this case, substance is not a
category, since the items which fulfil this description do not share
any common nature (*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, p.
263).
2. The second opinion is that of Avicenna, who affirms that any
entity which does not inhere in something else is a substance (cf.
*Liber de philosophia prima*, tr. 8, cap. 4, S. Van Riet ed., 2
vols., Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill, 1977-80, vol. 2, pp.
403-404). According to this view, God, substantial differences,
and negative truths can be said to be substances, even though only in
an analogical way (*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, pp.
263-264).
3. A third meaning of the term 'substance' can be drawn
from the use (of that term) proper to common people and theologians:
everything which plays the role of foundation (*fundamentum*)
in relation to something else is a substance. In this sense, the
surface is the foundation (and therefore the substance) of the
whiteness (*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, p.
264).
4. The fourth opinion seems to be the same as the anonymous one
discussed and partially criticized by Burley in his last commentary on
the *Categories* (C.E. 1337, cap. *de substantia*, ed.
Venetiis 1509, fol. 22rb-va). Substance would be (i) a positive
being, which (ii) does not inhere in something else, and (iii) is
naturally apt to play the role of subject in relation to absolute
accidents (that is, quantities and qualities). According to this view,
matter, form, the composite made up of matter and form, and the
angelic intelligences are substances, whereas substantial differences
and negative truths are not, since the former do not satisfy the third
requisite, nor the latter the first one (*In Cat*., cap. *de
substantia*, p. 264).
5. The fifth opinion is that of Boethius (cf. *In Categorias
Aristotelis libri quattuor*, PL, vol. 64, 184A-B), according
to whom substance is (i) a positive being, which (ii) does not inhere
in something else, and (iii) is a compound of matter and form (*In
Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, p. 264).
6. The sixth opinion is that of Burley (cf. *Expositio super
Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, fol.
24ra.), to whom Alyngton refers by the expression '*moderni
logici*'. According to Burley, (i) not being in a subject,
(ii) having an essence, (iii) autonomy and independent existence, and
(iv) the capacity of underlying accidental forms are the main aspect
of substances. This means that primary substances alone are substances
properly speaking, while matter and form, and substantial differences
are not (*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, p. 265).
7. The last opinion is that of Wyclif (cf. *De ente
praedicamentali*, cap. 5, pp. 36-39), quoted extensively and
almost verbatim. Alyngton claims that it is superior to the preceding
ones (*septima est expositio metaphysica et altior ad intelligendum
quam praenominatae*). According to this view, the constitutive
principle of the substance is not the capacity of underlying absolute
accidents, but it is the capacity of underlying potency and act, which
are its inner foundations--the capacity of underlying accidents
being only a derivative property (*In Cat*., cap. *de
substantia*, p. 267).



Wyclif's position about the nature of substance implies that the
distinction between potency and act is, from the point of view of
metaphysics, the most fundamental distinction, of which that between
form and matter is but one example. As (i) prime matter is pure
potentiality, while form is act, and (ii) the distinction between
potency and act is wider than that between matter and form, the latter
is a particular case of the former. In fact, according to Wyclif, the
distinction between potency and act runs though the whole of creation,
since it applies also to any kinds of spiritual creatures, whereas the
distinction between matter and form is found only in the corporeal
creatures. On the contrary, Alyngton seems to interpret the
distinction between potency and act as a particular case of the
distinction between matter and form, since he constantly explains the
meaning of the opposition potency-act in terms of the opposition
between matter and form in a crucial passage that he quotes from
Wyclif's *De ente praedicamentali* (*In Cat*.,
cap. *de substantia*, p. 267 [= Wyclif, *De ente
praedicamentali*, cap. 5, pp. 38-39]). The result is a sort
of universal hylemorphism, since in this way matter and form serve as
principles in the order of being as well as in the order of becoming.
All the more so because Alyngton seems to accept the thesis that
(angelic) intelligences are not pure forms existing by themselves, but
formal principles necessarily joined to the matter of the heavens in
such a way as to make up living beings (*In Cat*., cap. *de
substantia*, p. 264).



A second consequence of this approach to the problem of the nature of
substance is that, within his system, primary substances alone are
substances properly speaking. This conclusion is confirmed by his
analysis of the distinctive mark (*proprium*) of substance:
while remaining numerically one and the same, being capable of
admitting contrary properties, the modification taking place through a
change in the subject itself of the motion at issue. Alyngton appears
to think that this description is satisfied only by primary (that is,
individual) substances (*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*,
fol. 104v). Secondary substances therefore are *per se* in the
category of substance only insofar as they are constitutive parts of
primary substances. Thus, secondary substances belong to the category
of substance by virtue of the individual substances that instantiate
them, since they are not formally substances. In fact, unlike primary
substances, secondary substances are forms, and consequently
incomplete entities with an imperfect and dependent mode of existence.
They require composite substances in order to properly exist. No form
as such, not even the substantial ones, is formally a substance, since
no form as such has (i) the capacity of underlying potency and act,
and (ii) matter and form as its inner constituent. Secondary
substances are related to primary substances as formal principles of
the latter. It is in this way that humanity and (say) Socrates are
linked together. For this reason no secondary substances as such are
totally identical with primary substances (*In Cat*., cap.
*de substantia*, p. 280; see also pp. 281 and 282-283).
As a consequence, while 'man is animal' ('*homo
est animal*') is a sentence to which a formal predication
corresponds in the world, a predication by essence matches
'humanity is animality' ('*humanitas est
animalitas*'). Any (individual) man is an animal because of
the form of humanity present in him *qua* its essential
constituent, albeit the form of humanity as such is not the principle
of animality. Therefore, humanity is not formally animality nor
rationality, even though it is animality plus rationality (*In
Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, pp. 283-284; see also
cap. *de quantitate*, fols. 106v-107r).



Primary substances are the substrate of existence of any other kinds
of categorial being, as nothing exists in addition to primary
substances but secondary substances and accidents, which both are
forms present in individual substances. Like Aristotle
(*Categories* 5, 2b5-6), Alyngton can therefore affirm
that primary substances are the necessary condition of existence for
any other items of the world: nothing could exist, if primary
substances stopped existing (*In Cat*., cap. *de
substantia*, p. 286). This does not mean, however, that it would
be possible to find in the world a primary substance (i) that would
not belong to a certain species, and (ii) without any accident
inhering in it. It means that, from the point of view of full
existence, accidents and secondary substances always presuppose
primary substances, as to be a primary substance is to be an
autonomous singular existing item (*hoc aliquid*), whilst (i)
to be a secondary substance is to be a *quale quid*, that is,
an inner and essential determination (or form) of a primary substance,
and (ii) to be an accident is to be an outer determination or aspect
of a primary substance (*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*,
fol. 101v).


## 5. The Absolute Accidents



Since Alyngton thinks of primary substances as the ultimate substrates
of existence in relation to anything else, the only way to safeguard
the reality of accidents as well as their distinction from substance
and from each other, while at the same time, to affirm their
dependence on substance in existence, was to conceive of them as forms
of the substance itself, and therefore as something existentially
incomplete. Accordingly, like Wyclif, he insists that quantity,
quality, and relations, considered as abstract accidents, are forms
inherent in primary substances, whereas, if considered from the point
of view of their actual existence as concrete items, they are not
really distinct from the substance in which they are present, but only
formally, as they are modes of substances. So, the chief features of
Alyngton's treatment of accidents are his twofold consideration
of them as abstract forms and as concrete properties as well as his
commitment to their objective reality, since, in his opinion, they are
mind-independent items of the world in both cases. Hence, the main
goals of his reading of the chapters 6-8 of the Aristotelian
treatise are showing the ordered internal structure of the chief
categories of accidents, and reasserting their reality and real
distinction from the category of substance, against those thinkers,
like Ockham and his followers, who had attempted to reduce quantity
and relations to mere aspects of material substances.



1. (*Quantity*) According to the standard realist
interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories,
followed also by Alyngton among the nine genera of accidents, quantity
is the most important one, as it is the basis of all further
accidents, since quantity orders material substances for receiving
quality and the other accidental forms (*In Cat*., cap. *de
quantitate*, fol. 106r). On the contrary, Ockham had claimed that
it was superfluous to posit quantitative forms really distinct from
substance and quality, since quantity presupposes what it is intended
to explain, that is, the extension of material substances and their
having parts outside parts. As an accident, quantity needs substance
as its substrate of inherence (cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 10.4, in *Opera
philosophica*, vol. 2, pp. 205-24). Like Burley and Wyclif,
Alyngton denies that material substance can be actually extended
without the presence of the general form of quantity in it, thereby
affirming its necessity. Hence, he tries to confute Ockham's
argumentation. He thinks that the existence of quantity always implies
that of substance, but he also believes that the actual existence of
parts in a substance necessarily implies the presence of a general
form of quantity in it, really distinct from the substance (say
Socrates) in which it inheres, and formally distinct from the fact,
grounded on the substance at issue, that this same substance is a
quantified thing. For Alyngton, what characterizes quantity and
differentiates it from the other accidental forms, and in particular
from quality, are the following features: (1) being the appropriate
measure of anything, and (2) being an absolute entity which makes it
possible that material substances actually have parts outside parts
(*In Cat*., cap. *de quantitate*, fols. 106v, 107r,
114v).



If the highest genus of the category of quantity is a form, the seven
species Aristotle enumerates (line, surface, solid, time, place,
number, and speech) clearly are not. Alyngton tries to meet this
difficulty by reformulating the notion of quantified-thing
(*quantum*), and by proposing a method for deducing the seven
species of quantity from the highest genus (a sort of *sufficientia
quantitatum*). He considers the seven species Aristotle lists not
as quantitative forms, but as the most proper and primary bearers of
the quantitative nature, revealed by the highest genus of the
category. In fact, encouraged by the Aristotelian distinction between
strict and derivative quantities (*Categories* 6,
5a38-b10), like Burley, he distinguishes two different ways of
being quantified: by itself and accidentally (*per accidens*).
Only the seven species of quantity would be *quanta* by
themselves, while any other *quantum* would be such *per
accidens*, and so indirectly, because of its connection to one (or
more) of the seven *quanta per se* (*In Cat*., cap.
*de quantitate*, fol. 116r).



In Alyngton's view, the seven species of quantity correspond to
the seven possible ways of measuring the being (*esse*) of the
material substance. In fact, substance has two main kinds of being:
permanent and in succession. And both of them can be either discrete
or continuous. In turn, the being permanent and continuous of material
substance can be measured either from inside or from outside. If from
inside, then in three different modes: according to one, two or all
the three dimensions proper to material substances. In the first case,
the measure is line, in the second surface, and in the third solid. If
it is measured from outside, then it is place. The being of material
substance which is permanent and discrete is measured by numbers. The
being which is in succession and continuous is measured by time. And
finally, the being of substance which is in succession and discrete is
measured by the quantity called 'speech' (*oratio*)
(*In Cat*., cap. *de quantitate*, fol.
107r-v).



Alyngton's derivation of the seven species of quantity from a
unique principle common to them is unconvincing, but extremely
interesting, nonetheless, as it clearly shows that he wants to stress
the unity of the category of quantity, which at first appears
heterogeneous, and to trace the problem of reality and real
distinction of quantities back to that of the nature and status of its
distinctive mark.



2. (*Quality*) The chapter on quality is the least complex and
interesting part of the whole commentary, since Alyngton is faithful
to Aristotle's text and doctrine, and sometimes even offers
rather unproblematic analyses and elucidations. The main general topic
he deals with is the internal structure of the category.



In the first lines of the eighth chapter of the *Categories*
(8a25-26) Aristotle observes that quality is among those things
that are spoken of in a number of ways--an affirmation which
seems to imply that quality is not a highest genus, as, according to
Aristotle himself, what is spoken of in a number of ways always
gathers in several different natures. Furthermore, the Stagirite
speaks of four species of quality (habits and dispositions, natural
capacities and incapacities, affective qualities and affections,
figures and shapes), without explaining how they are related to one
another and to the highest genus of the category. No Aristotelian
commentator had ever thought that quality was spoken of in many ways
purely equivocally. Therefore no Aristotelian commentator had ever
presumed that the term 'quality' could have several
different (but connected) meanings. On the contrary, they unanimously
took for granted that it had a unique *ratio*, common to all
the items belonging to the category. They disagreed, however, about
the status and hierarchical order of the four species mentioned by
Aristotle. For example, Albert the Great held that quality at once and
directly splits up into the four species, which would all be equally
far from the highest genus. Duns Scotus, Ockham, and Walter Burley
maintained that the so called 'species' of the quality
were not properly species (or intermediate genera), but modes of
quality, since many singular qualities would belong to the first three
species at the same time, as, unlike species, modes are not
constituted by opposite properties. Alyngton rejected both opinions.
The latter because it compromises the actual goal of a correct
categorial theory, and the former because it does not fit in with the
standard infracatagorial structure described by Porphyry in his
Isagoge. Consequently, he inserts an intermediate level between the
highest genus of the category and the four species by claiming that
quality is first of all divided into perceptible (*sensibilis*)
and non-perceptible (*insensibilis*) qualities. Affective
qualities and affections, figures and shapes stem from the former kind
of quality, while habits and dispositions, natural capacities and
incapacities derive from the latter. In fact, (1) figures and shapes
are those perceptible qualities which inhere in substances because of
the mutual position of its quantitative parts, while affective
qualities and affections inhere in substances because of the form
itself of the substantial composite. (2) Natural capacities and
incapacities are inborn non-perceptible qualities, while habits and
dispositions are due to the activity, both physical and, if it is the
case, intellectual, of the substance in which they inhere (*In
Cat*., cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 130r).


## 6. Relations and Relatives



Aristotle's treatment of relations and relatives in the
*Categories* is opaque and incomplete, since (1) he does not
have any notion of relation, as he speaks of relatives and conceives
of them as those entities to which non-absolute terms of our language
refer; (2) he does not discuss the question of the reality of
relatives; (3) he does not clarify the connection between the two defi
nitions of relatives he proposes in the seventh chapters of the
*Categories*; (4) he does not give any effective criterion for
distinguishing relatives from some items belonging to other categories
(cf. Ackrill 1963, pp. 98-103). Because of these
facts, in the Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages many authors tried
to reformulate the doctrine of relatives. The most successful and
interesting attempt was that of the Neoplatonic commentators of the
sixth century, such as Olympiodorus, Philoponus, and Simplicius.
Unlike Aristotle, they were able to elaborate a notion of relation
(*schesis*) almost equivalent to our modern notion of two-place
predicates, as they conceived of relations as abstract forms whose
distinctive feature was the property of being present-in and joining
two different substances at once. This view was rejected by Latin
medieval authors. According to Boethius relation (respectus or
habitudo) is an accidental form which is in a substance (its substrate
of inherence) and simply entails a reference to another, without
inhering in that other. Shortly after the middle of the13th century,
Albert the Great explicitly denied that a relation could inhere (in
the technical sense of the word) in two substances at once (*Liber
de praedicamentis*, tr. 4, cap. 10). Some years later, the same
thesis was held by Simon of Faversham (*Quaestiones in librum
Praedicamentorum*, q. 43). In the 14th century, also Walter Burley
shared this approach, since it appeared to him to be the only thing
consistent with one of the basic principle of medieval metaphysics:
the equivalence and correspondence between accidental forms and their
substrates of inherence, so that no accidental form could inhere at
the same time and in full in two (or more) substances (cf. Burley,
*Expositio super librum Sex principiorum*, cap. *de
habitu*). On the contrary, Wyclif seems to support a different
opinion, similar to that of the Neoplatonists , as he maintained that
relation (1) is different from quality and quantity, since it
presupposes them, and (2) qua such is a sort of link between two
things (cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*,
ch. 7. p. 61).


Alyngton's theory of *ad aliquid* is worthy of note,
as he possibly was the only late medieval author who followed and
developed Wyclif 's ideas on that topic. He conceived of
relation (*relatio*) as an accidental form which is present in
both the relatives at once - even though in different ways,
since it names only one of them. Consequently his relation can be
considered as a sort of ontological counterpart of our modern
functions with two variables, or two-place predicates (*In
Cat*., cap. *de relativis*, pp. 295-96). According
to Alyngton, whose account partially differs from that of Wyclif, in
the act of relating one substance to another four distinct
constitutive elements can be singled out: (1) the relation itself
- for instance, the form of paternity; (2) the subject of the
relation, that is, the substance that denominatively receives the name
of the relation - for instance, the (substance that is the)
father; (3) the object of the relation, that is, the substance which
the subject of the relation is connected with - for instance,
the (substance that is the) son; and (4) the foundation
(*fundamentum*) of the relation, that is, the absolute entity
in virtue of which the relation inheres in the subject and in the
object (*ibidem*, p. 299). The foundation is the main
component, since it joins the relation to the underlying substances,
lets the relation link the substrate to the object, and transmits some
of its properties to the relation (*ibidem*, p. 291). Like
Wyclif, Alyngton affirms that only qualities and quantities can be the
foundation of a relation (*ibidem*). Some consequences about
the nature and status of relations and relatives derive from these
premises: (1) relation is a categorial item whose reality is feebler
than that of any other accidental form, as it depends upon the
simultaneous existence of three different items: the subject, the
object, and the foundation (*ibidem*, p. 295). (2) A relation
can start inhering in a substance without any change in the latter,
but simply because of a change in another substance. For example:
given two things, one white and the other black, if the black thing
becomes white, then, because of this change, a new accident, that is,
a relation of similarity, will inhere also in the fi rst thing, apart
from any other change in it. (3) All the real relatives (relativa
secundum esse) are simultaneous by nature, since the real cause of
being a relative is relation, which at the same time inheres in two
substances, thereby making both ones relatives (*ibidem*,
p. 301). On this basis Alyngton can divide relations into
transcendental and categorial relations (*ibidem*, pp.
290-91), and, what is more, among the latter he can contrast
real relatives (*relativa secundum esse*) with relatives of
reason (*relativa rationis*) without utilizing references to
our mental activities nor to semantic principles. In fact, on the one
hand, Alyngton describes real relatives as those aggregates (1) made
up of a primary substance, (2) an absolute accidental form (quantity
or quality), and (3) a relation which correlates the substance at
issue to another substance existing in actu. On the other hand, he
defi ne relatives of reason as those aggregates characterized by the
occurrence of at least one of these negative conditions: (1) either
the relation's subject of inherence or its object is not a
substance; (2) the object is not an actual entity; (3) the foundation
of the relation is not an absolute accident (*ibidem*, p. 293).
The strategy which supports this choice is evident: Alyngton wanted to
substitute references to mental activity with references to the
external world, thus using only objective criteria, based on the
framework of reality itself in order to classifying things.


## 7. The Semantics of Second Intentions



Not until the end of the fourteenth century did anyone claim
extramental reality for second intentions, not even Walter Burley.
According to him, second intentions are concepts that have a
foundation in the extramental world, but are not "things"
in the proper sense of the term. This account implied that the
keystone of medieval realism, the principle of one-to-one
correspondence between language and the world, has to suffer an
exception, since no common nature matches second intention terms. It
was just in order to do away with this exception that Alyngton (then
followed by William Penbygull, Roger Whelpdale, and John Tarteys)
hypostatized second intentions, heavily modifying the standard theory
of the status of second intentions. In fact, Alyngton not only
considers second intentions as objective, but clearly hypostatizes
them, speaking of them in terms of real determinations joined to the
modes of being of extramental things and directly inhering in them
(*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, pp. 268-69). As
a consequence, he conceives of logic as an analysis of the general
framework of reality, since according to him logic turns on structural
forms (aimed at building up semantic contents), which are, as forms,
independent of both such contents and of the mental acts by which they
are learned. It is through these forms that the network connecting the
basic constituents of the world (individuals and universals,
substances and accidents) is disclosed to us (*In Cat*., cap.
*de substantia*, pp. 278-79). The strategy that supports
this choice is evident: as in the case of relations of reason,
Alyngton is trying to substitute references to external reality for
references to mental activity. In other words, he seeks to reduce
epistemology to ontology. From a logical point of view, this means
that the same interpretative pattern is employed in order to account
for both the semantic power of proper names and common terms (that is,
those expressions that refer to a class of individuals), and first and
second intentions. Like proper names, common terms also primarily
signify and label a unique object--that is, a common nature. But
unlike the object signified by a proper name, the reality of the
common nature is distributed among many individuals as their main
metaphysical constituent, since it determines the typical features of
the individuals themselves. By associating common terms with such
objects as their main referent, Alyngton thinks he can explain the
fact that a common term can stand for and label many individuals at
once. Only in this way does he believe we can grant the value of our
knowledge, which otherwise lacks an adequate foundation (*In
Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, fols. 101v-102v).



Still, this procedure, so strong and powerful, leads to a paradox when
applied to terms of second intention by which we speak of singular
objects considered as such--that is, terms (or expressions) like
'first substance' (*substantia prima*),
'individual' (*individuum*), and so on. In fact,
according to Alyngton (and many other Realists of that period), a
common term is always matched by a common nature really existing in
the world. Therefore, as the term 'individual' appears to
be common, since it can stand for a multiplicity of things, it should
signify an extramental common nature shared by them. As a consequence,
we would have to admit the existence of an *individual common
nature*, that is a (self-contradictory) entity present in all the
individuals as the cause of their being individuals. Alyngton, who
would not give up the principle of the one-to-one relation between
philosophical language and the world, could remove this paradox only
by classifying this kind of term among atomic (*discreti*)
terms--that is, terms or nominal syntagms, like
'Socrates' or 'this man' (*hic homo*),
that refer to individuals and not to sets of individuals. According to
Alyngton, there are three main kinds of atomic terms:


1. personal pronouns, which identify a singular definite referent by
means of an ostensive definition (*a demonstratione*);
2. proper names; and
3. range-narrowed expressions (*a limitatione
intellectus*)--that is, expressions, like 'this
man', that identify a singular referent as a member of a given
(manifested) set of individuals. Also expressions like 'first
substance' and 'individual' belong to this third
type, since they presuppose a general concept (substance and being, in
the example), the range of which is narrowed to a unique object among
substances and beings by an act of our intellect--to one object
that is not common (*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, pp.
270-71).



The rule that terms can be listed as common ones if and only if they
signify a common nature is safe, but at the cost of a counterintuitive
categorization of their semantic power. In fact, according to
Alyngton's account, saying that Socrates and Plato are first
substances simply means that (i) each one is what he is, and that (ii)
what each one is is a non-universal substance. This is a solution that
entails that to be an individual is not a positive state of affairs,
but a negative one, and therefore connects Alyngton's ontology
with Henry of Ghent's theory of individuation.


## 8. Alyngton in the History of Medieval Thought



Alyngton's theory of categories is an interesting example of
that partial dissolution of the traditional doctrine which took place
in between the end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th
centuries. Within Alyngton's metaphysics, (1) the relationships
between primary (or individual) substances and secondary (or
universal) substances, and (2) between substances and accidents (both
abstract and concrete) as well as (3) the inner natures of essential
and accidental predications are so different from their Aristotelian
originals that the general meaning of the categorial doctrine is
deeply modified. According to Alyngton, the formal-and-essential
predication and the formal-and-accidental predication would correspond
to Aristotle's essential and accidental predications
respectively. But he regards remote inherence as more general than
formal predication. Therefore, in his system formal predication is a
sort of sub-type of the remote inherence. This means that he
recognises a single ontological pattern, founded on a partial
identity, as the basis of every kind of predicative relation. Thus,
the *praedicatio formalis essentialis* and the *praedicatio
formalis accidentalis* are very different from their Aristotelian
models, as they express degrees in identity as well as the remote
inherence. As a consequence, the relationships between substance and
accidents and between individuals and universals (and hence the
ontological status of universal substances and that of accidents) are
completely changed. In Alyngton's view, both concrete accidents,
qua modes of individual substances, and universal substances, qua the
main components of the natures of individual substances, are really
identical-to and formally distinct-from primary substances. Moreover,
in the *Categories* Aristotle (1) characterizes primary
substances as those beings which are neither present in a subject nor
predicable of a subject, and (2) considers the capacity of underlying
accidents as the constitutive principle of substance, while Alyngton
(1) defi nes primary substance as what (i) is apt to underlie potency
and act, and (ii) has matter and form as its inner foundations, and
(2) explicitly affi rms that underlying accidents is only a derivative
property of substance. Finally, because of his strong propensity
towards hypostatization (as we have seen, Alyngton methodically
replaces logical and epistemological rules with ontological criteria
and references), he interprets Aristotle's theory of homonymy,
synonymy, and paronymy as an ontological theory about real items and
not as a semantic one about the relations between terms and things. In
conclusion, Alyngton conflates the real and logical (so to say) levels
into one: just like Burley and Wyclif , he considers logic as the
theory of the discourse on being, turning on structural forms and
relations, which exist in the world and are totally independent of the
mental acts by which they are grasped. It is through these structural
forms and relations that the network connecting the basic items of
reality (individuals and universals, substances and accidents) is
clearly disclosed. Yet, because of his peculiar ideas on substance and
predication, his world is different from those of Burley and of
Wyclif. On Burley 's view, macro-objects (i.e., what is
signified by a proper name or by an individual expression, such as
'Socrates ' or 'this particular horse') are
the basic components of the world. They are aggregates made up of
really different items: primary substances and substantial and
accidental forms existing in them. Primary substances and substantial
and accidental forms are like simple (or atomic) objects, each
possessing a unique, well-defi ned nature. Although they are simple,
some of these components are in a sense composite because they are
reducible to something else - for example, primary substance is
composed of a particular form and matter. Primary substance differs
from the other components of a macro-object because of its peculiar
mode of being as an autonomous and independently existing object, in
contrast with the other categorial items, which necessarily presuppose
it for their existence. Primary substances are therefore substrates of
existence in relation to everything else. The distinction between
substantial and accidental forms derives from their different
relations to primary substances: substantial, universal forms disclose
the natures of primary substances; by contrast, those forms that
simply affect primary substances without being actually joined to
their natures are accidental forms. As a result, the macro-object is
not simply a primary substance but an orderly collection of categorial
items, so that primary substance, even though it is the most important
element, does not contain the whole being of the macro-object. On
Wyclif 's view, whatever is is a proposition
(pan-propositionalism). The constitutive property of any kind of being
is the capacity of being the object of a complex act of signifying.
This choice implies a revolution in the standard medieval theory of
transcendentals, since Wyclif actually replaces being with true.
According to the common belief, *verum* was nothing but being
itself considered in relation to an intellect, no matter whether
divine or human. According to Wyclif, being is no more the main
transcendental and its notion is not the first and simplest, but there
is something more basic to which being can be brought back: the truth
(*veritas*) (or true, *verum*). Only what can be signifi
ed by a complex expression is a being, and whatever is the proper
object of an act of signifying is a truth. 'Truth' is
therefore the true name of being itself. From the ontological point of
view this entails the uniqueness in type of the *significata*
of every class of categorematic expressions. Within Wyclif 's
world it is the same (kind of ) object which both concrete terms and
propositions refer to, as primary substances have to be regarded as
(atomic) states of affairs. According to him, from the metaphysical
point of view a singular man, for instance, is nothing but a real
proposition, with its real suject (the concrete existence in time of
that singular thing, say Socrates), its real predicate (the common
nature, i.e., the human nature viewed qua universal), and its copula
(the singular essence, i. e., the individual essence of Socrates). The
result is that Wyclif 's world consists of molecular objects,
which are not simple, but composite, because they are reducible to
something else, belonging to a different rank of reality, and unable
to exist by itself: being and essence, potency and act, matter and
form, abstract genera, species and differences. For that reason,
everything one can speak about or think of is both a thing (or
molecular object) and a sort of atomic state of affairs, while every
true proposition expresses either an atomic or a molecular state of
affairs, that is the union (if the proposition is affirmative) or the
separation (if the proposition is negative) of two (or more) molecular
objects. On the contrary, Alyngton's world consists of atomic
objects whose constitutive elements are abstract forms (or essences),
both substantial and accidental, potency and act, and matter. In fact,
according to him, unlike Burley, what is signified by a proper name or
by an individual expression is a primary substance, and, unlike
Wyclif, simple and complex expressions have different
*significata*. Moreover, in his view, Socrates cannot be
regarded as an aggregate, since the beings of the substantial
universal forms predicated of him and those of the concrete accidental
forms inhering in him coincide with the being of that primary
substance Socrates himself is. Thus, if we consider Socrates from the
point of view of his being, Socrates is simply an atomic object, a
primary substance. If we consider him from the point of view of the
essences that he contains in himself, then he is a compound of really
different forms, which can exist only in it, as its components, and
through its being. This is the inner sense (1) of the formula
'really identical and formally distinct' that Alyngton
employs for explaining the relation between universals and individuals
as well as the relation between substance and concrete accidents; and
(2) of his description of the nature and peculiar mode of being of the
primary substance: to be a primary substance is to be *the
being* of whatever can be.