## 1. Life and Writings



Geraud (or Gerauld) de Cordemoy was born in October of 1626,
the son of a University of Paris professor. He was the third of four
children born to Geraud and Nicole de Cordemoy, and the only
son. His father died when he was nine years old, and other than this,
almost nothing is known of Cordemoy's early years. While there
is not a record of the date of his marriage (to Marie de Chazelles),
the first of his five children is known to have been born on December
7, 1651, when Cordemoy was twenty-five.



Cordemoy earned a living as a lawyer, but was very active in Parisian
philosophical circles. He attended various philosophy salons, and was
acquainted with the Minim Emmanuel Maignan and the physicist Jacques
Rohault, both organizers of philosophical conferences. In 1664,
Cordemoy's essay *Discours de l'action des corps
(A Discourse on the action of bodies)* was included, along with a
discourse by Rohault, in the posthumous publication of
Descartes' *Le Monde (The World)* by Claude Clerselier.
That essay would later become the second of the six discourses which
make up one of Cordemoy's two most important works, *Le
Discernement du corps et de l'ame en six discours pour
servir a l'eclaircissement de la physique (The
Distinction of the body and the soul in six discourses, in order to be
useful for the clarification of physics)* (1666). In this work,
Cordemoy presents his atomism, his arguments for occasionalism, and
his accounts of the distinction of and the interaction between the
mind and the body.



Cordemoy's other important work, the *Discours physique de la
parole (A Physical discourse on speech)*, appeared in 1668, as did
his *Copie d'une lettre ecrite a un scavant
religieux de la Compagnie de Jesus (A Copy of a letter written
to a learned religious of the Company of Jesus)*. The latter is
Cordemoy's attempt to reconcile Cartesian philosophy with the
story of creation as found in the Book of Genesis. The former is an
account of speech production, and its popularity led to
Cordemoy's being recognized as one of the more important French
philosophers of his time. He was even the model for the character of
the Master of Philosophy in Moliere's play *Le
Bourgeois Gentilhomme*.



Other, shorter works by Cordemoy include his *Traitez de
Metaphysique (Treatise on Metaphysics)* and his *Traitez sur
l'Histoire et la Politique (Treatise on History and
Politics)*. At the time of his death, Cordemoy was working on a
history of France, which would be completed by his eldest son
Louis-Geraud and which appeared in two volumes, in 1685 and
1689. In addition to his philosophical and historical publications,
Cordemoy served briefly as the director of *l'Academie
Francais* (having been elected a member in 1675) and was
for a time the tutor to the Dauphin, son of King Louis XIV. Shortly
after his 58th birthday, Cordemoy suffered a brief illness
and died, on October 15, 1684.


## 2. Atomism



Descartes had held that the essence of body is extension, and that as
a result matter can be divided without end. If it is the nature of a
body to take up space in three dimensions, that is, to have width,
length, and height, then we can always conceive of that width, length,
or height being divided. Further, according to Cartesian metaphysics,
extension is the principle attribute of body, and as such cannot exist
independently of body (nor can body exist independently of it). Thus
according to Descartes, anywhere there is extended space, there is
body occupying that space, making the existence of a void impossible.
And so it is surprising to find Cordemoy, whose metaphysics is in most
other respects quite Cartesian, arguing at the beginning of the
*Discernement* for the existence of both indivisible atoms and
empty space.



The First Discourse of the *Discernement* opens with five
claims about bodies which lay the ground for Cordemoy's physics
(which he goes on to discuss in Discourses Two and Three). He tells us
that bodies are: (1) limited in their extension, and this limit is
called the 'figure' of the body; (2) inasmuch as each body
is a substance, bodies are not divisible into smaller bodies, nor are
bodies penetrable by other bodies; (3) the relation a body has to
other bodies is called its 'place'; (4) a change in this
relation is the motion of the body; and (5) when the relation
continues unchanged, the body is at rest. Cordemoy then declares that
matter is clearly and distinctly understood as an assembly of bodies.
Properly considered, bodies are parts of matter, and depending how
these bodies are related to each other determines what sort of portion
of matter the collection is: if they are very near each other, it is a
heap (*un tas*); if they are "changing their position
incessantly" (1968, 96), it is a fluid (*une liqueur*);
and if the bodies are not moving and cannot be separated from each
other, it is a mass (*une masse*).



While not stated explicitly, Cordemoy's reason for accepting
atomism seems to be based on his understanding of the concept of
substance. Following Descartes, Cordemoy takes substance to be that
which requires nothing else for its existence. Strictly speaking, this
would make God the only substance, but in the created world, Descartes
held that we may consider minds and body to be substances in a
qualified sense. Each of these substances has a principle attribute
distinguishable from it only by reason. It is this attribute through
which we conceive the substance, and it is that to which all of the
substance's other properties are referred. For minds this
attribute is thought, and for body it is, as mentioned above,
extension.



With regard to body, Cordemoy warns that we must be careful to avoid
the mistake made by other Cartesians, who have conflated what are in
fact two distinct things, namely, 'bodies' and
'matter'. The former are, according to Cordemoy, the true
extended substances, while the latter are *assemblages*, or
collections, of the former. The key point is that as substances,
bodies must be simple: if bodies had parts, they would depend on those
parts to be what they are, and in this way the parts would threaten a
body's very status as a substance. Thus we are led to atomism on
strictly a priori grounds: in positing bodies as substances, we are
precluded from attributing parts to them, for if we did, they would no
longer be substances. Matter on this account is divisible not because
its nature is extension and any extension can always be divided, but
rather because it is composed of bodies which can be separated from
each other, though each one is itself indivisible.



The reason for this confusion between body and matter is due, says
Cordemoy, to an over-reliance on the senses: "we have a very
clear idea of body, and as we know that they are extended substances,
without thinking clearly we join this notion which we have of body to
that which we have of matter. Taking a mass for a body, we consider it
as a substance, believing that all that we see is only the same
extension. And because all that we see as extended is divisible, we
thus join the notion of that which is extended to the notion of that
which is divisible, such that we believe divisible all that is
extended" (1968, 97). The bodies being too small to be
perceived, we can be misled into thinking that a collection of bodies,
that is, matter, is the true extended substance, and from
matter's divisibility wrongly conclude that material substance
can therefore be divided.



Cordemoy also maintains the possibility of a void, that is, space
which is truly empty, and as before, his argument is based on his
understanding of the concept of substance. If we have three contiguous
bodies and the one in the middle is destroyed in an instant, we will,
Cordemoy claims, be left with an empty space between the two remaining
bodies (that is, the two would not instantaneously rush together).
These two bodies, being substances, possess a metaphysical
independence from what happens to other bodies. For Cordemoy, to hold
otherwise would disqualify bodies (atoms) from being substances, on
his understanding of the concept of substance. Likewise, if one could
remove all of the matter filling a vase, the sides of the vase,
*pace* Descartes and others, would not collapse, according to
Cordemoy. The bodies that compose the sides are each themselves
substances, and as such are ontologically independent of what happens
to other bodies (for again, if they were not, they would not qualify
as a substance).



Cordemoy concludes the First Discourse with a discussion of three
*inconveniens*, problems with which Descartes' plenum
theory must deal but which Cordemoy's atomism escapes. The first
involves a distinction between two concepts, 'indefinite'
and 'infinite', which Cordemoy claims amount to the same
thing: "When I ask [the Cartesians] if this substance, which
they believe to be divisible, is divisible to infinity, as it seems to
me their supposition would give them to understand, they respond that
it is not, but that it is divisible indefinitely. When I begged them
to explain this indefinite division to me, I was led to understand it
in the same way that the whole world understands the infinite"
(1968, 99). Descartes was (usually) careful to distinguish between
that to which we cannot see or comprehend an end, which he termed
'indefinite', and that which we know in a positive way to
be without limit, which he termed 'infinite'. The
divisibility of matter is for Descartes indefinite, while only God can
properly be said to be infinite. Cordemoy's complaint is that if
'indefinite' and 'infinite' really amount to
the same thing--and he thinks according to the Cartesians'
own account they do--then "there is something
inconceivable" (*ibid*.) in claiming that bodies are
divisible *ad infinitum*, since this would threaten their
status as substances. (Clearly, though, this objection goes through
only given a prior acceptance of Cordemoy's atomism.)



The second and third *inconveniens* both deal with Descartes
theory of the individuation of physical bodies. For Descartes, bodies
are individuated in terms of motion: an individual body is that
portion of matter which moves together, that is, which changes place
with respect to the bodies which are its neighbors. Cordemoy's
first question is how, on this account, can we individuate a body at
rest: "According to their doctrine, we cannot conceive of a body
at rest between other bodies, because supposing that it is touching
them, this doctrine teaches that together with them it makes only one
body. Yet it seems to me that we have a very clear and very natural
idea of a body perfectly at rest between other bodies, where nothing
is in motion, and what I say of each body accords perfectly well with
this idea" (1968, 99). It is, then, our clear conception of a
body at rest between other bodies but at the same time distinct from
them which signals trouble for the Cartesians theory. Cordemoy, on the
other hand, faces no such problem, since for him the only
*true* physical individuals are bodies/atoms; all other
'bodies' are rightly called matter, and are individuals
only in a loose sense of the word.



The third problem raised by Cordemoy concerns a body which has its
different parts in motion in different directions, such as a tree and
its branches being blown in the wind. According to Descartes'
own definition of a physical individual, we would seem to have a
problem, since the different parts are changing differently with
respect to the other individuals which would be considered its
neighbors. In such cases, it would seem to "follow that when
neighboring bodies push it in different spots along opposing lines,
they will divide it in as many ways as it is pushed"
(*ibid*.). As with the second complaint, this violates the
clear idea we have of the object as one thing. And as before, Cordemoy
notes that no such problem arises for his atomism.



Cordemoy was, as mentioned previously, alone among Descartes'
followers in his acceptance of atomism. One of his harshest critics
was his fellow Cartesian Dom Robert Desgabets, who accused Cordemoy of
giving ammunition to the enemies of Descartes, namely the Gassendists,
themselves atomists. Desgabets had been sent a copy of the
*Discernement* by Clerselier, and quickly responded to it with
his *Lettre ecrite a M. Clerselier touchant les nouveaux
raisonnements pour les atomes et le vide contenus dans le livre du
discernement du corps et de l'ame (A Letter written to M.
Clerselier concerning the new arguments for atoms and the void
contained in the book on the distinction of the body and the
soul)*. In addition to his accusation of betraying the true
philosophy, Desgabets defends the intelligibility of the
indefinite/infinite distinction and offers several criticisms of
Cordemoy's position. He notes that in Cartesian terms, as
distance is a mode, it can only exist as a mode of a substance. Thus
wherever we have a distance, it must be a distance of
*something*, and as distance is expressed quantitatively, that
something can always be divided, even if only by God. The same line of
thinking shows the impossibility of the void: if it is claimed that
between two points there is only empty space, there is nothing there
which could posses any properties, including length. So of what is the
length between the two points a property? Cordemoy did not respond to
Desgabets in print, but the Benedictine would seem to have raised some
important questions for anyone holding atomism grounded upon a
Cartesian metaphysics.


## 3. Occasionalism



Cordemoy was one of the first, if not the first, to argue that
Cartesian metaphysics leads to occasionalism, the doctrine that God is
the one true cause active in the world. (Louis de La Forge's
*Traite de l'esprit de l'homme et de ses
facultez et fonctions, et de son union avec le corps (Treatise on the
mind of man and its faculties and functions, and on its union with the
body)*, which also argued for occasionalism on Cartesian grounds,
appeared just months before the *Discernement*, though Cordemoy
claims to have accepted occasionalism as early as 1658 (1968, 145). It
is unlikely that either Cordemoy or de La Forge influenced the
other.)



Cordemoy's argument for occasionalism with regard to body-body
interaction appears in the Fourth Discourse of the
*Discernement* (he will later expand his occasionalism to cover
all 'interaction' in the created world). There we are
given a series of definitions and axioms, and conclusions derived from
these. Cordemoy begins by asserting as axioms (1) a thing does not
have of itself (*de soy*) that which can be lost without
ceasing to be what it is, and (2) bodies are able to lose their motion
without ceasing to be bodies. The conclusion drawn is that bodies do
not have motion of themselves (that is, they do not possess the
property of motion essentially), since they continue to be bodies when
not in motion. Nor can one body give motion to another. This is not
stated as one of Cordemoy's axioms, but rather follows from
Cartesian metaphysics, which holds motion to be a mode or state of a
body, and not a quality distinct from the body. As such, a
mode--that is, the very same mode--cannot be transferred
from one body to another.



As for the first mover, it could not itself be a body, since if it
were, it would have to have motion of itself (for as first mover,
where else would it get it?), and this has been shown to be impossible
for bodies. Thus we may also conclude that the first mover is not a
body. But there being only two kinds of substances (Cordemoy's
third axiom), bodies and minds, only a mind remains as a candidate for
the first mover. Further, it is clear that our (finite) minds are not
the source of motion in bodies. In the first place, our minds cannot
effect our bodies in certain ways, either because they are immune to
such influence (e.g., I cannot will the cells in my liver to cease
dividing) or because of old age or injury (e.g., a crippled man cannot
will himself to walk). Second--and noteworthy in that it
anticipates both Malebranche and Hume--if we restrict ourselves
to what we observe, we never experience a causal connection but only
temporal succession between our volitions at one moment and our
body's actions the next. Third, if we could produce motion in
bodies at will, it would, says Cordemoy, upset God's plan for
the quantity of motion which God conserves in the world. Thus he
concludes that an infinite will must be the first mover.



It is Cordemoy's fourth and fifth axioms which, together with
this conclusion, get us occasionalism. The fourth axiom states that to
move is an action, and the fifth claims that an action can only be
continued by the agent which initiated it. Therefore, the mind which
initiates the motion of bodies, God, is the same agent who continues
their motion in the present. As with those who fail to distinguish
bodies from matter, the fault of those who posit finite causes are
guilty of making an unsupported inference from their sense experience.
Making a point that Malebranche and Hume would later echo, Cordemoy
says: "When we say, for example, that body B drives body A away
from its place, if we examine well what is acknowledged for certain in
this case, we will only see that body B was moved, that it encountered
C, which was at rest, and that since this encounter, the first ceased
to be moved [and] the second commenced to be moved. But if we
recognize that B gave some of its motion to C, that is truly only a
prejudice which comes from what we do not see." In good
Cartesian spirit, Cordemoy is claiming that it is reason which points
out the way the world must be, and that uncritical acceptance of the
deliverances of the senses will only lead to error.


## 4. The Mind and the Body



Like Descartes' *Meditations*, the *Discernement*
contains six sections, and also like the *Meditations*, it
concludes with discussions of the union of and the distinction between
the mind and the body (though while Cordemoy addresses them in this
order, Descartes, in the 6th Meditation, first tackles the
distinction, and later the nature of the union). But unlike Descartes,
who had gone to some length to argue that the nature of the mind is to
think, Cordemoy's Fifth Discourse accepts this as a given.
Further, Cordemoy does not provide an argument that the mind and body
form a substantial union, but gives an example to show that they are
united, that of the body moving when the mind wills that it do so. In
fact, the union is *defined* in terms of this sort of
interaction: to say that the mind and body are united simply is to say
that they interact. (Thus the question of whether the problem of the
mind-body union is distinct from that of mind-body interaction, which
has been much discussed in Descartes scholarship, does not arise for
Cordemoy.) The Fifth Discourse also contains Cordemoy's
expansion of his occasionalism to cover interaction between the mind
and the body. God's activity is required here on the grounds
that as the union is defined in terms of the interaction of
essentially distinct substances with mutually exclusive essences, we
must go outside that union to account for the ability of one substance
to effect change in the other.



The final of the six discourses which make up the
*Discernement* addresses the question of the distinction
between the mind and the body, as well as an argument that the
existence of the mind is better known than the existence of the body
(but note: not that the *nature* of the former is better known
than the *nature* of the latter, as Descartes had claimed) and
a glossary of the affects of the mind, the body, and the mind-body
union. Cordemoy's first argument for the distinction begins by
listing a number of features of bodies, and contrasts this with a list
of features of minds. Seeing that what is most fundamental to body is
absent from the list of properties of the mind, and vice versa, he
concludes that we thus "have reason to judge that they are two
completely different things" (1968, 153).



Cordemoy employs a second argument for the distinction, one which,
while much less rigorous than Descartes', follows in spirit the
argument from the *Discourse on Method* by appealing to doubt:
"I even see that when I wish to doubt everything that I know
when I think of bodies, I am not able at the same time to doubt my
thought. For let it be false, if you will, that there are any bodies
in the world; it cannot be that there are no thoughts, inasmuch as I
would be thinking. How could I believe that my thought might be the
same thing that I call 'body'? I can suppose that there
aren't any bodies, and I cannot suppose that I do not think, the
supposition itself being a thought. Thus I know firstly that the soul,
or that which thinks, is different from the body" (1968, 153).
Cordemoy goes on to argue along similar lines that he can be assured
of the existence of his mind, but that the existence of his body, and
all other bodies, must be taken as an article of faith.


## 5. Language and Speech



Though it is in the *Discernement* that we find the basics of
Cordemoy's philosophy, it was his *Discours physique de la
parole* which was most identified with him. (Unlike the
*Discernement*, the *Discours* was translated into
English during Cordemoy's lifetime.) The *Discours* opens
with the question of other minds: while I know that I am a thinking
thing, how can I be certain that other humans are--might not they
be mindless automata who only behave *as if* there were clever
thoughts behind their behavior? Following Descartes, Cordemoy claims
that it is other humans' use of language--both in its
complexity and its creativity--which assures me that they have
minds, in that such communication cannot be explained on mechanical
principles alone. Cordemoy then concludes this discussion, saying:
"Now that it is no longer possible for me to doubt that the
bodies which resemble mine are united to souls, and since I am sure
that there are other men than me, I think that I ought to look with
care at what remains to be known about speech" (1968, 209). The
remainder of the *Discours* is taken up with this
investigation.



'True' language use, as opposed to the mere production of
sound, is according to Cordemoy a matter of "giving signs to
one's thoughts" (1968 196). Language is on his account an
artificial system of signs, the purpose of which is to communicate our
thoughts, the words standing as their representatives, to one another.
It is the creative aspect of language which demands the presence of a
rational soul. True speech requires two things, says Cordemoy:
"the formation of the voice, which can only come from the body,
and the signification or idea that is joined with it, which can only
come from the soul" (1968, 198). Yet while there is a need for a
soul in order to engage in what would rightly be called genuine
language use, the ability to make sounds can be explained on entirely
mechanistic grounds (the explanation being for Cordemoy very similar
to how musical instruments produce sound). In this way sound
production is like nutrition, circulation, and respiration, none of
which, as Descartes had also believed, require a soul, but which
result instead from a proper disposition of one's organs. As for
animals such as parrots which not only make sounds, but utter words,
Cordemoy claims that 'returning words' is not a sign of a
soul in such creatures, any more than a canyon's echo requires
rocks to have souls. As a testament to the significance of
Cordemoy's study of language, one scholar has written that
Cordemoy "picked up one of Descartes'
arguments--based on the lack of true speech among
animals--and developed it fully; so fully, in fact, that after
Cordemoy the point was given very little attention, as if subsequent
authors considered this the last word on the subject"
(Rosenfield 1968, 40).