## 1. Metaphysics: sources and importance



Avicenna reads his main reference--Aristotle's
*Metaphysics*--in the light of two interrelated
traditions: that of the Late Ancient commentators (e.g., Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Themistius, Ammonius of Hermias) and that of the
Neo-Platonic writings known in the Arabic world--the so-called
*Plotiniana* and *Procliana
 arabica*[1]--part
 of which were ascribed to Aristotle himself. He consequently
reinterprets Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and gives an
original structure to his own text (Bertolacci 2006: Ch. 5; Menn
 2013).[2]
 The Arabic-Islamic traditions of philosophy and theology
(Yahya ibn 'Adi, al-Farabi, the
Kalam) are also essential to understanding Avicenna's
metaphysics: not only does Avicenna's terminology often depend
on his predecessors, but also some of the solutions he adopts are the
result of the ongoing discussion about their positions. Yet Avicenna
surpasses both his sources and his interlocutors. From a theoretical
point of view, his metaphysics is, in fact, incredibly rich and
refined. Many issues--such as being and universality, the
God-world relationship, the problem of evil--receive a quite
original treatment in Avicenna's system. This clearly explains
the paramount importance Avicenna's metaphysics has for the
history of philosophy, in both the West and the East. Indeed, thanks
to the Toledo Latin version of the *Ilahiyyat* of
*Kitab al-Sifa`* (*Liber de
philosophia prima sive scientia divina*), every Latin medieval
philosopher from the late 12th century onwards encountered
one or more of Avicenna's interpretations (Hasse and Bertolacci
2011; Bertolacci 2013). In the East (and especially in the Persian
area), Avicenna's metaphysics not only profoundly influenced
philosophy and theology, but also founded a centuries-old tradition
which can be considered still extant (Endress 2006; Michot 1993;
Wisnovsky 2004, 2011, 2014). 


## 2. Metaphysics Between Ontology and Theology


### 2.1 Ontology and Theology



Avicenna's definition of metaphysics as a science is rooted in a
premise he elaborates on the basis of Aristotle (*Post.
Analytics* I.10, 76b11-22) and al-Farabi
(*On the aims of the
 Metaphysics*[3]):
 a science must have a subject-matter (*upokeimenon*:
*mawdu'*) and an object of research
(*zetoumenon*: *matlub*;
*mabhut 'an-hu*). The former is assumed
to be existent (it is a starting-point); the existence of the latter
has to be established, which is the purpose
(*garad*) of the science or the aim towards which
the science is oriented (*maqsud*). From this
distinction a fundamental duality emerges: by virtue of its
subject-matter (the existent and its properties), metaphysics is
concerned with being and is ontology, whereas from the point of view
of the question which it must answer, metaphysics establishes
(*itbat*) the existence of the First Principle and
is
 theology.[4]
 So Avicenna retains the theological conception that al-Kindi
highlighted (and Aristotle himself
 suggested);[5]
 at the same time, he develops the line al-Farabi
initiated by positing being--and not God--as the focus of
metaphysics as a universal science (Bertolacci 2006: Ch. 2-3;
Menn 2013). He thus gives his own solution to a traditional question
(how should Aristotle's metaphysics be defined?): metaphysics
fits the definition given in Gamma 1, 1003a20-26, as the science
of being *qua* being or, literally, of the existent
*qua* existent: *al-mawgud bi-ma huwa
mawgud* (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 1, 9, 8; 2,
13, 12-13). It is only in terms of the question it must answer
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 1, 5, 13-7, 2; 9, 6-10;
3, 19, 5-8; 21, 1-8; 23, 1-9), that the science of
metaphysics is "divine" (*al-'ilm
al-ilahi*; cf. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*
A.2, 982b28-983a11; E.1, 1026a16-21) or "of the
divine things" (*'ilm al-ilahiyyat*; cf.
*Metaph.*, 1026a13-16), as the title of the metaphysical
sections of Avicenna's philosophical *summae*
indicate.


### 2.2 The Meaning of the Dual Definition



Avicenna's dual characterization of metaphysics results in a
profound connection between theology and ontology. Inasmuch as It
exists, the First Principle partially coincides with the
subject-matter of metaphysics, so that theology is included in
ontology: the existence of God is *part* of existence
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 2, 14, 4-10: the Principle is
the Principle of part of being). The dual definition of metaphysics
reflects a twofold way of considering existence or being itself: when
it is taken as set apart from any condition, and hence taken to be
absolute, being is the subject-matter of metaphysical investigation.
On the contrary, when it is identified as the being of the Principle,
it is necessarily defined as uncaused. In fact, the definition of
metaphysics as a science and its twofold denomination derive from a
logical-predicative distinction: being is either *not on condition
of* (*min gayr sart*)--and is hence
an undetermined common being--or is *on condition of not*
and requires that (non-relational) predications be excluded. In more
technical terms (analogous distinctions define quiddity and genus in
*Ilahiyyat*,V,1 and V,3) being is either *not on
the condition of adding a determination* (*la
bi-sarti al-ziyada*)--and can therefore be
unconditionally predicated of everything--or is *on the
condition of not adding a composition* (*ma'a
sarti la ziyadati tarkib*;
*Ilahiyyat*, I, 2, 13, 8-13; VIII, 4, 347,
10-16; Porro 2011b; Lizzini 2013). In the latter case, being
constitutes the divine being which is the research object of
metaphysics, i.e., the answer to the questions: does an uncaused
principle exist? And if so, what are its properties? 


### 2.3 The Theological Vocation of Metaphysics: The First Principle as Absolute Cause



According to Avicenna, metaphysics--and no other
science--can (and must) establish the existence of a First
absolute Principle. Physics, which deals with bodies and their
movement, can explain no more than motion (its result is, in fact, a
Prime Mover) and, unable to answer the fundamental ontological
question about the origin of the world's *being*, it
simply anticipates the idea of the Principle that metaphysics
demonstrates (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 1, 6, 17-7, 6;
I,2,14-end).



From this perspective, Avicenna is not Aristotelian: metaphysics must
explain the transition from non-being to being, an atemporal
transition which does not exclude eternity from what is caused to be.
His idea is entirely consistent with Greco-Arabic Neo-Platonism: both
the *pseudo-Theology of Aristotle* (a re-elaboration of
*Enneads* IV-VI) and the *Book of the pure Good* (a
reworking of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*) insist on
an originated being. At the same time, Avicenna includes in his system
the Aristotelian conception of a world eternally in movement: hence
the notions of matter, form, potency and act are elaborated so as to
answer the question of the origin of the world's eternal
existence. In keeping with Proclus (and against John
Philoponus's position: Davidison 1987; Chase 2012; McGinnis
2012, 2013), Avicenna considers the world to be
"instaured" or absolutely created (*mubda'*)
and at the same time establishes that it is eternal and eternally in
motion, as Aristotle's physics and metaphysics teach. He
therefore posits a Principle of the world's existence
(*wugud*) that does not correspond to the prime
unmoved mover (cf. *Commentaire Lambda*: 7-12;
*Ta'liqat*, 62, 14-19; Janssens 2003).
Indeed, according to Avicenna, in metaphysics the efficient cause is a
cause of existence (*Ilahiyyat*, VI, 1, 257,
13-16). It is only in this sense that metaphysicians conceive
the Principle as an agent. At the same time, since It is first and
perfect (*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 4, 343, 12-15;
VIII, 7, 368, 2-3; 369, 4-5; in some passages Avicenna
even accepts the Neo-Platonic idea of the Principle above perfection:
*fawqa al-tamam*: *Ilahiyyat*, IV, 3,
186, 15; 188, 5-15; VIII, 6, 355, 9-10), the Principle
must also be a final cause (Wisnovsky 2003a: 180-195). The idea
of aim must then be (aporetically) shifted from the level of movement
to that of being: the final cause is not a cause of movement but the
same efficient cause that makes things exist
(*mugid*). The First Principle is therefore a cause
in every respect (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 1, 4, 14-17;
VIII, 3). The prime unmoved mover--which is, in fact, the first
caused Intelligence--justifies the movement of the world, but
refers in its turn to the Principle, which is absolutely First
(McGinnis 2010a: 151; cf. *Physics of "The
Healing"* IV, 15).


### 2.4 Univocacy of Being and Ontological Distinction



The dual definition (and notion) of both being and metaphysics reveals
the nuanced univocacy or univocity that rules both Avicenna's
ontology and his theology. If the uncaused Principle is itself
*part* of being, then It is the principle of only *part*
of being: of being insofar as it is caused, and not of all being or of
being as such. Indeed, if the Principle were the principle of all
being, it would, paradoxically, be Its own principle (while the
"First" can be defined only as the being that Itself has
no principle at all; the whole as such has no principle:
*Ilahiyyat*, I, 2, 14, 1-16,20). Insofar as It
is existent, the Principle is thus existent just as the world is.
Hence the ontological distinction between the uncaused Principle and
Its effect does not lie in existence as such, but in one of its modes:
the uncaused Principle is *necessary as regards existence*,
while everything else is always *possible as regards
existence*: i.e., it exists insofar as it is necessitated and
therefore necessary by virtue of something other. As a consequence,
the existence of things that are in themselves possible is always
conceived as *related to* a (possible) *essence*, while
the being of the Principle is purely and necessarily existence:
despite a certain unavoidable ambiguity in Avicenna's language
(see e.g., *Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 363, 1-2;
*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 5, 349, 11: "the reality of
the First"), the Necessarily Existent has no essence or no
quiddity that differs from existence (*anniyya*:
*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 4, 344, 10-11; 346,
8-12; cf. Macierowski 1988) and is in that respect beyond
essence. The first attribute of the Principle is "that It is and
that It is existent" (*inn wa-mawgud*;
*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 367, 12-13): existence is
not what It "has": It simply is.



This nuanced univocacy of being has been variously determined:
scholars have adopted locutions like *per prius* and *per
posterius* (Menn 2013: 163-167 on *Categories*, I,
2), "ambiguity of being's univocity" (Druart 2014),
"modulated univocity" (Treiger 2012) and gradual
predication or predication according to an arrangement:
"*gradueller oder ordnungsbezogener
Pradikationsmodus*" (Koutzarova 2009: 211-258) or
even "analogy" (De Haan 2015). Certainly Avicenna
attributes existence both to the Principle and to things; he ascribes
to existence differences in worth (*Categories* 10-11;
Bertolacci 2011: 43-44)--there is in fact an evident
hierarchy governing necessity and possibility (see
 Section 4.4);
 he modulates existence according to the absolute or relative
necessity it expresses, clearly excludes the possibility that
existence is a genus or that it is predicated equally
(*bi-l-tasawi*) of what is beneath it, openly speaks
about its anteriority and posteriority within the same pattern of
reference to be found in Aristotle (health:
*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 34, 15-35, 2; other passages
suggest a different analogy; Menn 2013) and clearly establishes the
starting-point of theology in the analysis of the existent. Existence
as such has no graduations but has modes or statutes
(*Ilahiyyat*, VI, 3, 276,12-14) and hierarchy
is ascribed to reality (*Ilahiyyat*, VI, 3,
277,7-278,8). The necessary cause is more worthy of reality than
the effect: the essence of the cause is not necessary in relation to
the effect, whereas the essence of the effect is necessary only in
relation to the cause. 


## 3. Essence and Existence


### 3.1 The Existent as Primary



The first step in the analysis of the existent
 (*al-mawgud*)[6]
 is to acknowledge its absolute priority: the existent as such is
indefinable (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 29, 5-31,9; cf.
I, 2, 13, 8-13): everything implies the notion of the existent
and cannot exist outside of it. In fact, whereas a definition serves
to answer the question about the quiddity (*mahiyya*: what
is it: *ma huwa?*) of a thing, the existent as such cannot
have a quiddity (one cannot investigate its *mahiyya*:
*Ilahiyyat*, I, 2,13,
 8-13).[7]
 In order to ask what a thing is, one cannot avoid referring to being,
which is exactly what allows us to conceive all things, whether they
are sensible, imaginary or intelligible, as existent. According to
Avicenna's formula, which had a great impact on Thomas Aquinas
(and on medieval Western philosophy in general), the existent
is--together with the thing, the necessary and the one--one
of the "intentions" (*ma'ani;
intentiones*) that are "imprinted in the soul in a primary
way" (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 29, 5-6; 30,
3-4).



The primacy of being (everything that is conceived of
"is") leads to an often unseen consequence: everything
that is conceived of or simply mentally represented *exists*
and hence has *at least* a mental existence (which means either
intellectual or imaginary or estimative). Indeed, the existent as such
is immaterial and only non-existence in the absolute sense does
(obviously) not exist, since it cannot be either conceived or
discussed (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 32, 6-16).
Non-existent things are only relatively non-existent: resurrection,
e.g., and possible and imaginary entities exist at least in the mind
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 33, 12-34, 9; cf. Arist.,
*Metaph.*, 1006b10). Impossible things seem to be non-existent
insofar as they are not properly conceived (intellectual existence is
distinct from imaginative existence: Michot 1987; Black 1997,
1999).



Together with the distinction between mental and external existence
(or existence in concrete individuals: *fi
l-'ayan*) Avicenna posits a distinction between the
*being of the thing* and its *existence*. Clearly, then,
the fundamental and primary character of being does not imply
simplicity: to *exist* means *to be a given entity* in
the world or--as Avicenna also uses it--a
"thing" (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5). The
existence of something must thus be distinguished from its being what
it is.



In *Ilahiyyat*, I, 5 Avicenna summarizes the meanings
of the term *mawgud* ("existent") and of
the locutions that are related to it: "thing"
 (*say`*),[8]
 but also "what" (*ma*), "that"
(*alladi*), "what is given" or
"realized" (*al-muhassal*) and
"what is affirmed" or "established"
(*al-mutbat*). On the one hand, there are the existent
and the thing as first notions: both indicate being as what cannot be
known through anything other than itself, so that knowledge is built
on it. On the other, there is what the word "thing" may
also indicate in every language: "the reality whereby every
thing (*amr*) is what it is"
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 31, 5-6; cf. VI, 5, 292,
1-5). 


### 3.2 The Distinction Between Essence and Existence



So the analysis of being reveals two meanings of existence: the first
affirms or establishes the *existence of* something; the second
expresses, without affirming its existence, the *reality* by
virtue of which *something is what it is*, namely, its essence.
The first is what Avicenna calls "the existence related to the
fact that [something] is established" (*al-wugud
al-itbati*), the second identifies the
"particular" or "proper existence" of the
thing (*al-wugud al-hass*). As
regards the latter, one is either not required to know whether the
thing is or is not existent or else one ignores the whole question. In
the first sense, then, the "existent" (or
"existing") thing stands for "what is
established" (*al-mutbat*) or
"realized" (*al-muhassal*) and
affirms that something *exists*; in the second sense, which is
expressed by "proper existence", what is referred to is
the "reality" (*al-haqiqa*),
"nature" (*al-tabi'a*),
"essence" (*al-dat*) or--according
to Avicenna's technical terminology--"quiddity"
(*mahiyya*) or "thingness"
(*say`iyya*) of the thing. Here no existential judgment
is implied (one does not know if the thing exists); what is expressed
is an intentional note, independent of its existence, which
necessarily accompanies it (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 31,
1-9).



The background of this distinction is Aristotelian. In a very broad
sense its origin can be discovered in Aristotle's *Posterior
Analytics* (II B 92b10)--where the question that asks
"*if* a thing exists" is separate from the one that
asks *"what* a thing is"--in the
*Metaphysics* (D V.5, 1015a20-b15; 7,
1017a7-b10; but also E and Z)--where the various
meanings of "being" are differentiated and the question of
essence (*ousia, to ti en einai*) is posed--and in *De
interpretatione* 11 21a25-8; Lizzini 2003; Menn 2013).
Moreover, although original in its development Avicenna's
distinction uses terms and concepts that can be found in both the
philosophical and the theological traditions of classical Islam: in
al-Farabi's *Book of Letters* (*K.
al-Huruf*; cf. Menn 2008), in Yahya ibn
'Adi's discussion of natures (Rashed 2004; Benevich
2018 and 2019; Janos 2020) and also in the distinctions of
Mu'tazilite Kalam, in which a "thing" was
conceived of as separate from existence (Jolivet 1984; Wisnovsky
2003a).


### 3.3 The Composition of Essence and Existence



If distinguishing between two areas of being--i.e., existence,
which can be either mental or real, and the proper existence of the
thing, i.e., its essence, quiddity, thingness (see
*Ilahiyyat* I, 5 and VI, 2)--can be read as
logical, its value is ontological, since the composition which is
recognized in things concerns their being. Indeed, not only must the
conceptual constituents that define the being of something be
distinguished from the affirmation of its existence (as in
gnoseology), but also the very essence of something must be
metaphysically distinguished from its existence. Essence is not, so to
speak, "ontologically neutral". The essence or thingness
of which Avicenna speaks is not simply the essence of the thing
considered as such, regardless of its existence, but the thingness and
hence the thing that, considered as such and regardless of its
existence, reveals exactly the character or modality that its own
existence has. If the analysis of a thing, i.e., of its quiddity or
proper existence, does not inform me of its existence (by knowing what
a thing is, I do not necessarily know *if* it is), this is
because a thing is in itself only possible: it can be either existent
or non-existent, and since it is *in itself* possibly existent,
it is *in itself* non-existent. On the contrary, if the
analysis of a thing--i.e., of its quiddity or proper
existence--were to inform me positively of its existence (by
knowing what a thing is, I also know *that* it is), this would
be because a thing is in itself necessarily existent and therefore in
itself existent (Lizzini 2003). Paradoxically, however, in the latter
case, the "thing" in question is only necessary existence,
it has no quiddity (or no quiddity beyond its existence) and is not,
properly speaking, a "thing" (Bertolacci 2012a): in this
case, in fact, what is revealed is the existence of the Necessary
Principle, which is pure existence *on condition of not* and
can therefore be conceived beyond essence and thingness.



The core of the distinction is that what is necessarily existent is
purely existence (but not undetermined common existence) and is indeed
the Necessarily Existent Principle. Conversely, everything that does
not exist necessarily and therefore has a possible relation to
existence is *something that is possible*, so that in order to
exist it always and necessarily refers to a cause that makes it exist:
a cause that justifies the fact that instead of being possible
(*mumkin*) and therefore not already assigned to existence, the
thing is qualified as existent. Non-determination to existence leads
to non-existence (*'adam, lays, laysa*) and this is in
fact what pertains to the thing in itself. Existence--or more
precisely a determination of its relation to existence--pertains
to the thing because of something else (the cause). In this respect,
non-determination coincides with possibility, whereas determination
coincides with necessity *per aliud*. In ontology, the logical
notions of the possible and the necessary become the duo of what is
"necessary in itself" and what is "necessary by
virtue of another" (*Nagat*: 547-549;
Lizzini 2011: 116-132).



The distinction between (or relation or composition of) quiddity and
existence is a fundamental issue of Avicenna's ontology. This
holds too for the modal concepts that connote it in as much that
quiddity could be said to refer to possibility, whereas existence
would be necessity. Although problematic (especially as regards mental
existence), it allows Avicenna to give an account of the so-called
"ontological difference" between the uncaused Principle
and the caused world: the First Principle is absolutely necessary and
simply coincides with, or more exactly, *is* Its own existence:
"that is" expresses a primary attribute of the Principle
(all others are relations, either positive or negative:
*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 367, 13-15; cf. 4, 343,
13-344, 5; 5, 354, 12-14), whereas in everything else
there is a duality. In every *thing* the distinction between
*what the thing is* and *the fact that it is* is
inevitable. Existence can consequently be said to be external to
essence, so that an existing thing, whose essence or quiddity is
possible, can be said to be *composed* of essence and
existence. Conversely, in that which is in itself necessary there is
no need for such a composition (there is no essence: no being
something, but only being). Necessity is an affirmation or more
precisely a confirmation of existence (*ta`akkud
al-wugud*: *Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 36,
4-5). The idea of a distinction/composition thus has a precise
theological function: not only does it distinguish everything from the
Necessary Principle (everything except the Principle is
*twofold*: *Ilahiyyat*, I, 7, 47,
18-19); it also reveals the divine creative act: everything
except the Principle *receives* (or *obtains*) existence
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 3, 342, 10;
*Ta'liqat*, 175, 10-176, 7). The
distinction also explains the derivation of celestial souls and bodies
from supernal intelligences: in this respect emanation is nothing but
the exposition of the dialectic between necessary existence and
possible essence, which together constitute the intelligences'
being. This same distinction between a possible essence and its
necessary existence can, finally, explain any causal relationship: a
cause is ultimately nothing but that which allows the transition from
the possible to the necessary, or that which makes possibility incline
towards necessity. Certainly, a cause may, in its turn, be possible
and so refer to a further cause, but every causal chain leads back to
the First Cause, which is in Itself necessary and one
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 1-3).


### 3.4 Quiddity and Mental Existence



Nevertheless, composition is not the result of an addition. The
quiddity or essence of a thing is not in its turn a
"thing" with its own mental existence so that, once added
to (real) existence, it could become a real thing (Lizzini 2014). This
would not only lead to infinite division (in the quiddity one would
again distinguish quiddity from existence), but also--as Avicenna
notes--to Platonism (*Ilahiyyat*, V, 1, 204,
4-5; cf. VII, 2-3; Marmura 2006; Porro 2002, 2011a). But
here lies the problem: the distinction between essence and existence
cannot obviously lead to the conclusion that essence is simply
non-existent (no affirmative statement about the absolutely
non-existent is possible: *Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 32,
12-13; cf. 15-16). What Avicenna states by distinguishing
quiddity and existence in what exists either in the mind or in reality
is that quiddity does not coincide with the existence of the thing:
neither with its mental existence, which is related but does not
correspond to universality, nor with its concrete existence
*(fi l-'ayan*), which implies individuality. On
this point there are two fundamental if problematic sections of
*Ilahiyyat* (V 1-2) where Avicenna outlines the
so-called theory of the "indifference of essence": in
itself quiddity is only quiddity (equinity is only equinity:
*fa-l-farasiyya fi nafsi-ha farasiyya faqat*
or, according to the celebrated Latin formula, *equinitas ergo in
se est equinitas tantum*). The same logical consideration
(*i'tibar*) that Avicenna applies to the existence of
God and existence in general serves here to explain the separation of
quiddity from existence: the animal that is *not on condition
of* something other is the animal in its reality or quiddity; it
*can exist either in the mind or in the concrete world* but
only if it is accompanied by some fulfilled conditions; the animal
*on condition of not* (i.e., of not being accompanied by any
other), is the abstract form that results from a mental consideration
(*Ilahiyyat*, V, 1, 203, 15-204, 13). Indeed,
when it is considered either *in intellectu* or *in re*,
quiddity is accompanied by existence and by the quantitative
determination that belongs to it: it is then either universal or
particular, although *in itself* it is neither universal nor
particular and is nothing but quiddity. When it is considered with a
quantitative determination, quiddity is thus no longer considered as
it is *in itself* (Alexander of Aphrodisias'
*Quaestiones* I.3 and I.11 have been indicated as the source of
this distinction: Menn 2013; cf. de Libera 1999; Benevich 2019). Every
intention (*ma'na*), that of universality--which
is the inherent non-impossibility of a multiple predication
(*Ilahiyyat*, V, 1, 195, 4-196, 3)--and
those of particularity or unity, accompanies quiddity in existence
(mental or real); in Avicenna's technical terminology they are
attributes (*sifat*) or necessary concomitants
(*lawazim*) of the quiddity of the thing, not identical
with it. Quiddity (e.g., equinity) is not the universal (of horse):




> 
> 
> the universal (*al-kulli*) insofar as it is universal, is
> one thing, but insofar as it is something accompanied by universality,
> it is another thing. (*Ilahiyyat*, V, 1, 196, 6;
> Marmura 1992, slightly modified; see also *The Metaphysics of the
> Healing*, 149)
> 
> 
> 



The indifference of quiddity to any kind of determination truly
establishes the correspondence between reality and knowledge: it is
exactly because quiddity is in itself neither real (i.e. extra-mental)
nor mental that it can be present both in reality and in the mind,
accompanied by the determinations of either individuality or
universality: in concrete reality there is x in its particular
existence, while in the mind there is x with its possible multiple
predication. In this respect, the *consideration* of quiddity
in itself--which corresponds to the thing in itself as expressed
by its definition--transcends both levels of existence (external
and mental) and in one passage is equated to the "divine
existence" (*wugud ilahi*) of
something that depends on God's providence
(*Ilahiyyat*, V, 1, 204, 16-205, 4; for the
possible reference to Yahya ibn 'Adi's
discussion of Alexander's essentialism, see Rashed 2004; Menn
2013; Benevich 2018, 2019; cf. Black 1999). Quiddity is in fact the
'reality' of the thing and is always identical to itself
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 31,2-9, 36,4-6).
Recently scholars have analyzed the question of the reality and the
being of quiddity from both a logical (Benevich 2018) and an
ontological perspective, highlighting the point that the discussion of
the universals plays a crucial role in understanding Avicenna's
theory of quiddity in itself (Janos 2020; cf. de Libera 1999; Marmura
1992). The crux of the matter lies in the notion of mental existence.
Clearly through *consideration* one ascribes properties to
quiddity and in that respect quiddity is existent or realised (see
e.g. *Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 32,12). Consideration
(*i'tibar*) should therefore be conceived as grantinga
kind of existence, although not as a composition of essence
andexistence (for the mereological interpretations of quiddity, see
DeHaan 2014 ; Benevich 2018 ; Janos 2020). 


### 3.5 Ontology and Henology (Being and Oneness)



Clearly then, not only Avicenna's ontology but also his henology
should be understood in the light of the distinction between being and
thing: the existent and the one are both primary indefinable concepts
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 30, 3-4) and necessary
concomitants of a thing (if a thing is, it is one), but being a thing
is different from existing and being one: *in itself* the
quiddity of a thing is neither existent nor one. Indeed, even unity is
an attribute or a concomitant added to quiddity as it exists
(*Ilahiyyat*, V, 1, 200, 13-201, 3; 201,
8-13). So, while for Aristotle "being" and
"one" are coextensive--being one is a *per se*
attribute of being--(they are not identical in meaning, although
Aristotle presents this possibility: *Metaph.* 1003b25), for
Avicenna being and one are *per se* attributes of a thing, so
that being and one are coextensive, although not identical in meaning,
and this is so whenever we can speak of a "thing" (Druart
2001; Wisnovsky 2003a, esp. 158-60) i.e., always excepting the
Principle. Consequently there is the difficulty of conceiving
"one" as both univocal and transcendental: being and being
one coincide only because they are both said of every category and do
not indicate a substance (*Ilahiyyat*, III, 2, 103,
7-9). Unity--which is an accident in the category of
quantity--is indivisibility; it is said in terms of priority and
posteriority--with a certain ambiguity or modulation
(*bi-l-taskik*)--of several things
(*Ilahiyyat*, III, 2, 97, 4-5; 99, 13-14;
but cf. *Averroes on Aristotle's Metaphysics*,
39-42; Menn 2013) and cannot coincide with being because
otherwise multiplicity could not *be* (unity and
multiplicity--which derives from unity--cannot be opposite:
*Ilahiyyat*, III, 3, 104, 6-7; 6, 129,
11-130, 7).


## 4. Modality and Existence


### 4.1 Possibility and Necessity



The so-called distinction between essence and existence reveals an
unavoidable modal characterization of being. The starting-point of
Avicenna's metaphysics is the existent, but the analysis
Avicenna applies to it (see *Ilahiyyat*, I, 6) does
not concern what exists insofar as it is existent (the existent is
indefinable: *Ilahiyyat*, I, 2, 13, 8-13), but
instead concerns the modality that explains the *relation* that
what exists has to its own existence: an existent can be either
necessary in itself (*daruri*;
*wagib*: it is then also necessarily one) or possible
(*mumkin*) in itself (this is the case of every existent with
the exception of the First Principle: *Ilahiyyat*, I,
6, 37, 7-10). These distinctions thus reveal the inner complex
of relations that explain existence: not only are the notions of
existent and thing primary, but so are those of unity, necessity
and--to some extent--possibility
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 5, 29, 5-6; 30, 3-4; 35,
3-4; 36, 4-5). If, on the one hand, the primacy of these
notions ultimately leads to positing the transcendentals (de Libera
1994; Aertsen 2008; Bertolacci 2008a; Koutzarova 2009), on the other
hand they reveal that, in the world, being is always *the being of
something*, so that the notions of existence (unity and
necessity), although separate from that of the thing, can never be
isolated from the thing or from the relation that it has to existence
itself. A crucial point is that the division between necessity and
possibility regards *something that exists*. Avicenna speaks,
in fact, precisely of what is "necessarily existent" or of
what is "necessary as far as existence is concerned"
(*al-wagib al-wugud*), and of what is
"possibly existent" or "possible as far as existence
is concerned" (*al-mumkin al-wugud*). What is
considered is the quiddity (*mahiyya*) or essence
(*dat*) of what exists: the modality of existence
depends, in fact, not on existence (which would be impossible), but on
essence (although in the case of the Principle there is no essence
different from its own existence; see
 Section 2.4).



Necessity (by virtue of another or in itself) defines the ways in
which an *existent* exists: if an existent is necessary by
virtue of another and therefore in itself possible, it establishes a
relation 'of being caused' with something other than
itself (its cause): it is precisely this relation that explains its
existence. If an existent is necessary in itself, there is no causal
relation at all (no cause). In this respect, possibility and necessity
in existence are to be identified with the notion of need, dependence
or link (the former) and with its negation (the latter;
*Ilahiyyat* I, 6). Consequently, what is possible is
always and inevitably an effect and answers the question why, while
what exists necessarily does not refer to any cause and has no
"why" (*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 4, 348,
5-6; cf.VIII, 1, 327, 12-329,4). The Necessary Existent
has no cause (cf. *Ta'liqat*, 80, 24-81,
2). It has relations in so far as it is existent
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 3, 343, 16-344, 5; cf.
Lizzini 2013).


### 4.2 The Existence of the Necessary Principle



"Considered in themselves" (*ida
u'tubira bi-dati-hi*), the things that find place
in existence (*al-umur allati tadhulu fi
l-wugud*) are subject to "two divisions in the
intellect": they are either "not necessarily
existent", and therefore possible, or "necessarily
existent" (inherently impossible things do not exist and are
excluded from the analysis: *Ilahiyyat*, I, 6, 37,
6-10).



On this basis, Avicenna deduces the properties of what is in itself
necessarily existent. The first is being uncaused. It is in fact
"evident" (*zahir*:
*Ilahiyyat*, I, 6, 38, 1) that the necessary has no
cause: to have a cause means to exist by virtue of something else, and
what exists by virtue of itself cannot exist by virtue of another, nor
can it exist by virtue of itself and at the same time not exist by
virtue of itself. The second property is uniqueness: the necessary has
no "homologue": there is nothing that--even if
equivalent to it as regards its definition--could exist together
with it and thus occupy the same rank of existence, without being
either its cause or its effect. Two necessary beings would in fact
either both be caused (and therefore both non-necessary), or refer to
a cause that would make only one of them exist; but in the latter
case, they could no longer be defined as equivalent or homologous
(*mutakafi al-wugud*): one would be
possible and caused, while the other--in the absence of another
external cause--would be its cause (*Ilahiyyat*,
I, 6, 39, 17-42, 7). Indeed, as shown by the discussion of the
relations between form and matter (*Ilahiyyat* II,
4), and also soul and body (see the psychological part of the *Book
of the Healing*, the *Kitab al-nafs*;*Avicenna's De anima*, V, 4), the co-existence of two
things always implies the action of a cause that makes them exist
(Lizzini 2004).



Other properties (see *Ilahiyyat*, I, 7) are
attributable to a being necessary in itself: unity, simplicity and
then non-relativity, immutability, non-multiplicity and
non-association with anything other than itself (these properties,
among others, are discussed in terms of negative
attributes--*sifat*--of the Principle in
*Ilahiyyat* VIII (4, 347, 10-348, 6; 5, 354,
9-14). The various and complex justifications Avicenna uses in
this respect are all reducible--as he himself observes
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 7, 46, 4-5)--to a single
general line of argumentation, which shows that two supposed necessary
beings could not be distinguished one from the other: if they were to
be distinguished by virtue of an essential property, they would be
essentially different and therefore both not necessarily existent in
themselves; if they were to be distinguished by virtue of an
accidental property, they would imply the existence of an external
cause and would be equally--each of them--not necessary
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 7, 43, 4-46, 5; 46,
6-47, 5).



The Necessarily Existent is therefore absolutely one, indivisible and
unique (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 7, 47, 6-9; cf. VIII,
4, 5) and the properties of the possible are deducible as opposite to
these (*e contrario*) (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 7, 47,
10-19): the possible is caused and twofold
(*Ilahiyyat*, I, 7, 47, 18-19); in itself it
does not exist and therefore always receives existence from something
else. The hypothesis of a possible existent thing, which can both
exist and not exist, leads necessarily to positing a cause that makes
it necessary (by virtue of another). If the possible were not rendered
necessary by its cause, but--given the cause and its relationship
to it--were still possible, it would be continuously in a state
in which it could exist and not exist. But since it exists (the
analysis concerns existing things), its relation to the cause must be
necessary. Analogously, if the cause were in its turn possible, it
would refer to a further cause that would explain the existence of
both the caused thing and its cause. If even this further cause were
possible, it would perforce have recourse to a third one, and so on.
One could not proceed *ad infinitum* (as an Aristotelian,
Avicenna accepts only a potentially infinite series of causes) and
could consequently not explain the actual existence of a thing: the
thing would still be possible and therefore non-existent.



The arguments of *Ilahiyyat* I, 6-7--which
are in part both reminiscent of and influential for those of the
Kalam (Rudolph 1997; Alper 2004)--could be interpreted as an
ontological proof of God's existence (Hourani 1972; Morewedge
1979; Marmura 1980; Davidson 1987), especially when seen in relation
to an earlier passage of *Ilahiyyat* I, where
Avicenna attributes to metaphysics the power to establish the
existence (*itbat*) of God without recourse to sense
data (*Ilahiyyat* I, 3, 21). Undeniably, Avicenna
offers here a description of the status of necessary existence and a
deduction of its properties.


### 4.3 The Results of the Analysis



In sum, the analysis of the thinkability of existence demonstrates
that: 


1. existence and necessity are related or even coincident: every
existent is necessary, either *per se* or *per aliud*;
2. by virtue of this correlation existents are divided into two
general categories: those that, considered in themselves require no
(causal) connection with anything other than themselves, and those
that, as they do need a (causal) link with something other, are not
(in themselves) necessary;
3. independence and dependence on some other correspond respectively
to the necessity and non-necessity of "being" or the
existent;
4. everything that is not necessary in itself and is not made
necessary by something other, is possible as regards both existence
and non-existence: as such, without a necessitating cause it does not
exist; the possible is thus exactly what must establish a causal
relation as regards its own existence, which ultimately leads us back
to a necessary and absolute cause;
5. the ontological field of what is in itself necessary can
comprehend only one being, simple and absolutely one and unique: the
intellect can conceive of only one being whose existence is unrelated
to a cause, while it conceives of things as multiple only by virtue of
a relation or a connection to a
 cause;[9]
6. the relationship between two things always implies a causal
relation (of two separate things, either one is the cause of the
other, or both are caused by a third entity), which clearly shows the
need of a vertical causality (from a superior to an inferior level of
being).



This general law governs Avicenna's emanative theory: it is
always a third and superior cause that accounts for two apparently
correlated existing elements (*Ilahiyyat*, I, 7, 39,
16-42).


### 4.4 The Kinds of Status of Existence



The significance of these determinations becomes clear if one
considers the other kinds of status (*ahkam:*
literally "judgments, statutes, precepts") Avicenna
assigns to existence in addition to necessity and possibility (which
in *Ilahiyyat* I, 1, 7, 16-19 are said to be
among the proper accidents of being), namely *priority* and
*posteriority*, on the one hand, and *richness* and
*poverty* (or *indigence)*, on the other
(*Ilahiyyat*, VI, 3, 276, 13-277,
 3).[10]
 These determinations explain the distinction between essence and
existence (or "proper" and "affirmative"
existence) and are, in turn, clarified by the notions of
"nexus" and "need". Indeed, what is necessary
in itself is ontologically and axiologically *prior* to the
possible because it is independent, whereas the possible is
*posterior* precisely because it depends on a cause. Insofar as
it is autonomous, the necessary is also *rich*, while the
possible, which is posterior and secondary, is needy, poor or
indigent. The necessary is "rich" because it is
independent of any thing; the possible is "poor" because
it cannot exist without something else (i.e., without the cause). From
a theoretical point of view, these determinations immediately refer to
a causal relation that is either negated (by what is prior, rich and
necessary) or affirmed (by what is posterior, poor and possible). In
other words, the determinations Avicenna calls the kinds of status of
existence serve to establish a clear distinction between a kind of
existence (i.e., one existent) that is necessarily uncaused and a kind
of existence (i.e., of existent things) that is necessarily
 caused.[11]
 It is in fact in the light of the relationship between the absolute
Principle and the world that they reveal their true significance. They
have an absolute or a relative meaning according to the causal
relation to which they refer. If the causal relation is relative and
consequently concerns secondary causes, these determinations are
relative, so that the cause is said to be necessary, prior and rich
only with respect to its effect, not in itself. If the relation is
absolute (if it refers to the First Cause), they are absolute: in this
case, the cause is necessary, prior and rich in itself.


## 5. Causality and Cosmology


### 5.1 The Causal Relationship



The causal chain is the key idea of the argument by means of which
Avicenna, in *Ilahiyyat* VIII, 1-3, posits a
First Cause, in accordance with--at least partly--a
cosmological scheme. Indeed, according to some scholars, this is the
only place to track down a demonstration of the existence of the
Principle in the *Metaphysics* of the *Book of the
Healing* (Bertolacci 2007; De Haan 2016). As an Aristotelian,
Avicenna establishes formal, material, efficient and final causes.
Consequently, in order to demonstrate the existence of a First
absolute Principle, he must show not only that "for every causal
order there is a first principle" (*Ilahiyyat*,
VIII, 1, 327, 9) but also that causal chains are all based on the same
First Principle. The demonstration of the finiteness of the agent
causes, from which every other series derives is an exemplar and
serves as a general proof. Avicenna deduces the finiteness of all
series (*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 1, 329, 5-9) from
the finiteness of an unqualified causal series: thus all series refer
to a First Principle that is both an agent (*'illa
fa'iliyya*) and a final or completive (*'illa
tamamiyya*) cause (*Ilahiyyat* VIII,
1-3; Wisnovsky 2003a).



This argument has a general premise: "the cause of the existence
of a thing exists along with it" (*Ilahiyyat*,
VI, 2, 1, 264-265, 5; VIII, 1, 327, 11); its structure is taken
directly, and almost *verbatim*, from Aristotle. The causal
chain is composed--as in *Metaph.*, a, 2, 994 a
1-19--of three elements: the cause
(*al-'illa*), and then the effect (or what is caused:
*al-ma'lul*) and the intermediary or medium
(*al-mutawassit*), which both have a
"relationship" to the cause "that consists in being
caused" (*nisba ma'lulyya*; see
 section 4.1).
 In a nutshell, the argument is simple: the existence of an effect
(which is the cause of nothing) cannot be explained without evoking a
First Cause; a cause that is cause and effect at the same time and
therefore a medium, would in turn refer to a cause: therefore, no
matter how many intermediate terms it includes, the series must always
imply an absolutely First Cause: a cause that is a cause for each
element of the series and exists together with them.



Defining the series on the basis of three elements (each with its own
property*: hassiyya*), allows Avicenna
to include the possibility of a multiplicity of intermediate terms
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 1, 327, 12-328, 3). In a
series, in fact, the first term--the absolute cause--has the
property of being the cause of all that is other than itself; however
the middle term, which is a cause for one part of the series and an
effect for the other, may repeat this relation in a multiplicity if
not in an infinity of elements (in an eternal succession of causal
relations); the effect that is simply caused, finally, has the
property of being the cause of nothing. This proves to be the pattern
of a causal series as such; and this is so not only because any series
has its own first principle, but also because every causal series and
then every causal relation finally refers to a Principle that provides
its foundation by transcending it: every causal series implies a First
absolute cause by which each of its elements is caused
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 1, 328, 4-329, 4). A causal
chain without a *primum* is therefore impossible; if it is
posited, this occurs "only through language"
(*bi-l-lisan*; *lingua tantum*). The true causal
series (i.e., the causes that always exist *along with* their
effects) are themselves always finite (on infinity, see McGinnis
2010b).


### 5.2 The Causal Chain



These ideas--the series, its vertical pattern, the distinction
between internal and external causes and a transcendent principle of
the series--are also elaborated in the *Kitab
al-Isarat* (see IV, 9-15; IV, 1-8 for
its premises)-- *Remarks and Admonitions* or
*Pointers*--as the title of the work is known in English
--, a work of extreme importance for the Eastern philosophical
tradition. The *Isarat* argument has been
defined as *a priori* or ontological (Mayer 2001; cf. Marmura
1980). It originates from the general consideration of "every
existent": once examined in their essence (*min
haytu dati-hi*), or in isolation, without
anything other than themselves, all existents either necessarily have
or do not have existence in themselves: that which exists in itself is
real or true (*al-haqq*), it necessarily exists
(*al-wagib al-wugud*) and always subsists
(*al-qayyum*: an Islamic theological term); that which
does not have existence in itself is always in need of a connection to
something other, namely a condition (*sart*) that
will accompany it, both when it is conceived as existent and when
conceived as non-existent. Thus, conceiving a causal chain means
positing the existence of something that is prior and external to it.
If the connection of the possible with something other than itself
were continuously repeated, *ad infinitum*, each unit in the
chain would be possible in itself, and the collection
(*gumla*) that the units constitute would also, in itself,
be unnecessary. In order to devise a collection of things, possible in
themselves but existing, one must conceive of a collection rendered
necessary by virtue of something external to it. The propensity to
exist, which is necessity, is ascribed to the units of a collection,
and hence to the collection itself, by something that, transcending
it, is necessary in itself.



Thus Avicenna arrives at the idea of an absolute cause which is the
cause of all things: the series, its units and the relations that bind
them to one another. One might posit the existence of something that
causes some units and not others, but this would certainly not be the
absolute cause, which is a cause that cannot be caused in any way. It
is an extreme (*taraf*) and therefore neither an
intermediate element nor an effect. So, every chain (*silsila*)
needs a cause external to it: an extreme--the Necessary Existent
Principle--which is not caused and therefore gives a foundation
to the causal chain without being part of it. Indeed, in the
*Ilahiyyat* of *Kitab
al-Sifa* Avicenna explicitly states that the flow of
being is "distinct" (*mubayin*) from the
Principle (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 4, 403, 13).


### 5.3 Absolute creation



According to Avicenna the only way to conceive creation rationally is
to conceive it as an ontological derivation outside of time. Hence the
Aristotelian model of eternity must be elaborated: the world can be
both eternal and created. It can, in fact, be continuously
(*da`iman*) brought into existence, without any
interruption or temporal precedence (it is possible and made eternally
necessary *per aliud* by its cause). In this manner Avicenna
not only develops Proclus' idea of an eternal effect, but also
integrates the theological concern for an absolute creation: indeed,
he intends to ascribe to the divine action the same absoluteness that
the idea of creation out of nothing is thought to imply. Using a
terminology already applied by al-Kindi and distinctly
reminiscent of Neo-Platonic texts (Janssens 1997), Avicenna states
that the philosophers understand "creation"
(*ibda'*) as an act of bringing into existence that
does not suppose a world preceded by non-existence (which would mean
that creation was placed in time), but nonetheless absolutely excludes
that same possibility of non-existence (Marmura 1984; Janssens 1987;
Lizzini 2011):



> 
> 
> This is the meaning that philosophers
> (*al-hukama`*) term "instauration"
> (*ibda'*): it is to make the thing be
> (*ta`yis al-say`*) after an absolute
> non-being (*ba'da lays mutlaq*). In fact, it belongs
> to the effect in itself to be *non-being* (*lays*),
> while because of its cause it belongs to it to be "being"
> (*ays*). And what belongs to the thing in itself is prior in
> the mind (*dihn*)--as regards essence, not as
> regards time--to that which *is* because of something
> other than itself. Here then each caused [thing] "is"
> (*ays*) after "not being" (*lays*),
> according to a posteriority in essence (*Ilahiyyat*,
> VI, 2, 266, 12-15).
> 
> 
> 



It is precisely on the basis of the problematic identification of
possibility and non-existence (here *lays* elsewhere also
*'adam*: *Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 3, 342,
6-343, 6) that Avicenna shapes his idea of the divine flow in
opposition to the theological conception of creation in time: for him
non-existence is what the possible in itself deserves. Reworking the
Aristotelian ideas of anteriority and agent causality, he ascribes to
the creation by the First Principle (with the consequent non-existence
of the effect) not a temporal but an essential anteriority (Marmura
1984). A non-existence that is prior in time would refute the
absoluteness of creation because it would, contradictorily, posit
non-existence. Moreover, this would explain a relative
creation--a "certain causing to be"
(*ta`yis ma*)--but not an absolute
instauration. The principle according to which Avicenna excludes time
in the instaurative act of the First Principle is the same one that
leads him to exclude any mediation: in order to be truly and
absolutely that which makes things existent, the First Principle must
perform an act that is free of any mediation; as Avicenna states in
the *Kitab al-Isarat* (Dunya, III
vol., 95), creation is not conceivable in terms of time because a time
before the creative act of God would end up being an intermediate
between the First Principle and the world:



> 
> 
> Instauration (*ibda'*) [signifies that] from the
> thing [is derived] existence for [something] other than it, which
> depends on it alone, without an intermediary [such as] matter, or an
> instrument or a time. On the contrary, what is preceded by a temporal
> non-existence does not do without an intermediary. Instauration is of
> a higher rank than generation (*takwin*) and than bringing
> [the thing] into being in time (*ihdat*).
> 
> 
> 



The action of the First Cause must therefore be conceived as exempt
from any mediation. Nothing (neither a matter, nor an act of will, nor
even time) can be inserted between the Principle and Its effect (see
also *Hudud*: 42-43). An image often occurs in
Avicenna's writings: the causality of the First Principle is
similar to that of the hand that moves the key in the lock of a door:
the movement of the hand and that of the key--respectively the
cause and the effect--are simultaneous, and yet one is prior to
the other. Priority is essential, not temporal
(*Ilahiyyat*, IV, 1, 165).


### 5.4 Emanation: Celestial Intelligences, Souls and Bodies



Avicenna explains the creation of the world with an idea he adopted
from Arabic Neo-Platonic writings: emanation, in Arabic
*fayd* (literally "flow"; cf. the Latin
*fluxus*; Hasnawi 1990), which, like the Greek
*aporrein* originally indicated the flow of water from a
source. By virtue of an act of thought which is outside time and
totally auto-reflective--the First Principle is Itself
intelligence, as well as subject and object of intellection:
*'aql, 'aqil* and *ma'qul*
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 6, 357, 3-12; cf. Arist.,
*Metaph*., XII (L) 7, 9)--a thinking entity is
derived from the First Principle: an intellect or intelligence
(*'aql*) which is both the objectification of the
intellection of the Principle and an active subject of thought. To the
extent that is possible for a caused entity (which is in itself
relative), this first emanated intelligence is "one"
("from the one, insofar as it is one, comes only one":
*ex uno non fit nisi unum*; *Ilahiyyat*, IX,
4, 405, 13-14; cf. IX, 5, 411, 1, 5-6;
*Isarat*, III, ed. Dunya, 95-102;
cf. *Ta'liqat*, 97, 12-13). Nevertheless,
unlike the Principle, which is absolutely simple, this first caused
intelligence is already a complex existence. The reason for its
existence lies in fact not only in itself--as in the case of the
First Principle--but in itself (in its possibility) and in the
First Principle's act of thinking, which makes it necessary:
this first created intelligence is therefore twofold.



Indeed the intrinsic duality of the first caused intelligence exhibits
both the structure of the universe (*Ilahiyyat*, I,
7, 47, 18-19) and, at the same time, the reason the universe
unfolds: if the First Principle's thought can only be simple and
auto-reflective, that of the first caused intelligence is already a
complex thought. This first caused intelligence has not only two
possible objects of thought (its Principle and itself); it also has a
thought of itself, which is in turn complex: it reflects the duality
of its own being, in which essence and existence (and therefore
possibility and necessity) are to be distinguished. Hence the first
caused intelligence thinks of the First Principle and then proceeds in
its auto-intellection according to a descent which, as in a mirror,
reflects (thus showing it in reverse), the ontological order of
causality: the intelligence thinks first of all of its existence or
actualization (its necessity *per aliud*) and then recognizes
its potential foundation (its essence as possible). The effect of this
articulation is consequently triple ("from every intelligence
three things follow": *Ilahiyyat*, IX, 4, 406
11-15): 


1. from the act by which the first caused intelligence thinks of the
First Principle and aims at it, a further intelligence originates;
from the act by which it thinks of itself and aims at itself, two
entities originate:
2. a soul, which is an intelligence bound to a body and which is, in
some texts, equated to the practical intellect
(*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 2, 387, 4-7); and
3. the celestial body to which this intelligence is bound.



Clearly, the consequence of the immediacy of the divine act is the
necessity of the series: only one caused element can derive directly
from the absolutely unique Principle. Multiplicity is produced by
mediation and the product of divine causality is divided between what
is created directly (and is necessarily one) and what is created by
way of mediation. With his emanative doctrine, Avicenna thus maintains
the idea of the absolute causation of being and simultaneously
establishes two distinct kinds of effects: those that correspond to
the intermediate (*mutawassit*), which is caused without
mediation, and those that are like the last caused thing
(*ma'lul*), which is caused by virtue of the
intermediate and is only an effect. In Avicenna's emanative
scheme, the first effects correspond to the celestial entities (and,
strictly speaking, only to the first one, which is caused or
"instaured" or absolutely created*: al-mubda'
al-awwal*); the following ones are, roughly speaking, all the
effects (and, strictly speaking, the sublunary effects).



This pattern also explains the relations among the different causal
series: as is the case in the Neo-Platonic tradition Avicenna divides
the four Aristotelian causes into internal and external as regards the
thing of which they are causes (Jolivet 1991; Bertolacci 2002;
Wisnovsky 2003b); thus he inserts them in a hierarchy
(cause-intermediate-caused) that places the intermediate term above
the last effect, but below the absolute cause. In the sublunary world,
for example, the form is part of the cause of matter and is superior
to it, because it is an intermediate in the causal relation that binds
matter (the last caused thing) to the intelligence--the *dator
formarum--* from which both form and matter result
(*Ilahiyyat*, II, 4, 87, 13-89, 15; VI, 1, 259,
7-10). Moreover, the effects that are caused without mediation
are absolutely created (or "instaured") and immaterial and
consequently defined only by the ontological composition of the
possibility of their essence and the necessity of their existence;
those that are caused by virtue of a mediation are defined by virtue
of their ontological composition (possibility and necessity; existence
distinct from essence), but also by virtue of the composition that is
consequent to the mediation: they are material entities, composed of
matter and form. In this sense the whole of the cosmos is explained:
the intelligences (*al-'uqul*) that are caused
directly by the Necessarily Existent (properly speaking only the first
of them); the entities originated by virtue of the intellection of the
first intelligences: the souls (*al-nufus*) and the
heavenly bodies (*al-agram al-samawiyya*). Both
of these have an influence on the sublunary world and--like the
celestial intelligences--are sometimes called
"angels" in religious terms (*Ilahiyyat*,
X, 1); they are followed by the world of simple effects: the beings of
the sublunary world. 



Indeed the intellectual process is welded to cosmology (in which the
Ptolemaic system is painstakingly harmonized with Aristotle's
*Metaphysics*, Book L and *De Caelo*). The whole
of the heavens is explained in terms of emanation or flow. In some
texts, Avicenna mentions "ten intelligences after the
First" (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 3, 401, 9-12):
the Heavens--the outermost orb, and the orb of the fixed stars,
and then Saturn, and so on, up to and including, according to the
traditional scheme, the animated spheres of Jupiter, Mars, the Sun,
Venus, Mercury and the Moon--are bound to the intelligences. The
earth is at the center. Theology, metaphysics, cosmology and
(celestial) noetic seem fused with one another.



The noetic process also explains the multiplicity of intelligibles:
the Aristotelian idea of the First Principle as *noesis
noeseos* is interpreted by means of Themistius' idea of Its
knowing all things through Itself (*Ilahiyyat*, VIII,
6, 359, 15-360, 10; *Commentaire Lambda*: 13; Pines 1987;
Bertolacci 2006), but in the Principle's thinking the multiple
is intellected as a "whole" and "at once" and
appears to be reduced to something unique (to *one*
intelligible). Thus, its order (*tartib*), the syllogistic
concatenation of intellection that corresponds to reality, is a
consequent of divine intellection and is in a sense relocated from the
thought of the First Principle to that of its immediate effects
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 362, 17-366). 


### 5.5 Celestial Movement



The explanation of celestial movement elaborates and alters some of
Aristotle's (and al-Farabi's) ideas.
Intelligences and souls together explain--as remote and proximate
causes respectively--the motion of the spheres, as they are at
the root of the influence (*ta`attur* ) the
spheres have on the sublunary world. Metaphysics explains
cosmology--to which it is linked--but also adopts its data.
Thus the circular movement of the spheres is explained by Avicenna not
directly by means of nature--celestial bodies always leave the
spot they have just attained only to return to occupy it again later,
whereas through natural movement a body should come to rest in its
*locus naturalis*--but by means of a principle which is
both intellectual and psychic (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 2,
382, 8-383, 13): the motion of the spheres is a reflection of
the love and desire (*'isq* and
*tasawwuq*; *Ilahiyyat*, IX, 2, 387,
1-392, 3), common to both intelligences and souls, to resemble
their principle (to realize their
assimilation--*tasabbuh*--to it). It is
because of this desired resemblance that celestial bodies actualize,
by occupying all their possible positions in turn, the only
potentiality they have (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 2, 389,
13-390, 8; Hasnawi 1984; Janos 2011). In other words, celestial
souls continuously move the bodies to which they are bound in order to
realize this resemblance: each time they have before them the
representation of a point they must reach by virtue of which
imperfection will, however briefly, be eliminated; in a way that is in
part irrational, each time every soul chooses one point rather than
another (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 2, 383, 10-11).



The movement of the spheres is thus explained by combining nature,
soul and intelligence. Indeed, the soul follows nature
(*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 2, 383, 7-13; in a sense,
since it is not opposed to the potentiality of the body, celestial
motion could be defined as natural), but is also thought and will.
Only an intellectual discursive will, which is capable of a particular
intellection, can explain the celestial movement by which the body is
always located in a particularly determined position: the soul
conceives and therefore elects and desires a movement whose status (to
leave a point in order to return to it and then leave it again as in a
cycle) is rightly expressed by a paradox: celestial movement is
"persistence itself" (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 3,
398, 2-7). In fact, intelligences guarantee the infinity of
motion because their thought is oriented towards the Principle; every
intelligence moves because it looks to the Principle as to its object
of love and assimilation and consequently receives from It an infinite
light (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 2, 389, 10-13),
while--as we have observed (see
 Section 2.3)--the
 First Principle is not a direct but a transcendent principle of
motion: it is the ultimate horizon to which the intelligences look
with their desire for resemblance.


## 6. Conclusion


### 6.1 The Ethical Dimension



The attribution of intellection and hence awareness to the Necessarily
Existent (*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 368, 6;
*Ta'liqat*, 50, 23-52) allows Avicenna to
connote the divine act in an ethical sense: according to Avicenna the
flow explains the procession of being from the Principle--also
called the Pure Good (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 3, 394,
4)--in different terms from those used of natural necessity
(which is explicitly rejected together with its typical image of
light: *Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 363, 10-13). The
atemporal act "at one blow" (*duf'atan
wahidatan*) of divine intellection--according to
the formula already present in the *pseudo-Theology of
Aristotle*--is interpreted as an act of will
(*irada*) and love ('*isq*). The First
Necessarily Existent "creates" the world, because, having
intellection of Itself, It comprehends, intends, wants and loves Its
own intellection and the consequences that this entails
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 363, 14-17; 366,
8-17; *Commentaire Lambda*: 15, 23-24). Will and
love--which Avicenna includes among the attributes of the
Principle (*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 366, 6-8; 370,
7)--explain the flow revealing its ethical dimension
(*Ilahiyyat*, VIII, 7, 367, 7-11). The flow is
the good (*hayr*) and generosity (*gud*)
and gives the world, or lets it acquire the good: indeed, the flow is
good for the world, as it is generosity in itself (Lizzini 2005). Even
evil (defined as non-existence or privation) is an object of divine
will: it is willed accidentally, i.e., insofar as it is a necessary
consequent of the good (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 6; Steel
2002). Will is also ascribed to the First Principle in terms of
logical possibility: the Principle always wills (there is no time
lag), but It could nevertheless have not willed to create
(*Ilahiyyat*, IV, 2, 172, 13-173, 12). The very
rejection of the temporal dimension which would allow an authentic
conception of *creatio ex nihilo*, is also the condition of a
true conception of the divine will, a will that coincides totally with
the being of the Principle and aims at a good inherent in It, from
which the good of the world follows as a consequence. The flow is
indeed a communication or donation of existence: it explains the
necessity *per aliud* of possible essences and, as a donation,
connotes, in an ethical sense, the divine act (Lizzini 2011). At the
same time, the definition of absolute good as the full realization of
possibility is the very basis on which Avicenna ascribes an ethical
dimension to the action of the First Principle; and this comes not
without difficulty: it entails the First Principle's having to
create the world, because the realization of possibilities would be
good (Lizzini 2014).


### 6.2 The Sublunary World: Matter and Evil



Without Avicenna's attempting to provide a philosophical reason
for it (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 4, 407, 4-8;
*Isarat*, ed. Dunya, III, 228-230),
the last intelligence does not lead to a further intelligence but
instead looks after the sublunary world and human beings. Indeed, the
last intelligence provides forms for the sublunary world.
Called--with an expression that was to be in great favor in the
Latin medieval world (which came to know it also through
al-Ghazali) "bestower" or "giver of
forms" (*dator formarum*; Arabic: *wahib
al-suwar*; but, for Avicenna, this name can be applied to
all intelligences: *Ilahiyyat*, IX, 5, 411; 413), the
last Intelligence or Agent Intellect (*al-'aql
al-fa''al*) represents the principle of the
physical constitution of the world as well as the founding principle
of human intellection (which at least in some texts Avicenna explains
through the idea of donation). In general terms, the sublunary world
is explained by means of the metaphysical structures used by
Aristotle: matter and form, potentiality and act. These structures are
nevertheless sustained by the emanative pattern which explains the
world not only as regards its origin, but also as regards its
"life": generations and natural transformations are
conceived as the result of a process by which matter becomes
specifically prepared to receive the gift of forms from above. So to
the active donation of forms by the Agent Intellect, Avicenna adds the
influence of the spheres, the mutual interactions of the sublunary
elements as preparatory causes and the reception of matter. The
dynamic ideas of potency and act are thus elaborated and complicated:
the idea of potency--*quwwa*--to which Avicenna adds
those of preparation (*isti'dad*) and specific or
proper preparation (*isti'dad
hass*)--is interpreted in the light of
emanation: the potency of matter is reception in time and is in fact
possibility in time. In the temporal dimension of the sublunary
world--where what becomes is something after not having been it,
possibility requires a substratum (matter) and becomes material
potency: it thus explains a non-eternal thing, which is brought into
existence "after being non-existent"
(*Ilahiyyat*, IV, 2, 181, 7-12).


### 6.3 Concluding Remarks



Hence, through the concept of emanation, Avicenna explains the
God-world relationship and, more generally, efficient causality. The
causality of motion (*tahrik*) and of influence
(*ta`attur*) are both added to and subsumed
under the causality of emanation, which is sustained by the ideas of
both donation and reception. With his metaphysics Avicenna provides a
foundation for every level of his theory: physics and then psychology,
gnoseology or epistemology, prophecy (*Ilahiyyat*, X,
2-3) and even eschatology (*Ilahiyyat*, IX, 7;
Michot 1986) find their ultimate explanation in the metaphysical
concept of the flow of forms. Consequently, if the
*Ilahiyyat* of the *Kitab
al-Sifa`* and the metaphysical parts of the other
*summae* (*Salvation, Remarks, Science, Guidance*)
together with the *Kitab al-Ta'liqat*
(*The Book of Notes*) and other writings like the
*Kitab al-Mabda` wa-l-ma'ad (The Book of
Provenance and Destination)*, are essential to the study of
metaphysics, it is no exaggeration to state that every work Avicenna
devoted to philosophy can be relevant to the understanding of his
metaphysical ideas and that metaphysical works clarify the other parts
of Avicenna's system: metaphysics is omni-comprehensive.