## 1. Introduction


### 1.1 Background: Sport, Culture, and Philosophical Thinking




Human communities have engaged in sport for reasons as diverse as
amusement, religious worship and political stability (Baker, 1988).
Ancient Sumerians and Egyptians practised sport to prepare themselves
for war. So too did ancient Greeks and Romans, for whom sport also had
important religious and social signification. For instance, in
Classical Greece, athletic contests (*gymnikoi* *agones*)
provided an arena for the cultivation and demonstration of excellence
(*arete*). This pursuit of excellence through sport played a
major role in Hellenistic culture, where striving for perfection in
body and mind served as one of the society's principal unifying
activities (Lunt & Dyreson, 2014). Likewise, in the Mayan
civilization, ballgames served religious, social, and political
purposes such as providing a common bond while downplaying differences
and conflict arising from local diversity (Fox, 2012).




Philosophers have reflected on the nature of sport at least since
Ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle viewed sport as a key component of
education and, by extension, human flourishing (Reid, 2011,
26-80). An educated Greek must find harmony between body and
mind by, among other things, engaging in athletic contests. Reflection
on the role sports play in human life and culture continued during
Roman times and the medieval era. In Rome, sports were understood
instrumentally as tools to train warriors. For instance, the fifth
book of Virgil's Aeneid is devoted to the celebration of
contests of speed and strength with an emphasis on preparing Romans
for war. In medieval times, despite losing relevance in the public
sphere, sport played a significant role in Christian imagery (Reid,
2011, 81-106). For example, in *City of God*, Augustine
(14.9) referred to the apostle Paul as 'the athlete of
Christ'. Thomas Aquinas, like Plato and Aristotle, advocated for
the need to cultivate body and soul to flourish as human beings
(Kretchmar et al., 2017, 93-120). 




In early modernity, sport regained prominence in public life, not
least on account of its potential to cultivate human excellence and
promote the good life. Renaissance schoolmasters included sport in
their curricula. Even Protestant thinkers, often thought to have been
opposed to leisurely activities such as sports, embraced the practice
of athletic activities for formative purposes (Reid, 2012). Martin
Luther and John Milton advocated for the utilization of sport
activities to educate individuals and train Christian soldiers
(Overman, 2011). During the Enlightenment, drawing on the empiricists'
emphasis on the cultivation of bodily capacities to achieve accurate
sensory data, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued for the need to exercise and
develop body and mind harmoniously (Andrieu, 2014). Rousseau's
pedagogical theory, along with several others, was implemented in the
19th-century Victorian England and Germany, where sports were valued as
character-building activities. Inspired by these pedagogical
philosophies, Baron Pierre de Coubertin founded the Olympic Movement,
regarding Olympic sport as a 'philosophy of life which places
sport at the service of humanity' (IOC 2019; see also McFee 2012;
Parry 2006).




In contemporary society, sport plays a central role in the lives of
countless players, coaches, officials, and spectators. The teaching of
sport is part of national school curricula, sports news forms part of
our national media, and sport has been deployed as a public policy
measure to address everything from anti-social behaviour to obesity.
However, despite the role sport has played throughout human history,
the philosophy of sport as an academic sub-discipline did not develop
until the middle of the 20th century. We recount some of the
field's history now.


### 1.2 History of the Philosophy of Sport




The philosophy of sport was pre-dated and inspired by the philosophy
of play, most notably Johan Huizinga's *Homo Ludens*
(1938). However, sport is a distinctive type of play and not every
instance of sport is an instance of play (Suits, 1988), so sport
requires independent philosophical analysis. In the philosophy of sport
literature, myriad characterizations and definitions of the nature and
scope of the field have been proffered (Torres, 2014, 4-5). For Paul
Weiss, the philosophy of sport provides an 'examination of sport
in terms of principles which are to be at once revelatory of the nature
of sport and pertinent to other fields - indeed, to the whole of
things and knowledge' (Weiss, 1971, vii-viii). According to
Robert G. Osterhoudt, first editor of the *Journal of the Philosophy
of Sport*, this branch of Philosophy is committed 'to
the presentation of genuinely philosophical examinations, or reflective
authentic examinations of the nature of sport ... and systematic
discussions of issues peculiar to sport until they are reduced to
matters of a distinctly philosophical order' (Osterhoudt, 1973,
ix-xi).




R. Scott Kretchmar (1997) has suggested that, from the 1870s to the
1990s, the philosophy of sport evolved from being a sub-branch of the
philosophy of education to being a field of study in its own right.
During this time, the field went through three phases: the
'eclectic' phase, the 'system-based' phase and
the 'disciplinary' phase. In the eclectic phase, also
referred to as 'philosophy-of-education period,'
philosophies of education laid the ground for the philosophical study
of sport. Challenging the dominant intellectualist pedagogical
tradition, philosophers such as William James, Edward L. Thorndike, and
John Dewey emphasized the value of play, games, and sport in preparing
human beings for achieving good lives. Physical educators Thomas D.
Wood and Clark Hetherington, among others, built upon these
philosophers to develop what was called 'The New Physical
Education,' a pedagogical movement aimed at showing that physical
education should become an integral part of overall human education.
These educators, despite contributing little to philosophical
discussion, helped to generate an era where physical education was
required in most educational programs.




In the 'system-based period,' pedagogical concerns
motivated the philosophical analysis of sport and physical exercise.
However, the protagonists of this phase, such as Elwood Craig David and
Earle Ziegler, relied on a method that placed greater weight on
philosophical modes of analysis. They began by describing and comparing
different philosophical systems, distilled them to the basic concepts
and positions that related to physical education, and finished by
drawing practical implications and pedagogical recommendations. Their
emphasis on philosophical systems created a fertile ground for the
development of the philosophy of sport. As William J. Morgan (2000,
205) notes, this shift in emphasis led to the progressive displacement
of science and pedagogy as the main pillars of physical education
curricula, and it facilitated a broader approach to the study of
physical exercise and sport that gave pride of place to cultural and
historical dimensions. 




This evolution within physical education departments during the
'disciplinary phase' facilitated the emergence of the
philosophy of sport as a discipline in its own right. The Philosophic
Society for the Study of Sport (PSSS) was formed during the celebration
of the 1972 Eastern Division conference of the American Philosophical
Association (APA) in Boston; the organization's name was changed
to International Association for the Philosophy of Sport (IAPS) in
1999. The Society founded a scholarly journal, the *Journal of the
Philosophy of Sport (JPS)*, and established that the mission of the
Society and the Journal was 'to foster interchange and
scholarship among those interested in the scholarly study of
sport' (Fraleigh 1983: 6). Weiss' contribution to the formation
of the discipline in its early stages was crucial. With the publication
of *Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry* in 1969, Weiss, a philosopher
of international repute, demonstrated that sport provided a fertile
ground for philosophical inquiry. Along with Weiss, other pioneers of
the philosophical analysis of sport were Eleanor Metheny (1952, 1965)
and Howard S. Slusher (1967), who also helped to consolidate the
nascent sub-discipline by publishing monographs in the philosophy of
sport. 




Early philosophy of sport divided along 'analytic' and
'continental' lines. Klaus V. Meier (1988), Bernard Suits
(1977), and Frank McBride (1975, 1979) focused on the possibility of
providing individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for
something to be a 'sport'. They drew on tools from
analytical philosophy to analyse the use of the term
'sport' (in both plain and academic language) and to
attempt to identify traits common to all sports. Early philosophers of
sport also examined sport phenomenologically. R. Scott Kretchmar, Drew
H. Hyland, and Robert G. Osterhoudt, among others, drew on the works of
Eugene Fink, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georg W. F. Hegel, Martin
Heidegger, and Edmund Husserl to study the nature of sport by focusing
on the lived experiences of those individuals engaged in it.




More recently, the philosophy of sport has transitioned into a
'hermeneutic' or 'applied philosophy' phase
(Lopez Frias, 2017; McNamee, 2007). The field took a
'practical' turn in the 1990s. The work of Alasdair
MacIntyre, especially his seminal work *After Virtue* (1984),
played a key role in this shift among philosophers of sport towards
normative issues. Drawing on MacIntyre's concept of
'social practice,' philosophers of sport aimed to identify
the intrinsic goods and excellences of sport in order to assess and
critique sport and related ethical issues such as doping, cheating,
and sportsmanship.




Classic debates concerning the nature of sport and the phenomenology
of participants' experience have not been abandoned, however. As we
will show later (section 2.1), the debate on the nature of sport
remains central. Indeed, the rise of electronic games (so-called
'eSports') has reignited discussion of the defining
elements of sport and, more broadly, the contrast between traditional
games and digital games (Conway, 2016). In particular, philosophers
of sport have explored the question of whether eSports test physical
skills (Van Hilvoorde, 2017; Holt, 2016), the implications of the
institutionalization of eSport competitions (Hemphill, 2005; Parry,
2018), and moral engagement in digital gaming (Edgar, 2016). 




Still more prominent is the phenomenology of sport. The rapid
progression of computational science and neuroscience has had a
profound influence in the philosophy of sport, encouraging exponential
growth in publications concerning skill acquisition in sport
(Ilundain-Agurruza, 2016), the mind-body relationship (Gerber
and Morgan, 1979), and sport experience (Breivik, 2014). The aesthetics
of sport has also flourished in recent decades by focusing on two
themes (Edgar, 2014): the nature and relevance of aesthetic qualities
(e.g. beauty, ugliness, grace, and strength) to the experience of
practising and watching sport (see also Kreft, 2012; Lacerda and
Mumford, 2010; Lacerda, 2012) and the consideration of sport as an art
and its relationship to art (see also Best, 1974, 1985; Elcombe, 2012;
Gaffney, 2013). So, while still an emergent field, the philosophy of
sport has progressed quickly in developing central methods and
preoccupations.


## 2. What is Sport?




Philosophical theories of sport take descriptive or normative forms.
Broadly speaking, descriptive theories attempt to provide an accurate
account of sport's central concepts, and normative theories
attempt to provide an account of how sport should be. Normative
theories of sport are broadly classified as either
'externalist' or 'internalist.' Externalist
theories of sport understand sport as a reflection of larger social
phenomena. Heavily influenced by Marxism and structuralism, externalist
philosophers take the nature of sport to be determined by principles
from other practices or the larger society. William J. Morgan (1994)
identifies three types of externalist theories: 'Commodification
theory,' 'New Left theory,' and 'Hegemony
theory.' In Commodification theory, sport is understood as a
commodity with use- and exchange-value. When sports are commodified,
they are viewed not as having inherent characteristics worthy of
protection, but solely according to the economic profit that they can
generate (Sandel, 2012; Walsh and Giulianotti, 2007). The main
proponents of the New Left theory theory are Bero Rigauer (1981),
Jean-Marie Brohm (1978), Rob Beamish (1981), Richard Lipsky (1981), and
Paul Hoch (1972). They understood sport materialistically by focusing
on the role that sport plays in the genesis and reproduction of social
history, mostly by exploring the connection between labor, economic
infrastructure, and sport. Hegemony theories of sport attack the
reductive and deterministic character of the New Left's analyses of
sport. Hegemony theorists such as Richard Gruenau (1983) and John
Hargreaves (1986) explore the role that cultural practices and
processes play in shaping the nature of sporting practices, while
emphasizing the value of human agency. 




Externalist accounts of sport tend to be regarded as deflationary
because they deny, or overlook, that sport has independent value. They
understand sport's value solely in instrumental terms (Ryall,
2016). Internalist theories of sport do not analyse sport based on
other social practices or historical processes. Rather, they aim to
identify the distinctive values and purposes of sport that
differentiate it from other social practices. Proponents of internalism
acknowledge the influence on sport of other practices and the larger
society, but internalists argue that sport is a practice with its own
distinctive value and internal logic. Thus, the primary goal of
internalism is to uncover the intrinsic normative principles of sport.
A central task within the philosophy of sport has been to develop an
adequate internalist normative theory of sport. At a minimum, such a
theory should articulate sport's non-instrumental value and it
should provide guidance on appropriate standards of both conduct within
sport, and sporting rules and practices themselves. Internalist views
are typically classified into the following three categories:
formalism, conventionalism, and broad internalism (or interpretivism).
We examine each in turn now.


### 2.1 Formalism




Formalism conceives of sport as constituted solely by written rules:
a sport is just the set of written rules that govern it. On this view,
there is no need to look beyond the written rules to determine whether
an activity is a sport (e.g. is tennis a sport?), whether an activity
constitutes the playing of a certain sport (e.g. are they playing
tennis or squash?), or whether a particular move is permitted within a
specific sport (e.g. is kicking the ball permitted in tennis?).




Bernard Suits' *The Grasshopper: Games, Life and
Utopia* (1978 [2014]) is regarded as the seminal formalist text
(Hurka, 
 2005)[1].
 Suits attempts to refute Wittgenstein's claim that, as a
'family-resemblance' concept, 'game' resists
definition. On Wittgenstein's view (1958, sect. 66-67), it
is not possible to specify individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for something to constitute a game. Instead,
games are endlessly varied, and, while some games may share features
in common with some other games, there is no single element that is
shared by all games. Contra Wittgenstein, Suits argues that there are
four elements common to every game: goals, means, rules, and a certain
attitude among the gameplayers.




Games are goal-directed activities. Every game has two distinct
goals: a 'lusory' goal and a 'pre-lusory' goal.
The pre-lusory goal is a specific state of affairs that game players
try to bring about: placing the ball in the hole in golf, crossing the
bar in the high jump, and crossing the line in the marathon. These can
be achieved prior to the formation of a game. For example, I can place
a golf ball in a hole even if no game of golf has begun, or I can jump
over a bar even if no high jump competition is underway. The lusory
goal is winning. This can be achieved only in the context of an
organised game.




The second element of any game is the means. Every game restricts
the methods that gameplayers are permitted to use to achieve the
pre-lusory goal. Golfers are not allowed to drop the ball into the hole
with their hands; high jumpers are not permitted to vault the bar using
a trampoline, and marathon runners are forbidden from completing the
race using a bicycle. The means permitted in games are always
'inefficient' for the achievement of the pre-lusory goal.
For example, if the goal of boxing is to incapacitate one's
opponent for a count of '10', it would be much more
efficient to attack her with a baseball bat or to shoot her with a gun
than having to punch her above the waist wearing gloves. If the
goal of soccer is to put the ball into the goal, it would be much more
efficient to kick, head, and carry the ball rather than only kicking
and heading it. Means permitted within a game are the
'lusory' means, and those prohibited are the
'illusory' means.




The third element of a game is the (constitutive) rules. Rules
provide a complete account of what means are permitted and not
permitted within the game. They establish what means can be employed to
achieve the pre-lusory goal of the game. These limitations on the
permitted means make the game possible, for they erect (unnecessary)
obstacles that participants attempt to overcome in the game. For
instance, boxing rules disallow the use of weapons, such as knives or
firearms. This ensures that the sport is a punching contest. The laws
of soccer permit the use of any body part other than the arms so that
the ball is played predominantly with the feet. In addition to
constitutive rules, Suits argues, there are rules of skill, which
establish how to play the game *well*. Such rules are rules of
thumb that a coach may advise a player to follow to help her better
execute the skills of the sport (e.g. keep your eye on the ball, follow
through after impact, accelerate through the finish line).




The final element of gameplaying is attitudinal. Suits argues that,
to play a game, one must have the 'lusory attitude'.
Players must commit themselves to playing in accordance with the rules
that constitute the game just so that the game can take place. The type
of motivation must be a particular kind (or at least must
*include* motivation of a particular kind): players must respect
the rules because they wish to play and they endorse the formalist view
that breaking the rules necessarily ends the game. It is not sufficient
to be motivated to respect the rules, for example, to ensure
one's good reputation or to compete for a
'sportsmanship' award. So, in the absence of the lusory
attitude, it is quite possible, according to Suits, for a player to act
in accordance with the rules without actually playing the game. The
players accept the constitutive rules because, in the absence of such
acceptance, no game is possible. On this view, if someone decided that
she would break the rules whenever she could do so undetected, then,
according to Suits, she is not really playing the game - even if
no opportunity to break the rules undetected ever arose. She might
*appear* to be playing the game, but, in the absence of an
acceptance to bind herself to the constraints imposed by the
constitutive rules, she would not count as *really* playing the
game. 




The four elements in Suits' analysis of games culminate in the
following definition:



> 
> To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs,
> using only means permitted by the rules, where the rules prohibit use
> of more efficient in favour of less efficient means, and where the
> rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity.
> (Suits, 1978 [2014, 43])




Suits also offers a shorthand definition: 'playing a game is
the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles' (Suits,
1978 [2014, 43]). Suits' account of games has attracted much critical
attention. Principal among the objections raised are that games are not
constituted by their constitutive rules only (D'Agostino, 1981;
Russell, 1999) and that gameplaying does not require strict adherence
to constitutive rules (i.e. some rule-breaking can be consistent with
game-playing) (Lehman, 1981; Fraleigh, 2003).




Suits draws on his definition of games to provide a definition of
sport. He defines sports as 'games of physical skill'
(Suits, 1988, 2), incorporating the elements of his earlier
definition of game and adding further elements that are distinctive to
sport as compared to other types of games. In particular, a game
becomes a sport by meeting the following criteria: '(1) that the
game be a game of skill; (2) that the skill be physical; (3) that the
game has a wide following; and (4) that the following achieve a
certain level of stability' (Suits, 1973 [2007]). Thus, the
outcome of the game must be dependent on the exercise of physical
skills. This is what differentiates sporting games from card games or
chess, for example (see Kobiela, 2018 and Hale, 2008). In the latter,
the way the body is moved is irrelevant, and what matters are the
moves made (either with cards or pieces on the board). Indeed, such
games can be played in non-physical spaces such as virtual reality and
by non-human players such as computers. However, in soccer or boxing,
the skillful control of the body is essential to the achievement of
the goal of the game.




The third and fourth criteria in Suits' definition demand that
sports are widely followed institutionalized games. A sport is
institutionalized when its norms and codified rules are established and
enforced by formal associations or organizations. The
institutionalization criterion is often employed in sociological and
historical analyses of sport. For example, historian Allen Guttmann
(1978) argues that bureaucratization and rationalization are defining
components of modern sports. Sport philosophers, however, have remained
skeptical about the possibility of defining sports as institutionalized
games. For instance, Klaus V. Meier (1988) rejects the
institutionalization criterion. For him, the institutionalization
aspect is not a defining element of sport, but rather a contingent one
that 'adds color and significance to particular sports'
(Meier, 1988, 15). In his view, should soccer lack international
following and institutions to establish and enforce the rules of the
game, it would still be a sport. 




In 'Tricky Triad,' Suits revises his original definition
of sport from 'The Elements of Sport', redefining sports
as



> 
> ... competitive events involving a variety of physical (usually
> in combination with other) human skills, where the superior
> participant is judged to have exhibited those skills in a superior
> way. (Suits, 1988: 2)




In this definition, Suits narrows the scope of the concept of
'game' and distinguishes between two types of sports:
'refereed games' and 'judged performances.'
That is to say, whereas in his earlier definition *all* sports
are games, in his revised definition *only* some sports are
games, other sports are performances. Soccer, basketball, tennis, and
American football are games, while gymnastics, figure skating, and
diving are performances. The key difference between the two, according
to Suits, is that games have constitutive rules, whereas performances
lack constitutive rules and have only rules of skill. Thus, for Suits,
games consist in overcoming obstacles erected by the constitutive
rules, whereas performances centre on the approximation of an ideal or
perfect performance. For example, soccer players play the ball with
their feet cooperatively as a team to put the ball into the opponent's
net. Using the feet, working as a team, and facing an opponent are the
obstacles erected by the rules of soccer. For Suits, there is nothing
like these in performances. Figure skaters do not attempt to overcome
obstacles. Rather, they try to approach an ideal performance that
manifests virtues such as power, grace, and imagination. 




This revised definition sparked a classic debate in the philosophy
of sport between Suits and Meier. The latter criticized Suits' revised
definition of sport and defended the original one. For Meier (1988),
Suits' original definition is correct because what Suits calls
'performances' also have constitutive rules. For example,
gymnasts perform their acrobatics in a specific space, utilising
certain equipment. Kretchmar agrees with Meier that both types of
sports are games, but acknowledges that performances place more
emphasis on aesthetic criteria, calling them 'beautiful
games' (Kretchmar, 1989). Despite criticism, Suits' definitions
of games and sport serve as the point of departure for most
contemporary philosophical theorising about sport, thereby making Suits
the most influential figure in the discipline.




Turning to formalism more generally, adherents of this view take
rules to be the normative cornerstone of a proper ethical analysis of
sport. They define the rightness and wrongness of conduct within sport
solely in terms of rule-following. Strict formalists contend that one
cannot play the game and break the rules at the same time (i.e. the
'logical incompatibility thesis'). If gameplaying requires
adherence to the rules, then any rule violation - intentional or
otherwise - marks an end to the game. Formalists oppose strategic
fouling and doping because both practices involve breaking the rules
(Moore, 2017a; Morgan, 1987; Perez Trivino, 2014).




Formalist analyses of sport hold important similarities to debates
within the philosophy of law about the nature of law. Indeed, the works
of philosophers of law such as Ronald Dworkin and H. L. A. Hart, as
well as philosophical analyses of rules such as those of Immanuel Kant
and John R. Searle, have been influential within formalism (Kretchmar,
2001; Torres, 2000).




Formalism has been criticised as an inadequate normative theory of
sport on account of its failure to recognise non-rule based norms in
sport. As formalists do not recognise normative reasons internal to
sport other than the rules themselves, they lack criteria to evaluate
existing or proposed rules as well as criteria to evaluate actions not
contemplated in the rulebook. Kretchmar attempts to salvage formalism
from this criticism by drawing on both Suits and Searle. In Kretchmar's
view, critics of formalism overlook the fact that games and, *a
fortiori*, constitutive rules are created to serve a function: to
provide engaging, artificial problems. Games are made by humans for
humans. Human biological nature is, in Searle's terms, a 'brute fact'
that gamewrights consider when creating the rules. They craft games
that fit human capacities to present a 'just right' challenge
(Kretchmar, 2015a). Otherwise, games would fail to perform their
function. Kretchmar argues that Suits' account already contains
the resources necessary to discharge this evaluative function of an
adequate normative theory of sport. Suits argues that when games set an
extremely difficult or extremely easy obstacle, individuals lose
interest in playing them (Kretchmar, 1975). Such games, then, fail to
fulfil their goal of providing players with a worthy set of obstacles
to overcome.




Another criticism that has been levelled against formalism is the
apparently implausible implication of the logical incompatibility
thesis that any game in which a rule is broken ends at the point at
which the rule-breaking occurs. If rule-breaking is incompatible with
gameplaying then any foul or accidental transgression of the rules
would cause the game to end. For instance, a 100m sprint would cease
when a runner makes a false start. A basketball game would terminate
when a player commits a strategic foul to prevent an opponent from
scoring in a fast break. A tennis match would end whenever a shot is
hit out. Formalists have attempted to overcome this objection by
distinguishing between 'constitutive rules' and
'regulative rules'. The latter allow the game to be
reinstated following a transgression of the rules by determining how
the game is to be restarted (e.g. restarting the race, a free kick, a
second serve) and how rule-breakers are to be penalized (e.g.
disqualified from the race, a penalty kick awarded to the opposing
team, the loss of a point). For Graham McFee (2004b), this constitutive
rule/regulative rule distinction does not address the objection
adequately, as it remains unclear when a rule is constitutive or
regulative. For instance, an outfield player in soccer using her hands
to stop a counterattack would be considered a strategic foul and,
therefore, judged according to a regulative rule. However, if players
constantly used their hands, the game would become either impossible
(e.g. all players are eventually sent off) or a different game (e.g.
rugby or handball). Thus, according to McFee, rules must be understood
based on how participants use them in specific contexts. However,
formalism does not provide the resources to make these contextual
discriminations. What criteria should we use to evaluate the rules of a
sport? When should we change the rules of a sport? Can we evaluate a
purported need for rule change without appealing to some consideration
other than the rules themselves? 


### 2.2 Conventionalism




Conventionalism attempts to address the limitations of formalism by
recognizing the normative significance of unwritten rules of the game.
For conventionalists, rules do not exhaust the sources of normative
reasons within sport. Conventionalists argue that rules (whether
constitutive or regulative) cannot determine their own application and
they fail to provide guidance for all possible eventualities in a game
(e.g. situations that were not envisioned by the rule makers). In
addition, a strictly rule-centric approach fails to account for the
existence of unwritten norms that supplement the rules. Such norms
exist independent of, and sometimes in conflict with, the formal
rules.




Conventionalists argue that an adequate account of sport must appeal
to collectively agreed-upon norms called 'conventions.'
Fred D'Agostino, the pioneer of conventionalism, maintains that the
conventions that operate within a game constitute the
'ethos' of the game. The ethos of a game is the 'set
of unofficial, implicit conventions which determine how the rules of a
game are to be applied in concrete circumstances'
(D'Agostino, 1981, 15). Thus, from a conventionalist perspective,
sports comprise both formal rules and conventions. For example, in
soccer, convention dictates that the ball must be put out of play when
any player requires medical attention. No written rule demands that
players kick the ball out of play in such circumstances. However, any
player who failed to do so would be subject to blame and rebuke.
Conventionalism is better equipped than formalism to describe and
understand how sports are actually practiced in specific contexts. For
instance, despite playing the same game, amateur soccer players in a
pick-up game and professional players in the World Cup final apply the
rulebook differently (e.g. amateurs often suspend the offside rule,
whereas the rule is crucial at the professional level). Likewise, the
non-contact and travelling rules in basketball are applied differently
depending on the context.




Critics acknowledge that conventionalism is a fruitful descriptive
theory of sport, but point out that its normative implications are
problematic (Ciomaga, 2013). For instance, much as formalism lacks the
resources to distinguish good from bad rules, it has been objected that
conventionalism too lacks 'critical edge,' for it fails to
provide the resources necessary to distinguish good from bad
conventions (Simon et al., 2015). That a convention in fact operates in
a sport does not settle the question of whether it should operate. In
short, conventionalists seem to take the status quo as normative. An
implication of conventionalism would seem to be, then, that manifestly
objectionable conventions (e.g. 'never pass the ball to a black
person' or 'spit at members of the opposing team whenever
possible') could be normative on a conventionalist scheme.




Drawing on David Lewis' and Andrei Marmor's work on conventions,
conventionalists have attempted to address this objection by
distinguishing 'deep' from 'surface'
conventions (Morgan, 2012). This view is called 'deep
conventionalism'. Surface conventions are what Lewis called
'coordinating' conventions. Their main function is to help individuals
to resolve recurrent, collective problems. For instance, Morgan argues
that, when participating in a game, players may encounter situations
that require collective decisionmaking related to the application of a
specific rule or an event that disrupts the flow of the game. To solve
these problems, participants harmonize their action by agreeing to
uphold the same unwritten rules.




Deep conventions do not relate to problem solving and coordination.
Rather, they are 'normative responses to deep psychological and social
needs for playing sports' (Morgan, 2015, 39). Put differently, deep
conventions shape sports into the various historical and social forms
they have taken. For instance, the principles and ideals underlying the
amateur view of sport, according to which participants engage in the
game chiefly for the love of it, are deep conventions. Thus, a
sport's deep conventions determine the point of that sport and
provide a rationale for playing the sport in a specific way by
establishing what counts as normatively intelligible and justifiable
within that sport. For example, amateur athletes often view sport as a
perfective enterprise pursued for its own sake. They play sport for the
love of the game not for instrumental benefit. The amateur's
emphasis on the intrinsic value of sport contrasts with the
professional's view of sport. For professionals, sport tends to
be viewed as a serious, instrumental occupation, that is, a means to
earn a living (Morgan, 2015, 40-41). Thus, amateurs and professionals
evaluate differently practices such as training, doping, and
strategising. While professionals embrace conduct that increases their
chance of victory, amateurs are often more discerning, rejecting
practices such as professional coaches and strategic fouling on the
grounds that they are detrimental to the emphasis of the appreciation
of the practice itself, not the instrumental goals achieved through it.
 




In response to critics of conventionalism, Morgan has argued that
deep conventions provide evaluative criteria by which the moral
standing of surface conventions can be assessed. However, it remains
unclear whether Morgan responds satisfactorily to criticisms that have
been leveled against deep conventionalism (Moore, 2018). How can deep
conventions be distinguished from surface conventions? Does deep
conventionalism only shift the 'critical edge' problem to
the deep convention level? What resources does deep conventionalism
provide to evaluate deep conventions? 


### 2.3 Broad Internalism (Interpretivism)




In contrast both to formalists who see sport as constituted by rules
only and conventionalists for whom sport is constituted by rules and
conventions, broad internalists maintain that sport is constituted by
rules, conventions, as well as underlying intrinsic principles
(Russell, 1999; Simon et al., 2015). According to Robert L. Simon, one
of the pioneers of this view, 'broad internalism claims that in
addition to the rules of various sports, there are underlying
principles that might be embedded in overall theories or accounts of
sport as a practice' (Simon, 2000, 7). Intrinsic principles are key for
broad internalists, as they provide the foundation for interpreting or
understanding sport practices. Such principles are 'presuppositions of
sporting practice in the sense that they must be accepted if our
sporting practice is to make sense or, perhaps, make the best sense'
(Simon et al., 2015, 32). Formalists and conventionalists fail to give
due recognition to the idea that rules and conventions must be
interpreted and applied so as to respect and promote normative
principles that determine the point of the practice.




Ronald Dworkin's interpretivist theory of law holds that law must be
interpreted in accordance with principles (e.g. justice) without which
legal practice would not make sense. Interpretivism heavily influenced
Simon's formulation of broad internalism. This is perhaps unsurprising
as several broad internalists consider sport to constitute a type of
legal system with its own jurisprudence (e.g. Russell. 2015). On
Simon's view, sport is interpreted by appealing to intrinsic
principles, separate to rules and conventions, that define the logic of
the practice. Justice and competitive excellence are examples of such
principles. Without them, Simon's argument continues, the sporting
practice would not make sense. Drawing on different understandings of
the intrinsic principles that underlie sport, three broad internalist
approaches have been formulated: contractualism, the 'respect for
the integrity of the game' account, and mutualism.




The contractualist approach holds that sports are made possible by
an implicit social contract among participants. Agreement to partake in
the practice and abide by a specific set of rules and conventions
provides normative validity to the rules and conventions upheld during
the game. For instance, Warren P. Fraleigh argues that sports are made
possible not only by the rules, but also by the fact that players agree
to follow them (Fraleigh, 1984). Inaugural events prior to sporting
events symbolize such an implicit pact. In the Olympic Games, for
example, countries parade with their respective national flags during
the opening ceremony and, as in the Ancient Olympic Games (Miller,
2006), competitors swear an oath, agreeing to abide by the rules and
the spirit of fair play.




The 'respect for the integrity of the game' approach was
proposed by Robert Butcher and Angela Schneider (Butcher and Schneider,
1998). It focuses on identifying a game's interest, that is, the
interests of the game itself separate to the interest of players. These
interests, so the argument goes, must be respected by all involved. The
game is regarded as an intrinsically valuable entity which demands
respect. To flesh out the idea that a game itself may have interests,
Butcher and Schneider draw upon Kretchmar's theory of sport as a
contest aimed at comparing the participants' performances and Alasdair
MacIntyre's notion of 'social practice.' Combining these
views, Butcher and Schneider argue that a game is an activity in which
participants test each other both to discover who is superior in that
sport and to achieve certain goods and excellences internal to the
practice. These goods and excellences are connected to the distinctive
nature of sport and the participants' experiences while engaged
in them. For instance, the ability to kick a ball skillfully - to
make a beautiful pass - is an intrinsic good of soccer.




The foundation of the mutualist view is the understanding of
sporting competition as a 'mutually acceptable quest for excellence
through challenge' (Simon et al., 2015: 47). Robert L. Simon, Cesar R.
Torres, and Peter F. Hager have provided the most detailed account of
this approach. They argue that mutualism is the philosophical theory
that best conceives sport.




John S. Russell provides a similar account of sport, whereby



> 
> ... rules should be interpreted in such a manner that the excellences
> embodied in achieving the lusory goal of the game are not undermined
> but are maintained and fostered. (Russell, 1999, 35)




For Russell, as for Simon, broad internalism 'generate[s] a coherent
and principled account of the point and purposes that underlie the
game, attempting to show the game in its best light' (Russell, 1999,
35).




By way of illustration, Russell (1999) recounts a baseball match
from 1887 between Louisville and Brooklyn in which a Louisville player,
Reddy Mack, who had just crossed home plate interfered with a Brooklyn
catcher, preventing him from tagging another Louisville runner. While
the interference was ongoing, another Louisville player crossed home
plate. Crucially, at the time of the game, the rules prohibited only
base runners from interfering with fielders. However, when Mack
interfered with the Brooklyn fielder, he was no longer a runner,
because he had crossed the home plate. So, the rules did not explicitly
prohibit Mack from interfering with the fielder. If the umpire followed
the rules strictly, then Mack's interference should have been
allowed, and the runner who followed Mack to home plate should not have
been ruled out. However, as Russell notes, following the rules in this
way would have invited further interference of fielders by non-base
runners, so the game would likely have descended into a
'nine-inning-long wrestling match' (Russell, 1999: 28). To
prevent such an outcome, the umpire read into existence a rule that
prohibited non-base runners from interfering with fielders. So, he
called out the runner who made it to home plate following Mack. This
exercise of discretion was not subsequently overturned, and it
precipitated a rule change to prohibit non-base runners from
interfering with fielders. Indeed, it seemed necessary to depart from
the rules to protect the nature of the sport. The umpire might be
understood to have considered the purpose of the sport in deciding how
he should rule on this incident. Baseball is a sport that tests
excellence in running, batting, throwing and catching - but not
wrestling. The umpire interpreted (and amended) the rules in light of
the sport's underlying purpose. In short, the umpire had to
appeal to principles that underlie the rules and conventions to decide
how the rules should be applied, and, in this case, to read a rule into
existence. In inventing a rule to govern this situation which the
rulemakers had likely never countenanced, the umpire protected the
integrity of the game. For broad internalists, this example
demonstrates the necessity of appeal to principles that precede the
rules and conventions. 




Broad internalist accounts closely connect sport to the pursuit of
excellence, as they typically view the fundamental purpose of sporting
competition to be the display of sporting excellence. The connection
between competition and excellence allows mutualist philosophers to
develop a critical-pedagogical view of sport's competitive
nature. This view challenges the strong emphasis placed on victory at
the elite level. For Simon, when victory is overemphasized, sports are
seen as 'zero-sum' games (Simon, 2014), that is, games where only the
victor can benefit from participation. 




On the mutualist view, sports are 'non-zero-sum' games. All players
can benefit from participation, even those who lose. Through
competition, players push each other to perform and improve. While only
one player or team can win, all can benefit from competing, as
competition can provide an avenue to more fully perfect one's
abilities. When sport is at its best, competitors struggle
cooperatively for excellence. On this view, the intrinsic principles of
sport do not revolve around the pursuit of victory, but the cultivation
of excellence. Drawing on MacIntyre, mutualist philosophers argue that
the goods more directly connected to victory are external to the
practice, whereas those linked to excellence are internal (McFee,
2004a). Mutualism is an Aristotelian-inspired teleological account of
sport, whereby the purpose of sport is understood to be the promotion
of human flourishing. This view of sport resonates with that of the
Olympic Movement and its founder Pierre de Coubertin (Loland,
1995).




Broad internalism has been criticised on three principal grounds:
for failing to adequately acknowledge the importance of history to a
proper normative account of sport; for its reliance on interpretive
principles that are too vague to provide any practical guidance to
decisionmaking in sport (Morgan, 2016); and for delivering an
incomplete account of sport (Kretchmar, 2015b; Nguyen, 2017). Drawing
on Thomas Nagel, Morgan argues that broad internalism provides a 'view
from nowhere' notion of sport that fails to acknowledge the historical
and social situatedness of sporting practices (Morgan, 2012). Kretchmar
contends that broad internalism provides a restrictive view of sport
built upon the value of work and excellence (Kretchmar, 2016). On this
view, we should be pluralists, not monists, about the intrinsic value
of sport. Excellence captures some of sport's intrinsic value,
but it is only a partial account. Paraphrasing Russell, mutualism shows
sport in only one of its best lights. 


## 3. Topics in the Philosophy of Sport




In this section, we explore the central philosophical problems that
arise in sport and how they have been addressed in the literature. In
particular, we chart the landscape of the following seven leading
ethical problems: (a) sportsmanship; (b) cheating; (c)
performance-enhancement; (d) dangerous and violent sport; (e)
sex, gender, and race; (f) fans and spectators; (g) disability sport;
and (h) sport aesthetics.


### 3.1 Sportsmanship




Sportsmanship is the quintessential sporting virtue. It has also
been thought important to civic and cultural life beyond sport (Sabl,
2008). Nevertheless, the concept has received little philosophical
attention. The literature on sportsmanship converges on the view that
this virtue requires more than mere compliance with formal rules.
However, there are two principal disputes in the literature: whether
sportsmanship is a virtue at all levels of sport or just at the
recreational level and whether sportsmanship is a unified concept or a
cluster of distinct virtues.




The traditional point of departure in the sportsmanship debate is
James W. Keating's 'Is Sportsmanship a Moral
Category?' (1965). On this account, there is a moral distinction
between 'sport' (recreational sport) and
'athletics' (competitive sport). Standards of ethics
appropriate to sport at the recreational level are not equivalent to
those appropriate at the competitive level. Indeed, conduct appropriate
to the recreational sport may be morally objectionable at the
competitive level and vice versa. This moral discontinuity between
recreational and competitive sport extends to sportsmanship.
Specifically, as the goal of recreational sport is 'pleasant
diversion', the essence of sportsmanship in that context is
'generosity' (Keating, 1965, 34). This requires the
participant always to try to increase the enjoyability of the activity
both for themselves and for other participants. In athletics, where the
overriding goal is 'honorable victory', sportsmanship
requires 'fairness'. The type of fairness in question is
formal fairness - 'equality before the law' (Keating,
1965, 34). An equal and impartial application of the rules, as dictated
by formal fairness, purportedly helps to ensure that competition
fulfills its purpose as a test of athletic excellence and that victory
correctly tracks athletic superiority (Keating, 1965, 34). 




Keating's distinction between sport and athletics has been
contested. Simon et al. (2015) have suggested that this distinction is
too sharp. A given contest can contain elements of both sport and
athletics. Moreover, sportsmanship requires more than, as Keating
suggests, generosity to opponents or fidelity to the rules. Not only
does sportsmanship require respect for the principles that underpin
morally defensible competition, it also requires positive action to
protect and promote these principles. Randolph Feezell (1986) offers an
understanding of sportsmanship that seems to combine both, as
sportsmanship is understood as the mean between excessive seriousness
and excessive playfulness in sport.




Diana Abad (2010) argues that sportsmanship should not, as typically
assumed, be treated as a unified concept. Instead, sportsmanship is
constituted by four irreducible elements: fairness, equity, good form
or honour, and the will to win. These elements are not only
analytically distinct but also potentially incompatible. However, she
argues that such conflict between these values can be resolved by
striking an appropriate 'balance' between the conflicting
elements.


### 3.2 Cheating




In contrast to sportsmanship, cheating represents, at least prima
facie, the chief form of moral failure in sport.




Cheating has proved to be a notoriously difficult concept to define.
A commonsense understanding of cheating as the 'intentional
violation of the rules to gain a competitive advantage' is
replete with difficulties (Green, 2006; Russell, 2017). For example, if
cheating is necessarily a type of rule violation, what of the
violation of conventions and other norms not captured by the formal
rules? If cheating must be aimed at the attainment of competitive
advantage, what of intentional rule-breaking that aims to rectify an
earlier injustice (e.g. cheating or refereeing error) that advantaged
one's opponent?




Leaving aside definitional issues and turning to the moral status of
cheating, moral objections to cheating typically rest on two principal
arguments. The first invokes the logical incompatibility thesis -
the idea that rule-breaking is not compatible with game playing,
because game playing requires strict adherence to the rules (see sect.
2.1). This argument could justify a prohibition of only forms of
cheating that involve rule-breaking: it could not ground an
objection to cheating that involves the violation of conventions or
broad internalist principles. The second argument relies on the idea
that cheating is an attempt to gain an unfair advantage, that is, an
advantage not permitted under the agreement between players or the set
of norms by which players are expected to abide (Gert, 2004).
Fairness-based objections may not ground a prohibition to
'retaliatory' or 'compensatory' cheating that
is undertaken to re-establish fairness following an injustice that has
placed a competitor at an unfair disadvantage (Kirkwood, 2012).




The moral impermissibility of cheating has been challenged from
several directions. The case of cyclist Lance Armstrong has provided a
focal point for some of this debate (Moore, 2017b; Pike and Cordell,
forthcoming): is cheating wrong if one's competitors (or at least a
significant proportion of one's competitors) are also cheating?
That is, does one's duty not to cheat cease if one's
competitors do not discharge their duty not to cheat? Here the problem
of ethics in non-ideal theory (i.e. acting in conditions of only
partial compliance with justice) arises in sport.




Oliver Leaman has argued that cheating can become part of the skill
and strategy of a game, thereby adding to the game's excitement
and interest for both players and spectators. If cheating is accepted
as part of the game such that all competitors recognize cheating as an
option (whether or not they avail of that option), then concerns over
equality and justice do not arise (Leaman, 1981) In these
circumstances, according to Leaman, cheating would be morally
permissible.




Hugh Upton (2011) has gone further to suggest not only that cheating
may be morally *permissible* in certain circumstances but that
one may be morally *required* to cheat. This moral requirement
arises specifically in team sports where, from a duty of loyalty, a
player may owe her teammates maximum effort to win the game subject
only to the requirements of fair play that are routinely observed in
the sport. To observe standards of fair play that are not usually
observed in the sport may be 'self-indulgent',
demonstrating an undue concern for one's own ethical propriety at
the expense of one's teammates. On this view, the duty not to let down
one's teammates may imply a duty to cheat.




Finally, it is worth noting the related discussion of
'gamesmanship'. This is a term used to denote conduct that
falls short of cheating (as it does not violate the formal rules) but
is morally dubious nonetheless. Such acts might include the
intimidation of one's opponent, the manipulation of officials, or
the intentional disruption of an opponent's preparations (e.g.
coughing just as she is about to putt). Gamesmanship may add a test of
one's psychological robustness to the sporting contest, but this
may diminish the contest as a test of athletic excellence (Howe, 2004).
While such conduct is not formally proscribed, it speaks to a question
that every athlete must ponder: what should I be prepared to do to
win?


### 3.3 Performance Enhancement




Athletes have attempted to improve their performances by deploying a
variety of different performance enhancers, ranging from pharmaceutical
substances (e.g. anabolic steroids) to equipment (e.g. full-body 100%
polyurethane swimsuits), with genetic manipulation seemingly just
around the corner. Which, if any, performance-enhancing methods should
be allowed in sport? Is there any good reason to restrict their use, or
should athletes be free to use whatever methods they choose? This
debate cuts to the very heart of questions regarding the purpose of
sporting competition and what counts as excellent athletic performance
(Moller, Hoberman, and Waddington, 2015).




The most widely discussed form of enhancement is the use of performance-enhancing drugs (i.e. 'doping'). There are three sides in the doping debate: 'pro-doping', 'anti-doping', and 'anti-anti-doping' (McNamee
2008; Murray 2016: 128-133). Those who regard doping as a morally
acceptable practice that should not be banned from sport are
pro-doping. For them, the use of performance-enhancing methods or
substances is justified because it aligns with the idea that a central purpose of sport is to
strive to be better or, more broadly, it aligns with a natural human impulse to
create tools to achieve our goals (Brown, 1980, 1984; Moller,
2009; Savulescu, Foddy, and Clayton, 2004). For instance, Savulescu et
al. argue: 'Far from being against the spirit of sport,
biological manipulation embodies the human spirit - the capacity to
improve ourselves on the basis of reason and judgment' (Savulescu
et al., 2004, 667). Pro-doping arguments typically rely on the claim
that doping is morally equivalent to the use of other sports technology
or medical interventions that are widely accepted in sport (e.g.
cushioned running shoes, graphite tennis rackets, or Lasik eye
surgery). If we are willing to allow their use, so the argument goes,
then it would be irrational to preclude the use of
performance-enhancing substances (Murray, 2018).




The anti-doping side argue that restriction on the use of
performance-enhancing methods is justifiable. They typically appeal to
any of the following arguments: (a) performance enhancement runs
counter to the intrinsic nature of sport by undermining its central
purpose - the cultivation and display of sporting excellence
(Devine, 2011; Sandel, 2007); (b) performance enhancement compromises
the fairness of competition by providing its users with an unfair
advantage (Douglas, 2007; Loland, 2002); (c) performance enhancement
exerts a negative and dangerous influence on society, especially young people, by spreading acceptance of drug use (Pound, 2006); (d)
performance enhancement is intrinsically immoral as it is the
expression of a morally corrupt character or violates a moral value
(e.g. authenticity or naturalness) (Bonte and Tolleneer, 2013;
Habermas, 2003; Sandel, 2009); and (e) performance enhancement is
harmful to participants (Holm, 2007; Kayser and Broers,
2015; Savulescu, 2015).



Finally, proponents of the anti-anti-doping view object morally to the
practical implications of anti-doping regulations (especially with
regard to policing the use of performance enhancing drugs). On this
view, a ban on performance-enhancing drugs should not be imposed, even
if justifiable in principle, because the implementation of such a ban
would necessarily involve morally objectionable practices.
Anti-anti-doping arguments criticise the fight against doping on the
grounds that it costs too much (in both economic and moral terms) and
secures insufficient benefit in terms of the promotion of compliance
and the identification of non-compliance with anti-doping rules (Kayser
et al., 2005, 2007). Advocates of this view may endorse principled
objections to doping but believe that the institutional requirements
for policing such a ban are not morally justifiable. Such an objection
includes concerns that the institutional framework associated with
anti-doping involves the violation of athletes' rights (Tamburrini,
2013), that anti-doping policy too closely resembles a criminal justice
system (Kornbeck, 2013), and that the normative assumptions that
underpin anti-doping campaigns are morally problematic.
Anti-anti-doping advocates propose alternative regulations that often
involve the legalization of currently banned substances and methods
(Perez Trivino, 2013; Tamburrini, 2000b; Tamburrini and
Tannsjo, 2005; Tannsjo, 2009) or the adoption of a
harm-reduction approach (Kayser et al., 2005, 2007). 


### 3.4 Violent and Dangerous Sport




Exposure to the risk of significant physical harm is intrinsic to participation
in many sports. The category of 'dangerous sport' includes
non-violent sports such as free solo rock-climbing and downhill skiing,
collision sports such as American football and rugby union, and combat
sports such as boxing and mixed martial arts. What is the value of
dangerous sports, and how, if at all, should the state regulate such
activities through public policy?




Russell argues that dangerous sports manifest distinctive forms of
value (2005). Their value lies in the perfectionist ideal of
'self-affirmation', whereby we challenge and resist the
ordinary bounds of our lives and attempt to extend those boundaries to
surpass the apparent limits of our being (Russell, 2005). Russell
further argues that these kinds of sports can be of particular
practical benefit for children. Such activities place children in a
context in which they must confront danger, thereby preparing the child
for adulthood, as well as helping the child to discover and affirm
aspects of her selfhood (Russell, 2007).




Others have suggested that, in their current form, collision sports
such as American football and combat sports such as boxing should be
banned by the state. Nicholas Dixon (2001) has argued on autonomy-based
grounds that boxing which involves blows to the head should be banned,
but boxing that limits the permissible target area to the area between
the waist and the head should be permitted. Others have defended the
status quo on the grounds that any attempt to criminalise boxing will
lead to the sport moving underground where more harm may result
(Warburton, 1998).




Pam Sailors (2015) has argued that American football, both at the
professional and amateur levels, is morally objectionable, though she
stops short of proposing its prohibition. She grounds this objection on
harm to the players, the objectification of the players, and the harms
done by players to non-players. Angelo Corlett (2019) has argued, more
narrowly, that a prohibition of American football at the
inter-collegiate level could be justified on account of the large
healthcare and medical costs that must be borne by the general public
arising from associated injuries. Mike McNamee and Francisco Javier
Lopez Frias have called for caution regarding the proposed prohibition
of American football and other collision sports that pose the risk of
permanent brain injury. In particular, they critically analyze
arguments for the elimination of such sports that draw on Mill's
consensual domination principle. These arguments equate the decision of
playing football with that of selling oneself to slavery (consensual
domination). According to Lopez Frias and McNamee (2017), human beings
should be allowed to pursue the kind of lives that they have reasons to
value, even if that involves consensual domination. For them, the
nature of the goods people pursue in their lives might justify the
sacrifice of future autonomy. Moreover, they challenge the idea that
CTE-related injuries are morally equivalent to harms that arise from
consensual domination. In a latter paper, Lopez Frias and McNamee
propose that one possible solution to the debate over the reform or
prohibition of such sports should have at its centre the concept of
'social good' (Lopez Frias and McNamee, 2019).


### 3.5 Sex, Gender, and Race




Sporting competition has traditionally been sex-segregated along the
binary 'male/female' distinction, and challenges to the
prevailing understandings of sex and gender have been heard within the
sporting community since the 1960s. Two principal questions with
regard to sex and gender arise in sport: is sex segregation in sporting
competition morally justifiable? If so, in what category should trans
and intersex athletes compete?




The starting point for the sex segregation debate is Jane
English's 'Sex Equality in Sport' (1978). English
considers what equality of opportunity between the sexes requires in
sport. She argues that a just society would incorporate a greater
variety of sports than at present. Specifically, sports that reward
'women's distinctive abilities' (English, 1978, 227)
(e.g. flexibility, low centre of gravity) would be more numerous. On
grounds of self-respect, women should enjoy roughly half of the
'basic benefits' of health and recreation. This includes
the right to equal facilities. This would require significant
re-ordering of how resources are distributed between the sexes within
sport. Ultimately, however, English advocates a (qualified)
retention of binary sex segregation in sport. The contours of this
distinction have been challenged by intersex, trans, and non-gendered
athletes who do not fit comfortably into either category. The question
'Who is a sportswoman?' (Camporesi, 2017) has never been
more contested.




To police sex segregation in competition, sports authorities have
adopted a variety of approaches to sex verification at different times
since the 1930s. These have included visual tests, chromosome
tests, and testosterone tests. The prevailing approach to the
eligibility of trans women to compete in women's events does not
preclude those who are biologically male from competing in
women's sport, but it requires that their testosterone level
remains below a certain threshold for a period prior to and
continuously throughout their time competing in women's
competition (IOC, 2015). The requirement that trans, as well as
intersex, women whose natural testosterone level is above the permitted
threshold must undergo hormone treatment (i.e. androgen suppressive
therapy) to bring their level below that threshold has been criticised
as the unnecessary medicalisation of healthy athletes and a violation
of the principle of beneficence in medical ethics. (Camporesi, 2016).
Critics have suggested that athletes should not be required to meet
certain physiological criteria to be eligible to compete in a
particular gender category. Proposals sympathetic to this view have
included that athletes should be allowed to compete in the gender
category with which they identify (Davis and Edwards 2014); that trans
women athletes should be allowed to compete in women's sport but,
to mitigate unfair advantage, should be subject to a handicap based on
effective testosterone levels (Bianchi, 2017); and, finally, that
eligibility should be determined by legally recognised gender (McKinnon
and Conrad, forthcoming) 




At the heart of this debate is whether trans women enjoy an unfair
advantage over cis female athletes (i.e. athletes who were assigned the sex of
female at birth and whose gender identity is female). Some have suggested that testosterone has not been
proved to provide an advantage in competition (Camporesi, 2016) or that
the advantage it provides, even if unfair, may be tolerably unfair
(Devine, 2019). Moreover, no attempt is made to regulate other
biological and genetic variations that provide a clear performance
advantage. For example, there is no attempt to exclude or regulate
athletes with Marfan syndrome. However, the long limbs and flexible
joints associated with that condition provide a clear advantage for
swimmers, basketball players, and volleyball players. It has been
suggested that, if there is no morally relevant difference between
advantages that result from sex and those that result from other
biological and genetic variations, why should testosterone levels be
regulated when other such variations relevant to sporting performance
are not (Camporesi 2017; Camporesi and Maugeri 2016)?




A more fundamental challenge has been levelled at the very
institution of sex segregation in sport. It has been proposed that the
organisation of sport should be indifferent to an athlete's sex, so men and women should compete with and against each other. On this view,
rather than retaining sex segregation, which involves
discrimination against women as well as complex questions concerning
the proper categorization of intersex, trans, and non-gendered
athletes, we should eliminate sex segregation altogether, and sport
should either be open (not segregated at all) (Tamburrini, 2000a, ch.
6; Tannsjo, 2000) or segregated along dimensions other than
sex such as weight, height, haemoglobin level, or testosterone level
(Knox et al, 2019).




Aside from the sex segregation question, there has been much
discussion of sport as a site of gender politics. The role that sport
plays in the construction of gender (including gender hierarchies) was
taken up in Iris Marion Young's classic paper 'Throwing
Like a Girl' (1980) which explores the modalities of feminine bodily
existence for women in contemporary society. Young's central
claim is that such modalities of feminie movement, motility, and
spatiality have as their source not anatomy or physiology but the
particular situation of women, which is shaped by sexist oppression
(Young, 1980). The framework developed by Young has inspired
phenomenologies of female embodiment in particular sports such as
surfing (Brennan, 2016) and climbing (Chisholm, 2008), which delineate
the oppression of women within these sporting communities arising from
prevailing sexist notions of the female body. Young has also argued
that, as long as women's bodies are understood as objects, they
are excluded by the culture from sport. This cultural exclusion of
women from sport, in turn, creates a masculine bias within sport, which
precludes the exhibition of sport's potential humanity (Young,
1979). There has also been discussion of whether the very nature of
competiton - a central feature of sport - is masculinist
and inherently incompatible with feminism (Davion, 1987).




Compared to the well-developed literature around sex and gender in
sport, issues around race and sport have received surprisingly little
attention in the philosophy of sport literature (with exceptions
including disparate articles by Mosley, 2003; Lapchick, 2003; and
Marqusee, 2003). However, recent political activism by American
football star Colin Kaepernick to highlight systematic racism in the
United States against African Americans has inspired philosophical work
about race and sport, and the ethics of political activism by athletes
(Brackett, 2017; Klein, 2017; Marston, 2017; Sailors, 2017; and Rorke
and Copeland, 2017).




Several Foucauldian post-structuralists and existentialists have
explored the connections between hegemonic racial power structures and
sport (Early, 2007). For instance, writers such as Grant Farred (2018),
Erin C. Tarver (2018), and Katrhryn E. Henne (2015), have explored
themes around sports and white (and/or colonial) hegemonic interests.
They have examined whether sport and the engagement of minorities in
sport perpetuates and promotes white privilege and white interests
(Henne, 2015). They have also critiqued the hegemonic forces
purportedly used by the institutionalized and corporate structure of
sport to discipline and exploit minorities, especially in professional
sport and American college sport (Hawkins, 2001; Farred,
2018). 


### 3.6 Fans and Spectators




What is the best way to watch sport? Is our fascination with and
admiration of elite sportspeople morally defensible? The debate about
the most valuable form of spectatorship has revolved around whether the
'purist' model of spectator is superior to the
'partisan' model. Purists derive aesthetic pleasure from
good play. They appreciate a virtuoso performance irrespective of the
performer, that is, irrespective of which team or athlete delivers it
(Dixon, 2016). Purists have no allegiance to any particular team but
appreciate feats of athletic excellence on their merits only. They
appreciate good play, as one might appreciate a work of art without
knowing or caring about the identity of the artist. For purists, a
proper appreciation of the spectacle is paramount, and allegiance to a
particular team threatens to undermine a proper appreciation of
sport. 




Chief among the criticisms of purism (Russell, 2012; Feezell, 2013;
Mumford, 2011, 2012) is its neglect of partisanship. Partisans espouse
the virtue of supporting a particular team, even when that team plays
poorly. Loyalty is paramount to partisans, and they follow their team
through good times and bad.
Partisans typically support their favoured team zealously, and they
cheer for their team's success. For partisans, it matters that
their team wins, even if they display less, or a lower form of,
athletic excellence than the opposition.




Some have argued that the admiration of individual sporting heroes,
characteristic of purist spectators, is morally problematic. On this
view, enthusiasm and awe surrounding the achievements of elite athletes
are not morally respectable. Indeed, such attitudes reflect a
fascistoid ideology (Tannsjo 1998, 2005). Admiration for
winners in sport involves the celebration of strength and, inevitably,
the expression of contempt for weakness. Strength is understood as a
trait for which one is not responsible but which has its origin in
genetics (Tannsjo 2005), so admiration for athletes based on
their strength is thought fascistoid. On this view, in admiring the
victor(s), we cannot but demonstrate contempt for the loser(s):
admiration for the former and contempt for the latter are two sides of
the same coin.




It has been argued against Tannsjo's account that it
is descriptive rather than normative. At best, Tannsjo
describes how spectators do behave, not how they should behave.
Moreover, admiration for the winner does not necessarily imply contempt
for the loser, and by extension, for the weak. Contra
Tannsjo, there is no necessary link between these two
attitudes. Our admiration of elite athletes need not rest on an
appreciation of their excellence understood solely in terms of strength
(Tamburrini, 2000, ch. 5), as admiration for sports stars, properly
understood, is only to a limited extent admiration of them because of
their physical strength (Persson, 2005).


### 3.7 Disability Sport




'Disability sport', also referred to as
'Paralympic sport' or 'sport for athletes with
disabilities or impairments' contrasts with sport for able-bodied
persons. The two principal ethical questions that arise regarding
disability sport are: 1. What criteria should be used to classify
disability athletes in competition?; and 2. Should disability athletes,
specifically those with prosthetic limbs, be allowed to compete with
able-bodied athletes?




Who may be considered a Paralympic athlete? In order to compete in
disability or Paralympic sport, one must be classed as having a
disability. The notion of disability is a contested concept (Boorse
2010, 2011; Nordenfelt 1987, 2007). It is unsurprising, then, that,
what counts as a disability for the purpose of sport and how to
categorise those with disabilities for the purpose of competition are
matters of some dispute (Edwards and McNamee 2015). For example, for an
athlete to qualify as a disability athlete, must her disability be
permanent, or could it be temporary? Could the disability be only
somewhat impairing or must it be profoundly impairing?




Central to this dispute is whether it is preferable to adopt a
'functional classification system', which would group
together athletes with different disabilities but similar ability
levels, or a 'disability-specific classification system',
which would group together athletes with similar types of disabilities
despite different capabilities. At least for the purposes of the
quadrennial Paralympic Games, this question cannot be addressed
adequately in isolation from the proper aims of the Paralympic
Movement, including whether these aims are in contrast with, or even in
tension with, those of elite able-bodied sport.




The second question concerns the appropriate relation between
disabled and able-bodied sport. Specifically, should disabled athletes
who use prosthetic limbs be allowed to compete in able-bodied sport?
Oscar Pistorius was controversially permitted to compete in the 400m
at the Olympic Games in 2012 (in addition to the 2012 Paralympic Games)
despite using carbon-fibre prosthetic legs. Some objected that his
prosthetic legs conferred him with an unfair advantage while others
questioned whether the prosthetics precluded him from
'running' in the relevant sense at all (Edwards, 2008).




Finally, the practice of Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs) operates
in elite able-bodied and disability sport to allow athletes with
chronic or temporary illness to use medication for therapeutic (as
opposed to enhancement) purposes that they would otherwise be prohibited
from using. This practice has proved controversial as the
therapy/enhancement distinction is difficult to specify with precision
(Daniels, 2000), and the system has been criticised as open to abuse.
However, if the use of such substances were denied across the board,
athletes with chronic conditions, for example, would effectively be
excluded from sport on account of being unfairly disadvantaged (Pike,
2018).


### 3.8 The Aesthetics of Sport




While the ethical analysis of sport has been the central preoccupation
of recent philosophy of sport, the last two decades has seen a revived
interest in the aesthetic analysis of sport (Edgar, 2013b; Lacerda,
2012a). The study of aesthetics and sport has focused on two principal
areas. The first concerns the relevance of aesthetic qualities to the
experience of playing and watching sport. Does sport elicit aesthetic
values? If so, what are these values and are they inherent to or only
incidental to sport? The second examines the relationship between
sport and art. Is sport one of the arts? If so, what makes sport an
art? An early precursor of these discussions is C. L. R. James'
(1963) classic, *Beyond a Boundary*. In his seminal analysis of
cricket, James explores the identity between sport and art, arguing
that both yield aesthetic pleasure because they have been created to
be beautiful.




Related to both of these concerns is whether the aesthetic
appreciation of sport is distinctive, that is, different in kind to
other forms of aesthetic appreciation. For Joseph Kupfer (1975), sport
has multiple purposes. One of these purposes is to create aesthetically
pleasant experiences. Stephen Mumford (2011) observes that the
aesthetic values elicited by sports depend on the physical demands that
each sport makes of participants. However, in Mumford's view, all
sports yield aesthetic experiences related to bodily motion and grace,
high-level abstract forms, drama, and innovation and genius. Edgar
(2012, 2013a) criticizes this view as narrow because it connects sport
only to values related to harmony, neglecting the fact that sport is
also ugly. Since sport yields aesthetic pleasure, James (1963) argues
that sport should be seen as one of the arts. More recently, Spencer K.
Wertz (1985; 1985), Hans Ulrich Gumbretch (2006), and Wolfgang Welsch
(1999) have supported the idea that sport has aesthetic qualities and
that sport should be regarded as an art. However, some have denied
sport's artistic credentials.




Eliseo Vivas (1959, p. 228) contends that, unlike aesthetic
experiences, sport cannot be experienced disinterestedly. To do so, one
must bracket an essential feature of sport: competition. For Maureen
Kovich (1971), if athletes and spectators focused on the aesthetic
aspects of sport, their preoccupation would be the observation and
creation of art in movement rather than on scoring and winning. The
main purpose of sport is to meet physical challenges and to compare
oneself to others in doing so. For instance, in the high jump, the goal
is to clear the bar by jumping over it. Athletes compete to see who can
jump the highest, not the most beautifully. Dick Fosbury introduced the
'flop' not because it was more beautiful than previous
techniques (i.e., scissors, western roll, and straddle jump), but
because it was more effective (2007). To ignore the essential
competitive elements of sport in favor of aesthetic principles is to
fail to take sport seriously. To strengthen this claim, Paul Ziff
(1974) argues that some sporting events have little or no aesthetic
value. Often, athletes play dirty and achieve ugly victories. In
support of this view, David Best (1974, 1985) argues that most athletes
prefer an ugly victory than a defeat where they have performed
gracefully. On this view, not only is aesthetics inessential to sport,
but the pursuit of aesthetic purposes can undermine the achievement of
sport's main goals. Thus, Ray Elliot (1974) posits that the
goddess of sport is not Beauty but Victory. Creating beauty should
never be the main goal of sport. Aesthetics is incidental in sport,
whereas, in art, it is the principal aim. Therefore, sport is not an
art.




A further challenge to the idea that sport can be art is that art
concerns something beyond itself, whereas sport concerns play and
nothing in real life beyond play. For instance, an actor playing Hamlet
is not Hamlet in real life. They represent the modern
individual's existential struggle. By contrast, a point guard in
basketball is actually a point guard; point guards do not represent
anything outside the game of basketball. In response, Kevin Krein
(2008) and Tim L. Elcombe (2012) have argued that, like art, sports
convey values and meanings external to sport that represent, or present
an alternative to (in the case of non-traditional sports such as
climbing and surfing), the culture in which sport practitioners find
themselves. In Terrence J. Roberts' (1995) view, athletes are
'strong poets.' They expresses something about our life
situation as embodied agents (Mumford, 2014). Drawing on Nelson Goodman
(1978), philosophers such as Edgar, Breivik, and Krein understand sport
as worldmaking, that is, sport embraces and refigures symbolic worlds
outside of sport, opening up new ways of describing, or making, such
non-sporting worlds. Sport provides resources for re-describing the
non-sporting world. Building upon this view of sport, Edgar (2013a)
argues for a shift from sport aesthetics to sport hermeneutics, that
is, to the interpretation of the meaning of sport and how that meaning
is interpreted (see Lopez Frias & Edgar, 2016).