## 1. Traditional Definition of Lying




There is no universally accepted definition of lying to others. The
dictionary definition of lying is "to make a false statement
with the intention to deceive" (*OED* 1989) but there are
numerous problems with this definition. It is both too narrow, since
it requires falsity, and too broad, since it allows for lying about
something other than what is being stated, and lying to someone who is
believed to be listening in but who is not being addressed.




The most widely accepted definition of lying is the following:
"A lie is a statement made by one who does not believe it with
the intention that someone else shall be led to believe it"
(Isenberg 1973, 248) (cf. "[lying is] making a statement believed
to be false, with the intention of getting another to accept it as
true" (Primoratz 1984, 54n2)). This definition does not specify
the addressee, however. It may be restated as follows:


* (L1)
To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to
another person with the intention that the other person believe that
statement to be true.



L1 is the traditional definition of lying. According to L1, there
are at least four necessary conditions for lying. First, lying requires
that a person make a statement (statement condition). Second, lying
requires that the person believe the statement to be false; that is,
lying requires that the statement be untruthful (untruthfulness
condition). Third, lying requires that the untruthful statement be made
to another person (addressee condition). Fourth, lying requires that
the person intend that that other person believe the untruthful
statement to be true (intention to deceive the addressee
condition).




These four necessary conditions need to be explained before
objections to L1 can be entertained and alternative
definitions can be considered.


### 1.1 Statement Condition




According to the statement condition, lying requires that a person
make a statement. Making a statement requires the use of conventional
signs, or *symbols*. Conventional signs, such as
"WOMEN" on the door to a restroom, are opposed to natural
or causal signs, or *indices*, such as women coming in and out
of a restroom, as well as signs that signify by resemblance, or
*icons*, such as a figure with a triangular dress on the door
to a restroom (cf. Grotius 2005, 2001; Pierce 1955; Grice
1989). Making a statement, therefore, requires the use of language. A
commonly accepted definition of making a statement is the
following: "*x* states that *p* to *y*
=df (1) *x* believes that there is an expression
*E* and a language *L* such that one of the standard uses
of *E* in *L* is that of expressing the proposition
*p*; (2) *x* utters *E* with the intention of
causing *y* to believe that he, *x*, intended to utter
*E* in that standard use" (Chisholm and Feehan 1977,
150).




It is possible for a person to make a statement using American Sign
Language, smoke signals, Morse code, semaphore flags, and so forth, as
well as by making specific bodily gestures whose meanings have been
established by convention (e.g., nodding one's head in response to a
question). Hence, it is possible to lie by these means. If it is
granted that a person is *not* making a statement when he wears
a wig, gives a fake smile, affects a limp, and so forth, it follows
that a person cannot be lying by doing these things (Siegler 1966,
128). If it is granted that a person is *not* making a
statement when, for example, she wears a wedding ring when she is not
married, or wears a police uniform when she is not a police officer,
it follows that she cannot be lying by doing these things.




In the case of a person who does not utter a declarative
sentence, but who curses, or makes an interjection or an
exclamation, or issues a command or an exhortation, or asks a question,
or says "Hello," then, if it is granted that she is
*not* making a statement when she does any of these things, it follows
that she cannot be lying by doing these things (Green 2001,
163-164; but see Leonard 1959).




An ironic statement, or a statement made as part of a joke, or a
statement made by an actor while acting, or a statement made in a
novel, is still a statement. More formally, the statement condition of
L1 obeys the following three constraints (Stokke 2013a, 41):


1. If *x* makes a statement, this does not entail
that *x* believes the statement to be true;
2. If *x* makes a statement, this does not entail
that *x* intends her audience to believe the statement to be
true;
3. If *x* makes a statement, this does not entail
that *x* intends her audience to believe that *x*
believes the statement to be true.




The statement condition is to be distinguished from a different
putative necessary condition for lying, namely, the condition that an
*assertion* be made. The assertion
condition is not a necessary condition for lying, according to L1. For
example, if Yin, who does not have a girlfriend, but who wants people
to believe that he has a girlfriend, makes the ironic statement
"Yeah, right, I have a girlfriend" in response to a
question from his friend, Bolin, who believes that Yin is secretly
dating someone, with the intention that Bolin believe that he actually
does have a girlfriend, then this 'irony lie' is a
lie according to L1, although it is not an assertion.




According to the statement condition, it is not possible to lie by
omitting to make a statement (Mahon 2003; Griffiths 2004, 33).
So-called 'lies of omission' (or 'passive
lying' (Opie 1825)) are not lies (Douglas 1976, 59; Dynel 2011,
154). All lies are lies of commission. It is possible for a person to
lie by remaining 'silent,' if the 'silence' is
a previously agreed upon signal with others that is equivalent to
making a statement (Fried 1978, 57). However, such a lie would not be a
'lie of omission' (see *People v. Meza* (1987) in
which, on the basis of Californian Evidence Code that
"'Statement'" included "nonverbal conduct
of a person intended by him as a substitute for oral or written verbal
expression," prospective juror's Eric Luis Meza's
silence and failure to raise his hand in response to questions was
"taken for a negative answer, i.e., a negative statement"
(*People v. Meza* 1987, 1647) and he was found guilty of
perjury).




Note that the statement condition, all by itself, does not require
that the statement be made to another person, or even that it be
expressed aloud or in writing. One's inner statements to oneself
are statements, and, if other conditions are also met, can be
"internal lies" (Kant 1996, 553-554).


### 1.2 Untruthfulness Condition




According to the untruthfulness condition, lying requires that a
person make an *untruthful* statement, that is, make a
statement that she *believes* to be false. Note that this
condition is to be distinguished from the putative necessary condition
for lying that the statement that the person makes *be* false
(Grotius 2005, 1209; Krishna 1961, 146). The falsity condition is not
a necessary condition for lying according to L1.


Statements that
are truthful may be false. If George makes the
statement to Hillary (with the intention that Hillary believe that statement
to be true), "The enemy has weapons of mass destruction,"
and that statement is false, he is not lying if
he does not believe that statement to be false.


Statements that are untruthful may be true. In Jean-Paul
Sartre's short-story, *The Wall*, set during the Spanish
Civil War, Pablo Ibbieta, a prisoner sentenced to be executed by the
Fascists, is interrogated by his guards as to the whereabouts of his
comrade Ramon Gris. Mistakenly believing Gris to be hiding with his
cousins, he makes the untruthful statement to them that "Gris is
hiding in the cemetery" (with the intention that they believe
this statement to be true). As it happens, Gris is hiding in the
cemetery, and the statement is true. Gris is arrested at the cemetery,
and Ibbieta is released (Sartre 1937; cf. Siegler 1966: 130).
According to L1, Ibbieta lied to his interrogators, although the
untruthful statement he made to them was true, and he did not deceive
them about the whereabouts of Gris (Isenberg 1973, 248; Mannison 1969,
138; Lindley, 1971; Kupfer 1982, 104; Faulkner 2013).




If a person makes a truthful statement with the intention to deceive
another person, then she is not lying, according to the untruthfulness
condition. For example, if John and Mary are dating, and Valentino is
Mary's ex-boyfriend, and one evening "John asks Mary,
'Have you seen Valentino this week?,'" and
"Mary answers: 'Valentino's been sick with
mononucleosis for the past two weeks,'" and
"Valentino has in fact been sick with mononucleosis for the past
two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary had a date with Valentino
the night before" (Coleman and Kany 1981, 31), then Mary is not
lying to John, even if she is attempting to deceive John. This is what
is called a *palter* (see Schauer and Zeckhauser 2009; they
illegitimately add that a palter must *succeed* in deceiving),
or a *false implicature* (Adler 1997), or an attempt to
*mislead* (Saul 2012b; Webber 2013).




In addition to palters not being lies, a *double bluff* is not
a lie either according to the untruthfulness condition. If one makes a
truthful statement, intending one's addressee to believe that
the statement is false, then one is not lying. Consider the following
joke about two travelers on a train from Moscow (reputed to be Sigmund
Freud's favorite joke) (Cohen 2002, 328):



> 
> Trofim: Where are you going?   
> 
> Pavel: To Pinsk.  
> 
> Trofim: Liar! You say you are going to Pinsk in order to make me
> believe you are going to Minsk. But I know you are going to
> Pinsk.
> 



Pavel does not lie to Trofim, since his statement to Trofim is
truthful, even if he intends that Trofim be deceived by this double
bluff.




One implication of the untruthfulness condition is that if a person
makes a statement that she believes to be neither true nor false, then
she cannot be lying (Siegler 1966, 133; cf. Strawson 1952, 173). For
example, if a person begging for money says "All my children need
medical attention," but believes that this proposition is neither
true nor false, because he has no children, then he is not lying, even
if he is attempting to deceive (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 155-6; but
see Siegler 1966, 135).


 It is a matter of debate as to whether it is possible to lie using
metaphors. For example, if a gardener who has had a very bad crop of
tomatoes says "We've got tomatoes coming out of our
ears," intending to deceive about his having a bumper crop, then
this untruthful statement made with an intention to deceive is
typically not considered a lie, because the untruthful statement is
metaphorical (Saul 2012, 16). Nevertheless, some argue that it is
possible to lie using metaphors (Adler 1997, 444 n. 27; Griffiths
2004, 36; Dynel 2011, 149). If literally false metaphorical
statements can be truthful statements, according to the beliefs of the
speaker, and hence, can be untruthful statements, according to the
beliefs of the speaker, then the deceptive gardener is lying in this
example according to L1.


### 1.3 Addressee Condition




According to the addressee condition, lying requires that a person
make an untruthful statement to another person (or,
strictly speaking, to a *believed* other person, since one
might, e.g., mistake a waxed dummy for another person, and lie to it).
That is, lying requires that a person *address* another person
(Simpson 1992, 626). According to L1, it is not possible for me to lie to
no one whatsoever (i.e., not even myself), and it is not
possible to lie to someone whom one is not addressing but whom one
believes is listening in on a conversation. For example, if Mickey and
Danny both believe that the F.B.I. is monitoring their telephone
conversation, and Mickey says to Danny, "The pick-up is at
midnight tomorrow," with the intention of deceiving the FBI
agents listening in, then Mickey is not lying to the F.B.I. agents
(this is a "bogus disclosure" (Newey 1997, 115)).




According to L1, it is possible to lie to a general
audience. It is possible for a person to lie by publishing an
untruthful report about an event (Kant 1997, 203), or by making an
untruthful statement on a tax return, or by sending an untruthful
e-mail to everyone on a mailing list, or by making an untruthful
statement in a magazine advertisement or a television commercial. In
these cases, the readers, hearers, watchers, etc., are the addressees.




According to the addressee condition, lying necessarily involves
addressing someone whom you believe to be a person capable of
understanding your statement and forming beliefs on that basis. It is
not possible to lie to those whom you believe to be non-persons
(goldfish, dogs, robots, etc.) or persons whom you believe cannot
understand the statements that are made to them (infants, the insane,
etc., as well as those whom you believe cannot understand the language
you are speaking in). It is possible to lie to other persons via
intermediaries which are not persons, however (e.g., entering false
answers to questions asked by a bank's ATM).


### 1.4 Intention to Deceive the Addressee Condition




According to the intention to deceive the addressee condition, lying
requires that a person make an untruthful statement to another person
with the *intention* that that other person believe that
untruthful statement to be true. Making ironic statements, telling jokes,
writing fiction, acting in a play, and so forth, without the
intention that the addressee believe these untruthful statements to be
true, is not lying (Morris 1976, 391).




If *x* makes an untruthful statement to *y*,
without the intention that *y* believe that untruthful
statement to be true, but with the intention that *y*
believe something else to be true that *x*
believes to be true, then *x* is not lying to
*y*, according to L1. Examples of such non-deceptive untruthful
statements include *polite untruths* (Kant 1997, 27; Mahon 2003,
109). For example, if servant Igor makes the untruthful statement to
unwelcome visitor Damian, "Madam is not at home,"
without the intention that Damian believe it to be true that
she is not home (that would be lying on Igor's part), but
with the intention that Damian believe it to be true that it
is inconvenient for Madam to see Damian now, something that Igor
believes to be true, then according to L1, Igor is not lying to Damian
(Isenberg 1973, 256). However, for Igor to intend that Damian believe
this, it must be the case that Igor believes that this is how
Damian understands "Madam is not at home." Polite untruths
may be said to be examples of "falsifications but not
lies," since the person "says just what etiquette
demands" (Shiffrin 2014, 19). As it has been said about
untruthful statements situations "in which politeness requires
some sort of remark" and the other person "knows quite well
that the statement is false," such statements "are not
really lies" (Coleman and Kay 1981, 29). They are better
considered as cases of speaking in *code*. Another example of a
non-deceptive untruthful statement is what has been called an
"*altruistic lie*" (Fallis 2009, 50; cf. Augustine
1952, 57), such as when a speaker makes an untruthful statement to a
hearer whom he believes distrusts him, in order that the hearer will
believe something that the speaker believes to be true.
This is not a lie according to L1.




Such non-deceptive untruths are not to be confused with *white
lies*, i.e., harmless lies (Bok 1978, 58; Sweetser 1987, 54; 52 n.
73) or *prosocial lies* (also called *social lies*),
i.e., lies that do not harm social life but protect it (Meibauer 2014,
152; Sweetser 1987, 54), or *fibs*, i.e., inconsequential lies
told for selfish reasons (Sweetser 1987, 54). White lies, prosocial
lies, and fibs are all intentionally deceptive, and are all lies
according to L1 (Green 2001, 169). For example, "both American
and Ecuadorian cultures would probably consider Jacobo's reply
to be a white lie," and hence deceptive, in the following case
presented to Ecuadorians by linguists: "Teresa just bought a new
dress. Upon trying it on for the first time, she asks her husband
Jacobo, 'Does it look good on me?' Jacobo responds,
'Yes' even though he really thinks that the dress is ugly
and too tight" (Hardin 2010, 3207; cf. Dynel 2011, 160). Or, to
take another example, "Some people would call it a white lie to
tell a dying person whatever he or she needs to hear to die in
peace" (Sweetser 1987, 54). Note that both white lies and
prosocial lies are to be distinguished from "lies which most
people would think justified by some higher good achieved but which
would not be called white lies [or prosocial lies], since their
informational consequences are too major (however moral)," such
as "to lie to the Gestapo about the location of a Jew"
(Sweetser 1987, 54).




According to the untruthfulness condition, it is not merely the case
that the person who makes the untruthful statement intends that some
other person believe the untruthful statement to be true; the person
intends that the *addressee* believe the untruthful statement
to be true. Also, according to this condition, it is not merely the
case that the person intends that the addressee believe some statement
to be true that the person believes to be false; the person intends
that the addressee believe to be true *the untruthful statement
that is made to the addressee*. If Maximilian is a crime boss, and
Alessandro is one of his henchmen, whom he secretly believes is a
police informant, and Maximilian makes the untruthful statement to
Alessandro "There are no informants in my organization,"
without the intention that Alessandro believe that statement to be
true, but with the intention that Alessandro believe that
Maximilian *believes* that statement to be true, then
Maximilian is not lying according to L1 (Mahon 2008, 220). (Maximilian
has, of course, attempted to deceive Alessandro). This conclusion has
prompted some to revise L1 to include more than one intention to
deceive.




According to the untruthfulness condition, it is sufficient for lying that the
person who makes the untruthful statement *intends* that the
addressee believe the untruthful statement to be true; it is not
necessary that the addressee believe the untruthful statement to be
true. That is, a lie remains a lie if it is *disbelieved*. If
Sophie makes the untruthful statement to Nicole "I didn't
get any homework today," with the intention that Nicole believe
that statement to be true, and if Nicole does not believe that
statement to be true, then Sophie is still lying. This is because
'lie' is not an achievement or success verb, and an act of
lying is not a perlocutionary act. The existence of an act of lying
does not depend upon the production of a particular response or state
in the addressee (Mannison 1969, 135; Wood 1973: 199; MacCormick 1983,
9 n. 23; but see Reboul 1994). As it has been said, "It is very
odd to think that whether a speaker lies
*hinges* upon the persuasiveness of the speaker or the credulity
of the listener" (Shiffrin 2014, 13).




Because L1 does not have an assertion condition, however, according to
L1 it is possible to lie by making ironic statements, telling jokes,
writing fiction, acting in a play, and so forth, if the person making
the untruthful statement (somehow) intends that it be believed to be
true, as in the case of the 'irony lie' above. Similarly,
if someone intends to deceive using a joke--for example, if con
artist David says "Yeah, I am a billionaire. That's why I am in
this dive" to his mark, Greg, at a bar, intending that Greg
believe that David is a billionaire who is attempting to to pass
incognito in a bar--then this 'joke lie' is a lie
according to L1. If a novelist were to write a novel with the
intention that her audience believe that this was a true story
disguised as a novel--a pretend *roman a 
clef*--then this 'fiction lie' would be a lie according
to L1. If an actor in a play were to deliver an untruthful statement
with the intention that his audience believe the statement to be 
true--say, if an an actor delivered a line about his life being too
short with the intention that the audience believed that the actor
was actually dying from some disease ("it is possible that the
performance is part of an elaborate deception aimed at getting members
of the audience to believe that the particular line from the play is
actually true" (Fallis 2009, 56))--then this
'acting lie' would be a lie according to L1. 


### 1.5 Objections to the Traditional Definition of Lying




Two kinds of objections have been made to L1. First, objections have
been made to each necessary condition, on the basis that it is not
necessary for lying. According to these objections, L1 is too
narrow. Second, objections have been made to the four necessary
conditions being jointly sufficient for lying, on the basis that some
further condition is necessary for lying. According to these
objections, L1 is too broad.


#### 1.5.1 Conditions Are Not Necessary




Against the statement condition of L1 it has been objected that the
making of a statement is not necessary for lying. Lying to others may
be defined as "*any* form of behavior the function of
which is to provide others with false information or to deprive them of
true information" (Smith 2004, 14), or as "*a successful
or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in
another a belief which the communicator considers to be
untrue*" (Vrij 2000, 6). Importantly, this entails that lying can
consist of simply withholding information with the intent to deceive,
without making any statement at all (Ekman 1985, 28; Scott 2006, 4).
Those who make this objection would make lying the same as
intentionally deceiving (Ekman 1985, 26).




Against the untruthfulness condition of L1 it has been objected that
an untruthful statement is not necessary for lying. This objection
comes in a variety of forms. There are those who argue any statement
made with an intention to deceive is a lie, including a truthful
statement that is made with an intention to deceive (Barnes 1994, 11;
Davidson 1980, 88). Lying may thus be defined as "any
intentionally deceptive message that is *stated*" (Bok
1978, 13). There are also those who, relying upon a Gricean account of
conversational implicature (Grice 1989, 39)), argue that someone who
makes a truthful statement but who thereby conversationally implicates
a believed-false statement is lying (Meibauer 2011, 285;
2014a). Importantly, such an "untruthful implicature"
(Dynel 2011, 159-160) is "directly intended" (Adler
1997, 446). Thirdly, there are those who argue for the possibility of
"lying ironically" (Simpson 1992, 631), or indirect lying.
If a speaker makes an ironic untruthful statement, then "Through
this presentation of himself as insincerely asserting he presents
himself as believing" the opposite of what he says, which is
"capacity to... assert in-effect" (Simpson 1992,
630). If the person is "insincere in this" and actually
does believe in the truth of what he states, despite invoking trust in
his believing its opposite, then "this is a lie (an indirect
lie, we might say)" (Simpson 1992, 630). For example, if a
person who is listening to a sappy pop song at a party is asked if she
likes this kind of music and replies, ironically, "Yeah, right,
I love this kind of music," then she is lying if she actually
*does* love this kind of music (cf. Dynel 2011,
148-149).




Against the untruthfulness condition it has also been objected that
it is not necessary for lying that the statement that is made is
believed to be false; it is sufficient that the statement is *not
believed to be true*, or is believed to be *probably false*
(Carson 2006, 298; 2010, 18). As it has been claimed, "Agnostics
about the truth of their assertions who nonetheless assert them without
qualification tell lies" (Shiffrin 2014, 13).




Against the addressee condition of L1 it has been objected that it is
sufficient for lying that the untruthful statement is made, even if it
is made to no one -- not even to oneself (Griffiths 2004,
31). Lying may thus be defined as "conscious expression of other
than what we believe" (Shibles 1985, 33). It has also been
objected that it is possible to lie to third parties who are not
addressees. In general, it is possible to distinguish between cases
where "the hearer *eavesdrops*, unbeknown to the first
and second parties" (*eavesdropping*), cases where
"the speaker utters *p* to the interlocutor while the
hearer, with the awareness of both other parties, listens in and knows
that the first- and second-party know he is listening in...
although it is for the interlocutor that the utterance is
intended" (*kibbitzing*), as well as cases similar to
kibbitzing except that "the utterance is also intended for the
hearer [who knows that they know that he is listening in]"
(*disclosure*), and cases similar to disclosure "except
that although the first and second parties know that the hearer is
listening in, the hearer does not know that they are listening
in" (*bogus disclosure*) (Newey 1997, 115). Even if it is
not possible to lie to eavesdroppers, or to those merely listening in,
as in the case of kibbitzing, it may be possible to lie in the cases
of bogus disclosure, as in the example above of Mickey saying to
Danny, "The pick-up is at midnight tomorrow," with the
intention of deceiving the F.B.I. agents listening in. It may even be
possible to lie in the case of disclosure. In the 1978 thriller
*Capricorn One* about a Mars landing hoax, during a nationally
televised transmission between the astronauts 'in space'
and their wives at the control center, which is being monitored
closely by NASA handlers, Colonel Charles Brubaker tells his wife Kay
to tell his son that "When I get back, I'm gonna take him
to Yosemite again, like last summer." In fact he brought his son
to a different place the previous summer (Flatbush, where a movie was
being shot), something that his wife knows. According to this
objection, Brubaker is lying to his NASA handlers about
what he did last summer, even if they are not his addressees.




Against the addressee condition it has also been objected that it
is possible to lie to an animal, a robot, etc., as well as to
what might be another person--for example, if a home
owner, woken up in the middle of the night and wondering if there are
burglars below the stairs, shouts down, "I'm bringing my rifle
down there," although he has no rifle (Chisholm and Feehan 1977,
157).




Against the intention to deceive the addressee condition of L1 it
has been objected that, even if an intention to deceive the addressee
is required for lying, it is not necessary that it be an intention to
deceive the addressee about the *content* of the untruthful
statement; it may be an intention to deceive the addressee about the
*beliefs* of the speaker abut the statement--specifically,
the belief that the untruthful statement is true (Chisholm and Feehan
1977, 152; Williams 2002, 74; Reboul 1994, 294; Mahon 2008, 220;
Tollefsen 2014, 24). 


There are at least two ways in which L1 could be modified in
response to this objection. First, it could be held that what is
essential to lying is the intention to deceive the hearer about the
speaker's belief that the untruthful statement is true:
"*x* utters a sentence, '*S*,' where
'*S*' means that *p*, in doing which
either *x* expresses his belief that *p*, or *x*
intends the person addressed to take it that *x* believes
that *p*" (Williams 2002, 74) and "the speaker
believes [*p*] to be false" (Williams 2002,
96-97). L1 could therefore be modified as follows:


* (L2)
To lie =df to make a statement that *p*,
where *p* is believed to be false, to another person, with the
intention that the other person believe that *p* is believed to
be true. (cf. Williams 2002, 74, 96-97)




Alternatively, L1 could be modified to incorporate either intention,
as follows:


* (L3)
To lie =df to make a believed-false statement
(to another person), either with the intention that that statement be
believed to be true (by the other person), or with the intention that
it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to
be true (by the person making the statement), or with both
intentions. (Mahon 2008, 227-228)




Against this condition it has also been argued that it is not
necessary that it be an intention to deceive the addressee about either
the content of the untruthful statement or about the beliefs of the
speaker about the untruthful statement. It is sufficient that there is
an intention to deceive about some matter--that is, it
is sufficient that the speaker intend that the hearer believe to be
true something that the speaker believes to be false. Note
that those who make this objection would turn lying into *any*
deception involving untruthful statements. If this
objection were combined with the objection that lying could be directed
to third parties (as in bogus disclosure, or disclosure), L1 could be
modified, as follows:


* (L4)
To lie =df to make a believed-false statement, to
another person or in the believed hearing of another person, with the
intention that some other person--the person addressed or the
other person in the believed hearing--believe some
believed-false statement to be true. (Newey 1997, 100)




Against this condition it has also been objected that although there
is "a necessary relationship between lying and deception,"
nevertheless this intention should be understood merely as the
intention to *be deceptive* to another person, which is the
intention "to *conceal information*" from the other
person (Lackey 2013, 5-7). According to this objection, concealing
evidence, understood as hiding evidence or keeping evidence secret,
counts as being deceptive to another person. L1 could be modified, as
follows:


* (L5)
*x* lies to *y* if and only if (i) *x* states
that *p* to *y*, (ii) *x* believes that *p* is
false and (iii) *x* intends to be deceptive to *y* in
stating that *p*. (Lackey 2013, 237)




Finally, against this intention to deceive the addressee condition it
has been objected that no intention to deceive is required for lying
(Shibles 1985, 33; Kemp and Sullivan 1993, 153; Griffiths 2004, 31;
Carson *et al.* 1982; Carson 1988; 2006; 2010; Sorensen 2007;
2010; 2011; Fallis, 2009; 2010; 2012; 2015; Saul, 2012a; 2012b; Stokke
2013a, 2013b; 2014; Shiffrin 2014). If the sworn-in witness in the
trial of a violent criminal goes on the record and gives untruthful
testimony--in order, for example, to avoid being killed by the
defendant or any of his criminal associates--without any
intention that that testimony be believed to be true by any person
(not the jury, the judge, the lawyers, the journalists covering the
trial, the people in the gallery, the readers of the newspaper
reports, etc.), then the witness is still lying (but see Jones
1986). Such non-deceptive lies are lies according to this objection
(but see Lackey 2013 for the argument that these lies are
intentionally deceptive, and Fallis 2015 for the argument that they
are not intentionally deceptive).


#### 1.5.2 Conditions Are Not Jointly Sufficient




It has been objected that L1 is not sufficient for lying because it is
also necessary that the untruthful statement be false (Coleman and Kay
1981, 28; *OED*, 1989; Moore 2000). This is the falsity
condition for lying (Grimaltos and Rosell forthcoming, see Other
Internet Resources). For most objectors the falsity condition
supplements L1 and makes this definition of lying even narrower (e.g.,
Coleman and Kay 1981). For other objectors the falsity condition is
part of a different definition of lying, and makes that definition
narrower (Carson 2006, 284; 2010, 17; Saul 2012b, 6).




It has been objected that L1 is not sufficient for lying because it is
also necessary to intend that that other person believe that that
statement is *believed to be true* (Frankfurt 1999, 96; Simpson
1992, 625; Faulkner 2007, 527). If Harry makes the untruthful
statement "I have no change in my pocket" to Michael, but
Harry does not intend that Michael believe that Harry believes it to
be true, then Harry is not lying to Michael, even if Harry intends
that Michael believe it to be true (Frankfurt 1986, 85; 1999,
96). This additional condition would make L1 even narrower, since it
would have the result that Maximilian is not lying to Alessandro in
the example above.




Finally, it has been objected that L1 is insufficient because lying
requires that an untruthful assertion be made, and not merely
that an untruthful statement be made. This is the assertion condition
for lying. According to this objection, one is not lying when one makes
a deceptive untruthful ironic statement ('irony lie'), or a
deceptive untruthful joke ('joke lie'), or a deceptive
untruthful fiction ('fiction lie'), or deceptive untruthful
acting ('acting life'), since in none of these cases is one
making an assertion. For most objectors the assertion condition
supplements L1 and makes L1 even narrower (Chisholm and Feehan
1977; Fried 1978; Simpson 1992; Williams 2002; Faulkner 2007). For
others the assertion condition is part of a different definition of
lying, and makes that definition narrower (Sorensen 2007;
Fallis 2009; Stokke 2013a).




The most important objection to L1 is that lying does not require an
intention to deceive. This has led to a division amongst
those writing on the definition of lying.


## 2. Deceptionism vs. Non-Deceptionism About Lying




There are two positions held by those who write on the definition of
lying: Deceptionism and Non-Deceptionism (Mahon 2014). The first
group, Deceptionists, hold that an intention to deceive is necessary
for lying. Deceptionists may be divided further in turn into Simple
Deceptionists, who hold that lying requires the making of an
untruthful statement with an intention to deceive; Complex
Deceptionists, who hold that lying requires the making of an
untruthful assertion with the intention to deceive by means of a
breach of trust or faith; and Moral Deceptionists, who hold that lying
requires the making of an untruthful statement with the intention to
deceive, as well as the violation of a moral right of another or the
moral wronging of another. The second group, Non-Deceptionists, hold
that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying. They see the
traditional definition as both incorrect and
insufficient. Non-Deceptionists may be further divided into Simple
Non-Deceptionists, who hold that the making of an untruthful statement
is sufficient for lying, and Complex Non-Deceptionists, who hold that
a further condition, in addition to making an untruthful statement, is
required for lying. Some Complex Non-Deceptionists hold that lying
requires warranting the truth of what is stated, and other Complex
Non-Deceptionists hold that lying requires the making of an untruthful
assertion.


### 2.1 Simple Deceptionism




Simple Deceptionists include those who defend L1 (Isenberg 1973;
Primoratz 1984) as well as those who defend the modified versions of
this definition: L2 (Williams 2002), L3 (Mahon 2008), L4 (Newey 1997),
and L5 (Lackey 2013). For Simple Deceptionists, lying requires the
making of an untruthful statement with an intention to deceive, but it
does not require the making of an assertion or a breach of trust or faith.


### 2.2 Complex Deceptionism




Complex Deceptionists hold that, in addition to requiring an intention
to deceive, lying requires the making of an untruthful
*assertion*, as well as (or which therefore entails) a
*breach of trust* or *faith*. Roderick Chisholm and
Thomas Feehan hold that one is only making an assertion to another
person if one makes a statement to another person and one believes
that the conditions are such that the other person is
*justified* in believing both that one *believes*
one's statement to be true and that one *intends* that
the other person *believe* that one believes one's
statement to be true: "*x* asserts *p* to *y*
=df *x* states *p* to *y* and does so under
conditions which, he believes, justify *y* in believing that he,
*x*, not only accepts *p*, but also intends to contribute
causally to *y*'s believing that he, *x*, accepts
*p*" (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 152).
 




A lie is an untruthful assertion, that is, the speaker believes the
statement that is made is *not true*, or is *false*:



> 
> *x* lies to *y* =df There is a proposition
> *p* such that (i) either *x* believes that *p* is
> not true or *x* believes that *p* is false and (ii)
> *x* asserts *p* to *y*. (Chisholm and Feehan
> 1977, 152)


In the case of a lie, the speaker is attempting to get the hearer
to believe a falsehood. Note, however, that this falsehood is not
(normally) what the speaker is stating. Rather, the falsehood that the
speaker is attempting to get the hearer to believe is *that the
speaker believes the statement to be true*. This is the intention
to deceive in lying (although, strictly speaking, deception is
*foreseen* and not *intended* ("Essentially, under
this definition, you are only lying if you expect that you will be
successful in deceiving someone about what you believe" (Fallis
2009, 45)).




The speaker is also attempting to get the hearer to have this false
belief about what the speaker believes "in a special
way--by getting his victim to place his faith in him"
(Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 149). This is the breach of trust or breach of faith
in lying: "Lying, unlike the other types of deception, is
essentially a breach of faith" (Chisholm and Feehan 1977,
153). Their complete definition of a lie may be stated as follows:


* (L6)
To lie =df to (i) make a believed-false or
believed-not-true statement to another person; (ii) believe that the
conditions are such that the other person is justified in believing
that the statement is believed to be true by the person making the
statement; (iii) believe that the conditions are such that the other
person is justified in believing that the person making the statement
intends to contribute causally to the other person believing that the
statement is believed to be true by the person making the statement.
(Chisholm and Feehan 1977; cf. Guenin 2005)




According to L6 it not possible to lie if the speaker believes that
the conditions are such that the hearer is not justified in
believing that the speaker is making a truthful statement. Kant
provides an example in which a thief grabs a victim by the throat and
asks him where he keeps his money. If the victim were to make the
untruthful statement, "I have no money," Kant says that
this is not a lie, "for the other knows that... he
also has no right whatever to demand the truth from me" (Kant
1997, 203; but see Mahon 2009). Chisholm and Feehan hold that the
victim is not making an assertion, and hence, is not lying, given that
the victim believes that the thief is not justified in believing that
the victim is being truthful (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 154-155; but
see Strudler 2009 (cf. Strudler 2005; 2010), for the argument that the
thief can believe that the victim is credible, even if not trustworthy,
because he is motivated by the threat of violence). 




Charles Fried also holds that lying requires an assertion and a
breach of faith, but he rejects L6, arguing that it is possible for the
victim to lie to the thief in Kant's example (Fried 1978, 55 n1).
According to him, making an assertion involves making a statement and
intending to cause belief in the truth of that statement by giving an
implicit "warranty"or an implicit *"*promise
or assurance that the statement is true" (Fried 1978, 57). When
one asserts, one intends to "invite belief, and not belief based
*on the evidence* of the statement so much as *on the
faith* of the statement" (Fried 1978, 56). A lie is an
untruthful assertion. The speaker intends to cause belief in the truth
of a statement that the speaker believes to be false. Hence, a lie
involves an intention to deceive. The speaker also implicitly assures or
promises the hearer that the statement that is made is true. Hence, the
speaker is giving an insincere assurance, or breaking a promise--
"in lying the promise is made and broken at the same
moment"-- and every lie involves a
"breach of trust" (Fried 1978, 67).




Fried's definition of lying may be stated as follows (modified
to include cases in which speakers only intend to deceive about their
beliefs):


* (L7)
To lie =df to (i) make a believed-false statement to
another person; (ii) intend that that other person believe that the
statement is true [and that the statement is believed to be true] [or
intend that the other person believe that the statement is believed to
be true]; (iii) implicitly assure the other person that the statement
is true; (iv) intend that that other person believe that the statement
is true [and that the statement is believed to be true] [or intend that
the other person believe that the statement is believed to be true]
*on the basis* of this implicit assurance. (Fried
1978)




David Simpson also holds that lying requires an assertion and a
breach of faith. In asserting "we present ourselves as believing
something while and through invoking (although not necessarily gaining)
the trust of the one" to whom we assert (Simpson 1992, 625). This
"invocation of trust occurs through an act of 'open
sincerity'" according to which "we attempt to
establish... both that we believe some proposition and that we
intend them to realize that we believe it" (Simpson 1992, 625).
Lying is "insincere assertion" in the sense that "the
asserter's requisite belief is missing" (Simpson 1992,
625). This entails that someone who lies aims to deceive in three ways.
First, "we have the intention that someone be in error regarding
some matter, as we see the fact of the matter" (Simpson 1992,
624). This is the "primary deceptive intention" (Simpson
1992, 624). Second, we intend to deceive the other person
"regarding our belief regarding that matter... We
don't lie *about* this belief, but we intend to deceive
*regarding* it" (Simpson 1992, 624). We intend that they
be deceived, about whatever matter it is, on the basis of their being
deceived about our belief in this matter. Finally, someone who lies
"insincerely invokes trust" (Simpson 1992, 625). We intend
that they be deceived about our belief in this matter on the basis of
this insincere invocation of trust. Other forms of intended deception
that are not lies do not attempt to deceive "by way of a trust
invoked through an open sincerity" (Simpson 1992, 626). This is
what makes lies special: "it involves a certain sort of
betrayal" (Simpson 1992, 626). 




Since it is possible to lie without having the primary deceptive
intention, Simpson's definition needs to be modified
accordingly:


* (L8)
To lie =df to: (i) make a statement to another
person; (ii) lack belief in the truth of the statement; (iii) intend
that the other person believe: (a) that the statement is true and that
the statement is believed to be true [or (b) that the statement is
believed to be true]; (iv) intend that the other person believe: (c)
that it is intended that the other person believe that the statement is
true; (d) that it is intended that the other person believe that the
statement is believed to be true; (v) invoke trust in the other person
that the statement is believed to be true by means of an act of
'open sincerity'; (vi) intend that the other person
believe (a), or (b), on the basis of (v). (Simpson 1992)




Paul Faulkner holds that lying necessarily involves telling someone
something, which necessarily involves invoking trust. He distinguishes
between telling and making an assertion, and argues that in certain
cases the implication of my assertion "is sufficiently clear
that I can be said to have told you this" (Faulkner 2013, 3102)
even if I did not *assert* this. He defines *telling* as
follows: "*x* tells *y* that *p* if and only if
(i) *x* intends that *y* believe that *p*, and
(ii) *x* intends that *y* believe that *p*
because *y* recognizes that (i)" (Faulkner 2013, 3103). In
telling another person something, the speaker intends that the hearer
believe what she is stating or implying, but she intends that the
hearer believe what she is stating or implying *for the reason
that* "*y* [the hearer] believes *x* [the
speaker]" (Faulkner 2013, 3102). It follows that tellings
"operate by invoking an audience's trust" (Faulkner
2013, 3103). In lying, the speaker intends that the hearer believe
what she is stating or implying on the basis of trust: "In
lying, a speaker does not intend his audience accept his lie because
of independent evidence but intends his audience accept his
lie *because of his telling it*. The motivation for presenting
his assertion as sincere is to thereby ensure that an audience treats
his intention that the audience believe that *p* *as a reason for
believing* that *p*" (Faulkner, 2007, 527) A lie is
an untruthful telling. The speaker believes that what she asserts or
implies is false, she intends that the hearer believe that what she
states or implies is true, she intends that the hearer believe that
she intends this, and she intends that this be *the reason*
that the hearer believes that what she states or implies is true:
"*x*'s utterance *U* to *y* is a lie if and
only if (i) in uttering *U*, *x* tells *y*
that *p*, and (ii) *x* believes that *p* is
false" (Faulkner 2013, 3103).




Faulkner's definition of lying also needs to be modified to
include cases in which speakers only intend to deceive about their
beliefs:


* (L9)
To lie =df to (i) utter some proposition to another
person; (ii) believe that the proposition is false; (iii) intend that
the other person believe that the proposition is true and is believed
to be true [or intend that the other person believe that the
proposition is believed to be true]; (iv) intend that the other person
believe that it is intended that the other person believe that the
proposition is true; (v) intend that the other person believe that the
proposition is true and is believed to be true [or intend that the
other person believe that the proposition is believed to be true] for
the reason that it is intended that the other person believe that the
proposition is true. (Faulkner 2007; 2013)


 It is an implication of Complex Deceptionist definitions of lying
that certain cases of putative lies are not lies because no assertion
is made. Consider the following case of an (attempted) confidence
trick double bluff (Newey 1997, 98). Sarah, with collaborator Charlie,
wants to play a confidence trick on Andrew. She wants Andrew to buy
shares in Cadbury. She decides to deceive Andrew into thinking that
Kraft is planning a takeover bid for Cadbury. Sarah knows that Andrew
distrusts her. If she tells him that Kraft is planning a takeover bid
for Cadbury, he will not believe her. If she tells him that there is
no takeover bid, in an (attempted) double bluff, he might believe the
opposite of what she says, and so be deceived. But this simple double
bluff is too risky on its own. So Sarah gets Charlie, whom Andrew
trusts, to lie to him that Kraft is about to launch a takeover bid for
Cadbury. She also gets Charlie to tell Andrew that she believes that
it is false that Kraft is about to launch a takeover bid for
Cadbury. Sarah then goes to Andrew, and tells him, "Kraft is
about to launch a takeover bid for Cadbury." She does not intend
that Andrew believe that she believes that Kraft is about to launch a
takeover bid for Cadbury. However, she intends that he believe that
she is mistaken, and that in fact Kraft is about to launch a takeover
bid for Cadbury. As a result, he will be deceived.




According to L6, L7, L8, and L9, Sarah is not lying, because she is
not asserting anything. According to Simpson, for example, Sarah would
only be "*pretending* to invoke trust" (Simpson
1992, 628), and would not be invoking trust. In such a case, the
speaker intends to represent himself as "*intending to
represent himself* as believing what he does not" (Simpson
1992, 628). In order to lie, "one must pretend sincerity, but
also act on an intention that this sincerity be
accepted--otherwise one is pretending to lie, and not
lying" (Simpson 1992, 629). Sarah would be merely pretending to
lie to Andrew, in order to deceive him.




Another case of a putative lie that is not a lie according to Complex
Deceptionist definitions of lying is a *triple bluff*
(cf. Faulkner 2007, 527). Imagine an even more devious Pavel, from the
example above, telling an openly distrustful Trofim, in response to
Trofim's question, that he is going to "Pinsk." He is
actually going to Minsk, but he answers"Pinsk" in order to
have Trofim believe that he is attempting a double bluff. If it works,
Trofim will respond by telling him "Liar! You say you are going
to Pinsk in order to make me believe you are going to Minsk. But I
know you are going to Pinsk." According to L6, L7, L8, and L9,
Pavel is not lying to Trofim. He is pretending to attempt to deceive
him with a double bluff, in order to actually attempt to deceive him
with a triple bluff. At no point is he invoking trust, and breaching
that trust.


### 2.3 Moral Deceptionism




Moral Deceptionists hold that in addition to making an untruthful
statement with an intention to deceive, lying requires the violation
of a moral right of another, or the moral wronging of another.




According to Chisholm and Feehan, every lie is a violation of the
right of a hearer, since "It is assumed that, if a
person *x* asserts a proposition *p* to another
person *y*, then *y* has the right to expect
that *x* himself believes *p*. And it is assumed
that *x* knows, or at least that he ought to know, that, if he
asserts *p* to *y*, while believing himself
that *p* is not true, then he violates this right
of *y*'s" (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 153,
[variables have been changed for uniformity]). Nevertheless, it is not
part of their definition of lying that lying involves the violation of
the right of another person. According to most philosophers, the
claim that lying is (either defeasibly or non-defeasibly) morally wrong is
"a synthetic judgment and not an analytic one" (Kemp and
Sullivan 1993, 153). However, 'lie' is considered by some
philosophers to be a thick ethical term that it both describes a type
of action and morally evaluates that type of action negatively
(Williams 1985, 140). For some philosophers, "the wrongfulness
of lying is... built into the definition of the term" (Kemp
and Sullivan 1993, 153). For these philosophers, the claim that lying
is (either defeasibly or non-defeasibly) morally wrong is a tautology
(Margolis 1962).




According to Hugo Grotius, it is part of the meaning of
'lie' when it is "strictly taken" that it
involves "the Violation of a Real right" of the person lied
to, namely, "the Freedom of him... to judge" (Grotius
2005, 1212). One can *only* lie to someone who possesses this
right to exercise liberty of judgment. Grotius's definition of lying
is therefore as follows (modified accordingly):


* (L10)
To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to
another person, with the intention that that other person believe that
statement to be true (or believe that the statement is believed to be
true, or both), violating that person's right to exercise liberty
of judgment. (Grotius 2005)




According to L10, one cannot lie to "Children or
Madmen," for example, since they lack the right of liberty of
judgment (Grotius 2005, 1212). One cannot lie to someone who has given
"express Consent" to be told untruths, since he has given
up the right to exercise his liberty of judgment about these matters
(Grotius 2005, 1214). One cannot lie to someone who by "tacit
Consent" or presumed consent "founded upon just
Reason" has given up the right to exercise his liberty of
judgment about some matter, "on account of the Advantage, that he
shall get by it," such as when "a Person... comforts
his sick Friend, by making him believe what is false," since
"*no Wrong is done to him that is willing*" (Grotius
2005, 1215-1217). Furthermore, "he who has an absolute Right over
all the Rights of another," is not lying when he "makes use
of that Right, in telling something false, either for his particular
Advantage, or for the publick Good" (Grotius 2005, 1216-1218).
The right to exercise one's liberty of judgment can also be taken
away in cases "When the life of an innocent Person, or something
equal to it," is at stake, or when "the Execution of a
dishonest Act be otherwise prevented" (Grotius 2005, 1221). In
such a case, the person has forfeited his right, and
"speaking falsely to those--like thieves--to whom
truthfulness is not owed cannot be called lying" (Bok 1978,
14).




Alan Donagan also incorporates moral conditions into his definition
of lying (modified to include cases in which speakers only intend to
deceive about their beliefs):


* (L11)
To lie =df to freely make a believed-false statement
to another fully responsible and rational person, with the intention
that that other person believe that statement to be true [or the
intention that that other person believe that that statement is
believed to be true, or both]. (Donagan 1977)




According to L11, it is not possible to lie to "children,
madmen, or those whose minds have been impaired by age or
illness" (Donagan 1977, 89), since they are not fully responsible
and rational persons. It is also not possible to lie to "a
would-be murderer who threatens your life if you will not tell him
where his quarry has gone" (Donagan 1977, 89), and in general
when you are acting under duress in any way (such as a witness in fear
of his life on the witness stand, or a victim being robbed by a thief),
since statements made in such circumstances are not freely made.
 




It has been objected that these moral deceptionist definitions are
unduly narrow and restrictive (Bok 1978). Surely, for example, it is
possible to lie to a would-be murderer, whether it is impermissible, as
some absolutist deontologists maintain (Augustine 1952; Aquinas 1972
(cf. MacIntyre 1995b); Kant 1996 (cf. Mahon 2006); Newman 1880; Geach
1977; Betz 1985; Pruss 1999; Tollefsen 2014), or permissible (i.e.,
either optional or obligatory), as consequentialists and moderate
deontologists maintain (Constant 1964; Mill 1863; Sidgwick 1981; Bok
1978; MacIntyre 1995a; cf. Kagan 1998).




It has also been objected that these moral deceptionist definitions
are morally lax (Kemp and Sullivan 1993, 158-9). By rendering certain
deceptive untruthful statements to others as *non-*lies, they
make it permissible to act in a way that would otherwise be open to
moral censure. In general, even those philosophers who hold that all
lies have an inherent negative weight, albeit such that it can be
overridden, and hence, who hold that lying is defeasibly morally wrong,
do not incorporate moral necessary conditions into their definitions of
lying (Bok 1978; Kupfer 1982; cf. Wiles 1988).


### 2.4 Non-Deceptionism




Non-Deceptionists hold that an intention to deceive is not necessary
for lying.



For Simple Non-Deceptionists (Augustine 1952 (cf. Griffiths 2003, 31);
Aquinas 1952; Shibles 1985), there is nothing more to lying than
making an untruthful statement. According to Aquinas, for example, a
jocose lie is a lie. This position is not defended by contemporary
philosophers.



For Complex Non-Deceptionists, untruthfulness is not sufficient for
lying. In order to differentiate lying from telling jokes, being
ironic, acting, etc., a further condition must be met. For some
Complex Non-Deceptionists, that further condition is warranting the
truth of the untruthful statement. For other Complex
Non-Deceptionists, that condition is making an assertion.




Thomas Carson holds that it is possible to lie by making a false and
untruthful statement to an addressee without intending to deceive the
addressee, so long as the statement is made in a context such that one
"warrants the truth" of the statement (and one does not
believe oneself to be not warranting the truth of the statement), or
one *intends* to warrant the truth of the statement:


* (L12)
A person *x* tells a lie to another person *y*
iff (i) *x* makes a false statement *p* to *y*,
(ii) *x* believes that *p* is false or probably false (or,
alternatively, *x* does not believe that *p* is true),
(iii) *x* states *p* in a context in which *x* thereby
warrants the truth of *p* to *y*, and (iv) *x* does not
take herself to be not warranting the truth of what she says to
*y*. (Carson 2006, 298; 2010, 30)
* (L13)
A person *x* tells a lie to another person *y* iff (i)
*x* makes a false statement *p* to *y*, (ii) *x*
believes that *p* is false or probably false (or,
alternatively, *x* does not believe that *p* is true), and
(iii) *x* intends to warrant the truth of *p*
to *y*. (Carson 2010, 37)




Carson includes the falsity condition in both of his definitions;
however, he is prepared to modify both definitions so that the falsity
condition is not required (Carson 2010, 39). He also holds that the
untruthfulness condition is not stringent enough, since, if a speaker
simply does "not believe" her statement to be true (but
does not believe it to be false), or believes that her statement is
"probably false" (but does not believe it to be false),
then she is lying.




Carson gives two examples of non-deceptive lies: a guilty student who
tells a college dean that he did not cheat on an examination, without
intending that the dean believe him (since "he is really
hard-boiled, he may take pleasure in thinking that the Dean knows he
is guilty"), because he knows that the dean's policy is
not to punish a student for cheating unless the student admits to
cheating, and a witness who provides untruthful (and false) testimony
about a defendant, where there is a preponderance of evidence against
the defendant, without the intention that the testimony be believed by
anyone, in order to avoid suffering retaliation from the defendant
and/or his henchmen (Carson 2006, 289; 2010, 21). Neither person is
lying according to the definitions of lying of Simple Deceptionists
(L1, L2, L3, L4, and L5) or Complex Deceptionists (L6, L7, L8, and L9)
(cf. Simpson 1992, 631) or Moral Deceptionists (L10, L11). Both are
lying according to L12 and L13, because each warrants the truth of his
statement, even though neither intends to deceive his addressee.




It has been argued that the witness and the student do have an
intention to deceive (Meibauer 2011, 282; 2014a, 105). It has also
been argued that they are being deceptive, even if they lack an
intention that their untruthful statements be believed to be true
(Lackey 2013; but see Fallis 2015). However, it has also been argued
that they fail to warrant the truth of their statements, and hence
fail to be lying according to L12 and L13. One argument is that, in
the witness example, the statement is coerced, and "Coerced
speech acts are not genuinely assertoric" (Leland 2013, 3;
cf. Kenyon 2010). "In the context of a threat of violent death,
the mere fact that he is speaking under oath is not sufficient to
institute an ordinary warranting context" (Leland 2013,
4). Another argument is that the witness and the student are not
warranting the truth of their statements because they believe that
their audiences believe that they are being untruthful.



Carson has said that "If one warrants the truth of a statement,
then one promises or guarantees, ether explicitly or implicitly, that
what one says is true" (Carson 2010, 26) and "Warranting
the truth of a statement presupposes that the statement is being used
to invite or influence belief. It does not make sense for one to
guarantee the truth of something that one is not inviting or
influencing others to believe" (Carson 2010, 36). The result is
that to lie is to breach trust: "To lie, on my view,
is to invite others to trust and rely on what one says by warranting
its truth, but, at the same time, to betray that trust by making false
statements that one does not believe" (Carson 2010, 34). The
combination of warranting the truth of one's statement and
breaching trust would appear to make Carson's definition of
lying similar to that of Complex Deceptionists such as Chisholm and
Feehan. It would also appear to produce similar results. For example,
Carson says the following about negotiators:



> 
> In the US, it is common and often a matter of course for people to
> deliberately misstate their bargaining positions during
> negotiations. Such statements are lies according to standard
> dictionary definitions of lying--they are intentional false
> statements intended to deceive others. However, given my first
> definition of lying [L12], such cases are not lies unless the
> negotiator warrants the truth of what he says... Suppose that two
> "hardened" cynical negotiators who routinely misstate
> their intentions, and do not object when others do this to them,
> negotiate with each other. Each person recognizes that the other party
> is a cynical negotiator, and each is aware of the fact that the other
> party knows this. In this sort of case, statements about one's
> minimum or maximum price are not warranted to be true. (Carson
> 2010, 191)


If a negotiator makes an untruthful statement, "That is the
highest I can go," to another negotiator, then, since the
negotiator believes that the other negotiator believes that he is
making an untruthful statement, he cannot intend to warrant the truth
of his statement, and/or the context (of negotiation) is such that he
is not warranting the truth of his statement. As a result, he is is
not lying, according to L12. He is not lying according to L13, either,
at least if it is true that you cannot "intend to do something
that you do not expect to succeed at" (Fallis 2009, 43 n 48;
cf. Newey 1997, 96-97).



It seems that the same thing can be said about the student and the
witness. If the student believes that the dean already knows he is
guilty, and if the witness believes that the jury, etc., already knows
that the defendant is guilty, then it seems that neither can intend to
warrant the truth of his statement, and/or the context is such that
neither is warranting the truth of his statement. If this is so, then
neither is lying according to L12 and L13. Carson has said, about
their Complex Deceptionist definition of lying, "Chisholm and
Feehan's definition has the very odd and unacceptable result
that a notoriously dishonest person cannot lie to people who he knows
distrust him" (Carson 2010, 23). It does seem, however, that
Carson's definition has the same result.


Jennifer Saul also holds that it is possible to lie without
intending to deceive. She has provided a modified version of L12 that
combines the warranting context condition, and the not believing that
one is not warranting condition, in the single condition of
*believing that one is in a warranting context*:


* (L14)
If the speaker is not the victim of linguistic error/malapropism
or using metaphor, hyperbole, or irony, then they lie iff (i) they say
that *p*; (ii) they believe *p* to be false; (iii) they take
themselves to be in a warranting context. (Saul 2012, 3)


According to Saul, it is not possible to lie if one does not
believe that one is in a warranting context. Saul considers the case
of a putative lie told in a totalitarian state: "This is the
case of utterances demanded by a totalitarian state. These utterances
of sentences supporting the state are made by people who don't
believe them, to people who don't believe them. Everyone knows
that false things are being said, and that they are only being said
only because they are required by the state. [...] It seems
somewhat reasonable to suggest that, since everyone is forced to make
these false utterances, and everyone knows they are false, they cease
to be genuine lies" (Saul 2012, 9). Saul adds that "People
living in a totalitarian state, making pro-state utterances, are a
trickier case (which they should be). Whether or not their utterances
are made in contexts where a warrant of truth is present is not at all
clear" (Saul 2012, 11). If a speaker is making an untruthful
statement to a hearer, and "Everyone knows that false things are
being said," that is, the speaker knows that the hearer knows
that the speaker is being untruthful, then the speaker does not
believe that she is in a warranting context. According to L14, the
speaker is not lying. However, it is arguable that in both the student
and the witness cases, "Everyone knows that false things are
being said," and hence, that the speaker does not believe that
he is in a warranting context. If this is so, then according to L14,
neither the student nor the witness is lying.


Roy Sorensen agrees with Carson that lying does not require an
intention to deceive, and that there can be non-deceptive
"bald-faced" lies (Sorensen 2007) and
"knowledge-lies" (Sorensen 2010). However, he rejects L12,
since it entails that one cannot lie when the falsity of what one is
stating is common knowledge: "Carson's definition of lying
does not relieve the narrowness. The concept of warrant is not broad
enough to explain how we can lie in the face of common knowledge. One
can warrant *p* only if *p* might be the case. When the
falsehood of *p* is common knowledge, no party to the common
knowledge can warrant *p* because *p* is epistemically
impossible" (Carson 2007, 254). According to Sorensen, a
negotiator who tells "a falsehood that will lead to better
coordination between buyer and seller" is telling a
*bald-faced lie* (Sorensen 2007, 262).


Sorensen defines lying as follows: "Lying is just asserting
what one does not believe" (Sorensen 2007, 256). It is a
condition on telling a lie that one makes an assertion. Sorensen
differentiates between assertions and non-assertions according to
"narrow plausibility": "To qualify as an assertion,
a lie must have narrow plausibility. Thus, someone who only had access
to the assertion might believe it. This is the grain of truth behind
'Lying requires the intention to deceive.' Bald-faced lies
show that assertions do not need to meet a requirement of wide
plausibility, that is, credibility relative to one's total
evidence" (Sorensen 2007, 255).


Sorensen provides, as examples of assertions, and hence, lies, the
servant of a maestro telling an unwanted female caller that the sounds
she hears over the phone are not the maestro and that the servant is
merely "dusting the piano keys," and a doctor in an Iraqi
hospital during the Iraq war telling a journalist who can see patients
in the ward in uniforms that "I see no uniforms" (Sorensen
2007, 253). The claim that these are assertions, however, and
therefore lies, is controversial (cf. Keiser 2015). These statements
neither express the speaker's belief, nor aim to affect the
belief of the addressee in any way, since their falsehood is common
knowledge (cf. Williams 2002, 74). As it has been said:
"Sorensen does not offer a definition of asserting a proposition
(with necessary and sufficient conditions)... To the extent that
he does not fully analyze the concept of assertion, Sorensen's
definition of lying is unclear" (Carson 2010, 36). It may be
argued against Sorensen that the "utterances in question are not
assertions" (Keiser 2015, 12), and hence, on his own account, fail to
be lies.


Don Fallis also holds that it is possible to lie without intending
to deceive. He has also defended the assertion condition for lying:
"you lie when you *assert* something that you believe to
be false" (Fallis 2009, 33). He has held that you assert
something when you you make a statement and you believe that you are in
a situation in which the Gricean norm of conversation, 'Do not
say what you believe to be false,' is in effect. His definition
of lying was thus as follows:



> 
> You *lie* to *x* if and only if (i) you state
> that *p* to *x*, (2) you believe that you make this
> statement in a context where the following norm of conversation is in
> effect: Do not make statements that you believe to be false, and (iii)
> you believe that *p* is false. (Fallis 2009, 34).
> 


Counterexamples to this definition
(Pruss 2012; Faulkner 2013; Stokke 2013a) have prompted a revision of
this definition in order to accommodate these counterexamples:


* (L15)
You lie if and only if you say that *p*, you
believe that *p* is false (or at least that *p* will be
false if you succeed in communicating that *p*), and you intend
to violate the norm of conversation against communicating something
false by communicating that *p* (Fallis 2012, 569)
* (L16)
You lie if and only if you say that *p*, you believe that
*p* is false (or at least that *p* will be false if you succeed in
communicating that *p*), and you intend to communicate something
false by communicating that *p*. (Fallis 2012, 569)




Both L15 and L16 are able to accommodate the following
counterexample to the earlier definition: "when Marc Antony said
to the Roman people, 'Brutus is an honorable man' ...
the citizens of Rome know that (a) Antony did not believe that Brutus
was an honorable man, that (b) Antony was subject to a norm against
saying things that he believed to be false, and that (c) Antony had
been a cooperative participant in the conversation so far. Thus, they
were led to conclude that Antony was *flouting* the norm in
order to communicate something other than what he literally uttered. In
fact, the best explanation of his statement was that he wanted to
communicate the exact opposite of what he literally uttered"
(Fallis 2012, 567). Since Antony does not intend to violate the norm of
conversation against communicating something that he believes to be
false (that Brutus is an honorable man) by saying "Brutus is an
honorable man," or, more simply, since Antony does not intend to
communicate something false with his untruthful statement, it follows
that Antony is not lying. However, in the case of a guilty witness,
Tony, against whom there is overwhelming evidence, who says "I
did not do it," without the intention that anyone believe him, he
does intend to violate the norm of conversation against communicating
something that he believes to be false (that he did not do it) by
saying "I did not do it," or, more simply, he does intend
to communicate something believed-false with his untruthful statement,
even though he does not intend that anyone believe this.




It has been contended that non-deceptive liars do not intend to
communicate anything believed-false with their untruthful statements,
and, indeed, may even intend to communicate something believed-true
with their untruthful statements (Dynel 2011, 151). Fallis rejects the
claim that non-deceptive liars do not intend to communicate anything
believed-false, even if they intend to communicate something
believed-true:



> Bald-faced liars might want to communicate something
> true. For instance, Tony may be trying to communicate to the police
> that that they will never convict him. But that does not mean that he
> does not also intend to communicate something false in violation of
> the norm. He wants what he actually said to be understood and accepted
> for purposes of the conversation. It is not as if "I did not do
> it" is simply a euphemism for "You'll never take me
> alive, coppers!" (Fallis 2012, 572 n 24)


However, in the case of polite untruths, such as "Madam is
not at home," the untruthful statement is simply a euphemism:
"For example, the words "She is not at home,"
delivered by a servant or a relative at the door, have become a mere
euphemism for indisposition or disinclination" (Isenberg 1973,
256). In the case of polite untruths, it seems, there is no intention
to communicate anything believed-false. In the case of the servant who
tells the female caller, "I'm dusting the piano
keys," or the Iraqi doctor who tells the journalist "I see
no uniforms," or the negotiator who tells the other negotiator
"That is the highest I can go," or the person living in
the totalitarian state who makes the pro-state utterance, it is also
arguable that there is no intention to communicate anything
believed-false. If this is true, then there is some support for the
claim that non-deceptive liars do not intend to communicate anything
believed-false with their untruthful statements, and hence, that they
are not lying according to L15 or L16.




Andreas Stokke also holds that it is possible to lie without
intending to deceive. He has also defended the assertion condition for
lying: "you lie when you assert something you believe to be
false" (Stokke 2013a, 33). According to Stokke, to "assert
that *p* is to say that *p* and thereby propose that
*p* become common ground" (Stokke 2013a, 47). A
proposition, *p*, becomes common ground in a group "if all
members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) that *p*,
and all believe that all believe that all accept that *p*,
etc." (Stokke 2013a, 49, quoting Stalnaker 2002, 716). Stokke thus
defines lying as follows:


* (L17)
*x* lies to *y* if and only if ...
*x* says that *p* to *y*, and ... *x*
proposes that *p* become common ground, and ... *x*
believes that *p* is false. (Stokke 2013a, 49)


In the case of a speaker making an ironic untruthful statement,
the speaker does not propose that the believed-false proposition
(e.g., "Brutus is an honorable man") become common ground
(Stokke 2013a, 50). However, in the case of a non-deceptive liar, the
speaker does propose that the believed-false proposition (e.g.,
"I did not cheat") become common ground (Stokke 2013a,
52). The fact that in the case of a non-deceptive lie it is common
knowledge that what the speaker is saying is (believed to be) false
does not alter the fact that the speaker is proposing that the
believed-falsehood become common ground. Indeed, even if the
(believed) truth is initially common ground, before the speaker
proposes that the believed-falsehood become common ground, it is still
the case that the non-deceptive liar is proposing to "update the
common ground with her utterance" (Stokke 2013a, 54). For
example, in the case of the student and the dean, "The student
wants herself and the Dean to mutually accept that she did not
plagiarize" (Stokke 2013a, 54).


It is possible to argue that Stokke's account of assertion,
and hence L17, is faced with a dilemma when it comes to non-deceptive
lies. Either, in the case of a non-deceptive lie, the speaker does
propose that the believed-false proposition become common ground, but
becoming common ground is too weak to count as asserting, or becoming
common ground is strong enough to count as asserting, but, in the case
of a non-deceptive lie, the speaker does not propose that the
believed-false proposition become common ground. Stokke considers
Stalnaker's example of a guest at a party saying to another
guest, "The man drinking a martini is a philosopher," and
of the two guests proceeding to talk about the philosopher, when it is
common knowledge that the drink in question is not a martini. About
this example Stalnaker says: "perhaps it is mutually recognized
that it is not a martini, but mutually recognized that both parties
are *accepting* that it is a martini. The pretense will be
rational if accepting the false presupposition is an efficient way to
communicate something true" (Stalnaker 2002, 718). However, if
proposing that a believed-false proposition become common ground can
mean engaging in and sustaining a "pretence," possibly in
order to communicate truths, then it is not clear that this counts as
making an assertion (cf. Keiser 2015). Hence, a non-deceptive liar may
be proposing that her believed-false proposition become common ground
without this being an act of making an assertion. But this means that
she is not lying, according to L17. Alternatively, if proposing that a
believed-false proposition become common ground means something more
than this, such that the speaker intends or wants herself and her
hearer "to mutually accept" her believed-false
proposition, then it is not clear that a non-deceptive liar intends or
wants this. If this is correct, then non-deceptive lies fail to be
lies according to L17. 


## 3. Traditional Definition of Deception




The dictionary definition of deception is as follows: "To cause
to believe what is false" (*OED* 1989). There are several
problems with this definition, however (Barnes 1997; Mahon 2007;
Carson 2010). The principal problem is that it is too broad in
scope. On this definition, mere appearances can deceive, such as when
a white object looks red in a certain light (Faulkner,
2013). Furthermore, it is possible for people
to *inadvertently* deceive others. If Steffi believes that
there is a talk on David Lewis and the Christians on Friday, and she
tells Paul that "There is a talk on Lewis and the Christians on
Friday," and as a result Paul believes that there is a talk on
C. S. Lewis and the Christians on Friday, then Steffi has deceived
Paul. Also, it is possible for people to *mistakenly* deceive
other people. If Steffi mistakenly believes that there is not a
philosophy talk on Friday, and she tells Paul that there is not a
philosophy talk on Friday, and he believes her, then then Steffi has
deceived Paul.




Although some philosophers hold that deceiving may be inadvertent or
mistaken (Demos 1960; Fuller 1976; Chisholm and Feehan 1977; Adler
1997; Gert 2005), many philosophers have argued that it is not possible
to deceive inadvertently or mistakenly (Linsky 1970; van Horne
1981; Barnes 1997; Carson 2010; Saul 2012; Faulkner 2013). They
hold that deception, like lying, is *intentional*. They reserve
term "mislead" to cover cases of causing false beliefs
either intentionally or unintentionally (Carson 2010, 47).




A modified version of the dictionary definition that does not allow
for either inadvertent or mistaken deceiving is as follows:


* (D1)
To deceive =df to intentionally cause to have a false
belief that is known or believed to be false.



D1 may be taken as the traditional definition of deception, at least
in the case of other-deception (Baron 1988, 444 n. 2). As contrasted
with 'lying,' 'deceive' is an achievement or
success verb (Ryle 1949, 130). An act of deceiving is not an act of
deceiving unless a particular result is achieved. According to D1,
that result is a *false belief*. Note that D1 is not restricted
to the deception of other persons by other persons; it applies to
anything that is capable of having beliefs, such as (possibly)
chimpanzees, dogs, and infants.




There is no statement condition for deception. In addition to
deceiving by means of lying, it is possible to deceive using natural
or causal signs (indices), such as packing a bag as though one were
going on a holiday, in order to catch a thief (Kant 1997, 202). It is
possible to deceive by using signs that work by resemblance (icons),
for example by posting a smiley face emoticon about a news item that
one is actually unhappy about. Finally, it is possible to deceive by
non-linguistic conventional signs (symbols), such as wearing a wedding
ring when one is not married, or wearing a police uniform when one is
not a police officer. It is also possible for a person to deceive by
cursing, making an interjection or an exclamation, issuing a command
or an exhortation, asking a question, saying "Hello," and
so forth. It is also possible to deceive by omitting to make certain
statements, or by remaining silent.




There is also no untruthfulness condition for deception. It is
possible to deceive by making a truthful and true statement that
intentionally implies a falsehood. This is a palter. Palters include
Bill Clinton stating "There is no improper relationship,"
with the intention that it be believed that there was *never* an
improper relationship (Saul 2012, 30), greeting a famous person by his
or her first name with the intention that other people believe that you
are a close friend of his, or making a reservation for a restaurant or a hotel
as "Dr.," intending to be believed to be a (typically
wealthier) physician rather than a (typically less wealthy) academic
(Schauer and Zeckhauser 2009, 44). If Pavel truthfully and truly tells
Trofim that he is going to Pinsk, with the intention that the
distrustful Trofim believe falsely that Pavel is going to Minsk, and as
a result Trofim believes falsely that Pavel is going to Minsk, then
Pavel deceives Trofim (a double bluff). It is also possible to
deceive using truthful statements that are not assertions, such as
jokes, ironic statements, and even the lines of a play delivered on
stage, so long as the intention to deceive can be formed. If, for
example, I am asked if I stole the money, and I reply in an ironic
tone, "Yeah, right, of course I did," when I did steal the
money, intending that I be believed to have not stolen the money, and
if I am believed, then I have deceived using a truthful statement (it
is unclear if such cases of "telling the truth falsely"
(Frank 2009, 57) are to be considered as cases of paltering).




There is also no addressee condition for deception. In addition to
deceiving addressees, it is possible to deceive those listening in, as
in a bogus disclosure (e.g., deceiving F.B.I. agents secretly known to
be listening in on a telephone conversation) or a disclosure (e.g.,
deceiving NASA handlers openly listening to exchanges between
astronauts and their wives in *Capricorn One*). It is also
possible to deceive an addressee about some matter other than the
content of the statement made (e.g., making a truthful statement, but
faking an accent).


### 3.1 Objections to the Traditional Definition of Deception




Several objections can be made to D1. One objection is that it is not
necessary that the deceiver causes another person to have a false
belief that is (truly) believed to be false by the deceiver: "if
I intentionally cause you to believe that *p* where *p* is
false and I neither believe that *p* is true nor believe
that *p* is false" (Carson 2010, 48) then this is still
deception (van Frassen 1988; Barnes 1997; cf. Shiffrin 2014, 13). For
example, if Michael has no belief whatsoever regarding the condition
of the bridge, but he convinces Gertrude that the bridge is safe, and
the bridge happens to be dangerous, then Michael deceives Gertrude
about the bridge being safe (van Frassen 1988, 124). Or, if Alyce
places a fake rabbit in Evelyn's garden, in which lives a
reclusive rabbit, in order to guarantee that Evelyn believes that she
is seeing a rabbit in her garden (one way or the other), and Evelyn
sees the fake rabbit, and calls Alyce on the phone and tells her
"I am looking at a rabbit in my garden!" then Alyce has
deceived Evelyn, even though she cannot believe or know that Evelyn is
seeing the fake rabbit rather than the real rabbit (Barnes 1997,
11). Although this objection to D1 is not necessarily compelling
(Mahon 2007, 191-2), a modified definition of interpersonal
deception that incorporates this objection is as follows:


* (D2)
A person *x* deceives another person *y* if and only
if *x* intentionally causes *y* to believe *p*,
where *p* is false and *x* does not believe that *p* is
true. (Carson 2010, 48)




The most common objection to D1 is that it is not necessary that the
deceiver intentionally cause another person to have a *new*
false belief. Although this form of deception, according to which a
person intentionally brings about "the change from the state of
not being deceived... to that of being deceived" (Chisholm
and Feehan 1977, 144), is the most normal form of deception, it is not
the only form. A person may deceive another person by causing that
person to *continue to have* a false belief (Fuller 1976, 21;
Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 144; Mahon 2007 189-190; Carson 2010, 50;
Shiffrin 2014, 19). This is where, "but for the act" of the
deceiver, the person "would have lost or given up" the
false belief (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 144), or least have a greater
chance of losing the false belief. A modified definition of
interpersonal deception that incorporates this objection is the
following:


* (D3)
A person *x* deceives another person *y* if and only
if *x* intentionally causes *y* to believe *p* (or
persist in believing *p*), where *p* is false and *x*
knows or believes that *p* is false. (Carson 2010, 50)




A further objection to D1 (and D2 and D3) is that it is not sufficient
for deception that a person intentionally causes another person to
have a false belief that she truly believes or knows to be false; it
must also be that this false belief is *caused by evidence*,
and that the evidence *is brought about* by the person in order
to cause the other person to have the false belief (Linsky 1970, 163;
Fuller 1976, 23; Schmitt 1988, 185; Barnes 1997, 14; Mahon 2007). If
Andrew intentionally causes Ben to believe (falsely) that there are
vampires in England by, for example, operating on Ben's brain,
or giving Ben an electric shock, or drugging Ben, then Andrew does
not deceive Ben about there being vampires in England. Also, if Andrew
causes Ben to believe falsely that there are vampires in England by
getting Ben to read a book that purports to demonstrate that there are
vampires in England, then Andrew does not deceive Ben about there
being vampires in England. However, if Andrew writes a book that
purports to demonstrate that there are vampires in England, and Ben
reads the book, and as a result Ben comes to believe that there are
vampires in England, then Andrew does deceive Ben about there being
vampires in England (Fuller 1976). A modified definition of
interpersonal deception that incorporates this objection is the
following:


* (D4)
To deceive =df to intentionally cause another
person to have or continue to have a false belief that is known or
truly believed to be false by bringing about evidence on the basis of
which the person has or continues to have the false belief.
(Mahon 2007, 189-190)




All of the definitions so far considered are definitions of *positive
deception*, where a person "has been caused to *add*
to his stock of false beliefs" or has been caused to continue to
have a false belief (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 144). A further
objection to D1 (and D2, D3, and D4) is that it is not necessary for
deception to cause a new belief or to cause to continue to have a false
belief. One can deceive another person by causing the person to
*cease to have* a true belief, or by *preventing the person
from acquiring* a true belief. These are both cases of *negative
deception*, according to which a person "has been caused to
*lose* one of his true beliefs" or been prevented from
gaining a true belief (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 143-144). For
example, if I intentionally distract someone who is prone to
forgetting things irretrievably when distracted, in order to make that
person forget something irretrievably, and, as a result, that person
loses a (veridical) memory irretrievably, then I have caused him to
cease to have a true belief. (In science-fiction the same result can
be achieved by using a memory-erasing device, as in the neuralyzer
used in the 1997 science-fiction film *Men in Black*). Also, if
I hide a section of the newspaper from someone in order to prevent her
from learning about some news item, such as an earthquake in a foreign
country that harmed no-one, then I prevented her from acquiring a true
belief about a distant earthquake. A modified definition of
interpersonal deception that incorporates this objection is the
following:


* (D5)
To deceive =df to intentionally cause another person
to acquire a false belief, or to continue to have a false belief, or to
cease to have a true belief, or to be prevented from acquiring a true
belief.




However, this objection to D1 (and D2, D3, and D4) is not
necessarily compelling. It may be argued that negative deception is not
deception at all. After all, no false belief has been acquired or sustained.
It may be argued that to prevent someone from acquiring a true belief
is to keep that person in ignorance, or to keep that person "in
the dark," rather than to deceive that person (Mahon 2007,
187-188; cf. Carson 2010, 53). The state of being ignorant is not the
same as the state of being mistaken. One may not know what city is the
capital city of Estonia (Tallinn); this is different from mistakenly
believing that Riga is the capital city of Estonia. Similarly, although
it is more unusual, rendering a person ignorant of some matter is not
the same as deceiving that person, at least if it results in no false
belief. For example, in the 2004 science-fiction film *The Eternal
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind*, people go to Lacuna, Inc., to have
their memories of their previous relationships, as well as their visits, erased.
Those who run Lacuna, Inc., make their clients forget things, or render
them ignorant of things. They do not deceive them in doing this.
Chisholm and Feehan admit that Augustine and Aquinas "do not call
it 'deception'" to "hide the truth"
(Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 187).




D5 only counts as deception cases of deception "by
commission" (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 143-144). According
to Chisholm and Feehan, it is also possible to deceive "by
omission" (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 143-144). One may
*allow* a person to acquire a false belief, or *allow* a
person to continue with a false belief, or *allow* a person to
cease to have a true belief, or *allow* a person to continue
without a true belief. For example, one may allow a person to read a
news story and acquire a belief that one knows is false (e.g., a news
story about the CEO of your company resigning for health reasons, when
you know he was forced out for mismanagement of funds), and one may
allow a person to continue to have a false belief by not correcting
the person's false belief (e.g., not correcting a child's
belief in Santa Claus). Or, for example, one may allow a person to
forget a veridical memory by not stopping them from getting
distracted, and one may allow a person to continue without knowing
about an earthquake that has occurred in a foreign country. According
to Chisholm and Feehan, there can positive and negative deception by
commission and by omission. A modified definition of interpersonal
deception that incorporates this objection is the following:


* (D6)
To deceive =df to intentionally cause another person to
acquire a false belief, or to continue to have a false belief, or to
cease to have a true belief, or to be prevented from acquiring a true
belief, or to intentionally allow another person to acquire a false
belief, or to continue to have a false belief, or to cease to have a
true belief, or to be prevented from acquiring a true
belief.




Finally, D6 only counts as deception actions and omissions that are
intentional. According to Chisholm and Feehan, however, deception can
be unintentional. A modified definition of interpersonal deception that
incorporates this objection is the following:


* (D7)
To deceive =df to cause another person to acquire a
false belief, or to continue to have a false belief, or to cease to
have a true belief, or be prevented from acquiring a true belief, or
to allow another person to acquire a false belief, or to continue to
have a false belief, or to cease to have a true belief, or be
prevented from acquiring a true belief. (Chisholm and Feehan 1977,
145).


The objection to D5 that negative deception is not
deception also applies to D6 and D7.