## 1. Historical Overview



Although in Western philosophy the earliest formulation of a version
of the cosmological argument is found in Plato's *Laws*,
893-96, the classical argument is firmly rooted in
Aristotle's *Physics (*VIII, 4-6) and
*Metaphysics* (XII, 1-6). Islamic philosophy enriches the
tradition, developing two types of arguments. Arabic philosophers
(*falasifa*), such as Ibn Sina (c. 980-1037), developed
the argument from contingency, which was taken up by Thomas Aquinas
(1225-74) in his *Summa Theologica* (I,q.2,a.3) and in
his *Summa Contra Gentiles* (I, 13). Influenced by the
Neoplatonist John Philoponus (5th c) (Davidson 1969), the
*mutakallimum*--theologians who used reason and
argumentation to support their revealed Islamic
beliefs--developed the temporal version of the argument from the
impossibility of an infinite regress, now referred to as the
*kalam* cosmological argument. For example,
al-Ghazali (1058-1111) argued that everything that
begins to exist requires a cause of its beginning. The world is
composed of temporal phenomena preceded by other temporally-ordered
phenomena. Since such a series of temporal phenomena cannot continue
to infinity because an actual infinite is impossible, the world must
have had a beginning and a cause of its existence, termed Allah or God
(Craig 1979: part 1). This version of the cosmological argument
entered the medieval Christian tradition through Bonaventure
(1221-74) in his *Sentences* (*II Sent*.
D.1,p.1,a.1,q.2).



Enlightenment thinkers, such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel
Clarke, reaffirmed the cosmological argument. Leibniz
(1646-1716) appealed to a strengthened principle of sufficient
reason, according to which "no fact can be real or existing and
no statement true without a sufficient reason for its being so and not
otherwise" (*Monadology*, SS32). Leibniz uses the
principle to argue that the sufficient reason for the "series of
things comprehended in the universe of creatures" (SS36)
must exist outside this series of contingencies and is found in a
necessary being that we call God (SS38). Samuel Clarke likewise
employed the principle of sufficient reason in his cosmological
argument (Rowe 1975: chap. 2).



Although the cosmological argument does not figure prominently in
Asian philosophy, a very abbreviated version of it, proceeding from
dependence, can be found in Udayana's
*Nyayakusumanjali* I,4. In general,
philosophers in the Nyaya tradition argue that since the universe
has parts that come into existence at one occasion and not another, it
must have a cause. We could admit an infinite regress of causes if we
had evidence for such, but lacking such evidence, God must exist as
the non-dependent cause. Many of the objections to the argument
contend that God is an inappropriate cause because of God's
nature. For example, since God is immobile and has no body, he cannot
properly be said to cause anything. The Naiyayikas reply that God
could assume a body at certain times, and in any case, God need not
create in the same way humans do (Potter 1977: 100-07).



Rene Descartes advances his version of the cosmological
argument not only as a piece of natural theology that proves
God's existence by natural reason, but also serving an epistemic
function of guaranteeing that God could not be deceiving him
(*Meditations on First Philosophy*, Preface & Meditation
3). The cosmological argument came under serious assault in the
18th century, first by David Hume and then by Immanuel Kant.
Hume (1748) attacked both the view of causation presupposed in the
argument (that causation is an objective, productive, necessary power
relation that holds between two things) and the Causal
Principle--every contingent being has a cause of its
existence--that lies at the heart of the argument. Kant contended
that the cosmological argument, in identifying the necessary being,
relies on the ontological argument, which in turn is suspect. We will
return to these criticisms below.



In the first part of the 20th century, with the rise of Positivism,
the argument was largely abandoned. For critics like J.J.C. Smart
(1955), the claim of the cosmological argument that God necessarily
exists is equivalent to "Necessarily, God exists." But
since existence claims cannot be logically necessary, the statement is
absurd. However, he notes, within us lies a deep-seated question: why
should anything exist at all? Smart does not know what sort of
question this is for it fails to fit his conception of propositions as
either necessary truths or empirical claims. However, he continues,
this awe-inspiring theological question appeals to those with a
religious attitude. In this, the cosmological argument is reduced to a
mystical role, catering to our emotions but devoid of rational
content.



Both theists and nontheists in the last part of the 20th
century and the first part of the 21st century generally
show a healthy skepticism about the argument. Alvin Plantinga
concludes "that this piece of natural theology is
ineffective" (1967: chap. 1), and from his later Reformed
Epistemology, it is unnecessary since belief in God can be properly
basic. Richard Gale contends, in Kantian fashion, that since the
conclusion of all versions of the cosmological argument invokes an
impossibility, no cosmological arguments can provide examples of sound
reasoning (1991: chap. 7). (However, Gale seems to have changed his
mind and in recent writings proposed and defended his own version of
the cosmological argument, which we will consider below.) Similarly,
Michael Martin (1990: chap. 4), John Mackie (1982: chap. 5), Quentin
Smith (Craig and Smith 1993), Bede Rundle (2004), Wes Morriston (2000,
2002a, 2003, 2010), and Graham Oppy (2006: chap. 3), among numerous
others, reason that no current version of the cosmological argument is
sound or provides probabilistic evidence. Yet dissenting voices can be
heard. Robert Koons (1997) employs mereology and modal and
nonmonotonic logic in taking a "new look" at the argument
from contingency. In his widely discussed writings William Lane Craig
marshals multidisciplinary evidence for the truth of the premises
found in the *kalam* argument. Richard Gale and Alexander
Pruss propose a version based on a so-called weak principle of
sufficient reason that leads to a finite God that is not
omnibenevolent, while Michael Almeida constructs a version of the
argument based on modal realism and a strong principle of sufficient
reason. Richard Swinburne, though rejecting deductive versions of the
cosmological argument, proposes an inductive argument that is part of
a larger cumulative case for God's existence. 



> 
> 
> There is quite a chance that if there is a God he will make something
> of the finitude and complexity of a universe. It is very unlikely that
> a universe would exist uncaused, but rather more likely that God would
> exist uncaused. The existence of the universe...can be made
> comprehensible if we suppose that it is brought about by God.
> (Swinburne 1979: 131-32) 
> 
> 
> 



In short, in contrast to the first half of the last century,
contemporary philosophers contribute increasingly detailed, complex,
and sophisticated arguments on both sides of the debate, some
connected to natural theology, many others unconnected but important
for their philosophically complex and subtle reasoning.


## 2. Typology of Cosmological Arguments



Philosophers employ diverse classifications of the cosmological
arguments. Swinburne distinguishes inductive from deductive versions.
Craig distinguishes three types of deductive cosmological arguments in
terms of their approach to an infinite regress of causes. The first,
advocated by Aquinas, is based on the impossibility of an essentially
ordered infinite regress. The second, which Craig terms the
*kalam* argument, holds that an infinite temporal regress
of causes is impossible because an actual infinite is impossible, and
even if it were possible it could not be temporally realized. The
third, espoused by Leibniz and Clarke, is overtly founded on the
Principle of Sufficient Reason (Craig 1980: 282-83), although it
appears that all versions use some form of that principle. Craig notes
that the distinction between these types of arguments is important
because the objections raised against one version may be irrelevant to
other versions. So, for example, a critique of a particular version of
the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), which one finds developed by
William Rowe or Richard Gale, might not be telling against the
Thomistic or *kalam* versions of the argument. Another way
of distinguishing between versions of the argument is in terms of the
relevance of time to the argument. In Aquinas's version,
consideration of the essential ordering of the causes or reasons
proceeds independent of temporal concerns. The relationship between
cause and effect is treated as real but not temporal, so that the
first cause is not a first cause in time but a sustaining cause
(Siniscalchi 2018: 691). In the *kalam* version, however,
the temporal ordering of the causal sequence is central, introducing
issues of the nature of time into the discussion.


## 3. Complexity of the Question



It is said that philosophy begins in wonder. Thus it was for the
pre-Socratic Greeks, who wondered what constituted the basic stuff of
the world (kosmos) around them,
how this basic stuff changed into the diverse forms they experienced,
and how it came to be. These origination questions related to the
puzzle of existence that, in its metaphysical dimensions, is the
subject of our concern.



First, why is there anything at all? This question becomes clearer
when put in contrastive form, Why is there something rather than
nothing? We can ask this question even in the absence of contingent
beings, though in this context it is likely to prove unanswerable. For
example, if God or the universe is logically or absolutely necessary,
it would not only exist but must exist even if nothing else existed.
Probably no reason can be given for why logically or absolutely
necessary things exist, if they do at all. (Almeida disagrees; see his
argument below.)



Some doubt whether we can ask this question because there being
nothing is not an option. John Heil asks, "What exactly is
*nothing at all*? What would nothing *be*?" (Heil
2013: 174). He analogizes nothing with the notion of empty space, in
terms of which, he thinks, we can conceptualize nothing. He reasons
that we cannot achieve a notion of empty space simply by removing the
universe's contents one at a time, for space (the void) would
still exist. However, we need not analogize nothing in terms of empty
space, and even if we do, we surely can conceive of removing space. If
we think of space as a particular type of relation between objects,
the removal of all objects (everything) would leave nothing, including
relations. The key point is that "leaving nothing" is not
to be understood in the sense that nothing is or has existence. We can
easily be misled by the language of there *being* nothing at
all, leading to the notion that nothing has being or existence. Heil
suggests that nothing might be a precursor to the Big Bang. However,
this too is a misconception--though one widely held by those who
think that the universe arose out of nothing, e.g., a vacuum
fluctuation. A vacuum fluctuation is itself not nothing "but is
a sea of fluctuating energy endowed with a rich structure and subject
to physical laws" (Craig and Sinclair 2009: 183, 191). The
contrastive question is comprehensible: "Why is there something
rather than there never having been anything whatsoever?"



Rutten (2012, 13-15, see Other Internet Resources) develops an
*a priori* *reductio ad absurdum* argument for the
impossibility of there being nothing. Suppose nothing exists. If
nothing exists, then no actual states of affairs exist, and if no
actual states of affairs exist, no merely possible states of affairs
exist, since (on an Aristotelean model) there is nothing to actualize
them or bring them about. Hence, if nothing exists, there are no
possible states of affairs, since to be possible, something must
either be actual or merely possible. (This is consistent with the
theists' contention that out of nothing nothing can come.)
However, one can conceive of a possible world with at least one actual
and hence possible state of affairs *S*, for example, a world
with one atom. But, Rutten notes, on the S5 axiom system of modal
logic (see the entry on
 modal logic),
 all possible worlds are connected. Hence, if *S* is
metaphysically possible in one world, *S* is metaphysically
possible in all possible worlds. That is, *S* is necessarily
possible. However, this contradicts the original conclusion that if
total nothingness is metaphysically possible, there are no possible
states of affairs in that possible world. Hence, there is a
*reductio* against the original thesis that there can be
nothingness. One might counter this reductio not only by questioning
the principle that what is metaphysically possible in one world is so
in every world, but also by contending that the argument trades on a
confusion between metaphysical necessity, as evidenced by appeal to an
Aristotelian principle regarding the relationship between actuality
and possibility, with logical necessity, which in invoking the S5
modal system addresses logical possibility across possible worlds (for
this distinction, see Burgess 1999, 81). 



Second, why are there *these* particular contingent beings? The
starting point here is the existence of particular things, and the
question posed asks for an explanation for there being these
particular things. If we are looking for a causal explanation and
accept a *full* explanation (in terms of contemporary or
immediately prior causal conditions and the relevant natural laws that
together necessitate the effect), the answer emerges from an analysis
of the relevant immediate causal conditions present in each case. Hume
argues that an explanation in terms of temporally conjoined factors is
all that is necessary for a satisfactory explanation. In contrast,
O'Connor treats this formulation of the question as the basis
for his construction of a cosmological argument for the existence of
an absolutely necessary being (2008: 65). 



Heil suggests that the answer depends on how one understands the Big
Bang (2013: 178). If it was spontaneous, the question has no answer.
If not spontaneous, there might be an answer. Theists broaden the
explanatory search to include final causes or intentions appropriate
to a personal cause. It leads us to ask the question, "Supposing
that God exists, why did God bring about contingent beings?"
This assumes that God exists and now inquires about the reasons for
creation. On the one hand, we might argue that this question is
unanswerable in that only God would know his reasons for bringing the
universe into existence (O'Connor 2008). On the other hand, God
acts out of his nature; Swinburne (2004: 47, 114-23) emphasizes
God's goodness, from which we can infer possible reasons for
what God brings about (although at this point the problem of evil has
bite). God also acts from his intentions (Swinburne 1993:
139-45; 2007: 83-84), so that God could reveal his
purposes for his act of creating (Richard Swinburne, *The Evolution
of the Soul*: 309).



Third, why do things continue to exist? This is the question that
Thomas Aquinas posed. Aquinas was interested not in a beginning cause
but in a sustaining cause, for he believed that the universe could be
eternal--although he believed on the basis of revelation that it
was not eternal. He constructed his cosmological arguments around the
question of what sustains things in the universe in their
existence.



Fourth, if the universe has a beginning, what is the cause of that
beginning? This is the question that is addressed by the
*kalam* cosmological argument, given its central premise
that everything that begins to exist has a cause. Many, however, deny
the antecedent in the conditional, that the universe had a
beginning.



Fifth and fundamentally, why are there contingent beings? This may be
asked about particular finite beings and, if the universe is
contingent, the universe. Several responses have been given. One is
that particular things exist because of their causes, and their causes
because of their causes, and so on. Had those causes not existed, the
effect in question would not exist. If one speaks about the universe,
then either it exists because it is caused (e.g., brought about by the
intentional act of a supernatural being) or it is inexplicable (the
universe just exists; its existence is a brute fact; it has always
existed, though perhaps through many phases). This is the question
that traditional cosmological arguments connected to natural theology
address.



Two things should be obvious from this discussion. First, questions
about existence are more nuanced than usually addressed (Heil 2013:
177). It is important to be more precise about what one is asking when
one asks this broader metaphysical question about why there is
something rather than nothing. Second, the cosmological argument lies
at the heart of attempts to answer the questions, and to this we now
turn.


## 4. Argument for a Non-contingent Cause



Thomas Aquinas held that among the things whose existence needs
explanation are contingent beings that depend for their existence upon
other beings. Richard Taylor (1992: 84-94) discusses the
argument in terms of the world ("everything that ever does
exist, except God, in case there is a god", 1992: 87) being
contingent and thus needing explanation. Arguing that the term
"universe" refers to an abstract entity or set, William
Rowe rephrases the issue, "Why does that set (the universe) have
the members that it does rather than some other members or none at
all?" (Rowe 1975: 136). Put broadly, "Why is there
anything at all?" (Smart, in Smart and Haldane, 1996: 35; Rundle
2004). The response of defenders of the cosmological argument is that
what is contingent exists because of some action of a necessary
being.


### 4.1 A Deductive Argument from Contingency



As an *a posteriori* argument, the cosmological argument begins
with a fact known by experience, namely, that something contingent
exists. We might sketch out a version of the argument as follows.


1. A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it
could have not-existed) exists.
2. All contingent beings have a sufficient cause of or
fully adequate explanation for their existence.
3. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation
for the existence of contingent beings is something other than the
contingent being itself.
4. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation
for the existence of contingent beings must either be solely other
contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide a sufficient
cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent
beings.
6. Therefore, what sufficiently causes or fully
adequately explains the existence of contingent beings must include a
non-contingent (necessary) being.
7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it
exists, it cannot not-exist) exists.
8. The universe, which is composed of only contingent
beings, is contingent.
9. Therefore, the necessary being is something other than
the universe. (For a Thomistic version of this argument, see
Siniscalchi 2018: 690-93).



In the argument, steps 1-7 establish the existence of a
necessary or non-contingent being; steps 8-9 attempt in some way
to identify it.



Over the centuries philosophers have suggested various instantiations
for the contingent being noted in
 premise 1.
 In his *Summa Theologica* (I,q.2,a.3), Aquinas argued that we
need a causal explanation for things in motion, things that are
caused, and contingent
 beings.[1]
 Others, such as Richard Swinburne (2004), propose that the contingent
being referred to in premise 1 is the universe. The connection between
the two is supplied by John Duns Scotus, who argued that even if the
essentially ordered causes were infinite, "the whole series of
effects would be dependent upon some prior cause" (Scotus [c.
1300] 1964: I,D.2,p.1,q.1,SS53). Richard Gale (1999) calls this
the "Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact". Whereas the
contingency of particular existents is generally undisputed, not the
least because of our mortality, the contingency of the universe
deserves serious defense (see
 section 4.2).
 Premise 2 invokes a moderate version of the Principle of Causation,
according to which there must be a sufficient cause for any contingent
being or event, or of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, according to
which there must be a fully adequate explanation for any contingent
being or event. Applied here, the Principles of Causation or of
Sufficient Reason support the contention that if something is
contingent, there must be a sufficient cause of its existence or a
fully adequate reason or explanation why it exists rather than not
exists. The point of
 premise 3
 is simply that something cannot cause or explain its own existence,
for this would require it to already exist (in a logical if not in a
temporal sense).
 Premise 4
 is true by virtue of the Principle of Excluded Middle: what explains
the existence of the contingent being either are solely other
contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
 Conclusions 6
 and
 7
 follow validly from the respective premises.



For many critics,
 premise 5
 (along with
 premise 2)
 holds the key to the argument's success or failure. The truth
of 5 depends upon the requirements for an adequate explanation. Using
the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), what is required here is an
account in terms of sufficient conditions that provides an adequate
explanation why the cause had the effect it did, or alternatively, why
this particular effect and not another arose. Swinburne (2004:
75-79), and Alexander Pruss (2006: 16-18) after him, note
diverse kinds of explanations. In a *full* explanation the
causal factors--in scientific causation, contemporary or
immediately precedent causal conditions and natural laws; in personal
causation, persons and their intentions-- are sufficient for the
occurrence of an event. They "together necessitate the
occurrence of the effect" (Swinburne 2004: 76). 



> 
> 
> It does not allow a puzzling aspect of the explanandum to disappear:
> anything puzzling in the explanandum is either also found in the
> explanans or else explained by the explanans. (Pruss 2006: 17) 
> 
> 
> 



It suffices to explain why something comes about given the immediately
present causal conditions but leaves unexplained why those explanatory
causal conditions and/or reasons themselves hold.



In a *complete* explanation, every aspect of the explanandum
and explanans at the time of the occurrence is accounted for; nothing
puzzling remains. 



> 
> A complete explanation of the occurrence of *E* is a full
> explanation of its occurrence in which all the factors cited are such
> that there is no [further] explanation (either full or partial) of
> their existence of operation in terms of factors operative at the time
> of their existence or operation. (Swinburne 2004: 78)
> 



Pruss and Swinburne argue that the kind of explanation required by the
PSR is a complete explanation.



Quinn argues that an adequate explanation need not require a complete
explanation (2005: 584-85); a partial explanation might do just
as well, depending on the context. Among these adequate explanations
of why this actual world obtains rather than another possible world
(including one with no contingent beings) is that the universe is an
inexplicable brute fact or that God strongly actualized the world
(although not everything in it). He refuses to take sides on the
debate between explanations, except to say that science cannot provide
an adequate explanation if the explanatory chain is infinite, for the
chain of causes is itself contingent or it ends in an initial
contingency not scientifically accountable. However, not only does
Quinn not clarify what constitutes an adequate explanation, but as
Pruss contends, the PSR "is not compatible with an infinite
chain of explanations that has no ultimate explanans" (2006:
17), for in an infinite chain something puzzling remains to be
explained, with the result that the PSR would again be invoked to
explain what is puzzling. However, as we will question below, is the
brute fact of the universe any more unacceptable as a complete
explanation than the brute fact of a necessary being (God)?



One worry with understanding the PSR in this way is that it may lead
to a deterministic account that not only may bode ill for the success
of the argument but on a libertarian account may be incompatible with
the contention that God created freely. Pruss, however, envisions no
such difficulty, for giving reasons neither makes the event
deterministic nor removes freedom. 



> 
> 
> What gives sufficiency to explanation is that mystery is taken away,
> for example, through the citing of relevant reasons, not that
> probability is increased.... Once we have said that \(x\) freely chose
> \(A\) for \(R\), then the only thing left that is unexplained is why
> \(x\) existed and was both free and attracted by \(R\). (Pruss 2006:
> 157,158) 
> 
> 
> 



One might reply that an explanation needs to be given for why \(x\)
was attracted to \(R\_1\) rather than to \(R\_2\), and that if that
explanation is given, \(x\)'s choice is not free but determined
by the degree to which \(x\) is attracted to different reasons.
However, Pruss might respond that being "attracted by" is
not to be understood in any deterministic sense. One might freely
consider an option to be the best without being necessitated to choose
it. The debate hinges on how one understands how reasons function in
human agency. 



Finally, some (disputedly, see below) argue that explanations must be
either natural (impersonal) or non-natural (personal).
 8
 &
 9
 assert that if the contingent being identified in
 1
 is the universe, given that the universe encompasses all natural
existents and the laws and principles governing them, the explanation
must be in terms of a non-natural, eternal, necessary being that
provides an intentional, personal, ultimate explanation. Since the
argument proceeds independent of temporal considerations, the argument
does not necessarily propose a first cause in time, but allows for a
first or primary sustaining cause of the universe. As Aquinas noted,
the philosophical arguments for God's existence as first cause
are compatible with the eternity of the universe (*On the Eternity
of the World*), although he rejects the latter based on divine
revelation.



Whether 8 and 9 are an intrinsic part of the cosmological argument is
debated. Kant argued that the argument had two parts, the first
establishing the existence of an absolutely necessary being; the
second part, identifying this being as the most real being (1787,
B633-40). Without the second part, the concept of a necessary
being was empty. The issue achieves significance when the question
arises whether the argument has religious significance, that is,
whether necessary being to which the argument concludes is God. Some
contend that from the concept of a necessary being flow properties
appropriate to a divine being (Siniscalchi 2018, 693). Timothy
O'Connor (2004) argues that being a necessary being cannot be a
derivative emergent property, otherwise the being would be contingent.
Likewise, the connection between the essential properties must be
necessary. Hence, the universe cannot be the necessary being since it
is mereologically complex. Similarly, the myriad elementary particles
cannot be necessary beings either, for their distinguishing
distributions are externally caused and hence contingent. Rather, he
contends that a more viable account of the necessary being is as a
purposive agent with desires, intentions, and beliefs, whose activity
is guided but not determined by its goals, a view consistent with
identifying the necessary being as God. Koons (as are Craig and
Sinclair 2009: 192-94) is willing to identify the necessary
being as God. He identifies seven corollaries regarding God's
nature that follow from his mereological construction of the
cosmological argument (e.g., God as the necessary being is not a mere
aggregate or composite; has its basic attributes by necessity; is not
essentially located in space or time; etc. (1997). Oppy (1999,
381-84), on the other hand, in critiquing Koons's
presentation "of seven corollaries to his (cosmological) proof
which are intended to establish that the First Cause has at least some
of the attributes which are traditionally attributed to God,"
expresses significant skepticism about Koons's arguments and the
possibility of such a deductive move to determine its properties.



Critics have objected to key premises in the argument. We will
consider the most important objections and responses.


### 4.2 Objection 1: The Universe Just Is



Interpreting the contingent being in
 premise 1
 as the universe, Bertrand Russell denies that the universe needs an
explanation
 (premise 2);
 it just is. Russell, following Hume (1779), contends that since we
derive the concept of cause from our observation of particular things,
we cannot ask about the cause of something like the universe that we
cannot experience. The universe needs no explanation; it is
"just there, and that's all" (Russell 1948 [1964]:
175). This view was reiterated by Hawking (1987: 651).



Swinburne replies that 



> 
> 
> uniqueness is relative to description. Every physical object is unique
> under some description,... yet all objects within the universe
> are characterized by certain properties, which are common to more than
> one object.... The objection fails to make any crucial
> distinction between the universe and other objects; and so it fails in
> its attempt to prevent at the outset a rational inquiry into the issue
> of whether the universe has some origin outside itself. (Swinburne
> 2004: 134-35) 
> 
> 
> 



We do not need to experience every possible referent of the class of
contingent things to be able to conclude that a contingent thing needs
a cause. "To know that a rubber ball dropped on a Tuesday in
Waggener Hall by a redheaded tuba player will fall to the
ground", I do not need a sample that includes tuba players
dropping rubber balls at this location (Koons 1997: 202).



Morriston (2002a: 235) responds that although it is true that we do
not need to experience every instance to derive a general principle,
the universe is a very different thing from what we experientially
reference when we say that things cannot come into existence without a
cause. Tuba players are not "anything remotely analogous to the
'initial singularity' that figures in the Big Bang theory
of the origin of the universe".



Defenders of the argument respond that there is a key similarity
between the cosmos and its content, namely, both are contingent.
However, why should we think that the cosmos is contingent? Defenders
of the view contend that if the components of the universe are
contingent, the universe itself is contingent. Russell replies that
the move from the contingency of the components of the universe to the
contingency of the universe commits the Fallacy of Composition, which
mistakenly concludes that since the parts have a certain property, the
whole likewise has that property. Hence, whereas we legitimately can
ask for the cause of particular things, to require a cause of the
universe based on the contingency of its parts is mistaken.



Russell correctly notes that arguments of the part-whole type can
commit the Fallacy of Composition. For example, the argument that
since all the bricks in the wall are small, the wall is small, is
fallacious. Yet it is an informal fallacy of content, not a formal
fallacy. Sometimes the totality has the same quality as the parts
because of the nature of the parts invoked--the wall is brick
(composed of baked clay) because it is built of bricks (composed of
baked clay). The universe's contingency, theists argue,
resembles the second case. If all the contingent things in the
universe, including matter and energy, ceased to exist simultaneously,
the universe itself, as the totality of these things, would cease to
exist. However, if the universe can cease to exist, it is contingent
and requires an explanation for its existence (Reichenbach 1972: chap.
5).



It is worth noting that on the one hand, "universe" can
refer to what is spatio-temporally connected to us. On the other hand,
"universe" can refer to the totality of contingent beings
(Oppy 1999: 384). This argument for the contingency of the universe
from its component, contingent parts coalesces these two
understandings in the cosmological argument. 



Whether this argument for the contingency of the universe is similar
to that advanced by Aquinas in his Third Way depends on how one
interprets Aquinas's argument. Aquinas holds that "if
everything can not-be, then at one time there was nothing in
existence" (*ST* I,q.2,a.3). William Rowe (1975:
160-67) argues that what looks like a similar argument in Samuel
Clarke for the contingency of the universe is fallacious, for even if
every contingent being were to fail to exist in some possible world,
it may be the case that there is no possible world that lacks a
contingent being (on Aquinas, see Plantinga 1967: 5-6; Kenny
1969: 56-66). That is, although no being would exist in every
possible world, every possible world could possess at least one
contingent being. In such a case, although each being is contingent,
something must exist. Rowe gives the example of a horse race. 



> 
> 
> We know that although no horse in a given horse race necessarily will
> be the winner, it is, nevertheless, necessary that some horse in the
> race will be the winner. (1975: 164)
> 
> 
> 



Rowe's example will work only if it is necessary that some horse
will finish the race, for otherwise it is possible that all the horses
break a leg and none finishes the race--a condition he notes in
that "it is necessary that there exists at least one member of
the collection". So why should we think that something must
exist, even if it is contingent? Rowe does not say why, but one
argument given in defense of this thesis is that the existence of one
contingent being may be necessary for the nonexistence of some other
contingent being. However, although the fact that something's
existence is necessary for the non-existence of something else holds
for certain relational properties (for example, the existence of a
spouse is necessary for a man not to be a bachelor), it is doubtful
that something's existence is necessary for the non-existence of
something else *per se*, which is what is needed to support the
argument that denies the contingency of the universe.



Haldane (Smart and Haldane 1996: 132) defends the cogency of
Aquinas's reasoning on the grounds that Aquinas's argument
is fallacious only on a temporal reading, but Aquinas's argument
employs an atemporal ordering of contingent beings. That is, Aquinas
does not hold that over time there would be nothing, but that in the
per se ordering of causes, if every contingent thing in that order did
not exist, there would be nothing.



Rowe (1975: 166) develops a different argument to support the thesis
that the universe must be contingent. He argues that it is necessary
that if God exists, then it is possible that no dependent beings
exist. Since it is possible that God exists, it is possible that it is
possible that no dependent beings exist. (This conclusion is licensed
by the modal principle: If it is necessary that if \(p\) then \(q\),
then if it is possible that \(p\), it is possible that \(q\).) Hence,
it is possible that there are no dependent beings; that is, that the
universe is contingent. Rowe takes the conditional as necessarily true
in virtue of the classical concept of God, according to which God is
free to decide whether or not to create dependent beings.



To avoid any hint of the Fallacy of Composition and to avoid its
complications, Koons (1997: 198-99) formulates the argument for
the contingency of the universe as a mereological argument. If
something is contingent, it contains a contingent part. The whole and
part overlap and, by virtue of overlapping, have a common part. Since
the part in virtue of which they overlap is wholly contingent, the
whole likewise must be contingent.



One might approach Russell's thesis regarding the brute fact of
the universe from a different direction. If theists are willing to
accept the existence of God as the necessary being as a brute fact,
why cannot nontheists accept the existence of the universe as a brute
fact, as a necessary being? Bede Rundle, for example, argues that what
has necessary existence is causally independent. Matter has necessary
existence, for although it undergoes change as manifested in
particular bits of matter, the given volume of matter found in the
universe persists, and as persisting matter/energy does not have or
need a cause. This accords with the Principle of Conservation of
Mass-Energy, according to which matter and energy are never lost but
rather transmute into each other. As indestructible, matter/energy is
the necessary being. Consequently, although the material components of
the universe are contingent *vis-a-vis* their form, they
are necessary *vis-a-vis* their existence. On this
reading, there is not one but there are many necessary beings, all
internal to the universe. Their particular configurations are
contingent, but since matter/energy is conserved it cannot be created
or lost.



Interestingly enough, this approach was anticipated by Aquinas in his
third way in his *Summa Theologica* (I,q.2,a.3). Once Aquinas
concludes that necessary beings exist, he then goes on to ask whether
these beings have their existence from themselves or from another. If
from another, then we have an unsatisfactory infinite regress of
explanations. Hence, there must be something whose necessity is
uncaused. As Kenny points out, Aquinas understands this necessity in
terms of being unable to cease to exist (Kenny 1969: 48). Although
Aquinas understands the uncaused necessary being to be God, Rundle
takes this to be matter/energy itself.



One question that arises with Rundle's view is whether there
could have been more or less matter/energy than there is. That is, if
there is \(n\) amount of matter/energy in the world, could there be a
possible world with \(+n\) or \(-n\) amounts of matter/energy? We do
not know how much matter/energy existed in the first \(10^{-35}\)
seconds of the universe. Even if the universe currently operates
according to the principle of the Conservation of Matter and Energy,
Rundle's thesis depends on the contention that during the very
early phase of rapid expansion, a period of time we know little about,
this principle held. A second significant problem concerns what
follows from the existence of necessary beings. If the matter/energy
nexus constitutes the necessary being, what causally follows from that
nexus is itself necessary, and contingency, even in the composing
relations within the universe, would disappear. Everything in the
universe would be necessary, which is a disquieting position. Third,
O'Connor (2004) argues that since the necessary being provides
the ultimate explanation, there is no explanation of the
differentiation of the kinds of matter or of contingencies that
matter/energy causally undergo, for example, in terms of space-time
location. We will return to the question of the contingency of the
universe below.


### 4.3 Objection 2: Explaining the Individual Constituents Is Sufficient



Whereas Russell argued that the universe just is, David Hume held that
when the parts are explained the whole is explained.



> 
> 
> But the *whole*, you say, wants a cause. I answer that the
> uniting of these parts into a whole...is performed merely by an
> arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of
> things. Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a
> collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very
> unreasonable should you afterwards ask me what was the cause of the
> whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the parts.
> (Hume 1779: part 9)
> 
> 
> 



Hume contends that uniting the parts or individual constituents into a
whole is a mental act. In reality, all that exist are individual,
causally-related events, not whole sets of events. When we have
provided an account of each of these individual, causally-related
events we have explained the whole. We don't need anything
more.



Rowe objects to what he terms the Hume-Edwards principle--that by
explaining the parts we have explained the whole:



> 
> 
> When the existence of each member of a collection is explained by
> reference to some other member *of that very same collection*,
> then it does not follow that the collection itself has an explanation.
> For it is one thing for there to be an explanation of the existence of
> each dependent being and quite another thing for there to be an
> explanation of why there are dependent beings at all. (Rowe 1975:
> 264)
> 
> 
> 



Pruss (1999) expands on Rowe's argument. An explanation of the
parts may provide a partial but not a complete explanation. The
explanation in terms of parts may fail to explain why these parts
exist rather than others, why they exist rather than not, or why the
parts are arranged as they are. Each member or part will be explained
either in terms of itself or in terms of something else that is
contingent. The former would make them necessary, not contingent,
beings. If they are explained in terms of something else, they still
remain unaccounted for, since the explanation would invoke either an
infinite regress of causes or a circular explanation. Pruss employs
the chicken/egg sequence: chickens account for eggs, which account for
chickens, and so on where the two are paired. However, appealing to an
infinite chicken/egg regress or else arguing in a circle explains
neither any given chicken nor egg.



Richard Swinburne notes that an explanation is complete when
"any attempt to go beyond the factors which we have would result
in no gain of explanatory power or prior probability" (2004:
89). However, explaining why something exists rather than something
else or than nothing and why it is as it is gives additional
explanatory power in explaining why a universe exists at all. Gale
(1991: 257-58) concludes that if we are to explain the parts of
the universe and their specific concatenation, we must appeal to
something other than those parts.


### 4.4 Objection 3: The Principles of Causation and Sufficient Reason Are Suspect



Critics of the cosmological argument contend that the Causal Principle
or, where applicable, the broader Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
that underlies versions of the argument, is suspect. As Hume argued,
there is no reason for thinking that the Causal Principle is true
*a priori*, for we can conceive of events occurring without
conceiving of their being caused, and what is conceivable is possible
in reality (1748: IV). Neither can an argument for the application of
the Causal Principle to the universe be drawn from inductive
experience. Even if the Causal Principle applies to events in the
world, we cannot extrapolate from the way the world works to the world
as a whole (Mackie 1982: 85; Kant 1787: B638).



Several replies are in order. First, Hume's conceivability to
possibility argument is unsound. For one thing, whose conceivability
is being appealed to here? For another, someone who fails to
understand a necessarily true proposition might conceive of it being
false, but from this it does not follow that it possibly is false. A
person might think (wrongly) that *pi* is a determinate number,
but it does not follow that it is so. In the phenomenology of
conceivability, what is really conceivable is difficult if not
impossible to differentiate from what some might think is conceivable.
And even if something is conceivable, say in a logical sense, it does
not follow that it is metaphysically or factually possible. One might
conceive that, since heads can be distinguished from tails on a coin,
they can actually be separated, but metaphysically such is impossible.
What is distinguishable is not necessarily separable. Hume, it seems,
confuses epistemic with ontological conditions. Hence, the argument
based on conceivability is suspect (Reichenbach 1972:
57-60).



Second, some suggest a pragmatic-type argument to show that the Causal
and Sufficient Reason principles are true, namely that the principles
are necessary to make the universe intelligible. Without such
principles, Pruss argues, science itself would be undercut.
"Claiming to be a brute fact should be a last resort. It would
undercut the practice of science" (Pruss 2006: 255). Utilization
of the principles best accounts for the success of science, indeed,
for any investigatory endeavor (Koons 1997; see also Koons 2008:
111-12, where he argues that it is "a subjectively
required presumption needed for immunity to internal
defeaters"). The best explanation of the success of science and
other such rational endeavors is that the principles really indicate
how reality operates.



Critics reply that the principles then only have methodological or
practical and not ontological justification. As John Mackie argues, we
have no right to assume that the universe complies with our
intellectual preferences for causal order. We can simply work with
brute facts; beginning with them, science would work just as well.



Pruss goes further to suggest that the PSR in particular is
"self-evident, obvious, intuitively clear, in no need of
argumentative support" (2006: 189). For example, he holds that
the Principle of Sufficient Reason--"necessarily, every
contingently true proposition has an explanation" (he defers on
whether the principle also applies to necessarily true
propositions)--is self-evident in the sense that anyone who
understands it correctly understands that it is true. These persons
might not know it to be self-evidently true, but they do understand it
to be true. This is consistent with other persons denying it is
self-evident, for those who deny it might misunderstand the principle
in various ways. 



The problem with the claim of self-evidence is that it is a
conversation ender, not a starter. One who denies its self-evidence
might think that those who hold to the principle are the ones who
experience conceptual blindness. In contrast to analyticity,
self-evidence holds in relation to the knowers themselves, and here
intuitions vary, perhaps according to philosophical or other types of
perspectives. Furthermore, if the principle truly is self-evident, it
would be strange to respond to skeptics by attempting to give reasons
to support that contention, and were such demanded, the request would
itself invoke the very principle in question.



Pruss responds that being self-evident is not incompatible with
providing arguments for self-evident propositions, and he thinks that
arguments can show the truth of the PSR to those who deny its
self-evidence. Among the numerous arguments he advances is a modal
argument employing a Weak Principle of Sufficient Reason, according to
which "every contingent proposition possibly has a complete
explanation" (Pruss 2006: 234-35). We will develop this in
 section 6.



Peter van Inwagen (1983: 202-04) argues that the PSR must be
rejected. If the PSR is true, every contingent proposition has an
explanation. Suppose *P* is the conjunction of all contingent
true propositions. Suppose also that there is a state of affairs
*S* that provides a sufficient reason for *P*. *S*
cannot itself be contingent, for then it would be a conjunct of
*P* and entailed by *P*, and as both entailing and entailed
by *P* would be *P*, so that it would be its own sufficient
reason. However, no contingent proposition can explain itself. Neither
can *S* be necessary, for from necessary propositions only
necessary propositions follow. Necessary propositions cannot explain
contingent propositions, for if *x* sufficiently explains
*y*, then *x* entails *y*, and if *x* is necessary
so is *y*. *S* cannot be either contingent or necessary, and
hence the PSR is false. Thus, if the cosmological argument appeals to
the PSR to establish the existence of a necessary being whose
existence is expressed by a necessary proposition as an explanation
for contingent beings, it fails in that it cannot account for the
contingent beings it purportedly explains. 



However, as Pruss notes (2006: chaps. 6 & 7), "The word
*sufficient* can be read in two different ways: the reason
given can be *logically* sufficient for the explanandum, or it
can *sufficiently* explain the explanandum (2006: 103)."
According to Pruss, we need not hold to the strong claim of logical
sufficiency about the relation between explaining and entailment in
cases where the explanation is brought about by libertarian free
agency. Although God is a necessary being, his connection with the
world is through his free agency, and free actions explain but do not
entail the existence of particular contingent states.



Clearly, the soundness of the deductive version of the cosmological
argument hinges on whether principles like that of Causation or
Sufficient Reason are more than methodologically true and on the
extent to which these principles can be applied to things, events, and
facts. Critics of the argument will be skeptical regarding the
universal application of the principles; defenders of the argument
generally not so, at least as limited to contingencies. Perhaps the
best one can say, with Taylor, is that even those who critique the PSR
(understood broadly that every contingent thing, event, or fact must
have a sufficient cause, reason, or ground) invoke it when they
suggest that defenders of the principle have failed to provide a
sufficient reason for thinking it is true. 



> 
> 
> The principle of sufficient reason can be illustrated in various
> ways,...but it cannot be proved.... If one were to try
> proving it, he would sooner or later have to appeal to considerations
> that are less plausible than the principle itself. Indeed, it is hard
> to see how one could even make an argument for it without already
> assuming it. For this reason it might properly be called a
> presupposition of reason itself. (Taylor 1992: 87) 
> 
> 
> 



 It might be denied that the request for a sufficient
reason for the truth of principle itself invokes the PSR on the
grounds that "reason" has two senses, explanation and
evidence. However, in requesting and giving a sufficient reason for
the truth of the principle, the explanation of why it is true should
provide sufficient evidence to support the claim. (See the
introduction to the entry
 Principle of Sufficient Reason).




Finally, critics have argued that an argument for the application of
the Causal Principle to the universe cannot be drawn from inductive
experience. Even if the Causal Principle applies to events in the
world, we cannot extrapolate from the way the world works to the world
as a whole (Mackie 1982: 85). The type of causation we experience in
the empirical world is different from the kind of causation proposed
to hold between a necessary being and the cosmos (Kant 1787:
B638).



We will return to the Principle of Causation below with respect to the
*kalam* argument.


### 4.5 Objection 4: Problems with the Concept of a Necessary Being



Kant argued that the cosmological argument introduced an empirical
premise to evade the difficulties of the ontological argument.
Although in the ontological argument the perfect being is allegedly
determined to exist through its own concept, in fact nothing can be
determined to exist in this manner; one has to begin with existence
(see entry on
 Ontological Arguments).
 The cosmological argument, on the other hand, proceeds from an
empirical premise about my existence to the existence of an
unconditioned, absolutely necessary being, a being whose nonexistence
is "impossible", "absolutely inconceivable"
(1787: B621). This concept has the same status as geometrical
concepts, which though necessary do not establish the existence of
anything corresponding to the concept. So, when we think of an
absolutely necessary being, are we thinking about anything at all?
What this absolutely necessary being is, what properties it has, can
be determined not through experience but only through reason, that is,
from a priori concepts alone. Since the only concept that suffices to
determine its properties is that of a most real being, the concept of
an absolutely necessary being presupposes that concept. However, that
the most real being necessarily exists is the burden of the
ontological argument. Hence, the CA depends on the ontological
argument to determine the absolutely necessary being. But since the
ontological argument is defective for the above and other reasons, the
cosmological argument that depends on or invokes it likewise must be
defective (1787: B634; for an alternative interpretation of
Kant's argument see Proops 2014).



Kant's contention that the necessity found in "necessary
being" is logical necessity was common up through the 1960s.
J.J.C. Smart wrote,



> 
> 
> And by "a necessary being" the cosmological argument means
> "a *logically* necessary being", i.e., "a
> being whose non-existence is inconceivable in the sort of way that a
> triangle's having four sides is inconceivable"....
> Now since "necessary" is a word which applies primarily to
> propositions, we shall have to interpret "God is a necessary
> being" as "The proposition 'God exists' is
> logically necessary" (1955: 38); in a later work, Smart (Smart
> and Haldane 1996: 41-47) broadened his notion of necessity.)
> 
> 
> 



Many recent discussions of the cosmological argument, both supporting
and critiquing it, interpret the notion of a necessary being as a
being that cannot not exist (O'Connor 2008: 78, 2013: 38). For
example, Gale-Pruss contend that speaking about necessary beings does
not differ from speaking of the necessity of propositions (see
 section 6).
 As such, as Plantinga notes, if a necessary being is possible, it
exists (*God, Freedom and Evil*, 1967: 110). It is a being that
exists in all possible worlds. The only question that remains is
whether God's existence is possible. This notion is similar to,
if not a modernization of, Aquinas's contention that God's
essence is to exist. Aquinas attempts to avoid the accusation that
this invokes the ontological argument on the grounds that we do not
have an adequate concept of God's essence (*ST*
I,q.2,a.1). However, if we understand "necessary being" in
this sense, we can dispose of the cosmological argument as irrelevant;
what is needed rather is an argument to establish that God's
existence understood as logically necessary is possible, for if it is
possible that it is necessary that God exists, then necessarily God
exists (by Axiom S5).



However, this need not be the sense in which "necessary
being" is understood in the cosmological argument. A more
adequate notion of necessary being is that the necessity is
metaphysical or factual (Hick 1960). A necessary being is one that if
it exists, it neither came into existence nor can cease to exist, and
correspondingly, if it does not exist, it cannot come into existence
(Reichenbach 1972: 117-20). If it exists, it eternally maintains
its own existence; it is self-sufficient and self-sustaining. So
understood, the cosmological argument does not rely on notions central
to the ontological argument. Rather, instead of being superfluous, the
cosmological argument, if sound, gives us reason to think that the
necessary being exists rather than not.



Mackie replies that if God has mere metaphysical or factual necessity,
God's existence is logically contingent, such that some reason
is required for God's own existence (Mackie 1982: 84). As
Swinburne notes, God is a logically contingent being, and so could
have not-existed (2004: 79, 148). Why, then, does God exist? The PSR
can be applied to the necessary being.



The theist responds that the PSR does not address logical contingency
but metaphysical contingency. One is not required to find a reason for
what is not metaphysically contingent. It is not that the necessary
being is self-explanatory; rather, a demand for explaining its
existence is inappropriate. Hence, the theist concludes,
Hawking's question "Who created God?" (Hawking 1988:
174) is out of place (Davis 1997). We will return to this discussion
in
 section 9.


## 5. Argument from a Strong Principle of Sufficient Reason



Michael Almeida (2018) builds on the critical arguments of van Inwagen
and others regarding the PSR. He contends that the version of the PSR
used by defenders of the cosmological argument is inadequate because
it fails to provide the best explanation for the universe. The best
explanation, and hence the one required of a sound cosmological
argument, is an absolute explanation, where everything is explained
completely. There are no brute or contingent facts. He notes that in
constructing their respective cosmological arguments, Pruss and
Swinburne reject absolute explanation for complete explanations, where
the effect is explained fully by the cause operating at a given time
but where no explanation of the cause at the time of the occurrence is
required. According to him, traditional defenders of the cosmological
argument cannot invoke the requirement of an absolute explanation
because if they did, given their metaphysic of actualist realism, they
would incur a host of problems. Since all is determined on an absolute
explanation, they would face the problems of the impossibility of
libertarian free will, of indeterministic quantum effects, of modal
imagination about lawless worlds where things pop into existence, and
the collapse of modal distinctions. These problems, he says, arise not
from an absolutist PSR *per se* but from its conjunction with
actualist realism (only the actual is real). 



The way around this, he contends, if one is going to defend the
cosmological argument, is to opt for a different ontology, namely,
genuine modal realism (mere possibilities are also real), which he
claims not only can legitimize the cosmological argument but avoids
the above problems. According to Almeida, modal realism makes
libertarian free will compatible with necessitarianism in that two
possible worlds can have the same history *H* up to time
*t*, but at *t*, *A* occurs in one world and not in
another world. The two histories do not determine whether *A* or
*-A* occurs, but all possibilities necessarily occur. To make
this work Almeida fudges on the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles. Although the two series *H* and *H\** up to
*t* are identical, there is not one series *H* that forks at
*t*. Rather, there are two series, such that at *t* *A*
can occur in one series and *-A* can occur in another. The past
does not necessitate the future. Similarly, lawless or chaotic worlds,
i.e., worlds lacking relations following a causal principle, are
possible, so that it is possible and hence necessary that causeless
events occur. In such a world the cosmological argument would still
hold, he claims, because the principle of sufficient reason,
compatible with the falsity of the causal principle, still holds. This
analysis, he thinks, frees the defender of the cosmological argument
from problems that trouble traditional formulations. 



We cannot digress here into modal realism (for discussion of possible
worlds, see entries on
 Possible Worlds
 and
 David Lewis:
 Modal Metaphysics), but turn specifically to Almeida's
cosmological argument. He argues that whereas cosmological arguments
in the past commenced with an initial premise that was taken to
express a contingent fact known *a posteriori*, "facts
about change, causation, contingency, and objective...becoming
are not usefully characterized as a posteriori facts" (2018: 3).
He advances a cosmological argument with what he takes is an *a
priori* fact: the pluriverse and everything in it, including all
actualia and all possibilia, exist necessarily. This, he claims, is
knowable *a priori* and according to the PSR requires an absolute
explanation. Part of his novel approach is his contention that every
proposition in the argument expresses a necessary fact known *a
priori*, and that *a priori* propositions also require an
explanation.



Since Almeida does not advance a detailed version of the cosmological
argument, we might attempt to reconstruct his view. 


1. "Possible worlds are composite concrete
objects... [that] *necessarily* coexist" (2018: 75).
This is a central contention of his Lewisian modal realism (75).
2. The pluriverse exists as "the collection of all possible
worlds" (7,75).
3. Everything that exists has an absolute explanation for its
existence. Strong PSR
4. "Therefore, there is an absolute explanation for the
pluriverse" (75).
5. An absolute explanation is possible "only if there are no
contingent facts," that is, only if everything exists
necessarily (78-79).
6. Therefore, there are no brute or contingent facts.
7. This absolute explanation is found in the fact that God
necessarily exists (75,82).



The pluriverse is the necessary, creative manifestation of the
necessarily existing God (5). 



Although from necessary propositions contingent propositions cannot
follow, necessary propositions can follow. That is, from God's
necessary existence we can conclude that the pluriverse necessarily
exists. This avoids the van Inwagen objection to the PSR as employed
in the cosmological argument. Almeida holds that it also avoids the
other problems associated with the cosmological argument in that it
allows for contingency within absolute explanation. He contends that
contingency is protected by lowering the standards of similarity
between worlds; that is, contingency is possible where we do not
require exact identity between things held to exist in different
worlds. He gives the example of his speaking Finnish, something he
cannot do in the actual world. If someone who is identical to Almeida
exists in another world, metaphysically he must have identical
properties. However, it makes sense to say that in another possible
world Almeida could speak Finnish and still be Almeida. We lower the
standards of similarity in our everyday consideration of existence in
alternate worlds to allow for such possibilities and hence for the
contingency of his not speaking Finnish in the actual world.



Several objections might be raised against this version of the
cosmological argument. Perhaps most basic is the question why one
would accept modal realism. It is, as Almeida and others note,
"ontologically extravagant". Second, whereas necessity
characterizes the metaphysical world, for Almeida contingency appears
to be a subjective, epistemic contribution. That is, metaphysically,
everything necessarily is what it is, has all its properties
essentially, and is not something else. Epistemically, we can lower
the standards of similarity, so that two things with somewhat
differing essential properties can be named the same, although
strictly or metaphysically speaking, they are not the same. Similarity
is an epistemically expansive concept to allow for contingency, but it
does not allow for metaphysical contingency. Third, he contends that
there are no brute facts on his theory. However, if there must be an
absolute explanation for everything, what is the explanation for
God's existence? He gives God as an absolute explanation for the
necessary existence of the pluriverse, but no absolute sufficient
reason for God's existence. He might reply that God's
existence is explained by being metaphysically necessary. However, if
this explains God's existence, since every component of the
pluriverse and the pluriverse itself necessarily exist, why could not
their metaphysical necessity be a sufficient reason or absolute
explanation for their existence? Could they, like God, simply be
necessary? 


## 6. Argument from a Weak Principle of Sufficient Reason



Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss (1999) advanced a modal version of
the cosmological argument. They reject the strong version of the PSR,
according to which "for every proposition \(p\), if \(p\) is
true, then there is a proposition, \(q\), that explains \(p\)".
In its place they favor using a weak version of the PSR--it is
possible that for every true proposition, there is a proposition,
\(q\), that explains \(p\)--that they believe is less
question-begging and more initially acceptable to critics. They phrase
the argument in terms of contingent and necessary propositions. A
contingent proposition is one that is both possibly true and possibly
false (i.e., true in some worlds and false in others); a necessarily
true proposition is true in every possible world. In its simplest
form, the argument is (1) if it is possible that it is necessary that
a supernatural being of some sort exists, then it is necessary that a
supernatural being of that sort exists. Since (2) it is possible that
it is necessary that a supernatural being of some sort exists, (3) it
is necessary that this being exists. The being that Gale has in mind
is a very powerful and intelligent designer-creator, not the perfect
God of Anselm, for this perfect God who would exist in all possible
worlds would be incompatible with the existence of gratuitous and
horrendous evils to be found in some of those possible worlds.



If one grants modal Axiom S5 (if it is possible that it is necessary
that \(p\), then it is necessary that \(p\)), the critical premise in
the argument is the second, and Gale and Pruss proceed to defend it
using their weak PSR. They begin with the notion of a Big Conjunctive
Fact (BCF), which is the totality of propositions that would be true
of any possible world were it actualized. Since all possible worlds
would have the same necessary propositions, they are differentiated by
their Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF), which would contain
different contingent propositions. Let \(p\) be the BCCF of the actual
world \(W\). Suppose, further, that it is possible that \(p\) has an
explanation, that is, that it is possible that some proposition \(q\)
explains \(p\). As such, there is a possible world \(W\_{1}\) that
contains \(p\), \(q\), and the proposition that \(q\) explains \(p\).
The question now is whether \(W\_{1}\) is the actual world, that is,
whether there is a proposition \(q\) that explains \(p\) in the actual
world. Gale argues that \(W\_{1}\) (which contains \(q\) and the
proposition that \(q\) explains \(p\)) is the actual world, for since
\(W\_{1}\) contains \(p\), there can be no property of \(p\) that is
not found in \(W\_{1}\). Every conjunct of \(p\) will be a conjunct of
\(p\_{1}\) (the BCCF of \(W\_{1}\)) in \(W\_{1}\). Suppose that \(r\) is
a conjunct of \(p\) in \(W\), then not-\(r\) cannot be a conjunct of
\(p\_{1}\) in \(W\_{1}\). Since \(W\) and \(W\_{1}\) have the same
properties, \(W\_{1}\) is the actual world. Therefore, since these
worlds are identical, the actual world contains \(p\), \(q\), and the
proposition that \(q\) explains \(p\). That is, there is something
that explains the BCCF of the actual world. The explanation of the
BCCF cannot be scientific, for such would be in terms of law-like
propositions and statements about the actual world at a given time,
which would be contingent and hence part of the BCCF. Since the only
explanations we can conceive of are personal or scientific, \(q\)
provides a personal explanation of the BCCF in terms of the
intentional action of a necessary being who freely brings it about
that the world exists. \(q\) cannot report the action of a contingent
being, for then the being would be part of \(p\) and explained by
\(q\). However, something cannot explain itself. Hence, although
contingent, \(q\) reports the action of a necessary being. Gale
concludes that although this necessary being exists in every possible
world, this tells little about its power, goodness, and other
qualities. To make this being palatable to theists, he offers that the
argument be supplemented by other arguments, such as the teleological
arguments, to suggest that the necessary being is the kind of being
that satisfies theistic requirements. Since 



> 
> 
> the actual world's universe displays a wondrous complexity due
> to its law-like unity and simplicity, fine tuning of natural
> constants, and natural purpose and beauty,...there exists a
> necessary supernatural being who is very powerful, intelligent, and
> good and freely creates the actual world's universe. (1999:
> 468-69) 
> 
> 
> 



(For the detailed 18 step deductive argument, see Gale and Pruss 1999:
462-69).



Several objections have been raised about the argument from the weak
principle of sufficient reason. Almeida and Judisch (2002) construct
their objection via two reductio arguments. They note that, according
to Gale's argument, \(q\) is a contingent proposition in the
actual world that reports the free, intentional action of a necessary
being. As such, since the actual world contains the contingent
proposition \(q\), non-\(q\) is possible. That is, there is a possible
world \(W\_{2}\) that contains \(p\), non-\(q\), and the proposition
that \(q\) does not explain \(p\). However, by Gale's own
reasoning, \(W\_{2}\) is identical to the actual world. But the actual
world cannot contain both \(q\) and non-\(q\). Thus, \(q\) cannot be a
contingent proposition.



On the other hand, assume that \(q\) is a contingently necessary
proposition, that is, that it is possible that \(q\) is necessary and
possible that \(q\) is not necessary. By S5, we get that it is
necessary that \(q\) is necessary, making it impossible that \(q\) is
not necessary. As a result, it is both possible and not-possible that
\(q\) is not necessary, which likewise shows that \(q\) cannot be a
contingently necessary proposition. The only other option is that
\(q\) is a necessary truth, which would beg the question. Thus, the
argument fails by being unable to characterize \(q\). For rebuttals,
see Gale and Pruss (2002) and Rutten (2012: 84-87, see Other
Internet Resources).



Graham Oppy (2000) similarly argues that suppose \(p\_1\) is the BCF of
some possible world, and \(p\_1\) has no explanation. Then, given \(r\)
(namely, that \(p\_1\) has no explanation) there is a conjunctive fact
\(p\_1\) and \(r\). Since by hypothesis the conjunctive fact \(p\_1\)
and \(r\) is true in some world, on Gale's account it is true in
the actual world. Then by the weak PSR there is a world in which this
conjunction of \(p\_1\) and \(r\) possibly has an explanation. If there
is an explanation for the conjunction of \(p\_1\) and \(r\), there is
an explanation for \(p\_1\). Thus, we have the contradiction that
\(p\_1\) both has and does not have an explanation, which is absurd.
Hence, no world exists where the BCF lacks an explanation, which is
the strong principle of sufficient reason that Gale allegedly
circumvented. Since accepting the weak PSR would commit the nontheist
to the strong PSR and ultimately to a necessary being, the nontheist
has no motivation to accept the weak PSR.



Gale and Pruss (2002) subsequently concede that their weak PSR does
entail the strong PSR, but they contend that there still is no reason
not to proceed with the weak PSR, which they think the nontheist would
accept. The only grounds for rejecting it, they claim, is that it
leads to a theistic conclusion, which is not an independent reason for
rejecting it. Oppy, however, maintains that appealing to some initial
instincts of acceptance is irrelevant. Perhaps the nontheists did not
see what granting the weak PSR entailed, that it contradicted other
things they had independent reasons to believe, or they did not fully
understand the principle. There is a *modus tollens* reason to
reject it, since there are other grounds for thinking that theism is
false.



Jerome Gellman has argued that the Gale/Pruss conclusion to a being
that is not necessarily omnipotent also fails; this being is
essentially omnipotent and, if omnipotence entails omniscience, is
essentially omniscient. This too Gale and Pruss concede, which means
that the necessary being they conclude to is not significantly
different from that arrived at by the traditional cosmological
argument that appeals to the moderate version of the PSR (that
*contingent* beings need a sufficient reason or explanation for
their existence). 


## 7. The *Kalam* Cosmological Argument



A second type of cosmological argument, contending for a first or
beginning cause of the universe, has a venerable history, especially
in the Islamic *mutakalliman* tradition. Although it had
numerous defenders through the centuries, it received new life in the
recent voluminous writings of William Lane Craig. Craig formulates the
*kalam* cosmological argument this way (Craig and Sinclair
2009; Craig and Smith 1993: chap. 1).


1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its
existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its
existence.
4. No scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws
and initial conditions of the universe) can provide a causal account
of the origin (very beginning) of the universe, since such are part of
the universe.
5. Therefore, the cause must be personal (explanation is
given in terms of a non-natural, personal
 agent).[2]



The *kalam* argument has been the subject of much recent
debate, only some of which can be summarized here. (For greater
bibliographic detail, see Craig and Sinclair 2009 and Copan and Craig,
eds. 2017 & 2019.)


### 7.1 The Causal Principle and Quantum Physics



The basis for the argument's first premise is the Causal
Principle that undergirds many cosmological arguments. (Oderberg
[2002: 308] is mistaken when he tries to establish the uniqueness of
the *kalam* argument by denying that the Causal Principle
plays a role in *kalam* argument. It only does not play a
role in supporting a particular premise in the argument.) Defenders
and critics alike suggest that basing the argument on the Principle of
Causation rather than on the more general Principle of Sufficient
Reason is advantageous to the argument (Morriston 2000: 149). Craig
holds that the first premise is intuitively obvious; no one, he says,
seriously denies it (Craig, in Craig and Smith 1993: 57). Although at
times Craig suggests that one might treat the principle as an
empirical generalization based on our ordinary and scientific
experiences (which might not be strong enough for the argument to
succeed in a strong sense, although it might be supplemented by an
inference to the best explanation argument that what best explains the
success of science is that reality operates according to the causal
principle), ultimately, he argues, the truth of the Causal Principle
rests "upon the metaphysical intuition that something cannot
come out of nothing" (Craig, in Craig and Smith 1993: 147).
"No one *sincerely* believes that things, say, a horse or
an Eskimo village, can just pop into being without a cause"
(Craig and Sinclair 2009: 182), and this includes the universe.



The Causal Principle has been the subject of extended criticism. (We
addressed objections to the Causal Principle as subsumed under the PSR
from a philosophical perspective earlier in
 4.4.)
 Some critics deny that they share Craig's intuitions about the
Causal Principle (Oppy 2002). Morriston (2000) argues that, for one
thing, it does not seem to be an *a priori* truth, for not only
does it lack "a kind of 'luminosity' that makes it
impossible not to believe it, but closer inspection does not make it
clearer that it is true" (2000: 156-59). He points not
only to the presence of serious doubters (which he thinks he should
not be able to find were it truly an *a priori* truth), but
also to quantum phenomena, and thereby joins those who raise
objections to the Causal Principle based on quantum physics (Davies
1984: 200). On the quantum level, the connection between cause and
effect, if not entirely broken, is to some extent loosened. For
example, it appears that electrons can pass out of existence at one
point and come back into existence elsewhere. One can neither trace
their intermediate existence nor determine what causes them to come
into existence at one point rather than another. Neither can one
precisely determine or predict where they will reappear; their
subsequent location is only statistically probable given what we know
about their antecedent states. Hence, as Smith argues, 



> 
> 
> quantum-mechanical considerations show that the causal proposition is
> limited in its application, if applicable at all, and consequently
> that a probabilistic argument for a cause of the Big Bang cannot go
> through. (Smith, in Craig and Smith 1993: 121-23, 182)
> 
> 
> 



Craig responds that appeals to quantum phenomena do not affect the
*kalam* argument. For one thing, quantum events are not
completely devoid of causal conditions. Even if one grants that the
causal conditions are not jointly sufficient to determine the event,
at least some necessary conditions are involved in the quantum event.
However, when one considers the beginning of the universe, he notes,
there are no prior necessary causal conditions; simply nothing exists
(Craig, in Craig and Smith 1993: 146; see Koons 1997: 203). Pruss
(2006: 169) contends that in quantum phenomena causal indeterminacy is
compatible with the causal principle in that the causes
indeterministically bring about the effect. Morriston is rightly
puzzled by this reply, for, he asks, what 



> 
> 
> makes a *cause* out of a bunch of merely *necessary*
> conditions. Apparently *not* that they are jointly
> *sufficient* to *produce* the effect. (2000: 158) 
> 
> 
> 



If conditions are not jointly sufficient, is there reason to think
that premise 1 is true? More recently, Craig argues that 



> 
> 
> not all physicists agree that subatomic events are uncaused....
> Indeed, most of the available interpretations of the mathematical
> formulation of [Quantum Mechanics] are fully deterministic. (Craig and
> Sinclair 2009: 183. Jean Bricmont 2017, chap. 5, argues that
> Bohm's causally deterministic interpretation of quantum
> phenomena is superior to the nondeterministic interpretation.) 
> 
> 
> 



For another, Craig argues, a difference exists between predictability
and causality. It is true that, given Heisenberg's principle of
uncertainty, we cannot precisely predict individual subatomic events.
What is debated is whether this inability to predict is due to the
absence of sufficient causal conditions, or whether it is merely a
result of the fact that any attempt to precisely measure these events
alters their status. The very introduction of the observer into the
arena so affects what is observed that it gives the appearance that
effects occur without sufficient or determining causes. However, we
have no way of knowing what is happening without introducing observers
into the situation and the changes they bring. In the above example,
we simply are unable to discern the intermediate states of the
electron's existence apart from introducing conditions of
observation. When Heisenberg's indeterminacy is understood 
as describing not simply the events themselves but these events
relative to our knowledge of the events, the Causal Principle still
holds and can still be applied to the initial singularity, although we
cannot expect to achieve any kind of determinate predictability about
what occurs in specific cases on the sub-atomic level given the
cause.



At the same time, it should be recognized that showing that
indeterminacy is a real feature of the world at the quantum level
would have significant negative implications for the more general
Causal Principle that underlies the deductive cosmological argument.
The more this indeterminacy has ontological significance, the weaker
is the Causal Principle. This is particularly important for subatomic
events, which would characterize the beginning of the universe.
However, if the indeterminacy has merely epistemic significance, it
scarcely affects the Causal Principle. Quantum accounts allow for
additional speculation regarding origins and structures of universes.
In effect, whether Craig's response to the quantum objection
succeeds depends upon deeper issues, in particular, the epistemic and
ontological status of quantum indeterminacy, the nature of the Big
Bang as a quantum phenomenon, the nature and role of indeterminate
causation, and whether realist theories about quantum phenomena have
serious traction. Quantum physics is murky, as evidenced by
Bell's *gedanken* experiments, as described by Mermin
(1985).



Supporting the Causal Principle, Andrew Loke (2017: chapter 5) offers
a Modus Tollens argument that he thinks is immune to the criticisms in
4.4 and that responds to the suggestion that only the initial state of
reality began to exist uncaused (Oppy 2015). Loke argues that (a) if
*x* begins to exist without a causally antecedent condition, then
other kinds of things that can begin to exist can do so without a
causally antecedent condition, because (b) there would be no causally
antecedent condition that would make it the case that only *x*
(rather than these other kinds of things) begins to exist, and (c) the
properties of *x* and the properties of other kinds of things
that differentiate between them would be had by them only when they
had already begun to exist. (b) and (c) jointly imply that there would
be no essential difference between *x* and other kinds of things
where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. However, (d) it is not
the case that other kinds of things that can begin to exist would also
begin to exist without a causally antecedent condition. Therefore, (e)
it is not the case that *x* begins to exist without a causally
antecedent condition. For the critic, the critical question concerns
the grounds on which (d) is true, since there is a significant
difference between quantum events and nonquantum events (see the
discussion of Quantum Physics above).


### 7.2 Impossibility of an Actual Infinite



In defense of premise 2, Craig develops both *a priori* and
*a posteriori* arguments. His primary *a priori*
argument is


6. An actual infinite cannot exist.
7. A beginningless temporal series of events is an actual
infinite.
8. Therefore, a beginningless temporal series of events
cannot exist.



Since conclusion 8 follows validly, if premises 6 and 7 are true the
argument is sound. In defense of premise 6, he defines an actual
infinite as a determinate totality that occurs when a part of a system
can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the entire system
(Craig and Sinclair 2009: 104). Craig argues that if actual infinites
that neither increase nor decrease in the number of members they
contain were to really exist, rather absurd consequences would result.
For example, imagine a library with an actually infinite number of
books. Suppose that the library also contains an infinite number of
red and an infinite number of black books, so that for every red book
there is a black book, and vice versa. It follows that the library
contains as many red books as the total books in its collection and as
many red books as red and black books combined. However, this is
absurd; in reality the subset cannot be equivalent to the entire set.
Likewise, in a real library by removing a certain number of books we
reduce the overall collection. However, if infinites are actual, a
library with an infinite number of books would not be reduced in size
at all by removal of a specific number of books (short of all of them
or all but a specific number), for example, all the red books or those
with even catalogue numbers (Craig and Smith 1993: 11-16). The
absurdities resulting from attempting to apply basic arithmetical
operations, functional in the real world, to infinities suggest that
although actual infinites can have an ideal existence, they cannot
really exist.



Craig's point is this. Two sets \(A\) and \(B\) are the same
size just in case they can be put into one-to-one correspondence, that
is, if and only if every member of \(A\) can be correlated with
exactly one member of \(B\) in such a way that no member of \(B\) is
left out. In the case of infinite sets, this notion of "same
size" yields results like the following: the set of all natural
numbers (let this be \(A\)) is the same size as the set of squares of
natural numbers (\(B\)), since every member of \(A\) can be correlated
with exactly one member of \(B\) in a way that leaves out no member of
\(B\) (correlate \(0\leftrightarrow 0\), \(1\leftrightarrow1\),
\(2\leftrightarrow4\), \(3\leftrightarrow9\), \(4\leftrightarrow
16\),...). This is a case--recognized in fact as early as
Galileo (*Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences*)--where
two infinite sets have the same size but, intuitively, one of them, as
a proper subset, appears to be smaller than the other.



Craig uses a similar, intuitive notion of "smaller than"
in his argument concerning the library. It appears that the set \(B\)
of red books in the library is smaller than the set \(A\) of all the
books in the library, even though both have the same (infinite) size.
Craig concludes that it is absurd to suppose that such a library is
possible *in actuality*, since the set of red books would
simultaneously have to be smaller than the set of all books and yet
equal in size.



Critics fail to be convinced by these paradoxes of infinity. For
example, Rundle (2004: 170) agrees with Craig that the concept of an
actual infinite is paradoxical, but this, he argues, provides no
grounds for thinking it is incoherent. The logical problems with the
actual infinite are not problems of incoherence but arise from the
features that are characteristic of infinite sets. When the intuitive
notion of "smaller than" is replaced by a precise
definition, finite sets and infinite sets just behave somewhat
differently, that is all. Cantor and all subsequent set theorists
define a set \(B\) to be smaller than set \(A\) (i.e., has fewer
members) just in case \(B\) is the same size as a subset of \(A\), but
\(A\) is not the same size as any subset of \(B\). The application of
this definition to finite and infinite sets yields results that Craig
finds counter-intuitive but which mathematicians see as our best
understanding for comparing the size of sets. They see the fact that
an infinite set can be put into one-to-one correspondence with one of
its own proper subsets as one of the *defining characteristics*
of an infinite set, not an absurdity. Say that set \(C\) is a
*proper* subset of \(A\) just in case every element of \(C\) is
an element of \(A\) while \(A\) has some element that is not an
element of \(C\). In finite sets, but not necessarily in infinite
sets, when set \(B\) is a proper subset of \(A\), \(B\) is smaller
than \(A\). However, this does not necessarily hold for infinite
sets--as above where \(B\) is the set of squares of natural
numbers and \(A\) is the set of all natural numbers. The proper subset
\(B\) might be "smaller" than \(A\). What is crucial is
that \(B\) is not smaller in the sense of having a smaller number of
members than \(A\) (i.e., a smaller cardinality).



Cantorian mathematicians argue that these results apply to any
infinite set, whether in pure mathematics, imaginary libraries, or the
real world series of concrete events. Thus, Smith argues that Craig
begs the question by wrongly presuming that an intuitive relationship
holds between finite sets and their proper subsets, namely, that a set
has more members than its proper subsets must hold even in the case of
infinite sets (Smith, in Craig and Smith 1993: 85). So while Craig
thinks that Cantor's set theoretic definitions yield absurdities
when applied to the world of concrete objects, which entails that
infinites cannot be actual, set theorists see no problem so long as
the proper definitions are maintained. Further discussion is in Oppy
2006: 137-54.



Loke (2017: 55-61; see Craig and Sinclair, 2009: 105-6)
replies to the above objections by arguing that what is mathematically
possible is not always metaphysically possible. For example, the
quadratic equation \(x^2=4\) can have two mathematically consistent
results for \(x\): 2 or [?]2, but if the question is "how
many people carried the box home", the answer cannot be
[?]2, for in the concrete world it is metaphysically impossible
that [?]2 people carry a box home. Thus, the conclusion of 2
people rather than [?]2 people derives not from mathematical
equations alone but also from metaphysical considerations. Loke
proceeds to argue that concrete infinities violate metaphysically
necessary truths concerning causal powers. 



Craig is well aware of the fact that he is using actual and potential
infinite in a way that differs from the traditional usage in Aristotle
and Aquinas [Craig and Sinclair 2009: 115. For Aristotle, all the
elements in an actual infinite exist simultaneously, whereas a
potential infinite is realized over time by addition or division.
Hence, the temporal series of events, as formed by successively adding
new events, was a potential, not an actual, infinite (Aristotle,
*Physics*, III, 6)]. For Craig, however, an actual infinite is
a timeless totality that cannot be added to or reduced. "Since
past events, as determinate parts of reality, are definite and
distinct and can be numbered, they can be conceptually collected into
a totality" (Craig, in Craig and Smith 1993: 25). The future,
but not the past, is a potential infinite, for its events have not yet
happened.



Turning to
 premise 7,
 why should one think that it is true that a beginningless series,
such as the universe up to this point, is an actual rather than a
potential infinite? For Craig, an actual infinite is a determinate
totality or a completed unity, whereas the potential infinite is not.
Since the past events of a beginningless series can be conceptually
collected together and numbered, the series is a determinate totality
(1979: 96-97). And since the past is beginningless, it has no
starting point and is infinite. If the universe had a starting point,
so that events were added to or subtracted from this point, we would
have a potential infinite that increased through time by adding new
members. The fact that the events do not occur simultaneously is
irrelevant.



Bede Rundle rejects an actual infinite. His grounds for doing so (the
symmetry of the past and the future), if sustained, make
  premise 7
 false. He argues that the reasons often advanced for asymmetry, such
as those given by Craig, are faulty. It is true that the past is not
actual, but neither is the future. Likewise, that the past, having
occurred, is unalterable is irrelevant, for neither is the future
alterable. The only time that is real is the present. 



For Rundle, the past and the future are symmetrical; it is only our
knowledge of them that is asymmetrical. Any future event lies at a
finite temporal distance from the present. Similarly, any past event
lies at a finite temporal distance from the present. For each past or
future event, beginning from the present, there can always be either a
prior past event or a subsequent future event. Hence, for both series
an infinity of events is possible, and, as symmetrical, the infinity
of both series is the same. Since the series of future events is not
an actual but a potential infinite (or, better, an "indefinitely
extendible" series, 2004: 168; Craig and Sinclair 2012,
104-5), the series of past events is also indefinitely
extendible. It follows that although the future is actually finite, it
does not require an end to the universe, for there is always a
possible subsequent event (2004: 180). Similarly, although any given
past event of the universe is finitely distant in time from now, a
beginning or initial event can be ruled out; for any given event there
is a possible earlier event. However, since there is a possible prior
or possible posterior event in any past or future series respectively,
the universe, although finite in time, is temporally unbounded
(indefinitely extendible); both beginning and cessation are ruled out.
[How Rundle (2004: 176-78) gets from the possibility of a
subsequent event to actually ruling out cessation and beginning is
unclear.] Since there is no time when the material universe did not
exist, it is not contingent but necessary. Hence, although the
principle of sufficient reason is still true, it applies only to the
components of the material universe and not to the universe itself. No
explanation of the universe is possible. The universe, as
matter-energy, is neither caused nor destructible, not in the sense
that it could have been caused or could cease, but in the sense that
"the notions of beginning and ceasing to exist are inapplicable
to the universe" (2004: 178).



However, one might wonder, are the past series and future series of
events really symmetrical? It is true that one can start from the
present and count either forward or backward in time. Rundle thinks
that ...\(x\_5\), \(x\_4\), \(x\_3\), \(x\_2\), \(x\_1\), \(t\_0\),
\(y\_1\), \(y\_2\), \(y\_3\), \(y\_4\), \(y\_5\) are all on the same
continuum, so that we cannot distinguish ontologically the time
dimension of the future and past series. The two series, going into
the past and into the future, would be the same in that however far we
count from the present \(t\_0\) remains finite although indefinitely
extendible. However, is it true that, as he claims, with regard to the
past, "any movement currently terminating can be redescribed as
extending back", that counting backward from the present is the
same as counting from the past to the present (2004: 176)?



Craig says no, for in the actual world we do not start from now to
arrive at the past; we move from the past to the present. To count
backwards, we would start from a particular point in time, the
present. From where would we start to count forward were the past
indefinitely extendible? Both to count and to move from the past to
the present, we cannot start from the indefinitely extendible. Indeed,
if the past is indefinitely extendible, no matter where we started, we
would have arrived at \(t\_0\) long before now. 



One cannot just reverse the temporal sequence of the past, for we do
not ontologically engage the sequence from the present to the past.
Rundle's two movements are quite disparate, such that the two
sequences--of the past and of the future--are not
symmetrical, which leaves intact Craig's claim that a
beginningless past would result in an actual and not a potential
infinite.



Morriston (2010) constructs an argument to show that, contrary to
Craig, there is no relevant difference between a beginningless past
and a determinate, endless future, such that if one is impossible
because of absurdities so is the other, and if one is possible so is
the other. He creates a fictional scenario where God commands angels
Gabriel and Uriel to praise God alternatively for an eternity. 



> 
> 
> If you ask, "How many distinct praises will be said?", the
> only sensible answer is, "infinitely many.... Each of
> infinitely many distinct praises will be said, precisely because there
> will be no future time at which all have been said ". (Morriston
> 2010: 443-44)
> 
> 
> 



However, an actually infinite number of future events is not
impossible; it can be envisioned and determined by God. 



Morriston proceeds to note that puzzles or absurdities parallel to
those Craig finds in the concept of an actual infinite of past events
also occur in the infinite series of future events. Suppose that 



> 
> 
> God could instead have determined that Gabriel and Uriel will stop
> after praise number four. Infinitely many praises would be prevented,
> and the number of their future praises would be only four.
> Alternatively, God could have determined that Gabriel be silent during
> all the celestial minutes between Uriel's future praises. In
> this case too, infinitely many praises would be prevented, but the
> number of future praises would instead be infinite. (Morriston 2010:
> 444) 
> 
> 
> 



Although this shows that an infinite future can have inconsistent
implications, God could still bring it about that these angels utter
distinct praises, one after another, ad infinitum. But then, Morriston
concludes, since these inconsistent implications do not count against
an actual infinity of future events, the puzzles Craig poses do not
count against the possibility of an actual infinity of past events,
i.e., a beginningless universe. If an infinite future is possible, as
Craig concedes, so is an infinite past. 



Morriston contends that Craig's reply that in the one case the
events have occurred and in the other they have not, and hence that
the number of future praises is indefinite, is a distinction without a
difference. God can determine that an infinite number of praises will
be sung. 



> 
> 
> The non-existence of past events does not prevent us from asking how
> many have occurred. Nor should the non-existence of future events
> prevent us from asking how many will occur. In neither case will
> "indefinitely many" do as an answer. (2010: 449) 
> 
> 
> 



Craig's defense is that Morriston has ignored the difference
between a potential and an actual infinite. According to Craig, an
actual infinite is a collection of definite and discrete members whose
number is greater than any natural number, whereas a potential
infinite is a collection that is increasing toward but never arriving
at infinity as a limit (Craig 2010; Craig and Sinclair 2009: 116).




Morriston objects to Craig's definition of the potential
infinite. For one thing, there is no limit to which the future praises
grow. The collection of praises continues to grow as the praises are
sung, but it does not approach a limit, for always one more praise can
be sung. The series of future praises is actually infinite. 



Craig responds that Morriston is really attacking his notion of a
potential infinite by claiming that no relevant distinction exists
between a potential and an actual infinite. But this, he says, rests
on confusing an A-theory with a B-theory of time. An infinite directed
toward the future would be actual only on a B-theory of time, but not
on an A-theory (Craig 2010: 452-53). On an A-theory of time, a
change of tense makes a difference. That something actually has
happened differs significantly from what may (even if determined)
happen. 



Cohen (2015: 177) continues Morriston's argument, insisting that
Craig invokes an unmotivated principle that Cohen terms the "The
Actuality-Infinity Principle: In order for *x* to be actually
infinite in quantity, *x* must be actual". Cohen argues
that this begs the question. However, Craig's principle is
different: In order for *x* to be actually infinite in quantity,
*x* must be or have been actual or actualized (Craig 2010:
455-56). Cohen might respond, "Why not then say that for
*x* to be actually infinite in quality *x* must be, have
been, or will be actual or actualized?" Cohen argues that
Craig's presentism does not assist him here, since neither the
past nor the future events are present and hence do not exist. Craig
thinks otherwise (Craig and Sinclair 2009: 126), tacitly defending the
principle in that temporal becoming sees to it that what has not
occurred or is not occurring but as future is merely potential, even
if determined or foreseen by God. 


### 7.3 Successive Addition Cannot Form an Actual Infinite



Craig's second argument addresses this very point.


9. The temporal series of events is a collection formed
by successive addition.
10. A collection formed by successive synthesis is not an
actual infinite.
11. Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an
actual infinite (Craig 1979: 103; Craig and Sinclair 2009, 117).



The collection of historical events is formed by successively adding
events, one following another. The events are not temporally
simultaneous but occur over a period of time as the series continues
to acquire new members. Even if an actual infinite were possible, it
could not be realized by successive addition; in adding to the series,
no matter how much adding is done, even to infinity, the series
remains finite and only potentially infinite. One can neither count to
nor traverse the infinite (Craig and Sinclair 2009: 118).



It might be objected that this sounds very much like Zeno's
paradoxes that prohibit Achilles or anyone from either beginning to
cross an area or succeeding in doing so. However, notes Craig,
significant disanalogies disallow this conclusion. For one,
Zeno's argument rests on progressively-narrowing, unequal
distances that sum to a finite distance, whereas in traversing the
past the equal distances continue to the infinity of the future.
Second, Zeno's distances are potential because of divisibility,
whereas the distances from the past are actual distances or times to
be traversed.



Morriston argues that premise 10 presupposes what is to be shown,
namely, that there is a beginning point. He asks, 



> 
> 
> Why couldn't there have been an infinite series of years in
> which there was no first year? It's true that in such a series
> we never "arrive" at infinity, but surely that is only
> because infinity is, so to speak, "always already there".
> At *every* point in such a series, infinitely many years have
> *already* passed by.... Each event in a beginningless series
> terminating in the present could have been "added" to the
> infinitely many prior events. (2003: 290) 
> 
> 
> 



Thus, we don't need a starting point to form an actual infinite
by successive addition. Infinity is already present in the series.


 Craig responds that we cannot just add "arriving at the
present" to an already existing infinite.


> 
> 
> Before the present event could occur, the event immediately before it
> would have to occur; and before that event could occur, the event
> immediately before it would have to occur; and so on *ad
> infinitum*. One gets driven back into the past, making it
> impossible for any event to occur. Thus, if the series of events were
> beginningless, the present could not have occurred, which is absurd.
> (Craig and Sinclair 209: 118) 
> 
> 
> 



In other words, Why this moment rather than another? 



Morriston replies that that is just the way it is; "the past
just *is* the series of events that have already
happened". To require a reason for the series of past events
arriving at now is to appeal to the principle of sufficient reason,
which he deems both suspect and inappropriate for Craig to invoke
(Morriston 2003: 293). 



To defend his position, Craig presents Bertrand Russell's
example of Tristram Shandy, who writes his autobiography. It takes him
a year to write about one day of his life, so that as his life
progresses so does his autobiography in which he gets progressively
farther behind. Russell concludes that 



> 
> 
> if (Shandy) had lived forever, and had not wearied of his task, then,
> even if his life had continued as eventfully as it began, no part of
> his biography would have remained unwritten. ([1903] 1937: 358) 
> 
> 
> 



However, Oderberg (2002: 310) claims, Russell seems to have
fallaciously moved from (1) For every day, there is a year such that,
by the end of that year, Shandy has recorded that day, which is true,
to (2) There is a year such that, for every day, by the end of that
year Shandy has recorded that day. (2) is needed for Russell's
conclusion but fails to follow from (1). Shandy's writing never
catches up with his life; indeed, the longer he lives, even if for
infinity, his writing would never catch up to his life but
progressively would get farther behind. Indeed, if he has been living
and writing from infinity, his autobiography is infinitely behind his
life. Contrary to Russell, there will be days--an infinite
number--about which he will be unable to write. As can be
imagined, this example has been greatly contested, modified, and has
generated a literature of its own. For samples, see Eells (1988),
Oderberg (2002), and Oppy (2003). Waters (2013) reformulates the
paradox, attempting to avoid problems with earlier formulations.



Finally, it is objected that Craig's argument presupposes an
\(A\) view of time, where time flows from past to present to future
and not all events tenselessly coexist. It seems that Craig's
argument cannot be sustained if time is understood in the \(B\) sense,
where all members of the series tenselessly coexist, being equally
real (Grunbaum 1994). On a \(B\) view of time there is no
beginning, and it would seem that on this view the argument would
collapse.


### 7.4 The Big Bang Theory of Cosmic Origins



One of Craig and Sinclair's *a posteriori* arguments for
 premise 2
 invokes the Big Bang theory of cosmic origins. Since the universe is
expanding as the galaxies recede from each other, if we reverse the
direction of our view and look back in time, the farther we look, the
denser the universe becomes. If we push backwards far enough, we find
that the universe reaches a state of compression where the density and
gravitational force are infinite. This unique singularity constitutes
the beginning of the universe--of matter, energy, space, time,
and all physical laws. It is not that the universe arose out of some
prior state, for there was no prior state. Since time too comes to be,
one cannot ask what happened before the initial event. Neither should
one think that the universe expanded from some state of infinite
density *into* space; space too came to be in that event. Since
the Big Bang initiates the very laws of physics, one cannot expect any
scientific or physical explanation of this singularity.



One picture, then, is of the universe beginning in a singular,
non-temporal event roughly 13-14 billion years ago. Something,
perhaps a quantum vacuum, came into existence. Its tremendous energy
caused it, in the first fractions of a second, to expand or inflate
and explode, creating the four-dimensional space-time universe that we
experience today. How this all happened in the first \(10^{-35}\)
seconds and subsequently is a matter of serious speculation and
debate. What advocates of
 premise 2
 maintain is that since the universe and all its material elements
originate in the Big Bang, the universe is temporally finite and thus
had a beginning. (For a detailed consideration of cosmogenic theories
from the *kalam* perspective, see Craig and Sinclair 2009:
125-182; for the counter discussion see Grunbaum 1991). By
itself, of course, this reasoning, even if accurate, leaves it the
case that
 premise 2
 and hence
 conclusion 3
 are only probably true, dependent on accepted cosmogenic
theories.



Several replies to this argument can be made. First, questions have
been raised about the adequacy of the theory of inflation to explain
the expansion of the universe. One problem is predictability, for on
this view anything that can happen will happen, an infinite number of
times (Steinhardt 2011: 42). Further, the argument presupposes that
the General Theory of Relativity applies to the beginning of the
universe, but some doubt that this is so, given that it cannot
adequately account for the quantum gravity involved. 



Second, some have suggested that since we cannot "exclude the
possibility of a prior phase of existence" (Silk 2001: 63), it
is possible that the universe has cycled through oscillations, perhaps
infinitely, so that Big Bangs occurred not once but an infinite number
of times in the past and will do so in the future. The current
universe is a "reboot" of previous universes that have
expanded and then contracted (Musser 2004).



The traditional idea of an oscillating universe faced significant
problems. For one, no set of physical laws accounts for a series of
cyclical universe-collapses and re-explosions. That the universe once
exploded into existence provides no evidence that the event could
reoccur even once, let alone an infinite number of times, should the
universe collapse. Second, even an oscillating universe seems to be
finite (Smith, in Craig and Smith 1993: 113). Further, the cycle of
collapses and expansions would not, as was pictured, be periodic (of
even duration). Rather, entropy would rise from cycle to cycle, so
that even were a series of universe-oscillations possible, they would
become progressively longer (Davies 1992: 52; Tolman 1934). If the
universe were without beginning, by now that cycle would be infinite
in duration, without any hope of contraction. Fourth, although each
recollapse would destroy the components of the universe, the radiation
would remain, so that each successive cycle would add to the total.




Responding to these issues, recently proposed cosmologies based on
string theory have given new life to a cyclic view. For example, Paul
Steinhardt and Neil Turok have proposed a cyclic cosmological model
where the universe repeatedly transitions from a big bang to a big
crunch to a big bang, and so on. They contend that 



> 
> 
> the Universe is flat, rather than closed. The transition from
> expansion to contraction is caused by introducing negative potential
> energy, rather than spatial curvature. Furthermore, the cyclic
> behavior depends in an essential way on having a period of accelerated
> expansion *after* the radiation and matter-dominated phases.
> During the accelerated expansion phase, the Universe approaches a
> nearly vacuous state, restoring very nearly identical local conditions
> as existed in the previous cycle prior to the contraction phase.
> (Steinhardt and Turok 2002: 2) 
> 
> 
> 



Dark energy becomes a key player in all of this. On the
*kalam* view, the amount of dark energy in the universe
makes a return to its original state impossible. The universe is not
cyclical but will die a cold death. On a cyclic view, dark energy
accelerates the expansion of the universe needed "to dilute the
entropy, black holes and other debris produced in the previous cycle
so that the universe is returned to its original pristine vacuum state
before it begins to contract, bounce, and begin a cycle anew"
(Steinhardt and Turok 2001: 1436). 



This specific cyclic theory has been challenged, and other cyclic
cosmological theories have been proposed. What this shows is that any
attempt to support the second premise of the *kalam*
argument by accepting or refuting scientific cosmologies will
encounter an ever-changing scene, given the speculative nature of
cosmology. Thus, while Craig and Sinclair (2009: 150-74)
critically evaluate current contenders as not being viable, changes in
and development of these theories and the inevitable development of
others make for unending point-counterpoint. 


### 7.5 The Big Bang Is Not an Event



One critical response to the kalam argument from the Big Bang is
that, given the Grand Theory of Relativity, the Big Bang is not an
event at all. An event takes place within a space-time context.
However, the Big Bang has no space-time context; there is neither time
prior to the Big Bang nor a space in which the Big Bang occurs. Hence,
the Big Bang cannot be considered as a physical event occurring at a
moment of time. As Hawking notes, the finite universe has no
space-time boundaries and hence lacks singularity and a beginning
(Hawking 1988: 116, 136). Time might be multi-dimensional or
imaginary, in which case one asymptotically approaches a beginning
singularity but never reaches it. And without a beginning the universe
requires no cause. The best one can say is that the universe is finite
with respect to the past, not that it was an event with a beginning.
(Rundle 2004: chap. 8.)



Grunbaum defends this position by arguing that events can only
result from other events. 



> 
> 
> Since the Big Bang singularity is technically a non-event, and \(t=0\)
> is not a bona fide time of its occurrence, the singularity cannot be
> the effect of any cause in the case of either event-causation or agent
> causation alike.... The singularity \(t=0\) cannot have a cause.
> (Grunbaum 1994; Rundle 2004: 168, writes, "[T]here is no
> event--the beginning of the universe--to be explained,
> events being possible only in time")
> 
> 
> 



One response to Grunbaum's objection is to opt for broader
notions of "event" and "cause". We might
broaden the notion of "event" by removing the requirement
that it must be relational, taking place in a space-time context. In
the Big Bang the space-time universe commences and then continues to
exist in measurable time subsequent to the initiating singularity
(Silk 2001: 456). Thus, one might consider the Big Bang as either the
event of the commencing of the universe or else a state in which
"any two points in the observable universe were arbitrarily
close together" (Silk 2001: 63). As such, one might inquire why
this initial state of the universe existed in the finite past.
Likewise, one need not require that causation embody the Humean
condition of temporal priority, but may treat causation
counter-factually, or perhaps even, as traditionally, a relation of
production. Any causal statement about the universe would have to be
expressed atemporally, but for the theist this presents no problem
provided that God is conceived atemporally (at least prior to
creation) and sense can be made of atemporal causation.



Furthermore, suppose Grunbaum is correct that the Big Bang
singularity is not an event. Then, by his reasoning that events only
arise from other events, subsequent so-called events cannot be the
effect of that singularity. If they were, they would not be events
either. 



Given this understanding of space/time, we might reconceive the
*kalam* argument.


12. If something has a finite past, its existence has a
cause.
13. The universe has a finite past.
14. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its
existence.
15. The universe includes space-time.
16. Therefore, the cause of the universe transcends
space-time (in the sense that it existed aspatially and, when there
was no universe, atemporally).
17. If the cause of the universe's existence
transcends space-time, no scientific explanation can provide a causal
account of the origin of the universe.
18. If no scientific explanation can provide a causal
account of the origin of the universe, the cause must be personal
(explanation is given in terms of a personal agent).
19. Therefore, a personal cause of the universe exists.



Some critics see a problem with this reformulation of the
*kalam* argument in
 premise 12.
 Whereas behind
 premise 1
 of the original argument lies the ancient Parmenidean contention that
out of nothing nothing comes, it is alleged that no principle directly
connects finitude with causation. They contend that we have no reason
to think that just because something is finite it must have a cause of
its coming into existence. Theists respond that this objection has
merit only if the critic denies that the Principle of Causation is
true or that it applies to events like the Big Bang.



Grunbaum (1991) also argues that defenders of the
*kalam* argument cannot make sense of the claim that the
universe began to exist. 



> 
> 
> The question of its beginning is not, "If the universe did have
> a bounded past of finite duration, what was the cause of its initial
> event \(t=0\)?" *There simply did not exist any instants of
> time before* \(t=0\)! 
> 
> 
> 



One simply cannot ask what happened before \(t=0\); the question makes
no sense. And if we cannot ask that question, then we cannot inquire
whether the Big Bang was an effect, for nothing temporal preceded it.
Questions about creation occur in time in the universe, not outside of
it (Hawking 1987: 650-51).



Grunbaum's contention is that to begin to exist requires a
previous time, and that there was no time prior to the Big Bang.



> 
> 
> *[T]here is no first instant of time at all*, just as there is
> no leftmost point on an infinite Euclidean line that extends in both
> directions. Since here as elsewhere, the term 'always'
> refers to all actual past instants of time, the non-existence of time
> before \(t=0\) ... allows that matter has *always*
> existed, despite the finitude of the age of the universe in both sets
> of models. (1991)
> 
> 
> 



However, as Craig observes, the series is finite, not infinite, even
though it includes all past instants of time. Beginning to exist does
not entail that one has a beginning point *in time*. Craig
defines "\(x\) begins to exist" as "\(x\) exists at
\(t\) and there is no time immediately prior to \(t\) at which \(x\)
exists" (1992: 238). 



> 
> 
> Something has a beginning just in case the time during which it has
> existed is finite.... So understood, deleting the beginning point
> of a thing's existence does not imply that the thing no longer
> begins to exist and therefore came into being uncaused. (Craig and
> Sinclair 2009: 185)
> 
> 
> 



Morriston (2000) suggests that this analysis of the universe's
coming to be no longer adequately supports
 premise 1,
 for we have no reason to think that something could not just come
into existence. Any appeal to *ex nihilo nihil fit* is either
tautologous with the first premise or else appears mistakenly to treat
*nihilo* as if it were "a condition of something".
In part, what Morriston rejects is the intuitiveness that Craig sees
in the truth of
 premise 1,
 where "beginning to exist" is understood as explicated as
above (see our discussion in
 7.1).
 It is not that premise 1 is false; it is just that it is unsupported
and hence loses its plausibility. It has the same plausibility (or
implausibility) as *creation ex nihilo*. Morriston thinks that
 premise 1
 fares equally poorly if Craig attempts to justify it empirically, for
we have many situations where the causes of events have not been
discovered, and even if we could find the causes in each individual
case, it provides no evidence that causation applies to the totality
of cases (the universe). (See our discussion of this argument in
 4.2
 and
 4.3
 above.) Indeed, he argues, the inductive generalization involved in
defending the causal principle stands at odds with similar inductive
generalizations that conflict with the *kalam*
argument--that something can be made without there being a prior
stuff or that causes can bear no temporal relation to their effects.



### 7.6 Personal Explanation



Finally, something needs to be said about
 premise 3
 and
 conclusion 5,
 which asserts that the cause of the universe is personal. Defenders
of the cosmological argument suggest two possible kinds of
 explanation.[3]
*Natural explanation* is provided in terms of precedent
events, causal laws, or necessary conditions that invoke natural
existents. *Personal explanation* is given "in terms of
the intentional action of a rational agent" (Swinburne 2004: 21;
also Gale and Pruss 1999). We have seen that one cannot provide a
natural causal explanation for the initial event, for there are no
precedent natural events or natural existents to which the laws of
physics apply. The line of scientific explanation runs out at the
initial singularity, and perhaps even before we arrive at the initial
singularity (at \(10^{-35}\) seconds). If no scientific explanation
(in terms of physical laws) can provide a causal account of the origin
of the universe (premise 4), the explanation must be personal, that
is, in terms of the intentional action of an intelligent, supernatural
agent.



Morriston (2000: 163-68) questions whether Craig's
argument for the cause being personal goes through. Craig argues that
if the cause were an eternal, nonpersonal, operating set of
conditions, then the universe would exist from eternity. Below
freezing temperatures will always freeze whatever water is present.
Since the universe has not existed from eternity, the cause must be a
personal agent who chooses freely to create an effect in time.
However, notes Morriston, if the personal cause intended from eternity
to create the world, and if the intention alone to create is causally
sufficient to bring about the effect, then the universe would also
exist from eternity, and there would be no reason to prefer a personal
cause of the universe over a nonpersonal cause. For a timeless eternal
being before creation, which is Craig's view, "There can
be no temporal gap between the time at which it does the willing and
the time at which the thing willed actually happens" (2000,
167). So the distinction in this respect between a personal and a
nonpersonal eternal cause disappears. Craig (2002) replies that it is
not intention alone that must be present, but the personal agent must
also employ or exercise its personal causal power to bring about the
world. However, Morriston retorts, exercising personal causal power is
an action in time, a view that is unavailable to Craig, for there is
no time when God would restrain his causal powers. 



Paul Davies argues that one need not appeal to God to account for the
Big Bang. Its cause, he suggests, is found within the cosmic system
itself. Originally a vacuum lacking space-time dimensions, the
universe "found itself in an excited vacuum state", a
"ferment of quantum activity, teeming with virtual particles and
full of complex interactions" (Davies 1984: 191-92),
which, subject to a cosmic repulsive force, resulted in an immense
increase in energy. Subsequent explosions from this collapsing vacuum
released the energy in this vacuum, reinvigorating the cosmic
inflation and setting the scenario for the subsequent expansion of the
universe. However, what is the origin of this increase in energy that
eventually made the Big Bang possible? Davies's response is that
the law of conservation of energy (that the total quantity of energy
in the universe remains fixed despite transfer from one form to
another), which now applies to our universe, did not apply to the
initial expansion. Cosmic repulsion in the vacuum caused the energy to
increase from zero to an enormous amount. This great explosion
released energy, from which all matter emerged. Consequently, he
contends, since the conclusion of the *kalam* argument is
false, one of the premises of the argument--in all likelihood the
first--is false.



Craig responds that if the vacuum has energy, the question arises
concerning the origin of the vacuum and its energy. Merely pushing the
question of the beginning of the universe back to some primordial
quantum vacuum does not escape the question of what brought this
vacuum laden with energy into existence. A quantum vacuum is not
nothing (as in Newtonian physics) but 



> 
> 
> a sea of continually forming and dissolving particles that borrow
> energy from the vacuum for their brief existence. A quantum vacuum is
> thus far from nothing, and vacuum fluctuations do not constitute an
> exception to the principle that whatever beings to exist has a cause.
> (Craig, in Craig and Smith 1993: 143-44)
> 
> 
> 



Hence, he concludes, the appeal to a vacuum as the initial state is
misleading.



One might wonder, as Rundle (2004: 75-77) does, how a
supernatural agent could bring about the universe. He contends that a
personal agent (God) cannot be the cause because intentional agency
needs a body and actions occur within space-time. However, acceptance
of the cosmological argument does not depend on an explanation of the
manner of causation by a necessary being. When we explain that the
girl raised her hand because she wanted to ask a question, we can
accept that she was the cause of the raised hand without understanding
how her wanting to ask a question brought about her raising her hand.
As Swinburne notes, an event is "fully explained when we have
cited the agent, his intention that the event occur, and his basic
powers" that include the ability to bring about events of that
sort (2004: 36). Similarly, theists argue, we may never know why and
how creation took place. Nevertheless, we may accept it as an
explanation in the sense that we can say that God created that initial
event, that he had the intention to do so, and that such an event lies
within the power of an omniscient and almighty being; not having a
body is irrelevant.



The issues raised by the *kalam* argument concern not only
the nature of explanation and when an explanation is necessary, but
even whether an explanation of the universe is possible (given the
above discussion). Whereas all agree that it makes no sense to ask
about what occurs before the Big Bang (since there was no prior time)
or about something coming out of nothing, the dispute rests on whether
there needs to be a cause of the first natural existent, whether
something like the universe can be finite and yet not have a
beginning, and crucially the nature of infinities and their connection
with reality.


## 8. An Inductive Cosmological Argument



Richard Swinburne contends that the cosmological argument is not
deductively valid; if it were, 



> 
> 
> it would be incoherent to assert that a complex physical universe
> exists and that God does not exist. There would be a hidden
> contradiction buried in such co-assertions.... [A]ttempts to
> derive obviously incoherent propositions from such co-assertions have
> failed through commission of some elementary logical error. (2004:
> 136) 
> 
> 
> 



Swinburne is correct that if someone believes that a deductive
cosmological argument (proof) for God's existence is sound, then
it would be incoherent for that same person to then deny that God
exists. However, in their respective proofs defenders of the deductive
cosmological arguments make a claim about incoherence, namely, that it
would be contradictory for the same person to affirm the premises of
the argument and to claim that God or a personal necessary being does
not exist. And they believe both that the respective premises have the
intuitiveness that Swinburne deems necessary and that the argument has
not committed some "elementary error of logic". 



Has Swinburne shown incoherence? Whereas propositions are true and
deductive arguments are valid independent of anyone's beliefs
that they are true and valid (the proposition that the earth orbits
the sun is true regardless of whether anyone believes it), the
acceptance of premises as true, of deductive arguments as valid, and
of an argument's use as a proof is not independent of those same
beliefs. An argument that one person takes as being sound another
might believe not to be sound, in that the person rejects one or more
of the premises or holds that the conclusions fail to properly follow;
arguments are person-relative in their persuasive value or assessment
of coherence. Swinburne himself notes that arguments of coherence and
incoherence are persuasive only to the extent that someone accepts
other statements inherent to the proof as coherent or incoherent and
that one statement entails another (1993: 39). Elsewhere Swinburne
admits to having 



> 
> 
> some doubt about whether men have enough initial consensus about what
> is coherent and what entails what, are clever enough and have enough
> imagination to reach agreed proofs which would settle all disputes
> about whether a statement is coherent or incoherent. (1993: 45) 
> 
> 
> 



As such, Swinburne cannot so easily dismiss deductive cosmological
arguments, although he is justified in wondering whether
"reasons less strong than compelling proofs can be given for
thinking some statements coherent and others incoherent" (1993:
45).



In place of a deductive argument, Swinburne develops an inductive
cosmological argument that appeals to the inference to the best
explanation. Swinburne distinguishes between two varieties of
inductive arguments: those that show that the conclusion is more
probable than not (what he terms a correct P-inductive argument) and
those that further increase the probability of the conclusion (what he
terms a correct C-inductive argument). In *The Existence of
God* (1979) he presents a cosmological argument that he claims
falls in the category of C-inductive arguments. However, for him this
argument is part of a larger, cumulative case for a P-inductive
argument for God's existence that includes as its evidence the
orderliness of the universe, the existence of consciousness, miracle
reports, and religious experience.



Swinburne notes that "a cosmological argument argues that the
fact that there is a universe needs explaining" (2004:
9-10). However, he emphasizes that his approach differs from
those we have already considered in that he rejects the Principle of
Sufficient Reason understood as "everything not
'metaphysically necessary' has an explanation in something
'metaphysically necessary'" (2004: 148), for the PSR
leads, as it does in Leibniz, to a being that is logically necessary,
and such a being cannot explain the logically contingent. From the
logically necessary only the logically necessary follows. In place of
using the PSR to construct a deductive argument, he employs a
"basic theorem of confirmation theory", Bayes'
Theorem, to construct an inductive argument (2004: 67). (In making
this claim about the *need* for an explanation of the universe,
however, it is hard not to see that he invokes some formulation of the
PSR.)



Swinburne begins his discussion with the existence of a physical
universe that (a) contains odd events that cannot be fitted into the
established pattern of scientific explanation (e.g., miracles, the
appearance of conscious beings), (b) is too big in that science cannot
explain why there are states of affairs at all or why the fundamental
natural laws to which science appeals to explain things hold, and (c)
is complex (its matter-energy has relevant powers) (2004: 74, 150).




It is not logically necessary that the existence of the universe needs
explanation; we could accept this universe as a brute, inexplicable
fact, but Swinburne thinks that to do so fails to accord with the
example of the sciences, which seek the best explanation for any given
phenomena. Since "it is reasonable to suppose" that there
is an explanation (2004: 75), the issue, then, is which view is more
reasonable: that science can provide a natural explanation for the
existence of this universe, or whether the universe and its phenomena
exist because of the intentional, causal activity of a personal being
whose existence also is a brute fact.



To find the explanatory hypothesis most likely to be true, especially
about something that might be unobservable, he claims to follow the
example of science. Using Bayes' Theorem, he looks for a
hypothesis \(h\) such that \(p(e\mid h \amp k) \gt p(e\mid k)\) where
\(p\) is probability, \(e\) is the existence of a complex universe,
and \(k\) is the background data. A hypothesis is more likely to be
true (1) in so far as it has high explanatory power, in that it makes
probable the evidence of the observation; this may be predictive but
can be postdictive as well (Swinburne 1996: 34, 2001: 80-81),
and insofar as the evidence is very *un*likely to occur if the
hypothesis is false. And (2), it has a greater prior probability. The
prior probability of a hypothesis encompasses three features: (a) how
well it fits with our background knowledge (2001: 81). The broader the
scope, the less relevant this criterion becomes (2004: 60). Since
there are no "neighboring fields of inquiry related to the
origin of the universe", Swinburne treats this condition in the
cosmological argument as irrelevant or reducing to the feature of
simplicity (1996: 29). (b) The scope of the hypothesis (the extent of
its claims)--the broader the scope, the less likely it is to be
true. For example, all crows are black is less likely to be true than
all crows along the upper Mississippi River are black. Since both
scientific naturalism and theism have the same scope--explaining
the universe, this does not factor into his calculations for
explaining the complex universe (2001: 82); and (c) simplicity, which
for Swinburne holds the key (2001: 82-83).



He holds that we are looking for a complete explanation, where 



> 
> 
> we may reasonably conclude that the criteria for supposing that
> factors have no further explanation (scientific or personal) in terms
> of factors acting at the time and so that any explanation is a
> complete explanation over all (not just a complete explanation within
> scientific or within personal explanation) are that any attempt to go
> beyond the factors that we have would result in no gain of explanatory
> power or prior probability. (2004: 89) 
> 
> 
> 



A scientific explanation fails to give a complete explanation. It
leaves us not with a simple but with a very complex explanatory
hypothesis, in that "ultimate explanation stops at innumerable,
different stopping points, many of them ... having exactly the
same powers and liabilities as each other" (1996: 42). It
presents us with the brute fact of the existence of the universe, not
an explanation for it. It explains in terms of a full cause the events
at any moment, but it cannot provide a complete explanation of the
universe, "for there are no physical causes apart from the
universe itself and parts thereof" (1984: 144).



On the other hand, a personal explanation, given in terms of the
intentional actions of a person, is simpler and no explanatory power
is lost. Further, a personal explanation can be understood, as in the
case of explaining basic actions, without knowing or understanding any
of the natural causal conditions that enable one to bring it about. In
the case of the cosmological argument, personal explanation is couched
in terms of a being that has beliefs, purposes, and intentions, and
possesses both the power to bring about the complex universe and a
possible reason for doing so.



Swinburne argues that a personal explanation of the universe satisfies
the above probability criteria. It satisfies condition (1) in that
appealing to God as an intentional agent has explanatory power. It
leads us to have certain expectations about the universe: that it
manifests order, is comprehensible, and favors the existence of beings
that can comprehend it. It makes probable the existence of the complex
universe because God could have reasons for causing such a universe,
whereas we would have no reasons at all if all we had was the brute
fact of the material universe. Among these reasons is that the
universe would be "a theatre for finite agents to develop and
make of it what they will" (Swinburne 1979: 131).



Michael Martin objects at this point. Martin contends that if
Swinburne is to compare the *a priori* probability of there
being a complex universe given our background knowledge with the *a
priori* probability of a complex universe given our background
knowledge and the existence of God, he has to be clear on how he
interprets the probability. Martin notes that herein lies crucial
ambiguity that disables calculating the *a priori* probability.
If one compares the very many possible complex universes with there
being *no* universe, on the basis of assigning equal
probability to all possibilities the probability of there being a
complex universe is nearly 1. However, if one compares the probability
of there being a complex universe with there being no universe at all,
it is 50 percent (Martin 1986: 155). Furthermore, Martin wonders
whether complexity is an issue at all. According to Swinburne, as free
God can create any kind of world or no world at all. But then the
existence of God is compatible with any number of scenarios: the
existence of no world, a simpler world than we have, one like ours, or
any number of more complex universes. Consequently, the complexity of
*this* world does not matter in constructing an inductive
argument for God's existence (1986: 155). Put another way,
adding the existence of God to our background knowledge does not
increase the likelihood of there being a complex universe, let alone
of there being this particular universe or a universe at all (1986:
158). 



In short, Martin does not see how Swinburne can establish an *a
priori* probability for the existence of a complex universe, to be
compared with an *a priori* probability for the existence of
God based on simplicity, a feature of Swinburne's Bayesian
argument. This introduces the theme of simplicity, to which Swinburne
devotes much attention.



Swinburne goes on to argue that a personal explanation in terms of God
satisfies condition (2) because of its simplicity. If one is going to
construct an explanatory hypothesis using the criterion of simplicity,
God rather than science is more likely to be the focus of the true
explanatory hypothesis. God is one and of one kind; polytheism is
ruled out. Moreover, God is the simplest kind of person there can be
because a person is a being with power (to do intentional actions),
knowledge, and freedom (to choose, uncaused, which actions to do), and
in God these properties are infinite, and having infinite properties
is simpler than having properties with limits, as humans do. "It
is always simpler to postulate infinite or zero degrees of some
property than a certain precise finite value of it" (Swinburne
1983: 385). Furthermore, God engages in simple causation, that is,
causation by simple intention. Swinburne concludes that although the
prior likelihood of neither God nor the universe is particularly high,
the prior probability of a simple God exceeds that of a complex
universe. Hence, if anything is to occur unexplained, it would be God,
not the universe.



Consequently, if we are to explain the universe, we must appeal to a
personal explanation 



> 
> 
> in terms of a person who is not part of the universe acting from
> without. This can be done if we suppose that such a person (God)
> brings it about at each instant of time, that (the laws of nature)
> \(L\) operate. (Swinburne 1979: 126, 2004: 142) 
> 
> 
> 



Although for Swinburne this argument does not make the existence of
God more probable than not (it is not a P-inductive argument), it does
increase the probability of God's existence (is a C-inductive
argument) because it provides a more reasonable explanation for the
universe than merely attributing it to the brute fact of the
universe's existence. 



> 
> 
> Theism does not make [certain phenomena] very probable; but nothing
> else makes their occurrence in the least probable, and they cry out
> for an explanation. *A priori*, theism is perhaps very
> unlikely, but it is far more likely than any rival supposition. Hence,
> our phenomena are substantial evidence for the truth of theism.
> (Swinburne 1979: 290)
> 
> 
> 



In his critique of Swinburne, J. L. Mackie wonders whether personal
explanations are reducible to natural, scientific explanations. To
implement intentionality requires an entire system of neurological and
macro-biological conditions. Not only does God as nonphysical lack
these biological conditions, but these conditions are exceedingly
complex, not simple. "Only by ignoring such key features [the
role of the body] do we get an analogue of supposed divine
action" (Mackie 1982: 100). When we incorporate these features,
the simplicity disappears.



Swinburne replies that Mackie has misunderstood his argument.
"The simplicity of the relation between intention and its
realization has nothing to do with how our will or intentions are
realized in practice" (Swinburne 1983: 386). Even if we
understand all the neural connections and firings, we may not achieve
any better explanation of why persons intended to act as they did than
simply asking them why they acted as they did. This indicates that the
existence of intermediate physical causal links is not an essential
part of personal explanation. In fact, Swinburne argues, since it is
easier to understand the function of intention without invoking any
physical causal limitations, it makes it easier to understand the case
of God who as nonphysical has no need for intermediary physical
processes. Thus, he claims, Mackie missed the point about God when he
invokes the complexity of physical accounts. The point is that God can
will to act on his intentions directly, and this provides a simple
account or explanation of why things came to exist.



The critical aspect of Swinburne's argument is his almost total
reliance in his inductive cosmological argument on simplicity as the
deciding factor between competing hypotheses regarding the cause of
the existence of the universe (2004: 333-34; 2010, 9;
Ostrowick). Swinburne has at least six understandings that one
hypothesis is simpler than another. (1) It invokes the fewest number
of entities (2004: 106; 1983: 386; 2001: 87; 2010, 5). This is a
quantitative understanding. (2) It invokes the fewest kinds of
entities--a qualitative understanding (1983: 386, 2001: 87). (3)
It invokes entities with simple or few properties (1983: 386)
Swinburne invokes a subcriterion that explanations are simpler when
the properties they invoke are observable (2010, 6). (4) It invokes
powers, acquisition of beliefs, and consistency of intentions similar
to ours when applied to personal explanation of rational behavior
(2004: 61-64). (5) The explanation invokes the simplest
organization of the features functioning in the explicans, e.g., laws
or variables (2001: 83, 89-90). (6) Simplicity can be found in
the explicans in that it does not invoke extraneous features that are
not necessary to explain the effect (2001: 81).



Swinburne holds that the appeal to God as an explanation is simpler in
all of these
 ways.[4]
 Not only is there one entity and that entity is simple, the
explanation effectively has no organization of the features. The
explanation itself is simple. The appeal to God's causal
activity satisfies understanding or interpretation 6 in that it
involves no extraneous entities to do the explaining and requires no
intermediaries. God can bring about the effect by himself alone.



Several important questions about simplicity arise. First, is
simplicity the criterion we should use to decide between hypotheses?
For one thing, simplicity is not always a reliable criterion for
determining which hypothesis is true or which hypothesis provides the
best explanatory account. The rise of quantum explanations suggests
that the simplest account of the universe, for example, that of
Newton, is not a complete and fully adequate account. The events in
the subatomic realm are far from explained simply. For another,
although an explanation in terms of four factors might make an
explanation simpler, the reverse might hold: an explanation in terms
of ten factors might be simpler than an explanation in terms of four
because the relationships that hold between the ten factors are less
complex than those that hold between the four, making for a simpler
explanation (Ostrowick 2012). In reply, Swinburne might grant this,
but argue that in these much more limited cases explanatory power,
background knowledge, and scope now come into significant play in a
way that they don't when addressing hypotheses explaining the
oddness, bigness, and complexity of the universe.



Second, why think that theism is simpler than naturalism? Oppy argues
that whereas both naturalism and theism equally fit the data and have
the same scope, naturalism is simpler, for theism is 



> 
> 
> committed to two kinds of entities (the natural and the supernatural),
> two kinds of external relations (the natural and the supernatural),
> two kinds of causation (the natural and the supernatural), two kinds
> of non-topic-neutral properties (the natural and the supernatural),
> and so on, whereas naturalism is committed to only one kind in each of
> these categories. (2013: 52) 
> 
> 
> 



In conclusion, Swinburne contends that it is *very unlikely*
that a universe would exist uncaused, but *more likely* that
God would exist uncaused. It is *likely* that if there is a
God, he will make something like the finite and complex universe. The
puzzling existence of the universe can be *made comprehensible*
(explicable) if we suppose it is brought about by a personal God with
intentional beliefs and the power to bring intentions to fruition
(2004: 152). Whether simplicity can bear the weight of his argument is
the key matter in question.


## 9. Necessary Being



Finally, even if the cosmological argument is sound or cogent, the
difficult task remains to show, as part of natural theology, that the
necessary being to which the cosmological argument concludes is the
God of religion, and if so, of which religion. Rowe suggests that the
cosmological argument has two parts, one to establish the existence of
a first cause or necessary being, the other that this necessary being
is God (1975: 6). It is unclear, however, whether the second
contention is an essential part of the cosmological argument. Although
Aquinas was quick to make the identification between God and the first
mover or first cause (growing out of his contention that philosophy is
the handmaiden of theology, such that in philosophy faith seeks
understanding, not confirmation), such identification seems to go
beyond the causal reasoning that informs the argument (although one
can argue that it is consistent with the larger picture of God and his
properties that Aquinas paints in his *Summae*). Some
(Rasmussen, O'Connor, Koons) have plowed ahead in developing
this stage 2 process by showing how and what
properties--simplicity, unity, omnipotence, omniscience,
goodness, and so on--might follow from the concept of a necessary
being. It "has implications that bring it into the neighborhood
of God as traditionally conceived" (O'Connor 2008: 67).
Others have proposed a method of correlation, where to give any
religious substance to the concept of a necessary being, one conducts
a lengthy discussion of the supreme beings found in the diverse
religions and carefully correlates the properties of a necessary being
with those of a religious being. This is done to discern
compatibilities and incompatibilities (Attfield 1975).



Regardless of the connection of a necessary being with religion, it is
necessary to flesh out the nature of the necessary being if one is to
hold that the cosmological argument is informative. As O'Connor
notes, the mere concept of a necessary being is "quite
thin". Along with classical Islamic defenders of the argument
(e.g., al-Baghdadi, c. 1000), O'Connor (2008: 88) concludes that
there is a necessary connection between a personal necessary being and
its nature. He suggests that there is not a contingent but a
"subtle entailment relation" between certain essential
properties like being perfectly powerful, perfectly free, and
perfectly knowledgeable. For example, the 



> 
> 
> extent of power seems to be a function of at least two variables: the
> amount of work that can be performed in a single task and the range of
> tasks one is able to perform in a given circumstance.... Perfect
> power and freedom would require an essentially unlimited knowledge,
> corresponding to the unlimited range of possibilities. (2008: 89) 
> 
> 
> 



A necessary being must also be causally independent for its existence
and thus transcendent (2008: 92). Similarly, Swinburne ties
God's perfection to his simplicity that, as we have seen,
functions centrally in his argument.



Two notions of necessity are found in the conclusion to the deductive
argument: "Necessarily, a necessary being exists". The
first is conditional necessity: the proposition is necessary given
that the premises are true and the argument valid. The other use
concerns what is meant by "necessary being".
O'Connor writes that God is absolutely necessary, by which he
means that God is "absolutely invulnerable to
nonexistence" (2008: 70). 



> 
> 
> The concept of a necessary being is of one that could not have failed
> to exist, absolutely speaking. For such a being to be possible, it
> must be such that it would exist in every possible circumstance,
> including the actual one. That's precisely why the question of
> its existence cannot arise, thereby ending the regress of explanation
> nonarbitrarily. (O'Connor 2013: 42) 
> 
> 
> 



For him necessary existence is necessarily tied up with a particular
nature (otherwise the existence would be contingent) but not
derivative from it; God's existence entails his nature (2008:
88). God's necessity is not logical (for there is no
contradiction in denying that such a being exists) but made possible
on explanatory grounds (the cosmological argument). However, we might
inquire, if God could not have failed to exist, how does an absolutely
necessary being differ from a logically necessary being?
O'Connor goes on to argue that God's absolute necessity
does not invoke the ontological argument. He agrees that by modal
Axiom S5, if it is possible that a necessary being exists, it
necessarily exists (2008: 71), but denies that this invokes the
ontological argument, since it "gives no reason to think that
the nature in question is genuinely possible, and not merely logically
consistent". However, one might wonder, what would one have to
establish to show that the existence of a necessary being understood
in this sense is genuinely possible? (see Plantinga, *God, Freedom,
and Evil*, 1967: 112). Gale himself admits that, given this view
of necessity and S5, the ontological argument works although we
don't know how to properly construct it (Gale and Pruss 1999:
462).



One way to understand the necessary being is as factually or
metaphysically necessary. In this understanding, the necessary being
is "sheer, ultimate, unconditioned reality, without beginning or
end" (Hick 1960: 730). God's necessity refers to his
aseity, in that God does not depend on anything else for his
existence. It is from God's aseity that his eternity
follows.



> 
> 
> God is not one fact amongst others, but is related asymmetrically to
> all other facts as that which determines them. This is the ultimate
> given circumstance, which it is not possible to go with either
> question or explanation. For to explain something means either to
> assign a cause to it or to show its place within some wider context in
> relation to which it is no longer puzzling to us. However, the idea of
> the self-existent Creator of everything other than himself is the idea
> of a reality which is beyond the scope of these explanatory
> procedures. (Hick 1960: 733-34)
> 
> 
> 



Given this reading of "necessary being", God as the
necessary being possesses metaphysical or factual necessity and
logical contingency (Hick 1960; Swinburne 2004: 79). If the necessary
being exists at any time, then necessarily it exists at all times. If
the necessary being does not exist, it cannot come into existence.
Nothing can bring it into existence or cause it to cease to exist.
Thus, if God exists now, it is not coherent to suppose that any agent
can make it false that God exists (Swinburne 2004: 249, 266).
O'Connor objects that if the necessary being is contingent, it
just happens to exist (2008: 70; see White (1979) for further
objections). However, one might reply that God does not just happen to
exist; God exists because of his nature (although his nature does not
precede his existence).



Further considerations beyond the scope of the cosmological argument
are in order to discern the relationship between a necessary being and
the properties often associated with a religious Ultimate. While
defenders of the cosmological argument point to the relevance and
importance of connecting the necessary being with natural theology,
critics find themselves freed from such endeavors.



After all is presented and developed, it is clear that every thesis
and argument we have considered, whether in support or critical of the
cosmological argument, is seriously contested. Perhaps that is as it
should be when trying to answer the difficult questions whether the
universe is contingent or necessary, caused or eternal, and if caused,
why it exists or what brought it into being.