## 1. Rational Coherence and Reason



Someone displays instrumentally rationality insofar as she adopts
suitable means to her ends. But how should "rationality"
be understood? Here it is important to distinguish between two things
that the casually phrased question, "What would it be rational
for an agent to do or intend?" could mean:


1. By doing or intending what would the agent make her responses
(i.e., her attitudes and actions) *cohere* with one another?
Call the answer, stipulatively, what it would be *rationally
coherent* for the agent to do or intend.
2. What does the agent have reason, or ought she, to do or intend?
This is the question that an agent characteristically asks when she is
deliberating about what to do or intend, or when someone else is
advising her what to do or intend. (Note that claims about reasons are
weaker than claims about "oughts". One could have a reason
to do something without it being the case that one ought to do it, as
when the reason is outweighed by competing reasons. However, it is
generally thought that if one ought to do something, then one has a
reason to do it.)



As with any philosophical distinction, this contrast between
"rational coherence" and "reason" might be
questioned. But it is accepted by many of the authors who have written
on the subject, and it will help to organize the discussion of the
subject matter.



In principle, the answers to these questions might perfectly coincide:
that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be
rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways,
however, the answers might be expected to diverge.



First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's
responses *globally* coherent, what it takes to make
one's responses *locally* coherent might differ from what
it takes to make them globally coherent. According to the Subjective
Desire-Based Theory, for example, what agents have reason, or ought,
to do or intend is just what, given what they believe their
circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present
intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose that the agent's
strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, out
of habit, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a
necessary means. According to the Subjective Desire-Based Theory, it
is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. And it might be
said that if he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to
light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he at least
achieves a kind of local coherence.



Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may
depend not on what she *believes* her circumstances to be, but
on something more "objective." There are several
possibilities. What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be
what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her
attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances,
what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim
suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of
the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's
circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's
circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory, which says
that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given
what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their
strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the
agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin
and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that
the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she
believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin
and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does
not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it.
But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind
of rational coherence, both local and global.



Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based
Theory, according to which whatever *ultimate ends* an agent
has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she
*desires* or *wills*, but instead on what is of
independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present
intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends.
Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a
necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. It might
be said that, in intending to press this button, the madman would
achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. And according to
the Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. According to
a Value-Based Theory, however, it presumably is not the case that he
ought so to intend.



There are several reasons, therefore, to expect at least some
divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and
what it would be rationally coherent for one to do or intend. But that
is perfectly compatible with partial convergence, even of a
non-accidental character. As we will discuss below, some suggest that
among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is
precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we
ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to
be rationally coherent.


## 2. Instrumental Transmission



We'll begin by discussing how means-end relations matter for
what one ought, or has reason, to do or intend. (For an opinionated
survey, see Kolodny 2018.) But we should first consider how
"means" is understood. While "means" are often
taken to be tools or resources, for our purposes, we will view means
as actions, intentions, choices, decisions, etc. that might make use
of such tools or resources. It is natural to think of means to an end,
so understood, as actions that help to *cause* the end to
occur. But often philosophers count as means to an end whatever may
help to bring it about. *M* may bring about *E* by
causing it, as flicking this switch causes the illumination of this
room, but *M* may also bring about *E* by helping to
constitute it, as playing this measure partially constitutes the
playing of this sonata, or fulfilling preconditions for it, as
registering for this conference fulfills preconditions for attending
it, or preventing things that might prevent it, as vaccination
prevents disease that might prevent successful completion of the
school year. Means are also often probabilistic. Something may also
count as a means to an end even if it is not guaranteed to help to
bring about the end, but only has some chance of doing so. Usage of
"end" is also often ambiguous. Sometimes "end"
is used to refer to an *action*, such as the action of
illuminating this room. But sometimes "end" is used to
refer to a *state of affairs* that is either desired or
valuable, such as the state of affairs of this room's being
illuminated. We'll here use "end" to refer to an
action.



Reasons for action are often said to "transmit" from ends
to means, in the sense that if there is reason for an end, then,
because of this, there is reason for the means. This idea is captured
in Joseph Raz's Facilitative Principle:



> 
> 
> [w]hen we have an undefeated reason to take an action, we have reason
> to perform any one (but only one) of the possible (for us) alternative
> plans that facilitate its performance. (Raz 2005b)
> 
> 
> 



Insofar as what one ought to do depends on what one has reason to do,
one might expect a similar transmission of "ought" from
end to means. If one ought to achieve an end, then one ought to take
the means, or at least means of certain kinds.



Principles of instrumental transmission of this kind are compatible
with different views about what ends we have reason to achieve. For
example, it may be accepted by either a Desire-Based, or a
Value-Based, Theory.



What the correct principle, or principles, of instrumental
transmission are is controversial. Most commonly, principles describe
transmission to necessary means. However, some speak of sufficient
means, and others speak of neither. For example, Raz's
Facilitative Principle speaks of "facilitating plans."
Some transmission principles say that "oughts" transmit
from end to means, others say that the full force of the reason for
the end transmits to the means, others say that the strength of the
reason for the end that transmits to the means is proportional to
other factors, and others, like Raz's Facilitative Principle,
say only that some reason for the end transmits to the means.



To illustrate the problems facing an account of instrumental
transmission, it may be useful to work with some very simple
principles, which lack many of the qualifications and nuances of
Raz's Facilitative Principle and other principles discussed in
the literature:



*Ought Necessity*:
If one ought to *E*, and *M* is a necessary means to
*E*-ing, then one ought to *M*.
*Strong Reasons Necessity*:
If one has reason to *E*, and *M* is a necessary
means to *E*-ing, then that is as strong a reason to
*M*.
*Weak Reasons Necessity*:
If one has reason to *E*, and *M* is a necessary
means to *E*-ing, then that is some reason to *M*.
*Ought Sufficiency*:
If one ought to *E*, and *M* is a sufficient means
to *E*-ing, then one ought to *M*.
*Strong Reasons Sufficiency*:
If one has reason to *E*, and *M* is a sufficient
means to *E*-ing, then that is as strong a reason to
*M*.
*Weak Reasons Sufficiency*:
If one has reason to *E*, and *M* is a sufficient
means to *E*-ing, then that is some reason to *M*.


There are several problems that principles of instrumental
transmission need to avoid. First, means to an end can be
*costly*, or otherwise objectionable. Suppose that I ought to
take a job in Alaska. One (sufficient) means is to fly there; another
(sufficient) means is to take free passage on a merchant ship. But
flying costs more than I would earn there. Presumably, I ought not
fly. It may be said that I have some reason to fly, but that it is
outweighed. This is an argument against Ought Sufficiency.



However, with other kinds of costs, or objectionable features, it may
sound wrong to say even that one has reason for the means. Suppose I
have reason to alleviate pangs of hunger. One sufficient means to this
is eating a sandwich; another sufficient means is killing myself
(Broome 2005b). Some will resist the conclusion that I have any reason
at all to kill myself. This is an argument against Strong Reasons
Sufficiency and Weak Reasons Sufficiency. Or suppose I have reason to
improve college policy. But a necessary means to this is to kill the
old don who resists any change (because unanimous approval is
required). Some will resist the conclusion that I have any reason at
all to kill the don. This is an argument against Strong Reasons
Necessity and Weak Reasons Necessity. However, it may not be an
argument against Ought Necessity. It may be said that the fact that
improving policy requires killing the don is itself a strong reason
against improving policy, in light of which it is not true that one
ought to improve it. In that case, Ought Necessity does not imply that
one ought to kill the don, which seems intuitive. In any event, the
force of the intuition on which the argument rests may be resisted.
Granted, it sounds odd to say that one has reason to kill oneself. But
this may have a pragmatic explanation. Why bother to identify any
reason to kill oneself when it is vastly outweighed by the reasons
against doing so? (Raz 2005a; Schroeder 2005a, 2007; for objection to
the pragmatic explanation, see Gertken and Kiesewetter 2021.)



Second, problems arise from *repeated applications* of
transmission principles. For one thing, means *to means* to an
end may actually undermine the end. Suppose, to take an example of
Ryan Millsap's, Kenny has reason to bake both a loaf of bread
and a cake for a display on Marie Antoinette. A (necessary) means to
that end is baking a loaf of bread. Plausibly, he has reason to bake a
loaf of bread. A (sufficient) means to *that* means is baking a
giant loaf, which uses all of the flour. But that would prevent him
from baking a cake, and so prevent him from achieving the end. So,
presumably, he does not have reason to bake a giant loaf, even though
it is a means to something that he has reason to do. For another
thing, if we accept both Weak Reasons Necessity and Weak Reasons
Sufficiency, then repeated applications of these principles may imply
that if there is reason for something, then there is reason for
everything. To take another example from Ryan Millsap, suppose there
is reason to *E*, and let *F* be
anything. If *E*-ing or *F*-ing is a necessary means
to *E*-ing, and if *F*-ing is a sufficient means
to *E*-ing or *F*-ing, then, repeated application of
those principles implies that there is reason to *F*. Note that
similar problems arise if we accept both Ought Necessity and Ought
Sufficiency.



Third, a means to an end might have a very *low probability* of
helping to bring that end about. Suppose, to take an example from
Jackson and Pargetter 1986, Professor Procrastinate has been asked to
review a book, which he both ought, and has reason, to do. A
(necessary) means to reviewing it is accepting the commission to
review it. However, even if he accepts the commission, he is very
unlikely to review it. Professor Dispatch, in a parallel universe, is
in the same situation, except that he is very likely to review it if
he accepts. Perhaps Procrastinate, like Dispatch, has some reason to
review it. But Procrastinate may not have as much reason as Dispatch
to accept; not all of the reason for the end may be transmitted to
this (necessary) means. And it may not be the case that Procrastinate
ought to accept. This is an argument against Strong Reasons Necessity
and Ought Necessity, since even if one takes a necessary means, there
may still be a low probability of helping to bring that end about.
However, it is not an argument against the Sufficiency principles,
assuming that sufficient means, if taken, are sure to help to bring
the end about.



In response to this problem, one might argue that Procrastinate both
ought to write the review and ought to accept the invitation. After
all, if we follow Jackson and Pargetter in thinking that Procrastinate
both ought to [write the review and accept the invitation]
*and* ought to decline the invitiation, then it would no longer
be possible for Procrastinate to do everything that he ought to do. As
Benjamin Kiesewetter (2015) argues, we would then have to reject



*Joint Satisfiability*:
If *A* ought to *x* and *A* ought to
*y*, then it is possible for *A* to [*x* and
*y*].


which might prove costly. It may be that such counterexamples to Ought
Necessity (and Strong Reasons Necessity) rely on such costly views.
(For further discussion, see Kiesewetter 2015, White 2017, and
Kiesewetter 2018.)



The fourth and final problem is that a sufficient means may be
*superfluous* to an end, where this means that the end would
still be achieved, even if those means were omitted. Suppose that Drug
1 is a sufficient means to relieving the patient's pain. A
doctor is sure to give Drug 1. Giving Drug 2, in addition, would at
first neutralize the effect of Drug 1, but then recombine with it to
produce a third drug, which will relieve the patient's pain.
Giving Drug 2 would be superfluous to relieving the patient's
pain, although it would help to bring it about, by being part of the
cause of the relief of the patient's pain. Does the doctor then
also have any reason to give Drug 2? At first, one might be tempted to
say that the doctor does indeed have reason to give Drug 2, but that
this reason is outweighed by the cost of giving Drug 2. But observe
that no matter how low we make that cost, it still outweighs any
reason to give it. This suggests that there is no reason at all to
give it. Note that necessary means cannot be superfluous, since if
necessary means were left out, the end would not be achieved.


## 3. Instrumental Coherence



Now we consider instrumental rationality understood as a matter of
rational coherence. It is often said that someone is being locally
instrumentally incoherent insofar as he intends an end, believes,
roughly, that something is a means to it, but refuses to intend that
means. More precisely, it seems that this is so only when the relevant
belief is about *necessary* means. Suppose that I intend to go
to Alaska, but believe that flying there is a sufficient, but not
necessary, means to going to Alaska. Am I being instrumentally
incoherent in refusing to intend to fly there? Not obviously: perhaps
I believe that going by sea is cheaper, and I intend that.



Some suggest that this focus, on intentions and beliefs about
necessary means, inspired by Kant's initial discussion of
hypothetical imperatives (see
 SS4.4
 below), is overly narrow (see Smith 2004 and Wedgwood 2011). Not
simply intentions, but also desires, should be considered, and not
simply beliefs about necessary means, but also beliefs about
non-necessary means should be considered. And others have developed
theories of instrumental rationality focused on (intentional) actions,
as opposed to intentions (see Tenenbaum 2021).



More precisely still, the relevant belief must be that
*intending* the means is itself necessary. Suppose your dentist
intends to remove your tooth, and believes that a necessary means to
removing your tooth is causing you pain. Is she being instrumentally
incoherent in refusing to intend to cause you pain? Not necessarily:
she might believe that she will remove your tooth even if she does not
intend to cause you pain. But she will, presumably, believe that she
will remove your tooth only if she *intends* to use her
instruments. So, though she wouldn't be irrational in not
intending to cause you pain, she would be irrational in not intending
to use her instruments (Kamm 2000, 2007; Searle, 2001; Broome
2003).



Moreover, the relevant belief must be that intending the means
*now* is necessary. Suppose a beginning student intends to earn
a doctoral degree and believes that, when the dissertation is
completed, intending to submit the final paperwork is necessary for
earning the degree. It is not clear that she is being instrumentally
incoherent in refusing to intend, now, to submit that paperwork. She
may trust that, when the time comes, she will intend it (Setiya 2007).
This suggests, as Raz notes, that opportunities for instrumental
incoherence may actually be very rare.



Even with the content of the relevant belief being restricted in these
ways, worries might still arise given that (all-out) belief falls
short of certainty. Suppose I believe the only way to arrive on time
is to steal my neighbor's car, which I'm unwilling to. But
I also think there's a very small chance I could bike in and
arrive on time. (This is compatible with my all-out believing
I'll arrive on time only if I steal my neighbor's car.)
One might argue that it's rationally permissible to intend to
arrive on time in such a case (Nunez 2020). However, perhaps we
should instead say here that it's rationally permissible to have
the *goal*, or *aim*, of arriving on time, not the
*intention* to arrive on time.



There seems to be considerable agreement, then, on what we might call
the:



*Violation Claim*:
If one is instrumentally incoherent--i.e., one intends at
*t* to *E*, believes at *t* that one will
*E* only if one intends at *t* to *M*, but does
not (or, more restrictively, refuses to) intend at *t* to
*M*--then one violates some requirement.


But it is unclear exactly what requirement one violates. Additionally,
it is unclear whether the requirement violated would be
"normative" in the sense that one ought not to violate it.
In other words, it is unclear whether, in being instrumentally
incoherent, one violates a *requirement of reason*, in the
sense of "reason" identified earlier. In the remainder of
this section, we'll consider some possible answers to these
questions.



First,
 (SS3.1)
 we might say that there isn't any requirement of reason to be
instrumentally coherent *as such*, but whenever one is
instrumentally incoherent, one violates some *independent*
requirement of reason. Second,
 (SS3.2)
 we might say that there is a requirement of reason to be
instrumentally coherent as such. Third,
 (SS3.3)
 we might deny that one necessarily violates a requirement of reason
in being instrumentally incoherent; perhaps the normativity of
instrumental coherence is merely apparent, or the requirement merely
evaluative (it may be a standard of proper functioning without giving
anyone reason to comply with it). Fourth,
 (SS3.4)
 one might think, given the ways in which intention is thought to
involve belief, that in being instrumentally incoherent, one violates
a requirement of *theoretical* rationality.



There are, of course, other answers that could be given. (For
instance, we briefly discuss a constitutivist approach to instrumental
incoherence, attributed to Kant, in
 SS4.4)
 But consideration of these approaches will give a reasonably
comprehensive picture of the recent attempts to explain the Violation
Claim.


### 3.1 Independent Requirements of Reason



One answer is that when one is instrumentally incoherent one violates
some independent requirement of reason. That is, *either* one
*has* some *specific* attitude (or pattern of attitudes)
that one ought not to have *or* one *lacks* some
specific attitude (or pattern of attitudes) that one ought to have.
The source of the problem, according to this answer, is *not*
that when one is instrumentally incoherent, one violates some
requirement of reason to be instrumentally coherent *as such*.
The source of the problem is instead that when one is instrumentally
incoherent, then it is guaranteed that one's having (or lacking)
one attitude (or pattern of attitudes) violates some
*independent* requirement of reason. (See Kolodny 2007b, 2008a;
Kiesewetter 2017, esp. Ch. 10; Lord 2018, esp. Ch. 2. For criticism,
see Brunero 2020, Ch. 4; Fogal and Worsnip 2021; Worsnip 2021, Ch. 3,
Lee 2021.)



Certainly, this can happen in some cases, at least accidentally.
Suppose our madman intends to start World War III, believes that he
will start World War III only if he intends to launch a nuclear
missile, but refuses to intend to launch a nuclear missile. The
Violation Claim might be explained in this case by pointing out that,
whatever his other attitudes may be, he ought not to have the
intention to start World War III, but does have that intention. But
why should we suppose that, in general, *whenever* one has an
instrumentally incoherent set, one *either* has an attitude (or
pattern) that one ought not to have, *or* lacks an attitude (or
pattern) that one ought to have?



This would be so, in general, if the following were the case:



**Ought Pattern 1**:
In any situation, either

* one ought not to believe *that one will *E* only if one
intends to *M**, or
* one ought not to intend to *E*, or
* one ought to intend to *M*.

 


It would also be so, in general, if the following were the case:



**Ought Pattern 2**:
In any situation, either

* one ought not to believe *that one will *E* only if one
intends to *M**, or
* whatever pattern of intention one ought to have, it is not *one
intends to *E* and does not intend to *M**; i.e.,
either
	+ one ought *not to intend to *E* and not to intend to
	*M**, or
	+ one ought *not to intend to *E* and to intend to
	*M**, or
	+ one ought *to intend to *E* and to intend to
	*M**, or
	+ one ought either *not to intend to *E* and not to intend
	to *M** or *not to intend to *E* and to intend to
	*M**, or
	+ one ought either *not to intend to *E* and not to intend
	to *M** or *to intend to *E* and to intend to
	*M**, or
	+ one ought either *not to intend to *E* and to intend to
	*M** or *to intend to *E* and to intend to
	*M**, or
	+ one ought either *not to intend to *E* and to not to
	intend to *M** or *not to intend to *E* and to
	intend to *M** or *to intend to *E* and to intend
	to *M**.

 


Ought Pattern 2 speaks of "oughts" for patterns of
intention, rather than for single intentions. The reason for this is
that one's having an intention to *X* can affect
one's reason for having an intention to *Y*. This can
happen in the following way. First, one's reason to intend to
*Y* plausibly depends, among other things, on how likely one is
to succeed in it. Second, how likely one is to succeed in it in turn
depends on how the future is likely to be. I am more likely to succeed
in drying the laundry if there is no rain. Third, how the future is
likely to be can depend on how some person is likely to act. I am more
likely to succeed in drying the laundry if the children are unlikely
to be playing with the hose at the same time. Fourth, the relevant
person may be the agent himself. I am more likely to succeed in drying
the laundry if I am unlikely to be at the same time watering the
garden. Finally, the fact that an agent intends to *X* can make
it more likely that the agent will *X* in the future. The fact
that I intend to water the garden can make it more likely that I will
be watering the garden. Thus, the fact that an agent intends to
*X* can make it more likely that the agent will not succeed in
an intention to *Y*, and so that the agent has less reason to
intend to *Y*. Given that one's intending to *X*
can affect one's reason to *Y* and vice versa, the
questions, "What reason do I have to intend to *Y*? What
reason do I have to intend to *X*?" may be insufficiently
determinate. Better questions may instead be "What reason do I
have (to intend to *X* and to intend to *Y*)? What
reason do I have (to intend to *X* and not to intend to
*Y*)? What reason do I have (not to intend to *X* and to
intend to *Y*)? What reason do I have (not to intend to
*X* and not to intend to *Y*)?"



This phenomenon, or apparent phenomenon, that the presence of one
intention can affect one's reason to have another intention,
should be distinguished from the phenomenon, or apparent phenomenon,
that the presence of one intention and the presence or absence of
another can make it the case that one violates or satisfies a rational
requirement of instrumental coherence as such. First, what matters for
rational requirements is what we *believe* about the relations
between the intentions, whereas what matters for reason would seem to
be how they are *likely* to affect one another, which may be
independent of what we believe. Second, what matters for rational
requirements is intending to *X as such*, whereas what matters
for reason is what intending to *X means for the future*. In
some cases, intending to *X* (e.g., intending to become King of
France in 2023), may *not* affect the likely future. In other
cases, conditions other than intending to *X* (e.g., my
self-trust that I will *X* even if I don't intend it now,
or my knowledge that I will be tortured or coerced into
*X*-ing) may affect the likely future in the *same* way.
Finally, rational requirements are usually taken to be wide-scope, as
we will see below. That is, one never needs to have or lack any
particular attitude in order to satisfy them. By contrast, one usually
needs to have or lack a particular attitude in order to conform to
one's reason to have a certain pattern of intentions. If one
ought, for example, (to intend to *X* and not to intend to
*Y*), then one can comply with this requirement of reason only
by intending to *X* and not intending to *Y*.



One might argue for Ought Pattern 1 in the following way. Suppose that
it is not the case that one ought not to believe that one will
*E* only if one intends to *M*. Then by:



*Epistemic Strictness*:
If one believes *P* or is considering whether *P*,
and it is not the case that one ought not to believe *P*, then
it is the case that one ought to believe *P*.


one ought to believe it. Suppose further that it is not the case that
one ought not to intend to *E*. Then by:



*Practical Strictness*:
If it is not the case that one ought not to intend to *E*,
then one ought to intend to *E*.


one ought to intend to *E*. Suppose further that:



*Ought Intention*:
One ought to intend to *E* only if one ought to
*E*.


Then one ought to *E*. Then by:



*Variant of Ought Necessity*:
If one ought to *E*, and one ought to believe that one will
*E* only if one intends to *M*, then one ought to intend
to *M*.


one ought to intend to *M*. In other words, either one ought
not to believe that one will *E* only if one intends to
*M*, or one ought not to intend to *E*, or one ought to
intend to *M*.



One problem is that the objections to Ought Necessity that we saw in
 SS2
 seem to apply to Variant as well. Another is that Practical
Strictness seems untenable (Way 2012a; Cheng-Guajardo 2014). It might
be the case neither that one ought not to intend to *E*, nor
that one ought to intend to *E*; intending to *E* might
be merely permitted. Suppose I ought to take a can of beans. I can
take the can of beans on the left, or I can take the equally good can
on the right. It is neither the case that I ought not to intend to
take the can on the left, nor that I ought to intend to take the can
on the left.



But perhaps in such cases one's *intending* to take the
can on the left provides a reason that tips the scales, thereby making
it the case that one ought to intend the means to that end. (See
Schroeder 2009, SS4.1; For criticism of the view that intentions
provide reasons in this way, see Broome 2001 and Brunero 2007.) If
that's true, then these cases of "picking"
wouldn't pose a special problem for Ought Pattern 1; in all such
cases, one ought to intend to *M*.



One might argue for Ought Pattern 2 in the following way. Again,
suppose that it is not the case that one ought not to have the belief.
Then, by Epistemic Strictness, one ought to have the belief. For the
time being, suppose that one does not intend to *M*. Then
by:



*Required Self-Knowledge*:
If one does not intend to *M*, then one ought to believe
that one does not intend to *M*,


one ought to believe that one does not intend to *M*. Then
by:



*Reverse Closure*:
If one ought to believe not *Q* and one ought to believe
*P* only if *Q*, then one ought to believe not
*P*,


one ought to believe that one will not *E*. Then by:



*Effectiveness*:
So long as one ought to believe that one will not *E*, one
has no reason to intend to *E*, since the evidence suggests
that doing so is pointless.


one has no reason to intend to *E*. In other words, so long as
one does not intend to *M*, one has no reason to intend to
*E*. If we also accept:



*Cost*:
There is reason not to intend to *E*,


then, so long as one does not intend to *M*, one has no reason
to intend to *E* and reason not to intend to *E*. This
makes it plausible that there is more reason (not to intend to
*M* and not to intend to *E*) than (not to intend to
*M* and to intend to *E*). This does *not* mean
that one ought (not to intend to *M* and not to intend to
*E*) all things considered. For example, it might be the case
that one ought (to intend to *M* and to intend to *E*).
But it does mean that whatever pattern of intention one ought to have,
it is not to (not to intend to *M* and to intend to
*E*). There is a superior alternative.



One question, of course, is whether we should accept these
assumptions, in particular Required Self-Knowledge.



Another problem is that even if this explains Ought Pattern 2, and so
the Violation Claim, it does not explain the:



*Satisfaction Claim*:
One satisfies a requirement by avoiding or escaping instrumental
incoherence (of a kind which one would not satisfy by entering or
remaining in instrumental incoherence) no matter how one does it.


Suppose that one ought to have the means-end belief and one ought (to
intend to *E* and to intend to *M*). However, one avoids
incoherence by dropping the means-end belief, not intending to
*E*, and not intending to *M*. Intuitively, one has
satisfied some requirement. This is what the Satisfaction Claim
reflects. But one hasn't adopted the particular attitudes (or
patterns) that one ought to adopt. How, then, are we to explain the
Satisfaction Claim?



A quick answer might be this. One might suggest, first, that one ought
to be instrumentally coherent, because it is a necessary means to, or
at least a necessary condition of, having the particular attitudes (or
pattern) that one independently ought to have, or not having the
particular attitudes (or pattern) that one independently ought not to
have. Suppose that one ought to intend to *M*, but does not.
Just as (*P* or *Q*) is a necessary condition of
*P*, so too a necessary condition of intending to *M* is
(either not to intend to *E*, or not to believe that one will
*E* only if one intends now to *M*, or to intend to
*M*). Now suppose that instead of intending to *M*, one
drops one's intention to *E*. While one hasn't
intended to *M*, which one ought to do, one has fulfilled a
necessary means, or at least a necessary condition, of that. Assume
Ought Necessity of
 SS2,
 perhaps slightly strengthened: that one ought to take any necessary
means to, or at least fulfill any necessary condition of, what one
ought. In that sense, by dropping one's intention to *E*,
one has done something that one ought, and so satisfied a requirement.
Analogously, if one ought to post the letter, then, by similar
reasoning, one ought (either to post the letter or to burn it). So, if
one burns the letter, one has done something that one ought, and so
satisfied a requirement.



Note that this response assumes that either Ought Pattern 1 or Ought
Pattern 2 is correct. Otherwise, we have no guarantee that, in any
given case, a necessary condition of having the particular attitudes
that one ought to have, or not having the particular attitudes that
one ought not to have, is (either not to intend to *E*, or not
to believe that one will *E* only if one intends now to
*M*, or to intend to *M*). So it inherits all of the
challenges in defending Ought Pattern 1 or Ought Pattern 2.



Another problem with this response is that it is not obvious that
Ought Necessity is true, as the Professor Procrastinate example of
 SS2
 suggested.



A third problem is that necessary conditions of intending to
*M* are easy to come by. Another necessary condition is (either
intending to *M* *or being instrumentally incoherent*)!
Therefore, in exactly the same way, one satisfies a requirement by
remaining incoherent. But the intuitive Satisfaction Claim is
precisely that in escaping incoherence one satisfies a requirement of
a kind which one would not satisfy by remaining instrumentally
incoherent.


### 3.2 Requirements of Reason to be Instrumentally Coherent As Such



The Violation and Satisfaction Claims would be explained by a
requirement of reason to avoid or escape instrumental incoherence
*as such*. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care
for our children, we ought to be instrumentally coherent as such.



One might instead suggest a weaker view: we have a reason to be
instrumentally coherent as such. But this weaker version faces a
difficulty in explaining the "strictness" of the Violation
Claim. One could have a reason to *X* without being under any
*requirement* to *X*, as when that reason to *X*
is outweighed. But, according to the Violation Claim, whenever one is
instrumentally incoherent, one violates some requirement. This
"strictness" would thus remain unexplained by the weaker
view (Broome 1999). Of course, the weaker view--that we have a
reason to be instrumentally coherent as such--could be true even
though it fails to explain the Violation and Satisfaction Claims.
(However, some philosophers have raised important challenges to the
"strictness" of rational requirements. Most notably, Fogal
2020 suggests replacing a "requirements-based" account of
structural rationality with a "pressure-based"
account.)



So, let's work with the stronger view, according to which we
ought to be instrumentally coherent as such. One worry about this
answer is "bootstrapping." Suppose that this requirement
to be instrumentally coherent as such is stated in
"narrow-scope" form: if one intends to *E* and
believes that one will *E* only if one intends to *M*,
then one is required to intend to *M*. Now suppose that one
intends to stay in power and believes that one will do so only if one
intends to kill one's rival. If one ought to be instrumentally
coherent as such, it would follow that one ought to intend to kill
one's rival. But that seems implausible. So, one may conclude,
we cannot understand "one is rationally required" as
implying "one ought."


#### 3.2.1 Wide-Scoping and its Problems



A natural reply, however, is that there is *another* way to be
instrumentally coherent: namely, to abandon the intention to stay in
power. Thus, a requirement of instrumental coherence as such should
take "wide-scope." It should say: one is required to
either revise one's intention to *E*, or revise
one's belief that one will *E* only if one intends to
*M*, or intend to *M*. (See especially Broome 1999 and
Wallace 2006. For earlier defenses of the wide-scope view, see Hill
1973 and Darwall 1983.) So even if "one is rationally
required" is taken to imply "one ought," all that
follows is that one ought to either revise the intention to stay in
power, or revise the belief that one will do so only if one intends to
kill one's rival, or intend to kill one's rival. It does
not follow that one ought to intend to kill one's rival.



However, there are some problems facing this approach, which we
outline in the supplemental document
 Problems for Wide-Scoping.
 Some of those problems concern the allegedly implausible consequences
that emerge when we apply some of the transmission principles we
discuss in
 SS2
 above--specifically, Ought Necessity, Weak Reasons Necessity,
and Weak Reasons Sufficiency--to the relevant wide-scope ought in
certain cases. Other problems concern whether the wide-scope
formulation is adequate as a formulation of the rational
requirement.


#### 3.2.2 What is the Reason?



There are other challenges facing the view that the Violation and
Satisfaction Claims are explained by a requirement of reason to be
instrumentally coherent as such. The proponent of this view,
presumably, should be able to say *what the reason is* to be
instrumentally coherent as such (see Kolodny 2005, SS2).



Keep in mind that it won't be enough to state a reason to be
*disposed* to be instrumentally coherent. It doesn't
follow from one's having a reason to have a disposition that one
has a reason to manifest that disposition on every particular
occasion. And so pointing to a reason to be disposed to be coherent
wouldn't yield a reason to be instrumentally coherent as such.
(As we'll see in
 SS4.4,
 a similar problem confronts the Kantian constitutivist view that
continued instrumental incoherence threatens our status as agents.
Since our agency isn't at risk with every instance of
instrumental incoherence, this account won't yield a reason to
be instrumentally coherent on every particular occasion; it would only
provide a reason to do so when one's incoherence is extreme
enough to threaten one's status as an agent.) Furthermore, it is
not clear what reasons there are to be disposed to be instrumentally
coherent. It might be thought that being disposed to be instrumentally
coherent will make one more likely to conform to reason over the long
run. But given that instrumental coherence may just as soon be gained
by revising one's attitudes against reason as in conformity to
reason, one might doubt that this is so (Kolodny 2008b).



There's a reason to be skeptical that such a reason could be
provided. A reason to be instrumentally coherent as such would have to
apply at once to beliefs and intentions. But one might think that this
cannot be the case: that reasons for belief and reasons for intention
are fundamentally different in kind. Reasons for belief are
considerations that show that the belief is likely to be true, whereas
reasons for action are considerations that show that the action would
realize one's desires, or promote or respect something of
value.



Some philosophers have attempted to meet this challenge. Jonathan Way
(2012a) has developed an account which points to the costs necessarily
involved in intending to *E* without also intending to
*M*, specifically the psychological resources that would be
wasted (one's monitoring one's progress towards
*E*-ing, being disposed to take means towards *E*-ing,
etc.). And Michael Bratman (2009c) has suggested that we have a reason
to be instrumentally coherent as such because doing so is a necessary,
constitutive component of self-governance, and we have an intrinsic
reason to govern ourselves. In his view, just as we have a reason not
to torture, and a reason to care for our children, we have a reason to
govern ourselves. And one's being instrumentally incoherent on
any particular occasion would be a way of failing to govern oneself.
Also, Alex Worsnip (2021, Ch.8) has argued that consideration about
coherence constitute (non-derivative) reasons to *structure
deliberation* in certain ways -- in particular, they
constitute reasons to treat certain options as
"off-limits" in one's deliberations. On this view,
we would have reason to treat the instrumentally incoherent
combination [intending to X, not intending to Y, believing intending
to Y is necessary for X-ing] as off-limits. Why is there such a
reason? For Worsnip, it's simply *fitting* to stucture
deliberation in a way that respects coherence constraints.


### 3.3 Instrumental Incoherence without Violating Requirements of Reason



A third approach to instrumental incoherence holds that one need not
violate any requirement of reason in being instrumentally incoherent.
One version of this view
 (SS3.3.1)
 holds that instrumental coherence is to be explained in terms of
appropriate responses to one's *beliefs* about
independent requirements of reason, where these beliefs could be
false. Another version of this view
 (SS3.3.2)
 holds that instrumental incoherence is nothing more than an indicator
that one is not functioning well as an agent, where this evaluation
doesn't entail any particular conclusions about what one ought,
or has reason, to do.


#### 3.3.1 Responsiveness to Beliefs about Independent Requirements of Reason



On this first approach to explaining the Violation and Satisfaction
Claims, what one does "wrong" in being instrumentally
incoherent is violate one's own judgments about one's
reasons (or fail to be attentive enough to form such judgments in the
first place), and what one does "right" in becoming
instrumentally coherent is respond appropriately to one's
judgments about one's reasons.



Suppose one is instrumentally incoherent. Plausibly, one is in a
position to know this, that one is instrumentally incoherent.
Plausibly, one is also in a position to know Ought Pattern 2: the
general fact that, when one is instrumentally incoherent, there is
some specific change that one ought to make. So, one is in a position
to know that there is some specific change that one ought to make. So,
plausibly, one ought to give some thought to what this specific change
is. In other words,



*Self-Monitoring*:
If one is instrumentally incoherent, then one ought to arrive at
some belief about which attitude (or pattern of attitudes) one ought
to have.


Suppose one arrives at some such belief. And suppose one revises
one's attitudes in accordance with that belief. If one becomes
instrumentally coherent in *this* way, then, even if one
revises one's attitudes in the wrong way (i.e., against reason),
one still satisfies:


1. Self-Monitoring, and
2. Krasia: If one believes that reason requires one to *X* (or
not to *X*), then one is rationally required to *X* (or
not to *X*).



This would explain the Satisfaction Claim.



It might be thought that it's not much of an improvement to
explain the requirement to be instrumentally coherent in terms of
Self-Monitoring and Krasia, since we are still appealing to a
requirement of coherence: namely, Krasia. The only difference is that
it requires us not to be *instrumentally* coherent, but instead
to be *kratically* coherent: i.e., *to follow one's
judgment about one's reasons*. Indeed, if we thought that it
were a requirement *of reason* to comply with Krasia, then
similar challenges to those we discussed in
 SS3.2.
 would reappear, and so it would not be much of an improvement.



But, the view considered here naturally suggests a new strategy:
presenting a Transparency Account according to which the normativity
of instrumental coherence is merely apparent (Kolodny 2005, SS5).
According to the Transparency Account of rational requirements in
general, when we point out to people that rationality requires
something of them, we aren't presenting them with some
requirement of reason; rather, we're pointing out to them what
they already think reason requires of them. And, so, when we point out
to someone that rationality requires they be instrumentally coherent
with respect to some end, we're pointing out to them that (on
the assumption that Self-Monitoring is satisfied) they already think
that reason requires some specific change in their attitudes. Of
course, the instrumentally incoherent agent could be mistaken in these
thoughts; perhaps he thinks reason requires him to intend the means
when reason actually requires that he abandon the end instead. It is
this possibility for false belief that restricts us to saying that the
normativity of rational requirements is merely apparent.



However, one might challenge whether the Satisfaction Claim is
adequately explained by an appeal to Self-Monitoring and Krasia.
Suppose an instrumentally incoherent agent knows that she ought to
give up her intention to kill her boss, but instead she comes to
intend to poison the office coffee, which she believes to be a
necessary means to killing her boss. She clearly violates a
requirement of reason and she clearly violates Krasia, but it still
seems that she satisfies some requirement in coming to intend the
means to her immoral end. The appeal to Self-Monitoring and Krasia
can't explain our thinking that she satisfies some requirement
in proceeding this way.


#### 3.3.2 Proper Functioning



Perhaps a violation of a requirement of instrumental coherence is
merely an indicator that an agent is not functioning well in the
exercise of her rational capacities, where this evaluation
doesn't entail that she ought, or has reason, to be
instrumentally coherent on any particular occasion (see Raz 2005a,b).
In holding this view, one could also say that there is value in being
a properly functioning agent, and that this value is explained by the
ways in which functioning properly as a agent tends to bring one into
conformity with what reason requires. But, it doesn't follow
from this that there is value in functioning properly, or that one has
any reason to function properly, in every particular occasion.
(Similar things could be said about the value of having
well-functioning perceptual capacities.) For instance, when one has
the unalterable intention to kill one's boss (for more on
unalterable ends, see
 Section 1
 of the supplementary document
 Problems for Wide Scoping),
 there is nothing valuable in one's functioning properly, so far
as instrumental rationality goes, on that particular occasion, and one
would have no reason to do so (see Raz 2005a, especially pp.
10-13, and Bratman 1987).



But one might worry about how well this account explains the Violation
and Satisfaction Claims. On this view, the requirements violated, or
satisfied, are simply standards of proper rational functioning. These
standards can be used to evaluate how well particular agents are
functioning, in the same way that standards of what makes for a
well-functioning perceptual apparatus can be used to evaluate how well
particular perceivers are functioning. But, rational requirements also
seem to *call for* some response. For instance, when we advise
others who are in violation of rational requirements, such as those
who are instrumentally incoherent, we say that some change in attitude
*is called for*. And, when we ourselves are instrumentally
incoherent, we feel some "normative pressure" to change
our attitudes in some way (see Kolodny 2005, SS4). It's
unclear how these features of rational requirements could be explained
by a view that takes them to be merely evaluative.



Another related view attempts to explain instrumental incoherence in
terms of the *success conditions* of the relevant individual
attitudes. If your belief that intending to Y is necessary for X-ing
is successful (true), then your failure to intend to Y ensures that
your intending to X will not be successful (in that it won't
result in your X-ing). In other words, your being instrumentally
incoherent ensures that either your instrumental belief is false, or
that your intention will not be successfully executed (Brunero 2020,
Ch.7). Some philosophers have recently argued that the impossibility
of joint attitudinal success can explain coherence requirements in
general, not just instrumental rationality (Fullhart and Martinez,
forthcoming; Fink, forthcoming).


### 3.4 "Cognitivist" Requirements on Belief



A fourth approach to explaining the Violation and Satisfaction Claims
argues that the requirement violated, or satisfied, is, or is
explained by, requirements on *belief* exclusively. There are
two components to this "cognitivist" approach: first,
there is some thesis about how intention involves belief, and, second,
there is some account of how the requirements governing those involved
beliefs constitute, or explain, the requirement to be instrumentally
coherent.



Here are some candidates for the first component:


* Strong: If one intends to *E*, then one believes that one
will *E*.
* Medium: If one intends to *E*, then one believes that it is
possible that one will *E*.
* Weak: If one intends to *E*, then one does not believe that
one will not *E*.



(Cognitivist accounts developed with Strong, or a variant of it, are
found in Harman 1976, 1986; Velleman 1989, 2007; Setiya 2007; Broome
2009; and Archer 2018. Earlier defenses of Strong can be found in
Hampshire and Hart 1958 and Grice 1971. Wallace 2006 develops a
cognitivist account with Medium, and Binkley 1965 does so with
Weak.)


#### 3.4.1 Strong



Let's begin with Strong. Suppose I am instrumentally
incoherent--that is, I intend to *E*, believe I will
*E* only if I intend to *M*, but don't intend to
*M*. According to Strong, I believe


1. I will *E*.



When we pair this with my instrumental belief


2. If I will *E*, then I intend to *M*,



and apply the theoretical rational requirement



*Closure*:
Rationality requires that [if one believes *P*, and one
believes *P* - *Q*, then one believes
*Q*].


we get the result that I am required to believe


3. I intend to *M*,



or drop either (1) or (2). If I drop (1), I would cease to intend to
*E* (according to Strong) and thereby cease to be
instrumentally incoherent, and if I drop my instrumental belief (2), I
would also cease to be instrumentally incoherent.



But is coming to believe (3) enough to cease to be instrumentally
incoherent? What if my belief is false? There are two options for the
cognitivist at this point. The first would be to defend



*Self-Fulfillment*:
If one believes that one intends to *M*, then one intends
to *M*.


But we might doubt that we are infallible in our beliefs about our own
intentions (Bratman 2009b, SS4,5). After all, it seems that we can
be mistaken in our beliefs about other attitudes we have (see
Schwitzgebel 2010, SS4).



A second option for the cognitivist would be to say that having false
beliefs about one's own intentions is *possible*, but
theoretically *irrational*. (On this option, the cognitivist
approach to instrumental coherence appeals to *two* theoretical
requirements: Closure plus some other requirement not to have false
beliefs about one's own intentions.) However, there is usually
nothing necessarily incoherent about one's having a
*false* belief. So, the challenge for cognitivists is to
explain why, in this particular case, there is. (This strategy is
pursued by Setiya 2007, 670-671. For criticism, see Bratman
2009a, SS4 and Brunero 2009, SS2.)



Additionally, one might worry that Strong is too strong. Suppose you
intend to go shopping on Thursday but don't believe you intend
this and instead believe that you intend to go shopping on Friday.
Maybe you've temporarily forgotten that you've recently
changed your mind, deciding to go on Thursday instead of Friday
(Bratman 2009a, SS5). In this case, you might not believe you will
go shopping on Thursday. In light of this example, John Broome (2009,
SS7) suggests the following



*Variant of Strong*:
If one *believes* one intends to *E*, then one
believes one will *E*.


But this wouldn't help the cognitivist if she aims to account
for the application of instrumental coherence to all intentions,
including those we don't believe we have (Bratman 2009b,
SS2). Additionally, both Strong and Variant of Strong seem
vulnerable to counterexamples. Suppose I intend, and believe I intend,
to carry out a difficult task. Knowing the difficulty involved, I
could intend to carry out the task but remain agnostic about whether I
will do so. Here's another counterexample: suppose I intend to
stop by a bookstore on the way home, but know that once I'm
riding on my bicycle, I tend to go on "autopilot." Aware
of my absentminded tendencies, I might intend to stop by the bookstore
without believing I will (Bratman 1987, 38-39; also discussed in
Holton 2008, SS2). Since such intentions make applicable a
requirement of instrumental coherence, but don't involve a
belief in success, the cognitivist cannot explain why requirements of
instrumental coherence apply to these intentions.


#### 3.4.2 Medium



Next, let us consider Medium. Suppose again that I am instrumentally
incoherent--that is, I intend to *E*, believe I will
*E* only if I intend to *M*, but don't intend to
*M*. By



*Self-Knowledge*:
If one does not intend to *M*, then one believes that one
does not intend to *M*.


I believe:


1. I do not intend to *M*.



Let us now suppose that the instrumental belief takes this form:


2. If I do not intend to *M*, then it is not possible for me
to *E*.



If I satisfy Closure, then I believe:


3. It is not possible for me to *E*.



However, since I intend to *E*, then, by Medium, I believe:


4. It is possible for me to *E*.



Thus, in believing (3) and (4), I violate:



*Belief Consistency*:
Rationality requires that [if one believes not *P*, then
one does not believe *P*]


Thus, if one satisfies Closure, then one violates Belief Consistency
(Wallace 2006).



One might object to Self-Knowledge, arguing that we aren't
always aware of what we fail to intend. One might falsely believe one
intends the means (Bratman 2009a) or one might simply fail to notice
that one hasn't intended the means (Brunero 2005a). One response
available to the cognitivist would be to say that such lapses in
self-awareness are *possible*, but are theoretically
*irrational*. And so instrumental coherence would be explained
by Closure, Belief Consistency, and the requirement to be aware of
one's absent intention in this context. While it wouldn't
be plausible to claim that rationality requires, in general, awareness
of what one does not intend, it might be plausible to say that
awareness of what one does not intend is rationally required in this
specific context (Wallace 2006, 118).



One might also object that if one is going to be a cognitivist about
practical requirements in general, one must account for both
instrumental coherence and



*Intention Consistency*:
One is required [if one intends not to *E*, then one does
not intend to *E*].


But Medium, on its own, does not seem sufficient to account for
Intention Consistency. Such a conflict of intentions would involve the
following beliefs:


5. It is possible for me not to *E*,
6. It is possible for me to *E*,



But unlike those beliefs involved according to Strong, namely,


7. I will not *E*,
8. I will *E*,



(5) and (6) are perfectly consistent with one another. I could
consistently believe it's possible that I not go to the game
tonight, and possible that I go to the game tonight. So, we are still
in need of an explanation of why I'm rationally required to not
both intend not to go and intend to go (Bratman 2009b, SS3).



One might also raise doubts about Medium. Suppose I know I
haven't yet investigated whether the stores are closed for the
holiday on Thursday, and so I haven't yet formed any beliefs
about whether I can go shopping then. Couldn't I still intend to
go shopping on Thursday? That might be irrational or careless planning
on my part, but it seems possible. (The example might prove even more
convincing if we add the feature of Bratman's example above:
suppose, forgetting about my change of mind, I believe I intend to go
shopping on Friday, not on Thursday.) Perhaps doubts could even be
raised, not just about whether intending to *E* involves
believing *E* is possible, but also about whether intending to
*E* involves *not believing *E* is impossible*.
Richard Holton (2008), drawing on Anscombe's example from
*Intention* (SS52) of a man who is certain he'll
break down under torture but is determined not to break down, has
argued that one could intend some end while believing that end
isn't a "live possibility." Such combinations,
Holton argues, may be irrational, but aren't impossible.


#### 3.4.3 Weak



Next, let us consider Weak. Suppose again that I am instrumentally
incoherent--that is, I intend to *E*, believe I will
*E* only if I intend to *M*, but don't intend to
*M*. By Self-Knowledge, I believe:


1. I do not intend to *M*.



When this belief is paired with the contrapositive of my instrumental
belief


2. If I do not intend to *M*, I will not *E*,



Closure requires that I believe


3. I will not *E*,



or cease to believe (1) or (2). But since I intend to *E*, it
follows, by Weak, that I do not believe (3). Were I to comply with
Closure by forming the belief (3), I would, according to Weak, thereby
cease to intend to *E*. In ceasing to believe (2), I would
cease to be instrumentally incoherent. And in ceasing to believe (1)
(which, if Self-Knowledge is true, would mean that it is no longer the
case that I do not intend to *M*) I would also cease to be
instrumentally incoherent.



Some of the objections mentioned above would also apply to this
account. There is the objection to Self-Knowledge. And
Anscombe's example, exploited by Holton, also presents a
challenge to Weak, since the torture victim intends not to break down
but believes that he will.



Additionally, one might raise questions concerning the rationality of
*responding* to the violation of Closure in this context.
Usually, if one discovers that one believes *P*,
*P* - *Q*, but does not believe
*Q*, the rational way to proceed depends upon one's
assessment of the relevant reasons for belief (where these are
evidential, not pragmatic, reasons). Let us assume, for simplicity,
that *P* - *Q* is a fixed background
belief. If one thinks there are really strong reasons for believing
*P* and not strong reasons for not believing *Q*, then
it would be irrational for one to refuse to believe *Q* and
instead to drop one's belief that *P*. Now, according to
this cognitivist account, when I'm instrumentally incoherent, I
believe (1) and (2) but not (3). How should I proceed? If I currently
do not intend to *M*, and if, as Self-Knowledge holds,
I'm infallibly aware of what I do not intend, then it seems that
the evidence I have for my belief that I do not intend to *M*
is really quite strong. Let's assume (2) is a fixed background
belief. In revising in light of my assessment of the evidence, it
seems that the revision could only proceed in one direction: by
*modus ponens*, coming to believe I will not *E*. It
would be irrational for me instead to proceed by *modus
tollens*, ceasing to believe that I do not intend to *M*.
So, if we respond to violations of Closure in the usual way, we are
left with the counterintuitive result that there is only one way to
escape a state of instrumental incoherence: by abandoning the end.



Finally, one might also cast doubt on the general cognitivist strategy
being employed here, whether it appeals to Weak, Medium, or Strong.
Many of the same questions that we've raised about instrumental
incoherence could be raised about rational requirements on belief,
including Belief Consistency and Closure. There are analogues of the
Violation and Satisfaction Claims for these rational requirements that
would need to be defended and explained. For example, Joseph Raz
questions whether the analogue of the Violation Claim for Belief
Consistency is even true (see Raz 2005b, SS3; Raz 2005a, SS5).
If one has a set of beliefs that is inconsistent, then at least one of
the beliefs in that set is false. But, Raz argues, it does not follow
that there is any revision in one's beliefs that one ought to
make. (Reflection on logical paradoxes, like the sorities paradox,
shows that having an inconsistent set of beliefs doesn't imply
that there is any belief in the set that one ought to give up.)
Although Raz objects to the cognitivist's appeal to Belief
Consistency in particular, similar questions might be raised about the
cognitivist's appeal to Closure.


## 4. The Status of Instrumental Rationality



Much discussion of instrumental rationality has taken place in the
context of a debate about whether instrumental rationality is the only
kind of practical rationality or, alternatively, there are other
requirements of practical rationality as well, such as requirements of
prudence and morality. Typically, the former view is called a
"Humean" one and the latter a "Kantian" one.
In this section, we'll consider some possible understandings of
the thesis that instrumental rationality is the only kind of practical
rationality
 (SS4.1),
 and whether some version of this thesis is given any support by an
instrumental analogue of Lewis Carroll's famous paradox
concerning *modus ponens*
 (SS4.2).
 We'll also consider the views of Hume
 (SS4.3)
 and Kant
 (SS4.4)
 on instrumental rationality.


### 4.1 The Only Kind of Practical Rationality?



It is sometimes claimed that instrumental rationality is the only kind
of practical rationality. But what exactly is being claimed?



Is the claim about rational incoherence? Then it would seem to be the
claim that the only kind of practical, rational incoherence is
instrumental incoherence. But this claim would have to contend with
the idea that there are other kinds of practical, rational
incoherence. For example, it seems incoherent to refuse to intend what
one believes one ought to intend. It also seems incoherent to intend
to *X* and to intend to *Y* when one believes that if
one *X*s, one will not *Y*.



Alternatively, the claim might be about reason: that all (practical)
reason is, in some sense, instrumental. On one interpretation, the
claim would say that the *only true claim about reason is some
principle of instrumental transmission*. But this would seem to
imply that there are no practical reasons at all. Unless there is some
other true claim about reasons for "ends" understood as
actions, there is nothing to be transmitted. (For arguments that there
would need to be another kind of rationality, see Nozick 1993;
Korsgaard 1997; Hampton 1998; Hubin 1999; Lavin 2004.)



A different interpretation is that *all reasons are
instrumental*. In other words, the reason for any action (or
intention) can be expressed as: the action will help to bring about
some "end," where "end" is understood not as
an action, but instead as some valuable or desired state of affairs.
The Desire-Based Theory is committed to this claim. But not all
Value-Based Theories are. The reason for an action, for example, might
be that it honors or respects something of value, even though it does
not help to bring it about.



A final interpretation is that *all deliberation is of means*.
In other words, there is no place for significant evaluative or
normative reflection on the ultimate ends that one has reason to bring
about. The Desire-Based Theory seems committed to this claim, at least
to some extent. According to the Desire-Based Theory, reflection on
the ultimate ends that one has reason to bring about is just
reflection on the non-normative matter of what one in fact desires,
plus grasp of the Desire-Based Theory itself. On the other hand,
Value-Based theories seem committed to rejecting this claim, even
those Value-Based Theories that accept that all reasons are
instrumental in the sense discussed in the previous paragraph. For
whether a certain state of affairs is valuable, and so an end that one
has reason to bring about, is itself the object of significant
evaluative thought. (Note that it is a mistake to express the present
idea, that all deliberation is of means, as the idea that one cannot
be *criticized* for ends. According to the Desire-Based Theory,
one can be criticized for what one *intends* or *acts*
to bring about, insofar as it is not the realization of one's
strongest, present intrinsic desires. And even according to
Value-Based theories, one cannot be criticized for what one has
*reason* to bring about.)



Notice that the Desire-Based Theory is committed to the claim that
practical reason is exclusively instrumental, on these two last
interpretations. This may explain why the Desire-Based Theory is often
simply identified with "instrumental rationality," and why
the claim that "the only kind of practical rationality is
instrumental rationality" is sometimes just meant as an
assertion of the Desire-Based Theory.


### 4.2 The Relevance of Carroll's Paradox



Lewis Carroll (1895) introduced a famous paradox concerning *modus
ponens*. Some philosophers have argued that an instrumental
analogue of this paradox shows there to be something special about
instrumental rationality, and perhaps even provides support for some
version of the thesis that instrumental rationality is the only kind
of practical rationality.



Carroll imagined a conversation between Achilles and a Tortoise
regarding the following valid argument:



(A)
Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
(B)
The two sides of the Triangle are equal to the same.


Therefore,



(Z)
The two sides are equal to each other.


The Tortoise adopts a skeptical position, asking how he can be
logically forced into accepting (Z) when he accepts (A) and (B).
Achilles attempts to supply him with the missing premise:



(C)
If (A) & (B) are true, (Z) must be true.


But the Tortoise grants (C), and resumes his skepticism, asking how he
can be logically forced to accept (Z) when he accepts (A), (B), and
(C). It soon dawns on Achilles that the mere addition of further
premises (like "If (A), (B), and (C) are true, (Z) must be
true", and so on) won't help resolve the Tortoise's
skepticism. One could keep on adding such premises *ad
infinitum* and yet not get the Tortoise to accept (Z).



Much has been written about what lessons to draw from Carroll's
paradox, but this much seems clear: the Tortoise refuses to accept (Z)
because he refuses to *apply modus ponens* to the premises he
accepts. So, if *modus ponens* itself is *merely*
accepted by him as yet another premise, that won't suffice to
get him to accept (Z).



Now, imagine we confront someone who holds some end *E*,
believes some means *M* is necessary for *E*-ing, yet
doesn't intend to *M*, and, like the Tortoise,
doesn't intend to *M* because he refuses to
*apply* instrumental rationality to the ends he has, including
*E*. If we suggest that he remedy this defect by adopting yet
another end (namely, the end of doing what instrumental rationality
requires), this wouldn't help matters. Since his problem is that
he doesn't apply instrumental rationality to the ends he has, he
wouldn't apply instrumental rationality to this new end as well,
and so still wouldn't intend to *M* (or drop the
intention to *E*). So, the mere addition of instrumental
rationality as another end would be futile.



What should we conclude from this instrumental analogue of
Carroll's paradox? Railton (1997) argues that it shows that a
certain form of skepticism about rationality--specifically,
one's asking "Why should I comply with the norms of
practical rationality?"--can be answered. First, the asking
of this skeptical question reveals a commitment to at least
instrumental rationality, since one is here questioning whether being
practically rational would *advance one's ends*. And,
second, the instrumental analogue of Carroll's paradox shows
that we can't think of this commitment to instrumental
rationality as merely another end the agent accepts and could dismiss
at will. If the skeptic thinks it is, Railton suggests that "we
can answer 'No, on pain of regress, it cannot be just another
end of yours'" (p. 317).



However, it's not clear why the skeptic would have to think of
instrumental rationality as just another end she has. Couldn't
she think of it instead as (or also as) a disposition that she
manifests, or a capacity that she exercises, with respect to the ends
that she accepts? (If so, she would avoid the particular problem that
confronts the character in the instrumental analogue of
Carroll's paradox, who merely accepts instrumental rationality
as another end without *applying it* to her ends.) And then
couldn't she request some philosophical explanation of why she
should exercise that capacity? That she already has the capacity is of
course no barrier to posing such a question (Wedgwood 2005). Indeed,
as we've seen in
 SS3.3,
 some philosophers have *denied* that we always ought, or have
reason, to be instrumentally coherent; they've argued that
rational requirements are only apparently normative, or are merely
evaluative.



Dreier (2001) concludes that the instrumental analogue of
Carroll's paradox shows that instrumental rationality has a
special status. In Carroll's original paradox, the Tortoise
would be such that we couldn't give him reasons to believe in
some proposition. In the normal case, I can provide you with a reason
to believe *Q* by getting you to believe *P* and to
believe *P* - *Q*. But this simply
won't work for the Tortoise, who refuses to apply *modus
ponens*. Likewise, Dreier observes, we would be incapable of
giving reasons to someone who refused to draw "practical
inferences" between ends and means. The acceptance of
instrumental rationality is thus, he argues, a necessary condition for
being receptive to reasons at all. And this supports his conclusion
that "the only ultimate sort of reasons are instrumental
reasons" (p. 43). This seems to be an endorsement of the
Desire-Based Theory.



Does the conclusion follow? Even if a disposition to be instrumentally
rational is indispensable in the way Dreier suggests to
*having* a practical reason, nothing follows about
*what* one has practical reason to do. Additionally, it's
worth noting that it's doubtful that Carroll's original
paradox would license a restriction on the scope of
*theoretical* reasons analogous to the Humean restriction on
the scope of practical reasons that Dreier thinks the instrumental
analogue of Carroll's paradox supports. That is, it is not
obvious that I have reason to believe *Q* only if I am disposed
to come to believe it by applying *modus ponens*. Perhaps my
merely believing, with reason, both *P* and
*P* - *Q* provides me with a reason
for believing *Q*. Or perhaps the mere fact the available
evidence supports *Q* is enough (Jollimore 2005).



Korsgaard (2009) argues that we can draw a conclusion about the
*metaethical* status of instrumental rationality by considering
an instrumental analogue of Carroll's paradox. Specifically, she
appeals to it to argue against metaethical realism about instrumental
rationality (and about other normative principles as well).
Let's suppose that there is a requirement of reason to be
instrumentally coherent. A realist would claim that there is some
normative fact, according to which we ought to be instrumentally
coherent. But a skeptic might ask, "Why ought I apply that
fact--that I ought to be instrumentally coherent--to my
actions?" The realist might answer, "Because--and
here's another normative fact--it just is the case that you
ought to apply the fact that you ought to be instrumentally coherent
to your actions." But one might resume one's skepticism
and ask why one must apply *that* normative fact to one's
actions. One could keep adding normative facts *ad infinitum*
without providing an answer to the question, in the same way that
Achilles could keep adding premises without meeting the
Tortoise's challenge.



A full discussion of the metaethical issues raised by this argument
would take us too far afield (see Parfit 2006). But one strategy of
reply is to argue that the realist has already answered the question.
What it is for such normative facts to be *normative* just is
that they require that you act in some way. If you're asking of
normative facts in general why you should act in accordance with them,
then you don't fully understand what normative facts are.


### 4.3 Hume on Instrumental Rationality



The thesis that instrumental rationality is the only kind of practical
rationality is often taken to be a "Humean" thesis,
though, as we've seen
 (SS4.1),
 there are several ways in which this thesis could be understood. One
could take the thesis just to be an assertion of the Desire-Based
Theory. One could also take the thesis to specify that instrumental
coherence is the only requirement of practical rationality. However,
it is doubtful that Hume held either of these views.



There are some passages which might seem to suggest these views. In
Book II of the *Treatise* (1739-40), Hume denies that a
person's ends, however immoral or imprudent, can be unreasonable
("contrary to reason," to use his exact phrase) if
they're not based on a false belief:



> 
> Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses
> means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify
> nor condemn it. 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the
> destruction of the world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis
> not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the
> least uneasiness of an *Indian* or person wholly unknown to me.
> 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own
> acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent
> affection for the former than the latter. (p. 416)
> 



Here he seems to claim that one's choosing means insufficient
for one's end can be deemed unreasonable, even though the end
itself is not subject to such rational assessment.



However, this wouldn't support the Desire-Based Theory, since
the Desire-Based Theory allows that ends can be unreasonable when they
don't promote the satisfaction of one's strongest, present
intrinsic desires. For instance, choosing one's total ruin, when
doing so runs counter to one's strongest, present intrinsic
desires, even when doing so isn't based on a false belief, can
be criticized as unreasonable on the Desire-Based Theory.



Soon after this passage, Hume is careful to note that it
wouldn't be one's *intending* of means insufficient
for one's ends that's unreasonable, but the false
*belief* on which this intention is based. For example, when I
falsely believe that staying on 95N will get me to Memphis, which is
where I intend to go, and so I intend to stay on 95N, it's my
belief that 95N will get me to Memphis that's unreasonable, not
the intention, based on this belief, to stay on 95N.



Why did Hume think this? Hume holds that "reason is the
discovery of truth and falsehood" (p. 458). Since beliefs aim to
correctly represent the world--and the beliefs that succeed in
representing the world are true, while the beliefs that fail to do so
are false--they can be assessed as reasonable or unreasonable.
But passions, as well as intentions and actions, are "original
existences." They don't purport to represent or
"copy" some other "existence" (p. 415).
Specifically, they don't aim to correctly represent the world,
and so they can't be true or false. Hence, they can't be
assessed as reasonable or unreasonable.



In light of such considerations, many philosophers have argued that
Hume doesn't endorse an instrumentalist conception of practical
reason, but instead, more radically, is a skeptic about all of
practical reason. (See, for instance, Hampton 1995; Millgram 1995;
Korsgaard 1997. For objections to this skeptical interpretation of
Hume, see Setiya 2004.) On this interpretation, Hume acknowledges the
existence of requirements of *theoretical* reason, since
beliefs can be assessed as reasonable or unreasonable, but is
skeptical about the existence of requirements of *practical*
reason, including instrumental reason, since desires, intentions, and
actions can't be assessed as reasonable or unreasonable. (Even a
preference for "one's own acknowledg'd lesser
good" wouldn't be unreasonable, on his view.) Since, on
this interpretation, Hume was skeptical about practical reason *in
general*, we can't appeal to his view to establish a special
place for instrumental rationality among the requirements of practical
rationality.



Various challenges could be raised against Hume's rather narrow
conception of reason. But our primary interest here is in whether Hume
can provide us with a plausible account of *instrumental
rationality*. On Hume's view, our intentions are subject to
rational criticism when, and only when, they are based on false
beliefs (and, again, it's the belief that's to blame,
strictly speaking). As an account of instrumental rationality,
Hume's view would face two serious objections.



First, it seems that one can be instrumentally irrational without
having any intentions based on false beliefs (or lacking any
intentions because of false beliefs). John Broome provides an example:
suppose I know the hotel is on fire and that the only escape involves
my intending to go through the open window, and, though I intend to
live, I sit on the windowsill singing happily until the flames consume
me. This is a clear case of instrumental irrationality, despite my not
having any false beliefs (Broome 1997). Indeed, one could fail to
intend the means believed necessary for one's ends because of
rage, depression, distraction, grief, or other causes which
don't necessarily involve any false beliefs (Korsgaard 1986).
Hume would have to conclude either that such cases are impossible, or
that they involve no instrumental irrationality.



Second, it seems that one can have intentions based on false beliefs
without being instrumentally irrational, or irrational in any other
way. Instrumental rationality, as it's usually understood, is a
requirement of *coherence* governing one's intentions and
beliefs--a requirement that is in place regardless of the
*truth* of those beliefs. The person who intends to get to
Memphis, believes that he must intend to stay on 95N to get there, and
does intend to stay on 95N, displays coherence in his attitudes,
despite having a false belief. So, an accusation of instrumental
irrationality here would be misplaced. (Additionally, it would also be
inappropriate to accuse him of any *theoretical* irrationality,
if we suppose that this belief isn't inconsistent with any other
beliefs he holds, and he also believes there's conclusive
evidence for it, and so forth.) Hume would have to conclude either
that such cases are impossible, or that they involve instrumental
irrationality.


### 4.4 Kant on Hypothetical Imperatives



An alternative to the narrow instrumentalism associated with Hume is
found in the work of Immanuel Kant, who thought that rationality
required us not only to be instrumentally rational, but also to obey
the moral law. In his *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals* (1785), Kant distinguishes two kinds of imperatives:



> 
> Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically.
> The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a
> means for attaining something else one wants (or may possibly want).
> The categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as
> objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end.
> (4:414--citations use volume and pages from the Akademie Edition)
> 



For example, "If you intend to go to law school, take the
LSAT" would be a hypothetical imperative since it commands an
action (taking the LSAT) as a means to some end (going to law school).
If you didn't have any ends that would be served by taking the
LSAT, the command for you to do so would be withdrawn. Categorical
imperatives, such as "If someone is drowning nearby, offer
assistance," differ in two ways. First, the command to offer
assistance applies to you regardless of whether offering assistance
serves any of your (desired or intended) ends. Second, you have a
reason to offer assistance regardless of whether doing so serves any
of your (desired or intended) ends. (Philippa Foot has argued that
this second feature doesn't follow from the first: a rule of
etiquette, or a club rule, may apply to you regardless of whether
compliance with it serves any of your ends, but you may nonetheless
have no reason to comply with it. See Foot 1972.)



By "one wants" in the passage above, Kant means "one
wills": something closer to "one intends" than
"one desires." (After all, it wouldn't be plausible
to suggest that one is instrumentally irrational in not intending the
necessary means to what one merely *wants*. I want to own a
BMW, but I don't intend to work the kind of job that would allow
me to buy one. But there's nothing incoherent about my
continuing to desire to own one.) According to Kant:



> 
> How an imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion.
> Whoever will the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence
> on his actions) also the means that are indispensably necessary to his
> actions and that lie in his power. This proposition, as far as willing
> is concerned, is analytic. (4:417)
> 



But if Kant's view is to provide a plausible account of
instrumental coherence, it should instead refer to the means
*believed to be* indispensably necessary, since there is
nothing incoherent about not willing necessary means of which you are
unaware, and something incoherent about not willing the means you
believe are necessary, even when they actually aren't (Korsgaard
1997, 236).



Kant's parenthetical remark in the passage above is important.
For Kant, when one fails to will the necessary means to one's
ends, then reason has failed to have decisive influence. In other
words, one is irrationally incoherent. Less guardedly, Kant says
"the proposition (if I fully will the effect, then I will the
action required of it) is analytic" (4:417). But it is puzzling
how this proposition could be analytic. If it were analytic, then it
would be *conceptually impossible* to be instrumentally
incoherent since whenever one doesn't will the means, then one
doesn't will the end. (For defense of this conceptual
impossibility, see Finlay 2009 and Lee 2022.) And if it's
conceptually impossible to be instrumentally incoherent, we'd be
unable to make sense of why Kant formulates his account of
instrumental incoherence in terms of *imperatives*, which, on
Kant's view, are commands addressed to a will that is capable of
both following and not following the commands (Kant 1785, 4:414; Hill
1973, 430; Korsgaard 1997, 236). So, perhaps we should read
Kant's claim as that if one wills the end, *rationality
requires* that one will the means. (For an alternative reading,
see Lee 2018.)



Even so, there is a debate over the interpretation of Kant's
claim, particularly about the logical scope of "requires."
According to the wide-scope interpretation of Kant's claim, what
reason requires is that one *either* will the means *or*
not will the end. In contrast, according the narrow-scope
interpretation of Kant's claim, if one wills the end, then what
reason requires is *that one will the means*. The wide-scope
interpretation posits a disjunctive requirement (that one either not
will the end or will the means) that, like Kant's categorical
imperative, *applies to every rational agent*, regardless of
the particular ends she wills. But it's hard to square the
existence of such a universally applicable requirement with some other
claims Kant makes about how hypothetical imperatives are to be
distinguished from categorical ones, and how hypothetical imperatives
could be derived from an analysis of the concept of willing an end.
(See Schroeder 2005b. For a defense of the wide-scope interpretation
against Schroeder's objections, see Rippon 2014. For a related
discussion of these issues, see Schwartz 2008.)



But the narrow-scope interpretation appears to leave Kant's view
vulnerable to "detachment" objections. Suppose you will
some immoral end but, irrationally, don't will the immoral means
you believe necessary to carry out this immoral end. On the
narrow-scope interpretation, reason would require that you will the
immoral means. But that seems implausible. At the very least, it would
lead to something Kant wouldn't accept: reason issuing
contradictory commands. Your willing the immoral means would be
required by a hypothetical imperative but forbidden by the categorical
imperative (Hill 1973, 436).



Kant could avoid the detachment problem if he holds, as some
interpreters claim, that it is impossible to will (*Wille*)
immoral ends (Schroeder 2005b, SS3). If this interpretation is
right, then reason would never require one to will immoral means. But
it would also leave Kant without an account of instrumental
incoherence, at least as we have been understanding it. After all,
agents can display instrumental incoherence in the pursuit of
*both* moral and immoral ends. To use Kant's own
examples, the doctor who doesn't intend the means believed
necessary to making his patient healthy is instrumentally incoherent
in the same way as is the poisoner who doesn't intend the means
believed necessary to kill his victim (4:415). So, this interpretation
would have Kant avoiding the detachment objection, but at the cost of
no longer presenting an account of instrumental incoherence that holds
regardless of whether the end is reasonable or good.



Let's now turn to Kant's explanation of the normative
authority of hypothetical imperatives. While Kant presents a
complicated and intricate argument to explain the normative authority
of the categorical imperative, he claims that hypothetical imperatives
require "no special discussion," and spends comparatively
little time discussing them (4:417). Kant's approach
here--which might seem to play into the hands of instrumentalists
(see
 SS4.1
 above) who, while skeptical of the rational authority of the
categorical imperative, follow Kant in thinking that the authority of
hypothetical imperatives is obvious and unproblematic--has been
challenged. Although the "ought" of a hypothetical
imperative is contingent on an agent's ends, that
"ought" still needs to be explained. Additionally,
it's not clear that a hypothetical "ought" is any
more compatible with a naturalistic worldview than a categorical one.
Specifically, some of the same metaethical challenges that have been
raised about the status of the categorical "ought" could
be raised about normative claims in general, including the
hypothetical "ought" (Hampton 1998, Ch. 4; Shafer-Landau
2006, SS6).



So, what is Kant's explanation of the normative authority of
hypothetical imperatives? According to Korsgaard (1997), Kant's
views changed over the course of his philosophical development.
Kant's early "dogmatic rationalist" view (evident in
the *Groundwork*) held that we should comply with these
hypothetical imperatives simply because they express what a perfectly
rational agent would do. But the mature Kantian view--which
Korsgaard endorses--explains the normative authority of
hypothetical imperatives in terms of the commitments that are
constitutive of willing. According to this view, what's involved
in *willing* some end (as opposed to merely desiring it) is
being committed to taking the means to that end. It's not that
*complying* with this commitment is constitutive of intention
(this would render instrumental irrationality conceptually impossible)
but that *having* this commitment is constitutive of intention.
So, when one is instrumentally irrational, one fails to live up to
one's own commitments. Korsgaard writes:



> 
> ...willing an end just is committing yourself to realizing the
> end. Willing an end, in other words, is an essentially first-personal
> and normative act. To will an end is to give oneself a law, hence, to
> govern oneself. ... What is constitutive of willing the end is
> ... the inward, volitional act of prescribing the end along with
> the means it requires to yourself. (Korsgaard 1997, 245)
> 



But is Korsgaard right that willing an end necessarily involves
*prescribing that end* to yourself? Korsgaard argues that to
will some end, you must at least take that end to be good in some
sense, and you must also think that there is a reason for pursuing
that end (246, 250-1). But it seems possible for one to have
some akratic end while failing to see anything even *pro tanto*
good about it, or any reason to pursue it (Wallace 2006, SS1). And
it's clear that one could display instrumental rationality or
irrationality relative to these akratic ends. So, Korsgaard's
view seems unable to explain the authority of instrumental rationality
with respect to such ends--ends that an agent *has* but
doesn't *prescribe to herself*.



Korsgaard offers a second Kantian explanation of the authority of
instrumental rationality. She argues that incessant instrumental
irrationality threatens one's status as an agent:



> 
> So the reason that I must conform to the instrumental principle is
> that if I don't conform to it, if I *always* allow myself
> to be derailed by timidity, idleness, or depression, then I never
> really *will* an end. The *desire* to pursue the end and
> the desires that draw me away from it each hold sway in their turn,
> but *my will* is never active. The distinction between my will
> and the operation of the desires and impulses in me does not exist and
> that means that I, considered as an agent, do not exist. (1997, 247)
> 



But this argument doesn't provide a reason to conform to the
instrumental principle in every case in which the instrumental
principle is applicable. Rather, it provides a reason to do so only
when accompanied by enough other instances of non-conformity to
threaten one's status as an agent (Kolodny 2005, 544; Shaver
2006, 342). So, like the previous Kantian argument, and like the
Hume's skepticism discussed in
 SS4.3,
 this argument also fails to explain why instrumental rationality
applies in every case in which it does.