## 1. A Framework for Naturalist Analysis



Scholars differ among themselves regarding the classical period in
Indian Philosophy, but here we will assume the classical period to
reach from the end of the Vedic era to the beginning of the early
modern age in the fifteenth century CE. Classical Indian philosophy is
by no means a monolith but accommodates within it different systems
which either admitted or denied the infallibility of the Vedas (the
hallowed Revealed Scripture of the Hindus). The systems upholding the
authority of the Vedas are Vedanta, Mimamsa,
Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaisesika, while
the systems that challenged its scriptural authority include
Carvaka materialism and various schools of Buddhism and
Jainism. Naturalistic traits are available in these systems, but first
it is necessary to determine the sense of naturalism relevant for the
purpose at hand.



Peter Strawson in his Woodbridge Lectures (Strawson 1987) points out
that the term 'naturalism' is elastic in its use. He
distinguishes two main varieties: hard or reductive and soft or
liberal naturalism. Hard naturalists view human beings with their
different endowments as mere 'objects'--parts of
nature--to be described, analysed and causally explained. The
claim is that it is possible to have an absolute and pure objective
view of human beings and their behaviour. Soft naturalists, on the
other hand, are ready to accommodate subjective dispositions and
personal attitudes within a general naturalistic framework. Following
John McDowell (1998, 2004, 2008), Ganeri (2012) proposes a more
nuanced naturalist scheme to classify non-Cartesian Theories of
Mind/Self propounded by classical Indian philosophers where the
distinction between hard naturalism and relaxed/ liberal naturalism
depends on a distinction between a realm of law and a space of
reasons. While the realm of law provides an explanatory framework for
ideal physics, the space of reason or the logical space justifies
'conditions of our humanity'. On this theory, thinking,
knowing, freedom of will, considered 'natural powers of human
beings' can be accommodated within relaxed naturalism,
'though they are beyond the reach of natural scientific
understanding, ..., without thereby relegating them to the
sphere of the occult or supernatural' (McDowell, 2008). Another
way of discriminating naturalists in recent literature (Kornblith
1985, Papineau 2007) is to distinguish between methodological and
substantive naturalism; where the former has as its sub-varieties (a)
Replacement Theory and (b) Expansionist/ Normative Theory, while the
latter may be subdivided into Ontological and Semantic varieties.
According to Methodological Naturalism, philosophical theorizing
should be continuous with empirical enquiry in the sciences. Some
Methodological Naturalists want to do away with normative
justification theories and to replace them with empirical and
descriptive explanatory accounts. Other Methodological Naturalists are
more liberal and retain the normative level with the proviso that the
theorist must not forget that 'it is an empirical question what
normative advice is actually usable and effective for creatures like
us'. Ontological Substantive Naturalism is the reductive view
that there exists only natural and physical things and Semantic
Substantive Naturalists emphasize that philosophical analysis of any
theoretical concept must show it to be amenable to empirical
enquiry.



A rejection of the supernatural is the point of minimal agreement
amongst naturalists of all types, but there is no consensus regarding
the boundary between natural and supernatural. Most schools of Indian
philosophy identify nature with the empirical world or the world of
experience. Two extreme views about the empirical world are available
to Indian theory. The Advaita Vedantins declare the world of
experience unreal, an apparent transformation of the eternal and
unchanging ultimate conscious principle. To the materialist
Carvakas, on the other hand, this world is real and it is
composed of physical matter, consciousness is an emergent property of
matter and self is nothing but conscious material body. They were also
known as svabhavavadins (a term translatable as
"naturalists") because to discard everything supernatural
from their world-view they subscribe to a doctrine which holds that
the occurrence of an effect is not determined by its cause but by its
essential nature, thus making causation entirely redundant. This is
indeed a unique move in the history of naturalism, for all types of
naturalism in the West are intimately connected with the provision of
a causal account of the world or of nature. In terms of our earlier
taxonomy, the Advaita Vedantins might be branded as
non-naturalist and the Carvakas as hard naturalist. In
between these two lie the Buddhists, the Jainas, the
Nyaya-Vaisesikas and the Samkhya-Yoga
philosophers, whose accounts of the empirical world need to be
analysed carefully if we are accurately to place them. Two questions,
the answers to which will help to discern naturalist traits in these
systems, are: what are the ultimate constituents of the empirical
world, and what is the accepted model of causation for a particular
school? For the bounds of nature are to be determined by the nature of
real entities as admitted in a system and the nature of causal
connection amongst these entities. If only physical things governed by
the rules of mechanical causation are taken to be natural, then
attempts would be made either to reduce psychological, biological,
social, moral and mathematical entities to the physical or to
establish somehow their causal relevance to the physical world.



Only Carvaka hints at the causal closure of the physical
world, and the four models of causation entertained in Indian
philosophy allows interactions between matter and consciousness,
material particles and mathematical entities, non-living and living
beings, accumulated merits and demerits of past actions and present
events, and so on. This, however, should not lead one to think that
Indian thinkers admit transgression of the barrier between the natural
and the supernatural. On the contrary, they establish their own
criteria of demarcation and in doing so legitimize the admission of
various kinds of entities in the 'natural world'.


## 2. Indian Concepts of Nature



There are two contending theories of the natural world in India.
According to the first, the empirical world arises out of combinations
of atoms. Proponents of atomism (paramanuvada) are
found among Nyaya, Vaisesika, Buddhist and Jaina
thinkers. Samkhya philosophers hold instead that the world
is a transformation of an ever-dynamic Ur-Nature
(mula-prakrti). Variations of this second conception are
also available in some branches of Vedanta.


### 2.1 Atomism : Nyaya-Vaisesika



Like Greek atomism, Indian atomism was speculative and local. The
roots of Indian atomism can be traced back to the Upanisadic
doctrine of five elements (panca-mahabhutas), viz.,
earth, water, fire, air, and vyom or akasa. According
to the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers, the first four
elements are of two types--eternal and non-eternal. Atoms are
eternal, while composite 'wholes' are non-eternal, since
every product is eventually destroyed. Atoms, it is claimed, possess
the smallest magnitude (anu-parimana), are spherical
(parimandala), indivisible, and eternal. Though
quantitatively identical, each type of atom has specific attribute. An
earth atom has odour, a water atom taste, a fire atom colour and an
air atom has touch as specific attribute. What motivates an atomistic
conception of nature? Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers offer a
two-step argument to establish the existence of atoms. The first step
is:



> 
> Every visible substance is composed of parts.
>   
> 
> Therefore, the smallest visible composite thing--say, the
> smallest mote seen in a sunbeam--is also composed of parts, as it
> is visible, like a piece of cloth.
> 



There are two presuppositions of this argument: (1) A part of a whole
is always smaller in size than a whole--a thesis of which no
counter-instance is available in our world; and (2) the parts of the
smallest visible composite thing are imperceptible. The second step of
the argument runs as follows:


* The imperceptible part of the smallest visible thing must possess
parts, if it is a composite thing.
* However, this division of composite things into its parts must
come to an end; otherwise there will be a vicious infinite regress
(anavastha).
* So, there must be partless, indivisible, imperceptible things,
things which are defined as atoms.



But why is a process of infinite division inadmissible? Because,
reason the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, a mountain and a mustard
seed will then be equal in size: both being infinitely divisible, they
will have countless parts. One might object that the said division
will stop only when there is nothing left to be divided, but that this
would imply that the whole world can be created out of nothing; and
the idea of creation ex nihilo is not viable. But division is possible
only when there is a thing to be divided, something which forms the
base (adhara) of division. A process of division annulling
its base is as absurd a notion as digging a hole in empty space. To
avoid these inconsistencies, therefore, indivisible atoms must be
admitted.



A theory is provided of atomic composition. There is a distinct order
of combination of atoms. Two atoms of the same type combine to form a
dyad (dyanuka) and three dyads of the same type combine to form
a triad (tryanuka), which is held to be the smallest perceptible
object. Triads combine in varying numbers to give rise to large
composite wholes of different shapes and sizes. Dyads are also thought
as the 'arambhaka'--that from which the process
of creation starts, the atoms being eternal are uncreated and continue
to exist when a creation comes to an end.



There are two main puzzles about the Nyaya-Vaisesika
theory of composition. First, why can't two atoms of different
types form a dyad? An answer is, if an earth atom and a water atom
combine to produce a dyad, to which type will the resultant belong? It
cannot belong to both types possessing two exclusive class-characters,
nor can the resultant be of a mixed type, for then we shall never have
any natural kind of perceptible dimension. The second issue here is
why three atoms or two dyads cannot directly produce a composite
object. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, sticking to
the order of conjunction of atoms is important to explain how
perceptible magnitude arises at the stage of triad from the
combination of its imperceptible components. If an atom is of
imperceptible magnitude, so will be the magnitude of a dyad, for a
quality of a part produces in the whole the same quality in greater
degree. Now if the dyads are imperceptible, then by the same logic a
triad will also be imperceptible. If this process continues, then
there will never be any composite object of perceptible dimension. So
the Nyaya-Vaisesikas need to give a rational
justification for the perceptibility of a triad. They uphold that,
unlike other qualities, the magnitude of a compound is not caused by
the magnitude of its components. The gross magnitude of a composite
whole is a resultant either of the grossness of its component or the
looseness of their conjunction or of the plurality of their numbers.
The first alternative has already been rejected. The second
alternative also is not acceptable to the
Nyaya-Vaisesikas because they do not admit any
interstice between two atoms. So they endorse the last alternative
that the perceptible magnitude of a triad is caused by its number.
Some think that triads of different elements can combine to form
tetrads, and so on. Since the atoms of different elements have
specific qualities, there would be different structural arrangements
(vyuha) in triads constituted by different types of atoms.
Different qualities observed in large composite substances are due to
such different structural arrangements of their components.



Let us quickly review some other features of
Nyaya-Vaisesika atomism. First, like the four material
elements, mind (manas) is also said to be of corporeal nature and
atomic in magnitude though lacking in sensible quality. Material atoms
have specific sensible qualities and so are called
'bhuta'; both matter and mind are capable of movement
and so designated 'murta'. The four elements come
closest to a scientific conception of matter. Second, all atoms are
said to be quantitatively identical and qualitatively different. Two
atoms belonging to different types can be easily differentiated by
their specific attributes, but the problem arises while
differentiating two atoms of the same type, say, two earth atoms. The
Nyaya-Vaisesikas therefore introduce in their ontology
a unique objective principle called 'visesa'
(ultimate differentiator) for individuating atoms. Third, the wholes
constituted by atoms are not mere conjunctions of atoms, but are new
entities inhering in their own parts. Fourth, the atomic theory is
intimately connected with their theory of causation. A cause has been
defined in this system as an invariable, unconditional antecedent of
an effect; an effect, on the other hand, is said to be the
counter-correlative of a prior absence. A counter-correlative of any
absence removes that absence. A pot is a counter-correlative of its
prior absence because this absence of pot disappears as soon as the
pot is produced. Every effect is preceded by its prior absence, so
each effect is a new production. Such theory of causation is known as
arambhavada, the theory that an effect always comes into
existence out of a prior state of non-existence (as opposed to the
theory of existent effect (satkaryavada) advocated by the
Samkhya school). Causes are of two types: (a) common
(sadharana) and (b) uncommon
(asadharana). A common cause is uniformly present
before the occurrence of any effect whatsoever and is necessary for
effectuation as such; an uncommon cause is that which invariably and
unconditionally precedes a particular effect. Common causes are space,
time, accumulated merits and demerits of individual agents
(adrsta), God, knowledge, desire and will (prayatna)
of God, and prior absence (pragabhava). Uncommon causes are
divided into three classes: (a) inherent (samavayi), (b)
non-inherent (asamavayi) and (c) efficient (nimitta). Without
entering into their technical definitions, let us understand them with
the help of an example. Atoms are the inherent causes of the world,
conjunctions of atoms are its non-inherent causes, and God and
adrsta are its efficient causes. Fifth, admitting
numbers as the cause of grossness of a triad shows that they have a
capacious world-view where numbers can have causal effect on the
physical world.



For a consideration of early modern Nyaya discussions of atomism
in India in contrast with mechanical philosophy in Europe, see Ganeri
2011, chapter 14.


### 2.2 Atomism: The Buddhist and the Jaina Views



Two realist schools of Buddhism, the Vaibhasika and the
Sautrantika, also present an atomistic conception of nature.
According to the former, matter is a collocation of the substratum of
colour, taste, odour and touch. Atoms are the minutest units of the
rupa-skandha (collocation of material elements). As it is
mentioned in the Abhidharmakosa (I. 44), 'Atoms of the
visual organ are arranged in the pupil of the eye in the shape of an
ajaji flower; those of the auditory organ are arranged in
the earhole in the shape of a bhurja leaf, atoms of the olfactory
organ are arranged in the form of a long pin (salaka)
inside the nostrils, those of the gustatory organ inside the mouth in
the shape of the half-moon, and those of the cutaneous organ in the
shape of the body.' Atoms are thus indirectly related to
observational entities. Atoms, according to them, are indivisible,
imperceptible and momentary. They continually undergo phase-changes.
Some Sautrantikas hold that atoms are not particles of matter but
a dynamic force or energy. According to Vasubandhu, atoms are always
in an aggregate and never alone. For it has been mentioned by some
that the rupa-skandha is that which can cause obstruction and is
also subject to transformation. A single atom cannot possess these
properties; hence atoms are always in a cluster.



The Buddhists then speculate about the nature of the smallest
aggregate. The Sautrantikas hold that seven atoms form the
smallest aggregate. They also maintain that atoms do not touch one
another. So the aggregate of atoms is not a solid whole but rather
there is space among atoms. Others, however, concede the possibility
of dense combination of atoms. The combination of seven atoms takes
place in the form of a cluster with one atom at the centre and others
around it. The Sarvastivadins talk about eight types of
atom. The four fundamental types are of earth (solid), water (fluid),
fire (hot) and air (moving). The secondary atom types are of colour,
odour, taste and touch. Thus, according to this view, specific
qualities are atomic too. Each secondary atom requires for its support
four fundamental atoms. So, by simple calculation, a non-sounding
aggregate (asabda) consists of 20 atoms, while a sounding
aggregate (sasabda) is composed of 25 atoms.



The Jainas also propound atomism. All the entities admitted in their
ontology, except souls and space, are constituted by material elements
(pudgalas). Atoms are eternal as regards their substance and each
exists by occupying one space-point (pradesa). These atoms are
qualitatively similar, each possessing one kind of taste, smell and
colour and two kinds of touch, viz. hot or cold and rough or smooth.
Other kinds of touch, viz. heavy, light, soft and hard, and varied
colour, taste and smell are found only in compounds formed by atoms.
The Jainas maintain that atoms are usually in motion but not always.
Depending upon the spatio-temporal conditions, atomic motion is either
regular (niyamita) or irregular. In one unit of time atoms regularly
move in a straight line. However, while in interaction with another
atom or a group of atoms, atomic motion becomes curvilinear. The
Jainas also speculate about the speed of a moving atom under different
conditions.



The main difference between these atomisms and
Nyaya-Vaisesika atomism lies in their account of
combination of atoms. The latter had to resort to God's will and
an unseen force (apparently non-natural) to explain this process of
combination. The Jainas and the Buddhists, on the other hand, gave a
satisfactory account of the combination of atoms in terms of natural
forces. The Jainas, for example, explain the bonding of atoms on the
basis of an empirical observation
(Tattvarthadhigamasutra, 5. 32). It is seen that when
drops of water fall on particles of barley, one single lump is formed.
By generalization, the claim is that a viscid / smooth (snigdha) atom
tends to combine with a dry / rough (ruksa) atom. Viscidity and
dryness, smoothness and roughness, are no doubt natural properties of
atoms. The following rules of combination are formulated:


1. To combine, atoms must be opposite in nature. According to some
modern interpreters, to interact one particle of matter must be
negative and the other positive. It has been speculated that the
Jainas arrived at this rule on the basis of observed electrification
of smooth and rough surfaces on rubbing.
2. The opposing properties of the atoms to be combined must be
sufficiently strong.
3. Atoms endowed with similar properties must differ in
'intensity' to combine. The intensity of one must be at
least twice strong than the other, i.e., atoms possessing viscidity of
two degrees will combine only with atoms possessing viscidity of four
degrees.
4. While combining, higher degrees transform the lower one. Viscidity
of four degrees will transform viscidity of two degrees and the
resultant will be one unit having viscidity of four degrees.
Otherwise, in combination two will remain separate just like a cloth
woven with black and white yarn.



Subhagupta (Bahyarthasiddhikarika,
56-58), a later Vaibhasika, offers an alternative
account of the combination of atoms. According to him, two atoms come
close to each other because of their inherent potency
(dravyasakti), though they are not actually conjoined. Like a
mantra drawing out a snake and keeping it immobile by its inherent
potency, two atoms are drawn towards each other and form an aggregate
by their natural inherent potency. The accumulated atoms combine again
to give rise to varied composite objects of the world. However not all
atoms are equally potent, and some never become a part of an aggregate
because of their insufficient bonding power. Atoms when bonded
together undergo a transformation because of mutual influence and
novel properties emerge in the aggregate which were not present in the
single atoms. For example, carbon compounds when transformed into
diamonds become too hard to be disintegrated.



Through theoretical speculation alone, Indian atomists tried to throw
light on the nature of the ultimate particles. Some Buddhists, we have
seen, even described atoms as packets of energy. The chemical laws
that the ancient Indians derived on the basis of their speculations
about the process of composition of atoms led to the advancement of
applied chemistry and applied medicine. These theories may not have
much relevance in the context of modern science or cosmology but the
associated debates about the nature of causation have contributed to
an understanding of the philosophical foundations of scientific
enquiry.


### 2.3 An Extreme Naturalism (Svabhavavada)



Svabhavavada, which is the strongest form of ontological
naturalism in Indian scenario, literally means 'the view of
individual nature/essences' (Bhattacharya, R. 2002). The
hard-core naturalists, Carvakas, admit four types of basic
material elements--earth, water, fire and air. They reject
atomism, however, since they refuse to admit any imperceptible thing
in their ontology, including God, Soul, akasa and all
kinds of non-natural forces. The material elements are said to possess
some qualities naturally. Multifarious objects of this world including
living and conscious beings are produced out of the combination of
material elements. It is generally held that the nature of any effect
is determined by the nature of its cause.The reductionist
Carvakas and the nihilist Ajivika-s, however, deny
any causal connection between the material elements and the compounds
arising out of them. The Carvakas, however, deny any causal
connection between the material elements and the compounds arising out
of them. Just as fire is naturally hot and water is naturally cold,
similarly, they hold, sugarcane is naturally sweet, margosa leaves are
naturally bitter and thorns are naturally sharp. They think that
further componential or causal analysis is completely redundant. The
distinguishing feature of this kind of extreme naturalism is a belief
in a fortuitous generation of events (akasmikatavada).
Causal relations are supposed to involve necessity, but necessity is
not perceptible and whatever is not perceptible cannot be inferred or
established by any other means. Udayana argues, in an elaborate
critique of this view (Nyayakusumanjali I,
4-5), that every event must have a cause because every event
without exception has 'conditional' (sapeksa)
existence, because it has 'occasional'
(kadacitka) existence, i.e., it occurs at a certain time. An
eternal entity is always existent and a fictitious entity does not
exist at any time: as these are not characterized by occasional
existence, these are not caused. The only counter-instance to this
rule is prior absence, which has occasional existence but being
beginningless has no cause. Carvakas affirm, however, that
an event need not originate from a cause; it may come into being
fortuitously. Even the occasional origination of an event is due to
the nature of the event and has got nothing to do with its cause.



The thesis of fortuitous generation may be given five alternative
formulations on the basis of the etymological analysis of the word
'akasmat' (without cause):


1. An effect does not originate from a cause.
2. An effect does not arise at all.
3. An effect is self-caused; it is not determined by any external
condition.
4. An effect is generated by an unreal cause.
5. The occurrence of an effect is not determined by its cause but by
its own nature (svabhava).



Udayana objects to all these formulations. If an effect were not
dependent on its cause for its existence, then it could have occurred
at any time, in fact at all times, and thus would lose its occasional
nature. In fact, every effect has a temporal limit fixed by its cause,
prior to which it cannot exist. The second formulation runs contrary
to our perception of the occurrence of an event at a particular
spatio-temporal location. The third formulation is unacceptable
because the same thing cannot be both a cause and an effect at the
same time in respect of the same set of conditions, and because it is
not possible for anything to exist before its origination. The fourth
formulation is rejected outright for no unreal thing can ever enter
into a causal process. The fifth formulation leaves us totally
mystified because the proponents of the fortuitous generation thesis
have nowhere specified what this nature is by virtue of which an
effect can occur without its cause. So we wonder, is this nature
different from or the same as the effect? On the first alternative the
principle of causality is re-established while the second alternative
is unintelligible. If the nature of an effect is the same as the
effect and a thing can never be separated from its nature, then it
would follow that an existent entity would go on causing its own
existence over and over again. This is surely absurd. Philosophically
these arguments appear to be pretty convincing, but Carvaka
naturalists may find an ally in quantum physical talk about
spontaneous decay of a radioactive element, quantum jumps, and so
forth.


### 2.4 Prakrti-parinama-vada: An Alternative View of Nature



That a whole arises out of smaller parts and that atoms are the
material causes of the world--these mainstays of atomism have
been contested by other schools of Indian philosophy. There are two
important cosmological theories in the anti-atomic
camp--Prakrti-parinama-vada and
Brahma-karana-vada. Of these two, the first, a
Samkhya view that the world evolves from Ur-Nature or
prakrti, is more relevant in the discussion of naturalism.
Ur-Nature is an ever-dynamic whole of all-pervasive magnitude having
three constituent principles or gunas, viz. sattva, rajas and
tamas. Sattva has the power to illuminate, rajas to activate and tamas
to restraint. B.N. Seal (1958), therefore, thinks that these
principles are three aspects of matter, viz., form, energy and mass.
K.C. Bhattacharya (1956), on the other hand, has offered a
psychological interpretation which appears to have a closer fit with
the text. Bhattacharya maintains that the Samkhya considers
things of nature as contents of affective experience. Mohanty (1992)
also concurs that 'the gunas are the substantial, but
dynamic, being of the elementary feelings that constitute, in their
interconnections, all experience.' The gunas as affective
absolutes constitute the object. In the process of evolution, the
Samkhya gives the central role to rajas, which is said to
be an ever-active principle of pain. Mohanty explains, following
Bhattacharya, that 'since pain implies the active wish to be
free from pain, pain is a freeing activity: it is restless willing to
be free. Pleasure is restful freedom from pain; indifference is not
only want of freedom but is also not actively willing freedom.'
So these three constituents of Ur-nature are present in all objects of
the world in different proportions and are responsible for our varied
experience. This theory of nature is complemented by a theory of
causation, viz. satkaryavada, which states that an effect
exists in its cause prior to its production in a latent or
non-manifest form.



The Samkhya philosophers advance the following arguments in
favour of their theory of causation:


1. What is non-existent cannot
ever be produced. Whatever is non-existent remains non-existent for
ever and whatever is existent always exists. Nothing can be sometimes
existent and sometimes non-existent. Self, for example, is always
existent, whereas the fictitious sky-flower is eternally non-existent.
No agency can turn non-existent into existent. So if the effect were
non-existent in the material cause before the causal operation, then
it would never be produced.
2. If a particular cause is to be a prior
determinant of a particular effect, then there must be an appropriate
relation between cause and effect. That means, a cause produces an
effect only being related to it. But no such relation can obtain, if
the effect were non-existent. For, a relation to obtain requires at
least two relata. Hence an effect must pre-exist in its cause.
Moreover, on the Samkhya view the relation between cause
and effect is one of identity (tadatmya), and it is obvious
that an existent cause cannot be identical to a non-existent effect.
3. One may still wonder, why should not the effect be produced by an
unrelated cause? The reason is that if the effect could arise without
being related to the cause, then any cause could give rise to any
effect. If there were no definite relation between threads and cloth,
then why does a pot not arise from threads?
4. The opponent might say
that the effect need not pre-exist in the material cause because when
the cause is potent even a non-existent effect can be made to exist by
the causal operation. When, on the other hand, the cause lacks the
potency the desired effect cannot be produced. Since oil-seeds possess
the adequate potency, oil can be produced out of these seeds but not
out of sand. Samkhya philosophers concede this point and
maintain that causal operation enables a potent cause to manifest the
latent effect. However, they point out that positing potency or
efficiency will not satisfy their opponents. For then the question
will be: where does this potency exist? The opponent must agree that
this potency exists in the material cause. Does this potency have any
relation with the effect or not? The answer has to be affirmative,
otherwise we would not have said that oilseeds possess the capacity of
producing oil and not pots. So once again we are back to the same
question: how can the potency residing in the material cause be
related with a non-existent effect? The Samkhyas,
therefore, affirm that this causal efficiency is nothing other than
the existence of the effect in the material cause in a latent form.
5. The final argument in favour of the Samkhya position
reveals the whole issue very pointedly. The effect, they say, exists
in the material cause because cause and effect are essentially the
same but only different in form. Since the cause is existent, the
effect also must exist. The Samkhya has a special stake in
this point because the whole debate is geared to proving the existence
of prakrti as the ultimate material cause of the universe. In
the process they also attempt to establish, contra Vedanta, that
the evolution of the universe is genuine and not merely illusory.



The process of evolution of the world from Ur-Nature is briefly as
follows. The first evolute of prakrti is the mahat-tattva (the
Great Principle, the Cosmic Intelligence or buddhi). From this emerges
I-consciousness (ahamkara). From the sattva aspect of
I-consciousness evolve five organs of knowledge (eye, ear, nose,
tongue and skin), five motor organs (speech, hands, feet, reproductive
and excretory organs) and manas (sometimes translated as mind); from
the tamas aspect of I-consciousness emerge five subtle elements
(panca-tanmatra), viz., sound, touch, colour, taste and
smell. The five subtle elements give rise to five gross elements,
viz., akasa, air, fire, water and earth.



It has already been mentioned that the three constituents of Ur-Nature
are always in transformation. Before the beginning of creation or
empirical manifestation of Ur-Nature, there is a homogeneous
transformation (sadrsa-parinama) of the principles,
sattva transforms into sattva, rajas into rajas and tamas into tamas.
At the time of world-manifestation the active principle, rajas,
becomes predominant and activates the other two principles. The
stability of Ur-Nature is disturbed due to its close proximity with
the Self (purusa), an independent co-eternal reality, like a
piece of iron in proximity of a magnet, and the process of
heterogeneous transformation begins. The constituent principles of
Ur-Nature combine with one another in different proportions and the
manifold world comes into existence.



The Samkhya theory of evolution has been described as
teleological because on this view the entire process of evolution
takes place for the sake of the enjoyment and liberation of
purusa, the pure Self. As such, purusa stands outside the
process of evolution. When purusa is reflected in the first
evolute of Ur-Nature, cosmic intelligence, it conflates its own
identity with the first evolute and appears to have enjoyment and
suffering. When it once again comes to realise its own nature by
attaining discriminatory knowledge, it is liberated. Certainly there
are problems in the Samkhya admission of a conscious but
inactive principle, purusa. Purusa is eternal and
ubiquitous like prakrti, but if these two are always in contact
the start of the creation process remains inexplicable. Again, it is
not easy to understand why Ur-Nature should ensnare the pure self into
bondage and then liberate it through discriminatory knowledge.
Samkhya philosophers say that the enjoyment of the pure
self is a sham enjoyment, and so is the liberation because the pure
self is eternally free. Then, however, the teleology loses its force,
something that is perhaps inevitable because the Samkhya
teleology had always been proto-naturalistic, as is evident from two
examples used in the literature. Just as non-sentient cow-milk flows
merely from its own nature for the nourishment of the young calf and
non-sentient rain clouds naturally yield rain for the sustenance of
life on earth, so Ur-Nature ensnares the pure self for the
latter's enjoyment and liberation. The Samkhya theory
has never upheld a conscious teleology, rather it has spoken of the
natural directedness of Ur-Nature and its evolutes towards
satisfaction of another's need.



Though the later Samkhya narration embraces a clear-cut
dualism of Ur-Nature and pure self, Dasgupta (1987) mentioned a
version of early Samkhya philosophy where the self is
regarded as a non-manifest part of prakrti. In this system
consciousness exists in the material Ur-Nature in a latent form. This
monistic theory is undoubtedly much more consistent; so why did the
later Samkhya change its position to dualism? Dasgupta
writes succinctly, 'Man's body so far as it is a physical
object is like any other object of nature passing through the process
of evolution. But the introduction of soul from the organic state
marks the epoch of a new kind of progress. This epoch attains it as
the highest achievement when it comes to the moral being. So far as
the physical world is concerned there is the same law of evolution
from the relatively less differentiated, more determinate, more
coherent whole and looked at from this point of view man's life
and body are but a part of the universe suffering the same process of
growth and decay. But looked at from another point of view all living
beings and man pre-eminently by virtue of his soul, is a person and
this addition of personality is a decisive addition. Thus so far as
the physical parts and the biological sides of life are concerned he
is an object of nature, but so far as his soul is concerned he is a
person and it is this personality which constitutes his
spirituality.' The inexplicability of the normative, especially
of the moral and the spiritual, a perennial bane of naturalism, thus
led the proto-naturalist Samkhya philosophers to admit pure
self passively witnessing the process of evolution and standing
outside the bounds of Ur-Nature. But that does not make empirical
consciousness in any way naturalistically unexplainable. In the world
process, buddhi plays a conscious role, reflecting the pure
consciousness, just as the moon lightens up the world by borrowing the
reflected light of the sun.



A detailed account of self and consciousness within naturalistic
framework is available in Ganeri (2012, Part I). 


### 2.5 Naturalism about Self and Consciousness



Indian philosophers of Mind/Self and Consciousness are of naturalist
persuasion. Most systems subscribe to soft naturalism except the
Carvaka and the Advaita Vedanta. Regarding mind and
consciousness, too, the materialist Carvaka-s are hard
naturalists and the spiritualist Advaitins are non-naturalists.
However, naturalists and non-naturalists alike approach mentalistic
concepts on the basis of our lived experience. That is, they theorize
on these concepts at the person-level using the vocabulary eminently
suitable for expressing human experiences. Hence subjective phenomena
fall squarely within the Space of Reason. Pluralist schools, viz., the
Nyaya-Vaisesika-s, the Jaina-s, the
Prabhakara school of Mimamsa,
accommodate mind, body, consciousness and emotions within nature
without much problem because they construe nature rather widely. They
do not think that nature is homogeneous as it is constituted by the
material elements and their properties. Consequently Indian theorists
are not bugged by the problems of interactionism and reductionism. Let
me explain this point in brief. Whoever placed mind and consciousness
in one realm and body and brain in a different realm failed to account
for causal interaction amongst conscious mind and extended body, a
phenomenon we commonly experience in our everyday life. Besides,
denial of a pluralist ontology and adopting a particular kind of
scientific explanation underlie reductionism and its associated
problems. If different kinds of entities could be accommodated in
nature and the model of scientific explanation adopted in the wake of
the unification of science program could be given up then the
reductive tendencies (metaphysical, doctrinal and theoretical
reduction) could be kept in check.



In the Upanisads, the Ultimate Reality or *Brahman* had
been identified with the inner essence of an individual being or
*Atman*. At the beginning there was only One, the essence
of which is Existence-Consciousness-Bliss. That One desired to be many
and this world of multifarious object was created. Having created the
world *Brahman* entered into it. Hence It is both transcendent
of and immanent in Its creations. Classical followers of the
Upanisadic view are divided on this point. Sankara
maintained that Brahman is transcendent and the world is an illusory
transformation of the *Brahman* projected by its power called
Maya. Brahman therefore stands apart from Nature. Apparently
Sankara and his followers are non-naturalists. Other major
schools of Vedanta propounded respectively by Ramanuja
(*Visistadvaita*), Madhva
(*Bhedadvaita*), Nimbarka and Bhaskara
(*Bhedabheda*-*vada*), Vallabha
(*Suddhadvaita*), Sri Caitanya
(*Acintyabhedabheda*-*vada*) - all upheld
that the world is an evolution of the *Brahman*. In empirical
life existence, consciousness and enjoyment of an individual is
constrained by his/her body, though the final aim of individual life
is to dissociate itself from its body and merge with the Ultimate
Reality having realized his/her own essential nature. Vedantins,
even Advaitins, thus, explain and justify all lived human experience,
hence tilt towards relaxed naturalism. 



The materialist Carvaka-s maintain that consciousness
emerges from the four basic material elements - earth, water,
fire and air combined in the right proportion, though none of these
material elements possesses consciousness. It is like emergence of red
colour from the chewing of beetle-nut and certain other ingredients,
none of which contains red colour; or like emergence of water from
hydrogen and oxygen molecules. Consciousness, according to the
Carvaka-s, is a quality of the body and self to them is
nothing but a conscious body. Major interpreters of the
Carvaka philosophy brand this emergentist view as
reductionist. but Ganeri (2012) sees a possibility of interpreting
this view as a kind of non-reductive supervenience which entails that
'a full inventory of reality must include both the supervenience
base and all that is emergent, irreducibly supervenient, upon
it' (pp.30-31). 



As opposed to the Carvaka-s and the Vedantins, the
Nyaya-Vaisesika-s, maintain that consciousness is a
non-essential adventitious quality (*agantuka-guna*)
of the self because consciousness is present in the self only during
its embodied existence. In their metaphysics, they enumerated
different kinds of entities, viz. soul/self (*atma*),
body (*sarira*), sense organs (*indriya*),
objects of experience (*artha*), knowledge (*budhhi*),
inner sense (*manas*), etc. A summary account of these
metaphysical entities shows that all these kinds of knowable objects
are inter-related. Here, *atma* is the seer of all
things, enjoyer of all things, knows and experiences. Body is the site
of all sorts of experiences including enjoyment and suffering. The
sense organs are the means of knowledge as well as enjoyment.
*Manas* is the internal sense organ with the help of which we
introspect our inner states. Volition (*pravrtti*) is
that which leads to physical and mental acts. Affection, aversion and
stupidity are listed as faults (*dosa*-s). Transmigration
(*pretyabhaba*) means the series of births and deaths
through which an individual soul travels until attaining liberation.
Birth means connection of a soul with body, senses and so forth; death
means their dissociation. Consequences of activities are mainly of two
types: pleasure and pain. This is the Nyaya account of all
possible experiences of soul. The means of release from the cycle of
life and death is the correct knowledge of different types of entities
which enables one to distinguish between self from not-self. This
paraphrase from the first commentary (bhasya) of the oldest
Nyaya treatise makes it evident that if the excellence of an
individual lies in its knowledge, its sentience, its attempt to avoid
painful existence - it cannot be an abstract essence - a
soul minus its bodily entrapments. It has to be a self-body continuum
immersed and engaged in meaningful pursuits of life in its journey
towards emancipation - towards absolute cessation of all
sufferings. Self, according to this school, cannot be individuated
without a body and hence this view is again a version of liberal
naturalism guaranteeing causality without over-determination among
different kinds of entities material and non-material. 



In the teachings of the Buddha, which is available in the
*Nikaya*-s, consciousness is described as one link in the
twelve-link-causal chain
(*dvadasanga-bhavacakra*) that is responsible
for the birth and bondage of human beings. Consciousness is the link
between the past and the present. It arises out of ignorance
(*avidya*) and mental formations (*karma*) and
gives rise to name and form (*nama-rupa*), i.e., the
psycho-physical constituents of a person in bondage. One should
remember that each of the twelve links in the *bhava-cakra* is
both conditioned and that which conditions. One's consciousness
is conditioned not only by what one experiences in this world but also
by the way one reacts to these experiences. If a person realizes that
pleasurable experiences of this world are all temporary then he can
control his cravings and the chain will snap ultimately leading to his
liberation. On the other hand, if he craves for and clings to
apparently pleasurable experiences, that will lead him to future
births and the wheel of *samsara* goes on and on for
him with all its associated pains. The Buddha thus with his doctrine
of dependent origination (*pratitya-samutpada*)
explains the nature of *samsara*  and of the
I-consciousness, though he never admitted a permanent Self.
I-consciousness, says the Buddha, is a collection of five-fold
aggregates (*paeca-skandha-samahara*). The
aggregates are of matter (*rupa*), sensation
(*vedana*), perception (*sanjea*),
dispositions (*samskara*) and consciousness
(*vijeana*). Consciousness is of six kinds -
visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual/bodily and mental.
Corresponding to each consciousness there is a dedicated
object-structure, viz, visible forms correspond to eye-consciousnes,
sound to ear-consciousness, odour to nose-consciousness, taste to
tongue-consciousness, tangible things to body-consciousness and ideas
to mind-consciousness. Consciousness in Early Buddhism stands for a
simple awareness of the presence of an object. This view of the mental
can be branded as liberal naturalism on two grounds, (a) both material
and non-material elements of nature can causally interact and (b) all
experiences of an individual in his empirical journey are explainable
with reference to 'the space of reasons'.


## 3. Methodological Naturalism: Nyaya Epistemology



Methodological naturalism is the view that regards science and
philosophy as continuous. 'Methodological naturalists',
writes Papineau (2007), 'see philosophy and science as engaged
in essentially the same enterprise, pursuing similar ends and using
similar methods.' In classical Indian philosophical systems, we
find instances of method continuity as well as result continuity. In
this context, we shall discuss mainly the Nyaya view, for the
Nyaya methodology of scientific and epistemic investigation was
adopted by other philosophical schools too.



In the West, the relation between science and philosophy has been
almost symbiotic. Sciences separated from philosophy only after
attaining maturity, developed to their full capacity, proliferated
into different branches and, when the circle was complete, all the
off-springs started coming closer to the parent disciplines to form an
inter-disciplinary consortium. But even when sciences went their own
way, a special branch of philosophy, traditional epistemology,
continued to guard their foundation and police their frontiers with
the help of its unique method. Thus, in a second moment of fission,
science and philosophy were found to differ in contents as well as in
methods. In India, however, the fission did not occur so emphatically
and the borders of different disciplines were never hermetically
sealed. Consequently, there is science in philosophy and also
trans-empirical philosophy in empirical sciences. Different
philosophical systems combine the metaphysics of the transcendent with
the logic of the mundane and the rules of individual and social
morality. We find these systems supplying us with ratiocinative
principles that form the core of a scientific methodology while
simultaneously facilitating the process of self-realisation
culminating in liberation or moksa through discourses on the
nature of reality. Thus with a view to unraveling the real nature of
existents (tattvadarsana), philosophical systems indulge in
quasi-scientific discussions of cosmology, physics, chemistry,
psychology, biology, and so on. That is why B.N. Seal (1958) has
called these philosophical systems 'positive sciences'.
Thus in both method and content philosophy and theoretical sciences
coincided to a large extent. Applied (phalita) sciences like alchemy
and medicine did diverge from philosophy, but there too the influence
of fundamental philosophical concepts like accredited means of
knowledge, causality, adrsta, etc., was conspicuous
on patterns of observation and experimental design.



The Naiyayikas are a part of this tradition. One of their most
significant contributions is formulation of a method which forms the
core of inquiry in general and so also of scientific inquiry. The
method has four main steps. The first step is to provide an
enumeration (uddesa) of the divisions of the subject matter. The
second step is to supply a definition (laksana) of the
subject under consideration, in the form of a distinguishing mark of
it. The third step is an examination (pariksa) of the
definition, and the fourth verification (nirnaya). Enumeration
sometimes includes classification (vibhaga); however, in general,
classification comes after definition. Any truth reached by this
procedure is raised to the status of an established theory
(siddhanta). 'Pramanas [methods of
knowledge-acquisition] are operations subsidiary to the ascertainment
of truth. The methods of special sciences are ancillary to these
pramanas' (P. C. Ray, 1956). It is evident that
methodologically there is no difference between science and
philosophy, particularly epistemology. In Nyaya epistemology,
common sense, science, logic and scriptures are all considered to be
continuous with one another.



Naturalized epistemology defines itself in contrast with analytic
epistemology, which is also often described as
'traditional' or 'mainstream' epistemology.
Analytic epistemology is justification-centric. The
epistemologists' preoccupation with the formulation of
principles of epistemic appraisal are geared to meet sceptical
challenges. They adopt three main strategies:


1. They grant autonomy
to epistemology, which is meant to provide the basis for all human
scientific endeavours. Epistemology supposedly possesses an
Archimedean standpoint or a view from nowhere, something that warrants
the objectivity of the sciences. This presupposition led to the
dissociation between epistemology and psychology.
2. They declare
that all epistemic norms of justification are a priori in nature. They
further maintain that providing causal explanation is no part of
epistemology (Chisholm, 1992). Causal questions and matter of
justification are to be kept strictly separate. So, according to
traditional epistemologists, to judge whether a person's belief
that *p* counts as knowledge that *p*, it is sufficient
to find out if *p* is connected in the right way to other
propositions, the rightness of the connection to be determined by
logic (Kitcher, 1983). That is, the evidential story and the causal
story should be kept strictly separate because the former is
necessarily normative, while the latter is descriptive; in providing
an epistemic justification of a piece of knowledge, it is not
necessary to probe the question of its origins.
3. As a follow-up of
the Cartesian programme, analytic epistemologists try to ground
knowledge of the external world on the subject's knowledge of
inner experience. Justification thus becomes internalist and knowing
that *p* entails knowing that knowing that *p*. If this
condition is not satisfied, no one can be a responsible knower. (4)
Most traditional epistemologists also subscribe to the realist
conception of truth and one determinate theory of reality. (5) They
are also committed to the No Accident Thesis, which says that beliefs
expressed by true sentences are better guides to action than those
expressed by false sentences; it is no accident that well-confirmed
sentences tend to be true.



Naturalised epistemologists form a heterogeneous group and not all of
them contest all the above features. However, in general
epistemological naturalists question the first three traits. (a) They
give up the privileged autonomous position of epistemology and uphold
that epistemology must be continuous with science. (b) Causal
questions must form part of epistemology, epistemologists should take
stock of psychological conditions of cognition. (c) The traditional
internalist model of justification being unacceptable, either
epistemology should give up the task of justification altogether or
look for alternative means of justification. Radical naturalists like
the early Quine want to replace epistemology by psychology and give up
the justification task entirely. Later Quine and more moderate
naturalists, on the other hand, re-instate justification but of a
different kind: some consider justification offered in terms of
causally reliable process of belief generation to be adequate, some
others admit epistemic justification but retain naturalism by making
it supervenient on natural facts.



The most general arguments in favour of the claim that Indian
epistemic systems are naturalistic are as follows. Each develops its
respective theory of veridical cognition and/or knowledge (the term
prama is ambiguous) in response to sceptical threats. In spite of
having different metaphysics, most attempt to explain cognition with
reference to psycho-causal chain. As far as knowledge of the empirical
world is concerned, all admit the primacy of perception and thus
provide the systems of epistemology with a strong empirical
foundation. Indian traditions, in general, as we have seen, sustain a
methodological continuity between science and philosophy. Indian
philosophers did not feel any need for the a priori/ a posteriori
distinction, nor does their theory depend on necessity/possibility or
analytic/synthetic distinctions. As a result, they could easily
commute between the realm of the normative and that of the
descriptive. All these are considerations in favour of a moderate
methodological naturalism; however, in the absence of any special
scientific domain, they do not lend support to the conjecture that
Indian theory sustains a radical replacement naturalism.



The Nyaya response to sceptical objections occurs at two levels,
at the first level enumerating a set of virtuous processes by which
true beliefs are acquired, and the second level dealing with the
ratification of those reliable or virtuous processes of
belief-acquisition. Naiyayikas admit four kinds of
cognition--perceptual (pratyaksa) inferential (anumiti),
that which arises from comparison (upamiti) and verbal
(sabda), and four accredited means of acquiring veridical
cognition (pramana), viz., perception (pratyaksa),
inference (anumana), comparison (upamana) and authority
(sabda). They decide the number of the accredited means by
empirically observing the effectiveness and reliability of the
respective means in generating true beliefs. According to them, these
processes generate true beliefs only when accompanied by genuine
excellence or epistemic virtue (guna). The virtue that makes a
generating process meritorious differs in each type of true belief. In
case of perception the relation of the sense organ with the object
characterised by the property which figures as the qualifier in the
perceptual cognition is said to be the virtue. For example, when one
perceives a white shell as white, our sense organ stands in
appropriate relation with the object of perception, a shell in this
case, and apprehends the property whiteness which characterizes the
shell in question and thus gives rise to a veridical perception. In a
veridical inferential cognition the mark, which is invariably
concomitant with the thing to be inferred, must be known to be present
in the locus of the inference. For instance, when someone correctly
infers fire on a distant hill, it is known to him that smoke, which is
invariably concomitant with fire, is present on the hill. In case of
knowledge by comparison, knowledge of similarity is the excellence,
e.g., someone rightly identifies an unknown animal as a bison on
seeing its similarity with a cow which he came to know from an
expert's utterance to the effect that a bison is similar to a
cow. Finally, in case of verbal knowledge, the speaker's
veridical cognition of the state of affairs described by the sentence
uttered is the excellence, e.g., when an umpire declares a batsman out
in a cricket match on the basis of his expertise and veridical
cognition of the state of affairs. A false belief results from the
presence of some defect (dosa), and not merely from absence of
the required virtue. Someone may perceive a white shell as yellow
because he is suffering from jaundice or because of the yellow tinted
light in the room or due to some other defective condition. These
defects differ in each instance of false belief. The Naiyayikas
therefore maintain that a false belief is caused by a defect and a
true belief is caused by a virtue. This principle holds in all cases
and all types of belief--be it commonsensical, scientific, or
philosophical.



The topic of epistemic luck is an important one in this theory. For,
although a defective process usually generates a false belief and a
meritorious process generates a true belief, yet some beliefs may be
true by fluke, in spite of being produced by a defective process.
Suppose someone wrongly perceives mist as smoke and argues, 'The
hill has fire, as it has smoke on it'. Unbeknownst to him, the
hill actually possesses fire. So this argument yields a veridical
conclusion though the ground is defective. Or consider the following
example (Chakrabarti, 1994): 'Suppose that on a Tuesday a cheat
mistakenly believing it to be Monday says, "Today is
Tuesday". If the listener does not suspect him to be a cheat, he
would "understand" that today is a Tuesday. What he would
understand surely would agree with facts.' Here also the
resultant cognition is veridical even though it is produced by a
defective process. That is why the Naiyayikas hold the following
principle: if there is a false belief then there must be a defect in
the generating process, but not its converse, i.e., if there is a
defect in the generating process, then it produces a false belief
(defects are necessary but not sufficient for error). The problem of
epistemic luck has led scholars like Sibajiban Bhattacharyya to
declare that the Naiyayikas did not mean by veridical cognition
(prama) a justified true belief. Others, including J.N. Mohanty
(Mohanty 1992, 2001) contest this view. They rather reconstruct the
notion of prama as a justified true belief and include the two
examples mentioned above in the list of the Gettier-type
counter-examples, thereby attempting to accommodate pramana
theories within the framework of traditional epistemology.



The Naiyayikas beginning with Vacaspati Misra
succinctly uphold that since a belief cannot reveal its own truth, nor
can it be grasped in after-perception, it must be apprehended by a
subsequent inference following from volition leading to successful
activity. An example from the Nyaya literature will make the
point clear. Suppose a thirsty traveller perceives a lake at a
distance. Suppose further that all the propitious conditions for a
veridical perception are present in this case, e.g., the
traveller's vision is not defective, there is adequate light,
and so on. Yet, if he were ever eluded by a mirage, he might doubt his
vision. The only way to allay his doubts is, says the Naiyayika,
to approach the lake, take a dip in it and drink the water. If he
feels cool and his thirst is quenched, he can be sure about the truth
of his perceptual belief. It is significant that the Naiyayika
calls the volition leading to successful behaviour 'samvadi
pravrtti', literally meaning coherent volition.
One's volition is realised into action and he gets his desired
object. Thus there is coherence between the object of volition and the
object of perception. One's perceptual belief that there is a
lake at a distance is true, if and only if, there is a lake at a
distance. However, to establish it, he needs further corroboration.
His perceptual belief about the lake must cohere with his other
beliefs about water, e.g., it quenches thirst, wets a thing, and
douses fire, etc., which motivates him to act positively or negatively
in a particular situation. I think the model of ratification here is
similar to that of the crossword puzzle, which combines moderate
foundationalism with coherentism. A belief to be true must have a
content-to-world fit. Yet, until such a belief, produced by an
accredited means, matches other beliefs in the existing network, the
belief cannot be known / believed to be true nor the means of
generation can be warranted. The same theory applies to scientific
knowledge. They specifically mention the case of Ayurveda or the
science of medicine. Ayurveda is considered a science because
Ayurvedic prescriptions lead to successful action. When a sick man is
cured by following the prescription of his doctor, he infers the truth
of the utterance of his doctor and gradually gains confidence in
Ayurveda as a science.



The Naiyayikas address the question of ratification in the
context of scriptural injunctions. No knowledge is, according to them,
self-justified, and scriptural prescriptions are no exception, but
they are also not empirically testable. Vacaspati Misra
suggests that scriptural injunctions can be verified by trading on
their similarity with medicinal prescriptions: like medicinal
prescriptions, scriptural prescriptions are also acceptable, since
both are uttered by an infallible speaker. It is interesting to note
in this context that one of the premises of the argument that God is
infallible ultimately rests on another accredited belief-generating
process, viz., reliable testimony or authority. And again, when the
authority as a means of valid cognition is questioned, there is a fall
back on inference. Many a times we see the Naiyayikas paying
scant attention to obviously circular reasoning. This cannot be due to
their inadvertence or ignorance. Rather, like true naturalists, they
favour repairing their boat while still floating. And significantly,
at no stage in their rebuttal of scepticism do they resort to an
internalist mode of justification.



The naturalism of the Naiyayikas can be thrown into relief by
their dispute with Madhyamika Buddhists. The Madhyamikas
play the role of sceptic against the metaphysical realism of
Nyaya. Nagarjuna points out that a Naiyayika
cannot establish the pramana-hood of a pramana
by means of another pramana for that will lead to an
infinite regress. Nor can the Naiyayika establish it by pointing
out its reliable character because that will lead to circularity (a
piece of cognition is said to be prama when it is produced by a
reliable pramana; to establish the reliability of a
pramana by referring to the fact that it has always been
sufficient for generating a prama is obviously circular). This
objection would have been irrefutable if the Naiyayikas had only
one kind of prama and one kind of pramana in their
epistemic repertoire. But as the Naiyayikas admit four different
pramanas for four different types of prama, they can
always fall back on other pramanas when the reliability of
one is questioned: to justify perception, one might take recourse to
inference, and again to justify inference one can rely on verbal
cognition. As to establishing the reliability of the verbal cognition,
they appeal to inference. As Quine once said, 'Such scruples
against circularity have little points once we have stopped dreaming
of deducing sciences from observation. If we are simply to understand
the link between observation and science, we are well advised to use
any available information, including that provided by the very science
whose link with observation we are seeking to understand.' A
naturalist need not be afraid of circularity.


## 4. Moral Naturalism: karma and adrsta



Moral naturalism has two characteristic features: first, moral facts
are considered to be natural facts; second, moral facts can causally
influence the physical world as well as human experience. Both these
features are present in the moral theories of many of the classical
systems of Indian philosophy.



The doctrine of karma is a foundational thesis of Indian moral
philosophy. According to the doctrine of karma, every action gives
rise to some consequence; a good act leads to good consequence and a
bad act to bad consequence: every human agent has to reap the
consequences of his/ her actions. One is sure to be rewarded or
punished for one's good or wrong deeds. A just moral scheme
requires that one should never suffer or enjoy the consequences of
another's action. The burden of moral responsibility for
one's deeds is thus to be borne by the individual. In spite of
this, most Indians believed and still believe that even if our present
actions are causally necessitated by our past actions, our present
actions can be free.



The validity of the doctrine, however, has often been doubted on
empirical grounds. For, it is a common sight that saintly people
suffer in their life, while habitual wrongdoers enjoy happiness. To
account for such anomalies, a theory of rebirth is tagged to the
karma-doctrine. The logic is somewhat like this: since nothing comes
from nothing, one must have done something good in the past, in this
life or some other life, if one is happy; and, on the other hand, if
one suffers then one must have done something wicked, if not in this
life then in some other previous life. Although, with the exception of
a few parapsychologists, nobody claims to have any scientific evidence
for rebirth, yet this is a rational justification of the belief in
rebirth on the assumption that the universe is law-governed. The
overarching law that the philosophers in India believed in was called
rta--the principle of cosmic order or harmony that
'makes science possible, the world beautiful and the humans
moral'. Rta is the principle underlying the
'finely-tuned universe', the transgression of which leads
to sin. It represents the totality of physical and moral laws, which
even the gods are bound to obey. The law of karma follows from
rta as the causal basis of the phenomenal world. God is
constrained so to act as to keep in view the accumulated karma of
individuals, yet to bear fruit.



Karma is standardly divided into three types in Indian thought: (1)
that which has started to bear fruit (prarabdha) and cannot be
diverted or stopped in the middle of its course; (2) that which is
being performed now the consequence of which is being credited for
future fruition (sanciyamana); and (3) that which has
been accumulated but yet to start yielding results (sancita). A
very apt illustration available in the literature is that of an archer
with his quiver full of arrows. The arrow which has been shot by the
archer is like the first type, the arrow that the archer holds in his
hand in a state of readiness is like the second type, and the arrows
in the quiver, yet unused, are like the third type. It is evident that
the explanation of human acts being provided by the law of karma is a
causal explanation. Perrett 1998, p. 73 comments that 'just as
causal principle exhorts us to keep seeking explanations for physical
occurrences, so the karmic principle exhorts us to keep looking for
explanations for "moral" events.'



The Mimamsaka-s admit the doctrine of karma but
supports non-naturalism in moral context. They believe in two causal
realms -- ritual and natural and according to them the ritual
order is independent of the natural order. In fact the causal
connection that obtains between a ritual enjoined by the scripture and
its result cannot be explained naturally, e.g., how the correct
performance of putresti sacrifice fulfills one's
desire for a son is beyond natural and scientific explanation
(Chatterjee 2016).



Nyaya thinkers seek to relate the principle of karma with the
atomistic conception of nature described above, but in doing so might
appear to compromise their commitment of metaphysical naturalism.
Individuals can enjoy or suffer the consequences of their actions only
during their embodied existence in the world. Atoms, therefore,
combine to form such a world as individuals deserve because of their
past deeds. When accumulated merits and demerits become ready for
fruition, they can impart motion to atoms. To admit an unseen force as
a cause of atomic motion, identified with the accumulated merits and
demerits of individual beings, might seem to run against a commitment
to naturalism. Yet the idea that there is unbroken chain of causal
connection within the empirical world spanning across different lives
situates the postulated 'unseen force' itself within the
boundaries of the natural world. Mohanty (1992, p. 222) observes that
'if actions of the self and the moral forces
(adrsta) generated by actions account for empirical
nature's manifestation or creation, then ultimately nature is
both natural and moral: the two order coincides.'