## 1. What is Cloning?



Strictly speaking, cloning is the creation of a genetic copy of a
sequence of DNA or of the entire genome of an organism. In the latter
sense, cloning occurs naturally in the birth of identical twins and
other multiples. But cloning can also be done artificially in the
laboratory via embryo twinning or splitting: an early embryo is split
*in vitro* so that both parts, when transferred to a uterus,
can develop into individual organisms genetically identical to each
other. In the cloning debate, however, the term 'cloning'
typically refers to a technique called somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT). SCNT involves transferring the nucleus of a somatic cell into
an oocyte from which the nucleus and thus most of the DNA has been
removed. (The mitochondrial DNA in the cytoplasm is still present).
The manipulated oocyte is then treated with an electric current in
order to stimulate cell division, resulting in the formation of an
embryo. The embryo is (virtually) genetically identical to, and thus a
clone of the somatic cell donor.



Dolly was the first mammal to be brought into the world using SCNT.
Ian Wilmut and his team at the Roslin Institute in Scotland replaced
the nucleus from an oocyte taken from a Blackface ewe with the nucleus
of a cell from the mammary gland of a six-year old Finn Dorset sheep
(these sheep have a white face). They transferred the resulting embryo
into the uterus of a surrogate ewe and approximately five months later
Dolly was born. Dolly had a white face: she was genetically identical
to the Finn Dorset ewe from which the somatic cell had been
obtained.



Dolly, however, was not 100% genetically identical to the donor
animal. Genetic material comes from two sources: the nucleus and the
mitochondria of a cell. Mitochondria are organelles that serve as
power sources to the cell. They contain short segments of DNA. In
Dolly's case, her *nuclear* DNA was the same as the donor
animal; other of her genetic materials came from the mitochondria in
the cytoplasm of the enucleated oocyte. For the clone and the donor
animal to be exact genetic copies, the oocyte too would have to come
from the donor animal (or from the same maternal line -
mitochondria are passed on by oocytes).



Dolly's birth was a real breakthrough, for it proved that
something that had been considered biologically impossible could
indeed be done. Before Dolly, scientists thought that cell
differentiation was irreversible: they believed that, once a cell has
differentiated into a specialized body cell, such as a skin or liver
cell, the process cannot be reversed. What Dolly demonstrated was that
it is possible to take a differentiated cell, turn back its biological
clock, and make the cell behave as though it was a recently fertilized
egg.



Nuclear transfer can also be done using a donor cell from an embryo
instead of from an organism after birth. Cloning mammals using
embryonic cells has been successful since the mid-1980s (for a history
of cloning, see Wilmut et al. 2001). Another technique to produce
genetically identical offspring or clones is embryo twinning or embryo
splitting, in which an early embryo is split *in vitro* so that
both parts, when implanted in the uterus, can develop into individual
organisms genetically identical to each other. This process occurs
naturally with identical twins.



However, what many people find disturbing is the idea of creating a
genetic duplicate of an existing person, or a person who has existed.
That is why the potential application of SCNT in humans set off a
storm of controversy. Another way to produce a genetic duplicate from
an existing person is by cryopreserving one of two genetically
identical embryos created *in vitro* for several years or
decades before using it to generate a pregnancy. Lastly, reproductive
cloning of humans could, in theory, also be achieved by combining the
induced pluripotent stem cell technique with tetraploid
complementation. Several research teams have succeeded in cloning mice
this way (see, for example, Boland et al. 2009). The technique
involves injecting mouse iPS cells in tetraploid embryos, i.e. embryos
with twice the normal number of chromosomes that cannot result in live
offspring. The resulting mouse pups are derived solely from the iPS
cells, which means that the tetraploid embryos only acted as a
substitute trophectoderm, which forms the placenta and other
nourishing membranes but which does not contribute to the
'embryo proper'.



Dolly is a case of reproductive cloning, the aim of which is to create
offspring. Reproductive cloning is to be distinguished from cloning
for therapy and research, sometimes also referred to as
'therapeutic cloning'. Both reproductive cloning and
cloning for research and therapy involve SCNT, but their aims, as well
as most of the ethical concerns they raise, differ. I will first
discuss cloning for research and therapy and will then proceed to
outline the ethical debate surrounding reproductive cloning.


## 2. Cloning for Research and Therapy



Cloning for research and therapy involves the creation of an embryo
via SCNT, but instead of transferring the cloned embryo to the uterus
in order to generate a pregnancy, it is used to obtain pluripotent
stem cells. It is thus not the intention to use the embryo for
reproductive purposes. Embryonic stem cells offer powerful tools for
developing therapies for currently incurable diseases and conditions,
for important biomedical research, and for drug discovery and toxicity
testing (Cervera & Stojkovic 2007). For example, one therapeutic
approach is to induce embryonic stem cells to differentiate into
cardiomyocytes (heart muscle cells) to repair or replace damaged heart
tissue, into insulin-producing cells to treat diabetes, or into
neurons and their supporting tissues to repair spinal cord
injuries.



A potential problem with embryonic stem cells is that they will
normally *not* be genetically identical to the patient.
Embryonic stem cells are typically derived from embryos donated for
research after *in vitro* fertilization (IVF) treatment.
Because these stem cells would have a genetic identity different from
that of the recipient - the patient - they may, when used
in therapy, be rejected by her immune system. Immunorejection can
occur when the recipient's body does not recognize the
transplanted cells, tissues or organs as its own and as a defense
mechanism attempts to destroy the graft. Another type of
immunorejection involves a condition called graft-versus-host disease,
in which immune cells contaminating the graft recognize the new host
- the patient - as foreign and attack the host's
tissues and organs. Both types of immunorejection can result in loss
of the graft or death of the patient. It is one of the most serious
problems faced in transplant surgery.



Cloning for research and therapy could potentially offer a solution to
this problem. An embryo produced via SNCT using the patient's
somatic cell as a donor cell would be virtually genetically identical
to the patient. Stem cells obtained from that embryo would thus also
be genetically identical to the patient, as would be their
derivatives, and would be less likely to be rejected after
transplantation. Though therapies using embryonic stem cells from SCNT
embryos are not yet on the horizon for humans, scientists have
provided proof of concept for these therapies in the mouse.



Embryonic stem cells from cloned embryos would also have significant
advantages for biomedical research, and for drug discovery and
toxicity testing. Embryonic stem cells genetically identical to the
patient could provide valuable *in vitro* models to study
disease, especially where animal models are not available, where the
research cannot be done in patients themselves because it would be too
invasive, or where there are too few patients to work with (as in the
case of rare genetic diseases). Researchers could, for example, create
large numbers of embryonic stem cells genetically identical to the
patient and then experiment on these in order to understand the
particular features of the disease in that person. The embryonic stem
cells and their derivatives could also be used to test potential
treatments. They could, for example, be used to test candidate drug
therapies to predict their likely toxicity. This would avoid dangerous
exposure of patients to sometimes highly experimental drugs.



Cloning for research and therapy is, however, still in its infancy
stages. In 2011, a team of scientists from the New York Stem Cell
Foundation Laboratory was the first to have succeeded in creating two
embryonic stem cell lines from human embryos produced through SCNT
(Noggle et al. 2011). Three years earlier, a small San Diego
biotechnological company created human embryos (at the blastocyst
stage) via SCNT but did not succeed in deriving embryonic stem cells
from these cells (French et al. 2008). Cloning for research and
therapy is thus not likely to bear fruit in the short term though
progress is made (Tachibana et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2020). Apart
from unsolved technical difficulties, much more basic research in
embryonic stem cell research is needed. The term 'therapeutic
cloning' has been criticized precisely for this reason. It
suggests that therapy using embryonic stem cells from cloned embryos
is already reality. In the phase before clinical trials, critics say,
it is only reasonable to refer to research on nuclear transfer as
'research cloning' or 'cloning for biomedical
research' (PCBE, 2002).



Cloning for research and therapy holds great potential for future
research and therapeutic applications, but it also raises various
ethical concerns.


### 2.1 Creating and Killing Embryos for Stem Cells



Much of the debate about the ethics of cloning for research and
therapy turns on a basic disagreement about how we should treat early
human embryos. As it is currently done, the isolation of embryonic
stem cells involves the destruction of embryos at the blastocyst stage
(day five after fertilization, when the embryo consists of
125-225 cells). But cloning for research and therapy not only
involves the destruction of embryos, it also involves the creation of
embryos *solely* for the purpose of stem cell derivation. Views
on whether and when it is permissible to create embryos solely to
obtain stem cells differ profoundly.



Some believe that an embryo, from the moment of conception, has the
same moral status, that is, the same set of basic moral rights, claims
or interests as an ordinary adult human being. This view is sometimes
expressed by saying that the early embryo is a person. On this view,
creating and killing embryos for stem cells is a serious moral wrong.
It is impermissible, even if it could save many lives (Deckers 2007).
Others believe that the early embryo is merely a cluster of cells or
human tissue lacking any moral status. A common view among those who
hold this position is that, given its promising potential, embryonic
stem cell and cloning research is a moral imperative (Devolder &
Savulescu 2006). Many defend a view somewhere in between these
opposing positions. They believe, for example, that the early embryo
should be treated with respect because it has an intermediate moral
status: a moral status lower than that of a person but higher than
that of an ordinary body cell. A popular view amongst those who hold
this position is that using embryos for research might sometimes be
justified. Respect can be demonstrated, it is typically argued, by
using embryos only for very important research that cannot be done
using less controversial means, and by acknowledging the use of
embryos for research with a sense of regret or loss (Robertson 1995;
Steinbock 2001). One common view among those who hold the intermediate
moral status view is that the use of discarded IVF embryos to obtain
stem cells is compatible with the respect we owe to the embryo,
whereas the creation and use of cloned embryos is not. An argument
underlying this view is that, unlike IVF embryos, cloned embryos are
created for instrumental use only; they are created and treated as a
mere means, which some regard as incompatible with respectful
treatment of the embryo (NBAC 1999). Others (both proponents and
opponents of embryo research) have denied that there is a significant
moral difference between using discarded IVF embryos and cloned
embryos as a source of stem cells. They have argued that *if*
killing embryos for research is wrong, it is wrong regardless of the
embryo's origin (Doerflinger 1999; Fitzpatrick 2003; Devolder
2005, 2015). Douglas and Savulescu (2009) have argued that it is
permissible to destroy 'unwanted' embryos in research,
that is, embryos that no one wishes to use for reproductive purposes.
Since both discarded IVF embryos and cloned embryos created for the
purpose of stem cell derivation are unwanted embryos in that sense, it
is, on their view, permissible to use both types of embryos for
research.



A less common view holds that obtaining stem cells from cloned embryos
poses *fewer* ethical problems than obtaining stem cells from
discarded IVF embryos. Hansen (2002) has advanced this view, arguing
that embryos resulting from SCNT do not have the same moral status we
normally accord to other embryos: he calls the combination of a
somatic nucleus and an enucleated egg a "transnuclear
egg", which, he says, is a mere "artifact" with no
"natural purpose" or potential "to evolve into an
embryo and eventually a human being," and therefore falls
outside the category of human beings. McHugh (2004) and Kiessling
(2001) advance a similar argument. On their view, obtaining stem cells
from cloned embryos is less morally problematic because embryos
resulting from SCNT cannot (yet) develop further, and are thus better
thought of as tissue culture, whereas IVF represents instrumental
support for human reproduction. Since creating offspring is not the
goal, they argue, it is misleading to use the term
'embryo' or 'zygote' to refer to the product
of SCNT. They suggest to instead use the terms 'clonote'
(Mc Hugh) and 'ovasome' (Kiessling).


### 2.2 The Need for Oocytes



Cloning for research and therapy requires a large number of
high-quality donor oocytes. Ethical issues arise regarding how these
oocytes could be obtained. Oocyte donation involves various risks and
discomforts (for a review of the risks, see Committee on Assessing the
Medical Risks of Human Oocyte Donation for Stem Cell
Research*,* 2007). Among the most pressing ethical issues
raised by participating in such donation is what model of informed
consent should be applied. Unlike women who are considering IVF,
non-medical oocyte donors are not clinical patients. They do not stand
to derive any reproductive or medical benefit themselves from the
donation (though Kalfoglou & Gittelsohn, 2000, argue that they may
derive a psychological benefit). Magnus and Cho (2005) have argued
that donating women should not be classified as research subjects
since, unlike in other research, the risks to the donor do not lie in
the research itself but in the procurement of the materials required
for the research. They suggest that a new category named
'research donors' be created for those who expose
themselves to substantial risk only for the benefit of others (in this
case unidentifiable people in the future) and where the risk is
incurred not in the actual research but in the procurement of the
materials for the research. Informed consent for altruistic organ
donation by living donors to strangers has also been suggested as a
model, since, in both cases, the benefits will be for strangers and
not for the donor. Critics of this latter suggestion have pointed out,
however, that there is a disanalogy between these two types of
donation. The general ethical rule reflected in regulations concerning
altruistic donation, namely that there must be a high chance of a good
outcome for the patient, is violated in the case of oocyte donation
for cloning research (George 2007).



Given the risks to the donor, the absence of direct medical benefit
for the donor, and the uncertain potential of cloning research, it is
not surprising that the number of altruistic oocyte donations for such
research is very low. Financial incentives might be needed to increase
the supply of oocytes for cloning research. In some countries,
including the US, selling and buying oocytes is legal. Some object to
these practices because they consider oocytes as integral to the body
and think they should be kept out of the market: on their view, the
value of the human body and its parts should not be expressed in terms
of money or other fungible goods. Some also worry that, through
commercialization of oocytes, women themselves may become objects of
instrumental use (Alpers &Lo 1995). Many agree, however, that a
concern for commodification does not justify a complete ban on payment
of oocyte donors and that justice requires that they be financially
compensated for the inconvenience, burden, and medical risk they
endure, as is standard for other research subjects (Steinbock 2004;
Mertes &Pennings 2007). A related concern is the effect of
financial or other offers of compensation on the voluntariness of
oocyte donation. Women, especially economically disadvantaged women
from developing countries, might be unduly induced or even coerced
into selling their oocytes (Dickinson 2002). Baylis and McLeod (2007)
have highlighted how difficult it is concomitantly to avoid both undue
inducement and exploitation: a price that is too low risks
exploitation; a price that avoids exploitation risks undue
inducement.



Concerns about exploitation are not limited to concerns about payment,
as became clear in the 'Hwang scandal' (for a review, see
Saunders & Savulescu 2008). In 2004, Woo-Suk-Hwang, a leading
Korean stem cell scientist, claimed to be the first to clone human
embryos using SCNT and to extract stem cells from these embryos. In
addition to finding that Hwang had fabricated many of his research
results, Korea's National Bioethics Committee also found that
Hwang had pressured junior members of his lab to donate oocytes for
his cloning experiments.



Some authors have argued that a *regulated* market in oocytes
could minimize ethical concerns raised by the commercialization of
oocytes and could be consistent with respect for women (Resnik 2001;
Gruen 2007). Researchers are also investigating the use of alternative
sources of oocytes, including animal oocytes, fetal oocytes, oocytes
from adult ovaries obtained post mortem or during operation, and stem
cell-derived oocytes. Scientists have already succeeded in creating
human oocytes from embryonic stem cells (Ma et al. 2017; Saitou &
Miyauchi 2016). Finally, another option is 'egg-sharing'
where couples who are undergoing IVF for reproductive purposes have
the option to donate one or two of their oocytes in return for a
reduced fee for their fertility treatment. The advantage of this
system is that it avoids exposing women to extra risks - these
women were undergoing IVF in any case (Roberts & Throsby
2008).


### 2.3 Social Justice Considerations



Personalized cloning therapies are likely to be labor intensive and
expensive. This has raised social justice concerns. Perhaps cloning
therapies will only be a realistic option for the very rich? Some have
replied to this concern by pointing out that Cloning therapies may
become cheaper, less labor intensive and more widely accessible after
time. Moreover, cloning may *cure* diseases and not only treat
symptoms. Regardless of the economic cost, it remains true of course
that the cloning procedure is time consuming, rendering it
inappropriate for certain clinical applications where urgent
intervention is required (e.g., myocardial infarction, acute liver
failure or traumatic or infectious spinal cord damage). If cloning for
therapy became available, its application would thus likely be
restricted to chronic conditions. Wilmut (1997), who cloned Dolly, has
suggested that cloning treatments could be targeted to maximize
benefit: an older person with heart disease could be treated with stem
cells that are not a genetic match, take drugs to suppress her immune
system for the rest of her life, and live with the side-effects; a
younger person might benefit from stem cells from cloned embryos that
match exactly. Devolder and Savulescu (2006) have argued that
objections about economic cost are most forceful against
'cloning for self-transplantation' than, for example,
against cloning for developing cellular models of human disease. The
latter will enable research into human diseases and may result in
affordable therapies and cures for a variety of common diseases, such
as cancer and heart disease, which afflict people all over the world.
Finally, some have pointed out that it is not clear whether cloning
research is necessarily more labor intensive than experiments on cells
and tissues now done in animals.



Some are skeptical about the claimed benefits of cloning for research
and therapy. They stress that for many diseases in which cloned
embryonic stem cells might offer a therapy, there are alternative
treatments and/or preventive measures in development, including gene
therapy, pharmacogenomical solutions and treatments based on
nanotechnology. It is often claimed that other types of stem cells
such as adult stem cells and stem cells from the umbilical cord blood
might enable us to achieve the same aims as cloning. Especially
induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) have raised the hope that
cloning research is superfluous (Rao & Condic 2008). iPSCs are
created through genetic manipulation of a body cell. iPSCs are similar
to embryonic stem cells, and in particular to embryonic stem cells
from cloned embryos. However, iPSC research could provide tissue- and
patient-specific cells without relying on the need for human oocytes
or the creation and destruction of embryos. iPSC research could thus
avoid the ethical issues raised by cloning. This promise
notwithstanding, scientists have warned that it would be premature to
stop cloning research as iPSCs are not identical to embryonic stem
cells (Pera & Trounson 2013). Cloning research may teach us things
that iPSC research cannot teach us. Moreover, iPSC research has been
said to fail to completely avoid the issue of embryo destruction
(Brown 2009, Devolder 2015).


### 2.4 A Slippery Slope to Reproductive Cloning



Slippery slope arguments express the worry that permitting a certain
practice may place us on a slippery slope to a dangerous or otherwise
unacceptable outcome. Several commentators have argued that accepting
or allowing cloning research is the first step that would place us on
a slippery slope to reproductive cloning. As Leon Kass (1998, 702) has
put it: "once the genies put the cloned embryos into the
bottles, who can strictly control where they go?"



Others are more skeptical about slippery slope arguments against
cloning and think that effective legislation can prevent us from
sliding down the slope (Savulescu 1999; Devolder & Savulescu
2006). If reproductive cloning is unacceptable, these critics say, it
is reasonable to prohibit this specific technology rather than to ban
non-reproductive applications of cloning. The UK and Belgium, for
example, allow cloning research but prohibit the transfer of cloned
embryos to the uterus.



Apart from the question of how slippery the slope might be, another
question raised by such arguments concerns the feared development
-reproductive cloning- and whether it is really ethically
objectionable. Profound disagreement exists about the answer to this
question.


## 3. Human Reproductive Cloning



The central argument in favor of reproductive cloning is expansion of
opportunities for reproduction. Reproductive cloning could offer a new
means for prospective parents to satisfy their reproductive goals or
desires. Infertile individuals or couples could have a child that is
genetically related to them. In addition, individuals, same sex
couples, or couples who cannot together produce an embryo would no
longer need donor gametes to reproduce if cloning were available (some
might still need donor eggs for the cloning procedure, but these would
be enucleated so that only the mitochondrial DNA remains). It would
then be possible to avoid that one's child shares half of her
nuclear DNA with a gamete donor.



Using cloning to help infertile people to have a genetically related
child, or a child that is only genetically related to them, has been
defended on the grounds of human wellbeing, personal autonomy, and the
satisfaction of the natural inclination to produce offspring
(Hayry 2003; Strong 2008). Offering individuals or couples the
possibility to reproduce using cloning technology has been said to be
consistent with the right to reproductive freedom, which, according to
some, implies the right to choose what kind of children we will have
(Brock 1998, 145).



According to some, the main benefit of reproductive cloning is that it
would enable prospective parents to control what genome their children
will be endowed with (Fletcher 1988, Harris 1997, 2004; Pence 1998,
101-6; Tooley 1998). Cloning would enable parents to have a
child with a genome identical to that of a person with good health
and/or other desirable characteristics.



Another possible use of reproductive cloning is to create a child that
is a tissue match for a sick sibling. The stem cells from the
umbilical cord blood or from the bone marrow of the cloned child could
be used to treat the diseased sibling. Such 'saviour
siblings', have already been created through sexual reproduction
or, more efficiently, through a combination of IVF, preimplantation
genetic diagnosis and HLA testing.



Many people, however, have expressed concerns about human reproductive
cloning. For some, these concerns are sufficient to reject human
cloning. For others, these concerns should be weighed against reasons
*for* reproductive cloning.



What follows is an outline of some of the main areas of concern and
disagreement about human reproductive cloning.


### 3.1 Safety and Efficiency



Despite the successful creation of viable offspring via SCNT in
various mammalian species, researchers still have limited
understanding of how the technique works on the subcellular and
molecular level. Although the overall efficiency and safety of
reproductive cloning in mammals has significantly increased over the
past fifteen years, it is not yet a safe process (Whitworth &
Prather 2010). For example, the rate of abortions, stillbirths and
developmental abnormalities remains high. Another source of concern is
the risk of premature ageing because of shortened telomeres. Telomeres
are repetitive DNA sequences at the tip of chromosomes that get
shorter as an animal gets older. When the telomeres of a cell get so
short that they disappear, the cell dies. The concern is that cloned
animals may inherit the shortened telomeres from their older
progenitor, with possibly premature aging and a shortened lifespan as
a result.



For many, the fact that reproductive cloning is unsafe provides a
sufficient reason not to pursue it. It has been argued that it would
simply be wrong to impose such significant health risks on humans. The
strongest version of this argument states that it would be wrong now
to produce a child using SCNT because it would constitute a case of
wrongful procreation. Some adopt a consent-based objection and condemn
cloning because the person conceived cannot consent to being exposed
to significant risks involved in the procedure (Kass 1998; PCBE 2002).
Against this, it has been argued that even if reproductive cloning is
unsafe, it may still be permissible if there are no safer means to
bring that very same child into existence so long as the child is
expected to have a life worth living (Strong 2005).



With the actual rate of advancement in cloning, one cannot exclude a
future in which the safety and efficiency of SCNT will be comparable
or superior to that of IVF or even sexual reproduction. A remaining
question is, then, whether those who condemn cloning because of its
experimental nature should continue to condemn it morally and legally.
Some authors have reasoned that if, in the future, cloning becomes
safer than sexual reproduction, we should even make it our
reproductive method of choice (Fletcher 1988; Harris 2004, Ch. 4).



### 3.2 Harm to the Individual Conceived through Cloning


#### 3.2.1 A Threat to Autonomy



Some fear that cloning threatens the identity and individuality of the
clone, thus reducing her autonomy (Ramsey 1966; Kitcher 1997; Annas
1998; Kass 1998). This may be bad in itself, or bad because it might
reduce the clone's wellbeing. It may also be bad because it will
severely restrict the array of life plans open to the clone, thus
violating her 'right to an open future' (a concept
developed in Feinberg 1980). In its report 'Human Cloning and
Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry', the US President's
Council on Bioethics (2002) wrote that being genetically unique is
"an emblem of independence and individuality" and allows
us to go forward "with a relatively indeterminate future in
front of us" (Ch. 5, Section c). Such concerns have formed the
basis of strong opposition to cloning.



The concern that cloning threatens the clone's identity and
individuality has been criticized for relying on the mistaken belief
that who and what we become is entirely determined by our genes. Such
genetic determinism is clearly false. Though genes influence our
personal development, so does the complex and irreproducible context
in which our lives take place. We know this, among others, from
studying monozygotic twins. Notwithstanding the fact that such twins
are genetically identical to each other and, therefore, sometimes look
very similar and often share many character traits, habits and
preferences, they *are* different individuals, with different
identities (Segal 2000). Thus, it is argued, having a genetic
duplicate does not threaten one's individuality, or one's
distinct identity.



Brock (2002) has pointed out that one could nevertheless argue that
even though individuals created through cloning would be unique
individuals with a distinct identity, they might not experience it
that way. What is threatened by cloning then is not the
individual's identity or individuality, but her *sense*
of identity and individuality, and this may reduce her autonomy. So
even if a clone has a unique identity, she may experience more
difficulties in establishing her identity than if she had not been a
clone.



But here too critics have relied on the comparison with monozygotic
twins. Harris (1997, 2004) and Tooley (1998), for example, have
pointed out that each twin not only has a distinct identity, but
generally also views him or herself as having a distinct identity, as
do their relatives and friends. Moreover, so they argue, an individual
created through cloning would likely be of a different age than her
progenitor. There may even be several generations between them. A
clone would thus in essence be a 'delayed' twin.
Presumably this would make it even easier for the clone to view
herself as distinct from the progenitor than if she had been
genetically identical to someone her same age.



However, the reference to twins as a model to think about reproductive
cloning has been criticized, for example, because it fails to reflect
important aspects of the parent-child relationship that would incur if
the child were a clone of one of the rearing parents (Jonas 1974;
Levick 2004). Because of the dominance of the progenitor, the risk of
reduced autonomy and confused identity may be greater in such a
situation than in the case of ordinary twins. Moreover, just
*because* the clone would be a delayed twin, she may have the
feeling that her life has already been lived or that she is
predetermined to do the same things as her progenitor (Levy & Lotz
2005). This problem may be exacerbated by others constantly comparing
her life with that of the progenitor, and having problematic
expectations based on these comparisons. The clone may feel under
constant pressure to live up to these expectations (Kass 1998; Levick
2004, 101; Sandel 2007, 57-62), or may have the feeling she
leads 'a life in the shadow' of the progenitor (Holm 1998;
PCBE 2002, Ch.5). This may especially be the case if the clone was
created as a 'replacement' for a deceased child. (Some
private companies already offer to clone dead pets to create
replacements pets.) The fear is that the 'ghost of the dead
child' will get more attention and devotion than the replacement
child. Parents may expect the clone to be like the lost child, or some
idealized image of it, which could hamper the development of her
identity and adversely affect her self-esteem (Levick 2004,
111-132). Finally, another reason why the clone's autonomy
may be reduced is because she would be involuntarily informed about
her genetic predispositions. A clone who knows that her genetic parent
developed a severe single gene disease at the age of forty will
realise it is very likely that she will undergo the same fate. Unlike
individuals who *choose* to have themselves genetically tested,
clones who know their genetic parent's medical history will be
involuntarily informed.



These concerns have been challenged on several grounds. Some believe
that it is plausible that, through adequate information, we could
largely correct mistaken beliefs about the link between genetic and
personal identity, and thus reduce the risk of problematic
expectations toward the clone (Harris 1997, 2004; Tooley 1998,
84-5; Brock 1998, Pence 1998). Brock (1998) and Buchanan et al.
(2000, 198) have argued that even if people persist in these mistaken
beliefs and their attitudes or actions lead to cloned individuals
*believing* they do not have an open future, this does not
imply that the clone's right to ignorance about one's
personal future or to an open future has *actually* been
violated. Pence (1998, 138) has argued that having high expectations,
even if based on false beliefs, is not necessarily a bad thing.
Parents with high expectations often give their children the best
chances to lead a happy and successful life. Brock (2002, 316) has
argued that parents now also constantly restrict the array of
available life plans open to their children, for example, by selecting
their school or by raising them according to certain values. Though
this may somewhat restrict the child's autonomy, there will
always be enough decisions to take for the child to be autonomous, and
to realize this. According to Brock, it is not clear why this should
be different in the case of cloning. He also points out that there may
be advantages to being a 'delayed twin' (154). For
example, one may acquire knowledge about the progenitor's
medical history and use this knowledge to live longer, or to increase
one's autonomy. One could, for example, use the information to
reduce the risk of getting the disease or condition, or to at least
postpone its onset, by behavioral changes, an appropriate diet and/or
preventive medication. This would not be possible, however, if the
disease is untreatable (for example, Huntington's Disease).
Harris (2004, Ch.1) has stressed that information about one's
genetic predispositions for certain diseases would also allow one to
take better informed reproductive decisions. Cloning would allow us to
give our child a 'tried and tested' genome, not one
created by the genetic lottery of sexual reproduction and the random
combination of chromosomes.


#### 3.2.2 The clone will be treated as a means



Cloning arouses people's imagination about the clone, but also
about those who will choose to have a child through cloning. Often
dubious motives are ascribed to them: they would want a child that is
'just like so-and-so' causing people to view children as
objects or as commodities like a new car or a new house (Putnam 1997,
7-8). They would want an attractive child (a clone of Scarlett
Johansson) or a child with tennis talent (a clone of Victoria
Azarenka) purely to show off. Dictators would want armies of clones to
achieve their political goals. People would clone themselves out of
vanity. Parents would clone their existing child so that the clone can
serve as an organ bank for that child, or would clone their deceased
child to have a replacement child. The conclusion is then that cloning
is wrong because the clone will be used as a mere means to
others' ends. These critiques have also been expressed with
regard to other forms of assisted reproduction; but some worry that
individuals created through cloning may be more likely to be viewed as
commodities because their total genetic blueprint would be chosen
- they would be "fully made and not begotten"
(Ramsey 1966; Kass 1998; PCBE 2002, 107).



Strong (2008) has argued that these concerns are based on a fallacious
inference. It is one thing to desire genetically related children, and
something else to believe that one owns one's children or that
one considers one's children as objects, he writes. Other
commentators, however, have pointed out that even if parents
themselves do not commodify their children, cloning might still have
an impact on society as a whole, thereby increasing the tendency of
others to do so (Levy & Lotz 2005; Sandel 2007). A related concern
expressed by Levick (2004, 184-5) is that allowing cloning might
result in a society where 'production on demand' clones
are sold for adoption to people who are seeking to have children with
special abilities - a clearer case of treating children as
objects.



But suppose some people create a clone for instrumental reasons, for
example, as a stem cell donor for a sick sibling. Does this imply that
the clone will be treated merely as a means? Critics of this argument
have pointed out that parents have children for all kinds of
instrumental reasons, including the benefit for the husband-wife
relationship, continuity of the family name, and the economic and
psychological benefits children provide when their parents become old
(Harris 2004, 41-2, Pence 1998). This is generally not
considered problematic as long as the child is also valued in its own
right. What is most important in a parent-child relationship is the
love and care inherent in that relationship. They stress the fact that
we judge people on their attitudes toward children, rather than on
their motives for having them. They also deny that there is a strong
link between one's intention or motive to have a child, and the
way one will treat the child.


#### 3.2.3 Societal Prejudice and Respect for Clones



Another concern is that clones may be the victims of unjustified
discrimination and will not be respected as persons (Deech 1999;
Levick 2004, 185-187). Savulescu (2005, Other Internet
Resources) has referred to such negative attitudes towards clones as
'clonism': a new form of discrimination against a group of
humans who are different in a non-morally significant way. But does a
fear for 'clonism' constitute a good reason for rejecting
cloning? Savulescu and others have argued that, if it is, then we must
conclude that racist attitudes and discriminatory behavior towards
people with a certain ethnicity provides a good reason for people with
that ethnicity not to procreate. This, according to these critics, is
a morally objectionable way to solve the problem of racism. Instead of
limiting people's procreative liberty we should combat existing
prejudices and discrimination. Likewise, it is argued, instead of
prohibiting cloning out of concern for clonism, we should combat
possible prejudices and discrimination against clones (see also Pence
1998, 46; Harris 2004, 92-93). Macintosh (2005, 119-21)
has warned that by expressing certain concerns about cloning one may
actually reinforce certain prejudices and misguided stereotypes about
clones. For example, saying that a clone would not have a personal
identity prejudges the clone as inferior or fraudulent (the idea that
originals are more valuable than their copies) or even less than human
(as individuality is seen as an essential characteristic of human
nature).


#### 3.2.4 Complex Family Relationships



Some worry that cloning will threaten traditional family structures; a
fear that has come up in debates about gay people adopting children,
IVF and other assisted reproduction techniques. But in cloning the
situation would be more complex as it may blur generational boundaries
(McGee 2000) and the clone would likely be confused about her kinship
ties (Kass 1998; O'Neil 2002, 67-68). For example, a woman
who has a child conceived through cloning would actually be the twin
of her child and the woman's mother would, genetically, be its
mother, not grandmother. Some have argued against these concerns,
replying that a cloned child would not necessarily be more confused
about her family ties than other children. Many have four nurturing
parents because of a divorce, never knew their genetic parents, have
nurturing parents that are not their genetic parents, or think that
their nurturing father is also their genetic father when in fact he is
not. While these complex family relationships can be troubling for
some children, they are not insurmountable, critics say. Harris (2004,
77-78) argues that there are many aspects about the situation
one is born and raised in that may be troublesome. As with all
children, the most important thing is the relation with people who
nurture and educate them, and children usually know very well who
these people are. There is no reason to believe that with cloning,
this will be any different. Onora O'Neil (2002, 67-8)
argues that such responses are misplaced. While she acknowledges that
there are already children now with confused family relationships, she
argues that it is very different when prospective parents seek such
potentially confused relationships for their children from the
start.


### 3.3 Harm to Others



Other concerns related to cloning focus on the potential harmful
effects of cloning for others. Sometimes these concerns are related to
those about the wellbeing of the clone. For example, McGee's
concern about confused family relationships not only bears on the
clone but also on society as a whole. However, since I have already
mentioned this concern, I will, in the remainder of this entry, focus
on other arguments


#### 3.3.1 Adoption and the Importance of Genetic Links



It is often claimed that the strongest reason for why reproductive
cloning should be permissible, if safe, is that it will allow
infertile people to have a genetically related child. This position
relies on the view that having genetically related children is morally
significant and valuable. This is a controversial view. For example,
Levy and Lotz (2005) and Rulli (2016) have denied the importance of a
genetic link between parents and their children. Moreover, they have
argued that claiming that this link is important will give rise to bad
consequences, such as reduced adoption rates (and, in Rulli's
case, a failure to fulfil one's duty to adopt) and diminished
resources for improving the life prospects of the disadvantaged,
including those waiting to be adopted. Levick (2004, 185) and Ahlberg
and Brighouse (2011) have also advanced this view. Since, according to
these authors, these undesirable consequences would be magnified if we
allowed human cloning, we have good reason to prohibit it. In
response, Strong (2008) has argued that this effect is uncertain, and
that there are other, probably more effective, ways to help such
children or to prevent them from ending up in such a situation.
Moreover, if cloning is banned, infertile couples may make use of
donor embryos or gametes rather than adoption. Rob Sparrow (2006) has
pointed out another potential problem for those who defend
reproductive cloning for the reason that it will overcome infertility
by providing a genetically related child. According to Sparrow,
cloning just doesn't provide the right sort of genetic relation to
make those who use the technology the parents of the child.So, in
order to justify reproductive cloning one then has to emphasise the
importance of the intention with which the parents bring the cloned
child into the world, rather than the genetic relationship with the
child. And this emphasis works to undermine the justification for
reproductive cloning in the first place.


#### 3.3.2 Genetic Diversity



Another concern is that because cloning is an asexual way of
reproducing it would decrease genetic variation among offspring and,
in the long run, might even constitute a threat to the human race. The
gene pool may narrow sufficiently to threaten humanity's
resistance to disease (AMA 1999, 6). In response, it has been argued
that if cloning becomes possible, the number of people who will choose
it as their mode of reproduction will very likely be too low to
constitute a threat to genetic diversity. It would be unlikely to be
higher than the rate of natural twinning, which, occurring at a rate
of 3.5/1000 children, does not seriously impact on genetic diversity.
Further, even if millions of people would create children through
cloning, the same genomes will not be cloned over and over: each
person would have a genetic copy of his or her genome, which means the
result will still be a high diversity of genomes. Others argue that,
even if genetic diversity were not diminished by cloning, a society
that supports reproductive cloning might be taken to express the view
that variety is not important. Conveying such a message, these authors
say, could have harmful consequences for society.


#### 3.3.3 Eugenics



Some see the increase in control of what kind of genome we want to
pass on to our children as a positive development. A major concern,
however, is that this shift 'from chance to choice' will
lead to problematic eugenic practices.



One version of this concern states that cloning would, from the
outset, constitute a problematic form of eugenics. However, critics
have argued that this is implausible: the best explanations of what
was wrong with immoral cases of eugenics, such as the Nazi eugenic
programs, are that they involved coercion and were motivated by
objectionable moral beliefs or false non-moral beliefs. This would not
necessarily be the case were cloning to be implemented now (Agar 2004;
Buchanan 2007). Unlike the coercive and state-directed eugenics of the
past, new 'liberal eugenics' defends values such as
autonomy, reproductive freedom, beneficence, empathy and the avoidance
of harm (Agar, 2004). Enthusiasts of so-called 'liberal
eugenics' are interested in helping individuals to prevent or
diminish the suffering and increase the well-being of their children
by endowing them with certain genes. 



Another version of the eugenics concern points out the risk of a
slippery slope: the claim is that cloning will lead to objectionable
forms of eugenics--for example, coercive eugenics--in the
future. After all, historical cases of immoral eugenics often
developed from earlier well intentioned and less problematic practices
(for a history of eugenics as well as an analysis of philosophical and
political issues raised by eugenics, see Kevles 1985 and Paul 1995).
According to Sandel (2007, Ch.5), for example, 'liberal
eugenics' might imply more state compulsion than first appears:
just as governments can force children to go to school, they could
require people to use genetics to have 'better'
children.



A related concern expressed by Sandel (2007, 52-7) is that
cloning, and enhancement technologies in general, may result in a
society in which parents will not accept their child for what it is,
reinforcing an already existing trend of heavily managed,
high-pressure child-rearing or 'hyper-parenting'. Asch and
Wasserman (2005, 202) have expressed a similar concern; arguing that
having more control over what features a child has can pose an
"affront to an ideal of unconditioned devotion". Another
concern, most often expressed by disability rights advocates, is that
if cloning is used to have 'better' children, it may
create a more intolerant climate towards those with a disability or a
serious disease, and that such practices can express negative
judgments about people with disabilities. This argument has also been
advanced in the debate about selective abortion, prenatal testing, and
preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Disagreement exists about whether
these effects are likely. For example, Buchanan et al. (2002, 278)
have argued that one can devalue disability while valuing existing
disabled people and that trying to help parents who want to avoid
having a disabled child does not imply that society should make no
efforts to increase accessibility for existing people with
disabilities.


### 3.4 Human Dignity



UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights (1997) was the first international instrument to condemn human
reproductive cloning as a practice against human dignity. Article 11
of this Declaration states: "*Practices which are contrary to
human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not
be permitted...*" This position is shared by the World
Health Organization, the European Parliament and several other
international instruments. Critics have pointed out that the reference
to human dignity is problematic as it is rarely specified how human
dignity is to be understood, whose dignity is at stake, and how
dignity is relevant to the ethics of cloning (Harris 2004, Ch.2,
Birnbacher 2005, McDougall 2008,). Some commentators state that it is
the copying of a genome which violates human dignity (Kass 1998);
others have pointed out that this interpretation could be experienced
as an offence to genetically identical twins, and that we typically do
not regard twins as a threat to human dignity (although some societies
in the past did), nor do we prevent twins from coming into existence.
On the contrary, IVF, which involves an increased 'risk'
of having twins, is a widely accepted fertility treatment.



Human dignity is most often related to Kant's second formulation
of the Categorical Imperative, namely the idea that we should never
use a person merely as a means to an end. I have, however, already
discussed this concern in section 4.2.2.


## 4. Religious perspectives



No unified religious perspective on human cloning exists; indeed,
there are a diversity of opinions within each individual religious
tradition. For an overview of the evaluation of cloning by the main
religious groups see, for example, Cole-Turner (1997) and Walters
(2004). For a specifically Jewish perspective on cloning, see, for
example, Lipschutz (1999), for an Islamic perspective, Sadeghi (2007)
and for a Catholic perspective, Doerflinger (1999).