## 1. Biographical Sketch



Wittgenstein was born on April 26, 1889 in Vienna, Austria, to a
wealthy industrial family, well-situated in intellectual and cultural
Viennese circles. In 1908 he began his studies in aeronautical
engineering at Manchester University where his interest in the
philosophy of pure mathematics led him to Frege. Upon Frege's
advice, in 1911 he went to Cambridge to study with Bertrand Russell.
Russell wrote, upon meeting Wittgenstein: "An unknown German
appeared ... obstinate and perverse, but I think not
stupid" (quoted by Monk 1990: 38f). Within one year, Russell was
committed: "I shall certainly encourage him. Perhaps he will do
great things ... I love him and feel he will solve the problems I
am too old to solve" (quoted by Monk 1990: 41). Russell's
insight was accurate. Wittgenstein was idiosyncratic in his habits and
way of life, yet profoundly acute in his philosophical
sensitivity.



During his years in Cambridge, from 1911 to 1913, Wittgenstein
conducted several conversations on philosophy and the foundations of
logic with Russell, with whom he had an emotional and intense
relationship, as well as with Moore and Keynes. He retreated to
isolation in Norway, for months at a time, in order to ponder these
philosophical problems and to work out their solutions. In 1913 he
returned to Austria and in 1914, at the start of World War I
(1914-1918), joined the Austrian army. He was taken captive in
1918 and spent the remaining months of the war at a prison camp. It
was during the war that he wrote the notes and drafts of his first
important work, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. After the war
the book was published in German and translated into English.



In the 1920s Wittgenstein, now divorced from philosophy (having, to
his mind, solved all philosophical problems in the
*Tractatus*), gave away his part of his family's fortune
and pursued several 'professions' (gardener, teacher,
architect, etc.) in and around Vienna. It was only in 1929 that he
returned to Cambridge to resume his philosophical vocation, after
having been exposed to discussions on the philosophy of mathematics
and science with members of the Vienna Circle, whose conception of
logical empiricism was indebted to his *Tractatus* account of
logic as tautologous, and his philosophy as concerned with logical
syntax. During these first years in Cambridge his conception of
philosophy and its problems underwent dramatic changes that are
recorded in several volumes of conversations, lecture notes, and
letters (e.g., *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*,
*The Blue and Brown Books*, *Philosophical Grammar,
Philosophical Remarks*). Sometimes termed the 'middle
Wittgenstein,' this period heralds a rejection of dogmatic
philosophy, including both traditional works and the
*Tractatus* itself.



In the 1930s and 1940s Wittgenstein conducted seminars at Cambridge,
developing most of the ideas that he intended to publish in his second
book, *Philosophical Investigations*. These included the turn
from formal logic to ordinary language, novel reflections on
psychology and mathematics, and a general skepticism concerning
philosophy's pretensions. In 1945 he prepared the final
manuscript of the *Philosophical Investigations*, but, at the
last minute, withdrew it from publication (and only authorized its
posthumous publication). For a few more years he continued his
philosophical work, but this is marked by a rich development of,
rather than a turn away from, his second phase. He traveled during
this period to the United States and Ireland, and returned to
Cambridge, where he was diagnosed with cancer. Legend has it that, at
his death in 1951, his last words were "Tell them I've had
a wonderful life" (Monk: 579).


## 2. The Early Wittgenstein


### 2.1 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*



*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was first published in German
in 1921 and then translated--by C.K. Ogden (and F. P.
Ramsey)--and published in English in 1922. It was later
re-translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. Coming out of
Wittgenstein's *Notes on Logic* (1913), "Notes
Dictated to G. E. Moore" (1914), his *Notebooks*, written
in 1914-16, and further correspondence with Russell, Moore, and
Keynes, and showing Schopenhauerian and other cultural influences, it
evolved as a continuation of and reaction to Russell and Frege's
conceptions of logic and language. Russell supplied an introduction to
the book claiming that it "certainly deserves ... to be
considered an important event in the philosophical world." It is
fascinating to note that Wittgenstein thought little of
Russell's introduction, claiming that it was riddled with
misunderstandings. Later interpretations have attempted to unearth the
surprising tensions between the introduction and the rest of the book
(or between Russell's reading of Wittgenstein and
Wittgenstein's own self-assessment)--usually harping on
Russell's appropriation of Wittgenstein for his own agenda.



The *Tractatus*'s structure purports to be representative
of its internal essence. It is constructed around seven basic
propositions, numbered by the natural numbers 1-7, with all
other paragraphs in the text numbered by decimal expansions so that,
e.g., paragraph 1.1 is (supposed to be) a further elaboration on
proposition 1, 1.22 is an elaboration of 1.2, and so on.



The seven basic propositions are:




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Ogden translation** | **Pears/McGuinness translation** |
| 1. | The world is everything that is the case. | The world is all that is the case. |
| 2. | What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic
facts. | What is the case--a fact--is the existence of states
of affairs. |
| 3. | The logical picture of the facts is the thought. | A logical picture of facts is a thought. |
| 4. | The thought is the significant proposition. | A thought is a proposition with sense. |
| 5. | Propositions are truth-functions of elementary
propositions. | A proposition is a truth-function of elementary
propositions. |
|  | (An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.) | (An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.) |
| 6. | The general form of truth-function is \([\bar{p}, \bar{\xi},
N(\bar{\xi})]\). | The general form of a truth-function is \([\bar{p}, \bar{\xi},
N(\bar{\xi})]\). |
|  | This is the general form of proposition. | This is the general form of a proposition. |
| 7. | Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. |



Clearly, the book addresses the central problems of philosophy which
deal with the world, thought and language, and presents a
'solution' (as Wittgenstein terms it) of these problems
that is grounded in logic and in the nature of representation. The
world is represented by thought, which is a proposition with sense,
since they all--world, thought, and proposition--share the
same logical form. Hence, the thought and the proposition can be
pictures of the facts.



Starting with a seeming metaphysics, Wittgenstein sees the world as
consisting of facts (1), rather than the traditional, atomistic
conception of a world made up of objects. Facts are existent states of
affairs (2) and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of
objects. "Objects are simple" (*TLP* 2.02) but
objects can fit together in various determinate ways. They may have
various properties and may hold diverse relations to one another.
Objects combine with one another according to their logical, internal
properties. That is to say, an object's internal properties
determine the possibilities of its combination with other objects;
this is its logical form. Thus, states of affairs, being comprised of
objects in combination, are inherently complex. The states of affairs
which do exist could have been otherwise. This means that states of
affairs are either actual (existent) or possible. It is the totality
of states of affairs--actual and possible--that makes up the
whole of reality. The world is precisely those states of affairs which
do exist.



The move to thought, and thereafter to language, is perpetrated with
the use of Wittgenstein's famous idea that thoughts, and
propositions, are pictures--"the picture is a model of
reality" (*TLP* 2.12). Pictures are made up of elements
that together constitute the picture. Each element represents an
object, and the combination of elements in the picture represents the
combination of objects in a state of affairs. The logical structure of
the picture, whether in thought or in language, is isomorphic with the
logical structure of the state of affairs which it pictures. More
subtle is Wittgenstein's insight that the possibility of this
structure being shared by the picture (the thought, the proposition)
and the state of affairs is the pictorial form. "*That*
is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to
it" (*TLP* 2.1511). This leads to an understanding of
what the picture can picture; but also what it cannot--its own
pictorial form.



While "the logical picture of the facts is the thought"
(3), in the move to language Wittgenstein continues to investigate the
possibilities of significance for propositions (4). Logical analysis,
in the spirit of Frege and Russell, guides the work, with Wittgenstein
using logical calculus to carry out the construction of his system.
Explaining that "Only the proposition has sense; only in the
context of a proposition has a name meaning" (*TLP* 3.3),
he provides the reader with the two conditions for sensical language.
First, the structure of the proposition must conform to the
constraints of logical form, and second, the elements of the
proposition must have reference (*Bedeutung*). These conditions
have far-reaching implications. The analysis must culminate with a
name being a primitive symbol for a (simple) object. Moreover, logic
itself gives us the structure and limits of what can be said at
all.



"The general form of a proposition is: This is how things
stand" (*TLP* 4.5) and every proposition is either true
or false. This bi-polarity of propositions enables the composition of
more complex propositions from atomic ones by using truth-functional
operators (5). Wittgenstein supplies, in the *Tractatus*, a
vivid presentation of Frege's logic in the form of what has
become known as 'truth-tables.' This provides the means to
go back and analyze all propositions into their atomic parts, since
"every statement about complexes can be analyzed into a
statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions
which completely describe the complexes" (*TLP* 2.0201).
He delves even deeper by then providing the general form of a
truth-function (6). This form, \([\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]\),
makes use of one formal operation \((N(\bar{\xi}))\)and one
propositional variable \((\bar{p})\) to represent Wittgenstein's
claim that any proposition "is the result of successive
applications" of logical operations to elementary
propositions.



Having developed this analysis of world-thought-language, and relying
on the one general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein can now
assert that all meaningful propositions are of equal value.
Subsequently, he ends the journey with the admonition concerning what
can (or cannot) and what should (or should not) be said (7), leaving
outside the realm of the sayable propositions of ethics, aesthetics,
and metaphysics.


### 2.2 Sense and Nonsense



In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein's logical construction of
a philosophical system has a purpose--to find the limits of
world, thought, and language; in other words, to distinguish between
sense and nonsense. "The book will ... draw a limit to
thinking, or rather--not to thinking, but to the expression of
thoughts .... The limit can ... only be drawn in language
and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply
nonsense" (*TLP* Preface). The conditions for a
proposition's having sense have been explored and seen to rest
on the possibility of representation or picturing. Names must have a
*bedeutung* (reference/meaning), but they can only do so in the
context of a proposition which is held together by logical form. It
follows that only factual states of affairs which can be pictured can
be represented by meaningful propositions. This means that what can be
said are only propositions of natural science and leaves out of the
realm of sense a daunting number of statements which are made and used
in language.



There are, first, the propositions of logic itself. These do not
represent states of affairs, and the logical constants do not stand
for objects. "My fundamental thought is that the logical
constants do not represent. That the *logic* of the facts
cannot be represented" (*TLP* 4.0312). This is not a
happenstance thought; it is fundamental precisely because the limits
of sense rest on logic. Tautologies and contradictions, the
propositions of logic, are the limits of language and thought, and
thereby the limits of the world. Obviously, then, they do not picture
anything and do not, therefore, have sense. They are, in
Wittgenstein's terms, senseless (*sinnlos*). Propositions
which do have sense are bipolar; they range within the
truth-conditions drawn by the truth-tables. But the propositions of
logic themselves are "not pictures of the reality ... for
the one allows *every* possible state of affairs, the other
*none*" (*TLP* 4.462). Indeed, tautologies (and
contradictions), being senseless, are recognized as true (or false)
"in the symbol alone ... and this fact contains in itself
the whole philosophy of logic" (*TLP* 6.113).



The characteristic of being senseless applies not only to the
propositions of logic but also to mathematics or the pictorial form
itself of the pictures that do represent. These are, like tautologies
and contradictions, literally sense-less, they have no sense.



Beyond, or aside from, senseless propositions Wittgenstein identifies
another group of statements which cannot carry sense: the nonsensical
(*unsinnig*) propositions. Nonsense, as opposed to
senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is even more
radically devoid of meaning, when it transcends the bounds of sense.
Under the label of *unsinnig* can be found various
propositions: "Socrates is identical," but also "1
is a number" and "there are objects." While some
nonsensical propositions are blatantly so, others seem to be
meaningful--and only analysis carried out in accordance with the
picture theory can expose their nonsensicality. Since only what is
"in" the world can be described, anything that is
"outside" is denied meaningfulness, including the notion
of limit and the limit points themselves. Traditional metaphysics, and
the propositions of ethics and aesthetics, which try to capture the
world as a whole, are also excluded, as is the truth in solipsism, the
very notion of a subject, for it is also not "in" the
world but at its limit.



Wittgenstein does not, however, relegate all that is not inside the
bounds of sense to oblivion. He makes a distinction between
*saying* and *showing* which is made to do additional
crucial work. "What can be shown cannot be said," that is,
what cannot be formulated in sayable (sensical) propositions can only
be shown. This applies, for example, to the logical form of the world,
the pictorial form, etc., which show themselves in the form of
(contingent) propositions, in the symbolism, and in logical
propositions. Even the unsayable (metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic)
propositions of philosophy belong in this group--which
Wittgenstein finally describes as "things that cannot be put
into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is
mystical" (*TLP* 6.522).


### 2.3 The Nature of Philosophy



Accordingly, "the word 'philosophy' must mean
something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural
sciences" (*TLP* 4.111). Not surprisingly, then,
"most of the propositions and questions to be found in
philosophical works are not false but nonsensical" (*TLP*
4.003). Is, then, philosophy doomed to be nonsense
(*unsinnig*), or, at best, senseless (*sinnlos*) when it
does logic, but, in any case, meaningless? What is left for the
philosopher to do, if traditional, or even revolutionary, propositions
of metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics cannot be
formulated in a sensical manner? The reply to these two questions is
found in Wittgenstein's characterization of philosophy:
philosophy is not a theory, or a doctrine, but rather an activity. It
is an activity of clarification (of thoughts), and more so, of
critique (of language). Described by Wittgenstein, it should be the
philosopher's routine activity: to react or respond to the
traditional philosophers' musings by showing them where they go
wrong, using the tools provided by logical analysis. In other words,
by showing them that (some of) their propositions are nonsense.



"All propositions are of equal value" (*TLP*
6.4)--that could also be the fundamental thought of the book. For
it employs a measure of the value of propositions that is done by
logic and the notion of limits. It is here, however, with the
constraints on the value of propositions, that the tension in the
*Tractatus* is most strongly felt. It becomes clear that the
notions used by the *Tractatus*--the logical-philosophical
notions--do not belong to the world and hence cannot be used to
express anything meaningful. Since language, thought, and the world,
are all isomorphic, any attempt to say in logic (i.e., in language)
"this and this there is in the world, that there is not"
is doomed to be a failure, since it would mean that logic has got
outside the limits of the world, i.e. of itself. That is to say, the
*Tractatus* has gone over its own limits, and stands in danger
of being nonsensical.



The "solution" to this tension is found in
Wittgenstein's final remarks, where he uses the metaphor of the
ladder to express the function of the *Tractatus*. It is to be
used in order to climb on it, in order to "see the world
rightly"; but thereafter it must be recognized as nonsense and
be thrown away. Hence: "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one
must be silent" (7).


### 2.4 Interpretative Problems



The *Tractatus* is notorious for its interpretative
difficulties. In the decades that have passed since its publication it
has gone through several waves of general interpretations. Beyond
exegetical and hermeneutical issues that revolve around particular
sections (such as the world/reality distinction, the difference
between representing and presenting, the Frege/Russell connection to
Wittgenstein, or the influence on Wittgenstein by existentialist
philosophy) there are a few fundamental, not unrelated, disagreements
that inform the map of interpretation. These revolve around the
realism of the *Tractatus*, the notion of nonsense and its role
in reading the *Tractatus* itself, and the reading of the
*Tractatus* as an ethical tract.



There are interpretations that see the *Tractatus* as espousing
realism, i.e., as positing the independent existence of objects,
states of affairs, and facts. That this realism is achieved via a
linguistic turn is recognized by all (or most) interpreters, but this
linguistic perspective does no damage to the basic realism that is
seen to start off the *Tractatus* ("The world is all that
is the case") and to run throughout the text ("Objects
form the substance of the world" (*TLP* 2.021)). Such
realism is also taken to be manifested in the essential bi-polarity of
propositions; likewise, a straightforward reading of the picturing
relation posits objects there to be represented by signs. As against
these readings, more linguistically oriented interpretations give
conceptual priority to the symbolism. When "reality is compared
with propositions" (*TLP* 4.05), it is the form of
propositions which determines the shape of reality (and not the other
way round). In any case, the issue of realism (vs. anti-realism) in
the *Tractatus* must address the question of the limits of
language and the more particular question of what there is (or is not)
beyond language. Subsequently, interpreters of the *Tractatus*
have moved on to questioning the very presence of metaphysics within
the book and the status of the propositions of the book
themselves.



'Nonsense' became the hinge of Wittgensteinian
interpretative discussion during the last decade of the 20th century.
Beyond the bounds of language lies nonsense--propositions which
cannot picture *anything*--and Wittgenstein bans
traditional metaphysics to that area. The quandary arises concerning
the question of what it is that inhabits that realm of nonsense, since
Wittgenstein does seem to be saying that there is something there to
be shown (rather than said) and does, indeed, characterize it as the
'mystical.' The traditional readings of the
*Tractatus* accepted, with varying degrees of discomfort, the
existence of that which is unsayable, that which cannot be put into
words, the nonsensical. More recent readings tend to take nonsense
more seriously as exactly that--nonsense. This also entails
taking seriously Wittgenstein's words in 6.54--his famous
ladder metaphor--and throwing out the *Tractatus* itself,
including the distinction between what can be said and what can only
be shown. The *Tractatus*, on this stance, does not point at
ineffable truths (of, e.g., metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, etc.),
but should lead us away from such temptations. An accompanying
discussion must then also deal with how this can be recognized, what
this can possibly mean, and how it should be used, if at all.



This discussion is closely related to what has come to be called the
ethical reading of the *Tractatus*. Such a reading is based,
first, on the supposed discrepancy between Wittgenstein's
construction of a world-language system, which takes up the bulk of
the *Tractatus*, and several comments that are made about this
construction in the Preface to the book, in its closing remarks, and
in a letter he sent to his publisher, Ludwig von Ficker, before
publication. In these places, all of which can be viewed as external
to the content of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein preaches
silence as regards anything that is of importance, including the
'internal' parts of the book which contain, in his own
words, "the final solution of the problems [of
philosophy]." It is the importance given to the ineffable that
can be viewed as an ethical position. "My work consists of two
parts, the one presented here plus all that I have *not*
written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important
point. For the ethical gets its limit drawn from the inside, as it
were, by my book; ... I've managed in my book to put
everything firmly into place by being silent about it .... For
now I would recommend you to read the *preface* and the
*conclusion*, because they contain the most direct expression
of the point" (*ProtoTractatus*, p.16). Obviously, such
seemingly contradictory tensions within and about a text--written
by its author--give rise to interpretative conundrums.



There is another issue often debated by interpreters of Wittgenstein,
which arises out of the questions above. This has to do with the
continuity between the thought of the early and later Wittgenstein.
Again, the 'standard' interpretations were originally
united in perceiving a clear break between the two distinct stages of
Wittgenstein's thought, even when ascertaining some
developmental continuity between them. And again, the more recent
interpretations challenge this standard, emphasizing that the
fundamental therapeutic motivation clearly found in the later
Wittgenstein should also be attributed to the early.


## 3. The Later Wittgenstein


### 3.1 Transition and Critique of *Tractatus*



The idea that philosophy is not a doctrine, and hence should not be
approached dogmatically, is one of the most important insights of the
*Tractatus*. Yet, as early as 1931, Wittgenstein referred to
his own early work as 'dogmatic' ("On
Dogmatism" in *VC*, p. 182). Wittgenstein used this term
to designate any conception which allows for a gap between question
and answer, such that the answer to the question could be found at a
later date. The complex edifice of the *Tractatus* is built on
the assumption that the task of logical analysis was to discover the
elementary propositions, whose form was not yet known. What marks the
transition from early to later Wittgenstein can be summed up as the
*total* rejection of dogmatism, i.e., as the working out of
*all* the consequences of this rejection. The move from the
realm of logic to that of the grammar of ordinary language as the
center of the philosopher's attention; from an emphasis on
definition and analysis to 'family resemblance' and
'language-games'; and from systematic philosophical
writing to an aphoristic style--all have to do with this
transition towards anti-dogmatism in its extreme. It is in the
*Philosophical Investigations* that the working out of the
transitions comes to culmination. Other writings of the same period,
though, manifest the same anti-dogmatic stance, as it is applied,
e.g., to the philosophy of mathematics or to philosophical
psychology.


### 3.2 *Philosophical Investigations*



*Philosophical Investigations* was published posthumously in
1953. It was edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and translated
by Anscombe. It comprised two parts. Part I, consisting of 693
numbered paragraphs, was ready for printing in 1946, but rescinded
from the publisher by Wittgenstein. Part II was added on by the
editors, trustees of his *Nachlass*. In 2009 a new edited
translation, by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, was published;
Part II of the earlier translation, now recognized as an essentially
separate entity, was here labeled "Philosophy of Psychology
- A Fragment" (*PPF*).



In the Preface to *PI*, Wittgenstein states that his new
thoughts would be better understood by contrast with and against the
background of his old thoughts, those in the *Tractatus*; and
indeed, most of Part I of *PI* is essentially questioning. Its
new insights can be understood as primarily exposing fallacies in the
traditional way of thinking about language, truth, thought,
intentionality, and, perhaps mainly, philosophy. In this sense, it is
conceived of as a *therapeutic* work, viewing philosophy itself
as *therapy*. (Part II (*PPF*), focusing on
philosophical psychology, perception etc., was different, pointing to
new perspectives (which, undoubtedly, are not disconnected from the
earlier critique) in addressing specific philosophical issues. It is,
therefore, more easily read alongside Wittgenstein's other
writings of the later period.)



*PI* begins with a quote from Augustine's
*Confessions* which "give us a particular picture of the
essence of human language," based on the idea that "the
words in language name objects," and that "sentences are
combinations of such names" (*PI* 1). This picture of
language cannot be relied on as a basis for metaphysical, epistemic or
linguistic speculation. Despite its plausibility, this reduction of
language to representation cannot do justice to the whole of human
language; and even if it is to be considered a picture of only the
representative function of human language, it is, as such, a poor
picture. Furthermore, this picture of language is at the base of the
whole of traditional philosophy, but, for Wittgenstein, it is to be
shunned in favor of a new way of looking at both language and
philosophy. The *Philosophical Investigations* proceeds to
offer the new way of looking at language, which will yield the view of
philosophy as therapy.


### 3.3 Meaning as Use



"For a *large* class of cases of the employment of the
word 'meaning'--though not for all--this word
can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the
language" (*PI* 43). This basic statement is what
underlies the change of perspective most typical of the later phase of
Wittgenstein's thought: a change from a conception of meaning as
representation to a view which looks to use as the crux of the
investigation. Traditional theories of meaning in the history of
philosophy were intent on pointing to something exterior to the
proposition which endows it with sense. This 'something'
could generally be located either in an objective space, or inside the
mind as mental representation. As early as 1933 (*The Blue
Book*) Wittgenstein took pains to challenge these conceptions,
arriving at the insight that "if we had to name anything which
is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its
*use*" (*BB* 4). Ascertainment of the use (of a
word, of a proposition), however, is not given to any sort of
constructive theory building, as in the *Tractatus*. Rather,
when investigating meaning, the philosopher must "look and
see" the variety of uses to which the word is put. An analogy
with tools sheds light on the nature of words. When we think of tools
in a toolbox, we do not fail to see their variety; but the
"functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these
objects" (*PI* 11). We are misled by the uniform
appearance of our words into theorizing upon meaning:
"Especially when we are doing philosophy!" (*PI*
12)



So different is this new perspective that Wittgenstein repeats:
"Don't think, but look!" (*PI* 66); and such
looking is done *vis a vis* particular cases, not
generalizations. In giving the meaning of a word, any explanatory
generalization should be replaced by a description of use. The
traditional idea that a proposition houses a content and has a
restricted number of Fregean forces (such as assertion, question, and
command), gives way to an emphasis on the diversity of uses. In order
to address the countless multiplicity of uses, their un-fixedness, and
their being part of an activity, Wittgenstein introduces the key
concept of 'language-game.' He never explicitly defines it
since, as opposed to the earlier 'picture,' for instance,
this new concept is made to do work for a more fluid, more
diversified, and more activity-oriented perspective on language.
Hence, indeed, the requirement to define harkens back to an old dogma,
which misses the playful and active character of language.


### 3.4 Language-games and Family Resemblance



Throughout the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein
returns, again and again, to the concept of language-games to make
clear his lines of thought concerning language. Primitive
language-games are scrutinized for the insights they afford on this or
that characteristic of language. Thus, the builders'
language-game (*PI* 2), in which a builder and his assistant
use exactly four terms (block, pillar, slab, beam), is utilized to
illustrate that part of the Augustinian picture of language which
might be correct but which is, nevertheless, strictly limited because
it ignores the essential role of action in establishing meaning.
'Regular' language-games, such as the astonishing list
provided in *PI* 23 (which includes, e.g., reporting an event,
speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, making
up a story, reading it, play-acting, singing catches, guessing
riddles, making a joke, translating, asking, thanking, and so on),
bring out the openness of our possibilities in using language and in
describing it.



Language-games are, first, a part of a broader context termed by
Wittgenstein a form of life (see below). Secondly, the concept of
language-games points at the rule-governed character of language. This
does not entail strict and definite systems of rules for each and
every language-game, but points to the conventional nature of this
sort of human activity. Still, just as we cannot give a final,
essential definition of 'game,' so we cannot find
"what is common to all these activities and what makes them into
language or parts of language" (*PI* 65).



It is here that Wittgenstein's rejection of general
explanations, and definitions based on sufficient and necessary
conditions, is best pronounced. Instead of these symptoms of the
philosopher's "craving for generality," he points to
'family resemblance' as the more suitable analogy for the
means of connecting particular uses of the same word. There is no
reason to look, as we have done traditionally--and
dogmatically--for one, essential core in which the meaning of a
word is located and which is, therefore, common to all uses of that
word. We should, instead, travel with the word's uses through
"a complicated network of similarities overlapping and
criss-crossing" (*PI* 66). Family resemblance also serves
to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness that
characterize different uses of the same concept. Such boundaries and
exactness are the definitive traits of form--be it Platonic form,
Aristotelian form, or the general form of a proposition adumbrated in
the *Tractatus*. It is from such forms that applications of
concepts can be deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein now
eschews in favor of appeal to similarity of a kind with family
resemblance.


### 3.5 Rule-following and Private Language



One of the issues most associated with the later Wittgenstein is that
of rule-following. Rising out of the considerations above, it becomes
another central point of discussion in the question of what it is that
can apply to all the uses of a word. The same dogmatic stance as
before has it that a rule is an abstract entity--transcending all
of its particular applications; knowing the rule involves grasping
that abstract entity and thereby knowing how to use it.



Wittgenstein begins his exposition by introducing an example:
"... we get [a] pupil to continue a series (say '+
2') beyond 1000--and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008,
1012" (*PI* 185). What do we do, and what does it mean,
when the student, upon being corrected, answers "But I did go on
in the same way"? Wittgenstein proceeds (mainly in *PI*
185-243, but also elsewhere) to dismantle the cluster of
attendant questions: How do we learn rules? How do we follow them?
Wherefrom the standards which decide if a rule is followed correctly?
Are they in the mind, along with a mental representation of the rule?
Do we appeal to intuition in their application? Are they socially and
publicly taught and enforced? In typical Wittgensteinian fashion, the
answers are not pursued positively; rather, the very formulation of
the questions as legitimate questions with coherent content is put to
the test. For indeed, it is both the Platonistic and mentalistic
pictures which underlie asking questions of this type, and
Wittgenstein is intent on freeing us from these assumptions. Such
liberation involves elimination of the need to posit any sort of
external or internal authority beyond the actual applications of the
rule.



These considerations lead to *PI* 201, often considered the
climax of the issue: "This was our paradox: no course of action
could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be
made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be
made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to
conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict
here." Wittgenstein's formulation of the problem, now at
the point of being a "paradox," has given rise to a wealth
of interpretation and debate since it is clear to all that this is the
crux of the general issue of meaning, and of understanding and using a
language. One of the influential readings of the problem of following
a rule (introduced by Fogelin 1976 and Kripke 1982) has been the
interpretation, according to which Wittgenstein is here voicing a
skeptical paradox and offering a skeptical solution. That is to say,
there are no facts that determine what counts as following a rule, no
real grounds for saying that someone is indeed following a rule, and
Wittgenstein accepts this skeptical challenge (by suggesting other
conditions that might warrant our asserting that someone is following
a rule). This reading has been challenged, in turn, by several
interpretations (such as Baker and Hacker 1984, McGinn1984, and Cavell
1990), while others have provided additional, fresh perspectives
(e.g., Diamond, "Rules: Looking in the Right Place" in
Phillips and Winch 1989, and several in Miller and Wright 2002).



Directly following the rule-following sections in *PI*, and
therefore easily thought to be the upshot of the discussion, are those
sections called by interpreters "the private-language
argument." Whether it be a veritable argument or not (and
Wittgenstein never labeled it as such), these sections point out that
for an utterance to be meaningful it must be possible in principle to
subject it to public standards and criteria of correctness. For this
reason, a private-language, in which "words ... are to
refer to what only the speaker can know--to his immediate private
sensations ..." (*PI* 243), is not a genuine,
meaningful, rule-governed language. The signs in language can only
function when there is a possibility of judging the correctness of
their use, "so the use of [a] word stands in need of a
justification which everybody understands" (*PI*
261).


### 3.6 Grammar and Form of Life



Grammar, usually taken to consist of the rules of correct syntactic
and semantic usage, becomes, in Wittgenstein's hands, the
wider--and more elusive--notion which captures the essence
of language as a special rule-governed activity. This notion replaces
the stricter and purer logic, which played such an essential role in
the *Tractatus* in providing a scaffolding for language and the
world. Indeed, "*Essence* is expressed in grammar
... Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as
grammar)" (*PI* 371, 373). As opposed to grammar-book
rules, the "rules" of grammar are not technical
instructions from on-high for correct usage and are not idealized as
an external system to be conformed to, independently of context.
Therefore, they are not appealed to explicitly in any formulation, but
are only used in cases of philosophical perplexity to clarify where
language misleads us into false illusions. Thus, for example, "I
can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. It is
correct to say 'I know what you are thinking,' and wrong
to say 'I know what I am thinking.' (A whole cloud of
philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.)"
(*Philosophical Investigations* 1953, p.222). In this example,
being sensitive to the grammatical uniqueness of first-person avowals
saves us from the blunders of foundational epistemology.



Grammar is hence situated within the regular activity with which
language-games are interwoven: "... the word
'language-*game*' is used here to emphasize the
fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or
of a form of life" (*PI* 23). What enables language to
function and therefore must be accepted as "given" are
precisely forms of life. In Wittgenstein's terms, "It is
not only agreement in definitions but also (odd as it may sound) in
judgments that is required" (*PI* 242), and this is
"agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life"
(*PI* 241). Used by Wittgenstein sparingly--five times in
the *Investigations*--this concept has given rise to
interpretative quandaries and subsequent contradictory readings. Forms
of life can be understood as constantly changing and contingent,
dependent on culture, context, history, etc.; or as a background
common to humankind, "shared human behavior" which is
"the system of reference by means of which we interpret an
unknown language" (*PI* 206); or as a notion which can be
read differently in different cases - sometimes as relativistic,
in other cases as expressing a more universalistic approach.


### 3.7 The Nature of Philosophy



In his later writings Wittgenstein holds, as he did in the
*Tractatus*, that philosophers do not--or should
not--supply a theory, neither do they provide explanations.
"Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains
nor deduces anything.--Since everything lies open to view there
is nothing to explain" (*PI* 126). The anti-theoretical
stance is reminiscent of the early Wittgenstein, but there are
manifest differences. Although the *Tractatus* precludes
philosophical theories, it does construct a systematic edifice which
results in the general form of the proposition, all the while relying
on strict formal logic; the *Investigations* points out the
therapeutic non-dogmatic nature of philosophy, verily instructing
philosophers in the ways of therapy. "The work of the
philosopher consists in marshalling reminders for a particular
purpose" (*PI* 127). Working with reminders and series of
examples, different problems are solved. Unlike the *Tractatus*
which advanced one philosophical method, in the
*Investigations* "there is not a single philosophical
method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it
were" (*PI* 133d). This is directly related to
Wittgenstein's eschewal of *the* logical form or of any
a-priori generalization that can be discovered or made in philosophy.
Trying to advance such general theses is a temptation which lures
philosophers; but the real task of philosophy is both to make us aware
of the temptation and to show us how to overcome it. Consequently
"a philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know
my way about.'" (*PI* 123), and hence the aim of
philosophy is "to show the fly the way out of the
fly-bottle" (*PI* 309).



The refusal of theory goes hand in hand with Wittgenstein's
objection to have "anything hypothetical in our [philosophical]
considerations" (*PI* 109): "All
*explanation* must disappear, and description alone must take
its place." In *The Blue Book*, Wittgenstein explained
the difficulty encountered by philosophers to work on a minor scale
and to take seriously "the particular case" as originating
from their "craving for generality." This craving is
strongly influenced by philosophers' "preoccupation with
the method of science," a reductive and unifying tendency which
is "the real source of metaphysics" (*BB* 18).
Wittgenstein's determined anti-scientism should not be read as
an opposition to science in itself; it is the insistence that
philosophy and science are to be kept apart - that (contrary to
the prevalent attitude of modern civilization) the scientific
framework is not appropriate everywhere, and certainly not for
philosophical investigations.



The style of the *Investigations* is strikingly different from
that of the *Tractatus*. Instead of strictly numbered sections
which are organized hierarchically in programmatic order, the
*Investigations* fragmentarily voices aphorisms about
language-games, family resemblance, forms of life, "sometimes
jumping, in a sudden change, from one area to another"
(*PI* Preface). This variation in style is of course essential
and is "connected with the very nature of the
investigation" (*PI* Preface). As a matter of fact,
Wittgenstein was acutely aware of the contrast between the two stages
of his thought, suggesting publication of both texts together in order
to make the contrast obvious and clear.



Still, it is precisely via the subject of the nature of philosophy
that the fundamental continuity between these two stages, rather than
the discrepancy between them, is to be found. In both cases philosophy
serves, first, as critique of language. It is through analyzing
language's illusive power that the philosopher can expose the
traps of meaningless philosophical formulations. This means that what
was formerly thought of as a philosophical problem may now dissolve
"and this simply means that the philosophical problems should
*completely* disappear" (*PI* 133). Two
implications of this diagnosis, easily traced back in the
*Tractatus*, are to be recognized. One is the inherent
dialogical character of philosophy, which is a responsive activity:
difficulties and torments are encountered which are then to be
dissipated by philosophical therapy. In the *Tractatus*, this
took the shape of advice: "The correct method in philosophy
would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said,
i.e. propositions of natural science ... and then whenever
someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to
him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his
propositions" (*TLP* 6.53) The second, more far-
reaching, "discovery" in the *Investigations*
"is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I
want to" (*PI* 133). This has been taken to revert back
to the ladder metaphor and the injunction to silence in the
*Tractatus*.


### 3.8 Interpretative Problems



Whereas the *Tractatus* has been interpreted in different ways
right from its publication, for about two decades since the
publication of *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953 there
seemed to be wide agreement on the proper way to read the book (along
with the vast material from 1930 onwards in Wittgenstein's
*Nachlass*, gradually released over the years).
Wittgenstein's turn from his early emphasis on the role of
logical analysis in his philosophical method to the later preference
of particular grammatical descriptions was read, quite unanimously, as
marking the two clearly distinct - "early" and
"later" - phases in his thought. The later phase, it
was agreed, consisted mainly of particular descriptions of our
ordinary uses of words - especially those words which tend to
create the illusion that they represent something profound, words
which seem to point at the "essence of language."
"Whereas, in fact, if the words 'language,'
'experience,' 'world' have a use, it must be
as humble a one as that of the words 'table,'
'lamp,' 'door'." (*PI* 97)



With the publication of Stanley Cavell's *Must We Mean What
We Say?* (1969) and especially *The Claim of Reason:
Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* (1979), it turned
out that such notions as 'description,'
'ordinary,' and 'usage' are not as innocuous
as they had seemed. Cavell's reading of *Philosophical
Investigations* suggested a more radical emphasis on the
particularity of contexts and blocked the way to any general
description of "grammatical rules." For Cavell,
Wittgenstein's idea that meanings are determined *only*
within language games, i.e., *only* in particular cases, is the
key to reading his philosophy. When ignored, we are bound to import an
outside requirement into our investigation and thus, favoring a
distilled and rigid account of our linguistic exchanges, miss (and
misrepresent) their vividness: "As if the meaning were an aura
the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use"
(*PI* 117).



In 1980, Oxford philosophers G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker launched the
first volume of an analytical commentary on Wittgenstein's
*Investigations*. This gigantic project, spanning over 4
volumes (the 3rd and 4th written by Hacker
alone), advocated and developed the orthodox reading of
Wittgenstein's later work, according to which a systematic
mapping - an overview, or *Ubersicht* (Cf.
*PI* 122) - of the use of our words is not only possible
but also necessary, if we wish to dissolve the philosophical problems
arising from the traditional philosophical inattention to ordinary
use, due to a prior metaphysical requirement. For Baker and Hacker, a
key notion for reading Wittgenstein's later philosophy is that
of philosophical 'grammar.' Acute attention to grammatical
rules of use offers a way to elucidate meanings and thus to expose
philosophical blunders.



Gradually, these alternatives in reading *Philosophical
Investigations* came to form two schools of interpretation that
are broadly parallel to the ones we encounter regarding
Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. As noted above (in section
2.4), there is, first, the question of the continuity between
Wittgenstein's earlier and later writings. When emphasis is
given - as in the orthodox reading - to
Wittgenstein's switch from logic to grammar, the break between
the philosophical stages is easily marked. When, on the contrary, it
is the resistance to generalization (of any kind) that is emphasized,
then the similarity in Wittgenstein's therapeutic motivation
throughout his life is much more clearly seen.



As in the previous stage, the debate here has to do with the question
of ethics and its centrality in reading Wittgenstein's oeuvre.
According to the traditional approach, amplified in Hacker and
Baker's interpretive project, Wittgenstein's main
objective is to resolve or dissolve general philosophical puzzles
- concerning, e.g., the mind, the nature of color, perception,
and rule-following - by clarifying, arranging, and contrasting
different grammatical rules relevant to the notion examined. This is
an intellectual investigation and, apart from its being critical of
traditional philosophy and its reflection in contemporary science, it
has nothing particularly relevant to ethics and should not be read as
an ethical endeavor. Readers taking their cue from Cavell, on the
other hand, believe that the gist of the Wittgensteinian effort *in
toto* is ethical, cultural, or even political. They point at the
*Investigations'* motto ("The trouble about
progress is that it always looks much greater than it really is"
- Nestroy) and Wittgenstein's mention of "the
darkness of this time" in the book's Preface; but more
substantially, they argue that Wittgenstein's insistence on the
ordinary, the practice of every-day living, is ethical through and
through. Our lives are saturated by ethics; we are members of a
historically and culturally conditioned society; and our linguistic
practices cannot but have an important ethical aspect. Ignoring this
aspect, according to these interpreters, entails a rejection of what
is human in our linguistic exchanges.



To be sure, the interpretations' map is much more complicated
than what is briefly sketched here. There are philosophers who object
to the characterization each side in the above debate attaches to the
other. There are those who claim that while there is a genuine dispute
about the right interpretation of the *Tractatus*, the various
interpreters of *Philosophical Investigations* are much closer
to one another than they are ready to acknowledge; and there are
independent readings of Wittgenstein which draw their clues from both
sides and attempt a different path altogether.


## 4. The Middle Wittgenstein



It is noteworthy that the conventional conceptualization of two
Wittgensteins, originally thought to be clearly demarcated between the
early and later Wittgensteins, has been repeatedly re-worked in the
ensuing interpretative project of understanding the
philosopher's writings, thoughts, and ideas, with no show of
subsiding. One of the natural outcomes of such intense investigation
is the awareness that, indeed, understanding Wittgenstein means
recognizing other times and other developments, such as before the
early Wittgenstein (of the *Tractatus*), between the early
Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein (of *Philosophical
Investigations*), and following that later Wittgenstein.



The middle Wittgenstein, he of the period between the early
Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein, was, early on, identified as
worthy of exposure and more interpretative work, but such a venture
was clearly a function of two mutually impactful grand questions: What
is the relationship between the early and later Wittgenstein (as
adumbrated in 2.4 and 3.8) and, following upon answers to that
question, what is then the more exact time-frame that is worthy of the
independent label "middle"? Thus, there is presently much
more work being done on the middle Wittgenstein as the questions of
the relationship between the early and the later Wittgenstein have
taken center-stage and become a constant in Wittgenstein
scholarship.



How, then, to best demarcate the middle Wittgenstein? The wide date
recognition, all along from 1929 (or even earlier) to 1944 (the time
when Wittgenstein began the final revision of *PI*) might seem
too obvious, though it can house readings of the
continuity-between-early-and-later-Wittgenstein school persuasively.
Such is work by, for instance, Joachim Schulte (1992), who notes a
middle Wittgenstein already in the *TLP* leading all the way to
later Wittgenstein's key treatments of grammar or mathematics.
The opposite extreme, of pinpointing one point in time as expressing a
sole significant transformation, seems too summary. This strategy is
adopted, for example, by the Hintikkas (1986b) regarding the year 1929
or by Kienzler (1997) concerning a transitional break in 1931. Then
there are the various more moderate determinations, which adopt a
time-span of a few years, usually sometime between 1929 and 1935,
explaining their delineations by philosophical interpretations of the
texts and contexts of those times. Such are: O. K. Bouwsma (1961), who
points to the period of the *Blue and Brown Books* (1933-35);
P. M. S. Hacker (1986), who follows a two year period -
1929-1930 - as the middle Wittgenstein "bridge";
Alois Pichler (2004), who recognizes a middle Wittgenstein in
1930-1935 based on Wittgensteinian styles; or David Stern (1991), who
briefly gives the demarcation of "the late 1920s and early
1930s."



If we adopt that last marker of dates, the late 1920s to the early (or
mid-)1930s, we can address, in general, the objects of interpretation
that have provided the basis for a middle Wittgenstein. Although
everything in the *Nachlass* is now digitally available to the
aspiring interpreter, the published versions of
typescripts/manuscripts of talks and notes (sometimes dictated to
students) have been the evidence upon which middle Wittgenstein
interpretation has flourished. These are (in chronological order of
their occurrence, not their publication) "Some Remarks on
Logical Form" (1929), "A Lecture on Ethics" (1929),
*Philosophical Remarks* (1929-1930), *Philosophical
Grammar* (1932-33), *The Big Typescript*
(1932-1933); the *Blue and Brown Books*
(1933-1935), and "Notes for Lectures on 'Private
Experience' and 'Sense Data'"
(1935-36). Just as illuminating, even tantalizing, are the
publications of notes taken by participants in Wittgenstein's
classes in those philosophically eventful years, since it was in those
surroundings that Wittgenstein was working out - live -
the deliberations and moves into what would become the later
Wittgenstein. Supplied by Alice Ambrose, Desmond Lee, G. E. Moore,
Rush Rhees, and Friedrich Waismann (on Wittgenstein's
conversations with members of the Vienna Circle), these are volumes
replete with questions of philosophy, meta-philosophy, method, and
style that provide the Wittgensteinian interpreter with voluminous raw
data in order to characterize a middle Wittgenstein.



The themes that populate the texts above are wide and varied. Some
harken back to Tractarian refrains, more appear to introduce later
Wittgensteinian terms; a number of subjects make transitory
appearances, never to return. Phenomenology, for one, is a constant
Wittgensteinian concern, mostly for interpreters of all Wittgensteins
who bicker over the very ascription of phenomenology to
Wittgenstein's thought, accompanied by their attempt to define
Wittgenstein's use of the term. But it is in the middle
Wittgenstein that phenomenology makes a literal appearance,
specifically in the "Phenomenology is Grammar" chapter of
*The Big Typescript*. The questions then become whether
phenomenology can be ascribed to the early Wittgenstein, whether it
was really only adopted in the later Wittgenstein, and most relevant
here - whether it can be identified as either vacating the scene
in the middle Wittgenstein or, contrarily, there becoming
terminologically and therefore significantly present. There is also
the option that phenomenology appears exclusively in the middle
Wittgenstein. These last options may then be seen as (at least partly)
definitive of a middle period.



Mathematics, and Wittgenstein's original thoughts on it, can
undoubtedly be seen as another investigative anchor of middle
Wittgenstein. Although it is clear that mathematics was of great
interest to him in *TLP*, his thoughts on it became more
enigmatic precisely in the middle period. Several "isms"
are attributed to his view(s) on mathematics here -
verificationism, formalism, and finitism, along with recognition of a
"calculus conception" of mathematics. (Intuitionism, a
favorite label for interpreters of Wittgenstein's mathematics,
is only identified in the *Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics* (1937-1944) and after, i.e., in the later
Wittgenstein.) It appears, however, that middle Wittgenstein's
dealings with mathematics in this period are, as claimed by Juliet
Floyd (2005), constantly changing - and even that, not in any
consistent developmental way but in "piecemeal and uneven"
fashion. Indeed, along with written evidence of Wittgenstein's
influence on and by mathematicians, we can identify the work on
mathematics done particularly by the later Wittgenstein and even he of
the post-*Investigations* period, as a substantial overturning
of his early *and* middle conceptions of mathematics.



While phenomenology and mathematics stand out as almost quirky (and
perhaps suspiciously unclear) subjects making their idiosyncratic
appearance in the middle Wittgenstein, the more evident
Wittgensteinian constructs of this period are, of course, logic,
language, and method. Unsurprisingly, "Some Remarks on Logical
Form" in 1929 heralds the transition from early to later
Wittgenstein, moving from (ideal, formal) logic to (the rules of use
of) grammar. Language is also viewed as the connecting factor between
the early and later Wittgenstein, either by discovering still
"representational" aspects in descriptions of its use or
by deciphering roots of the private language arguments in this
Wittgenstein's musings. Other times, analysis of linguistic
phenomena as language games rather than tools of logic provides what
we have always acknowledged as paradigmatic transitions from early to
later Wittgenstein. These all involve methodology - Wittgenstein
espousing a method of doing philosophy that is different from that of
*TLP*, but still not the plurality of methods proposed in
*PI*. Furthermore, the method proposed is the turn to grammar
as a back turning on dogmatism (and/of metaphysics). David Stern calls
the early Wittgenstein's views on logic, language, and method
"logical atomism" and the later Wittgenstein's
"practical holism," tagging the middle Wittgenstein as
"logical holism." Between logical atomism and practical
holism seems to lie a drastic divide, but seeing logical holism as
bridging the divide gives us the perception - and understanding
- of a natural development between them. As spelled out by Mauro
Engelmann (2013), this development can then also encompass all the
above elements in a comprehensive transition gesturing towards an
"anthropological" view.


## 5. After the *Investigations*



It has been submitted that the writings of the period from 1946 until
his death (1951) constitute a distinctive phase of
Wittgenstein's thought. These writings include, in addition to
the second part of the first edition of the *Philosophical
Investigations (PPF)*, texts edited and collected in volumes such
as *Remarks on Colour*, *Remarks on the Philosophy of
Psychology*, *Zettel*, *On Certainty*, and parts of
*Remarks on t**he Foundations of Mathematics*.



Part II of the *Philosophical Investigations* was, in fact, an
item of contention *ab initio*. In Anscombe and Rhees's
first edition of 1953 (translated by Anscombe), reasons were given for
including it, admittedly as a differentiated part, in the book. In
Hacker and Schulte's (translated and edited) fourth edition of
2009, its position was contrarily explained. It now became, instead of
Part II, an almost independent entity - *Philosophy of
Psychology - A Fragment (PPF)*. It is also emphasized that
it was a "work in progress." Be that as it may, that
installment of a post-*Philosophical Investigations* text
exhibits all the vagaries of Wittgensteinian interpretation -
behooving philosophers to attend to questions of placement (which
Wittgenstein is here represented, middle, later, or other?), affinity
(how do these comments relate to Wittgenstein's later work in
general?), and topic (what is Wittgenstein dealing with here,
psychology, epistemology, or the method of philosophy?).



PPF is the *locus classicus* of a key Wittgensteinian term
- "seeing aspects" (*PPF* xi), where
"two uses of the word 'see'" are elaborated.
The second use, where one "sees" a likeness in two
objects, is the one that has given rise to the question of aspect
perception and the attendant phenomena of aspect-dawning and change of
aspect. "I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness
to another. I *see* that it has not changed; and yet I see it
differently. I call this experience 'noticing an
aspect'" (113). Aspect seeing involves noticing something
about an object - an aspect of the object - that one
hadn't noticed before and thereby seeing it as something
different. Importantly, it also arises as a result of a change of
context of our perceptions. This immensely insightful discovery by
Wittgenstein, and its successive development, has been the source of a
multitude of discussions dealing with questions of objectivity vs.
subjectivity, conception vs. perception, and psychology vs.
epistemology. It also highlights the move from dogmatic, formalistic
universalism to open, humanistic context-laden behavior, aptly
reverberating in the to-and-fro of seeing aspects.



On Certainty is generally accepted as a work of epistemology, as
opposed to *PPF*, which is usually recognized as dealing with
psychology (though even that distinction is called into question by
some interpretations). It tackles skeptical doubts and foundational
solutions but is, in typical Wittgensteinian fashion, a work of
therapy which discounts presuppositions common to both. As always
before in the interpretative game, the general view sees Wittgenstein
as landing on the non-skeptical side of the epistemological debate,
choosing instead to peruse "hinge propositions." These are
propositions about which doubt cannot be entertained, but whether this
be due to their being epistemically foundational, naturally certain,
or logically unavailable to doubt is still a matter for philosophical
explanation; as is the question of Wittgenstein's object of
critique - Cartesian or radical skepticism - or, in some
quarters, the very assumption of his unequivocal anti-skepticism. This
is intimately related to another of *On Certainty*'s
themes--the primacy of the deed to the word, or, in
Wittgenstein's *PI* terminology, of form of life to
logos. Such a clearly delineated philosophical phase has garnered the
recognition of a "third Wittgenstein" (initially by
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock).



*Remarks on Colour* is a collection of remarks, composed by
Wittgenstein during the last year and a half of his life. In these
remarks he attempts to clarify the language we use in describing our
experience and impression of colours, sameness of colours, saturated
colours, light and shade, brightness and opaqueness of surfaces,
transparency, etc. These reflections present us with a "geometry
of colours," though Wittgenstein makes it clear that due to
"the indefiniteness in the concept of colour" (III-78) the
"logic of colour concepts" (I-22) should be given
piecemeal. When we consider colours "there is merely an
inability to bring the concepts into some kind of order"
(II-20). Philosophical attention should be given rather to such
particularities as the blending in of white (as opposed to blending in
yellow), "the coloured intermediary between two colours"
(III-49), " the difference between black-red-gold and
black-red-yellow" (III-51), etc. The investigation is therefore
directed not merely to colour phenomena and the language we use to
describe them but also to philosophical methodology, in comparison
with scientific inquiry, and to what is taken to be conceivable and
what is not. It is also unique in reminding us of a hint, by
Wittgenstein, that it was prompted by Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe's *Zur Farbenlehre* (*On the Theory of
Colour*, 1810)!



The general tenor of all the writings of this last period can thence
be viewed as, on the one hand, a move away from the critical (some
would say destructive) positions of the *Investigations* to a
more positive perspective on the same problems that had been facing
him since his early writings; on the other hand, this move does not
necessarily bespeak a break from the later period but might be more
properly viewed as its continuation, in a new light. In other words,
the grand question of interpreting Wittgenstein, i.e., the question of
continuities or breaks, remains at the forefront of understanding
Wittgenstein.