## 1. Terminology



"Theism" will here refer to the view that there is a God
who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, who created the
world, and who is still actively involved in the world.



In philosophical discussions about God and time, the term
"eternity" has been used in different ways. On one usage,
which will be followed here, "eternity" stands for the
relationship to time that God has, whatever it is. When used in that
way, the term is neutral between different ways of spelling out what
God's relationship to time is. Western theists agree that God is
eternal; the task is to formulate and assess conceptions of what this
eternality might amount to.



Broadly speaking, there have been two rival views of what God's
eternality consists in. On the first, God is timeless (divine
timelessness); on the second, God is in time (divine temporality).
Sometimes the term "eternity" is used to denote
timelessness, but as mentioned, we will here use it as neutral between
the timeless and temporal views. The term "everlasting"
(or "sempiternal") on the other hand, is mostly associated
with the temporal view. On the temporal view, God is in time and thus
exists at every time; there is no time at which God doesn't
exist.


## 2. Methodology



This discussion inherits the complexities of two very intricate
philosophical debates (about God, and about time). Given the nature of
the topic, it is perhaps not unreasonable to wonder what methodology
can be fruitfully employed here.



As the topic is the God of Western theism, there are constraints
arising from relevant passages in Western Scripture. Much of the
discussion focuses on the Judeo-Christian, especially the Christian,
tradition. (But note that specific Christian doctrines such as the
doctrine of the Trinity or the Incarnation, while closely related, are
not the focus here; for more on these, see, e.g., (Le Poidevin 2023).) The Bible contains many
passages calling God eternal, as well as ones that elaborate on
God's eternality. For example, there are passages telling us
that God's "years have no end" (Ps. 102:27, all
quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version) and that God
exists "from everlasting to everlasting" (Pss. 90:2,
103:17). God says, "let there be lights in the dome of the sky
to separate the day from the night, and let them be for signs and for
seasons and for days and years" (Gen. 1:14), and "I am the
first and I am the last" (Isa. 44:6). Moreover, we are told that
God promised us eternal life "before the ages began"
(Titus 1:2), and that "He himself is before all things"
(Col. 1:17). These passages require interpretation, and that's
where the philosophical work begins (see, e.g., Leftow 2005 for a
formulation of constraints based on these passages).



One broad methodological choice concerns whether or not to let
one's theological commitments determine one's views about
the metaphysics, or even the physics of time. A salient alternative
would be to do the opposite, for example by taking as one's
starting point the metaphysical view of time suggested by our best
physical theories and then drawing out any theological implications. A
third approach might involve giving equal weight to both poles and
seeking to come to a coherent and adequate conception of both time and
God as part of the same endeavor. There probably exist a variety of
stances across the philosophical and theological landscapes (for
explicit reflection on related methodological questions see, e.g.,
Murray & Rea 2008: 47; Mullins 2016: Ch. 1).


## 3. Brief Historical Remarks



Until recently, the timelessness view dominated in both philosophy and
theology. For that reason, much of the historical discussion revolves
around that view.


### 3.1 The *Loci Classici*



The *loci classici* are to be found in Book XI of the
*Confessions* of Augustine (354-430) and Book V of
Boethius's (480-c.525) *The Consolation of
Philosophy*. (The extent to which the Platonism of Philo of
Alexandria [c. 25 BCE-CE 40], particularly as applied to the idea
of creation [for example, in his *De opificio mundi*] was
influential, is not clear.) However, the styles of these two thinkers
are very different. Boethius presents the idea of timeless eternity as
straightforward and relatively problem-free. Augustine wrestles with
the idea and expresses continual puzzlement at the idea of time itself
and with it the contrasting idea of timeless eternity.



In Boethius, the contrast is between timeless eternity, which only God
enjoys, and everlastingness, which (following Plato) the world itself
possesses.



> 
> 
> It is the common judgement, then, of all creatures that live by reason
> that God is eternal. So let us consider the nature of eternity, for
> this will make clear to us both the nature of God and his manner of
> knowing. Eternity, then, is the complete, simultaneous and perfect
> possession of everlasting life; this will be clear from a comparison
> with creatures that exist in time.
> 
> 
> 
> ...for it is one thing to progress like the world in
> Plato's theory through everlasting life, and another thing to
> have embraced the whole of everlasting life in one simultaneous
> present. (Boethius *Consolation*, V.VI., transl. V. E. Watts
> 1969)
> 
> 
> 



Boethius uses his view of eternity to address the problem of divine
foreknowledge (see
 section 6.2).
 If God knows beforehand what we will do then how can we act freely?
His answer is that this problem dissolves in the face of the fact that
God does not know anything beforehand but has an immediate, atemporal
knowledge of all things.



In Boethius, we find several analogies for timeless eternity. One is
that between timeless eternity and the centre of a circle. The thought
is that the centre bears the same relation to any point on the
circumference of the circle, and in the same way timeless eternity
bears the same relation to anything in time. (Aquinas develops this
analogy later.) Another analogy is that between God's timelessly
eternal vision and someone at the summit of a hill taking in at a
glance what is taking place beneath her.



Augustine connects God's timeless eternity to God's being
the cause of all times and God's immutability.



> 
> 
> What times existed which were not brought into being by you? Or how
> could they pass if they never had existence? Since, therefore, you are
> the cause of all times, if any time existed before you made heaven and
> earth, how can anyone say that you abstained from working? (Augustine,
> *Confessions*, XI. xiii (15)).
> 
> 
> 
> It is not in time that you precede times. Otherwise you would not
> precede all times. In the sublimity of an eternity which is always in
> the present, you are before all things past and transcend all things
> future, because they are still to come. (Augustine,
> *Confessions*, XI. xiii (16)).
> 
> 
> 
> In you it is not one thing to be and another to live: the supreme
> degree of being and the supreme degree of life are one and the same
> thing. You are being in a supreme degree and are immutable. In you the
> present day has no ending, and yet in you it has its end: "all
> these things have their being in you" (Rom.11.36). They would
> have no way of passing away unless you set a limit to them. Because
> "your years do not fail" (Ps.101.28), your years are one
> Today. (Augustine, *Confessions*, I. vi (10))
> 
> 
> 


### 3.2 Sources in Antiquity



As mentioned, Boethius finds the source of his conception of eternity
in Plato. In the *Timaeus* (37E6-38A6) Plato contrasts
the eternal forms with the time-bound created world, the world of
change and becoming. Time was created along with the heaven
(38B5)--meaning at least that time is the measure of change, and
perhaps that it is identical with the movements of the heavenly bodies
(a view later critiqued by Augustine (*Confessions*, Book XI.
xxiii)). Plato's idea of eternity in the *Timaeus* seems
to be that of a timeless duration. The Forms endure in the temporal
order in which "time is the moving image of eternity". One
can trace a similar idea of timeless eternity back to Parmenides
(though exactly what he means is the subject of scholarly
dispute).



While (in some places at least) Plato connects the necessary character
of the Forms to timelessness, in Aristotle the connection is between
necessity and everlastingness. What is necessary is what exists at all
times. What is contingent is what at some time is not. God, being
necessary, is everlasting. It may be said that the everlasting is not
bounded by time (though it is unbounded in a weaker sense than Plato
ascribes to the Forms) in that what exists everlastingly cannot age
(*Physics* 221b30). Philo of Alexandria is thought to be the
first to ascribe timelessness to God, to the God of the Jewish
Scriptures. In Plotinus (ca. 185-254) timelessness and life are
for the first time identified. *Nous* is eternal and beyond
time, enjoying duration without succession.


### 3.3 Medieval Thinkers



Anselm (c. 1033-1109) presents a view similar to that of
Boethius and Augustine.



> 
> 
> Suppose, on the other hand, that it exists as a whole in individual
> times severally and distinctly. (A human being, for instance, exists
> as a whole yesterday, today and tomorrow.) In this case we should,
> properly, say that it was, is and will be. In which case its time-span
> is not simultaneously a whole. Rather it is stretched out in parts
> through the parts of time. But its time-span is its eternity and its
> eternity is precisely itself. The supreme essence, therefore, would be
> cut up into parts along the divisions of time. (Anselm,
> *Monologion*, Ch. 21)
> 
> 
> 



For Anselm, the timeless eternity of God follows from God's
being that than which nothing greater can be conceived (cf.
 section 6.1).
 In the *Proslogion*, Anselm articulates a
"grammar" of the divine powers, which determines what it
makes sense to say of the most perfect being, including that
being's timelessness.



In the medieval period, the discussion embraces not only Christian but
also Jewish and Islamic thinkers. In keeping with the sharp line drawn
between the Creator and creation, Aquinas and the Jewish thinker Moses
Maimonides (1131-1204) (who greatly influenced Aquinas) argue
that God's timeless eternity ought to be understood primarily in
negative terms. For Aquinas, God's timeless eternity is
unending, lacking both beginning and end, and an instantaneous whole
lacking succession. It is a correlate of divine simplicity (see the
SEP entry on
 divine simplicity),
 and it is incapable of being defined or fully grasped by a creature.
For Aquinas too, timeless eternity constitutes part of the
"grammar" of talking about God. Since God is timelessly
eternal it does not make any sense to ask how many years God has
existed, or whether he is growing old, or what will he be doing later
on in the year.



Despite differences with Thomas Aquinas regarding the nature of
God's relation to time, Duns Scotus (c.1266-1308) seems to
have upheld divine timelessness (though see Leftow 1991: 228). In
general, it would seem that commitment to divine simplicity,
widespread if not universal in the medieval period, entails a
commitment to divine timelessness (Mullins 2016: Ch. 3).


## 4. Some Views on God and Time



It has recently been suggested that there are actually two orthogonal
issues regarding God's relationship to time: (1) whether God is
located in our spacetime--the spacetime investigated by modern
physics; and (2) whether God is eternal or everlasting. (Note that
this is the terminology not employed here.) God could be eternal, with
a life that's not marked by temporal succession, while being
located at every spacetime point. Conversely, God could be everlasting
while not located in physical spacetime at all (Murray & Rea 2008:
Ch. 2).



At first sight, this distinction can seem to leave the second issue
somewhat mysterious: if it is not being located in our, physical
spacetime, then what is it? What can it mean to say that an entity is
everlasting, or exists at all times, if that doesn't commit one
to a view on whether that entity is located in spacetime? What then
are times--are they not somehow to be understood in terms of
spacetime, ultimately?



But there are two distinct issues in the vicinity. One is about
God's life, or, for want of a better phrase, the nature of
God's experience. Whether or not a being experiences succession,
and more generally, what the (a)temporal features of its experience
are, is distinct from whether or not that being is located in
spacetime.



However, there are also connections between these issues. The beings
we are most familiar with, such as ourselves, are spatiotemporal and
experience temporal succession; and for us, these facts are related.
It is partly because we are located in spacetime that we experience
succession, and there are interesting questions about the details of
this connection.



This section outlines some views on God and time, with a focus on the
contemporary literature; further reading suggestions appear at the end
of this section. Each view may involve claims both about whether God
is located in time/spacetime, and about (a)temporal features of
God's experience. Specifically, timelessness views may involve
both the claim that God is not located in time/spacetime, and the
claim that God's life is atemporal, for example in the sense
that God doesn't experience succession. Similarly, temporal
views may involve both the claim that God is in time/spacetime and
that God's life is temporal, for example in the sense that God
experiences succession.


### 4.1 Divine Timelessness


#### 4.1.1 Pure Atemporalism



On this view, God is not located in time and God's life does not
have any temporal features. This is a natural first gloss of the
timelessness position. However, few defenders of divine timelessness
sign up to this view. It has been suggested that Maimonides and
Schleiermacher may hold it (Leftow 2005; actually, the view Leftow
attributes to these authors is that God has no "typically
temporal properties" (TTPs); see the end of
 section 4.1.3).


#### 4.1.2 Atemporal Duration



Boethius has strongly influenced the contemporary landscape. Much of
this influence flows through work by Eleonore Stump and Norman
Kretzmann (hereafter S&K 1981, 1987, 1992).



Recall Boethius (*Consolation*, V.VI., here in a different
translation, by Stewart et al. 1973): "Eternity [...] is
the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of boundless
life". Or again, eternity is the complete possession all at once
of illimitable life.



Stump and Kretzmann distill four ingredients from this claim.


1. A timeless being has life (of a non-biological kind), i.e. is
alive. That is, abstracta (if there are any), like numbers or sets,
don't count. Neither would the world, even if it was
sempiternal.
2. The life of a timeless being is without limit and cannot be
limited. It cannot begin or end. It is impossible for it not to have
infinite duration.
3. The life of a timeless being therefore involves a special sort of,
atemporal, duration.
4. A timeless being
possesses its life all at once, completely. That is, it doesn't
experience succession. This, according to Stump and Kretzmann, is what
makes it the case that a timeless being is outside of time. By
contrast, a living being in time experiences succession, only ever
possessing one moment of its life at a time.



Not only does a timeless being not experience succession, but its
life's events don't involve succession. Since change
requires succession, a timeless being doesn't change. But a
timeless being is still presently alive in some sense of
"presently". Moreover, the events in that being's
life are simultaneous in some sense, both with each other and with
temporal items.



To show how, Stump and Kretzmann coin the notion of Eternal-Temporal
Simultaneity ("ET-simultaneity"). First, define an
"eternal present" to be an infinitely extended, pastless,
futureless duration (strictly speaking, on the terminology used here,
it should be "timeless present"). Then let Temporal
Simultaneity ("T-simultaneity") be existence/occurrence at
the same time, and let Eternal Simultaneity
("E-simultaneity") be existence/occurrence at the same
eternal present. Each involves only one mode of existence, namely
either the temporal or the eternal. ET-simultaneity, by contrast,
relates items in different modes of existence, one temporal, and one
eternal.



Stump & Kretzmann base their definition of ET-simultaneity on
notions borrowed from some presentations of special relativity:



> 
> 
> Let "\(x\)" and "\(y\)" range over
> entities and events. [...]
> 
> 
> 
> (ET)
> For every \(x\) and every \(y\), \(x\) and \(y\) are
> ET-simultaneous if and only if:
>  
> i.
> either \(x\) is eternal and \(y\) is temporal, or vice versa;
> and
> ii.
> for some observer, \(A\), in the unique eternal reference frame,
> \(x\) and \(y\) are both present--that is, either \(x\) is
> eternally present and \(y\) is observed as temporally present, or vice
> versa; and
> iii.
> for some observer, \(B\), in one of the infinitely many temporal
> reference frames, \(x\) and \(y\) are both present--that is,
> either \(x\) is observed as eternally present and \(y\) is temporally
> present, or vice versa. (S&K 1981: 439)
> 
> 
> 



They also offer the following image. Imagine two parallel horizontal
lines. The lower line represents time, and the upper one represents
timeless eternity. Presentness is represented by light. The temporal
present is represented by a light that moves steadily along the lower
line, while the eternal present is represented by the upper line being
lit all at once. Each dot in the lower line, when it is temporally
present, is ET-simultaneous with the whole of the upper line. Or at
least this is so from the viewpoint of that time. From the viewpoint
of eternity, the entire lower line is lit up; each time "insofar
as [it] is temporally present" is ET-simultaneous with the whole
upper line (S&K 1992: 475).



Since, by definition, two items can only be ET-simultaneous if one is
temporal and the other eternal, and since any given item is only one
of these, ET-simultaneity is not reflexive; in fact, it never holds
between an entity and itself. Nor is it transitive; in fact, when
\(x\) and \(y\) are ET-simultaneous and \(y\) and \(z\)
are too, \(x\) and \(z\) never are. The non-transitivity of
ET-simultaneity is needed to solve a pressing problem. If \(t\) is
simultaneous with eternity, and eternity is simultaneous with \(t'\),
then \(t\) is simultaneous with \(t'\). So, all times collapse into
one:



> 
> 
> But, on St. Thomas' view, my typing of this paper is
> simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Again, on his view, the great
> fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore,
> while I type these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on. (Kenny
> 1979: 38-9)
> 
> 
> 



The Stump & Kretzmann proposal has generated much discussion. Here
are three questions that have been raised.



First, is the notion of an atemporal duration coherent? (See
Fitzgerald 1985; also Craig 1999; Nelson 1987; Helm 1988: 35.) What
licenses speaking of a duration here? The eternal present is supposed
not to be pointlike, but to involve an infinite stretch or extension
of some kind. This suggests that it should possess some of the formal
features of extension. For example, it should be possible for two
particulars to have the same or different amounts of the extension. If
this is not the case with atemporal duration, then how is it a
duration? And if it is the case, then how is it not a temporal
duration?


 A proponent of this view may insist that such features are not
possessed by atemporal duration, because such features are had only if
the extension in question is divisible (S&K 1987, 1992). And the
eternal present is not. In support of this, they may suggest that not
even all temporal extension is divisible. Consider our temporal
experience on short time scales and the doctrine of the
"specious present". On that doctrine, temporal experience
involves a temporally extended content. Perhaps this is not even
conceptually divisible, even though it's a temporal extension
(S&K 1992: 468). The comparison is particularly apt if one wants
to think of the eternal present as God's specious present
encompassing all of time (Alston 1984, also Leftow 1991: 143; though
see Oppy 1998, in Other Internet Resources, for a critique of this
idea).



Moreover (they may add), even if all temporal extension is divisible,
this doesn't show that all extension is. Pressed to justify
their use of the term "extension" and explain its
connection to ordinary usage, they point to other cases in theology of
irreducibly analogical predication (see Rogers 1994 for objections to
this move).



Second, what can it mean for something eternally present to observe
something as in the temporal present, and vice versa? (See Lewis
1984; also Nelson 1987; Padgett 1992: 69; Swinburne 1993.) Suppose
something eternal observes something as temporally present. If that
means it observes something that comes to be, then doesn't the
observation itself come to be, making the being temporal? Conversely,
how can a temporal entity observe something as being eternal? How can
it observe anything without bringing that thing into the temporal
series? After all, the event of \(x\)'s observing \(y\)
at \(t\) is identical with the event of \(y\)'s being
observed by \(x\) at
\(t\).



Consider this revised definition of ET-simultaneity:



(ET')
For every \(x\) and every \(y\), \(x\) and \(y\) are
ET-simultaneous if and only if
 
i.
either \(x\) is eternal and \(y\) is temporal, or vice
versa (for convenience, let \(x\) be eternal and \(y\)
temporal); and
ii.
with respect to some \(A\) in the unique eternal reference
frame, \(x\) and \(y\) are both present--i.e., (a) \(x\)
is in the eternal present with respect to \(A\), (b) \(y\) is in
the temporal present, and (c) both \(x\) and \(y\) are situated
with respect to \(A\) in such a way that \(A\) can enter into
direct and immediate causal relations with each of them and (if
capable of awareness) can be directly aware of each of them; and
iii.
with respect to some \(B\) in one of the infinitely many temporal
reference frames, \(x\) and \(y\) are both present--i.e.,
(a) \(x\) is in the eternal present, (b) \(y\) is at the same
time as \(B\), and (c) both \(x\) and \(y\) are situated with
respect to B in such a way that B can enter into direct and immediate
causal relations with each of them and (if capable of awareness) can
be directly aware of each of them. (S&K 1992: 477-8)



Does this provide an answer to the objection, or does it rely on one?
As pointed out by Brian Leftow in a similar context (Leftow 1991: 173;
also Fales 1997), on the view proposed, the temporal and the eternal
can enter into causal relations only if they are in some sense
simultaneous. That is the reason ET-simultaneity is invoked. If one
then relies on a notion of ET-causality in the definition of
ET-simultaneity one faces a problem of circularity.



Third, what role, if any, is special relativity playing in the
proposal? The intended role is a considerable one. Considerations of
the relativity of simultaneity are supposed to show that the
difficulties with the notion of ET-simultaneity are "by no means
unique" and "cannot be assumed to be difficulties in the
concepts of ET-simultaneity or of eternity themselves" (S&K
1981: 439). But it is hard to see how they could show this. Stump and
Kretzmann emphasize the finding that simultaneity is a three-place
relation and present it as a response to a threat of incoherence (two
distant events being both "simultaneous [...] and not
simultaneous" (S&K 1981: 437)). But the difficulties with
ET-simultaneity arise whether it is two-place or three-place. They
pertain to spelling out what an eternal present and the unique eternal
frame of reference might be, and how there can be causal relations,
including observational ones, between a being in it and us. No
comparable difficulties are involved in special relativity (Fales
1997; also Padgett 1992: 71; Craig 2009).


#### 4.1.3 The time of timeless eternity



For Brian Leftow, the central idea is that all things in time are
also, with God, in timeless eternity. He finds this idea in Anselm.
Like in the Stump and Kretzmann proposal, the idea is given a
contemporary twist through appeals to the notion of a reference frame
and special relativity.



Consider the claim that God has no spatial location. Since there can
be a spatial distance only between things or locations in space, this
implies that there is no spatial distance between God and things in
space. From this, Leftow infers that the distance between God and any
thing in space is zero (the "Zero Thesis") (Leftow 1991:
222).



The Zero Thesis says not only that the distance between God and any
spatial thing is zero, but also that it always is zero. Therefore
nothing ever moves with respect to God. Moreover, all change
supervenes on motion, e.g., change in color supervenes on motion in
microparticles. So there is no change with respect to God (Leftow
1991: 227). Therefore, God and all spatial things share a frame of
reference, the reference frame of eternity, in which nothing changes.
In this reference frame, all events are simultaneous, including
God's actions and their effects. That is, they all occur at
eternity, and eternity is something like another time, so they are all
simultaneous. But in other, temporal reference frames, this is not the
case. In these, God's actions occur at eternity but their
effects occur at particular points in time. So in these frames, they
are nonsimultaneous. And this is where special relativity comes in.
After all, the relativity of simultaneity shows that events
simultaneous in one frame of reference may be nonsimultaneous in
others.


 Unfortunately, the Zero Thesis and Leftow's case for it are
problematic. From the fact that there is no spatial distance between
spatial things and God, it does not follow that the spatial distance
between spatial things and God is zero. A similar inference leads one
to claim that all spatial things are spatially contiguous with yellow
and the number 3. Leftow is of course aware of this consequence, and
accepts it as a surprising finding about yellow and the number 3; he
argues that the Zero Thesis only seems problematic because one fails
to notice that a distance of zero is just an absence of distance
(Leftow 1991: 225). However, a distance of zero would seem to be a
distance, not an absence of distance (Oppy 1998, in Other Internet
Resources).



As before, it's hard to see how talk of reference frames and
appeals to the relativity of simultaneity can be helpful or even
relevant. A reference frame is a system of physical devices such as
measuring rods and clocks that allow an observer to fix the positions
of events. It's not clear how timeless eternity can be such a
system. Nor is it clear how timeless eternity can, in addition, be
(like) a time, simultaneity with which can be the outcome of
measurements.



Before turning to further elements of Leftow's view, it is
useful to pause to describe some background on the metaphysics of time
(see also the SEP entries on
 time,
 John M.E. McTaggart, and
 being and becoming in modern physics).
 McTaggart distinguished between the A-series and the B-series of
events. The A-series runs from the future through the present and into
the past, while the B-series runs from earlier to later (McTaggart
1908). This distinction survives in the form of the contemporary
opposition between the B-theory and (various versions of) the A-theory
of time.



According to the B-theory (tenseless theory, block universe view), (a)
all times and/or events exist and are equally real (this is known as
eternalism--not to be confused with divine timelessness which has
also sometimes gone by the same name); and (b) there is a complete
tenseless description of temporal reality. A tenseless description is
one that stays accurate, because it mentions only such things as which
events happen when, and how they are temporally related to one
another. So it mentions only facts about B-relations like simultaneity
and succession. Call these tenseless facts. The B-theory combines
eternalism with the claim that there is a complete description of
temporal reality, a description of temporal reality at its most
fundamental, that doesn't mention any tensed facts, like that
it's 12:00 now.



Opposed to this are various versions of the A-theory, which deny one
or both of (a) and (b). What these A-theoretic views (including
eternalist and non-eternalist ones, like presentism or the growing
block view) have in common is that they metaphysically privilege one
time. Fundamental tensed facts capture this privilege. One prominent
motivation for the A-theory is the conviction that time passes
(robustly--i.e. in a sense that goes beyond mere B-theoretic
temporal succession (see Skow 2015: 2); in what follows that's
what I mean by "temporal passage"). As time passes, the
tensed facts change: first it's a fundamental fact that
it's 12:00, then that it's 12:01.



Now return to Leftow's view. Let A-occurring be occurring now,
and let B-occurring be occurring at a certain temporal location
*t* that is now. (This is intended to be continuous with
McTaggart's distinction.) B-occurring entails A-occurring: if
something occurs at a temporal B-location *t* that is now, it
occurs now. But not vice versa. Something can occur now without
occurring at a temporal B-location *t* that is now. Something
can, that is, A-occur without B-occurring. Now define A-simultaneity
as occurring "at the same now". B-simultaneity, by
contrast, is having the same temporal B-location in some B-series. If
two events are B-simultaneous and they B-occur (i.e. they are located
at the same B-temporal location that is now), they are A-simultaneous.
And if two events occur at the same atemporal now and A-occur (i.e.
occur now), they are also A-simultaneous.



The upshot is that 



> 
> 
> the A-simultaneity that obtains between a timeless God and temporal
> entities is univocal with the A-simultaneity that obtains between
> temporal entities. (Leftow 1991: 239) 
> 
> 
> 



This would make the relation between temporal entities and the
timeless God less mysterious than it is on the Stump & Kretzmann
proposal, on which ET-simultaneity is sui generis, obtaining only
between one temporal and one eternal relatum.



But this seems to be an advance that was gained by stipulation,
because the discussion started thus: "[L]et us so understand
'now' that occurring now does not entail having a position
in a B-series of earlier and later events. That is, let us in effect
take 'now' and 'occurring now' as primitive
terms univocally applicable to temporal and eternal or timeless
things" (Leftow 1991: 239). It's not surprising that given
this initial stipulation, the ensuing definitions allow one to say
that the A-simultaneity that obtains between temporal entities is the
same relation that obtains between a timeless God and temporal
entities.



According to Leftow, there can be no change in (timeless) eternity,
and in eternity, all events happen (A-) simultaneously. However, in
some places eternity is instead described as involving succession,
namely as consisting of a number of different B-series corresponding
to different temporal reference frames (Leftow 1991: 239). *Prima
facie*, these are different, incompatible ideas. B-theorists, who
hold that time, fundamentally, consists of events standing in
B-relations of precedence and simultaneity, do not also hold that all
of time collapses to a single time.



This is relevant to the notion of Quasi-Temporal Eternality (QTE,
Leftow 1991: 120-2). Unlike Stump & Kretzmann, Leftow holds
that atemporal duration, understood as QTE, involves distinct points
but not parts. These points are (at least in some sense) earlier and
later than one another, but they do not stand in the relation of
succession. This seemingly paradoxical claim is partly defended via
appeals to the B-theory. The idea is that Boethian eternity is like an
extension in B-time, and that a QTE being's life contains
earlier and later points with no succession between them. In this
respect, we are told, it is like life in B-time, only without an
illusion of temporal passage.



There is a danger here of misinterpreting the B-theory. While the
B-theory doesn't posit temporal passage, it does posit
succession. Relatedly, the traditional project of squaring our
temporal experience with the B-theory is about explaining away an
illusion of temporal passage, not about explaining away an illusion of
temporal succession (see the SEP entry on the
 experience and perception of time).
 Since the B-theory posits succession (a B-relation), an experience of
succession is non-illusory, on the B-theory. This makes trouble for
Leftow's appeals to the B-theory. After all, Leftow holds that a
QTE being's life, in which all times are experienced at once, is
what a non-illusory experience of B-time would be like (Leftow 1991:
122). In other words, the thought is that an experience of temporal
succession is illusory, on the B-theory.



Leftow also suggests that the sense in which QTE involves earlier and
later points is not a temporal one, but a logical one. However,
logical priority is not temporal priority, nor is it relevantly like
temporal priority (Rogers 1994: 11).



A more recent idea is that of a typically temporal property (TTP). A
property is a TTP if a term predicating it is "part of a
definition of being temporal or figures appropriately in the right
sort of nondefining sufficient condition for being temporal"
(Leftow 2002). The right sort is for example "necessarily,
whatever is past was temporal" rather than "necessarily,
whatever is a pig is temporal". The thought is that just like
being bipedal helps make us human without being sufficient for making
us human, so, e.g., being present helps make things temporal without
being sufficient for making things temporal (and so there can be an
timeless eternal present a la Boethius).


### 4.2 Divine Temporality



In recent times, there has been a notable shift away from divine
timelessness. There are many different kinds of views that fall under
the heading of divine temporality; many of these could also be
classified as "intermediate" views. As in 4.1, the list is
of course far from exhaustive.



Note that while Open Theism has been part of the shift away from
divine timelessness, the position arises specifically in relation to
the topic of divine foreknowledge. Open Theism says that God does not
know which choices we will freely make in the future, because there is
nothing yet to be known; here, free choice is understood along
libertarian lines and the future is taken to be genuinely open in some
metaphysically significant sense. For more on Open Theism, see
Pinnock et al. 1994, Zimmerman 2010, Rice 2020, Rissler (Other
Internet Resources), and the SEP entry on
divine foreknowledge.



#### 4.2.1 Pure Temporalism



On this view, God is located at all times, God experiences succession,
and God has lived through and will live through a non-finite past and
future. The idea here is that God is in (our, physical)
time/spacetime, and God is a temporal being in just the way we are,
except that the temporal extent of God's life is infinite.
Compared to other temporal views, this one is conceptually
straightforward. Arguably, however, it is in tension with current
cosmology, which suggests that the universe has a finite past. Insofar
as the view implies that God is bound by, or has no power over time,
it may also be at odds with some of the constraints arising from
Western Scripture (see
 section 2).
 The view is found at least in process theologians like Charles
Hartshorne (Hartshorne 1947).


#### 4.2.2 Relative Timelessness



On Alan Padgett's view, God changes, so God is temporal.
However, timelessness is not abandoned; instead, it is redefined. 



> 
> 
> [...] I have not abandoned timelessness. Instead, I have
> redefined "God is timeless" to mean that God is relatively
> timeless, i.e. he is not measured by time nor is he affected by the
> negative aspects of temporal passage. (Padgett 1992: 146; also 2001)
> 
> 
> 
> 



The idea is that God's time is non-identical with our,
"Measured Time".



"Measured Time" is "the specifically human time of
our history and our universe: the time of seconds, days, and
centuries; the time of our space-time" (Padgett 1992: 130). In
that sense of "time", God is timeless. However, God is not
timeless in the strict sense in which "time" refers to any
kind of temporality, because God is in his own time. Does that mean
God is only in his time and not in ours? No, he is in our time too (p.
131--at least saying this is "philosophically
acceptable" (p. 126)), as we are in his. It's just that he
transcends our time. What does it mean to transcend our time? It means
that God is the ground of time, that he is not negatively affected by
the passage of time, and (things get a little circular here), that he
is relatively timeless.



One question one might have about this is what "Measured
Time" and "God's time" are, and how plausible
it is to think there are both. Padgett maintains that in everyday
speech, "time" refers "not to an ontological
category" but to "the human time of our history and our
universe" (1992: 130). The distinction is supported by appeals
to the differences between this sense of "time" and
"the strict ontological sense of 'time' used in
philosophy" (p. 140). But this may still leave one wondering
about the distinction. For one thing, few contemporary ontologists
take themselves to be investigating a time distinct from "the
human time of our history and our universe". Nor do they tend to
think of the time of the universe as specifically human. For another,
there are a number of different philosophical views about time.


#### 4.2.3 Timeless Without and Temporal With Creation



William Lane Craig's view is that God is timeless without
creation, and temporal with creation (Craig 2000). God exists
timelessly "without" creation rather than before creation,
because there isn't literally a before. And so it can't
literally be the case that God becomes temporal, since becoming
anything involves being first one thing and then the other.
Nonetheless, God is "timeless without creation and temporal
subsequent to creation ", God "enters time at the moment
of creation" (Craig 2000: 33). God exists changelessly and
timelessly, but by creating, God undergoes an extrinsic change
"which draws Him into time" (Craig 2000: 29).



The problem is that even extrinsic change still presupposes a before
and after (Leftow 2005: 66). Craig is aware of the difficulty: 



> 
> 
> [O]n such a view, there seem to be two phases of God's life, a
> timeless phase and a temporal phase, and the timeless phase seems to
> have existed earlier than the temporal phase. But this is logically
> incoherent, since to stand in a relation of  *earlier than*  is by all
> accounts to be temporal. (Craig 2000: 32) 
> 
> 
> 



His solution is 



> 
> 
> that "prior" to creation there literally are no intervals
> of time [...] no earlier and later, no enduring through
> successive intervals and, hence, no waiting, no temporal becoming.
> This state would pass away, not successively, but as a whole, at the
> moment of creation, when time begins. 
> 
> 
> 



And this state, he says, "looks suspiciously like a state of
timelessness" (Craig 2000: 33).



But this solution looks suspiciously like a re-statement of the view.
The problem was that we could only talk of a "before" in
quotation marks. Yet we needed there to literally be such a before on
the view in question. (This is unless we decline to make literal sense
of all this, but that is not Craig's approach.) What can it mean
to say God underwent a change at the end of which God was temporal?
Craig's answer seems to be that there is timelessness before
time's beginning, or rather, "before" time's
beginning.



Craig endorses Padgett's distinction between "Measured
Time" and "Ontological Time" (God's time).
Unlike Padgett, he identifies the latter with Newton's absolute
time. He defends a "neo-Lorentzian" interpretation of
special relativity, according to which there is a privileged reference
frame that is in principle undetectable due to the effective Lorentz
invariance of the dynamical laws. In addition, he points to the cosmic
time of some general relativistic spacetime models as a candidate for
absolute time. Each of these claims is made in support of a strong
prior commitment to the A-theory, shared with Padgett. However, each
claim faces problems, and their connection is unclear, since the
"neo-Lorentzian" approach to special relativity
doesn't allow for as natural a development in the direction of
general relativity as does the standard approach (see, e.g., Balashov
& Janssen 2003, Wuthrich 2013).



Craig and Padgett differ over whether cosmic time gives a
"proper measure" of God's time, and thus effectively
over whether, on this kind of view, we have any epistemic access to
God's time (which we are also in). Craig answers in the
affirmative, but still hesitates to identify cosmic time with
God's time, preferring instead to say that the two
"coincide" (Craig 1990: 344).


#### 4.2.4 Metrically Amorphous Time



Richard Swinburne originally defends timelessness (Swinburne 1965),
but then switches allegiance to a temporal view. According to his
later view, before creation God lives alone in a metrically amorphous
time (Swinburne 1977, 1993, 1994). (Padgett also describes God's
time as metrically amorphous.) Once God creates the world and
institutes the laws of nature, time acquires a metric. There then
begin to be facts of the matter about how long temporal intervals
are.



Further Reading: 


* Defenses of Divine Timelessness: Helm 1988, 2001; Yates 1990;
Rogers 2000, 2007; Dolezal 2017; Duby 2022.
* Defenses of Divine Temporality: Lucas 1973, 1989; Wolterstorff
1975, 2000a,b, 2001; Hasker 1989, 2002; Zimmerman 2002; DeWeese 2002,
2004; Mullins 2016.


## 5. Arguments against Divine Timelessness


### 5.1 Arguments from Divine Omniscience and Tensed Facts



Recall that the theistic God is omniscient. Presumably then, God knows
what temporal reality is like at its most fundamental. If there are
fundamental tensed facts (like that it's 12:00), God knows them.
But since these facts change, what God knows changes constantly. So
God changes constantly; so God is in time.



Argument 1

(1)
God is omniscient.
(2)
If God is omniscient, then God knows the fundamental temporal
facts.
So (3)
God knows the fundamental temporal facts. (From (1), (2))
So (4)
if there are fundamental tensed facts (i.e. the A-theory is true),
then God knows them. (From (3))
(5)
If God knows fundamental tensed facts, then what God knows
changes.
(6)
If what God knows changes, then God changes.
(7)
If God changes, then God is temporal.


Therefore, if the A-theory is true, then God is temporal. (From (4),
(5), (6), (7))




Various versions of this argument have been defended (Craig 2000,
2001; DeWeese 2004; Hasker 2002; Kretzmann 1966; Padgett 1992, 2001;
Wolterstorff 1975; Mullins 2016: Ch. 4). Since many participants of
the debate think the A-theory is true, it is treated as an argument
for divine temporality. In response, advocates of timelessness
challenge one or more of the argument's premises (Wierenga 1989,
2002; Alston 1989a; Ganssle 1993, 1995, 2002). Others respond by giving up
on the A-theory and accepting the B-theory (Helm 1988, 2001; Rogers
2000). The thought is that this argument can't be run for the
B-theory, since on the B-theory, the fundamental (tenseless) temporal
facts don't change. The parallel argument would get stuck at the
analogue of step (5): it's not the case that if God knows
fundamental tenseless facts, then what God knows changes. So while the
argument itself is silent on whether the B-theory allows one to
combine timelessness with omniscience, part of the point of making it
is that the parallel argument can't be run for the B-theory.



One might, however, wonder whether there are arguments in the vicinity
of Argument 1 that can be run on the B-theory too. Consider first the
following, somewhat similar argument.



Argument 2

(1')
God is omniscient.
(2')
If God is omniscient, then God knows what time it is.
So (3')
God knows what time it is. (From (1'), (2'))
(4')
What time it is changes.
So (5')
What God knows changes. (From (3'), (4'))
(6)
If what God knows changes, then God changes.
(7)
If God changes, then God is temporal.


Therefore, God is temporal. (From (5'), (6), (7))




Unlike in the case of Argument 1, the connection to the A-theory here
is not straightforward. There is certainly a sense in which (4')
is true on the B-theory, even though there is, on the B-theory, no
change in the fundamental temporal facts. At each time, that time is
present--not in the absolute, metaphysically privileged sense of
the A-theory, but in a relative, perspectival sense. Each time is
present at itself, just like each spatial location is here relative to
itself. Moreover, on a standard B-theoretic account of tensed language
(e.g., Mozersky 2015; but see Torre 2010 for an alternative account),
at each of those times, a temporal subject *S* can know, and have
a true belief about, what time it is. At noon, *S* believes that
it is noon; that belief is made true by a tenseless fact, such as that
*S* holds the belief at (a time simultaneous with) noon. At
12:01, *S* believes truly that it is 12:01, where this belief is
made true by another tenseless fact, such as that this later belief is
held by *S* at (a time simultaneous with) 12:01, and so on.



Admittedly, it is not the case, on this B-theoretic account, that knowing
what time it is (at different times) involves knowing different things
at different times. The reason is that the tenseless contents that are
believed can be believed by *S* at all times equally (and typically
will be). So while, at each time, *S* has a tensed belief with a
tenseless content that differs from the tenseless content of
*S*'s tensed beliefs at previous times, *S* may not
come to believe, or know, anything new. This suggests that the same
applies to God, and that (5') doesn't follow from
(3') and (4').



However, what matters is not just *what* *S* knows and
believes, but *how* *S* knows and believes it. Tensed
beliefs have rather different cognitive significance from the
corresponding tenseless ones. What matters for timely action is
believing the tenseless content via a tensed representation, by having
a true tensed belief ("it is noon (now)"). The point is a
more general one that applies equally to indexicals other than
"now", such as "I" or "here": the
cognitive significance of indexical beliefs differs from that of the
corresponding non-indexical ones.



Therefore, if a B-theoretic subject *S* knows (at more than one
time) what time it is, then they undergo changes. The reason is that
how they believe what they believe changes. They need to keep track of
their temporal perspective by having appropriately varied tensed
beliefs ("it's noon", "it's
12:01"). At least this is so for anyone whose temporal nature
relevantly resembles our own. Does this group include God? If so, then
on the B-theory too, there is reason to worry about the combination of
omniscience with timelessness.



Argument 3

(1')
God is omniscient.
(2')
If God is omniscient, then God knows what time it is.
So (3')
God knows what time it is. (From (1'), (2'))
(4'')
If *S* knows what time it is, then how *S* believes
(what *S* believes) changes.
(5'')
How God believes (what God believes) changes. (From (3'),
(4''))
(6'')
If how God believes changes, then God changes.
(7)
If God changes, then God is temporal.


Therefore, God is temporal. (From (5''), (6''), (7))



### 5.2 Arguments from Divine Action



One might reason as follows. When God creates the universe, God begins
to stand in the relation of *coexisting with* to the universe,
and also in the relation of *sustaining it in existence*.
Acquiring these and other relations to the universe makes God
temporal, because it constitutes a change that God undergoes at the
moment of creation. Even if God was timeless before, God is temporal
after creation (Craig 2009).



The problem with this line of thought is again that it is not clear
how to understand the notions of before and after, of acquiring, and
of beginning, as applied to a timeless God.



However, the point can be made in another way. God is thought to be
causally active in the world, where those causal relations include
God's responding to petitionary prayer and being actively
involved in world history. Similarly, God coexists with the world and
sustains it in existence at every moment. God loves, and knows about
the lives of, God's creatures. All these are relations. God
stands in causal and other relations to a temporal world.
Doesn't this make God temporal (Mullins 2016, Ch. 5)?



Each version of divine timelessness tries to address this concern in
some way. One somewhat radical response, given by Aquinas and others,
is that while the world is related to God, God is not related to the
world.


### 5.3 Arguments from Divine Personhood



Suppose that whatever is a person does at least some of the following:
remembering, anticipating, reflecting, deliberating, deciding,
intending, and acting intentionally. If timelessness precludes one
from doing any of these, then being timeless is incompatible with
being a person. Since God is a person, God is not timeless.



But is it the case that being a person requires one to do at least
some of the above? Instead one might hold that at most, it requires
one to be *capable* of doing at least some of the above. And
perhaps a timeless God is capable of doing some of the above, even if
God does not do them.



Alternatively, one might question the grounds for thinking that these
activities tend to be precluded by timelessness. It is true that they
all seem to involve change, namely a change in one's mental
states. But defenders of timelessness may think we should leave room
in our conceptual scheme for a timeless, changeless version of each of
these activities (Craig 2009; Murray & Rea 2008: Ch. 2).


## 6. Arguments for Divine Timelessness


### 6.1 Arguments from Divine Perfection



There are a number of considerations speaking in favor of divine
timelessness that arise out of perfect being theology. Perfect being
theology is the approach to theology that involves figuring out what
God is like on the basis of God's being the most perfect (or
greatest possible) being. A general argument goes as follows. The most
perfect being, God, has the most perfect mode of existence. But
temporal existence is a less perfect mode of existence than timeless
existence. Therefore, God has a timeless mode of existence.



Why think that temporal existence is less perfect than timeless
existence? Note that we're here mostly concerned with the second
issue distinguished at the beginning of
 section 4,
 namely the nature of God's experience (rather than the first,
namely whether or not God is located in time/spacetime). The thought
is that ordinary temporal experience involves gain and loss, and an
awareness of the inescapable passage of time. Relatedly, for ordinary
temporal beings, neither the distant past nor the future are
perceptually accessible. We remember parts of the past, but
imperfectly, and we merely anticipate the future. We know much less
about the future than the past. We can't change or re-experience
the past, nor can we skip ahead to later moments, except one at a
time.



But then again, God is no ordinary temporal being. The defender of
temporality can reply that while God's life has temporal
features, in that God experiences succession, God's temporal
experience is otherwise very much unlike ours (Mullins 2014). For
example, God is omniscient, so God forgets no part of the past and
already knows all about the future. It's true that experiencing
succession means experiencing things one at a time. But, the defender
of temporality might add, this very feature is necessary for, e.g.,
the ability to enjoy music, which is good and therefore something the
most perfect being would have.



There are more indirect ways of arguing from perfection to
timelessness. For example, suppose that the most perfect mode of
existence involves immutability, and that immutability requires
timelessness. Or suppose that perfection requires divine simplicity,
and that simplicity requires timelessness (for more, see the SEP
entries on
 divine simplicity
 and
 immutability).


### 6.2 Arguments from Divine Foreknowledge



One line of thought is that complete knowledge of future contingent
events is impossible for beings in time. Since God is omniscient, and
therefore knows all that will happen, God is timeless.



Another line of thought is that while God is omniscient, and therefore
knows all that will happen, some of our actions are genuinely free.
But these two facts are in tension with one another, and the tension
can be resolved by thinking of God as timeless.



Here is this line of thought in more detail. First consider an
argument for theological fatalism, the view that divine foreknowledge
and freedom are incompatible (Pike 1965; Murray & Rea 2008: Ch.
2). God is omniscient. So God knows all that is true and believes
nothing false. Now consider the proposition *p* that you will
read this section 1,000 years hence. Suppose *p* was true 1,000
years ago. Then God believed *p* then. And you never had a choice
about whether God believed *p* 1,000 years ago. Nor have you ever
had a choice about anything that follows from God's believing
*p* 1,000 years ago, including that you read this section today.
So you never had a choice about whether you read this section today,
which means you're not doing it freely.



One proposed solution is to deny that *p* was true 1,000 years
ago. (Aristotle responds in this way to a similar, non-theological
argument for logical fatalism.) For more on this solution, see the SEP
entries on
 foreknowledge and free will
 and
 fatalism.



A defender of divine timelessness may attempt another solution
(inspired by Boethius). God is not located in time, so God does not
know or believe things at times. So it is not the case that God
believed *p* 1,000 years ago. Rather, all temporal events are
before God's mind "at once", or in an atemporal
present. However, some argue that a similar problem still arises
(Zagzebski 1991: Ch. 2).


### 6.3 Arguments from Relativity Theory



God is immaterial. Suppose it follows from this that God is not in
space. Then one might argue that relativity theory implies that God is
not in time either, because according to relativity theory, anything
that is in time is also in space (Leftow 1991: 272).



While the basic thought is clear enough, one might worry about the
details of this argument. In relativity theory, there are no such
things as times or spatial locations, at the fundamental level. So it
would be at least misleading to say that according to relativity
theory, anything that is located at times is located at spatial
locations. But a defender of the argument probably has in mind
precisely this implication of (special) relativity, that
spatiotemporal regions are fundamental, because there is no unique
decomposition of spacetime into space at times. Presumably the lesson
of relativity theory for the present debate can be suitably
reformulated.


 Further Reading on God and Time: Pike 1970; Braine 1988; Yates
1990; Gale 1991; Mawson 2008; Craig 1998, 2001, 2009; Murray & Rea
2008; Leftow 2010; Tapp & Runggaldier 2011; Oppy 2014; Mullins
2016; Melamed 2016; Deng 2019; Schmucker, Williams and Fischer
2022; Moravec (forthcoming); and Ganssle (Other Internet
Resources). 


## 7. Other Debates about Eternity



Both timelessness or atemporality, and permanence or everlastingness,
are widely applicable concepts. This section outlines a few non-religious
philosophical debates in which the concept of eternity, in the sense
of atemporality, can play a role (McDaniel 2016).



Consider questions about the nature of propositions, mathematical
objects, or other abstracta. Perhaps these are atemporal entities,
existing outside of time/spacetime, and not standing in any
spatiotemporal relations to other entities. What sorts of
considerations might bear on whether they are or not? Take
propositions, the true or false things sentences express. Take a
sentence that changes its truth-value over time (e.g.,
"It's sunny"). Does such a sentence express
different propositions at different times (that it's sunny at
\(t\_1\), that it's sunny at \(t\_2\), etc.)? Or does it express
the same proposition over time (that it's sunny)? If it's
the former, then the propositions expressed don't themselves
change truth-value. If it's the latter, the proposition (that
it's sunny) itself changes truth-value. In this latter case,
that might give one reason think that the proposition is located
within time rather than outside of it. On the other hand, it might
not. After all, the truth-value also seems to vary with spatial
location; yet we may be reluctant to infer from this that the
proposition has spatial locations.



As another example, consider the view that time does not exist, for
example as argued for by speculative metaphysicians such as McTaggart
or F. H. Bradley. On such views, *everything* is eternal (in the
sense of atemporal).



The view that time is unreal was also argued for by Kurt Godel on
the basis of general relativistic considerations (Godel
1949). Godel's starting point is his discovery of solutions
to Einstein's Field Equations that permit the existence of
closed timelike curves. Such spacetimes, he argues, do not contain a
temporal dimension, since time only exists if there is genuine passage
of time, and there cannot be genuine passage of time in such
worlds. This in turn suggests that time does not pass, and thus does
not exist, in the actual world either (for more on the argument see
Savitt 1994; Dorato 2002; Yourgrau 2005).



More recently, some physicists and philosophers of physics working on
approaches to quantum gravity have entertained the view that spacetime
may not be fundamental (see the SEP entry on
 quantum gravity).
 Of course, whether the concept of atemporality applies in this
context depends on how the claim that spacetime is not fundamental is
best understood.