## 1. Taxonomy



Much valuable scholarship explicates the central terms
'federalism', 'federation' and 'federal
systems' (cf. Wheare 1964, King 1982, Elazar 1987, Elazar 1987a,
Riker 1993, Watts 1998).



A *federal political order* is here taken to be "the
genus of political organization that is marked by the combination of
shared rule and self-rule" (Watts 1998, 120).
*Federalism* is the descriptive theory or normative advocacy of
such an order, including principles for dividing final authority
between member units and the common institutions.



A *federation* is one species of such a federal order; other
species are unions, confederations, leagues and decentralised
unions--and hybrids such as the present European Union (Elazar
1987, Watts 1998). A *federation* in this sense involves a
*territorial* division of power between constituent
units--sometimes called 'provinces',
'cantons', possibly 'cities', or confusingly
'states'--and a common government. This division of
power is typically entrenched in a constitution which neither a member
unit nor the common government can alter unilaterally. The member unit
and the common government both have direct effect on the
citizenry--the common government operates "on the
individual citizens composing the nation" (Federalist Paper
39)--and the authorities of both are directly elected (Watts
1998, 121). In comparison, decentralized authority in unitary states
can typically be revoked by the central legislature at will. Many
multilevel forms of governance may also be revised by units at one
level without consent by bodies at other levels. Such entrenchments
notwithstanding, some centralization often occurs owing to the
constitutional interpretations by a federal level court in charge of
settling conflicts regarding the scopes of final legislative and/or
judicial authority.



In contrast, 'confederation' has come to mean a political
order with a weaker center than a federation, often dependent on the
constituent units (Watts 1998, 121). Typically, in a confederation a)
member units may legally exit, b) the center only exercises authority
delegated by member units, c) the center is subject to member unit
veto on many issues, d) center decisions bind member units but not
citizens directly, e) the center lacks an independent fiscal or
electoral base, *and/or* f) the member units do not cede
authority permanently to the center. Confederations are often based on
agreements for specific tasks, and the common government may be
completely exercised by delegates of the member unit governments. Thus
many would count as confederations the North American states during
1776-1787, Switzerland 1291-1847, and the present European
Union--though it has several elements typical of federations.



In *symmetric* (*con*)*federations* the member
units have the same bundles of powers, while in *asymmetric*
(*con*)*federations* such as Russia, Canada, the
European Union, Spain, or India the bundles may be different among
member units; some member units may for instance have special rights
regarding language or culture. Some asymmetric arrangements involve
one smaller state and a larger, where the smaller partakes in
governing the larger while retaining sovereignty on some issues
(Elazar 1987, Watts 1998).



A helpful categorisation among federal arrangements concerns the
relationship between the central unit, member units and individuals.
If the decisions made centrally do not involve member units at all, we
may speak of *separate* (*split* or *compact*)
federalism. Some issues may be the responsibility of the central unit,
others belonging to the member units, where citizens vote their
representatives directly to both bodies (U.S. Constitution Art. II
Section 1; cf. Dahl 2001). Federations can involve member units in
central decision-making in at least two different ways in various
forms of *interlocking* (or *cooperative*) federalism.
Member unit representatives can participate within central
bodies--in cabinets or legislatures--(*collective agency
compositional* arrangement). Or they constitute one central body
that interacts with other central bodies, for instance where member
unit government representatives form an Upper House with power to veto
or postpone decisions by majority or qualified majority vote
(*divided agency*/*relational* arrangements). These
legal arrangements give rise to varieties of multi-level governance:
continuous negotiations among authorities at different territorial
levels (Marks 1993, Hooghe and Marks 2003, Scharpf 1983).
Responsiveness to individuals may benefit from interlocking
federalism, but often at the cost of transparency and
accountability.



Several authors identify two quite distinct processes that lead to a
federal political order (Friedrich 1968, Buchanan 1995, Stepan 1999
and others). Independent states may aggregate by ceding or pooling
sovereign powers in certain domains for the sake of goods otherwise
unattainable, such as security or economic prosperity. Such *coming
together* federal political orders are typically arranged to
constrain the center and prevent majorities from overriding a member
unit. Examples include the present USA, Canada, Switzerland, and
Australia. *Holding together* federal political orders develop
from unitary states, as governments devolve authority to alleviate
threats of unrest or secession by territorially clustered minorities.
Such federal political orders often grant some member units particular
domains of sovereignty e.g. over language and cultural rights in an
*asymmetric* federation, while maintaining broad scope of
action for the central government and majorities. Examples include
India, Belgium and Spain.



In addition to territorially organized federal political orders, other
interesting alternatives to unitary states occur when
*non-territorial* member units are constituted by groups
sharing ethnic, religious or other characteristics. These systems are
sometimes referred to as 'non-territorial' federations.
Karl Renner and Otto Bauer explored such arrangements for
geographically dispersed cultural minorities, allowing them some
cultural and "personal" autonomy without territorial self
rule (Bauer 1903; Renner 1907; Bottomore and Goode 1978; cf. Tamir
1993 and Nimni 2005). *Consociations* consist of somewhat
insulated groups in member units who in addition are represented in
central institutions often governing by unanimity rather than by
majority (Lijphart 1977).


## 2. History of Federalism



A wide-spread interest among political philosophers in topics
concerning the centralised nation state have fuelled attention to
historical contributions on unitary sovereignty. However, we can also
identify a steady stream of contributions to the philosophy of
federalism, also by those more well known for their arguments
concerning centralised power (cf. Karmis and Norman 2005 for such
readings). Much of the Western literature on federalism has focused on
the unit of states. To underscore this bias, consider first some
non-Western practices and theories of federal features.


### 2.1 Some global perspectives



We find federal modes of political organisation on many continents,
and contributions to theories about federalism in written sources
across philosophical traditions. A range of philosophical
contributions underscore that federal perspectives can apply to a wide
range of units other than the sovereign states central in European and
U.S. thought.



The tribal organisation of the Maori in what is now New Zealand
included family groups (*whanau*), who would work together and
collaborate for defense as a clan (*hapu*). The tribe
(*iwi*) would in turn operate as a federation among several
hapu for common defense (Ballara 1998, 19).



Several extinct African societies had federal elements. Edward Wamala
describes what we recognise as federal features in pre-14th century
Ganda society, in what later became the kingdom of the Baganda, now
part of Uganda. The power structures between the chief
(*ssabataka*) and heads of tribes (*mutaka*) was one of
*primus inter pares*. The tribes enjoyed immunity, in that the
higher units should no usurp the responsibilities of the lower units
of power but only promote the well-being of the lower units (Wamala
2004: 436-437)



Nahua (Aztek) culture illustrates multi-level federalism: Tlaxilacalli
- badly translated and understood as "neighbourhoods" -
would submit to the authority of the sovereign local polity, or
*altepetl*, which then scaled up to autonomous mega-provinces
(*huei altepetl*) and finally to the entire empire. At each
level, submission was traded for autonomy, undercutting any attempt at
direct centralising rule (Johnson 2017). In the 1428 triple alliance
for military purposes among the three city-states (*altepeme*)
of Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Totoquihuatzin, each of these rules over
their dependent *altepetl* without interference by the other
two (Lockhart 1992).



The Confucian political philosopher Mencius (379-298 BC) laid
out a three level 'familial' order (Chan 2003). The family
had primary responsibility for those unable to care for themselves,
and rulers should be the parents of the people. (Mencius 2003, 1B.13).
When the family *could not* assist, the community network
should provide support. Only when the community was *unable*
would what we might call the state have *an obligation* to
aid.



We find expressions of federalism in the third pillar of Islam:
Obligatory charity in the form of *zakat* provided to certain
needy persons outside one's own household (Qur'an 9: 103).
Every able Muslim must provide a fixed proportion of their net
wealth--2.5%--to support others in need. The role of the
state may vary when it comes to assess, collect and distribute zakat.
In some states, the collection or distribution of zakat is the
responsibility of civil society organisations or mosques. In other
states, it is the government's responsibility to either ensure
that zakat is managed if Muslims fail to pay; or the whole system may
be managed by the state (Bilo and Mechado 2018).



The sub-Saharan philosophy of Ubuntu has federal features that have
also contributed to legal theory. The term 'Ubuntu' stems
from the Nguni phrase *"Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu"*
meaning a person is a person through other persons. Ubuntu emphasises
the harmonious relationships between persons as constitutive of the
individual, underscoring compassion and commitment to one
another's growth (Mbiti 1969, Gadeke 2019, Metz 2011). The
task of governments at various territorial levels is to promote
harmonious flourishing and community of the constituent parts (Shutte
2001). Ubuntu was included in the epilogue of the 1993 Interim
Constitution of South Africa, but not explicitly in its 1996
Constitution.



The confederacy among five (later six) Haudenosaunee (Iroquois)
nations dates back to between the 12th and 15th century. The oral
constitution--The Great Law of Peace--specified that each
nation elected delegates, or *sachems*, who dealt with internal
affairs. The confederacy's Grand Council could not interfere
with the internal affairs of each tribe, but would discuss particular
matters of common concern such as war, peace, and treaty making. The
Haudenosaunee practice of granting the member units immunity
apparently influenced Benjamin Franklin's and others' call
for a union among the English colonies (Fenton 1998). Iris Marion
Young explored this tradition to develop a theory of federalism that
would secure immunity and redress power imbalances (Young 2000; Levy
2008).


### 2.2 Western contributions



Aristotle (384-322 BC) provides an early Western example of
federal thought, where some of the member units are not political. The
tasks of households and villages is to secure individuals'
necessities of life. The city-state (*polis*) is a
self-sufficient community of such households, clans and villages, for
protection and fulfilment (Politics, III.9, 1280b).



Several of the early European contributors to federalist thought
explored the rationale and weaknesses of centralised states as they
emerged and developed in the 17th and 18th century. Johannes Althusius
(1557-1630) is often regarded as the father of modern federalist
thought. He argued in *Politica Methodice Digesta* (Althusius
1603) for autonomy of his city Emden, both against its Lutheran
provincial Lord and against the Catholic Emperor. Althusius was
strongly influenced by French Huguenots and Calvinism. As a permanent
minority in several states, Calvinists developed a doctrine of
resistance as the right and duty of "natural leaders" to
resist tyranny. Orthodox Calvinists insisted on sovereignty in the
social circles subordinate only to God's laws. The French
Protestant Huguenots developed a theory of legitimacy further,
presented 1579 by an author with the telling pseudonym "Junius
Brutus" in *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos*. The people,
regarded as a corporate body in territorial hierarchical communities,
has a God-granted right to resist rulers without rightful claim.
Rejecting theocracy, Althusius developed a non-sectarian,
non-religious contractualist political theory of federations that
prohibited state intervention even for purposes of promoting the right
faith. Accommodation of dissent and diversity prevailed over any
interest in subordinating political powers to religion or vice
versa.



Since humans are fundamentally dependent on others for the reliable
provision of requirements of a comfortable and holy life, we require
communities and associations that are both instrumentally and
intrinsically important for supporting [*subsidia*] our needs.
Althusius, like Aristotle, included non-political units in his federal
theory. Families, guilds, cities, provinces, states and other
associations owe their legitimacy and claims to political power to
their various roles in enabling a holy life, rather than to
individuals' interest in autonomy. Each association claims
autonomy within its own sphere against intervention by other
associations. Borrowing a term originally used for the alliance
between God and men, Althusius holds that associations enter into
secular agreements--*pactum foederis*--to live
together in mutual benevolence.



Several early contributors explored what we may now regard as various
species of federal political orders, partly with an eye to resolving
*inter-state* conflicts.



Ludolph Hugo (ca. 1630-1704) was the first to distinguish
confederations based on alliances, decentralized unitary states such
as the Roman Empire, and federations, characterized by 'double
governments' with territorial division of powers, in *De
Statu Regionum Germanie* (1661) (cf. Elazar 1998; Riley 1976).



A recurring concern was tensions between federalism and conceptions of
sovereignty. Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1684) maintained that
sovereign states could at most "agree to intertwine for all
time" in a confederation deciding by unanimity. Move to majority
rule turned the legal order into an 'irregular system'
closer to a state. If sovereignty is a unique site of final and
independent authority, federations are no more than voluntary treaties
among fundamentally independent states, argued Emmerik Vattel
(1714-1767). Later thinkers challenged this understanding of
sovereignty, in debates continuing to this day concerning the European
Union. (MacCormick 1999, Schutze 2009).



In *The Spirit of Laws* (1748) Charles de Secondat, Baron de
Montesquieu (1689-1755) argued for confederal arrangements as
combining the best of small and large political units, without the
disadvantages of either. On the one hand they could provide the
advantages of small states such as republican participation and
liberty understood as non-domination--that is, security against
abuse of power. At the same time confederal orders secure the benefits
of larger states such as military security, without the risks of small
and large states. A 'confederate republic' with separation
of powers allows sufficient homogeneity and identification within
sufficiently small member units. The member units in turn pool powers
sufficient to secure external security, reserving the right to secede
(Book 9, 1). Member units serve as checks on each other, since other
member units may intervene to quell insurrection and power abuse in
one member unit. These themes reoccur in later contributions, up to
and including discussions concerning the European Union (cf. Levy
2004, 2005, 2007).



David Hume (1711-1776) disagreed with Montesquieu that smaller
size is better. Instead, "in a large democracy ... there is
compass and room enough to refine the democracy." In "Idea
of a Perfect Commonwealth" (Hume 1752) Hume recommended a
federal arrangement for deliberation of laws involving both member
unit and central legislatures. Member units enjoy several powers and
partake in central decisions, but their laws and court judgments can
always be overruled by the central bodies, hence it seems that
Hume's model is not federal as the term is used here. He held
that such a numerous and geographically large system would do better
than small cities in preventing decisions based on "intrigue,
prejudice or passion" against the public interest.



Several 18th century peace plans for Europe recommended confederal
arrangements. The 1713 Peace Plan of Abbe Charles de
Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) would allow intervention in member
units to quell rebellion and wars on non-members to force them to join
an established confederation, and required unanimity for changes to
the agreement.



Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) presented and critiqued
Saint-Pierre's proposal, listing several conditions including
that all major powers must be members, that the joint legislation must
be binding, that the joint forces must be stronger than any single
state, and that secession must be illegal. Again, unanimity was
required for changes to the agreement.



Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) defended a confederation for peace in
*On Perpetual Peace* (1796). His Second Definite Article of a
Perpetual Peace holds that the right of nations shall be based on a
pacific federation among free states rather than a peace treaty or an
international state: "This federation does not aim to acquire
any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the
freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other
confederated states, although this does not mean that they need to
submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as
do men in a state of nature."



The discussions surrounding the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787
marks a clear development in federal thought, also as regards the
tensions between unitary sovereignty and divided authority. One
central feature is that federations were seen as uniting not only
member units as in confederations, but also the citizenry
directly.



The Articles of Confederation of 1781 among the 13 American states
fighting British rule had established a center too weak for law
enforcement, defense and for securing interstate commerce. What has
become known as the U.S. Constitutional Convention met May
25-September 17, 1787. It was explicitly restricted to revise
the Articles, but ended up recommending more fundamental changes. The
proposed constitution prompted widespread debate and arguments
addressing the benefits and risks of federalism versus confederal
arrangements, leading eventually to the Constitution that took effect
in 1789.



The "Anti-federalists" were fearful of undue
centralization. They worried that the powers of central authorities
were not sufficiently constrained e.g., by a bill of rights (John
DeWitt 1787) that was eventually ratified in 1791. They also feared
that the center might gradually usurp the member units' powers.
Citing Montesquieu, another pseudonymous 'Brutus' doubted
whether a republic of such geographical size with so many inhabitants
with conflicting interests could avoid tyranny and would allow common
deliberation and decision based on local knowledge (Brutus (Robert
Yates?) 1787).



In *The Federalist Papers*, James Madison (1751-1836),
Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) and John Jay (1745-1829)
argued vigorously for the suggested model of interlocking federal
arrangements (Federalist 10, 45, 51, 62). Madison and Hamilton agreed
with Hume that the risk of tyranny by passionate majorities was
reduced in larger republics where member units of shared interest
could and would check each other: "A rage for paper money, for
an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any
improper or wicked project, will be less likely to pervade the whole
body of the Union than a particular member of it." (Federalist
10). Splitting sovereignty between member unit and center would also
protect individuals' rights against abuse by authorities at
either level, or so believed Hamilton, quoting Montesquieu at length
to this effect (Federalist 9).



Noting the problems of allocating powers correctly, Madison supported
placing some authority with member units since they would be best fit
to address "local circumstances and lesser interests"
otherwise neglected by the center (Federalist 37).



Madison and Hamilton urged centralized powers of defense and
interstate commerce (Federalist 11, 23), and argued for the need to
solve coordination and assurance problems of partial compliance,
through two new means: Centralized enforcement and direct
applicability of central decisions to individuals (Federalist 16, also
noted by Tocqueville 1835-40). They were wary of granting member
units veto power typical of confederal arrangements, since that would
render the center weak and cause "tedious delays; continual
negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public
good." (Madison and Hamilton, Federalist 22; and cf. 20).



They were particularly concerned to address worries of undue
centralization, arguing that such worries should be addressed not by
constraining the extent of power in the relevant fields, such as
defense, but instead by the composition of the central authority
(Federalist 31). They also claimed that the people would maintain
stronger "affection, esteem, and reverence" towards the
member unit government owing to its public visibility in the
day-to-day administration of criminal and civil justice (Federalist
17).



John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), in chapter 17 of
*Considerations on Representative Government* (1861),
recommended federations among "portions of mankind" not
disposed to live under a common government, to prevent wars among
themselves and protect against aggression. He would also allow the
center sufficient powers so as to ensure all benefits of
union--including powers to prevent frontier duties to facilitate
commerce. He listed three necessary conditions for a federation:
sufficient mutual sympathy "of race, language, religion, and,
above all, of political institutions, as conducing most to a feeling
of identity of political interest"; no member unit so powerful
as to not require union for defense nor tempt unduly to secession; and
rough equality of strength among member units to prevent internal
domination by one or two. Mill also claimed among the benefits of
federations that they reduce the number of weak states hence reduce
temptation to aggression, ending wars and restrictions on commence
among member units; and that federations are less aggressive, only
using their power defensively. Further benefits from
federations--and from decentralized authority in
general--might include learning from 'experiments in
living'.



Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), in *Du Principe
federatif* (1863) defended federalism as the best
way to retain individual liberty within 'natural'
communities such as families and guilds who enter pacts among
themselves for necessary and specific purposes. The state is only one
of several non-sovereign agents in charge of coordinating, without
final authority.



While Proudhon was wary of centralisation, authors such as Harold
Laski warned of 'The Obsolesence of Federalism' (1939).
The important problems, such as those wrought by 'giant
capitalism,' require more centralised responses than federal
arrangements can muster.



Philosophical reflections on federalism were invigorated during and
after the Second World War, for several reasons. Altiero Spinelli and
Ernesto Rossi called for a European federal state in the *Ventotene
Manifesto*, published 1944. They condemned totalitarian,
centralised states and the never ending conflicts among them. Instead
there should be enough shared control over military and economic
power, yet "each State will retain the autonomy it needs for a
plastic articulation and development of political life according to
the particular characteristics of the various peoples." Many
explain and justify the European Union along precisely these lines,
while others are more critical.



Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) traced both totalitarianism and
industrialized mass murder to flaws in the sovereign nation-state
model. Skeptical both of liberal internationalism and political
realism, she instead urged a Republican federal model or ideal type
wherein "the federated units mutually check and control their
powers" (Arendt 1972).



The exit of colonial powers also left multi-ethnic states that
required creative solutions to combine self rule and shared rule
(Karmis and Norman 2005). In addition, globalisation has prompted not
only integration and harmonisation, but also--partly in
response--explorations of ways to still maintain some local self
rule (Watts 1998).



Developments of the European Union and backlash against its particular
forms of political and legal integration is one major cause of renewed
attention to the philosophy of federalism. Recent philosophical
discussions have addressed several issues, including centrally the
reasons for federalism, and attention to the sources of stability and
instability; the legitimate division of power between member unit and
center; distributive justice, challenges to received democratic
theory, and concerns about the politics of recognition.


## 3. Reasons for Federalism



Many arguments for federalism have traditionally been put in terms of
promoting various forms of liberty in the form of non-domination,
immunity or enhanced opportunity sets (Elazar 1987a). When considering
reasons offered in the literature for federal political orders, many
appear to be in favor of decentralization without requiring
constitutional entrenchment of split authority. Two sets of arguments
can be distinguished: Arguments favoring federal orders compared with
secession and completely independent sovereign states; and arguments
supporting federal arrangements rather than a (further) centralized
unitary state. They occur in different forms and from different
starting points, in defense of 'coming together'
federalism, and in favor of 'holding together'
federalism.


### 3.1 Reasons for a federal order rather than separate states or secession



There are several suggested reasons for a federal order rather than
separate states or secession.


* Federations can facilitate some objectives of sovereign states,
such as credible commitments, certain kinds of coordination to secure
'public goods' of various sorts, and to control
externalities that affect other parties, by transferring some powers
to a common body. Since cooperation in some areas can 'spill
over' and create demands for further coordination in other
sectors, federations often exhibit creeping centralisation. Note that
several of these objectives require getting the allocation of
competences and veto points right within the federal order. For some
complex common objectives such as environmental problems, federal
features otherwise risk becoming part of the problem (Adler 2005,
Dalmazzone 2006).
* Federations may foster peace, in the senses of preventing wars and
preventing fears of war, in several ways. States can join a
(con)federation to become jointly powerful enough to dissuade external
aggressors, and/or to prevent aggressive and preemptive wars among
themselves. The European federalists Altieri Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi
and Eugenio Colorni argued the latter in the 1941 Ventotene Manifesto:
Only a European federation could prevent war between totalitarian,
aggressive states. Such arguments assume, of course, that the
(con)federation will not become more aggressive than each state
separately, a point Mill argued.
* Federations can promote *economic prosperity* by removing
internal barriers to trade, through economies of scale, by
establishing and maintaining inter-member unit trade agreements, or by
becoming a sufficiently large global player to affect international
trade regimes (for the latter regarding the EU, cf. Keohane and Nye
2001, 260).
* Federal arrangements may protect individuals against political
authorities by constraining state sovereignty, placing some powers
with the center. By entrusting the center with authority to intervene
in member units, the federal arrangements can protect
minorities' human rights against member unit authorities
(Federalist, Watts 1999). Such arguments assume, of course, that abuse
by the center is less likely.
* Federal arrangements may enhance the *political influence* of
formerly sovereign governments, both by facilitating coordination,
and--particularly for small states--by giving these member
units influence or even veto over policy making, rather than remaining
mere policy takers.
* Federal political orders can be preferred as the appropriate form of
nested organizations, for instance in 'organic'
conceptions of the political and social order. The federation may
promote cooperation, justice or other values among and within member
units as well as among and within their constituent units, for
instance by monitoring, legislating, enforcing or funding agreements,
human rights, immunity from interference, or development. Starting
with the family, each larger unit responsible for facilitating the
flourishing of member units and securing common goods beyond their
reach without a common authority. Such arguments have been offered by
such otherwise divergent authors as Althusius, the Catholic traditions
of subsidiarity as expressed by popes Leo XIII (1891) and Pius XI
(1931), and Proudhon.


### 3.2 Reasons to prefer federal orders over a unitary state



There are several arguments that may apply in favor of federal orders
over a unitary state. Among the challenges for some of these arguments
is how to allocate authority when there are conflicting claims to
provide different benefits for partly overlapping groups; and how to
construct overrides in cases of emergencies such as pandemics
(Steytler 2021). Who has the power to decide what are exceptions is
important, even if we may disagree with Schmitt that it defines who is
sovereign (Schmitt 1985).


* Federal arrangements may protect against central authorities by
securing immunity and non-domination for minority groups or nations.
Constitutional allocation of powers to a member unit protects
individuals from the center, while interlocking arrangements provide
influence on central decisions via member unit bodies (Madison, Hume,
Goodin 1996). Member units may thus check central authorities and
prevent undue action contrary to the will of minorities: "A
great democracy must either sacrifice self-government to unity or
preserve it by federalism. The coexistence of several nations under
the same State is a test, as well as the best security of its freedom
... The combination of different nations in one State is as
necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of men in
society" (Acton 1907, 277).
* More specifically, federal arrangements can accommodate minority
nations who aspire to self determination, political expressions of
their sense of shared identity and belonging, and the preservation of
their culture, language or religion (Carla 2012). Such autonomy and
immunity arrangements are clearly preferable to the political
conflicts that might result from such groups' attempts at
secession. Central authorities may respond with human rights abuses,
civil wars or ethnic cleansing to prevent such secessionist
movements.
* Federal orders may increase the opportunities for citizen
participation in public decision-making; through deliberation and
offices in both member unit and central bodies that ensures character
formation through political participation among more citizens (Mill
1861, ch. 15).
* Federal orders may facilitate learning by fostering alternative
solutions to similar problems and sharing lessons from such a
laboratory of 'experiments in living' (Rose-Ackerman
1980).
* Federations may facilitate efficient preference maximization more
generally, as formalized in the literature on economic and fiscal
federalism--though many such arguments support decentralization
rather than federalism proper. Research on 'fiscal
federalism' addresses the optimal allocation of authority,
typically recommending central redistribution but local provision of
public goods. Federal arrangements may allow more optimal matching of
the authority to create public goods to specific affected subsets of
the populations. If individuals' preferences vary systematically
by territory according to external or internal parameters such as
geography or shared tastes and values, federal--or
decentralized--arrangements that allow local variation may be
well suited for several reasons. Local decisions prevent overload of
centralised decision-making, and local decision-makers may also have a
better grasp of affected preferences and alternatives, making for
better service than would be provided by a central government that
tends to ignore local preference variations (Smith 1776, 680).
Granting powers to population subsets that share preferences regarding
public services may also increase efficiency by allowing these subsets
to create such 'internalities' and 'club
goods' at costs borne only by them (Musgrave 1959, 179-80,
Olson 1969, Oates' 1972 'Decentralization
Theorem').
* Federal arrangements can also shelter territorially based groups with
preferences that diverge from the majority population, such as ethnic
or cultural minorities, so that they are not subject to majority
decisions severely or systematically contrary to their preferences.
Non-unitary arrangements may thus minimize coercion and be responsive
to as many citizens as possible (Mill 1861 ch. 15, Elazar 1968;
Lijphart 1999). Such considerations of economic efficiency and
majority decisions may favor federal solutions, with "only
indivisibilities, economies of scale, externalities, and strategic
requirements ... acceptable as efficiency arguments in favor of
allocating powers to higher levels of government"
(Padou-Schioppa 1995, 155).
* Federal arrangements may not only protect existing clusters of
individuals with shared values or preferences, but may also promote
mobility and hence territorial clustering of individuals with similar
preferences. Member unit autonomy to experiment may foster competition
for individuals who are free to move where their preferences are best
met. Such mobility towards member units with like-minded individuals
may add to the benefits of local autonomy over the provision of public
services--absent economies of scale and externalities (Tiebout
1956, Buchanan 2001)--though the result may be that those with
costly needs and who are less mobile are left worse off.


## 4. Further Philosophical Issues



Much recent attention has focused on philosophical issues arising from
empirical findings concerning federalism (for an overview of such
empirical research, cf. Burris 2015), and has been spurred by quite
different dilemmas facing--inter alia--Canada, Australia,
Nepal, Ethiopia, several European states and the European Union.


### 4.1 Sovereignty or federalism



The tensions between sovereignty and federalism still pose puzzles,
reflected in 'international' and 'national'
understandings of the latter (Schutze 2009). If sovereignty is a
unique site of final and independent authority, federal orders cannot
be sovereign, since no one has the 'last word' on all
political matters (Friedrich 1968), and "authority and power are
dispersed among a network of arenas" (Elazar 1994, xiii).
Another tradition, including Madison (Federalist Paper 39), and more
recently Beaud (2009) and Schutze (2009), seeks to square the
circle allowing dual sovereignty. Several contributions to the
political and legal theory of the European Union resolve these issues
in different directions (Bellamy 2019; Schutze 2020).


### 4.2 Issues of Constitutional and Institutional Design



Federal political orders require attention to several constitutional
and other institutional issues. The great variation and how the
features interact require careful comparative studies to understand
their impact on law and politics (Palermo and Kossler 2017). The
design of federal orders raise peculiar and intriguing issues of
normative political theory (Watts 1998; Norman 2006).


* Composition: How to determine the boundaries of the member units,
e.g., along geographical, ethnic or cultural lines; whether
establishment of new member units from old should require
constitutional changes, whether to allow secession and if so how,
etc.
* Distribution of Power: The allocation of legislative, executive,
judicial and *constitution-amending* power between the member
units and the central institutions. In asymmetric arrangements some of
these may differ among member units.
* Power Sharing: The form of influence by member units in central
decision-making bodies within the interlocking political systems.



These tasks must be resolved taking due account of several important
considerations noted below.


### 4.3 Sources of Stability



As political orders go, federal political arrangements pose peculiar
problems concerning stability and trust. Federations tend to drift
toward disintegration in the form of secession, or toward
centralization in the direction of a unitary state.



Such instability should come as no surprise given the tensions
typically giving rise to federal political orders in the first place,
such as tensions between majority and minority national communities in
multinational federations. Federal political orders are therefore
often marked by a high level of 'constitutional
contestation'. The details of their constitutions and other
institutions may affect these conflicts and their outcomes in drastic
ways. Political parties often disagree on constitutional issues
regarding the appropriate areas of member unit autonomy, the forms of
cooperation and how to prevent fragmentation. Such sampling bias among
states that federalize to hold together makes it difficult to assess
often heard claims that federal responses such as granting some local
autonomy perpetuate cleavages and fuel rather than quell secessionist
movements. Some nevertheless argue that democratic, interlocking
federations alleviate such tendencies (Simeon 1998, Simeon and Conway
2001, Linz 1997; cf. McKay 2001, Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova
2004).



Many authors note that the challenges of stability must be addressed
not only by institutional design, but also by ensuring that citizens
have an 'overarching loyalty' or 'federal
spirit' to the federation as whole in addition to loyalty toward
their own member unit (Franck 1968, Linz 1997, Burgess 2012). The
legitimate bases, content and division of such a public dual
allegiance are central topics of political philosophies of federalism
(Norman 1995a, Choudhry 2001). Some accept (limited) appeals to
considerations such as shared history, practices, culture, or
ethnicity for delineating member units and placing certain powers with
them, even if such 'communitarian' features are regarded
as more problematic bases for (unitary) political orders (Kymlicka
1995, Habermas 1996, 500). Debates about the existence of a
'European demos' and the need for a common 'European
identity' merit more careful scrutiny (Habermas 1992). The
appropriate consideration that voters and their member unit
politicians should give to the interests of others in the federation
in interlocking arrangements must be clarified if the notion of
citizen of two commonwealths is to be coherent and durable. Several of
these challenges are especially acute for 'ethnic
federalism' when the member units are delineated along ethnic
lines: Any 'internal minorities' of other ethnicity risk
persecution, the prospects of an overarching loyalty are dimmer, and
ethnic nationalism may fuel secessionist movements (Selassie 2003)


### 4.4 Division of Power



Another and related central philosophical topic is the critical
assessment of alleged grounds for federal arrangements in general, and
the division of power between member units and central bodies in
particular, indicated in the preceding sections. Recent contributions
include Knop *et al*. 1995, Kymlicka 2001, Kymlicka and Norman
2000, Nicolaidis and Howse 2001, Norman 2006. Among the important
issues, especially due to the risks of instability, are:


* How the powers should be allocated, given that they should be
used--but may be abused--by political entrepreneurs at
several levels to affect their claims. The concerns about stability
require careful attention to the impact of these powers on the ability
to create and maintain 'dual loyalties' among the
citizenry.
* How to ensure that neither member units nor the central authorities
overstep their jurisdiction. As Mill noted, "the power to decide
between them in any case of dispute should not reside in either of the
governments, or in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire
independent of both." (1861) Such a court must be sufficiently
independent, yet not utterly unaccountable. Many scholars seem to
detect a centralising tendency among such courts (Watts 1998).
* How to maintain sufficient democratic control over central bodies when
these are composed by representatives of the executive branch of
member units? The chains of accountability may be too long for
adequate responsiveness. This is part of the core concerns about a
'democratic deficit' in the European Union (Watts 1998,
Follesdal and Hix 2006).
* Who shall have the authority to revise the constitutionally embedded
division of power? Some hold that a significant shift in national
sovereignty occurs when such changes may occur without the unanimity
characteristic of treaties.



The "Principle of Subsidiarity" has often been used to
guide the decisions about allocation of power. This principle has
recently received attention owing to its inclusion in European Union
treaties. It holds that authority should rest with the member units
unless allocating them to a central unit would ensure higher
comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving certain goals.
This principle can be specified in several ways, for instance
concerning which units are included, which goals are to be achieved,
and who has the authority to apply it. The principle has multiple
pedigrees, and came to recent political prominence largely through its
role in quelling fears of centralization in Europe--a contested
role which the principle has not quite filled (Fleiner and Schmitt
1996, Burgess and Gagnon 1993, Follesdal 1998).


### 4.5 Distributive Justice



Regarding distributive justice, federal political orders must manage
tensions between ensuring member unit autonomy and securing the
requisite redistribution within and among the member units. Indeed,
the Federalists regarded federal arrangements as an important
safeguard against "the equal division of property"
(Federalist 10). The political scientists Linz and Stepan may be seen
as finding support for the Federalists' hypothesis: Compared to
unitary states in the OECD, the 'coming together'
federations tend to have higher child poverty rate in solo mother
households and a higher percentage of population over-sixty living in
poverty. Linz and Stepan explain this inequality as stemming from the
'demos constraining' arrangements of these federations,
seeking to protect individuals and member units from central
authorities, combined with a weak party system. By comparison, the
Constitution of Germany (not a 'coming together'
federation) explicitly requires equalization of living conditions
among the member units (Art. 72.2). Presbey argues that ethnic
federalism further exacerbates unfair distribution of resources among
individuals of different ethnic groups in Africa (Presbey 2003).
Normative arguments may also support some distributive significance of
federal arrangements, for instance owing to trade-offs between member
unit autonomy and redistributive claims among member units
(Follesdal 2001), or the relevance of a shared
'identity' (Gregoire and Jewkes 2015, de Schutter
2011). A central normative issue is to what extent a shared culture
and bonds among citizens within a historically sovereign state reduce
the claims on redistribution among the member units.


### 4.6 Democratic Theory



Federalism may increase citizens' control over matters important
to them but also raises several challenges to democratic theory,
especially as developed for unitary states. Federal arrangements are
often more complex, thereby challenging standards of transparency,
accountability and public deliberation (Habermas 2001). The restricted
political agendas of each center of authority also require defense
(Dahl 1983; Braybrooke 1983). One of several sets of issues concern
the standing of member units. Challenging puzzles concern federal
orders where some or all units are not internally democratic (for
further issues, cf., Norman 2006, 144-150).



The power that member units wield in federations often restricts or
violates majority rule, in ways that merit careful scrutiny.
Democratic theory has long been concerned with how to prevent
domination of minorities, and many federal political orders do so by
granting member units some influence over common decisions. Federal
political orders typically influence individuals' political
influence by skewing their voting weight in favor of citizens of small
member units, or by granting member unit representatives veto rights
on central decisions. Minorities thus exercise control in apparent
violation of principles of political equality and
one-person-one-vote--more so when member units are of different
size. These features raises fundamental normative questions concerning
why member units should matter for the allocation of political power
among individuals who live in different member units. Some of these
puzzles are addressed in terms of 'demoicracy', especially
regarding the European Union (van Parijs 1997, Nicolaidis 2012,
Schutze 2020). Thus theorists disagree about whether every EU
member state should maintain sovereignty in the sense of enjoying a
veto for all decisions (Bellamy 2019, Cheneval et al 2015).


### 4.7 Politics of Recognition



Many federal political orders accommodate minority groups in two ways
discussed above: both through a division of power, and by granting
them influence over common decisions. These measures of
 identity politics
 can be valuable ways to give public acknowledgment and recognition to
groups and their members, sometimes on the very basis of previous
domination. But identity politics also create challenges (Gutman
1994), especially in federal arrangements that face greater risks of
instability and must maintain citizens' dual political
loyalties. Self-government arrangements may threaten the federal
political order: "demands for self-government reflect a desire
to weaken the bonds with the larger community and, indeed, question
its very nature, authority and permanence" (Kymlicka and Norman
1994, 375). The emphasis on "recognition and
institutionalization of difference could undermine the conditions that
make a sense of common identification and thus mutuality
possible" (Carens 2000, 193).



Federations are often thought to be *sui generis*,
one-of-a-kind deviations from the ideal-type unitary sovereign state
familiar from the Westphalian world order. Indeed, every federation
may well be federal in its very own way, and not easy to summarize and
assess as an ideal-type political order. Yet the phenomenon of
non-unitary sovereignty is not new, and federal accommodation of
differences may well be better than the alternatives. When and why
this is so has long been the subject of philosophical, theoretical and
normative analysis and reflection. Such public arguments may
themselves contribute to develop the overarching loyalty required
among citizens of stable, legitimate federations, who must understand
themselves as members of two commonwealths.