## 1. Biographical Sketch




The known details of Albo's life are sparse. As far as we know,
he was born in Christian Spain in the crown of Aragon around 1380, and
died in the crown of Castile around 1444. In documenting the
highlights of his career, we should first mention his period of study
in the school of Hasdai Crescas in Saragossa. Further, in
1413-1414 he played a dominant role in the Disputation at
Tortosa, a major public polemic between the Jewish convert to
Christianity Geronimo de Santa Fe (formerly Joshua Lorki), who
represented the pope, and delegates from many Jewish communities in
Christian Spain. In this debate, Albo represented the Jewish community
of Daroca in Aragon (Graetz 1894, 179-220; Baer 1961,
170-232; Rauschenbach 2002, 11-47). After this community
was decimated in 1415, he moved to the town of Soria in Castile
(Gonzalo Maeso 1971, 131; Motis Dolader 1990, 148). But Albo is mainly
known for his philosophical treatise,
*Sefer ha-'Ikkarim*, which he finished around 1425. Aside from
acting as a philosopher and spiritual leader, Albo served as a
preacher and possibly also as a physician. Apparently, Albo had a
command of Spanish and Latin in addition to Hebrew, the language of
*Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* (Husik 1928-30, 67), but we cannot
determine his level of fluency in Arabic.


## 2. Historical Background




The roots of Albo's philosophical theory are located deep within the
ground of the historical reality in which he lived and worked. The
central circumstance that directly shaped his thought was the
distressed state of Jewish society in Christian Spain. Beginning in the
fourteenth century, the Jews in Spain were subject to religious
persecution on the part of the Catholic Church and Christian society in
general. Jewish thought also suffered from sharp ideological conflict
between conservative thinkers and rationalists over both theological
and social issues.




First of all, in pressuring the Jews to convert, the Christian
authorities instituted extreme economic measures and passed
discriminatory social legislation. They used coercive tactics in their
exhortations. They also organized harsh pogroms, such as those of
1391. These repressive measures forced many Jews to die a martyr's
death. They also led to mass conversion of Jews to Christianity and to
deterioration on the social, economic, and spiritual planes (Baer
1961, 95-243; Netanyahu 1966, cf. index
["Conversions"]; Ben-Sasson 1984, 208-220,
232-238; Gutwirth 1993).




In addition, this period witnessed the revival of the dispute between
followers of Maimonides and his opponents. On one side of this
conflict stood the rationalists. They espoused the study of philosophy
and attempted to integrate it into their religious-spiritual world
while resolving the contradictions that emerged between philosophy and
the sources of revelation. On the other side stood the conservatives,
who rejected the study of philosophy. They adhered to the classic
religious sources, the Bible and the Talmud, and viewed kabbalistic
literature as a continuation of the chain of revelation. One of the
focal points of the conflict between these two theological schools
was the exchange of mutual accusations on the issue of responsibility
for the dire situation of Jewish society under Christian persecution
(Schwartz 1991).




Modern scholars have conducted comprehensive studies of the
relationship between the characteristics of Jewish philosophy in Spain
during the fifteenth century, including Albo's thought, and the
historical reality of that period (Baer 1961, 232-243; Davidson
1983, 112-113; Cohen 1993; Manekin 1997).


## 3. Introduction to *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim*



*Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* is Albo's monumental philosophical
treatise. This book offers an extensive description of the author's
theoretical doctrine. Forming the basis of this doctrine and the
framework for the rest of his formulations are his principles of
faith, which attempt to define the beliefs that are the necessary
fundamentals of a system of laws whose source is the divine. Before we
examine the various philosophical views incorporated within this book,
we will offer a concise description of its structure, stylistic
characteristics, and goals.



*Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* is composed of a preface, which
includes a highly detailed table of contents; an introduction; and
four treatises divided into chapters. Although Albo completed writing
the book around 1425, scholars have long agreed that before the book
was published in its entirety, a preliminary version appeared,
comprising the first of the four treatises (Back 1869, 8-10;
Tanzer 1896, 19-22, 27; Schweid 1967, 25).




In the first treatise of *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim*, Albo
presents in detail his theory of principles and the various issues it
includes. Albo points out several problems with the lists of
principles of faith proposed by his predecessors. In particular, he
challenges Maimonides' list of thirteen principles of faith,
proposing in their place a concise list numbering only three basic
beliefs. Absent these beliefs, Albo believes that divine law has no
existence or significance: 1) the existence of God, 2) the divine
origin of the Torah, and 3) reward and punishment. This list
determines the structure of the entire book, since the following three
treatises address each one of the three principles in turn. The main
topic of the second treatise is the existence of God, and it discusses
the theory of divinity, especially the theory of divine
attributes. The third treatise, whose main topic is the divine origin
of the Torah, covers the issues of human perfection, general prophecy,
and Mosaic prophecy and law. It concludes with a thorough discussion
of the religious emotions of fear and love of God. The fourth and last
treatise, whose main subject is reward and punishment, divides into
two sections. The first section describes the theory of divine
providence, the problem of evil and the significance of the precepts
of prayer and repentance. The second section in the fourth treatise
speaks of the theory of recompense, emphasizing that of the world to
come. We should note here that Albo's theory of principles also
includes additional components. Each one of the principles
necessarily leads to further beliefs, which he calls
"roots," and these in turn lead to a third level of less
important beliefs, which he calls "branches."




The language of *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* is straightforward, and its
philosophical arguments are formulated in a relatively simple and
clear manner. These characteristics mean that a broad audience of
readers can approach this philosophical work on their
own. Furthermore, the modern reader can rely on Albo's clear
formulations to gain a preliminary acquaintance with many of the
philosophical viewpoints offered in the general framework of medieval
Jewish philosophy.




An additional stylistic aspect of *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* touches
directly on the body of his theory. The book includes a number of
internal contradictions on a wide variety of philosophical issues.
This fact has led most scholars to the conclusion that this is an
eclectic work, lacking originality and vision, at a low philosophical
level (Guttmann 1955; Guttmann 1964, 247-251; Ravitzky 1988,
104-105). Yet recent scholars have proposed a new angle of
perception on the significance of these internal contradictions,
identifying in *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* an esoteric writing style
similar to that of Maimonides' *Guide of the
Perplexed*. According to this viewpoint, the internal
contradictions are not the result of lack of attention on the part of
an eclectic and average philosopher who combined various sources
without regard to the differences between them. On the contrary, they
believe these contradictions demonstrate meticulous attention on the
part of the philosopher. The maverick position claims that Albo
intentionally embedded in his book conflicting opinions in order to
hide his true viewpoint on various theological issues from certain
groups of readers. Among other evidence, this research position relies
on Albo's explicit statement in the introductory comment to the second
treatise (Schwartz 2002, 183-196; Ehrlich 2009a).




Most scholars assume that we should understand Albo's goal in
writing *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* against the
background of the historical reality in which he lived. As indicated,
the book was written as an attempt to address the severe social and
religious distress of the Jews of Christian Spain in the late
fourteenth - early fifteenth centuries. In the framework of this
approach, we may discern two different goals that the book intends to
serve.



> 
> *Social goal* -to offer a rationalist
> apologetic for Judaism alongside a refutation of the doctrines of
> Christianity, with the aim of limiting the phenomenon of conversion and
> the spiritual decline of the Jews of Christian Spain at that time
> (Husik 1928-30, 62-65).
> 
> 
> *Theoretical goal* - to redefine the
> principles of Judaism and discuss its theoretical relation to
> philosophy, in light of the intensification of internal arguments on
> these issues within Jewish thought during the period discussed (Back
> 1869, 5-6; Lerner 2000, 90-95).
> 
> 
> 



*Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* was first published in 1485 as one of the
first works of Jewish philosophy to reach the printing press. The book
made a considerable impact throughout the fifteenth century, with
renowned Jewish philosophers citing it and contending with its
ideas. Among them we may name such personalities as Isaac Arama,
Abraham Bibago and Isaac Abravanel. From the sixteenth to the
eighteenth centuries, his thought continued to engage Jewish and
non-Jewish philosophers, including Baruch Spinoza, Moses Mendelssohn,
and several Christian theologians. During this period, two authors
wrote commentaries on *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim*: Jacob Koppelman
(*Ohel Ya'akov*, Freiburg 1584) and Gedaliah Lipschitz (*Etz
Shatul*, Venice 1618). In addition, the book was translated into
Latin, German, English and Russian, and its first treatise was
translated into Italian. In 1929, Isaac Husik published a critical
edition of *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim*, including his translation of
the book into English, an introduction, and detailed notes and indices
(Albo 1929).




Before taking up our discussion of Albo's thought, we must point out a
significant methodological problem that this discussion entails. On
the one hand, the common opinion in the literature on Albo estimates
that he was not an original philosopher at all, and that the body of
his book merely summarizes the various approaches he knew from the
works of the Jewish philosophers that preceded him. This theory, in
its extreme version, argues that even the theory of principles, the
main reason for his book's renown, is not Albo's unique creation. In
contrast, a more recent trend in research on Albo's work identifies
clear characteristics of esoteric writing in his book. This theory
interprets the conflicting opinions on the issues in the book as
belonging to two separate layers of writing - the external,
exoteric layer, and the inner, esoteric layer. In many cases, these
two research approaches lead to differing opinions regarding the
question of Albo's independent philosophical positions.




Because of this, the overview below will present the central issues
addressed in *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* with a faithful reflection of
the state of present research on Albo's philosophy. At the same time,
we will refrain from categorizing his various philosophical
views. This essay will discuss Albo's theories of: (1) law, (2)
principles, (3) divinity, (4) humanity, and (5) providence and
recompense.


## 4. The Theory of Law




In striving to formulate a list of the fundamental beliefs of religion
from within his theory of principles (which we will explain in the
next section), Albo abandons the status quo of similar lists composed
by his predecessors. Instead of naming the principles of Mosaic law
("the Torah of Moses") as, for example, Maimonides did in
his well-known list of thirteen principles, Albo widens his target and
lists the principles of "divine law." By this term he
refers to the entire system of laws whose source is in the revelation
of God to humanity. This change leads Albo to dedicate a particularly
long discussion (treatise 1, chapters 5-8) to the topic of the
various types of law. Albo distinguishes three such types. The first
of these is divine law, meaning a law whose origin is in divine
revelation, such as Judaism. The second type is conventional law, a
system of laws that human beings establish by mutual agreement in
numerous political and social frameworks. Its purpose is to maintain
the moral order of society and ensure the ongoing function of its
systems. The third form of law according to Albo is natural law, or
the basic laws of morality that aim to prevent injustice and promote
honest behavior. Following is a short explanation of two main aspects
of Albo's theory of law that the academic literature covers: the
concept of natural law, its origins, meaning and influence; and the
method of verification of divine law.



**Natural law.** Albo was one of the first Jewish
philosophers to specifically address the concept of natural law along
with his contemporary Zerahia Halevi Saladin. Apparently, this was due
to the influence of the Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas, who
classified laws in his book *Summa Theologica*. Albo's
view of natural law has attracted the attention of many scholars, in
comparison to other topics in his philosophy, but the popular view
among these scholars is that Albo did not attach great importance to
this concept (Guttmann 1955, 176-184; Lerner 1964; Novak 1983,
319-350; Melamed 1989; Ehrlich 2006; Ackerman 2013).



**Verification of divine law.** One of the formative
factors in Albo's philosophy was the anti-Christian polemic. For this
reason, one of the questions that engages him is the method of
distinguishing between the true divine law, meaning the Torah of Moses,
and a false religion that also claims to be of divine origin, meaning
Christianity. Albo proposes two criteria for distinguishing between the
two. Firstly, the true divine law is the one whose beliefs do not
contradict any one of the necessary principles of divine law. Secondly,
the true divine law provides incontrovertible proof of the credibility
of its messenger, who informs the world of the law's existence and
divine origin (treatise 1, chapter 18). An important study on this
issue argued that the first point is problematic, because it assumes
that philosophy defines the basic beliefs of divine law and thus
determines which law is truly divine. This is in opposition to the
Averroistic approach, which disallows the use of philosophy for
verifying religious matters. The solution for this problem lies in an
alternate understanding of the role of philosophy in inter-religious
debate. Philosophy does not serve as an affirming mechanism to validate
certain beliefs, but only as a negating tool for identifying beliefs
that stand in direct conflict with the basic rules of logic. In other
words, Albo does not use philosophy to prove the validity of the
beliefs of Judaism, but rather to reject Christianity as a false
religion in light of its beliefs that stand in contradiction to
philosophy (Lasker 1980).


## 5. The Theory of Principles




Albo's theory of principles is the focal point of his book, the
framework upon which its sections are built, and the element that
grants the book its name. Naturally, the academic debate on the theory
of principles is also quite extensive. Below we will relate to two
aspects of the theory. First we will present the conceptual structure
of the theory of principles as detailed in the first treatise of
*Sefer ha-'Ikkarim*, and then we will survey the various
approaches of the scholarship on this theory.




Albo presents his theory of principles as an alternative to previous
theories of principles, especially that of Maimonides. Additionally,
Albo openly criticizes his predecessors' lists of principles. In their
stead, he proposes a system of fundamental beliefs divided into three
levels, which he calls "principles," "roots,"
and "branches." The principles are those beliefs that are
derived necessarily from the term "divine law." They are:
(1) the existence of the divine entity ("existence of
God"); (2) the divine origin of the system of laws ("Torah
from heaven"); and (3) the existence of divine providence,
expressed in compensatory reward and punishment for humanity
("reward and punishment"). From these principles stem
eight "roots," which are beliefs that instill clear and
detailed content into the general concept of the principle. The first
principle, the existence of God, develops into four roots: (1) the
unity of God, (2) the incorporeality of God, (3) God's independence of
time, (4) God's lack of deficiencies. The second principle, Torah from
heaven, leads to three roots: (5) God's knowledge, (6) prophecy, and
(7) the genuineness of the divine messenger. The third principle,
reward and punishment, branches into a single root: (8)
providence. Denial of any of the principles or roots represents a
heresy of the divine law.




The third category, "branches," comprises beliefs that
Albo argues are true and that every follower of divine law must
accept. But in contrast to the first two categories, Albo does not
define refusal to accept the branches as heresy of the divine law, but
rather only as a sin requiring atonement. Albo lists six beliefs in
this category: (1) creation *ex nihilo*; (2) the supremacy of
Moses' prophecy; (3) the eternal nature of the Torah; (4) the
possibility of obtaining human perfection through the performance of a
single commandment; (5) the resurrection of the dead; (6) the coming
of the Messiah.




Early scholars of Albo's work in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries argued that Albo's contribution to the history of
Jewish thought was limited to his theory of principles and the first
treatise of his book (Schlesinger 1844, xi-xiv; Back 1869,
3-5, 8-9; Tanzer 1896, 23-30). Later scholars
called his theory unoriginal, and identified the philosophical sources
that influenced it, especially Maimonides, Ibn Rushd, Nissim of Gerona,
Hasdai Crescas and Simeon ben Zemah Duran (Guttmann 1955,
170-176; Waxman 1956, 158-161; Schweid 1963; Klein-Braslavi
1980, 194-197). A subsequent, third scholarly trend attempted to
clarify the nature of the internal relationship between the categories
of Albo's theory of principles (principles, roots, and branches), and
examined Albo's position regarding the concept of heresy (Kellner 1986,
140-156).


## 6. The Theory of Divinity




The central discussion in the theory of divinity in *Sefer
ha-'Ikkarim* is located in the second treatise, which is dedicated
to the principle of the existence of God and its derivative roots. The
philosophical issue at the focal point of this discussion is the
theory of divine attributes. Scholars of Albo's theory of attributes
have discerned an internal contradiction between rationalist and
conservative positions in his discussion of this topic. On the one
hand, in a number of locations he purports to support Maimonides'
negative theology, and interprets the various attributes of God as
negative attributes. On the other hand, elsewhere he relates positive
attributes to God, in accordance with the method of his teacher,
Crescas. Some scholars have ascribed this contradiction to the
eclectic character of Albo's work (Wolfson 1916-17,
213-216; Guttmann 1955, 184-191), while others have
related it to the esoteric style of writing of *Sefer
ha-'Ikkarim*. Possibly, they suggest, his goal here was to
conceal his conservative position on this issue from the circles of
rationalist thinkers he frequented (Schwartz 2002, 187-196;
Ehrlich 2009a, 88-93).




The second treatise of the book raises another important philosophical
problem, the significance of the concept of time. One of the roots of
the principle of the existence of God is God's independence of
time. In Albo's discussion of this root, he discriminates between two
different concepts of time, Aristotelian-physical and
Neoplatonic-ontological. Two central trends appear in the academic
literature on this topic. The first places the concept of time at the
focus of the discussion, attempting to clarify the relationship
between the two different concepts of time that appear in Albo's
discussion (Harvey 1979-80). Those scholars who take the second
position discuss Albo's concept of time as part of their attempt to
identify his cosmogonic view, in other words, which theory of the
origin of the world he upholds (Klein-Braslavi 1976, 118-120,
126; Rudavsky 1997, 470-473). In this context, we should point
out that comprehensive study of Albo's writing on this issue reveals a
certain difficulty in categorizing his exact position. Together with
explicit dogmatic statements supporting the theory of creation *ex
nihilo* appearing in the first treatise, we find other statements,
although less overt, some of which argue for the eternal existence of
matter, and some of which even support the eternal existence of the
world (Ehrlich 2009a, 94-112).


## 7. The Theory of Humanity




The central discussion on the theory of humanity in *Sefer
ha-'Ikkarim* is located in the third treatise, which covers
the principle of Torah from heaven and its roots. The philosophical
issue present throughout the sections of this treatise is that of the
nature of human perfection. To put it mildly, Albo's discussion on this
topic has not merited intensive treatment in the academic literature.
Aside from this concept, the treatise addresses in depth the idea of
prophecy and several aspects of the Torah of Moses and its
commandments. In one section of his discussion on the last topic, Albo
responds to the attacks of a Christian scholar on the Torah of Moses,
including both apologetic and polemic elements in his rejoinders.




In the introductory chapters of the third treatise, Albo criticizes
the position of the rationalist Jewish philosophers, who associated
human perfection with the level of individual intellectual
achievement. In contrast to this approach, Albo proposes a
conservative theory, arguing that human perfection depends on the
fulfillment of the Torah's commandments, in other words, the practical
worship of God (treatise 3, chapters 1-7). Yet on this subject
as well, we note considerable internal contradictions, which we will
illustrate with several examples. Firstly, in the first treatise of
his book, Albo clearly determines that human perfection depends on
faith in God and in the principles of divine law (treatise 1, chapters
21-22). Secondly, in several places in the book he diminishes
the value of the practical element of fulfilling the commandments of
the Torah, and emphasizes in its stead the element of awareness, or
intent (treatise 3, chapters 28-29). A third contradiction is
found in the final chapters of the third treatise, which analyze the
concepts of reverence and love for God. Albo considers these to be
the highest levels of divine worship. He defines love of God as an
intellectual phenomenon whose level depends on the intellectual status
of the person (treatise 3, chapters 35-36; Ehrlich
2004a). According to the two main theories found in the academic
literature, these contradictions may characterize either eclectic or
esoteric writing.




To Albo, prophecy is not a natural characteristic of the human soul,
but rather depends on divine will. God, should He so will, grants
divine inspiration to the prophet. His primary purpose in so doing is
to inform humanity of the commandments so that through them they may
achieve human perfection (treatise 3, chapter 8). Scholars who have
studied Albo's theory of prophecy have pointed out that it integrates
both rationalist elements from Maimonides' parallel discussion and
spiritual, supra-intellectual elements from the writings of Rabbi
Judah Halevi and Crescas on this subject. Some have seen in this
integration a demonstration of Albo's purpose in remaining faithful to
the Aristotelian tradition of Maimonides, while attempting (not always
successfully) to bend it as far as possible in the conservative
direction (Schweid 1965). Others have considered this integration an
expression of the general problematic character of Albo's thought that
does not contend with the problems it produces. These scholars also
argue that Albo's basic approach is that prophecy transcends the
natural, and that this concept is grounded in the deep-seated
tradition of Jewish thought (Kreisel 2001, 540-543). Here as
well, we should not ignore the possibility that the internal
contradictions in Albo's discussion reflect an esoteric writing
style.




Albo distinguishes between various levels of prophecy, with the
central goal of establishing the supremacy of Mosaic prophecy as the
starting point for validating Mosaic law as the divine law. According
to Albo, Moses is the most exalted prophet, for only in his case did
divine inspiration directly reach the intellectual power of his soul,
without the mediation of the imagination. The significance of this
proclamation is that only for Moses' prophecy is there no doubt
regarding the validity of its content (treatise 3, chapters
8-10). Albo also claims that at the giving of the Torah on Mt.
Sinai, the Israelites all received prophetic inspiration; however, they
were not on the prophetic level, and this is in support of Moses'
advanced status (treatise 3, chapter 11).




After discussing the prophecy of Moses, Albo takes up the topic of the
divine Torah that Moses gave to the people of Israel. He treats a
number of aspects of this issue, such as the classification of the
*mitzvot* (commandments), the status of the Ten Commandments,
and the importance of the Oral Law. Yet apparently, the thrust of his
efforts is directed toward establishing the idea of the eternity of
the Torah, apparently in response to the Jewish-Christian polemic on
this topic. Remaining faithful to his dogmatic method, Albo argues
that in Mosaic law, and in divine law in general, changes in the
details of the commandments may take place, but their fundamental
principles cannot change (treatise 3, chapters 13-22).




Within his discussion on Mosaic law, Albo includes a chapter
describing its condemnation by an anonymous Christian scholar
(treatise 3, chapter 25). The Christian contends that in every
possible parameter, the religion of Jesus supersedes Mosaic law, and
Albo replies to this assault in detail. The present forum is too
limited to specify the content of this polemic, but suffice it to say
that this chapter in particular reflects Albo's quite extensive
knowledge of the Christian religion. He demonstrates proficiency in
Christian writings, and in addition, he recognizes the internal
tension within Christianity between the papacy and the Roman
Empire. He reveals knowledge of Church history, and finally, he
challenges the central Christian doctrines (the Trinity,
transubstantiation, and the virgin birth) while describing them in
detail. It should be noted that Albo's polemic against Christianity is
not limited to this chapter, but runs throughout the book, both
explicitly and implicitly (Schweid 1968; Lasker 1977, cf. index
["Albo, Joseph"]; Rauschenbach 2002, 142-156).


## 8. The Theory of Providence and Recompense




The fourth and last treatise of *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim* is
primarily concerned with the principle of reward and punishment and
its roots. The first part of this treatise (chapters 1-28)
contains Albo's central discussion on the theory of providence, while
the second part (chapters 29-51) incorporates his main
discussion on the theory of recompense. Below we will discuss these
two theories in their order of appearance in the book.




Albo begins this treatise with the statement that humanity has basic
free will, for this is the necessary condition of the concept of
recompense. Additionally, he argues that this human freedom does not
conflict with God's omniscience, nor with the existence of an
astrological-deterministic system in the universe (treatise 4,
chapters 1-6; Sadik 2012; Weiss 2017). His direct discussion of
the concept of divine providence divides into three main parts. First,
he discusses the proofs of the veracity of providence from natural and
human reality, and from intellectual investigation (treatise 4,
chapters 8-10). Then he treats the principal theological
challenge to the concept of providence, namely, the problem of evil,
or the suffering of the righteous and success of the wicked (treatise
4, chapters 12-15). Finally, he examines the specific religious
consequences of providence, paying special attention to the
theoretical infrastructure of the precepts of prayer (treatise 4,
chapters 16-24) and repentance (treatise 4, chapters
25-28; Ehrlich 2008; Harvey 2015). These last two discussions
are of exceptional scope within medieval Jewish philosophy.




Albo's discussions of free will, of proofs for divine providence, and
of the problem of evil do not include almost any original ideas, and he
mostly relies on the writings of the Jewish philosophers who preceded
him. In contrast, his treatment of prayer and repentance seem to
reveal a certain level of innovation. Regarding free will, Albo
apparently adopts Maimonides' opinion that divine knowledge differs
significantly from human knowledge, and that God's absolute knowledge
does not necessarily abrogate free will for human beings. The academic
literature considers several of Albo's discussions on providence to be
nothing more than comprehensive summaries of the work of his
precursors. This category includes his methods of proving the
existence of divine providence over humanity, as well as his attempts
to defend the concept of God's absolute good, despite what seems to be
injustice in the world (Bleich 1997, 340-358). Still, in the
rest of the treatise Albo presents broad, methodical discussions on
the various philosophical aspects of the issues of prayer and
repentance, for which his predecessors addressed mainly the halakhic
features.




Albo's central argument on the topic of prayer is that it
influences a person's status by causing an internal change
within that person. This change raises the person to a level where he
receives constant divine inspiration through God's
benevolence. The basic assumption of this concept is that prayer
cannot cause any change in God, since such an assumption would detract
from divine perfection. Thus we should conceive of prayer as the
internal act of a person upon the self, raising the self to a higher
spiritual level (treatise 4, chapters 16-18). This model stands
in opposition to the traditional conception of prayer as a channel of
communication between the praying person and the listening God.




Albo understands the significance of repentance in two directions.
The first is based on his concept of prayer, and defines repentance as
an act in which a person uplifts himself to a higher level than at the
time of the sin. In this way, he changes his identity, and is no
longer deserving of punishment for the act he performed in his
previous identity (treatise 4, chapter 18). The second conception of
repentance focuses not on the person but on the sinful act he has
committed. Under this rubric, repentance retroactively expropriates
the conscious foundations of this act. In other words, repentance
redefines the sinful act as unintentional, and thus undeserving of
punishment (treatise 4, chapter 27).




The second half of the fourth treatise of *Sefer ha-'Ikkarim*
presents Albo's theory of recompense. The main issue Albo raises here
is the character of the reward and punishment destined for a person in
the world to come. Throughout his wide-ranging discussion on the
question of recompense in the next world, Albo confronts two
conflicting points of view. Maimonides views recompense as applying to
the soul alone, while Nahmanides opines that it affects the body as
well (treatise 4, chapters 29-41). Albo's own opinion on this
subject is unclear. At the beginning of the discussion, he seems to
support Maimonides' viewpoint, but he continues the discussion with
the assumption that he cannot definitely rule out Nahmanides'
approach, which is supported by sources from kabbalistic literature.
Scholars who have discerned the unique character of this section have
described Albo's position in almost every possible way. Some say he
avoids commitment (Sarachek 1932, 224), while others think he adopts a
synthetic middle position (Schwartz 1997, 202-208); still others
believe he accepts Maimonides' approach (Husik 1966, 426), and their
opponents argue that he accepts Nahmanides' view (Agus 1959,
238-239). Apparently, therefore, this issue in Albo's
philosophical-religious theory is especially obscure (Ehrlich 2009b).