## 1. Feminist Criticisms of the Canon as Misogynist



> Women are capable of education, but they are not made for
> activities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced
> sciences, philosophy and certain forms of artistic production. ...
> Women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality, but by
> arbitrary inclinations and opinions. 
> 
> (Hegel 1973: 263)
> 




The idea that the gender of philosophers is important or even relevant
to their work is a thought that runs counter to the self-image of
philosophy. So, it is interesting to explore how and why feminist
philosophers came to the realization that gender is a useful analytic
category to apply to the history of philosophy. We can distinguish two
aspects to this process although, in many cases, the two aspects merge
into a single project. The first stage of realizing the importance of
gender consisted of the cataloguing of the explicit misogyny of most of
the canon. The second stage consisted of probing the theories of
canonical philosophers in order to uncover the gender bias lurking in
their supposedly universal theories. The second stage, the discovery
that a philosopher's supposedly universal and objective theories were
gender specific, raised the further question of whether or not the
theoretical gender bias was intrinsic to the theory or extrinsic to it.
Let me illustrate these points with Aristotle. 


### 1.1 Explicit Statements of Misogyny in Philosophical Texts




There is no doubt that Aristotle's texts are misogynist; he thought
that women were inferior to men, and he said so explicitly. For example,
to cite Cynthia Freeland's catalogue: "Aristotle says that the courage
of a man lies in commanding, a woman's lies in obeying; that 'matter
yearns for form, as the female for the male and the ugly for the
beautiful'; that women have fewer teeth than men; that a female is an
incomplete male or 'as it were, a deformity': which contributes only
matter and not form to the generation of offspring; that in general 'a
woman is perhaps an inferior being'; that female characters in a
tragedy will be inappropriate if they are too brave or too
clever"(Freeland 1994: 145-46). However dispiriting or annoying this
litany is, and whatever problems it presents to a woman studying or
teaching Aristotle, it can be argued that Aristotle simply held a
mistaken view about women and their capacities (as did most Athenians
of his time). But, if this is so, then Aristotle's theories, or most of
them, are not tarnished by his statements about women, and we can
ignore them, since they are false. 




Here Aristotle is the chosen example, but similar feminist
critiques are available chronicling the explicit misogyny of other
canonical figures like Plato and Kant. Feminist criticisms of Plato's
theories stress dialogues (like the *Timaeus* and *Laws*)
that characterize women as inferior to men rather than the egalitarian
*Republic*. Kant's writings, like Aristotle's, provide the ideal
target for feminist criticism because they contain both overt
statements of sexism and racism, and a theoretical framework that can
be interpreted along gender lines.[2]


### 1.2 Gendered Interpretations of Philosophical Concepts




If we consider Aristotle's theory of hylomorphism we find a connection
between form and being male, and matter and being female. That is, we
find that matter and form are gendered notions in Aristotle (Witt
1998). By a gendered notion we mean a notion that is connected either
overtly or covertly, either explicitly or metaphorically with gender or
sexual difference.[3]
 Furthermore, matter and form are not equal
partners in Aristotle's metaphysics; form is better than matter. And
since hylomorphism is the conceptual framework that underlies most of
Aristotelian theory from metaphysics and philosophy of mind to biology
and literary theory, it looks as if his supposedly universal and
objective theories are gendered, and it looks as if his negative
characterization of women tarnishes his philosophical theories.




Are Aristotle's theories intrinsically gendered and sexist, so that
gender cannot be removed without altering the theories themselves?
Several feminist philosophers have developed this thesis. For example,
in "Woman Is Not a Rational Animal", Lynda Lange argues that
Aristotle's theory of sex difference is implicated in every piece of
Aristotle's metaphysical jargon, and she concludes that "it is not at
all clear that it [Aristotle's theory of sex difference] can simply be
cut away without any reflection on the status of the rest of the
philosophy"(Harding and Hintikka 1983: 2). Elizabeth Spelman has argued
that Aristotle's politicized metaphysics is reflected in his theory of
soul, which, in turn, is used to justify the subordination of women in
the Politics (Spelman 1983). And, finally, Susan Okin has argued that
Aristotle's functionalist theory of form was devised by Aristotle in
order to legitimate the political status quo in Athens, including
slavery and the inequality of women (Okin 1979: ch. 4).




If these scholars are right, then Aristotle's theories are
intrinsically biased against women, and it is unlikely that they can
have any value for feminists beyond the project of learning about the
ways in which the philosophical tradition has devalued women.
Alternatively, Charlotte Witt has argued that the suspect gender associations with
Aristotelian matter and form are extrinsic to these concepts, and
therefore removable from Aristotle's theories without substantially
altering them (Witt 1998). The argument that Aristotle's gender
associations are not intrinsic to his concepts of matter (female) and
form (male) turns on the incompatibility of the position that matter is
intrinsically female, and form intrinsically male with the position
that every composite substance is a unity of matter and form. If every
composite substance is a complex of matter and form, then each would be
a hermaphrodite, rather than a male or a female as is the case with
animals. Moreover, whatever plausibility gender associations with
matter and form might have with regard to animals, is lost entirely
when we consider artifacts, like shoes and beds. If intrinsic gender
associations with matter and form are incompatible with Aristotle's
theory of substance and extrinsic gender associations are compatible
with that theory, then the principle of charity dictates that we opt
for the consistent interpretation. Recent work on sexism in Aristotle's philosophy
focuses on his theory of animal reproduction in the biological writings.
To what extent and in what ways is Aristotle's theory of animal generation sexist?
(Henry 2007; Nielsen 2008) A related issue concerns how Aristotle's view of
sexual difference in the biology is connected to his ideas about sexual
difference in the "Politics". (Deslauriers 2009) 




Sometimes, as in the case of Descartes, the feminist argument in
favor of a gendered theory is subtle since, unlike Aristotle, he
expresses both a personal and a theoretical commitment to equality.
Further, his theories are not stated using gendered notions. Yet, some
feminists have argued that his theory of mind-body dualism and his
abstract characterization of reason resonate with gender implications--
on the assumption that women are emotional and bodily creatures (e.g.
Scheman 1993; Bordo 1987; Lloyd 1993b, ch. 3).


### 1.3 Synoptic Interpretations of the Philosophical Canon




The philosophical canon can allow the luster some of its members to be
tarnished by feminist criticism, just as it has weathered criticisms
from analytic or continental perspectives. The most radical feminist
critics, however, have urged that the canon's central philosophical
norms and values, like reason and objectivity, are gendered notions.
The synoptic approach considers the Western philosophical tradition as a
whole, and argues that its core concepts are gendered male. But, if
this is so, then the Western philosophical tradition as a whole, and
the central concepts that we have inherited from it, requires critical
scrutiny by feminists. Moreover, philosophy's self-image as universal
and objective, rather than particular and biased, is mistaken. 




Feminist synoptic interpretations of the canon take several forms.
The first, exemplified by Genevieve Lloyd's *Man of Reason*,
argues that reason and objectivity in the history of philosophy are
gendered male.[4]
 The way that reason and objectivity are
gendered male varies as philosophical theory and historical period
varies, but the fact that they are gendered is a constant. From
Aristotle to Hume, from Plato to Sartre, reason is associated with
maleness. Therefore, the notion of reason that we have inherited,
whether we are empiricists or existentialists, requires critical
scrutiny.




The second form of synoptic interpretation, exemplified by Susan
Bordo's *The Flight to Objectivity*, argues that the modern
period in philosophy, and, in particular, the philosophy of Descartes,
is the source of our ideals of reason and objectivity that are gendered
male. In other words, this story chronicles a turn in philosophy
coincident with the rise of modern science, which generated ideals of
reason and objectivity that are deeply antagonistic to women and
feminism.[5]
 Cartesian rationalism and the norms of
modern science mark a decisive break with a philosophical and cultural
tradition that was more accommodating of female characteristics and
powers.




It is important to note that Lloyd and Bordo differ not only with
regard to the historical story they tell concerning the maleness of
reason, but also with regard to the way they understand that maleness.
For Lloyd, the maleness of reason is symbolic and metaphorical rather
than cultural or psychological. Lloyd does not intend the maleness of
reason to refer to either a socially constituted gender category or a
psychological orientation shared by males. "This book is not a direct
study of gender identity. It seeks rather to contribute to the
understanding of how the male-female distinction operates as a symbol
in traditional philosophical texts, and of its interactions with
explicit philosophical views of reason".[6]
 In understanding the
maleness of reason as symbolic rather than as psychological or social,
Lloyd avoids making a theoretical commitment to any particular
psychology of sex differences or any particular account of the social
formation of gender identity. What she gains in flexibility, however,
she loses in content, since it is difficult to specify exactly what
metaphorical maleness is, and how it is related to psychological or
social maleness. Other feminists have attempted to develop an account
of how male metaphors and symbols undermine philosophical arguments
(Rooney 1991).




For Bordo, however, the maleness of Cartesian reason is given both a
social meaning and a psychological content. First, the social meaning
of maleness: "In the seventeenth century it [the feminine orientation
toward the world] was decisively purged from the dominant intellectual
culture, through the Cartesian 'rebirthing' and
restructuring of knowledge and the world as masculine"(Bordo 1987:
100). This social meaning is paired with a psychological consequence:
"The 'great Cartesian anxiety,' although manifestly
expressed in epistemological terms, discloses itself as anxiety over
separation from the organic female universe"(Bordo 1987: 5). Cartesian
'anxiety' is separation anxiety from mother nature; the
rational norms of clarity and distinctness are read as symptoms of
this anxiety.[7]
 Bordo's social-psychological notion of
maleness while rich and explicit, provides a large target for critics
because it is based on a controversial historical thesis (that the 17th
century showed a marked increase in gynophobia) and a disputed
psychological theory of the family (Object Relations Theory).




Luce Irigaray takes a radical stance towards the history of
philosophy by trying to indicate what is suppressed and hidden in the
tradition rather than cataloguing its evident "maleness". Her work,
like Bordo's, makes use of psychoanalytic theory in interpreting texts
and, like Lloyd's, it explores the symbolic associations of
philosophical images and concepts. However, unlike Bordo and Lloyd,
Irigaray uses highly unconventional methods of interpreting canonical
philosophical texts in order to uncover the ways in which the feminine
or sexual difference is repressed in them. For example, Irigaray uses
humor and parody rather than straightforward exegesis, and she points
to instabilities (contradictions) in philosophical texts as symptoms of
patriarchal thinking. According to Irigaray, patriarchal thinking
attempts to achieve universality by repressing sexual difference. But,
the presence of contradictions or instabilities in a philosophical text
is symptomatic of the failure of patriarchal thinking to contain sexual
difference. For example, Irigaray might look at the argument we
described above for considering gender associations with form and
matter in Aristotle to be extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, to those
concepts, and argue that the fact that Aristotle's hylomorphism as a
universal theory is incompatible with gender associations is a symptom
of patriarchal thinking rather than evidence that the proposed
interpretation is
 mistaken.[8]




Despite their different historical stories, and the different ways
that they understand the maleness of reason, each of these panoramic
visions of the history of philosophy deliver the same moral, which is
that the central norms that inform our philosophical culture today are
gendered male.[9]
 Hence, these synoptic narratives of the
philosophical tradition provide historical justifications for feminist
philosophers who are critical of our central philosophical norms of
reason and objectivity. Does the feminist synoptic critical reading of
the history of philosophy justify either the conclusion that
traditional conceptions of reason ought to be flat-out rejected by
feminists or the conclusion that traditional conceptions of reason
ought to be subjected to critical scrutiny?




Even if feminist historical arguments are successful in showing that
philosophical norms like reason and objectivity are gendered male, this
conclusion does not justify a flat-out rejection of either traditional
philosophy or its norms of reason and objectivity (Witt 1993). Recall
the distinction introduced above between intrinsically and
extrinsically gendered notions. An intrinsically gendered notion is one
that necessarily carries implications regarding gender, i.e., if one
were to cancel all implications concerning gender, one would be left
with a different notion than the original. In contrast, an
extrinsically gendered notion typically does carry implications
concerning gender, but not necessarily so. If the maleness of reason is
extrinsic to the traditional concept of reason, then the historical
fact that it was a gendered notion does not justify or require its
rejection by feminists. If on the other hand, it can be shown that the
maleness of reason is intrinsic to it, it still does not follow that
reason ought to be rejected by feminists. For, the idea the reason is
intrinsically male-biased would justify a rejection of it only if it
ought to be other than it is. So, what needs to be argued is that
reason and objectivity would be different, and better, if they were not
gendered male, but were gender-neutral, gender-inclusive or female.
But, if feminist philosophers develop this argument, which they need to
buttress the historical argument, then they are reconceptualizing
traditional notions of reason and objectivity rather than rejecting
them.




Even though the work that feminist philosophers have done to show
the ways in which traditional conceptions of reason and objectivity are
associated with maleness falls short of justifying their rejection,
their work has been valuable in two respects. First, it has established
that gender is associated with the central norms of philosophy, a
conclusion that warrants attention from anyone attempting to understand
our philosophical tradition. Second, the historical studies raise
questions about reason and objectivity that are valuable areas of
inquiry for contemporary philosophers.


## 2. Feminist Revisions of the History of Philosophy



> These women are not women on the fringes of philosophy, but
> philosophers on the fringes of history. 
> 
> --Mary Ellen Waithe
> 




Feminist canon revision is most distinctive, and most radical, in
its retrieval of women philosophers for the historical record, and in
its placement of women in the canon of great philosophers. It is a
distinctive project because there is no comparable activity undertaken
by other contemporary philosophical movements, for whom canon creation
has been largely a process of selection from an already established
list of male philosophers. It is a radical project because by
uncovering a history of women philosophers, it has destroyed the
alienating myth that philosophy was, and by implication is or ought to
be, a male preserve.




In *A History of Women Philosophers* Mary Ellen Waithe has
documented at least 16 women philosophers in the classical world, 17
women philosophers from 500-1600, and over 30 from 1600-1900.




And, in the recent feminist series *Re-reading the Canon*
seven of the thirty-five canonical philosophers are women: including Mary
Wollstonecraft, Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir. What is crucial
to understand is that none of the three is canonical--if by that you
mean included in the history of philosophy as it is told in philosophy
department curricula, in histories of philosophy, and in scholarly
writing. Still, there has been progress.




Consider that *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, published in
1967, which contains articles on over 900 philosophers, did not
include an entry for Wollstonecraft, Arendt or de Beauvoir. Moreover,
if the index is to be believed, de Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft are not
mentioned at all in any article, and Hannah Arendt merits a single
mention in an article on "Authority". Far from being canonical, these
women philosophers were scarcely even marginal, warranting perhaps a
passing reference in a survey of existentialism or political
philosophy, but little
 more.[10]
 By 1998, however, *The Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy* had entries for all three, and also
many other important women philosophers.




The project of retrieving women philosophers has a paradoxical
relationship with contemporary feminist theory, however. On the one
hand, it is clearly a feminist project; its originators were interested
in establishing that women have been philosophers throughout the
history of the discipline despite their routine omission from standard
histories and encyclopedias of philosophy. However, the newly-recovered women philosophers suggest that there is little overlap
among three groups: women philosophers, feminine philosophers and
feminist philosophers. For most of the newly discovered women
philosophers were not feminist thinkers nor did they write philosophy
in a feminine voice, different from their male counterparts. Indeed,
their breadth of philosophical interests is comparable to that of male
philosophers although their domain of application sometimes differs. In
her introduction to *A History of Women Philosophers* Mary Ellen
Waithe comments "If we except the Pythagorean women, we find little
differences in the ways men and women did philosophy. Both have been
concerned with ethics, metaphysics, cosmology, epistemology and other
areas of philosophic inquiry" (Waithe 1987-1991 Vol. 1: xxi). And
another editor, Mary Warnock, comments "In the end, I have not found
any clear 'voice' shared by women philosophers" (Warnock 1996: xlvii).
The women philosophers restored to the tradition by feminist hands are
not all proto-feminists nor do they speak in a uniform, and different,
voice from their male peers.




Similarly, women philosophers who are candidates for initiation into
the philosophical canon--like Mary Wollstonecraft, Hannah Arendt and
Simone de Beauvoir--are a diverse crew. According to Elizabeth
Young-Bruehl "That Hannah Arendt should have become a provocative
subject for feminists is startling" presumably because of Arendt's
explicit criticism of feminism. And while Wollstonecraft and de
Beauvoir were both feminists, they share neither a common philosophical
voice nor common philosophical principles. In *The Vindication of
the Rights of Women* Wollstonecraft argued for the education of
women using Enlightenment principles, while Beauvoir's *The Second
Sex* reflects her marxist and existentialist roots.




The diversity of women philosophers raises the question why their
recovery or re-valuation is an important project for contemporary
feminist theory. What the retrieval of women philosophers, and their
inclusion in the philosophical canon has done is to challenge the myth
that there are no women in the history of philosophy and the fallback
position that if there are any women philosophers, they are
unimportant. Lovers of wisdom that we all are, we all benefit from the
correction of these mistaken beliefs. Moreover, as feminists, we are
interested in correcting the effects of discrimination against women
philosophers, who were written out of history, unfairly, because of
their gender not their philosophical ideas.




However, what is really at issue is not philosophy's past, but its
present; its self-image as male. That self-image is created and
maintained in part by a tacit historical justification. It is a
damaging self-image for women philosophers today, and for women who
aspire to be philosophers. The real significance of uncovering the
presence of women in our history, and in placing women in our canon is
the effect that has on the way we think about the "us" of
philosophy.




The rediscovery of women philosophers raises the following question: 
How can women philosophers be rewoven into the history of philosophy 
so that they are an integral part of that history? Lisa Shapiro, considering the case of women philosophers in the 
early modern period, argues that it is not enough to simply add a woman 
philosopher or two to the reading list (Shapiro 1994). Rather, according to Shapiro,
we need to provide internal reasons for the inclusion of women 
philosophers rather than relying upon a feminist motivation on the part 
of the teacher or editor. The history of philosophy is a story and we 
need to find a plot line that includes new, female characters.




One way to do this is to show how certain women philosophers made 
significant contributions to the work of male philosophers on central 
philosophical issues. We could call this the "Best Supporting 
Actress" approach in that the central cast remains male and the story 
line of philosophy is undisturbed. It is a good strategy for several 
reasons: it is relatively easy to accomplish, and it provides an 
internal anchor for women philosophers. On the other hand, it 
reinforces the secondary status of women thinkers and if this were 
the only way of integrating women philosophers, that would be an 
unfortunate result. The wholly inadequate interpretation of 
Beauvoir's philosophical thought as a mere application of Jean-Paul 
Sartre's is a good example of the limitations of this strategy. Not 
only does is reinforce a secondary, handmaiden role for Beauvoir, 
but it also promotes a distorted understanding and appreciation of 
her thought (Simons 1995).




Alternatively, we could find in the work of women philosophers issues
that they have developed in a sequential fashion. Shapiro suggests 
that there are certain philosophical issues concerning women's 
rationality, nature, and education that women philosophers of the 
seventeenth century discuss extensively in a sequential, interactive 
fashion. The thread extends into the following century in the work of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Wollstonecraft. Since philosophers become 
canonical as part of a story anchored at one end by contemporary 
philosophical questions that are thought to be central, the task 
would be to make these questions ones that we turn to the tradition 
for help in answering. And, of course, these are precisely the 
central questions posed and discussed extensively by contemporary 
feminism. Thus, the idea is that as we pose new kinds of questions 
to the history of philosophy we will find in women philosophers an 
important, sequential discussion that we can securely thread into 
our curricula and textbooks.




At this relatively early stage of the process of including women in
the history of philosophy we need all to use all three strategies.
There is nothing wrong with a purely external approach. By all means
one should include a woman philosopher on a topic just to provide an
indication that there are some interesting and important women working
on a particular topic. And the strategy of anchoring a woman
philosopher's work to a male canonical figure can also be a useful
strategy as long as it is done in a manner that preserves the
independence and originality of her work. Finally, it is important to
ask new questions of the tradition, questions that might allow some
women philosophers to play a starring role rather than a walk-on
part.


### 2.1 Early Modern Women Philosophers: A Case Study




From about the mid-1990s, there has been a concerted effort by
scholars both to rehabilitate the works of early modern women
philosophers and to integrate at least some of these women into the
philosophical canon. These efforts illustrate how a range of different
feminist approaches to the history of philosophy can be integrated
together.




While many contemporary philosophers have little knowledge of the
women philosophers of the early modern period, there are in fact good
historical records of these women and their works. This fact has made
the doxographic task of retrieving these women thinkers a relatively
straightforward one, even if labor intensive. O'Neill (1998) catalogs a
long list of these women, and her doxographical work has provided a
starting point for both expanding the list and interpreting the
philosophical works of these women.




It is worth considering the context in which these women were
writing and what it suggests about their feminist methodology in the
history of philosophy. Though anachronistic, it seems appropriate to
characterize at least some of these women, along with some of the their
male contemporaries, as engaged in a feminist project. Many of these
thinkers were self-consciously countering a recognized misogyny in
philosophy but, insofar as they deployed philosophical methods, they
would seem to reject the view that the problem was intrinsic to the
discipline of philosophy itself. While the so-called *querelle des
femmes* had been going on for centuries, the seventeenth century
marked a turning point in the debate over the status of women as better
or worse than men in virtue of their form or soul. (See Kelly 1988.)
Both women and men thinkers of the period advanced egalitarian
arguments. So, for instance, Marie De Gournay, in her "On the Equality
of Men and Women,"(1622) deployed a skeptical method to argue for the
equality of men and women (De Gournay 2002); Anna Maria van Schurman
deployed syllogistic argumentation to argue for women's education both
by demonstration and as evidence in her *Dissertatio Logica*
(1638) (van Schurman 1998); in her *Serious Proposal to the Ladies
for the Advancement of their True and Greatest Interest* (1694)
Mary Astell applied Descartes's sex-neutral account of the mind
(insofar as mind is really distinct from body, rationality is not tied
to sex) to argue for women's education (Astell 2002); Francois
Poulain de la Barre in *On the Equality of the Two Sexes* (1673)
also drew on Cartesian principles to argue for the social equality of
men and women (Poulain de la Barre 2002) . (Clarke 2013 collects de
Gournay, van Schurman and Poulain de la Barre together.) While the
methods deployed by these thinkers are different, they all appropriate
philosophical methods - skepticism, basic rules of inference, a new
metaphysics - different from what was then the dominant Aristotelian
paradigm to counter misogynist claims.




Contemporary scholars concerned to reintegrate these women into the
philosophical canon have tended to adopt a strategy that does not
assume that standard philosophical concepts or the canon itself are
gender biased. Rather scholars aim (1) to make long out-of-print texts
accessible again; (2) to develop interpretations of these texts that
(a) bring out their philosophical content and (b) demonstrate the
involvement of these women in the philosophical debates of the period.
The bibliographical appendix to this entry can direct readers to some
recent editions of writings by early modern women. The remainder of
this section sketches out one way in which scholars have pursued the
second aim, and suggests some others.




One of the central themes of early modern philosophy is the
reconceptualization of causation. Scholastic philosophy largely
understood causation on an Aristotelian model, on which all change was
to be explained by a constellation of four causes: final, formal,
material and efficient causes. Early modern thinking about causation
began with a rejection of final and formal causes. Determining final
causes involved a speculation that outstripped human understanding,
while formal causes were dismissed as occult qualities, simple
assertions that things worked without an intelligible explanation of
how they did so. Several canonical figures in early modern philosophy
- Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume and Kant - are often situated with
respect to one another through their views on causation. In recent
years, Malebranche, with his account of occasionalist causation, (a
view on which neither bodies nor minds have causal power in themselves,
and God is the only efficient cause), has been worked into the story.
What Malebranche highlights is that understanding the nature of
causation was a live philosophical problem: while there was agreement
about dismissing final and formal causation, there was much
disagreement about what should replace it, and in particular about the
nature of efficient causation. Some early modern women thinkers were
very much involved in this debate, and they are just as easily
incorporated into the philosophical story as Malebranche. For instance,
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, in her 1643 correspondence with him,
questions Descartes about the nature of causation between mind and
body. She can be read as insisting that an adequate account of
causation must be applicable in all causal contexts. Margaret
Cavendish, in her *Observations on the Experimental Philosophy*,
develops a vitalist account of causation wherein motion is not
transferred from one body to another, but rather one body comes to be
in motion through a self-patterning in harmony with another body around
it. (The SEP entry on Margaret Cavendish provides a more detailed
summary of Cavendish's account of causation, along with guidance for
further reading.) While Cavendish's account of causation did not carry
the day, vitalism of one form or another was a dominant strand of
thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is worth noting
that vitalism is also a position within contemporary philosophy of
biology.




A similar strategy for incorporating women into the philosophical
canon can be used with respect to such central topics as the Principle
of Sufficient Reason (Emilie du Chatelet), free will (Cavendish,
Damaris Masham, du Chatelet), and cosmology (Cavendish, Anne
Conway, Masham, Mary Astell, du Chatelet; see Lascano
(forthcoming)). The SEP entry on du Chatelet contains a helpful
discussion on her position on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as
well as an array of secondary sources. The SEP entries on Cavendish,
Masham and du Chatelet provide some detail as to their positions
regarding free will.




However, one can also move to incorporate women into our
philosophical history by rethinking the questions through which that
history is structured. How the questions are framed influences who is
taken to have interesting answers on offer. Within the early modern
period, questions in epistemology are often about the nature of reason
and rationality, and the limits of the human understanding. While women
of the period sometimes address these questions theoretically, more
often they are concerned with implications of such answers for training
the human mind. That is, they are concerned with matters of education,
and they directly relate positions on education to positions on the
nature of human understanding and rationality. Already mentioned are
the works of Anna Maria van Schurman and Mary Astell, but others
including Madeleine de Scudery and Gabrielle Suchon also wrote
on education. While education is not today typically taken to be
central to philosophy, a little reflection on the history of philosophy
can destabilize this contemporary outlook. Descartes's *Discourse on
Method for Rightly Conducting Reason* (1637) is arguably a work
about education; John Locke wrote *Some Thoughts Concerning
Education* (1693) and *On the Conduct of the Understanding*
(1706); and Rousseau's *Emile* (1762) also concerns education.
Equally, education is a central concern of philosophers predating the
early modern period (consider Plato in *Republic*) and after it
(consider John Dewey). Reconsidering education as a central question of
philosophy can facilitate seeing women thinkers as contributing
centrally to philosophical projects.


## 3. Feminist Appropriation of Canonical Philosophers




Feminist philosophers have also changed the history of philosophy by
appropriating its ideas for feminist purposes. From the perspective of
negative canon formation, the history of philosophy is a resource only
in so far as it describes the theories and thinkers that were most
deeply mistaken about women. Other feminist historians of philosophy
have found important resources for feminism in canonical philosophers.
Indeed, they have found valuable concepts even in the worst offenders
of the negative canon, like Aristotle and Descartes.




For example, in *The Fragility of Goodness* Martha Nussbaum
has described the virtues of an Aristotelian ethics with its emphasis
on the importance of concrete context, emotion and care for others in
an ethical life (Nussbaum 1986). And Marcia Homiak has argued that
Aristotle's rational ideal, far from being antithetical to feminists,
actually captures some of feminism's deepest ethical insights (Homiak
1993). With regard to Descartes, Margaret Atherton has argued that his
concept of reason was interpreted in egalitarian rather than
masculinist terms by several women philosophers of the 18th century,
and was used in their arguments for equal education for 
women.[11]




Other feminists have urged the reconsideration of the views of
canonical figures, like Hume and Dewey, who have played only a minor
role in the negative feminist canon. For example, Annette Baier has
argued at length for the value of a Humean perspective in both
epistemology and in ethics for feminist theory (Baier 1987; Baier
1993). And, in *Pragmatism and Feminism* Charlene Seigfried
argues for the value of pragmatism for feminism; a position also taken
by Richard Rorty (Seigfried 1996; Rorty 1991).




It is interesting to note that some of the very same philosophers
who were cast as the villains of the negative canon are also mined by
feminist theorists for useful ideas. Indeed, it is likely that every
philosopher, from Plato to Nietzsche, who has been condemned to the
negative canon also appears in some feminist's positive canon. This is
perplexing. After all, if feminists evaluate canonical texts so
differently, it raises questions about the coherence of feminist
interpretations of texts. Is Aristotle a feminist hero or villain? Are
Descartes' ideas dangerous for feminists or useful to them? If
feminists have argued both positions, we begin to suspect that there is
no such thing as a feminist interpretation of a philosopher. And this
might lead us to wonder about the coherence and unity of the project of
feminist canon revision.




Why is it that feminist philosophers have reached different, and
even sometimes incompatible interpretations of the history of
philosophy? The multiple and contrary readings of the
philosophical canon by feminists reflects the contested nature of the
"us" of contemporary feminism. The fact that feminist interpretations
of canonical figures is diverse reflects, and is a part of, on-going
debates within feminism over its identity and self-image. Disagreements
among feminist historians of philosophy over the value of canonical
philosophers, and the appropriate categories to use to interpret them,
are, in the final analysis, the result of debate within feminist
philosophy over what feminism is, and what is theoretical commitments
should be, and what its core values are.


## 4. Feminist Methodological Reflections on the History of Philosophy




Disagreements over the value of the history of philosophy for feminist 
theory has stimulated discussion concerning the methods and 
presuppositions of the study of the history of philosophy itself. Can 
feminists use the history of philosophy as a resource in the same way 
that other philosophical movements have done? This question, in turn, 
inspires us to reflect upon different reading strategies that we might 
employ in relation to the history of philosophy.




Cynthia Freeland (2000) criticizes the idea that feminists can mine 
the history of philosophy for useful ideas as other philosophical 
movements and perspectives have done. She argues that the feminist 
appropriation/inheritance approach to the history of philosophy is an 
ideology. Freeland defines an ideology as a theory or viewpoint that 
is politically oppressive and epistemically flawed. Feminists who view 
the philosophical canon as a resource to be mined for ideas useful to 
feminism are engaged in a potentially oppressive activity since the 
history of philosophy is replete with ideas and theories that are (or 
might be) oppressive of women today. The epistemic flaw is that the 
appropriation approach is overly reverential of the tradition and might 
therefore be insufficiently critical of it. Deference is not an 
epistemic virtue. Freeland points out that appropriators tend to use 
standard criteria of historical interpretation like the principle of 
charity that tries to find consistency in a philosopher's theories or 
doctrines. Following out this line of thought, it turns out that all 
standard historians of philosophy might be guilty of this epistemic 
defect since all of them use standard criteria of historical 
interpretation. The criticism cuts a wide swath since it requires 
feminist historians of philosophy to deviate radically from the norms 
of their discipline since it turns out that the norms themselves might 
promote deference and oppression. What kind of feminist engagement with 
the history of philosophy remains possible?




Several reading strategies other than the standard have been advocated. 
Some feminists advocate a radical departure from the norms of textual 
interpretation by focusing, and drawing out the "unthought" of a text; 
its images and metaphors; its omissions and paradoxes. (Deutscher 1997) Others 
emphasize the importance of questioning the line demarcating a text 
from its cultural, psychological or material context. (Schott 1997) And yet others 
advocate for an active philosophical engagement with a text rather 
than the backward-looking activity of trying to determine the exact
meaning of a historical text. (LeDoeuff 1991) These reading strategies, in turn, 
raise further issues concerning the limits of the history of philosophy
and the criteria for adequate interpretation.