## 1. Egalitarian-Liberal Feminism



Egalitarian-liberal feminism conceives of freedom as personal autonomy
(living a life of one's own choosing) and political autonomy
(being co-author of the conditions under which one lives).
Egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the exercise of personal
autonomy depends on certain enabling conditions that are
insufficiently present in women's lives or that social and
institutional arrangements often fail to respect women's
personal autonomy and other elements of women's flourishing.
They hold also that women's needs and interests are
insufficiently reflected in the basic conditions under which they live
and that basic arrangements that perpetuate those conditions lack
legitimacy because women are inadequately represented in the processes
of democratic self-determination. Egalitarian-liberal feminists link
autonomy deficits like these to the "gender system" (Okin
1989: 89), that is, inherited patriarchal traditions and institutions,
and they hold that the women's movement should work to identify
and remedy them. As the protection and promotion of citizens'
autonomy is an appropriate role of the state on the
egalitarian-liberal view, egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the
state can and should be the women's movement's ally in
promoting women's autonomy. There is disagreement among
egalitarian-liberal feminists, however, about the role of personal
autonomy in the good life, the appropriate role of the state, and how
egalitarian-liberal feminism is to be justified.



Egalitarian-liberal feminists draw from the broad tradition of
feminist theorizing for insight concerning the gender system. For
example, some draw on radical feminist insights into the nature of
violence against women (Nussbaum 1999a) and the nature of gender
hierarchy (Watson 2019); some draw on psychoanalytic feminist theory
(Meyers 2002, Cornell 2003); some draw on feminist work on caregiving
(Bhandary 2019); and some draw on socialist feminist thinking about
the exploitation of women's work in the home (Gheaus 2008).
Contemporary egalitarian-liberal feminism may be understood as a
contribution to the larger scholarly philosophical conversation
concerning egalitarian-liberalism. Since John Rawls's work
(1971, 1993, 2001) has played a very large role in that conversation
over the past 50 years, it figures centrally in much
egalitarian-liberal feminist philosophy.


### 1.1 Personal Autonomy


#### 1.1.1 Procedural Accounts of Personal Autonomy



Egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that women should enjoy personal
autonomy. That is, they hold that women should live lives of their own
choosing. Some offer "procedural" accounts of personal
autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar discuss these, 2000a: 13-19).
These accounts suggest that to say women should enjoy personal
autonomy means they are entitled to a broad range of autonomy-enabling
conditions. On this view, the women's movement should work to
identify and promote these conditions. Identifying these enabling
conditions requires careful attention to the particular ways in which
autonomy deficits are produced in diverse women's lives.
Procedural accounts avoid judging directly the substance of
women's choices or the arrangements that ensue. The following
list of enabling conditions is representative.



*Being free of violence and the threat of violence*: Violence
and the threat of violence violate women's dignity; they make
women do what others want or reduce women's sphere of activity
to avoiding harm. In some cases violence fractures the self and takes
from women their sense of self-respect (Brison 1997). The feminist
literature on violence against women documents the particular role
that violence and the threat of violence play in unfairly
disempowering and limiting women (Cudd 2006: 85-118).



*Having access to options*: On the egalitarian-liberal feminist
view, women are entitled to access to options (Alstott 2004: 52).
Women's access to options is frequently and unfairly restricted
due to economic deprivation, in particular due to the
"feminization of poverty" (Pearce 1978; see also Cudd
2006: 119-154). Other sources of unfairly reduced options for
women are stereotyping and sex discrimination in education and
employment (Smith 2004; Rhode 1997). Such stereotyping and
discrimination affect some racial, ethnic and cultural groups in
particularly pernicious ways. Egalitarian-liberal feminists also point
to the way cultural homogeneity unfairly limits women's options
(Cudd 2006: 234), for example when culture assigns identities and
social roles according to sex (Okin 1989: 170ff; Alstott 2004; Meyers
2004; Cornell 1998: x; Chambers 2008).



*Being free of the limits set by patriarchal paternalistic and
moralistic laws and policies*: Patriarchal paternalistic laws and
policies restrict women's options on the grounds that such
limits are in women's interest. Think for example of laws that
limit women's employment options on the grounds that taking
certain jobs is not in women's interest (Smith 2004).
Patriarchal moralistic laws and policies restrict women's
options on the grounds that certain options should not be available to
women because morality forbids women's choosing them. Think for
example of laws that prohibit abortion, or laws that favor certain
kinds of sexual expression or family forms (Cornell 1998; Brake 2004).
Welfare state programs that distinguish between the supposedly
"deserving" and "undeserving" poor are
moralistic responses to poverty among women (Folbre 1984). Together,
patriarchal paternalistic and moralistic laws and policies steer women
into socially preferred ways of life. These are unfair restrictions on
women's choices, on the egalitarian-liberal feminist view,
because women's choices should be guided by their own sense of
their self-interest and by their own values. (But see Chambers [2008:
203-231] for egalitarian-liberal feminist *uses* of
paternalism.)



Some emphasize the importance of internal, psychological enabling
conditions as well, for example *the ability to assess one's
own preferences and imagine life otherwise* (Meyers 2002: 168;
Cudd 2006: 234-235; Mackenzie 2000). Without the ability to
assess the preferences on the basis of which one makes choices and to
imagine life otherwise, one can't meaningfully be said to have
options other than affirming the status quo (see also Chambers 2008:
263-4). These internal enabling conditions are related to the
external ones. Violence and the threat of violence, stereotyping and
discrimination, material deprivation, and cultural homogeneity all can
have the effect of closing down reflection and imagination.



On this view, the women's movement should work to identify and
promote autonomy-enabling conditions. Identifying these conditions
requires careful attention to the particular ways in which autonomy
deficits are produced in particular women's lives. On the
egalitarian-liberal feminist view, the state has an important role to
play in promoting these conditions (see
 SS1.1.4,
 SS1.2.1, and
 SS1.2.2).
 Some egalitarian-liberal feminists emphasize that there is much that
cannot be done by the state (Cudd 2006: 223). For example, while the
state can refrain from blocking such endeavors, women themselves must
develop new "alternative emancipatory imagery" (Meyers
2002: 168), and fashion new ways of being a woman and new kinds of
relationships through experiments in living (Cudd 2006: 234; Cornell
1998).



Some critics argue that freedom is of limited value because, even when
enabling conditions like these are in place, women may choose limiting
and disadvantaging social arrangements. Some point to the phenomenon
of deformed preferences: when attractive options are limited or
arrangements unfair, people may develop preferences for those limits
or for less than their fair share (Nussbaum 1999a: 33, 50; Cudd 2006:
152). This phenomenon makes changing preferences through increased
freedom problematic and leads some feminists to reject theories that
prioritize free choice (Yuracko 2003). Advocates of procedural
accounts of autonomy concede that the enabling conditions do not rule
out that a woman could choose, for example, to undergo clitorectomy
(Meyers 2004: 213) or become a pornographic model (Cudd 2004: 58). As
Ann Cudd explains, possibilities like these must be accepted because
liberal feminism values freedom and thus cannot advocate direct
"preference education" (Cudd 2004: 57). Liberal feminism
must offer only a



> 
> 
> gradualist approach. Individuals and groups will make various
> experiments in living that we cannot now precisely imagine. They
> ... will sometimes go on a mistaken path. (2004: 57)
> 
> 
> 



But they must be freed up to find their own way. As Diana Meyers
explains, the moral imagination of feminist theorists and activists is
limited (as is everyone's); they cannot know with certainty what
substantive choices are compatible with personal autonomy (Meyers
2004: 213). Moreover, one should expect autonomous lives to take
diverse forms in diverse cultural contexts. On this view, "a
morally defensible and politically viable conception of autonomy for
an era of global feminism" must be agnostic about the content of
women's choices as long as they do not close off autonomy (2004:
205).


#### 1.1.2 Fairness in Personal Relationships



Some egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the social arrangements
of personal life should not only be freely chosen but should be
characterized by fairness or justice. Jean Hampton draws on the
contractualist tradition in moral and political philosophy to describe
one way in which heterosexual intimate relationships often fail to be
fair or just (Hampton 1993). (For extended discussion of
Hampton's feminism, see Abbey 2011: 120-151. For more on
feminist uses of contractualism, see
 SS1.2.1.)



On Hampton's view, a personal relationship is fair only if both
parties to it could



> 
> 
> reasonably accept the distribution of costs and benefits (that is, the
> costs and benefits that are not themselves side effects of any
> affective or duty-based tie between us) if it were the subject of an
> informed, unforced agreement in which we think of ourselves as
> motivated solely by self-interest. (Hampton 1993: 240)
> 
> 
> 



Of course, many women choose to enter or remain in relationships in
part because of affective benefits; for example women often get
satisfaction from satisfying others or fulfilling a duty. Why set
aside these affective benefits, as Hampton recommends, when evaluating
the fairness of a relationship? Hampton does not set them aside out of
a conviction that a woman's affective nature is not part of her
essential self. Nor does she set them aside out of a conviction that
this aspect of a woman's nature is not valuable. (For criticism
of Hampton, see Sample 2002.) Her test sets them aside because
affective benefits of relationships are not received *from* the
other; they are benefits that flow from one's own nature (Radzik
2005: 51). Thus while they may, and probably should, figure in a
woman's overall decision about whether to enter or remain in a
particular relationship, Hampton believes they should not figure in
the evaluation of a relationship's fairness. As Linda Radzik
explains in her defense of Hampton, a relationship is fair or just if
the benefits that flow *from* each *to* the other are on
par, that is, if each gives as much as she gets (2005: 51). When one
party gets from the other significantly more than he gives, he is
denying the other her legitimate entitlement to reciprocation.



This test formalizes an important insight of the women's
movement: personal relationships, in particular traditional
heterosexual relationships, are often unfair to women, indeed often
exploit women's tendency to care about others. Injustice of this
sort is not uncommon. Thus Hampton's test invites criticism of a
wide swath of human social life (Sample 2002: 271). But Hampton does
not call on women to cease valuing others' satisfaction or the
fulfillment of duty (Hampton 1993: 227). Instead, she calls on the
women's movement to cultivate in women and men a sensitivity and
an aversion to this kind of injustice and to develop remedies. (For an
early feminist articulation of this idea, see Alex Kates
Shulman's "A Marriage Agreement" (1970) in Shulman
2012.)



Procedural accounts of personal autonomy (see
 SS1.1.1)
 do not require that relationships be just in the way Hampton
recommends. According to procedural accounts, it is possible that a
choice to enter or remain in a personal relationship in which one
gives more than she gets from the other can be autonomous. Therefore,
the focus should be on ensuring that women are not pressured into or
unable to exit them.



To be sure, Hampton's account of justice in personal
relationships can be a resource to women and men reflecting on their
own preferences. It invites reflection on how one's own
preferences affect the distribution of benefits and burdens within a
relationship. Also, moral criticism of relationships that exploit
women's preferences reminds us that relationships can be
otherwise (because ought implies can). This reminder enhances personal
autonomy by broadening the imagination. Thus procedural accounts of
personal autonomy can include Hampton's test, not as definitive
of the acceptability of social arrangements, but as a contribution to
the kind of reflection about the good life on which the personal
autonomy of individuals depends.


#### 1.1.3 Personal Autonomy and Human Flourishing



Martha Nussbaum proposes an account of the good life that has



> 
> 
> at its heart, a profoundly liberal idea ... the idea of the
> citizen as a free and dignified human being, a maker of choices.
> (Nussbaum 1999a: 46)
> 
> 
> 



Echoing procedural accounts of personal autonomy
 (SS1.1.1),
 Nussbaum explains:



> 
> 
> if one cares about people's powers to choose a conception of the
> good, then one must care about the rest of the form of life that
> supports those powers. (1999a: 45)
> 
> 
> 



But for Nussbaum personal autonomy is merely one of the "major
human functionings" (1999a: 43) which define "a good human
life" (1999a: 42). These functionings include, among other
things, bodily health and integrity, affiliation, and political
participation (1999a: 41-42). To be sure, personal autonomy, or
in Nussbaum's words "practical reason", is a good
that "suffuses all the other functions" (1999a: 44). But
personal autonomy is not prioritized. A good life is one in which one
is able to enjoy all of the major human functionings, that is, to
flourish.



Nussbaum's approach takes on the problem of deformed preferences
(see
 SS1.1.1)
 directly. To be sure, some may choose lives that do not include the
actual exercise of some of the functionings--an ascetic may
choose to compromise bodily health, for example. But, Nussbaum
explains, one must *be able* to function in each of these ways.
Social arrangements are to be criticized if they render their
participants *unable* to function in the valued ways regardless
of their preferences (1999a: 50). The women's movement should
sensitize women and men to the injustice of denying women the ability
to function in these valued ways, identify arrangements that are
unjust to women by paying careful attention to diverse women's
lives, and recommend remedies. Nussbaum holds that her account is
compatible with global moral pluralism and thus may function as a
foundation for a global feminism (Nussbaum 1999a: 40).



Nussbaum's "capabilities approach" may be compared
with procedural accounts of autonomy (see
 SS1.1.1).
 Procedural accounts suggest that the women's movement should
work to protect and promote women's ability to live lives of
their own choosing by identifying particular autonomy deficits in
women's lives and promoting the conditions that enable autonomy.
These approaches avoid directly judging the substance of the choices
women make or the arrangements that result. They leave it to
individuals and groups to fashion new, diverse, non-oppressive ways of
life. The list of enabling conditions for personal autonomy is not
unlike Nussbaum's list of human functionings. But advocates of
procedural approaches may worry that the goal of the women's
movement, according to the capabilities approach, is to bring to women
*a particular way of life*, namely one in which women can
function in these ways, instead of freeing women up to find their own
way (Cudd 2004: 50). As Drucilla Cornell, an advocate of a procedural
approach explains, "social equality [should be] redefined so as
to serve freedom" (Cornell 1998: xii) because "there is
nothing more fundamental for a human being" (1998: 17; see also
Cudd 2004: 51-52). Procedural accounts of autonomy can include
Nussbaum's approach, not as definitive of the kinds of lives
women should live, but as an important contribution to the kind of
reflection on the good life on which personal autonomy depends. (There
is a large literature on Nussbaum's liberal feminism; see for
example Abbey 2011: 152-205; and Robeyns 2007.)


#### 1.1.4 Personal Autonomy and the State



There is substantial agreement among egalitarian-liberal feminists
that the gender system--that is, inherited patriarchal traditions
and institutions--plays an important role in perpetuating morally
objectionable deficits in personal autonomy in women's lives and
that the state can and should take action to remedy them. There is
also substantial agreement concerning what the state should do. There
is disagreement about some hard cases, however, that pit liberal
values against one another.



Egalitarian-liberal feminists agree that the state must effectively
protect women from violence, regardless of where that violence takes
place (Cudd 2006: 85-118, 209; Rhode 1997: 1193-95). They
also hold that sexist paternalistic and moralistic laws and policies
are an unjust use of state power. Such laws place control over
women's lives in the hands of others and steer women into
preferred ways of life. Laws restricting access to birth control and
abortion are of particular import in this context because they take an
extremely momentous choice away from women and, together with the
cultural assignment of caregiving duties to women, steer women into
the social role of mother. Women must have a legal right, and
meaningful access, to birth control and abortion services. In
addition, egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the state must not
grant preferential treatment to particular family forms (Brake 2004:
293; Lloyd 1995: 1328; McClain 2006: 60) which means giving gay and
lesbian partnerships the same recognition currently available to
heterosexuals (Brake 2012; Hartley & Watson 2010; McClain 2006:
6). Others argue for removing marriage's privileged legal status
altogether or treating it legally more like other associations (Case
2006; Chambers 2017; Metz 2010).



Egalitarian-liberal feminists also support laws against sex
discrimination in education, employment, and public accommodations.
According to egalitarian-liberal feminists, the refusal to hire or
promote a woman or do business with her because she is a woman is a
morally objectionable limit on her options. So are workplaces that are
hostile to women. Liberal feminists argue that laws prohibiting sexual
harassment and requiring affirmative action and comparable worth
policies are often called for to remedy past and ongoing sex
discrimination (Williams 2000: 253).



Egalitarian-liberal feminists agree also that a significant source of
women's reduced options is the structure of the workplace which
assumes that workers are free of caregiving responsibilities (Okin
1989: 176; Williams 2000). Women, and increasingly men, do not fit
this model. The effect of not fitting the model is dramatic. As Anne
L. Alstott explains: "Caretakers at every income level have
fewer options than noncaretakers at the same income level"
(Alstott 2004: 97). She continues: "I am worried that
child-rearing too dramatically contracts the options among which
mothers can choose" (2004: 23). Alstott and others argue that
the state must ensure that the socially essential work of providing
care to dependents does not unreasonably interfere with the personal
autonomy of caregivers. Policies proposed to ensure sufficient
personal autonomy for caregivers include parental leave, state
subsidized, high quality day care, and flexible work schedules (Cudd
2006: 228; Eichner 2021; Okin 1989: 175). Joan Williams has
argued for legal recognition of the right to not be discriminated
against in employment on the basis of one's caregiving
responsibilities. Williams recommends, if necessary, legal action
alleging failure to recognize this right as an incentive to employers
to accommodate caregivers (Williams 2000: 274). (See
 SS1.2.1
 for discussion of caregiving and distributive justice.)



The egalitarian-liberal feminist literature concerned with
women's personal autonomy emphasizes the role the state should
play in protecting women from violence and discrimination; the
importance of ridding the law and policy of patriarchal paternalism
and moralism; and the role the state can play in restructuring the
workplace, including ensuring access to childcare. Note, however, that
egalitarian-liberal feminists are egalitarian-liberals and, as such,
hold that among the proper uses of state power is to ensure that all
individuals can enjoy a decent standard of living, including access to
adequate income, education and healthcare (Eichner 2010; on a
guaranteed minimum income, see Cudd 2006: 154; see also Stark
2021). Egalitarian-liberals also tend to support the right to
collective bargaining to secure decent wages and working conditions
(Cornell 1998: 57; Cudd 2006: 211). (For more on distributive justice,
see
 SS1.2.1.)



There is disagreement among egalitarian-liberal feminists about some
hard cases that pit liberal values against one another. Several hard
cases concern autonomy and the body. Consider pornography.
Egalitarian-liberal feminists tend to reject legal limits on
pornography (Cornell 1998: 57-58). But some hold that arguments
for restricting violent pornography are not unreasonable (Laden 2003:
148-149; Watson 2019 and 2007: 469; for what such a not
unreasonable argument might look like, see Eaton 2007) and that the
best arguments for freedom of expression fail to show that it should
not be limited (Brison 1998). Indeed some argue that violent
pornography can undermine the autonomy of viewers (Scoccia 1996) and
the status of women as equal citizens (Spaulding 1988-89; see
also Watson 2015). Prostitution is a similar case. Egalitarian-liberal
feminists tend to reject laws prohibiting prostitution and advocate,
instead, the legal regulation of the sex trade prioritizing
women's safety and women's control over their own working
conditions (Cornell 1998: 57; Nussbaum 1999a, 295). But some
egalitarian-liberal feminists suggest that liberal values can support
an argument for criminalizing the purchase of sex (Watson &
Hartley 2018: 163-188). Surrogate motherhood is another case
around which there is egalitarian-liberal feminist disagreement with
some arguing that women have a right to sell procreative bodily
services (see for example Church 1997) and others raising serious
concerns (see for example Anderson 1990 and Satz 2010).



Some hard cases concern the role of the state in family life. Family
life has dramatic effects on the personal autonomy of its adult
members. Assuming the role of caregiver, for example, can dramatically
contract options. On an egalitarian-liberal feminist view, the state
has an interest in ensuring that family life does not undermine
women's personal autonomy. Some hold that the state should
promote justice in the family--for example, the sharing of paid
and unpaid labor by its adult members (Okin 1989: 171). Others hold
that the state may not be guided by a substantive ideal of family life
(Alstott 2004: 114; see also Nussbaum 2000a: 279-280; and
Wolf-Devine 2004). In response to the disadvantage and vulnerability
to which full-time care-givers in the home are commonly exposed, some
egalitarian-liberal feminists suggest guaranteeing a non-wage-earning
spouse one half of her wage-earning spouse's paycheck (Okin
1989: 181). Others propose financial support for caregivers, for
example state-funded care-giver allowances (Alstott 2004: 75ff; Baehr
2021; compare Eichner 2010: 77-80). Some warn against
care-giver allowances however because, if women took disproportionate
advantage of them--which is not unlikely--the gendered
division of labor might be reinforced (Schouten 2021; see also
Gheaus 2008 and Gheaus & Robeyns 2011). (See
 SS1.2.1
 for more discussion of this issue.)



Girls' participation in families is, especially in the early
years, nonvoluntary. The family affects the development of
girls' sense of self-worth as well as their preferences and the
capacities, like the capacity for reflection and imagination, on which
their ability to live lives of their own choosing depends (Okin 1989:
97). Egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the state must protect
and promote the development of autonomy capacities in children,
especially girls. For example they hold that child-marriage should be
legally prohibited (McClain 2006: 79); girls should have access to
abortion without parental consent or notification (Rhode 1994: 1204);
girls must receive a formal education free of sexist stereotyping,
including instruction in the legal equality of women (McClain 2006:
81; Lloyd 1995: 1332), including autonomy-promoting sex education
(McClain 2006: 57-58), and ensuring that girls are prepared to
be economically independent (Lloyd 1995: 1332). Beyond this, some hold
that girls' interest in developing autonomy capacities requires
that families be internally just, that is, that there be an equal
division of paid and unpaid labor between adults so that families are
not characterized by "dependence and domination" (Okin
1989: 99-100; see also Follesdal 2005). Others are not convinced
that there is a necessary connection between this kind of justice in
families and the development of girls' autonomy capacities
(Lloyd 1995: 1335-1343) and hold that the state may not be
guided by a substantive ideal of family life (Alstott 2004: 114; see
also Nussbaum 2000a: 279-280; and Wolf-Devine 2004). (See
 SS1.2.1
 for more discussion of this issue).


### 1.2 Political Autonomy



Some egalitarian-liberal feminists emphasize the importance of
political autonomy, that is, being co-author of the conditions under
which one lives. Some use contractualist political theory to argue
that the state should ensure that the basic structure of society
satisfies principles of justice that women, as well as men, could
endorse (see
 SS1.2.1).
 And some argue that the democratic legitimacy of the basic conditions
under which citizens live depends on the inclusion of women in the
processes of public deliberation and electoral politics (see
 SS1.2.2).


#### 1.2.1 Distributive Justice



Some egalitarian-liberal feminists, inspired by John Rawls'
contractualist liberal theory of justice (Rawls 1971; 1993; 2001),
argue that the state should ensure that the basic structure of society
distributes the benefits and burdens of social cooperation fairly,
that is, in a manner that women as well as men could endorse (for
example Alstott 2004; Baehr 2021; Bhandary 2019; Bojer 2002;
Lloyd 1998; McClain 2006; Okin 1989; Thompson 1993; for an overview of
feminist responses to Rawls, see Abbey 2013a). They argue that the
basic structure currently distributes benefits and burdens unfairly,
in part due to the gender system, that is, inherited patriarchal
traditions and institutions.



As Rawls puts it, the basic structure of society is



> 
> 
> the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental
> rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social
> cooperation. By major institutions I understand the political
> constitution and the principal economic and social
> arrangements.... Competitive markets and the monogamous family
> [are] examples of major social institutions.... The basic
> structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so
> profound and present from the start. The intuitive notion here is that
> this structure contains various social positions and that men born
> into different positions have different expectations of life
> determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic
> and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society
> favor certain starting places over others. (Rawls 1971: 6-7)
> 
> 
> 



Rawls argues that the fairness of the basic structure of society may
be assessed by asking what principles representatives of citizens
(parties) would choose to determine the distribution of primary goods
in society if they were behind a "veil of ignorance"
(Rawls 1971: 12). The veil of ignorance blocks from the parties
knowledge of their place in society: for example their socio-economic
status, religion, and sex. (Rawls does not include sex in *A Theory
of Justice* (Rawls 1971), but adds it in "Fairness to
Goodness" (Rawls 1975: 537).) Susan Okin proposes we



> 
> 
> take seriously both the notion that those behind the veil of ignorance
> do not know what sex they are and the requirement that the family and
> the gender system, as basic social institutions, are to be subject to
> scrutiny. (Okin 1989: 101)
> 
> 
> 



Rawls argues that parties behind a veil of ignorance would choose two
principles: a liberty principle providing for the "most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all" and a principle of equality
requiring equality of opportunity and permitting inequalities in
wealth and income only if they are to the benefit of the least well
off (Rawls 1971: 302-303).



Okin argues that the gender system violates both the liberty and
equality of opportunity principles because by effectively assigning
roles to citizens according to sex it circumvents citizens'
"free choice of occupation" (Okin 1989: 103). On
Okin's view, this means that in a just society "gender
could no longer form a legitimate part of the social structure,
whether inside or outside the family" (1989: 103). None of the
institutions of the basic structure, including the family, could
assign roles according to sex. It is common to argue that the state,
educational institutions and workplaces should not assign roles
according to sex. But Okin argues that this applies to the family as
well. Gender blindness must play the same role in the family that it
plays in these institutions. In Okin's words, there must be
"congruence" between the principles that govern these
institutions and those that govern family life (1989: 21). That is,
families must be just.



Okin offers a second argument to support the claim that families must
be just. Rawls explains that a society satisfying his two principles
of justice can be stable because within it citizens develop a sense of
justice (Rawls 1971: 453ff). For our purposes consider that citizens
must develop the conviction that citizens generally are due the rights
of equal citizenship. Okin argues that when children are raised within
unjust families, families that lack "equality and
reciprocity" and are sites of "dependence and
domination", they are not likely to develop the requisite sense
of justice (Okin 1989: 99-100; see also McClain 2006:
73-84). Instead, girls and boys may grow to believe that women
are not entitled to equal citizenship. Therefore, if the society
governed by Rawls' two principles of justice is to be stable,
families must be just.



So, Okin's view is that the state may and should promote a
particular ideal of family life. She tells us that the state
should



> 
> 
> encourage and facilitate the equal sharing by men and women of paid
> and unpaid work, or productive and reproductive labor. (1989: 171)
> 
> 
> 



Okin discusses several measures that might contribute to ensuring that
gender no longer forms "part of the social structure, whether
inside or outside the family" (Okin 1989: 103), including state
subsidized daycare, a legal entitlement to parental leave and flextime
(1989: 176, 186), as well as autonomy-promoting public education for
children (1989: 177). She also recommends protecting from
vulnerability those women who do choose traditional roles by making
them legally entitled to half of their spouse's paycheck (1989:
181). While Okin argues that what is desired is a "future in
which all will be likely to *choose* this mode of life"
(1989: 171, my emphasis), the fact that many people currently
don't choose egalitarian family life is not, for Okin, a reason
for the state to not take measures to promote it (1989: 172). At the
same time, Okin does not endorse simply any and all state involvement;
for example, while she thinks justice requires the 50-50 sharing of
domestic work, she doesn't recommend that the state enforce it
(1989: 171) (on this issue, see Neufeld & van Schoelandt 2014: and
Baehr 2017: 18-19). (There is a substantial literature on
Okin's use of Rawls' theory of justice. See for example
Abbey 2011; Reich & Satz 2009.)



Since Okin published these arguments (1989), a substantial literature
has developed by other egalitarian-liberal feminists--more or
less in the Rawlsian tradition--which argues that women's
shouldering a disproportionate share of the costs of social
reproduction is unjust. (See for example: Alstott 2004; Baehr
2021; Barclay 2013; Bhandary 2019; Brighouse & Wright 2008;
Eichner 2010; Engster 2001, 2010; Gheaus 2009, 2012; Gheaus &
Robeyns 2011; Gornick & Meyers 2008; Lloyd 1995, 1998; Nussbaum
2006: 96-223; Robeyns 2007; Reiheld 2015; Schouten 2017, 2019;
Stark 2021; Watson & Hartley 2018; and Wright 2008.)
Okin's claim that the state should promote a particular,
substantive ideal of family life is a central matter for discussion in
this literature. So, for example, while Lloyd and Alstott endorse many
of Okin's policy proposals (Lloyd 1995: 1332; 1998: 218; Alstott
2004), they reject her claim that the state should promote a
particular substantive ideal of family life (Lloyd 1995:
1340-1341; Lloyd 1998: 218; McClain 2006: 78). Alstott
writes:



> 
> 
> The egalitarian family is, even in principle, a troubling ideal.
> Strictly equal sharing seems unduly constraining, not merely because
> families today deviate from the ideal, but because free people might
> want to organize their lives differently. (Alstott 2004: 113)
> 
> 
> 



Other egalitarian-liberal feminists have voiced similar concerns. Ann
Cudd worries that state action intended to promote gender fairness and
foster women's autonomy could impose a homogenizing conception
of the good life and stifle the very reinventions of self and
experiments in living that women's liberation requires (Cudd
2006: 209, 223; see also Wolf-Devine 2004). Elizabeth Anderson
writes:



> 
> 
> The plurality of conceptions of the good that are likely to survive in
> a world in which the state has done all it can be reasonably and
> justly expected to do will include a host of unreasonable conceptions
> of the good, some of which may well be patriarchal. In the face of
> such injustices, liberals counsel feminists to redirect their claims
> from the state to those promulgating such unreasonable conceptions of
> the good, and to redirect their activism from a focus on state action
> to other domains, including civil society, churches, and the family. I
> think this counsel is wise, which is why I am a liberal feminist.
> (Anderson 2009: 131; see also 141-144)
> 
> 
> 



Recent work by egalitarian-liberal feminists Lori Watson and Christie
Hartley (2018) and Gina Schouten (2019), however, may be understood as
responding to these concerns as it aims to establish that some state
action to undermine the gendered division of labor and promote
egalitarian family life is both reasonable and just.



The gendered division of labor allocates to women the work of
providing care for individuals who cannot care for themselves or who
require help doing so. A full accounting of justice in caregiving
focuses not only on the fairness of the distribution of caregiving
work but also on the needs of individuals who receive care. Some
egalitarian-liberal feminist work includes this dual focus. Asha
Bhandary argues that the whole "system of practices"
through which care is given and received must be subject to liberal
evaluation with an eye to both those who provide and those who receive
care (Bhandary 2019: 71, quoting Rawls 1958: 169). Elizabeth Brake
argues that doing so requires recognizing "the social bases of
caring relationships [as] primary goods" (2012: 175). And Martha
Nussbaum argues that liberal political theory must begin with a
"political conception of the person [that] holds that human
beings are vulnerable temporal creatures, both capable and
needy" (Nussbaum 2006: 221). (See also the essays in Bhandary
and Baehr (2021) on caregiving and liberalism).



Rawlsian political philosophy provides the framework for the bulk of
egalitarian-liberal feminist writing on distributive justice. The
focus of much of that writing has been to explore Rawlsian resources
for criticizing the role gender has and continues to play in the basic
structure of societies like the United States and to lay out what a
gender just society might look like. However, as Nancy Holmstrom
writes (in a rather different context),



> 
> 
> a feminism concerned only with ending the oppression women *based
> on gender* would be a very limited version, far from the
> emancipatory vision at its core. (Holmstrom 2011: 137)
> 
> 
> 



Thus we should note that although egalitarian-liberal feminists are
egalitarian-liberals, and as such hold that the state should ensure
that all individuals enjoy a decent standard of living, poverty has
not been a major focus of much egalitarian-liberal feminist work (but
see Bhandary 2019; Cudd 2006; Eichner 2010; Stark 2021; Watson
& Hartley 2018: 167-168, 228-9). Nor has much
egalitarian-liberal feminist work attended directly to the role race
has played and continues to play in the basic structure of societies
like the United States (but see Bhandary 2019; and Mills 2017).


#### 1.2.2 Public Deliberation and Electoral Politics



Some egalitarian-liberal feminists who emphasize the importance of
political autonomy--that women be co-authors of the conditions
under which they live--focus in particular on participation in
the processes of democratic self-determination. These processes
include both political deliberation in the many arenas of public
political discourse and electoral politics. Some egalitarian-liberal
feminists hold that the conditions under which women live lack
legitimacy because women are inadequately represented in these
processes. They hold that this political autonomy deficit is, in large
part, due to the "gender system" (Okin 1989: 89), that is,
inherited patriarchal traditions and institutions, and that the
women's movement should work to identify and remedy it.



Attempts to increase women's participation in public
deliberation and electoral politics confront a vicious circle of
women's exclusion. The gender system leads to women's
being underrepresented in influential forums of public deliberation,
including in elected law-making bodies. For example women have less
free time to engage in public deliberation because of the
double-burden of paid and unpaid labor; sex stereotyping leads many to
think that women (especially women from particular ethnic and cultural
groups) are less capable of leadership than men; the behavior called
for in agonistic public deliberation and electoral politics is
understood to be masculine; issues of particular interest to women are
seen as personal and not political issues; and women lack power in the
many institutions (like churches, universities, and think tanks) that
influence political debate. But when women are underrepresented in
these forums and law-making bodies, it is unlikely that the justice of
the gender system will become the subject of public conversation or
its dismantling a target of legislative action.



Some egalitarian-liberal feminists explore ways to escape this vicious
circle. Because women are excluded from important forums of public
deliberation and electoral politics in complex ways, remedies must
address a variety of problems. Justice in the distribution of benefits
and burdens in society would go some way towards enabling women to
access forums of public debate on equal terms with men (Okin 1989:
104). But cultural change is necessary as well if stereotypes about
women's abilities are not to interfere with their participation,
if women's needs and interests are to be understood as
legitimate claims on democratic power, and if men's dominance in
institutions of influence is to be overcome. Seyla Benhabib argues
that the women's movement, along with other new social movements
like the gay and lesbian liberation movement, has begun this work
(Benhabib 1992). While much of this change is cultural, the state has
a role to play. Linda McClain argues that all children must receive
civic education--to equip them for democratic
citizenship--including instruction in women's equality
(McClain 2006: 81). She also argues that the state may use its
persuasive power to put traditionally excluded issues, like violence
against women or the dilemma of balancing work and family, on the
agenda for public deliberation (2006: 78).



Others take on the vicious circle of women's exclusion by
recommending legal mechanisms for the inclusion of women in electoral
politics (see Rhode 1994: 1205-1208; Phillips 1991). Some
suggest that legal mechanisms for including those who have been
systematically excluded may be justified as remedies for the unjust
disproportionate political power enjoyed by others (Phillips 2004:
6-10). Suggested mechanisms include targets or quotas for women
and other underrepresented groups on party slates, or proportional
representation in elected bodies. Karen Green, for example, argues for
"guaranteed equal representation of both sexes in
parliament" (Green 2006). There is diversity of opinion,
however, among egalitarian-liberal feminists about the justice and
efficacy of such mechanisms (Rhode 1994: 1205; and Mansbridge
1997).


### 1.3 Justification



John Rawls distinguishes between what he calls comprehensive and
political liberal doctrines (Rawls 1993). This distinction has been of
interest to egalitarian-liberal feminist philosophers. (For explicit
discussion of the distinction in liberal feminism, see for example
Abbey 2007; 2011: 72-82, 226-247; Baehr 2008; 2013;
Chambers 2008: 159-201; Enslin 2003; Lloyd 1998; Neufeld 2009;
Neufeld & Schoelandt 2014; Nussbaum 1999b: 108; 2000b: 76 fn38;
Okin 1994; 1999: 129-130; Watson & Hartley 2018.)



Comprehensive egalitarian-liberal feminisms are grounded in particular
moral doctrines. As we have seen, egalitarian-liberal feminists
typically claim that some social and institutional arrangements are
unjust and that such arrangements should be remedied; some claim that
state power is an appropriate tool for such remediation. For example,
and as we have seen, egalitarian-liberal feminists argue that families
should foster women's and girls' personal autonomy and
that domestic associations should distribute benefits and burdens
fairly; and, as we have seen, some argue that state power may and
should be used to these ends. Comprehensive egalitarian-liberal
feminisms ground such claims in particular moral doctrines.



Among comprehensive liberal feminists we may count Jean Hampton, Carol
Hay, Drucilla Cornell, Ann Cudd, Susan Okin, and Clare Chambers.
Kantian moral theory serves as a foundation for Hampton's
feminist contractualist account of justice in personal relationships
(Hampton 1993: 241; see Abbey 2011: 120-151) (see
 SS1.1.2)
 and for Hay's liberal feminist theory of oppression (Hay 2013),
as well as for Cornell's psychoanalytically informed liberal
feminism that focuses on the right to intimate and sexual
self-determination (Cornell 1998: 17-18; 2003; see also
Thurschwell 1999: 771-772). Cudd explains that her liberal
feminist account of oppression as harm is grounded in a
"background moral theory", namely



> 
> 
> a liberal contractarian view of the sort developed by John Rawls in A
> *Theory of Justice*, or the more libertarian version of David
> Gauthier in *Morals by Agreement*. (Cudd 2006: 231)
> 
> 
> 



Okin's liberal feminism draws on Rawls' *A Theory of
Justice*, which Rawls himself claims is a comprehensive liberalism
(Okin 1999: 129; Rawls 1993: xvii). (But note that Okin claims hers is
"in between" comprehensive and political liberalism (Okin
1999: 129-130).) Chambers' liberal feminism--which
explores the relationship between social construction and
choice--may also be counted among comprehensive liberal feminisms
as it is grounded in personal autonomy as a moral value (Chambers
2008).



Political liberal feminisms are accounts of how state power may and
should be used to feminist ends that are grounded in public political
values. Public political values are not the particular values of any
one moral doctrine; they are values that are shared by the many
reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines citizens hold (Rawls 1993:
227-230). Advocates of political liberal feminism hold that
state power is used justly when supported by values that are
endorsable by all reasonable citizens.



Among political liberal feminists we may count S.A. Lloyd, Linda
McClain, Martha Nussbaum, Gina Schouten, Christie Hartley, Lori
Watson, and Amy Baehr. Lloyd constructs an argument based on public
political values to the conclusion that "women's
disproportionate burden in social reproduction [must] be
eliminated" (Lloyd 1998: 214). McClain argues that sex equality
is a public and constitutional value (2006: 60; see also 22-23,
60-62, and 76) which requires state opposition to relations of
subordination and domination in the family (2006: 62); state support
for autonomy in intimate matters (2006: 22); and support for the
development of autonomy capacities in children, especially girls
(2006: 109). Nussbaum (see
 SS1.1.3)
 also presents her "capabilities approach" as a political,
and not a comprehensive, liberalism. The capabilities list, Nussbaum
argues, can be shared by citizens holding a wide variety of
comprehensive conceptions of the good life, and thus should be able to
function as a foundation for a political liberalism (Nussbaum 2000b:
76 fn38). Schouten argues that the political liberal value of
reciprocity undergirds state measures to alleviate the gendered
division of labor (Schouten 2019). And Watson and Hartley argue that
public deliberation based on shared values is incompatible with
"pervasive social hierarchies" (Hartley & Watson 2010:
8; see also Watson & Hartley 2018). As Watson puts it,



> 
> 
> a central task of public reason arguments, in the context of social
> hierarchy and inequality, is to expose the ways in which background
> conditions (inequalities) undermine the necessary conditions for
> reasonable deliberations among citizens to occur. (Watson 2007:
> 470)
> 
> 
> 



Political liberal feminists suggest some advantages of political
liberal over comprehensive liberal feminism. According to S.A.
Lloyd,



> 
> 
> it's true that confining the argument to talk of socially
> recognized values requires operating with one hand tied behind
> one's back, so to speak. Conclusions that would be quite easy to
> reach from stronger feminist principles, or other comprehensive
> principles, are much harder to reach using the sparse ... toolbox
> [of public reason]. (Lloyd 1998: 210)
> 
> 
> 



But if we can reach feminist conclusions on these sparse grounds, they
will be much more difficult to reject. Amy Baehr suggests that
arguments to feminist ends from public political values can move the
political community toward a more reasonable understanding of those
values (Baehr 2013; see also Rawls 1993: 227). Comprehensive liberal
feminists, in turn, worry that the public political values on which
feminist political liberalism must rely render the latter
insufficiently critical of precisely those hierarchies and forms of
disadvantage egalitarian liberal feminism aims to criticize and
undermine (Abbey 2007; Baehr 1996; Chambers 2008: 12, 159-201;
Enslin 2003; Hay 2013: 34-39; Okin 1994; see also Munoz-Darde
1998: 347).


### 1.4 Criticism



Egalitarian-liberal feminism has been subject to a variety of
criticisms. Addressing some of these criticisms is a focus of some
egalitarian-liberal feminist work.



Some reject egalitarian-liberal feminism because, they argue, feminist
theory must rely on a much more robust feminist ideal of the good life
than egalitarian-liberal feminism is able to provide (Yuracko 2003;
Jaggar 1983). Some argue that liberalism's focus on the
individual renders it unable to adequately conceptualize injustice to
groups (I. Young 1990: 18). Some argue that liberalism's focus
on distribution neglects relations of power (I. Young 1990: 37) and
the eroticization of domination and subordination (MacKinnon 1987;
1989) which are the true linchpins of the gender system. Lori Watson
and Christie Hartley's recent feminist political liberal work
may be profitably read as a response to worries like these as it aims
to show how feminist political liberalism can conceptualize injustice
to groups as a matter of relations of domination and subordination
(Watson & Hartley 2018).



Critics have focused on the role played by ideals in liberal political
philosophy, especially in Rawlsian liberalism. For example, Lisa
Schwartzman argues that Rawls' ideal of the fully just society
obscures race and sex as "social markers of inequality"
(Schwartzman 2006: 59). Charles Mills argues that a focus on
dismantling an "existing unjust basic structure" requires
a shift from



> 
> 
> ideal theory [which] asks what justice demands in a perfectly just
> society...[to] non-ideal theory [which] asks what justice demands
> in a society with a history of injustice. (Mills 2017: 34; see also
> Pateman & Mills 2007; but compare Mills 2017: 201-215)
> 
> 
> 



Egalitarian liberal feminist Asha Bhandary addresses these concerns by
developing what she calls a "two-level contract theory"
which is attentive to non-ideal contexts (Bhandary 2019).



Some are concerned that egalitarian-liberal feminist embrace of the
ideal of the egalitarian family effectively elevates one particular
comprehensive conception of the good life over the many others found
in multicultural societies and across the globe (Shachar 2009; for
discussion see Okin 1999 and Khader 2011). As we have seen
 (SS1.2.1)
 some egalitarian-liberal feminists eschew the ideal of the
egalitarian family and thus avoid this criticism. Some argue that an
egalitarian-liberal feminism that holds that women's
independence and self-sufficiency are central feminist ideals fails to
recognize many relational goods on which many women depend for their
well-being, and thus a women's movement guided by such an ideal
may harm many of the very women it aims to benefit (Khader 2018). Care
ethicists also raise a concern about an egalitarian-liberal feminism
for which independence and self-sufficiency are central ideals. They
argue that centering such ideals obscures the fact that human beings
come into the world dependent upon others and that many are dependent
on others throughout their lives; this, in turn, obscures the value of
being cared for and the role that caregiving plays in a good society
(Held 1987, 2006b; Kittay 1999). Conceptualizing personal autonomy as
relational, and thus downplaying independence and self-sufficiency,
has been a focus of some recent egalitarian liberal feminist work (see
the end of
 SS1.1.1;
 see also the essays in Bhandary and Baehr (2021).)



Egalitarian-liberal feminism has been subject to socialist feminist
critique. Nancy Fraser, for example, has issued a
"provocation" by "contending that feminism has
entered a dangerous liaison with neoliberalism", that is, with
political forces that promote largely unfettered capitalism (Fraser
2013: 14, see also 209-226). Arruzza, Bhattacharya and Fraser
argue that a non-elite feminism, a "feminism for the 99%",
must eschew such a liaison (Arruzza, Bhattacharya, & Fraser 2019;
see also Holmstrom 2011). Egalitarian-liberal feminists have not
focused a great deal of attention on capitalism. But as some
egalitarian-liberals embrace "liberal socialism", it is
not clear that egalitarian-liberal feminism couldn't do the same
(Rawls 2001: 138; see also Edmundson 2017; Baehr 2017: 10-12;
Robeyns 2012; and Stark 2021).



Conservative critics of egalitarian-liberal feminism argue that
reformers can do more harm than good when they undermine the
institutions and norms which, while surely offending in many ways,
also serve as the foundation for many people's well-being
(Muller 1997a; see also Fox-Genovese 1996). Such conservatives worry
about the radical implications of egalitarian-liberal feminism, its
willingness to put women's autonomy ahead of institutions and
norms on which, they believe, many people rely for their well-being.
While Ann Cudd suggests that the expansion of opportunity and equality
promised by liberal feminism "makes us all better off"
(Cudd 2006: 237), conservatives encourage us to consider also the loss
that is in liberation.



Classical-liberal critics of egalitarian-liberal feminism argue
that



> 
> 
> the very arguments that rightly led to the legal reforms affecting the
> status of women during the 19th century militate against
> the demands for reform from the late 20th century
> women's movement. (Epstein 2002: 30; see also Tomasi 2009)
> 
> 
> 



That is, they hold that the defense of equal rights and independence
for women promulgated by these early feminists is incompatible with
the tendency of the contemporary women's movement to call on the
state to improve the lives of women (see
 SS2).


## 2. Classical-Liberal Feminism



In this article the term *classical-liberal feminism* is used
for a family of doctrines that range from libertarian feminist
doctrines that endorse very little (if any) state power to doctrines
that endorse more, yet still limited state power, largely unfettered
markets, and an expansive understanding of individual rights. The
doctrines in this family share the following. They conceive of freedom
as freedom from coercive interference; they hold that women, as well
as men, have a right to freedom from coercive interference due to
their status as self-owners; and they hold that coercive state power
is justified only to the extent necessary to protect the right to
freedom from coercive interference. *Equity feminists* are
classical-liberal feminists who hold that, in societies like the
United States, the only morally significant source of oppression of
women is the state. They hold that feminism's political role is
to bring an end to laws that limit women's freedom in
particular, but also to laws that grant special privileges to women.
Some equity feminists see a nonpolitical role for feminism, helping
women to benefit from their freedom by developing beneficial character
traits or strategies for success, or navigating among their increasing
options. Other equity feminists are socially conservative and argue
that, while the state should not enforce them, traditional values
function as bulwarks against state power and produce independent and
self-restraining citizens. *Cultural libertarian feminists* are
classical-liberal feminists who hold that the culture of societies
like the United States is patriarchal and a significant source of
oppression of women. They hold that the patriarchal culture and the
state are complementary systems of oppression. Cultural libertarian
feminists hold that much of the oppression women suffer today is
noncoercive, however, and thus should not be met with state remedies
but with a nonviolent movement for feminist social change.



Classical-liberal feminists understand themselves as heirs to the
first generation of feminist political philosophers, for example Mary
Wollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor Mill, and John Stuart Mill (Taylor
1992: 25-39); the first generation of feminist political
reformers in the United States, for example the abolitionist feminists
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Sarah Grimke (McElroy 2002a: 6-7));
and the tradition of 19th century anarchist feminism which
includes figures such as Voltairine de Cleyre (McElroy 2002a: 8;
Presley 2000; Presley & Sartwell 2005). Equity feminists (see
 SS2.2.1)
 stress the extent to which these early thinkers and activists
identify women's liberation with equal respect for women's
right against coercive interference (Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth
2001: 1-2). Cultural libertarian feminists (see
 SS2.3)
 emphasize the extent to which these thinkers and activists challenged
both coercive state power and the patriarchal culture (Presley 2000;
Long & Johnson 2005--see
 Other Internet Resources).


### 2.1 Self-Ownership and Women's Rights



Classical liberalism holds that women and men are self-owners capable
of acquiring property rights over things. As such women and men,
equally, have the right to freedom from coercive interference with
their person and property. This right to freedom from coercive
interference consists in, at least, rights to freedom of conscience
and expression, freedom to control what happens to one's body,
freedom of association, freedom to acquire, control and transfer
property, freedom of contract, as well as the right to compensation
when rights are violated. The state's role is, exclusively, to
protect citizens from coercive interference by protecting their
rights. Some reject even a limited state, however, holding that
nongovernmental means of protecting rights are to be preferred.



Classical-liberal feminists hold that the right to freedom from
coercive interference has powerful implications for women's
lives. It implies that women have the right to freedom in intimate,
sexual and reproductive matters. This includes sexual autonomy (the
right to engage in sexual activity of one's choosing including
the buying and selling of sex (Almodovar 2002; Lehrman 1997: 23), and
the right to defend oneself against sexual aggression, including the
use of firearms (Stevens, Teufel, & Biscan 2002)); freedom of
expression (the right to appear in, publish, and consume pornography
free of censorship (McElroy 1995; Strossen 2000)); freedom of intimate
association (the right to partner or enter into a private marriage
contract (McElroy 1991a: 20)); and reproductive freedom (the right to
use birth control, have an abortion (on the minority of pro-life
libertarians see Tabarrok 2002: 157), and buy and sell bodily
reproductive services, for example as in surrogate motherhood (Lehrman
1997: 22; McElroy 2002c; Paul 2002)). Freedom from interference with
person and property also means that women have the right to engage in
economic activity, entering contracts, and acquiring, controlling and
transferring property free of sexist state limits (Epstein 2002; Kirp,
Yudof, & Franks 1986: 204).



One way to characterize the wrong involved when states fail to
recognize these rights of women is as a failure to respect
women's right to be treated as men's equal, or the right
to equal treatment under the law. To be sure, classical-liberal
feminists hold that the law should not treat women and men
differently. But this is because they believe everyone has the same
rights, not because they believe women have a right to be treated the
same as men. This is clear when we note that, for classical-liberal
feminism, equal treatment under unjust law is not justice (McElroy
1991a: 3).



Same treatment under the law does not guarantee same outcomes.
Classical-liberal feminists hold that women's rights are not
violated when citizens exercise their rights in ways that create
unequal outcomes (Epstein 2002: 30). A woman's rights are
violated only when she is interfered with coercively, that is, when
there is, or is a threat of, forced loss of freedom, property or life
(which does not serve as just restraint or compensation).


### 2.2 Equity Feminism



Equity feminism is a form of classical-liberal feminism that holds
that feminism's *political* role is simply to ensure that
everyone's, including women's, right against coercive
interference is respected (Sommers 1994: 22). Wendy McElroy, an equity
feminist writes:



> 
> 
> I've always maintained that the only reason I call myself a
> feminist is because of [the] gov[ernment]. By which I mean, if the
> government (or an anarchist defense assoc[iation]) acknowledged the
> full equal rights of women without paternalistic protection or
> oppression, I would stop writing about women's issues. (McElroy
> 1998c--see
>  Other Internet Resources)
> 
> 
> 



Feminism's political role involves assuring that women's
right against coercive interference by private individuals is
recognized and protected by the state (for example women's right
against groping on the street or rape within marriage (McElroy
1991b)), and that women's right against coercive interference by
the state itself is respected. The latter means feminists should
object to laws that restrict women's liberty in particular (for
example laws that limit women's employment options (Taylor 1992:
228)), and laws that protect women in particular (for example laws
granting preferential treatment to women (Paul 1989)). Equity
feminists suggest that this has been largely accomplished in countries
like the United States. Joan Kennedy Taylor explains: feminism's
"goal of equal political liberty for women has been pretty much
reached in the United States" (Taylor 2001; see also Sommers
1994: 274).


#### 2.2.1 Equity Feminism on the Oppression of Women



On the equity feminist view, the feminist slogan "the personal
is political" is accurate when the state fails to recognize
women's right against coercive interference, especially in
women's personal lives. So, for example, in some countries
husbands have legal control over their wives' persons and
property. (Some equity feminists argue that the women's movement
in Western countries should not hesitate to criticize countries in
which this occurs (Sommers 2007).) But in countries like the United
States, where the right of women against this sort of coercive
interference is recognized and protected by law, equity feminists hold
that "the personal is no longer political" (Lehrman 1997:
5; see also 21).



If an individual or group of individuals suffers sustained and
systematic denial of their rights, on the equity feminist view, we may
call them oppressed. Women were oppressed in the United States during
most of its first two centuries; people of African descent were
oppressed before the dismantling of Jim Crow laws. While the culture
of the United States supported this denial of rights, equity feminists
hold that the oppressor was the state (McElroy 1998cc--see
 Other Internet Resources),
 which refused to recognize and protect the right of women and people
of African descent to treatment as self-owners. When the state
recognizes and protects this right of women and Americans of African
descent, they are no longer oppressed, even if the culture
disadvantages them. So, for example, in a discussion of whether Muslim
women are oppressed, Cathy Young focuses on whether women's
conformity with a religious tradition that subordinates them is
enforced by law. If it is, then women are oppressed (C. Young
2006).



If women are to be described as currently oppressed in societies like
the United States, on the equity feminist view, one must show that the
state fails to protect women, as a group, from sustained and
systematic rights violations. Some feminists have argued that violence
against women is pervasive in societies like the United States so
that, even though the law recognizes women's right against it,
that right is insufficiently protected and thus women endure sustained
and systematic denial of their right to bodily integrity (Dworkin
1991). Equity feminists endeavor to refute this claim by showing that
the prevalence of violence against women has been exaggerated. For
example Rita Simon contests the claim that as many as 154 out of 1,000
women have been raped. On her accounting, the number is closer to 19
per 1,000; and "rape is less common than other violent
crimes" (Simon 2002: 235). In addition, she claims, "the
criminal justice system does not ignore or make light of crimes
against females" (2002: 236). Katie Roiphe argues that date rape
is not a significant threat to women (Roiphe 1994). Concurring with
Roiphe, Cathy Young writes:



> 
> 
> women have sex after initial reluctance for a number of
> reasons.... [F]ear of being beaten up by their dates is rarely
> reported as one of them. (C. Young 1992)
> 
> 
> 



Women have also been said to be oppressed because their right to be
treated the same as men by employers, educational institutions, and
associations has been violated in a sustained and systematic way. That
is, some argue, women have been regularly denied the right to equal
access to opportunities because they are women. Equity feminists
generally hold that no rights are violated when employers, educational
institutions, public accommodations or associations discriminate
against women. Nonetheless, equity feminists argue that discrimination
against women is not a serious problem. Diana Furchtgott-Roth and
Christine Stolba argue that "complaints about systematic
economic discrimination against women simply do not square with the
evidence" (Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 1999: xi; see also
2001). They argue that "women's wages and education levels
are closing the gap with those of men" (1999: xii). In addition,
Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth claim that women have "surpassed men
in education" (23; see also 23-43). Christina Hoff Sommers
concurs, arguing that, rather than failing to provide girls with an
education equal to that of boys, our current educational system
disproportionately benefits girls (Sommers 2000: 20-23,
178).



Equity feminists argue that the differences in outcomes between women
and men can be explained, not by violence against women and sex
discrimination, but by differences in the preferences of women and men
(Epstein 2002: 33; Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 1999: xii). "In
many cases where women remain behind men, personal choices explain
outcomes more readily than does overt discrimination" (Stolba
& Furchtgott-Roth 1999: xii). To be sure, classical-liberal
feminists hold that women and men are sufficiently the same that they
have the "same political interests", in particular the
interest in being treated as a self-owner (McElroy 2002a:
14-15). But, for some equity feminists, biological differences
between the sexes largely explain the sex segregation in the workplace
and in family roles still common in countries like the United States
(Epstein 2002; Lehrman 1997: 5, 31).



Other equity feminists think biological sex differences alone do not
explain this phenomenon (C. Young 2004). Women's preferences may
reflect the effects of socialization or incentives: for example women
may be socialized to prefer stereotypically female roles, or the
rewards associated with such roles for women may provide motivation
for women to take them up. But equity feminists hold that, because
women are not legally required, or actually forced in some other way,
to choose traditional roles, their choices are not coerced and thus
state remedies are inappropriate. On the equity feminist view, a law
prohibiting women from becoming surgeons is coercive because it
constitutes a threat of loss of liberty or property. But if one is
socialized to prefer stay-at-home motherhood, or one discovers that
one prefers to stay home with children given the other real options,
one may still choose to become a surgeon without risking loss of
liberty or property. As Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth put it (using the
word "prevents" in a very strong sense): "Nothing
*prevents* women from choosing the surgical specialty"
(Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 1999: 60; my emphasis).


#### 2.2.2 Feminism's Nonpolitical Role



While equity feminists hold that feminism's political
task--securing for women the right to freedom from coercive
interference--is nearly completed, some equity feminists believe
that feminism has a *nonpolitical* role to play in
women's personal lives. In its nonpolitical role, feminism can
help women to develop character traits and strategies that will help
them benefit from their freedom; and it can help women to navigate
personally among their increasing options.



Karen Lehrman writes:



> 
> 
> Men have typically held title to quite a few traits that women can now
> put to good use. In addition to ambition, assertiveness, and
> independence, there's also decisiveness. (Lehrman 1997: 33; see
> also 62)
> 
> 
> 



Other character traits emphasized by equity feminists include
"self-confidence" (Stevens et al. 2002: 255), being able
to think and argue independently (McElroy 1998a), and taking
responsibility for oneself (Taylor 1992: 86). Some equity feminists
suggest that feminism offers individual women and men the opportunity
for freedom from conformity with sex roles (Lehrman 1997: 6; Taylor
1992: 23-24).



Equity feminists recommend strategies for success for women in
education and employment as alternatives to state regulation. In male
dominated fields, for example, equity feminists recommend that women
mentor one another or organize supportive associations, making use of
the techniques of 1960's feminism like consciousness-raising
(Taylor 1992: 100-101). Some recommend that, instead of being
ambivalent about work outside of the home, women should "lean
in" to it (Sandberg 2013). In *What You Can Do About Sexual
Harassment When You Don't Want to Call the Cops*, Joan
Kennedy Taylor argues that women can avoid sexual harassment or lessen
its impact if they learn to diffuse conflicts with men and understand
the role of sexual banter in male culture (Taylor 1999). Equity
feminists also recommend that women make full use of their right to
contract by turning their preferences--for example the preference
for being paid and/or promoted on the basis of one's job
performance and not on the basis of sexual favors--into rights
through contract (Epstein 2002: 40; Taylor 1992: 169).



Some equity feminists stress that women need not give up their gender
difference to benefit from their freedom (Lehrman 1997: 198). As Karen
Lehrman writes, "completing the feminist
revolution...primarily involves [women] completing their own
personal evolutions" (1997: 35). Lehrman quotes Elizabeth Cady
Stanton:



> 
> 
> the strongest reason for giving woman ... a complete emancipation
> from all forms of bondage of custom, dependence, superstition ...
> is the solitude and personal responsibility of her own individual
> life. (1997: 201, quoting "The Solitude of Self"
> [1892])
> 
> 
> 



An important part of this individual life, on Lehrman's view, is
navigating among sexual difference and sameness in the personal
construction of a satisfying life.


#### 2.2.3 Socially Conservative Equity Feminism



Some equity feminists are socially conservative (Morse 2001; Sommers
2000). To be sure, equity feminism as described here is a form of
classical-liberalism. As such it involves the claim that traditional
values should not be imposed on citizens by the state. For example,
the state should not tax citizens to support institutions that promote
traditional values; nor should the criminal or civil law create
incentives for adherence to such values. But some equity feminists
hold that it is best when citizens voluntarily adhere to traditional
values. They hold that widespread voluntary adherence to traditional
values is conducive to well-being in society because traditional
values make possible the reproduction of independent and
"self-restraining citizens" who are "the basis of
free institutions, both economic and political" (Morse 2001:
161).



Socially conservative equity feminists do not take the classical
liberal theory of the limits of state power to imply endorsement of a
libertine cultural ethos. So, for example, while socially conservative
equity feminists hold that the state should not force citizens to
accept traditional family forms (because individuals have a right
against such coercive interference), they hold that society should
strongly discourage disfavored ways of life and encourage favored ones
through noncoercive, nonstate means. Socially conservative equity
feminists hold that when feminism strays from its political role of
assuring equal rights and ventures into women's personal lives
it tends to discourage in women the kinds of delayed gratification and
self-sacrifice on which vital social institutions, like the family,
depend (Morse 2001: 133).



To be sure, there are *political* conservatives who take equity
feminism's claim that women and men should be treated the same
by the law as a rule of thumb. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese is an example of
such a political conservative (Fox-Genovese 1991; 1996). The
difference between political conservatives who embrace the equity
feminist account of women's equality and socially conservative
equity feminists is that the former endorse the use of state power to
promote traditional values while the latter do not. Also, socially
conservative equity feminists hold that individuals' political
rights derive from their status as self-owners (Morse 2001: 57) while
political conservatives hold that citizens' political rights
derive from their status as members of communities (Fox-Genovese 1991:
9). In contemporary popular political discourse it is often hard to
distinguish these two, as they are in political coalition. To appeal
to both classical liberal and socially conservative constituencies, on
occasion theorists help themselves to a bit of both traditions. For
example, Jennifer Roback Morse identifies herself as a libertarian:
"When the topic is the proper relationship between the
individual and the state, libertarianism is pretty much the right
path" (Morse 2001: 4). But she also makes the un-libertarian and
politically conservative recommendation that the state should
intervene in personal relationships by making it "costly to
divorce" (2001: 164, see also 104, 111).


### 2.3 Cultural Libertarian Feminism



Cultural libertarianism is a form of classical liberalism that is



> 
> 
> concerned about constraints on individual freedom from government as
> well as from traditionalist familial, religious, and community
> institutions--the same civil institutions that conservatives see
> as necessary for ordered liberty to thrive. (C. Young 2007)
> 
> 
> 



Cultural libertarian feminism holds that these institutions reflect
the patriarchal nature of society and oppress women. Thus cultural
libertarian feminism recognizes sources of women's oppression
other than the state (Presley 2000; Long & Johnson 2005--see
 Other Internet Resources).
 As Charles Johnson and Roderick Long put it, patriarchal culture and
the state are "interlocking systems of oppression" (Long
& Johnson 2005--see
 Other Internet Resources),
 both of which should be opposed by feminists. They explain:



> 
> 
> There is nothing inconsistent or un-libertarian in holding that
> women's choices under patriarchal social structures can be
> sufficiently "voluntary," in the libertarian sense, to be
> entitled to immunity from coercive legislative interference, while at
> the same time being sufficiently "involuntary," in a
> broader sense, to be recognized as morally problematic and as a
> legitimate target of social activism. (Long & Johnson
> 2005--see
>  Other Internet Resources).
> 
> 
> 



Calling this view "anarchist feminism", Sharon Presley
writes: "What the anarchist feminists are calling for is a
radical restructuring of society, both in its public and private
institutions" (Presley 2000). Such feminists hold that much of
the oppression women currently suffer is noncoercive, however. Laws
against prostitution are coercive--the state can put a violator
in jail or force her to pay a fine. But on the cultural libertarian
feminist view much of the pressure to conform to gender roles is not
coercive. Noncoercive oppression can be resisted, although it is often
not easy to do so. Cultural libertarian feminists hold that
noncoercive oppression should not be remedied by the state (see also
Tomasi 2009). As Presley and Kinsky explain, on the cultural
libertarian view, to try to remedy the noncoercive oppression of women
with coercive state action "just changes the sort of oppression,
not the fact" (Presley & Kinsky 1991: 78). This oppression
should be opposed by a nonviolent movement for feminist social
change.



Cultural libertarian feminists target the patriarchal culture by, for
example, developing in individuals (especially women) the ability to
be independent. This involves enabling individuals to resist authority
and think for themselves (Presley 2001). Cultural libertarian
feminists also recommend the development of more deeply consensual
relationships and institutions (Heckert 2004--see
 Other Internet Resources),
 relationships and institutions in which there is an equality of
authority (Long 2001--see
 Other Internet Resources).
 While some equity feminists (see
 SS1.2)
 would applaud this work, they would call it "personal",
reserving the term "political" for the work of securing
for women their right against coercive interference. Equity feminist
Wendy McElroy writes:



> 
> 
> I understand that there is a cultural form of feminism and many women
> would still fight for improved prestige or status, and I
> wouldn't criticis[e] them for doing so. It just wouldn't
> grip me. Guess I'm a political animal after all. (McElroy
> 1998c--see
>  Other Internet Resources)
> 
> 
> 



But cultural libertarian feminists consider this work to be an
integral part of a larger political struggle for women's
freedom.


### 2.4 Anti-Discrimination Law and Preferential Treatment



Classical-liberal feminism requires same treatment of women and men
under just law. This means that sex discrimination by the state, for
example when the state functions as an employer, is impermissible
(Block 1991: 102; Epstein 2002: 34; Warnick 2003: 1608). But
classical-liberal feminists oppose laws that prohibit discrimination
against women by nonstate actors, for example in employment,
education, public accommodations, or associations (McElroy 1991b:
22-23; Epstein 2002). They hold that the interaction of citizens
should be subject to state control only to the extent necessary to
protect citizens' right against coercive interference.
Businesses violate citizens' right against coercive interference
if they steal from their customers or employees; associations violate
it if they extort their members; colleges violate it if they kidnap
students. But businesses do not violate this right if they refuse to
do business with women, pay women less for the same work, or create a
working environment that is hostile to them because of their sex.
Private educational institutions do not violate this right if they
refuse to educate girls or women, offer them an inferior education, or
create a learning environment that is hostile to them because of their
sex. Business and professional associations do not violate this right
if they refuse to admit women as members or make them feel unwelcome
because of their sex.



Classical-liberal feminism, as described here, clearly implies
rejection of the legal prohibition against private discrimination in
employment, education, public accommodations, and associations. But in
the literature one finds a range of views. Some categorically reject
any legal protection against private discrimination (Taylor 1992: 62).
Others accept basic protections such as those afforded in U.S. law by
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972; but reject more
robust protections, such as non-remedial affirmative action or
comparable worth (Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 2001: 179; see also
107-108).



Classical-liberal feminism holds that private businesses, educational
institutions, and associations are free to give or withhold
preferential treatment to women. But the state may not treat women
preferentially because the state must treat citizens the same
regardless of sex. Nor may the state require that private businesses,
educational institutions, or associations treat women preferentially.
This is because, on the classical-liberal feminist view, failure to
treat women preferentially is not a violation of anyone's right
against coercive interference. Examples of preferential treatment
under the law, which classical-liberal feminists oppose, include
affirmative action in employment and education (Lehrman 1997: 25),
comparable worth (Paul 1989) and advantages for women in the legal
treatment of custody and domestic violence (Simon 2002).



While classical-liberal feminists resist state remedies for private
discrimination against women, they also hold that such discrimination
is not currently a serious problem in countries like the United
States. In addition, they argue,



> 
> 
> even where discrimination may exist, we find little, if any, evidence
> that expanded government intervention would serve any useful purpose.
> (Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 1999: xii)
> 
> 
> 



and speculate that freer markets would make whatever discrimination
currently takes place even more rare (McElroy 2002b, 187).


### 2.5 Justification



Much of the classical-liberal feminist literature, especially the
equity feminist literature, is written for public policy and popular
audiences, so emphasis is on policy implications rather than
philosophical justifications. Nonetheless, we find in the literature a
variety of justifications, some consequentialist and some
non-consequentialist.



The most common justification offered in the classical-liberal
feminist literature is consequentialist. This argument says that the
political arrangements recommended by classical-liberalism, as
compared with the alternatives, will provide women with more of what
is good for them: for example safety, income and wealth, and options.
Liberalizing guns laws will make women safer (Stevens, et al. 2002);
legalizing prostitution and pornography will improve the lives of
women in those trades (Almodovar 2002; Strossen 2000) and open
opportunities for others; freer markets will root out discrimination
against women and stimulate the proliferation of amenities essential
to working women, like daycare centers (Epstein 2002: 33; Paul 2002:
208-209; Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 2001: 124, 180; Conway
1998). Indeed, some argue that liberalizing the market will release
such an "explosion of prosperity" that women will not need
help from a welfare state (Long 1997--see
 Other Internet Resources).



A variety of non-consequentialist arguments are offered as well. Kirp,
Yudof, and Franks, for example, refer to Kant's categorical
imperative and claim that treating individuals as self-owners is what
is meant by treating individuals as ends in themselves ((Kirp, et al.
1986: 13-14). Wendy McElroy grounds her thought in the natural
law tradition (McElroy 1998b). Some imply a perfectionist
justification according to which the perfection of the human being
requires being treated as a self-owner (Presley 2001).


### 2.6 Criticism



Some criticism of classical-liberal feminism addresses the
consequentialist argument offered in support of classical-liberal
feminism. The consequentialist argument says that the political
arrangements recommended by classical-liberalism, as compared with the
alternatives, will provide women with more of what is good for them
(see
 SS2.5).
 Following Ashlie Warnick, we can distinguish the claim that
particular liberty-restricting policies are bad for women (and that
some liberty-enhancing policies are good for women) from the claim
that all liberty-restricting policies harm women, or that a minimal
state (or no state) would be better for women overall (Warnick 2003).
It is surely possible to cite liberty-restricting policies that are
bad for women--laws limiting women's employment
options--and thus to cite liberty-enhancing policies that are
good for women--not having such laws. But it is also possible to
cite liberty-restricting policies that are good for women--for
example the legal prohibition against sex discrimination in
employment, education, and public accommodations (which
classical-liberal feminists recommend dismantling (see
 SS2.4)).
 Of course, if sex discrimination is rare, as some classical-liberal
feminists contend (see
 SS2.2.1),
 laws prohibiting it will not produce much benefit. But, as
egalitarian-liberal feminists Deborah Rhode and Ann Cudd argue, sex
discrimination remains a significant problem (Rhode 1997: 156; Cudd
2006: 140-142). Think also of the classical-liberal feminist
recommendation that women and men be treated exactly the same by the
state (see
 SS2.1
 and
 SS2.4).
 While different treatment can stigmatize and entrench stereotypes,
same treatment can disadvantage women if they are not similarly
situated to men--which, arguably, is the case (Minow 1990). So
the larger case--that all liberty-restricting policies harm
women, or that a minimal state (or no state) would be better for women
overall--has not been made convincingly (Warnick 2003). Another
concern about the larger case is that much of the support offered is
speculative, for example Roderick Long's assertion that
"the explosion of prosperity" classical liberal
arrangements would bring about "would go a long way toward
providing women with an economic safety net more effective than any
government welfare program" (Long 1997--see
 Other Internet Resources).



Some criticism addresses non-consequentialist arguments for
classical-liberal feminism. These arguments say that, regardless of
the consequences, women and men should be treated as self-owners with
rights to property justly acquired and to freedom from coercive
interference because this is what they deserve as ends in themselves,
because this is what insight into natural law teaches, or because this
is what their perfection requires (see
 SS2.5).
 Critics contend that even if we concede the relevant
classical-liberal premises--that women and men should be treated
in ways they deserve as ends in themselves, or as natural law teaches,
or in ways their perfection requires--it does not follow that the
state should treat individuals merely as self-owners entitled only to
property justly acquired and freedom from coercive interference. For
example, egalitarian-liberal feminism suggests that treating
individuals as ends in themselves requires legal measures to protect
women's personal and political autonomy--measures such as
anti-discrimination law, workplace changes to accommodate caregiving
responsibilities, and adequate material means (see
 SS1.1.4
 and
 SS1.2.1).
 Since classical-liberal feminism rejects such measures,
egalitarian-liberal feminism suggests that it fails to treat women as
ends in themselves. Also, that treating individuals as ends in
themselves means treating them as entitled merely to protection from
coercive interference is plausible only if one ignores the fact of
human dependency. By the fact of human dependency is meant the fact
that all human beings are utterly dependent on the caregiving of
others for many years at the start of life, that many come to need the
caregiving of others due to temporary or permanent disability later in
life, and that many require caregiving when they become infirm at the
end of life; and also, that those who provide caregiving for those who
cannot care for themselves become dependent on others for support
(Kittay 1995: 10). If human beings are dependent in these ways, then
treating them as ends in themselves will, at least for some of the
time, mean something other than merely leaving them alone. Failure to
recognize this suggests that classical-liberal feminism assumes that
there is a nonpolitical "realm of private life in which the
reproductive and nurturant needs of human beings are taken care
of" (Okin 1989: 75). Such an assumption makes it impossible to
evaluate the justice of the arrangements under which caregiving is
given and received and removes from our consideration the nature of
obligations to, and entitlements of, members of society who require
caregiving to survive and thrive. Some worry that one form of
classical liberalism--libertarianism--seriously
misunderstands the political relevance of caregiving because it
construes one key caregiving arrangement, the parent-child
relationship, as one of ownership (see Okin 1989: 80-85; see
also Nozick 1974; Andersson 2007; and Jeske 1996). As Jennifer Roback
Morse, herself a libertarian puts it: "I think it is well to
admit... that our inattention to family life and community
responsibility has left libertarians open to the charge that we do not
care very much about these matters" (Morse 2001: 28).