## 1. Aristotle's Works on Rhetoric



The work that has come down to us as Aristotle's
*Rhetoric* or *Art of Rhetoric* consists of three books,
while the ancient catalogue of the Aristotelian works, reported e.g.
by Diogenes Laertius, mentions only two books on rhetoric (probably
our *Rhetoric* I & II), plus two further books on style
(perhaps our *Rhetoric* III?). Whereas most modern authors
agree that at least the core of *Rhetoric* I & II presents
a coherent rhetorical theory, the two themes of *Rhetoric* III
(style/diction and the partition of speeches) are not mentioned in the
original agenda of *Rhetoric* I & II. The conceptual link
between *Rhetoric* I & II and *Rhetoric* III is not
given until the very last sentence of the second book, so the
authenticity of this seeming *ad hoc* connection is slightly
suspicious; we cannot rule out the possibility that these two parts of
the *Rhetoric* were not put together until the first complete
edition of Aristotle's works was accomplished by Andronicus of
Rhodes in the first century. In Aristotle's *Poetics*
(1456a33) we find a cross-reference to a work called
'*Rhetoric*' which obviously refers only to
*Rhetoric* I & II, but does not seem to include the agenda
of *Rhetoric* III, suggesting that Aristotle at this time
regards *Rhetoric* I & II as the complete work. Regardless
of such doubts, the systematic idea that links the two heterogeneous
parts of the *Rhetoric* -- *Rhetoric* I & II on
the one hand and *Rhetoric* III on the other-- does make
good sense: it is not enough, or so the linking passage says, to have
a supply of things to say (the so-called 'thought'); one
should also know how to express or formulate those things (the
so-called 'style'), so that the project of
*Rhetoric* I & II concerning what we say (or the
'thought') needs to be complemented by the peculiar
project of *Rhetoric* III (i.e. a treatise on
'style').



The chronological fixing of the *Rhetoric* has turned out to be
a delicate and controversial matter. At least the core of
*Rhetoric* I & II seems to be an early work (see e.g.
During 1966, 118-125, Rist 1989, 85-86, Rapp 2002 I,
178-184), written during Aristotle's first stay in Athens
(it is unclear, however, which chapters belong to that core; regularly
mentioned are the chapters I.4-15 and II.1-17). It is true
that the *Rhetoric* also refers to historical events that fall
in the time of Aristotle's exile and his second stay in Athens
(see SS 1 of
 Aristotle),
 but most of them can be found in just two chapters, namely chapters
II.23-24, and moreover such examples could have been updated,
which is especially plausible if we assume that the *Rhetoric*
formed the basis of a lecture course held several times. However, what
is most striking are its affinities to the early work *Topics*
(for the idea that the *Topics* is early see e.g. Solmsen 1929,
191-195; for a discussion of Solmsen's theses in English
see Stocks 1933); if, as is widely agreed nowadays, the
*Topics* represents a pre-syllogistic stage of Aristotelian
logic, the same is likely to be true of the *Rhetoric*, as we
actually find only few or even no hints to syllogistic inventory in
it. (Indeed, the *Rhetoric* includes two short passages that
explicitly refer to the *Analytics*, which presents
Aristotle's syllogistic theory: I.2, 1357a22-1358a2,
II.25, 1402b13-1403a16. Some authors -- e.g. Solmsen 1929,
13-31, Burnyeat 1994, 31, Allen 2001, 20-40 -- take
this as evidence that at least in these two passages the
*Rhetoric* makes use of the syllogistic theory, while others
-- e.g. Rapp 2002, II 202-204 -- object to this
inference.)



It seems that Aristotle was the author not only of the
*Rhetoric* as we know it today, but of several treatises
dealing with rhetoric. According to ancient testimonies, Aristotle
wrote an early dialogue on rhetoric entitled
'*Grullos*', in which he put forward arguments for
why rhetoric cannot be an art (*techne*); and since this
is precisely the position of Plato's *Gorgias* (see
SS4 of
 Plato: rhetoric and poetry),
 the lost dialogue *Grullos* has traditionally been regarded as
a sign of Aristotle's (alleged) early Platonism (see Solmsen
1929, 196-208). But the evidence for the position defended in
this dialogue is too tenuous to support such strong conclusions: it
also could have been a 'dialectical' dialogue, simply
listing the pros and cons of the thesis that rhetoric is an art (see
Lossau 1974). We are in a similar situation concerning another lost
work on rhetoric, the so-called '*Techne
Sunagoge*', a collection of previous theories of
rhetoric that is also ascribed to Aristotle. Cicero seems to use this
collection, or at least a secondary source relying on it, as his main
historical source when he gives a short survey of the history of
pre-Aristotelian rhetoric in his *Brutus* 46-48. Finally,
Aristotle once mentions a work called
'*Theodecteia*' which has also been supposed to be
Aristotelian; but more probably he refers to the rhetorical handbook
of his follower Theodectes, who was also a former pupil of Isocrates.
From these lost works on rhetoric we only have a meagre collection of
scattered fragments (frg. 68-69 R3, 114
R3, 125-141 R3: see Rose 1886).


## 2. The Structure of the *Rhetoric*



The structure of *Rhetoric* I & II is determined by two
tripartite divisions. The first division consists in the distinction
between the three *pisteis*, i.e. 'persuaders' or
'means of persuasion', that are technical in the sense
that they are based on the rhetorical method and are provided by the
speech alone. And speech can produce persuasion either through the
character (*ethos*) of the speaker, the emotional state
(*pathos*) of the listener, or the argument (*logos*)
itself (see below
 SS 5).
 The second tripartite division concerns the three species or genres
of public speech (see de Brauw 2008 and Pepe 2013). A speech that
takes place in the assembly is defined as a *deliberative
speech*. In this rhetorical genre, the speaker either advises the
audience to do something or warns against doing something.
Accordingly, the audience has to judge things that are going to happen
in the future, and they have to decide whether these future events are
good or bad for the city or city-state (*polis*), whether they
will cause advantage or harm. A speech that takes place before a court
is defined as a *judicial speech*. The speaker either accuses
somebody or defends herself or someone else. Naturally, this kind of
speech treats things that happened in the past. The audience, or
rather the jury, has to judge whether a past event actually happened
or not and whether it was just or unjust, i.e., whether it was in
accordance with the law or contrary to the law. While the deliberative
and judicial genres have their context in controversial situations in
which the listener has to decide in favour of one of two opposing
parties, the third genre does not aim at such a decision: an
*epideictic speech* (e.g. funeral speeches, celebratory
speeches) praises or blames somebody, and tries to describe the
affairs or deeds of its subject as honourable or shameful.



The first book of the *Rhetoric* treats these three genres in
succession. *Rhetoric* I.4-8 deals with the deliberative,
I.9 with the epideictic, I.10-14 with the judicial genre. These
chapters are understood as contributing to the argumentative mode of
persuasion (*logos*) or -- more precisely -- to that
part of argumentative persuasion that is specific to the respective
genre of speech. The second part of the treatment of argumentative
persuasion (*logos*) that is common to all three genres of
rhetorical speech is treated in chapters II.19-26. The second
means of persuasion, the one that works by evoking the emotions of the
audience (*pathos*), is described in chapters II.2-11.
Although the following chapters II.12-17 treat different types
of character (*ethos*), these chapters do not, as one
might infer, develop the first means of persuasion, i.e. the one that
depends on the character of the speaker. The underlying theory of this
means of persuasion is rather unfolded in a few lines of chapter II.1.
The aforementioned chapters II.12-17 rather account for
different types of character and their disposition to emotional
response, which can be useful for speakers who want to arouse the
emotions of the audience. Why the chapters on the specific (in the
first book) and the common (in the second book) argumentative means of
persuasion (*logos*) are separated by the treatment of emotions
and character (in II.2-17) remains a riddle, especially since
the chapter II.18 tries to give a link between the specific and the
common aspects of argumentative persuasion -- as though this
chapter follows directly upon the end of *Rhetoric* I.
*Rhetoric* III.1-12 discusses several questions of style
(see below
 SS 8.1)
 while *Rhetoric* III.13-19 is dedicated to the various
parts of a speech and their arrangement.



Owing to ambiguities like these, the structuring of the
*Rhetoric* has always been somewhat controversial, since
different attempts to structure the work manifest different
interpretative decisions. By and large, though, the following
structure seems to capture its main topics and divisions:



***Rhetoric* I** 



* Ch. 1: Rhetoric as a counterpart to dialectic --
dialectically conceived rhetoric is centred on proofs --
rhetorical proofs are 'enthymemes' -- this is
neglected by previous manuals of rhetoric that focus instead on
emotions, slandering and on other techniques for speaking outside the
subject -- "speaking outside the subject" is
forbidden in states with good legislation -- the benefits of
rhetoric.
* Ch. 2: Rhetoric is the capacity to discern the available
persuasive potential in any given case -- means of persuasion
(*pisteis*) based on the art (*techne*) of
rhetoric vs. artless means of persuasion -- of the art-based
means of persuasion (*pisteis*) there are three types:
	+ Through the speaker: credibility of the speaker
	(*ethos*)
	+ Through the hearer: the emotional state of the audience
	(*pathos*)
	+ Through the argument: proving or seemingly proving what is true
	(*logos*) Deductive and inductive types of rhetorical arguments --
the enthymeme as the deductive type of rhetorical argument --
peculiarities of rhetorical arguments -- enthymemes from
probabilities and signs -- the technique of *topoi*
-- the difference between generally applicable and specific
*topoi*.
* Ch. 3: There are three genres of public speech:
	+ Judicial (or forensic) speech deals with accusation and defence
	about past events -- aiming at the just/unjust.
	+ Deliberative (or political) speech deals with exhortation and
	dissuasion about future events -- aiming at the
	advantageous/harmful.
	+ Epideictic speech deals with praise and blame primarily with
	regard to the present time -- aiming at the
	honourable/shameful.
* Ch. 4-8: Premises or *topoi* specific to the
deliberative speech: Types of advantageous/harmful things the speaker
should be familiar with (Ch. 4) -- Happiness
(*eudaimonia*) (Ch. 5) -- what is good/advantageous (Ch.
6) -- what is better/more advantageous (Ch. 7) -- the
various constitutions (Ch. 8).
* Ch. 9: Premises or *topoi* specific to the epideictic
speech: virtue and vice -- the honourable and the
blameworthy.
* Ch. 10-14: Premises or *topoi* specific to the
judicial speech: wrong-doing and motives for wrong-doing (Ch. 10)
-- pleasure (Ch. 11) -- the state of mind of the wrong-doers
and characteristics of their victims (Ch. 12) -- kinds of just
and unjust deeds, unwritten laws (Ch. 13) -- degrees of
wrong-doing (Ch. 14).
* Ch. 15: Artless means of persuasion (i.e. means that cannot be
invented by the art, but are just given -- such as contracts,
laws, witnesses, oaths, torture -- and need to be used in one way
or the other), mostly connected with judicial speech.




***Rhetoric* II**



* Ch. 1: Why persuasion through *logos* is insufficient
-- how persuasion through *ethos* and
*pathos* is supposed to work.
* Ch. 2-11: Particular types of emotions
(*pathe*) and their counterparts: anger (Ch. 2) --
mildness (Ch. 3) -- loving/friendly affection (*philia*)
and hating (Ch. 4) -- fear and confidence (Ch. 5) -- shame
and lack of shame (Ch. 6) -- gratefulness and lack of
gratefulness (Ch. 7) -- pity (Ch. 8) -- indignation plus two
nameless emotions (Ch. 9) -- envy (Ch. 10) -- emulation or
ambition (Ch.11).
* Ch. 12-17: Different types of character
(*ethos*): the character of young people (Ch. 12), of
elderly people (Ch. 13), of people in the prime of their life (Ch.
14), of people of noble birth (Ch. 15), of wealthy people (Ch. 16) and
of powerful people (Ch. 18).
* Ch. 18: Transition to generally applicable aspects of persuasion
through *logos*:
* Ch. 19-25: Generally applicable aspects of persuasion
through *logos*: *topoi* about the possible/impossible,
past and future facts, significance and insignificance (Ch. 19)
-- examples: factual (report) and fictitious (the parable and the
fable) (Ch. 20) -- maxims (Ch. 21) -- the enthymeme (Ch. 22)
-- *topoi* for the construction of enthymemes (Ch. 23)
-- *topoi* for the construction of merely apparent (i.e.
fallacious) enthymemes (Ch. 24) -- refutation (Ch. 25).
* Ch. 26: Amplification -- transition to *Rhetoric*
III.




***Rhetoric* III**, **Ch. 1-12: Style
(*lexis*):**



* Ch. 1: Delivery of a speech and why style/diction should be
considered.
* Ch. 2-3: The virtue and the vices of prose style: the
excellent prose style is neither too banal nor above the due dignity,
but appropriate -- the choice of words -- the role of
metaphors (Ch. 2) -- Four deterrent factors (or vices) of style
(Ch. 3).
* Ch. 4-11: Particular ingredients of prose style: the simile
(Ch. 4) -- linguistic correctness (Ch. 5) -- stylistic
voluminousness and its contrary (Ch. 6) -- appropriateness in
style (Ch. 7) -- periodic style (Ch. 8) -- rhythm (Ch. 9)
-- urbanity, bringing before the eyes, metaphors (Ch.
10-11).
* Ch. 12: Written and oral style.




***Rhetoric* III**, **Ch. 13-19:
Arrangement (*taxis*):**



* Ch. 13: Only two parts of the speech are necessary, namely the
statement and the proof of the main claim -- contemporary authors
of rhetorical manuals make futile subdivisions of the parts of speech
-- introduction of a quadripartite scheme of the speech: (1)
proem, (2) statement of the main claim, (3) proof of the stated claim
(*pistis*), (4) epilogue.
* Ch. 14-19: Particular parts of the speech: the proem in the
three genres of speech (Ch. 14) -- *topoi* for slandering
(Ch. 15) -- narration (Ch. 16) -- proof (*pistis*)
(Ch. 17) -- interrogation (Ch. 18) -- epilogue/conclusion
(Ch. 19).



## 3. Rhetoric as a Counterpart to Dialectic



Aristotle stresses right from the beginning of his *Rhetoric*
that rhetoric is closely related to dialectic. He offers several
formulations to describe the affinity between these two disciplines:
in the first line of the book *Rhetoric* rhetoric is said to be
a 'counterpart' (*antistrophos*) to dialectic
(*Rhet.* I.1, 1354a1); in the second chapter of the first book
it is also called an 'outgrowth' or 'offshoot'
(*paraphues ti*) of dialectic and the study of character
(*Rhet.* I.2, 1356a25f.); finally, Aristotle says that rhetoric
is part of dialectic and resembles it (*Rhet.* I.2,
1356a30f.).



In saying that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic, Aristotle
obviously wants to allude to Plato's *Gorgias* (464bff.),
where rhetoric is ironically defined as a counterpart to cookery in
the soul. Since, in this passage, Plato uses the word
'*antistrophos*' to indicate an analogy, it is
likely that Aristotle wants to express a kind of analogy too: what
dialectic is for the (private or academic) practice of attacking and
maintaining an argument, rhetoric is for the (public) practice of
defending oneself or accusing an opponent.



The notion of 'dialectic' is prominent in the work of
Aristotle's teacher, Plato; Plato often labels his philosophical
method, or certain parts of it, as dialectic. In his dialogue
*Gorgias* (see SS4 of
 Plato: rhetoric and poetry),
 dialectic seems to be strictly opposed to rhetoric, the former aiming
at the disclosure of truth, the latter allegedly aiming at
'persuasion without knowledge'. In his *Phaedrus*
Plato pictures the relation between dialectic and rhetoric in a
different way (see SS5.1 of
 Plato: rhetoric and poetry);
 here he entertains the idea of a new philosophical rhetoric, quite
different from the then contemporary style of speech writing, which
rests upon dialectic, the genuine philosophical method, for acquiring
genuine knowledge both of the subject matter of a speech and of the
soul of the audience. When Aristotle speaks of dialectic, he certainly
has his book *Topics* in mind, where he develops at some length
an argumentative method for attacking and defending theses of any
content (see SS8 of
 Aristotle: logic).
 Clearly, Aristotle's dialectical method was inspired by Plato
and by the debates in Plato's Academy; however, while Plato
often presents dialectic as a method for discovering and conveying
truth, Aristotelian dialectic is strictly confined to examining
particular claims or testing the consistency of a set of propositions
(which in his view is different from establishing or proving the truth
of a proposition). This is, in a nutshell, the context that must be
kept in mind, when Aristotle presents -- quite allusively --
a new art of rhetoric by stressing its affinity to dialectic;
obviously he plays upon his readers' expectations concerning the
meaning of dialectic and the relation between dialectic and rhetoric,
as described by Plato. Those students of Plato's Academy who
were still suspicious about any engagement with rhetoric and public
speech possibly received the opening of Aristotle's
*Rhetoric* with its postulated affinity between rhetoric and
dialectic either as a provoction or as some sort of joke.



This purported analogy between rhetoric and dialectic (as conceived by
Aristotle) can be substantiated by several common features of both
disciplines:


* Both rhetoric and dialectic are concerned with things that do not
belong to a definite genus or are not the object of a specific
science.
* Both rhetoric and dialectic are not dependent on the established
principles of specific sciences.
* Both rhetoric and dialectic have the function of providing
arguments.
* Both rhetorical and dialectical arguments rely on assumptions or
premises that are not established as true, but are only reputable or
accepted by one group or the other (*endoxa*).
* Both rhetoric and dialectic are concerned with both sides of an
opposition, dialectic by constructing arguments for and against any
thesis, rhetoric by considering what is possibly persuasive in any
given case.



This analogy to dialectic has extremely significant ramifications for
the status of Aristotle's supposedly new art of rhetoric. Plato
argued in his *Gorgias* that rhetoric could not be an art
(*techne*), since it is not related to a definite
subject, while real arts are defined by their specific subjects, as
e.g. medicine or shoemaking are defined by their products (health and
shoes). By claiming that rhetoric and dialectic are similar or
analogous, Aristotle suggests a quite different picture. The analogy
is even meant to flesh out the thought that neither rhetoric nor
dialectic are like ordinary arts (*technai*) or sciences with a
limited, well-defined subject matter. However, this should not be seen
as a drawback, or so the analogy suggests, since the alleged
shortcoming, i.e. that they do not have such a definite subject
matter, can be turned into a virtue, by entrusting to dialectic and
rhetoric the practices that are common to all fields of rationality,
namely the various practices of argumentation. For even though
dialectic has no definite subject, it is easy to see that it
nevertheless employs a consistent method (both in Plato's and
Aristotle's understanding of dialectic), because dialectic has
to grasp the ultimate reason why some arguments are valid and others
are not. Now, if rhetoric is nothing but the counterpart to dialectic
within the domain of public speech, it must be similarly grounded in
an investigation of what is persuasive and what is not, and this, in
turn, qualifies rhetoric as an art or, after all, as a discipline that
is methodologically not inferior to dialectic.



As already indicated, it is crucial for both disciplines, dialectic
and rhetoric, that they deal with arguments from accepted premises
(*endoxa*). Dialecticians do not argue on the basis of
established, scientific principles, but on the basis of only reputable
assumptions, i.e. of what is accepted either by all or the many or the
few experts. In a similar vein, rhetoricians or orators try to hit
assumptions that are already accepted by their audience, because they
want to persuade the addressees on the basis of their own convictions.
Of course, owing to the different fields of application --
philosophical-academic debates in the case of dialectic, mostly
public speeches in the case of rhetoric -- the situation is not
quite the same. While e.g. the dialectician tries to test the
consistency of a set of propositions, the rhetorician tries to achieve
the persuasion of a given audience, and while dialectic proceeds by
questioning and answering, rhetoric for the most part proceeds in
continuous-monologic form. Still, and in spite of these
differences, the method of both dialectic and rhetoric share the same
core idea that they have to hit certain, accepted assumptions of their
addressees -- the dialectical disputant in order to get the
explicit assent of the dialectical opponent, the rhetorician in order
to base the rhetorical proofs on views the audience already finds
convincing. Furthermore, just as the dialectician is interested in
deductions and inductions for refuting the opponent's claims,
the rhetorician is interested in deductions and inductions that
logically connect (or seem to connect) the audience's existing
convictions with certain other views that the rhetorician wishes to
establish (see below
 SS 6).
 For, indeed, Aristotle seems to think that arguments or proofs are
central to any process of persuasion, for people are most or most
easily persuaded, he says (*Rhet.* I.1, 1355a3f.), when they
suppose something to have been proven.



Hence the rhetorician who is willing to give a central place to
arguments or (rhetorical) proofs -- and this seems to be the
peculiar approach to rhetoric that Aristotle suggests at the beginning
of his *Rhetoric* -- can base his or her method of
persuasion to a significant extent on the method of dialectical
argumentation, as expounded in Aristotle's *Topics* (see
Rapp 2016 and 2018). And since the notion of 'dialectic'
is inextricably linked with a genuinely philosophical method, the
implied message of this dialectical turn of rhetoric seems to be that
philosophers, properly understood, have access to a method that is
superior not only for internal academic discussions between
philosophers, but also for the so-called 'encounter with the
many' (*Rhet.* I.1, 1355a29, *Topics* I.2,
101a35), i.e. for the purpose of addressing a mass audience with
little or no education. As already indicated, Aristotle does not seem
to have been the first to come up with the idea that
'true' rhetoric should become dialectical; however, while
in Plato's *Phaedrus* the dialectical turn of rhetoric
remains a mere sketch, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* does not
hesitate to set this idea into operation, most notably by adapting
most of the dialectical equipment developed elsewhere, especially in
his *Topics*. In many particular instances he just imports
technical vocabulary from his dialectic (e.g. *protasis*,
*sullogismos*, *topos*, *endoxon*); in many other
instances he redefines traditional rhetorical notions by his
dialectical inventory, e.g. the enthymeme is redefined as a deduction,
the example is redefined as an induction, etc. Above all, the
*Rhetoric* introduces the use of the so-called *topoi*
(see below
 SS 7)
 that is typical for the dialectical method and is otherwise only
treated in Aristotle's works on dialectic, i.e. in
*Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*.


## 4. The Nature and Purpose of Rhetoric



There are widely divergent views on the purpose of Aristotle's
*Rhetoric*. Ultimately, it is certainly meant to support those
who are going to address a public audience in court, at assemblies of
the people, or at certain festive events and who, to that end, have to
compose speeches. But does this in itself render the *Rhetoric*
a mere 'manual' or 'handbook' aiming at the
persuasion of a given audience? Or does it rather aim at a
specifically qualified type of persuasion (bringing about, e.g.,
conviction based on the best available grounds and without
misunderstanding)? Influenced by the debate in the 20th century about
'old and new rhetoric' and by the work of authors such as
I.A. Richards, Kenneth Burke and Wayne C. Booth on the one hand and
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur on the other, Aristotle scholars
began to wonder whether his *Rhetoric* is an instruction manual
offering guidance about how to change other people's minds or
has, rather, a philosophically more ambitious scope, such as e.g.
human communication and discourse in general. This second approach is
reflected in the statements of those contending that the "object
of Aristotle's treatise on rhetoric is ultimately an analysis of
the nature of human discourse in all areas of knowledge."
(Grimaldi 1972, 1) or of those suggesting that it can be read as
"a piece of philosophic inquiry, and judged by philosophic
standards" (Garver 1994, 3). Others have diagnosed a most
notable ambivalence in the Rhetoric (see Oates 1963, 335), as between
its role as a practical handbook on the one hand and Aristotle's
attempt to connect it to his logic, ethics and politics on the other.
Likewise, interpreters are divided on the questions of whether
Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is meant to be used for good and
bad purposes alike or whether it is specifically tailored to
implementing the good and virtuous goals delineated in
Aristotle's ethical and political writings; and whether, to that
latter end, the speaker is entitled to deploy the whole range of
persuasive devices, even manipulative and deceptive ones. In many
instances, the text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is open to
several interpretations; however, it seems possible to restrict the
range of plausible readings, e.g. by considering Aristotle's
definition of rhetoric and what he says about the internal and
external ends of rhetoric.


### 4.1 The Definition of Rhetoric



Assuming that Aristotle's *Poetics* gives instructions
for how to compose good tragedies, shouldn't we expect, then,
that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is similarly meant to give
instructions for how to compose good speeches? And does this, by the
same token, render the art of rhetoric a sort of productive knowledge
aiming at the fabrication of a speech (similar to the way the art of
shoemaking aims at the fabrication of shoes)? This sounds plausible,
as far as it goes (for a discussion of this issue see Leff 1993), and
in a few passages (especially in *Rhet.* III: e.g. 1415b35,
1417a2, 1417a34f. and 36, 1418a10 and 12 and 39, 1420b1) Aristotle
actually seems to directly address and instruct a speechwriter in the
second person. However, these are rather exceptions to a broader
tendency and it is striking that Aristotle never defines the art of
rhetoric through the supposed product, the speech, nor the full
command of the art of rhetoric through the perfection of the product,
i.e. the excellent speech. Instead, Aristotle defines the rhetorician
as someone who is always able to see what is persuasive
(*Topics* VI.12, 149b25); correspondingly, rhetoric is defined
as the ability to see what is possibly persuasive in every given case
(*Rhet.* I.2, 1355b26f.). Indeed there are passages
(*Rhet.* I.1, 1355b15-17) in which the persuasive plays
the same role in rhetoric as the conclusive plays in dialectic or
logic. This is not to say that it is the defining function
(*ergon*) of rhetoric to persuade, for the rhetoricians (the
ones who possess the art of rhetoric) will not be able to convince
people under all circumstances (*Rhet.* I.1, 1355b10-14).
Rather they are in a situation similar to that of physicians: the
latter have a complete grasp of their art if and only if they neglect
nothing that might heal their patients, although they are not expected
to heal *each and every* patient. Similarly, rhetoricians have
a complete grasp of their method, if and only if they are capable of
seeing the available means of persuasion, although they are certainly
not able to convince *each and every* audience -- owing to
factors that the art of rhetoric cannot alter (e.g. biases,
partisanship, stubbornness or corruption of the audience). In light of
this definition, it seems that the art (*techne*) of
rhetoric is primarily concerned with the nature and the ingredients of
persuasiveness and that the book *Rhetoric* is primarily
concerned with elaborating the various ingredients of this art. It
goes without saying that possessing such an art is useful for the
composition of speeches, but might also be useful for other purposes,
e.g. for assessing other people's speeches, for analysing the
persuasive potential of competing cases, etc.


### 4.2 What Rhetoric Is Useful for



For Aristotle, who defines rhetoric in terms of considering what is
persuasive (see above
 SS 4.1)
 and sees it as a branch of dialectic (see above
 SS 3),
 rhetoric is clearly not a matter of finding or conveying knowledge.
For Plato (see SS4 of
 Plato: rhetoric and poetry),
 by contrast, this would have been reason enough to become suspicious
about the intentions of those who use rhetorical techniques.
Isn't any technique of persuasion that is negligent of knowledge
useful only for those who want to outwit their audience and conceal
their real aims? For, after all, someone who just wants to communicate
the naked truth could be straightforward and would not need to employ
rhetorical gimmicks. This, however, is not Aristotle's point of
view: Even those who are simply trying to establish what is just and
true need the help of rhetoric when they are faced with a public
audience. Aristotle points out that it is impossible to teach such an
audience, even if the speaker has the most exact knowledge of the
subject (*Rhet.* I.1, 1355a24-29). Perhaps he is thinking
of ordinary people attending a public speech who are not able to
follow the kind of argument that, according to Aristotle's
theory of knowledge (see SS6 of
 Aristotle: logic),
 is apt to establish genuine knowledge. Moreover, he seems to doubt
that the controversial, sometimes partisan and hostile, setting of
political or judicial speeches is suitable for teaching and learning
at all, since whoever wishes to learn has to presuppose that he or she
won't be cheated or deceived by the teacher. But why should one
trust the intentions of the opposing party? This is why rhetorical
arguments addressing public audiences should be taken from premises
that are likely to be accepted by the given audience, from assumptions
the audience is already convinced of, and not from the kind of
principles (accepted mostly or only by the experts) through which one
conveys and establishes knowledge.



More than that, one might wonder whether the typical subject of public
speeches really allows of genuine knowledge. In court for example, the
judges have to form a reasoned view about whether the accused person
is guilty or not and whether the crime committed is minor or major; in
political speeches the parties might contend about whether it is
advantageous or not to invade the neighbour's territory or to
build a border wall (Aristotle's examples), but none of these
questions allow of precise knowledge. Aristotle says that in some
questions treated in public speeches there is only
*amphidoxein*, i.e. room for doubt and only divided opinions
(*Rhet.* I.2, 1356a8). From this perspective, rhetoric seems
useful especially for controversies about contingent matters that
cannot be fixed by appealing to what we unmistakably know, but only by
appealing to widely shared convictions, to what happens (not
necessarily, but) only for the most part and to what is likely to be
the case (but not necessarily so). For all those reasons, affecting
the decisions of juries and assemblies is a matter of persuasiveness,
not of knowledge. It is true that some people manage to be persuasive
either at random or by habit, but it is rhetoric that gives us a
method to systematically disclose *all* available means of
persuasion on *any* topic whatsoever.



When Aristotle speaks about the benefits of the art of rhetoric he
also mentions that it is not only disgraceful when one is unable to
defend oneself physically, but also when one is unable to defend
oneself through rational speech, for rationality and speech are more
peculiar to human beings than physical strength (*Rhet.* I.1,
1355a38-b2). A certain familiarity with rhetoric is therefore
required for sheer self-defence -- in general and, perhaps,
especially under the conditions of the extreme Athenian form of
democracy with its huge courts of lay assessors (one of which
sentenced Socrates to death) and with demagogues who would abuse the
democratic rules for a coup d'etat. Perhaps Aristotle is
addressing fellow philosophers who find it beneath their dignity to
engage with rhetoric: it is not sublime but naive and embarrassing if
they do not gear up for political and legal battles. For those who are
defeated in court when they try to defend what is true and just (due
to the failure to speak persuasively) are to be blamed (*Rhet.*
I.1, 1355a20-24).


### 4.3 Can Aristotle's Rhetoric Be Misused?



Possessing the art of rhetoric is useful then even for those whose
sole intent is to defend what they take to be true and just. Still,
can't the same art of rhetoric be misused, e.g. when practised
by people with malicious intentions? The short answer is: Yes, of
course. Rhetoric in general and even Aristotle's dialectic-based
rhetoric can be misused depending on what people use it for what
purposes. (And Aristotle himself is actually aware of the fact that
demagogues of his time use a certain style of rhetoric for
overthrowing the democratic order: *Politics* V.5,
1304b21-1305a15). The more elaborate answer that he gives is
this. The art of rhetoric (if based on dialectic: see above
 SS 3)
 is useful partly because it facilitates persuasive argument for the
opposites, i.e. on either side of a question. This is first of all
seen as an advantage in competence, for people who have full command
of this art won't miss any persuasive aspect of a given
question, and this is also seen as a practical advantage, for it helps
to detect what goes wrong in the opponent's arguments
(1355a29-38), especially if those opponents use it for
objectionable purposes. That this peculiar feature of dialectic-based
rhetoric opens the door for misuse is true, but this cannot be held
against the art of rhetoric, since the same ambivalence (that
something can be used for the better or for the worse) applies to most
goods (e.g. wealth, beauty -- the only non-ambivalent good is, on
Aristotle's view, virtue). Also, Aristotle downplays the risk of
misuse by stressing that it is easier to convince someone of the just
and good than of their opposites (especially when using the
Aristotelian style of rhetoric).



Still, for many interpreters of Aristotle, from the times of the great
Roman rhetoricians on, it is hard to embrace the thought that
Aristotle -- the famous author of the *Nicomachean Ethics*
and the *Politics* -- who in his ethical work praises the
life in accordance with human virtue, could ever endorse a rhetorical
project that is not meant to promote virtue and happiness in the
city-state (*polis*). Is it, in other words, possible or likely
that Aristotle, whose name in the history of moral philosophy stands
for an ethics based on the sustainable development of moral virtues,
endorses a technique of rhetoric that does not serve the purpose of
promoting virtuous goals? This is a legitimate worry. It can be
addressed by distinguishing internal from external ends of rhetoric
(which is, to be sure, not Aristotle's distinction; however, he
uses a similar distinction between a thing's proper function,
corresponding to the internal end, and the question what something is
useful for, corresponding to the external end). The internal end, i.e.
the function that defines the art of rhetoric, is to consider what is
persuasive (see above
 SS 4.1),
 and since there might be persuasive aspects on both sides of a
question, the art of rhetoric as such -- i.e. according to its
internal end -- is neutral with regard to true and false, just
and unjust, noble and wicked points of view. It can be equally used
for promoting good or bad positions (even though, as Aristotle says,
it is easier to promote the good ones). All this follows from the
dialectical character of Aristotle's art of rhetoric (see above
 SS 3).
 If we are interested, by contrast, in the external ends of rhetoric,
i.e. the question of what it is useful for (see above
 SS 4.2)
 or the question of how Aristotle himself wants this art to be used,
then it is easy to contrive a plausible story either based on
Aristotle's ethico-political writings or on hints given in the
*Rhetoric* itself (see e.g. Dow 2015, 64-75, for such an
attempt) about the morally desirable uses of a style of rhetoric that
is based on arguments (sanctioning convicted offenders, defending
innocent culprits, averting political decisions that are likely to do
harm to the city-state, voicing the point of view of the decent
citizens, defending the rule of law, standing up to insurrectionists
and demagogues, etc.).


### 4.4 Is Aristotle's Conception of Rhetoric Normative?



Obviously, Aristotle's rhetoric is not thought to be normative
in the moral sense that it would only provide the means for persuading
people of what is true, just and noble (but not of their opposites;
see section
 SS 4.3
 above). There is however the widespread intuition that
Aristotle's rhetoric crucially differs from manuals of rhetoric
that recommend doing whatever it takes to win a case. This becomes
clear already in the beginning of *Rhet.* I.1, where Aristotle
criticizes his predecessors among other things for presenting
techniques that are not derived from any art (*techne*),
such as slander and the arousal of pity and anger. He accuses them of
dwelling on methods that instruct how to speak "outside the
subject" and to distract the attention of the hearers from the
subject, while good legislation, he says, requires not speaking
outside the subject at all (indeed, "speaking outside the
subject" was a legal term in Athenian law of Aristotle's
time). This immediately suggests two senses in which Aristotle's
rhetoric is normative and does not advocate an 'anything
goes'-approach to persuasion: first, the rhetorical devices are
required to flow from the art or method of rhetoric and, second, they
must not be "outside the subject". As for the first
criterion, Aristotle requires that art-based means of persuasion must
be provided by the speech alone and must rely on the systematic
analysis of what is persuasive in a given case (see the definition of
rhetoric in
 SS 4.1
 above). As for the second criterion, it is striking that Aristotle
refers to judges or jurors who just "surrender to one of the
litigants without really judging" (*Rhet.* I.1,
1354b34-1355a1), which might be taken to mean that those people
cast their votes in favour of the party they side with, but that their
votes are not based on a judgement that really considers the case at
hand. This formulates a minimally normative criterion for what the
rhetorical art aims at, namely the formation of a judgement in the
audience that deserves to be called a 'judgement', i.e.
that it judges *something*, namely what the judges or jurors
are asked to judge. And it seems that in rhetorical persuasion the use
of rhetorical devices that are based on the art and are related to the
case at hand are more apt to bring about judgements in this genuine
sense of the word.



By all appearances, it seems then that Aristotle's rhetoric is
not indifferent with regard to the persuasive means deployed. The
effect that speakers using the Aristotelian style of rhetoric can
bring about in the audience is thus qualified by the limited range of
techniques (based on the art of rhetoric) they use, which means that
they do not try to bring the audience over to their side at any cost,
but only on the basis of an argumentation that actually addresses the
point at issue. In this sense one might say that Aristotle's
rhetorical method aims at something like 'persuasion based on
arguments', 'reasonable persuasion' or a
'reasoned judgment' on the audience's part.



Even if this much is agreed upon, there remains a lot of room for
scholarly disagreement on what exactly this normative approach to
rhetoric is meant to imply. Is this normativity grounded in the
requirements of the art (*techne*) alone, e.g. what can
and what cannot be achieved in a methodical way, or does it hinge on
an envisaged effect, e.g. the best possible judgement on the
hearer's part? And which methods are approved by this normative
approach and which definitely excluded? Does Aristotle's art of
rhetoric require, above all, that persuasion be centred on arguments
and proofs (that are related to the thing at issue and are, thus,
pertinent), while other art-based means of persuasion (see below
 SS 5)
 are mostly thought to offer support to get one's arguments
through (see e.g. Rapp 2012)? Or does the art aim at enhancing only
"well-founded" judgements or judgements that are
"formed on the basis of good grounds for conviction",
requiring that each particular means of persuasion provide such a good
ground for conviction (see Dow 2014 and Dow 2015)?


## 5. The Three Means of Persuasion



The methodical core of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the
theorem that there are three 'technical' *pisteis*,
i.e. 'persuaders' or 'means of persuasion'.
Persuasion comes about either through the character
(*ethos*) of the speaker, the emotional state
(*pathos*) of the hearer, or the argument (*logos*)
itself. The structure of *Rhetoric* I & II & is
determined by this tripartition (see
 SS 2
 above). The attribute 'technical' seems to imply several
things: (i) Technical persuasion must rest on a method or art
(*techne*), and this, in turn, is to say that we must
know the reason why some things are persuasive and some are not. (ii)
Further, technical persuasion must rest on a complete analysis of what
is possibly persuasive (see above
 SS 4.1),
 and not on the random use of scattered persuasive factors. (iii)
Technical means of persuasion must be provided by the speakers
themselves and through the speech, whereas pre-existing facts, such as
oaths, witnesses, testimonies, etc. are non-technical, since they
cannot be brought about by the speaker. (iv) Given that Aristotle
criticizes his predecessors, because they deal with non-technical
persuasive devices instructing how to speak "outside the
subject" (see section
 SS 4.4
 above), one might speculate whether the technical means of persuasion
are required, vice versa, to actually address *the things at
issue*.



Why just these three? And why only these three? Aristotle does not
give an elaborate defence of this tripartition. However, he says in a
different context that a speech consists of three things: the speaker,
the subject that is treated in the speech, and the listener to whom
the speech is addressed (*Rhet.* I.3, 1358a37ff.). Probably, he
thinks that each of these three ingredients of a speech contributes to
persuasion in a specific way, in that persuasion either flows from the
person of speaker, namely that he or she comes across as credible, or
from the condition of the hearer, i.e. whether they are in an
emotional state and which emotional state they are in or from the subject
that is treated in the speech, i.e. from the arguments or proofs that
are meant to support a suggested point of view. Summarizing the
account of the three *pisteis* in a later section of the book,
Aristotle actually insists that there can be no other technical means
of persuasion:



> 
> It has already been spoken about the means of persuasion
> (*pisteis*), from how many things they are, namely that they
> are from three things, and what kind of things these are, and why
> there are only these three; for all people who are casting judgements
> are persuaded either because they themselves are affected, or because
> they assume that the speakers are a certain kind of person or because
> something has been proven. (*Rhet.* III.1, 1403b10-13)
> 


### 5.1 Persuasion Through the Character of the Speaker



With regard to the speaker, persuasion is accomplished whenever the
speech is held in such a way as to render the speaker worthy of
credence. How is it exactly that the credibility of the speaker
contributes to persuasion? Aristotle is not overly explicit on this
issue. However, he says that people follow the trustworthy speaker
more easily and more quickly on almost all subjects and completely so
in affairs in which there are not exact criteria (to decide the case),
but only wavering opinions (*Rhet.* I.2, 1356a6-8). This
might be taken to mean that in the absence of other criteria to decide
a case, the audience will form the second-order judgment that
suggestions put forward by a credible speaker are themselves received
as trustworthy and acceptable. Also, according to this remark, the
impact of what seems to be the speaker's character comes in
degrees; it is most important, if the point of issue is such that it
leaves room for doubt and cannot be decided by conclusive proofs.



But how does the speaker manage to appear a credible person? Even
though Aristotle says that the speaker's character can have the
greatest impact on the hearers' judgement (especially in
deliberative speeches that are about future states of affairs), he
dedicates only fifteen lines to this question. (*Rhet.* II.1,
1378a6-20). Speakers, he says, must display (i) practical
intelligence, prudence or competence (*phronesis*), (ii)
a virtuous character, and (iii) good will; for, if they displayed none
of them, the audience would doubt that they are able to give good
advice at all. Again, if they displayed (i) without (ii) and (iii),
the audience could doubt whether their aims or intentions are good.
Finally, if he displayed (i) and (ii) without (iii), the audience
could still doubt whether they are giving the best suggestion or
whether they keep the best available suggestion for themselves due to
their lack of benevolence. However, if they display all of them,
Aristotle concludes, it cannot rationally be doubted that their
suggestions are trustworthy. It should be stressed that the speakers
must accomplish these effects by *what* they say in the speech;
it is not necessary that they are actually virtuous persons: on the
contrary, a pre-existing good character cannot be part of the
technical means of persuasion. Also, even a person with outstandingly
virtuous character would have to present herself as virtuous by what
she says in the speech.


### 5.2 Persuasion Through the Emotions of the Hearer



With regard to the hearer, persuasion comes about whenever the hearers
are led by the speech to feel a certain emotion or passion that, in
turn, has an impact on the judgement they are going to make. The
underlying assumption of this persuasive technique is that
people's emotional states broadly conceived -- i.e. whether
they actually undergo an episode of emotion or not and what kind of
emotion they feel -- makes a difference for the formation of the
judgement they are about to pass. Indeed, Aristotle even introduces
the emotions or passions (*pathe*) in an important
passage (*Rhet.* II.1, 1378a20-30) by saying that they
are "those things due to which people, by undergoing a change,
*differ in their judgements* ...". He illustrates this
general assumption by pointing out that we do not judge in the same
way when we grieve and rejoice or when we are friendly and hostile. It
therefore seems that the speaker has to arouse emotions exactly
because emotions have the power to modify our judgments: e.g. to a
juror or judge who is in a friendly mood, the person about whom he or
she is going to judge seems not to do wrong or only in a small way;
but to the juror or judge who is in an angry mood, the same person
will seem to do the opposite (see *Rhet.* II.1, 1378a1ff.).
Since rhetoric aims at steering the hearers' judgement and since
emotions, thus, have a significant impact on the formation of
judgements (on the various ways how emotions, according to Aristotle,
can alter our judgements see Leighton 1982), the rhetorical method
requires to address the emotional states of the hearers, if only in
order to calm down adverse feelings or emotions that are likely to
prevent the jurors or judges from forming their judgement in
accordance with the presented evidence and arguments.



Some scholars writing on the rhetorical use of emotions take it to be
significant that emotions also play a crucial role in
Aristotle's moral philosophy, for Aristotle defines the virtuous
person not only by performing the right actions, but also by having
and by being motivated through the appropriate sort of emotions.
Applying this to the rhetorical situation, one might wonder whether in
Aristotle's art of rhetoric the speaker tries to arouse
emotions, in order (i) to motivate the audience (e.g. motivate them to
act in accordance with the judgement they pass) or (ii) to turn them
into better persons (e.g. by providing and making them familiar with
the appropriate emotions that are definitory of the virtuous persons).
However, both options are not backed by the evidence given in the text
of the *Rhetoric*. With regard to (i), it seems crucial to note
that the aim of rhetorical persuasion is a certain judgement
(*krisis*), not an action or practical decision
(*prohairesis*), which would intrinsically involve a specific
sort of desire and motivation (see e.g. Kontos 2021, 20-31).
While the practical decision that Aristotle discusses in his ethical
writings is always about things the agents themselves are able to do,
the judgements of the hearers of a public speech are often about
things to be done by other agents or about actions that took place in
the past. With regard to (ii), one might be reluctant to accept that
moral education might be the direct purpose of the kind of public
speeches Aristotle has in mind. At least, no such moral purpose is
mentioned when Aristotle addresses the purpose and use of rhetoric
(see above
 SS 4).
 It is also significant that the appropriateness of the aroused
emotions (in accordance with Aristotle's doctrine of the mean) is
nowhere discussed in the *Rhetoric*. More than that, Aristotle
seems to think that moral education requires individual habituation
and habituation is a matter of gradually adjusting a person's
attitudes and hedonic responses, while the uneducated ones are not
really responsive to disciplinary allocutions. For all these reasons,
he is not too optimistic with regard to the pedagogical effect of
public speeches: "Now if speeches were in themselves enough to
make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very
great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as
things are ... they are not able to encourage the many to
nobility and goodness" (*EN* X.9, 1179b4-10).



But how is it possible for the orator, in the first place, to lead the
audience to feel a certain emotion? After all, the technical means of
persuasion are restricted to *what* the speakers say in a
speech. It is remarkable that Aristotle's treatment of several
types of emotions in Chapters 2-11 of *Rhet.* II is based
on the definition of each type of emotion. Even though Aristotle
mostly leaves it to the reader to infer how these definitions are
useful for arousing a particular type of emotion, it seems safe to
conclude that these definitions are meant to offer the key to the
methodical arousal of emotions in the audience. Let, for example,
anger be defined as "desire, accompanied with pain, for
conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight that was directed against
oneself or those near to one, when such a slight is undeserved."
(*Rhet*. II.2 1378a31-33). According to such a
definition, someone who takes it to be the case that he or she has
suffered a slight from a person who is not entitled to do so, etc.,
will, all other things being equal, become angry. Obviously, this
presupposes an account of emotions according to which emotions are
closely related to what people think or take to be the case.
Unfortunately and owing to the overall nature of Aristotle's
*Rhetoric*, this underlying account of emotion is nowhere
explicitly unfolded and defended. What we can infer though is that
Aristotle assumes at least a covariance between someone's
thought or opinion that she has been slighted undeservedly and her
feeling of anger. If that much is granted and if the speakers have
access to such definitions of each type of emotions, it is possible to
deduce conditions under which a person is likely to feel this
particular type of emotion. And if the speakers manage to make the
hearers think -- by what they say -- that these conditions
are given, it is likely, as far as this method goes, that the hearers
will feel the corresponding emotion. Aristotle himself suggests the
following example. If we take the above-mentioned definition of anger
for granted, it is possible to deduce circumstances in which a person
will become angry; most notably, we can deduce (i) in what state of
mind people are angry and (ii) against whom they are angry and (iii)
for what sorts of reason. If we want to make an audience angry, we
have to address all three factors, making the hearers think (ii) that
there are people who deserve their anger, (iii) that there is a reason
for being angry (a slight, an insult, a belittlement, etc.) and (i) by
bringing them into a state of mind in which they are prone to anger.
Aristotle himself shows how to deduce these three factors for each
particular type of emotion throughout chapters II.2-11. With
this equipment, the speaker will be able, for example, to highlight
such characteristics of a case as are likely to provoke anger in the
audience. In comparison with the tricks of former rhetoricians (which,
Aristotle thinks, are bound to speak "outside the
subject"), this method of arousing emotions has a striking
advantage: The speaker who wants to arouse emotions need not even
speak "outside the subject" or distract from the thing at
issue; it is sufficient to detect aspects of a given subject that are
connected with the intended emotion and to make the addressee think
that certain emotion-provoking aspects, in accordance with the three
factors mentioned above, are given.



Supplement on Judgemental and Non-Judgemental Accounts of Aristotelian Emotions



### 5.3 Persuasion Through the Argument Itself



With regard to the subject the speech is about, persuasion comes about
through arguments, i.e. by proving (or seemingly proving) that
something is the case. Most probably, this is meant to take up the
idea mentioned above, i.e. that people are most or most easily
persuaded, when they suppose something to have been proven
(*Rhet.* I.1, 1355a3f.). This third means of persuasion
(*pistis*) is distinguished from the other two means of
persuasion through being the only probative (*apodeiktikos*)
device of persuasion; due to its argument-like structure, involving
premises and a conclusion, it can directly argue for the point of view
that the speaker wishes to establish. It does so by inferentially
connecting the suggested conclusion with facts that are evident or
with convictions already held by the audience. Probative persuasion is
essential, since, at the end of the day, each speech necessarily
involves a claim (i.e. the point of view the speaker suggests) plus
the proofs that are given in support of this claim (*Rhet.*
III.13, 1414a30-36). For Aristotle, there are two species of
arguments: inductions and deductions (*Posterior Analytics*
I.1, 71a5ff.). Induction (*epagoge*) is defined as
the proceeding from particulars up to a universal (*Topics*
I.12, 105a13ff.). A deduction (*sullogismos*) is an argument in
which, certain things having been supposed, something different from
the suppositions results of necessity through them (*Topics*
I.1, 100a25ff.) or because of their being true (*Prior
Analytics* I.2, 24b18-20). The inductive argument in
rhetoric is the example (*paradeigma*); unlike other inductive
arguments, it does not proceed from many particular cases to one
universal case, but from one particular to a similar particular if
both particulars fall under the same genus (*Rhet.* I.2,
1357b25ff.). The deductive argument in rhetoric is the enthymeme (see
below
 SS 6).
 Indeed, most of *Rhet.* I & II is dedicated to the
treatment of this third probative means of persuasion: After the
second part of the long chapter *Rhet.* I.2 has introduced
basic distinctions within the probative mode of persuasion, chapters
*Rhet.* I.4-15 unfold argumentative devices that are
specific to the three genres of speech, while chapters *Rhet.*
II.4-26 discuss generally applicable aspects of proofs or
arguments (see above
 SS 2).



Aristotle repeatedly says that these rhetorical arguments persuade
people either by proving or by (merely) seeming to prove
(*Rhet.* I.2, 1356a3-4 and I.2, 1356a19-20);
accordingly, he lists *topoi* for real (*Rhet.* II.23)
and merely apparent enthymemes (*Rhet.* II.24) (see below
 SS 7).
 Obviously, Aristotle refers here to fallacious or deceptive
arguments, for these arguments have a similar persuasive effect, if
the fallacy or deception goes unnoticed by the audience (for people
will *think*, i.e. take it to be the case, that something has
been proven). One might wonder whether the inclusion of only seemingly
probative arguments is compatible with Aristotle's general
tendency to base rhetorical persuasion on (real) proofs. However, the
treatment of fallacious rhetorical arguments is strictly parallel to
what happens in the case of dialectic. For dialectic too, includes a
part dealing with sound or valid arguments (namely in *Topics*
II-VII) and a part that analyses fallacious arguments (namely in
the *Sophistical Refutations*). It is part of the
rhetorician's competence also to know about fallacious
arguments, if only in order to detect them, when they are used by
opponents.


### 5.4 Is There an Inconsistency in Aristotle's Rhetorical Theory?



One of the most notorious debates about Aristotle's
*Rhetoric* concerns the second means of persuasion
(*pistis*) that is said to proceed through the emotions of the
hearer (see above
 SS5.2),
 for it seems to involve a major inconsistency in Aristotle's
approach to rhetorical persuasion: While in *Rhetoric* I.2
Aristotle is happy to accept emotions or the arousal of emotions as
one of the three 'technical' *pisteis*, it seems
that he has a much more reserved or even repudiating attitude to the
rhetorical use of emotions in *Rhetoric* I.1. There, in the
very first chapter of the book, Aristotle claims that the previous
authors of rhetorical manuals have only covered a small part of the
art of persuasion, for while only the proofs or means of persuasion
(*pisteis*), such as the enthymeme, are a matter of
*techne*, those authors mostly dealt with rhetorical
devices that are merely supplementary and involve "speaking
outside the subject". Aristotle exemplifies this alleged
tendency of his predecessors by adding that "slander, pity,
anger and suchlike passions of the soul" are not about the
things at issue, but are directed at the person of the juror or judge
(1354a11-18). Briefly afterwards he adds that one "should
not distort the juror or judge by arousing anger, fear or pity in
him", which, he says, would be like making the standard or
yardstick crooked before using it (1354a24-26). Apart from the
fact that *Rhetoric* I.2 endorses the rhetorical use of
emotions, while *Rhetoric* I.1 seems to dismiss them, the
remarks in *Rhetoric* I.1 seems to imply that the arousal of
emotions is not or cannot be 'technical', while
*Rhetoric* I.2 unequivocally introduces persuasion through the
emotions of the hearer as one of three 'technical' means
of persuasion.



Various strategies have been contrived to deal with this seeming
inconsistency. In the early 20th century there was the tendency to
think that the two chapters are simply incompatible and that either
one of these two chapters was written by a different author (Marx
1900) or that the two chapters were put together by an inept editor
(Kantelhardt 1911; in a similar vein, Barnes (1995, 262) argues that
the two chapters are doublets, one of them originally written to
supplant the other) or that the two chapters represent different
stages in Aristotle's philosophical development (Solmsen 1929).
Even though Solmen's developmental account has gone out of
fashion, there are more recent authors who emphasize the alleged
'Platonic' character of *Rhetoric* I.1 (see e.g.
Fortenbaugh 1986, 248 and Schuetrumpf 1994, 106f.), thus implying that
Aristotle, when writing this chapter, was still under the influence of
Plato, from which he gradually emancipated himself. However, one might
wonder whether some of the strategies mentioned tend to exaggerate the
alleged inconsistency of the two chapters, since, after all, it is
obvious that the two chapters have different agendas (see above
 SS 2)
 and that some of the differences might be due to these different
agendas. Also, in the later chapter Aristotle is happy to refer back
to the treatment of emotions in the previous chapter
(1356a16-17), which indicates (provided that this back-reference
is authentic) that he himself was not aware of any inconsistency. It
has hence been suggested e.g. that the seeming inconsistency can be
fixed just by identifying different meanings of the word
*pistis* for the two chapters (Grimaldi 1957), which would
solve the problem that in one chapter emotions are said to be a
*pistis* in the 'technical' sense, while in the
other chapter they are opposed to 'technical'
*pisteis*. Sprute 1994 and, similarly, Schuetrumpf 1994 argue
that the chapters are not inconsistent, but envisage different
settings, in that *Rhetoric* I.1 considers the kind of rhetoric
that is apt for a well-ordered city, while *Rhetoric* I.2 moves
on to the style of rhetoric that is required and practiced under less
ideal political circumstances. Rapp 2002 (I 364, II 32f., 109, 112)
proposes that what Aristotle primarily criticizes in *Rhetoric*
I.1 is not that those predecessors deal with emotions at all, but that
they *mostly* deal with emotions and the like, which are merely
supplementary, instead of dealing with the main point, i.e. the
enthymeme, and that they use pre-fabricated formulae for the arousal
of emotions, by which they are bound to speak outside the things at
issue. Dow 2007 uses a similar idea of set-piece rhetorical devices,
going however beyond the previous suggestion by saying that the
critique of *Rhetoric* I.1 does not, as it may seem, refer to
emotions strictly speaking, but only to such set-piece rhetorical
devices aimed at manipulating emotions. On these accounts it is possible,
at least, to reconcile the claims that there is a
'technical' and innocent (or, perhaps, even beneficial)
use of emotions within the art-based process of persuasion, as
maintained in *Rhetoric* I.2, and that there are
non-'technical' uses of emotions in rhetoric with the
potential to distort the judgement, as emphasized in *Rhetoric*
I.1.


## 6. The Enthymeme


### 6.1 The Concept of Enthymeme



For Aristotle, an enthymeme is what has the function of a proof or
demonstration in the domain of public speech. Since a demonstration is
a kind of *sullogismos*, the enthymeme is said to be a
*sullogismos* too (on the enthymeme and its relation to
syllogistic theory see also Raphael 1974). The word
'*enthymeme*' (from
'*enthumeisthai*--to consider') had already
been coined by Aristotle's predecessors and originally
designated clever sayings, bon mots, and short arguments involving a
paradox or contradiction. The concepts 'proof'
(*apodeixis*) and '*sullogismos*' play a
crucial role in Aristotle's logical-dialectical theory. In
applying them to a term of conventional rhetoric, Aristotle appeals to
a well-known rhetorical technique, but, at the same time, codifies and
redefines the original meaning of 'enthymeme': properly
understood, what people call 'enthymeme' *should*
have the form of a *sullogismos*, i.e., a deductive
argument.



A major scholarly debate concerns the question of whether the
enthymeme is actually meant to be a genuine *sullogismos*, i.e.
a deductive argument, or whether it is only a
'*sullogismos* of a kind', i.e. a
*sullogismos* in an attenuated sense, which would amount to
saying that Aristotelian enthymemes, even though they are introduced
as *sullogismoi*, are or include 'relaxed
inferences', i.e. inferences that are not logically valid (see
Burnyeat 1994, 1996). This suggestion has been widely accepted,
presumably because it helps to solve the alleged paradox that,
although Aristotle defines the enthymeme as a *sullogismos*,
the logical form of the enthymemes that are actually given as examples
in the *Rhetoric* does not seem to conform to that of the
categorical syllogisms that we know from his *Prior Analytics*
(a problem that, by the way, might also be addressed by assuming that
the enthymeme corresponds to the form of deductive arguments we find
in the *Topics*, not to the ones familiar from the *Prior
Analytics*). Others accepted this suggestion primarily in order to
accommodate the non-necessary sign arguments from *Rhetoric*
I.2 (see
 SS 6.5),
 which are treated as a type of enthymeme (without being flagged as
merely 'seeming enthymeme'), but are said not to yield a
*sullogismos* (see e.g. Allen 2001).



Supplement on the Thesis that Enthymemes are Relaxed Inferences



### 6.2 Formal Requirements



In general, Aristotle regards deductive arguments as a set of
propositions in which some sentences are premises and one is the
conclusion, and the inference from the premises to the conclusion is
guaranteed by the premises alone. Since enthymemes in the proper sense
are expected to be deductive arguments, the minimal requirement for
the formulation of enthymemes is that they have to display the
premise-conclusion structure of deductive arguments. This is why
enthymemes have to include a statement as well as a kind of reason for
the given statement. Typically this reason is given in a conditional
'if'-clause or a causal 'since'- or
'for'-clause. Examples of the former, conditional type
are: "If not even the gods know everything, human beings can
hardly do so." "If the war is the cause of present evils,
things should be set right by making peace." Examples of the
latter, causal type are: "One should not be educated, for one
ought not be envied (and educated people are usually envied)."
"She has given birth, for she has milk." Aristotle
stresses that the proposition "There is no man among us who is
free" taken by itself is a maxim, but becomes an enthymeme as
soon as it is used together with a reason such as "for all are
slaves of money or of chance (and no slave of money or chance is
free)." Sometimes the required reason may even be implicit, as
e.g. in the proposition "As a mortal, do not cherish immortal
anger" the reason why one should not cherish mortal anger is
implicitly given in the term "immortal," which alludes to
the rule that it is not appropriate for mortal beings to have such an
attitude.


### 6.3 Enthymemes as Dialectical Arguments



Aristotle calls the enthymeme the "body of persuasion",
implying that everything else is only an addition or accident to the
core of the persuasive process. The reason why the enthymeme, as the
rhetorical kind of proof or demonstration, should be regarded as
central to the rhetorical process of persuasion is that we are most
easily persuaded when we think that something has been demonstrated.
Hence, the basic idea of a rhetorical demonstration seems to be this:
In order to make a target group believe that *q*, the orator
must first select a proposition *p* or some propositions
*p*1 ... *p**n* that are
already accepted by the target group; secondly he has to show that
*q* can be derived from *p* or *p*1
... *p**n*, using *p* or
*p*1 ... *p**n* as
premises. Given that the target persons form their beliefs in
accordance with rational standards, they will accept *q* as
soon as they understand that *q* can be demonstrated on the
basis of their own opinions.



Consequently, the construction of enthymemes is primarily a matter of
deducing from accepted opinions (*endoxa*). Of course, it is
also possible to use premises that are not commonly accepted by
themselves, but can be derived from commonly accepted opinions; other
premises are only accepted since the speaker is held to be credible;
still other enthymemes are built from signs: see
 SS6.5.
 That a deduction is made from accepted opinions--as opposed to
deductions from first and true sentences or principles--is the
defining feature of dialectical argumentation in the Aristotelian
sense. Thus, the formulation of enthymemes is a matter of dialectic,
and the dialectician has the competence that is needed for the
construction of enthymemes. If enthymemes are a subclass of
dialectical arguments, then it is natural to expect a specific
difference by which one can tell enthymemes apart from all other kinds
of dialectical arguments (traditionally, commentators regarded logical
incompleteness as such a difference; for some objections against the
traditional view, see
 SS6.4).
 Nevertheless, this expectation is somehow misguided: The enthymeme is
different from other kinds of dialectical arguments insofar as it is
used in the rhetorical context of public speech (and rhetorical
arguments are called 'enthymemes'); thus, no further
formal or qualitative differences are needed.



However, in the rhetorical context there are two factors that the
dialectician has to keep in mind if she wants to become a rhetorician
too, and if the dialectical argument is to become a *successful*
enthymeme. First, the typical subjects of public speech do
not--like the subjects of dialectic and theoretical
philosophy--belong to the things that are necessarily the case,
but are among those things that are the goal of practical deliberation
and can also be otherwise. Second, as opposed to well-trained
dialecticians, the audience of a public speech is characterized by an
intellectual insufficiency; above all, the members of a jury or
assembly are not accustomed to following a longer chain of inferences.
Therefore, enthymemes must not be as precise as a scientific
demonstration and should be shorter than ordinary dialectical
arguments. This, however, is not to say that the enthymeme is defined
by incompleteness and brevity. Rather, it is a sign of a well-executed
enthymeme that the content and the number of its premises are adjusted
to the intellectual capacities of the public audience; but even an
enthymeme that failed to incorporate these qualities would still be an
enthymeme.


### 6.4 The Brevity of the Enthymeme



In a well-known passage (*Rhet.* I.2, 1357a7-18; similar:
*Rhet.* II.22, 1395b24-26), Aristotle says that the
enthymeme often has few or even fewer premises than some other
deductions (*sullogismoi)*. Since most interpreters refer the
word '*sullogismos*' to the syllogistic theory (see
the entry on
 Aristotle: logic),
 according to which a proper deduction has exactly two premises, those
lines have led to the widespread understanding that Aristotle defines
the enthymeme as a *sullogismos* in which one of two premises
has been suppressed, i.e., as an abbreviated, incomplete syllogism.
But certainly the passages mentioned do not attempt to give a
definition of the enthymeme, nor does the word
'*sullogismos*' necessarily refer to deductions
with exactly two premises. Properly understood, both passages are
about the selection of appropriate premises, not about logical
incompleteness. The remark that enthymemes often have few or fewer
premises concludes the discussion of two possible mistakes the orator
could make (*Rhet*. I.2, 1357a7-10): One can draw
conclusions from things that have previously been deduced or from
things that have not been deduced yet. The latter method is
unpersuasive, for the premises are not accepted, nor have they been
introduced. The former method is problematic, too: if the orator has
to introduce the needed premises by another deduction, and the
premises of this pre-deduction too, etc., one will end up with a long
chain of deductions. Arguments with several deductive steps are common
in dialectical practice, but one cannot expect the audience of a
public speech to follow such long arguments. This is why Aristotle
says that the enthymeme is and should be from fewer premises.



Supplement on The Brevity of the Enthymeme



### 6.5 Different Types of Enthymemes



Just as there is a difference between real and apparent or fallacious
deductions in dialectic, we have to distinguish between real and
apparent or fallacious enthymemes in rhetoric. The *topoi* for
real enthymemes are given in chapter II.23, for fallacious enthymemes
in chapter II.24. The fallacious enthymeme pretends to include a valid
deduction, while it actually rests on a fallacious inference.



Further, Aristotle distinguishes between enthymemes taken from
probable (*eikos*) premises and enthymemes taken from signs
(*semeia*). (*Rhet*. I.2, 1357a32-33). In a
different context, he says that enthymemes are based on probabilities,
examples, *tekmeria* (i.e., proofs, evidences), and signs
(*Rhet*. II.25, 1402b12-14). Since the so-called
*tekmeria* are a subclass of signs and the examples are
used to establish general premises, this is only an extension of the
former classification. (Note that neither classification interferes
with the idea that premises have to be accepted opinions: with respect
to the signs, the audience must *believe* that they exist and
*accept* that they indicate the existence of something else,
and with respect to the probabilities, people must *accept*
that something is likely to happen.) However, it is not clear whether
this is meant to be an exhaustive typology. That most of the
rhetorical arguments are taken from probable premises ("For the
most part it is true that ..." "It is likely that
...") is due to the typical subjects of public speech,
which are rarely necessary. When using a sign-argument or
sign-enthymeme we do not try to explain a given fact; we just indicate
*that* something exists or is the case: "...
anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come
into being, the other has come into being before or after, is a sign
of the other's being or having come into being."
(*Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a7ff.). But there are several types
of sign-arguments too; Aristotle offers the following examples:




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | ***Rhetoric*** I.2 | ***Prior Analytics*** II.27 |
| (i) | Wise men are just, since Socrates is just. | Wise men are good, since Pittacus is good. |
| (ii) | He is ill, since he has fever. / She has given birth, since she
has milk. | This woman has a child, since she has milk. |
| (iii) | This man has fever, since he breathes rapidly. | She is pregnant, since she is pale. |



Sign-arguments of type (i) and (iii) can always be refuted, even if
the premises are true; that is to say that they do not include a valid
deduction (*sullogismos*); Aristotle calls them
*asullogistos* (non-deductive). Sign-arguments of type (ii) can
never be refuted if the premise is true, since, for example, it is not
possible that someone has fever without being ill, or that someone has
milk without having given birth, etc. This latter type of
sign-enthymemes is necessary and is also called
*tekmerion* (proof, evidence). Now, if some
sign-enthymemes are valid deductions and some are not, it is tempting
to ask whether Aristotle regarded the non-necessary sign-enthymemes as
apparent or fallacious arguments. However, there seems to be a more
attractive reading: We accept a fallacious argument only if we are
deceived about its logical form. But we could regard, for example, the
inference "She is pregnant, since she is pale" as a good
and informative argument, even if we know that it does not include a
logically necessary inference. So it seems as if Aristotle
didn't regard all non-necessary sign-arguments as fallacious or
deceptive; but even if this is true, it is difficult for Aristotle to
determine the sense in which non-necessary sign-enthymemes are valid
arguments, since he is bound to the alternatives of deduction and
induction, and neither class seems appropriate for non-necessary
sign-arguments.


## 7. The *Topoi*



Generally speaking, an Aristotelian *topos*
('place', 'location') is an argumentative
scheme that enables a dialectician or rhetorician to construe an
argument for a given conclusion. The first comprehensive and
systematic collection of *topoi* is given in Aristotle's
treatise *Topics*. Still, the use of so-called *topoi*
or '*loci communes*' can be traced back to early
rhetoricians such as Protagoras, Gorgias (cp. Cicero, *Brutus*,
46-48) and Isocrates. But while in earlier rhetoric a
*topos* was mostly understood as a complete, pre-fabricated
pattern or formula that can be mentioned at a certain stage of the
speech to produce a certain effect, most of the Aristotelian
*topoi*, in particular most of the dialectical *topoi*
of the *Topics*, are general instructions saying that a
conclusion of a certain form can be derived from premises of a certain
form; and because of this 'formal',
'semi-formal' or, at least topic-neutral character of
Aristotle's dialectical *topoi*, one *topos* can
be used to construe several different arguments or arguments about
different contents. Aristotle's treatise *Topics* lists
some hundred *topoi* for the construction of dialectical
arguments. These lists of *topoi* form the core of the method
by which the dialectician should be able to formulate deductions on
any problem that could be proposed. Most of the instructions that the
*Rhetoric* gives for the composition of enthymemes are also
organized as lists of *topoi*; especially the first book of the
*Rhetoric* essentially consists of *topoi* concerning
the subjects of the three genres of public speech (See *Rhet.*
I.5-14), while chapters 23-24 of the second book of the
*Rhetoric* provide lists of generally applicable
*topoi*.


### 7.1 The (Lacking) Definition of '*Topos*'



It is striking that the work that is almost exclusively dedicated to
the collection of *topoi*, the book *Topics*, does not
even make an attempt to define the concept of *topos*. At any
rate the *Rhetoric* gives a sort of defining characterization:
"I call the same thing element and *topos*; for an
element or a *topos* is a heading under which many enthymemes
fall" (*Rhet.* 1403a18-19). By
'element' Aristotle does not mean a proper part of the
enthymeme, but rather a general scheme under which many concrete
enthymemes of the same type can be subsumed. According to this
definition, the *topos* is a general argumentative scheme or
pattern, and the concrete arguments are instantiations of the general
*topos*. That the *topos* is a general instruction from
which several arguments can be derived is crucial for
Aristotle's understanding of an artful method of argumentation;
for a teacher of rhetoric who makes his pupils learn ready samples of
arguments would not be imparting the art itself to them, but only the
products of this art, just as if someone pretending to teach the art
of shoe-making only gave samples of already made shoes to his pupils
(see *Sophistical Refutations* 183b36ff.).


### 7.2 The Word '*Topos*' and the Technique of Places



The word '*topos*' (place, location) most probably
is derived from an ancient method of memorizing a great number of
items on a list by associating them with successive places one is
acquainted with, say the houses along a street. By recalling the
houses along the street we can also remember the associated items (on
this mnemonic technique see Sorabji 2004, 22-34). Full
descriptions of this technique from antiquity can be found in Cicero,
*De Oratore* II 86-88, 351-360, *Auctor ad
Herennium* III 16-24, 29-40 and in Quintilian,
*Institutio* XI 2, 11-33. In *Topics*
163b28-32, Aristotle seems to allude to this technique:
"For just as in the art of remembering, the mere mention of the
places instantly makes us recall the things, so these will make us
more apt at deductions through looking to these defined premises in
order of enumeration." Aristotle also alludes to this technique
in *On the soul* 427b18-20, *On Memory*
452a12-16, and *On Dreams* 458b20-22.



But although the name '*topos*' may be derived from
this mnemotechnical context, Aristotle's use of *topoi*
does not rely on the technique of places. At least within the system
of the book *Topics*, every given problem must be analyzed in
terms of certain linguistic, semantic or logical criteria: Does the
predicate of the sentence in question ascribe a genus or a definition
or peculiar or accidental properties to the subject? Does the sentence
express a sort of opposition, either contradiction or contrariety,
etc.? Does the sentence express that something is more or less the
case? Does it maintain identity or diversity? Are the words used
linguistically derived from words that are part of an accepted
premise? Depending on such criteria of the analyzed sentence one has
to refer to a fitting *topos*. For this reason, the succession
of *topoi* in the book *Topics* is organized in
accordance with their salient linguistic, semantic or logical
criteria; above all *topoi* presented in Books II-VII of
this treatise are structured in accordance with the four so-called
'predicables', i.e. whether a predicate signifies the
genus, an accident, a proprium (peculiar attribute) or the definition
of the subject. This structure suggests that no additional
mnemotechnique is essentially involved. Besides all this, there is at
least one passage in which the use of the word
'*topos*' can be explained without referring to the
previously mentioned mnemotechnique: In *Topics* VIII.1,
155b4-5 Aristotle says: "we must find the location
(*topos*) from which to attack", where the word
'*topos*' is obviously used to mean a starting
point for attacking the theses of the opponents.



More or less the same might apply to the
*Rhetoric*--except that most of its lists of
*topoi* are structured by certain contents and not by
linguistic, semantic or logical criteria; moreover, the system of the
four 'predicables' that structured the *topoi* in
the *Topics* is absent from the *Rhetoric* (see below
 SS 7.4).


### 7.3 The Ingredients and the Function of *Topoi*



A typical *topos* in Aristotle's dialectic runs as
follows: "Again, if the accident of a thing has a contrary, see
whether it belongs to the subject to which the accident in question
has been declared to belong: for if the latter belongs, the former
could not belong; for it is impossible that contrary predicates should
belong at the same time to the same thing" (*Topics*
113a20-24). Like most *topoi*, it includes (i) a sort of
general instruction ("see, whether ..."); further it
mentions (ii) an argumentative scheme--in the given example, the
scheme 'if the accidental predicate *p* belongs to the
subject *s*, then the opposed *P*\* cannot belong to
*s* too'. Finally, the *topos* refers to (iii) a
general rule or principle ("for it is impossible,
...") which justifies the given scheme. Other
*topoi* often include the discussion of (iv) examples; still
other *topoi* suggest (v) how to apply the given
schemes.--Though these are elements that regularly occur in
Aristotelian *topoi*, there is nothing like a standard form
with which all *topoi* conform. Often Aristotle is very brief
and leaves it to the reader to add the missing elements.



In a nutshell, the function of a *topos* can be explained as
follows. First of all, one has to select an apt *topos* for a
given conclusion. The conclusion is either a thesis of the opponent
that someone wishes to refute, or it is the assertion someone wishes
to establish or defend. Accordingly, there are two uses of
*topoi*: they can either prove or disprove a given sentence;
some can be used for both purposes, others for only one of them. In
Aristotle's dialectic, most *topoi* are topic-neutral and
need hence be selected by certain linguistic, semantic or logical
features of the given conclusion; if, for example, the conclusion
maintains a definition, one has to select a *topos* from a list
of *topoi* pertaining to definitions, etc. Once the
dialectician or rhetorician has selected a *topos* that is
appropriate for a given conclusion, the *topos* can be used to
construe a premise from which the given conclusion can be derived. If
for example the argumentative scheme is 'If a predicate is
generally true of a genus, then the predicate is also true of any
species of that genus', we can derive the conclusion 'the
capacity of nutrition belongs to plants' using the premise
'the capacity of nutrition belongs to all living things',
since 'living thing' is the genus of the species
'plants'. If the construed premise is accepted, either by
the opponent in a dialectical debate or by the audience of a public
speech, we can draw the intended conclusion. In the *Rhetoric*
though the situation is slightly different (see below
 SS 7.4),
 because here the topic-neutral type of *topoi* that was
prevalent in the *Topics* seems to play a secondary role. Many
*topoi* of the *Rhetoric* seem to be rather
'material' in the sense that they are only useful for
establishing conclusions of a certain content; this is why the
appropriate *topos* here cannot be selected by formal criteria,
but must be chosen in accordance with the content of the envisaged
conclusion--whether, for example, something is said to be useful
or honourable or just, etc.



It has been disputed whether the *topos* (or, more precisely,
the 'if ..., then ...' scheme that is included
in a *topos*) that we use to construe an argument must itself
be regarded as a further premise of the argument. It could be either,
as some say, the premise of a propositional scheme such as the modus
ponens, or, as others assume, as the conditional premise of a
hypothetical syllogism. Aristotle himself does not favour one of these
interpretations explicitly. But even if he regarded the *topoi*
as additional premises in a dialectical or rhetorical argument, it is
beyond any doubt that he did not use them as premises that must be
explicitly mentioned or even approved by the opponent or audience.


### 7.4 Rhetorical *Topoi*



Even though there are good reasons for thinking that the nature and
use of *topoi* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are based
on his elaborate account of dialectical *topoi* in the
*Topics* (see above
 SS 7.2
 and
 SS 7.3),
 commentators are faced with the difficulty that the use of the word
'*topos*' in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is
much more heterogeneous than in the *Topics*. Beside
*topoi* which do perfectly comply with the description given in
the *Topics*, there is an important group of *topoi* in
the *Rhetoric* that are not topic-neutral and hence do not
contain instructions for arguments of a certain logical form, but
rather with a certain predicate (for example, that something is good,
or honourable, or just, or contributes to happiness, etc.). While
those latter 'material' *topoi* so to speak are,
after all, used to construe arguments, there are also mentions of
so-called '*topoi*' in the context of the
non-argumentative means of persuasion, which might be taken as
procedural instructions, but no longer seem to be concerned with the
construction of arguments, which was the one and only function of
dialectical *topoi*.



Supplement on the Variety of *Topoi* in the *Rhetoric*




In addition to the more heterogenous use of the word
'*topos*' in the *Rhetoric* (which might
originate from Aristotle's attempt to combine his own
dialectical use of the term with more traditional rhetorical uses),
there is the problem of the controversial distinction in
*Rhet.* I.2, 1358a2-35 between *topoi* (which are
understood to be general/common) on the one hand and certain specific
devices (*idia*) on the other. While Aristotle seems inclined
to call the general or common *topoi* simply
'*topoi*', he uses several names for the opposing,
specific items (e.g. *idiai protaseis*, *idia*,
*eide*). This distinction has a major impact on the
structure of the *Rhetoric* as a whole (see above
 SS 2),
 in that it is responsible for the occurence of 'specific'
instructions, premises, '*topoi*' or whatever in
the bulk of the first book and the occurence of 'common'
*topoi* in the second part of the second book. Traditionally,
this distinction has been understood as a division between
general/common *topoi* on the one hand and specific
*topoi* on the other (the traditional view has been defended
among others by Cope 1877 and Rapp 2002). However, it is unclear (i)
what the opposition between general/common and specific refers to,
(ii) where in the *Rhetoric* the common *topoi* can be
found and (iii) whether the distinction is meant to be a distinction
between *topoi* in the first place, since even though Aristotle
distinguishes *topoi* that are common from specific
(*idia*) rhetorical devices, he never explicitly uses the
phrase 'specific *topoi*', as one might expect on
the traditional reading.



As for (i), Aristotle points out in *Rhet.* I.2 that some
things are specific to physics, others to ethics, etc. This seems to
suggest a distinction between *topoi* (or other building blocks
of arguments) that are peculiar to the different sciences on the one
hand and other *topoi* that are not, but are instead applicable
to all sciences and fields of knowledge alike--just as (most of)
the dialectical *topoi* of the *Topics* are. However,
from *Rhet.* I.3 on, Aristotle makes the readers think, by
contrast, that 'specific' refers to the different genres
of rhetoric, so that some *topoi* are specific to deliberative,
others to epideictic, and still others to juridical speech.
Correspondingly, this would require a sense of
being'common' that boils down to saying that they are not
specific to one single species of speech, but that does not amount to
the topic-neutrality of the dialectical *topoi*.



With regard to (ii), it is generally agreed that the specific
*topoi* can be found in the first book of the *Rhetoric*
and the common *topoi* in the second. Most commentators assume
that all common *topoi* are listed in chapters II.23-24
(real enthymemes in II.23, fallacious enthymemes in II.24). However,
it is less common to count the items listed in II.19 (about the
possible/impossible, past and future facts, significance and
insignificance) as common *topoi*, which might be due to the
controversy mentioned in (i) about the required sense of being
'common', for the *topoi* in II.19 are applicable
to all genres of speech, but are most probably not common in the way
the dialectical *topoi* are. In addition, it is important to
notice that even chapter II.23, which is undisputedly dedicated to
common *topoi*, is a mixed bag, for it includes some
*topoi*, especially in the first third of the chapter, that,
being topic-neutral, thoroughly correspond to dialectical
*topoi* and even might be generally applicable as the
dialectical *topoi* are, while some other *topoi*
mentioned in II.23 are quite different in style, as they are taken
from extant historical speeches.



The most difficult debates are posed by (iii), as the traditional
interpretation is based on some fragile assumptions. Not only does
Aristotle never call the specific items '*topoi*'
by name, it is also significant that the specific items that are
listed in *Rhet.* I.5-15 often have the form of mere
propositions or premises rather than of *topoi* as we know them
from the *Topics* (see above
 SS 7.3).
 This is why several authors insist that the distinction between
*topoi*, which are thought to be common, and *idia* is
not a distinction between different types of *topoi*, but
between *topoi* and something else, most notably premises,
commonly accepted premises or premises established by the arts. This
objection comes in several versions. (a) Several authors subscribed to
the view of Solmsen 1929 that there are two types of enthymemes,
respresenting different stages in the development of Aristotle's
logical thinking insofar as some are taken from *topoi*
(deriving from Aristotle's early- pre-syllogistic logic) and
some are built from premises through the figures of the syllogism
(thus presupposing syllogistic logic), not from *topoi*.
According to this view, the specific *topoi* given in the first
book of the *Rhetoric* are the premises of the latter type of
enthymemes, and the enthymemes of the former type are taken only from
common *topoi*. From this point of view, only common
*topoi* would be *topoi* in the proper sense, while
specific *topoi* would be, strictly speaking, nothing but
premises. Accordingly, one would expect to find propositions of the
form "All *F* are just/noble/good" in the first
book of the *Rhetoric*; with such propositions one could
construe syllogisms like "All *F* are
just/noble/good--This particular *x* is
*F*--This particular *x* is just/noble/good."
Against Solmsen it has been objected that what one actually gets in
the first book hardly fits Solmsen's model. In some sense one
finds more than the required premises in that Aristotle gives here not
only isolated propositions, but also certain propositions together
with a reason or a justification. Furthermore, chapters I.6-7 of
the *Rhetoric* offer *topoi* which can also be found in
the third book of *Topics*; in the *Topics* they are
clearly called '*topoi*', so that there is less
pressure to think that they are premises rather than *topoi*.
(b) Grimaldi 1958 requires that in order to build a rhetorical
argument one needs the logical form of an argument provided by the
*topoi* plus the material (content) provided by the specific
premises or *idia*. A more refined version of this
'complementarity'-view has been suggested by Rubinelli
2009, who, however, also allows of the possibility that some
enthymemes are taken only from the *topoi*, while others are
only taken from the *idia*. Against Grimaldi's view it is
has been objected that many of the common *topoi* listed in
chapters II.23-24 are not based on linguistic, semantic or
logical categories as the topic-neutral *topoi* of the
*Topics* are. Some of them only offer strategic advice, for
example, to turn what has been said against oneself upon the one who
said it. For this reason, it would be misleading to interpret the
common *topoi* of the *Rhetoric* as providing logical
schemes of inference. (c) Havrda 2019 has attacked the presuppositions
of the traditional view, but does not settle for the alternatives
suggested by Solmsen, Grimaldi or Rubinelli either. According to him,
Aristotle never distinguishes between common and specific
*topoi*. Rather, he distinguishes between two different sources
of rhetorical deductions; one source, the dialectical one, uses
*topoi*, while the other, which is based on definitions
provided by arts and sciences, does not.


## 8. Style: How to Say Things with Words



*Rhet.* III.1-12 introduces the topic of *lexis*,
usually translated as 'style'. This topic was not
announced until the final passage of *Rhetoric* II, so that
most scholars have come to think of this section as a more or less
self-contained treatise. The insertion of this treatise into the
*Rhetoric* is motivated by the claim that, while
*Rhetoric* I & II dealt with thought (dianoia), i.e., about
*what* the orator should say, it remains to inquire into the
various ways of saying or formulating one and the same thing. In the
course of *Rhetoric* III.1-12 it turns out that Aristotle
tackles this task by using some quite heterogeneous approaches. After
an initial exploration of the field of delivery and style (III.1)
Aristotle tries to determine what good prose style consists in; for
this purpose he has to go into the differentiation and the selection
of various kinds of nouns, one of which is defined as metaphor
(III.2). The following chapters III.3-6 feature topics that are
at best loosely connected with the theme of good prose style; among
these topics is the opposite of good style, namely frigid or deterring
style (*psuchron*) (III.3), the simile, which turns out to be
connected with the metaphor (III.4), the issue of correct Greek
(III.5), the appropriateness (III.7) and the means by which
one's style becomes long-winded and dignified (III.6). Chapters
III.8-9 introduce two new approaches to the issue of style,
which seem to be unrelated to everything that has been said so far:
These are the topics of the rhythmical shaping of prose style and of
periodic and non-periodic flow of speech. Chapters III.10-11 are
dedicated to how the orator can 'bring things before one's
eyes', which amounts to something like making the style more
vivid. Again metaphors are shown to play a crucial role for that
purpose, so that the topic of metaphor is taken up again and deepened
by extended lists of examples. Chapter III.12 seems to make a new
start by distinguishing between oral and written style and assessing
their suitability for the three genres of speech (see above
 SS2).
 The philosophical core of Aristotle's treatise on style in
*Rhetoric* III.1-12 seems to be included in the
discussion of the good prose style (see below
 SS8.1),
 however it is the topic of metaphor (see below
 SS8.2)
 that has attracted the most attention in the later reception up to
the present day.


### 8.1 The Virtue of Style



Originally the discussion of style belongs to the art of poetry rather
than to rhetoric; the poets were the first, as Aristotle observes, to
give an impulse for the study of style. Nevertheless he admits that
questions of style or, more precisely, of different ways to formulate
the same subject, may have an impact on the degree of clarity:
"What concerns the topic of *lexis*, however, has some
small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather
than another makes some difference in regard to clarity; although not
a great difference..." (*Rhet.* III.1,
1404a8-10). Clarity again matters for comprehension and
comprehensibility contributes to persuasiveness. Indeed Aristotle even
claims that the virtue or excellence (*arete*) of prose
style ultimately depends on clarity, because it is the genuine purpose
of a speech is to make something clear. In prose speeches, the good
formulation of a state of affairs must therefore be a clear one.
However, saying this is not yet enough to account for the best or
excellent prose style, since clear linguistic expressions tend to be
banal or flat, while good style should avoid such banality. If the
language becomes too banal it will not be able to attract the
attention of the audience. The orator can avoid this tendency of
banality by the use of dignified or elevated expressions and in
general by all formulations that deviate from common usage. On the one
hand, uncommon vocabulary has the advantage of evoking the curiosity
of an audience. On the other hand the use of such elevated vocabulary
bears a serious risk: Whenever the orator makes excessive use of it,
the speech might become unclear, thus failing to meet the default
requirement of prose speech, namely clarity. Moreover, if the
vocabulary becomes too sublime or dignified in relation to
prose's subject matter (Aristotle assumes it is mostly everyday
affairs), the audience will notice that the orator uses his words with
a certain intention and will become suspicious about the orator and
his intentions. Hitting upon the right wording is therefore a matter
of being clear, but not too banal; In trying not to be too banal, one
must use uncommon, dignified words and phrases, but one must be
careful not to use them excessively or inappropriately in relation to
prose style and the typical subject matter of prose speeches.



Bringing all these considerations together, Aristotle defines the good
prose style, i.e. the virtue of prose style, as follows: "Let
the virtue of linguistic form be defined as being clear, for since the
logos is a (linguistic, sc.) sign, it would fail to bring about its
proper function, whenever it does not make clear (whatever it is the
sign of, sc.)--and neither banal/mean/flat
(*tapeinen*) nor above the deserved dignity, but
appropriate (*prepon*)" (*Rhet.* III.2,
1404b1-4; similar at III.12, 1414a22-26). According to this
definition, the virtue of prose style has to avoid two opposed
tendencies, both of which are excessive and therefore fallacious: The
good style is clear in a way that is neither too banal nor too
dignified, but appropriate (in proportion to the subject matter of
prose speech). In this respect the definition of stylistic virtue
follows the same scheme as the definition of ethical virtues in
Aristotle's ethical writings, insofar as both the stylistic
virtue and the virtue of character are defined in terms of a mean that
lies between two opposed excesses. If the virtue of style is defined
as a mean between the banality involving form of clarity and overly
dignified (and hence inappropriate) speech, it is with good reason
that Aristotle speaks of only one virtue of prose style, and not of
clarity, ornament (by dignified expressions) and appropriateness as
three distinct virtues of style. However, from the times of Cicero and
Quintilianus on, these three, along with the correctness of Greek or
Latin, became the canonical four virtues of speech (*virtutes
dicendi*). Reading Aristotle through the spectacles of the Roman
art of rhetoric, scholars often try to identify two, three or four
virtues of style in his *Rhetoric*.



Finally, if the virtue of style is about finding a balance between
banal clarity, which is dull, and attractive dignity, which is
inappropriate in public speeches, how can the orator manage to control
the different degrees of clarity and dignity? For this purpose
Aristotle equips the orator with a classification of words (more or
less the same classification can also be found in *Poetics*
chapter 21): First of all Aristotle distinguishes between the
*kuria onamata*, the standard expressions, and the
*glotta*, the borrowed words, idioms or vernacular
expressions. Most examples that Aristotle gives of this latter class
are taken from the different Greek dialects, and most examples of this
type are in turn taken from the language of the Homeric epos. Further
classes are defined by metaphors and by several expressions that are
somehow altered or modified, e.g., newly coined expressions
(*pepoiemena*), composite expressions (especially new or
unusual compositions (*ta dipla*)), and lengthened, shortened
or otherwise altered expressions. Sometimes Aristotle also uses the
term *kosmos* under which he collects all epithets and
otherwise ornamental expressions. These different types of words
differ in accordance with their familiarity. Most familiar are the
usual or current words, the least familiar words are the
*glotta* or words that are newly coined. The metaphors
are also unknown and unusual, because a usual, well-known word is used
to designate something other than its usual designation (see below
 SS8.2).
 The best established words, the *kuria*, make their subject
clear, but do not excite the audience's curiosity, whereas all
other types of words are not established, and hence have the sort of
attraction that alien or foreign things used to have. Since remote
things are admirable (*thaumaston*) and the admirable is
pleasant, Aristotle says, one should make the speech admirable and
pleasant by the use of such unfamiliar words. However one has to be
careful not to use inappropriately dignified or poetic words in prose
speech. Thus the virtue of style is accomplished by the selection and
balanced use of these various types of words: Fundamental for prose
speech is the use of usual and therefore clear words. In order to make
the speech pleasant and dignified and in order to avoid banality the
orator must make moderate use of non-familiar elements. Metaphor plays
an important role for prose style, since metaphors contribute, as
Aristotle says, clarity as well as the unfamiliar, surprising effect
that avoids banality and tediousness.


### 8.2 Aristotelian Metaphors



According to Aristotle *Poetics* 21, 1457b9-16 and
20-22, a metaphor is "the application of an alien name by
transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus,
or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion".
These four types are exemplified as follows:




|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Type** | **Example** | **Explanation** |
| (i) | From genus to species | There lies my ship | Lying at anchor is a species of the
genus "lying" |
| (ii) | From species to genus | Verily ten thousand noble deeds hath
Odysseus wrought | Ten thousand is a species of the
genus "large number" |
| (iii) | From species to species | (a) With blade of bronze drew away
the life | (a) "To draw away" is
used for "to cleave" |
|  |  | (b) Cleft the water with the vessel
of unyielding bronze | (b) "To cleave" is used
for "to draw away." Both, to draw away and to cleave, are
species of "taking away" |
| (iv) | From analogy | (a) To call the cup "the shield
of Dionysus" | (a) The cup is to Dionysus as the
shield to Ares |
|  |  | (b) To call the shield "the cup
of Ares" | (b) The shield is to Ares as the cup to Dionysus |



Most of the examples Aristotle offers for types (i) to (iii) would not
be regarded as metaphors in the modern sense; rather they would fall
under the headings of metonomy or synecdoche. The examples offered for
type (iv) are more like modern metaphors. Aristotle himself regards
the metaphors of group (iv), which are built from analogy, as the most
important type of enthymemes. An analogy is given if the second term
is to the first as the fourth to the third. Correspondingly, an
analogous metaphor uses the fourth term for the second or the second
for the fourth. This principle can be illustrated by the following
Aristotelian examples:




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Analogy** | **Metaphor** |
| (a) | The cup to Dionysus as shield to
Ares. | To call the cup "the shield of
Dionysus" or the shield "the cup of Ares" is a
metaphor. |
| (b) | Old age to life as the evening to
day | To call old age "the evening of
the life" or the evening "old age of the day" is a
metaphor |
| (c) | Sowing to seed as *X* to sun
rays, while the action of the sun in scattering his rays is nameless;
still this process bears to the sun the same relation as sowing to the
seed. | To call (a nameless) *X*
"sowing of sun rays" is a metaphor by analogy |
| (d) | = (a) | To call the shield "a cup
without wine" is also a metaphor by analogy. |



Examples (a) and (b) obey the optional instruction that metaphors can
be qualified by adding the term to which the proper word is relative
(cp. "the shield *of Ares*," "the evening
*of life*"). In example (c), there is no proper name for
the thing that the metaphor refers to. In example (d) the relation of
analogy is not, as in the other cases, indicated by the domain to
which an item is referred to, but by a certain negation (for example
"without name"); the negations make clear that the term is
not used in its usual sense.



Metaphors are closely related to similes; but as opposed to the later
tradition, Aristotle does not define the metaphor as an abbreviated
simile, but, the other way around, the simile as a metaphor. The
simile differs from the metaphor in the form of expression: while in
the metaphor something is identified or substituted, the simile
compares two things with each other, using words as
"like," "as", etc. For example, "He
rushed as a lion" is, according to Aristotle, a simile, but
"The lion rushed" is a metaphor.



While in the later tradition the use of metaphors has been seen as a
matter of mere decoration, which has to delight the hearer, Aristotle
stresses the cognitive function of metaphors. Metaphors, he says,
bring about learning (*Rhet.* III.10, 1410b14f.). In order to
understand a metaphor, the hearer has to find something common between
the metaphor and the thing the metaphor refers to. For example, if
someone calls the old age "stubble", we have to find a
common genus to which old age and stubble belong; we do not grasp the
very sense of the metaphor until we find that both, old age and
stubble, have lost their bloom. Thus, a metaphor not only refers to a
thing, but simultaneously describes the thing in a certain respect.
This is why Aristotle says that the metaphor brings about learning: as
soon as we understand why someone uses the metaphor
"stubble" to refer to old age, we have learned at least
one characteristic of old age.


## Glossary of Selected Terms


* Accepted opinions: *endoxa*
* Argument: *logos*
* Art: *techne*
* Character: *ethos*
* Counterpart: *antistrophos*
* Credible: *axiopistos*
* Decision (practical): *prohairesis*
* Deduction: *sullogismos*
* Emotions: *pathe*
* Enthymeme: *enthumema*
* Example: *paradeigma*
* For the most part: *hos epi to polu*
* Induction (*epagoge*)
* Judgement: *krisis*
* Location: *topos* (an argumentative scheme)
* Maxim: *gnome*
* Means of persuasion: *pistis* (in pre-Aristotelian use this
word also designates a certain part of the speech)
* Metaphor: *metaphora*
* Persuasive: *pithanon*
* Place: *topos* (an argumentative scheme)
* Practical intelligence: *phronesis*
* Premise: *protasis* (can also mean 'sentence',
statement')
* Probable: *eikos*
* Proof: *apodeixis* (in the sense of 'demonstrative
argument, demonstration')
* Proof: *tekmerion* (i.e. a necessary sign or sign
argument)
* Sign: *semeion* (can also mean 'sign
argument')
* Style: *lexis*
* Specific *topoi*: *idioi* *topoi* (Aristotle
refers to them also by '*idiai protaseis*' or
'*eide*')