## 1. Basic Concepts


### 1.1 Indian Background



Buddhism was founded some time between the 6th and 4th centuries BCE
in South Asia. The fundamental teachings of Buddhism are that ordinary
life is suffused with (Skt.) *dukkha* (often translated as
"suffering"), and that *dukkha* is caused by the
illusory belief in persistent individual selves. The belief in selves
leads to endless craving (Skt. *tanha*) which is unsatisfiable,
because it is a longing by one illusory entity (the personal self) to
permanently possess other equally illusory things. Escape from craving
(and hence *dukkha*) is only possible by achieving
enlightenment, which is fully believing the truth of no-self (Skt.
*anatman*). Enlightenment leads to universal compassion:
*dukkha* is seen to belong to no one, so there is no reason to
prefer the elimination of what would conventionally be described as
"my suffering" to "your suffering" or
"their suffering." The illusory world of independent
selves is referred to as (Skt.) "*samsara*," and
the state achieved through enlightenment is (Skt.)
"*nirvana*." 



The two major sects of the Buddhist religion are Theravada and
Mahayana. These sects have a great variety of philosophical
formulations, but three of the more influential schools are Abhidharma
(Theravada), Madhyamaka (Mahayana), and Yogacara (Mahayana). Each of
these schools interprets the key concepts of Buddhism in different
ways. 
 Abhidharma Buddhists
 argue that the things that are taken to be
independent, persistent selves by common sense (such as particular
monks like "Nagasena" and objects like chariots) exist
only by convention. However, these conventionally existing entities
are ontologically grounded in other, genuinely existing (Skt.)
 *dharmas*
 (entities such as instantaneous configurations of
matter, or temporary mental states). Although these *dharmas*
are transient and causally dependent on one another, they also possess
a self-nature (Skt. 
 *svabhava*). 



In contrast, Madhyamaka Buddhists (like Nagarjuna) argue that, because
all *dharmas* are causally dependent, nothing is ultimately
grounded. They describe this by saying that reality is characterized
by "emptiness" 
(Skt. *sunyata*), in the sense that
everything is "empty" of self-nature and an independent,
persistent self. The doctrine of emptiness is easy to misunderstand,
and is sometimes mistakenly conflated with metaphysical nihilism.
However, Buddhists distinguish their view from both Annihilationism
(Skt. *uccheda-drsti*) and Eternalism (Skt.
*sasvata-drsti*). Annihilationism is the view that nothing
exists in any sense, while Eternalism is the view that something
exists that is eternal, unchanging, and unconditioned by anything
else. Madhyamaka denies both extremes, and holds that while
*dharmas* do exist, each *dharma*'s existence is
"conditioned" (causally or conceptually dependent) on
something else, without any ultimate ground. 



Yogacara
 offers a third alternative: everything is "empty"
of a mind-independent self. All that exists are mental states.
Consistent with the doctrine of "no-self," Yogacara
Buddhists deny that there is a substantial entity that has, thinks, or
experiences the mental states. However, in order to explain why there
are correlations among experiences (for example, why the apparent
experience of "my starting a fire" is correlated with the
apparent experience of "you feeling warmth"), Yogacara
posits a 
 repository consciousness
 (Skt. *alayavijnana*) which
metaphorically contains the "seeds" of previous
experiences that bear fruit in later experiences. 


### 1.2 Chinese Developments



Buddhism was brought to China by missionaries some time during the
first century CE. Indian scriptures and expositions arrived in China
piecemeal, with the result that early Chinese adherents to Buddhism
did not perceive contributions from different Indian traditions as
fundamentally inconsistent. Chinese Buddhism is thus eclectic in its
use of concepts from what were originally distinct Indian Buddhist
schools. This, in turn, led to the practice of (Ch.) *panjiao*
(doctrinal classification), according to which different philosophical
systems are treated not as exclusive, but as partial conceptions of
the truth, which can be arranged hierarchically in terms of how
complete (literally, "rounded," Ch. *yuan*) their
grasp of the truth is. To use Western terminology, one might say that
*panjiao* is a form of inference to the best explanation, since
the more comprehensive teachings are shown to offer a more plausible
and comprehensive interpretation of the relevant ethical,
metaphysical, and empirical assumptions. 



Upon gradually growing in influence, Buddhism became one of the
"Three Teachings" (Ch. *San jiao*) of the Chinese
tradition, along with Confucianism and Daoism. In fact, at times
Buddhism has been the dominant religious and philosophical movement in
China (among both intellectuals and commoners). However, there have
been several periods of Buddhist persecution in Chinese history. In
567 CE, Wei Yuansong (n.d.), having left the Buddhist order, argued to
Emperor Wu of the Northern Zhou (543-578, ruled 561-578) that Buddhism
should be de-institutionalized. He argued that Buddhism is responsible
for social instability because its various institutions--monastic
living, internal hierarchies, and freedom from political
control--undermine harmony-facilitating Chinese culture and
tradition by virtue of facilitating corruption among monks and by
isolating Buddhism from practical affairs (Ch. *shi*). 



Emperor Wu's subsequent persecutions of Buddhism, in 574 and
577, disrupted Buddhist institutions. Many monks fled to rural areas,
seeking forms of Buddhism better suited to a Chinese context.
Searching for ways to make Buddhism more accessible to laity, for more
amenable practices and more achievable ideals, they also began
exploring in earnest scriptures that receive little if any attention
in the well-established schools of Indian Buddhism. The lack of
definitive commentaries on these scriptures from established Indian
traditions, together with political disruptions to the inertia of
extant scholarly traditions of Buddhism, permitted a freedom of
creative appropriation and innovation that resulted in traditions of
Buddhism unique to the Chinese context. 



Huayan is one of these traditions. Chief among the scriptures
responsible for its distinctive teachings are the *Avatamsaka
(Flower Garland) Sutra* and *Awakening of Faith in
Mahayana*. Huayan takes its name from the *Avatamsaka
Sutra* (Ch. *Huayan jing*), which presents a dizzyingly
complex and intricate vision of reality as thoroughly
"interpenetrating," of Buddhahood as coextensive with all
there is, and of the features of reality as completely dependent upon
the mind and deeds of sentient beings. *Awakening of Faith in
Mahayana* develops the theory of the *tathagatagarbha*,
(Skt. for "Buddha-embryo" or "Buddha-womb"),
the potentiality of Buddhahood. It posits One Mind as the foundation
of reality. It also ascribes to One Mind two aspects, *tathata*
(Skt. for "suchness" or "thusness") and
*samsara*. *Tathata* refers to reality as experienced
without *dukkha*; it is generally taken to be non-conceptual
and hence incapable of being expressed in words. *Samsara* is
reality as experienced with *dukkha*. *Awakening of Faith in
Mahayana* presents these aspects as mutually inclusive and
inseparable. 


### 1.3 Basic Arguments



Through the fusion of the ideas of the *Avatamsaka Sutra* and
*Awakening of Faith in Mahayana*, Huayan Buddhism developed a
distinctive interpretation of the concepts of "emptiness"
and "no-self." The original Indian Buddhist view that
there are no selves transformed into the Chinese Buddhist view that
there is no *individual* self, but there is a sort of
transpersonal self (One Mind) of which all the transient and
ontologically interdependent aspects of reality are parts. The
fundamental human vice is selfishness, which is caused by the illusory
belief in individual selves, and the fundamental human virtue is
universal compassion, which is caused by the recognition that we are
all parts of one, transpersonal reality. To fail to have compassion
for another person is like ignoring a wound to my own limb because it
is temporarily numb. 



Huayan inherits from Madhyamaka the view that all entities are
conditioned. To be conditioned is for an entity to be causally or
conceptually dependent for its existence and its identity on something
else. However, Huayan takes the additional steps of arguing that,
because the identity of any one thing is dependent on the identities
of other things, "one is all," and because the whole is
dependent for its identity on its parts, "all is one."
Huayan adopts from Yogacara the terms "repository
consciousness" (*alayavijnana*) and "womb of the
Buddha" (*tathagatagarbha*), which it uses to describe
the reality of the world in itself. The Third Patriarch Fazang
(discussed more below) illustrates how "one is all and all is
one" with the relationship between a rafter and the building of
which it is a part. He argues that the building is the rafter, because
the building is nothing more than the sum of its parts, so each part
is essential to its identity. Conversely, the rafter is the building,
because what makes the rafter a rafter is its role as a part of the
building. (Intuitively, if the rafter were removed from the building,
its identity could change to being a bench, or a teeter-totter, or
simply kindling.) 



One of the metaphors from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* that is
frequently used to illustrate mutual interdependence is Indra's
net (or "Indra's web"). According to pre-Buddhist
myth, the god Indra has a net with a jewel at the intersection of
every two strands. Each jewel is so bright that it reflects every
other jewel in the net. This is adopted as a metaphor for the manner
in which each thing that exists is dependent for both its existence
and its identity upon every other thing that exists. 



Since the only thing that exists is this reality, the world of
illusion (*samsara*) is no different ontologically from
*nirvana*. (The slogan "*Nirvana is
samsara*" is antecedently present in Madhyamaka.) In other
words, *samsara* is simply a mistaken perception of the same
ultimate reality experienced in enlightenment. Fazang illustrates this
with the metaphor of a statue of a golden lion (Fazang 2014a). We
should not deny or fail to perceive the conventional fact that the
statue appears to be a lion. However, we must realize that there is no
sense in which a lion is actually there, and even the appearance of
the lion is not a separate entity beyond the gold that is present. The
gold can take on different forms (ore, ingots, coins, etc.), but in
itself it is ultimately unchanging. Similarly, we should not deny or
fail to perceive that ordinary reality appears to consist of distinct,
persistent individuals. However, we must realize that there are not
actually distinct, persistent individuals. All that really exists is
the complete network of mutually interdependent entities
(*dharmas*), and this network (extended through all of time and
space) is eternal and unchanging. 


## 2. Dushun (557-640)



Dushun holds the posthumous honor of being known as the first
patriarch of the Huayan School. He was active as a monk during the Sui
(581-618) and early Tang (618-907) dynasties. We know very little
about his life. He had no sectarian affiliation, and he seems to have
been relatively unconcerned with scholarly controversies. We know that
he was keenly interested in the *Avatamsaka Sutra*, and that he
was renowned as a meditation master. For a time, he served as leader
of the Zhixiang Temple on Zhongnan Mountain, which was a center for
studying the *Avatamsaka Sutra*. His main interest seems to
have been ministering to rural laity for the sake of making Buddhist
practice relevant to their lives--by hosting common meals,
distributing food to the poor, chanting scriptural passages, and
offering edifying homilies. 



Dushun authored only a handful of texts. Chief among these is
*Discernments of the Dharmadhatu of Avatamsaka* (Ch. *Huayan
fajie guanmen*, trans. Gimello 1976b, 457-510). This no longer
exists as an independent text. But it is interspersed within several
commentaries, most notably those by Chengguan (T45.1883; trans. Cleary
1993, 71-124) and Zongmi (T45.1884, trans. King 1976). The text itself
is quite unusual. It is not a commentary on the *Avatamsaka
Sutra*. Nor does it offer exegesis of the *Avatamsaka
Sutra*. There are no paraphrases, no explanations of passages, no
definitions or technical terminology. Instead, the text distils the
central insights available through studying the *Avatamsaka
Sutra*. Its apparent goal is making the *Avatamsaka Sutra*
relevant to meditative practice and accessible to the laity. 



*Discernments of the Dharmadhatu* divides into three sections,
each of which corresponds to a "discernment" or meditation
on the content of the *Avatamsaka Sutra*. The first discernment
reviews the equivalence between form (Skt. *rupa*) and
emptiness. This is a well-known equivalence from the *Heart
Sutra* and other literature from the Indian Mahayana tradition.
Nothing in this discernment should be unfamiliar to students of the
history of Indian Buddhism. The second discernment, by contrast,
contains two innovations that are critical for understanding the
Chinese appropriation of Buddhism--and thereby renders the text
especially significant from a philosophical perspective. 



The first innovation is Dushun's decision to use the Chinese
term *li* (principle/pattern) to characterize the nature of
ultimate reality. Indian Mahayana typically characterizes the nature
of ultimate reality as emptiness (Skt. *sunyata*) or suchness
(Skt. *tathata*). Both of these terms connote something that
defies conceptualization. Dushun imbues *li* with an
epistemological connotation: *li* is that which is present to
those who achieve *nirvana*. *Nirvanic* experience, as
Dushun understands it, reveals neither emptiness nor an
undifferentiated manifold but, instead, boundless and ceaseless
activity that has a patterned coherence to it (see Jiang 2001,
466-467; for a contrary interpretation, see Gimello 1976a, 125). 



By discussing *li*--the boundless and ceaseless activity
present during *nirvanic* experience--rather than
emptiness, Dushun forestalls any conflation between *li* and
*total voidness*. Whatever else it might be, *li* is far
from *nothing at all*. By discussing *li* rather than
*tathata*, Dushun affords the possibility of saying something
about ultimate reality. Conceptualizing *nirvanic* experience
as encountering suchness presents those experiences as something other
than "such," but conceptualizing *nirvanic*
experience as encountering *li* does not present activity as
something other than activity. Dushun's first innovation thereby
opens the way to developing a metaphysical theory (conceptualization)
about reality as encountered during *nirvanic* experience. 



The second innovation in *Discernments of the Dharmadhatu* is
Dushun's decision to use the Chinese term *shi*
(thing/events/phenomena) to refer to the myriad things that appear in
our experiences of reality. Indian Mahayana prefers to oppose
emptiness to form, where form stands in as one of the myriad
*dharmas* that constitute reality. Strictly speaking, then, the
equivalence "emptiness is form, form is emptiness" is a
claim *only* about the relation between the *dharmas*
and the notion of emptiness: it is the claim that all *dharmas*
are empty. This equivalence says nothing about whether composite
realities--such as persons and chariots--are empty. 



The distinction between *dharmas* and composite realities makes
sense in the Abhidharma tradition: *dharmas* are real,
composites are empty. But all Mahayana traditions claim that
*dharmas* are empty as well. So Dushun's second
innovation makes Mahayana metaphysics more efficient: absent a reason
to distinguish *dharmas* from the constituents built therefrom,
everything is on an ontological par, *dharma* and
non-*dharma* alike. 



Dushun titles the second discernment the "mutual non-obstruction
between *li* and *shi*." He divides the
discernment into ten themes, which naturally group into five pairs:



* 1/2 *Li* and *shi* pervade each other.
* 3/4 *Li* and *shi* make each other manifest.
* 5/6 *Li* and *shi* hide each other.
* 7/8 *Li* and *shi* are identical with each other.
* 9/10 *Li* and *shi* are distinct from each other.



These five mutual relationships specify the meaning of "mutual
non-obstruction." Since the first is fundamental to the
remaining four, we focus on understanding the "pervasion"
relation between *li* and *shi*. 



The mutual pervasion of *li* and *shi* presents itself
as paradoxical. *Li* is boundless and ceaseless. *Shi*
are limited and impermanent. Pervade means "to spread through
and be totally in every part of." The paradox is that it is not
at all clear how the limited and the unlimited can pervade each other.
Would not the boundless become *bounded* by virtue of being
contained within something limited? Would not the limited, by virtue
of being limited, need to become *unlimited* in order to spread
through *every part* of the boundless? The first pairing in
Dushun's second discernment seems to violate two quite plausible
constraints, namely: nothing limited contains anything boundless; and
nothing limited appears throughout anything boundless. 



Dushun admits that his claim of mutual pervasion "transcends
conventional sensibilities." However, he offers a metaphor for
clarification, comparing *li* to water and *shi* to
waves. This metaphor, originating with the *Lankavatara Sutra*,
posits that each wave contains the entire ocean, and that each wave
appears in every part of the ocean. These posits are not entirely
implausible. Individual waves extend across the entire ocean, insofar
as waves lack natural borders for extension; and waves extend beneath
the surface of ocean waters, insofar as waves also lack natural
borders for thickness. But, regardless of plausibility, the metaphor
suggests that the mutual pervasion of *li* and *shi*
amounts to the claim that none of the myriad things has natural
borders even though they appear to have them (by virtue of presenting
to us as discrete individuals that are separate from and independent
of each other). 



The third discernment in *Discernment of the Dharmadhatu* is
"total pervasion and accommodation." This discernment
concerns the nature of and relations among individual *shi*.
Dushun observes that each *shi* is nothing other than
*li* and yet, in its individuality, distinct from *li*;
that each *shi* includes, and is included within, all other
*shi*; that this mutual inclusivity makes each *shi*
somehow omnipresent, albeit in ways that preserve differences among
*shi*; that each *shi* contains, and is contained by,
all other *shi*; that this mutual containment, while preserving
differences among *shi*, is fractal, such that even the
smallest mote of dust contains the entirety of everything else, which
in turn contains the same mote of dust containing everything else, on
and on *ad infinitum*; and that mutual inclusion and
containment is simultaneous and, somehow, a matter of perspective.
These claims are, somehow, consequences of the mutual pervasion of
*li* and *shi*. It remains for subsequent contributors
to the Huayan School to explain and elaborate upon Dushun's
final discernment. 


## 3. Zhiyan (602-668)



Tradition identifies Zhiyan as the second patriarch of the Huayan
School. Zhiyan entered the Buddhist sangha under the tutelage of
Dushun, who exposed him to the *Avatamsaka Sutra* at Zhixiang
Temple. But the youthful Zhiyan was also keenly interested in
doctrinal matters, and he studied a wide variety of texts and learned
from masters of other schools. His encyclopedic scholarly knowledge of
Buddhism, paired with uncertainty about how the many doctrines of the
many Buddhist schools cohere with each other and an abiding concern
with the charge that Buddhism neglects practical matters, led the
young Zhiyan to become disheartened and confused. 



Rather than follow the more typical path of monk-scholars, Zhiyan left
public life, spending some 20 years wandering the countryside and
preaching to the laity. He returned to Chang'an in the late
640s, whereupon he attracted many disciples--chief among them
Fazang (who would later become the Third Patriarch) and the Korean
monk Uisang (625-702), who took Huayan to Korea. In 661, Prince Pei,
son of Emperor Gaozu and Empress Wu, appointed Zhiyan as a chief
lecturer. (This appointment may have been a factor in granting Fazang
the access to the royal court that was so important in his later
career.) Zhiyan spent his remaining years teaching and refining his
earlier work with scholarly detail. 



Perhaps the most significant of Zhiyan's later works is his
*Essays on Sundry Topics in the Huayan Sutra* (Ch. *Huayan
Jing Nei Zhang Men Deng Za Kong Mu Zhang*; T45.1870). Here Zhiyan
introduced a five-tiered *panjiao*. Lowest in rank for this
*panjiao* are Abhidharma teachings that posit the existence of
*dharmas* with self-natures (*svabhava*). The second and
third ranks then encompass the sectarian Mahayana teachings
responsible for Zhiyan's early confusions. These teachings
acknowledge that everything, *dharmas* as well as constructions
thereof, is empty of self-nature. But they do so in different ways.
Some, such as Madhyamaka, take universal and thoroughgoing emptiness
to preclude the possibility of experiencing or knowing a reality that
is free of conceptual construction. Others, such as the
*tathagatagarbha* theory of Yogacara, ground universal and
thoroughgoing emptiness upon a pure and untainted consciousness.
Zhiyan classifies teachings without a pure and untainted ground for
emptiness as "elementary" and those with such a ground as
"advanced," ranking them second and third in his
*panjiao*, respectively. 



The second tier of Zhiyan's *panjiao* stands to the third
tier as Dushun's first discernment stands to his second. In both
cases, the latter makes claim to a more penetrating insight into the
significance of dependent arising, by virtue of applying not only to
*dharmas* but also to constructions thereof. For both Zhiyan
and Dushun, the more penetrating insight seems to reveal a preference
for kataphatic accounts--focusing on the positive import of
dependent arising, as manifest with doctrines about
*tathata*--over apophatic accounts that focus on the
connections between dependent arising and emptiness. 



Similarly, the third tier of Zhiyan's *panjiao* stands to
subsequent tiers as Dushun's second discernment stands to his
third, delving further into the nature of and relations among
individual *shi*. But Zhiyan's *panjiao*, unlike
Dushun's discernments, offers a doctrinal motivation for
proceeding to higher stages. The motivation, in brief, is that no
Mahayana teaching, elementary or advanced, explains both the origins of
enlightenment and the origins of ignorance (as the main cause of
barriers to enlightenment). Some Mahayana teachings ground the
emptiness of reality upon something impure and tainted, laden with
hindrances and defilements. These teachings accommodate ignorance. Yet
they struggle to explain how enlightenment--pure and
untainted--arises from the impure and tainted. Other Mahayana
teachings ground the emptiness of reality upon something pure and
untainted. Yet they struggle to explain how such a ground gives rise
to hindrance and defilement. 



Zhiyan claims that the teachings of the *Avatamsaka Sutra*
overcome the limitations of the "elementary" and
"advanced" Mahayana. (He claims this virtue for the
teachings of the *Lotus Sutra* as well.) For Zhiyan, the
*Avatamsaka Sutra* reveals an unmediated vision of ultimate
reality that resolves all conflict among opposites. He calls this a
vision of the "*dharma*-realm of dependent
arising." This realm stands in contrast, conceptually, with the
realm of "dependent origination" (Skt.
*pratitya-samutpada*) familiar from earlier Buddhist teaching.
The realm of dependent origination concerns relations of dependence
among conditioned and illusory *dharmas*, and in particular
relations that help to sustain or extinguish *samsaric* modes
of experience. By contrast, the *dharma*-realm of dependent
arising concerns relations that pertain to *nirvanic* modes of
experience. The most pertinent of these relations, for Zhiyan's
*panjiao*, is the relation between the unmediated vision of
ultimate reality and *nirvanic* experience itself. According to
Zhiyan, these stand to each other as cause and result, respectively.
He calls the teaching that pertains to the first (cause) the "sudden" teaching; and the teaching that pertains to the
second (result), the "round" teaching. Ranking result as
superior to cause thereby completes his five-tiered *panjiao*.




Zhiyan endeavors to explain the *Avatamsaka Sutra*'s
vision of reality in his *Ten Mysteries of the One Vehicle of
Huayan* (Ch. *Huayan Yicheng Shixuan Men*; trans. Cleary
1993, 125-146). He does so with his doctrine of the ten mysteries (Ch.
*shi xuan*) of the *dharma*-realm of dependent arising.
Each mystery is meant to reveal some aspect of the *Avatamsaka
Sutra*'s vision of reality. These aspects do not quite
correspond with Dushun's ten claims about the "total
pervasion and accommodation" of each *shi* with all
others (in his third discernment). But subsequent contributors to the
Huayan School understand Zhiyan's mysteries as an effort to
elaborate upon these claims. 



Zhiyan intends for the ten mysteries to apply to ten categories of
*dharmas*. He presents each category as a pairing among
contraries: doctrine and meaning, *li* and *shi*,
understanding and practice, cause and result, person and
*dharma*, realms and stages, teacher and disciple, chief and
attendants, substance and function, response and stimulus. But there
is no apparent pattern or system to the order in which Zhiyan presents
the ten mysteries, nor does Zhiyan explain how each category applies
to each mystery. 



For the sake of illustration, consider each mystery as it pertains to
the category of *shi*. (1) Each *shi* simultaneously
causes, and results from, all other *shi*. (2) Each relates to
all other *shi* in a manner that might be described as
"fractal": reflecting all others, being reflected by those
others, reflecting those reflections, being reflected in reflections
of those reflections, and so on *ad infinitum*, akin to a jewel
of Indra's net. (3) The arising of each *shi* is
simultaneous with its cessation, and each *shi*'s
revealing itself to *nirvanic* awareness coincides with the
concealment of its dependence upon other *shi*. (4) Each is
endowed with the qualities of all others and so, for example,
manifests as simultaneously the smallest particle of dust and the
great Mount Sumeru. (5) Each *shi*, appearing in a single
instant of thought, is simultaneously past, present, and future; and
each of these times has its own past, present, and future. (6) Each
*shi* is simultaneously pure, insofar as it is identical with
all other *shi*, and mixed, insofar as it contains all other
*shi* within itself. (7) Each *shi* simultaneously
includes, and is included within, all other *shi*, yet without
losing its distinctness from those others. (8) Each is identical with
all others, in the sense that each determines the identity and power
of all others--and has its identity and power determined by those
others--without losing its distinctness. (9) Each *shi* is
nothing more than a creation of mind. (10) Each *shi* reveals the round teaching of the *Avatamsaka Sutra* and
fosters understanding of the nature of ultimate reality. 



Many of Zhiyan's mysteries have a paradoxical flavor, presenting
*shi* with apparently contrary characteristics. But Zhiyan
finds mystery rather than contradiction. His insight seems to involve
a sort of aspectualism, whereby contrary characteristics are ascribed
to different aspects of one and the same *shi*, and where
opposition among these aspects is a matter of perspectival limitation
rather than inherent contradiction. This perspectival aspectualism
supports, as a corollary, Zhiyan's doctrine of the six
characteristics. According to this doctrine, each *shi* creates
all others while retaining its particularity, includes all others
within itself while retaining its difference from them, and integrates
others into a whole without cooperating with those others to do so.
But Zhiyan provides little by way of explanation for these
characteristics. Nor does he provide explanatory detail for locating
the full diversity of experience in a common foundational source of
mind. These tasks fall to his successors. 


## 4. Fazang (643-712)



Fazang is Zhiyan's most accomplished and influential student,
and became the third patriarch of Huayan. He is responsible for
systematizing and extending Zhiyan's teaching, and for securing
the prominence of Huayan-style Buddhism at the imperial court. He is
known especially for his definitive commentaries on the *Avatamsaka
Sutra* and *Awakening of Faith in Mahayana*, and for making
Huayan doctrines accessible to laity with familiar technologies such
as mirror halls and wood-block printing. These contributions support
the traditional regard for Fazang as the third patriarch of the Huayan
School.



Fazang's ancestors came from Sogdiana (a center for trade along
the Silk Road, located in what is now parts of Uzbekistan and
Tajikestan), but he was born in the Tang dynasty capital of
Chang'an (now Xi'an), where his family had become
culturally Chinese. Fazang was a fervently religious adolescent.
Following a then-popular custom that took self-immolation as a sign of
religious devotion, Fazang burned his fingers before a stupa at the
age of 16. After becoming a monk, he assisted Xuanzang--famous
for his pilgrimage to India--in translating Buddhist works from
Sanskrit into Chinese. Fazang had doctrinal differences with Xuanzang,
though, so he later became a disciple of Zhiyan, probably around 663
CE. 



Zhiyan's access to the imperial court gave Fazang access to
Empress Wu, with whom he quickly gained favor. He undertook a variety
of public services, such as performing rain-prayer rituals and
collaborating in various translation projects. He traveled throughout
northern China, teaching the *Avatamsaka Sutra* and debating
Daoists. He intervened in a 697 military confrontation with the
Khitans, gaining further favor when Empress Wu ascribed to his ritual
services an instrumental role in suppressing the rebellion. In
addition, Fazang provided information to undermine plots by some of
the empress' advisors to secure power after her death. This
secured Fazang's status--and the prominence of Huayan
teachings--with subsequent rulers. 


### 4.1 Three Nature Theory



The tenth and final chapter of *Treatise on the Five Teachings of
Huayan* (Ch. *Huayan Wujiao Zhang*; T45.1866, trans. Cook
1970) contains many of Fazang's most distinctive and important
doctrines. In the first section, Fazang develops his theory of the
three natures. The original theory was developed in Yogacara Buddhism,
and posits three "realities": first, that there is nothing
but ineffable, inexpressible reality that resembles space, gold, and
water in its absolute natural purity; second, that this reality
appears as an unreal imaginative construction; and third, that this
unreal construction is the basis for error, which arises through
confusing the construction for reality. 



In his 
 *Three Natures Treatise*,
 the Yogacara philosopher
Vasubandhu names the natures for each of these three
"realities." He says that inexpressible and ineffable
reality has the nature of "consummation" (or perfection):
this reality is perfect, and its nature is nothing other than
emptiness. He says that unreal imaginative constructions, appearances
appearing as nothing other than appearances, have the nature of
"other-dependence," which is synonymous with dependent
arising (*pratitya-samutpada*). He says, finally, that
confusions about unreal imaginative constructions have the nature of
"fabrication" (or imagination, or discrimination). 



The Madhyamaka tradition eventually endorsed a version of the three
nature theory, albeit with some significant differences from the
Yogacara version. According to the Yogacara theory, while the
fabricated nature is empty, the other-dependent and consummate natures
are real. The imaginative constructions associated with the
other-dependent nature--the karmic seeds in the repository
consciousness--must have some aspect that is real, according to
Yogacarins, lest there be nowhere for them to await their future
actualization; and the ineffable reality associated with the
consummate nature also must have some aspect that is real, for the
sake of avoiding the error of annihilationism. Madhyamakins reject the
Yogacarin reasoning as fallacious, preferring an epistemological
rather than an ontological interpretation of the three natures. The
challenge with the epistemological interpretation, however, is making
sense of how (delusional) appearances are possible in the absence of
anything real. 



Fazang's strategy for resolving this debate involves adapting
the perspective-taking tactic of the *Awakening of Faith in
Mahayana* to the three nature theory, ascribing two aspects to
each nature. According to Fazang's theory, one of the two
aspects associated with each nature is fundamental, the other is
derivative. The fundamental aspects are, respectively: pure and
unchanging, lacking self-nature (*svabhava*), and non-existence
from the standpoint of reality--that is, being nothing more than
convention. The derivative aspects are: confluence to conditions,
apparent existence as thoroughly interdependent, and common-sense
existence (which involves a capacity to appear as if possessed of
self-nature). 



Yogacarins and Madhyamkins both endorse the derivative aspect for each
nature. So Fazang's technique for justifying his theory is
twofold: first, argue that the fundamental aspects associated with
the three natures are compatible with each other; second, argue that
each nature has its fundamental aspect if and only if it has its
derivative aspect. Since everyone accepts that the derivative
aspects are legitimate and correct, it should then follow that the
fundamental aspects are legitimate and correct as well.
Fazang's view thereby aims to include everything that is correct
in the Yogacarin and Madyamakin views, while avoiding objections that
each of those more limited views lodges against the other. 



Fazang's three-nature theory foregrounds the other-dependent
nature of reality--how reality appears when conceptualized by
those lacking delusion and ignorance. This introduces the possibility
of developing a metaphysical theory about reality as it appears to
those who are enlightened. Fazang endorses two complementary analyses
of this reality. One analysis focuses on dharmas insofar as they are
results, investigating the nondual relationality of One Mind (as
cause) and the entirety of *dharmas* (as result). The other
analysis focuses on *dharmas* insofar as they are causes,
investigating the mutual inclusion and identity among each individual
*dharma* and all remaining *dharmas*. 


### 4.2 Analysis of One Mind



In his Commentary on *Awakening of Faith in Mahayana* (Ch.
*Dasheng qixin lun yiji*; T44.1846, trans. Vorenkamp 2004a),
Fazang identifies One Mind with *tathagatagarbha*.
*Tathagatagarbha*, as Fazang understands it, is neither an
individual consciousness nor something that stands apart from or
opposed to matter. It is, instead, the one and only source of all that
exists, creating and sustaining the *dharma*-realm of dependent
arising--albeit without separation from that realm. One Mind, for
Fazang, is reality prior to any individual consciousness and prior to
the objects of consciousness (whether mental or material). This
priority is ontological, tracking the order with respect to which
reality is structured into more or less fundamental components. 



Fazang posits that One Mind has two aspects, Suchness Mind and Samsara
Mind. Suchness Mind is free from discerning cognition, neither
produced nor destroyed. It witnesses that which is neither
"this" nor "that" and yet is also not empty.
Samsara Mind, by contrast, arises and ceases in accordance with
conditions, transforming into purity and impurity. 



Fazang explains the relation between these two aspects of One Mind by
positing a distinction between Suchness and Ignorance. Suchness is the
true nature of reality. Fazang posits that Suchness has two aspects,
one unchanging, the other accompanying change. Suchness as unchanging
is calm and quiescent. Suchness as accompanying change, by contrast,
is dynamic, embedded within the ebb and flow of conditioned
*dharmas*. Because Suchness is available for encounter only to
witnessing consciousness that lacks a sense of self, Fazang
characterizes it as empty. Ignorance, by contrast, is that which
initiates *dukkha*. Fazang posits that it, too, has two
aspects. As empty, Ignorance renders its results illusory. As actively
functioning and completing affairs, it perfumes conditioned
*dharmas* with hindrances and defilements. Because it is
responsible for the appearance of illusory objects, Fazang
characterizes this aspect as existing. 



Suchness and Ignorance, on Fazang's account, are the two
fundamental aspects of One Mind. The aspects of Suchness as unchanging
and Ignorance as empty correspond to Suchness Mind. This
correspondence positions Suchness Mind as the witnessing of
unconditioned *dharmas*. Similarly, the aspects of Suchness as
accompanying change and Ignorance as actively functioning correspond
to Samsara Mind. This correspondence positions Samsara Mind as the
witnessing of conditioned *dharmas*. (Fazang provides an
elaborate analysis of Samsara Mind, inspired by the 
 *Yijing*
[*Classic of Changes*]. The gist of his analysis explains that,
because Suchness is present to Samsara Mind, right practice for the
cessation of *dukkha* involves attending to the Suchness aspect
of conditioned *dharmas* rather than causing those
*dharmas* to cease.) 


### 4.3 Analysis of *Dharmas*



In the third section of the tenth chapter of *Treatise on the Five
Teachings of Huayan*, Fazang offers eight theses on
*dharmas* as dependently-arisen causes. Four theses concern
*dharmas* with respect to their different substance
(*dharmas* as they relate to all other *dharmas*): each
*dharma* includes all others, is included within all others,
determines the identity of all others, and has its identity determined
by all others. The remaining four concern *dharmas* with
respect to their same substance (*dharmas* as they relate to
the totality of the *dharma*-realm of dependent arising): each
*dharma* includes the totality of *dharmas*, is included
within the totality, determines the identity of the totality, and has
its identity determined by the totality. 



Fazang's theses involve two salient posits. The first is that
every *dharma* simultaneously has the aspects of existing and
being empty. As existing, each *dharma* appears as an
individual that is (numerically) distinct from others. As empty, each
*dharma* lacks any sort of self-nature that would render it
invulnerable to others. Fazang's second posit is that every
*dharma* also simultaneously has the aspects of having power
and lacking power. As powerful, each *dharma* affects others in
ways beyond their control and despite their resistance. As powerless,
each *dharma* is vulnerable to others, affected by them in ways
beyond its own control and despite its resistance. Fazang uses these
posits to argue that insofar as one *dharma* exists or has
power, the others are empty and lack power; and that insofar as one
*dharma* is empty or lacking power, the others exist and have
power. His theses about mutual inclusion and identity follow as
corollaries. 



Fazang offers several metaphors to elucidate his claims about mutual
inclusion and identity, such as the metaphor of Indra's net and
the metaphor of counting ten coins. The most developed metaphor occurs
in the fourth and final section of the tenth chapter of *Treatise
on the Five Teachings of Huayan*, where Fazang uses a metaphor of
a framed building to explain six characteristics of *dharmas*
as dependently-arisen causes (Fazang 2014b). Fazang labels the six
characteristics as wholeness, particularity, identity, difference,
integration, and disintegration. Each of these pertains to some
characteristic an individual *dharma* has as a part of some
integrated whole, akin to the relation a rafter bears to a building.
Fazang's explanations are notoriously dense. Roughly speaking,
it seems that a *dharma* has wholeness insofar as it creates
some whole; particularity insofar as it is numerically distinct from
that whole; identity insofar as it includes all other parts of the
whole; difference insofar as it is numerically distinct from those
others; integration insofar as its creating the whole does not
interfere with every other *dharma* of the whole doing the
same; and disintegration insofar as its creative success does not
depend upon the cooperation of other *dharmas* in the whole.



### 4.4 *Panjiao*



The first nine chapters of Fazang's *Treatise on the Five
Teachings of Huayan* provide, in effect, an encyclopedic argument
for a *panjiao* system that positions Fazang's views as
surpassing the limitations of all prior Buddhist traditions, but
Fazang provides no convenient summary. With some minor exceptions, the
basic outline follows Zhiyan's *panjiao*. 



The first teaching in Fazang's *panjiao*--the one he
ranks as conveying the least truth, as being the most limited in its
skillful means--is what he calls Hinayana (and what we now call
Abhidharma). Fazang offers three criticisms of this teaching. First,
he claims that the Abhidharmic analysis of consciousness is
incomplete, because it does not provide a thorough analysis of
repository consciousness (*alayavijnana*)--that occurs
only with the Yogacara branch of the Mahayana tradition. Second, he
claims that the Abhidharmic analysis of *dharmas* is
incomplete, because no school within the tradition manages to
establish a list of *dharmas* that contains all the
*dharmas* contained by all other lists, and because the
tradition cannot seem to resolve disagreements on the status of
certain putative *dharmas*. Third, and most importantly, he
claims that the Abhidharmic tradition remains committed to the error
of Eternalism by virtue of denying that *dharmas* are empty.




The second teaching in Fazang's *panjiao* is what he
calls Elementary Teaching of the Mahayana. These are the teachings of
Madhyamaka and Yogacara, represented by figures such as Nagarjuna and
Vasubandhu in India, and by Jizang and Xuanzang in China. Fazang ranks
this teaching as superior to the first because it teaches that
everything, *dharma* or not, is empty, and because the Yogacara
tradition provides a thorough analysis of repository consciousness.
But, according to Fazang, the Yogacarin analysis of consciousness is
erroneous because it mistakes the repository consciousness for some
sort of ultimate reality. The repository consciousness, according to
Yogacara tradition, contains impurities and defilements. Yet ultimate
reality, as Fazang understands it, is free of such imperfections. 



The third teaching in Fazang's *panjiao* is what he calls
the Final Teaching of the Mahayana. Fazang has in mind teachings
associated with *tathagatagarbha* theory, as present in texts
such as *Awakening of Faith in Mahayana*. According to Fazang,
the Final Teaching improves upon the Elementary Teaching by virtue of
correctly understanding ultimate reality as pure and
undefiled--not as repository consciousness, but as
*tathagatagarbha*. The Final Teaching also transcends the
limitations of the prior two teachings--each of which focuses on
one of the pair "existence" and "emptiness" to
the exclusion of the other--by treating ultimate reality as
having two aspects: an aspect of existing, and an aspect of being
empty. 



There is a latent tension within *tathagatagarbha* theory, as
Fazang understands it. This is the tension between conceptualizing
ultimate reality as *tathagatagarbha* and conceptualizing
*tathagatagarbha* as ineffable. This is why Fazang ranks the
Final Teaching of the Mahayana as inferior to a fourth teaching, which
he calls the Sudden Teaching. This is the teaching of Vimalakirti,
from the *Vimalakirti Sutra*, who, in responding to a request
to characterize ultimate reality, answers with silence. This is
superior to the Final Teaching of Mahayana, according to Fazang,
because the only way to succeed at conceptualizing the ultimate nature
of reality is to refuse to conceptualize in the first place. 



The fifth and final teaching in Fazang's
*panjiao*--the pinnacle of Buddhist teaching, in his
view--is what he calls the Round Teaching. Here Fazang refers to
*his own* teaching, which he positions as developing the
teachings of his master, Zhiyan, and which he locates in fetal form
among the writings of Dushun and amidst the many verses of the
*Avatamsaka Sutra*. While the first teaching in Fazang's
*panjiao* focuses on the fabricated nature of reality, and
while the three intermediate teachings focus on the consummate nature
of reality, Fazang claims that only the Round Teaching accommodates
all three natures of reality. For, according to the Round Teaching,
everything is empty, and so the teaching correctly understands the
"fabricated" nature of what seems to be not-empty; but the
consummate nature of ultimate reality is ineffable, and so the
teaching manages to avoid the limitations of the Elementary and Final
Teachings of Mahayana. Since, in Fazang's view, only the Round
Teaching understands the other-dependent nature of ultimate
reality--a nature ignored by other Buddhist traditions--he
concludes that the Round Teaching, as expressed by his metaphysics, is
superior to all other Buddhist teachings. 


## 5. Li Tongxuan (635-730)



Li Tongxuan is a contemporary of Fazang's who remained
relatively unknown during his lifetime, and so he lacks the honor of
being considered one of the patriarchs of Huayan Buddhism. However,
Li's work came to exert substantial influence upon subsequent
Buddhist tradition, through its impact on the Korean monk Chinul
(1158-1210), the Japanese monk Moye (1173-1232), and the Linji Chan
masters Juefan Huihong (1071-1128) and Dahui Zonggao (1089-1163). We
know little about Li's life. He lived as a reclusive lay exegete
of Buddhism, leading an austere lifestyle involving a daily meal of
only seven rice cakes made with dates and cypress. He also seems to
have had extensive knowledge of the *Book of Changes* (Ch.
*Yijing*), presumably due to his being an offspring of the Tang
royal family. Li influenced the Huayan tradition through a handful of
writings: a commentary on the *Avatamsaka Sutra* (Ch. *Xin
huayan jing lun*; T36.1739), a summary of that commentary, and a
chapter-by-chapter summary of the *Avatamsaka Sutra* itself.
His writings are notable for using the theory of *yin-yang* and
the Five Phases, as well as appealing to correlative reasoning, to
discern soteriological significance in minor details such as
geographical directions, numbers, and the names of bodhisattvas. 



Li's central contribution to Huayan tradition is his teaching of
the one true *dharma*-realm (Ch. *yi zhen fajie*).
According to this teaching, all places and objects in the world are
true just as they are. There is no real ontological separation between
the sacred and the secular, enlightenment and ignorance, or the Buddha
and sentient beings. Li's teaching of the one true
*dharma*-realm supports a subitist approach to enlightenment,
whereby sentient beings attain Buddhahood suddenly rather than
gradually. It supports, as well, his decision to explicate Buddhist
ideas using classical Chinese texts, as manifested in his frequent
appeal to the *Book of Changes* in his commentary on the
*Avatamsaka Sutra*. According to Li, Chinese sages such as
Kongzi (Confucius) and Laozi (the traditional founder of Daoism), and
Chinese classics, offer instructions from bodhisattvas by virtue of
their endeavoring to edify sentient beings--and because,
according to Li's teaching, the ordinary human condition is the
foundation for enlightenment in this lifetime. 



Li justifies his teaching of the one true *dharma*-realm with a
distinctive and non-temporal approach to existence. According to Li,
existence is not only subject to change but also entirely complete at
each moment. Past, present, and future co-exist at every moment. This
non-temporality of existence resolves several problems Li identifies
with the notions of cause and effect. The first problem pertains to
conceptual relation. If cause and effect are not simultaneous (arising
at one and the same moment), Li argues, then because causes are not
considered causes until their effects arise, effects precede their
causes. If, by contrast, cause and effect are simultaneous, causes
become causes exactly when effects arise. The second problem pertains
to temporal relation. If cause and effect are not simultaneous, Li
argues, there is an inexplicable gap between the time at which a cause
arises and the time at which the effect of that cause arises. If, by
contrast, cause and effect are simultaneous, there is no such gap.




If past, present, and future intermingle, then insofar as sentient
beings who are now ignorant subsequently gain enlightenment, there is
no ontological difference between being a sentient being and being a
Buddha: sentient beings are simultaneously Buddhas. Li here diverges
from Fazang's more canonical Huayan teaching, whereby ignorance
and enlightenment are different ontological aspects of the same one
reality. On Li's account, the difference between sentient beings
and Buddhas, and between ignorance and enlightenment, is merely
epistemological, a matter of confusion about the nature and conditions
of *dukkha*. 



Li finds scriptural support for his non-temporal approach to
existence, and his associated teaching of the one true
*dharma*-realm, in two tales. The first, the tale of the dragon
girl, occurs in the *Lotus Sutra*, where the dragon girl
attains enlightenment in a single moment. The second, the tale of
Sudhana, occurs in the *Avatamsaka Sutra*, where Sudhana
attains enlightenment in a single lifetime. Li interprets both tales
as examples illustrating that the moment in which the mind arises to
practice the Buddhist path is the same as the moment in which one
attains perfect enlightenment. Insofar as practice is the cause of the
effect that is enlightenment, it follows that cause and effect are
simultaneous--and so all times coexist in one moment. (For Li,
the tale of the dragon girl is less perfect than the tale of Sudhana,
because the dragon girl, unlike Sudhana, changes her body and
geographical location upon attaining enlightenment.) 


## 6. Chengguan (738-839)



Chengguan's life was marked by continual encounter with
difference. He lived through the reigns of nine Tang emperors, and his
studies ranged widely--including Buddhist doctrines and
meditation practices, classic works indigenous to China, as well as
the Indian *Vedas* and works on Indian science. Tradition
identifies Chengguan as the fourth patriarch of the Huayan School,
because he studied under Fashen (718-778), who was a student of
Fazang's student Huiyuan (673-743). 



Chengguan was a voluminous writer. He authored a commentary (with an
accompanying subcommentary) on the *Avatamsaka Sutra* that
displaced Fazang's with respect to authority and influence, as
well as an influential commentary on Dushun's *Discernments
of the Dharmadhatu* (Ch. *Huayan fajie xuan jing*;
T45.1883, trans. Cleary 1983, 71-124). He gave frequent lectures to
imperial officials, and he wrote many essays at their request.
Chengguan's writings are notable for quoting frequently from
Chinese classics, borrowing words but not meanings for the sake of
making his teaching accessible to educated literati. This style is
likely a response to the weakened political status of Buddhism
following the An Lushan rebellion (755-763), which increased Chinese
suspicions of foreign traditions such as Buddhism and thereby
heightened a need to show how Buddhist teachings harmonize with native
Chinese traditions. 



Chengguan's most distinctive contribution to Huayan tradition is
his theory of the fourfold *dharma*-realm. This theory
identifies four ways of encountering the *dharma*-realm of
dependent arising. Chengguan calls the first the *dharma*-realm
of *shi*. *Shi*, for Chengguan, refers to form, mind,
and other characteristics. Chengguan characterizes this realm as
conditioned, akin to an illusion by virtue of lacking true substance
and nature, and containing unreal characteristics. It is the
*dharma*-realm encountered as particularized into innumerably
many distinct individuals. Chengguan calls the second
*dharma*-realm the *dharma*-realm of *li*.
Chengguan understands *li* to refer to substance, nature,
emptiness, quiescence, the immutable nature of all *dharmas*.
He characterizes this realm as identical with true nature. It is the
*dharma*-realm encountered as originally pure and free from
defilement. 



Chengguan groups the remaining two *dharma*-realms together as
*dharma*-realms of non-obstruction. The third, the
*dharma*-realm of non-obstruction among *shi* and
*li*, correlates with the second discernment from
Dushun's *Discernments of the Dharmadhatu*. The fourth,
the *dharma*-realm of non-obstruction among *shi* and
*shi*, correlates with the third discernment from
Dushun's *Discernments of the Dharmadhatu*. Chengguan
endorses Dushun's analysis of these realms. He adds, to
Dushun's insights, the claim that the non-obstruction of
*li* and *shi* is the foundation for the non-obstruction
among *shi*. His meaning is twofold. From a practical
perspective, he means that meditative insight into *li* is a
prerequisite for meditative insight into *shi*. From a
theoretical perspective, he means that *shi* are mutually
identical and inclusive by virtue of their common penetration by
*li*: since each *shi* is identical with and includes
*li*, and since *li* is identical with and includes all
*shi*, each *shi* is identical with and includes all
other *shi*. 



Chengguan further develops Huayan tradition by subsuming Chan
teachings under the perfect teaching of Huayan. Huiyuan,
Fazang's disciple, had criticized Fazang's
*panjiao* for including the Sudden Teaching. His criticism was
twofold. First, the Sudden Teaching does not belong, because
Fazang's *panjiao* ranks teachings with respect to their
content but the sudden teaching--as inexpressible--lacks
content. Second, if one ranks teachings with respect to how well they
express truth about ultimate reality, then the Sudden Teaching, by
virtue of teaching the inexpressibility of ultimate truth, is distinct
from neither the Final Teaching of Mahayana nor the Round Teaching.




Chengguan presents Huiyuan's *panjiao* as an artifact of
his impoverished understanding of Chan meditation practice. In
response, and in an effort to defend Fazang's *panjiao*,
Chengguan develops his own *panjiao*. He identifies the Sudden
Teaching with the teachings of various Chan traditions. These
teachings, as Chengguan understands them, use words to express the
identity of mind and Buddha; and the direct mind-to-mind transmission
of this truth suffices to distinguish Chan from other Buddhist
traditions--with respect to practice if not content. 



Despite Chengguan's unfavorable evaluations of Huiyuan's
teachings, Chengguan followed Huiyuan in explicitly criticizing
indigenous Chinese teachings of the *ru* (Confucians) and the
Daoists. He identifies the cardinal teaching of the *ru*
tradition as the five constant virtues--benevolence,
righteousness, propriety, wisdom, sincerity; the cardinal teaching of
Daoism as spontaneity (Ch. *ziran*); and the cardinal teaching
of Buddhism as causality (Ch. *yinyuan*). Chengguan's
criticisms center upon the claim that non-Buddhist teachings endorse a
kind of pseudo-causality that abnegates responsibility for actions and
denigrates the role of wisdom. Against the *Yijing* (associated
with Confucians), he argues that locating the source of the myriad
things in the transformations of *yin* and *yang*
ascribes responsibility for wisdom or stupidity to the impersonal
workings of heaven, thereby denying the role of consciousness in
creating reality. He develops a similar criticism against the
*Daodejing*, which locates the source of the myriad things in
Dao and denigrates practices of cultivation as superfluous. Against
the *Zhuangzi*, finally, he argues that the emphasis upon
spontaneity as fundamental means that enlightenment arises without
cause rather than through careful practice, and that this is erroneous
by virtue of ignoring the way ignorance and enlightenment depend upon
prior conditions. 


## 7. Guifeng Zongmi (780-841)



Tradition identifies Zongmi as the fifth patriarch of Huayan. Zongmi
spent his early years studying Confucian classics and Buddhism before
training with the Chan (Zen) master Suizhou Daoyuan (750-820). Then,
following a brief period of studying the *Avatamsaka Sutra*
with Chengguan, Zongmi began an extensive period of writing. His
efforts focused, at first, on gathering commentaries on various sutras
and writing his own. In time, he focused on compiling Chan texts to
create a canon for the Chan tradition. These efforts resulted in his
achieving status as a patriarch for the Heze school of Chan. Although
Zongmi's *Collected Writings on the Source of Chan* (Ch.
*Chanyuan zhuquanji*) is no longer extant, its preface,
*Prolegomena to the Collected Writings on the Source of Chan*
(Ch. *Chanyuan zhuquanji duxu*; T48.2015, trans. Broughton
2004), survives. 



Zongmi's major philosophical work is *Inquiry into the Origin
of Humanity* (Ch. *Yuanren lun*; T45.1886, trans. Gregory
1995). The title of this book might be a play on *Inquiry into the
Origin of the Way*, an influential anti-Buddhist essay by the
Confucian philosopher Han Yu (768-824). Zongmi's book offers, in
effect, an innovative *panjiao* system. The central innovation
is its inclusion of Daoism and Confucianism. Zongmi's discussion
of the strengths and weaknesses of each view are detailed, and here we
present only some of his arguments. 



Zongmi states that 
 Kongzi and 
 Laozi are both great sages, and that
their ethical teachings are extremely beneficial to the common people.
However, Confucians and Daoists claim that humans, animals, and
inanimate objects all come into existence from the same underlying
"vital force" (Ch. *qi*, roughly similar to the
"boundless" of Anaximander). Zongmi argues that this
creates an insoluble problem. Since vital force is originally without
consciousness, then since we receive this force in the same way
grasses and trees do, either we should lack consciousness or else
grasses and trees should be conscious. In addition, Confucians and
Daoists believe that fate is governed by Heaven (Ch. *tian*, an
impersonal higher power), which acts in accordance with the moral Way.
Zongmi argues that they cannot explain why a moral Heaven allows the
virtuous to suffer and the vicious to flourish. Since some who lack
virtue flourish, while others with virtue suffer, the distribution of
rewards and punishments is unjust. 



Zongmi argues that Buddhists can resolve both dilemmas. Regarding the
problem of evil, Zongmi appeals to the Buddhist doctrine of
reincarnation to explain how the distribution of rewards and
punishments in the universe is ultimately just. According to this
doctrine, the distribution of rewards and punishments is determined
not only by one's actions in one's current life but also
by one's actions in previous lives. So the flourishing of the
vicious, and the suffering of the virtuous, is attributable to karma
from their past lives. 



According to Zongmi, the only plausible solution to the problem of
consciousness is that fundamental reality is mental, and
non-consciousness is the result of a kind of self-deception, where the
mind fails to realize its objects as manifestations of itself.


## 8. Later Developments and Influence


### 8.1 Neo-Confucianism



Competition for power, prestige, and wealth led to sectarian conflicts
among Buddhists, Daoists, and Confucians. In addition, some aspects of
institutional Buddhism were socially problematic, including the vast
amounts of tax-exempt wealth controlled by monasteries and extreme
religious practices such as self-immolation and self-mutilation, which
were endorsed even by leading figures like Zhiyan and Fazang.
Eventually, Daoists encouraged the Tang Emperor Wuzong to launch the
Great Anti-Buddhist Persecution (Ch. *huichang huifo*) of
842-846. During this period, Buddhist monks and nuns were forcibly
defrocked, temples and shrines were destroyed, and their property
seized. Although the persecution only lasted until the emperor's
death and was reversed by the next emperor, Buddhism never fully
recovered from the damage to its social influence and intellectual
prestige. 



Following the decline of Buddhism, the movement known in the West as
"Neo-Confucianism" became increasingly influential.
 Neo-Confucianism
 presents itself as a revival of the original
teachings of Confucianism against the mistaken doctrines of Daoism and
Buddhism. However, after centuries of Buddhist dominance in
philosophy, it was almost inevitable that Neo-Confucian thinkers would
unconsciously reinterpret their tradition in the light of Buddhist
concepts. For example, we saw how the Chinese term *li*
(principle/pattern) is central to Huayan metaphysics. It is also
central to 
 Neo-Confucian metaphysics,
 even though the term is of
peripheral importance in the Confucian classics. For example, of the
*Four Books* of the Confucian canon, "*li*"
occurs precisely zero times in all of the *Analects* of
Confucius and the *Great Learning*, only twice in the
*Mean*, and a mere seven times in the *Mengzi*. In none
of the passages where it does occur is there any suggestion that the
term has any deep metaphysical importance. (A typical use is in a
dialogue in which someone asks Mengzi for help with his lack of
eloquence, describing himself as "not patterned (*li*) in
regard to my mouth.") Nonetheless, Neo-Confucian philosophers
like 
 Zhu Xi
 (1130-1200) repeatedly use the term to explain what they
take to be the underlying meaning of the classics, and give it a
metaphysical meaning very reminiscent of Indra's net. Similarly,
the Neo-Confucian emphasis on the dangers of "selfish
desires" (Ch. *siyu*) and "selfish thoughts"
(Ch. *siyi*) is not characteristic of ancient Confucianism, but
rather reflects the centrality of selfishness in Buddhist accounts of
human wrongdoing. 


### 8.2 Contemporary Huayan



Huayan Buddhism has largely died out as a distinct religious movement
in China, Korea, and Japan; however, Huayan texts continue to be
studied and have been particularly influential on Chan Buddhism (Jap.
*Zen*). Huayan has also had a substantial influence on other
philosophies. The so-called "New Confucian Manifesto"
advocates the "rounded and spiritual wisdom" of the East
as opposed to the "square" wisdom of the West (see Harris
(trans.), Part 11, Other Internet Resources). Although they identify
the ultimate source of this distinction as the *Classic of
Changes*, their description of it is reminiscent of the
"round" wisdom advocated by
*panjiao* theorists. In addition, Mou Zongsan, one of the
co-authors of the "Manifesto," wrote extensively and
sympathetically about Huayan. Among contemporary philosophers, Graham
Priest (2015) has shown how to formalize the ontology of Huayan using
non-standard set theory.