## 1. Life and Works



Erasmus was born in Rotterdam on 27 October 1467 (?) as the
illegitimate son of a priest. He attended a school at Deventer which
was regarded as progressive and had capable teachers who introduced
Erasmus to "something of a higher standard of literature"
(CWE 4: 405). Orphaned in 1483, he came into the care of guardians who
sent him to a school run by the Brethren of the Common Life in the
spirit of the Devotio Moderna. Since Erasmus' inheritance was
small, his guardians persuaded him to enter the monastery of the
Augustinian Canons Regular at Steyn. He was ordained priest in
1492.



In later years Erasmus alleged that he had been pressured into taking
the vows. His misgivings found expression in one of his first works,
*De Contemptu Mundi* (On disdaining the World, written in the
1490s, published 1521). Ostensibly a praise of monastic life, it began
by recommending seclusion and withdrawal from the world but ended in a
lament about the decline of monasticism and a warning to postulants
not to take the vows rashly. Erasmus himself discovered that he was
constitutionally and psychologically unsuited to the monastic life. He
would have preferred to go to university. In 1495 he saw a chance to
realize this goal when Bishop Hendrik of Bergen sent him to the
College de Montaigu in Paris and promised him financial
support. It is uncertain how much, if any, theological training
Erasmus received during his brief stay at the college. In any case, he
did not find the Parisian brand of theology to his liking, declaring
that scholasticism "repelled him" (CWE 4: 408).When the
promised financial support did not materialize, Erasmus left the
college, then renowned for its strict discipline and harsh living
conditions, and supported himself by tutoring well-to-do young men.
This experience produced a number of educational handbooks and aids,
among them *De Epistolis Conscribendis*, a letter-writing
manual (1522); *De Copia*, a handbook of style (1502);
*Colloquia*, a collection of dialogues meant to teach correct
Latin (1518), and the *Adagia* , an anthology of proverbs to be
used as rhetorical tools to embellish style (1500). All of these books
saw multiple editions, some of them expanded and given a larger
purpose. Thus some of the proverbs provided starting points for
essays, and many of the colloquies likewise became opinion pieces on
issues of the day.



In 1499 Erasmus accompanied one of his pupils, William Blount, Lord
Mountjoy, to England. The visit led to important connections. He made
life-long friends, among them the humanists William Grocyn and Thomas
Linacre, who inspired him to take up the study of Greek, and John
Colet who shared his scorn for scholastic theology and drew him toward
biblical studies. He was on close terms also with Thomas More, later
Lord Chancellor of England, with whom he collaborated on translations
of Lucian, and he found a patron in William Warham, archbishop of
Canterbury, who granted him an ecclesiastical benefice in Aldington,
Kent. His illegitimate birth disqualified Erasmus from taking up
benefices, but he received a papal dispensation through the
intervention of the nuncio Andrea Ammonio, another of his English
connections. Eventually he drew a steady income from pensions and
benefices. A stipend, which he received as councilor to Charles V, was
paid only irregularly, however.



Over the next two decades Erasmus traveled extensively. He returned to
France for a time, made two more journeys to England, and traveled to
Italy where he obtained a doctorate in theology at the University of
Turin. In 1517 he finally settled in Leuven. By that time he had made
a name for himself. He had published a number of bestsellers: the
witty satire *Encomium Moriae*  (The Praise of Folly, 1511);
the *Adagia*, which he enriched and expanded to more than 4000
proverbs; and the devotional *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*
(Handbook of the Christian Soldier, 1503). In 1516, he published his
*magnum opus*, an edition of the Greek New Testament, the first
to reach the market. It anticipated the *Complutensian
Polyglot*, which was already in print but still awaiting the papal
imprimatur. Thus Erasmus found success in four different genres:
literature, education, religion, and theology. In a catalogue he
published in 1523, Erasmus arranged his writings under nine headings:
works furthering language arts, that is, literary and educational
writings; his collection of adages; his correspondence; works
furthering moral education (he noted that their content overlapped
with works in the first category); works promoting piety; the
annotated edition of the New Testament; paraphrases on the New
Testament; polemics; and editions and translations of patristic
works.



While Erasmus was revered among humanists, his biblical scholarship
soon came under attack from theologians. They refused to acknowledge
him as a colleague and derided his doctorate, which had been granted
*per saltum*, that is, without fulfilling the residence
requirements or passing the usual examinations. In their eyes, Erasmus
was merely a "theologizing humanist", as the prominent
Paris theologian Noel Beda put it (Preface to
*Annotations* 1526). Erasmus was not the first humanist to
treat the New Testament in a text-critical fashion and to compare the
Latin Vulgate with the Greek original, although none of his
predecessors had dared to use their findings to publish an amended
edition of the text. Erasmus had discovered a manuscript of Lorenzo
Valla's annotations on the New Testament and originally planned
to publish notes of a similar nature, that is, observations of errors,
discrepancies, and mistranslations. He expanded the scope of his
project on the urging of his publisher, Johann Froben, and rather
hastily assembled a text based on the biblical manuscripts he had been
able to consult. In the resulting edition, the Greek text was faced by
a lightly amended Vulgate, with Erasmus' editorial changes
explained in annotations following the text. The reception of the
edition varied. Humanists generally praised it as an exceptional
achievement; a considerable number of theologians disapproved of it
and not only impugned Erasmus' scholarship but also questioned
his orthodoxy. Their attacks must be seen in the context of
Luther's coincidental rise to prominence and the resulting
religious debate which cast a long shadow over state and church and
over society at large. Erasmus' move from Leuven to Basel in
1521 was partly motivated by a desire to escape the hostile climate at
the University of Leuven, but his opponents were not limited to the
Low Countries. He had critics in Italy and was formally investigated
by ecclesiastical authorities in Spain and in France. In 1531the
prestigious faculty of theology at the University of Paris publicly
censured and condemned numerous passages in his works as unorthodox.
Erasmus responded to his critics with lengthy polemics, which fill two
folio volumes in the Leiden *Opera Omnia*. He also published
four revised editions of his New Testament (1519, 1522, 1527, 1531)
with corrections and expanded notes.



Critics of Erasmus' New Testament edition accused him of
introducing changes to a sacred text and thus challenging the
principle of inspiration. Erasmus denied these charges. On the
contrary, he said, his edition restored the original text and
corrected the errors introduced by translators and scribes.
Theologians questioned Erasmus' qualifications to tackle Holy
Writ, but he insisted that editing and textual criticism did not
require a degree in theology. They were tasks proper to philologists.
The prefaces he added to successive editions of the New Testament
attempted to clarify his aims and methods. He somewhat ingenuously
claimed that he was *only* doing philological work and ignored
the fact that a change in words frequently also shifted the meaning.
Indeed, some of his critics acknowledged the usefulness of his work,
but took issue with specific editorial choices. Thus they protested
against Erasmus replacing the traditional *poenitentiam agite*
(do penance) at Matt. 3:2 with *poeniteat vos* (repent), in
which they saw a Lutheran slant. There was an uproar also about his
omission of the so-called Comma Johanneum at I John 5:7, one of the
proofs for the divine trinity, for which Erasmus had found no evidence
in the Greek manuscripts or support in the Fathers. The biblical
commentaries of the Church Fathers and their quotations from the bible
were important sources for Erasmus in establishing the text of the New
Testament. He read widely and published numerous editions and
translations of patristic writings, among them Jerome, Augustine,
Chrysostom, and Origen, and in many cases established the first
reliable critical text of their works (see Bene 1969 and
Godin 1982).



In the last two decades of his life, Erasmus wrote numerous apologiae,
refuting critics of his New Testament edition and battling the
accusation that he had inspired the Reformation and was a supporter of
Luther. It was difficult, however, to change an opinion that was so
entrenched that it had become proverbial and issued in the popular
saying "Erasmus laid the egg, and Luther hatched it".
Erasmus' critics demanded proof of his orthodoxy in the form of
a direct attack on Luther. For some years Erasmus held out and refused
explicitly to endorse any religious party. Maintaining scholarly
detachment was, however, impossible in the militant climate of the
Confessional Age. In 1524 Erasmus reluctantly published *De Libero
Arbitrio Diatribe* (Discussion of Free Will). A politely worded
disquisition addressed to Luther, it showed their fundamental
disagreement on a crucial theological question. The ensuing polemic
failed to convince Erasmus' critics of the orthodoxy of his
views. It was undeniable that Erasmus had been in sympathy with the
reformers for a time, although he was not prepared to challenge the
authority of the church and never promoted schism. Erasmus'
criticism concerned abuses rather than doctrine, and although his
annotations on the New Testament show that he disagreed with certain
traditional interpretations, he always emphasized his willingness to
defer to the judgment of the Church.



In 1529 when the city of Basel, where he resided at the time, turned
Protestant, he voted with his feet and moved to Catholic Freiburg.
Questions about Erasmus' orthodoxy persisted, however, even
after his death in 1536. In the wake of the Council of Trent, which
defined articles of faith more rigidly, Erasmus' works were
placed on the Index of Prohibited Books.


## 2. Methodology



During his lifetime Erasmus' name became synonymous with
humanism, a label also adopted in modern reference works (such as
Nauert 2006). Today the term "humanist" has a broad range
of meanings. In the 16th century the word denoted a student
or teacher of the *studia humanitatis*, a curriculum focusing
on the study of classical languages, rhetoric, and literature. At
northern universities, where scholasticism and the dialectical method
reigned supreme, the trend-setting humanists were regarded as
challengers of the status quo (see Rummel 1995). The defenders of
tradition belittled their competitors as "grammarians" and
dismissed the humanities as *poetria*, the stuff of poetry. To
a certain extent, the tensions between the two schools of thought may
be explained in terms of professional jealousy, but at its core was
the dispute over methodology and qualifications. Humanists favored
rhetorical arguments; scholastics insisted on logical proof.
Scholastic theologians in particular regarded the humanists as
dangerous interlopers. They questioned their orthodoxy because of
their inclination to use the skeptical *ars dubitandi* and
denied their right to apply philological principles to the biblical
text. Scripture, they insisted, was the exclusive domain of graduate
theologians. Humanists in turn saw the dialectical method used by the
scholastics as a perversion of Aristotelian logic and derided their
technical terminology as a corruption of the Latin language. In the
*Praise of Folly* Erasmus lampooned scholastic theologians in a
passage that became notorious:



> 
> 
> They are fortified with an army of scholastic definition, conclusions,
> corollaries, and propositions both explicit and implicit.... They
> quibble about concepts, relations, instants, formalities, quiddities
> and ecceities, which a man could not possibly perceive unless like
> Lynceus he could see through blackest darkness things which
> don't exist.... You'd extricate yourself faster from
> a labyrinth than from the tortuous obscurities of realists,
> nominalists, Thomists, Albertists, Ockhamists, and Scotists....
> Such is the erudition and complexity they all display that I fancy the
> apostles themselves would need the help of another Holy Spirit if they
> were obliged to join issue on these topics with our new breed of
> theologians. (CWE 27: 126-7)
> 
> 
> 



On a more serious note, he voiced two objections against the
dialectical disputations of the theologians: "The portentious
filth of their barbarous and artificial style" obscured the
meaning (CWE 3: 124), and their argumentation lacked a moral
dimension. Scholastic disputations honed intellectual skills but
failed to make better Christians of the protagonists. "Well, we
are training not a pugilist but a theologian", Erasmus says in
his *Methodus*, "and a theologian who prefers to express
with his life rather than in syllogisms what he professes" (CWE
41: 452).



He further insisted on the right of humanists, who were trained in the
classical languages, to apply their philological skills to both
secular *and* sacred writings. Translation and textual
criticism of the Bible required philological skills, and theologians
who engaged in this task "were acting in the capacity of
philologists (*grammatici*)" (Ep. 181: 120-5; CWE
2).



While the need for language studies and the use of philological
methods found gradual acceptance among theologians, the skeptical
*ars dubitandi*, which was also closely associated with
humanism, remained anathema. Since skepticism was identified with
atheism in Erasmus' time, most humanists refrained from
advocating this method openly. They expressed their skepticism through
the use of open-ended dialogue or rhetorical compositions that argued
opposing points of view. Erasmus used these means to argue for and
against marriage, for and against monastic vows, and for and against
doctrinal positions. Rather surprisingly he admitted to his preference
for skepticism in *A Discussion of Free Will*. This tract was
aimed at Luther's assertion that free will did not exist and the
sinner was justified *sola fide*, by faith alone, and *sola
gratia*, by grace alone (more in Boyle 1983).



Erasmus' tract, which he called a *diatribe*, that is, a
disquisition, is a showpiece of his methodology. He begins his
argumentation in the classic skeptical fashion by collating scriptural
evidence for and against the concept of free will and demonstrating
that there is no consensus and no rational way of resolving the
resulting dilemma.



The method of arguing *in utramque partem*, on both sides of a
question, was first developed by the Greek Sophists as a demonstration
of their rhetorical prowess. Pyrrhonic skeptics adopted this method as
a preliminary step in arguing a case. If the evidence was ambivalent,
they advocated *epoche*, suspension of judgment. Academic
skeptics modified this process, admitting probability as a criterion
to settle an ambiguous question. A variant of the skeptical method
also appears in medieval scholastic handbooks where doctrinal
questions are argued *sic et non*, that is, on both sides, then
settled by a magisterial decision or *resolutio*.



Erasmus stressed that he was not prepared to pass judgment on the
question of free will himself. Indeed his natural inclination was to
take the Pyrrhonic route and suspend judgment since the evidence was
not unequivocal. "I take so little pleasure in assertions that I
will gladly seek refuge in Scepticism", he writes (CWE 76: 7),
but as a believer he was obliged to take a different route. He
substituted for his own judgment the authoritative decision of the
Catholic Church, which affirmed the existence of free will. As her
obedient son, he accepted this resolution. Unlike the scholastics,
then, Erasmus does not provide a dialectically reasoned answer, but
submits to "commonly accepted creeds or universal synods"
(LB IX: 1091C), that is, to long-standing tradition and to decisions
arrived at by the consensus of authorized representatives of the
Catholic Church. Modern scholars acknowledge this slant when they
label Erasmus a "Christian humanist". Likewise his
skepticism might be called a "Christian skepticism", that
is, a pagan philosophy modified and adapted to Christian thought.



Erasmus' skepticism shaped his attitude toward the reformers.
For several years he gave them his qualified support, but in the 1520s
when he saw Luther openly defy Catholic authorities, he decried his
radical methods and distanced himself from the Reformation movement.
The decision to disengage may have been prompted by considerations for
his own safety and a desire to avoid inquisitorial scrutiny, but
epistemological considerations also played a role in his withdrawal
from the reformers and ultimate reversal of opinion about Luther.
Erasmus regarded consensus as an essential criterion of the doctrinal
truth. Schism posed a threat to his decision-making process. If papal
authority was questioned in principle and the decrees of the synods
were not binding, Erasmus the Christian Skeptic was paralyzed in his
decision-making process and unable to settle questions that did not
allow a resolution based on clear scriptural evidence.



Luther, who believed in the clarity of Scripture, did not accept
skepticism as a methodological approach. He saw it as waffling. He
scoffed at Erasmus who wanted "to compare everything and affirm
nothing" and called him a follower of Lucian or Epicurus, an
atheist who ridiculed the beliefs of others. "Permit us to be
asserters", he wrote, "to be devoted to assertions and
delight in them, while you stick to your sceptics and
Academics... The Holy Spirit is no Sceptic!" Luther
criticized Erasmus for using the skeptical method also in his
*Catechismus* (1524) and thereby sowing doubt among
catechumens. He was unwilling to put up with ambivalence and demanded
a clear-cut judgment. There was no room in doctrinal discussions for
Erasmus' slippery rhetoric (see CWE 76: 116-24; Luther
1525, "On the Bondage of the Will" quoted in Rummel 2000,
59-60).



Erasmus responded to Luther's criticism with a second tract,
*Hyperaspistes* (A Defensive Shield, 1526), reaffirming his
skepticism, but clarifying its meaning:



> 
> 
> A Sceptic is not someone who doesn't care to know what is true
> or false...but rather someone who does not make a final decision
> easily or fight to the death for his own opinion, but rather accepts
> as probable what someone else accepts as certain.
> 
> 
> 



Up to this point he might be describing the position of an Academic
skeptic, but he goes on to specify:



> 
> 
> I explicitly exclude from Scepticism whatever is set forth in Sacred
> Scripture or whatever has been handed down to us by the authority of
> the Church. (CWE 76: 118)
> 
> 
> 



Erasmus' criteria then are first of all Scripture, but if
scriptural evidence is ambiguous, he relies on



> 
> 
> the decrees of the Catholic Church, especially those issued by general
> councils and fully approved by a consensus of the Christian people.
> (CWE 76: 127)
> 
> 
> 



In other words, he substitutes for the Academic criterion of
probability, the criteria of Christian tradition and consensus (see
especially Payne in Coppens 1969, 2: 77-99).



Luther disapproved of Erasmus' use of rhetorical terms in what
was a doctrinal dispute. His admirers, by contrast, praised his
skillful use of language. They contrasted his moderate wording with
Luther's antagonistic tone and commended Erasmus'
courteous and accommodating style, but did not comment on the
epistemological underpinning of his conclusions. It is possible that
they appreciated Erasmus' arguments but did not think it politic
or indeed helpful to his cause to acknowledge his skepticism.



In addition to the arguments rooted in skepticism, Erasmus also brings
ethical criteria to bear on the question of free will. He argued that
denying the existence of free will would destroy the moral basis of
human action. Affirming the power of free will was socially expedient.
Humanists criticized the dialectic method used by the scholastics
precisely because it resulted only in a technical victory over their
opponents and did not produce moral conviction or change their
opponents' mind. To convince the other party, consensus was
necessary. Thus the characters in Erasmus' *Colloquies*
"Inquiry into Faith" and "The Godly Feast"
argue on both sides of the questions at issue, but their dialogue ends
in a friendly consensus. This rhetorical type of argumentation which
emphasizes collaboration and consensus-building is a typical
humanistic approach and an important element also of Erasmus'
political thought and his educational philosophy.


## 3. Educational Philosophy



Erasmus earned his living as a teacher for only a few years, but
education remained a lifelong interest and a central theme in his
writings (see especially Margolin 1995). Erasmus expressed confidence
in the potential of human beings for self-improvement, a corollary of
his acceptance of free will. He believed in the preponderance of
nurture over nature, given the power of the will. It was therefore the
duty of parents and teachers to ensure that children fulfilled their
potential and of adults to live up to it. "What is man's
real nature?" Erasmus asks.



> 
> 
> Is it not to live according to reason? This is why he is called a
> rational being, and this is what sets him apart from animals. And what
> is the most harmful influence upon man? Surely it is ignorance. (CWE
> 26: 312)
> 
> 
> 



Citing Origen, Erasmus speaks of a tripartite human nature, made up of
spirit, soul, and flesh. The soul, which is "the middle
part", may through free will align itself either with the divine
spirit and "itself become spiritual, but if it abandons itself
to the cupidities of the flesh, it will degenerate into the
body" (CWE 66: 51). This is a characteristic humanistic position
and recalls the wording of Pico della Mirandola's iconic
*Oration on the Dignity of Man* (1496 [1996], 8), which
describes the choice as one between "descend[ing] to the lower,
brutish forms of life...[or] ris[ing] again to the superior
orders whose life is divine".



Erasmus accepted the classical doctrine of the three prerequisites of
excellence--natural talent, instruction, and practice (CWE 26:
311)--but he tended to blame a poor result on neglect and wrong
teaching methods rather than a lack of ability or intention on the
part of student. This parallels the Catholic belief in the limited
power of free will. Without divine guidance human endeavours are in
vain. Similarly the successful education of children depends on the
guidance of parents and teachers, father figures recalling God's
patriarchal model.



Erasmus composed a number of treatises on the subject of education. He
discussed curriculum in two works, *De Ratione Studii* (On the
Method of Study, 1511) and *Ratio Verae Theologiae* (Method of
True Theology, 1518). In both tracts he emphasized the importance of
learning the classical languages and studying the classics. In the
case of secular education, he counseled early exposure of students to
Greek and Latin and extensive reading in *probati autores* (the
approved canon of authors), like Homer, Terence, Plautus, Virgil,
Horace, and Cicero. He recommended an all-round education but
emphasized the study of history, the proverbial teacher of life.
Similarly, he counseled theology students to read the
"classics", that is, the sources of Christianity: the
Bible and the Church Fathers. In contrast to the scholastics, whose
core subject was dialectic, Erasmus privileged ethics over logic and
the formation of character over factual knowledge.



His ideas on the aims and methods of education are contained in *De
Pueris Instituendis* (On the Education of Children, 1529) and
*Institutio Principis Christiani* (On the Education of a
Christian Prince, 1516), but are expressed there in a rhetorical
rather than a systematic fashion. Erasmus himself calls *On the
Education of Children* a demonstration of rhetorical principles,
an example of a theme "presented first in brief summary form and
then developed into a more elaborate and more detailed argument"
(CWE 26: 295). The rhetorical nature of the *Education of a
Christian Prince* is self-evident. It is hardly more than a
collection of aphorisms, a showcase for Erasmus' rhetorical
skills rather than an expression of personal opinions. This creates a
problem of interpretation for the modern reader. To separate
cliches from principles it is necessary to consider the
frequency and consistency of certain thought patterns in
Erasmus' works. Four ideas are recurring themes in his writings
on education: the humanizing effect of education; the effectiveness of
cooperative rather than coercive methods; the ability of both sexes to
benefit from education, and the importance of internalizing the
material taught.



He proclaimed that human beings without education had no humanity:
"Man was not born but made man" (CWE 26: 304). It was
education that raised human beings above the level of brute beasts and
made them useful members of society. "Man, unless he has
experienced the influence of learning and philosophy, is at the mercy
of impulses that are worse than those of a wild beast" (CWE 26:
305). Education is an important socializing process. A child that has
been well educated will grow up "a son who will be a faithful
protector of his family, a good husband to his wife, and a solid and
useful citizen of his country" (CWE 26: 302). There are
immediate practical advantages to schooling as well.



> 
> 
> Being occupied with his studies, a child will avoid the common
> pitfalls of youth--for learning is something that engages the
> entire person- and this is a blessing which should not be undervalued.
> (CWE 26: 297)
> 
> 
> 



Teachers must understand that education will bear fruit only if it is
a cooperative effort. It is the teacher's task to present the
material in an instructive and entertaining fashion to retain the
student's interest rather than use punitive methods. Coercion
and corporal punishment are counter-productive, whereas an appeal to
the students' interests and praise for their effort are
effective means of education.



Like many of his contemporaries, Erasmus grew up in the belief that
women were intellectually inferior to men and therefore could not
benefit from education in the same measure. He changed his mind after
meeting the erudite daughters of Thomas More and hearing of learned
women like Marguerite of Navarre and Caritas Pickheimer. Several of
his *Colloquies*, notably "The Abbot and the Learned
Lady" and "The New Mother", acknowledge the
intellectual aspirations of women (and in a winking manner, their
occasional superiority to men).



In Erasmus' time memorization and imitation were the predominant
methods of education. Anticipating modern principles, Erasmus
emphasized the importance of understanding and internalizing the
material presented. This approach is examined at length in his
treatise *Ciceronianus* (The Ciceronian, 1528), which deals
with the imitation of Cicero's style, a subject of burning
interest to Erasmus' contemporaries (excellent analysis in
Chomarat 1981, 815-840). He emphasizes the importance of
*aptum et decorum* in compositions, that is, the
appropriateness of arguments to time, place, and audience. This cannot
be achieved by a slavish imitation of classical models. It requires a
solid understanding of the rules underpinning style, which in turn
will allow a creative reworking of the original to meet the
requirements of the writer's own circumstances.



> 
> 
> Imitation does not immediately incorporate into its own speech any
> nice little feature it comes across, but transmits it to the mind for
> inward digestion, so that becoming part of our own system, it gives
> the impression not of something begged from someone else, but of
> something that springs from our own mental processes. (CWE 28:
> 441)
> 
> 
> 



The gist of Erasmus' arguments about imitation is drawn from
classical handbooks of rhetoric, such as Quintilian's
*Institutio Oratoria* or Cicero's *Ad Herennium*,
but Erasmus goes further, giving a Christian context to the classical
precepts. To satisfy the requirements of *aptum et decorum*, a
Christian's speech must savor of Christ, "or you will turn
out not Ciceronian but pagan". Indeed, this was the purpose of
all education, "of studying philosophy, of studying eloquence,
to know Christ, to celebrate the glory of Christ. This is the goal of
all learning and all eloquence" (CWE 28: 447)


## 4. Language and Literature



The formation and correct use of language was a primary concern for
Erasmus (as in Boyle 1977). He wrote several works that would seem to
provide a starting point for a philosophy of language. Indeed, he
devoted a treatise to the subject of language (*De Lingua*, The
Tongue, 1525), but no systematic thought on the nature, origin, or
function of language emerges from this tractate. We find only isolated
comments about the relationship between words and things, for example,
the statement that things were intelligible only through words,
"by the sounds we attach to them". A person who did not
understand the force of words was "short-sighted, deluded, and
unbalanced in his judgment of things as well" (CWE 24: 666). The
treatise *De Recta Pronuntiatione* (The Right Way of Speaking,
1528) contains another stand-alone pronouncement. Citing the ancient
physician Galen, Erasmus declares that language (*oratio*),
rather than reason (*ratio*), was the distinguishing mark of
human beings (CWE 26: 369). A promising statement in *De Ratione
Studii* likewise remains without follow-up. "In principle,
knowledge as a whole seems to be of two kinds, of things and of
words", Erasmus states. "Knowledge of words comes earlier,
but that of things is the more important" (CWE 24: 666). These
words appear to introduce a theory resembling the duality of
word/thing developed in Plato's *Cratylus* or
Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, but turn out to be only an
organizational principle indicating to readers that Erasmus will talk
first of language, then of content.



Occasionally Erasmus uses metaphors to indicate the relationship
between words and things, likening them to clothing /body
("style is to thought as clothes are to the body", CWE 24:
306) or vessel/content ("mystery concealed by the letter",
CWE 66: 32), but these expressions are no more than apt figures of
speech. Similarly, a statement in his annotations on the New Testament
appears to be an instance of ideational epistemology. Commenting on
John 1:1 ("In the beginning was the word") and on the
implications of rendering Greek *logos* into Latin using
*sermo* or *verbum*, Erasmus explains that
*verbum* is used "of what sounds rather than of what is
conceived in the mind", although "things the voice
expresses are signs of the states that are present first in the
mind" and therefore may also be called *verbum*. He adds:
"Thinking is, as it were, talking to oneself" (CWE 73:
35-6). In this case, too, Erasmus' remarks remain without
solid context.



Similarly, Erasmus' comments on the function of language as a
means of communication appear significant at first sight. In the
*Lingua*, for example, he says: "The tongue was given to
men so that by its agency as messenger one man might know the mind and
intention of another" (CWE 29: 314). He also acknowledges the
communicative function in the *Paraclesis*, one of the prefaces
to his New Testament edition: "for our daily conversation
reflects in large measure what we are. Let each person understand what
he can; let each express what he can" (CWE 41: 412). Here as
elsewhere Erasmus does not elaborate on his thoughts, and his
statements fall short of a philosophy of language.



And yet, though he may not be a philosopher of language in any formal
sense, he has been recognized as one of the founders of the modern
concept of literature (Cummings 2013). Throughout his work, Erasmus
conducts a profound inquiry into literary mimesis, even and especially
in regard to the gospels and their representation of Jesus Christ.
From his engagement with sacred letters, there emerges a vital and
challenging theory of literature and a strong commitment to the
central importance of literature for human life. This theory
encompasses questions of literal and figurative meaning, of the
likeness of speech and thought, of the relationaship of *res*
and *verba*, and of the primacy of verbal over visual
representation. All these issues may indeed be of interest to the
philosophy of language even when this philosophy eschews Scripture.



## 5. Political Thought



Scholars investigating Erasmus' political thought generally
consider the *Institutio Principis Christiani* (The Education
of a Christian Prince, 1516) and the *Panegyricus* (Panegyric,
1504 ) the main sources for his ideals (see Tracy 1978). For his views
on the legitimacy of warfare, they draw on the *Querela Pacis*
(The Complaint of Peace, 1517) and the adage *Dulce Bellum
Inexpertis* (War is sweet to those who have not experienced it).
These sources are problematic, however, because of their strong
rhetorical flavor and the commonplace nature of the arguments
presented there. In fact it is possible to show a literal
correspondence between passages in these works and the *Copia*,
Erasmus' textbook of style, and Erasmus himself acknowledges
that *The Education of a Christian Prince* is a collection of
aphorisms (CWE 27: 204). It will serve as an additional caveat to
readers that Erasmus, who is often depicted as a pacifist, also wrote
a piece in praise of war--now lost, but documented in his
Catalogue of Works (Ep. 1341A: 1455-57; CWE 9. I would not go so
far as to say that the (rhetorical) medium invalidates the message,
but it is important to support and reinforce any views expressed in
Erasmus' epideictic writings with passages in more cogently
argued works, notably his theological and polemical tracts. There are
two treatises, contained within psalm commentaries, which are relevant
to Erasmus' pacifism: *De Bello Turcico* (On War Against
the Turks, 1530) and *De Sarcienda Ecclesiae Concordia (*On
Mending the Peace of the Church, 1533). Both recommend compromise and
arbitration as alternatives to warfare.



Erasmus first voices the idea of arbitration as a method of conflict
resolution in *The Education of a Christian Prince*: "If
some dispute arises between princes, why do they not take it to
arbitration instead [of waging war]?" (CWE 27: 183) He suggests
a committee of churchmen, magistrates, and scholars to settle the
dispute. Similar ideas are voiced in *Dulce Bellum*. Why not
call on bishops, nobles, and councils as intermediaries to
"settle the childish disputes of princes by arbitration?"
(CWE 35: 430). We may take this to be an authentic Erasmian point of
view because it appears not only in these rhetorical compositions but
also in his psalm commentary, *De Concordia*. There it is
presented not merely as a general proposition but given a more
specific context. Erasmus suggests that the religious strife which
characterized his age be settled by a general council of the
church--a desire also voiced in contemporary religious colloquies
and Imperial Diets and realized after long delay in the Council of
Trent. Erasmus furthermore counseled the parties to find a middle
ground and make concessions. He called this process
*synkatabasis* (CWE 65: 201), a military term denoting a move
in which two armies give up their vantage point and descend into the
open plain to negotiate.



Erasmus does not entirely reject warfare, although he depicts it as a
last resource. In his rhetorical tracts he waxes eloquent about the
horrors of war and the destruction inflicted on the population. He
calls war fundamentally unchristian and fit for beasts rather than
humans. In his annotations on the New Testament (Luke 22: 36) he wrote
in a more sober tone about war and the circumstances under which it
was legitimate. By that time Erasmus' pacifism and strong
rejection of warfare had been called heretical, that is, at variance
with the accepted definition of just war. Erasmus amended his
annotation accordingly. The expanded and finely nuanced version of
1527 serves as clear testimony to his views on the subject. He begins
by quoting St. Martin and St. Jerome condemning war. He then
succinctly states his own opinion:



> 
> 
> We should not propagate the Christian religion only with arms, nor
> should princes undertake war when it can be avoided by using other
> means. They should, moreover, conduct a war they have undertaken with
> a minimum of bloodshed and end it as quickly as possible. Finally,
> [war] is not compatible with the purity of the gospel, and we must not
> seek to derive the right to go to war from gospel
> precepts...There are many necessary evils in human affairs, which
> are tolerated because they prevent greater evils; yet they are not
> approved as gospel teaching. (ASD VI-5: 594)
> 
> 
> 



Erasmus' praise of peace and concord is informed by the
Christian ideal of a universal fellowship. "Why don't you
wish [your neighbour] well as another man and a fellow
Christian?" he asks in *The Complaint of Peace* (CWE 27:
315). The theme is also taken up in *War Against the Turks*.
There Erasmus concedes that the war against the Ottoman Empire is
"just" by the definition of the Church, but disparages a
military solution and promotes instead the idea of using spiritual
weapons. He depicts the Turks as a scourge of God (an idea promoted
also by Luther) and therefore urges his contemporaries to repent and
reform to appease God and overcome the enemy.



The *Institutio Principis* and the *Panegyricus* are
addressed to Charles (later Emperor Charles V) and his father Philip
respectively. They belong to the genre of Mirror of Princes, in which
the ideal of a ruler is held up as a model to be imitated. The
Erasmian model prince is a father figure who has the wellbeing of his
people at heart. He is the guardian of justice and provides moral
leadership. He is God's representative and as such owed
obedience. Conversely, the ruler must give an account of his
stewardship to God. Although "it is pretty well agreed among the
philosophers that the most healthy form [of government] is
monarchy", Erasmus believes that monarchy should be
"checked and diluted with a mixture of aristocracy and democracy
to prevent it ever breaking out into tyranny" (CWE 27: 231). It
is not entirely clear what Erasmus meant by "democracy".
It may be no more than a loose reference to the cooperation of the
subjects with their ruler. The best situation is for people to obey
voluntarily, Erasmus says (CWE 27: 236). Alternatively he may be
thinking of the historical roots of kingship when he says that
"it takes general agreement to make a prince" and
"government depends to a large extent on the consent of the
people, which was what created kings in the first place" (CWE
27: 284). Some of the qualifications and limitations he imposes on
absolute monarchy are based on the Christian ideals of charity and
fellowship. Echoing Plato, Erasmus believes that the best ruler must
be a philosopher, that is, a wise man,



> 
> 
> not someone who is clever at dialectics or science but someone who
> rejects illusory appearance and undauntedly seeks out and follows what
> is true and good.
> 
> 
> 



Being a philosopher is in practice the same as being a Christian, he
notes (CWE 27: 214). The ruler must not shirk his moral obligations.
"Power without goodness is unmitigated tyranny" (CWE 27:
220). In an even more radical tone, Erasmus declares: "If you
cannot defend your kingdom without violating justice...then
abdicate" (CWE 27: 217).



The prince's rights need to be balanced against the welfare of
his people.



> 
> 
> The good prince uses the public interest as a yardstick in every
> field, otherwise he is no prince. He has not the same rights over men
> as over cattle. (CWE 27: 284)
> 
> 
> 



The duties and obligations are mutual. Neither the ruler nor his
subjects are above the law: "The happiest situation arises when
the prince is obeyed by all and himself obeys the laws" (CWE 27:
264). Many of the ideas voiced in *The Education of the Christian
Prince* also appear in the *Panegyric*, but are expressed
there in more fulsome terms and, to the modern ear, with excessive
flattery. The message is the same, however. The prince is God's
representative and his steward and "ought never to take his eyes
off his model, ...Christ, the prince of princes" (CWE 27:
56-7).



Describing the hierarchy preserved in the ideal state, Erasmus draws
on the traditional medieval image of the three estates--clergy,
nobility, and common people--arranged in three concentric circles
around the central figure of Christ. This suggests a political and
moral hierarchy with specific duties assigned to each tier. While
everyone "according to the measure that is given him must strive
upwards toward Christ", the hierarchical arrangement also
involves a responsibility to those in the tier below. Explaining the
image, Erasmus notes that this monarchic order is divinely instituted,
and those who fight it, "fight against God its author"
(CWE 42: 74). Thus kings, the representatives of Christ, must be
obeyed even if they are corrupt,



> 
> 
> because they administer public justice and because God is justice;
> they are the ministers of God and in a way rule for him as long as
> they apply their efforts to the mandate given them by public
> authority. (CWE 42: 75)
> 
> 
> 



Indeed, "Order is a good in itself" (CWE 42: 74). There
are multiple roots for the idea of mutual obligations among the
members of a society. It is the foundation of the Medieval feudal
system and embedded in the paternalistic biblical model. It also
resembles the virtue of justice as defined in Plato's
*Republic*, with each member of society maintaining their
proper place and a higher position entailing higher moral authority
and corresponding responsibilities.



Outlining his ideals, Erasmus thus makes use of concepts found in
classical philosophers and Christianizes or adapts them to specific
rhetorical needs. The persistence of key elements in his thought over
a lifetime and in diverse literary genres would indicate that these
ideas, even if they fall short of a philosophy, developed into a habit
of mind that can be labeled "Erasmian". This applies more
particularly to his views on *pietas*.


## 6. *Pietas* and *Philosophia Christi*



The term *philosophia Christi* , the philosophy of Christ,
first appears in patristic writings. It is an aspect of the larger
concept of *pietas*, the moral conscience governing the proper
relationship between individual and God as well as the individual and
society. A central tenet in Erasmus' spiritual writings,
*pietas* thus straddles the subjects of theology and
philosophy.



The main sources for Erasmus' concepts of piety and the
philosophy centered on Christ are his *Enchiridion Militis
Christiani* (Handbook of the Christian Soldier, 1503) with its
prefatory letter to the 1518 edition (Ep. 858; CWE 6), the
*Paraclesis* (*Summons*, 1516) and, perhaps
surprisingly, his lampoon of human foibles, *Moriae Encomium*
(The Praise of Folly, 1511). As he said in reply to indignant critics
of his famous *jeu d'esprit*:



> 
> 
> The *Folly* is concerned in a playful spirit with the same
> subject as the *Handbook of the Christian Soldier*. My purpose
> was guidance and not satire; to help, not to hurt; to show men how to
> become better, and not stand in their way...not only to cure them
> but to amuse them, too. I had often observed that this cheerful and
> humorous style of putting people right is with many of them most
> successful. (Ep. 337: 98-101, 126-8; CWE 3)
> 
> 
> 



While the *Paraclesis*, the *Enchiridion*, and the
*Moriae Encomium* constitute the main sources for
Erasmus' thoughts on Christian morality, this theme is so
pervasive in his works, that any attempt to define his concept of
*pietas* "would be almost tantamount to summarizing and
synthesizing everything that has been written on Erasmus"
(O'Malley in CWE 66: xv). Three characteristics stand out,
however. Piety is an internal quality independent of the outward
observance of rites; it is perfected through divine grace; and it is
inclusive, that is, open to all.



Erasmus calls *pietas* a quality of the mind (*animi
affectus*, LB X: 1675 B) which is expressed in a person's
way of life. Describing human nature, he notes the dichotomy of spirit
and flesh which parallels the duality of visible and invisible things.
Piety requires the development of a person's inner, spiritual
qualities:



> 
> 
> [A person] participates in the visible world through the body, and in
> the invisible through the soul. Since we are but pilgrims in the
> visible world, we should never make it our fixed abode, but should
> relate by a fitting comparison everything that occurs to the senses
> either to the angelic world or, in more practical terms, to morals and
> to that part of man that corresponds to the angelic. (CWE 66: 65)
> 
> 
> 



Erasmus' emphasis on piety as an inner quality is a response to
the undue importance his contemporaries placed on external ceremonies.
He offered his definition as an alternative or rather, a corrective to
the ritualistic observances which he calls "a kind of
Judaism" (CWE 66: 74). He used the term "Judaism"
because in his eyes the rigid observance of rites exemplified the
spirit of the Old Testament, which had been superseded by the new
covenant with Christ. His critique of ritualistic practices puts him
in the vanguard of the Reformation, whose representatives also
protested against the emptiness of ceremonies in the absence of
sincere faith. Like Luther, Erasmus demanded "Christian
liberty", that is, deliverance from the dead letter of the
law.



For Erasmus, monasticism typified the superstitious observance of
external rites and the reliance on human works instead of divine
grace. In a notorious phrase, he declared: *Monachatus non est
pietas*, being a member of a religious order does not amount to
piety. "I advise you to identify piety not with diet, or dress,
or any visible thing, but with what I have taught here [in the
*Enchiridion*]"--the priority of soul over body and
of the inner over the outer person (CWE 66: 127).



The question of Erasmus' affiliation with ancient schools of
philosophy comes up often in Erasmus scholarship. Some scholars have
associated Erasmus' dualism with Platonic philosophy, although
it is more readily explained as a Christian principle and more
specifically as Pauline teaching, which Erasmus discusses at length in
the *Enchiridion*. He does quote Plato as well, but then it is
his habit to cite classical sources in order to give a historical and
pan-cultural dimension to Christian values. Indeed he drew on a number
of models, both pagan and Christian, to describe human nature. Thus he
also introduced the concept of a three-fold division--body, soul,
and spirit--an idea for which he cited Origen. Scholars have also
pointed to the Stoic underpinnings found in Erasmus' thoughts on
*pietas* and even argued that he consciously embraced the Stoic
concept of the simultaneous working of two opposite but equally
essential types of value: spirit and instinct (Dealy 2017). Many years
ago, R. Bultot studied the Epicurean tendencies of the early work,
*On disdaining the World*, in which Erasmus speaks of the
spiritual pleasures of the solitary life, calling its rationale
"Epicurean" (Bultot in Coppens 1969, 2: 205-238).
More recently, John Monfasani has emphasized the role of Christian
Epicureanism in Erasmus' work (Monfasani 2012). Most famously,
Richard Popkin highlights the role of Erasmus in the revival of
Skepticism in early modern Europe (Popkin 1964). For her part, Maria
Cytowska classifies Erasmus as an eclectic philosopher, indeed a
"Christian eclectic", who chooses among ancient philosophy
whatever is closest to Christian religion (Cytowska 1976). In the
*Enchiridion*, Erasmus does not privilege one philosophy over
another but deliberately presents various concepts of human nature by
way of offering a survey of philosophical positions. He
"provided a mass of material" (CWE 66: 54), illustrating
in a general way the superiority of spiritual over material concerns.
His message to the reader was: You should be able to master as a
Christian and for the love of God "what pagan philosophers did
not find hard...for the sake of learning or reputation"
(CWE 66: 142).



Erasmus described his *Enchiridion* as a "summary
guide" to Christian living, which included not only personal,
but also public piety. In its social dimension, *pietas* equals
*caritas*, love of one's neighbor. *Caritas* in
turn parallels love of God. Caring for one's neighbor is
"how our heavenly creditor taught us to pay our debt" (CWE
66: 124).



The ability to fulfill one's moral duty depends on divine grace,
however, and is an aspect of *pietas* related to the Catholic
doctrine of Free Will. Thus human beings have a capacity for piety and
a moral duty as well as the power to do good, although their power is
limited and dependent on the efficacy of divine grace. Erasmus is
emphatic about this aspect in his definition of the *philosophia
Christi*, that is, the pursuit of *pietas*. In a letter to
Jan Slechta (1519), he writes:



> 
> 
> The whole of Christian philosophy lies in this, our understanding that
> all our hope is placed in God, who freely gives us all things through
> Jesus his son, that we were redeemed by his death and engrafted
> through baptism with his body, that we might be dead to the desires of
> this world and live by his teaching and example...that we may
> ever advance from one virtue to another, yet in such a way that we
> claim nothing for ourselves, but ascribe any good we do to God. (Ep.
> 1039: 245-54; CWE 7)
> 
> 
> 



The Erasmian concept of piety was "principled rather than
prescriptive" (as O'Malley puts it, CWE 66: xix). It is
ironic (and perhaps meant ironically) that Erasmus chose to present
his counsel in the form of twenty-two rules since his overall message
is that there are no fixed rules and no need for definitions and
pronouncements. These are the hallmark of institutional theology,
whereas the philosophy of Christ does not require formal training or
attendance at university. It is open to anyone: "no one is
prevented from being godly; and, I shall boldly add, no one is
prevented from being a theologian" (CWE 41: 415). Every
Christian must study the bible, however, Erasmus says.



> 
> 
> I would like every woman to read the Gospel, to read the Epistles of
> Paul. And oh, that these books were translated into every tongue of
> every land so that not only the Scots and the Irish, but Turks and
> Saracens too could read and get to know them...How I wish that
> the farmer at his plow would chant some passage from these books, that
> the weaver at his shuttles would sing something from them; that the
> traveler would relieve the tedium of his journey with stories of this
> kind. (CWE 41: 411)
> 
> 
> 



*Pietas* does not depend on learning. Faith is the only
prerequisite. This is the conclusion Erasmus offers in *The Praise
of Folly*. He begins his satire showing off his classical learning
and ends it paradoxically by praising the devout fool. Those who scorn
the world are considered fools or madmen by the majority of people,
Erasmus says, but they will inherit God's kingdom and in their
ecstasy "feel some foretaste and savour of the reward to
come" (CWE 27: 152).



Praising Christian folly in such extravagant terms, Erasmus seems to
align himself with the radical mystics who considered human
intelligence worthless and studies futile. As we have seen, however,
education is a central concern for Erasmus, and what seems like a
contradiction, is merely a matter of priorities. Erasmus urges
everyone to pursue learning, as long as it plays a supportive role to
faith. He repeatedly praises *docta pietas*, piety which
combines learning with a devout and humble spirit and warns against
its opposite, *impia curiositas*, unholy inquisitiveness.
*Docta pietas* means respecting the limits of human
understanding.



> 
> 
> What is granted to you to see, fall down before it and kiss it; what
> is not granted to see--this, though concealed, worship nevertheless
> from afar in sincere faith, and venerate whatever it is. Let ungodly
> curiosity be absent [*absit impia curiositas*],
> 
> 
> 



he counsels students of theology in the *Ratio* (Vessey 2021,
117). For Erasmus, St. Jerome is the embodiment of *docta
pietas*. In his *Life of Jerome* (which prefaces his
edition of the works of the Church Father, 1516), he depicted him as
the Christian scholar *par excellence*, combining Ciceronian
eloquence with a thorough understanding of theology and a devout
spirit with a holy life.



In the *Paraclesis* Erasmus distinguished the simple philosophy
of Christ from that of Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophical
writers of antiquity, pointing out that the gospel provided the only
certain doctrine and Christ was the only true teacher (CWE 41: 408).
For Erasmus learning and knowledge were qualities that had no value
unless they centered on Christ and contributed to an understanding of
the *philosophia Christi*. Even language studies, which formed
the core of his curriculum proposal, had to be subordinated to that
goal. He wished for an eloquence



> 
> 
> which does not simply charm the ears by a pleasure soon to die, but
> which leaves barbs clinging in the hearts of those who hear; an
> eloquence that seizes, transforms, and sends the listener away a much
> different person from the one it received. (CWE 41: 406)
> 
> 
> 



This is the goal of a preacher's eloquence, as Erasmus explains
in the *Ecclesiastes* (The Evangelical Preacher, 1535). There
he adapts the threefold task Cicero envisages for the speaker--to
instruct, to move, to entertain--and develops the idea that the
inspired words of a preacher will not only move but transform the
listeners, that the preacher's sermon will captivate not only
the mind but also the soul of the hearers. This ability is "a
gift of the Holy Spirit" however (CWE 67: 283).



Although Erasmus' curriculum focused on the authors of classical
antiquity, the philosophy of Christ required the adaption of pagan
ideas to Christian thought and their application to Christian ideals,
a process Erasmus called (after Augustine) "spoiling the
Egyptians". Accordingly he urges the preacher in the
*Ecclesiastes* to select suitable material from classical
writers but inject a Christian perspective. Erasmus himself edited and
translated a number of pagan writers whose teachings he considered
germane to the philosophy of Christ. Among them, he singled out
Plutarch: "I have read nothing outside of Scripture with such a
high moral tone" (Ep. 1341A: 259-60; CWE 9). He had high
praise also for the Platonists, "because in much of their
thinking as well as in their mode of expression they are the closest
to the spirit of the prophets and the gospel" ( CWE 66: 33).



Erasmus was a prolific writer. His works were translated into the
vernacular and circulated widely. His ideas had a strong impact that
can be traced into the modern age. Even in his own time, the term
"Erasmian" denoted a certain set of values. In 1530, the
Leuven theologian Frans Titelmans noted that enthusiasts of humanistic
studies were called "Erasmians" because Erasmus was their
chief inspiration (1530, Ei verso-Eii recto). His contemporary,
the Swiss chronicler Johann Kessler, declared that "whatever is
skilled, polished, learned, and wise is called Erasmian"
(1523-1539, 87). It was classical learning and eloquence that
defined Erasmus in his own time, and modern scholarship has come to
recognize the role that Erasmus played in the cultivation of his own
image (see Jardine 1993). In the Age of Enlightenment he was
celebrated as a rationalist, an image that held into the
20th century (as chronicled by Mansfield 1992). Wilhelm
Dilthey, for example, called Erasmus the Voltaire of the
16th century (GS II, 74). The emphasis shifted in the
20th century, when Erasmus' irenicism caught
readers' attention. Thus Jose Chapiro (1950) dedicated
his translation of *The Complaint of Peace* to the United
Nations, and Erasmus' biographer Johan Huizinga identified
"Erasmian" with "gentleness, kindliness, and
moderation" (1912 [1957], 194). In 1999, Ralf Dahrendorf defined
*Erasmus-Menschen* as people guided by reason and avoiding the
pitfalls of political extremism. Their hallmark was compassion and
tolerance. In contemporary usage, then, "Erasmian" has
come to denote a liberal thinker, an attitude or *modus
vivendi* rather than a school of philosophy. The newest trend
emerging from contemporary scholarship is to recognize Erasmus as one
of the makers of the modern book, due to his collaboration with
printers and book sellers and his indefatigable efforts as editor of
classical and patristic texts (see Vanautgaerden 2012).