## 1. Life of Albert the Great




The precise date of Albert's birth is not known. It is generally
conceded that he was born into a knightly family sometime around the
year 1200 in Lauingen an der Donau in Germany. He was apparently in
Italy in the year 1222 where he was present when a rather terrible
earthquake struck in Lombardy. A year later he was still in Italy and
studying at the University of Padua. The same year Jordan of Saxony
received him into the Dominican order. He was sent to Cologne in order
to complete his training for the order. He finished this training as
well as a course of studies in theology by 1228. He then began
teaching as a lector at Cologne, Hildesheim, Freiburg im Breisgau,
Regensburg, and Strassburg. During this period he published his first
major work, *De natura boni*.




Ten years later he is recorded as having been present at the general
chapter of the Dominican Order held in Bologna. Two years later he
visited Saxony where he observed the appearance of a comet. Some time
between 1241 and 1242 he was sent to the University of Paris to
complete his theological education. He followed the usual prescription
of lecturing on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. In addition
he began writing his six part *Summa parisiensis* dealing with
the sacraments of the Church, the incarnation and resurrection of
Christ, the four coevals, human nature, and the nature of the good. He
took his degree as master of theology in 1245 and began to teach
theology at the university under Gueric de Saint-Quentin. St. Thomas
Aquinas became his student at this time and remained under
Albert's direction for the next three years. In 1248 Albert was
appointed regent of studies at the *studium generale* that was
newly created by the Dominican order in Cologne. So Albert, along with
Thomas Aquinas, left Paris and went to Cologne. Thomas continued his
studies under Albert in Cologne and served as *magister
studium* in the school as well until 1252. Then Thomas returned to
Paris to take up his teaching duties while Albert remained in Cologne,
where he began to work on the vast project he set himself of preparing
a paraphrase of each of the known works of Aristotle.




In 1254 the Dominican order again assigned Albert a difficult task.
He was elected the prior provincial for the German-speaking province
of the order. This position mandated that Albert spend a great deal of
his time traveling throughout the province visiting Dominican
convents, priories, and even a Dominican mission in Riga. This task
occupied Albert until 1256. That year he returned to Cologne, but left
the same year for Paris in order to attend a General Chapter of his
order in which the allegations of William of St. Amour's *De
periculis novissimorum temporum* against mendicant orders were
considered. A little later Pope Alexander IV asked Albert to go to
Anagni in order to speak to a commission of Cardinals who were looking
into the claims of William. While engaged in this charge Albert
completed his refutation of Averroistic psychology with his *De
unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*. Afterwards Albert
departed for another tour of the province of Germany. In 1257 he
returned to the papal court, which was now located in Viterbo. He was
relieved of his duties as prior provincial and returned again to
Cologne as regent of studies. He continued to teach until 1259 when he
traveled to Valenciennes in order to attend a General Chapter of his
order. At that time, along with Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarentasia,
Bonhomme Brito, and Florent de Hesdin, he undertook on behalf of his
order an extensive discussion of the curriculum of the scholastic
program used by the order.




The next year of his life found Albert once again appointed to an
onerous duty. In obedience to the wishes of the pope Albert was
consecrated a bishop of the Church and sent to Ratisbon (modern
Regensburg) in order to undertake a reform of abuses in that diocese.
Albert worked at this task until 1263 when Pope Urban IV relieved him
of his duties and asked Albert to preach the Crusade in the German
speaking countries. This duty occupied Albert until the year 1264. He
then went to the city of Wurzburg where he stayed until 1267.




Albert spent the next eight years traveling around Germany conducting
various ecclesiastical tasks. Then in 1274 while he was traveling to
the Council of Lyons Albert received the sad news of the untimely
death of Thomas Aquinas, his friend and former student of many
years. After the close of the Council Albert returned to
Germany. There is evidence that he traveled to Paris in the year 1277
in order to defend Aquinas' teaching, which was under attack at
the university. In 1279, anticipating his death he drew up his own
last will and testament. On November 15, 1280 he died and was buried
in Cologne. On December 15, 1931 Pope Pius XI declared Albert both a
saint and a doctor of the Church. On the 16th of December
1941 Pope Pius XII declared Albert the patron saint of the natural
sciences.


## 2. Philosophical Enterprise




An examination of Albert's published writings reveals something
of his understanding of philosophy in human culture. In effect he
prepared a kind of philosophical encyclopedia that occupied him up to
the last ten years of his life. He produced paraphrases of most of the
works of Aristotle available to him. In some cases where he felt that
Aristotle should have produced a work, but it was missing, Albert
produced the work himself. If he had produced nothing else it would be
necessary to say that he adopted the Aristotelian
philosophical-scientific program and subordinated it to the Neoplatonic tradition. Albert's
intellectual vision, however, was very great. Not only did he
paraphrase "The Philosopher" (as the medievals called
Aristotle) but Porphyry, Boethius, Peter Lombard, Gilbert de la
Porree, the *Liber de causis*, and Ps.-Dionysius. He
also wrote a number of commentaries on the Bible. In addition to all
of this work of paraphrasing and commenting, in which Albert labored
to prepare a kind of unified field theory of medieval Christian
intellectual culture, he also wrote a number of works in which he
developed his own philosophical-scientific-theological vision. Here
one finds titles such as *De unitate intellectus*, 
*Problemata determinate*, *De fato*, 
*De XV problematibus*, *De natura boni*, 
*De sacramentis*, *De incarnatione*, 
*De bono*, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, 
*De homine*, and his unfinished 
*Summa theologiae de mirabilis scientia Dei*.




Albert's labors resulted in the formation of what might be
called a Christian reception of Aristotle in the Western Europe.
Albert himself had a strong bias in favor of Neo-Platonism,and his
work on Aristotle shows him to have had a deep understanding of the
Aristotelian program. Along with his student Thomas Aquinas he was of
the opinion that Aristotle and the kind of natural philosophy that he
represented was no obstacle to the development of a Christian
philosophical vision of the natural order. In order to establish this
point Albert carefully dissected the method that Aristotle employed in
undertaking the task of expounding natural philosophy. This method,
Albert decided, is experientially based and proceeds to draw
conclusions by the use of both inductive and deductive
logic. Christian theology, as Albert found it taught in Europe rested
firmly upon the revelation of Sacred Scripture and the Church
Fathers. Therefore, he reasoned, the two domains of human culture are
distinct in their methodology and pose no threat to each other. Both
can be pursued for their own sake. Philosophy was not to be valued
only in terms of its ancillary relation to theology. As recent
research has shown, Albert subordinated his use of Aristotle to his
understanding of the Neoplatonic view of reality that he found in the
writings of Pseudo Dionysius and the *Liber de causis*. He saw
all of reality in terms of the Neoplatonic categories of exit and
return, which he referred to in his writings with the terms
*exitus*, *perfectio*, and *reductio*. This
schema gave him a framework into which he could develop the scientific
insights of Aristotle. But within this framework he insisted that natural science must investigate the causes that are operating in nature as based on empirical evidence.


## 3. Logic




Albert carefully prepared a paraphrase of Aristotle's
*Organon* (the logical treatises in the Aristotelian corpus). He
then used the results of this paraphrase to address the problem of
universals as he found it discussed in the philosophical literature and
debates of the medieval philosophical culture. He defined the term
universal as referring to " ... that which, although it
 exists in one, is apt by nature to exist in
 many."[1]
 Because it is apt
to be in many, it is predicable of them. (*De praed*., tract II,
c. 1) He then distinguished three kinds of universals, those that
pre-exist the things that exemplify them 
(*universale ante rem*), 
those that exist in individual things (*universale in re*), 
and those that exist in the mind when abstracted from individual things 
(*universale post rem*).




Albert attempted to formulate an answer to Porphyry's famous problem
of universals--namely, do the species according to which we
classify beings exist in themselves or are they merely constructions
of the mind? Albert appealed to his three-fold distinction, noting
that a universal's mode of being is differentiated according to which
function is being considered. It may be considered in itself, or in
 respect to understanding, or as existing in one particular or
 another.[2]
 Both the nominalist and realist solutions to Porphyry's problem are
thus too simplistic and lack proper distinction. Albert's distinction
thus allowed him to harmonize Plato's realism in which universals
existed as separate forms with Aristotle's more nominalistic theory of
immanent forms. For universals when considered in themselves
(*secudum quod in seipso*) truly exist and are free from
 generation, corruption, and
 change.[3]
 If, however, they are taken in reference to the mind (*refertur ad
intelligentiam*) they exist in two modes, depending on whether
they are considered with respect to the intellect that is their cause
 or the intellect that knows them by
 abstraction.[4]
 But when they are considered in particulars (*secundum quod est in
isto vel in illo*) their existence is exterior to as well as
 beyond the mind, yet existing in things as
 individuated.[5]


## 4. Metaphysics




Albert's metaphysics is an adaptation of Aristotelian
metaphysics as conditioned by a form of Neo-Platonism. His reading the
*Liber de causis* as an authentic Aristotelian text influenced
his understanding of Aristotle. It seems that Albert never realized the
Neo-Platonic origin of the work. As with the other works of Aristotle
he prepared a paraphrase of the work entitled *De causis et processu
universitatis*, and used it as a guide to interpreting other works
by Aristotle. However, he also used the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius to
correct some of the doctrine found in the *Liber de causis*.




Albert blends these three main sources of his metaphysics into a
hierarchical structure of reality in which there is an emanation of
forms directed by what Albert calls "a summoning of the
good" (*advocatio boni*). The good operates metaphysically
as the final cause of the order of forms in the universe of beings. But
it is also the First Cause. And its operation in the created order of
being is discovered as an attraction of all being back to itself.
"We exist because God is good," Albert explains, "and
 we are good insofar as we
 exist."[6]
 Thus the balanced relations of the exit and return of all things
according to classical Neo-Platonism is skewed in favor of the
relationship of return. This is because Albert, as a Christian
philosopher, favors a creationist view of being over the doctrine of
pure emanation. Rejecting also the doctrine of universal hylomorphism
Albert argues that material beings are always composite in which the
forms are inchoate until they are called forth by the ultimate
good. Spiritual creatures (excluding man) have no material
element. Their being summoned to the good is immediate and final. The
summoning of the inchoate forms of material beings, however, is not
direct. It depends upon the intervention of the celestial spheres.




The First Cause, which Albert understands as God, is an absolutely
transcendent reality. His uncreated light calls forth a hierarchically
ordered universe in which each order of being reflects this light.
God's giving existence to creatures is understood by Albert as
 their procession from him as from a first
 cause.[7]
 At the top of this hierarchy of light are found the purely spiritual
beings, the angelic orders and the intelligences. Albert carefully
distinguishes these two kinds of beings. He basically accepts the
analysis of the angelic orders as found in Pseudo-Dionysius' treatise
of the celestial hierarchy. The intelligences move the cosmic spheres
and illuminate the human soul. The intelligences, just as the order of
angels, form a special hierarchy. The First Intelligence, as Albert
calls it, contemplates the entire universe and uses the human soul, as
illuminated by the lower intelligences, to draw all creatures into a
unity.




Beneath the angels and intelligences are the souls that possess
intellects. They are joined to bodies but do not depend on bodies for
their existence. Although they are ordered to the First Intelligence
so as to enjoin contemplative unity on the entire cosmos, Albert
rejects the Averroistic theory of the unity of the intellect. Each
human soul has its own intellect. But because the human soul uniquely
stands on the horizon of both material and spiritual being it can
operate as a microcosm and thus can serve the purpose of the First
Intelligence, which is to bind all creatures into a universe.




Finally there are the immersed forms. Under this heading Albert
establishes another hierarchy with the animal kingdom at the top,
followed by the plant kingdom, then the world of minerals (in which
Albert had a deep interest), and finally the elements of material
creation.




One important aspect of Albert's metaphysics appears in his
commentary on Aristotle' *Metaphysics*. In this work
Albert relies heavily on both Averroes in his *Long Commentary on
the Metaphysics* and Avicenna's *Philosophia
prima*. While the commentary of Averroes is an almost literal
analysis of the text of Aristotle, Avicenna's analysis often
departs from this literal approach and incorporates ideas that
Avicenna found in Aristotle's *Posterior
Analytics*. Albert seems to be using Averroes when he is
paraphrasing Aristotle's text, but relies on Avicenna when he
departs from the paraphrasing. As a result of this usage Albert
proceeds to develop his own ideas of first philosophy as outlined
above. This can be seen for example in his analysis of the fifth book
of the *Metaphysics* in his digression on unity found in
tractate 1, chapter 8. Following Avicenna he argues that unity cannot
be an essential feature of any substance.


## 5. Psychology and Anthropology




Albert's interest in the human condition is dominated by his
concern with the relationship of the soul to the body on the one hand
and the important role that the intellect plays in human psychology.
 According to Albert, man is identified with his
 intellect.[8]
 With regard to the relationship between the soul and the body Albert
appears to be torn between the Platonic theory which sees the soul as
a form capable of existing independently of the body and the
Aristotelian hylomorphic theory which reduces the soul to a functional
relationship of the body. With respect to human knowing, for example,
he maintains the position that the human intellect is dependent upon
 the
 senses.[9]
 In order to resolve the conflict between the two views Albert availed
himself of Avicenna's position that Aristotle's analysis
was focused on the function and not the essence of the
soul. Functionally, Albert argues, the soul is the agent cause of the
body. "Just as we maintain that the soul is the cause of the
animated body and of its motions and passions insofar as it is
animated," he reasons, "likewise we must maintain that the
lowest intelligence is the cause of the cognitive soul insofar as it
is cognitive because the cognition of the soul is a particular result
 of the light of the
 intelligence."[10]
 Having been created in the image and likeness of God it not only
governs the body, as God governs the universe, but it is responsible
for the very existence of the body, as God is the creator of the
world. And just as God transcends his creation, so does the human soul
transcend the body in its interests. It is capable of operating in
complete independence of corporeal functions. This transcendental
function of the soul allows Albert to focus on what he believes is the
essence of the soul--the human intellect.




Viewed as essentially an intellect, the human soul is an incorporeal
substance. Albert divides this spiritual substance into two
 powers--the agent intellect and the possible
 intellect.[11]
 Neither of these powers needs the body in order to function. Under
certain conditions concerning its powers the human intellect is
capable of transformation. While it is true that under the stimulus or
illumination of the agent intellect the possible intellect can
consider the intelligible form of the phantasms of the mind which are
derived from the senses, it can also operate under the sole influence
of the agent intellect. Here, Albert argues, the possible intellect
undergoes a complete transformation and becomes totally actualized, as
the agent intellect becomes its form. It emerges as what he calls the
"adept intellect" (*intellectus
 adeptus*).[12]
 At this stage the human intellect is susceptible to illumination by
higher cosmic intellects called the "intelligences". Such
illumination brings the soul of man into complete harmony with the
entire order of creation and constitutes man's natural
happiness. Since the intellect is now totally assimilated to the order
of things Albert calls the intellect in its final stage of development
the "assimilated intellect" (*intellectus
assimilativus*). The condition of having attained an assimilated
intellect constitutes natural human happiness, realizing all the
aspirations of the human condition and human culture. But Albert makes
it clear that the human mind cannot attain this state of assimilation
on its own. Following the Augustinian tradition as set forth in the
*De magistro* Albert states that "because the divine
truth lies beyond our reason we are not able by ourselves to discover
it, unless it condescends to infuse itself; for as Augustine says, it
is an inner teacher, without whom an external teacher labors
 aimlessly."[13]
 There is thus an infusion involved with divine illumination, but it
is not a pouring forth of forms. Rather, it is an infusion of an inner
teacher, who is identified with divine truth itself. In his commentary
on the *Sentences* Albert augments this doctrine when he argues
that this inner teacher strengthens the weakness of the human
intellect, which by itself could not profit by external
stimulation. He distinguishes the illumination of this interior
teacher from the true and final object of the
 intellect.[14]
 Divine light is only a means by which the intellect can attain its
 object.[15]
 This is consistent with his emphasis upon the analogy of divine light
and physical light, which pervades so much of his thinking. It
follows, then, that in the order of human knowing there are first of
all the forms that are derived from external things. They cannot teach
us anything in any useful way until the light of an inner teacher
illuminates them. So light is the medium of this vision. But the inner
teacher himself is identified with the divine truth, which is the
final object and perfection of the human intellect. In his
*Summa*, however, Albert makes further distinctions concerning
the object of human knowing. Natural things, he tells us, are received
in a natural light, while the things that the intellect contemplates
in the order of belief (*ad credenda vero*) are received in a
light that is gratuitous (*gratuitum est*), and the beatifying
realities are received in the light of
 glory.[16]
 It seems that Albert has abandoned the position that even
*naturalia* require divine illumination. Strictly speaking, he
has not abnegated his earlier position. *Naturalia* may very
well still require the work of a restorative inner teacher. In the
*Summa*, however, Albert is anxious to stress the radical
difference natural knowing has from supernatural knowing. He has
already established this difference in his study of the human
intellect (*De intellectu*) where he tells us, "Some
[intelligibles] with their light overpower our intellect which is
temporal and has continuity. These are like the things that are most
manifest in nature which are related to our intellect as the light of
the sun or a strong scintillating color is to the eyes of the bat or
the owl. Other [intelligibles] are manifest only through the light of
another. These would be like the things which are received in faith
from what is primary and
 true."[17]
 But in both natural and supernatural knowing Albert is careful to
stress the final object and perfection of the human intellect. This
leads naturally to a consideration of Albert's understanding of
ethics.


## 6. Albertus Magnus and the Sciences




In the first section of his *Commentary on Aristotle's
Physics* Albertus Magnus discusses the possibility of the study of
natural science. If science could only study particulars, Albert
argues, then there would be no science in the sense of the
demonstration of necessary causes because there would be as many
sciences as there are particulars. But particulars, Albert goes on to
point out, belong to definite kinds (species) and these can be studied
because their causes *can be demonstrated*. Species have common
attributes and a determined subject of which the attributes can be
determined with necessity. Thus science is possible.




And this conviction about science being possible, as opposed to the
Platonic and Neoplatonic tendency to discount the world of particular
reality, and its presumed unaccountable changeableness, was not just a
theoretical position on Albert's part. He devotes a great deal of
his time and attention to the actual empirical study of the
relationships between attributes and natural subjects. Furthermore, he
orders such study into what today would be called the "natural
sciences". Besides the study of the heavens and the earth and
generation and corruption that he found in Aristotle, he adds the study
of meteors, the mineral, animal, and vegetable kingdoms.




Albert inherited astronomy as part of the scholastic curriculum known
as the *quadrivium**.* But his interest in this science
was not merely conceptual; he was also interested in using mathematical
calculations and conferring with astronomical tables to study the
nature of celestial bodies. He was concerned with the constellations,
the sizes of planets and stars and their positions and movements in the
heavens. He seems to have known about astronomical instruments,
particularly the astrolabe, but gives no clue as to what method of
investigation he used to carry out his studies. He did make it clear,
however, that the principles of physics had to be applied to celestial
bodies, which he regarded as natural physical bodies moving in real
space.




Besides studying the properties of the celestial bodies themselves, he
also was concerned with their effects on terrestrial objects. For
example, he seems to have understood that the tides on earth were
related to celestial bodies.




After astronomy, Albert develops a particular order in which he
proposes to study the other sciences. In his *Meteora*, he
explains that sublunary moveable bodies can be studied in three ways.
First, in so far as they come into and pass out of being (generation
and corruption). Then they must be investigated with respect to their
mixture with other moveable bodies. And lastly, they need to be studied
with respect to their contraction to the mineral, vegetable, and animal
species. This last phase of his plan, however, is where Albert made his
own contribution to the development of modern science as it is known
today. That is, he undertook his own empirical investigations into the
mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms.




Albert's *Treatise on Minerals* (*De mineralibus*)
shows that he undertakes his own observations and did not merely
collate authorities on the topic. He studies different kinds of
minerals and metals as well as rare stones. Beginning with the mineral
kingdom, he notes the properties of each mineral specimen, including
where it was found along with its cause or causes. Next, he deals with
rare stones, investigating the powers of these specimens along with
their causes. He then produces an alphabetical list of a large number
of these more precious stones. Throughout the treatise, Albert is
careful always to proceed from the effects or properties of the mineral
world to hypotheses concerning their causes. It is clear from his text
that he himself made a number of studies (experiments) with different
minerals.




Next, Albert studies the plant kingdom. In his *Treatise on
Plants* (*De vegetabilibus*), as in his *Treatise on
Minerals*, he combines his own observations with those of other
authorities, providing an alphabetical list of plants as he did for
stones in his *Treatise on Minerals*. But he adds a long section
on the cultivation of plants. He makes the interesting observation that
the properties of certain plants are caused by celestial bodies. He
also indicates the medicinal properties of certain plants, although he
is careful to point out that his principal concern is in understanding
the nature of plants based on a study of their properties and
virtues.




Albert's interest in the natural order concludes with his
investigations of the final level of natural beings, the animal
kingdom. His *Treatise on Animals* (*De animalibus*)
involves Aristotle's studies of animals as well as material taken
from Thomas of Cantimpre's encyclopedic *On the Nature
of Things* (*De natura rerum*). But Albert inserts his own
studies of animals into the treatise. He investigates the causes of the
properties of different kinds of animals based on their operations and
powers. Again, Albert organizes a kind of dictionary of animals based
on their various species, listed in alphabetical order as he had done
in the other special sciences.




It seems to have been of considerable importance to Albert to do two
things in developing his scientific investigations. First, to review
and organize the authorities in each of the branches of science and
second to test by his own experience the claims made by these
authorities. In this way, he was careful to accommodate readers who
were used to consulting authorities instead of experience by providing
a context in which he could introduce his new findings.


## 7. Ethics




Albert's ethics rests on his understanding of human freedom. This
freedom is expressed through the human power to make unrestricted
decisions about their own actions. This power, the *liberum
arbitrium*, Albert believes is identified neither with the
intellect nor the will. He holds this extraordinary position because
of his analysis of the genesis of human action. In his treatise on man
(*Liber de homine*) he accounts for human action as beginning
with the intellect considering the various options for action open to
a person at a given moment in time. This is coupled by the will
desiring the beneficial outcome of the proposed event. Then the
*liberum arbitrium* chooses one of the options proposed by the
intellect or the object of the will's desire. The will then moves the
person to act on the basis of the choice of the *liberum
arbitrium*. Brutes do not have this ability, he argues, and must
act solely on their initial desire. Hence they have no power of free
choice. In his later writings, however, Albert eliminates the first
act of the will. But even so he distinguishes the *liberum
arbitrium* from both the will and the intellect, presumably so
that it can respond to the influences of both these faculties
equally. Thus the way to ethics is open.




Albert's concern with ethics as such is found in his two
commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. The
prologues to both these works reveal Albert's original thoughts
on some problems about the discipline of ethics. He wonders if ethics
can be considered as a theoretical deductive science. He concludes that
it can be so considered because the underlying causes of moral action
(*rationes morum*) involve both necessary and universal
principles, the conditions needed for a science according to the
analysis of Aristotle that Albert
 accepted.[18]
 The *rationes morum* are contrasted by him to the mere
appearance of moral
 behaviour.[19]
 Thus virtue can be discussed in abstraction from particular actions
of individual human agents. The same is true of other ethical
principles. However, Albert maintains that it is possible to refer to
particular human acts as exemplifying relevant virtues and as such to
include them in a scientific discussion of
 ethics.[20]
 Therefore, ethics is theoretical, even though the object of its
theory is the practical.




Another concern that Albert expresses is how ethics as a theoretical
deductive science can be relevant to the *practice* of the
virtuous life. He addresses this problem by distinguishing ethics as a
doctrine (*ethica docens*) from ethics as a practical activity
of individual human beings (*ethica
 utens*).[21]
 The outcomes of these two aspects of ethics are different he
argues. Ethics as a doctrine is concerned with teaching. It proceeds
by logical analysis concentrating on the goals of human action in
general. As such its proper end is knowledge. But as a practical and
useful art ethics is concerned with action as a means to a desired
 end.[22]
 Its mode of discourse is rhetorical--the persuasion of the
human being to engage in the right actions that will lead to the
desired
 end.[23]
 Albert sees these two aspects of ethics as linked together by the
virtue of prudence. It is prudence that applies the results of the
doctrine of ethics to its
 practice.[24]
 Ethics considered as a doctrine operates through prudence as a remote
cause of ethical action. Thus the two functions of ethics are related
and ethics is considered by Albert as both a theoretical deductive
science and a practical applied science.




Albert goes beyond these methodological considerations. He addresses
the end of ethics, as he understands it. And here his psychology bears
fruit. For he embraces the idea that the highest form of human
happiness is the contemplative life. This is the true and proper end
of man, he claims. For the adept intellect, as noted above, is the
highest achievement to which the human condition can aspire. It
represents the conjunction of the apex of the human mind to the
separated agent intellect. In this conjunction the separated agent
intellect becomes the form of the soul. The soul experiences
self-sufficiency and is capable of contemplative wisdom. This is as
close to beatitude as man can get in this life. Man is now capable of
contemplating separated beings as such and can live his life in almost
stoical detachment from the concerns of sublunar existence.


## 8. The Influence of Albert the Great




Albert's influence on the development of scholastic philosophy in the
thirteenth century was enormous. He, along with his most famous
student Thomas of Aquinas, succeeded in incorporating the philosophy
of Aristotle into the Christian West. Besides Thomas, Albert was also
the teacher of Ulrich of Strassburg (1225 - 1277), who
carried forward Albert's interest in natural science by writing a
commentary on Aristotle's *Meteors* along with his metaphysical
work, the *De summo bono*; Hugh Ripelin of Strassburg
(c.1200 - 1268) who wrote the famous *Compendium theologicae
veritatis*; John of Freiburg (c.1250 - 1314) who wrote the
*Libellus de quaestionibus casualibus*; and Giles of Lessines
(c. 1230 - c. 1304) who wrote a treatise on the unity of
substantial form, the *De unitate formae*. The influence of
Albert and his students was very pronounced in the generation of
German scholars who came after these men. Dietrich of Freiberg, who
may have actually met Albert, is probably the best example of the
influence of the spirit of Albert the Great. Dietrich (c. 1250 -
c. 1310) wrote treatises on natural science, which give evidence of
his having carried out actual scientific investigation. His treatise
on the rainbow would be a good example. But he also wrote treatises on
metaphysical and theological topics in which the echoes of Albert can
be distinctly heard. Unlike Albert he did not write commentaries on
Aristotle, but preferred to apply Albertist principles to topics
according to his own understanding. On the other hand Berthold of
Moosburg (+ c. 1361) wrote a very important commentary on Proclus'
*Elements of Theology*, introducing the major work of the great
Neo-Platonist into German metaphysics. Berthold's debt to Albert is
found throughout his commentary, especially with regard to
metaphysical topics. Many of these Albertist ideas and principles
passed down to thinkers such as Meister Eckhart, John Tauler, and
Heinrich Suso where they took on a unique mystical flavor. The
Albertist tradition continued down to Heymeric de Campo (1395 -
1460) who passed it on to Nicholas of Cusa. From Nicholas the ideas
pass down to the Renaissance. The philosophers of the Renaissance seem
to have been attracted to the Albert's understanding of Neo-Platonism
and his interest in natural science.