## 1. History



The history of Latin American philosophy is usefully divided into five
periods: Pre-Columbian, Colonial, Independentist, Nationalist, and
Contemporary (that is, the twentieth century to the present). Most
periods are characterized by the dominance of a particular tradition:
the Pre-Columbian by Amerindian religious cosmologies, the Colonial by
scholasticism, the Independentist by Early Modern philosophy and
Enlightenment thought, and the Nationalist by positivism. However, the
contemporary situation is more complex and varied. For that reason, it
is discussed in a separate and subsequent section, apart from the
other historical periods that are the focus of this section.



There is good evidence that in at least the major pre-Columbian
civilizations there were attempts to explore questions about the nature
of reality, the limits of knowledge, and the basis of right action.
Moreover, such work persisted in various forms for some time after the
Conquest (Restrepo 2010; Maffie 2014). Whether this body of work is rightly
characterized as philosophy or something else is a disputed matter,
with scholars disagreeing about how best to characterize it (see
Nuccetelli, 2001, ch. 3; Mignolo, 2003). It is clear that the
reflective and speculative work of pre-Columbian Amerindian peoples was
undertaken without any familiarity with the Western philosophical
tradition. Those inquiries were also generally undertaken within the
religious frameworks of their places and times and the literary or
presentational modes in which such questions were entertained were
typically removed from traditional forms of European philosophical
production.



Despite these differences with European philosophy, and despite the
often fragmentary and frequently second-hand information that survives
concerning pre-Columbian thought, extant works have nevertheless
supported a variety of intriguing and subtle accounts of those
philosophical or proto-philosophical
 reflections.[1]
Still, the conventional view about the pre-Columbian
period is that its reflections had little to no impact on the
indisputably philosophical intellectual production in the period that
immediately followed the
 Conquest.[2]



European-derived philosophy began in Latin America in the sixteenth
century. Among the most notable figures of this period is
Bartolome de Las Casas (1484-1566), whose work on the
rights of conquered Amerindians has had a particularly important and
long-lasting legacy. Scholasticism, introduced by the Spanish and
Portuguese clergy that arrived with the *conquistadores,* was
the dominant philosophical perspective. Most of the work produced
during the first two centuries in the colonies was cast in the
framework used in the Iberian peninsula. It was particularly indebted
to the thought of both sixteenth-century Iberians and their medieval
predecessors. Important figures included Francisco Suarez
(1548-1617) and Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546), and
earlier medieval philosopher-theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274) and John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308). Most of
these authors were born in the Iberian peninsula, but many of them had
settled in the colonies. Among the most important, apart from Las
Casas, are Alonso de la Vera Cruz (ca. 1504-84), who composed
the first fully philosophical treatises in Latin America, Tomas
de Mercado (ca. 1530-1575), and Antonio Rubio
(1548-1615). Some of the works of these authors, such as Rubio's
*Logica mexicana,* were known and used in Europe.



Humanism also had some influence, as is clear from the work of Juan
de Zumarraga (ca.1468-1548) and Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz
(1651-1695), among others. Sor Juana has the distinction of being the
first Latin American thinker to raise questions concerning the status
of women in Latin American society. She is also retrospectively
regarded as the first Latin American feminist writer and philosopher
(see also the section on *feminist philosophy,* below.)



The eighteenth century, under the influence of modern philosophy and
the Enlightenment, helped prepare the way for the revolutionary wars of
independence. Philosophical discussions of the time were dominated by
political thought. Even so, scholasticism continued to influence
the intellectual class and stoked an ongoing interest in traditional
metaphysical questions. Authors such as Juan Benito Diaz de
Gamarra y Davalos (1745-1783) and Francisco Javier Clavijero
(1731-1787), both from Mexico, were influenced by early modern
philosophers such as Rene Descartes (1596-1650). However, the
wave of independentist thought found its greatest inspiration in
Enlightenment political philosophy. In particular, liberal political
ideals based on the thought of the French *philosophes* helped
to consolidate independentist views throughout Latin America. Among the
significant Latin American inheritors of that tradition were
Simon Bolivar (1783-1830) in Venezuela and Colombia,
Miguel Hidalgo (1753-1811) and Jose Maria Morelos
(1765-1815) in Mexico, and much later, Jose Marti
(1854-1895) in Cuba.



In the early 19th century, many Latin American countries secured
independence from European colonial powers. In the wake of
independence, the newly liberated peoples faced the challenge of
forming stable, enduring nations out of the remnants of the Spanish
and Portuguese empires. The predominant political concerns of that era
included the organization and consolidation of the new nations, along
with aspirations for social stability, national integration of largely
diverse peoples. The overarching ambition in many nations was to
achieve the same economic and social progress enjoyed by other nations
in Europe and North America.



In this context, the ideology of choice was a version of positivism. The positivist
motto, "order and progress," which graces the Brazilian
flag, suggests why positivism was especially appealing in the context
of nation building. Positivism's emphasis on both empirical
science and pragmatic solutions appeared to provide a practical
foundation for attaining the diverse ends of the new nations. Indeed,
positivism became so influential and widely accepted by intellectuals
that it became the official state philosophy of several nations. It was
even used to justify dictatorial regimes, as in the case of Mexico.



Positivism of the Latin American variety was derived from a peculiar
mix of European ideas primarily originating in the thought of Auguste
Comte (1798-1857), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), and Ernst Haeckel
(1834-1919). The period of positivist hegemony, in which it was the
dominant philosophical perspective in Latin America, extended roughly
from the middle of the nineteenth century to the first decade of the
twentieth. Among the most famous positivists were Gabino Barreda
(1818-1881) and Justo Sierra (1848-1912) in Mexico, Jose
Victorino Lastarria (1817-1888) in Chile, and Domingo Faustino
Sarmiento (1811-1888) in Argentina. Andres Bello (1781-1865),
from both Venezuela and Chile, and Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884)
and Esteban Echevarria (1805-1851), from Argentina, were
transitional figures between independentist liberal thought and
positivism. Later, Jose Ingenieros (1877-1925), from Argentina,
and Enrique Jose Varona (1849-1933), from Cuba, prepared the way
for the revolt against positivism, although their thought arose in a
positivist context and maintained an alliance with positivist
ideas. 


## 2. The Contemporary Period



Contemporary Latin American philosophy begins in the twentieth
century, around 1910, coinciding with the decline of positivism. By
1930, the remaining positivists in Latin America were usually regarded
as museum pieces rather than proponents of a viable philosophy meriting
serious attention. The contemporary, post-positivist period can be
divided into three distinct sub-periods. The
first--*rebellion*--is characterized by the backlash
against positivism and the subsequent development of foundations for
future philosophical movements (ca.1910-1940). The
second--*normalcy*--is characterized by the
achievement of a degree of institutionalization and normalization in
the philosophical profession (1940-1960). The third
period--*maturity* (ca. 1960 to the present)--is
distinguished by the degree of professional and philosophical maturity
attained by Latin American philosophers.


### 2.1 Rebellion and the Generation of Founders (1910-1940)



The anti-positivist rebellion constitutes the first phase of
contemporary Latin American thought. It was brought about by a
generation of philosophers born around 1910, all of whom were trained
as positivists, before breaking with it. The principal members of this
generation--called "the generation of founders" by
Francisco Romero, and dubbed "the generation of
patriarchs" by Francisco Miro Quesada--are well
known: Alejandro Korn (1860-1936) in Argentina, Alejandro
Octavio Deustua (1849-1945) in Peru, Jose
Vasconcelos (1882-1959) and Antonio Caso (1883-1946) in
Mexico, Enrique Jose Molina (1871-1956) in Chile, Carlos
Vaz Ferreira (1872-1958) in Uruguay, and Raimundo de Farias
Brito (1862-1917) in Brazil.



The adoption of ideas from France, and later from Germany, was
instrumental in formulating the basis for rejecting positivism. It
began with the influence of Emile Boutroux (1845-1921), Henri
Bergson (1859-1941), and French vitalism and intuitionism. It
was cemented when the Spaniard Jose Ortega y Gasset visited
Latin America in 1916 and introduced the thought of Max Scheler
(1874-1928), Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), and other
German philosophers. Ortega y Gasset and the German philosophy of the
spirit had substantial influence on the generation that followed that
of the founders, called by Miro Quesada "the generation
of forgers." Samuel Ramos (1897-1959), from Mexico,
Francisco Romero (1891-1962), from Argentina, Alceu Amoroso Lima
(1893-1982), from Brazil, and Jose Carlos
Mariategui (1894-1930), from Peru, among others, followed
the founders' course, attacking positivist ideas and favoring in some
instances a rather poetic philosophical style that contrasts with the
scientistic emphasis of positivism. They completed the process
initiated by the founders and laid the foundations of future
developments.



One of the main preoccupations of the founders and the generation that
followed them was the absorption of European ideas; they wanted to be
philosophically up to date. In contrast with the objectives of the
philosophers that preceded them, which were for the most part
religious (during the colonial period), political (during the period
of independence), or economic (during the nationalist period), the
concern of these thinkers was more systematically philosophical in
motivation. This was a significant change in Latin American
philosophy, insofar as scholasticism, Enlightenment liberalism, and
positivism were typically undertaken (at least in Latin American) for
purposes frequently disconnected from a conception of philosophy in
which the discipline was pursued for its own sake. For scholastics,
the primary objective was the apologetic defense of the faith; for
liberals, the end was political emancipation; and for positivists, the
goal was national integration and economic and social progress. In all
three cases, European ideas were typically adopted with
pre-established ends in mind. As a consequence, philosophical
movements were not obviously the products of philosophical concerns as
such. 



In contrast to prior generations, the founders and those who followed
them did not tend to adopt European ideas with a view to the defense of
a body of doctrine, or in order to achieve certain practical ends of
political liberation or of national unity and economic and social
progress. Their ideas arose from philosophical dissatisfactions with
positivism. Thus, we find in the writings of Caso, Deustua, and
the other founders who rebelled against positivism, purely
philosophical criticisms of that perspective. They were concerned, for
example, with freedom and the fact that determinism, which they
considered undesirable, was a necessary corollary of
positivism. Still, their attitude toward the ideas
they adopted was seldom critical. They saw the defects of positivism,
but too often they still accepted uncritically the solutions they
borrowed from non-positivist European philosophers to fight it.



Although the founders and some of their immediate successors had
attained some emancipation in the philosophical enterprise, full
maturity remained elusive. Still, the sophistication of some
thinkers, such as Korn, was considerable and planted the critical seeds
that germinated in the following period.


### 2.2 Normalcy and the Generation of 1910 (1940-1960)



It is not until the generation born around 1910 reached maturity in
the 1940s that a self-critical spirit clearly entered Latin American
philosophy. A state of normalcy became established in most countries
of Latin America, and what might be called *Latin-Americanism*
grew significantly. The limitations on originality characteristic of
previous generations were in part the result of the lack of
self-criticism and the practical difficulties involved in pursuing a
philosophical career in Latin America. The contribution of those
generations was largely restricted to the importation of foreign
thought; originality in substantive doctrine was rarely achieved, or
even an ambition.



There were exceptions, of course. Romero, for example, in his
*Theory of Man* (1952)*,* developed an original
philosophical anthropology. However, philosophers and philosophical
practice was not "normalized," as Romero put it, until the emergence
of the subsequent generation philosophers. That group included Risieri
Frondizi (1910-1985), Eduardo Garcia Maynez
(1908-1993), Miguel Reale (1910-2006), Francisco
Miro Quesada (1918-), Leopoldo Zea (1912-2004), and
Juan Llambias de Azevedo (1907-1972).



This group was the first generation of Latin American philosophers to
benefit from formal education in philosophy. Previous philosophers had
been mostly self-taught, typically trained in another profession,
but taking up philosophy out of personal interest. The
structural changes in the academy introduced by the Founders and the
generation that followed made it possible for an entire generation to
be trained by philosophers at the university.



Another important general feature of this period of Latin American
philosophy was that the incipient Latin-Americanism of the previous
generation developed and flourished. This change became evident with
the philosophers born around 1910 and those who followed them. Several
philosophers of this generation readily traveled throughout Latin
America and establishing dialogue with other Latin Americans. This is
not to say that Latin-Americanism in philosophy was very robust. Even
today, lack of region-wide philosophical dialogue remains more common
than not, and communities of discourse tend to be more local or
national than international. Still, philosophical communication within
Latin America markedly increased during this period.



One of the factors that helped the development of philosophy was the
increasing consciousness of a distinctly Latin American philosophical
identity, of a sense that there was something different or distinctive
about Latin American philosophy. In part, this was a result of growing
consciousness of the increasing importance of Latin America in the
world and, on the philosophical side, of the introduction in Latin
America of Ortega's perspectivism. By the time of Samuel Ramos and
Leopoldo Zea, the Founders' preoccupation with the existence of an
autochthonous Latin American philosophy gave rise to a controversy
about whether and how it existed. This debate was one in which
practically all important philosophers of the period participated. In
turn, this debate provided impetus to the study and dissemination of
the philosophical work of Latin American thinkers throughout the
region.



Notable work in this vein includes Anibal Sanchez
Reulet's (1910-1997) groundbreaking work, published
in *Tierra Firme* in 1936 and entitled "Panorama de las
ideas filosoficas en Hispanoamerica." Subsequent
work by Zea on positivism in Mexico, written in the early 1940s, as
well as Ramos' historical study of Mexican philosophy took up the
thread, as did Ramon Insua Rodriguez's history of
philosophy in Hispanic America and Guillermo Francovich's account of
philosophy in Bolivia. In the eight decades since the publication of
Sanchez Reulet's essay, there has been a remarkable
proliferation of work concerned with the identity of Latin American
philosophy. In addition, anthologies, specialized works, and critical
editions of Latin American philosophical classics have been
published. The very controversy concerning the existence and
possibility of an autochthonous Latin American philosophy that drew so
much attention in the second quarter of the twentieth century (and,
for that matter, still continues), has helped to promote and spread
the knowledge of Latin American thought and the philosophical dialogue
among Latin American philosophers.[3]



A second factor that contributed to philosophical growth and
Latin-Americanism was political oppression and the periodic repression
of intellectual freedom in Latin America. This was not a phenomenon
limited to any one period of Latin American philosophy. The colonial
regime was without a doubt paradigmatic of intellectual oppression and
control, but the fact of oppression and intellectual constraints
became more profound after independence. In the nineteenth century,
positivists used philosophy as an instrument for specific political
and social agendas, and it was used as a basis for suppressing
dissent. In the twentieth century this oppressive pattern was not
limited to a specific intellectual orientation; philosophical
suppression became institutionalized in regimes of the right and the
left. The result has always been the same: intellectual abuse, the
violation of rights indispensable for the pursuit of philosophical
ideas and their investigation, the lack of freedom of expression, and
the manipulation of pedagogic institutions and scientific
investigation for political and ideological ends. Latin American
intellectuals subject to these pressures have regularly been forced to
go into exile, a state of affairs that has become almost customary and
is prevalent to this day in some countries. Frondizi's life is
paradigmatic of the situation: his many trips throughout Latin America
were the result of the periodic political upheavals and oppression in
Argentina. An indirect but unexpectedly beneficial result of this
recurring situation was that the philosophical peripatetism of Latin
American philosophers contributed to inter-American philosophical
dialogue.



Philosophy in Latin America was also transformed by the arrival of
Spanish emigres. Among the most influential were:
Joaquin Xirau (1895-1946), Eduardo Nicol (1907-1990),
Jose Ferrater Mora (1912-1991), Jose Gaos
(1900-1969), Luis Recasens Siches (1903-1977), Juan
D. Garcia Bacca (1901-1992), Jose Medina
Echevarria (1903-1977), Maria Zambrano (1904-191),
and almost fifty others (see Abellan, 1967). There were diverse
effects of the arrival of this group. First, their migrations
throughout Latin America helped break down some of the national
barriers between philosophical communities in Latin America. The
conception of *hispanidad* that they inherited from Miguel de
Unamuno and from Ortega, and the need to establish themselves in Latin
America, helped the process; they went from country to country,
spreading ideas and contributing to the increase in philosophical
dialogue. Second, many of them helped implement changes in university
curricula across Latin America, frequently establishing lasting
programs in philosophy. The effects of their work became evident when
the generation born around 1910 reached maturity. It was at that point
that Latin American philosophers began to think and act
philosophically in pan-Latin American terms, traveling, exchanging
ideas, and cooperating in projects of common interest.



The period that goes from 1940 to 1960 does not reveal drastic changes
in philosophical orientation. The generation of the Founders used
French vitalism as an instrument to reject positivism, and the
following generation, with Ortega's help, took charge of the process,
incorporating German philosophy and the new ideas introduced by
phenomenology and existentialism. At this time, Martin Heidegger
(1889-1976) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980)
constituted the dominant philosophical force in Latin
America. Simultaneously, scholasticism experienced renewed
impetus. The number of sympathizers of philosophical analysis and
Marxism continued to grow, but Thomism, phenomenology, existentialism,
and various versions of nationalist and culturalist philosophy were
the dominant approaches throughout Latin America. Those working
outside the dominant currents had little institutional power.


### 2.3 Maturity (1960-present)



By the 1960s, philosophy in Latin America had indisputably reached a
level of philosophical maturity. The work had markedly increased in
originality and depth, and some of it achieved international
visibility. This period of maturity continues to the present. To
appreciate the distinctiveness of this new situation, it helps to
recall that the period of normalcy was characterized by (1) critical
interaction with the philosophical ideas coming from outside Latin
America, (2) an increase in dialogue within Latin America, and (3) the
institutionalization of philosophy. In the period of maturity, these
features became stable and the general caliber of philosophical work
continued to improve accordingly.



If one measures philosophical activity by the number of new journals
founded, or by the number of important congresses that occur, one might
mistakenly conclude that philosophical activity actually diminished
after the 1960s. However, many of the journals founded in the preceding
twenty years continued publication, so there was actually a net
increase in fora for philosophical work. Moreover, more than a dozen
important congresses and philosophical meetings took place between 1960
and 1980. In short, the activity related to publications and
professional meetings had reached a healthy level of
stability. 



Four philosophical currents deserve special attention at this period
because of their growing influence and the new ideas and approaches
they introduced in Latin American philosophy: socialist and Marxist
thought (broadly conceived), philosophical analysis, the philosophy of
liberation, and the history of philosophy. 



Latin America has had a long and notable history of receptivity to
socialist thought. Its introduction goes back to the nineteenth
century. The impact of the socialist ideas of Claude Henri de
Saint-Simon (1790-1825) and Charles Fourier (1772-1873) are clearly
visible in the treatise *Dogma socialista* of Esteban
Echevarria (1805-1851). In the twentieth century, Emilio Frugoni
(1880-1969) in Uruguay and Mariategui in Peru, among others,
developed Marxist accounts, although frequently in heterodox terms.
For example, Mariategui allowed that there is no essential
conflict between religious thought and Marxism, departing from the
standard materialist, atheist commitments of orthodox Marxism. He also
held that the conception of economic stages in Marx, modeled on Europe,
did not apply to Peru. Although bourgeois liberal
capitalism had not materialized in Peru, he held that the only way to
move forward was to transition to socialism.



Latin American Marxism has been diverse in its philosophical
particulars, and is subject to ongoing development. Even so, many
forms of Latin American Marxism commitments to the following: (1) an
end to imperialism, neo-colonialism and class oppression through
socialist democratic change and/or revolution; (2) a form of socialist
humanism based on (a) ending the capitalist exploitation of human
being by human being, and (b) upholding a model of dignity based on
economic and social equality; (3) a conception of philosophy as
committed to understanding the world in all its dynamic and
interrelated aspects, theorizing the meanings of capitalism and
socialism, and shedding light on acting accordingly. Class
consciousness of workers, the proletariat, or the people is typically
regarded as an important engine of social change. Apart from these
shared commitments, Antonio Gramsci's (1891-1937) influential
model of "organic intellectuals"--intellectuals who
support social revolution with critical perspectives--also
resonated with a range of leftist intellectuals who lent their support
to Marxist revolutionary movements in Cuba, Nicaragua, and
elsewhere.[4]



Despite a long-standing openness to various strands of socialist
thought, it was only after 1960 that Marxism gained notable academic
standing throughout Latin America. Indeed, Harold Davis claimed,
plausibly enough, that Marxism became the most common ideological
conviction among professionals in the decades following the
1960s. Mariategui continues to loom large in characterizations
of a distinctively Latin American form of Marxism. However, other
important figures in academic Marxism emerged in the contemporary
period, including Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez
(1915-2011), of Spanish origin but working in Mexico, and the
Brazilian Caio Prado Junior (1907-1990).



The popularity of the Marxism has made possible its
widespread institutionalization and its impact on virtually
all active philosophical approaches in Latin America. To be sure, it is
not without its critics, many of whom charge that a philosophy that
aims to change the world is not philosophy at all, or that its scope is
entirely too limited for an entire discipline. Nevertheless, it is not
much of an exaggeration to say that, broadly speaking, Marxist themes
are widely present in Latin American philosophy, even if philosophers
pursuing an explicitly Marxist philosophical research program remain in
the minority.



Compared to Marxism, analytic philosophy was a late arrival to Latin
America. Owing to its technical and academic character, analytic
philosophy's initial influence was small. Its historical connection
with Logical Positivism caused many to reject it because of its
perceived commonality with nineteenth century positivism. However, in
a relatively short period of time, analytic philosophy became one of
the most forceful philosophical currents in Latin America. The
publication of the journals *Critica* in Mexico,
*Analisis* *Filosofico* in Argentina, and
*Manuscrito* in Brazil, the foundation of the Society of
Philosophical Analysis (SADAF) in Argentina, and the growth of
publications of an analytic bent in journals of neutral philosophical
orientation, testify to the fact that philosophical analysis is now
well established in Latin
 America.[5]



An important dimension of this was the international uptake of some of
this work. Some analytic philosophers from Latin America attracted the
attention of philosophers in Europe (particularly in England and
Germany), the United States, and Canada. In addition, Latin American
philosophers who emigrated or made extended visits to these countries
produced important work. Three areas of contributions stand out: the
philosophy of human rights, legal theory, and logic. Eduardo Rabossi
(1930-2005) work on human rights in Latin America attracted the
attention of major English and American philosophers. Carlos Nino's
(1943-1993) work in the philosophy of law, such as his
consensual theory of punishment, has been widely recognized as an
original contribution to philosophy and jurisprudence (see Navarro in
Nuccetelli et. al., 2010). Finally, Latin American work in logic has
been particularly fecund. Newton C. A. da Costa (b. 1929) has done
considerable work on paraconsistent logic that has been the subject of
international attention (see da Costa & Bueno 2010). Carlos Eduardo
Alchourron's (1985) contributions to the AGM model of belief
change (named after Alchourron and his collaborators, Peter
Gardenfors and David Makinson) has also been
influential. Although its underpinnings were initially developed from
Alchourron and Makinson's efforts at modeling changes in legal
codes, it is now the dominant formal framework for modeling belief
revision.



The growing influence of analytic philosophy in Latin America has not
gone without criticism. It is not uncommon to hear that analytic
philosophers lack sensitivity to the pressing problems affecting Latin
America. Although this concern is hardly unique to analytic
philosophy, it is also sometimes merited. However, it is also true
that the rigorous argumentation, analysis of language, and use of
symbolic logic often constitute obstacles for outsiders to this
methodology. Nevertheless, Latin American analytic philosophers have
often been involved in socially pertinent issues. Indeed, both
Rabossi and Nino were involved in the politics of Argentina, serving
in the government of President Raul Alfonsin. Da Costa
and Alchourron both applied their logical theories to law and a
variety of arguably "practical" problems. Moreover, a variety of Latin
American analytic philosophers have been centrally preoccupied with
ethical and political questions. In the wake of the 1994 Zapatista
rebellion, a number of prominent Mexican philosophers (including
Fernando Salmeron and Luis Villoro) became involved in public
and academic efforts at addressing the concerns of the Zapatistas.



A third contemporary approach that merits special attention is the
philosophy of liberation . This autochthonous philosophical perspective
started in the early 1970s with a group of Argentinian philosophers,
most notably Arturo Andres Roig (1922-2012), Horacio
Cerutti-Guldberg (b. 1950), and Enrique Dussel (b. 1934), with Dussel
being primarily responsible for spreading the philosophy of liberation
outside of Latin America. This philosophy shares some of its
intellectual touchstones with the theology of liberation--in
particular, indebtedness to dependency theory, as well as Catholic and
Marxist ideas. Some of the most significant features of the various
strands of the movement include the aspiration for Latin American
intellectual independence, an emphasis on economic autonomy as opposed
to economic dependence, an emphasis on political regimes that are
responsive to the interest of the poor and indigenous populations, and
in general, a concern to put Third World realities at the center of
philosophical concerns.



The international visibility of the philosophy of liberation was in
part an unanticipated consequence of military repression in 1976-83 in
Argentina. The founding figures of the philosophy of liberation went
into exile in various countries in Latin America. Although this early
diaspora created permanent splits in the
movement--Cerutti-Guldberg urges that one speak of
"philosophies of liberation"--its ideas spread
throughout the region.



The goal of intellectual independence, important to many varieties of
the philosophy of liberation, was not new with the philosophy of
liberation. Strands of it can be found in the work of Ramos and others
in the early parts of the 20th century. Other forerunners
include the culturalist and historicist views of Leopoldo Zea, which
emphasize the distinctiveness of Latin America and its history.
Moreover, Augusto Salazar Bondy's (1925-1974) concern for
intellectual authenticity, informed by dependency theory, paved the way
for important developments in the philosophy of liberation. However,
the distinctive feature of the philosophy of liberation is the degree
to which it has developed the theme of liberation into a
far-reaching and systematic critique of European (and later, United
States) dominance in intellectual, economic, and social worlds. In
particular, philosophers of liberation charge that the intellectual and
economic frameworks of Europe and the United States are distinguished
(currently and historically) by a disregard for or hostility to the
concerns of those outside the systems of power central to Europe and
the United States.



The philosophy of liberation has been subject to varied criticisms.
There is a rich tradition of disagreements internal to the movement
(Cerutti-Guldberg 1983), and even those sympathetic with aspects of it
have charged that its proponents have failed to adequately accommodate
concerns about gender and sexuality (Schutte 1993), that it is
insufficiently attentive to the way identity categories work (Alcoff
2000), and that despite its condemnation of Eurocentrism, it too is
Eurocentric (Vargas 2005).



Although analytic philosophers (whether in Latin America or abroad)
have generally ignored the philosophy of liberation (or else dismissed
it as unrigorous or unphilosophical), this philosophical perspective
has arguably had more impact outside of Latin America than any other
Latin American philosophical development. In particular, Dussel has
been in dialogue with a variety of philosophers in Europe (including
Apel, Ricoeur, and Habermas), and with Continental-influenced
philosophers in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Rorty, Taylor,
Alcoff, and
 Mendieta).[6]



The fourth philosophical current in the Latin American contemporary
scene worth noting is not properly an orientation but a field of study:
the history of philosophy. Philosophical productivity in this area is
worthy of note because its impact has been considerably among
philosophers of diverse persuasions. Before 1960, both the quantity and
the quality of studies on the history of philosophy published in Latin
America were often deplorable. Most works amounted to panegyrics, or
mere paraphrases of texts not available in Spanish translation.
Moreover, complete periods of the history of philosophy remained
outside the scope of those studies. Since 1960, the situation has
changed substantially. There are now works that deal with practically
every period of the history of Western philosophy, and even Eastern
philosophy. Moreover, a good proportion of those studies are serious,
revealing knowledge of the pertinent languages and primary sources and
adding a critical element without which the history of philosophy
becomes merely a gloss.



A development that should be noted in this regard is the appearance of
journals specializing in the history and thought of some historical
periods. For example, the last decade saw the appearance of journals
devoted to the study of the Middle Ages. Although not all these
journals are strictly speaking philosophical, their publication is
important, because it indicates the existence of the technical
background doubtlessly necessary for serious historical research. It
also reveals the dedication of Latin American intellectual groups to
what might be called "pure research"--the search for
knowledge for its own sake without consideration of its immediate
practical applications.



Collectively, these facts demonstrate a thematic dexterity in handling
philosophical ideas and arguments, a fact that led Miro Quesada
to characterize the generations of Latin American philosophers in the
period of maturity as 'technical'. Philosophy has become a
specialized and professional discipline in Latin America. Indeed, since
1960, Latin American philosophy has achieved a degree of maturity that
compares well with the state of the profession in Europe and the United
States.



A final recent development in the United States merits mention in
connection with Latin American philosophy. There are now several
generations of distinguished philosophers of Hispanic or Latin
American descent have worked in the United States and Canada,
contributing to traditional philosophical fields such as metaphysics,
epistemology, and the history of philosophy. Among these are George
Santayana (1863-1952), Hector-Neri Cataneda
(1924-1991), Mario Bunge (b. 1919), Ernesto Sosa (b. 1940),
Jorge J. E. Gracia (b. 1942), and Linda M. Alcoff, among others.



In the last two or three decades a new sense of Latino/a
identity in philosophy has grown among a group of philosophers who have
undertaken work in areas related to Hispanic/Latino issues and have
identified themselves as Hispanics or Latinos/as. Among senior
philosophers who have been more clearly identified with this movement
are two from the mentioned group (Alcoff and Gracia), as well as
others, such as J. Angelo Corlett, Susana Nuccetelli, Eduardo Mendieta,
and Ofelia Schutte. These philosophers have contributed in particular
to the discourse on issues of race, ethnicity, nationality, and
feminism, particularly through an analysis of ethnic, racial, and
gender identity. One striking feature of much of this work is the
remarkable degree to which it is explicitly informed by, or engaged
with, Latin American philosophy and its history.


## 3. Problems and Topics



The third section of this entry focuses on topics that have been of
particular concern to Latin American and Latino/a philosophers and
that have interest today. These topics offer a general picture of the
way these philosophers have approached philosophical problems.
Nevertheless, the issues canvassed here are, necessarily, an
inadequate representation of the diverse issues and approaches taken
up in Latin American 
philosophy.[7]


### 3.1 The Rights of Amerindians



Perhaps the oldest distinctive philosophical problem of
post-Columbian Latin American philosophy concerns the rights of
indigenous populations in the Americas, and the duties of those
governments that claimed jurisdiction over them. In the mid-sixteenth
century, there were serious reservations on the part of a number of
philosophers, theologians, and legal theorists concerning the validity
of the Spanish wars of conquest. Francisco Vitoria's developments
of just war theory were among the earliest and most lasting
philosophical contributions to the topic. One of the most significant
issues for sixteenth century thinkers in Spain was whether the
indigenous populations were natural slaves or not. Whether the Spanish
Crown could "pacify" the indigenous populations through
violence--or whether more peaceful means of persuasion and
political control were necessary--was perceived to turn on whether
the indigenous populations were natural slaves. Relatedly, the outcome
of this dispute had implications for the duties of the Spanish Crown to
the indigenous population, and correspondingly, the manner in which the
indigenous populations ought to be treated (Cantens 2010).



The issue reached its apex in a debate between Juan Gines
Sepulveda, who defended the Spanish Crown's right to forcibly
impose its legal and religious practices on the indigenous populations
of the Americas, and Bartolome de Las Casas, a Dominican friar
and the first Bishop of Chiapas. Las Casas argued for a nuanced
reading of the idea of natural slavery, while insisting on the full
rationality of the indigenous populations, the need for peaceful
evangelization of those populations, and for strict limits on the
means used on behalf of Spanish interest in the Americas. The results
of the debate were inclusive--Sepulveda's work was
suppressed for a time, but Las Casas' position on the limits of
Spanish use of force never became officially adopted by the Spanish
Crown. Nevertheless, Las Casas continued to play a prominent role in
the Spanish Imperial court, tirelessly arguing on behalf of the native
populations. 



Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, perhaps the dominant
view of Latin American philosophers (a predominantly upper class group,
generally of European ancestry) tended to regard indigenous populations
as a "problem" that needed to be overcome. By the late
nineteenth century, amidst the considerable influence of Huxley and
Social Darwinism, several nations had policies of encouraging
assimilation and "civilizing" of the indigenous
populations, oftentimes in conjunction with encouraging more
immigration from Europe. For philosophers and policy-makers alike,
concern for preserving indigenous cultural practices, language, and
political autonomy was typically negligible.



In the twentieth century, the concerns and nature of indigenous
populations received more varied evaluations from philosophers. For
example, Mariategui (1971) argued that indigenous Peruvians were
collectivists, "natural" communists whose economic
difficulties were due in large part to the ownership, distribution and
use of lands in Peru. In the work of Jose Vasconcelos
(Vasconcelos/Gamio, 1926; Vasconcelos, 1997), indigenous populations in
the Americas were something to be assimilated along the way towards the
formation of a "cosmic" race of mixed-people. That future
population, a mixed-race people, would adapt the best cultural
practices from around the world. In the work of Enrique Dussel (1995),
the encounter with the Amerindian populations are philosophically
important for a variety of reasons, including the formation of Europe
as an important conceptual category, the creation of modernity, and
what the interactions between conquerors and conquered reveal about the
difficulty of understanding the interests and concerns of other
peoples.



In the decade leading up to 1992 (the quincentenary of the Conquest)
intellectual discussion of indigenous peoples and their interests grew
considerably. By the 1990s, there was a flourishing of philosophical
work, especially but not exclusively in Mexico, on issues of ethnic
identity and political representation of indigenous populations. Luis
Villoro, Fernando Salmeron, and Leon Olive were
among the prominent contributors to those discussions.



In the first part of the twenty first century, philosophical work on
aspects of a distinctly Latin American problematic concerning race and
politics
 proliferated.[8]
For more
on some of these matters, see the section below on the *Identity of
the People.*


### 3.2 The Identity of the People



One of the most enduring challenges that the peoples of Latin
America have encountered in their history concerns the definition of
their identity as a people. When Iberians arrived at the Americas,
Amerindians were scattered throughout an enormous territory, divided by
substantially different cultures, including numerous languages.
Iberians imposed a colonial unity on them, but the question of their
identity became critical, particularly after Africans were brought in
to make up a labor deficit in the Caribbean and the East coast of South
America. How do all these peoples fit together as a people or a nation,
and how are they to be conceived? The question of identity first
surfaced in the discussions about the rights of Amerindians, and later
of African slaves, but extended to Iberian born versus American born
Europeans. 



The issue became critical during the period of independence, when those
who fought against the Spanish domination in particular faced the task
of forming nations of a population that was diverse in race, culture,
and origin. Liberators such as Bolivar and Marti
understood well the challenge and rejected race in particular as a
divide among the different populations from which they sought to forge
unified nations (see Aguilar Rivera and Schutte in Gracia, 2011). They
proposed notions of national unity based on a mixed population under
ideals of political self-determination.



This emphasis changed after independence, in response to the pressing
needs for national development and progress. Positivist philosophers,
such as Sarmiento, frequently advocated national policies that favored
European immigration as a way of undermining the racial and ethnic
differences that divided the population (see Burke and Humphrey in
Gracia, 2011). These policies were often based on a negative view of
both Amerindians and Africans. Moreover, these policies failed to
achieve the goals their proponents sought. The failure of positivist
ideas to help define the identity of the populations of the various
nations gave rise to a reaction, most evident in the Mexican
Revolution, to turn back to the Amerindian past as a way to find a
unity that would make nations of the diverse population. Notions of
both national and Latin American unity were proposed on various grounds
at this time. For some, as is the case with Vasconcelos, the unity is
racial, a result of the mixing of the various races that constitute the
Latin American populations (see von Vacano in Gracia, 2011). For
others--such as Zea--the cultural unity of these populations
provided the basis of national or Latin American identity (see Oliver
in Gracia, 2011).



The efforts to find an effective way to define the identity of Latin
Americans has continued unabated in Latin America, and has found
fertile ground in the work of Latino/a philosophers working in the
United States. Efforts to define the racial, ethnic and national
boundaries of the identity of Latin Americans and of Latinos/as in the
United States have been pursued by such authors as Alcoff, Corlett, and
Gracia (see Millan and Velasquez in Gracia, 2011).


### 3.3 Philosophical Anthropology


A corner stone of Latin American positivism was a scientific
conception of human beings that was cashed out in psychological terms
in order to solve the mind-body problem. Antipositivists attacked this
conception of personhood, and set out to develop a philosophical
anthropology that would provide an appealing alternative to the
positivist conception of persons. Practically every established
philosopher engaged in this project. Three major approaches emerged: a
vitalistic anthropology, an anthropology of the spirit, and various
existentialist/Marxist alternatives.


The group of philosophers who adopted some form of vitalism were
strongly influenced by Bergson. On early versions of this approach, a
positivist anthropology was rejected on grounds that it has no place
for freedom. Among the most important early proponents of this view
were Vaz Ferreira (Uruguay), Alejandro Deustua (Peru), Antonio
Caso (Mexico), Enrique Molina (Chile) and Alejandro Korn
(Argentina). In the work of both Caso and Vaconcelos, the distinctive
character of human beings is consciousness of a sort that is
purportedly at odds with deterministic or mechanistic views of the
world.


The work of these authors and the visit of the popular Spanish
philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset, opened Latin American
philosophical anthropology to the influence of a new wave of European
philosophers. In particular, Husserl, Dilthey, Scheler, and Hartman
gave rise to a different approach within philosophical anthropology:
the anthropology of the spirit. Among the most important proponents of
this view were Samuel Ramos (Mexico), Francisco Romero Argentina),
Risieri Frondizi (Argentina), Francisco Miro Quesada (Peru),
and Leopoldo Zea (Mexico). For Ramos, feeling, not reason, is the
central feature of humanity. For Romero, the characteristic that
identifies humans is duality; for Miro Quesada, the fundamental
question is metaphysical, namely, "What is human?" Doubts
about the possibility of finding an adequate theory tended to turn the
challenge into an epistemic rather than metaphysical matter.


In the 1950s and early 1960s, Existentialism gained a foothold
among philosophers in Latin American. Among the most important Latin
American existentialists/Marxists are Carlos Astrada (Argentina) and
Vicente Ferreira da Silva (Brazil), who were particularly influenced
by Heidegger. Both were concerned with whether there is such a thing
as a human essence. Astrada argues that there is not: Humans do not
have a determinate essence, and that constitutes their fundamental
problem. In Mexico, a variety of prominent philosophers--members of
the Hyperion Group--briefly took up existentialist themes, abandoning
them with a few short years (Sanchez 2016).


### 3.4 Latin America's Philosophical Identity



The notion of Latin American philosophy has been a subject of heated
controversy for most of the twentieth century. The controversy has
several foci. Five of the most hotly debated ones are existence,
identity, characteristics, originality, and authenticity. Is there such
a thing as Latin American philosophy? In what does its identity
consist? Does it have any distinguishing marks? Is it original? And is
it authentic?



The disagreements in the answers given to these questions are deep.
There are at least four ways of looking at them depending on the
approach used: universalist, culturalist, critical, and ethnic. The
universalist views philosophy as a universal discipline akin to
science. Consequently, the fundamental issue for universalists turns on
whether Latin Americans have been able to produce the kind of universal
discipline that one expects when one has science as a model. Its
problems are common to all humans, its method is also common, and its
conclusions are supposed to be true, regardless of particular
circumstances. Most universalists, such as Frondizi, see Latin
American philosophy as largely a failure in this respect.



The culturalist thinks that truth is always perspectival, dependent on
a point of view. The method to acquire truth is always dependent
on a cultural context. Philosophy is a historical, non-scientific
enterprise concerned with the elaboration of a general point of view
from a certain personal or cultural perspective. Accordingly, the
culturalist can allow for the existence of Latin American philosophy
insofar as Latin Americans have engaged in developing views from their
perspective as individuals or as Latin Americans, and using whatever
means they have found appropriate to do so. Whether they are original
or authentic, or have produced a kind of scientific philosophy, are
irrelevant matters. This is Leopoldo Zea's position (see Zea in
Gracia 1988-89).



The critical approach considers philosophy a result of social
conditions, and closely related to those conditions. Some conditions
are conducive to the production of philosophy, or what is sometimes
called authentic philosophy, whereas others are not. Unfortunately,
proponents of this position (e.g., Salazar Bondy, 1969) have typically
seen Latin American philosophy as a failure in this respect because of
the conditions operative in the region. According to them, Latin
American philosophy is, and will continue to be, inauthentic and
therefore not true philosophy, as long as Latin American philosophers
continue to emulate the views of philosophers from the developed
world. 



The ethnic approach argues that Latin American philosophy needs to be
understood as the philosophy produced by the Latin American people. The
notion of Latin Americans as a people is the key to understanding both
how Latin American philosophy has unity in diversity. It is one because
an ethnic group has produced it, but it differs from place to place and
across time because different historical circumstances prompt the
people that produce it to address different problems and to adopt
different perspectives and methods. This approach seeks to understand
how Latin American philosophy can be universal, particular, and
authentic, (see Gracia, 2008, ch 7).



Questions concerning the notion of Latin American philosophy were first
raised in Latin America in the nineteenth century. However, it was not
until the end of the first half of the twentieth century that they were
seriously explored, in particular, by Zea and Frondizi. Since then,
this topic has been a constant source of discussion and controversy.
Indeed, it is perhaps the most discussed subject matter within Latin
American philosophy.


### 3.4 Feminist Philosophy



Since at least the 19th century, feminist academic work in Latin
America has had a complicated and generally ambivalent relationship
with academic and philosophical work more generally (Fornet-Bentacourt,
2009). For example, after Independence, women were granted greater
access to education but recognizably feminist concerns tended to be
mostly peripheral to academic and philosophical discussion. This
history has led some to argue that feminist philosophy should be
centered not in philosophy but in a diverse collection of academic
fields and (often activist) social practices. For example, Ofelia
Schutte (2011) has maintained that feminist philosophy requires a home
in a broader Latin American feminist *theory* and not in the
discipline of philosophy in Latin America because "feminism is
too new there to be able to effectively transform centuries of
masculine intellectual dominance in philosophy" (p. 784).



Despite feminist philosophy's ongoing ambivalent relationship
with academic philosophy in Latin America, there has nevertheless been
a recurring strand of academic philosophical work in an identifiable
feminist vein since the end of the 19th century (Oliver 2007, p. 32).
For example, Uruguayan philosopher Carlos Vaz Ferreria (1871-1958) gave
a series of lectures in 1917 on feminism, which were later published in
1935 under the title *Sobre* *feminismo* [*On
Feminism*]. Mexican philosopher Graciela Hierro (1928-2003)
published extensively on feminist ethics and the role of feminism in
public and academic spaces. Moreover, starting in the 1980s there has
been considerable growth in the field, with important work by such
figures Maria Pia Lara, Maria Luisa
Femenias, and Ofelia Schutte. A good deal of recent feminist
philosophy has been transnational in its sources, explicitly drawing on
academic philosophy in the Americas and Continental Europe, but also
drawing from the history of feminist activism in Latin America, social
science research, and personal narratives.



The diversity of interests and positions of Latin American feminists
makes it difficult to provide a simple but accurate characterization of
the field. It is sometimes held that, in comparison to U.S. forms of
feminist thought, Latin American feminism has had a somewhat greater
interest in the critical analysis of families, class, and ethnicity
(Schutte and Femenias 2010, p. 407-9). Consistent with the wider
Latin American philosophical tradition's impulse to self-critical
reflexiveness about its tradition, it is perhaps fair to say that Latin
American feminist philosophy has been particularly reflexive or
self-critical about what it means to pursue feminist philosophy in
Latin America. For example, feminist philosophers have emphasized the
need to recognize that academic philosophers, wherever they live, enjoy
a cultural privilege that may put them at some distance from the living
conditions of most women in Latin America (Femenias and Oliver,
2007, p. xi). Given such a model of "epistemic privilege"
where, as a matter of actual social practices, the experiences and
categories of some tend to be valued over others, a number of feminist
philosophers have thought feminist philosophers have a special reason
to consider the ways in which feminist goals are conceptualized and
represented in popular and academic discourse (Schutte 2011, p.
785).



Although the future of feminist philosophy in Latin America remains
unclear, it seems rather likely that a range of its prominent
concerns--including activist philosophy, concerns for epistemic
and cultural privilege, and reliance on interdisciplinary interpretive
frameworks will survive in the interests of a range of academic
contexts.