## 1. The *Cratylus* and Its *Personae*--a First Overview



Who are the protagonists of the *Cratylus*? All of them are
historical figures--citizens of fifth and fourth century Athens,
to be precise. Hermogenes was a (possibly illegitimate) offspring of a
very wealthy and powerful Athenian dynasty (on which see Nails 2002:
68-74), but did apparently not inherit anything from his family
(391c). Always in financial troubles (384c), he was a committed member
of the circle around Socrates; as the *Phaedo* (59b) indicates,
he was even present at Socrates' death. Cratylus was a
philosopher who, according to Aristotle's report, taught the
young Plato (*Metaphysics* 987a29-b7). He is known as a
radical advocate of the Heraclitean claim that everything is in flux;
apparently, he even stopped speaking at some point because he took
speaking to be senseless in a world of flux (*Metaphysics*
1010a7-15). In the *Cratylus*, he appears to be at an
early stage of his philosophical career, just beginning to appropriate
Heraclitean positions (440d-e; cf. Kirk 1951: 236). About
Socrates, the third protagonist, there is so much to say that
interested readers should consult the entry on
 Socrates.
 One well-known fact appears to be particularly relevant in the
present context, however: Socrates was the other teacher of the young
Plato--which means that the *Cratylus* is an encounter
between the two philosophers who influenced Plato most directly.



The *Cratylus* begins when Socrates joins the on-going debate
between Cratylus and Hermogenes as an arbiter. He first invites
Hermogenes to state his conventionalist view of the correctness of
names (383a-386e)--and refutes him by presenting an
argument for the conclusion that names are indeed subject to a
standard of natural correctness (386e-390e). Asked to expand on
this standard (391a), Socrates conjectures that a correct name needs
to be a portmanteau: Like the name "shepherd" (from
"sheep" and "herder"), it needs to be composed
of other names in a way that ensures that it encapsulates a
description of what its referents are (390e-394e). He
illustrates this conjecture by uncovering the descriptive content of
many Greek names in a famous--and famously
extensive--etymological survey (394e-421c). The survey ends
abruptly when Socrates realizes that he cannot account for the
correctness of all names in this way; there must, after all, be some
names that are not composed of other names. Socrates' hypothesis
is that these names are correct because they are imitations of what
their referents are (421c-427d). He thus arrives at a two-tiered
naturalist theory of the correctness of names. Cratylus, who takes
over from Hermogenes as Socrates' interlocutor, endorses this
theory enthusiastically. But in a surprising twist, Socrates turns
against his own brainchild and compels Cratylus to admit that
convention is a factor that contributes to the correctness of names
(427d-435d). He never spells out, however, what exactly the
contribution of convention is. He rather goes on to refute
Cratylus' further claim that unearthing the descriptive content
of names yields unshakable evidence for the belief that reality is in
a state of flux (435d-439c)--and ends his investigation by
sketching four arguments for the existence of unchangeable forms
(439c-440e).


## 2. Exegetical Divides



As should be clear from the above summary, the *Cratylus* is a
long and intricate work, and it raises many pressing questions. But
there seems to be one question that must play a role in any attempt to
arrive at an overall interpretation of this dialogue:



> 
> 
> Which view of the correctness of names does the *Cratylus*
> support?
> 
> 
> 



Given the obvious importance of this question, it is reasonable to
provide a quick overview of the possible answers before taking a
closer look at the *Cratylus*. There are three such answers,
corresponding to three possible readings of the *Cratylus*:


* **Reading A**: Some commentators
believe that the *Cratylus* supports Hermogenes'
conventionalism. In their view, Plato's readers are not supposed
to accept Socrates' refutation of conventionalism and the
naturalist theory he elaborates at 390e-427d. Instead, they are
to infer from Socrates' criticism of this naturalist theory at
430a-435b that Hermogenes was right all along with his denial of
a natural correctness of names. (See Lanzalaco 1955; Guzzo 1956;
Robinson 1956; Bestor 1980; Rehn 1982; Schofield 1982; and Ademollo
2009 and 2011.)
* **Reading B**: Other commentators take
the arguments of 430a-435b to establish a very different result:
Conventions may ensure that (some) names fulfil a certain minimal
standard of correctness; but nevertheless, the extent to which names
are correct depends on how well they describe or imitate what their
referents are. It is thus the naturalist theory of the correctness of
names elaborated at 390e-427d that is borne out by the
*Cratylus*, albeit in a refined version which ascribes a
certain limited role to convention. (See Grote 1865: ch. XXIX; Benfey
1866: Weingartner 1970; Anagnostopoulos 1973; Fine 1977; Palmer 1989;
Barney 2001; and Sedley 2003.)
* **Reading C**: Yet other commentators
urge a sharp distinction between the claim that there is a natural
correctness of names and the claim that correct names need to describe
or imitate what their referents are. They argue that the
*Cratylus* supports the former and undermines the latter claim.
(See Kretzmann 1971; Kahn 1973; Gold 1978; Ketchum 1979; Heitsch 1984;
and Meissner forthcoming a.)



It would be an exaggeration to say that these are the only available
interpretations of the *Cratylus*. There are, for example,
authors who claim that Plato's main goal in the
*Cratylus* is to debunk the idea that etymological analyses can
lead to philosophical knowledge (Baxter 1992 and Keller 2000), or that
he wishes to make an ontological point about flux and stability
(Gaiser 1974). But the most important dividing lines among
interpreters of the *Cratylus* have certainly been exhibited by
distinguishing between
 **Reading A**,
 **Reading B**, and
 **Reading C**;
 and it will become evident in due course that many scholarly disputes
about individual passages and arguments can be traced back to the
differences between these readings.


## 3. Hermogenes' Conventionalism (383a-386e)



When Socrates agrees to join the debate between Hermogenes and
Cratylus, Hermogenes immediately bursts out with his own view of the
correctness of names (384c-e). Frustrated by the on-going
quarrel with a recalcitrant Cratylus, he is probably hoping for some
sort of support, or at least for clarity. However, Socrates reacts by
asking questions and presenting arguments that do not make any
immediately recognizable contribution to the clarification of the
issue at hand (384e-386e). The present section will ascertain
what Hermogenes wishes to claim and discuss the perplexing way in
which Socrates responds to Hermogenes' contentions.


### 3.1 What Hermogenes Does (Not) Say



Hermogenes' main claim is--as has already been
indicated--that it is completely dependent on conventions and
decisions whether any given name is a correct name for any object or
kind of object. Today, a convention ensures that "Boris
Johnson" is a correct name for a former prime minister of the
United Kingdom; but if Hermogenes is right, this convention might be
changed tomorrow, and the very same name might then be a correct name
for the cat that currently lives in 10 Downing Street. One can thus
never go wrong in imposing a name on a given (kind of)
object--such an act will automatically turn the name into a
correct name for this (kind of) object.



As it stands, this claim seems plausible. Note, however, that it needs
to be distinguished very carefully from the infinitely less plausible
claim that one cannot go wrong in using a name that has already been
imposed on some (kind of) object. Scholars used to agree that
Hermogenes fails to make this vital distinction: that he does not keep
apart name imposition and name use and thus ends up denying the
possibility of misapplying a name and, ultimately, the possibility of
false speaking (see, e.g., Gold 1978: 242f.; Williams 1982: 90; and
Mackenzie 1986: 126). But as more recent work (especially Barney 1997)
has demonstrated, this diagnosis is not borne out by the evidence. For
Hermogenes consistently uses the term *tithenai* to refer to
acts of name imposition and the term *kalein* to refer to acts
of name use. Given this terminological circumspection, it would be
uncharitable to charge him with a crude conceptual confusion.
(However, see Healow 2020 for a defense of the claim that Hermogenes
is less clear about the distinction between name imposition and name
use at 384c-e than at 385d-e.)



But who exactly has the authority to impose names on
things--linguistic communities or even individual speakers?
Pressed on this point, Hermogenes opts for the latter option
(385a-b). If you decide to impose the name "Boris
Johnson" on the cat that lives in 10 Downing Street while all
other speakers continue to use this name for the former prime
minister, "Boris Johnson" will be a private correct name
for the cat and a public correct name for its former human
housemate--or so Hermogenes says. This concession does not imply,
as scholars used to think, that a speaker with solipsistic
inclinations can apply names in a way that is in principle immune to
criticism and correction (see, e.g., Robinson 1956: 338; Kahn 1973:
158f.; and Baxter 1992: 18). For Hermogenes never considers naming
conventions that are private in the sense that no other speakers could
possibly become party to them; he talks about naming conventions that
are *accidentally* private, not about naming conventions that
are *essentially* private. And it is hard to see how a
speaker's adherence to naming conventions that are only
accidentally private would allow her to apply names in a way that is
in principle immune to criticism and correction (Barney 1997:
152-156).



While older discussions of the passage 383a-386e thus tended to
paint Hermogenes as a confused or radical "anything goes"
conventionalist, there are good and widely accepted reasons for
reversing this traditional verdict. All Hermogenes wishes to claim is,
apparently, that speakers are at least in principle completely free to
impose any name they like on any given (kind of) object. And
*this* view seems to be very much in tune with common
sense.


### 3.2 True and False Names



According to all extant manuscripts of the *Cratylus*, Socrates
reacts to Hermogenes' concession that private naming conventions
are possible by presenting an argument for the conclusion that
"it is possible to say a true and a false name"
 (385b-d).[1]
 But as this conclusion is so strange, and as there is also a
philological problem with the transition from 385d1 to 385d2-3
(Schofield 1972: 248), it is contested whether Socrates'
argument really belongs where the manuscripts have it. While many
commentators claim that it should either be transposed between 387c5
and c6 (Schofield 1972: 246-251 and Barney 2001: 28) or excised
from the text altogether (Sedley 2003: 10-13), some are strictly
opposed to such radical measures (Baxter 1992: 32-17 and
Ademollo 2011: 68-70).



As it is not possible to summarize the immensely complicated debate
about the textual status of the contested passage in the confines of
this entry, the best course is to switch to the conditional mood and
provide a brief discussion of the questions that would be most
pressing if Socrates' argument did belong where the manuscripts
have it:


1. What is the purport of the conclusion that "it is
possible to say a true and a false name"?
2. Why does Socrates establish this conclusion here?



Regarding
 (i),
 it is tempting to assume that Socrates' conclusion rests on the
false idea that names have the same properties--truth and
falsehood, in particular--as the sentences of which they are
parts (Robinson 1956: 328). But a more charitable reading is
available: Socrates might not be saying that names can be true and
false in the same absolute sense as sentences, but that they can be
true or false *of objects* (Fine 1977: 295f.; cf. Lorenz &
Mittelstrass 1967 and Luce 1969). If that were the case, he would
be making a respectable and important point about the logical
properties of names, comparable to a point made by Quine (Quine 1959:
65).



Regarding
 (ii),
 one might wonder whether Socrates' argument is supposed to
undermine Hermogenes' position (see, e.g., Kretzmann 1971: 127;
Gaiser 1974: 20; and Bagwell 2011: 20). But as Hermogenes does not
make any claims that would compel him to deny that "it is
possible to say a true and a false name", this is not a
plausible conjecture. So maybe Socrates is pursuing a more
constructive purpose here. He might be interested, for example, in
ascertaining Hermogenes' attitude towards the distinction
between truth and falsehood--not least because Hermogenes'
claim that one cannot go wrong in imposing names might wrongly be
taken to imply that false speaking is impossible (Richardson 1976:
136f.; Ademollo 2011: 65-68).


### 3.3 Conventionalism and Relativism



Once Socrates' has drawn the conclusion that "it is
possible to say a true and a false name", Hermogenes reaffirms
his conventionalist position loudly and clearly (385d-e).
Socrates proceeds to inquire whether Hermogenes accepts
Protagoras' claim that "however the objects appear to me
to be, such they are for me" (385e-386a). This is a
radical claim, entailing that objects have their properties in a
subject-dependent manner: that it only makes sense to ask whether it
is the case *for some subject *S** that an object
*O* has property *P*, but not whether it is objectively
the case that *O* has *P*. Hermogenes admits that he
found this relativist outlook tempting at some point, but is
nevertheless unwilling to adopt it (386a). Socrates then presents an
argument against relativism: Since there are both virtuous and wicked
persons, and since virtuous persons are wise and wicked persons
unwise, Protagoras cannot be right in saying that no one is ever wrong
about anything (386a-e). A very similar argument is found to be
wanting in the *Theaetetus* (166d-167d). But here in the
*Cratylus*, Socrates is happy to conclude from his reflections
that "objects have some stable being of their own" (386e).
He thus asserts that objects have their properties in a
subject-independent manner: that it makes sense to ask whether a
subject *S* is objectively right or objectively wrong in
believing that an object *O* has property *P*.



It is not clear why Socrates discusses Protagorean relativism with
Hermogenes. Commentators used to think that he does this because
Hermogenes defends an "anything goes" conventionalism that
has relativist implications (see, e.g., Mackenzie 1986: 129; Palmer
1988: 44-50; and Silverman 1992: 31-34); but as has been
noted, Hermogenes' position is in fact a very sensible one. If
there really is a connection between Hermogenes' conventionalism
and Protagorean relativism, it must thus be of a more indirect nature
(Barney 1997: 156-162; Meissner 2021). It has also been
argued, however, that Plato has Socrates discuss relativism with
Hermogenes to prevent misunderstandings and show that conventionalism
about names has nothing to do with relativism (Ademollo 2011:
80f.).


## 4. The Tool Analogy (386e-390e)



Socrates' initial reaction to Hermogenes' conventionalist
position is puzzling. But his philosophical agenda becomes more
transparent when, at 386e-390e, he uses the result that
Protagorean relativism is false to show against Hermogenes that there
is a natural correctness of names. The argument he presents for this
highly significant interim conclusion is analogical in nature: It
compares names to tools such as knives or drills to establish that
they are subject to a natural standard and need to be introduced by an
expert. This section takes a closer look at this major turning point
of Socrates' investigation.


### 4.1 The Name as a Tool for Naming



To set up the analogy between names and tools, Socrates considers
actions. Given that objects have a stable being or a stable nature of
their own, actions too must have a stable nature (386e). This seems to
mean that a particular act needs to meet a certain objective standard
to count as a genuine instance of a given action
 type.[2]
 As Socrates points out, one will meet this standard if and only if
one handles a naturally suitable tool in a naturally fitting way
(387a-b). This entails, crucially, that a tool for a given
action needs to fulfil an objective or natural standard: It needs to
be such as to enable a competent person to perform this action.



What do these plausible reflections about tools have to do with
*names*? To make the connection, Socrates argues that naming
*qua* part of speaking is an action with a stable nature
(387b-d). He combines this claim with his observation that
actions with a stable nature need to be performed by means of a
naturally suitable tool--and infers that naming needs to be
performed by means of such a tool. This tool
is--unsurprisingly--the name (387d-388a). It follows
that names are subject to a natural standard in the same (or at least
a similar) sense as drills or shuttles.



As it stands, this analogical argument is frustratingly abstract. Its
purport becomes clearer when Socrates provides two closely related
accounts of naming a little later. He says, first, that "we
teach something to each other and separate the objects as they
stand" (388b) when we name; and he says, second, that we use
names for "teaching and for separating being"
(388b-c). What is the purport of these two accounts of naming?
Consider the first one first. It is widely and plausibly assumed that
Socrates explicates the sense in which "we teach something to
each other" in naming when he says that we "separate the
objects as they stand", and so it is best to focus on this
phrase. Many authors read it as a description of the act of using a
name to mark off a species or a kind. Some believe that this act
occurs only in the context of Platonic division and must be
distinguished from more mundane forms of naming (see, e.g., Sedley
2003: 60f. and Ademollo 2011: 112f.); others point out that even in
the bread-and-butter sentences "I love dogs" or "Her
favorite pastime is reading", the names "dog" and
"reading" seem to pick out a kind of animal and a kind of
activity (Meissner 2019: 127-132). Be that as it
may--it seems reasonable to assume that Socrates defines naming
as the act of picking out objects (in the broadest sense of the term)
*as a kind or a species*. This construal of Socrates'
first account of naming makes his second account transparent as well.
Readers of the Platonic dialogues are, after all, well acquainted with
the idea that if a name is used to designate a class of objects that
have something in common, it can also be said to refer to what its
referents have in common--the way of being or the *ousia*
they share (see, e.g., *Laches* 190e-192a or
*Meno* 71e-72c). It thus makes sense to move from the
claim that we "separate the objects as they stand" to the
contention that we use names "for separating being" or a
way of being.



When Socrates ascribes a stable nature to naming, he is thus relying
on the assumption that one performs an act of naming if and only if
one picks out a kind or, equivalently, the way of being that is shared
by the members of this kind. Given this result, the application of his
reflections on tools like drills or shuttles to names at
387b-388c is a little easier to follow. His central point is
presumably that names are subject to a natural standard insofar as
they need to be suitable instruments for picking out a kind. The
second stage of his analogical argument will elaborate
this--still somewhat vague and elusive--point.


### 4.2 Creating (and Evaluating) Names



Socrates proceeds to argue that names are like drills or shuttles not
only insofar as they are subject to an objective or natural standard:
Precisely because they are subject to such a standard, they are also
similar to ordinary tools insofar as they need to be created by a
skilled expert. This expert is a lawgiver or *nomothetes*
(388d-389a). A lawgiver, Socrates explains, will create a
naturally suitable name only if he looks "to that thing itself
which is a name" (390a). The thought is probably that the
lawgiver's creative efforts need to be guided by knowledge of
how to produce a linguistic device that enables a competent user to
perform the action of naming. Socrates adds that the lawgiver needs to
fulfil a second condition: He needs to embody "the form of the
name appropriate to each in syllables of whatever sort" (390a).
What does this mean? In making a parallel claim about shuttle
production, Socrates' point is that there are different specific
versions of the action for which shuttles are made--separating
*linen* warp and weft, e.g., or separating *woolen* warp
and weft--and that the carpenter needs to create a naturally
suitable tool for one of these specific action types (389b-c).
Socrates must thus be assuming that there are different specific
versions of naming, and that the lawgiver needs to create a suitable
tool for one of these versions. Given that naming has been defined as
the action of picking out a kind, it is not difficult to see what the
versions of naming might be: If *A* and *B* are
different kinds, picking out *A* and picking out *B*
will certainly be different versions of naming. Hence, Socrates'
claim is that the lawgiver needs to make sure that his product is a
suitable tool for picking out a specific kind.



All of this sounds rather complicated. But while the details of
Socrates' argument are indeed obscure at times, the big picture
is clearer. Socrates proceeds from the idea that names are tools for
picking out kinds to the idea that an individual name needs to be
suited for picking out a *specific* kind and must be created
accordingly. And even though he does not say this in so many words,
there can be no doubt that he thus arrives at the following
characterization of *correct* names:



(NAT)
A correct name for a given kind is a linguistic device that has
been created from letters and syllables in a way that guarantees that
it is suited for picking out this kind (or, equivalently, the way of
being shared by its members).


As Socrates hastens to point out (390a-e), an expert
dialectician is responsible for ascertaining whether a name fulfils
the standard described by
 (NAT).
 It is clear, then, that while there are many humdrum contexts in
which names are used, their true purpose is to make possible
dialectical inquiries.


### 4.3 Assessing the Argument of the Tool Analogy



At 390e, Socrates concludes the tool analogy by stating "that
names belong to the objects by nature" (390d/e). As the above
analysis indicates, the purport of this conclusion is captured by
 (NAT).
 But (NAT) is still a highly abstract claim. It is far from clear what
it takes to create a linguistic device in a way that guarantees that
it is suited for picking out a given kind (or the being of its
members); and consequently, it is far from clear how a correct name
for a given kind differs from a linguistic device that does not
deserve that title. This unclarity makes it very hard to say what
exactly the tool analogy contributes to Socrates' investigation.
One widespread assumption is that the tool analogy's conclusion
is a blueprint for the theory of the correctness of names that
Socrates elaborates at 390e-427d: that (NAT) anticipates the
claim that correct names need to be composed of letters and syllables
in a way that ensures that they describe or imitate the being of their
referents. Champions of both
 **Reading A**
 and
 **Reading B**
 are committed to this assumption. That does not mean, however, that
they agree in their overall assessment of the tool analogy and its
conclusion--quite the contrary. Champions of **Reading
A** contend that while the analogy between names and tools may
be highly suggestive, Plato wants his readers to realize that
comparing the introduction of a name for a given kind to the creation
of a tool for a specific task is ultimately misleading--and to
discard the conclusion that there is a natural correctness of names.
Champions of **Reading B** disagree strongly: They assume
that Plato wants his readers to accept the argument of the tool
analogy and its conclusion.



One way of dealing with the exceedingly abstract conclusion of the
tool analogy is thus to construe it as an anticipation of the claim
that correct names need to be descriptions or imitations, and to ask
in a next step whether Plato want his readers to accept this claim.
But there is also a radically different approach to the problem at
hand. Champions of
 **Reading C**
 take the tool analogy's conclusion to boil down to the claim
that names are correct if they have been assigned to genuine kinds by
adopting suitable conventions (whereas they are not correct if they
have been assigned to gerrymandered classes of things such as, e.g.,
the class that comprises all cats and all donkeys and nothing else).
They argue that Plato wants his readers to accept *this*
claim--and to see that Socrates is going astray when he moves on
to elaborate the theory that correct names are descriptions or
imitations of their referents' being. It has been objected,
however, that assigning a name to a kind and creating a correct name
in the sense of
 (NAT)
 seem to be two very different things (Ackrill 1994: 18 f.; Smith
2014). Whether **Reading C**'s take on the tool
analogy is a viable alternative to
 **Reading A**'s
 and
 **Reading B**'s
 interpretation is thus a matter of debate (Meissner forthcoming
a).


## 5. Correctness and Etymological Meaning (390e-394e)



When Socrates infers from the argument of the tool analogy "that
names belong to the objects by nature" (390d/e), Hermogenes is
not fully convinced and demands to know what "the natural
correctness of a name consists in" (390e). As has become evident
by now, this is a good question--it is in fact not clear what
Hermogenes would commit himself to if he accepted
 (NAT).
 Socrates attempts to answer Hermogenes' question at
390e-394e by discussing the name "Astyanax".
"Astyanax" is actually a proper name of a victim of the
Trojan war (Hector's son, who would have become king of Troy had
the city not been destroyed). However, Socrates does not treat it as a
proper name, but as a general term that refers to the kind
(*genos*) of kings. He gives the following account of its
correctness:



> 
> 
> "Astyanax" is a correct name for the kind (*genos*)
> of kings because its etymological meaning ("townlord")
> ensures that it indicates (*deloun*) the way of being
> (*ousia*) that the members of this kind share.
> 
> 
> 



What does this account entail? What, in particular, does it mean to
say that "Astyanax" *indicates* the way of being
that is shared by all kings? It has been claimed that indicating a way
of being is tantamount to disclosing its definition (see, e.g., Barney
2001: 103). But Socrates' examples, and his later use of the
term *deloun* (see
 section 8.2),
 suggest that this is an overinterpretation (Ademollo 2011: 165f.).
Apparently, a way of being is indicated if and only if it is
distinguished from other ways of being--if it is picked out, as
it were.



How, then, does the etymological meaning of the name
"Astyanax" ensure that it picks out the way of being that
is characteristic of kings? Socrates' idea seems to be that the
etymological meaning of the name ensures that it functions as a
*description* of what it means to be a king. It is important to
note, however, that indicating something does not necessarily entail
describing it; as Socrates will explain at 421c-427e, names that
are not composed of other names indicate a way of being in virtue of
imitating it. But in the passage at hand, he ignores this possibility
and focuses on names that are composed of other
names--*etymologically complex* names, as one might
say.



Socrates does not stop to distill a general account of the correctness
of etymologically complex names from his reflections on the name
"Astyanax". But he clearly has the following account in
mind:



(NAT\*)
If an etymologically complex name is a correct name for a given
kind, this is because its etymological meaning ensures that it
describes and thus indicates the way of being (*ousia*) that
the members of the kind share.


At first blush,
 (NAT\*)
 seems to be a far cry from
 (NAT),
 the central claim of the tool analogy. But this impression might be
misleading. According to (NAT), a correct name for a given kind is a
linguistic device that has been created in a way that makes it fit for
picking out the way of being that the members of this kind share. As
has just been indicated, picking out a way of being and indicating a
way of being are the same act. Hence, (NAT) would appear to be
equivalent to the claim that a correct name for a given kind must be
suited for indicating the way of being that the members of this kind
share. And clearly, (NAT\*) does provide an explanation of how a name
can be suited for this act.



There is one more thing to note before we move on: As virtually all
commentators who take a closer look at 390e-394e agree,
Socrates' discussion of the name "Astyanax" is
peppered with blatant mistakes. Proponents of
 **Reading A**
 and
 **Reading C**
 see this as Plato's way of discrediting
 (NAT\*)
 (Heitsch 1984: 53-57; Eckl 2003: 135-155; Ademollo 2011:
146-180); proponents of **Reading B**, on the other
hand, need to bite the bullet and argue that Plato is simply not aware
of Socrates' blunders (Sedley 2003: 75-86).


## 6. The Etymological Section (394e-421c)



Having arrived at the conjecture that there is a connection between
the correctness of names and their etymological meaning, Socrates
begins to uncover the etymological meaning of Greek names--and
does not stop until he has spent more than 25 Stephanus pages on
discussing more than 100 names. Remarkably, his etymological analyses
gradually take on a Heraclitean character; taken together, they
suggest that many Greek names encapsulate descriptions that would be
true of the being of their referents if and only if Heraclitus were
right in claiming that everything is in flux. The Greek name for
excellence, *arete*, is characterized as an
abbreviation of the descriptive phrase "that which always
flows" (*aei rheon*), for example (415c-d);
and the name for practical wisdom, *phronesis*, is said
to have the meaning "understanding of movement and flux"
(*phoras kai rhou noesis*) (411d). These and many
comparable analyses eventually lead Socrates to the conclusion that
all (or at least many) Greek names must be built up from a small set
of basic names that refer to movements and processes--such as,
e.g., the names *ion*, *rheon*, and *doun*.
This result, in turn, prompts him to augment his naturalist theory by
investigating the correctness of these basic names.



Insofar as the etymological section provides an incentive to complete
the naturalist theory of correctness, it has a clear dialectical
function. But given its extraordinary length, this can hardly be its
only function. How else does the etymological section contribute to
Socrates' inquiry, then? Three (non-exclusive) answers to this
question suggest themselves:


1. The etymological section might shine a light on the prospects and
problems of etymological research.
2. The etymological section might make a point about the correctness
of names.
3. The etymological section might draw attention to the ontological
challenge of Heracliteanism.



The present section zooms in on these possible answers.


### 6.1 Prospects and Problems of Etymological Research



The *Cratylus* introduces its readers to two very different
forms of etymological research. Socrates is engaged in one form of
etymological research when he tries to uncover the etymological
meaning of names; Cratylus is engaged in a different (if not
independent) form of etymological research when he later derives
claims about the being of the referents of a name from conjectures
about its etymological meaning (435d-440e; see
 section 9).
 Taking one's cue from Sedley's universally accepted
distinction between the exegetical and the philosophical correctness
of etymological analyses (Sedley 2003: 28), one might thus say that
Socrates practices *exegetical* etymology and Cratylus
*philosophical* etymology.



The etymological section illustrates vividly that philosophical
etymology is a nonstarter. For it shows that one would just take over
the Heraclitean opinions of the ancient lawgivers if one relied on
philosophical etymology--and as Socrates himself points out,
these opinions are mistaken (411b-c). While this much is
acknowledged by all commentators, matters are more complicated when it
comes to exegetical etymology. Some commentators point out that many
of Socrates' etymological analyses are obviously absurd, and
that he punctuates these analyses with ironical remarks about his
unusually inspired state (see, e.g., 396c-397a or 410e) and with
reflections on the methodological pitfalls of etymological research
(414c-415a and 418a-b); they conclude that the
etymological section must be read as a parody of exegetical etymology
(see, e.g., Schleiermacher 1824: 5-9; Heitsch 1984: 51; and
Trivigno 2012). But other commentators object that Socrates'
etymological analyses will have seemed much less absurd to ancient
readers than they appear to modern readers, and downplay the
significance of his intermittent meta-observations. In their view,
Plato does not make fun of exegetical etymology, but puts forward
claims that are at least "bona fide guesses" (Grote
1865: 526) about the etymological meaning of names (see, e.g., Grote
1865: 518-529; Sedley 1998 and 2003; and Ademollo 2011:
237-256).



As this scholarly dispute is still unresolved, it is very hard to say
which point the etymological section is supposed to make about
exegetical etymology. One plausible minimalist assumption would seem
to be that Socrates' etymological analyses suggest that
exegetical etymology is not a science and does not lead to true
knowledge. There are, to be sure, commentators who reject even this
minimalist assumption (Sedley 2003: 41-50). But since it is
compatible with both the idea that Socrates' analyses are
"bona fide guesses" and the claim that these
analyses are meant to parody exegetical etymology, it might be
acceptable to a solid majority among scholars.


### 6.2 Application or Subversion?



Which conclusion(s) about the correctness of names might the
etymological section suggest? Here is one possible answer to this
question. Socrates' etymological analyses indicate that the
etymological meanings of many Greek names mirror mistaken Heraclitean
assumptions about the being of their referents. It follows that many
etymologically complex names fail to indicate the being of their
referents by describing it. If one does not want to assume that these
names are all incorrect, one is compelled to conclude that
etymologically complex names can be correct even if they encapsulate
descriptions that do not apply to the being of their referents. This
conclusion is clearly incompatible with
 (NAT\*)--with
 the hypothesis, i.e., that a correct etymologically complex name for
a given kind needs to encapsulate a description of the way of being
that the members of this kind share. It is a very natural thought,
then, that the etymological section might be meant to discredit (NAT\*)
and the naturalist theory of which (NAT\*) is part.



This elaboration of the idea that the etymological section makes a
point about the correctness of names appeals, unsurprisingly, to
champions of
 **Reading A**
 and
 **Reading C**.
 It is not the only possible elaboration of this idea, however. The
alternative is to contend that Plato wants his readers to conclude
that many of the names under scrutiny are not correct. If one is
willing to commit oneself to this assumption, one is free to argue
that the etymological section does not discredit
 (NAT\*),
 but applies this account of the correctness of names to assess the
correctness of selected Greek names. On this interpretation, which
obviously appeals to champions of
 **Reading B**,
 the etymological section relies on Socrates' naturalist theory
of correctness to show that one should not place one's trust in
the correctness of actual Greek names.


### 6.3 The Challenge of Heracliteanism



What remains to be discussed is the idea that the etymological section
is meant to draw attention to the ontological challenge of
Heracliteanism. As it is clear from other dialogues like the
*Theaetetus* that coming to grips with Heracliteanism is a
philosophical task of paramount importance for Plato, this idea is
indeed plausible. But what, exactly, is the challenge of
Heracliteanism? This is a very difficult and contested question. It is
not even clear how the notion of flux is to be construed. Some
commentators believe that for Plato, flux amounts to what Irwin has
called "aspectual change" (Irwin 1977). If that were true,
the claim that all things are in flux would be equivalent to the claim
that all things have opposing properties in different respects.
Heracliteanism would then not be a theory that reduces reality to
genuine change and motion, but a position that is very close to (a
certain variety of) relativism (see, e.g., Sedley 2003:
109-112). It has also been claimed, however, that the
etymological section presents Heracliteanism as "a robustly
physical theory according to which everything is engaged in
*spatial* change, i.e. locomotion" (Ademollo 2011: 233).
If that were the case, there would be a sharp distinction between
Heracliteanism and relativism.



If it is controversial how the Heraclitean claim that everything is in
flux should be construed--can one at least be sure about
Plato's assessment of this claim? He has Socrates disagree
strongly with Heraclitus in the etymological section (411b-c);
and later on, he has him postulate forms and thereby acknowledge the
existence of entities that are exempt from flux (439c-440e).
Hence, Plato certainly takes Heraclitus and his followers to err
insofar as they overlook that there is a flux-less
*intelligible* realm. But what about the *sensible*
realm--the realm of the things that surround us? Might Plato not
believe that these things are in flux and thus accept a restricted
version of Heracliteanism? The issue is once again contested: While
some commentators do indeed take the *Cratylus* to lend support
to the venerable claim that Plato is a Heraclitean when it comes to
sensible things (Gaiser 1974: 61-80; Barney 2001: 73; Sedley
2003: 99-122), it has been objected that Socrates seems to
consider Heracliteanism as "wrong across the board" in the
etymological section (Ademollo 2011: 207f.).



As these considerations show, the etymological section's
treatment of Heracliteanism leaves open many important questions. This
is clearly no coincidence. Just like the whole *Cratylus*, the
etymological section is not aimed at providing a thorough metaphysical
discussion of the ins and outs of Heracliteanism (this is, arguably,
the job of the *Theaetetus*). It illustrates, however, that
such a discussion is of much greater necessity and consequence than an
inquiry into the hidden meanings of names could ever be. And thus, it
dovetails with the conclusion that Socrates reaches at the very end of
his investigation (440c-d).


## 7. Correctness and Imitation (421c-427d)



Having discovered that many Greek names are built up from names like
*ion*, *rheon*, and *doun*, Socrates
observes that the process of etymological analysis must necessarily
stop after finitely many steps. There must be "first
names" (*prota onomata*), then--names that do not
have an etymological meaning in virtue of the fact that they are
composed of other names (421c-422c). Since *ion*,
*rheon*, and *doun* seem to be among these
*etymologically simple* names, their correctness cannot
possibly depend on their etymological meaning. Socrates thus finds
himself in a predicament: For his theory of the correctness of
etymologically complex names would be built on sand if it were
impossible to account for the natural correctness of etymologically
simple names (cf. 426a-b). Hence, he decides to
"investigate in some other manner" what the correctness of
these names "consists in" (422b). The present section
focuses on this investigation.


### 7.1 Indicating by Imitating



Socrates assumes that etymologically simple names must meet the same
standard as etymologically complex names: They need to "indicate
what each of the beings is like" (422d)--which turns out to
mean that they need to indicate the being of their referents (423e).
He argues that etymologically simple names can only meet this standard
by *imitating* the being of their referents (422e-423e).
And thus, he arrives at this augmented version of
 (NAT\*),
 his earlier account of the correctness of etymologically complex
names:



(NAT\*\*)
If an etymologically complex name is a correct name for a given
kind, this is because its etymological meaning ensures that it
describes and thus indicates the way of being (*ousia*) that
the members of this kind share; and if an etymologically simple name
is a correct name for a given kind, this is because its composition
from letters and syllables ensures that it imitates and thus indicates
the way of being that the members of this kind share.


(NAT\*\*)
 is a full-fledged, completely general theory of the correctness of
names. The most pressing question raised by this theory is probably
how exactly the imitation of a way of being by means of letters and
syllables is supposed to work. Socrates' answer to this question
presupposes that individual letters or individual syllables resemble
the basic kinds of beings (424d-425a); he takes this to ensure
that a combination of different letters and syllables can
resemble--and thus imitate--any given way of being. Note
that Socrates does not take the resemblance between letters and
syllables on the one hand and the basic kinds of beings on the other
hand to depend on the sound of these letters and syllables, but on the
way in which the mouth and the tongue move in articulating them. For
him, imitation is not onomatopoetic, but "articulatory"
(Ademollo 2011: 309-311; cf. Belardi 1985: 33).



Socrates' theory of the correctness of etymologically simple
names has its problems and omissions; it does not take into account,
e.g., that the mimetic qualities of a name would probably not only
depend on the letters and syllables from which it is composed, but
also on the way in which these letters and syllables are arranged
(Barney 2001: 105 n. 31). Characterizing etymologically simple names
as imitations is nevertheless an ingenious attempt at filling the
explanatory gap left by
 (NAT\*).


### 7.2 An Ideal Language?



Having formulated
 (NAT\*\*),
 Socrates seems to take up his original task of accounting for the
correctness of concrete etymologically simple names like *ion*,
*rheon*, and *doun* (424a-b). But very soon,
he digresses: Instead of examining existing names, he expands on how a
lawgiver should ideally go about creating names that imitate the being
of their intended referents (424b-425a). His explanation is
dense and difficult, and a crucial
sentence--424d1-5--is fraught with philological
problems. The basic idea seems to be that an ideal lawgiver would have
to do four things:


1. He would have to provide a taxonomy of all the letters;
2. he would have to identify and distinguish those basic kinds of
beings to which all things can be traced back;
3. he would have to determine which letters or syllables resemble
which basic kinds; and
4. he would have to form concatenations of letters and syllables that
imitate the being of the *nominanda*.



What Socrates sketches here is clearly a very ambitious research
project. Some parts of this research project--the taxonomy of
letters and, especially, the taxonomy of beings--are certainly
close to Plato's heart; they are, after all, strongly
reminiscent of the dialectical investigations that are conducted (or
at least envisaged) in dialogues such as the *Sophist*, the
*Statesman*, and the *Philebus*. It is less clear,
however, whether Plato really believes that a linguistic lawgiver
should detect correlations between the two taxonomies and introduce
names that imitate the being of their referents on the basis of these
correlations. Some commentators do indeed contend that the passage at
hand contains Plato's recipe for the creation of an ideal
language. Most of these commentators
are--unsurprisingly--adherents of
 **Reading B**
 (see, e.g., Anagnostopoulos 1973: 331f.; Baxter 1992: 80-85;
and Barney 2011: 97). Other commentators--usually proponents of
 **Reading A**
 and
 **Reading C**--object
 that the language Socrates describes here would have no real
advantage over other possible languages, since its users would not be
able to access and appropriate the system of knowledge it encodes
unless they embark on their own philosophical investigation (see,
e.g., Williams 1982: 92). These commentators conclude that the passage
424b-425a is meant to show that even a mimetically perfect
language would not be particularly useful--and thus to discredit
 (NAT\*\*).


### 7.3 *Reductio ad Absurdum?*



At 425a, Socrates abruptly returns to his examination of individual
etymologically simple Greek names. He confesses that he is not up to a
systematic classification of both letters and beings, and that he will
thus have to work with conjectures about the resemblance between
letters and basic kinds of beings (425b-426b). These conjectures
appear "absolutely outrageous and ridiculous" (426b) not
only to many scholars, but also to Socrates himself. What Socrates
suggests is, e.g., that the Greek letter *rho* (or, more
precisely, the way in which the mouth moves in articulating this
letter) resembles movement (426c-e), or that the letter
*iota* resembles fine things "which should most go
through everything" (426e-427a). Building on these and
similar suggestions, he ascertains what many etymologically simple
names imitate--that names like *psychron* or *zeon*
imitate "what is blowy" (427a), for example.



Given the avowedly "outrageous and ridiculous" quality of
Socrates' mimetological discussion, it might seem tempting to
assume that Plato must be out to debunk the idea that a name
*qua* concatenation of letters and syllables can resemble and
imitate a way of being, and thus to discredit
 (NAT\*\*).
 But while some proponents of
 **Reading A**
 and
 **Reading C**
 endorse this assumption (see, e.g., Heitsch 1984: 40-43;
Belardi 1985: 39-41; and Trivigno 2012: 63-67), there is
reason for doubt. What Socrates calls "outrageous and
ridiculous" is his attempt to spell out which letters and
syllables resemble which basic kinds of beings. But crucially, his
self-critical remarks do not seem to be directed against the idea that
the imitation of a way of being by means of letters and syllables is
possible *in principle* (Sedley 2003: 76; Ademollo 2011:
313-315). Whether Plato accepts or rejects this idea is very
hard to tell from the passage at hand.


## 8. Criticizing Naturalism (427d-435d)



Once Socrates has concluded his discussion of individual
etymologically simple names, Hermogenes wants to know whether Cratylus
accepts Socrates' account of the natural correctness of names.
Cratylus endorses this account wholeheartedly (427d-428c).
Fearing that he might have fallen prey to some sort of self-deception,
Socrates suggests revisiting his account together with Cratylus
(428d). Cratylus agrees and takes over from Hermogenes as
Socrates' interlocutor. It soon turns out that he is committed
not only to
 (NAT\*\*),
 but to some very counterintuitive additional claims. He thus espouses
a radical version of the naturalist theory of correctness that
Socrates has presented (428e-430a). Socrates marshals a series
of arguments against Cratylus' position
(430a-435b)--and is led to a disappointingly vague
conclusion about the correctness of names (435b-d). This section
takes a closer look at this pivotal and difficult passage.


### 8.1 Cratylus' Naturalism



Socrates begins his discussion with Cratylus by observing that the
products of craftsmen are usually of variable quality
(428e-429a). Cratylus denies that this principle applies to the
products of (linguistic) lawgivers (429b). Even though he takes
etymologically simple names to be imitations, he thus commits himself
to the following claim:



(C1)
No name can be any better or worse than any other name.


Socrates takes (C1) to imply that "all names have been set down
correctly" and asks Cratylus whether he accepts this implication
(429b/c). Cratylus responds by endorsing a second claim (429c):



(C2)
A linguistic device is a name for its (conventional) referents if
and only if it fulfils the standard of correctness described by
 (NAT\*\*).


And it soon turns out that there is yet another claim that Cratylus
wants to defend (429c-430a):



(C3)
If a name is not a correct name for an object, it cannot possibly
be applied to this object (and thus be used to speak falsely).


These three claims are very counterintuitive, and Socrates immediately
begins to attack
 (C3)
 and
 (C1).
 His arguments against these two claims rely on the presupposition
that etymologically simple names are imitations and can thus be
compared to pictures. To refute (C3), Socrates observes that it is
possible to assign a picture of a man to a woman, and that it should
therefore be equally possible to apply an etymologically simple name
that does not imitate the being of a given object to this object
(430a-431c). This suffices to show that one can speak falsely by
misapplying names. To debunk (C1), Socrates points out that if someone
were to produce an object that is perfectly like Cratylus in every
respect, this object would not be a picture of Cratylus, but a second
Cratylus (432a-c). He infers from this that pictures can
resemble the objects they depict only to a certain degree (432c/d).
But if resemblance comes in degrees, imitative success comes in
degrees, and qualitative differences between imitations must be
possible. Consequently, qualitative differences between etymologically
simple names must be possible (433a).


### 8.2 The Return of Convention



Socrates' convincing arguments against
 (C1)
 and
 (C3)
 lead him to the interim conclusion that even if
 (NAT\*\*)
 holds, etymologically simple correct names imitate the being of their
referents only in outline, but not perfectly (432d-433b). His
next argument--the so-called *sklerotes*
argument--complements this interim conclusion by undermining
 (C2)
 and re-introducing *convention* into the picture. The basic
premise of this argument is the following one:



(P1)
If a convention ensures that a name is a means to indicate
(*deloma*) the being (*ousia*) of its
 referents,[3]
 the correctness of this name is conventional. (433d-434a)


Socrates' reliance on this premise is a bit surprising. After
all, he had first introduced the concept of indication when he began
to elaborate his naturalist theory of correctness at 390e-394e;
but now, he is characterizing the assumption that names are used to
indicate as a shared tenet of naturalism and conventionalism. He must
believe, then, that conventionalism and naturalism do not differ in
their account of the use to which speakers put names, but in their
account of what makes this use possible (Ademollo 2011:
385-388).



At any rate, Socrates moves on to apply
 (P1)
 to the name *skleron*
 ("hard").[4]
 He considers this name a correct etymologically simple name that can
be used to indicate the way of being that unites all hard
things--hardness. Using the results of his earlier mimetological
discussion of individual letters, he points out that while
*skleron* contains one
letter--*rho*--that resembles hardness, it also
contains one letter--*lambda*--that resembles the
opposite of hardness, softness (434c-d). Hence,
*skleron* contains as many letters that resemble the
opposite of hardness as letters that resemble hardness; and
consequently, it cannot be a means to indicate hardness in virtue of
being an imitation of hardness. He then introduces two more premises
to show that *skleron* is such a means in virtue of a
convention:



(P2)
If a convention ensures that a hearer understands that a speaker
who articulates the name *skleron* is thinking of
hardness, then a convention ensures that *skleron* is a
means to indicate the being of its referents (= hardness). (435a)
(P3)
A convention ensures that a hearer understands that a speaker who
articulates the name *skleron* is thinking of hardness.
(434e)


Cratylus does not object to any of this and is compelled to accept the
following conclusion:



(CONV)
The correctness of the name *skleron* is conventional
(435a-b).


This argument is certainly plausible. What is very important to see is
that its conclusion is explicitly framed as a claim about the
*correctness* of the name *skleron*. It thus
cannot be right to assume (as, e.g., Williams 1982: 83) that Socrates
shows only that *skleron* is a name for hardness in
virtue of a convention, but not that it is correct in virtue of a
convention. As a matter of fact, Socrates does not distinguish between
names and correct names at this crucial moment (Barney 2001: 137; cf.
Ademollo 2011: 2-4). And consequently, his argument does not
only show that
 (C2)
 is wrong: It also demonstrates that
 (NAT\*\*)
 cannot be true as it stands.


### 8.3 Socrates' Conclusion



Having established
 (CONV),
 Socrates makes a more general claim that is apparently supposed to
wrap up his whole investigation (435b):



(CONV\*)
Convention contributes to the correctness of names.


To lend further support to this conclusion, Socrates argues that there
would be a problem if one did not assume that convention has
"some authority concerning the correctness" of the names
for the natural numbers (435b/c). But as he does not elaborate on the
nature of this problem, the precise purport of his argument is
contested (see, e.g., Sedley 2003: 142 and Robinson 1956: 117). He
goes on, in any case, to state that while "he likes the idea
that names are, as far as possible, similar to the objects"
(435c), he sees no alternative to accepting
 (CONV\*).



(CONV\*)
 is Socrates' last word on the correctness of names--and a
disappointingly vague claim. How can one make sense of Socrates'
concluding remarks despite their vagueness? One option, favoured by
champions of
 **Reading A**,
 is to argue that Socrates *understates* the true result of his
investigation when he formulates (CONV\*). What he could conclude after
presenting the *sklerotes* argument, and what
Plato's readers are supposed to work out for themselves, is that
the correctness of all names is completely conventional. For while the
*sklerotes* argument and its conclusion (CONV)
concern only one name, it seems obvious that this argument could be
generalized and would then vindicate a thoroughly conventionalist
view. (To see why this may seem obvious, take another look at the
premises of the *sklerotes* argument.
 (P1)
 is about all correct names, and
 (P2)
 does not seem to concern the name *skleron* in
particular. But even when it comes to
 (P3),
 which is specifically about *skleron* as a name that
does not successfully imitate hardness, a generalization seems to be
warranted. For even if it is granted that a given name succeeds at
imitating hardness or any other way of being, it will still not seem
to be this imitative success which guarantees that a hearer
understands what a speaker is thinking of when using the name. As only
a shared convention would seem to ensure such understanding, (P3)
appears to convey an insight that applies to all correct names. And if
one combines this insight with (P1) and a generalized version of (P2),
one will arrive at the conclusion that the correctness of all names is
completely conventional.)



But of course, one could also take Socrates' endorsement of the
vague
 (CONV\*)
 to indicate that he is not convinced that the correctness of all
names is completely conventional and wants to stick to a suitably
modified version of
 (NAT\*\*).
 This alternative assessment of Socrates' concluding remarks,
which is favoured by champions of
 **Reading B**,
 can be elaborated in different ways. It has been argued, for
instance, that the *sklerotes* argument concerns
only those names which--like the name
*skleron*--contain letters that resemble a certain
way of being and an equal number of letters that resemble the opposite
way of being. While Socrates does indeed acknowledge that convention
is crucial for the correctness of *those* names, he believes
that the correctness of all other names is completely dependent on
their mimetic qualities or their etymological meaning (Sedley 2003:
144f.). But the *sklerotes* argument has also been
taken to show only that names fulfil some sort of minimal condition
for correctness in virtue of a convention, and thus to be compatible
with the idea that the degree of a name's correctness is a
function of its mimetic qualities or its etymological meaning (Barney
2001: 134-142). There may be yet other elaborations of the idea
that Socrates' concluding remarks do not amount to a total
repudiation of
 (NAT\*\*).
 They must all agree, however, in characterizing the import of the
*sklerotes* argument as more limited than it might
appear to be.



Is it also possible to maintain that Socrates rejects
 (NAT\*\*)
 at 435b-d, but not the more general claim that there is a
natural correctness of names? This is obviously how champions of
 **Reading C**
 would have to read Socrates' concluding remarks. Unfortunately,
there is no in-depth discussion of these remarks by any proponent of
this reading (see, however, Kretzmann 1971: 138, for some reflections
on the issue). Two conjectures about the shape that the suggested
interpretation would have to take seem reasonable, however:


1. Proponents of
 **Reading C**
 would have to read Socrates' official conclusion
 (CONV\*)
 as the claim that while there is a natural correctness of names, the
ways in which correct names are composed of letters and syllables is
conventional (see
 section 4.3).
2. To defend such an assessment of (CONV\*), it would be necessary to
explain how the *sklerotes* argument can justify a
wholesale rejection of
 (NAT\*\*)
 and yet fail to show that the correctness of all names is completely
conventional.



Choosing between these exegetical options is exceedingly difficult.
The fact that Socrates avowedly "likes the idea that names are,
as far as possible, similar to the objects" might be thought to
prove that he does not completely reject
 (NAT\*\*).
 But a different reading is available: Socrates could be expressing
the conviction that most (etymologically simple) names are indeed
similar to their referents while steering clear of the claim that this
similarity constitutes their correctness (Ademollo 2011: 415). It is
true, however, that it is not easy to make sense of 435b-d, and
especially of the vague
 (CONV\*),
 if one takes Socrates to believe that the correctness of all names is
completely conventional. But on the other hand, it is harder to do
justice to the *sklerotes* argument if one does not
ascribe this belief to Socrates. Given the mixed signals Socrates
sends, the debate about his conclusion is not likely to end anytime
soon.


## 9. Coda: The "Power" of Names (435d-440e)



As soon as Socrates has concluded his investigation of the correctness
of names, he turns to a different (if closely related) topic and asks
Cratylus what the "power" (*dynamis*) of names is.
Cratylus answers that names have the power to teach (435d). While this
is reminiscent of Socrates' earlier contention that names are
instruments for teaching (388b-c), it soon turns out that
Cratylus has something more radical in mind. What he wants to defend
is the claim that analysing names is the only way of gaining knowledge
about their referents' being. For him, philosophical etymology
(see
 section 6.1)
 and mimetological studies are thus not *a*, but *the*
path to knowledge. Socrates objects by making an observation that is
illustrated well by his earlier etymological and mimetological
discussions: that examining names will at the very best lead one to
the opinions of the ancient lawgivers who have introduced the names,
and that these opinions can be wrong (436a-b). Cratylus has a
response: He argues that the opinions of the ancient lawgivers are
coherently Heraclitean in character, and that this coherence
guarantees their truth (436b-c). Unimpressed, Socrates retorts
that coherence does not guarantee truth (436c-d) and that there
are also some cases in which the analysis of names suggests that the
ancient lawgivers held decidedly un-Heraclitean opinions
(436d-437d). He also points out that the knowledge that Cratylus
ascribes to the ancient lawgivers cannot--on pain of
regress--have resulted from an examination of names
(438a-d).



All in all, Socrates presents a very compelling case against
Cratylus' conviction that one needs to analyse names in order to
learn anything about reality. But he also draws a positive conclusion
from his reflections: It must be possible "to learn about the
beings without names" (438e). The purport of this conclusion is
not immediately clear. One might think that Socrates means to
advertise some sort of intuitive, non-linguistic understanding (see,
e.g., Derbolav 1972: 201-207; Silverman 2001: 25f.). But that
seems implausible; for Socrates will soon go on to use names to gain
insight into the nature of reality. According to a more plausible
interpretation, Socrates wants to claim that one should examine things
instead of names, but not that one should refrain from using names
when investigating (Sedley 2003: 162; Ademollo 2011: 445). He might
also have a special mode of inquiry in mind when he says that it must
be possible to learn without names: He might be thinking of a broadly
transcendental inquiry that aims at ascertaining how reality must be
organized if language and knowledge are to be possible (Thomas
2008).



Whatever Socrates' exact theoretical point is when he suggests
an "inquiry without names"--he very soon starts his
own investigation into the nature of reality, arguing that Heraclitus
cannot be right when he claims that everything is in flux. His case
against this claim is based on the presupposition that there are not
only beautiful or good things, but also the beautiful itself or the
good itself (439c-d)--Platonic forms, it would seem. As
Socrates points out, four absurd consequences follow if one assumes
that even these entities are in constant flux:


1. One could not make true statements about them, because they would
change while one speaks (439d);
2. they would not be anything, because being something presupposes
staying in the same state for some time (439d-e);
3. they would not be knowable, because they would change before one
could get to know them (439e-440a); and
4. there would be no knowledge, because knowledge itself would be in
constant flux (440a-b).



These arguments against Heraclitus' theory of flux are very
compressed and leave open many questions. Fittingly, Socrates admits
that he is not sure whether he has really established that Heraclitus
is wrong in claiming that everything is in flux and declares that the
issue should be investigated more thoroughly without relying on
philosophical etymology (440c-d). Cratylus, on the other hand,
is still convinced that Heraclitus is right (440d-e).
Accompanied by Hermogenes, he leaves for the countryside--and
ends the dialogue that bears his name.