## 1. Tsongkhapa's Life


### 1.1 Overview



Biographical information about Tsongkhapa comes from clues in his own
writing, and primarily from the hagiography written by his student
Kedrup Pelzangpo (*mKhas grub dpal bzang po*) (1385-1438)
called *Stream of Faith* (*Dad pa'i 'jug ngog*) (partial
translation in Thurman
 1982).[1]



Tsongkhapa's life falls roughly into an earlier and later period. The
later period is defined by a series of publications, beginning in
about 1400, which systematically present his mature philosophy.
Tsongkhapa, influenced by the divisions used by the editors of the
Kanjur, treats non-tantric and tantric sources separately. His
philosophical views on tantra, and, to a certain extent his work on
ethics fall naturally into separate categories. The later period of
his life includes a period of institution building, possibly with an
eye to the founding of a new school or sect.


### 1.2 Detailed account



The name Tsongkhapa derives from Tsong kha, an ancient name for a part
of the A mdo region of Greater Tibet (*Bod chen*) now included
in Qinghai Province of the People's Republic of China, and the Tibetan
suffix *pa* that works as an agentive nominalizing particle.
His given name is Losang (sometimes written Lozang) Drakpa (*bLo
bzang grags pa*). He is also known by the honorific title Je
Rinpoche (*rJe rin po che*) ("Precious Lord"). He
was born, probably to semi-nomadic farmers, in a settlement now
incorporated into the outskirts of the Chinese city of Xi ning. His
birthplace is marked by the popular Kumbum (*sKu 'bum*)
monastery,



In his teens (1372-73), Tsongkhapa travelled from Tsong kha to
Central (*dBus*) Tibet (*Bod*) where he remained until
his death in 1419. He arrived as a young man in Central Tibet at the
end of a long flowering of intellectual activity called "the
later diffusion [of Buddhism]" (Tib. *spyi dar*) that
began with translator Rin chen bzang po (958-1055) and the
scholar-saint Dipamkara-srijnana
Atisa (980-1054), and ended with the most important editor
of the Kanjur, Buton (*Bu ston Rin chen grub*),
(1290-1364).



According to Kedrup, on his arrival in Central Tibet Tsongkhapa first
studied Tibetan medicine, then a traditional Buddhist curriculum of
*abhidharma*, tenet systems (Tib. *grub mtha'*) focusing
on the Middle Way and Mind Only (Sk. *cittamatra* also
called *yogacara*) philosophy, Buddhist ethics (Tib.
*sdom gsum*), and epistemology (Sk.
*pramana*). His early studies were pursued mainly in
institutions affiliated with the two dominant scholarly traditions
(Tib. *lugs*) of the time: the Sangphu (*gSang phu ne'u
tog*) tradition founded by Ngok (*rNgog bLo ldan shes rab*)
(1059-1109), and the Sakya (*Sa skya*) epistemological
tradition based primarily on the works of the Sa skya
pandi ta (1182-1251). He also studied and practiced
tantric Buddhism.



In his early years he wrote a number of essays on topics in
*abhidharma* (Apple 2008), a detailed investigation of the
*alaya-vijnana* (Sk.) ("foundation,
storehouse, basis-of all consciousness") (Sparham 1993), and an
important treatise, *Golden Garland* (*Legs bshad gser
phreng*), on the *Perfection of Wisdom* (Sk.
*prajna-paramita*) literature based on
the codification of its topics in the *Ornament for the Clear
Realizations* (*Abhisamayalamkara*)
(Sparham 2007-2013).



After completing his *Golden Garland* in 1388-89,
Tsongkhapa spent a period of some ten years removed from the hub of
intellectual activity. He engaged in meditation and ritual religious
exercises in Southern Tibet (*Lho kha*) where, as evidenced in
his short autobiographical writing from this transitional period
(Thurman 1982), and corroborated by traditional sources (Kaschewsky
1971, Vostrikov 1970), he resorted to a communion or dialogue with
Manjusri--the iconographic representation
of perfect knowledge in the Buddhist pantheon. Through the voice of
Manjusri he articulated a hierarchical system of
philosophies culminating in what he characterized as a pristine,
Middle Way, \*Prasangika-madhyamaka (Tib. *dBu ma thal
'gyur pa*) that avoided over-reification (of the absolute) and
over-negation (of the conventional).



Tsongkhapa framed his insights not as original contributions, but as a
rediscovery of meanings already revealed by the Buddha. In all his
works he characterizes his philosophy as identical to the Buddha's.
Further, he says his philosophy is based on Nagarjuna's and
Nagarjuna's follower Aryadeva's (third-fourth century)
explanation of what the Buddha said. His philosophy gets its name
\*Prasangika ("those who reveal the unwelcome
consequences [inherent in other's assertions]") from the
importance it gives to Buddhapalita's (late fifth century)
explication of Nagarjuna's work, and to Candrakirti's
defense of Buddhapalita's explanation, in the face of criticism
by Bhaviveka.



Tsongkhapa presented his mature philosophy in a series of volumes
during the later period of his life, beginning with the publication of
his most famous work, the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the
Path* (*Lam rim chen mo*) in 1402, at the age of 46. This
was followed by *Essence of Eloquence* (*Legs bshad snying
po*) and *Ocean of Reasoning* (*Rigs pa'i rgya
mtsho*) (1407-1408), the *Medium-Length Exposition of the
Stages of the Path* (*Lam rim 'bring*) in 1415, and, in the
last years of his life, his *Elucidation of the Intention*
(*dGongs pa rab gsal*).



Together, in this series of works written over a seventeen year
period, he succeeded in setting the agenda for the following
centuries, to a great extent, with later writers taking positions pro
and con his arguments. As is so often the case, his stature pushed
much of earlier Tibetan intellectual history into the shadows, until
its rediscovery by the Eclectic Movement (Tib. *Ris med*) in
Derge (*sDe dge*) in the late 18th century.



Tsongkhapa wrote his major works on tantra and ethics at the same time
as his major philosophical works. Volumes 3-12 of his collected
works in 18 or 19 volumes deal exclusively with topics based on
tantric sources. In 1405 he completed his *Great Exposition of
Tantra* (*sNgags rim chen mo*) (Hopkins 1980, Yarnall 2013)
a companion volume to his *Great Exposition*, where, in harmony
with his philosophy, he argued that tantra is defined neither by
special insight (Sk. *vipasyana*) or Mahayana
altruism (Sk. *bodhicitta*), but solely by deity yoga (Tib.
*lha'i rnal 'byor*) (Hopkins 1980).



In 1402, Tsongkhapa, with his teacher Rendawa (*Red mda' ba gzhon
nu blo gros*), (1349-1412) (Roloff 2009) and others, at the
temple of Namstedeng (*rNam rtsed ldeng*/*lding*)
convened a gathering of monks with the intention of reinvigorating the
Buddhist order. From this came Tsongkhapa's short, but influential
works on basic Buddhist morality (Sk. *pratimoksa*)
that in turn laid the foundation for the importance some Gelukpa
monasteries would place on a stricter adherence to the monastic code.
In 1403 his influential works on ethical codes for bodhisattvas
(*Byang chub gzhung lam*) (Tatz 1987) and for tantric
practitioners (*rTsa ltung rnam bshad*) (Sparham 2005)
appeared. His separate explanations of the three ethical codes (Tib.
*sdom gsum*) are distinguished by the centrality they give to
basic morality, the importance the bodhisattva's code retains in
tantra, and in the antinomian tantras the presence of a separate
*pratimoksa*-like ordination ritual built around a
codification of of ethical conduct specific to tantric
practitioners.



By 1409, at the age of 52, his place in Tibetan society was
sufficiently established that he could garner the support and
sponsorship necessary for a successful rejuvenation of the central
temple in Lhasa, for establishing a new-year prayer festival (*smon
lam chen mo*), and for completion of a large new monastery, Ganden
(*dGa' ldan*), where he lived for much of his subsequent life
until his death there in 1419. He inspired two of his students Tashi
Palden (*bKra shis dpal ldan*) (1379-1449) and Shakya
Yeshey (*Ye shes*) (1354-1435) to found Drepung ('Bras
spungs) monastery in 1416, and Sera Monastery in 1419, respectively.
These, with Ganden, would later become the three largest and most
powerful Gelukpa monasteries, and indeed, the biggest monasteries in
the world. In 1407 and 1413 the Ming dynasty Yongle Emperor recognized
Tsongkhapa's growing fame and importance by inviting him to the
Chinese court, as was the custom.


## 2. Early Period


### 2.1 *Explanation of the Difficult Points* (*Kun gzhi dka' 'grel*)



Tsongkhapa's most important works from his early period are his
*Explanation of the Difficult Points* (*Kun gzhi dka'
'grel*) and *Golden Garland* (*Legs bshad gser
phreng*).



In the former he gives a detailed explanation of the
*alaya-vijnana* ("foundation
consciousness")--according to Tsongkhapa the
distinctive eighth consciousness in the eight-consciousness system of
Asanga's (fourth century) Indian Yogacara
Buddhism.



Tsongkhapa opens his work with a brief discussion of the relationship
between the views of Nagarjuna and Asanga. Tsongkhapa
then discovers in the different usages of the term
*alaya-vijnana* and its near synonyms a
negative connotation conveying the cause and effect nature of repeated
suffering existences (Sk. *samsara*). He surveys the
relevant literature, limiting his discussion of *gotra*
("lineage," in the sense of the innate ability a person
has to grow up into a fully enlightened being) to the presentation
given in Asanga's *Bodhisattva Levels*
(*Bodhisattva-bhumi*). There the "residual
impression left by listening [to the correct exposition of the
truth]" (Sk. *sruta-vasana*) is the
"seed" (Sk. *bija*) that matures into
enlightenment. It is little more than the innate clarity of mind when
it is freed from limitation by habituation to a correct vision of
reality.



Tsongkhapa limits the sources for his explanation to non-tantric
works, almost all by persons he will later describe as Indian
Yogacara writers, demonstrating thereby the influence the
categories used in the recently redacted Kanjur and Tenjur (Tib.
*bsTan 'gyur*, the name for the commentaries in Tibetan
translation included in the canon) had on his thinking.



When Tsongkhapa arrived in Central Tibet, the pressing philosophical
issue of the day was Dolpopa's (*Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal
mtshan*) (1292-1361) Great Middle Way (Tib. *dBu ma chen
po*, Sk. \**Maha-madhayamaka*) philosophy. It
propounded a hermeneutics based on the principle that a Buddha will
always tell you clearly what he means. Based on a wide array of
sources, and without making a clear distinction between tantric and
non-tantric works, the central tenet of the Great Middle Way is that
an absolute, pure, transcendental mind endowed with all good qualities
exists radically other than the ordinary world of appearance. It is
the archetypical Tibetan Buddhist *gzhan stong* (pronounced
shentong, "emptiness of other") philosophy.



Dolpopa, stressing the hermeneutic stated above, says
Nagarjuna and Asanga, writing during the golden age,
have the same philosophy, the Great Middle Way clearly articulated by
the Buddha. Dolpopa distinguishes a pure, transcendental knowledge
(Tib. *kun gzhi ye shes*) that is quite other than the defiled
foundation consciousness (Tib. *kun gzhi rnam shes*), and
equates the former with his single absolute, endowed with all the
qualities of a Buddha.



Later, in his mature period, as explained below, Tsongkhapa will be
explicit. He will state categorically that Asanga's
Yogacara Buddhism is quite separate from, and in profundity
inferior to, Nagarjuna's Middle Way school (Wangchuk 2013),
removing all references to a Great Middle Way school. He will say the
*alaya-vijnana*, devoid of subject-object
bifurcation, provides the essential mind-stuff for defilement
(=*samsara*) and carries seeds for purification
(=*nirvana*) in a Yogacara system that is
fundamentally wrong, and at odds with the way things actually are. He
will give the *alaya-vijnana* only a heuristic
value, and say a correct view (the \*Prasangika-madhyamaka
view) of the workings of psycho-physical reality (the Buddhist
*skandha*s) totally invalidates it. As Jeffrey Hopkins (2002,
2006b) has shown conclusively, such statements constitute an explicit
rejection of Dolpopa's view, a position Tsongkhapa still is
formulating in early works like the *Explanation of the Difficult
Points*.



In his *Explanation of the Difficult Points*, Tsongkhapa is
certain he does not accept the view of Dolpopa, but he is still unsure
exactly what he will put in its place. He ignores Dolpopa's pure,
transcendental knowledge called *alaya*, mentioning it
obliquely, only in passing, during a final brief survey of views based
on Chinese sources; he leaves unanswered the question of the final
ontological status of the eighth consciousness, but appears to accept
it as having a provisional reality; and he allows the views of
Asanga set forth in the *Bodhisattva-bhumi* to
retain an authority he will later explicitly deny.


### 2.2 *Golden Garland* (*Legs bshad gser phreng*)



Tsongkhapa's *Golden Garland* is his most important early work.
It takes the form of a long explanation of the *Perfection of
Wisdom* sutras, given pride of place in the Kanjur as the
foremost words of the Buddha, after the Vinaya section (the
codifications of ethical conduct). It is a word-by-word commentary on
the topics in the *Ornament for the Clear Realizations*
(*Abhisamayalamkara*). Tsongkhapa bases his
explanation on two sub-commentaries by Arya Vimuktisena (sixth
century?) and Hari Bhadra (end of the eighth century). It propounds a
philosophy that later Gelukpas, following the taxonomy developed in
the mature works of Tsongkhapa, call
Yogacara-svatantrika-madhyamaka, in essence a Middle
Way that incorporates many of the categories of Yogacara
Buddhism, yet does not have the authority of Candrakirti's
Prasangika interpretation.



A great deal has been written on the difference between
Prasangika and Svatantrika (Dreyfus and McClintock
2003). Historically, the Gelukpa's
Yogacara-svatantrika-madhyamaka is another name for the
mainstream philosophical school that developed in Tibet, based
primarily on the teaching of Santaraksita and his
student Kamalasila (both fl. end of the eight century), the
most influential of all the Indian panditas involved in
the dissemination of Buddhist ideas to Tibet. Later Gelukpa
scholastics, basing themselves on the mature works of Tsongkhapa, are
unequivocal that Yogacara-svatantrika-madhyamaka, like
the Yogacara philosophy of Asanga, is wrong, and has
only heuristic value. At the same time, they tacitly acknowledge its
centrality by taking this "wrong" philosophy as the
foundation of their studies.



In the *Golden Garland*, Tsongkhapa, following
Santaraksita's school as it developed in Tibet,
asserts that all bases (Sk. *vastu*) (the psycho-physical
factors locating the person as they begin their philosophical career),
all mental states along the course of the path (Sk.
*marga*), and the final result, are illusory, because they
lack any essential nature. But it is not yet clear how the basis
relates to the final outcome (the result). As explained below,
Tsongkhapa will solve the problem in his mature works by a clear,
radical, nihilistic leap denying any essential nature whatsoever,
anywhere, to anything, thereby implicitly and explicitly devaluing (in
absolutist terms) the ontological status of the final, pure, unified
state, relegating it to just one more conventional,
dependently-originated thing.



In the *Golden Garland*, Tsongkhapa has not yet fully developed
his mature, systematic philosophy. He is still content with
discrediting Dolpopa and surveying different points of view. He uses
Yogacara terminology to present his own opinion, and uses a
language to describe enlightened (and enlightening) knowledge that
retains for it a separateness (through its freedom from all mental
construction) from all other mental states. The primary object of
philosophical inquiry in the *Golden Garland* is the unity of
the perceiving subject in enlightenment, a topic that reflects the
language and concerns of the
Yogacara-svatantrika-madhyamaka school. 



Tsongkhapa in this early work is still comfortable with characterizing
the ultimate as an absence of elaboration (Tib. *spros bral*,
Sk. *nisprapanca*) beyond the four extremes, later
set forth as the orthodox view of the Sakya sect. Tsongkhapa's
rejection of this characterization in his later work occasions a
strong rejection of his view by writers like Gorampa (*Go rab
'byams pa bsod nams sge ge*) (1429-1489) (Cabezon and Dargyay
2006).



The *Golden Garland* is driven in no small measure by an agenda
dedicated to discrediting Dolpopa's *Perfection of Wisdom*
commentaries. This is evident from a comparison of Dolpopa and
Tsongkhapa's sources and views. While Dolpopa excoriates Arya
Vimuktisena and Hari Bhadra and says they belong to the degenerate
age, propounding doctrines harmful to golden age Buddhism, the
*Golden Garland* privileges the commentaries by Arya
Vimuktisena and Hari Bhadra. Dolpopa says the two *Detailed
Explanations of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras* (Sk.
*Brhattika*, Tib. *Gnod
'jom*) by "the foremost, Great Middle Way master
Vasubandhu" stand as the primary scriptural authority for the
Great Middle Way doctrine, superior even to the partial truths
revealed by Nagarjuna. The *Golden Garland* disputes
that Vasubandhu is the author of the two *Detailed
Explanations*, and says, regardless of their author, they are
simply restatements of Nagarjuna's Middle Way. Finally,
Dolpopa propounds a doctrine that holds the basis, path, and result
are eternally the same, and all else is thoroughly imaginary, but the
*Golden Garland* is certain that such a view is wrong, and
directly cites a passage from Dolpopa's work, though without naming
its author, saying, "since no other great path-breaker, [i.e.,
founder of an original philosophy] besides him has ever asserted [what
Dolpopa says], learned persons are right to cast out [what he says]
like a gob of spit" (Sparham 2007-2013 vol. 1, 425).


## 3. Mature Period



Tsongkhapa formulated the philosophy for which he is best known some
ten years after finishing the *Golden Garland*. He
characterized the vision that led him to his philosophy as a pristine
Middle Way. Reflecting back on his insight he would write in his
*In Praise of Dependent Origination* (*brTen 'brel bstod
pa*) (translation by Tupten Jinpa, undated)



> 
> 
> "Nonetheless, before the stream of this life
>   
> 
> Flowing towards death has come to cease
>   
> 
> That I have found slight faith in you--
>   
> 
> Even this I think is fortunate.
>   
> 
> Among teachers, the teacher of dependent origination,
>   
> 
> Amongst wisdoms, the knowledge of dependent origination--
>   
> 
> You, who're most excellent like the kings in the worlds,
>   
> 
> Know this perfectly well, not others."
> 
> 
> 



Tsongkhapa first sets forth this mature philosophy linking dependent
origination and emptiness in a special section at the end of his
*Great Exposition*. There, in the context of an investigation
into the end-product of an authentic, intellectual investigation into
the truly real (Sk. *tattva*, Tib. *de kho na*), and
into the way things finally are at their deepest level (Sk.
*tathata*, Tib. *de bzhin
 nyid*),[2]
 he says you have to identify the object of negation (Tib. *dgag
bya*), i.e., the last false projection to appear as reality, by
avoiding two errors: going too far (Tib. *khyab che ba*) and
not going far enough (Tib. *khyab chung ba*) (Drefus et al,
2011, chapter 5).



That his project does not presuppose a privileged, soul-like, state of
consciousness that surveys and categorizes phenomena is evident from
his assertion that these two errors originate in a latent
psychological tendency in philosophers: first, to hold on to vestiges
of truth (reality) where there is in fact an absence of it, and
second, to fall back on some version of truth (reality) in ordinary
appearance after failing to avoid nihilism in a futile quest for
meaning.



This section of Tsongkhapa's work is based on the opening verse of
Nagarjuna's *Root Verses on the Middle Way*
(*Mula-madhyamaka-karika*). Tsongkhapa's
*Ocean of Reasoning* (Garfield and Samten 2006) is a detailed
exegesis of this work. In it, Nagarjuna says nothing is
produced because it is not produced from itself, other, both or
neither. In Tsongkhapa's *Great Exposition*, the subject of
Nagarjuna's syllogism is primarily the embodied person,
reflecting the trend that runs throughout Buddhist philosophical
literature, in general, to stress the application of philosophical
analysis to praxis. Furthermore, for Tsongkhapa, Nagarjuna's
statement is about a first moment in the continuum of the
investigating person. By implication, reflecting the continuing
influence of Santaraksita, it is the person engaged in
the philosophical investigation in the immediate moment. It is
axiomatic for Buddhist philosophers that there is no independent
subject (soul) other than the five heaps (*skandhas*), so the
subject of the syllogism becomes the complex or continuum of
sense-faculties in the present instant. Such a subject makes
excellence sense of Tsongkhapa's otherwise confusing juxtaposition of
Nagarjuna's analysis with Dharmakirti's epistemology,
in which it is axiomatic that direct sense perception is an
authoritative means of knowledge (Sk.
*pramana*).



Nagarjuna's statement that such a person was never produced
seems paradoxical, to say the least, because it appears to undercut
the reality of the very intellectual act in which the thinker is
self-evidently engaged. Tsongkhapa makes it abundantly clear that in
his view not only is the intellectual act itself utterly devoid of any
essential reality, even the sense-faculties (the complex eye, ear and
so on) also lack any essential reality, never mind the sense data they
convey to the knowing individual.



Tsongkhapa's choice of the opening line's of Nagarjuna's
work as a point of departure for his philosophy stems from his belief
that he has gained a true insight into dependent origination
(*pratitya-samutpada*). This insight, he believes,
resolves the paradox between his apparent nihilism and his insistence
on the weight of authoritative statements and cognitions. Thus he says
in his *Great Exposition*,



> 
> 
> "Therefore, the intelligent should develop an unshakeable
> certainty that *the very meaning of emptiness is
> dependent-arising*... Specifically, this is the subtle point
> that the noble Nagarjuna and his spiritual son Aryadeva
> had in mind and upon which the master Buddhapalita and the
> glorious Candrakirti gave fully comprehensive commentary. This is
> how dependent-arising bestows certain knowledge of the absence of
> intrinsic existence; this is how it dawns on you that it is things
> which are devoid of intrinsic existence that are causes and
> effects" (Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee Vol. 3, 139).
> 
> 
> 



Tsongkhapa set out the ramifications of his view in "eight
points that are difficult to understand" (Tib. *dka' gnas
brgyad*) first enumerated in notes (*rjes byang*) to one of
his lectures by his contemporary and disciple, Darma rin chen (also
called *rGyal tshab rje* "the regent"). Tillemans
(1998) has nicely rendered the opening of the text as follows,



> 
> 
> "Concerning the [ontological] bases, there are the following
> [three points]: (1) the conventional nonacceptance of particulars and
> of (2) the storehouse consciousness, and (3) the acceptance of
> external objects. Concerning the path, there are the following [four
> points]: (4) the nonacceptance of autonomous reasonings as being means
> for understanding reality and (5) the nonacceptance of self-awareness;
> (6) the way in which the two obscurations exist; (7) how it is
> accepted that the Buddha's disciples and those who become awakened
> without a Buddha's help realize that things are without any
> own-nature. Concerning the result, there is: (8) the way in which the
> *buddhas* know [conventional] things in their full extent.
> Thus, there are four accepted theses and four unaccepted
> theses." 
> 
> 
> 



They have been discussed by a number of writers (Ruegg 2002, Cabezon
1992, 397, Cabezon and Dargyay 2006, 76-93, 114-201).



I have surveyed Tsongkhapa's early work on the
*alaya-vijnana* (Tilleman's "storehouse
consciousness") above. For Tsongkhapa, until the correct view is
understood, it is necessary to assert the
*alaya-vijnana* in order to save cause and
effect, and avoid falling into nihilism. When the correct view is
obtained, the *alaya-vijnana* stands
invalidated (Tillemans's second point). For Tsongkhapa, it is only
possible to understand cause and effect (in particular, as experienced
in the immediate moment by an embodied person), by correctly
understanding that dependent origination precludes any essential
existence whatsoever.



Tsongkhapa asserts that a specific mark (Sk.
*sva-laksana*), for instance a mark that makes blue
blue, instead of red or any other color, has not even a nominal
existence. This is the first of Tillemans's eight difficult
points.



In his monograph *Essence of Eloquence*, Tsongkhapa employs a
hermeneutics that treats language and knowledge as equally semiotic in
nature. This is consistent with Tsongkhapa's view that any
intellectual act is itself utterly devoid of any essential reality,
yet functions on a conventional level through the natural workings of
dependent origination (Sk. *dharmata*). This view allows
him to conclude that Dignaga and Dharmakirti's
Logico-epistemological school is equivalent to Asanga's
Yogacara school insofar as the former school asserts a
specific mark, seen by direct sense perception, that is necessary in
order to retain the reality of the conventional world. Tsongkhapa
takes the strong position that no datum that appears to (or is there
but unknown to) thought or sense perception, has any essential
reality. All are, equally, simply labeled by thought construction
(Tib. *rtog pas btags tsam*). Only convention makes the actual
sense-faculties, for example, real, and success or failure experienced
in a dream, for example, false. This dependent origination (between a
label and what is labeled) precludes the essential existence implicit
in the Epistemologist's *sva-laksana*.



Tsongkhapa's strong rejection of Yogacara idealism leads him
to assert the existence of external objects (the third point). His
(discredited) Yogacara school, based on either the works of
Asanga or the Epistemologists, explains the absence of
subject-object bifurcation as non-dual with thought or mind (Sk.
*citta*). Realizing this in a non-conceptual, meditational
state constitutes a liberating vision. Ultimately, therefore, external
objects are projections of a deluded mind. Tsongkhapa rejects this,
though he suggests only those who have understood the emptiness of
inherent existence through reflecting on the natural workings of
dependent origination can set it aside. As he says in his *Ocean of
Reasoning*,



> 
> 
> "The meaning of the statement that the conventional designation
> of subject and objects stops is that the designation of these two
> stops from the perspective of meditative equipoise, but it does not
> mean that the insight in meditative equipoise and the ultimate truth
> are rejected as subject and object. This is because their being
> subject and object is not posited from the perspective of analytic
> insight, but from the perspective of conventional understanding"
> (Garfield and Samten 2006, p. 26). 
> 
> 
> 



From the perspective of ordinary convention there are external
objects, so it is sufficient, on that level, to assert that they are
there.



Tsongkhapa does not accept *svatantra*
("autonomous") reasoning (the fourth point). He asserts
that it is enough, when proving that any given subject is empty of
intrinsic existence, to lead the interlocutor, through reasoning, to
the unwelcome consequences (*prasanga*) in their own
untenable position; it is not necessary to demonstrate the thesis
based on reasoning that presupposes any sort of intrinsic
(=autonomous) existence. This gives Tsongkhapa's philosophy its name
\*Prasangika-madhyamaka, i.e., a philosophy of a middle way
(between nihilism and eternalism) arrived at through demonstrating the
unwelcome consequences (in any given position that presupposes
intrinsic existence).



In the context of this assertion, Tsongkhapa offers a distinctive
explanation of the well-known Nayayika objection to
Nagarjuna's philosophy, namely, if the statements he uses to
prove his thesis are themselves without any final intrinsic reality,
they will be ineffective as proofs. Tsongkhapa says
Prasangika-madhyamakas do not simply find faults in all
positions and reject all positions as their own. They only deny any
thesis that presupposes an intrinsic existence. They do hold a
specific thesis, to wit, that all phenomena lack an intrinsic
existence. They use reasoning and logic that lacks any essential
reality to establish this thesis. Such reasoning derives its
efficacity on a conventional level through the natural workings of
dependent origination. This is one of the most contentious assertions
of Tsongkhapa.



Tsongkhapa's rejection of any form of self-referential consciousness
(Sk. *sva-samvitti*, *sva-samvedana*) (the
fifth point) is in essence a rejection of
Santaraksita's position that such self-referential or
reflexive awareness is necessary to explain the self-evidential nature
of consciousness, and to explain the privileged access the conscious
person has to their own consciousness as immediate and veridical
(Garfield
 2006).[3]
 At issue is the status of the knowing subject engaged in the
intellectual pursuit of the truly real. Tsongkhapa holds that such a
knowing subject has no essential reality at all.



Such a position requires of Tsongkhapa an explanation of memory. His
solution is to deny that when you remember seeing object *X*
you also remember the conscious act of seeing it. (Were you to do so,
there would have to be an aspect of the earlier consciousness of the
object that was equally conscious of itself, i.e., self-referential.)
Instead, Tsongkhapa argues, memory is simply the earlier consciousness
of object *X*, now designated "past." When
designated past, inexorably (or inferentially, as it were) the
presence of a consciousness of the past object *X* is required
to make sense of the present reality.



Tsongkhapa characterizes basic ignorance (Sk. *avidya*),
the root cause of suffering in Buddhist philosophy, not as a latent
tendency, but as an active defiling agency (Sk.
*klesavarana*) that projects a reality onto
objects that is in fact absent from them. This ignorance affects even
sense perception and explains the veridical aspect that is, in fact,
just error. The residual impressions left by distortion (literally
"perfumings" Sk. *vasana*) explain the
mere appearance of things as real. Beyond that, he asserts that
habituation to this distortion prevents conventional and ultimate
reality from appearing united in an appearing object. This explanation
of the psychology of error differs markedly from earlier Tibetan
explanations and constitutes the sixth difficult point.



In Tsongkhapa's mature philosophy the Mahayana altruistic
principle (*bodhicitta*) is the sole criterion for
distinguishing authentic Mahayana views and practices from
non-Mahayana ones. By privileging the principle in this way
he is able to assert that any authentic realization of truth is a
realization of the way things are, namely, a realization of no
*sva-bhava* (Sk.) ("own-being, own-nature, intrinsic
identity"). For Tsongkhapa, therefore, Hinayanists (by
which he intends followers of the basic Buddhist doctrine of the Four
Noble Truths set forth in the earliest scriptures), necessarily have
the same authentic knowledge of reality. Were they not to have such
knowledge, he argues, they could not have reached the goals they
reached (the seventh point).



Finally, Tsongkhapa has a robust explanation of the difference between
true and false on the covering or conventional level. He denies any
difference between a false object (a dream lottery ticket, for
example) and a real one; as appearances, he asserts, both are equally
false, only convention decides which is true. All phenomena equally
lack truth. In Tsongkhapa's mature philosophy, therefore, *all*
appearance is false--to appear is to appear as being truly
what the appearance is of, and the principle of dependent origination
precludes such truth from according with the way things actually
are.



Tsongkhapa holds that sentences and their content and minds and what
appears to them function in the same way. Saying (1) of a set of
"true" and "false" statements that they are
all equally untrue, and (2) saying of unmediated sense-based
perception or mistaken ideas that they are equally untrue is to say
the same thing. The truth in both is decided by convention, not by
something inhering in the true statement (or its content), or the
valid perception (or its object). For Tsongkhapa, therefore, since all
appearance is false, the Buddha knows, but without any appearance of
truth (the eighth difficult point).



Towards the very end of his life, in his *Medium-Length Exposition
of the Path* and *Elucidation of the Intention* Tsongkhapa
defends his views against Rongton's (*rong stong shes bya kun
rig*) (1367-1449) criticism that his earlier and later works are
inconsistent. Tsongkhapa extends his comparison of Candrakirti's
and Bhaviveka's interpretations of Nagarjuna to more
clearly identify a less subtle object of negation in the works of
Yogacara-svatantrika-madhyamaka writers, particularly
Jnanagarbha (8th century) and Santaraksita
(Hopkins 2008, Part One, Yi 2015). Tsongkhapa finds in their works an
analysis leading beyond the Yogacara's mere absence of a
substantial difference between known object and knowing subject, but
limited insofar as it negates the ultimate truth of all objects
appearing to conventional awareness while still allowing room for an
object of negation that does not appear to sense perception. 



Dreyfus et al (2011) and Falls (2010) suggest parallels between the
issues raised by the Svatantrika-Prasangika
difference and some recent work in Western philosophy. They are
helpful for those familar with Western philosophy but unfamiliar with
Tsongkhapa, surveying questions that arise from the interaction of
philosophical traditions from different cultures. Falls argues
Tsongkhapa's philosophy is a therapeutea not a theoria and draws
parallels between issues raised by Tsongkhapa and John McDowell's
interpretation of Wilfrid Sellars in particular. 


## 4. Hermeneutics



A distinctive feature of Tsongkhapa's mature philosophy is the
centrality he accords hermeneutics, and the particular stratification
of philosophical systems it occasions. His focus on hermeneutics stems
in no small measure from his acceptance of the Kanjur as a true record
of authentic statements of the Buddha, and also from his wish to
discredit Dolpopa's views. According to Tsongkhapa, and worked out in
detail in his *Essence of Eloquence*, the given record of the
Buddha's diverse statements seems to contain contradictions, so a
reader must decide on criteria for interpreting them. No statement of
the Buddha can serve as a primary hermeneutic principle, so that
principle necessarily becomes human reason (Sk. *yukti*, Tib.
*rigs pa*).



When human reason is brought to bear on the diverse statements of the
Buddha, it concludes that all statements that an essential or
intrinsic identity exists, or any statements that presupposes that,
cannot be taken literally, at face value. This is because human
reason, when it analyzes the ultimate truth of any object or
statement, finds it empty of anything intrinsic to it that would make
it true. For Tsongkhapa, the line of reasoning that leads most clearly
to this conclusion is dependent origination.



Statements that require interpretation Tsongkhapa groups into those of
different Buddhist philosophical schools: in ascending order, Listener
(Sk. *Sravaka*) schools based on older Buddhist
sources (the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika),
Yogacara schools following Asanga and
Dignaga/Dharmakirti, and non-Prasangika
Madhyamaka schools following Bhaviveka and
Santaraksita. The Prasangika-madhyamaka
school of Candrakirti alone captures the final intention of the
Buddha. Tsongkhapa was certainly not the first doxographer, but his
clear and definitive categories had immense influence on later
writers, so much so they have anachronistically been read back into
works that were written before his time.



Tsongkhapa's particular hermeneutics, the primary means he employs to
lead readers to his philosophical insight, allows him to characterize
particular, authentic, Buddhist philosophies as wrong (because they
are wrong from a Prasangika perspective), yet right from
the perspective of those particular systems. They are right because
the philosophies have particular roles to play in a larger, grander
scheme. This scheme is part of the larger philosophy of a perfect
person whose views are in perfect accord (Sk. *tathagata*)
with the way things are, i.e., dependently originated, and whose
statements are motivated solely by the benefit they have to those who
hear them.



In this way, Tsongkhapa's hermeneutics lead to, or incorporate, a
second principle, namely, *bodhicitta* (Sk.). The word
*bodhicitta* has at least six different, but interrelated
meanings in different contexts (Wangchuk 2007). In his philosophical
works Tsongkhapa uses it to mean a universal, altruistic principle
(not unlike the *logos*) that explains, primarily, the genesis
of the Buddha's diverse statements, i.e., explains why a person with
perfect intellect and powers of expression would make statements that
seem to contain contradictions.



This principle plays a central role in Tsongkhapa's assertion that all
authentic attainments, without distinction, are based on an authentic
insight into emptiness (the seventh of the eight difficult points
listed above), and it leads him to assert that the
"origin" of the Mahayana is located in
*bodhicitta*, and *bodhicitta* alone


## 5. Ethics



Tsongkhapa is part of a long, shared, Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition
that conceives of ethical conduct not in absolute terms, but in the
context of different individuals in different situations. There is an
unspoken presupposition that ethical statements are grounded in
reality, in the sense that suffering (Sk. *duhkha*) comes
from actions (Sk. *karma*) that are not in accord with the way
things actually are (Tib. *dngos po'i gnas lugs*). The person
is ultimately not present as an ethical subject, but is so, on a
conventional or covering level, through the natural working of
dependent origination.



Tsongkhapa groups such individuals into three separate categories
(those who privilege basic Buddhist codes, bodhisattvas, and
tantrikas). Each is governed by an ethical code (Tib. *sdom
gsum*), each superior code subsuming the points of the lesser.
Beyond these three, his *Great Exposition* suggests ordinary
ethical conduct is codified as well, in the main, in the ten ethical
points (Sk. *dasa-kusala-patha*) basic to any human
life that rises above the mere animal.



The first of the three specifically Buddhist codes, the basic code,
primarily governs the behavior of monks and nuns. Since for Tsongkhapa
each higher code incorporates all the rules in the lower code, he
conceives of the seven (or even twelve) sub-codes making up the basic
code as, in descending order, containing fewer and fewer of the rules
that constitute the full code. Each of the sub-codes is designed for
particular people in particular human situations. Tsongkhapa does not
expect a butcher to be governed by the rule of not killing, for
example, and he does not expect a lawyer to be governed by the rule of
not lying. He avoids gross devaluation of the basic code by
privileging spiritual elites. In this, he takes a pragmatic approach
to ethics in line with his non-absolutist stance. For Tsongkhapa, it
is axiomatic that human life is not *ipso facto* privileged
above any other form of life, but his detailed explanation gives
greater "weight" to the karmic retribution that comes from
killing humans, and amongst humans, noble persons, for example, than
less fortunate forms of life.



Tsongkhapa's explanation of the bodhisattva moral code presented in
the *Bodhisattva-bhumi* (Tatz 1987) follows naturally from
the importance he gives to the altruistic principle
(*bodhicitta*) in his other writing. He reconciles rules in the
bodhisattva code that enjoin behavior contradicting the basic code by
positing an elite that, through a *noblesse oblige* of the
spiritually advanced, are required to do things which would be
unethical in an ordinary person. Their not doing so constitutes an
ethical lapse. For example, the basic code prohibits actions that
influence what food a donor puts in the begging bowl (with a few
exceptions for human flesh and so on), and prohibits eating after
noon. The bodhisattva code contradicts the basic code insofar as it
prohibits eating meat, even though, by so doing, the donor does not
get the opportunity to make charity. Tsongkhapa argues that if a monk
at the bodhisattva stage of development eats meat it clashes with the
dictates of the altruistic principle (*bodhicitta*).



Tsongkhapa accepts that the diverse body of literature, including the
historically latest Buddhist tantras (some of which are distinctly
antinomian in character), are the work of a fully awakened being (Sk.
*buddha*). The last of the three codes systematizes the conduct
espoused in these tantras. Tsongkhapa's presentation is distinctive
for finding a code complete with a full ordination ceremony. The
practical result of his presentation is to revalue the basic code for
monks, and devalue the ritual of tantric consecration as it pertains
to ethical conduct. It stresses ethical conduct even in the context of
works that appear, in line with the nihilistic drift of Buddhist
philosophy, to count ethical codes as a block to the highest spiritual
and philosophical attainment.



For Tsongkhapa the tantric code is only for the very highest spiritual
elite, mainly monks and nuns. Tsongkhapa divides tantras into two
sections, and says the lower section is governed exclusively by the
bodhisattva code, supplemented by specific ritual injunctions (Sk.
*vrata*). He gives two interpretations of the rules for the
higher tantras, reserving the truly antinomian behavior for a
theoretical elite whose altruism is so strong, and whose understanding
and status is so ennobled, that they engage in what ordinarily would
be condemned as gross immorality. According to this code, it is an
ethical lapse not to eat meat, perhaps even human flesh, the logic
being that in certain specific and unusual circumstances, in a person
at this stage of development, such behavior would constitute a
skillful means to benefit others.


## 6. Tantra



Tsongkhapa does not have a different tantric philosophy. His
Prasangika Middle Way is the philosophical position he
articulates in his works on tantra. He does however, unlike in his
non-tantric works, accept that those propounding Idealistic
philosophies (Yogacara, Svatantrika Middle Way) can
have success in their practice. In this he reveals again the
importance of the central Tibetan philosophical tradition going back
to Santaraksita.



Tsongkhapa conceives of tantra as a subset of the Mahayana,
and to that extent all authentic Buddhist tantric activities are,
necessarily, authentically altruistic. What differentiates tantric
activity from other ordinary Mahayana activities is deity
yoga (Tib. *lha'i rnal 'byor*), i.e., whether or not, from a
first person perspective, the person is acting as a perfect,
"divine" subject when engaging in (primarily ritual)
behavior.



Tsongkhapa wrote works on the *Vajrabhairava*,
*Cakrasamvara* (Gray 2017), and *Kalacakra*
tantras, but is best known for his exposition of the
*Guhyasamaja* tantra based on Indian commentaries
associated with the names of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva,
particularly his short but influential *Commentary on the
Jnana-vajra-samuccaya* (*Ye shes rdo rje kun las
'dus pa'i ti ka*) (1410), and magisterial
*Clear Exposition of the Five Stages of Guhyasamaja*
(*gSang 'dus rim lnga gsal sgron*) (1411) (Thurman 2011,
Kilty 2013). He accords great importance to esoteric yoga. In this
respect, his work is firmly located in the mainstream Tibetan
tradition, influenced in particular by the translator Mar pa (Mar pa
Chos kyi blo gros) (1012-1097), who spread the *Six Teachings
of Naropa* (*Na ro chos drug)*, a later Indian
synthesis of diverse tantric practices, in Tibet. Based on this
Tsongkhapa gives detailed explanations of the
*nadi* (channels for the energy or feelings
that run through the tantric practitioner's body), *cakra*
(circles of channels in the heart, throat, and other central points up
the center of the body from the bottom of the spine, or tip of the sex
organ, to the top of the head) and *candali*
(an intense pleasure experienced as heat that spreads through the
channels and fills the body). Tsongkhapa is praised, in particular,
for his explanation of theory and praxis associated with the illusory
body (Sk. *maya-kaya*, Tib. *sgyu lus*)
and clear light (Sk. *prabhasvara*, Tib. *'od
gsal*), a skillful adaptation of his understanding of the two
truths to yogic praxis (Natanya 2017). This is summed up nicely in the
statement, "The
*Pancakramasamgrahaprakasa (Illumination of
the Summary of the Five Steps)*, a short treatise attributed to
Naropa (956-1040), combining the Six Teachings with the
'Five Steps' (*pancakrama*) of the Arya
tradition provided Tsong kha pa with the basic ideas of his Tantric
system" (Tillemans 1998).