## 1. Life and Circle



Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Yahya ibn as-Sa'igh at-Tujibi Ibn
Bajja was known to the Latin philosophers as Avempace. We can assume
that he was born in Saragossa some years before 1085, when the city
was the capital of the Taifa kingdom of the Banu Hud. Yusuf
al-Mu'tamin Ibn Hud reigned from 1081-1085; he was
outstanding in all the sciences including mathematics (Rashed 2012,
721-766) and he largely contributed to the development of the
city as a cultural center. His successor al-Musta`in II reigned
until the year 1110 when he was killed in the battle of Valtierra that
Alfonso the Christian King of Aragon won. Avempace had been in the
service of al-Musta'in II Ibn Hud because he praised him in his
poems showing familiarity with the emir (Maqqari-N: vol. 7, p. 25)
(Ibn Khaqan 1989, p. 943). Al-Musta'in II Ibn Hud was followed
by `Imad ad-Dawla Ibn Hud who stayed in power only for a few
months. In the same year, 1110, he was overthrown by the Almoravid
Sultan `Ali ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin (ruled 1107-1143), who
sent Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad Ibn al-Hajj, governor of Valencia
(and the East province), with the Almoravid army to conquer Saragossa.
`Imad ad-Dawla had to leave the town and retire to Rueda, a
fortress located some distance from Saragossa.



After Ibn al-Hajj's death in 1114, the Almoravid Sultan
appointed his brother-in-law Abu Bakr `Ali ibn Ibrahim
as-Sahrawi, known as Ibn Tifilwit, as the governor of the
 province.[1]
 The connection of Avempace to Ibn Tifilwit is well attested by
al-Maqqari, Ibn al-Khatib (Ibn al-Khatib 1973, 412-417) and Ibn
Khaqan. Avempace composed panegyrics for Ibn Tifilwit who rewarded him
lavishly. The emir was living in the fortified palace of
Al-Ja'fariyya and the construction was reminiscent of the
castles in the Arabian desert, so that in a long poem Avempace refers
to their days spent in Al-Mushaqqar, one of the fortresses often
mentioned in pre-Islamic poetry (Ibn Khaqan 1989, 934-935).
Avempace also wrote poems of the *muwasshaha* kind that pleased
him, and they both enjoyed music and wine. Abu Bakr Ibn Tifilwit had
nominated Avempace his vizier, and Avempace went to meet the deposed
'Imad ad-Dawla Ibn Hud King in his castle apparently in a
diplomatic mission, but he ended up in his jail for some months. Ibn
Tifilwit died in 1116 in an operation against the Christians and
Avempace composed moving elegies in his memory (Ibn Khaqan 1989: 937,
943).



King Alfonso *the Battler* conquered Saragossa from the
Almoravids on December 18, 1118, after a long blockade. It is not
clear whether Avempace then left town or had already left. We know
that he looked for shelter in Xatiba in the court of Abu Ishaq
Ibrahim ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashufin, known as Ibn Ta`yasht because
Ta'yasht was the name of his Berber mother. Ibrahim was a
brother of the Sultan 'Ali Ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin (d. 1143), and
governor of Murcia and the Eastern part of al-Andalus. Avempace was
again imprisoned and we may guess the causes. Abu Marwan 'Abd
Malik bn Abi l-'Ala' Zuhr (d. 1161) was a famous physician
in the service of Ibrahim (he wrote for him the *Kitab
al-Iqtisad*), and al-Maqqari informs us that there was an extreme
enmity between Avempace and the father of 'Abd al-Malik, also a
physician, named Abu l-'Ala' Zuhr (d. 1130) (Maqqari-N:
vol. 3, pp. 432-434). Even worse for him, Abu Nasr al-Fath Ibn
Muhammad Ibn Khaqan (d. 1134?) was also a courtier of Ibn
Ta'yasht, to whom he devoted the *Qala'id
 al-iqyan*[2]
 a poetry anthology where he contemptuously put Avempace in last place
(Ibn Khaqan 1989: 931-947), and where he also disqualified him
as a poet, accusing him of plagiarism. The court of Ibrahim ibn Yusuf
was not a welcoming place for him.



In spite of the incident, Avempace remained within the Almoravid
circle for the rest of his life and for approximately twenty years
served as vizier of the mentioned Yahya ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin,
another brother of the Sultan 'Ali Ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashufin in the
Maghrib (Maqqari-N: vol.3, p. 28). Vincent Lagardere has done
the most extended research on the Almoravids in recent times and
provided us with information on all the children of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin
(Lagardere 1989: 80 and 174-178). Nevertheless,
Lagardere has not found any information on Yahya other
than he was a son of Yusuf and his wife Zaynab, and that he was born
around 1084. Thus, he was of a similar age to Avempace.



From around 1118 until 1136, we have no further information on
Avempace's life. In 1136, he was in Seville and his disciple Abu
l-Hasan Ibn al-Imam was in his company (IB-coll-alawi: 87). He
mentions in one of his writings that he is moving to Oran
(IB-coll-genequand: 202 SS60), maybe in his planned trip to Egypt
(IB-coll-genequand: 90 SS1). Nevertheless, three years later, in
Ramadan 533/ May 1139, Avempace died in Fez.



As for the causes of his death, several sources point to poisoning.
Al-Maqqari recounts that Ibn Ma'yub was a servant of the
physician Abu l-'Ala' Ibn Zuhr, his enemy, and that Ibn
Ma'yub was suspected of poisoning him with an eggplant
(Maqqari-N: vol. 4, pp. 12-13), but Abu l-'Ala' Zuhr
(not Ibn Zuhr) had already died in 1130 at Cordova, and lived in
Seville most of his life. The rivalry between the two was widely known
and M. Forcada has exhaustively analyzed it on the base of some
satirical verses ascribed to them (Forcada 2021) but the enmity should
not be so extreme to cross the limit of poisoning. The general
impression is that Yahya ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin did not support
Avempace any longer.



The Almoravids bestowed their support on Avempace and other non
religious scholars in spite of being very reverential to the Malikite
jurists. Abu 'Abd Allah Malik ibn Yahya Ibn Wuhayb
al-Azdi (1061-1130) (Dunlop 1955b) cultivated all sciences
including philosophy but none of his works is extant. Nevertheless,
the Amir al-Mu'minin 'Ali ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin made him
his vizier and his friend. Al-Maqqari informs us that 'Ali
called him from Seville to Marrakech and appointed him *qadi*
of Marrakech. He ordered him to discuss religious matters with Ibn
Tumart, the intellectual founder of the Almohad movement (Maqqari-N:
vol. 3, pp. 479-480). Al-Maqqari says that Avempace supported
him, but we do not know anything more about their relationship
(Maqqari-N: 3: 434).



We are better informed about his friends Abu Ja'far Yusuf ibn
 Hasday[3]
 and Abu l-Hasan 'Ali ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn al-Imam
 al-Ansari.[4]
 Ibn al-Imam was from Saragossa too and was vizier of Abu Tahir Tamim
Ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin al-Mu'izz, (1072-1126) the eldest
son of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, brother of the ruling Sultan and governor of
Granada and later of the whole al-Andalus. Tamim was a hero, being the
winner in the battle of Ucles in 1108.



Ibn al-Imam and Avempace were friends for years; we have several
letters that Avempace wrote to him on philosophical issues. Dunlop
translated the beginning of an incomplete letter of Avempace to Ibn
al-Imam in which Avempace refers to a treatise he composed during his
second
 imprisonment.[5]
 As Ibn Khaqan reported, Avempace was imprisoned by Abu Ishaq Ibrahim
ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin for a second time, after 1118 (Ibn Khaqan, 1989,
p. 941).



Avempace's works are mainly preserved in following
manuscripts:


* Oxford Bodleian, Pococke 206,
* Berlin, Ahlwardt 5060 WE87 (now Krakow, Biblioteka
Jagiellonska),
* Tashkent, 2385/92,
* Escorial, Derenbourg 612,
* Cairo, Dar al-kutub, Akhlaq 290,
* Istanbul, Carullah 1279,
* Ankara, Library of the Faculty of History and Geography, Ismail
Saib I 1696 (Taylor 1982).



The copyist of manuscript Pococke 206 wrote on folio 120a that he
copied his text from an original that included the handwriting of Ibn
al-Imam. "The vizier finished the reading of this section under
him [Avempace] on the 15th of Ramadan 530" (June 17,
1136) and the place was Seville (*IB-coll-alawi*: 87). Ibn
al-Imam was governor (*'amil*) of the town and in charge
of the poll-tax, the copyist added.



When Ibn al-Imam decided to move to the East, Avempace composed the
*Epistle of the Farewell Message* as a spiritual companion for
the travel. Since Avempace died in May 1139, Ibn al-Imam should have
left al-Andalus between 1136 and 1139, after he finished copying many
texts of Avempace which he took with him. From his manuscript another
one, the mentioned Pococke 206, was copied in Qus, in the upper Egypt
in 547/1152 by al-Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad Ibn
an-Nadr when Ibn al-Imam was alive. Thus, 1152 is the earliest date
for Ibn al-Imam's death.



Abu Ja'far Yusuf ibn Hasday is also the recipient of a letter
from Avempace in which he refers to the astronomer az-Zarqalluh,
*Azarquiel* (d. ca. 1000), and also writes about his own order
of
 learning.[6]
 Abu Ja'far (d. 1123) was the great-great-grandson of the famous
Jewish scholar and statesman Hasday Ibn Shaprut (ca. 910-ca.
970; Stroumsa 2016). Ibn Abi Usaybi'a includes in Abu
Ja'far's biography his history of
 physicians,[7]
 and reports his friendship with Avempace. Sa'id Ibn Sa'id
gives a biography of probably his grandfather, Abu l-Fadl Hasday ibn
Yusuf (fl. 485/1092), "of the city of Saragossa and of the
Jewish nobility in al-Andalus" who was first to read
Aristotle's *Physics* and *De caelo* in
 al-Andalus.[8]



Abu Ja'far Yusuf ibn Hasday moved to the East and from 1121 to
1125 he worked for al-Ma'mun al-Bata'ihi, a vizier of the
Fatimid Caliph al-Amir. He wrote for him commentaries on Hippocrates
and was involved in building an observatory at Cairo known as the
Ma'muni Observatory (Maqrizi 1913: 174-176). The
observatory was demolished when the vizier fell into disgrace in 1125.
Dunlop added a few names to the circle of Avempace, like Abu l-Hasan
Ibn Judi, a younger friend, but Malik Ibn Wuhayb, 'Ali Ibn
al-Imam and Abu Ja'far Ibn Hasday are the outstanding figures in
his circle. See
 Annex 1
 for a discussion of sources on his life.


## 2. Foundation and Organization of the Sciences



Ibn al-Imam (IB-coll-fakhry: 177-178) produced the first list of
Avempace's writings, which was followed by Ibn Abi
Usaybi'a in his bio-bibliography (mentioned above, 1886, 2001).
A scholarly account was first made by the late Jamal ad-Din
al-'Alawi (1983) who not only described manuscripts and
printings, but also tried to determine which works ascribed to
Avempace are authentic, as well as to establish the chronology of his
writings and, on this basis, to draw a developmental account of his
thought.



Al-'Alawi based his chronology on the before mentioned letter
which Avempace sent to his friend Abu Ja'far Yusuf ibn Hasday in
which he explained that he first learned about mathematical sciences,
music and astronomy. He went on to study logic using the books of
Alfarabi and later devoted himself to physics, the philosophy of
nature. We understand that Avempace had not worked with metaphysics
yet. J. Al-'Alawi distinguished three stages in Avempace's
development and classified his writings according to these stages. His
writings on music, astronomy and logic belong to the first stage;
those on natural philosophy to the second; and those most
representative of his thinking--the *Rule of the
Solitary*, the *Epistle of Conjunction* and the
*Farewell Message*--to the third and last stage.



Avempace himself tells us how these sciences are organized. He
followed other Andalusians in turning to Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Alfarabi
(d. *ca*. 950), for instruction in logic and in classifying the
sciences. Alfarabi is the author of a treatise
"enumerating" the sciences (Farabi 1952) and some books of
the introductory genre: *Epistle with which the book on logic
begins* (Dunlop 1957a), *Sections containing all what needs the
beginner in logic* (Dunlop 1955), and the *Book of the Eisagoge
or Introduction* (Dunlop 1956).



Avempace wrote commentaries on many of them, beginning with his
annotations on the *Chapters,* or *Sections*, and on the
*Eisagoge*, mixed with ones on the *Categories*. His
annotations are preserved in two manuscripts: Oxford Pococke 206 and,
to a larger extent, Escorial Derenbourg 612. These annotations on the
books belonging to the introductory genre are often intermingled and
may offer different versions ('Alawi 1983: 80-83). We are
changing the order of the Escorial manuscript and analyzing
Avempace's annotations on the *Five Sections* before
those on the *Eisagoge* as they are adressed to one who intends
to learn logic, and the sciences, in general.



*The five sections* of Alfarabi (Alfarabi, 1985-1987, v.
1, pp. 63-74) (Dunlop, 1955) contain general indications on how
to proceed with the study of logic; they are propaedeutic guidelines
(Kleven, 2013-2014). Avempace feels the need for an explanation
why these indications are given and begins his annotations with
it:



> 
> 
> Since all knowledge in every art is "conceptualization"
> (*tasawwur*) of the meanings of the art and it is
> "assent" (*tasdiq*) to what is conceptualized,
> everyone who learns an art logically (*bi-qawl*), when he
> learns this science, he intends to conceptualize its meanings
> (*ma`na*) and to give assent to what he has
> conceptualized, and no one can acquire any science unless he has the
> two (IB-taaliq: 64).
> 
> 
> 



The term *tasawwur* is sometimes translated as
'concept', 'conception,'
'conceptualization', the grasping of an idea;
*tasdiq* is 'assent',
'belief', internal motion, 'adhesion de
l'esprit a un jugement, assentiment' (Goichon
1939). Since Harry A. Wolfson wrote about *tasawwur* and
*tasdiq* and suggested their Stoic origins (Wolfson
1943), considerable research has been done; I refer to the recent
article of M. Forcada on Avempace for a detailed state of the art
(Forcada 2014: 104).



In the first section Alfarabi pleads for having a specific technical
language in each discipline. He refers to expressions that have
different meanings in the colloquial and in the technical language.
When the grammarian hears *raf'*, he understands the
vowel of the nominative case, and not 'lifting a weight'
as the unlearned man does.



Avempace points to the distinction between term (sound,
*lafz*) and meaning (*ma'na*): man
listens to a sound, and gets the meaning that he conceptualized. He
may have conceptualized a first meaning but he must learn that the
term has more than one meaning and how the various meanings are
derivate. This learning happens by means either of a strong mind or of
instruction and Avempace blames the mental deficiency of a student for
not being capable of grasping the derived meaning of the term.



The second section deals with issues raised in Aristotle's
*Topics*. Alfarabi classifies knowledge into argumentative and
intuitive knowledge. Demonstration (*istidlal*), cogitation
(*fikr*), deliberation (*ru'ya*), and deduction
(*instinbat*) are four kinds of argumentative knowledge.
Cogitation and deliberaation belong to the Aristotelian tradition
(d*ianoia*, *boule*), but demonstration and
deduction are found in Islamic theology and other Islamic sciences.
Intuitive knowledge comprises accepted opinions, things generally
known, sense perceptions, and first intelligibles.



Avempace does not pay any attention to these important issues. On the
contrary, he focusses on the classes of assent, he complains that many
people lack the distinction between the degrees of assent "and
maybe the most difficult is the most powerful in them"
(IB-taaliq: 65). It is important that the learner of a discipline
knows its degrees, he insists.



The third section is related to Aristotle's C*ategories*
but it deals only with the difference between the essential and the
accidental. The opposition between 'essential-accidental'
lies in the background of Avempace's annotations too, but, in
addition, he aims at conceptualization and assent; concerning the
former he writes:



> 
> 
> What exists in something either exists in it by itself, and it is that
> which is intended by the conceptualization, or it exists in it
> accidentally, and is that which is not intended but it is flung away
> (IB-taaliq: 65).
> 
> 
> 



Philosophers as well as the practitioners of any discipline have to
conceptualize what is essential, although he points out that the
accidental and the essential often coincide in one subject. The
Alfarabian fourth section describes the five ways of anterior and
posterior: in time, by nature, in precedence, in excellence, as cause
to effect and his division echoes that of Aristotle in the book of
*Categories*. Avempace sees the distinction as the way to
understand equivocity -- primary and derivative sense, and
focuses on three senses of anterior and posterior: in precedence, in
excellence, as cause, because the three kinds concern
conceptualization and assent.



Priority in precedence "is of great avail for the
conceptualization , for the assent, and for the easiness to keep that
which one conceptualizes and that to which one gives assent"
(IB-taaliq: 69). Priority in cause means that essential things precede
other essential things and the concept has to abide by this priority.
Priority in excellence means that essential is more excellent than
accidental and the concept has to show it. Priority in cause and in
excellence are "degrees" that are applied to the matching
concepts in the soul. The benefit of priority and posteriority
regarding the cause and the perfection, or excellence, results from
the fact that



> 
> 
> Man understands the grades of assent while conceptualizing so that it
> may grasp the received (maqbul) where it is needed, the generally
> admitted (mashhur) where it is needed, and the intelligible
> (ma`qul) likewise (IB-taaliq: 69).
> 
> 
> 



The sequence 'received,' 'generally admitted',
and 'intelligible' corresponds to degrees of certainty for
Avempace. The 'received' seems to be so from an authority
of belief, the 'generally admitted' is that which
qualifies the premisses of dialectical syllogisms, and the
'intelligible' is the direct apprehension of an object.
The highest grade of assent belongs to the 'received', the
'generally known' to the intermediate degree, and the
'intelligible' to the lowest grade.



Alfarabi's fifth section is related to Aristotle's *De
interpretatione.* He distinguishes between simple and composite
expressions; the simple expresssions are three: name, vocable
(*kalimah*) and instrument. "The vocable, the Arab
grammarians know it as the verb (*fi`l*), and the
instrument they call it the particle (*harf*)"
(Dunlop 1955, 278). Avempace immediately links the classification of
terms with the construction of science and he justifies the section
saying:



Any learner of a logical art must have an ability to distinguish the
signs (*dalal*) of the terms in order to conceptualize the
meanings of this art in his mind; he obtains the meanings from the
terms pointing to them (IB-taaliq: 71. 9-11).



His idea of science can be defined as obtaining concepts from meanings
and producing them in his mind, as opposite to memorization. Learning
by heart all the terms would never be a science and Avempace adds that
understanding "everything written in a book" implies
understanding the meanings of the terms contained in it. The ability
to discern (*mayz*) the signs of the terms is the key condition
to learn any theoretical art. Although the ability exists in most
people, the vast majority stifle it from a very young age and Avempace
blames this behavior as the main cause for the ignorance, and not the
natural lack of ability to discern.



Avempace sees a hierarchy in the three simple expressions: The name
precedes the verb, and this, the instrument. Verbs are either
existential or non-existential. By contrast to Alfarabi, the basic
function of existential verbs is connective, and it is shared with the
particle. The difference between the particle and the eanxistential
verb is that time inheres to the existential verb, but it is absent in
the particles (IB-taaliq: 73. 11-15).



Finally, he deals with the "composite expressions"
(*alfaz murakkabah*) of two or three simple expressions.
Alfarabi had classified them into declaratory, conditional,
particularizing, and restrictive. Avempace comments on this and
expresses his particular view about what conditional is:



> 
> 
> The expression 'condition' is appropriately predicated of
> the composition of the meanings that are appropriate to universal
> things without the mind apprehending their universality, but the mind
> assumes that they are attributes in the thing (IB-taaliq: 75.
> 20-23).
> 
> 
> 



Avempace does not understand conditional in the ordinary sense of
protasis, the conditional sentence, opposite to apodosis, the main
sentence. He thinks in terms of opposition between universal and
particular and categories of genus and species.



Although for Alfarabi each of the *five sections* are
propedeutical, Avempace sees in them some instruments needed for the
construction of science in general, namely, conceptualization and
assent, grades of certainty, and the integration of composite
expressions into the categories of genus and species, something that
leads us to his interpretation of the *Eisagoge*.



Porphyry's *Eisagoge* was translated into Arabic by Abu
'Uthman Ya'qub ad-Dimashqi (*fl.* 914) and his
translation was used by Alfarabi in his *Book of the Eisagoge
(Isaghuji) or Introduction (Madkhal*). In his *Eisagoge*,
Porphyry established five universal "meanings": genus,
species, differentia, property, and accident, as the foundations of
logic, the first element of a chain, the highest development of which
is the syllogism. Alfarabi opened his *Introduction* with the
following statement:



> 
> 
> Our purpose in this book is the enumeration of the things of which
> judgments are composed and into which they are divided, i.e., the
> parts of parts of the syllogistic expressions employed in general in
> all the syllogistic arts. (*Eisagoge* [Dunlop 1956: 127,
> {Arabic 118.3-4}])
> 
> 
> 



Avempace comments on his words but when he comes to "in all the
syllogistic arts", he moves to another treatise of Alfarabi
(*Risalah* [Dunlop 1957a: Arabic, pp. 225-225, English
transl. 230-231]), and seizes the opportunity to expound on
their common classification of the syllogistic arts. There are five:
"philosophy and the [four] arts". The four arts are
dialectic, sophistic, rhetoric, and poetry. He uses Alfarabi's
words and explains what makes them syllogistic: "It is in the
nature of the syllogistic arts to be employed [for their own sake]
once they are assembled and completed, and not to have an action as
their
 end".[9]



Philosophy embraces all beings "insofar as it knows them with
*certain* science" (Ibn Bajja, Fakhry 1994: 27). Thus,
two requirements are to be fulfilled: certainty of knowledge and
universality of scope, and these requirements hold only for the five
divisions of philosophy: metaphysics, physics, practical philosophy,
mathematics, and logic.



Metaphysics aims at those beings which are the ultimate causes; they
are neither a body nor in a body. Physics or natural science aims at
the natural bodies, the existence of which does not depend on human
will at all. Practical philosophy--which Avempace calls
"voluntary science"--aims at beings produced by the
human will and choice.



Mathematics deals with beings abstract from their matters, although
endowed with number and measure, and is divided into arithmetic,
geometry, optics, astronomy, music, mechanics or the science of
weights, and the "science of devices," which studies:



> 
> 
> How to bring into existence many of the things proved theoretically in
> mathematics, where the worth of the device consists of removing
> hindrances that, perhaps, hindered their existence. There are
> numerical devices--like the algebra, geometrical ones--like
> those for measuring the surface of bodies which are impossible to
> access, astronomical devices, optical--like the art of
> mirrors-- musical, and mechanical. (Alwuzad 1988: 253.
> 7-11; IB-taaliq: 28. 9-11)
> 
> 
> 



We shall soon see that astronomy occupies a particular place in the
system because its subject results from optical observation. Logic is
the fifth and last division of philosophy and focuses on properties
that beings acquire in the human mind; "because of such
properties and their knowledge [logic] becomes an instrument for
apprehending the right and the truth in beings" (IB-taaliq: 28.
13-14). Avempace remarks that for this reason some people
consider logic to be only an instrument and not a part of philosophy,
but insofar as these properties have real existence, logic can be
integrated into philosophy. He concludes that logic is both part and
instrument of philosophy.



Since a distinguishing feature of philosophy is the use of the
apodictic syllogism (*burhan*) because it is the only one that
yields certain knowledge, not all syllogistic sciences can be
considered parts of philosophy by Avempace. He enumerates four such
non-philosophical arts: Dialectic relies only on opinion and negates
or asserts something through methods of general acceptance. Sophistry
aims at beings insofar as it misrepresents them and deceives us: it
makes the false look true, and the true, false. And following the
tradition initiated by the Greek commentators on Aristotle, Avempace
includes *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* in logic (IB-taaliq:
28-29). These four arts use other kinds of syllogism but only to
convince another, not to infer the truth, whereas philosophy causes
man to convince another and to infer the truth for
 himself.[10]



The classification of the sciences, indeed, is not complete because
the aforementioned arts are all theoretical and arts like medicine or
agriculture have not been considered. Alfarabi distinguished, at the
beginning of his *Risala,* between syllogistic and
non-syllogistic arts and aligned medicine, agriculture, carpentry with
the second. They were non-syllogistic because, once their parts were
assembled they resulted in doing something, not in employing a
syllogism (Dunlop 1957a: 225). He admitted, nevertheless, that some
parts of these non-syllogistic arts were brought out by syllogisms,
and he mentioned medicine, agriculture and navigation. Avempace was
not as systematic as Alfarabi but he picked up the forgotten
non-syllogistic arts, changed them into "practical arts",
and wrote:



> 
> 
> If some of them [the practical arts] employ syllogisms as medicine and
> agriculture do, they are not called syllogistic because their purpose
> is not [to convince another] nor to employ syllogisms, but to do some
> activity. (IB-taaliq: 29. 17-20)
> 
> 
> 



Avempace composed nine medical treatises (Forcada 2011:
113-114). Forcada has edited, studied, and translated one of
them, his "Commentary on *Aphorisms*", a
supercommentary on Galen's commentary on Hippocrates'
Aphorisms which illustrates Avempace's view about medicine.
Medical syllogisms have their premises specifically obtained by means
of experience. Experience is obtained on its turn by means of
perception through one's life time. Avempace defines
*tajriba,* experience, as an intentional human activity:



> 
> 
> 3. Experience consists in man's intentional perception of the
> particulars [*juz'iyyat*] of some matter in order to
> acquire knowledge from this perception.
> 
> 
> 
> 4. Experience is said in general and in particular. If it is said in
> general, it indicates the intentional perception of the particulars of
> a matter, from which a universal proposition results. These individual
> [instances] may result either from man's will or by nature.
> (Forcada 2011: 146)
> 
> 
> 



Therefore, only general experience is useful to science, but Avempace
ranks experience not as high in certitude as the first intelligible
but second to it, although he makes it essential part of medicine,
insofar as it can yield universal propositions. Avempace occupied
himself again with the issue of the classification of sciences in his
introduction to the *Book of Animals* (IB-BA). He placed the
science of animals within natural philosophy, which falls again within
theoretical philosophy.



> 
> 
> Every theoretical science is composed of principles and problems. The
> results may be called problems (*masa'il*). The
> principles can be concepts (*tasawwur*) and they are uttered by
> spoken sounds that are individual in potency or in actions. The
> principles can be given assent to (*tasdiq*) and they are
> uttered by sentences that are statement-making and necessary. There
> are sciences like geometry where the principles are more general and
> anterior. By "principles", I mean these concepts
> (*tasawwurat*): the triangle is anterior to the equilateral
> triangle and to other kinds of triangles. (IB-BA: 65.5-11)
> 
> 
> 



Ibn Bajja employs the term *tasawwur* in a broad sense,
since *tasawwur* in its proper sense does not express
statements as it here does, but concepts. He is employing also
"problems" in a rare sense since he means here
"statements", he goes on and says:



> 
> 
> Anteriority can be either in itself or in relation to us because of
> our assent that objects equal to a third one are equal is anterior to
> our assent that the sides of the triangle the vertex of which lays
> above equal angles are equal. In these examples, the predicates in the
> principles are the causes of the predicates in the problems, and they
> are anterior in both aspects. (IB-BA: 65.16-66.4)
> 
> 
> 



Geometry and arithmetic do not employ the senses at all but mechanics
and optics do; although their subject matters are sensible beings,
they are in "remote common sensibles". Mechanics and
optics differ from astronomy because the subject of astronomy is
sensible; it needs examination and the astronomer has to try to find
out the causes. Therefore, astronomy follows mechanics and optics, and
the latter follow geometry and arithmetic in the order of particular
to general knowledge.



Both approaches are complementary. In the *Book of Animals,*
Avempace does not insist on the syllogism as the tool with which
sciences are built but he points to the elements, principles or
problems, employed in the propositions that can be part of any
syllogism.


## 3. Logic



Avempace inserted his classification of the sciences into the
*Eisagoge*, a treatise whose aim is to discover the simple
universal categories underlying the parts of the sentences. His master
Alfarabi added the chapters on definition, borrowed from the
Aristotelian *Analytica Posteriora*. Alfarabi had also
introduced, at the beginning and in his enumeration of the parts of
the sentence, the distinction between "sound"
(*lafz*) and "meaning"
(*ma'na*) and said:



> 
> 
> Every predicate and every subject is either a sound signifying a
> meaning or a meaning signified by a certain sound, and every meaning
> signified by a sound is either universal or individual.
> (*Eisagoge*, Dunlop 1956: 119.1-2)
> 
> 
> 



Avempace observes that "subject" and
"predicate" are ambiguous terms because they may refer to
meanings as well as to sounds, and what Alfarabi considers in this
book are the meanings, not the sounds (IB-taaliq: 30. 6-8).
According to their meaning, both parts of the sentence are either
universal or individual. Avempace then follows Alfarabi and divides
universal parts into simple and composite: simple parts of the
sentence are genus, species, specific difference, property, and
accident. Composite parts are the definition, the description, and
"an expression the composition of which is restricted, and is
neither a definition nor a description" (IB-taaliq: 30.
16-17). Avempace's meaning here can only be understood by
reading Alfarabi's *Eisagoge.* Alfarabi defined it as an
expression which



> 
> 
> is made up of species and an accident, as when we say of Zayd that he
> is a white man and sometimes it is made up of accidents, as when we
> say of Zayd that he is an excellent secretary. (*Eisagoge*,
> Dunlop 1956, translation p.
>  137)[11]
> 
> 
> 



The nine categories or sorts are parts of the syllogisms (IB-taaliq:
30. 18-19), according to Avempace and his observations on
"subject" and "predicate" are linked to the
sciences which are built on syllogisms. The philosophical sciences,
dialectic and sophistry, have universal subjects and predicates.
Poetry and rhetoric have individual subjects and universal predicates.
Rhetoric employs one or more individual subjects as well as predicates
in cases in which the syllogism resorts to an image or to
 corroboration[12].



Avempace knew the difficulties of bringing together the Porphyrian
*Eisagoge* with the Aristotelian *corpus* as well as the
need to classify and organize the sciences. He did not leave us a
systematic treatise, but only wrote comments on Alfarabi's
writings. In spite of it, we can perceive a model that starts with the
division of "meaning" into individual and universal,
continues with the distinction between simple and composite
universals, inserts the doctrine of the categories, moves toward the
construction of syllogisms, and develops into the variety of sciences
according to their syllogistic nature or not. Let us deal with the
place of the categories.



The Oxford manuscript marks a new chapter in the text with the heading
"Of his discourse at the beginning of the
*Eisagoge*". Here Avempace divides "meanings"
into two kinds: intelligibles (*ma'qulat*) and
individuals (IB-taaliq: 42. 7). Intelligibles can exist either in the
mind or in something outside of it and they are associated mainly with
the universals. Avempace quotes Aristotle's definition of the
universal: "That which is by its nature predicated of more than
one thing" (*De interp.* 17a 39) but he borrows the
quotation from Alfarabi who commented on the sentence
(*Eisagoge*, Dunlop 1956: 119. 4-13). Avempace has two
interpretations for the passage. The first says: "that which is
by its nature" refers to an actual resemblance so that
universals contain similar individuals "at one and the same
time". By contrast, the second interpretation does not limit the
universals to any moment, and Avempace writes:



> 
> 
> [Aristotle] intended with the expression "that which is by its
> nature" the natural [character of the universal] and its
> disposition to resemble more than one, which does not imply that the
> resemblance exists in its actualization. For it is not impossible for
> the eclipse, insofar it is intelligible, to have a resemblance;
> further it is not impossible for the eclipse to be predicated of many.
> (IB-taaliq: 46. 4-6)
> 
> 
> 



The concepts of possibility and impossibility come into action and the
universal is defined as having the possibility to resemble more than
one, "the possibility inhering in the meaning insofar as it is
intelligible" (IB-taaliq: 46. 10-11). On the contrary, the
individual lacks such possibility; rather, it is impossible for the
individual to resemble more than one.



Any relation, i.e., the Aristotelian category, in order to exist needs
two possibilities, one for each subject of the relation in contrast to
the other nine categories, in which one possibility in one subject is
sufficient. Resemblance is a relation, since it is to be predicated on
two, and both are properties of the classes of intelligibles as well
as of their individuals. The intelligible relations exist in the
categories, not because of their own essence. To sum up, only the
intelligibles possess the possibility of resembling more than one and
are predicted to possess many.



For Avempace, the main purpose of the *Eisagoge* is to explain
the concepts that underlie the ten Aristotelian categories. The first
interpretation of "that which is by its nature" is more
appropriate to this purpose because the second interpretation affects
all beings, but the categories do not affect all beings and they deal
with existents insofar as the mind acquires them. These concepts are
of two kinds: simple and composite. The simple ones are the five
universals and the three composite are the definition, the description
and the aforementioned "restricted composition".



Avempace affirms that the five predicables are not primitive concepts,
but constitute correlations between two universals falling within the
rules of individuals and classes. He says: "Genus, species,
property and accident are correlates (*idafa*) which are
inherent to the intelligibles regarding the quantity of their
subjects" (IB-taaliq: 50). Genus, species and property are
essences inhering in a shared subject; by contrast, the accident is
not an essence and exists outside the subject. The specific difference
is related only to the individual and may be grasped without reference
to the universal.



Avempace's annotations to Alfarabi's *Kitab
al-Madkhal* are more innovative than they might seem at first
sight. He points out that the *Eisagoge* should not be limited
to the exposition of the five "sounds"--maybe six, if
the individual is
 added[13]--and
 that a particular science was needed to lay the foundations for the
*Organon*. He conceives this science as a formal theory of
individuals and classes that is followed by the theory of definition
and description.



Avempace wrote annotations on other logical books of Alfarabi that
were edited by M. T. Danishpazhuh (1989) and by Majid Fakhry
(IB-taaliq), whose edition is complete. The Center of Averroic Studies
in Fes, Morocco, had started the publication of some of them (Alwozad,
1988) and completed them in 1997-2006 (Avempace, Alwozad,
1997).



Alfarabi's books on the Aristotelian *Categories*, *De
interpretatione*, and the *First Analytics*, were also
interpreted by Avempace. Alfarabi had "completed" the
latter with a *Book of the Analysis* and Avempace made an
"exercitation" on it, *Al-Irtiyad fi kitab
at-Tahlil*. His annotation on the *First Analytics*
contains his views on Aristotle's purpose in introducing the
syllogism:



> 
> 
> The purpose of Aristotle in his book "Analytics" is to
> discourse on the syllogistic potency (*al-quwa al-qiyasiyya*)
> because he considered that, if he discoursed on the action of the
> syllogistic potency, he had to do it on the syllogism, just as when he
> discoursed on the natural potency, he had to do it on medicine, that
> is its art. (IB-taaliq: 184. 7-9)
> 
> 
> 



Avempace explains what he understands under "syllogistic
potency": Aristotle sometimes would say that many conclusions
result from one syllogism, and sometimes not only one, and this
possibility is interpreted as "syllogistic potency".
According to Avempace, when Aristotle argues: Every man is an animal
and every animal is sensible, thus every man is
 sensible,[14]
 he means that by action of the syllogistic potency the conclusion
'a certain animal is a man' follows from the assertion
'every man is an animal'.



Avempace links the inversion to the introduction of the fourth figure
of the syllogism in which the middle term is the predicate of the
premise containing the predicate of the conclusion and the subject of
the other premise. "Since [Aristotle] discourses on the action
of the syllogistic potency, he keeps perceiving the fourth figure that
Galen thought he had ignored" (IB-taaliq: 184. 20-21).



The fourth figure is not rejected by Avempace, who tries to safeguard
it by using potency in a specific sense, "syllogistic
potency". He creates a wider framework in which he places the
"five sections" while the core belongs to the standard
syllogistic doctrine.



To this wider framework it belongs Avempace's use of the
syllogism in his book on *Coming-to-be and Passing-away*. When
man argues, he accomplishes a kind of mental movement and the movers
are the premises of the syllogism. Avempace illustrates it with an
example: A man takes our money and travels with it towards Cairo. We
go after him and we have to stop over in the different places of his
way up to when we reach the final point, Cairo. Avempace explains us
the story:



> 
> 
> Since the existence of the final aim depends on the accomplishment of
> a desire, to grasp it is pleasant, and since no other desire
> accompanies it, it is pleasant with such a delight that no pain
> interferes it, neither essentially nor accidentally. In all
> intermediate degrees there is pleasure and pain, and in the first
> degree, that is first matter, only pain. That final aim is permanent
> pleasure and first matter is permanent pain. The desired thing is the
> first mover and the final aim, so that it is both efficient and final
> cause.The arrangement of the premises is similar to that of motion,
> while the concept (*tasawwur*) is similar to first matter, and
> the existence of the final aim is the accomplishment. (IB GC 1995: 35.
> 7-36. 3)
> 
> 
> 



The reference to the syllogism, its premises and its conclusion is far
distant, but the topic how man can attain his perfection, and
therefore his happiness is present here as it is in most of
Avempace's writings as we will see.



The exercitation on the *Analysis* (Alwuzad 2006) relates to a
particular work by Alfarabi concerning the premises of the syllogism
(Mallet 1994). Alfarabi placed it between the *First* and the
*Second Analytics* considering that it provided us with the
laws ruling the formation of the premises, something which became
necessary after the syllogism had been described. Alfarabi linked the
theory of the premises to the *topoi* "places" as
they are understood in the Aristotelian treatise with the same title,
the *Topics*. He defined *topoi*, Arabic
*mawadi'* in these terms:



> 
> 
> They are the universal premises the particular ones of which are
> employed as major premises in every syllogism and every discipline.
> Each topos is employed in many particular premises, some of them are
> employed in dialectics, others in rhetoric, others in the sciences,
> yet others in the rest of intellectual disciplines (Alfarabi, 1986,
> pp. 95. 5-8).
> 
> 
> 



According to Mallet, Alfarabi understood the topoi as the universal
matrices of all possible major premises (Mallet, 1992, pp. vol. 1, p.
127). Mallet does not define 'matrix' in the context, but
its use shows that the term designates that within which, and from
which, a major premise originates.



Avempace understands it in the same way and comments on the
*topoi* at length. His doctrine of conceptualization
(*tasawwur*) is present here also and shows his original
approach.



> 
> 
> If the *topoi* are conceptualized by that which their
> definition completely gives and by the fact that the major premise is
> a major premise taken over from the *topoi*, the definition of
> the *topos* is perfect (IB-taaliq: 195. 3-5).
> 
> 
> 



*Topos* results from conceptualization and does not exist
outside the soul. *Topos* is immaterial, and something general
(*`amm*). 'General' has its own meaning in
Avempace: it comprises universals (*kulliyat*) and particulars,
as well as the specific difference, the definition and its parts, the
description and its parts, properties, accidents, and concomitants,
etc. 'General' helps to elevate the theory of the
*topoi* to a comprehensive theory of syllogisms as vehicles of
knowledge in all disciplines.


## 4. Mathematical Sciences



Al-'Alawi's exposition of three steps in the intellectual
development of Avempace does not conflict with Avempace's view
of the sciences. In fact, Alfarabi was active in the three fields in
addition to the preparatory logic. The first of the three syllogistic
sciences is mathematics that deals with objects deprived of matter but
endowed with number and measure. Mathematics contains various
sciences, among them music and astronomy.



The biographical sources are informed by Avempace's expertise as
a musician and as a composer of *muwashshaha* poetry. In
addition, he has left us a brief composition on the
 melodies[15].
 Avempace expounds on the therapeutic effect of playing the
*'ud,* lute, on the basis of universal harmony existing
between the heavenly spheres and the bodily nature, the humors. Each
chord of the lute is related to one of the four elements: fire, air,
earth, water, and each chord has a beneficial influence on each
disease caused by one of the humors. The chord called *zir*
acts on the bile, the chord *mathna* on the blood, the
chord *mathlat* on the black bile, and the chord *bam*
on the phlegm. Avempace instructs the player how to place the lute on
his body and which finger plays which chord. If the musician plays the
lute in the right way, his day will be most beautiful.



In his letter to Abu Ja'far Yusuf Ibn Hasday (IB-coll-alawi:
77-81), Avempace blames the astronomer az-Zarqalluh for not
having properly understood astronomy and attacks him for his
"Treatise to refute the method employed by Ptolemy to calculate
the apogee of Mercury". This work of az-Zarkalluh is not extant.
J. Samso informs us that Ptolemy's calculation of the
apogee was wrong by approximately 30o and that az-Zarkalluh
calculated the apogee in another work only with an error of 10o
(Samso 1993-1994: 676-677). Avempace, however,
criticizes the method that az-Zarkalluh employed.



Avempace wrote a letter to Abu Zayd 'Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Sayyid
al-Muhandis (IB-coll-alawi: 84-87) about a preliminary question
from the first book of the *Conic Sections* of Apollonius of
Perga (ca. 200 BC). In another letter to his disciple 'Ali Ibn
al-Imam (IB-coll-alawi: 88-96) Avempace mentions Ibn Sayyid as
the discoverer of new procedures in geometry. In addition to this
letter, one passage in his *Commentary on the
 Physics*[16]
 and another in the *Book of animals* (IB-BA: 74) deal with the
*Conic Sections* in a sketchy way. Ahmed Djebbar studied Ibn
Sayyid and Avempace and gathered that both Andalusians were innovative
in their study of warped surfaces resulting from the intersection of
conic and non-conic
 surfaces[17].


## 5. Natural Philosophy and Necessity



Avempace commented very freely on the Aristotelian works and wrote
independent articles on various subjects of personal interest. We are
not always sure which source he read and whether it was the complete
translation or an abridgment. In the case of his commentary on the
 *Meteorology*,[18]
 we know from Paul Lettinck's edition and translation of the
commentary. Lettinck proved that Avempace read the altered version of
the *Meteorology* made by Yahya Ibn al-Bitriq (d. ca.
830; Petraitis 1967).



The Aristotelian treatises dealing mainly with natural philosophy are
the *Physics*, *Coming-to-be and Passing-away*, *On
the Heavens*, and *Meteorology*. This is the traditional
order of their arrangement within the *corpus,* and the books
on the *Animals* are last. Avempace followed the order for his
reading of the *corpus*, wrote his commentaries accordingly and
therefore we should first consider his commentary on the
 *Physics*.[19]



Avempace defines this science as theoretical, the subject of which is
the natural body and says that most of its subject is known by the
senses (IB-SS-fakhry: 15.7-9). Physics works on the basis of
principles insofar as it is theoretical and searches for causes as its
demonstrative science. We should not leave aside the long discussion
on the essence and position of physics in Avempace's
introduction to his *Book of Animals*.



There we learned that the matter of physics is strenuous.



> 
> 
> This science must employ all the potencies [capacities] developed
> previously in mathematics and logical and it employs them only insofar
> they belong to a common genus. (IB-BA: 69. 5-7)
> 
> 
> 



Avempace finally affirms that natural science has various kinds of
principles and problems, and that it contains objects that are not
sensible at all, like the intellect.



Avempace makes clear that natural science or physics is a theoretical
science which requires mastering other sciences. It is not a science
like geometry the objects of which are anterior, both in knowledge and
in reality. Its objects are posterior in knowledge, but Avempace
remarks that some are not related to the senses.



Motion is one of the main issues in the *Physics* and Avempace
had original views on the issue. Book VII of the Aristotelian
*Physics* does not fit into the sequence of Books V, VI and
VIII and its chapters deal with subjects not related to each other.
One of them mentions that every movable or mobile is moved by a mover
different from itself (*Phys.* VII.1, 241b 24). Avempace
considers the tenet that everything is moved by something else, and
says:



> 
> 
> It is evident that the rest of the whole caused by the rest of one of
> its parts takes place in so far as the movable is other than the
> mover, and when the influence (*athar*) of the latter ends, it
> comes to rest. Its influence ends because the mover ceases to act
> either on its own or because something else exerts resistance on it.
> Whenever the mover ceases to act on its own, this happens due either
> to its destruction, or to exhaustion (*kalal*) of the power of
> the mover, or because the cause disappears, or because the motion is
> complete, since the movable has reached the end toward which it was
> moving. (IB-SS-fakhry: 99.16-20. Lettinck 1994:
> 532-533)
> 
> 
> 



"Influence" is not a technical term, but the words
following the quoted text clarify it. Motion necessarily takes place
if a moving power exists in such a condition that enables it to cause
motion and if no contrary moving power exerts resistance. If the
moving power ceases, its influence does too.



The movements involved here are so-called "violent"
movements, as opposed to "natural" ones discussed below.
Avempace sketches a theory of dynamics based on a notion of
"power" different from the Aristotelian notion of
*dynamis*: they are mechanical forces which can join another
force or counteract it by offering resistance. Shlomoh Pines
introduced the term
 "dynamics"[20]
 to define his views, which no doubt were influenced by the tradition
linked to John Philoponus (d. *ca.*
 566).[21]
 There is a minimum amount of moving power for each movable. For
instance, to move a boat a minimum of power is needed, otherwise
"one grain of sand could move the boat" (IB-SS-fakhry:
112.27).



When two opposing powers are equal, there is no motion, and when one
power "overcomes" the other, the body moves until it
suffers "exhaustion" (*kalal*), because any body
moved "violently" creates a contrary power stronger than
the one imposed by the mover, and also because the imposed force
becomes "exhausted". The moving power is also subject to
time and distance factors and the mobile can offer almost no
resistance, so that the absolute terms of proportionality do not
apply.



Another contribution is related to motion in the void. Avempace
analyzes "natural" movements such as a stone's
falling through air and water. They are the movements of the four
elemental bodies: fire, air, water and earth. These movables need a
moving power capable not only of moving them, but also of displacing
the medium through which they pass. Dust particles stay suspended in
the air because, although they possess enough power to go down, their
power is insufficient to displace the air.



Aristotle rejected the possibility of motion in the void because the
medium was essential to natural movement at finite speed
(*Phys*. IV.8). John Philoponus had already expressed the view
that the medium is not a necessary condition, but only provides
resistance. The different velocities with which the stone passes
through the air or the water is only caused by the different density
of the medium; it is not connatural to the medium. As a proof that
motion without any medium, namely, through a void, is possible,
Avempace adduces the movement of the spheres:



> 
> 
> [In the heavens] there are no elements of violent motion, because
> nothing bends their movement, the place of the sphere remains the same
> and no new place is taken by it. Therefore, circular movement should
> be instantaneous, but we observe that some spheres move
> slowly--such as the sphere of fixed stars--and others
> fast--the daily movement--and that there is neither violence
> nor resistance among them. The cause for the different velocities is
> the difference in nobility (*sharf*) between mover and movable.
> (IB-SS-fakhry: 116.13-17)
> 
> 
> 



The role of the medium is not essential, but is only a kind of
resistance, and thus motion in the void is both theoretically possible
and confirmed by the observation of the spheres. Avempace contradicts
Aristotle and advances a doctrine that Galileo will later prove to be
 right.[22]
 The similarity with Philoponus' doctrine is clear, but an
influence is not certain (Lettinck 1994: 549). Said El Bousklaoui
shares the view that Avempace's doctrine although similar to
Philoponus's it is not inherited from it (Bouskaloui 2020).
Bousklaoui links the impetus theory to movement by itself,
"spontaneously", but this view needs further
development.



The treatise *On the Heavens* followed next in the Aristotelian
order but no commentary of Avempace has reached us, and the following
extant commentary is on *Coming-to-be and Passing-away*
(IB-GC). Avempace coincided with Philoponus in a preliminary remark
observing that Aristotle proved in his book *On the Heavens*
the existence of four elementary bodies: fire, air, water, earth.
Since one of the subjects of *Coming-to-be and Passing-away* is
the mutual generation of these bodies, it is the logical continuation.
Thus, Avempace's lost commentary *On the Heavens* likely
comes after the one on *Physics* and before the one on
*Coming-to-be and Passing-away*.



This commentary runs parallel to the Aristotelian text. After
explaining changes in quality, Avempace suddenly starts a discourse on
force or power (*quwwa*) and on the moving power (*quwwa
muharrika*; IB-GC: 26-40). The four elementary bodies are
defined by the four possible binary combinations of cold/warm with
heavy/light. Some of them can be also moving powers:



> 
> 
> If the causes of the qualities exist primarily in their subjects and
> belong to the same species, the qualities are movers [...]
> Absolute actuality is the existence of this moving power as moving and
> this is only the case because of the existence of the movable being in
> motion, and this is coherent if we assume the movable power to exist.
> (IB-GC: 26. 1-7)
> 
> 
> 



For Wirmer the passage is one of the pillars, on which he develops the
ontological system based on "Potenz" in Avempace (Wirmer
2014: 346-352) and, as expected, most of the passages where the
term *quwwa* comes out, are found in his book *On the
Soul*.



Avempace does not extend in the issue of elementary qualities as
moving powers, and focuses on the soul as a moving power (elemental
bodies do not have souls; instead, they have natures). The case of the
human soul interests him most and he wants to explain how intellectual
apprehension moves man in reasoning and action. Avempace will deal, in
a more satisfactory way, with the issue of rank of ideas and forms in
relation to human activity in other works.



Avempace's reflections on absolute coming-to-be and passing-away
start with a linguistic analysis of the term *kawn*
"coming-to-be" which echoes Alfarabi's method and
itself is a novelty (IB-GC: 41-44). Avempace stresses that
coming-to-be is only possible if the metaphysical structure of act and
potency are admitted (IB-GC: 46-47).



At the beginning of his treatise of *Meteorology*, Aristotle
summarizes his preceding research: he has established the four causes
of nature and dealt with all natural motion in *Physics*. He
has investigated the ordered movement of the stars in the heavens in
*De caelo*, and changes of the four elements into one another,
growth, and perishing in *De generatione et corruptione*. What
still has to be investigated is that which takes place "in the
region nearest to the motion of the stars such as the Milky Way"
(*Meteo.* 338b 3-4).



Avempace's commentary presents his own theory of the Milky Way.
Aristotle explained it as the ignition of the fiery exhalation of some
stars which were large, numerous and close together. The ignition
takes place in the upper part of the atmosphere, in the region of the
world which is continuous with the heavenly motions (*Meteo.*
346b 11-12). The version transmitted by Ibn al-Bitriq diverges
and considers the Milky Way to be a phenomenon exclusively of the
heavenly spheres, not of the upper part of the atmosphere. The light
of those stars makes a visible patch because they are so close.



Avempace considers the Milky Way to be a phenomenon both of the
spheres above the moon and of the sublunar region. The Milky Way is
the light of many stars which almost touch one another. Their light
forms a "continuous image" (*khayal muttasil*) on
the surface of the body which is like a "tent"
(*takhawwum*) under the fierily element and over the air which
it
 covers.[23]
 Avempace defines the continuous image as the result of refraction
(*in'ikas*) and supports its explanation with an
observation of a conjunction of two planets, Jupiter and Mars which
took place in 500/1106-7. He watched the conjunction and
"saw them having an elongate figure" (Lettinck 1999: 434)
although their figure is circular.



Avempace wrote a treatise on animals related to the Aristotelian books
*Generation of Animals*, *Parts of the animals*, and
*Description of the animals*, and another one on plants
(Asin Palacios 1940) and probably a third one on minerals, all
following the Pseudo-Aristotelian
 *corpus*.[24]



The *Book of Animals* was edited by Jawad al-'Imarati
(IB-BA). As said above, Avempace begins his book situating it in the
context of the theoretical sciences, and then within natural science.
The science of the living animals is a species of the natural
philosophy (IB-BA: 71). Avempace wonders whether the relationship of
its subject, the animal, is similar to the relationship of arithmetic
to numbers. Arithmetic is a discipline where the pattern of genus and
species applies smoothly: It establishes ten units, and then it
combines them and gives them accidents like being odd or a pair, etc.
Since numbers are made one of another "ten is made of the five
multiplied by the two" and they are "simple forms"
which can be continuously incremented (IB-BA: 73) and animals have a
completely different existence, Avempace denies the relationship.



Geometrical objects are similar to numbers, but they differ insofar as
their species are infinite. Avempace mentions infinite figures
"resulting from [intersecting] the straight line with the
circle, either cylinder or conic". Primary genera of geometry
are the line, the surface and the body, and Avempace denies any
parallelism to the swimming, walking and flying characteristics of
animals--he uses the term *tanasub*,
'proportional', opposite to *tawatu',*
'univocal' (IB-BA: 74. 16-20).



As for a possible similarity to the numbers, numerical specific
differences are anterior and actively dividing, not divisible. On the
contrary, according to Avempace, the science of the animals goes
another way:



> 
> 
> We must take the first contrariety inherent to the animals and by
> which they are divisible, and whether it belongs to the essential
> universal opposite accidents by which the primary species come to
> stand. (IB-BA: 75. 1-3)
> 
> 
> 



Avempace inquiries further about these basic contrarieties to
establish the furthermost species and make possible a demonstrative
science.



> 
> 
> We predicate of the animals contrary specific differences, like having
> blood or not, and then we can prove it. If we talk about man and about
> bull, we cannot make any specific distinction. (IB-BA: 76.
> 7-9)
> 
> 
> 



Aristotle, according to Avempace, classified the science of animals
into four sections: 1) properties of the sensible parts of animals, 2)
properties of their limbs, 3) properties of their homogeneous sensible
parts, and 4) properties of their non-homogeneous sensible parts
(IB-BA: 76).



If we go into the material content of the book, we find some
remarkable contributions of Avempace. Remke Kruk points to his
description of the copulation of insects and to the male and female
role in the procreative process (Kruk 1997: 172-175).



However, the theoretic endeavor of Avempace in his *Book of
animals* seems to be more relevant. Avempace wants to draw a
theoretic system embracing all reality. Reality is plenty of forms,
and their perfection consists of motion and action (IB-BA: 79). He
divides forms into natural and artificial. The specific difference is
that natural forms possess a power (*quwwa*) which moves bodies
and by which bodies move themselves while artifacts only move
accidentally).



> 
> 
> Art (*sina'a*) is the elaborated form abstracted from
> matter; it is abstracted from its matter. The artificial form which
> exists in its matter does not have any power to move that which is in
> it nor to move something else. This is the difference between
> artificial and natural forms. (IB-BA: 79. 1-4)
> 
> 
> 



Natural powers are obviously nobler than artificial ones. Avempace
also takes modal factors into account for his design and introduces
necessity in his discourse. Necessity is predicated of immovable forms
in its primary sense, and metaphysics deals with them. The natural
scientist deals with forms subject to motion and, for this reason,
necessity can be predicated "by design"
*bi-l-wad'*. Avempace gives the following example that
clarifies what he means with "by design":



> 
> 
> If there is a house, there is a foundation by necessity, and this kind
> of necessity is a relationship between the causes of the existing
> [object] and the final [cause]. If [the final cause] is described, the
> various kinds of the causes follow it by necessity, and the form acts
> in a similar way.
> 
> 
> 
> If the form is the final [cause] of a motion, motion follows it by
> necessity, and it is something evident because, if there is building
> activity, there will be a house, and if there is building, there is
> the art of construction, but if there is only the art of construction,
> there will be no building. If [form] is acquired 'by
> design,' the other causes result in a well kept way from the
> final cause by necessity. (IB-BA: 81. 6-10)
> 
> 
> 



'Design' is the human involvement in the example. In
natural philosophy, necessity can be predicated also in another sense.
Avempace mentions the case of the carpenter who choses an iron hatchet
because of the hardness of its iron; the hatchet as formal cause
cannot carry its function unless its matter is iron or an alike
material. He sees here another kind of necessity, intrinsec necessity
because of matter. Following the example, iron melts by the
application of fire or it rusts in the soil. Melting and rusting take
place by necessity and "not because the smith intends it"
(IB-BA: 81. 16).



By contrast absolute necessity reigns in the heavenly spheres,
Therefore, Avempace reckons three kinds of necessity: absolute,
"by design", and material. Interestingly, Avempace turns
now to the lunar eclipses: they happen with absolute necessity in a
determined period of time (IB-BA: 82). As he goes on and discusses
possibility, Avempace admits possibility in relation to the eclipses,
but combined with necessity--he literally says that
"possibility shares necessity". Possibility is present
insofar as no specific limits determine the periods of time in which
the eclipse exists potentially from those in which it exists actually.
Necessity shows when it does not exist in a given time because of
opposed motions caused by opposed unmoved movers.



Avempace considers then the four elements, in which necessity is only
existent because the temporal determination. Avempace's lengthy
and twisted arguments end with the conclusion:



> 
> 
> Since the celestial bodies do not have any contrary form, there is
> absolutely no potentiality (*quwwa*), and if there is no
> possibility (*imkan*) in them, there is no coming-to-be nor
> passing-away. (IB-BA: 83. 13-16)
> 
> 
> 



As Avempace's natural philosophy goes beyond the analysis of
motion, matter, time and place, it extends to metaphysical principles
of necessity and possibility which eventually concern human
behavor.


## 6. Soul and Knowledge



We have read above that physics aims not only at sensible objects
(*above,*), but also spiritual ones--which allows us to
introduce Avempace's book on the *Soul*. The book was
edited (IB-S1a) and translated by Muhammad Saghir Hasan
al-Ma'sumi (IB-S1e) who unfortunately could use only the Oxford
manuscript; the Berlin manuscript is longer although its composition
is less coherent. In 2007 J. Lomba Fuentes used both manuscripts for
his Spanish translation (IB-S-lomba) as D. Wirmer has done for his
German version (IB-S-Wirmer).



When Avempace starts the book, he proceeds in a similar way to the one
on animals, namely with a comprehensive framing of the subject. Bodies
are either natural or artificial; all they have in common the presence
of matter and form; and form is their perfection. Natural bodies have
their mover inside the whole body, because the natural body is
composed of mover and moved.



Most of the artificial bodies are moved by an external mover, although
automats or machines have their motor inside, and Avempace adds
"I have explained it in the science of *Politics*"
(which is lost) (IB-S1a: 25. 4; IB-S1e: 15). The mover is identical
with the form. He distinguishes two kinds of perfecting forms, namely
forms moving by means of an instrument or not (IB-S1a: 28; IB-S1e:
17). The first kind is nature, the second, the soul.



To define the soul as operating through an instrument, i.e., the body
"in an ambiguous sense", as Avempace does (IB-S1a: 29. 2),
implies it is autonomous. Avempace defines the soul also as first
entelechy (*istikmal*), as opposed to the last entelechy of the
geometer, i.e., its being geometer in act. Soul appears as an
incorporeal substance, of highest rank. The science of soul is
considered by Avempace as superior to physics and mathematics, only
inferior to metaphysics. Avempace is not disturbed by
Aristotle's hylemorphic view of the soul which he may have
known. He affirms that all philosophers agreed that the soul is a
substance and portrays Plato as the adequate source:



> 
> 
> Since it was clear to Plato that the soul is assigned to substance,
> and that substance is predicated on the form and matter which is body,
> and that the soul cannot be said to be a body, he fervently defined
> the soul in its particular aspect. Since he had established that the
> forms of spheres are souls, he looked for the commonality of all
> [souls], and found that sense perception is particular to animals,
> [but] that movement is particular to all, and therefore he defined the
> soul as "something which moves itself". (IB-S1a: 40.
> 5-41; IB-S1e: 26)
> 
> 
> 



Aristotle's treatise is relevant for Avempace in its description
of the various powers of the soul, i.e., nutritive, sense-perceptive,
imaginative, rational faculties, although Avempace may have not had
any Arabic translation of Aristotle's *De
 anima*.[25]
 Avempace often digresses into general reflections; for instance, at
the beginning of his chapter on the nutritive faculty he talks about
possibility and impossibility. But, in other places, there are some
references to Aristotle, for instance, when it comes to the
imaginative faculty. Avempace writes that "The imaginative
faculty is the faculty by which the 'reasons'
(*ma'ani*) of the sensibles are apprehended"
(IB-S1a: 133. 3; IB-S1e: 106).



*Ma'na* can translate various Greek words, and the
Stoic *lekton* "meaning" is the most
relevant. The Arab grammarians used the term
*ma'na,* plural *ma'ani* to point to
the content of the word, to its semantic component, in contrast to
*lafz*, its phonic part; the pair *ma'na
/ lafz* is already found in Sibawayhi (d. *ca*. 796).
*Ma'na* was frequently used by Islamic theologians
too, to express the concrete cause or "reason" of a thing.
The Latin *intentio* of medieval philosophy is used to
translate *ma'na*, and the concept of
*intentio* appears close to that intended by Avempace since
*ma'na* has two characteristics: it is some form
or figure dissociated from matter but having reference to the thing
the figure of form of which it is (Blaustein 1986: 207).



Imagination apprehends the internal contents of the sensations and
animals operate with them. "It is the most noble faculty in
irrational animals, and through it animals move, have many arts, and
look after their progeny". Avempace gives as examples ants and
bees, which are exactly the kind of animals to which Aristotle denies
the faculty! (IB-S1a: 140; IB-S1e: 111).



Avempace begins his chapter on the rational faculty by asking whether
this faculty is always actual or sometimes potential and actual. He
answers that it is sometimes potential and sometimes actual (IB-S1a:
145-146; IB-S1e: 117-118). It is just a note without
continuation.



The main activity of the reasoning faculty is to enquire and to learn.
Avempace introduces here the discursive faculty (*al-quwwa
al-mufakkira*) which binds subject and predicate. The text is
confusing and the Oxford manuscript ends inconclusively. The
Berlin-Krakow manuscript has a few more pages
(176ro-179ro) that Joaquin Lomba included in
his Spanish translation, as well as Wirmer in his German (IB-S-Wirmer,
720-727). At the end of the fragment, the unknown editor writes
that Avempace's discourse on the soul is followed by a treatise
on the intellect, i.e., the *Epistle of Conjunction* of it with
man.



The intellect, Avempace affirms, apprehends the essence of something,
not something material and individual. The essence of any object is
its "reason" (*ma'na*) which
corresponds to its form linked to matter in this case. If we go back
to a former passage of the same book, we read how the distinction
is:



> 
> 
> The difference between the reason and form is that form and matter
> become one thing without existing separately, whereas the reason of
> the thing perceived is a form separated from matter. So the reason is
> the form separated from matter. (IB-S1a: 94. 11-13)
> 
> 
> 



Then the intellect apprehends it in such a way that they
both--essence and intellect--are "one in the subject
and two in expression". The speculative intellect searches for
the essences of material beings, but it is not satisfied with their
apprehension. It realizes that they are material intelligibles which
need further foundation and Avempace contends that the intellect knows
that there are superior intelligibles which found them and strives for
them (Mss. Berlin 176 vo). The fragment contains these and other
notes which are difficult to bring together although they are in
harmony with other writings of Avempace. We may refer to his
exposition of the "spiritual forms" in the *Rule of the
Solitary* as more relevant.



Finally, we should mention his text in defense of Alfarabi, accused of
denying survival after
 death.[26]
 There, Avempace argues that since man has knowledge of intelligibles
beyond sense-perception and since it occurs by means of introspection,
it is a divine gift to man who has no need for the matter to survive
after death.


## 7. Ethics and Metaphysics



Avempace illustrated for us his views on how knowledge is organized
and how the world of nature is structured, but we have not yet
expounded on his proper ideas on metaphysics, nor on the sciences that
aim at beings produced by the human will and choice, namely, ethics
and politics.



Avempace's most representative works are the *Rule of the
 Solitary*,[27]
 the epistle of the *Farewell
 Message*,[28]
 and the *Epistle of Conjunction of Intellect with
 Man*.[29]
 The latter work contains references to *Rule of the Solitary*
and to the epistle of the *Farewell Message* (as well as to his
book on the *Soul*).



Alfarabi's major work is *Book of the opinions of the
inhabitants of the righteous
 city*[30].
 It is an exposition of a Neo-Platonist emanationist system as well of
the different kinds of societies. Alfarabi wanted a perfect city,
ruled by a righteous man parallel to the rule of the universe by the
perfect One. His connecting cosmogenic explanations and political
plans were known to Avempace who did not follow him. Avempace does not
quote this or other works by Alfarabi which have a similar content. He
quotes Plato but follows the opposite way. While Plato in the
*Republic* would take the human soul as the model for the
perfect city, so that the perfect organization inside it tells how the
city has to be organized, Avempace starts from the ideal city and
wants to transfer its organization to the individual (Abbes
2011: 86).



Avempace echoes Plato and mentions his division of cities, or
societies, into a perfect one and others which are corrupted
(IB-RS-AP: 5-6; IB-coll-genequand: 123; IB-RS-berman: 125). One
assumes that Avempace is referring to the four imperfect cities,
namely, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny
(*Republic*, viii-ix) although Asin Palacios interpreted
them as the four imperfect cities cited in Alfarabi's works
(IB-RS-AP: 37, note 6), and Genequand accepts both possibilities
(IB-coll-genequand: 256 SS13)



The virtuous city is the only that can make its inhabitants happy
because they achieve their perfection. It is characterized by the
absence of the art of medicine and the art of adjudication. Avempace
follows Plato, but his version is also characterized by the absence of
weeds (IB-RS-AP: 10. 16-18; IB-RS-berman: 126;
IB-coll-genequand: 126 SS32). Avempace explains that in imperfect
cities there are false opinions, but that the majority of inhabitants
accept them as right, or that there are contradictory positions and
that there is no way to know which one is true.



> 
> 
> Now the people who discover a right action or learn a true science
> that does not exist in the city belong to a class that has no generic
> name. As for the ones who stumble upon a true opinion that does not
> exist in the city or the opposite of which is believed in the city,
> they are called weeds. (IB-RS-AP: 10. 8-11; IB-coll-genequand:
> 126, SS31; IB-RS-berman: 127)
> 
> 
> 



E.I.J. Rosenthal already pointed to the different evaluation of the
"weeds" by Alfarabi and Avempace (Rosenthal 1951).
Avempace borrows the concept from Alfarabi who saw these men as a
danger in the imperfect as well as the perfect city. Avempace saw the
virtuous city free of weeds, because it is free from false opinions.
Weed-men spring up only in the imperfect cities, and they can help in
correcting their views. However, he realized that they were strangers
in the cities or societies of his time, which all belonged to the
corrupted types, and he did not believe that these societies could be
rehabilitated; he abandoned Alfarabi at this point and addressed the
"weed-men".



Avempace wrote a book of a genre similar to that which physicians
write to preserve and acquire health, the so called *tadbir
as-sihha*. He referred to Galen and what Galen wrote in the
*Preservation of Health* as a model for his *Rule of the
Solitary*. To preserve physical health requires knowledge of the
natural science about delivering justice, for example, and knowledge
of political science. Avempace concluded that since his treatise aims
at acquiring and preserving spiritual health, "it reverts to the
natural and political science" (IB-RS-AP: 12.15-16;
IB-RS-berman: 129; IB-coll-genequand: 128 SS38). What binds
natural and political science? Forms, insofar as men have similar and
different forms, and forms are related to nature.



"Form" acquires a broad sense for Avempace who
distinguishes various kinds of it. Forms are known as the intelligible
essences of objects. Avempace accepts this meaning. For him, however,
forms have something in common, namely, moving power, and forms are
integrated into a participating hierarchy. Avempace's doctrine
of the forms is no doubt original, although antecedents are found in
the Neo-Platonist tradition. He once quotes a treatise "On the
Spiritual Forms" misattributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias
(IB-coll-fakhry: 166. 16-17; IB-CIM: 18) which S. Pines (1955)
demonstrated to belong to Proclus. Alfarabi's *Risala fi
l-'aql* (1938) and other of his works contain the principles
of the participating hierarchy of intellects and intelligibles (cf.
Davidson 1992; Ramon Guerrero 1992).



Thus, man's actions belong to different levels according to the
different forms found in man: physical, animal and spiritual. The
latter are specific to man; we can know which actions are most
appropriate to man only if we know what is his essence, namely, his
most excellent form. Therefore, Avempace accompanies his *Regimen
sanitatis* with a following *Treatise on the spiritual
forms*, lengthier than the former. Steven Harvey already insisted
that his epistemology allows us to understand his attitude about
politics, and that is not something accidental (Harvey 1992: 212).
Avempace assigns the term "spiritual" to the soul insofar
as it is "a moving soul". This may be too broad a
definition, but he then specifies the various kinds of
"spiritual forms"--all having the capacity to
move:



> 
> 
> The spiritual forms are of various kinds: the first are the forms of
> the circular [i.e., heavenly] bodies, the second are the active
> intellect and the acquired intellect, the third are the material
> intelligibles (*ma'qulat*), the fourth are the
> "reasons" (*ma'ani*) existent in the
> faculties of the soul, i.e., existent in common sense, in the
> imaginative faculty and in the memory. (IB-RS-AP: 19.2-5;
> IB-coll-fakhry: 49.16-19; IB-coll-genequand: 132 SS58)
> 
> 
> 



The heavenly bodies are not only immaterial for Avempace and the long
Aristotelian tradition, but they are also the most spiritual and are
followed in rank by the class of the active intellect and the acquired
intellect. The active intellect is immaterial, but the acquired
intellect has some connection to matter "because it perfects
(*mutammim*) the material intelligibles" (IB-RS-AP: 19.
10; IB-coll-genequand: 133 SS59: *"il
actualize"*). The latter are "not spiritual *per
se* because their existence takes place in prime matter"
(IB-RS-AP: 19. 7-8; IB-coll-genequand: 132 SS59), and we
assume that they are the internal counterpart of the substantial
forms. We see that spiritual forms differ from similar forms which are
joined to matter and determine the substances.



Avempace does not give us any instance of "material
intelligibles", but we may well think of the idea of a tree or a
horse in our mind. In his later treatise on the *Conjunction of
Intellect with Man*, Avempace differentiates between intelligibles
of real existing beings such as the horse, and intelligibles of
non-existent beings, such as a one-legged man, and he further
differentiates between intelligibles of real existing beings which one
has seen, and intelligibles of existing being which one has not seen.
For Avempace, the latter are intelligibles in a derivative sense or by
analogy (IB-CIM: 15; IB-coll-fakhry: 163; IB-coll-genequand: 191
SS27). "Material intelligibles" should contain both
categories.



The objects of common sense, imagination, and of memory are not
intelligibles; they are *ma'ani*, "reasons".
The term is ambiguous, but it is clear that a "reason" is
the cognitive product of any of these three faculties and it is also
clear that "reason" is some spiritual form.



According to Avempace, spiritual forms divide into universal and
particular forms: universal forms are found in the active intellect
and the individual intellect apprehends them too. Particular forms are
found in common sense, and Avempace gives the instance of a certain
mount in Arabia. The "spiritual" content of the forms in
the common sense is lower than in the forms of the imagination, and
that of the latter ones is lower than in the forms of the memory
insofar as their content is more and more "corporeal". The
forms of the rational faculty--we may say, the material
intelligibles--are not corporeal (IB-RS-AP: 21. 2-3;
IB-coll-fakhry: 50; IB-coll-genequand: 132 SS61). Avempace seems
to be aware of the difficulties of his explanation, and later on the
same treatise he summarizes the views:



> 
> 
> We say: The form of any generated corruptible being has three grades
> of existence, the first is that of the universal spiritual form which
> is the intelligible form and is the species, the second is that of the
> particular spiritual form, and the third that of bodily form.
> 
> 
> 
> The particular spiritual form has again three grades, the first is
> that of the "reason" existing in the memory, the second is
> that of the picture (*rasm*) existing in the imaginative
> faculty, and the third is the image (*sanam*) or the common
> sense. (IB-RS-AP: 31.13-32.1; IB-coll-fakhry: 58.10-15;
> IB-coll-genequand: 141-142, SS90)
> 
> 
> 



Particular spiritual forms may be true or false; if they have come to
us through the common sense, they are mostly true. Spiritual forms
play a role in every aspect of human life, even in the prophetic
revelation. The inspiration received by the prophets belongs to the
category of particular spiritual forms, which do not pass through the
common sense, but are received directly from the active intellect.
Avempace wrongly refers to Aristotle in support of his view and view
and ends by saying "These instances go beyond the natural world,
they are divine gifts" (IB-RS-AP: 24. 7; IB-coll-fakhry: 53;
IB-coll-genequand: 136 SS71).



As for the Sufis, their experiences belong to the level of the
particular spiritual forms, where common sense, imagination and memory
are active, but they mistake them for universal spiritual forms, and
wrongly believe that the coincidence of the three faculties is the
source of supreme happiness (IB-RS-AP: 26-27; IB-coll-fakhry:
55).



Man has to organize his various faculties--from the rational to
the nutritive--and there are categories of men according to the
prevalence of each of the three faculties. In some of them,
corporeality prevails; in a select few, spirituality does. Avempace
counts some ascetics and Sufis among the latter--but for most,
the situation is mixed. Man is moved by spiritual forms that may be as
basic as clothing, housing or food. Clothing, for instance, acts on
two levels, the protective and the ornamental. Virtues are attached to
the spiritual forms found in the imaginative faculty because the
purpose of virtuous actions is generating positive feelings and
admiration in the souls of those who see them. The spirituality of
most men is, however, limited to particular forms. Only philosophers
attain the highest degree of spirituality, the immaterial and
universal intelligibles. Although philosophers have to take due care
of the corporeal and particular spiritual forms in order to live, and
live honorably, their main concern is the universal separated
forms:



> 
> 
> Spiritual acts render him nobler, and the intellectual acts render him
> divine and virtuous. The man of wisdom is therefore necessarily a man
> who is virtuous and divine. Of every kind of activity, he takes up the
> best only. He shares with every class of men the best states that
> characterize them. But he stands alone as the one who performs the
> most excellent and the noblest of actions. When he achieves the
> highest end--that is, when he apprehends simple substantial
> intelligences (*'uqul*) that are mentioned in the
> [Aristotelian] *Metaphysics*, the book *On the Soul*,
> and *On Sense and the Sensible*--he then becomes one of
> these intelligences. It would be right to call him simply divine, and
> he will be free from the mortal sensible qualities, as well from the
> [particular] spiritual qualities. (IB-RS-AP: 61.11-18;
> IB-coll-fakhry: 77; IB-RS-berman: 131-132; IB-coll-genequand:
> 163-164, SS164-165)
> 
> 
> 



In his later treatise *Conjunction of Intellect with Man,*
Avempace reformulated his theory. He addressed the treatise to his
disciple Ibn al-Imam and complained about lack of time because of his
numerous occupations. For this reason he chose a non technical way to
describe how man first acquires the spiritual forms, then he
apprehends the intelligibles, and by means of the latter he approaches
the final intelligence, whose intelligible is itself. He calls it the
natural way: each man has a material intellect which receives them and
the intelligibles are relative to each material intellect (IB-CIM: 17;
IB-coll-fakhry: 164; IB-coll-genequand: 193 SS32).



He distinguished three stages, the first is that of the common people
and their intelligibles are linked to the material objects; the second
is that of the natural scientists or philosophers, and their
intelligibles are linked to the spiritual forms. (IB-CIM: 18;
IB-coll-fakhry: 167; IB-coll-genequand: 196 SS41). The third is
that of the blessed. Avempace knew Plato's Republic and the
allegory of the cavern, he recalls it in order to exemplify these
stages:



> 
> The condition of the common people regarding the intelligibles is
> similar to the condition of the vision of people who are in a cave
> where the sun does not rise: they look, and they see all the colors in
> the shadow (IB-CIM:19; IB-coll-fakhry: 168; IB-coll-genequand: 198
> SS47).
> 



Avempace does not talk about Ideas but intelligibles and he groups the
prisoners in Plato's allegory with the common people, while he
distinguishes two categories among those who have gone out of the
cavern: The theoreticians (*nazariyyin*, philosophers)
and the blessed (*su`ada'*). For Plato, those who
have gone out of the cavern are the educated citizens who master the
art of dialectic, but Avempace is not satisfied with an indirect
approach to the last intelligence and wants to reach and acquire the
absolute intelligibles, free of any relation to the material
intellects and free of any spiritual form (particular or universal):
it is the third and final stage that has no equivalence in
Plato's two categories of men.



We are informed that absolute intelligibles are the true existence and
that they merge into the one last intelligence. Avempace never says
that God is the last intelligence, which he compares with the sun and
its light. The felicitous person who succeeds in reaching the highest
step of knowledge becomes light himself (IB-CIM: 19; IB-coll-fakhry:
168; IB-coll-genequand: 198 SS46). But, in this stage, he abandons
any articulated scientific knowledge and dips into a wordless mystical
experience.



By contrast, practical intelligibles play a minor role in spite of the
import they have in ethics and politics. Avempace includes among them
the ruling of the city or of the armies and considers them
"intermediate forms". They exist in the solitary only for
the sake of one of the three spiritual forms, corporeal, particular
spiritual and universal spiritual (IB-coll-fakhry: 91;
IB-coll-genequand: 179 SS210).



As we said above, Avempace presented his *Rule of the Solitary*
(*Tadbir al-mutawahhid*) as a *Regimen sanitatis* in
order to acquire and preserve spiritual health, which obviously equals
to happiness (IB-RS-AP: 11; IB-coll-fakhry: 43; IB-RS-berman: 128).
The companion he gave to Ibn al-Imam for his travel, the *Epistle
of Farewell*, was intended to help him attain spiritual happiness.
Avempace enumerates the different degrees of pleasure, the highest
being science. Man suffers from ignorance and when he reaches the
truth, pain goes away and pleasure seizes him. However, intellectual
pleasure is also caused by the very fact of knowing.



> 
> 
> But when we strive for knowledge, we do it not because of pleasure but
> pleasure is some profit (*ribh*) we gain as it follows the
> existence of the truth, because every pleasure is like the shadow of
> something else. (IB-CIM: 23. 5-7; IB-coll-fakhry: 123.
> 2-4; IB-coll-genequand: 98 SS29)
> 
> 
> 



Avempace enquires further on the issue of pleasure and knowledge, and
we can abbreviate it by saying that the highest form of pleasure
requires continuity and that continuous pleasure is attained not only
by intellectual knowledge but also by knowledge of an eternal object.
Metaphysical knowledge is man's uppermost stage and source of
highest pleasure. Averroes (d. 1198), however, would express doubts
whether man's uppermost stage is a natural perfection or divine
gift for Avempace, an issue which Alexander Altmann researched (1965).
Altmann concluded that Avempace defended the uppermost stage as a
mystical experience, similar to that preached by the Sufis, and in any
case we can agree that Avempace saw the uppermost stage as a divine
gift.



Avempace concluded his enquiry moving out of the rational and leaving
many loose ends. He was a busy man. When he finished his treatise
*On the Conjunction of Man with Intellect* he apologized for
not having been able to produce a demonstrative argument,
*burhan*, on the issue and uttered his hope that the addressee
of the epistle would be able to grasp its sense and meaning (IB-CIM:
22-23; IB-coll-fakhry: 172-173; IB-coll-genequand: 203
SS60). Still, the outlines of his system are visible.



Inspired by the Porphyrian division of the five voices, knowledge
starts with the opposition universal/individual, and develops into
syllogistic and non-syllogistic sciences which can explain all aspects
of reality. Reality consists of matter and forms, but form
differentiates into a stairway of forms, according to their distance
from matter. Forms are essences as well as active potencies, and any
form is a mover. In addition, the ascension of spiritual forms inside
man runs parallel to the ascension of forms in nature. They both unite
in separate substances, pure intelligibles, and true beings, and at
the summit, man merges into the Active Intellect. Avempace's
intention appears clear, but whether the conjunction is possible and
how it occurs remains obscure.



Even if no metaphysical interpretation of Avempace's thought
would be accepted, his ethical doctrine would remain indisputable.
Avempace was clearly concerned by man's fragile nature and the
ever-threatening presence of death (Alwuzad 1994) but he was convinced
that man could master his destiny with the sole means of his
intellectual capacity and resolve.