## 1. Life and Works


### 1.1 Life



Biographical data on the life of Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi, the
'Master of Illumination' (*shaykh al-ishraq*), is
scarce. Born in the northwestern Iranian village of Suhraward around
1154, he pursued his education in nearby Maraghah with Majd al-Din
al-Jili, one of the teachers of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d.1210). He then
traveled to Isfahan, where he studied with the logician Zahir (al-Din)
al-Farisi (or Qari) with whom he read the *Nasiri
Observations*, a text on logic penned by 'Umar Ibn Sahlan
al-Sawi (or Sawaji) (d.ca.1158). Suhrawardi then embarked on a journey
in search of knowledge. According to Shams al-Din al-Shahrazuri
(d.ca.1288), he would have traveled extensively throughout Anatolia
and befriended Sufi masters, such as Fakhr al-Din al-Mardini (d.1198)
(who also taught medicine and Avicennan works), seemingly seeking
spiritual guidance and experiences, Suhrawardi leading himself the
life of a wondering ascetic (retreats, ascetic practices) (Shahrazuri,
1988). The putative classical Sufi spiritual lineage put forward by
biographers and Suhrawardi himself partake of Suhrawardi's
claims to revive the intellectual heritage of a long intitiatic chain
of transmitters who possessed 'true' knowledge, that of
the Ancients (*Husrawaniyyun*) (Landolt, 2008, 240-242).
Like most scholars of the time, Suhrawardi was also seeking patrons
during his travels among the local Anatolian rulers.



In 1183, Suhrawardi arrived in Aleppo, the year the Ayyubid ruler,
Saladin (d.1193), conquered the city and handed it over to his son
al-Zahir (d.1216). A Shafi'i Sunni, Suhrawardi made a name for
himself among the religious scholars of the city (Marcotte, 2001,
399-400). He eventually managed to secure an audience at the
palace, and to befriend al-Zahir. In 1186, he completed his most
important work, the *Philosophy of Illumination* (hereafter
 *PI*),[1]
 at the age of thirty-three. Sometime in 1189 or soon therafter,
'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi met Suhrawardi in Aleppo, probably
after having come across Suhrawardi's *Intimations*,
*Flashes of Light* (*al-Lamahat*) and *Ascending
Steps* (*al-Ma'arij*) while in Mosul, works he did
not find useful, most probably because Suhrawardi (that
'imbecile') had rejected foundamental elements of
Peripateticism of which he was fond (Martini Bonadeo, 2015, 2013,
124-125). And there is a possibly apcryphal meeting Suhrawardi
had with Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (Nasr and Aminrazavi, 2010, 185). 



A combination of religious and political factors led to
Suhrawardi's downfall, namely the fact that he succeeded in
alienating the powerful religious elite of Aleppo, on whom the
Ayyubids depended for the legitimacy of their rule over the city, by
always gaining the upper hand when he debated with the learned of the
city, none of whom were able to keep up intellectually with him, and
seemingly behaving in such a manner as to display a condescending
arrogance for the scholars of Aleppo (Marcotte, 2001, 400-401).
On the one hand, he was accused of holding heretical beliefs, a vague
charge easily supported with the pre-Islamic Persian names and symbols
that some of his works contained, his claim to divine-like
inspiration, and his questioning, in light of God's omnipotence,
the logical finality of Prophethood. On the other hand, his
association with al-Zahir, the Ayyubid ruler, and his earlier
relationships with the recently conquered Artuqids, one of the local
rulers of southwest Anatolia to whom his *Tablets to
'Imad* (written in Aleppo) was dedicated, may have been
interpreted as political intrigue or, at worst, holding Isma'ili
views: Suhrawardi's views regarding the 'Caliph of God on
Earth'; the hierarchical conception of being structured around
the 'victorial domination (*qahr*)' relation of
'irridiations' (*shuruq*) of light in terms similar
to the Arabic 'Empedoclean' views found in the works of
Sijistani (d. after 971) or the Ikhwan al-Safa', etc. (Landolt,
2008, 242-244). 



In the end, Suhrawardi's fate was sealed with accusations of
heresy (rather than treason). Biographers and historians remained at
odds over the exact charges and course of events that led to his
execution at the end of 1191 (or early1192) (Marcotte 2001a). 


### 1.2 Works



Various classifications exist of Suhrawardi's works, with either
three (Massigon), four (Corbin, Walbridge and Ziai), five (Nasr 1964,
58-9) or six (Kadivar 2011, 297-8) categories (Suh. 1993a,
vii-xvii, xviii-xx). Although very few of his works can be
dated, Walbridge (2017, 257-8), guided by indications found in
his works, established the following classification that takes into
account the overlapping redaction of some of the texts: (i)
*juvenilia* (before ca. 1180), such as *Temples of
Light* (Suh. 1996), his allegories (many in Persian) depicting the
journey of the soul (Suh. 1976, 1993c, 1999b, 2001, 2007), but also a
translation into Persian of Avicenna's *Treatise of the
Bird*, a commentary of the latter's *Pointers and
Reminders*, and his take on the latter's *Treatise on
Love*; (ii) mature Peripatetic works (from 1180 to 1186), like
*Flashes of Light* and *Intimations* (completed before
*PI*), a *precis* of Avicennan Peripatetic theses
(Suh. 1993a, 1-121 [metaphysics], 2009a [logic, physics,
metaphysics]; cf. Ibn Kammuna 2003, 2009); (iii) *Philosophy of
Illumination* (completed in 1186) in which he details the main
rules, principles and arguments of his *ishraqi*) philosophical
system, the symbolism of Light resting at the heart of his
reconfiguration of a number of cosmological and ontological
Peripatetic theses put forward by Avicenna ; (iv) other Peripatetic
works (completed by 1186): *Paths and Havens* (completed when
he was almost 30; probably early 1180s) (Suh. 1993a, 194-506
[metaphysics], 2006 [logic], 2015 [physics]), and *Opposites*
(Suh. 1993a, 124-92 [metaphysics], cf. 2009b), revisiting issues
discussed in the *Philosophy of Illumination*; and (v) other
short works (from 1180 to 1185), such as Tablets for 'Imad (Suh.
2001, 31-98 [Ar.], 1993c, 110-95 [Pers.], 1976,
99-116 [Corbin]), and his shorter *Book of Hours*-like
Arabic prayers, supplications (*du'a*) and intimate
devotions (*munajat*), 'occult invocations'
(prayers to celestial bodies) (Walbridge 2011; Suh., 1976),
commentaries on some verses of the Qur'an (Nurbakhsh 2007), and
poetry (Suh. 2005). 



Corbin (d.1978) noted that there might not have been a purely
Peripatetic intellectual period, though Suhrawardi asserts he defended
the approach in his youth (*PI*, SS166), if, indeed, he
composed most of his treatises over a very short span of time,
probably during the course of about ten years. Moreover, a number of
his works expound both Peripatetic and *ishraqi* principles,
like *Tablets to 'Imad* (written after *PI*,
during the last five years of his life) and *Temples of Light*
(Suh. 1996, 1976, 139-47). Likewise, although
*Intimations* is said to be written according to the
Peripatetic tradition (*PI*, SS3) whose principles
Suhrawardi's reexamined (Suh. 1993a, 2), it prepares the ground
for some of the *Philosophy of Illumination*'s more
distinctive Illuminationist positions (Suh. 1993a, 70-8,
105-21; (Walbridge 2017, 256-9). 



Thus, one must take into account the interrelations between
Suhrawardi's five major philosophical works, which contain
cross-references, to grasp fully his system as a whole. Walbridge
(2017, 258) proposes the following order of Suhrawardi's majors
works: (i) *Intimations* (completed before *PI*); (ii)
*Philosophy of Illumination* (completed in 1186); (iii)
*Paths and Havens* and *Flashes of Light* (written
simultaneously with *PI*, but completed later, cf. Suh. 1991,
142.10, 146.14 [Najafquli ed., 175.19-20], cf. 1988, 207.5, 215.6,
2001, 241.2-4); and (iv) *Opposites* (written after the
completion of *PI* and *Paths and Havens*) (cf.
Suhrawardi's order: *Intimations*, then
*Opposites*, followed by *Paths and Havens*, and ending
with *PI*). 



In his quest to revive the intellectual heritage of all those who had
mastered 'true' knowledge, i.e. that of the Ancients for
the East and the West, Suhrawardi tapped into an experiential-like
type of knowledge. In his 's *Philosophy of
Illumination*, he mentioned that the work was written with the
objective of disclosing what he says he "obtained through my
intuition during my retreats and visions. [...] the present work has
another method and provides a shorter path to knowledge [...] I did
not first arrive at it through cogitation; rather, it was acquired
through something else. Subsenquently I sought proof for it, so that,
should I cease contemplating the proof, nothing would make me fall
into doubt. In all that I have said about the science of lights and
that which is and is not based upon it, I have been assisted by those
who have traveled the path of God. This science is the very intuition
of the inspired and illumined Plato, the guide and master of
philosophy", and those who came before and after him
(*PI*, SSSS2-4). This is the *ishraqi*
method, with all its principles and rules, that builds upon, modifies
and complements the principles at the heart of the Peripatetic method
(notably Avicenna's). It seems reasonable to cast
Suhrawardi's project as a critique of Avicenna's Plato and
Neoplatonizing brand of Peripateticism, similar to the various
critiques put forward by Shahrastani (d.1153), Abu al-Barakat
al-Baghdadi (d.ca.1142), Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d.1210) and al-Ghazali
(d.1111), etc.



Suhrawardi's works circulated mainly within traditional circles
of learning in the Islamic East. At the beginning of the
20th century and in the wake of the works of Bernard Carra
de Vaux (1902), Max Horten (1912), Otto Spies and Sarfaraz K. Khatak
(1935), and Helmut Ritter (1938), the French Iranologist, Henry Corbin
began to study Suhrawardi's works after having received, from
Louis Massigion, a copy of Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi's commentary
on the *Philosophy of Illumination*. Corbin embarked on a
lifelong project of edition, translation and study of
Suhrawardi's works. A first volume, published in Istanbul in
1945 (Suh. 1993a), contained the metaphysics of three major Arabic
works of Suhrawardi. Corbin then edited, in 1952, the Arabic
*magnum opus*, the *Philosophy of Illumination* (Suh.
1993b, 1999a, 1986), together with two minor works. He went on to
write a number of translations and studies, namely *Suhrawardi et
les platoniciens de Perse* (Corbin 1971; cf. Abu Rayyan 1969; Suh.
1999b). In 1970, Hossein Nasr edited fourteen of his Persian texts
(two attributed to him), many allegorical or mystical in nature (Suh.
1976, 1993c, 1999b). 


### 1.3 Influences on Suhrawardi



Mapping Suhrawardi's intellectual trajectory and identifying the
sources he may have used proves difficult, notably because he states
he was first a 'zealous' defender of the Peripatetic
tradition, and was later assisted by those who "have travelled
the path of God" and mastered the 'science of
intuition', the likes of "the inspired and illuminated
Plato", Hermes, Empedocles, Pythagoras, etc. among the Greeks
and Jamasp, Frashostar, Bozorgmehr, etc. among the Ancient Persians
(*PI*, SS3; cf. Suh. 1993a, 502-4). His philosophical
project sought to revive the wisdom (*hikma*) of the Ancients,
tapping into this double (Eastern/Western) initiatic genealogy of
Sages and from the Greek and Arab philosophers who threaded the
'path of God'.



Instructed in the Avicennan Peripatetic tradition, Suhrawardi studied
the views of Aristotle, Plato, the Neoplatonists, and later
philosophers (*falasifa*) who wrote in Arabic, notably
Avicenna's (d.1037) whose major works remained central. Work is
still needed to assess the nature of the influence exerted on him by
Avicenna's other works, for instance, his *Discussions*
(1992) and *Notes* on Aristotle's *De anima*
(1984), and by post-Avicennan philosophers, particularly Abu
al-Barakat al-Baghdadi (d.ca.1165), the original yet eclectic critic
of Avicenna's logic, psychology and metaphysics, Fakhr al-Din
al-Razi (d.1210), and the the innovative Ibn Sahlan al-Sawi (the
logician) (d.ca. 1158).



Charting Suhrawardi's intellectual journey and encounters with
mysticism, ancient Greek Gnosticism and Hermeticism, or ancient
Persian Zoroastrian traditions, to whose symbols he often appeals,
remains exceedingly difficult (Muwahhid 1995). Some have attempted to
trace the Greek influences of such figures as Empedocles, Pythagoras,
Hermes, etc. in his work, an exercise that has, for example, rendered
him a 'Pythagoreanizing Neoplatonist' (Walbridge 2000,
2001) with more or less success (Gutas 2003, 308). 



Suhrawardi frequently appeals to the authority of Plato. This includes
material from the Arabic (pseudo)*Theology of Aristotle* (a
paraphrase of parts of Books IV-VI of Plotinus'
*Enneads*) that he attributes to Plato, perhaps because the
latter is mentioned more than once at the end of the first chapter
(D'Ancona 2004). This is evidenced where Suhrawardi quotes or
alludes to a passage from the (pseudo)*Theology of Aristotle*
(I.21-26; cf. Enneads 4.8.1) that he ascribes to Plato
(*PI*, SS171; cf. Suh. 1993a, ), a passage to which he
again alludes (*PI*, SS171), and again in summary form in
his *Intimations* (*Talwihat*) (Suh. 1993a, 112; cf.
Walbridge, 2000, 134-137; (for a number of specific overlaps,
see Arnzen, 2011, 119-150 and Sinai, 2011 [commentary on
SSSS 4, 94, 109, 129 and 171]). Shahrazuri seems to have known
the work as the *Kitab al-Mimar* (the Arabic term of the
division headings of the work). Moreover, the *Theology*
contains passages (*Enneads* IV, 8.1) that mention many
philosophers of the Greek tradition to which Suhrawardi states being
the heir. Why Suhrawardi "*presented* himself as
following these ancient philosophers, and especially Plato, rather
than Avicenna" has yet to be elucidated and adequately explained
(Gutas 2003, 308-9). 



In addition, possible influences of Ismailism or Sufism have yet to be
fully explored: some elements of his *ishraqi*doctrine may have
more affinity with Ismaili thought (such as the hierarchical notion of
being in the works of 10th century Abu Ya'qub
al-Sijistani) than with the doctrines of classical Sufis whom he
claims to be following (Landolt 1987), although similarities with
certain Sufi theories have been identified (Landolt 2008,
forthcoming). Medieval biographers, on the other hand, readily
reported Suhrawardi's mystical inclination, his association with
mystics, his ascetic practices and (hagiographic) wondrous deeds. He
himself considered spiritual exercises a necessary preparation for the
advent of 'presential' (*huduri*) knowledge and
vision of the Lights. 



Suhrawardi also appeals to ancient Zoroastrian motifs, terminology and
mythical figures, even Mazdean theology, for example, in his
*Invocations and Prayers* (Suh. 1976; Mo'in 1950; cf.
Gaffari 2001, 375-85; see the occult and devotional works
unearthed by Walbridge 2011). For some, his appeal to angels as
embodiments of intellective light principles has been likened to
ancient Zoroastrian (Corbin 1971, 111-3, 124-5) or Mazdean
(Nasr 1964, 71) angelology; for others, it echoes the angels found in
Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi's *al-Mu'tabar*
(*What Has Been Established Through Personal Reflection*)
(1939, vol. 2, 157; cf. Pines 1979, 253-5), the latter being
devoid of any ancient Persian symbolism. Without any clear historical
filiations to particular textual traditions, one can only rely on
Suhrawardi's own claims to have intended to provide a synthesis
of those ancient Western and Eastern intellectual traditions. 


## 2. Logic


### 2.1 Role of Logic



Very little has been written about Suhrawardi's logical
treatises or his logic in general, namely because most of his logical
works remain unedited, and few scholars of Islamic philosophy delve
into logic. Hussein Ziai (1990) provides perhaps the only general
overview of his logic, his criticisms of Peripatetic
(Aristotelian/Avicennan) essentialist definitions and his
*ishraqi* theory of definition. While Suhrawardi includes
logical discussions in his major Arabic works, in the *Philosophy
of Illumination*, he criticizes and restructures some elements of
Peripatetic logic. For Shahrazuri (1988), his works bear the marks of
extensive study of the *Nasiri Observations* of Ibn Sahlan
al-Sawi (1988, 378), a non-Aristotelian Persian Logician who
reorganized the content of the *Organon*. The work may have
inspired Suhrawardi's restructuring of the logic, in
*Intimations*, into expository propositions, wherein definition
and description become part of his semantic theory, and theory of
proofs (*hujaj*) (Ziai 1990, 45, 51-6). Noteworthy is
Ziai's reconceptualization of Suhrawardi's pragmatic use
of logic into three parts: semantics, formal logic and techniques, and
material logic (Ziai, 1990, 73-75).



The *Philosophy of Illumination* does not follow the customary
tripartite logic, physics, and metaphysics division of many
Post-Avicennan Peripatetic works. It is divided into two main parts.
The first part, divided into three 'discourses',
introduces 'Rules of Thought' that cover not only logic,
but also some elements of physics and metaphysics (*PI*,
SSSS7-106). The seven rules of the first discourse are
on knowledge and definition (see 2.2 below) (*PI*,
SSSS7-15). The first five rules pertain to logic and
deal with subject matter found in the *Isagoge* and derived
from the Avicennan Peripatetic tradition (Ziai 1990, 58-67).
First, Suhrawardi introduces elements of semantics, where are
discussed problems of meaning, the distinction between conception and
assent, and on the nature, definition and description of
'reality' (*haqiqa*), the latter being equated by
Qutb al-Din Shirazi (d.1311) with quiddity (*mahiyya*). Then,
he discusses accidents, universals (his nominalist ontology), and the
innate (*fitriyya*) and acquired nature of human knowledge
(intuition, personal revelation, and inspiration being prior in
essence, while logic being applicable only to the latter) (Mousavian
2014a, 478; cf. Walbridge 2014; Mousavian 2014b). 



The seven sections of the second discourse pertain to proofs and their
principles (*PI*, SSSS16-33). Suhrawardi
introduces short discussions to describe propositions and syllogisms,
the classes and the modalities in propositions. He proposes to reduce
all types of propositions to necessary affirmative propositions. He
criticizes the Peripatetics' understanding of negation and
discusses the differences between the Peripatetics and his novel views
regarding a number of sophisms, for example, reducing the second and
third figures to the first figure, and reducing modal propositions to
one form. Street (2008, 165, 175) also showed that Suhrawardi
"reduces all his modal propositions to the appropriate
definitely necessary version" in accord with Avicenna's
syllogistic; this enables him "to express the truths of
essentialism" befitting for his "essentialist
metaphysics", thus making him a "defender and
expositor" Avicenna's modal logic. He also discusses
contradiction, conversion, conditionals, demonstrative syllogisms, and
*reductio ad absurdum*, the latter also discussed in the third
discourse (Ziai 1990, 67-72). In *Intimations*, he
describes the distinct syllogistic forms used in dialectics, rhetoric,
and poetics, for example, the non-demonstrative syllogism of poetry
due to its imagined and non-scientific premises (Ziai 1990, 54). 



The third discourse presents sophistical refutations of errors
uncovered in the formal and material logic of Peripatetic logic (an
epitome of the *Sophistical Refutations of the Organon*)
(*PI*, SSSS34-106). The third section deals with
a number of his *ishraqi* judgements against a number of
Peripatetic issues of physics and metaphysics (see 3. and 4.). It also
serves to establish certain "technical terms" (substance
and accident, necessity and contingency, cause, and possible and
impossible infinities) (*PI*, SS52-5), and on
'beings of reason' (*i'tibarat
'aqliyya*) (existence, necessity, etc.) (*PI*,
56-68). Suhrawardi also revisits the classical theory of the
categories, adopting a reduced non-Peripatetic classification of five
categories: 'substance' (*jawhar*),
'quantity', 'quality', 'relation'
(similar to Stoic reduction of categories to those four, cf. Walbridge
1996, 527), to which he adds 'motion' (absent in Ibn
Sahlan), the latter four being accidental categories (*PI*,
SS71; Suh. 1993a, 4-12, 284-93; Ziai 1990, 72 n.2, 73
n.3; Beidokhti 2018, 394-400). An 'intensity' (or
perfection) is predicated of those five categories, such that the
degree of intensity (with its corollary 'weakness') of
light becomes a property of substances as well as of accidents (Ziai
1990, 73-5). 


### 2.2 Definition



Rule seven of the first discourse is dedicated to the notion of
definition, its conditions and reconfiguration into an
*ishraqi* principle (*PI*, SSSS13-5; Ziai
1990, 77-114). Suhrawardi begins by rejecting the Peripatetic
theory of definition that he criticizes for the inductive approach it
advocates as a foundation for scientific knowledge and demonstration.
He uses logical and semantic arguments to question its
'essentialist' definition (Aristotelian) on which
Avicenna's own 'complete definition' depends. He
rejects the claims that it is possible to obtain a complete definition
able to encompass all the essential constituents needed to lead to the
knowledge of that which is previously unknown and in need of a
definition. Suhrawardi writes that "it is clear that it is
impossible for a human being to construct an essential definition in
the way the Peripatetics require--a difficulty which even their
master [Aristotle or Avicenna] admits. Therefore, we have definition
only by means of things that specify by conjunction"
(*PI*, SS15). Suhrawardi insists that a definition should
enumerate, in some kind of unitary formula, all the essential
constituents of the described object. Therefore, he includes elements
of definition by extension (enumeration of members of a
'class') and of definition by intension (enumeration of
defining property or properties), for example, that "the essence
of man (which is the truth underlying the symbol 'man'),
is a thing which *is only* recoverable [...] in the
subject. This act of 'recovery' is the translation of the
symbol to its equivalent in the consciousness or the self of the
subject" (Ziai 1990, 127). For Street (2008, 178), what he calls
his 'anti-essentialism', or the inability to graps
essences discursively, as he accepts the Platonic forms, does not rest
on his logic. Suhrawardi explains his 'conceptualist'
notion of definition at greater length in his *Paths and
Havens* (Suh. 2006, 83, 90-100). His epistemological
critique of the Peripatetic theory of definition is undoubtedly
inspired by Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi's own critical evaluation
of the *Isagoge* which was developed in his
*al-Mu'tabar* (1939, vol. 1, 55-7; cf. Ziai 1990,
183-4), but also by Suhrawardi's own understanding of the
epistemic role of self-knowledge as presence. 



In the *Philosophy of Illumination*, Suhrawardi introduces his
*ishraqi* theory of definition that signals what some have
identified as a 'Platonic' or 'Neoplatonic'
turn (Ziai 1990, 114-128). Now, only direct experience
guarantees acquisition of true knowledge, such that epistemological
considerations are at the heart of his reconceptualization of the
definition. Suhrawardi's theory of definition thus builds on a
Platonic (perhaps even Neoplatonic) epistemology. Knowledge of the
reality of things occurs through the direct apprehension of the
intrinsic light-nature (the thing *as it is*) of all entities
(see 4.). Direct knowledge occurs through
'vision-illumination', as a person realizes that what is
to be defined becomes available to one's self through
self-consciousness. At such time, the soul becomes *directly*
aware of the reality of that which is to be defined. The soul is then
able to grasp directly those essences whose elements can then be
translated using proofs and demonstrations to develop a discursive
type of knowledge about that original apperception of reality. 



In his *Paths and Havens*, Suhrawardi notes that to define
something is to actually 'see' the thing as it really is
(Ziai 1990, 104-14). Suhrawardi opens the second part of his
*Philosophy of Illumination* with the following principle:
"anything in existence that requires no definition or
explanation is evident. Since there is nothing more evident than
light, there is nothing less in need of definition"
(*PI*, SS107). Light, in and of itself, is not in need of
any definition, because in and of itself it is self-evident. Here,
Suhrawardi posits the epistemological and ontological centrality of
the concept of light. He argues that only direct intuitive experience
can lead to knowledge of the reality (*haqiqa*) of things,
which definitions can only attempt to describe and explain via *a
posteriori* rational investigations or demonstrations (Ziai 1990,
81). Qutb al-Din Shirazi notes that *ishraqi* epistemology
relies on this type of personal and intuitive knowledge, itself not in
need of any definition (Ziai 1990, 133).



## 3. Physics



Suhrawardi's *Intimations*, *Paths and Havens*,
*Opposites* and *Flashes of Light* all contain sections
on physics, although they have remained unstudied. Of those, only the
physics of the *Flashes of Light* (2001, 185-209; 1991
[Najafquli ed.]) and of *Intimations* have been edited, the
latter together with a commentary by Ibn Kammuna (2003). In the third
discourse of the *Philosophy of Illumination*, and in *Paths
and Havens* (though not in *Flashes of Light* or
*Intimations*), Suhrawardi reviews some general principles of
physics (albeit not in detail). Like Avicenna before him, he rejects
the atomism of the theologians (*PI*, SS89), as well as the
idea of a vacuum (*PI*, SSSS89-90). He also
criticizes and rejects (Aristotelian) Peripatetic hylomorphic division
of bodies into matter and form, rejecting the notion of prime matter.
Shurawardi provides a number of arguments for his rejection of
hylomorphism (*PI*, SS72-88). One of them relies on
his theory of bodies that now consist of "self-subsistent
magnitude with accidents" (Walbridge 2017, 266-7), a
"compound of extension and properties just as Simplicius".
In addition, he needed "that accidents be able to constitute
causes, for it is the causality of accidents that makes it possible to
explain the existence of the Platonic Forms and ultimately to explain
the diversity of the celestial and sublunary reals". Moreover,
he held that "entities that cannot be perceived either by
physical senses or by nonsensible intuition", for example
'forms', "cannot be known, and if they exist, it is
only as mental constructs". These are important critiques and
reformulations of physics to assist him in his reformulation of his
metaphysics. Bodies become 'barriers' or "things
that acquire properties from the lights" that differ in
'intensity' (Walbridge, 2005, 240-242). Hylomorphism
becomes incompatible with the possibility of knowing real essences,
the 'ontic' luminous essence, of all entities, that of
immaterial lights and of 's own self, which cannot be known via
a postulated 'form' (Ziai 1990, 131, 151-2). The
determination of different bodies now "depends on the
multi-aspect movement and internal relationships of strong and weak
lights", intensity becoming the ontological discriminating
criterion (Arslan 2014, 150; *PI*, SS74). 



With his philosophy of lights, he manages, nonetheless, to reconfigure
some elements of physics. For instance, immaterial entities and
material bodies are composed of varying degrees of intensity of light.
The physical world is composed of dusky substances with dark
accidents, while self-subsistent magnitude appears to replace prime
matter which, like a number of traditional physical notions, becomes a
mere mental concept that has no reality outside the mind. It is no
longer the perception of the form of objects, but their constitutive
lights that becomes the true object of knowledge (Walbridge 2000,
22-3). 


### 3.1 Psychology



Suhrawardi revisits Avicenna's psychology, the framework out of
which he elaborates his original *ishraqi* psychology. While he
finds inadequate the Peripatetic proofs for the immortality of the
soul (*PI*, SSSS91-3),the soul remains an
immaterial, self-subsisting, living, knowing substance, capable of
ruling over the body. However, he defines its substance in terms of
the intensity of its individual luminosity. Thereupon, a relation of
dominion (*qahr*) and love (*mahabba*) or desire
(*'ishq*) is established between the luminous substance
of the soul and the tenebrous substance of the body (*PI*,
SSSS147-8). Between the two, the subtle substance of the
(psychic) *pneuma* (*ruh*) functions as an intermediary
that enables the reception of images, forms or 'icons' of
metaphysical realities that it then reflects and manifests onto the
soul (*PI*, SSSS216-7). 



Vision remains the most important sense. It rests at the heart of
Suhrawardi's *ishraqi* theory of vision that provides,
once redefined, a mode of apprehension upon which can be modelled his
theory of knowledge by presence. He criticizes and rejects the
materialist implications of the imprinting of forms in the material
substratum of the eye implied in the prevalent
'extramissive' and 'intromissive' theories of
vision. Although mediated by a physical organ, vision remains instead
primarily an activity of the human (light) soul, whereby the soul
accesses directly the reality of the objects of vision (*PI*,
SSSS101-4). In the *Philosophy of Illumination*,
the vision of physical objects requires, first, a
'presential' face-to-face encounter of that which
perceives, both the physical organ and the human soul, and the
illuminated object; second, the absence of obstacles between subject
and object, often described in mystical terms as the absence of veils,
whereby the soul becomes illuminated by the (substantial or
accidental) light of the object; and, finally, the presence of light,
the necessary condition for the establishment of this *ishraqi*
relation. Vision thus unfolds simultaneously on two different planes,
physical visual perception being reduced to the soul's
perception or awareness of the intrinsic and essential light possessed
by the object, with which it shares a light reality. Therefore, true
vision does not require the acquisition and transmission of forms, but
occurs through the soul's ability to be aware of the essential
light-reality of the object. Hence, physics and metaphysics merge, as
visible objects have the ability to receive and emit light, though
only in an accidental manner, light being precisely what the managing
(*mudabbira*) light-soul, the Isfahbad-light, is able to
perceive, whether it be through the senses, the soul/intellect,
intuition, or dreams (*PI*, SSSS145-6). A certain
type of intuitive (innate) knowledge of the light rests at the heart
of vision (*PI*, SS226) and upon which discursive knowledge
may subsequently validate rationally through demonstrations
(Ha'iri Yazdi 1992; Dinani 1985). 



Suhrawardi also criticizes the localization of the internal faculties
in different parts of the brain, since localizing them in a material
organ again naturalizes the process of representation. Internal
faculties now become shadows (or functions) of the soul, lumped
together into a single faculty responsible for representation. The
Isfahbad-light principle accesses the dominating (*qahira*)
lights, rules over the active imagination, and reflects onto it the
lights it receives and grasps. The faculty of representation perceives
particulars, while the governing (*mudabbira*) light, the
Isfahbad-light principle that guarantees the unity of the soul, can
perceive universals and immaterial entities. The emphasis on the
wholeness of the soul, as the main perceiving entity, and the
reduction of the Avicennan faculties traditionally responsible for
representation to a single faculty could find their origin in Abu
al-Barakat al-Baghdadi's *al-Mu'tabar* (1939, vol.
2, 318-24; cf. Pines 1979, 227-31). As for recollection,
Suhrawardi defines it in a rather Platonic manner, whereby it becomes
the retrieval of images (or concepts) whose existence lies in the
'world of memorial', accessible only to the luminous part
of the soul, though not in the manner of the Platonic theory of
knowledge by recollection of the soul's prior knowledge it
possessed before its temporal origination with its body. 



For Suhrawardi, illumination becomes a metaphor for the intellective
process. Illuminative relations take place between metaphysical active
light principles and the human soul (Marcotte forthcoming). Whereas
only the (rational) Isfahbad-light part of the soul is immortal,
Suhrawardi, nevertheless, notes the possibility for the imaginative
faculty of souls that have not yet achieved perfection to
"escape to the world of suspended images, whose locus is one of
the celestial barriers" that would function as an
'astral' body, bringing "images into being"
(*PI*, SSSS244-6). While perfect souls have
direct access to the (intelligible) immaterial lights (*PI*,
SS250), the survival of human imagination would be required for
the experiencing of divine retribution and the perfecting of imperfect
souls in the afterlife. 



The spheres of Ether and Zamharir, both situated below the sphere of
the Moon and associated with the world of elements, are identified as
possible spiritual/'pneumatic' substrata for the
posthumous activities of the imaginative faculties of those souls
(Suh. 1993c, 245); although, it has been suggested that it could
"simply be read as one of the celestial bodies, Moon, Mercury,
Venus, and so on" (van Lit 2017, 47). Suhrawardi postulates the
existence of this independent eschatological realm with the assistance
of which sensitive perceptions can occur in the form of imaginable
representations (*PI*, SS244-8; Suh. 1992a, 90;
Marcotte 2011; cf. Kutubi 2015, 93-6). Suhrawardi's
'world of images' provides a solution to Avicenna's
attempt to explain posthumous felicity of souls in the Hereafter, in
the form of posthumous 'imaginable' experience of
pleasures and pains (see section 4.3) and to explain the ethics
eschatology nexus (see section 5). 



Finally, while Suhrawardi denies metempsychosis in his Peripatetic
works (namely *Flashes of Light* and *Intimations*), he
would seems more sympathetic to the idea in the *Philosophy of
Illumination*. In this work, he reviews arguments for and against
metempsychosis that remain inconclusive, such that he does not appear
to reject completely the possibility of some kind of transmigration of
souls (cf. Plotinus' *Enneads*), especially for imperfect
(miserable) souls. However, some commentators, like Shahrazuri, were
of the opinion that he upheld metempsychosis (*PI*,
SSSS229-45; Schmidtke 1999; Walbridge 2017,
271-73). 


### 3.2 Epistemology



At the heart of Suhrawardi's epistemological concerns lie two
important components of his *ishraqi* philosophy of lights: the
concepts of 'self-awareness' (*shu'ur
bi-l-dhat*) and 'knowledge by presence'
(*'ilm huduri*) (*PI*, SSSS114-7).
What is at stake is the nature of the acquisition of knowledge and its
ontological underpinning. He begins by exploring and questioning some
of the issues raised by the hypothetical thought experiment of the
'flying' or 'suspended' person found in
Avicenna's *Discussions* and his *Notes* on
Aristotle's *De anima*, and his treatments of the soul in
the *Cure* and *Salvation*. In *Intimations*, for
instance, he criticizes and then rejects Avicenna's Peripatetic
'representational' epistemology that conceives acquisition
of knowledge by means of a 'representation' or a
'form' of what is known in the knower (Kaukua 2015,
106-17). He rejects it as a proof for the existence of the
immaterial soul, claiming that the relation enjoyed by the (material)
body/(immaterial) soul is a "more intimate relationship of
'presence' (*hudur*)", since
'presence' now connects (immaterial) intellection and
internal (material/brain) senses activities. This experiential
evidence would serve as proof for the existence of the soul



In his *Philosophy of Illumination*, he deals primarily with
'apperception' (which now replaces representation or
form). He analyzes the notions of apperception and self-awareness as
he explores this pre-logical mode of perception distinct from
intellection. He discusses the primary awareness of the soul's
existence, its self-identity, the unmediated character of this
particular type of knowledge and issues of individuation. He develops
his epistemological theory by providing various arguments to
demonstrate the existence of a type of knowledge that is self-evident,
innate and unmediated through any type of abstraction or
representation of forms, whether it be through an image, a form, a
notion or an attribute of the self (Marcotte 2006).



The perception of pain becomes paradigmatic of the type of
apperception or awareness he envisions when discussion self- awareness
as unmediated perception, i.e., a non-discursive, non-conceptual and
non-propositional type of knowledge that, nonetheless, constitutes a
mode of knowing distinct from discursive knowledge. Similar to pain,
self-awareness provides yet another illustration of this type of
epistemic process. In this manner, Suhrawardi is able to explain the
knowledge of both an individual self-awareness of its self and the
awareness of other external objects of knowledge. The unmediated
nature of this process characterizes both the soul's
self-awareness and the soul's awareness or knowledge of external
objects of knowledge, such as dominating (intelligible)
light-entities, and even provides the conditions for possible glimpses
of the Light of Lights, God, it may catch (Suh. 1993a, 72-3,
487-9; cf. Kaukua 2015, 130-1). 



The concept of self-awareness informs the epistemological and
ontological aspects of Suhrawardi's metaphysic of lights.
Building upon a basic type of self-awareness found in Avicenna (but
without its inference to the substantiality of the human soul) and the
selfhood (of the contemplative soul) of the Arabic Plotinus,
Suhrawardi introduces a pre-cognitive level of self-consciousness or
self-awareness, logically prior to any distinction between subject and
object (Kaukua 2011, 141-4). Self-awareness of human beings is
equated with the self-awareness that incorporeal lights possess and
share. Suhrawardi writes, "It has been shown that your ego
(*ana'iyya*) is an incorporeal light, that it is
self-conscious, and that the incorporeal lights do not differ in their
realities. Thus, all the incorporeal lights must apprehend their own
essences (*dhat*), since that which is necessarily true of a
thing must also be true of that which has the same reality"
(*PI*, SS127; cf. Kaukua 2011, 150). He thus distinguishes
the 'object of cognition' from the 'subject',
the latter embodied in the 'I-ness'
(*ana'iyya*) coined by Suhrawardi to identify the
"mode of being proper to a cognitive subject";
self-awareness, as mere apprehension and existence, is now
distinguished from the awareness of separate objects (Kaukua 2015,
113; Marcotte 2006). 



It is upon self-awareness that Suhrawardi builds his
"revisionist concept of knowledge as presence" (Kaukua
2015, 125-42). In his *Intimations*, the
'Plotinian' (cf. *Enneads* V 3.6) Aristotle figure
of Suhrawardi's famous 'dream-vision ' provides an
illustrious example of what constitutes real knowledge based on
immediate and intuitive knowledge: "return to your self
(*nafs*)" (1993a, 70), that is, knowledge one obtains
through one's own soul. This Aristotle continues to explain how
one knows, introducing intellection as "the presence
(*hudur*) of a thing for a self (*dhat*)",
presence (*hudur*) or appearance (*zuhur*) being a
"function of luminosity". These passages of
*Intimations* introduce central elements of Suhrawardi's
knowledge by presence (Suh. 1993a, 71-4; cf. Walbridge 2000,
225-9; Eichner 2001, 127-40; Kaukua 2013, 310-7,
2015, 127-33; Fanaei Eshkevari, 1996). 



In Suhrawardi's 'science of lights', the object of
apperception -- light -- cannot be known discursively, but
only through an immediate presence or awareness of its luminosity, as
not to fall into reification. Mystical vision and contemplation
operate through this intuitive process of knowing metaphysical lights.
Individuals achieve such states through spiritual and ascetic
practices that enable them to detach themselves from the darknesses of
the world in their quest for the apperception of those lights.
Intuitive knowledge (*dhawq*) thus constitutes a superior means
of accessing the luminous reality and the divine realm of metaphysical
truths. 



Suhrawardi appears to spiritualize Avicenna's Peripatetic
epistemology with a notably Platonic reading, now that the access to
the ultimate reality is guaranteed through divine photic illumination.
His classification of learned men according to their respective merits
in discursive (philosophy) and intuitive (mystical) knowledge is
revealing. For some, like Qutb al-Din Shirazi, whereas the
Peripatetics had extolled intellection, Suhrawardi brings direct
intuition (*dhawq*) or mystical contemplation (heightened by
ascetic components) to the forefront, as an alternative -- albeit
more reliable -- foundation of certainty, where this presence can
be achieved through intuitive apprehension or contemplative vision
(*mushahada*) in order to access true reality, following
continuous practice of spiritual exercises. 



Direct intuition (*dhawq*) or mystical contemplation plays a
predominant role, even for prophets. Prophetic knowledge relies on the
functions of the faculty of imagination, i.e., its mimetic function
and its role in the particularization of universal truths. Prophecy
becomes the 'direct' experience of the world of lights.
Suhrawardi also introduces an independent 'world of
images' to account for the ability of prophets and other gifted
individuals to access divine metaphysical realms where imaginable
forms already exist. Such individuals are either commissioned or
uncommissioned to receive and transmit God's message, the
prophets being those who are among the privileged commissioned. Direct
intuition lies at the heart of Suhrawardi's prophetology,
inasmuch as only the most perfect sage (*hakim*) with intuitive
philosophy (*muta'allih*) who witnesses those truths,
whether he be a prophet or not, deserves God's viceregency
(*khilafa*), by being either a living proof or in occultation.
Individuals who have access to those metaphysical lights can be
invested with this viceregency, depending on the degree of their
receptivity and the purity of their hearts (*PI*, SS5).




On the whole, however, the epistemic process by which mystics such as
Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d.874), Sahl al-Tustari (d.896) and Hallaj
(d.912), sages such as Zarathustra and Empedocles, philosophers such
as Pythagoras and Plato, or Suhrawardi himself have all had access to
those metaphysical truths and divine realms remains quite similar to
the process by which prophets have accessed the same divine and
metaphysical truths. Liberated from the enslavement of the material
world, their Isfahbad-light souls become receptive to illumination and
perceive truths similar to those perceived by prophets. Prophetic and
mystical knowledge only occur once the human soul is able to conjoin
with those metaphysical lights. The soul is able to acquire a luminous
and theurgic power, mediated by the active imagination which
existentiates images and forms that have been reflected, in a
mirror-like manner, onto it (Sinai 2015). It can imitate and reproduce
forms that it has received from non-sensible realms, as it
short-circuits all incoming external and sensible data. The faculty of
active imagination then projects those matters onto the 'common
sense' that provides a sensible form to those divine
metaphysical realities that they did not originally possess. 


## 4. Metaphysics



In the *Philosophy of Illumination*, Suhrawardi develops a
complex metaphysic of 'divine' lights. Light, the lynchpin
of his metaphysics, structures his ontology and cosmology at the heart
of which lies a spectrum of light and darkness that shapes the whole
of reality. In his *Intimations* (Suh. 1993a, 2-3),
philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical components, where
the tripartite division of the practical encompasses the standard
peritatetic disciplines of ethics (*khuluqiyya*), economics
(*manziliyya*) and politics (*madaniyya*), while the
theoretical is concerned with immaterial realities, the highest
theoretical component being concerned with absolute being
(*wujud*). 


### 4.1 Essence and Existence



Suhraward's concept of light manages to 'disrupt'
the classical Peripatetic ontology by rendering obsolete the Avicennan
distinction between 'essence' and 'existence'
in contingent beings (Rizvi 2000). Perhaps following Aristotle,
Avicenna favored the primacy of essence over existence, the latter
being considered an abstract concept. Suhrawardi criticized and
rejected the Peripatetic logical distinction between the two concepts,
insisting that the concept of existence is added to quiddity *in
re*, such that the general extension of the concept of existence
remains a mental predicate, not a real one. Concepts such as being,
thingness, etc. that Peripatetics considered *a priori* and
real are, for Suhrawardi, 'beings of reason'
(*i'tibar 'aqli*), i.e. "merely mental
considerations (*i'tibari*) with no corresponding
reality" (Rizvi 1999, 222; *PI*, SS68, 56; Suh.
1993a, 175-6). This is what some have labeled Suhrawardi's
'conceptualist' position, essence and existence being
distinct only in the mind, and his 'anti-realist' approach
to existence, a notion predicated only of concepts in the mind
(Benevich 2017, 206, 251), a possible later Nasir al-Din al-Tusi
inspired reading. 



The primacy of light signals a shift in the understanding of the very
nature of the 'essence' of things. The respective degree
or intensity of light of essences makes them distinct from one
another, although they all share in the same light whose origin
remains with the Light of Lights. Everything partakes *in* and
*of* light, in an almost infinite manner. The distinction
between essence and existence no longer becomes appropriate to assert
contingency and only remains notional, since the difference between
necessary and contingent beings depends now on whether a being
possesses light *in itself* or light *for other than
itself* (Rizvi 1999, 223; *PI*, SS68). In the
*Philosophy of Illumination* (SS121), Suhrawardi writes,
"Light is divided into light of itself and in itself and light
of itself but in another. You know that accidental light is light in
another. Thus, it is not a light *in* itself although it is a
light *of* itself". 



Rizvi (1999, 224) showed how later philosophers ascribed the
ontological primacy of essence (or quiddity) thesis to Suhrawardi who
"clearly states that quiddity/essence in itself is a conceptual
and unreal a notion as existence", Suhrawardi noting that
"the quiddity of luminosity [i.e., the same as light] is a
mental universal" (*PI*, SS141). But it is also true
that Suhrawardi's "phenomenological epistemology of
eidetic vision" *could* easily imply a primacy of essence
(Rizvi 1999, 224). The position is eminently nominalist, now that both
existence and essence are considered mere mental concepts, reality
having been redefined with the new primacy of light. Likewise, his
theory of knowledge by presence remains "deeply nominalist and
empiricist" (viz. mystical experience) (Walbridge 2000, 169).
However, light and essence cannot be synonymous. Both light and
darkness exist: "light is the being of things as their
instantiating principle *in concreto* and not their
essences" (*ibid.*). Likewise, light is not identical
with substance, since both dark substances and accidental lights exist
(Walbridge 2000, 24). Rizvi (1999, 224) notes that entities grasped as
essences through presential knowledge are "apparent aspects of
what one might regard as 'light monads'", an idea
whose source appears to be highly Platonic or Neoplatonic (Proclus).




For Suhrawardi (*PI*, SSSS111-3), being is
grasped through the (non-sensible) vision of lights that lie beyond
the essences, as even the existence of bodies depends upon incorporeal
lights: "Nothing that has an essence (*dhat*) of which it
is not unconscious is dusky, for its essence is evident
(*zuhur*) to it. It cannot be a dark state (*hay'a
zulmaniyya*) in something else, since even the luminous state
(*hay'a nuriyya*) is not a self-subsistent light (*nur
li-dhati-ha*), let alone the dark state. Therefore, it is
nonspatial pure incorporeal (*nur mahd*) light"
(*PI*, SS114). Access to this ultimate reality of beings is
achieved through the direct experience of its ontic light reality,
rendering intuitive and non-discursive knowledge (logically) prior to
any other type of knowledge. 



Suhrawardi's criticism of the essence-existence distinction had
an impact on later discussions, namely those of Ibn Kammuna (d.1284)
(Eichner 2010), Athir al-Din al-Abhari (d.ca.1265) and al-Katibi
al-Qazwini (d.ca.1276) (Eichner 2012). Later, Mulla Sadra (d.1636)
notes Suhrawardi's confusion between the concept of existence
and the reality of existence and replaces his notion of light with the
notion of being, blending Avicenna's ontology of contingency
with his *ishraqi* hierarchy of lights (Rizvi 1999, 225). 


### 4.2 Ontology of Lights



In the second part of the *Philosophy of Illumination*,
Suhrawardi lays out his light ontology. While some parallels can be
drawn with the mystical light epistemology of Muhammad al-Ghazali
(d.1111) in his *Niche of Lights* (1998) (cf. *PI*,
SS171; Sinai 2016), Suhrawardi develops a distinctly original
theory of light. Light and its manifestation are fundamental
ontological principles of his complex metaphysics wherein the
continuous irradiation from the Light of Lights creates and sustains
the unity of reality. 



The nature of light, its various manifestations and their
interconnectedness determine what exists. All existing things can are
divided into four classes of existents (from which Suhrawardi's
cosmology is derived). The first category of entities consists of
self-subsistent 'pure' or 'immaterial lights'
that are strikingly similar to Leibniz's
monads (Walbridge 2005: 244), those that are associated with the
Peripatetic intellects. These lights manifest to themselves are aware
of both themselves and what is other than them. These are causally
primary, in terms of existence and of efficiency, though they
"can differ in intensity and in luminous and dark
accidents" (aspects of their individuation). In addition, they
are now endowed with the capacity to create and to be "manifest
to other immaterial lights". The second category consists of
'dark barriers', bodies whose existence depends on
accidental light to make them manifest (as "the effects of
lights") and that are "known only by incorporeal
lights". The third category consists of 'accidental
lights', inhering in another, such as physical lights, and the
"luminous accidents" occurring "in both barriers and
in immaterial lights". The last category consists of 'dark
accidents', the "qualities of physical things that are not
manifest in themselves", but inhering in another (Walbridge
1992, 49-51, 2004, 213-4; *PI*,
SSSS107-13, 121). Thus, what distinguishes quiddities is
the degree of their luminous intensity within the ontological
hierarchies or 'grades' (more or less) of light, from the
noblest of light, the Light of Lights (God) to the absence of it
(matter). 



Suhrawardi adopts a familiar 'pyramidal structure of levels of
light being', from the Light of lights to the sublunary world.
He appeals to two (Peripatetic) principles to uphold the existence of
a first necessary cause -- the Light of Lights -- and all
the basic classes of beings (light and darkness, substance and state,
independent and dependent beings). A first principle, Walbridge notes,
"is a form of the principle of sufficient reason, 'the
principle of the most noble contingency' [...] which
asserts that nothing can exist without a cause of higher ontological
level" (*PI*, SSSS164-73; cf. *Paths and
Havens* for Aristotle's views in *On the Heavens*;
Suh. 1993a, 434-5). This first principle of 'nobler
contingency' (*imkan ashraf*), central for
Suhrawardi's demonstration of the existence of a Light of Light
that is ontologically discinct from, though partaking in the
contingent of which it is the first cause. A second principle
corresponds to the Aristotelian "impossibility of an ordered,
actual infinity" which, with the first principle, guarantees
that "there cannot be an infinite number of levels of being and
that there must be one being whose existence is necessary in itself
-- Avicenna's 'Necessary of Existence'
(*wajib al-wujud*)" -- and for Suhrawardi, the Light
of Lights (Walbridge 2000, 24-5, 1992, 56-61; *PI*,
SSSS129-38, 55). Mayer (2001) showed that this second
principle was certainly not central to Avicenna's
cosmological/ontological argument of the existence of God. From the
being of the One, the Light of Lights, can emanate all the existents
and the cosmos via a complex interconnected irradiation of light
intensity (*PI*, SS150-4), varying light intensity
bringing to life the different 'degrees' of contingent
immaterial and material beings, a monist-like ontology of lights that
accommodates the contingency of all existents irradiated, but
distinct, from Light of Lights (cf. Rizvi, 2019, and 2009, ch.2). 



While light always remains in itself identical, its proximity or
distance from the Light of Lights determines the ontic light reality
of all beings. Their ontological statuses, qualities and influences
are determined by the different degrees of intensity of light. The
distinguishing characteristic is the scale of lights coming into being
through the radiance of light: the greater its radiance, the greater
its ontological perfection. Reality proceeds from the Light of Lights
and unfolds via the First Light and all the subsequent dominating and
managing lights whose exponential interactions bring about the
existence of all existents. As each new light interacts with other
existing lights, more light and dark substances are generated. Light
produces both immaterial and substantial lights, such as immaterial
intellects (angels), human and animal souls. Light produces dusky
substances, such as bodies. In fact, light generates both luminous
accidents, such as those in immaterial lights, physical lights or
rays, and dark accidents, whether it be in immaterial lights or in
bodies (*PI*, SSSS109-10). 



Along with the notion of varying degrees of intensity of light,
Suhrawardi introduces two hierarchies of immaterial lights: a vertical
order and a horizontal order. The first vertical order of lights
proceeds from the Light of Lights. These are the pure and incorporeal
(*mujarrada*) dominating (*qahira*) lights. From the
Light of Lights proceeds an incorporeal First Light -- following
the Neoplatonic principle *ex uno non fit nisi unum*, i.e.
'from the one, in so far as it is one, comes only one'
(principle at the heart of Avicenna's emanationist
(*fayd*) cosmology, cf. Lizzini, 2016, sect. 5.4) -- thus
assuring ontological dependency of all that comes into existence upon
the Light of Lights. From this First Light proceeds a Second Light and
the all-encompassing *barzakh* (highest heaven); from the
second proceeds a Third Light and a second *barzakh*, or the
Sphere of fixed stars; and so forth (*PI*, SS141-3,
151-2). This vertical order of incorporeal lights is further
divided into two classes: the loftier dominating lights -- the
Avicennan Peripatetic immaterial intellects -- and the managing
(*mudabbira*) lights -- the Avicennan Peripatetic
immaterial souls of the spheres associated with the various bodies
(*barazikh*), as well as the managing Isfahbad light that rules
over human souls (*PI*, SS155). Light operates at all
levels and hierarchies of reality: irradiation proceeds from higher
dominating (*qahira a'la*) lights, whereas the lower
lights desire the higher ones (*PI*, SS147). There is a
correlative relation of dominance (*qahr*) and yearning or love
(*mahabba*) between the higher incorporeal lights and the lower
accidental lights (*PI*, SS156). 



This vertical hierarchy of lights mirrors the Avicennan Neoplatonic
process of emanation of intellects. Suhrawardi, however, increases the
number of active principles (the Peripatetics immaterial intellects,
something Averroes denounced in Avicenna's Neoplatonic
ontology). Each of level of immaterial dominating lights is associated
with a celestial sphere. They are no longer limited to
al-Farabi's (d.950) nine spheres or to those and their
"varying number of subordinate spherical bodies" Avicenna
suggested with his "second kinematic model" (Janos 2011,
172-9). This development may have inspired Suhrawardi's
indefinite, though not infinite, number of immaterial dominating
(*qahira*) lights that are more "than ten, or twenty, or
one hundred, or [...], or a hundred thousand", lights that
are, in fact, as numerous as the stars in the fixed heavens
(*PI*, SS151; Arslan 2014, 138-9). 



The vertical hierarchy of immaterial dominating lights interacts with
a second horizontal order of dominating lights. Some are equal to
others, "because the higher lights possess many luminous aspects
or interact with each other, the existence of other equal dominating
lights may occur from them [...]. Thus, among the dominating
lights are mother-lights (*ummahat*) -- the fundamental
vertical lights with few and substantial intermediaries -- while
other are lights horizontal in their ranks from intermediate
rays" (*PI*, SS183, 154-5). This second
horizontal hierarchy of dominating (*qawahir*) lights is, at
times, associated with 'managing angels' (*PI*,
SS248, 259, 269-70) (perhaps equal in number to celestial
bodies; at times, referring to ancient Semitic angelic hierarchies and
Zoroastrian mythology). 



But more importantly, some of the horizontal self-subsisting and
incorporeal dominating lights are identified as formal dominating
lights, as 'Lords of Species' (archetypes) or
'idols' (*arbab al-asnam*): "though they are
not imprinted in the barriers (bodies), they occur from each master of
an idol in its barrier shadow with respect to some exalted luminous
aspect" (*PI*, 155). These are, at times, labelled the
Platonic Forms (*muthul Aflatun*) (located perhaps at the lower
threshold of the world of souls), which Suhrawardi incorporates into
his metaphysics, over which rules the Light of Lights (*PI*,
SSSS246-8; Suh. 1999, 111). Each of those eternal,
unchanging and pure luminous lights can differ in kind without
differing in ontological level. They are "lights of equal
strength" that "differ from others of the same strength by
luminous and dark accidents", some of the lights of this
horizontal order being "the efficient, not the formal, causes of
natural kinds" (Walbridge 2017, 270; Suh. 1993a, 67-8;
*PI*, SSSS94-5, 164-71). The function of
those Platonic Forms is analogous to the archetypal Forms of Plato,
but only in so far as they govern various species whose exemplars they
existentiate (rather than being mere universals), such as the species
of bodies that move the celestial spheres and being the cosmological
efficient causes of all sublunar matters, including human souls
(Walbridge 1992, 61-6, 2017, 270-1). 



Out of the interaction of the irradiations of the vertical and the
horizontal lights, the bodies of the lower world are generated. These
two hierarchies of lights are structurally interrelated through the
principle domination (*qahr*) that the higher lights have over
the lower ones and the principle of desire and love (*mahabba*)
that the lower lights have for the higher lights (*PI*,
SSSS152-6). The increase of dominating immaterial lights
and the introduction of a second order of horizontal lights (the
Platonic Forms) enabled the possibility of simple effects from
composite causes (*PI*, SSSS94-5). The two
dimensional hierarchy of lights introduces a new nonlinear and
composite notion of metaphysical causation. The multiplication of
metaphysical entities increases the ontological distance that exists
between the Light of Lights and the sublunar world, while
simultaneously providing a greater holistic view of reality, since
light lies at its core. Notions of intensity and gradation of light,
together with notions of presence and self-manifestation, are thus
central to Suhrawardi's metaphysics. The intensity of light
corresponds to the degree of the lights self-awareness. Similarly, the
self-awareness of the Light of Lights encompasses, with varying
degrees of intensity, all the other constitutive lights of reality.
Later, Mulla Sadra (d.1636) will take up Suhrawardi's insight
about the gradation and intensity of light and develop an ontology
grounded in the gradation of existence (rather than light) of all
beings, somehow reversing Suhrawardi's ontology with his primacy
of existence and his understanding of essence as a mental concept.




With his metaphysic of lights, Suhrawardi proposes what he may have
deemed a more satisfying argument for the difficult philosophical and
theological problem of God's knowledge of particulars. The
concepts of self-knowledge and knowledge by presence, at the heart of
the knowledge by presence of all light-beings, provides a means to
explain God's self-awareness, as the Light of Lights, as well as
Its self-knowledge and It's knowledge of all things other than
itself (creation), such as particulars. Knowledge by presence serves
to explain the presence of God's knowledge of Itself to Itself,
as it does for the self-knowledge of all beings of light: "Its
knowledge of Its essence is Its being a light in Its essence and
evident to Its essence". At the same time, God is able to be
aware of what is other than It, such that "Its knowledge of
things is their being evident to It, either in themselves or in their
connections" (*PI*, SS162). Hence, God's
knowledge by presence is now conceived in terms of the
"existence of a 'relation' (*idafa*) between
it and whatever is known to it", whereby this "purely
relational" nature of God's knowledge enables the Light of
Light to know material particulars without there being any changes or
effects on its light substance (Sinai 2013, 320-1, 2016,
288-93; Eichner 2001, 137-9). For a good overview of
Suhrawardi's light ontology, see Walbridge (1992, 40-78,
2004, 212-6). 


### 4.3 World of Images



About half a century earlier than Ibn 'Arabi (d.1240),
Suhrawardi introduces an independent 'world of images'
- what Corbin labelled the *mundus imaginalis*, a fourth
ontological level (later rejected by Mulla Sadra, see Landolt 2017).
Van Lit (2017, 7) prefers the translation 'world of
images' (or 'imaginable world') over Corbin's
'imaginal world' to render Suhrawardi's concept of
*' alam al-mithal*. This fourth world lies alongside the
three worlds (i) of the intelligible or of the dominating
(*qahira*) lights, (ii) of the spiritual, i.e. a soul
associated with a body, either human or celestial, or the managing
(*mudabbira*) lights, and (iii) of the material or the
'barriers' (*barzakhiyan*) (*PI*,
SS246). This independent 'world of immaterial shapes'
(*ashbah murajjada*) or images (*suwar*) operates like
an 'isthmus' or an 'intermediary realm' of
"dark and illuminated suspended images (*suwar
mu'allaqa*)". It lies somewhere between the physical
world of darkness and the world of the 'Lords of the
species' (*arbab al-anwa'*), i.e. the world of the
Platonic Forms of 'pure Lights' (horizontal lights). This
fourth 'world of images' is where new entities - the
'suspended forms' (*muthul mu'allaqa*)
- exist and which post-mortem souls grasp with their
imagination. Suhrawardi actually expands on Avicenna's
suggestion that imagination has an important eschatological function
to explain the fate of souls in the Afterlife (cf. van Lit, 2017,
20-47). 



With the introduction of this 'world of images' ,
Suhrawardi sought to account for entities that possess an existence of
their own (some, prior to their coming into existence in this world).
The 'world of images' contains 'suspended
forms' that are not embedded in matter, this world being
conceived as a plane of "ghosts, of the forms in mirrors,
dreams, and worlds of wonder beyond our own" which light can
existentiate (Walbridge 2000, 26). The 'world of images'
provides the material for mystical visions and the miraculous. 



It is where those "who have attained an intermediate bliss and
the ascetics [...] may escape", a place where they
"can and do bring images into beings", where
eschatological forms and images will be existentiated for the souls of
the deceased so that they may continue to perfect their souls, where
"all the promises of prophecies find their reality through
it" (*PI*, SSSS244-8), as well as where
elements not fitting conveniently into the Aristotelian scheme of
forms in matter are found. 



The world of 'suspended images' is distinct from the Forms
of Plato (*muthul Aflatun*) that are "are luminous, while
some of the suspended forms are dark and others illuminated"
(*PI*, SS246). The 'world of images' is where
images and suspended forms are found that are perceived by the
soul's imaginative power (*PI*, SS225). Suhrawardi
notes, "Whoever sees that station knows with certainty the
existence of a world other than that of barriers (*barazikh*;
i.e. bodies). In it are self-subsistent [lit.: suspended] images
(*muthul mu'allaqa*)" (*PI*, SS259),
although those suspended forms "are in neither a place nor a
locus" (*PI*, SS225; see van Lit 2017). More
importantly, Suhrawardi's 'world of images' and
suspended forms plays a novel eschatological function, ensuring that
imperfect souls may experience posthumously the pains and pleasures of
divine retribution by providing an 'objective' status to
those 'real' experiences. (*PI*, SSSS
244-6; Sinai 2015, 280-1; van Lit 2017, 37-78) (see
3.1). Suhrawardi did not conceptualize systematically his 'world
of images' and 'suspended forms'. Hence, from the
thirteen century up to the twenty-first century, quite a few
commentators have delved deeper into the matter (van Lit 2017,
142-75). 


## 5. Politics and Ethics



Suhrawardi's *Philosophy of Illumination* carries a
political dimension. Ziai (1992) provides an overview of what he calls
his 'Illuminationist political doctrine': it establishes a
connection between political authority, just rule, and the
ruler's access to divine light. For instance, in *Tablets to
'Imad* (Suh. 1993c, 186-8 [Pers.]), Suhrawardi
introduces two Zoroastrian terms *kharrah* (*xwarrah*)
and *farrah* (Avesta/Pahlavi) to allude to the divine/regal
light that was bestowed upon ancient kings; in the *Book of
Radiance*, it is the Light of Lights that bestows upon them
luminous glory and power (*kharra-yi kayani*) (Suh. 1998,
84-5, cf. 1993c, 81; Gnoli 1999); and in the *Philosophy of
Illumination*, it corresponds to the light of the Kingdom of Power
(*malakut*) that Kay Khusraw and Zarathustra were able to
behold (*PI*, SSSS165-6; cf. 1993a, 502-5).




This political 'doctrines' provides indications of the
conditions able to guarantee the reign of the just rule, thus
providing elements of an Illuminationist political ethic of the
Sage-ruler. However, the general framework of the ethics underlying
Suhrawardi's *ishraqi* system requires further
investigation. His particularly Platonic understanding of the mystic
qua ruler and his political role, coupled with the role of intuitive
or 'mystical' access to the 'divine' lights by
prophets, mystics and sages might, however, not leave Suhrawardi
immune to the same criticism Popper leveled against Plato. 



Suhrawardi may, in fact, appeal to a somewhat
'mythological' genealogy of the transmission of ancient
Illumination/*ishraqi* philosophies from the Greek/West and the
Iranian/East which he claims to revive. Ziai (1992, 337; cf. Walbridge
2000, 201-10) speculates that he tried to put into practice the
political dimension (i.e. a 'new' political doctrine) of
his *ishraqi* philosophy, based mainly on passages from his
works and considering the possible circumstances of his demise and
execution. Historical data supporting the thesis, Suhrawardi's
relationship with his many patrons and the purpose of passages
relating to these Illuminationist political doctrines need further
examination to confirm the claim (Marcotte 2001a, 415-6). 



Suhrawardi's eschatology -- the Return -- and his
discussions on the fate of the soul in the afterlife offers a glimpse
of what might constitute a 'good' and ethical life in this
world. In line with Avicenna's classification of souls in the
hereafter according to their worldly acquisition of practical and
theoretical knowledge, the moral qualities developed in this life
determine the fate of souls in the afterlife (*PI*,
SSSS244-8). In search of felicity, souls must attempt to
detach themselves from their tenebrous bodies and all that is worldly
and material and seek to access the world of immaterial lights. Souls
engrossed in matter in this life partially determine their fate in the
afterlife. In this respect, Suhrawardi does not depart greatly from
Avicenna's Peripatetic eschatology (see 4.3). 



Prophets, saints and exceptionally gifted mystics are the ones best
able to achieve conjunction with the world of pure lights. Ascetic
practices in this life can become a means to attain self-consciousness
of the ontic light reality of the soul. Some of Suhrawardi's
allegorical and mystical treatises, like *The Treatise of the
Bird*, *A Tale of Occidental Exile* or *A Day with a
Group of Sufis* (Suh. 1993b, 274-97, 1999b, 2001, 1976),
provide examples of the pedagogical role and instruction of the guide
figure, of the Lord of the human species, or of spiritual entities to
the novice in his or her quest for the immaterial world of lights in
which salvation lies. The posthumous life of individual souls and
their ability to perceive the promised other-worldly rewards and
punishments become conditions for divine retribution. 


## 6. Suhrawardi's Legacy


### 6.1 Post-Suhrawardian Traditions



Suhrawardi's tragic end marked the beginning of a long history
of commentaries by both proponents and detractors of his novel
reassessment of the Avicennan Peripatetic tradition. By the end of the
13th century, at least two of his works were readily
available and studied in the major centers of learning of Syria
(Damascus and Aleppo), Iraq (Baghdad) and Iran (Maraghah), some of
which circulating most probably before his death. Two major trends
within the commentarial tradition of the 13th century were
to shape later developments: one wass exemplified by Ibn Kammuna
(d.1284) who emphasizes the "purely discursive and the more
systematically philosophical" aspects of Suhrawardi's
works, and the other was exemplified by Shahrazuri (d.ca.1288) who
focuses on, and expands the symbolic and the allegorical aspects of
what came to be known as the *ishraqi* tradition (Ziai 2003,
473-87). 



Ibn Kammuna, a Jewish philosopher greatly influenced by both Avicenna
and Suhrawardi, is the first commentator (Langermann 2005,
297-301; Pourjavady and Schmidtke 2006, 23-32; Eichner
2010) who, while in Baghdad, completes in 1268 his commentary on the
logic, physics and the metaphysics of *Intimations* (Ibn
Kammuna 2003, 2009). Having resided in Aleppo, he could well be, with
such works as *The Revealer*, completed in 1278 (2008;
Langermann 2005), the link between Suhrawardi and Shahrazuri who
writes the earliest commentary on the *Philosophy of
Illumination* (ca. 1286), after having written a commentary on
*Intimations* (Shahrazuri 1993; cf. Marcotte 2002).
Shahrazuri's encyclopedic *Metaphysical Tree*, also
written before his commentary on the *Philosophy of
Illumination* (Shahrazuri, 2004 and 2005 [a better edition]),
would contain some *ishraqi* elements, although it remains to
be ascertained whether his *Divine Symbols and Proverbs* does
(Privot
 2004).[2]



More work is needed to determine the extent and the nature of
Shahrazuri's contribution to what came to be known as an
'Illuminationist' tradition. Van Lit (2017, 79-112)
provides a good example of how focussing on a particular doctrinal
element can yield much insight into Shahrazuri's contribution,
namely giving expression and stabalising the name of the 'world
of images', its location and topography, the means to access it,
its reality, etc. (see also Marcotte 2001b, 2002). In 1295, Qutb
al-Din Shirazi completes his own commentary on the *Philosophy of
Illumination* (Shirazi 2001; Suh. 1986), which supplanted
Shahrazuri's commentary (Walbridge 1992). 



Authors that incorporated or commented and discussed *isharaqi*
ideas include (Isma'il ibn) Muhammad Ibn Rizi (fl.ca.1280), in
his *Life of Souls* (Marcotte 2004); Athir al-Din al-Abhari
(d.1242) in a number of his works (Eichner 2012); 'Allamah Hilli
(d.1325), who pens a commentary on the *Philosophy of
Illumination* (now lost), and solutions to issues raised in
Suhrawardi's *Intimations* (completed before 1293) and
*Opposites*; Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani (d.1414) writes a
commentary on the *Philosophy of Illumination* (Kadivar 2011,
290-2); Ibn Abi Jumhur Ahsa'i (d.1501) (Schmidtke 2000);
Najm al-Din Mahmud al-Nayrizi (d.ca.1526), a critic of Suhrawardi,
completes in 1526 his commentary on *Tablets to 'Imad*
(Pourjavady 2011, 131-6, 137-52); the two theologians
Jalal al-Din al-Dawani (d.1501) and Ghiyath al-Din al-Dashtaki
(d.1542) write commentaries on his *Temples of Light* (Dawani
1953; Dashtaki 2003; Suh. 1996); and 'Abd al-Razzaq (Fayyaz)
Lahiji (d.1667), one of Mulla Sadra's students, would have also
written a commentary on *Temples of Light*. 



Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi) (d.1636), who was most interested
in Suhrawardi's critique of Avicennan Peripateticism (existence
as a being of reason, the Platonic forms, knowledge by presence,
eschatology), writes marginal glosses on the *Philosophy of
Illumination* and on Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi's commentary on
the work (Mulla Sadra 2010; cf. Suh. 1986; Landolt 2017). Mulla Sadra,
like Hadi Sabzawari (d.1873), upholds the principality of existence
(*wujud*), in opposition to what he understood to be
Suhrawardi's view that quiddity was primary over existence, a
view shared by Mir Damad (d.1631) (cf. his *Spiritual
Attractions* [2001] and *Divine Embers* [2001]). 



During the same period, Suhrawardi's works enter the Turkish
Ottoman and Persian Indian philosophical traditions. In the Ottoman
world, Isma'il Ankaravi (d.1631), a member of the Mevlevi Sufi
order, translates and comments *Temples of Light* in his
*Elucidation of Wisdoms* (Kuspinar 1996). During the
17th century, the enigmatic Ahmad Ibn al-Harawi (probably
from Herat), who lived in the Indian subcontinent, translates the
*Philosophy of Illumination* into Persian on which he writes a
commentary (Harawi 1979). Azar Kayvan (d.ca.1615), a Zoroastrian high
priest from Fars, who emigrated to Gujurat in Mughal India during the
reign of Emperor Akbar (r.1556-1605), starts a Zoroastrian
*ishraqi* school (Walbridge 2001, 91-3). Muhammad
'Ali Hazin Lahiji (d.1667) writes a commentary on
Suhrawardi's *Words of Sufism* (Suh. 2001, 101-39;
1993d), along with glosses and notes on three other of his works,
including the *Philosophy of Illumination* (Kadivar 2011,
290-2). Even thinkers of the 20th century, such as
Muhammad Kazim 'Assar (d.1975) and his discussion of
"equivocal being", have been influenced by
*ishraqi*elements (Ziai 2003, 472). Van Lit provides a
chronological sketch of eighteen commentators on Suhrawardi, including
lesser-known ones (2018, 548-53). Cataloguing and making
accessible hundreds of philosophical works in Arabic and Persian from
the 12th-19th century, like the recent
publication of the Persian *Inner Light* (2012) of Shihab
al-Din Kumijani (d.1895), are bound to shed new light on
Suhrawardi's legacy. 



Although very little has been written on the history of the
philosophical legacy of Suhrawardi's novel *ishraqi*
ideas and doctrines, how is one to understand claims made about the
existence of a truly original and distinct 'Illuminationist
tradition'? Some are more cautious in their assessment of
Suhrawardi's project and legacy. Van Lit (2017, 2-3,
6-7), for example, questions Corbin and others who have deemed
what is often labelled the 'Illuminationist' or
*israqi* tradition a 'school of thought', and offer
a corrective assessment with his detailed study on the notion of
- suspended images - and the 'world of image'.
Landolt (2008, 235) also nuanced such claims, like those of Ziai
amongst others, regarding the existence of a truly Suhrawardian
'Illuninationist' tradition conceived as a philosohpical
(*hikma*) system radically different from Avicenna's
Peripateticism. Suhrawardi's project needs to be recast as a
critique of the latter's brand of Peripateticism, similar to the
various critiques put forward by Shahrastani (d.1153), Abu al-Barakat
al-Baghdadi (d.ca.1165), Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d.1210) and
al-Ghazali(d.1111), etc. 


### 6.2 Historiography



Two main schools of thought dominate the historiography of the
Illuminationist tradition. The first, more prevalent and older school,
views Suhrawardi as the founder of a mystical, or
'theosophical' tradition. Henry Corbin, the father of
contemporary *Suhrawardiana* studies, introduced this paradigm
(Gutas 2002, 16-9). 



His interest in the Shaykh *al-ishraq* rested primarily with
the latter's *hikmat al-ishraq*, Corbin's
'Oriental theosophy' -- the lost mythological
traditions of the Ancient sages of the West and the East --
Suhrawardi was reviving, also with his Persian allegories, (views
shared by Nasr). Interested mainly in his mystical views and
metaphysics of light and irradiation, he saw little interest in
editing Suhrawardi's works on logic and physics. These
'gnostic'/'mystic',
'esoteric'/'theosophical' wisdom, or even
pre-Aristotelian *philosophia perennis* or *universalis*
(Nasr 1964, 60-3) approaches to Suhrawardi's works often
overemphasize the mystical and the theosophical at the expense of the
philosophical, and thus blur the distinction between philosophy,
theology and mysticism (cf. Pourjavady 2013). Proponents of this
approach highlight Suhrawardi's aim to expound on
Avicenna's incomplete project to develop an
'Eastern' (*mashriqiyya*) (not
'illuminative') philosophy of Khurasan, in spite of the
fact that Avicenna's 'Eastern' philosophy was not a
mystical enterprise; rather, it aimed at developing a philosophical
tradition distinct from the 'Western' philosophical school
of Baghdad (Gutas 2000). Many scholars often overlook the fact that
Suhrawardi's major works are largely devoted to technical
philosophical questions and theories of which even his allegorical or
minor works are not devoid. More generally, the proponents of the
mystical approach interpret Suhrawardi's *ishraqi*views
as a break or a departure from the philosophical tradition. Some, like
Fakhry (1982), go so far as to question the originality of the
*isharqi* elements of his work, deeming it a mere transposition
of Avicennan philosophy into a light terminology. 



The second, more recent school, views the novel elements of
Suhrawardi's *ishraqi* system as an original
philosophical 'critique' -- in the wake of the
reassessments of Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and
al-Ghazali -- a reconfiguration of Avicennan Peripateticism, an
interpretation adopted by a great many of his medieval commentators.
Some contemporary commentators, like Izutsu (1971), explore the
analytical aspect of Suhrawardi's work; others, like Mehdi
Ha'iri Yazdi (1992) and Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, propose
'Neo-Avicennan' interpretations of the *ishraqi*
tradition (Amin Razavi 2013, xvii-xix). Ziai (1990) focuses
primarily on his logic; whereas Walbridge (1992) studied, first, the
work of Qutb al-Din Shirazi (d.1311), and then the philosophical
heritage of Ancient sages and wisdoms (Greeks, Stoic, Platonic, etc.;
pre-Socratics; Persians, etc.) of Suhrawardi's *ishraqi*
system (2000, 2001, etc.). 



While some, like Corbin (1971), Nasr (1964) and Mohammad Mo'in
(1948, 1950), view Suhrawardi as the reviver of some ancient form of
Persian philosophy; some, like Shahab Ahmed (d. 2015) have
overemphasized his role within the Islamic
 East[3];
 still others are more skeptical. For example, Ziai (2003, 484) notes
the absence of an independent textual Persian philosophical tradition,
although he believes that the Islamic *ishraqi* philosophical
tradition incorporated "Mazdayasnian sentiments kept alive in
popular and oral traditions and in poetic, epic and mystical
compositions". Gutas (2003) also notes the lack of any textual
evidence to support claims that Suhrawardi attempted to revive ancient
Western Greek, Gnostic, and Hermetic traditions and suggests focusing
research on the reasons why Suhrawardi appeals to the authority of the
'Ancients', East and West, rather than trying to find
'real' historical filiations to sources to which he
*might* have had access. 



Since the 1990s, interest in Suhrawardi's work and
*ishraqi* philosophical system and its reception was rekindled
(Ziai 1990; Walbridge 1992, 2000, 2001; Amin Razavi 2004). However,
although some recent scholarship has focused on his critique of
Avicennan Peripatetic views, as well as explored a number of more
specific logical, physical, psychological, epistemological,
ontological, and metaphysical issues of Suhrawardi's major
Arabic works, further studies is still needed to add to our knowledge
of the influence of Avicenna's major works (*Cure*,
*Pointers* and *Reminders*, even *Discussions*),
as well as the influence of the Arabic Platonic and Neoplatonic
traditions in the form they would have been available to him. Eichner
(2011, 140) suggests any "interpretation of Suhrawardian texts
must avoid simply assuming that they were rendered correctly by later
interpretations, which sought to present a unified and coherent
account of his system and the relation of that system to
Peripateticism". This methodological principle would help
revisit Suhrawardi's work, and to produce much-needed studies on
the works of authors who belonged to, or were influenced by various
and novel *ishraqi* elements (cf. Gheissari *et al.*
2018), to chart the complex historical and philosophical developments
of what was to become known as a novel 'Illuminationist'
tradition. This would undoubtedly provide new insights into his
distinctly Platonic reworking of Avicennan Peripateticism, what Gutas
(2002) has identified as Suhrawardi's 'Illuminationist
Avicennism'.