## 1. Political Science in General



The modern word 'political' derives from the Greek
*politikos*, 'of, or pertaining to, the polis'.
(The Greek term *polis* will be translated here as
'city-state'. It is also commonly translated as
'city' or simply anglicized as 'polis'.
City-states like Athens and Sparta were relatively small and cohesive
units, in which political, religious, and cultural concerns were
intertwined. The extent of their similarity to modern nation-states is
controversial.) Aristotle's word for 'politics' is
*politike*, which is short for *politike
episteme* or 'political science'. It
belongs to one of the three main branches of science, which Aristotle
distinguishes by their ends or objects. Contemplative science
(including physics and metaphysics) is concerned with truth or
knowledge for its own sake; practical science with good action; and
productive science with making useful or beautiful objects
(*Top*. VI.6.145a14-16, *Met*. VI.1.1025b24,
XI.7.1064a16-19, *EN* VI.2.1139a26-8). Politics is
a practical science, since it is concerned with the noble action or
happiness of the citizens (although it resembles a productive science
in that it seeks to create, preserve, and reform political systems).
Aristotle thus understands politics as a normative or prescriptive
discipline rather than as a purely empirical or descriptive
inquiry.



In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle describes his subject
matter as 'political science', which he characterizes as
the most authoritative science. It prescribes which sciences are to be
studied in the city-state, and the others -- such as military
science, household management, and rhetoric -- fall under its
authority. Since it governs the other practical sciences, their ends
serve as means to its end, which is nothing less than the human good.
"Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a
city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and more
complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain
it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a
nation or city-state" (*EN* I.2.1094b7-10). The two
ethical works (the *Nicomachean* Ethics and the *Eudemian
Ethics*) explain the principles that form the foundations for
the *Politics*: that happiness is the highest human good, that
happiness is the activity of moral virtue defined in terms of the
mean, and that justice or the common advantage is the political good.
Aristotle's political science thus encompasses the two fields which
modern philosophers distinguish as ethics and political philosophy.
(See the entry on
 Aristotle's ethics.)
 Political philosophy in the narrow sense is roughly speaking the
subject of his treatise called the *Politics*. For a further
discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary
document:



Supplement: Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle's Politics



## 2. Aristotle's View of Politics



Political science studies the tasks of the politician or statesman
(*politikos*), in much the way that medical science concerns
the work of the physician (see *Politics* IV.1). It is, in
fact, the body of knowledge that such practitioners, if truly expert,
will also wield in pursuing their tasks. The most important task for
the politician is, in the role of lawgiver
(*nomothetes*), to frame the appropriate constitution for
the city-state. This involves enduring laws, customs, and institutions
(including a system of moral education) for the citizens. Once the
constitution is in place, the politician needs to take the appropriate
measures to maintain it, to introduce reforms when he finds them
necessary, and to prevent developments which might subvert the
political system. This is the province of legislative science, which
Aristotle regards as more important than politics as exercised in
everyday political activity such as the passing of decrees (see
*EN* VI.8).



Aristotle frequently compares the politician to a craftsman. The
analogy is imprecise because politics, in the strict sense of
legislative science, is a form of practical knowledge, while a craft
like architecture or medicine is a form of productive knowledge.
However, the comparison is valid to the extent that the politician
produces, operates, maintains a legal system according to universal
principles (*EN* VI.8 and X.9). In order to appreciate this
analogy it is helpful to observe that Aristotle explains the
production of an artifact such as a drinking cup in terms of four
causes: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes
(*Phys*. II.3 and *Met*. A.2). For example, clay
(material cause) is molded into a roughly cylindrical shape
closed at one end (formal cause) by a potter (efficient or moving
cause) so that it can contain a beverage (final cause). (For
discussion of the four causes see the entry on
 Aristotle's physics.)



One can also explain the existence of the city-state in terms of the
four causes. It is a kind of community (*koinonia*), that
is, a collection of parts having some functions and interests in
common (*Pol*. II.1.1261a18, III.1.1275b20). Hence, it is made
up of parts, which Aristotle describes in various ways in different
contexts: as households, or economic classes (e.g., the rich and the
poor), or demes (i.e., local political units). But, ultimately, the
city-state is composed of individual citizens (see
III.1.1274a38-41), who, along with natural resources, are the
"material" or "equipment" out of which the
city-state is fashioned (see VII.14.1325b38-41).



The formal cause of the city-state is its constitution
(*politeia*). Aristotle defines the constitution as "a
certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state"
(III.1.1274b32-41). He also speaks of the constitution of a community
as "the form of the compound" and argues that whether the
community is the same over time depends on whether it has the same
constitution (III.3.1276b1-11). The constitution is not a
written document, but an immanent organizing principle, analogous to
the soul of an organism. Hence, the constitution is also "the
way of life" of the citizens (IV.11.1295a40-b1, VII.8.1328b1-2).
Here the citizens are that minority of the resident population who
possess full political rights (III.1.1275b17-20).



The existence of the city-state also requires an efficient cause,
namely, its ruler. On Aristotle's view, a community of any sort can
possess order only if it has a ruling element or authority. This
ruling principle is defined by the constitution, which sets criteria
for political offices, particularly the sovereign office
(III.6.1278b8-10; cf. IV.1.1289a15-18). However, on a
deeper level, there must be an efficient cause to explain why a
city-state acquires its constitution in the first place. Aristotle
states that "the person who first established [the city-state]
is the cause of very great benefits" (I.2.1253a30-1). This
person was evidently the lawgiver (*nomothetes*), someone
like Solon of Athens or Lycurgus of Sparta, who founded the
constitution. Aristotle compares the lawgiver, or the politician more
generally, to a craftsman (*demiourgos*) like a weaver or
shipbuilder, who fashions material into a finished product
(II.12.1273b32-3, VII.4.1325b40-1365a5).



The notion of final cause dominates Aristotle's *Politics* from
the opening lines:



> 
> Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that
> every community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone
> does everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is
> clear that every community aims at some good, and the community which
> has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims
> highest, that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is
> called the city-state or political community. [I.1.1252a1-7]
> 



Soon after, he states that the city-state comes into being for the
sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life
(2.1252b29-30). The theme that the good life or happiness is the
proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the *Politics*
(III.6.1278b17-24, 9.1280b39; VII.2.1325a7-10).



To sum up, the city-state is a hylomorphic (i.e., matter-form)
compound of a particular population (i.e., citizen-body) in a given
territory (material cause) and a constitution (formal cause). The
constitution itself is fashioned by the lawgiver and is governed by
politicians, who are like craftsmen (efficient cause), and the
constitution defines the aim of the city-state (final cause,
IV.1.1289a17-18). Aristotle's hylomorphic analysis has important
practical implications for him: just as a craftsman should not try to
impose a form on materials for which it is unsuited (e.g. to build a
house out of sand), the legislator should not lay down or change laws
which are contrary to the nature of the citizens. Aristotle
accordingly rejects utopian schemes such as the proposal in Plato's
*Republic* that children and property should belong to all the
citizens in common. For this runs afoul of the fact that "people give
most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or
only as much as falls to them to give attention" (*Pol.*
II.3.1261b33-5). Aristotle is also wary of casual political
innovation, because it can have the deleterious side-effect of
undermining the citizens' habit of obeying the law
(II.8.1269a13-24). For a further discussion of the theoretical
foundations of Aristotle's politics, see the following supplementary
document:



Supplement: Presuppositions of Aristotle's Politics




It is in these terms, then, that Aristotle understands the fundamental
normative problem of politics: What constitutional form should the
lawgiver establish and preserve in what material for the sake of what
end?


## 3. General Theory of Constitutions and Citizenship



Aristotle states, "The politician and lawgiver is wholly
occupied with the city-state, and the constitution is a certain way of
organizing those who inhabit the city-state" (III.1.1274b36-8).
His general theory of constitutions is set forth in *Politics*
III. He begins with a definition of the citizen
(*polites*), since the city-state is by nature a
collective entity, a multitude of citizens. Citizens are distinguished
from other inhabitants, such as resident aliens and slaves; and even
children and seniors are not unqualified citizens (nor are most
ordinary workers). After further analysis he defines the citizen as a
person who has the right (*exousia*) to participate in
deliberative or judicial office (1275b18-21). In Athens, for
example, citizens had the right to attend the assembly, the council,
and other bodies, or to sit on juries. The Athenian system differed
from a modern representative democracy in that the citizens were more
directly involved in governing. Although full citizenship tended to be
restricted in the Greek city-states (with women, slaves, foreigners,
and some others excluded), the citizens were more deeply enfranchised
than in modern representative democracies because they were more
directly involved in governing. This is reflected in Aristotle's
definition of the citizen (without qualification). Further, he defines
the city-state (in the unqualified sense) as a multitude of such
citizens which is adequate for a self-sufficient life
(1275b20-21).



Aristotle defines the constitution (*politeia*) as a way of
organizing the offices of the city-state, particularly the sovereign
office (III.6.1278b8-10; cf. IV.1.1289a15-18). The
constitution thus defines the governing body, which takes different
forms: for example, in a democracy it is the people, and in an
oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well born). Before
attempting to distinguish and evaluate various constitutions Aristotle
considers two questions. First, why does a city-state come into being?
He recalls the thesis, defended in *Politics* I.2, that human
beings are by nature political animals, who naturally want to live
together. For a further discussion of this topic, see the following
supplementary document:



Supplement: Political Naturalism




Aristotle then adds, "The common advantage also brings them
together insofar as they each attain the noble life. This is above all
the end for all both in common and separately"
(III.6.1278b19-24). Second, what are the different forms of rule
by which one individual or group can rule over another? Aristotle
distinguishes several types of rule, based on the nature of the soul
of the ruler and of the subject. He first considers despotic rule,
which is exemplified in the master-slave relationship. Aristotle
thinks that this form of rule is justified in the case of natural
slaves who (he asserts without evidence) lack a deliberative faculty
and thus need a natural master to direct them (I.13.1260a12; slavery
is defended at length in *Politics* I.4-8). Although a
natural slave allegedly benefits from having a master, despotic rule
is still primarily for the sake of the master and only incidentally
for the slave (III.6.1278b32-7). (Aristotle provides no argument
for this: if some persons are congenitally incapable of governing
themselves, why should they not be ruled primarily for their own
sakes?) He next considers paternal and marital rule, which he also
views as defensible: "the male is by nature more capable of
leadership than the female, unless he is constituted in some way
contrary to nature, and the elder and perfect [is by nature more
capable of leadership] than the younger and imperfect"
(I.12.1259a39-b4).



Aristotle is persuasive when he argues that children need adult
supervision because their rationality is "imperfect"
(*ateles*) or immature. But he is unconvincing to modern
readers when he alleges (without substantiation) that, although women
have a deliberative faculty, it is "without authority"
(*akuron*), so that females require male supervision
(I.13.1260a13-14). (Aristotle's arguments about slaves and women
appear so weak that some commentators take them to be ironic. However,
what is obvious to a modern reader need not have been so to an ancient
Greek, so that it is not necessary to suppose Aristotle's
discussion is disingenuous.) It is noteworthy, however, that paternal
and marital rule are properly practiced for the sake of the ruled (for
the sake of the child and of the wife respectively), just as arts like
medicine or gymnastics are practiced for the sake of the patient
(III.6.1278b37-1279a1). In this respect they resemble political
rule, which is the form of rule appropriate when the ruler and the
subject have equal and similar rational capacities. This is
exemplified by naturally equal citizens who take turns at ruling for
one another's advantage (1279a8-13). This sets the stage for the
fundamental claim of Aristotle's constitutional theory:
"constitutions which aim at the common advantage are correct and
just without qualification, whereas those which aim only at the
advantage of the rulers are deviant and unjust, because they involve
despotic rule which is inappropriate for a community of free
persons" (1279a17-21).



The distinction between correct and deviant constitutions is combined
with the observation that the government may consist of one person, a
few, or a multitude. Hence, there are six possible constitutional
forms (*Politics* III.7):




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Correct** | **Deviant** |
| **One Ruler** | Kingship | Tyranny |
| **Few Rulers** | Aristocracy | Oligarchy |
| **Many Rulers** | Polity | Democracy |



This six-fold classification (which is doubtless adapted from Plato's
*Statesman* 302c-d) sets the stage for Aristotle's inquiry into
the best constitution, although it is modified in various ways
throughout the *Politics*. For example, he observes that the
dominant class in oligarchy (literally rule of the *oligoi*,
i.e., few) is typically the wealthy, whereas in democracy (literally
rule of the *demos*, i.e., people) it is the poor, so
that these economic classes should be included in the definition of
these forms (see *Politics* III.8, IV.4, and VI.2 for
alternative accounts). Also, polity is later characterized as a kind
of "mixed" constitution typified by rule of the
"middle" group of citizens, a moderately wealthy class
between the rich and poor (*Politics* IV.11).



Aristotle's constitutional theory is based on his theory of justice,
which is expounded in *Nicomachean Ethics* book V. Aristotle
distinguishes two different but related senses of
"justice" -- universal and particular -- both of
which play an important role in his constitutional theory. Firstly, in
the universal sense "justice" means
"lawfulness" and is concerned with the common advantage and
happiness of the political community (*NE*
V.1.1129b11-19, cf. *Pol.* III.12.1282b16-17). The
conception of universal justice undergirds the distinction between
correct (just) and deviant (unjust) constitutions. But what exactly
the "common advantage" (*koine sumpheron*)
entails is a matter of scholarly controversy. Some passages imply that
justice involves the advantage of all the citizens; for example, every
citizen of the best constitution has a just claim to private property
and to an education (*Pol.* VII.9.1329a23-4,
13.1332a32-8). But Aristotle also allows that it might be
"in a way" just to ostracize powerful citizens even when
they have not been convicted of any crimes (III.13.1284b15-20).
Whether Aristotle understands the common advantage as safeguarding the
interests of each and every citizen has a bearing on whether and to
what extent he anticipates what moderns would understand as a theory
of individual rights. (See Fred Miller and Richard Kraut for differing
interpretations.)



Secondly, in the particular sense "justice" means
"equality" or "fairness", and this includes
distributive justice, according to which different individuals have
just claims to shares of some common asset such as property. Aristotle
analyzes arguments for and against the different constitutions as
different applications of the principle of distributive justice
(III.9.1280a7-22). Everyone agrees, he says, that justice
involves treating equal persons equally, and treating unequal persons
unequally, but they do not agree on the standard by which individuals
are deemed to be equally (or unequally) meritorious or deserving. He
assumes his own analysis of distributive justice set forth in
*Nicomachean Ethics* V.3: Justice requires that benefits be
distributed to individuals in proportion to their merit or desert. The
oligarchs mistakenly think that those who are superior in wealth
should also have superior political rights, whereas the democrats hold
that those who are equal in free birth should also have equal
political rights. Both of these conceptions of political justice are
mistaken in Aristotle's view, because they assume a false conception
of the ultimate end of the city-state. The city-state is neither a
business enterprise to maximize wealth (as the oligarchs suppose) nor
an association to promote liberty and equality (as the democrats
maintain). Instead, Aristotle argues, "the good life is the end
of the city-state," that is, a life consisting of noble actions
(1280b39-1281a4). Hence, the correct conception of justice is
aristocratic, assigning political rights to those who make a full
contribution to the political community, that is, to those with virtue
as well as property and freedom (1281a4-8). This is what
Aristotle understands by an "aristocratic" constitution:
literally, the rule of the *aristoi*, i.e., best persons.
Aristotle explores the implications of this argument in the remainder
of *Politics* III, considering the rival claims of the rule of
law and the rule of a supremely virtuous individual. Here absolute
kingship is a limiting case of aristocracy. Again, in books VII-VIII,
Aristotle describes the ideal constitution in which the citizens are
fully virtuous.



Although justice is in Aristotle's view the foremost
political virtue (*Pol*. III.9.1283a38-40), the other great
social virtue, friendship, should not be overlooked, because the two
virtues work hand in hand to secure every sort of association
(*EN* VIII.9.1159b26-7). Justice enables the citizens of a
city-state to share peacefully in the benefits and burdens of
cooperation, while friendship holds them together and prevents them
from breaking up into warring factions (cf. *Pol*.
II.4.1262b7-9). Friends are expected to treat each other justly, but
friendship goes beyond justice because it is a complex mutual bond in
which individuals choose the good for others and trust that others are
choosing the good for them (cf. *EE* VII.2.1236a14-15, b2-3;
*EN* VIII.2.1155b34-3.1156a10). Because choosing the good for
one another is essential to friendship and there are three different
ways in which something can be called 'good' for a human
being--virtuous (i.e., good without qualification), useful, or
pleasant--there are three types of friendship: hedonistic,
utilitarian, and virtuous. Political (or civic) friendship is a
species of utilitarian friendship, and it is the most important form
of utilitarian friendship because the polis is the greatest community.
Opposed to political friendship is enmity, which leads to faction or
civil war (*stasis*) or even to political revolution and the
breakup of the polis, as discussed in Book V of the *Politics.*
Aristotle offers general accounts of political or civic friendship as
part of his general theory of friendship in *EE* VII.10 and
*EN* VIII.9-12.


## 4. Study of Specific Constitutions



The purpose of political science is to guide "the good lawgiver
and the true politician" (IV.1.1288b27). Like any complete
science or craft, it must study a range of issues concerning its
subject matter. For example, gymnastics (physical education) studies
what sort of training is best or adapted to the body that is naturally
the best, what sort of training is best for most bodies, and what
capacity is appropriate for someone who does not want the condition or
knowledge appropriate for athletic contests. Political science studies
a comparable range of constitutions (1288b21-35): first, the
constitution which is best without qualification, i.e., "most
according to our prayers with no external impediment"; second,
the constitution that is best under the circumstances "for it is
probably impossible for many persons to attain the best
constitution"; third, the constitution which serves the aim a
given population happens to have, i.e., the one that is best
"based on a hypothesis": "for [the political
scientist] ought to be able to study a given constitution, both how it
might originally come to be, and, when it has come to be, in what
manner it might be preserved for the longest time; I mean, for
example, if a particular city happens neither to be governed by the
best constitution, nor to be equipped even with necessary things, nor
to be the [best] possible under existing circumstances, but to be a
baser sort." Hence, Aristotelian political science is not
confined to the ideal system, but also investigates the second-best
constitution or even inferior political systems, because this may be
the closest approximation to full political justice which the lawgiver
can attain under the circumstances.



Regarding the constitution that is ideal or "according to
prayer," Aristotle criticizes the views of his predecessors in
the *Politics* and then offers a rather sketchy blueprint
of his own in *Politics* VII-VIII. Although his own
political views were influenced by his teacher Plato, Aristotle is
highly critical of the ideal constitution set forth in Plato's
*Republic* on the grounds that it overvalues political unity,
it embraces a system of communism that is impractical and inimical to
human nature, and it neglects the happiness of the individual citizens
(*Politics* II.1-5). In contrast, in Aristotle's
"best constitution," each and every citizen will possess
moral virtue and the equipment to carry it out in practice, and
thereby attain a life of excellence and complete happiness (see
VII.13.1332a32-8). All of the citizens will hold political
office and possess private property because "one should call the
city-state happy not by looking at a part of it but at all the
citizens." (VII.9.1329a22-3). Moreover, there will be a
common system of education for all the citizens, because they share
the same end (*Pol*. VIII.1).



If (as is the case with most existing city-states) the population
lacks the capacities and resources for complete happiness, however,
the lawgiver must be content with fashioning a suitable constitution
(*Politics* IV.11). The second-best system typically takes the
form of a polity (in which citizens possess an inferior, more common
grade of virtue) or mixed constitution (combining features of
democracy, oligarchy, and, where possible, aristocracy, so that no
group of citizens is in a position to abuse its rights). Aristotle
argues that for city-states that fall short of the ideal, the best
constitution is one controlled by a numerous middle class which stands
between the rich and the poor. For those who possess the goods of
fortune in moderation find it "easiest to obey the rule of
reason" (*Politics* IV.11.1295b4-6). They are
accordingly less apt than the rich or poor to act unjustly toward
their fellow citizens. A constitution based on the middle class is the
mean between the extremes of oligarchy (rule by the rich) and
democracy (rule by the poor). "That the middle [constitution] is
best is evident, for it is the freest from faction: where the middle
class is numerous, there least occur factions and divisions among
citizens" (IV.11.1296a7-9). The middle constitution is
therefore both more stable and more just than oligarchy and
democracy.



Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a deviant constitution
(albeit the best of a bad lot), he argues that a case might be made
for popular rule in *Politics* III.11, a discussion which has
attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. The central
claim is that the many may turn out to be better than the virtuous few
when they come together, even though the many may be inferior when
considered individually. For if each individual has a portion of
virtue and practical wisdom, they may pool these moral assets and turn
out to be better rulers than even a very wise individual. This
argument seems to anticipate treatments of "the wisdom of the
multitude" such as Condorcet's "jury theorem."
In recent years, this particular chapter has been widely discussed in
connection with topics such as democratic deliberation and public
reason.



In addition, the political scientist must attend to existing
constitutions even when they are bad. Aristotle notes that "to
reform a constitution is no less a task [of politics] than it is to
establish one from the beginning," and in this way "the
politician should also help existing constitutions"
(IV.1.1289a1-7). The political scientist should also be
cognizant of forces of political change which can undermine an
existing regime. Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for excessive
utopianism and neglect of the practical duties of a political
theorist. However, he is no Machiavellian. The best constitution still
serves as a regulative ideal by which to evaluate existing
systems.



These topics occupy the remainder of the *Politics*. Books
IV-VI are concerned with the existing constitutions: that is,
the three deviant constitutions, as well as polity or the
"mixed" constitution, which are the best attainable under
most circumstances (IV.2.1289a26-38). The mixed constitution has
been of special interest to scholars because it looks like a
forerunner of modern republican regimes. The whole of book V
investigates the causes and prevention of revolution or political
change (*metabole*) and civil war or faction
(*stasis*). Books VII-VIII are devoted to the ideal
constitution. As might be expected, Aristotle's attempt to carry out
this program involves many difficulties, and scholars disagree about
how the two series of books (IV-VI and VII-VIII) are
related to each other: for example, which were written first, which
were intended to be read first, and whether they are ultimately
consistent with each other. Most importantly, when Aristotle offers
practical political prescriptions in Books IV-VI, is he guided
by the best constitution as a regulative ideal, or is he simply
abandoning political idealism and practicing a form of
Realpolitik?For a further discussion of this topic, see the following
supplementary document:



Supplement: Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle's Politics



## 5. Aristotle and Modern Politics



Aristotle has continued to influence thinkers up to the present
throughout the political spectrum, including conservatives (such as
Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin), communitarians (such
as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel), liberals (such as William
Galston and Martha C. Nussbaum), libertarians (such as Tibor R.
Machan, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den Uyl), and democratic
theorists (such as Jill Frank and Gerald M. Mara).



It is not surprising that such diverse political persuasions can lay
claim to Aristotle as a source. For his method often leads to
divergent interpretations. When he deals with a difficult problem, he
is inclined to consider opposing arguments in a careful and nuanced
manner, and he is often willing to concede that there is truth on each
side. For example, though he is critical of democracy, in one passage
he allows that the case for rule by the many based on the superior
wisdom of the multitude "perhaps also involves some truth"
(*Pol.* III.11.1281a39-42). Again, he sometimes applies his own
principles in a questionable manner, for example, when he reasons that
because associations should be governed in a rational manner, the
household should be run by the husband rather than by the wife, whose
rational capacity "lacks authority" (I.13.1260a13). Modern
commentators sympathetic with Aristotle's general approach often
contend that in this case he applies his own principles
incorrectly-leaving open the question of how they
*should* be applied. Further, the way he applies his principles
may have seemed reasonable in his socio-political context-for
example, that the citizen of a polity (normally the best attainable
constitution) must be a hoplite soldier (cf. III.7,1297b4)-but
it may be debatable how these might apply within a modern democratic
nation-state.



The problem of extrapolating to modern political affairs can be
illustrated more fully in connection with Aristotle's discussion of
legal change in *Politics* II.8. He first lays out the argument
for making the laws changeable. It has been beneficial in the case of
medicine, for example, for it to progress from traditional ways to
improved forms of treatment. An existing law may be a vestige of a
primitive barbaric practice. For instance, Aristotle mentions a law in
Cyme that allows an accuser to produce a number of his own relatives
as witnesses to prove that a defendant is guilty of murder.
"So," Aristotle concludes, "it is evident from the
foregoing that some laws should sometimes be changed. But to those who
look at the matter from a different angle, caution would seem to be
required" (1269a12-14). Since the law gets its force from the
citizens' habit of obedience, great care should be exercised in making
any change in it. It may sometimes be better to leave defective laws
in place rather than encouraging lawlessness by changing the laws too
frequently. Moreover, there are the problems of how the laws are to be
changed and who is to change them. Although Aristotle offers valuable
insights, he breaks off the discussion of this topic and never takes
it up elsewhere. We might sum up his view as follows: When it comes to
changing the laws, observe the mean: don't be too bound by traditional
laws, but on the other hand don't be overeager in altering them. It is
obvious that this precept, reasonable as it is, leaves considerable
room for disagreement among contemporary
"neo-Aristotelian" theorists. For example, should the laws
be changed to allow self-described transsexual persons to use sexually
segregated restrooms? Conservatives and liberals might agree with
Aristotle's general stricture regarding legal change but differ widely
on how to apply it in a particular case.



Most scholars of Aristotle advisedly make no attempt to show that he
is aligned with any contemporary ideology. Rather, insofar as they
find him relevant to our times, it is because he offers a remarkable
synthesis of idealism and pragmatism unfolding in deep and
thought-provoking discussions of perennial concerns of political
philosophy: the role of human nature in politics, the relation of the
individual to the state, the place of morality in politics, the theory
of political justice, the rule of law, the analysis and evaluation of
constitutions, the relevance of ideals to practical politics, the
causes and cures of political change and revolution, and the
importance of a morally educated citizenry.


## Glossary of Aristotelian Terms


* action: *praxis*
* citizen: *polites*
* city-state: *polis* (also 'city' or
'state')
* community: *koinonia*
* constitution: *politeia* (also 'regime')
* faction: *stasis* (also 'civil war')
* free: *eleutheros*
* friendship: *philia*
* good: *agathos*
* happiness: *eudaimonia*
* happy: *eudaimon*
* justice: *dikaiosune*
* law: *nomos*
* lawgiver: *nomothetes*
* master: *despotes*
* nature: *phusis*
* noble: *kalon* (also 'beautiful' or
'fine')
* people (*demos*)
* political: *politikos* (of, or pertaining to, the
*polis*)
* political science: *politike
episteme*
* politician: *politikos* (also 'statesman')
* practical: *praktikos*
* practical wisdom: *phronesis*
* revolution: *metabole* (also
'change')
* right: *exousia* (also 'liberty')
* ruler: *archon*
* self-sufficient: *autarkes*
* sovereign: *kurios*
* virtue: *arete* (also 'excellence')
* without qualification: *haplos* (also
'absolute')
* without authority: *akuron*