## 1. Nyingma



Longchen Rabjam sets out the course of the Nyingma theory of the
truths and the later philosophers of the school took similar stance
without varying much in essence. In *Treasure* he begins the
section on the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths as follows:
"The Madhyamaka tradition is the secret and profound teachings
of the [Sakya]muni. Although it constitues five
ontological categories, the two truths subsume them" (Longchen,
1983: 204f).



Nyingma defines conventional truth as consisting of unreal phenomena
that appear to be real to the erroneous cognitive processes of the
ordinary beings while ultimate truth is reality which transcends any
mode of thinking and speech, one that unmistakenly appears to the
nonerroneous cognitive processes of the exalted and awakened beings.
In other words (1) ultimate truth represents the perspective of
epistemically correct and warranted cognitive process of exalted
beings ('phags pa); whereas (2) conventional truth represents
the perspective of epistemically deceptive and unwarranted cognitive
processes of the ordinary beings (Mipham Rinpoche 1993d:
543-544).



Let us consider these two definitions turn by turn. Nyingma supports
definition (1) with two premises. The first one says that cognitive
processes of the exalted ('phags pa) and awakened beings (sang
rgyas) are epistemically correct and non-deceptive, because "It
is in relation to this cognitive content that the realisation of the
ultimate truth is so designated. The object of an exalted cognitive
process consists of the way things really are (gshis kyi gnas lugs),
phenomena as they really are (chos kyi dbyings) which is undefiled by
its very nature (rang bzin dag pa)" (Longchen 1983: 202f).
However ultimate truth for Nyingma is not an object per se in the
usual sense of the word. It is object only in the metaphorical sense.
"From the [ultimate] perspective the meditative equipoise of the
realised (sa thob) and awakened beings (sangs rgyas), there exists
neither object of knowledge (shes bya) nor knowing cognitive process
(shes byed) and so forth, for there is neither object to apprehend nor
the subject that does the apprehending. Even the exalted cognitive
process (yeshes) as a subject ceases (zhi ba) to operate"
(Longchen 1983: 201f). Therefore "At this stage, [Nyingma]
accepts the total termination (chad) of *all* the continua
(rgyun) of the cognitive processes ('jug pa) of the mind (sems)
and mental factors (sems las byung ba). This exalted cognitive process
which is inexpressible beyond words and thoughts (smra bsam brjod du
med pa'i yeshes), and thus is designated (btags pa) as a
*correct* and *unmistaken* cognitive process (yang dag
pa'i blo ma khrul ba) as it knows the reality as it is"
(Longchen 1983:201f).



The second premise comes from Nyingma's transcendent theory. According
to this theory ultimate truth constitutes reality and the reality
constitutes transcendence of all elaborations. Reality is that which
cannot be comprehended by the means of linguistic and conceptual
elaboration, as it is utterly beyond the grasp of words and thoughts
which merely defile the cognitive states. Given that exalted beings
are free of defiled mental states, all forms of thoughts and
conceptions are terminated in their realization of the ultimate truth.
Ultimate truth transcends all elaborations, thus remains untouched by
the philosophical speculations (Longchen, 1983: 203f). "In short
the characteristic of [ultimate truth] is that of nirvana,
which is profound and peaceful. It is intrinsically unadulterated
domain (dbyings). The cognitive process by means of which ultimate
truth is realized must therefore be free from all cognitive
limitations (sgribs pa), for it is disclosed to the awakened beings
(sangs rgyas) in whose exalted cognitive processes appear the objects
as they really are without being altered" (Longchen, 1983:
204f).



Nyingma's defence of the definition (2) also has two premises. The
first one comes from its theory of error, the most commonly used by
the Nyingma philosophers. According to this theory, conventional truth
is, as matter of fact, an error confined to the ordinary beings (so so
skye bo) who are blinded by the dispositions (bag chags) of confusion
(ma rig pa). It is argued that under the sway of confusion the
ordinary beings falsely and erroneously believe in the reality of
entirely unreal entities and the truth of wholly false epistemic
instruments, just like the people who mistakenly grasps cataracts and
falling hairs to be real objects. Conventional truths are mere errors
that appear real to the ordinary beings, but they are in fact no more
real than the falling hairs that are reducible into the "modes
of apprehensions" (*snang tshul*) (Mipham Rinpoche
1993c: 3, 1977: 80-81ff, 1993d: 543-544).



The second premise comes from its representationalist or
elaboration-theory which says that conventional truths constitute
merely mental elaborations (spros pa) represented to appear (rnam par
snang ba) in the minds of the ordinary beings as if they are realities
having the subject-object relation. They are thus deceptive since they
are produced through the power of the underlying cognitive confusion
or ignorance, and that they do not cohere with any corresponding
reality externally. Confusion is *samvrti* because
it conceals (*sgrib)* the nature, it fabricates all conditioned
phenomena to appear as if they are real. Even though conventional
truths are to be eventually eradicated (spang bya), the
representational images of the conventional reality will nevertheless
continue to appear in the minds of even those who are highly realized
beings, that is, until they achieved a complete cessation of mind and
mental states (Longchen, 1983: 203f). It is argued that when the eye
that is affected by cataracts mistakenly sees hairs falling in
containers, the healthy eye that is not affected by cataracts does not
even perceive the appearances of falling hairs. Likewise, those who
are affected by the cataracts of afflictive confusion see things as
intrinsically real, hence for them things are conventionally real.
Those noble beings who are free from the afflictive confusion and the
awakened beings who are free from even the non-afflictive confusion
see things as they are (ultimate truth). Just as the person without
cataracts does not see the falling hairs, the noble beings and
awakened beings do not see any reality of things at all.



Mipham Rinpoche also proposes another definition of the two truths
which diverges significantly from the one we saw. As we saw Longchen's
definition is based on two radically opposed epistemic criteria
whereas Mipham's definition, as we shall see, has two radically
opposed ontological criteria--one that withstands reasoned
analysis and the other that does not withstand reasoned analysis. In
his *Clearing Dhamchoe's Doubts* (*Dam chos dogs sel*),
Mipham says that: "Reality as it is (de bzhin nyid) is
established as ultimately real (bden par grub pa). Conventional
entities are actually established as unreal, they are subject to
deception. Being devoid of such characteristics ultimate is
characterized as real, not unreal and not non-deceptive. If this
[reality] does not exist," in Mipham's view, "than it
would be impossible even for the noble beings (arya / phags pa)
to perceive reality. They would, instead, perceive objects that are
unreal and deceptive. If that is the case, everyone would be ordinary
beings. There would be no one who will attain liberation"
(1993a: 602).



Mipham anticipates objections to his definition from his Gelug
opponents when he writes, "Someone may object: although ultimate
truth is real (bden p), its reality is not established ultimately
(bden grub), because to be established ultimately is for it to
withstands reasoned analysis (rigs pas dpyad bzod)" (Mipham
1993a: 603). The response from Mipham makes it even clearer.
"Conventional truth is not ultimately real (bden par grub pa)
because it is not able to withstand reasoned analysis, in spite of the
fact that those that are conventionally real (yang dag kun rdzob) are
nominally real (tha snyad du bden pa) and are the objects of the
dualistic cognitive processes" (Mipham 1993a: 603). In contrast:
"Reality (*dharmata / chos nyid)*, ultimate truth,
is really established (bden par grub pa) on the ground that it is
established as the object of nondual exalted cognitive
process. Besides, it withstands reasoned analysis, for no
logical reasoning whatsoever can undermine it or destroy it.
For that reason so long as it does not withstand reasoned analysis, it
is not ultimate, it would be conventional entity" (Mipham
1993a: 603). According to Mipham's argument, that an object that cannot
withstand reasoned analysis is the kind of object that mundane
cognitive processes find dually, and it is not the kind of object
found by the exalted cognitive processes that perceive ultimate truth
nondually (Mipham 1993a: 603).



As we have noticed, Mipham's definition seems to have departed from
Longchen's some what significantly. In the final analysis, however,
there does not seem to be much variation. Mipham Rinpoche also is
committed to the representationalist argument to ascend to nonduality:
"In the end," he says, "there are no external
objects. It is evident that they appear due to the force of mental
impressions ... All texts that supposedly demonstrate the
existence of external objects are provisional [descriptions of] their
appearances"(Mipham 1977: 159-60ff). Consequently whatever
appears to exist externally, according to Nyingma, "is like a
horse or an elephant appearing in a dream. When it is subjected to
logical analysis, it finally boils down to the interdependent inner
predispositions. And this is at the heart of Buddhist
philosophy" (Mipham 1977: 159-60ff).



Following on from its definition, Nyingma argues that there is no one
entity that can be taken as the basis from which divides the two
truths; since there is no one entity which is both real (true) and
unreal (false). Hence it proposes the two truths division based on the
two types of epistemic practices "because it confirms a direct
opposition between that which is free of the elaborations and that
which is not free of the elaborations, and between what is to be
affirmed and what is to be negated excluding the possibility of the
third alternative. Thus it ascertains the two" (Longchen, 1983:
205-206ff). Nyingma has two key arguments to support the claim
the two truths division is an epistemic. The first argument states,
"It is definite that we posit the objects (yul rnams) in
dependence upon the subjects (yul can). The subjects are exclusively
two types--they are either ultimately (mthar thug pa) fallacious
cognitive processes (khrul ba'i blo) or ultimately (mthar thug pa)
non-fallacious cognitive processes (ma 'khrula ba'i blo). The
fallacious cognitive processes posit [conventional truth]--all
samsaric phenomena--whereas as the non-fallacious
cognitive processes posit the [ultimate] reality. Therefore it is due
to the cognitive processes that we posit the objects in terms of two
[truths]" (Longchen, 1983: 206f) The second argument states that
ultimate truth is not an objective domain of the cognitive processes
with the representational images (dmigs bcas kyi blo'i spyod yul), for
the reason that it may be known by means of the exalted cognitive
processes (yeshes) with no representational image (dmigs pa med).
(Longchen, 1983: 206f) In contrast conventional truth is an objective
domain of the cognitive processes with the representational images
(dmigs bcas kyi blo'i spyod yul), for the reason that it may be known
by means of the cognitive processes having the representational images
(dmigs bcas kyi blo'i spyod ul).



Nyingma categorically rejects commitment to any philosophical
position, for it would entail a commitment to, at least, some forms of
elaborations. This is so since "the Prasangika
rejects all philosophical systems, and does not accept any self-styled
philosophical elaboration (rang las spros pas grub mtha').
(Longchen, 1983: 210ff) The Prasangika therefore presents
the theory of the two truths and so forth by merely designating them
in accordance with the mundane fabrications (sgro btags) (Longchen
1983: 211f). "Therefore ultimate truth which is transcendent of
all elaborations cannot be expressed either as identical to or
separate from the conventional truth. They are rather *merely
different in terms of negating the oneness* (Longchen,
1983: 192-3ff, Mipham 1977: 84f). Interestingly Mipham
Rinpoche also says that "the two truths constitute a single
entity but different conceptual identities *(ngo bo gcig la ldog pa
tha dad)*. "This is because," he says,
"appearance and emptiness are indistinguishable. This is
ascertained through reliable cognitions (tshad ma) by means of which
the two truths are investigated. What appears is empty. If emptiness
were to exist separately from what appears, the reality of that
[apparent] phenomenon would not be empty. Thus the two [truths] are
not distinct" (Mipham 1977: 81f). The identity of ultimate truth
at issue here, according to Mipham, is that of absolute ultimate (rnam
grangs min pa'i don dam ste), rather than provisional ultimate. This
is because the kind of ultimate truth under discussion when we are
discussing its relation with conventional truth is the ultimate truth
"which is beyond the bound of any expression, although it is an
object of direct perception" (Mipham 1977: 81f).


## 2. Kagyu



According to Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, Atisha and his followers
in Tibet, are the authoritative former masters of the
Prasangika. It is this line of reading of the
Prasangika that Kagyu takes it to be authoritative
which the later Kagyu wholeheartedly embraces as the standard
position (Mikyo Dorje, 2006: 272-273). Karmapa Mikyo
Dorje cliams that it is a characteristic of Kagyu masters and
their followers to recognise the ancient Prasangika
tradition to be philosophically impeccable ('khrul med) (2006:
272).



Unlike the other Tibetan schools, Kagyu rejects the more dominant
view that each philosophical school in Indian Buddhism has its own
distinctive theory of the two truths. "There are those who
advance various theories proclaiming that the Vaibhasika on
up to the Prasangika Madhyamaka, for the purpose of
distinctive definitions of the two truths, unique rational and unique
textual bases. This is true," says Karmapa Mikyo Dorje,
an indication "of the failure to understand the logic, and the
differentiation between the definition (mtshan nyid) and the defined
example (mtshan gzhi)" (Mikyo Dorje 2006: 293). The Indian
Buddhist philosophical schools only disagree, according to Kagyu,
on the issue concerning the defined example (mtshan gzhi) of the two
truths. The instances of ultimate truth in each lower school are, it
argues, their philosophical reifications, hence, they are the ones the
higher schools logically refute. There is nevertheless no disagreement
between the Indian Buddhist schools as far as the definiendum (mtshon
bya / laksya) and the definition (mtshan nyid /
laksana) of the two truths are concerned. If they disagree
on these two issues, there would be no commonly agreed definition, but
there is a definition of the ultimate which is common to all schools,
even though there is no commonly agreed defined example to illustrate
such definition (Mikyo Dorje 2006: 293).



Where the Indian Buddhist philosophical schools party their company,
Kagyu argues, is their conception of the defined example of the
ultimate. For the realists (dngos smra ba) ultimate truth is a
foundational entity (rdzas su yod pa) that withstands rational
analysis. The Madhyamaka rejects this and argues that if ultimate
truth is a foundational entity, it is not possible to attain an
awakening to it. If it is possible to attain awakening, then ultimate
truth is impossible to be a foundational entity, for the two mutually
exclude each other. The foundational entity, like the substance of the
Brahmanical metaphysicians, does not allow modification or change to
take place whereas the attainment of awakening is an ongoing process
of modification and change (Mikyo Dorje 2006: 294).



From the position Kagyu takes, it is clear then, that it does not
endorse Gelug's position that the Prasangika has its
own theory of the two truths which affords a unique framework within
which a presentation of the definition and the defined example of the
two truths can be set out. (See Yakherds 2021 vol. 1 for the Gelugpa
critiques)Kagyu argues that the Prasangika's
project is purely for pedagogical and heuristic reasons, "for it
seeks to assuage the cognitive errors of its opponents--the
non-Buddhists, our own-schools such as Vaibhasika on up to
the Svatantrika--who assert philosophical positions based on
certain texts" (Mikyo Dorje 2006: 294). The
non-Prasangika philosophical schools equate the definition
of the ultimate with the defined example, and this is the malady that
the Prasangika seeks to allay. Therefore the
Prasangika's role, as Kagyu sees it, is to point
out the absurdities in the non-Prasangika position and to
show that the definition of the ultimate and the defined example are
rather two separate issues, and that they cannot be identified with
each other (Mikyo Dorje 2006: 294-95). The
Prasangika does not, like Nyingma, entertain any position
of its own, except for the purpose of a therapeutic reason, and for
which "the Prasangika relies on the convention as a
framework for things that need to be cultivated and those that are to
be abandoned. For this, our own position does not need to base the
linguistic conventions on the concepts of definition and the defined
example. Instead [our position]," says Kagyu,
"conforms to the non-analytical mundane practice in which what
needs to be abandoned and what needs to be cultivated are undertaken
in agreement with the real-unreal discourses of the conventional
[truth]" (Mikyo Dorje 2006: 295).



Therefore according to Kagyu, the position of all Indian Buddhist
philosophical schools--be it higher or lower--agree in so
far as the definitions of the two truths are concerned. (1)
"[Ultimate truth] is that which reasoned analysis does not
undermine and that which withstands reasoned analysis. Conventional
truth is the reverse. (2) Ultimate is the non-deceptive nature and it
exists as reality. Conventional [truth] is the reverse. (3) Ultimate
is the object of the non-erroneous subject. Conventional [truth] is
the object of the erroneous subject" (Mikyo Dorje 2006:
294). Of these three definitions, the first one proposes conventional
truth as one that does not withstands reasoned analysis whereas
ultimate truth does indeed withstand the reasoned analysis.
"Conventional [truth] is a phenomenon that is found to exist
from the perspective of the cognitive processes that are either
non-analytical (ma dpyad pa) or slightly analytical (cung zad dpyad
pa), whereas ultimate [truth] is that which is found either from the
perspective of the cognitive process that is thoroughly analytical
(shing tu legs par dpyad pa) or meditative equipoise"
(Mikyo Dorje 2006: 274). Conventional truth is non-analytical in
the sense that ordinary beings assume its reality uncritically, and
become fixated to its reifications in virtue of how it appears to
their uncritical minds, rather than how it really is from the critical
cognitive perspective. When conventional truth is slightly analysed,
however, it reveals that it exists merely as collocations of the
codependent causes and conditions (Mikyo Dorje 2006: 273).
Therefore conventional truth is "one that is devoid of an
intrinsic reality, rather it is *mere name* (ming tsam),
*mere sign* (rda tsam), *mere linguistic convention*
(tha snyad tsam), *mere conception* (rnam par rtog pa tsam) and
*mere fabrication* (sgro btags pa tsam)--one that merely
arises or ceases due to the force of the expressions or the conceptual
linguistic convention" (Mikyo Dorje 2006: 273). Ultimate
truth is defined, on the other hand, as one that is found by
analytical cognitive process or by a meditative equipoise of the
exalted beings, for the reason that when it is subjected to analysis,
phenomena are fundamentally, by its very nature transcendent of the
elaborations (spros pa) and all symbolisms (mtshan ma) (Mikyo
Dorje 2006: 273).



On the second definition "Conventional truth is that which does
not deceive the perspective to which it appears (snang ngor), or that
which does not deceive an erroneous perspective ('khrul ngor),
or that which is non-deceptive according to the standard of the
mundane convention" (Kun Khyen Padkar, 2004: 66). Ultimate
truth, on the other hand, is defined as "that which does not
deceive a correct perception (yang dag pa'i mthong ba), or that which
does not deceive reality as it is (gnas lugs la mi bslu ba), or that
which does not deceive an awakened perspective (sang rgyas kyi gzigs
ngor)" (Kun Khyen Padkar, 2004: 74).



The third definition is based on the two conflicting epistemic
practices. Here ultimate is defined as an ultimate object from the
perspective of exalted beings (arya / 'phags pa). The
ultimate reality, although, is not one that is regarded as cognitively
found to exist in and of itself inherently (rang gi bdag nyid).
Conventional truth is defined as the cognitive process that sees
unreal phenomena (brdzun pa mthong ba) from the perspective of the
ordinary beings whose cognitive processes are obscured by the
cataracts of confusion. Conventional truth is unreal, for it does not
exist in the manner in which it is perceived by the confused cognitive
processes of the ordinary beings (Mikyo Dorje 2006:
269-70). Karmapa Mikyo Dorje puts the point in this way.
"Take a vase as one entity, for instance. It is a conventional
entity, for it is a reality for the ordinary beings, and it is found
to be the basis from which arise varieties of hypothetical
fabrications. The exalted beings," he argues, "however, do
not see any of these [fabrications], anywhere, whatsoever, and this
mode of *seeing by way of not seeing anything at all* is termed
as *the seeing of the ultimate*. Therefore the two truths, in
this sense, are not distinct. They are differentiated from the
perspective of the cognitive processes that are either erroneous or
non-erroneous" (Mikyo Dorje, 2006: 274).



Although, like Nyingma and Sakya it is the view of Kagyu to
maintain that erroneous cognitive process represents the nature of the
ordinary beings, whereas non-erroneous cognitive processes represent
the exalted beings. However, unlike Nyingma and Sakya, Kagyu
insists that the distinctions between the two truths has nothing to do
with the perspective of the exalted beings. Everything, it claims, has
to do with how ordinary beings fabricate things erroneously--one
more real than the other--and that it has nothing to do with how
exalted beings experience things. "Even this distinction is made
from the point of view of the cognitive process of the childish
beings. Since all things the childish beings perceive are
characteristically unreal (brdzun pa) and deceptive (bslu ba), they
constitute the conventionality. The exalted beings, however, do not
perceive at all anything in the way in which the childish beings
perceive and fabricate. So ultimate truth is, according to Kagyu,
that which is unseen and unfound by the exalted beings since it is the
way things really are. Therefore both the truths are taught for the
pedagogical reasons in accord with the perspective of the childish
beings, but not because the exalted beings experienced the two truths
or that there really exist the two truths (Mikyo Dorje 2006:
274). As for the conventional truth, Kagyu divides it into having two
aspects: the conventional in the form of imputed concrete phenomena
that are capable to appear concretely as such, and the conventional in
terms of merely nominal imputations of abstract entities that are
incapable of concrete appearance (Mikyo Dorje, see Yakherds
2021: 153-55).



What follows from the above discussion is that Kagyu is monist
about truth (Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, 2006: 302) in that it claims
only one truth and that truth it equates with transcendent wisdom.
Despite minor differences, Nyingma, Kagyu and Sagya all emphasize
the synthesis between transcendent wisdom and ultimate truth, arguing
that "there is neither separate ultimate truth apart from the
transcendent wisdom, nor transcendent wisdom apart from the ultimate
truth" (2006: 279). For this reason Kagyu advances the view
similar to Nyingma and Sakya that the exceptional quality of awakened
knowledge consists in not experiencing anything conventional or
empirical from the enlightened perspective, but experiencing
everything from the other's--nonenlightened--perspective.
(Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, 2006: 141-42ff)



Finally, on the relationship of the two truths, Kagyu maintains a
position which is consciously ambiguous--that they are
expressible neither as identical nor distinct. Responding to an
interlocutory question, "Are the two truths identical or
distinct?" Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, says, "neither
is the case." And he advances three arguments to support this
position. First, "From a perspective of the childish beings,
[the two truths] are neither identical, for they do not see the
ultimate; nor are they distinct, for they do not see them
separately" (Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, 2006: 285).
Second, "From standpoint of the meditative equipoise of the
exalted beings, the two truths are neither identical, for the
appearance of the varieties of conventional entities do not appear to
them. Nor are they distinct, for they are not perceived as
distinct" (Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, 2006: 285). The
third is the relativity argument which says, "They are all
defined relative to one another--unreality is relative to reality
and reality is relative to unreality. Because one is defined relative
to the other, one to which it is related (ltos sa) could not be
identical to that which it relates (ltos chos). This is because it is
contradictory for one thing to be both that which relates (ltos chos)
and the related (ltos sa). Nor is it the case that they are distinct
because," according to Kagyu's view, "when the
related is not established, so is the other [i.e., one that relates]
not established. Hence there is no relation. If one insists that
relation is still possible, then such a relation would not be relative
to another" (Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, 2006:
285-86).



So from these three arguments, Kagyu concludes that the two
truths are neither expressible as identical nor distinct. It argues
that "just as the conceptual images of a golden vase and a
silver vase do not become distinct on the account of them not being
expressed as identical. Likewise these images do not become identical
on the account of them not being expressed as distinct"
(Mikyo Dorje, 2006: 286).


## 3. Sakya



Sakya's theory of two truths is defended in the works of the
succession of Sakya scholars--Sakya Pandita
(1182-1251), Rongton Shakya Gyaltsen (Rong ston
Sakya rgyal tshan, 1367-1449), the translator Taktsang
Lotsawa (Stag tsang Lo tsa ba, 1405-?), Gorampa Sonam Senge
(Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge, 1429-89) and Shakya Chogden
(Sakya Mchog ldan, 1428-1509). In particular Gorampa
Sonam Senge's works are unanimously recognised as the authoritative
representation of the Sakya's position. Sakya agree with Nyingma and
Kagyu in maintaining that the distinction between the two truths
is merely subjective processes, and that the two truths are reducible
to the two conflicting perspectives (Sakya Pandita 1968a:
72d, Rongton Shakya Gyaltsen n.d. 7f, Taktsang Lotsawa n.d.: 27,
Shakya Chogden 1975a: 3-4ff, 15f). "Although there
are not two truths in terms of the object's ontological mode of being
*(gnas tshul)*, the truths are divided into two in terms of
[the contrasting perspectives of] the mind that sees the mode of
existence and the mind that does not see the mode of
existence...This makes perfect sense" (Gorampa 1969a:
374ab). Since it emphasizes the subjective nature of the distinction
between the two truths, it proposes "mere mind" *(blo
tsam)* to be the basis of the division (Gorampa 1969a: 374ab). It
aruges that "Here in the Madhyamaka system, the object itself
cannot be divided into two truths. Conventional truth and ultimate
truth are divided in terms of the modes of apprehension *(mthong
tshul)*--in terms of the subject apprehending unreality and
the subject apprehending reality; or in terms of mistaken and
unmistaken apprehensions *('khrul ma 'khrul);* or
deluded or undeluded apprehensions *(rmongs ma rmongs);* or
erroneous or nonerroneous apprehensions *(phyin ci log ma
log);* or reliable cognition or unreliable cognitions *(tshad
ma yin min)*" (Gorampa 1969a: 375b). He also adds that:
"The position which maintains that the truths are divided in
terms of the subjective consciousness is one that all
Prasangikas and Svatantrikas of India unanimously
accepted because they are posited in terms of the subjective cognitive
processes depending on whether it is deluded *(rmongs)* or
nondeluded *(ma rmongs),* a perception of unreality *(brdzun
pa thong ba)* or a perception of reality *(yang dag mthong
ba),* and mistaken *(khrul)* or incontrovertible *(ma
khrul)* (1969a: 384c).



Sakya's advances two reasons to support its position. First, since the
minds of ordinary beings are always deluded, mistaken, and erroneous,
they falsely experience conventional truth. Conventional truth is thus
posited only in relation to the perspective of the ordinary
 beings.[2]
 The wisdom of exalted meditative equipoise is however never mistaken,
it is always nondeluded, and nonerroneous, hence exalted beings
flawlessly experience ultimate truth. Ultimate truth is thus posited
strictly in relation to the cognitive perspective of exalted beings.
Second, the view held by Sakya argues for separate cognitive agents
corresponding to each of the two truths. Ordinary beings have direct
knowledge of conventional truth, but are utterly incapable of knowing
ultimate truth. The exalted beings in training have direct knowledge
of the ultimate in their meditative equipoise and direct knowledge of
the conventional truth in the post meditative states. Fully awakened
buddhas, on the other hand, only have access to ultimate truth. They
have no access to conventional truth whatsoever from the
*enlightened perspective*, although they may access
conventional truth from the perspective of ordinary deluded
beings.



Etymologically Sakya characterizes ultimate (*parama)* as a
qualification of transcendent exalted cognitive process
*('jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes,
lokottarajnana)* that belongs to exalted beings with
*artha* as its corresponding object. The sense of ultimate
truth (*paramarthasatya)* grants primacy to the exalted
transcendent cognitive process of the noble beings, which supersedes
the ontological status of conventional phenomena (Gorampa 1969a:
377d). "There is no realization and realized object, nor is there
object and subject" (Gorampa 1969b: 714f, 727-729). As
Taktsang Lotsawa puts it: "A wisdom without dual appearance is
without any object" (Taktsang n.d.: 305f). Strictly speaking,
transcendent wisdom itself becomes the ultimate truth. "Ultimate
truth is to be experienced under a total cessation of dualistic
appearance through exalted personal wisdom," and further,
"Anything that has dualistic appearance, even omniscience,must
not be treated as ultimate truth" (Gorampa 1969b:
612-13ff).



Therefore conventionality (samvrti, kun rdzob) means
primal ignorance (Gorampa, 1969b: 377b, Sakya Pandita
1968a: 72b, Shakya Chogden 1975a: 30f, Rongton Shakya Gyaltsen
1995: 288). In agreement with Nyingma and Kagyu, Sakya treats
primal ignorance as to the villain responsible for projecting the entire
system of conventional truths. It argues ignorance as constituting the
defining characteristics of the conventional
 truth.[3]
 (Sakya Pandita 1968a: 72, Rendawa 1995: 121, Shakya
Chogden 1975b: 378f, 1975c: 220, Taktsang Lotsawa n.d.: 27f,
Rongton Shakya Gyaltsen 1995: 287, n.d: 6-7ff) It
formulates the definitions of the two truths in terms of the
distinctions between the ignorant experiences of ordinary beings and
the enlightened experiences of noble beings during their meditative
equipoise. Sakya's definition is based on three reasons. First, each
conventionally real phenomenon satisfies only the definition of
conventional truth because each phenomenon has only a conventional
nature (in contrast to the two nature theory of Gelug), and that
ultimate truth has a transcendent ontological status. Second, that
each cognitive agent is potentially capable of knowing only one truth
exhaustively, being equipped with either the requisite conventionally
reliable cognitive process or ultimately reliable cognitive process.
Each truth must be verified by a different individual and that
access to the two truths is mutually exclusive--a cognitive agent
who knows conventional truth cannot know ultimate truth and vice versa
except in the case of exalted beings who are not fully enlightened.
Third, that each conventional entity has only one nature, namely, its
conventional nature, and the so-called ultimate nature must not be
associated with any conventionally real phenomenon. If a sprout, for
example, actually did possess two natures as proposed in Gelug's
theory of the two truths, then, according to Sakya, each nature would
have to be ontologically distinct. Since the ontological structure of
the sprout cannot be separated into a so-called conventional and
ultimate nature, the sprout must possess only one phenomenal nature,
i.e., the conventional reality. As this nature is found only under the
spell of ignorance, it can be comprehended only under the conventional
cognitive processes of ordinary beings, and of unenlightened noble
beings in their post meditative equipoise. It is therefore not
possible, in Sakya's view, to confine the definition of ultimate truth
to the framework of conventional phenomena.



Ultimate truth, on the other hand, requires the metaphysical
transcendence of conventionality. Unlike conventional reality, it is
neither presupposed nor projected by ignorance. Ultimate truth, in
Gorampa's words: "is inexpressible through words and is beyond
the scope of cognition" (1969a: 370a). The cognition is always
conceptual and thus deluded. "Yet ultimate truth is experienced
by noble beings in their meditative equipoise, and is free from all
conceptual categories. It cannot be expressed through
definition, through any defined object, or through anything
else" (1969a: 370a). In fact, Sakya goes so far as to combine
the definition of ultimate truth with that of *intrinsic
reality* *(rang bzhin, svabhava).* When an
interlocutor ask this question: "What is the nature of the
reality of phenomena?" Gorampa replies that reality is
transcendent and it has three defining characteristics: namely:
"It is not created by causes and conditions, it exists
independently of conventions and of other phenomena; and it does not
change" (Gorampa, 1969c: 326a). Like Nagarjuna's
*hypothetical*, not real, intrinsic reality, Sakya claims that
ultimate truth is *ontologically unconditioned*, and hence it
is not a dependently arisen phenomenon; it is *distinct* from
conventional phenomena in every sense of the word; it is
*independent* of conceptual-linguistic conventions; it is a
*timeless* and *unchanging* phenomenon.



It is clear then, according to Sakya view, any duality ascribed to
truth is untenable. Since there is only one truth, it cannot be
distinguished any further. Like Nyingma and Kagyu, Sakya holds
the view that truth itself is not divisible (Sakya
Pandita n.d.: 32ab, Rendawa 1995: 122, Rongton Shakya
Gyaltsen, 1995: 287, n.d.: 22f Taktsang Lotsawa n.d.: 263, Shakya
Chogden 1975a: 7-8ff, 1975c: 222f). It agrees with Nyingma and
Kagyu that the distinction between the two truths is essentially
between two conflicting perspectives, rather than any division within
truth as such. In Shakya Chogden's words: "Precise enumeration
*(grangs nges)* of the twofold truth all the earlier Tibetans
have explained rests on the precise enumeration of the mistaken
cognition *(blo 'khrul)* and unmistaken cognition
*(blo ma 'khrul).* With this underpinning reason, they
explained the precise enumeration through the elimination of the third
alternative. There is not even a single figure to be found who claims
the view comparable with the latter [i.e., Gelug], who asserts a
precise enumeration of the twofold truth based on the certification of
reliable cognitive processes" (1975a: 9-10ff).



Sakya rejects the reality of conventional truth by treating it as a
projection of conventional mind--it is the ignorance of ordinary
beings. When asked this question: "If this were true, even the
mere term *conventional truth* would be unacceptable, for
whatever is conventional is incompatible with truth," Gorampa
Replies: "Since [conventional] truth is posited only in relation
to a conventional mind, there is no problem. Even so-called real
conventionalities *(yang dag kun rdzob ces pa yang)* are
posited as real with respect to a conventional mind" (1969b:
606b). By "conventional mind," Gorampa means the ignorant
mind of an ordinary being experiencing the phenomenal world. In other
words, conventional truth is described as "truth" only
from the perspective of ignorance. It is a truth projected *(sgro
brtag pa)* by it and taken for granted.



Sakya equates conventional truth with "the appearances of
nonexistent entities like illusions" (Gorampa 1969c: 287c). It
follows Sakya Pandita on this point who puts it:
"Conventional truths are like reflections of the moon in the
water--despite their nonexistence, they appear due to
thoughts" (Sakya Pandita 1968a: 72a). According to
Sakya Pandita "The defining characteristic of
conventional truth constitutes the appearances of the nonexistent
objects" (1968a: 72a). In this sense, conventional truths
"are things apprehended by the cognition perceiving conventional
entities. Those very things are found as nonexistent by the cognition
analyzing their mode of existence that is itself posited as the
ultimate" (Gorampa 1969a: 377a).



Since mere mind is the basis of the division of the two truths wherein
ultimate truth--wisdom--alone is seen as satisfying the
criterion of truth, so conventional truth--ignorance--cannot
properly be taken as truth. Wisdom and ignorance are invariably
contradictory, and thus the two truths cannot coexist. Sakya argues,
in fact, that conventional truth must be negated in the ascent to
ultimate truth. Given wisdom's primacy over ignorance, in the final
analysis it is ultimate truth alone that must prevail without its
merely conventional counterpart. Conventional truth is an expedient
means to achieve ultimate truth, and the Buddha described conventional
truth as truth to suit the mentality of ordinary beings (Gorampa
1969a: 370b). The two truths are thus categorized as a *means
(thabs)* and a *result* *(thabs byung)*.
Conventional truth is the means to attain the one and only ultimate
truth.



According to this view, then, the relationship between the two truths
is equivalent to the relationship between the two conflicting
perspectives--namely, ignorance and wisdom. The question now
arises: How is ignorance related to wisdom? Or conversely, how does
wisdom relate to ignorance? It says that the two truths are distinct
in the sense that they are incompatible with unity, like
entity and without entity. In the ultimate sense, it argues,
the two truths transcend identity and difference (Gorampa, 1969a:
376d). The transcendence of identity and difference from the ultimate
standpoint is synonymous with the transcendence of identity and
difference from the purview of the meditative equipoise of noble
beings. However, from the conventional standpoint, it claims that the
two truths are distinct in the sense that they are incompatible with
their unity. It likens this relationship to the one between
*entity* and *without entity* (Gorampa, 1969a:
377a).



Sakya's claim that the two truths are distinct and incompatible
encompasses both ontological and epistemological distinctions. Since
what is divided into the two truths is mere mind, it is
obvious that there is no single phenomenon that could serve as the
objective referent for both. This also means that the two truths must
be construed as corresponding to distinct spheres belonging to
distinct modes of consciousness: conventional truth corresponds to
ignorance and ultimate truth to wisdom. It is thus inappropriate to
describe the relationship between the two truths, and their
corresponding modes of consciousness, in terms of two ways of
perceiving the *same* entity. Although the two truths can be
thought of as two ways of *perceiving*, one based on ignorance
and the other on wisdom, there is no *same* entity perceived by
both. There is nothing common between the two truths, and if they are
both ways of perceiving, then they do not perceive the same thing.



According to this view, the relationship between conventional truth
and ultimate truth is analogous to the relationship between the
appearance of falling hairs when vision is impaired by cataracts and
the absence of such hairs when vision is unimpaired. Although this is
a metaphor, it has a direct application to determining the
relationship between the two truths. Conventional truth is like seeing
falling hairs as a result of cataracts: both conventional truth and
such false seeing are illusory, in the ontological sense that there is
nothing to which each corresponds, and in the epistemological sense
that there is no true knowledge in either case. Ultimate truth is
therefore analogous, ontologically and epistemologically, to the true
seeing unimpaired by cataracts and free of the appearance of falling
hairs. Just as cataracts give rise to illusory appearances, so
ignorance, according to Sakya, gives rise to all conventional truths;
wisdom, on the other hand, gives rise to ultimate truth. As each is
the result of a different state, there is no common link between them
in terms of either an ontological identity or an epistemological or
conceptual identity.


## 4. Gelug



Gelug's (Dge lugs) theory of the two truths is campioned by Tsongkhapa
Lobsang Dragpa (Tsong khapa Blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419).
Tsongkhapa's theory is adopted, expanded and defended in the works of
his immediate disciples--Gyaltsab Je (Rgyal tshab Rje,
1364-1432), Khedrub Je (Mkhas grub Rje, 1385-1438),
Gendun Drub (Dge 'dun grub,1391-1474)--and other
great Gelug thinkers such as Sera Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen (Se
ra Rje tsun Chos kyi rgyal tshan, 1469-1544), Panchen Sonam
Dragpa (Pan chen Bsod nams grags pa,1478-1554), Panchen
Lobsang Chokyi Gyaltsen (Pan chen Blo bzang chos kyi rgyal
tshan,1567-1662), Jamyang Shepai Dorje ('Jam dbyangs Bzhad
ba'i Rdo rje, 1648-1722), Changkya Rolpai Dorje (Lcang skya
Rol pa'i rdo rje, 1717-86), Konchog Jigme Wangpo
(Kon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, 1728-91), and many others
scholars.



Gelug maintains that "objects of knowledge" *(shes
bya)* are the basis for dividing the two truths (Tsongkhapa
 1984b:176).[4]
 This means that the two truths relate to "two objects of
knowledge," the idea it takes from the statement of the Buddha
from *Discourse on Meeting of the Father and the Son
(Pitaputrasamagama
 Sutra)[5]*
 By *object of knowledge* Gelug means an object that is
cognizable *(blo'i yul du bya rung ba).* It must be an object
of cognitive processes in general ranging from those of ordinary
sentient beings through to those of enlightened beings. This
definition attempts to capture any thing knowable in the broadest
possible sense. Since the Buddha maintains knowledge of the two truths
to be necessary for awakening, the understanding of the two truths
must constitute an exhaustive understanding of all objects of
knowledge.



Gelug's key argument to support this claim comes from its two-nature
theory in which it has been argued that every nominally *(tha
snyad)* or conventionally *(kun rdzob)* given phenomenon
possesses dual natures: namely, the *nominal* (or conventional
nature) and the *ultimate nature*. The conventional nature is
unreal and deceptive while the ultimate nature is real and
nondeceptive. Since two natures pertain to every phenomenon, the
division of the two truths means the division of each entity into two
natures. Thus the division of the two truths, "reveals that it
makes sense to divide even the nature of a single entity, like a
sprout, into dual natures--its conventional and its ultimate
natures. It does not however show," as non-Gelug schools have
it, "that the one nature of the sprout is itself divided into
two truths in relation to ordinary beings *(so skye)* and to
noble beings (*aryas)*" (Tsongkhapa 1984b: 173,
1992: 406).



The relation of the two truths comes down to the way in which the
single entity appears to cognitive processes--deceptively and
nondeceptively. The two natures correspond to these deceptive or
nondeceptive modes of appearance. While they both belong to the same
ontological entity, they are epistemically or conceptually mutually
exclusive. Take a sprout for instance. If it exists, it necessarily
exhibits a dual nature, and yet those two natures cannot be
ontologically distinct. The ultimate nature of the sprout cannot be
separate from its conventional nature--its color, texture, shape,
extension, and so on. As an object of knowledge, the sprout retains
its single ontological basis, but it is known through its two natures.
These two natures exclude one another so far as knowledge is
concerned. The cognitive process that knows the deceptive conventional
nature of the sprout does not have direct access to its nondeceptive
ultimate nature. Similarly, the cognitive process that apprehends the
nondeceptive ultimate nature of the sprout does not have direct access
to its deceptive conventional nature. In Newland's words: "A
table and its emptiness are a single entity. When an ordinary
conventional mind takes a table as its object of observation, it sees
a table. When a mind of ultimate analysis searches for the table, it
finds the emptiness of the table. Hence, the two truths are posited in
relation to a single entity by way of the perspectives of the
observing consciousness. This is as close as Ge-luk-bas will come to
defining the two truths as perspectives" (1992: 49).



Gelug's two-nature theory not only serves as the basic reference point
for its exposition of the basis of the division of the two truths,
their meanings and definitions, but also serves as the basic
ontological reference for its account of the relationship between the
two truths. Therefore Gelug proposes the view that the two truths are
of single entity with distinct conceptual identities. This view is
also founded on the theory of the two natures. But how are the two
natures related? Are they identical or distinct? For Gelug argues that
there are only two possibilities: either the two natures are identical
*(ngo bo gcig)* or distinct *(ngo bo tha dad);* there
cannot be a third (Tsongkhapa 1984b:176). They are related in terms of
being a single entity with distinct conceptual identities--thus
they are both the same and different. Since the two natures are the
basis of the relationship between the two truths, the relationship
between the two truths will reflect the relationship between the two
natures. Just as the two natures are of a same entity, ultimate truth
and conventional truth are of same ontological status.



Gelug argues that the relationship between the two truths, therefore,
the two natures, is akin to the relationship between being conditioned
and being impermanent (Tsongkhapa 1984b:176). It appropriates this
point from Nagarjuna's *Bodhicittavivarana,*
which states: "Reality is not perceived as separate from
conventionality. The conventionality is explained to be empty. Empty
alone is the conventionality, if one of them does not exist, neither
will the other, like being conditioned and being impermanent"
(v.67-68) (Nagarjuna 1991:45-45, cited
Tsongkhapa, 1984b: 176; Khedrub Je 1992: 364). Commenting on
this passage from the *Bodhicittavivarana*, Tsongkhapa
argues that the first four lines (in original Tibetan verses) show
that things as they really are, are not ontologically distinct from
that of the conventionality. The latter two lines (in the original
Tibetan verse) show their relationship such that if one did not exist,
neither could the other *(med na mi 'bung ba'i 'brel
ba).* This, in fact, he says, is equivalent to their being
constituted by *a single-property relationship* *(bdag cig
pa'i 'brel ba).* Therefore, like the case of being
conditioned and being impermanent, the relation between the two truths
is demonstrated as one of a single ontological identity (Tsongkhapa
1984b: 176-77).



The way in which the two truths are related is thus analogous to the
relationship between being conditioned and being impermanent. They are
ontologically identical and mutually entailing. Just as a conditioned
state is not a result of impermanence, so emptiness is not a result of
the conventional truth (the five aggregates) or the destruction of the
five aggregates--Hence in the *Vimalakirtinirdesa
Sutra* it is stated: "Matter itself is void. Voidness
does not result from the destruction of matter, but the nature of
matter is itself voidness" (Vimalakirti, 1991:74). The same
principle applies in the case of consciousness and the emptiness of
consciousness, as well as to the rest of the five psychophysical
aggregates--the aggregate and its emptiness are not causally
related. For the causal relationship would imply either the aggregate
is the cause, therefore its emptiness is the result, or the aggregate
is the result, and its emptiness the cause. This would imply,
according to Gelug's reading, either the aggregate or the emptiness is
temporally prior to its counterpart, thus leading to the conlusion
that the conventional truth and ultimate truth exist independently of
each other. Such a view is for Gelug is completely unacceptable.



The ontological identity between being conditioned and being
impermanent does not imply identity in *all* and *every*
respect. Insofar as their epistemic mode is concerned, conditioned and
impermanent phenomena are distinct and contrasting. The concept
*impermanence* always presents itself to the cognizing mind as
momentary instants, but not as conditioned. Similarly, the concept
*being-conditioned* always presents itself to its cognizing
mind as constituted by manifold momentary instants, but not as
moments. Thus it does not necessarily follow that the two truths are
identical in every respect just because they share a common
ontological identity. Where the modes of conceptual appearance are
concerned, ultimate nature and conventional nature are distinct. The
conceptual mode of appearance of ultimate truth is nondeceptive and
consistent with its mode of existence, while that of conceptual mode
of conventional truth is deceptive and inconsistent with its mode of
existence.



Conventional truth is uncritically confirmed by conventionally
reliable cognitive process, whereas ultimate truth is critically
confirmed by ultimately reliable cognitive process. Hence, just as
ultimate truth is inaccessible to the conventionally reliable
cognitive process for its uncritical mode of engagement, so, too, is
conventional truth inaccessible to ultimately reliable cognitive
process for its critical mode of engagement. This is how, in Gelug's
view, the truths differ conceptually despite sharing a common
ontological entity. In summarizing Gelug's argument, Khedrub Je
writes: "The two truths are therefore of the same nature, but
different conceptual identities. They have a single-nature
relationship such that, if one did not exist, neither could the other,
just like being conditioned and impermanent" (1992: 364).



The two nature theory also supports Gelug's view that the truth is
twofold. Since the two natures of every conventional phenomenon
provide the ontological and epistemological foundation for each of the
truths, the division of truth into two is entirely appropriate. Both
the conventional and the ultimate are actual truths, and since the two
natures are mutually interlocking, neither of the two truths has
primacy over the other--both have equal status, ontologically,
epistemologically, and even soteriologically.



Given Gelug's stance on conventional truth as actual truth and its
argument for the equal status of the two truths, Gelug must now
address the question: How can conventional truth, which is unreal
(false) and deceptive, be truth (real) at all? In other words, how can
the two truths be of equal status given if conventional truth is
unreal (false)? The success of Gelug's reply depends on its ability to
maintain harmony between the two truths, or their equal footing.There
are several arguments by means of which Gelug defends this. The first,
and the most obvious one, is the argument from the two-nature theory.
It argues since two truths are grounded in the dual nature of a single
phenomenon, then "just as the ultimate reality of the sprout
[for instance] is taken as characteristic of the sprout, hence it is
described as the sprout's nature, so, too," explains Tsongkhapa,
"are the sprout's color, shape, etc., the sprout's
characteristics. Therefore they too are its nature"
(1992: 406). Since the two natures are ontologically mutually
entailing, the sprout's ultimate truth cannot exist ontologically
separate from its conventional truth, and vice versa. Neither truth
could exist without the other.



The most important argument Gelug advances for the unity of the two
truths draws upon an understanding of the compatible relation between
conventional truth and dependent arising on the one hand, and between
ultimate truth and emptiness on the other. For Gelug emptiness and
dependent arising are synonymous. The concept of emptiness is
incoherent unless it means dependent arising, and equally the concept
of dependent arising is incoherent unless it means emptiness of
intrinsic reality. Gelug argues, as Tsongkhapa does in the *Rten
'brel stod pa (In Praise of Dependent Arising,* 1994a),
since emptiness means dependent arising, the emptiness of intrinsic
reality and the efficacy of action and its agent are not
contradictory. If emptiness, however, is misinterpreted as
contradictory with dependent arising, then Gelug contends, there would
be neither action in empty phenomena, nor empty phenomena in action.
But that cannot be the case, for that would entail a rejection of both
phenomena and action, a nihilistic view (v.11-12). Since there
is no phenomenon other than what is dependently arisen, there is no
phenomenon other than what is empty of intrinsic reality (v.15).
Understood emptiness in this way, there is indeed no need to say that
they are noncontradictory--the *utter nonexistence of
intrinsic reality* and making sense of everything in the light of
the principle *this arises depending on this* (v.18). This is
so because despite the fact that whatever is dependently arisen lacks
intrinsic reality, and therefore empty, nonetheless its existence is
illusion-like (v.27).



Sometimes Gelug varies its ontological argument slightly, as does
Tsongkhapa in the *Lam gtso rnam gsum* *(The Three Principal
Pathways)*, to stressing the unity of the two truths in terms of
their causal efficiency. It argues that empty phenomena is causally
efficient is crucial in understanding the inextricable relationship
between ultimate truth and conventional truth. The argument takes two
forms: (1) *appearance* avoids realism--the *extreme of
existence*, and (2) *emptiness* avoids inhilism--the
*extreme of nonexistence*. The former makes sense for Gelug
because the appearance arises from causal conditions, and whatever
arises from the causal conditions is a non-eternal or non-permanent.
When the causal conditions changes any thing that dependently arises
from them also changes. Thus the appearance avoids the realism. The
latter makes sense because the empty phenomena arises from causal
conditions, and whatever arise from the causal conditions is not a
non-existent, even though it lacks intrinsic reality. Only when the
causal conditions are satisfied do we see arising of the empty
phenomena. Hence by understanding that the empty phenomenon itself is
causally efficient, the bearer of cause and effect, one is not robbed
by the extreme view of nihilism (1985: 252).



The argument for the unity of the two truths also takes
epistemological form which also rests on the idea that emptiness and
dependently arising are unified. The knowledge of empty phenomena is
conceptually interlinked with that of dependently arisen
phenomena--the latter is, in fact, founded on the former. To the
extent that empty phenomena are understood in terms of relational and
dependently arisen phenomena, to that extent empty phenomena are
always functional and causally effective. The phrase "empty
phenomena," although expressed negatively, is not negative in a
metaphysical sense--it is not equivalent to no-thingness.
Although the empty phenomenon appears to its cognizing consciousness
negatively and without any positive affirmation, it is nonetheless
equivalent to a relational and dependently arisen phenomenon seen
deconstructively. Since seeing phenomena as empty does not violate the
inevitable epistemic link with the understanding of phenomena as
dependently arisen, and the converse also applies, so the unity
between the two truths--understanding things both as empty and as
dependently arisen--is still sustained.



The unity between the two truths, according to Gelug, does not apply
merely to ontological and epistemological issues; it applies equally
to soteriology--the practical means to the freedom from
suffering. As Jamyang Shepai Dorje argues that undermining either of
the two truths would result in a similar downfall--a similar
eventual ruin. If, however, they are not undermined, the two are alike
insofar as the accomplishment of the two accumulations and the
attainment of the two awakened bodies (kayas), and so forth, are
concerned. If one undermines conventional truth or denies it's
reality, one would succumb to the extreme of nihilism, which would
also undermine the fruit and the means by which an awakened physical
body (rupakaya) is accomplished. It is therefore not
sensible to approach the two truths with bias. Since this relation
continues as a means to avoid falling into extremes, and also to
accomplish the two accumulations and attain the two awakened bodies
(kayas), it is imperative, says Jamyang Shepai Dorje, that the
two truths be understood as mutually interrelated (1992:
898-99).



One could object Gelug's position as follows: If the two natures are
ontologically identical, why is conventional truth unreal and
deceptive, while ultimate truth real and nondeceptive? To this Gelugs
replies that "nondeceptive is the mode of reality *(bden
tshul)* of the ultimate. That is, ultimate truth does not deceive
the world by posing one mode of appearance while existing in another
mode" (1992: 411). Ultimate truth is described as
*ultimate*, not because it is absolute or higher than
conventional truth, but simply because of its consistent character,
therefore non-deceptive--its mode of appearance and its mode of
being are the same--in contrast with the inconsistent (therefore
deceptive) character of conventional truth. Ultimate truth is
nondeceptive for the same reason. The premise follows because to the
cognizing consciousness, conventional truth presents itself as
inherently or instrinsically real. It appears to be substance, or
essence, and therefore it deceives ordinary beings. Insofar
as conventional truth presents itself as more than
conventional--as inherently real--they deceive the ordinary
beings. We take them to be what they are not--to be intrinsically
and objectively real. In that sense, they are unreal. "But to
the extent that we understand them as dependently arisen, empty,
interdependent phenomena," as Garfield explains, "they
constitute a conventional truth" (1995: 208).



Another objection may be advanced as follows: Gelug's position
contradicts the Buddha's teachings since it is not possible to
reconcile Gelug's view that there are two actual truths with the
Buddha's declaration that nirvana is the only
 truth.[6]
 For its answer to this objection Gelug appropriates
Candrakirti's
*Yuktisastikavrtti* which states
that nirvana is not like conditioned phenomena, which
deceives the childish by presenting false appearances. For the
existence of nirvana is always consistent with its
characteristic of the nonarising nature. Unlike conditioned phenomena,
it never appears, even to the childish, as having a nature of arising
*(skye ba'i ngo bo).* Since nirvana is always
consistent with the mode of existence of nirvana, it is
explained as the noble truth. Yet this explanation is afforded
*strictly in the terms of worldly conventions* (1983:
14-15ff, cited in Tsongkhapa 1992: 312, Khedrub Je 1992:
360).



For Gelug the crucial point here, as Candrakirti emphasizes, is
that nirvana is the truth *strictly in terms of worldly
conventions.* Gelug recognizes this linguistic convention as a
highly significant to the Prasangika system and it insists
on conformity with the worldly conventions for the the following
reasons. First, just as an illusion, a mirror image, etc., are real in
an ordinary sense, despite the fact that they are deceptive and
unreal, so, too, conventional phenomena in the Prasangika
Madhyamaka sense are conventionally real, and can even be said to
constitute truths, despite being recognized by the Madhyamikas
themselves as unreal and deceptive. Second, because the concept
*ultimate truth* is also taken from its ordinary convention,
nirvana is spoken of as *ultimate* on the ground of
its nondeceptive nature, in the sense that its mode of existence is
consistent with its mode of appearance. The nondeceptive nature of the
empty phenomenon itself constitutes its reality, and so it is
conventionally described as ultimate in the Prasangika
system.



Thus Gelug asserts that neither of the two truths is more or less
significant than the other. Indeed, while the illusion only makes
sense as illusion in relation to that which is not illusion, the
reflection only makes sense as reflection in relation to that which is
reflected. So, too, does the real only make sense as real in relation
to the illusion, the thing reflected in relation to its reflection.
This also holds in the case of discussions about the ultimate nature
of things, such as the being of the sprout--it only makes sense
inasmuch as it holds in discussions of ordinary phenomena. The only
criterion that determines a thing's truth in the Prasangika
Madhyamaka system, according to Gelug, is the causal effectiveness of
the thing as opposed to mere *heuristic* significance. The
sprout's empty mode of being and its being as appearance are both
truths, insofar as both are causally effective, and thus both
functional.



The two truths, understood as, respectively, the empty and the
dependently arisen characters of phenomena, are on equal footing
according to Gelug. Nevertheless these truths have different
designations--the sprout's empty mode is always described as
"ultimate truth," while the conventional properties, such
as color and shape, are described as "conventional
truths." The former is accepted as *nondeceptive truth*
while the sprout's conventional properties are accepted as
*deceptive* or *false truth,* despite common sense
dictating that they are true and real.



In conclusion Gelug's theory of the two truths is based on one
fundamental thesis that each conventionally real phenomenon satisfies
the definitions of both truths for each phenomenon, as it sees it,
possesses two natures that serve as the basis of the definitions of
the two truths. The two truths are conceptual distinctions applied to
a particular conventionally real phenomenon, and every conventionally
real phenomenon fulfills the criterion of both truths because each
phenomenon constitutes these two natures they are not merely
*one* specific nature of a phenomenon mirrored in two different
perspectives. As each phenomenon possesses two natures, so each
verifying cognitive process has a different nature as its referent,
even though there is only one ontological entity and one cognitive
agent involved.


## 5. Implications



Gelug considers the two natures of each phenomenon as the defining
factor of the two truths. It argues that the conventional nature of an
entity, as verified by a conventionally reliable cognitive process,
determines the defining criterion of conventional truth; the ultimate
nature of the same entity, as verified by an ultimately reliable
cognitive practice, determines the defining criterion of ultimate
truth. Since both truths are ontologically as well as
epistemologically interdependent, knowledge of conventionally real
entitity as dependently arisen suffices for knowledge of both truths.
In contasty non-Gelug schools--Nyingma, Kagyu and Sakya
Non-Gelug, as we have seen, rejects Gelug's dual-nature theory,
treating each conventional entity as satisfying only the definition of
conventional truth and taking the definition of ultimate truth to be
ontologically and epistemologically transcendent from conventional
truth. They argue, instead, it is through the perspectives of either
an ordinary being or an unenlightened exalted being
*(aryas)* that the definition of conventional truth is
verified--fully enlightened being *(buddhas)* do not
experience the conventional truth in any respect. Similarly, for
non-Gelug, no ordinary being can experience the ultimate truth.
Ultimate truth transcends conventional truth, and the knowledge of
empirically given phenomena as dependently arisen could not satisfy
the criterion of knowing ultimate truth.



For Gelug, there is an essential compatibility between between the two
truths, for the reason that there is a necessary harmony between
dependently arisen and emptiness of intrinsic reality. As dependently
arisen, empty phenomena are not constructions of ignorant
consciousness, so neither is conventional truth such a construction.
Both truths are actual truths that stand on an equal footing.
Moreover, according to this view, whosoever knows conventional truth,
either directly or inferentially, also knows ultimate truth; whosoever
knows ultimate truth, also knows phenomena as dependently arisen, and
hence knows them as empty of intrinsic reality. Where there is no
knowledge of conventional truth, the converse applies. For non-Gelug,
the incommensurability between dependently arisen and emptiness of
intrinsic reality also applies to the two truths. Accordingly,
whosoever knows conventional truth does not know ultimate truth, and
one who knows ultimate truth does not know conventional truth;
whosoever knows phenomena as dependently arisen does not know them as
empty, whereas whosoever knows phenomena as empty does not know them
as dependently arisen.



While Gelug thus distances itself from the subjective division of the
two truths, Nyingma, Kagyu and Sakya attempt to demonstrate the
validity of their view by arguing that perspective provides the
primary basis for the division of the two truths. Unlike Gelug,
non-Gelug schools hold that the two truths do not have any objective
basis. Instead they are entirely reducible to the experiences of the
deluded minds of ordinary beings and the experiences of the wisdom of
exalted being.



According to Gelug, the agent who cognizes the two truths may be one
and the same individual. Each agent may have all the requisite
cognitive resources that are potentially capable of knowing both
truths. Ordinary beings have only conceptual access to ultimate truth,
while exalted beings, who are in the process of learning, have direct,
but intermittent, access. Awakenened beings, however, invariably have
simultaneous access to both truths. The view held by non-Gelug argues
for separate cognitive agents corresponding to each of the two truths.
Ordinary beings have direct knowledge of conventional truth, but are
utterly incapable of knowing ultimate truth. The exalted beings in
training directly know ultimate while they are meditative equipoise
and conventional truth in post meditative states. Fully awakened
buddhas, on the other hand, only have access to ultimate truth.
Awakened beings have no access to conventional truth whatsoever from
the enlightened perspective, although they may access conventional
truth from unenlightened ordinary perspectives.