## 1. Life



Only little is known about Brito's life. Recent studies by
William Courtenay (2005) and Jean-Luc Deuffic (2002) significantly
increased our knowledge of his biography. He was born in the village
of Ploudiry, in French Brittany, around 1270 and not later than 1273.
He was a master of arts in Paris from around 1290. He probably began
the study of theology in 1299, while still teaching in the faculty of
arts. He read Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in 1308/09 and
obtained his doctorate in theology in 1313/14. Brito became
 Provisor[1]
 of the Sorbonne at some point between 1312 and 1315 and kept this
function until at least 1319. He also held several ecclesiastical
positions, which is a good indication of both his prominence within
the university and excellent personal connections. Brito died in
1320/21.


## 2. Writings



Brito's philosophical output consists mainly of
question-commentaries on the corpus of Aristotle's writings,
Boethius' logical corpus, and Priscian's grammar. In all
likelihood, these commentaries were produced during his career as a
master of arts in Paris in the 1290s.



His grammatical and logical works, which are those that have been most
thoroughly studied, consist of the following
question-commentaries:



> 
> * 1. *Quaestiones super Priscianum minorem* (=
> *QPm*)
> * 2. *Quaestiones super librum De divisione Boethii* (two
> versions)
> * 3. *Quaestiones super librum Topicorum Boethii*
> * 4. *Quaestiones super artem veterem* (= *QAV*)
> 	+ 4.1 *Quaestiones super Porphyrium* (= *QsP*)
> 	+ 4.2 *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*
> 	+ 4.3 *Quaestiones super librum Perihermeneias*
> * 5. *Quaestiones super librum Priorum Analyticorum*
> * 6. *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum Analyticorum*
> * 7. *Quaestiones super librum Topicorum*
> * 8. *Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*
> * 9. *Quaestiones in librum Sex principiorum*
> * 10. *Sophismata*
> 
> 
> 



Although most of these works are only extant in manuscript form, there
are editions of 1 (*QPm-1980*), 3 (*QTB-1978*) and 5
(*QPA-2016*), and editions in progress of, at least, 2,
4.1-4.2 and
 7-9.
 Finally, there is a fifteenth-century edition (*QR-1499*) and
a Renaissance Greek translation by Gennadios Scholarios (Ebbesen &
Pinborg 1981-1982) of 4, as well as a number of partial editions
of
 4-10. See in particular Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981-1982 
for an edition of the prooemium of
 4.1.[2]



Much less studied is the remaining part of Brito's philosophical
corpus, which consists of the following question-commentaries:



> 
> * 1. *Quaestiones super libros I-XII Metaphysicae* (=
> *QMet*)
> * 2. *Quaestiones super librum Physicorum*
> * 3. *Quaestiones in libros De anima* (= *QDA*)
> * 4. *Quaestiones in parva naturalia* (including
> *Quaestiones De memoria et reminiscentia* (=
> *QDM*))
> * 5. *Quaestiones super librum Meteorologicorum*
> * 6. *Quaestiones super libros I-II Politicorum*
> * 7. *Quaestiones super librum Ethicorum* (= *QEN*;
> two versions)
> * 8. *Quaestiones in parva mathematicalia*
> * 9. *Quaestiones in librum De substantia orbis* (the
> attribution to Brito remains uncertain; see *QE-2008*:
> 103)
> * 10. *Quaestiones super librum De motibus animalium*
> * 11. *Quaestiones super Physiognomicam*
> * 12. *Quaestiones super librum De causis*
> 
> 
> 



Most of these works are also extant only in manuscript. There are
editions in progress of 1 and 4.

Only 7 (*QE-2008*) and 12 (*QDc-2016*) have been fully
edited. Regarding 3, the questions on *De anima* I
(*QDA-2012-I*) and on *De anima* III
(*QDA-1974-III*) are fully edited, and there is a partial
edition of the questions on *De anima* II
(*QDA-2012-II*). Finally, there are partial editions of 1,
4-6 and
 8.[3]



Almost completely unexplored are Brito's theological writings,
virtually all of which are unedited. These include a question
commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* I-III,
written in 1308/9 and preserved in the ms. Pavia, Biblioteca
Universitaria Aldini 244 ff. 15-54. In addition, Prospero di
Reggio Emilia reports a set of theological questions, preserved in ms.
Vaticana lat. 1086, ff. 156rv and 196r-208r (see *QE-2008*: 103).
And F. Stegmuller has
attributed to Brito a set of questions on the *Psalms*, also
preserved in the Pavia manuscript (see *QE-2008*: 103). The authenticity of the two
latter items is still uncertain, however (see *QE-2008*: 103).
Partial editions of the commentary on the *Sentences* are found
in Rossini and Schabel 2005 and in *QE-2008*. 


## 3. Grammar


### 3.1 The Subject Matter of Grammar



In his commentary on *Priscian Minor*, Brito endeavors to show
that grammar meets the criteria a medieval discipline must meet in
order to be considered a theoretical science. In doing so, he puts
forth his own account of grammar as an independent theoretical science
in terms of both subject matter and principles (for Brito's
theoretical grammar, see Pinborg 1967; Rosier-Catach 1983, 1999, 2010;
Ebbesen 1998a.). Regarding grammar's subject matter,
Brito's position is that, from the point of view of predication,
significant speech (*sermo significativus*) is the general
subject matter. In fact, significant speech is: 


1. the common predicate of what is first known in grammar;
2. that the existence of which is presupposed by grammar; and
3. that the features of which are demonstrated in grammar
(*QPm*; *QPm-1980*: 103-104).



However, from the point of view of attribution, the expression
(*oratio*) can also be considered the subject matter of
grammar, as everything that grammar considers is in one way or another
related to it (*QPm*; *QPm-1980*: 104). More
specifically, from the point of view of predication, the expression is
discussed in the so-called *Priscian Minor* (books
XVII-XVIII of Priscian's *Institutiones*), which is
exclusively concerned with the principles of grammatical expressions
and with the demonstration of their features (*QPm*;
*QPm-1980*: 107).


### 3.2 The *Modi significandi* or the Principles of Grammatical Speech



The principles of the grammatical expression--what makes an
expression grammatical--are the modes of signifying (*modi
significandi*) of its constituent parts (Rosier-Catach 1995),
which are the parts of speech (*partes orationis*), i.e., noun,
verb, participle, pronoun, preposition, adverb, conjunction, and
interjection. The modes of signifying are, in turn, the formal
constituent features of these parts (*QPm*; *QPm-1980*:
138-139).



A part of speech is the result of a series of hylomorphic compositions
starting with articulated sound (*vox*). First, the word
(*dictio*) is the result of the hylomorphic composition of an
articulate sound (*vox*) and the relation of signification
(*ratio
 significationis*).[4]
 This relation links the articulate sound to the thing signified
(*res significata*, for *res significata*, see
Rosier-Catach 1995), regardless of the thing's different modes
of being (*modi essendi*; for *modi essendi*, see Donati
2013). In fact, things and their modes of being are not identical. For
instance, a horse may happen to be a particular horse, a universal
horse, my horse, etc., but being particular, being universal, being
mine, etc. are all different from being a horse.



A part of speech (*pars orationis*) is the result of the
hylomorphic composition of a word and a mode of signifying. The mode
of signifying, in turn, is derived from some of the modes of being a
thing may have (*QPm*; *QPm-1980*: 164). For instance, a
'walk' has the mode of signifying of a qualified
substance, because it indicates the action of walking as a qualified
substance (*QPm*; *QPm-1980*: 192-193). This mode
of signifying directly results from a particular mode of understanding
(*modus intelligendi*) the action of walking, namely from
understanding it as a qualified substance. Generally speaking, then,
the modes of signifying are taken from their corresponding modes of
understanding; and the modes of understanding, in turn, are taken from
the modes of being of things. This is, in fact, the fundamental tenet
of the modistic grammar to which Brito adheres: the modes of
signifying follow from the modes of understanding things, which in
turn follow from the modes of being of things. Note, however, that a
walk is in itself an action and not a substance. But this is not a
problem for grammar's scientific status because a grammatical
item takes its mode of signifying from the possible modes of being of
things and not necessarily from the actual modes of being of a
word's significate (*QPm*; *QPm-1980*: 164).
Consequently, every mode of signifying is ultimately grounded in a
real mode of being, making the science of grammar grounded in
something real. 



Having established that every mode of signifying corresponds, through
a mode of understanding, to a thing's mode of being, Brito goes
on to introduce a distinction between active and passive modes of
signifying, as well as between active and passive modes of
 understanding.[5]
 The passive mode of understanding and the passive mode of signifying
are the mode of being as understood and the mode of being as indicated
by the part of speech, respectively. Therefore, although the passive
mode of signifying, the passive mode of understanding, and the mode of
being are features of the same thing, they are notionally
different.



The active mode of understanding and the active mode of signifying are
the intellectual apprehension of the mode of being and the
corresponding relation of consignification whereby the part of speech
indicates that mode of being (*QPm*; *QPm-1980*: 153).
Hence, the active mode of understanding and the active mode of
signifying are both notionally different and features of different
things. Nevertheless, they are linked by a causal relation, because
the mode of understanding immediately causes the mode of signifying.
Thus, the active modes of signifying and understanding are similar
(*QPm*; *QPm-1980*: 158).



Finally, the active and passive modes of signifying are notionally
identical, but they are features of different things. This is because
one and the same relation of consignification is considered on the one
hand as a feature of a grammatical item and, on the other, as a
feature of a thing. The same goes for the active and passive modes of
understanding (*QPm*; *QPm-1980*: 170).



Since grammar is mainly concerned with the principles of grammatical
speech, one could expect these principles to be the active modes of
signifying--the formal features of the words that constitute a
grammatical phrase. However, since the active modes are notionally
identical to the passive ones, Brito claims that, from a formal
perspective, both the active and the passive modes of signifying are
the principles of grammatical constructions. The modes of being, on
the contrary, are the principles of grammatical constructions only
insofar as they are consignified by the parts of speech (*QPm*;
*QPm-1980*: 173).



A grammatical phrase is formed when the modes of signifying of its
constituent parts are compatible with each other (*QPm*;
*QPm-1980*: 132). Hence, 'a man runs' is a
grammatical construction, because the mode of signifying of 'a
man' (i.e., the mode of the qualified substance) and that of
'runs' (i.e., the mode of being performed) are compatible
with each other. These modes of signifying are in turn compatible with
each other because the modes of being that 'a man' and
'runs' consignify are compatible with each other.


## 4. Logic


### 4.1 The Subject Matter of Logic and Its Division: The Methods of Scientific-Knowledge Acquisition and the Syllogism



According to Brito, logic is a theoretical science dealing with the
methods of scientific-knowledge acquisition (*modi sciendi*,
hereafter 'methods of knowledge') (*QsP*; see
Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981-1982: 301). However, since the
syllogism is the method of knowledge *par excellence*, and that
to which all the other methods of knowledge are subordinated, it can
also be posited as the general subject matter of logic.



For a medieval master like Brito, the science of logic is first and
foremost contained in Aristotle's *organon* (see entry on
 Aristotle's logic).
Hence, Brito's account of logic as a science must explain the
division of the *organon* into six treatises as a reflection of
a division of the syllogism into its different kinds (the
demonstrative syllogism, the dialectical syllogism, etc.) and its
constituent parts (simple words, assertions, etc.). Accordingly,
Brito's first division of logic proceeds as follows: the
syllogism considered only with regard to its moods and figures is the
subject matter of the *Prior Analytics*. The syllogism
considered according to the alethic modality of its premises is the
subject matter of the *Topics* and of the *Posterior
Analytics*, the former dealing with the syllogism from probable
premises and the latter with the syllogism from necessary premises.
The syllogism from apparently probable premises is, in turn, the
subject matter of the *Sophistical Refutations*. Now, since the
syllogism can also be analyzed with respect to its constituent parts,
the *Categories* deals with its simple parts--simple
words--insofar as they can be sorted into different kinds
(substance, quality, quantity, etc.). Finally, the *De
interpretatione* deals with the complex parts of the
syllogism--assertions that become its premises and
conclusion--as well as with the simple parts of the assertion,
i.e., the subject and predicate terms (*QsP*; see Ebbesen &
Pinborg 1981-1982: 301 and 303).


### 4.2 The Subject Matter of Logic and Its Division: The Logic of Second Intentions



Brito also puts forth the most developed account of the
thirteenth-century logic of intentions (for Brito's logic, see
Pinborg 1967, 1971, 1975a; Ebbesen 1998a). His logic of intentions
considers the subject matter of logic to be second
 intentions[6]
 (*intentiones secundae*), which are best understood as
qualified fundamental concepts (first intentions). A first intention
is the first intellectual apprehension of a thing--the
unqualified concept that only grasps what a thing essentially is. A
second intention, in turn, is a first intention qualified according to
one of the several modes of being that things have. For instance, the
concept of man can be understood as a substance because its content is
the substantial form of individual men, or it can be understood as a
species because its content actually informs several individuals at
the same time, etc. (*QsP*; see Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981-1982: 307).



Since first and second intentions are essentially related to a
cognitive object, depending on whether the cognitive relation is taken
from the side of the thinking subject or from the side of the object,
first and second intentions can be abstract or concrete. Accordingly,
man, insofar as it is known through its concept, is a concrete first
intention; its concept is an abstract first intention. On the other
hand, man, understood as a species of animal, is a concrete second
intention; the concept of man thus qualified is an abstract second
intention, etc. (*QsP*; see Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981-1982: 307).



Brito goes on to claim that, more precisely, the subject matter of
logic is *concrete* second intentions. The subsequent division
of logic must then correspond to a division of concrete second
intentions. Such a division is deduced from the three cognitive
operations of the intellect: apprehension, composition/division, and
deduction (Ebbesen and Pinborg 1981-1982: 309). A second intention
qualifies the object of some of these intellectual operations.
Correspondingly, the *Categories* deals with concrete second
intentions understood through intellectual apprehension (e.g., man as
substance, whiteness as quality, etc.). *De interpretatione*
deals with concrete second intentions understood through composition
and division (e.g., man as subject, white as predicate, a man being
white as an assertion, etc.). Both *Analytics*, the
*Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations* deal with
concrete second intentions understood through deduction. In other
words, these treatises deal with things insofar as they are related to
a syllogistic process, e.g., with the premise that every man is an
animal (in the *Prior Analytics*), with the probability of a
man being white (in the *Topics*), with the necessity of every
man being an animal (in the *Posterior Analytics*), etc.
(*QsP*; see Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981-1982: 309 and 311).



Of particular importance is the difference between concrete second
intentions as they are dealt with in the *Prior Analytics* on
the one hand, and in the *Topics* and the *Posterior
Analytics* on the other. For the *Prior Analytics* deals
with second intentions related to a syllogistic process, regardless of
whether its premises are probable or necessary, whereas the
*Topics* and the *Posterior Analytics* deal with those
second intentions whereby the premises are qualified as probable or
necessary, respectively. Therefore, while the *Prior Analytics*
deals with the intentions involved in a syllogistic deduction only
with regard to its mood and figure, the *Topics* and the
*Posterior Analytics* deal with these intentions with regard to
their probability and necessity (*QsP*; see Ebbesen &
Pinborg 1981-1982: 311 and 313).



Brito's logic of intentions also allows him to explain away a
concern that had troubled earlier commentators of Aristotle's
logic, such as Nicholas of Paris and Robert Kilwardby, namely the fact
that simple words, such as 'man', are discussed in the
*Categories*, *De interpretatione* and *Prior
Analytics* (see Mora-Marquez 2015b: 71). If, they thought,
a discussion of simple words belongs in logic at all, then at least it
ought to be found in precisely one treatise. However, since logic, for
Brito, deals with man as a concrete second intention rather than as a
word or a thing, the problem does not arise. In fact,
the *Categories* discusses man insofar as it is a substance;
the *De interpretatione* insofar as it is a subject of
predication; and the *Prior Analytics* insofar as it is a term,
i.e., the major, minor or middle term of a syllogism (*QsP*;
see Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981-1982: 313).



Finally, Brito's logic of intentions results in a major
departure from the logical tradition represented by Kilwardby and his
contemporaries: the exclusion of truth from the realm of logic (see
Mora-Marquez 2015b: ch. 4). According to Brito, logic does not
deal with truth because it does not deal with real things per se, and
real things, regardless of whatever second intentions they may fall
under, are the truth-makers of assertions (*QPm*;
*QPm-1980*: 138-139). The truth of an assertion such as
'every man is an
 animal'[7]
 depends on a real identity holding between man and animal--a
real identity that is independent of the fact that man is a species, a
subject, a substance, etc. In other words, such an identity is
independent of the second intentions that qualify the cognitive
apprehension of man. Despite this, second intentions do play a role in
the validity of deductions that have 'every man is an
animal' as a premise, for second intentions are the principles
of a syllogism's validity. But they are not the principles of an
assertion's truth or falsity, and hence truth is no longer a
logical concern. 


## 5. Psychology


### 5.1 The Science of the Soul



In his question commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* I,
Brito asks about the subject matter of the science of the soul (for
Brito's psychology, see De Boer 2012, 2013). With respect to
this question, earlier scholars usually take one of two main opposing
positions: the subject matter of psychology is either simply the soul,
or it is the body that has a soul, i.e., the animate body. Brito opts
for the second position: the subject matter of the science of the soul
is the animate body, with an emphasis on its being animated. Two
arguments are given to support his position: the science of the soul
studies the operations and features specifically related to the
animate body's having a soul (growth, nutrition, sensation, and
understanding). Hence, its subject matter ought to be the possessor of
those operations and features--the animate body. Accordingly,
this science does not study the soul, that which makes the animate
body animate, without any consideration of its relation to the body;
rather, it studies the entire composite of body and soul, and more
specifically, the body that has a soul (*QDA-2012-I*: 276).
Therefore, the science of the soul approaches the soul not as an
entity totally detached from the body it animates, but rather as the
cause of the set of operations and features that separate living
bodies from inanimate ones.


### 5.2 Body/Soul Relation and the Definition of the Soul



In his commentary on *De anima* II, Brito goes on to discuss
the description of the soul as the substantial form of the living
body. The discussion is directly related to the debate between those
(like Albert the Great) who describe the soul as the extrinsically
given perfection of the living body, and those (like Thomas Aquinas)
who describe it as the living body's intrinsic substantial form.
The first group of commentators refrained from describing the soul as
the substantial form of the body because this seemed too close to the
materialist account of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who seemingly would
deny the possibility of the separation of the human soul after the
body's death. Albert therefore describes the soul as that which
extrinsically perfects (*perficit*) a material body that has
life potentially--a material body capable of performing the
operations causally related to being alive. Aquinas, however, opts for
a description more in accordance with Aristotelian doctrine: the soul
is the intrinsic substantial form of the living body, for that which
separates animate from inanimate bodies must belong essentially, and
intrinsically, to animate bodies as their form. Brito, in turn, sides
with Aquinas and describes the soul as the substantial form of the
body. His position is supported by two arguments: a substantial form
is that due to which something receives its specific name (e.g.,
'horse'); when this form is removed, its subject is called
by that name only equivocally (e.g., a dead horse is called 'a
horse' only equivocally); since the soul is that due to which an
animate body is said to be animate per se, and since its removal makes
the body animate only equivocally, the soul must be the substantial
form of the animate body (*QDA-2012-II*: 319). More
importantly, the substantial form is that due to which individuals
belonging to a natural kind can perform the specific operations that
distinguish them from other kinds belonging to the same genus. Hence,
since the soul is that due to which the animate body can perform its
specific operations of growth, nutrition, sensation, and
understanding, the soul must be described as the substantial form of
the animate body (*QDA-2012-II*: 320).



Accordingly, Brito also considers the animate body--the
hylomorphic composition of body and soul--to be an essential
unity--a unity where the body is the material part and the soul
is the formal part (*QDA-2012-II*: 325). Like Aristotle, Brito
dismisses as misleading the question about the metaphysical link that
binds soul and body together into an essential unity. In fact, there
is no such link that could belong essentially and intrinsically to the
animate body. If there were, it would be either material or formal. It
cannot be material, because whatever is material is also potential,
and whatever is potential is unable to actually connect body and soul.
If it were formal, it would be either a substantial or an accidental
form. It cannot be a substantial form, for then the animate body would
have two substantial forms--a possibility that Brito
categorically rejects. And it cannot be an accidental form, because
the possession of accidents naturally implies the possession of a
substantial form that serves as their support. Hence, we end up with
an additional substantial form that supports the accident that binds
body and soul. Consequently, the cause of the union of body and soul
can only be an extrinsic agent that does not belong essentially to the
animate body (*QDA-2012-II*: 326).



Brito defends, then, the correctness of Aristotle's definition
of the soul as the act of an organic physical body that has life
potentially. In keeping with the description of the soul as a
substantial form, the soul is defined as that which essentially
constitutes the first actualization of the animate body. The rest of
the definition singles out the specific kind of body the soul
actualizes. First, the body in question is natural and not artificial,
for the actualization of the body by the soul creates an individual
belonging to a natural kind and not an artifact like a table. Second,
it is organized (i.e., organic), for it involves an interconnected set
of fundamentally different parts whereby the different operations of
the animate body are carried out (*QDA-2012-II*: 328). Finally,
it has life potentially, quite simply because there cannot be
something actual in a certain respect that was not previously
potential in the very same respect. In other words, one could not be
an actual living being if one's body did not first possess the
potential to be alive (*QDA-2012-II*: 329). Consequently,
according to Brito, Aristotle's definition of the soul correctly
places the soul in the class of substantial acts or forms, just as it
correctly singles out the specific kind of matter that this act or
form actualizes--an organic physical body that has life
potentially.


### 5.3 Faculty Psychology



Brito's explanation of why the animate body must be organic also
shows clearly his commitment to a faculty psychology. He says:



> 
> 
> Every form that has several capacities and operations [...]
> requires its subject to have multiple organs in order to perform those
> operations; the soul has several faculties and several operations;
> therefore etc. [...] [T]he vegetative faculty has the capacities
> of nutrition, growth, and generation; and these capacities have
> different operations: the capacity of nutrition must preserve the
> substance of what is nourished; the capacity of growth must lead it to
> a perfect quantity (*ducere ad perfectam quantitatem*), and the
> capacity of generation must preserve the species. The sensitive soul
> also has multiple capacities: the capacity of sight, of hearing, of
> smell, etc., which have different operations. Also, the common sense
> has several capacities, as imagination (*potentia ymaginativa*)
> and memory (*potentia memorativa*). Therefore, the soul
> requires multiple organs in its body in order to perform those
> operations. Also, the intellectual soul insofar as it is intellectual
> does not have a bodily organ; however, its operation depends on some
> bodily power (*virtus*) that is in an organ, i.e., on the
> *phantasia*. (*QDA-2012-II*: 328-329)
> 
> 
> 



Consequently, the parts of the organic body are the instruments for
the operations specifically performed by living beings; operations
that are divided into three different kinds: vegetative (bodily,
non-cognitive), sensitive (bodily, cognitive) and intellectual
(non-bodily, cognitive). These operations must, then, correspond to
three specifically different faculties of the soul, which are
responsible for the actualization of the organic body's
potential with regard to those operations (*QDA-2012-II*: 343
and 345).


### 5.4 Cognitive Psychology



The soul has two cognitive faculties: the sensitive and the
intellectual. The sensitive faculty is bodily in the sense that its
operations necessarily use bodily organs (*QDA-1974-III*: 102).
This faculty involves a set of powers that are divided into external
and internal senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch, and
common sense, estimation, memory and *phantasia*,
 respectively),[8]
 depending on whether their operations are performed through external
or internal organs (i.e., the eye, the ear, the tongue, etc., and the
three ventricles of the brain) (*QDM*; Ebbesen 2016: 36). The
most complex animals must have both internal and external senses,
because for their self-preservation they must have the capacity to
form sense representations of external objects, whether they are
present or absent (*QDM*; Ebbesen 2016: 35). All of these
senses perform different cognitive operations that take different
objects (e.g., sight takes color, hearing takes sound, estimation
takes the harmful and the useful, memory takes sensorial
representations, etc.) (*QDM*; Ebbesen 2016: 38). Moreover,
each of these senses contributes in a specific way to the formation by
the *phantasia* of a unified sensory representation (a
*phantasma*) of an external object.


### 5.5 Intellectual Cognition



The intellectual faculty, in turn, does not use a bodily organ in its
operations. According to Brito, however, every single case of
intellectual cognition takes as a starting point a *phantasma*
or image (*QDM*; Ebbesen 2016: 40). This does not mean that the
image is itself the object of intellectual cognition. On the contrary,
Brito emphasizes in several places that the object of intellectual
cognition is the essence (*quod quid est*) of the thing
(*QDA-1974-III*: 174; cf. *QDM*; Ebbesen 2016: 41). For
instance, what is known through intellectual cognition is neither the
image of the apple nor the external apple, but the essence of the
external apple that is represented in the image.



The process of intellectual cognition of an essence involves two
operations that correspond to two different powers of the intellectual
faculty: the operations of abstraction and intellection by the agent
and the possible intellect. Since the essence in both the image and
the external thing has material existence, and since the object of
intellectual cognition must be immaterial, it is necessary to
introduce a power that makes the essence immaterial. This power is the
agent intellect--an active power that, through the act of
abstraction, makes immaterial the essence materially represented in
the image (*QDA-1974-III*: 212).



Brito rejects two alternative accounts that explain this act of
abstraction either as


1. the impression of a disposition in the image, or as
2. the removal of the accidental features that accompany the essence
in the image.



The former, (i), is rejected because whatever is impressed in a
material power immediately becomes material, and hence the impression
of a disposition in the image cannot make the essence immaterial
(*QDA-1974-III*: 218). The latter account, (ii), in turn, is
rejected because either the result of the removal remains in the
*phantasia*--a material power--and we end up again
with the same problem as (i), or the result is transferred to the
possible intellect and we end up with a problematic transfer of an
accidental form from one subject to another--from the organ of
the *phantasia* to the soul (*QDA-1974-III*: 230). An
accident only has being in a substance; hence, if the transfer of
accidents from one subject to another were possible, one would need to
posit a time *t* where the accident has no supporting
substance, which is impossible. Brito's own account is that the
agent intellect functions as a 'light' that enables the
essence in the image to trigger a corresponding act of intellection
without any removal, impression, or transfer of a form. Brito explains
his point by means of an analogy with seeing milk's whiteness:
thanks to the action of light, the milk's whiteness is seen,
without other features of the milk being seen, e.g., its sweetness;
but the action of light on the milk involves neither the impression of
a disposition on the milk's whiteness (namely, visibility) nor a
real removal of the whiteness from the sweetness
(*QDA-1974-III*: 237). In fact, the milk's whiteness is
in itself potentially visible and the action of light does nothing
more than to make it actually visible. The same goes for the agent
intellect: it makes the essence in the image, which is in itself
potentially intelligible, be actually intelligible.



The essence in the image thus illuminated, but neither really
separated from the image nor transferred anywhere, triggers the act of
intellection of the possible intellect--the passive power of the
intellectual faculty. This power is passive precisely in the sense
that it cannot trigger its own operation; rather, this operation must
be caused in it by the essence of the thing with the assistance of the
agent intellect (*QDA-1974-III*: 122). Finally, the act of
intellection comes about when, thanks to the action of the agent
intellect, the actually intelligible essence in the image is actually
understood by the possible intellect, thus causing the formation of
the essence's concept in the soul.


## 6. Metaphysics


### 6.1 The Science of Metaphysics



Assuming that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (*Met.*)
is a systematic account of a particular subject, Brito follows the
majority of medieval commentators by beginning his inquiry with the
question "What is the subject matter of metaphysics?". In
the first question of the first book he asks whether the subject
matter of metaphysics is being. Traditionally, the question arises
because of Aristotle's treatment of: 


* (i) being in general in
*Met.* G 1-2 and E 1;
* (ii)  being as applied
primarily to first substances in *Met.* Z-Ks; and
* (iii)  being as applied
to the causes of being in *Met.*. A 1-2, E 1 and
L.



Therefore, it seems necessary to determine whether the proper subject
matter of metaphysics is: 


* (i)  being in general;
* (ii)  first substances;
or
* (iii)  separate
substances.



Depending on which subject matter is posited, metaphysics would be
considered 


* (i') as a science
about what it is to be;
* (ii') as a
science about material things; or
* (iii') as a
science akin to theology.



In his solution to the question, Brito considers only positions (i)
and (iii), the first of which he attributes to Avicenna and the second
to Averroes. He sides with Avicenna and supports his position with
both authoritative and epistemological arguments: the subject matter
of metaphysics is being, not only because Aristotle says so in
*Met.* G.1.1003a20-23, but also because, just as
the science of being must do, the *Metaphysics* deals with the
parts and attributes of being in general (e.g., in its discussion of
first substances, form and matter, truth and unity, etc.), as well as
with its causes and principles (e.g., in its discussion of the causes
of being in *Metaphysics*. A and E) (*QMet*: I.1).



Averroes' position is dismissed for epistemological reasons:
first, metaphysics cannot be equated with theology, because the latter
must posit God and proceed to the demonstration of his attributes, but
*Met.* E presumably contains an inquiry into God's
existence. Second, metaphysics is not the science of separate
substances, because the inquiry into the notion of being is also
concerned with material substances (*QMet*: I.1).


### 6.2 Essence and Being



Brito also contributes to the famous medieval debate about whether
there is a fundamental difference between a thing's essence and
its being (*essentia et esse*). In his reply to the question
whether being belongs to the essence of things, Brito, like Siger of
Brabant before him, takes issue with Aquinas' position,
according to which being would be something added to the essence of a
thing, though not as an accident. Aquinas' position posits an
odd constituent of things, which is neither essential nor accidental,
but, as Brito calls it, "fictional" (*figmentum*)
(Ebbesen 2001: 476).



Brito's position is that essence and being are identical
(*QMet*: IV.2).
His argument can be summarized as
follows:


1. A thing *x* has being either by itself (i.e., essentially)
or by something else, say by \(x\_{1}\).
2. If by itself, then being belongs to its essence; if by \(x\_{1}\),
then \(x\_{1}\) has being either by itself or by something else, say by
\(x\_{2}\).
3. If by itself, then the same conclusion must obtain with respect
to *x*; if by something else, then there would be an infinite
regress.
4. Therefore, *x* has being by itself.



Brito's opponents attack either step 2 or step 3 of his
argument. The objection to step 2 states that a thing's being
does not need have being, in the same way that the whiteness that
makes something white needs not be white; so, \(x\_{1}\) need not have
being. A first objection to step 3 rejects the infinite regress,
because there may be a \(x\_{n}\) that has being by itself--the
first cause (*QMet*: IV.2).
According to a second objection to
step 3, not everything is such that its being and essence differ, so
some \(x\_{n}\)'s being and essence can be the same without this
leading to the same conclusion with respect to *x*.



Brito's position is clearly articulated in his reply to these
objections. In fact, whatever is predicated of a thing is predicated
on the basis of something that is either essential or accidental to
it. If being is not predicated essentially, then it must be predicated
by means of an accidental attribute. But according to Brito accidents
have
 being,[9]
 therefore step 2 stands. Moreover, if being belongs to the essence of
some \(x\_{n}\), which is not the first cause, then it must belong to
the essence of any \(x\_{n}\), which is not the first cause; therefore,
step 3 also stands. And no \(x\_{n}\) can be the first cause, because,
Brito tells us, being is an intrinsic and formal disposition of
things, which the first cause cannot be (*QMet*: IV.2; cf. Donati
2013: 348). In other words, the predication of being cannot be based
on something that is neither essential nor accidental; and whoever
claims that it is based on something accidental will be committed to
an infinite regress. Consequently, being is predicated essentially of
things, i.e., it belongs to them essentially.


### 6.3 *Modi essendi* and *Apparentia*



Although being is not equivocally predicated relative to substance and
accident, it is not predicated completely univocally either (Ebbesen
2001: 477). In fact, Brito develops his own account of the analogy of
being, according to which being is predicated of substances and
accidents with respect to a single concept, but under different
modalities (Donati 2013: 338). For him, the predication of being has
reality in the ontological structure of things, specifically in
metaphysical constituents called presentations (*apparens*) or
modes of being (*modus essendi*). A thing's presentations
or modes of being are properties of the thing that manifest themselves
in its perceivable operations (Donati 2013: 344; Ebbesen 2001: 479).
These presentations explain both the common attribution and the
different ways in which being is attributed to substance and accident,
without having to appeal to a multiplicity of forms. The common
predication of being to substance and accident is supported by a
common mode of being: their *esse formaliter*--the
principle of being that formally exists in both of them (Donati 2013:
345). The different modalities of predication, in turn, are taken from
the substance's capacity to exist in its own right and by the
accident's dependence on the substance for its existence, which
are modes of being of the substance and of the accident, respectively.



### 6.4 Universals



Brito's contribution to the debate about the ontological status
of universals can be found in his reply to the set of questions left
unresolved in Porphyry's *Isagoge*. In his commentary on
this text, Brito raises the question whether the universal exists
independently of any intellectual operation. His reply is negative or
positive depending on whether the question concerns the actual or the
potential universal. In doing so, Brito puts forth a moderate realist
position with respect to the external existence of universals (see
also Sirridge 2008).



On the one hand, the actual universal does not exist independently
from the intellect, because its being depends on a separation from
matter performed by the active power of the intellect (*QsP*;
see Pinborg 1980: 86). The actual universal is, indeed, the cognition
of an essence, and hence it is evidently dependent on the
intellect's activity (*QsP*; see Pinborg 1980: 100). 



On the other hand, the potential universal exists independently of the
intellect, because it is an essence that as one of its modes of being
has the capacity to be separated from matter by the agent intellect.
But the essence and its modes of being are in themselves external and
independent of such an intellectual separation (*QsP*; see
Pinborg 1980: 86 and 92). Therefore, the potential universal exists
independently from any intellectual operation.



However, in a subsequent question (*QsP*; q.8) Brito also
presents a way in which the actual universal can be said to exist in
the external world. For, as was explained above in Brito's
logic, any cognition is an abstract or concrete intention depending on
whether we consider it from the perspective of the cognitive subject
or from the perspective of the thing understood. Hence, the actual
universal understood as a concrete intention (i.e., as the thing
understood) has external existence, although not independently of the
intellect. But understood as an abstract intention (i.e., from the
perspective of the cognitive subject) the actual universal exists only
in the soul (*QsP*; see Pinborg 1980: 114).



In sum, Brito's realist position states that the universal has
external existence in at least two senses: first, potentially, in the
essence with the intrinsic capacity of becoming the object of
universal cognition; second, actually, in the essence actually known
through universal cognition by virtue of some of its modes of being.



## 7. Ethics


### 7.1 The Commentaries on the Ethics



Radulphus Brito has been identified as the author of two anonymous
sets of questions on Aristotle's *Ethics*. The first one
(previously known as the 'Vatican commentary') was
ascribed to Brito by Costa after a suggestion by Rene-Antoine
Gauthier (*QEN*; *QE-2008*: 99-137). The second
set of questions, preserved in a sole manuscript, Vat. Lat. 2173, is
still unedited. The first one was written around 1295, when Brito was
a master of arts, and the second some years later, most likely when he
was studying theology.


### 7.2 Philosophical Happiness



Philosophical happiness is discussed in books I and X of Brito's
commentaries on the *Ethics*. Following in the footsteps of
Aquinas (cf. *Summa theologiae*, I.II 3.4), Brito holds the
essence of happiness to consist in the intellect's actual
knowledge of God and the separate substances. Happiness, thus, amounts
to the intellectual union of man with the highest beings. But despite
Aquinas' strong influence on his position, Brito's notion
of human happiness is still 'radically Aristotelian', as
he fervently defends the Aristotelian ideal of philosophical life, or
*bios theoretikos* (*QEN*; *QE-2008*:
171-176). As a result, Brito establishes the superiority of the
contemplative life over the active life (or of philosophical life over
political life). The contemplative life is the highest form of life
for a rational creature and that towards which active life must aim as
an end. This conception of philosophical happiness is the same we find
in other Parisian commentaries on the *Ethics* from the same
period, particularly the Anonymous of Paris (ms. BnF lat. 14698: see Costa
2010), the Anonymous of
Erlangen (ms. Universitatsbibl. 213), the Anonymous of Erfurt
(ms. Amplon. F. 13) and Giles of Orleans (ms. Paris, BnF lat. 16089).


### 7.3 Human Freedom, Free Will and Responsibility



Brito's accounts of human freedom and moral responsibility
heavily depend on Godfrey of Fontaines. Godfrey, a theology master, is
the author of an important set of quodlibetal questions, where he
offers a strongly intellectualist account of the psychology of human
acts (or of free agency). After Aquinas' death in 1274, two main
notions of human agency were opposed, especially among theologians. On
the one hand, voluntarist theologians proposed that intellect and will
are the two main faculties of the intellectual soul, with the
intellect being a cognitive power, and the will an active, or dynamic,
power. Since the perfection of the will is greater than that of the
intellect, will is the main agent of human action. Intellectual
knowledge is only a condition *sine qua non* of free action. In
other words, the intellect's function is merely to present to
the will the objects of action. On the other hand, as a critical
response to voluntarism, intellectualism proposes that the
intellect's main function is to act responsibly. Thus,
intellectualist theologians, such as Godfrey, hold that the
intellect's function is not only to present to the will the
objects of action, but also to judge about the good and evil of
possible actions. Moreover, voluntarist theologians consider will to
be an active power, whereas the intellectualists consider it a passive
one insofar as it is moved by the judgment it receives from the
intellect. Accordingly, voluntarist theologians raise against the
intellectualists the charge of determinism, since in the
latter's position, the will's action would not be properly
free. On the other hand, intellectualist theologians reject the
voluntarists' consideration of will as a cognitive power, as it
would perform the intellect's judgment about good and evil.



For Brito, free will (*liberum arbitrium*) depends entirely on
intellectual judgment:



> 
> 
> When something appears to the will as a good, the will desires it,
> until deliberation and the intellect's judgment make something
> else to appear as being better. Thus, when the will is brought towards
> a good object, it doesn't pursue it immediately, but it first
> deliberates about its contrary, its consequences, its accidents and
> circumstances, and so the discourse of reason can make something,
> which appeared as good, appear as evil. And this is how free will
> works. (*QEN* 60; *QE-2008*: 322)
> 
> 
> 



Brito thinks that the will necessarily desires something that appears
as good. If there were no means to restrain the will, this would
certainly be a form of determinism. However, for Brito, the intellect
has the power to restrain the will. By deliberating about the extent
to which the object is good, the intellect can eventually come upon
negative aspects in it and obstruct the action of the will. 


### 7.4 Moral Virtue



Regarding the essence of moral virtue, Brito holds different positions
in his two commentaries on the *Ethics*. In this change of
position, Brito reveals an interesting use of theological sources. In
the first commentary, he holds that will is the subject of justice,
while the sensitive appetite is the subject of the remaining moral
virtues (*QEN*; *QE-2008*: 276-279,
426-428). Here Brito roughly replicates Aquinas' position
(cf. *Summa theologiae*, II.II 58.4). However, in his second
commentary, Brito adopts the rather Aristotelian position of Godfrey
of Fontaines (*Quodl.* 
 XIV),[10]
 according to which all the moral
virtues are dispositions of the sensitive appetite. Thus, Brito
opposes, on the one hand, Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, for whom all
moral virtues are dispositions of the will, and, on the other hand,
Peter of Auvergne, for whom all virtues exist both in the will and in
the sensitive appetite.