## 1. *Kalam* debates


### 1.1 Divine justice and human freedom in Mu'tazilite theology



Generally speaking, Islamic theologians in the Classical period saw
the created world as comprised of atoms and their
accidents (Dhanani 1994; Frank 1999). They held that
God produced this world at an initial moment, and that He
reproduces it at every subsequent moment in which it exists. They
also identified God as the immediate cause of every change in the
created world. For example, according to their view, God
created the atoms that comprise my skin, and the accidents of
paleness that belongs to those atoms, at the initial moment of
their existence, and he recreates them at all subsequent moments in
which they exist. If my skin retains its paleness over a period
of time, this is due to God's continuous recreation of its
paleness. Likewise, if my skin reddens when exposed to
sunlight, this is due to God's ceasing to recreate its paleness,
and creating in it redness instead. (This would involve His creating a
series of accidents of deepening shades of red.)



Eighth-century Mu'tazilite theologians made an important
exception to this general account: they claimed that human
beings have the power to produce their own actions, whether these
are thoughts, volitions or bodily movements. They saw this position as
required by divine justice (Wolfson 1976; Frank 1982, 1983, 1985;
Vasalou 2008). Suppose, for example, that I intentionally strike you
and that, as a result, you fall into a coma. According to
the ontology just described, this event involves the coming into
being of several accidents, including my choice
(*ikhtiyar*) to strike you, my bodily motion of striking,
and your falling into a coma. According to the Mu'tazilites,
I must be the source of these accidents; if I were
not, divine reward or punishment of me on the basis of my
actions would be unjust.



For Mu'tazilite theologians, then, the circle of agents
includes both God and humanity, since human beings cause certain
accidents. Some of these accidents are directly produced by human
agents; for example, my choice to strike you and my bodily motion of
striking. Others are produced by "generation"
(*tawallud*); for example, your falling into a coma. A human
agent produces an accident by generation when she produces
the cause (*sabab*) of the accident, but not the accident
itself. (The accident itself is brought into being by God,
unless impeded by another accident.) The production of accidents
by generation was not supposed to involve shared responsibility
between God and human beings, since the point of identifying a
human being as the source of such accidents was to attribute
responsibility for their production to that human being. 



This approach to agency engendered debate among Mu'tazilites
about the scope of human responsibility. One topic of concern
was the relationship between motivation and action. Given that
motivation is determined by antecedent causes, were an agent's
motivation the sufficient cause of her action, responsibility for the
action would seem to lie with the source of the motivation, which
may be external to the agent. According to 'Abd al-Jabbar
(935-1025), motivation is not the sufficient cause of action,
which requires choice as well (Frank 1982). This response links human
agency and responsibility to choice.


### 1.2 Divine omnipotence and occasionalism in Ash'ari and his followers



In the ninth century, many *mutakallimun* were persuaded
by al-Ash'ari (874-936) that Mu'tazilite accounts
of human action incorrectly limit divine power. According to
al-Ash'ari, the doctrine of divine power requires that God
be in complete control of the production of all atoms and accidents.
For this reason, he rejected the Mu'tazilite view that human
agents create or generate certain accidents.
Al-Ash'ari developed a rival position on human
action, whose core doctrine is divine creation of the powers by which
human beings perform their actions (Frank 1966). Suppose, again,
that I intentionally strike you and that, as a result, you fall into a
coma. As al-Ash'ari sees it, this occurs by God creating in
me a power through which I generate your falling into a coma. This
power is a power for a specific action, namely, my striking you in a
particular way at a particular time. It is an accident that
belongs to me only temporarily. Though the power is in me, God is in
complete control of what happens, since he elects to create the power.
Al-Ash'ari and his followers used the term *kasb*
(acquisition) to designate this type of power. In his treatise *On
Power*, al-Ghazali (1056-1111) explains the
doctrine of acquisition as a middle position between that of the
determinists, who deny that created things have power, and that of the
Mu'tazilites, who hold that humanity produces certain accidents.
Al-Ghazali rejects the determinist position on the
ground that it cannot account for the difference between a deliberate
human action and an involuntary one, such as a bodily tremor. And
he also rejects the Mu'tazilite position; central to his
argument against them is an appeal to the pervasiveness of divine
power. On the basis of his analysis of these rival positions,
al-Ghazali draws two conclusions. First, it must be possible
for two possessors of power, a human being and God, to be related to
the same object of power. Second, the power possessed by the human
being cannot be causally related to the object of power because this
would conflict with the pervasiveness of divine power. He links these
conclusions to the doctrine of acquisition. As he sees it, this
doctrine attributes created power to humanity, but it also maintains
that the relationship between this created power and its object is
non-causal (al-Ghazali AIFI; McGinnis and Reisman 2007:
254-265; Marmura 1994). This account of acquisition
suggests that God alone has causal power.



In sum, whereas Mu'tazilite theologians appealed to divine
justice to show that the circle of agents includes God and humanity,
al-Ash'ari and his followers appealed to divine omnipotence
to limit agency to God alone. Broadly speaking, Ash'arite
theologians seem to endorse occasionalism, the view that God is the
only true cause. Some interpreters, however, consider
al-Ash'ari's claim that human beings are the subjects
of temporary powers for specific actions to indicate that his position
falls short of full-blown occasionalism (Frank 1966).



Ash'arite theologians also attacked Aristotelian views of
causation. Some of their arguments were addressed by
Arabic *falasifah.* Relayed by
al-Ghazali, Ash'arite accounts
of causation contributed to the development of occasionalist
doctrines in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Nadler 1996;
Perler and Rudolph 2000). See the entry on
 occasionalism.


## 2. Aristotelian causality


### 2.1 Aristotle's four causes in Arabic *falsafa*



The Arabic word *falsafah* is taken from the Greek
*philosophia*. *Falsafah* is understood by our authors
as an intellectual practice developed in Ancient Greece, which
emphasizes the use of rational understanding and demonstration in the
pursuit of knowledge (*'ilm*). For them, the most
important and influential of the Ancient Greek philosophers is
Aristotle, whom they deem "the First Teacher". Other
influences include Neoplatonic thinkers, especially Proclus and
Plotinus, as well as Ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, such as
Alexander of Aphrodisias. See the entry on
 Greek sources in Arabic and Islamic philosophy.



Just as Aristotle is "the First Teacher" for the
philosophers, so his doctrine of the four causes is the starting point
for their accounts of causation. In *Physics*, Aristotle
introduces this doctrine as ancillary to the study of natural change:
We must proceed to consider the character and number of causes, he
says, because to know a thing is to grasp the "why" of it,
and this is to grasp its primary cause. He then posits four types of
causes to explain natural change (whether substantial, i.e., coming to
be and passing away, or accidental, i.e., change of quantity, quality
or place). In works of natural philosophy and metaphysics, Arabic
authors defend Aristotle's view that we must posit four (and
only four) types of causes: material, formal, efficient and final.
Generally speaking, they maintain that each type of cause contributes
to the goal of explanation and that the four causes together are
sufficient for explanation.



Material and formal causes are considered as intrinsic to or immanent
in their effects, efficient and final causes as extrinsic to their
effects (Wisnovsky 2003b). While the philosophers examine each type of
cause, they appear to devote greater attention to the latter pair, the
efficient and final causes. Their accounts of these have therefore
received more scholarly notice. Still, certain aspects of their
accounts of Aristotle's material and formal causes have been
studied (Bertolacci 2002). Perhaps the most important of these is the
doctrine of "corporeal form" (*surah jismiyyah*),
which was developed to explain a defining feature of body: its
receptivity to the three dimensions of length, breadth and depth
(Hyman 1965; Stone 2001; Shihadeh 2014). However, their discussions of
corporeal form contribute primarily to their accounts of substance,
not causation. Their contributions to the philosophy of causation
emerge from their discussions of the efficient and final
causes.


### 2.2 Efficient causality



In *Physics* 2.3, Aristotle says that the causes include the
primary principle of motion and coming to rest. In Arabic
philosophical works, the terms "agent"
(*al-fa'il*), "active"
(*al-fa''al*) and "efficient"
(*al-fa'ilah*) refer to this type of cause. Generally
speaking, the philosophers consider the circle of agents to encompass
natural bodies, created intellects and God. They regard God as a
creative agent in the sense that his activity presupposes nothing
outside of him, not even matter. Most of the philosophers see creation
as an eternal act, not a temporal one. Al-Kindi (800-870)
is exceptional in defending creation in time. Ibn Rushd
(1126-1198), known to English speakers by his Latinized name,
Averroes, is also exceptional: in his mature works, he rejects
creation as incompatible with Aristotelian texts and principles. In
his *Long Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Book
*Lam*, for example, he interprets Aristotle's God as an
ultimate final cause of motion, not a creative agent (Genequand 1984).
Arabic philosophical accounts of God as a creative agent are partly
derived from Neoplatonic texts (Wisnovsky 2002; Kukkonen 2010). No
doubt these accounts are also influenced by a cultural context in
which the term "agent" is associated with God and with the
divine power to create. Still, it is important to note that the
philosophers attempt to demonstrate their accounts of God as a
creative agent, often in novel ways. So, they cannot be said merely to
follow tradition or culture on this issue.



The philosophers' expansive view of the scope of agency presents
a challenge with respect to defining the efficient cause: it demands
an overarching account, which encompasses natural and creative
agents.


#### 2.2.1 Al-Kindi



Early attempts to provide an overarching account of the efficient
cause are found in writings by al-Kindi. These include *The
Explanation of the Proximate Efficient Cause for Generation and
Corruption* (al-Kindi RAKAF: 214-37; McGinnis and
Reisman 2007: 1-16). In this text, al-Kindi illustrates the
efficient cause by means of an example drawn from the realm of art:
the making of a golden coin. In this example, the efficient cause is
the craftsman who makes the form of "coin" become one with
some gold. Divine efficient causality is also construed in terms of
art, though its art is said to be very superior to ours: the
craftsmanship in a bed or chair is as nothing in comparison to the
harmonious product of God's most perfect command.



In this text, al-Kindi also employs a distinction between
proximate and remote efficient causes to show how created efficient
causality depends on divine causality:



> 
> 
> The remote efficient cause is like someone who shoots an arrow at an
> animal and kills it. The one who shoots the arrow is the remote cause
> of killing the animal, whereas the arrow is the proximate cause of its
> being killed; for the one who shoots with the intention of killing the
> animal produces the piercing action of the arrow, but the arrow
> produces the killing of the living thing by wounding it (McGinnis and
> Reisman 2007: 4).
> 
> 
> 



The example emphasizes the instrumental nature of the causality of a
proximate efficient cause. That the arrow acquires the force needed
for its piercing action, and that it pierces an animal, rather than a
tree, depends on the hunter's shooting it with the intention to
kill the animal.



Al-Kindi applies his distinction between proximate and remote
efficient causes to explain generation and corruption as follows.
Created things are the proximate efficient causes of generation and
corruption, but God is their remote efficient cause. God's
contribution to generation and corruption has to do with the
harmonious order of his creation. This order is seen in the
relationships between created things, especially their causal
relationships.



In sum, al-Kindi suggests in this text that both created and
divine efficient causes can be understood in terms of craftsmanship.
The craftsman model serves as the overarching account of the efficient
cause. On the other hand, al-Kindi identifies two major
differences between created and divine agency. First, divine
craftsmanship is far superior to that of created things. Second, the
efficient causality of created things depends on divine efficient
causality. The actions of the former depend on the harmonious order of
God's creation.



In a second text, *The One True and Complete Agent and the
Incomplete Metaphorical Agent*, al-Kindi may seem to
attribute genuine agency to God alone (al-Kindi OPK:
169-171; McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 22-23). In this text,
al-Kindi defines a true agent as one that acts without being
acted upon in any way. God is said to be the sole true agent. He
likewise defines a metaphorical agent as one who acts as a result of
having been acted upon, i.e., one that is both an agent and a patient.
Every created agent is said to be a metaphorical agent. Al-Kindi
then argues that God is truly the First Cause of everything acted upon
because he is an agent not acted upon in any way. As he sees its, God
is the immediate cause of a first thing acted upon and a cause through
mediation of the effects of the first thing acted upon and so on
(Adamson 2007: 57-62). Al-Kindi's account of
"true" agency is rather different from that of an
occasionalist. While the occasionalist holds that causal efficacy
belongs to God alone, al-Kindi attributes causal efficacy to God
and to created things. The latter differ from God in that they are
both agents and patients. Generally speaking, the doctrine of
occasionalism is rejected by the philosophers.


#### 2.2.2 Avicenna



The most extensive treatment of Aristotelian efficient causation, and
the most influential, is given by Ibn Sina (987-1037),
known to English speakers by his Latinized name, Avicenna. Avicenna
treats the efficient cause in numerous works, including
*Kitab al-Najat* (*Book of
Salvation)* and *Kitab al-Isharat
wa-l-tanbihat (Book of Remarks and Admonitons),* but his
most developed accounts of the efficient cause appear in the
*Physics* and *Metaphysics* of his magnum opus,
*Kitab al-Shifa`* (*Book of
Healing*) *(*McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 209-211; Inati
2014: Fourth Class; Avicenna PH: I.10-15; Avicenna MH: IV.1-2,
VI.1-3).



In the *Physics* of the *Book of Healing*, Avicenna
defines the efficient cause or agent as follows:



> 
> 
> In natural things, *agent* is often said of the principle of
> another's motion insofar as it is other. By *motion*, we
> mean here whatever passes from potency to act in a given matter.
> (Avicenna PH: 64)
> 
> 
> 



This definition accords with the subject of the science of
physics, namely, body insofar as it moves and comes to rest, and it
is sufficient for the purposes of doing natural
philosophy (Lammer 2018: ch. 2-3). However, with
respect to science in general, this "physical" definition is
provisional:



> 
> 
> When the efficient principle is considered not with respect to natural
> things, but rather with respect to existence itself, there will be a
> more general concept. (Avicenna PH: 65)
> 
> 
> 



The task of developing this more general conception of the efficient
cause falls to the metaphysician, whose investigations transcend the
concerns of any of the particular sciences, e.g., natural
philosophy.



In the *Metaphysics* of the *Book of Healing*, Avicenna
defines each of the four causes in relation to the subject studied in
metaphysics, the existent *qua* existent. He defines the
efficient cause or agent as that which bestows existence to another
(Avicenna MH: 194). He distinguishes his metaphysical definition of
the efficient cause from that of the natural philosopher as
follows:



> 
> 
> Metaphysical philosophers do not mean by "agent" only the
> principle of motion, as the natural philosophers mean, but the
> principle and giver of existence, as in the case of God with respect
> to the world. As for the natural efficient cause, it does not bestow
> any existence other than motion in one of the forms of motion. Thus,
> in the natural sciences, that which bestows existence is a principle
> of motion. (Avicenna MH: 195, trans. modified)
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Avicenna states that natural efficient causes do not
"bestow any existence other than motion in one of the forms of
motion" and that "in the natural sciences, that which
bestows existence is a principle of motion". These statements
suggest that natural efficient causes do bestow existence, albeit in
an inferior way. So, Avicenna considers his definition of the
efficient cause as a giver of being to another to encompass both
natural agents and creative agents.



Avicenna proceeds to elaborate his "metaphysical"
conception of the efficient cause in a series of arguments, which aim
to correct common errors about this type of cause. One such error
is the claim that every agent is first inactive and then active,
and the related claim that every agent is also a recipient of action
(Avicenna MH: 200). These claims accord with familiar examples
of agency. Suppose I rise from my chair upon hearing
the doorbell. I am first inactive and then active. And my activity
(rising) is partly due to my being the recipient of action
(hearing the sound made by the bell). Avicenna maintains that,
though agency often or mostly occurs in this way, it need
not: being first inactive and then active, and being the
recipient of action, are not essential characteristics of
agency. Indeed, because inactivity and being affected are opposed
to activity and action, he reasons, the former do not belong to the
account of agency, strictly speaking. In correcting this error about
the efficient cause, Avicenna aims to make conceptual room for divine
agency. One feature of divine agency, which we have already seen in
al-Kindi, is that God acts without his being affected in any way.
However, Avicenna does not appeal to accepted features of divine
agency to defend his view. Rather, he attempts to rebut the common
account of agency on independent grounds.



As we have seen (in
 SS2.2.1),
 al-Kindi, in one text, draws a distinction between a
"true" agent, one that acts without being acted upon, and
a "metaphorical" agent, one that is both an agent and a
patient. Avicenna likewise distinguishes the agent that acts without
being acted upon from the agent that is both an agent and a patient.
While he does not deem the latter a "metaphorical" agent,
he does elaborate a hierarchical conception of agency.



Avicenna explains the superiority of a highest type of efficient cause
as follows: Where something is such that, whenever it exists, it
produces the existence of something else by virtue of its own essence,
and where its effect exists after absolute nonexistence and is
permanent, then that thing has a higher claim to causality than other
things. For such an efficient cause entirely prevents the nonexistence
of its effect; it gives complete existence to the effect (Avicenna MH:
203; Marmura 1984).



Avicenna explains the inferiority of the lowest type of efficient
cause as follows: This type gives being to an effect that does not
exist after absolute nonexistence but after a specific privation in
matter. Of this type of agent, he says that its power to give being to
another is weak, of short duration, and intermittent (Avicenna MH:
204). Sublunary substances such as plants and animals are efficient
causes of this lowest type.



Avicenna also recognizes an intermediate type of efficient cause: This
third type gives being to an effect that does not exist after absolute
nonexistence or after a specific privation in matter; rather the
existence of this effect is preceded by the existence of something
else, which is non-material. Avicenna mentions that there is dispute
about whether an agent of this third type should be called a
"creator". He says that while some wish to reserve that
term for the efficient causality of the first cause (God), he favors
the opposite view: "creation" is properly said of every
agent which gives being to an effect whose existence is not preceded
by privation in matter. This intermediate type of efficient cause
plays a role in Avicenna's emanationist account of creation. On
this account, creation occurs in a stepwise way beginning with the
original creative act of God, whose immediate effect is an intellect.
The first created intellect then creates three things: (i) the body of
the outermost sphere, (ii) the soul which moves the outermost sphere
and (iii) a second intellect. The second intellect likewise creates
three things and so on. The lowest of the created
intellects--namely, the Agent Intellect--creates the form
and matter of the sublunary world, as well as the rational souls of
individual human beings. Avicenna adapts his account of emanation from
al-Farabi (870-950), known among the philosophers
as the "Second Teacher", though his version of emanation
differs from that of al-Farabi in several ways
(Davidson 1992).



Avicenna's hierarchical account of agency acknowledges the
superiority of divine causation and identifies the differences between
creative and non-creative efficient causes. Still, it supports his
earlier suggestion that he means to offer a unified account of the
efficient cause, which encompasses both natural and creative agents.
For each member of the hierarchy is construed as that which gives
being to another. So, in his *Metaphysics*, Avicenna provides
an overarching account of the efficient cause as that which gives
being to another.



This unified account may seem incompatible with Avicenna's
use of a distinction between "true" and
"auxiliary" efficient causes. On his account of this
distinction, however, the term "auxiliary" merely
describes a true efficient cause insofar as its action aids that of
another true efficient cause (Richardson 2013). This account emerges
from his defense of the view that the efficient cause is simultaneous
with its effect. He sees the opposite view--that the efficient
cause is temporally prior to its effect--as another common error,
which arises from consideration of ordinary events and processes, such
as construction and reproduction: the builder building is temporally
prior to the existence of the house; the father inseminating is
temporally prior to the existence of the child. Avicenna argues that
this account misreports the proper effects of ordinary efficient
causes. The proper effect of the builder is building, not the
existence of the house, and the proper effect of the father is
insemination, not the existence of the child. Builders and fathers are
true efficient causes of building and insemination, but they are only
auxiliary efficient causes of the existence of buildings and children.
So, builders and fathers are simultaneous with, not temporally prior
to, their proper effects. Still, their actions make some contribution
to the existence of buildings and children. This contribution is
acknowledged through their designation as auxiliary efficient causes
of the existence of buildings and children. The claim that builders
and fathers are only auxiliary efficient causes of the existence of
buildings and children invites us to investigate the true causes of
their existence. According to Avicenna, the proximate efficient cause
of the existence of sublunary substance is the Agent Intellect, while
its ultimate efficient cause is God.


#### 2.2.3 After Avicenna



Avicenna's account of the efficient cause was influential in the
Medieval Latin West in part because it offers an explanation of divine
agency within an Aristotelian philosophical framework (Gilson 1958,
1962). It appears to have influenced discussion of divine agency by
Scholastic theologians, including Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus
(Druart 2002; Acar 2005). While Avicenna also had many adherents
within his own culture, his positions on numerous issues, including
the scope of efficient causation, were criticized not only by Islamic
theologians but also by his fellow philosophers.



As mentioned earlier (in
 SS1.2),
 Ash'arite theologians tend to hold that God alone has causal
power. They primarily support this view by appeal to the doctrine of
divine omnipotence. Still, discussion of the nature of agency also
plays a role in some of their arguments. For example, in *The
Incoherence of the Philosophers*, al-Ghazali maintains
that "agent" (*al-fa'il*)



> 
> 
> refers to that from whom the act proceeds; this is one who acts by
> will and choice and has knowledge (*al-'ilm*) of what is
> willed. (al-Ghazali IP: 57).
> 
> 
> 



This argument suggests that we should restrict the scope of agency to
intelligent beings on conceptual grounds. Al-Ghazali makes a
similar argument in his treatise *On Power*
(al-Ghazali AIFI; McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 254-265;
Marmura 1994). The conclusion of the conceptual argument allows for
agency in any intelligent being and so allows for human agency.
Whether al-Ghazali accepts this implication of his
conceptual argument is unclear (Druart 2006).



Averroes undertakes to defend positions closer to Aristotle against
"innovations" by later Aristotelians. These innovations
include al-Farabi's and Avicenna's
emanationist accounts of creation. While Averroes accepts emanation in
his early writings, he denounces it with vigor in his mature works
(Averroes MTE; Genequand 1984; Davidson 1992). He argues that
God's existence can be satisfactorily shown only via a proof
from motion (Davidson 1987: 311-335; Twetten 1995; Kukkonen
2002). He also argues that, strictly speaking, God is not a creator:
his causality is that of an ultimate final cause of motion. This is
suggested in the *Incoherence of the Incoherence*, where he
claims that God is an agent by way of final causality (Averroes ITI:
138). It is perhaps mostly plainly stated in his *Long Commentary
on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Book *Lam* (Genequand
1984). From this position, it follows that certain aspects of
Avicenna's accounts of the efficient cause are otiose: there is
no need to revise Aristotle's account of the efficient cause to
encompass creative agents.



Averroes' account of divine causality reflects his position that
truth is to be found through correct interpretation of Aristotle,
together with correct application of the principles and methods of
philosophy. According to Averroes, the methods of philosophy are
uniquely suited to establish truth (Taylor 2000). The role of religion
is to transmit that truth to the masses via narrative and metaphor.
Generally speaking, this position on the relationship between
philosophy and religion is shared by other Aristotelians in the Arabic
tradition, including al-Farabi and Avicenna. The latter
differ from Averroes in that they are less concerned than he is to
interpret Aristotle correctly. Rather, they adopt Aristotle's
philosophical framework, but feel free to modify it in light of their
own discoveries.


### 2.3 Final causality



In *Physics* 2.3, Aristotle says that "the end or
that for the sake of which the thing is done" is also considered
a type of cause. In Arabic philosophical works, the terms "final
cause" (*al-'illah al-gha`iyyah*) and
"end" (*al-ghayah*) designate this type of
cause. The philosophers hold both natural motion and divine
action to occur for the sake of an end, though they consider the
latter to differ from the former in an important way. Natural bodies
are said to act for the sake of something distinct from themselves,
which they lack. For example, an animal builds for the sake of
shelter. By contrast, God's end is not distinct from God itself,
rather God acts for the sake of itself. This idea is implicit in
al-Kindi's account of the final cause in *The
Explanation of the Proximate Efficient Cause for Generation and
Corruption*, which states that the end is either something
external to the efficient cause, which compels it to act, or it is not
something external to the efficient cause; in the latter case, the
efficient cause acts "only because of itself" (McGinnis
and Reisman 2007: 4). Presumably, the latter case describes divine
action. Avicenna attempts to explain the idea that God cannot act for
the sake of something distinct from itself as follows. He argues that
an agent's desire for an end distinct from itself implies the
agent's imperfection, since the object of the agent's
desire must be superior to the agent. In support of the latter claim,
he reasons that the object of an agent's desire must be
something that perfects or benefits the agent (Avicenna MH: 321). So,
an absolutely perfect agent as is God cannot act from desire for an
end distinct from itself. Avicenna also argues that an agent's
intending something distinct from itself implies the agent's
multiplicity, since it involves multiple acts of knowledge, e.g.,
knowledge of the intention, of the reason for the intention and of the
benefit to the agent to be derived from the intention (Avicenna MH:
326; McGinnis 2010: 206-208). So, an absolutely simple agent as
is God cannot act by intending for the sake of something other than
itself.



Arabic philosophical discussions of final causality also aim to meet
various objections to Aristotelian teleology. Avicenna takes up this
challenge with great energy. Again, the most developed arguments are
found in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of the *Book
of Healing*. In *Physics* I 13-14, Avicenna attempts
to meet to objections derived from Aristotle's discussion of
Ancient materialists, such as Democritus and Empedocles. In
*Metaphysics* VI 5, he treats additional objections. Perhaps
these are of greatest interest.



One objection asserts as obvious that certain human actions are
trivial or purposeless (*'abath*); the example given is
playing with one's beard (Avicenna MH: 220-225). This
objection challenges the idea that every natural motion has an end or
goal. The objection is probably derived from Alexander of Aphrodisias,
who claims in *On Fate* that twiddling with toothpicks and
touching and pulling one's hair do not have a cause in the sense
of an end (Sharples 1983: 44). Against this objection, Avicenna
maintains that apparently trivial human actions are motivated by
unconscious desire for pleasure, the good of the animal soul
(Richardson 2015). This argument derives support from Avicenna's
original and influential account of the internal senses, which
explains the cognitive bases of such actions (Avicenna ASAN:
43-45, 58-61, 163-69; Black 2000, 2013a).



Avicenna also devotes considerable attention to this objection:
"Why is the end considered a prior cause when in fact it is an
effect of the other causes?"(Avicenna MH: 220, trans. modified).
This objection asserts that it is inappropriate to include the end
among the types of causes on the ground that causes are ontologically
prior to effects. Avicenna's reply involves a distinction
between (i) the "thingness" (*shay`iyyah*) or
essence (*mahiyyah*) of the end and (ii) the existence of
the end: while the existence of the end in concrete particulars is
posterior to and, thus, an effect of the other causes, the thingness
(or essence) of the end exists prior to action and causes the
causality of the other causes (Avicenna MH: 228; Wisnovsky 2000,
2003a). He also makes a further point, which is historically
significant: the thingness (or essence) of the end "is not a
cause unless it occurs as an image in the soul, or as something
analogous to that" (Avicenna MH: 228, trans. modified).



Avicenna's account of the priority of the final cause was
influential in the Latin West, where it was taken by some to support
the view that the scope of final causation be restricted to agents
with cognitive powers (Maier 1955). This interpretation also appears
in the Arabic tradition. Roughly speaking, Avicenna was taken to have
shown that (i) the claim that the end is a cause of motion depends on
the claim that it is prior to and a cause of the causality of the
other causes and (ii) the claim that the end is prior to and a cause
of the causality of the other causes is true only in cases where it
exists in the mind or soul of the efficient cause.



With respect to this interpretation of Avicenna, it is important to
emphasize that, in his account of the priority of the final cause, he
mentions that the thingness (or essence) of the end may exist prior to
motion as an image in the soul "or as something analogous to
that" (Avicenna MH: 228, trans. modified). In this passage, he
suggests that the thingness or essence of the end may exist prior to
motion either as an object of cognition, or in another way, which is
different from, but analogous to, existing as an object of cognition.
Furthermore, Avicenna's various discussions of the final cause
give every indication that he considers the motion of natural bodies
without cognitive powers to occur for the sake of an end, which is
prior to and a cause of that motion. Still, it seems especially
difficult to prove that that the end of natural motion is prior to and
a cause of that motion.



This issue was widely discussed by Arabic philosophers and
theologians. In his commentary on Avicenna's *Pointers and
Reminders*, al-Tusi attempts to resolve this
problem by suggesting that we can attribute a sort of prior awareness
(*shu'ur*) to the nature of a body (Avicenna and
Tusi PR: part IV, 7, 18). Tusi makes
these remarks in reply to Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's
complaint that Avicenna's conception of the final cause applies
only to cognitive agents. By contrast, al-Ghazali maintains
that the inanimate is called "a seeker and a willer" only
figuratively:



> 
> 
> For it is said the stone falls because it wills [to move to] the
> center and seeks it, when seeking and willing in reality are only
> conceivable in conjunction with the knowledge (*al-'ilm*)
> of what is willed and sought after and are [thus] conceivable only of
> animals. (al-Ghazali IP: 57)
> 
> 
> 



Avicenna may be able to meet this objection by appeal to his account
of natural inclination (Richardson 2015).


## 3. Modality and the causal relation


### 3.1 Avicenna's necessitation thesis



One striking feature of Arabic and Islamic accounts of causation is
the use of the modal terms "necessary" and
"possible" to analyze the causal relation. This practice
is especially prominent in Avicenna's discussions of causality,
which emphasize his necessitation thesis: "with the existence of
its cause, the existence an effect is necessary". Although
Avicenna does not employ this thesis to restrict the scope of causal
power to God, his necessitation thesis appears to have played a role
in the history of occasionalism insofar as it is a target of
al-Ghazali's "no necessary connection"
argument, which is discussed below (in
 SS3.2).



In the *Metaphysics* of the *Book of Healing*, Avicenna
defends the necessitation thesis in order to support his coexistence
thesis, which states that cause and effect coexist in time. In other
words, Avicenna considers the necessitation thesis to entail that the
priority of cause to effect is ontological, not temporal (Marmura
1981a).



In the central part of the argument for the necessitation thesis,
Avicenna attempts to show that the causal relation cannot be fully
understood in terms of possibility:



> 
> 
> [What happens] has the possibility of happening and the possibility of
> not happening. It is not insofar as its happening is possible that it
> exists. And it is not only insofar as something else has the
> possibility of making it happen that it exists from another. Having
> the possibility of making a thing happen is not sufficient for making
> it happen. Given the mere possibility of making a thing happen, which
> is not sufficient, the thing would sometimes exist when it exists and
> sometimes not exist when it exists. [...] But something that has
> the very same relationship to a thing's existing from it as to
> its not existing from it has no greater claim to be the thing's
> cause than not to be its cause. Indeed, sound reason demands that
> there be a state that differentiates between the thing's
> existing from it and its not existing from it. (Avicenna MH:
> 126-7, trans. modified)
> 
> 
> 



In this argument, Avicenna analyzes an event as follows: considered in
itself, the event may exist or not exist; and, considered in relation
to what has the mere possibility of making it happen, the event may
exist or not exist. So, considered in either of these ways, the event
may or may not exist: its existence or nonexistence hangs in the
balance. He then asserts that the existence or nonexistence of one
thing from another requires a difference-maker, which destroys this
equilibrium. To support this conclusion, he appeals to a version of
the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which states that, for everything
that exists from another, there is a sufficient reason why it exists
from that other rather than does not exist from that other. He then
links the Principle of Sufficient Reason to the notion of
"cause": by "cause" we mean not what has the
mere possibility of making something happen, but rather what is
sufficient to make it happen (Richardson 2014). On the basis of this
argument, Avicenna ultimately concludes that, with the existence of
its cause, the existence of the effect is not merely possible, it is
necessary.



Avicenna considers this account of "cause" to apply to all
instances of the causal relation. Still, he recognizes important
differences across the various things which function as causes. Most
important are the differences between God and sublunary substance.
According to Avicenna, with God's existence, the existence of
his sole immediate effect, the first intelligence, is necessary. His
reasoning involves the following ideas. First, God needs nothing
outside himself to produce the first intelligence. Second, God is
immutable. Avicenna considers God's immutability to entail that
his knowledge and volition are also immutable. God's knowledge
and volition are the principles by which he acts. So, whenever God
exists, he possesses the knowledge and volition by which he produces
the first intelligence. So, with God's existence, the existence
of the first intelligence is necessary.



By contrast, with the existence of a sublunary substance, the
existence of its effect is typically not necessary, but merely
possible. A sublunary substance is a subject of causality
(*mawdu' al-'illiyah*). Whenever a
subject of causality is in a state that differentiates between a
thing's existing from it and its not existing from it,



> 
> 
> [t]he effect would then proceed from it necessarily, regardless of
> whether [the differentiating state] is an act of will, appetite, or
> anger, or something originated, natural or otherwise, or some external
> thing. (Avicenna MH: 127, trans. modified)
> 
> 
> 



Thus, a subject of causality is a substance that functions as a cause
when it is in a certain state. For example, fire functions as a cause
for the burning of cotton when its power to burn is actualized in the
cotton. This state occurs only when contact between agent (fire) and
patient (cotton) is unimpeded and when the patient (cotton) is itself
in a suitable state, e.g., the cotton is not wet.


### 3.2 Al-Ghazali's "no necessary connection" argument



In the *Incoherence of the Philosophers*, al-Ghazali
provides the most celebrated critique of Arabic Aristotelian accounts
of causation. Al-Ghazali's first and most influential
argument against his philosopher opponents appears to target
Avicenna's necessitation thesis (Lizzini 2013). He
writes,



> 
> 
> The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and
> what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary,
> according to us. But [with] any two things, where "this"
> is not "that" and "that" is not
> "this" and where neither the affirmation of the one
> entails the affirmation of the other nor the negation of the one
> entails negation of the other, it is not a necessity of the existence
> of the one that the other should exist, and it is not a necessity of
> the nonexistence of the one that the other should not exist--for
> example, the quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating,
> burning and contact with fire, light and the appearance of the sun,
> death and decapitation [...] and so on to [include] all [that is]
> observable among connected things in medicine, astronomy, arts, and
> crafts. Their connection is due to the prior decree of God, who
> creates them side by side, not to its being necessary in itself,
> incapable of separation. (al-Ghazali IP: 166)
> 
> 
> 



Al-Ghazali denies that natural events involve necessary
connections, using as his main example the burning of cotton when in
contact with fire:



> 
> 
> For we allow the possibility of the occurrence of the contact without
> the burning, and we allow as possible the occurrence of the
> cotton's transformation into burnt ashes without contact with
> the fire. [The philosophers], however, deny the possibility of this.
> (al-Ghazali 2000: 166-7)
> 
> 
> 



Al-Ghazali appears to attribute to his Aristotelian
opponents two main claims:



(i)
natural substances, such as fire, are causes, and
(ii)
causal connections are necessary connections.
 


He also contends that (i) and (ii) imply a third claim:



(iii)
the affirmation of contact between fire and cotton entails the
affirmation of the burning of the cotton.


Al-Ghazali suggests that, because (iii) is false, his
opponents' account of causation in nature is mistaken. One
question raised by the argument is whether his opponents really accept
(ii); another is whether they consider (i) and (ii) to imply
(iii).


### 3.3 Averroes on causal necessity in nature



In the *Incoherence of the Incoherence*, Averroes challenges
Ghazali's portrayal of the philosophers' account
of causal necessity as follows:



> 
> 
> [A]re the acts which proceed from all things absolutely necessary for
> those in whose nature it lies to perform them, or are they only
> performed in most cases or in half the cases? This is a question which
> must be investigated, since one single action-and-passivity between
> two existent things occurs only through one relation out of an
> infinite number, and it happens often that one relation hinders
> another. Therefore it is not absolutely certain that fire acts when it
> is brought near a sensitive body, for surely it is not improbable that
> there should be something which stands in such a relation to the
> sensitive thing as to hinder the action of the fire, as is asserted of
> talc and other things. But one need not therefore deny fire its
> burning power so long as fire keeps its name and definition. (Averroes
> ITI: 318-19)
> 
> 
> 



Averroes affirms that natural substances, such as fire, are causes.
Yet, he claims that, given fire's nearness to cotton, it is not
"absolutely necessary", nor "absolutely
certain" that the cotton burns. In this sentence, he seems to
deny that causal connections are necessary connections. On the other
hand, the reason he denies that fire's nearness to cotton
necessitates the burning of the cotton is that there may be an
impediment: the cotton could be covered in talc, which hinders the
action of the fire. And he suggests that, absent this impediment, the
burning would certainly take place. So, while he initially seems to
deny that causal connections are necessary connections, his overall
argument suggests that he affirms this claim. Furthermore, his account
of causal necessity involves a more nuanced version of
al-Ghazali's claim (iii) above (that the affirmation
of contact between fire and cotton entails the affirmation of the
burning of the cotton). According to Averroes' account of causal
necessity, the affirmation of contact between fire and cotton, and the
affirmation that there are no impediments, together entail the
affirmation of the burning of the cotton.



In sum, Averroes responds to al-Ghazali's "no
necessary connection" argument as follows. He claims that
al-Ghazali misreports the philosophers' account of
causal necessity in nature. Furthermore, he suggests that his revised
version of their account is true. So, the philosophers' account
of causal necessity in nature, properly understood, is not
mistaken.



It is worth noting that Averroes' own account of causal
necessity in nature is roughly in accord with Avicenna's. As
discussed above (in
 SS3.1),
 Avicenna holds that "with the existence of its cause, the
existence of the effect is necessary". He also holds, however,
that the existence of a sublunary substance, which functions as a
cause, is, typically, not sufficient for the exercise of its causality
and, thus, typically, not sufficient for the existence of the effect
of its causality. For example, fire functions as a cause of the
burning of cotton only when its power to burn is actualized in the
cotton. This not only requires that contact between agent (fire) and
patient (cotton) be unimpeded but also that the patient (cotton) is
itself in a suitable state, e.g., the cotton is not wet.


### 3.4 Disputed principles



According to Averroes, al-Ghazali misreports the
philosophers' account of causal necessity in nature. Averroes
also suggests that his own revised version of their account is true.
While al-Ghazali might accept the former claim, he would not
accept the latter. This has to do with his understanding of the
modalities. On his account of "necessary", a connection
between two things is not necessary if it is conceivable that it be
severed (Kukkonen 2000; Dutton 2001). So, if it is conceivable that
the cotton not burn, even though its contact with fire is unimpeded
and it is dry, then it is not necessary that it burn, even when these
conditions obtain. As we have seen, al-Ghazali considers it
conceivable that the cotton not burn, even when these conditions
obtain. For he says that the connection between burning and contact
with fire



> 
> 
> is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side by side, not
> to its being necessary in itself, incapable of separation.
> (al-Ghazali IP: 166)
> 
> 
> 



So, according to al-Ghazali, it is conceivable that the
cotton not burn, even though its contact with fire is unimpeded and it
is dry, so it is not necessary that it burn, even when these
conditions obtain. On this view, even Averroes' revised version
of the philosophers' account of causal necessity in nature is
mistaken. On the other hand, the philosophers do not accept
al-Ghazali's account of "necessary". More
generally, they do not characterize the modalities in terms of
conceivability. This suggests that the disagreement between
al-Ghazali and the philosophers about causal necessity in
nature has partly to do with their differing accounts of the
modalities (Kukkonen 2000; Dutton 2001). However, the fundamental
source of their disagreement is theological.



Al-Ghazali attacks the philosophers' view of causal
necessity in nature in order to safeguard the Muslim belief in
miracles and divine omnipotence (al-Ghazali IP: 165). These
tenets of faith are incompatible with Avicenna's account of God.
As mentioned earlier (in
 SS3.1),
 Avicenna considers God's immutability to entail that his
knowledge, volition and action are immutable. He also denies that
God knows particular things, except in a universal way (Avicenna MH:
288; Marmura 1962; Adamson 2005). So, according to Avicenna, God
cannot act otherwise than he does; furthermore, he cannot plan or
execute any particular event. So, God cannot cause a miracle by
altering his action so as to interrupt the course of nature.
Furthermore, God cannot cause a miracle by planning and executing a
grand series of particular events, which includes a deviation from the
course of nature. On the contrary, God serves as the ultimate
explanation of order and stability in the universe, including in the
realm of nature. Likewise, Averroes' mature view, which describes
God as an ultimate final cause of motion, who is
neither a creator, nor an efficient cause of earthly events,
is obviously incompatible with the view that God can cause
miracles.



Of course, Avicenna and Averroes do not always state in plain terms
that their accounts of God are incompatible with Muslim doctrine. They
often take a conciliatory approach to religious tenets that are in
tension with truths established by philosophy. This approach is
related to their view that the role of religion is to transmit truth
to the masses via narrative and metaphor, as discussed above (in
 SS2.2.3).


## 4. Knowledge of causal powers


### 4.1 Avicenna on induction and experience



Aristotelian natural philosophy relies in part on sensory observation
in its attribution of causal powers to natural bodies. So, it is not
surprising that Arabic and Islamic thinkers raise objections to
Aristotelian science, which anticipate later philosophical accounts of
the problem of induction. Some of these emerge from within
Aristotelianism. Avicenna provides a sustained critique of induction
(*istiqra`*) in his treatise *On
Demonstration* (*al-Burhan*), the logical part of the
*Book of Healing*. As he sees it, part of the problem is that
induction may be supposed to lead to absolute, universal, and certain
premises, while in reality it leads to merely probable belief. On the
other hand, he holds that sensory observation together with a
"hidden syllogism" gives rise to certitude. Avicenna
elaborates this cognitive process under the heading of
"experience" (*tajribah*). *Tajribah* is the
Arabic translation of the Greek *empeiria*. Avicenna's
account of experience is derived in part from remarks by Aristotle and
al-Farabi on *empeiria*/*tajribah*,
though it goes beyond these sources (al-Farabi AMIF:
24-25; McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 66-67; McGinnis 2003;
Janssens 2004; Black 2006).



As Avicenna describes it, experience involves repeated sensation of
some phenomenon that is preserved in memory, e.g., that purging of
bile follows ingestion of scammony. It also involves a
"hidden" or implicit process of reasoning. We infer that
the repeated connection involves an essential relation between two
things: e.g., it is not accidental that the purging of bile follows
the ingestion of scammony, for regularities cannot be due to chance.
This implicit process of reasoning removes doubt. So, experience gives
rise to certitude. Avicenna defines certitude in terms of second-order
belief: one is certain when one knows that what one has assented to
cannot be otherwise (Black 2013b: 122). Certitude is not wholly
subjective, since knowledge of a proposition requires its truth (Black
2013b: 125). On the other hand, though experience gives rise to
certitude, it does not yield knowledge in the strict sense. For
knowledge in the strict sense is both necessary *and*
explanatory. From experience we derive our certitude *that*
members of a certain species cause something; but experience does not
show *why* (McGinnis 2003: 320-1).



Avicenna also addresses the objection that experience may lead to
false generalizations. He uses the following example. Suppose we had
seen only black humans and had observed without exception that
procreation issues in black children. By experience, we would conclude
that all humans are black, i.e., that blackness is essential to
humanity. In response to this objection, Avicenna says that knowledge
derived from experience is conditional,



> 
> 
> which is to say that the character of this thing that is repeatedly
> perceived is necessarily joined to something that holds always in the
> domain in which the thing is repeatedly perceived, unless there is an
> obstacle. (McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 150)
> 
> 
> 



This point is applied to the example of the Sudanese as follows:



> 
> 
> when procreation is taken to be procreation by black people, or people
> of one such country, then experience will be valid. If procreation is
> taken to be that of any given people, then experience will not end
> with the aforementioned particular instances; for that experience
> concerned a black people, but people absolutely speaking are not
> limited to black people. (McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 150; McGinnis
> 2003: 322-325)
> 
> 
> 



So, in response to the objection that experience could lead to false
generalizations, Avicenna advises that proper use of experience would
include careful attention to the domain of a species, which was
subject to repeated observation.


### 4.2 Al-Ghazali's skeptical argument



The problem of induction also plays a role in Ash'arite attacks
on Aristotelian accounts of causation in nature. As we have seen,
Aristotelian natural philosophy relies in part on repeated observation
in its attribution of causal powers to natural bodies. Ash'arite
theologians attack this aspect of Aristotelian natural philosophy on
the ground that repeated observation of concomitance is not evidence
of causation. A version of this argument appears in
al-Ghazali's *Incoherence of the
Philosophers*.



Al-Ghazali distinguishes a few different positions held by
his philosopher opponents. One position considers changes in nature to
be brought about by natural bodies alone, without any contribution by
God. Applied to the example of the burning of the cotton, this
position holds that



> 
> 
> the agent of the burning is the fire alone, it being an agent by
> nature [and] not by choice--hence, incapable of refraining from
> [acting according to] what is in its nature after contacting a
> substratum receptive of it. (al-Ghazali IP: 167)
> 
> 
> 



Against this position, al-Ghazali maintains that



> 
> 
> [t]he one who enacts the burning by creating blackness in the cotton,
> [causing] separation in its parts, and making it cinder or ashes is
> God, either through the mediation of His angels or without mediation.
> (al-Ghazali IP: 167)
> 
> 
> 



In support of this view, he argues as follows:



> 
> 
> As for fire, which is inanimate, it has no action. For what proof is
> there that it is the agent [of the burning of cotton]? They have no
> proof other than observing the occurrence of the burning at the
> [juncture of] contact with the fire. (al-Ghazali IP:
> 167)
> 
> 
> 



Al-Ghazali appeals to a point also made by his
Ash'arite predecessors: we observe not that fire burns cotton but
rather that cotton burns when in contact with fire. So, the evidence
of repeated observation, even when unvarying, does not show that fire
is the agent of the change. Furthermore, this evidence is consistent
with God's being the agent of the change.


### 4.3 Averroes' argument from natural science



In response to the skeptical argument, Averroes appeals to the fact of
natural science: We do have (some) knowledge of the natural world.
Furthermore, knowledge of the natural world just is knowledge of the
natural causes of change (Averroes ITI: 318-19). Such knowledge
must be derived, at least in part, from repeated observation of
bodies. He also suggests that none of us sincerely doubts that this is
so: he claims that his occasionalist opponent "denies with his
tongue what is present in his mind" (Averroes ITI: 318). So, as
Averroes sees it, the fact of natural science is sufficient reason to
reject the skeptical argument. Still, he acknowledges that we lack
complete knowledge of nature, that much remains to be investigated and
that this endeavor faces various obstacles.



While Averroes' argument from natural science may succeed
against some versions of the skeptical argument, it is not clear that
it succeeds against its immediate target, al-Ghazali's
skeptical argument. The latter argument may leave open the possibility
that natural bodies, such as fire, are causes (McGinnis 2006). For
al-Ghazali does not conclude his skeptical argument by
denying that fire is a cause of the burning *tout court*;
rather, he denies that it has action on the ground that it is
inanimate and he denies that the fire alone is the agent of burning.
So, al-Ghazali may hold that the fire is a (non-active)
cause of the burning, while God is its active cause.



On this interpretation, al-Ghazali's skeptical
argument merely denies that the evidence of repeated observation shows
that natural bodies are the sole causes of change. So, that argument
is compatible with the claim that the evidence of repeated observation
indicates that natural bodies are among the causes of change.
Averroes, however, suggests that al-Ghazali denies the
latter claim. So, his argument from natural science does not succeed
against al-Ghazali's skeptical argument. On the other
hand, to allow that natural bodies are among the causes of change may
not be sufficient to avoid a problem raised by Averroes'
argument from natural science. Averroes' argument involves the
idea that repeated observation of bodies gives us insight into their
natures. By "nature" is meant an intrinsic principle of
motion and coming to rest. So, the argument demands more than the
concession that natural bodies make some causal contribution to
change. It demands that the causality of natural bodies is rooted in
and explained by their natures.



Al-Ghazali's Ash'arite predecessors tend to deny
the existence of Aristotelian natures because these would impose
restrictions on God's action. If a body has an Aristotelian
nature, it has an internal principle, which restricts the sorts of
changes it can undergo from one moment to the next. For example, the
dead cannot be raised and a staff cannot become a snake. According to
Islamic theology, however, God can raise the dead and turn a staff
into a snake. Thus, bodies do not have Aristotelian natures, since the
existence of such natures would conflict with the doctrine of divine
omnipotence.



Al-Ghazali appears to reject this more traditional
Ash'arite view when he argues that the existence of bodily
natures is compatible with the occurrence of miracles. This argument
may reflect a concern to reconcile theology with natural science. It
proposes that, even if we suppose that bodies have natures as
construed by the philosophers, God could still cause miracles in two
main ways. On the one hand, he could impede the operation of natural
causal powers. For example, God could prevent the burning of Abraham
in the fiery furnace by causing the fire's heat to be contained
within the fire or by causing Abraham to be covered in talc. On the
other hand, God could cause a miracle by causing a series of natural
changes to occur with astonishing speed. For example, God could change
the staff in a serpent by causing matter to take on successive forms
at an accelerated rate:



> 
> 
> Thus, earth and the rest of the elements change into plants,
> plants-when eaten by animals-into blood, blood then changing into
> sperm. Sperm is then poured into the womb and develops in stages as an
> animal; this, in accordance with habit, takes place in a lengthy
> period of time. Why, then, should the opponent deem it impossible that
> it lies within God's power to cycle matter through these stages
> in a time shorter than has been known? (al-Ghazali IP:
> 172)
> 
> 
> 



So, the affirmation of bodily natures is compatible with the belief
miracles.



Whether this argument shows al-Ghazali to hold that it is
possible that bodies have natures is a matter or dispute (Marmura
1981b; Frank 1992; Griffel 2009). Averroes takes the argument to
concede the philosophers' view that bodies have natures by which
they function as causes of change (Averroes ITI: 330). Still, there
remains a crucial difference between al-Ghazali's view
and that of the philosophers. Even if al-Ghazali allows that
bodies may have natures, he also considers divine choice and action to
govern particular events in the sublunary world. God can plan and
execute particular events, which deviate from or accelerate the course
of nature. The latter aspect of his view is incompatible with the
philosophers' accounts of God, as discussed above in
 SS3.3.