## 1. Life and works



Du Bos was born in Beauvais on 14 December 1670. Little is known of
his family or childhood. He was educated in Paris, where he received a
Master of Arts in 1688 and a Bachelor of Theology in 1692. Although
later in life he was a titular abbe and canon, he seems to have
had little interest in the ecclesiastical life. He was more interested
in politics and in the life of a man of letters and he soon moved in
leading intellectual circles. His friends included Nicolas
Boileau-Despreaux, an important poet and literary critic,
Charles Perrault, another major poet, and Pierre Bayle, the famous
philosopher. He was a friend of Jean Jacques-Rousseau though, as was
often the case with Rousseau's friendships, the friendship did
not endure. Du Bos was particularly closely associated with Bayle, who
had an important impact on Du Bos's thought. Du Bos traveled
extensively in Europe in his capacity as a diplomat and in order to
meet the leading intellectuals of the day. Lombard (1913) remains the
standard account of his life.



Du Bos's first book was *Histoire de Quatre Gordiens,
prouvee et illustree par les Medailles*
(*History of the Four Gordians, Proven and Illustrated by
Medallions*) (1695). In this work, he argued, on the basis of
numismatic evidence, that there had been four, not three Gordian
emperors. His hypothesis was quickly refuted by historians.



Du Bos worked as a diplomat and was involved in negotiating a peace
treaty between the Netherlands and France. In this connection, he
wrote *Les Interests de l'Angleterre mal entendus dans la
guerre presente* (*England's Interests in the
Present War Misunderstood*) (1703).



His next book was *L'Histoire* *de la Ligue de
Cambray* (*History of the League of Cambrai*). This was a
clear and engaging history of the alliance, including France,
assembled by Pope Julius II to wage war against the Venetian Republic
between 1508 and 1516. The book was praised by, among others,
Voltaire.



Du Bos travelled to England in 1698 to meet John Locke at the request
of their mutual friend Nicolas Toinard. Toinard wanted advice on the
preparation of a translation of Locke's *Essay concerning
Human Understanding*. Locke and Du Bos became close friends and
Locke asked his French friend to review the French translation of the
*Essay*. The influence of Locke's empiricism is evident
throughout the *Critical Reflections*.



In 1719 Du Bos published *Reflexions critiques sur la
poesie et sur la peinture* (*Critical Reflections on
Poetry and Painting*), the book on which his posthumous reputation
depends. Further editions appeared in 1732, 1733, 1740, 1746, 1755,
1760, and 1770. The work was significantly expanded and revised for
the 1740 and subsequent editions. It was translated into German,
Dutch, and English. Largely on the basis of the *Critical
Reflections*, Du Bos was elected to the Academie
francaise in 1720. He became perpetual secretary of the
Academie in 1723.



Du Bos's final major work was the *Histoire critique de
l'etablissement de la monarchie francaise dans les
Gaules* (*Critical History of the Establishment of the French
Monarchy in Gaul*) (1734). The book's thesis is that the
Franks did not conquer Gaul. Rather, according to Du Bos, the Gauls
invited them to become the rulers of what became France. The book won
the praise of many, including Edward Gibbon, but it was effectively
criticized by Montesquieu in *The Spirit of the Laws*.



By all accounts, Du Bos was a pleasant and charming man. Many
affectionate remembrances were published in the wake of his death on
23 March 1742.


## 2. *Critical Reflections on Poetry and Painting*



*Critical Reflections on Poetry and Painting* begins with an
investigation of the "striking pleasure (94)" that humans
receive from the experience of poetry and painting. (All references to
the *Critical Reflections* are to pages of Du Bos 1719/2021.)
The book focuses on the two fine arts mentioned in the book's
title, but Du Bos also discusses sculpture, engraving, dance, and
music. According to Du Bos, we receive pleasure from the fine arts
because works of art are imitations of objects in the world.
Presumably, on Du Bos's view, the similarity between imitations
and the objects imitated is responsible for the arousal of emotion.
When we experience imitations, we receive emotions similar to, but
less intense than, the emotions we feel when we experience the objects
imitated. If these emotions are pleasing, Du Bos has an account of the
pleasure that humans receive from experience of the fine arts.



Du Bos's account of the striking pleasure that we receive from
the fine arts commits him to the ancient view that the fine arts are
imitative arts. This view is traceable to Plato and Aristotle and Du
Bos acknowledges these ancient sources. Although the view that the
fine arts make up a coherent 'system' is sometimes
attributed to Charles Batteux (Kristeller 1951; 1952), Du Bos's
views clearly anticipate those of Batteux (Young 2015).



According to Du Bos, all arts are imitative, but the arts do not all
represent in the same way. In the course of the *Critical
Reflections*, Du Bos makes a contribution to philosophy of
language by distinguishing between natural signs and the artificial
signs found in language. Natural signs, such as those found in
painting, sculpture, and music, represent because they resemble their
objects. The artificial signs of language are arbitrary or
conventional. They are employed in poetry (that is, literature).



Du Bos asks which of the arts is best able to arouse emotions. He
believes that painting has an advantage over poetry on the grounds
that natural signs affect us more effectively. He argues, however,
that poetry when combined with music or acting (or both, as in opera)
has an advantage over painting.



Du Bos is aware that his account of the pleasure we receive from art
faces a serious objection. When the emotions we receive from viewing
an imitation are positive, Du Bos's account has a prima facie
plausibility. Sometimes, however, as he recognizes, we receive
unpleasant emotions from the experience of artistic imitations. Du Bos
considers, for example, an imitation of the sacrifice of
Jephthah's daughter and Le Brun's painting, *Massacre
of the Innocents*. These works arouse negative emotions.
Nevertheless, we willingly, even enthusiastically, experience the
works. Our willingness to experience works that arouse negative
emotions is often referred to as the paradox of tragedy.



Du Bos tries to resolve the paradox by making two points. He begins by
saying that, although imitations of unpleasant events will arouse
unpleasant emotions, these emotions are not as intense or as enduring
as we receive from experience of the events themselves. This point
cannot, by itself, resolve the paradox. Du Bos's second point is
that although the emotions aroused by imitations of unpleasant events
are unpleasant, they are preferable to an emotion that we would
otherwise feel. According to Du Bos, we are constitutionally subject
to a feeling of deep ennui. This ennui is not merely boredom. Rather
it is a weariness of the human condition.



In 'On Tragedy,' Hume endorses Du Bos's solution to
the paradox, at least up to a point. Hume notes that, according to Du
Bos, "nothing is in general so disagreeable to the mind as the
languid, listless state of indolence, into which it falls upon the
removal of all passion and occupation." Hume then adds that,
when a work of tragic art arouses an emotion "Let it be
disagreeable, afflicting, melancholy, disordered; it is still better
than...insipid languor" (Hume 1757, 217). Some contemporary
philosophers have also found merit in Du Bos's approach to the
paradox of tragedy (Livingston 2013).



Later in the *Critical Reflections* Du Bos returns to the
paradox of tragedy and gives a rather different solution. This later
passage is apparently influenced by Aristotle's *Poetics*
since Du Bos speaks of the purging of emotions. He means by this,
however, something other than Aristotle meant. According to Du Bos,
"The faithful depiction of the passions suffices to make us
afraid and make us resolve to avoid them with all of the determination
of which we are capable" (318). For example, we watch a
performance of *Medea* and we are horrified by the passion for
vengeance and resolve not to indulge in it.



The concept of sentiments is crucial to Du Bos's thought. He
seems to have been the writer who made talk of sentiments so
commonplace in eighteenth-century aesthetics. Du Bos never precisely
defines what he means when he speaks of sentiments. In what is,
perhaps, the closest he comes to a definition he writes that,
"The first ideas born in the soul, when it receives a lively
stimulus,...we call *sentiments*" (237). According
to Du Bos, sentiments are not produced by a special sort of aesthetic
experience. Rather, they are, as already indicated, ordinary emotional
responses. We can receive sentiments from experience of ordinary
objects and from experience of the imitations found in art. The
difference, as already noted, is that sentiments produced by art are
fainter.



Despite believing that sentiments are ordinary emotions or fainter
copies of them, Du Bos posits a sense of beauty. He writes that,
"We have in us a sense intended to judge the value of works that
imitate touching objects in nature" and calls this a
"sixth sense" (519). Du Bos compares the sense of beauty
to gustatory taste and seems to have been among the first writers to
do so.



Since artistic imitations are intended to arouse emotions similar to
those aroused by the objects imitated, Du Bos values what he calls
*vraisemblance* (verisimilitude). Painters, for example, must
"make a painting consistent with what we know of the customs,
habits, architecture, and arms of the people that one intends to
represent" (226). A work can, however, be *vraisemblable*
without being an imitation of the real world and historical events. A
work can be *vraisemblable* and yet be an example of what Du
Bos calls "the marvelous". An opera, for example, can be
*vraisemblable* even though it depicts marvelous ancient Greek
gods and goddesses. It must, however, depict them as existing in a way
that gods and goddesses can exist. *Vraisemblance* is not an
end in itself as it was for some earlier thinkers. The real goal of
the arts is to arouse sentiments and *vraisemblance* is only a
means of doing so.



According to Du Bos, we judge artworks by means of our sentiments
rather than by means of reason. He rejects the rationalist school of
criticism associated with writers such as Roland Freart de
Chambray (1606--76), the author of *L'Idee de la
perfection de la peinture demonstree par les principles de
l'art* (1662) and Jean Terrasson, whose work
*Dissertation critique sur l'Iliade d'Homere*
appeared in 1715. Terrasson wrote that the "proper and natural
principle by which we must judge a work of literature [*belles
lettres*] is the real conformity that it must have with good
reason and *belle nature*; this is philosophy" (Terrason
1715, iv). He adds that this philosophy comes from Descartes and
"the spirit of our philosophy is not limited to works of natural
science [*physique*]; the pulpit, the courts and even poetry
feel it....[modern philosophy] submits everything to
reason" (Terrason 1715, lxi). In a similar vein, Bosse wrote
that the "noble *art of painting* must be based for the
most part on correct and rule-governed reasoning, which is to say,
geometrical and, consequently, demonstrative" (Bosse 1649,
sommaire). Du Bos mocks these writers as 'geometrical
critics.'



He writes that the evaluation of art "is not left to reason. It
must submit to the judgement that sentiment pronounces. Sentiment is
the competent judge of this issue." He goes on to compare the
evaluation of an artwork to making a judgement about a ragout. Reason
is of no use here. Rather, "We taste the ragout and...we
know that it is good. It is the same with works of wit and pictures
made to please us by touching us" (519).



In making sentiments the means by which artworks are judged, Du Bos
gave rise to a question that he did not fully appreciate and certainly
did not solve. This is the question of providing a standard of taste.
Du Bos is a subjectivist. He makes the value of an artwork a
response-dependent property. A work of art is valuable if it arouses
certain valuable sentiments in audience members. Du Bos was aware that
different works will arouse different pleasing sentiments in different
people:



> 
> To want to persuade a man who prefers colour to expression, in
> accordance with his own feelings, that he is wrong, is to want to
> persuade him to take more pleasure in seeing Poussin's paintings
> than Titian's. The matter depends no more on him than it does on
> a man, whose palate is formed in such a way as to prefer champagne to
> Spanish wine, to change his taste and prefer the Spanish wine to
> French (345).
> 



The problem, as Hume clearly recognized, was that not everyone
receives the same sentiments from a work of art. This leads to the
conclusion that a work has value for some people and not for others.
However, as Hume also recognized, thorough-going subjectivism is
counterintuitive. It seems that there is a fact that Milton is a
greater poet than Ogilby, even if some people prefer Ogilby.



Du Bos was unaware of the full extent of the problem caused by
subjectivism. Likely this was because he believed that everyone has
very much the same sentiments. In fact, he believed that the general
public was the best judge of the value of artworks because their taste
was least corrupted by prejudice.



Du Bos also proposes the test of time. When a work of art repeatedly
pleases audiences over a long period of time, this is conclusive
evidence that it is a work of high value. Du Bos point out, for
example, that the reputations of the best Greek and Roman poets are
firmly established since they have pleased audiences through the
ages.



Some writers, Du Bos was aware, believe that artworks can be valuable
as a source of knowledge. At times Du Bos indicates that there is
something to this, and that art is valuable as more than the source of
valuable sentiments. In the end, however, his considered opinion is
that, "We can acquire some knowledge by reading a poem, but this
is scarcely the motive for opening the book" (244).



Du Bos speaks about audience members' states of mind but he also
speaks of the artist's state of mind. Artists, he believes, feel
the emotions that their works arouse in audience members. Indeed, the
artist's "goal is to make us share his sentiments"
(354). The difference between the artist's state of mind, and
those of audience members, is that the artist's sentiments are
more intense. Artists must be in a state of "enthusiasm"
if they are to create successful works of art. This enthusiasm can
border on madness. Since Du Bos believes that artists convey their
emotions to their audiences, he is an early advocate of an expression
theory of the arts.



The *Critical Reflections* make a contribution to the Quarrel
of the Ancients and Moderns. This was a long running debate about the
relative merits of ancient and modern writers and artists. Du
Bos's contribution to the debate is judicious. He reaches the
conclusion that modern sculptors have not surpassed their ancient
counterparts. With regard to painting, he says that it is difficult to
reach a judgement since so few ancient paintings have survived.
Nevertheless, he thinks it unlikely that modern painters have
surpassed the ancients. Ancient poets have a significant edge over
modern ones. Du Bos allows that, in the natural sciences, modern
scientists have eclipsed the ancients.



Much of Du Bos's book is devoted to an explanation of artistic
genius. He is particularly concerned to explain why certain eras (the
Golden Age of Athens, the Rome of Augustus, the Italian Renaissance,
and the era of Louis XIV) are more productive of geniuses. Although Du
Bos says, in passing, that a "poet needs divine
inspiration" (241), he decisively rejects the Platonic
conception of genius. Instead, he believes that genius has physical
causes. In part, genius is to be explained by physiological
considerations. According to Du Bos, a genius has a well-formed brain
and other physiological advantages over other people. Most
importantly, he believes, genius is the result of certain
environmental factors. These factors include climate, air quality,
soil, and diet. For example, England is supposedly unable to produce
painters of the first rank because the climate is too cold. Although
highly influential in the eighteenth century, Du Bos's views on
genius have been supplanted. Nevertheless, Du Bos's views on
genius are noteworthy as an early effort to provide a scientific
explanation of genius.



Although Du Bos was primarily concerned with poetry and painting, he
made a significant contribution to philosophy of music. He was an
advocate of the resemblance theory of musical expression. According to
this theory, music is expressive of emotions because it resembles
human expressive behavior. This view is found, in the contemporary
world, in Davies (1994) and Kivy (1980). (See the article on
Philosophy of Music, 3.1.) Music can resemble either vocal or
non-vocal expressive behavior. It can resemble, for example, the
plodding steps of a sad person or the joyful cries of a happy one.
Because music resembles such expressive behavior, it is heard as sad,
joyful, or expressive of some other emotion.



In the *Critical Reflections*, the resemblance theory is
crucial in explaining how music can be, like painting and poetry, an
imitative art. It does so by resembling and, consequently, imitating
"natural signs of the passions". Du Bos also believes that
music can imitate sounds in nature. He writes that "There is
truth in a symphony, composed to imitate a tempest, when the music of
the symphony, its harmony and its rhythm, make us hear a noise similar
to the tumult of the wind and the roaring waves, which clash with each
other or break against the rocks" (323). (Here the word
'symphony' means instrumental music. It does not refer to
a symphony in the modern sense of the word.) Notice that, on Du
Bos's view, even purely instrumental music can be imitative.



Unlike some modern advocates of the resemblance theory, Du Bos
believes that the experience of musical imitations arouses emotion.
Music arouses emotions in very much the same way that poetry and
painting do. The emotion aroused will be the emotion that would be
aroused by the object represented.



Du Bos's prose is often execrable. Voltaire wrote, with
reference to Du Bos and the *Critical Reflections*, that,
"the judgement is good, the style bad. It is necessary to read
him, but re-reading him would be tiresome" (Voltaire
*Correspondence*, letter 3917). An English translation of the
*Critical Reflections* was published in the eighteenth century.
Thomas Nugent translated the book as *Critical Reflections on
Poetry, Painting and Music* (Du Bos 1748). Unfortunately, this
translation is inaccurate and preserves all of the problems of the
original French. A new translation (Du Bos 1719/2021) recently
appeared. 


## 3. Du Bos's impact on the development of aesthetics



No single person deserves to be credited as the inventor of modern
aesthetics. Several figures in the early eighteenth century
independently made contributions to criticism and philosophy that
would become modern aesthetics. In England, Shaftesbury's
*Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times* (1711)
and Joseph Addison's *Pleasures of the Imagination*
(1712) laid some of the groundwork for aesthetics. On the Continent,
Jean-Pierre de Crousaz's *Traite de beau* (1715)
and Christian Wolff's *Rational Thoughts on God, the World,
and the Soul of Man* (1720) were pioneering contributions to
aesthetics. All of these works appeared in the second decade of the
eighteenth century, as did Du Bos's *Critical
Reflections*. Du Bos deserves to be recognized as among the
originators of modern aesthetics and philosophy of art. His importance
was widely recognized in the eighteenth century. Johann Georg Sulzer,
in his *General Theory of the Fine Arts* (1771-74)
described Du Bos as "the first of modern critics to construct a
theory of art upon general principles" (Baker and Christensen
1995, 25).



The influence of Du Bos on aesthetics in France began with his impact
on Voltaire (Williams 1966). He described Du Bos as "a very
wise, very learned, and very esteemed man" and, according to
Voltaire, "All artists read with profit his *Reflections*
on poetry, painting, and music" (Voltaire 1877-85, vol. 3,
10; vol. 14, 66). Du Bos's influence is found at a number of
points in Voltaire's writings. He adopts Du Bos's
subjectivism, writing that, "In order to judge poets, it is
necessary to know how to feel" (Voltaire 1877-85, vol. 8,
319). Voltaire agreed with Du Bos that there have been four ages where
the arts particularly flourished and he agreed with Du Bos's
assessment of which ages they have been. Voltaire also adopted one of
Du Bos's controversial views: the belief that national character
is affected by matters such as climate.



Du Bos had a significant impact on the *Encyclopaedia* of
Diderot and d'Alembert. Louis, chevalier de Jaucourt was the
author of many of this work's articles on the fine arts and he
cites Du Bos in the articles on Painting, Modern Painting,
Inscription, Landscape Painting, and Landscape Painter. In fact, a
large chunk of the article on Landscape Painting is lifted wholesale
out of *Critical Reflections*, vol. 1, chapter
6 (d'Alembert et al. 2003).



The influence of Du Bos on Jean Jacques Rousseau has long since been
established (Jones 1974). This influence is particularly apparent in
the *Lettre a mr d'Alembert sur les spectacles*
(1758). Rousseau agrees with Du Bos that theatre does not aim to
arouse in audience members the sentiment that the characters
represented feel. Rousseau agrees that, on the contrary, theatre
arouses quite opposed sentiments. For example, if a character in a
tragedy is represented as feeling fear and despair, audience members
will have pity aroused in them.



Du Bos seems to have been one of the important sources of the
resemblance theory of musical expression in the eighteenth century.
Batteux is known to have read the *Critical Reflections* and
was apparently influenced by Du Bos when he wrote that gestures and
sounds are "natural means of expression" that are
"especially suited to the expression of emotion". He adds
that "music is half-formed in the words that express some
emotion. It takes only a little art to turn the words into music
" (Batteux 1746/2015, 129; 133). These passages from *The
Fine Arts* are little more than paraphrases of passages from the
*Critical Reflections*.



Du Bos had a significant influence on aesthetics in Britain. His
influence is found, for example, in James Harris's *Three
Treatises*, particularly in the second of these treatises,
'A Discourse on Music, Painting and Poetry' (Harris 1744).
In fact, this treatise is little more than a brief reprisal of central
themes from the *Critical Reflections*. Harris, like Du Bos,
distinguishes between the fine arts according to their means of
expression. Painting employs natural signs and poetry artificial ones.
They agree that this gives painting an advantage when it comes to the
arousal of emotion, but both believe that the power of poetry can be
enhanced by music and staging to the point where it has the advantage
over poetry. They agree that art owes its value to its capacity to
arouse sentiments.



Since Jones (1982) it has been known that Du Bos had an impact on
Hume's thinking about art. Hume owned the 1732 edition of the
*Critical Reflections* (Norton and Norton, 1996, 88). He must
have acquired it soon after his move to France to begin writing his
*Treatise*.



Hume's discussion of Du Bos in 'Of Tragedy' has
already been noted, but Jones (1982) argues that Du Bos's
influence is also apparent in 'Of the Standard of Taste'.
Hume's views on art were influenced by several of his
contemporaries, including Francis Hutcheson, and it can be difficult
to disentangle their contributions to his thought. (See the article on
Scottish Philosophy in the 18th Century, section 4 for a discussion of
Hutcheson's influence on Hume.) The difficulty is compounded by
the fact that the views of Hutcheson and Du Bos are similar in certain
respects. Nevertheless, Jones (1982) finds significance in the fact
Hume, like Du Bos, believed that we have an internal sense of beauty.
Both believe that this sense of beauty, not reason, is the means by
which the beauty of work is determined. Moreover, there is an uncanny
similarity between the ways in which they express these views. Du Bos,
in the *Critical Reflections*, and Hume, in 'Of the
Standard of Taste,' say that they are opposed to
"geometrical" criticism. Both believe that rules of
criticism can be given, but that they can be violated by great works
of art. Both give Ariosto as an example of a poet who violates the
rules of criticism.



Jones (1982) noted the impact of Du Bos on Hume's essays, but
did not remark on the impact of the Frenchman on Hume's
*Treatise*. Norton and Norton, in their edition of the
*Treatise* (Hume 1739-40 [2007]) noted some passages
where Du Bos influenced Hume, but many more passages have recently
been identified (Mazza and Mori 2016; Young and Cameron 2018).
Virtually every passage in the *Treatise* where the fine arts
are mentioned shows signs of Du Bos's influence. Young and
Cameron (2018) have argued that several passages in the
*Treatise* so closely resemble passages in the *Critical
Reflections* that the similarity cannot be coincidental. For
example, both Du Bos and Hume agree that poetry and painting arouse
the same emotions that we feel in ordinary life, but that the emotions
aroused by the arts are fainter. Hume, like Du Bos, believes that
passions that are displeasing when experienced in daily life can be
pleasing when aroused by art. A passage in the *Treatise*
(2.2.4.4) refers to Du Bos's view that humans are plagued by
ennui and they seek to escape it by gaming and other activities. On
the other hand, Hume explicitly rejects Du Bos's view on the
influence of climate on national character. Goldhaber (2021) argues
that Hume adopted a four humor psycholgy under the influence of Du
Bos. 



Lombard (1913) judged that Du Bos's impact was greatest in
Germany. Du Bos was responsible for a move away from a rationalist
approach to criticism there as in France. His influence in Germany is
found as early as Johann Jakob Breitinger's *Critische
Dichtkunst* (1740). Subsequently, Baumgarten, Herder, Lessing,
Mendelssohn, and Winckelmann either adopted some of Du Bos's
views or argued against them. Lessing translated part of the
*Critical Reflections* into German and was deeply influenced by
him. For a study of the relationship between Du Bos and Lessing see
Leysaht (1874).


## 4. Du Bos on epistemology and philosophy of science



Du Bos's primary contributions to philosophy are in aesthetics
but he also contributed to the revolt against Cartesianism in France.
Cartesianism dominated French thinking about knowledge and science
until well into the eighteenth century (Illiffe 2003, 269). Du
Bos's approach to philosophy of art was thoroughly empiricist
and so was his attitude towards science. He deserves credit for
applying Locke's empirical account of knowledge to scientific
hypotheses.



In the first instance, Du Bos applied empiricism to the study of art,
as we have seen. According to Du Bos, judgements of works of art must
be empirical. He writes that



> 
> Do we use reason to determine whether a ragout is good or bad? Did you
> ever, after having applied geometrical principles to the flavour,
> determine the properties that each of the ingredients contributes, go
> on to discuss the proportions preserved in their mixture, in order to
> decide whether the ragout is good? You never have. We have a sense
> that makes us recognize whether the cook has followed the rules of his
> art. We taste the ragout and, even without knowing these rules, we
> know that it is good. It is the same with works of wit and pictures
> made to please us by touching us (519).
> 



Elsewhere Du Bos adds that



> 
> if there is some matter where reason should fall silent in the face of
> experience, it is certainly in questions that can be raised regarding
> the value of a poem. It is when we want to know whether a poem is
> pleasing or not; if, generally speaking, a poem is an excellent work
> or just average...there are few general principles to rely on
> regarding the value of a poem (531).
> 



Du Bos stresses the importance of sentiments, that is, the feelings we
have in response to works of art.



While Du Bos rejected rationalism in judgements about art, his
empiricism did not end there. He was opposed to the a priori
construction of scientific systems. He notes that



> 
> The two most famous philosophical organizations in Europe, the Academy
> of Sciences in Paris and the Royal Society in London, refuse to adopt
> or build a single general system of natural science. Agreeing with the
> view of Chancellor Bacon, they have espoused not a single one out of
> fear that having to justify it should draw attention from onlookers
> and make them see experiments not as they truly are, but as they
> should be, in order to give weight to an opinion they try to pass off
> as true. Our two famous academies rest content to verify facts and
> publish them in their journals, persuaded that nothing is easier
> according to reason and that they would stumble if they took two steps
> beyond what they acquired from experience. These two organizations
> expect a general system on the basis of first-hand
> experience (527).
> 



In another passage, Du Bos discusses Harvey's discovery of the
circulation of blood and makes clear that it could only have been
discovered a posteriori. People have accepted Harvey's
hypothesis, Du Bos writes, because



> 
> they know that it no longer relies on reasoning for its proof and that
> it is demonstrated by experience. To repeat, people have much more
> confidence in those who tell them "I have seen" than in
> those who tell them "I have concluded" (589).
> 



This passage is clearly an endorsement of empiricism and a rejection
of Cartesian rationalism.



Du Bos makes a related claim in a discussion of physicians. A
physician may be a Cartesian while young, but he will end up as an
empiricist. According to Du Bos,



> 
> At twenty-five, a doctor is as persuaded of the truth of his
> anatomical reasoning, which tries to discover the manner by which
> cinchona bark works to alleviate intermittent fevers, as he is by the
> effectiveness of the remedy. By age sixty, a doctor is persuaded by
> the truth of a fact that he has seen multiple times, but he does not
> put any faith in the explanation of the effect of the remedy than
> *by the piling up of examples*, if it permitted to use that
> expression. (530)
> 



Experience will transform the wise physician into an empiricist.
Elsewhere, Du Bos says something similar about engineering, navigation
and related sciences. He considers four modern scientific discoveries
(the discovery of air pressure, the invention of the compass, the
development of the printing press, and the invention of the telescope)
and observes that all of these discoveries were due to the acquisition
of new experiences.



When Du Bos investigates any scientific matter, he proceeds in an
empirical fashion. For example, he examines the question of why
certain eras have produced more geniuses than other periods. He begins
by considering the hypothesis that a social cause is responsible for
the production of geniuses. In particular, he considers the hypothesis
that the production of geniuses can be explained by reference to
generous patrons. He refutes this hypothesis by giving examples of
eras when patrons abounded but geniuses were scarce. Having
empirically refuted this hypothesis, he considers the hypothesis that
genius has a natural or physical cause. Du Bos supports this
hypothesis by attempting to find a correlation between certain
environmental, climatic, and dietary factors and the production of
genius. Du Bos's views on the origin of genius were widely
accepted in the first two thirds of the eighteenth century. Herder,
Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Winckelmann were among the important
figures to adopt Du Bos's views on climate and genius.



Du Bos held that scientific investigation always involves some
uncertainty. He wrote that "I distrust physical explanations,
since the imperfection of this science almost always makes guesswork
necessary" (362). According to Du Bos, a scientific hypothesis
is only probable to some extent or another. He illustrates this view
by reference to Harvey's hypothesis concerning the circulation
of blood. Du Bos writes that, "Most scholars of his
[Harvey's] time were persuaded by his views. It was as firmly
and widely established as a scientific truth as something that is not
directly observed can be. That is, it was regarded as a view more
probable than the contrary opinion" (588).