## 1. Biography



Max Horkheimer was born into a conservative Jewish family on February
14, 1895, the only son of Moritz and Babette Horkheimer. A successful
and respected businessman who owned several textile factories in the
Zuffenhausen district of Stuttgart (where Max was born), Moritz
Horkheimer expected his son to follow in his footsteps. Thus Max was
taken out of school in 1910 to work in the family business, where he
eventually became a junior manager. During this period he would begin
two relationships that would last for the rest of his life. First, he
met Friedrich Pollock, who would later become a close academic
colleague, and who would remain Max's closest friend. He also
met Rose Riekher, who was his father's personal secretary. Eight
years Max's senior, a gentile, and of an economically lower
class, Riekher (whom Max called "Maidon") was not
considered a suitable match by Moritz Horkheimer. Despite this, Max
and Maidon would marry in 1926 and remain together until her death in
1969 (Wiggershaus 1994, p. 41-44).



In the spring of 1919, after failing an army physical, Horkheimer
began studies at the University of Munich, and transferred to the
University of Frankfurt a semester later. At Frankfurt he studied
psychology and philosophy, the latter with the neo-Kantian philosopher
Hans Cornelius. He also spent a year, on Cornelius's
recommendation, studying in Freiburg with Edmund Husserl. After an
abortive attempt at writing a dissertation on gestalt psychology,
Horkheimer, with Cornelius's direction, completed his doctorate
in philosophy with a dissertation titled *The Antinomy of
Teleological Judgment*. Upon completion of the degree he was
offered an assistantship under Cornelius, and thus definitively set
off on an academic career rather than continuing in his father's
business. In 1925 Horkheimer completed his Habilitation with a work
titled *Kant's Critique of Judgment as a Link between
Theoretical and Practical Philosophy*, and took a position as
*Privatdozent*, or lecturer, at Frankfurt. During this time he
would lecture extensively on 18th and 19th Century philosophy, with
his research interests moving more in line with Marxian themes
(Wiggershaus 1994, p. 44-47).



The most important moments of Horkheimer's early academic career
would come in 1930. In July he was appointed Professor of Social
Philosophy at Frankfurt, and in October made the director of the
*Institut fur Sozialforschung* (Institute of Social
Research). The Institute began as a Marxist study group started by
Felix Weil, a one-time student of political science at Frankfurt who
used his inheritance to fund an institution that would support his
leftist academic aims. Along with Pollock (who also completed a
doctorate in Frankfurt, writing on Marx), Horkheimer became acquainted
with Weil, and took part in the activities of the Institute from the
beginning. The Institute formally opened in 1924 under the direction
of the Austrian Marxist scholar Carl Grunberg, who became ill
quickly after taking the post. While Pollock was more closely
associated with the Institute during the Grunberg period, he
supported his friend for the directorship (on the early history of the
Institute, see Jay 1996, ch. 1). On January 24, 1931, Horkheimer
delivered his inaugural lecture for the chair of social philosophy and
directorship of the Institute, titled "The Present Situation of
Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social
Research." This lecture, and several essays written by
Horkheimer in the early 1930s, would develop a conception of
interdisciplinary social research that was meant to guide the
activities of the institute during Horkheimer's tenure as
director.



This program was obstructed from the very beginning by
social-political unrest. In the time between Horkheimer's being
named Professor of Social Philosophy and director of the Institute in
1930, the Nazis became the second largest party in the Reichstag. In
the midst of the violence surrounding the Nazis' rise,
Horkheimer and his associates began to prepare for the possibility of
moving the Institute out of Germany. Shortly after Hitler was named
Chancellor in 1933, the Institute in Frankfurt was closed and its
building seized by the Gestapo. Horkheimer was also relieved of his
professorship and directorship in early 1933, and relocated to Geneva,
where the Institute had opened a satellite office. In 1934 Horkheimer
moved to New York, where one of Pollock's assistants had been
negotiating an agreement for the Institute with the department of
sociology at Columbia University. In July of 1934 Horkheimer accepted
an offer from Columbia to relocate the Institute to one of their
buildings. Having received American citizenship in 1940, Horkheimer
would continue to live and work largely in New York until 1941, when
he moved to the Los Angeles area (for a thorough history of the
development of Horkheimer's thought up to this point, see
Abromeit 2011). With the Institute splintering between New York and
California, Horkheimer concentrated his energies on his own work,
including the collaborative efforts with Theodor Adorno that produced
*Dialectic of Enlightenment*.



With the end of WWII, Horkheimer gradually considered moving back to
Germany. In April 1948, he returned to Europe for the first time, to
lecture in various cities, including as a visiting professor in
Frankfurt. His full return to Germany would follow shortly, and in
July 1949 he was restored to his professorship at the University of
Frankfurt. The following year the Institute would return as well.
After returning, Horkheimer would focus on administrative work,
reestablishing the Institute and serving two terms as University
Rector in the early 1950s. In 1953 he was awarded the Goethe Plaque of
the City of Frankfurt, and would later be named honorary citizen of
Frankfurt for life. His academic activities also continued throughout
the 1950s, and included a period during which he served as a regular
visiting professor at the University of Chicago. His work would slow,
however, once he retired in 1958 to the Swiss town of Montagnola. Max
Horkheimer passed away on July 7, 1973, at the age of 78.


## 2. Materialism and The Early Program of the Institute of Social Research



The theoretical viewpoint that oriented the work of the Institute of
Social Research, most famously known as "critical theory,"
was largely developed by Horkheimer in various writings in the 1930s
(most of which were published in the Institute's journal, the
*Zeitschrift fur
 Sozialforschung*).[1]
 In the earliest works Horkheimer used the term
"materialism," rather than critical theory, to name his
philosophical viewpoint. Though his early texts do not directly
mention Marx as much as one might expect (perhaps for reasons of
political expediency), it is clear that this theory draws great
inspiration from Marxian thought (see Borman 2017 for further
discussion of Horkheimer's early materialism and its connection
to Marx). Horkheimer's materialism is not systematically
presented in those early essays; rather the epistemological,
methodological, and moral concepts that were to orient the work of the
Institute are developed through a variety of texts. What follows is an
attempt at a reconstruction of Horkheimer's program for the
Institute, which draws on elements from various essays of the early
1930s.



One can begin to piece together Horkheimer's materialist method
by examining the 1931 inaugural address. There he presents most of the
main themes of his early philosophy in the context of describing what
the Institute was to accomplish under his leadership. As he notes at
the beginning, social philosophy must interpret the various phenomena
associated with human social life. But along with this fairly obvious
point, he asserts that "social philosophy is confronted with the
yearning for a new interpretation of a life trapped in its individual
striving for happiness" (p. 7). This introduces perhaps the most
fundamental element of Horkheimer's view. Social philosophy must
connect with the practical aim of alleviating suffering. But it is,
after all, still a theoretical enterprise, and he would emphasize that
the work of the Institute would amount to "a reformulation...of
the old question concerning the connection of particular existence and
universal Reason" (pp. 11-12). Along with the emphasis on
suffering, the proper interpretation of reason would play a crucial
role in Horkheimer's thought.



Early in the inaugural address he lays out a quick, and critical,
history of modern German social philosophy that fixes on Hegel.
Hegelian social philosophy is criticized for
"transfiguring" oppression; individual human experience,
with all its suffering, is given sense insofar as it is fit within a
rational, overarching conception of the movement of the "eternal
life of Spirit" (pp. 4-5). Horkheimer rejects this kind of
metaphysical view because it seeks to cover over the reality of human
suffering. But he is not unreservedly critical of metaphysics. After
criticizing Hegelian social philosophy, he notes that in reaction
certain strands of social research eschewed philosophy entirely. This
leads to Horkheimer's criticism of the excessive specialization
of the (in this case social) sciences. Due to this specialization,
scientific researchers omit any broader examination of the social
roots, and social meaning, from their inquiry. At least metaphysical
thinking recognizes the need to present a comprehensive view that can
make sense of the social whole. The twin critiques of metaphysics and
science provide a space for Horkheimer to present his own view. The
aim of materialist social research is to combine specific empirical
studies with more comprehensive theorizing, and thus overcome these
problems. Horkheimer finishes by noting that this research will be
aimed at the elucidation of the links between economic structure,
psychology, and culture, such that the work of various social
scientists and theorists can be brought together to forge an
empirically informed picture of society that might replace such
previous metaphysical categories as Universal Reason or Spirit.



Thus construed, we can use the themes presented in the inaugural
address as a guide for the further examination of Horkheimer's
early thought. Four elements become key: the emphasis on suffering and
happiness, the role rationality plays in emancipatory movements, the
combined critiques of metaphysics and positivism, and the methodology
of interdisciplinary social research. Each of these four is examined
in more depth in the four subsections below.


### 2.1. Suffering and the Desire for Happiness



As noted, the rejection of Hegelian social philosophy in the inaugural
lecture is tied to a broader rejection of metaphysics, which will be
discussed in more detail in SS2.2. At the root of the rejection of
"transfiguration," however, is a very basic point. No
social philosophy that denies the singular import of suffering, and
the corresponding desire to overcome that suffering, can properly
grasp human social reality. Thus, in the 1933 essay "Materialism
and Metaphysics" Horkheimer writes that "man's
striving for happiness is to be recognized as a natural fact requiring
no justification" (p. 44). Prior to any critique of metaphysics,
materialism rests on the basic recognition of suffering and the desire
for happiness. Suffering and happiness are in some sense
"properly basic"; their significance is evident, in no
need of justification, and foundational to materialist social
theory.



The talk of both "suffering" and "happiness"
suggests that Horkheimer oscillated between pessimistic and optimistic
renderings of this foundational idea. The pessimistic side of this
view, with its conception of human life as shared suffering, was
present in Horkheimer's thought from very early in his life. In
the novellas and diary entries written from 1914-1918 and later
published as *Aus der Pubertat* (*From Puberty*),
this pessimism is prominent (see Schmidt 1993, 25-26). This is
in part due to the early influence of Schopenhauer's
"metaphysical pessimism" on Horkheimer's thought,
and Horkheimer himself would emphasize that Schopenhauer was his first
philosophical role model (Horkheimer 1968, p. ix). It is noteworthy
(especially given the link here to Horkheimer's critique of
metaphysics), that for Schopenhauer this "metaphysical"
view is tied to the concrete need to interpret the world in a way that
can help humans understand and deal with their suffering (on this
point, and Horkheimer's relation to Schopenhauer's thought
in general, see Schmidt 1993). Metaphysical or not, this view is based
on the notion that life is marked by pain. The optimistic rendering
comes to the fore in the above quote from "Materialism and
Metaphysics" insofar as the desire for happiness is emphasized.
But the optimism should not be overestimated, because happiness is
construed in a solely negative manner. The oppressed are motivated not
by some positive conception of happiness, but by the hope of freedom
from suffering. This individual desire for happiness can further
manifest itself as the moral sentiment of compassion, wherein we
desire the happiness of others (Horkheimer 1933b, pp.
 34-35).[2]
 The desire to overcome one's own suffering, combined with the
feeling of compassion, should help motivate the oppressed to join
together to work for positive social change. But even this optimistic
note is tinged with a pessimistic note, as "the aim of a future
happy life for all" arises only "out of the privation of
the present" (Horkheimer 1933b p. 34); it is the existence of
current shared suffering that could lead to revolutionary social
change.



Along with Schopenhauer, Horkheimer's thoughts on suffering owe
a great deal to Freud. The notion that human beings have an inner
drive to overcome suffering is taken from Freud's early libido
theory (see Held 1980, pp. 43-44 and 197-198).
Horkheimer's most direct analysis of Freud in the 1930s is found
in "Egoism and Freedom Movements" (especially pp.
103-106), and the Freudian conception of inner drives will
further mark Horkheimer's later work, as will be shown in
SS4.2 below. In the 1930s Horkheimer was also influenced by Erich
Fromm, who was a member of the Institute at the time; for example,
shortly after the claim in "Materialism and Metaphysics"
that the desire for happiness is a natural fact, Fromm's work is
referenced. It is noteworthy in this regard that Fromm's work
from this period aimed to broadly draw together Freudian and Marxian
views. This connection can be seen in the link between the desire for
happiness and emancipation, as discussed in the next section.


### 2.2 Reason and Emancipation



When focusing on the affective nature of suffering, happiness, and
compassion in Horkheimer's view, one might get the sense that he
is relying on a sort of emotivism that shuns reason. But there is a
strongly rationalistic strand present in Horkheimer's early work
that is tied directly to his views on positive social change. In fact,
he describes suffering as resulting from a lack of rational social
organization, and proposes that any attempt to improve society must
involve making it in some way more rational. This view is in turn tied
to the broadly Marxian element in Horkheimer's early work, as
capitalism is criticized for creating the irrational social conditions
that lead to suffering.



To a large extent, this problem of irrationality is described as a
social coordination problem. Insofar as it is individual human beings
who suffer, and who desire happiness, individual welfare is a crucial
matter. This is made clear by the critique of Hegelian
"transfiguration," which is problematic partly because it
subsumes individual suffering and happiness within the absolute. At
the same time, individual welfare is still dependent upon a broader
social basis, so the life of society as a whole is pertinent to the
search for happiness. But capitalism has created a situation wherein
people are made to focus on their own individual welfare, without
considering anything other than "the conservation and
multiplication of their own property" (1933b, p. 19). Social
needs are thus handled through various disorganized activities focused
on individual needs, which in turn inadequately deals with the social
basis of individual welfare, thus detracting from individual welfare.
This kind of critique is found in some form in many of
Horkheimer's early essays (see, for example, 1934c, pp.
247-250 and 1935b, pp. 162-170).



Such an argument is made particularly clearly in "Materialism
and Morality," where Horkheimer discusses idealist, and
predominantly Kantian, conceptions of morality. One main thread of the
rather intricate argument made there is that there is a tension in
Kant's view, insofar as he places a radical emphasis on the
individual will, but also makes that will beholden to the universal
law described in terms of the kingdom of ends. This tension supposedly
comes from the bourgeois socio-economic context in which Kant
lived:



> 
> The categorical imperative holds up a "universal natural
> law," the law of human society, as a standard of comparison to
> this [bourgeois] natural law of individuals. This would be meaningless
> if particular interests and the needs of the general public
> intersected not just haphazardly but of necessity. That this does not
> occur, however, is the inadequacy of the bourgeois economic form:
> there exists no rational connection between the free competition of
> individuals as what mediates and the existence of the entire society
> as what is mediated...This irrationality expresses itself in the
> suffering of the majority of human beings...This problem, which only
> society itself could rationally solve through the systematic
> incorporation of each member into a consciously directed labor
> process, manifests itself in the bourgeois epoch as a conflict in the
> inner life of its subjects. (pp. 19-20)
> 



This passage makes it clear that the coordination problems associated
with the "bourgeois epoch" (i.e. the capitalist period)
are problems of irrationality. Furthermore, it makes clear that the
solution to these problems is to be found in the formation of a more
rational social order, which is described in terms of a socialist
planned economy. This point, then, provides the space where Horkheimer
can link his own materialist theory, and the work of the Institute, to
the broadly Marxian aim of emancipation through overcoming the
capitalist order. Because "the wretchedness of our own time is
connected with the structure of society" (1933b, 24) a social
theory that could make that structure's irrationality explicit
could help overcome that wretchedness. Furthermore, that irrationality
needs to be made explicit to the classes who suffer the most from it,
so they can take proper action. So Horkheimer's view connects
generally to the Marxian view of the proletariat as a critical force
in history, but unlike (on certain interpretations, at least) Marx, he
does not see history as necessarily moving the proletariat to
"critical consciousness" because of the irrationality
inherent in capitalist socio-economic arrangements. Rather, various
social and economic forces keep the proletariat from recognizing its
potential; for example there is a split between the unemployed, who
suffer most from capitalism but are disorganized, and the workers who
can be organized, but fear losing their jobs (Horkheimer 1934a,
61-65). The proletariat requires the help of the theorist. That
theorist must engage in a special kind of activity, however, which (as
the next section will show) must steer clear of two opposing
errors.


### 2.3 Critiques of Metaphysics and Science



One can get a sense of what Horkheimer means when criticizing
metaphysics by looking at "Materialism and Metaphysics."
There metaphysics is described in relation to Wilhelm Dilthey's
doctrine of "world views." For Dilthey, human beings
engage in metaphysics in an attempt to explain the enigmatic elements
of human life. In this attempt, certain characteristics of experience
are emphasized and developed into coherent world views that have
putatively universal validity, and describe the significance of the
world and human life (pp. 10-17). So "metaphysics,"
in this sense, amounts to a kind of intellectualized, theoretically
elaborated attempt at turning partial, finite experiences into a
comprehensive view of nature and human experience.



For Horkheimer, theories of this type are in part problematic because
"knowledge of the infinite must itself be infinite"
(Horkheimer 1933a, p. 27). But human beings are only capable of finite
knowledge, and can only pay attention to changing historical
conditions. If insights into the absolute are impossible, there is no
known ultimate order of things that grounds all other forms of
knowledge. Along these lines Horkheimer criticized Max Scheler's
metaphysical anthropology for holding that all human works and
achievements could be described in terms of some basic structure of
human nature (Horkheimer 1935b, p. 153). Rather than pursuing an
interest in understanding human existence, Horkheimer argues,
metaphysics obscures the proper understanding of human life. Many of
Horkheimer's early essays aim to show how the works of various
philosophers, past and present, are troubled in this way. For example,
along with the criticism of Dilthey in "Materialism and
Metaphysics" and the criticism of Scheler in "Remarks on
Philosophical Anthropology," there are (among others) critiques
of this type that attack Kant in "Materialism and
Morality," and Henri Bergson in "On Bergson's
Metaphysics of Time."



In each case, however, Horkheimer was not solely critical, and there
is a positive element that Horkheimer finds in metaphysics that serves
as a transition to his critique of science. For example, in the 1932
essay "Notes on Science and the Crisis," he applauds
"postwar metaphysics, especially that of Max Scheler" for
developing "a method less hindered by conventional narrowness of
outlook" (p.6). Similarly, in the 1934 essay "The
Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy," Horkheimer
agrees with Dilthey and Bergson (and also Nietzsche, all three under
the aegis of *Lebensphilosophie*) insofar as they critique
scientism and formalistic rationalism. Metaphysics is, in general,
right to try to engage in some form of synoptic theorizing, although
it takes it too far. But the opposite extreme, of which Scheler,
Dilthey, and Bergson are critical, fits with Horkheimer's
conception of the state of the sciences.



The critique of the sciences developed in the early texts moves along
two lines. First, the sciences are criticized for being overly
specialized. For example, in the inaugural address Horkheimer
complains of "chaotic specialization" (p. 9). The danger
of focusing on technical minutiae is that researchers become insulated
from one another, and lose the ability to use one another's
resources. The result is a lack of unification and overall direction.
Just as he favors a planned economy, Horkheimer wants the
"setting of tasks" in scientific research to be brought
under rational control, so empirical researchers can work together
toward broader ends. Second, as noted in "Notes on Science and
the Crisis," science "has no realistic grasp of that
comprehensive relationship upon which its own existence and the
direction of its work depends, namely, society" (p. 8). All
human work, be it in the sciences or anything else, depends on a
broader context which supports it, and the activities that are
associated with the social interests prevalent at any given time
affect the direction of scientific research. There is no "view
from nowhere" from which empirical research begins, but only
socially situated standpoints. Horkheimer expands on this point to
argue that when empirical research misses its social roots, it also
misses the effects the "direction of its work" might have
on society. Science has a responsibility to society that can only be
filled if its various research efforts are knit together within a more
comprehensive framework that takes society and its improvement as its
object.



This is largely repeated in other works that criticize
"positivism." The fact that the Frankfurt School mounted a
strong critique of positivism is quite well known, in part because of
the so-called "*Positivismusstreit*" of the 1960s,
and Horkheimer also uses the term frequently, especially in his later
works. The critiques of science and positivism make the same basic
 points.[3]
 Consider the critique of logical positivism in the 1937 essay
"The Latest Attack on Metaphysics." There Horkheimer
argues that insofar as logical empiricism "holds only to what
is, to the guarantee of facts" (pp. 133-134), it tries to
insulate the individual sciences from broader interpretation. Thus
positivism disconnects science from society and robs it of its
emancipatory possibilities, because brute facts can only grasp the
present, and the possibility for changing the status quo in the future
is lost.



The crucial point to note is that the critiques of metaphysics and
science work together, and are meant to open up a space between the
two where materialist social research should operate. Philosophy
maintains metaphysics' goal of producing a synoptic view of
human life, but it does so in a merely provisional way, which is open
to empirical research that genuinely follows the contours of history.
Science, on the other hand, maintains its rigorous empirical methods,
but must open itself up to the role it plays in the broader social
framework. In the inaugural address, Horkheimer thus claims that there
must be a "continuous, dialectical penetration and development
of philosophical theory and specialized scientific practice" (p.
9).


### 2.4 The Epistemology and Methodology of Interdisciplinary Research



Horkheimer's conception of interdisciplinary social research is
rooted in, broadly construed, both empiricist and realist views.
Horkheimer speaks often of such research as aiming at
"facts," as seen in SS2.1 when he refers to the desire
for happiness as a natural fact. This connects to a kind of realism
seen most directly in the 1935 essay "On the Problem of
Truth." "Materialism" he tells us, "insists
that objective reality is not identical with man's
thought," and truth is determined by the "relation of the
propositions to reality" (pp. 189, 194). But this realism has to
be qualified; materialism is distinguished from idealism through the
appeal to an objective reality outside of our thinking, but it is
further separated from metaphysical realism by its recognition that
our knowing is historically bounded. Along these lines, Horkheimer
admits to holding to a correspondence theory of truth, but notes
that:



> 
> 
> This correspondence is neither a simple datum [nor] an immediate
> fact...Rather, it is always established by real events and human
> activity. Already in the investigation and determination of facts, and
> even more in the verification of theories, a role is played by the
> direction of attention, the refinement of methods, the categorical
> structure of the subject matter--in short, by human activity
> corresponding to the given social period. (p. 190)
> 
> 
> 



Here we find Horkheimer's epistemological considerations echoing
his critique of science. Presumably the "real events and human
activity" that grasp objective truth involve empirical research.
But because (as discussed in the critique of science) empirical
research is always tied to a social context, one must see that the
truths it reveals are conditioned by the "human activity
corresponding to the given social period." Knowledge is always
affected by the historical changes in our methods noted. But more than
theoretical or methodological changes that shift scientific theories,
Horkheimer sees knowledge as being marked by our practical interests.
This is why a strong metaphysical conception of reality is unavailable
to us; all thinking is marked by practical and theoretical interests
that are partial and subject to historical change.



But this point cannot be taken too far; truth is neither wholly
determined by our practical interests nor by theory-dependent
conditions of verification. When it is claimed that truth is dependent
on the "relation of propositions to reality," Horkheimer
means both of those to be given equal weight. While the weight put on
"propositions" (or better, human conceptual activity)
removes the possibility of a metaphysical theory of reality, it does
not remove reality. But because all inquiry into truth is historically
and socially mediated, it is constantly open to adjustment. This
points out why the "continuous, dialectical penetration"
of philosophy and science spoken of in the inaugural address is
necessary. Objective truths have to be grasped empirically, and the
work of the specialized sciences is thus necessary to determine the
truth of the current state of society. But "truth is
advanced" only when "human beings who possess it stand by
it unbendingly, apply it and carry it through, act according to it,
and bring it to power against the resistance of reactionary, narrow,
one-sided points of view" (Horkheimer 1935a, p. 4). This
requires that empirical research be saved from "chaotic
specialization," and interpreted through an adequate theoretical
framework. It is noteworthy in this regard that toward the end of the
inaugural lecture, Horkheimer states that it is appropriate for the
head of the Institute to also hold a chair in social philosophy, as
was not the case with his predecessor who worked in the
"specific discipline" of political economy. For
Horkheimer, it was properly the job of the philosopher to plan out and
guide the interdisciplinary work of the Institute.



Historical exigencies kept the Institute's early researchers
from implementing this program. They did press on with their empirical
and theoretical efforts during the time of upheaval in the 1930s,
producing various small studies in the *Zeitschrift fur
Sozialforschung*, and the larger *Studies on Authority and the
Family*. It is clearly the case, however, that there were many
difficulties in carrying out the empirical research that was used in
those studies (see the historical discussion of this period in
Wiggershaus 1994, 149-156). Even if we set aside the historical
difficulties that beset the Institute during this time, there is still
reason to question whether Horkheimer's interdisciplinary
program could have been carried out successfully. One might doubt, for
example, that the philosophers who formed the core of the Frankfurt
School, including Horkheimer himself, were actually open enough to the
sciences. Jay 1996 (pp. 130-131), Wiggershaus 1994 (p. 151), and
Wolin 1992 (pp. 56-58), argue that they were not, such that
their theoretical works (especially in *Studies on Authority and
the Family*) were not really integrated with the empirical
studies. Perhaps more damningly, Bonss 1993 argues that this
failure comes from faults internal to Horkheimer's
methodological and epistemological considerations such that "the
interdisciplinary claim amounts to no more than an external formula
for integration" (p. 118). This seems fair insofar as Horkheimer
spent a great deal of energy claiming that empirical and theoretical
research should be combined, and explaining why they should be
combined, but did very little to explain *how* they would be so
combined. It remains to be shown if one might reactivate
Horkheimer's intentions while providing a better explanation of
how such integrated research might actually work. Clearly, however,
Horkheimer would come to gradually doubt the efficacy of such a
program; one can begin to trace out this shift by examining the 1937
essay "Traditional and Critical Theory" (this separation
of the 1937 essay from the earlier "materialist" works
roughly follows arguments in Dubiel 1985).


## 3. "Traditional and Critical Theory": Summation and Dissolution of the Early Program



To an extent, Horkheimer's materialist theory is encapsulated in
his most famous and widely-read essay from the 1930s,
"Traditional and Critical Theory." The essay is often
referred to as being "programmatic," highlighting the
notion that it summarizes the philosophical and methodological views
that were meant to guide the work of the Institute (see, for example,
Schmidt 1993, p. 34, and Ingram 1990, p. 108). This is not wrong, but
can be misleading if overemphasized. At the same time as it summarizes
the earlier work, "Traditional and Critical Theory"
evinces a transition to Horkheimer's later critiques of reason
and enlightenment (a similar point is made in Benhabib 1986, pp.
149-163). The most obvious change occurs in the name Horkheimer
gives to his favored view, as he shifts from "materialism"
to "critical theory." But the changes are more than
cosmetic. For example, the critique of "traditional
theory" subtly shifts the terms of the critiques of metaphysics
and positivism. Also, the role of the theorist vis-a-vis society
changes. In part, this prefigures later views.



The titular forms of theorizing correspond (as noted at the beginning
of the 1937 "Postscript," p. 244) to those found in
Descartes' *Discourse on Method* and Marx's
critique of political economy, respectively. So the overarching point
of the essay can be summarized fairly succinctly; it describes a form
of "traditional" theory that follows Descartes'
methodology, examines the weaknesses of such theory, and then opposes
to traditional theory a superior Marxian "critical"
theory. The critique of traditional theory largely follows the earlier
critique of the sciences and positivism, and in this sense is a
summation. Again, the fact that the sciences do not recognize their
presence in a broader social framework is emphasized. Traditional
theory misses the fact that that "bringing hypotheses to bear on
facts is an activity that goes on, ultimately, not in the
savant's head but in industry" (p. 196).
"Savant" is the derisive term Horkheimer uses throughout
the text to refer to the traditional theorist, and the savant does not
recognize that the economic (and thus currently capitalist) structure
of society shapes scientific work. The savant further misses the
suffering caused by that social structure, and the fact that science
is complicit in this oppression. Critical theorizing, on the other
hand, is "a human activity which has society itself for its
object" (p. 206); it overcomes the blindness of the savant by
openly and purposely examining the way in which theory is immersed in
a particular historical and social setting, and it seeks to critique
that social setting for emancipatory effect. This relies on a form of
immanent critique, tied to the suffering of the oppressed; the
theorist must seize on the meaning of the experience of the oppressed
and develop it into a coherent critique of existing society. To this
end Horkheimer notes that if the critical theorist's
"presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an
expression of the concrete historical situation but also a force
within it to stimulate change, then [the critical theorist's]
real function emerges" (p. 215).



This general symmetry with the earlier program belies certain
important changes to the theory, however. The very beginning of the
text, which discusses traditional theory, shows a subtle shift from
the earlier work. Traditional theory is first linked with the natural
sciences, for which "theory" involves a set of logically
linked propositions that are consonant with empirical facts. The
logical coherence of such a set of propositions is then emphasized,
and connected to Descartes' method. Horkheimer goes on to
suggest that such a conception of theory has an inherent tendency to
move toward "a purely mathematical system of symbols."
Formal logic and reasoning thus become a main target of criticism.
This is not a radical departure from Horkheimer's earlier
critique of science, since, for example, in "Notes on Science
and the Crisis," he objects to the rigid, mechanistic character
of the scientific method. But the earlier texts focus more on a
problem that is external to the sciences. There is no coherent
"setting of tasks" prior to the engagement in empirical
research, and the results of empirical research are not knit into a
broader theory that can have emancipatory intent. The earlier essays
largely ask for the sciences to go about their normal business within
an interdisciplinary setting that would correct these problems. In
"Traditional and Critical Theory," on the other hand, the
critique strikes more directly at the formalism inherent in the
sciences' own methodology, such that the problem is internal to
the sciences. This provides one clear transitional point, insofar as
formalism will be a primary object of critique in Horkheimer's
writings from the 1940s.



Another interesting shift is that the critique of metaphysics largely
falls out of the picture. For some commentators, metaphysics is
folded, along with science, into traditional theory (see Brunkhorst
1993, 74). But this does not seem entirely correct, because in the
midst of criticizing positivism, Horkheimer notes that there is,
"lurking" in positivism's emphasis on facts,
"something like a reaction against the alliance of metaphysics
and oppression" (p. 232). This claim harkens back to the
notion, described in places like "Materialism and
Metaphysics," that scientific attention to facts, when properly
construed within materialist research, can keep philosophy from
overlooking actual human suffering. But such references are few, and
Horkheimer does shift the discussion of science in such a way that it
takes over parts of his earlier critique of metaphysics. For example,
he criticizes the sciences, in a manner that is not common in earlier
essays, for the way they subsume facts under universal concepts (pp.
224-226). This critique of universal concepts is tied to the
critique of formalism; Horkheimer finds fault in the fact that the
sciences relate facts to concepts in terms of the "relation of
classes to instances" which can be "accomplished by a
simple deduction" (p.225). Critical theory is then contrasted
with this overly simplified universal-particular relation insofar as
it constantly reexamines the relation of facts to universal concepts,
and sees them as fitting together in a dynamic relationship that must
be carefully charted. The implication is that logical formalism leads
the sciences to form static universals into which all particulars can
be neatly placed. Since the sciences are attending to facts in
engaging in such an operation, the critique does not exactly match up
with the criticism that metaphysics turns a blind eye to the world.
But as those facts are misconstrued through formalism, the upshot of
the critique is the same; actual social existence has not been
adequately incorporated into theory because of the creation of a false
universal. This formalism is contrasted with the fact that critical
theory is "the unfolding of a single existential judgment"
(p. 227). Displaying the contradictions inherent in capitalist
society, and fixing on possibilities for emancipatory change, does not
involve the scientific subsumption of facts within a logically ordered
conceptual system. It rather involves unfolding and elaborating on an
insight that one initially acquires simply by existing in (with
"existing in" taken in the robust sense of living and
acting in) that society.



The way this point is construed displays the most crucial difference
between "Traditional and Critical Theory" and its
antecedents. Horkheimer's attitude toward the possibility of
social change is less optimistic, and the critical theorist is
described as having a somewhat antagonistic relationship with the
oppressed. This fits with a general shift in the Frankfurt
School's work from the 1930s to the 1940s corresponding to a
lack of faith in the possibility of emancipatory social change. In his
1937 essay "Philosophy and Critical Theory," (which he
wrote largely as a response to and counterpart with "Traditional
and Critical Theory") Herbert Marcuse rhetorically asks what
happens "if the development outlined by the theory does not
occur? What if the forces that were to bring about the transformation
are suppressed and appear to be defeated?" (Marcuse 1937, 63)
"Traditional and Critical Theory" is worried precisely
with these questions. For a variety of reasons, including obvious
social and political exigencies, Horkheimer and his associates would
become less and less confident that the oppressed classes could become
a force for change. Horkheimer clearly did not believe that compassion
and the desire to overcome suffering could, on their own, motivate
social change. Consider the assertion in "Traditional and
Critical Theory" that while the oppressed strive for happiness
they do not know how to achieve it, so the theorist must step in and
help the oppressed come to critical consciousness. "Even the
situation of the proletariat is...no guarantee of correct
knowledge" (pp. 211-215); the significance of suffering is
not always evident to those who experience it, and it is the job of
the social theorist to elaborate on this significance in such a way
that it can have practical effect. "Traditional and Critical
Theory" holds out the hope that this task is possible, but it is
noteworthy that the critical theorist is described as being set over
against the oppressed, as "it is the task of the critical
theoretician to reduce the tension between his own insight and
oppressed humanity in whose service he thinks" (p. 221).



Horkheimer would become less and less confident that the tension could
be so reduced. He also ominously notes that while the "commodity
economy" might at first usher in a period of progress,
"after an enormous extension of human control over nature, it
finally hinders further development and drives humanity into a new
barbarism" (p. 227). This passage states the main themes that
would dominate Horkheimer's work in the 1940s, which would be
marked by an increasing pessimism in the ability of rational,
theoretical activity to halt that drive toward barbarism.


## 4. The Critique of Reason and the Domination of Nature



In the late 1930s, Horkheimer described all of his efforts as working
toward a project on dialectical logic (Wiggershaus 1994, 177). This
"dialectics project" would, through many twists and turns,
develop into ideas presented primarily in two books published in 1947.
Horkheimer was the sole author of *Eclipse of Reason*, which
appeared originally in English. The book incorporates and expands on a
series of lectures delivered at Columbia University in 1944, and, as
Horkheimer writes in its preface, presents "in epitome some
aspects" of his work with Adorno from that time (p. vi). That
work with Adorno would also produce *Dialectic of
Enlightenment*, a collaborative text that was first published in
1947, after having been distributed as a limited edition typescript in
1944. It would become the most famous work of the "first
generation" of the Frankfurt School, and is surely the work most
commonly associated with Horkheimer's
 name.[4]
 The rest of this section will review the major themes of
Horkheimer's work from the 1940s, considering both *Dialectic
of Enlightenment* and *Eclipse of Reason* together.


### 4.1 The Critique of Instrumental Reason



It is noteworthy that the text of *Eclipse* would eventually be
published in German as "*Zur Kritik der instrumentellen
Vernunft*" ("On the Critique of Instrumental
Reason"). Both *Eclipse* and *Dialectic* are
nuanced texts that present a number of themes, but if there is one
overarching theme to the work from the 40s it is, as that German title
suggests, the critical description of how reason collapses into
irrationality through its emphasis on instrumental concerns. What is
at stake here is made most clear by the first chapter of
*Eclipse*, which is straightforwardly titled "Means and
Ends." Instrumental reason is interested only in determining the
means to a goal, without reasoning about ends in themselves. In
*Dialectic*, the Enlightenment is largely equated with the
advance of instrumental reason, and through instrumental reason,
Enlightenment turns against itself. This is noted in the very
beginning of the text: "Enlightenment, understood in the widest
sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human
beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly
enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity"
(p.1).



While the strong emphasis on instrumental reason's domination of
nature (which will be more fully discussed in SS4.2) is new to the
work of the 1940s, it picks up on themes present in Horkheimer's
earlier work. A prominent component (particularly in
*Dialectic*) of the critique of instrumental reason is a
critique of formalistic rationality, which evokes the criticism of the
Cartesian mathematical method in "Traditional and Critical
Theory." On the face of it, one might question the necessary
link between "formal" and "instrumental." But
Horkheimer and Adorno equate formalism with the drive to make nature
calculable, and calculability is assimilated to usefulness. Thus
formalistic reason becomes a species instrumental reason. Along
similar lines, the critique of positivism is repeated in
*Eclipse* (pp. 40-62). All parts of nature that cannot be
calculated and formalized fall out of the Enlightenment's
scientific picture of the world. This scientific picture is further
reproduced through activities which seek to dominate nature, thus
instrumental-scientific activity creates a reality to fit this
picture. The inexorable drive of instrumental reason causes this
distorted picture to be seen as the only true picture of the world
(Horkheimer 1947a p. 33).



Moreover, all elements of society, not just scientific research, are
touched by the progress of instrumental rationality. Motivated by
self-preservation, people seek protection from various powerful groups
(sometimes called "rackets," see Schmid Noerr 2002, and
Stirk 1992 ch. 6). Instrumental rationality causes society to fragment
into these various competing cliques. But this fragmentation is
attended by cultural homogenization, as displayed by the chapter in
*Dialectic* titled "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment
as Mass Deception." The general thrust of that chapter is that
instrumental rationality has assimilated culture to an industrial
model, which leads to a leveling and homogenizing of that culture. At
points, this homogenizing move is described as though it is
necessarily all-encompassing, as when the authors write that
"anyone who resists can survive only by being incorporated. Once
registered as diverging from the culture industry, they belong to it
as the land reformer does to capitalism" (p. 104).



*Eclipse* also presents a slightly different view of
instrumental reason, which is equated with "subjective
reason," and contrasted with "objective
 reason."[5]
 At the beginning of "Means and Ends," Horkheimer notes
that "the average man will say that reasonable things are things
that are obviously useful," and then notes that it is through
"classification, inference, and deduction...the abstract
functioning of the thinking mechanism," that one is to determine
what is thus reasonable (p. 3). Usefulness is further equated with
whatever works in favor of one's self-preservation. This is why
instrumental reason is subjective reason; it is thought oriented to
the subject's preservation. Objective reason (which Horkheimer
largely associates with history's great metaphysical systems
from Plato to German Idealism), on the other hand, seeks to root truth
and meaning, which should be the proper ends of thought, within some
comprehensive totality. Objective reason is interested in ends, while
subjective reason is interested only in means. Subjective reason thus
falls into incoherence, because as the drive toward self-preservation
becomes more and more all encompassing, any real conception of the
significance of what is to be preserved is lost. Subjectivity is so
oriented toward self-preservation that the drive toward
self-preservation is the only end left. An interesting comparison can
be drawn here with the earlier critique of capitalist social
arrangements discussed in SS2.2 above. There the similar point is
made that the drive to fulfill self interests is ultimately self
defeating. But there is a crucial difference; in the works from the
1930s this is clearly said to be the fault of irrationality, and it is
supposed that more rational social arrangements could overcome the
problem. In the works from the 1940s, rationality itself is
impugned.



This description of subjective reason thus displays one way in which
reason works against itself, and so falls into irrationality. A more
famous way that this movement is displayed is through one of the
primary themes of *Dialectic*, viz. that "myth is already
enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology" (p.
xviii). Myth is already enlightenment insofar as myths are already an
attempt to control nature; "myth sought to report, to name, to
tell of origins, but therefore also to narrate, record, explain"
(p. 5). The interpretation of the *Odyssey* in Excursus I
serves as a concrete example of this point. In general, the
*Odyssey* maps out and rationally orders ancient myths, and
shows how humanity, in the person of Odysseus, goes about submitting
the mythological to rational control (pp. 35-40). Just as myth
prefigured enlightenment, enlightenment in turn becomes myth insofar
as our abstract categories become reified, leveling their relation to
nature and thus making them untrue. This is the case, for example,
with the formalistic scientific picture of the world mentioned above;
"the mythical scientific respect of peoples for the given
reality, which they themselves constantly create, finally becomes
itself a positive fact, a fortress before which even the revolutionary
imagination feels shamed as utopianism" (p. 33).


### 4.2 The Domination of Outer and Inner Nature



Instrumental rationality necessarily involves the domination of
nature. Taken in its most straightforward sense, this point has become
something of a commonplace. As the sciences developed during the
enlightenment period (and earlier, insofar as myth was already
enlightenment), technology also developed, at the service of
self-preservation. Technology involves making over nature for human
purposes. This movement ends up thwarting human preservation, however,
insofar as the destruction of nature involves the destruction of
humanity. This now fairly common line of critique is complicated in
Horkheimer's work from the 1940s, however, because instrumental
rationality's distortion of "outer nature" (nature
taken in the most straightforward sense), is directly tied to the
repression of "inner nature."



The concept of "inner nature" is tied to the Freudian
libido theory already mentioned in SS2.1 above. Our inner life is
most immediately, or "naturally," marked by various
drives, particularly the desire for pleasure (which would be akin to
the desire for happiness discussed above). On the Freudian view ego
development involves the suppression of these various drives (along
these lines Horkheimer directly mentions Freud in *Eclipse* in
discussing the way the child relates to the superego which embodies
the principles of father-figures; see p. 75). While the development of
the ego is necessary, undue repression of our inner drives leads to
pathological results. In Excursus II of *Dialectic*, this
repression of inner nature is related to Kant's moral theory,
insofar as it specifies that the will should follow reason against
inclination. This complete denial of inclination by calculating reason
finds its fullest expression (in an ironic suggestion that would
surely horrify Kant) in the writings of the Marquis de Sade. Pleasure,
in Sade's orgies, is submitted to rigorous order, such that the
rationalized pursuit of pleasure takes precedence over pleasure itself
(pp. 66-69). And importantly in this case it is not only the
inner desires that are subjugated; others people are subjugated in the
process of subjugating pleasure to organization. This is one instance
of Horkheimer and Adorno's broader claim that the domination of
nature leads to the domination of human beings.



The same points are made in *Eclipse* in the chapter "The
Revolt of Nature," where the domination of inner nature is
described as following necessarily from the domination of outer
nature. Instrumental reason leads us to dominate outer nature by
taking outer nature to be meaningless apart from the way it can
satisfy the prerogatives of our self-preservation. But this further
requires that our desires must be construed in such a way that they
can provide a clear guide for the technological and industrial
activity that makes use of outer nature. In this case,
"domination becomes 'internalized' for
domination's sake. What is usually indicated as a goal--the
happiness of the individual, health, wealth--gains its
significance exclusively from its functional potentiality" (p.
64). Lohmann 1993 suggestively sums up Horkheimer's point by
referring to the domination of outer and inner nature as a process of
"desubstantialization" (p. 392). This connects clearly
with the contrast between objective and subjective reason discussed
above. Nature loses its objective meaning, or in this sense, its own
"substance"; not only in the case of outer nature, but
also in the case of inner nature, because of the functionalization of
our desires and drives. *Eclipse* construes this in terms of a
loss of autonomy, which would involve our creatively developing drives
and desires into ideal ends that could orient the ways we act on our
environments (see, for example, 66). This can make sense of the
somewhat unique interpretation in *Dialectic* of Odysseus
telling the cyclops that he is "Nobody" (p. 53). As we
reduce our inner nature to instrumental functions, we lose any strong
sense of self, and thus lack the inner substance in a manner that
makes us, metaphorically, into nobodies.


### 4.3 Sources of Emancipation



The upshot of these views seems to be that reason is self-destructive
in a way that limits the very possibility of a rational critique of
reason. It is fairly common to interpret the work from the 1940s as
being so totalizing in its critique that it closes all avenues for
finding in reason the possibility for any emancipatory critique of
society (Habermas is the most famous exponent of such a critique, see
for example his 1984, pp. 366-399). One can certainly find much
pessimistic rhetoric in both *Dialectic* and *Eclipse*
that supports such a notion. But there are also elements of the text
that hint at the possibility for positive social change, such that the
emancipatory aim of earlier critical theory is not entirely lost.



The emancipatory aim is not lost, but it is perhaps obscured. In the
first essay of *Dialectic*, it is noted that "a true
praxis capable of overturning the status quo depends on theory's
refusal to yield to the oblivion in which society allows thought to
ossify" (p. 33). That "theory" and
"thought" are so emphasized is important. Relatedly,
Horkheimer disavows, in the preface to *Eclipse*, the idea he
should present a program of action, because "action for
action's sake is in no way superior to thought for
thought's sake, and is perhaps even inferior to it" (p.
vi). This does not necessarily separate thought from action, of
course, and the quote from *Dialectic* speaks of a "true
praxis." But genuinely emancipatory action is said to depend on
correcting problems of thought first, such that Horkheimer would
stress thought for thought's sake. Correcting these problems
would require freeing reason from instrumentality, which would mean
eschewing formalism. But this does not mean eschewing reason, if there
can be a kind of knowing that uses rational concepts while at the same
time moving beyond the static form of concepts associated with
scientific thinking. Such a view is closely associated with
Adorno's later work (see the entry in this encyclopedia on
Adorno, Zuidervaart 2008). It is sometimes argued that the unusual
literary style of *Dialectic* itself is meant to exemplify such
an attempt at escaping the ossification of thought (for an
interpretation that generally takes such a view, see Honneth 2007).
Along somewhat similar lines, modern art might have emancipatory
potential, in its ability to express something of the current state of
society through means other than formal reasoning. This is, again, a
view that is commonly associated with Adorno's thought. But
Horkheimer also presents such a view, especially in his 1941 essay
"Art and Mass Culture." There culture is criticized in a
manner similar to the discussion of the culture industry in
*Dialectic*, and a largely pessimistic picture of the
restrictive and homogenizing role of contemporary mass culture is
presented. But Horkheimer does note that some art can break free of
this and still help the human being "conceive of a world
different from that in which he lives." Such works (Horkheimer
mentions Joyce's literature and Picasso's
*Guernica*) can do so only negatively, however, by displaying
the difference between the human being and his or her "barbarous
surrounding" (p. 278; on Horkheimer's views on art see Jay
1993). In the case both of non-ossifying thought and modern art, the
emancipatory potential is found only in traces, presented in an
esoteric and perhaps abstruse manner. Such a conception of
"emancipation" now seems to be somewhat separated from the
experience of the proletariat, and is possibly evidence of elitism
(see Heller 2002). Whatever one makes of these criticisms, it is clear
that Horkheimer was less than sanguine regarding the possibility of
positive social change.



Horkheimer does suggest another avenue for emancipatory social change,
however. He notes in *Eclipse* that "there are some
forces of resistance left within man," and that "the
spirit of humanity is still alive, if not in the individual as a
member of social groups, at least in the individual as far as he is
left alone" (p. 95). Unsurprisingly given the tone of the text
as a whole, much of what follows that passage discusses the difficulty
of separating oneself from the homogenizing forces of society. But
Horkheimer does suggest that it is possible to engage in a kind of
non-conformism (without much of a description of what it would be
like), which comes through the "spontaneity of the individual
subject" (p. 99). The emphasis on individual action is tempered,
however, through the emphasizing of a point that brings the latter
parts of *Eclipse* back to one of Horkheimer's earliest
views; solidarity can be formed through the experience of shared
suffering, and philosophy should "translate what [those who
suffer in the face of oppression] have done into language that will be
heard" (p.109). How this happens is unclear, as is the
connection between individual acts of non-conformism and solidarity.
One might also doubt the reliance on the power of the compassion. For
a thorough discussion of *Eclipse* that examines these
potential problems, see Lohmann 1993. Whatever one makes of these
points, it is clear that this emphasis on suffering is the thread that
ties all of the periods of Horkheimer's work together, as it
would continue to be present in Horkheimer's last works.


## 5. Late Work



With his return to Frankfurt the year after the publication of both
*Eclipse of Reason* and *Dialectic of Enlightenment*,
Horkheimer's academic production would largely consist of essays
and lectures. He also left a number of unpublished texts from the
period, including a set of notes and aphorisms published shortly after
his death (along with a set of aphorisms from the early 30s titled
*Dammerung*) under the name *Notizen 1950 bis
1969*. There is no real systematic unity to these writings
(Habermas 1993, p. 51 even refers to them as "shot through with
contradictions"), but there are common themes that can be
explored.



One can, for instance, trace out Horkheimer's late views on the
tasks of critical theory. In a remark in *Notizen* from
1957-1958 titled "Critical Theory," he pursues the
idea mentioned in the preface to *Eclipse* that philosophy need
not be immediately related to practical action. Philosophy
"holds up a mirror to the world" but "it is no
imperative" (p. 148). It is as though Horkheimer wants to guard
against a caricature of his earlier views as blindly equating theory
and practice. But there is also a very pessimistic note sounded when
Horkheimer says that philosophy "has replaced theology but found
no new heaven to which it might point, not even a heaven on
earth" (p. 148). Horkheimer touches on these same themes in his
1956 conversations with Adorno in which they preliminarily discussed
producing a new (never finished) joint work. In the transcripts of
those conversations (which were published in 1989 as a part of
Horkheimer's collected works with the title
"*Diskussion uber Theorie und Praxis*") one
finds Horkheimer continually stressing the importance of linking
theory to practice without reducing the former to the latter. And
while he does at points seem to hold out a vague hope for such a
combination of theory and practice, he also pessimistically claims
that "it is easy to believe that the whole of world history is
just a fly caught in the flames" (p.39). Because of this
pessimism, critical theory takes on a primarily negative task. In
another note from a collection dated 1966-1969 titled "On
Critical Theory" he continues with the idea that no positive
conception of the good can be formed, but "if one wishes to
define the good as the attempt to abolish evil," such a view can
be formed, and "this is the teaching of Critical Theory"
(p. 237).



The negative conception of critical theory is closely related to the
renewed interest Horkheimer showed in Schopenhauer in his last works.
Schopenhauer is said, in the 1961 essay "Schopenhauer
Today," to be "the teacher for modern times" (p.
81). This is in part because Schopenhauer's work grasps the need
to focus on the suffering of the present as it is, without covering it
over with a false philosophical conception of the good. To a certain
extent this repeats the earlier emphasis on suffering and rejection of
metaphysics. But these points work in a much more pessimistic
direction, because, "according to Schopenhauer, philosophy does
not set up any practical aims" (p. 80). It rather focuses on
correctly grasping suffering. Schopenhauerian pessimism also connects
with an interest in negative theology in Horkheimer's late work.
In 1935, he would write that the religious belief in another world of
perfect justice, when uncoupled from "the inhibiting religious
form" amounted to a positive force for social change (Horkheimer
1935c, p. 131). In his late writings this combination of criticism of
organized religion and respect for the desire for the "wholly
other" would be further developed (see Siebert 1976). In
religious beliefs, if not in organized religion, Horkheimer would find
a desire for a better world that never forgets the suffering of this
world (see, for instance, Horkheimer 1963).



The overall tenor of Horkheimer's last writings has led some to
criticize him for falling into a backhanded form of conservatism (see,
for example, Bronner 1994, pp. 88-92). This criticism makes some
sense, especially when one considers the political climate of the late
1960s that served as a backdrop for his latest work. It is pertinent,
along these lines, that he was generally opposed to the radical
student movements, and he supported (with much qualification) the
Vietnam War as an attempt to halt the totalitarian movement of Chinese
Communism (on these points see Stirk 1992, 178-181). But
Horkheimer did not give up on the possibility of radical action
entirely. For example, *Notizen* ends on something of a
positive note by ( in the note "For Nonconformism")
holding out hope that the "critical analysis of
demagogues" might aid the practical work of those who are
attempting to create non-conformist collectives that work against
current society. But the primary possibility for hope discussed in
Horkheimer's later work is compassion, as seen at the end of the
1961 essay "The German Jews":



> 
> The decisive point--and the real task of education without which
> neither the Jewish nor the Christian nor the German cause is
> helped--is that men should become sensitive not to injustice
> against the Jews but to any and all persecution, and that something in
> them should rebel when any individual is not treated as a rational
> being. (p. 118)
> 



In a way, this passage sums up the aim of all of Horkheimer's
work, early to late. The task of education, and the task of the
critical theorist, is to foster such compassionate sensitivity to
injustice.