## 1. Basic Categories


### 1.1 The Heart-Mind and the Things-Events



In classical Chinese philosophy the meaning of the Chinese word
*xin* Xin , which literally refers to the physical heart,
is not limited to its common connotations. Unlike Western definitions,
the Chinese metaphorical understanding of this notion not only denotes
this organ as the center of emotions, but also as the center of
perception, understanding, intuition and even rational thought. As
ancient Chinese believed that the heart was the center of human
cognition, the notion of *xin* is most commonly translated as
"heart-mind" in philosophical discourses. This
understanding was determined by the absence of the contrast between
cognitive (representative ideas, reasoning, beliefs) and affective
(sensation, feelings, desires, emotions) states.



In classical Chinese epistemologies, each person's
self-awareness was based upon a holistic understanding of the world,
which was structured as an interactive relationship between human
beings and nature (*tianren heyi*
Tian Ren He Yi ). The unity of all cosmic beings was
seen in terms of the organismic and dynamic wholeness of nature and
society. Hence, self-awareness as the basis of any kind of
comprehension originated with the awareness that one's own being
was organically embedded and interwoven with (rational) indeterminate,
constitutive cosmic structures. The heart-mind which represents the
crucial part of this self-awareness, is innately equipped with the
basic structure of (moral) recognition.



The origins of this tradition reach far back into pre-Qin intellectual
history. The human heart-mind was not only posited as the seat of the
concept of mind or consciousness and thus the source of both emotions
and reasoning, but was also perceived as a kind of sense organ by the
ancient Chinese. Indeed, Mengzi (372-289 BC) sometimes even
views it as the principal sense organ, responsible for selecting and
interpreting the sensations transmitted to it by other sense organs
(Mengzi CTP: *Gaozi shang*, 15). In other words, while the
latter enabled perception, the heart-mind enabled the comprehension of
external reality or that part of reality transmitted by the sense
organs. In *Guanzi*, a philosophical work ascribed to the
legalist politician Guan Zhong (7th century BC, although
probably dating much later) the leading function of mind does not
refer merely to the sense organs, but also to all other major organs
as for instance intestines or bladder (Guanzi CTP: *Jiu shou*,
6). Later on, such an approach was typical of the legalist scholars,
who set the concepts of Confucian hierarchy upon absolutist
foundations. Such discourses also recall the relation between the
(inferior) body and the (superior) spirit. However, in the early
Chinese philosophical texts hearing and seeing seem to be regarded as
the most important senses in that they play the most significant role
in acquiring knowledge (Geaney 2002). In most ancient Chinese
philosophical discourses the body-mind relationship was seen as an
organic unity, determined by the principle of complementarity. This
led to the establishment of bodily recognition (*tiren*
Ti Ren  or *tiyan* Ti Yan ) that belongs to
the fundamental methods of perception (Ni 2002: 287) in traditional
Chinese epistemology.



Thus, with the exception of the Mohist school which elaborated some
divisions regarding the problem of *things as they are*
(*shi* Shi ) and *things as they appear*
(*ran* Ran ) (*Mozi CTP*: *Xiao qu*, 8), the
heart-mind as the inherent organ of perception was seen as
continuously integrated with the phenomena of the external world that
manifested themselves in the notion things-events (*wu*
Wu ). Hence, instead of establishing a clear demarcation line
between the subject and the object of comprehension, human perception
and recognition of reality were mostly seen as a product of a
coherent, structurally ordered and complementary interaction between
the heart-mind and the things-events. This continuity of internal and
external worlds prevailed in classical Chinese epistemology until the
11th century, i.e., till the earliest beginnings of
Neo-Confucian philosophy, when it was further developed.


### 1.2 Names and Actualities, Language and Meaning



The harmonic regularity, which represents the elementary postulate for
the comprehension process, has been linked to questions of language
and its relation to the world. The realization of such regularity has
therefore been preconditioned by language which was intended to
provide a formal framework for social understanding. The
standardization of language (and thus of cognitively reflected
perception) had to be realized in accordance with the structural
regularity of existence. According to most scholars, the elementary
categorization which defined the essential and formal assumptions of
classical Chinese epistemologies was therefore closely connected to
issues concerning the regulation of the relationship between the
structure of language and reality. This categorization has been
expressed in the bipolar complementary relationship between names or
concepts (*ming* Ming ) and actualities (*shi*
Shi ).



The Confucian glorification of the perfect, harmonious and utopian
society of the past was also reflected in the discourse on *Proper
Names* (Lunyu CTP: *Zi lu*, 3), which envisioned a society
in which everyone lived in accordance with the original meaning of
that which expressed their social position. According to this
approach, words in ideal, past society incorporated the core of the
realities denoted by them, while the crisis of the Warring States
period (475-221 BC) emerged from the growing discrepancies
between the names (social positions) of individuals and their actual
behavior. The ideal conditions for society could therefore only be
established when everyone acted in accordance with their (social) name
(Lunyu CTP: *Yanyuan*, 11).



In contrast to Confucius, Mo Di (ca 650-200 BC), the founder of
the Mohist school, questioned the existence of an ideal language (the
essence of the notion *ming*) to which (external) reality and
society had to adapt. Instead of shaping social interactions according
to language standards, which Confucians viewed as incorporating the
essential structure of natural order and humaneness, the Mohists
adopted the opposite approach, arguing that since language was a means
for transmitting realities, it was language which had to adjust to
such realities and not vice-versa. According to Mo Di, the criteria
for such adjustment had to be based on actual social needs, and not on
the idealized and alien models of a bygone era.



However, in both cases, the realization of a regulation that could
provide a framework for a social understanding needed to be
preconditioned by the standardization of language, which is a possible
factor in the problem of the relation between actualities
(*shi*) and proper naming (*ming*) became the basic
epistemological question in ancient China. Naturally, the question as
regards the normative criteria for such a relational structure arose
at the very outset of this approach. The standardization or
continuation (*chang* Chang ) of language had to be carried
out in accordance with the formal premises of a binary structured
(*shi* Shi  : *fei* Fei ) valuation
(*bian* Bian ). Only when these conditions were met, was it
possible to achieve the ultimate goal of pragmatically oriented
epistemology in classical Chinese discourses: every linguistic
expression, every name (*ming*) could (and should) therefore be
applied in accordance to the principles that determined actuality
(*shi*).



The adherents of the School of Names (*ming jia*
Ming Jia ) believed that, with respect to the concrete
situation to which language has been applied, each single thing could
have a single meaning. Gongsun Long (ca 325-250 BC)
understood this in a way in which mutual coverings of meanings could
only exist on an abstract level. He attempted to eliminate semantic
overlapping, or at least to reduce it to a level on which language
could still be overseen and controlled.



However, according to the Neo-Mohist school the semantic overlapping
of different terms was a natural quality of human language which meant
that the Neo-Mohist philosophers saw no need to eliminate it. They
were far more interested in the question of language as a means for
categorizing the natural and social worlds.



Semantic approaches occupied a privileged position within these models
of thought. These proto-epistemological discourses would have a
decisive impact on later developments in this specific area, most of
which took place between 2nd and 6th centuries
AD. This epistemological shift followed the debate on the nature of
the relation between names (or concepts) and realities (*ming*and *shi*), which was later essentially upgraded within
the so-called Neo-Daoist discourses on the relation between language
and meaning (*yan yi* Yan Yi ), i.e., between
comprehension and interpretation. However, these philosophers of the
Wei Jin era (265-420) also began to investigate the structure of
meaning in a way that was no longer limited to the sphere of the
concrete, existing, objective, external actuality (Tang 1955: 68). The
focus of the scholars from this period was no longer limited to
responding to the questions concerning "proper" behavior,
i.e., "proper" rituals, or formulating wise maxims that
inspired people to a wiser, more ethical life, leading to a more
harmonious society. Instead, they were interested in the question of
expressions and in investigating the relations between these maxims or
sayings and the reality to which they referred. This meant determining
which names were suitable for denoting certain things and which were
not and, conversely, which sort of realities could be designated by
certain names, and which could not. Based on these investigations,
they tried to establish a system, based on the semantic structure of
names (*mingli lun* Ming Li Lun , see Tang 1955:
66) that divided specific concepts from one another, in order to be
able to identify the errors and misapprehensions that resulted from
the improper use of names. In effect, these scholars discovered the
epistemological dimension of meta-language, which was certainly a
higher level of thought than that of simple teachings that merely
implied direct and one-dimensional reasoning about things and the
external reality. According to Tang Junyi (1955: 66), teachings
formulated at this level were more abstract and belonged to higher
cognitive levels. They were teachings about "how teachings were
made". The principles derived from them were principles of
"how principles were established". This new dimension, in
turn, would lead them to analyze the relation between human reasoning
and their own cognitive concepts and, ultimately, these concepts as
such.



In later, pre-modern critical approaches to philosophical thought, it
was exposed that even though names do not comprise the meanings of an
original Heavenly essence, they should not be regarded as arbitrary;
the naming of reality has to be performed in accordance with the
objective and generally valid principles. The prime innovation in this
regard was Dai Zhen's (1724-1777) emphasis on the concept
of the "exhaustive comprehension of concrete facts (actualities)
(*jinqi shi* Jin Qi Shi )" pertaining to the
reality we seek to comprehend (Xia 1996b: 417).


### 1.3 Knowledge and Action



In traditional China knowledge and the way in which it is obtained
(method of comprehension) was viewed as an important element of human
existence. The dispute as to which of the elements forming the binary
categorical pair of knowledge and action (*zhi*, *xing*)
had priority, constituted one of the crucial debates in traditional,
as well as modern Chinese epistemology. In the context of the
classical holistic worldview that was inherently permeated with
ethical values, the recognition of reality was linked to the active
involvement of humanity in their interactive relationship with their
social and natural environment. Knowledge (*zhi*) was thus seen
as a valuable factor, necessarily and inextricably linked to human
activities and the implementation of social practice (*xing*):
any separation of knowledge and (social) practice was equated with the
separation of human beings from the world in which they have found
themselves. The close proximity between knowledge and action was seen
as the close proximity between an individual and the world, because
action was a means for his/her self-transformation and the
transformation of the world in the world. Hence, the unity or
non-unity of knowledge and action was always a measure of the unity or
non-unity of humanity and the world (Cheng 1989: 207).



The crucial aspect of the unity between knowledge and action (*zhi
xing heyi* Zhi Xing He Yi ) has been emphasized
and upgraded in the developing course of Neo-Confucian philosophy
during the Song and Ming dynasties by Wang Shouren (alias Wang
Yangming,1472-1529). This holistic thesis not only defined the
entire ethical foundation of the epistemology of the School of
Heart-Mind (Xin xue Xin Xue ) but is also typical of most
similar philosophical precepts. (Wang 1933: Xu Ai yinyan, 5) 



In the 17th century, the Academy of the Eastern Forest
(*Donglin shuyuan* Dong Lin Shu Yuan ) and the
materialist philosopher Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) advocated the
priority of action (*xing*). Since this position was in
opposition to the views of the orthodox Neo-Confucians, and since it
represented a new, predominantly materialistic opposition to the
Neo-Confucian tradition, it set the stage for the ideological
struggles which took place during the last Chinese dynasty. The
contribution of scholars from the School of Practical Learning
(*shixue* Shi Xue ) is especially valuable in the
context of the further development of the binary category of knowledge
and action. Due to their rediscovery of the orthodox classics and
their unstinting emphasis on the significance of the practical
applicability of ideas, they not only consistently placed the archaic
connection between knowledge and action at the center of
epistemological thought, but also gave it a more concrete emphasis, as
in the relationship between thought and (political) practice. This
rediscovered and somehow remodeled traditional connection would
subsequently influence the great majority of later Chinese theories of
knowledge, while also underpinning one of the crucial approaches to
the specifically Chinese understanding of Marxist philosophy. In his
essay "On Praxis" (*Shijian lun*), even Mao Zedong
explicitly argued for a similar epistemological and axiological
primacy of praxis over theory (2014: 8). It should be pointed out,
however, that in their social theories, Chinese Marxists subscribed to
the idea of the inseparability and dialectical relation of both
categories, which in the context of Chinese ideational tradition had
always been viewed in terms of complementary bipolarity. Although they
considered social praxis as the element which imparted meaning to any
(theoretical) reasoning, it was precisely this kind of renewed
synthesis of knowledge and action which formed the epistemological
bridge linking the classical Chinese tradition to the new ideas of
Western Modernity.


## 2. Specific Features


### 2.1 Relational Epistemology



The naturalistic epistemologies that prevailed in Western discourses
were dealing with the external world (or objective reality), which was
to a great extent independent from the subject of comprehension.
Chinese approaches to knowledge can be called relational
epistemologies, because they refer to relations. This applies not only
to radical holistic epistemologies, which denied the notion of
substance, but also to a number of contemporary theories which
advocate a strict division between the subject and object of
comprehension (see Xia 2000: 4)



Chinese relational epistemology was based upon viewing the world as a
complex structure composed of relations, intersections and interacting
feedback loops. Specific Chinese models for investigating questions
related to knowledge were thus premised upon a structurally ordered
external reality; since natural (or cosmic) order is organic, it
naturally follows the "flow" of structural patterns and
operates in accordance with structural principles that regulate every
existence and are manifested in the concept of *li* Li .
In this worldview, the human mind is also structured in accordance
with this all-embracing but open organic system. The axioms of our
recognition and thought are therefore not coincidental or arbitrary,
but follow this dynamic structure. In this view, the compatibility or
correspondence of both the cosmic and mental structures is the basic
precondition that enables human beings to perceive and recognize
external reality (Rosker 2010: 79-82).



In most traditional discourses (with the exception of the Mohist
school, The School of Names and certain representatives of the
Neo-Confucianism), the focus upon relations was linked to the unity of
the subject and object of comprehension. If we posit that the relation
represents the object of comprehension, we must also specify that this
object is not automatically to be seen as a counter-pole to the
subject of comprehension. Relational epistemologies are not based upon
a strict division between these entities, nor upon a strict (or
necessary) demarcation of what, with respect to the subject of
comprehension, we are accustomed to see as the external or internal
world. Therefore, the methods used by certain philosophers in various
currents of the Chinese tradition, are by no means decisive for
defining the positions of the subject and the object of comprehension,
or the nature of their mutual relations. The methods for exploring
(external) reality (*gewu* Ge Wu ) and introspective
recognition (*fanxing* Fan Sheng ) were both important as
perceptive tools that primarily served to understand relations.
However, these relations can be either continuous or discontinuous.
This means that the relation between *A* and *B* can be
changed into a relation between *A* and *C*. In Chinese
epistemologies, such de-composition and changing of positions is in
the nature of comprehension (Zhang 2002: 78). In this context,
knowledge (*zhi*) was primarily understood as recognition
(*shi* Shi ) of the structural principles (*li*) of
the all-embracing Way (*dao*), which, among all other entities
of being, was also expressed in linguistic terms.



The relation as a basis or a central object and goal of any
recognition manifests itself on all levels of comprehension and
transmission of being. Hence, the relational aspect as a core of
comprehension was already apparent in the specific structure of
Chinese cosmology, which was based upon the holistic unity of humanity
and nature (*tian ren heyi*). The complexity and integrity of
relations in nature and society therefore represent a basic aspect of
Chinese epistemology. This aspect was expressed in all classical
debates, which were based upon the elementary traditional
epistemological categories of name (*ming*) and actualities
(*shi*). Relations also formed the basic postulate of
traditional thought which defined the nature of the central
epistemological relation between knowledge (*zhi*) and action
(*xing*). Primarily due to the impact of the Buddhist thought,
the ancient holistic approach to perception and understanding reality
through substance (*ti* Ti ) and functions (*yong*
Yong ) was later replaced by the subject (*neng* Neng )
and object (*suo* Suo ) of comprehension. This kind of
categorical demarcation that derived from the Indian tradition of
thought would subsequently, in the 19th and especially the
20th centuries, help Chinese philosophers gain a better
understanding of theories of knowledge in western philosophy, which
were based on the ontology of dividing substance from phenomena.


### 2.2 The Axiology of Comprehension



While in the most influential European theories, knowledge has mainly
been gained through reasoning, traditional Chinese thought understood
this question in a much broader sense, namely as something which also
(or primarily) stems from moral contents. Chinese epistemology also
included teachings of wisdom and dealt with questions such as
"how is metaphysics (or metaphysical wisdom) possible?"
and "how can an ideal personality be cultivated?" Hence,
Chinese epistemology focuses upon the internal relationship between
good and truth, between virtue and reason; it needs morality to
acquire knowledge, and regards epistemology and axiology as
overlapping (Xu and Huang 2008: 42). Thus, traditional Chinese, and
especially traditional Confucian epistemology, greatly emphasizes the
concept of moral cultivation. Confucius believed that all genuine
knowledge and comprehension arises from humaneness (*ren*
Ren ), and thus morality should be valued to gain knowledge (Lunyu
CTP: *Li Ren*, 2, 7). Classical Chinese epistemological
teachings of cultivation and theories of values both dealt with
criteria and methods that evaluate proper attitudes, ways of thinking
and feelings (Xu and Huang 2008: 39).



In contrast with the view that the human mind is defined merely by its
cognitive potential and could thus not be autonomous, Mengzi
introduced the concept of a moral Self which is incorporated in the
original heart-mind (*ben xin* Ben Xin , Mengzi CTP:
*Gaozi shang*, 10) i.e., the heart-mind of goodness and morality.
This presumption has been seen as utmost important and hence, exposed
by several modern and contemporary Confucians. In his interpretation,
Xu Fuguan (1902/03-1982) noted that the moral Self--at
least in terms of its basic characteristics--was already present
in the early Zhou Dynasty (10th century BC). When this moral
consciousness is seated within a person, it will--according to
this Modern Confucian interpreter (Xu 2005: 178)--naturally begin
to direct his/her life and guide his/her desires through something
s/he calls "moral reason" (*daode lixing*Dao De Li Xing ). In this context, Lee Ming-huei
exposes the importance of the Confucian humaneness (*ren*
Ren ), which he mostly analyses in the context of its embeddedness
into the Mencian theory of inherent morality (*renyi neizai*
Ren Yi Nei Zai ), which is comparable to Kant's
apriorism (e.g. Lee 2018: 37-8).



This spirit was focused on subjectivity; its bodily desires were
incorporated into its moral responsibility and they thus manifested
themselves in rationality and autonomy (Xu 2005: 34). Modern
interpretations also emphasize that this Mencian line of thought has
later been developed further and elaborated upon within the scope of
Neo-Confucian philosophy, especially Wang Yangming's concept of
innate moral knowledge (*liang zhi* Liang Zhi ).



However, due to the specific economic and political factors that
determined traditional Chinese culture, the traditional Chinese
concept of moral Self could not provide (or, at least, formulate) the
possibilities for gaining "objective" knowledge (i.e.,
knowledge not necessarily linked to morality) and exploring
"natural" phenomena. For Mou Zongsan (1909-1995),
this was the key ideological factor that explained why traditional
Chinese culture did not develop discourses of science and democracy.
He therefore argued that the traditional Confucian moral Self should
(temporarily) negate itself (*ziwo kanxian*
Zi Wo Kan Xian ), in order to make it possible for
these discourses to develop.



A similar critique of classical Confucian moral epistemology
was--although from a different perspective--formulated
already by his teacher Xiong Shili (1885-1968). Based on his
central thesis dealing with the inseparability of substance and
function (Rosker 2009a: 377), Xiong created an ethical system
rooted in the classical Confucian paradigm of the nobleman
(*junzi* Jun Zi ), defined as someone who possesses
the qualities of the "inner sage" and the "outer
ruler." The concept of the inner sage refers to spiritual
adjustment, while the concept of the outer ruler has to do with that
person's social and political activities. While this moral
directive, which was expressed in the ancient phrase *nei sheng wai
wang* Nei Sheng Wai Wang , was based on classical
Confucian political studies, Xiong criticized classical Confucianism,
especially the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties,
precisely in this regard, accusing them that their epistemologies
exaggeratedly emphasized the principle of inwardness and ignored the
social aspects of the binary category.


### 2.3 Onto-Epistemology



In the Chinese holistic tradition epistemology is inseparable from
ontology, as in its view of the world every object of cognition is
also cognition itself; the manner of its existence is thus linked to
our understanding of it. Because this connection goes both ways, i.e.,
their relation is not a relation of single sided dependency and
determination, but an interaction that includes mutual co-dependency,
we cannot state that this is a solipsistic conceptualization of the
world. The same as can be said for the perception of the existing
world can also be said for its comprehension and interpretation. This
cannot be separated from the wholesome, but changeable and totally
individualized existence of objects of cognition; this is clearly
manifested in the theoretical system of the so-called
onto-hermeneutics (*benti quanshi xue*
Ben Ti Quan Shi Xue ), which was developed by
Chung-ying Cheng (Cheng Zhongying) (see Nelson 2011: 335; Cheng
2008).



In the work of the representatives belonging to the realist currents
of Neo-Confucian philosophy, as well as in the later developments
which took place during the 16th, 17th and
18th centuries, especially in the formation processes of
new methodologies and the processes of incorporating the Buddhist
thought, this unity of reality and comprehension was modified through
a gradual constitution of a dualistic demarcation line manifesting
itself in the differentiation between the subject
(*zhu*Zhu , *neng* Neng ) and the object
(*ke* Ke , *suo* Suo ) of recognition. This
demarcation line has been additionally strengthened by the subsequent
influence of Western philosophy from the 19th century
onwards. The search for a synthesis between the classical Chinese
paradigm of the unity of existence and (its) perception on one side,
and the dualistic view, according to which both realms are mutually
separated on the other, led to the modern debates on the priority of
ontology and epistemology. These debates culminated in several
attempts to revive, modernize and re-establish the classical Chinese
view of structural, organic and dynamic links between ontology and
epistemology.


## 3. Classical Approaches



In the pre-Han era, the most influential epistemological debates were
conditioned by the question as regards the relations between language,
thought and reality. Hence, according to Chad Hansen (1989:
107-120), the classical Chinese discussions on language offers
new insights and a distinctive perspective on the developments of the
central discourses within this field.


### 3.1 Language and Comprehension



These debates were determined by the conflict between classical
Confucianism and orthodox Mohism, with the representatives of the
former advocating traditionalist positions, while the latter argued
for more utilitarian approaches (Hansen 1989: 108). In contrast to the
classical Confucian position which had been formulated in the
*Discourse on proper names* (see
 section 1.2)
 and follows the presumption that names imply the essence of
realities, this utilitarian position derived from their awareness of
the relativity of comprehension. Just as we can never know whether the
things we perceive are identical to reality, we can also never be
certain whether the meanings we express are actually understood in the
same way as they were intended (see Mozi CTP: *Jing
xia*,110).



The reaction to these traditionalistic and utilitarian positions
within ancient Chinese epistemology expressed itself in two different
epistemological viewpoints that can both be designated as
"uniformist". The foundations of the first approach were
established by the Confucian Xunzi (ca 230-310 BC) while the
central premises of the second were founded by his disciple and
founder of the Legalist school (*Fa jia* Fa Jia ) Han
Fei (280-233 BC).



Xunzi did not advocate the positions of pure traditionalism. And while
he saw his epistemology as an elaboration of the traditional Confucian
teachings, it can in qualitative terms be considered as a new reaction
to traditional approaches. In this respect, Xunzi can be placed among
the precursors of the new epistemology, which advocated universalistic
positions. However, Xunzi's own teachings were based upon
relativistic approaches. Because language depended on social
conventions, he knew how difficult it was to choose criteria for
selecting names. However, despite these views, he sharply condemned
the Mohist reformism, arguing that the Confucian system of
standardization was still the best possible way to ensure a
well-regulated and harmonious society. Contrary to the Confucian
*Analects*, he did not believe in the primary mission of some
ideal language which incorporated the essence of existing realities,
but considered names and linguistic concepts as merely arbitrary means
for expressing concrete (objective) social realities. Despite this
fundamental difference, for purely pragmatic reasons he continued to
advocate the Confucian *Discourse on proper names*, for he was
convinced that names (*ming*) also transmitted values, thus
serving the social order, and therefore had to be adequately
standardized (Xunzi CTP: *Zheng ming*, 4). He also argued that
the classification and categorization of names were not necessarily as
difficult as it first appeared, for the human senses perceived
different realities in a structurally similar way; this
physiologically conditioned similarity therefore provided a basis for
the formation of common linguistic conventions (Xunzi CTP: *Zheng
ming*, 5). These standardized agreements made a functioning social
coordination--including the connection between human acts and
moral postulates--possible. Names therefore had to be regulated
in such a way that they could serve the elite as a formal tool for
restoring and preserving their political power: It was precisely these
arguments which, in the works of his followers, would come to form the
basis for the legalistic epistemology that shaped the doctrine of one
of the most totalitarian governments in Chinese history.



Xunzi's disciple Han Fei developed a philosophy that combined
the basic concepts of the traditionalistic and utilitarian approaches.
His epistemology, which was based upon the concepts of authority
(*wei* Wei ) and advantage (*li* Li ),
represented a unified system founded on the idea of political
absolutism (see Han CTP: *Gui Shi*, 1).


### 3.2 Neglecting Linguistic Positivism



The second basic approach can be seen as derived from the negation of
the two positions we have just described, or their common features
and, in fact, denied the positivistic functions of language. This
approach also contained two different epistemological currents: the
first was pre-linguistic and had its main representative in Laozi (ca
6th century BC), while the second current, which found its
most famous exponent in the Confucian Mengzi, argued that language was
not necessarily innate (*Mengzi CTP*: *Gongsun Chou
shang*, 2.8, also see Hansen 1989: 110-111). Their moral
epistemology was equally based solely upon introspection.



However, while Laozi represented a current that could be defined as
pre-linguistic, and though the Daoist school differed from many of the
basic premises of Mengzi's teachings, Laozi's negation of
language closely resembles that of Mengzi. While Laozi suggests that
the natural behavior generated by our natural constitution requires
the abandonment of language, it is hardly coincidental that the
declarative Confucian, Mengzi never mentions the *Proper names*
discourse, which occupies such an important position in the
*Analects*. They both accept the action or behavior generated
by the natural human constitution. Although they disagree on how rich
and extensive these natural dispositions are, both scholars share the
common belief that behavior should primarily be guided through their
use (Hansen 1989: 110-111).



While Laozi's dao cannot be contained or inscribed within any
kind of linguistic structure, it still represents the basic cosmic and
moral force, creating and immanently governing everything that exists.
He viewed knowledge (in the sense of learning virtues) as a kind of
social pressure which impeded our natural spontaneity (Laozi CTP: 18).
In Laozi's view, every linguistic concept is determined by time
and space, and can therefore represent only a partial, incomplete
expression of reality, which he saw as integral, dynamic and
holistically structured. Consequently, in order to preserve the
naturalness of our existence, we must withdraw from all conventions,
including that of language itself. Laozi thus sought a radically
different process of comprehension: one of non-linguistic
introspection (Laozi CTP: 47).



Mengzi believed that the inborn qualities of human beings
(*xing* Xing ) are naturally disposed towards the good. If
individuals are in touch with their true nature, their actions will
inevitably tend towards the good (Allinson 1989: 17) without needing
to rely on linguistic maxims. In this sense, he formulated the first
anti-linguistic version of Confucian epistemology (Mengzi CTP: Wan
zhang shang, 5; Jin xin shang, 1, 5, 15; Liang Hui wang shang, 6).
With this approach, he wanted both to refute one of the central tenets
of Mohist theory, while also resolving (or avoiding) the central
problem of Confucian epistemology, i.e., the insertion of moral
principles into behavior patterns through linguistic interpretations
(Hansen 1989: 110).



According to Chad Hansen (1989: 111), Mengzi did not view language as
being an innate system which contained the essence of proper social
norms, and instead believed that all traditional Confucian conventions
were 'wired' into the human heart-mind (*xin*).
However, this view has been challenged by other sinologists (e.g.,
Shun 1997; Van Norden 2000; Ivanhoe 2002), who have pointed out that
only the four 'sprouts' (*si duan*
Si Duan ) of essential moral qualities (Ivanhoe 2002: 43) were
innate to heart-mind, and that these had to be properly cultivated in
order to enable human beings to comprehend the world and act in
accordance with moral virtues (Lee 2018: 36-9). But given that proper
names (*zheng ming*) did not represent a system of (moral)
recognition for Mengzi, such cultivation was not based on a shared
linguistic system or consensus (Mengzi CTP: *Jinxin shang*,
15). This position allowed him to formulate a series of well-grounded
arguments against the challenges presented by the Mohist school.


### 3.3 Proto-analytic Approaches



The next position which decisively influenced the further development
of epistemological debates derived from certain analytical approaches
based either upon isomorphic assumptions, as advocated by the
representatives of the School of Names (Ming jia), especially by
Gongsun Long, or upon linguistic relativism. The latter was elaborated
by the followers of the so-called Neo-Mohist school (*Houqi Mo
jia* Hou Qi Mo Jia ) through a purely formal
analytical method. However, the approach to the linguistic analysis of
the two most important representatives of the School of Names, i.e.,
Gongsun Long and Hui Shi (ca 370-310 BC), sustained
fundamentally divergent views regarding the relationship between names
and actualities, with Gongsun Long arguing that the ideal construct of
an accomplished language was still of crucial importance, and that
language and social reality were inseparably linked and semantically
overlapping (Xiang 2000: 52). His arguments were founded upon the
Confucian premise that the ideal application of language was based
upon a complete mutual congruency of the name and the object to which
it referred (Gongsun Longzi CTP 2014: *Bai ma lun*, 4). Despite
his idealistic stance, he believed language was not only a consecrated
structure which embraced the essence of all existence, but that the
crucial function of language remained that of denominating actualities
(Gongsun Longzi CTP 2014: *Ming shi lun*, 13). This is the
hypothesis which underpins his main arguments on this topic, entitled
*The Dispute on Names and Actualities* (*Ming shi
lun*).



Hui Shi instead believed names (*ming*) provided a basis for
categorizing reality (Xiang 2000: 51), a position which placed him in
direct opposition to Mohist approaches. His "constant"
relativism was also a response to Neo-Mohist realism, which was
founded upon formal distinctions as a necessary precondition for
comprehension. As his 11th paradox (see Zhuangzi CTP:
Tianxia, 7) indicates, the Neo-Mohist "obsession" with
definitions of particular terms (or names) was likewise redundant.



In any case, this analytic epistemological current of the ancient
Chinese tradition, which was rediscovered only in the latter half of
the 20th century, helped dispel a number of prejudices
concerning the methodological uniformity of classical Chinese thought
(Allison 1989: 8). Certain similar "realist" currents
within ancient Chinese discourses formulated additional
epistemological questions related to binary oppositions of identity
and difference (*tong/yi* Tong /Yi ), or the
consistency and quality (*jian/bai* Jian /Bai ) of the
objects of comprehension.



Gongsun Long's arguments were founded upon Confucius'
premise that the ideal application of language was based on a complete
mutual congruency of the name and the object to which it referred.
Despite his idealistic stance, he believed language was not only a
consecrated structure which embraced the essence of all existence, but
that the crucial function of language remained that of denominating
actualities (Gongsun Longzi CTP: *Bai ma lun*, 4). This is the
hypothesis which underpins his main arguments on this topic, entitled
*The Dispute on Names and Actualities* (*Ming shi lun*).
With respect to the concrete situation to which language has been
applied, each single thing could have only one single meaning. Of
course, this projection is in contrast with the usual application of
language, for people tend to use different names for the same objects.
In everyday language, the meanings of words usually overlap. Gongsun
Long attempted to eliminate this semantic overlapping, or at least to
reduce it to a level on which language could still be overseen and
controlled. The famous 'White horse not horse' debate was
an attempt to deal with these concerns.



For the Neo-Mohist philosophers, however, the semantic overlapping of
different terms was a natural quality of human language and,
consequently, they saw no need to eliminate it. They were far more
interested in the question of language as a means for categorizing
society.



However, given that the variegated complexity of language could not be
molded into a reliable regulatory structure within the linguistic
conventions (Mozi CTP: *Jing xia*, 140), they acknowledged the
*de facto* unreliability of language, concluding that a
general, valid standardization of language was impossible. In their
view, the formal indefinableness of language was, to a degree, a part
of its intrinsic structure (Mozi CTP: *Jing xia*, 168).



Instead of the endless search for definitions of the semantic
extensions of terms, the Neo-Mohists preferred to deal with questions
that addressed causal connections. However, their approach to these
questions differed greatly from that of formal logic in many respects.
They were disinterested in the attempts to construct an ideal
language, as expressed in the discourses on names; instead, they
focused on linguistic analyses, which led them to conclusions that
were diametrically opposed to Gongsun Long's ideas and the early
Confucian views on the relation between names and actualities.



More specifically, their analyses led them to conclude that the
connections between certain individual names (*ming*), which
were simply understood as arbitrary entities of language, were
multi-layered and incoherent. While some compound terms could embrace
semantic scopes that extended beyond all the partial meanings of the
individual *mings* (i.e., the linguistic entities of which they
were compounded), in other instances the exact opposite was true (Mozi
CTP: *Jing xia*, 102).



However, the fragments of their analyses which have survived do not
contain any substantial discovery that goes beyond the recognition or
acknowledgment of the inconsistent nature of linguistic structures.
Thus, in contrast to Gongsun Long, their investigations were not aimed
at establishing a universal linguistic system that could unify
divergent models of language application. A fundamental premise of
their work was that the formal shapes of naming could not embrace the
complex integrity of existence, as reflected in actualities. Language
could never attain, let alone go beyond actual existence;
consequently, the objective features of reality automatically
determined and limited the structures of language, and thus our
application of linguistic constructs and expressions (Mozi CTP: *Da
qu*, 25).



However, this did not mean that language was exclusively a product of
arbitrary social conventions. Despite its fundamental importance, the
only Neo-Mohist attempt to establish a formal linguistic basis for
this notion can be found in their analysis of the classical
distinction between identity and difference (*tong yi*, Mozi
CTP: *Da qu*, 22).



The issue here is the problem of the essential relativity of this
distinction with respect to various contexts, for the difference
between the two antipodes is by no means more constant than, for
example, the difference between the notions of largeness and
smallness, or length and shortness. From a realistic viewpoint, this
can appear as paradoxical, and this paradox was formulated and
analyzed by Hui Shi, a Nominalist philosopher who was the closest to
Daoist discourses. By means of his apparently paradoxical
suppositions, Hui Shi attempted to situate the problem of identity and
difference within the context of holistic relativity. Through his
exposition of contradictions, by which he showed the limits of the
semantic extensions of certain attributes, he wished to demonstrate
the relativity of time and space as expressed in the names
(*ming*) applied in different contexts.



One of his most significant contributions to the classical
epistemology of linguistic analysis can be found in his comment on the
general problem of identity and difference which, as we have seen, the
representatives of the Neo-Mohist school were unable to develop to a
concise conclusion (Hui Shi in Zhuangzi CTP: *Tianxia*, 7). He
claimed that any two things were always different in something, no
matter how equivalent they were in all other respects (otherwise they
could not represent two separate entities). Yet even two things that
seemed to be completely different were likewise identical in at least
one quality, since they were both parts of a unified structure
(otherwise, it would not be possible to express, or even think of them
in the framework of language).



Hui Shi's "constant" relativism was, of course, a
response to the Neo-Mohist realism, which was founded upon formal
distinctions as a necessary precondition for comprehension. As his
11th paradox indicates, the Neo-Mohist obsession with
definitions was likewise redundant (Hui Shi in Zhuangzi CTP:
*Tianxia*, 7). His categorization of identity and difference,
or of the radical relativity of objects, was thus based upon the
impossibility of conceptual definitions of reality, since every
linguistic comprehension was necessarily limited to a contextually
determined meaning which was incapable of embracing all dimensions of
the object of comprehension.


### 3.4 Egalitarian Epistemology



Although the Neo-Mohists were never able to formulate an exhaustive
response to Hui Shi's radical relativism, his contemporary
Zhuangzi (4th century BC) clearly found it to be an
important stimulus for his own thought, and was definitely influenced
by him when elaborating his own epistemological system. Zhuangzi
believed that because knowledge was infinite, the human capacity for
comprehension was too limited to enable us to gain any true knowledge
(Zhuangzi CTP: *Yang sheng zhu*, 1). Thus, he believed that
comprehension is always something relative (Zhuangzi CTP: *Qiwu
lun*, 11). As a result, we are lost in a labyrinth of real and
false recognitions. But this apparently tragic situation is mitigated
by the fact that we do not have to face it alone, we are always
accompanied by other people who are just as blind as we are. All of us
are busy dealing with questions of mastering our reality and thus with
questions of the indefinite nature of our existence (Zhuangzi CTP:
*Qiwu lun*, 3). Since we are determined by the limitations of
our senses, we naturally tend to acknowledge the truth of those kinds
of recognitions that happen to match our own value systems (Zhuangzi
CTP: *Yu yan*, 1). Ultimately, human subjectivity determines
what should be regarded as (true and universally valid) knowledge. The
apparent objectivity and independence of the human mind has repeatedly
been proven to be a false, illusory chimera, which only leads to
self-deception. The quality, the features and the extent of our
perception are always determined by the actual conditions of our
existence. Hence, our perception--and the actions resulting from
it--are always dependent upon external factors, even though
ultimately, every form of dependence is actually a form of
*self*-dependence. Of course, such dependence and determination
are connected to our ignorance, to our incapacity to recognize our
essence and the essence of our surroundings (Zhuangzi CTP: *Qiwu
lun*, 13).



Zhuangzi believed that acknowledging the relative nature of all
existence was still not sufficient in order to define equivalents and
distinctions (Zhuangzi CTP: *Qiwu lun*, 10). In each concrete
case, the structure of our cognition enables us to identify at least
one common or different quality, which then allows us to make a
distinction, no matter how atypical it might be.



This position of radical relativism was common to both Hui Shi and
Zhuangzi. They also shared a skepticism concerning the idea that the
categorical mechanism of identity and difference (*tong/yi*)
could provide an adequate basis for a universal, permanently valid
(*chang*) standardization of concepts or names
(*ming*).



Following the tradition of classical Daoism, Zhuangzi also believed in
the inherent inexpressibility of the holistic essence of all being.
This led him to espouse the classical Daoist method of comprehension,
i.e., introspection (Zhuangzi CTP: *Qiwu lun*, 5). Although he
did not offer an instant solution to the eternal issues that form the
heart of his philosophical discourse, he tried to create a new
approach to the complex problem of human interactions. For him, the
internalization of language is a process inherent to human nature,
just like eating, drinking and breathing, or anything else that
conditions our survival (Zhuangzi CTP: *Qiwu lun*, 9).



However, the uncertain connection between language and thought is not
a one-way street (Allinson 1989: 11) and, in fact, the communicative
potential of language was trapped on the narrow footbridge between
speaker and hearer, between transmitter and receiver. Therefore,
Zhuangzi believed that language was inseparably connected to
comprehension; in essence, they share the same qualities (Zhaungzi
CTP: *Qiwu lun*, 2). As a result, all linguistically determined
boundaries within holistically structured reality are, in fact, false,
since language cannot express itself (Zhuangzi CTP: *Qiwu lun*,
10).



Just like *dao* in its original function of the fundamental,
all-embracing essence of all beings, and just like our recognition of
this original path, language itself is also absolute in the sense of
the unity of all relative contradictions of which it is composed
(Zhuangzi CTP: *Qiwu lun*, 12).



Zhuangzi showed little interest in the problems that occupied the
majority of philosophers of his time, i.e., problems of connecting
different, individual minds into one comprehensible unity. He
evidently believed that the problems of inter-subjectivity were not
imposed upon us from outside; rather, he saw them as resulting from
our being trapped in patterns of socially determined ambitions. We
could never master our destinies by forceful interventions into the
integrity of everything that exists, neither by artificial and false
distinctions nor by absolute valuations. The reason for this was that
human existence was not subordinated to any external, higher powers
that could be controlled through comprehension (Zhuangzi CTP: *Qiwu
lun*, 3).



In such an egalitarian epistemology, each type of understanding is
equally possible. Zhuangzi's correlativity does not provide an
absolute perspective that could overrule the judgments or valuations
of any method of comprehension.


## 4. Buddhist Influences and the Neo-Confucian Epistemology


### 4.1 General Overview



Epistemology was the leading field of progress in Song-ming
Neo-Confucianism (Wen 2011: 271). Its systematic discussion began
after the Buddhist philosophy reached its high point in China. The
Buddhist distinction between the subjective perception (*neng*
Neng ) and the objects of comprehension within external reality
(*suo* Suo ) influenced already the earliest precursors of
this intellectual stream, such as for instance Shao Yong
(1011-1077). However, in this context the most influential
stream of thought was Chan-Buddhism (*Chan* Chan ). In
contrast to other schools of Chinese Buddhism, for example the School
of Pure Consciousness (*Wei shi zong*
Wei Shi Zong ), the Tiantai (*Tian tai zong*
Tian Tai Zong  ) and the Huayan (*Huayan zong*
Hua Yan Zong ) schools, Chan discarded traditional Indian
methods of realizing the Buddha-nature and proposed a teaching of
enlightenment in accordance with Chinese philosophical sensibility.
Its adherents, especially its last patriarch Hui Neng (638-713)
exposed the possibility of enlightening humans without the use of
words. The central topic of interest within this context shifted from
trying to understand what the world was, to understanding the world
and Buddha's wisdom. Since the latter issue falls within the
scope of understanding a certain kind of knowledge, this discourse
represented an innovative shift from metaphysics to epistemology.



In this shift of philosophical paradigms, Chan Buddhism infused the
relationship between heart-mind and things-events with a distinct
sensibility that derived from classical Chinese discourses: the
continuity of heart-mind and things-events (Wen 2011: 272). In this
way, the Chan teachings synthesized earlier Buddhist and classical
Chinese epistemology, which provided a starting point for the
Neo-Confucian epistemology.



According to Wen Haiming (2011: 271), the general line of development
in solipsistic epistemology could be drawn as follows: the
epistemology of Chan Buddhism and Li Ao's (772-841) study
of "*recovering human nature*" (*fu xing*
Fu Xing ) provided the foundations for Neo-Confucian
epistemology; Zhou Dunyi's (1017-1073) concept of
*creativity* (*cheng* Cheng ) and his epistemological
structure linking the Great Ultimate (*taiji* Tai Ji )
with the Great Ultimate of Humans (*renji* Ren Ji ),
as well as Shao Yong's teaching of *observing things*
(*guan wu* Guan Wu ) comprehensively raised the basic
questions of this new discourse; Zhang Zai's (1020-1077)
paradigm of *expanding one's heart-mind to be continuous with
things* (*da xin ti wu* Da Xin Ti Wu )
and Cheng Hao's (1032-1085) elaborations on *stilling
the nature* (*ding xin* Ding Xing ) served as the
basic frameworks and major discourses for Neo-Confucian epistemology;
Cheng Yi's Cheng Yi  (1033-1107) study of
*Heavenly patterns* (*tian li* Tian Li ) and Zhu
Xi's (1130-1200) *Exploration of things*
(*gewu*) reached their first peak in this new epistemology of
the Song and Ming periods; after them, another peak was reached in Lu
Jiuyuan's (1139-1192) and Wang Yangming's agreement
that *nothing is outside one's mind* (*wu xinwaizhi
wu* Wu Xin Wai Zhi Wu ). The final stage of
Neo-Confucian breakthroughs in the epistemology field can be found in
Wang Ji's (1498-1583) concept of *intentional
propensity* (*ji* Ji ) and Liu Zongzhou's
(1578-1645) teaching on *intention as the root*
(*yigen* Yi Gen ) of the heart-mind.


### 4.2 Subjective and Objective Knowledge



This distinction which was most often expressed in later,
17th century epistemology with the binary category of the
subject (*neng*) and the object (*suo*) of
comprehension, also definitely reveals the influence of Buddhist
thought upon the entire Neo-Confucian philosophy. In Chinese Buddhist
terminology, the term *neng* has namely also been used to
express the ability to perceive phenomena; the compound *neng
bie* Neng Bie , for instance, was placed in opposition to
the term *suobie* Suo Bie , whereas the first one was
understood as "that which differentiates" and the latter
as "that which is differentiated." The two terms together
(*nengsuo*) refer to active and passive ideas; *neng*
indicates the ability to transform and *suo* the object that
was transformed (Soothill and Hodous 2014: 337).



However, the earliest Neo-Confucian philosophers, such as Shao Yong,
developed similar epistemological distinctions in order to
differentiate between the subject (me, *wo* Wo ) and
object (thing, *wu*) of comprehension, gradually leading to a
direct definition of subjective and objective knowledge.



In his fictional dialogue between the woodcutter and his friend, the
fisherman (Xingli da quan 1989: XIII, 3b, 932), Shao Yong elaborated
the traditional distinctions between identity and difference into the
fundamental epistemological division between subjective and objective
comprehension. This development took place in a discourse on the
nature of comprehension and the relation between ourselves and the
things we perceive.



In the philosophy of the main exponent of the Neo-Confucian system of
thought, Zhu Xi, these categories were developed so as to become
crucial criteria for the proper method of comprehension (Zhu 1999: 14,
53). Similar to Shao Yong, he also argued for an objective
epistemological method and tried to avoid subjective projections upon
the object of comprehension (Zhu 1999: 11, 8). In this way, he tried
to define the separation between the subject (*zhu* Zhu )
and the object (*ke* Ke ) of comprehension (Zhu 1999:
45).



A few centuries later, Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) elaborated these
two basic categories from a realistic viewpoint, denied the classical
concepts of non-existence and emphasized the objective reality that
exists independently of human perception. Following the Buddhist
terminology, Wang denoted them as the comprehensive potential
(*neng*) and its material basis (*suo*). In the context
of Buddhist teachings, both the term *suo*, which referred to
the external reality and the object of comprehension, and the term
*neng*, which referred to subjective perception and the subject
of comprehension, were essentially empty (i.e., illusory), whereas
Wang includes them in his materially determined world of comprehension
and defines their relation as analogous to the relation between
function or applicability (*yong*) and (physical) substance or
essence (*ti*), with the latter as the primary and determinant
factor (Wang 1982: V., 122).


### 4.3 The Structural Principle as the Leading Principle of Comprehension



Following the Chinese Middle Ages, the main Neo-Confucian ontological
concept of structural pattern or principle (*li* Li ), as
opposed to vital creativity (*qi* Qi ), gradually evolved
into a new, crucial epistemological notion.



In the context of Neo-Confucian philosophy, things can generally be
recognized or understood through their basic structural principles.
Just as *dao* in classical Daoist cosmogony represents the
all-embracing fundamental law which manifests itself simultaneously
within every single entity of being, the Neo-Confucian *li*
expresses itself on both, the level of cosmic unity, as well as on the
level of its concrete manifestations. The nature of *li* is thus
both holistic and binary, transcendent and immanent. According to this
new aspect of being, knowledge can only be achieved by following these
principles of the external world.



Although *dao* as the elementary metaphysical force is abstract
and therefore cannot be apprehended directly, it can, in Neo-Confucian
thought be recognized through both intuition and reason. The
epistemological role of the concept *li* becomes even more
salient, for *li* was developed not only as the structural
principle that defines the concrete state of being of everything that
exists, but also as the leading structural principle of human reason
(see
 section 1.2).



After distinguishing between subjective and objective knowledge, Shao
Yong warns against subjectivity, which is a consequence of our
inability to recognize or understand structural principles underlying
reality, making him one of the first philosophers to apply the term
*li* in the Neo-Confucian sense. In this relatively new
context, he often applied the term *wu li* Wu Li 
(lit.: structural patterns or principles of things), which would, in
modern Chinese, serve as the translation of the Western word physics
(in the sense of physical science). Given his approach, it comes as no
surprise to find him stressing the distinction between
"true" recognition and false mysticisms. Zhu Xi also
advocated comprehension in accordance with the principle *li*
(Zhu 1999: 8, 25). Like Shao Yong, he was convinced that *li*was not only the structural principle that governs the existence
of all external things, but also a necessary and inseparable part of
the human heart-mind (Zhu 1999: 60, 6, 7). However, in Zhu Xi's
view the spiritual functions of *li* did not refer only to
human reason, but also represented the human ability to perceive and
comprehend the external world (Zhu 1999: 47). Following the priority
of moral principles within Confucian (and Neo-Confucian)
epistemologies, as the central and universal principle, Zhu Xi's
*li* also naturally incorporated ethical components (Zhu 1999:
8, 20).


### 4.4 Ultimate Knowledge and the Exploration of Things vs. Secluded Meditation



These new concepts led to a polarization of epistemology which also
manifested itself in the methods of comprehension. Neo-Confucian
philosophy presents two epistemological currents, which were named
"realistic" and "idealistic" (or
"intuitionistic") by Western sinology. Both were based on
the different portions of *The Book of Rituals* (*Li ji*
Li Ji  ), which is part of the classic Confucian canon.



The epistemology of the "realistic" current followed the
paradigms of the *Great learning* (*Da xue*
Da Xue ), which postulates the exploration of things
(*gewu*) for the purpose of attaining ultimate knowledge
(*zhi zhi* Zhi Zhi  ). These approaches were previously
advocated by Han Yu (768-824), a precursor of Neo-Confucianism,
and by most of the above mentioned Neo-Confucians such as Zhou Dunyi,
Cheng Yi and especially Zhu Xi (Zhu 1999: 14, 48). However, in Zhu
Xi's understanding the exploration of things (*gewu*) was
not limited to the process of investigation. In order to explore a
thing one should exhaustively recognize all of its qualities (Zhu
1999: 15, 3). For him, exploring things (*gewu*) and attaining
ultimate knowledge (*zhizhi*) form a unity (Zhu 1999: 15,
17).



The "idealistic" or "intuitive" studies of
knowledge of Neo-Confucian epistemology was derived primarily from the
*Doctrine of the Mean* (*Zhong yong* Zhong Yong )
and sought to achieve recognition of reality based upon the practice
of secluded meditation or concentration (*shendu*
Shen Du ). The main Neo-Confucian exponents of this
epistemological current were Li Ao and Cheng Hao. According to them,
the indeterminable cosmic force *dao* represented the only true
base of comprehension. The main goal of the introspection in the sense
of secluded meditation was thus to understand *dao* (Cheng and
Cheng 1981: I, *Yi Shu*, 13, 221).


### 4.5 Innate Knowledge



During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) this epistemological split
in Neo-Confucian philosophy manifested itself in the establishment of
two divergent streams of thought, represented by the
"realist" current of the School of the Structural
Principle (*Li xue* Li Xue ) on one side, and the
"idealist" School of the Heart-Mind (*Xin xue*
Xin Xue ) on the other. Wang Yangming, the most influential
representative of the latter, provided a crucial node in the
inextricable link between Chinese epistemology and ethics, something
that is especially evident in the main concepts of his epistemological
system: the ideas of heart-mind (*xin*), the unity of knowledge
and action (*zhi xing heyi*) and innate knowledge
(*liangzhi*). The latter notion represents an original, natural
truth in the sense of the basic recognition of the most profound
structure of existence. Innate knowledge is inborn and thus
necessarily implied in every person, forming an inseparable part of
the human heart-mind. In the same way as the heart-mind, of which it
is a part, innate knowledge also contains the basic structure of
natural principles (*li*) (Wang 1933: II, 57). This basic
epistemological concept also forms the foundation of Wang's
ethic in the sense of moral recognition, or the distinction between
good and evil (Wang 1933: III, 26). Thus, innate knowledge represents
the basic criterion for the recognition and evaluation of individual
comprehension, as well as social interactions. Since Neo-Confucian
ideology is based on the Mencian interpretation of ancient
Confucianism, this unity of innate knowledge and moral goodness is
quite unsurprising. Therefore, Wang pointed out that Mengzi, in
contrast to Xunzi, stressed the goodness of human nature. However,
innate knowledge is not merely a passive substance of ethical
comprehension. Through the process of "successful"
introspection, it also automatically leads to "proper"
(and, thus, morally good) action, and can therefore provide a
criterion for our behavior. Here, Wang, obviously influenced by Chan
Buddhism, tried to expand upon Mengzi's teachings, stressing
that the notions of good and evil are not absolute concepts, since all
that exists is regulated in accordance with the all-embracing and
all-encompassing structure of the natural order of cosmic reason, and
thus with the system of the structural, absolutely valid principles of
nature (*li*) (Wang 1929: II, 29a).



According to Wang Yangming, good and evil cannot be separated from
human "intention" (*yinian* Yi Nian ).
Hence, human action can only be evaluated in the context of specific
concrete situations. The impulse which tells us what is right
(*shi*) or wrong (*fei*) in a particular situation is,
once again, the concept of innate knowledge (*liangzhi*). As we
have seen, the binary category of knowledge and action and the
question of the relation between these two concepts represented one of
the fundamental problems of Chinese epistemology. Hence, "innate
knowledge", the inborn capacity in which the boundary between
knowledge and action apparently disappeared, was of utmost
importance.


## 5. Later Conceptual Developments and Modern Chinese Epistemology


### 5.1 Pre-modern Methodologies



At the threshold of the 18th century, Chinese
epistemologists sought to establish a new analytical and critical
methodology for "exploring things (*gewu*)."
Similar tendencies could be observed already in Wang Fuzhi's and
Gu Yanwu's (1613-1682) notion of evidence
(*kaozheng* Kao Zheng ). Gradually, they acquired greater
importance within the framework of new practice-oriented
approaches.



Wang and Gu profoundly influenced the epistemology of the School of
Practical Learning (*Xi zhai*) which consisted of two main
currents; the most important representatives of the first, Yan Yuan
(1635-1704) and Li Gong (1659-1746), followed the
essential approaches of Huang Zongxi (1610-1695) and Wang Fuzhi,
while the chief proponent of the second, the philosopher Dai Zhen,
founded his epistemological system upon Gu Yanwu's methodology.
Their emphasis on the practical, physical aspects of knowledge and the
significance of sensations led them to rehabilitate human feelings,
inclinations and desires as a driving force that motivated human
beings to seek knowledge. By so doing, they unknowingly prepared the
terrain for the later Chinese understanding of the European notion of
the individual as the subject of comprehension.



Dai Zhen is widely considered to be the first Chinese philosopher to
have described the relation between the subject and object of
comprehension by defining the subject's potential for
comprehension as a tool, which can be compared to light that makes
objects visible. Xia Zhentao (1996b: 405) especially indicates his
elaboration of the notions of the potential for comprehension (*xin
zhi shenming* Xin Zhi Shen Ming ), elucidation,
exposure and illumination (*zhao* Zhao ). Xia stresses that
Dai's reflective method, by which reality is perceived through
its reflection (*fanying* Fan Ying ) in the human mind,
pertains to basic theories of materialistic epistemology, given that
the objective reality (which is external to the subject of
comprehension) is seen as a necessary precondition of reflection (Xia
1996b: 405).



At this point we should mention China's first encounter with
Western thought, which slowly began to seep into the Middle Kingdom at
that time. During the 18th century, the Jesuit influence on
the Chinese academic world grew steadily.



Hence, Tan Sitong (1865-1898) believed that the central
Confucian virtue of humaneness (*ren*) is not merely an
ethical, but also an epistemological term that determines the social
function of the basic stuff of which everything is composed, namely of
ether, which makes it possible for people to experience circulation
(*tong* Tong ), i.e., one of the principal components in the
process of comprehension. In accordance with this mechanistic
understanding of concrete reality, circulation provides both the inner
and external conditions of perceiving, comprehending and transmitting
reality. In terms of inwardness, circulation makes the harmonic,
coordinated operation of the senses (*wu guan*
Wu Guan ), brain (*nao* Nao ) and nervous system
(*nao qi jin* Nao Qi Jin ) possible. Tan Sitong
was one of the first Chinese scholars who accepted the Western notion
that mind and consciousness arise from the brain and not from the
heart (*xin*), as was widely believed in traditional China.


### 5.2 Syntheses of Methods and Disciplines



The majority of 20th century Chinese epistemologists
advocated the conceptual divisions between the subjectivity and
objectivity of comprehension. While analytical and/or Marxist scholars
(such as Jin Yuelin) gave absolute priority to the rational method,
most Modern Confucians (principally Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan)
applied the intuitive one. He Lin drew attention to the traditional
complementary comprehension of reason and intuition (He 1982: 27). In
this context, the two methods are not only inseparably connected to
each other, but are also connected to the method of reasoning itself,
which is based upon distinctions. In his view, philosophers who apply
the method of intuition, simultaneously apply methods of formal logic
and dual differentiations; others, who apply the rational method, also
use the intuitive method, as well as dual distinctions. All three
methods, the formal analysis and inferences, as well as methods of
dual distinctions and intuition, are necessary compounds for any
philosophical activity (Zhang 2000: 75).



The epistemological discourses of the 20th century current
of the so-called Modern or New Confucianism (*Xin ruxue*Xin Ru Xue ) were rooted in the specific features of
traditional Chinese epistemological thought and defined by a search
for fruitful amalgamation with contemporary Western theories of
knowledge. In this field, they were most interested in the relation
between reason and intuition, for the latter concept belongs to
principle traditional epistemological notions, and the former to the
concepts that are crucial for the establishment of modernization
theories. The Western notion of intuition came to China in close
connection and with many connotations arising from Henri
Bergson's vitalism, was translated by the neologism
*zhijue* Zhi Jue . 



An important notion in Modern Confucian epistemologies is the advanced
concept of the traditional moral self, which in the new global
philosophies was intended to assume the function of a
"truly" autonomous cognitive subject. While this subject
acts and perceives the world as an individual, necessarily forming a
part of the social community, it is also ennobled by an infinite
heart-mind, which enables it to be aware of its unity with the
universe. This new, moral and infinite, limitless subject represents
an elaboration of the "traditional" Confucian concept of
the moral self, and thus may also be the active personality that can
sustain the idea of modernization. In the Confucian framework, this
self is autonomous precisely due to its rational and structural (*li*Li ) connection with all aspects of its natural and social
environment. Further, because this connection is also dynamic and
organic, it is capable of infinite forms of communication and
cooperation. For a Chinese model of modernity, i.e. for a modernity
permeated with humanism or mutuality (*ren* Ren ), these
forms of communication and cooperation are much more important than
formal laws of economy and official politics.



Modern Confucian epistemological notions, e.g. Mou Zongsan's
intellectual intuition, Tang Junyi's (1909-1978) concept
of sensual compatibility, Xiong Shili's and Liang
Shuming's (1893-1988) sinization of reason and intuition,
all represent the various Modern Confucian responses to the global
questions of the contemporary epistemology. These questions are linked
to the dilemmas of the modern subject, who is trapped within the
complex technologies of the profit-seeking world and has thus
forgotten the ethical dimensions that define their humanity.



Within the framework of his structurally ordered system of thought,
Zhang Dongsun decidedly rejected the Modern Confucian paradigm
expressed in the glorification of intuition as the most objective
mystical method for innate knowledge. Zhang believed that reason was
the only reliable and unequivocal method of comprehension; because it
led us to knowledge that was not only logically consistent but also
applicable, there was no need to search for any other, more reliable
method. However, the rational method was not one-dimensional and
undiversified, for it not only functioned in accordance to the pure
formal structure, but also with the aid of the so-called intuitive
insight (*touzhi* Tou Zhi ), which represented an
inseparable and complementary part of intuitive methods. Thus, by
proceeding from ratio centrism, Zhang Dongsun finally managed to
overcome the boundary between reason and intuition (Zhang 1924: 76).
However, according to him, the thing we are directly confronted with,
is neither reason nor intuition, but knowledge itself. Knowledge is a
result of reason, but it implies intuition on an unconscious level.
Intuition is not mysterious. It merely represents a process of
applying a philosophical "method of
counter-investigation", by which we peel away from the image of
knowledge the ultimate, most intimate thing. And this thing is the
pure, completely unregulated "that." (Zhang 1924:
64-65)



The Taiwanese Modern Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan tried to define
the position of reason within traditional Chinese thought by comparing
Western and Chinese culture, arguing that they were based on different
representational forms of human reason. He called the Chinese form
"functional or intensive" (*lixingzhi yunyong
biaoxian*
Li Xing Zhi Yun Yong Biao Xian ) and the
Western "constructive or extensive" (*lixingzhijiagou
biaoxian*
Li Xing Zhi Jia Gou Biao Xian ) (Mou 1995:
544-553). This distinction could be compared to the Kantian
differentiation between practical and theoretical reason. The
"reason" which appears in the functional representation is
a practical one. It is not abstract, but concrete, connected to actual
life. This reason can thus be equated with morality within the
personality (Mou 1995: 544-545). However, Mou endows functional
reason with intellectual intuition (*zhide zhijue*
Zhi De Zhi Jue ) which is--in contrast to
Kant's epistemology--a potential implied not only in Divine
consciousness, but also in the human heart-mind.



In his treatise on Kant's philosophy, Jin Yuelin established a
clear and insuperable demarcation between synthetic and analytical
propositions: if a certain proposition is synthetic, it cannot be at
the same time necessary or *a priori*; and if it is necessary
or *a priori*, it cannot be synthetic (Jin 1996: 46). This
difference is clearly of great importance for the elementary framework
of Jin's theory of knowledge. Modern Confucian epistemology
criticized a similar division, since ethics and their pragmatic social
implications were still at the heart of their theoretical efforts.
Feng Youlan also encountered many difficulties related to analytic and
universal (synthetic) propositions: on one hand, he did not wish to
abandon the universality of the metaphysical statements, because in
this way he could express the ideal of every single thing, but, on the
other hand, he tried to respond to the attacks against synthetic
propositions carried out by the Viennese circle (Jin 1996: 78).



Zhang Dongsun maintained that a pure form of either proposition did
not exist in reality. The absence of distinctions between analytic and
synthetic propositions implies the abolition of the demarcation
between (posterior) experience and (*a priori*) knowledge and,
consequently, between metaphysics and the (natural) sciences. Most
Chinese scholars from the latter half of the 20th century
argued that the reason for this demarcation was to be found in the
fact that metaphysics only referred to the formal regulation of
experiences, while science also explained their contents (Feng 1986:
166-167). However, some recent Chinese epistemological theories
likewise reject the reasoning behind such demarcations and criticize
the existence or methods of the discourses based upon them. For them,
both science and metaphysics explain experience; in addition, both
represent a formal kind of explanation. Hence, Zhang Dongsun
transcended the boundary between science and metaphysics, while Feng
was convinced that it was insuperable. In Zhang Dongsun's view,
the only difference between metaphysics and science lay in the fact
that science applied the postulate of relations, while metaphysics
applied the postulates of being and existence (Zhang 2002: 77).



This all-embracing, specifically Chinese tendency towards transcending
abstract demarcations ultimately also manifested itself on the level
of heuristics, with respect to the question of the nature of creating
theories. In the context of the neo-holistic research, which was, in
the field of epistemology, founded by Zhang Dongsun, and further
elaborated primarily by Zhang Yaonan, the demarcation between the
concepts of discovery (*faxian* Fa Xian ) and invention
(*faming* Fa Ming ) was also considered to be
artificial. This assumption was developed as a negation of Jin
Yuelin's paradigm which stated that theories could not be
created (or "invented"), but only discovered. Zhang
Dongsun denied this affirmation, declaring that there was no
qualitative difference between these two concepts (or methods), given
that science was not a reflection, but an explanation or
interpretation of the world. He argued that scientific discourses were
a method of selection, that is, they selected and isolated specific
entities in (originally chaotic) reality or nature, defining them as
facts, even though they only represented a kind of abstract reality.
By "discovering" facts in this way, science simultaneously
created them. Thus, the existence of facts co-existed with the results
of science. Although facts as such were not separated from nature,
they could not be a part of "pure" nature either, for in
Zhang's view, pure forms that would be separated from our
awareness, perception and apprehension, did not exist. However, since
Zhang Dongsun cannot be considered a solipsist, for whom mind or
consciousness is the sole "creator" of reality, there had
to be something apart from humans (or living beings), despite the
non-existence of substance. Of course, this "something"
was an (at least potentially) all-connecting and all-embracing
structure, which was neither material nor ideal in its essence. In
fact, this structure represented a concretization of manifold
relations. It was precisely here that contemporary Chinese theories of
knowledge once again revealed their traditional connotation.