## 1. Authenticity and Chronology



In the more exuberantly speculative days of the 19th century, the
authenticity of the *Laws* was rejected by various figures:
even the great Platonist, Ast, held that "One who knows the true
Plato needs only to read a single page of the *Laws* in order
to convince himself that it is a fraudulent Plato that he has before
 him."[1]
 Such skepticism is hard to understand, especially since Aristotle
refers to the *Laws* as a dialogue of Plato's in numerous
passages and today no serious scholar doubts its authenticity.



On the question of chronology, two external references are
helpful:


1. Aristotle tells us that the *Laws* is later than the
*Republic*, (*Pol.* 2.6) and
2. Diogenes Laertius (3.37) reports that it was unfinished at
Plato's death (and the text of the *Laws* itself shows
some signs of incompleteness and lack of
 revision).[2]



Platonic scholars also frequently appeal to stylometry (that is, the
quantitative study of the features of Plato's prose style) to
help to date the dialogues. Although the usefulness of stylometry is
sometimes questioned, it is widely accepted and the agreement of many
such studies allows us to divide the dialogues, with some confidence,
into three
 groups.[3]



> 
> Group 3: *Critias*, *Laws*, *Philebus*,
> *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Timaeus*
> 
> Group 2: *Parmenides*, *Phaedrus*, *Republic*,
> and *Theaetetus*
> 
> 
> 
> Group 1: the rest
> 
> 
> 



Drawing upon other evidence, it is reasonable to see the dialogues in
Group 3 as the latest. Given the length of the *Laws* (it is
the longest of the dialogues and is, roughly 20% longer than the
*Republic*), it seems likely that its composition overlapped
with the composition of at least some of the other dialogues in Group
3.


## 2. Overview



The *Laws* comprises a conversation in 12 books, set on Crete,
among three interlocutors: an unnamed Athenian Visitor (Plato's
spokesman in the *Laws*), Megillus, a Spartan, and Kleinias, a
Cretan. The Athenian proposes that the three discuss governance and
laws as they walk along the long road to the temple of Zeus. The first
two books of the dialogue consider the proper goal or end
(*telos*) of legislation, which turns out to be the virtue of
the citizens. They also contain discussion of topics, such as ethical
psychology and education, which will help them to understand how a
city could achieve this goal. The third book turns to a discussion of
the origins of political systems (*politeia*) and of changes in
those political systems, and attempts to draw lessons for the lawmaker
from the histories of various actual states, including Persia, Sparta,
Crete, and Athens. At the end of Book 3 (*Laws*
702B4-D5), Kleinias reveals that he has a practical use for just
the kinds of discussions they've been having: the cities of
Crete have decided to found a new city, to be named Magnesia, in a
long abandoned part of Crete, and he, along with nine others, is to be
responsible for doing so. He asks the Athenian to help in the
construction of the new city's constitution and laws. The
Athenian agrees, and proposes that they use a new method of law-giving
- one in which preludes which aim at persuading the citizens
come before the laws themselves. Books 4-5 contain an argument
for the use of preludes and the Great Prelude to the laws in general.
The Great Prelude to the laws in general ends in the latter part of
Book 5, after which the Athenian proceeds to sketch, often in
considerable detail, the constitution, the political and social
institutions, and the laws of this new city, along with the political
and ethical principles that justify them.



A brief sketch of the content and structure of the first 5 books of
the *Laws* follows. From that point on (after the end of the
Great Prelude), we will organize our discussion topically rather than
going book by book.


### Book 1



The dialogue begins with an investigation into the reasons for the
laws and social practices of Sparta and Crete. The Athenian argues
that laws ought to be justified not by reference to war - which
is how both Megillus and Kleinias first attempt to justify the laws of
their own cities - but rather by reference to what is best,
which is complete virtue (that is, courage, justice, moderation, and
wisdom, rather than courage alone). In fact, the Athenian says that
the complete virtue of the citizens as a whole should be the single
goal of the lawgiver (*Laws* 630C3-6; see also e.g.,
705D3-706A4,
 963A).[4]
 The Athenian also tells us that laws are true laws insofar as they
promote the happiness (*eudaimonia*) of the citizens
(*Laws* 631B; see also 715B, 743C-D). Immediately after
he first makes this latter claim, he draws a distinction between human
and divine goods and tells us that the human goods - like wealth
and health - are dependent upon the divine goods, of which
wisdom is first, then moderation, then justice, and finally courage;
he later describes this dependency by saying that the human goods are
good for someone who is virtuous but bad for bad men (*Laws*
661B-C). The dependency thesis helps Plato bring together the
two characterizations of the goal of the laws in terms of the
citizens' virtue and happiness, respectively: if virtue is
necessary for benefit and thus for happiness, promoting the happiness
of the citizens will require making them virtuous. This dependency
thesis, as well as the dual characterization of the goal of the laws,
raises but leaves unanswered questions about the precise relation
between virtue and happiness, however: for example, is virtue actually
sufficient for happiness, or is it simply
 necessary?[5]



The remainder of Book 1 is concerned with ethical psychology and
education: that is, with beginning the project of showing how a city
could produce citizens who possess complete virtue. This discussion
heavily emphasizes the importance of feeling pleasure and pain
correctly; the Athenian, in fact, claims that "[For] human
beings who inquire into laws almost their entire inquiry concerns
pleasures and pains, in cities and in private dispositions. These two
springs flow forth by nature, and he who draws from the right one, at
the right time, and in the right amount is happy."
(*Laws* 636D5-E1). This phase of the discussion begins
with the Athenian announcing his intention to discuss the institutions
which promote courage, which he swiftly notes should cover the ability
to resist pleasure in addition to the ability to resist pain. He
proposes controlled symposia (drinking parties) as the institution
which will train this ability to resist pleasure, to the surprise of
his interlocutors. As this sort of training will serve as an important
part of ethical education, this suggestion leads the Athenian to
discuss education in general. Education involves the direction of a
child's pleasures, desires, and love towards his adult
occupation; in the case of the citizens, education must draw their
souls to a desire and love of being a perfect citizen who rules and is
ruled in accordance with justice (*Laws* 643C-D).
Pleasure is clearly central to the account of ethical psychology and
education in the *Laws*, and one important question to ask of
the *Laws* is why this is so. Is coming to have the correct
pleasures simply of instrumental value (insofar as it blocks one route
to akratic action and vice or focuses the child on the things which he
must come to find valuable), or are at least some of these pleasures
good in their own right, e.g. in virtue of their
 contents?[6]



The discussion of Book 1 closes with a model of the soul which, the
Athenian says, will make it clearer what virtue and vice are, and will
help us to understand what effects various sorts of educational
practices, such as the symposia, should be expected to have on the
human soul (*Laws*
 645C).[7]
 The model is one of a puppet
 (*thauma*)[8]
 made by the gods, possessing three cords, two, hard and iron,
representing the expectations of pleasure and pain, and one, soft and
gold, representing reason or calculation (*Laws* 644D). This
model differs in noteworthy ways from the image of the soul as
composed of a human, a lion, and a hydra-headed beast in the
*Republic* and the charioteer and two horses of the
 *Phaedrus*.[9]
 The three elements in the puppet image *are* affections rather
than *possessors* of affections; and the most important
division here is between the two iron cords and the golden cord, with
no fundamental difference (of the sort that we see when spirit is
called reason's natural ally in the *Republic*) between
the two iron cords. How to explain the differences in the model of the
soul that we get here from the ones we get in other dialogues is
another important question for interpreters of the
 *Laws*.[10]


### Book 2



Book 2 begins by returning to the definition of education; the
Athenian here tells us that education consists in training a child to
feel pleasure and pain, and to love and hate, correctly, before he can
understand the reason why (*Laws* 653B-C). Education in
music and gymnastics is particularly crucial for the project of
ethical education. The Athenian tells us that young children naturally
desire to move and to make noise, and are naturally capable of taking
pleasure in order in movement and sound (*Laws*
653D-654A); one explanation for the centrality of music and
gymnastics in the educational program, then, could appeal to the role
of music and gymnastics in training this capacity to perceive and take
pleasure in
 order.[11]
 Book 2 focuses primarily on musical education and the standard of
correctness in music; Book 7 returns to the topic of education in
gymnastics, and lays out the rest of the educational program. These
topics will be discussed further in section 7 of this article (Poetry
and Education).



Part of the discussion of poetry in Book 2 deals with its content. The
Athenian praises the Spartans and the Cretans for compelling poets to
teach that the good man is happy and for giving no attention to the
bad man; he also asserts that the poet ought also to teach that human
goods are dependent upon virtue and that the most pleasant life, the
most just life, and the happiest (most *eudaimon*) life
coincide (*Laws* 662C-E). This latter doctrine has great
significance given that, as the Athenian says next, no man will
voluntarily do anything unless it involves more pleasure than pain;
this passage has also been thought to provide evidence that Plato
remains a rational eudaimonist in the
 *Laws*.[12]
 The Athenian tells us that the views that the poet is to be compelled
to espouse are both most true and most useful for persuading the
citizens to live virtuously (*Laws* 664C).


### Book 3



Book 3 abruptly moves to a discussion of the origin of government,
beginning from the disorganized condition in which human beings would
have been left after one of the great catastrophes which the Athenian
takes to have destroyed human society over and over again. After
describing how cities would have first come about out of this
disorder, the Athenian turns to the discussion of the histories of
actual states. He first focuses on the histories of Sparta, Argos, and
Messene, with particular attention to the features of the Spartan
constitution which saved it from the corruption which afflicted its
neighbors. This discussion highlights the destructive power of
ignorance about what is to be valued (*Laws* 688C) and the
danger of entrusting too much power to a single, corruptible,
individual (*Laws* 691C-D). The Athenian then turns to a
discussion of Persia and Athens. The Athenian begins this discussion
by reminding us that a lawgiver ought to aim at his city's being
free, wise, and a friend to itself (*Laws* 693B). He then
claims that there are two forms of constitution from which the rest
are derived, monarchy and democracy, and attempts to show the virtues
of the moderate forms, and the vices of the extreme forms, of each
constitution by considering Persia's development from a moderate
to an extreme monarchy and Athens's development from a moderate
to an extreme democracy. The moral of this discussion is that only a
mixture of monarchy and democracy can allow a state to be both wise
and free (*Laws* 693E) - a state which is strikingly
characterized in the case of the earlier, more moderate form of
Athenian democracy, as voluntary slavery to the laws (*Laws*
 700A).[13]
 After this discussion has been completed, Kleinias announces that the
discussion has had a practical point: he, along with nine others, is
to craft laws for a new Cretan colony. He asks for the help of the
Athenian and Megillus in building up the laws and institutions of this
new state, which is the project of the rest of the *Laws*.


### Book 4



Book 4 opens with a discussion of the way in which the geographical
location and features of the proposed city of Magnesia affect the ease
or difficulty of creating a virtuous city. It then turns to consider
the method of settlement of the proposed city, and the practical
challenges of forming a group of settlers (whether they be from one or
many states) into a genuinely new society. Here, the Athenian suggests
that the easiest way to form new and good institutions in a society is
for it to be blessed with a good tyrant who wishes to create
institutions conducing to virtue. The Athenian moves on to ask what
type of polity they ought to form; he answers by saying that the best
ruler a city can have is god, and that they ought to imitate the rule
of god by ordering their city in obedience to reason, the immortal
element within themselves. These regulations set down by reason are to
be called law (*Laws*
 714A).[14]



The Athenian then imagines their address to the new settlers. He
begins by emphasizing the power of god over human affairs and suggests
that each man ought therefore to become dear to god. The way to do
this, he says, is to come to be like god, i.e. to become virtuous
(*Laws* 716A-E). After discussing the worship of the gods
and the veneration of parents, the Athenian pauses to reflect on the
way in which the laws that he is beginning to describe are to make the
city happy (*Laws* 718B). He distinguishes between two methods
of law-giving, one appropriate to free men and another to slaves,
illustrating this by means of a distinction between a slave doctor who
simply prescribes what he thinks to be right to each of his patients,
and a free doctor who investigates the ailment with his patient and
instructs him as to the nature of his disease as much as possible,
prescribing a treatment only with the patient's consent
(*Laws* 720A-720E). The analogous method in the case of
law-giving, the Athenian tells us, is to offer preludes to the laws
that aim at persuasion, and it is this method that he proposes to
follow in establishing the laws of Magnesia, condemning the
alternative as the employment of mere force (*Laws*
722B-C). After illustrating this 'double method' in
the case of marriage laws, the three decide to proceed systematically
for the rest of the dialogue, giving first the preludes and then the
laws. Issues connected with the preludes will be discussed in greater
detail in section 5 (Preludes in the *Laws*).


### Book 5



Book 5 continues the Great Prelude to the laws in general which
started with the discussion of gods and ancestors in Book 4. The
Athenian begins this next phase of the address by telling the citizens
that they ought to honor their souls above all their other
possessions, as their souls are both most their own and the most
divine of all their possessions. To honor one's soul, he tells
them, is to follow virtue and, in general, good things, rather than to
allow it to satisfy any desires and to enjoy any pleasures it might
want; and, at the end of the discussion, this ability of the soul to
follow the good is identified as that which explains why the soul is
to be so highly honored. Next on the list comes the body, which ought
to be honored by being put in a moderate state, as that is what best
supports the good state of the soul; third are money and property,
which also ought to be held in moderation, for the same reason. After
a very brief discussion of relations with friends and strangers, the
Athenian turns to the character of the person who leads the finest or
most noble (*kallista*) life. There, he describes various
praiseworthy or blameworthy traits of character, before giving a
general warning to all citizens to avoid excessive self-love as
"the greatest of all evils" and "the cause of all of
each man's wrongdoings on every occasion" (*Laws*
731D6-E5). Instead, he encourages each citizen to love not
himself or his own possessions but rather what is just, whether it
belongs to himself or to someone else. This claim will be discussed
further in section 9 (Ethics).



The prelude then moves from the "divine things" with which
it has been occupied to the "human things", chief among
them pleasure and pain, explaining that "to these every mortal
animal is, as it were, inextricably attached and bound in the most
serious ways" (*Laws* 732E5-7). The Athenian then
sets out the types of pleasures and pains which characterizes moderate
and immoderate lives, with the aim of arguing that those which
characterize the moderate life should be preferred and thus that the
life of virtue is the most pleasant life. This ends the Great Prelude
to the laws in general, and the Athenian announces that they must now
sketch the organization of the state (*Laws* 734E). The rest of
Book 5 is concerned primarily with the citizens' properties
- the number of households there shall be, the degree of
variance in wealth that the citizens shall be allowed to attain, and
the way that the citizens should engage with money - and with
justifying those precepts with reference to the citizens'
happiness. The rest of the *Laws* continues to describe and to
justify the organization and the laws of this new city.


## 3. The *Laws*' Relation to the *Republic*



As we've seen, the *Laws* undertakes to create a good
city and to discuss political theory, ethics, psychology, and other
topics relevant to the creation of such a city. This makes it very
natural to ask what the relation between the *Laws* and the
*Republic* is. The predominant view, until fairly recently,
holds that the *Republic* is Plato's statement of what
the ideally best city is; the *Laws*, on the other hand,
describes the city that would be best, given less optimistic
assumptions about what human nature is capable of. This position has
two variants, depending on one's view of whether Plato at the
time of the *Republic* thought that its political program was
compatible with human nature. If one thinks that even at the time of
the *Republic*, Plato thought that its ideal city placed too
great demands on its citizens to be psychologically realizable, then
one can hold that the *Laws* is entirely consistent with the
*Republic*: they could, at least as far as their philosophical
positions are concerned, have been written at the same
 time.[15]
 If, on the other hand, one thinks that Plato held that the city of
the *Republic* was psychologically possible, even if difficult
to realize, it is natural to see the *Laws* as the outcome of a
change in Plato's views about human
 nature.[16]
 The first view faces two challenges:


1. providing evidence from the *Republic* that Plato did not
think its ideal city was realizable, and
2. either explaining why the *Republic* does not at least
gesture in the direction of the arrangements of the *Laws* as
the best humanly possible option or arguing that we can find such
evidence.



The second view should explain why Plato becomes more pessimistic
about human nature. The need for such an explanation is especially
pressing, since the most common attempt to do so by appealing to
Plato's experiences in Sicily is philosophically quite
 unsatisfactory.[17]



In recent years, it has been argued that there are deep and pervasive
differences between the *Republic* and the *Laws* (and
more generally between the dialogues of Group 3 and those of Group 2)
on ethical and political
 questions.[18]
 The debate over these claims is just in its initial stages and no
scholarly consensus has yet emerged. Among other topics relevant to
the interpretation of the *Laws*, this entry sketches a few
important topics of contemporary controversy and then points to lines
of future research. To begin, perhaps the most important passage in
the *Laws* directly bearing on its relation to the
*Republic* comes in Book 5. There, in what is nowadays perhaps
the most famous passage in the *Laws*, the Athenian announces
that they are to engage in the construction of a
"second-best" city.



> 
> Anyone who uses reason and experience will recognize that a
> second-best city [*deuteros ... pros to beltiston*]
> is to be constructed ... That city and that constitution are
> first, and the laws are best, where the old proverb holds as much as
> possible throughout the whole city: it is said that the things of
> friends really are in common. (*Laws* 739A3-740C3)
> 



The traditional assumption is that Plato here endorses the city
sketched in the *Republic* as the best possible city, but now
thinks that the demands it places on its inhabitants are too high: the
city in the *Laws* is the second-best, but is the best that is
likely to be compatible with human nature. It is also sometimes
thought to follow from this that Plato still endorses the basic
elements of the *Republic*'s political and ethical
theory.



But such an interpretation misreads the passage. Even if Plato were to
endorse the political arrangements of the *Republic* as the
best possible ones, it would not follow that he also endorses all the
claims concerning political theory made in the *Republic*, much
less that he endorses all of the *Republic*'s claims in
ethics, psychology and epistemology. The political arrangements of the
*Republic* are entailed by, and are consistent with, many
different sets of premises, some of which are mutually inconsistent.
Nor does the present passage endorse all of the political structures
of the *Republic*, rather it endorses the community of
property, women and children and the goal of making the city as
unified as possible. But what is most important is that this passage
does not in fact endorse the *Republic*'s method for
making the city one by introducing a certain kind of community of
property and families. In the *Republic*, these institutions
are restricted to the first two classes, but are rejected for the
third class, the producers. The *Laws* passage presents as the
"first-best" city, not that of the *Republic*, but
one in which there is, throughout the entire city, a community of
property and of women and children. So the claim that the city
sketched in the *Laws* is second-best does not suggest that the
*Republic* still represents Plato's ideal political
 arrangement.[19]
 What the *Laws* represents as the ideal - that is to be
approximated as closely as possible - is a city in which all
citizens are subject to the same extremely high ethical demands.


## 4. The Social and Political Institutions of Magnesia



This section provides a brief overview of the basic social and
political institutions of Magnesia. Magnesia will be located in a part
of Crete that has been left empty by an ancient migration and is about
ten miles from the sea. The site is basically self-sufficient in
resources without having much excess to export. Plato sees this
unsuitability for active commerce and distance from the sea as
advantages: they discourage the maritime and commercial activities
that corrupt cities by fostering a love of money-making in the
citizens and by allowing close contact with foreigners who bring
innovation and have not received the good ethical education afforded
to Magnesians.



The city will be relatively populous: its number of households is to
remain permanently at
 5,040.[20]
 Immigration and emigration policies are designed to avoid population
excess and deficiency. Each household will have an allotment
consisting of two plots of land: one nearer the city's center
and one nearer its borders. Each household's allotment is
intended to be equally productive (*Laws* 737CE, 745CD) and to
support a comfortable, although not luxurious, life for the
household's members. The households and land are not owned or
farmed in common, but each shareholder must consider his share to be
at the same time the common property of the whole city (*Laws*
740A3-6). Part of the sense in which the lot is in common is
that it is inalienable and cannot be divided or aggregated: the
assignment of the lot to a household is intended to support the
household throughout the generations. (There are also restrictions on
the use of the
 land.[21]
 ) Further, each household will help, out of its own resources, to
fund Magnesia's system of common
 meals.[22]
 Plato establishes four property classes: the members of the top or
first class have assets worth between three and four times the value
of the lot (and the tools and animals needed to farm it), the second
class between two and three times this value and so
 on.[23]
 Anything accumulated over the highest amount will be confiscated by
the city (*Laws* 744D-745A). Such assets do not include
gold and silver, since these may be possessed only by the city; there
will be only a token currency (*Laws*
 742AB).[24]



Many of Magnesia's inhabitants are not citizens. There is a
considerable slave population (including both public and private
slaves) and they, of course, are not citizens. Also found within the
city are transient foreigners and resident foreigners (metics) who may
stay for twenty years. Slaves and foreigners are an economic necessity
for the city for they will carry on the trading, manufacturing and
menial occupations that are barred to citizens. The lot holders or
heads of households are citizens, but citizenship is not restricted to
them and owning land is not a necessary condition of citizenship. The
sons and heirs of lot holders are called "citizens" and
are liable to military service at age 20, can participate in elections
at that age and can serve in office at
 30.[25]
 They will not inherit the household lot, however, until their father
dies. What of women? In Magnesia, the private family is not abolished.
Although women lack an independent right to own property, they are
liable to military training and service and attend their own common
meals (*Laws* 780D). The Athenian holds that they can attain
the four cardinal virtues and for this reason requires that they be
educated (*Laws* 804D-805A). For Aristotle, women are not
citizens of the ideal city, since they are excluded from political
office. But in Magnesia, women can participate in elections and hold
political office and the Athenian explicitly counts them as citizens
(*Laws*
 814C2-4).[26]



Let us turn to the political system or constitution
(*politeia*) of Magnesia. Magnesia has a rich variety of
offices, but the main ones are: the Assembly (*koinos
sullogos*, *ekklesia*), the Council
(*boule*), the magistrates, especially the guardians of
the laws (*nomophulakes*), the courts and the Nocturnal Council
(*nukterinos sullogos*). The Nocturnal Council is discussed in
more detail below in section 6.



The Assembly is the main electoral authority in the city; it is
composed of all citizens, or more precisely, all those who have served
or are serving in the military. The Assembly is responsible for the
election of most of the city's officers and magistrates. The
other functions explicitly given to it are


1. a role in judging offenses against the public,
2. making awards of merit,
3. extending the term of residence for metics, and
4. passing on proposed changes in the laws, at least those regarding
dances and sacrifices.



It may also have other responsibilities in connection with foreign
 affairs.[27]



The Council is composed of 90 members chosen by election from each
property class for a total of 360 members. Men are eligible for office
at age 30, women at age 40. Members serve one-year terms. The Council
exercises ordinary administrative powers, such as calling and
dissolving the Assembly, receiving foreign ambassadors, supervising
elections and so on.



The guardians of the laws (*nomophulakes*) are composed of 37
citizens, at least fifty years of age who serve from the time of their
election until age 70 (*Laws* 755A). There are four ways in
which the *nomophulakes* guard the
 laws:[28]


1. Although they do not seem to have the authority to discipline
other magistrates, they are assigned the general task of supervising
them and are expected to bring appropriate cases to the attention of
the proper officials.
2. They exercise wide supervisory powers over citizens in general
and, for example, are charged with fining those who spend excessively,
granting permission to travel abroad and overseeing the care of
orphans.
3. They possess various judicial functions and are in charge of
especially important or difficult cases involving the family, property
and the abuse of laws.
4. Perhaps their most important task is the revision and
supplementation of the existing laws, although the extent of revision
possible is
 controversial.[29]



Finally, there is an extensive system of courts in Magnesia, both
public and private. One of Plato's major innovations, compared
with Athenian law, is the elaborate structure of appeals in judicial
cases. It is worth noting that Plato holds that citizens, in virtue of
their standing in the political community, may legitimately expect to
have a share in the administration of justice (*Laws*
767E9-768B3).


## 5. Preludes in the *Laws*



A significant part of the impetus for interpretations that see
considerable differences between the *Republic* and the
*Laws* comes from the presence in the latter of
"preludes" to individual laws and to the lawcode as a
whole that are available to all the citizens. In Plato's own
view, one of the most important innovations in the political theory of
the Laws is the requirement that good lawgivers try to persuade the
citizens and not simply issue commands to them by means of laws
(*Laws* 722B5-C2). Plato compares the lawgiver in
Magnesia to a free doctor treating free people. Slave doctors who
treat other slaves merely give them orders and then rush off to other
patients. Free doctors treating free people must explain to their
patients the condition they have and the rationale for treatment
before prescribing (*Laws* 722B-723B). In doing so, they
will "educate" the patients and use "arguments that
come close to philosophizing" (*Laws* 857C2-E5).
Similarly, Plato thinks that the lawgiver in Magnesia should not
merely issue legal commands: law without persuasion is condemned as
mere force (722B). Drawing on Plato's programmatic remarks in
Books 4, 9, and 10 the preludes should have the following
features.


1. What the person who is to be persuaded is asking for is to be
"educated" or "taught," that is, to be given
good epistemic reasons for thinking that the principles lying behind
the legislation are true (*Laws* 885DE).
2. What the lawgiver and the preludes actually do is characterized as
"teaching," that is, giving reasons to the citizens and
bringing it about that they "learn" (*Laws* 718CD,
720D, 723A, 857DE and 888A).
3. The preludes are thus designed to be instances of rational
persuasion, that is, attempts to influence the citizens' beliefs
by appealing to rational considerations. They are not intended to
inculcate false, but useful beliefs, or to effect persuasion through
non-rational means.
4. The preludes are meant to provide quite general ethical
instruction. The lawgiver is to be a primary source of instruction
about what is fine, just and good. Thus the citizens will learn why
the laws are fine and just and should also learn why following the
laws and, more generally, acting virtuously is good for them. They are
to receive a true and reasoned account of what is good for human
beings.



The view that this use of preludes marks a significant difference from
the *Republic* depends on two claims.


1. The *Laws* advocates the use of preludes, along with other
methods, to educate the citizens and give them some rational
understanding of the laws and, more generally, an understanding of
ethical truths.
2. The *Republic* does not intend to provide, except to its
highest class, the philosopher-rulers, an education that can result in
such a rational appreciation of basic ethical truths.



With respect to (II), advocates of the change interpretation point to
passages from the *Republic* such as the following.



> 
> Therefore, to insure that someone like that [one whose reason is not
> strong enough to rule himself] is ruled by something similar to what
> rules the best person, we say that he ought to be the slave
> [*doulon*] of that best person who has a divine ruler within
> himself. (*Rep*. 590C8-D1)
> 



The education provided to the two lower classes, it is argued, thus
does not succeed in enabling them to be ruled by their own reason and
leaves them in the state of slaves. In *Republic* Book 7, Plato
considers whether the musical education the auxiliaries receive (which
is the most advanced education that they get) tends to the good of
leading the soul out of the Cave and toward the
"intelligible" or "knowable region." The
answer is that it does not, since musical education



> 
> educated the guardians through habits. Its harmonies gave them a
> certain harmoniousness, not knowledge; its rhythms gave them a certain
> rhythmical quality; and its stories whether fictional or nearer the
> truth, cultivated other habits akin to these. But there was nothing in
> it that aimed at any such subject as you are now seeking.
> (*Rep*. 522A4-B1, cf. 484C3-D10 and
> 516E8-517E2)
> 



Thus all citizens, other than the philosopher-rulers, remain within
the Cave.



Both (I) and (II) are, however, quite controversial. With respect to
(I), some have argued that despite the fact that Plato's
programmatic remarks about the preludes suggest that they are designed
to further a rational appreciation of ethical truths, what is actually
provided for the vast majority of the citizens is, primarily,
rhetorical persuasion appealing to their sense of honor and shame.
This gap is then explained either by the hypothesis (i) that Plato is
being deceptive, or his mental capacities declined in old age; or (ii)
that the programmatic remarks represent an ideal that Plato makes it
clear cannot be realized in actual
 practice.[30]
 Evaluating the acceptability of (II) will require careful examination
of the education provided to the *Republic's* auxiliary
and money-making classes and, in particular, consideration of what the
auxiliaries' "musical education" provides them
 with.[31]



Interpretations that see the main aim of the preludes as providing,
along with the rest of the citizens' education, a rational,
although less than fully philosophic, grasp of basic ethical
principles need not hold that this is the only aim of the preludes or
that there is only one kind of prelude. Plato does include some
preludes - e.g. those to laws pertaining to murders that are
especially heinous in that they are fully voluntary and committed out
of desire for pleasure, envy and so on - that work primarily by
rhetorical means or appeal to myths that Plato probably did not accept
as literally true (e.g. 870D-871A). Such preludes are designed,
as Saunders notes, for those citizens who have badly failed to benefit
from Magnesia's educational system (Saunders 1992,
210-11). Such preludes are a last resort before the infliction
of punishment and are aimed at the inevitable failures among the
citizens. Interpretations stressing the rational aim of the preludes
argue that Magnesia's education is intended to give the citizens
as a whole the ability to follow the more sophisticated preludes and
that such preludes are not restricted to an elite sub-class of
citizens.



Further progress in resolving these disputes might be made by
continued research on three topics. First, we must consider the
preludes in light of the broader context of the citizens'
education in the *Laws*. What sort of education is provided for
them and what cognitive and ethical abilities will such education
foster? Second, we need to examine Plato's views about education
in the other late dialogues, especially the
 *Statesman*.[32]
 Finally, the issues concerning citizens' education are
intimately linked to deep questions in Plato's psychology and
epistemology. In order to understand what kind of education is
required in order to have a rational grasp of ethical principles we
must consider the nature of ethical learning, given Plato's
epistemology and psychology, in both the middle and late periods. This
issue is discussed a bit further in section 10.


## 6. The Nocturnal Council and Political Participation



A second, more longstanding, controversy about the *Laws*
concerns the role of the body known as the "Nocturnal
Council" which is so-called because it meets daily from dawn
until sunrise when everyone has the most leisure from public and
private activities (*Laws*
 961B6-8).[33]
 The Nocturnal Council is first explicitly mentioned in Book 10 (but
is alluded to earlier at *Laws* 632C4-6 and
818A1-3) where it is assigned an educational function. Those who
have violated Magnesia's impiety laws due to ignorance, rather
than bad character, are to be imprisoned for five years. During their
imprisonment, the members of the Nocturnal Council meet with them in
order to reform their beliefs by teaching (*Laws* 909A). The
Nocturnal Council's membership seems to include:


1. the 10 oldest guardians of the laws,
2. the current supervisor of education and his predecessors,
3. examiners (officials who check the qualifications of those
entering office and audit them when they leave office) and other
citizens who have won awards of honor,
4. certain citizens who have traveled abroad under official auspices
to gather knowledge and have been invited to participate by the
Nocturnal Council itself, and
5. each of the above members is to nominate for membership (whose
acceptance is subject to the approval of the other members) a younger
associate between the ages of 30 and 40 (*Laws* 951D4-E5
and 961A1-B6).



In Book 12, the Athenian returns to the Nocturnal Council and
emphasizes its great importance for the city. The following passage
from Book 12 has encouraged some to think that Plato here grants the
Nocturnal Council very great, or even unlimited, political power.



> 
> If this divine council should come into being for us, dear friends,
> the city ought to be handed over to it [*paradoteon toutoi
> ten polin*] (*Laws* 969B2-3, cf.
> 960B5-E11 and 961C3-6)
> 



Some scholars have held, on the basis of these passages, that Plato
intends the Nocturnal Council to be the main political authority in
Magnesia. On this view, either it will have the same powers as did the
philosopher kings in the *Republic* to change laws and
institutions as it sees fit or the extent of its powers will simply be
left to the Nocturnal Council itself to
 determine.[34]
 Such an interpretation has, however, quite high costs. As its main
contemporary proponent concedes, it requires us to see the
*Laws* as inconsistent: the earlier provisions of political
authority to various offices are incompatible with assigning such
unlimited powers to the Nocturnal
 Council.[35]
 Further, such a grant of power is at least in serious tension with
one of the *Laws*' basic political principles. Repeatedly
in the *Laws*, Plato emphasizes that allowing any magistrate or
political body unchecked authority runs too great a risk of the abuse
of power. Such a risk is still too great even if the possessors of
power have genuine knowledge: even those with full knowledge are
subject to corruption in such
 circumstances.[36]



Other interpreters, such as Glenn Morrow, have suggested that the
Nocturnal Council's role is primarily
 informal.[37]
 This Council is to possess various sorts of knowledge and it must
also educate its own members. Even without possessing powers beyond
those explicitly assigned to it, the Nocturnal Council should exercise
a considerable influence on Magnesia's governance. Its members
include some of the city's most important officials. Plato would
certainly expect that these officials' administration of the
laws and revision of them - if this is permitted - will be
informed by their studies. Perhaps even more important, the younger
associate members of the Nocturnal Council will come to fill many
offices of the state and will exercise an informal, but still
significant, influence on other citizens in the deliberations that
play such an important role in Magnesia's system of government,
as well as in their other contacts with their fellows.



There is, however, a third option. Morrow adopts his
"informal" interpretation in part because Plato does not
explicitly assign to the Nocturnal Council any powers beyond those we
have noted. But one could hold that the *Laws* is not intended
to provide a fully determinate blueprint of the just
 city.[38]
 On this interpretation, there is an open texture to the political and
social institutions that Plato sketches and we should allow for a
range of ways of implementing the basic structure. For example, Plato
appears to assign to the "guardians of the laws" (the
nomophulakes) some important role in revising Magnesia's laws.
In his Book 12 discussion, Plato describes the members of the
Nocturnal Council as "those who will really be guardians of the
laws" (*Laws* 966B5). The members of the Nocturnal
Council will, if properly educated, be "made into guardians
whose like, with respect to the virtue of safekeeping, we have not
seen come into being in our lives previously" (*Laws*
969C2-3). We need not see these claims as a volte-face on
Plato's part, if we allow for a range of ways in which the
outline of Magnesia sketched can be realized that fall between
excluding the Nocturnal Council from any political role at all and
seeing them as philosopher kings in disguise. We can thus allow that
the Nocturnal Council is intended to have genuine political authority
going beyond its explicitly stated responsibilities that still falls
well short of autocratic power, without expecting the
*Laws*' text to make this authority fully
determinate.



But in addition to the specific issue of the extent of the Nocturnal
Council's powers, there is a deeper question. The more political
authority that is assigned to the Nocturnal Council, the more
politically passive most citizens of Magnesia will be. Thus the
question about the power of the Nocturnal Council has significant
implications for our evaluation of the ethical capacities of
non-philosophical citizens. If their education really does give them
some rational appreciation of the principles underlying the laws of
Magnesia, we should expect that they can, to a significant degree, be
free from detailed regulation and supervision by others. Further, not
only is it the case that they will be capable of being free from such
regulation, but we should expect that deliberating and acting upon
their grasp of ethical principles forms an important part of their own
 good.[39]
 If, however, their political activity is reduced to the level of the
two lower classes in the *Republic*, who have little or no part
in political deliberation or judicial administration, we might think
that Plato has the same fairly low estimate of the ethical capacities
of ordinary citizens in both works. Resolving the issue of the
Nocturnal Council's powers thus has broad implications for our
understanding of Plato's later ethics.


## 7. Poetry and Education



The goal of the city of the *Laws*, as we've seen, is to
produce citizens who possess complete virtue (*Laws*
630C3-6; see also e.g. 705D3-706A4, 963A). The education
in virtue of the citizens is, therefore, of central importance for the
*Laws*: we are told early on that well-educated men will turn
out to be good men and thus that it is of great importance for a state
to educate its citizens well (*Laws* 641B). This makes the
education of the citizens a topic of great importance for interpreters
of the *Laws* as well, especially insofar as understanding what
effect the educational program of Magnesia can be expected to have on
the citizens will help us to understand what sort of virtue the
citizens can be expected to have.



The educational program of Magnesia begins with music and gymnastics,
and Plato emphasizes the deep importance of this part of the
educational program in various parts of the
 *Laws*.[40]
 The right nurture of children begins in the womb, and is described as
"pre-natal gymnastics": pregnant women are to walk, and,
later, nurses are to carry the children, so as to, as much as
possible, have the children moved as though they were being constantly
rocked by the sea (*Laws* 789B-790C). From the ages of
three to six children are to play at prescribed games (*Laws*
797B; but see also the claim, at 794A, that the games arise from
natural instinct). Plato in fact insists that childrens' games
are of decisive importance for legislation, as a change in the games
will, he thinks, lead to a change in the childrens' standards
for propriety and impropriety; this will, in turn, lead to a change in
their characters and in the laws they desire to be governed
 by.[41]
 At the age of six the sexes are to be divided and lessons in music
and gymnastics begun. Both music and gymnastics include imitations of
virtuous people engaged in virtuous activities or exhibiting virtuous
traits, such as fighting courageously or feeling moderate pleasures
(see e.g. *Laws* 655A-655E, 660A, 795E-796C, and
814E-816B); what it is to be well-educated in choristry is to
delight in and to hate the imitations that one ought, more so than to
be able to execute certain songs and dances skillfully (*Laws*
654C-D). This education in music and gymnastics is a lifelong
process: citizens of Magnesia are meant to sing and dance in
age-specific choruses for the rest of their lives, and are told that
it is their duty to constantly encourage in themselves an appetite for
ethically improving songs (*Laws* 665C). The oldest chorus
members participate in symposia in addition to singing, at least in
part with the goal of making their souls soft and youthful, and thus
once again capable of being molded by the legislator (*Laws*
671C-D).



In addition to music and dance, children are given a literary
education, are taught to play the lyre, and learn arithmetic,
geometry, and astronomy (*Laws* 809C). The Athenian warns
against having children read the poets, as, he says, each has said
some things badly, but declares that the text of the *Laws*
itself and whatever other prose, poetry, or speeches should resemble
it are appropriate for the children to study (*Laws*
 811B-E).[42]
 In arithmetic and geometry, the Athenian emphasizes how shameful it
is for the citizens to be ignorant (as so many Greeks then were) of
incommensurability (*Laws* 819E-820D). The situation is
even worse in astronomy: there, the common belief that the planets
wander rather than traveling the same circular path is not only
shameful but also impious, as it is a mistake about the gods
(*Laws* 821A-D).



One striking feature of the educational program in the *Laws*
is its emphasis on music and gymnastics, from the very beginning up to
the very end of a life. What sort of impact does this type of
education have on the soul and how can we explain why it is so central
to the educational program? In considering these questions, it is
worth thinking about the educational program in the *Republic*
as a contrast case: there the musical education given to the
auxiliaries is said to be an education through habits which cannot
produce genuine virtue (*Rep* 522A4-B1, cf.
484C3-D10 and
 516E8-517E2).[43]
 If we think that Plato wants the educational program of Magnesia to
produce something approaching genuine virtue in the citizens, then
we'll need to give an account of how music and dance can do more
than produce good habits in the citizens. (This is not to say that
habituation does not or cannot play an important role in the
educational program: see e.g. *Laws* 656B.)



One recent
 strategy[44]
 that might explain the centrality given to education in music and
gymnastics in the *Laws* begins with the following passage:



[A]lmost without exception, every young creature is incapable of
keeping either its body or its tongue quiet, and is always striving to
move and to cry, leaping and skipping and delighting in dances and
games, and uttering, also, noises of every description. Now, whereas
other creatures are devoid of any perception of the various kinds of
order and disorder in movement (which we term rhythm and harmony), to
us men the very gods, who were given, as we said, to be our fellows in
the dance, have granted the pleasurable perception of rhythm and
harmony, whereby they cause us to move and lead our choirs...
(*Laws* 653D7-654A3)



This passage tells us that human beings are capable of perceiving
order in sound and motion and that they have natural tendencies
towards moving and making noise which provide the opportunity for that
capacity to perceive order to be trained. Insofar as good order is
what makes things
 fine,[45]
 then the pleasurable perception of the good order in sound and motion
will be a way of appreciating finemaking properties, which could in
turn help the child to acquire or refine the concepts of fineness and
goodness. And if this perception and resulting comprehension of order
is cognitively continuous with the grip on order that is involved in
genuine virtue, then this also helps us show how this education could
be part of the acquisition of genuine
 virtue.[46],
 [47]



Citizens of Magnesia, as we've seen, also get a sophisticated
education in mathematics and astronomy. The particular results that
this education aims to impart may be significant. As Ian Mueller has
pointed out, incommensurability is itself a non-sensible property: two
(physical) lines which represent incommensurable magnitudes will
nonetheless appear to someone who measures them carefully to be
 commensurable.[48]
 Understanding the fact that there are some incommensurable segments
thus crucially involves a grip on non-sensible properties, which is
essential for coming to grasp genuine value
 properties.[49]
 The results aimed at in astronomical education are also significant:
circular motion is the motion associated with reason and thus the
circular motion of the gods is related to their status as paradigms of
reason and of goodness.



We've seen, then, that there are robust resources available for
an interpreter of the *Laws* to show how the educational system
of Magnesia could produce something like genuine virtue: their
education in music and dance may serve to give students an
appreciation of order which will help them to grasp value concepts,
and their mathematical and astronomical education may be designed to
allow them to articulate those concepts and to see their role in
structuring the cosmos. There are, however, also reasons to worry
about how robust the virtue established by the educational system of
Magnesia really is. The lifelong nature of education - and, in
particular, the striking claim that old men must participate in
symposia so as to make their souls young and malleable again -
suggests that the virtue of the citizens is fragile enough to require
constant
 upkeep.[50]
 The way in which we account for what does or can go wrong to make the
citizens' virtue need reinforcement will also help us fix on the
nature of that reinforcement and thus on the way in which the
educational system affects the souls of the citizens more generally.
More research, then, is needed into the two interrelated questions of
the way in which the education given to the citizens of Magnesia has
its effect and of what sort of virtue the educational program of
Magnesia can or tends to produce.



Plato also offers some discussion of the standards of music and poetry
in their own right in the course of his discussion of education. As in
other works, Plato is quite critical of the ethical content of poetry
and the ethical knowledge possessed by the poet (see e.g.
*Laws* 719A-C, 811B-E) and heavily censors the
poetry that will be allowed into the city (see e.g. *Laws*
657B, 719B-D, 796E-802E). Plato also here offers a
somewhat obscure discussion of the standard for correctness in music,
saying both that it must be judged by the pleasure of the virtuous man
(*Laws* 659A) and that, because music is imitative, the
standard must involve not pleasure but truth, and that correct music
is music which resembles the imitation of the beautiful (*Laws*
 668A-B).[51]


## 8. Theology



The Athenian opens the dialogue by asking Kleinias and Megillus
whether god or some man is responsible for their laws, and they answer
that, for each of them, it is a god (Zeus for the Cretans and Apollo
for the
 Spartans).[52]
 God is thus presented from the very start of the dialogue as the
appropriate source of law and human institutions. This notion of god
as the lawgiver or ruler for a city returns in Book 4, when the three
are considering what sort of constitution to give to their new city:
there, the Athenian claims that the best ruler for a city to have is
god, and that they ought to imitate the rule of god by ordering their
society in obedience to the immortal element within themselves, namely
reason, which here will have the name of law (*Laws* 714A; see
also *Laws* 762E, where service to the laws is said to be
service to the gods). God is also presented in the *Laws* as
the appropriate model for a human life. In the address to the new
settlers, they are told that they ought to become like god, and that
to do this is to become virtuous; in fact, the Athenian claims that
god is the measure of human affairs, where this means that god, by
possessing the virtues, embodies the standard to which we should aim
(*Laws*
 716C-D).[53]
 It is also worth noting that the early books of the *Laws*
often present a fairly traditional theology: we're encouraged to
pray to the gods, the gods are presented as having the power to
intervene in human affairs, and the Athenian happily uses the names of
the Olympian gods (see e.g. *Laws* 717A, 828B-D).



Book 10 takes up the existence and nature of the god(s) as its main
theme, and it is here that we get the most sophisticated theology the
*Laws* has to offer. The bulk of the book is presented as the
prelude to impiety laws, and consists in an argument against three
beliefs which are the characteristic causes of impiety: (1) that the
gods do not exist; (2) that the gods are not concerned with human
beings; and (3) that the gods can be influenced by prayers and
sacrifices.



The Athenian begins by addressing those who believe that the gods do
not exist. He attributes to these people the view that it is material
substances which exist by nature and which are the causes of the
motions we see in the cosmos, and says that what they've failed
to understand is the nature and power of soul - that is, the
fact that soul is "among the first things" and older than
bodies, and that "it more than anything governs their changes
and all of their transformations" (*Laws*
 892A2-7).[54]
 He begins by arguing that soul, which he here defines in terms of
self-motion, must be the source of all other motions, as none of them
have the capacity to move themselves. Soul is not simply the original
source of all motion, however; the Athenian also claims that it
*governs* the motion of all bodies which are in motion by using
its own characteristic motions (e.g., wishing and believing) to take
over the secondary motions of
 bodies.[55]
 As soul governs the motion of bodies in general, it must govern the
motions of the heavens in particular (896E); and as those motions are
orderly, they must be governed by a good soul possessing reason rather
than a bad soul (897B-898C). The Athenian then says that such a
soul - one possessing reason and governing the orderly motions
of the heavens - ought to be regarded as a god (899A-B).
This concludes the argument with someone who thinks that the gods do
not exist. The Athenian then turns to argue that god (or, the gods)
care for human beings and cannot be bribed. These arguments crucially
appeal to a characterization of god as a craftsman and a ruler: god
would be a poor craftsman indeed if he did not attend to even the
small parts of the whole (i.e., human beings), and a bad ruler if he
could be bribed with prayers and
 sacrifices.[56]



These arguments raise a number of questions:


* The Athenian goes back and forth, in the entire text of the
*Laws*, between speaking of 'god' and 'the
gods'. How many gods are there, and, if more than one, is there
one which is somehow
 supreme?[57]
* What is the nature of a god? Plato's argument demonstrates that
there are gods by identifying a certain sort of soul - one that
possesses reason and governs the heavens - as a god. Are
*all* gods like this, or can there be a god without soul? Plato
also claims that soul is "among the first things to have come
into being" (892C4). Do some or all gods come into being, or is
there a god who has always
 existed?[58]
* Soul is said to be the cause of all motions and, thus, "of good
things and bad" (896D6), and Plato suggests the hypothesis of an
evil soul precisely to explain bad things (896E). On the other hand,
Plato elsewhere explains the existence of evil in other
 terms[59];
 and soul and especially god are deeply linked to reason and good
order in this discussion. Is a cosmic soul (either good or bad)
responsible for evil in the *Laws*, or is there some other
cause of
 evil?[60]
* How do cosmic souls govern the motions of the celestial bodies? Is it
by being within them, by acting on them by means of some external
matter, or in some other
 way?[61]
* Finally, how does the theology of the *Laws* relate to the
theology of other late dialogues such as the *Timaeus*,
*Philebus*, and
 *Statesman*?[62]



What is clear from the theological discussion in Book 10, however, is
that god is something which governs the cosmos, by using reason, in a
way that aims at its best state. This adds richness to the idea that
god and god's rule provides a standard for law and for
individual human lives: just as god governs the cosmos, so too law
governs a society and reason an individual, in all cases for the sake
of their best
 state.[63]


## 9. Ethics



There is a strong case to be made that Plato, as in other works,
accepts rational eudaimonism in the *Laws*: that is, that he
believes that each individual's goal, insofar as he is rational,
is his own happiness or well-being (*eudaimonia*). Some of the
most explicit evidence for this can be found at *Laws*
662C-E, in which the Athenian presents as appropriate the demand
that the life that is recommended by an ancestor or a god be the
happiest and most pleasant
 life[64];
 but the emphasis the *Laws* places on the happiness of the
citizens as the aim of the laws and the importance it gives to showing
that virtue conduces to a happy and a pleasant life also suggest that
Plato remains within a eudaimonist framework. The *Laws* also
offers some discussion of what it is that is good for a human being
(as we would expect if Plato remains a rational eudaimonist). Plato
distinguishes between human goods such as health, beauty, and wealth,
and divine goods, namely the virtues, and claims that human goods are
not good independently of virtue. Instead, they are good for the good
man, but bad for the bad man (661B-C; cf. 631D). There are
important questions here about the precise nature of human
*eudaimonia* and the precise way in which the human goods
benefit the good man and fail to benefit or even harm the bad man. Is
virtue sufficient or only necessary for
 *eudaimonia*?[65]
 Do the human goods benefit the good man only insofar as they increase
his capacity to act virtuously, and harm the bad man only insofar as
they increase his capacity to act viciously, or is there additional
value and disvalue in the possession of human goods, e.g. are they
genuinely good in a way that can only be appreciated by those who are
 virtuous?[66]
 What is clear from this discussion, however, is that virtue is an
essential component of human happiness and a precondition for all
other benefit.



Several passages in the *Laws* suggest that the sort of virtue
that Plato thinks the citizens of Magnesia ought to exhibit involves
an impartialist sort of regard for the good of the cosmos as a whole
rather than a special regard for one's own good. Perhaps the
most striking of these passages occur in the midst of the theological
discussions in Book 10. Immediately after the Athenian's
arguments that god does not neglect men, he goes on to give a short
speech in which he declares that the cosmos has been put together by
god with a view to the safety and virtue of the whole, and that the
parts of the cosmos - including human beings - have come
to be for the sake of the *eudaimonia* (happiness or
well-being) of the whole
 cosmos[67]
 (*Laws* 903B-D). This passage suggests that what it is
proper for human beings to do, insofar as they are parts of the cosmos
and generated for the sake of its *eudaimonia*, is to aim at
its *eudaimonia*; and this suggestion is confirmed by a passage
which follows closely upon this one, in which the Athenian portrays
human beings as the allies and the possessions of the gods in a cosmic
battle of good against evil (*Laws* 905E8-906B3).
Finally, towards the beginning of the Great Prelude to the laws in
general, Plato warns about the evil of self-love and suggests that
what each man must do instead is to love "neither himself nor
his own belongings, but things just, whether they happen to be actions
of his own or rather those of another man" (*Laws*
731D-732A). This looks like a rejection of partiality to oneself
as such, and a requirement to instead love what is of value. The
argument turns on the thought that a lover is a bad judge of value, as
he is necessarily partial to what he loves. If this is right, the
conclusion is very radical indeed: any sort of love that is directed
at anything other than the just and good and fine will be problematic,
and this will include love of family, friends, and fellow-citizens,
except insofar as they are just, good and fine. While these three
passages are different in detail, the picture that emerges from them
is one on which what we are meant to do is to orient ourselves towards
what is of genuine value and, perhaps as a consequence, to aim at the
well-being of the cosmos as a whole, rather than to be oriented
towards our own narrowly-construed good or the good of particular
individuals as such.



The discussion of these passages is still at a very early stage and no
consensus about how to understand them has yet emerged. However, if we
do think that they show that Plato held impartialist ethical views in
the *Laws*, we will be left with important questions about how
to reconcile those views with his eudaimonism. What conception of an
individual's own happiness or well-being could yield as a
conclusion that one ought to aim at the happiness or well-being of the
cosmos as a whole rather than one's own (narrowly construed)
happiness? And what assumptions would make it plausible to think that
my aiming at the well-being of the whole would necessarily correspond
to something that was worth calling my own
 good?[68]
 (Why, for example, couldn't my aiming at the well-being of the
whole call on me to sacrifice myself to the good of others to the
extent that I was no longer able to cultivate my own virtue and thus
could not, according to the Dependency Thesis, be benefited by
anything at
 all?[69])



We might also profitably compare Plato's ethical views in the
*Laws* to those which he expresses in the *Republic*.
Plato in the *Republic* famously claims that the
philosopher-kings will return to rule as a matter of necessity, and
there is a large literature exploring just how this fits into a
eudaimonist framework, given that it looks like the narrowly-construed
good of the philosopher-kings would be best served by contemplation of
the Forms. It would be worth exploring the relationship between the
two dialogues on this point, especially given that the *Laws*
seems to endorse a conception of an individual's well-being
which could lead them to set aside their own, narrowly-construed
well-being in just as, if not more, radical a way than the
*Republic*.


## 10. Plato's Later Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Psychology



With respect to the specific controversies we have examined, for
example, that over the role of the preludes and that concerning the
powers of the Nocturnal Council, we have found that the issues under
dispute have important connections to Plato's epistemology and
psychology. This should not, however, be surprising. To understand the
nature of ethical learning and what ethical cognitive states can be
produced by different kinds of education, we must ultimately turn to
Plato's epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology. Further,
since the appropriate political role for citizens depends in large
part on the kinds of ethical character and knowledge (or true belief)
they can acquire, we can only understand Plato's later political
philosophy by understanding its connections with his later
epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology.



The idea that Plato's ethics and politics rest, at least in
large part, on his views in these other areas of philosophy is not
novel. Much of the best work on the ethical and political theory of
the *Republic* tries to draw such
 connections.[70]
 But this has not yet happened to anything approaching the same degree
with respect to his later ethics and
 politics.[71]
 This is due perhaps primarily to the fact that while the
*Republic* provides within itself an account articulated in
some detail not only of Plato's ethics and politics, but also of
the psychology, epistemology and metaphysics on which they rest, the
*Laws* is comparatively lacking in extended argumentation on
these basic philosophical issues. But Plato is not trying in the Laws
to provide a comprehensive philosophical statement of the sort found
in the *Republic*. Questions of psychology, epistemology,
ethics and metaphysics (including the metaphysics of value) are
explored in great detail and with extraordinary sophistication in the
other later dialogues. Indeed, they are treated in much more detail
and with greater philosophical power than in the middle period. And it
is these later dialogues that provide the indispensable background for
understanding the *Laws*. Thus we should read it together with,
for example, the *Philebus*' metaphysics of value and
account of pleasure and with the epistemology and psychology of the
 *Timaeus*.[72]
 More cautiously, we should look for connections with the
epistemology, metaphysics and psychology of other dialogues which are
plausibly thought to be post-*Republic*, but do not fall into
the final group of six, such as the *Phaedrus* and the
 *Theaetetus*.[73]
 By examining Plato's philosophical positions in these later
dialogues, we can work out the deeper justification for Plato's
vision of political and ethical community in the *Laws*. And by
articulating this vision, we gain greater understanding of the other
later dialogues on which it rests.