## 1. "Gender" in Translation



The trouble with the study of gender in Confucian philosophy begins
with the concept of "gender" as an analytic category for
feminist theorizing. The term "*xingbie*
Xing Bie " (natural differences) or "*shehui
xingbie* She Hui Xing Bie " (societally
constructed natural differences) now used to translate
"gender" is a neologism introduced during the 1990s as a
local, internal response to the importation of western feminist
theories (Spakowski 2011: 31-54; Dai 2019: ch. 12; S. Y. Chan
2023). Whatever the concept of "gender" stands for in
contemporary feminist discourse, it does not have a clear, ready-made
Chinese counterpart in its linguistic memories, ancient or modern.
Prior to the 1990s, the term "*nuxing*
Nu Xing " (woman/female nature) is the closest
approximation used to designate a sense of universal
"womanhood" or the "female sex" outside their
kinship roles. And, just like the later variants of
"*xingbie*" and "*shehui
xingbie*" used to translate the concept of
"gender", "*nuxing*" is also a
neologism constructed during the 1920s by the May Fourth Movement as
part of their modernization project to mark the end of the indigenous
representation of "women" as *funu*
Fu Nu  (married women and young maidens) (C. S. Chan 1988:
19-39; Barlow 1989, 1994a,
 1994b).[1]



According to the earliest etymological dictionary, *Discussing
Writing and Explaining Characters* (*Shouwen jiezi*), the
character *nu* Nu  was defined synonymously as
*fu* Fu  (married women). The overlapping of
*nu* Nu  and *fu* Fu  points to the
prioritization of kinship roles in the process of genderization.
Generally speaking, *nu* refers to daughters or young
maidens, a life-stage before becoming *fu*. The synonymy of
*nu* Nu  and *fu* Fu  (as well as
*nan* Nan  and *zhangfu* Zhang Fu , i.e.,
husband) as defined by the *Shouwen jiezi,* hence, can be seen
as a linguistic clue to the Chinese conception of *nannu*
Nan Nu  (man/woman), who are essentially *fufu*
Fu Fu  (husband/wife) in waiting.



The concept of "women" or "gender" as a
kinship-neutral discursive category hence is absent in the Chinese
intellectual traditions including Confucianism. The lack of an
indigenous linguistic equivalent of "gender" or
"women", to some (as it is for the May Fourth thinkers in
the 1920s as well as for some contemporary feminists who seek to bring
Chinese women's movements into the fold of the global feminist
movements), serves as an indication of the conceptual inadequacy, if
not backwardness, of Chinese society to articulate gender and to
contribute to this very modern project of feminist
discourse/movements. But, for others, the imposition of western
conceptual paradigms distorts the subject matter at hand and
consequently misconstrues the roots of gender oppression as well as
its possible solutions in the study of gender in Confucianism (Hall
& Ames 1998: 79-100; 2000: 75-96; Rosenlee 2006). This
linguistic trouble of "gender" serves to highlight the
conceptual chasm in the inter-cultural discourse of
"Confucianism", which itself is also a much debated
inexact translation of *Ru* Ru  (Jensen 1997; Standaert
1999; Barrett 2005; Csikszentmihalyi 2020; Richey 2023)


## 2. *Yin-Yang* Yin Yang  Correlative Cosmology



Men and women in Confucian philosophy are properly
"gendered" when they are ritualized to embody a series of
familial/social roles; their genderization is not derivative from a
set of kinship-neutral inborn traits, as the way "man" or
"woman" as a conceptual category functions in the
contemporary western discourse. Nevertheless, the equivocation of
*yin/yang* Yin Yang  and femininity/masculinity has
become a popular analytic entrance into the study of gender in
Confucian philosophy. Numerous scholars have attributed gender
oppression and the misogynistic strains in Confucian philosophy to the
correlation of *yin* with women and *yang* with men.
Dong Zhongshu's *Luxurious Dews of the Spring and Autumn*
(*Chunqiu fanlu*; 2nd century BCE
text)--especially Ch. 43: "*Yang* the Venerable,
*Yin* the Lowly" and Ch. 53: "Basic Meaning"
where one finds the exaltation of *yang* and the devaluation of
*yin*--is named as the culprit transforming the supposedly
more egalitarian, textual presentation of gender relations in the
pre-Han era to the decisively patriarchal bent of Han Confucianism
(Csikszentmihalyi 2003: 163-64; R. Wang 2005; Pang-White 2018:
8-10). On the flip side, the Daoist texts that consistently
favor *yin* over *yang* are said to suggest the
possibility of a matriarchal past or at least a maternal matrix
(Needham 1956: 105; Chen 1969: 401-05; Wawrytko 2000:
163-98; Lee 2014: 57-77). Such theoretical postulation of
a matriarchal past based on the textual presence of a favorable
*yin* over *yang,* however alluring, runs the risk of
over-interpretation as well as the risk of oversimplification of the
issue of gender relations as a matter of *yin-yang*
cosmology.



*Yin-yang*--as most prominently a Daoist concept, but also
broadly shared in many different schools of thought including
Confucianism--unlike the western oppositional binary of
femininity-masculinity, is not primarily, exclusively, nor invariably
a gender-based concept (Rubin 1982; Graham 1986; Black 1989). Rather,
*yin-yang*--that functions as an organizational cosmic
schema--is applicable to gender, but itself is cross-gender and
beyond gender. *Yin* and *yang* exist only in relation
to one another internally as the way warmth-coldness only exist
relative to one another. Furthermore, when using *yin-yang* as
an organizational schema, achieving balancing harmony is always the
goal, not domination nor subordination of one to the other. And hence
*yin-yang* at its face value cannot even function as a
theoretical explanation for gender oppression where women are
subordinated to and dominated by men. The focus on the
*yin-yang* cosmology yields little that is useful in the study
of gender in Confucian philosophy.


## 3. *Nei-wai* Nei Wai  and Gendered Differentiation



Since being a man or a woman is concomitant with one's
embodiment of familial/social roles through ritual learnings, the
interrogation of how these roles are inscribed ritually would be a
much more fruitful way into the study of gender in Confucian
philosophy. Ritualization marks not only the beginning of the process
of genderization, but more fundamentally the beginning of
humanity/civility. The concept of *xing* Xing --a
stand-in for human nature or animal nature--is not what sets one
class of people apart from the other, or humans from
 animals.[2]
 As Confucius said in the *Analects*, "By nature we are
similar; learned habits set us apart" (17.2; for other
translations see Ames & Rosemont 1998). Similarly, according to
the *Xunzi*,



> 
> 
> As regards to raw material, nature, awareness and capability,
> *junzi* and petty persons are equal [...] Rather, it is
> the way they employ these to make decisions make them different.
> (*Xunzi* 4.9; for other translations see Knoblock & Zhang
> 1999)
> 
> 
> 



Sages and the rest of us are of the same kind (*lei* Lei ),
and there is little distinguishing difference between humans
(*ren* Ren ) and birds/beasts (*qinshou*
Qin Shou ), since raw materials and in-born propensities are
possessed in common by humans and animals
 alike.[3]
 Ritual (*li* Li ) differentiation (*bie* Bie )
is that slight differentiation separating humans from animals.
According to the *Xunzi*,



> 
> 
> The reason why humans are human is [...] because they have the
> ability to make distinctions. Whereas birds/beasts have father and
> son, they don't have the affection between father and son; and
> whereas birds/beasts have male and female (*pinmu*
> Pin Mu ), they don't have the differentiation between
> man and woman (*nannu* Nan Nu ). Hence, the way
> of humanity cannot be without distinctions. (*Xunzi* 5.9)
> 
> 
> 



The most important distinction that humans make, as the same passage
goes on to say, is ritual differentiation (*Xunzi* 5.10).


### 3.1 *Nei-wai* as Gendered Spheres



Ritual differentiation gives rise to role differentiation, and among
them, gender role differentiation (*nannu zhibie*
Nan Nu Zhi Bie  or *fufu youbie*
Fu Fu You Bie ) is foundational. As it is said in
the *Book of Rites* (*Liji*),



> 
> 
> From the distinction between man and woman came the righteousness
> between husband and wife. From the righteousness between husband and
> wife came the affection between father and son. From the affection
> between father and son came the rectitude between ruler and minster.
> Hence it is said, "The marriage rite is the root of other ritual
> observances". (*Liji*, "*Hunyi*"
> chapter; for other translations see Legge 1885)
> 
> 
> 



Gender role differentiation, in turn, is marked along the spatial
binary of inside-outside (*nei-wai* Nei Wai ).
According to the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing*),



> 
> 
> In the Family (*Jiaren* Jia Ren ) hexagram, a
> woman's correct place is in the *nei* and man in the
> *wai*, that men and women occupy their correct places is the
> great righteousness of heaven and earth [...] Let the father be
> the father, the son son, the brothers brothers, the husband husband,
> the wife wife, then the way of family will be correct; when the family
> is correct then the world will be secured. (*Yijing*,
> "*Jiaren*" hexagram,
> "*Tuanzhuan*" commentary; for other translations
> see Legge 1882)
> 
> 
> 



Gender role differentiation corresponding to the spatial binary of
*nei*-*wai*, hence, lays the groundwork for all other
human relations--be familial or political--to follow.



The *nei-wai* binary - much like the *yin-yang* binary -
is correlative, overlapping, as well as cross- and beyond-gender. But
unlike the cosmic concept of *yin-yang*, *nei-wai* is
primarily a spatial concept demarcating both ritual and physical
boundaries. This inside-outside spatial demarcation doesn't mean
that *nei* is inferior to *wai*. On the contrary,
*nei* is the focused center on which one anchors in order to
proceed to or retract from the *wai*. Even though the
*nei-wai* spatial boundary is ever shifting and overlapping
depending on one's proximity to the focused center (Yu 1986; Ko
1994; Ames 1994; Hay 1994), whatever counts as *nei* is
necessarily and invariably encircled by the expansive sphere of
*wai*. The sphere of *nei* is necessarily and invariably
a defined inside marking whatever outside of it as *wai*.
Hence, the spatial concept of *nei-wai*, when it is coupled
with gender role differentiation, draws a much more restrictive
sphere--both ritually and physically--for women compared to
a more expansive sphere for men where advanced literary learning,
non-familial roles, and service to the wider world including
officialdom are located.



According to the *Book of Songs* (*Shijing*), the gender
marking of *nei-wai* signifying the spheres of domesticity and
officialdom respectively begins as soon as a child is born: a boy is
clothed in robes, placed on couches to sleep and given [official]
scepters to play with, whereas a girl is clothed in wraps, laid on the
ground to sleep, and given [weaving] tiles to play with
(*Shijing*, Song 189 "*Sigan*"; for other
translations see Legge 1876). Similarly, in the *Liji*, the
birth of a boy is signaled by placing a bow (i.e., archery as one of
the six arts in the Confucian educational curriculum for men) on the
left side of the door, whereas a girl's birth is marked by a
handkerchief (i.e., weaving/embroidering as part of women's work
in the four womanly virtues, *side* Si De ) on the
right side of the door. Children are to begin their self-conscious
embodiment of these gender roles at age seven when boys and girls
cease to sit together nor eat together on the same mat, and at age
ten, their educational curricula begin to diverge widely: a boy is to
venture out seeking worthy mentors to broaden his education befitting
his anticipated expansive responsibilities both as a husband and as a
scholar-knight (*shi* Shi ), whereas a girl is engaged in
homebound training for an enclosed, domestic life befitting her
anticipated role as a congenial, pleasant, understanding, and
compliant wife (*Liji*, "*Neize*"
chapter).


### 3.2 The Ritual Confinement of *Nei*



One thing to keep in mind is that to say a woman is marked as a person
of *nei* training for her anticipated domestic roles of wife
and mother is not the same as to say that these familial roles are
somehow insignificant ethically in Confucian philosophy. On the
contrary, the highest accolade for a benevolent ruler is called
"the father and mother of the people" (*minzifumu*
Min Zhi Fu Mu ) indicative of parental
 parity.[4]
 The Confucian reverence for the role of mother is best shown in the
enduring maternal icon of Mengmu (mother of Mencius) perpetuated in
countless didactic texts for women. Furthermore, the marriage rite,
that commences the spousal relationship, as proscribed in the
*Liji*, "*Jiaotesheng*" chapter, dignifies
the bride by requiring the groom to perform the job of a servant
standing by the carriage and handing the bride the strap to assist her
in mounting. This ritual gesture is meant to convey the reverence that
the husband owes to the wife, since spousal affection is built on
mutual respect and a harmonious household is foundational to a secured
world. As explained in the *Liji*, "with respect there
comes affection; it is with this spousal affection that the sage kings
are able to secure the world" (*Liji*,
"*Jiaotesheng*"
 chapter).[5]



Furthermore, unlike many of the canonical thinkers in the western
intellectual tradition from Socrates down to Kant where the inherent
inferiority of women--not in terms of the roles that women play,
but their in-born nature as such (e.g., the "Re-Reading the
Canon" series of the Pennsylvania State University
Press)--are explicitly stated, Confucian philosophy offers no
such articulation of women's in-born inferior nature, moral or
otherwise. Much of the depiction of virtuous women in the antiquity
period, such as Liu Xiang's *Exemplary Women's
Biographies* (*Lienu zhuan*; c. 18 BCE), consistently
applies the same moral and intellectual accolades to women as they do
to men. In other words, women in Confucian philosophy are not inferior
by nature, nor are their gender roles indicative of their inferior
nature.



Much of the gender hierarchy in Confucianism is derived from the
gender markings along the spatial as well as ritual boundary of
*nei-wai*. Once again, this is not to say that *nei* is
inferior to *wai*; being associated with *nei* does not
automatically make women inferior to men, nor does the gender
association of woman with *nei* devalue *nei* (Goldin
2009: 371-74). But using *nei-wai* as a mark of gender
differentiation does dictate which sphere one should inhabit.
Gender-based hierarchy is, first and foremost, embedded in the spousal
relationship, since the role of a wife is to follow and the
husband's is to lead. As the same *Liji* passage on the
marriage rite quoted earlier goes on to say,



> 
> 
> In passing the front door gate, the man precedes and the woman
> follows, and with this the right relation between husband and wife
> commences. (*Liji*, "*Jiaotesheng*"
> chapter)
> 
> 
> 



To follow and to lead indicate more than just complementary role
differentiations; they indicate power differentials as well: the one
who leads takes charge and the one who follows cannot initiate or
dictate the direction of the union. Wifely subordination is both
functional and gender-based. In marriage--just as in any
institution--there are inevitable role differentiations, but the
spousal hierarchy is gender-based, instead of capacity, merit, or age
based. As a person of *nei*, a woman can only express her
life's work through ritualized familial roles (i.e., daughter,
wife, and mother); there are no non-familial roles available to her
without first being mediated and thereby legitimated by the men of her
kin. That meditating requirement constricts what is deemed possible
for a woman to be a properly gendered person.



Unlike men, women have no non-familial roles--such as friend
(*you* You ), scholarly knight (*shi* Shi ),
ruler (*jun* Jun ), or minster (*chen*
Chen )--available to them. For instance, even to make friends
and maintain friendship outside one's kin pose quite a challenge
for women, since the notion of "friend" (*you*
You ) and "travel" (*you\** You ) are
synonymous at
 times.[6]
 For a woman to travel outside the bound of her household, it not only
raises logistic challenges, but more importantly, requires additional
justifications for her ritual transgression. The ritual requirements
for women not to traverse the bounds of the domestic are dictated in
various
 *Classics*.[7]
 To transgress that--or any ritual boundary--compelling,
circumstantial justifications are required. Hence the gender marking
of *nei* makes all non-familial roles *prima facie* out
of reach for women.



The famed case of Confucius as a traveling scholarly knight spending
decades wandering around different states to propagate his moral
visions and collecting friends and disciples along the way was beyond
the reach for any equally talented and virtuous woman. There was
simply no legitimate, ethical, or normative route for women to partake
in governance exercising political authority, except through marriage
and only in service of patrilineage such as occupying the position of
a dowager or as the kin of a high ranking official. And even then, it
was problematic and precarious at best. As shown in the
*Analects* 8.20, Confucius discounted King Wu's wife as
among the ten capable ministers (*chen* Chen ) that King Wu
boasted to have. Or, as recorded in the *Analects* 6.28,
Confucius felt compelled to explain himself with a dramatic appeal to
*tian* Tian  as his witness of ritual propriety to Zilu who
was displeased by the encounter between Confucius and Nanzi--a
powerful concubine of Duke Ling of Wei (r. 534-492
BCE)--audaciously calling herself a little
 lord![8]


### 3.3 Traversing the *Nei-Wai* Boundary: The Case of Ban Zhao



Ban Zhao (c. 45-117 CE) was the first and foremost Confucian
woman scholar-official--one of the few exceptions where women
were able to have remarkable achievements in the *wai*
comparable to their male counterparts, despite the structural
limitations of *nei*. Ban Zhao came from a long line of erudite
families: both of her great-great-grandfather and great-grandfather
held imperial scholarly degrees; her grandfather and great-uncle were
court scholar-officials, and so were her father and eldest brother;
her second brother was a famed frontier governor-general granted the
rank of marquis and her son was also a court official granted the rank
of marquis. Lastly, her great aunt, her mother, her younger
sister-in-law, and her daughter-in-law were equally erudite. Ban Zhao
was given an advanced education immersed in classical learning by both
of her father and mother, and after the death of her eldest brother,
she was summoned by Emperor He (r. 89-105 CE)--though
without the official title--to complete the imperial account of
the *History of Han*. Serving as a *de facto* grand
imperial scholar, Ban Zhao was in charge of the instruction of not
only the palace women and princesses, but also her ten male colleagues
in the imperial library, including Ma Rong who later became a famed
scholar as well as his brother Ma Xu (Swann 1932 [2001: 17]). After
the emperor's death, Ban Zhao also served as a close advisor to
Empress Dowager Deng (r. 106-121 CE) who was then the *de
facto* ruler since the reigning emperor was still an infant (Swann
1932 [2001: 43]; Pang-White 2018: 32). No other virtuous and talented
woman outside the royal family had managed to achieve the same
position ever since.



Beyond the political, the pristine preservation of Ban Zhao's
*Admonition for Women* (*Nujie*; c.106 CE) is equally
impressive, considering the scarcity of women's records in
antiquity. Furthermore, this treatise despite its overall conservative
bent, is probably the earliest extant text in human history advocating
for equal education for women (Swann 1932 [2001: xvii]). Ban
Zhao's advocacy for women's education, in turn, provided a
historical precedent and a much needed justification for virtuous and
talented women to engage in classical learning that was ritually
reserved for men. Indeed, for many subsequent generations of women
from empresses to widowed commoners, Ban Zhao held the esteemed
position as the first teacher for women as Confucius was for men
(Swann 1932 [2001]; Pang-White 2018).



As remarkable as it was, Ban Zhao's ascendancy in the realm of
*wai* was first and foremost made possible through her familial
luck, not through the socially sanctioned venues available to many men
of talents. Being born into a long line of erudite families that could
spare precious resources to educate her for no apparent social
utility, and being widowed at a young age allowed Ban Zhao to
virtually live a life of letters and governance as her male
counterparts did. Without such familial luck, it would be unthinkable
for women to leave a mark in the realm of *wai* without
incurring significant social costs. This is one of the many inevitable
fallouts from the *nei-wai* gender marking that generates
structural impediments for women to leave their marks in the realm of
literary culture and state governance.



The outward expansion of one's virtuous influences in a
concentric fashion from self, family, state, to the world at large in
order to bring about the idyllic state of "great harmony"
(*datong* Da Tong ) is the highest spiritual goal of
Confucianism (*Liji*, "*Liyun*" chapter).
After all, Confucius spent decades leaving his family behind and
risking his own life instructing rulers and disciples alike all in an
effort to moralize the world around him beyond his own family. Being
thus confined to the realm of *nei*, denied all non-familial
roles, and deprived of all normative routes to operate and excel in
literary culture and state governance, a woman's moral
personhood, thus construed, is essentially curtailed and dependent on
the men of her kin.


## 4. Female Dependency and Didactic Texts for Women



As a person of *nei*, ritually speaking, a woman is without
rank, title, or name of her own. And hence it is by necessity that a
woman throughout her life cycle is dictated by the doctrine of
"three-fold following/dependency" (*sancong*
San Cong ): when young, she follows her father, when married,
her husband, when widowed, her sons. The advantage of translating
*cong* Cong  as following/dependency instead of obedience is
that the principle of generational seniority is one of the mitigating
factors in the Chinese gender system where not only is the position of
mother accorded with accolades textually and ritually, but also is in
actual possession of a tremendous amount of power over the sons
however grand the sons' social stations may be: emperors,
generals, prime ministers, or famed scholars.



The iconic maternal model of Mengmu--the widowed mother of
Mencius--is a case in point. As recorded in the *Exemplary
Women's Biographies* (*Lienu zhuan*) 1.11,
Mencius was displeased with his wife for what he perceived as her lack
of ritual propriety in their private quarter; instead of sending her
daughter-in-law back to her natal family, Mengmu reprimanded Mencius
for his own lack of ritual propriety by entering their private quarter
without first announcing himself as the instigating cause of this
familial discord (for translation see Kinney 2014). It is clear from
this famed tale of Mengmu that the widowed mother continued to
exercise her maternal authority over the adult son, overriding his
decisions even on his spousal relations. Nonetheless, even a revered
widowed mother is still ritually a person without rank, title, or name
of her own. The iconic case of Mengmu is after all memorialized as the
mother of Mencius who went on to achieve great literary and political
fame!


### 4.1 *Sancong* San Cong  and *Side* Si De 



A woman's dependency on men throughout her entire life cycle is
codified ritually, textually, but also by necessity, given the fact
that no other socially sanctioned venues to the realm of *wai*
are open to her. The teaching of *sancong* San Cong 
first appears in the *Liji* and is widely circulated in the
later Confucian
 texts*.*[9]
 As explained in the *Liji* in conjunction with the marriage
rite:



> 
> 
> Women are the ones who follow others; when they are young they follow
> their fathers and elder brothers, when they are married they follow
> their husbands, and when their husbands die they follow their sons.
> "Husband" denotes supporter. A husband uses wisdom to lead
> others. (*Liji*, "*Jiaotesheng*"
> chapter)
> 
> 
> 



To be compliant was generally advised as the way of married women. As
recorded in the *Mencius*, "To look upon compliance
(*shun* Shun ) as their correct course is the way of married
women" (3B2; for other translations see Lau 1970 [2003]).



Since marriage is the only socially sanctioned venue open to women, to
successfully navigate the marriage life is essential for women; the
teaching of "four [womanly] virtues" (*side*
Si De ) is meant to explicitly spell out four essential
areas for women's self-cultivation, much like the teaching of
"five social relations" (*wulun* Wu Lun )
for men as they journey outward from family, state, to the world at
large (*Mencius* 3A4; *Zhongyong*, Ch. 20;
*Daxue*). The teaching of *side* was first introduced in
the *Liji* as an intensive three-month training curriculum for
the bride-to-be in the context of the marriage rite; the betrothed
young maiden is to be instructed on four areas of being a wife:
virtue, speech, comportment, and work (*Liji*,
"*Hunyi*" chapter). And Ban Zhao's
*Nujie* then provided a clear summation and explanation of
what each area consists of.



The basic tenet of *side* is diligence and sincerity; these
four areas of self-cultivation are achievable ideals for women in much
the same way as the virtue of *ren* Ren  is an achievable
ideal for Confucius. As Ban Zhao wrote,



> 
> 
> These four are women's utmost virtues, therefore one cannot be
> without them. With intentional sincerity, they are easy to accomplish.
> Confucius is said to have commented: "Is *ren* far? If I
> desire *ren*, *ren* is here. This is what it
> means". (*Nujie*, Ch. 4:
> "*Fuxing*"; also see *Analects* 7.30)
> 
> 
> 



The parity of *side* for women and *ren* as the highest
Confucian ideal (for men) is clear. Even though the virtue of
*ren* is non-gendered in Confucian texts, the necessary
concentric expansion of one's moral cultivation from family,
state, to the world at large is not accessible to women, and hence in
effect, the highest achievable moral ideal for women is *side*,
that focuses on practical training in the areas of ritual propriety,
cautious speech, modest comportment, and household management in the
roles of wife and mother.


### 4.2 Women's Education and *Nushishu* Nu Si Shu 



The cultivation of women's domestic roles in the *nei* as
on par with men's expansive moral cultivation in the
*wai* is propagated partly through the literary genre of the
"didactic texts for women" that are written for, of, and
by women. Ban Zhao's *Nujie* (c. 106 CE) is the
inaugurating text, which, by and large, focuses on the limited
domestic roles and ritual trainings for women emphasizing modesty,
pleasing compliance, spousal fidelity, resourcefulness, and diligent
servitude to patrilineage. The overall conservative bent of this
literary genre contrasts greatly with the emergence of gender-based
consciousness as its natural fallout from a literary genre that gives
justifications to not only female readership, but also female
authorship and hence also provides justifications for advanced
literary education for women as well.



In order to advocate for an equal educational curriculum for women,
Ban Zhao in Chapter two of the *Nujie* appealed to the
textual authority of the *Liji* to lay claim that girls at age
eight should begin their literary education and by age fifteen should
be given advanced classical education, despite the contrary was stated
in the cited text. In the *Liji*, "*Neize*"
chapter, two separate educational curricula for boys and girls are
explicitly laid out: girls are to learn only basic literacy of numbers
and objects, and by age ten while boys begin their classical education
with outside mentors, girls cease to venture out. Instead, girls
should focus on the domestic trainings of cooking, weaving, and food
preparation in addition to mastering pleasing speech and compliance.
Serving equivalently as the grand imperial scholar, Ban Zhao would be
highly unlikely ignorant of the ritual injunction stated in the
*Liji*; Ban Zhao's textual subversion for the sake of
equal education for women was then obviously intentional. The
radicality of Ban Zhao's advocacy for educational parity,
however, was clothed under the conservative rhetoric of husbandly
leadership and wifely servitude: husband should lead the wife with
virtue and wife should serve the husband with virtue, and hence both
should be equally educated (*Nujie*, Ch. 2; for
translation see Swann 1932 [2001]; Pang-White 2018). Setting aside the
many possible reasons for Ban Zhao's conservatism, the irony
that women should be given advanced education on par with men so that
they can serve men better is not lost here.



Nonetheless, Ban Zhao's advocacy for educational parity itself
became a historical precedent and a much needed justification for many
virtuous and talented women in subsequent generations to continue
pursuing a life of literary learning and authorship in a society where
there were no legitimate venues available for women to apply their
advanced education beyond the domestic realm of *nei*. Unlike
men, these women of talents required additional justifications for
them to cross the ritual boundary into the realm of *wai*. The
literary genre of women's didactic texts--its
conservativism notwithstanding--provided that safe passage for
learned and talented women to cross into the *wai* without
leaving the *nei* nominally.



The authors of the *Four Books for Women*
(*Nusishu*) compiled by Wang Xiang during the late Ming
are cases in point. All five women authors lived an extraordinary life
on par with their male counterparts: Ban Zhao's
*Nujie* of Han (c.106 CE), Song Ruoxin and Song
Ruozhao's *The Analects for Women*
(*Nulunyu)* of Tang (c.820/825 CE), Empress
Renxiaowen's *Instructions for the Inner Quarter*
(*Neixun*) of Ming (c.1405 CE), and Woman Liu's
*Concise Selections of Model Women* (*Nufan jielu*)
of Ming (c.1580
 CE).[10]
 In a sense, one of the safest ways for women to exercise their
socially deemed superfluous literary talents was to author
conservative didactic texts which provided a deflecting cover for
their extraordinary lives.



Ban Zhao, as noted earlier, lived an exceptional life of scholarship
and state governance that was beyond the reach of not only women in
the *nei*, but also most men of letters. Song Ruoxin and Song
Ruozhao of Tang declined marriage proposals, instead choosing a life
of scholarly work and were appointed by the emperor as
"scholar-officials/teachers" (*xueshi*
Xue Shi /*xiansheng* Xian Sheng ) instructing
princes, princesses, and consorts alike. Empress Renxiaowen lived a
life of the highest level of literary learning by virtue of her royal
position, but also had her literary works including *Neixun*
preserved and propagated by the Emperor's royal edict, making
them available to the wider audience. Woman Liu, unlike all the
previous authors, did not come from a prominent family, but was
widowed at a young age and lived a long life of her own accord
immersed in literary learning for sixty years, writing the most
self-assertive didactic text among the *Nusishu* and had
her writings preserved by her son Wang Xiang, the editor of the
*Nusishu* (Pang-White 2018).



The impact of this uniquely women-centric literary genre of the
didactic texts for women obviously went beyond its overall
conservative content. Its subversive effect on virtuous and talented
women was made clear not only through the kind of life that these
women authors had, but also through the emergence of gender-based
consciousness that asserted not only the importance of women's
work in the *nei*, but also women's own authority over
their own domain. Instead of looking to men for intellectual guidance,
virtuous and talented women became the historical precedents for other
women.


### 4.3 Gender-based Consciousness



The emergence of gender-based consciousness is the natural fallout
from this uniquely women-centric literary genre made for women, of
women, and by women. Ban Zhao's *Nujie* as the
inaugurating text for this literary genre and the kind of life that
Ban Zhao lived became inspirational models for other equally talented
and virtuous women. Song Ruoxin and Song Ruozhao who self-consciously
invoked Ban Zhao as their interlocutor in their original draft of the
*Nulunyu*--intended as a parity to the Confucian
canonic text of *Lunyu*--are clear examples of this sort.
Instead of looking to Confucius as their intellectual guide, the two
Song sisters took Xuan Wenjun (c. 4th century CE)--a
learned woman held the position of instructor in the state academy
teaching over one hundred students--as Confucius, and took Ban
Zhao as their Yen Hui (i.e., Confucius's favorite disciple) in
their imagined dialogical instructions to provide domestic counsels to
women (*Jiutangshu*, Ch. 56, paragraph 33), seemingly invoking
a women-centric intellectual genealogy.



Empress Renxiaowen composed *Neixun* with a view to supplant
Ban Zhao's seven brief chapters of *Nujie* in order
to offer a comprehensive text for women's education; this is
another example of women's affirmation of their own intellectual
authority over the domain of *nei*. Furthermore, Empress
Renxiaowen equated her own effort in writing the *Neixun* as a
standard text for women's education with the famed Confucian
scholar's (i.e., Zhu Xi; 1130-1200 CE) compilation of the
*Elementary Learning* (*Xiaoxue*) as a standard text for
men (*Neixun*, Preface), making women's education
comparable to men's.



The self-assertiveness of a women-centric genealogy and women's
own intellectual authority is most clearly illustrated in the
*Nufan jielu*, the last text of the *Nusishu*.
Unlike Ban Zhao's *Nujie*, Woman Liu's
*Nufan jielu* was not overly concerned with household
management nor immersed in excessive humble rhetoric of lowliness.
Instead, Woman Liu appealed to past virtuous and talented women from
empresses, female generals, concubines, to servants as historical
precedents to illustrate the importance of *nei* and
furthermore to advocate for the priority of *nei* over
*wai*, women over men, daughters over sons (*Nufan
jielu*, Ch. 1, Ch. 3, Ch. 9, and Ch. 11). Woman Liu's
audacious claim of female priority is part of this subversive effect
of the didactic texts for women, which paradoxically are meant to
propagate female servitude and compliance to patrilineage.


## 5. Patrilineage and Gender Oppression



Virtuous and talented women who are able to leave their marks in the
*wai* are indeed few and far between. Women for the most part
in Confucian philosophy are exalted for their unyielding devotion and
diligent servitude to patrilineage throughout their life cycle as
daughters, wives, or mothers. Since there is no other socially
sanctioned venue for women to leave their marks in history, the only
social accolade for women comes in the form of their exceptional
devotion and servitude to patrilineage. The literary genre of
biographies of "exemplary women" (*lienu*
Lie Nu ) compiled by Confucian court historians is a case in
point.



Liu Xiang's *Lienu zhuan* Lie Nu Chuan 
(c. 18 BCE) is the inaugurating text for the
"*lienu*" literary tradition that later became
a standard feature in each dynastic history from the Han to the last
dynasty of the Qing (for the "*lienu*" entry
in dynastic histories, see Judge and Ying 2011, Appendix B). Liu
Xiang's *Lienu zhuan* is a collection of commentarial
biographies of women from early antiquity onward and was originally
composed as an admonition to Emperor Cheng (r. 33-7 BCE) to
recognize the importance as well as the precarious influences of
palace women. The text was organized under six distinct sets of
virtues--"maternal rectitude" (*muyi*
Mu Yi ), "worthy and enlightened"
(*xianming* Xian Ming ), "benevolent and
wise" (*renzhi* Ren Zhi ), "principled and
righteous" (*jieyi* Jie Yi ) and
"persuasive and communicative" (*biantong*
Bian Tong ), plus one chapter on the "deprived and
favored" (*niebi* Nie Bi ). As shown above,
women in antiquity were not strictly praised for their gender roles
per se since among the six sets of virtues enumerated in the text,
only the virtue of *muyi* Mu Yi  (maternal rectitude)
is gender-role specific. And yet women's unyielding devotion and
diligent servitude to patrilineage still formed part of their social
memorialization in other non-gender specific categories of virtue.


### 5.1 *Lienu zhuan* Lie Nu Chuan  and Gendered Virtues



Female servitude to patrilineage is so pervasive that it shapes even
the way in which a virtuous and talented woman is memorialized even if
the enumerated virtues under which she is celebrated are non-gender
specific. For instance, even under the non-gendered virtue of
"persuasive and communicative" (*biantong*) where
women in early antiquity were celebrated as skillful rhetoricians
turning a precarious situation in their favor through the sheer power
of persuasion, the narratives of these skillful women rhetoricians
were still told in the context of or their servitude to
patrilineage.



Take for example the opening biography of Ch. 6, *Lienu
zhuan* 6.1: "Guan Zhong of Qi's Concubine,
Jing". Jing was a skillful rhetorician who successfully helped
Guan Zhong (c. 720--645 BCE)--the famed prime minister of
Qi--decipher the opaque speech of Ning Qi. Guan Zhong was under
the Duke's directive to gauge Ning Qi's intention to
serve, and yet during their encounter Ning Qi only uttered the phrase
"How vast, the white water" which had vexed Guan Zhong for
five days. Upon seeing Guan Zhong's vexation, Jing, the
concubine, offered her help to lessen his burden, but was quickly
dismissed as nothing that she would understand. Jing was obviously
erudite, since she was able to place Ning Qi's speech of
"How vast, the white water" in the context of an old
*Ode* signaling Ning Qi's willingness to serve the Duke.
The story ended with a praise of Guan Zhong's recommendation of
Ning Qi to the Duke who then was able to secure the means to good
governance. It is clear that even though Jing was as erudite as Ning
Qi, one was offered the position of a minister and the other remained
a lowly concubine who had to persuade Guan Zhong not to take her lowly
status as the ground to dismiss her ability to help him in the first
place. The most a talented woman could do was to be of service to the
men of her kin who then were memorialized for their achievements in
the *wai*.


### 5.2 Marriage and Womanhood



The prioritization of patrilineage underpins the Chinese family system
and is codified in various ritual practices. For instance, the
marriage rite has two different meanings for men and women. As
explained in the *White Tiger Hall* (*Baihutong*), the
term "marriage" (*jiaqu* Jia Qu ) is in
fact a compounded term: *jia* Jia  for women and
*qu* Qu  for men. For a woman, to get married
(*jia* Jia ) is to seek an external completion so as to
find a suitable home, and for a man, to *qu* Qu  is to
acquire [a bride] (*Baihutong*, "*Jiaqu*"
chapter; for other translations see Tjan 1949 [1952]; also
see *Shuowen jiezi*). In other words, in the family system of
patrilineage, marriage for the groom is an occasion of
*acquisition* for his family contiguous to his existing
identity, whereas for the bride an occasion of exodus from her own
natal family in search for a new home, an external completion to her
personhood/womanhood.



A successful integration into the husband's patrilineage is
indeed essential to a woman's life ritually and by necessity. In
the Confucian textual tradition, marriage is consummated, however, not
through the physical intimacy between the husband and wife, but
through the ritual completion of ancestor worship. According to the
*Liji*, the purpose of marriage is twofold: first is to secure
the sacrificial service in the ancestral temple, and second to
continue the lineage (*Liji*, "*Hunyi*"
chapter). To secure her service to the ancestral hall marks the
priority of the marriage institution and hence also marks the
beginning of a consummated marriage through which a new bride
establishes herself as part of this new patrilineage.



A new bride becomes a wife in the fullest sense only after she has
partaken in the ancestral rites; otherwise, she is not yet a member of
her new patrilineal family. As explained in the
*Baihutong*,



> 
> 
> To take in a wife without first announcing it in the ancestral temple,
> it will be inauspicious [...] Once a wife has been here for three
> months, she is now allowed to partake in the ancestral worship
> [...] If she dies before partaking in the ancestral worship, her
> body is to be interred with her natal family; this is to show that she
> is not yet a wife in the fullest sense. (*Baihutong*,
> "*Jiaqu*" chapter; also see *Liji*,
> "*Zengziwen*" chapter)
> 
> 
> 



In addition, according to the customary law of "Three grounds a
wife cannot be expelled" (*sanbuchu*
San Bu Chu ) as stated in the *Family Sayings of
Confucius* (*Kongzi jiayu*), a wife's participation
in the three-year mourning ritual for the in-laws constitutes one of
the three compelling grounds that overrides the customary law of
"Seven reasons for expelling a wife" (*qichu*
Qi Chu ), one of which is childlessness (*Kongzi
jiayu*, "*Benmingjie*" chapter; for other
translations see Kramers
 1950).[11]
 In sum, for a woman to establish herself as part of this new
patrilineage, she must retrospectively observe the ancestral rites or
prospectively provide a male heir.


### 5.3 Wifely Fidelity and Widowhood



Non-gender specific virtues as enumerated in Liu Xiang's
*Lienu zhuan* dissipated from the subsequent dynastic
historical accounts of exemplary women's biographies; women in
the post-Han era were praised specifically for adhering to their
gender roles, such as wifely fidelity, widow chastity, and maternal
rectitude (Raphals 1998: Appendix 5). The power of these historical
accolades for women obviously reinforced the limited roles and social
venues available for women. One way for women to garner social
accolades is through observing spousal fidelity, and there is a long
tradition in Confucian texts that teach the virtue of wifely fidelity.
According to the *Liji*,



> 
> 
> Faithfulness is the requisite in all service of others, and
> faithfulness is the virtue of a wife. Once mated, she will not change
> for her entire life; therefore, when her husband dies, she will not
> remarry. (*Liji*, "*Jiaotesheng*"
> chapter)
> 
> 
> 



Similarly, as stated in the *Baihutong* in the context of the
wifely duty to remonstrate with the husband:



> 
> 
> when the remonstration is not taken, the wife cannot thus leave the
> husband. Once mated, the wife cannot change for her entire life. There
> is no justification for deserting one's husband.
> (*Baihutong*, "*Jianzheng*" chapter)
> 
> 
> 



Wifely fidelity to patrilineage is cumulated in the observance of
widowhood, and since the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) onward,
widowhood had been recognized as one of the many honored deeds by the
imperial court with a "testimonial of merit" that elevated
one's entire household. The cult of widowhood reached its height
during the Qing dynasty (1644 to 1912 CE) where widowhood became a
religious expression that enshrined chaste widows at the state and
county's expense (Mann 1987: 37-56). Considering the fact
that a woman is ritually without rank, title, or name of her own, for
her to earn an imperial merit--which at times comes with monetary
awards--is itself an impressive achievement. But as impressive as
this might seem, social accolades for women, unlike those for men,
must be mediated through patrilineage; she is exemplary because of her
servitude to the men of her kin.



Without that kinship tie, it would be nearly impossible for a woman to
acquire social recognition. One only needs to compare the biographies
of "exemplary women" (*lienu*
Lie Nu ) with the "exemplary [men's]
biographies" (*liezhuan* Lie Chuan )--both are
standard entries in each dynastic historical records compiled and
written by Confucian court historians--and it is clear that there
was no such kinship meditation needed for men of virtue, even though
many of them were recorded to have benefited from their mothers'
instructions. Men are exemplary mainly because of their own doings,
whereas women are memorialized, if and only if, they are tied to
patrilineage as filial daughters, faithful wives, chaste widows, or
devoted mothers.



In prioritizing the perpetuation of patrilineage, women often
participate in gender oppressive practices such as female infanticide,
child bride, and concubinage. It is in the wife's interest that
her new family has a male heir through which she anchors her place in
the family, since *her* failure to produce children is one of
the seven grounds for her expulsion from the marriage. Through
whatever means necessary, a wife must ensure that there is sufficient
family resources for her to produce or procure the coming of a male
heir. Perpetuating patrilineage is also codified into the very
practice of filiality (*xiao* Xiao ). As shown in this famed
saying of Mencius,



> 
> 
> There are three unfilial things, and to have no posterity is the
> greatest. King Shun married without informing his parents was because
> otherwise he would have no posterity. An exemplary person considers
> this so treating what he did as if he had informed them.
> (*Mencius* 4A26)
> 
> 
> 



Not to inform one's parents of one's marriage is a serious
ritual infraction, but the imperative to perpetuate one's
lineage overrides that ritual requirement. The perpetuation of
patrilineage, hence, is of utmost importance.


## 6. Contemporary Feminist Discussions



A systematic examination of gender relations using gender as a
category of analysis is a mark of feminist theorizing. In the
philosophical community, this often involves critical re-reading of
the canon shedding light on the overt display of misogyny textually,
historically, and culturally in noted canonical thinkers from Plato to
the twentieth century (e.g., the "Re-Reading the Canon"
series of the Pennsylvania State University Press). But beyond the
critical interrogation of the canon's misogyny, feminists also
engage in the effort of re-appropriation of the canon for the purpose
of constructing liberating solutions for gender-based oppression
(Schott 2003: Ch.1). However, in the theoretical space, feminist
consciousness and westernization are more or less synonymous, since
positive feminist theorizing is largely reliant on western canonical
texts. Non-western intellectual traditions, if they are included at
all, are used as an example of moral depravity to demonstrate the
plights of "third-world" women.


### 6.1 "Third-world" Women and Multiculturalism



Around the 1970s, there was a surge of interest in studying the lives
of women outside the western sphere in order to construct a global
history of women. By going beyond the western sphere, feminists
intended to provide an empirical proof of the urgency and the ubiquity
of gender oppression, while expanding their sphere of concern to
include their less fortunate sisters in the "third-world".
In cross-cultural studies, the status of "third-world"
women is usually measured on a sliding scale of universal victimhood
with western women being the most liberated, the most
gender-conscious, and the most self-determined (Mohanty 1984, 2003;
Mohanty, Russo, & Torres 1991; Narayan 1997). Western feminists
see gender-based oppression faced by non-western women as
"similar but much worse", treating non-western
cultures/traditions as the worsening factors aggravating the suffering
of "third-world" women.



A multicultural approach to gender studies is said to be bad for
"third-world" women, since, unlike the west, non-western
cultures/traditions are said to be deeply entrenched in their
patriarchal past, and unlike western feminists,
"third-world" women with their "false
consciousness" have no agency of their own (Okin 1994: 5 &
11; 1999: 22). The only solution to universal patriarchy then seems to
be a whole-sale importation of western thought and way of life to the
rest of the world. For "third-world" women are said to be
better off, if their indigenous cultures are preferably changed by
modeling after the western liberal culture or simply "to become
extinct" (Okin 1999: 22).



In the western imagination, footbinding remains as the favorite
example of Chinese patriarchy and moral depravity focusing on the
exotic, highly sexualized nature of the practice (Levy 1966; Jackson
1997; Dworkin 1974; Greenhalgh 1977; Daly 1978
 [1990]).[12]
 The familiar exoticization of footbinding is a clear case of
"orientalism" seeing non-western cultures as barbaric and
oppressive to the so-called "third-world" women (Said
1978). Even though there is no textual basis connecting Confucian
philosophy to the practice of footbinding that has persisted for a
thousand years, the prolonged co-existence of the practice and
Confucian teaching to some makes Confucian philosophy suspect by
association.


### 6.2 Care Ethics and Confucian *Ren* Ren 



Seeing non-western cultures/traditions as deeply entrenched in
patriarchy of a by-gone era that should be left behind for good is a
common sentiment in feminist encounters inter-culturally. And this is
true in the feminist engagement with Confucian philosophy as well.
From the turn of the twentieth century to the mid-1990s, the
engagement between feminism and Confucian philosophy, as Terry Woo
puts it, has been mostly a one-sided affair: feminists criticizing
Confucianism for its victimization of women (Woo 1999: 110). The
common caricature of Confucian philosophy as synonymous with
patriarchy inevitably leads to the sentiment that Confucian philosophy
is incompatible with feminist theorizing. Pushbacks from the
Chinese-comparative communities against this feminist caricature began
in the mid-1990s, centering on the positive comparison between care
ethics and Confucian *ren* Ren  on the ground that both
share the emphasis on caring relations and relational personhood (Li
1994; Hall & Ames 1998: 79-100; 2000: 75-96; and two
special issues of the *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*: Lai
[ed.] 2000 and Gu [ed.] 2009).



Some care ethicists have voiced specific concerns regarding the
incorporation of non-western intellectual traditions into feminist
theorizing, in that its distinctive "feminist" as well as
"feminine" character is being adulterated by such
incorporation (Held 2006: 22; Noddings 2010:
 140).[13]
 "Indigenous" feminism that frames traditions in a
progressive idiom is dismissed as a "cultural recovery"
project, seen as easily coopted and swept away by the nationalistic
efforts. The development of "indigenous" feminism is,
hence, framed by some as "Trojan horses" from the
conservative right that would only lead to further oppression of women
on the ground (Dalmiya 2009: 205-207). Curiously, no such
out-pouring worries are voiced when western intellectual
traditions/canonical thinkers are routinely incorporated into
contemporary feminist theorizing.


### 6.3 Comparative Feminist Studies on Confucianism



A quick survey of the content of publications in feminist journals
such as *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*--whose
journalistic mission is to propagate feminist
philosophy--illustrates the lopsided dependency on western
canonical texts for feminist theorizing. Few publications outside the
Chinese-comparative philosophical communities have explored any
feminist potential in non-western intellectual traditions including
Confucianism to address women's issues, concerns and experiences
in the contemporary world. Non-western philosophies, if included at
all, in feminist theorizing serve more as negative examples
illustrating how else things could possibly go wrong for
"third-world" women, instead of serving as positive
conceptual resources for women's liberation from gender-based
oppression.



Despite the lack of positive engagement from the feminist communities
with Confucian philosophy, the Chinese-comparative communities,
nevertheless, persist. Around the mid-2010s, the Chinese-comparative
communities began to go beyond the issue of compatibility between care
ethics and Confucian *ren* and took a step further to
articulate positive Confucian approaches to address women's
concerns, issues, and experiences in the contemporary world, such as
abortion, same-sex marriage, mothering, ecofeminism, domestic
violence, elder care, etc. (Butnor & McWeeny 2014; Olberding 2015;
Pang-White 2016; Foust & Tan 2016; Yuan 2019). The field of
comparative feminist philosophy exploring the feminist potential in
Confucianism is the latest attempt to reconceptualize the complex
connection between gender and Confucian philosophy laying the
foundation for an inclusive, transnational, transcultural feminist
theory.


## 7. Confucian Feminism: A Hybrid Feminist Theory



Considering how routinely canonical western philosophers--some
with egregious connections to misogyny, white supremacy, Nazism, or
pedophilia, personally or textually (Park 2013; Oltermann 2014; Zack
2017; Kirkpatrick 2019; Chrisafis 2019; Rosenlee 2020a,b)--are
extensively integrated into contemporary feminist theorizing, it
prompts the question: why not Confucian philosophy? In the following,
we will look at a theoretical construction of a hybrid theory of
Confucian feminism by using characteristic Confucian concepts,
methods, and concerns to navigate women's issues, concerns, and
experiences in the contemporary world. Confucian feminism proposed
here is not just a historical study of women's lives in the
Confucian textual tradition. Rather, it is a forward-looking project
intended to formulate a feminist theory based on a distinct Confucian
framework--a feminist theory that is Confucian--on par with
other feminist theories such as liberal feminism, social feminism,
etc. in the pantheon of feminism.


### 7.1 Rectification of *Nei-Wai*



Sexism is undeniably a shared human experience in most societies.
Different intellectual traditions might have framed the degree and the
ways in which women are lesser differently--let it be lesser in
intellect, will, or sphere of influence--but women's lesser
status is plain. Women in Confucian philosophy are lesser, first and
foremost, in their sphere of influence; the womanly sphere of
*nei*--even though it is indispensable to the expansive
sphere of *wai*--is restrictive and mostly concerned with
the functional aspects of household management. Confucius's
famous saying that one does not need to leave home to get involved in
state governance is true to a certain extent (*Analects* 2.21),
but part of the process of self-cultivation to achieve moral
perfectibility is to expand one's sphere of influence
concentrically from family, state, to the world at large.



A woman, confined to the realm of *nei*, is essentially a
functional vessel for household management, a sort of thing that
Confucius said a well-rounded exemplary person should not be
(*Analects* 2.12). The structural impediment derived from the
confinement of *nei* will need to be addressed in Confucian
feminism, since any viable feminist theory, first of all, will need to
be able to deal with the gender-based division of labor that confines
each gender to a set of prescriptive roles and duties regardless of
one's actual capacities or unique circumstances. The
*nei-wai* distinction as applied to gender, as noted earlier,
is derived from the functional differentiation (*bie* Bie )
in the spousal relationship as in *fufu youbie*
(Fu Fu You Bie ). Hence, in order to address the
problem of the confinement of *nei*, the spousal relationship
as articulated in the Confucian five core social relations
(*Mencius* 3A4; *Zhongyong*, Ch. 20; *Daxue*)
will also need modification as well.



One possible replacement for the spousal relationship within the
Confucian framework would be friendship (*you* You ), which
is anchored in the virtue of trust (*xin* Xin ). Unlike the
spousal relationship, friendship is not primarily, distinctively, nor
invariably gender-based; furthermore, the excellence of Confucian
friendship is marked by friends' mutual commitment to moral
perfectibility, instead of a functional distinction based on gender or
a fulfillment of some sort of external obligations/duties. Lastly,
given the long overlapping usage of friendship and familial
relationships from antiquity onward, east and west, this substitution
is not inappropriate textually or historically (Rosenlee
 2015).[14]


### 7.2 Friendship as Spousal Relationship



Replacing spousal relationship with friendship will enable us to
address the many problematics associated with the gender-based
division of labor; furthermore, we will be able to accommodate the
expanded institution of marriage to include same-sex couples. This new
conceptual paradigm of marriage is both Confucian and feminist. It is
feminist, since it discards gender-based restrictions/hierarchy in the
division of labor. It is also Confucian, since it utilizes one of the
five Confucian social relations (father-son, husband-wife, siblings,
ruler-minister, friends). Friendship is a corridor bridging the
familial and the world at large, in much the same way, marriage serves
as a pathway through which two strangers become family. The
idyllically enduring spousal bond till death do us part is also
characteristic of true friendship in good times and bad. In sum,
friendship and spousal relationship are not only compatible, but also
oftentimes mirror one another in form and in content.



The advantage of using our Confucian friendship-based model of
marriage is that it provides us with a flexible approach to household
management and child-rearing as an alternative to the 50/50 equal
split prevalent among liberal feminists (Okin 1989) or the call for
the abolition of the institution of family and marriage advocated by
some radical feminists (Allen 1984 [1993]; Card 1996, 2007). Compared
to the liberal 50/50 equal split, the Confucian friendship model is
much more attainable and, unlike the radical call for abolition, the
Confucian model addresses instead of evading the problems of family
and marriage. For the vast majority of women (and men) who continue to
opt to enter the marriage institution and to propagate, the call for
abolition provides no applicable guidance. Furthermore, the liberal
template of absolute equality in intimate relationships is not
attainable since favors done for one's loved ones are not
usually tracked on a scoresheet. Nor is this desirable. In a good
relationship of any kind, there must be a sense of reciprocity, but
unlike in a contractual transaction, in a good marriage or friendship,
reciprocity is not marked by numerical equality.



For what is especially appealing about friendship is the penetrating
understanding that two good friends have of one another, and that
faithful understanding of one another is what enables friends to
transcend the temporal needs to repay in kind and in a timely manner
that an ordinary dealing in everyday life demands. Friends are
faithful to one another, not in a sense of blind obedience, but in a
way that insists on the enduring goodness in one another, both actual
and potential. By being faithful to one another in this way, friends
not only see what is good in one another, but also help realize what
else is possible through thick and thin. Looking at marriage in this
way, to mandate a 50/50 equal split makes marriage seem not only
transactional, but also contrary to what is required in an enduring
friendship.


### 7.3 Relational Personhood and Dependency Care



It is important to note that the Confucian friendship model is not a
replica of the contemporary peer friendship model that is morally
neutral and is underpinned by an autonomous concept of the self
(English 1979 [1989]; Dixon 1995). As many contemporary scholars have
argued, unlike the liberal model of individualism, Confucianism offers
a relational conception of the self whose personhood is deeply
entrenched in the intertwining of the self and other (Ivanhoe 2007;
Ames 2011; Rosemont 2015). The Confucian relational personhood is,
first and foremost, grounded in the parent-child relationship, and
that Confucian emphasis on the parent-child relationship not only fits
right into the ongoing feminist discourse on care ethics but also is
ahead of the growing consensus among philosophers that the liberal
concept of an autonomous self is a deeply flawed one.



Most feminists, even those anchored in the liberal tradition, have
begun to theorize a more robust concept of the self that is relational
and embodied (Mackenzie 2014). And most feminists have looked past the
"Man of Reason" as a guide for moral and political theory
(Lloyd 1984, 2002). In particular, feminists with the rise of care
ethics have begun to take the activity of caring as meriting ethical
insights that have long been discarded to the realm of the sentiment,
personal, or pre-moral. In contrast, Confucianism not only exalts the
moral valence of caring relations, but more importantly recognizes the
political dimension of caring, a critical step that was lacking in the
early development of care ethics (Card 1990; Friedman 1993: Ch. 6;
Yuan 2002).



Confucianism understands that interdependency is an existential given
and hence providing care to vulnerable others in Confucianism is not
only a moral response, but also a characteristic political response of
a *ren*-based benevolent state. For the way of Confucians,
according to the competing school of *Mo* (*Mojia*), is
characterized by the parental devotion of caring for the newborn
infant (*Mencius* 3A5). Remarkably, in Confucian philosophy,
the discussion of caring for the newborn infant occurs not in the
context of the so-called "womanly sphere", but instead in
the context of state governance.



The metaphor of caring for the newborn infant in state governance is
first derived from the *Book of Documents*
(*Shujing*):



> 
> 
> if the king tended to the people as if he were tending to his own
> newborn infant, then the people would be tranquil and orderly.
> (*Shujing*, "*Kangzhao*" chapter; for other
> translations see Legge 1879).
> 
> 
> 



And the way to tend to the newborn infant is to be responsive and
sincere. As the same passage is further elaborated in the *Great
Learning* (*Daxue*):



> 
> 
> In the "Kangzhao" [of *Shujing*] it is said,
> "Act as if you were watching over an infant". If one is
> really responsively sincere, though one may not exactly hit the mark,
> one will not be far from doing so (for other translation see Legge
> 1885, *Liji*, "*Daxue*" chapter).
> 
> 
> 



Providing good care for the most vulnerable is an integral part of
Confucian political discourse. A kingly state, according to the
*Mencius*, takes caring for those without the care of a
family--the widower, the widow, the childless, and the
orphan--as its first political consideration (*Mencius*
1B5). Similarly, according to the *Xunzi* in the discussion of
the regulation of a king:



> 
> 
> Those who have one of the Five Illnesses (*wuji*
> Wu Ji ) should be raised up and gathered in so that they can
> be cared for. They should be given official duties commensurable with
> their abilities and employment adequate to feed and clothe themselves
> so that all are included and not even one of them is overlooked.
> (*Xunzi* 9.1)
> 
> 
> 



According to the later commentary, the "Five Illnesses"
here refers to physical or mental disabilities (Watson 1963: n3,
34).



Unlike the liberal bifurcation of the family and the state or the
private and the public, the Confucian model provides a relational
alternative to address the issue of dependency care that has long been
advocated by care ethicists (Noddings 1984; Kittay 1999; Held 2006).
For, in Confucianism, caring for others is not just constitutive of
one's moral personhood, but more importantly a political ideal
that grounds the state authority in its demonstrated capacity to
provide good care for the most vulnerable--the young, the old,
the sick, and the disabled--as if one were caring for one's
own family. In other words, to care for those who cannot care for
themselves beginning in one's family and then concentrically
radiating to the world at large has both ethical and political
importance in Confucian philosophy.


### 7.4 *Ren* as Feminist Care



Some early critics of care ethics have pointed out that by advocating
for a care-based approach to ethics by itself doesn't make it
feminist, since it might well exacerbate the demand for caring labor
on women (Card 1990; Friedman 1993; Yuan 2002). In Confucian feminism,
this imbalance in caring labor is addressed through the substitution
of the gender-based division of labor in marriage on the basis of
*nei-wai* with friendship. Without gender-based hierarchy or
the gender-based division of labor on the basis of *nei-wai*,
this Confucian model not only provides a flexible arrangement for both
men and women to assume different caring responsibilities, but also
guards against a one-sided demand for self-sacrifice. Since a mutual
commitment to moral perfectibility is the anchor of Confucian
friendship, exploitation and moral degradation characteristic in many
oppressive relationships would also be contrary to a friendship-based
marriage where caring labor is performed for the sake of propelling
each other to moral perfectibility, not for the sake of fulfilling the
gender-based division of labor or gender-based hierarchy.



Once the gender-based division of labor and hierarchy is removed from
the performance of caring labor, Confucian feminism can move forward
with its moral affirmation of the importance of caring for others,
especially those who cannot care for themselves. This pronouncement is
feminist because not only is it morally sound, but because, as a
feminist, one should be committed to creating a more caring and
equitable world not just for oneself but for those who need it most.
No feminist, as Eva Kittay argues, would, could, or should advocate
for voluntary abandonment of the old, the young, the sick, or the
disabled, let it be under the pretext of the pursuit of equality or
fairness (Kittay 2002: 238). If feminists abandon those who cannot
help themselves, then the focus on one's liberation from
gender-based oppression rings hollow.



As in Confucianism where morality is deeply embedded in the
cultivation of one's relational personhood, feminism should also
live up to the basic moral decency of being responsive to the needy,
first, in one's family and then concentrically radiating to the
world at large. There should be no chasm between being a feminist and
being a morally responsive person to those who cannot care for
themselves from near to afar. Confucian feminism--a hybrid
account of a feminist theory in a Confucian framework--is
committed to creating an ever more inclusive and compassionate world
through a *ren*-based self-cultivation and through a
*ren*-based political governance.



The caricature of Confucianism as synonymous with patriarchy and a
backwater ideology need not persist. With the rise of the field of
comparative feminist studies on Confucianism, it is now also possible
to imagine a hybrid Confucian-feminist theory to address women's
issues, concerns, and experiences. This tentative theoretical
construct of Confucian feminism is here to serve as a facilitator to
spur further positive engagement between the Chinese-comparative
communities and the feminist communities to not only expand the range
of our understanding of gender oppression in the lives of women, but
also provide women with viable conceptual tools going beyond the
confine of the western philosophical canon to articulate their own
vision of a liberating future.