## 1. Life and Works



Diogenes Laertius is our main source for Theophrastus' life and
works. In his *Life of Theophrastus* V. 36-38 (fr. 1
FHS&G: for this abbreviation, see Primary Literature
Bibliography), he reports that Theophrastus was born in Eresos on the
island of Lesbos around 371 BCE and his original name was Tyrtamus,
but Aristotle changed it to Theophrastus because of the godlike manner
of his speech (*theos-phrazein*). According to Diogenes
Laertius, early in his life Theophrastus was a student of an otherwise
unheard of Alcippus in his native city and then of Plato in the
Academy, where he met Aristotle, who was not more than fifteen years
his senior and with whom he had a relationship of colleagues or
associates rather than one of teacher and pupil. After Plato's
death in 347 BCE, Theophrastus travelled with Aristotle to Assos in
Asia Minor, back to Lesbos, and later on to Macedonia, because
Aristotle was summoned there as tutor of Alexander. Around 335 BCE
they both returned to Athens. Aristotle founded his school at the
Lyceum but he had to leave again, when Alexander died in 323 BCE, due
to the increasing anti-Macedonian feelings. Theophrastus succeeded
Aristotle at the school, which during the next thirty-five years,
under his headship, acquired a more institutionalized character. It is
reported that he lectured to as many as two thousand pupils at a time
at the Peripatos, among whom we find the Academic skeptic Arcesilaus,
who left him for Polemo's Academy, the comic poet Menander and
the politician Demetrius of Phalerum. So, when Demetrius became
governor of Athens in 317 BCE in the Macedonian interest, he protected
and helped Theophrastus, whose situation had become precarious, as is
testified by a prosecution of impiety that was brought against him by
a certain Agnonides. After Demetrius' expulsion in 307 BCE, he
was again persecuted, more seriously this time, when a law was passed
forbidding anyone to open a school of philosophy without a government
license; Theophrastus as well as many other philosophers left Athens,
and he returned only when the law was repealed a year later. He died
around 287 BCE and in his will, which survives in a copy provided by
Diogenes Laertius (V. 51-57), he left all his books to his
disciple Neleus, including the manuscripts of Aristotle's works,
which he had inherited when he took over the Lyceum.



Diogenes attributes to Theophrastus well over two hundred
separate treatises in different styles, of varying length and on a
very wide range of topics, totaling 232,808 lines; of these less than
ten per cent survives. Some works seem to have been intended for use
within the school as basis for Theophrastus' lectures, while
others were intended for a wider audience and they were, therefore,
written in a popular style or in dialogue form. Judging from the
surviving material and from their titles, some works were on the same
topics as ones by Aristotle, whereas others seem to have dealt with
topics related to those of the Aristotelian treatises but not covered
by them.



Unfortunately, only a few Theophrastean works are extant, mainly
because they seem to have been particularly influential in later
periods, and were recopied then for that reason:


1. Two large treatises on botany, which constitute the first
systematization of the botanical world and one of the most important
contributions to botanical science during antiquity and the Middle
Ages:
	* *Plant Explanations*, six books on the vital functions of plants and
	their causes.
	* *Enquiry into Plants*, nine books with material relevant
	for the writing of *Plant Explanations*.
2. The *Characters*, a collection of thirty concise, often
humorous sketches of negative types of individuals from everyday
Athenian life.
3. Two short independent treatises:
	* *Metaphysics* or *On First Principles*, a treatise
	investigating the principles of nature.
	* *On the Senses* or *On Sensations*, a treatise
	dealing with theories concerning the senses and their objects from
	Parmenides to Democritus and Plato.
4. A number of minor treatises on more specialized topics:
	* *On Odours*, on the production of different perfumes and
	on their medicinal characteristics and effects.
	* *On Fire*, on the origins and properties of fire.
	* *On Winds*, on the phenomenon of winds and their various
	types and aetiology.
	* *On Stones*, on the origins and various types of stones
	with a particular focus on precious stones.
	* *On Weather Signs*, a practical guide of meteorological
	prognoses for the general reader, especially farmers and sailors.
	* *On Sweat*, on the sources and certain distinctive
	qualities of sweat.
	* *On Fatigue*, on the seats, symptoms and causes of
	fatigue.
	* *On Dizziness*, on the phenomenon and causes of
	dizziness.
	* *On Fish*, on the unusual phenomena of fish which venture
	onto dry land and live in air, or burrow into the ground.



Apart from these extant works, we know that Theophrastus wrote
treatises on many more subjects in all areas of philosophy, but of
those we have only their titles, some fragments, and few reports and
paraphrases. The ancient authors who refer to Theophrastus'
writings are diverse and vary greatly in their reliability. For
instance, traces of Theophrastus' doctrines can be found in the
works of Plutarch, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Galen, Sextus Empiricus,
Diogenes Laertius, Pliny the Elder, Priscian, Simplicius, Themistius,
Photius as well as in Arabic authors (Averroes,
al-Farabi, Ibn-an-Nadim) and Latin sources (Albert
the Great, Thomas Aquinas). The following list of titles of
Theophrastus' writings
gives an idea of his prolific philosophical production:


* On logic: *On Affirmation and Denial*, *Prior and
Posterior Analytics*, *On the Analysis of Syllogisms,
Definitions, Topics, The Reduction of Topics*, *Preliminaries
to the *Topics**, *Dialectical Arguments*,
*Objections*, *Sophisms*, *On the Liar*.
* On physics and psychology: *Physics*, *Opinions of the
Natural Philosophers* or *Opinions in Natural Philosophy*,
*On Nature*, *On the Heavens*, *Meteorology*,
*On the Soul*, *On Vision*, *On Experience*.
* On ethics and politics: *On Emotions*, *On the
Voluntary*, *On Virtue, On Happiness*, *On Marriage, On
Wealth, On Retribution*, *On Friendship*, *On
Pleasure*, *On Drunkenness, Politics*, *Political
Customs*, *On Kingship*, *On the Education of a King,
Laws.*
* Finally, on rhetoric, poetics and music: *On the Art of
Rhetoric, Rhetorical Precepts, On Enthymemes, Introductions, On
Judicial Speeches, On Style, On Meters, On Delivery, On Music, On the
Musicians, Harmonics.*



Due to the scattered character of our evidence, it remains a challenge
to reconstruct Theophrastus' views and to piece together his
philosophical preoccupations. The central question which has puzzled
scholars is, understandably, his relation to Aristotle; that is to
say, the question whether he should be treated as a loyal follower of
Aristotle or as an original thinker who was prepared to diverge
considerably from him. Boethius (fr. 72A FHS&G) and Simplicius
(fr. 151B FHS&G) describe him as someone who systematized
Aristotle's doctrines, by ordering them and filling their real
or apparent gaps, whereas Quintillian (fr. 694 FHS&G) reports that
Theophrastus was accustomed to dissent from Aristotle. It seems,
however, that neither the portrait of Theophrastus as a disciple who
simply added footnotes to Aristotle's work without making any
original contribution of his own, nor the image of him as an innovator
who introduced radical changes in the Aristotelian system can be
upheld. It is true that Theophrastus pointed out difficulties and
obscurities with regard to some of Aristotle's theories, but he
did not explicitly abandon them or put anything different in their
place; his modifications were most likely intended as suggestions
within the Aristotelian framework, and his efforts seem to have been
directed at developing the Aristotelian system as well as at meeting
various objections against it. After all, Theophrastus did not adopt
the same approach in all of his works and in all subjects. It is
probably safe to say that he always began where Aristotle left off,
but sometimes his treatment of particular issues did not only expand
Aristotle's thought but also presented a challenge to it. Even
in such cases, though, the problems raised by him should not be seen
as a rejection of the general Aristotelian context, but as specimens
of a philosophical inquiry that is in line with Aristotle's
teaching (see Sharples 1988; Gottschalk 1998; Sorabji 1998).



The aporetic character of many of his writings, especially on
metaphysics, physics and psychology, exemplify Theophrastus'
dialectical method, which is designed to encourage further
investigation rather than to drive towards an exposition of a
full-fledged theory. That is to say, Theophrastus
introduced in his treatises the various and conflicting views of
previous philosophers, and then subjected them to a series of
criticisms, but he did not offer solutions of his own, though he often
made it clear that he thought of some views as more plausible than
others. It is also important to note that Theophrastus' aim in
using such a method should not be understood merely as polemical and
critical, or as a pure logical exercise, but as providing the
preliminary steps of a constructive inquiry that often sets aside
general theoretical questions in order to concentrate on the detail
(see Baltussen 2000).



To this purpose, Theophrastus amassed all the possible information in
connection with a particular subject and tried to find some
explanatory order within it. His empirically minded investigations
thus departed from some of the speculative aspects of the Aristotelian
work, given that his attention was centered on the description and
explanation of actual phenomena more than on the construction of
over-arching theories. It is striking, for instance, that he devoted
separate treatises to marriage and drunkenness, and that he found it
important to tell us everything from demands made by audiences on
lecturers to penalties from withdrawing from an agreed property
deal. Coupled with all this, there is also an emphasis on strange and
remarkable phenomena, which he studied with an interest to find a
suitable explanation for them; for example, the changing in colour of
the chameleon and the octopus (fr. 365 FHS&G; see Sharples 2006;
Ierodiakonou 2020). But the urge to compile a complete and
wide-ranging set of specific cases did not stop Theophrastus entirely
from drawing theoretical generalizations or from issuing practical
instructions. In methodological matters, for instance, he advocated
that the possibility of causal explanation cannot be the same for all
levels of beings and for all subjects; for instance, in the case of
the inquiry about first movers, the heavenly bodies and their final
causes, it is more likely that reason should provide the answers,
while in the case of animals, plants or inanimate things, order has to
be less apparent and a limit needs to be set to the explanatory
requirements. He also defended the principle of multiple explanations,
according to which no single cause is sufficient to explain a
phenomenon that results from many factors all of which should be taken
into account, and he applied it much more widely than Aristotle had
done (see Wohrle 1985; Daiber 1992; Gottschalk 1998).


## 2. Logic



Theophrastus wrote more logical treatises than Aristotle, though most
of them deal with topics similar to those of the Aristotelian
treatises. The fragments and later testimonies that have survived from
his contributions to logic are mainly to be found in the ancient
commentaries of Aristotle's logical works. Theophrastus is
reported there to have improved over some parts of the Aristotelian
syllogistic, but he is also supposed to have introduced a number of
innovations, sometimes independently sometimes working together with
his colleague Eudemus of Rhodes.



Theophrastus abandoned some of Aristotle's statements about
propositions, and in particular his account of the quantifiers (see
Brunschwig 1982; Mignucci 1998). He distinguished, for instance,
between singular and particular propositions, maintaining that the
former are definite while the latter are indefinite; that is to say,
he considered propositions *A*i*B* and *A*o*B* to
be indefinite, because in cases such as "Some man is
just" and "Not every man is just" the quantifier
picks up at least one individual without specifying which one (frs.
82A-E FHS&G). Moreover, Theophrastus claimed that the
proposition "Not every *B* is *A*" has a
different meaning from the proposition "Some *B* is not
*A*", since the latter means that there is at least one
*B* which is not *A*, whereas the former implies that there
are several *B*s which are not *A*s (fr. 83 FHS&G).
Finally, he used the expression "by transposition"
(*kata metathesin / ek metatheseos*) to indicate
affirmative propositions whose predicates are indefinite, e.g.,
"A man is not-just" (frs. 87A-F FHS&G), and he
established the convertibility of universal negative sentences (frs.
90A-B FHS&G).



Theophrastus is reported to have added to the four syllogisms of the
first figure another five (*Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis,
Fapesmo*, and *Frisesomorum*), which Aristotle had just
mentioned in the second book of his *Prior Analytics* (frs.
91A-E FHS&G). In this way, he redefined the first figure, so
that it includes every syllogism in which the middle term is subject
of one premise and predicate of the other. Furthermore, he put the
syllogisms of the second and third figure in a different order from
that chosen by Aristotle, listing them according to the type and
complexity of the proof needed for reducing them to the syllogisms of
the first figure. For instance, his discussion of Ferison precedes
that of Bocardo, since the latter is proved by *reductio ad
absurdum* while the former by conversion of the minor premise
(frs. 96A-B FHS&G).



More interestingly, Theophrastus introduced the so-called
"prosleptic" (*kata proslepsin*) syllogisms
that have prosleptic premises, i.e., propositions with three terms of
which two are definite and the other indefinite (frs. 110A-D
FHS&G). The following are prosleptic premises:


* Whatever holds of all *A*, of all of that *B*
holds.
* Whatever holds of all *A*, that holds of all *B*.
* *A* holds of all of that of all of which *B*
holds.



In fact, these three types of prosleptic premises are used in
constructing three figures of prosleptic syllogisms, which are
composed of one prosleptic and one categorical premise; for instance,
the following is a first figure prosleptic syllogism:




Whatever holds of every man, of all of that substance holds.


Animal holds of every man.


Therefore, substance holds of every animal.



Theophrastus claimed that certain prosleptic premises were equivalent
to categorical propositions; for instance, "*A* holds of
all of that of all of which *B* holds" is equivalent to
"*A* holds of all *B*". Nevertheless, since
there are prosleptic premises that are not equivalent to categorical
propositions, many prosleptic syllogisms cannot be reduced to
categorical syllogisms (see Lejewski 1961, 1976; Kneale and Kneale
1972).



There has been a scholarly debate about whether Theophrastus
recognized arguments in *modus ponens*, *modus tollens*,
*modus ponendo tollens* and *modus tollendo ponens*:


* If *p*, then *q*; but *p*; therefore
*q*.
* If *p*, then *q*; but not-*q*; therefore
not-*p*.
* Either *p* or *q*; but *p*; therefore
not-*q*.
* Either *p* or *q*; but not-*q*; therefore
*p*.



While earlier commentators doubted that Theophrastus ever considered
anything of the sort (see Bochenski 1947), recent scholars have
maintained that he studied such arguments, or at least that he studied
arguments which can be regarded as their forerunners (see Barnes 1985;
Mignucci 1998; Bobzien 2002, 2004). More specifically, our sources
report that Theophrastus and Eudemus, being inspired by
Aristotle's syllogisms "from a hypothesis" (*ex
hupotheseos*: *Prior Analytics* 1.44), discussed
"hypothetical" (*hupothetikoi*) syllogisms, i.e.,
arguments at least one of whose premises is hypothetical, that is a
proposition compounded of at least two propositions.
Theophrastus' hypothetical propositions mark either a
connectedness or a separateness, i.e., they are either conditional or
disjunctive propositions (with exclusive "or"), and his
hypothetical syllogisms have the following forms (frs. 111-112
FHS&G):





If something is *A*, it is *B*.


*a* is *A*.


Therefore, *a* is *B*.




If something is *A*, it is *B*.


*a* is not *A*.


Therefore, *a* is not *B*.




Either something is *A* or it is *B*.


*a* is *A*.


Therefore, *a* is not *B*.




Either something is *A* or it is *B*.


*a* is not *A*.


Therefore, *a* is *B*.




Theophrastus also considered relative quantified propositions such as
those containing "more", "less" and
"equal", and seems to have considered syllogisms built
from such premises (fr. 111E FHS&G). But however innovative his
additions to Aristotle's syllogistic may have been,
Theophrastus' hypothetical syllogisms cannot be said to form
part of an elaborate and comprehensive system of propositional logic,
and thus he cannot be credited with the invention of a logical
calculus similar to that of the Stoics.



Theophrastus also developed the so-called "wholly
hypothetical" (*di' holou hypothetikoi*)
syllogisms, which were abbreviated categorical arguments of the
following form (frs. 113A-D FHS&G):




If [something is] *A*, [it is] *B*.


If [something is] *B*, [it is] *C*.


Therefore, if [something is] *A*, [it is] *C*.



In parallel to the Aristotelian syllogistic, Theophrastus
distinguished three figures of wholly hypotheticals, each with sixteen
modes. He claimed that all second and third figure syllogisms could be
reduced to first figure syllogisms, and he also regarded some of them
as reducible to Aristotle's categorical syllogisms, presumably
by way of the equivalence to "Every *A* is *B*"
(see Bobzien 2000).



Finally, in modal logic, Theophrastus seems to have deviated from the
Aristotelian doctrine. In contrast to Aristotle, Theophrastus defined
possibility as no longer entailing non-necessity (fr. 101 FHS&G).
He recognized that the problematic universal negative proposition
"*A* possibly holds of no *B*" converts, just as
the assertoric universal negative and the necessary proposition do
(frs. 102A-C FHS&G). Furthermore, he introduced the *in
peiorem* rule for mixed modal syllogisms, according to which the
conclusion always has the same modal character as the weaker of the
premises, assuming that possibility is weaker than actuality, and
actuality is weaker than necessity (frs. 106-107 FHS&G).



## 3. Metaphysics and Physics



Theophrastus' short treatise *Metaphysics* or *On
First Principles* is an inquiry into the foundations of natural
science; it studies the first principles of nature as well as their
relationship to the world of perceptible and changeable entities. It
is recognized by scholars as an integral and independent work, which
was most probably written during Theophrastus' stay in Assos or,
at the latest, at the very beginning of Aristotle's final stay
in Athens; that is to say, in the period between 347 and 334 BCE. The
early date of the composition of this treatise has been argued mainly
on the basis of the following two considerations: (i) Theophrastus
seems to have known nothing of the central and latest books of
Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and thus concentrated all his
comments on the older books, and especially on book Lambda. (ii) Some
of the puzzles raised by Theophrastus in this treatise are resolved in
Aristotle's works *On the Parts of Animals* and *On
the Generation of Animals*; had the Aristotelian works been
available to him, he would not have made these remarks (see Most 1988;
Devereux 1988; Huby 2015).



To investigate the first principles of nature, Theophrastus depended
on various observations of natural phenomena as well as on existing
theories by earlier and contemporary thinkers, which are presented in
this treatise sometimes in a sketchy manner and sometimes in more
detail. In the case of the Academy, for instance, we find allusions to
important metaphysical views introduced by Plato, but also by
Speusippus and Xenocrates. These references cannot be said to
constitute mere doxography, since they seem to have served the purposes of
a dialectical examination. Theophrastus subjected the views of other
philosophers to a series of objections and criticisms, while he
avoided making definitive assertions; this gives the whole treatise an
aporetic character, which has been compared both with
Aristotle's *Metaphysics* B, but also with the style of
*Metaphysics* A.



The first and main subject, occupying more than half of
Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, is the nature and properties
of first principles. More specifically, this treatise begins by
demarcating the study of first principles as distinct from the objects
of nature to which they are to be related. Next, it
discusses the nature, number, identity and causality of first
principles; the motion of celestial spheres, and how these connect to
the sublunar world; the properties of first principles, i.e., whether
they are indeterminate, determinate, or both, and how to understand
their property of being at rest. The first part is followed by two
extensive appendices, investigating problems relating to the main
subject: (i) on epistemology, i.e., on determining the methods of
knowing everything from first principles down to inanimate beings, and
hence the nature of the connection between intelligibles and
sensibles; and (ii) on teleology, i.e., on testing the alternative
views of the application to the universe of a certain first principle,
namely the principle that everything has a final cause and that nature
does nothing in vain. It is particularly noteworthy that, in his
*Metaphysics*, Theophrastus seems not to have been interested
to explore some of the central themes of Aristotle's thought,
namely those concerned with the being *qua* being, the relation
between form and matter and the problem of universals (see Sharples 2015).



The subject of Theophrastus' take on Aristotle's teleology
has been at the centre of contemporary scholarship.
Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* refers to passages in
Aristotle's writings that reveal him struggling to explain
certain phenomena in terms of his teleological principle, when it may
have been better for him to admit that such explanations are simply
inappropriate. For instance, Theophrastus claimed that natural
phenomena such as extremely dry and moist seasons, the size of the
deer's horns, or the insects that only live for a day seem to
violate the principle that all things in nature are for the sake of
something. He thus suggested that such instances should urge us to
question whether teleological reasons should be put forward in all
cases without qualification, as well as to acknowledge that there may
be limits to the determination of causes. This does not mean, however,
that Theophrastus failed to recognize the role of necessity in nature
nor that he rejected all teleological explanations, though it is true
that in his surviving works there are few such examples. So, his
attitude in this issue should rather be interpreted as showing nothing
but caution towards an indiscriminate application of the principle
that nature does nothing in vain (see Lennox 1985; Repici 1990; van
Raalte 1993: 491-2; Gourinat 2015).



Aristotle's teleological worldview seems to give way, in
Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, to a conception of the
universe as an organism, according to which the cosmos is a single,
complete and coherent entity compared to a living creature. The key
Theophrastean term for the relationship between intelligibles and
sensibles is "connection" (*sunaphe*), which
is to be understood as a particular kinship characteristic of entities
that are inseparable parts of a continuous whole, bound by some
"partnership" (*koinonia*) of a hierarchical
but also reciprocal nature. Hence, by claiming that the universe is a
single system subject to one set of laws, Theophrastus questioned
Aristotle's division between the sublunary and the celestial
spheres as well as Plato's tendencies towards dualism. Most
importantly, since his unified and coherent cosmos is thought of as an
ensouled and divine being, whose movement becomes the product of
forces inherent in its different parts, Theophrastus did not think
there is need for any additional principle. In other words, it seems
that Theophrastus preferred to locate the cause of the movement of the
heavens in the heavens themselves, rather than in their desire for
something else, and he thus abandoned the Prime Unmoved Mover
postulated by Aristotle. But although it is generally agreed that
Theophrastus deviated in this respect from Aristotle, it has also been
argued that Theophrastus may have been mainly interested to point out
the need to supplement this postulate with explanations of perceptible
movements, since the Unmoved Mover could never by itself determine all
of them in full. Besides, it has also been pointed out that Aristotle
did not himself believe in an Unmoved Mover of the heavens throughout
his career, and other Aristotelians, for instance Alexander of
Aphrodisias, continued later to question whether an Unmoved Mover
actually plays an essential part in the movement of the heavens (see
Sharples 1985a; Lefebvre 2015; Berti 2015).



Theophrastus discussed the first principles of nature not only in his
*Metaphysics*, but also in his various treatises on natural
philosophy; there are passages from Simplicius' and
Philoponus' commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics*
(frs. 144A-B FHS&G), which suggest that physics, according
to Theophrastus, is just as much concerned with the first principles
of nature as with its causes and elements. Many titles of
Theophrastus' works on natural philosophy are mentioned in our
sources, e.g., *Physics*, *Opinions of the Natural
Philosophers or Opinions in Natural Philosophy*, *On
Nature*, *On the Heavens*, *Meteorology*, though it
is difficult to determine from their few surviving fragments whether
they are collections of doxographical material or whether they present
Theophrastus' own theories (see Mansfeld 1992; Zhmud 2001, 2006:
117-65). But even in his role as a doxographer, Theophrastus
seems to have been careful in expounding accurately the physical
doctrines of his predecessors, and presumably more careful than
Aristotle, whether he agreed with them or not (see McDiarmid 1953;
Schofield 2002).



Concerning Theophrastus' account of the four elements, it has
been debated to what extent this conforms to the Aristotelian
doctrine. In particular, it is not clear whether Theophrastus followed
Aristotle in holding that the heavens are made of a fifth element, the
ether, distinct from the four sublunary elements, or whether he
claimed that the heavens are simply made of fire (frs. 158-168
FHS&G). It has been argued, for instance, that Theophrastus
abandoned the fifth element, but used it only in arguments against
Plato without endorsing it himself (see Steinmetz 1964). There is no
doubt, on the other hand, that he gave prominence to the element of
fire. In his short treatise *On Fire*, Theophrastus
distinguished heavenly fire from terrestrial fire, which is always
mixed with other elements, and pointed out that, in contrast to the
other three elements, terrestrial fire can be generated artificially
and constantly requires refuelling. Most importantly, Theophrastus
postulated that fire, or heat, is active while the other three
elements are passive (fr. 177 FHS&G). In fact, this Theophrastean
view has been interpreted as a serious departure from
Aristotle's physics, according to which hot and cold are active
while moist and dry are passive. Against this interpretation, however,
it has been remarked that, since the Aristotelian biology postulates
only the hot as active, Theophrastus did nothing but extend
Aristotle's view to physics in general (see Longrigg 1975).
Furthermore, although some scholars have presented the action of the
hot as constituting for Theophrastus the reason for the interchanges
between the elements, others have counterclaimed that these should be
understood as qualitative and not just due to a mechanical mixture
(see Steinmetz 1964; Gottschalk 1967).



But there are occasions in which Theophrastus' explanations of
physical phenomena clearly differ from Aristotle's. He explains,
for instance, the composition of the winds entirely by dry exhalations
(frs. 186-194 FHS&G); the sideways motion of the winds by
the rotation of the heavens (fr. 186 FHS&G); the saltiness of the
sea by dry exhalation from the land being carried down again in the
rain (fr. 220 FHS&G); the rainfall and condensation by direct
physical pressure rather than by the effect of cooling (fr. 211
FHS&G).



Finally, although it seems that Theophrastus' account of time as
an accidental attribute of motion is a fairly minor amendment of the
Aristotelian thesis that time is the number of motion (frs.
151A-C FHS&G), his analysis of place is more interesting.
Simplicius reports in his commentary on Aristotle's
*Physics* that Theophrastus indicated a number of difficulties
resulting from the Aristotelian definition of place as the inner
boundary of the surrounding body (fr. 146 FHS&G), and thus
questioned whether place may be not something that exists in its own
right, but rather the arrangement and position of a thing as part of
an ordered whole (fr. 149 FHS&G). Simplicius, moreover, refers to
a passage from Theophrastus' *Physics* which he takes to
bear witness to the relational theory of place that Simplicius himself
adopts, following his teacher Damascius. In fact, this has been the
traditional interpretation of Theophrastus' account of place,
namely that he developed a relational theory of place as a full-blown
alternative to Aristotle's defective theory of an absolute
concept of place.

Nevertheless, a qualified version of the traditional view has been put
forward as more plausible, according to which Theophrastus'
account should not be read as a fully developed conception of place,
but as an objection specifically directed against Aristotle's
notion of natural place; that is to say, Theophrastus only attempted
to provide a new account of natural place within a wider world order,
rather than of place, in general, as an abstract and quasi-geometrical
concept (see Sorabji 1988). Against this interpretation, it has been
argued that Theophrastus did not have as his target Aristotle's
notion of natural place; in fact, Theophrastus never developed a
detailed and coherent alternative theory of place, and the phrasing of
his account points most probably to a dialectical context (see Algra
1992). Lastly, it has also been suggested recently that Theophrastus
did not think that his objections to the Aristotelian theory of place
were insoluble, and the text cited by Simplicius as bearing witness to
Damascius' view is not inconsistent with Aristotle's
account of place; hence, Theophrastus did not offer a new or competing
theory of place, but rather shared Aristotle's view of what
place is (see Morison 2010).



## 4. Psychology



Theophrastus is reported to have written a treatise with the title
*On the Soul*, which was a commentary on Aristotle's
*On the Soul* and comprised at least two books. Nearly all we
know about this Theophrastean work comes from Themistius'
paraphrase of Aristotle's *On the Soul*, which was used
heavily in Arabic philosophical writings, as well as from Priscian of
Lydia's paraphrase of Theophrastus' work. In this
treatise, just like in his *Metaphysics*, Theophrastus pointed
out difficulties in Aristotle's text, suggested conceptual
distinctions and clarified the implications of obscure Aristotelian
doctrines like, for instance, the definition of perception as
assimilation of the sensible form of an object without its matter (see
Laks 2002, 2019; Caston 2019). It is debatable, however, whether
Theophrastus also offered clear and unambiguous solutions to the
problems he raised.



In particular, it has been proposed that his questions and remarks
concerning Aristotle's theory of the intellect do not pose
serious challenges (frs. 307-327 FHS&G). Theophrastus
accepted the basic Aristotelian assumptions and simply tried to
elucidate the opaque statements in Aristotle's *On the
Soul* 2.5-3.5. For instance, he raised the issue of how the
intellect differs from matter; how the descriptions of the intellect
as passive and as productive can both be true of one and the same
entity; whether the passive intellect is actualized by the
intelligibles or by the productive intellect; what the relation is
between the intellect and the intelligibles; why is it that the
intellect sometimes thinks and sometimes does not. Every question
raised in this treatise receives an answer, or at least a suggestion
of an answer. For instance, Theophrastus replied that while matter
receives individual forms, intellect receives universal forms. As to
his suggestion concerning the relation between the passive and the
productive intellect, different interpretations have been offered; it
has been argued that Theophrastus treated them both as immanent parts
of the soul, but it has also been argued that he thought of the
productive intellect as a transcendent separate entity. Also, he seems
to have claimed that the productive intellect is the principle of
thought, not by operating directly on the passive intellect but by
actualizing the intelligibles, and thus by enabling them to affect the
passive intellect; in this way, the productive intellect is
responsible for thought just like light, which actualizes colours and
renders them perceptible, is responsible for vision. All such
Theophrastean suggestions, however, were most probably not intended as
diversions from nor as developments of Aristotle's views, but
rather as reformulations and clarifications of the Aristotelian
doctrine (see Barbotin 1954; Devereux 1992; Magrin 2011).



In addition, we are fortunate to have some information about
Theophrastus' theory of knowledge, mainly thanks to a passage in
Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Logicians*, in which
Sextus presents the different views of preceding philosophers on the
criterion of truth (fr. 301A FHS&G). There are many ambiguous
statements in this passage, but it clearly ascribes to Theophrastus
the view that sensation (*aisthesis*) and thought
(*noesis*) are the sources of knowledge, while
self-evidence (*to enarges*) is the basic criterion for both.
So, Theophrastus is said to have claimed that our senses are moved by
the sense object and, when the sensation is self-evident, a reliable
memory of the sensation and an appearance or an imagination
(*phantasia*) of the sense object follow; for instance, the
memory and the *phantasia* of Socrates existing in the minds of
those who knew him directly. A third movement is added, namely
rational *phantasia*, which results from our judgement and
choice, and which involves the production of a model by the
aggregation of individuals in the universal, for instance the rational
*phantasia* of man; hence, rational *phantasia*
constitutes, with regard to being potential, understanding
(*dianoia*) and, with regard to being actual, intellect
(*nous*). Finally, from understanding and intellect concepts
arise, and thus knowledge (*episteme*) and skill
(*techne*). Sextus' passage has been used as
evidence for the interpretation, according to which Theophrastus
managed to sort out an ambiguity in Aristotle's use of the term
*phantasia*, by distinguishing the rational *phantasia*,
which is tied up with speech and reason, from the formation of the
*phantasia*, which is nothing but a by-phenomenon of sensation
(see Huby 1989).



The other Theophrastean treatise in psychology has the title *On
the Senses* or *On Sensations* (*peri
aistheseon*). This work survived for the most part
intact and was edited by Hermann Diels, in his *Doxographi
Graeci* (1879), as part of Theophrastus' *Opinions of the
Natural Philosophers* or *Opinions in Natural Philosophy*;
it was, therefore, treated as a mere source for the physical doctrines
of previous philosophers and considered as the origin of the rest of
the doxographic tradition. It is rather recently that scholars have
eventually recognized it as an independent work, whose study would
probably benefit from a new critical edition (see McDiarmid 1962;
Baltussen 2019; Mansfeld 2019). More specifically, *On the
Senses* or *On Sensations* deals with the theories of sense
perception put forward by Parmenides, Empedocles, Alcmaeon,
Anaxagoras, Cleidemus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Plato and Democritus. It
presents and criticizes the views of these philosophers about the
senses and their objects, among which vision and colour occupy a
central place; it also discusses pain and pleasure, as well as the
physiology of thought. Theophrastus applied throughout this work the
method of division: The first and main division, already found in
Aristotle, is between those who believe sense perception to be by
similarity, i.e., in accordance with the principle "like by
like", and those who assume it is through contrast. But another
division that is not Aristotelian also plays a part, namely between
those who believe that sense perception differs from thought, and
those who do not. The last philosopher whom this treatise discusses is
Democritus and not Plato, because Democritus argued, in
Theophrastus' view, both that sense perception is by like and
that it is by unlike, and so failed to fit the main division (see
Mansfeld 1996; Johansen 2019).



Theophrastus' reconstruction of previous theories has been at
the centre of the scholarly discussion on this work. Detailed studies
concerning the way he summarized preceding opinions have been written,
and it has been interestingly suggested that he often proves to have
been more reliable and careful than Aristotle in expounding accurately
what each one of his predecessors advocated (see McDiarmid 1959a,
1959b, 1960; Sedley 1985, 1992; Sharples 1985b; Laks 1990; Long 1996;
Bredlow 2011; van Raalte 2015; Ierodiakonou 2019b; Rudolph 2019). In
addition, more attention has lately been given to Theophrastus'
own analysis of earlier arguments as well as to his critical
evaluations, so that this treatise is no longer thought of as a mere
report of past doctrines but rather as a document of Peripatetic
dialectic (see Baltussen 2000).


## 5. Biology: Human Physiology, Zoology and Botany



Theophrastus' extensive monographs on botany fortunately
survive, but we have very few of his works in human
physiology--namely, *On Sweat, On Fatigue, On
Dizziness*--and only summaries and reports of his works in
zoology, apart from one that is preserved in manuscripts, the short
treatise *On Fish*.



Concerning the human body and its functions (frs. 328-349
FHS&G), Theophrastus seems to have followed Aristotle in
postulating four basic qualities (hot, cold, dry, wet), and in
ascribing to the heart a central role. He also emphasized the function
of breath or spirit (*pneuma*), which is meant to keep the body
and the soul of human beings together, linking psychic functions with
physical motions (fr. 346 FHS&G). In fact, it has been argued that
in this case, too, Theophrastus diverged from Aristotle, since
Aristotle thought that *pneuma* was concentrated in the area of
the heart while Theophrastus claimed that it extends throughout the
body; however, Aristotle's position on this issue is
controversial (see Longrigg 1993: 173-6).



The titles of Theophrastus' zoological treatises, as well as our
testimonies with regard to his research in this area, suggest that he
did not pursue Aristotle's interest in the anatomical structure
of living creatures, but tried to supplement the Aristotelian approach
with observations on animal behaviour and its causes. The variations
in animals resulting from different local environments, the generation
of swarming creatures and the nuisance caused by them, the
psychological qualities shared by animals with humans, and hibernation
and reproduction, are some of the themes in Theophrastus'
zoological works that our secondary sources discuss (frs.
350-383 FHS&G). Some of these Theophrastus introduced as
strange and paradoxical, for some he offered multiple explanations, in
some cases he simply repeated the Aristotelian view, in others it is
disputable whether or not his account differed considerably from
Aristotle's. For instance, in the case of spontaneous
reproduction (frs. 376-383 FHS&G), some scholars have
claimed that Theophrastus shared Aristotle's views, while others
have insisted that he is certainly more sceptical than Aristotle. It
has also been suggested that Theophrastus agreed with the Aristotelian
doctrine in the *Metaphysics* (Z 7 1032a30), according to
which the same plants and animals can come either from seed or
spontaneously, but not with Aristotle's view in his biology that
there is a sharp distinction between the plants and animals that are
generated from inanimate matter and those that never are (e.g., *On
the Generation of Animals* 1.1 715b8-15); in fact, this
suggestion has been presented as evidence in favour of the thesis that
some of Theophrastus' zoological works may have been written
before Aristotle's biological treatises (see Balme 1962).



Interestingly enough, Theophrastus' comments on animal behaviour
have often raised the question of how far he considered it to be
analogous to human behaviour. By showing, in particular, an interest
in intelligent animal behaviour, he seems to have somewhat effaced the
line between humans and other animals. According to Porphyry's
treatise *On Abstinence From Eating Meat*, Theophrastus
stressed a natural relationship (*oikeiotes*) among all
human beings, but also between human beings and other animals. This
relationship, however, is not to be confused with Stoic
*oikeiosis*; for the latter starts as an innate and
self-regarding impulse of newly born creatures that is modified over
time, so that an individual comes to realize the priority of virtue
over soundness of body, whereas Theophrastus' notion designates
a kinship based on common bodily and psychical characteristics (see
Brink 1956; Long 1998). So, in the case of the relationship between
humans and other animals, Theophrastus claimed that humans are akin to
animals because they are made of the same skin, flesh and fluids, and
most importantly because their souls are no different in desires,
angry impulses, reasonings and above all sensations (fr. 531
FHS&G). But if the mention here of reasonings or calculations
(*logismoi*) is pressed, then Theophrastus can be understood as
seriously deviating from Aristotle, who stated in his treatise *On
the soul* (3.10 433a12) that animals did not have the ability of
reasoning. Also, at the beginning of his treatise *Enquiry into
Plants*, Theophrastus stated that animals differ from plants
because they act (*prattein*). But assuming that Theophrastus
shared Aristotle's requisite for action (*praxis*),
namely that in acting one exercises one's reason, his ascription
of actions to animals implies that they have a reasoning faculty of at
least some sort, though it is not entirely clear how he supported this
claim.



This relationship between animals and humans stands behind
Theophrastus' aversion to animal sacrifice as an unjust act
incompatible with holiness (fr. 584A FHS&G). In his treatise
*On Piety* (see Potscher 1964), Theophrastus argued that
there are three reasons humans offer sacrifices to gods: to show
honour, or gratitude, or to get a favour. But humans cannot show
honour, or gratitude, or expect a favour, by doing harm and by
committing an injustice. And since sacrificing an animal does cause
harm, for it robs the animal of its soul, it should be considered as
unjust. In fact, the idea that animals can be treated unjustly is
rather important, since it suggests that in this respect, too,
Theophrastus departed from Aristotle, who had claimed in his ethical
writings that animals are not moral agents, and cannot be recipients
of injustice. It is worth pointing out, however, that
Theophrastus' different approach to animal intelligence and
character has been interpreted more as a matter of different emphasis
than as a deliberate divergence. That is to say, it has been argued
that while Aristotle had underlined dissimilarities between humans and
other animals, Theophrastus stressed deep underlying similarities, so
that the chasm that Aristotle had recognized between humans and other
animals became for Theophrastus less important than the chasm between
animals and plants (see Browning Cole 1992).



Theophrastus' two main botanical treatises, *Enquiry into
Plants* and *Plant Explanations*, have stood the test of
time better than Aristotle's zoological works. Especially, the
*Enquiry into Plants* (*Historia Plantarum*) is
considered as one of the most important books of natural history in
antiquity, along with Pliny the Elder's *Natural History*
and Dioscorides' *De Materia Medica*. It was written some
time between c. 350 and c. 287 BCE in ten volumes, of which nine
survive. Theophrastus seems to have continually revised the
manuscript, and it remained in an unfinished state on his death.
Judging from its condensed style and the many lists of examples,
Theophrastus may have used it as notes for teaching purposes, rather
than intending it to be read as a book. He investigated in it over 550
species of plants and showed great interest in their structure, growth
and reproduction, their varieties around the world, the wood of
different trees and the effects of climate on it, the wild and
cultivated plants, the classification and uses of herbs, cereals and
legumes; finally, in book 9 he presented the medicinal uses of plants,
described the juices, gums and resins extracted from them, and
explained how to gather them from different regions (see Desautels
1988).



The purpose of Theophrastus' botanical treatises seems the same
as that of Aristotle's zoological writings; first, in the
*Enquiry into Plants*, he aimed at identifying the plants and
at gathering all the available information about them, then, in the
*Plant Explanations*, he proceeded to account for their common
or distinctive characteristics. So, Theophrastus methodically laid out
all the differences among plants, by distinguishing major categories
and by drawing successive subdivisions within each of these
categories; this involved the close study of the parts of plants,
their morphology and reproduction, as well as relevant factors of
habitat and cultivation. On the basis of such research, he
subsequently undertook to discover their causes, and thus to acquire
better understanding (see Wohrle 1985, 2019: 31-56). It is
no exaggeration to say that the history of botany owes to Theophrastus
the first systematic classification and explanation of plants and
their uses.


## 6. Ethics and Politics



From the titles of Theophrastus' ethical works as well as from
the surviving second-hand reports, it becomes clear that his interests
in ethics covered a wide range of topics, some similar to
Aristotle's, e.g., virtue, happiness, emotions, pleasure,
friendship, but also others of a more particular concern, e.g.,
marriage, old age, wealth, retribution (frs. 436-437
FHS&G).



Theophrastus adopted Aristotle's analysis of virtue as a mean
disposition in regard to emotional response and action; that is, for
each individual virtue there are two co-ordinate vices, one of excess
and the other of deficiency (fr. 449A FHS&G). To illustrate virtue
as the mean disposition relative to us, Theophrastus referred to the
garrulous person who says too much, his opposite who says too little,
and the virtuous person who lays hold upon due measure (see also,
*Characters* 3 and 7). He also gave similar accounts for
temperance, courage and the other moral virtues. In the case of
temperance, for instance, he claimed that the insensitive person fails
to desire what is in accordance with nature, the intemperate person is
marked by excessive desire, whereas the temperate person enjoys
pleasures to the extent he ought and in accordance with nature. It is
worth noting that in his account of justice, in particular, he seems
to have followed more closely Aristotle's *Eudemian
Ethics* rather than the better-known *Nicomachean Ethics*
(see Fortenbaugh 1983); justice is treated as a standard mean
disposition co-ordinate with an excess and a deficiency, since neither
the man who distributes the larger quantity to himself nor the man who
distributes the lesser is considered as just, but the man who
distributes the equal portion. Furthermore, in line with the
Aristotelian conception of virtue as the mean which is determined by
reason and such as the practically wise man would determine it,
Theophrastus emphasized that a person must learn to reason correctly
or, in other words, to acquire practical wisdom which is, in his view,
inseparable from moral virtue (fr. 460 FHS&G); for instance, those
who have been insulted may be quite justified in feeling angry and
seeking revenge, but without practical wisdom they may choose the
wrong course of action and fail to achieve their goal (frs. 526,
527A-B FHS&G).



Apart from the fragments of his ethical treatises, in which
Theophrastus presented with few modifications the Aristotelian account
of virtue, we also have his extremely influential book
*Characters*, in which he went beyond his Aristotelian
inheritance and focused on vicious human behaviour. More precisely,
Theophrastus' *Characters* is a collection of thirty
brief, often humorous descriptions or sketches, or even caricatures,
of unattractive moral behaviour; for instance, loquacity,
insensitivity, flattery, shamelessness, obnoxiousness, superstition.
Each sketch is preceded by a definition of the personality type, and
the entire collection is preceded by a spurious prologue which
indicates that the *Characters* came to be used for moral
instruction.



Indeed, many interpretations have been put forward with regard to the
composition and purpose of this book. It has been regarded by some
scholars as an independent work, while others have argued that it is a
collection of extracts from one or more writings of Theophrastus that
were brought together and edited after his death; but the coherence
and stylistic unity of the collection suggest that its parts cannot
have been derived from unconnected works (see Diggle 2004:
4-26). Theophrastus' main interest, here, seems to have been limited to
merely portraying superficial behavioural patterns, without any
consideration of the various desires and beliefs that may underlie
these character traits; for Theophrastus, in contrast to Aristotle,
hardly gave any explanation of why people behave in these ways or what
motivates them (see Fortenbaugh 2003b). It is not surprising that his
sketches of immoral and corrupt characters have often been linked with
the stage characters of his pupil and comic writer Menander, such as
Sicon, the garrulous cook in the *Dyscolus*, or Polemon, the
vehement person in the *Perikeiromene* (see Fortenbaugh 2003d).
Moreover, the *Characters* have also been closely connected to
rhetorical instruction as well as to actual rhetorical practice, since
it is plausible to believe that this book would have been of use to
the student of rhetoric as well as to the rhetorician who wished to
study and narrate emotional behaviour; it is indicative, after all,
that it was preserved in rhetorical manuscripts (see Fortenbaugh
2003c). But whatever one thinks about the purpose of the
*Characters*, there is no doubt that Theophrastus' book
constitutes a valuable testimony to the culture and society of his
contemporary Athens, by vividly depicting the complex etiquette
considered appropriate for Athenian citizens in their homes, streets
and other public places of their city (see Millett 2007).



Theophrastus stressed the importance of education and development of
good habits in producing moral characters; education, he claimed,
tames the human soul (fr. 465 FHS&G). In particular, early
education trains us in the appropriate emotional response, but also
helps us acquire moral principles that are both action-guiding and
good in themselves; for instance, in acquiring courage one learns not
only to confront danger steadfastly, but also to do so because
steadfastness in the face of danger is noble. In addition,
Theophrastus claimed that education helps us acquire practical reason,
so that we carefully investigate how we should live and act
accordingly.



But virtue can be lost, according to Theophrastus, and adverse
external circumstances may influence a person's moral character
(frs. 462-463 FHS&G). Indeed, he is reported to have said
that it is very difficult to decide on, to choose, and especially to
remain steadfast to the best life (fr. 476 FHS&G). Besides, if we
are to accept Cicero's testimony, Theophrastus did not think
that virtue is sufficient for happiness, since happiness partly
depends on factors over which an individual has no control and they
can make a person's life miserable, such as tortures,
banishments, bereavements (frs. 495-499 FHS&G). In fact, he
was criticized for endorsing, in his book *Callisthenes* or
*On Grief*, the maxim "Fortune rules life, not
wisdom". (fr. 493 FHS&G). But even if Theophrastus stressed
more than Aristotle the power of chance to ruin a human life, he still
assigned special importance to the life of contemplation, which he
thought of as similar to the life of the gods. In fact, Cicero reports
that Theophrastus was involved in a great controversy with another
Peripatetic philosopher, namely Dicaearchus, who ranked more highly
the practical life than that of leisured study, but it may well be the
case that this debate is nothing but Cicero's own creation (frs.
481-482 FHS&G; see Fortenbaugh 2013).



Regarding his treatment of emotions, Theophrastus agreed with
Aristotle that emotions are complex phenomena involving bodily
changes, which manifest themselves as painful or pleasant sensations,
thought or belief, desire, and in many cases goal-directed behaviour.
To take, for instance, the case of anger that features predominantly
in our sources, it is said to involve the thought that insult has
occurred, which causes the boiling of blood and warmth around the
heart, but it also involves changes in countenance and voice, as well
as the desire for revenge (frs. 271, 441, 446-447, 526, 542
FHS&G). On the other hand, Theophrastus seems to have diverged
from Aristotle, when he discussed closely related emotions in terms of
the more and the less. Using again the example of anger, Theophrastus
postulated that while anger is characterized by bodily changes and
painful sensations, the thought that some injustice has occurred, and
the wish for retribution, rage involves these same features to a
greater degree and faultfinding to a lesser degree (fr. 438
FHS&G). However, due to the meagre evidence available, it is not
clear whether Theophrastus thought of difference in degree as merely
compatible with difference in kind, or actually determinant of
difference in kind (see Fortenbaugh 1985a).



The interest in politics Theophrastus acquired, most likely, from
Aristotle. It has even been claimed that, in some cases, it was
Aristotle who suggested to Theophrastus the topics of his books on
politics and prepared with him the relevant material before his death;
but the evidence on this point is not conclusive (see Podlecki 1985).
On the other hand, the titles of Theophrastus' political
treatises indicate that in some of them he dealt with topics similar
to Aristotle's--e.g., *Politics*,
*Laws*--while in others he introduced new ones--e.g.,
*Political Customs*, *On Kingship*, *On the Education
of a King*. Not much has survived from these writings, but from
the little we know it seems that in politics, too, Theophrastus used
the same research methods as in the other disciplines, namely taking
into consideration the particular circumstances as well as
conscientiously collecting and recording all relevant information (see
Wohrle 2019: 93-6).



To take his treatise *Laws*, for instance, Theophrastus treated
in its twenty-four books all the branches of legislation by comparing,
discussing and criticizing the laws of all Greek states in connection
with each and every legal institution (fr. 590 FHS&G). There is
interesting material, here, on legal procedures like those of
impeachment, retrial and ostracism, but also regulations concerning
property and commerce. In fact, this treatise seems to have been
intended as a practical guide or an encyclopedia for legislators,
which could be consulted to insure that a prospective law was the best
one available. Furthermore, Theophrastus recognized that legislators
can never fully control the course of future events; they legislate in
response to a limited set of circumstances and are likely to overlook
conditions which may arise in the future and justify exceptions to the
law. So, he talked of the "right moment" (*kairos*)
and of politicians who in special circumstances permitted injustice
for the benefit of their city-state (frs. 614-615, 617,
628-630 FHS&G). It has been argued, however, that
Theophrastus' treatment of political issues is not always
systematic; sometimes it lacks a rigorous point-by-point development
and is characterized by a rather speculative examination of the
theories behind the laws (see Szegedy-Maszak 1981).


## 7. Rhetoric, Poetics and Music



The titles of Theophrastus' works on rhetoric as well as their
few surviving fragments suggest that they were probably written to
serve different purposes: The treatise *On the Art of
Rhetoric*, for instance, seems to have been rather theoretical in
scope, *Rhetorical Precepts* may have been a practical guide to
composing speeches, *Introductions* could have contained a
collection of sample *prooemia* for imitation, *On Judicial
Speeches* is likely to have been a discussion of courtroom
speeches. There is plenty of evidence that in this area, too,
Theophrastus' writings were influential: they are often
mentioned by later writers. For instance, Cicero and Quintilian take
notice of his contributions to rhetoric (frs. 667-670
FHS&G), his diction is cited occasionally by lexicographers (frs.
449B, 464, 494A-B FHS&G), he is repeatedly referred to as
someone who wrote in an attractive manner (frs. 5B, 50-54, 497,
669 FHS&G), and later rhetoricians made use of his
*Characters* for instruction in the schools (see Fortenbaugh
2003c). It proves difficult, however, to determine Theophrastus'
own input to rhetoric, especially when compared to those of Aristotle
and the other Peripatetics, since he seems to have been building
extensively on their work.



Theophrastus closely followed Aristotle in distinguishing between
deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric, as well as in dividing
a speech into parts (fr. 671 FHS&G). He also distinguished between
audience-oriented speech and fact-oriented speech; the former is
illustrated by poetry and rhetoric, which are characterized by their
ornamented style, while the latter is illustrated by philosophy, which
is concerned with truth and methods of argument (fr. 78 FHS&G).
Although the originality of this classification and his acceptance of
the legitimacy of affective prose may be limited to a simple
modification of Aristotle's views, Theophrastus thus managed to
eliminate the last traces of Plato's hostility to rhetoric. In
his treatise *On Style*, on the other hand, he seems to have
tried to improve over the Aristotelian tripartite division of good
style into clarity, appropriateness and ornamentation
(*Rhetoric* 3.2-12), by adding a fourth virtue of speech,
namely that of speaking correct Greek (*hellenismos*), which he
places before the others; it is likely that his interest in it
reflects the development at the time of grammar as an independent
subject. So, it is the combination of precisely these four qualities
that is meant, according to Theophrastus, to achieve in style the
desired mean, which he also advocated in diction, rhythm and sentence
structure (see Innes 1985).



Concerning rhetorical delivery, Theophrastus gave the subject
recognition and paid more attention to the actual performance than
Aristotle had done before him. It is true, of course, that Aristotle
touched on delivery both in his *Rhetoric* and in his
*Poetics*, but his remarks were quite brief and largely
subordinate to accounts of style. In contrast, Theophrastus composed a
special treatise *On Delivery*, which is unfortunately lost;
there are at least a few texts among our sources that provide us with
information about Theophrastus' views on delivery, but none of
these texts actually refers by title to the treatise *On
Delivery*. Still, it is safe to say that in his rhetoric
Theophrastus attributed primary importance to the pitch of voice as
well as to bodily movement (fr. 712 FHS&G). He also emphasized the
effects of facial expression and, in particular, those resulting from
a fixed gaze or a blank stare (fr. 713 FHS&G). It is worth adding
that, by giving importance and independent treatment to the subject of
delivery, Theophrastus succeeded in influencing the subsequent
development of rhetoric, for delivery came to be recognized as its
fourth part coordinate with style, invention and arrangement (see
Fortenbaugh 1985b).



Like Aristotle, Theophrastus discussed prose rhythm, too. He drew a
sharp distinction between verse and rhythm, arguing that verse has no
place in prose and suggesting that a colon or a period can be
rhythmical without having too precise a rhythm. More specifically, he
showed a preference for periods in which the final colon is longer
than the preceding one (fr. 701 FHS&G), and betrayed a fondness
for the paeon, which he considered as most flexible and at the same
time most magnificent (frs. 702-704 FHS&G).



Theophrastus seems to have been well known in antiquity as a writer on
music (frs. 715-721B FHS&G), and there are Arabic sources
that refer to a tradition of musical theory that was believed to be
traceable to him (frs. 722-725 FHS&G). But although his work
on the subject was apparently respected, we know rather little of its
content. Theophrastus' writings on music--namely, *On
Music*, *On the Musicians* and *Harmonics*--are
lost, and it is only thanks to Porphyry that a single verbatim
quotation from his treatise *On Music* is preserved (fr. 716
FHS&G), in which we find some of Theophrastus' views (see
Barker 1985; Sicking 1998).



Theophrastus advocated that all previous musical theories, which tried
to provide a basis for the analysis of differences of pitch in
quantitative terms, were to be rejected. That is to say, he argued
against the Pythagoreans, Plato and Aristotle, because they all had
defended the view that, since pitches differ in a quantitative manner
and a melody is a series of different pitches, music itself consists
in quantities and relations between quantities. Theophrastus claimed
instead that differences in pitch are essentially qualitative, but it
proves very difficult to reconstruct in detail the doctrine about
pitch that he himself suggested in place of the quantitative account.
However, the important question about music, for Theophrastus, seems
to be the extent to which it is possible to identify in audible pitch
sequences qualities that are the same as or analogous to qualities of
psychic states. Plato and Aristotle believed that music has an
important role to play in the process of educating the human soul to
virtue, for music is not only pleasant but also expressive of
character. Theophrastus, on the other hand, limited the role of music
to a significant degree; in his view, only in the case of children
does music contribute to virtue, while with others it may even
contribute to vice (fr. 720 FHS&G). On the other hand, it seems
that Theophrastus assigned to music a cathartic effect; according to
him, music cures many of the ills that affect the soul and the body,
such as fainting, fright and prolonged disturbances of mind (fr. 726
FHS&G).


## 8. Theophrastus' Legacy



The impact of Theophrastus' various writings cannot be
exaggerated; his treatises were read and respected by subsequent
generations of philosophers and others, whose works contain sometimes
clear and sometimes latent signs of his influence. To start with the
Hellenistic period, Epicurus took careful note of Theophrastus'
writings and seems to have made use both of his reports concerning the
theories and arguments of previous philosophers as well as of his
objections against them. In physics, in particular, it has been shown
that Epicurus owes a direct and positive debt to Theophrastus'
exclusion of divine causes as well as to his principle of multiple
explanation. It is noteworthy, however, that Theophrastus'
acceptance of multiple explanations differs from that of Epicurus;
Theophrastus seems to have correlated different explanations with
different forms of a phenomenon in our experience, whereas Epicurus
claimed that any possible explanation will be true somewhere in the
infinite Atomist universe (see Sedley 1998).



Regarding, on the other hand, Theophrastus' influence on
Stoicism, at least in its earliest years, it has been argued that it
was probably minimal in all three parts of Stoic philosophy: Stoic
ethics presented happiness as entirely independent of external
circumstances or chance events, while the Stoics' account of
physical phenomena was mainly influenced by Heraclitus and
Plato's *Timaeus*. In logic, finally, it may be true that
Theophrastus elaborated a logic of propositions, but there is no doubt
that he considered the categorical syllogism as primary, and never
came close to developing Chrysippus' sophisticated hypothetical
syllogistic. Therefore, it is not the case that the early Stoics put
forward positions that they could scarcely have adopted without the
help of Theophrastus' doctrines or methods, even if it proves
that he left a stronger imprint on Chrysippus than on
Chrysippus' Stoic predecessors (see Barnes 1985; Long 1998).



Cicero often refers to Theophrastus together with Aristotle in matters
of ethics, politics and rhetoric. Although he gives Theophrastus a
subordinate role, he regards the encyclopedic research carried out by
him as a guide containing useful directives to politicians and
rhetoricians, but also as a helpful example in his attempt to present
Greek philosophy to the Roman society (see Gigon 1988; Runia 1989;
Fortenbaugh 2005). The encyclopedic character of Theophrastus'
writings, and in particular of his treatise *Opinions of the
Natural Philosophers* or *Opinions in Natural Philosophy*,
has also been assumed to be the source for much of the material on the
Presocratics in later doxographic accounts. In his seminal work
*Doxographi Graeci* (1879), Hermann Diels argued that
doxography proper began with the Theophrastean writings; according to
him, the fragmentary information on the Presocratics found in his
reconstructed Aetius' *Placita*
(1st/early 2nd cent.), though debased and
modified in the course of transmission, is linked to
Theophrastus' treatises in a direct and vertical line of
descent. He further argued that also a number of doxographical
passages in Hippolytus' *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium*
(early 3rd cent.), in Diogenes Laertius'
*Lives* (early 3rd cent.), in the
*Stromateis* preserved by Eusebius (early 4th cent.)
and in a few other works of minor importance, in some way or other for
the most part go back to Theophrastus himself. By and large Hermann
Diels' argument as pertaining to Aetius, though in need of
revision, has been judged as correct; but the relation of the
doxographical sections in the person-oriented overviews of the later
authors to the topic-oriented work of Theophrastus seems to be more
complicated than he believed. Moreover, Diels has also been criticized
for having failed to take into account the possibility that already
before Aetius more than a single tradition existed, or mutually
diverging witnesses belonging to the same tradition may have been
available (see Mansfeld 1992, 1998).



In the Arabic sources we find many references to Theophrastus'
life, works and sayings, but only the translations of two genuine
Theophrastean texts have been preserved; namely, the
*Metaphysics* or *On First Principles* and the
*Meteorology*. It is not surprising, however, that
Theophrastus' works were neither extensively copied nor much
quoted in the Arabic philosophical literature. One of the reasons
suggested is the fact that from 900 to 1050 the promotion of Aristotle
by the school of Baghdad as the most important philosopher eclipsed
other Peripatetics, whose works were not seen to be commentaries on
the Aristotelian treatises. In addition, Theophrastus' treatises
with their aporetic nature and identical titles with those of
Aristotle were hardly appropriate for constructing a dogmatic
Aristotelian system, which the Baghdad Peripatetics were seeking.
Finally, after 1050 the crushing influence of Avicenna caused the
disappearance of manuscript copies even of Aristotle's works,
let alone of Theophrastus (see Gutas 1985, 1999; Daiber 1985).



Byzantine scholars, on the other hand, appreciated and cited
Theophrastus' works, and it is thanks to their efforts that some
of his works survived. The Patriarch Photius (9th cent.),
for instance, refers both in his *Lexicon* and in his
*Library* to a number of Theophrastus' treatises.
Byzantine rhetoricians incorporated the *Characters* within a
collection of rhetorical writings of Hermogenes and Aphthonius, whose
discussions of *ethos* they were taken to illustrate, and
thus contributed to the survival of this book (see Diggle 2004: 13;
38). In the twelfth century the polymath John Tzetzes and the
archbishop of Thessaloniki Eustathius drew material from
the *Characters* and imitated its style, while Michael of
Ephesus used Theophrastus' ethical and biological writings when
compiling his comments on Aristotle's treatises. Finally, there
is clear evidence that in the fifteenth century Cardinal Bessarion was
well familiar with Theophrastus' views and his testimony may be
used as a reliable source (see Lautner 1995).



During the Western Middle Ages, direct knowledge of
Theophrastus' writings was very limited, and it was not until
the fifteenth century that some of his more important works were
recovered and translated into Latin, even though not all of them also
appeared in print (see Schmitt 1971). Two Theophrastean treatises were
translated by Bartolommeo da Messina for King Manfred of Sicily during
the years 1278-1266, namely *De principiis* and *De
signis*; at first they were thought to be Aristotle's and
their influence was scant, but in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries they were finally attributed to Theophrastus and attained
some importance. During the Renaissance, though, the *fortuna*
of Theophrastus' writings changed considerably: The Latin
translations by Theodore of Gaza of the two major botanical works,
*Enquiry into Plants* and *Plant Explanations*, were
printed in 1483, even before the edition of the Greek text from the
press of Aldus Manutius in 1495-1498. In 1644 Johannes Bodaeus
published in Amsterdam a frequently cited folio edition of these works
with commentaries and woodcut illustrations. The Latin version of the
*Metaphysics* by Cardinal Bessarion was published in 1515,
while the classical scholar Adrianus Turnebus began publishing Latin
translations of Theophrastus' *opuscula* in 1553.
Finally, the Latin translation of the *Characters* by Lapo da
Castiglionchio was produced around 1430 and appeared in print in 1517.
It is worth adding that the *Characters* became the inspiration
for the literary genre of the character study, and found many
imitators in the seventeenth century, notably Bishop Joseph Hall, Sir
Thomas Overbury, Bishop John Earle and the French satirist Jean de La
Bruyere; finally, George Eliot was also inspired by this
Theophrastean work, and wrote her own book of caricatures,
*Impressions of Theophrastus Such*, which was first published
in 1879.