## 1. Some Definitional Issues


### 1.1 Global and International Justice



A distinction is often drawn between *global* and
*international* justice. The key point of difference between
these two notions involves clarifying the entities among which justice
is sought. In international justice the nation or state is taken as
the central entity of concern and justice among nations or states is
the focus. In the domain of global justice, by contrast, theorists do
not seek primarily to define justice between states or nations. Rather
they drill down through the state shell and inquire about what justice
requires among human beings. Global justice inquiries take individual
human beings as of primary concern and seek to give an account of what
fairness among such agents involves. There are several types of
actions that cut across states or involve different agents,
relationships, and structures that might be invisible in an inquiry
seeking justice among states exclusively. Many different kinds of
interactions are not circumscribed by state membership and yet can
importantly affect human beings' most fundamental interests, so
asking the question about what individual human beings owe one another
often uncovers significant neglected features of relationships and
structures that are of normative concern. Global justice analyses are
not precluded from yielding state-level obligations; indeed, they
typically do. However, they consider a wider array of possible agents
and organizations that might have duties as well.



There are advantages associated with both types of inquiries. An
important advantage of asking what states owe one another is that much
international law presupposes the states system and requires states to
perform various actions to promote justice. In this way,
responsibilities often appear to be clearly allocated to particular
parties thus making it quite precise who ought to do what in our
actual world. One advantage of global justice inquiries is that we are
not forced to take states as a fixed constraint and we can therefore
consider a range of relevant relationships, capacities and roles that
also structure our interactions and might be relevant to how we ought
to conceptualize global responsibilities. While asking about what
individuals owe each other may well have implications for states and
their obligations, a range of other agents and institutions may also
have relevant justice obligations. These responsibilities can become
more visible when we explore what individuals owe each other. The two
approaches have different strengths and can complement each other, but
in contemporary debate they are often taken as rivals competing to
provide the most plausible framework.



For further discussion of international justice, see the entry on
 international distributive justice.


### 1.2 What is a Theory of Global Justice?



In general, a theory of global justice aims to give us an account of
what justice on a global scale consists in and this often includes
discussion of the following components:


1. identifying what should count as important problems of global
justice
2. positing solutions to each identified problem
3. identifying who might have responsibilities in addressing the
target problem
4. arguing for positions about what particular agents (or collections
of agents) ought to do in connection with solving each problem
and
5. providing a normative view which grounds (1)-(4).



Theories of global justice aim to help us understand our world better
and what our responsibilities are in it. While some theorists aim
purely at theoretical understanding, others hope also to provide an
analysis that can be useful in practical policy making concerning
global justice matters.


### 1.3 When is a Problem a Global Justice Problem?



Problems of global justice arise when one (or more) of the following
conditions obtain:


1. Actions stemming from an agent, institution, practice, activity
(and so on) that can be traced to one (or more) states negatively
affect residents in another state.
2. Institutions, practices, policies, activities (and so on) in one
(or more) states could bring about a benefit or reduce harm to those
resident in another state.
3. There are normative considerations that require agents in one
state to take certain actions with respect to agents or entities in
another. Such actions might be mediated through institutions,
policies, or norms.
4. We cannot solve a problem that affects residents of one or more
states without co-operation from other states.



So, in general, a problem is one of global justice when the problem
either affects agents resident in more than one state or the problem
is unresolvable without their co-operation. For the problem to be
considered genuinely global rather than regional it should affect more
than one regional area.


## 2. Principles to Guide Behavior in International and Global Matters



What sorts of duties of justice, if any, exist among human beings who
do not reside in the same country? If there are such duties, what
grounds them? Some argue that John Rawls's principles developed
for the case of domestic justice, notably, the Fair Equality of
Opportunity Principle or the Difference Principle, should apply
globally (Beitz 1999; Caney 2005a; Moellendorf 2002). Others maintain
that the content of our duties to one another is best explored by
examining alternative concepts not featured in the Rawlsian corpus,
such as capabilities or human rights (Nussbaum 2006; Pogge 2008;
Nussbaum 2015).



Much discussion about what we owe one another in the global context is
influenced by the work of John Rawls, so a short synopsis is needed to
situate debates. Since discussion of these issues is amply covered in
the entries on
 international distributive justice
 and
 John Rawls,
 this will be a compressed summary focusing only on the most central
aspects of the debate that have a bearing on core topics of global
justice.


### 2.1 The Influence of Rawls's *Law of Peoples*



In *The Law of Peoples*, John Rawls argues for eight principles
that he believes should regulate international interactions of
peoples. For Rawls, a "people" is constituted by a group
of persons who have in common sufficient characteristics such as
culture, history, tradition, or sentiment. Rawls uses the term
"people" in ways that relevantly correspond with how many
use the term "nation". In addition, Rawls often assumes
that, for the most part, each people has a state.



The eight principles Rawls endorses acknowledge peoples'
independence and equality, that peoples have the right to
self-determination along with having duties of non-intervention, that
they ought to observe treaties, honor a particular list of human
rights, should conduct themselves in certain appropriate ways if they
engage in warfare, and that they have duties to assist other peoples
in establishing institutions to enable people's
self-determination. He also advocates for international institutions
governing trade, borrowing, and other international matters that are
characteristically dealt with by the United Nations.



Several claims have been the subject of much debate between critics
and defenders of Rawls's position. In particular, Rawls believes
that so long as all peoples have a set of institutions that enable
citizens to lead decent lives, any global inequality that might remain
is not morally troubling. Critics draw attention to the ways in which
global inequality - perhaps in levels of power or affluence
- can convert into opportunities for deprivation and
disadvantage. For instance, the global advantaged can use their
superior position to influence the rules that govern international
institutions - such as trade practices - which can
facilitate further opportunities for increased advantage and so they
can indeed threaten the abilities of others in distant lands to lead
decent lives (Pogge
 2008).[1]



Another important issue that underlies debate between Rawls and his
critics concerns different views about the nature and origins of
prosperity. Rawls gives a particularly strong statement of what he
takes the causes of prosperity to be. He claims that the causes of the
wealth of a people can be traced to the domestic political culture,
the virtues and vices of leaders, and the quality of domestic
institutions. He says:



> 
> I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it
> takes lie in their political culture and in the religious,
> philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure
> of their political and social institutions, as well as in the
> industriousness and cooperative talents of its members ... The
> crucial elements that make the difference are the political culture,
> the political virtues and civic society of the country (Rawls 1999,
> 108).
> 



Critics observe that in addition to local factors, there are also
international ones which play an important role in prospects for
well-being. Thomas Pogge prominently helps bring some of these into
view. The international borrowing and resource privileges, are good
examples of the ways in which international practices can have
profound effects on domestic factors which undeniably also play a role
in promoting prosperity. According to the international borrowing
privilege, governments may borrow amounts of money on behalf of the
country and the country thereby incurs an obligation to repay the
debt. The international resource privilege refers to a
government's ability to do what it likes with resources,
including selling them to whomever it chooses to and at what price.
Any group that exercises effective power in a state is internationally
recognized as the legitimate government of that territory and enjoys
the two privileges. But, Pogge argues, this sets up undesirable
incentives that hamper developing countries' abilities to
flourish (Pogge 2008). These include incentivizing those strongly
motivated to hold office for material gain to take power by force or
exercise it in ways that help reinforce oppressive governments'
abilities to retain control. The global advantaged benefit greatly
from these privileges and so have little incentive to reform them.
But, according to Pogge, reforms are sorely needed. If only
sufficiently legitimate governments are able to enjoy these
privileges, the international community would remove one important
obstacle developing countries currently face.



Defenders of Rawls's views argue that his position is more
complex than is commonly acknowledged and allows for both a principled
stance on some fundamental values along with appropriate openness to
alternative ways in which legitimate and decent peoples might organize
their collective lives (Reidy 2004; Freeman 2006). They argue that
Rawls's position shows great sensitivity to a number of factors
that must be weighed in considering right conduct in international
affairs. For instance, when Rawls makes his bold claims about the
causes of wealth it is useful to bear in mind the context in which he
is arguing. Against an assumption that resources are enormously
important for a society's ability to flourish, Rawls emphasizes
the importance of strong institutions, political culture and other
local factors, in sustaining decent lives for citizens. Rawls also
reflects on the difficulty of changing political culture, noting that
simply transferring resources will not help. Interestingly, in a
little discussed passage, Rawls ventures that an "emphasis on
human rights may work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of
rulers who have been callous about the well-being of their own
people" (Rawls 1999, 109). For more on whether Rawls provides us
with a cogent model that can provide sage guidance in international
matters see the entries on on
 international distributive justice
 and
 John Rawls.
 See also Martin and Reidy (2006). For the purposes of this entry we
need only summarize some key questions that were influential in
setting the terms of discussion about global justice for some
time.



Some key questions are:


1. What principles should govern interactions among peoples at the
global level?
2. What are the causes of prosperity and are they traceable entirely
to domestic factors or are international considerations relevant?
3. What should count as the kind of prosperity or well-being that we
are aiming to promote?
4. Do we have an obligation to ensure people have their basic needs
met and can otherwise lead "decent" lives, or should we be
more concerned with global socio-economic equality?
5. What duties do we have to those peoples who do not yet have what
they need for self-determination or prosperity?
6. If human rights serve an important role in world affairs, which
rights should be on our list of those to endorse? What duties arise
from such commitment?
7. Can we properly hold nations to be entirely responsible for the
well-being of their people and if so, in what kinds of conditions
might this make sense? How do we encourage nations to take
responsibility for their people's well-being?
8. When we consider what we owe one another, do compatriots deserve
special consideration?



We trace some of the influential positions that have shaped answers to
these questions next.


### 2.2 What Global Duties Do We Have?



One of the most visible and large-scale contemporary global justice
problems we face is that of global poverty. What ought we to do for
the 1 billion or so people who currently live in poverty? This is a
huge area nicely canvassed in the entry on
 international distributive justice.
 A few seminal arguments deserve mention here as well, however. In a
classic argument Peter Singer describes a so-called easy rescue case
in which an infant is drowning in a shallow pond. You happen by and
can save the child with minimal effort and inconvenience on your part.
Singer argues that you would be obligated to assist using the
principle that when it is in our power to prevent something bad from
happening without sacrificing anything significant or comparable, it
is wrong not to prevent the bad from occurring. So, Singer argues that
we have extensive duties to assist needy others, whether they be
geographically proximate or not. We have extensive duties to assist
the global poor who, with equally minimal effort on our part, can be
saved from dire circumstances, since the same principle applies in
both cases (Singer 1972). (For more treatment see Unger 1996 and for
criticism see Lichtenberg 2013).



Thomas Pogge offers another influential contribution in *World
Poverty and Human Rights*. He argues that since developed
countries impose a coercive global order on the poor that foreseeably
and avoidably causes great harm, they have important responsibilities
to reform the global order such that it ceases to do so and instead
better secures human rights (Pogge 2002, 2008, 2010). We harm the
global poor when we collaborate in imposing an unjust global
institutional order on them and, moreover, that order is unjust when
it foreseeably perpetuates large-scale human rights deficits that can
reasonably be avoided were we to make quite feasible institutional
modifications (Pogge 2002, 2008, 2010). We also harm the poor when we
deprive them of their resources and through a shared and violent
history (Pogge 2008). While Singer emphasizes our capacity to assist
with need satisfaction, Pogge emphasizes instead our contributions to
the problem as grounding our duties.



When discussing our duties to one another there is also vigorous
debate about what the content and target of our duties should be,
along with discussion about what are the best ways to discharge these.
Traditional dominant economic approaches to promoting prosperity have
focused on raising income levels or increasing Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). Railing against such approaches, Amartya Sen suggested that the
capabilities approach provides an improved measure of well-being and
constitutes a better way to capture changes in people's
condition over time (Sen 1980). Exploring what people are able to do
and be provides a more appropriate standard by which to evaluate
whether their condition has improved rather than focusing exclusively
on their incomes or per capita GDP. Martha Nussbaum develops this
approach and argues for a list of ten capabilities that should be
secured for all people in all places. This universal list can provide
an important tool in persuading governments to make reforms conducive
to their citizens' flourishing. (See the entry on
 the capability approach
 for more.) Another important discourse for discussing duties is that
of human rights which is discussed in
 Section 2.4
 below. Before we continue it is important to mention that there are
many possible ways to understand the content of our duties to one
another. (For more see entries on
 egalitarianism,
 equality,
 sufficiency,
 capability theory,
 well-being,
 and
 needs in moral and political philosophy).
 The issue of our duties to one another is a vast topic and we
continue to discuss it throughout this entry. This section serves only
as an introduction.


### 2.3 Cosmopolitanism, Duties to Non-Compatriots, and Compatriots



When considering what we owe one another, are compatriots special? Do
we have the same duties to non-compatriots as we have to compatriots
or is there some principled way in which these two sets of duties
ought to differ?



Nationalists argue that we belong to national communities and any
account of our global responsibilities that ignores this omits an
important aspect of how we relate - and ought to relate -
to one another. They argue that nations can provide a valuable
grounding for social attachment, identity and meaning in life, and can
ground special obligations to strengthen national life and assist
co-nationals (Miller 1995; Tamir 1993; Lenard 2012). Others defend the
value of nationalism on instrumental grounds; there is nothing
inherently special about our co-national relationships but state
boundaries are useful in assigning important duties to particular
agents (Goodin 1998). In a world of great unmet need, paying special
attention to one's co-nationals can be justified (Goodin 1998;
Lenard
 2012).[2]



In the words of Diogenes, widely credited as the first person to
propound cosmopolitan views, cosmopolitans see themselves as
"citizens of the world". Contemporary cosmopolitans
typically hold that every human being has standing as an ultimate unit
of moral concern and is entitled to equal consideration of her
interests no matter what other affiliations, especially national
affiliations, she might have. Drawing on the idea that we all have
equal moral worth, cosmopolitans seek to broaden our moral horizons so
that we do not forget about the responsibilities we have to others
beyond state borders, even when we have local responsibilities as
well.



Prominent cosmopolitans frequently offer accounts that feature
different elements. Martha Nussbaum emphasizes that, as human beings,
we belong to a global community of human persons (Nussbaum 1996).
Nussbaum argues that while love for one's country might have a
legitimate place in people's conceptions of a good life, we
should not overlook the many other relationships we are in which
connect us to others in the world. We need to draw the global
community in closer to the local one, and, more generally, aim to see
ourselves as members of overlapping communities which also have
important claims on us.



By contrast, Thomas Pogge focuses on the implications of
cosmopolitanism for the global institutional order. We need to ensure
that global institutional structures give equal consideration to
everyone's interests. He says, "Insofar as human agents
are involved in the design or administration of global rules,
practices, or organizations, they ought to disregard their private and
local, including national, commitments and loyalties to give equal
consideration to the needs and interests of every human being on this
planet" (Pogge 2013, 298). This equal-consideration-of-interests
requirement only applies to such contexts. While such impartiality
norms are perfectly familiar within the state, for instance, when
judges operate in law courts, we have yet to realize the requirement
at the global level.



It is often assumed that cosmopolitanism must necessarily be in
tension with more local attachments to friends, family or compatriots.
Some cosmopolitans believe such conflict is inevitable, unproblematic
and a necessary part of understanding what cosmopolitanism entails
(Ypi 2013a). Others argue for different ways in which the apparent
tensions could be resolved (Pogge 2013; Tan 2004; Appiah 2007; Cabrera
2020). As we see above, Pogge emphasizes the clear separation of
spheres in which equal consideration of people's interests
applies. Kok-Chor Tan offers a similar argument. His strategy is to
show that cosmopolitan principles should govern global institutional
structures that ensure people are treated as equals in their
entitlements (Tan 2004). When this is the case there can be a
legitimate role for patriotism that operates within such constraints.
Partiality to co-nationals need not conflict with cosmopolitan
obligations. Another notable strategy is to argue that we cannot
achieve justice at a national level unless we attend to justice at a
global level. On this view, we have at least instrumental reasons to
care about global justice, even if we care deeply about social justice
in our nation (Banai; Ronzoni and Schemmel 2011; Ronzoni 2013).



There is an important debate among egalitarian theorists about whether
our concern with equality should be confined to members of the same
state or whether it should extend to all globally. Some theorists
argue that careful consideration of notions such as reciprocity,
coercion, or fair terms of co-operation mandate that we give special
weighting to the interests of compatriots (Blake 2013). Others, by
contrast, argue that these concerns, when properly understood, point
in the direction of equally strong duties to non-compatriots. One form
of the argument that we have special duties to compatriots that are
not shared with non-compatriots, draws on the coercive legal structure
that applies within states and claims that such coercive structures do
not apply outside of them (R. Miller 1998; Blake 2001). Another highly
influential version claims that there is a difference in the authority
to enforce justice within and outside the state (Nagel 2005). There
are many important challenges to such positions. One important line of
argument maintains that coercion is indeed relevant in triggering
duties of egalitarian justice, but since this is rampant at the global
level it activates global not just national egalitarian duties (Cohen
and Sabel 2006; Abizadeh 2007; Valentini 2012). So, the same
ingredients Nagel identifies as crucial in generating state authority
exist at the global level as well (Cohen and Sabel 2006). Nicole
Hassoun argues that there are many coercive international institutions
and that, to be legitimate, these institutions must ensure that
everyone they subject to coercive rules can secure what they need to
consent or object to these rules. This requires adequate food, water,
shelter, education, healthcare and the social and emotional support
they require for sufficient autonomy (Hassoun 2012). Laura Valentini
suggests coercion requires freedom as independence (non-domination)
but this does not require egalitarianism in the global sphere. Rather,
a just global order would be inclusive, not oppressive (Tan 2013, 25).
Others provide novel ways of defending cosmopolitan egalitarian
theories or combining them with statist commitments. Pablo Gilabert
articulates a contractualist theory of egalitarian justice that
generates positive obligations to eradicate severe poverty globally
even without robust international institutions or cosmopolitan
solidarity (2012). Similarly, Lea Ypi defends a statist
cosmopolitanism that stresses the importance of political obligations
to support cosmopolitan ends. She suggests a significant degree of
equality is important for helping everyone secure a basic minimum and
cultural resources, a sense of justice, and education can help promote
this equality (Ypi 2012; on education and global justice, in
particular, see Culp 2020a). Ypi sees fostering the commitment to
cosmopolitan ideals as a political, as well as moral, task (Ypi
2013a).



Once again, these are vast topics and more treatment can be found
elsewhere in this encyclopedia, such as the entry on
 international distributive justice.
 For comprehensive treatment of nationalism and cosmopolitanism see
the entries on
 nationalism
 and
 cosmopolitanism,
 respectively.


### 2.4 Human Rights Fulfillment



Discussion of global justice matters often invokes concern for human
rights. In fact, for all their differences, both nationalists and
cosmopolitans frequently agree that a good way to think about some of
our duties to one another is via human rights. Human rights can and do
therefore serve as an important discourse for furthering discussion
about our global responsibilities.



Respecting human rights is an important requirement in much
international law and can be a key criterion in evaluating whether
governments are considered legitimate by the international community.
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a highly
influential account of all human beings' basic entitlements and
this document often plays an important role in real world debates
about justice matters. See the comprehensive entry on
 human rights
 for more detail. Here we have space to discuss only two issues that
have been prominent in debates about global justice.



The first concerns the kinds of duties we have in relation to human
rights. Against a conventional view widespread before 1980, Henry Shue
argues that if rights to physical security are basic, so are rights to
subsistence (Shue 1980). A careful analysis of the duties associated
with human rights indicates that the commonly held distinction between
positive and negative duties cannot be maintained. All rights have a
range of both positive and negative duties associated with them.



The second prominent issue concerns whether our failures in relation
to fulfilling human rights amount to rights violations. Thomas Pogge
(2008) offers an influential account of duties with respect to human
rights. Our current global order perpetuates global poverty on a
massive scale, but since feasible reforms to that order could avert
this harm, our failure to make reforms not only implicates us in the
misery but also in the violation of the rights of the
 poor.[3]
 We therefore have extensive obligations to reform our global order so
that the rights of the poor can be fulfilled.



Many theorists have done important work on a range of issues
concerning human rights and international obligations (Buchanan 2004;
Hessler 2005; Nickel 2007; Beitz 2009; Holder and Reidy 2013; Song
2019). Theorists have also focused attention on particular rights,
prominently the right to health (Wolff 2013). Some important questions
include: What are human rights' grounds or can they be defined
by their functions? Are human rights properly moral or
political/legal? Does respect for rights conflict with community
obligations or respect for culture? What is the proper role of human
rights in morality, law, and policy? How should we best understand the
normative implications of our contemporary human rights practice?
(Wolff 2013; Cruft, Liao, and Renzo 2015; Gilabert 2019; Etinson 2018;
O'Neill 2005; Beitz 2009; Brock 2023).



For more treatment of issues, especially concerning what human rights
are, which rights are rightly construed as human rights, and how human
rights function in international law, see the entry on
 human rights.


## 3. The Proper Use of Force, Military Intervention, and its Aftermath


### 3.1 War and Just Conduct



Within the field of global justice, issues concerning war have one of
the longest histories. The just war framework has been influential in
setting the terms of much debate about the proper use of force in
international affairs. Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
offered some of the earliest accounts of the criteria that should be
met for war to be justified. Two areas have been especially thoroughly
studied: (1) the conditions under which entry into the war is
justified (Jus Ad Bellum) and (2) the conditions for fair conduct
within the war (Jus In Bello). While having a just cause is standardly
held to be a necessary condition for a war to be justified, it is not
sufficient. Theorists often disagree about which additional conditions
must be satisfied for a war to be characterized as a just war. The
most common additional conditions proposed are that the war should be
undertaken by a proper authority, with the right intentions, when the
war would follow requirements of proportionality (the ends to be
secured would warrant going to war), only as a last resort, and when
there are reasonable prospects of success. On traditional accounts of
just war theory all conditions must be met, while several theorists
challenge whether they are all necessary (Mellow 2006; Moellendorf
2002; Walzer 1983).



Once the fighting begins two central principles guide evaluation of
whether the war is being conducted fairly: one which respects the
distinction between combatants and noncombatants (The Principle of
Non-Combatant Immunity) and another that governs what counts as the
proportional use of force (Proportionality). On the first, it is not
legitimate to use force against civilians and, even though some
collateral civilian damage may occur, it is wrong to deliberately
target non-combatants. On the second, combatants may only use the
force necessary to achieve their ends - the force used must be
proportional to the ends that are to be secured in conducting the war.
There are further requirements governing fairness, such as
requirements to comply with international laws and treat prisoners
fairly, but the two featured principles are the most commonly invoked
in normative analyses of *Jus In Bello*.



The third part of just war theory (*Jus Post Bellum*) concerns
how the war concludes and the transition back to a situation of peace
(Bass 2004, Rodin 2008). It deals with issues such as compensation,
punishment, and reform (Ohlin 2014). A fourth component has been
suggested especially in light of engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan
in the years 2001-2011, namely, justice in exiting the war
(*Jus Ex Bello*), which concerns when it is appropriate to end
a war (Moellendorf 2008; Rodin 2008).



There are many contemporary global justice issues concerning the
appropriate use of force (and its aftermath) that currently command
attention including: Is drone warfare (or any kind of warfare)
permissible? Can terrorism ever be justified? Are "targeted
assassinations" (where leaders who are primarily responsible for
decisions to go to war are targeted for assassination) justifiable?
May we engage in a war in order to prevent an anticipated "worse
war"? Is torture to contain major global threats permissible? Is
the attempt to contain nuclear weapons development by those who have
them already fraught with hypocrisy? How should we deal best with
societies in a state of transitional justice? Is there a place for
"Truth and Reconciliation Committees" (Walker 2006)? When
are political apologies for historic injustice in warfare appropriate?
Some suggest that the changing nature of combat has fundamentally
altered the ethics of war, for instance emphasizing how individuals
can be held morally accountable for their participation and actions
contributing to unjust wars (Ryan 1983; McMahan 2009; Pfaffe 2020;
Ohlin 2014; Reitan 2018). Scholars also consider different ways to
engage in defensible non-militaristic international reform
interventions (Rafanelli 2021).



Here we consider very briefly only two further issues that continue to
attract widespread current interest in the global justice literature:
Humanitarian Intervention and Terrorism. See the entry on
 terrorism
 for an extended analysis of such questions. See the entry on
 war
 for a comprehensive overview of issues concerning justice in war.


### 3.2 Humanitarian Intervention



Under what conditions, if any, may we engage in military intervention
aimed at stopping genocide? In recent years this issue has become
salient as large-scale human rights violations and suffering unfolded
in Rwanda, the Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, and Libya. Against the
traditional understanding that respecting state sovereignty requires
non-interference, successful arguments were marshaled that there are
important responsibilities to protect the vulnerable (International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). Leaning
heavily on the conventional conditions contained in the just war
framework, the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty argued that we may engage in war aimed at protecting those
who suffer at the hands of governments unwilling or unable to stop
large-scale human rights abuses. The commission produced an
influential report "The Responsibility to Protect" which
was accepted by the United Nations in 2005, and the principles
contained in the report have guided decisions about cases, such as
Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012. One frequently voiced concern about
humanitarian interventions is whether they are just another form of
imperialism. How will interveners be held accountable for their
actions? Taking such concerns seriously Allen Buchanan and Robert
Keohane advocate for a series of innovative mechanisms of
accountability, both before and after the proposed intervention takes
place, to allay fears about abuse (Buchanan and Keohane 2004).


### 3.3 Terrorism



What kinds of violence count as terrorism? Is there a difference
between state terrorism and that perpetrated by insurgent
organizations? Might terrorism be justified under certain
circumstances? Terrorism centrally involves either using or
threatening to use violence against people, commonly taken to be
innocent, in order to produce results that would not otherwise occur
(Coady and O'Keefe 2002; Primoratz 2013). Some challenge that
the targets are innocent. As terrorists often point out about citizen
complicity in atrocities, citizens pay taxes and vote, and their
governments undertake actions that they can be said to sanction and
from which they benefit, so it is coherent to hold citizens
responsible for their governments' actions. On this argument,
citizens can be legitimate targets of violence. In addition, there is
relevant precedent from governments targeting civilians when they
perceive the situation to be one of a "supreme emergency",
as happened in the case of Britain targeting German civilians in the
Second World War. So when governments judge that some moral disaster
is sufficiently likely, it can be repelled using unorthodox and
otherwise repugnant means.


## 4. Global Economic Injustice



Do global economic arrangements - especially economic
globalization - give rise to important responsibilities?
Globalization is a complex phenomenon, characterized by the faster
movement of people, goods, and ideas across borders but with many
facets. For our purposes we need to note only some of its
characteristic central features. These include (i) an increasingly
globally integrated economy, (ii) dominated by transnational
corporations engaged in activities (such as production and
distribution) that span multiple countries, (iii) increasing
regulation of economic matters by supranational institutions (such as
the World Trade Organization), (iv) general commitment to removal of
barriers to "free trade," and (v) higher levels of
economic interdependence. While there is much debate about the
long-term effects of globalization and whether they are on balance
good or bad, at this stage, the effects of globalization have been
mixed. For some, globalization has brought improvements, while it has
worsened the position of others (Singer 2002; Hassoun 2008; Risse
2012a; Risse and Wollner 2019).



Philosophers have been concerned with answers to a range of questions
such as: What kinds of economic arrangements are just? Should our
international institutions be reformed to better reflect fair terms of
co-operation in our globalized world? Can globalization be better
managed so that it works to assist the global poor more effectively?
Are protectionist policies in trade justified or, rather, is free
trade required by considerations of justice? Should poor working
conditions in developing countries be a matter of concern for citizens
and consumers in affluent, developed countries? If so, how might
harmful employment conditions be effectively improved?



While Thomas Pogge argues that globalization has harmed the poor on a
massive scale, Mathias Risse argues that this is not at all clear
(Pogge 2010; Risse 2005). Risse argues that in many ways the global
order must be credited with benefiting the global poor as well. He
challenges Pogge's claim that there are feasible alternatives to
our global order that could be easily implemented and would avert the
harm to which Pogge draws attention.



The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been an important focal point
for discussion about global economic justice. In particular, critics
argue that some of its policies, such as those that generally advocate
free trade but allow protectionism in affluent developed countries,
involve grave hypocrisy and unfairness to some of the world's
most vulnerable people, while others defend some key WTO provisions
(Risse and Wollner 2019; Pogge 2001; Moellendorf 2002; Hassoun 2009a,
2011; James 2012). For further reading see: de Bres 2016. There are
also large disparities in the resources at the disposal of various
parties such that weaker parties often suffer huge disadvantages in
being able to negotiate agreements that work well for them. In these
sorts of ways agents in developed countries (such as governments,
citizens or firms) can take unfair advantage of those in developing
countries (R. Miller 2010; Barry and Reddy 2008).



More generally, there are concerns related to the extraordinary power
of multinationals and the undue influence they are able to exercise in
negotiating deals favorable to them at the expense of the interests of
the most vulnerable. So-called sweatshops (in which workers typically
labor under harsh and hazardous conditions) are also a frequently
raised example of how western consumers are implicated in far away
suffering, given the high level of dependence in high-income countries
on labor from low-income ones. When we purchase products manufactured
in sweatshops are we guilty of contributing to exploitation and if so,
what ought we to do to mitigate these unfairnesses? Christian Barry
and Sanjay Reddy offer an innovative proposal to incentivize
improvements in labor standards and wage levels in poor developing
countries (Barry and Reddy 2008). This "Just Linkage"
proposal offers some additional desirable opportunities for enhanced
international trade to those who meet higher standards.



In this domain, philosophers have also examined a range of other
issues including obligations to forgive odious debt and whether
micro-finance is to be welcomed as a positive force for the global
poor (Barry, Herman and Tomitova 2007; Khader 2014; Sorell and Cabrera
2015; Hassoun 2019).



Several philosophers have considered individuals' obligations to
promote economic justice through ethical consumption. There is an
important debate on whether ethical consumption is helpful and
required (Risse 2005; Walton 2014). Some argue that ethical
consumption is only permissible when appropriately democratic (Hussain
2012; Barry and MacDonald 2018). Others argue that ethical consumption
is permissible as long as it promotes positive change (Hassoun 2018;
Berkey 2021; Budolfson 2015).



Other more general concerns about exploitation and economic justice
can be found at the entries on
 exploitation
 and
 normative economics and economic justice.
 See also the entry on
 globalization.


## 5. Global Gender Justice



The effects of poverty do not fall equally on men and women, nor on
boys and girls. In general, poverty makes the lives of women and girls
harder than their male counterparts, as cultural expectations often
dictate that women and girls do more care and domestic work or go
without (or much less) when resources are scarce. This can
significantly thwart women and girls' well-being, as education,
health care, and food are routinely withheld in favor of distribution
to men and boys.



Cultural perceptions of gender roles can often lead to practices
highly damaging to the most fundamental interests of women and girls.
These include "honor killings" (where it is believed
culturally permissible to kill a girl or woman who is perceived to
have brought shame to the family), genital mutilation, infanticide,
forced prostitution, arranged marriage, and legal recognition of
property and inheritance rights that significantly disadvantage women
and girls. Poverty can exacerbate such vulnerabilities so we have
further reasons to address it as a matter of urgency (Jaggar 2009,
2013, 2014). Martha Nussbaum has argued for a list of ten capabilities
that all human persons, no matter what their gender, ought to be
positioned to exercise. She argues that this approach offers a
powerful tool for persuasion in cases where girls and women are denied
these opportunities by local actors in different cultures.



Alison Jaggar prominently argues that various structures create and
recreate transnational gendered vulnerabilities and she illustrates
with practices common in domestic work and the sex industry (Jaggar
2009, 2014). Anca Gheaus has argued that patterns of international
immigration - where women typically provide an international
market for care work - constitute a kind of care drain. This
work is not fully voluntary occurring against a background of unjust
options, and amounts to a major issue for women and their families as
well as countries and global justice more broadly (Gheaus 2013;
Eckenwiler 2009). Others focus on how universal values can inform
feminist approaches and discuss how concrete issues like globalization
affect women (Khader 2014, 2018; Parekh and Wilcox 2018). (For more
see also the entry on
 feminist perspectives on globalization).



Some important policies have influenced international discourse in
combating gender injustice. The Millennium Development Goals (MGDs)
includes as a third goal the promotion of gender equality and the
empowerment of women (for discussion of the MGDs, see: Pogge and
Sengupta 2020). The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action set the stage for
several International Covenants and before that the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women afforded some important protection for women's human
rights. Some theorists are suspicious of human rights language and are
inclined to reject what they perceive as a masculine or neocolonial
discourse that trumpets individual autonomy in a way that fails to
acknowledge, adequately, our fundamental human interdependence and
history of oppression (Jaggar 2020). While there certainly is a place
for discussion of these important themes, others argue that we should
not lose sight of the important victories human rights have also been
able to secure, despite still having a long way to go (United Nations
n.d.). The rhetoric of human rights has enabled substantial gains for
promoting gender equality and protection of women's fundamental
interests, so it has at least strategic value.



For a good survey of recent work on global gender justice, see Jaggar
2020. For more on solutions to often discussed problems, such as
adaptive preferences, see Khader 2011, 2018. For more see the entries on
 feminist perspectives on globalization
 and
 feminist perspectives on power.


## 6. Race and Global Justice



Discussion of how histories of imperialism and racial discrimination
have shaped current patterns of global injustice have become more
prominent in Anglo-American discussions of global justice. In
particular, concerns arise about how colonial histories affect
continued oppression and exploitation of racial minority groups on a
global scale (Mills 1997; Bell 2019; Boxill 2009; Okeja 2019; Buckinx,
Trejo-Mathys, and Waligore 2015a; Lu 2017). Shining a light on how
colonialists often embraced beliefs about racial inferiority and
superiority, theorists argue that white supremacy has played an
important role in structuring ways of thinking about global justice.
Key questions that emerge from such analysis include: Have debates
about global justice been inclined to ignore imperial histories
(especially of racial domination) and if so, how should that be taken
into account now? Are egalitarian cosmopolitan accounts effectively
trying to promote liberal imperialism or can such discourse
effectively combat it? What alternative resources can we find in other
traditions of political thought and practice for theorizing global
justice in insightful ways? While some argue that liberalism and
imperialism are inextricable (Mehta 1999), others are more optimistic
about liberalism's prospects. Yet others believe that sometimes
imperial-like solutions are necessary to solve especially challenging
problems (Ignatieff 2003). (For a good range of views see Bell
2019).



Reflecting on the philosophical field of global justice, it is notable
that until more recently, race is often absent from some of the most
prominent discussions of global justice. Charles Mills was an
especially important figure in drawing attention to these omissions.
In his view, this means that theoretical debates have largely ignored
or misunderstood "some of the principal sources and sites of
injustice" (2019). These omissions can often be traced to
dominant methods in Anglo-American philosophy in which ideal
theorizing (in a Rawlsian fashion in particular) brackets out certain
issues in a conscious way. But putting to the side issues of (say)
racial domination means we will be blind to core histories and
practices, such as slavery, imperialism, and racism that structure our
contemporary world.



Discussion of race and empire have not been completely ignored by
global justice theorists. For instance, there is an important
literature on historical injustice and reparations (Butt 2008; Tan
2007; Lu 2016; Barry and Goodin 2009), and another on trying to
identify how to describe the wrongs of colonialism (Ypi 2013b; Stilz
2015; Valentini 2015). Margaret Moore draws attention to the ways in
which the dispossession of land and racial domination are particularly
important features in identifying the wrongs of settler colonialism
(2016). And yet, the concerns Mills raises still resonate. What would
global justice theorizing look like if it placed histories and
contemporary practices of racial domination at its core? How can we
better integrate histories of colonialism and racial domination into
our thinking about current problems of global justice?



For some, this means we must reject theoretical frameworks and
vocabularies currently on offer by most political philosophers; others
do not believe wholesale rejection is needed. (For a good review of
positions see Bell 2019). Charles Mills exemplifies the first
approach. For Mills, global justice theorists have failed to take
seriously global white supremacy and its legacy and this is especially
noteworthy given its role in understanding current patterns of global
inequality, poverty and violence (1997, 2019). We need to consider
this history and make race a central site of investigation for global
justice theorizing, which requires rejecting Rawlsian-style ideal
theorizing. It would also involve giving a more prominent role to
issues of corrective justice and seeking compensation for the
wide-scale massive injustices perpetrated through structures of global
white supremacy. Similar views can be found in the work of
Olufemi Taiwo who writes:
"Injustice and oppression are global in scale... [b]ecause
Trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism built the world we live in, and
slavery and colonialism were unjust and oppressive", reparations
require remaking the "world system"
(Taiwo 2022, 1). On his account, reparations
require, among other things, reconciliation and eliminating
institutional racism (Taiwo 2022, 4).



Another very important literature has emerged concerning the many
alternative understandings of justice that can be found in places
formerly dominated by colonial occupation. Indigenous philosophies
have many important insights to offer (Lauer 2017; Metz 2017; Watene
2022). In particular, scholars often consider the prospects for
indigenous perspectives to promote global environmental justice (Whyte
2014; Watene 2022). Locally embedded frameworks often support, but
also provide new alternatives to, traditional approaches to human
needs, rights, international development and justice issues more
generally (Lauer 2017; Menkiti 2017; Metz 2017).



Ines Valdez (2019) argues we should substitute discourse centered on
obligations and duties with one centered on power, coalition-building
and contestation. Kimberley Hutchings (2019) emphasizes that in
decolonizing our theorizing about global justice, we have to change
the way we see the practice of global justice theorizing. We need to
think of the latter less as a way to arrive at answers to global
justice questions and more as a way to live with others without
subsuming them into a particular world. Rather, opening up the
conversation to sharing different perspectives we embark on a
collaborative approach to experiments in living and being with others.
It is not about finding new answers to what we mean by justice but
rather "about finding new ways of relating to ourselves and to
each other in our pursuit of whatever we may think of as
justice" (2019, 121). Adopting such perspectives may reduce some
noted tensions in being part of a world community and others that are
smaller, drawn along racial, ethnic or other identity lines (Appiah
2007).



For more on these topics see the entries on
 colonialism,
 race,
 black reparations,
 reconciliation,
 transitional justice,
 and
 critical philosophy of race.


## 7. Immigration



There are many issues debated in the global justice literature
concerning migration, whether temporary, permanent, legally sanctioned
or undocumented. These include: Should states have the right to
control their borders? Even if they have such a right, should states
be more generous in admitting would-be migrants, especially
considering the facts about global disparities in life prospects? When
affluent developed states refuse to open their borders to the
economically disadvantaged, is this equivalent to members of the
aristocracy unjustly protecting their privilege, as was the case in
feudal times? What responsibilities are there to refugees? Can
undocumented immigration be justified under certain contemporary
circumstances? What sorts of criteria may affluent developed countries
use when selecting migrants from the pool of applicants for
citizenship? May they legitimately consider how prospective migrants
would fit in with current citizens, favoring certain religious,
linguistic, or ethnic affiliations to manage compatibility? When
making migrant selection decisions, should they consider the effects
on those who remain in countries of origin and if so, is this fair to
the would-be migrants who would be excluded on grounds of alleged
negative impacts for home country citizens? If states admit migrant
workers, are there moral constraints on how they should be treated?
Would admitting temporary workers without simultaneously allowing them
a pathway to citizenship be unjust? What responsibilities do we have
in relation to human trafficking?



There are several now classic defenses of state's rights to
control borders. David Miller (Miller 2005, 2007), Michael Walzer
(Walzer 1981) and Christopher Wellman (Wellman and Cole 2011) have
been particularly important. Prominent proponents of the alternative
"Open Borders" position include Joseph Carens (Carens
1987, 2013), Philip Cole (Cole 2000; Wellman and Cole 2011), Chandran
Kukathas (2021) and Alex Sager (2018). While many theorists discuss
the responsibilities to refugees and guest workers, Walzer's
treatment is particularly influential, especially in arguing for his
view that guest worker programs are only justified when they offer
such "guests" a proper pathway to full and equal
citizenship (Walzer 1981). See also: Owen 2020 and Miller 2020. Within
the global justice literature, there is considerable discussion of the
ethics of recruiting migrants away from poor countries. Whether brain
drain issues should be salient for migration decisions has been a
focal point for some discussion (Carens 2013; Oberman 2013; Brock and
Blake 2015; Bertram 2018). More generally, much recent discussion
concerns justice in state admission policies and the kinds of factors
that may or should be included in deciding who to admit and exclude
(Wellman and Cole 2011; Lister 2010; Oberman, Fine and Ypi 2016; Blake
2019; Sager 2018; Song 2018; Brock 2020; Morgan 2020; Wilcox 2021;
Hidalgo 2021; Buckinx 2019; Jaggar 2020; Vasanthakumar 2022). There
has been considerable discussion of appropriate treatment for refugees
(see especially Serena Parekh 2017, 2020 and Brock 2020). And
discussion has also focused on duties for those who leave their
countries of origin (Vasanthakumar 2022; Brock and Blake 2015). For
more detailed coverage of issues concerning migration matters, see the
entry on
 immigration.


## 8. Global Environmental Issues



Patterns of human behavior that destroy habitats, accelerate species
extinction, exacerbate toxic levels of pollution, degrade the oceans,
contribute to ozone layer destruction, or increase population levels
are all issues of global environmental concern (Armstrong 2022;
Gardiner 2011; Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson, Shue, and Pachauri 2010).
However, although there are many global environmental topics that are
rightly concerns of global justice, there is one that dominates
discussion and that concerns our responsibilities with respect to
climate change. Here we focus exclusively on this issue.



Among the scientific community it is no longer controversial that
anthropogenic climate change is real and a significant threat to the
well-being of both current and future generations. But it is also
widely acknowledged that human development is an important way to
address high levels of global poverty, that such development is energy
intensive, and the cheapest sources of energy available are not likely
to be clean energy types. These considerations significantly affect
efforts to deal with problems presented by climate change. There is
much discussion about the principles that should inform a fair treaty
aimed at dealing with addressing climate change that also gives
appropriate weight to concerns for human development (Shue 2014;
Athanasiou et al. 2022). Some of the main contenders include
principles that recognize causal responsibility for high emission
levels, principles that are sensitive to ability to pay, and ones
according to which those who have benefited from emissions should now
be expected to absorb more costs.



We have not all contributed equally to the problems created by
emissions; industrialized nations have contributed historically at
much higher levels than those that are still developing. And so we
should endorse the guidelines that those who have polluted more should
pay more to help redress current problems (The Polluter Pays
Principle). However critics argue that this principle unfairly holds
some responsible when they did not know they were causing harm, since
it was not widely known that greenhouse gases could result in climate
change prior to 1990. So on this view, responsibility for emissions
prior to 1990 should not conform with the Polluter Pays Principle,
even if it is used to allocate costs after 1990. Others reply that
countries can still be liable for causing harm even if they lack moral
responsibility for doing so (Shue 2014). A second principle that is
often discussed is The Beneficiary Pays Principle. Those who live in
industrialized countries have typically benefited greatly from high
levels of emissions so it is not unfair if they are expected to pay a
higher proportion of costs. Critics object that a history of
benefiting is an insufficiently strong consideration for assigning
responsibilities now: in many cases whether or not people benefit is
largely outside of their control. According to a third popular
principle, The Ability to Pay Principle, the capacity of agents to pay
for costs associated with mitigating climate change should be
relevant. Again, some object that the ability to pay is a poor
principle for assigning responsibility.



More recently, philosophers have evaluated different proposals for not
only mitigating and distributing the costs of climate change but also
adaptation to its diverse effects (Gosseries 2004; Vanderheiden 2008;
Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson, Shue, and Pachauri 2010; Blomfield 2019;
Shue 2014, 2021; Brooks 2020). Moreover, they have considered how we
can mobilize hope in the face of the seemingly tragic consequences of
our failures to both address the challenges of climate change and
human development in a timely manner (Moellendorf 2022; Cripps 2022;
Malm 2021; Mckinnon 2022). Some of this work connects to important
debates about feasibility and institutional mechanisms for addressing
climate change fairly (Caney 2020; Gheaus 2013; Gilabert and
Lawford-Smith 2012). For more on climate justice see the entries on
 climate justice
 and
 climate science
 (Parker 2018; Caney 2022). Comprehensive treatment of climate justice
requires addressing the issue of responsibilities to future
generations (Meyer and Gossieries 2009). For important treatment of
our responsibilities to other generations see the entry on
 intergenerational justice.


## 9. Global Health Issues



One striking feature of the state of global health is that there are
large inequalities in health outcomes and opportunities for health.
Consider that life expectancy can vary a great deal. A person born in
Sierra Leone can expect to live about 40 years whereas one born in
Japan can expect to live for 80 years. Malaria has been almost
entirely eradicated in high-income countries, but it still kills about
a million people in developing countries per year (United Nations
2009). A woman in Niger has a 1 in 7 chance of dying in childbirth,
whereas this is 1 in 11 000 for women in Canada (Benatar and Brock
2011, 2021). The global burden of disease is by no means evenly spread
nor does workforce capability correspond with areas of highest need.
In fact many of the countries that suffer from the greatest burdens of
disease have the fewest skilled healthcare workers. In addition,
pharmaceutical companies do not spend their research and development
budgets in ways that match where the needs are greatest. Rather,
seeking the most profitable ventures, they are much more likely to
spend resources developing drugs for lucrative markets where the
payoffs are greatest, even when the marginal benefits to consumers are
small. One example is the research and development resources
pharmaceutical companies frequently spend on developing drugs that are
similar to others already available, rather than developing treatments
for diseases for which there are no cures. Historically, it is
estimated that drug companies spent approximately 90% of their
research and development resources in seeking treatment for about 10%
of diseases and some argue that justice requires reorienting
incentives for new research and development to better align with the
global disease burden (Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group
2001; Flory and Kitcher 2004).



The poor in developing countries are also often more vulnerable to
disease and less able to resist disease because of poor living
conditions related to poverty. Lack of clean water, clean energy
sources, inadequate nutrition, and other social determinants of health
play a key role in explaining this increased vulnerability. Living in
overcrowded houses can facilitate the spread of infectious diseases,
such as tuberculosis. So, a number of issues that sustain poverty or
exacerbate people's vulnerability to disease as a result of
poverty should be of concern (Benatar and Brock 2021). As Norman
Daniels argues, health inequalities among different social groups can
be considered unjust when they result from unjust distribution in
factors that are socially controllable that affect population health
(Daniels 2011, 101). On this view many health inequalities that exist
are ones that ought to be of concern as they meet this criterion. How
should responsibilities for improving this situation be allocated? In
many ways, but here we pick out just a few that have received
considerable attention in the philosophical literature.



The current system of intellectual property rights is one troubling
area. The World Trade Organization grants product patents for a twenty
year period which effectively renders many new medicines unaffordable
for the vast majority of the world's population and those in
greatest need. There are a number of innovative proposals aimed at
addressing these issues. One prominent example is the Health Impact
Fund proposal developed by Thomas Pogge, which offers alternative ways
to reward pharmaceutical companies, notably by how much impact they
have on actually curing diseases (Pogge 2008). The greater their
impact, the larger the share of the rewards they would receive from
the Health Impact Fund. Nicole Hassoun proposes a "Global Health
Impact" certification program for rating pharmaceutical
companies' contributions to the global poor (Hassoun 2020).
Companies would compete for the gold star rankings which could
significantly affect consumption choices and thereby expected profits.
In both cases the aim is to create important incentives for key agents
to care about how their products affect the global poor.



There are many other issues that concern philosophers in the domain of
global health. There are worrying practices of experimentation on
disadvantaged subjects in developing countries (Emanuel et al. 2004).
Increasingly, clinical research has been outsourced to poor,
developing countries with populations that are often highly
vulnerable. We might wonder about whether these populations are being
exploited and whether the participants have compromised abilities to
consent to drug trials. In many cases the trials bring considerable
health benefits that would not come their way were it not in the
interests of pharmaceutical companies to do clinical research in those
locations. If sufficient benefits accrue for local populations, some
argue that these cases need not be of concern, while others disagree
(Emanuel et al. 2004; London 2011).



New infectious diseases and the threat of pandemics are creating
further questions about our responsibilities. Often the case is made
that national interests in public health in developed countries
mandate concern for infectious diseases that originate in developing
countries. When resources for addressing these threats are limited,
some argue it is acceptable for states to prioritize their
populations, while others disagree (Hassoun 2021; Ferguson and Caplan
2021; Savulescu 2020). There are also important debates about how to
distribute vaccines across borders and about whether other public
health policies - e.g. immunity passports - violate
individual rights or are justified for protecting public health
(Emanuel et al. 2020; Emanuel et al. 2021; Herlitz et al. 2021; Liu,
Salwi, and Drolet 2020; Persad and Emanuel 2020; Voigt 2022; Jecker
2022; Bramble 2020; Baylis and Kofler 2020a, 2020b; Jecker, Wightman,
and Diekema, forthcoming). Some argue that global justice -
solidarity and respect for human rights - demands addressing
diseases that are not as transmissible as COVID-19 and may not pose as
significant threats to many people in developed countries (Daniels
2007; Atuire and Hassoun 2023; Gould 2018; Lenard and Straehle 2012;
Benatar and Brock 2021; Herlitz et al. 2021). There is also
significant concern for fair procedures in addressing health crises
globally.



For more see also
 public health ethics,
 and
 justice, inequality, and health.


## 10. Some Issues that Cut Across Several Themes


### 10.1 Natural Resources and Global Justice



Discussion of natural resources often figures prominently in several
topics of global justice. Some relevant questions include: Are
national communities entitled to the resources they find on their
territories? Should principles of global justice apply to our
arrangements for justly distributing natural resources? Charles Beitz
was an early proponent of a resource distribution principle, according
to which natural resources should be allocated such that each society
is able to provide adequately for its population (Beitz 1975). We saw
in
 Section 2
 that Rawls believes that resources are not important to prosperity in
the ways many imagine. Rather, institutional resilience matters more.
By contrast, Thomas Pogge highlights the ways in which international
practices concerning the distribution of resources create considerable
obstacles for prosperity in developing countries. In short, these
practices create incentives for the wrong kinds of people to take
power through illegitimate means and to focus on retaining power at
the expense of other goals governments should have, such as trying to
improve the well-being of their citizens. We need to modify these
international practices so they do not create such an unfavorable
environment. In addition, Pogge proposes a Global Resources Dividend
as one measure by which practices concerning natural resource
distribution would work in some small way to the benefit of the global
poor. On this Global Resources Dividend proposal there would be a
small tax on resource extraction, payable by the consumers of
resources, and available for projects that would assist in helping
everyone to be able to meet their basic needs with dignity (Pogge
2008).



Leif Wenar is also concerned with prevailing practices governing the
sale of natural resources and their products (Wenar 2010, 2016). When
consumers in wealthy states buy goods from developing countries, this
is often similar to consciously receiving stolen goods. Legitimate
resource sales require general agreement from citizens. Evidence of
agreement requires that: (i) owners must be informed about sales, (ii)
owners must be able to express dissent freely should they have doubts
about sales, and (iii) owners should be able to stop resource sales
without fearing grave consequences such as violence and intimidation.
Wenar aims to outlaw dispossession of citizens' resources by
promoting various practices that would satisfy these conditions and
promote clean trade (Wenar 2016).



For various reasons (including strategic ones) Thomas Pogge and Leif
Wenar do not directly challenge the right of nations to own resources
on their territories. Policy recommendations, are much more likely to
be effective if they can fit within the main structures of
international conventions. However, other theorists do take up this
issue including Hillel Steiner (2005), Tim Hayward (2005) and Mathias
Risse (2005, 2012b). Steiner argues that all inhabitants of the world
are entitled to an equal share in the value of all land and he
advocates for the "Global Fund" which aims to ensure that
equal share entitlements can be secured. The Global Fund would
constitute a clearing house for payments and disbursements (Steiner
2005).



Appealing to accounts of ownership of resources, some philosophers
draw out important implications for diverse global justice debates.
Mathias Risse argues that we all, collectively, own the resources of
the earth and this has profound implications for a range of global
justice issues, including immigration. When people are under-utilizing
their "rightful shares" of territory, they cannot complain
when co-owners would like to occupy some of it. Some theorists
concerned with environmental issues also discuss our rights with
respect to natural resources. Some argue that we have equal rights to
access the earth's resources. Tim Hayward, for instance, argues
that we have equal rights to ecological space (Hayward 2005). This is
often appealed to when there is a perception that we have exceeded our
share, such as in levels of carbon emissions and consumption more
generally.



Accounts according to which we have equal rights to resources, land,
ecological space and so on, are often accused of suffering from an
important common problem. It is difficult to defend a clear and
compelling account of the value of resources as these can vary
considerably in different social, cultural and technological contexts.
But we need to be able to quantify resource values to some plausible
extent, if we are to determine whether people are enjoying or
exceeding their equal shares (Armstrong 2017).



Others defend territorial sovereignty for other reasons. Some, like
Cara Nine argue that collectives have a right to territory when they
"establish legitimate, minimal conditions for justice within a
geographical region" (Nine 2012, 2022). While Anna Stilz argues
that states allow people to associate in specific geographical
locations and realize economic, social, and cultural values free from
interference as long as they respect others' rights to associate
as well (Stilz 2019). She defends collective self-determination that
represents subjects' political will and ensures self-directed
agency and non-alienation where this is compatible with global
justice. Stilz maintains that actual states only have a legitimate
right to territory if they have rightful occupancy, implement a system
of basic justice, and represent the shared will of most inhabitants.
But, even when they do not, she thinks states can be justified in
ruling a territory if they are the only available way of providing
decent rule or changing their boundaries will jeopardize urgent
interests or come with high costs (Stilz 2019).



Others argue against territorial sovereignty or for reconceiving
sovereignty in a way that encourages respect for human rights and can
limit our tendency towards war, coercion, inequality and collective
action problems (Chatterjee 2011; Held 1995). Some maintain that all
who are affected by states' actions should have a say in their
rules while others reject this conclusion. For discussion, see
Buchanan and Keohane 2011. For other important work on territory, see
the entry on
 territorial rights and territorial justice.


### 10.2 Allocating Responsibilities for Global Problems



There are a number of global justice problems that need to be
addressed, and this raises the issue of how to allocate
responsibilities fairly. Who should do what to reduce global
injustices? Several different agents, groups, organizations and
institutions could play a role. Which responsibilities should devolve
to corporations, governments, consumers, citizens, international
organizations or social movements? Some frequently discussed proposals
focus on agents' contributions to a problem, their patterns of
benefit from the problem, and their capacity to take constructive
action now. Two influential frameworks deserve more extended
treatment, notably that of Iris Marion Young concerning a social
connection model for allocating responsibilities for structural
injustice and that of David Miller concerning remedial responsibility
(Young 2011; Miller 2007).



In contrast to the idea of responsibility as involving finding fault
and individual liability, Iris Marion Young develops a forward-looking
model which she argues is more appropriate. She draws on the idea that
participation via institutions sometimes produces injustice, so we
have particular responsibilities to address injustice. We share
responsibility for addressing injustice but we may have different
degrees and kinds of responsibility. She offers different parameters
of reasoning that can help individuals and organizations decide what
might make the most sense for them to do in efforts to remedy
injustice, given that there are so many injustices, whereas time and
resources are limited. Using the case study of the global apparel
industry she illustrates how the fact that we are positioned
differently can entail varying but important responsibilities for all
who participate in activities that sustain sweatshops. There are at
least four parameters that agents can use in their reasoning:


1. Power: we have different levels of influence and capacities to
change processes. We should focus on those areas where we have greater
capacities to change worrisome structural processes. This might mean
focusing on a few key players who have both greater capacity to make
changes themselves and to influence others.
2. Privilege: some people have more privilege than others in relation
to structures. So middle-class clothing consumers have more
discretionary income, choice and ability to absorb costs - they
can change their clothing purchasing practices more easily than those
who earn minimum wage, have little discretionary income, and little
ability to absorb further costs.
3. Interest: All who have an interest in changing oppressive
structures have responsibilities in connection with remedying these.
This entails that "victims" too have important
responsibilities since they have a great interest in eliminating
oppression. In a nuanced analysis she argues that they might have
responsibilities in certain contexts, such as to speak out about the
harsh conditions in which they work. They must take some
responsibility for resisting and challenging the structures. Without
their participation the need for reforms may be rationalized away or
reforms may not take the required form. These obligations may not
always exist, especially when the costs of resistance would require
extraordinary sacrifices.
4. Collective ability: In some cases we already have collective
organization capacities and resources that are well established.
Sometimes it just makes good practical sense to draw on these. So, for
instance, sometimes student associations, faith-based organizations,
unions, or stockholder groups already exercise significant power in
being able to coordinate like-minded members who are willing to take
certain actions. She encourages us to harness organizational resources
where doing so would prove effective.



In summary, Young encourages us to think about how we can best take
responsibility for reducing structural injustice by reflecting on
these four parameters - different positions of power, privilege,
interest and collective ability. (For comprehensive review of the
merits of Young's approach see McKeown 2018, 2021.)



David Miller offers a tremendously influential connection theory of
responsibility that also discusses our remedial responsibilities.
There are six ways in which we can be connected to someone, P, who
needs help and so be held remedially responsible for assisting. These
connections give rise to six ways in which remedial responsibility can
be identified. We might be morally responsible for P's
condition; we might be outcome or causally responsible for P's
condition; we might have had no causal role in their condition but
have benefited from it; we might have capacity to assist P; or we
might be connected to P through ties of
 community.[4]



There is a huge literature on taking responsibility for remedying or
preventing future global injustice, including discussing the merits of
these two dominant approaches. For some other innovative contributions
see, for instance, Barry and Overland 2016, Dahan, Lerner and
Milman-Sivan 2023, 2016, McKeown 2018, 2021, Brock 2023.



More recently attention has focused on what those on the receiving end
of injustice may permissibly do. Alejandra Mancilla (2016) argues that
the needy can take what they need and use material resources for self
preservation even if that requires taking from others. In doing so she
expands on James Sterba's earlier arguments against libertarians
for similar conclusions (Sterba 2008, 1996). Also see (Cabrera 2004).
Others like Cecil Fabre, Johan Olsthoorn, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
argue that sometimes poor states may wage war on the affluent for
subsistence (Lipper-Rasmussen 2013; Fabre 2016; Olsthoorn 2021).
[Some, like Peter Unger and Gerhart Overland argue that it is
acceptable to force others to assist in poverty-alleviation under at
least some circumstances (Unger 1996; Overland 2009)].



In the global justice literature, there are also important concerns
about the distribution of responsibilities among collective and
individual agents. Prominently, can we hold nations responsible for
global injustices or remedying such injustices? This raises important
questions about collective responsibility that are well treated
elsewhere in this encyclopedia (see the entry on
 collective responsibility).


### 10.3 Authority in the Global Domain: Do We Need a World State to Secure Global Justice?



Is it possible to have global justice in the absence of a world state?
Hobbes argues that this is not possible since there is no global
authority that can secure and enforce the requirements of justice. He
presents the classic so-called realist case, which is highly
influential in international politics, such that there is a state of
nature in the international realm. All states compete in pursuing
their own advantage and since there is no global authority there can
be no justice in international affairs. Also for an overview of some
key work on realism in political philosophy, see the entry on
 political realism in international relations
 and Rossi and Sleat 2014.



Others are more optimistic. Since we already have a high level of
interaction among states, organizations and other agents, this has
generated various norms and expectations about appropriate conduct
that guides behavior in the international sphere (Beitz 1999).
Moreover, we have a strong interest in co-operation when this is
necessary to deal practically with a range of problems that have
global reach. Global governance is concerned with how we manage
interests affecting the residents of more than one state in the
absence of a world state. There is already a high level of
co-operation among a variety of networks, organizations and other
groups of interested parties at the sub-state level, and this is
powerfully influencing the redesign of best practice norms in
particular domains (Slaughter 2004). Some argue for a global state or
democratic system - often with subsidiarity or some kind of
poly-centric political order, and others argue for more limited forms
of legitimate global governance (Cabrera 2018; Gould 2004, 2014; Held
2004; Kuper 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006).



Other change agents that can and have exercised considerable reform
pressures include global social movements, such as the anti-sweatshop
movement, the fair trade movement, and other ethical consumption
movements. Global activism has been an important source of incremental
change. These simple examples show that much more is possible in the
absence of a world state than realists acknowledge.



For more on issues of world government, see the entry on
 world government,
 which provides extended treatment of this issue.


## 11. The Contribution to Public Policy, Interdisciplinary Engagement, and New Methods



Philosophers are contributing in important ways to discussions of
global justice policy issues. As illustrations, in this entry we have
canvassed several institutional reform proposals for addressing global
injustices which have enjoyed widespread attention, both within the
academy and beyond. These include Thomas Pogge's Health Impact
Fund and Nicole Hassoun's Global Health Impact proposals
 (Section 9)
 along with Pogge's proposal for a Global Resources Dividend
 (Section 10.1),
 Christian Barry and Sanjay Reddy's Just Linkage Proposal to
help improve working conditions
 (Section 4),
 Allan Buchanan and Robert Keohane's institutional innovations
to secure accountability in the use of military force
 (Section 3.2),
 and the innovative work of Leif Wenar concerning proposals for clean
trade
 (Section 10.1).



In addition to those illustrations already highlighted in this
article, philosophers are having an impact on policy discussions in a
wide range of areas including climate change and contributing ideas to
the Human Development Reports (United Nations Development Programme
2020, United Nations Development Programme 2022). They have
contributed to influential international multi-disciplinary projects
that seek alternative ways to measure quality of health, life or
poverty (Nussbaum and Sen 1993, Esposito and Hassoun 2017, Wisor et
al. 2014). Philosophers have also discussed rampant abusive tax
practices by corporations and wealthy individuals and how this
deprives developing countries of much-needed income for human
development in developing countries (Brock 2009). There are also
important discussions of global income taxes, carbon taxes, financial
transaction taxes and Tobin Taxes (Moellendorf 2009; Caney 2005b;
Brock 2009). The pervasive problems associated with corruption have
been attracting increased attention (Wenar 2016; Brock 2023). So,
philosophers continue to make an important contribution to policy
debates and this is also likely to be an area in which important
future work on global justice will concentrate.



Philosophers are also engaging in more interdisciplinary research and
global justice theorists sometimes do experimental or more broadly
empirical philosophy (Miller 2001; Appiah 2007; Hassoun 2009b, 2014;
Lindauer 2020; Lindauer et al. 2023; Buckland et al. 2022;
Polzler and Hannikainen 2022). Furthermore, there is some
sophisticated work in related disciplines and there is significant
room for fruitful interdisciplinary future research (Cappelen, Fest,
Sorensen and Tungodden 2020).



Philosophers also play central roles in methodological innovation,
which can in turn play an important role in informing debates about
theory and public policy. As one prominent example of the
contributions of new global justice methodologies, it is worth noting
the emergence of "Engaged Theorizing" (see website listed
under internet resources), especially in the global justice context
(Ackerly 2018; Deveaux 2015, 2021; Cabrera 2010; Lu 2017; Rafanelli
2021; Reed-Sandoval 2020). Such approaches take lived experience,
social action campaigns, and justice movements as the central
important starting point for normative theorizing. Using interpretive,
qualitative, and normative analysis, engaged political theorists try
to align political philosophy with the questions, goals, and needs of
communities seeking social justice. In these ways there have been
important new attempts to bring philosophy to bear on our contemporary
global realities, with significant progress made in bridging the
divisions between theory and practice.