## 1. Life and Works




Peter Damian (Petrus Damianus or Petrus Damiani) was born in or
around 1007 in Ravenna, Italy. He acquired the name Damianus or Damiani
after his elder brother Damianus, who cared for him in his youth. Peter
studied liberal arts and law in Ravenna, Faenza and Parma, and gained a
reputation as a teacher of rhetoric. About 1035, Damian experienced a
religious conversion and entered the monastery at Fonte Avellana, near
Gubbio. Because of his zealous devotion and his learning, Damian was
soon entrusted with administrative and teaching tasks in his own and
other monasteries. He became prior of Fonte Avellana in 1043, and led
the monastery to a new prosperity. Damian developed into one of the
most influential persons in the Church of his time who, through his
writings and personal contacts, sought to foster monastic reform and
reform of the Church. In 1057, Damian was nominated Cardinal-Bishop of
Ostia against his will; he was relieved of at least some of the duties
related to the office a few years later. Because of Damian's rhetorical
skills and his knowledge of Canon Law, the Pope used him as his legate
on several occasions. Damian died when returning from one such mission
on the 22nd or 23rd of February 1072 in Faenza.




Peter Damian was a voluminous writer. The most important part of his
production is his letters, which number 180. Damian's treatises are
also included in the collection of letters because they take the form
of letters. The only one of Damian's works which is considered to be of
philosophical interest is Letter 119, which is better known as *De
divina omnipotentia* (*On Divine Omnipotence*). This letter
is addressed to Abbot Didier of Monte Cassino and his community, and it
is dated at the beginning of 1065.


 

The recent book-length studies on Damian's life and thought by
McCready (2011) and Ranft (2012) are not philosophical in orientation,
but they can be usefully read to gain an understanding of Damian's
career and his personality.


## 2. Passage 612A-B and Damian's Reputation




Damian's reputation as a thinker who denies the universal validity
of the principle of non-contradiction goes back to a series of studies
that the German scholar J.A. Endres published early in the twentieth
century (Endres 1906, Endres 1910, and some others). This notion is one
of the central pieces in Endres's more comprehensive thesis about a
controversy between "dialecticians" and
"anti-dialecticians" in the eleventh century --
"dialecticians" being thinkers with a rational tendency
while "anti-dialecticians" are suspicious of or hostile
towards use of secular arts in discussions related to Christian faith.
Peter Damian is Endres's prime representative of the anti-dialectical
attitude. Endres's interpretation of Damian's position ultimately
depends on a single passage in *De divina omnipotentia*, passage
612A-B (in the Migne edition). To better understand that passage, some
preliminary remarks about the content and aim of *De divina
omnipotentia* should be made. (However, see also
 Section 6.)




In *De divina omnipotentia*, Damian treats two questions
related to divine power: Can God restore virginity to a woman who has
lost it? Can God bring it about that what has been done has not been
done? These questions had been brought up at a mealtime discussion
during Damian's recent visit to the Abbey of Monte Cassino. The first
question was suggested by a passage in a letter by Jerome which had
been read aloud during one of the meals (596C-D). Damian maintained the
view of divine omnipotence and claimed that God can restore virginity.
The second question was suggested by the first one: some people asked
Damian whether, in his view, God can undo the done; for example, can
God bring it about that Rome was never founded (601C)? The general
tendency in Damian's treatment is clear: he aims at defending the
doctrine of divine omnipotence. It is also clear that Damian's answer
to the first question is affirmative: he explicitly and emphatically
declares that God can restore virginity to a woman who has lost it.




Given the information in the previous paragraph, one can construct
the following argument for the claim that Damian has to deny the
universal validity of the principle of non-contradiction: (1) Damian
maintains that God can restore virginity to a woman who has lost it.
(2) But restoration of virginity consists in removing those events in
the woman's past that are incompatible with her being a virgin. (3)
Therefore, Damian has to maintain that God can undo what has been done.
(4) But the undoing of what has been done involves a contradiction. (5)
Therefore, Damian has to claim that the principle of non-contradiction
is not universally valid.




This construction of Damian's view is not entirely unrelated to the
text of *De divina omnipotentia*. There is a passage in *De
divina omnipotentia* where Damian touches upon the connection
between the question of restoring virginity, the question of undoing
the done, and the validity of the principle of non-contradiction, viz.
the very passage on which Endres based his view about Damian's
position. The passage reads as follows (the preceding sentences are
also included to provide the context):



> Let the quibbling of the impious question be once more put
> forth; let it also be seen from what root it was produced, for then the
> stream that ought to be engulfed by the ground lest it should flood and
> ruin the rich fruits of sound faith may just dry out with its source.
> For in order to prove that God could not restore a virgin after her
> lapse, they add, as if it were a consequence [of the original question]
> (*quasi consequenter*): for would even God be able to bring it
> about that what has been done, has not been done? As if [it were so
> that] if it is ever established that a virgin has been spoilt, it could
> not happen that she would be intact again. This is assuredly true as
> far as nature is concerned, and the opinion holds. Also, that something
> has been done and that the very same thing has not been done cannot be
> the case. These, to be sure, are contraries to each other in such a way
> that if one of them is, the other cannot be. For of what has been it
> cannot truly be said that it has not been, and, the other way around,
> of what has not been it is not correctly said that it has been. For
> contraries cannot coincide in one and the same subject. This
> impossibility, then, (*haec porro inpossibilitas*) is indeed
> rightly affirmed if it is attributed to the lack of means of nature,
> but on no account should it be applied to the divine majesty. For he
> who has given birth to nature easily removes the necessity of nature
> when he wills. (611D-612B).




Towards the end of this passage, Damian appears to be saying that
God can restore virginity and undo what has been done even if it
requires that the principle of non-contradiction is violated. At least
this is how Endres interpreted the passage. According to Endres, Damian
counts the principle of non-contradiction among the laws of nature; as
such, it belongs to the sphere of the contingent and cannot restrict
the agency of God Almighty. Because of this passage, the critique of
dialectic and other secular arts that Damian presents elsewhere (see,
e.g., 603C-604A, 610D-611D) acquires a new significance. Damian was not
satisfied with simply criticizing the misplaced and mistaken use of
dialectic in theology; he aimed at denying the possibility of science
existing independent of theology (Endres 1906, 30-31; 1910, 23-30).




Recent commentators disagree about the correct interpretation of
612A-B, but none of them find Endres's conclusions justified (see,
e.g., Gonsette 1956, 100-101; Cantin 1972, 139-140, 173-176, 203-206;
Remnant 1978, 260-261; Resnick 1992, 110-111; Knuuttila 1993, 65-66;
Holopainen 1996, 36-39, 42; Gaskin 1997, 232-233, 240-243; closest to
Endres's view comes Bauke-Ruegg 1998, 443-451). The problem with
Endres's reading of 612A-B is that it fits badly with what Damian says
elsewhere in *De divina omnipotentia*. Namely, Damian rejects
as outrageous the suggestion that God could bring about something that
violates the principle of non-contradiction (see
 Section 5.1).
 Either Endres's reading of 612A-B is
altogether wrong, or at least the passage does not have the weight that
Endres wants to give it.




There is a curious feature in Damian's idea about restoring
virginity. Damian talks about kinds of restoration of virginity that do
not require any interfering with past events (see
 Section 4).
 This is significant because it ruins our constructed argument
for the claim that Damian has to deny the universal validity of the
principle of non-contradiction (above, steps [1]-[5]). If Damian does
not share the assumption that restoration of virginity consists in
removing some events in the past (step [2]), then the two questions in
*De divina omnipotentia* can be treated and answered separately.
Even though Damian affirms the possibility of restoring virginity, he
need not affirm the possibility of undoing the done.




Passage 612A-B (or 611D-612B) appears to be connected to this issue.
The beginning of the passage shows that Damian intends to make a point
about the relation (or unrelatedness) of the two questions in *De
divina omnipotentia*. (By "impious question" Damian
means the question about undoing the done.) From 612B onwards, Damian
discusses God's power to reverse the laws of nature and arrives at the
conclusion that God can restore virginity through a miracle within some
present moment of time (cf.
 Section 4).
 As for
Damian's claim about "this impossibility" (*haec ...
inpossibilitas*), which applies to nature but not to God, it is not
clear whether he refers to the impossibility of bringing about
something that violates the principle of non-contradiction or the
impossibility of restoring virginity. If he refers to the latter, his
point would be to say that God can restore virginity even though it is
not possible to undo the done (Holopainen 1996, 36-39).




Passage 612A-B is too ambiguous to support any substantial claims
about Damian's view; Damian does not deserve his reputation as a
thinker who denies the universal validity of the principle of
non-contradiction in order to defend the divine omnipotence. (At the
same time, it must be added that Damian is not quite clear about the
validity of the principle of non-contradiction for those things for
which God is not responsible. See
 Section 5.1.)


## 3. Definition of Omnipotence




Damian's central interest in *De divina omnipotentia* is to
defend the doctrine of omnipotence against certain challenges. The
defense that Damian offers rests on a specific understanding of what
constitutes omnipotence.




The doctrine of omnipotence (*omnipotentia*) implies that God
"is capable of everything" (*omnia possit*; e.g.,
596C-D, 610C-D). In Damian's view, it does not follow from the doctrine
that we should think that God would be able to do anything whatsoever.
Admittedly, there are many things that God cannot do, e.g., God cannot
lie (e.g., 597C). Lying is an evil thing. In Damian's view, an agent
need not be able to do evil in order to qualify as omnipotent because
not being able to do evil is no sign of impotence or inability.
Actually, God cannot do anything that is evil and he can do anything
that is good. By "omnipotence", Damian means this ability
to do anything that is good. This ability can properly be characterized
as "omnipotence" because evil things are
"nothing" (*nihil*). To be capable of
"everything" (*omnia*), an agent must be capable of
anything that is "something" (*aliquid*), but he
need not be capable of "nothing" (598D-599A, 600A-B,
610C-D).




The remarks about "nothing" and "something"
are related to Damian's conception of the major metaphysical division
among things in the world. The things in the world can be divided into
the good (*bona*) and the bad or evil (*mala*), and these
are quite different from each other (see 602A-C, 608B-610D, 618B-C).
What is characteristic of good things is that they are (*esse*)
and that they are something (*aliquid*). The good things that
are have been made by God and are willed by God. Evil things are not
willed by God, and they are far away from him. The being of evil is
apparent and not real. Evil things seem to be, but in the testimony of
the truth, they are not (*non esse*); they are not something but
nothing (*nihil*). God is not the author of evil, for
"nothing was made without him" (*sine ipso factum est
nihil*, John 1:3).




In some passages, Damian assumes that divine omnipotence can be
characterized as God's ability to bring about anything that he can
will. Because God can will anything that is good, and he cannot will
anything that is evil, this amounts to the same as the characterization
of omnipotence as God's ability to bring about anything that is good
(cf. 596C-597B, 599A, 600A-B). However, the characterization of
omnipotence as God's ability to bring about anything that he can will
reveals an important aspect in Damian's view of divine power, viz.
divine freedom. Damian is very emphatic about God's freedom in his
creative activity. In his omnipotence, God can do anything that is
good, but he need not do everything that is good -- he need not do
anything at all (600B, 605C, 607A; for the Augustinian background, see
Knuuttila 1993, 66-70).




Given Damian's understanding of omnipotence, it is, in principle,
easy to determine whether God can do some given thing or not. One just
has to find out whether the thing in question is a good thing or a bad
thing. If it is a good thing, then God can both will it and bring it
about. If it is evil, it is something that God cannot even will (cf.
600B).


## 4. Can God Restore Virginity?




To determine whether God can restore virginity, we need to find out
whether getting virginity back is a good thing. In Damian's view, there
is no doubt about it. As the loss of virginity is an evil, getting
virginity back would be a good thing. Since God Almighty can will and
do anything that is good, he can will to restore virginity, and he can
restore it. This is Damian's general solution to the first question
(599C-600B).




Damian expands his solution by explaining that there are two
relevant ways of understanding what the restoration of virginity means
(see 600C-601B). Restoring virginity concerns either the fullness of
merits (*iuxta meritorum plenitudinem*) or the integrity of the
flesh (*iuxta carnis integritatem*). Restoration of virginity
according to merit is possible, maintains Damian, for it consists of
returning to the Lord. And, surely, the creator of humans can also
repair the damage that the loss of virginity causes to the flesh. Thus,
Damian can end his main discussion concerning the first question by
boldly declaring that God can restore virginity to a woman, no matter
how many husbands she has had, and that he can also repair the sign of
virginity in her flesh, so that it is as good as when she emerged from
her mother's womb.




As already intimated (Section 2), the restoration of virginity that
Damian affirms as possible does not imply any interfering with past
events. This goes both for restoration of fullness of merits and
restoration of the integrity of the flesh. In the remarks related to
restoration of virginity that Damian presents later in *De divina
omnipotentia*, he mainly concentrates on the restoration of
virginity according to the integrity of the flesh (see 611B-D,
614C).




Damian makes some comparisons that make it clear that the
restoration of virginity is a miracle within some present moment of
time. Damian says that restoring virginity is a lesser miracle than the
virgin birth. The virgin birth is like going through doors without
opening them; the restoring of virginity is like closing doors that
have been opened (611B-C). Damian further compares the virgin birth and
the restoration of virginity to the eternal life of Enoch (Sirach
44:16; Hebrews 11:5) and the resurrection of Lazarus (John 11) (614C).
What seems to be common to the restoration of virginity, the
resurrection, and the closing of doors is that, in all three cases,
something is restored to its original state. Such a restoration need
not affect the past in any way. Restoring virginity does nothing to the
fact that a woman has lost her virginity and has been without it, as
the resurrection of Lazarus does not remove the fact that he has died
and been dead. Restoration of virginity is an "ordinary"
miracle comparable to some of the miracles that are reported in the
Bible.




In *De divina omnipotentia*, Damian presents some systematic
remarks concerning God's power to produce miracles. God has sovereign
power over nature. As the author of nature and its laws, he has
reserved to himself the right to change the laws of nature according to
his free choice and bend them as he wishes. Nature cannot but obey the
will of its maker (612B-D). As evidence for this view, Damian
enumerates a large number of miracles and miraculous phenomena that are
contrary to the ordinary laws of nature (612D-614B; cf. 610D-611D). The
discussion ends with the renewed affirmation that God is capable of
restoring virginity if he wills (614C). None of the miracles that
Damian mentions imply that God could undo the done or bring about a
contradictory state of affairs. The aim of Damian's discussion appears
to be to argue that God can miraculously restore the physical integrity
of the flesh even though it is not possible to change the past (cf.
615A-B and
 Section 2).


## 5. Can God Undo the Done?


### 5.1. Damian's Main Approach




The second question discussed by Damian in *De divina
omnipotentia* asks whether God is able to bring it about that what
has been done has not been done. Damian's discussion of the question is
somewhat complicated, and he is not too explicit about what he is
doing. There are some interrelated passages which offer what can be
identified as Damian's main approach (601C-610D, 615A-B, 618B-D,
620C-D). Towards the end, there is a passage which Damian marks as an
additional consideration (619A-620C; see
 Section 5.2).




Damian's main approach to the second question is to argue that the
past cannot be undone because what God has made cannot lose its status
of having been. Before directly arguing this point, Damian presents two
preliminary considerations which help to put the question in the proper
setting. The first of these preliminary considerations is related to
some discussions within the art of dialectic whereas the second is
theological in nature.




In the first preliminary consideration (602D-604B; see also 609A and
615A-B), Damian connects the question about undoing the done to what he
says is a disputed question of dialectic, "the question about the
consequence of necessity and impossibility" (*quaestio ... de
consequentia necessitatis vel inpossibilitatis*, 604A).




In Damian's view, those who have put the question about God's
ability to undo what has been done have acted impetuously, for they do
not understand the import of their query. They are asking whether God
can bring it about that what has been done, will not have been done.
However, the kind of impossibility that is implied here concerns not
only what is past but also what is present or future. One must also ask
whether God can bring it about that what is, is not, or whether he can
bring it about that what will be, will not be. In Damian's view, the
logic in these questions is the same. The rules of dialectic say that
from the factuality of any statement, regardless of the tense, you can
infer its necessity and the impossibility of its contradictory in the
following manner: what has been, necessarily has been, and it is
impossible that it has not been; what is, necessarily is, as long as it
is, and it is impossible that it is not; what will be, necessarily will
be, and it is impossible that it will not be (602D-603B).




What should one think of the necessity and impossibility which
follow from any true singular statement? Does it follow that everything
happens of necessity (so that not even God can do anything about it)?
There was a disputed question in the dialectic of Damian's time which
dealt with these kinds of queries. The root of the question is
Aristotle's discussion of singular future statements in *De
interpretatione* 9 which the eleventh-century dialecticians read in
Boethius's Latin translation. They also knew what Boethius said about
the theme in his two commentaries to *De interpretatione* and in
*Philosophiae consolatio*. These works provide the background
for the question that Damian refers to, but the formulation which
Damian knows appears to be of early medieval invention (see Holopainen
1999, 230-232; Holopainen 2006). Damian himself says that the question
is an old question from the liberal arts which has newly been taken up
again. However, the contemporary discussion is different from the
ancient one in that the ancients discussed the question purely as a
question of dialectic, whereas the contemporary writers have turned it
into a quasi-theological question that has bearing on divine power
(604A).




Another contemporary source with information about the question is
the discussion in *Cur deus homo* II.17 by Anselm of Canterbury,
some thirty years later. Anselm makes a distinction between two kinds
of necessity: there is preceding necessity (*necessitas
praecedens*) and there is subsequent necessity (*necessitas
sequens*). Preceding necessity is an efficient kind of necessity,
and it is the cause of a thing's being the case. The subsequent
necessity does not cause anything, but is caused by a thing's being the
case. The necessity which follows from any true singular statement in
any tense is subsequent necessity. Anselm's discussion implies that the
question about the consequence of necessity and impossibility arises
from the failure to keep the two kinds of necessity separate (Knuuttila
1993, 74; Knuuttila 2004, 122-124; Marenbon 1996, 12-16; Holopainen
1999; Binini 2017, 251-253).




Damian does not tell us how the question about the consequence of
necessity and impossibility can be resolved. It is possible that he was
familiar with the kind of solution that one can find in *Cur deus
homo* II.17 (see Holopainen 1999, 227-232; Holopainen 2006,
116-119). At any rate, Damian takes it for granted that the question
can be solved in a manner which does not restrain omnipotence for he
rejects the question as irrelevant to a discussion about divine power
(604A-B; cf. 609A and 615A-B). In the same context, Damian also makes a
comment about applying dialectic to theology: when dialectic and other
branches of human knowledge are applied to the investigation of
theological matters, they must serve as a maid (*ancilla*)
serves her mistress; they must not try to adopt the leading position.
Damian also accuses his discussion companions of being incompetent in
the field of their art: they do not yet know the rudiments of
dialectic, but nevertheless they try to apply it to theological issues
(603B-D).




The second preliminary consideration in Damian's main approach to
the second question focuses on divine providence. Drawing mainly on
Augustine's writings, Damian presents a lengthy discussion concerning
God's eternity and his relation to created beings (604C-608A; see also
599A-B and 618C-D). God is immutable, both in himself and in his
relation to creation. He is not in any time or place, but all times and
places, as well as all creatures, are contained in "the treasure
of God's wisdom", or in his providence (*providentia*). To
God there is no past or future; everything is present to him in an
eternal now. To him, nothing changes or moves; everything that streams
by or goes past in time stands immutably and eternally in his
providence.




The doctrine of divine providence puts the question about changing
the past in a new perspective (see 607A-610D). This doctrine warrants
Damian's claim that the same considerations apply to things past,
present and future, at least when we are discussing God's power. The
doctrine of divine providence also makes it immediately clear what the
answer to the second question has to be: the past cannot be changed
because the past events are immutably present in the divine
providential plan which is immutable (607A).




To Damian, asking whether God can undo the done is asking whether
God can bring about a contradictory state of affairs. In Damian's view,
it is obvious that this is something that God cannot do:



> You, therefore, while you demand that one and the same
> thing both has been and has not been, is and is not, will be and will
> not be, you truly strive to confuse everything that has been made or is
> to be made and to show that it wavers between being and non-being.
> Certainly, the nature of things will not tolerate this. For nothing can
> be and not be at the same time; but what is not in the nature of
> things, is undoubtedly nothing. You ask, therefore, harsh critic, that
> God make what is not his, that is to say nothing. But behold! the
> Evangelist stands against you, saying that *nothing is made without
> him* (John 1:3). God has not yet learned to make nothing. You,
> teach him, and command him to make nothing for you! (608C; translated
> in Holopainen 1996, 32).




The passage provides a justification for the idea that God's
inability to undo what has been done does not contradict his
omnipotence. In Damian's view, omnipotence consists of God's power to
bring about anything that is good. A contradictory state of affairs
would be nothing and evil, and therefore the ability to bring it about
is not included in omnipotence (cf.
 Section 3).




In another passage (608D-610D), Damian appeals to the efficacy of
God's will to argue that a contradictory state of affairs cannot become
actualized. Here, different considerations apply to the good and the
evil (cf.
 Section 3).
 The good things are because God
wills them to be. God's will as the efficient cause of the being of
beings has such intensity that what he wills to be, cannot not be, and
what he does not will to be, cannot be. Good things, then, are
unequivocally in the case that they are, and a contradictory state of
affairs cannot be realized through some good thing's being and not
being at the same moment. As far as good things are concerned, we can
say that the validity of the principle of non-contradiction is a
consequence of divine omnipotence: it is an indication of the might of
God's will as the efficient cause of being. The same is true of the
validity of the consequence of necessity and impossibility; what some
people see as a limitation to God's power is really an expression of
his power (608D-609A, 610B).




Damian's view is blurry when it comes to the validity of the
principle of non-contradiction for evil things. He states that a
contradictory state of affairs cannot be realized through some evil
thing's being and not being at the same time. However, he supports this
statement by pointing out that the being of evil things is apparent and
not real: they cannot both "be" and "not be" at
the same time because they never have the kind of "being"
(*esse*) that good things have (610B-C). This leaves open the
possibility that some evil thing could have and not have its
quasi-being at the same moment of time (cf. Resnick 1992, 110-111). It
is not clear whether this is an intended feature of Damian's view or
not. In any case, the issue is not relevant for Damian's discussion
about the power of God because God gives being in an unequivocal
manner.



In the conclusion to his main approach, Damian focuses on the principle
of non-contradiction as he understands it. He first lets us understand
that we need not bother about the evil things. As for the rest, i.e.,
the good things, it is outrageous to suggest that their being would not
be unequivocal: 


> When therefore this question is proposed, with these words:
> "How can God bring it about that what has been done will not have
> been done", let a brother of sound faith answer that what has
> been done, if it was an evil, was not something but nothing, and on
> that account it must be said not to have been, because what the Maker
> of things did not order to be, did not have the grounds for existence.
> *For he said, and they were made, he ordered, and they were
> created* (Psalms 32:9). For *everything was made by him, and
> nothing was made without him* (John 1:3). And therefore to ask,
> "How can God make it so that what has been done will not have
> been done?" is the same as to ask, "Can God bring it about
> that what he has made he will not have made?" Undoubtedly, what
> God has made, God will not have made! Therefore, who utters this is to
> be spat upon, and he is not worthy of reply, but rather should be
> condemned to branding. (618B-C; translated in Holopainen 1996,
> 40).




In Damian's view, the past cannot be undone because what God has
made cannot lose its status of having been (because God has made what
he wanted to make, and his will is immutable in eternity). For the same
reason, the principle of non-contradiction is universally valid for
everything which has being from God. Also, the things that have being
from God cannot but be when they are, and therefore the consequence of
necessity and impossibility is valid for them (609A).


### 5.2. A Supplementary Approach




Towards the end of *De divina omnipotentia*, Damian presents
an additional approach to the question of undoing the done (619A-620C).
Damian clearly marks the passage as an additional consideration that
can be used to combat those impudent people who are not satisfied with
his principal solution (619A). In spite of this, the passage has often
been mistaken for Damian's principal statement of the matter; in many
selections from the text, only the additional approach is included
whereas Damian's main approach is omitted (except for the question
about the consequence of necessity and impossibility).




Damian's main approach has been to show that divine omnipotence
remains intact even though God cannot undo the done. In the
supplementary approach, he pursues a different strategy: there is a
sense in which it can be said, and not in a foolish way (*non
inepte*), that God "can" (*potest*) bring it
about that what has been done, has not been done. This can be proved as
follows. Since God's power (*posse*) is coeternal with God
himself, it is immutably the same. Before the beginning of time, it was
possible for God that none of those things that we know as the past
would come into being. Therefore, this is possible for him now and
always (620A-B).




In his additional approach, Damian purposefully put forward ideas
that he knew were problematic. For if it is true that God cannot undo
what has been done, there must be something wrong in any argument that
seems to prove that he can. To save the faithful among the readers from
too much bewilderment, Damian suggests that the additional
consideration that he presents is principally of a grammatical nature.
Namely, he points out that when we speak about God's ability to bring
it about that what has been done, has not been done, the expression
"He can (*potest*) do it" is appropriate for
speaking of the eternal God; from our temporal point of view, "He
could have (*potuit*) done it" is the appropriate way of
expressing it (619A-C). If we follow this lead, the statement that God
can undo what has been done collapses into the statement that God could
have chosen to make the past different from what it actually was
(Remnant 1978; Moonan 1980; Holopainen 1996, 42). Of course, this is
not changing the past properly speaking. What Damian assumes here is
that God could have chosen a different providential plan, not that God
could make changes in the providential plan that he has actually
chosen.


## 6. Damian's Objective




It is easy to misunderstand Damian's position regarding the validity
of the principle of non-contradiction and the possibility of altering
the past. This is partly due to the disorderliness of some of Damian's
ideas. There is also another important factor which promotes
misunderstanding. In Damian's view, there are some ideas that you
should not articulate even though they are true. The idea that God
cannot undo the done counts among these.




The situation from which *De divina omnipotentia* resulted
begun from Damian's attempt to regulate what one may utter about God.
Damian had been sitting at the table of Abbot Didier in Monte Cassino
and eating. While they were eating, a passage in Jerome's letter to
Eustochium was read in which it is claimed that even though God is
capable of everything (*omnia possit*), he cannot restore
virginity to a woman who has lost it. Damian stated that he had always
found it disturbing that an inability (*inpossibilitas*) was so
lightly ascribed to God. A discussion followed in which Damian defended
the view that God has the power of restoring virginity whereas Didier
argued for Jerome's view that he cannot restore it. In Damian's view,
there is a sense in which we can say that God can restore virginity,
and therefore we must affirm that he can restore it (596C-601B).




Damian's objective at the table of Monte Cassino was to protect the
doctrine of divine omnipotence by advising that we should abstain from
saying anything which implies that God is powerless in some respect.
Some of the monks sitting at the table were less interested in Damian's
advice and more interested in the issue of omnipotence in itself. They
were bold enough to put a question to Damian: if God is omnipotent in
all things, as Damian has asserted, does he have the power of bringing
it about that what has been done has not been done (601C)? We can be
sure that Damian found this question very annoying. It is a difficult
question, and it is a question that is difficult to handle without
making statements about what God cannot do. Damian does not offer us
any report about how the discussion continued. However, there is a
remark in *De divina omnipotentia* which suggests that Damian
himself was accused of implying that God is impotent in a certain
respect (620D).




Damian's objective in *De divina omnipotentia* is twofold.
First, Damian reiterates his point about moderation while talking about
God (e.g., 597B-599A, 603B-604B, 614D-616C). He strongly advises that
we should abstain from spreading certain kinds of statements, even in
cases where they are found in the Bible (597B-C). Damian's most
important motive here seems to be to protect the faith of the simple
believers:



> For if it should reach the common people that God is
> asserted to be impotent in some respect (which is a wicked thing to
> say), the unschooled masses would instantly be confused and the
> Christian faith would be upset, not without grave danger to souls.
> (597C; tr. Spade 3.18-22).




Second, Damian defends himself against the accusation that he said
that God is impotent in a certain respect (620D). His delicate task in
*De divina omnipotentia* is to convince his readers of the view
that divine omnipotence remains intact even though God cannot undo the
done, without ever saying that God cannot undo the done because this is
"a wicked thing to say".