## 1. Initial Observations



The tradition that is known as Confucianism in the West is known as
*Yuhak* in Korean (Ru Xue ; C. *Ruxue*) [the
study of the "Ru" scholars], or *Yugyo*
Ru Jiao , C. *Rujiao*) [the teachings of the scholars].
Korean Confucians have contributed greatly to complex metaphysical
discussions relating to the moral psychology of Confucian philosophy
and its teachings. The goal of such teachings is to become a sage
(Sheng Ren , C. *Shengren*, K. *Songin*), and
this is a salient feature of Korean Confucianism, referring to someone
who studies, and who morally transforms themselves through concerted
effort. In this sense, one's moral cultivation, known in the
Confucian texts as "self-cultivation" (Xiu Ji ,
C. *xiuji*, K. *sugi*), meant that humans should depend
on themselves and their own inherent abilities to solve their own
problems (social and personal), ruling out the need for help from gods
or deities. This becomes evident when we read the Korean philosophical
texts on sagehood discussed below.



The classical texts of Confucianism, which were later edited and
probably re-organised by Confucius himself, are known as the *Five
Classics* (Wu Jing , C. *Wujing*, K.
*Ogyong*):


* *Yijing* (Yi Jing ) [Classic of Changes],
* *Shujing* (Shu Jing ) [Classic of History],
* *Shijing* (Shi Jing ) [Classic of Poetry],
* *Liji* (Li Ji ) [Records of Rites], and
* *Chunqiu* (Chun Qiu ) [Spring and Autumn
Annals].



Later, a new body of work would be grouped into a new set of texts
collectively known as *The Four Books* (Si Shu , C.
*Sishu*, K. Saso), by the great Southern Song dynasty
(1126-1271) scholar Zhu Xi (1130-1200):


* *Lunyu* (Lun Yu ) [The Analects],
* *Daxue* (Da Xue ) [The Great Learning],
* *Zhongyong* (Zhong Yong ) [The Doctrine of the Mean],
and
* *Mengzi* (Meng Zi ) [The Mencius].
* (The *Daxue* and
*Zhongyong* were originally separate chapters in the
*Liji*--Record of Rites. See also
 Other Internet Resources
 for more information.)



Zhu, a harsh critique of Buddhism, synthesised the later metaphysical
developments of Confucianism, known as Neo-Confucianism, and his ideas
shaped the trajectory of Korean Neo-Confucianism. Additionally, his
commentaries on the *Four Books* (and his re-organisation and
re-wording in some cases) were considered "orthodox",
while other interpretations were considered heterodox. Meanwhile,
Korean Confucians clearly debated received ideas differently than
Confucian scholars in China, and this gives the Korean contribution to
Confucianism even greater significance.



One's social obligations calibrated through a distinct set of
relationships has been extremely important for Koreans, in the past as
well as in the present. The "Five Cardinal Relationships"
(Wu Lun , C. *wulun*, K. *oryun*) of
Confucianism, where each relationship was related to a particular
virtue, are emphasised in *Mencius*:



> 
> 
> between father and son there should be affection; between ruler and
> minister there should be righteousness; between husband and wife there
> should be attention to their separate functions; between old and young
> there should be proper order; and between friends there should be
> faithfulness. (3A:4; translated SB-Chan: 69-70)
> 
> 
> 



In the Korean Confucian tradition, social position and age have
important implications for maintaining social hierarchies, and women
were particularly disadvantaged through interpretations of these
relationships, expected always to be subordinate to men: fathers,
husbands and sons (see Cawley 2018). Adhering to these clearly
delineated relationships was associated with a well-functioning
"harmonious" society, whereby harmony was achieved through
fulfilling one's specific role. Nevertheless, the
"superior" person in these relationships *should*
be a morally and socially responsible individual, especially the king,
who also has obligations to the population he governs, a theme that is
recurrent in the literature on "Sage Learning"
(Sheng Xue , C. *shengxue,* K. *songhak*),
that shapes and defines Korean Neo-Confucianism. The other
relationship, emphasised much more in Korea than in China, is the idea
of filial piety (Xiao , C. *xiao*, K. *hyo*).
*Hyo* remains one of the defining features of Korean
Confucianism, where respect for one's parents and elders is
still emphasised. The eldest male is the most respected person in the
family, which also highlights the gender bias that Confucianism has
facilitated on the peninsula, something that is contentious today in a
Korea that is heavily debating this gender imbalance, gaining traction
thanks to the #MeToo movement.



Ritual propriety (Li , C. *li*, K. *ye*), or the
use of rituals a mechanism for ordering society, is something still
prevalent in rituals related towards ancestors, known as
*chesa* (Ji Si , C. *jisi*) in Korea, which
are still conducted by many Korean families. They, however, further
reinforce other social norms related to patrilineality and the place
of privilege for the eldest son, while preventing women from
performing these rituals. Naoaki Hiraishi (2003: 187) underscores the
important function of rituals in society, noting their refining
influence, and how they have



> 
> 
> the advantage of inculcating people with social norms rather than
> [...] social ordering with criminal law and other physical
> punishment.
> 
> 
> 



The refining nature of moral education is another important feature of
Korean Confucianism, something scholars asserted and accentuated, and
even the king was indoctrinated with formal Confucian training with
lectures on conformist Confucian morality (see Sohn 2000: ch. 1).
Korean Confucians agreed with the Mencian tradition of education,
shaped by the view of "human nature" (Xing , C.
*xing,* K. *song*) as something inherently good,
whereby education was a vehicle to refine and promote one's
virtuous nature. In relation to Korean Confucianism, it is not an
understatement to say that Mencius' ideas became responsible for
a great deal of Choson's metaphysical stimulation and
recalibration, while also ultimately leading to its philosophical
debates.


## 2. Neo-Confucian Metaphysical Recalibration


### 2.1 *Principle*, Human Nature, and Material Force



Earlier Confucian scholars lacked a sophisticated metaphysical and
cosmological basis for their ethical codes, and so were motivated to
"offer a cosmology that could compete with the Buddhists"
(Creel 1971: 205). This would eventually lead to the development of
Neo-Confucianism, which had already permeated Korea by the end of the
Koryo dynasty (918-1392), when discussions on human nature
(K. *song*) were starting to be discussed in great detail.
The Chinese scholar Han Yu (768-824) initiated the resurgence of
interest in Confucianism, especially the ideas of Mencius, evident in
*An Inquiry on Human Nature,* while at the same time rejecting
Buddhism. These ideas that would make their way into Korean diatribes
against Buddhism, also propelling them towards debates about human
nature (SB-Chan: 452-455; SB-BB: 583-585). One of Han
Yu's disciples, Li Ao (died ca. 844), also wrote on Mencian
ideas in *Returning to the Nature*, focusing on how to become a
sage: a theme that would be developed by Koreans to a much more
sophisticated degree during the Choson dynasty (see Fung 1937
[1983: 413-415]). However, his writings are indebted to Buddhist
ideas about the recovery of one's inherent good nature or Buddha
Nature (Fo Xing , C. *foxing*, K.
*bulsong*), influential at that time, although he
reorients them to advocate Confucian sagehood, especially important
for Korean Confucianism.



Neo-Confucianism can be traced to the writings of "The Five
Sages of Song": Shao Yong (1011-1077), Zhou Dunyi
(1017-1073), Zhang Zai (1020-1077), and two brothers,
Cheng Hao (1032-1085) and Cheng Yi (1033-1107). However,
their main ideas were recognised and appreciated



> 
> 
> only later when their various contributions were synthesised by the
> impressive scholar Zhu Xi (1130-1200),
> 
> 
> 



particularly the ideas of the Cheng brothers (Fairbank & Goldman
1999: 98). Ames and Rosemont (1998: 17) highlight how



> 
> 
> Zhu Xi's commentaries [...] became the definitive of the
> [Neo-Confucian] tradition from the early fourteenth century through
> the twentieth centuries,
> 
> 
> 



and this influence also extended to Korea, becoming deeply rooted
there. Zhu's compendium on Neo-Confucian thought,
*Jinsilu* (Jin Si Lu ) [Reflections on Things at
Hand], written with Lu Zu-qian (1137-1181), became the handbook
on this great philosophical synthesis, and was integral to the Korean
development of those ideas. Zhu focused on self-cultivation, a
necessary ingredient in Confucian sagehood that became central to
Korean's interpretation of those ideas (Chan 1987:
122-124; Tillman 1992: 114-118).



However, it was Zhu's adaptation of the Cheng brother's
ideas on *Principle* (Li , C. *li,* K. *i*)
that governed its reception in Korea (where *Principle* in
italics is used to distinguish this key Neo-Confucian term from
Western interpretations of the word). *Principle* was
considered to be an original ideal governing source of all principles
of reality in the world, where everything has its own individual
principle that is a part of this greater immaterial and universally
organising *Principle.* Cheng Yi even insisted that
*Principle* is one but its manifestations (or sub-principles)
are many, while underscoring that it reached its zenith in humans,
especially in the human mind, which was endowed with its
"good" human nature (SB-Chan: 544). In Korea,
Neo-Confucianism is generally referred to as the School of
*Principle* (Li Xue , K. *ihak*), or School of
the *Principle* and Human Nature (Xing Li Xue , K.
*songnihak*), highlighting the interest in metaphysics
that was examined by the Korean scholars to a whole new microcosmic
level (Keum 1980 [2000]; Kang 2003 [2006]).



While Zhu had given primacy to *Principle*, at the same time he
recognised it as intertwined with the material force:



> 
> 
> Fundamentally [*Principle*] and material force cannot be spoken
> of as prior or posterior. But if we trace their origin, we are obliged
> to say that [*Principle*] is prior. (SB-Chan: 634)
> 
> 
> 



This stance was initially adapted by the majority of Neo-Confucian
scholars in Korea, and developed by Kwon Kun
(1352-1409), who "had the most sophisticated understanding
of Neo-Confucian metaphysics" in the fourteenth century,
especially his *Diagrammatic Treatises for the Commencement of
Learning* (Ru Xue Tu Shuo , K. *Iphak
tosol*), which consisted of some



> 
> 
> forty diagrams and explanations designed to help beginners grasp the
> fundamentals of [Human] Nature and *Principle* Learning.
> (SB-Lee: 449-450)
> 
> 
> 



These diagrammatic expositions reflect an important dimension of the
Korean Neo-Confucian tradition, to use diagrams to explain complex
metaphysical ideas and how they related to moral psychology embedded
within the mind. Kwon wrote that



> 
> 
> [*Principle*] is the fundamental basis of the mind and material
> force. Therefore, [*Principle*] precedes Material Force,
> 
> 
> 



which allows him to uphold the idea that human nature is good, because
*Principle* is good, and that what is not good is due to the
material force (see Choi M.-H. 1980: 37-38; slightly adapted
translation). Furthermore, he was the first Neo-Confucian scholar in
Korea to discuss *Principle* and material force in relation to
the human mind linked with the "four beginnings", and the
"seven feelings": The "four beginnings" are
referred to by Mencius (2A:6; see SB-Chan: 65): the feeling
[(Qing , C. *qing*, K. *chong*)] of
commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and the
feeling of right and wrong, which when developed lead to the cardinal
virtues of Confucianism (humanity, righteousness, propriety and
wisdom). Humanity (Ren , C. *ren* (sometimes *jen*),
K. *in*) was seen as the greatest Confucian virtue, often
translated as benevolence or kind-heartedness. The "seven
feelings" are referred to in the ninth chapter of the *Book
of Rites*: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, dislike and liking.
Kwon linked the four beginnings (which were always good) with
*Principle,* and the seven feelings (which could be potentially
bad) with the material force, starting a veritable meta-psychological
chain reaction that continues until today. These ideas were
consolidated in his "*Diagram of the Unity* and Oneness
of *Heaven*, Human Beings, Mind, and Human Nature"
(Tian Ren Xin Xing He Yi Zhi Tu , K.
*Ch'onin simsong habil-to*), and in
Kwon's view "Heaven" referred to the working of
*Principle* in all things, including the human mind, and so
(wo)man's mind was linked to the moral *Principle* of the
universe, embodied by the sage (see Halla Kim 2017: 1-23).



Further complicating the intellectual impetus of Korean Confucianism
was its reaction to (or rather against) Sinitic Chan meditational
developments that shaped the Son school in Korea. Korean Son
ideas had arguably reached their maturity in the teachings of the
Koryo monk Chinul (1158-1210), especially his text *On
Cultivating the Mind* (Xiu Xin Jue , K. *Susim
kyol*). Chinul's approach recognises the mind as the
essence (Ti , K. *che*) of one's Buddha Nature,
which requires continual practice and cultivation aids to refine its
function (Yong  K. *yong*), bringing together the important
essence-function (*che-yong*) feature of Korea's Buddhist
tradition, which would deeply influence the Neo-Confucian thought of
Choson. The Son practice of seated meditation would also
shape Neo-Confucianism's own mind-focused concept of
"quiet-sitting" (Jing Zuo ; C. *jingzuo*, K.
*chongjwa*), also known as *chongjwa chonsim*
(Jing Zuo Cun Xin ): to sit quietly and preserve the
mind (Palais 1996: 181).


### 2.2 Neo-Confucianism and Social Transformation



An Hyang (1243-1306) was one of the most important Korean
scholars responsible for introducing Neo-Confucian ideas into the
Korean peninsula, he "copied [Confucian Classics] by hand, drew
(Zhu Xi's) likeness and brought them back home" (Deuchler
1992: 17). Paek I-jong (1247-1323) and other Korean
scholars also helped transmit the new philosophy to Korea as they
became acquainted with many Chinese Neo-Confucian scholars, including
the direct successors of the Cheng-Zhu tradition, who met at the
Man'gwondang library (the hall of ten thousand scrolls)
founded by King Ch'ungson (1308-1313) in the Mongol
capital of the Yuan empire (Deuchler 1992: 19). Furthermore, Yi
Che-hyon (1287-1367) endorsed the printing of *The Four
Books* and believed that a king should indeed be a
"sage" and interpreted the relationship between government
and Neo-Confucianism as essential. Yi Saek (1328-1396), son of
Yi Che-hyon, was responsible for the dissemination of the texts
in Korea where Neo-Confucian prestige was increasing rapidly, and he
was "appointed educational intendant for the Yuan in
Korea" (De Bary & Haboush 1985b: 41). Hence,
Neo-Confucianism was linked to education and governing the state,
while shaped by a moral code of ethics.



These revitalised Confucian ethics would redefine the moral guiding
discourse of the emerging Choson dynasty (1392-1910).
Chong Tojon (1342-1398), who helped to validate the
new kingship, instigated a rejuvenation of Confucian morality, that
would culminate in a renewal of society through the use of propriety,
manifest in specific rites (K. *ye*) (Deuchler 2004: 46). Lee
Sang-wha (2005) draws attention to the remodeling of patriarchal
patterns of behaviour, validated through the metaphysics of the Yin,
or *Um* in Korean (as weak) and Yang (as strong), linked
to the social functions of women (as passive) and men (as active),
also inculcated through the study of detailed ritual sourcebooks,
especially *Zhuzi jiali* (Zhu Zi Jia Li )
[Zhu Xi's Family Rites], which linked personal self-discipline
with the cultivation of the mind through the rigid application of
propriety. In the Korean context, propriety was embodied by four
specific rites that were to be put into practice to reorganise
society: coming of age (also known as capping), wedding, mourning, and
most importantly, ancestral rites (Deuchler 1992: 108-111). In
Korea, rites were made a legal requirement and even encoded into the
national "Grand Code for State Administration", known as
the *Kyongguk taejon*
(Jing Guo Da Dian ), first promulgated in the late
fifteenth century. Failure to perform the prescribed rituals could
lead to physical punishment, imprisonment, and even death (as would be
the case for thousands of Catholics during the nineteenth century).
These laws asserted and ingrained a newly prescribed Neo-Confucian
cultural order into the social matrix, that suppressed and repressed
any challenges to its authority, including Buddhism.


## 3. Korea's Neo-Confucian Confrontation with Buddhism


### 3.1 Early Criticisms of Buddhism



One of the first Confucian texts critical of the Buddhists was that of
Paek Munbo (1303-1374), *Ch'okpulso*
(Chi Fo Shu ) [*In Rejection of Buddhism*], which
used Shao Yong's Daoist-inspired cyclical cosmological
philosophy to ratiocinate that it was again time for restoration of
the "way" of the sage Confucian rulers Yao and Shun
(Deuchler 1992: 23). Kang (2003 [2006: 158-164]) outlines the
opposition to Buddhism towards the end of the Koryo period,
especially among Confucian scholars such as Chong Mongju
(1337-1392) and Chong Tojon. Chong Mongju
emphasised the practical "everyday life" of the Confucians
who fulfilled social and sexual relations unlike the Buddhists who



> 
> 
> part with relatives, denounce the relationship between man and woman
> [...] and revere the search for emptiness and Nirvana. (Kang 2003
> [2006: 160-161])
> 
> 
> 



He also was noted for his loyalty to last king of the Koryo,
which would cost him his life: this was how seriously Confucian
philosophers were dedicated to the moral principles they wrote
about--ideas they were expected to practice in their lives. It
was Chong Tojon, the "godfather" of early
Choson Neo-Confucianism, who had helped General Yi Songgye
(1335-1408) to form a military alliance with other powerful
Neo-Confucian scholars following Yi's decision to oust the last
Koryo king from power in 1388, soon establishing the Choson
dynasty. Neo-Confucianism became the guiding socio-political ideology
of Choson with Chong Tojon at the helm as its chief
architect, benefiting from military support and royal authority to
carry out his grand scheme (E. Chung 1995: 59). From the point of view
of intellectual history, Chong played a major role in the attempt
to discredit and marginalise Buddhism, and Kwon Kun (quoted
in Deuchler 1992: 101 [*Sambong-jib*: 286]), commented on how
Chong aspired to make



> 
> 
> the elucidation of the Learning of the Way [Neo-Confucianism] and the
> repulsion of heterodox teachings [i.e., Buddhism] his own
> responsibility.
> 
> 
> 



Confucian philosophy was then used to undermine Buddhism during this
early stage of its development in Korea.


### 3.2 Chong Tojon's Neo-Confucian Critique of Buddhism



Chong Tojon's arguments against Buddhism are
encapsulated in his final treatise *Pulssi Chappyon*
(Fo Shi Za Bian ) [*Array of Critiques of Mr.
Buddha*], while his shorter text, *Simgiri
p'yon* (Xin Qi Li Pian ) [On Mind,
Material Force and Principle], also critiques the Buddhists and
Daoists. Both texts have been translated and annotated along with the
original Chinese characters by A. Charles Muller (2015) in
*Korea's Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate*, as well as the
rebuttal of Hamho Kihwa (1376-1433), an erudite Confucian
trained Buddhist, in his treatise entitled
*Hyonjong-non* (Xian Zheng Lun ) [*The
Exposition of the Correct*].



Chong, while investigating the phenomenological issues concerning
human nature and their ethical implications, was completely unwilling
to acknowledge any conceptual dependence on Buddhist doctrines, while
reinforcing the staunch position of Neo-Confucians in Korea to link
philosophical principles to one's social reality (see Muller
2015: introduction). For Confucians, Buddhists had cut themselves off
from both social and filial obligations. His ideas, therefore,
"provide grounded guidelines for individuals as social beings
who faced daily challenges" and this is exemplified by the
recent translation of his writings as *Seeking Order in a
Tumultuous Age* (Robinson (trans.) 2016: here 5). These writings
reflect the need to help the people, as well as the need to rectify
the mind of the ruler, but also the obligation to rectify oneself
before trying to rectify others (Robinson (trans.) 2016:
128-129). They also recount the practical reasons behind his
philosophical attack of Buddhism:



> 
> 
> the bulk of the Finance Commission is spent on Buddhism and deities.
> There is no greater waste of fiscal resources. (trans. in Robinson
> 2016: 53)
> 
> 
> 



These are ideas that later scholars might refer to as "practical
learning" or *Sirhak*, often described as a trend that
emerged after the Hideyoshi invasions of the late sixteenth century,
yet here we have very practical guidance from Chong at the start
of the Choson dynasty, or rather the beginnings of a practical
form of "sage" learning applied to issues directly related
to daily life.



Chong's shorter rebuttal of Buddhism, *On Mind, Material
Force and Principle* (*Simgiri p'yon*:
45-53), already highlights this intellectual nexus which
dominates Neo-Confucianism in Korea. It introduces the main
metaphysical issues that were of great importance in Korea at this
time, namely, the mind (Xin ; also referred to in literature as
the heart-and-mind), the material force (Qi ), and of course
*Principle* (Li ), which he describes as "the
inherent virtue of the mind and that through which material force is
produced", and clearly states that "only after there is
principle is there material force" (*Simgiri
p'yon*: 50). He discusses what he considers to be the
misinterpretation and application of ideas in the teachings of the
Buddhists and Daoists, vindicating his rebuttal with quotes from the
*Mencius*, the *Analects*, and the writings of Zhu Xi,
as well as the *Book of Rites*. Chong's arguments
culminate in a radical espousal of Confucianism as an exclusivistic
discourse, and he lauds the practical and direct social implications
of these metaphysical ideas, juxtaposed to Buddhist and Daoist
emphasis on emptiness and vacuity, which he considers to be devoid of
meaning when related to matters of the mundane world (*Simgiri
p'yon*: 53). The philosophical implications of
Chong's ideas are related to this-worldly affairs and not
speculative spiritual proclivities of other traditions, which he
suggests depended on deities who could then reward or punish.
Chong asserts the need to investigate one's human nature
and the mind for oneself, and not to rely on teachings that call upon
spirits to do so, advocating the Confucian practice of preserving what
is good in the mind and nourishing the material force to control
bodily desires through proper Confucian education (*Simgiri
p'yon*: 51). This bifocal approach would become greatly
elucidated by later Neo-Confucian philosophers who would advocate an
approach to fully develop the humanity (K. *in*) that our minds
were "naturally" endowed with by *Principle*.



Chong's *Pulssi Chappyon* is translated by
Muller (2015) under the title *An Array of Critiques of
Buddhism*. The text lists 19 critiques, which Chong
systematically treats in turn, including important Buddhist doctrines,
such as transmigration and karma. The goal of Confucianism, being
firmly focused on this life, was not interested in idle speculation
about an afterlife. Initially, Chong (*Pulssi
Chappyon*: 59-61) sets out to critique the Buddhists
interpretations of the mind (K. *sim*), and human nature (K.
*song*), and criticises the Koryo monk Chinul of
"nebulous supposition", lacking "hard facts",
accusing Buddhists of "word play", while lacking a
definitive doctrine. Chong explains that the Confucians consider
the mind to be made of the material force that "one takes from
heaven at birth", while the mind itself is endowed by
one's human nature through *Principle* at birth
(*Pulssi Chappyon*: 59). He reinforces the
"concrete" aspect of the "function" of
Confucianism in reality, which the Buddhists consider completely
illusory, and refers to Cheng Yi's dictum,



> 
> 
> The study of the Buddhists includes reverence to correct the internal,
> but does not include justice to straighten the external. (*Pulssi
> Chappyon*: 63)
> 
> 
> 



Cheng Hao had similarly added that "The Buddhist way of internal
and external life is incomplete" (SB-Chan: 538). This Confucian
rationale underpins Chong's arguments in his
"Critique of the Buddhists' Abandonment of the Basic Human
Relationships" and the "Buddhist Notion of
Compassion", initiating his discourse (*Pulssi
Chappyon*: 64-67) on the Confucian virtue of humanity
(K. *in*), which functions through social interactions,
manifested through "The Five Relationships". Furthermore,
Chong denounces Buddhists for rejecting filial piety, adding that
they "regard their most intimate family members like passers-by
on the street", despite having inherited their material force
from their parents, illustrating how Neo-Confucians now used
metaphysics to validate their moral "reality" (*Pulssi
Chappyon*: 66).



As Buddhists could take refuge in the Buddha, thereby rely on
something external, the point is excoriated by Chong in his
critique of Son Buddhists and their teachings (*Pulssi
Chappyon*: 72-73), who he insinuates,



> 
> 
> took nothingness [Kong , K. *kong*; this was the translation
> of the Sanskrit term Sunyata] as their cardinal
> teaching and abandoned the obligations of society,
> 
> 
> 



contrasting it greatly with the practical "way" of
Confucianism, further emphasised in his, "Critique of the
Equivalence and Differences between Confucianism and Buddhism"
(*Pulssi Chappyon*: 73-77). Chong accuses
Buddhists of being "masters of glibness, lewdness, trickiness,
and evasiveness" (*Pulssi Chappyon*: 77). In
contrast, the role of the Confucian "sage" is also acutely
heralded as a pragmatic pathway that has use for governing, to plan
for the welfare of the people and to "avoid activities that
would bring harm to [them]", ideas that are also emphasised in
his practical handbook for governance, *Seeking Order in a
Tumultuous Age*, discussed above (Robinson (trans.) 2016: 81).



Chong's text draws together multiple quotes by renowned
Confucian scholars to fuel his arguments and support his overall view
that Buddhism had no practical social worth. As Muller (1999: 185)
underscores, such ideas were closely linked to the Confucian
understanding that "Buddhists regarded existence as illusory and
that only mind was real", hence they "scorned human
relationships", while "only quiet meditative inner
cultivation was valued". The most important retort to this
diatribe would come from the monk Hamho Kihwa, who skillfully
counter-charges Chong's caustic attack using Confucian
ideas and texts, while encouraging a much more inclusivistic, hence
less divisive, approach. Kihwa (*Hyonjong-non*:
110-111), argued for the "unity of the Three
Teachings", giving a valid piece of advice about what not to do
that is useful for us to hear today:



> 
> 
> Holding stubbornly onto one's own opinion while ignoring the
> positions of others, arbitrarily affirming this and rejecting
> that.
> 
> 
> 


## 4. Sage Learning and The Four-Seven Debate



Two of the most preeminent scholars of the first half of the
Choson dynasty, Yi Hwang (1501-1570), well known by his pen
name T'oegye, and Yi I (1536-1584), known by the pen name
Yulgok, are responsible for the deep level of metaphysical debates
that would mark Neo-Confucianism in Korea. Both would engage in
attempts to analyse the macrocosmic *Principle* and its
microcosmic interactions with material force (K. *ki*). More
importantly, they would initiate an intricate debate about what these
interactions meant for our minds and human nature, as actualised
through our thoughts and actions, linked with a sense of psychological
and social urgency. Korea's Neo-Confucian scholars propounded a
social guiding discourse that is humanistic in essence (drawing on the
Confucian *in*), reflected in how we are linked externally
(through conduct) and internally (through thought). Sagehood itself is
achieved through learning, or rather, "Sage Learning", a
term underscored by Oh Kangnam (1993: 313) as "one of the
essential components, if not the essence, of Korean Confucianism
[...]", adding that "Neo-Confucianism's
hallmark was its emphasis on sage-learning".



Both T'oegye and Yulgok both wrote very specific texts on
Sagehood. In 1568, T'oegye wrote *Songhak sipto*
Sheng Xue Shi Tu  (The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning),
and in 1575 Yulgok wrote *Songhak chipyo*
Sheng Xue Ji Yao  (Essentials of the Learning of the
Sages). According to Keum Jang-tae (1980 [2000: 40]), author of
*Confucianism and Korean Thoughts*, these texts (the *Ten
Diagrams* and the *Essentials*) reflect "the two main
classical works epitomizing Neo-Confucian learning in the Choson
era". They also embody the development of Korea's
Neo-Confucian tradition. Kim Yung Sik (2017: 25) suggests that



> 
> 
> the full understanding of [Zhu's thought] seems to have come
> quite late, only after Yi Hwang [...] launched an all-out effort
> to come to grips with the entire scope of the Zhu Xi Learning.
> 
> 
> 



In fact, Japanese Neo-Confucian scholars, such as Yamazaki Ansai
(1618-82), considered T'oegye to be "the greatest
Confucian in Korea", even suggesting he was on a par with Zhu Xi
himself (Pak 1983: 69).



T'oegye's *Ten Diagrams* represents the finest
synthesis of this Neo-Confucian thought current in Korea at that time,
and it was one of the most reproduced texts of the entire Choson
dynasty, overshadowing Yulgok's text. T'oegye's text
consists of a collection of diagrams by Neo-Confucian scholars from
China and Korea, including three by T'oegye himself, that
elucidate Zhu Xi's main teachings, as well as
T'oegye's own synthesis and analysis of them, especially
through his focus on the mind (K. *sim*), though guided by a
methodological approach that focuses on *Kyong*
(Jing ). *Kyong* is often translated as seriousness,
but T'oegye has reoriented this term's use, underscoring
the mind's mastery over one's thoughts and actions,
leading Michael Kalton (1985: 212-214) to translate it as
"mindfulness", while Kim Hyoungchan (2018: 27-32)
uses the term "reverent mindfulness". Mindfulness, in this
very Confucian re-appropriation of a Buddhist concept, reflects
T'oegye's approach to sagehood: the daily practice of
constantly being aware of the mind, controlling its impulses so that
good thoughts can lead to good actions.



The first two diagrams reflect the underpinnings of Neo-Confucian
ontologico-cosmology:


1. Zhou Dunyi's *Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate*
(Tai Ji Zhi Tu , K. *T'aeguk
chido*), and
2. Zhang Zai's *Western Inscription*
(Xi Ming Tu , K. *Somyongdo*)
3. (see
 Kalton's translations online).



They provide us with a clear outline of the interconnected
Neo-Confucian vision of a morally interconnected universe. While the
first diagram identifies the Supreme Ultimate
(*T'aeguk*) as *Principle*, which generates
yin and yang, which then materialise through the Five Elements, the
second diagram further concretises this organising aspect of the
greater originating *Principle* in the material world, showing
its inherent order that inscribes itself hierarchically.
*Principle* is reflected in all things, and therefore used to
validate human social relations and the distinctions that exist
between ruler and subjects, older and younger for example. The next
three diagrams are all concerned with the basic underpinnings of
Confucian moral humanistic education: The *Diagram of Elementary
Learning*, the *Diagram of the Great Learning*, and the
*Diagram of Rules of the White Deer Hollow Academy*, the latter
being the rules of Zhu Xi's own retreat centre for learning.
This education embodies Confucian morality which is the basis for
understanding more complex issues of the mind and human nature.
*The Elementary Learning* is an original diagram by
T'oegye himself based on Zhu Xi's text of the same name,
which was widely studied in Korea in its own right. Meanwhile, the
*Diagram of the Great Learning* was by Kwon Kun,
appearing in his collection of diagrams mentioned above, bolstering
the importance of moral education within the Korean Neo-Confucian
tradition.



It is the sixth diagram in T'oegye's collection where we
find his view of the "Four-Seven" issue that was first
mentioned by Kwon Kun, but which really addressed the
questions: if human nature is completely good--why do people do
things that are "not good" and how/why are there negative
feelings? Is this due to *Principle* or the material force?
This was a conundrum for Neo-Confucians just as good and evil was for
the Scholastics in Europe trying to explain why there was evil if
their God was good. Michael Kalton (1985: 119) describes the
subsequent debate, outlined below, as "the single most important
intellectual controversy of the Yi dynasty", ultimately related
to the different roles of *Principle* and material force, their
interactions and significance in regard to one's human nature
and the mind. T'oegye's sixth diagram is actually divided
into three parts, relating to the saying *The Mind Combines and
Governs the Nature and the Feelings*
(Xin Tong Xing Qing Tu ) and they describe different
but interrelated aspects of the mind:


1. "the not yet aroused state" (Wei Fa , K.
*mibal*), linked to the four beginnings, and pure
*Principle*, and
2. the seven feelings linked to "the aroused state"
(Yi Fa , K. *ibal*) when *Principle* interacts
with the material force.



In this instance, both *Principle* and material force
interpenetrate each other, but this was not T'oegye's
initial interpretation, which had changed due to his
"Four-Seven" debate with another scholar.



The "Four-Seven" debate (which was clearly deeply related
to *Principle* and material force) originated from a series of
correspondences between T'oegye and Kobong, penname of Ki
Taesung (1527-1572), and later it was continued on between
Yulgok and Ugye, penname of Song Hon (1536-1598).
T'oegye originally suggested that the four beginnings and seven
feelings had different origins, and this instigated the original
debate with Kobong, who did not agree with T'oegye's
dualistic approach: that *Principle* (*i*) was the
source of the four beginnings, while the material force was the source
of the seven feelings. Kobong was more interested in
*ki*'s moral and activating function, and considered
*i* and *ki* as inseparable, especially when it came to
"their presence in actual things" (Kalton 1994: 6). The
issue at hand was how could the morally good *Principle*,
manifested to its highest form in (wo)mankind, be corrupt, or led
astray, in the sense that people clearly do not always conduct
themselves in a kind-hearted manner towards others. Though
T'oegye revised his view, he still gave primacy to
*Principle* and maintained that it always initially preceded
*ki* when we act morally, or rather that *Principle*
guided *ki*, like a rider guiding a horse. Hence, T'oegye
upheld the moralistic perfection and integrity of *Principle*
by suggesting that things could be less than perfect, and human
behaviour sometimes not good, as a result of the interaction with the
material force, which could be affected/corrupted depending on the
concrete circumstances of its actualisation in concrete
form/action.



For T'oegye *Principle* had been equated with the Supreme
Ultimate, and thus represented the source of the possibility for all
existence, whereby the very *Principle* (or potential) of a
thing preceded its actual realisation, which would then interact with
*ki*. In this sense, the potential for life in the universe
predated the actualisation of that life. T'oegye suggests
something quite idealistic: that *Principle* leads with what I
describe as the "*possibility for actualisation*",
while its interaction with *ki* enables the
"*actualisation of the possibility*". The
possibility for actualisation was always "perfect", but
the individual *ki*, in his opinion, could fluctuate and so
does not always "function" to the optimum level of its
inherent *Principle* (or potential). Let us consider this in
terms of sexual reproduction to clarify this point: when a man and
woman mate (or using other medical techniques), there is the potential
that an egg will be fertilised by a sperm, and if so, given that the
physical conditions are optimum, a woman will carry a baby to term.
However, sometimes there can be biological (material) issues that may
prevent the woman from even getting pregnant (due to fertility issues
with the man or woman) or from carrying the baby to term.
Additionally, the baby may not always develop as healthily as
theoretically expected, which is not related to the *Principle*
(i.e., that the fertilisation process itself produces a healthy baby),
but rather the actualisation of potential genetic codes that can
determine physical and biological outcomes: hence, it is *ki*
that we inherit from our parents, and not their *Principle*. In
relation to the mind, T'oegye referred to the mind of Dao, a
pure form, as well as the human mind, where less than perfect thoughts
could lead to less than perfect actions. However, one could use
mindfulness as a way to guide our inner good nature to reflect the
mind of Dao where *Principle* took control to divert us from
desires and negative feelings.



Contrary to T'oegye and Ugye, Yulgok posited that *ki*
was both the activating factor of the seven feelings and four
beginnings, and in this sense was less idealistic in relation to
*Principle*. He argued that *Principle* needed somewhere
to settle before it could guide or affect things, and that was
*ki*, the material force. How can we relate this to daily life
in some way? The man and woman needed to exist and to mate before the
"principle" for fertilisation could take place, which is
perhaps a more practical way of looking at things. This then had
implications for more important moral matters. Yulgok concluded that
while the seven feelings included the four beginnings, the four
beginnings did not contain the seven feelings--in order to
maintain human nature "innately" good and intact. Bongrae
Seok (2019: 24) clarifies that Yulgok (and Kobong, for that matter)
did not believe that



> 
> 
> the goodness of the Four is a distinct moral property explained
> exclusively by [*i*] but a common property shared by the Seven
> explained by both [*i*] and *qi* [*ki*],
> 
> 
> 



hence, in a sense "smoothening the sharp distinction between the
Four and the Seven" as argued by T'oegye and rearticulated
by Ugye. Seok (2019: 19) also notes how Ugye interpreted the four
beginnings and the seven feelings as separate sets of emotions, with
the "seven" having the potential for evil, drawing on
T'oegye who clearly viewed *Principle* as the essence of
the mind and *ki* as the function (on which *Principle*
mounts), again using the interrelationship between essence-function,
or *che-yong,* discussed above in relation to Chinul. For the
Korean Neo-Confucians, this only reinforced the need for proper moral
education and the incessant need for self-cultivations to guide one
from falling prey of the shortcomings of one's physical,
material and environmental existence as it related to the mind and
one's human nature (see E. Chung 1995; Ro 1989; Cawley 2019:
84-89). Though Yulgok was interested in the metaphysical aspects
of Neo-Confucianism, Ro Young-Chan (2017: 74) underscores his interest
in the practical side of "sagely learning".



Both T'oegye's *Diagrams* and Yulgok's
*Essentials* advocate pathways towards sagehood and promote the
concept of self-cultivation. Both scholars also emphasised the special
role of the king who was expected to be a paragon of Confucian
morality and humanity (*ren*), the living embodiment of the
ideals of "sagehood". T'oegye and Yulgok elucidate
our place in a morally directed universe, where one is expected to act
responsibly towards other members of the family and the larger
society, or rather "practice" a social vision of morality
in our daily lives. For both scholars, sagehood represented a noble
*savoir vivre*, the goal of which was to benefit others, and
this in itself was the key to *becoming a sage*. T'oegye
and Yulgok provide us with archetypes of a sort of East Asian
Neo-Confucian "Social Contract", to draw on Jean Jacques
Rousseau's (1712-1778) major work published in 1762. Both
Korean scholars stress the moral and social responsibility of those in
power, but also the moral responsibility of individuals to each other
as members of an interconnected society--and this is something
the world can appreciate now more than ever, as we face a global
pandemic in 2020/21, where through socially responsible distancing, we
both respect and protect others.


## 5. The Horak Debate



The "Ho-rak" debate, literally refers to the general
"Provincial-Capital" divide among the different
sub-factions of the "Noron" (Old Doctrine) Faction, which
had been initiated by scholars who had followed the metaphysical
stance of Yulgok for the most part. As Kang (2003 [2006: 300]) points
out,



> 
> 
> The problem was that differences in academic opinions were associated
> with antagonism between factions or regions.
> 
> 
> 



Therefore, scholars aligned themselves with either T'oegye or
Yulgok's interpretations depending on their factional
affiliation, and if one disagreed with the faction in power it could
have serious consequences (think Republicans/Democrats in the U.S.).
In this instance, like the Four-Seven Debate, it relates to a series
of arguments raised in correspondence between two primary scholars of
this time, who were tightly aligned with different factions: Han
Won-jin (1682-1751) from Ch'ungch'ong
province and Yi Kan (1677-1727) from Kyonggi province where
Seoul is located. Seoh (1977:47) notes that both scholars are



> 
> 
> particularly important because it was their debate over the definition
> of nature that precipitated a resurgence of the *ki*
> school.
> 
> 
> 



Though Yi Kan underscored the central role of *Principle*, Han
posited the operation of the human mind as dependent on
*ki*--both original *ki*, and corrupted
*ki*. These ideas were related, not only to the emotions and
how they affect the actualised mind (thoughts/actions), but led to
other speculative questions:


1. How should one describe the unaroused mind (*mibal*), in
terms of *ki* or *Principle*, or a mixture?
2. Whether sages and ordinary people have the same nature?, and
3. Is the nature of human beings and nonhuman animals identical?
(Richard Kim 2017: 90; Choi Y. 2011)



Richard Kim (2017: 90) notes that such questions became the
debates' "foundational issue", thought it also
brought up some of issues related to the previous debate, in regard to
the effects of the emotions on the mind, and whether minds of sages
and normal people were originally the same.



The notion of the unaroused mind appears in the *Doctrine of the
Mean*, one of the *Four Books*:



> 
> 
> Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy are aroused it
> is called equilibrium (*chung* [Zhong ], centrality, mean).
> When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure
> and degree, it is called harmony. (SB-Chan: 98)
> 
> 
> 



Choi Young-jin (2011: 9) describes this as "a state of
moderation [...] bent neither one way or another [...] the
state of balance". This actual state of mind had never been
analysed in such minute detail before, nor had it been considered in
such detail in relation to the sage, normal humans, and other animals:
were they the same, or not, at the microcosmic level of their mind in
terms of *ki* or *Principle*? Han Won-jin's
essay on the "Explanation of the Original Nature and the
Psycho-Physical Nature", sowed the seeds of the debate. In this
essay he suggested that the original nature, even before being aroused
in the mind (*mibal*, as argued by T'oegye), was already
interacting with *ki*, in other words, energised by material
force, or as Richard Kim (2017: 92) puts it, Han viewed
"*gi* [*ki*] as constitutive of the inactivated
mind". For Han, *Principle* required *ki*, so
*ki* already had to exist in the mind and this *ki* had
to be originally good or in equilibrium, balanced and unmotivated by
desires. Clearly Han was "adhering more strictly to the
materialist core of the *ki* school", while claiming that
"nature is not an abstract [undifferentiated] entity", and
that *Principle* "is nothing but a law of the dynamics of
*ki,*" in other words, *Principle* had no concrete
existence of any sort (Seoh 1977: 48). He ultimately saw the nature of
a human and other animals as different even in their unaroused or
*mibal* state where *ki* was inactive, and used their
different psycho-physical make-up (due to the variant manifestations
of material force when activated) as the basis for his thesis. Han
ultimately considered the sage to possess a pure form of *ki*,
already balanced and pure even in an unaroused state, unlike other
beings (which for him also included women and children) and in this
sense he is more hierarchically inclined in his approach, with a more
idealistic vision of the sage--something usually linked with
proponents of *Principle*.



Yi Kan advocated the primacy of *Principle* in all living
things, and therefore the immanence of goodness embedded within the
Confucian virtues. The idea of the immanence of *Principle* in
all things is also addressed in a more macrocosmic sense in Zhang
Zai's *Diagram of the Western Inscription*, which appears
in T'oegye's Diagrams, though here again, in the Korean
context these ideas are analysed in a more microcosmic manner. Yi
asserted that human and nonhuman animals had the potential to manifest
the universal "original mind" (Ben Xin , K.
*bonsim*). This, according to Yi, was not always manifest by
humans because their "physical nature" and, thereby, their
psycho-physical preponderances varied: some humans were good, but some
acted badly, just as was the case for nonhuman animals. He rather
suggested that the apparent differences, were actually nothing other
than differences in temperaments due to the turbidity of *ki*
after feelings were aroused, but that the underlying
*Principle* meant that they were morally unified in an
unaroused state (R. Kim 2017). This also meant that theoretically,
women too, even children, could aspire to be sages because their
"original mind", which was "the foundation of for
human morality" was no different from that of a sage, what
mattered was that one controlled one's desires because
"sages are those who maintain their moral self": those who
develop themselves to the optimum level of *humanity* (Lee
2011: 108). As Lee (2011: 111) asserts, Yi



> 
> 
> went so far as to say that the original mind-heart [*sim*] is
> clearly present in anyone at any time, and the mind-hearts of sages
> and commoners are alike when aroused.
> 
> 
> 



For Yi, what made one a sage was the fact that they
"acted" morally--being aware of what is good but not
acting on it at all times was what made one a "common"
person.



Seoh (1977: 43) summarises the debate as follows:



> 
> 
> Yi Kan equated the nature of man with other creatures and stressed its
> universality, while Han maintained the uniqueness of the nature of man
> in contrast with other creatures.
> 
> 
> 



One interesting contribution in regard to this debate, came from one
of the few women of the Choson period to write on
Neo-Confucianism (hence trained in Classical Chinese), Im Yunjidang
(1721-1793). She disagreed with Yulgok's interpretation of
*ki*, whom her own brothers had agreed with, and instead
claimed "that each thing [or species] in the universe possesses
a particularised and embodied nature", while ultimately
convinced of the role of "Heaven endowed"
*Principle* (Kim Sungmoon 2017: 190-191). Im also wrote
about the moral equality of both sexes, something highlighted by the
early Catholics in Korea. Kang Chongiltang (1772-1832),
another female Confucian scholar from this period, emphasised that
human nature is good, as well as the importance of putting Confucian
ideals into practice. Her short poem on "Concentrating on
Mindfulness" [or reverence] manages to capture with exquisite
conciseness the main themes and the ultimate goal of Neo-Confucian
learning in Choson, namely, sagehood (Kim Youngmin 2007: 226,
slightly altered translation):



> 
> 
> Myriad Patterns [principles] originate from Heaven-and-Earth.
>   
> 
> One mind unites nature and emotions.
>   
> 
> Without concentrating on mindfulness,
>   
> 
> How can you manage the long trip to sagehood?
> 
> 
> 



Interestingly, by this stage it is important to note that Catholicism,
considered as part of "Western Learning"
(Xi Xue , K. *Sohak*), had already attracted the
interest of some Neo-Confucian scholars, directing them away from an
unemotional *Principle*, towards a belief in an anthropomorphic
caring deity.


## 6. Confucian Reactions to Early Catholicism


### 6.1 Matteo Ricci and Reactions to Western Theology



The time frame of the Horak debate also coincided with Catholic texts
being read by Korean Neo-Confucian philosophers. The most important
text from this period was *Tianzhu shiyi*
(Tian Zhu Shi Yi ; K. *Chonju sirui*)
[The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven], which had a great impact in
Korea after being read by scholars there (see Ricci 1985). It was
actually written by Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), an Italian Jesuit
missionary who had lived for many years (and died) in China. Ricci
weaved in the mediaeval Scholastic philosophy of his European
tradition into a newly enlarged tapestry including his newly
discovered Confucian ideas. He retraced the trajectory of
Neo-Confucianism, revealing its Buddhist and Daoist legacy that has
been carefully coloured over by Zhu Xi, whose ideas also dictated how
Koreans received the Confucian canon, something that clearly irked the
Korean scholars. These ideas and messages had serious repercussions in
Korea, where, as Seoh Munsang (1977: 46-47) points out, the
intellectual milieu had retained Zhu Xi's orthodoxy where
metaphysical speculation was "still a vital force polarising the
*i* and *ki* schools".



Yi Sugwang (1563-1628) provides a short analysis of
Ricci's text, which is of value as it is the earliest commentary
on the text in Korea. He remarked that Ricci's God,
*Tianzhu* (pronounced *Ch'onju* in Korean),
had created the world, hence was worshiped and praised, something he
criticised as he clearly understood *Principle* to be behind
all things. He incorrectly indicates that Ricci, like Confucians,
asserts that human nature is originally good: Ricci had actually
suggested that the Confucians had no unanimity of position in this
regard, as Mencius had said it was good, but Xunzi regarded it as
evil--a point clearly avoided by Korean Neo-Confucian scholars
almost entirely (Yi 2000: 61). Yi Ik (1681-1763), who headed one
of Choson's many scholarly factions, the *Namin*
(Southern) faction, in more recent times described as a proponent of
*Sirhak* "practical" thought, also compiled a wide
range of encyclopedic texts and wrote commentaries on the Confucian
canon too. He engaged more intellectually with Ricci's ideas in
his critique entitled *Ch'onju sirui-bal*
(Tian Zhu Shi Yi Ba ) [Reactions Against
*Tianzhu zhiyi*] (Kim Shin-ja [ed.] 1987: 22-23). Yi Ik,
who was also a follower of T'oegye's metaphysics and wrote
treatises on the Four-Seven debate such as *Sach'il
sinp'yo,* (Si Qi Xin Bian ) [New
Treaty on the Four-Seven Debate], did not accept that
"God" had created the world, and outright rejects the idea
that this God had incarnated himself as a man. He also examined the
moral teachings of another Jesuit, Diego de Pantoja (1571-1618),
and in his commentary on Pantoja's *Qike*
(Qi Ke ) [Seven Victories], which described how to overcome
the seven deadly sins, he argued that if one removed what was written
about God and the devil, the morals could almost be considered
Confucian. This reflects the non-theistic orientation of
Neo-Confucianism in Korea, but also highlights how Yi was not about to
overturn his onto-cosmological inheritance from T'oegye (Yi Ik
*Songho sasol*: 343).



Some of Yi's associate *Namin* scholars were much more
critical of Western ideas in general, especially Sin Hudam
(1702-1761) and An Chongbok (1712-1783). Sin Hudam
was particularly scathing of Catholic teachings in his critique
entitled *Sohak pyon* (Xi Xue Bian )
[Critique of Western Learning]. There is a sub-stratum of thought at
play in Sin's text, which hopes to dissuade others from
believing in Jesus as God, or God in the form of a man who spreads
teachings to the poor. This idea would disengage God from the realm of
insensitive Neo-Confucian metaphysics and could potentially wreak
havoc for the king and society at large if the social hierarchy
inscribed universally through *Principle* were to be
rejected.



This foreboding is much more urgent in the writings of a fellow
*Namin* scholar An Chongbok, as his own son-in-law
Kwon Ilsin (1736-1791) was among the earliest Confucian
converts to Catholicism. These were the incentives behind his two
critiques of Catholicism: *Ch'onhakko*
(Tian Xue Kao ) [Thoughts on Heavenly Learning], and
*Ch'onhak mundap* (Tian Xue Wen Da )
[Questions and Answers on Heavenly Learning]. An Chongbok draws
our attention to the importance of the figure of Jesus and his message
as the focal point of these young Korean Neo-Confucian scholars who
had overturned the onto-cosmology of *Principle* and
*ki*, which then also had no bearing on one's human
nature and mind. In *Ch'onhak mundap*, An upholds
his traditional Neo-Confucian horizon and suggests that Catholics
misused Confucian vocabulary when they discussed sagehood (in relation
to Jesus), emphasising that Confucius did not discuss the supernatural
and was concerned with this life (Kim Shin-ja [ed.] 1987:
28-29).



These Confucians were all toeing the line of orthodox Confucian
morality, which was practical (not mystical), and where the onus for
morality was on oneself, inscribed into one's mind and human
nature. For them, humans decided their own moral fate by mastering
one's desires, and neither the devil nor God had any part in
this. The "this-worldliness" of the Confucian discourse
was something they championed, advocating its benefits for human
affairs governed by "mindfulness", and not by any sort of
interference from the spirit world. In this sense they were upholding
the agnostic stance of Confucius himself in the *Analects*:



> 
> 
> If we are not yet able to serve man, how can we serve spiritual
> beings? [...] If we do not yet know about life, how can we know
> about death? (SB-Chan: 36)
> 
> 
> 


### 6.2 Confucian-Catholics, Tasan and Moral Priorities



The earliest converts to Catholicism were all Confucian-trained
scholars from aristocratic (*yangban*) families. Yi Pyok
(1754-1786), as well as Yi Sunghun (1756-1801), were
the leaders of this group who were soon joined by other yangban
scholars, such as the two Kwon brothers (including the son-in-law
of An Chongbok), and the three Chong brothers. The youngest
of the Chong brothers, Yagyong (1762-1836), more generally
known by his penname Tasan (often written as Dasan), is one of the
most widely acclaimed philosophers in Korea's intellectual
history, discussed below. His early Confucian mentor, Yi Pyok,
wrote the first lengthy outline of Christian doctrine in Korea,
*Songgyo yoji* (Sheng Jiao Yao Zhi ) [The
Essence of the Divine Doctrine] in Classical Chinese for his
"Confucian" entourage. However, his hymn,
*Ch'onju konggyong-ga*
(ceonjugonggyeongga) [Hymn in Adoration of God],
is considered one of the first hymns written in Han'gul,
the vernacular script, which was first promulgated in the fifteenth
century, though generally associated with women and men from the
poorer classes. In fact, so poorly was this simplified script esteemed
in elite circles that it was referred to as *Onmun*
(Yan Wen ), meaning the vulgar script. But Yi's hymn was
also deeply Confucian, advocating loyalty to the king, emphasising
filial piety, and even encouraging adherence to the "Five
Relationships". This Confucian aspect of early Catholicism
reflects an interesting transcultural interaction between both
traditions, highlighting their moral priorities. Chong
Yakchon (1758-1816) and Chong Yakchong
(1760-1801), also wrote Catholic texts in Han'gul,
which also exhort Confucian morality: loyalty to the king, as well as
filial piety, tropes already found in Yi's hymn. In fact, in
Chong Yakchon's *Sipkyemyong-ga*
(sibgyemyeongga) [Hymn in Praise of the Ten
Commandments], he writes that "Among all the things in the
world, filial piety is the most important", which also clarifies
the singular importance of filial piety in Korean Confucianism (Ha
(ed.) 2000: 334). Chong Yakchong wrote a much longer treatise on
Catholicism in *Han'gul*, called *Chugyo
yoji* (jugyoyoji) [The Essence of The
Lord's Teachings], obviously directed at a growing audience who
were not yangban scholars. In fact, many were women and members of the
lower classes, overturning and destabilising entrenched hierarchical
Confucian social norms, while at the same time advocating Confucian
morality, but supplemented with egalitarian Christian ideas (Cawley
2015).



Tasan, like many others, renounced the religion after witnessing close
relations and friends brutally executed, and as a result his authorial
control had been clearly compromised through the fear of his own
execution, as well as the fact that his wife and children could have
been sold as slaves (Cawley 2014b). Some scholars, such as Kim Shin-ja
(2006 [2010: 92-102]), comment on the philosophical inclinations
in Tasan's writings, and consider him as having returned to the
"original theory of Confucius", known as *Susahak*
(Zhu Si Xue ). However, Tasan's commentaries are
full of references to "The Sovereign on High",
*Sangje* (which is the Korean pronunciation of
*Shangdi*), despite the fact that the *Analects* never
mention this term, not even a single time. It appears only five times
in the entire *Four Books*! This term was used in the *Five
Classics*, as highlighted by Matteo Ricci, and was of great
importance to the early Catholics in Korea, who, having read
Ricci's text, considered *Sangje* to be God. Why might
this be important? Seen in this light, Tasan's interest in
"original" Confucianism (*Susahak*), may have been
merely a ploy to detract from his religious affiliation with
Catholicism. The *Sangje* one encounters in Tasan's
writings is a personal, monotheistic, creator deity, and *not*
an impersonal *Principle.* Indeed, Tasan's
"dis-assembling" of Neo-Confucianism, extracting the
Zhu-Cheng influenced metaphysical discourse, and reorienting it
towards *Sangje,* resembles the strategy of Matteo Ricci,
though supplemented with a sense of active social morality (see Cawley
2014a). Keum (1980 [2000: 189]) insists that



> 
> 
> Catholic Doctrine not only provided a bridge to a new understanding of
> the universe, it also became a spring-board for the development of his
> [Tasan's] Neo-Confucianism,
> 
> 
> 



leading to a creative synthesis, which can also be described as
"Post-Confucian" as it moves beyond the metaphysical
parameters of *Ihak* (School of *Principle*) or
*Songnihak* (School of Nature and *Principle)*. It
might even be described as a sort of cryptic
"Christo-Confucianology", whereby Christian motifs inform
his discourse on morality, which is guided by an anthropomorphic
*Sangje* (discussed in detail in Cawley 2014b).



In *Chungyong kanguibo*
(Zhong Yong Jiang Yi Bu ) [Supplement to Lectures on
the *Doctrine of the Mean*], Tasan (*Kugyok
yoyudang chonso*: vol. 1: 390) queries the link
between the "Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate" (which had
provided the foundation for T'oegye's onto-cosmology) and
original Confucian ideas, noting that, "it was written over a
thousand years after Confucius", hence not found in
"original" Confucianism at all. In another text,
*Maengja youi* (Meng Zi Yao Yi ) [The
Essentials of *The Mencius*] Tasan notes that



> 
> 
> the circle in this diagram which represents the Supreme Ultimate does
> not appear anywhere in the [Five] Classics. (*Maengja
> youi*: 383)
> 
> 
> 



Tasan, similar to Matteo Ricci, reorients his ideas away from these
widely accepted Neo-Confucian metaphysical norms towards an all-seeing
*Sangje* to provide an alternative foundation for his moral
framework. It is *Sangje* who re-stabilises Tasan's
re-conceptualised ontotheological-cosmology, disentangling it from
*Principle*, the Supreme Ultimate, yin and yang, as well as the
five elements. It is *Sangje* who makes Tasan's
philosophy theistic-oriented. In *Ch'unch'u kojing*
(Chun Qiu Kao Zheng ) [Evidential Analysis of the
*Spring and Summer Annals*] written circa 1812, he asks,
"Who is *Sangje*?", answering that



> 
> 
> *Sangje* is a being that *creates*, governs and
> maintains heaven, earth, spirits, humans and all things, but also
> transcends them. (*Ch'unch'u kojing*,
> a283\_363a)
> 
> 
> 



Furthermore, this quote echoes the full title of Ricci's first
chapter in the *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*:



> 
> 
> A Discussion on the creation of Heaven, Earth, and all things by the
> Lord of Heaven and on the way he governs and sustains them. (Ricci
> 1985:65)
> 
> 
> 



Earlier scholars such as Yun Hyu (1617-1680) and Pak Sedang
(1629-1703) had dared to be critical of Zhu Xi's
interpretations of texts and rituals, but Mark Setton (1997:
102-103) notes how Tasan took this to another level, arguing
that even his conception of Confucian virtue was "diametrically
opposed" to Zhu Xi's. Setton also notes how Tasan even
rejected the introspective aspects of self-cultivation, advocating an
outward ethical practice based on our moral priorities. This then is
contingent upon free will, a radical idea in Tasan's work, where
good and evil are not aspects of one's material force, but
rather, related to the psychological level, and only exist "in
the context of concrete human relations" (Setton 1989: 380).
Free will is then the defining feature of the human being because



> 
> 
> This ability to make moral choices, and consequently to shape his own
> moral destiny, places man in an entirely different category from the
> animals. (1989: 380)
> 
> 
> 



This also shapes Tasan's other writings that highlight his
profound interest in reforming his society: *Kyongse
yup'yo* (Jing Shi Yi Biao ) [Design for Good
Government], *Mongmin simso*
(Mu Min Xin Shu ) [Admonitions on Governing the
People], and *Humhum sinso*
(Qin Qin Xin Shu ) [Toward a New Jurisprudence]. These
three texts are generally considered to embody Tasan's practical
*Sirhak* ideology, though they too draw on commentaries and
examples from Confucian literature. However, Tasan's writings do
not necessarily eulogise Confucianism and its laws, rather, we often
find a harsh critique of it, which moves away from metaphysical
debates to deal with the actual matters at hand--a society in
decay, and poor people suffering from harsh punishments and taxes (see
B. Choi (trans.) 2010 [*Mongmin simso*]). Justice, in
Tasan's writings, becomes a call for moral responsibility, a
gesture of "Humane" government actively involved in
*loving* the people, where we can again possibly find Christian
undertones.


## 7. Emergence of Modernisation and Confucian Challenges



The nineteenth century was a time of transformation in East Asia,
particularly in Korea, and Confucian scholars were still eager to
validate their discourse, even if it meant persecuting rivals: between
1866 and 1871, between 8,000 and 10,000 Catholics, men, women and
children were tortured and executed by Confucian authorities. Choi
Min-Hong (1980:191-217) notes the re-emergence of philosophers
interested in *Principle* in the nineteenth century, many who
had been linked with the *Namin* faction, hence, proponents of
the T'oegye's metaphysical ideas. This included Ki
Chongjin (1798-1876) and Yi Hangno (1792-1868), the
latter who considered *Principle* to be the basic substance of
the universe, and "something spiritual" (1980: 194). Ki
Chongjin, who again returned to study the writings of Zhu Xi,
also re-engaged with studying sage learning and "researching the
Classics". He regarded *Principle* as a sort of spiritual
Supreme Ultimate, which then produced yin and yang (and the material
force)--in other words, *Principle* preceded *ki,*
and this *Principle* was reflected differently in men and
animals (Choi M.-H. 1980: 196-198). Yi Chin-sang
(1818-1885) also considered *Principle* as preceding
*ki*, but also as that which generated it, therefore,
self-cultivation lay in the study of the mind and not in knowing
external things due to man's "Heaven-bestowed cognitive
powers" which depended on "transcendental Li
[*Principle*]". Such idealistic ideas were hardly needed
at a time when society was in such a state of disarray, already
foreboded in the writings of Tasan.



At the same time, another branch emerged championing *ki*, such
as Ch'oe Han-ki (1803-1879), who was weary of being
governed by prejudices. Ch'oe's work has been re-evaluated
in more recent times. Scholars underscore his empiricist philosophy
that investigated the role of experience in a methodologically
sophisticated manner, reminiscent of John Locke (1632-1704), but
used in Ch'oe's work to undermine the idea of a naturally
good mind before learning from accumulated experiences (Park 2004). He
was very well acquainted with European science and observes a more
practical interest in the material force. One can notice his ontology
based on a "One-Dimensional *ki* theory", which, in
his opinion, was what shaped all things, even preceding all forms,
while at the same time "denying the [Zhu Xi's
school's] world of innate reasoning power" (Choi M.-H.
1980: 205). He was also influenced by the changing times, critical of
the class system and the inhumane treatment of the population, issues
raised by Tasan earlier in the century.



Park Chong-hong (2004: 396) critiques the trend of the (later-called)
*Sirhak* [Practical] scholars, who "made the mistake of
arranging encyclopedic knowledge" and other "trivial
matters", clearly unable to fathom what was coming, and unable
to provide Choson with the tools it needed to survive the
"modernisation" that would soon be thrust upon the
peninsula, leading to Japan's eventual colonial rule over the
peninsula (1910-1945). As the situation on the peninsula
disintegrated, Koreans sought alternatives to Confucianism to deal
with social issues and inequality. The first of these New Religious
Movements (NRMs) was known as *Tonghak* (Dong Xue ), or
Eastern Learning, to contrast directly with the foreign "Western
Learning", and it attempted to help hopeless poor peasants whose
lives were getting progressively worse, especially in the southern
regions far from the capital. Tonghak was founded by Ch'oe Che-u
(1824-1864), known by his followers as Su-un, and while
providing an alternative to Confucianism, it used the name of the
"Sovereign on High" (*Sangje*) from the Confucian
Classics to refer to its deity, while also using the Catholic term
"Lord of Heaven" (*Ch'onju*) as well.
There were splinter groups formed out of this NRM such as
Chungsando (more commonly written Jeungsando), and Daesoon
Jinrihoe, both worshipping different iterations of
*Sangje*--a monotheistic Korean deity with Confucian
origins (see Cawley 2019: ch. 5).



As the end of the Choson dynasty drew nearer, and Korea opened up
to Western countries, many Protestant missionaries would enter Korea
by the late 1880s to make their mark on its religious culture. This
motivated some Confucian scholars to attempt to revitalise
Confucianism, emphasising its religious aspects, while others sought
to reform Confucianism to counter the attempts by the Japanese
government to "Japanize" the peninsula. Interestingly,
Keum (1980 [2000: 219]) comments that "It goes without saying
that the idea of Confucian Religion was prompted by the Christian
concept of a transcendent God", as well as the idea of
"the organisation of a religious community [and] their own
religious institutions". However, this did not really take off,
likely due to the elitism associated with Confucianism, and the way it
had been responsible for the unfair treatment of people from different
classes, and in particular, women, who were increasingly embracing
Protestantism, which had facilitated their education in
"modern" schools.



Han Hyong-jo (2016) articulates that more recent understandings of
Korean Confucianism "has mirrored its chief nemesis,
modernity" and outlines three stages:


1. Denial (1890s-1930s), where Confucianism was blamed for the
loss of Korea's sovereignty;
2. Excuse (1930s-1980s): *Sirhak*, whereby
"practical" ideas were "fished" out of the
tradition as a sort of retrospective consolation had things gone
differently;
3. Rehabilitation (1980s-1997): suggesting that Confucianism is
behind of the economic rise of Korea and linked to the emergence of
its democracy, despite the fact that Confucians were against industry
and labour, and they supported unelected rulers from a royal
clan.



Indeed, rulers' challengers were easily disposed of--even
if they should be senior members of their own
family--contravening teachings on filial piety. Confucianism has
also been linked with a resurgence of "Asian" values, or
recalibrated (yet again) to permit a feminist turn, and possibly even
found in some of the Juche ideas of North Korea's state
ideology, which commands undisputed loyalty (*chung*) to its
Dear Leader.



Confucianism is currently at a crossroads as it interacts with other
traditions in the twenty-first century, nestling between them and
insinuating itself throughout them (Min 2016). In a sense, one might
look to recovering what Han Hyoung-jo (2016) describes as a lost art
of Confucian *ihak*, a form of cultivation of the mind, whereby
reengaging with it might just draw us closer to how it was understood
for centuries, and bring us closer to its goal, which is not
democracy, but something more noble, sagehood. Han (2016) suggests
that this has the potential to cure us from "self-oblivion and
self-centredness", the deficiencies and flaws of our culture
today, by helping us to rediscover our innate potential for humane
co-existence, irrespective of our political or religious views. Korean
Confucianism and its emphasis on sage learning, rather than being
outmoded, may be the agnostic moral approach that has the potential to
reconnect us to ourselves and each other, at a time when psychological
distress is on the rise in all modern "developed"
democracies.