## 1. Life and Work




Very little is known about Numenius' life. The existing evidence
associates Numenius with two cities, Apamea in Syria and Rome.
Plotinus' student, Amelius, who was an enthusiastic admirer of
Numenius (Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 3.44-5), calls him
"Apamean" (ibid. 17.18) and himself moved from Rome to
Apamea after Plotinus' death (ibid. 2.32-33). John Lydus
(6th c. CE), however, refers to Numenius as "the
Roman" (*De mensibus* IV.80, p. 132.11-12
Wunsch). The strong interest that both Amelius and Porphyry take
in Numenius makes the evidence about Numenius in Porphyry's *Life
of Plotinus* quite significant, but the testimony of John Lydus
may also hold some truth. One possible way of reconciling the two is
that Numenius was born in Apamea but taught both there and later also
in Rome (Dodds 1960, 6-7).



Several indications point to a date around the middle of the
2nd century CE for Numenius' philosophical activity. There
is good evidence to suggest that Numenius antedates the Platonist
Atticus, whose *floruit* is set around 176 (Eusebius,
*Chronicle*, p. 207 Helm): Proclus in his 5th-c. CE
Commentary on the *Timaeus* outlines in chronological order the
views of ancient Platonists on the relation of the demiurge (the
creator god of the *Timaeus* myth) to the Forms, presenting
first those of Numenius, then of Harpocration and Atticus, then of
Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyry and Iamblichus (*In Timaeum*
I.303.27-307.19). The chronological order is disturbed only by
the place of Harpocration (a pupil of Atticus) in the list, but this
is because the latter follows Numenius rather than Atticus in his
interpretation of the way the demiurge relates to the Forms (Proclus,
*In Timaeum* I.304.22-305.16; on this matter see below,
Metaphysics). Furthermore, a number of indications suggest Atticus'
own dependence on Numenius. Atticus' work targeting those who profess
to teach Plato's philosophy through the use of the writings of
Aristotle (Atticus frs. 1-9 Des Places) may well be inspired
from Numenius' plea for a purification of Plato's philosophy from
alien elements, Aristotelian and Stoic included. Numenius argues for
this purification in his work *On the Dissension of the Academics
from Plato* (Numenius fr. 24-28 Des Places). The resemblance
between the relevant works of Atticus and Numenius extends to details:
the analogy of Plato's philosophy with the body of Pentheus torn apart
by the Bacchai, that is found in Atticus (fr. 1.19-23 Des
Places) goes back to Numenius (fr. 24.71-73), and so does the
comparison of the 3rd c. BCE Academic skeptic Arcesilaus'
suspension of judgment (*epoche*) to the cuttle fish
spreading ink (Numenius fr. 25.77-81; cf. Atticus fr. 7.78-81).
Atticus however presents Plato as the one who unified philosophy by
putting together its dispersed parts, while Numenius implies that
Plato combined parts which were belonging to the same body,
i.e. Pythagorean philosophy. Also Numenius makes Arcesilaus resemble
the cuttle fish, in order to highlight his skeptic suspension of
judgment as an escaping device, while Atticus applies this analogy to
Aristotle whose philosophy he criticizes as obscure. Numenius' dating
in the middle 2nd century is compatible with two further
facts: the first surviving author who mentions Numenius is Clement of
Alexandria (*ca.* 150-215) in his *Stromata*
(I.22.150.4). Clement cites Numenius asking rhetorically what is Plato
but an atticizing Moses, a citation that Eusebius takes up
(*Praep. Ev.* XI.10.14, fr. 8; on this see below,
Influence). The second fact that pertains to Numenius' dating is that
the latest author our fragments of Numenius mention is Mnaseas
(fr. 25.17), the "methodist" doctor of the 1st
c. CE.



We are fortunate to know the titles of some of Numenius'
treatises. One was *On the Good*, which comprised at least 6
books (Eusebius, *Preparatio Evangelica* XI.18.22). Apparently,
this was one of Numenius' most important works and judging from the
existing excerpts, it must have been cast in dialogical form (see
frs. 3, 4a; cf. Edwards 2010, 118-120). In it Numenius set out to
outline his ontology and theology and, more specifically, to
investigate the nature of the first principle, which is divine, the
cause of everything, and the source of goodness (hence the title
*On the Good*). Numenius is clearly inspired by Plato's
accounts of the Form of the Good in *Republic* VI (508e-509b)
and of the one concerning the goodness of the demiurge in the
*Timaeus* (29e-30b), yet, as I will explain below, he did not
identify the demiurge with the Form of the Good. Also important must
have been Numenius' work *On the Indestructibility of the Soul*
(Origen, *Against Celsus* V.57; fr. 29), in at least two
books. We know of only one certain fragment of this work, but it is
probable that many of the testimonies of later Platonists regarding
Numenius' views on the soul reflect claims made in it (Dillon 1977,
364) (see below, Psychology). Quite unclear, however, remains the
content of Numenius' treatise *On Plato's Secret Doctrines*
(Eusebius, *Prep. Ev*. XIII.4.4; fr. 23). In the sole
surviving fragment (fr. 23) Numenius discusses Plato's use of the
character Euthyphro in the *Euthyphro* as representative of
Athenian popular religion. Dillon (1977, 364) has speculated that in
this work Numenius proposed allegorical interpretations of aspects of
Platonic dialogues. This seems plausible since Numenius appears to
have indulged in allegorical interpretation of the cultic practices of
various nations, taking them to be philosophically significant
(fr. 1a; see below, Numenius' Platonism). But given Numenius'
attachment to Pythagoreanism (on which see below, Numenius' Platonism)
it may also be the case that in this work Numenius presented doctrines
that Platonists traditionally associated with Plato, such as the
immortality of the soul, as originally Pythagorean (see Dillon 1988,
121).




Numenius' best attested work is his treatise *On the Dissension of
the Academics from Plato* (frs. 24-28). The Christian writer
Eusebius in his *Preparatio Evangelica* (*Preparation for
the Gospel*) has excerpted five long pieces from it (in book
XIV). Eusebius quotes so extensively from this work in order to
substantiate his claim, which permeates the entire *Preparatio
Evangelica*, that ancient philosophers were in disagreement with
each other. He takes that feature to indicate the inability of pagan
philosophy to reach the truth. This is an originally skeptic argument,
that is employed by Academic and Pyrrhonean skeptics alike, to the
effect that dogmatic philosophy amounts to failure because of the
disagreements occurring in it (Cicero, *Academica* II.115,
Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* II.11). Eusebius
has a special kind of disagreement in mind, namely that with Plato's
philosophy, which he considers to have come closer to the truth than
any other pagan philosophy (*Prep. Ev.* XI.pref. 2-3, XI.8.1,
XIII.4.3). Numenius' testimony fits well an argument like that of
Eusebius. For Numenius criticizes in this work the departure of the
skeptical Academics from what he considers to be Plato's doctrine,
namely, the doctrine of first principles of reality that Numenius
finds adumbrated in the 2nd *Letter* attributed to
Plato (fr. 24.51-6). For Numenius it is primarily the
disagreement of the Academic skeptics with Plato's allegedly dogmatic
philosophy that marks a failure. The surviving fragments of his work
indicate Numenius' strong concern with the history of Platonism and
are quite telling as to the tendencies of Platonism at his
time. Numenius' reaction against a skeptical interpretation of Plato
may have been triggered by attempts chronologically close to him, such
as those by Anonymus in *Theaetetum* (1st c. CE?),
Plutarch, and Favorinus (1st-2nd c. CE), to
revive a form of academic skepticism (see Opsomer 1998). Three other
works of Numenius, namely *Epops, On Numbers, On place*
(Origen, *Against Celsus* IV.51; fr. 1c), were consulted by
Origen but are only titles to us (see Zambon 2002, 180-181).


## 2. Numenius' Platonism




The remains of Numenius' work leave no doubt that he relied primarily
on texts of Plato in constructing his own system of
principles. Ancient testimonies are, however, divided between those
that classify him as a Platonist philosopher (Porphyry, *Life of
Plot*. 14.12, Eusebius, *Prep. Ev*. XI.21.7) and those that
consider him a Pythagorean (Origen, *Against Celsus* I.15, VI.51, V.38
frs. 1b-1c, 53, Porphyry, *Ad Gaurum* 34.20-35.2;
fr. 36, Calcidius, *In Timaeum* 297.8 Waszink; fr. 52.2). We
should not see any contradiction or even tension in this double
classification. Numenius is a Pythagorean Platonist like Moderatus
half a century earlier or Eudorus around the turn of the
millennium. That is, Numenius accepted both Pythagoras and Plato as the
two authorities one should follow in philosophy, but he regarded
Plato's authority as subordinate to that of Pythagoras, whom he
considered to be the source of all true philosophy--including
Plato's own. For Numenius it is just that Plato wrote so many
philosophical works, whereas Pythagoras' views were originally passed
on only orally (cf. fr. 24.57-60).




This view of Numenius is part of a general view about the history of
philosophy that we can reconstruct from his fragments. Numenius
believes that the truths given to us by philosophy have a status like
that claimed for the scriptures by revealed religions: they are the
revelation of *logos* (reason) in which all nations have a
share (frs. 1a, 1b) but which only certain inspired geniuses could
articulate properly and explain for the first time. Numenius appears
to believe that the religious practices of the various nations are
philosophically significant, because they contain some lore or
"wisdom" that reflects philosophical truth. We find a
similar view first in Posidonius (1st c. BCE) (in Seneca,
*Epist.* 90.5-13, 20-25, 30-32; fr. 284 Edelstein-Kidd) and
then it appears in variations in several authors of the first two
centuries CE. The Platonist Celsus, for instance, who must have been
Numenius' contemporary, wrote a work entitled *True Account*,
in which he criticizes Christianity for deviating from the fundamental
original wisdom that he takes to lie behind the religions of many
nations (Origen, *Against Celsus* I.14, 16; see Frede 1994,
5193-5198). A similar view is maintained by Plutarch
(fr. 157.16-25 Sandbach; cf. his *On Isis and Osiris*)
but also by the 1st c. CE Stoic Cornutus in his
*Introduction to Greek Theology* (see Boys-Stones 2001,
49-59, 105-114). 




Numenius maintains that in the Greek tradition the revelation coming
from reason was first grasped and articulated in properly
philosophical terms by Pythagoras, the source of true philosophy; it
then found its way into the philosophy of Plato. Numenius argues that
Plato appropriated Pythagoras' doctrine and outlined it in his own
work (fr. 24.56-62). He suggests that Plato accessed Pythagorean
philosophy directly, presumably through his own acquaintance with
Pythagoreans, but also indirectly through Socrates, who, according to
Numenius, was also philosophically a Pythagorean and was communicating
to his pupils Pythagorean doctrines (fr 24.51-59), most
especially the doctrine of the three gods, that is, the One,
Intellect, and the creator-demiurge (see below, Metaphysics), which is
allegedly outlined in the pseudo-Platonic
2nd *Letter* (312e). Numenius suggests that Plato
was in a position to recognize Socrates' Pythagoreanism because,
before meeting him, Plato had already familiarized himself with
Pythagorean philosophy (fr. 24.57). On Numenius' view, then, Plato
speaks with authority in his many and extensive published works
precisely because he communicates Pythagorean doctrines. But to the
extent that Plato's philosophy is derivative from the Pythagorean one,
the authority of Plato's written work is inferior to that of
Pythagoras (frs. 7.5-7, 26.12-22). This is why Numenius
recommends a move away from Plato towards the discourses of Pythagoras
(fr. 1a). Numenius appears to claim even that Plato was not
faultless. Plato, Numenius suggests, did not present his doctrines
sufficiently clearly. This is why Numenius holds Plato partly
responsible for the departure of later Platonists (i.e. the Academic
skeptics) from Plato's actual Pythagorean philosophy
(fr. 24.60-66; Karamanolis 2006, 130-131). Plato's
obscurity is pointed out by several other Platonists in late
antiquity, such as Plutarch (*On Isis and Osiris*
370E-F, *On the Obsolescence of the oracles* 421F) and Plotinus
(*Ennead* IV.4.22.6-12), but none of them means this to be a
criticism of Plato, as is the case with Numenius, whose point is that
Plato did not make sufficiently clear his intellectual debt to
Pythagoreanism and that this may have played a role in the dissension of
his followers in the Academy.



Numenius continues the line of Eudorus and especially Moderatus of
Gadeira (1st c. CE), who also considered Plato to be a
Pythagorean in his philosophical commitments. But unlike Moderatus
(Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 53) and other Pythagoreans (see
e.g. Photius, *Bibliotheca* cod. 249, 438b14-19) who
considered also later philosophers, such as Aristotle, as
Pythagoreans, Numenius apparently maintains that nobody after Plato
had access to the Pythagorean wisdom. This tension among Pythagoreans
is indicative of a vivid debate they were having about the sources on
which one can rely for the reconstruction of Pythagorean
philosophy. This debate in turn is characterestic of a strong revival
of the Pythagorean philosophy in the first two centuries CE. This
revival becomes manifest in a series of Pythagorean pseudepigrapha of
the same age. These are treatises which pass themselves off as written
in ancient times and as communicating Pythagorean lore (see Centrone
1990). It can also be seen in the attempt of Moderatus to present
Pythagorean doctrines systematically in his *Pythagorean
teachings* (*Pythagorikai scholai*; Stephanus of Byzantius
s.v. Gadeira, and Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 48;
Karamanolis 2006, 132-134).



The stress on Plato's Pythagoreanism on the part of Pythagoreans
revives and extends connections between Plato's metaphysics and
Pythagorean ideas noted already by Plato's younger associates.
Already Aristotle saw these connections (e.g. *Metaphysics*
A.6, M.3, N.3). That early Academics like Xenocrates showed strong
interest in Pythagoras' doctrines is presumably because they took them
to be present in, or close to, Plato's. They even wrote
treatises on them (e.g. Diogenes Laertius IV.13). We hear that Plato
was accused of having copied the *Timaeus* from Philolaus' book
(Diogenes Laertius VIII.85) and in the 3rd c. BCE Timon of
Phlius parodied Plato for this (Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*
III.17.4). The renewed emphasis on the *Timaeus* in the work of
Platonists of the first centuries CE, which we can attribute already
to Eudorus (see Dillon 1977, 117-121), is closely associated
with the revival of Pythagorean Platonism. Platonists considered
the *Timaeus* to communicate Pythagorean doctrine and even
argued that it was inspired by the work of "Timaeus
Locrus", a late forgery in pseudo-Doric dialect (cf. Proclus, *In
Timaeum* I.7.17-8.29). Numenius is following ample precedent in
assigning a central role to the *Timaeus* for deriving a system
of first principles on the basis of Plato's metaphysics (Baltes 1975,
241-242). His interest in numbers (he wrote a work on numbers),
to which he assigns an ontological role (fr. 2.20-24) may well be for
him another Pythagorean doctrine that Plato had taken over (see Staab
2002, 99-100).


## 3. Metaphysics




The existing evidence about Numenius suggests that he was strongly
concerned with metaphysics. His metaphysical views can be distinguished
into ontological and theological ones. The remains of his treatise
*On the Good* show, however, that these two sets of views were closely
linked together. Numenius defines the subject matter of this treatise
as an investigation of the question what is being (fr. 3.1, fr. 5.5,
fr. 7.12-13), which is reminiscent of Aristotle's definition of
first philosophy, or metaphysics,
in *Metaphysics* *Gamma* (1003a20-32). Quite
notably, however, Numenius declares that he will be guided in his
investigation by the *Timaeus* (referring to
*Timaeus* 27d-28a; fr. 7.8-12). In line with
the *Timaeus*, Numenius treats the Good, the highest principle,
as well as the lower principles of reality that he introduces, as
gods.



Numenius maintains a sharp distinction between the sensible and the
intelligible world--the realms of becoming and (true or pure)
being respectively (fr. 16.8-10). In his *On the Good* he
proceeds in an ontologically ascending order, starting with sensible
(physical) entities, moving to the intelligible ones (including
Platonic Forms), and finally to the first principle, the Good, that is
the Platonic Form of the Good in the *Republic* (508e) that he
identifies with God (that is, the first and highest god). Arriving at
this divine first principle is the final aim of the treatise. This is
understandable since according to Numenius everything that exists in
the world as it is, depends on the Good, the God, which is the cause
of everything's goodness in the world (fr. 19.5-7). Beginning his
investigation from natural elements (*stoicheia*), namely
earth, fire, water, and air (cf. *Timaeus* 31b-c), Numenius
argues that no such element can possibly qualify as a being (as having
being), first because elements, like syllables, cannot exist by
themselves but only in combination, and secondly because no bodily
entity whatever can qualify as a being (as having being), because
bodies are subject to change (fr. 3.1-8). This means that all
bodies have, at best, being-and-not-being (cf. *Republic*
479c). What is more, Numenius suggests that for a body to exist, there
must be something to keep it together and account for its unity
(fr. 4b.11-19), and this cannot be a further body but rather must be a
power (*dynamis*; fr. 4b18), that is an intelligible entity,
for instance a soul, which is necessary to account for the unity of
bodies, as we see that it does for living things (fr. 4b). In the
*Timaeus* (33b), for instance, it is made clear that it is the
world-soul that keeps the body of the world together.




Such an argument shows that Numenius has strong views about the
ontological status of matter, the basis, he supposes, of all bodies
(fr. 4b.25). In his 4th c. CE Latin commentary on the
*Timaeus* Calcidius presents a long discussion about the status
of matter (*In Timaeum* p. 297.7-301.20 Waszink), claiming that
this is based on Numenius (fr. 52.2). If Numenius did elaborate on the
status of matter along the lines suggested in Calcidius, that must be
because it was crucial to do so for his argument about what qualifies
as being and also how the world has come into existence. Interpreting
the *Timaeus* literally, Numenius maintains that matter has
never come into existence but is co-eternal with, and yet distinct
from, God (fr. 52.7-14; cf. Alcinous, *Didascalicus* ch.
12, 166.15-30 Hermann), unlimited (*apeiros*), indefinite
(*aoristos*), without form and quality (fr. 52.6-14,
44-45; cf. Antiochus in Cicero, *Academica* II.27,
Alcinous, *Didascalicus* 163.6 Hermann). Numenius like other
Platonists of his age follows Aristotle in identifying Plato's
receptacle in the *Timaeus* with matter, which Aristotle
characterizes as non being (*Physics* 192a3-14), formless and
qualiteless (*De caelo* 306b17-19; cf. *Timaeus*
50d7). This lack of form of matter amounts to lack of reason for
Numenius (*alogos*; fr. 4a.1-4). In the same vein already
Plutarch (*De Iside* 374C f.) identified matter with Poverty
(*penia* that is informed by Abundance (*poros*), giving
a cosmological twist in Plato's myth in the *Symposium* (203B
f.). Since matter is lacking reason, Numenius considers it in itself
disordered (*ataktos*) and unknowable
(fr. 4.4-5). Because disorder and division were taken to be
essential characteristics of matter in the earlier Platonist
tradition, matter had been identified with the indefinite
"*dyad*" that is referred to in Aristotle's account
of Plato's metaphysics (cf. Plato, *Parmenides* 149d2; see
Baltes 1975, 255-6). This was widely maintained among the
Pythagorean Platonists (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the
Mathematicians* 10.261), including Eudorus (Simpicius, *In
Physica* 181.7-30, 281.5) and Moderatus
(ibid. 231.8-9; see Frede 1987, 1052). Numenius follows
precisely this line of thought (frs. 11.15, 52.6). And since for
Numenius disorder amounts to badness, he considers matter to be bad,
the source and cause of all instances of badness and disorder in the
world (fr. 52.37-9, 63-64). Numenius might appear to
maintain that disordered matter (cf. *Timaeus* 30a) is animated
by an evil world soul (fr. 52.64-5), as might be suggested in
*Laws* 10 (896e) (cf. Plutarch, *De animae procreatione in
Timaeo* 1014D). However, Calcidius' text, which preserves this
view of Numenius, suggests instead that matter is not animated by, but
somehow simply is the evil world soul, that is, matter has life of its
own (fr. 52.44-47, 66-67; see Baltes 1975, 247-248
but also Deuse, 1983, 68-73, Phillips 2002, 237). This is
presumably because a soul, if it animates anything, cannot be really
evil in doing so, as it is the principle of life. And life is one kind
of order and thus good (see Waszink 1966, 68-9, Baltes 1975,
250-251, Frede 1987, 1053). The fact that for Numenius matter is
bad, however, does not necessarily entail that the material world is
also bad, as Dillon (1977, 369) suggests, associating Numenius with
the Gnostic idea of an evil world. It actually seems that quite the
opposite is the case: for Numenius the world is good because it is
ordered due to the dominance of the highest principle, the Good.




Now, for Platonists only intelligible entities can account for order
which amounts to goodness. A Platonic Form, for instance, is
responsible for the ordered existence of the physical things it is the
Form of. A soul too accounts for the existence of living things, such
as animals. Since the world has an order of its own as a single
well-ordered whole, there must be such an intelligible entity that
accounts for the world's order, wherein its goodness or orderliness
lies (*kosmos*). Being the source of this comprehensive
goodness, this must itself be surpassingly good (frs. 16.14-15,
19, 20). Platonists tended to identify this principle with the Form
of the Good in the *Republic* (508e), which is the source of
all being. It was also traditional among them to think of this
principle as a divine one or unit--God.




Numenius, then, distinguishes two sources of reality, or two
ontological principles, God-the Good and matter (inspired by
*Timaeus* 47e-48a and Aristotle's report about Plato's
principles in *Metaphysics* 988a7-15). Yet the crucial
question for Numenius was how one should think about this divine
principle, the Good, what kind of God this is. Numenius' position on
this has much to do with his view on matter. Numenius advocates a
strong dualistic position. In this he is like Plutarch and later
Atticus follows them. Numenius' dualism is different from that of
most contemporary Pythagoreans we know of, like those referred to by
Alexander Polyhistor (in Diogenes Laertius VIII.25), by Sextus
Empiricus (*Against the Mathematicians* X.261-2), by
Nicomachus of Gerasa (*Theologia Arithmetike* in
Photius, *Bibliotheca* cod. 187, 143a24), by Eudorus
(Simplicius, *In Physica* 181.10-30) and by Moderatus
(Porphyry, *On Matter* in Simplicius, *In Physica*
231.6-24). Those Pythagoreans postulated God or One, on the one
hand, and matter or the indefinite dyad, on the other, but they
maintained that God or One is the ultimate principle of everything
(Simplicius, *In Physica*. 7.1-30); from this matter came
into existence through the total privation of form
(ibid. 231.7-9). Numenius appears to be reacting against this
view, which is associated specifically with Moderatus
(fr. 52.15-23; see Kahn 2001, 133). Numenius rejects Moderatus'
view in favor of his own dualistic position, presumably because he
wants to avoid the implication of the monistic position that God is
the source of what is bad. This concern seems also to motivate
Numenius to distance God from matter as much as possible. He thus
distinguishes the divine demiurge, who creates the physical world by
imposing order on matter, from the highest God. This highest God is
metaphysically above the demiurge (frs. 16, 17, 19-21) in the
sense that the highest God, which Numenius also calls the first
intellect (fr. 20.12), is inert (fr. 12.13, 15.2) and utterly simple
(fr. 11.11-14), qualifies as being itself (*auto on*;
fr. 17.4) and the source of being (fr. 16.4-5, 9), while the
demiurge is the source of generation (fr. 16.5); the highest God is
absolute goodness (frs. 16.4, 9-10, 20.12), identical with the
Form of the Good (fr. 20.5, 11). Unlike the Form of the Good in
*Republic* VI, however, that is beyond being, Numenius' first
God is being, and indeed the source of it. This is not at odds with
the *Republic*, however, since several passages in it describe
the Good as being (518c9, 526e3-4, 532c5-6; see Burnyeat 2005,
154-155). Numenius apparently takes stance in a debate among
Platonists as to whether the first principle is being or beyond being
(Origen, *Against Celsus* IV.64.14-28). Numenius actually
describes the First God as being (*ho on*), a phrase that
alludes to Exodus 3.14 (fr. 13.4). This Biblical reference has been
much debated and a number of alterations of the text have been
proposed (see Dodds 1960, 15-16, Baltes 1975, 262, Dillon 1977, 368,
Tarrant 1979, Edwards 1989). None of these proposals is however
convincing since Numenius frequently designates the first God as being
(frs. 5.5-14, 6.7-8, 8.2; see Whittaker 1978, Edwards 1990b, 21-22,
and also Burnyeat 2005, 149-162). Yet this first God that is
identified with being and absolute goodness, remains "alone,
isolated, abandoned" (fr. 2.9),which suggests that this God,
like Plotinus' One, is ineffable and incomprehensible (see Whittaker,
1993). Numenius thus sets himself apart from those Platonists who
identified the divine demiurge of the *Timaeus* with the Form
of the Good of *Republic* VI (508e), but his view is adopted by
Alcinous (*Didascalicus* ch. 10, 164.27-165.16 Hermann),
who must be writing some decades later than Numenius.



Numenius faces two challenges. First, how can the first God be the
ultimate cause of everything, as it appears it ought to be
(fr. 16.1-2, 9), if it is inert? Second how can it be simple, as
Numenius has claimed, if it is, as he has also claimed, an intellect
that thinks? Numenius maintains that the first or highest God, or
first intellect, brings about a second one (frs. 13, 21.7), in fact
the divine demiurge, and uses this second intellect as an instrument
of its thinking (fr. 22.1-2). It is not clear what this
instrumental use (*proschresis* fr. 22.2) amounts to, but
we find similar vocabulary in the *Timaeus* (28a7) for the use
of the Forms by the demiurge. It is clearer however that the second
intellect thinks of the Forms and creates by imposing them on matter
(fr. 18.10). Numenius is inspired again by the *Timaeus*. On
the basis of *Timaeus* 39e7-9 he believes that the demiurge
encompasses all Forms in him. To the extent that all other Forms exist
by participating in the Form of the Good (frs. 16.2-5,
46b-c), which is identical with the first intellect, this
intellect accounts also for the (other) Forms (Frede 1987,
1060-1063), while it is the second god who actually thinks of
them. The first intellect thinks only itself, like the Aristotelian
God of *Metaphysics Lambda*, and in this sense its being and
its object of thought are identical. Hence the first God remains
absolutely simple, pure goodness, is at rest and inert, while the
second god is in motion (fr. 15.3-4), is not simple, because it
contains the Forms of all entities, and is good only because of its
relation to the first God, the Form of the Good, a relation which
Numenius describes as "imitation" (fr. 16.15), or as
"participation" (frs. 19.9-11, 20.7-10). This,
however, does not mean that Numenius considers the demiurge to be
ignorant and a less than good creator and in this sense like the
demiurge of the Gnostics, as Dillon (1977, 369) has argued. Although
clearly the demiurge is not as good as the first God, however, for
Numenius the demiurge is a recipient of the goodness of the highest
God, the Good, and in turn transmits this goodness to the world which
it brings into existence (frs. 14,16, 19). In this respect Numenius'
demiurge is clearly different from the creator god of the
Gnostics.



Yet creation is a process which, according to the *Timaeus*,
can be divided into two stages, the demiurgic intellect's thinking of
the Forms of all entities and its imposing them on matter. Numenius
maintains that the demiurgic intellect, the second god in his
hierarchy, splits into two when engaged in the creation in the world,
because matter, which is required for and involved in creation, is
such that it divides whatever has anything to do with it. One reason
why matter divides is because it inspires desire in the demiurge (fr.
11.13-16), presumably desire for imposing order and goodness. As
a result, the demiurge is divided into one intellect which continues
contemplating the Forms and another which imposes Forms on matter and
thus orders matter (frs. 11.14-20, 16.10-12,
21.4-5). This means that the demiurgic intellect engages in
creation through a third god, that is a third intellect
(frs. 21.3-5, 22.4), which is thinking in a discursive way
(*dianooumenon*; fr. 22.4), not in the purely contemplative way
that the demiurgic intellect thinks. This third god is conceived along
the lines of the world-soul of the *Timaeus*; it is perhaps
fair to say that for Numenius the god that actually engages in
creation is in effect the world-soul of Plato's *Timaeus*
(Baltes 1975, 267). Numenius uses very metaphorical language, inspired
by the myth of Plato's *Statesman*, in order to present what
the demiurge does and how it thinks in doing it. He argues that it is
like a helmsman steering a ship using the Forms as instrument (fr. 18
with *Statesman* 272e; cf. *Timaeus* 39e). Despite the
metaphorical language, two things become reasonably clear. First, this
intellect, the world-soul, is also active in preserving order and
maintaining the world in existence (frs. 12.14-19, 18,
52.91-8). Secondly, the third god desires to create
(fr. 11.16-20, 18.7-13), which amounts to saying that God,
in the person of this third intellect, wants to impose order in the
world because order is good (see Deuse 1983, 65-67). Since this
third intellect is directly responsible for the existence of the
world, it is ultimately not distinguishable from the world itself
(fr. 21.3), which according to *Timaeus* 34b1 is god, because
it is this which keeps the world together (see also Tarrant 1979).



There is a question of how to understand Numenius' hierarchy of three
gods. Should we take seriously Proclus' testimonies that suggest there
are in fact three (frs. 21-22), or the fragments of Numenius
preserved by Eusebius which suggest that there are actually only two
(frs. 15-16, 20)? The question becomes accentuated in view of
Numenius' statement that the second and third gods are one, using the
verb "to be" in the singular (*estin*; fr.
11.14-15) in referring to them together. Frede (1987,
1057-1059) has argued convincingly that the unity of the two
does not mean their identity. The demiurge is split into two because
of the effect of matter. The second god is divisible in the same way
that some other intelligible entities, such as human and animal soul,
are (fr. 41.6). Soul remains essentially the same in all animate
beings and yet is divided, in the process of ensoulment of the things
that it makes animate. This is the case with the demiurge as
well. That Numenius proposed a hierarchy of three distinct gods,
rather than two (thus Holzhausen 1992, 253-254), or three
aspects of one god (Kramer 1964, 88), is strengthened by the fact
that Christians like Origen and Eusebius, being Trinitarians, approve
of his theology.



Numenius' three gods are the principles of being (first God) and
generation (second and third god; fr. 16), and thus of everything that
exists. And because the highest god is absolute goodness, the world of
generation becomes good and beautiful (fr. 16.16-17). Numenius
advanced the idea that goodness is transmitted from the highest God
through the second, demiurgic intellect, which realizes creation
through a third intellect, to the world without God actually doing
anything (fr. 14.6-14), an idea further developed later by
Plotinus (cf. *Enneads* I.6, III.8, V.8).


## 4. Psychology




Like most contemporary Platonists, Numenius was much preoccupied with
the status of soul and its relation to body. First, some fragments
from Numenius' treatise *On the Good* (frs. 2-4) show
clearly that the treatment of the soul was extensive in this
work. Secondly, Numenius' views on the soul are discussed by several
later Platonists, including Porphyry, Iamblichus, Damascius, and
Calcidius, while they can arguably be detected in Macrobius' *In
Somnium Scipionis*. The main reason for Numenius' strong interest
in the soul, especially the human soul, must have been one which can
be detected also in Plotinus: the soul-body relation is paradigmatic
for the relation between intelligible and sensible reality in general.
The former is an instance of the latter, which means that we cannot
grasp the one independently from the other. Indeed Numenius' views on
soul and its relation to body square well with his views on the
relation between intelligible and sensible reality.



Porphyry reports that Numenius speaks of two souls, a rational and a
non-rational one (Porphyry in Stobaeus I.350.25-351.1 Wachsmuth;
fr. 44), while Philoponus (*In de anima* 9.35-38; fr. 47)
suggests that Numenius may have distinguished also a third kind of
soul, namely a vegetative one (*phytikon*). To begin with
Porphyry's testimony, this is somewhat confusing because it does not
make clear that Numenius distingushes two kinds of soul and not two
souls in man (as Merlan 1967, 103 claims), while it groups Numenius
together with those Platonists who distinguish parts of the soul
(reason, spirit, and appetite). This, however, is a different matter
from that of distinguishing different kinds of soul for different
kinds of living thing, although both distinctions can be held by a
Platonist, and possibly also by Numenius. Further evidence, though,
corroborates the conclusion that Numenius did distinguish at least two
kinds of soul, a rational one for humans and gods, and a nonrational
one for animals. The distinction of a third kind of soul for plants,
though less well attested, is perfectly possible given the testimony
of *Timaeus* 77b and given Numenius' reliance on the
*Timaeus*. Porphyry himself states that according to Numenius
the rational soul has an "assenting faculty" which
motivates all actions (fr. 45). This reference to assent suggests that
Numenius operates with a notion of reason similar to that of the
Stoics and that, like the Stoics, he considers souls of human adults
to be nothing but reason. This view, though, does have Platonic
credentials, arguably going back to Socrates as he appears in the
*Protagoras*. This may explain why other Platonists
contemporary with Numenius, such as Celsus (Origen, *Against
Celsus* VIII.49), also endorse it. This picture is confirmed by
Iamblichus' testimony, which suggests that there is a fundamental
opposition between Numenius' two kinds of soul (*On the Soul*
in Stobaeus I.374.21-375-18 Wachsmuth, fr. 43.4-5), namely that
the human soul, being rational or intellectual, is in its essence that
of gods (fr. 41.15-6; Kahn 2001, 130-1), while that of
other animals, being essentially non rational, is not. For Numenius
the human soul is of the kind of the divine soul, namely an immortal
intellect (fr. 31.25-6), and in this sense human souls have
divine origin (fr. 52.73-5).



Apparently Numenius sides with those (notably the Stoics) who believe
that possessing reason makes a soul fundamentally different from souls
devoid of reason, and that this is crucial both for the status of the
soul as such as well as for its relation to the body and perhaps also
for the related bodily functions. For Numenius functions of this kind,
such as perception, memory, and desire, are not essential to the soul
and are later additions to it (fr. 43.7-9), coming into
existence with its embodiment. Numenius apparently held that the human
soul is an intellect that descended to human bodies through the
planets (fr. 12.14-16). This is a view that also Celsus shared
(Origen, *Against Celsus* VI.21; see Frede 1994, 5211), which
we can find also in Hermetic treatises (*Corpus Hermeticum*. I.25;
Dodds 1960, 8). Furthermore, Origen also adopts the view that the
human soul is essentially an intellect that falls in bodies and then
becomes a soul with the necessary faculties to operate within a human
body, yet the soul retains the ability to ascend and become an
intellect again (*On Principles* I.4.1, I.8.1, II.6.4,
II.9.7). Numenius arrives at this view guided by the analogy of the
Cave and the story of Er in *Republic* VII and X respectively,
but also by the description of the creation of the soul in
the *Timaeus* (41e), according to which the demiurge mounts the
souls on vehicles (*ochemata*). Porphyry in his
work *The Cave of Nymphs* makes clear that he relies on
Numenius' exegesis of the soul's descent to bodies through the planets
(frs. 30-33) and speaks of the honey offered by the astrologists
in anticipation of the future pleasures of the souls in earth
(fr. 32). Apparently pleasures draw the soul towards the earth and
also keep it attached to it.



Further light is shed in Macrobius' long account about the descent of
the soul from the sky to the earth (*In Somnium Scipionis*
1.12; test. 47 Leemans, omitted by Des Places), which at least to some
extent must be drawn from Numenius (thus Dodds 1960, 8-10
against Beutler 1940, 676-677; the extent of Macrobius' debt to
Numenius is debated by Elferink 1968, Ley 1972, Baltes 1975,
252-3, Deuse 1983, 72-73). According to Macrobius' story
of the soul's descent from heaven to earth, the soul acquires a number
of capacities necessary for its functions in a body as it goes through
the planets, such as the capacity of theoretical thinking
(*logistikon*) in Saturn, that of practical thinking
(*praktikon*) in Jupiter, the spirited aspect (*thumos*)
in Mars, the perceptual capacity (*aisthetikon*) and
imagination (*phantastikon*) in the Sun, appetite
(*orektikon*) in Venus, the linguistic capacity
(*hermeneutikon*) in Mercury, and finally the vegetative
functions (*phutikon*) in the Moon. As Frede (1987, 1072) has
argued, the capacities acquired in the seven planetary spheres
correspond to the seven parts of the soul according to the Stoics. It
is crucial to stress that these acquired capacities neither are
essential to soul nor do they change what the soul actually is, i.e.
intellect (fr. 42). They rather are, as Iamblichus reports, causes of
evil (*On the Soul* in Stobaeus I.374.21-375.18;
fr. 43.7-9), as the soul loses its simplicity and purity. Yet
the evil is not due (or not only due) to the capacities themselves,
but rather to the accumulation of astral matter while the soul
descends through the planets. This is confirmed by the testimony of
Iamblichus according to which Numenius,
 Cronius,[1]
 and Harpocration
consider all embodiments to be invariably bad (fr. 48.10-14) and
is compatible with Numenius' view that matter is the source of all
that is bad (see above, Metaphysics; cf. Dillon 1977, 375-376, Zambon
2002, 213-221).



When the soul is released from the body at death, then it remains only
what it is essentially, namely intellect (fr. 35.21-26). If this
is so, then for Numenius only the intellect is immortal. This however
conflicts with the report of Damascius (*In Phaedonem* I.177
Westerink; fr. 46a Des Places, wrongly attributed to Olympiodorus),
according to which Numenius maintained that not only the essence of
the soul, the intellect, is immortal, but also "the ensouled
condition" survives death, that is, the sum of all other psychic
capacities (the ones connected to bodily functions), and also with the
report of Philoponus (*In de anima* 3.35-38; fr. 47),
according to which Numenius follows Plato's *Phaedrus* (245c)
in maintaining that "all soul is immortal" (Baltes 1975,
245-246, Deuse 1983, 77). The immortality of the entire soul
though would be incompatible with the story of the soul's descent,
according to which the rest of the psychic capacities is acquired and
not originally present in the soul. Yet Numenius possibly
distinguished between the immortality of the intellect, and the
immortality for the rest of the psychic capacities. The intellect is
immortal in the sense that it always lives, while the irrational part
of the soul is immortal in that it survives death as its constituent
capacities dissolve gradually into the spheres from which they were
originated. This is also the view that Porphyry later takes (in
Stobaeus 1.384.19-28, Porphyry fr. 453 Smith), who may well
follow Numenius on this (see Smith 1974, 56-68, Karamanolis
2006, 292). For Numenius the soul is immortal strictly speaking only
in its essence, that is as intellect, being free from body, even the
astral body or matter accumulated during its descent. Numenius
maintains that the human rational soul may continue to live in other
bodies and these may also be bodies of animals if the soul becomes bad
during its bodily life (fr. 49; cf. Alcinous, *Didascalicus*
178.26-179.39 Hermann). Presumably such a life is a form of
punishment. 


## 5. Influence




Numenius had a powerful influence on contemporary and later
philosophers, pagans and Christians alike. His impact was particularly
pronounced on Plotinus and on many Platonists of Plotinus'
generation. It is possible that Numenius exercised some influence
already on Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus and the Christian
Origen (see Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 69-72 Matthaei;
fr. 4b), given that all of Ammonius' students about whom we know
anything show respect for and knowledge of Numenius' thought despite
their disagreements on specific topics in Platonist philosophy. The
main issue which divides Ammonius and his followers from Numenius is
the number of the intelligible principles. The pagan Origen, another
student of Ammonius, is a rigorous monist, holding that the supreme
god is also the creator of the universe (Porphyry, *Life of
Plotinus* 3.32, Proclus, *Platonic Theology* II.4.9-22;
see Saffrey-Westerink,
*Proclus Theologie Platonicienne* vol. II, X-XX).
Longinus, who studied both with Ammonius and the Christian Origen
(Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 20.36-37), apparently also
committed himself to this kind of metaphysical monism (Proclus, *In
Timaeum* I.322.18-26; Longinus fr. 60 Mannlein-Robert,
538-540), possibly in reaction to Numenius, whose work he
reportedly knew well (Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus*
20.74-76). Also well acquainted with Numenius' philosophy was
Cronius, Numenius' contemporary (frs. 46b 48), as well as Atticus (see
Life and Work). Numenius' work was particularly appreciated by the
early Christians. The Christian Origen was reportedly a keen reader of
the works of Numenius as he was of Plato and of Pythagoreans other
than Numenius, like Moderatus and Nicomachus
(Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* VI.19.8). Indeed Origen has an
impressive knowledge of Numenius' work. This becomes evident in that
he often cites verbatim from it in his *Against Celsus* (I.15;
fr. 1b, IV.51; fr. 1c, 10, V.57; fr. 29, V.38; fr. 53), which is
remarkable given that Origen normally cites only from Scripture (see
Kritikos, 2007, 406-7). The practice of quoting verbatim from
Numenius' work is inherited by Eusebius, who has preserved more
fragments of Numenius than any other ancient author.



There are three reasons accounting for such a strong approval of
Numenius by the early Christians. First, Numenius is rare among his
contemporaries in showing respect for the Jewish tradition (frs. 1a-c,
8, 9); he is attested to speak of the religion of the Jews claiming
that their God is incorporeal (*Against Celsus* I.15; fr. 1b),
he is also reported as being a reader who practiced allegorical
interpretation of the statements of Moses and the prophets of the Old
Testament (ibid. IV.51; fr. 1c). Moreover, Numenius famously states
that Plato is like Moses speaking Attic Greek (fr. 8.13; see Whittaker
1967, Edwards 1990a), he even alludes to Jesus and he also speaks of
Moses and Egyptian sages (fr. 10a). Such attention to the Jewish
tradition is important for the early Christian theologians and
apologists who want to establish the superiority of the
Jewish-Christian tradition against that of the pagan culture. This
attention however is not motivated by historical concerns on the part
of Numenius but rather by philosophical ones. Numenius wanted to show
that the Jewish nation must be counted among the ancient ones that
have a share in *logos* and also that Moses had a conception of
the first principle similar to that of Plato, since both identified
God with being (see Burnyeat 2005, 155-156). Secondly, Numenius'
doctrine of three divine principles of reality can be read as
analogous to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. To the extent that
Numenius is an exegete of Plato, Christians feel entitled to claim
that Plato in the 2nd Letter foreshadows the doctrine of
the Trinity, and use this argument to try to convince the pagans that
Christianity is not something new but was anticipated in the best
parts of the pagan philosophical tradition (Eusebius,
*Prep. Ev*. XI.praef. 3, XI.20.1-3; see Kritikos 2007,
407-9). Origen in particular was inspired by Numenius'
distinction between the first God and the immediate agent of creation,
a second, creator god, a distinction which is meant to preserve the
immutability of the highest God (Origen, *Against Celsus*
VII.42-44, *Commentary on John* I.6.35; Kritikos 2007,
409-416). Finally, Numenius is valuable for the argument which
Eusebius makes in his *Preparatio Evangelica* that the pagan
philosophers disagree with each other and do not stick to what
Eusebius considers the best part of Greek philosophy, which is Plato's
philosophy (see above, Numenius' Platonism).



The extent of Numenius' influence on Plotinus was debated in
antiquity. Plotinus' students, Amelius and Porphyry, were concerned to
discredit the widespread charge of Plotinus' plagiarism of Numenius
(*Life of Plotinus* 18.1-8, 21.1-9). Amelius, who
is attested to have known Numenius' work by heart (ibid.
3.44-5), devoted a special work on this topic, *On the
Difference Between the Doctrines of Plotinus and Those of
Numenius* (ibid. 17.1-6). Porphyry discusses the matter
extensively in his biography of Plotinus (ibid. 17-18,
21.1-9), making reference to Amelius' work mentioned above as
well as to Longinus' claim that Plotinus' works were far superior in
terms of precision to Numenius', Cronius', Moderatus', and Thrasyllus'
(ibid. 20.71-76, 21.5-9). Clearly, however, several of
Plotinus' views resemble those of Numenius: both distinguish three
intelligible principles, both consider matter to be evil, although
Plotinus does not raise it into a principle (see *Ennead* I.8),
and both consider the soul to be essentially an intellect.




Amelius and Porphyry themselves are also much influenced by Numenius'
philosophy, as later Platonists point out. Amelius follows Numenius in
maintaining that not only sensible entities but also intelligible ones
participate in intelligibles (Syrianus, *In Metaphysica*
109.12-14; fr. 46b). Porphyry also relies much on Numenius
especially in his doctrine of the soul (e.g.
 *Ad Gaurum* 34.20-35; fr. 36), to the extent that he is
explicitly accused by Proclus of taking over Numenius' views (on
demons, *In Timaeum* I.76.30-77.23; fr. 37; see Waszink
1966, Zambon 2002, ch. 4).



Numenius' influence goes beyond the contemporaries of Plotinus.
Iamblichus, Proclus, Syrianus, Philoponus and Damascius also draw on
his work, although not always with approval (see
frs. 46a-51). Numenius was also used by Calcidius in his commentary on
the *Timaeus* (297.7-301.20 Waszink; fr. 52; see Phillips
2003) and by Macrobius in his *In Somnium Scipionis*
(frs. 54-55), a work that exerted considerable influence in the
Middle Ages.