## 1. Hutcheson's Metaethics



Hutcheson's most detailed statement of his sentimentalism and
substantive moral and aesthetic theory is to be found in his 1725 (and
subsequently revised) work, *An Inquiry into the Original of our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. Indeed, at least in early editions of
the *Inquiry*, Hutcheson considered this essay an attempt to
defend the (broadly considered) sentimentalist doctrines of Lord
Shaftesbury, as expressed in the *Characteristiks of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times* (1711). Indeed, the subtitle of the book's
first edition runs as follows: 



> 
> 
> In which the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are
> Explain'd and Defended, against the Author of the *Fable of
> the Bees:* and the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil are
> establish'd, according to the Sentiments of the Antient
> Moralists. With an Attempt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation in
> Subjects of Morality. (*Inquiry*)
> 
> 
> 



The reference to Mandeville is significant here. In the
*Inquiry*, Hutcheson considered it his task to defend, not the
exact details of Shaftesbury's scheme, but rather his general
sentimentalism against the "self-interest" theories of
Mandeville and Thomas Hobbes. But leaving aside his rejection of
self-interest theorists for the moment (see
 SS2.1),
 what is the nature of Hutcheson's overall metaethic?


### 1.1 The Senses



In the *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*,
Hutcheson defines his sentimentalism in the following terms: 



> 
> 
> "Objects, Actions, or Events obtain the Name of *Good*,
> or *Evil*, according as they are Causes, or Occasions,
> mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful
> *Perception* to some sensitive Nature". To understand
> therefore the several Kinds of *Good*, or *Evil*, we
> must apprehend the several *Senses* natural to us.
> (*Essay*, 15) 
> 
> 
> 



This passage reveals a number of features of Hutcheson's
sentimentalism. First, he admits of a wide variety of what might be
called evaluative *modes*: there are several kinds of good or
evil, according to Hutcheson, which arise given the "grateful or
ungrateful" perceptions in people, or other "sensitive
Natures". These evaluative modes will correspond to the various
senses that are apt to receive such perceptions.



But what, for Hutcheson, is a "sense"? (For a very
thorough introduction, see Schmitter 2016.) In the *Essay*, he
defines this notion as follows: 



> 
> 
> *every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on
> our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain*.
> (*Essay*, 17) 
> 
> 
> 



Now, this account of the nature of senses permits of a fairly broad
range--any "determination" of our mind to receive
ideas involuntarily is to be understood as a sense. And, indeed,
Hutcheson takes this breadth seriously. He recognizes not just the
"five senses"--which he dubs "external"
senses (*Inquiry*, I.X; *Essay* I.1)--but a broad
range of "internal" senses. Hutcheson writes: 



> 
> 
> In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct
> Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a good Ear; and
> the like distinction we should probably acknowledge in other Objects,
> had we also got distinct Names to denote these Powers of Perception
> by. (*Inquiry*, I.X) 
> 
> 
> 



For Hutcheson, the ideas, and pleasures, received *via* the
"good ear"--as opposed to the simple external sense
of hearing--are the products of an *internal* sense.



Indeed, in Hutcheson's psychology, we get a very wide array of
internal "senses". While this is not an exhaustive list,
he lists or at least suggests senses of:



> 
> 1. Imagination (*Essay*, 17) or "Beauty and
> Harmony" (*Inquiry*, 23) ("the *Pleasant
> Perceptions* arising from *regular, harmonious, uniform*
> Objects; as also from *Grandeur* and *Novelty*";
> *Essay*, 17).
> 2. the "Publick Sense" ("our Determination to be
> pleased with the *Happiness* of others, and to be uneasy at
> their *Misery*"; *Essay*, 17).
> 3. The Moral Sense ("by which we perceive *Virtue*, or
> *Vice* in our selves, or others"; *Essay*,
> 17).
> 4. The "Sense of Honour" ("which makes the
> *Approbation* or *Gratitude* of others, for any good
> Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of Pleasure; and their
> *Dislike*, *Condemnation*, or *Resentment* of
> Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called
> *Shame*, even when we fear no further evil from them";
> *Essay*, 18).
> 5. The sense of "decency or dignity" (by which we take
> pleasure in actions or activities that are specifically adapted to
> human nature; *System*, 27-30; *Essay*, 18).
> 
> 
> 



In Hutcheson's psychology there is a key difference between the
external and internal senses. According to Hutcheson, the external
senses have the power to perceive *simple* ideas--notes,
colors, sounds, tastes, etc. (*Inquiry*, 23). But the
*internal* senses are those, according to Hutcheson, that arise
"only upon some *previous* Idea, or *Assemblage*,
or *Comparison of Ideas*" (*Essay*, 15-16).
The internal senses, then, will proliferate under Hutcheson's
general account--any capacity to generate pleasure or pain
involuntarily given the comparison of ideas will, on Hutcheson's
view, be a sense. And hence it should not at all be surprising that
Hutcheson gives the diverse accounting of senses that he does.



However, despite there being a difference, in Hutcheson, between the
external and internal senses concerning their operation on simple or
complex ideas, they are nevertheless justly grouped together
*as* senses:



> 
> 
> Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what
> are commonly called the External Senses are the same; since the most
> accurate Knowledge of what the External Senses discover, often does
> not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a good
> Taste will enjoy at once without much Knowledge; we may justly use
> another Name of these higher, and more delightful Perceptions of
> Beauty and Harmony, and call the power of receiving such Impressions,
> an Internal Sense...This superior Power of Perception is justly
> called a Sense, because of its Affinity to other Senses in this, that
> the Pleasure does not arise from any Knowledge of Principles,
> Proportions, Causes or of the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us
> at first with the Idea of Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge
> increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it may super-add a distinct
> rational Pleasure from prospects of Advantage, or from the Increase of
> Knowledge. (*Inquiry*, 24-25)
> 
> 
> 



Here Hutcheson appears to be defending his use of the term
"sense" to describe the internal senses as well as the
external. According to Hutcheson, the fundamental similarity is the
generation of pleasures and ideas *immediately*, without
intervening cognitive work--the sense of taste "strikes us
at first with the Idea of Beauty", along with its accompanying
pleasure.


### 1.2 Senses and Evaluative Modes



According to Hutcheson's metaethic, evaluations are specifically
linked to the senses, in particular the internal senses. So, for
instance, aesthetic goodness will be determined (in a sense to be
discussed in
 SS1.3)
 by the operation of the sense of imagination. Honorable actions will
be determined by the operation of the sense of honor. Morally good
actions will be determined by the operation of the moral sense, and so
on. But one might wonder whether there is such a ready distinction
between the internal senses. Given that we can form new ideas given
their comparison, and derive pleasure from them, why believe that
there is such a sharp distinction between, e.g., the sense of
imagination and the moral sense? Put another way, what
*individuates* these senses, sufficient to distinguish
evaluative modes?



Generally, Hutcheson appears to individuate senses by the sorts of
things that generate the particular ideas/pleasures involved. For
instance, he suggests that "Harmony" "denotes our
pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of Sounds"
(*Inquiry* 23). Here we know it is the sense of harmony, rather
than, e.g., the moral sense, because the pleasure we take is given
rise by the "composition of sounds". The pleasures of the
publick sense arise as a result of the consideration of others'
happiness and misery (*Essay*, 17). The pleasures of the sense
of dignity arise from others' assessment of us, and so on.



However, the moral sense has a further characteristic feature that the
other internal senses, and hence other evaluative modes, do not.
Hutcheson's earliest reference to the moral sense runs as
follows:



> 
> 
> [S]ome Actions have to Men an immediate Goodness; ...by a
> superior Sense, which I call a Moral one, we perceive pleasure in the
> Contemplation of such Actions in others, and are determin'd to
> love the Agent, (and much more do we perceive Pleasure in being
> conscious of having done such Actions our selves) without any View of
> further natural Advantage from them. (*Inquiry*, 88)
> 
> 
> 



Here it appears that Hutcheson holds that the moral sense is that
which takes pleasure *in actions*. But it is also the case that
the moral sense, aside from a distinctive input, as it were, maintains
a distinctive *output*: love of the agent. Later editions of
the *Inquiry* also identify this output as "the simple
ideas of Approbation and Condemnation" (*Inquiry*,
217n45) (see Darwall 1995: 210).



But it would appear that, for Hutcheson, the senses--and with
them the evaluative modes--are distinguished by the object
sortals to which they apply.


### 1.3 Semantics and Moral Ontology



Given Hutcheson's insistence that the operation of our various
senses "determines" the various evaluative modes,
it's clear that he is marked out as a sentimentalist in some
form or other. But how should we understand Hutcheson's
sentimentalism more precisely? Several questions arise.



First, we might ask a semantic question. Can we take Hutcheson, in
expressing his view, to be a proto-non-cognitivist? In other words, is
it the case that when people make moral utterances, they are simply
expressing their attitudes? Second, we might ask an ontological or
metaphysical question. Can we take Hutcheson to regard his moral
metaphysics as response-dependent (i.e., that moral properties just
are the properties of eliciting certain responses), or is his view
compatible (or does it even express) some kind of realism about moral
properties?



Let's begin with the question of whether Hutcheson is a
non-cognitivist. Now, of course, much depends on what one means by
this. But for the purpose of fixing our discussion, treat
non-cognitivism as a sematic thesis, according to which moral terms do
not refer to specific properties or objects, but are rather the
expression of a particular non-cognitive (such as conative, affective,
and so on) attitude. And, indeed, there are some who read Hutcheson in
just this way. Perhaps most famously, William Frankena writes:



> 
> 
> As I read Hutcheson, then, his position is this: in passing moral
> approbation as such on an action I am not cognizing and ascribing any
> identifiable property of goodness, etc., in or to the action, and I am
> not cognizing or asserting any fact about the actual or possible
> reactions of any spectators to the action. I am simply feeling a
> unique sort of pleasure in contemplating the action, and I am
> *expressing* this feeling by my verbal utterance, perhaps also
> expressing (but not asserting) a conviction that others will feel this
> pleasure if similarly situated, and almost certainly intending to
> evoke similar feelings in my hearers. That is, my moral approbation as
> such is wholly non-cognitive, very much as it is on Ayer's more
> recent view, except that Ayer does not bring in a unique unacquired
> moral sense as the source of the feelings involved. (Frankena 1955:
> 372)
> 
> 
> 



Why think this? Frankena mentions that Hutcheson specifically notes
that our moral sense is a determination to "receive
pleasure" independently of any further ideas: 



> 
> 
> We are not to imagine, that this moral Sense, more than the other
> senses, supposes any innate Ideas, Knowledge, or practical
> Proposition: We mean by it only a Determination of our Minds to
> receive amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they occur to
> our Observation, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or loss to
> redound to our selves from them. (*Inquiry*, 100) 
> 
> 
> 



Here it would appear that Hutcheson identifies the "amiable or
disagreeable Ideas" as the "immediate Pleasure"
gained as a result of the operation of the moral sense. If so, it
would make some sense to say that Hutcheson holds that when making
moral judgments, one is simply expressing the affective attitudes,
i.e., pleasure, that one gains as a result of the operation of the
moral sense.



However, on balance Hutcheson's text does not permit of this reading.
(For a much more thorough rejection of such a reading, see Darwall
1995: ch. 8; esp. 215-16; Kupperman 1985) Recall again his
passage from the opening of the *Essay*: 



> 
> 
> Objects, Actions, or Events obtain the Name of *Good*, or
> *Evil*, according as they are the Causes, or Occasions,
> mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful
> *Perception* to some sensitive Nature. 
> 
> 
> 



Hutcheson does not claim that the property, say,
"goodness", or our expressions of such a property just
*are* expressions of our sensitive responses to such objects.
But, rather, the property of goodness identified in such objects is
the property of being a "Cause or Occasion" of such
reactions. A similar thought is expressed in the opening passages of
the *Inquiry*: 



> 
> 
> The Word Moral Goodness, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea of some
> Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love
> toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action.
> (*Inquiry*, 85) 
> 
> 
> 



Frankena dismisses this passage by noting that Hutcheson, in the next
sentence, holds that these are "Imperfect Descriptions"
(Frankena 1955: 368). But Hutcheson does not believe that they are
"Imperfect" in the sense of being
*incorrect*--rather, he holds that these descriptions are
imperfect in the sense requiring additional evidence and argument,
i.e., 



> 
> 
> until we discover whether we really have such Ideas, and what general
> Foundation there is in Nature for this Difference of actions, as
> morally Good or Evil.
> 
> 
> 



Thus it seems that we shouldn't accept that Hutcheson is a
non-cognitivist in the sense meant by Frankena. For Hutcheson, moral
goodness (and, presumably, the other evaluative modes) refers to
particular properties. However, at this point we may wish to turn to
the nature of these properties. What sort of property is moral
goodness or evil? The key question is the manner in which the moral
sense "determines" moral distinctions (Radcliffe 1986).
Though this is a bit of a coarse-grained division, one could
distinguish what we might call "constitutive
sentimentalism", according to which the property referred to by
the term "good" just is the property of causing the
relevant sentiments in observers. Contrast this with "epistemic
sentimentalism", according to which the properties referred to
by the term "good" are independent of the moral sense, but
it is nevertheless the operation of the moral sense that allows us to
ascertain or recognize these properties (Raphael 1947).



Indeed, it is not immediately clear from the *Inquiry* how we
are to read Hutcheson on this matter. As already quoted, he holds that
the moral sense is the source of the *ideas* of moral good and
bad (*Inquiry* 86). But this would appear to be neutral
concerning whether Hutcheson is a constitutive or epistemic
sentimentalist. However, the passage from the *Essay* is less
ambiguous. As noted, he holds that objects, actions, and so on
"obtain the name *Good*" insofar as they are
*causes* of the relevant perceptions (*Essay*, 15). And
hence this would appear to be a constitutive sentimentalism: moral
properties just are those properties that cause a particular
sentimental reaction. On this reading (or so it would seem), if our
psychology were different, then it may be that those things that
"procure Approbation" would be substantially different
than what they are now. This consequence was a key contemporary
criticism of Hutcheson. John Balguy, for instance, writes 



> 
> 
> In the *first* place, it seems an insuperable difficulty in our
> author's scheme, that virtue appears in it to be of an arbitrary
> and positive nature, as entirely depending upon *instincts*,
> that might originally have been otherwise, or even contrary to what
> they now are, and may be at any time altered or inverted, if the
> Creator pleases. (Balguy 1728 [BM: 390])
> 
> 
> 



However, there are two further points worth making here, as we come to
understand Hutcheson's moral ontology. First, even if it were
the case that Hutcheson accepted a kind of constitutive
sentimentalism, Hutcheson nevertheless believes that the property of
goodness *could not have been* otherwise. This is for two
reasons. First, Hutcheson believes that our capacity for approbation,
and our capacity to take pleasure in particular actions given the
moral sense is firmly rooted in the universal principles of human
nature:



> 
> 
> But if we call "that *State*, those *Dispositions*
> and *Actions*, *natural*, to which we are inclined by
> some part of our Constitution, antecedently to any *Volition of our
> own*; or which flow from some *Principles* in our Nature,
> not brought upon us by our own *Art*, or that of others;"
> then it may appear, from what has been said above, that "a State
> of *Good-will, Humanity, Compassion, mutual Aid, propagating and
> supporting Offspring, Love of a Community or Country, Devotion, or
> Love and Gratitude to some governing Mind*, is our natural
> State". (*Essay*, 130)
> 
> 
> 



Furthermore, Hutcheson seems to believe that only the fundamental
principles of human nature maintain moral authority. He writes, in the
*Inquiry*:



> 
> 
> All Men seem persuaded of some Excellency in the Possession of good
> moral Qualitys, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on the
> contrary, look upon a State of moral Evil, as worse and more wretched
> than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment in this
> matter from the Actions of Men; for however they may be
> influenc'd by moral Sentiments, yet it is certain, that
> Self-interested Passions frequently overcome them, and partial Views
> of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really morally evil,
> apprehending it to be good. But let us examine the Sentiments which
> Men universally form of the State of others, when they are no way
> immediately concern'd; for in these Sentiments human Nature is
> calm and undisturb'd, and shews its true Face.
> (*Inquiry*, 163-4)
> 
> 
> 



And the root of our moral sentiments in human nature is further
evidence that morality is not, as suggested by Balguy, arbitrary. This
is because, after all, we are created by a benevolent deity (Rauscher
2003). And no benevolent deity would have chosen to impart a
disposition to praise, e.g., ill-will, cruelty, pain, hatred, and so
forth as principles of human nature (*Essay* 132). (Indeed,
this passage reveals a key error in Frankena's criticism of a
"subjectivist", rather than non-cognitivist, approach to
Hutcheson's metaethics. According to Frankena, the subjectivist
view is 



> 
> 
> incomplete. For it should include a statistical investigation into the
> actual or possible incidence of feelings of pleasure or pain at
> contemplating the act in question among the preliminaries to a moral
> judgment. (Frankena 1955: 371) 
> 
> 
> 



But Frankena fails to recognize that Hutcheson *does* conduct
this statistical inquiry. He holds that the sentiments he is
describing are universal principles of human nature, implanted by a
benevolent deity.) Of course, that's not to say that the deity
*couldn't* have made us different than we are
(*Inquiry*, 80; Radcliffe 1986)--just that the deity
*wouldn't* have.



So if Hutcheson is a constitutive sentimentalist, it appears that his
brand of constitutive sentimentalism has at least had some responses
to some common objections. After all, our responses are fixtures of
human nature, so there needn't be any sort of problematic
contingency in the application of moral predicates.



However, there is one slight complication that can and should be
raised for the constitutive interpretation of Hutcheson. (Further to
this discussion, see Kail 2001.) Recall how we distinguish senses,
i.e., *via* their subject matter. Now, as noted before, the
moral sense takes pleasure in actions. But so does, e.g., the sense of
dignity or decency. Of course, this isn't any particular problem
for his account of sense individuation. After all, Hutcheson holds, in
the latter case, that it is the *suitableness to human nature*
upon which the sense of dignity operates. This indicates that whether
an action is suitable to human nature is independent of the operation
of the sense of dignity. But note that Hutcheson also (at least
occasionally) refers to the moral sense as a quality that perceives
and operates upon *virtue and vice* (*Essay*, 17). Now,
were Hutcheson a constitutive sentimentalist, this would create a
serious problem. After all, on a constitutive sentimentalist view,
virtue and vice is logically posterior to the operation of the moral
sense, rendering any attempt at individuating that particular sense
circular. It would appear a better reading to hold that, as a
perceptive quality, the moral sense is perceiving and reacting *to
something*, viz., virtue and vice, telling in favor of an
epistemic rather than constitutive reading of Hutcheson's
sentimentalism.



In further support of an epistemic reading, consider the following
passage from Hutcheson's *A System of Moral Philosophy*.
Here, Hutcheson writes the following:



> 
> 
> Tho' the approbation of moral excellence is a grateful action or
> sensation of the mind, 'tis plain the good approved is not this
> tendency to give us a grateful sensation. As, in approving a beautiful
> form, we refer to the beauty of the object; we do not say that it is
> beautiful because we reap some little pleasure in viewing it, but we
> are pleased in viewing it because it is antecedently beautiful. Thus,
> when we admire the virtue of another, the whole excellence, or that
> quality which by nature we are determined to approve, is conceived to
> be in that other; we are pleased in the contemplation because the
> object is excellent, and the object is not judged to be therefore
> excellent because it gives us pleasure. (*System*, 54; see also
> Norton 1985: 410)
> 
> 
> 



Now, this seems to be a direct rejection of his view, expressed in the
*Essay*, that goodness just is the *cause or occasion*
of a "grateful Perception". Rather, or so it would appear
here, Hutcheson seems to be holding that the goodness is a real
property of the object, which we feel pleasure upon contemplating,
just as beauty is a real property of a particular object, which we
feel pleasure upon seeing or appreciating. This clearly tells in favor
of an epistemic rather than a constitutive sentimentalism.



One might hold that Hutcheson, by the time he wrote the
*System*, had changed his view. Indeed, the
*Essay*'s first edition was published in 1728, and the
*System* was a much later book, left unpublished at the time of
his death. A standard view is that Hutcheson's thinking changed
substantially once we reach the *System* (Carey 2005:
v-vi; Scott 1900: 214). However, this explanation is
somewhat unsatisfactory, for at least one reason. Hutcheson was a
perennial tinkerer. The *Essay* underwent no fewer than three
separate revised editions during Hutcheson's lifetime. The
final, third, edition of the *Essay* was completed and
published in 1742. But the *System*, while it was not published
until after Hutcheson's death in 1755, was substantially
complete by 1737, five years *earlier* than the final revised
edition of the *Essay*. And hence were Hutcheson to have
changed his view concerning the nature of the property of goodness,
one would certainly expect to see this change reflected in the text of
the *Essay*, which was revised as of 1742. But one
doesn't. (This is especially striking given that Hutcheson was
not shy about making very substantive changes in later editions of his
work; this is especially true of the four editions of the
*Inquiry*.)



This, therefore, is an exegetical puzzle. However, progress may be made by reconsidering Hutcheson's passage from the *Essay*. He writes
that objects, etc.,"obtain the Name of *Good*"
given their capacity to cause pleasurable sensations. Notice the word
"obtain". We might read Hutcheson as saying not that the
property of goodness *is* the tendency to cause feelings of
approbation or feelings of pleasure, but rather the property of
goodness is one to which we have access given our feelings of
pleasure, just in the sense that beauty is a property to which we have
access given our feelings of pleasure in contemplation of the
beautiful object. Our feelings of pleasure, in this way, serve to
*fix the reference* of the term "goodness", but do
not constitute the *referent* of that term. In other words,
moral goodness just is the property of XYZ, but we
"apprehend" that property given our affective responses
and the operation of the moral sense. For Hutcheson, the pleasure
generated by the moral sense operates in an analogous way that the
description of an object operates in a causal theory of reference.
"The author of *The Shining*" fixes the reference
of "Stephen King", but the property of *being Stephen
King* is not the property of being the author of *The
Shining*. Similarly, that which has a tendency to cause
approbation fixes the reference of moral goodness, but being the
property of moral goodness is not the same as being the disposition to
cause approbation. For Hutcheson, the property is independent.


### 1.4 Attack on Rationalism



However we understand the ontological status of moral properties in
Hutcheson's sentimentalism, it is clear that Hutcheson made it
his business to insist that the foundation of morality is *not*
to be found in our rational capacities, or capacities for the
determination of truth and reason (see Gill 2006: ch. 12). This put
Hutcheson at odds with his rationalist contemporaries, most
importantly John Balguy, Samuel Clarke, and William Wollaston. In the
*Illustrations on the Moral Sense* (which was published with
the *Essay*), Hutcheson offers a sustained critique of these
authors and other forms of rationalism (cf. *Essay*,
137-155).



At this point, however, it would
do to say a little bit about how rationalism is understood by
Hutcheson's interlocutors. According to Clarke, the virtue
and/or vice of particular actions is determined by the "eternal
relations" of "fitness and unfitness". More
specifically, Clarke writes: 



> 
> 
> there is a fitness or suitableness of certain circumstances to certain
> persons, and an unsuitableness of others; founded in the nature of
> things and the qualifications of persons, antecedent to all positive
> appointment whatsoever; also that from the different relations of
> different person one to another, there necessarily arises a fitness or
> unfitness of certain manners of behaviour of some persons towards
> others: it is as manifest, as that the properties which flow from the
> essences of different mathematical figures, have different congruities
> or incongruities between themselves; or that, in mechanics, certain
> weights or powers have very different forces.... (Clarke 1706
> [BM: 192-3]) 
> 
> 
> 



One way in which this "fitness" seems to work, for Clarke,
is that there is a "fitness" in humans worshiping God;
there is a "fitness" in behaving benevolently toward
others, and so forth. But these "fitnesses" are not known
via, nor are they the product of, any moral *sense*--they
are "eternal and immutable" and are discoverable by
rational inquiry.



Balguy, another rationalist, takes a somewhat different approach.
According to Balguy, 



> 
> 
> VIRTUE, or *moral goodness*, is the conformity of our moral
> actions to the reasons of things. VICE the contrary...The
> CONFORMITY of such actions to REASON, or the RECTITUDE of them, is
> their agreeableness to the nature and circumstances of the agents and
> their objects.--A *social* action is then *right*,
> when it is suitable to the nature and relations of the person
> concerned. Thus a person obliged acts *rightly* and
> *reasonably*, when his actions are answerable to the relation
> of gratitude between him and his benefactor. (Balguy 1728 [BM:
> 398]) 
> 
> 
> 



Finally, Wollaston suggests a different variety of rationalism,
according to which the rightness and wrongness of action is determined
by their interference or otherwise with "truth". Wollaston
writes:



> 
> 
> I lay this down then as as fundamental maxim, *that whoever acts as
> if things were so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are
> so, or not so*; as plainly as he could by words, and with more
> reality...*No act* (whether word or deed) *of any
> being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with
> any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be
> right*...*Every act* therefore *of such a being, as
> is before described, and all those omissions, which interfere with
> truth* (i.e., deny any proposition to be true, which is true; or
> suppose any thing not to be what it is, in any regard) are morally
> evil, in some degree or other: the forbearing such acts, and the
> acting in opposition to such omissions are morally good: and when any
> thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation
> of true, that thing is indifferent. (Wollaston 1724 [BM: 243, 250])
> 
> 
> 



In each case, the rationalist seems to suggest that there are certain
actions that, *antecedent* to our approval of them, or
sentiments toward them, have certain qualities, i.e., they are
reasonable, fit, true, and so forth. However, Hutcheson believes that
all such positions are fundamentally confused. His general line of
attack on rationalism is to disambiguate a number of potential
readings of rationalism, showing that each is either absurd on its
face, or else surreptitiously relies on the existence of a moral sense
or sentiment. "But what", asks Hutcheson, "is this
*Conformity of Actions to Reason*?" (Here he clearly has
in mind the view championed by Balguy.) And here he provides two
possible answers. 



> 
> 
> When we ask the Reason of an Action we sometimes mean, "*What
> truth shews a Quality in the Action, exciting the Agent to do
> it*?" Thus, why does a *Luxurious* Man pursue
> *Wealth*? The Reason is given by this Truth, "Wealth is
> useful to purchase Pleasures". (*Essay*, 138) 
> 
> 
> 



Alternatively, Hutcheson distinguishes another way an action might be
conformable to reason: 



> 
> 
> Sometimes for a Reason of Actions we shew the *truth expressing a
> Quality, engaging our Approbation*. Thus the *Reason* of
> hazarding Life in just War, is, that 'it tends to preserve our
> honest Countrymen, or evidences publick Spirit...The former sort
> of Reasons we will call *exciting*, and the latter
> *justifying*. (*Essay*, 138) 
> 
> 
> 



Here Hutcheson is making reference to the, now commonplace,
distinction between explanatory reasons (i.e., why did a person do
such a thing? what was her motivation?) and normative reasons (i.e.,
why should this person have done that thing? what does this thing have
to say for itself?, and so on).



In examining the nature of exciting reasons, Hutcheson rejects the
claim that such reasons could be antecedent to our sentiments or
affections. For Hutcheson, our motivations must be a result of our
affections, and cannot arise without them.



When it comes to justifying reasons, Hutcheson believes that one
cannot genuinely justify an action without reference to a moral sense.
As Hutcheson notes, one cannot justify an action simply by noting that
it conforms to a true proposition, as this would justify every
possible action (*Essay*, 144). Furthermore, even if we focus
on particular *truths* that may be said about particular
actions (such as, e.g., "a Truth shewing an Action to be fit to
attain an End"), these truths do not genuinely justify
*without* some reference to the moral quality of the end
itself. But for this we must advert to a moral sense. Simply
discerning truths about particular ends will not tell us whether those
ends are morally justified:



> 
> 
> We have got some strange Phrases, "*that some things are
> antecedently reasonable in the Nature of the thing*", which
> some insist upon: "That otherwise, they say, if before Man was
> created, any Nature *without a moral Sense* had existed, this
> Nature would not have approved as morally good in the Deity, his
> constituting our Sense as it is as present". Very true; and what
> next? If there had been no *moral Sense* in that Nature, there
> would have been no *Perception of Morality*. But "could
> not such Natures have seen something *reasonable* in one
> Constitution more than in another?"...They would have
> *reasoned* about *both*, and found out *Truths*:
> are both Constitutions alike *reasonable* to these Observers?
> No, they say, "the *benevolent* one is
> *reasonable*, and the *malicious unreasonable*:"
> And yet these Observers *reasoned* and *discovered
> Truths* about both: An Action then is called by us
> *reasonable* when 'tis *benevolent*, and
> *unreasonable* when *malicious*. This is plainly making
> the Word *reasonable* denote whatever is *approved* by
> our moral Sense, without Relation to *true Propositions*.
> (*Essay*, 153-4)
> 
> 
> 



Hutcheson also spends considerable time examining the positions of
Clarke and Wollaston in detail. For Clarke, moral distinctions derive
from the relations of fitness and unfitness, which are themselves
eternal. For Hutcheson, any construal of such relations as morally
significant must presuppose a moral sense. As Hutcheson notes, we do
not morally praise the relations between, e.g., the natural numbers as
in mathematics, or the fitness of certain chemical compositions. The
fitness of a sword to end someone's life is in and of itself
morally neutral. And the fitness of an action to its end is also
morally neutral--some actions are just as fit to human misery as
other actions are fit to human happiness. Of course, one might hold
that the fitness relation is simply to be applied (in a morally
interesting sense) to the ultimate end of action. Happiness, in other
words, is "fit"; misery "unfit". But,
according to Hutcheson, what does this mean? It cannot be
"fit" to, say, give rise to some other
thing--that's what makes it an *ultimate* end. But
any explication that would render some particular end as
"fit" seems, according to Hutcheson to presuppose an
*independent* evaluation beyond its "fitness".
(Though for a reading of Hutcheson that suggests significant
continuity between Hutcheson and Clarke, see Sheridan 2007.)



Hutcheson saves his most biting criticism for Wollaston's view,
however. According to Hutcheson, there is no plausibility to be had
that moral distinctions can be derived by the tendencies of our
actions to signify truth or falsity. Depending upon what one
understands to be "significance", or how one understands
Wollaston's "[acting] as if things were so, or not
so", we would declare as immoral such benign acts as leaving
one's lights on at night, or traveling, as a noble,
"without Coronets", or walking in plainclothes despite
being clergy, or writing plays or "*Epicks*"
(*Essay*, 164-66). In addition, according to Hutcheson,
Wollaston's system cannot distinguish between degrees of virtue
or vice. Assuming it makes some sense to say that particular actions
signify truth or falsehood, this appears to be a binary
property--it either does or does not. But virtue is scalar: some
actions are horribly vicious, others are heroic, others are relatively
morally insignificant (*Essay*, 170; see also
 SS2.2).
 Ultimately, then, Hutcheson concludes that Wollaston (and every other
rationalist he considers) is really smuggling in some sort of moral
sense in disguise, whether this is by means of a reference to the
"reasonableness" of particular actions, a reference to
their "fitness" or reference to their "significance
of truth or falsity".


## 2. Hutcheson's Normative Ethics



Most of the scholarly attention paid to Hutcheson concerns his
metaethics--the nature of his moral psychology, his understanding
of the ontological status of moral facts, his critique of rationalism,
and so forth. But equally interesting is his
normative ethics, which features a striking critique of
"self-interest" theories, a unification of virtue and
happiness, and a view that clearly anticipates later British
utilitarianism.


### 2.1 Self-Interest and Benevolence



To begin, Hutcheson believed that the most important contribution of
the *Inquiry* was a rejection of the
"self-interest" theories of Hobbes and Mandeville (see
Gill 2006: ch. 11). Famously, Hobbes and Mandeville placed the
foundation of morality on the individual self-interest of every moral
agent. Now, Hutcheson thinks that a crass reduction of morality to
self-interest is thoroughly untenable--else we would assign moral
properties to "a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation"
(*Inquiry*, 89).



However--as Hutcheson clearly understands--the reduction
morality to self-interest proposed by the self-interest theorists is
clearly more sophisticated than this. To see this, consider the
argument connecting morality and self-interest from Hobbes. Hobbes
begins with a psychological claim. According to Hobbes, humans are
motivated by their own good. (Note that this is something of an
oversimplification. Hobbes believes that individuals are motivated by
whatever they in fact desire--but that their desires
*constitute* the nature of their good; *Leviathan*, VI,
IX.) This leads them into conflict, as each person desires greater
power to satisfy their desires, which inevitably interferes with the
desires of others. The result is violence, and "the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (*Leviathan*,
XIII). Notice, however, that Hobbes thinks that these tendencies in
people--their tendencies toward self-interest and
self-preservation, resulting in violence--are not themselves
morally problematic. He writes: 



> 
> 
> The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No
> more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know
> a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor
> any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make
> it. (*Leviathan*, XIII) 
> 
> 
> 



Hobbes thus seems to think that moral normativity has an essential
connection to the motivations of agents. But because the motivations
of agents are fundamentally self-directed, moral normativity cannot
extend beyond what is in the fundamental interest of agents.



Hobbes, then, develops his self-interest theory by means of two
premises. The first, *psychological*, premise is that human
motivation is essentially self-directed. The second,
*normative*, premise is that moral obligation is determined
simply given what agents will be motivated to do.



Hutcheson concentrates his attack on the first premise of this
argument (see Bishop 1996). According to Hutcheson, we are not simply
guided by our self-interest, but possess a form of
"disinterested benevolence" toward others. His most
striking example of this comes from the following thought
experiment:



> 
> 
> To make this yet clearer, suppose that the Deity should declare to a
> good Man that he should be suddenly annihilated, but at the Instant of
> his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his
> Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the
> Future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain
> from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their
> State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from
> it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life? Nay, is it not a
> pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease we know nothing
> of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that we do not
> lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends,
> or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any Thing
> only as the Means of private Good, as violently when we know that we
> shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the
> Possession of this good for many Years? (*Inquiry*, 228n33)
> 
> 
> 



Insofar as our self-interest is not affected by what happens after our
death, at least according to Hutcheson, it seems strange to say that
individuals are concerned only for their self-interest. After all, we
appear to be concerned not just with ourselves, but with, e.g., our
children, friends, and compatriots. (Note also that Hutcheson uses a
very similar argument against Hume's reliance on the
motivational significance of sympathy. See *System*,
48-49.)



Now, as Hutcheson argues here, we may have a certain form of
*partial* benevolence toward others. But Hutcheson also argues
that we in fact maintain "a universal Determination to
Benevolence in Mankind, even toward the most distant parts of the
Species" (*Inquiry*, 147; *Essay*, 34). He
writes:



> 
> 
> Every one at present rejoices in the Destruction of Pirates; and yet
> let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast upon some desolate Island,
> and that we were assur'd some Fate would confine them there
> perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more. Now let us
> calmly reflect that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and
> Counsel, may be happy, and joyful...[L]et us ask ourselves, when
> Self-Love or regard to the Safety of better Men, no longer makes us
> desire their Destruction...whether we would wish them the Fate of
> Cadmus's Army, by plunging their Swords in each others
> Breast...or rather that they should recover the ordinary
> Affections of Men, become Kind, Compassionate, and Friendly...and
> form an honest happy Society, with Marriages, and Relations dear, and
> all the Charities of Father, Son, and Brother--I fancy the latter
> would be the Wish of every Mortal. (*Inquiry*,
> 105-106)
> 
> 
> 



Furthermore, it is crucial for Hutcheson that motivations of
self-interest should play no role in the esteem of actions as
virtuous. And hence According to Hutcheson, our moral sense approves
only actions motivated by benevolence, not self-interest:



> 
> 
> If we examine all the Actions which are counted amiable any where, and
> enquire into the Grounds upon which they are approv'd, we shall
> find, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always
> appear as Benevolent, or flowing from Love of others, and a Study of
> their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons
> belov'd, or profited, or not; so that all those kind Affections
> which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos'd
> to flow from such Affections, appear morally Good, if while they are
> benevolent toward some Persons, they be not pernicious to others.
> (*Inquiry*, 116)
> 
> 
> 



Indeed, for Hutcheson, 



> 
> 
> the Perfection of Virtue consists in 'having the *universal
> calm Benevolence*, the prevalent Affection of the Mind, so as to
> limit and counteract not only the *selfish Passions*, but even
> the *particular kind Affections*. (*Essay*, 8) 
> 
> 
> 



Indeed, even *if* a particular action is beneficent in its
effects--that is, it benefits other people to some extent or
other--Hutcheson holds that such an action cannot be esteemed as
virtuous if we presume that the action was motivated *by*
self-interest:



> 
> 
> Nor shall we find any thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where
> there is no Benevolence imagin'd; nor in any Disposition, or
> Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and
> design'd for benevolent Purposes. Nay, as was before
> observ'd, the Actions which in fact are exceedingly useful,
> shall appear void of moral Beauty, if we know they proceeded from no
> kind Intentions toward others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of
> Kindness, or of promoting publick Good, shall appear as amiable as the
> most successful, if it flow'd from as strong Benevolence.
> (*Inquiry*, 116)
> 
> 
> 


### 2.2 Virtue and Utility



Hutcheson is often recognized as an early figure in the development of
contemporary utilitarianism. Indeed, it was Hutcheson who first used
the phrase, in identifying the nature of moral goodness, that acts
should promote "the greatest happiness for the greatest
number". He writes, in the *Inquiry*, that 



> 
> 
> that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the
> greatest Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions
> Misery. (*Inquiry*, 125)
> 
> 
> 



But is Hutcheson really a utilitarian? And if so, what sort of
utilitarian is he?



To begin, there are passages in Hutcheson that sound quite
utilitarian, indeed. In the early editions of the *Inquiry*,
Hutcheson suggests a quasi-mathematical principle by which to 



> 
> 
> compute the Morality of any Actions, with all their Circumstances,
> when we judge of the Actions done by our selves, or by others.
> (*Inquiry*, 128) 
> 
> 
> 



He holds that 



> 
> 
> The moral Importance of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick Good
> produced by him, is in a compound Ratio of his Benevolence and
> Abilitys: or (by substituting the Letters for the Words, as M = Moment
> of Good, and m = Moment of Evil) M = B x A.
> (*Inquiry*, 128) 
> 
> 
> 



Deriving, then, that a person's benevolence is determined by
M/A, Hutcheson declares that 



> 
> 
> must be the Perfection of Virtue where M = A, or when the Being acts
> to the utmost of his Power for the public Good. (*Inquiry*,
> 130) 
> 
> 
> 



(It should be noted that the fourth edition of the *Inquiry*
refrains from this technical language, but the general idea remains
the same. See *Inquiry*, 234n56.)



Now this sounds as if Hutcheson is espousing a relatively
straightforward utilitarianism. After all, the morality of an action
is determined, on this view, by whether or not an agent produces the
greatest "publick Good" he or she can. In addition,
"Publick Good", here, is understood by Hutcheson to mean
the "natural Good of Mankind" (*Inquiry*, 91) where
"natural good" (more on this later) is understood to mean
a person's happiness, defined in hedonistic terms
(*Inquiry*, 86; *Essay*, 87). Putting this all together,
we get a standard, run-of-the-mill, hedonistic utilitarianism.



However, there are major deviations from a straightforward
utilitarianism as we might understand it from, e.g., Bentham or
Sidgwick (see Albee 1896: 32-35). First, Hutcheson appears to
offer us something like a *scalar* utilitarianism. On a scalar
view, there is no absolute rightness or wrongness, but rather degrees
of rightness or wrongness that an action may display (see Norcross
2020). And while Hutcheson does discuss the notion of "perfect
virtue"--achieved when the good one has the ability to do
is equal to the good one does--he admits that there will be
degrees of virtue (which simply follows given his mathematical
calculations), and does not describe the perfection of virtue as any
sort of absolute obligation (see Darwall 1997: 87-88). (Indeed,
this point is essential to his critique of Wollaston,
 SS1.4.)



Second, Hutcheson clearly intends his moral "calculation"
to refer, at least in part, to the *motivation* of a given
action. Only actions motivated by benevolence will be perfectly
virtuous. If one is motivated by self-interest, or has a mixed
motivation, the extent to which the action was motivated by
self-interest will be deducted from the overall moral character of an
action: 



> 
> 
> when the Moment of Good, in an Action partly intended for the Good of
> the Agent, is but equal to the Moment of Good in the Action of another
> Agent, influenc'd only by Benevolence, the former is less
> virtuous; and in this Case the Interest must be deducted to find he
> true Effect of the Benevolence. (*Inquiry*, 129) 
> 
> 
> 



So Hutcheson clearly means to hold that any "publick good"
that is to be credited to the moral quality of an act must be
*intended*.



Third, Hutcheson holds that the consequences of a particular act will
have no bearing on its moral quality not just if it is not intended,
but also if it is not *foreseen*: 



> 
> 
> It is true indeed, that that publick Evil which I neither certainly
> foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my
> Action, does not make my present Action Criminal, or Odious; even
> altho I might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my
> own Actions; because such actions do not, at present, evidence either
> Malice, or want of Benevolence...In like manner, no good Effect
> which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my Action morally
> Good. (*Inquiry*, 131).
> 
> 
> 



The second and third deviations from a standard utilitarianism might
be expected given his affirmed belief that the motivation of virtuous
actors is paramount in understanding the virtue of their action. As
already noted, Hutcheson holds that the moral sense approves actions
insofar as they are motivated by disinterested benevolence. Thus far
one might state his version of utilitarianism as a kind of *scalar
motivational* utilitarianism (which we should think of as clearly
distinct from a "motive" utilitarianism (see Adams 1976),
according to which morally appropriate actions are motivated by
dispositions the possession of which leads to the best consequences),
according to which an act is virtuous insofar as the agent
*aims* at the greatest overall good.



But there is one interesting twist that is briefly suggested by
Hutcheson that is also worth mentioning. Hutcheson holds that the
perfectly benevolent, and hence perfectly virtuous, agent will aim at
the greatest public good they can achieve. But the "publick
good" here should not be understood as a straightforward
aggregate of happiness across persons. In describing his understanding
of public good, Hutcheson says this:



> 
> 
> In comparing the moral Qualitys of Actions, in order to regulate our
> Election among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of
> them has the greatest moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense
> of Virtue to judge thus; that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected
> to proceed from the Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number
> of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend; (and here the Dignity,
> or moral Importance of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal
> Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Happiness, or natural
> Good; or that the Virtue is in a compound Ratio of the Quantity of
> Good, and Number of Enjoyers...Again, when the Consequences of
> Actions are of a mix'd Nature, partly Advantageous, and partly
> Pernicious; that Action is good, whose good Effects preponderate the
> evil, by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and that, evil,
> which is otherwise. Here also the moral Importance of Characters, or
> Dignity of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the Degrees of
> Happiness or Misery: for to procure an inconsiderable Good to many,
> but an immense Evil to few, may be Evil; and an immense Good to few,
> may preponderate a small Evil to many. (*Inquiry*, 125)
> 
> 
> 



Two things are worth noting here. First, and less interestingly, the
phrase "compound Ratio of the Quantity of Good, and Number of
Enjoyers" suggests that Hutcheson is inclined toward a form of
*average* utilitarianism, rather than *total*
utilitarianism (see Smart & Williams 1974: 27-28; Parfit
1984: 420-421). Furthermore, and compatible with this form of
average utilitarianism, Hutcheson holds that small benefits spread
over many persons need not compensate for massive evils subjected to
few, and that small evils spread over many may be a price worth paying
for large benefits for a small number. All this is compatible with
standard forms of utilitarian aggregation.



But, more interestingly, Hutcheson suggests that the "Dignity,
or moral Importance of Persons, may compensate Numbers". How to
understand this passage? One might interpret it as a proto version of
a view according to which the moral virtue of individuals is
intrinsically significant, the happiness of two people, one of whom is
virtuous, the other vicious, are not of equal value. (One might
compare this to a form of "luckism" as advocated by, e.g.,
Richard Arneson [2004].) But Hutcheson explicitly denies this reading
one paragraph earlier. He writes:



> 
> 
> The moral Beauty, or Deformity of Actions, is not alter'd by the
> moral Qualitys of the Objects, any further than the Qualitys of the
> Objects increase or diminish the Benevolence of the Action, or the
> publick Good intended by it. Thus Benevolence toward the worst
> Characters, or the Study of their Good, may be as amiable as any
> whatsoever; yea often more so than that toward the Good, since it
> argues such a strong Degree of Benevolence as can surmount the
> greatest Obstacle, the moral Evil in the Object. (*Inquiry*,
> 124)
> 
> 
> 



For Hutcheson, any "compensation" the moral worth of
individuals is allowed in comparison to numbers must be understood to
be *pragmatic*: 



> 
> 
> Yet when our Benevolence to the Evil, encourages them in their bad
> Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief; this diminishes or
> destroyes the Beauty of the Action, or even makes it evil, as it
> betrays a Neglect of the Good of others more valuable.
> (*Inquiry*, 124) 
> 
> 
> 



In addition, in the *System*, Hutcheson holds that it is more
important to benefit friends, family, and people "of eminent
virtue" in comparison to strangers, but notice that only when
all other circumstances are equal is one permitted to favor such
individuals (see *System*, 247-8).



But this is puzzling. It would appear that any attention we pay to the
moral worth of the objects of our beneficence is simply given the
general consequences such beneficence may produce. And hence it would
appear that the "moral Importance of Persons" is not
actually "compensating" numbers at all. Rather, the moral
importance of persons is or perhaps could be an important causal
*factor* in the overall production of happiness or the overall
distribution of happiness, but is not *itself* a compensatory
axiological variable. But this is also puzzling, insofar as Hutcheson
seems to treat the moral importance of persons as such a variable
*twice*. At this point Hutcheson's embrace, or
lack thereof, of luckism must be left as an interpretive puzzle.


### 2.3 Virtue, Happiness, and Hedonism



The first sentence of Hutcheson's *System of Moral
Philosophy* runs this way: 



> 
> 
> The intention of moral philosophy is to direct men to that course of
> action which tends most effectually to promote their greatest
> happiness and perfection; as far as it can be done by observations and
> conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature, without aids
> of supernatural revelation. (*System*, 1) 
> 
> 
> 



Put another way, Hutcheson holds that his aim in discussing the very
nature of virtue, benevolence, and the moral sense, is to persuade
people to act in such a way as to develop "their greatest
happiness and perfection" (see Heydt 2009). And to this end, it
is important to note that Hutcheson steadfastly maintains that
virtuous behavior is in the interest of the virtuous. Of course, given
that Hutcheson holds that behavior is virtuous insofar as it is
motivated by benevolence and *not* self-interest, it is
impossible (on Hutcheson's view) to *pursue* one's
self-interest through virtuous behavior. To be motivated by self-love
diminishes, to that extent, the virtue of one's action.



But it is nevertheless the case, for Hutcheson, that virtue
*is* in one's self-interest. Notice, however, that
Hutcheson's argument for this claim is not straightforward. As
has already been indicated, Hutcheson is a hedonist: 



> 
> 
> Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words Interest,
> Advantage, natural Good, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The
> Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first
> Idea of natural Good, or Happiness; and then all Objects which are apt
> to excite this Pleasure are call'd immediately Good...Our
> Sense of Pleasure is antecedent to Advantage or Interest, and is the
> Foundation of it. (*Inquiry*, 86) 
> 
> 
> 



But how could it be that a *hedonist*, of all things, believes
that benevolent acts--acts that are motivated for the good of
others--are always in our self-interest? Surely such acts can
involve sacrifice of our own pleasure, as when a father dutifully endures the
painful duration of "Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer: the Live
Musical!" for the sake of his daughter's delight in
watching it.



The simple story, to be complicated shortly, runs this way. Hutcheson
holds that the moral sense is a greater repository of pleasure than
the other senses. He says, in many places, that the operation of the
moral sense provides *more* pleasure than the operation of the
other senses, internal and external. Hutcheson states, in the
*Inquiry*, that the moral sense "gives us more Pleasure
and Pain that all our other Facultys" (*Inquiry*, 163).
In the *Essay*, Hutcheson writes: 



> 
> 
> Our moral Sense thus regulated, and constantly followed in our
> Actions, may be the most constant Source of the most *stable
> Pleasure*. (*Essay*, 126)
> 
> 
> 



Hutcheson offers a number of arguments for this, generally appealing
to our own intuitions about the nature of happiness: 



> 
> 
> Now should we imagine a rational Creature in a sufficiently happy
> State, though his Mind was, without interruption, wholly
> occupy'd with pleasant Sensations of Smell, Taste, Touch,
> &c., if at the same time all other Ideas were excluded? Should we
> not thing the State low, mean and sordid, if there were no Society, no
> Love or Friendship, no good Offices? (*Inquiry*, 163) 
> 
> 
> 



So much for the external senses. But he goes on: 



> 
> 
> Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a wrathful,
> malicious, revengeful, or envious Being, tho we were at the same time
> to enjoy all the Pleasures of the external and internal
> senses?...What Castle-builder, who forms to himself imaginary
> Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he should be happy, ever made
> acknowledg'd Treachery, Cruelty, or Ingratitude, the Steps by
> which he mounted to his wish'd for Elevation, or Parts of his
> Character, when he had attain'd it? We always conduct our selves
> in such Reveries, according to the Dictates of Honour, Faith,
> Generosity, Courage.... (*Inquiry*, 163-4)
> 
> 
> 



Now, this is fine as far as it goes. But notice that Hutcheson does
not explain why it should be that, e.g., our Castle-building friends
tend to imagine that they are virtuous rather than vicious. And why
should it be that in every case, the virtuous are better-off than the
vicious?



A key mechanism here is the notion of a "reflex Act". Lord
Shaftesbury--borrowing Locke's notion of
"reflection"--introduces the idea this way (see Baier
& Luntley 1995):



> 
> 
> In a Creature capable of forming general Notions of Things, not only
> the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the
> Objects of the Affection; but the very *Actions* themselves,
> and the *Affections* of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their
> Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects.
> So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind
> of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, which have been
> already felt, and are now become the subject of new Liking or Dislike.
> (Shaftesbury 1711, v. 2, 16)
> 
> 
> 



For Hutcheson, while we do not immediately receive pleasure from our
own virtuous actions, we nevertheless can take the part of a spectator
to ourselves. When we do this, our virtuous actions will trigger our
moral sense, itself--as Hutcheson is insistent upon--the
fount of the most valuable pleasures. (Hutcheson details this in the
"D" (i.e., final, 1738) edition of the *Inquiry*.)
He writes: 



> 
> 
> every Spectator is persuaded that the reflex Acts of the virtuous
> Agent upon his own Temper will give him the highest pleasures.
> (*Inquiry*, 217n47)
> 
> 
> 



Again, this is fine as far as it goes. But we may still wonder why it
is that such "reflex Acts", even if engaging the moral
sense, necessarily produce the "highest pleasures?" And
what is exactly meant by such a phrase?



One solution to this puzzle, opted for by some commentators, holds
that Hutcheson is a kind of *qualitative* hedonist--a view
according to which some pleasures are of higher quality, and therefore
more valuable, pleasurableness held equal (Edwards 1979: 30; Riley
2008: 275; Strasser 1987: 518; Crisp 2020: 124). And there are some
very tantalizing passages that suggest just this:



> 
> 
> As to pleasures of the same kind, 'tis manifest their values are
> in a joint proportion of their intenseness and duration. In estimating
> the duration, we not only regard the constancy of the object, or its
> remaining in our power, and the duration of the sensations it affords,
> but the constancy of our fancy or relish: for when this changes it
> puts an end to the enjoyment. In comparing pleasures of different
> kinds, the value is as the duration and dignity of the kind jointly.
> We have an immediate sense of a dignity, a perfection, or beatifick
> quality in some kinds, which no intenseness of the lower kinds can
> equal, were they also as lasting as we could wish. No intenseness or
> duration of any external sensation gives it a dignity or worth equal
> to that of the improvement of the soul by knowledge, or the ingenious
> arts; and much less is it equal to that of virtuous affections and
> actions. (*System*, 117)
> 
> 
> 



Here it would seem that Hutcheson's justification for treating
virtuous conduct as in the interest of the virtuous is as plain as
day. In conducting our "reflex Acts" concerning our own
virtuous conduct, we trigger our "virtuous affections",
which themselves have a "worth" that no intenseness or
duration of any external sensation could match. If we interpret
Hutcheson as a qualitative hedonist, the explanation of the benefits
one maintains as a result of virtue are straightforward.



What is less straightforward is whether or not Hutcheson genuinely is
this form of qualitative hedonist. And there is very good reason to
doubt it. (Much more detailed argument for this point is available in
Dorsey 2010.) Nowhere in this passage is the "dignity" of
a pleasure thought an axiologically significant variable. In the
*Essay*, Hutcheson writes explicitly that: 



> 
> 
> The *Value* of any Pleasure, and the *Quantity* or
> *Moment* of any Pain, is in a compounded proportion of the
> *Intenseness* and *Duration*. (*Essay*, 87) 
> 
> 
> 



In the *Inquiry*, he seems especially clear that the
superiority of the moral sense is quantitative rather than
qualitative: it produces "more" pleasure than our other
senses (*Inquiry*, 162). Furthermore, while the *System*
passage cited above is extremely suggestive when it comes to
interpreting Hutcheson as a qualitative hedonist, a mere chapter
earlier in the *System* he seems to commit to a straightforward
quantitative hedonism: 



> 
> 
> supreme happiness must consist in the most constant enjoyment of the
> most intense and durable pleasures. (*System*, 100) 
> 
> 
> 



On a quantitative reading of Hutcheson's hedonism, rather than
being an axiological guarantee that the pleasures of the moral sense
are more valuable, it is simply a matter of psychological fact that
human beings take more intense and durable pleasures from the moral
sense, sufficient to override whatever joys may be taken in the low
road.