## 1. Life and Works



In his *Lives of the Philosophers* (Diels-Kranz, testimonium
A1), Diogenes Laertius reports that Xenophanes was born in the small
Ionian town of Colophon and flourished during the sixtieth Olympiad
(540-537 BCE). Laertius adds that when Xenophanes was
"banished from his native city" he "joined the
colony planted at Elea" (in Italy), and also lived at Zancle and
Catana (two Greek communities in Sicily). He credits Xenophanes with
composing verses "in epic meter, as well as elegiacs and iambics
attacking Hesiod and Homer and denouncing what they said about the
gods", with reciting his own works, and with composing poems on
the founding of Colophon and Elea. Later writers add that "he
buried his sons with his own hands", was sold into slavery, and
later released from it. By Xenophanes' own account (B8) he
"tossed about the Greek land" for sixty-seven years,
starting at the age of twenty-five.



Diels-Kranz (DK) provides 45 fragments of his poetry (although B4, 13,
19, 20, 21 and 41 would be more accurately classified as
*testimonia*), ranging from the 24 lines of B1 to the
single-word fragments of B21a, 39, and 40. A number of the
'sympotic poems' (poems for drinking parties) (B1-3,
5, 6, 22, and the imitation in C2) were preserved by Athenaeus, while
the remarks on the nature of the divine were quoted by Clement
(B14-16 and 23), Sextus Empiricus (B11, 12, and 24), and
Simplicius (B25 and 26). Other snippets survive in the accounts by
Diogenes Laertius and Aetius, or as marginal notes in our
manuscripts of various authors, or as entries in later rhetorical
summaries and dictionaries. Seventy-four selections, of which the most
extensive is the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *On Melissus,
Xenophanes, Gorgias* (*MXG*), make up the collection of
*testimonia* in DK. Laertius' statement (A1) that
Xenophanes "wrote in epic meter, also elegiacs, and
iambics" is confirmed by extant poems in hexameters and elegiac
meter, with one couplet (B14) a combination of hexameter and iambic
trimeter. Ancient writers referred to a number of his compositions as
*silloi*--'squints' or satires, and a critical
tone pervades many of the surviving fragments. Three late sources
credit Xenophanes with a didactic poem under the title *Peri
Phuseos* ("On Nature") but not every allusion to
an earlier author's views "on nature" represented a
reference to a single work on that subject.


## 2. Criticisms of Greek Popular Religion



Fragments B11 and B12 describe, and implicitly criticize, the stories
about the gods told by Homer and Hesiod.



> 
> Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods
>   
> 
> all sorts of things that are matters of reproach and censure among
> men:
>   
> 
> theft, adultery, and mutual deception. (B11)
>   
> 
>   
> 
> ...as they sang of numerous illicit divine deeds:
>   
> 
> theft, adultery, and mutual deceit. (B12)
> 



The basis for Xenophanes' unhappiness with the poets'
accounts is not explained, but we may infer from the concluding call
to pay due honor to the gods in Xenophanes' B1 that an
attribution of scandalous conduct would be incompatible with the
goodness or perfection any divine being must be assumed to possess
(cf. Aristotle *Meta*. 1072b; Plato, *Rep*. 379b.)



In the well-known fragments B14-16, Xenophanes comments on the
general tendency of human beings to conceive of divine beings in human
form:



> 
> But mortals suppose that gods are born,
>   
> 
> wear their own clothers and have a voice and body. (B14)
>   
> 
>   
> 
> Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black;
>   
> 
> Thracians that theirs are are blue-eyed and red-haired. (B16)
> 



B15 adds, probably in a satirical vein, that if horses and oxen had
hands and could draw pictures, their gods would look remarkably like
horses and oxen. B17, "...and bacchants of pine stand round
the well-built house" may represent a criticism of the common
ancient belief that a god could assume possession of a physical object
so as to offer protection to its possessor. The ridiculing of
Pythagoras' claim to have recognized the soul of a departed
friend in the voice of a barking dog (B7), together with the attacks
on divination credited to Xenophanes in A52, reflect the broader
denial of knowledge of divine attributes and operations set out in
B34. Xenophanes is prepared to offer a positive account of the nature
of the deity (see the following section) but his position appears to
be that while no mortal being will ever know about the gods with any
degree of certainty, we can at least avoid adopting beliefs and
practices clearly at odds with the special nature any divine being
must be assumed to possess.


## 3. The Nature of the Divine



So far as is known, Xenophanes was the first Greek thinker to offer a
complex and at least partially systematic account of the divine
nature. We have already noted how an implicit assumption of divine
perfection may underlie his criticisms of Homer, Hesiod, and the
tendency to imagine the gods in human form. Of the positive
characterizations of the divine made in B23-26, perhaps the most
fundamental is B23:



> 
> One god greatest among gods and men,
>   
> 
> not at all like mortals in body or in thought.
> 



Although the remark has often been read as a pioneering expression of
monotheism, this reading is made problematic by the nearby reference
to 'gods' in the plural in the first line and the
possibility that Xenophanes sought to highlight not the *one*
god but rather the one *greatest* god (cf. Homer,
*Iliad* 12, 243 for the use of 'one' (Greek
*heis*) reinforcing a superlative). The relevant measures of
divine 'greatness' are not specified, but the two most
obvious choices would be greatness in honor and power, with honor
perhaps the more basic of the two (cf. *Iliad* 2, 350; 2, 412;
4, 515; *Od*. 3, 378; 5,4; Hesiod, *Theogony* 49, 534,
538, etc.). Greatness in power would in turn explain the
characterizations of the divine as perceptive and conscious in all its
parts (B24), able to shake all things by the exercise of his thought
(B25), and able to accomplish everything while remaining forever in
the same place or condition (B26). It is unclear, however, how far
Xenophanes himself realized the interconnections among the different
divine attributes or sought to exploit those connections for didactic
purposes. At least as they have come down to us, none of the remarks
on the divine nature (B23-26) contains any of the inferential
particles (*gar, epei, oun, hoti*, etc.) one would normally
expect to find in a piece of reasoned discourse.



Some later writers (A28.6, 31.2, 34-36) report that Xenophanes
identified his 'one greatest god' with the entire physical
universe--often termed 'the whole' or 'all
things', and some modern accounts portray Xenophanes as a
pantheist. But this understanding of Xenophanes' doctrines seems
inconsistent with his assertion that "god shakes all
things" (B25) that "all things are from the earth and to
the earth all things come in the end" (B27), and that "all
things which come into being and grow, are earth and water"
(B29). On the whole, Xenophanes' remarks on the divine nature
are perhaps best read as an expression of a traditional Greek piety:
there exists a being of extraordinary power and excellence, and it is
incumbent on each of us to hold it in high regard.


## 4. Social Criticism



Five fragments touch on traditional subjects of Greek sympotic
verse--on proper conduct at symposia (drinking parties), the
measures of personal excellence, and the existence of various human
foibles or failures. Xenophanes appears to have been particularly
interested in identifying and discouraging conduct that failed to pay
due honor to the gods or posed a risk to the stability and well-being
of the city (or perhaps both). Although these passages may be
insufficiently abstract and demonstrative in character to count as
'philosophical teachings', they do represent an important
bridge between Greek poetry of the archaic period and the kind of
moral theorizing practiced by many 5th and 4th-century thinkers.
Xenophanes' disparagement of the honors accorded to athletes
(B2), his call to censor the stories the poets tell about the gods
(B1), and counsel to live a life of moderation (B3 and 5, and perhaps
B21) all anticipate views expressed in Plato's *Republic*
(cf. 607a, 378b, 372b.) His criticism of the pursuit of useless
luxuries (B3) also anticipates Socrates' rebuke of his fellow
citizens for caring more about wealth and power than about virtue (cf.
*Apology* 30b.) His cautionary remarks about knowledge (B34)
and reminder of the subjectivity of human taste (B38: "If god
had not made yellow honey, they would think that figs were far
sweeter") also reflect a traditional view of human judgment as
limited and conditioned by personal experience. In each of these
areas, Xenophanes' social commentary represents a continuation
of the Greek poetic tradition as well as a step toward explicit
philosophical theorizing.


## 5. Scientific Interests



We may reasonably conclude from several surviving fragments and a
large number of *testimonia* that Xenophanes was well aware of
the teachings of the Milesian philosopher-scientists (Thales,
Anaximander, and Anaximenes), and sought to improve on them. While
many of the details of his own 'scientific' views remain
obscure, the range and interconnectedness of his interests make him an
important figure in the development of Ionian scientific theory.
Theodoretus, Stobaeus, and Olympiodorus (all in A 36) credit him with
a view of earth as the *arche* or "first
principle" of all things. Yet Galen (also in A36) rejects this
attribution, and B29 equates "all things which come into being
and grow" with "earth *and* water". A
two-substance *arche* would, moreover, be compatible with
the many references to physical mixtures. A33 credits Xenophanes with
a view of the sea as containing many mixtures, while B37 notes the
presence of water in rocky caves, and A50 reports a view of the soul
as earth and water. Insofar as some natural bodies are described as
consisting entirely of water (or of a part of water, as in A46 where
"the sweet portion" of the water is drawn up from the sea
and separated off), it would be best to understand Xenophanes'
"two-substance theory" in a distributed sense: all things
are either earth, or water, or earth combined with water.



Xenophanes appears to have explored many of the same phenomena studied
at an earlier date by the Milesians. B28 presents a view of the nature
and extent of the earth's depths; B30 identifies the sea as the
source of clouds, wind, and rain; B32 comments on the nature of Iris
(rainbow); B37 notes the presence of water in caves; B39 and 40
mention "cherry trees" and "frogs";
A38-45 discuss various astronomical phenomena, and A48 indicates
an interest in periodic volcanic eruptions in Sicily. Hippolytus (A33)
credits Xenophanes with a theory of alternating periods of world-wide
flood and drought that was inspired, at least in part, by the
discovery of fossilized remains of sea creatures at inland locations.
Whether or not Xenophanes himself traveled to Syracuse, Paros, and
Malta where these remains were found, his use of this information as
the basis for a broad explanation of phenomena is an implicit
testimonial to the heuristic value of information gained through
travel and observation.



Many *testimonia* credit Xenophanes with an interest in
meteorological and astronomical phenomena. Not only are these comments
of interest in their own right, they also present us what was arguably
his single most important scientific contribution--his contention that
clouds or cloud-like substances play a basic role in a great many
natural phenomena. The term *nephos* ("cloud")
appears only twice in the fragments of his work (in B30 and 32) but
many *testimonia* either bear directly on the nature of clouds
or make use of clouds in order to explain the nature of other
phenomena. To cite an example of the first type, according to Diogenes
Laertius "he says...the clouds are formed by the
sun's vapor [i.e. vapor caused by the heat from the sun's
rays] raising and lifting them to the surrounding air"
(A1.24-5). Aetius (A46) provides a similar account:



> 
> Xenophanes (says that) things in the heavens occur through the heat of
> the sun as the initial cause; for when the moisture is drawn up from
> the sea, the sweet portion, separating because of its fineness and
> turning into mists, combines into clouds, trickled down in drops of
> rain due to compression, and vaporizes the winds.
> 



B30 gives us essentially the same view in Xenophanes' own
words:



> 
> The sea is the source of water and of wind,
>   
> 
> For without the great sea, there would be no wind
>   
> 
> Nor streams of rivers, nor rainwater from on high
>   
> 
> But the great sea is the begetter of clouds, winds, and rivers.
> 



Having accounted for the formation of clouds in mechanistic terms
through processes of vaporization and compression Xenophanes proceeds
to make use of clouds to explain a large number of meteorological and
astronomical phenomena. The general claim appears in the
pseudo-Plutarch *Miscellanies*: "he says that the sun and
the stars come into being from the clouds" (A32), and
Aetius gives us many specific applications: 



> 
> The stars come into being from burning clouds (A38).
> 
> 
> The sort of fires that appear on ships--whom some call the Dioscuri
> [St. Elmo's fire]--are tiny clouds glimmering in virtue of the
> sort of motion they have (A39).
> 
> 
> 
> The sun consists of burning clouds...a mass of little fires,
> themselves constructed from the massing together of the moist
> exhalation (A40).
> 
> 
> 
> The moon is compressed cloud (A43).
> 
> 
> 
> All things of this sort [comets, shooting stars, meteors] are either
> groups or movements of clouds (A44).
> 
> 
> 
> Flashes of lightning come about through the shining of the clouds
> because of the movement (A45).
> 
> 
> 



As it happens, clouds are natural candidates for the
*explanans* in a scientific account. Since they are midway in
form between a solid and gaseous state they are easily linked with
solids, liquids, and gases of various kinds. And since they occupy a
region midway between the surface of the earth and the upper regions
of the heavens, they are well positioned to link the two basic
substances of earth and water with many astronomical phenomena.



Another important feature of Xenophanes' cloud-based approach to
understanding natural phenomena is the application of this theory to a
set of phenomena closely linked with traditional religious belief. We
have already seen this in the thoroughly naturalistic accounts given
of the "great sea", sun, moon, and stars, but nowhere is
the contrast of the old and new ways of thinking more evident than in
his comments on "Iris"--rainbow:



> 
> And she whom they call Iris, this too is by nature a cloud.
>   
> 
> Purple, red, and greenish-yellow to behold. (B32)
> 



For the members of Xenophanes' audience "Iris"
referred to the messenger goddess of Homer's *Iliad* (2,
686) and Hesiod's *Theogony* (780) and a set of
atmospheric phenomena (halos, coronae, and cloud iridescence) commonly
considered portents or signs of the intentions of divine beings. As
the daughter of Thaumas ("marvel") Iris was the natural
marvel *par* *excellence*. Yet for Xenophanes,
'she' is really an 'it' and a
'this' (the Greek neuter demonstrative *touto*), by
nature a purple, red, and greenish-yellow cloud. It is, moreover,
something that is there for us 'to behold' or 'to
look at' (*idesthai*). Perhaps nowhere in presocratic
philosophy can we find a clearer expression of the character of the
Ionian 'intellectual revolution'--a decision to put
aside an older way of thinking about events grounded in a belief in
divine beings in favor of an approach to understanding the world that
employs wide-ranging inquiry and direct observation and resorts to
strictly physical causes and forces. Having deprived the gods of human
form and clothing and removed the divine to some permanent and distant
location, Xenophanes proceeds to strip a wide range of natural
phenomena of all vestiges of religious or spiritual significance. His
de-mythologized account of natural phenomena is, in short, the logical
complement to his thoroughly de-naturalized account of the divine
nature.



Despite its several virtues, Xenophanes' physical theory appears
to have had little impact on later thinkers. Anaxagoras followed his
lead on the nature of the rainbow (cf. DK 59 B19) and Empedocles knew
(but repudiated) his claim of the earth's indefinitely extended
depths (DK 31 B39). But both Plato and Aristotle appear to have
ignored Xenophanes' scientific views or assigned them little
importance. One factor that may have contributed to this chilly
reception was the absence of any expression by Xenophanes of the kind
of commitment to teleology that both Plato and Aristotle regarded as
essential to a proper understanding of the cosmos. Xenophanes'
universe is controlled by a set of forces, but it is never described
as "heading toward the best" nor is it directed toward
some best result by a controlling intelligence. (Xenophanes'
divine does "shake all things" by the thought of his mind
(alone), but he is never described as in any way directing or
controlling particular events.) It is also obvious that
Xenophanes' heavenly bodies would have fallen far short of the
level of perfection that, with Aristotle, became a hallmark of
classical astronomical theory. Not only are Xenophanes' heavenly
bodies not divine beings, they undergo creation and destruction at
regular intervals. Only from the perspective of a much later period
can the merits of Xenophanes' scientific views be fairly
appreciated. Many centuries would have to pass before an emphasis on
direct observation and the use of entirely natural causes and forces
would become the scientific orthodoxy.


## 6. Reflections on Knowledge



Five surviving fragments and roughly a dozen *testimonia*
address what might be termed 'epistemological
questions'--"How much can any mortal being hope to
know?", "Does truth come to us through our own efforts or
by divine revelation?", and "What role do our sense
faculties play in the acquisition of knowledge?" Unfortunately,
the picture that emerges from many of the *testimonia* largely
contradicts what appear to be the views Xenophanes himself expressed.
According to the summary in the pseudo-Plutarch *Miscellanies*,
Xenophanes "declares that the senses are deceptive and generally
rejects reason along with them" (A32.) Similarly, in his
*Concerning Philosophy* Aristocles reports that
"...since they think that sense perceptions and appearances
must be rejected and trust only reason. For at one earlier time
Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus said something of this
sort" (A49). Similarly, Aetius declares that
"Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Xenophanes (say that) sense
perceptions are deceptive" (A49). Yet, as we have noted, B28
refers without qualification to "the upper limit of the earth
that is seen (*horatai*) here at our feet" and B32
appears to encourage those in Xenophanes' audience to
'look at' or 'observe' (*idesthai*) the
multi-colored cloud that is the rainbow. The realistic description of
the sumptuous banquet in B1 and the wide range of Xenophanes'
reported geographical and geological interests all sit poorly with an
Eleatic "rationalism" that would dismiss all information
gained through our faculties of sense and construct on the basis of
reason alone a view of "what is" as a motionless,
changeless and eternal unity.



Xenophanes' most extended comment on knowledge is B34:



> 
> ...and of course the clear and certain truth no man has seen
>   
> 
> nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I say about
> all things.
>   
> 
> For even if, in the best case, one happened to speak just of what has
> been brought to pass,
>   
> 
> still he himself would not know. But opinion is allotted to all.
> 



Portions of these remarks were quoted, and thereby preserved for
posterity, by the ancient skeptics who hailed Xenophanes as the
founder of their particular variety of philosophical skepticism.
Recent interpretations of B34 reject the skeptical interpretation in
favor of other less extreme readings. On some accounts, B34 is
concerned to deny only a direct perceptual awareness. Others find in
his comments a distinction between natural science, where only
probabilities can be achieved, and theology, where certainty is
possible. Still others read Xenophanes' remarks as a blanket
endorsement of "fallibilism"--the view that while
each individual is free to express his or her opinion, the possibility
of error can never be completely excluded.



Since B34 opens with the phrase "and indeed..." it is
likely that we do not have the whole of the remark, or all the
premises from which its main conclusion was intended to follow.
However, the use of the term *saphes* ("clear", in
the first line of the fragment) by Xenophanes' Ionian
contemporary, the historian Herodotus, provides a helpful clue to the
logic of the argument. At several points in his *History*
Herodotus speaks of what is *saphes*, or what can be known in a
*sapheos* manner, as what can be confirmed to be the case
on the basis of first-hand observation:



> 
> And wishing to gain sure knowledge of these things (*thelon
> de touton peri saphes ti eidenai*) from a point where this
> was possible, I took ship to Tyre in Phoenicia, where I heard there
> was a very holy temple of Heracles. There I saw it (*eidon*)
> richly equipped... Then I went to Thasos where I also found a
> temple of Heracles...Therefore what I have discovered by inquiry
> clearly shows (*ta men nun historemena deloi
> sapheos*) that Heracles is an ancient god. (*History*
> II, 44)
> 



Since the gods were believed to inhabit a realm far removed from that
of mortal beings, it would be natural for Xenophanes to hold that no
account of their nature and activities could possibly be confirmed on
the basis of first-hand observation, hence known for certain to be
correct. And since the pioneering cosmological accounts put forward by
his Milesian predecessors held that a single material substance
underlay phenomena in *all* places and times it would be
equally impossible for any individual to confirm such a universal
claim on the basis of first-hand observation, hence know for certain
that it was true--even if in fact it was true. The sentiments
expressed in lines three and four can be read as reinforcing this
cautionary sentiment. Their point would be that no one (moreover)
should be credited with knowledge (of the certain truth concerning the
gods or the nature of all things) simply on the basis of having
correctly described, perhaps even predicted, individual events as they
take place (perhaps a reference to self-styled paragons of wisdom and
predictors of events such as Epimenides and Pythagoras). The overall
message of B34, from its opening reference to "no man" to
its concluding phrase "fashioned for all" would have been
that there never has been nor ever will be anyone who has the capacity
to achieve certainty with respect to these important matters.



Xenophanes' reference to a second-best level of comprehension or
awareness--'opinion' or 'conjecture'
(*dokos*) should not be read as inherently negative or
dismissive. By Platonic standards, opinion--even when
correct--would be an inferior possession, unstable and subject to
removal through persuasion. But we have no reason to assume that
Xenophanes shared Plato's view on this topic. And in fact B35,
quoted by Plutarch in connection with encouraging a bashful speaker to
express his views, appears to present what one 'opines' or
believes in a fairly positive light:



> 
> ...Let these things be believed (*dedoxastho*) as
> like the realities...
> 



The similarity between the verbal *dedoxastho* of B35 and
the nominative *dokos* of B34 permits us to combine the two
fragmentary remarks into a single coherent view: of course there can
be no knowledge of the certain truth concerning the gods and the basic
principles governing the cosmos, but *dokos*--opinion or
conjecture--is available and should be accepted when it
corresponds with how things really are.



The full sense of B36, however, may never be determined. Neither its
context (a grammatical treatise of Herodian) nor its wording
("...however many they have made evident for mortals to
look upon") provides definitive guidance. Perhaps Xenophanes was
seeking to set an upper limit to the range of things that can be known
by human beings (i.e. to caution others that they could know only as
many as things as the gods had made available to them to experience).
But it is equally possible that the remark was intended (as B32 above)
to encourage the members of his audience to explore and inquire on
their own (i.e. to encourage them to investigate "however many
things" the gods have made available to them to experience).



B18 has often been hailed as an expression of an optimistic outlook or
"faith in human progress"--the conviction that
humankind has made and will continue to make improvements in the arts
and conditions of life generally. Yet none of the other surviving
fragments reflects such an optimism and several (e.g. B2 and 3)
suggest that Xenophanes was not at all optimistic about his
city's prospects for survival. In the light of his reported
repudiation of divination (A52), de-mythologizing of various natural
phenomena (B30 and 32), and evident enthusiasm for inquiry into a wide
range of subjects, B18 is perhaps best read as an expression of faith
in the value of 'inquiry' or 'seeking' as the
preferred approach to gaining knowledge of 'all
things'.



To sum up: Xenophanes' attitude toward knowledge appears to have
been the product of two distinct impulses. While he believed that
inquiry in the form of travel and direct observation was capable of
yielding useful information about the nature of things, he remained
sufficiently under the influence of an older piety to want to caution
others against seeking to understand matters that lay beyond the
limits of all human experience. Here, as in other aspects of his
thought, Xenophanes stands with one foot in the world of the archaic
poet and the other in the "new science" of the late 6th
and early 5th centuries BCE


## 7. Xenophanes' Legacy



Many later writers identified Xenophanes as the teacher of Parmenides
and the founder of the Eleatic "school of
philosophy"--the view that, despite appearances, what there
is is a motionless, changeless, and eternal 'One'. This
view of Xenophanes is based largely on Plato's reference to
"our Eleatic tribe, beginning from Xenophanes as well as even
earlier" (*Sophist* 242d) and Aristotle's remark
that "...with regard to the whole universe, he says that the one
is the god" (*Meta*. A5, 986b18), along with some verbal
similarities between Xenophanes' description of the "one
greatest, unmoving god" and Parmenides' account of a
"motionless, eternal, and unitary being". But the
Xenophanes who speaks to us in the surviving fragments is a
combination of rhapsode, social critic, religious teacher, and keen
student of nature. Euripides' *Heracles* 1341 ff. echoes
his attack on the stories told about the gods by Homer and Hesiod
(B11-12) and a passage of Euripides' *Autolycus*
quoted by Athenaeus (C2) repeats portions of the attack on the honors
accorded to athletes delivered in B2. In the *Republic*, Plato
shows himself the spiritual heir of Xenophanes when he states that the
guardians of his ideal state are more deserving of honors and public
support than the victors at Olympia, criticizes the stories told about
the gods by the poets, and calls for a life of moderate desire and
action. A pronounced ethic of moderation, sometimes bordering on
asceticism, runs through much of ancient Greek ethical thought,
beginning with Solon and Xenophanes and continuing through Socrates
and Plato to the Epicureans and Cynics. Xenophanes' conception
of a "one greatest god" who "shakes all things by
the thought (or will) of his mind" (*noou phreni*) may
have helped to encourage Heraclitus' belief in an
'intelligence' (*gnome*) that steers
all things (B41), Anaxagoras' account of the *nous* that
orders and arranges all things (B12), and Aristotle's account of
a divine *nous* that inspires a movement toward perfection
without actually doing anything toward bringing it about
(*Metaphysics* Lambda.)



In his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) Pierre Bayle began
the modern philosophical discussion of the problem of evil by quoting
Xenophanes' remark (as reported in Diogenes Laertius 9.19) that
"most things give way to mind" (*ta polla
hesso nou*). Accepting the conjecture proposed by the
classical scholar Meric Casaubon, Bayle took Xenophanes to be
asserting that God was unable to make all things conform to his
benevolent will. Bayle then assembled a set of texts in support of the
view that in fact the amount of evil in the universe far exceeds the
amount of good. Bayle's article sparked a reply from Leibniz (in
his Theodicee of 1710). In his Candide (1759), Voltaire
supported Bayle's view by ridiculing Leibniz's contention
that this is the best of all possible worlds. Although there may be no
direct line of influence, we may also consider Feuerbach's
critique of religious belief as a 'projection' of human
attributes, and Freud's analysis of religious belief as an
instance of 'wish-fulfillment', as two modern successors
to Xenophanes' observation of the general tendency of human
beings to conceive of divine beings in terms of their own attributes
and capacities.



Xenophanes' most enduring philosophical contribution was
arguably his pioneering exploration of the conditions under which
human beings can achieve knowledge of the certain truth. The
distinction between knowledge and true opinion set out in B34 quickly
became an axiom of ancient Greek accounts of knowledge and survives in
modern garb as the 'belief' and 'truth'
conditions of the 'standard' or 'tripartite
analysis' of knowledge. It can be plausibly argued that every
later Greek thinker, at least until the time of Aristotle, undertook
to respond to the basic challenge posed in Xenophanes'
B34--how, given the severely limited character of human
experience, anyone can plausibly claim to have discovered the truth
about matters lying beyond anyone's capacity to observe
first-hand. Xenophanes may also be credited with expanding the range
of topics considered appropriate for philosophical inquiry and
discussion. His Ionian predecessors had initiated the study of
phenomena "above the heavens and below the earth" but, so
far as we know, they did not turn their critical fire against the
leading poets of ancient Greece nor did they seek through their
teachings to correct or improve the conduct of their fellow citizens.
Although many aspects of his thought remain the subject of scholarly
debate, Xenophanes was clearly a multi-dimensional thinker who left
his mark on many aspects of later Greek thought.