## 1. The Nature and Scope of the Doctrine



The doctrine of Vision in God is easily misunderstood. It is not the
view that we see God's essence - that vision *in*
God is vision *of* God - though Malebranche's chief
critic, the Cartesian Antoine Arnauld, charged that it was. It is also
not the view that corporeal objects, such as olive trees and Old
English sheepdogs, reside in God, or that God himself is corporeal.
The former would make Malebranche an idealist or an immaterialist, the
latter a Spinozist, but he rejects all such epithets.



To appreciate Malebranche's epistemological theory, one must
remember that he was an orthodox Cartesian dualist and an orthodox
Christian. Like Descartes, he maintained that there are two kinds of
created substance - minds and bodies - and that the
essence of bodies is extension (or spatial dimension). God, in turn,
is an infinite, all-perfect, spiritual being. On this traditional
Christian conception, it would be heresy to identify God with his
creatures, to suppose that God was extended, or to pretend to fathom
God's essence. Concerning the latter, Malebranche stressed that
we don't see God as he is in himself, for God's essence is
perfectly simple, and by his grace we see only the diversity of
particular beings. God's simplicity also entails that he is not
extended:



> 
> 
> God's essence is his own absolute being, and minds do not see
> the divine substance taken absolutely but only as relative to
> creatures and to the degree that they can participate in it. What they
> see in God is very imperfect, whereas God is most perfect. They see
> matter that is shaped, divisible, and so on, but there is nothing
> divisible or shaped in God, for God is all being, since he is infinite
> and comprehends everything; but he is no being in particular. Yet what
> we see is but one or more particular beings, and we do not understand
> this perfect simplicity of God, which includes all beings.
> (*Search* 3.2.6, OC 1:439; LO 231)
> 
> 
> 



Here Malebranche underscores another feature of God: the divine
substance is not any particular being but 'all being' or
what he elsewhere calls 'being in general.' We can see
material beings in God precisely because he is indeterminate; in
seeing creatures we are seeing how they determinately
'participate in' or 'imitate' his
perfections.



In conceiving God as 'being in general' Malebranche
borrows much from the thirteenth-century scholastic thinker St. Thomas
Aquinas. Aquinas also conceives God as simple and indeterminate, and
thinks it follows from this that we, with our finite minds, cannot
fathom God's essence, and so must know him through his effects.
Malebranche qualifies this last point somewhat by saying that we know
God through his *possible* (material) effects, that is,
relative to what he *can* produce. Indeed, Malebranche holds
that in God we see an infinity of possible worlds:



> 
> 
> When you contemplate ... extension, you still see only the
> archetype both of the material world in which we live, and of an
> infinity of other possible worlds. You are then actually seeing the
> divine substance, for that alone is visible or capable of enlightening
> the mind. But you do not see it in itself or as it really is. You see
> it only in its relation to material creatures, only as it is
> participable by or representative of them. Consequently, it is not
> strictly speaking God whom you see, but only the matter he can produce.
> (Dialogue 2, OC 12:51; JS 21)
> 
> 
> 



As we have seen, there are no particular beings in God, for God is
simple and general. But still Malebranche will insist that we
*see* material objects in God. How is this possible? The answer
to this question involves another aspect of his doctrine not yet
broached - the theory of ideas. Malebranche defends a
representational theory of ideas, which holds that we don't see
material objects directly but only via the ideas that represent them.
On his version of this theory, material objects are unintelligible in
themselves and can be known only via something spiritual and
immediately present to the mind. Malebranche was not alone in the
seventeenth-century in endorsing representationalism; in fact, it is
often thought that he inherited this position from Descartes. Where
they clearly differ is in the ontological status they accord to ideas.
Descartes develops a 'Christianized' version of the
Platonic theory of innate ideas, according to which ideas are created
with us at birth and constitute the very structure of our mind.
Malebranche, in contrast, vehemently denies that ideas are created or
that they are modifications of finite minds, and instead regards them
as eternal, necessary, and immutable realities that reside in God. To
say, then, that we perceive material things in God means that we
immediately perceive ideas in God, and via these ideas, we
*indirectly* perceive corporeal objects. Ideas in God are the
'archetypes' or models that he uses to create things.
Thus, we can be assured that our knowledge of material things is of
the highest order.



As already noted, Malebranche restricts the doctrine of Vision in God
to our sensory perception of material objects and their properties and
to the abstract thought of mathematical essences. It does not
encompass knowledge of God's essence, for as we have seen he
thinks we know God only indirectly, by way of the material things that
he can create. But what about our knowledge of other things,
especially the self or the mind, or other minds? Why is that sort of
knowledge excluded from the doctrine, especially since as a faithful
Cartesian dualist he maintains that there are both bodies *and*
minds?



Given his theory of divine archetypes for creation, Malebranche must
allow that there is an idea of the mind in God, but he does not think
God gives us access to this idea. We lack, therefore, what Descartes
would call a clear and distinct idea of the mind. And since ideas for
Malebranche are the essences or natures of things, he denies that we
have knowledge of the mind's essence. To be sure, he endorses
Descartes' *cogito*, or the claim that one knows
one's own existence. But here Malebranche distinguishes two
kinds of knowledge (*connoitre*) - knowledge through
ideas as afforded by Vision in God and knowledge through consciousness
- the latter being inferior. I have knowledge through
consciousness of the existence of my mind and its modifications, which
is just to say that I know them by an inner awareness (*sentiment
interieur*) that attends all of my thoughts, beliefs,
sensations, passions, etc. But this awareness is limited to their bare
existence and fails to reveal their underlying nature. Indeed,
although sensations and other such modifications of the mind are
typically strong and lively in their affects, they are 'confused
modalities ... full of darkness' (Dialogue 3, OC 12:65; JS
33). Malebranche's negative view of knowledge of the mind is the
natural complement to his theory of Vision in God. Following
Augustine, Malebranche often stresses that the human mind is not a
light unto itself, and that God (or what he sometimes calls
'universal Reason') is the only true light, that is, the
only source of truth and knowledge: 'Man is not a light unto
himself. His substance, far from enlightening him, is itself
unintelligible to him. He knows nothing except by the light of
universal Reason which enlightens all minds, by the intelligible ideas
which it discloses to them in its entirely luminous substance'
(Dialogue 3, OC 12:64; JS 32). The human mind is so utterly devoid of
cognitive resources, and thus so completely dependent on God, that it
cannot even know its own nature (for Malebranche on self-knowledge,
see Jolley 2000, Nolan and Whipple 2005, and Schmaltz 1996).



Malebranche thinks that knowledge of other minds is even more
impoverished (if this seems possible), for here we must rely on
conjecture. Other minds are not immediately present to us in the way
that our own mind and its modifications are, and so they cannot even
be known by consciousness. Instead, we must conjecture, on the basis
of our sensory perception of the behavior of bodies similar to our
own, that they are united to minds and that these minds are affected
with the same sorts of sensations and passions as ours. Such
knowledge, however, is 'very liable to error'
(*Search* 3.2.7, OC 1:455; LO 239). One might wonder why
Malebranche calls this 'knowledge' (*la
connoissance*) at all, and not 'opinion' or
'belief,' in keeping with the philosophical tradition. The
simple answer is that he is using the term broadly here to refer to
different forms of cognition - i.e., ways of perceiving
(*manieres de voir*) God, bodies, the self, and other
minds.


## 2. The Distinction between Ideas and Sensations



In the last section, we learned that there are no particular things in
God, but what about particular *ideas*? Malebranche sometimes
writes as if there are, and one commentator has argued that he was
committed to such a view in the first edition of the *Search*
(Gueroult 1955-9, vol. 1, 63f). This has since been disputed
(see Schmaltz 2000, 72 and note 39), but whatever the case,
Malebranche tends in later editions of the *Search* and in his
later writings generally to treat ideas as general and abstract. This
is true both of the various geometrical ideas that we see in God and
of the idea of extension: 'when I said that we see different
bodies through the knowledge we have of God's perfections that
represent them, I did not exactly mean that there are in God certain
particular ideas that represent each body individually ...'
(Elucidation 10, OC:154; LO 627). Beginning with the
*Elucidations*, Malebranche employs the term
'intelligible extension' to denote the general idea of
extension, and to distinguish it from actual extension, which again is
*un*intelligible in itself. In addition to being general, ideas
in God are also 'pure' in the Cartesian sense that they
are non-sensuous. Intelligible extension, then, is just the idea of
geometrical extension and its properties, or what in the
seventeenth-century came to be known as the 'primary
qualities.' Malebranche reduces these to two - figure
(i.e., size and shape) and motion.



These two characteristic features of ideas raise the following
questions:



> 
> 
> If intelligible extension is pure, then how can it represent
> *sensible* objects? Following Descartes, Malebranche wanted to
> highlight the intellectual character of sense perception, but has he
> done so at the expense of its sensory component?
> 
> 
> 
> Supposing that intelligible extension does represent sensible objects
> how, as a *general* idea, can it represent *particular*
> objects?
> 
> 
> 



To answer these questions we must first uncover an important
distinction that Malebranche draws between ideas on the one hand and
sensations on the other. As we have already discovered, ideas are in
God and are cosubstantial with his substance. Sensations of colors,
sounds, odors, heat, pleasure, etc., on the other hand, are
modifications of finite minds. Another important difference is that
ideas are intrinsically representational, whereas sensations are not.
The idea of a pyramid, for example, represents an actual pyramid in
the sense that it resembles it, but the sensation of pain that one
experience's when, say, accidentally lacerating one's arm,
in no way resembles the wounded tissue. Ideas and sensations, then,
are very different kinds of entity, but Malebranche maintains that
sense perception combines elements of each.



> 
> 
> When we perceive something sensible, two things are found in our
> perception: *sensation* and pure *idea*. The sensation
> is a modification of our soul, and it is God who causes it in us. As
> for the idea found in conjunction with the sensation, it is in God,
> and we see it because it pleases God to reveal it to us.
> (*Search* 3.2.6, OC 1:445; LO 234)
> 
> 
> 



The composite character of sense perception provides answers to both
of our questions. Malebranche explains:



> 
> 
> intelligible extension becomes visible and represents a certain body
> in particular only by means of color, because it is only by the
> variety of colors that we judge the difference between the objects we
> see.... [A]s the sensations of color are essentially different,
> by means of them we judge the variety of bodies. If I distinguish your
> hand from your coat and both from the air surrounding them, this is
> because the sensations of light or color that I have of them are very
> different (Dialogue 1, OC 12:46-7; JS 17).
> 
> 
> 
> we see or sense a given body when its ideas, i.e., when some figure
> composed of intelligible and general extension, becomes sensible and
> particular through color or some other sensible perception by which
> its idea affects the soul and that the soul ascribes to it, for the
> soul almost always projects its sensations on an idea that strikes it
> in lively fashion. (Elucidation 10, OC 3:152; LO 626)
> 
> 
> 



In sense perception the mind 'projects' its sensations
onto intelligible extension, or some determinate part of it, thereby
rendering sensible what is otherwise abstract and general. It was a
common view in the seventeenth century that sensations of color and
light, in particular, also serve another function in sense perception:
they enable us to discriminate shapes and, correlatively, individual
bodies. As illusionists of the age were well aware, one can make a
woman appear headless if her head is covered with something that
blends into the background (such as a black hood against a black
curtain) and she is dressed in clothing that is color-contrasting. In
these passages, Malebranche applies this general point to explain how
the sensations of color and light individuate intelligible extension
and thereby yield sensory perceptions of *particular* objects.
Sensations both 'sensualize' and
'particularize' intelligible extension, and thus make it
possible for us to see particular sensible objects in it.



In characterizing the relation between ideas and sensations here,
Malebranche relies partially on metaphors. He speaks of
'projecting' our sensations onto ideas and elsewhere he
compares intelligible extension to a canvas onto which sensations are
'painted' (OC 6:78). Some commentators have attempted to
unpack these metaphors and to offer a more specific account of the
relation between ideas and sensations in sense perception. They
attribute an 'adverbial theory' of sensation to
Malebranche. Since sensations are nonrepresentational, they do not
constitute an extra object of perception over and above the general
idea of extension and the material objects they represent. In other
words, we do not perceive sensations; we directly perceive ideas and
via these ideas we indirectly perceive corporeal objects. Given this
account of the intentionality of perception, sensations are best
understood adverbially, that is, as a *way* of perceiving
objects in the world. For example, when observing the setting sun, it
would be most accurate to say not that one senses 'red,'
but that one senses redly (see Jolley 2000, 37f; Nadler 1992, 64; Pyle
2003, 57, 63-5 and Radner 1978, 89). However, more recent
discussions have cast serious doubts on whether Malebranche could be
committed to an adverbial theory of sense perception, for a variety of
different reasons (see Nolan 2012, Ott 2014, and Simmons 2009).



In addition to the roles already discussed, sensations play one other
important function in Malebranche's epistemology. They provide a
kind of 'natural revelation' of the existence of bodies.
It is important to remember here that the idea of extension in God
does not reveal anything about the existence of bodies, only their
essence. Speaking once again of the composite character of sense
perception, he writes: 'There is always a clear idea and a
confused sensation in the view we have of sensible objects. The idea
represents their essence, and the sensation informs us of their
existence' (Dialogue 5, OC 12:113; JS 74). More strongly,
sensations 'make us judge' that there is an object in the
world corresponding to our perception (Elucidation 10, OC 3:143; LO
621). 'God joins the sensation to the idea when objects are
present so that we may believe them to be present....'
(*Search*, 6.2.6, OC 3:152; LO 234).



Although sensations provide a 'strong propensity' to
believe in the existence of bodies, they do not provide conclusive
proof or even evidence of their existence, for the senses often
deceive us (Elucidation 6, OC 3:55f; LO 569f). Malebranche notes, for
example, that 'our eyes represent colors to us on the surface of
bodies and ... our ears make us hear sounds as if spread out
through the air and in the resounding bodies; and if we believe what
the senses report, heat will be in fire, sweetness will be in sugar,
musk will have an odor....' (ibid., OC 3:55-6; LO
569). Like many of the mechanical philosophers in the seventeenth
century, Malebranche holds that so-called sensible qualities (colors,
sounds, odors, heat and cold, etc.) are not in bodies - which
again are to be conceived in terms of geometrical extension alone
- but are modifications of the mind. However, his point in the
passage cited is that the senses deceptively entice us to attribute
them to bodies. If they deceive us in this way, then it is at least
possible that they also deceive us about the existence of bodies.



If the senses do not provide absolute certainty about the existence of
bodies, one might wonder why God uses them at all for this purpose,
especially since Malebranche also contends 'faith obliges us to
believe that there are bodies' (ibid., OC 3:62; LO 573). Why
then don't the revelations of Scripture suffice? Why do we need
the 'natural revelations' of sense? The answer is that
like most Cartesians, Malebranche holds that the main purpose of the
senses is to aid and preserve one's mind-body union. If a lion
is chasing me or if I am in danger of being consumed by a raging fire,
I do not need to be absolutely certain that the lion or the fire
exists in order to know that it is in my best interests to flee. So
whereas faith obliges me to believe in the existence of bodies
generally, sensations inform me of the existence of those particular
bodies, such as my own body and those in its vicinity, which may
affect it positively or negatively.


## 3. Descartes, Augustine, and the Argument from Properties



Malebranche's philosophy generally owes much to the thought of
Descartes and Augustine. This is particularly true in the case of
Vision in God, which bears a striking resemblance to Augustine's
theory of divine illumination, but which is also informed by Cartesian
views about the role of ideas in cognition and the intellectual
character of sensory perception. One way of gaining insight into the
doctrine of Vision in God then is by regarding it as a synthesis of
Descartes and Augustine's philosophies of cognition. By
integrating their views, and using each as a corrective to the other,
Malebranche produces a new doctrine that attempts to preserve and
extend their philosophical insights while avoiding their limitations
and problems.



Let us pursue this inroad into Malebranche's theory of
cognition, beginning with his Cartesian inheritance. Descartes is
often read as holding a representative theory of perception, according
to which our perception of material objects is mediated by ideas.
Ideas are the immediate objects of perception and, via these ideas, we
are able to perceive bodies in the world. He encourages such a reading
in the Third Meditation, where he famously says that all ideas are
'as it were the images of things' (CSM 2:25, AT 7:37).
Descartes explicitly denies that ideas *are* mental images;
however, he suggests here that they are *like* images in the
sense that they represent objects in the world.



Why would someone hold such a view, especially as it seems to violate
commonsense? In cases where I am looking directly at an object that is
before me, such as a tree, I am inclined to think that what I perceive
directly is the tree itself, not some ideational proxy for the tree.
Proponents of the representative theory, however, are often motivated
by cases of non-veridical perception. In endorsing this theory
himself, Malebranche is no exception. When I hallucinate a pink
elephant nothing in the world corresponds to my perception;
nevertheless, my perception has an intentional character, i.e., it is
'of' or 'about' some object. Indeed,
Malebranche maintains that all thought takes an object, on the grounds
that 'To see nothing is not to see; to think of nothing is not
to think' (OCM 2:99, LO:320). Call this 'the principle of
intentionality.' If, in hallucinating the pink elephant, there
were not some object of my hallucination I would not be having a
perception at all. Ideas are introduced as a way of explaining how my
perception can be intentional even in such cases. Absent a material
thing, there must be some immaterial surrogate - call it an
'idea' - toward which my perception is immediately
directed.



Having established this result in the case of hallucinations, dreams,
sensory illusions, etc., the representationalist must find a ground
for extending this conclusion to veridical perception. For in
veridical perception the principle of intentionality could be
preserved without appealing to ideas. One could say that the immediate
object of my perception is some material thing in the world.
Malebranche eliminates this possibility by appealing to the principle
that all the immediate objects of perception must be of the same
ontological kind. One set of perceptions cannot have ideas as their
objects, while another set of perceptions is directed toward material
things. If non-veridical perceptions derive their intentional
character from being directed toward ideas, then so must all
perceptions; otherwise this principle would be violated (see Nadler
1992, 83).



*The Argument from Properties:* Establishing the representative
theory of perception is just one part of Malebranche's task in
defending the doctrine of Vision in God. Having argued that ideas are
the immediate objects of perception and thought, he must now deal with
a further question: 'where' are ideas? What is their
locus? Malebranche's answer of course is that ideas reside in
God, but in affirming this claim he is making his first important
break with Descartes. It is fair to say that this is one place where
Malebranche sees himself as correcting Descartes and using Augustine
to do so. Descartes had taught that ideas are modifications of human
minds. Indeed, Descartes would say that the ideas that figure most
prominently in Malebranche's doctrine - *viz.* the
idea of extension and the ideas of various mathematical objects
- are innate, part of the very structure of the mind bestowed
upon us by God. This means that Cartesian ideas are 1) finite mental
items and 2) created. Malebranche rejects both of these claims but,
ironically, he does so on grounds that appear to be at least partially
inspired by Descartes' own writings.



In the Third Meditation, Descartes stresses that insofar as they
represent things to us, ideas are real beings, even if the objects
they represent do not exist outside thought. The
'representational reality' of ideas falls short of the
actual being of things in the world but, nevertheless, it is not
nothing (AT 7:41, CSM 2:29). He reaffirms this point in the Fifth
Meditation and adds that the ideas of various geometrical figures have
'immutable and eternal' essences, as is clear from the
fact that these ideas resist efforts by our mind to deform them. For
example, once I have recognized that having angles equal to two right
angles is part of the content of the idea of triangle, I am compelled
to recognize this property 'whether I want to or not' (AT
7:64, CSM 2:45). In general, Descartes holds that so-called
'clear and distinct ideas' are such that I cannot add
anything to them or subtract anything from them (AT 7:51, 117-8;
CSM 2:35, 83-4). Although he does not mention Descartes as his
source, Malebranche develops these points in a way that leads to some
very anti-Cartesian conclusions. He too wishes to stress that ideas
are real beings and that they resist our mind's efforts to alter
them:



> 
> 
> I am thinking of a number, of a circle, of a room, of your chairs, in
> a word, of particular beings. I am also thinking of being or of the
> infinite, of undetermined being. All these ideas have some reality
> while I think of them. You do not doubt this, because nothingness has
> no properties and they do. (Dialogue 1, OC 12:37; JS:10)
> 
> 
> 
> You believe this floor exists because you feel it resist
> you.... But do you think your ideas do not resist you? Find me
> then two unequal diameters in a circle, or three equal ones in an
> ellipse. Find me the square root of eight and the cube root of
> nine.... [M]ake two feet of intelligible extension equal no more
> than one. Certainly the nature of this extension cannot countenance
> that. It resists your mind. Do not, therefore, doubt its reality.
> (ibid., OC 12:41-2; JS:13-14)
> 
> 
> 



So far, Malebranche has not said anything with which Descartes would
disagree: the fact that ideas have properties and resist our thought
demonstrates their reality. But Descartes also speaks of ideas as
'immutable and eternal.' Malebranche concurs with this as
well, and adds that they are 'necessary,'
'universal,' and 'infinite'. The idea of
extension, for example, is 'necessary, eternal, immutable, and
common to all minds....' (ibid., OC 12:42; JS:14) To say
that ideas are 'necessary' just means that 'it is
impossible that they should not be as they are,' and this is
something that Malebranche thinks is discoverable in thought
(Elucidation 10, OC 3:130; LO 614). Ideas are infinite in the sense
that they are 'inexhaustible.' One can discover in the
idea of extension, for example, 'infinite numbers of
intelligible triangles, tetragons, pentagons, and other such
figures,' as well as an infinite number of truths that can be
demonstrated of them (ibid.). The ideas of extension and the various
geometrical figures are also immutable (or unchanging) and eternal in
the sense that they did not come into being, and will not go out of
being. And although cultural norms and tastes may vary among cultures,
races, and periods, the truths of mathematics are universal and common
to all intelligences in the sense that all minds will, upon
reflection, discover the same ones. Such truths are not the product of
convention but are intellectual givens that impose themselves on our
thought.



From the claim that ideas are necessary, eternal, immutable, etc.,
Malebranche draws his first and most important anti-Cartesian
conclusion, namely, that ideas must reside in God and be
'coeternal and consubstantial with Him' (Elucidation 10,
OC 3:131; LO 614). Indeed, since Descartes affirms some or all of
these properties himself, consistency would seem to require that he
abandon his view that ideas are created modes of finite minds. If
ideas are necessary and eternal then they cannot be created, as
created things are contingent and have a beginning. Ideas also cannot
be modes of the soul, for 'it is clear that the soul's
modes are changeable but ideas are immutable; that its modes are
particular, but ideas are universal and general to all intelligences;
that its modes are contingent, but ideas are eternal and
necessary....' (*Search*, OC 2:103; LO 322-3).
Malebranche expresses his positive conclusion at times by referring to
God once again as 'universal Reason' or the intelligible
realm of ideas:



> 
> But if it is true that the Reason in which all men participate is
> universal, that it is infinite, that it is necessary and immutable,
> then it is certainly not different from God's own reason, for
> only the infinite and universal being contains in itself an infinite
> and universal reason. All creatures are particular beings; universal
> reason, therefore, is not created. No creature is infinite; infinite
> reason, therefore, is not a creature. (Elucidation 10, OC 3:131;
> LO:614)
> 



Although he appears to draw these results from tensions within
Descartes' theory of ideas, Malebranche finds additional support
and inspiration for the doctrine of Vision in God in Augustine's
theory of divine illumination. Indeed, it is often said that Vision in
God combines Descartes' representationalism with an Augustinian
or Neoplatonic ontology of ideas. The exact degree to which Augustine
directly influenced Malebranche here, however, is difficult to gauge
and one commentator has argued that the influence was minimal at most
(See Connell 1967). That having been said, Malebranche often writes as
if the lineage was direct and tends to minimize his philosophical
differences with Augustine over the nature of cognition:



> 
> It therefore must be, as St. Augustine says in 500 hundred places,
> that ideas are eternal, immutable, necessary, common to all souls, so
> that there are most certainly truth and falsehood, justice and
> injustice, eternal truths and laws; and that our souls are enlightened
> by the same ideas in consequence of the union that they have with this
> universal Reason which contains them all in its substance, which alone
> is the life and light of all intelligences.... (OC 9:933)
> 



Despite what he regards as general agreement, Malebranche
differentiates his view from Augustine's in two ways. First,
whereas Augustine spoke of seeing 'truths' in God,
Malebranche speaks primarily of (immediately) seeing
'ideas.' This minor difference stems from
Malebranche's tendency to privilege ideas and to understand
truth in terms of them. Truth is but a relation among ideas, though on
his scheme relations need not be anything real, over and above ideas,
for in perceiving any two ideas we can also grasp the relations
between them.



> 
> We are of the opinion, then, that truths (... such as that twice
> two is four) are not absolute beings, much less that they are God
> Himself. For clearly, this truth consists only in the relation of
> equality between twice two and four. Thus, we do not claim, as does
> Saint Augustine, that we see God in seeing truths, but in seeing the
> *ideas* of these truths - for ideas are real, whereas the
> equality between the ideas, which is the truth, is nothing
> real .... Thus, our view is that we see God when we see eternal
> truths, and not that these truths are God, because the ideas on which
> these truths depend are in God - it might even be that this was
> Saint Augustine's meaning. (*Search* 3.2.6, OC 1:444; LO
> 234)
> 



Malebranche speaks rather baldly here. He seems to deny truths any
reality whatsoever, but what he really wants is something weaker.
Elsewhere he draws a distinction between real relations like truth and
imaginary relations such as falsehood. He denies reality only to the
latter, and wants to reduce real relations to ideas (*Search*
6.1.5, OC 2:286; LO 433). Thus, the difference between Augustine and
Malebranche on whether we directly perceive truths or ideas in God may
be only nominal, for Malebranche is not denying the reality of truths
but merely reducing them to ideas.



Second, and more significantly, Malebranche self-consciously extends
Augustine's theory of divine illumination to material things.
Where Augustine limited his account to the intellectual apprehension
of truths that are eternal and necessary, Malebranche conceives Vision
in God as an all-encompassing theory of cognition that includes the
sensory perception of sensible objects in the world. Malebranche
believes that Augustine was prevented from seeing how the theory of
illumination could be extended in this way as a result of two
philosophical prejudices. First, he maintained that we see bodies
directly, without the aid of ideas. Second, like most philosophers
prior to the scientific revolution he thought that colors, sounds,
pains, heat, and other sensory qualities are in bodies. But of course
these qualities change. If these two prejudices are combined, as
Malebranche believed they were in Augustine's thinking, then to
say that we see material things in God would mean that God contains
objects that are changeable and corruptible. But this violates
God's immutability. Malebranche, however, thinks he has the
resources for avoiding this result:



> 
> We further believe that changeable and corruptible things are known in
> God, though Saint Augustine speaks only of immutable and incorruptible
> things, because for this to be so, no imperfection need be placed in
> God, since, as we have already said, it is enough that God should
> reveal to us what in Him is related to these things. (*Search*
> 3.2.6, OC 1:444-5; LO 234)
> 



Malebranche is able to extend the scope of Augustine's theory of
illumination as a result of what were then two recent philosophical
developments, courtesy of Descartes. First, the representational
theory of ideas allowed Malebranche to say that what we see directly
in God are not changeable objects but ideas or essences. In the case
of material things we see intelligible extension, which is immutable
and incorruptible, in keeping with the divine nature. Second,
Malebranche took from Descartes the view that colors and the other
so-called 'secondary qualities' are not qualities of
bodies but sensations or modifications of the mind (whether Descartes
actually held this position himself is controversial). Since bodies do
not have these qualities, the idea of extension need not represent
them, and once again God is spared from having to accommodate
changeable entities. It is interesting to note here that by reducing
secondary qualities to sensations, Malebranche can also explain the
variations we see in the primary qualities of extension. Even if
bodies are not colored, they still change their size, shape, motion,
and position. How can intelligible extension represent those
variations without violating God's immutability? The answer is
that it need not, for as we have already discussed, color and light
sensations 'particularize' extension and enable the mind
to discriminate shapes and, correlatively, all the other primary
qualities - sizes, positions, motions, etc. Sensations, then,
are responsible for all the variations we see in material objects.


## 4. Other Arguments for Vision in God



In the previous section, we examined Malebranche's most mature
argument for locating ideas in God in the Argument from Properties.
This argument, which first appeared in *Elucidations of The Search
After Truth*, highlights the Neoplatonic and Augustinian character
of Malebranchean ideas and reveals his efforts to correct Descartes.
When coupled with the Cartesian view that all perception is
representational, it provides one of Malebranche's strongest
supports for Vision in God.



When first introducing the doctrine of Vision in God in the
*Search*, however, he takes a different tack. There he presents
a negative, or eliminative, argument in which he enumerates five
competing theories of how material objects are known, and then
systematically eliminates each one until only Vision in God remains.
For such an argument to succeed, one must ensure that the enumeration
is complete - that it exhausts all *possible* theories.
Malebranche clearly thinks that he satisfies this requirement, though
critics from John Locke onwards have complained that it does not. Some
recent commentators have attempted to show why Malebranche's
enumeration is, indeed, complete or at least why he thinks it is
(Connell 1967, 162; Nadler 1992, 138-140).



But rather than pursue that line of thought, we might note something
else about Malebranche's strategy: he does not rest content with
the standard structure of an eliminative argument. After raising
doubts about the four other theories, he marshals various positive
arguments in support of vision in God. One might think that
Malebranche is simply making as strong a case as possible for his
preferred theory or, since he has these other arguments ready to hand,
displaying them for his readers' edification. But when his
positive arguments are examined carefully, one finds that many of the
same reasons are used to cast doubt upon the rival theories. It would
appear that as much as trying to convince the reader of Vision in God,
the Argument from Elimination lays the groundwork for that doctrine by
prefiguring the positive reasons in favor of it or, to put it somewhat
differently, by revealing what is required for us to have knowledge of
material objects. Malebranche holds that once one appreciates the
requirements or preconditions for knowledge, she will be forced to
conclude that only Vision in God satisfies all of them. Thus, behind
the surface of Malebranche's eliminative argument lies a deeper,
more positive approach. Given this understanding of
Malebranche's strategy, and in the interests of brevity, we
shall focus here on the positive arguments that he adduces in favor of
Vision in God.



Malebranche's arguments appeal primarily (but not exclusively)
to facts about the divine nature and about the relation between God
- the infinite substance - and his finite creation. This
reflects the theological spirit of Malebranche's philosophy
generally, but it is also a common strategy of the modern rationalists
(most notably, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz) to derive
conclusions about finite beings from considerations about infinite
being. Malebranche identifies five main reasons in support of the
claim that 'we see all things in God.' Before developing
these reasons, however, he reminds the reader of two other
considerations, introduced previously, that provide a prima facie case
in favor of Vision in God. First, there must be ideas of all created
beings in God, for otherwise he would not have been able to create.
The view that 'blind creation' is impossible is part of
Malebranche's Augustinian heritage, and relies on the intuition
that in order to create something one must have models or archetypes
of what one is going to create. Ideas, then, serve as these
archetypes, but they must be in God himself prior to creation for
otherwise there would something external to God constraining what he
could create, which would violate his omnipotence or supreme power.
God can have the ideas of all things within him because he contains an
infinite number of perfections and, as discussed in section 2, he sees
all possible beings by considering how his perfections can be imitated
in finite ways. There is a deeper intuition here as well, and that is
that if God is truly wise or omniscient then creation must be an
intelligible and rational process whereby God acts in accordance with
certain standards. Malebranche rejects Descartes' doctrine that
the created universe is an arbitrary product of God's
indifferent will. Ideas in God, then, constitute these eternal and
immutable standards.



Second, Malebranche holds that created minds enjoy an intimate union
with God even in this life, as a result of our complete and utter
dependence on the creator. As a result of this union, God is always
'present' to our mind. Speaking metaphorically,
Malebranche says that God is, in a sense, the 'place' of
minds as space is the place of bodies. On the basis of these two
considerations, Malebranche concludes that God could, if he saw fit,
cause finite minds to see all things in him: 'the mind surely
can see what in God represents created beings, since what in God
represents created beings is very spiritual, intelligible, and present
to the mind. Thus, the mind can see God's works in Him, provided
that God wills to reveal to it what in Him represents them'
(*Search* 3.2.6, OC 1:437; LO 230). Since the ideas of all
things are already in God *and* our minds enjoy an intimate
union with him at all times, it is easy to see how God could make us
see all things in him. But, again, Malebranche does not intend these
considerations to be decisive, only to show how Vision in God is
possible and 'conforms to reason' (ibid., OC 1:438; LO
230). The introduction of these considerations is primarily strategic,
for he then proceeds to develop and reinforce them in his five main
arguments, to which we now turn:


1. *The Simplicity of the Divine Ways*: Having already highlighted
the rational character of creation in the first consideration,
Malebranche begins this argument with another such point that once
again underscores God's wisdom. God always creates in the
simplest of ways. This is a consequence not only of his simplicity,
but also of his wisdom and power.



God never does in very complicated fashion what can be done in a very
simple and straightforward way. For God never does anything uselessly
and without reason. His power and wisdom are not shown by doing lesser
things with greater means - that is contrary to reason and
indicates a limited intelligence. Rather, they are shown by doing
greater things with very simple and straightforward means (ibid.).



How is Vision in God simpler? And simpler than what? One of the
alternative theories that he considers in the Argument from
Elimination is that God creates a complete set of innate ideas within
each mind. But our mind is capable of thinking of an infinite number
of figures, numbers, etc. Thus, if this alternative theory were true,
it would mean God would have to create an infinite set of ideas for
every finite mind. But as God already contains within his
understanding a complete set of ideas or archetypes for creation, it
is far simpler for him to reveal them to us, to allow us to see all
things in him.



One should not underestimate the intended force of this argument.
Malebranche is not conceding that God *could have* stocked
every mind with a complete set of innate ideas but just happened to
act in accordance with his simplicity. One commentator has noted that
in the first four editions of the *Search*, Malebranche begins
the argument by saying, 'although it is not absolutely denied
that God can make an infinity of infinite numbers of entities
representative of things with each mind he creates, nevertheless one
ought not to believe that he does....' Daisie Radner
concludes on the basis of this statement that the appeal to simplicity
is 'not considered even by Malebranche to be one of the stronger
arguments for seeing all things in God,' for it does not rule
out the alternative view, absolutely speaking (1978, 52). But this
conclusion misunderstands the sentence above that Malebranche
subsequently excised in later editions. To get a grip on what he means
we must compare similar language, and a similar point about divine
simplicity, to which Malebranche appeals in his theodicy (i.e., his
solution to the problem of evil). He attempts to justify the existence
of evil in the world by saying that although God wished to create the
best of all possible worlds absolutely speaking, he was constrained to
act in such ways as honor his attributes or perfections -
especially his simplicity: 'His ways must bear the character of
His attributes, as well as His work. It is not enough that His work
honor Him by its excellence; it is necessary in addition that His ways
glorify Him by their Divinity' (Dialogue 9, OC 12:214; JS 163).
For Malebranche, God's works and his ways (or means of creating)
must honor him; he therefore strikes a balance between the
'beauty of the work' and the 'simplicity of his
ways' (Dialogue 9, OC 12:215; JS 164). This is not the best of
all possible worlds that God could create, absolutely speaking, but it
is the best relative to the simplicity of his ways (Jolley 2004). In
making this point, Malebranche is not claiming that God could have
made a better world, for that would require violating his simplicity.
On the supposition that he is going to create anything, God must act
so as to honor his perfections; otherwise he would not be an
all-perfect being, which is impossible. The same point applies to
Malebranche's epistemology; here too divine simplicity
constitutes a side constraint on God's actions, such that there
is no genuine sense in which he could have created each mind with a
complete set of ideas. Divine simplicity demands Vision in God.
2. *Dependence*: It is a mark of Christian philosophy generally to
stress the dependence of created beings on God. This emphasis
manifests itself primarily in the traditional doctrine of divine
concurrence, according to which God not only creates but also
continually conserves finite minds and bodies in their existence. But
Malebranche thinks this doctrine has an air of mystery to it, and
fails to capture the magnitude and character of our dependence:
'that general and confused term *concourse*, by means of
which we would explain creatures' dependence on God, rouses not
a single distinct idea in an attentive mind' (OC 1:440, LO 231).
A proper conception of God entails that we depend on God in every way
possible, not just ontologically but cognitively as well. Vision in
God is the only theory that does justice to the latter, for on this
account God not only causes us to see material objects but he is the
one in whom we see them: 'He is truly the mind's light and
the father of lights' (ibid.).



The view that created beings depend completely on God informs
Malebranche's entire philosophy. Indeed, Malebranche
acknowledges this at the end of the chapter we are discussing, where
he returns to the theme of dependence and invokes the words of St.
Paul which he sees his philosophy as vindicating: 'In God we
live, move, and have our being' (Acts 17:28). It is sometimes
said that Vision in God is the 'epistemological correlate'
of Malebranche's Occasionalism, according to which God is the
only true cause (McCracken 1983, 66; Nadler 1992, 141; Pyle 2003, 56).
Where Occasionalism stresses our dependence on God's power,
Vision in God underscores our dependence on his wisdom. Without God,
we are both causally and cognitively impotent.
3. *Infinite Cognitive Capacity*: In his first argument,
Malebranche appealed to the fact that we are capable of thinking of an
infinite number of things, at least in principle, and this is obvious
he thinks from considerations of mathematical objects, which are
infinite in number. The question raised by the third argument -
which Malebranche declares to be his 'strongest' -
is how this infinite capacity is possible. He might have ended the
argument here by concluding that we must see all things in God, for a
finite mind is incapable of containing an infinity of beings. Instead,
he attempts to strengthen his case by observing a further wrinkle in
the nature of cognition. Malebranche asserts that whenever we desire
to think of some particular object we must first survey all beings and
then focus on the object we wish to think about. If we did not already
have at least a general and confused apprehension of the object we
wished to consider, then we could not direct our attention to it.
Malebranche takes this to be a datum of our experience, but the
underlying principle is of Platonic origin. Plato famously argues in
the *Meno* that all knowledge is recollection, for it is
impossible to inquire about that of which one is ignorant. One must be
at least dimly aware of all things one seeks to know, and thus
learning is more like remembering than discovering something entirely
new (cf. McCracken 1983, 66). Augustine (*On the Teacher*10.33)
had already adapted this argument for his own ends, and here
Malebranche is following suit.



So each of us is capable of thinking of an infinite number of things
and, more importantly, in thinking of any particular thing one must
grasp this infinity. It is at this point that Malebranche concludes
(for the reason given above) that this infinity of beings must be in
God, and that it is only through our union with God that these beings
are present to us in thought. How does God contain this infinity? Not
by literally being composed of an infinity of particular ideas, for
again God is perfectly simple. On Malebranche's conception, God
is 'being in general,' 'infinite being,' or
'being without restriction' (3.2.8, OC 1:456; LO 241). In
him, 'all beings [are] contained in one' precisely because
he is infinite and indeterminate. This point allows him to further
clarify the nature of cognition: 'not only does the mind have
the idea of the infinite, it even has it before that of the
finite.... In order for us to conceive of a finite being,
something must necessarily be eliminated from this general notion of
being, which consequently must come first' (3.2.6, OC 1:441; LO
232). Here Malebranche follows Descartes in affirming that the idea of
the infinite is conceptually prior to the idea of the finite, but then
adds a twist that pushes him away from Descartes (and closer to
Spinoza), namely that we conceive particular things by limiting or
negating the idea of the infinite.
4. *Causal Efficacy*: In this argument, Malebranche begins by
noting that ideas are causally efficacious 'since they act upon
the mind and enlighten it' and 'make it happy or unhappy
through pleasant or unpleasant perceptions by which they affect
it' (3.2.6, OC 1:442; LO 232). To establish that these ideas are
in God, he then invokes an Augustinian principle, namely that
'nothing can act immediately upon the mind unless it is superior
to it.' To make sense of this principle, one must envisage, as
Augustine did, a hierarchy of being in which minds are higher than
bodies and God constitutes the upper limit of moral perfection. For
Malebranche, these are the only substances there are. So it follows
that only God can act on the soul and, insofar as they are
efficacious, ideas must be the very substance of God.
5. *The Purpose of Creation*: In his final argument, Malebranche
appeals once again to creation, focusing this time on its purpose. He
maintains that as an absolutely perfect being, God can act only for
his own glory. There is nothing that he lacks for which created beings
somehow compensate. Thus, God created the universe so that his works
would reflect his perfections and, as much as possible, be directed
toward him. As conscious beings whose thoughts point beyond
themselves, minds are especially well suited to this purpose for only
they are capable of knowing his perfections. But don't we know
other things besides God? Yes, Malebranche will answer, but given
God's aim in creation we can know his works only if we also see
him to some extent (3.2.6, OC 1:442-3; LO 233). Vision in God
satisfies this requirement, for it affirms that we see all things in
God by way of ideas that are identical with his substance.


## 5. Efficacious Ideas



Malebranche is a philosopher whose thought developed markedly over
time. In part this was due to his lively engagement with critics and
his attempts to respond to their objections, and also to his
recognition that his doctrines required further articulation than he
had provided in earlier writings. One of the most significant
developments to the theory of Vision in God was the view that ideas
are causally efficacious. Malebranche had already argued that ideas
have properties - necessity, eternality, immutability,
universality, etc. - but in response to an objection by his
Cartesian critic Pierre-Sylvain Regis, he came to ascribe
causal powers to them as well. This new theory is introduced in the
context of the claim that the mind is united to God, even in this
life. It is because of this union, Malebranche maintains, that Vision
in God is possible. We are always in immediate contact with being in
general and so can focus our attention on the idea of intelligible
extension at any time or immediately perceive it in sense
perception.



Regis was rightly curious about the nature of this union with
God. Malebranche had spoken metaphorically of the
'presence' of God to the mind, but without ever specifying
what he meant. Regis noted that this union cannot be understood
on the model of the union of one body with another, for that requires
actual physical contact; nor should it be thought to resemble the
mind's union with the body, for that would make the mind and God
mutually dependent on each other, and the infinite being depends on
nothing. No, Regis argued, the only viable way to understand
the God-mind union is on the model of cause to effect, respectively.
At this point he uncovers an important objection that he had been
anticipating: if mind-God union is to be understood causally, then it
is still possible that we perceive bodies by means of ideas that are
in us, but caused by bodies themselves, as Descartes himself had
taught (SG 1:188; also see Schmaltz 2000, 76-7).



In his response, Malebranche attempts to exploit Regis'
suggestion but without leaving the door open to Cartesianism. Lacking
causal efficacy and being 'invisible' in themselves,
bodies cannot act directly on the mind in the way that Regis
had indicated. In virtue of being in God, however, the idea of
extension can 'affect' or 'touch' the mind in
various ways (OC 17-1, 282-3). In changes made to
previously published works, two years later (1695), Malebranche even
more explicitly ties the intelligibility of ideas to their causal
efficacy (Robinet 1965, 259, note 2). Readers are told for the first
time that the reason ideas are intelligible and bodies are not is
because only the former can act on the mind.



The theory that ideas are efficacious becomes Malebranche's
mature position, and to mark this development changes are made to
later editions of the *Search* and to other writings. With the
advent of this theory, it becomes easier to see the relation between
Vision in God and Malebranche's other main doctrine of
Occasionalism, or the view that God is the only genuine cause. Indeed,
one can regard Vision in God as a corollary to Occasionalism. As the
only true cause, God produces minds, bodies, and the various changes
they endure. The mind's nature is to think and to perceive, and
God produces those modifications via ideas, which are the instruments
by which he enlightens us.



Make no mistake about it, the theory of efficacious ideas marks a
significant development in the doctrine of Vision in God. One
commentator aptly notes that Malebranche's epistemology shifts
from being a vision *in* God to a vision *by* God
(Alquie 1974, 209). Ideas are no longer the direct objects of
perception, passively awaiting our reflection upon them, but the
active agents of cognition. Moreover, whereas on Malebranche's
earlier view ideas figured exclusively in the intellectual side of
perception, on the new version of the doctrine they cause both our
sensations and what he came to call our 'pure perceptions'
(*perceptions pures*). Malebranche had been reluctant
previously to say that ideas are 'sensible' lest he
attribute colors and other sensible qualities to God. But on the
revamped doctrine he can say that ideas are both sensible and
intelligible insofar as they causally affect our mind in different
ways (Schmaltz 2000, 80). 'When the idea of extension affects or
modifies the soul with a pure perception, then the soul conceives
simply this extension. But when the idea of extension touches the soul
more sharply, and affects it with a sense perception, then the soul
sees, or senses extension' (*Christian Conversations*3,
OC 4:75-6). Thus, the theory of efficacious ideas enables
Malebranche to offer a more unified theory of cognition.


## 6. Skepticism



One of the hallmarks of Descartes' epistemological project is
its obsession with refuting skepticism. Descartes begins his
*Meditations* by entertaining the widest and most radical
doubts possible so that he can defeat them once and for all. Some
commentators have suggested that Malebranche's doctrine of
Vision in God is also designed to refute skepticism, at least
concerning our knowledge of the essence of material things, but in
fact the relation of his epistemology to skepticism is more complex,
and he is best read as aiming for something more modest. Although
Malebranche is as obsessed as Descartes with finding the correct
method for discovering the truth, nothing like the Cartesian method of
universal doubt can be found in his writings. There is a very simple
reason for this: Malebranche refuses to take seriously some of the
more radical forms of skepticism. He never doubts that certain types
of knowledge are possible. The task of the doctrine of Vision in God
then is not to refute skepticism, but to show *how* such
knowledge is possible. The problem with rival theories of cognition,
especially Descartes', is that they encourage skepticism and
fail to account for the knowledge we clearly have.



At times, Descartes seems to allow that there are some truths -
such as the simple propositions of mathematics - that can never
be doubted, but in darker moods that carry the day he worries whether
an omnipotent deceiver might beguile us even about these. Malebranche,
however, is more impressed by Descartes' first inclination. That
I exist, that I have various thoughts, and that twice two equals four
are not subject to deception but are known by what Malebranche calls
'simple perception,' by which the mind 'perceives a
simple thing without any relation to anything else whatsoever'
(*Search* 1.2, OC 1:49; LO 7). He opposes simple perception to
reasoning or inference: whereas the former consists in a direct or
immediate grasp of something, reasoning constitutes an indirect
apprehension and involves more than one mental act (Schmaltz 1996,
24). Because of the latter, reasoning requires the use of memory,
which is subject to error and deception:



> 
> 
> For when we reason, the memory acts; and where there is memory, there
> can be error, should there be some evil genius on whom we depend in
> our knowledge who amuses himself by deceiving us.... [But] I am
> quite persuaded that he could not deceive me in my knowledge through
> simple perception.... For even if I should really suppose such a
> God, a God as powerful as I can imagine, I feel that in this
> extravagant supposition I could not doubt that I am, or that twice two
> equals four, because I perceive these things through simple perception
> without the use of memory. (*Search* 6.2.6, OC 2:370; LO
> 480-1)
> 
> 
> 



Malebranche does not quite say here why he thinks things known through
simple perception are impervious to the omnipotent-deceiver doubt,
though his examples provide some indication. Descartes himself had
said that even a malicious demon could not make him doubt his own
existence, *at least while he is presently attending to this
question*. Such doubts are self-defeating: if the demon deceives
me about anything then I must exist in order to be deceived. Rather
than offering an explanation of this kind, Malebranche is content here
simply to report on his own psychological response to the
'extravagant supposition' of a deceiving God, which fails
to instill doubts in him about such simple truths. This supposition,
however, does cause him to doubt things that depend on inference and
here he is quite explicit that this is due to the fallibility of
memory.



To defeat doubts of the latter variety, Malebranche thinks, 'It
is ... necessary to know by simple perception and not by inference
that God is not a deceiver, because reasoning can always be mistaken
if we assume God to be a deceiver' (ibid., OC 2:371; LO 481).
Malebranche is indicating here his own analysis of, and solution to,
the infamous Cartesian Circle. As he sees it, the Circle results from
'ordinary proofs of the existence and the perfections of
God' that involve inferences and hence are subject to the very
doubts that their conclusions are designed to dispel. Since on his
view, simple perceptions are not subject to doubts of this or any
kind, the only way to defeat the omnipotent deceiver doubt is by
establishing that God exists and is perfectly benevolent from
'proofs' by simple perception. The term
'proofs' here may seem confusing, given
Malebranche's distinction between simple perception and
inference, but he uses it loosely to refer to his version of the
ontological 'argument,' where God's existence is
established directly from the idea of an infinite or supremely perfect
being. Malebranche thinks that one of the virtues of the doctrine of
Vision in God is that it provides such a proof by simple perception.
Recall from our earlier discussion in section 4 that Malebranche
thinks we have an infinite cognitive capacity; for example, we can
think of any one of an infinite number of geometrical figures. A
precondition for this capacity, he maintains, is that we be in
constant and immediate union with the idea of being in general, which
we then delimit in various ways when thinking 'square,'
'circle,' etc. But the idea of being in general or the
infinite can't be in any finite thing such as our mind. It can
only be in God - more precisely, it can only *be* God
himself, for there can be only one infinite or all-encompassing
being:



> 
> 
> we can only apprehend the infinite in the infinite itself.... For
> the first principle of our knowledge is that nothingness is not
> perceptible, whence if follows that, if we think of the infinite, it
> must exist. We also see that God is not a deceiver, because, knowing
> that He is infinitely perfect and that the infinite cannot lack any
> perfection, we clearly see that He does not want to beguile
> us.... (ibid., OC 2:372; LO 481-2)
> 
> 
> 



Although Malebranche sometimes refers to the 'idea' of
God, strictly speaking, 'The infinite is its own idea'
(Dialogue 2, OC 12:53; JS 23). And we can explain our infinite
cognitive capacity only by our union with this infinite being, who
must therefore exist.



In addition to thinking that there are some truths that are impervious
to doubt, Malebranche also has a different understanding of
Descartes' principle that whatever one clearly and distinctly is
true. Descartes maintains that when I clearly and distinctly perceive
something my will is causally compelled to affirm it. So, for example,
if I understand the proposition that five is the sum of two added to
three then I will spontaneously affirm its truth. But as one
commentator has noted, Malebranche has a normative, rather than a
causal-psychological conception, of clear and distinct perceptions
(Lennon 2000). Reason 'obliges,' rather than causally
compels, my will to assent. Indeed, I can resist a clear and distinct
perception, but only at the risk of 'feeling an inward pain and
the secret reproaches of reason' (*Search* 1.2, OC 1:55;
LO 10). This is significant because it explains why Malebranche
refuses to take some forms of skepticism seriously: skepticism with
respect to things perceived through clear and distinct perceptions is
simply perverse, for it violates norms to which reason demands
adherence (Lennon 2000, 19).



So far, we have seen that Malebranche is concerned to defeat some
forms of skepticism and is contemptuous and dismissive of others.
Although Vision in God plays a prominent role in defeating skepticism
of the first variety, regarding inference, its more primary task is to
explain how knowledge is possible. This point is evident in some of
the demonstrations that Malebranche marshals in support of the
doctrine, which have the character of 'transcendental
arguments.' Transcendental arguments typically begin with some
claim about knowledge that is taken as given. The transcendental move
then involves showing that such knowledge is possible only if some
condition, or set of conditions, has been satisfied. We might view the
Argument from Properties, discussed in section 3, as an example of
such an argument. Malebranche argues that the condition for the
possibility of knowledge of truths that are necessary, immutable, and
common to all minds or intelligences is that we see all things in
God:



> 
> 
> No one disagrees that all men can know the truth, and even the least
> enlightened of philosophers agree that man participates in a certain
> *Reason* that they do not determine .... I see, for example,
> that twice two is four, and that my friend is to be valued more than
> my dog; and I am certain that no one in the world does not see this as
> well as I.... There must, therefore, be a universal Reason that
> enlightens me and all other intelligences. For if the reason I consult
> were not the same that answers the Chinese, it is clear that I could
> not be as certain as I am that the Chinese see the same truths as I do.
> (Elucidation 10, OC 3:129; LO 613)
> 
> 
> 



Malebranche begins here by assuming that we have knowledge of
mathematical and moral truths. The problem involves showing
*how* this knowledge is possible, and he resolves it by
appealing to Vision in God. The Argument from Properties is not the
only demonstration in Malebranche's arsenal that has a
transcendental flavor. Indeed, one can view all of his positive
arguments for Vision in God, including those discussed in section 4,
as constituting an over-arching transcendental argument. Viewed in
this way, each of the considerations that he puts forth are not so
much separate arguments as they are separate conditions for the
possibility of knowledge that only Vision in God can jointly
satisfy.



Malebranche's primary objection to other theories of cognition,
then, is that they fail to satisfy these conditions and, in the case
of Descartes' theory in particular, encourage the
skeptic's claim that we lack knowledge. Descartes' very
conception of ideas as perceptions, or modifications of finite minds,
makes it impossible to guarantee that they accurately represent their
objects:



> 
> 
> For if our ideas were only our perceptions, if our modes were
> representative, how would we know that things correspond to our ideas,
> since God does not think, and consequently does not act, according to
> our perceptions but according to His own; and therefore He did not
> create the world according to our perceptions but in accordance with
> His ideas, on its eternal model that He finds in His essence
> (*Search* 4.11, OC 2:99; LO 320).
> 
> 
> 
> [T]o maintain that ideas that are eternal, immutable, and common to
> all intelligences, are only perceptions or momentary particular
> modifications of the mind, is to establish Pyrrhonism and to make room
> for the belief that what is moral or immoral is not necessarily so,
> which is the most dangerous error of all. (Elucidation 10, OC 3:140; LO
> 620)
> 
> 
> 



As discussed in section 3, Descartes insists that our ideas of
geometrical figures and the like are 'eternal' and
'immutable' (and Malebranche takes him also to hold that
they are 'common to all intelligences'), but Malebranche
wonders here how this can be possible if they are merely fleeting
modes of finite minds. To identify ideas with such modes suggests that
they are merely subjective representations that vary among perceivers,
and whose correspondence to reality can never be established. It thus
invites skepticism (or 'Pyrrhonism,' an ancient form of
skepticism, though here the term just means radical or universal
skepticism) regarding our knowledge of the essences of created
things.



Again, the virtue of Vision in God is that rather than encouraging
skepticism, it shows how knowledge is possible. If ideas are eternal
and immutable realities in God that serve as his archetypes for
creation, then there is no problem about whether they conform to their
objects. On the contrary, created objects must conform to them:



> 
> 
> It is certain that things conform to the idea that God has of them.
> For since God created them, He can only have made them according to
> the idea that He has of them. Now according to the opinion that I
> maintain, the idea that I have of extension in length, breadth, and
> depth is not a modification of my soul: it is eternal, immutable,
> necessary, common to God and all intelligences, and this idea is the
> model of created extension from which all bodies are formed. I can
> thus affirm with truth of created extension what I see contained in
> this uncreated idea. (OCM 9:925-6)
> 
> 
> 


## 7. Objections and Replies



Although Malebranche had his share of admirers and imitators, he also
had his share of critics. The theory of Vision in God was subjected to
severe and sometimes bitter attacks by some of his contemporaries,
especially Cartesians such as Arnauld and Regis who saw
themselves as defending the legacy of Descartes against a corrupting
influence. Fortunately for us, Malebranche was eager to defend himself
and his replies to criticisms often help elucidate and amplify his
original doctrine, as stated in the first edition (1674) of the
*Search After Truth*. In some cases, these replies are quite
extensive. Although the dispute with Arnauld ranged over other topics,
and was originally sparked by theological differences, it lasted some
11 years and occupies several volumes (four of Malebranche's,
two of Arnauld's) of their collected works. Some of
Malebranche's critics were dismissive of his doctrine.
'[Vision in God] is an opinion that spreads not and is like to
die of itself, or at least do no great harm,' John Locke was
reported as saying three days before his death (quoted in Cranston
1957, 478). Malebranche, however, could be equally disparaging of his
opponents. To his critic Simon Foucher, he quipped: 'When one
criticizes a book, it seems to me necessary at least to have read
it' (OC 2:496). But once the dust from the *ad hominems*
settled, several important philosophical issues became apparent. We
shall begin here by discussing objections to the doctrine that were
prevalent in Malebranche's own time and his replies to them.
We'll focus on *internal* criticisms, that is, objections
that purport to expose incoherencies, unsound arguments, and
inconsistencies with larger aspects of his philosophy (as opposed to
complaints, for example, about his Cartesian infidelities). Toward the
end of this section, we shall examine a few objections that have been
raised by recent commentators.



Let's begin with an objection that may have already occurred to
the reader. Malebranche claims that the idea of the infinite cannot be
a modification of our mind, for our mind is finite; it can only reside
in God, the sole infinite being. But anyone familiar with
Descartes' causal argument for God's existence, from the
Third Meditation, knows that he argued otherwise. We have an innate
idea of an actually infinite being that has been implanted in us by
God himself. How, as finite beings, can we contain such an idea? To
answer this question, Descartes drew an important distinction between
two aspects of an idea - its so-called 'formal'
being and its 'objective,' or representational, being.
Formal being is the kind of being or reality that ideas have in virtue
of being modes or modifications of one's mind. As such, they all
have the same degree of finite reality. Whether I am thinking of the
sun, my own mind, or an infinite substance, my ideas in this case are
all finite, formally speaking. However, insofar as they represent
different things to my mind, my ideas have different degrees of what
he calls 'objective reality,' exploiting a notion
prevalent among scholastic philosophers. The idea of myself as a
thinking thing, for example, has a finite degree of objective reality,
while the idea of God has an infinite degree of such reality. The
level of objective reality of an idea is determined by the level of
reality that the object it represents has formally. So Descartes
thought that as a finite being, my ideas must all have a finite degree
of formal reality, but they can have varying degrees of objective
reality all the way up to the infinite level. He would thus reject
Malebranche's claim that insofar as my ideas represent something
infinite, they must reside in God.



One should not suppose that Malebranche was unaware of
Descartes' distinction between formal and objective reality. On
the contrary, he casts the distinction in even starker terms: the
mind's perceptions have formal reality, and *only* formal
reality, for they do not represent anything beyond themselves.
Objective reality is reserved for ideas in God, the only
representative beings. But why can't ideas be perceptions in
finite minds? In particular, why can't our mind have an idea
with infinite objective reality? As faithful Cartesians, Arnauld and
Regis both raise this objection against Malebranche, though
using slightly different technical vocabulary. Instead of speaking of
formal and objective reality, they speak of something being finite or
infinite *in essendo* as opposed to finite or infinite *in
repraesentando*, respectively. Addressing Malebranche directly,
Arnauld writes:



> 
> 
> [I]t is not true that a modality of our soul, which is finite, cannot
> represent an infinite thing; and it is true, on the contrary, that
> however finite our perceptions may be, there are some which must pass
> for infinite in this sense, that they represent the infinite. This is
> what M. Regis correctly maintained to you, and what he meant by
> these terms, that they are finite *in essendo*, and infinite
> *in repraesentando*. You are not happy with this distinction.
> Too bad for you. (OA 40:88-9; also see Regis SG
> 1:194)
> 
> 
> 



Malebranche responds:



> 
> 
> [S]ince [the modalities of our soul] are finite, we cannot find the
> infinite there, since nothingness is not visible, and one cannot
> perceive in the soul what is not there. Similarly, from the fact that
> I perceive in a circle an infinity of equal diameters, or rather, from
> the fact that there are equal diameters therein *in
> repraesentando*, I must concede that they are really there *in
> essendo*. For, in effect, a circle contains the reality of an
> infinity of diameters. In order, then for a reality to be present to
> the mind, for it to affect the mind, for the mind to perceive or
> receive it, it necessarily must really be there. (OC 9:954)
> 
> 
> 



Malebranche's reply is subtle and lends itself to multiple
interpretations (see e.g., Nadler 1992, 41f; Radner 1978, 107-8,
110-18 and Schmaltz 2000, 73). One way to understand it is to
compare it to a causal principle that Descartes invokes in his
argument for God's existence in the Third Meditation. He claims
that the objective reality of an idea (such as that of God) must have
a cause with at least as much *formal* reality. Using this
principle, he concludes that only a being with infinite formal reality
can be the cause of the (infinite) objective reality of my idea of
such being. Now, Malebranche is not concerned with causes in this
context but with what is required for something to be present to the
mind; nevertheless, he is making the same general point: something
cannot give what reality it does not have. In perceiving a general
idea, such as a circle, we are able to perceive an infinite number of
possible diameters (and thus an infinity of possible particular
circles). Thus, the general idea of circle contains an infinite degree
of reality. If this idea were a modification of my mind, my mind
itself would have to be infinite, which it clearly is not.



How should we assess Malebranche's reply? To the contemporary
reader, the suggestion that ideas and things can have different levels
of reality or being sounds bizarre, but to his seventeenth-century
readers, especially his Cartesian adversaries, this was a common view.
Evaluated from that perspective, Malebranche's response holds up
well.



Let us now consider a second objection, related to the first. A good
general source of objections to Vision in God is Malebranche's
own *Elucidations*, which was first appended to the
*Search* in 1678, only four years after the original edition.
There he faces objections that had already been raised against the
doctrine, but also anticipates criticisms that were to be developed
later, such as Arnauld's worry that Vision in God reduces to
Vision *of* God, which we have already discussed. One of the
objections canvassed there raises a cluster of difficulties.
Malebranche claims that God is the locus of intelligibility, but why
couldn't this 'intelligible world' (*monde
intelligible*) reside in our own mind? God supposedly sees all
possible creatures in his own perfections, but why couldn't the
mind see extension at least in its own being? Malebranche subscribes
to what might be called a 'cognitive resemblance thesis,'
which holds that the immediate object of cognition must have the same
nature as the mind, which is immaterial or spiritual. According to
this principle, in order for the mind to see material things in
themselves, it would have to be material. But how is God any better
off here, as he too is immaterial? 'The soul is not material,
admitted. But God, though he is a pure spirit, sees bodies in himself;
why could not the soul, then, see them by considering itself, even
though it itself is spiritual?' (OC 3:147, LO 624).



To answer this objection, Malebranche stresses the distinction between
infinite and finite natures, as he understands it: whereas the mind is
a limited, particular being, God is 'universal being' or
'being without restriction' that consists of an infinity
of perfections. Because he is infinite and indeterminate, God can
contain the perfections of materials things in an
'eminent' or higher sense, without thereby becoming
extended. 'But as the soul is a particular being, a limited
being, it cannot have extension in it without becoming material,
without being composed of two substances' (OC 3:148, ibid.). The
thesis that God contains the perfections of created beings
'eminently,' as opposed to 'formally' or
literally, is one that Malebranche borrows from Descartes, but he puts
his own spin on it by conceiving God as a general being. Recall that
Malebranche appropriates this conception from St. Thomas Aquinas and,
indeed, invokes the saint's name here:



> 
> 
> God's ideas of creatures are, as Saint Thomas says, only his
> essence, insofar as it is participable or imperfectly imitable, for
> God contains every creaturely perfection, though in a divine and
> infinite way; he is one and he is all.... But the soul ... is
> a particular being, a very limited and imperfect being. Certainly it
> cannot see in itself what is not there in any way at all. How could we
> see in one species of being all species of being, or in a finite and
> particular being a triangle in general and infinite triangles? (OC
> 3:149, LO 625)
> 
> 
> 



The claim that God is 'being in general,' however, invites
further objections, both theological and philosophical. The God of
Christianity is supposed to be a personal savior who hears our prayers
and absolves us of sin, not an abstract
 universal.[1]
 It may be difficult to save Malebranche (or Aquinas) from this
objection, but one should note that the 'God of the
philosophers,' conceived of in purely intellectual terms as an
infinite and all perfect being, is already removed from the more
churchly conception. To add that God is universal being takes us even
further from that conception, though the Christian philosopher can
always insist that scripture need not be taken literally. Malebranche
himself maintains that his view of God follows from divine infinity,
which of course has a scriptural basis.



The conception of God as being in general also offended the
philosophical sensibilities of the seventeenth century, which tended
to favor a nominalist or conceptualist account of universals.
According to this anti-Platonistic view, which had adherents among
rationalists (e.g., Descartes) and empiricists (e.g., Locke) alike,
the only things that exist are particulars, and so-called universals
such as numbers or geometric objects are merely concepts or names. To
conceive God as a universal violates this creed and, in the view of
Locke specifically, makes God a bare abstraction (McCracken 1983,
139). Malebranche, however, maintains that the existence of God or
being in general is necessary to explain the very possibility of
abstract thought:



> 
> 
> the mind would be incapable of representing universal ideas of genus,
> species, and so on, to itself had it not seen all beings contained in
> one.... [S]ense can be made of the way the mind knows certain
> abstract and general truths only through the presence of Him who can
> enlighten the mind in an infinity of different ways. (*Search*
> 3.2.6, OC 1:441; LO 232)
> 
> 
> 



It is not clear, however, that the possibility of abstract cognition
*demands* Vision in God. Some rival theories of abstract
cognition, prevalent in the period, did not require a Platonistic
ontology, and arguably were more philosophically satisfying.



This brings us to yet another objection, concerning the ontology of
ideas in God. Following Descartes, Malebranche proclaims throughout
his work that everything that exists is either a substance or a
modification of a substance. Thus, it would seem that if ideas are in
God then they too must be either substances in their own right or
divine modifications. Malebranche explicitly denies the latter, for
God is immutable and thus 'incapable of modifications'
(Elucidation 10, OC 3:149; LO 625). But they cannot be substances
either for that would violate the theological doctrine that God is
perfectly simple (more on this below). Malebranche, it would appear,
is forced to abandon his substance-mode ontology: 'I believe
that intelligible extension is neither a substance nor a modification
of substance, notwithstanding the axiom of the Philosophers [that
everything is a either a substance or a mode]' (OC 6:245). One
must be careful, however, not to read this remark as conceding defeat,
for in the continuation of this reply to Arnauld and in the passage
above, he identifies ideas with God's substance:
'God's ideas of creatures are ... only His essence,
insofar as it is participable or imperfectly imitable'
(Elucidation 10, OC 3:149; LO 625). Perhaps Malebranche is not
inconsistent after all for, as it turns out, ideas are substances,
just not distinct substances. They are God's substance conceived
of in a certain way. The problem, unfortunately, goes beyond the issue
of whether Malebranche is inconsistent. We are never given a clear
account of the ontology of ideas; even in identifying them with God he
must rely on the Platonic metaphor of participation.



There is also considerable pressure in Malebranche's philosophy
*against* identifying ideas with God (even with all of the
qualifications that identification usually assumes). In holding that
God creates via archetypes, Malebranche seems committed to the
position that ideas are discrete, and not just as we perceive them but
for God himself. This may require only one idea of extension, but
there also must be an idea of the mind. This again raises the problem
of reconciling the theory of ideas with divine simplicity, a doctrine
to which Malebranche is strongly committed and, ironically, to which
he appeals in arguing for Vision in God (see section 4). Even two
discrete ideas in God would be sufficient to violate his simplicity,
and sometimes Malebranche speaks as if there are more. He recognizes
that there is a problem here: 'there is a great deal of
difficulty in reconciling the Divine Being's simplicity with
this variety of intelligible ideas that He contains in His
wisdom' (ibid., OC 3:137, LO 618). But his only solution is to
appeal to divine incomprehensibility. '[T]he divine substance in
its simplicity ... is beyond our reach....' (Dialogue 2,
OC 12:52; JS 22).



Far from trying to reconcile divine simplicity with his theory of
ideas, Malebranche seems to exacerbate the problem in some of the ways
he characterizes ideas. In Elucidation 10 and elsewhere, for example,
he speaks of the 'parts' of intelligible extension (see
e.g., Elucidation 10, OC 3:152-3; LO 627). This locution led
Arnauld and others to worry not just about divine simplicity but
whether Malebranche was a Spinozistic pantheist who identified God
with extension. Malebranche replied that by 'parts' he
meant *intelligible* parts, not spatial ones (Dialogue 4, OC
12:95, JS 58), but it is not clear how this solves the problem,
especially since these so-called intelligible parts continue to
function like spatial ones within his theory, becoming larger or
smaller depending on the object we are perceiving and our perspective
on it (Radner 1978, 117f). The charge of Spinozism would continue to
haunt Malebranche throughout his career and was developed with even
greater zeal by a former student named Dortuous de Mairan toward the
end of his life.



One recent commentator has tried to make sense of Malebranche's
talk of intelligible parts, in a way that preserves God's
simplicity and avoids the dangers of pantheism, by conceiving
intelligible extension as a set of "point-like entities"
that correspond to material extension. Jasper Reid stresses that the
former are not real points and that the relation between them is not
one of actual distance. Indeed, he maintains that these intelligible
points are points only in relation to the intellect that conceives
intelligible extension in a partial manner. One virtue of this
interpretation, he argues, is that it establishes an isomorphism or
identity of structure between intelligible extension and the corporeal
world without making the former materially extended (2003, 600).
Reid's view is motivated in part by the conviction that
Malebranche conceived representation in terms of resemblance.
Intelligible extension can represent the material world only if it
resembles it in some way. He sees Malebranche's talk of
intelligible parts as gesturing at the aforementioned structural
resemblance. Reid's view is very ingenious but it suffers from
philosophical and textual shortcomings. Although one other commentator
(Watson 1966) has argued that Malebranche conceived representation in
terms of resemblance, the textual basis for such a claim is rather
dubious (see Nadler 1992, 46f). More fatally, Reid's view
requires that one conceive of material extension as consisting of a
system of extensionless points, but, like other mathematical objects,
points are abstractions or idealizations that do not exist in nature.
As Malebranche notes in the Search, "Nature is not abstract: the
levers and balls of mechanics are not the lines and circles of
mathematics" (OC 2:277; LO 428). In short, Reid's view
works only if one idealizes material extension, something Malebranche
refuses to do.



Recent commentators have developed some of the traditional criticisms
of the doctrine of Vision in God and proposed new ones of their own.
These days many commentators are impressed by the link between
Malebranchean ideas and logical concepts (e.g., Jolley 1990, McCracken
1983, Nadler 1992, Pyle 2003). Whereas Cartesian ideas were
psychological entities or modes of finite minds, Malebranchean ideas
are abstract, logical entities residing in a third realm (over and
above minds and bodies). The virtue of this conception is that it
explains how two or more people can be said to be thinking of the same
abstract object, such as the number 'two,' and how various
properties, such as the Pythagorean Theorem, can be said to follow
logically from the idea of a right triangle. It also pushes
Malebranche closer to Frege, Kant, and other more recent philosophical
heroes, and makes him appear prescient with respect to certain
insights characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy.



On the other hand, it also resurrects with renewed vigor some of the
problems considered above. Most notably, if ideas are abstract,
logical entities, then they are even more difficult to reconcile with
Malebranche's substance-mode ontology. Indeed, one commentator
has argued that, to avoid inconsistency, Malebranche ought to have
made a clean break with the Cartesian assumption that everything is
either a substance or a mode in favor of a more
'trialistic' view that grants that ideas, *qua*
third realm entities, are *sui generis* (Jolley 1990, 79). As
abstract entities, it is also difficult to understand how ideas can
have causal powers, in keeping with the doctrine of efficacious ideas,
or how they can be identical with God's substance (Jolley 1990,
76f). In Malebranche's defense, one might note that the latter
problem arises only from regarding ideas as logical entities. Perhaps
ideas in God should not be conceived in this manner (Pepper-Bates
2005, 93).



Among recent objections to Vision in God, one of the most important
concerns the relation of intelligible extension to sensations. As we
have seen, Malebranche draws an important distinction between these
but also thinks that sense perception combines elements of each. To
the sensory component Malebranche accords a crucial role in explaining
how intelligible extension is 'particularized' or
individuated, so as to represent a material object in the world.
Sensations of color and light, he says, are 'projected' or
'painted' onto intelligible extension as if it were an
artist's canvas. The problem, however, is in understanding how
these radically disparate entities - ideas and sensations
- can have any commerce with each other. Even if we reject the
reading that ideas are logical entities, they are nevertheless general
and pure, and thus different in kind from sensations.



One proposed solution to this difficulty involves the notion of
'seeing as' (see Nolan 2012, 27-32).
Malebranche's painting analogy is merely a metaphor. Sensations
of course are not literally painted onto intelligible extension. In
fact, intelligible extension is not altered by our perception of it
since, like all things in God, it is immutable. Rather, we see
intelligible extension *as* a particular object, such as a tree
or a mountain, even though its intrinsic nature is very different.
These different ways of perceiving nevertheless qualify as cases of
seeing intelligible extension because, according to the doctrine of
efficacious ideas, it causes us to perceive it in these different
ways. In fact, when intelligible extension affects our mind with one
set of sensations, we see it as a mountain; when it produces another
set of sensations in us, we see it as a white-winged bird flying
against a blue sky, etc. Malebranche writes:



> 
> 
> there need be in God no sensible bodies or real figures in
> intelligible extension in order for us to see them in God or for God
> to see them in Himself. It is enough that His substance, insofar as
> the corporeal creature can participate in it, *should be able to be
> perceived in different ways*. (Elucidation 10, OC 3:152; LO 626;
> emphasis added)
> 
> 
> 



Later in the same work he adds: "we see all things in God
through the efficacy of his substance, and particularly sensible
things, through God's applying intelligible extension to our
mind in a thousand different ways" (OC 3:154, LO 628).



One attraction of this interpretation is that it also provides a
satisfying reply to de Mairan's objection, considered above,
that Malebranche succumbs to Spinozism by ascribing parts to
intelligible extension. Once again, Malebranche could avail himself of
the notion of seeing as: we see intelligible extension as having parts
even though it lacks real parts because it causes us to do so. Given
Malebranche's representationalism, seeing intelligible extension
in this way explains how we see the material world as divided into
discrete bodies (see Nolan 2012, 35-37).