## 1. Life and Works



There are several different dates ascribed to Sankara.
Early scholars placed him from 788-820 CE. Nakamura (1983:
48-88) argues for an earlier date of 700-750 CE, and
discusses the various dating theories at length. Potter (1981:
14-15, 116-119) places him from the late seventh to early
eighth centuries CE due to the dating of a contemporaneous Advaitin
named Mandanamisra (see Thrasher 1979 on
Mandanamisra's dating). There are no dependable
historical records of Sankara's life beyond his
written works which provide few biographical clues. Scholars are also
not clear about his religious identity. According to the Advaita
Vedanta tradition itself, he was Saiva (a devotee of the
deity Siva); but several scholars believe he was
Vaisnava, a devotee of the deity Visnu (see
Clark 2006: 159-170 for an overview of these theories).
Hagiographical accounts of his life, the
*Sankaravijaya*s (*Conquests of
Sankara*), were composed several centuries after his
death. They describe him as being born in Kaladi, located
in modern day Kerala. He became a renouncer at a young age, left his
family to pursue liberation, and spent his life travelling around the
sub-continent while teaching his pupils, engaging in philosophical
debate, and composing his works. He supposedly died at the young age
of thirty-two. (See Bader 2000 for a discussion of
Sankara's life according to his hagiographies).



Sankara was a systematizer of Advaita Vedanta, not a
founder. He viewed himself as part of a long lineage of teachers.
Sankara's teacher was named Govinda; and according to
tradition, Govinda's teacher was Gaudapada (sixth
century CE), who composed the
*Gaudapadakarika*s (*Verses of
Gaudapada*) on the *Mandukya
Upanisad*. The historical record of Advaita Vedanta is
obscure prior to Gaudapada (see Nakamura 2004 for his
extensive work on pre-Sankara Vedantins). Advaita
Vedantins trace their lineage back through
Badarayana (ca. first century BCE), who authored the
*Brahmasutra*s (*The Aphorisms on Brahman*), to the
individuals in Upanisadic narratives, and ultimately to
*isvara* (roughly "God") as
Visnu-Narayana or the teaching form of
Siva known as Daksinamurti. By this lineage they
claim the authority of Upanisadic teachers,
Krsna, and Badarayana as their own. The
corresponding texts of the Upanisads,
*Bhagavadgita*, and *Brahmasutra*s
constitute Advaita Vedanta's triple canon
(*prasthanatrayi*).



From a historical standpoint, Sankara's textual works
define his identity. He composed our earliest complete extant
commentaries on the *Brahmasutras*,
*Bhagavadgita,* and the ten principal Upanisads
consisting of the *Isa*, *Kena*,
*Katha*, *Prasna*,
*Mundaka*, *Mandukya*,
*Aitareya*, *Taittiriya*, *Chandogya*,
and *Brhadaranyaka* Upanisads.
Sankara's commentary on the
*Mandukya* is part of his extensive commentary
on the *Gaudapadakarika*s'
explanation of the *Mandukya*.
Sankara also composed an independent work titled the
*Upadesasahasri* (*A Thousand
Teachings*). There are hundreds of other texts attributed to
Sankara, but their authorship is questionable and most were
likely composed in later centuries by monastic heads who held a
"Sankaracarya" title. (See Potter
1981: 115-117; Hacker 1995; and Mayeda 1965a, 1965b, and 1967
for discussions of Sankara's likely works, as well as
Hacker's criteria for determining their authenticity. See
Sundaresan 2002 for some critiques and expansion of Hacker's
criteria).



Sankara was an exegete, philosopher, and teacher. His
primary commitment was to establish his philosophy of nondual
*brahman* as the subject matter of the Upanisads, and to
systematize Advaita exegesis by harmonizing the diverse and
potentially contradictory passages between Upanisadic texts. One
must note however, that Sankara does not attempt to prove
nonduality solely through independent reasoning. Such an endeavor is
not possible in his opinion because nonduality is not subject to
logical proofs (see Murty 1959 on the role of reason for
Sankara). He accepts nonduality based on the
Upanisad's authority alone. Nonetheless, he was an
original philosopher who constructed novel arguments to make sense of
the Upanisads, defend his positions, and critique his
philosophical adversaries. Sankara also shaped a
pedagogical method to approach texts as a means of knowledge. At the
same time, he left several open questions and ambiguities in his
writing, in part due to the different source texts of his commentaries
and the voluminous amount of his work. This has led to different
interpretations and several intra-Advaitin philosophical disputes in
the post-Sankara tradition (see Potter 2012).



Sankara purportedly established the earliest monastic
system in Brahmanical religion, including the Dasanami
(Ten Names) renouncer orders (see Clark 2006 on these orders) as well
as four or five principle monasteries (*mathas*) across
the subcontinent (see Cenkner 1983 on *mathas*). Many
Sankara-identifying lineages, along with the principle
monasteries, and several smaller monasteries, hermitages, and learning
institutions continue to flourish today in the living Advaita
Vedanta tradition. An unbroken lineage beginning with
Sankara's direct disciples, such as Padmapada
and Suresvara, continued to develop, defend, and expand upon his
philosophy into the modern period. At present,
Sankara's Advaita Vedanta extends far beyond its
orthodox cultural and geographical confines. Its streams of thought
continue to evolve due to the encounter with different philosophical,
theological, and socio-political contexts; yet the tradition as a
whole demonstrates a significant degree of philosophical continuity
from past to present.


## 2. Metaphysics



Sankara's metaphysical arguments defend
Upanisadic propositions claiming that existence is "one
only, without a second" (ChU 6.2.1). He follows the general
Upanisadic model that all known objects are compounded
permutations of a set of primary elements. This is modeled as
threefold, consisting of fire, water, and earth (ChU 6.2.3); or as
five-fold, consisting of space, air, fire, water, and earth (TaiU
2.1.1; see BrSuBh 2.3.1-12 for reconciling these two
different models). The elements emerge successively from
undifferentiated existence, at first in subtle (i.e., non-perceptible)
form. They then undergo a process of division and recombination, so
that each element includes portions of the others, to evolve into the
coarse (i.e., perceptible) "great elements"
(*mahabhuta*s). Perceptual objects are in fact
derivative products that lack existence independent of these primary
elements. These elements, however, do not constitute an elemental
foundationalism, nor do they bottom out in an atomic foundationalism,
because they are ultimately ontologically dependent on something else,
namely pure existence (*brahman*) (BrSuBh
2.2.15-17). *Brahman* is the nondual ground underlying
all objects, the single foundation (*adhisthana*)
on which the entire universe depends. All objects point back to this
independent ground and possess no existence apart from it.
Sankara argues that this foundational existence has no
dependence on a second thing. It is self-established, irreducible,
immutable, and free of space, time, and causation.



According to Sankara, a corollary of his position on
nondual existence is that the world we perceive is less-than-real or
illusory in some way in comparison to its ground. Though objects exist
within existence, their forms are merely concepts that we represent
with names (see BrSuBh 2.1.14 and ChUBh 6.1.4). They are
cognitive constructions; however, in Sankara's view
this construction is an epistemic error of attributing independent
reality to objects, not an ontological subjective idealism of
individuals mentally projecting the world. His commentary on BrSu
2.2.28-31, for example, affirms that we must assume perceptual
realism and rejects Buddhist Yogacara idealism. By knowing
nondual existence, one knows the reality of all things in the
universe, and recognizes their forms as merely names. The immediate
epistemic recognition of one's consciousness as numerically
identical with this ground of nondual existence is
Sankara's philosophical goal. This recognition is
synonymous with liberation (*moksa*), and entails an
absolute metaphysical wholeness by which the individual's mind
is freed from psychological suffering.


### 2.1 Existence, Reality, and Causation



Throughout his commentaries Sankara employs two related
criteria, dependence and persistence, to determine what is real. He
defines the real as that which does not change its nature, whereas
what is unreal does change (see, e.g., GKBh 2.6; TaiUBh 2.1.1). The
primary distinction here is change. Something which persists is more
real than what is transient because what is transient is subject to
negation. His canonical illustration is a clay pot. One may shape a
substantial cause such as clay into new names and forms, from a lump
to a pot to a plate. With each new form, the former is destroyed, yet
the clay continues through each. This example illustrates his
foundational discriminative reasoning of continuity and discontinuity,
which determines the relationship of what persists and what does not
persist between two things (see
 SS4.3
 below). Accordingly, the clay persisting through causation is
relatively more real than the non-persisting lump, pot, and plate
forms, because clay is not negatable. In this illustration, clay is
analogous to *brahman*, the underlying existence of the
universe, and the pot is analogous to objects.



Sankara also incorporates the persistence argument to show
that one term (clay) is independent of another (pot)--clay is
more real based on independence in causation. The pot form arises out
of the clay cause, is sustained by clay, and resolves back into clay
upon its destruction. The pot depends on clay for its being. Its form
and mass possess no objective existence apart from its clay substance.
Therefore, the clay is more real based on a hierarchy of dependency.
This hierarchical relationship reveals an asymmetrical
dependence--pot form depends upon clay substance for its being,
but clay substance does not depend on the particular pot form.
Sankara draws several important conclusions from this:


1. the metaphysical ground possesses more reality than the grounded
effect;
2. the effect is wholly reducible to its causal ground; and
3. therefore the effect is not different than its ground.



(See ChUBh ch. 6 and BrSuBh 2.1.15-20 for
Sankara's understanding of cause and effect; see
Potter 1981: 65-7 for a summary of his views on causality).



Everything in the universe undergoes constant change; however,
according to Sankara, objects cannot simply come into being
and go out of being. They must depend on something else, some existent
cause, for their being. Sankara argues that prior to
universe emergence, when all objects, time, and space, are unmanifest,
only primordial undifferentiated existence exists (see ChUBh
6.2.1-2 for example). This existence is a single potential cause
free of form; but even after the universe emerges, there is still just
that single cause. It persists through all objects and causation, like
the clay persists through its changing forms. He concludes that every
object, including the universe itself, is a temporal artifact, simply
a name (*nama*) and form (*rupa*). The entire
universe is not different from *brahman*, and its form is less
real than *brahman*. All forms are less real than existence
itself. Foundational existence is transitive, lending existence to
objects, like the clay to each of its forms. Furthermore, the
relationship is asymmetrical--pure undifferentiated existence
does not depend on objects, but objects depend on existence. Objects
borrow their existence from this metaphysical ground and lack any
independent being apart from it. They are not different than their
cause, and therefore their names and forms are only provisionally real
appearances.



In considering Sankara's position, it is questionable
where to locate the given existence possessed by objects in everyday
propositions like, "this pot exists", "this seed
is", or "the shirt is". How would one isolate the
object's existence within its particular form? For
Sankara, this question is misguided and unanswerable
because form does not delimit existence. When one encounters a form
and seeks its existence in the locus of its substantial cause, one
encounters another form that decomposes into further forms. For
example, the existence of a shirt depends on its causal cloth
substance; however, cloth existence depends on threads, thread
existence depends on fibers, and fibers are composed of further subtle
causes, *ad infinitum*. Similarly, we may view the pot beyond
the boundaries of an illustration--clay is the material cause of
the pot, but has further causes, like minerals and water, which
themselves depend on a descending chain of subtler causes.



Reductions of wholes to aggregates of parts, forms to further forms,
properties to other properties, effects to causes, or names to further
names are infinite. They never bottom out in a metaphysical
foundation. The proposition that an object's form delimits
existence crumbles because the regress defers an object's
existence to the next ontological level, an unending descent into
subtler causes or further mereological parts. Therefore, attempting to
isolate stable independent existence as delimited by a given form is a
receding horizon. The form's existence is self-evident at each
point, but forever out of objective reach. Sankara argues
that this non-finding of existence in a form or as a form should not
lead to positing the emergence of objects (e.g., properties, forms,
wholes, etc.) from non-existence somewhere in the chain of dependency
(a position he interprets as Vaisesika philosophy). Nor
should one conclude that if no unchanging ultimate essence can be
objectified, then everything must be empty of essential existence, and
therefore no metaphysical foundation ultimately exists (see ChUbh
6.2.1-2). He considers this latter position, which he construes
as the Madhyamika Buddhist, to be counter-intuitively nihilistic. It
also conflicts with his premises that existence is self-evident and
that it persists even as something evolves or devolves. Decomposition
chains do not reveal any disruption of existence, only disruption of
forms.



The philosophical upshot of Sankara's metaphysic is
that no form or object constitutes the fundamental ground of
existence. This explains why one cannot isolate existence itself
through hierarchical descension or ascension in the realm of causation
and objects. If this very effort is misguided, then the non-finding of
existence in an object does not entail an absolute absence of
existence, nor the object's emergence from non-existence. He
rejects the presupposition that objects possess a property of
existence, or that the object delimits existence in spatial-temporal
ways. Existence is formless and nondual in reality. Therefore, in
light of Sankara's theory of causation, one cannot
attribute independent reality to an object. Objects are divisible,
derivative, dependent, and transient. They are merely names,
nominalist wholes that lack any independent being. By negating the
reality of their name and form one discovers that objects are in fact
numerically identical to formless existence. If this existence is not
bound by space or time, which are also forms, it must be nondual. (See
Sankara on BrSu 2.1.15, ChU 6.2.2, and BhG 2.16 for
further discussion of these points).


### 2.2 The Appearance of the Universe



Sankara's philosophy is perhaps most infamous for
undermining the reality of the universe and its ultimate value. His
philosophical adversaries pejoratively labeled him a
*mayavadin*--"one who argues the
world is illusory (*maya*)". While this epithet
is not exactly incorrect, it misrepresents his intention as centered
on world negation, and ignores the fact that he infrequently uses the
term "*maya*" (see Hacker 1995 on his use
of this term). Sankara places great emphasis on moral
virtues and acting for the good of the world (see BhGBh ch.3 for
example and
 SS4.1
 below). Furthermore, the world is a pedagogical necessity as the
instrumental means to discover nonduality (on this, see Suthren Hirst
2005). His goal is not to negate the axiological value of the world
and intersubjective life (see Rambachan 2006 for a development of this
point). Rather, his focus is simply *brahman*. The world is a
dependent effect of *brahman* and therefore not other than
*brahman*, and *brahman* is not a cosmogonic
construction. This metaphysical view possesses epistemic value for
liberation, along with is positive psychological byproducts such as
cessation of suffering and the deepest happiness.



Given Sankara's absolute nonduality, how can he
explain the world's emergence in the first place? Later
Advaitins developed cosmogonic defenses to neutralize philosophical
rivals, including theories of *maya* as a creative
material cause equated with beginningless ignorance. Whether or not we
can accurately read such theories into Sankara is contested
by academic and traditional scholars (see Comans 2000: 263-7;
Doherty 2005; and Satchidanandendra 1964 [1989]). The more pertinent
point though is that Sankara does not require a definitive
cosmogonic story of world causation for his philosophical goal of
knowing *brahman*. He employs cosmologies as models that map
the empirical order in order to point back obliquely to nonduality as
already present as one's most primitive self-existence. These
models may be dropped after serving their purpose (see, e.g., GKBh
4.4.2; BrSuBh 3.2.21, 2.1.27, and 4.3.14). Furthermore, an
airtight philosophical causal account for a less-than-real world is
not possible. One strength of his position is a remarkable flexibility
in accommodating contemporary scientific cosmologies. It is more
accurate to read Sankara as ambivalent towards the world.
His approach is analogous to a dream character attempting to discover
the waking ground of their dreamscape. Analyzing the dream's
causation and illusoriness may be part of a method, but is not the
goal. The dream's illusoriness is only seen upon awakening and
recognizing the dream's waking foundation.



Still, the empirical universe presents an ontological difficulty for
Sankara because he is an epistemic realist. He accepts that
external objects are not individual subjective illusions because we
perceive these effects with intersubjective agreement. The world is
thus independent of mind and not wholly unreal. One may therefore
argue that he contradicts himself or falls into an excluded middle
(see Fost 1998). The universe either exists or does not exist, is real
or unreal, and cannot be both simultaneously. His solution is to argue
for a third ontological space--that the universe is an objective
but less-than-real appearance. This appearance, akin to a magic trick,
is *maya*. All objects are unreal in that they are
transient and dependent; yet are not non-existent like the horn of a
hare or self-contradictory like a square circle. His understanding of
what is unreal as a less-than-real appearance does not contradict what
is real. The universe of names and forms holds a unique ontological
position as indeterminable (*anirvacaniya*) as
*brahman* or something else other than *brahman*
(BrSuBh 2.1.14, 2.1.17; GK 2.34; see Comans 2000: 239-246
on indeterminability). It is not identical to *brahman* (even
though reducible to *brahman*), but is not different
either--it does not constitute a second reality. One may thus
view *maya* as a postulate by elimination to account
for the world's ontological inexplicability, intended to direct
one toward the unity of reality. In Sankara's final
philosophical position, there is only *brahman* without parts,
attributes, or causation.


### 2.3 Two-Tiered Reality



For Sankara, the existence of the phenomenal empirical
world alongside that of nondual *brahman* is in fact an
illusory false reality. They are one, not two. Yet the world's
indeterminable appearance sets up a two-tiered (or two truths or two
orders) approach to reality: (1) The conventional intersubjective
empirical reality (*vyavaharikasatta*) that
comprises the universe; and (2) the ultimate reality
(*paramarthikasatta*) of nondual existence that
is *brahman*. This hierarchy of two orders and their
asymmetrical relationship avoids their mutual contradiction. A
conscientious reader must understand this distinction and be mindful
that Sankara toggles his perspective between the two. This
distinction is also foundational for comprehending his views on
consciousness and his philosophical methods intended to culminate in
*moksa*, more on which below.



The empirical order is a provisional ontology, whereas the ultimate
reality is a final ontology. From the provisional empirical
perspective, our universe is well founded like the pot is founded in
clay. No object depends on itself, and its dependence is transitively
descending to the foundation of nondual existence. The
universe's relationship with this ground is dependent and
asymmetrical. This relationship collapses however at the ultimate
order of nondual reality. For example, Sankara can
provisionally speak of the relationship of pot and clay (akin to the
empirical standpoint); but from the perspective of cause and effect
identity, there is only clay (i.e., the absolute standpoint). The pot
form is a mere property, not a substantive. Despite its name and
function, Sankara does not ultimately attribute pot form to
clay because it possesses no being apart from the clay substantive and
is less real. Similarly, the order of ultimate reality is nondual
existence alone, with no second things like properties.



One cannot count two things, existence and object or existence and
property, as equally existing across two orders of reality. Nor does
causation cross between two orders. In fact, from the ultimate
perspective, the world (including the individual) is never truly born
because nonduality is not subject to causation. It has no parts, is
not bound by time or space, and is changeless (BrSuBh 2.1.14).
Similarly, the pot-space which appears to be delimited by the walls of
the pot does not delimit space itself--it is never truly born
from infinite space (GKBh 3.3-9). Therefore, the ultimate
reality perspective excludes any dependence relations to make sense of
metaphysical grounding. (See GKBh 2.32-33, 3.3-9 for
discussions of brahman as that which has no birth
(*ajati*) as the universe).



The clay-pot example falls short of adequately illustrating the two
orders of reality. Sankara's more apt illustration is
our phenomenal worlds of waking and dreaming, by which he can pump the
intuition that there is no objective causation between the two states.
For example, the dreamscape or an object like a dream clay-pot, is
well founded in the dreamer's cognition born of waking
perceptual memory. This ontological dependence is asymmetrical. The
dream pot depends on the memory of a waking pot cognition, but not
vice versa; however, the dreamer cannot discover that causation solely
from within the dream's objective reality no matter how hard
they reductively squeeze the dream pot. The dream pot's ground
is in the waking state, and discovering that waking reality
simultaneously falsifies the dream world. After awakening, there is no
dream to speak of, no level playing field for causation across the two
orders. Similarly, discovering the metaphysical ground of the
empirical universe transitions to the ultimate reality of nondual
existence, in which there is no world of forms to question and no
levels of hierarchy remaining. (See Ram-Prasad 2002 on
Sankara's use of the dream analogy).



In this way, even though Sankara assumes realism at the
empirical level in terms of veridical cognition, he negates it
metaphysically from the absolute level. This leads him to a position
of non-realism (Ram-Prasad 2002). From the empirical standpoint, these
two orders seem to exist simultaneously and possess an asymmetrical
relationship--the world is dependent upon *brahman* for
its existence, yet *brahman* has no dependence on the world
even though immanent in it. Only from the absolute standpoint does
empirical reality collapse into *brahman*. The ultimate reality
perspective metaphysically devours the world, all of its causation,
and even its status as an appearance. From the nondual standpoint
there is only *brahman*. *Brahman* never undergoes
genuine transformation (*parinama*) into the world,
just as a rope mistaken to be a snake does not actually transform into
a snake. Nor is the snake separate from the rope.


### 2.4 Isvara (God)



Though Sankara dismisses empirical reality from the
metaphysical standpoint of nonduality, the universe still possesses
value in its identification with *isvara* (usually
translated as "God" or "Lord" for lack of a
more suitable English term). Sankara is ambiguous at times
in differentiating *isvara* from *brahman*,
and uses several terms synonymously for both such as the
"highest lord" (*paramesvara*); but he
generally distinguishes *isvara* as the lower
(*apara*) *brahman* qualified with attributes (i.e., the
universe), from the higher (*apara*) *brahman* that is
absolute nonduality (BrSuBh 4.3.14). Following his readings of
the Upanisads, Sankara identifies
*isvara* as both the material and intelligent causes
of the universe (BrSuBh 1.1.2). *Isvara*
emanates the universe through a cosmic causal power
(*mayasakti*), and is the very process of
becoming itself, a beginningless cycle of universe manifestation,
sustenance, and dissolution. This process is an auto-cosmogony, making
*isvara* the material of the universe. As nothing but
*isvara*, the whole universe is sentient and
self-aware. (See Ram-Prasad 2013; Comans 2000; Hacker 1995; and
Warrier 1977 for further discussions of
*isvara*).



Following his reading of the *Mandukya
Upanisad*, Sankara likens the universe's
unmanifest state to *isvara* in a cosmic state of
deep dreamless sleep. Manifestation occurs when
*isvara,* as the intelligent cause, visualizes the
universe through memory of past universes. This projective ontological
capacity of *isvara* is analogous to an
individual's process of dreaming. Dreaming utilizes memory to
project a dream world that is not separate from one's mind
(BrUBh 4.3.10). The universe is similarly an effortless
manifestation of *isvara*'s knowledge, and
possesses no existence apart from *isvara*. The
universe's ongoing manifestation is concurrent with
*isvara's* perception of it like the dreamscape
is concurrent with the dreamer's perception. The
universe's very existence depends on *isvara*
knowing it, for *isvara'*s knowing is its very
projection into objective existence.



As the material cause, *isvara* takes form as the
universe through a processual cosmogony of subtle elements that
undergo a process of grossification, first into elements and then into
objects. On the level of subtle elements, *isvara*
functions as a cosmic mind named Hiranyagarbha, whose
unrestricted intelligence pervades the universe. This cosmic mind is
enlivened by its fundamental ground of consciousness-existence
(*brahman*). On the level of coarse element composition, the
perceptible universe is akin to *isvara's*
physical body or brain. In this form *isvara* is
named Virat. Sankara's view of the universe at
the empirical level, with its universal mind and fundamental nature as
consciousness, parallels some contemporary iterations of panentheism
and panpsychism, particularly top-down cosmopsychism; however, his
ultimate view of nondual *brahman* collapses any questions
about the individual derivation or instantiation of nondual
consciousness. (See Gasparri 2019; Vaidya 2020; and Albahari 2019 for
comparisons of Advaita Vedanta and cosmopsychism).



Individuals are microcosms homologous to the *isvara*
macrocosm; however, they are part and parcel of the universe. They are
ontologically dependent on *isvara* and lack any
objective ontological power of projection beyond subjective
projections like dreaming and imagination. While the individual has a
part to whole relationship with *isvara* from the
mind-body standpoint, ultimately there is only numerical identity
between the individual and *isvara* from the
standpoint of existence identified as pure consciousness.
*Isvara* is the "knower of the field"
(*ksetrajna*)--the core of subjectivity
present in all living beings and identified with *brahman* as
pure consciousness (BhGBh 13.2).


## 3. Consciousness, Mind, and Personal Identity



Sankara does not intend his position that existence exists
without objective location to be a paradox or a kind of obscurantist
mysticism (see
 SS2.1
 above). He believes the world is mysterious in that it is
indeterminable, but not so existence itself. His crucial point is that
the singular place to discover existence without objectifying it is
within the foundation of our own phenomenal experience--as
consciousness itself. Sankara analyzes consciousness
(*cit* or *caitanyam*) through both perspectives of his
two orders of reality. From the provisional empirical order,
consciousness is a witnessing presence (*saksin*) by
which all mental cognition is revealed as known. The absolute
perspective strips consciousness of all relational properties,
including intentionality and its status as a witness, leaving only the
intrinsic self-illuminating nature of consciousness remaining. He
identifies this pure non-intentional consciousness as numerically
identical with nondual existence, which is *brahman*.


### 3.1 Witnessing Consciousness



From the standpoint of individual experience, witnessing consciousness
is the locus of one's subjective being, the basic sense of
self-existence, and the foundation of self-identity. It is the glue
that unifies disparate forms of experience like waking, dreaming, and
different modes of perception, and it accounts for memory and
diachronic personal identity (BrSuBh 2.3.31; BrUBh 4.3.7).
This consciousness is distinct from an autobiographical sense of self
constructed through recollective memory traces. Sankara
distinguishes witnessing consciousness from the mind, mental
qualities, and cognitive modes. Consciousness is not composed of
physical materials, structures, or processes, whereas the mind is
composed of inert subtle matter. Consciousness is not an emergent
property of the brain and body, which are composed of inert coarse
matter, because that which is inert cannot give rise to sentiency.
(See Ram-Prasad 2001a on Advaita's consciousness and
contemporary physicalism).



Witnessing consciousness always accompanies cognition (see, e.g.,
BrUBh 1.4.10; KeUBh 1.2, 2.4). When one's mind assumes the
form of intentional objects, the cognition is immediately manifested
as known in the presence of witnessing consciousness. Consciousness
illumines cognitions directly with infallible access and without the
mediation of another mental mode. It reveals first order states of
cognition, including sense perception and internal states such as
affect and imagination; as well as second order states such as
introspection and meta-cognitive monitoring. Yet the witness is not
itself a meta-function of the mind, such as an inner sense, a higher
order cognition, or an introspective awareness that deliberately
recognizes the fact of one's experience. The witness is not a
separate substantial entity at all according to Sankara,
nor does it possess agency in revealing cognition as a knower. It is
intransitive and receptive, simply the passive witnessing itself
(BrUBh 1.4.10; TaiUBh 2.1.1; KeUBh 2.4). Only the mind possesses
object directed intentionality, not witnessing consciousness. (See
Gupta 1998 and Fort 1984 on witnessing consciousness. See Albahari
2009; and Fasching 2011 and 2012 for contextualizing witnessing
consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind).



Sankara understands consciousness as immediately evident,
yet outside the scope of any means of knowledge. As the illuminating
background of all phenomenal states, witnessing consciousness is the
presupposition of all epistemological knowing. It is intrinsically
first-personal. Consciousness is therefore not objectifiable (KeUBh
2.1). This conclusion further entails that it is unaffected by what it
illumines and remains untouched by mental states. Consciousness does
not undergo any causation whatsoever because causation must presuppose
its object-hood status.



Sankara views witnessing consciousness as invariable
despite the fluctuations of mental modes. One foundational argument
for this is his analysis of waking, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep
states based on the *Brhadaranyaka* and
*Mandukya Upanisad*s. He considers
these three mental states as exhaustive of human experience, and
claims that consciousness persists constantly through all three
despite their mutual exclusivity. When awakening from a dream state,
though the dream world and dream body discontinue, there is no rupture
to the continuity of one's consciousness. Consciousness
continues seamlessly even in deep dreamless sleep where ego and agency
resolve into an unmanifest state and subject-object distinctions
collapse.



One might object that persistence of consciousness in deep sleep is
not possible given the mainstream premise of identifying consciousness
as intentional experience. Sankara disagrees with the
premise that consciousness is intrinsically intentional. (This was a
matter of great debate between Advaita Vedanta and rival
philosophies like Nyaya-Vaisesika). He counters that
the absence of intentional experience in deep sleep does not entail
the lack of consciousness insofar as consciousness is not
intrinsically intentional. It exists even in the absence of cognition
representing an object. Rejecting his position is difficult because
one cannot claim direct perception of unconsciousness in deep sleep,
and in that case cannot inductively infer unconsciousness either.
Rather than viewing deep sleep as the absence of consciousness,
Sankara claims there is simply an absence of objects.
Consciousness of the absence of objects is not the absence of
consciousness. This is akin to having one's eyes wide open and
seeing but in a pitch-black room. Consciousness simply has nothing to
illumine, therefore no intentional experience occurs nor any awareness
of one's self as a knower. This presence of consciousness in
deep sleep is possible because it is self-illuminating and exists
independently from objects or knowing agents. (See
Sankara's discussions of deep sleep in BrUBh
4.3, GKBh ch.1, and BrSuBh 3.2.7-10. For further studies
see Thompson 2015; Comans 1990; and Sharma 2004).


### 3.2 Self-Illumination of Consciousness



Witnessing consciousness is elusive because it is unobjectifiable. It
escapes our attention because it stands behind cognitive
intentionality and cannot attend to itself. One cannot isolate the
witness by pulling it to one side and objects to another, for in
drawing a line between the two, both become objects of consciousness.
Consciousness cannot become an objective content of consciousness. If
one infers that this non-finding of consciousness is evidence of its
non-existence, Sankara counters that one cannot deny their
own consciousness (BrSuBh 2.3.7). Consciousness is self-evident.
It cannot admit its own absence or antecedent negation, for any
dismissal of consciousness presupposes its very existence.
Consciousness thus falls outside the scope of negation.



Sankara defines the intrinsic nature of consciousness as
uniquely self-illuminating (*svaprakasa*) because it
does not require a second awareness for it to be known. Consciousness
is intrinsically reflexive, immediate, and self-revealing in all
cognition, while simultaneously remaining the non-object of knowledge.
It is self-established in that it does not require a means of
knowledge to be known, nor any proof or justification for its
existence. It is self-disclosing. No second thing mediates its access
to itself (see Sankara on BrUBh 4.3, TaiUBh
2.1.1).



Sankara repudiates rival philosophies such as the
Nyaya school which rejects witnessing consciousness and
self-illumination in favor of other-illumination
(*paraprakasa*)--a thesis more akin to
contemporary higher order theories. Nyaya argues that a second
cognition is required to illumine the first.
Sankara's basic counter-critique is that if a primary
cognition requires a second apperceptive cognition to be known, then
the second would require a third, etc., leading to a vicious infinite
regression fallacy. In that case no perception could ever be known.
The self-illumination of witnessing consciousness accounts for the
immediacy of cognition without falling into an infinite regress of
mental modes (BrSuBh 2.2.28; BrUBh 4.3.7). There is no need
to apprehend the witness because it is self-established. If
consciousness cannot become its own object, yet does not require a
second, subsequent, or higher order cognition to reveal itself, than
an infinite regression fallacy does not arise.



Sankara also critiques the view of some Mahayana
Buddhist philosophers, Vasubandhu and Dharmakirti for example,
who argue that a given cognition or mental state can simultaneously
reveal itself and its object. Their self-illumination thesis is quite
similar to Advaita Vedanta but endeavors to be more parsimonious
by eliding the witnessing consciousness. Sankara counters
that a self-illuminating cognition is incoherent because it is subject
to the reflexivity fallacy (BrSuBh 2.2.28). Just as a knife
cannot cut itself, so too is cognition unable to objectify itself. A
cognition requires a different source of illumination to be known.
This is also a matter of direct experience, for we are aware of a
cognition's changes such as its origination and destruction and
the arising of a new cognition. A source of illumination distinct from
the cognition itself is required to know such changes.
Sankara contends that the self-illumination of witnessing
consciousness does not similarly fall to a reflexivity fallacy (KeUBh
1.3). Even though consciousness is immediately known, it does not
objectify itself. Self-illuminating consciousness does not come into a
relationship with itself. It does not entail being subject and object
simultaneously, which would be incoherent, for there is no distinction
to be made between itself and consciousness of itself. (See Mackenzie
2012; Ram-Prasad 2007; Timalsina 2009; Indich 1980; and Fasching 2021
for further discussions of self-illumination).


### 3.3 Reflection: Consciousness, Mind, and Personal Identity



As the foundation of experience and presupposition of knowledge,
Sankara's witnessing consciousness precedes his
epistemology. The difficulty he faces, however, is how to bridge
self-illuminating consciousness, which is unchanging and
non-relational, to cognition and intentional experience within the
individual knower. He develops a reflection or semblance
(*pratibimba* or *abhasa*) theory of
consciousness to address such issues. The deeper purpose of this
theory however is to develop an account for individuals superimposing
false identities on consciousness (see US ch.18 for
Sankara's most detailed discussion of reflection, as
well as BrUBh 4.3.7 and ChUBh 6.3.2).



For Sankara, *isvara's* emanation
into the universe not only indicates that the universe is sentient,
but also how living beings come to possess phenomenal consciousness
and identify themselves as individuals. Even though the entire
universe is sentient, individual sentiency is only expressed under the
condition of having a mind. He employs the analogy of reflection to
explain the relationship of mind and consciousness, and to
provisionally wed intrinsic reflexivity with cognitive intentionality.
His theory of reflection is also a novel way of addressing the
decombination problem in cosmopsychism--the explanatory gap
between universal and individual organism consciousness. (See Albahari
2019 on the decombination problem).



Sankara's common term for the mind is the
"inner instrument" (*antahkarana*). He
categorizes the mind in different ways in accordance with his source
texts (see BrSuBh 2.3.32 for example), yet consistently
distinguishes between two functions:


1. the intellect (*buddhi*) which is the mental function of
determination and definitive knowing; and
2. the *manas*, which includes sensory, affective, and
conative functions as well as indecision.



He also includes two additional functions:


3. the I-notion (*ahamkara*-literally the
"I-maker",) which is one's sense of self; and
4. the power of recollection (*citta*)



(see, e.g., his commentary on *Mandukya*
2. The later Advaita tradition standardized the mind as having this
four-fold function). Sankara maintains an Upanisadic
view that minds are materially constituted by *sattva*, the
subtlest aspect of each primary element. *Sattva* has a
qualitative predominance of lucidity and transparency. It makes the
mind akin to the reflective surface of a mirror capable of reflecting
light, or like a transparent glass that allows light to pass through
while illuminating variations on its surface. Unlike minds, mediums
like rocks are inert because of their opacity. They lack enough
*sattva* constitution to be reflective even though they are
also fundamentally grounded in consciousness.



Sankara identifies the reflective medium specifically as
the *buddhi* (BrUBh 4.3.7). Just as light is pervasive
but only becomes visible through a reflective medium (because space
does not reveal light), so too is consciousness expressed
experientially only in the reflective medium of the intellect. The
intellect takes on the semblance of consciousness. Consciousness thus
appears to be located in one's mind even though all-pervasive.
The mind depends on reflected consciousness for its experience of
itself, like we use a mirror reflection to see ourselves. The mind
also depends on consciousness to cognize objects, like using the
mirror reflection of light to illumine things in darkness. The
reflection enables intentionality even though the prototype witnessing
consciousness is non-intentional and remains untouched in the
appearance of causation.



Reflection is the seed of individuation and the I-notion because mind
appears to be the locus of consciousness. Mind becomes the reflexive
center of self-identification, manifesting as knower-ship, doer-ship,
and enjoyer-ship. The reflection further extends through the sense
organs, which are also predominantly *sattva*, to encompasses
the body's periphery through the sense of touch. This extension
forms a constellation of experiential points of reference that
circumscribes self-identity as the complex of mind, body, and sense
organs (see BrUBh 4.3.7; ChUBh 8.8.1-2; BrSuBh
2.3.28-30).



Sankara employs another theory, the limitation theory
(*avaccheda*), to help explain the individuation of
consciousness. This theory counters potential problems arising from
the reflection theory, such as assuming a genuine duality of mind and
consciousness, or that consciousness undergoes causation and entry, or
that it actually resides locatively in the mind. The limitation theory
explains that just as we mistakenly perceive nondual space as
delimited by an object--for example, a pot delimiting a pot
space--so too do we misunderstand non-dual consciousness as
delimited by the mind (see GKBh 3.3-9). The pot space is not a
genuine limiting property of space because space is not divisible by
the pot form. The pot space is an appearance. It is merely an as
though limiting property, a conditioning adjunct
(*upadhi*) that we superimpose on to space to account for
particular functions (e.g., containing a liquid). So too, do people
mistakenly assume the mind-body-sense complex possesses consciousness
and that consciousness is intrinsically intentional. In reality, the
mind-body-sense complex is merely an *upadhi* that does
not possess or limit nondual consciousness.



For Sankara, the reflection of consciousness is an as
though appearance because all-pervasive consciousness is not subject
to movement or change. Consciousness is not like a substance that
undergoes modification or entry within time and space. It remains
untouched and unaffected, like the prototype image is untouched by its
reflection or universal space is unaffected by the pot (BrSuBh
2.3.46). Furthermore, literal entry is also not possible because the
reflection is less real than its prototype. Sankara argues
that a real thing (consciousness) cannot enter into a less real one
(mind) because they are of two different orders of reality. My limited
sense of self-identity, what I take to be me, is merely a reflection.
It only appears to be my self like a reflected facial image appears to
be my face. My actual face, the prototype, is more real than the
reflection and does not literally enter the mirror (US 18.85-6).
Furthermore, my facial reflection possesses no existence apart from my
face. Self-identity with the mind-body-sense organs is similarly
virtual, not fully real; yet people remain unaware of this fact
because they are mired in self-ignorance and enamored with their
reflections.



The intention of the reflection analogy is not to establish a
definitive metaphysical process of how one becomes conscious; but
rather to reveal consciousness as untouched, and to point out the
fundamental epistemological problem of falsely buying into constructed
self-identities as if they are fundamental features of reality. This
intention parallels his use of cosmogonies to undermine our assumed
reality of the world and point back towards the metaphysical ground of
existence (see
 SS2.2
 above). Similarly, the reflection theory obliquely points back
towards the prototype, the witness, which is the ground of pure
consciousness underlying the reflection. Recognizing that ground cuts
through mistaken self-identities. The reflection analogy thus provides
a conceptual framework to discriminate consciousness from all points
of reflected identity from within the starting point of our
phenomenology. This project is difficult however because consciousness
is unobjectifiable, situated elusively behind cognition so to speak,
and is transparent to cognition. Consciousness and intellect cannot be
separated like a blade of grass from its sheath (BrUBh 4.3.7).
Cognition is also subtly embedded in bodily identity and invariably
accompanied by a sense of knower-ship/I-ness and
ownership/for-me-ness; however, Sankara claims that
embodiment, knower-ship and ownership are all objectifiable
cognitions. They are known and therefore not intrinsic to witnessing
consciousness.



The distinction of witnessing consciousness from mind and objects
appears dualistic from the empirical order perspective but transitions
to nonduality from the absolute perspective. Witnessing consciousness
is the bridge between the two orders, an ontological primitive that is
fundamental to one's self as well as all reality. Pure
consciousness matches the nature of nondual existence as free of name
and form. Consciousness is "pure", in that it is free from
any relation, predication, or intentionality. Consciousness is unlike
any object because it is unobjectifiable. It is ultimately not even
subject to time or space, which are themselves objects of the witness.
Like pure existence, consciousness is self-established. It has no
parts, is irreducible, and stands outside of causation and dependence
relations. Consciousness is a constant unchanging presence, the only
continuity of existence persisting through the process of infinite
object reductions in searching for an object's metaphysical
ground. It resists qualification, eliminative reduction, or dependence
on a second thing.



Sankara's philosophical conclusion is that
non-reducible existence is numerically identical to pure
non-intentional consciousness. Consciousness is nondual. It is the
intrinsic nature of *brahman* itself. Consciousness is not
simply the witness of one's experience. It is the ultimate
ground comprising an individual's self-existence, the single
self (*atman*) of all sentient beings from a blade of
grass to *isvara*, and the metaphysical foundation of
the entire universe.


### 3.4 Superimposition: The Fundamental Problem of Ignorance



The reflection and limitation theories above point to a fundamental
error shared by all beings. If individuation is the apparent
delimitation of nondual consciousness, then assuming personal identity
is real is actually an error, a manifestation of ignorance.
Sankara explains that we falsely identify with
"I", construct the possessiveness of "mine",
and then cling to them. We mutually superimpose consciousness on to
our mind-body, and the mind-body on to consciousness (i.e., I am the
mind-body, and the mind-body is I). Superimposition is possible even
though consciousness is not an object because it is the content of
"I" and always immediate in one's experience. We
assume the mind intrinsically possesses consciousness, and that
consciousness is subject to the mind-body's limitations, like
one may mistake a scratch in the mirror as actually marring
one's face. Similarly, one may mistake a clear crystal as red
due to a red flower placed behind it. Like the crystal or mirror, the
mind-body is a conditioning adjunct (*upadhi*) that
provides a locus of individuation. This error conceals one's
fundamental nondual nature, the ground of superimposition, like
mistaking a rope for a snake conceals its rope nature. (See
Sankara's seminal discussion of superimposition in
his introduction to the BrSu titled, the "Commentary on
Superimposition" [*Adhyasabhasya*]).



The epistemic failure of mutual superimposition is caused by ignorance
(*avidya*). Sankara identifies
*avidya* as the root cause of all existential suffering.
It produces a baseline of fear and anxiety due to assuming one's
self as a limited being subject to sorrow, sickness, and death. Based
on this error, individuals seek wholeness, happiness, and
limitlessness through known ends like material gains, social status,
hedonic pleasures, or reaching heavenly worlds; however, such
endeavors are perpetually bound to fail because results of finite
actions are limited, transient, and dependent. They may provide
temporary reprieves or happy mental states, but do not provide the
limitless wholeness of liberation. Only the direct understanding of
one's self as nondual *brahman* negates the error of
superimposition, and frees one from the beginningless *karmic*
cycle of death, rebirth, and suffering. One's cluster of
mistaken self-identities and the whole psychological scaffolding that
perpetuates suffering collapses only by removing the kingpin of
ignorance. Then only nondual consciousness remains standing. Upon
recognizing this reality, the mind rests in its own intrinsic being
with absolute fullness, peacefulness, and tranquility.
Sankara's soteriological project is thus primarily
epistemological with several positive psychological repercussions.



Several questions about Sankara's position on
ignorance became contentious in post-Sankara Advaita: Is
the locus of ignorance in the individual or *brahman*? Is
ignorance simply misapprehension or does it have a two-fold power of
covering and projection? Does it hold both epistemological and
ontological powers? Is there a distinction of cosmic root ignorance
and secondary individual ignorance? And what is its relationship with
*maya*? Such questions have caused several
intra-Advaita debates as well as philosophical critiques from rival
traditions such as Ramanuja's
Visistadvaita Vedanta and
Madhva's Dvaita Vedanta. (For further discussions of
these issues see Potter 1981: 78-80; Ingalls 1953; Comans 2000:
263-7; Doherty 2005; and Grimes 1990).


## 4. Contemplative Philosophical Methods



According to Sankara, because the individual is nondual
*brahman* in reality, they already are what they seek to
be--unlimited, whole, and complete. The difficulty, however, is
that one's felt sense of finite identity contradicts nonduality
and engenders a seeming distance between the person and
*brahman*. *Moksa* thus appears to be a future
attainment rather than a recognition of present reality. This false
premise entices one into action with the intent to gain or become
*brahman*, but one cannot attain anew what is already attained.
Action is superfluous to accomplish an already accomplished fact. In
fact, the more one attempts to gain, reach, or experience liberation
while mistakenly presupposing its distance, the further it recedes
like the horizon. This quagmire of action is not intractable though
because both bondage and liberation are just figurative--no
change occurs in reality. The solution is purely self-knowledge, a
radical epistemic shift in perspective by which one simultaneously
sheds limited self-identities and recognizes their existence as
nondual consciousness. Only this direct immediate recognition of
nonduality defeats the error of superimposition. One becomes
*brahman* simply by knowing *brahman* (MuU 3.2.9).
Sankara illustrates this concept of accomplishing the
accomplished with the "tenth man story" (TaiUBh 2.1.1).
Ten children cross a river and then regroup to count each other. Each
child counts only nine, and they sorrowfully conclude that the missing
tenth child must have drowned. A passerby sees their plight and
states, "you are the tenth!" They then realize they simply
forgot to count themselves. The tenth child was never truly lost or
gained. (See Comans 2000; Suthren Hirst 2005; and Rambachan 1991 for
further discussions of Sankara's method).


### 4.1 Action and Meditation



Sankara is ambivalent about actions such as yogic
meditation, ritual practice, or ethical duties within his method. On
the one hand he strives to undermine the importance of mental or
physical action as an independent methodology for liberation. Action
is a cause for bondage, not a means of liberation, because it always
presupposes the reality of individual agency and contributes to a
cycle of further desire and action. Furthermore, any product of action
is finite and transient (Potter 1981: 38-41). Sankara
views action as having no epistemic fruitfulness independent of a
means of knowledge. He draws a critical distinction based on content
dependence. Physical actions such as ritual performance or mental
actions like imagination or meditation are dependent on an
individual's will. They arise independently of the nature of the
thing concerned. Veridical cognition, however, is ultimately dependent
on the nature of the object. It is determined by the object through a
proper means of knowledge, with no options or alternatives in terms of
an agent's choice. Action is therefore incapable of providing
veridical knowledge whatsoever, let alone knowledge of non-duality
(BrSuBh 1.1.4). This critique of action collapses any
methodological dichotomy of theory and practice, which is intrinsic to
both ritual practice and yogic meditation methods. Liberating
self-knowledge is not subject to any kind of ritual injunctions. It is
not procedural knowledge, nor the result of procedural knowledge. (See
Ram-Prasad 2000 on Sankara's distinction of knowledge
and action. See Bader 1990 and Dalal 2016 on his approach to
meditation).



On the other hand, Sankara accepts the secondary importance
of yogic practices that involve a variety of meditation methods,
devotional practices, ascetic austerities, moral psychology, and the
development of ethical virtues and action ethics (see Sundaresan 2003
on Yoga in Sankara's method). They may function as
indirect means to liberation. Sankara's ambivalence
towards action is not a contradiction. He recognizes a voluntary
element in any knowledge to some degree. One must create the proper
conditions to align a means of knowledge. For example, to visually
perceive an object one may have to open their eyes and turn their
head. Then visual knowledge automatically takes place. Similarly, the
Advaitin must possess a prepared mind to recognize *brahman.*
Sankara provides a fourfold set of prerequisite conditions
characterizing this qualified student: (1) discrimination between what
is transient and eternal; (2) dispassion towards objects of enjoyment;
(3) perfecting practices such as the control of the mind and senses;
and (4) the desire for liberation (BrSuBh 1.1.1).



Yogic and ethical practices, as well as analyses of the limitations of
goals like pleasure, wealth, status, and heaven provide the conditions
for self-knowledge by cultivating mental purity
(*antahkaranasuddhi*). Mental purity is the
removal of epistemic obstructions to knowing *brahman*, such as
greed, anger, selfishness, violence, jealousy, and distraction. It
also includes developing positive qualifications such as ethical
attitudinal values of equanimity, acceptance, truthfulness,
compassion, and benevolence. Mediation practices provide mental
stability and focus. These qualifications hone the mind's
capacity to be a proper container for text-sparked knowledge; though,
in theory, if a student is already sufficiently qualified, they need
not undergo any such practices.



Sankara's commentary on the
*Bhagavadgita* provides a rich resource for his yogic
methods and ethical virtues. For example, following BhG ch. 2-4,
he endorses a yoga of action (*karmayoga*). *Karmayoga*
is a yogic process that employs a philosophy of action to cultivate
emotional growth and world participation. It extends Vedic ritual
frameworks of sacrificial contribution and consumption to all actions.
All action becomes analogous to devotionally placing ritual oblations
into the sacrificial fire as offerings to deities. The Advaitin
*yogin* offers actions altruistically to
*isvara* for the benefit of all beings
(*lokasangrah*) and the harmonious functioning of
the world. Just as the sacrificer equanimously consumes the remnants
of sacrificial food offerings as a blessing, sans gustatory pleasure
or aversion, so too does the *yogin* learn to accept the
results of their actions with equanimity. *Karmayoga* intends
to free one from the binding attachment of desires caused by the
mistaken belief that desired objects possess one's happiness. It
develops internal renunciation, equipoise, gratitude, and benevolence,
while releasing one from the anger, sadness, and inner turmoil that
arise from thwarted desire. This yogic attitude extends not only
externally to society, beings, and world, but also internally to
one's physiology and psychology.


### 4.2 The Triple Process and the Means of Nondual Knowledge



Sankara embraces particular verbal methods to understand
propositions affirming nonduality crystallized in pithy
Upanisadic sentences. (Post-Sankara Advaitins focused
on four such "great sentences"
[*mahavakyas*]). These methods include continuity and
discontinuity (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), secondary
indication (*laksana*), and negative language
(*neti neti*). Sankara does not clearly codify these
separately, but it may be most accurate to describe his primary method
as continuity and discontinuity (see, e.g., GKBh 13.13).
Post-Sankara Advaitins often discuss his method as
*laksana* instead; however, Sankara
appears to view all three as varying iterations of a single
method.



*Anvaya* and *vyatireka* is a method of discriminative
reasoning to determine the relationship of what persists and what does
not persist between two things. It reveals whether one term is
independent of another. For example, in the analogy of the clay and
its forms (see
 SS2.1
 above), when a particular form of clay (such as a pot) occurs, then
clay occurs (continuity). And when that particular form (pot) is
absent (discontinuity) after being shaped into a plate, then clay
still occurs. One may apply this method, for example, to consciousness
and mental states. Consciousness is continuous through the
discontinuous states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep and never
subject to its negative instance of discontinuity. Consciousness
itself can never be absent. One cannot escape from one's own
consciousness, nor can one directly separate a particular mental state
from consciousness because consciousness itself is not mutually
exclusive of anything and not subject to the negative instance of
*vyatireka*. However, separating consciousness and a particular
mental state is possible through *anvaya* and
*vyatireka* because the states themselves are mutually
exclusive. For example, dream reality and waking reality are mutually
exclusive, pointing to the fact that consciousness is independent of
them even as it persists through both. (See Cardona 1981;
Satchidanandendra 1964 [1989]; Halbfass 1991: 162-77; Comans
1996: 59-63; and Mayeda 1992: 51-58 on *anvaya* and
*vyatireka*).



*Mahavakyas* like "I am Brahman"
(BrU 1.4.10: *aham brahmasmi*) or "You
are that" (ChU 6.8.7: *tat tvam asi*) are identity
statements that form an equation consisting of two or more
co-referential terms in grammatical apposition. The equation's
lack of logical congruence--identifying the limited individual
(*aham*) with nondual *brahman*, or you (*tvam*)
with that (*tat*) universe for example--contradict
syntactical expectancy. This prods the reader to use the
*anvaya* and *vyatireka* method to resolve the equation.
In the case of "You are that", *tvam* negates the
mediacy of *tat* as existence external to one's Self. And
*tat* negates any subjective limitations to the consciousness
referred to in *tvam*. The apposition thus restricts what does
not persist between the two terms to reveal what is continuous and
numerically identical--namely pure consciousness and
undifferentiated existence. The identity statement reveals that you
(*tvam*), the pure consciousness which is the underlying
existence of the individual, is that (*tat*) pure existence
which is the metaphysical ground of all objects. Existence and
consciousness are one, not two. There is no distinction between the
am-ness of one's self and the is-ness of objects. (See ChUBh
ch.6 and US ch.18 for Sankara's interpretation of
"You are that").



*Laksana's* indirect implication employs
a theory of metonymy which distinguishes between literal denotative
meanings and implied connotative meanings. The contradictory
juxtaposition of an identity statement such as "You are
that" triggers a particular form of secondary implication in
which a portion of the primary meaning is rejected while another part
is retained. The canonical Advaita example is, "This (person
that you see now) is that Devadatta (whom you knew in the
past)". Here, the primary referents of "this" and
"that" cannot be identical because "this" and
"that" refer to different locations and times, Devadatta
in the past somewhere else and Devadatta here and now. The two
Devadattas are not completely identical because of their relationships
to time and place, nor are they completely separate. The import of the
sentence creates a cognition of a single Devadatta substantive that is
not connected to a specific time or place. (See Lipner 1997; Bartley
2002: 111-23; Suthren Hirst 2005: 145-51; Kunjunni Raja
1969: 251-54, and the entry on the
 literal-nonliteral distinction
 for further discussions of indirect implication).



*Neti neti* (negative language) literally means "not
(this), not (this)". Its negation targets the discontinuity
aspect by stripping away all qualifications to personal identity and
the external world. This process removes false superimpositions of
body, senses, and mind previously attributed to *brahman*.
Negative language attempts to avoid defining absolute reality as a
thing in the world. It denies any nameability of *brahman*, its
grammatical object. This is directly tied to *brahman's*
unobjectifiable status, for the hermeneutical premise of
Sankara's negative language is the inability of
predicates to apply to absolute reality. To give positive predicates
would reify the absolute to a finite entity (on this see BrUBh
2.3.6).



*Neti neti* negates all properties, conceptions, limitations,
and identities attributed to *brahman*; however, it cannot lose
all reference. Passages using negative language may push their object
away, allowing the unobjectifiable object to continually slip back and
beyond; however, the purpose is not open ended. Negation strips away
all false conceptions, including one's tendency to grasp after
the absolute, without lapsing into nihilism or an infinite regression
(BrSuBh 3.2.22). What appears to be an illogical infinite regress
of negation is harnessed as a semantic force for understanding the
absolute. Negative language turns onto itself as well, negating its
prior negation and its own referential delimitations. When all
conceptions of "I" as "this" or
"that" are negated, then one's self is understood to
be nondual consciousness.



Negative language usually constitutes half of a paradox that affirms
positive and negative propositions at the same time. Textual instances
of negation usually follow positive statements about *brahman*
which provide an explicit positive proposition of continuity. There is
a positive assertion of an entity but the negative language strips
that entity of any limitations or finite objectivity. This methodology
threads the needle of indicating *brahman*'s presence
without objectifying it. It ensures that the reader neither grasps at
an object nor falls into nihilism. The negative assertions of *neti
neti*, which follow or imply a positive assertion, parallel the
other two methods. *Laksana* and
*anvaya*-*vyatireka* similarly depend on negation
through mutual restriction, while simultaneously indicating the
intrinsic nature of *brahman* without falling into
nihilism.


### 4.3 Self-Knowledge and Living While Liberated



How to exactly define liberation in Sankara's thought
is inherently problematic. He does not provide a precise
epistemological account of how knowledge of *brahman* takes
place. Sankara's conception of liberation removes
itself from the boundaries of ordinary discourse, debate, and causal
epistemology (See TaiUBh 2.9.1 for example). There is a metaphysical
uncertainty about it, for on the one hand a liberating cognition may
be able to remove self-ignorance, but on the other it is problematic
to reduce ever-present liberation to a cognition which is a product
and a temporal event. From the empirical perspective liberation may be
inexplicable and indeterminable due to its transition to ultimate
nondual reality.



Perhaps the greatest difficulty is describing what Sankara
thought about the transition from what appears to be descriptive
knowledge to direct knowledge, or from a type of modal knowledge to a
knowledge of intrinsic being that is pure consciousness. In his view,
understanding the Upanisadic identity statement generates a
unique cognition revealing the veridical knowledge, "I am
brahman"--that one is indiscernible from nondual
consciousness, numerically identical with *brahman*, and the
reality of everything. This knowledge removes root ignorance to negate
superimposition veiling one's true nature. It strips all
qualifications and relationships from consciousness, deconstructs the
I-sense and knower-ship as unreal, and deindividuates the individual
from all conditioning adjuncts (see Ram-Prasad 2001b: ch. 4). Then
suffering, *karma,* and rebirth have no locus in which to cling
because only nondual consciousness remains.



Nondual knowledge does not entail subject-object distinction like
object cognitions because its content is identical to the
consciousness illuminating the cognition. Its content is
*brahman* itself (see, e.g., TaiUBh 2.1.1; MuUBh 3.1.2, 4; and
BrSuBh 2.1.14). There is no call to apperceive this knowledge for
the sake of a truth certifying inference. Extrinsic certification
cannot determine its veridicality because intrinsic consciousness
(*svarupajnanam*) is self-illuminating and
cannot be known by a second cognition. Its self-illumination entails
its self-certification when directly known. The cognition's
modal form (*vrttijnanam*), however, is analogous
to a self-immolating match. By recognizing its content, it
cannibalizes its own modal form. It reveals its own modal appearance
as an appearance, which is only brahman. In this process it loses its
status as a means of knowledge, akin to a means of knowledge in a
dream (BhGBh 2.69).



Sankara uses the analogy of waking up from dreaming to
illustrate understanding nonduality and the non-realism of the world
(BrSuBh 2.1.14). He does not characterize this as a mystical
state of union, an extraordinary oceanic experience, or a state of no
mind. In fact, one cannot describe this knowledge as an experiential
state because states are objectifiable cognitions. Furthermore, this
knowledge ostensibly negates experiential agency. His liberation is a
purely epistemic shift that removes false conceptual constructions.
From an epistemic perspective, Sankara sees the liberated
person as having no more dealings concerned with actions, instruments,
and results. They have no more perception of duality, and possess no
more self-identity with the mind and body (BrUBh 2.4.14,
4.5.15); however, from a phenomenal perspective, liberation does not
entail an annihilation of one's experience of the world
(BrSuBh 3.2.21). This is like a magician who remains unconfused
despite perceiving their own magical illusions. The liberated person
recognizes nonduality but continues living as an embodied individual
experiencing the world. This lasts according to the ongoing
fructification of *karma* in their present birth (ChUbh
6.14.2). One who is "living while liberated"
(*jivanmukti*) seamlessly inhabits the apparent paradoxes
of being disembodied in the midst of embodiment, of acting while
recognizing their non-agency, and of perceiving the world despite
deindividuation. (See Fort 1998 on *jivanmukti*).



A lucid dream experience is an ideal illustration of
Sankara's liberation, though not found in his work.
For experienced lucid dreamers, the recognition that one is dreaming
possesses a conviction that completely cuts through the appearance of
the dream fabric, but does so without eliminating perceptual dream
experience. They are epistemically aware of two orders of reality,
waking and dreaming, while phenomenally remaining in the less real
dreaming order. The lucid dreamer is deindividuated from the dream
body, yet remains embodied within the dream experience. They recognize
that the dream is not separate from themselves, that it cannot touch
them, and that there is nothing to fear or gain from it. In
Sankara's metaphysical view however, the empirical
order is analogous to *isvara*'s dream, not
one's own. This view accommodates the universe's identity
with *isvara*, along with intersubjective agreement
and veridical cognition, without falling into solipsism. The
individual is not creating empirical reality, but rather making a
mistake about it. Like the dream, empirical reality is not illusory
from within its own order of reality. It is known as a virtual
appearance only from the more foundational perspective of knowing
*brahman*, analogous to awakening to the reality of the dream.
The liberated person is like a finite dream being within
*isvara*'s cosmic dream who has awakened within
the dream. They recognize that the immediate presence of consciousness
is the single foundation grounding all objects, the single self of all
beings, and the self of *isvara*.