## 1. Life and works




Plutarch was born in Chaeronea, a city of Boeotia in central Greece
around 45-47 CE. This date is inferred from Plutarch's own
testimony (*On the E at Delphi* 385B), according to which he
began studying at Athens with a Platonist philosopher named Ammonius
(see Dillon 1977, 189-192, Donini 1986b), when Nero was in
Greece (66/67 CE). (This assumes that he was not more than twenty
years old at the time.) We know little about Ammonius and his school,
that is, also of Plutarch's institutional affiliation (the evidence of
*On the E at Delphi* 387F has been much debated; see
e.g. Donini 1986a, 209-212, 1986b, 108-119, Opsomer 1998,
21-25, 129-131). The main evidence about Ammonius' philosophical views
is his speech as a character in *On the E at Delphi*
(391E-394C), on god, being, generation and corruption as well as
his contributions to the discussion in *On the Obsolence of
Oracles* (410F-414C) regarding divine justice and providence
(Dillon 1977, 189-192, Opsomer 2009, 142-179). This
evidence can be reasonably considered indicative of Ammonius'
engagement with metaphysics, which must have stimulated Plutarch's own
interest in metaphysical questions. Plutarch must have stayed in
Athens not only during his studies with Ammonius but considerably
longer, so as to become an Athenian citizen (*Table Talks*
628A). According to this testimony, he also visited Rome
(*Demetrius* 2) and Alexandria (*Table Talks* 678A; see
Russell 1973, 7-8). However, Plutarch spent most of his life in
his native city and in nearby Delphi. There must have been two reasons
for this; first, Plutarch's strong ties with his family, which
apparently was wealthy enough to support his studies and travels
(Russell 1973, 3-5), and, second, his own interest in the
religious activity of Delphi. The latter is testified to by the fact
that Plutarch served in various positions in Delphi, including that of
the priest of Apollo (*Table Talks* 700E), and also in his
several works concerning Delphi and the local sacred rituals (*On
the E at Delphi, On Oracles at Delphi, On the Obsolescence of
Oracles*; see Stadter 2005). These works demonstrate intimate
knowledge of Delphi, its traditions, and activities. Plutarch must
have died after 119 CE, the date at which he was appointed procurator
of Achaea by Hadrian (Eusebius' *Chronicle*).



Plutarch was a prolific writer. The so-called Lamprias catalogue, an
ancient library catalogue (preserved mutilated), supposedly compiled by
Plutarch's son Lamprias, lists 227 works, several of them no
longer extant (Russell 1973, 18-19). Plutarch's works divide into
philosophical and historical-biographical. The latter, the so-called
*Lives* (*Bioi*) of distinguished Greek and Roman men
examined in pairs, demonstrate Plutarch's historical and
rhetorical abilities, also showing his interest in character formation
and politics (Russell 1973, 100-116). Plutarch's philosophical
works, many of them dialogues (set in Delphi or Chaeronea), cover half
of his literary output. In modern times they have been published under
the collective term *Moralia*, a term first given to a
collection of eleven ethical works preserved in a 14th
century manuscript (Parisinus Graecus 1672). When the collection was
augmented by many other writings preserved in other manuscripts on
topics ranging from metaphysics, psychology, natural philosophy,
theology, logic, to philosophy of art, the name was retained with the
misleading implication that Plutarch's philosophical works are
essentially or primarily ethical.



Among Plutarch's works, several serve polemical purposes. He wrote a
number of works against the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies. Against
the Stoics are mainly the works *On the Self-contradictions of the
Stoics* (*De stoicorum repugnantiis*), *On the Common
Notions against the Stoics* (*De communibus notitiis*),
*On the Cleverness of Animals* (*De sollertia
animalium*), and *On Moral Virtue* (*De virtute
morali*). Plutarch's main works against the Epicureans are:
*That One Cannot Live Happily Following Epicurus* (*Non
posse suaviter vivere secundum Epicurum*), *Against
Colotes* (*Adversus Colotem*), *Is 'Live
Unnoticed' Well Said?* (*An recte dictum sit latenter
esse vivendum*). All these works are marked by the use of a
distinct polemical tone against assumed adversaries, and of
recognizable polemical strategies. They are often captious and in many
instances betray a less than fair engagement with the views being
opposed (see Warren 2011, 290-293 and Kechagia 2011,
135-294 for a vindication of Plutarch's polemics in *Against
Colotes*).



It is worth considering why Plutarch engaged in writing so many
polemical works against the two main Hellenistic schools of
philosophy. One reason for Plutarch's preoccupation must be that the
early Stoics and Epicureans both strongly criticized Plato. The
Epicurean Colotes, for instance, Plutarch's target in the *Against
Colotes*, was critical of Plato's dialogues in his *Against
Plato's Lysis* and *Against Plato's Euthydemus* (meager fragments
of which are preserved in Herculaneum papyri *PHerc*. 208,
*PHerc*. 1032), while he also criticized the
*Republic*'s myth of Er and the implied view of an immortal
human soul (Proclus, *In Rempublicam* 2.109.11-12,
111.6-17; see Kechagia 2011, 53-132). Another reason for
Plutarch's engagement was the fact that both Epicureans and Stoics
drew freely and extensively for their own purposes on Plato without
acknowledging it and despite their criticism of Plato. This holds true
especially for the Stoics (see Babut 1969a). They were inspired by the
*Timaeus*, for instance, in their adoption of two principles,
god and matter, but their god, unlike that of Plato, is immanent in
the physical world and bodily, and he alone, without the Forms,
suffices for the formation of matter. The Stoics were probably guided
to their view that only bodies exist by passages in the
*Sophist* (246a-247c) and in the *Timaeus* (31b-32c,
49d-e, 53b-c). For Plutarch, though, this is an utterly mistaken
reading of the *Timaeus* (*De communibus notitiis*
1073D-1074E). Plutarch's polemics were, then, motivated by his desire to
advocate Platonism against what he regarded as misguided
interpretations and criticisms on the part of Epicureans and
Stoics. This defense of Platonism was of vital importance for
Platonism at Plutarch's time, since both Stoicism and Epicureanism were
still thriving, mainly in virtue of their ethics. Plutarch wanted to
show that Stoic and Epicurean ethics rest on mistaken assumptions
about human nature and reality, which render their ethical doctrines
useless (*De virtute morali*, *De Stoicorum
repugnantiis* 1041E-1043A, *De communibus notitiis*
1060B-1073D). Plutarch's polemics were fuelled by the view he shares
with Hellenistic philosophers that the end of philosophy is to support
ethical life (see e.g. *De profectibus in virtute*); if a
school's ethical ideal is unrealizable or, worse, unworthy of human nature,
this for Plutarch (as for Antiochus, Cicero, *De finibus* 5.13,
5.89) is evidence that the entire philosophical system is a
failure. As in the rest of his philosophical works, in his polemical
treatises too, Plutarch aims to show that Plato's philosophy makes
good sense as a whole, that is, it does justice to the world and human
nature and can bring human beings to happiness (see below, sect. 2),
but in his polemical works Plutarch aims especially to demonstrate
that departure from Plato results in self-contradictions, of which he
accuses the Stoics in particular (Boys-Stones 1997a). Two further
features of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy appear to annoy Plutarch
considerably: first, their dismissal of the aporetic/dialectical
spirit that Socrates embodies, and which Plutarch regards as central
to philosophy, and second, that Stoics and Epicureans alike adopt a
corporealist or materialist metaphysics, rejecting the intelligible
realm (that comprises god, Forms, immaterial souls), which was
essential to Platonism. The central line permeating Plutarch's
relevant criticism is that Stoics and Epicureans contradict our common
notions (see e.g. *De communibus notitiis* 1073C-1074F) and do
not do justice to things themselves (*De profectibus in
virtute* 75F-76A). Ironically, perhaps, Plutarch's polemical
writings are chiefly of interest--but also of very great
value--for the many quotations they contain from Stoics,
Epicurus, and other authors whose works were not preserved into modern
times, and for his references to and paraphrases of their views in
other passages of works available to him but not to us. Were it not
for Plutarch, our grasp of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy would be
much less extensive than it is, and our ability to reconstruct and
appreciate their ideas much reduced.



Here is an overview of Plutarch's works, to give a sense of his
conception of philosophy and of what in Platonist philosophy especially
he valued.



Plutarch wrote relatively little in the field of "logic"
in the ancient sense (*logike*), which includes
philosophy of language and epistemology. This, however, does not
necessarily point to a lack of interest or knowledge on his
part. Quite the opposite is the case. Plutarch is particularly
attracted to epistemology because he considers this as a crucial
aspect of Platonist philosophy. He seeks to defend the epistemology of
Academic skeptics like Arcesilaus and Carneades and on these grounds
to advocate the unity of the Academy against the criticisms of
Antiochus of Ascalon (1st c. BCE; see below, sects. 2 and
3). The Lamprias list of Plutarch's works contains one on Stoic logic
(*Reply to Chrysippus on the First Consequent*, #152), and two
on Aristotle's: *On Aristotle's Topics* in eight books (#56),
and a *Lecture on the Ten Categories* (#192), all of them now
lost. The latter two are indicative of a reawakening of interest in
Aristotelian logic, beginning in the 1st c. BCE, cultivated
mainly by Peripatetics such as Boethus and Andronicus, but also
characterizing Platonists of Plutarch's era, such as Eudorus and
Nicostratus, who set themselves in dialogue especially with
Aristotle's *Categories*. Although the content of these
Plutarchean works remains unknown, we do have Plutarch's own claim
that Aristotle's doctrine of categories is foreshadowed in the
*Timaeus* (*De an. procr.* 1023E; *Timaeus*
37b-c), which suggests that he considered Aristotelian logic a welcome
development of relevant Platonic ideas (Karamanolis 2006,
123-125). Plutarch's interest in the *Topics*, on the
other hand, must have been motivated by his interest in the
dialectical methodology of arguing both sides of a question
(Karamanolis 2006, 86-87; see further below, sect. 3), to which
the *Topics* is devoted. Plutarch's works on epistemology cover
a broad spectrum of issues. The question of the criterion of truth
must have been central to works such as *On How We Should Judge
Truth* (#225), *What is Understanding*? (#144), *That
Understanding is Impossible* (#146), none of which is extant
today. The lost work *Whether He Who Suspends Judgment on
Everything is Led to Inaction* (#158) must have confronted the
common accusation against skepticism voiced in its title. Among
Plutarch's surviving works important for understanding his
epistemology are the *Platonic Questions* I and III,
*Against Colotes*, *On Common Notions*, and *On the
Generation of the Soul* 1024F-1025A (see below, sect. 3).



Plutarch paid special attention to "physics,", which in
antiquity included metaphysics, natural philosophy, psychology and
theology. His most important surviving works in metaphysics are those
related to the interpretation of the *Timaeus*, namely *On
the Generation of Soul in the Timaeus* (*De animae procreatione
in Timaeo*)*,* *On Isis and Osiris (De Iside et
Osiride)*; from lost works of Plutarch relevant are the following:
*Where are the Forms*? (#67), *How Matter Participates in
the Forms: It Constitutes the Primary Bodies* (#68), *On the
World's Having Come into Beginning According to Plato* (#66),
*On Matter* (#185), *On the Fifth Substance*
(#44). Plutarch shows quite some interest in the explanation of
natural phenomena in several surviving works, most importantly in:
*On the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon (De facie quae in
orbe lunae apparet*), *On the Principle of Cold (De primo
frigido), On the Cleverness of Animals (De sollertia
animalism)*. Plutarch's interest in this area is apparently
motivated by the wish to develop Platonist natural philosophy and also
oppose the Stoics, who were dominant in this field especially since
Posidonius (1st c. BCE), and in Plutarch's age with his
much older contemporary Seneca (*ca.* 1BCE-65CE), the
author of *Naturales Quaestiones*. Given the importance of god
in the world's coming into being according to Plutarch, he is
seriously engaged with theology, especially with questions pertaining
to the relation between god and man, such as the issue of divination,
divine justice and divine punishment, and so on, in: *On Oracles at
Delphi* (*De Pythiae oraculis*), *On the Obsolescence of
Oracles* (*De defectu oraculorum*), *On the E at
Delphi* (*De E apud Delphos*), *On Delays in Divine
Punishment* (*De sera numinis vindicta*), and *On the
Daemon of Socrates* (*De genio Socratis Socratis*).
Plutarch's *On the Generation of Soul in the Timaeus* together
with the ten *Platonic Questions* illustrate well his work as a
Platonic exegete (see Hershbell 1987, Ferrari 2001). Like the former
work, most of the *Platonic Questions* also deal with
metaphysics and psychology (*Questions* I and III are concerned
with epistemology, VII with physics, and X with language).



Plutarch's ethical works include some of theoretical orientation
(e.g. *On Moral Virtue*, which refutes the Stoic theory of
virtue) and some of practical one (e.g. *On Control of Anger, On
Curiosity, How Could you Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*),
offering practical advice on how to attain virtue and build a good
character. The tendency, however, to distinguish two altogether
separate classes of ethical works (following Ziegler 1951,
768-825) is problematic given the considerable affinities
between them, yet Plutarch does use different styles in them,
presumably targeting different audiences (Van Hoof 2010,
264-265). Particularly representative of Plutarch's ethical
views are the treatises *On Moral Virtue* (*De virtute
morali*), *On Making Progress in Virtue* (*De
profectibus in virtute*), *On Delays in Divine Punishment*
(*De sera numinis vindicta*), *On Control of Anger*
(*De cohibenda ira*), and *On Tranquility of Mind*
(*De tranquillitate animi*). Plutarch wrote also works on
aesthetics and education, which one could classify also as works of
practical orientation. Plutarch, following Plato, evaluates poetry
from the point of view of ethical education. In this category belong
the works *On How the Young Man Should Listen to Poets* (*De
audiendis poetis*) and *On the Education of Children*
(*De liberis educandis*), the latter of dubious authenticity
(Ziegler 1951, 809-811).



Finally, Plutarch wrote a number of works on aspects and figures of the
history of philosophy, all lost, such as *On What Heraclitus
Maintained* (#205), *On Empedocles* (#43), *On the
Cyrenaics* (#188), *On the Difference between Pyrrhonians and
Academics* (#64), *On the Unity of the Academy Since Plato*
(#63). The latter two could not have been merely historical, however; the
historical perspective must rather have served to defend the point of view of the
skeptical Academy, which Plutarch advocated as doing justice to the
aporetic spirit of Plato's philosophy (see below, sect. 2).


## 2. Plutarch's Platonism




Plutarch lived in the wake of the revival of the dogmatic
interpretation of Plato begun by Antiochus and Eudorus in the
1st c. BCE, which in a way he continues. Plutarch, however,
shows a more complex philosophical profile, apparently through
developing the version of Academic skepticism defended by Antiochus'
contemporary Philo of Larissa and also (slightly later) Cicero. He
strives for a synthesis of the skeptical interpretation of Plato,
defended by the Academic skeptics Arcesilaus, Carneades and Philo,
with that of Antiochus' dogmatic interpretation, according to which
Plato held doctrines of his own. Thus Plutarch objects to the
distinction that Antiochus suggested between Socratic and Platonic
philosophy and the corresponding division of Plato's dialogues into
Socratic/aporetic and Platonic/doctrinal (Cicero, *Academica*
I.15-17). For Plutarch, rather Plato accommodates harmoniously
both an aporetic and a doctrinal element in his philosophy. According
to Plutarch, the aporetic element in Plato encourages a way of
searching for the truth without prejudices or a priori commitments,
and this practically amounts to a dialectical inquiry, arguing either
side of a given question; but this dialectical spirit does not deny
the possibility of reaching firm conclusions, or even the possibility
of achieving secure knowledge. According to Plutarch, Plato had
reached such conclusions in his dialogues, which can be identified as
Plato's doctrines and yet he still preserved the spirit of unceasing
inquiry, embedded in the dialogue form itself, by not holding them in
a way which closed off reconsideration and further inquiry. This is
why Plutarch advocates an epistemology that integrates both the
suspension of judgment (i.e., the rejection of dogmatism) and a
defense of the possibility of acquiring true knowledge (see below,
sect. 3). On this basis Plutarch defends the unity of the Academy,
going all the way back to Plato, which Antiochus had considered as
having been disrupted with the advent of Academic Skepticism, in lost
treatises, such as *On the Unity of the Academy since Plato*,
*On the Difference Between Pyrrhoneans and Academics* (see
*Adversus Colotem* 1121F-1122E, *Platonic Question* I;
with Opsomer 1998, 127-133). Plutarch actually tried to
disengage the term 'Academic' from implying exclusive
commitment to the skeptical construal of Plato. Suspension of
judgment, he thinks, is rather an established method of philosophical
research followed by several illustrious ancient philosophers
(Heraclitus, Parmenides, Socrates, Plato), rather than an innovation
of Arcesilaus (*Adv. Col*. 1121F-1122A). For Plutarch, the
Academic both appreciates Plato's aporetic spirit and still values his
doctrines. Similar in this respect appears to be the position of the
anonymous author of the (1st c. CE?) *Commentary on the
Theaetetus* and of Plutarch's friend Favorinus, the addressee of
his *On the Principle of Cold* (cf. ibid. 955C, see Opsomer
1997, Opsomer 1998, 26-82, 213-240).



In accordance with this conception of Platonism, Plutarch himself
writes dialogues, which, like Plato's, are either dramatic
(e.g. *De cohibenda ira*), narrated (e.g. *De sera numinis
vindicta*), or mixed (*De genio Socratis*); see the
typology of Platonic dialogues in Diogenes Laertius 3.50). As in
Plato, in Plutarch's dialogues too the speakers give long speeches in
favor of a certain view (Russell 1973, 34-36). It is often
unclear, however, with what view Plutarch sympathizes, despite the
fact that sometimes he appears as character in some dialogues
(e.g. *On the E at Delphi*). Besides, Plutarch, following Plato
again, often uses myths, metaphors, and analogies. The work *On
Isis and Osiris* is particularly interesting in this regard. In it
Plutarch relates the myth of the two Egyptian deities, yet he
interprets it allegorically as a story informative about god, being,
and creation (Ziegler 1951, 206-208). Of special interest are
the eschatological myths in Plutarch, as they integrate cosmological,
psychological, and ethical considerations. This is the case with the
myth narrated in *On The Face Which Appears in the Orb of the
Moon*, which centers on the role of the moon in the world and its
role in the life of souls (see Cherniss, *Plutarch Moralia*,
vol. XII, Loeb, Introduction). Analogous is the case of the work
*On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance*, where Plutarch sets
out to defend divine providence, yet, following Plato's claim of
presenting only a likely account (*eikos mythos*) in the
*Timaeus*, he claims to be offering only what seems likely to
him about divine actions (549E-F), and also like Plato, Plutarch
structures his work into argument (*logos*) and a narrative
(*mythos*). These authorial practices present a problem for the
scholar who wants to identify Plutarch's own philosophical views, just
as they do with Plato's own dialogues. The works that unambiguously
present Plutarch's opinions on exegetical and philosophical matters
are *On the Generation of Soul in the Timaeus*, and
*Platonic Questions*, while the others must be used with
caution, for the reasons given above, or because of their polemical
aim and tone (see Opsomer 2007).



Plutarch represents a synthesis also with regard to his philosophical
interests. On the one hand he shares Antiochus' emphasis on ethics,
yet on the other he focuses considerably on metaphysics, which was
revived by Eudorus (end of 1st c. BCE) and flourished with
Neo-Pythagorean Platonists such as Moderatus (1st
c. CE). Like them, Plutarch (as noted above) pays special attention to
the *Timaeus*, which from then on became the keystone of
Platonism. Plutarch is particularly interested in the generation of
the soul, and he devotes an entire treatise to discussing one short
passage, *Timaeus* 35a1-36b5 (*On the Generation of
Soul in the Timaeus*; see Cherniss, *Plutarch Moralia*,
Loeb vol. XIII.1, 133-149, Hershbell 1987). It is not an
exaggeration to say that Plutarch's interpretation of the
*Timaeus* shapes his entire philosophy. This is because
Plutarch apparently endorses the idea suggested in the
*Timaeus* that the universe is a unified whole with humans
being an integral part of this unity, which means that both the
physical world and natural phenomena as well as human beings and human
society should be approached from a cosmic/metaphysical point of
view. In the case of natural phenomena, this means that explanations
should make reference to intelligible causes (*De primo
frigido* 948B-C) which account for the nature of things in the
world, while in the case of human beings, their nature and their final
end in life, that is, their happiness cannot be determined unless one
understands that the human constitution is similar to that of the
world, consisting of body, soul, and intellect (*De facie*
943A, 945A, *De virtute morali* 441D). Plutarch systematically
employs the analogy between worldly macrocosm and human microcosm,
suggested in the *Timaeus*, which is important also in Stoicism
(see below, sect. 5, 6).



Plutarch is also familiar with Neo-Pythagorean and Aristotelian
philosophies. Interest in both Pythagorean ideas and Aristotelianism
were in vogue at the end of the 1st century BCE and during
the 1st century CE, when Plutarch writes. There is a wave
of Neo-Pythagorean treatises written at this time, such as those
of ps-Archytas, Euryphamus, Theages (see Dillon 1977,
341-361, 1988b, 119-122, Centrone 1990), while Plutarch's
contemporary Moderatus attempted to systematize Pythagorean ideas as
background to Plato (he wrote a work *Pythagorean Doctrines* in
many books; Stephanus Byzantius, *s.v*. Gadeira, Porphyry,
*Life of Pythagoras* 48; Dillon 1977,
344-351). Aristotelian philosophy, on the other hand, was
revived by Peripatetics and Platonists alike during this period. In
the Peripatetic camp this is the time when Andronicus of Rhodes was
active, being responsible for a complete edition of Aristotle's works
at the end of the 1st century BCE, while Xenarchus of
Seleukeia was critically engaged with Aristotle's physics. But already
before them, Antiochus and Cicero had been well acquainted with
Aristotle's works, the former arguing that Aristotle was in essential
agreement with Plato, at least in ethical theory (Cicero,
*Academica* I.17, *De finibus* V.12). Antiochus'
students Aristo (of Alexandria) and Cratippus regarded themselves as
Peripatetics (*Index Academicorum* col. 35.2-17 Dorandi), while
the Platonust Eudorus did not hesitate to use Aristotle in order to
identify Pythagorean metaphysical principles in Plato (Alexander,
*In Met.* 58.25-59.8 with reference to Aristotle
*Metaphysics* 988a8-17). Plutarch was familiar with
several Aristotelian treatises from all periods of his writing career
(cf. *Adv. Col.* 1115B-C) and, quite interestingly, he
preserves numerous fragments from lost Aristotelian works (see Ross,
*Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta*, Karamanolis 2006,
89-92). Plutarch's attitude to Pythagoreanism and Aristotle is
complex and sophisticated. Plutarch's cosmic principles, the One and
the Indefinite Dyad (*De defectu oraculorum* 428F-429A),
allegedly found in the *Timaeus*, had long been considered
Pythagorean in origin. Plutarch shows his familiarity with
Pythagoreanism in the second (and rather cryptic) part of *On the
Generation of the Soul in Timaeus*, where he seeks to explain the
nature and role of numbers and ratios in the *Timaeus* making
repeated references to Pythagoreans. Plutarch also integrates into
Platonism other Pythagorean elements, such as number symbolism (*De
E* 387F, *De def. or.* 429D-430B), abstinence from meat
(*On the Eating of Flesh; De esu carnium*), and a belief in the
rationality of animals (*On the Cleverness of Animals, Beasts are
Rational; Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti*), probably because he
considers them implied in, or compatible with, statements made in
Plato (e.g. in the *Phaedo, Timaeus*). With regard to
Aristotle, Plutarch is more cautious than Antiochus; he considers some
of Aristotle's doctrines to be an articulation or development of
Platonic philosophy (e.g. Aristotle's ethics, logic and science; see
Teodorsson 1999), and espouses them as being Platonic (e.g. *De
virtute morali* 442B-C*, De an. procr.* 1023E). However, he
also criticizes Aristotle for contradicting Plato's presumed doctrines
(e.g. on the Forms and on the constitution of the world;
*Adv. Col.* 1114F-1115C; see Karamanolis 2006,
85-126).



Hence it is wrong to portray Plutarch as an eclectic philosopher (e.g.
Ziegler 1951, 940, F. Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*,
Introduction, vol. I, Loeb 1927, xiv, Becchi 1981), who occasionally
compromises his Platonism in order to carry out his polemic
(Dorrie 1971, Donini 1988b, 131, 1999, 16-19). Rather
Plutarch uses philosophers such as Aristotle only instrumentally in
order to advance through them what he perceives as Plato's doctrines
(Karamanolis 2006, 92-109). Plutarch shares with Antiochus
(Cicero, *Academica* I.17-19, 33-34) the view that
Plato's philosophy is subject to articulation and development through
his successors in the Platonist tradition, but also to
misinterpretation and distortion. On this view, Xenocrates, Polemo and
Aristotle developed and articulated Platonic philosophy, though not
without faults, while the Stoics and Epicureans were instead guilty of
systematic distortion. Plutarch is not a populariser either (Babbitt op. cit.).
Rather, Plutarch's work shows great complexity and sophistication and
evinces the spirit of a meticulous interpreter, who ventures to
advance innovative views, such as on the creation of the soul, on
human constitution, as well as on ethics and poetics (see below,
sects. 6 and 7). It is also unfair to say of Plutarch that he was
"no original thinker" (Ziegler 1951,
938-939). Plutarch lived in an age in which philosophy had taken
the form of exegesis of classical philosophical texts, but through
this exegetical process philosophers in late antiquity (such as
Plotinus and the commentators on Plato and Aristotle) crystallize and
voice their own views on crucial philosophical questions. Indeed
Plutarch takes some very interesting lines on metaphysics, psychology,
and ethics, which became influential in later generations of
Platonists, such as Plotinus and Porphyry (see below, sect. 4, 5,
6).


## 3. Logic/Epistemology




Like the Hellenistic Philosophers and Antiochus, Plutarch appears to
be particularly sensitive to the question of how we acquire
knowledge. Plutarch sets out to defend the interpretation of Plato's
epistemology maintained in the skeptical Academy. According to this
interpretation, suspension of judgment (*epoche*) is the
best way to avoid overhasty commitment to opinions (*doxai*),
since the appearances on which they are based can be
deceitful. Plutarch defends this epistemological position against the
Stoic accusation that such an attitude leads to inaction, making life
impossible, and also against the Epicurean claim that
sense-experiences are always true. Plutarch distinguishes between
three different movements in the soul, which are identical to those
assumed by the Stoics, namely those of sensation
(*phantastikon*), impulse (*horme*), and assent
(*synkatathetikon*; *Adv. Col*. 1122B). The first two
alone, Plutarch argues, against the Stoics, suffice to produce action
(*Adv. Col*. 1122C-D). Since suspension of judgment does not
interfere with either perception/sensation or impulse, it does not
affect our actions but only eliminates opinions
(ibid. 1122B). Consequently, Plutarch argues, suspension of judgment
saves us from making mistakes (1124B) but does not prevent us at all
from acting. Opsomer (1998, 88) has rightly noted that Plutarch's
argument is very similar to that of the Pyrrhonian skeptics. Plutarch
recommends suspension of judgment as a method of testing and
evaluating knowledge obtained through the senses (*Adv. Col.*
1124B). This is not only because the senses often deceive us (*De
primo frigido* 952A, *De E*392E); the problem according to
Plutarch rather is that the world is a place that cannot be known
perfectly. This, however, does not amount to dismissal of the senses,
which is how Colotes criticized Plato
(*Adv. Col*. 1114D-F). According to Plutarch, the senses are of
limited application because they can at best inform us only about the
sensible world, which is a world of generation, of appearances, not of
being (*De E* 392E). For a Platonist like Plutarch, perfect
knowledge can only be of being, and for that we need to transcend the
sensible world and move our thought to the intelligible one (*De
Iside* 382D-383A).



Plutarch makes a sharp distinction between sensible and intelligible
knowledge, which corresponds to the fundamental ontological
distinction between sensible or physical and intelligible reality
(*Plat. Quest.* 1002B-C). He appears to distinguish two
distinct faculties of human knowledge, the sensory and the
intellectual, each of which grasps the corresponding part of reality
(*Plat. Quest.* 1002D-E). The cognitive faculty for
intelligibles, the human intellect, is external to the embodied soul
(*De an. procr*. 1026E, *Plat. Quest*. 1001C, 1002F;
cf. Numenius fr. 42 Des Places); the sensory faculty, on the other
hand, comes about when the soul enters the body (*De virtute
morali* 442B-F; see below, sect. 5), and provides the means for
dealing effectively in daily life with our needs and circumstances in
the physical world as it appears to our senses. In Plutarch's view,
human beings come to understand through the intellect by making use of
the notions or concepts (*ennoiai*), apparently identifiable
with the Forms (*Plat. Quest*. 1001E), with which the intellect
is inherently equipped. That is, the embodied soul recollects what it
knows from its inherent familiarity with the intelligible realm, as
Plato argued in the discussion of *anamnesis* or
recollection in the *Meno* (*Plat. Quest*. 1001D, 1002E;
Opsomer 1998, 193-198). This knowledge of intelligibles is
superior to sensory "knowledge," which can only remain at
the level of belief (*pistis*) and conjecture
(*eikasia*; *Plat. Quest*. 1001C). Indeed, knowledge of
intelligibles can take one as far as to understand the divine realm
(ibid. 1002E, 1004D). But we can achieve this kind of knowledge,
Plutarch suggests, only when "souls are free to migrate to the
realm of the indivisible and the unseen" (*De Iside*
382F). This is the main task of philosophy for Plutarch. Philosophy in
his view must be inspired by the Socratic practice of inquiry, and
this practice amounts to the continuous search for truth, which
presupposes that, following the example of Socrates, one admits
ignorance (*Adv. Col*. 1117D, *De adulatore et amico*
72A).



According to Plutarch, knowledge of intelligibles through
*anamnesis* is not in tension with the Academic
prescription for suspension of judgment; rather, knowledge can be
advanced by suspension of judgment, since the latter puts aside
opinion (*doxa*) as well as egoism (*philautia*), both
of which prevent us from finding the truth
(*Plat. Quest*. 1000C). To be in a position to carry out this
search for truth, however, one must search oneself and purify one's
soul, Plutarch argues (*Adv. Col*. 1118C-E). And he points out
that Socrates promoted precisely this practice, using the
*elenchus* as a purgative medicine, trying to remove false
claims to knowledge and arrogance from the souls of his interlocutors,
and to seek truth along with them, instead of defending his own view
(*Plat. Quest*. 999E-F, 1000B, 1000D; Opsomer 1988, 145-150,
Shiffman 2010). Socrates, Plutarch claims, was in a position to do
that because he had purified his soul from passions (*De genio
Socratis* 588E), hence he was capable of understanding the voice
of his *daimon*, his intellect (see below, sect. 5).



Plutarch does not defend the Socratic-Academic epistemology only at
the theoretical level, but also applies it practically. While
discussing in *On the Principle of Cold* whether cold is a
principle rather than a privation and whether earth is the primary
cold element, he defends suspension of judgment as the right attitude
to take on the matter (955C; see Babut 2007, 72-76 contra
Boys-Stones 1997b). This is indicative of Plutarch's attitude to
natural phenomena quite generally. He maintains that natural phenomena
cannot be understood merely by means of investigating their natural
causes. The discovery of the immediate, natural causes, Plutarch
argues, is only the beginning of an investigation into the first and
highest causes, which are intelligible (*De primo frigido*
948B-C; Donini 1986a, 210-211, Opsomer 1998, 215-6). In other
words, a metaphysical explanation in terms of the Forms and god, the
creator of the universe, must be sought (*De def. or.*
435E-436A). This is what, for Plutarch, demarcates the philosopher
from the mere natural scientist (*physikos*; *De primo
frigido* 948B-C), a distinction further exploited by later
Platonists (e.g. Atticus fr. 5 Des Places, Porphyry in Simplicius,
*In Physica* 9.10-13; fr. 119 Smith). Plutarch is guided
here by the dichotomy between natural and intelligible causes found in
*Phaedo* 97B-99D and *Timaeus* 68E-69D (Opsomer 1998,
183). Explaining the physical world through an appeal to natural
causes alone is insufficient, Plutarch argues, since such an explanation
ignores the agent (god) and the end for which something happens in the world
(*De def. or.* 435E). The fundamental ontological and
epistemological distinction between the sensible and intelligible
realms suggests to Plutarch an analogous distinction of corresponding
levels of explanation (Donini 1986a, 212, Opsomer 1998, 217). Plutarch
maintains that there are two levels of causality, physical and
intelligible, and full understanding of natural phenomena requires the
grasping of both. While in the case of natural phenomena suspension of
judgment maintains an unfailing spirit of research, in the case of
the divine realm, where human understanding is seriously limited,
suspension of judgment, Plutarch suggests, is due also as a form of
piety towards the divine (*De sera* 549E; Opsomer 1998,
178-179).


## 4. Metaphysics


### 4.1 First Principles




Plutarch's metaphysics rests heavily on his interpretation of the
*Timaeus*. Plutarch maintains that the cosmogony of the
*Timaeus* must be interpreted literally, which means that the
world had a temporal beginning (*Plat. Quest.* 1001B-C, *De
an. procr*. 1013C-1024C; cf. *Timaeus* 30a, 52d-53b).
Plutarch argues against the interpretation of most Platonists of his
time, who refuse to understand creation in terms of an actual
generation (*De an. procr*. 1013E). He appears to believe that
his interpretation is the only way to understand Plato's claim that
the soul is "senior" to the body (*Timaeus* 34c),
and that it initiates all change and motion (*De an. procr.*
1013D-F; *Phaedrus* 245c, *Laws* 896a-c). This literal
interpretation of the *Timaeus* also aims to solve the puzzle
of how the soul in Plato is said to be both uncreated
(*Phaedrus* 245c-246a) as well as created (*Timaeus*
34b-35a; *De an. procr*. 1016A), and how the soul is said to be
a mixed entity composed of indivisible being (i.e. intellect) and
divisible being (i.e. the non-rational pre-cosmic soul;
*Timaeus* 35a; *De an. procr*. 1014D-E, 1024A). Plutarch
tries to address these issues in a number of works (see above, sect.
1), most importantly, of the surviving ones, in *On the Generation
of Soul in the Timaeus*, a commentary on *Timaeus*
35a1-36b5, as I noted above.



Plutarch proposes the following interpretation. The cosmos is an
ordered entity that has come into existence at a certain point (when
time did not exist; *Plat. Quest*. 1007C) as a result of the
contact between god and pre-existing, disorderly matter. God puts this
matter in order (*De an. procr.* 1024C; cf. *De Iside*
374E-F), which means that god cannot be the only cosmic principle,
otherwise disorderly matter would be left unaccounted for. Plutarch
postulates two antithetic and antagonistic cosmic principles: the one
is God (the Monad or the One, the unitary eternal substance from which
everything devolves; see below sect. 4.3), and the other is the
Indefinite Dyad, both principles being eternal and uncreated (*De
def. or*. 428E-F). God is the real being, unchangeable, simple
(*De E* 392E-393B), and good (*De def. or.*
423D)--the cause of order, intelligibility, stability, and
identity in the universe. This is why God is the object of striving
for all nature (*De facie* 944E). The Indefinite Dyad, on the
other hand, is the principle of non-being, multiplicity, disorder,
chaos, irrationality and badness (*De def. or*. 428F). This
principle is described as being identical with matter which is ordered
by God (*De def. or*. 428F-429D) or by its *logos*
(*De Iside* 373A-C), yet the existence in it of an active
element which is essentially disorderly and evil (*De Iside*
369D-F; Dillon 1977, 206-8) seems to suggest that the
Indefinite Dyad is regarded not merely as identical with matter, taken
as the underlying element of all qualities, as is suggested in
*Timaeus* 50e (*De def. or*. 414F).). These two
principles, God and the Indefinite Dyad, were allegedly accepted by
the ancient Pythagoreans (Diogenes Laertius 8.24-25; Diels-Kranz
58 Bl), and by the Neo-Pythagoreans of Plutarch's time (Sextus
Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 10.261-284,
Nicomachus, *Introductio Arithmetica* II.18.4; see Dillon 1977,
342-3, 354), but they were also attributed to Plato (Plato,
*Parmenides* 149d2, Simplicius, *In Physica*
453.25-7), presumably by neo-Pythagorean Platonists (Eudorus in
Simplicius, *In Physica* 181.7-30, Moderatus,
ibid. 231.8-9; see Kahn 2001, 105-110 and Numenius in
SEP). Plutarch identifies the two principles with the Limited and the
Unlimited of the *Philebus* (he also calls the Indefinite Dyad
limitlessness, *apeiria*; *De def. or.* 428F). The two
principles are constantly opposing each other in the form of goodness
and badness (*De def. or*. 429B-D, *De Iside* 369E;
Dillon 1977, 203). Although God, the One, prevails over the Dyad
(*De def. or*. 429C-D), order and goodness are always in danger
of being displaced by disorder and badness. Both the Indefinite Dyad
and God relate to the universe through intermediaries, namely a
non-rational and a rational world soul (see above), which operate as
antithetic powers of the two antagonistic cosmic principles. The
result of the interaction of the two cosmic principles through these
powers is the cosmos in which humans live.



This interaction happens in stages. Before the world has come into
being, the universe was animated by the non-rational world soul, which
accounts for the disordered motion of matter. In Plutarch's words,
"what preceded the generation of the world was disorder,
disorder not incorporeal or immobile or inanimate, but of corporeality
amorphous and incoherent, and of motivity demented and irrational, and
this was the discord of soul that has not reason" (*De an.
procr*. 1014B; Cherniss' trans., altered). Plato speaks indeed of
the receptacle as amorphous (*Timaeus* 50d7, 51a7), there is,
however, no explicit mention of a non-rational pre-cosmic soul in the
*Timaeus*, which is why Plutarch has been accused of
arbitrariness in this regard (Cherniss, *Plutarch Moralia*,
Loeb vol. XIII.1, 140-147). It is wrong, though, to treat
Plutarch as one might treat a modern commentator of the
*Timaeus*, with conscientious scholarly attention to what is
and is not made explicit in a text. Plutarch assumes that there is a
single "Platonic view" about the generation of the world,
the first principles of reality, and the role of soul in the world's
generation, and he seeks support for his interpretation in many
Platonic dialogues. He identifies the non-rational soul with the
"disorderly and maleficent soul" of *Laws* X (a
testimony Plutarch himself considers unambiguous, *De Iside*
370F), with the "limitlessness" of the *Philebus*
(26b), the "congenital desire" and "inbred
character" of the *Politicus* (272d, 273b), and with the
necessity (*ananke*) and the generation
(*genesis*) of *Timaeus* 52d (*De an. procr*.
1014D-1015A). None of these passages lend clear support to Plutarch's
interpretation, since nowhere does Plato explicitly speak of a
pre-cosmic maleficent soul or other pre-cosmic soul-like entities:
even the maleficent soul of the *Laws* is not pre-cosmic
(Cherniss, ibid. 140). Yet Plutarch's interpretation does have merits
in imposing consistency on Plato's work as a whole in the following
sense. First, according to the *Timaeus* (35a) the demiurge
(the creator god) does not create the substance of the soul, but
compounds the world soul by blending indivisible with divisible being,
which Plutarch not unreasonably identifies with the divine intellect
and the non-rational world soul respectively (*De
an. procr*. 1014D-E). This does justice to the nature of the
soul, which for Platonists is not subject to change and
corruption. Secondly, it was generally assumed that no motion is
possible without a principle of motion (cf. Aristotle, *De
anima* 402a6-7), and this traditionally is identified with
the soul in Platonism (cf. *Phaedrus* 245c-e); so the
disordered motion of matter before the creation of cosmos that Plato
appears to postulate in the *Timaeus* needs to be accounted for
by a soul (see *Laws* 892a), which must, then, be a pre-cosmic
one (*De an. procr*. 1015E).



Further, the existence of a pre-cosmic non-rational soul is suggested
also if one considers the world soul and the human soul in
conjunction. Already the *Timaeus* (34c, 41d-e, 69c) suggests
a relation between the two. Plutarch takes the human soul to be
derivative from the world soul, which means that their natures are
similar (*De an. procr*. 1025A-D; see below, sect. 5). In
*Republic* 4, in the *Phaedrus* and also in the
*Timaeus* it is argued that the human soul has a rational and a
non-rational aspect, fighting for dominance. And it is suggested that
order and harmony is established in the soul when the rational aspect
rules over the non-rational, yet the non-rational aspect is always
capable of revolting against rationality and creating disorder and
badness. Plutarch identifies the rational aspect with intellect, which
he distinguishes from the soul, making the former the cause of order
and goodness while the latter the cause of disorder and badness
(*De an. procr.* 1015E; see below, sect. 5). If the human soul
reflects the nature of the world soul, then also in the latter even
when rationality prevails, when the cosmos comes into being, there is
room for disharmony and disorder. This is evidenced by occurrences of
badness in the world, such as accidents, natural catastrophes, etc. If
there is no such non-rational aspect in the world soul, then either
God must be ultimately accountable for such phenomena, which is what
the Stoics maintain - and this, argues Plutarch, hardly fits
God's goodness (*De an. procr*. 1015A-B) - or they
must happen without cause, as the Epicureans maintain, which then
diminishes God's ruling power (ibid. 1015C). Better to think that such
occurences are caused by the non-rational aspect of the world
soul. Finally, a pre-cosmic soul is needed to play the role of
mediator between God and matter (*De an. procr.* 1015B, 1024C;
cf. *Timaeus* 35a), which is required in order to maintain
God's transcendence, goodness, and purity, since matter, because of
its inherent disorderliness and badness, pollutes and taints, and thus
is hardly worthy of God (cf. Numenius fr. 52.37-39 Des Places;
see also below, sect. 4.3).



The first stage in creation is that God imparts his own intelligence
and reason to the pre-cosmic non-rational soul, making it into a
partly rational thing (*De an. procr*. 1014C-D, 1016E-D,
*Plat. Quest.* 1001B-C). Plutarch makes clear that the
rational world soul is "not merely a work but also a part of God
and has come to be not by his agency, but both from him as a source
and out of his substance" (*Plat. Quest.* 1001C). Since
the world soul, thus constructed, contains divine reason, which is a
"portion" (*moira*) or "efflux"
(*aporrhoe*) of God (*De Iside* 382B), it is not
merely a product of God but rather an inseparable part of him (*De
sera* 559D, *Plat. Quest*. 1001C). That is, the world soul
becomes assimilated to God (*homoiosis*; *De sera*
550D). This does not entirely eradicate the world soul's initial
non-rationality (*De an. procr*. 1027A), yet the motions
produced by the world soul become now (for the most part) harmonious
and orderly (*De an. procr.* 1014C-E). This means that matter
ceases to be disordered and indefinite. Matter now becomes stable and
"similar to the entities that are invariably identical"
(ibid. 1015F). Presumably Plutarch is referring here to the
transcendent Forms. He states that the cosmos comes into being when
the soul disperses the semblances from the intelligible world to this
one (ibid. 1024C; cf. *Timaeus* 50c-e, 52d-53c). Plutarch
appears to maintain that the world soul is capable of being molded by
receiving the intelligible Forms, which is how presumably the world
soul becomes rational (*De an. procr.* 1024C). The world soul,
then, transmits the Forms onto matter (*De Iside* 373A, *De
Pyth. orac*. 404C). This transmission seems to take a two-stage
process, allegedly implied in the *Timaeus*. First, the Forms
inform matter to bring about primary bodies, such as water and fire,
as *Timaeus* 53b-d, 69b-c suggests (*De an. procr.*
1025A-B, *Plat. Quest.* 1001D-E); second, the imposition of
further Forms on matter brings about compound material stuffs and
different kinds of objects, which make up the cosmos (*De
Iside* 372E-F, 373E-F).



The precise role of Forms in Plutarch's interpretation of the creation
remains obscure. Plutarch discussed this issue in treatises no longer
extant, such as, for example, *Where are the Forms?*, yet the
relevant surviving evidence is inconclusive (see though Schoppe 1994,
Ferrari 1995, 1996b). Some insight can be gained from the myth of Isis
and Osiris, which Plutarch presents as an analogy to the world
creation in his *De Iside et Osiride*. Osiris is a divine
intellect that brings everything into being by being sown in matter,
that is, in Isis, the reasons (*logoi*) of himself (*De
Iside* 372E-F), eventually producing Horus, i.e. the cosmos (ibid.
374A, *De an. procr.* 1026C). Osiris is identified with the
good itself (372E), to which Isis always inclines, offering herself to
be impregnated " with effluxes and likenesses in which she
rejoices" (ibid. 373A). Apparently Osiris stands for the
demiurge of the *Timaeus* and also the Form of the Good of the
*Republic* (cf. *De an. procr*. 1017 A-B) --which
explains why Osiris constitutes the object of desire by nature and
Isis (*De Iside* 372E-F; cf. *De facie* 944E) and Isis
stands for the receptacle (*De Iside* ibid., *De
an. procr.* 1026C; *Timaeus* 49a, 51a). This suggests that
Plutarch probably maintained the existence of the Forms in God
(cf. *Timaeus* 39e), as did several other Platonists in late
antiquity (e.g. Alcinous, *Didascalikos* 163.11-17, with
Dillon 1993, 93-96). This is supported by the fact that for
Plutarch Osiris is both the intellect and the *logos* present
in the world soul (*De Iside* 371A, 376C, *De
an. procr.* 1023C-D) and by Plutarch's claim that God is the
totality of Forms (*paradeigma*; *De sera* 550D; see
Helmig 2005, 20-26). However, it is not clear how for Plutarch
the Forms exist in God, since in Plutarch's view God, as Osiris, can
be analyzed into three elements, intellect, soul, and body (*De
Iside* 373A). That Plutarch makes such a distinction with regard
to God is also supported by his claim that "God is not senseless
nor inanimate nor subject to human control" (*De Iside*
377E-F) and also by his reference to the body of Osiris, which
symbolizes the Forms immanent in matter (ibid.; Dillon 1977,
200). Presumably, then, Plutarch assumes the existence of a divine
soul, guided by statements in Plato *Philebus* 30c,
*Sophist* 248d-249a, *Timaeus* 46d-e, according to which
the intellect, to the extent that it implies life, requires the
presence of the principle of life, namely soul (*Plat. Quest.*
1002F).



There is a question, then, as to where in the divine creator the
transcendent Forms reside. We have reason to believe that Plutarch
places the Forms not in the intellect of the divine creator as
thoughts, as was assumed by several later Platonists (e.g. Alcinous,
Porphyry), but rather in the soul (Schoppe 1994, 172-178, Baltes
2001; against Opsomer 2001, 195-197). Syrianus testifies this
explicitly (*In Metaphysica* 105.36-38), while we find
the same doctrine also in Atticus (frs. 8, 11, 35 Des Places;
Karamanolis 2006, 169-170), who was said in antiquity to follow
Plutarch in the interpretation of the cosmogony of the
*Timaeus* (Iamblichus, *De anima*, in Stobaeus 1.49.37,
Proclus, *In Timaeum* 1.276.30-277.7, 325.30-326.6;
Atticus frs. 10, 19, 22 Des Places). The reason for endorsing such a
view presumably was that it allows one to maintain the utter
simplicity and order of the demiurgic intellect, so as to preserve God
as the source of intelligibility, and yet to distance God from the
creation, without, however, either creating gaps between god and
creation or destroying the unity of God. This was the path already
taken by Moderatus (Dillon 1977, 348) and later Platonists, such as
Numenius and Plotinus, who postulated distinct divine hypostases. If
Plutarch endorsed the view that the Forms exist in the divine soul,
this may explain why he sometimes speaks of God and the Forms as a
unity (e.g. *De sera* 550D), and at other times as if they are
separate (*De an. procr.* 1024C-D, *Plat. Quest.* 1001E;
Helmig 2005, 24-5). The reason may be that sometimes Plutarch
speaks of the divine creator in the strict sense, as an intellect, and
some other times in the wider sense, as an animated intellect (one in
a soul). When Plutarch refers to being, the receptacle, and
*genesis* in *Timaeus* 52d2-4, identifying the
last with the non-rational soul, the receptacle with matter, and being
with the intelligible realm, while he also mentions an intellect
"abiding and immobile all by itself," this is not evidence
that Plutarch adds arbitrarily a fourth entity, the divine intellect,
as Cherniss (*Plutarch Moralia*, Loeb XIII.1, 143)
argued. Apparently Plutarch understands "being" in
*Timaeus* 52d2 as equivalent to "animal" in
*Timaeus* 39e8, namely as that which comprises both the divine
intellect (in a soul) and the intelligible Forms.


### 4.2 Fate and what is up to us




The antagonism between God and the Indefinite Dyad, between intellect
and soul, between the rational and the non-rational aspect of the
world soul, and ultimately between goodness and badness is an
entrenched feature of the world, according to Plutarch. He claims that
the world contains both goodness and badness and he postulates two
antithetical principles to account for each one of them (*De
Iside* 369C-D), since God can only be the principle of
goodness (ibid; cf. *Republic* 379c, *Theaetetus*
176a). And he criticizes the Epicureans and the Stoics, who postulate
either matter (the atoms) or god respectively as active principles of
the world (*De Iside* 369A). Plutarch expresses his dualism
also in religious-symbolic terms: he equates the pair of good and evil
principles with the Persian pair of gods Oromazes and Areimanius
(*De Iside* 369D-E). Plutarch's pervasive dualism gives
rise to problems, however. The constant presence and operation of the
disorderly, non-rational aspect of the soul in the universe (*De
an. procr*. 1027A), implies God's failure totally to
dominate. Plutarch appears to maintain that God's power is limited by
the necessity (*ananke*) imposed by matter. Yet, on the
other hand, he does distinguish between the rule of nature, or fate,
on the one hand, and divine providence on the other, arguing, against
the Stoics, that God can dominate nature (*De facie* 927A-B)
and can function providentially for us (*De comm. not*. 1075E,
*De Iside* 371A, *De defect oraculorum* 413E
-Ammonius speaking). The fact that God, by means of his
*logos*, with which he is often identified (*De Iside*
373A-B), moulds the principle of disorder, the Indefinite Dyad,
suggests to Plutarch the supremacy of God over any other force. This
is actually one of the reasons why Plutarch defends temporal creation;
if the world were eternal and God responsible for it, then God would
be the cause of both good and bad, while on Plutarch's interpretation
of the *Timaeus* badness is accounted for by the evil world
soul, which, as I said above, according to Plutarch is pre-cosmic (see
Dillon 2002, 234; see also below, sect. 4.3).



The problem however remains. It becomes more serious if we move from
the cosmic macrocosm to the human microcosm. If disorder,
non-rationality, and badness are cosmic forces, producing what is bad
in the world, the question is how they relate to the bad or the vice
caused by human beings. Plutarch distinguishes three causes, fate,
chance, and ourselves as causes of what is up to us, all of which play
a role in what happens to us (*Quaest. Conv*. 740C-D). The
first two kinds of causes need some explanation in view of Plutarch's
metaphysical principles. Presumably, fate amounts to God, chance to
the non-rational part of the world soul, since the latter can bring
about events not planned by God which are disorderly and evil.
Plutarch's distinction amounts to three classes of events. Some events
are fated (or planned by God), some happen by chance (or through the
operation of the non-rational aspect of the world soul), while there
is a third class of events for which we, humans, are the only causes
(*De tranq. an*. 476E). We can, Plutarch says, decide what to
do, how to live our lives, but not how life will turn out in terms of
desired or intended outcomes of our actions (ibid. 467A-B; Eliasson
2008, 130-141). He criticizes the Stoics for violating this
distinction, arguing that the Stoic notion of "that which is up
to us" coincides with the Stoic notion of fate (*De Stoic.
repugn*. 1056E-D). In view of that evidence Plutarch may appear to
defend human freedom, but the problem remains, since it is still
unclear how the human's participation in the intelligible realm
through soul and intellect, sharing the characteristics of the
(originally non-rational) world soul and the (naturally rational)
divine intellect, shapes one's character and accounts for one's
actions in life.


### 4.3 Theology




The issue of human freedom becomes more complex in view of Plutarch's
conception of god and his theory of divine providence. This is an
important aspect of Plutarch's philosophy. Plutarch distinguishes
sharply between God or the divine (*theos, to theion*) and
gods, and the question is how the plurality of gods is to be
understood vis-a-vis the first God. This is not entirely clear
(Ziegler 1951, 940). Plutarch appears to maintain that the first God
can take different names, yet he is to be distinguished from the
deities of the Greek pantheon (such as Asclepius in *Amatorius*
758A-B), who are to be identified with the lesser gods. In the *On
the E at Delphi* Apollo is presented as the supreme God
(393D-394A), while elsewhere it is Zeus who is described as the
supreme God, creator of the universe (*De facie* 927B).
According to Plutarch the first God constitutes a unity of utter
simplicity, a unity including all divine beings in it (*De
Iside* 377F), and is identified with the Good and with Being
(*De E* 393B-D; see Opsomer 2009,
158-160). Apparently Plutarch identifies the highest principle
with the Form of the Good of the *Republic* and with the
demiurge of the *Timaeus* (see Ferrari 2005, Brenk 2005), a
tendency that Numenius and Plotinus will resist later. God rules over
the world and provides for it, but being supreme
(*an**otato*; *Plat. Quest*. 1000E),
father of gods and men alike, he remains transcendent. This becomes
clear in Ammonius' speech in *On the E in Delphi*, where God is
said to be "beyond everything" (*epekeina tou
pantos*; 393B), but also in the *On the Obsolescence of
Oracles*, where Lamprias defends the possibility of God being
provident over many worlds, provided that these are of a finite number
(426E). This means that God is not immanent in the world, and yet he
is its creator. God's transcendence is maintained by delegating to the
world soul some mediatory demiurgic performance (see above, sect. 4.1;
cf. Opsomer 2005, 94-5). This resonates with Plutarch's more
general view (inspired by Plato), according to which the soul has a
mediating role between the intellect and the body or sensible reality
(see below, sect. 5).



Apart from the world soul, the creator God also needs some further
mediation with the sensible world if his transcendence is to be
maintained--this is already suggested in the distinction between
the demiurge and the lesser gods in the *Timaeus*
(42e). Plutarch acknowledges the existence of divine entities inferior
to the first God or the One but also to gods, namely the
"*daimones.*" They are said to be "by nature
on the boundary between gods and humans" (*De
def. or*. 416C). Placed in the moon, these lesser gods mediate
between the first God and human beings, thus extending God's
providence to them (Dillon 1977, 216-8). Plutarch explores a
tradition going back to Empedocles, to Plato (*Symposium*
202d-203e, *Phaedo* 107D, 113D, *Republic* 427b,
620d, *Timaeus* 90a-d), and to Xenocrates, by whom he appears
to be particularly influenced on this matter (*De Iside* 360E,
*De def. or.* 416C-D). The precise role of the demons
becomes an interesting issue in view of the fact that Plutarch speaks
of two kinds of demons, good and bad, and indeed he claims that demons
exhibit different degrees of virtue and vice, as is the case with men
too (*De def. or.* 417B, *De Iside* 360E). Plutarch
provides us with evidence according to which the role of demons
consists in communicating God's will to humans, bestowing them with
prophetic powers and inspiration (*Amatorius* 758E, *De
genio Socratis* 580C, *De facie* 944C-D), in taking
care of humans when they are needy (*Amatorius* 758A-B),
in taking care of the sanctuaries and the sacred rites (*De
def. or.* 417A-B), but also in punishing humans and avenging
human bad acts (ibid.). The latter is the role of the bad demons. For
apparently Plutarch maintained that proper punishment is never
vengeful. This emerges when Plutarch discusses the question of divine
punishment in his work *On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance*
(*De sera numinis vindicta*).



In this work Plutarch examines an issue with which philosophers of his
age are seriously concerned, namely that of theodicy. Even if God is
not responsible for occurrences of evil (see above, sect. 4.2), there
is a question of why these are not always punished promptly by God. In
his treatise *On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance* Plutarch
addresses the question of whether the delays of divine punishment speak
against the existence of divine providence (550C) and he replies that
this is not the case. God, he argues, acts on reason, not on
passionate anger or impulse (551A, 557E), thus avoiding errors, and by
doing so, Plutarch continues, he sets the model for our own actions
(ibid.). On the other hand, Plutarch argues that human wickedness is
not always to be punished, because it of itself ruins the life of
those who act thus, and this is already a sufficient punishment
(ibid. 556D-E). Besides, Plutarch suggests, the punishment of the
divine does not have to be obvious; this can actually take place in
the afterlife of the soul, as is suggested in *Republic* 10, so
Plutarch claims that "it is one and the same argument
...that establishes both the providence of god and the survival
of the human soul" (560F; see also below, sect. 5).


## 5. Psychology




Plutarch, as a Platonist, regards soul as responsible for all life and
all motion of any kind. The world and all living beings have
soul. While in Plato soul sometimes includes (or is even restricted
to) intellect (e.g. *Phaedo* 94b) and sometimes not (e.g.
*Phaedrus* 247c, *Timaeus* 69c-e), Plutarch
distinguishes sharply between soul and intellect. For Plutarch soul is
essentially non-rational and yet receptive of reason that stems from
the intellect (*De virtute morali* 441F). Plutarch criticizes
the Stoics who analyze the nature of man in two parts only, body and
soul, for disregarding the intellect (*De facie* 943A-B;
see Alt 1993, 94-6). For Plutarch the threefold distinction of
the individual person (body, soul, and intellect) has its equivalent
in the universe at large. As the human soul is intermediary between
body and intellect, similarly, Plutarch claims, the world soul is
intermediary between earth and sun (*De facie* 943A, 945A,
*De virtute morali* 441D; see Deuse 1985, 45-47, Opsomer
1994). In both the human being and the world, the intellect is
external to the soul (cf. *Phaedrus* 247c-d); the world
soul is informed by the reason of the creator god, the demiurge, while
in the case of humans the intellect amounts to the
"*daimon*" assigned to each of us (*De
genio Socratis* 591E), which is what *Republic* 620d and,
especially, *Timaeus* 90a-d suggest. Ultimately both the world
soul and the human souls are informed by reason and become rational by
coming into contact with the divine intellect. Plutarch argues that
all ensouled beings, including animals, exhibit the presence of the
divine intellect (*De Iside* 382A-B). However, as I said
above (sect. 4.1), an element of non-rationality always remains in
souls (*De an. procr*. 1027A), but Plutarch claims that this
happens in different degrees, depending on how much a soul partakes of
intellect (*De genio Socratis* 588 D, 591D-E). On this
basis Plutarch argues, against the Stoics, that animals also share in
reason (*De sollertia animalium* esp. 960B). The extent to
which a soul partakes of reason largely depends on the training and
the habits of that soul itself. Strong emotions, for instance,
distance soul from intellect and increase its non-rationality (*De
genio Socratis* 591D; see Dillon 1977, 212-213).



Plutarch maintains that there is a constant interaction between
intellect, soul, and body. This interaction manifests itself both at a
psychological and at an ethical level. The soul as such accounts for
the senses, while the intellect accounts for intelligence (*De an.
procr*. 1026D-E). Clearly, though, perception is an activity
involving both the senses and the notions residing in the intellect
(see above, sect. 3). It is the intellect that gives order to the
sense impressions and accounts for understanding. Analogously, the
interaction of soul and body gives rise to non-rational movement or
passion, while the interaction between intellect and soul brings about
rational movement, harmony and virtue (*De sera* 566A-D,
591D-F; see Dillon 1977, 194). Plutarch actually suggests that
the soul that is devoid of intellect comes close to being
quasi-corporeal (*De sera* 566A; Teodorsson 1994,
120). Regarding the embodied soul, Plutarch appears to be guided by
Aristotle's view in the *De anima* (see also *Phaedo*
82d-e), arguing that the soul uses the body as an
instrument. The soul, he argues, develops faculties, such as the
vegetative, the nutritive, the perceptive, when associating with the
body, so that it can carry out the functions of an animated body
(*De virtute morali* 442B, 450E, 451A, *Plat. Quest*.
107E-1009B; Karamanolis 2006, 111-113, Baltes 2000). This
coordination of the body is such that we sense and understand, and
this is possible because the soul is informed by the intellect (*De
genio Socratis* 589A).



For Plutarch, the proximity of soul as such to body in its operations
as living body is evidence for the superiority of the
intellect. Inspired by passages in Plato such as *Phaedrus*
247c and *Timaeus* 30b, 90a, Plutarch argues that intellect is
as superior to soul as soul is to body (*De facie* 943A). In
his view, the intelligent part of the human soul is not subject to
corruption (*De genio Socratis* 591D-F) and Plutarch identifies
it with one's true self. He argues that one's self is neither that in
virtue of which we sense nor that in virtue of which we desire, but
rather that in virtue of which we reason and think (*De facie*
944F-945A; cf. *Timaeus* 90a-d). Plutarch actually goes
so far as to distinguish two kinds of death, first when intellect
leaves soul and body, second when soul leaves body (*De facie*
943A-B; see Donini 1988b, 140-143, Brenk 1994, 15). The
separation of intellect from soul and body happens "by love for
the image of the sun...for which all nature strives"
(*De facie* 944E). The ascent to the sun as the goal of
intellect symbolizes the human being's imitation of, and assimilation
to, the divine, and is a frequent theme in Plutarch (*De Iside*
372D-E, *De E* 393D-F, *De sera* 556D; see Brenk
1994, 10-14, Becchi 1997). This is illustrated in the myth
presented in *On Delays in Divine Punishment* of a certain
Aridaeus, who like Er in the *Republic*, died but has come back
to life to narrate his experience after death. The death of Aridaeus
amounts to the fall of the intelligent part of his soul (*to
phronoun*; *De sera* 563E-F, 566A), through which
humans partake of the divine (564C), with the soul remaining behind
(*alle psyche*) as an anchor in the body (564C;
cf. 560C-D). The latter is the non-rational part of the soul, which is
such because it is bound to the body
(*somatoeides*; 566A) and inclines the entire soul
toward earthly concerns, preventing the soul from going very far away
(566D). This is very similar to what Plotinus maintains later in
*Enn.* IV.8.8.1. However, in his *On the Soul* that is
only fragmentarily preserved, Plutarch speaks of the separation of
soul from body and recounts the story of a certain Antyllos who had
died and then his soul had been released again (fr. 176 Sandbach). In
this context Plutarch claims that the doctrine of the incorruptibility
of the soul is an ancient one (fr. 177 Sandbach), a claim which may
well be a criticism of the Epicurean doctrine of the mortality of soul
(cf. *Non posse suaviter vivi* 1103F; see Bonazzi 2010,
78-83). Inspired by the *Phaedo*, Plutarch argues that
the very task of philosophy is to prepare us for the separation from
the body, which amounts to a life without bodily needs that he
considers as the "true life", which in his view the
Epicureans ignore (*Non posse suaviter vivi*
1105C-E). After death, Plutarch claims, souls go through the
process of reincarnation, which, as in Plato, is a form of punishment
for wicked souls (*De sera* 567D-F). While all intellects live
eternally, those of noble souls become divine (*daimones*) and
operate as guardians of humans (*De genio Socratis* 593D-594A;
see further Dillon 1977, 219-224). Such evidence suggests that
for Plutarch both intellect and soul are immortal though in a
different way, a doctrine we find also later in Porphyry (fr. 453
Smith).


## 6. Ethics and Politics




Plutarch shares the view of Hellenistic philosophers that philosophy
is a way of life. He is much concerned to advocate the life according
to Plato, and to show that such life is possible and indeed happy (*Adv.
Col*. 1107E, *Non posse suaviter vivi* 1086C-D). He
criticizes Stoics and Epicureans for proposing misguided ethical ideals
(e.g. *An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum* 1129F-1130E).
Plutarch's strong concern with ethics is reflected also in his
*Lives*, which focus on the character of a historical figure.
Central to these is how man's nature (*physis*) can be
educated so that a certain state of character is formed
(*ethos; Pericles* 38, *Alcibiades* 2.1, *De
sera* 551E-F, 552C-D; Russell 1973, 105-106, 117). Plutarch's
especially strong interest in ethics among the sub-fields of philosophy
is characteristic of his age. The two most prominent of
Plutarch's Stoic contemporaries or near-contemporaries, Epictetus
and Seneca, devote most of their attention in their writings to ethics,
and this is the case also with the Peripatetic Aristocles of Messene
(1st c. CE?), the author of some eight books on ethics (Suda
*s.v*. Aristocles). To some extent, this especially strong
interest in ethics goes back to Antiochus (1st c. BCE).
Plutarch and the Peripatetic Aristocles identify ethical formation as
the ultimate goal of philosophy, yet Plutarch at least differs from Antiochus in
that he founds his ethics on metaphysics, largely based on his
interpretation of the *Timaeus* outlined above (sect. 4.1). It is because Plutarch
maintains the existence of an intelligible world, which has shaped the
sensible world including humans, that he rejects the ethics of both
Stoics and Epicureans. On the basis of the *Phaedrus* and the
*Timaeus*, Plutarch maintains that both the human intellect and the
human soul stem from the intelligible realm, the indivisible and the
divisible being respectively, which shapes our human nature accordingly
(cf. *Plat. Quest*. 1001C).



Plutarch argues that the crucial difference between the Platonic and
the Stoic understanding of virtue is grounded in their different
conceptions of soul as the source of human agency (*De virtute
morali* 441C-E). While for the Stoics soul is reason only,
Plutarch defends the conception of soul outlined in the
*Republic* (esp. book 4), which presents the soul as consisting
of rational and non-rational parts. As explained above (sect. 4), this
fits well with Plutarch's interpretation of the creation of the
world, according to which the pre-cosmic non-rational world soul is
informed by the reason (*logos*) of the divine demiurge, yet
this is not sufficient to eliminate its natural non-rationality. The
non-rational aspect of the human soul accounts for emotions and bodily
desires (Opsomer 1994, 41). In fact, however, Plutarch does not lump
together bodily desires and emotions as constituting an
undifferentiated non-rational part. Given the theory of
*Republic* 4, Plutarch distinguishes spirit, as responsible for
emotions, from appetite, which is responsible for bodily desires. But he
classes them together to the extent that both are dependent upon
reason, sensitive to, and nurtured by, it (*De virtute morali*
443C-D; *Plat. Quest*. 1008A-B). Plutarch describes virtue
(without mentioning appetite) as the state in which reason succeeds in
managing emotion and drives it in the right direction (*De virtute
morali* 443B-D, 444B-C, 451C-E), while vice arises when emotion is
not properly informed by reason (443D). Plutarch defines virtue as the
state in which emotion is present as matter and reason as form (440D),
a definition inspired by *Nicomachean Ethics* 1104b13-30 (cf.
Aspasius, *In Ethica Nicomachea* 42.20-25). Plutarch's
definition of virtue matches his account of how the world came into
being, when matter was informed by reason. As with the world soul,
similarly with the human soul in Plutarch's view, the impact of reason is possible because
the soul, or part thereof, can heed what reason dictates.



Interestingly, Plutarch does not refer to the *Timaeus* to support his theory
of the tripartite soul, but rather to Aristotle (*De virtute morali* 442B-C), whom
Plutarch, like most ancient and modern commentators, recognizes as
adopting essential aspects of Plato's doctrine. The essential
feature that Aristotle shares with Plato is the belief in rational and
non-rational aspects of the soul. This accounts for unself-controlled
actions that, Plutarch thinks, prove how mistaken is the Stoic
conception of human agency as deriving from reason alone. Plutarch also
relies largely on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* with
regard to the nature of virtue. He describes virtue as being an extreme
of excellence (*akrotes*), which however lies in a mean,
determined by reason, between two opposite emotions (*De virtute
morali* 443D-444D; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1107a6-8). Plutarch
argues that there can be no virtue without some emotion. Without some
amount of fear, Plutarch contends, there can be no courage, for
instance (*De virtute morali* 451E-452A); courage, he claims, is the virtue
that one acquires when, in a state of fear, one manages to
subordinate fear to a goal set by reason, such as fighting for
one's country; in this sense, emotion is an ally to reason in
constituting virtue (cf. *De tranq. animi* 471D). Plutarch
suggests this specifically in the case of anger becoming bravery
(*De ira* fr. 148 Sandbach). Anger, when moderated and guided by
reason, can also motivate reasonable and due vengeance (*De
sera* 551A-B).



Since virtue is the state (*hexis* 443D) in which emotion is
guided by reason, it follows that virtue requires training in how to
make emotion right. Plutarch devotes an entire treatise to that
subject (*De profectibus in virtute*). He defends, against the
Stoics, the view that progress in virtue is possible (ignoring the
relevant views of Epictetus, *Dissertations* I.4 and Seneca,
*Letters to Lucilius* 75.8). Education in virtue can be
provided by parents and teachers, by the example of the virtuous
actions of the people around us (*De communibus notitiis*
1069A), by the law of the cities (*De virtute morali* 452D),
and also by philosophy, poetry and history (*De profectibus*
79B-80B). Plutarch tries indeed to offer such an education in virtue
through his writings that have practical orientation, such as *On
the Control of Anger, On Curiosity, How Could you Tell a Flatterer
from a Friend, Precepts of Marriage, To an Uneducated Ruler* (see
Van Hoof 2010), which are similar in spirit with the works of
Philodemus *On Property Management, On the Good Ruler according to
Homer* and Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius*. Plutarch
maintains that the pervasion of emotion by reason should be thorough,
which is why he claims that the temperate person is less virtuous than
the practically wise one (*phronimos*), who does the good
without wavering (*De virtute morali* 445C-D;
cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1151b23-1152a3), as a temperate
person might. To the extent that virtue reflects the operation of
reason in the human soul, which is capable of following reason,
virtue, Plutarch argues, is natural to us. He argues that nature
itself attracts us (*oikeiousa*) to things which are natural
for us to strive for, but these include also life, health, beauty,
which Plutarch considers as completing happiness
(*symplerotika, De communibus notitiis*
1060B-E). Plutarch censures the Stoics because they argue that the
final human end is to live in accordance with nature, but, he claims,
they contradict themselves when they admit only virtue as being good,
neglecting all other things which are, by everyone's admission, good
for us, such as health. Plutarch, like Antiochus, maintains that the
human final end includes the satisfaction of primary demands of the
body, a doctrine Plutarch finds in Aristotle, Xenocrates and Polemo
(*De communibus notitiis* 1069E-F).



This, however, is not the only conception of happiness that Plutarch
advocates. While he argues against the Stoics that a life of thinking
only, devoid of all affection, cannot be happy (*De tranq.
animi* 468D), he also defends an alternative end for human life,
which consists in a life of *theoria* (an Aristotelian term
meaning contemplative knowing) or, in Plutarch's words,
*epopteia* (a religious term referring to the final vision
achieved in initiation ceremonies for mystery religions; *De
Iside* 382D-E; cf. *Quaestiones Convivales*
718d). Formally, the end that Plutarch advocates for human beings is,
as he says, a life similar to god (*De sera* 550D-E). This end
is suggested in the several eschatological stories found in Plutarch's
work, which suggest that a human being can transcend the sensible
world and become united with the divine (see Alt 1993,
185-204). This doctrine, which has its roots in the
*Phaedo*, the *Theaetetus* and *Republic* X, is
again to be understood against Plutarch's interpretation of the
cosmogony of the *Timaeus*. The "younger gods" of
the *Timaeus* imitate the demiurge in constructing human
beings' and the other animals' bodies and souls (40b-d, 42e), and this
is also the case with nature, which strives to imitate the creator and
become like him (*De facie* 944; Helmig 2005,
21-23). This assimilation with god (*homoiosis*)
amounts to the complete domination of the intelligible aspect of
humans over the sensible one. Humans are invited to follow the cosmic
example and in this sense to live in accordance with nature too. To
achieve this, one should let his intellect rule and get beyond having
any emotions. This amounts to having and exercising theoretical
virtue alone, which pertains to the intellect (*Non posse suaviter
vivi* 1092E). The practical virtues that pertain to the embodied
soul are achieved, according to Plutarch, through the subordination of
emotion to reason (Tyrwitt frs. p. 68 Sandbach). Plutarch's
distinction between a life of happiness through theorizing or
contemplation and a practical life of happiness is made in his *On
Moral Virtue*, apparently inspired by the relevant Aristotelian
distinction in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Plutarch suggests that his
theoretical ideal does not only require a distinct kind of virtue but
also determines a distinct kind of happiness. In this Plutarch
anticipates Plotinus' distinction of two kinds of ethical life, a
political and a theoretical one. For Plutarch, however, the
theoretical ideal of the philosopher involves a political dimension
too, which is to help their fellow citizens and the city with his
reasoning, as is suggested in the *Republic*, and he criticizes
both Stoics and Epicureans for refusing to engage in politics (*De
Stoic. rep.*  1033A-1034C, *Adv. Col.*
1126B-1127E, *Ad Princ. Inerud.* 780C-F).


## 7. Poetics and Educational theory




Given Plutarch's concern for the education of character and of the
city as a whole, it is hardly surprising that he wrote works on
education (*On the Education of Children, De liberis
educandis*, which is considered spurious, however, by Ziegler
1951, 809-812) and especially on the effect that poetry has on
the education of one's character. His most important work in this
field is *On How the Young Man Should Listen to Poets*
(*Quomodo adolscens poetas audire debeat; De aud. poet.*),
while he also wrote a treatise on Homer (*De Homero*) that is
no loner extant. In the former work Plutarch deals with the question
of how young people should read and understand poetry, since poetry
can be both beneficial and harmful, depending on its
interpretation. Following the *Republic*, Plutarch argues that
poetry is a mimetic art; it imitates the character and lives of
various people, good and bad alike (*De aud. poet*. 17E-F,
26A). In the course of this, Plutarch claims, poets tell lies and
present obscene stories and images (ibid. 16A). Plutarch selects
examples of such poetic habits mainly from the *Republic*,
focusing on stories from Homer in particular. Plutarch does not
condemn poetry altogether; he rather finds a convenient middle
solution. He tries to show how one should read the poets in the most
beneficial way. In order to do so, Plutarch argues, first one should
avoid reading the deliberate lies made in poetry, which can
unnecessarily upset one (ibid. 17B; see Russell 1989, 303). Second,
Plutarch recommends that the reader, especially the young one, should
learn how to read poetry allegorically, in such a way that this can
have a beneficial effect on one's character (ibid. 19E-20B; see Lamberton
2001, 48-50). This is the approach that Plutarch himself applies to
the myth of Isis and Osiris in his work with that title. Plutarch
illustrates the search for the correct (morally uplifting) meaning of
a poetic saying also in parts of the *Table Talks*
(*Quaestiones Conviviales* 622C, 673C; see Russell 1989, 305). The
young man needs to learn the skill of how to recover and isolate the
beneficial elements of poetry and absorb them alone. In that way
poetry can guide one to virtue (ibid. 28E-F). Plutarch likens properly
educated young men in their attitude towards poetry to the way bees
select the best from flowers (32E), a simile adopted by the
Christians, Basil (*To young men on the right use of
literature* 4.7-8), and Gregory of Nazianzus
(*Orationes* 43.13.1). Such a use of poetry, Plutarch claims,
prepares youths for their education in philosophy (*De
aud. poet*. 15F, 37B). This happens in two ways. First, poetry
can guide youths towards philosophy by familiarizing them with the
concepts that philosophers also use; second, poetry, as we have seen,
when properly used, can guide to virtue, and this, Plutarch argues, is
a requirement for philosophical education (*De aud.
poet*. 36D-37B). Plutarch actually maintains that the best of
poetry is nothing other than philosophy in disguise (ibid. 15F), and
throughout his work he tries to illustrate precisely this through a
selection of verses from the most well known ancient poets. In *On
Making Progress in Virtue* (79B-D) Plutarch goes so far as to
treat poetry and history as complementary to philosophy in educating
one's character. Regarding the educative role of poetry, Plutarch
appears to be influenced by the Stoics, who were using poetry in
education, but he goes further than they in devising specific
strategies meant to turn young men into good readers of poetry (see
Blank 2011).



From this point of view, one may relate Plutarch's *Lives* to
his philosophical works (see Gill 2006, 421-424). Plutarch
himself says he wrote the *Lives* for the improvement of
others, assuming that the actions of virtue will instigate emulation
in the reader (*Pericles* 1-2; see Russell 1973,
100-101). Perhaps, then, the *Lives* also aim to train
the reader's character, and in such a way to prepare them for the life
of philosophy. If this is the case, then the *Lives* are
complementary with Plutarch's ethical works of practical orientation
that I discuss in the previous section.


## 8. Influence




Plutarch exercised considerable influence on later Platonism. His
emphasis on the *Timaeus* and on metaphysics and psychology set
the tone for the following generations of Platonists, in which
metaphysical and psychological questions and the high authority of the
*Timaeus* were prominent features of philosophical
inquiry. Plutarch's literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*
itself was highly debated among Platonists. It was adopted by Atticus,
but was resisted by most others, including Taurus, Porphyry and
Proclus. Later Platonists criticized Plutarch for a narrow-minded
interpretation of the *Timaeus*, some of their criticisms
(e.g. on the world soul), however, rest on an uncharitable
interpretation of Plutarch (see Opsomer 2001). Nevertheless,
Plutarch's view that the world soul is created in the sense that it
partakes of reason and intelligence imparted to it by the demiurge, is
endorsed by Alcinous, *Didascalikos* 169.33-42 and
presumably also by Numenius (fr. 45 Des Places; see Dillon 1993, 127).
Plutarch's radical metaphysical and psychological dualism is shared by
Numenius and Atticus, but is rejected by Plotinus and Porphyry. The
latter, however, draws on Plutarch in his argument that animals
partake of reason (*De abstinentia* 3.6-7). Plutarch's
theory of divine providence and theodicy, as presented in his *On
Delays of the Divine Providence* (*De sera numinis
vindicta*) was influential among ancient Platonists and Christians
alike. Proclus, for instance, took over much from it in his *Ten
Objections Against Divine Providence* (esp. 8 and 9). Despite the
vagaries of judgment by later Platonists of Plutarch's work, Plutarch
not only set the agenda of questions for later Platonists, redirecting
their attention to the *Timaeus*, but he was also influential
in terms of his interpretative strategy in approaching Plato's
writings, which aspired to take into account Plato's entire work and
to treat it as a system still to be articulated. It is this strategy
that leads Plutarch to distinguish hierarchies of being in Plato's
work and also levels of ethical life, a strategy that Plotinus will
adopt and develop. Plutarch was highly influential also among early
Christians, who approved of his literal interpretation of the
*Timaeus*, of his theory of good and bad demons, and of his
educational theory. His work was used by Clement of Alexandria, who
followed Plutarch in writing a treatise with the title
"Stromateis," but also by Eusebius, Cyril of Alexandria
and the Cappadocean Church Fathers, especially Basil (see above,
sect. 7).