## 1. Introduction



Despite its status as a core part of contemporary physics, there is no
consensus among physicists or philosophers of physics on the question
of what, if anything, the empirical success of quantum theory is
telling us about the physical world. This gives rise to the collection
of philosophical issues known as "the interpretation of quantum
mechanics". One should not be misled by this terminology into
thinking that what we have is an uninterpreted mathematical formalism
with no connection to the physical world. Rather, there is a common
operational core that consists of recipes for calculating
probabilities of outcomes of experiments performed on systems
subjected to certain state preparation procedures. What are often
referred to as different "interpretations" of quantum
mechanics differ on what, if anything, is added to the common core.
Two of the major approaches, hidden-variables theories and collapse
theories, involve formulation of physical theories distinct from
standard quantum mechanics; this renders the terminology of
"interpretation" even more inappropriate.



Much of the philosophical literature connected with quantum theory
centers on the problem of whether we should construe the theory, or a
suitable extension or revision of it, in realist terms, and, if so,
how this should be done. Various approaches to what is called the
"Measurement Problem" propose differing answers to these
questions. There are, however, other questions of philosophical
interest. These include the bearing of quantum nonlocality on our
understanding of spacetime structure and causality, the question of
the ontological character of quantum states, the implications of
quantum mechanics for information theory, and the task of situating
quantum theory with respect to other theories, both actual and
hypothetical. In what follows, we will touch on each of these topics,
with the main goal being to provide an entry into the relevant
literature, including the Stanford Encyclopedia entries on these
topics. Contemporary perspectives on many of the issues touched on in
this entry can be found in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy
of Physics* (Knox and Wilson, eds., 2021); *The Oxford Handbook
of the History of Quantum Interpretations* (Freire, et al. eds.,
2022) contains essays on the history of discussions of these
issues.


## 2. Quantum Theory



In this section we present a brief introduction to quantum theory; see
the entry on
 quantum mechanics
 for a more detailed introduction.


### 2.1 Quantum states and classical states



In classical physics, with any physical system is associated a state
space, which represents the totality of possible ways of assigning
values to the dynamical variables that characterize the state of the
system. For systems of a great many degrees of freedom, a complete
specification of the state of the system may be unavailable or
unwieldy; classical statistical mechanics deals with such a situation
by invoking a probability distribution over the state space of the
system. A probability distribution that assigns any probability other
than one or zero to some physical quantities is regarded as an
incomplete specification of the state of the system. In quantum
mechanics, things are different. There are no quantum states that
assign definite values to all physical quantities, and probabilities
are built into the standard formulation of the theory.



In formulating a quantum theory of some system, one usually begins
with the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian formulation of the classical
mechanical theory of that system. In the Hamiltonian formulation of
classical mechanics, the configuration of a system is represented by a
set of coordinates. These could be, for example, the positions of each
of a set of point particles, but one can also consider more general
cases, such as angular coordinates that specify the orientation of a
rigid body. For every coordinate there is an associated *conjugate
momentum*. If the coordinate indicates the position of some
object, the momentum conjugate to that coordinate may be what we
usually call "momentum," that is, the velocity of the body
multiplied by its mass. If the coordinate is an angle, the momentum
conjugate to it is an angular momentum.



Construction of a quantum theory of a physical system proceeds by
first associating the dynamical degrees of freedom with
*operators*. These are mathematical objects on which operations
of multiplication and addition are defined, as well as multiplication
by real and complex numbers. Another way of saying this is that the
set of operators forms an *algebra*. Typically, it is said that
an operator represents an *observable*, and the result of an
experiment on a system is said to yield a value for some observable.
Two or more observables are said to be *compatible* if there is
some possible experiment that simultaneously yields values for all of
them. Others require mutually exclusive experiments; these are said to
be *incompatible*.



Of course, in a classical theory, the dynamical quantities that define
a state also form an algebra also, as they can be multiplied and
added, and multiplied by real or complex numbers. Quantum mechanics
differs from classical mechanics in that the order of multiplication
of operators can make a difference. That is, for some operators
\(A\),\(B\), the product \(AB\) is not equal to the product \(BA.\) If
\(AB = BA,\) the operators are said to *commute*.



The recipe for constructing a quantum theory of a given physical
systems prescribes algebraic relations between the operators
representing the dynamical variables of the system. Compatible
observables are associated with operators that commute with each
other. Operators representing conjugate variables are required to
satisfy what are called the *canonical commutation relations*.
If \(q\) is some coordinate, and \(p\) its conjugate
momentum, the operators \(Q\) and \(P\) representing them
are required to not commute. Instead, the difference between
\(PQ\) and \(QP\) is required to be a multiple of the
identity operator (that is, the operator \(I\) that satisfies,
for all operators \(A\), \(IA = AI).\)



A *quantum state* is a specification, for every experiment that
can be performed on the system, of probabilities for the
possible outcomes of that experiment. These can be summed up as an
assignment of an expectation value to each observable. These states
are required to be *linear*. This means that, if an operator
\(C\), corresponding to some observable, is the sum of operators
\(A\) and \(B\), corresponding to other observables, then
the expectation value that a quantum state assigns to \(C\) must
be the sum of the expectation values assigned to \(A\) and
\(B\). This is a nontrivial constraint, as it is required to hold
whether or not the observables represented are compatible. A quantum
state, therefore, relates expectation values for quantities yielded by
incompatible experiments.



Incompatible observables, represented by noncommuting operators, give
rise to uncertainty relations; see the entry on
 the uncertainty principle.
 These relations entail that there are no quantum states that assign
definite values to the observables that satisfy them, and place bounds
on how close they can come to be simultaneously well-defined in any
quantum state.



For any two distinct quantum states, \(\rho\), \(\omega\), and any
real number between 0 and 1, there is a corresponding *mixed
state*. The probability assigned to any experimental outcome by
this mixed state is \(p\) times the probability it is assigned by
\(\rho\) plus \(1-p\) times the probability assigned to it by
\(\omega\). One way to physically realize the preparation of a mixed
state is to employ a randomizing device, for example, a coin with
probability \(p\) of landing heads and probability \(1-p\) of
landing tails, and to use it to choose between preparing state
\(\rho\) and preparing state \(\omega\). We will see another way to
prepare a mixed state after we have discussed entanglement, in section
3. A state that is not a mixture of any two distinct states is called
a *pure state*.



It is both useful and customary, though not strictly necessary, to
employ a *Hilbert space* representation of a quantum theory. In
such a representation, the operators corresponding to observables are
represented as acting on elements of an appropriately constructed
Hilbert space (see the entry on
 quantum mechanics
 for details). Usually, the Hilbert space representation is
constructed in such a way that vectors in the space represent pure
states; such a representation is called an *irreducible
representation*. Irreducible representations, in which mixed
states are also represented by vectors, are also possible.



A Hilbert space is a vector space. This means that, for any two
vectors \(|\psi\rangle\), \(|\phi\rangle\) , in the space,
representing pure states, and any complex numbers \(a\),
\(b\), there is another vector, \(a |\psi\rangle + b
|\phi\rangle\), that also represents a pure state. This is called a
*superposition* of the states represented by \(|\psi\rangle\)
and \(|\phi\rangle\) . Any vector in a Hilbert space can be written as
a superposition of other vectors in infinitely many ways. Sometimes,
in discussing the foundations of quantum mechanics, authors fall into
talking as if some state are superpositions and others are not. This
is simply an error. Usually what is meant is that some states yield
definite values for macroscopic observables, and others cannot be
written in any way that is not a superposition of macroscopically
distinct states.



The noncontroversial operational core of quantum theory consists of
rules for identifying, for any given system, appropriate operators
representing its dynamical quantities. In addition, there are
prescriptions for evolving the state of system when it is acted upon
by specified external fields or subjected to various manipulations
(see
 section 1.3).
 Application of quantum theory typically involves a distinction
between the system under study, which is treated quantum mechanically,
and experimental apparatus, which is not. This division is sometimes
known as the *Heisenberg cut*.



Whether or not we can expect to be able to go beyond the
noncontroversial operational core of quantum theory, and take it to be
more than a means for calculating probabilities of outcomes of
experiments, remains a topic of contemporary philosophical
discussion.


### 2.2 Quantum mechanics and quantum field theory



*Quantum mechanics* is usually taken to refer to the quantized
version of a theory of classical mechanics, involving systems with a
fixed, finite number of degrees of freedom. Classically, a field, such
as, for example, an electromagnetic field, is a system endowed with
infinitely many degrees of freedom. Quantization of a field theory
gives rise to a *quantum field theory*. The chief philosophical
issues raised by quantum mechanics remain when the transition is made
to a quantum field theory; in addition, new interpretational issues
arise. There are interesting differences, both technical and
interpretational, between quantum mechanical theories and quantum
field theories; for an overview, see the entries on
 quantum field theory
 and
 quantum theory: von Neumann vs. Dirac.



The standard model of quantum field theory, successful as it is, does
not yet incorporate gravitation. The attempt to develop a theory that
does justice both the quantum phenomena and to gravitational phenomena
gives rise to serious conceptual issues (see the entry on
 quantum gravity).


### 2.3 Quantum state evolution


#### 2.3.1 Schrodinger and Heisenberg pictures



When constructing a Hilbert space representation of a quantum theory
of a system that evolves over time, there are some choices to be made.
One needs to have, for each time *t*, a Hilbert space
representation of the system, which involves assigning operators to
observables pertaining to time *t*. An element of convention
comes in when deciding how the operators representing observables at
different times are to be related.



For concreteness, suppose that have a system whose observables include
a position, \(x\), and momentum, \(p\), with respect to some
frame of reference. There is a sense in which, for two distinct times,
\(t\) and \(t'\), *position at time* \(t\) and
*position at time* \(t'\) are distinct observables, and also
a sense in which they are values, at different times, of the same
observable. Once we have settled on operators \(\hat{X}\) and
\(\hat{P}\) to represent position and momentum at time \(t\), we
still have a choice of which operators represent the corresponding
quantities at time \(t.\) On the *Schrodinger
picture*, the same operators \(\hat{X}\) and \(\hat{P}\) are used
to represent position and momentum, whatever time is considered. As
the probabilities for results of experiments involving these
quantities may be changing with time, different vectors must be used
to represent the state at different times.



The equation of motion obeyed by a quantum state vector is the
*Schrodinger equation.* It is constructed by first forming
the operator \(\hat{H}\)corresponding to the Hamiltonian of the
system, which represents the total energy of the system. The rate of
change of a state vector is proportional to the result of operating on
the vector with the Hamiltonian operator \(\hat{H}\).



\[ i \hbar {\,\D}/{\D t}\, \ket{\psi (t)} = \hat{H} \ket{\psi (t)}. \]


There is an operator that takes a state at time 0 into a state at time
\(t\); it is given by

 

\[ U(t) = \exp\left(\frac{{-}i H t}{\hbar}\right). \]


This operator is a linear operator that implements a one-one mapping
of the Hilbert space to itself that preserves the inner product of any
two vectors; operators with these properties are called *unitary
operators*, and, for this reason, evolution according to the
Schrodinger equation is called *unitary evolution.*



For our purposes, the most important features of this equation is that
it is *deterministic* and *linear*. The state vector at
any time, together with the equation, uniquely determines the state
vector at any other time. Linearity means that, if two vectors
\(\ket{\psi\_1(0)}\) and \(\ket{\psi\_2(0)}\) evolve into vectors
\(\ket{\psi\_1(t) }\) and \(\ket{\psi\_2(t)}\), respectively, then, if
the state at time 0 is a linear combination of these two, the state at
any time \(t\) will be the corresponding linear
combination of \(\ket{\psi\_1(t)}\) and \(\ket{\psi\_2(t)}\).


\[ a\ket{\psi\_{1}(0)} + b\ket{\psi\_{2}(0)} \rightarrow a\ket{\psi\_{1}(t)} + b\ket{\psi\_{2}(t)} . \]



The Heisenberg picture, on the other hand, employs different operators
\(\hat{X}(t)\), \(\hat{X}(t')\) for position, depending on the time
considered (and similarly for momentum and other observables). If
\(\hat{A}(t)\)is a family of Heisenberg picture operators representing
some observable at different times, the members of the family 
satisfy the Heisenberg equation of motion,



\[
i \hbar d/dt \; \hat{A}(t) = \hat{A}(t) \hat{H} - \hat{H} \hat{A}(t).
\]


One sometimes hears it said that, on the Heisenberg picture, the state
of the system is unchanging. This is incorrect. It is true that there
are not different state vectors corresponding to different times, but
that is because a single state vector serves for computing
probabilities for all observables pertaining to all times. These
probabilities *do* change with time.


#### 2.3.2. The collapse postulate



As mentioned, standard applications of quantum theory involve a
division of the world into a system that is treated within quantum
theory, and the remainder, typically including the experimental
apparatus, that is not treated within the theory. Associated with this
division is a postulate about how to assign a state vector after an
experiment that yields a value for an observable, according to which,
after an experiment, one replaces the quantum state with an eigenstate
corresponding to the value obtained. Unlike the unitary
evolution applied otherwise, this is a discontinuous change of the
quantum state, sometimes referred to as *collapse of the state
vector*, or *state vector reduction*. There are two
interpretations of the postulate about collapse, corresponding to two
different conceptions of quantum states. If a quantum state represents
nothing more than knowledge about the system, then the collapse of the
state to one corresponding to an observed result can be thought of as
mere updating of knowledge. If, however, quantum states represent
physical reality, in such a way that distinct pure states always
represent distinct physical states of affairs, then the collapse
postulate entails an abrupt, perhaps discontinuous, change of the
physical state of the system. Considerable confusion can arise if the
two interpretations are conflated.



The collapse postulate occurs already in the general discussion at the
fifth Solvay Conference in 1927 (see Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009,
437-450). It is also found in Heisenberg's *The
Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory*, based on lectures
presented in 1929 (Heisenberg, 1930a, 27; 1930b, 36). Von Neumann, in
his reformulation of quantum theory a few years later, distinguished
between two types of processes: Process 1:, which occurs upon
performance of an experiment, and Process 2:, the unitary evolution
that takes place as long as no measurement is made (von Neumann, 1932;
1955, SSV.I). He does not take this distinction to be a difference
between two physically distinct processes. Rather, the invocation of
one process or the other depends on a somewhat arbitrary division of
the world into an observing part and an observed part (see von
Neumann,1932, 224; 1955, 420).



The collapse postulate does not appear in the first edition (1930) of
Dirac's *Principles of Quantum Mechanics*; it is
introduced in the second edition (1935). Dirac formulates it as
follows.



> 
> 
> When we measure a real dynamical variable \(\xi\), the disturbance
> involved in the act of measurement causes a jump in the state of the
> dynamical system. From physical continuity, if we make a second
> measurement of the same dynamical variable \(\xi\) immediately after
> the first, the result of the second measurement must be the same as
> that of the first. Thus after the first measurement has been made,
> there is no indeterminacy in the result of the second. Hence, after
> the first measurement has been made, the system is in an eigenstate of
> the dynamical variable \(\xi\), the eigenvalue it belongs to being
> equal to the result of the first measurement. This conclusion must
> still hold if the second measurement is not actually made. In this way
> we see that a measurement always causes the system to jump into an
> eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured, the
> eigenvalue this eigenstate belongs to being equal to the result of the
> measurement (Dirac 1935: 36).
> 
> 
> 



Unlike von Neumann and Heisenberg, Dirac is treating the
"jump" as a physical process.



Neither von Neumann nor Dirac take awareness of the result by a
conscious observer to be a necessary condition for collapse. For von
Neumann, the location of the cut between the "observed"
system and the "observer"is somewhat arbitrary. It may be
placed between the system under study and the experimental apparatus.
On the other hand, we could include the experimental apparatus in the
quantum description, and place the cut at the moment when light
indicating the result hits the observer's retina. We could also
go even further, and include the retina and relevant parts of the
observer's nervous system in the quantum system. That the cut
may be pushed arbitrarily far into the perceptual apparatus of the
observer is required, according to von Neumann, by the *principle
of psycho-physical parallelism*.



A formulation of a version of the collapse postulate according to
which a measurement is not completed until the result is observed is
found in London and Bauer (1939). For them, as for Heisenberg, this is
a matter of an increase of knowledge on the part of the observer.



Wigner (1961) combined elements of the two interpretations. Like those
who take the collapse to be a matter of updating of belief in light of
information newly acquired by an observer, he takes collapse to take
place when a conscious observer becomes aware of an experimental
result. However, like Dirac, he takes it to be a real physical
process. His conclusion is that consciousness has an influence on the
physical world not captured by the laws of quantum mechanics. This
involves a rejection of von Neumann's principle of
psycho-physical parallelism, according to which it must be possible to
treat the process of subjective perception as if it were a physical
process like any other.



There is a persistent misconception that, for von Neumann, collapse is
to be invoked only when a conscious observer becomes aware of the
result. As noted, this is the opposite of his view, as the cut may be
placed between the observed system and the experimental apparatus, and
it is for him an important point that the location of the cut be
somewhat arbitrary. In spite of this, von Neumann's position is
sometimes conflated with Wigner's speculative proposal, and
Wigner's proposal is sometimes erroneously referred to as the
*von Neumann-Wigner interpretation*.



None of the standard formulations are precise about when the collapse
postulate is to be applied; there is some lee-way as to what is to
count as an experiment, or (for versions that require reference to an
observer) what is to count as an observer. Some, including von Neumann
and Heisenberg, have taken it to be a matter of principle that there
be some arbitrariness in where to apply the postulate. It is common
wisdom that, in practice, this arbitrariness is innocuous. The rule of
thumb that seems to be applied, in practice, in setting the split
between the parts of the world treated quantum-mechanically and things
treated as classical objects has been formulated by J. S. Bell as,
"[w]hen in doubt enlarge the quantum system," to the point
at which including more in the quantum system makes negligible
difference to practical predictions (Bell 1986, 362; Bell 2004, 189).
If anything is to be counted as "standard" quantum
mechanics, it is the operational core we have discussed, supplemented
by a heuristic rule of application of this sort. Standard quantum
mechanics works very well. If, however, one seeks a theory that is
capable of describing all systems, including macroscopic ones, and can
yield an account of the process by which macroscopic events, including
experimental outcomes, come about, this gives rise to the so-called
"measurement problem", which we will discuss after we have
introduced the notion of entanglement (see 
 section 3).


#### 2.3.3. Wave functions



Among the Hilbert-space representations of a quantum theory are
*wave-function* representations.



Associated with any observable is its *spectrum*, the range of
possible values that the observable can take on. Given any
physical system and any observable for that system, one can always
form a Hilbert-space representation for the quantum theory of that
system by considering complex-valued functions on the spectrum of that
observable. The set of such functions form a vector space. Given
a measure on the spectrum of the observable, we can form a Hilbert space
out of the set of complex-valued square-integrable functions on the
spectrum by treating functions that differ only on a set of zero
measure as equivalent (that is, the elements of our Hilbert space are
really equivalence classes of functions), and by using the measure to
define an inner product (see
 entry on Quantum Mechanics
 if this terminology is unfamiliar).



If the spectrum of the chosen observable is a continuum (as it is, for
example, for position or momentum), a Hilbert-space representation of
this sort is called a *wave function* representation, and the
functions that represent quantum states, *wave functions* (also
"wave-functions," or "wavefunctions"). The
most familiar representations of this form are position-space wave
functions, which are functions on the set of possible configurations
of the system, and momentum-space wave functions, which are functions
of the momenta of the systems involved.


## 3. Entanglement, nonlocality, and nonseparability



Given two disjoint physical systems, \(A\) and \(B\),
with which we associate Hilbert spaces \(H\_{A}\) and
\(H\_{B}\), the Hilbert space associated with the composite system is
the tensor product space, denoted \(H\_{A} \otimes H\_{B}\).



When the two systems are independently prepared in pure states
\(\ket{\psi}\) and \(\ket{\phi}\), the state of the composite system
is the *product state* \(\ket{\psi} \otimes \ket{\phi}\)
(sometimes written with the cross, \(\otimes\), omitted).



In addition to the product states, the tensor product space contains
linear combinations of product states, that is, state vectors of the
form

 

\[ a\ket{\psi\_{1}} \otimes \ket{\phi\_{1}} + b\ket{\psi\_{2}} \otimes \ket{\phi\_{2}} \]


The tensor product space can be defined as the smallest Hilbert space
containing all of the product states. Any pure state represented by a
state vector that is not a product vector is an *entangled
state*.



The state of the composite system assigns probabilities to outcomes of
all experiments that can be performed on the composite system. We can
also consider a restriction to experiments performed on system \(A\),
or a restriction to experiments performed to \(B\). Such restrictions
yields states of \(A\) and \(B\), respectively, called the *reduced
states* of the systems. When the state of the composite system
\(AB\) is an entangled state, then the reduced states of \(A\) and
\(B\) are mixed states. To see this, suppose that in the above state
the vectors \(\ket{\phi\_{1}}\) and \(\ket{\phi\_{2}}\) represent
distinguishable states. If one confines one's attention to
experiments performed on \(A\), it makes no difference whether an
experiment is also performed on \(B\). An experiment performed on
\(B\) that distinguishes \(\ket{\phi\_{1}}\) and \(\ket{\phi\_{2}}\)
projects the state of \(A\) into either \(\ket{\psi\_{1}}\) or
\(\ket{\psi\_{2}}\), with probabilities \(\abs{a}^{2}\) and
\(\abs{b}^{2}\), respectively, and probabilities for outcomes of
experiments performed on \(A\) are the corresponding averages of
probabilities for states \(\ket{\psi\_{1}}\) and
\(\ket{\psi\_{2}}\). These probabilities, as mentioned, are the same as
those for the situation in which no experiment is performed on
\(B\). Thus, even if no experiment is performed on \(B\), the
probabilities of outcomes of experiments on \(A\) are exactly as if
system \(A\) is either in the state represented by \(\ket{\psi\_{1}}\)
or the state represented by \(\ket{\psi\_{2}}\), with probabilities
\(\abs{a}^{2}\) and \(\abs{b}^{2}\), respectively.



In general, any state, pure or mixed, that is neither a product state
nor a mixture of product states, is called an *entangled
state.*



The existence of pure entangled states means that, if we consider a
composite system consisting of spatially separated parts, then, even
when the state of the system is a pure state, the state is not
determined by the reduced states of its component parts. Thus, quantum
states exhibit a form of *nonseparability*. See the entry on
 holism and nonseparability in physics
 for more information.



Quantum entanglement results in a form of nonlocality that is alien to
classical physics. Even if we assume that the reduced states of \(A\)
and \(B\) do not completely
characterize their physical states, but must be supplemented by some
further variables, there are quantum correlations that cannot be
reduced to correlations between states of \(A\) and \(B\);
see the entries on
 Bell's Theorem
 and
 action at a distance in quantum mechanics.


## 4. The measurement problem


### 4.1 The measurement problem formulated



If quantum theory is meant to be (in principle) a universal theory, it
should be applicable, in principle, to all physical systems, including
systems as large and complicated as our experimental apparatus. It is
easy to show that linear evolution of quantum states, when applied to
macroscopic objects, will routinely lead to superpositions of
macroscopically distinct states. Among the circumstances in which this
will happen are experimental set-ups, and much of the early
discussions focussed on how to construe the process of measurement in
quantum-mechanical terms. For this reason, the interpretational issues
have come to be referred to as the *measurement problem*. In
the first decades of discussion of the foundations of quantum
mechanics, it was commonly referred to as the *problem of
observation*.



Consider a schematized experiment. Suppose we have a quantum system
that can be prepared in at least two distinguishable states, \(\ket{0}
\_{S}\) and \(\ket{1} \_{S}\). Let \(\ket{R} \_{A}\) be a ready state of
the apparatus, that is, a state in which the apparatus is ready to
make a measurement.



If the apparatus is working properly, and if the measurement is a
minimally disturbing one, the coupling of the system \(S\)
with the apparatus \(A\) should result
in an evolution that predictably yields results of the form



\[ \ket{0} \_{S} \ket{R} \_{A} \Rightarrow \ket{0}
\_{S}\ket{"0" } \_{A} \]

\[ \ket{1} \_{S} \ket{R} \_{A} \Rightarrow \ket{1}
\_{S}\ket{"1"} \_{A} \]


where \(\ket{"0" } \_{A}\) and \(\ket{"1"}
\_{A}\) are apparatus states indicating results 0 and 1,
respectively.



Now suppose that the system \(S\) is prepared in a
superposition of the states \(\ket{0} \_{S}\) and \(\ket{1}\_{S}\).



\[ \ket{\psi(0)} \_{S} = a\ket{0} \_{S} + b\ket{1} \_{S}, \]


where \(a\) and \(b\) are both nonzero.
If the evolution that leads from the pre-experimental state to the
post-experimental state is linear Schrodinger evolution, then we
will have

 

\[ \ket{\psi(0)} \_{S} \ket{R} \_{A} \rightarrow a\ket{0} \_{S}
\ket{"0" } \_{A} + b\ket{1} \_{S}\ket{"1" }
\_{A}. \]


This is not an eigenstate of the instrument reading variable, but is,
rather, a state in which the reading variable and the system variable
are entangled with each other. The eigenstate-eigenvalue link, applied
to a state like this, does not yield a definite result for the
instrument reading. The problem of what to make of this is called the
"measurement problem" which is discussed in more detail
below.


### 4.2 Approaches to the measurement problem



If quantum state evolution proceeds via the Schrodinger equation
or some other linear equation, then, as we have seen in the previous
section, typical experiments will lead to quantum states that are
superpositions of terms corresponding to distinct experimental
outcomes. It is sometimes said that this conflicts with our
experience, according to which experimental outcome variables, such as
pointer readings, always have definite values. This is a misleading
way of putting the issue, as it is not immediately clear how to
interpret states of this sort as physical states of a system that
includes experimental apparatus, and, if we can't say what it
would be like to observe the apparatus to be in such a state, it makes
no sense to say that we never observe it to be in a state like
that.



Nonetheless, we are faced with an interpretational problem. If we take
the quantum state to be a complete description of the system, then the
state is, contrary to what would antecedently expect, not a state
corresponding to a unique, definite outcome. This is what led J.S.
Bell to remark, "Either the wavefunction, as given by the
Schrodinger equation, is not everything, or it is not
right" (Bell 1987: 41, 2004: 201). This gives us a (*prima
facie*) tidy way of classifying approaches to the measurement
problem:


1. There are approaches that involve a denial that a quantum wave
function (or any other way of representing a quantum state) yields a
complete description of a physical system.
2. There are approaches that involve modification of the dynamics to
produce a collapse of the quantum state in appropriate
circumstances.
3. There are approaches that reject both horns of Bell's
dilemma, and hold that quantum states undergo unitary evolution at all
times and that a quantum state-description is, in principle,
complete.



We include in the first category approaches that deny that a quantum
state should be thought of as representing anything in reality at all.
These include variants of the Copenhagen interpretation, as well as
pragmatic and other anti-realist approaches. Also in the first
category are approaches that seek a completion of the quantum state
description. These include hidden-variables approaches and modal
interpretations. The second category of interpretation motivates a
research programme of finding suitable indeterministic modifications
of the quantum dynamics. Approaches that reject both horns of
Bell's dilemma are typified by Everettian, or
"many-worlds" interpretations.


#### 4.2.1 The "Copenhagen interpretation"



Since the mid-1950's, the term "Copenhagen
interpretation" has been commonly used for whatever it is that
the person employing the term takes to be the 'orthodox'
viewpoint regarding the philosophical issues raised by quantum
mechanics. According to Howard (2004), the phrase was first used by
Heisenberg (1955, 1958), and is intended to suggest a commonality of
views among Bohr and his associates, included Born and Heisenberg
himself. Recent historiography has emphasized diversity of viewpoints
among the figures associated with the Copenhagen interpretation; see
the entry on
 Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics,
 and references therein. Readers should be aware that the term is not
univocal, and that different authors might mean different things when
speaking of the"Copenhagen interpretation."


#### 4.2.2 Non-realist and pragmatist approaches to quantum mechanics



From the early days of quantum mechanics, there has been a strain of
thought that holds that the proper attitude to take towards quantum
mechanics is an instrumentalist or pragmatic one. On such a view,
quantum mechanics is a tool for coordinating our experience and for
forming expectations about the outcomes of experiments. Variants of
this view include some versions of the Copenhagen interpretation. More
recently, views of this sort have been advocated by physicists,
including QBists, who hold that quantum states represent subjective or
epistemic probabilities (see Fuchs *et al.*, 2014). The
philosopher Richard Healey defends a related view on which quantum
states, though objective, are not to be taken as
representational (see Healey 2012, 2017a, 2020). For more on
these approaches, see entry on
 Quantum-Bayesian and pragmatist views of quantum theory.


#### 4.2.2 Hidden-variables and modal interpretations



Theories whose structure include the quantum state but include
additional structure, with an aim of circumventing the measurement
problem, have traditionally been called "hidden-variables
theories". That a quantum state description cannot be regarded
as a complete description of physical reality was argued for in a
famous paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) and by Einstein in
subsequent publications (Einstein 1936, 1948, 1949). See the entry on
the
 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument in quantum theory.



There are a number of theorems that circumscribe the scope of possible
hidden-variables theories. The most natural thought would be to seek a
theory that assigns to all quantum observables definite values that
are merely revealed upon measurement, in such a way that any
experimental procedure that, in conventional quantum mechanics, would
count as a "measurement" of an observable yields the
definite value assigned to the observable. Theories of this sort are
called *noncontextual* hidden-variables theory. It was shown by
Bell (1966) and Kochen and Specker (1967) that there are no such
theories for any system whose Hilbert space dimension is greater than
three (see the entry on
 the Kochen-Specker theorem).



The Bell-Kochen-Specker Theorem does not rule out hidden-variables
theories *tout court*. The simplest way to circumvent it is to
pick as always-definite some observable or compatible set of
observables that suffices to guarantee determinate outcomes of
experiments; other observables are not assigned definite values and
experiments thought of as "measurements" of these
observables do not reveal pre-existing values.



The most thoroughly worked-out theory of this type is the pilot wave
theory developed by de Broglie and presented by him at the Fifth
Solvay Conference held in Brussels in 1927, revived by David Bohm in
1952, and currently an active area of research by a small group of
physicists and philosophers. According to this theory, there are
particles with definite trajectories, that are guided by the quantum
wave function. For the history of the de Broglie theory, see the
introductory chapters of Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009). For an
overview of the de Broglie-Bohm theory and philosophical issues
associated with it see the entry on
 Bohmian mechanics.



There have been other proposals for supplementing the quantum state
with additional structure; these have come to be called *modal
interpretations*; see the entry on
 modal interpretations of quantum mechanics.


#### 4.2.3 Dynamical Collapse Theories



As already mentioned, Dirac wrote as if the collapse of the
quantum state vector precipitated by an experimental intervention on
the system is a genuine physical change, distinct from the usual
unitary evolution. If collapse is to be taken as a genuine physical
process, then something more needs to be said about the circumstances
under which it occurs than merely that it happens when an experiment
is performed. This gives rise to a research programme of formulating a
precisely defined dynamics for the quantum state that approximates the
linear, unitary Schrodinger evolution in situations for which
this is well-confirmed, and produces collapse to an eigenstate of the
outcome variable in typical experimental set-ups, or, failing that, a
close approximation to an eigenstate. The only promising collapse
theories are stochastic in nature; indeed, it can be shown that a
deterministic collapse theory would permit superluminal signalling.
See the entry on
 collapse theories
 for an overview, and Gao, ed. (2018) for a snapshot of contemporary
discussions.



*Prima facie*, a dynamical collapse theory of this type can be
a quantum state monist theory, one on which, in Bell's words,
"the wave function is everything". In recent years, this
has been disputed; it has been argued that collapse theories require
"primitive ontology" in addition to the quantum state. See
Allori *et al.* (2008), Allori (2013), and also the entry on
 collapse theories,
 and references therein. Reservations about this approach have been
expressed by Egg (2017, 2021), Myrvold (2018), and Wallace 
(2020).


#### 4.2.4 Everettian, or "many worlds" theories



In his doctoral dissertation of 1957 (reprinted in Everett 2012), Hugh
Everett III proposed that quantum mechanics be taken as it is, without
a collapse postulate and without any "hidden variables".
The resulting interpretation he called the *relative state*
interpretation.



The basic idea is this. After an experiment, the quantum state of the
system plus apparatus is typically a superposition of terms
corresponding to distinct outcomes. As the apparatus interacts with
its environment, which may include observers, these systems become
entangled with the apparatus and quantum system, the net result of
which is a quantum state involving, for each of the possible
experimental outcomes, a term in which the apparatus reading
corresponds to that outcome, there are records of that outcome in the
environment, observers observe that outcome, *etc.*. Everett
proposed that each of these terms be taken to be equally real. From a
God's-eye-view, there is no unique experimental outcome, but one
can also focus on a particular determinate state of one subsystem,
say, the experimental apparatus, and attribute to the other systems
participating in the entangled state a *relative state*,
relative to that state of the apparatus. That is, relative to the
apparatus reading '+' is a state of the environment
recording that result and states of observers observing that result
(see the entry on
 Everett's relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics,
 for more detail on Everett's views).



Everett's work has inspired a family of views that go by the
name of "Many Worlds" interpretations; the idea is that
each of the terms of the superposition corresponds to a coherent
world, and all of these worlds are equally real. As time goes on,
there is a proliferation of these worlds, as situations arise that
give rise to a further multiplicity of outcomes (see the entry
 many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics,
 and Saunders 2007, for overviews of recent discussions; Wallace 2012
is an extended defense of an Everettian interpretation of quantum
mechanics).



There is a family of distinct, but related views, that go by the name
of "Relational Quantum Mechanics". These views agree with
Everett in attributing to a system definite values of dynamical
variables only relative to the states of other systems; they differ in
that, unlike Everett, they do not take the quantum state as their
basic ontology (see the entry on
 relational quantum mechanics
 for more detail).


### 4.3 Extended Wigner's friend scenarios as a source of no-go theorems



As mentioned, quantum theory, as standardly formulated, employs a
division of the world into a part that is treated with the theory, and
a part that is not. Both von Neumann and Heisenberg emphasized an
element of arbitrariness in the location of the division. In some
formulations, the division was thought of as a distinction between
observer and observed, and it became common to say that quantum
mechanics requires reference to an observer for its formulation.



The founders of quantum mechanics tended to assume implicitly that,
though the "cut" is somewhat moveable, in any given
analysis a division would be settled on, and one would not attempt to
combine distinct choices of the cut in one analysis of an experiment.
If, however, one thinks of the cut as marking the distinction between
observer and observed, one is led to ask about situations involving
multiple observers. Is each observer permitted to treat the other as a
quantum system?


 
The consideration of such scenarios was initiated by Wigner
(1961). Wigner considered a hypothetical scenario in which a friend
conducts an observation, and he himself treats the joint system,
consisting of the friend and the system experimented upon, as a
quantum system. For this reason, scenarios of this sort have come to
be known as "Wigner's friend" scenarios. Wigner was
led by consideration of such scenarious to hypothesize that conscious
observers cannot be in a superposition of states corresponding to
distinct perceptions; the introduction of conscious observers
initiates a physical collapse of the quantum state; this involves,
according to Wigner, "a violation of physical laws where
consciousness plays a role" (Wigner 1961, 294 ;167, 181). 


 
Frauchiger and Renner (2018) initiated the discussion of scenarios
of this sort involving more than two observers, which have come to be
called "extended Wigner's friend" scenarios. Further
results along these lines include Brukner (2018), Bong et al. (2020),
and Guerin et al. (2021). The strategy of these investigations
is to present some set of plausible-seeming assumptions (a different
set, for each of the works cited), and to show, via consideration of a
hypothetical situation involving multiple observers, the inconsistency
of that set of assumptions. The theorems are, therefore, no-go
theorems for approaches to the measurement problem that would seek to
satisfy all of the members of the set of assumptions that has been
shown to be inconsistent.



An assumption common to all of these investigations is that it is
always permissible for one observer to treat systems containing other
observers within quantum mechanics and to employ unitary evolution for
those systems. This means that collapse is not regarded as a physical
process. It is also assumed that each observer always perceives a
unique outcome for any experiment performed by that observer; this
excludes Everettian interpretations. Where the works cited vary is in
the other assumptions made.




It should be noted that each of the major avenues of approach to the
measurement problem is capable of giving an account of goings-on in
any physical scenario, including the ones considered in these works.
Each of them, therefore, must violate some member of the set of
assumptions shown to be inconsistent. These results do not pose
problems for existing approaches to the measurement problem; rather,
they are no-go theorems for approaches that might seek to satisfy all
of the set of assumptions shown to be inconsistent. As the assumptions
considered include both unitary evolution and unique outcomes of
experiments, and the scenarios considered involved situations
involving superpositions of distinct experimental outcomes, these
results concern theories on which the quantum state, as given by the
Schrodinger equation, is not a complete description of reality,
as it fails to determine the unique outcomes perceived by the
observers. These preceptions could be thought of as supervening on
brain states, in which case there is physical structure not included
in the quantum state, or as attributes of immaterial minds. On either
interpretation, the sorts of theories ruled out fall under the first
horn of Bell's dilemma, mentioned in section 4.2, and these
no-go results in part reproduce, and in part extend, no-go results for
certain sorts of modal interpretations (see entry on
 modal interpretations of quantum mechanics).



These results involving extended Wigner's friend scenarios have engendered
considerable philosophical discussion; see Sudbery (2017, 2019),
Healey (2018, 2020), Dieks (2019), Losada et al. (2019), Dascal
(2020), Evans (2020), Fortin and Lombardi (2020), Kastner (2020),
Mucino & Okon (2020), Bub (2020, 2021), Cavalcanti (2021),
Cavalcanti and Wiseman (2021), and Zukowski and Markiewicz
(2021).


### 4.4 The role of decoherence



A quantum state that is a superposition of two distinct terms, such
as

 

\[ \ket{\psi} = a \ket{\psi\_{1}} + b \ket{\psi\_{2}} , \]


where \(\ket{\psi\_{1}}\) and \(\ket{\psi\_{2}}\) are distinguishable
states, is not the same state as a mixture of \(\ket{\psi\_{1}}\) and
\(\ket{\psi\_{2}}\), which would be appropriate for a situation in
which the state prepared was either \(\ket{\psi\_{1}}\) or
\(\ket{\psi\_{2}}\), but we don't know which. The difference
between a coherent superposition of two terms and a mixture has
empirical consequences. To see this, consider the double-slit
experiment, in which a beam of particles (such as electrons, neutrons,
or photons) passes through two narrow slits and then impinges on a
screen, where the particles are detected. Take \(\ket{\psi\_{1}}\) to
be a state in which a particle passes through the top slit, and
\(\ket{\psi\_{2}}\), a state in which it passes through the bottom
slit. The fact that the state is a superposition of these two
alternatives is exhibited in interference fringes at the screen,
alternating bands of high and low rates of absorption.



This is often expressed in terms of a difference between classical and
quantum probabilities. If the particles were classical particles, the
probability of detection at some point \(p\) of the
screen would simply be a weighted average of two conditional
probabilities: the probability of detection at \(p\),
given that the particle passed through the top slit, and the
probability of detection at \(p\), given that the
particle passed through the bottom slit. The appearance of
interference is an index of nonclassicality.



Suppose, now, that the electrons interact with something else (call it
the *environment*) on the way to the screen, that could serve
as a "which-way" detector; that is, the state of this
auxiliary system becomes entangled with the state of the electron in
such a way that its state is correlated with \(\ket{\psi\_{1}}\) and
\(\ket{\psi\_{2}}\). Then the state of the quantum system, \(s\),
and its environment, \(e\), is



\[ \ket{\psi} \_{se} = a \ket{ \psi\_{1}} \_{s} \ket{ \phi\_{1}} \_{e} + b \ket{ \psi\_{2}}\_{s} \ket{ \phi\_{2}} \_{e} \]


If the environment states \(\ket{\phi\_{1}} \_{e}\) are
\(\ket{\phi\_{2}}\_{e}\) are distinguishable states, then this
completely destroys the interference fringes: the particles interact
with the screen as if they determinately went through one slit or the
other, and the pattern that emerges is the result of overlaying the
two single-slit patterns. That is, we can treat the particles as if
they followed (approximately) definite trajectories, and apply
probabilities in a classical manner.



Now, macroscopic objects are typically in interaction with a large and
complex environment--they are constantly being bombarded with air
molecules, photons, and the like. As a result, the reduced state of
such a system quickly becomes a mixture of quasi-classical states, a
phenomenon known as *decoherence*.



A generalization of decoherence lies at the heart of an approach to
the interpretation of quantum mechanics that goes by the name of
*decoherent histories approach* (see the entry on
 the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics
 for an overview).



Decoherence plays important roles in the other approaches to quantum
mechanics, though the role it plays varies with approach; see the
entry on
 the role of decoherence in quantum mechanics
 for information on this.


### 4.5 Comparison of approaches to the measurement problem



Most of the above approaches take it that the goal is to provide an
account of events in the world that recovers, at least in some
approximation, something like our familiar world of ordinary objects
behaving classically. None of the mainstream approaches accord any
special *physical* role to conscious observers. There have,
however, been proposals in that direction (see the entry on
 quantum approaches to consciousness
 for discussion).



All of the above-mentioned approaches are consistent with observation.
Mere consistency, however, is not enough; the rules for connecting
quantum theory with experimental results typically involve nontrivial
(that is, not equal to zero or one) probabilities assigned to
experimental outcomes. These calculated probabilities are confronted
with empirical evidence in the form of statistical data from repeated
experiments. Extant hidden-variables theories reproduce the quantum
probabilities, and collapse theories have the intriguing feature of
reproducing very close approximations to quantum probabilities for all
experiments that have been performed so far but departing from the
quantum probabilities for other conceivable experiments. This permits,
in principle, an empirical discrimination between such theories and
no-collapse theories.



A criticism that has been raised against Everettian theories is that
it is not clear whether they can even make sense of statistical
testing of this kind, as it does not, in any straightforward way, make
sense to talk of the probability of obtaining, say, a '+"
outcome of a given experiment when it is certain that all possible
outcomes will occur on some branch of the wavefunction. This has been
called the "Everettian evidential problem". It has been
the subject of much recent work on Everettian theories; see Saunders
(2007) for an introduction and overview.



If one accepts that Everettians have a solution to the evidential
problem, then, among the major lines of approach, none is favored in a
straightforward way by the empirical evidence. There will not be space
here to give an in-depth overview of these ongoing discussions, but a
few considerations can be mentioned, to give the reader a flavor of
the discussions; see entries on particular approaches for more
detail.



Everettians take, as a virtue of the approach, the fact that it does
not involve an extension or modification of the quantum formalism.
Bohmians claim, in favor of the Bohmian approach, that a theory on
these lines provides the most straightforward picture of events;
ontological issues are less clear-cut when it comes to Everettian
theories or collapse theories.



Another consideration is compatibility with relativistic causal
structure. See Myrvold (2021) for an overview of relavistic
constraints on approaches to the measurement problem.The de
Broglie-Bohm theory requires a distinguished relation of distant
simultaneity for its formulation, and, it can be argued, this is an
ineliminable feature of any hidden-variables theory of this sort, that
selects some observable to always have definite values (see Berndl
*et al.* 1996; Myrvold 2002, 2021). On the other hand, there
are collapse models that are fully relativistic. On such models,
collapses are localized events. Though probabilities of collapses at
spacelike separation from each other are not independent, this
probabilistic dependence does not require us to single one out as
earlier and the other later. Thus, such theories do not require a
distinguished relation of distant simultaneity. There remains,
however, some discussion of how to equip such theories with beables
(or "elements of reality"). See the entry on
 collapse theories
 and references therein; see also, for some recent contributions to
the discussion, Fleming (2016), Maudlin (2016), and Myrvold
(2016). In the case of Everettian theories, one must first think
about how to formulate the question of relativistic locality. Several
authors have approached this issue in somewhat different ways, with a
common conclusion that Everettian quantum mechanics is, indeed, local.
(See Vaidman 1994; Bacciagaluppi 2002; Chapter 8 of Wallace 2012; Tipler
2014; Vaidman 2016; and Brown and Timpson 2016.)


## 5. Ontological Issues



As mentioned, a central question of interpretation of quantum
mechanics concerns whether quantum states should be regarded as
representing anything in physical reality. If this is answered in the
affirmative, this gives rise to new questions, namely, what sort of
physical reality is represented by the quantum state, and whether a
quantum state could in principle give an exhaustive account of
physical reality.


### 5.1 The question of quantum state realism.



Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) have introduced a framework for
discussing these issues. In their terminology, a complete
specification of the physical properties is given by the *ontic
state* of a system. An ontological model posits a space of ontic
states and associates, with any preparation procedure, a probability
distribution over ontic states. A model is said to be
\(\psi\)-*ontic* if the ontic state uniquely determines the
quantum state; that is, if there is a function from ontic states to
quantum states (this includes both cases in which the quantum state
also completely determines the physical state, and cases, such as
hidden-variables theories, in which the quantum state does not
completely determine the physical state). In their terminology, models
that are not \(\psi\)-ontic are called \(\psi\)*-epistemic*. If
a model is not \(\psi\)-ontic, this means that it is possible for some
ontic states to be the result of two or more preparations that lead to
different assignments of pure quantum states; that is, the same ontic
state may be compatible with distinct quantum states.



This gives a nice way of posing the question of quantum state realism:
are there preparations corresponding to distinct pure quantum states
that can give rise to the same ontic state, or, conversely, are there
ontic states compatible with distinct quantum states? Pusey, Barrett,
and Rudolph (2012) showed that, if one adopts a seemingly natural
independence assumption about state preparations--namely, the
assumption that it is possible to prepare a pair of systems in such a
way that the probabilities for ontic states of the two systems are
effectively independent--then the answer is negative; any
ontological model that reproduces quantum predictions and satisfies
this Preparation Independence assumption must be a \(\psi\)-ontic
model.



The Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem does not close off all
options for anti-realism about quantum states; an anti-realist about
quantum states could reject the Preparation Independence assumption,
or reject the framework within which the theorem is set; see
discussion in Spekkens (2015): 92-93. See Leifer (2014) for a
careful and thorough overview of theorems relevant to quantum state
realism, and Myrvold (2020) for a presentation of a case for quantum
state realism based on theorems of this sort.


### 5.2 Ontological category of quantum states



The major realist approaches to the measurement problem are all, in
some sense, realist about quantum states. Merely saying this is
insufficient to give an account of the ontology of a given
interpretation. Among the questions to be addressed are: if quantum
states represent something physically real, what sort of thing is it?
This is the question of the ontological construal of quantum states.
Another question is the EPR question, whether a description in terms
of quantum states can be taken as, in principle, complete, or whether
it must be supplemented by different ontology.



De Broglie's original conception of the "pilot wave"
was that it would be a field, analogous to an electromagnetic field.
The original conception was that each particle would have its own
guiding wave. However, in quantum mechanics as it was developed at the
hands of Schrodinger, for a system of two or more particles there
are not individual wave functions for each particle, but, rather, a
single wave function that is defined on \(n\)-tuples of
points in space, where \(n\) is the number of
particles. This was taken, by de Broglie, Schrodinger and others,
to militate against the conception of quantum wave functions as
fields. If quantum states represent something in physical reality,
they are unlike anything familiar in classical physics.



One response that has been taken is to insist that quantum wave
functions are fields nonetheless, albeit fields on a space of
enormously high dimension, namely, \(3n\), where \(n\)
is the number of elementary particles in the universe. On this view,
this high-dimensional space is thought of as more fundamental than the
familiar three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime) that
is usually taken to be the arena of physical events. See Albert (1996,
2013), for the classic statement of the view; other proponents include
Loewer (1996), Lewis (2004), Ney (2012, 2013a,b, 2021), and North
(2013). Most of the discussion of this proposal has taken place within
the context of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, which is not a
fundamental theory. It has been argued that considerations of how the
wave functions of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics arise from a
quantum field theory undermines the idea that wave functions are
relevantly like fields on configuration space, and also the idea that
configuration spaces can be thought of as more fundamental than
ordinary spacetime (Myrvold 2015).



A view that takes a wave function as a field on a high-dimensional
space must be distinguished from a view that takes it to be what Belot
(2012) has called a *multi-field*, which assigns properties to
\(n\)-tuples of points of ordinary three-dimensional
space. These are distinct views; proponents of the \(3n\)-dimensional
conception make much of the fact that it restores Separability: on
this view, a complete specification of the way the world is, at some
time, is given by specification of local states of affairs at each
address in the fundamental (\(3n\)-dimensional) space. Taking a wave
function to be a multi-field, on the other hand, involves accepting
nonseparability. Another difference between taking wave-functions as
multi-fields on ordinary space and taking them to be fields on a
high-dimensional space is that, on the multi-field view, there is no
question about the relation of ordinary three-dimensional space to
some more fundamental space. Hubert and Romano (2018) argue that
wave-functions are naturally and straightforwardly construed as
multi-fields.



It has been argued that, on the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory and
related pilot wave theories, the quantum state plays a role more
similar to that of a law in classical mechanics; its role is to
provide dynamics for the Bohmian corpuscles, which, according to the
theory, compose ordinary objects. See Durr, Goldstein, and
Zanghi (1997), Allori *et al.* (2008), Allori
(2021).



Durr, Goldstein, and Zanghi (1992) introduced the term
"primitive ontology" for what, according to a physical
theory, makes up ordinary physical objects; on the de Broglie-Bohm
theory, this is the Bohmian corpuscles. The conception is extended to
interpretations of collapse theories by Allori *et al.* (2008).
Primitive ontology is to be distinguished from other ontology, such as
the quantum state, that is introduced into the theory to account for
the behavior of the primitive ontology. The distinction is meant to be
a guide as to how to conceive of the nonprimitive ontology of the
theory.


## 6. Quantum computing and quantum information theory



Quantum mechanics has not only given rise to interpretational
conundrums; it has given rise to new concepts in computing and in
information theory. *Quantum information theory* is the study
of the possibilities for information processing and transmission
opened up by quantum theory. This has given rise to a different
perspective on quantum theory, one on which, as Bub (2000, 597) put
it, "the puzzling features of quantum mechanics are seen as a
resource to be developed rather than a problem to be solved"
(see the entries on
 quantum computing
 and
 quantum entanglement and information).


## 7. Reconstructions of quantum mechanics and beyond



Another area of active research in the foundations of quantum
mechanics is the attempt to gain deeper insight into the structure of
the theory, and the ways in which it differs from both classical
physics and other theories that one might construct, by characterizing
the structure of the theory in terms of very general principles, often
with an information-theoretic flavour.



This project has its roots in early work of Mackey (1957, 1963),
Ludwig (1964), and Piron (1964) aiming to characterize quantum
mechanics in operational terms. This has led to the development of a
framework of generalized probabilistic model. It also has connections
with the investigations into quantum logic initiated by Birkhoff and
von Neumann (1936) (see the entry
 quantum logic and probability theory
 for an overview).



Interest in the project of deriving quantum theory from axioms with
clear operational content was revived by the work of Hardy (2001
[2008], Other Internet Resources). Significant results along these
lines include the axiomatizations of Masanes and Muller (2011)
and Chiribella, D'Ariano, and Perinotti (2011). See Chiribella
and Spekkens (2015) for an overview of this burgeoning research
area.