## 1. Types of Improvement



At the most abstract level, reconciliation can be characterized as an
improvement in the relationship between two or more parties who were
previously in conflict. A relationship with another party consists of
patterns of interaction, the attitudes one tends to take toward that
party, and the expectations of and beliefs about the other that one
makes. Five rough categories of improvement in relationships emerge
from the literature:


1. Changes in institutional structures: examples include policies for
police reform, for building the rule of law, for overcoming alienation
from the existing institutional order, and for renewed participation
in shared institutions or practices (C. Murphy 2010, Lu 2017);
2. Changes in external behaviors: examples include a cessation of
aggressive or insulting behaviors, increased ability to function in
close proximity to the other party, and increased ability to cooperate
with the other party;
3. Changes in belief: for example, loss of the belief that the other
party is inherently evil or of lower moral value compared to others,
acceptance of a narrative of the past wrong according to which the
other party once again seems predictable and coherent (Dwyer 1999),
and belief that the other party is no longer likely to pose an
unreasonable danger to oneself;
4. Resolving negative emotions and attitudes: in this category,
examples include merely accepting what cannot be changed; overcoming
resentment, fear, hate or anger toward the wrongdoing party; as well
as managing shame or guilt (Mihai 2016, Lu 2017).
5. Adopting or resuming positive emotions and attitudes: e.g., mutual
respect, compassion, love, a shared sense of identity (Hirsch 2011b)
or solidarity, mutual recommitment to a shared set of moral or
communal norms, or mutual trust.



The term 'forgiveness' does not appear on this list,
though the substance of forgiveness may be broken down into these
categories. As section 3.8 explains, theorists disagree about how to
analyze forgiveness. While some see it as primarily a change in
attitudes and emotions, others take forbearance from certain behaviors
to be definitive of forgiveness.



Different kinds of relationships (friends, employer/employee, fellow
citizens, citizen/official) are marked by distinct sets of
interactions, attitudes, and expectations. Different kinds of
relationships can also be distinguished by the norms to which they
should adhere. The legitimate expectations we have of our friends
differ from those we have of our employees, strangers who are
nevertheless fellow citizens, or those who are acting in official
state capacities. Some critics find the images of damaged and repaired
relationships rather strained, given that many of the cases of
criminal or political wrongdoing that are spoken of in these terms
involve people who are strangers to one another (Sher 2013). In
response, those who favor the language of relationships argue either
that the conflict itself creates a problematic relationship, which
then must be reshaped or repaired (Govier 2002), or that even
strangers hold attitudes and expectations of one another, as is
revealed by the resentful or indignant reactions we have when those
strangers violate our expectations (Scanlon 2008).



In speaking of reconciliation, it is important for theorists to
specify *which* of the relationships between two parties is
being reconciled. For example, two individuals may be friends,
co-workers, co-religionists, fellow citizens, and fellow members of
the Kantian Kingdom of Ends, among many other connections. After a
dispute at work, two people may reconcile their working relationship
but not their friendship. On the other hand, they may decide that the
only way to save their friendship is by not working together anymore.
One cannot say whether they have reconciled without specifying which
relationship is in question.



Most theorists of reconciliation allow that, not only pairs of
individuals, but also groups can be reconciled. Indeed, all of the
following combinations appear within the literature: the
reconciliation of an individual with a small group (such as a family);
an individual to a large group (such as a state); two smaller groups
with one another (such as two ethnic groups within a state); a smaller
group with a large group (such as a minority group to a state); and
one group with a collection of groups (such as the international
community) (Govier and Verwoerd 2002a, Fabre 2016). Given that changes
in beliefs and attitudes play a role in most accounts of
reconciliation, these views put pressure on theorists to explain in
what sense groups can be described as having beliefs and attitudes
(cf. Griswold 2007).



Theorists disagree about whether there is a general theory of
reconciliation that can cover all kinds and types of relationship.
Some theorists offer accounts of reconciliation designed to cover the
repair of a wide range of interpersonal and political relationships,
including those among friends, co-workers, and fellow citizens (Govier
2006). Such accounts recognize the above variations in relationships,
but present a general characterization of categories that can be
further specified for relationships of different types. Other
theorists restrict their focus to a particular kind of relationship
(C. Murphy 2010, May 2011).


## 2. Defining Normative Standards



Reconciliation has as its goal improved relationships. Reconciliation
often denotes restoration, which suggests a return to the status quo
ante, that is, the state of affairs before the wrong or conflict in
question. This connotation has led some scholars to urge the use of
'conciliation' rather than 'reconciliation' in
contexts where groups or individuals have never lived according to
good, just relations, such as the white and black populations of South
Africa at the moment the apartheid regime fell (Krog 2008, Moon 2009).
But given the importance of the South Africa's post-apartheid
experiences to the literature on reconciliation, other scholars choose
to brook the linguistic infelicity of defining the term
'reconciliation' so that it includes the pursuit of good
relations for the first time, and not merely the reestablishment of
formerly good relations (Govier 2006, C. Murphy 2010, Philpott 2012).
Here, the task is to articulate an account of improved relationships
that satisfies a normative standard for the relationship in question,
a standard that may not have been previously realized in practice.



Theorists of reconciliation generally recognize that reconciliation is
a "scalar" concept, which allows for minimal and maximal
versions of improved relationships (Crocker 1999, Griswold 2007). Each
of the categories along which relationships might improve
(institutions, behavior, beliefs, attitudes or emotions) admits of
degree. For example, in the aftermath of a dispute between friends,
the resumption of basic respect is a lower degree of emotional
restoration than the resumption of love and trust. In the aftermath of
bloody civil war, the resumption of cooperation between two parties
may be described as a greater change in behavior than their mere
peaceful coexistence. Maximal forms of political reconciliation are
typically identified as either civic friendship (May 2011),
forgiveness (Tutu 1999), or political or national unity (for an
overview of such conceptions see Allen 1999).



Though the term 'reconciliation' can be used to pick out
an entire range of phenomena, theorists will often make an argument
for somehow privileging one point on the scale. Some scholars attempt
to fix the definition of reconciliation for a particular relational
context by looking to the nature of the relationship in question. For
example, it may not make sense to talk about spouses as reconciled
unless there is a reestablishment of trust, love and intimacy. Spouses
may get over their anger and resentment. They may cooperate
successfully in raising their children together. But if trust, love
and intimacy are not restored they have not reconciled *as
spouses*. Similarly, in order to define what is necessary for the
reconciliation of parties as members of a moral community (Radzik
2009), a political community (C. Murphy 2010), or the international
community (Barry 1980), we might look to the ideals that appropriately
define those relationships. In the South African debate, some
commentators linked their conception of reconciliation to the moral
value of *ubuntu* (Tutu 1999, Krog 2008). *Ubuntu* is
frequently summarized through the Zulu saying, "*umuntu
ngumuntu ngabantu,*" which can be translated as "a
person depends on others to be a person" (see, for example,
Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, who are more critical of the relevance
of *ubuntu* in post-apartheid South Africa).



The debate about the nature of political reconciliation reflects a
concern, not only with ideals of political relationship, but also with
non-ideal facts about societies torn apart by injustice or violence.
For example, Bhargava (2012) defends a weak conception of
reconciliation by emphasizing how significant an achievement peaceful
coexistence can be in the aftermath of atrocities. He worries that
advocating the pursuit of stronger forms of reconciliation will
require that the past be forgotten, leaving the victims to absorb the
costs of that past without protest. In contrast, C. Murphy (2010)
argues that minimal versions should be rejected, for they suggest that
relationships have been repaired and reconciliation achieved too
quickly. A more robust notion of political reconciliation highlights
the profound impact of conflict and repression on political
interaction, and draws attention to the long-term and complex changes
the establishment of a just peace among those formerly in conflict
demands. Tutu (1999) suggests that forgiveness may be necessary for
achieving a peaceful and stable political community. Others argue that
efforts at reconciliation should aim somewhere between the extremes of
a mere cessation of aggression and full-fledged forgiveness.
Moellendorf (2007), for example, claims that reconciliation involves
former enemies coming to see each other as fellow citizens, who should
be treated as equals. Gutmann and Thompson (2000) argue political
reconciliation is oriented towards the cultivation of democratic
reciprocity in interaction, which is a willingness to seek common
ground with fellow citizens on matters of public policy.



Another view, which emerges specifically out of the literature on
political reconciliation, insists that reconciliation cannot be
defined pre-politically (Schaap 2005) or in a non-context specific
manner (Kofi Annan Foundation 2018). That is, the proper standards for
reconciliation within a particular post-conflict society can only be
determined through the free, deliberative and democratic processes of
that society (Crocker 2008). It follows that what counts as
reconciliation in one context will not count in another.



Some critics charge that even to pose the problem that faces
conflict-ridden societies as an issue of reconciliation improperly
assumes that the project of political unity is legitimate and thereby
undermines calls for decolonization, secession or other forms of
greater political autonomy for disempowered groups (Woolford 2004,
Alfred 2009, Jung 2018). Critics further argue that adopting the frame
of a unifying rhetoric of reconciliation can blind the parties to
roles that racial or ethnic identity, gender, colonization or
oppression played in bringing the atrocities about in the first place,
as well as the lopsided distribution of harms that they have caused
(Corntassel and Holder 2008, Grey and James 2016). Theorists in the
"agonistic" tradition are also asking whether the concept
of reconciliation can remain useful within a framework that assumes
that politics is and will properly remain confrontational (Hirsch
2011a, Bohle 2017).


## 3. Processes of Reconciliation



Processes of reconciliation are designed to contribute to the
improvement of relationships damaged as a result of wrongdoing. A wide
range of such processes is examined in the literature. One that is
brought up, more often in the context of objections to reconciliation
rather than defenses, is forgetting (Hughes 2001, Bhargava 2012).
Since the past cannot be changed, wrongdoing cannot be undone.
Therefore, one might argue, the only way to overcome a painful past is
to suppress the memory of it. Policies of forgetting in the name of
reconciliation have been pursued by some states, including Cambodia,
whose prime minister advised his fellow citizens in 1999 "to dig
a hole and bury the past," while granting amnesty from
prosecution to Khmer Rouge leaders (Chandler 2003, 310).



However, those theorists who defend the political and moral value of
reconciliation more often reject the claim that reconciliation
requires forgetting. Instead, these defenders generally claim that
knowledge and acknowledgement of wrongdoing, as well as recognition of
the victims, are crucial to successful reconciliation. Especially in
political contexts, knowledge of basic facts is critical because often
victims and the broader political community do not know who was
responsible for the wrong suffered, nor the extent of violations
committed. Acknowledgement refers to the official, public recognition
of what happened. This is often needed to counter official denial of
wrongdoing or responsibility for wrongdoing (Weschler 1998). The
unspoken, Freudian assumption is that suppressed traumas will
inevitably reemerge in destructive ways. The more explicit arguments
are that the acknowledgement of wrongs and of victims helps heal
psychic wounds (van Ness and Strong 2002), enable trust (Gibson 2004),
reestablish normative standards for behavior (Walker 2006), and
reassert that the victims are indeed members of the moral or political
community (Llewellyn and Howse 1999, du Toit 2000).



As will be discussed below, while there is wide agreement that the
processes of reconciliation must acknowledge the wrongs of the past
and the proper standing of victims, theorists debate precisely how
such acknowledgements are best communicated, so that they will be
sufficiently credible and effective in improving future relations.
More broadly, theorists debate how effective past processes of
reconciliation have proven to be, and how to measure effectiveness
(Bates et al. 2020)



There is also ongoing debate in the political realm about which wrongs
must be acknowledged and redressed. Violations of civil and political
rights have historically been the focus of both theory and practice,
but scholars also argue for the importance of addressing violations of
economic and cultural rights (Mamdani 2000, Arbour 2007, Sharp 2015).
Theorists also disagree about what else, besides acknowledgement, must
be achieved in order for reconciliation to be either likely or
warranted. Must material forms of harm be redressed? Must retributive
justice be achieved? Must the parties forgive? Disagreements about
identifying necessary or appropriate processes are typically connected
to the issue of the last section: disagreements about what degree of
improvement in relations can reasonably be pursued in the aftermath of
wrongdoing. Finally, there is debate about who should decide which
process of reconciliation is adopted in a given context. In the
political context, this is in response to calls for greater local
agency and decision-making (McEvoy 2007).


### 3.1 Apologies



Apologizing is perhaps the most explicit way in which wrongdoing can
be acknowledged. A well-formed apology requires at least
acknowledgement of both the fact of wrongdoing and responsibility by
the wrongdoer, as well as an expression of regret or remorse (Tavuchis
1991). Ideally, the wrongdoer directly addresses the victim. This is
not possible in all cases, of course, as when victims have passed
away. However, apologies made to indirect victims, such as the
families of the deceased, as well as apologies performed before
broader, interested communities are well established in practice. In
recent decades, official apologies, delivered by state entities or
corporations, have become more common, raising questions about the
validity and significance of apologetic statements made by
representatives on behalf of groups (Harvey 1995, Gibney et al 2008),
especially when the events in question lie in the distant past
(Pettigrove 2003).



Apologies are frequently valued, not merely as acknowledgements of
past wrongdoing and gestures of respect to victims, but also as
providing evidence of a positive change in the wrongdoer or in the
wrongdoers' group. Parties who have come to take responsibility
for and repudiate past wrongful actions are better candidates for
renewed relationships of cooperation and trust (de Greiff 2008). This
potential is undermined, however, where apologies are overly vague,
incomplete, or appear insincere. One may reasonably question whether
mere admissions that "mistakes were made" (which do not
own up to responsibility or specify what the mistakes themselves were)
or that the speaker "regrets if anyone took offense"
(which leaves open the question of whether the action was really
wrong) qualify as apologies at all (Smith 2008). The importance of
being sensitive to the gendered aspects of apology has also been
highlighted (MacLachlan 2013).



While apologies are considered by some to make a significant
contribution to reconciliation (Brooks 2004, M. Murphy 2011), others
worry that, in political cases, apologies may be used as a substitute
for more substantive forms of redress (Corntassel and Holder 2008).
Official state apologies for systematic or historic injustices often
result only after protracted and heated debate, leaving little
political will to move on to other forms of redress that may be more
significant to the victimized group. Such dynamics give credence to
the view that apology may amount to a "politics of
distraction" (Corntassel and Holder 2008).


### 3.2 Memorials



Memorials take a number of different forms, such as monuments,
preserved sites of important or tragic events, museums, archives,
ceremonies or educational activities (Barsalou and Baxter 2007,
Zembylas 2011). They may be officially or privately sponsored. Yet all
provide a shared focus for memory. Scholars argue that memorials of
past wrongdoing have the potential to play a number of different roles
in the process of reconciliation. First and foremost, they help
preserve the memory of the past event, which counters any who would
deny or forget the past. They help consolidate a communal
understanding of history and provide a shared focus for emotions, such
as grief or remorse. By helping to forge a collective memory of the
past, memorials may also help rebuild or reshape a sense of collective
identity (Harjes 2005). Commemorations provided by groups responsible
for wrongdoing may demonstrate a willingness to acknowledge
responsibility for such wrongs, (renewed) respect for the victims, and
commitment never to repeat such misdeeds (Barsalou and Baxter 2007,
Blustein 2014). For the victimized group, a memorial can encourage
self-respect, show fidelity to the dead, and help preserve their sense
of themselves as a people (Blustein 2014).



On the other hand, memorials are frequently surrounded by controversy,
as parties disagree over the version of history put forward or the
manner in which it is displayed (Minow 1998). Attempts to aestheticize
past horrors may be offensive to some viewers (Young 2008). Memorials
may cynically divert attention from ongoing problems (Blustein 2014)
or serve as a rallying point for those who would like to renew the
conflict (Barsalou and Baxter 2007). Furthermore, the meanings of
memorials change over time, as they are continually reinterpreted by
later audiences inhabiting different political circumstances. There is
thus no guarantee that a memorial that contributes to reconciliation
at one point in time will continue to do so (Blustein 2014).


### 3.3 Truth Telling



Both apologies and memorials combine an acknowledgment of a
troublesome past with the suggestion of an emotional reaction to that
past, such as remorse, regret or grief. Yet, even without such
emotional content, the communication of the facts of the past can play
a role in reconciliation. Individual victims and survivors often find
themselves unable to move on when they are uncertain about crucial
facts of the past. What precisely happened to their loved one? Did she
suffer? Who exactly committed the violent act? Who gave the order?
Where is the body buried? Moreover, in political contexts wrongdoing
is frequently officially denied, either in the refusal to acknowledge
that violations of rights occurred or that a particular agent such as
the state was responsible for the violations that are known.



Truth telling, some scholars claim, can ameliorate ongoing suffering
of victims and survivors who lack information about what happened and
who was (or was not) responsible for abuses (Zalaquett 1995). It can
counter certain forms of denial (Zalaquett 1995, Dyzenhaus 2000) and
help combat the social structures that cultivate ignorance among more
privileged populations (Regan 2010, Steyn 2012). Truth telling may
also serve as a way of making reparation for those not actually
implicated in crimes. Efforts to record and archive this information,
as well as to distribute it in the form of educational materials, aim
at ensuring that future generations will not repeat the past.



In restorative justice processes, criminals are often required to give
a narrative of the crime (Llewellyn and Howse 1999). In the political
sphere, one formal mechanism for uncovering and documenting the past
is a truth commission. Truth commissions are temporary official
institutions established to examine patterns of specified human rights
abuses over a given time period (Hayner 2010). Dozens of truth
commissions have been established in communities around the globe,
including Chile, Chad, and Canada. Commission reports provide a
summary of such findings and typically issue recommendations on how to
prevent such abuses in the future. These reports vary in the degree to
which the proceedings and findings are made public. Some name
individual perpetrators and some do not. The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, which was marked by a high degree of
openness, televised the testimony of many victims and
perpetrators.



In the literature, a variety of claims are advanced regarding how
truth commissions can contribute to reconciliation, both among
individual perpetrators and victims as well as within national
communities. At the individual level, talking through the past is
often represented as a form of catharsis, wherein the trauma of the
past can be re-experienced, dealt with, and let go. The South African
TRC appeared to offer several examples of such a process, including
spontaneous requests for forgiveness by perpetrators and offers of
forgiveness by victims (Tutu 1999, South African *Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Final Report* 1998).



In terms of societal reconciliation, it is claimed that truth
commissions reintegrate victims in a number of ways. The very fact
that victims state publicly what happened to them contributes to
re-establishing their civic and political dignity as well as
participatory standing (Kiss 2000). Officially recording the wrongs
done to victims, which were typically officially denied in the past,
reinforces the equal moral standing of victims (du Toit 2000). The
report produced by a commission, especially when made public, can
cultivate collective reconciliation by aiding a community to alter its
self-understanding. A narrative must be produced of how a community
could at once have a past full of abuses as well as a present and
ideal future in which those abuses are rejected (Dwyer 1999). It can
also challenge stereotypes that dehumanized members of the community
in the past (C. Murphy 2010) and foster sympathy (Eisikovits 2009).
The proceedings and report of a truth commission can foster trust in
institutions (Gibson 2004). By condemning actions of the past, truth
commissions reassert the force of normative standards that have been
violated, or establish new normative standards for conduct when the
extant terms for a relationship are unjust or immoral (Walker 2010).
Telling the truth is taken to be a form of reparation for victims
(Zalaquett 1995, Walker 2010). Finally, the recommendations issued by
commissions can contribute to the prevention of future wrongdoing.



Truth commissions remain controversial. Many of the criticisms target,
not the value of establishing the truth itself, but the means used to
encourage perpetrators to testify, such as amnesty from prosecution.
Others object to the ways in which truth commissions (sometimes
subtly) pressure victims toward a forgiveness or reconciliation they
may want to resist (Dyzenhaus 2000, Gutmann and Thompson 2000, C.
Murphy 2010), or question the psychological benefits of giving
testimony for victims (Hamber 2009). Still other critics of truth
commissions charge that the pursuit of narrative self-understanding is
objectionable, insofar as it tries to establish a single authoritative
interpretation of the past (Gutmann and Thompson 2000, Regan 2010).
Finally, there are doubts about the reconciliatory effects of
commissions that uncover the truth, but fail to take action against
those implicated in wrongs (Hamber 2009).


### 3.4 Amnesties



Amnesties, which grant legal protection from civil and/or criminal
liability, are a particularly controversial form of reconciliation
process. Amnesty can be granted to individuals or classes of persons.
It can be granted unconditionally or conditionally. If conditional,
the granting of amnesty occurs only if certain provisions are met. For
example, in South Africa, perpetrators had to make a complete
disclosure of the rights violations for which they were responsible
and demonstrate that such violations were committed for political
reasons (Dyzenhaus 2000). Amnesties may also be conditional on
nonrecidivism (Freeman 2011). Finally, amnesties vary in the extent to
which they preclude other negative consequences (e.g., being fired)
(Greenawalt 2000). 



A number of moral objections to amnesties have been raised. Amnesties
seem at least *prima facie* unjust; specifically, amnesty
prevents retributive and/or corrective justice from being done
(Greenawalt 2000). Granting amnesty is claimed to be inimical to
countering historical impunity for political leaders and government
agents responsible for egregious violations of human rights. And
achieving the aspiration of "*Never Again*" seems
intuitively less likely if future political leaders and actors believe
they will not be held accountable for their actions. The danger posed
by amnesty policies is that, in failing to hold wrongdoers accountable
and undermining the ability of victims to seek legal recourse for
their harms, they may (inadvertently) send the message that the abuses
of the past were not wrong or that the victims did not deserve better
treatment (Pensky 2008). Justified anger against the perpetrators will
not be exorcised, and may instead find expression in acts of
revenge.



Amnesties continue to be used by states and in fact have increased in
frequency (Mallinder 2008). Communities adopt amnesties for a variety
of reasons. Amnesties may encourage perpetrators to give full and
truthful testimony to truth commissions. Here, the value of
remembering the past is emphasized. In contrast, as in Cambodia,
amnesties can be used as part of a strategy to forget the past.
Amnesties also may be used to incentivize an end to conflict, as was
the case in South Africa (Dyzenhaus 2000).



Arguments for the moral permissibility of amnesty challenge the idea
that granting amnesty reinforces impunity or undermines stability and
justice (Mallinder 2008). Freeman (2011) claims that amnesties can be
justified as a measure of last resort, so long as victims are included
in the process of deciding to pass an amnesty and amnesties are used
for the sake of facilitating an end to conflict or reconciliation.
Greenawalt (2000) argues that amnesties can be justified when
necessary to prevent even greater injustice from occurring, such as
violations of human rights as part of an ongoing conflict. By
demonstrating mercy to perpetrators, amnesties might help end a cycle
of violence (O'Shea 2002).


### 3.5 Trials and Punishment



Punishment is the intentional infliction of harm or suffering on a
wrongdoer in response to a wrong committed. Although transitional
societies are sometimes portrayed as having to choose between
reconciliation and punishment, these responses are not necessarily
opposed (Bennett 2008, Verdeja 2009). As is often clear in
interpersonal or criminal cases, the punishment of a wrongdoer (and
especially the wrongdoer's acceptance of that punishment) can be
a process by which the wrongs of the past are redressed. The power of
punishment to put the past to rest has been explained in a number of
different ways, such as repaying a debt, removing an unfair advantage
(Morris 1968), satisfying the victim's anger (Hershenov 1999),
or reaffirming the equal moral status of victims (Hampton 1992).
Implicit in this last analysis is the assumption that wrongdoing is
fundamentally expressive, and what is expressed is the inferior moral
standing of the victim, which permits the infliction of harm. Criminal
prosecutions help victims re-gain sense of status as rights holder and
so enhance dignity (Nino 1998, Bennett 2008).



In the context of transitions to democracy, some scholars concentrate
specifically on the significance of trials in response to collective
and politically significant crimes, such as those involving human
rights abuses by officials. Criminal trials mark a clear break from
the past (Malamud-Goti 1990). Trials signal the official disapproval
of the actions for which an individual is being prosecuted, actions
that may not have been officially condemned before. Criminal trials
and punishment are also claimed to make a crucial contribution to
societal reconciliation by reaffirming the normative standards that
should govern interaction. Punishment can signify or cultivate a
commitment to the rule of law, as well as the faith in law and decency
among officials upon which the rule of law depends (C. Murphy
2010).



On the other hand, a number of scholars are skeptical about the
reconciliatory impact of criminal trials, especially in response to
widespread wrongdoing. Judith Shklar (1964) and Hannah Arendt (1977)
argue trials do little to heal victims wounded by wrongdoing and have
little pedagogical role regarding the normative standards that should
govern relations. Trials fundamentally are oriented towards the
establishment of the guilt of individual perpetrators, not the pursuit
of the truth about the past. This can lead to a very limited
understanding of the collective character of the injustices
perpetrated, their impact on victims and the broader context that made
such wrongdoing possible, all of which may be important for
reconciliation (Llewellyn and Howse 1999, Isaacs 2016). Moreover, the
ability of domestic criminal justice systems in transitional societies
to adhere to internationally recognized procedural standards has been
questioned, as has the justifiability of selectively prosecuting only
a fraction of the perpetrators involved in collective crimes (van Zyl
2000).


### 3.6 Lustration



Lustration refers to legal measures that permit or require the
investigation of individuals running for election, serving in the
military, or working in government agencies, universities, or the
media. Individuals found to have connections to past injustices or
perpetrating groups may then be publicly exposed or excluded from
serving in public roles (David 2011). Such measures are frequently
adopted during postwar occupations or in countries transitioning to
democracy. Lustration is sometimes conceived of as a punitive measure,
which opens practitioners up to charges of engaging in collective
forms of punishment that ignore individual desert and violating
prohibitions on retroactive law (Cohen 1995, Meierhenrich 2006).
Lustration has also been defended in forward-looking terms as a means
of securing peace or a political transition as well as reestablishing
trust in government by assuring the public that past wrongdoers will
no longer be in power (Chiu 2011). Criticisms of lustration as a means
of pursuing political reconciliation highlight the potential for
biased application of the law (Cohen 1995), warn of the difficulties
of re-establishing a functional government when much of the
experienced and educated workforce is excluded from participation
(Hollywood 2007), and worry that lustration encourages the
continuation of suspicion rather than cooperation among former enemies
(Govier 2006).


### 3.7 Reparations



The term 'reparations' has been used more and less broadly
to refer to efforts to repair the harm that results from a wrong or
conflict. A narrow use of the term refers to a transfer of land,
goods, or wealth that is intended to directly compensate for goods
that were taken, damaged or destroyed. The payment is made either by
the party who was responsible for the harm, by the wrongdoers'
descendants or other beneficiaries, or potentially by a third party
acting on the wrongdoers' behalf. This sort of transfer is
perhaps better labeled 'restitution.' Transfers made in
response to losses that are not literally replaceable or monetizable,
such as deaths or injuries, are also referred to as restitution or
reparation. A still broader use of the term includes material
transfers that have a more purely symbolic function. These payments
are meant to send a conciliatory message of some sort rather than to
suggest that the wrong or harm is being paid back. One friend's
gift to another after a quarrel could be an example of a symbolic
reparation in everyday life. So could investments in the economy of a
former foe. The term 'reparations' is also used even more
broadly to include acts other than material transfers, such as
apologies or instances of truth-telling (Torpey 2003, Walker
2010).



As we will discuss further in section 4, arguments for material
transfers may appeal directly to principles of corrective justice.
Those commentators who defend material reparations in the name of
reconciliation frequently interpret such payments as acknowledgements
of responsibility, expressions of respect for the moral status of the
victims, acts of remorse or caring, evidence of increased
trustworthiness or a recommitment to the norms of justice (Thompson
2002, Brooks 2004, Gray 2010, Walker 2010). Yet the meanings of
reparations can change, be undermined or repudiated, depending on the
manner and context in which they are offered (Brooks 1999, Barkan
2000, de Greiff 2006). Still, when combined with apologies,
truth-telling, and other measures, reparations have the potential to
improve relations. Perhaps more importantly, leaving identifiable
harms uncompensated may undermine the effectiveness of apologies and
other efforts to reconcile.



Reparations for historical injustice are particularly controversial.
One ongoing debate concerns the guilt or liability of those who would
pay, the claim-rights and connection to the victims of those who would
receive payment, and the difficulty in calculating the proper sum of
restitution (Waldron 1992, Wheeler 1997, Boxill 2003). Such debates
suggest that reparations are being interpreted as restitution, where
the legalistic logic of property rights and inheritance are paramount,
rather than under the broader project of repairing relationships
(Thompson 2002, Brooks 2004).



Victims and their descendants, for their part, sometimes worry that
accepting reparation payments may be seen as drawing a line under the
past, as implying the moral debt is paid or that all is forgiven
(Barkan 2000). They also object to the suggestion that the people and
other valuable things lost could be repaid by money or other material
goods.


### 3.8 Forgiveness



There is considerable disagreement, especially in the political
literature, on the relationship between forgiveness and
reconciliation. Can parties be reconciled if forgiveness is refused?
Is forgiveness genuine if the victim refuses to restore her
relationship with the wrongdoer? In part, differences of opinion on
these matters are traceable to the sorts of disagreements about
defining reconciliation that have been surveyed here (namely,
regarding the kinds and degrees of improvement that must be made
before a specific kind of relationship may be described as
reconciled). Similar disagreements over the nature of forgiveness
complicate matters even further.



In the literature on interpersonal forgiveness, definitions of
forgiveness commonly focus on the overcoming or forswearing of
resentment (or similar negative attitudes) that were the result of
wrongdoing, and (some would add) the reestablishment of positive
attitudes, such as goodwill, toward the wrongdoer (J. Murphy 2003,
Pettigrove 2012). Where such changes in attitude do not occur, but
where the parties to the wrong manage to reestablish peaceful
coexistence, cooperation or even trust, talk of reconciliation seems
reasonable. This would be a case of reconciliation without
forgiveness. Similarly, a victim might let go of her resentment of
someone who mistreated her and yet take steps to avoid future contact
with that person out of concern for her safety. Such a case exhibits
forgiveness without reconciliation. Forgiveness and reconciliation, on
this account, appear to be distinct and independent phenomena.



Still, the attitude-centered account of forgiveness is compatible with
the view that forgiving is a powerful means to reconciliation. The
sorts of negative attitudes that are overcome by forgiveness are
powerful obstacles to good relations. When those attitudes are
resolved, reconciliation is an unsurprising result. It also makes
sense, given this view of forgiveness, to argue that a case of
reconciliation that does not include forgiveness is less complete than
one that does include forgiveness. Depending on the circumstances, an
improvement in relations that leaves resentment and ill will in place
may not seem worthy of the label 'reconciliation.' In
these cases, one might say that forgiveness is necessary for
reconciliation.



When commentators work with a different conception of forgiveness, the
discussion of reconciliation is also different. One alternative view of
forgiveness, which appears to be more popular in political than
interpersonal contexts, places emphasis on the actions of victims
rather than their internal mental states, suggesting that when a
person or group forgives they gives up their moral right to hold the
wrong against the wrongdoer (Digeser 2001, Wolterstorff 2013). Such
views have been labeled 'relational' or
'commissive' accounts of forgiveness (Blustein 2014,
Pettigrove 2012). Exactly how much one gives up in forgiving is not
always specified and opinions seem to differ. At a minimum, the victim
forswears his right to personally retaliate against the wrongdoer. But
does forgiving entail that he also forswears calling for punishment by
the proper authorities, or reparations for the harms he suffered, or
his right to remind the wrongdoer and others of the wrong? If one
thinks of forgiveness as relinquishing a (more or less broad) right to
hold a wrong against a wrongdoer, then it seems forgiveness may well
be productive of reconciliation. However, depending on how much
victims give up in forgiving, this kind of reconciliation may be
purchased at the cost of justice (Blustein 2014). In contrast, those
who think of forgiving as the overcoming of resentment often argue
that victims can forgive yet also call for punishment, reparations and
remembrance of the wrong (J. Murphy 2003).



However one defines forgiveness, the claim that victims should forgive
in order to bring about valuable reconciliation is likely to be
controversial because it asks the very people who were most deeply
insulted, wronged and harmed by the past conflict to bear the burden
of repairing it. Another point of concern is whether the victims are
being asked to forgive unconditionally (that is, without any prior,
ameliorative response from the wrongdoer) or conditionally (that is,
in response to a morally significant change in or act by the
wrongdoer) (Garrard and McNaughton 2011). Furthermore, whether or not
a particular act of forgiveness would be morally appropriate,
virtuous, or even prudent for the victim, pressuring a victim to
forgive is widely regarded as problematic (Govier and Verwoerd
2002b).



Efforts to make forgiveness central to reconciliation also run into
questions about who has the standing to forgive. To forgive on behalf
of a living victim is morally unacceptable, if not simply impossible
(Govier and Verwoerd 2002b). Some theorists also hold that it is
impossible to forgive on behalf of deceased victims, from which it
follows that wrongs such as murder will be unforgivable
(Jankelevitch 2005). In these cases, the possibility of
a reconciliation that is distinct from forgiveness offers a way to
conceive of a positive resolution of the past. Theorists debate
whether states or other groups might have the standing to forgive on
their own behalf, independent of the choices of individual victims.
Those who think of forgiveness as primarily a change in attitudes must
make sense of attributing such mental states to groups, perhaps by
explaining how attitude changes in representative persons (such as
leaders or spokespeople) qualify as group forgiveness (cf. Griswold
2007). The claim that groups can forgive is easier to make for those
who think of forgiveness as the waiving of a set of rights
(Wolterstorff 2013).


### 3.9 Participation in Deliberative Processes



At this point, a wide variety of processes that promise to repair
relationships in the aftermath of wrongdoing or conflict have been
reviewed. Perhaps one of the greatest factors in determining whether
reconciliation efforts will be successful is the manner in which they
are selected. A number of measures (e.g., apologies, truth telling)
are aimed at restoring a sense of dignity and inclusion to formerly
mistreated or disempowered parties. This effect may be magnified if
those parties also have a say, for example, in choosing criminal
trials or truth commissions, determining the form reparations would
take, or designing memorials.



Restorative justice approaches to criminal sentencing place a premium
on victims' participation (Johnstone 2002). In practices such as
sentencing conferences and victim-offender mediation, the victim plays
an active role in determining the manner in which the offender will
make up for her crime. In this way, the victim has a greater chance of
receiving a form of satisfaction that he will value more (e.g.,
restitution payments rather than the imprisonment of the offender).
The victim's active participation may also provide him with an
opportunity to exorcise his resentments or fears, restore his sense of
control over his life, and reaffirm his status as a valued member of
the community who should not have been mistreated (Johnstone
2002).



Restorative justice models also value the active participation of
offenders in finding a resolution to wrongdoing (Zehr 1990). For
example, offenders may be asked to propose forms of reparation they
could offer to victims. In being allowed an opportunity to play a role
in building a better future, the offender may avoid a dangerous
rage-shame spiral and regain a sense of self-worth (Braithwaite
2000).



In political cases, the roles of victim and perpetrator are often not
clear-cut or agreed upon. Here, incorporating input from the various
parties to the conflict in designing reconciliation processes will
increase the chances that those measures will be viewed as legitimate
across the entire community (Barsalou and Baxter 2007). Inclusive
deliberative processes for the selection, design, and interpretation
of reconciliation efforts can also provide a valuable model for the
future of the community (Crocker 1999, Anker 2016). The future will
never be free of conflict, so an appropriate goal of reconciliation
processes is to establish norms for resolving disagreements in a
peaceful, just and equitable manner.


## 4. Reconciliation and Justice



Wrongdoing has implications for multiple moral values, including, most
fundamentally, justice. Justice-based concerns traditionally dominate
philosophical discussions of responding to wrongdoing. What is the
relationship between justice and reconciliation? Discussion of this
question occurs most explicitly in the political context, especially
in debates about the moral justifiability of non-punitive responses to
wrongdoing such as truth commissions. This section provides an
overview of the various positions that have been advanced concerning
the relationship between justice and reconciliation.



Whether reconciliation is compatible with justice turns, of course, on
how one conceives of justice. In some parts of the literature, the
question concerns corrective justice. For example, critics object to
calls for reconciliation that are not accompanied with restitution for
harms suffered, such as the appropriation of land (Alfred 2009). In
section 3.7, we describe how, in other cases, restitution and
reparation are defended as a means to reconciliation. However, as
Howard McGary (2010 argues, here too there is a tension between
justice and reconciliation. Principles of restitution are generally
taken to be backward-looking, in the sense that the past action of
wrongful taking itself provides sufficient grounds for making the
victims whole. Bringing in the rhetoric of reconciliation suggests
instead that the reason for the transfer of goods is to secure better
future relations among wrongdoers and victims. McGary argues that this
forward-looking goal of reconciliation can insultingly suggest that a
concern for corrective justice is an insufficient reason to compensate
the victim--that justice for these victims is only worth securing when
it is also in the interest of the wrongdoers.



For many other theorists, especially those writing about transitional
contexts, justice is assumed to be 'retributive justice'
(see the entry on
 retributive justice).
 The core claim of retributivists is that perpetrators of wrongdoing
deserve to suffer a proportional punishment. Justice is a matter of
holding wrongdoers accountable by giving them the negative treatment
they deserve.



Against this background, one view is that reconciliation and
retributive justice are in tension with one another. Whereas
retributive justice focuses on delivering a punishment that fits the
past crime, reconciliation is concerned with bringing about future
good relations. The conflict between justice and reconciliation is
visible when individuals or communities choose non-punitive responses
in hopes of securing peace. According to one view, insofar as
transitional societies do not punish wrongdoers, they promote
reconciliation at a significant moral cost: they sacrifice justice.
Authors debate whether this sacrifice may be all-things-considered
morally justified, given the exigencies of transitional societies
(Mendez 1997, Dwyer 1999, Greenawalt 2000).



Another way of framing the relationship between retributive justice
and reconciliation is to see doing justice, conceptualized as
punishment, as contributing to reconciliation (Verdeja 2009, C. Murphy
2010). From this perspective, retributive justice and reconciliation
are not fundamentally or necessarily in conflict. Justice may even be
a precondition for reconciliation in cases where allowing impunity for
serious wrongdoing would fuel resentment and undermine trust in
institutions. Even if individual wrongdoers are further alienated by
punitive measures, holding them accountable may be productive of a
broader reconciliation among victims and other members of the
community, as well as among future generations.



Instead of conceptualizing the relationship between justice and
reconciliation through the processes that promote each value, a
different set of views consider instead the core moral concerns
constitutive of each value. According to some scholars, reconciliation
and justice are compatible, though distinct, moral values, and a
variety of processes can respond to the moral concerns each value
takes up (Allen 1999, Allais 2012). That is, responses to wrongdoing
can be just and conducive to reconciliation in different degrees.
Responses to wrongdoing may promote some aspects of justice (such as
demands for recognition of victims and accountability for
perpetrators), but not others. For example, this view can accommodate
the claim, made during the South African TRC, that wrongdoers are held
accountable when they are required to undergo the shaming experience
of testifying publicly to their crimes (Final Report, 1998, vol. 1,
ch. 1, para 35). Similarly, they may foster some dimensions of
reconciliation (such as epistemic or attitudinal changes), but not
others.



A final view is that reconciliation *is* (part or all of)
justice (Llewellyn and Howse 1999, Philpott 2012). Theorists who adopt
this position regard it as a mistake to equate justice with
retributive justice. In the view of advocates of restorative justice,
justice is fundamentally about repairing damaged relationships.
Chairman Rev. Desmond Tutu famously responds to the criticism of the
TRC's decision not to pursue retributive justice by saying,
"We believe, however, that there is another kind of justice
- a restorative justice which is concerned not so much with
punishment as with correcting imbalances, restoring broken
relationships - with healing, harmony and reconciliation"
(*Final Report*, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, para. 36). It is difficult to
provide a definitive account of restorative justice. However, the
emphasis is on achieving a morally appropriate state of relations,
where victims' needs for recognition, security and reparations
are given special emphasis (Kiss 2000, Walker 2006). Thus, to promote
reconciliation is to promote justice. Insofar as holding wrongdoers
accountable through punishment helps restore morally appropriate
attitudes, norms and interactions among the victim, the wrongdoer, and
the community, punishment is compatible with restorative justice.
However, retribution is not valued for its own sake.


## 5. Conclusion



This entry has explored the various ways that the repair of
relationships is conceptualized in the literature, and the processes
that are claimed to foster such repair. One lingering question
remains: what value is there in the pursuit of relational repair? The
section on justice suggests two, not incompatible, answers. The
process of repairing relationships is most obviously valuable and
important because of the other goods it enables individuals and
communities to achieve. In the political context, the cessation of
violence, the prevention of future violence, and the attainment of
democracy are some values that may be promoted. In more interpersonal
contexts, the benefits of relational repair include the avoidance of
further harms to one's interests, including the psychological
burden of resentment, or the goods that continued interaction bring,
such as material profit through ongoing trade. But in addition to
these sorts of instrumental value, one might also argue that
reconciliation is valuable for its own sake. Insofar as a relationship
is intrinsically valuable or morally appropriate, the repair of a
relation that has been ruptured acquires derivative intrinsic value.
Insofar as wrongdoing violates and damages the relationship that ought
to exist between two morally motivated parties (namely, a relationship
of mutual respect and a reasonable degree of trust in the
other's ability and willingness to abide by appropriate norms of
behavior), reconciliation sets things to right.