## 1. The History of Occasionalism


### 1.1 Islamic Occasionalism



Though the term "occasional cause" has been suggested as
originating with the French philosopher Louis de la Forge (Carraud
2002, 347), the first philosophers to explicitly expound the position
were the Islamic occasionalists. Our brief discussion here will not be
able to do justice to its complex and rich development, but Islamic
occasionalism seems to have emerged when the theologians of the
Ash'arite school of *kalam* (Islamic doctrinal
theology) began to consider the implications of the systematic
reinterpretation, development, and integration of Aristotelianism and
Neo-Platonism that occurred within the Islamic intellectual world in
the tenth and eleventh centuries (cf. Adamson, P. & Taylor, R.C.
2005, 4-6). Among these Islamic occasionalists, al-Ash'ari
(873-935), the founder of Ash'arite school, appears to
have been particularly influential (Griffel 2007).



If al-Ash'ari was the first of the Islamic occasionalists, it
was al-Ghazali (c.1055-1111), the great philosopher and
theologian of the Ash'arite school, who presented some of the
most significant and influential arguments for occasionalism in his
influential work, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*
(*Tahafut al-falasifa*). This work has long been
the source of the interpretation that al-Ghazali himself was
a committed global occasionalist, but recent interpretations have
challenged this view, arguing that al-Ghazali's goal
simply is to defend the possibility of miracles against the claims of
the *falasifa*, and that he leaves open the possibility
of some kind of genuine causality in creatures (Griffel 2007).
Notwithstanding this issue of whether al-Ghazali was an
occasionalist or not, no one doubts that al-Ghazali found
some key views of the *falasifa* Avicenna (Ibn
Sina, 980-1037) problematic and worthy of criticism.
In particular, it seems to have been Avicenna's
"Aristotelian" approach to creaturely natures and powers
that was most problematic for al-Ghazali in rendering
consistent with Ash'arite
 *kalam*.[1]
 The main point of tension seems to stem from the Avicennan view that,
given the natures or essences of creatures, there are causally
necessitating relations between creaturely causes and their effects
such that the creaturely cause necessarily brings about the effect.
Al-Ghazali took this view to be in tension with the
doctrinal claim that theological orthodoxy requires the possibility of
miracles, which consist in the divine interruption of the ordinary
course of events in nature. Thus, what worried al-Ghazali
most is the idea that if creatures genuinely necessitate their
effects, this would seem to imply that even in the face of divine
miraculous intervention, the natural effects would have to follow from
the cause. But such an implication was unacceptable for those holding
the standard understanding of divine omnipotence, which
al-Ghazali and other philosophers of the Ash'arite
theological tradition thought to be essential to *kalam*.
Any natural necessitating relation resistant to the exercise of divine
causal power was thought to be inappropriate, and thus causally
necessitating relations, properly understood (that is, in ways
consistent with divine omnipotence), are only instantiated in cases of
divine causation. In addition to this theologically motivated
argument, al-Ghazali's criticism of causally
necessitating relations between creaturely causes and effects also
incorporates his distinctive views on the modal relations between
distinct entities or facts, according to which "the connection
between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is
habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary"
(*TF* 170) Al-Ghazali's central claim, as we
will examine in more detail later, was that "each of the two
things has its own individuality and is not the other, and neither the
affirmation nor the negation, neither the existence nor the
non-existence of the one is implied in the affirmation, negation,
existence, and non-existence of the other" (Weinberg 1964,
 123).[2]



We end this section with the observation that the main disagreement
between those who regard al-Ghazali as an occasionalist and
those who do not seems to rest on whether they take
al-Ghazali to have accepted the principle that a genuine
cause must causally necessitate its effect. Those who argue for the
occasionalist reading of al-Ghazali appear to regard him as
committed to this principle, while their opponents (such as Griffel)
argue that al-Ghazali is not fully committed to this
principle. If al-Ghazali is indeed committed to this
principle, then given that al-Ghazali only grants such
causally necessitating powers to God, he would be committed to denying
any causal powers in creature. In contrast, if al-Ghazali
does not think that genuine causality implies that the cause causally
necessitates the effect, then he would in effect be making room for a
different conception of causation, one that is distinct from divine
causality, the unique causally necessitating power. This different
conception of cause would allow for genuine secondary causality in
that creaturely causes would be real causes on this alternative
conception, despite the fact that they do not causally necessitate
their effects. Implicit in this disagreement over how to read
al-Ghazali are key questions that naturally arise in
disputes over the nature of causation: can something be a cause even
if it does not necessitate its effect? Are not such antecedents at
most mere occasional causes? Moreover, what is the nature of the
necessitation involved? We will pursue these questions in the
following sections.


### 1.2 Medieval Christian Europe



The criticism of positing "necessary connections" between
creaturely powers and their alleged effects also emerged in medieval
Christian Europe, most notably, in the work of Nicholas of Autrecourt
(1300-d. after 1350). Autrecourt was a precursor to the general
criticism of Scholasticism that swept through Europe in the early
modern period, and his critique of our alleged knowledge of causal
connections was part of his overall project of critically examining
the various knowledge claims within natural philosophy that were
central to Aristotelian scholasticism. But his criticisms might have
been too radical for his time, for he was summoned to the Curia at
Avignon to answer charges of error and heresy, and in 1347 his
writings were publicly burned. He himself is said to have been banned
from lecturing (Weinberg 1964, 267).



Sources suggest that Autrecourt was acquainted with the arguments set
forth by al-Ghazali (cf. Wolfson 1969, 234-8). Thus, it is
no surprise that Autrecourt presents various arguments that are
reminiscent of al-Ghazali's. For instance, like
al-Ghazali, Autrecourt in one formulation of his criticism
of necessary connections relies on a dictum that the existence of one
thing cannot be logically inferred from the existence of another thing
(Weinburg 1964, 272). Hence Autrecourt held that, unless there were
overwhelming reasons to the contrary, the default position should be
to assume the lack of logically necessary connections between two
distinct entities.



We should note, however, that the overall focus of Autrecourt's
project was to persuade us that our various judgments about the
natural world, including those concerning genuine causal connections,
lack certainty, and that we thus ought to suspend judgment in such
matters. And it is with this goal in mind that he presented a variety
of epistemological, metaphysical, and theological arguments to support
this skeptical stance toward affirming genuine causality among
creatures. Therefore, while Autrecourt's arguments much resemble
the arguments deployed by occasionalists, it is far from clear that
Autrecourt himself was an occasionalist. For his overall attitude
seems to have been closer to that of a skeptic, in contrast to the
"dogmatic" position of the occasionalists, who
unequivocally denied creaturely causation and affirmed divine
causation. In this respect, the often quoted epithet that Autrecourt
was "the fourteenth-century Hume" seems rather appropriate
(Nadler 1996, 458). If Autrecourt was indeed more skeptical than
dogmatic about God's role in nature, we might think that, in the
Western philosophical tradition, occasionalists in the proper sense of
the term emerge in earnest in the wake of Rene Descartes
(1596-1650) in the form of "Cartesian
occasionalists".
 [3]


### 1.3 Descartes and the Cartesian Occasionalists (Louis de la Forge, Geraud de Cordemoy, Johannes Clauberg, and Arnold Geulincx)



The issue of whether Descartes himself was an occasionalist has been
the subject of considerable debate. Given how many prominent
Cartesians were indeed occasionalists, it is not surprising that
Descartes has been suggested as the source of this new wave of
occasionalism that swept through the European continent in the second
half of the seventeenth century. Some interpreters, accordingly, have
held that, while perhaps not fully endorsing occasionalism across the
board, Descartes did hold occasionalist views with regard to extended
substances, or bodies. According to these interpreters, Descartes
denied that bodies acted on either other bodies or
 minds.[4]
 Others disagree and have argued, for instance, that in cases of
body-body interaction, Descartes affirmed the genuine causal powers of
extended
 substances.[5]
 Note that, given the general framework of Cartesian dualism, four
types of causal interaction among finite substances are usually
considered: (1) body-body causation, where one extended substance
affects another; (2) body-mind causation, where bodily changes bring
about changes in the mind; (3) mind-body causation, where the
direction of causation is reverse to that of body-mind causation, and
certain thoughts or volitions bring about changes in bodies; (4)
intra-mental causation, where various forms of mental activity, such
as producing ideas, are considered as typical cases. It is within this
framework that the respective positions about causation, occasionalist
or not, can be identified.



Cases (2) and (3) have received much attention from the general
philosophical audience. This phenomenon stems as far back as Princess
Elisabeth of Bohemia (see her astute exchange with Descartes in AT III
663-8 (CSM III, 218)). As we can see in Elisabeth's
correspondence, from the beginning much of the focus has been directed
at the issue of how or even whether two radically different substances
can causally interact. And this attention has at times led to the
caricature of occasionalism as an ad hoc solution to this problem for
Cartesian dualists. But, as we have already seen and will further see,
the scope and depth of the issues surrounding the emergence of
occasionalism make it clear that this depiction is indeed a caricature
at
 best.[6]



In contrast to the situation concerning Descartes' alleged
commitment to occasionalism, there is no disagreement in the case of
Nicolas Malebranche, whose works provide some of the most extensive
and important discussions of occasionalism. Thus, his arguments will
be the topic of further examination. But in addition to Malebranche,
there were a number of other Cartesians, prior to Malebranche, that
presented a variety of views indicative of the occasionalist current
in the 1660s. Among these Cartesians, the French physician and
philosopher Louis de la Forge (1632-66), the Parisian lawyer and
philosopher Geraud de Cordemoy (1614-83), the German
theologian and philosopher Johannes Clauberg (1622-55), and the
Dutch philosopher Arnold Geulincx (1624-69) are the most
prominent.



In the case of La Forge, his credentials as an occasionalist about the
causal efficacy of extended substances or bodies has never been in
doubt. In fact, as noted earlier, it is La Forge who has been
suggested to have first employed the expression "occasional
cause" in his *Traite de l'esprit de
l'homme* (Carraud 2002, 347), where he argues that bodies
are merely the "remote and occasional" causes of our ideas
of them (*TEH* 132-4). Some interpreters have argued that
La Forge's occasionalism extended to minds as well and thus was
a global occasionalist (Prost 1907, ch.6; Bouillier 1865, vol. 1, 503,
513; cf. Nadler 1993b, 60, especially footnote 11), but others have
argued against this view (Bardout 2002a, 145; Nadler 1993b,
60-61). The case for restricting the scope of La Forge's
occasionalism to only extended substances seems well grounded, if we
take into consideration such texts as the following: "All of our
ideas considered in themselves in so far as they are only different
ways of thinking, need ... no cause for their production other
than our mind" (*TEH* 177; cf. Nadler 1993b, 65).



La Forge's work is also significant in that he seems to have
been the first in this period to present an argument for occasionalism
on the basis of how God conserves an extended substance in existence.
This argument puts particular emphasis on the fact that God must not
only "continue to produce [a body], if he wants to preserve it
in existence; but, in addition, because he cannot create it everywhere
nor outside of any particular place, he must himself put it in a
place" (*TEH* 241; cf. Nadler 1993b, 63; Nadler 1998,
219). As we shall see, this argument bears a strong resemblance to
Malebranche's most persuasive argument for global occasionalism,
the "conservation is but continuous creation"
argument.



Geraud de Cordemoy's work appears to have had a direct
influence on Malebranche, as Malebranche himself acknowledges in the
*Search* (*OCM* I 123/*Search* 49; Nadler 2005,
38; cf. Gouhier 1926 95ff.; Battail 1973, 146ff.). Though there has
been some disagreement about the scope of Cordemoy's
occasionalism, the consensus seems to be that he was a global
occasionalist, denying causal efficacy to both minds and bodies. Thus,
in this respect, he is a precursor to Malebranche. Cordemoy is also
known for a rather distinctive argument for why bodies are not real
causes, one that employs the controversial premise that the motion of
a body can be continued only by the causal agent that initiated it
(*Discernement* 135-36; cf. Nadler 2005, 42). Based on
the observation that bodies do not self-initiate movement, Cordemoy
argues that bodies thus need to be set into motion by a non-material
first mover (Nadler 2005, 42). But given the aforementioned premise,
any subsequent movement of bodies can only be continued by the causal
agent that initially moved them, which leads to the occasionalist
conclusion that God is the cause of all bodily motion. This argument
seems to be related to a slightly different argument employed by
Malebranche to argue for the same conclusion--that is, the lack
of causal efficacy of extended substances. This latter argument, which
emphasizes the passivity or passive nature of bodies, is one of
Malebranche's favorites and will be examined in more detail
later.



Johannes Clauberg (1622-1655) has been identified by some as one of
the first philosophers influenced by Descartes to argue for
occasionalism with regard to mind-body interaction on the basis of
their radical heterogeneity (Bardout 2008b). With regard to other
domains, such as body-body causation, the majority consensus appears
to be that he rejected occasionalism, and allowed bodily substances to
be causally efficacious (Nadler 2011). Even with regard to his
occasionalism concerning mind-body interaction, his position has been
suggested to be rather nuanced. Schmaltz, for instance, has argued
that Clauberg's occasionalism is restricted to the direction of
body to mind, such as in the case of sensations arising in accordance
with bodily changes, since there are textual grounds to think that
Clauberg endorsed some type of genuine causality on the part of our
volitions in the case of our voluntary control over our bodies
(Schmaltz 2016, 180-1). Given our characterization of occasionalism at
the outset, however, even this restricted version might not qualify
Clauberg's position as occasionalist, since most scholars agree
that Clauberg thinks that it is the soul itself that causes the
relevant sensations on the occasion of certain bodily changes. That
is, Clauberg does not think that it is God that is unique genuine
cause behind the occurrence of our sensations, a view he would have to
hold were he to satisfy the requirements of occasionalism as we have
specified it (Schmaltz and others well acknowledge this point).
Clauberg's significance then might best be thought of as
presenting the explicit rejection of bodily changes being genuine
causes of changes in the mind (Bardout 2008b, Schmaltz 2016). The
complexity of Clauberg's views can be seen as an example
revealing how intricate and finely nuanced the diverse position came
to be in the face of the complex considerations that were operative in
this period. 



Arnold Geulincx's most distinctive contribution to the
development of occasionalism comes in the form of a causal principle
that puts an epistemic restriction on the exercise of genuine
causality (see Nadler 1999, 268). In his *Metaphysica vera*,
Geulincx states that "it is impossible to bring about something
when one does not know how it is brought about ... you are not the
cause of that which you do not know how to bring about
(*impossibile est, ut is faciat, qui nescit quomodo fiat ...
quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis*)" (*MV*
150-1). If restricted to the causality of rational, intentional
agents, the principle seems to have some intuitive appeal. But
Geulincx, interestingly enough, does not restrict the principle in
this way. Rather, he takes it to be universally applicable, even to
bodily causes, which has raised questions about the plausibility of
this overall argument. Malebranche appears to be taking up a version
of this principle, which we will discuss later in the section on the
"no representation" argument.


### 1.4 Nicolas Malebranche



Given Malebranche's influence on the development of
occasionalism, a substantial portion of the section on the arguments
for occasionalism will be devoted Malebranche's views. Here we
simply note that Malebranche appears to have been committed to
occasionalism from early on in his philosophical career, since his
occasionalism emerges clearly in his first major work, *The Search
for Truth* (*De la recherche de la verite*,
1674-75). In addition to the *Search*, Malebranche in the
*Elucidations to the Search* presents a long defense of his
occasionalism against objections. And in the *Dialogues* we get
Malebranche's second major work to discuss the thesis of
occasionalism centrally. Whether or in what way Malebranche's
views were influenced by earlier occasionalists, as discussed earlier,
will not be centrally addressed here, given the limitations of
 space.[7]
 We will however compare some of Malebranche's arguments with
his predecessors when relevant.


### 1.5 Berkeley



The extent of George Berkeley's occasionalism is also a matter
of some controversy. But there is general agreement among interpreters
that Berkeley was an occasionalist with regard to the causal powers of
physical objects. That is, physical objects for Berkeley are not
causally active in bringing about any events in the world. This denial
is not surprising, if we consider the basic makeup of physical objects
in Berkeley's ontological scheme, along with his views about the
passivity of ideas. For, according to Berkeley, physical objects,
properly understood, are but bundles or collections of ideas, and
ideas are manifestly passive--no power or activity is perceived
in them (PHK
 25).[8]



In *De Motu*, Berkeley also argues for the causal passivity of
bodies in a more traditional manner, where he does not rely on his
views about the nature of physical objects as collections of
ideas:



> 
> 
> Today indeed Cartesian philosophers recognize God as the principle of
> natural motions. And Newton everywhere frankly intimates that not only
> did motion originate from God, but that still the mundane system is
> moved by the same action. This is agreeable to Holy Scripture; this is
> approved by the opinion of the Schoolmen; for though the Peripatetics
> tell us that nature is the principle of motion and rest, yet they
> interpret *natura naturans* to be God. They understand of
> course that all the bodies of this mundane system are moved by
> Almighty Mind according to a settled and unchanging plan. (*De
> Motu* 32)
> 
> 
> 
> Modern thinkers consider motion and rest in bodies as two states of
> existence in either of which every body, without pressure from
> external force, would naturally remain passive; whence one might
> gather that the cause of the existence of bodies is also the cause of
> their motion and rest. For no other cause of the successive existence
> of the body in different parts of space should be sought, it would
> seem, than that cause whence is derived the successive existence of
> the same body in different parts of time. (*De Motu* 34)
> 
> 
> 



Here Berkeley seems to be arguing that the proper understanding of how
God relates to bodies and their motion would naturally lead us to
conclude that all bodies are causally passive. The passive nature of
bodies in this argument does not depend on their status as collections
of ideas, but rather follows from the fact that the cause of the
existence of bodies is identical to the cause of the motion and rest
of bodies, namely, God. In the background appears to be the widely
held theological principle that "conservation is but continuous
creation", which, as we shall see, was most forcefully presented
by Malebranche.



How then would Berkeley account for the apparent interaction between
physical objects we common experience, such as the stove in my kitchen
boiling a pot of water? According to Berkeley, this phenomenon is to
be understood as God causing the relevant sensations in us in a
regular fashion, and this regularity underwrites what we typically
take to be the laws of nature (PHK
 30).[9]
 Thus, within the domain of physical objects, Berkeley appears to
think that God is the unique genuine cause, consistent with our
characterization of occasionalism. There has been, however, some
controversy in recent secondary literature as to whether one's
own body is to be included in this domain of physical objects. Some
(such as McDonough 2008) have argued against this inclusion, while
others (such as Lee 2012) have argued that we, as finite spirits, have
no genuine causal input in the movement of our own bodies, and such
movement is directly caused by God like any other physical object for
 Berkeley.[10]




Despite this clear occasionalist stance toward physical objects,
Berkeley, as has been pointed out, firmly maintains that spirits, both
infinite and finite, are causally active. The affirmation of the
causal efficacy of finite spirits or minds like us raises questions
about consistency, since the "conservation is but continuous
creation" principle, which seems to be doing the work in
Berkeley's occasionalist claims in *De Motu*, is
typically thought to be applicable universally, without discriminating
between minds and bodies.
 [11]


## 2. Occasionalism in Context



Before examining the actual arguments for occasionalism, it might be
helpful to compare and contrast occasionalism with alternative,
competing accounts of causation that aim to address similar issues and
concerns. The comparison can be done in two ways, since occasionalism
can be seen as dealing with two distinct sets of issues concerning
causation.


### 2.1 Cartesian Interactionism, Pre-established Harmony, and Occasionalism



One way to view occasionalism is to see it as one of three possible
responses to the aforementioned problem of mind-body interaction. The
other two responses would be "Cartesian interactionism"
and Leibniz's "pre-established harmony."



Faced with the issue of accounting for the apparent phenomena of
mind-body interaction, those who subscribed to "Cartesian
interactionism" (following Williams 1978, 287; Williams actually
describes the situation as a "scandal") held that the
causal interaction is not merely apparent but real. In other words,
changes in the body and mind really bring about changes in each other.
But many found this position deeply unsatisfying. Some raised
questions about whether it was intelligible that such radically
distinct substances with nothing in common causally interacted, and
others questioned whether such a view was consistent with the view
that was gaining popularity, namely, that the material universe is
causally closed and governed solely by physical laws of nature.
Whether or not Descartes actually held this interactionist position
is, as discussed earlier, a matter of controversy, but even in
Descartes' time the list of the critics of interactionism was a
long one.



Occasionalism and pre-established harmony emerged as alternatives to
the model of interactionism, in rejecting that there is genuine causal
interaction. In fact, their denial of real causal interaction among
distinct finite substances is not limited to mind-body interaction but
applies across all board, be it body-body or mind-body causation. In
other words, both views can be said to deny all
*inter*-substantial causation, where by "substance"
we refer to finite substances or
 creatures.[12]
 However, occasionalism and pre-established parted ways when it came
to the question of *intra*-substantial causation--that is,
whether or not there is causal activity going on *within* the
substances such that finite substances are active in causing their own
states. Leibniz, the principal proponent of pre-established harmony,
held firm to the view that, while finite substances do not have the
causal power to bring about changes in *other* substances, they
are causally active *internally*, that is, in causing their own
states. Each creature causally contributes to the occurrence of its
own states, and the apparent interaction between distinct substances
is due to how the states of distinct substances harmonize with each
other. Following our characterization of occasionalism at the outset,
even if the relevant domain of concern is restricted to the states of
a single, individual substance, an occasionalism would have to hold
that the creature itself is not playing a genuine causal role in the
occurrence of those states. Leibniz, as a proponent of genuine
intra-substantial causal forces, would reject this claim. Malebranche,
in contrast, denied all causal powers to creatures, including the
intra-substantial powers endorsed by Leibniz. For Malebranche, even
the internal states of a creature are mere occasions for God to bring
about the relevant subsequent states.


### 2.2 Mere Conservationism, Divine Concurrentism, and Occasionalism



The other issue that occasionalism addresses is one that concerns how
divine causality relates to natural causality, or as Alfred Freddoso
has put it, "the general problem of divine action in
nature" (Freddoso 1994, 131-5). The problem, as Freddoso
notes, consists of the following questions: if God ultimately is the
first and direct cause of everything, including whatever occurs and
exists in nature, can there be any causal activity on the part of
creatures?; and if there is secondary causation, how does this causal
activity fit in with God's causal activity? In response to these
questions, historically, three positions have appeared:
"conservationism," "concurrentism," and
"occasionalism."



We might distinguish the three positions by the degree of causal
activity assigned to God and the creature respectively, when a natural
event takes place. At one end is conservationism, which keeps divine
causal involvement to a minimum. According to conservationism, while
God conserves substances with their powers in existence, when
creatures are causally active in bringing about their natural effects,
God's contribution is remote or indirect. In other words,
God's causal contribution consists in merely conserving the
being or *esse* of the creature in question along with its
power, and the causal activity of the creature is in some
straightforward sense the creature's own and not God's
(Freddoso 1991, 554). At the other end is occasionalism, where divine
causal activity is maximal and creaturely causal activity is
non-existent. For the occasionalist, divine causal activity is the
only type of genuine causality. Creatures provide at most an occasion
for God's activity, which is uniquely direct and immediate in
bringing about all effects in nature. Concurrentism (or "divine
concurrentism") can then be seen as occupying the middle ground.
Concurrentists hold that when a natural effect is produced, it is
immediately caused by *both* God *and* the creature. God
and the creature are both directly involved and "concur"
in bringing about the natural effects typically attributed to the
 creature.[13]


## 3. The Arguments for Occasionalism



In this section, we will examine in more detail the main arguments in
support of occasionalism. We will focus on the arguments provided by
Malebranche and discuss relevant versions by other occasionalists when
 appropriate.[14]


### 3.1 The Passive Nature Argument



The "passive nature" (hereafter "PN") argument
aims to establish the occasionalist conclusion for bodies--that
is, Cartesian extended substances--and only bodies, by focusing
on the characteristic features of these substances. In this respect,
the argument appears to be an instance of a "local"
argument for occasionalism in that the scope of the argument is
limited to a particular type of substance. The argument aims to
establish the occasionalist conclusion for *some* finite
substances, that is, bodies, and not all substances.



The first passages that stress the lack of activity of bodies as well
as their lack of ability to initiate movement emerge in the
*Search* (OCM II 312-3/*Search* 448), soon after
Malebranche's first statement of his occasionalist thesis. In
the *Elucidations*, mixed together with the claim that the
"motor force of bodies is but the will of God," we are
presented with the following description of bodies as being
"purely passive substances":



> 
> When I see one ball strike another, my eyes ... seem to tell me,
> that the one is truly the cause of the motion it impresses on the
> other .... But when I consult my reason I clearly see that since
> bodies cannot move themselves, and since their motor force is but the
> will of God that conserves them successively in different places,
> *they cannot communicate a power they do not have and could not
> communicate even if it were in their possession. For the mind will
> never conceive that one body, a purely passive substance, can in any
> way whatsoever transmit to another body the power transporting
> it*. (*OCM* III 208-9/*Search* 660, my
> emphasis)
> 



But why are bodies purely passive substances? The answer, according to
Malebranche, lies in our idea of extension:



> 
> Consult the idea of extension and decide by this idea which represents
> bodies ... whether they can have any property other than the
> *passive faculty* of receiving various figures and movements.
> Is it not entirely obvious that all the properties of extension can
> consist only in relations of distance? (*OCM* XII
> 150-51/*Dialogues* 106, my emphasis)
> 



The central point seems as follows: given that all the properties of
extension are exhausted by relations of distance, it would be a
category mistake, as it were, to ascribe powers to bodies. Powers or
forces are not properties that bodies can have at all, since powers do
not consist in relations of distance. That is, that something
possesses a motive force and, thus, moves a body or affects a mind
would entail that the thing in question is not a body, since there
would be more to this thing than relations of distance. The key
premise here is that causal powers or forces are not relations of
distance and, hence, not modes that bodies possess. This assumption
gets expressed more explicitly in the following argument, which
reinforces the understanding of bodily "passivity" as the
body's being constituted by relations of distance alone:



> 
> But that bodies should receive in themselves a certain power, by the
> efficacy of which they could act on the mind--this I do not
> understand. For what would this power be? Would it be a substance, or
> a modality? If a substance, then bodies will not act, but rather this
> substance in bodies. If this power is a modality, then there will be a
> modality in bodies which will be neither motion nor figure. Extension
> will be capable of having modalities other than relations of distance.
> (*OCM* XII 151/*Dialogues* 107)
> 



With the help of the commonly accepted Scholastic assumption that any
real being must either be a substance or mode, Malebranche presents a
rather clever argument that active powers have no place in bodies (see
Clatterbaugh 1999, 114-5). One might wonder what would be so bad
with the first option--that is, that of granting the existence of
a separate, distinct substance in bodies responsible for the
bodies' activity. But Malebranche's response is clear:
even if we bracket the worry of whether we could have a sufficiently
clear idea of what kind of thing this substance would be, it is
unlikely that this substance would be a Cartesian extended substance.
For it would possess modes or properties other than relations of
distance. And in discussing why the second option is going to fail, we
see the explicit statement that, though an active power perhaps could
be a mode of some *other* substance, it is not a mode that
belongs to *bodies*, since forces or powers are not relations
of
 distance.[15]



But is it obvious that powers or forces are not relations of distance?
This question along with the questions about how powers or forces
relate to the more obvious properties of extension--for instance,
size and shape--raise interesting and important questions that go
to the heart of the PN argument. The main intuitive
thrust behind Malebranche's PN argument is to convince the
reader that, if we understand the Cartesian conception of matter or
extension properly, we can see that motive force or power is neither
necessary nor sufficient for being an extended
 substance.[16]
 This view seem rather close to Descartes' original insight that
having specific spatial features and standing in particular spatial
relations to other bodies are both necessary and sufficient conditions
to be a bodily
 substance,[17]
 and Malebranche takes this to imply that whether these bodies further
possess a motive force is an issue peripheral to the basic nature of
bodies. Such a view seems to be expressed in his discussion of motion
and rest in the *Search*:



> 
> I am not considering motion and rest here according to their relative
> being: for it is obvious that bodies at rest have relations just as
> real to those around them as those in motion. I conceive only that
> bodies in motion have a motor force, and that those at rest have no
> force for their state of rest, because the relation of moving bodies
> to those around them is always changing; and therefore there has to be
> a continuous force producing these continuous changes, for in effect
> it is these changes which cause everything new that happens in nature.
> But there need be no force to make nothing happen. When the relation
> of a body to those around it is always the same, nothing happens; and
> the preservation of this relation, I mean the action of God's
> will that preserves this relation, is no different from what preserves
> the body itself. (*OCM* II 431-32/*Search* 517)
> 



Here we get the impression that Malebranche is thinking that motive
force is something additional or added on, as it were, to bodies, and
that, in this respect, there is a fundamental difference between the
two modes of motion and rest. In other words, whatever causal
contribution is needed on the part of God to bring bodies into
existence, there needs to be an additional causal contribution on the
part of God in the form of a motive force to bring about changes in
relations of distance, which occur when bodies are moved. It is as if
the default mode of existence for extended substances is to be at
rest, and motive force is added on through another divine volition,
one that is distinct from the volition that brings the body into
existence in the first
 place.[18]
 If so, this understanding of motion and rest fits well with the PN
argument: motive force is not essential to extension because motive
force is not only not a relation of distance but rather some
additional feature that is added on to bodies, which are by default at
rest and passive.



We end this section with the observation that Malebranche's
views on motion and rest just discussed seems to be at odds with one
of his global arguments for occasionalism, in particular, the
"conservation is but continuous creation" argument
(hereafter referred to the "CCC" argument). For the CCC
argument strongly suggests a symmetry between God's act of
continuously creating a body at rest and continuously creating a body
in motion, since the latter is described as differing from the former
only in that, in the latter case, God continuously creates the body in
*different* locations over time.


### 3.2 The No Knowledge Argument



The "no knowledge" (hereafter "NK") argument
aims to secure the occasionalist conclusion by presenting an
intriguing, if controversial, epistemic condition on causal
 agency.[19]
 As noted earlier, Geulincx had argued that "you are not the
cause of that which you do not know how to bring about"
(*MV* 2 150-1). Malebranche presents his version of the
argument in numerous places, including the following passage from the
*Elucidations*, where he denies that our minds are true causes,
based on our lack of knowledge of the intended effects:



> 
> But I deny that my will is the true cause of my arm's movement,
> of my mind's ideas, and of other things accompanying my
> volitions, for I see no relation whatever between such different
> things. I even see clearly that there can be no relation between the
> volition I have to move my arm and the agitation of the animal
> spirits, i.e., of certain tiny bodies whose motion and figure I do not
> know and which choose certain nerve canals from a million others I do
> not know in order to cause in me the motion I desire through an
> infinity of movements I do not desire. (*OCM* III
> 226/*Search* 669)
> 



Though not explicitly stated, many commentators have read Malebranche
as endorsing, in places such as this passage, the claim that the agent
must know *how* to bring about the effect in order to be its
cause.



This "knowledge principle" (hereafter "KP")
raises a number of questions. One question concerns the scope of its
applicability. For the principle to be plausible, it might be thought,
one ought to restrict it to intelligent, volitional agents. As long as
we accept the traditional conception of the will as being
"blind" on its own and dependent on the guidance of the
intellect, we might think that there is something to be said for the
claim that we can only bring about what we know. That is, bringing
about a volitional effect seems to presuppose our intending the
effect, and we seem to intend only what we, through our intellect,
actually represent or know. While most commentators seem to favor
reading Malebranche as restricting the knowledge principle to minds,
there is, as Steven Nadler has argued, at least one passage that seems
to suggest that Malebranche is endorsing the wide scope applicability
of KP (*Conversations Chretiennes*, OCM 4:15-6).
And, as Nadler has also pointed out, Geulincx and some Islamic
occasionalists indeed pressed the view that the principle applies
ubiquitously to all cases of genuine efficacy (Nadler 1999,
263-74).



If Geulincx and Al-Ghazali (and, arguably, even Malebranche)
did hold KP to be applicable to chairs and rocks as well as thinking
substances, our next question then is why they would hold such a
counter-intuitive view. Nadler has made the interesting suggestion
that the wide-scope application of KP could have been motivated by the
view that takes "volitional agency to be *the* paradigm
of causality" (Nadler 1999, 270). Why take volitional agency to
be paradigmatic? According to Nadler, the critical link is divine
causal activity, which was the paradigmatic case of causality for the
occasionalists in question. For if we take God's causal activity
to be fundamentally intentional and volitional in character, then it
seems indeed a short step to taking volitional agency to be also
paradigmatic of causality.



That the occasionalist would take divine causality to be the paradigm
case, of course, is no surprise, and this might indeed explain why
Geulincx and Al-Ghazali held the wide-scope view. For, if
they further assumed that all cases of genuine causation resemble the
paradigmatic case of causation in this way, then insofar as KP is a
critical feature of divine causality, they would think that KP should
be satisfied in all cases of creaturely causation. This last
assumption, however, is not trivial. For one wonders whether
creaturely causation ought to resemble divine causation in this
respect. Consider the fact that not all the features of the
paradigmatic divine substance are replicated in created substances.
For instance, knowledge and intentionality are key divine features
that are not present in bodily substances. But this absence does not
prevent extended substances from being the substances they are. But if
knowledge and intentionality are not necessary for substancehood, as
is the case for bodies, we might wonder whether they are necessary for
causal activity in bodies.



The second question about KP concerns the plausibility of the
principle itself. Even if we just consider the best case
scenarios--that is, when its application is restricted to
thinking substances--it is not obvious that KP is without
problems. As mentioned earlier, on the assumption that volitional
power is blind, the requirement that the intentional agent possess
some degree of knowledge of the effect does not seem completely
implausible in and of itself. The key issue, however, concerns the
level of detail in the description of the intended outcome that is
required for KP to be satisfied. For instance, returning to
Malebranche's example, when I intentionally will to raise my
arm, I do seem to represent the outcome of my arm going up, insofar as
the description of this outcome is left at a fairly general level. It
is obvious, however, that I do not have knowledge of the outcome, if
the description of the outcome is at the level of detail that
Malebranche wants it to be, such that it would involve the movements
of the minute components of my arm, such as the minute organic matter
making up the muscle, nerves, bones, etc. So depending on the level of
description, one might think that I do satisfy KP. For the NK argument
to work, then, Malebranche has to restrict the description of outcomes
in KP to the highest level of detail. And it is not clear that
Malebranche can provide non-question begging reasons to support this
restriction.


### 3.3 The "No Necessary Connection" (NNC) Argument



As noted earlier, the criticism of positing necessary 
 connections[20]
 between creaturely powers and their effects first emerges in the work
of al-Ghazali. In the "Seventeenth Discussion"
of *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, al-Ghazali
writes:



> 
> The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and
> what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary,
> according to us. But [with] any two things, where "this"
> is not "that" and "that" is not
> "this," and where neither the affirmation of the one
> entails the affirmation of the other nor the negation of the one
> entails the negation of the other, it is not a necessity of the
> existence of the one that the other should exist, and it is not a
> necessity of the nonexistence of the one that the other should not
> exist--for example, the quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety
> and eating, burning and contact with fire, light and the appearance of
> the sun, death and decapitation, healing and the drinking of medicine,
> the purging of the bowels and the using of a purgative, and so on to
> [include] all [that is] observable among connected things in medicine,
> astronomy, arts, and crafts. Their connection is due to the prior
> decree of God, who creates them side by side, not to its being
> necessary in itself, incapable of separation. On the contrary, it is
> within [divine] power to create satiety without eating, to create
> death without decapitation, to continue life after decapitation, and
> so on to all connected things. The philosophers denied the possibility
> of [this] and claimed it to be impossible. (*TF* 170)
> 



Al-Ghazali's target is the "Aristotelian
philosopher", exemplified by Avicenna, who affirms strict causal
necessitation relations between creaturely causes and their effects. A
central motivation behind this criticism is to secure the possibility
of miracles reported in the Qur'an and the prophetic
traditions that were considered impossible by these philosophers
oriented towards "Aristotelianism" (*TF* 166; cf.
Marmura 2005, 146).



According to al-Ghazali, the proper understanding of divine
omnipotence dictates that no limitation on divine power is justified,
unless the state of affairs impermeable to divine power is one that is
logically inconsistent. In other words, it is within divine power to
bring about any state of affairs except for those that are logically
inconsistent--for instance, where I both exist and not exist:



> 
> The impossible is not within the power [of being enacted]. The
> impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it,
> affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or
> affirming two things while negating one [of them]. What does not
> reduce to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within
> [divine] power. (*TF* 179)
> 



Given the examples in *TF* 170, we see that
al-Ghazali does not take the state of affairs in which, say,
a live fire does not burn a dry piece of cotton to be impossible. For,
according to al-Ghazali, there is no logical entailment
relation between the cotton coming into contact with the fire and its
burning. Hence, it is logically consistent to suppose that cotton not
burn when it comes into contact with fire.



The interesting question is how the Aristotelian philosopher would
respond to this claim. Why couldn't Avicenna simply deny that
this state of affairs is possible in that the suggestion of fire not
burning cotton indeed is logically inconsistent, given their
respective natures or essences? In other words, why couldn't the
Aristotelian philosopher contest the non-entailment claim and argue
that the essences of fire and cotton along with the event of their
coming into contact do entail the event of the cotton burning?



As we can see in the long quote from *TF* 170 and other
passages in *The Incoherence* (e.g. *TF* 1), the
operative conception of entailment for al-Ghazali appears to
that of "conceptual" entailment, where the concepts of
"fire" and "cotton" are rather sparse in terms
of content. Whatever content is contained in these concepts, they are
still sparse enough to not entail such facts as "the burning of
appropriately dry cotton that comes into contact with fire." In
other words, the causal powers typically identified as being part of
the essences of created substances, something the Aristotelian
philosophers would have found very hard to resist, are not built into
the concepts, as it were, for al-Ghazali.



In this case, the main issue of contention between
al-Ghazali and the *falasifa* would concern how
rich the contents of the concepts of creatures are. What
al-Ghazali needs is a rather thin notion of what a concept
or essence of a creature is, while the Aristotelian philosopher would
obviously argue for a richer understanding of the contents of these
concepts, one that would include various causal powers as their
essences. A key intuition driving al-Ghazali's view
seems to be that if one takes the concepts of creatures to be rich in
this way, then there is no logical space for the miraculous
intervention on the part of God. For on the Aristotelian scheme,
divine intervention such as God's keeping the cotton from
burning would imply that either God has to change the cotton into
something else at the time of
 intervention,[21]
 or that God has to done something that is logically inconsistent, or
impossible.



Neither option seems palatable to al-Ghazali, and his
innovative proposal is to distinguish between logical connections and
causal connections. On al-Ghazali's scheme, the
logically necessary constitute a much narrower set of connections than
those that are causally necessary (Dutton 2001, 24-5; Schmaltz
2008b, 299-301). This setup allows him to claim that when God
intervenes to stop a piece of dry cotton from burning, which obviously
diverges from the natural course of events, God need not change the
cotton fibers into some material that is fire-resistant, nor is he
doing something that is logically impossible. Rather, God is bringing
about a state of affairs that is perfectly consistent, hence,
possible, but one that is an exception, when compared to the normal
type of causal connections we come to expect between fire and
cotton.



But what then grounds these normal types of causal connections we
typically anticipate? If they are not grounded in the natures or
essences of things, what is their source? As we saw in the long quote
from *TF* 170, al-Ghazali not surprisingly holds that
"[t]heir connection is due to the prior decree of God, who
creates them side by side, not to its being necessary in itself,
incapable of separation." In other words, the law-like relations
that we typically think to hold between creaturely natures are
actually grounded in divine decrees.



The question of whether al-Ghazali himself is committed to
occasionalism depends on whether al-Ghazali regards this
claim that the "connection [between creatures] is due to the
prior decree of God" to be incompatible with there being real
secondary causation--that is, genuine creaturely causation. As
noted earlier, interpreters disagree on this issue. Some, such as
Marmura, argue that al-Ghazali did find the two claims to be
inconsistent, and rejects the latter claim that there are real
secondary causes. Marmura grants that the texts in the
*Incoherence* are insufficient to support this claim, but
argues that other texts well establish al-Ghazali's
commitment to occasionalism (Marmura 2005, 145-52). Other
interpreters, such as Griffel in addition to Perler and Rudolph, have
argued that al-Ghazali leaves open the possibility that
God's causal activity is consistent with some form of genuine
secondary causality, on the condition that the secondary causation in
question is not of the type espoused by the *falasifa*
(Griffel 2007; Perler & Rudolph 2000, 75-77).



We end our discussion of al-Ghazali on necessary connections
with the following observation: if al-Ghazali does consider
genuine secondary causation to be consistent with divine causal
activity, he would have to concede that there are distinct types of
causation. For al-Ghazali would have granted that the causal
connection between the decree of God and its effect is substantially
different from the causal connection between a creaturely cause and
its effect. The former type of connection would be the strongest of
all possible causal connections, since divine omnipotence would
require that for all events that are logically possible, should God
decree their occurrence, they would come about with causal necessity.
In contrast, creaturely causes obviously lack this omnipotent power,
such that whatever causal connection they have to their effects, it
cannot be, in principle, as strong as that of divine decree. So this
suggests that the strength of the causal connection would differ
substantially between divine causation and secondary causation, and
this difference might lead one to wonder these two types of causation
can be brought under a single, univocal notion of causation.



In the work of Nicolas Malebranche, to whom we now turn, we are
presented with an explicit argument denying secondary causation on the
grounds that (1) something is a true cause if and only if there is a
necessary connection between it and its effect and (2) there are
necessary connections only between the will of God and its effects.
Consider the following passage from the *Search*:



> 
> A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a
> necessary connection between it and its effect. Now the mind perceives
> a necessary connection only between the will of an infinitely perfect
> being and its effects. Therefore, it is only God who is the true cause
> and who truly has the power to move bodies. (*OCM* II
> 316/*Search* 450)
> 



Though the argument clearly is couched in terms of *perceiving*
necessary connections, the overall context makes it clear the central
point is more metaphysical in nature. Malebranche's key point
here is that there are no causally necessary connections between
alleged creaturely causes and their effects, since creaturely causes
cannot but fall short of the criterion of genuine causation, that is,
necessary
 efficaciousness.[22]



Why is it that creaturely causes cannot but fall short in this way?
According to Malebranche, this is due to the fact that God could
always will some event contrary to what the creature allegedly brings
about. For instance, Malebranche invites us to consider the case of
demons, where God wills to bring about a state of affairs contrary to
what demons will:



> 
> ... [L]et us suppose that God wills to produce the opposite of
> what some minds will, as might be thought in the case of
> demons ... that deserve this punishment. One could not say in this
> case that God would communicate His power to them, since they could do
> nothing they willed to do. (*OCM* II 316/*Search* 450)
> 



Similar to what we had seen in al-Ghazali,
Malebranche's core intuition appears to be that it is plainly
possible for a creature to fail to bring about some effect that is
typically thought to be within the purview of its causal powers. To
deny such a possibility would entail a problematic restriction on
divine omnipotence, or so Malebranche appears to be thinking. This is
not to say that Malebranche is willing to expand divine omnipotence
limitlessly, such that divine volition would have power over logical
truths, for instance. In contrast to Descartes, Malebranche was
against the doctrine of the creation of eternal truths. Certain truths
for Malebranche hold of logical necessity: those truths whose denials
are contradictory are independent of and insulated from divine
volitional intervention. In this respect, he is in agreement with
al-Ghazali. For both philosophers, divine power extends to
all and only that which is possible, that is, logically
consistent.



Once again, the interesting question is how one should think of the
natures of things, and whether the natures of things are rich enough
to have various conceptual entailments that are logically binding. An
Aristotelian realist about secondary causes would likely hold that the
natures of creatures are robustly rich such that the effects that even
an omnipotent God can bring about are restricted to the possibilities
allowed by these creaturely natures. Malebranche is denying this view
of creaturely natures, in that the options for God, as it were, are
much more diverse, and we wonder on what grounds Malebranche can argue
for this view. In the case of extended substances or bodies, a reason
that is independent of theological motivations might be available to
Malebranche in the following way: armed with a Cartesian understanding
of extended substances, Malebranche could say that given the sparse
essence of bodies, consisting of merely size, shape, and motion, there
are no conceptual entailments that follow from a concept of a given
body that are rich enough to support the typical causal connections
Aristotelians would like to affirm. That is, proper consideration of
what bodily substances are, Malebranche could argue, clearly reveal
that there are no such entailments. And, perhaps, an analogous case
can be made for thinking substances, to the effect that that a
thinking substance essentially has thoughts does not lead to any
obvious conceptual connections that would dovetail nicely with the
causal powers traditionally identified as belonging to the mind. That
is, the mere having of certain thoughts, which is the essence of the
mind, carries no implications as to what other thoughts one must have
subsequently or what other states of mind one must be in.



Not surprisingly, Malebranche also has some theologically motivated
reasons for rejecting such rich conceptions of natures as well. He
appears to find the idea that divine efficient causality is bound by
natures of creatures to be rather problematic: "when one thinks
about the idea of God, i.e., of an infinitely perfect and consequently
all-powerful being, one knows that there is such a connection between
His will and the motion of all bodies, that it is impossible to
conceive that He wills a body to be moved and that this body not be
moved" (*OCM* II 313/*Search* 448). In other
words, were there a conceptually necessary connection between body A
moving body B in a particular way, then even if God were to will body
B to move in a different manner, given the assumed conceptually
necessary connection that holds between body A and body B, God's
volition would fail. But this is impossible, Malebranche is arguing,
given the proper understanding of divine omnipotence. So, for
Malebranche, the proper understanding of divine omnipotence dictates
the absence of conceptual entailments that determine specific
movements. 



Interestingly enough, from this claim concerning the necessary
efficaciousness of divine volition, Malebranche immediately infers
"[w]e must therefore say that only His will can move bodies if
we wish to state things as we conceive them and not as we sense
them" (*OCM* II 313/*Search* 448). This is a
problematic move, as we have already seen in our discussion of
al-Ghazali. For to accept that divine power is unique in its
necessary efficaciousness need not itself imply that God is the only
cause. Many a theist would grant that creaturely causes lack necessary
efficaciousness on the very grounds that Malebranche had presented,
but still argue that this does not mean that they lack causal powers.
Divine concurrentists, for instance, typically argue that all
secondary causation requires divine concurrence, such that the
creature's powers in themselves are never sufficient to bring
about an effect, and that God's power is such that he could
always override the causal contribution of the creature and bring
about a contrary effect. Despite such concessions, divine
concurrentists nonetheless affirm the causal activity of the creature
in producing the effect when the effect is concurrently produced. What
Malebranche needs to establish, then, is the claim that causation just
is necessary efficaciousness, and the pressing question for
Malebranche is how he can defend this claim.



In the *Search* at least, Malebranche seems to be thinking that
the divine intervention cases provide us with a reason to think that
it is God who does all the causal work. For when God intervenes to
bring about an effect contrary to what the demon wills, it is clear
that God is the unique cause of the event. So parity of reasoning
suggests, or so Malebranche seems to be thinking, that in the normal
case in which I will my arm to go up and it does go up, it is also God
who alone brings about my arm going up. But this argument is far from
convincing, since it does not follow from the fact that my power can
be overridden in certain circumstances, that I am powerless
*simpliciter*. We still need to consider cases when my power is
not overridden, and it seems clear that the fact that I successfully
pushed the door shut when my five year old son pulled to open it does
not entail that when my son is successful in opening the door with my
help, my son is causally ineffective.



In fairness to Malebranche, we might point out that, in identifying
necessary connections with genuine causality, Malebranche is
presenting an attractive reductive analysis of causation, one that we,
benefitting from the exposure to David Hume's work, are already
familiar with. In fact, it does not seem far-fetched to say that it is
in part due to Hume that we are accustomed to such a clear-cut
understanding of causation as necessary connection. But note that the
intellectual climate of Malebranche's time period was rather
different: philosophers were trying to come to grips with the
complicated task of understanding the nature of causality given the
new scientific developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Moreover, this endeavor took place against the backdrop of
the traditional approaches to causation, involving the confusing
myriad of the four Aristotelian causes. Compared to the Aristotelian
conception, Malebranche's conception of causation is remarkably
simple and unified, and does not face the question of how such diverse
and distinct types of Aristotelian causes can come under a single
conception of causation. Furthermore, there is some evidence that
Malebranche might have responded to our challenge to produce a better
argument for this conception of causation as necessary connections by
noting how difficult it is to imagine what causation would be if not
necessary connections, in much the same way that Hume did. That is,
given his statement in the *Search* that "[a] true cause
*as I understand it* [*c'est ainsi que je
l'etends*] is one such that the mind perceives a necessary
connection between it and its effect" (*Search* 450, my
emphasis), Malebranche might have had something close to the Humean
idea in mind*--*though not developed as clearly and
emphatically as in Hume*--*that we have no conception of
what a causal connection would be, if it is not a necessary
connection. If so, this intuition could have provided a rationale for
the claim that an event is a true cause if and only if there is a
necessary connection between it and its effect. But given how
controversial such a claim is within the context of considering divine
causation in nature, one wonders whether this central claim
identifying necessary connection with causation could have been
further
 motivated.[23]


### 3.4 The "Conservation is but Continuous Creation" (CCC) Argument



The main strategy of this argument is to establish the thesis of
occasionalism by drawing out the implications of the commonly held
theological principle that "conservation is but continuous
 creation."[24]
 If the main premise of the NNC argument--that is, the premise
that genuine causation just consists in necessary
connection--would have been resisted by many concurrentists, the
strategy behind the CCC argument holds more promise in that the CCC
thesis was widely accepted by the majority of theists in our time
period, including the concurrentists. The issue of how to interpret
the CCC thesis, however, is at the center of the dispute, since
occasionalists like Malebranche deny creaturely causation
*because* they accept the CCC thesis, while concurrentists like
Leibniz affirm genuine creaturely causation *despite* upholding
the CCC thesis. 



Before proceeding further, we might briefly examine why the CCC thesis
was so broadly accepted as the orthodox view, by considering what
implications the rejection of the CCC thesis was thought to entail.
The most significant implication of rejecting the CCC thesis, from the
perspective of the proponents of the CCC thesis, is the consequence
that divine causal activity at creation is markedly different from
divine causal activity in moments of conservation, such that the
difference is sufficient to deny the identity of the two acts. Hence,
conservation is *not* continuous creation. An intuitive way of
cashing out this difference, which indeed is how "mere
conservationists" such as Durandus proceeded, is to think that
while God does everything there is to be done, causally speaking, at
the moment of creation, God does less in subsequent moments of
conservation such that God merely conserves the creatures in
existence. How is God doing less in conservation, according to the
conservationist? In moments of conservation, if the event that is
caused is a non-miraculous natural event, the *direct,
immediate* cause of this event is a creaturely cause, and not
divine. God is involved, even for the conservationist, but only in a
*mediated, indirect manner*--God works in the background,
as it were, keeping the creaturely cause in existence, allowing the
creature to exercise its causal powers in a direct, immediate fashion.
For instance, if the fire of a gas range causes the water in the
coffee pot to boil, the boiling of the water is directly and
immediately caused by the fire, even if it is fully granted that the
existence of the fire must be directly conserved by God. Thus, God, in
keeping the fire in existence, which in turn allows the fire to boil
the water directly and immediately, is mediately and remotely involved
in the boiling of the water, according to the mere conservationist.
God is *merely* conserving the fire (and water) and not
directly causing the water to boil. From our contemporary perspective,
this indirect, mediated involvement on the part of God might seem
sufficient to give divine causality its due place in nature. But the
theistic philosophers of the late Scholastic and early modern period
found this way of securing the role of divine causality theologically
insufficient and suspect. The main worry appears to have been that to
think that the dependence of creatures on God is somehow reduced, once
creation has past, fundamentally misrepresents the critical dependence
creatures have on God *throughout* their existence, be it
creation or conservation. Because in terms of creaturely dependence
conservation and creation are fundamentally the same, these
philosophers seemed to have been thinking, what other differences
there might be between conservation and creation, these differences
are negligible. It is from this perspective that the orthodox view was
to affirm the identity between conservation and
 creation.[25]




An early version of something close to the core idea behind the CCC
argument emerges in the views of al-Ash'ari (873-935), the
founder of Ash'arite school. As Perler and Rudolph have argued,
according to al-Ash'ari, God rearranges the atoms that make up
this world anew at every instant, and in so doing God continuously
creates the accidents that inhere in these atomic substances (Perler
and Rudolph 2000, 28-62). The view seems to have been one where
the accidents of a substance possess only a momentary existence.
Hence, at every instant, God brings about the accidents that inhere in
the substances by continuously recreating these modes. If God sustains
the existence of the atoms themselves, while continuously recreating
all of their modes, then, barring causal overdetermination, the
occasionalist conclusion that God is the only genuine cause does seem
to follow from this interpretation of divine conservative
activity.



On the European continent, the most artful presentation of the CCC
argument is found in Malebranche. But the argument is not thought to
have originated with Malebranche, and it has typically been traced
back to Descartes, though whether he was himself indeed an
occasionalist is some matter of controversy, as noted earlier. One of
the main texts surrounding this controversy comes from the Third
*Meditation*:



> 
> ... [I]t does not follow from the fact that I existed a little
> while ago that I must exist now, unless there is some cause which as
> it were creates me afresh at this moment--that is, which
> preserves me. For it is quite clear to anyone ... that the same
> power and action are needed to preserve anything at each individual
> moment of its duration as would be required to create that thing anew
> if it were not yet in existence. Hence the distinction between
> preservation and creation is only a conceptual one, and this is one of
> the things that are evident by the natural light. (AT VII 49/CSM II
>  33)[26]
> 



Taken in isolation, this passage does suggest that Descartes took our
souls to be continuously created by God in a way that would preclude
any genuine causal activity on our part. For if, in initially creating
of my soul--that is, in its creation *ex nihilo*--God
brings about both the existence of my soul and its modes or
modification, then, since the "same power and action" of
God is required in preserving my existence subsequent to creation
*ab initio*, God would be the sole causal agent that brings
about my preserved existence with the modes I possess. But to conclude
on the basis of this interpretation that Descartes was an
occasionalist would be premature, since there is a good supply of
other texts that suggest Descartes' affirmation of our genuine
causal efficacy.



In contrast, Louis de la Forge's commitment to the occasionalist
thesis, at least with regard to bodies, seems unquestionable. For he
makes explicit the critical claim that God's causal activity of
producing a body is inseparable from his producing the particular
modes of the body in question:



> 
> Not only must [God] continue to produce [a body], if he wants it to
> persevere in existence; but in addition, because he cannot create it
> everywhere nor outside of any particular place, he must himself put it
> in place [*lieu*] B if he wants it there. (*TEH* 240)
> 



The central idea is that God's causal activity with regard to
the production of a body is an "all or nothing" affair, in
the sense that if God produces the body, God produces it with all of
its specific modes or properties. In other words, though God need not
create a body, as long as he does create or conserve it, he cannot do
so without bringing about its specific spatial properties or modes.
Why, we might ask, is this the case? Even if one grants that there can
be no abstract or general Cartesian body, as it were--that is, a
body that is extended in general without any specific spatial
properties or modes--such that even God could not create such a
body in the abstract, the concurrents could still wonder, why is it
the case that the cause that gives the *esse* to a given body
must also be the cause that produces its specific modes and properties
as well? It is here that the CCC thesis provides the missing link. For
if conservation is but continuous creation, in the sense that the
character and degree of dependence is identical in the two cases, then
insofar as there was total dependence at creation, there would have to
be total dependence in conservation. Occasionalism with regard to
bodies would follow. Given that God has a monopoly over producing both
the body itself and its modes, no other cause is operative in bringing
about any aspect of the world. Conservation is but continuous
creation.



At this point, we might want to consider the possibility of
overdetermination. Could we not think that some creaturely effects are
overdetermined in conservation? That is, might we not grant that God
is the total and direct cause of a creature's modes but also
hold that the creature causes its modes as well such that certain
effects are causally overdetermined? Moreover, if it is only the modes
of the creature that are overdetermined, then it seems as though there
is no violation of the central tenet that God is the unique causal
source of the *esse* that creatures have. As we have discussed
earlier, divine causal power importantly involves that of keeping the
being or *esse* of the creature in existence, and even the
conservationist grants that the role of a conserving cause--that
is, the causal power of keeping the being of creatures in
existence--is the unique prerogative of God as the *causa
secundum esse*. That is, all parties in this dispute concerning
the issue of secondary causation in nature agree, regardless of their
views about the reality of creaturely causal powers, that the being or
*esse* of a creature when the creature is conserved is just as
dependent on God as when the creature is created *ex nihilo*.
God is the unique creative and conserving cause of any being or
*esse* in this world.



The overdetermination of modes, thus, cannot be ruled out on the mere
grounds that such overdetermination involves a malignant type of
causal overreach on the part of creatures, overflowing into the
exclusive divine realm of providing *esse*. For the proponents
of overdetermination are taking the creaturely power to be restricted
to that of bringing about a creature's modes. The creature
therefore would not share in the power of the *causa secundum
esse*, and what power the creature would have to produce modes or
modifications would be effective only insofar as the creature's
being or *esse* has been produced by God. Hence, the critical
dependence of the creature's *esse* or being on God is
maintained. It is in this sense that cases of overdetermination of
modes might present a noteworthy challenge to the advocates of
occasionalism arguing on the basis of the CCC thesis.



But this is not to say that the occasionalist is left without possible
responses to this challenge. First of all, the occasionalists might
suggest that such overdetermination implies that God is engaging in
needlessly redundant causal behavior. Not only would God be producing
the modes himself but he would also be producing the causal power of
the creature that is an overdetermining cause of these modes. And the
occasionalist could go on to argue that such redundancy is
problematic. Second, and more importantly, if a core intuition behind
the CCC thesis, as pointed out earlier, is the point that a
creature's dependence on God when it is conserved is no less
than when it is initially created *ex nihilo*, then we might
think that the overdetermination of an effect in conservation
conflicts with this symmetric dependency. For if some effects are
overdetermined in conservation, then with regard to those effects of
the creature, the creature's dependence is in some significant
sense less than in creation, since the effects would come about even
if the mode-producing causal activity of God were absent. The fact
that the occurrence of these effects is causally guaranteed through
overdetermination--particularly in virtue of the creature's
productive power--could be thought to be inconsistent with the
radical dependence of creatures expressed in the doctrine of creation
*ex nihilo*. A different way to put the point would be to argue
that the view that allows for overdetermination in the production of
modes would come dangerously close to mere conservationism in that the
creaturely cause on the overdetermination view is capable of directly
and immediately bringing about the mode in question. For the
overdetermination scenario suggests that even if God were not to
produce the mode directly, the mode would come about from the
creature's power in virtue of God conserving the creature with
its power. Thus, insofar as the creature is an overdetermining cause,
its causal power, in effect, is of a type that is typically endorsed
by
 conservationists.[27]
 Though neither La Forge nor Malebranche directly address the
possibility of overdetermination, the following passage from La Forge
seems to support the view that this intuition about the symmetry of
dependence is indeed part of his motivation behind his endorsement of
the CCC thesis:



> 
> It was necessary for [God] to employ his omnipotent power in order to
> bring all of Nature out of nothing. ... It would all return to
> nothing if God ceased bringing it out of nothing at each moment that
> he conserves
>  it.[28]
> 



As we have seen, the success of the CCC argument relies heavily on the
claim that the act of creation *ex nihilo* and the act of
conservation are indistinguishable in terms of both the dependence of
the creature on God and the role and content of divine causal
activity. That is, the two acts are qualitatively identical in terms
of what God is doing, causally speaking. Malebranche reinforces this
claim in his *Dialogues* by emphasizing that God's causal
activity of sustaining the being or *esse* of a creature and
his causal activity of bringing about the modes of a creature cannot
come apart:



> 
> Creation does not pass, because the conservation of creatures
> is--on the part of God--simply a continuous creation, a
> single volition subsisting and operating continuously. Now, God can
> neither conceive nor consequently will that a body exist nowhere, nor
> that it does not stand in certain relations of distance to other
> bodies. Thus, God cannot will that this armchair exist, and by this
> volition create or conserve it, without situating it here, there, or
> elsewhere. ... Now it is a contradiction that God wills this
> armchair to exist, unless He wills it to exist somewhere and unless,
> by the efficacy of His will, He puts it there, conserves it there,
> creates it there. (*OCM* XII 160/ *Dialogues*
> 115-6)
> 



Malebranche here is assuming that in the case of creation *ex
nihilo* God is the cause of not only the being or *esse* of
a creature but also its modes--presumably because no other
possible cause actually exists prior to the act of creation *ex
nihilo.* So by taking God's conserving activity to be
qualitatively identical to his activity as creator *ex nihilo*,
Malebranche appears to arguing that even in cases where the creatures
are conserved, God is the unique cause of both their *esse* and
modes. Since the modes of a creature cannot in principle have been
causally overdetermined in the case of creation *ex
nihilo*--for creation *ex nihilo* suggests that no
cause exists prior to the act of creation--if the
creature's dependence on God in instances of conservation is
identical to the instance of creation *ex nihilo*, then there
can be no overdetermination in the production of modes in cases of
conservation. Now the concurrentist might reply at this point that
concurrentists deny overdetermining creaturely causes as well, since
their point is that the creature is a *concurring* cause of the
modes of the creature: the causal contribution of neither God nor the
creature are redundant, since both are necessary in some manner. But
notice that if it is indeed the case that the act of creation *ex
nihilo* should be understood to imply that God is the unique cause
of both the *esse* and modes of the creature, and if
conservation is qualitatively identical to continuous creation *ex
nihilo* in causally relevant respects, then the concurrentist
would have to either reject the CCC thesis or suggest a different
account of what is going on at creation *ex
 nihilo*.[29]
 For if this way of understanding continuous creation rules out
overdetermining causes, it also rules out concurring causes. 



However, some have suggested that identifying conservation with
creation *ex nihilo* this closely effectively pushes us to
regard conservation as continuous *recreation*, where the
creature that is supposedly "conserved" falls out of
existence instantaneously before it is repeatedly
 *recreated*.[30]
 Interestingly, this "continuous recreation" reading seems
well-motivated from the occasionalist perspective. If one wants to
enforce a strict identity between conservation and creation, why not
go all out and take conservation to be recreation *ex nihilo*,
in which case the absence of any cause other than God will be
guaranteed, thereby automatically securing the occasionalist thesis?
On this reading as continuous recreation, conservation is in fact the
continuous resuscitation of the creature from the void of
non-existence, into which the creature is thrust instantaneously after
its momentary existence. Some, such as Winkler, have suggested that
the continuous recreation reading of the CCC thesis would indeed do
the work of establishing occasionalism, since at every moment of
conservation, there would literally be no creature around, as it were,
to cooperate as a concurring
 cause."[31]
 Continuous creation as recreation, however, raises a number of
concerns, including the question of whether the transtemporal identity
of creatures can be maintained. For, on the recreation model, the
previous creature *ex hypothesi* goes out of existence, and
another one is created anew and the two would then seem to be
numerically distinct. 



Perhaps more serious is the following type of challenge by the
concurrentist. The concurrentist at this point might protest and
question whether and why the identity of conservation and creation
need be taken in this manner. Given that the concurrentist wishes to
maintain theological orthodoxy and endorse the CCC thesis as well, the
concurrentist might suggest that an alternative understanding of the
identity between creation and conservation is available in the
following manner: to say that conservation is but continuous creation
just is to say that the act of creation and conservation is but a
numerically single act on the part of God, and thus it need not be the
case that what God does, causally speaking, remains qualitatively the
same throughout this one, continuous act. For example, one might take
a single, continuous walk during which the pace is at times brisk, at
times leisurely, but such difference in terms of exertion throughout
the walk does not split the walk into two distinct
 acts.[32]
 On such a model, the concurrentist could argue that she also agrees
that conservation is continuous with creation and thus conservation
and creation comprise a single, identical act, but the affirmation of
the CCC thesis, cashed out in this way, need not imply that there is
no creaturely contribution in moments of conservation. God, on this
"continuous maintenance" reading (Winkler 2011, 301)
maintains the creature throughout its existence in a single, unified
act, but what God does at the initial point of creation differs from
what God does when he merely conserves the creature. Note that this
"continuous maintenance" reading targets not only the
"continuous recreation" reading but "qualitative
identity" reading as well. For the latter two readings share the
intuition that the identity in question is one in which divine causal
contribution be thought to be qualitatively the same, regardless of
whether it be in the form of recreation or not. 



The dialectic then at this point can be understood as a debate between
two fundamentally different readings of the CCC thesis. On the one
hand, there are those, like Malebranche, who take the CCC thesis as a
premise toward occasionalism in that the identity in question is one
of qualitative identity in the sense that what God does causally
speaking at creation *ex nihilo* is the same as what God does
in conservation--let's call this the "qualitative
identity" reading. On the other hand, there are who read the
identity as a mere numerical identity, wherein God continuously
maintains the creature throughout its existence, but what God does
qualitatively at creation is different from what God does in
conservation. God does less in conservation than at creation, but the
acts comprise one continuous whole--let's call this the
"numerical identity" reading. If the numerical identity
reading was more comfortable to those divine concurrents who wanted to
both endorse the CCC thesis *and* allow for genuine causation
at the creaturely level, one might think that the contribution of
occasionalists like La Forge and Malebranche to the debate was to
presenting a strong case as to why the qualitative identity reading
ought to be preferred as the correct interpretation of the CCC thesis.
Here actually is Malebranche pressing precisely this case:



> 
> "The moment of creation has passed!" But if this moment
> does not pass, then you are in a spot, and will have to yield.
> Therefore take note. God wills that a certain kind of world exist. His
> will is omnipotent, and this world is thus created. Let God no longer
> will there to be a world, and it is thereby annihilated. For the world
> assuredly depends on the will of the creator. If the world subsists,
> it is because God continues to will its existence. Thus, the
> conservation of creatures is, on the part of God, nothing but their
> continued creation. I say on the part of God who acts. For on the part
> of creatures there appears to be a difference, since by the act of
> creation they pass from nothingness to being, whereas by the act of
> conservation they continue to be. But in essence the act of creation
> does not cease, *because in God creation and conservation are but a
> single volition which, consequently, is necessarily followed by the
> same effects.* (*Dialogues* 112, my emphasis)
> 



Note in the last sentence that the identity of the volition is cashed
out in terms of the identity of the effects, which supports the view
that for Malebranche, the proper reading of the CCC thesis is the
qualitative identity reading. For the numerical identity reading
entails that God's effect in conservation ought to be
distinguished from God's effect at creation in that God does
less in conservation than creation.



Lastly, we note that, while La Forge appears to have limited his
occasionalism to extended substances and held that we as minds are
causally active in producing our ideas (*TEH* 166), Malebranche
extends his occasionalism to thinking substances. Consider the
following passage from the *Treatise on Ethics* (1684):



> 
> Glory and Honor belong to God alone. Toward Him alone, all the
> movements of all minds ought to tend, because only in Him does power
> reside. All willing by creatures is *inefficacious in itself. Only
> He who gives being could be able to give the ways of being, since the
> ways of being are nothing but beings themselves, in this or that
> fashio*n. Nothing is more evident to one who knows how to consult
> the inner truth. For what is more evident than that if God, for
> example, keeps a body always in one place, then no creature could move
> it to another? Or that no man could even move his own arm unless God
> wills to concur in doing that which ungrateful and stupid man thinks
> he is doing by himself? And the same goes for the ways of being of
> minds. If God keeps or creates the soul in a way of being which
> afflicts it, such as with pain, no mind can deliver itself therefrom,
> nor make itself to feel pleasure thereby, unless God concurs with it
> to carry out its desires. (*OCM* XI 160/*TE* 147, my
> emphasis)
> 



Here we get something close to a generalized version of the key claim
of the CCC argument in the *Dialogues* that God cannot will
that an extended substance exist, "without at the same time
willing that it exist either here or there and without His will
placing it somewhere" (*OCM* XII 156/*Dialogues*
110): only he who gives being could be able to give the ways of being.
And, importantly, this principle is said to be applicable to the
"ways of being of
 minds."[33]
 In effect, we are presented with an explicit denial of the
possibility that God's sustaining activity of the being or
*esse* of a creature can be separated from his activity of
bringing about the modes of the creature, regardless of whether the
creature is an extended or thinking substance. Hence, the CCC argument
seems to be fully applicable to the modes or ways of the being of the
minds, just like bodies.



Malebranche's extension of the thesis of occasionalism to
thinking substances, as presented here in the *Treatise on
Ethics*, is not an aberration. In one of his most careful
statements about how minds relate to his occasionalism, Malebranche
claims as follows:



> 
> I agree that God is the sole author of all substances and of all their
> modes, that He is the author of all beings: not only of all bodies but
> of all minds. But be careful: I understand by a *mode* of a
> substance only that which cannot change without there being some real
> or physical change in the substance of which it is the mode. ...
> Once again, I agree that God is the sole efficacious cause of all the
> real changes that take place in the world (*Premotion
> Physique*, OC XVI 40; the translation is from Kremer 2000,
> 210-11).
> 



Here, once again, we get an explicit statement that God is the sole
author of all substances and their modes. Note, however, that
Malebranche is careful to specify what he means by a
"mode" of a substance. This clarification is motivated by
the attempt to make room for a kind of power within minds or thinking
substances that will allow for the attribution of freedom and moral
responsibility to them. This power of consent or withholding of
consent is further developed in the following:



> 
> There are in the soul two different powers or activities. The first is
> properly only the action of God ... [who] continually creates the
> soul with the invincible desire to be happy, or continually moves it
> toward the good in general. But the second ... which is the
> essence of freedom, is ... very different from the first. It
> consists in a true power, not to produce, by its own efficacy, new
> modifications in itself, that is, new interesting perceptions or new
> movements in the will, but ... a true power of the soul to
> suspend or to give its consent to the movements that follow naturally
> upon interesting perceptions. (*OCM* XVI 46-7; the
> translation is from Kremer 2000, 1999)
> 



Interestingly enough, this power of the soul is described as not being
a power that produces modifications, which is an expression
of Malebranche's attempt to reconcile the positing of such
powers in minds with his occasionalism about minds. That is, insofar
as all powers that bring about changes in modes are in God, and merely
non-modal powers are in the creature, then Malebranche seems to be
thinking that such non-modal powers of creatures are consistent with
his occasionalism. This, however, raises the question of whether such
non-modal powers are robust enough to anchor the free will and moral
responsibility of thinking
 substances.[34]



If we bracket the issue of how to render a full-blown occasionalism
with a sufficiently robust account of free will, then, as we have
hopefully seen, the CCC argument is a fairly powerful argument as an
argument for global occasionalism.


## 4. Occasions and Occasional Causation



We end with a brief look at what " occasional causes" are
and how occasionalists understand "occasional
 causation."[35]
 As we saw at the beginning of this entry, an occasionalist is someone
who, within a relevant domain, denies that creaturely causes are
genuine causes and holds that the unique genuine cause is God. This
denial of the causal efficacy of creatures, however, is consistent
with the recognition that some creaturely events and their types stand
in peculiar relations, noteworthy enough to deserve a special status
in the causal story of the world. Most prominent, particularly to
those interested in causation, are the robust regularities found in
the world, the very regularities that initiated our interest in causal
connections in the first place. These regularities are of interest to
the occasionalist as well, and it is for these regularities that the
occasionalist employs the notion of occasional causes. Here is how
Malebranche describes them: 



> 
> A natural cause is therefore not a real and true cause but only an
> occasional cause, which determines the Author of nature to act in such
> and such a manner in such and such a situation.(*Search* 448)
> 



An occasional cause here is described as determining God "to act
in such and such a manner in such and such a situation." The
central idea is that when an event of a certain type occurs, a
distinct event of a different type is brought about by divine
volition, such that a regular, law-like relation holds between two
types of events, each exemplified by the occasional cause and its
effect respectively. A common misunderstanding about occasionalism is
that if it is divine causality that anchors what occurs in the world,
such grounding of natural events will render their occurrences rather
irregular and haphazard. Perhaps it is the unpredictability of our own
volitional activity that precipitates this assumption that volitions
do not provide stable foundations for regularity. As we seen above,
however, occasionalists accept the regularity of natural events as
much as any realist about creaturely powers. The link that allows
occasionalists to endorse regularity while grounding such regularity
in divine volitions is their view that the divine volitions in
question have a stable, law-like structure, thus being general in
character. Here again is Malebranche:



> 
> God acts by general volition, when he acts in consequence of general
> laws that he has established. For example, I say that God acts in me
> by general volitions when he makes me feel pain when I am pricked [by
> a pin], because, in consequence of the general and efficacious laws of
> the union of soul and body that he has established, he makes me suffer
> pain when my body is ill-disposed. I say, on the contrary, that God
> acts by particular volitions when the efficacy of his will is not
> determined by some general law to produce some effect-- thus,
> supposing that a body begins to move without being pushed by another,
> or without changes in the will of some mind, or without some other
> creature who determines the efficacy of some general law; I say that
> God would move this body by a particular volition. (*OCM* V
> 147-48 /*TNG* 195)
> 



When my body is injured, I subsequently feel pain. This pain,
according to Malebranche, is due to the "general and efficacious
law of the union of soul and body" that God has established,
and, thus, this injury is the occasional cause of the pain I feel.
Occasional causes, as noted earlier, are just those events of a
certain type on the occurrence of which God wills to be bring about an
instance of distinct, yet commonly conjoined, event type, such that
these two types of events are naturally correlated with robust
regularity. In fact, on the occasionalist scheme almost every event
that occurs in our world will turn out to be both an occasional cause
and effect in that it will be part of the vast network of regularities
that we observe. That is, any given effect that follows from an
occasional cause will, in turn, most likely be the occasional cause
for the following, subsequent effect. Thus, even on the occasionalist
picture, there are hardly any events that fail to be part of this
network of causal regularities, and such regularity is possible
because the overwhelming majority of events in the world are guided by
God's general volitions, which are determined by general laws that
have been established by God. Note that this last
qualification--that the general laws themselves are established
by God--marks a critical difference between an occasionalist like
Malebranche and an Aristotelian essentialist about creaturely causal
powers. For the latter holds that certain effects follow necessarily
from the creature's causal essence, while Malebranche rejects such
causal essences and denies any such necessary connection that holds
directly between a creaturely cause and
 effect.[36]



What events are exceptions and do not fall under general volitions?
These are what the occasionalists typically identify as miraculous
events, which, for Malebranche, would be those cases wherein God acts
by particular volitions. If an event occurs without its typical
preceding occasion and in violation of the general law known to us,
then such an event we are able to judge as occurring due to God
exercising his particular volition. Returning to Malebranche's
own example, when "a body begins to move without being pushed by
another, or without changes in the will of some mind," here God
can be said to move this body by a particular volition. However, even
in such instances, it is important to note that we should not think
that God is rejecting or overpowering some built-in essences within
the creature and conjoining some event inherently foreign to them. In
fact, as we have seen, one motivation behind the occasionalist project
was to avoid this picture of God having to act against natural
tendencies in miraculous cases, a picture that occasionalist charged
the Aristotelian essentialists to be committed to. For the
occasionalists, the general laws themselves are established by God
just as the particular volitions are exercised by God, hence there is
no struggle or conflict between divine volition and the results of
divine creation in either case. There is no need for God to overpower
his creation in cases of miraculous activity. Thus, on this
understanding of occasional causes, we can see that any occasion in
principle could be the antecedent event in God's exercise of a
particular volition, resulting in a miracle, and any antecedent event
in actual miraculous events could have been conjoined to a general
volition. Creaturely states are at most occasions in that they are
devoid of causal natures or essences. 



Given this understanding of occasional causation, occasionalism, as we
noted in the beginning, can be understood as a metaphysics of
causation that promotes a more discriminating attitude toward what are
typically taken to be causal interactions operative in this world. The
occasionalist resists a blanket, univocal understanding of these
apparent causal interactions, and argues that we distinguish two types
of relations in the world, that of genuine causation and that of
occasional causation, wherein the latter relations are ultimately and
fundamentally grounded in the former.