## 1. Life



Damaris Masham was born in 1658, the daughter of the Cambridge
Platonist, Ralph Cudworth, who was Master of Christ's College,
Cambridge. Little is known of her education, but she did have the
advantage of being born into a family with a considerable library.
However, despite the fact that her father was one of the most learned
men of his generation he did not teach her Latin or Greek. She did
apparently learn French as was deemed requisite for a gentlewoman of
the time, and she taught herself Latin, later in life, according to
the method recommended in Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning
Education*.



As a young woman, Damaris Cudworth (as she then was) was able to
escape 'the learned dullness' of Cambridge by visiting London
where she frequented the more stimulating environment of the circle of
Elizabeth Stillingfleet, whom she nicknamed 'Urgunda' in her
letters. Elizabeth Stillingfeet was the second wife of Edward
Stillingfleet, future Bishop of Worcester, who later engaged in
controversy with Locke. It was probably here, that she met her
husband, Sir Francis Masham, who was a relative of Elizabeth
Stillingfleet.



It was also in London, sometime before 1682, that she met John Locke,
probably through their mutual friend, Edward Clarke. By all accounts
Locke held her in high esteem as a philosophical mind, and she was to
be one of the earliest proponents of his philosophy. Their
acquaintance, at least in the early stages, was more than merely an
intellectual friendship. Among their earliest letters is a series of
pastoral love poems, conducted under the *noms de plume*,
Philoclea and Philander. They continued to correspond on a variety of
philosophical subjects during Locke's years in Holland. On his
return in 1688, he became guest and later permanent resident at her
home at Oates in Essex.



Her interest in philosophy was nurtured by her reading of the
Cambridge Platonists (Ralph Cudworth, Henry More and John Smith), with
whose works she was familiar by the time she met Locke. It was her
good fortune to make his acquaintance, since he certainly encouraged
her interest in philosophy. Thus, unlike most women of her time,
Damaris Cudworth had the relative advantages of a family and a
friendship that enabled her to develop her philosophical interests. On
the other hand, her marriage in 1685, to Sir Francis Masham, an Essex
squire and widower with nine children, was hardly one that enhanced
her opportunities to pursue philosophy. She had one son, Francis Cudworth
Masham. Damaris Masham's philosophical writings constitute only
a small part of her philosophical activity. Her surviving
correspondence, especially with Locke and with Leibniz show that her
interest in philosophy went far beyond what she published. Her two
books, *A Discourse Concerning the Love of God* (1696) and
*Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian
Life* (1705), were printed anonymously, and with encouragement
from Locke. She also wrote a biography of Locke which is the source of
the first printed biographies of Locke.



On the little evidence available it is impossible to establish her
early philosophical views with any certainty. Her published writings
contain clear echoes of Locke, which led to their being attributed by
some to Locke. Nonetheless her Cambridge Platonist background remains
evident, especially in the religious and ethical views which connect
both her books which are both concerned with practical ethics. While
these show that she became closer to Locke in epistemology, on ethics,
she is closer to Cudworth, especially with regard to moral
accountability, her acceptance that moral principles exist
independently as part of the nature of things, and her
anti-voluntarism. In fact her receptivity to Locke may be attributed
to her Cambridge Platonist background, reflecting the fact that there
is more common ground between Locke and the Cambridge Platonists than
is normally assumed. Areas where she is most in agreement with Locke
entail no sacrifice of Cudworthian principles, in particular her
holding that morality is founded in reason and the freedom to act,
that that the end of ethics is human happiness, and that the exercise
of virtue requires a right disposition of mind. Like both Locke and
the Cambridge Platonists she was a strong advocate of religious
toleration.


## 2. *A Discourse Concerning the Love of God*



Notwithstanding their religious-sounding titles, both of Damaris
Masham's books address philosophical issues which were topical
at the time: love, happiness and moral virtue. In both she offers an
optimistic view of human beings as rational and social creatures
motivated by the love of happiness. This "earliest and strongest
principle," consists of the enjoyment of pleasure achieved
through the regulatory exercise of reason, which directs us to the
greatest happiness.



*A Discourse Concerning the Love of God* (1696) was written in
explicit critique of John Norris, the most important English proponent
of the philosophy of Nicholas Malebranche. Norris had, in 1690,
attacked Locke in *Cursory Reflections upon a Book Call'd
Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. This may in part explain
Masham's hostility to Norris, in spite of the fact that she was
dedicatee of another book by him: *Reflections on the Conduct of
Human Life* (London, 1690). However, the immediate context for
*A Discourse* was the debate about the nature of love, which
was a theme in Norris's writings, especially his *Practical
Discourses* (1691, to which she makes direct reference), and his
correspondence with Mary Astell published as *Letters Concerning
the Love of God* (1695). Lady Masham's critique of Norris
and Astell is also aimed, indirectly, at Nicolas Malebranche. Further
in the background to it was the so-called  *Querelle du
Quietisme*, the debate on *amour pur* [pure love] between
Malebranche, Francois de Fenelon and
Jacques-Benigne Bossuet which was sparked by the mystical
writings of Madame Guyon.



Norris had taken an occasionalist position, maintaining that God is
the immediate cause of pleasure for us and is therefore the sole and
proper object of our love. Creatures are therefore merely the
occasional causes of pleasing effects in us, and our love of creatures
is inferior and secondary to our love of God. Accordingly he
distinguishes two kinds of love: love of God or benevolence and love
of creatures or concupiscence, claiming that desire only pertains to
the love of God. In response Lady Masham denies Norris's
distinction between love of God and love of creatures, insisting that
desire pertains to our love of created things. She argues that our
love of God comes not from a divinely instilled idea of God in our
minds, but from observing the world around us, whence we conclude,
rationally, that we owe love to its creator, God. Her fundamental
objection to Norris's occasionalism is that it undermines the
basis of morality because, by denigrating God's works, it
destroys the bonds of human society and the very basis of Christian
morality. In opposition to Norris, Lady Masham emphasises the
importance of practical morality, arguing that it is integral to
religious conduct.



Her affinity with Locke is most apparent in her epistemology. For
instance she argues that we derive our knowledge of God by comparing
ideas "received from Sense and Reflection" and that the
idea of God is "a Proposition containing many complex Ideas in
it; and which we are not capable of framing till we have been long
acquainted with pleasing Sensations" (*A Discourse*, p.
66). She also defines love in a Lockean manner as
"complaisance". A French translation of *A
Discourse* by Pierre Coste was published in Amsterdam in 1705, and
reviewed in Jean Le Clerc's *Bibliotheque Choisie* in the
same year. 


## 3. *Occasional Thoughts*



*Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian
Life* (1705) develops Lady Masham's views on practical
morality that she had set out in *A Discourse*. The book is
also, in part, an answer to Mary Astell's *The Christian
Religion as Professed by a Daughter of the Church* which was
published as a reply to *A Discourse Concerning the Love of
God*. In a discussion of the role of reason in religious matters
and the relationship between religion and virtuous conduct, Lady
Masham sets out to defend reasonable Christianity from Deism on the
one hand and superstition on the other. Against the Deists, Masham
insists on the importance of revelation and faith and denies that
natural religion based purely on reason is possible. On the other hand
religious belief that ignores the role of reason in religion is mere
superstition and will result in bigotry and atheism, because "an
Irrational Religion can never Rationally be conceived to come from
God" (*Occasional Thoughts*, p. 36). (In Masham's
view, Roman Catholicism, with its stress on the externals of religion
is largely superstition). For her part, Lady Masham emphasises the
moral aspect of religion, its practical application, rather than
doctrinal content. She shares Locke's view that virtuous living
is more important than religious ceremonial. Like Locke in the
*Epistola de tolerantia*, she argues that moral conduct is
central to religious practice. Accordingly she argues that morality
and religion should not be separated in religious instruction.
Furthermore, civil and religious liberties are necessary for the
exercise of virtue. 



In developing her arguments about practical morality she argues that
the exercise of virtue is grounded in civil and religious liberty.
"Freedom or Liberty of action", she insists, is "the
greatest endowment that a Created Being is capable of
heeding"(*Occasional Thoughts*, pp. 68-78). Education is
the key means to inculcate virtue. And virtue is to be learned not
through precept but by developing a rational understanding of moral
principles. Lack of education and poor education are destructive
socially, morally and spiritually, a point which she develops into a
feminist argument for the education of women. This centres on the
traditional role of mothers in the moral education of their children.
Highly critical of the limited and distorted education which girls
receive, she argues that a mother cannot give her children a
meaningful moral education if she herself is denied education.


## 4. Correspondence



Damaris Masham's correspondence is important for the insight it
gives into her philosophical interests. It is not a perfect source, as
it is far from complete. She herself preferred what she called
"rationall conversation" as a medium for philosophical
discussion. After Locke's arrival at Oates, she was able to
engage in person with visitors from Locke's otherwise male
social world of friends and associates, such as his nephew Peter King,
Anthony Collins, John Shute (later Viscount Barrington), Francis
Mercury van Helmont, Samuel Bolde, Lord Shaftesbury, Lord Peterborough
and Isaac Newton. Among these, Pierre Coste was engaged as tutor to
her son. Prior to this, letter-writing enabled her to engage with
others beyond her domestic environment. Letters also mitigated her
isolation from company at Oates after her marriage. Subsequently, the
review of her *Discourse* in Jean Le
Clerc's *Bibliotheque Choisie*, was confirmation that she
acquired a place of sorts in the international intellectual network
known as the 'Republic of Letters', which was centred on
Huguenot diaspora in the Netherlands. Her international correspondents
from this network besides Jean Le Clerc included Philip van Limborch
and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.



Damaris Masham's extant correspondence indicates a lively interest
in a range of topics, such as friendship and religious toleration. The
most philosophically important letters were those she exchanged with
Locke and Leibniz. 



The correspondence with Locke, conducted between 1682 and Locke's
taking up residence at Oates, is the largest extant group of letters
(some 45 letters survive). Most of Locke's letters to her have
been lost and many of the letters are of a personal nature. But themes
include proof of the existence of God and the role of reason in
matters of religion. Early on she defends the epistemology of the
Cambridge Platonist, John Smith, arguing that there is a
supra-rational/elevated form of knowledge accessible by a
'Higher Principle' than reason, which may nonetheless be
activated with the help of reason. Locke however, dismissed this as a
form of 'Enthusiasm'. Later she commented on the Epitome of
Locke's *Essay* which he sent her in 1688. 



Between 1704 and 1705-6, Lady Masham corresponded with Leibniz, at his
instigation, perhaps because he hoped thereby, to have contact with
Locke. This gave her the opportunity to discuss Leibniz's philosophy
with him, and for Leibniz to discuss the philosophy of her father,
Ralph Cudworth. Lady Masham knew Leibniz's philosophy only
indirectly from the *Journal des Scavans* of 1695, and
Bayle's article "Rorarius" in the first edition of
his *Dictionnaire*. She takes issue with Leibniz on a number of
points, including his theory of pre-established harmony, the nature of
substance and free will.



Her correspondence with Jean Le Clerc gives some insight into her
views on religious toleration. It also includes her defence of her
father's *True Intellectual System of the Universe*
against the critique of Cudworth by Pierre Bayle, a controversy which
was conducted by proxy through Jean Le Clerc. This is revealing in a
number of ways. It shows she was willing to disagree with Cudworth (e.g., on
the question of whether there could be such a thing as unextended
substance), whilst retaining her respect for him and being prepared to
defend him against his detractors (in this case Pierre Bayle). It also
indicates that she had not abandoned all the Platonist tenets to which
she subscribed before she met Locke.