## 1. Causal Theories of the Basing Relation



Causal theories of the basing relation hold that for a belief to be
based on a reason, the reason must cause the belief in an appropriate
way. Causal theories of the basing relation must not be confused with
causal theories of knowledge or justification. One might take a causal
theory of the basing relation to explain how one has taken into
account the reasons one possesses when forming or evaluating a belief,
regardless of whether the reason actually contributes to the
justification of the belief. Also, one might hold that a
belief's being justified requires not only being based on a good
reason, but also requires, e.g., the fulfillment of various epistemic
duties, coherence within an appropriate cognitive system, etc.



Paul Moser offers the following example of a causal theory of the
basing relation for propositional reasons (Moser, 1989, p. 157):



> 
> *S*'s believing or assenting to *P* is based on
> his justifying propositional reason *Q* =df
> *S*'s believing or assenting to *P* is causally
> sustained in a nondeviant manner by his believing or assenting to
> *Q*, and by his associating *P* and *Q*.
> 



Moser limits this account of the basing relation to instances of
inferential knowledge, unlike the more general characterization of the
basing relation given above.



A belief is causally sustained by a reason when the reason maintains
the belief, much like a rope might sustain the height and position of
a hanging plant. On Moser's account, the belief must be causally
sustained in a nondeviant manner by both the believing of or assenting
to *Q* and by the association of *P* and *Q*.



Moser defines the appropriate occurrent association relation as
follows (Moser 1989, pp. 141-142):



> 
> *S* occurrently satisfies an association relation between
> *E* and *P* =df (i) *S* has a *de
> re* awareness of *E*'s supporting *P*, and
> (ii) as a nondeviant result of this awareness, *S* is in a
> dispositional state whereby if he were to focus his attention only on
> his evidence for *P* (while all else remained the same), he
> would focus his attention on *E*.
> 



The association relation may also be non-occurrent and the belief
still justified by the reason in question. In this case, condition (i)
will have been satisfied in the past and the dispositional state
described in condition (ii) will still be present. The "*de
re* awareness" is a non-propositional, direct awareness of
*E*'s supporting *P*. This is the sort of
awareness one might have of being thirsty or cold before thinking
"I'm thirsty" or "I'm cold". This
awareness is non-propositional in that you need not put it into words
in order to have it, and it is direct in the sense that no sensation
state (mental image, sense datum) need come between being thirsty and
being aware of one's thirst. By contrast, some have held that,
for example, our awareness that there is a table in the room is
indirect in that it is mediated by a sensation state (mental image,
sense-datum) which represents the table.



In addition to Moser's theory, there are a variety of other
possible causal theories of the basing relation which might be
proposed. For example, one might eliminate the association condition,
requiring only that the reason cause the belief in some appropriate
way. One motivation for such a theory might be the view that one need
not be aware of a reason for it to be the basis of a belief, as in the
case of subliminal reasons. One issue here would be whether such
subconscious states can be justifying reasons. Alternatively, one
might hold that the reason need not sustain the belief, but only have
caused the belief to come into existence. One motivation for such a
view might be that one may justifiably believe things on the basis of
reasons one has forgotten (Goldman 2001, pp. 214-216). For
example, most people cannot remember on what basis they came to
believe that tigers are native to Asia, but it seems obvious that such
people are still justified in believing this. In such cases, the
reason no longer sustains the belief--in fact, the reason is no
longer possessed. Nonetheless, it might be argued, one's belief
that tigers are native to Asia is still based on the reason which
originally caused it. On the other hand, one consideration against
this view is the intuition that a belief cannot be justified if one
possesses no reason for it. In addition, it may be argued that there
are other ways of accounting for how a belief may be justified even if
the original reason for it has been forgotten. For instance, one might
reason as follows: "I can't recall where I first learned
this, but I feel sure it is true, and such feelings have proved to be
reliable in the past. Hence, my belief that tigers are native to Asia
is probably true."



A variety of objections have been raised against causal theories of
the basing relation
 generally.[2]
 The most common of these is the problem of deviant causal chains, a
problem which plagues causal analyses in general. With regard to the
basing relation, the problem is that not every instance of a
reason's causing a belief will establish a basing relation.
Alvin Plantinga illustrates the problem well (Plantinga 1993, p. 69,
n.8):



> 
> Suddenly seeing Sylvia, I form the belief that I see her; as a result,
> I become rattled and drop my cup of tea, scalding my leg. I then form
> the belief that my leg hurts; but though the former belief is a (part)
> cause of the latter, it is not the case that I accept the latter on
> the evidential basis of the
>  former.[3]
> 



What makes the problem so difficult is that there are a variety of
ways the causal chain of events can go wrong and thereby fail to
establish a basing relation. For example, glitches in the brain,
wandering thoughts, wishful thinking, strong emotions, etc., may all
be implicated in deviant causal chains. It is quite difficult to
clearly explain what non-deviant causation amounts to, yet without
such an explanation causal theories are ultimately unsatisfactory.



However, there have been efforts to modify causal theories to avoid
the problem:



An interesting possible solution to the problem is provided by Kevin
McCain (McCain 2012). McCain proposes an interventionist account of
causation according to which (roughly) *X* causes *Y* if and
only if were a change in *X* to occur, *Y* would change in a
regular way (setting aside any other redundant causes of *Y*).
Moreover, *X* is a direct cause of *Y* if and only if,
setting aside all other causally relevant events, a possible
intervention on *X* (e.g., to eliminate its causal power) would
change *Y* (e.g., *Y* would not occur). The basing relation
then gets defined as follows:



> 
> A person *S*'s belief that *p* at time *t* is
> based on her reasons *R* if and only if at *t*:
> 
> 1. each *ri* [?] *R* is a direct cause of
> *S*'s believing that *p*, and
> 2. each *ri* [?] *R* is an actual cause
> of *S*'s believing that *p*, and
> 3. It is not the case that intervening to set the values of all
> direct causes of *S*'s believing that *p*, other than
> the members of *R*, to zero will result in *S*'s not
> believing that *p* when every *ri* [?]
> *R* is held fixed at its actual value.
> 
>  (McCain 2012, p. 364)
> 



To set the value of a direct cause to zero is merely to stipulate that
it is not a cause. Thus, condition (3) ensures that the members of
*R* are collectively sufficient to cause S's belief that
*p*.



McCain's theory offers a quick solution to the problem of
deviant causal chains. In Plantinga's example of Sylvia, for
instance, the person's belief that their leg hurts is based only
on the pain felt in their leg for, on McCain's theory, neither
the becoming rattled nor the belief that the person sees Sylvia are a
direct cause of the belief that their leg hurts. This is because
neither the belief nor the becoming rattled are direct causes of the
belief that their leg hurts. (McCain 2012, p. 372) The requirement
that a cause be direct in order to be the basis of a belief seems to
limit, in cases like these, causes that establish basing relations to
the immediately previous link in the causal chain of events. To
oversimplify the point to a slogan, McCain eliminates the problem of
deviant causal chains by eliminating the causal chains (from counting
as bases).



McCain discusses the potential problem that it might be implausible to
require that basing relations be direct (McCain 2012, p.
368-369). To use McCain's example, suppose that Sally
believes that *p* and that *p* [?] *q*
("*p* implies *q*"), and validly infers, and
thereby comes to believe, that *q*. She also believes *q*
[?] *t*, and validly infers *t* from her beliefs that
*q* and *q* [?] *t*. On McCain's theory of the
basing relation, since Sally's beliefs that *p* and
*p* [?] *q* are not direct causes of her belief that
*t*, her belief that *t* is not based on those beliefs. In
other words, on McCain's theory, the basing relation is not
transitive. This raises questions about whether McCain's theory
adequately accounts for our pre-theoretical account of the basing
relation. In particular, does McCain's theory correctly identify
one's reasons for one's beliefs? McCain replies that,
given his theory, we can still claim that, e.g., Sally's belief
that *t* is dependent on her beliefs that *p* and that
*p* [?] *q*, even if not based on them.



An alternative kind of causal theory of the basing relation, also
intended to avoid the problem of deviant causal chains, is proposed by
Ru Ye (Ye 2020) and named Causation Caused by Believing (CCB):



> 
> 
> (CCB) One's belief that *p* is based on a reason *R*
> just in case *R* causes the belief and the causation is caused
> by one's believing that *R* supports *p*.
> 
> 
> 



Presumably, *R* need not produce the belief that *p*,
but may instead causally sustain it. Thus, one could acquire the
belief that *p*, and only later base the belief that *p*
on *R*. Note that unlike doxastic theories of the basing
relation, discussed below, the belief that *R* supports
*p*, alone, is not sufficient to establish a basing
relation.



In general, why would a (potential) reason cause one belief rather
than another or none at all? A natural answer is that the person
believes something to the effect that the reason is a good reason to
hold the belief. (CCB) captures this thought quite nicely.



Ye argues that (CCB) has considerable explanatory power. In
particular, it is said to avoid the problem deviant causal chains.
Consider Plantinga's example of Sylvia: your belief that your leg
hurts, though caused by seeing Sylvia enter the room, is not based on
it because you lack the belief that seeing Sylvia supports your belief
that your leg hurts. It may also help with clarifying the distinction
between triggering causes and structural causes: the latter play a
different causal role than the former. In the case of (CCB), the
structuring causes include the belief to the effect that *R* is
a good reason to believe that *p*.



Ye goes on to argue that CCB does not over-intellectualize basing (an
objection discussed further below, with doxastic theories of the
basing relation), putting it beyond the ability of those - such as
young children - with very few epistemic concepts because, following
Moser, the belief about one's reasons may be *de re*.
Regarding those incapable of forming even such a *de re*
belief, Ye argues that such cases are indistinguishable from deviant
causal chains.



A third alternative form of causal theory, the Causal-Manifestation
Account (CMA) proposed by John Turri, is also aimed at avoiding
problems with deviant causal chains (Turri 2011). Turri describes the
account as, roughly, this:



> 
> 
> (CMA): *R* is among your reasons for believing *Q* if
> and only if *R*'s causing your belief manifests (at least
> some of ) your cognitive traits.
> 
> 
> 



A cognitive trait is taken to be a disposition or habit to form (or
sustain) a doxastic attitude under certain circumstances. These may
include, for example, taking an experience at face value, or reasoning
in a pattern corresponding to modus ponens, etc. Consider
Plantinga's example of Sylvia: seeing Sylvia causes your belief
that you are in pain. But the causal relation as a whole between the
two events does not manifest any cognitive traits, such as some sort
of cognitive inference. Individual links in the chain of events
beginning with seeing Sylvia may manifest some cognitive traits, but
not the causal relation as a whole.



A second line of objection to causal theories of the basing relation
in general involves counterexamples raised in Lehrer
 1971.[4]
 We'll henceforth call these "superstitious lawyer"
examples, and they go like this. Suppose a series of eight grisly
murders has been committed, all the available evidence indicates that
the lawyer's client committed the first seven of those murders,
and everyone believes that he committed the eighth murder as well.
However, the lawyer, being superstitious, has absolute faith in the
cards. The cards indicate that his client is innocent of the eighth
murder, and the lawyer comes to believe this on the basis of his faith
in the cards. The lawyer then re-examines the evidence and finds a
very complicated line of reasoning showing that his client is innocent
of the eighth murder. The lawyer recognizes that the complicated line
of reasoning shows that his client is innocent. However, due to the
grisly nature of the case, the lawyer (and everyone else) strongly
desires to believe that the murderer of all eight victims has been
found. Thus, the lawyer's belief that the complicated line of
reasoning is correct lacks the overwhelming emotional conviction
needed to overcome the lawyer's desire, and thus cannot cause
the lawyer to believe that his client is innocent of the eighth
murder. It is only his unshakable faith in the cards that is
sufficient to cause the lawyer to believe that his client is innocent.
Nonetheless, since the lawyer takes the line of reasoning seriously,
it seems reasonable to believe that the complicated line of reasoning
could give the lawyer knowledge that his client is innocent.



The idea behind Lehrer's example is to conjoin the intuition
that the lawyer is justified in believing that his client is innocent
with the view that being justified in holding a belief requires that
the belief be based on a good reason in order to arrive at the
conclusion that the lawyer's belief that his client is innocent
is based on the complicated line of reasoning.



The case of the superstitious lawyer is very complicated and
Lehrer's argument has frequently been criticized. Alvin Goldman,
for example, has claimed that "...I find this example
unconvincing. To the extent that I clearly imagine that the lawyer
fixes his belief solely as a result of the cards, it seems intuitively
wrong to say that he *knows*--or has a *justified
belief*--that his client is innocent." (Goldman 1979,
p. 22, n.
 8)[5]
 Goldman does not elaborate on this objection, but the concern is that
the lawyer has not taken his good reason into proper account when
forming his belief that his client is innocent. One way of responding
to this concern is presented below in the discussion of the
causal-doxastic theory of the basing relation.


## 2. Counterfactual Theories of the Basing Relation



Among the most widely discussed theories of the basing relation is
that presented by Marshall Swain (1979, 1981, and 1985). Concerned
about superstitious-lawyer style counterexamples, Swain suggests that
a counterfactual analysis of causation may avoid them without doing
violence to the intuitions underlying causal theories of the basing
relation. A counterfactual statement is a statement of the form
"If *A* were to occur, then *B* would
occur", where '*A*' and
'*B*' denote events. Roughly, the idea is that a
belief is based on a reason if the reason either non-deviantly causes
or would have caused (in the appropriate circumstances) the belief in
question. Very roughly, where the reason would have caused the belief
(in the appropriate circumstances), the reason is, in Swain's
terminology, a pseudo-overdeterminant of the belief, and hence the
belief is based on it. Swain argues that the complicated line of
reasoning is a pseudo-overdeterminant of the lawyer's belief
that his client is innocent, and hence that there is a kind of causal
connection between the complicated line of reasoning and the
lawyer's belief by virtue of which the lawyer's belief is
based on the reasoning. Swain more precisely defines
pseudo-overdeterminants as follows (1981, p. 70):



> 
> (DPO) Where *c* and *e* are occurrent events, *c*
> is a pseudo-overdeterminant of *e* if and only if:
> 
> 1. *c* is not a cause of *e*(that is, there is no
> causal chain from *c* to *e* and *c* is not a
> genuine overdeterminant of *e*);  and
> 2. there is some set of occurrent events, *D* =
> {*d*1, *d*2,...,
> *dn*} (possibly having only one member), such that
> 	1. each *di* in *D* is a cause of
> 	*e*; and
> 	2. if no member of *D* had occurred, but *c* and
> 	*e* had occurred anyway, then there would have been a causal
> 	chain from *c* to *e*, and *c* would have been
> 	causally prior to *e*.
> 
> 
> 



Here '*c*' stands for a cause and
'*e*' for an effect. If we restrict the application
of (DPO) to reasons and beliefs, *c* will be the reason and
*e* will be the belief caused by the reason. The
"*di*" will stand for the actual
reason(s) for the belief. So, (DPO) in effect states that if the
actual reason(s) *di* for the belief had not
occurred, then if another reason *c* and the belief had
occurred anyway, and only the minimum necessary changes in the
person's epistemic situation (e.g., the person's other
beliefs, reasons, etc.) are made, then reason *c* would have
caused the belief and is therefore a pseudo-overdeterminant of the
belief.



It's important to note that a potential reason will not
pseudo-overdetermine a belief simply because there is some possible
world in which the actual reason does not cause the belief yet the
potential reason does. This is much too broad, for it would allow
beliefs to be based on reasons when it seems obvious that they are not
so based in the actual world. Rather, the various stipulations in
(DPO) are intended to limit the relevant domain of possible worlds to
those as close as possible to the actual world.



Swain's theory of the basing relation counts
pseudo-overdeterminants of a belief as reasons upon which a belief is
based, as we can see from the definition of the basing relation Swain
offers (Swain 1981, p. 74 and pp.
 86-87)[6]:



> 
> (DB) *S*'s belief that *h* is based upon the set
> of causal reasons *R* at a time *t*
> =*df*
> 1. *S* believes that *h* at *t*; and
> 2. For every member *rj* of *R*, there is
> some time *tn* (which may be identical with or
> earlier than *t*) such that
> 	1. *S* has (or had) *rj* at
> 	*tn*; and
> 	2. Either
> 		1. *S*'s having *rj* at
> 		*tn* is a cause (including genuine
> 		overdetermination) of *S*'s believing *h* at
> 		*t* or *S*'s having *rj* at
> 		*tn* is a pseudo-overdeterminant of
> 		*S*'s believing that *h* at *t*; or
> 		2. for some *ri* and *ti* that
> 		satisfy condition (i), with '*ri*'
> 		substituted for '*rj*' and
> 		'*ti*' for
> 		'*tn*', *S*'s having
> 		*rj* at *tn* is either a cause or
> 		a pseudo-overdeterminant of *S*'s having
> 		*ri* at *ti*, or
> 		3. ... , etc.
> 
> 
> 



Genuine causal overdeterminants occur when two or more causes both
occur and each is sufficient to generate a particular effect. For
example, perhaps a table has five legs, four at the corners and one at
the center. It may be the case that the four legs at the corners are
sufficient to cause the table to remain upright, but if the four legs
at the corners were removed, the center leg would also be sufficient
to keep the table upright. Here, the effect of the table's
remaining upright is overdetermined by the center leg, on the one
hand, and the four legs at the corners, on the other. Similarly,
perhaps a person has two good reasons for holding a belief, and either
one alone would be sufficient to cause the belief. In this case, the
two reasons would be said to overdetermine the belief. Assuming that
the causal relations were not deviant, the belief would be based on
both of the reasons. The '*ri*' and
'*rj*' in (DB) are simply reasons on
which the belief is based. Condition (ii) allows that a reason
*rj*, which is in turn a reason for
*ri*, which in turn is a reason for the belief that
*h*, is also a reason on which the belief that *h* is
based, and the "or ..., etc." clause is intended to
include each of the reasons in a long chain of reasoning leading to
the belief to count as reasons upon which the belief is based.



One advantage of Swain's theory (which could be easily
incorporated into many other theories of the basing relation) is that
reasons are not limited to beliefs. Things like perceptual states
(such as seeing something) or what Swain calls sensation states (such
as experiencing hunger, thirst, pain, or other things which we sense
but not necessarily through the five senses) are counted (by
stipulation) as non-propositional reasons for the purposes of his
theory. Thus, a unified account of belief basing is provided.



As already noted, Swain's theory is intended to avoid
Lehrer's objection regarding superstitious-lawyer style
counterexamples. The complicated line of reasoning is not a cause or
causal overdeterminant of the lawyer's belief that his client is
innocent because the lawyer's strong desire to believe that his
client is guilty of the eighth murder prevents the complicated line of
reasoning from causing the belief that his client is innocent. The
degree of conviction the lawyer has in the complicated line of
reasoning is sufficient for the lawyer to believe the complicated line
of reasoning (once his strong desire to believe that his client is
guilty is overridden by his strong faith (or rational belief, as the
case may be) in the cards), but alone is not sufficient to override
his strong desire to believe that his client is innocent. Swain argues
that (DB) avoids Lehrer's objection because the complicated line
of reasoning pseudo-overdetermines the lawyer's belief that his
client is innocent (Swain 1981, p. 74 and pp. 86-87). We can see
how this is to work by examining condition (2)(b) of (DPO). Suppose
that the actual cause of his belief that his client is innocent
(*di*) (namely, the lawyer's belief about the
result of the card reading) had not occurred, and that both the
complicated line of reasoning (*c*) and the belief that his
client is innocent (*e*) had occurred anyway. On this
supposition, the lawyer's strong desire to believe that his
client is guilty of all eight crimes could not have occurred, because
if it had it would have prevented the lawyer from believing that his
client is innocent. Since the lawyer's strong desire is the only
thing that prevents the complicated line of reasoning from causing the
lawyer's belief that his client is innocent, the complicated
line of reasoning would then have caused the lawyer to believe that
his client is innocent. Thus, the complicated line of reasoning
pseudo-overdetermines the lawyer's belief that his client is
innocent, and hence, on (DB), the lawyer's belief is based on
the complicated line of reasoning in Lehrer's original example.
So on Swain's theory, the lawyer's belief is based on the
complicated line of reasoning, in accordance with Lehrer's
intuitions about the case. Contrary to Lehrer, however, Swain argues
that there is a counterfactual causal connection between the reasoning
and the lawyer's belief that his client is innocent, thus
providing a theory of the basing relation consistent with the
intuition that the basing relation is best analyzed in terms of a
reason's causing a belief.



A variety of objections to Swain's theory have been proposed in
the
 literature.[7]
 Perhaps the best of these is that presented by Joseph Tolliver (1982,
pp. 151-155). Tolliver's counterexample, which he calls
the pendulum case, goes like this: suppose a physics student has
learned that from the period of a pendulum (i.e., the time it takes to
complete a swing) one can calculate its length and vice versa. 
The student measures a particular pendulum and discovers that it has a
length *L*, and calculates that it must have period *P*.
The student also has two general beliefs about pendulums, namely (1)
that if *x* is a pendulum of period *P*, then *x*
is a pendulum of length *L*, and (2) that if *x* is a
pendulum of length *L*, then *x* is a pendulum of period
*P*. We may suppose that it is clear in this case that the
student's belief about the period is based (at least in part) on
her belief about its length, but her belief about its length is not
based on her belief about the period. But, Tolliver claims, the
student's belief about the period pseudo-overdetermines her
belief about the length of the pendulum, and hence gets counted, on
Swain's theory, as the basis of her belief about the length of
the pendulum. This is so because, according to Tolliver, if the actual
cause of the student's belief about the length had not occurred,
and if the student still had both her belief about the period and her
belief about the length, then her belief about the period would have
caused her belief about the length.



One natural line of reply to this sort of counterexample to
Swain's theory would be to further specify the sorts of changes
in one's epistemic situation that are consistent with
pseudo-overdetermination. For example, perhaps the student in the
above example would have to engage in further reasoning, inferring the
length of the pendulum from her two general beliefs about pendulums
and her belief about the period of the pendulum. If such additional
inferences could be ruled out as being unwarranted changes in the
student's epistemic situation, then the student's belief
about the period would not pseudo-overdetermine her belief about the
length of the pendulum.


## 3. Doxastic Theories of the Basing Relation



Doxastic theories of the basing relation hold that having an
appropriate meta-belief to the effect that a reason is a good reason
to hold a belief is sufficient for the belief's being based on
the reason. Such a theory appears to be a natural fit for certain
kinds of epistemic internalism. For such an account, see Leite (2008).
Some theories of the basing relation, such as those of Helen Longino
and Robert Audi, state that such a meta-belief is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for a belief's being based on a reason
(Longino 1978; Audi 1986). Such theories hold that if a belief is to
be based on a reason, the reason must non-deviantly cause the belief,
and an appropriate meta-belief must be present. Such theories tend to
be vulnerable to the objections to causal theories of the basing
relation as well as the objections--to be discussed
shortly--to doxastic theories of the basing relation.



Here, we will examine Joseph Tolliver's account of the basing
relation. Roughly, Tolliver's view is that a belief is based on
a reason for a person *S* if and only if *S* believes
that the reason provides evidence for the belief, and also believes
that it is likely that the probability that the belief is true
increased at the time the reason was accepted. Tolliver's aim is
to avoid the pendulum objection to Swain's theory while
affirming Swain and Lehrer's intuition in the case of the
superstitious lawyer that the lawyer's belief that his client is
innocent is based on the complicated line of reasoning.
Tolliver's account is as follows (Tolliver 1982, p.
 159):[8]



> 
> (B) *S* bases his or her belief that *b* on reason
> *r* at a time *t* if and only if
> 
> 
> > 
> > 
> > (1) *S* believes that *b* at *t* and *S*
> > believes that *r* at *t*, and
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > (2) *S* believes that the truth of *r* is evidence for
> > the truth of *b* at *t*, and
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > (3) Where *S*'s estimate of the likelihood of *b*
> > equals *h* at *t* (*h* being greater than 0 and
> > less than or equal to 1), if it were the case that *S* came to
> > believe *r* for the first time at *t*, then
> > *S*'s estimate of the likelihood of the proposition
> > "the likelihood of *b* is greater than or equal to
> > *h*" would be greater at *t* then it was prior to
> > *t*.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 
> 



Condition (3) is intended to handle the pendulum case discussed above.
In the pendulum case, the student measures the length of a pendulum
and thereby comes to believe that it has length *L*. On the
basis of this measurement and other truths she knows about pendulums,
the student is able to calculate the period of the pendulum. Thus, the
student's belief about the length serves as a reason for her
belief about the period. The apparent problem for Swain's view
was that the students belief about the period also seemed to be
counted as a reason on which her belief about the length was based,
when in fact the basing relation went in the reverse direction.
Tolliver's theory attempts to handle this problem by means of
condition (3), which is intended to specify the direction of the
evidential support relation. Once the student measures the length and
makes the inference about the period, the student's estimate of
the likelihood that the pendulum has period *P* would increase.
However, the student's belief about the period of the pendulum
would not, according to Tolliver, increase the estimate of the
likelihood that the pendulum has length *L* because the
student's belief about the length is needed to calculate the
period.



One common line of objection to doxastic theories of the basing
relation has to do with individuals who do not possess the epistemic
concepts needed to form the meta-belief (that a reason is a good
reason to hold a belief) required by doxastic theories, but who
nonetheless seem to base beliefs on reasons. For example, young or
uneducated persons may seem perfectly capable having reasons for
beliefs even if they lack the appropriate concepts of epistemic
evidence required by condition (2) of Tolliver's theory. One
possible line of reply to this sort of objection would be to stipulate
that one may have either an appropriate meta-belief or some
appropriate form of awareness that need not involve any particular
fully developed epistemic concept. For example, one might allow, as
does Moser's theory discussed in the foregoing, that one merely
have a *de re* awareness of the evidential relation holding
between the reason and the belief.



Another common line of objection to doxastic theories concerns the
possibility of meta-beliefs (to the effect that a reason is a good
reason to hold a belief) which do not establish basing relations. For
example, suppose Ezekiel belongs to a religious cult and slavishly
believes whatever the cult leader, Exidor, tells him. One day Exidor
tells Ezekiel that his belief in God is a good reason to believe
everything else Ezekiel believes, and Ezekiel slavishly comes to
believe this. Nonetheless, it would seem highly counter-intuitive to
accept that, now, everything else Ezekiel believes is in fact based on
his belief in God. Perhaps one way to avoid this sort of objection is
to add additional conditions as to which meta-beliefs are capable of
establishing basing relations. One such solution is discussed below,
in the section regarding causal-doxastic theories of the basing
relation.



A third common line of objection to doxastic theories is that we may
sometimes base beliefs on reasons of which we are unaware. For
example, perhaps beliefs can be based on subconscious reasons. If
so,then beliefs may be based on reasons even though an appropriate
meta-belief (that the reason is a good reason to hold the belief)
cannot be formed because the person remains unaware of the reason.


## 4. Causal-Doxastic Theories of the Basing Relation



The basic idea of causal-doxastic theories is that a belief may be
based on a reason if either an appropriate meta-belief is present (as
in doxastic theories of the basing relation) or the reason causes the
belief in an appropriate way (as in causal theories of the basing
relation). One motive for such a view is to avoid superstitious-lawyer
style counterexamples while preserving the intuition that a
reason's causing a belief can sometimes establish a basing
relation. A second, more fundamental motive begins with the
observation that a belief is based on a reason when one has, with
regard to the belief, taken proper account of the evidential import of
the reason. It would be odd if, e.g., the conscious evaluation and
acceptance of the evidential import of a potential reason for a belief
was, in principle, completely irrelevant to whether the belief was
based on the reason. Intuitively, it seems that taking proper account
of a reason may merely involve thinking about the evidential import of
the reason in the appropriate way, and whether, in addition, the
reason non-deviantly causes (or, causally sustains) the belief is
merely a contingent, empirical matter.



Keith Allen Korcz's version of a causal-doxastic theory,
somewhat simplified, is as follows (Korcz 2000):



> 
> (CD) A person *S*'s belief that *p* is based on a
> reason *r* possessed by *S* at time *t* if and
> only if
> 
> 1. *S* believes that *p* at *t*, and
> 2. Either
> 	1. the following two conditions are met:
> 		1. *r* is an (or contributes to the) internal cause, internal
> 		causal overdeterminant or internal causal sustainer, at or prior to
> 		*t*, of *S*'s belief that *p*, and
> 		2. *r* is not rejected at *t*,
> 	or
> 	2. the following four conditions are met:
> 		1. *S* at *t* has a meta-belief or *de re*
> 		awareness to the effect that *r* is a good reason to believe
> 		*p*, and
> 		2. the causal explanation of *S*'s having this
> 		meta-belief or state of awareness involves both *S*'s
> 		belief that *p* and *r*, and
> 		3. *r*, the belief that *p*, and any other reason the
> 		meta-belief or state of awareness is causally based on meets all the
> 		requirements of condition (2)(a), and
> 		4. *S* has no other meta-belief or state of awareness contrary
> 		to the meta-belief described in condition (b)(i).
> 
> 
> 



Note that (CD) makes no allowance for a belief's being based on
a reason when the reason is no longer possessed. There are no such
basing relations, given (CD).



An internal cause is a causal chain of events such that each link in
the chain is either a belief, a reason (construed to include
perceptual and sensation states, as well as beliefs), or an inference.
One's beliefs, reasons, and inferences collectively constitute
what Korcz calls one's cognitive structure. The various sorts of
causes mentioned in (a)(i) are required to be internal to
*S*'s cognitive structure so as to avoid problems with
deviant causal chains. Deviant causal chains seem to occur when the
chain of causal events from a putative reason to a belief veers
outside the persons cognitive structure. For instance, in
Plantinga's example of Sylvia discussed above, the causal chain
of events includes the event of dropping a cup of tea, and this event
is not one which occurs within the person's cognitive structure.
However, Korcz acknowledges that this is not a fully satisfactory
solution to the problem of deviant causal chains, given the
difficulties of specifying exactly which events are internal to
one's cognitive system in the appropriate way.



Condition (a)(ii) (and, in effect, condition (b)(iv)) requires that
the reason a belief is based on not be rejected. A reason for a belief
is rejected when the following two conditions are met:


1. *S* has a meta-belief to the effect that the reason is no
longer a good reason to hold the belief, and
2. one has no meta-beliefs which contradict the meta-belief described
in (I).



By virtue of condition (I), this account of rejecting a reason for a
belief allows for a belief to cease to be based on a reason even when
the reason is still retained (not, e.g., forgotten). For example,
suppose I believe that Pablo Neruda was a great poet because all great
poets are revolutionaries and Neruda was a revolutionary. Later, I
come to believe that this inference is invalid, yet also come to
believe that all Nobel Prize winners in literature are great poets and
that Neruda won the Nobel prize in literature. Thus, I never lose my
belief that Neruda is a great poet and I never lose (at least some of)
my original reasons for believing that Neruda was a great poet (I
still believe that all great poets are revolutionaries and that Neruda
was a revolutionary). Instead, the reasons for which I believe that
Neruda was a great poet have shifted, in part by virtue of the fact
that I have come to believe that my original reasons did not support
my belief.



Condition (II) of this account of rejecting reasons excludes
contradictory meta-beliefs in order to account for some cases in which
it is unclear whether the reasons for a belief have been rejected.
Were a person to have contradictory meta-beliefs (perhaps not
recognizing they are contradictory as the result of thinking in
different terms which in fact have the same referent), it would be
unclear whether the reasons were still the basis of the belief.



Condition (b)(i) of (CD), by allowing that the meta-belief (or state
of awareness) merely be to the effect that the reason is a good reason
to hold the belief, is intended to allow the meta-belief to contain
any appropriate epistemic concept the individual may possess.
Conditions (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) are intended to exclude cases of
meta-beliefs which do not establish basing relations, as in the
example of Ezekiel discussed above. Ezekiel has the meta-belief that
his belief in God is a good reason to believe everything else he
believes. According to (CD), the reason this meta-belief does not
establish a basing relation is that it is not non-deviantly caused by
both his belief in God and every other belief he has. Instead, it is
based on his cult leader, Exidor, telling him that his belief in God
is a good reason to believe everything else he believes. For the
meta-belief to establish a basing relation, it must be based on (i.e.,
non-deviantly caused by) the belief and reason(s) it is about. This
helps to ensure that the person has taken appropriate account of the
evidential import of the reason for the belief, much as it does in
causal theories of the basing relation.



One line of objection to Korcz's causal-doxastic theory is that
simply combining causal and doxastic theories is *ad hoc*,
i.e., lacks appropriate theoretical support. In turn, this would
appear to prevent the theory from helping us to understand the basing
relation. The basing relation is presumably a unified epistemic
concept calling for a unified analysis, not a haphazard conglomeration
of different conditions, as a disjunctive analysis of the basing
relation as either causes or meta-beliefs would suggest. While the
analysis may be unified in the sense that it is a causal analysis
through and through, one would not expect the kinds of causes to be so
different. This objection gains further support if it is mistakenly
thought that the primary motive for the theory is merely to avoid
superstitious-lawyer style counter-examples.



One possible line of response to this sort of objection is to note
that an important motive for the theory is a fundamental fact about
human thinking, and not merely the desire to avoid
superstitious-lawyer style counter-examples. Intuitively, a
belief's being based on a reason involves taking into account
the epistemic import of the reason, and such a mental operation may be
of two sorts: either directly causal (where a reason non-deviantly
causes a belief) or intentional (where one has a meta-belief to the
effect that a reason is a good reason to hold a belief). The ability
to reflect on our beliefs and thereby evaluate them is often thought
to be an ability which distinguishes human cognition from that of many
other non-human animals. And to properly evaluate a belief is simply
to take into proper account its evidential import. Thus, it would be
highly implausible if such reflective evaluations were absent from an
account of a belief's being based on a reason. Yet on causal
theories of the basing relation, such reflective evaluations are
superfluous. On the other hand, such reflective evaluations do not
appear necessary for a belief to be based on a reason, as previously
argued. There seem to be situations in which non-deviant causes are
sufficient to establish basing relations, again as previously argued.
Therefore, the disjunctive analysis of (CD) appears to be essential if
we are to do justice to the various ways the human mind may take into
account the evidential import of reasons.


## 5. The Basing Relation and Epistemology



Given that a necessary condition of a belief's being justified
is that it be based on an appropriate reason, which theory of the
basing relation one adopts may have significant implications for
one's theory of epistemic justification. For example, accepting
a doxastic or a causal-doxastic theory of the basing relation would
appear to be at odds with the fundamental intuition behind causal
theories of justification (e.g., reliabilism), which assert that a
belief is justified merely by being caused in an appropriate way. On a
doxastic or causal-doxastic theory, a belief may be based on a good
reason (and thus, we may suppose, be justified) even if the belief
were not caused in the appropriate way or even if the belief were,
somehow, not caused at all.



Accepting some doxastic theories of the basing relation will commit
one to a strong form of access internalism. Strong access internalism
is the view that one must be aware of one's reasons for a belief
in order for the belief to be justified in light of those reasons.
Plausible doxastic theories of the basing relation will likely have
built in this requirement of access to one's reasons by virtue
of requiring that, for a belief to be based on a reason, one must
believe or be aware that the reason is a good reason to hold the
belief. Plausible doxastic theories will likely stipulate that one
cannot have an appropriate meta-belief or state of awareness without
being directly aware of the reason in question, in order to avoid
counting meta-beliefs such as that of Ezekiel's, in the example
discussed above, as sufficient to establish basing relations.



Finally, novel arguments for various forms of skepticism about
justification can be developed that focus on improperly based beliefs,
though such arguments remain largely unexplored. One exception is in
Jonathan Schaffer's discussion of the debasing demon (Schaffer
2010). Unlike the Cartesian Demon, the debasing demon may leave
one's beliefs true and reasons adequate, yet "cross the
wires" so that beliefs are only based on reasons that fail to
justify them. Such demonic efforts may include mistaken beliefs about
what belief is based on what reason. Schaffer argues that the debasing
demon even leaves us without the foundation of Descartes'
*cogito*, since one might be misled as to what reason
one's belief in one's own existence is based.