## 1. Abhidharma: its origins and texts



The early history of Buddhism in India is remarkably little known and
the attempt to construct a consistent chronology of that history still
engrosses the minds of contemporary scholars. A generally accepted
tradition has it that some time around the beginning of the third
century BCE, the primitive Buddhist community divided into two parties
or fraternities: the Sthaviras (Pali, Theriyas) and the
Mahasanghikas, each of which thenceforth had its own
ordination traditions. Throughout the subsequent two centuries or so,
doctrinal disputes arose between these two parties, resulting in the
formation of various schools of thought (*vada;
acariyavada*) and teacher lineages
(*acariyakula*) (*Vin* 51-54; *Mhv* V
12-13. See Cousins 1991, 27-28; Frauwallner 1956, 5ff
& 130ff; Lamotte 1988, 271ff; Wynne 2019, 269-283).



According to traditional Buddhist accounts, by the time the
Mahayana doctrines arose, roughly in the first century BCE,
there were eighteen sub-sects or schools of Sthaviras, the tradition
ancestral to the Theravada ("advocates of the doctrine of
the elders"). The number eighteen, though, became conventional
in Buddhist historiography for symbolic and mnemonic reasons
(Obeyesekere 1991) and, in fact, different Buddhist sources preserve
divergent lists of schools which sum up to more than eighteen. The
likelihood is that the early formative period of the Buddhist
community gave rise to multiple intellectual branches that developed
spontaneously due to the geographical extension of the community over
the entire Indian subcontinent and subject to the particular problems
that confronted each monastic community (*sangha*). Each
*sangha* tended to specialize in a specific branch of
learning, had its own practical customs and relations with lay
circles, and was influenced by the particular territories, economy,
and use of language and dialect prevalent in its environment. Indeed,
the names of the "eighteen schools" are indicative of
their origins in characteristic doctrines, geographical locations, or
the legacy of particular founders: for instance,
Sarvastivada ("advocates of the doctrine that all
things exist"), Sautrantikas ("those who rely on the
*sutras")*/Darstantikas
("those who employ
 examples"),[1]
 and Pudgalavada ("those who affirm the existence of the
person"); Haimavatas ("those of the snowy
mountains"); or Vatsiputriyas ("those
affiliated with Vatsiputra") respectively. As noted by
Gethin (1998, 52), rather than sects or denominations as in
Christianity, "at least some of the schools mentioned by later
Buddhist tradition are likely to have been informal schools of thought
in the manner of 'Cartesians,' 'British
Empiricists,' or 'Kantians' for the history of
modern
 philosophy."[2]



It is customarily assumed that the multiple ancient Buddhist schools
transmitted their own versions of Abhidharma collections, but only two
complete canonical collections are preserved, representing two
schools: the Sarvastivada, who emerged as an independent
school from within the Sthaviras around the second or first century
BCE, became dominant in north, especially northwest India, and spread
to central Asia; and the Sinhalese Theravada, a branch of the
Sthaviras that spread out in south India and parts of southeast Asia.
These two extant collections comprise the third of the "three
baskets" (Skt., *tripitaka*, Pali,
*tipitaka*) of the Buddhist canon. The exegetical
traditions of the Sarvastivada and Theravada understand
their respective canonical Abhidharma to consist of a set of seven
texts, though each school specifies a different set of texts. The
Sarvastivadin *Abhidharma-pitaka* consists of
the *Sangitiparyaya* (*Discourse on the
Collective Recitation*), the *Dharmaskandha*
(*Compendium of* *Dharmas*), the
*Prajnaptisastra* (*Manual of
Concepts*), the *Vijnanakaya*
(*Compendium of Consciousness*), the
*Dhatukaya* (*Compendium of Elements*), the
*Prakaranapada* (*Literary*
*Exposition*), and the *Jnanaprasthana*
(*The Foundation of Knowledge*). These seven texts survive in
full only in their ancient Chinese translations. The Theravadin
*Abhidhamma-pitaka* comprises the
*Dhammasangani* (*Enumeration of*
*Dhammas*), the *Vibhanga* (*Analysis*),
the *Dhatukatha* (*Discourse on Elements*),
the *Puggalapannatti* (*Designation of
Persons*), the *Kathavatthu* (*Points of
Discussion*), the *Yamaka* (*Pairs*), and the
*Patthana* (*Causal Conditions*). These
seven texts are preserved in Pali and all but the *Yamaka* have
been translated into English.



Later generations composed commentaries on the canonical Abhidharma
and introduced a variety of exegetical manuals that expound the
essentials of the canonical systems. These post-canonical texts are
the products of single authors and display fully developed polemical
stances and sectarian worldviews of their respective schools. Much of
the Theravada Abhidhamma system is contained in
Buddhaghosa's comprehensive *Visuddhimagga* (*The Path
of Purification*, fifth century CE). More direct introductory
Abhidhamma manuals are Buddhadatta's
*Abhidhammavatara* (*Introduction to
Abhidhamma*, fifth century CE) and Anuruddha's
*Abhidhammatthasangaha* (*Compendium of the Topics of
Abhidhamma*, twelfth century CE). The Sarvastivada
tradition preserves in Chinese translation three different recensions
of an authoritative Abhidharma commentary or
*vibhasa* dated to the first or second century
CE, the last and best known of which is called the
*Mahavibhasa*. The
*vibhasa* compendia document several centuries
of scholarly activity representing multiple Sarvastivada
branches, most notably the Sarvastivadins of Kashmir who are
known as Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika. The
Sarvastivada manual most influential for later Chinese and
Tibetan Buddhism, however, is Vasubandhu's
*Abhidharmakosa* (*Treasury of Abhidharma*, fifth
century CE). The *Abhidharmakosa*'s auto-commentary
contains substantial criticism of orthodox Sarvastivada
positions, which later Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika
masters attempted to refute. Particularly famous in this category is
the *Nyayanusara* (*Conformance to Correct
Principle*) of Sanghabhadra, a contemporary of Vasubandhu.
This comprehensive treatise reestablishes orthodox
Sarvastivada views and is considered one of the final
Sarvastivada works to have
 survived.[3]



In sum, the Abhidharma/Abhidhamma texts are by and large compositions
contemporary with the formative period in the history of the early
Buddhist schools, providing the means by which one group could define
itself and defend its position against the divergent interpretations
and criticisms of other parties. Although much of the Abhidharma
mindset and something of its method draw on the
Agamas/Nikayas, i.e., the collections of
*sutras* (Pali, *suttas*), the main body of its
literature contains interpretations of the Buddha's discourses
specific to each school of thought and philosophical elaborations of
selectively emphasized doctrinal issues. These continued to be refined
by subsequent generations of monks who contributed to the
consolidation of the two surviving Theravada and
Sarvastivada schools.


### 1.1 Literary style and genre



Scholarly opinion has generally been divided between two alternative
interpretations of the term *abhidharma*, both of which hinge
upon the denotation of the prefix *abhi*. First, taking
*abhi* in the sense of "with regard to,"
*abhidharma* is understood as a discipline whose subject matter
is the *Dharma*, the Buddha's teachings. Second, using
*abhi* in the sense of preponderance and distinction,
*abhidharma* has also been deemed a distinct, higher teaching;
the essence of the Buddha's teachings or that which goes beyond
what is given in the Buddha's discourses, in a sense somewhat
reminiscent of the term "metaphysics" (e.g.,
*Dhs-a* 2-3; Horner 1941; von Hinuber 1994).
Buddhist tradition itself differentiates between the
Sutranta and Abhidharma methods of instructing the teachings
by contrasting the Sutranta "way of putting
things" in partial, figurative terms that require further
clarification, versus the Abhidharma exposition and catechism that
expound the teachings fully, in non-figurative terms (*A* IV
449-456; *Dhs-a* 154). This coincides with additional
distinctions the tradition makes between texts that have implicit
meaning (Skt., *neyartha*, Pali, *neyyattha*)
versus those that have explicit meaning (Skt.,
*nitartha*, Pali *nitattha*) (*A*
I 60; *Ps* I 18), and texts that are expressed in conventional
terms (Skt., *samvrti*, Pali, *sammuti*)
versus others that are expressed in ultimate terms (Skt.,
*paramartha*, Pali, *paramattha*) (*Vibh*
100-101; *Mp* I
 94-97).[4]
 From Abhidharma perspective, the *sutras* were conveyed
in conventional terms whose ultimate meaning required further
interpretation.



The texts of the canonical Abhidharma are works that evolved over
decades, if not centuries, out of materials already present in the
Sutra and Vinaya portions of the canon. This is evidenced in two
characteristics of the genre that can be traced to earlier Buddhist
literature. The first is the analytical style of the texts, which
attempt to summarize meticulously the significant points of the Dharma
and provide a comprehensive taxonomy of the mental and physical
factors that constitute sentient experience. This analytical
enterprise includes the arrangement of major parts of the material
around detailed lists of factors and combinations of sets of their
categories yielding matrices (Skt., *matrka*,
Pali, *matika*) of doctrinal topics. Already in the
collections of the Buddha's discourses, certain texts are
arranged according to taxonomic lists, providing formulaic treatment
of doctrinal items that are expounded elsewhere. Lists were clearly
powerful mnemonic devices, and their prevalence in early Buddhist
literature can be explained partly as a consequence of its being
composed and for some centuries preserved
 orally.[5]
 For instance, one of the four primary Agamas/Nikayas, the
collection of "grouped" sayings
(*samyukta/samyutta*), groups the Buddha's
teachings according to specific topics, including the four noble
truths, the four ways of establishing mindfulness, the five
aggregates, the six sense faculties, the seven constituents of
awakening, the noble eightfold path, the twelve links of dependent
origination, and others. Similar taxonomic lists form the table of
contents of the *Vibhanga* and
*Puggalapannatti* of the Theravada and the
*Sangitiparyaya* and *Dharmaskandha* of
the Sarvastivada, which are structured as commentaries on
those lists.



The second characteristic of Abhidharma literature is its bent for
discursive hermeneutics through catechetical exposition. The texts
seem to be the products of discussions about the doctrine within the
early Buddhist community. Again, such discussions are already found in
the Agama/Nikaya collections (e.g., *M* I
292-305, III 202-257): they often begin with a doctrinal
point to be clarified and proceed to expound the topic at stake using
a pedagogical method of question and answer. The texts also record
more formal methods of argumentation and refutation of rival theories
that shed light on the evolution of the Abhidharma as responding to
the demands of an increasingly polemical environment. The process of
institutionalization undergone by Buddhist thought at the time and the
spread of the Buddhist community across the Indian subcontinent
coincided with a transition from oral to written methods of textual
transmission and with the rise of monastic debates concerning the
doctrine among the various Buddhist schools. Intellectual assimilation
and doctrinal disputes also existed between the Buddhist monastic
community and the contemporaneous Sanskrit Grammarians, Jains, and
Brahmanical schools with their evolving scholastic and analytical
movements, which must also have contributed to the Abdhidharma
discursive hermeneutics and argumentative style. The dialectic format
and the display of awareness of differences in doctrinal
interpretation are the hallmarks of the *Kathavatthu* and
the *Vijnanakaya*. Later on, post-canonical
Abhidharma texts became complex philosophical treatises employing
sophisticated methods of argumentation and independent investigations
that resulted in doctrinal conclusions quite far removed from their
canonical antecedents.



Abhidharma literature, then, arose from two approaches to discussing
the Dharma within the early Buddhist community: the first intended to
summarize and analyze the significant points of the Buddha's
teachings, the second to elaborate on and interpret the doctrines by
means of monastic disputations (Bronkhorst 2016, 29-46; Cousins 1983,
10; Dessein 2016, 4-7; Gethin 1992b, 165; Gethin 2022, 227-242).


### 1.2 Abhidharma exegesis: from *Dharma* to *dharmas*



The Buddha's discourses collected in the
Agamas/Nikayas analyze sentient experience from different
standpoints: in terms of name-and-form (*nama-rupa*),
the five aggregates (Skt., *skandha*, Pali, *khandha*),
the twelve sense fields (*ayatana*), or the eighteen sense
elements (*dhatu*). All these modes of analysis provide
descriptions of sentient experience as a succession of physical and
mental processes that arise and cease subject to various causes and
conditions. A striking difference between the Sutranta and
the Abhidharma worldviews is that the Abhidharma reduces the time
scale of these processes so they are now seen as operating from moment
to moment. Put differently, the Abhidharma reinterprets the terms by
which the *sutras* portray sequential processes as
applying to discrete, momentary events (Cousins 1983, 7; Ronkin 2005,
66-78).



These events are referred to as *dharmas* (Pali,
*dhammas*), differently from the singular
*dharma/dhamma* that signifies the Buddha's teaching(s).
The Agamas/Nikayas use the form *dharmas* to convey a
pluralistic representation of encountered phenomena, i.e., all sensory
phenomena of whatever nature as we experience them through the six
sense faculties (the five ordinary physical senses plus mind
[*manas*]). The canonical Abhidharma treatises, however, draw
subtle distinctions within the scope of the mental and marginalize the
differences between multiple varieties of mental capacities. Within
this context, *dharmas* are seen as the objects of a specific
mental capacity called mental cognitive awareness (Skt.,
*manovijnana*, Pali,
*manovinnana*) that is considered the
central cognitive operation in the process of sensory perception.
Mental cognitive awareness is a particular type of consciousness that
discerns between the stimuli impinging upon the sense faculties and
that emerges when the requisite conditions come together.
*Dharmas* are not merely mental objects like ideas, concepts,
or memories. Rather, as the objects of mental cognitive awareness,
*dharmas* may be rendered apperceptions: rapid
consciousness-types (*citta*) that arise and cease in
sequential streams, each having its own object, and that interact with
the five externally directed sensory modalities (visual, auditory,
etc.) of cognitive awareness. The canonical Abhidharma texts portray
*dharmas*, then, as psycho-physical events with diverse
capacities by means of which the mind unites and assimilates a
particular perception, especially one newly presented, to a larger set
or mass of ideas already possessed, thus comprehending and
conceptualizing
 it.[6]



Ultimately, *dharmas* are all that there is: all experiential
events are understood as arising from the interaction of
*dharmas*. While the analogy of atoms may be useful here,
*dharmas* notably embrace both physical and mental phenomena,
and are generally understood as evanescent events, occurrences, or
dynamic properties rather than enduring
 substances.[7]
 The Abhidharma exegesis thus attempts to provide an exhaustive
account of every possible type of experience--every type of
occurrence that may possibly present itself in one's
consciousness--in terms of its constituent *dharmas*. This
enterprise involves breaking down the objects of ordinary perception
into their constituent, discrete *dharmas* and clarifying their
relations of causal conditioning. The overarching inquiry subsuming
both the analysis of *dharmas* into multiple categories and
their synthesis into a unified structure by means of their manifold
relationships of causal conditioning is referred to as the
"*dharma* theory."


## 2. The *dharma* taxonomy: a metaphysics of experience



The Abhidharma attempts to individuate and determine the unique
identity of each *dharma* yield complex intersecting taxonomies
of *dharmas* organized by multiple criteria or sets of
qualities. Abhidharma texts of different schools proposed different
*dharma* taxonomies, enumerating a more or less finite number
of *dharma* categories. It is important to remember, though,
that the term *dharma* signifies both any category that
represents a type of occurrence as well as any of its particular
tokens or instances. The Theravada introduced a system of
eighty-two *dhamma* categories, meaning that there are
eighty-two possible types of occurrence in the experiential world, not
eighty-two occurrences. These are organized into a fourfold
categorization. The first three categories include the bare phenomenon
of consciousness (*citta*) that encompasses a single
*dhamma* type and of which the essential characteristic is the
cognizing of an object; associated mentality (*cetasika*) that
encompasses fifty-two *dhammas;* and materiality or physical
phenomena (*rupa*) that include twenty-eight
*dhammas* that make up all physical occurrences
(*Abhidh-av* 1). All the eighty-one *dhamma* types in
these three broad categories are conditioned
(*sankhata*). Conditioned *dhammas* arise and
cease subject to numerous causes and conditions and constitute
sentient experience in all realms of the round of rebirth
 (*samsara*).[8]
 The eighty-second *dhamma* that comprises the fourth category
is unconditioned (*asankhata*): it neither arises nor
ceases through causal interaction. The single occurrence in this
fourth category is nirvana (Pali, *nibbana*).



The Sarvastivada adopted a system of seventy-five basic
types of *dharmas* organized into a fivefold categorization.
The first four categories comprise all conditioned
(*samskrta*) *dharmas* and include, again,
consciousness (*citta*, one single *dharma*); associated
mentality (*caitta*, encompasses forty-six *dharmas*);
and physical phenomena (*rupa*, eleven *dharmas*);
but also factors dissociated from thought
(*cittaviprayuktasamskara*, fourteen
*dharmas*). The last category is mentioned neither in the
*sutras* nor in the Theravada lists, but is found
predominantly in northern Indian Abhidharma texts of all periods. The
specific *dharmas* included within it vary, but they are all
understood as explaining a range of experiential events, being
themselves dissociated from both material form and thought. The fifth
category in the Sarvastivada taxonomy, that of the
unconditioned (*asamskrta*), comprises three
*dharmas*, namely, space and two states of cessation
(*nirodha*), the latter being a term that connotes the
culmination of the Buddhist path (Cox 1995; 2004A, 553-554).



The Abhidharma analyzes in great detail each of these categories, thus
creating relational schemata whereby each acknowledged experience,
phenomenon, or occurrence can be determined and identified by
particular definition and function. Especially important is the
analysis of consciousness or *citta*, on which much of
Abhidharma doctrinal thought is built. Consider the Theravada
analysis of consciousness, whose basic principles are shared with the
other Abhidharma systems.



The epitome of the operation of consciousness is *citta* as
experienced in the process of sensory perception that, in Abhidharma
(as in Buddhism in general), is deemed the paradigm of sentient
experience. *Citta* can never be experienced as bare
consciousness in its own origination moment, for consciousness is
always intentional, directed to a particular object that is cognized
by means of certain mental factors. *Citta*, therefore, always
occurs associated with its appropriate *cetasika*s or mental
factors that perform diverse functions and that emerge and cease
together with it, having the same object (either sensuous or mental)
and grounded in the same sense faculty. Any given consciousness
moment--also signified by the very term *citta*--is
thus a unique assemblage of *citta* and its associated mental
factors such as feeling, conceptualization, volition, or attention, to
name several of those required in any thought process. Each assemblage
is conscious of just one object, arises for a brief instant and then
falls away, followed by another *citta* combination that picks
up a different object by means of its particular associated mental
factors.



The classic Abhidhamma scheme as gleaned from the first book of the
*Abhidhamma-pitaka*, the
*Dhammasangani*, and as organized by the
commentarial tradition describes eighty-nine basic types of
consciousness moments, i.e., assemblages of *citta* and
*cetasika* (*Dhs* Book I; *Vism* XIV
81-110; *Abhidh-av* 1-15; *Abhidh-s*
1-5). It classifies these basic *citta* types most
broadly according to their locus of occurrence, beginning with the
sense-sphere (*kamavacara*) that includes forty-five
*citta* types, most prominently those that concern the
mechanics of perception of sensuous objects; next come eighteen
form-sphere (*rupavacara*) consciousnesses that
concern the mind that has attained meditative absorption
(*jhana*); followed by eight formless-sphere
(*arupavacara*) consciousnesses that constitute the
mind that has reached further meditative attainments known as formless
states; finally, there are eighteen world-transcending
(*lokuttara*) consciousnesses that constitute the mind at the
moment of awakening itself: these have nirvana as their object. Within
these four broad categories many other classifications operate. For
instance, some *dhammas* are wholesome, others unwholesome;
some are resultant, others are not; some are motivated, others are
without motivations. These attribute matrices, writes Cox (2004A,
552), form "an abstract web of all possible conditions and
characteristics exhibited by actually occurring *dharmas.* The
individual character of any particular *dharma* can then be
specified in accordance with every taxonomic possibility, resulting in
a complete assessment of that *dharma*'s range of
possible occurrences."



Various scholars have argued that this system reflects a dynamic
conception of *dharmas:* that Abhidharma understands
*dharmas* as properties, activities, or patterns of
interconnection that construct one's world, not as static
substances (e.g., Cox 2004A, 549ff; Gethin 1992A, 149-150;
Karunadasa 2010, Ch. 4; Nyanaponika 1998, Ch. 2 & 4; Ronkin 2005,
Ch. 4; Waldron 2002, 2-16). The Abhidharma lists of dharmas are
"explicitly open" and reflect "a certain reluctance
and hesitancy to say categorically that such and such is the
definitive list of dharmas" (Gethin 2017, 252), leaving room for
continued debates about what is and is not a dharma. For the
Abhidharma, as for Buddhism in general, the limits of one's
world are set by the limits of one's lived experience, and the
causal foundation for lived experience is the operation of one's
cognitive apparatus. According to the Buddhist path, the nature of
lived experience as based on one's cognitive apparatus is to be
contemplated by investigating the very nature of one's mind
through the practice of meditation. From this perspective, Abhidharma
represents the theoretical counterpart to the practice of meditation.
Within this context of Buddhist practice, *dharmas* are
distinct (but interrelated) functions, energies, or causally
significant aspects--in this sense
"components"--of consciousness moments.



The categorial analysis of *dharmas* is therefore a meditative
practice of discernment of *dharmas:* it is not intended as a
closed inventory of all existing *dharmas* "out
there" in their totality, but rather "has a dual
soteriological purpose involving two simultaneous processes"
(Cox 2004A, 551). First, as "evaluative" analysis, the
*dharma* typology maps out the constituents and workings of the
mind and accounts for what makes up ordinary wholesome consciousness
as opposed to the awakened mind. For instance, consciousness types
that arise in a mind that has attained meditative absorption become
increasingly refined and may never involve certain tendencies or
defilements that might potentially occur in ordinary (even wholesome)
consciousness. To watch *dharmas* as *dharmas*, writes
Gethin (2004, 536), "involves watching how they arise and
disappear, how the particular qualities that one wants to abandon can
be abandoned, and how the particular qualities that one wants to
develop can be developed. Watching *dhammas* in this way one
begins to understand [...] certain truths
(*sacca*)--four to be exact--about these
*dhammas:* their relation to suffering, its arising, its
ceasing and the way to its ceasing. And in seeing these four truths
one realizes the ultimate truth--*dhamma*--about the
 world."[9]



The second, "descriptive" soteriological process involved
in the categorization of *dharmas* reveals the fluid nature of
sentient experience and validates the fundamental Buddhist teaching of
not-self (Skt., *anatman*, Pali, *anatta*). The
increasingly detailed enumerations of *dharmas* demonstrate
that no essence or independent self could be found in any phenomenon
or its constituents, since all aspects of experience are impermanent,
arising and passing away subject to numerous causes and conditions.
Even the handful *dharmas* that are categorized as
unconditioned (that is, having no cause and no effect) are shown to be
not-self. The practice of the discrimination of *dharmas* thus
undermines the apparently solid world we emotionally and
intellectually grasp at that is replete with objects of desire and
attachment. "Try to *grasp* the world of the
*Dhammasangani*, or the
*Patthana*," Gethin notes (1992B, 165),
"and it runs through one's fingers."



Nevertheless, the very notion of the plurality of *dharmas* as
the building blocks or the final units of analysis of sentient
experience signifies a considerable shift in the Buddhist
understanding of *dharma*. Abhidharma thought was gradually
drawn into espousing a naturalistic explanation of *dharmas* as
the fundamental constituents of the phenomenal world, increasingly
associating *dharmas* as primary existents. The category of the
unconditioned within the *dharma* taxonomy also asserted the
possibility of enduring or permanent *dharmas*, in contrast to
all other *dharmas* that arise and cease through causal
interaction. The Abhidharma exegesis, then, occasioned among Buddhist
circles doctrinal controversies that could be termed ontological
around such issues as what the nature of a *dharma* is; what,
in the internal constitution of a *dharma*, makes it the very
particular it is; the manner of existence of *dharmas;* the
dynamics of their causal interaction; and the nature of the reality
they constitute. The distinctive principles and their ensuing
ontological interpretations constructed by the Buddhist schools were
largely shaped by a radical construal of impermanence as
momentariness.


## 3. Time: from impermanence to momentariness



Both the Sarvastivada and the post-canonical Theravada
constructed a radical doctrine of momentariness (Skt.,
*ksanavada*, Pali,
*khanavada*) that atomizes phenomena temporally
by dissecting them into a succession of discrete, momentary events
that pass out of existence as soon as they have originated. Albeit not
a topic in its own right in the Buddha's discourses, the
doctrine of momentariness appears to have originated in conjunction
with the principle of impermanence (Skt., *anitya*, Pali,
*anicca*). This idea is basic to the Buddha's
empirically-oriented teaching about the nature of sentient experience:
all physical and mental phenomena are in a constant process of
conditioned construction and are interconnected, being dependently
originated (e.g., *A* I 286; *M* I 230, 336, 500;
*S* II 26, III 24-5, 96-9, IV 214). The Suttanta
elaboration on these three interlocking ideas results in a formula
(*A* I 152) that states that conditioned phenomena (Skt.,
*samskara*, Pali,
*sankhara*) are of the nature of origination
(*uppada*), "change of what endures"
(*thitassa annathatta*), and dissolution or
cessation (*vaya*). This formula is known as the "three
characteristics of what is conditioned"
(*tisankhatalakkhana*). The
Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika introduced four
characteristics of conditioned phenomena: origination, endurance,
decay, and dissolution. These are classified under the *dharma*
category of "factors dissociated from thought."



The Buddhist schools used the characteristics of conditioned phenomena
as a hermeneutic tool with which to reinterpret impermanence in terms
of momentariness. The Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika
proposed a fully-fledged doctrine of momentariness according to which
all physical and mental phenomena are momentary. The
Sarvastivadins use the term "moment"
(*ksana*) in a highly technical sense as the
smallest, definite unit of time that cannot be subdivided, the length
of which came to be equated with the duration of mental events as the
briefest conceivable entities. There is no Sarvastivadin
consensus on the length of a moment, but the texts indicate figures
between 0.13 and 13 milliseconds in modern terms (Gethin 1998, 221;
von Rospatt 1995, 94-110). This usage presupposes an atomistic
conception of time, for time is not reckoned indefinitely divisible.
Indeed, the term *ksana* is often discussed in
juxtaposition to the concepts of material atoms and syllables, which
are likewise comprehended as indivisible.



Within the Sarvastivada framework, material reality
(*rupa-dharma*) is reduced to discrete momentary atoms,
and much attention is drawn to ontological and epistemological
questions such as whether sense objects are real at any time, or
whether atoms contribute separately or collectively to the generation
of perception. Atomic reality is understood as constantly changing:
what appears to us as a world made up of enduring substances with
changing qualities is, in fact, a series of moments that arise and
perish in rapid succession. This process is not random, but operates
in accordance with the specific capability and function of each atom.
The spirit of this atomistic analysis of material reality applies
equally to mental reality: consciousness is understood as a succession
of discrete consciousness moments that arise and cease extremely
 rapidly.[10]
 Thus, the ratio of change between material and mental phenomena in
any given moment is one to one: they occur in perfect synchronicity
(Kim 1999, 54). On this point the Sautrantika agreed with the
Sarvastivada.



The Sarvastivadins ("advocates of the doctrine that
all things exist") were unique in their stance that the
characteristics of conditioned phenomena exist separately as real
entities within each moment. Their claim, then, is that all
conditioned *dharmas*--whether past, present, or
future--exist as real entities (*dravyatas*) within the
span of any given moment. This induced a host of problems, one of
which is that the Sarvastivada definition of a moment is
difficult to reconcile with its conception as the shortest unit of
time (von Rospatt 1995, 44-46 & 97-98). The
Sarvastivada replies to this criticism by stating that the
activities (*karitra*) of the four characteristics of
conditioned phenomena are sequential: the limits between the birth and
dissolution of any event are referred to as one moment. This solution,
however, implies that a single event undergoes four phases within a
given moment, which inevitably infringes upon its momentariness (Cox
1995, 151; von Rospatt 1995, 52ff).



The Theravadins created their own distinct version of the
doctrine of momentariness. They do not seem to have been as concerned
as the Sarvastivadins with the ontology and epistemology of
material and mental realities per se. Rather, they were more
preoccupied with the psychological apparatus governing the process of
cognizing of sense data, and hence with the changing ratio between
material and mental phenomena. The *Yamaka* of the canonical
Abhidhamma offers what is probably the first textual occurrence of the
term "moment" (*khana*) in the sense of a
very brief stretch of time that is divided into origination and
cessation instants (Kim 1999, 60-61). Relying on the three
characteristics of conditioned phenomena, the Pali commentaries later
present a scheme wherein each moment of every phenomenon is subdivided
into three different instants of origination
(*uppadakkhana)*, endurance
(*thitikkhana*) and cessation
(*bhanga**kkhana*) (*Spk* II 266;
*Mp* II 252). These are three phases of a single momentary
phenomenon defined as one single *dhamma* or consciousness
moment. A *dhamma* occurs in the first sub-moment, endures in
the second, and ceases in the third (Karunadasa 2010, 234ff). The
commentarial tradition thus analyzes phenomena temporally by
dissecting them into a succession of discrete, momentary events that
fall away as soon as they have originated in consciousness. As one
event is exhausted, it conditions a new event of its kind that
proceeds immediately afterwards. The result is an uninterrupted,
flowing continuum (*santana*) of causally connected
momentary events. These succeed each other so fast that we conceive of
the phenomena they constitute as temporally extended.



The Theravadins use the term *khana* as the
expression for a brief instant, the dimension of which is not fixed
but may be determined by the context. For example,
*citta**kkhana* refers to the instant taken by one
mental event. In this basic sense as denoting a very brief stretch of
time, the term "moment" does not entail an atomistic
conception of a definite and ultimate, smallest unit of time, but
leaves open the possibility that time is infinitely divisible (von
Rospatt 1995, 59-60 & 94-95). Here the three moments
of origination, endurance, and cessation do not correspond to three
different entities. Rather, they represent three phases of a single
momentary phenomenon and are defined as one single consciousness
moment: a *dhamma* occurs in the first sub-moment, endures in
the second sub-moment and perishes in the third one. In this way, the
Theravadins avoided some of the difficulties faced by the
Sarvastivada-Vaibhasikas, of how to compress the
characteristics of the conditioned into one single indivisible moment
and of how to account for their ontological status. The
Theravadins also claimed that only mental phenomena are
momentary, whereas material phenomena (e.g., common-sense objects)
endure for a stretch of time. The Theravadin commentarial
tradition subsequently elaborated on this proposition and produced a
unique view of the ratio between material and mental phenomena,
asserting that a material phenomenon lasts for sixteen or seventeen
consciousness moments (*Kv* 620; *Vibh-a* 25-28;
*Vism* XX 24-26; Kim 1999, 79-80 &
SS3.1).



Despite their different interpretations of the concept of
momentariness, the early Buddhist schools all derived this concept
from the analysis of impermanence in terms of the dynamics of
*dharmas* qua physical and mental events. The equation of a
moment with the duration of these transient events as extremely short
occurrences--even the shortest conceivable--led to the
direct determination of the moment in terms of these occurrences. Yet
the doctrine of momentariness spawned a host of problems for the
Buddhist schools, particularly with regard to the status of the
endurance moment and to the explanation of continuity and conditioning
interaction among the *dharmas* (see section 5 below). If
*dharmas* go through an endurance phase or exist as real
entities within the span of any given moment, how can they be
momentary? And if experience is an array of strictly momentary
*dharmas*, how can continuity and causal conditioning be
possible?



One might argue that the conceptual shift from
"impermanence" to "endurance" is a result of
scholastic literalism and testifies to the Abhidharma tendency towards
reification and hypostatization of *dharmas* (Gombrich 1996,
36-37, 96-97 & 106-107). Nevertheless, the
object of the doctrine of momentariness is not so much existence in
time or the passage of time per se, but rather, in epistemological
terms and a somewhat Bergsonian sense, the construction of temporal
experience. Instead of a transcendental matrix of order imposed on
natural events from without, time is seen as an inherent feature of
the operation of *dharmas*. The doctrine of momentariness
analyzes *dharmas* as they transpire through time: as
psycho-physical events that arise and cease in consciousness and, by
the dynamics of their rise and fall, construct time. The sequence of
the three times is therefore secondary, generated in and by the
process of conditioned and conditioning *dharmas.* In fact, the
conceptual shift from the principle of impermanence to the theory of
momentariness is a shift in time scales. While the Sutranta
worldview interprets the three times as referring to past, present,
and future lives, the Abhidharma sees them as phases that any
conditioned *dharma* undergoes each and every moment.
Impermanence marks *dharmas* over a period of time, but is also
encapsulated in every single consciousness moment (*Vibh-a*
7-8; Sv 991; *Vism* XIV 191; Collins 1992, 227).


## 4. Intrinsic nature: between categorization and ontology



To preserve the principle of impermanence and explain continuity and
causal conditioning in ordinary experience, the Buddhist schools
introduced novel interpretations of the nature of *dharmas*. At
the heart of these interpretations is the concept of intrinsic nature
(Skt., *svabhava*, Pali, *sabhava*) that plays
a major role in the systematization of Abhidharma thought, is closely
related to the consolidation of the *dharma* theory, and is
regarded as that which gave an impetus to the Abhidharma growing
concern with ontology.



The term *svabhava/sabhava* does not feature in the
*sutras/suttas* and its rare mentions in other
Sarvastivada and Theravada canonical texts offer no
account of *dharma* as defined by a fixed intrinsic nature that
verifies its real
 existence.[11]
 This situation changes significantly in the post-canonical
literature, in which *svabhava* becomes a standard concept
extensively used in *dharma* exegesis. A recurring idea in the
exegetical Abhidharma literature from the period of the early
*vibhasa* compendia onward is that
*dharmas* are defined by virtue of their
*svabhava*. For instance, a definition transmitted in the
*Abhidharmakosabhasya* reads:
"*dharma* means 'upholding,' [namely],
upholding intrinsic nature (*svabhava*)," and the
*Mahavibhasa* states that "intrinsic
nature is able to uphold its own identity and not lose it [...]
as in the case of unconditioned *dharmas* that are able to
uphold their own identity" (Cox 2004A, 558-559).
Similarly, a definition prevalent in Theravadin Abhidhamma
commentaries is: "*dhammas* are so called because they
bear their intrinsic natures, or because they are borne by causal
conditions" (e.g., *Dhs-a* 39-40; *Patis-a*
I 18; *Vism-mht* I 347). The commentaries also regularly
equate *dhammas* with their intrinsic natures, using the terms
*dhamma* and *sabhava* interchangeably. For
example, the *Visuddhimagga* proclaims that
"*dhamma* means but intrinsic nature"
(*Vism* VIII 246), and the sub-commentary to the
*Dhammasangani* indicates that "there is no
other thing called *dhamma* apart from the intrinsic nature
borne by it" and that "the term *sabhava*
denotes the mere fact of being a *dhamma*"
(*Dhs-mt* 28 & 94; see also Karunadasa 2010: Ch.
1).



These commentarial definitions of *dharmas* as carrying their
intrinsic natures should not be interpreted ontologically as implying
that *dharmas* are substances having inherent existence. The
Pali commentaries, cautions Gethin (2004, 533), "are often
viewed too much in the light of later controversies about the precise
ontological status of *dharmas* and the Madhyamaka critique of
the notion of *svabhava* in the sense of 'inherent
existence.'" In fact, defining *dharmas* as bearing
their intrinsic natures conveys the idea that there is no enduring
agent behind them. Adding that *dharmas* are borne by causal
conditions counters the idea of intrinsic natures borne by underlying
substances distinct from themselves. Just as *dharmas* are
psycho-physical events that occur dependently on appropriate
conditions and qualities, their intrinsic natures arise dependently on
other conditions and qualities rather than on a substratum more real
than they are (*ibid;* Karunadasa 1996, 13-16;
Nyanaponika 1998, 40-41).



We must also note that the context within which *dharmas* are
rendered in terms of their intrinsic natures is that of
categorization, where multiple criteria and qualities are applied to
create a comprehensive taxonomic system that distinguishes the
particular character of any given *dharma*. Cox (2004A:
559-561) has shown that in the early period of northern Indian
Abhidharma texts, as represented by the
*Sariputrabhidharmasastra* and
portions of the *Mahavibhasa*, the concept
of intrinsic nature develops within the context of the method of
inclusion (*samgraha*), that is, the process by which the
inclusion of *dharmas* within a specific category is to be
applied. *Dharmas* are determined (*parinispanna*)
by the intrinsic nature that defines them and hence should not be
considered to possess a separately existing intrinsic nature.
"'Determination' implies two further features of
*dharmas* [...] First, just as categories in a
well-structured taxonomic schema are distinct and not subject to
fluctuation, so also *dharmas*, as 'determined,'
are clearly and unalterably discriminated: they are uniquely
individualized and as such are not subject to confusion with other
*dharmas*. [Second,] determination by intrinsic nature
undergoes no variation or modification, and hence, *dharmas*,
which are in effect types or categories of intrinsic nature, are
established as stable and immutable" (*ibid*, 562). In
the early Sarvastivada exegetical texts, then,
*svabhava* is used as an atemporal, invariable criterion
determining *what* a *dharma* is, not necessarily
*that* a *dharma* exists. The concern here is primarily
with what makes categorial types of *dharma* unique, rather
than with the ontological status of *dharmas*.



Nevertheless, from the foregoing categorial theory, the mature
Abhidharma drew ontological conclusions with regard to the reality of
*dharmas*. This transition in the conception of *dharma*
coincided with an inherent ambiguity in the term
*svabhava*, which is grounded logically and etymologically
in the term *bhava* that came to denote "mode of
existence" (*ibid*, 565-568). In the
*vibhasa* compendia and contemporaneous texts,
"the explicit emphasis upon categorization *per se*
recedes in importance as the focus shifts to clarifying the character
and eventually the ontological status of individual *dharmas*.
Accordingly, the term *svabhava* acquires the dominant
sense of 'intrinsic nature' specifying individual
*dharmas* [...] And determining individual
*dharmas* through unique intrinsic nature also entails
affirming their existence, as a natural function both of the
etymological sense of the term *svabhava* and of the role
of *dharmas* as the fundamental constituents of experience.
This then leads to the prominence of a new term that expressed this
ontological focus: namely, *dravya"* (*ibid*,
569). *Dravya* means "real existence" and, within
the Sarvastivada framework, *dharmas* that are
determined by intrinsic nature exist as real entities
(*dravyatas*), as opposed both to composite objects of ordinary
experience that exist provisionally and to relative concepts or
contingencies of time and place that exist relatively. The presence of
intrinsic nature indicates that a *dharma* is a primary
existent, irrespective of its temporal status, namely, whether it is a
past, present or future *dharma*, and hence the
Sarvastivada declaration that "all things
exist."



The Theravada rejected the Sarvastivada ontological
model, claiming that *dhammas* exist only in the present. But
the Theravada Abhidhamma shares with the Sarvastivada
the same principles of *dhamma* analysis as a categorial theory
that individuates sentient experience. Here, too, the taxonomic
function of *sabhava* gave rise to ontological
connotations of existence in the characterization of *dhammas*.
As the final units of Abhidhamma analysis, *dhammas* are
reckoned the ultimate constituents of experience. "There is
nothing else, whether a being, or an entity, or a man or a
person," a famous Pali commentarial excerpt proclaims
(*Dhs-a*
 155).[12]
 While this statement is meant to refute the rival Pudgalavada
position of the reality of the person by insisting that there is no
being or person apart from *dhammas*, there emerges the idea
that the phenomenal world is, at bottom, a world of *dhammas:*
that within the confines of sentient experience there is no other
actuality apart from *dhammas* and that what constitutes any
given *dhamma* as a discrete, individualized particular is its
intrinsic nature. The Theravada elaborates on the concept of
*sabhava* in juxtaposition to its theory of momentariness,
and it acquires the sense of what underlies a *dhamma*'s
endurance moment and as a point of reference to the moments of
origination and cessation. Before a *dhamma* eventuates it does
not yet obtain an intrinsic nature and when it ceases it is denuded of
this intrinsic nature. As a present occurrence, though, while
possessing its intrinsic nature, it exists as an ultimate reality and
its intrinsic nature is evidence of its actual existence as such
(*Dhs-a* 45; *Vism* VIII 234, XV 15). One commentarial
passage even goes so far as naming this instant "the acquisition
of a self" (*Vism-mht* I 343).


## 5. Causation: existence as functioning



The Abhidharma's ontological investigations occasioned a host of
doctrinal problems that became the subject of an ongoing debate among
the Buddhist schools. One primary controversy centered on the
principle of impermanence: if all phenomena are impermanent, the
Sautrantika challenged the Sarvastivada and the
Theravada, then *dharmas* must be changing continuously
and can neither exist in the past and future nor endure for any period
of time, however short, in the present. On the other hand, the
systematic analysis of experience in terms of momentary
*dharmas* required the Abhidharma to provide a rigorous account
of the processes that govern psychological and physical continuity.
What fuels these processes is causal interaction, but the very notion
of causation is allegedly compromised by the theory of momentariness.
If causes, conditions, and their results are all momentary events, how
can an event that has ended have a result? How can an event that
undergoes distinct stages of origination, endurance, and cessation in
a brief moment have causal efficacy? Notwithstanding their doctrinal
differences, both the Sarvastivada and the Theravada
Abhidhamma had to confront these challenges, and they did so by
formulating complex theories of immediate contiguity that grant causal
efficacy.



The Sarvastivada developed an analysis of causal
conditioning in terms of intricate interrelations among four types of
condition (*pratyaya*) and six types of cause (*hetu*).
As documented in the *Abhidharmakosabhasya*
(AKB 2.49) based on canonical texts including the
*Vijnanakaya*, the
*Prakaranapada*, and the
*Jnanaprasthana*, the four conditions are: 1)
root cause (literally "cause as condition,"
*hetupratyaya*), reckoned the foremost in inciting the process
of fruition and origination; 2) immediate antecedent, which holds
between a consciousness moment and its immediately preceding moment in
that consciousness series; 3) object support, which applies to all
*dharmas* insofar as they are intentional objects of
consciousness; and 4) predominance, which facilitates sensory
discriminative awareness, e.g., the faculty of sight's
predominance over visual cognitive awareness. The six causes are: 1)
instrumentality (*karanahetu*), deemed the primary
factor in the production of a result; 2) simultaneity or coexistence,
which connects phenomena that arise simultaneously; 3) homogeneity,
explaining the homogenous flow of *dharmas* that evokes the
seeming continuity of phenomena; 4) association, which operates only
between mental *dharmas* and explains why the elements of
consciousness always appear as assemblages of mental factors; 5)
dominance, which forms one's habitual cognitive and behaviorist
dispositions; and 6) fruition, referring to whatever is the result of
actively wholesome or unwholesome *dharmas*. The four
conditions and six causes interact with each other in explaining
phenomenal experience: for instance, each consciousness moment acts
both as the homogenous cause as well as the immediate antecedent
condition of the rise of consciousness and its concomitants in a
subsequent
 moment.[13]



Underlying this analysis of causal conditioning is the notion of
existence as efficacious action, or karma. Karma, a fundamental
principle in Buddhist thought from its inception, is what fuels the
repetitive experience in *samsara*, the round of
 rebirth.[14]
 In Abhidharma exegesis, the efficacious action or distinctive
functioning of *dharmas* is understood predominantly as causal
functioning. For the orthodox
Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika, the existence of
*dharmas* as real entities (*dravyatas*) is determined
by both their intrinsic nature and particular causal functioning.
Intrinsic nature, however, is an atemporal determinant of real
existence. What determines a *dharma*'s spatio-temporal
existence is its distinctive causal functioning: past and future
*dharmas* have capability (*samarthya*) of
functioning, while present *dharmas* also exert a distinctive
activity (*karitra*). Present activity is an internal
causal efficacy that assists in the production of an effect within a
*dharma*'s own consciousness series. It is this activity
that determines a *dharma*'s present existence and
defines the limits of the span of its present moment. Capability, by
contrast, is a conditioning efficacy externally directed towards
another consciousness series: it constitutes a condition that assists
another *dharma* in the production of its own effect (Cox
2004A, 570-573; Williams 1981, 240-243). A
*dharma*'s present activity arises and falls away, but
past and future *dharmas* all have potential for causal
functioning and exist as real entities due to their intrinsic nature.
For the Sarvastivada, this model--which insists on
constant change within the limits of the present moment and implies
the existence of *dharmas* in the three time
periods--preserves both the principle of impermanence yet
explains continuity and causal efficacy.



The Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika distinction between a
*dharma*'s activity and capability implies that each
*dharma* or consciousness moment effects the next moment within
its series, but it can also act as a contributory condition towards
producing a different sort of effect. Activity engenders the next
moment within a *dharma*'s series, while capability
generates a different effect and explains the causal efficacy of past
*dharmas*. Williams (1981, 246-247) helpfully notes that
we may render this "horizontal" and "vertical"
causality, within a consciousness series and transcending it
respectively. For example, an instant of visual awareness horizontally
produces the next moment of visual awareness and may or may not,
depending on other factors such as light and so on, vertically produce
vision of the object. "It follows that to be present is to have
horizontal causality, which may or may not include vertical
causality--a fact which serves to remind us that we are dealing
here with primary existents which are frequently positioned within the
system in terms of what they do" (*ibid*). Thus activity
or horizontal causality--a *dharma*'s function of
precipitating the next moment of its own consciousness
series--individuates that *dharma* as a particular event
of its kind. A *dharma*'s capability or vertical
causality, by which it facilitates the occurrence of other
*dharmas* outside its consciousness series, locates it within
the web of interrelations that connects it with the incessant rise and
fall of other *dharmas*, and hence further individuates it as
that very particular *dharma* by manifesting its unique quality
and intensity of operation.



The Saturantika and the Theravada developed alternative
theories of causal conditioning in conjunction with their rejection of
the Sarvastivada ontological model and their claim that
*dharmas* exist only in the present. The Sautrantika
explained causal interaction among past and future *dharmas* by
reference to the idea of "seeds" (*bija*), or
modifications in subsequent *dharma* series. The
Sautrantika theory of seeds is the precursor of two extremely
important concepts of later Mahayana Buddhist thought,
namely, the Yogacara's concepts of "store
consciousness" (*alayavijnana*) and of
Buddha-nature (*tathagatagarbha*) (Cox 1995, 94-95; Gethin
1998, 222). The Theravada theory of causal conditioning, as set
out in the *Patthana*, proposes a set of
twenty-four conditional relations (*paccaya*) that account for
all possible ways in which a phenomenon may function in conditioning
the rise of another phenomenon. The twenty-four conditional relations
are: 1) root cause (*hetupaccaya*); 2) object support; 3)
predominance; 4) proximity; 5) contiguity; 6) simultaneity; 7)
reciprocity; 8) support; 9) decisive support; 10) pre-existence 11)
post-existence; 12) habitual cultivation; 13) karma; 14) fruition; 15)
nutriment; 16) controlling faculty; 17) *jhana* - a
relation specific to meditation attainments; 18) path - a
relation specific to the stages on the Buddhist path; 19) association;
20) dissociation; 21) presence; 22) absence; 23) disappearance; 24)
 non-disappearance.[15]
 The majority of the Theravada twenty-four conditions have
counterparts in the Sarvastivada theory and both systems
show various other parallel interests and points of resemblance. The
likelihood, then, is that the two systems originated before the two
schools separated and continued to evolve after their separation
(Conze 1962, 152-153; Kalupahana 1961, 173).



Their differences notwithstanding, both the Sarvastivada and
the Theravada theories of causal conditioning are based on the
notions that *dharmas* are psycho-physical events that perform
specific functions, and that to define what a *dhamma* is
requires one to determine what it does (Gethin 1992A, 150). It turns
out, then, that the relative positioning of each *dharma*
within a network of causes and conditions is, first and foremost, a
means for its individuation. Only in a subsidiary sense is this
network an analysis of causal efficacy. What reappears here is the
categorial dimension of the *dharma* analysis qua a
metaphysical theory of mental events in terms of sameness of
conditional relations. Analogous to the space-time coordinate system
that enables one to identify and describe material objects, the
network of conditional relations may be seen as a coordinate system
that locates within it any given *dharma*, implying that to be
a *dharma* is to be an event that has a place in that web of
relations--an idea reminiscent of Donald Davidson's
principle of sameness of causes and effects as a condition of identity
of events (2001 119-120 & 154-161). Two
*dharma* instances of the same type would fit into the web of
causal conditions in exactly the same way, but would then be
distinguished as individual instances on the grounds of their unique
degrees and modes of causal efficacy.


## 6. Epistemology: Perception and the theory of the consciousness process



In attempting to account for what effects liberating insight and what
makes up the awakened mind, Abhidharma inquiries extended into the
field of epistemology. We have seen that the Abhidharma's
analysis of sentient experience reveals that what we perceive as a
temporally extended, uninterrupted flow of phenomena is, in fact, a
rapidly occurring sequence of causally connected consciousness moments
or *cittas* (i.e., assemblages of *citta* and
*caitta/cetasika*), each with its particular object. The mature
Abhidharma thus assimilates the analysis of
phenomena-in-time-as-constituted-by-consciousness with a highly
complex description of the consciousness process, dissolving the
causal relations between ordered successions of consciousness moments
into the activity of perception. As previously noted in section 2, for
the Abhidharma, as in Buddhist epistemology in general, sensory
perception is the paradigm of perceptual, sentient experience. Like
every instance of consciousness, sensory perception is intentional,
encapsulated in the interaction among the sense faculties, their
corresponding types of discriminative consciousness, and their
appropriate sense objects. Different Buddhist schools, however, held
different positions on the distinctive nature of perceptual
experience, and on the specific roles of the sense faculties and
status of sense objects in it. The Theravada Abhidhamma and the
Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika both espouse a view that
proposes a direct contact between perceptual consciousness and its
sense objects, the latter being understood as *sensibilia*, for
what we perceive are not objects of common sense but their sensible
qualities. We may characterize this view as phenomenalist realism
(Dreyfus 1997, 331 & 336).



The Theravada Abhidhamma sets out its theory of the consciousness
process (*citta-vithi*) in its commentaries and manuals,
mainly in the works of Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta (5th century CE), and
Anuruddha (10th or 11th century CE), based on earlier descriptions in
the *Dhammasangani* and the
*Patthana* (*Vism* XIV 111-124,
XVII 126-145; *Dhs-a* 82-106 & 267-287;
*Vibh-a* 155-160; *Abhidh-s* 17-21). The
theory is not separate from the *dhamma* taxonomy and the
analysis of *citta* as previously outlined in section 2.
Rather, in congruency with the notion of existence (whether categorial
or ontological) as functioning, it analyzes sensory perception as
resulting from particular functions that are performed by the
eighty-nine *citta* types revealed by the foregoing taxonomy.
According to this analysis, the specific functions in the
consciousness flow occur at particular instants of that continuum, as
the normal flow of consciousness involves the mind picking up and
putting down sense objects by means of successive sets of associated
mental factors. The result is a fairly static account of mental and
material phenomena as they arise in consciousness over a series of
consciousness
 moments.[16]



Restricting the account to the consciousness process of ordinary
beings, two types of process are described: five-sense-door processes
(*pancadvara*) and mind-door processes
(*manodvara*). These may occur in succession, or mind-door
processes may occur independently. Five-sense-door processes account
for sensory perception as information is directly received from the
fields of the five physical sense faculties. Mind-door processes
internalize the information received through the sense faculties and
characterize the mind that is absorbed in thought or memory. Objects
at the "door" of the mind, which is treated in Buddhist
thought as a sixth sense faculty, may be past, present, or future,
purely conceptual or even transcendent. Normally, however, the object
at the mind door will be either a past memory or a concept. If there
is no perceptual activity, as is the case in deep, dreamless sleep,
the mind is in a state of rest called inactive mode
(*bhavanga*). Throughout one's life, the same type
of *citta* performs this function of the inactive mind that is
the natural mode to which the mind reverts. The mind switches from its
inactive mode to a simple mind-door process when a concept or memory
occurs and no attention is directed to the other five sense fields.
The simplest mind-door process is a succession of the following
functions: 1) adverting to the object of thought: a function that
lasts one moment and becomes internalized as an object support; 2)
impulsion: occurs for up to seven moments and performs the function of
the mind's responding actively to the object with wholesome or
unwholesome karma; 3) retaining: holding on to the object of the
consciousness process for one or two moments.



The mind switches from its inactive mode to any of the five-sense-door
processes when an object occurs at the "door" of the
appropriate sense faculty. This process of sensory perception involves
a greater number of functions: 1) disturbed inactive mind: a function
that arises due to the stimulus of the sense object. It lasts for two
moments, during which sensory contact takes place, i.e., a physical
impact of the sense object on the physical matter of the appropriate
sense faculty; 2) adverting: lasts one moment, during which the mind
turns towards the object at the appropriate sense "door;"
3) perceiving: lasts one moment and is the sheer perception of the
sense object with minimal interpretation; 4) receiving: lasts one
moment and performs the intermediary role of enabling transit to and
from the appropriate discriminative consciousness, whether visual,
auditory, etc.; 5) investigating: lasts one moment and performs the
role of establishing the nature of the sense object and of determining
the mind's response to that object that has just been
identified; 6) impulsion: same as in the mind-door process; 7)
retaining: same as in the mind-door process. As an example, visual
perception involves not only seeing itself, but also a succession of
moments of fixing of the visual object in the mind, recognition of its
general features, and identification of its nature. In both the
mind-door and five-sense door processes, the sense faculty and its
sense object condition the arising of a present moment of a
corresponding apprehending consciousness, that is, perception here is
modeled on simultaneous conditioning. And in both the mind-door and
five-sense door processes, when the retaining function ceases, the
mind reenters its inactive mode.



The consciousness types that perform most of the functions that make
up the mind-door and the five-sense-door processes fall into the
category of resultant *cittas*, that is, those that are the
result of past actively wholesome or unwholesome consciousness. This
means that the experience of the sense data presented to one's
mind is determined by one's previous actions and is beyond of
one's immediate control. Whenever one remembers or
conceptualizes, sees, hears, smells, tastes, or touches something that
is desirable or pleasing, one experiences a result of previous
wholesome consciousness. And vice versa with objects that are
undesirable or unpleasing and previous unwholesome consciousness
respectively. Only in the final stage of the consciousness process,
when the mind has chosen to respond actively to its object in some
way, actively present wholesome or unwholesome consciousness operates
and constitutes karma that will bear future results. The Abhidhamma
thus "provides an exact small-scale analysis of the process of
dependent arising" (Gethin 1998, 216).



The Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika proposes a similar
account of sensory perception, but argues that the sensory object
exists as a real entity. The Sautrantika theory of perception,
however, is rather different. It rests on the Sautrantika radical
view of momentariness, according to which there is no real duration
but only a succession of infinitesimal moments, and on its view of
causation, according to which causes cease to exist when their effects
come into existence. The application of these principles to sensory
perception makes it difficult to explain how perception directly
apprehends sense objects, for it implies that objects have ceased when
their apprehending consciousness arises. The Sautrantika reply is
that consciousness does not have direct access to its sense objects.
By contrast to phenomenalist realism, the Sautrantika view of
perceptual consciousness may be characterized as representationalism:
it sees perception as apprehending its objects indirectly, through the
mediation of aspects (*akara*) representative of
their objects (Dreyfus 1997, 335 & 380-381).



What is common to all the three main Abhidharma
traditions--Theravada, Sarvastivada, and
Sautrantika--is that they manifest a somewhat similar
paradigm shift towards reducing the phenomenal, causally conditioned
world into the activity of cognition and consciousness. This shift was
part of a broader movement in Indian philosophy in which Hindu, Jain,
and Buddhist thinkers turned away from traditional metaphysical
questions about the nature of the external world and the self, and
focused instead on the study of epistemology, logic, and language.
Their purpose was to provide systematic accounts of the nature and
means of valid cognition. Within Buddhist circles, this
epistemological turn saw the rise of thinkers such as Asanga and
Vasubandhu, the founders of the Yogacara (400-480 CE),
and, most notably, Dignaga and Dharmakirti (around 500 CE)
who developed sophisticated logical and philosophical systems
(*ibid*, 15-19). The Abhidharma, then, sets the stage for
this epistemological turn. The new emphasis becomes dominant from the
period of the *vibhasa* compendia onward and is
evident in a shift in the terminology used by the Abhidharma to
describe the nature of *dharmas*. This terminological shift is
indicated by the terms "particular inherent
characteristic" (Skt., *svalaksana*, Pali,
*salakkhana*) and "general characteristic"
(Skt., *samanyalaksana*, Pali,
*samanyalakkhana*).



The term *laksana/lakkhana* means a mark, or
a specific characteristic that distinguishes an indicated object from
others. The Logicians use this term in the sense of
"definition" of a concept or logical category. The
Abhidharma applies it to the practice of the discernment of
*dharmas*, distinguishing between multiple generic
characteristics a *dharma* shares with other *dharmas*
and (at least) one particular inherent characteristic that defines a
*dharma* as that very individual occurrence distinct from any
other instances of its type. The post-canonical Abhidharma thus
assimilates the concept of the particular inherent characteristic with
that of intrinsic nature. "*Dhammas*," the
Theravadin commentarial literature states, "are so called
because they bear their particular inherent characteristics"
(*Vibh-a* 45; *Vibh-mt* 35; *Patis-a*
I 79; *Vism* XV 3), and a particular characteristic "is
the intrinsic nature that is not held in common by other
*dhammas*" (*Vism-mht* II 137). Used in
conjunction or interchangeably with intrinsic nature, the particular
inherent characteristic constitutes a *dhamma*'s unique
definition (*Vism* VI 19, 35). It is an epistemological and
linguistic determinant of a *dhamma* as a knowable instance
that is defined by a distinct verbal description.



The *Mahavibhasa* of the
Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika similarly distinguishes
between a *dharma*'s particular inherent and generic
characteristics and identifies the former with intrinsic nature, thus
discriminating "levels in the apprehension or discernment of
*dharmas* that serve to clarify the ambiguity encountered in
the application of the term *svabhava* to both individual
*dharmas* and to categorial groups" (Cox 2004A, 575). The
difference between the analytical description of *dharmas* in
terms of their intrinsic nature or their characteristics, notes Cox
(*ibid*, 576), is that "whereas intrinsic nature acquires
its special significance in the context of exegetical categorization,
the starting point for the characteristics lies in perspectivistic
cognition. Ontology is a concern for both systems, but the shift in
terminology from intrinsic nature to the characteristics reflects a
concurrent shift from a category-based abstract ontology to an
epistemological ontology that is experientially or cognitively
determined." This new epistemological emphasis looms in through
a modified definition of existence proposed by the mature
Sarvastivada exegesis that sees the causal efficacy
underlying all existence as cognitive. Representing this development
in the history of Sarvastivada thought is Sanghabhadra
(fifth century CE), who states in his
*Nyayanusara:* "to be an object-field that
produces cognition (*buddhi*) is the true characteristic of
existence" (*ibid*). This means that *dharmas* as
the constituents of our experiential world are objectively
identifiable through cognition.



In sum, the Abhidharma project, as evident by the *dharma*
theory and its supporting doctrines, is, at bottom, epistemologically
oriented. Yet the project also intends to ascertain that every
constituent of the experiential world is knowable and nameable, and
that the words and concepts used in the discourse that develops around
the discernment of these constituents uniquely define their
corresponding referents. The *dharma* analysis therefore paves
the way for conceptual realism: a worldview that is based on the
notion of truth as consisting in a correspondence between our concepts
and statements, on the one hand, and the features of an independent,
determinate reality, on the other hand. Conceptual realism does not
necessarily have implications for the ontological status of this
reality as externally existing. But to espouse such a position is to
make a significant move away from the earliest Buddhist teaching that
presents the Buddha's view of language as
 conventional.[17]