## 1. What is a Nation?


### 1.1 The Basic Concept of Nationalism



Although the term "nationalism" has a variety of meanings,
it centrally encompasses two phenomena: (1) the attitude that the
members of a nation have when they care about their identity as
members of that nation and (2) the actions that the members of a
nation take in seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of political
sovereignty (see for example, Nielsen 1998-9: 9). Each of these
aspects requires elaboration.


1. raises questions about the concept of a nation or national
identity, about what it is to belong to a nation, and about how much
one ought to care about one's nation. Nations and national
identity may be defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or
cultural ties, and while an individual's membership in the
nation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded as
voluntary. The degree of care for one's nation that nationalists
require is often, but not always, taken to be very high: according to
such views, the claims of one's nation take precedence over
rival contenders for authority and
 loyalty.[1]
2. raises questions about whether sovereignty requires the
acquisition of full statehood with complete authority over domestic
and international affairs, or whether something less than statehood
suffices. Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood
(Gellner 1983: ch.
 1),[2]
 possible exceptions have been recognized (Miller 1992: 87; Miller
2000). Some authors even defend an anarchist version of
patriotism-moderate nationalism foreshadowed by Bakunin (see Sparrow
2007).



There is a terminological and conceptual question of distinguishing
nationalism from patriotism. A popular proposal is the contrast
between attachment to one's country as defining patriotism and
attachment to one's people and its traditions as defining
nationalism (Kleinig 2014: 228, and Primoratz 2017: Section 1.2). One
problem with this proposal is that love for a country is not really
just love of a piece of land but normally involves attachment to the
community of its inhabitants, and this introduces "nation"
into the conception of patriotism. Another contrast is the one between
strong, and somewhat aggressive attachment (nationalism) and a mild
one (patriotism), dating back at least to George Orwell (see his 1945
essay).[3]



Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of
agreement about the classical, historically paradigmatic form of
nationalism. It typically features the supremacy of the nation's
claims over other claims to individual allegiance and full sovereignty
as the persistent aim of its political program. Territorial
sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state
power and essential for nationhood. It was extolled in classic modern
works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stage
in the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical (see below).
Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people (in
particular immigration) and the resource rights implied in territorial
sovereignty make the topic politically central in the age of
globalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists and
anti-nationalists alike.



In recent times, the philosophical focus has moved more in the
direction of "liberal nationalism", the view that
mitigates the classical claims and tries to bring together the
pro-national attitude and the respect for traditional liberal values.
For instance, the territorial state as political unit is seen by
classical nationalists as centrally "belonging" to one
ethnic-cultural group and as actively charged with protecting and
promulgating its traditions. The liberal variety allows for
"sharing" of the territorial state with non-dominant
ethnic groups. Consequences are varied and quite interested (for more
see below, especially
 section 2.1).


### 1.2 The Concept of a Nation



In its general form, the issue of nationalism concerns the mapping
between the ethno-cultural domain (featuring ethno-cultural groups or
"nations") and the domain of political organization. In
breaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of the
attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their
national identity. This point raises two sorts of questions. First,
the descriptive ones:



(1a)
What is a nation and what is national identity?
 (1b)
What is it to belong to a nation?
 (1c)
What is the nature of pro-national attitude?
 (1d)
Is membership in a nation voluntary or involuntary?


Second, the normative ones:



(1e)
Is the attitude of caring about national identity always
appropriate?
 (1f)
How much should one care?


This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with
 (1a)
 and
 (1b);the
 normative questions are addressed in
 Section 3
 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for
their national interests, one must have some idea about what a nation
is and what it is to belong to a nation. So, in order to formulate and
ground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action,
pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity,
culture, nation, and state. Their opponents have in turn challenged
these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and
nations are essential for the nationalist, while others are
theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. The
definition and status of the social group that benefits from the
nationalist program, variously called the "nation",
"ethno-nation", or "ethnic group", is
essential. Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups
that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism
purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter.



Indeed, purely "civic" loyalties are often categorized
separately under the title "patriotism", which we already
mentioned, or "constitutional
 patriotism".[4]
 This leaves two extreme options and a number of intermediates. The
first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished
band of
 theorists.[5]
 According to their purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is any
group of people aspiring to a common political state-like
organization. If such a group of people succeeds in forming a state,
the loyalties of the group members become "civic" (as
opposed to "ethnic") in nature. At the other extreme, and
more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary
community of common origin, language, tradition, and culture: the
classic ethno-nation is a community of origin and culture, including
prominently a language and customs. The distinction is related
(although not identical) to that drawn by older schools of social and
political science between "civic" and "ethnic"
nationalism, the former being allegedly Western European and the
latter more Central and Eastern European, originating in
 Germany.[6]
 Philosophical discussions centered on nationalism tend to concern the
ethnic-cultural variants only, and this habit will be followed here. A
group aspiring to nationhood on this basis will be called an
"ethno-nation" to underscore its ethno-cultural rather
than purely civic underpinnings. For the ethno-(cultural) nationalist
it is one's ethnic-cultural background that determines
one's membership in the community. One cannot choose to be a
member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and
early socialization. However, commonality of origin has become
mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups have
been mixing for millennia.



Sophisticated, liberal pro-nationalists therefore tend to stress
cultural membership only and speak of "nationality",
omitting the "ethno-" part (Miller 1992, 2000; Tamir
1993,2013; Gans 2003). Michel Seymour's proposal of a
"socio-cultural definition" adds a political dimension to
the purely cultural one: a nation is a cultural group, possibly but
not necessarily united by a common descent, endowed with civic ties
(Seymour 2000). This is the kind of definition that would be accepted
by most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is a
somewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but still
closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic
extreme.



Let us now turn to the issue of the origin and
"authenticity" of ethno-cultural groups or ethno-nations.
In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of
views, but there is a third group, combining element from both. The
first are modernist views that see nationalism as born in modern
times, together with
 nation-states.[7]
 In our times the view was pioneered by Ernst Gellner (see his
 1983).[8]
 Other modernist choose similar starting points with century or two of
 variation.[9]
 The opposite view can be called, following Edward Shils (1957) "primordialist".
According to it, actual ethno-cultural nations have either existed
"since time immemorial".



The third, quite plausible kind of view, distinct from both
primordialism-ethno-symbolism and modernism, has been initiated by W.
Connor (1994).[10]
 A nation is a politicized and mobilized ethnic group rather than a
state. So, the origins of nationalism predate the modern state, and
its emotional content remains up to our times (Conversi 2002: 270),
but the actual statist organization is, indeed, modern. However,
nation-state is a nationalist dream and fiction, never really
implemented, due to the inescapable plurality of social groups. So
much for the three dominant perspectives on the origin of
nationalism.



Indeed, the older authors--from great thinkers like Herder and
Otto Bauer to the propagandists who followed their
footsteps--took great pains to ground normative claims upon firm
ontological realism about nations: nations are real, *bona
fide* entities. However, the contemporary moral debate has tried
to diminish the importance of the imagined/real divide. Prominent
contemporary philosophers have claimed that normative-evaluative
nationalist claims are compatible with the "imagined"
nature of a
 nation.[11]
 They point out that common imaginings can tie people together, and
that actual interaction resulting from togetherness can engender
important moral obligations.



Let us now turn to question
 (1c)
 about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue
that has interested political and social scientists concerns
ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national
attitude. Is it as irrational, romantic, and indifferent to
self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided
authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try
to explain it as being in some sense rational. Authors who see it as
irrational propose various explanations of why people assent to
irrational views. Some say, critically, that nationalism is based on
"false consciousness". But where does such false
consciousness come from? The most simplistic view is that it is a
result of direct manipulation of "masses" by
"elites". On the opposite side, the famous critic of
nationalism Elie Kedourie (1960) thinks this irrationality is
spontaneous. A decade and a half ago Liah Greenfeld went as far as
linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative 2005 article
(see also her 2006 book). On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has
offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his 2002.
Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper
explanations. To mention one, the French structuralist Etienne
Balibar sees it as a result of the "production" of
ideology effectuated by mechanisms which have nothing to do with
spontaneous credulity of individuals, but with impersonal, structural
social factors (Balibar & Wallerstein 1988
 [1991]).[12]



Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become
nationalists (Hardin 1985). Can one rationally explain the extremes of
ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do so
in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: most
typically, if an individual has no reason to trust someone, it is
reasonable for that individual to take precautions against the other.
If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the
other as increasingly inimical. It then becomes rational to start
treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small,
individually rational steps to a situation of conflict. (Such negative
development is often presented as a variant of the Prisoner's
Dilemma; see the entry on
 prisoner's dilemma).
 It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general
pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts (see also
Wimmer 2013).



Finally, as for question
 (1d),
 the nation is typically seen as an essentially non-voluntary
community to which one belongs by birth and early nurture and such
that the belonging is enhanced and made more complete by one's
additional conscious endorsement. Not everyone agrees: liberal
nationalists accept the idea of choice of one's national
belonging and of possibility for immigrants to become nationals by
choice and intentional acculturation.


## 2. Varieties of Nationalism


### 2.1 Concepts of Nationalism: Classical and Liberal



We pointed out at the very beginning of the entry that nationalism
focuses upon (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when
they care about their national identity, and (2) the actions that the
members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) some
form of political sovereignty. The politically central point is (2):
the actions enjoined by the nationalist. To these we now turn,
beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a national
struggle for independence. They raise an important issue:



(2a)
Does political sovereignty within or over a territory require
statehood or something weaker?


The classical answer is that a state is required. A more liberal
answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has
been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues:



(2b)
What actions are morally permitted to achieve sovereignty and to
maintain it?
(2c)
Under what conditions is it morally permitted to take actions of
this kind?


Consider first the classical nationalist answer to
 (2a).
 Political sovereignty requires a state "rightfully owned"
by the ethno-nation (Oldenquist 1997). Developments of this line of
thought often state or imply specific answers to
 (2b),
 and
 (2c),
 i.e., that in a national independence struggle the use of force
against the threatening central power is almost always a legitimate
means for bringing about sovereignty. However, classical nationalism
is not only concerned with the creation of a state but also with its
maintenance and strengthening.



*Classical nationalism* is the political program that sees the
creation and maintenance of a fully sovereign state owned by a given
ethno-national group ("people" or "nation") as
a primary duty of each member of the group. Starting from the
assumption that the appropriate (or "natural") unit of
culture is an ethno-nation, it claims that a primary duty of each
member is to abide by one's recognizably ethno-national culture
in all cultural matters.



Classical nationalists are usually vigilant about the kind of culture
they protect and promote and about the kind of attitude people have to
their nation-state. This watchful attitude carries some potential
dangers: many elements of a given culture that are universal or simply
not recognizably national may fall prey to such nationalist
enthusiasms. Classical nationalism in everyday life puts various
additional demands on individuals, from buying more expensive
home-produced goods in preference to cheaper imported ones to
procreating as many future members of the nation as one can manage
(see Yuval-Davies 1997, and Yack 2012).



Besides classical nationalism (and its more radical extremist
cousins), various moderate views are also now classified as
nationalist. Indeed, the philosophical discussion has shifted to these
moderate or even ultra-moderate forms, and most philosophers who
describe themselves as nationalists propose very moderate nationalist
programs.



*Nationalism in this wider sense* is any complex of attitudes,
claims, and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political,
moral, and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving
obligations (for individual members of the nation, and for any
involved third parties, individual or collective) from this ascribed
value. The main representative of this group of views is *liberal
nationalism*, proposed by authors like Miller, Tamir, and Gans
(see below).



Nationalisms in this wider sense can vary somewhat in their
conceptions of the nation (which are often left implicit in their
discourse), in the grounds for and degree of its value, and in the
scope of their prescribed obligations. Moderate nationalism is less
demanding than classical nationalism and sometimes goes under the name
of "patriotism." (A different usage, again, reserves
"patriotism" for valuing civic community and loyalty to
state, in contrast to nationalism, centered on ethnic-cultural
communities).



Let us now turn to liberal nationalism, the most discussed kind of
moderate nationalism.



Liberal nationalists see liberal-democratic principles and
pro-national attitudes as belonging together. One of the main
proponents of the view, Yael Tamir, started the debate in her 1993
book and in her recent book talks about the nation-state as "an
ideal meeting point between the two" (2019: 6). Of course, some
things have to be sacrificed: we must acknowledge that either the
meaningfulness of a community or its openness must be sacrificed to
some extent as we cannot have them both. (2019: 57). How much of each
is to give way is left open, and of course, various liberal
nationalists take different views of what precisely the right answer
is.



Tamir's version of liberal nationalism is a kind of social
liberalism, in this respect similar to the views of David Miller who
talks about "solidaristic communities" in his 1999 book
*Principles of Social Justice* and also takes stance in his
1995 and 2008 books. They both see the feeling of national identity as
a feeling that promotes solidarity, and solidarity as means for
increased social justice (Tamir 2019, in particular ch.20; compare
Walzer 1983, Kymlicka 1995a, 2001, and Gans 2003, 2008).



Liberal nationalists diverge about the value of multiculturalism.
Kymlicka takes it as basic for his picture of liberalism while Tamir
dismisses it without much ado: multicultural, multiethnic democracies
have a very poor track record, she claims (2019: 62). Tamir's
diagnosis of the present day political crisis, with politicians like
Trump and Le Pen coming to the forefront, is that "liberal
democrats were paralyzed by their assumed victory" whereas
"nationalists felt defeated and obsolete" (2019: 7).



Tamir lists two kinds of reasons that guarantee special political
status to nations. First kind, that no other political entity
"is more able than the state to promote ideas in the public
sphere" (2019: 52), and the second kind that nation needs
continuous creative effort to make it functional and attractive.



The historical development of liberalism turned it into a
universalistic, anti-communitarian principle; this has been a fatal
mistake that can be and should be corrected by the liberal nationalist
synthesis. Can we revive the unifying narratives of our nationality
without sacrificing the liberal inheritance of freedom and rights?
Liberal nationalism answers in the affirmative. From its standpoint,
national particularism has primacy: "The love of humanity is a
noble ideal, but real love is always particular..." (2019:
68).



Interestingly, Tamir combines this high regard of nation with an
extreme constructivist view of its nature: nations are mental
structures that exist in the minds of their members (2019: 58).



Is liberal nationalism implemented anywhere in the present world, or
is it more of an ideal, probably end-state theory, that proposes a
picture of a desirable society? Judging by the writings of liberal
nationalists, it is the latter, although presented as a relatively
easily reachable ideal, combining two traditions that are already well
implemented in political reality.



The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are those
that influence the moral standing of claims and of recommended
nationalist practices. The elaborate philosophical views put forward
in favor of nationalism will be referred to as "theoretical
nationalism", the adjective serving to distinguish such views
from less sophisticated and more practical nationalist discourse. The
central theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can be charted on
the map of possible positions within political theory in the following
useful but somewhat simplified and schematic way.



Nationalist claims featuring the nation as central to political action
must answer two crucial general questions. First, is there one kind of
large social group that is of special moral importance? The
nationalist answer is that there certainly is one, namely, the nation.
Moreover, when an ultimate choice is to be made, say between ties of
family, or friendship, and the nation, the latter has priority.
Liberal nationalists prefer a more moderate stance, which ascribes
value to national belonging, but don't make it central in this
way. Second, what are the grounds for an individual's
obligations to the morally central group? Are they based on voluntary
or involuntary membership in the group? The typical contemporary
nationalist thinker opts for the latter, while admitting that
voluntary endorsement of one's national identity is a morally
important achievement. On the philosophical map, pro-nationalist
normative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general:
most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose the
nation as the preferred community (in contrast to those of their
fellow communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such as
those defined by global religious
 traditions).[13]



Before proceeding to moral claims, let us briefly sketch the issues
and viewpoints connected to territory and territorial rights that are
essential for nationalist political 
 programs.[14] 
 Why is territory
important for ethno-national groups, and what are the extent and
grounds of territorial rights? Its primary importance resides in
sovereignty and all the associated possibilities for internal control
and external exclusion. Add to this the Rousseauian view that
political attachments are essentially bounded and that love --or,
to put it more mildly, republican civil friendship--for
one's group requires exclusion of some "other", and
the importance becomes quite obvious. What about the grounds for the
demand for territorial rights? Nationalist and pro-nationalist views
mostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have to
national territory and to the formative value of territory for a
nation to justify territorial claims (see Miller 2000 and Meisels
2009). This is similar in some respects to the rationale given by
proponents of indigenous peoples' rights (Tully 2004, but see
also Hendrix 2008) and in other respects to Kolers' 2009
ethno-geographical non-nationalist theory, but differs in preferring
ethno-national groups as the sole carriers of the right. These
attachment views stand in stark contrast to more pragmatic views about
territorial rights as means for conflict resolution (e.g., Levy 2000).
Another quite popular alternative is the family of individualistic
views grounding territorial rights in rights and interests of
individuals.[15]
 On the extreme end of anti-nationalist views
stands the idea of Pogge) that there are no specific territorial
problems for political philosophy--the "dissolution
approach", as Kolers calls it.


### 2.2 Moral Claims, Classical Vs. Liberal: The Centrality of Nation



We now pass to the normative dimension of nationalism. We shall first
describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i.e., sketch and
classify the typical normative and evaluative nationalist claims.
These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our
initial questions about (1) pro-national attitudes and (2)
actions.



We will see that these claims recommend various courses of action:
centrally, those meant to secure and sustain a political organization
for the given ethno-cultural national community (thereby making more
specific the answers to our normative questions
 (1e),
 (1f),
 (2b),
 and
 (2c)).
 Further, they enjoin the community's members to promulgate
recognizable ethno-cultural contents as central features of the
cultural life within such a state. Finally, we shall discuss various
lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense
of these claims. To begin, let us return to the claims concerning the
furthering of the national state and culture. These are proposed by
the nationalist as norms of conduct. The philosophically most
important variations concern three aspects of such normative
claims:


1. The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promote
merely a right (say, to have and maintain a form of political
self-government, preferably and typically a state, or have cultural
life centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture), or a moral
obligation (to get and maintain one), or a moral, legal, and political
obligation? The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism;
its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in
place, legally enforceable obligations for all parties concerned,
including for the individual members of the ethno-nation. A weaker but
still quite demanding version speaks only of moral obligation
("sacred duty").
2. The strength of the nationalist claim in relation to various
external interests and rights: to give a real example, is the use of
the domestic language so important that even international conferences
should be held in it, at the cost of losing the most interesting
participants from abroad? The force of the nationalist claim is here
being weighed against the force of other claims, including those of
individual or group interests or rights. Variations in comparative
strength of nationalist claims take place on a continuum between two
extremes. At one rather unpalatable extreme, nation-focused claims
take precedence over any other claims, including over human rights.
Further towards the center is the classical nationalism that gives
nation-centered claims precedence over individual interests and many
needs, but not necessarily over general human rights (see, for
example, MacIntyre 1994, Oldenquist 1997). On the opposite end, which
is mild, humane, and liberal, the central classical nationalist claims
are accorded *prima facie* status only (see Tamir 1993, Gans
2003, and Miller 2013; and for applications to Central Europe Stefan
Auer 2004).
3. For which groups are the nationalist claims, classical or
liberal, meant to be valid? What is their scope? One approach claims
that they are valid for every ethno-nation and thereby universal. An
example would be the claim "every ethno-nation should have its
own state". To put it more officially


> 
> 
> *Universalizing nationalism* is the political program that
> claims that *every* ethno-nation should have a state that it
> should rightfully own and the interests of which it should
> promote.
> 
> 
> 



Alternatively, a claim may be particularistic, such as the claim
"Group *X* ought to have a state", where this
implies nothing about any other group:



> 
> 
> *Particularistic nationalism* is the political program claiming
> that *some* ethno-nation should have its state, without
> extending the claim to all ethno-nations. It claims thus either
> 
> 
> 
> 	1. by omission (unreflective particularistic nationalism), or
> 	2. by explicitly specifying who is excluded: "Group *X*
> 	ought to have a state, but group *Y* should not"
> 	(invidious nationalism).
> 



The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism,
i.e., (B), has been called "invidious" since it explicitly
denies the privilege of having a state to some peoples. Serious
theoretical nationalists usually defend only the universalist variety,
whereas the nationalist-in-the-street most often defends the egoistic
indeterminate one.



The nationalist picture of morality traditionally has been quite close
to the dominant view in the theory of international relations called
"realism". Put starkly, the view is that morality ends at
the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but
 anarchy.[16]
 It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim about the
nation-state, i.e., that each ethno-nation or people should have a
state of its own, and suggests what happens next: nation-states enter
into competition in the name of their constitutive peoples.


## 3. The Moral Debate


### 3.1 Classical and liberal nationalisms



Recall the initial normative question centered around (1) attitudes
and (2) actions. Is national partiality justified, and to what extent?
What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? In
particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected
(ethno-) national cultures goods independent from the individual will
of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them? The
philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the
moral validity of its central claims. In particular, the ultimate
moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally
permissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of
 it?[17]
 Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations they
seem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless national
groups--the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical and
contemporary misfortunes of Kurds--lends credence to the idea
that having their own state would have solved the worst problems.
Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more
carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown
that the political form of the nation-state has some value as such,
that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and
political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity.
Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical
nationalist claims appear to clash--at least under normal
circumstances of contemporary life--with various values that
people tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essential
to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important
specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. The main
values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent
impartiality (most prominently towards members of groups culturally
different from one's own). The alleged special duties towards
one's ethno-national culture can and often do interfere with
individuals' right to autonomy.



Liberal nationalists are aware of the difficulties of the classical
approach, and soften the classical claims, giving them only a
*prima facie* status. They usually speak of "various
accretions that have given nationalism a bad name", and they are
eager to "separate the idea of nationality itself from these
excesses" (Miller 1992, 2000). Such thoughtful pro-nationalist
writers have participated in an ongoing philosophical dialogue between
proponents and opponents of the
 claim.[18]
 In order to help the reader find their through this involved debate,
we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the
ethno-nationalist to defend their case (compare the useful overview in
Lichtenberg 1997). Further lines of thought built upon these
considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of
nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones.



For brevity, each line of thought will be reduced to a brief argument;
the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch.
Some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the
debate will be indicated in brackets (see Miscevic 2001). The main
arguments in favor of nationalism will be divided into two sets. The
first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities
have a high value, sometime seen as coming from the interests of their
individual member (e.g., by Kymlicka, Miller, and Raz) and sometimes
as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their
individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected
by means of state and official statist policies. The second set is
less deeply "comprehensive", and encompasses arguments
from the requirements of justice, independent from substantial
assumptions about culture and cultural values.



The first set will be presented in more detail since it has formed the
core of the debate. It depicts the community as the source of value or
as the transmission device connecting its members to some important
values. For the classical nationalist, the arguments from this set are
communitarian in a particularly "deep" sense since they
are grounded in basic features of the human condition.



The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First,
the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good (e.g., a
person's identity), and some kind of community is essential for
acquisition and preservation of it. Then comes the claim that the
ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this
task. Then follows the statist conclusion: in order for such a
community to preserve its own identity and support the identity of its
members, it has to assume (always or at least normally) the political
form of a state. The conclusion of this type of argument is that the
ethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state and
the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their
own ethnic culture in relation to any other.



Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem
from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been
proposed by more liberal philosophers. The original communitarian
lines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is some
value in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings of
belonging to a common nation, and in solidarity between a
nation's members. A liberal nationalist might claim that these
are not the central values of political life but are values
nevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pure
individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, and
unmotivated by comparison. By cosmopolitanism we refer to moral and
political doctrines claiming that


1. one's primary moral obligations are directed to all human
beings (regardless of geographical or cultural distance), and
2. political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal
moral obligation (in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take
precedence over nation-states).



Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism,
many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and
patriotism-nationalism. In his writings, B. Barber glorifies "a
remarkable mixture of cosmopolitanism and parochialism" that in
his view characterizes American national identity (Barber 1996: 31).
Charles Taylor claims that "we have no choice but to be
cosmopolitan and patriots" (Taylor 1996: 121). Hilary Putnam
proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in which
each of us participates, apparently a middle way between a
narrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism
(Putnam 1996: 114). The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin
(1979) and Taylor (1989,
 1993),[19]
 and in the last two decades it has occupied center stage in the
debate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its
 light.[20]
 Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions of
the arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate or
ultra-moderate nationalist claims.



Here are then the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that
liberal, limited-liberal, and cosmopolitan nationalists propose.
First, ethno-national claims have only *prima facie* strength
and cannot trump individual rights. Second, legitimate ethno-national
claims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to a
state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural
autonomy. The main models of autonomy are either territorial or
non-territorial: the first involves territorial devolution; the
second, cultural autonomy granted to individuals regardless of their
domicile within the
 state.[21]
 Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, which
has little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria. Fourth,
ethno-national mythologies and similar "important
falsehoods" are to be tolerated only if benign and inoffensive,
in which case they are morally permissible despite their falsity.
Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be
derived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make.


### 3.2 Arguments in favor of nationalism, classical vs. liberal: the deep need for community



Consider now the particular pro-nationalist arguments from the first
set. The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the
subsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsic
value. The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value of
nation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral
understanding, firm identity and the like.


1. *The Argument From Intrinsic Value*. Each ethno-national
community is valuable in and of itself since it is only within the
natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that
important meanings and values are produced and transmitted. The
members of such communities share a special cultural proximity to each
other. By speaking the same language and sharing customs and
traditions, the members of these communities are typically closer to
one another in various ways than they are to the outsiders.
2. *The Argument from Flourishing*. The ethno-national
community is essential for each of its members to flourish. In
particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can
acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the
community's cultural life in general and the individual's
own life in particular. There has been much debate on the
pro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essential
for separateness of national groups.



The Canadian liberal nationalists Seymour (1999), Taylor, and Kymlicka
pointed out that "divergences of value between different regions
of Canada" that aspire to separate nationhood are
"minimal". Taylor (1993: 155) concluded that it is not
separateness of value that matters.


3. *The Argument from Identity*. Communitarian philosophers
emphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining our
identity as people--we come to be who we are because of the
social settings and contexts in which we mature. This claim certainly
has some plausibility. The very identity of each person depends upon
his/her participation in communal life (see MacIntyre 1994, Nielsen,
1998, and Lagerspetz 2000). Given that an individual's morality
depends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, the
communal conditions that foster the development of personal identity
must be preserved and encouraged. Therefore, communal life should be
organized around particular national cultures.
4. *The Argument from Moral Understanding*. A particularly
important variety of value is moral value. Some values are universal,
e.g., freedom and equality, but these are too abstract and
"thin". The rich, "thick" moral values are
discernible only within particular traditions; as Charles Taylor puts
it, "the language we have come to accept articulates the issues
of the good for us" (1989: 35). The nation offers a natural
framework for moral traditions, and thereby for moral understanding;
it is the primary school of morals.
5. *The Argument from Diversity*. Each national culture
contributes uniquely to the diversity of human cultures. The most
famous twentieth century proponent of the idea, Isaiah Berlin
(interpreting Herder), writes:


> 
> 
> The 'physiognomies' of cultures are unique: each presents
> a wonderful exfoliation of human potentialities in its own time and
> place and environment. We are forbidden to make judgments of
> comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable. (1976:
> 206)
> 
> 
>



Assuming that the (ethno-)nation is the natural unit of culture, the
preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally
protecting the purity of (ethno-)national culture. The plurality of
cultural styles can be preserved and enhanced by tying them to
ethno-national "forms of life".


 David Miller has developed an interesting and sophisticated
liberal pro-national stance over the course of decades from his work
in 1990 to the most recent work in 2013. He accepts multicultural
diversity within a society but stresses an overarching national
identity, taking as his prime example British national identity, which
encompasses the English, Scottish, and other ethnic identities. He
demands an "inclusive identity, accessible to members of all
cultural groups" (2013: 91). miller claims such identity is
necessary for basic social solidarity, and it goes far beyond simple
constitutional patriotism. A skeptic could note the following. The
problem with multicultural society is that national identity has
historically been a matter of ethno-national ties and has required
sameness in the weighted majority of cultural traits (common language,
common "history-as-remembered", customs, religion and so
on). However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groups
with very different histories, languages, religions, and even quite
contrasting appearances. Now, how is the overarching "national
identity" to be achieved starting from the very thin identity of
common belonging to a state? One seems to have a dilemma. Grounding
social solidarity in national identity requires the latter to be
rather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary cultural
identity. Thick constitutional patriotism may be one interesting
possible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving the
original cultural diversity.


### 3.3 Arguments in favor of nationalism: issues of justice



The arguments in the second set concern political justice and do not
rely on metaphysical claims about identity, flourishing, and cultural
values. They appeal to (actual or alleged) circumstances that would
make nationalist policies reasonable (or permissible or even
mandatory), such as (a) the fact that a large part of the world is
organized into nation-states (so that each new group aspiring to
create a nation-state just follows an established pattern), or (b) the
circumstances of group self-defense or of redressing past injustice
that might justify nationalist policies (to take a special case). Some
of the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to important
political goods, such as equality.


1. *The Argument from the Right to Collective
Self-determination*. A group of people of a sufficient size has a
*prima facie* right to govern itself and decide its future
membership, if the members of the group so wish. It is fundamentally
the democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the right
to an ethno-national state and to ethno-centric cultural institutions
and practices. This argument presents the justification of
(ethno-)national claims as deriving from the will of the members of
the nation. It is therefore highly suitable for liberal nationalism
but not appealing to a deep communitarian who sees the demands of the
nation as independent from, and prior to, the choices of particular
 individuals.[22]
2. *The Argument from the Right to Self-defense and to Redress
Past Injustices*. Oppression and injustice give the victimized
group a just cause and the right to secede. If a minority group is
oppressed by the majority to the extent that almost every minority
member is worse off than most members of the majority simply in virtue
of belonging to the minority, then nationalist claims on behalf of the
minority are morally plausible and potentially compelling. The
argument establishes a typical remedial right, acceptable from a
liberal standpoint (see the discussion in Kukathas and Poole 2000,
also Buchanan 1991; for past injustices see Waldron 1992).
3. *The Argument from Equality*. Members of a minority group
are often disadvantaged in relation to the dominant culture because
they have to rely on those with the same language and culture to
conduct the affairs of daily life. Therefore, liberal neutrality
itself requires that the majority provide certain basic cultural
goods, i.e., granting differential rights (see Kymlicka 1995b, 2001,
and 2003b). Institutional protections and the right to the minority
group's own institutional structure are remedies that restore
equality and turn the resulting nation-state into a more moderate
multicultural one.
4. *The Argument from Success*. The nationstate has in the
past succeeded in promoting equality and democracy. Ethno-national
solidarity is a powerful motive for a more egalitarian distribution of
goods (Miller 1995; Canovan 1996, 2000). The nation-state also seems
to be essential to safeguard the moral life of communities in the
future, since it is the only form of political institution capable of
protecting communities from the threats of globalization and
assimilationism (for a detailed critical discussion of this argument
see Mason 1999).



Andreas Wimmer (2018) presents an interesting discussion of the
historical success of nation-state (discussed in Knott, Tolz, Green,
& Wimmer 2019).



These political arguments can be combined with deep communitarian
ones. However, taken in isolation, their perspectives offer a
"liberal culturalism" that is more suitable for
ethno-culturally plural societies. More remote from classical
nationalism than the liberal one of Tamir and Nielsen, it eschews any
communitarian philosophical
 underpinning.[23]
 The idea of moderate nation-building points to an open
multi-culturalism in which every group receives its share of remedial
rights but, instead of walling itself off from others, participates in
a common, overlapping civic culture in open communication with other
sub-communities. Given the variety of pluralistic societies and
intensity of trans-national interactions, such openness seems to many
to be the only guarantee of stable social and political life (see the
debate in Shapiro and Kymlicka 1997).



In general, the liberal nationalist stance is mild and civil, and
there is much to be said in favor of it. It tries to reconcile our
intuitions in favor of some sort of political protection of cultural
communities with a liberal political morality. Of course, this raises
issues of compatibility between liberal universal principles and the
particular attachments to one's ethno-cultural nation. Very
liberal nationalists such as Tamir divorce ethno-cultural nationhood
from statehood. Also, the kind of love for country they suggest is
tempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in the
last instance trump national interest (Tamir 1993: 115; 2019: passim,
see also Moore 2001 and Gans 2003). There is an ongoing debate among
philosophical nationalists about how much weakening and compromising
is still compatible with a stance's being nationalist at
 all.[24]
 There is also a streak of cosmopolitan interest present in the work
of some liberal nationalists (Nielsen
 1998-99).[25]



In the last two decades, the issues of nationalism have been
increasingly integrated into the debate about the international order
(see the entries on
 globalization
 and
 cosmopolitanism).
 The main conceptual link is the claim that nation-states are natural,
stable, and suitable units of the international order. A related
debate concerns the role of minorities in the processes of
globalization (see Kaldor 2004). Moreover, the two approaches might
ultimately converge: a multiculturalist liberal nationalism and a
moderate, difference-respecting cosmopolitanism have a lot in
 common.[26]


### 3.4 Populism and a new face of nationalism



"Populism" is an umbrella term, covering both right-wing
and left-wing varieties. This section will pay attention to right-wing
populist movements, very close to their traditional nationalist
predecessors. This corresponds to the situation in the biggest part of
Europe, and in the US, where nationalist topics are being put forward
by the right-wing
 populist.[27]



However, it has become quite clear that nationalism is only one of the
political "isms" attracting the right-wing populists. The
migration crisis has brought to the forefront populist
self-identification with linguistic-cultural communities ("we,
French speaking people" for the former, "we
Christians" for the later) that goes beyond nationalism.



Jan-Werner Muller (2016) and Cas Mudde (2007) note that the form
common to all sorts of populism is quite simple and describe it as
"thin". Mudde explains: "Populism is understood as a
thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the
pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which
argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte
generale* (general will) of the People" (2007:
23). Populism, so defined, has two opposites: elitism and pluralism.
First, there is the elite vs. people ("underdog")
contrast. Second, it is possible to distinguish two ways of
characterizing "the people": either in terms of social
status (class, income-level, etc.) or in terms of ethnic and/or
cultural belonging (see also de Cleen 2017).





|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Elite |  |
|  | | |  |
| Social (class) |  - |  People  |  -  |  ethnic, cultural |




The second, horizontal dimension distinguishes the predominantly
left-wing from the predominantly right-wing populisms and leaves a
place for a centrist populist option. Take classical strong ethnic
nationalism. The relation between right-wing populism and such a
nationalism is very tight. This has led some theoreticians (Taguieff
2015) to present "nationalist populism" as the only kind
of populism. The term captures exactly the synthesis of populism and
the strong ethnic nationalism or nativism. From populism, it takes the
general schema of anti-elitism: the leader is addressing directly the
people and is allegedly following the people's interest. From
nationalism, it takes the characterization of the people: it is the
ethnic community, in most cases the state-owing ethnic community, or
the ethno-nation. In his work, Mudde documents the claim that purely
right-wing populists claim to represent the true people who form the
true nation and whose purity is being muddied by new entrants. In the
United States, one can talk about populist and reactionary movements,
like the Tea Party, that have emerged through the recent experience of
immigration, terrorist attacks, and growing economic polarization. We
have to set aside here, for reasons of space, the main populist
alternative (or quasi-alternative) to national populism. In some
countries, like Germany, some populist groups-parties (e.g., German
AfD party (Alternative for Germany)), appeal to properties much wider
in their reach than ethno-national belonging, typically to religious
affiliations. Others combine this appeal with the ethno-national
one. This yields what Riva Kastoryano (2006) calls "transnational
nationalism".



Interestingly, liberal nationalism is not very attractive to the
populists. On the theoretical side one can note that Tamir (2019) sees
her liberal nationalism as a good recipe against the threat of
demagogues like Trump and Boris Johnson (she avoids the use of the
label "populist", e.g., 2019: 31).



The rise of populism is changing the political playfield one must work
with. The tolerant (liberal nationalist or anti-nationalist) views are
confronting new problems in the populist age marked by migration
crisis, etc. The dangers traditionally associated with military
presence are gone; the national populists have to invent and construct
a presumed danger that comes into the country together with foreign
families, including those with children. In short, if these
conjectures hold, the politicians and theoreticians are faced with a
change. The traditional issue of the contrast between
patriotism/nationalism and cosmopolitanism has changed its profile:
the current drastic contrast is between the populist aversion to the
foreigners-migrants and a more generous attitude of acceptance and
Samaritan help. Finally, the populist understanding of "our
people" ("we-community") encompasses not only
nationalist options but also goes way beyond it. The important element
is the promiscuous character of the populist choices. It is probable
that the future scholarship on nationalism will mainly focus on this
new and challenging playfield, with an aim to address the new contrast
and locate kinds of nationalism in relation to
 it.[28]


### 3.5 Nation-state in global context



The migration crisis has made the nation-state in global context the
central political topic concerning nationality. Before moving on to
current events, the state of art before the crisis should be
summarized. First, consider the debates on territory and nation and
issues of global justice.



Liberal nationalists try to preserve the traditional nationalist link
between ethnic "ownership" of the state and sovereignty
and territorial control, but in a much more flexible and sophisticated
setting. Tamar Meisels thus argues in favor of "taking existing
national settlements into account as a central factor in demarcating
territorial boundaries" since this line "has both liberal
foundations" (i.e., in the work of John Locke) and
liberal-national appeal (2009: 159) grounded in its affinity with the
liberal doctrine of national self-determination. She combines it with
Chaim Gans' (2003: Ch. 4) interpretation of "historical
right" claims as "the right to formative
territories". She thus combines "historical arguments,
understood as claims to formative territories", with her
argument from settlement and insists on their interplay and mutual
reinforcement, presenting them as being "most closely related
to, and based on, liberal nationalist assumptions and underlying
ideas" (Meisels 2009: 160). She nevertheless stresses that more
than one ethnic group can have formative ties to a given territory,
and that there might be competing claims based on
 settlement.[29]
 But, given the ethno-national conflicts of the twentieth century, one
can safely assume that culturally plural states divided into isolated
and closed sub-communities glued together merely by arrangements of
*modus vivendi* are inherently unstable. Stability might
therefore require that the pluralist society envisioned by liberal
culturalists promote quite intense intra-state interaction between
cultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, reduce prejudice, and
create a solid basis for cohabitation.



But where should one stop? The question arises since there are many
geographically open, interacting territories of various sizes.
Consider first the geographical openness of big continental planes,
then add the modern ease of interaction ("No island is an island
any more", one could say), and, finally and dramatically, the
substantial ecological interconnectedness of land and climate. Here,
the tough nationalistic line is no longer proposed seriously in
ethical debates, so the furthest pro-national extreme is in fact a
relatively moderate stance, exemplified by Miller in the works listed.
Here is a typical proposal of his concerning global justice based on
nation-states: it might become a matter of national pride to have set
aside a certain percentage of GDP for developmental
goals--perhaps for projects in one particular country or group of
countries (2013: 182).



This brings us to the topic of migrations, and the heated debate on
the present
 scene.[30]
 In Europe immigration is probably the main topic of the present day
populist uproar, and in the United States it is one of the main
topics. So, immigration plus the nationalist-populist reactions to it
are in the current decade the main testing ground for nationalist and
cosmopolitan views.



Let's look at the pro-national side in the debate. Liberal
nationalists, in particular Miller, have put forward some thoughtful
pro-nationalist proposal concerning immigration. Miller's
proposal allows refugees to seek asylum temporarily until the
situation in their country of origin improves; it also limits economic
migration. Miller argues against the defensibility of a global
standard for equality, opportunity, welfare, etc., because measures of
just equality are context-bound. People do have the right to a minimum
standard of living, but the right to migrate only activates as a last
resort after all other measures within a candidate-migrant's
country of origin have been tried. However, he also (particularly in
his book on "Strangers in our midst", 2016), claims that
national responsibility to accept immigrant refugees is balanced by
considerations of the interest of would-be immigrants and the
interests that national communities have in maintaining control over
their own composition and character.



If we agree with the liberal nationalists on the positive side, we can
ask about the dynamics of the help required for the immigrants.
Distinguish at least three stages, first, the immediate emergency
(starvation, freezing, urgent medical problems) and catering to it,
second, settlement and learning (on the host and the immigrant
newcomer side), and third, the stage of (some kind of) citizenship, of
relatively stable life in the host country.



In the first phase, the immediate help comes first, both normatively
and causally: just accept the would-be refugees (indeed, the would-be
refugees should be helped in leaving their countries and travelling to
the host country). In longer term, staying should involve opportunity
for work and training.



But there is more. The Samaritan obligation can and should function as
a preparation for wider global
 activity.[31]
 So, we have two theoretical steps, first, accepting Samaritanism and
second, agreeing with deeper trans-national measure of blocking
distant causes, like poverty and wars in the Third world. Let us call
this "Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model". The model is
geared to the dramatically changed playground in which the nationalism
issues are played out in the context of populism and refugee crisis,
raising issues that were not around two decades ago.


## 4. Conclusion



In presenting the claims that the pro-nationalists defend, we have
proceeded from the more radical towards more liberal nationalist
alternatives. In examining the arguments for these claims, we have
presented metaphysically demanding communitarian arguments resting
upon deep communitarian assumptions about culture, such as the premise
that the ethno-cultural nation is the most important community for all
individuals. This is an interesting and respectable claim, but its
plausibility has not been established. The moral debate about
nationalism has resulted in various weakenings of culture-based
arguments, typically proposed by liberal nationalists, which render
the arguments less ambitious but much more plausible. Having abandoned
the old nationalist ideal of a state owned by a single dominant
ethno-cultural group, liberal nationalists have become receptive to
the idea that identification with a plurality of cultures and
communities is important for a person's social identity. They
have equally become sensitive to trans-national issues and more
willing to embrace a partly cosmopolitan perspective. Liberal
nationalism has also brought to the fore more modest, less
philosophically or metaphysically charged arguments grounded in
concerns about justice. These stress the practical importance of
ethno-cultural membership, ethno-cultural groups' rights to have
injustices redressed, democratic rights of political association, and
the role that ethno-cultural ties and associations can play in
promoting just social arrangements.



The events in the current decade, the refugee crisis and the rise of
right-wing populism, have dramatically changed the relevant practical
and theoretical playground. The traditional nationalism is still
relevant, but populist nationalism attracts much more attention: new
theories are being produced and debated, coming to occupy the center
stage. On the other hand, migration crisis has replaced the typical
cosmopolitan issue of solidarity-with-distant-strangers with burning
issues of helping refugees present at our doors. Of course, the causes
of the crisis are still the same ones that cosmopolitans have been
worrying about much earlier: wars and dramatically unequal global
distribution of goods, and of threats, like illnesses and climate
disasters. The task of the theory is now to connect these deeper
issues with the new problems occupying the center-stage of the new
playground; it is a challenge now formulated in somewhat different
vocabulary and within different political conceptual frameworks than
before.