## 1. Clarifying FA Theories: Some Choice Points


### 1.1 Metaphysical, Conceptual, or Semantic?



Early proponents of FA theory were sometimes unclear about whether
their intent was to elucidate the natures of evaluative concepts,
terms, or properties (e.g., Brentano 1889/2009; Broad 1930; Ewing
1939, 1947). In the last decade, however, FA theorists have tended to
theorize mostly in a metaphysical mode, seeking to account for various
evaluative properties and facts (McHugh and Way 2016; Howard 2019;
Rowland 2019). This entry follows the current trend and characterizes
FA theories as metaphysical theses. That being said, for many of the
necessary equivalences between specific evaluative and normative
properties that certain FA theories entail, their semantic and
conceptual counterparts plausibly hold with the corresponding kind of
necessity. For example, one might reasonably claim that it's
true in virtue of the meanings of the constituent terms, and so
analytic, that someone is admirable just in case they're fitting
to admire (Brandt 1946; Kjellmer 1986). And some have recently argued
that it's also true of conceptual necessity, i.e., in virtue of
the identity of the concepts, that something is generically valuable,
or valuable *simpliciter*, if and only if it's fitting to
value, or "worth valuing" (Svavarsd*o*ttir
2014).



Many contemporary FA theorists, then, take their FA theories to
provide metaphysical accounts of evaluative facts and properties. But
there are various ways to understand what a metaphysical account of a
property is. Sometimes such accounts are said to reveal the
*essences* of the properties they aim to explain (Fine 1994),
other times to assert *property identities* (Jackson 1998), and
still other times to specify *grounds* (Rosen 2015b; Berker
2018). Common to many contemporary FA theorists, however, is the claim
that their metaphysical accounts of evaluative properties in terms of
normative properties of human responses entail that facts involving
the latter are *explanatorily* *prior* to facts
involving the former, such that the former facts are always grounded
in the latter. This is important for several reasons. First, it
reveals a core commitment of many contemporary FA theories, viz., that
the evaluative facts they seek to explain obtain in virtue of
normative facts about human responses, rather than the other way
around. An FA theory of facts about what's *fearsome*,
for instance, would entail that whenever something is fearsome,
that's *because* it's fitting to fear. Second, this
explanatory commitment would seem to rule out understanding FA
theories as stating property identities, given the irreflexivity of
the grounding relation (see the entry on
 metaphysical grounding).



Some claim that the order of explanatory priority posited by FA
theories conflicts with commonsense (for discussion, see Stratton-Lake
and Hooker 2006; Jacobson 2011): if something is fitting to value, for
instance, isn't that precisely because it's valuable? In
other words, doesn't the fittingness of valuing a valuable thing
derive from the value of that thing rather than the reverse? And
indeed, isn't the value of valuable things, at least in
principle, independent of any actual or possible human responses to
those things? Such concerns are discussed further in sections 2.1 and
3.2.


### 1.2 FA Theory, Primitivism, and Subjectivism



The explanatory element of FA theories also distinguishes these
theories from "primitivism" about their explananda.
Whereas an FA theory of an evaluative property seeks to explain facts
involving that property by appeal to normative facts about human
responses, primitivism about the property holds that facts involving
it are explanatorily basic or fundamental. A paradigmatic proponent of
primitivism is G.E. Moore (1903), who held this view about the
property of being (intrinsically) good, or valuable
*simpliciter*. For Moore, something that's good
*simpliciter* just is good; its goodness can't be
explained in other terms, and so, *a fortiori*, can't be
explained in the way FA theorists propose. Notably, Moorean
primitivism about good is in principle compatible with FA theories of
various other evaluative properties. For example, one might favor an
FA theory of *being pitiful*, but reject such a theory of being
good (or vice versa). And more generally, FA theorists might be
selective, for various reasons, about the evaluative properties they
seek to explain. Possible reasons for such selectivity are discussed
in section 3.



FA theories of evaluative properties can also be distinguished from
"subjectivist" theories of those properties, which seek to
explain evaluative properties entirely in terms of human responses
that meet certain non-normative criteria (e.g., Lewis 1989). For
example, a subjectivist might hold that whenever someone is admirable,
that's because that person would be admired by anyone who knew
all the facts, reflected adequately on them, etc. FA theories, in
contrast, hold that what makes someone admirable is that admiring them
meets some *normative* condition. What this condition is,
precisely, is a matter of intramural debate (see section 1.3). If the
condition in question can ultimately be explained in naturalistic
terms, then FA theories may also turn out to be subjectivist theories
(McHugh and Way 2022a). For example, if an FA theorist explains facts
about what's good in terms of facts about what's rational
to value, but then explains the latter normative facts in naturalistic
terms, then their FA theory is subjectivist (Smith 1994). However, FA
theories *needn't* be subjectivist: instead, they might
deny that the normative facts in terms of which they explain certain
evaluative facts can themselves be explained in naturalistic
terms.


### 1.3 Which Normative Property?



So far, this entry has used the word 'fittingness' to pick
out the normative property that FA theories appeal to in their
explanations of evaluative facts. The fittingness relation can be
glossed as the relation in which a response stands to its object when
the object merits, or is worthy of, that response. Thus to say that
something is a fitting object of admiration is to say that it merits
admiration, or is worthy of this attitude. Many FA theorists have held
not only that fittingness is the right normative relation to appeal to
in explaining evaluative facts, but also that fittingness is
explanatorily fundamental relative to the rest of the normative domain
such that *all* other normative facts can be explained in terms
of it (Broad 1930; Ewing 1939, 1947; Chappell 2012; McHugh and Way
2016; Howard 2019). But FA theorists needn't be committed to
either of these claims. For instance, FA theorists might agree that
evaluative facts should be explained in terms of facts about fitting
responses, but reject that fittingness is explanatorily fundamental
relative to the rest of the normative domain. Alternatively, they
might deny that fittingness is the right normative property to appeal
to in explaining evaluative facts and opt instead to explain
evaluative facts by appeal to facts involving a distinct normative
property of responses. Other candidates for the normative property in
question include a response's being such that one
"ought" to have it (Sidgwick 1874), its being
"correct" (Brentano 1889/2009), "justified"
(Ewing 1959), "rational" (Brandt 1979; Anderson 1993;
Smith 1994), "required" (Chisholm 1986; Lemos 1994),
"warranted" (Gibbard 1990), or its being such that
there's (some, sufficient, or decisive) "reason" for
one to have it (Scanlon 1998; Schroeder 2010; Rowland 2019). The
debate among FA theorists concerning which normative property to
appeal to in their theories continues today. Presently, the two most
popular options are fittingness and reasons. For example, an FA
theorist who favors the latter option might claim that whenever
something is valuable, that's fully because there are
reasons for anyone to value it (see section 1.5). Some costs and
benefits associated with the FA theorist's selection of either
of these currently popular options are discussed in sections 2 and
3.


### 1.4 Fitting for Whom?



FA theories explain evaluative properties in terms of normative facts
about responses that are somehow called for by things that have those
properties. But *who* is to have the responses in question?
This is undertheorized, but the answer seems to be: it depends. In
particular, the answer seems to depend on the nature of the evaluative
property that an FA theory seeks to explain. If the evaluative
property is "agent-neutral", then everyone, or just
anyone, is to have the response in terms of which FA theories aim to
explain the relevant property; if the property is
"agent-relative", then at least someone, but not just
anyone, is to have the response. Whether an evaluative property is
neutral or relative can be a matter of debate, but consider
*awesomeness* as a plausible example of the former and
*shamefulness* as an example of the latter. The awesome calls
for everyone, or just anyone, to be in awe of it, but the same
isn't so for shamefulness: not just anyone is to be ashamed of a
shameful act; instead, a shameful act calls for shame only on the part
of the person who performed it (or perhaps also on the part of those
who are somehow closely
 related).[1]



A further, related question is whether the normative property of
responses that FA theories appeal to is (or should be)
*objective*, such that all facts are in principle relevant to
whether it obtains, or *perspectival*, such that only
epistemically accessible or possessed facts are relevant. Here, too,
it seems the FA theorist should say that it depends on the nature of
the evaluative property that an FA theory aims to explain. For
instance, facts about whether someone is *blameworthy*
don't seem to depend on anyone's epistemic position, so
someone could be blameworthy without anyone knowing it. FA theorists
should therefore say that such facts are to be explained by appeal to
an objective normative property of responses, i.e., a property the
obtaining of which can be affected by facts unknown to the subject. In
contrast, since facts about the *curiousness* of a question or
the *credibility* of a proposition can seem to depend on a
subject's perspective, FA theorists should say that such facts
are to be explained by appeal to a normative property that's
similarly perspective dependent (Way 2020)--for example,
*subjective reasons* (Fogal and Worsnip 2021) or perhaps
*warrant* (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000a). This is a further
way in which an evaluative property might be agent-relative, as
opposed to agent-neutral: if it's perspectival, as opposed to
objective. To be clear: this doesn't mean that FA theories are
necessarily disunified, appealing to different normative properties
depending on their explanandum. Instead, FA theorists can seek to
explain whatever objective normative property they appeal to in terms
of its perspectival counterpart or vice versa, and claim that
evaluative properties can ultimately be explained by appeal to
whichever of these is more fundamental. For example, an FA theorist
might appeal to both objective and subjective reasons to explain the
full range of evaluative properties they aim to explain, but then
explain subjective reasons in terms of objective ones, and thus
ultimately appeal only to normative facts of a single kind in
explaining the evaluative facts.


### 1.5 Buck Passing



Some suggest that FA theories date as far back as Kant (1785 [1996])
(see, e.g., Suikkanen 2009). More commonly, the progenitors of FA
theory are taken to be Sidgwick (1874) and Brentano (1889/2009).
Although many have discussed and defended FA theories in the meantime
(for a nice potted history, see Rabinowicz and
R*o*nnow-Rasmussen 2004) it's relatively
uncontroversial that T.M. Scanlon (1998) is largely responsible for
the contemporary revival of interest in FA theory (Jacobson 2011).
According to Scanlon's "buck-passing" account of
value, "to call something valuable is to say that it has other
properties that provide reasons for behaving in certain ways with
regard to it" (96). There are several things to note about
Scanlon's account. First, it purports to provide a theory
specifically of being valuable *simpliciter*. Scanlon
doesn't comment on whether he takes the form of his account to
generalize to apply to more specific evaluative properties such as
being lovable or delightful, though it's easy to see how it
might. For example, we might claim that to call something delightful
is to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for being
delighted by it. Second, Scanlon isn't very specific about
*how* we have reason to behave with regard to valuable things,
i.e., about the specific human responses in terms of which he aims to
explain facts about value *simpliciter*. This seems
intentional. Scanlon suggests that "to claim that something is
valuable (or that it is 'of value') is to claim that
others also have reason to value it, as you do" (95), but holds
that "valuing" might consist variously in a range of
pro-responses, where the particular kind of pro-response to a valuable
thing that we have reasons to have depends on, and so varies according
to, the kind of valuable thing at issue. For example, on
Scanlon's view, the pro-response(s) that we have reasons to have
toward a valuable piece of music can differ from the pro-response that
we have reasons to have toward a valuable friendship. And it can be
matter of substantive normative dispute, he suggests, which
pro-response we have reasons to have toward each. Thus, Scanlon
writes: "understanding the value of something often involves not
merely knowing that it is valuable or how valuable it is, but also how
it is to be valued" (100). (For a possible difficulty with this
part of Scanlon's view, see section 3.4.)



The final thing to note about Scanlon's account is its
commitment to the claim that the property of being valuable
doesn't itself provide a reason to value the things that have
it. Rather, Scanlon claims, being valuable is the "purely
formal, higher-order" property of having other properties that
provide reasons for a pro-response. This is the feature of
Scanlon's view that makes it a "buck-passing"
account: the account passes the normative buck from the property of
being valuable to lower-order properties of a thing that provide
reasons to respond to it favorably, where these lower-order properties
correspond to the value-making features of the valuable thing in
question. This feature of Scanlon's account has been called its
"negative thesis" (Schroeder 2009). This is in contrast to
its "positive thesis": that whenever something is
valuable, that's fully because there are reasons to have a
pro-response to it. The positive thesis is what makes Scanlon's
theory an FA theory: it claims that certain evaluative
facts--facts about value *simpliciter*--are always
grounded in normative facts about certain human responses, viz., facts
to the effect that the relevant responses are favored by reasons. As
several authors have pointed out, however, Scanlon's negative
thesis isn't entailed by the positive one and is otherwise
inessential to FA theory (see esp. Schroeder 2009). The costs and
benefits of the negative thesis are still being debated today (for
some advantages, see Suikkanen 2009; for some costs, see Schroeder
2009 and Johnson King 2019). Perhaps the most promising, conciliatory
approach is to claim that the property of being valuable does provide
a reason to value the things that have it, but only a
*derivative* reason which doesn't contribute any weight
to the case for valuing the thing in question over and above that
contributed by the non-derivative reasons provided by certain of the
thing's lower-order properties (Schroeder 2009; McHugh and Way
2016; Rowland 2019). Regardless, since the negative thesis isn't
plausibly essential to FA theory, whether to accept this or some other
version of it is a further choice point for FA theorists.



To summarize, FA theorists face a number of choices in formulating
their theories: are their theories metaphysical accounts of evaluative
facts and properties, analyses of evaluative concepts, or semantic
accounts of evaluative terms? Which evaluative items, in particular,
will they aim to explain? Which normative property of responses will
their theories appeal to: fittingness, reasons, or some alternative?
Who are the subjects of the relevant responses? And do their accounts
"pass the buck"? We can characterize FA theories, defining
their nature and scope, according to our answers to these
questions.


## 2. Attractions



This section canvasses three main attractions of FA theories: their
ability to explain various interesting connections between certain
normative and evaluative properties (section 2.1); their promise to
"demystify" various evaluative properties in various ways
(section 2.2); and their potential to unify the evaluative properties
they aim to explain by identifying what's common to them, while
respecting and clarifying any important differences between them
(section 2.3).


### 2.1 Normative-Evaluative Connections



A central attraction of FA theories is that they promise to explain
interesting connections between certain normative and evaluative
properties (McHugh and Way 2016). For example, it seems difficult to
deny that being valuable and being fitting to value necessarily
co-vary with each other such that something has value if and only if
it's fitting to value, or merits being valued (though see
section 3.2 for discussion). And, as discussed in the introduction to
this entry, similar equivalences also seem to hold between various
specific evaluative properties, such as being admirable or delightful,
and the fittingness of correspondingly specific types of human
responses, e.g., admiring, or being delighted by. FA theories offer
straightforward explanations of these equivalences, viz., that facts
involving the evaluative property on the left-hand side are always
grounded in facts involving the normative property of responses
mentioned on the right-hand side, such that facts of the former kind
obtain if and only if, and because, facts of the latter kind do.



As another example, consider that whenever something has value, it
seems that there's at least some reason to value it. More
precisely, it's plausible that, whenever *x* is valuable
in respect *p*, *p* is a reason to value *x* (Way
2013). For example, if your friendship is valuable in respect of the
happiness it brings, the happiness it brings is also a reason to value
your friendship. An FA theory that explains facts about value in terms
of facts about reasons for valuing is well-suited to explain this:
whenever *p* is a respect in which *x* is valuable,
that's fully because *p* is a reason to value *x*.
And parallel explanations can be given of similarly plausible claims
concerning the connections between various specific evaluative
properties and reasons: respects in which *x* is admirable,
lovable, or contemptible, for instance, are also reasons to admire,
love, or contemn *x*, because facts involving the former
properties are always grounded in facts involving the latter.



In principle, FA theorists who appeal to fittingness rather than
reasons to explain evaluative facts could also explain the necessary
connections between reasons and evaluative facts just mentioned. To do
so, they'd need only to offer an account of the relationship
between fittingness and reasons that, together with their FA theories,
explains the connections in question (McHugh and Way 2016; Howard
2019). For example, consider a theory of reasons on which reasons for
a response consist in facts that contribute to the fittingness of the
response. Paired with an FA theory of value that says that whenever
*x* is valuable in respect *p*, that's fully
because *p* contributes to the fittingness of valuing
*x*, this account entails that whenever *x* is valuable
in respect *p*, *p* is a reason to value *x*.
Likewise, FA theorists who formulate their theories in terms of
reasons rather than fittingness could try similarly to explain the
necessary connections noted above between evaluative properties and
various kinds of fitting response (Schroeder 2010). And more
generally, regardless of which normative property an FA theorist
appeals to in their explanations of evaluative facts, explanations of
the above connections are in principle available to them.



In this respect, FA theories have an advantage over so-called
"no-priority views" which hold that evaluative facts and
normative facts of other kinds can't be fully, non-circularly
explained by appeal to one another, such that neither kind of
fact is more fundamental (Ross 1939; Wiggins 1987; McDowell 1998;
Tappolet 2011). Indeed, at least barring their ability to provide
naturalistic explanations of the normative and evaluative facts that
figure in the above connections, it seems that no-priority theorists
would need to take these connections as brute. In this way, FA
theories have more explanatory power than no-priority views (Rowland
2019).



The potential to explain the above connections, however, isn't
unique to FA theory. For example, consider a version of value
primitivism, of the kind described in section 1.2, that would reverse
the order of explanation posited by FA theories, explaining normative
facts about human responses in terms of evaluative facts about the
objects of those responses. A proponent of this kind of
"object-focused" primitivism might hold that whenever
something is fitting to value that's fully because that
thing is valuable, and that this is what explains why something has
value if and only if it's fitting to value. And they might
propose similarly to explain the parallel equivalences between the
fittingness of various other types of response and other evaluative
properties. Likewise, an object-focused view that claims that facts
about reasons to value things are always grounded in the value of
those things might explain why there are always reasons to value
valuable things (Orsi 2013b). Object-focused views thus seem able to
explain the normative-evaluative connections noted above. Moreover, as
was mentioned in section 1.1, some find the order of explanation
posited by this kind of primitivism more intuitively plausible than
that claimed by FA theory (for discussion, see Hooker and
Stratton-Lake 2006; Jacobson 2011). Still, FA theories do seem to have
important advantages over object-focused views in explaining the
connections in question.



For one, FA theory is far more parsimonious. Suppose we explain
normative facts about human responses (whether they're facts
about the fittingness of those responses or facts about reasons for
them) in terms of evaluative facts about the objects of those
responses, as object-focused views suggest. So, for example, we
explain facts about fitting admiration in terms of facts about the
admirability of admiration's object, facts about fitting love in
terms of facts about the lovability of love's object, facts
about fitting shame in terms of facts about the shamefulness of
shame's object, and so on. Assuming these evaluative facts
couldn't then be explained in terms of normative or evaluative
facts of some other kind, it seems we'd thus be left with a
(massive) plurality of different kinds of evaluative fact, each of
which would be fundamental at least relative to the rest of the
normative and evaluative domain.



Alternatively, if, as the FA theorist proposes, we explain all such
evaluative facts in terms of facts involving a normative relation
of a *single* kind--e.g., the reason relation or the
fittingness relation--then we could in principle take only facts
involving that relation to be fundamental relative to the rest of the
normative and evaluative domain. Indeed, even if we didn't take
facts involving the relevant relation to be fundamental and instead
explained them in terms of facts involving some other normative
property of human responses, we'd still have to posit fewer
kinds of fundamental facts as compared to object-focused primitivism.
Thus, FA theories are more parsimonious than object-focused
 views.[2]



A second version of value primitivism, however, fares better along
this dimension. On this view--call it
"response-focused" primitivism--normative facts about
human responses are to be explained not in terms of evaluative facts
about the *objects* of those responses, but rather in terms of
evaluative facts about the responses themselves (Moore 1903). In
particular, this view holds that normative facts about our responses
are always grounded in facts to the effect that it's somehow
valuable (*simpliciter*) to have those
 responses.[3]
 Similar to object-focused views, response-focused views also seem
able to explain the normative-evaluative connections noted above. For
example, response-focused primitivists might claim that something is
valuable if and only if it's fitting to value because whenever
something is fitting to value, that's because it's
intrinsically valuable to value it; and, as a substantive matter,
something is intrinsically valuable to value if and only if it's
valuable (Hurka 2000). And the response-focused theorist might
similarly explain the parallel equivalences between various other
evaluative properties and the fittingness of certain other responses,
arguing that it's always intrinsically valuable, e.g., to admire
the admirable, love the lovable, despise the despicable, etc.
Likewise, response-focused views might claim to explain why there are
always *reasons* to value valuable things: they might hold that
whenever there are reasons to value something,
that's because valuing it is valuable and, as a substantive
matter, if something is valuable, then it's valuable to
value.



In contrast to object-focused views, response-focused views
needn't be less parsimonious than FA theory. In principle, a
response-focused primitivist could hold that all other normative and
evaluative facts are to be explained ultimately in terms of facts
about the value *simpliciter* of various types of human
response (or states of affairs, or whatever they take to be the
fundamental bearers of value) (Moore 1903). However, response-focused
views do face potential counterexamples that bear on the plausibility
of their possible explanations of the normative-evaluative connections
under discussion (Way 2013; Howard 2018). The main type of
counterexample targets the response-focused view's claim that,
whenever a response is fitting, it's valuable to have that
response. Perhaps it's somehow valuable to value what's
valuable, but is it also valuable to be disgusted by the disgusting,
to envy the enviable, and to be bored by the boring? If not, then
response-focused views would seem unable to explain, e.g., why
it's fitting to be disgusted by something if and only if
it's disgusting. And, for similar reasons, they'd also be
unable to explain, e.g., why there are reasons to be disgusted by the
disgusting, to be bored by the boring, etc.



FA theories thus look to have some important *prima facie*
advantages over at least many of their competitors in explaining the
normative-evaluative connections noted 
 above.[4]
 Of course, none of these
advantages is necessarily decisive with respect to overall theory
choice and there is, in any case, room for rivals of FA theory to
dispute them. For example, an opponent of FA theory might suggest that
the outstanding issues for FA theory that we'll discuss in
section 3 are at least as serious as the worries for primitivism
raised above. Nevertheless, it remains an attraction of FA theory that
it seems well placed to explain the normative-evaluative connections
in question.


### 2.2 Value "Demystified"



A second attraction often claimed for FA theory is its potential to
"demystify" value in various ways. Rabinowicz and
R*o*nnow-Rasmussen (2004) suggest, for example, that FA
theory "removes the air of mystery from the normative
'compellingness' of values" (391). Their thought is
that it's no mystery why facts about the value of things should
have normative implications for our responses to those things if such
facts are always grounded in, and so imply, normative facts about our
responses. But there are other ways in which FA theories have been
claimed to demystify value and, in particular, value
*simpliciter*.



Perhaps the most important way in which FA theory stands to demystify
value is by answering skepticism about it. In an influential paper,
Peter Geach (1965) argues that there's no such thing as being
good or valuable *simpliciter*. In particular, he argues that
the only intelligible kind of "goodness" there is, is
"attributive goodness", i.e., the kind of goodness that a
thing has when it's good as the kind of thing that it is. Thus,
for Geach, while it makes sense to claim that things can be good
*as* the kind of thing they are--e.g., that there can be
good toasters, baristas, and bombs--there's no sense to be
made of claims to the effect that something is *just plain
good*, i.e., valuable in a way that isn't relativized to a
particular kind of thing. Citing Geach, Philippa Foot (1985) and
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1993, 1997) also marshal versions of this idea
against traditional forms of consequentialism, which, on a natural
characterization, aim to explain the rightness and wrongness of acts
ultimately in terms of facts about the (comparative) value
*simpliciter* of their outcomes. Although Foot and Thomson
disagree with Geach that *all* value is attributive
(acknowledging the existence of a distinct property of being good
*for*, for instance), they at least agree that there's no
such thing as being just plain good, or valuable *simpliciter*.
This conclusion is independently interesting, but, if true, would also
have devastating implications for traditional forms of
consequentialism (not to mention for primitivism about value
*simpliciter* of the kind discussed in sections 1.2 and
2.1).



As several authors have noted, however, FA theories seem to offer a
promising response to this kind of skepticism (Zimmerman 2001; Nye,
Plunkett, and Ku 2015; Rowland 2016; McHugh and Way 2016). In
particular, FA theorists might hold that facts about value
*simpliciter* can be explained fully in terms of
certain kinds of normative facts about certain kinds of valuing
responses. Since skeptics about value *simpliciter*
aren't similarly skeptical about the kinds of normative facts
that FA theorists might appeal to in explaining this property, the FA
theorist's account of value *simpliciter* would thus seem
to render the property intelligible, even by the skeptic's own
lights. In this way, FA theorists can answer skeptics about value
*simpliciter*.



And skepticism about value *simpliciter* isn't the only
kind of value skepticism that FA theories stand to answer. In the last
several decades, a version of consequentialism known as
"agent-relative" consequentialism has come to prominence,
promising to account for a range of normative phenomena often held to
be incompatible with traditional formulations of the view, e.g.,
special obligations and deontic constraints (Dreier 1993; Portmore
2005; Smith 2003). This kind of consequentialism can be developed in
either of two ways. On the first way, agent-relative consequentialism
posits a distinctive evaluative relation, viz., that of being valuable
*relative to* an agent, where this 'agent-relative
value' is distinct both from value *simpliciter*, which
is typically held to be agent neutral, and from the relation of being
valuable *for* the agent (see esp. Portmore 2005). According to
some, this relation can be glossed as value from the agent's
"point of view", where what's valuable from an
agent's point of view is meant to be distinct somehow, at
least in principle, from what the agent believes, or should believe,
to be valuable (see, e.g., Hurka 2003). Agent-relative
consequentialists who posit this distinctive relation thus claim that
which outcomes are best *relative to an agent* might differ
from the outcomes that are either best *simpliciter* or best
for the agent. And, at least sometimes, what an agent ought to do on
this view is what would produce the outcome that's best relative
to them. Paired with the right substantive assumptions about how to
rank outcomes relative to particular agents, this apparatus purports
to allow agent-relative consequentialists to capture the normative
phenomena noted above. The second way of developing the view works
similarly except that, rather than positing a distinctive notion of
agent-relative value, on top of value *simpliciter* and the
relation of being valuable for, this variant of the view claims that,
in fact, there's just a *single* kind of value, whose
nature is fundamentally agent-relative, and which agents ought always
to maximize (Smith 2009).



However, in an influential paper, Mark Schroeder (2007b) questions the
intelligibility of the kind of agent-relative value to which these
versions of consequentialism appeal. And many others have also
claimed, similarly, that they lack any independent, pre-theoretical
grip on the notion of agent-relative value (Dancy 2000; Hurley 2017;
Maguire 2016; Zimmerman 2011). In response, agent-relative
consequentialists (of both kinds) have turned to FA theory, claiming
that the relevant evaluative relation can be rendered intelligible by
explicating it in terms of certain normative properties of preference
or desire (see esp. Portmore 2011 and Smith 2009). For example, the
agent-relative consequentialist might claim that the agent-relative
value of an outcome can be explicated in terms of agent-relative
reasons for preferring it to its alternatives. They might then claim
that what agents ought to do is to bring about the outcomes they ought
to prefer, all things considered, with the stipulation that
agent-relative reasons for preference can be relevant to which
outcomes agents ought to prefer. The details are important here, and
certain ways of developing this view seem less tenable than others
(see, e.g., Schroeder 2007, 292-94). Still, FA theories do seem
to offer agent-relative consequentialists the most promising line of
response to their skeptical critics. (For more on this application of
FA theory, see the entry on
 value theory).


### 2.3 Unifying the Evaluative



A third attraction of FA theory is its potential to unify the
evaluative properties it aims to explain, by identifying what's
common to those properties, while also clarifying important
differences among them. As an initial example, consider the various
ways of being good *simpliciter*. A thing might be good
instrumentally, noninstrumentally, intrinsically, extrinsically, in
some respect, or overall. An FA theory of being good
*simpliciter* can be applied to provide unifying explanations
of all these ways of having this property (McHugh and Way 2016;
Rowland 2019). Perhaps the most popular way to do this is to appeal to
different ways of *valuing*. For instance, an FA theorist might
hold that whenever something is noninstrumentally good
that's because it's fitting to value *for its own
sake*, whereas when something is instrumentally good,
that's because it's fitting to value ultimately
*for the sake of something else* (viz., something that's
fitting to value for its own sake). For example, they might say that
hard work is instrumentally good because it's fitting to value
ultimately for the sake of any reward it brings that's itself fitting
to value for its own sake. Similarly, FA theorists might hold that
whenever something is intrinsically (extrinsically) good,
that's because it's fitting to value that thing
intrinsically (extrinsically), i.e., for its intrinsic (extrinsic)
properties. For example, they might say that wisdom is intrinsically
good because it's fitting to value for certain of its intrinsic
features, whereas money is extrinsically good because it's
fitting to value for certain of its extrinsic, relational properties.
Likewise, the FA theorist might explain facts about a thing being good
in some respect (overall) in terms of facts to the effect that
it's fitting to value that thing in that respect (overall). For
instance, they might hold that one outcome is good overall because
it's fitting to value on the whole, whereas another outcome is
bad overall, but good in some respect, because it's fitting to
value in that respect (but not overall). And these accounts can of
course be combined to explain any way of being good that consists in a
complex of some possible subset of any of the above ways of possessing
this property. For example, an FA theorist might claim that whenever
something is noninstrumentally, extrinsically good in some respect,
that's just because it's fitting to value that thing for
its own sake, for its extrinsic properties, in the relevant respect.
And there are other possibilities for the FA theorist here, beyond
appealing to different ways of valuing. For example, an FA theorist
might propose to explain the difference between something being good
in a respect as opposed to being good overall not by appeal to
differences in the ways of valuing that figure in their accounts of
these properties, but rather by appeal to differences in the normative
properties that their accounts deploy. For instance, Rowland (2019)
suggests that whenever something is good in a respect, that's
because there's a *pro tanto* reason to value it, whereas
when something is good overall, that's because there's
*sufficient reason* to value it. Which approach is more
plausible is a matter of intramural debate.



In addition to offering unifying explanations of all the ways of being
good *simpliciter*, FA theories also promise to unify other
varieties of value. For example, just as we might offer FA theories of
being good *simpliciter*, we might also offer them of the
properties of being *attributively* good and of being good
*for* some person or thing (Schroeder 2010; Skorupski 2010;
McHugh and Way 2016; Rowland 2019). For example, McHugh and Way (2016)
suggest as a first pass that whenever something, *x*, is
attributively good, or good as a kind of thing *K*,
that's fully because it's fitting for anyone for whom
it's fitting to want a *K* to value *x*. And
according to Rowland (2019), whenever something, *x*, is good
for some person or thing, *S*, that's because there
are reasons for anyone who has reasons to care about *S* to
value *x*, because they have reasons to care about *S*.
And the prospects seem at least equally good for a fittingness-based
FA theory to explain the relation of being good for, and for a
reasons-based FA theory to explain the property of being attributively
good. So, regardless of which normative property of responses FA
theories appeal to, they have the potential to unify these different
varieties of value. And since it's plausible that different
varieties of value must have something in common in virtue of which
they all qualify as varieties of *value*, it's an
advantage of FA theories that they're able to explain what this
is--viz., that each can be fully explained in terms of facts
involving normative properties of responses to be had by certain sets
of agents--while also respecting the real, important differences
between the kinds of value in question.



And FA theories also seem able, similarly, to unify the variety of
specific evaluative properties that populate the evaluative domain,
e.g., that of being admirable, delightful, praiseworthy, etc. For
assuming that, for each such property, facts involving it can be
explained in terms of facts involving a certain normative property of
a certain type of response, FA theorists can claim that this is what
all such properties have in common, while also properly distinguishing
among them according to the particular type of response that they
appeal to in their explanation of each. And, according to some, there
are likewise prospects for applying FA theories to so-called
"thick" evaluative properties, such as that of being
courageous and kind (for extensive discussion, see Rowland 2019, ch.
9). If so, FA theories stand to provide unifying explanations not just
of proper subsets of evaluative properties, but of *all* such
properties. Indeed, the most ambitious FA theorists might claim that
all evaluative properties have in common that they can each be
accounted for in terms of a certain normative property of a certain
type of human response.


## 3. Outstanding Issues



Despite the attractions discussed above, FA theories also face several
outstanding issues, which challenge both their extensional adequacy
and explanatory commitments. This section covers four outstanding
issues for FA theory. The first three consist in putative
counterexamples that pose extensional challenges: the Wrong Kind
of Reason problem (section 3.1); the Wrong Kind of Value problem
(section 3.2); and the problem of partiality (section 3.3). The fourth
and final issue challenges the explanatory element of FA theory,
alleging that at least certain FA theories may be viciously circular
(section 3.4).


### 3.1 The Wrong Kind of Reason Problem



Perhaps the most famous challenge to FA theories is what's known
as the Wrong Kind of Reason problem (WKR problem). At a first pass,
the WKR problem is the problem that, at least sometimes, it seems that
what's valuable doesn't correspond to what there's
reason to value. For example, consider an FA theory like
Scanlon's buck-passing view from section 1.5, which entails that
something is valuable if and only if (and because) there are reasons
for just anyone to value it. The trouble is that, intuitively, there
can be reasons to value things that have no value as well as reasons
not to value things that do have value. To adapt an example from Roger
Crisp (2000), suppose an evil demon will kill you unless you value a
cup of mud. This fact seems like a reason to value the cup, but the
cup, being a cup of mud, has no value. Hence, an FA theory like
Scanlon's buck-passing view seems sometimes to predict that the
object of a valuing attitude has value when, intuitively, it
doesn't. Similarly, consider an FA theory that explains facts
about what's valuable in terms of facts about what there's
*sufficient* reason to value. Now suppose the demon will kill
you if you value something of value. Here, we might think you lack
sufficient reason to value the valuable thing. If so, then this
version of FA theory also seems subject to counterexample. This class
of counterexamples is known as the "Wrong Kind of Reason
problem" since the reasons that figure in the
examples--reasons that (dis)favor a valuing attitude without
making the attitude's object (dis)valuable--are of the
"wrong kind" to figure in FA theories: they're
reasons to value *x* that are irrelevant to whether *x*
has value, and hence can't be appealed to in order to explain
why *x* is (or isn't) valuable.



The WKR problem generalizes in two important ways. First, it seems to
arise not only for certain FA theories of value *simpliciter*,
but also for certain FA theories of more specific evaluative
properties. For example, Crisp's demon might equally threaten
harm unless you admire someone who's not admirable, despise
someone who's not despicable, love someone who's not
lovable, etc. Second, in addition to arising for versions of FA theory
that explain evaluative facts in terms of facts about *reasons*
for certain responses, the WKR problem also arises for FA theories
that try to explain evaluative facts by appeal to deontic facts of
various other kinds--for example, by appeal to facts about which
responses we ought to or may have. Indeed, just as the demon's
threat might give you a reason to value the mud, it might also make it
the case that you *should* or that you're
*required* to value it, or that valuing it would be
*justified*. The question of whether the WKR problem
generalizes to apply to all versions of FA theory is discussed in
detail below.



As is always the case when a theory is confronted with putative
counterexamples, two broad responses are available: proponents of the
theory might either reject the counterexamples or concede them, but
try somehow to revise the theory so as to avoid them. Proponents of FA
theory have explored both kinds of
 response.[5]
 The first kind of response amounts to skepticism about wrong-kind
reasons, the view that such "reasons" aren't really
reasons at all and hence aren't counterexamples to FA theory. On
this view, the demon's threat doesn't give you a reason to
value the mud (or make it the case that you should or may value it);
instead, it at best gives you a reason to *want* to value the
mud, or to bring it about that you do if you can. Thus, FA theories
that explain facts about value by appeal to facts about reasons (or
oughts, permissions, etc.) don't falsely predict, e.g., that the
mud has value. Hence, for WKR skeptics, putative WKRs pose no problem
for FA theories (Parfit 2011; Skorupski 2010; Way 2012).



The success of this response is a matter of debate. According to many,
the claim that WKRs for attitudes aren't reasons for those
attitudes seems implausible on substantive, first-order grounds. After
all, the fact that the demon will kill you unless you value the mud
does seem to speak in favor of valuing it, and it also seems this fact
could contribute to making it the case that you ought to value the
mud, or that you'd be justified in valuing it. And, for various
reasons, many have found unsatisfying the skeptic's attempt to
save the phenomenon by claiming that, although the demon's
threat gives you no reason to value the mud, it does give you a reason
to want or to try to bring it about that you do (see, e.g.,
D'Arms and Jacobson 2000b, Rabinowicz and
Ronnow-Rasmussen 2004, Danielsson and Olson 2007, Reisner 2009,
and Rosen 2015a).



WKR skeptics thus need to argue that WKRs aren't reasons for the
attitudes they seem to favor and to explain why they're not
(McHugh and Way 2016). One popular proposed explanation of why WKRs
aren't reasons appeals to a response-condition on reasons,
according to which a consideration *p* can be a reason for you
to *A* only if you could *A* for the reason that
*p* (Kelly 2002; Shah 2006; Parfit 2011). However, proponents
of FA theories that explain facts about value in terms of facts about
reasons seem committed to there being reasons that violate such a
condition (Way 2012). To adapt a case from Schroeder (2007a), suppose
Nate loves successful surprise parties thrown in his honor but hates
unsuccessful ones. Plausibly, if there's a surprise party for
Nate next door, then there's value in his going and hence, on a
reasons-based FA theory, a reason for him to want to go. However,
since Nate hates surprise parties he expects, this isn't a
reason for which he could want to go: "for as soon as you tell
him about it, [the reason] will go away" (Schroeder 2007a, 165).
Hence, reasons-based FA theories seem committed to there being reasons
that violate a response condition. Thus, an appeal to this condition
to explain why WKRs aren't reasons looks untenable as part of a
reply to the WKR problem as it applies to these theories.



The second strategy for responding to the WKR problem, in contrast,
accepts that WKRs are reasons. Proponents of this second strategy
concede the counterexamples that constitute the WKR problem and try to
revise FA theories in light of them. The idea is to distinguish
between the "right" and "wrong" kinds of
reasons to figure in FA theories, and to reformulate the theories such
that they reference only reasons of the "right" kind. The
distinction between right-kind reasons (RKRs) and WKRs for valuing
attitudes can of course be easily drawn by appeal to the property of
being valuable *simpliciter*: RKRs to value *x* are
reasons to value *x* that also make *x* somehow
valuable, whereas WKRs to value *x* are reasons to value
*x* that don't also make *x* valuable. Likewise,
RKRs to admire *x* are reasons to admire *x* that also
make *x* admirable, RKRs to despise *x* are reasons to
despise *x* that also make *x* despicable, etc. But such
accounts of the RKR/WKR distinction are of course unavailable to FA
theorists, at least insofar as they aspire to provide non-circular
accounts of evaluative properties.



Over the last two decades, many have attempted to draw the RKR/WKR
distinction in a way that doesn't render FA theories circular.
An early proposal held that RKRs are given by facts about the objects
of the attitudes they favor, whereas WKRs are given by facts about the
favored mental states themselves (Stratton-Lake 2005; Piller 2006;
Parfit 2011). But the object-/state-given theory is extensionally
inadequate: some WKRs are object-given (Rabinowicz and
Ronnow-Rasmussen 2004) and some RKRs may be state-given
(Schroeder 2012). For example, if a demon will kill me unless I admire
him, this looks like a reason to admire the demon that's given
by the object of this attitude, but it's irrelevant to whether
the demon is admirable, and hence a WKR. On the flip side, the fact
that I'll soon get more information relevant to deciding whether
to ph might be an RKR to hold off intending to ph, despite its
concerning not the object of intention, and whether it's
worthwhile, but the state of intending itself.



Another view--the "alethic view"--holds that
right- but not wrong-kind reasons to *A* are reasons to
*A* that bear on whether *A* accurately represents its
object (Tappolet 2011; Rosen 2015). But this proposal also faces
significant difficulties. First, it seems to require taking on
contentious commitments about how various types of attitudes represent
their objects in order to guarantee the account's extensional
correctness (McHugh and Way 2016; Schroeder 2010); and second, these
commitments may render FA theories circular, if it's held that
certain of these attitudes represent their objects as having
evaluative properties (Ross 1939). For example, if we assume that
desire represents its object as desirable, then the alethic view would
yield the plausible result that RKRs for desire are reasons for desire
relevant to whether the object of desire is desirable. But (1) this
view about the representational content of desire is contentious, and
(2) this commitment would seem to render an FA theory of desirability
 circular.[6]




In addition to these, many other accounts of the RKR/WKR distinction
have been offered and criticized (see, e.g., the proposals in
Schroeder 2010 and Rowland 2019 and the criticisms of each,
respectively, in Sharadin 2013 and McHugh and Way 2022a). Common to
many proposed ways of drawing the RKR/WKR distinction is a commitment
to the idea that the distinction can be drawn in terms of reasons and
certain non-normative properties alone. This commitment is common, for
instance, to all of the proposals mentioned so far. But none of these
proposals has gained wide acceptance. Partly in light of this, a
number of authors have opted to avoid this commitment, and instead to
offer an account of the RKR/WKR distinction that takes FA theories
back to their earliest roots. On this approach, the RKR/WKR
distinction can be drawn in terms of the normative notion of
fittingness. Roughly, RKRs for attitudes are considerations that
contribute to the fittingness of those attitudes, whereas WKRs for
attitudes are reasons for attitudes that lack this feature. On this
proposal, an FA theory of value *simpliciter* amounts to the
thesis that facts involving value *simpliciter* are always
fully and ultimately grounded in facts about the *fittingness*
of certain valuing responses, rather than in facts about
*reasons* for those responses.



Proponents of this position argue that the WKR problem poses no
problem for FA theories of value so understood (Danielsson and Olson
2007; Chappell 2012; Sharadin 2015; McHugh and Way 2016; Howard 2019).
They claim that while facts like the demon's threat may provide
reasons for the attitudes they support, or even make it the case that
you ought to have those attitudes, such facts are irrelevant to
whether those attitudes are fitting. For example, even if the fact of
the demon's threat gives you a reason to value a cup of mud, or
makes it the case that you ought to have this attitude, this fact
isn't one in virtue of which the mud *merits* being
valued, or is worthy of this attitude; hence, this fact fails to make
the attitude fitting (see the characterization of fittingness, in
terms of merit and worthiness, offered in section 1.3). The judgment
that WKRs such as the demon's threat are irrelevant to the
fittingness of the attitudes they favor is widely shared. In addition
to the authors cited above, see, *inter alia*, Broad 1930;
Brandt 1946; Ewing 1939, 1948; Wiggins 1987; and McDowell 1998. Hence,
some have argued, drawing the RKR/WKR distinction in terms of
fittingness, and so formulating FA theory ultimately in terms of
fittingness rather than in terms of some (other) deontic notion,
offers a promising solution to the WKR problem for FA theories of
value 
 *simpliciter*.[7]
 Further, this strategy promises to generalize to address the problem
as it occurs for FA theories of other, specific evaluative properties
as well.



At least on the face of things, then, FA theories that explain
evaluative facts ultimately in terms of facts about the fittingness of
certain types of response seem to have an advantage when it comes to
answering the WKR problem. Still, some have raised concerns with the
proposed appeal to fittingness in addressing this problem. For
example, some authors claim to lack a pre-theoretical grip on the
notion of fittingness, and thus find explanations of evaluative facts
in terms of facts involving the fittingness relation uninformative
(Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen 2004). And others have argued,
on various grounds, that facts involving the fittingness of human
responses will ultimately need to be explained in terms of reasons (of
a certain kind) for those responses (Schroeder 2010, 2020). A fully
satisfying answer to the WKR problem that appeals to the notion of
fittingness will thus need to address these challenges.


### 3.2 The Wrong Kind of Value Problem



The Wrong Kind of Value problem (WKV problem) also poses
counterexamples to at least certain FA theories. It alleges that there
can be cases in which something has value without calling for any
valuing response on the part of anyone--i.e., the thing
isn't fitting for anyone to value, there's no reason for
anyone to value it, it's not the case that anyone ought to value
it, etc. In short: there are cases where facts about value
*can't* correspond to normative facts to the effect that
some valuing response is called for, since in some cases the former
sort of fact can obtain without the latter.



To illustrate, consider an example, the spirit of which is due to
Krister Bykvist (2009), in which there are happy egrets, but no past,
present, or future agents, i.e., beings capable of having a valuing
response. Plausibly, the egrets' pleasure has value. But, the
thought goes, since there are no beings in this world capable of
valuing the egrets' pleasure, the egrets' pleasure
can't be valued and hence a valuing response to it can't
be fitting or otherwise called for. Thus, the value of the
egrets' happiness doesn't correspond to a normative fact
about a valuing response. Hence, FA theories must be extensionally
inadequate.



Another kind of example is due to Andrew Reisner (2015). In this kind
of example, the value of something in a given world depends on whether
anyone in that world values that thing. If anyone in the relevant
world does value the thing, then the thing becomes disvaluable, or
bad. However, if no one values it, then it's valuable. (There
are various ways of filling out this kind of case, but these are its
important structural features; for Reisner's preferred version,
see ibid., 467-8.) In this kind of case, valuing something
valuable extinguishes its value. Reisner claims that it therefore
can't be fitting to value the valuable thing; hence, FA theories
are extensionally inadequate.



Defenders of FA theory have responded to these cases in various ways
(Orsi 2013a; Way 2013; Elliott 2017; Rowland 2019). Perhaps the most
popular response to each is one that purports to answer both. This
response agrees that it's not fitting (or otherwise called for)
for anyone in the happy egret world to value the egrets'
pleasure (since there are no beings capable of valuing in this world)
and that it's not fitting for anyone in the world Reisner
describes to value the thing whose value would be extinguished if
anyone in that world were to value it. But, the response goes,
it's nonetheless fitting for beings in *other* possible
worlds--us, for example--to value the egrets' pleasure
(so far as it goes) and to value the valuable thing whose value would
be eliminated were to it be valued by its worldmates (Orsi 2013a; Way
2013; Rowland 2019). Hence, in both kinds of case, the value at stake
can still be said to correspond to normative facts about a certain
valuing response, albeit a response to be had by beings of other
worlds.



Reisner (2015) anticipates and criticizes the above response on
various grounds, though see Rowland (2019, ch. 7) for an extended
reply. A different response, also offered by Rowland, suggests that FA
theorists might state their theory counterfactually, claiming
(roughly) that whenever something has value, that's fully
because valuing it *would* be called for were there any beings
capable of valuing it around. On this formulation of FA theory,
something has value if, in the nearest world where there are beings
capable of valuing it, their valuing it is called for. Since a valuing
response to the egrets' pleasure is evidently called for in the
nearest world where there are beings capable of valuing it, this
formulation of the theory thus predicts that the birds' pleasure
has value. Thus, this formulation of FA theory seems at least to avoid
Bykvist's kind of counterexample. However, it doesn't also
obviously avoid Reisner's. In Reisner's case, unlike
Bykvist's, the nearest world where there are beings capable of
valuing the valuable thing in question is the same world that contains
the valuable thing. But recall: if beings in that world were to value
the valuable thing, the thing wouldn't be valuable. And
according to Reisner, this means that it can't be fitting or
otherwise called for, for those beings to value the thing in question.
Reisner here relies on a principle according to which it can be
fitting for an agent *S* to value a thing *x* only if
*x* would be fitting to value, conditional on
*S*'s valuing it. If this principle is true, then the
counterfactual proposal fails to address Reisner's case; but see
Rowland (ibid.) for arguments that it's false.



Which of these responses to the WKV problem is preferable, and whether
either is ultimately acceptable, remain open questions, and so
constitute avenues for further research. Two final points are worth
emphasis. First, the force of the WKV problem, unlike that of the WKR
problem, seems to depend not at all on which normative property of
responses that FA theories appeal to in their explanations of
evaluative facts. In particular, the problem seems to apply with equal
force to FA theories that appeal to the *fittingness* of human
responses and to those that appeal to *reasons* for those
 responses.[8]
 Hence, the WKV problem may apply more widely than the WKR problem.
But, secondly, the WKV problem seems in another way narrower than the
WKR problem. For while the WKR problem applies not only to FA theories
of value *simpliciter*, but also to FA theories of specific
evaluative properties, such as those of being shameful or disgusting,
the WKV problem may not generalize in this way. For notice that the
WKV problem illustrates and supports the worry, mentioned in section
1.1, that facts about value *simpliciter* can seem independent
of (normative) facts about actual or possible human responses. But
facts about what's *shameful* or *disgusting*
seemingly couldn't be independent of (normative) facts about the
human responses of shame or disgust (D'Arms and Jacobson 2006;
Jacobson 2011; D'Arms 2022). Perhaps something could be valuable
in a world without valuers, but could something be shameful in a world
without shame? If not, then the WKV problem may be a problem for some,
but not all, FA theories, depending on the evaluative properties the
theories target. At best, then, the WKV problem wouldn't be a
reason to reject FA theory *tout court*, but only to be more
selective about which FA theories we accept.


### 3.3 The Problem of Partiality



In addition to offering accounts of monadic evaluative properties,
such as being lovable or valuable, FA theories can offer accounts of
dyadic, comparative evaluative properties, such as those of being more
valuable or *better than*. For example, FA theorists might
claim that whenever *x* is better than *y*, that's
fully because it's fitting to value *x* more than
*y*, or to prefer *x* to *y*. Likewise, they
might hold that whenever *x* is more lovable than *y*,
that's fully because *x* is fitting to love more than
*y*. Indeed, according to some, FA theorists should take
monadic properties like that of being valuable or lovable to be
explanatorily posterior to their comparative counterparts (Schroeder
2010). But the problem of partiality poses potential counterexamples
to FA theories of at least certain comparative evaluative properties,
for example, that of being better than. The problem, roughly, is that
in some cases where *y* is no better than *x*--or
indeed, where *x* is worse than *y*--it can seem
fitting to be partial to *x*, or to prefer *x* to
*y*. For example, suppose that either My Pal or a Stranger can
be rescued from drowning, but not both. And suppose also that, except
for the fact that My Pal is my pal and that Stranger is a stranger,
everything else is equal. Plausibly, then, My Pal's being
rescued is no better than Stranger's being rescued and vice
versa--the two outcomes seem equally good. Still, it can seem
fitting for me to prefer that My Pal is rescued. Hence, it can seem
fitting for me to prefer one outcome to another when the outcomes are
equally good. This is the kind of example that constitutes the
partiality problem; and instances are easily multiplied.



The partiality problem was noticed and discussed by one of the
progenitors of FA theory, A.C. Ewing (1939), but has only recently
come to occupy the attention of contemporary authors (e.g., Bykvist
2009; Olson 2009; Lemos 2011; Zimmerman 2011; and Orsi 2013).
Importantly, the problem seems to apply only to FA theories of
comparative evaluative facts that propose to explain the relevant
facts in terms of normative facts that call for just anyone to have a
certain response. For example, that it's fitting for me to
prefer that My Pal is rescued seems problematic only for FA theories
of betterness that propose to explain facts about what's better
than what by appeal to facts about what's fitting for just
anyone to prefer (or to value more). This way of explaining the
property of being better than is a natural way of capturing the
popular and plausible idea that betterness is an agent-neutral
evaluative property (see section 1.4). However, if we hold
instead that betterness is fundamentally agent-relative, in the
manner of Smith (2009), then we might reject the idea that facts about
it are to be explained always in terms of normative facts about
what's fitting for just anyone to prefer (as Smith himself
does). This would be one way of avoiding the partiality problem as it
applies to FA theories of better than, though the view about
betterness on which it rests is controversial; by far, the majority
view is that the property is agent-neutral.



A second way of dissolving the partiality problem is suggested by
Jonas Olson (2009). On Olson's view, the partiality problem is
structurally the same as, and indeed a special case of, the WKR
problem (see section 3.1): the fact that My Pal is my pal gives me
(some, sufficient, or decisive) reason to prefer the outcome where
they're saved to the outcome where Stranger is, but it
doesn't make the former outcome any better than the latter.
Hence, according to Olson, a solution to the WKR problem should also
suffice to solve the problem of partiality. On Olson's favored
solution to the WKR problem, FA theorists should explain evaluative
facts in terms of facts about fittingness rather than reasons. Olson
suggests that while the fact that My Pal is my pal might give me
*reason* to prefer that they're rescued, this fact
doesn't also make this preference *fitting*. Hence, FA
theories that explain betterness in terms of what's fitting for
all agents to prefer, rather than in terms of what there's
reason for all agents to prefer, can avoid the problem of
partiality.



However, there are two worries for Olson's diagnosis of the
problem of partiality as an instance of the WKR problem. First,
whatever we might think about the plausibility of WKR skepticism as a
solution to the WKR problem, this view seems less plausible as a
solution to the problem of partiality. Even those inclined to deny
that the demon's threat gives you a reason to desire a cup of
mud would likely find it hard to deny that My Pal's being my pal
gives me a reason to prefer that they're saved. Further,
it's not obviously incoherent for the WKR skeptic to deny that
the former fact is a reason while accepting that the latter one is.
Thus, the fact that WKR skepticism seems at least more viable as a
solution to the WKR problem than it does as a solution to the problem
of partiality suggests that these problems aren't the same.



Second, as indicated above, it can seem plausible not only that I have
reason to prefer that My Pal is rescued, but that, contrary to Olson,
this preference is fitting. This, too, would distinguish the examples
that constitute the problem of partiality from those that constitute
the WKR problem. As discussed in section 3.1, the demon's threat
seems not to make it fitting to the value the mud--it's not
a fact in virtue of which the mud *merits* being valued. By
contrast, the fact that My Pal is my pal can seem to merit my
preferring that they're rescued; and if it does, this preference
is fitting.



Both of these considerations put pressure on the idea that the problem
of partiality is an instance of the WKR problem. But they also suggest
that, like the WKV problem (section 3.2), the problem of partiality
may pose a problem for certain FA theories regardless of the normative
property they appeal to: Just as the fact that My Pal is my pal gives
me a reason to prefer that they're saved, or perhaps makes it
the case that I should have this preference, this fact may also make
this preference fitting. Hence, the problem of partiality in this way
threatens to be a rather general problem for FA theories, specifically
for those that aspire to explain certain comparative evaluative
facts.



Beyond Olson's proposal, various other solutions to the
partiality problem have been suggested and debated (see, e.g., Lemos
2011; Zimmerman 2011; Orsi 2013a; and Nye, Plunkett, and Ku 2015).
However, it's fair to say that, so far, none has gained wide
acceptance. Thus, the partiality problem, perhaps more so than the WKR
problem or the WKV problem, remains an outstanding and pressing issue
for FA 
 theory.[9]


### 3.4 Circularity



As noted in the introduction to this entry, some FA theorists identify
what's valuable *simpliciter* with what's
desirable, and explain facts about what's desirable in terms of
facts about what's fitting to desire. Other FA theorists,
however, reject that the valuable can be identified with the
desirable, often on the grounds that some valuable things seem not to
call for desire but for other pro-responses (Ewing 1939; Anderson
1993; Scanlon 1998). For example, we might think that persons have a
particular kind of value that calls fundamentally for responses like
*respect* and *preservation*, and indeed that desire
isn't the proper response to the special value of persons at
all. And more generally, FA theorists might hold that the pro-response
called for by a valuable thing can vary according to the kind of thing
at issue. For example, as Scanlon (1998) suggests, the pro-response
called for by a valuable friendship might differ from that called for
by a valuable piece of music. Hence, Scanlon (and others) opt to
explain facts about value in terms of normative facts about
*valuing*, where valuing can consist variously in a range of
pro-responses.



But such FA theories face a challenge. As Rabinowicz and
Ronnow-Rasmussen (2004) put it, the challenge is to specify
"the common denominator for all the responses in the
'pro'-category", to tell us "what makes them
'pro'" (401). What makes respect and reverence, for
example, positive responses (as opposed to negative ones)? And why is
protecting something a pro-response to it while pondering it is not? A
possible and extensionally plausible answer would be to define
positive responses as responses that are called for by valuable things
(and negative responses as responses that are called for by
disvaluable things), but this makes FA theories circular. The
challenge is for FA theorists to specify what makes pro-attitudes
"pro" without circularity.



An early version of this challenge was pressed by W.D. Ross (1939), as
a criticism of Ewing's (1939) FA theory of value
*simpliciter*. Ross suggests that Ewing's account of
value in terms of fitting positive emotional responses is circular
because the positive emotional responses he appeals to are always
accompanied by the thought that the object of the response is somehow
"good". Since positive emotional responses to a thing
involve taking the thing to be good, the goodness of a thing
can't be non-circularly explained by appeal to (fitting)
positive emotional responses. Ewing's (1947) response was to
insist that positive emotional responses aren't necessarily
accompanied by the thought their object is good. Instead, a positive
emotional response need only be accompanied by thoughts about its
object's non-evaluative, *good-making* characteristics.
Hence, positive emotional responses needn't involve the thought
that their objects are good.



The success of Ewing's reply to Ross continues to be a matter of
debate (Hurka 2014, ch. 2). In any case, Ewing's reply
doesn't offer a positive account of what makes pro-responses
"pro"; it merely rejects a possible answer to that
question that would make FA theories circular. Another possible
response to the challenge is to embrace circularity. According to
some, even if we can't adequately characterize pro-responses
without reference to the kind of value that FA theories seek to
explain, FA theories can nonetheless remain illuminating and
informative (see esp. Wiggins 1987 and Tappolet 2011). In short, we
can concede the circularity, but claim it's not vicious. This
response pairs well with the "no-priority view" discussed
in section 2.1, but seems contrary to FA theories of value, insofar as
their explanatory element is essential to them.



A third response is to concede the purported circularity of certain FA
theories of value *simpliciter*, to reject such theories in
light of that circularity, but to embrace FA theories of more specific
evaluative properties, which, on the face of it, seem less vulnerable
to circularity worries. According to this response, the right response
to the present challenge isn't to abandon FA theory *tout
court*, but to be more selective about which FA theories we
accept. For example, we might reject an FA theory of value
*simpliciter* on grounds of circularity, but accept FA theories
of being delicious, trustworthy, admirable, despicable, lovable,
delightful, and so on. Of course, proponents of even this more limited
approach may still ultimately need to characterize the responses in
terms of which they seek to explain these evaluative properties
without referring to those properties, but, according to some, the
prospects for doing so seem at least comparatively promising (Gibbard
1990; D'Arms and Jacobson 2000b; Rabinowicz and
Ronnow-Rasmussen 2004; Jacobson 2011; Rosen 2015a).



A fourth and final response, of course, would be to try to tackle the
circularity challenge head on by offering a plausible account of what
makes pro-responses "pro" that doesn't refer to the
notion of value *simpliciter*. Perhaps, for example, what makes
pro-responses "pro" is some common descriptive
motivational element (Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen 2004). Or
perhaps there's some common normative element to all
pro-responses that FA theorists could non-circularly appeal to. At the
time of writing, however, this issue is underexplored, and the task of
developing this kind of response remains outstanding.