## 1. Isolationism and Integrationism



It is helpful to draw attention to a distinction between two
different ways in which one might approach issues of climate
justice.



One approach--Isolationism--holds that it is best to treat
the ethical issues posed by climate change in isolation from other
issues (such as poverty, migration, trade and so forth). The
isolationist seeks to bracket these other considerations and treat
climate change on its own. A second
approach--Integrationism--holds that it is best to treat the
ethical issues posed by climate change in light of a general theory of
justice and in conjunction with other issues (such as poverty,
development and so on).



Some philosophers have adopted an isolationist approach. Some, for
example, propose principles for allocating rights to emit greenhouse
gases that treat greenhouse gases in isolation from other issues
 (Section 6.2).
 Two related reasons are given for this approach. First, some argue
that there is value in simplifying the issue, and since introducing
these other concerns would complicate the question it is worth
bracketing them out. Second, some make a related pragmatic argument
about the implications of adopting an integrationist approach for
reaching agreement in climate negotiations. They argue that insisting
that climate justice be pursued in light of a general theory, and in
conjunction with other issues, would be a recipe for deadlock because
there is often deep disagreement about what theory of justice is
correct. For this reason, they propose bracketing out other phenomena
and treating climate change in isolation (Blomfield 2019: 24;
Gosseries 2005: 283; L. Meyer & Roser 2006: 239).



In reply, those who favour an integrationist approach tend to offer the
following considerations. First, they argue that in order to treat
climate change in isolation there would need to be something special
about it that warranted separate treatment. However, they argue,
climate change is not special in this way. For example, it impacts on
the same interests (people's interests in food and water; their
health; their access to land and so on) as other phenomena (such as
the distribution of economic resources, poverty and poverty
alleviation, migration, and trade). Furthermore, they claim that the
same distributive principles seem to be salient for climate change as
they are for other phenomena. If, for example, one thinks that
individuals have human rights to meet their socio-economic needs then
this should surely also bear on questions of climate justice too since
it provides a reason to combat climate change and a reason to
distribute responsibilities so that they do not burden the poor and
vulnerable. Another way of putting this point is that when people
engage in deliberation about, say, how the costs of tackling climate
change should be distributed then--so Integrationists
claim--they inescapably end up drawing on more general values
(such as "people have a right to a decent standard of
living" or "people should be accountable for their
choices") (Caney 2005: 763 & 765-766). If philosophers
eschew Integrationism and they try to answer questions such as
"who should bear the burdens of combating climate change?"
in an isolationist fashion--bracketing out, for example, what
economic rights persons have--then, so the argument runs, we end
up with very counter-intuitive conclusions (Caney 2018b:
682-684).



Whether this is true or not cannot be fully resolved in advance.
Rather it can only be decided by engaging in a normative analysis of
climate change and seeing whether it is borne out.



A second point that those who favour an Integrationist approach might
make is that climate change is causally interconnected with a wide
variety of other phenomena--such as economic growth, poverty
reduction, migration, health, trade, natural resource ownership, and
cultural rights--such that it is artificial to treat it on its
own. Climate change does not present itself to us as a discrete problem
that can be treated separately. Rather it is part and parcel of a
larger process. It is an upshot of people's activity (primarily
through the use of energy) and, as such, it is causally intertwined
with economic growth, poverty alleviation, urban design, and land use.
Furthermore, the effects of climatic change are often mediated through
other factors such as poverty, existing infrastructures, and the
responsiveness of political authorities. They interact with existing
inequalities and vulnerability, producing what Leichenko and
O'Brien (2008) term "double exposures". In addition
to this, the extraction of fossil fuels and the industry built around
it often directly harm the same interests (such as health and access
to land) that are harmed by the emission of greenhouse gases. So, from
this point of view, it seems artificial to focus on the effect of the
emissions rather than the whole phenomenon. Finally, the policies
proposed to tackle climate change themselves affect a wide range of
other phenomena (impacting on land use, access to food, health,
poverty alleviation, biodiversity loss, individual liberty, and so
on). Given this any attempt to cordon off climate change and apply
principles of justice to it in isolation seems misguided and
quixotic.



As we shall see--especially when we consider the distribution of
responsibilities and the application of principles of distributive
justice to the greenhouse gas budget--it matters a great deal
whether one takes an Isolationist or Integrationist perspective.



With this point duly noted, we can turn to the substantive issues.


## 2. Assessing Climate Impacts



One question of justice that arises is "What account of
persons" interests should be employed to evaluate the impacts of
climate change?' Such an account is needed for several reasons.
First, we need it to design adaptation policies for we need to know
what kind of protection people are entitled to and what interests
ought to be protected. In addition to this, when we are considering
proposed temperature targets we need to be able to evaluate them, and
to do this we need to have some account of persons' interests by
which to compare the different possibilities. For many years the
appropriate temperature target was assumed by many to be that of
keeping the increase in global mean temperatures from pre-industrial
times to below 2degC. However, some have campaigned for lower
targets. This is reflected in the Paris Agreement (2015,
 Other Internet Resources)
 which specified that the target should be 



> 
> 
> [h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below
> 2degC above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
> temperature increase to 1.5degC above pre-industrial levels.
> (Article 2.1(a)) 
> 
> 
> 



Others, by contrast, have argued that higher temperatures are
permissible. For example, William Nordhaus, a leading climate
economist, has argued that if we implement what he deems to be the
"optimal" climate policy the temperature increase would be
3.5degC in 2100 (when compared to a 1900 baseline) (Nordhaus 2018:
348 Fig 4).



Theories of distributive justice concern the just distribution of
burdens and benefits. We therefore need to know how we should conceive
of "burdens" and "benefits". Different
theories of distributive justice have put forward different accounts
of what it is that persons should have fair shares of (the
*distribuendum*) (see entries on
 distributive justice
 and
 egalitarianism).



When we consider climate change, different accounts of the
*distribuendum* are highly likely to converge in very many
cases. Climate change results in many dying (because of severe weather
events, such as extreme heatwaves, flooding, and storm surges). It
leads to droughts and crop failure and thus threatens people's
interests in food and water. It leads to an increase in certain
diseases. These impacts--threats to life, food and water, and to
health--would be condemned by many, if not all, theories of
distributive justice. (For a detailed discussion of the implications
of different accounts of the *distribuenda* of distributive
justice for the evaluation of climatic impacts see Page [2006:
50-77].)



Some, however, would argue that to limit our focus to these interests
(in life, health, food and water) is too narrow. They hold that some
persons have deep attachments to certain places, such as the land that
they have traditionally inhabited, and that being rooted in a
particular place is an integral part of what makes their life go well.
On this view, forcible displacement results in a non-substitutable
loss. This is highly pertinent in the case of climate change since
many indigenous peoples will be forcibly displaced from traditional
homelands. This is true both of those in small island states and
coastal settlements, as well as of inland communities forced to move
because of environmental degradation to their traditional lands. Many
argue, on this basis, that climate change constitutes a form of
cultural injustice (de Shalit 2011, Heyward 2014, Whyte 2016). An
adequate theory of climate justice must then consider whether
persons' have such cultural rights. 



This last example also helps to underscore another important point,
namely that which account of persons' interests is adopted can
have considerable practical implications, affecting what temperature
target to employ and what form adaptation should take.



The key issue here concerns the relationship between persons'
interests, on the one hand, and changes in the climate system, on the
other. On some views people's interests are such that a change
in the climate system might--at least in principle--be made
up for through adaptation and/or through the provision of other goods.
If, for example, one thinks that distributive justice is concerned
solely with persons' wealth and income, then the loss of a good
(such as one's house) because of climatic changes can be
compensated for by a transfer of wealth and/or income.



Other accounts of persons' interests will not, however, sanction
this kind of "compensation". Those who think that some
persons' good is bound up with a certain place or territory will
think that climate change inflicts on such people a loss that cannot
be compensated for. Protecting their interests necessarily requires
the environment to be a certain way (de Shalit 2011; Heyward 2014 esp.
156-157; Whyte 2016).



To put the point in other words, the key concern is about
"substitutability" (Neumayer 2003: 37-40). The
question is whether one can substitute the loss of nature with the
provision of other goods. Different accounts of justice will yield
different answers to this. This take us to a long-standing debate in
ecological economics and ethics between proponents of what has been
termed "weak sustainability" (which permits the
substitution of capital for the loss of nature) and proponents of
"strong sustainability" (which denies the possibility of
such substitution) (Neumayer 2003).



Four further points are in order.



First, it would be a mistake simply to employ an account of the
*distribuendum* and then apply that to evaluate climatic
impacts without considering whether that account adequately reflects
the values and ethical orientations of affected communities. See, in
this context, Krushil Watene's (2016) evaluation of the extent
to which the "capability" approach can accommodate the
insights of Maori philosophy concerning the value of nature. (See
entry on
 capability approach
 for information on the capability approach and relevant sources.)



Second, it is worth noting that once one has an account of the
relevant interests a further question is how one incorporates them
into a theory of justice. For example, some have argued that many of
the adverse impacts described above can accurately be described as
threatening people's human rights (Caney 2010b). This view
maintains that persons have certain human rights--to life,
health, water, food, not to be displaced--and that climate change
is unjust because it violates these human rights. Others are sceptical
of the applicability of human rights, arguing that they are too
inflexible and are unable to provide guidance when trade-offs are
necessary (Moellendorf 2014: 24-26 & 230-235).



Moellendorf suggests that we should instead adopt what he terms an
"Antipoverty Principle": this judges climate impacts (and
climate policies) in terms of their impact on poverty (Moellendorf
2014: 22-24). This, however, will be vulnerable to the objection
that it is unduly narrow in its focus, for climate change has harmful
effects that cannot simply be reduced to its effect on poverty levels
(such as its effects on political self-determination, 
people's ability to practise their traditional ways of life, and
their right not to be displaced) (Gardiner 2017: 441-443).



Another approach would be to follow the practice of many climate
economists. They employ what they term the "social cost of
carbon" where this calculates "a monetized value of the
present and future damages caused by the emission of a ton of
CO2" (Fleurbaey et al. 2019: 84). What stance one
adopts here will, then, depend on one's more general theory of
justice and normative public policy.



Third, the focus so far has been on the entitlements of individuals.
However, some will argue that this is too restrictive and that a
comprehensive account would include the rights of collective units to
be self-determining. The clearest and starkest (but not, of course,
the only) illustration of this is the destruction of small island
states.



Fourth, the focus, so far, has been on the impacts on human beings. On
some accounts, this is incomplete for it excludes nonhuman animals
(Cripps 2013: chapter 4). Clearly, evaluating such claims raises
questions that go beyond this entry. The point here is just that if
the interests of other creatures are included then this will have
implications for the evaluation of climatic impacts.


## 3. Intergenerational Justice



The question of what climate target to aim for will also depend on
what responsibilities members of one generation have to future
generations. The emission of some greenhouse gases can have an impact
far into the future. For example, CO2 lasts in the
atmosphere for "hundreds of thousands of years" (Allen,
Dube, & Solecki 2019: 64). So while climate change affects large
numbers of people alive now, many of the impacts of climate change
will fall on future generations. To know what temperature target is
appropriate it is necessary, then, to have an account of our
responsibilities to future generations and to know how much weight, if
any, to attribute to their interests.



Such an account is also needed for two further reasons. First, the
question of who should bear the burdens of climate change has an
intergenerational dimension. Some, for example, have argued that it
would be fair to impose some of the costs of mitigating (and adapting
to) climate change on future generations (Rendall 2011).



Finally, there is a fixed quantity of greenhouse gases which can be
 emitted.[2]
 Considering how this should be shared also raises questions of
intergenerational justice for if there is a fixed greenhouse gas
budget we need to consider what claims, if any, future people have to
emit greenhouse gases.


### 3.1 Principles of Intergenerational Justice



A number of different principles of intergenerational justice have
been proposed. Many for example, adopt a sufficientarian position and
hold that justice requires merely that all persons be above a certain
specified threshold. (For sophisticated analyses see L. Meyer &
Roser 2009 and Page 2006: 90-95; 2007.)



One challenge for this view will, of course, be determining how to
specify this threshold. Many, however, will grant that a sufficiency
condition is necessary even if it is hard to specify. Some may though
query whether it is sufficient. For example, a sufficientarian view
would allow members of one generation to leave future generations
worse off than them just so long as they are above a certain
threshold. This will strike many as too weak. Consider a case where
one generation could leave future people much better off than the
sufficientarian threshold at no (or little) cost. Here it would seem
inadequate to say that current generations need only ensure that
future people do not fall beneath the sufficientarian's
designated threshold.



Some adopt more demanding accounts of intertemporal justice which
avoid these problems. For example, in their book *Sustainability
for a Warming Planet* (2015) Humberto Llavador, John E. Roemer,
and Joaquim Silvestre defend what they term "growth
sustainability". They explain it as follows: 



> 
> 
> Growth sustainability (say, at 25% per generation) means to find that
> path of economic activity that maximizes the welfare of the present
> generation, subject to guaranteeing that welfare grows at least at 25%
> per generation, forever after. (Llavador, Roemer & Silvestre 2015:
> 4) 
> 
> 
> 



The key idea is to maximise the standard of living of current
generations but also commit to leaving future people better off by a
certain proportion. Their argument comes in two steps. First, they
think--along luck egalitarian lines--that there is a case
for intergenerational equality. But then they add that current
generations often desire to benefit the future and so there is a case
for building in a commitment to bettering the condition of future
people (Llavador, Roemer & Silvestre 2015: 4 &
35-36).



Others might query this second step, and, in particular, the claim
that a "preference" to benefit others can ground an
(enforceable) duty to do so. In general, whether people have a duty to
others cannot be vindicated on the basis of a preference that some
have to benefit others. This notwithstanding, some might still argue
that where current generations can leave future generations better off
than themselves at no cost, or at reasonable cost, then there is a
duty to do so.



There is one other aspect that bears mentioning. So far the focus has
been on what might term a vertical dimension (how well off the members
of generations in the future [at, say, *t*10] are when
compared to earlier generations [at, say, *t*1]). This
does not, however, exhaust questions of intergenerational justice for
one might think that members of one generation should also be
concerned about the likely distribution *within* any future
generation (so, what we might term a horizontal dimension). Those who
adopt an egalitarian perspective, for example, might think that
current generations have a duty to act in such a way that they do not
create stark inequalities *within* future generations (Caney
2018a: 161-162 & 168; see also Fleurbaey et al. 2019: 93).
This is relevant in this context because climate change tends to
exacerbate existing inequalities (Hoegh-Guldberg, Jacob, & Taylor
2019: 244).


### 3.2 Intertemporal Discounting



The focus of the previous subsection was on principles of
intergenerational justice. Much of the literature on intergenerational
justice and climate change has, however, engaged with economic
analyses of the impacts of climate change, and economic analyses tend
to employ the concept of a social discount rate to specify how people
should treat future generations. Given this a comprehensive treatment
of climate justice and future generations needs to discuss the concept
of discounting (see entry on
 Frank Ramsey and intergenerational welfare economics).
 



Roughly stated, social discount rates specify the extent to which
persons should "discount" the future and should allocate
resources to the current time as opposed to the future. The social
discount rate has several component parts.



*Time Discounting*. One important component is "time
discounting": this involves allocating less moral weight to a
person's well-being the further into the future it is. Many
philosophers have been highly critical of this approach, arguing that
it is objectionable to discriminate against people on the basis of
when they are alive. That, it is argued, penalises people for a
property that lacks any moral significance (Caney 2014b:
323-327; Parfit 1984: 480-486; Rawls 1999: 259-262).
Others would demur, and some have offered communitarian defences of
special obligations to those who are temporally near (de Shalit
1995).



*Growth Discounting*. A second important component is what
Nordhaus calls "growth discounting" (1997: 317). The idea
here is clearly stated by the economist Nicholas Stern, who writes
that we 



> 
> 
> should discount the consumption of future generations on the basis
> that they are likely to be richer than ourselves. This reason for
> discounting is, and should be, part of most models. (Stern 2008: 14)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Clearly what position one takes on this will depend on whether one
adopts a broadly egalitarian position on intergenerational justice or
not. If one thinks that egalitarian commitments should inform our
policies towards future generations, and, if one thinks that those
alive in the future will be wealthier (a crucial assumption that one
might at least query) then there is a case for growth discounting. So
one's verdict on growth discounting will depend on the nature of
one's principle of intergenerational justice (sufficiency,
equality, priority, Llavador et al.'s formulation and so on) as
well as empirical assumptions about future growth (and one's
attitude to risk and uncertainty).


### 3.3 Objections and Concerns



The previous subsections proceeded on the basis that there are duties
of justice to future generations. It is worth noting here then that
some dispute that. The reasons they do so are not peculiar to the case
of climate change, and are familiar from general debates about
intergenerational justice (see entry on
 intergenerational justice).



For example, some have invoked Derek Parfit's Non Identity
Problem (Parfit 1984: chapter 16) to call into question claims that
there are duties of justice to (remote) future generations (Broome
2012: 61-64). They argue that since the decisions made now
affect who gets born in the future they do not harm future generations
for they do not make them worse off than they would otherwise be
(Broome 2012: 61-64; Parfit 1984: chapter 16).



This is not the place to discuss the Non Identity Problem in depth
(see entry on
 nonidentity problem).
 It is, however, perhaps worth noting that many are not persuaded that
this argument shows that current generations lack duties of (climate)
justice to future people. The nub of the issue is whether theories of
justice are committed to a "narrow person-affecting" point
of view (Parfit 1984: 393-395). Broome appears to assume that
they are. However, many others maintain that justice to future
generations should not be conceived of in such narrow person-affecting
terms (e.g., Reiman 2007: esp. 83-86 & 88-92).
Consider, for example, sufficientarian accounts of our
responsibilities to the future. They maintain that there is a duty of
justice to act in such a way that the standard of living of those who
live in the future is above a certain threshold. They are *not*
committed to the thought that persons act unjustly *only* if
they render someone (future or present) worse off than they would
otherwise have been. Their claim is simply that persons of one
generation act unjustly if, other things being equal, the outcome of
their actions is that those who are alive in the future have a
lower-than-sufficiency standard of living (see the entry on
 intergenerational justice,
 sections 3 & 4). The same point could be made about other
accounts, whether egalitarian, prioritarian or Llavador et al.'s
view. 


## 4. Risk and Uncertainty



Another set of normative issues arises from the fact that climate
projections are characterised by risk and uncertainty. A comprehensive
analysis of climate justice needs, then, to consider the just way to
respond to risk and uncertainty. To underscore why this matters it is
salutary to consider the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report. Suppose
that we take the appropriate target to be avoiding an increase in
global mean temperatures of more than 1.5degC when compared with
pre-industrial times. The quantity of greenhouse gases that can be
permissibly emitted varies enormously depending on how risk-averse we
think that our approach should be. According to the IPCC a 33%
probability of meeting the 1.5degC target results in a greenhouse
gas budget of 840 GtCO2 whereas a 66% probability of
meeting the same target results in a greenhouse budget of 420
GtCO2 (Rogelj, Shindell, & Jiang 2019: 108). If we opt
for the more risk averse approach, then, the volume of greenhouse
gases than can be permissibly emitted is half the size that the budget
would be if we opt for the less risk averse approach. One
question that arises then is: How risk-averse should we be? How should
policy-makers treat risk and uncertainty?



Two approaches have been adopted.



First, some employ traditional cost-benefit analysis and seek to
derive the "expected value" of different scenarios by
combining the probability of each state of affairs and its value and
then choosing that policy with the greatest expected value (Broome
2012: 120-132). Fleurbaey et al. (2019: 97-100) provide an
excellent short analysis of this approach and variants of it. Some
query the validity of the "expected value" approach on the
basis that our understanding of the future is so imperfect that we
lack reliable probabilities (Gardiner 2011: 261-263; though see
Broome 2012: 127-129).



Second, some adopt a version of the "precautionary
principle". To introduce this principle it is helpful to turn to
Neil Manson's excellent analysis of the precautionary principle
(Manson 2002). Manson argues that all formulations of the
precautionary principle contain three elements. In particular they
include what he terms "a damage condition" (this states
what kinds of bad outcomes are relevant), a "knowledge
condition" (this states what kind of epistemic conditions are
required--is it uncertainty or a certain level of risk?) and a
"remedy" (this states the right response) (Manson 2002:
265). The central idea is that when people are engaged in a certain
kind of action in which there is a prospect of harms of the relevant
kind, and when our understanding of whether the harms will materialise
satisfies the knowledge condition, then it is appropriate to adopt a
precautionary policy (Manson 2002: esp. 265). Clearly, however, a
great deal of work is needed to specify the three core
features--how much harm and what kind of harm is relevant?; what
epistemic conditions must hold?; what course of action is required
(Manson 2002: 267)? 



In his illuminating analysis of the precautionary principle Gardiner
also identifies three essential features. There is a "threat of
harm"; there is "[u]ncertainty of impact and
causality"; and third there is a "precautionary
response" (Gardiner 2006: 36). 



Now some interpretations of the basic idea will be unduly risk averse
(Gardiner 2006: 37). Gardiner himself draws on Rawls's use of
maximin, and argues that we should prioritise avoiding very bad
outcomes when the following conditions are all satisfied: (1) people face options with a variety of different outcomes (including some potentially dire ones) but cannot ascertain the probabilities of these outcomes so are in a state of 
uncertainty, (2) people do not care greatly about how much they are
better off than "the minimum that can be guaranteed by the
maximin approach", and (3) people care greatly about not falling
beneath that minimum (Gardiner 2006: 47 & more generally
45-49). Under such circumstances, Gardiner argues, it would not
make sense to take the risk of a dire outcome.



A related (though not identical) approach is adopted by Shue, who
draws on Gardiner and Manson. Shue, like Gardiner, invokes three
conditions. These are as follows:



> 
> 
> (1) *massive loss*: the magnitude of the possible losses is
> massive; (2) *threshold likelihood*: the likelihood of the
> losses is significant, even if no precise probability can be
> specified, because (a) the mechanism by which the losses would occur
> is well understood, and (b) the conditions for the functioning of the
> mechanism are accumulating; and (3) *non-excessive costs*: the
> costs of prevention are not excessive (a) in light of the magnitude of
> the possible losses and (b) even considering the other important
> demands on our resources. (Shue 2014: 265; footnote omitted) 
> 
> 
> 



Shue's claim, then, is that 



> 
> 
> [w]here these three features are all present, one ought to try
> urgently to make the outcome progressively more unlikely until the
> marginal costs of further efforts become excessive, irrespective of
> the outcome's precise prior probability, which may not be known
> in any case. (Shue 2014:
>  265)[3]
> 
> 
> 



Note that the "expected value" and the
"precautionary" approaches disagree, at a fundamental
level, about the relevance of probabilities. The first one relies on
them to derive expected values, whereas the second does not rely on
precise probabilities. (Indeed, Gardiner's approach is intended
to apply to cases of "uncertainty" [which is when we
cannot specify probabilities] Gardiner [2006: 50].) This said, it
seems likely that in practice they will converge, at least to some
extent, in calling for aggressive mitigation policies.


## 5. Responsibilities



Suppose that we have identified what kinds of interests should be
included in a theory of justice, what responsibilities persons owe to
future people, and how to treat risk and uncertainty. These can guide
us in determining what goals we should aim for. The next question to
ask is '*Who* has *what* responsibilities to meet
these goals?' It is helpful to break this question down into several
parts. We can identify four further questions, which together would
enable us to answer this question and tell us what would be a just
distribution of climate responsibilities.



First, it is important to be clear on the content of the
responsibilities. As noted at the start, climate scientists and
policy-makers focus primarily (though not exclusively) on two kinds of
policies--mitigation and adaptation. The first question, then, is
"Who should engage in mitigation and adaptation, and to what
extent?" Let us call this the Climate Action Question.



A second question is "Who should bear the costs of mitigation
and adaptation?" Mitigation will often involve economic (and
other) types of cost. For example, if a carbon tax is levied on goods
then purchasers of those goods will be financially worse off.
Sometimes mitigation policies come with benefits (for example,
regulations discouraging car use are likely to improve air quality;
encouraging people to cycle rather than drive may improve physical
fitness). In many cases, however, the policies come with a cost.
Likewise adaptation policies (such as designing cities to cope better
with heatwaves) will come at a cost. Who should pay for these? Let us
call this the Burden-Sharing Question.



A third question is Who has the responsibility to ensure that (a)
those designated to engage in mitigation and adaptation do so and (b)
those designated to bear any financial burdens discharge their
responsibilities? Let us call this the Political Action Question.



The fourth question is rather different in kind. It asks, for all of
the previous questions, what kinds of entities are the duty-bearers?
Many will assume that governments have such responsibilities, but what
about other actors? Are individuals duty-bearers? For example, do
individuals have duties to engage in mitigation? Or does that duty
fall exclusively on other actors?


### 5.1 The Climate Action Question



Consider the first two questions. Very often these are treated
together, but they are not necessarily the same. One might think, for
example, that one agent has a responsibility to mitigate (on the
grounds that doing so would be an effective way of making a
significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) but that others
have a duty to bear some, or all, of the costs. In such a case, then,
our answer to the Climate Action Question might be that *X* should
mitigate, but our answer to the Burden-Sharing Question might be that
*Y* should bear the cost involved in *X*'s mitigating.
To illustrate: one might think that developing countries should
mitigate and should use clean technology instead of fossil fuels, but
one might also think that the cost of the clean technology should be
shouldered by others.



To give another illustration: one might think that current generations
should mitigate climate change aggressively but that they can pass on
some of the costs of doing so to future generations (Rendall 2011). (A
version of this position is defended by Broome [2012: 47-48],
and is introduced
 below--Section 8.)



Of course, even though the questions are distinct this does not entail
that they should be treated wholly separately. One might think, for
example, that *X* should mitigate but only if others pay at least
some (or even all) of the costs, and that if sufficient financial
support is not forthcoming then *X* is not obligated. With this
in mind, it is appropriate to turn to the Burden-Sharing Question. A
considerable literature has developed around the question of who
should bear the costs of combating climate change.


### 5.2 The Burden-Sharing Question



Three principles, in particular, have emerged.


#### 5.2.1 The Polluter Pays Principle



One principle commonly referred to as the Polluter Pays Principle holds that
burdens should be borne in proportion to how much an agent has emitted
(Shue 2014: 182-186). This is an intuitively plausible approach. It
reflects a widely held principle about responsibility, namely
that we can, subject to certain conditions, hold agents responsible
for their actions.



This noted, there are several complications. First, some argue that it
is unfair to hold agents responsible for the harms resulting from
their emission of greenhouse gases if they were excusably ignorant of
the impact of their actions. They then argue that many of those who
have emitted greenhouse gases in the past were excusably ignorant and
so cannot be held liable.



Several replies have been given to this line of argument.
First, on an empirical note, we can respond that for several decades
now people could not plausibly claim to be excusably ignorant about
the effects of greenhouse gas emissions. Of course, specifying
precisely when one could no longer claim to be excusably ignorant will
be hard, but the salient point is that there are limits to the extent
to which one can plead excusable ignorance (Singer 2002:
 34).[4]
 Second, some argue that it can be fair to ascribe burdens to those
who were excusably ignorant of the harms of their emissions if those
who emitted benefited sufficiently from the emissions. The rough
thought here is that while someone might reasonably complain that it
is unfair to penalise them for non-culpably contributing to harm,
their case is considerably weakened if it is also the case that the
harmful activity also created benefits for them. If they have
benefited then making them pay would not be so onerous and might even
leave them no worse off than if they had they not emitted. (For
discussion of the "excusable ignorance" objection and
responses to it see Gosseries [2004: 39-41].)



A second challenge draws attention to the fact that many emitters are
no longer alive. Why, the objection goes, should those alive now foot
the bill for the acts of previous generations? Again responses have
been forthcoming. Some may adopt a collectivist approach and hold that
the relevant agents are collective bodies like states, and so they
hold that since country *X* emitted in the past country *X*
should pay now. Some, by contrast, respond by appealing again to the
idea of benefiting. They hold that individuals alive today (and in the
future) enjoy benefits that result from previous emissions-generating
activities and so have a duty to pay at least some of the costs
incurred in their production. (For discussion see Neumayer [2000: 189], Shue [2014: 186] and
Gosseries [2004: 41-55].)



There is a third challenge. What if persons need to engage in
activities which emit greenhouse gases in order to enjoy a decent
minimum standard of living? Many hold that it is unfair to make
extremely poor people pay the cost of emitting greenhouse gases where
doing so would push them beneath a decent standard of living. More
generally, one might argue that if people are entitled to a certain
standard of living (which need not be specified according to
sufficientarian criteria, but could also be specified according to
egalitarian or prioritarian or some other criteria) then it would be
wrong to make them pay if doing so entails that they cannot enjoy that
standard of living.



It is worth noting here that if one does think that the existing
global poor should not be required to bear the costs of their
emissions then this might also be relevant for one's assessment
of rich countries' past emissions. For if developing countries
now should not be financially penalised for the emissions that they
incur when seeking to develop then should not the same be said of the
emissions incurred by (now affluent) countries when they were also
poor?


#### 5.2.2 The Beneficiary Pays Principle



In light of these kinds of challenges many hold that the Polluter Pays
Principle should be supplemented by other principles. As we have seen
in the previous subsection some appeal to what has been termed the
Beneficiary Pays Principle. This holds that agents should pay because,
and to the extent that, they have benefited from the activities that
involve the emission of greenhouse gases (Page 2012).



This approach faces a number of questions. One concerns which
emissions come under its remit. Does it just cover cases that the
Polluter Pays Principle cannot deal with (e.g., the emissions of the
previous generations) (Duus-Otterstrom 2014)? Or does it have wider applicability?



Second, one might query whether benefiting is always sufficient to
render someone liable to pay. Someone may, for example, benefit from
emissions and yet remain very poor. If one thinks that the Polluter
Pays Principle should not be applied in cases where it would push
someone beneath a decent standard of living then one might, for the
same reason, think that the Beneficiary Pays Principle is similarly
constrained.



Note that if this reasoning is correct it supports the Integrationist
approach outlined in
 Section 1,
 for it suggests that when answering who should pay one should not
bracket out more general considerations such as what rights, if any,
persons have to enjoy a certain standard of living (such as an
"equal standard of living" or a "minimum standard of
living").


#### 5.2.3 The Ability to Pay Principle



This takes us to a third proposed principle. Some have argued that any
burdens incurred by mitigation and adaptation should be distributed
according to agents' ability to pay. This principle is widely
interpreted to mean that the greater an agent's ability to pay
the greater the proportion of the cost that they should be expected to
pay (Shue 2014: 186-189; Moellendorf 2014: esp.
173-180).



One criticism of this principle is that it wholly divorces the
question of who pays from questions about who caused the problem or
who benefited from causing the problem. In addition to this, some
argue that it relies on controversial moral assumptions, namely that
the wealthy have a positive duty of assistance (Duus-Otterstrom
2014: 451-452).



Where one stands on the Ability to Pay Principle is likely to depend
on one's overall account of (global) distributive justice. For
example, those who think that global justice requires a more equal
world will, other things being equal, endorse a proposal that the
costs should be borne primarily by the most advantaged and not by the
world's poorest.



(For further discussion of these three principles and the above
objections to them, see Caney 2005, 2010a.)


### 5.3 The Political Action Question and First-Order and Second-Order Responsibilities



Although much of the literature has focused on who should pay, there
is another set of questions concerning responsibilities. To approach
it, it is useful to distinguish between first-order and second-order
responsibilities, where a first-order responsibility in this context
is a responsibility either (a) to mitigate climate change or
facilitate adaptation or (b) to bear the costs of mitigation or
adaptation or both. A second-order responsibility, in this context, is
a responsibility to take action that ensures that others comply with
their first-order (climate) responsibilities. (The distinction between
first- and second-order responsibilities is made by Onora
O'Neill [2005: 428 & 433-436] and is applied to the
case of climate change by Caney [2014a: 134-147].) Second-order
responsibilities are responsibilities to change the social, economic
and political environment so that agents comply with their first-order
responsibilities. They can include, for example,
*disincentivising* carbon-intensive options (through, say,
carbon taxes or quotas or mandatory regulations) thereby inducing
agents to comply with a first-order responsibility to mitigate. Or
they can involve incentivising others to discharge their
*mitigation* responsibilities by, for example, subsidising
clean sources of energy or by designing the urban environment so that
people are more likely to walk or cycle or use public transport rather
than drive.



A similar idea is advanced by Elizabeth Cripps who refers to what she
terms "promotional duties" (2013: 116 & chapter 6
[esp. 140-150]). These are "[d]uties to attempt to bring
about the necessary collective action" (2013: 116). What actions
might these involve? Cripps considers the promotional duties of
individuals and suggests that these involve campaigning, running for
election, signing petitions, sending letters to politicians, giving
money to environmental organisations, and going on marches (2013:
143). Walter Sinnott-Armstrong also suggests that citizens have a duty
to campaign for their governments to implement climate legislation
(2010: 344). One might also add to this list of second-order
responsibilities, duties to engage in civil disobedience and
resistance against laws that result in unjustified emissions or
inadequate levels of adaptation.



Two further points are worth noting. First, much of the focus has been
on what we might term "positive" second-order
responsibilities. They are "positive" because they require
agents to take action. Given the arguments above, however, we also
have good reason to think that there are "negative"
second-order responsibilities as well. Whereas a positive second-order
duty is a duty to take steps to ensure that others comply with their
first-order responsibilities, a negative second-order duty would be a
duty not to thwart or undermine initiatives to tackle climate change.
This is relevant given the argument that some organisations--most
notably fossil fuel companies and electric utilities companies, as
well as some labour organisations--have gone to considerable
lengths to undermine attempts to combat climate change (Mildenberger
2020; Oreskes & Conway 2010: chapter 6; Stokes 2020).



Second, the focus of many of those philosophers mentioned above has
been on political institutions. While institutions are necessary they
are likely to be insufficient. To arrive at a systematic and
comprehensive account of agents' second-order responsibilities
it is worth starting with a political, social and economic analysis of
why agents are not discharging responsibilities to mitigate and adapt.
If we start with this we can then work back from it and identify what
needs to be done by whom to bring about the necessary change. This is
highly likely to involve changing ideologies (for example, those that
foster fossil-fuel-driven growth), cultural practices, and social
norms, as well as institutions.


### 5.4 Who are the Duty Bearers?



We can turn now to the fourth question. What kind of agent is the
duty-bearer?



It is helpful here to focus on responsibilities to mitigate since
there has been considerable debate among philosophers as to whether
individuals have responsibilities to limit their own personal
emissions or not. Some, like Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, are sceptical
of the proposition that individuals have duties to limit their own
emissions. He considers a large number of separate commonsense moral
principles and argues that none of these can be marshalled to show
that individuals have a duty to limit their own emissions. One central
theme in his argument is that individuals' personal emissions
make no difference (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010).



Two kinds of response have been made to these kinds of arguments. The
first disputes the claim that individuals make no difference. Avram
Hiller argues that 



> 
> 
> it is *prima facie* wrong to perform an act which has an
> expected amount of harm greater than another easily available
> alternative (Hiller 2011: 352) 
> 
> 
> 



and argues that individual emissions, while small, violate this
principle. Similarly, Broome argues that individuals' emissions
create "expected harm" and they have a duty not to do so
(Broome 2019). John Nolt argues in the same vein, and calculates the
impact of a North Americans' emissions over their lifetime (Nolt
2011).



A second response would be to appeal to a different kind of principle.
For example, one might argue that we have a duty not to participate in
collective processes which generate unjust outcomes. To do so would be
stand in the wrong kind of relationship to such collective processes.
Such a reply might seek to build on the work on
"complicity" by Christopher Kutz (2000). In addition to a
negative duty not to participate in such destructive processes one
might also argue, as Tracy Isaacs has done, for a duty of individuals
in "collective contexts" to form associations and create
social forces for change (Isaacs 2011: chapter 5 esp.
144-155).



One further comment is in order. As noted above, while
Sinnott-Armstrong believes that individuals do not have a moral
responsibility to limit their emissions he does believe that
individuals have political responsibilities to vote and to pressurise
their representatives to pass climate legislation. As Hiller notes,
this position may be unstable. The reasons
Sinnott-Armstrong gives as to why individuals do not have mitigation
responsibilities (their actions are inconsequential) would, *if
correct*, also seem to establish that they do not have political
responsibilities either. For one person's vote is also almost
certainly inconsequential (Hiller 2011: 364-365).



To sum up, then, if we consider *who* has *what*
responsibilities to address climate change, it is helpful to
distinguish between four questions. First, who should engage in
mitigation and adaptation? Second, who should bear any cost involved
in mitigation and adaptation? Third, who has the responsibility to
ensure that the relevant duty bearers for questions 1 and 2 discharge
their responsibilities? Finally, for each of the above we need to know
"what kind of agent is being ascribed duties?"


## 6. Justice and the Greenhouse Gas Budget



One critical responsibility is to limit the emission of greenhouse
gases. Many hold that, at the moment, some greenhouse gases can
nonetheless be permissibly emitted. There is, then, a question about
how the use of the remaining "greenhouse gas budget" can
be distributed and among whom. As we have seen the size of the budget
depends in part on what temperature target is selected and how risk
averse we think we should be. To illustrate: the Fifth Assessment
Report of the IPCC reported that if we want to have a probability of
at least 67% of avoiding a more than 1.5degC increase in global mean
temperatures then there is a budget of approximately 420
GtCO2 (Rogelj, Shindell, & Jiang 2019: 108). (If we
operate with a less ambitious target then the budget is quite
different. See table 2.2 in Rogelj, Shindell, & Jiang [2019:
108].)



One key question then is, "How should this budget be
shared?" What principles of distributive justice should be
applied to this "good"?


### 6.1 Subsistence



One approach put forward by Henry Shue argues that rights to emit
greenhouse gases should be distributed so as to meet peoples'
"subsistence" needs, and that such emissions should take
priority over "luxury" emissions (Shue 2014: chapter 2).
The focus on meeting basic needs here seems hard to dispute. Many
philosophers and environmental campaigners have, however, argued that
equality should be the guiding principle--and not subsistence (or
not *merely* subsistence).


### 6.2 Equality



Many, that is, have endorsed what we might call the "equal
*per capita*" view. This holds that rights to emit
greenhouse gases should be distributed equally. An important and
influential statement of this position was affirmed by Anil Agarwal
and Sunita Narain in *Global Warming in an Unequal World*
(1991). They start from the premise that the atmosphere is part of the
"global commons" (see also Shiva 2016). They infer from
this that it should be divided equally among all human beings. As they
put it:



> 
> 
> The question is how should this global common--the global carbon
> dioxide and methane sinks--be shared amongst the people of the
> world? ... [I]n a world that aspires to such lofty ideals like
> global justice, equity and sustainability, this vital global common
> should be shared equally on a *per capita* basis. (Agarwal
> & Narain 1991: 9) 
> 
> 
> 



Similar positions have been taken by Dale Jamieson (2010:
272-273), and Steve Vanderheiden (2008: 107-109 &
chapter 7 [esp. 226-227]). Peter Singer (2002: 43-44) has
also argued for it for partly moral and partly pragmatic reasons.



Before noting objections, it is worth observing that that the
"equal *per capita* view" encompasses a family of
views and that one might distinguish between many different versions
of this view. For example, one version holds that countries
should be ascribed rights to emit greenhouse gases and that the size of their quota should vary in line with the number of people in their society
(Agarwal & Narain 1991: 9-10). However, one might interpret
it in a more individualistic way, and ascribe equal rights to emit to each
individual.



In addition to this, there are different ways of treating past (and
current) emissions. Some, for example, hold that countries have
emission rights and that a country's past emissions should be
debited from its quota (Neumayer 2000: esp. 186). Others suggest
disregarding past emissions and favour applying the equal *per
capita* emissions approach to the remaining budget (Singer 2002:
43-44; Vanderheiden 2008: 229-230). Still others argue
that we should phase in the equal *per capita* view gradually
over time, and hence high emitters now will have more-than-equal
emission rights at the start of the transition period, with their
share decreasing until it reaches equality (A. Meyer 2000).



A number of different objections might be levelled against the equal
*per capita* view (in all versions). First, some query why it
is appropriate to treat this good in isolation. The equal *per
capita* view is a paradigm case of an isolationist position.
However, theories of distributive justice tend to focus on the fair
distribution of a total package of goods (Bell 2008: esp. 250; Caney
2012: 265-271; Miller 2008: 142-143). Of course,
sometimes, in special cases, we do treat goods (e.g., rights to vote)
in isolation, but it is not at all clear why that reasoning should
apply to this case and it is arguable that in these other cases they
are grounded in a more general integrationist theory.



Second, it is worth asking why we should care about emissions at all.
In themselves they do not matter to the people who generate them or
who enjoy the goods and services whose production involves greenhouse
gas emissions. They matter because they are a by-product of activities
that people engage in to serve important human interests. More
specifically they largely arise because of energy use (for building,
heating, cooling, transporting, manufacturing, lighting and so on) and
because of agriculture and land use change. Given this it makes sense
to focus on protecting and promoting these interests (bearing in mind,
of course, limits to emissions) not the distribution of emissions
*in themselves*. Suppose, for example, that we compare two people, and
let us suppose that both enjoy whatever one takes to be the fair
distribution of goods overall. Suppose, for simplicity's sake,
that that is an equal standard of living. Suppose, however, that one
meets her interests through fossil fuels and the other through solar
energy, it is hard to see why that is necessarily unfair to the second
person. True they emit less. But that is irrelevant given that they
enjoy what is, *ex hypothesi*, the fair standard of living
(Hayward 2007: 432-433 & 440-444; Caney 2012:
285-291). In short: to care about emissions is not to care about
what really matters from the point of view of justice.



It is worth noting that this objection tells not only against
the equal *per capita* view. It has force against all theories of distributive justice that
treat the right to emit as a *distribuendum*. It would, for example,
be an objection to the "subsistence emissions" approach
originally pioneered by Shue (Hayward 2007).



There is a third problem with treating emissions as an appropriate
*distribuendum*. The problem is that a dilemma arises when we
consider our responsibilities to future generations. There seem to be
several options. Option 1 would be to deny that there are duties of
justice to future generations to ensure that they too have rights to
emit greenhouse gases. Perhaps someone might hold that there are no
duties of justice at all to them (1a). Or they might hold that there
are but that they do not include leaving them rights to emit (1b).
(1a) seems implausible in light of the points made in
 Section 3;
 and (1b) adopts a discriminatory attitude to future people that
stands in need of moral justification.



A second option is to think that future people have rights and hence
that, on the view under consideration, they too have an equal right to
emit greenhouse gases. If, however, one thinks that all current and
future persons are entitled to equal *per capita* emissions
then we face two severe problems. (i) It will be exceptionally
difficult, if not impossible, to calculate how much everyone is
entitled to. Furthermore, (ii), given the number of future and present
people included the equal *per capita* share would surely be
close to zero.



In light of these problems a better way forward would be *not*
to focus on emissions *per se*, but rather to focus on meeting
people's interests in food and energy and so on, and to draw on
other safe sources to meet these needs. What is imperative is to
transition away from a carbon-based economy towards one not dependent
on fossil fuels. Only in this way we can avoid the dilemma set out
above.


## 7. Justice and Climate Policies



A further set of normative questions arises when we turn to consider
what policies might be adopted to mitigate (and adapt to) climate
change. Many policies that have been recommended or adopted themselves
raise questions of justice. We can see this by considering three
policy areas.


### 7.1 Mitigation and Alternative Energy Sources



The first concerns other energy sources. In practice these can raise
questions of justice. For example, the construction of hydroelectric
plants can lead to the displacement of peoples from their homes and
indigenous peoples from their traditional homelands. The use of
biofuels can lead to increased food prices as crops are devoted to
producing fuel. The use of nuclear energy can lead to health risks.
The salient point here is that mitigation (and adaptation) policies
may raise ethical questions.



How should one address these? One suggestion would be that we should
draw on the same principles and values that one employs to evaluate climate
impacts. So, if, for example, one thinks that climate change is unjust
in part because it undermines the. enjoyment of individual human
rights then it would seem to follow that one should seek to implement
mitigation (and adaptation) policies that honour these individual
human rights. And, if one thinks climate change is unjust, in part,
because it undermines the cultural rights of indigenous peoples then,
again, it would seem to follow one should seek to implement mitigation
(and adaptation) policies that honour these. One's answer to the
challenges posed by the harmful side-effects of some mitigation
policies would then be part of one's overall theory.


### 7.2 Population



Some philosophers have argued that a commitment to preventing
dangerous climate change requires adopting policies designed to limit
or reduce world population size (Cafaro 2012; Cripps 2015). Their
argument is that population growth is one of the main factors
contributing to climate change. Other things being equal, more people
result in more emissions, so, given the direness of the situation
policies need to be implemented which will sufficiently lower world
population size. Some--like Sarah Conly--argue, on this
basis, each couple has a right to no more than one child (Conly 2016).




Assessing such arguments requires a combination of empirical,
normative and political analysis. A first step would be to consider
**all** the determinants of climatic harms and to have a
quantitative analysis of their effects and the extent to which their
ecological footprint could be reduced. Such an analysis would include
not simply the number of people, but also (1) the levels of
consumption, (2) the extent of waste, (3) the nature of the energy
system (does it use renewables or not?), (4) the distribution of
access to clean technology, (5) the extent to which energy efficiency
programmes are in place, (6) the extent to which fossil fuels are
being subsidised, (7) the nature of the public transport system, (8)
the urban infrastructure and the spatial organisation of cities, (9)
building design, (10) the extent to which deforestation is reversed,
and programmes of afforestation and reforestation are pursued, and so
on (Caney 2020). To make a case for a Conly-style conclusion one would
then have to show that either:


1. the above are insufficient, or
2. the above are (singly or in combination) sufficient but constitute
a less desirable kind of response than limiting procreative choice,
or, perhaps
3. the above may be sufficient and more desirable than Conly's
response but they are less politically feasible.



Another challenge facing Conly's conclusion is that it needs to
show that the optimal response turns out to be 1 child per couple and
that the same constraint applies equally to all irrespective of the
size of their ecological footprint.



Ethical concerns about attempts to limit world population have long
been expressed. For example, Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva argued in
*Ecofeminism* (1993 [2014]) that programmes to limit world
population reinforce control of women's bodies. Furthermore,
they object to proposals to curb world population growth that do not
call into question the high consumption lifestyles of affluent
countries, and instead convey the morally misleading message that
responsibility for the environmental crisis lies with low-emitting
developing countries (Mies & Vandana 1993 [2014: chapter 19]).


### 7.3 Geoengineering



One additional climate policy needs also be mentioned, namely
"geoengineering" the climate system, either by extracting
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (Carbon Dioxide Removal) or by
seeking to block the sun's rays (Solar Radiation Management).
These raise a host of ethical issues.



One concern is that some forms of geoengineering can have harmful
side-effects, ones that can harm already vulnerable people (a point
which takes us back to
 Section 7.1).
 For example, some forms of solar radiation management may affect the
monsoon season in India (Jamieson 2014: 220).



A second challenge is that while they may constitute a response to
climate change in some sense, some geoengineering policies (like Solar
Radiation Management), do not tackle other greenhouse-gas related
problems like ocean acidification, whereas mitigation policies would
(Jamieson 2014: 220).



A related concern is that geoengineering policies are unnecessary
because other less risky policies (like mitigation) should be
adopted.



A fourth problem concerns the political legitimacy of decisions to go
ahead with geoengineering. Geoengineering policies can have
wide-ranging impacts on many countries and so it would be problematic
for some to engage in it unilaterally (Jamieson 2014: 222-224).
If they are to be legitimate such world-shaping policies would stand
in need of an inclusive decision-making process that is global in
scope.



(For rich discussions of the ethical issues surrounding geoengineering
see further Gardiner [2010; 2011: chapter 10], Jamieson [2014:
219-227] and, from a Confucian perspective, Wong [2015].)


## 8. Climate Justice in a Nonideal World



The preceding sections have discussed different questions of justice
that arise when considering how to respond to climate change, and they
have explored different answers that can be given. One persistent
feature of global and domestic climate policies is that there has been
a high level of noncompliance with principles of climate justice.
Given this, it is appropriate to ask: "What principles of
justice should apply in the context of noncompliance?"



Different responses have been given. To locate them it may be helpful
to set out the possibilities (Caney 2016).


1. One response might be "duty-reallocation".
That is, one might propose a solution in which some bear some of the
responsibilities that should, ideally, be borne by others.
2. A second response might be to relax the moral
constraints on mitigation policies, the aim being to make it more
likely that non-complying agents will discharge their duties to
mitigate.
3. A third (related) response might be to adopt other
extreme responses that one might think are normally unacceptable but
permissible in an emergency.
4. A fourth response might be to take a more proactive
stance and seek to tackle the underlying structures which lead to
noncompliance (for example, by designing institutions which reduce
such noncompliance and undermining organisations which are thwarting
successful climate action).
5. A fifth response might be "target
modification". That is, one might lower one's ambition, so
whereas one might think that justice ideally requires a 1.5degC
target one might accept a less ambitious target.



A number of philosophers have argued for a
 type (1)-like response.
 One version maintains that some (the advantaged) should take on more
than their fair share of responsibilities. A second version is defended by Broome. He
argues that current generations ought to reduce their emissions to
tackle climate change and that they ought to absorb the costs of doing
so. However, he also thinks that implementing an effective climate
treaty is of paramount significance and that parties will not agree to
one if they have to pay. In light of this he suggests that they should
mitigate but pass on the costs to future generations (Broome 2012:
47-48). Broome thinks this involves an unjust distribution of
costs but that it is nonetheless, all things considered, justified
because it helps prevent dangerous climate change. Broome's
solution involves *some* (current people) making
*others* (future people) bear an unjust burden. A third related
position is defended by Eric Posner and David Weisbach (2010). They
argue that a climate treaty is imperative but will not be feasible
unless it leaves signatories to the climate treaty no worse off. They
assume that the benefits from such a treaty will be such that there is
a "surplus" and so no one need be worse off. However, if
this assumption does not hold then their commitment to leaving high
emitters no worse off might also entail that others bear an unjust
burden (making it a
 type (1) response).
 As they recognise, even if there is a surplus some powerful states
may agree to a treaty only if they receive such extensive compensation
that it leaves others with more than their fair share of
responsibilities or burdens (Posner and Weisbach 2010: 181). 



Consider now
 (2):
 some might think that normally one should not convert a place of
great natural beauty into giant fields of solar panels, but they might
also think that, in dire circumstances, this prohibition can be
overturned. If we now consider
 (3):
 many would see geoengineering as a version of this kind of response.
And if we turn to
 (4):
 This is a corollary of some of the views discussed in
 Section 5.3,
 which generally held that agents have political responsibilities to
create just and effective institutions and responsibilities to combat
ongoing campaigns to thwart effective climate action.



What response (or combination of responses) one thinks to be the least
bad here will depend on one's overall theory of justice.
Sufficientarians, for example, may think that the affluent--those
above the specified sufficiency threshold--should take on more
than their fair share of burdens, but will reject the idea that any of the world's
poorest should be required to adopt
 response (1)
 (unless perhaps it is absolutely necessary for very large numbers of future people to
enjoy what they are entitled to).


## 9. Concluding Remarks



It is time to conclude. This entry has provided an overview of eight
questions of justice that arise in the context of climate change. It
is salutary to end by noting two points



First, it is worth noting that the focus has been on climate
*justice* and that justice is not the only relevant value. When
confronting the challenges of climate change (and the Anthropocene
more generally) justice clearly plays a large role, but many would
argue for the relevance of other kinds of moral consideration,
including a recognition of the intrinsic value of the natural world.
Climate ethics, one might say, includes more than justice.



Second, it is also worth noting that taking climate justice seriously
may have major implications for existing economic institutions and
ideologies (such as the valorisation of economic growth), as well as
for political institutions (Gardiner 2011; Jamieson 2014). Some
critics of the status quo believe that capitalism cannot cope with
climate change. Some doubt the ability of our contemporary
institutional architecture to address the current challenges facing
humanity. Evaluating such claims clearly requires extensive empirical
analysis. Only with the help of climate science, history, politics,
economics, anthropology, political economy, sociology, science and
technology studies, and law can we begin to address such claims. But
philosophical analysis has its part to play and without an
understanding of climate justice we lack a compass to guide us.