## 1. Life and Works



Paul of Venice (Paulus Nicolettus Venetus, Paolo Nicoletti Veneto),
O.E.S.A. was born in Udine, Italy, around 1369. He joined the
Augustinian order near the age of fourteen, when he entered the
convent of Santo Stefano in Venice. He studied first at Padua, but in
1390 he was assigned to Oxford, where he spent three years. He became
Doctor of Arts and Theology by 1405. He taught in Padua, Siena
(1420-24), and Perugia (1424-28), and lectured in Bologna
(1424). At various times he held positions of leadership in his order
(Pope Gregory XII designated him Prior General of the Augustinians in
May 1409) and served as ambassador of the Venetian Republic. He died
in Padua on 15 June 1429, while commenting the *De anima*
(*On the Soul*) of Aristotle.



Paul wrote many philosophical and theological treatises (the complete
list of his writings and a guide to extant manuscripts are in Perreiah
1986; for the dating of his main philosophical works see Conti 1996,
pp. 9-20), including: *Logica parva* (*The Small
Logic*), ca. 1393-95; *Logica magna* (*The Great
Logic--LM*), ca. 1396-99; *Sophismata aurea*
(*Golden Sophisms*), ca. 1399; a commentary on
Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* (*In Post*.),
C.E. 1406; *Summa philosophiae naturalis* (*Summa of Natural
Philosophy*--*SN*), C.E. 1408; a commentary on
Aristotle's *Physics* (*In Phys*.), C.E. 1409; a
commentary on Aristotle's *On the Soul* (*In De
anima*), ca. 1415-20; *Quaestio de universalibus*
(*On Universals*--*QdU*), ca. 1420-24; a
commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (*In
Metaph*.), ca. 1420-24; a commentary on the *Ars
Vetus*, that is, on Porphyry's *Isagoge*,
Aristotle's *Categories*, and the *Liber sex
principiorum* (*Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii et Artem
Veterem Aristotelis*--*In Porph*., *In Cat*.,
and *In Sex pr*. respectively), C.E. 1428.


## 2. Logic



The main contributions of Paul of Venice to the history of logic in
the Middle Ages concern the notion of formal distinction and the
analysis of predication.


### 2.1 Identities and Distinctions



Paul's formulation of the theory of identity and distinction is
a further development of Duns Scotus' and Wyclif's
doctrines on the subject. The Italian master recognizes two main types
of identity: material (*secundum materiam*) and formal
(*secundum formam*). There is material identity when the
material cause is the same, either in number (it is a case of the same
thing called in different ways) or by species (it is a case of two
objects made of the same kind of stuff). There is formal identity when
the formal cause is the same. This happens in two ways: if the form at
issue is the singular form of the individual composite, then there is
a unique object known in different ways; if the form at issue is the
common essence instantiated by the singular form, then there are two
distinct objects belonging to the same species or genus (*In
Metaph*., book V, tr. 2, chap. 3, fol. 185ra). Correspondingly,
the main types of distinction (or difference) are also two: material
and formal. There is material distinction when the material cause is
different, so that the objects at issue are separable entities. In
general, there is formal distinction when the formal cause is
different. This happens in two ways: if the material cause is also
different, then it is a particular case of material distinction. If
the material cause is the same, then a further analysis is necessary.
If the material cause is the same by species only, then it is an
improper case of formal distinction; but if the material cause is the
same in number, then there is properly formal distinction, since the
forms at issue have different definite descriptions but share the same
substrate of existence, so that they are one and the same thing in
reality. For example, there is a proper formal distinction in the case
of the two properties of being-capable-of-laughing (*risibile*)
and of being-capable-of-learning (*disciplinabile*), which are
connected forms instantiated by the same set of individual substances
(*In Metaph*., book V, tr. 2, chap. 3, fol. 185rb).



Material distinction is a necessary and sufficient criterion for real
difference, traditionally conceived, whereas there is formal
distinction if and only if there is one substance in number (i.e.
material identity in the strict sense) and a multiplicity of formal
principles with different descriptions instantiated by it. Paul
therefore inverts the terms of the question in relation to what
earlier approaches had done. By means of the formal distinction Duns
Scotus and John Wyclif had tried to explain how it is possible to
distinguish many different real aspects internal to the same
individual substance (the passage is from one to many). On the
contrary, Paul is attempting to reduce multiplicity to unity (the
passage is from many to one). What Paul wants to account for is the
way in which many different entities of a certain kind (i.e. of an
incomplete and dependent mode of existence) can constitute one and the
same substance in number.


### 2.2 Predication



The starting point of Paul's theory of predication is his
doctrine of universals. Just like Wyclif and his followers (Alyngton,
Penbygull, Sharpe, Milverley, Whelpdale, Tarteys), the Augustinian
master claims that


1. There are real universals, which are common essences naturally apt
to be present in and predicated of many similar individuals.
2. Real universals and their individuals are really the same and only
formally distinct.
3. Predication is first of all a real relation between metaphysical
entities (*QdU*, fols. 124ra, 124vb, 127va, 132va).



But his analysis of predication is different from those of both Wyclif
and his followers. In fact, Paul divides predication into identical
predication and formal predication and defines them in a different way
than his sources do.



To speak of *identical predication* it is sufficient that the
form signified by the subject-term of a (true) proposition and the
form signified by the predicate-term share at least one of their
substrates of existence. This is the case for propositions like
'Man is (an) animal' and 'The universal-man is
something white' ('*Homo in communi est
album*'). One speaks of *formal predication* in two
cases:


1. When for the truth of the proposition it is necessary that the
form signified by the predicate-term is present in *all* the
substrates of existence of the form signified by the subject-term, in
virtue of a formal principle (made clear in the proposition itself)
that is in turn directly present in all the substrates of existence of
the form signified by the subject-term. This is the case for
propositions like 'Man is formally (an) animal' and
'Socrates *qua* man is an animal'.
2. Or else when the predicate of the proposition is a term of second
intention, like 'species' or 'genus'. This is
the case for propositions like 'Man is a species' and
'Animal is a genus' (*SN*, part VI, chap. 2, fol.
93vab; *QdU*, fols. 124vb-125rb).



As is evident, identical predication is extensionally defined, whereas
formal predication is intensionally defined, since formal predication
entails a relation modally determined between the subject-thing and
the predicate-thing. In fact, formal predication presupposes that
there is a *necessary* connection between the subject-thing and
the predicate-thing of the given proposition. For this reason, Paul
denies that sentences like '(What is) singular is (what is)
universal' ('*Singulare est universale*'),
which Wyclif and his followers acknowledged as true, are in fact true
propositions. For Wyclif and his followers, the sentence at issue is
an example of predication by essence. But for Paul of Venice, it is an
example of formal predication; no individual *qua* individual
is a universal, or *vice versa*, as no second intention
intensionally considered is any other second intention (*QdU*,
fol. 133va; *In Porph*., *prooem*., fol. 3ra-b).
As a consequence, Paul rewrites the preceding sentence in this form:
'(What is) singular is *this* universal'
('*Singulare est hoc universale*'), where the
presence of the demonstrative 'this' changes the kind of
predication from formal to identical. So corrected, the sentence is
true, since it signifies that a certain entity, in itself singular, is
the substrate of existence of a universal essence (*QdU*, fol.
133va-b).



As a result, Paul builds up a mixed system, where the copula of the
standard philosophical sentences he deals with can have a threefold
value: it means a partial identity between the subject-thing and the
predicate-thing in the case of identical predication; it means a
necessary link between forms in the case of the first type of formal
predication; it means that the subject-thing in virtue of itself is
necessarily a member of a given class of objects, which the
predicate-term of the proposition labels and refers to, in the case of
the second type of formal predication--that is, when the
predicate is a term of second intention.


## 3. Semantics: The Meaning and Truth of Propositions



Paul of Venice deals with the problem of the meaning and truth of
sentences in his *Logica Magna* and in his commentaries on the
*Metaphysics* and on the *Categories*. His theory is
substantially the same in all these works, but in the two commentaries
he stresses the ontological implications of his semantic choices
slightly more, and modifies his solution of the question of the
meaning of a true negative sentence. Paul's purpose is twofold.
He intends (1) to determine the ontological status and nature of the
*complexe significabile* more precisely; and (2) to develop a
general theory of the proposition which would be logically more
rigorous and less compromised by a metaphysics of the possible than
that supported by Gregory of Rimini, his main source on that subject.
For this reason Paul deals with the question of the truth and falsity
of a proposition before examining the problem of its meaning, and
solves the latter on the basis of the answer to the former, thus
inverting the order followed by Gregory.



As a sign of special respect, Gregory of Rimini is the only author
cited by name in the two treatises of Paul's *Logica
Magna* devoted to the questions of the meaning and truth of a
sentence. Paul's critique is nevertheless all-embracing. He
lists thirteen arguments against Gregory's theses: six are
philosophical and seven theological (*LM*, II, tr. 11, pp.
96-104). We can focus on the most important ones, as they help
us to better understand Paul's final choices on the matter.



The main philosophical arguments concern Gregory's theory of the
levels of being. As is well known, the aim of Gregory's theory
of *complexe significabile* seems to be to identify and
describe an objective and independent molecular entity existing *in
re*, which can be the *significatum* or the referent of a
sentence, and therefore guarantees the success of our effort to
understand the world. According to Gregory, this entity is the
*complexe significabile*, that is something (1) complex but one
in number, which cannot be identified with the things that the subject
and/or the predicate of the sentence signify; (2) real but distinct
from the extramental categorial items as well as from their
corresponding mental signs; and (3) the proper and adequate object of
a possible act of signification (see the prologue of his commentary on
the first book of *Sentences*, q. 1, a. 1, pp. 3-4). It
is precisely in order to provide the *complexe significabile*
with a suitable ontological status, and every sentence with a
significatum that Gregory elaborates a theory of the levels of being.
According to it, the world is constituted by (1) the categorial items
(or atomic objects) which are the ground of existence of every other
being; (2) the states of affairs connected to them; and (3) the
possible states of affairs that the atomic objects could cause if they
were combined in a different way from the actual one. In fact, Gregory
claims that the terms 'something'
('*aliquid*'), 'thing'
('*res*'), and 'being'
('*ens*') are synonyms, and that they have a
threefold meaning. They can be taken (1) for anything signifiable in
any way (that is, by a simple or a complex expression, truly or
falsely)--this would be the sense in which Aristotle in the
chapter *de priori* of his *Categories* says that it is
necessary that an expression is called true or false when a thing is
or is not. (2) For anything signifiable by a simple or a complex
expression, but truly. And (3) for an existing essence or entity
(*ibidem*, pp. 8-9). This distinction implies that (1)
the *complexe significabilia* are not real in the same sense as
the *entia praedicamentalia* are; (2) the *complexe
significabilia* designated by false sentences have a feebler
reality than those designated by true sentences, but they are
nevertheless real and constitutive elements of the world; and (3) the
reality of *complexe significabilia* (both true and false) is
different from that of the categorial items on which this reality is
grounded.



Paul denies (1) that states of affairs, both actual and possible, are
constitutive parts of the world really distinct from the categorial
items, and (2) that whatever is signifiable by a complex expression is
a thing. In fact, according to Paul, the term 'something',
taken in the first or second sense enumerated by Gregory, is a
transcendental term, and as a consequence it immediately signifies all
possible substances and accidents in just the same way. Therefore, if
being a man (*hominem esse*) were something, in the first or
second sense of the term 'something', then being a man
would be a substance or an accident, and so something in the third
sense of the term--that is, an atomic object (or categorial
item). If the supporters of Gregory's opinion were to claim that
'something' is not a transcendental term--remarks
Paul--, it would follow that 'something' would be
either less general than a transcendental term or more general. In the
first case, the logical consequence is that the term
'something' signifies a categorial item, and thus it still
follows that if being a man is something in the first or second way,
it is something in the third way. In the second case, it follows that
'something' is more general than 'being', and
therefore that the following inference is invalid:



> 
> 
> <<if being a man is something, then being a man is>>,
> 
> 
> 



a consequence which is the opposite of what Gregory intended to hold
(*LM*, II, tr. 11, pp. 96-98).



The second main philosophical argument against Gregory's theory
is meant to show that what is signified by a sentence (or complex
expression) cannot be qualified as a thing. Paul explicitly denies
that, according to Aristotle, whatever is signifiable by a complex is
a thing (*ibidem*, p. 104).



From a theological point of view, the main inconvenience arising from
Gregory's opinion is that there would be many eternal things
none of which is God--a thesis condemned at Paris in 1277. In
fact--argues Paul--this *complexe significabile*,
that God is, is a thing different from God Himself, according to
Gregory, and it is from eternity (*ibidem*, p. 100).



In sum, Paul agrees with Gregory that what is signified by a simple
expression is different from what is signified by a complex
expression, and that what is signified by a complex expression is also
real, but disagrees with him about the meaning of the term
'*res*'. In his view, only positive beings are
things, and what is signified by a complex expression is not a
positive being, as it is not an item in one of the ten categorial
lines. In other words, according to Paul, even though states of
affairs are not really, but only formally, different from individual
things, they cannot in any way be regarded as things in the world.



As a consequence, the chief feature of Paul's theory of the
*complexe significabile* is his claim that the adequate
significate of a proposition is really identical-to and somehow (and
more precisely, formally) distinct-from what is signifiable by the
subject-term and/or the predicate-term alone (*ibidem*, p.
156). All the other theses derive from this, which is the cornerstone
of his theory of the proposition.



Paul defines the propositio as a well formed (*congrua*) and
complete (*perfecta*) mental sentence, which signifies the true
or the false (*LM*, pars II, *tractatus de
propositione*, fol. 101rb-va), and sums up his position on
the problem of truth and falsity in four points:


* if the adequate significate of a proposition is true and it is not
inconsistent that the proposition, thus adequately signifying, should
be true, then the proposition is true;
* if a proposition, adequately signifying that things are in some
way, is true, then its adequate significate is true;
* if the adequate significate of a proposition is false, then the
proposition is false;
* if a proposition is false, and it is not inconsistent that its
adequate significate is false, then its adequate significate is false
(*LM*, II, tr. 10, p. 62).



The obvious consequence of these rules is that, with the sole
exception of *insolubilia*, which are called false not because
they signify the false, but because they affirm themselves to be false
or not to be true, all the other kinds of proposition are true if and
only if what they signify is true, and false if and only if what they
signify is false (*ibidem*, p. 64).



In his commentary on the *Categories*, Paul explains that the
direct and adequate objects of propositions, which make them true, are
molecular things (*res complexae*) existing outside the soul.
Such entities are *complexe significabilia*, the
*significata* of propositions, that is extramental realities
made up of a subject-form and a predicate-form linked together in one
and the same substance or set of substances (*In Cat*., cap.
*de subiecto et praedicato*, fol. 48ra). Thus, Paul's
approach to the question of the truth of a proposition is ontological,
as is Gregory's, since according to him the true is an attribute
of things and only secondarily of thought, but at the same time it is
consistent with the fundamental principle of every form of
correspondence theory of truth, that of the isomorphism of language,
thought, and the world. In fact, in his commentary on the
*Metaphysics* Paul distinguishes three different but connected
kinds of truth: truth of imitation (*veritas imitationis*),
truth of disclosure (*veritas manifestationis*), and relational
truth (*veritas respectiva*). The first type of truth is the
measure of the conformity (*adaequatio*) which all the things
have in relation to their corresponding ideas in the mind of God, from
which they derive. The second type is also a real property of
extramental things, which measures their various degrees of
disposition to be apprehended by our intellect. Relational truth,
unlike the first two *veritates*, is not an absolute property
of things, but, just as its name suggests, a relation, and more
precisely a relation of conformity which has its substrate of
existence in our intellect, its *fundamentum* in mental
sentences, and its *terminus ad quem* in the molecular objects
existing outside the soul. Despite the fact that it is related to the
activity of the intellect, the *veritas respectiva* is the
effect caused in our intellect by the existence of the *veritas
manifestationis*. If things were not intelligible by themselves,
they could not be grasped and recognised by our intellect for what
they are (*In Metaph*., lib. VI, cap. 4, fol. 233rb-va).
So, like Gregory, Paul also supports the idea that human knowledge is
true only *qua* knowledge of the ontological truth, and that
sentences are true only in so far as they are signs of the ontological
truth.



On the basis of this account, what then is the relationship that holds
between atomic objects (the *incomplexa* or categorial items)
and molecular objects (or *complexa* or *complexe
significabilia*)? And what is (if anything is) the significate of
a false proposition? Paul answers these questions in the *Logica
Magna* and in the commentary on the *Categories*. His
conception undergoes a certain development: in the *Logica
Magna* he denies that what is signified by a true negative
proposition is something real, since it is neither an atomic being,
nor an aggregate, nor a molecular being (II, tr. 11, p. 122). In the
commentary on the *Categories* he modifies his opinion on this
subject, since he admits that there are *in re* a kind of
negative state of affairs signified by true negative propositions.
Moreover, he now identifies the significate of any false sentence with
a second mental proposition existing *obiective* and not
*subiective* in our intellect.



The thesis of the *Logica Magna* that what is signified by a
true negative proposition is not something real was not consistent
with the universal principle adopted by Paul in this context: a
sentence is true if and only if it is a *signum veri*, nor with
what he affirms about the reality of what is signified by a true
affirmative sentence, which he identifies with the molecular truth
which derives from the *veritas manifestationis* proper to the
atomic beings, and which is at the same time really identical-with and
formally distinct-from them (*ibidem*, pp. 156 and 166).



It is clear that if he was not also able to give a form of reality to
the *significata* of true negative sentences, they could not be
considered true, but, paradoxically, would be false, because they
would be without any referent in reality. For this reason in the
commentary on the *Categories* Paul distinguishes between the
significate of a true sentence and the significate of a false
sentence. Paul persists in thinking that if there is no adequate
*significatum* in the world, that is, if there is not something
complex to which the mental proposition refers in extramental reality,
then the uttered sentence and the mental proposition are false, but he
now accepts Burley's idea that there are two different kinds of
mental expressions, those which exist *subiective* in the
intellect, as its acts of understanding, and those which exist
*obiective* in it, as the direct objects of those acts of
understanding. According to Paul, the mental proposition existing
*obiective* in our intellect is the *significatum ultimum et
adaequatum* of false propositions (*In Cat*., cap. *de
priori*, fol. 136vb).



As far as true propositions, both affirmative and negative, are
concerned, the case is different. In Paul's opinion, a true
affirmative proposition signifies a molecular truth, that is a complex
reality which is part of the whole reality (the *esse reale* of
the *Summa philosophiae naturalis*--see below) of a finite
corporeal being. So, like Gregory, Paul denies that what verifies the
proposition 'Socrates is white' is Socrates and the
accidental form of whiteness taken together. On the contrary, he
claims that the *significatum adaequatum* of that proposition
is the whole reality of Socrates or his being white (*LM*, II,
tr. 11, p. 170). In fact, if the realities signified by true
propositions were aggregates made up of the two entities signified by
the subject-term and the predicate-term, then these two propositions,
'the sun heats the house' and 'the house is heated
by the sun', would be interchangeable not only with respect to
their reference, but also wth respect to their significates, because
what verifies both of them would be the existence of the sun, the
house, and the action of heating. But according to Paul, the two
propositions are only extensionally equivalent, and intensionally
different, because of their own different *significata*
(*ibidem*). 'The sun heats the house' signifies a
state (of affairs) connected with the being of the sun, but 'the
house is heated by the sun' signifies a state (of affairs)
connected with the being of the house. Thus it is incorrect that,
according to Paul, the significate with which the adequate significate
of a proposition can be in fact identified is the one thing that, by
being in a certain state, renders the proposition true. It is quite
the opposite: a certain state of the thing signified by the subject of
the sentence is the adequate significate of that same sentence. Paul
maintains (1) that the adequate significate of a proposition is,
implicitly or explicitly, determined by the composition of its parts,
and (2) that it is impossible for the adequate significate of a simple
expression (a term) to be the adequate significate of a complex
expression (a proposition), since otherwise, an absolutely simple term
would adequately signify the true or the false--an evident
absurdity (*LM*, II, tr. 11, p. 196). So, in order to be
consistent with these claims, in the commentary on the
*Categories* Paul states that true negative propositions too
have something complex which corresponds to them in reality, a sort of
negative state of affairs grounded (1) in the two *esse realia*
proper to the things signified by the subject and predicate-terms, or
(2) in the laws which rule the order and the metaphysical structure of
the world (*In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, fol.
66ra).


## 4. Ontology



Paul's world consists of finite beings (that is, things like men
or horses) really existing outside the mind, each made up of a primary
substance and a host of forms existing in it and by it. The forms of a
primary substance belong to ten different types of being, or
categories. Therefore a finite being cannot be totally identified with
the primary substance. (In fact no primary substance contains the
whole being of a finite being.) Rather it is an ordered congeries of
categorial items. Primary substances are not simple items but complex
objects, since they are compounded of particular matter and
form--a form that is really identical with and formally distinct
from the specific nature itself that the primary substance
instantiates (*SN*, part VI, chap. 1, fols. 92vb-93ra).
The concepts of matter and form are relative, since their meanings are
connected with each other (*In Post*., fol. 40rb). Being the
form of something and being the matter of something are converse
relations of three different kinds, whose arguments and values
are:


1. the metaphysical constituents of the individual substance (i.e.
singular matter and form);
2. the metaphysical constituents of the specific natures (i.e. genus
and difference); and
3. the categorial items (i.e. individual and universal substances and
accidents) considered according to their various degrees of
generality.



The specific nature (or essence) can be conceived from a twofold point
of view: intensionally (*in abstracto*) and extensionally
(*in concreto*). Intensionally viewed, the specific nature
simply expresses the set of essential properties that compose a
categorial form, without any reference to the existence of individuals
which, if there are any, instantiate it. Extensionally viewed, the
specific nature is that same form conceived of as instantiated by at
least one singular entity. For instance, human nature intensionally
considered is humanity (*humanitas*); extensionally it is man
(*homo*) (*In Porph*., *prooem*., fol. 9va). Both
of them are substantial forms superordinated to the whole human
compound, but while humanity is properly a form, i.e. something
existentially incomplete and dependent, man is an existentially
autonomous and independent entity. Thus they differ from each other in
the same way as a predicate (for example '*P*')
differs from a formula (for example,
'*P*(*x*)').



Because of the complexity of the metaphysical composition of the
finite corporeal being, every creature has four different levels of
being: real, essential, temporal, and individual. Real being is
nothing but the whole reality of the finite being. Essential being is
the mode of being proper to the specific nature that a certain
singular directly instantiates. Temporal being is the state of affairs
designated by infinitival expressions like 'being a man'
('*hominem esse*') or 'being white'
('*esse album*')--that is, the object of the
act of judging. Finally, individual being is the actual existence of
the primary substance of a finite being as distinct from the whole
reality of the finite being itself (*SN*, part VI, chap. 1,
fol. 92vb).



Paul asserts the following relationships among these four levels of
being and the essence of a creature: the essence and being of any
creature are not really distinct from each other; the essence of a
thing is formally different from its real being and from its essential
being; the essence and the essential being of a thing are formally
(*ratione*) different from temporal and individual beings;
specific and generic essences can keep on being even though no
individual instantiates them, but in this case they do not have any
actual existence (*esse actuale*). From that point of view,
Socrates being a man (*Sortem esse hominem*) is in reality
Socrates himself considered together with all the properties of which
he is the bearer. On the other hand, the proposition identifies only
one of these properties, that signified by the predicate-term (in our
example the property of being a man), which is formally different from
the form (in our example that of humanity) connoted by the
predicate-term itself (*ibidem*, fols. 92vb-93ra).



According to Paul, who follows Duns Scotus and Wyclif on this subject,
being is univocally shared by everything real, since it is the stuff
that the ten categories modulate according to their own essence
(*In Phys*., book I, tr. 1, chap. 2, t. c. 13; *In
Metaph*., book IV, tr. 1, chap. 1, fols. 122ra-125vb,
*passim*; *In Porph*., chap. *De specie*, fol.
22rb). In view of this position, Paul maintains no real distinction
between essence and being (*In Metaph*., book IV, tr. 1, chap.
2, fol. 127rb; book VI, chap. 1, fol. 223vb). Like Duns Scotus and
Wyclif, Paul speaks of a formal difference (or difference of reason)
between essence and being in creatures, as the essence and the
essential being of a thing are one and the same entity considered from
two distinct points of view, intensionally (the essence) and
extensionally (the being) (*SN*, part VI, chap. 1, fol.
93ra).



This analysis identifies the opposition between essence and being with
the opposition between universals and individuals. Like Wyclif, Paul
thinks of essence as a universal form intensionally considered, and
existence (taken in the strict sense) as the mode of being proper to
primary substances. Thus, when Paul affirms that essence and being are
really identical and formally different, he simply restates the thesis
of the real identity and formal distinction between universals and
individuals that was typical of the Realists of the late Middle Ages.
Consequently, like Burley and Wyclif, Paul holds that a formal
universal actually (*in actu*) exists outside our minds only if
there is at least one individual that instantiates it, so that without
individuals common natures (or essences) are not really universals
(*SN*, part VI, chap. 2, fol. 94ra).



This means that the relationship between common natures and singulars
is ultimately grounded on individuation, since no actual universality
and no instantiation is possible without individuation. On this
subject Paul successfully reconciles the Scotistic approach with
certain Thomistic theses. Paul claims that the principle of
individuation is twofold, immanent and remote. The immanent principle
is the one whose presence necessarily entails the existence of the
individual it constitutes, and whose absence necessarily entails the
non-existence (or disappearance) of the individual. The remote
principle, on the other hand, is just what the immanent principle
presupposes, but whose presence and absence alone are insufficient for
causing the existence or disappearance of the individual, as it
continues being after the corruption of the individual. Thisness
(*haecceitas*) is the immanent principle of individuation,
whereas form, matter, and quantity are the remote principle. Thisness
in turn has a twofold origin, as it derives from matter and form
together in the case of corporeal substances, and as it derives from
the essence (*quidditas*) alone in the case of angelic
intelligences (*SN*, part VI, chap. 5, fol. 95vb). Furthermore,
according to Paul there is a close similarity between the thisness,
which he now calls individual difference (*differentia
individualis*), and the specific difference. The specific
difference is what differentiates the species from the genus, since it
is the determination or property which, once added to the genus,
results in the species. On the other hand, the specific difference is
really identical with the genus, from which it is distinct only in
virtue of a formal principle. The same happens to the individual
difference: it is what differentiates the individual from the species;
from the ontological point of view, it is really identical with and
formally distinct from the species itself; and it is the formal
principle in virtue of which the individual is what it is, something
particular, concrete, and perfectly determined in itself (*SN*,
part VI, chap. 5, fol. 96rb; chap. 26, fol. 112rb-va;
*QdU*, fol. 128va; fol. 129rb; *In Metaph*., book III,
tr. 1, chap. 1, fol. 83vb).



As far as the problem of angelic individuation is concerned, the
logical consequence deriving from such premisses is that it is
impossible to find two angels who share the same specific nature and
are numerically distinct, since only one *haecceitas* can
spring up from an incorporeal species (*SN*, part VI, chap. 5,
fol. 96ra). This solution is close to the inner meaning of Duns
Scotus' position and contrasts with Aquinas' view,
although Paul affirms that the angelic intelligences are specifically,
and not numerically, different. In fact, according to St. Thomas,
angels are specifically different because they are incorporeal, and
without matter no individuation is possible. On the contrary, Paul of
Venice thinks angels are individuated by means of thisnesses, but not
multiplied by them, because of the absence of matter, so that there is
only one angel per species. Since specific natures of incorporeal
beings do not include any reference to matter, only a unique principle
of individuation (*ratio suppositalis*) can flow from such
species. As a consequence, no angel is one in number in the strict
sense of the term (as being one in number necessarily implies the
actual presence of a multiplicity of things of the same species), even
though broadly speaking every angel is one in number, as two (or more)
angels are, after all, "many things"--but never many
angels of the same kind (*SN*, part VI, chap. 5, fol.
95vb).



In his last work, the commentary on the *Ars Vetus*, Paul
summarizes his position as follows:


1. The individual is the final result of a process of individuation
whose starting point is a specific form.
2. The individuation is what differentiates the individual from its
species.
3. The individuation is nothing but the thisness itself.
4. The thisness and the specific form are only formally distinct from
the individual they make up (*In Porph*., chap. *De
specie*, fol. 60ra).
5. The principle of individuation, when causing the passage from the
level of universals to that of singulars, does not play the role of
form (or act) in relation to the specific nature, but the role of
matter (or potency), as it is what the specific form structures
(*In Cat*., chap. *De substantia*, fol. 60ra).



In this way Paul of Venice tried to solve the aporetic aspects of Duns
Scotus' theory of individuation. Scotus said nothing about the
problem of the relation between the thisness and the particular matter
and form that constitute the individual. The Franciscan master was
also silent about a possible identification of the thisness with one
of the two essential forms of the individual substance, the *forma
partis* (for instance, the individual soul) and the *forma
totius* (the human nature). Paul identifies the principle of
individuation with the informing act through which the specific nature
molds its matter. This identification had been already suggested by
the opposition between immanent and remote principles of individuation
described in the *Summa philosophiae naturalis*. In fact, all
the constituents of the individual compound (matter, form, and
quantity) had been contrasted with the thisness, which for that reason
could not be identified with any of them. Moreover, it is obvious
that:


1. It is the union of the singular form with its matter that
establishes the "birth" of the individual.
2. It is its separation from the matter that establishes the
"death" of the individual.
3. The union of the singular form with its matter is the necessary
and sufficient condition for the passage of the specific essence from
its abstract (or intensional) mode of being to its concrete (or
extensional) mode of being.


## 5. The Body-soul Problem and the Theory of Knowledge



According to the standard medieval realist theories of knowledge, as
exemplified by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, the primary object of
the human intellect is the essence of material things. Such essences
become intelligible to us only when our intellect has abstracted them
from the individualising properties connected with the matter, so that
we can have direct knowledge of universals only. Yet, an intellective
knowledge of individuals is possible, if the intellect, after
abstracting the intelligible species through which it grasps essences,
turns its attention to the phantasm from which it has drawn the
intelligible species itself. This action, the conversion to phantasm,
produces a reflexive (that is, indirect) and incomplete knowledge of
the individual thing represented by the phantasm itself. On the other
hand, according to the standard medieval nominalist theories of
knowledge, as exemplified by Ockham, individuals alone are the object
of our intellect, and the main form of human cognition is not the
abstractive one, but intuitive cognition, which properly concerns the
existence and non-existence of individual things, as it is that
immediate apprehension of a thing (that is, an individual substance or
quality) as existent which enables us to form a contingent proposition
concerning the existence of that same thing. By contrast, abstractive
knowledge is an apprehension of terms by which it is impossible for us
to have evidence of whether or not a certain thing exists. Thus,
intuitive and abstractive cognition attain the same singular objects,
but in different ways, since abstractive cognition is indifferent to
existence and produces a universal sign of a multiplicity of
singulars.



These different epistemological explanations depend also on
differences in ontology. According to medieval Realists, individuals
cannot be the proper (not even a proper) and adequate object of
knowledge for any intellect, since (1) their world includes common
natures or essences besides individual things; (2) individuals stem
from species by means of prime matter (plus quantity); and (3) prime
matter is per se something opaque and unintelligible. Apart from the
unsuitable theological consequences (how is it possible that God knows
human beings perfectly, if every kind of individual is per se
something not completely intelligible?), the realist account entails a
paradox, as the phantasm already enables us to grasp the substance and
the accidental properties of an individual thing far before the
conversion to itself which follows intellective cognition, because it
is an appropriate image (or representation) of the particular material
object perceived by the senses. On the other hand, the punctum dolens
of any nominalist description of the process of knowledge lies in the
difficulty in explaining the nature and origin of abstractive
cognition and the relation which holds between the universal sign and
the individuals which it refers to--how can they constitute a
natural set? How can we know under a universal form (universaliter)
something which is in itself absolutely singular?



It is just in order to do away with the peculiar problems of the
realist paradigm that Paul of Venice worked out a new version of the
standard medieval realist theories of knowledge, critical of the most
common solutions proper to his intellectual environment, and where
much more stress is put on the question of class-membership, and on
the intellective cognition of individuals.



As to the problem of the relation of soul to body, Paul rejects the
Augustinian conception and follows the Aristotelian view of the soul
as form of the body, so that in his opinion the subject of knowledge
is not the soul alone, but the whole human composite. Not even
sensation can be attributed simply to the soul using a body, as
Augustine had thought. Moreover, against Aristotle and following
Aquinas, Paul claims that, although it is the form of the body, the
human soul is a self-subsistent form, and therefore incorruptible.
However, unlike Aquinas, he maintains that the human soul is two-fold,
as the complete human soul (anima totalis) derives from the close
union of two distinct principles, the cogitative and the intellective.
This fact does not break the unity of the human soul nor of the human
composite, since (1) the cogitative principle is the cause of the
animality and the intellective one of the rationality of man; (2)
neither of them can exist in man without the other; and (3) the
cogitative soul is in potency in relation to the intellective one
(*Summa philosophiae naturalis*, ed. Venetiis 1503 [=
*SN*], pars v, ch. 5, fols. 68vb and 69ra; see also
*Scriptum super libros De anima* ed. Venetiis 1504 [= *In De
an*.], II, t.c. 23, fols. 47rb-48ra).



Like Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, Paul maintains that there is a
real distinction between the soul and its faculties, but, in
opposition to them, he holds that there is only a formal distinction
(ratione et definitione) between the faculties themselves
(*SN*, p. v, ch. 4, fol. 68ra-b). Whereas the faculties of the
cogitative soul depend on bodily organs for their operations, the
faculties of the intellective soul, i.e. the active intellect, the
passive intellect, and the will, are independent, even though in the
state of union with the body they need sensation for exercising their
powers, and no act of sensation can be produced without the
concurrence of the body (*SN*, p. v, ch. 10, fols. 71va-72ra.).
Besides the vegetative faculty (which regulates nutrition, growth, and
reproduction) and the power of locomotion, the faculties of the
cogitative soul are the following: the five exterior senses, the
general sense (*sensus communis*), the fantasy
(*phantasia*), the *vis aestimativa* (or
*cogitativa* properly so called), and the memory. Against
Avicenna, Paul explicitly denies that there is a fifth internal sense,
the imagination, since he thinks that its presumed operations are the
same as those of the fantasy (*SN*, p. v, ch. 30, fol. 84ra).
The general sense distinguishes and collates the data of the special
exterior senses. The fantasy conserves the species apprehended by
senses and freely combines them together to produce figments. The
*cogitativa* recognizes those properties of things which cannot
be perceived through the senses, like, for example, that something is
useful for a certain purpose, or friendly, or unfriendly. The memory
is the 'warehouse' where all the species are stored, so
that the cogitative soul can perform its tasks even without the
presence of any material object (see *SN*, p. v, ch. 30, fol.
84ra-va).



According to Paul, the qualities which are the adequate and per se
object of the exterior senses cause a peculiar modification in the
bodily organs, that is the presence in them of a *forma
intentionalis* or *species sensibilis*, which does not
imply any material mutation in the organ itself, as such a form is a
resembling image (*similitudo*) of the real form which started
the process totally lacking extension, and therefore unable to modify
in any way the matter of the bodily organs (cf. *SN*, p. v, ch.
23, fol. 79va, and ch. 30, fol. 84rb). As a consequence, Paul affirms
that the *species sensibilis* is a pure form without matter in
a two-fold sense: it is not grounded on matter, and it has no
extension. Yet, as a resembling image of a real form it contains in
itself a sort of logical description of the matter to which the real
form gives structure (see SN, p. v, ch. 23, fol. 79 vb). When the
species meets the *potentia sensitiva* of the bodily organ, a
sensation is produced, by means of which the soul becomes aware of the
external existence of a certain reality (*SN*, p. v, ch. 28,
fol. 83ra). This process is totally passive, as exterior senses can
give birth to sensations only in virtue of the actual presence of the
material object (*SN*, p. v, ch. 10, fol. 71va-b). The
*species sensibilis* present in one of the exterior senses and
the *species sensibilis* present in the *sensus
communis* (and in the other internal senses), differ specifically
(*specifice*) from each other, since they are images of objects
of different types. In fact, the species present in the general sense
is a species of species, as it is not the logical image of the
external quality which caused the process of sensation, but an image
of the species present in the exterior sense (*SN*, p. v, ch.
28, fol. 83ra). The higher level of sense-knowledge is therefore
qualitatively distinct from the lower. At the higher level, every
passage from a faculty to another entails a sort of purification of
the *forma intentionalis*, which progressively loses the
information on the individual characteristics of the external object
(*SN*, p. v, ch. 40, fol. 90va). So the perceived thing is
first apprehended by the *cogitativa* as this singular bearer
of certain properties, then as a bearer of certain properties, a
change that Paul qualifies as a transition from the condition of
*intentio singularis signata* to the condition of *intentio
singularis vaga* (*In De an*., III, t.c. 11, fol. 137rb).
Not only does the *cogitativa* effect the transformation of the
*intentio singularis signata* into an *intentio singularis
vaga*, it also abstracts the substance, which is a *sensibile
per accidens* (something accidentally perceptible) from the
perceived accidental properties which are *sensibilia per se*
(perceptible by themselves--*In De an*., III, t.c. 11,
fol. 137rb; see also *SN*, p. v, ch. 11, fol. 72ra).



As we have already seen, in Nicoletti's view the phantasm is a
representation of the thing which started the process of knowing.
Altough immaterial and free from any reference to the individualising
properties (of the thing at issue), the phantasm is not completely
intelligible, since the *intentio singularis vaga* still
contains a sort of logical description of the generic matter which the
singular thing is made of, and through it to the general conditions
for individuation. For example, when we apprehend Socrates as a man,
we know human essence just as instantiated by a singular item, and not
in itself, as a specific type. In order to have the concept of man,
there is need of a further and higher activity on the part of the
soul, which has to abstract from the phantasm the universal or
intelligible species, which applies to all men. This further activity
is the proper action of the active intellect, which illumines both the
phantasm and the possible intellect, so impressing on the latter the
*species intelligibilis* abstracted from the former (*In De
an*., III, t.c. 11, fol. 137rb).



As for the possible (or passive) intellect, according to Nardi,
Ruello, and Kuksewicz, Paul was an Averroist, as he would have
supported the thesis of the unicity and separate character of such an
intellect for the whole human species. But this is false. On the
contrary, Paul's point of view for this question is close to
that of Thomas Aquinas, whose arguments against the unicity of the
passive intellect he utilizes in his commentaries on the *De
anima* and on the *Metaphysics* (after 1420). If his
affirmations in the *Summa philosophiae naturalis* are a bit
ambiguous and it is therefore possible to miss their deepest meaning,
in these two Aristotelian commentaries he clearly rejects all the main
theses of later medieval Averroism (see Amerini, 2012). He thinks that
(1) the claim of the unicity of the possible intellect for the whole
human species is lacking in a solid philosophical basis, since it can
be maintained from the physical point of view only, according to which
everything is considered qua affected-by or connected-with motion, but
(2) it is false from the metaphysical point of view, which is the most
comprehensive of all. From this viewpoint, according to which the
possible intellect has to be considered a substantial form (and more
precisely, the form of the human body), it is evident that it has a
beginning in time, but certainly not an end, and that, like any other
material substantial form, it is multiplied according to the
multiplication of bodies, since one and the same principle in number
cannot be the form of a multiplicity of substances. Furthermore, given
that different men can form different opinions about the same thing or
event, one and the same intellect could hold contradictory views at
once, in apparent violation of the law of contradiction (see *In De
an*., III, t.c. 27, fol. 149ra).



In the *SN* Paul had spoken of the active intellect in terms of
a separated substance. The active intellect is connected to the
possible intellect and the human soul by inherence and to the phantasm
as the phantasm is directly present before it (cf. *SN*, p. v,
ch. 38, fol. 89ra). On the contrary, in the commentary on the *De
anima*, he (1) identifies the active intellect with God Himself,
considered as the first cause, and its own activity with God's
activity of illumination in and outside the soul, and (2) affirms that
the active intellect is joined to the possible intellect neither by
inherence nor by information, but as a form directly present in it
(*In De an*., III, t.c. 19, fol. 143ra). This fact explains why
the first of the four main effects produced by the active intellect is
set in the external world, and the fourth one both in the external
world and in the human mind. In turn, the mutual connections and
distinctive features of the actions performed by the active intellect
explain why (1) individuals are proper objects of intellection for us;
(2) the intelligible species is singular and not universal; and (3)
the same intelligible species by means of which we grasp substantial
essences is the medium in virtue of which we can understand the
peculiar structure of the individual which instantiates that essence
(*In De an*., III, t.c. 11, fols. 136vb and 137rb-va)--all
theses which are just the opposite of the most common realist
convictions on the matter, as Paul himself points out (*In De
an*., III, t.c. 27, fol. 137va).



As a consequence, he explicitly polemicizes with Giles of Rome and
Thomas Aquinas on the problem of the cognition of individuals. He sums
up their position in four theses, accepts the first one, and argues
against the last three. The four theses are the following:


* the primary object of our intellect is the *quidditas
rei*;
* the first intelligible species produced in our intellect is
universal (that is, it enables us to know a common item) and
abstract;
* singulars are known only after the intellection of the
universal;
* singulars are not directly known by our intellect, but indirectly
by reflection (*In De an*., III, t.c. 11, fol. 136vb).



As far as the second thesis is concerned, Paul thinks that the first
intelligible species present in our mind is about a singular item and
enables us to know it, as the first intelligible species is drawn from
the phantasm, which is formally and per se the mental representation
of an individual item, and therefore singular itself (*phantasma
est intentio singularis*). The third and fourth theses are
questioned together. Paul raises two main objections against them. The
first one runs as follows: if we can know the individual which causes
the process of intellection only after the cognition of the universal,
then something in the cognition of the universal functions as a medium
for this new apprehension. It cannot be the universal itself, as it is
not more similar to this individual than to any other; so it must be
something singular, distinct from the universal and added to it. But,
if so, then this singular is to be known per se and directly (because
if per accidens and/or indirectly, then only in virtue of something
else, which in turn would become the new medium for the cognition of
the individual, and so on) far before the conversion to the phantasm,
which is therefore totally superfluous. The second objection is even
more articulated. Paul observes that, if our intellect apprehends the
singular thing which starts the process of understanding only by means
of the conversion to the phantasm, then the phantasm acts upon the
intellect, impressing an image (or species) on it. If the image
impressed is universal, then the passive intellect cannot apprehend
any singular thing by means of it; as a consequence, it can only be
particular; but in this case the phantasm performs just the same
action as before the conversion to itself, which is therefore
redundant. Nor can one say that the phantasm does not act upon the
passive intellect, because in this case the conversion to it would be
even more unnecessary, if possible, and material items would be known
by us in the same way as God and the (angelic) intelligences, which
are immaterial (*In De an*., III, t.c. 11, fols.
136vb-137ra).



As is evident, the Italian master is aware of the paradox entailed by
the standard realist account of human knowledge and his theory is a
serious attempt to avoid it. Paul refuses Aquinas's and
Giles's views since they imply that the intellectual
apprehension of the universal essence, because of its two-fold
relation to the phantasm, at once presupposes the sense-apprehension
of the individual thing (which instantiates that essence) and is
presupposed by the intellectual apprehension of the individual thing.
Since at the level of sense-apprehension of individual items the human
soul, through the *cogitativa*, is already able to recognize
the substance (of those individual things), the intellectual
apprehension cannot in any way add new information on the *res*
at issue and must be totally identical with the sense-apprehension. As
a consequence, instead of elaborating an interpretative pattern of
human knowledge based on the form of the spiral, where the same things
come back to our soul at different moments in the process of
abstraction, Paul tacitly develops in an original way some suggestions
drawn from Walter Burley's prologue to his last commentary on
the *Physics*. In criticizing Averroes's thesis that the
*quidditas* of material things is the primary object of our
understanding and the material and individual things themselves a
secondary object, Paul explains our knowledge in terms of a sort of
straight line which proceeds from the most superficial to the deepest
levels of reality, and states that our intellect is equally apt to
receive both universal and singular species, and, as a consequence,
that it is apt to know both common essences and singular things
(*In De an*., III, t.c. 11, fol. 136va-b).



This solution introduces the chief thesis of the nominalist approach
to epistemology (the direct knowledge of individuals) into a realist
context; nevertheless it is consistent with the metaphysical
presuppositions proper to the late medieval realist way of thought.
With the noteworthy exception of Walter Burley, according to any late
medieval Realist, in the extramental world universal essences and
individual things come together, since they are really identical and
only formally distinct, although universal essence belongs to a deeper
level of reality. In a certain way they are two different aspects of
the same thing. This fact explains what happens in the process of
knowledge according to Paul: since the intelligible species is
directly connected with the essence of a thing and indirectly, by
means of the phantasm, with the singular thing itself (cf. *In De
an*., III, t.c. 11, fol. 137rb), our intellect grasps the
universal essence and the individual thing at the same time, so that
both of them are the primary objects of our mind, even though the
universal essence is the primary object by nature (*primitate
naturae* - *In De an*., III, t.c. 11, fol. 137va; see
also *SN*, p. v, ch. 39, fol. 90va).


## 6. Theology: the Doctrine of Divine Ideas



Paul deals with the problem of divine ideas in his commentary on book
VII of the *Metaphysics* (tr. 3, chap. 2) and at the end of the
*Quaestio de universalibus* (tenth conclusion: *universalia
platonica et idealia sunt ex natura rei in mente divina causaliter
ponenda*). The cornerstone of his theory of divine exemplarism is
the conviction that there is a close parallelism between human
artificers as producers of artifacts and God as a creator--only
in this way, according to Paul, can the main goal of every theory of
divine ideas (that is, the explanation of the rationality of creation
as a free act of God) be achieved. Paul develops four rational pieces
of evidence for supporting the thesis of the eternal existence in
God's mind of a multiplicity of ideas, conceived of as the
formal patterns and principles (*exemplaria*) of creatures.



The first argument goes as follows: since the *prima causa*
produces individuals which differ in species (type) from each other
(say men and horses), they are produced according to different formal
principles, as the effects of the same principle are identical in
type. The second is that if A and B are two different
creatures (say a man and a donkey) that God is going to create, their
mutual differences cannot be grounded on their own beings, since they
are not yet existing things; therefore they have to be found in
something pertaining to God's productive potency, which will act
according to different principles present in it. The third argument is
unsound: Paul argues that since in God each generic principle
(*ratio generis*) is different from any corresponding specific
principle (*ratio speciei*), therefore specific principles too
are different from each other. Unfortunately, the proof he makes use
of for showing the difference in reality between generic and specific
principles is inconsistent. He affirms that if the generic and
specific principles were not distinct, then God could not create
something according to the generic principle without creating it
according to a correlated specific principle--while this is just
what happens, since no animal can be created which is not an animal of
a certain species or type (a man, or a monkey, or a mouse). The fourth
argument is that, since God knows that animal is the genus of man and
that being-an-animal is included in the definition of man, He thinks
of them by means of two different principles; otherwise He could not
distinguish them (*QdU,* fols. 133vb-134ra).



In the commentary on the *Metaphysics,* the Italian master,
after denying that the ideas are self-subsistent entities, as Plato
thought, maintains that the meaning of the term 'idea' is
twofold: (i) broadly speaking (*communiter*), an idea is a
specific essence or nature (*quidditas specifica*), existing in
a mind as a causal model for the production of something; (ii)
properly speaking (*proprie*), an idea is a specific essence
existing in God's mind as a causal model for the production of
something (*In Metaph.,* book VII, tr. 3, chap. 2, fol. 298va).
From these definitions, which he considers consonant with the teaching
of Aristotle and Averroes, Paul derives four consequences or theses,
which, taken together, represent the very core of his theory of divine
ideas:


1. Ideas are ideas of specific essences and not ideas of genera or of
individuals, because ideas are formal principles, and they are acts or
forms in relation to any other thing; on the contrary, both genera and
individuals are as matter in relation to species.
2. Ideas are present in the mind as in a substrate, or subject, since
ideas are the tools of the mind, and the mind can only use tools
closely connected with and existentially dependent on it.
3. Ideas are efficient causes (*causae effectivae*) in
relation to their effects.
4. Ideas are models (*exemplaria*) in relation to their
effects, since their effects are similar to them. This entails that
ideas are both direct objects of knowledge (*obiecta cognita
absolute*) and that by means of which the mind knows something
else (*obiecta cognita respective*), just as the phantasm is a
direct object for our knowledge and that by means of which we know the
individual from which it has been drawn. As a consequence--Paul
adds--an idea is not the notion of something (*cognitio
rei*), but the essence of a thing (*quidditas rei*)
considered according to its intelligible being in a mind (*In
Metaph.,* book VII, tr. 3, chap. 2, fol. 298vb; see also
*QdU,* fol. 134vb).



In sum, according to Paul, divine ideas play a threefold role in
relation to God and creatures: they are (i) the specific essences of
individual things themselves, considered according to their
intelligible being in the mind of God; (ii) God's principles of
cognition of creatures; and (iii) the eternal models of creatures. If
we also take into account that in his opinion (i) divine ideas are
really the same as the divine essence and formally distinct from it,
and (ii) this distinction originates from their being efficient
(co-)causes in relation to the different kinds of creatures, we can
easily realize how close his position was to Wyclif's, which was
considered heretical because of its consequences: metaphysical and
theological necessitarianism; restriction of divine omnipotence;
denial of the process of transubstantiation in the Eucharist. In order
to avoid this form of necessitarianism, Paul, both in the commentary
on the *Metaphysics* and in the *Quaestio de
universalibus,* maintains that in God there is an infinite number
of ideas, some of which only have been brought into existence by Him.
In fact, there is a formal difference between the supreme principle of
understanding of possibles, which is the divine essence itself as
infinitely imitable *ad extra*, and divine ideas, which are the
practical principles of the production of creatures (*In
Metaph.,* book VII, tr. 3, chap. 2, fol. 298va; see also
*QdU,* fol. 135rb). But he admits that we should conclude that
ideas in God are finite in number, if we considered the problem
exclusively from the point of view of natural philosophy
(*ibidem*).



The differences between Paul's doctrine and that of Thomas
Aquinas, his main source, on the one hand, and Wyclif's, on the
other hand, are evident. Paul agrees with Wyclif against Thomas that
divine ideas are the specific essences of individual creatures,
considered according to their intelligible being in the mind of God,
and efficient (co-)causes in relation to the different kinds of
creatures, while he agrees with Thomas against Wyclif that there is a
distinction between being a mere principle of understanding
(*ratio*) and being an effective model of production
(*exemplar*). If Paul did not accept such a distinction, his
theory would be substantially the same as Wyclif's. On the
contrary, not only does he accept this Thomistic distinction, but he
develops it in an autonomous way, which makes his admission of the
existence of an infinite number of ideas in God superfluous. According
to Thomas, divine *rationes* and divine *exemplaria* are
two different types of ideas, the former linked to pure speculative
knowledge only, the latter linked to practical knowledge. Only
*exemplaria* are ideas in the strict sense of the term.
Paul's definition of divine ideas excludes that the (Thomistic)
divine *rationes* can be considered ideas, since a divine idea
is the (i) specific nature (of a certain set of individuals) existing
in God's mind, (ii) principle of actuality, and (iii) efficient
cause in relation to creatures. Now, the Thomistic *rationes*
do not satisfy any of these requirements. Within Paul's system,
what plays the role of the Thomistic *rationes* is the divine
essence itself, which is the supreme principle of knowledge of
possibles, but not an idea. Moreover, in Paul's view, divine
ideas are formally distinct from the divine essence. This means that,
in principle, the divine essence and divine ideas are different
entities. In fact, Paul's definition of formal distinction
inverts the terms of the question in relation to the preceding
approaches, as Paul is attempting to reduce multiplicity to unity (the
passage is from many to one). What Paul wants to account for is the
way in which many different entities of a certain kind (i.e. of an
incomplete and dependent mode of existence) can constitute one and the
same substance. Hence, within Paul's theory of divine ideas the
gap between the sphere of the possible and the sphere of the existent
is deeper than in Thomas'. The possible is grounded on God
considered as a knower, while the existent is grounded on God
considered as a maker; ideas play a role only in creation, while the
sole divine essence is sufficient for allowing God to know possibles
(see *In Metaph.,* book XII, tr. 2, chap. 3, part 2, fols.
466vb-467ra).



Therefore, Nicoletti's view can be summarized as follows: (i)
divine ideas are really identical with and formally different from the
divine essence; (ii) ideas are both direct, but secondary, objects of
divine intellection (the primary object being the divine essence
itself) and that by means of which God knows every existent other than
Himself; (iii) there are no ideas of individuals or of prime matter.
Paul's position is more influenced by (Neo-)platonic
presuppositions than that of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas appealed to a
sort of non-real mode of existence of divine ideas, originating from
the relations of imitability holding between the divine essence and
possible creatures, so that the existence of divine ideas is purely of
reason. Paul of Venice tries the opposite way of hypostatizing
ideas--his peculiar version of the formal distinction enables him
to do so without compromising divine simplicity. He can therefore
claim that the divine essence is the substrate of divine ideas, as if
they were a sort of accidents inhering in a substance. As a
consequence, the statement that the ideas are direct but secondary
objects of divine intellection means that God's intellection
first grasps the divine essence and then ideas, even though
God's intuition of Himself and God's intuition of ideas
are not distinct. In fact, divine ideas are not the specific natures
of creatures as creatures are conceived of *terminative* in
themselves by God, but as they are conceived of *subiective* in
Him, that is, by means of a different reality (the divine essence) and
according to their relation of ontological dependence upon the divine
essence itself. The identity between divine ideas and the *esse
ideale* proper to specific natures, and the relation of
one-to-many holding between specific natures and the individuals which
originate from them, explain how God can know individuals
perfectly--even though mediately, through ideas. In fact,
infinite individual causal principles derive from one and the same
divine idea, formally distinct from each other. They correspond to the
thisnesses (*haecceitates*), which on the level of existence
give rise to individuals from species. As thisnesses are the formal
principles in virtue of which individuals are what they are, something
particular, concrete, and perfectly determined in itself, so these
individual causal principles deriving from ideas are what causes the
passage from the specific ideal standard to the analytical description
of its instantiations (*QdU,* fol. 135ra). Prime matter, which
is a necessary constituent of any corporeal thing, is known by God in
the same way as individuals are: not in itself, but derivatively in
something else (*ibidem,* fol. 135rb).


## 7. Philosophy of Nature: Potency, Act, and Prime Matter



As happens very often in the case of medieval authors, the salient
features of Paul of Venice's general view about potency and act
(and possible and real as well) are partly determined by the concrete
applications that the theory pursues. The specific areas that the
theory is called to cover are: (1) the (meta)physical explanation of
the nature and modalities of change and coming to be; (2) the
determination of the form of existence of universals with respect to
singulars; and (3) the explanation of the process of creation. Paul
proceeds by divisions that allow him to order this subject according
to a tree-like scheme that follows in some ways that adopted by
Porphyry in the chapter on species in his *Isagoge*. We can
leave out the minor divisions to concentrate on the main one only. At
the basis of Paul's doctrine of act and potency we find a
distinction between potency considerd as a disposition to exist, or
logical possibility (the *potentia ad esse*), and potency as a
disposition (proper to something which already exists) to perform or
achieve something or to undergo a change, or natural possibility (the
*potentia in esse*) (see *SN*, pars vi, ch. 7, fol.
97ra). This distinction should allow him to separate the
logical-theoretical sphere (the *potentia ad esse*) from the
physical one (the *potentia in esse*). The example chosen to
illustrate the nature of the *potentia ad esse*, that is, the
birth of the Antichrist, manifests, however, an internal ambiguity in
his doctrine. The existence of the Antichrist, in fact, is a possible
not in the sense of non-impossible (i.e., something not contradictory
in itself) but in the sense of that which, while not yet real, is
however *infallibly* destined to become real.



As a matter of fact, the Italian master does not always adequately
distinguish between the concept of potency (*potentia*) as pure
logical possibility (as it was taught by Duns Scotus) and that of
potency as preformation, that is, a sort of latent pre-existence, in
some other thing, of what will be actual/real but is not yet such.
This last sense of potency is the one prevalent in Paul, who seems to
use the logical sense only in theological contexts, in connection with
the theme of divine omnipotence, which enables God to create many more
species than He did (see *QdU*, *conclusio decima*). As
a consequence, in the theory of potency and act of Paul of Venice, two
different fields of investigation converge: the one related to the
problem of *changes of state* and the one related to the
analysis of the *modal concept of possible*. Nicoletti tends to
trace back in some way the notion of (logical) possible to that of
disposition to undergo a change. He therefore denies that there are
possibilities that will never come into being (*In Metaph*.,
IX, tr. 1, ch. 2, fol. 342rb): "The opinion of those who claimed
that something is possible even if it will never be was false"
(*Falsa fuit opinio dicentium aliquid posse esse quod tamen nullo
modo erit*). Yet, such a denial - he adds - is valid
ony within the philosophy of nature; it must be rejected from a
theological point of view ( *ibidem*).



The thesis (which he shares with Wyclif and his followers) of the
composition of potency and act proper to all categorial items
(universal and individual substances, and universal and individual
accidents - see *SN*, pars vi, ch. 4, fol. 95rb) is in
accord with this approach. In Paul's opinion, each categorial
item is act, and hence form, with respect to the entity that according
to the high-low direction immediately precedes it in the categorial
line (*linea praedicamentalis*), and in potency, and hence
matter, with respect to the entity that immediately follows it -
taking the terms 'matter' and 'form' in a
broad sense (*communiter*), since 'matter' stands for any
potential nature and 'form' for any act (or form) contracting some
given nature (cf. *ibidem*). For instance, the highest genus of
the category of substance is immediately composed of act and potency;
intermediate genera and lowest species immediately of genus and
difference, and mediately of act and potency (because of the supreme
genus, which is the original constitutive element of their natures);
and individuals immediately of essence and being (that is to say, as
Paul puts it, of specific nature and an individuating principle, or
*ratio individualis*, and mediately of genus and difference
(because of the lowest species), and of act and potency (because of
the highest genus) (*SN*, pars vi, ch. 4, fol. 95rb; *In
Metaph*., V, tr. 2, ch. 2, fol. 184ra; and book XII, tr. 1, ch. 4,
fols. 433va and 434ra-b; *In Cat*., cap. *de
substantia*, fols. 54vb, 55ra, and 55rb-va).Thus, for example,
*mammal* is in act with respect to *animal*, of which it
actualises a potentiality, and in potency with respect to
*feline*, which in turn actualises a potentiality of
*mammal*. The Porphyrian (see *Isagoge*, chs. on genus
and on species) and neo-Platonic idea of potentiality as a productive
capacity reinforces this interpretation. As a result, what is
potential, because it is more universal, comes first and is more
important than what is actual, and therefore real (*In
Metaph*., V, tr. 2, ch. 4, fol. 193ra) - a scale of values
that overturns the Aristotelian one. As is evident, the notions of act
and potency are central to Paul's ontology, since potency and
act constitute the first, basic, and most universal type of
composition of created beings. Every other type of composition somehow
presupposes it.



If the concept of act is taken up quite faithfully from Aristotle,
Paul's concept of potency conflates the Aristotelian one with
the Neoplatonic one. For this reason, the Aristotelian pre-eminence of
act over potency is weakened in more than one aspect - as we
have already seen. And finally, the pure potentiality of Aristotelian
prime matter is read in terms of the theory of *rationes
seminales*, and therefore as an innate disposition to receive any
form. In Paul's opinion, prime matter has in itself the
"right" places to set every form, since it is like the
coffer in which are contained in potency all the forms of the things
that will be generated in nature. His theory combines the two
Aristotelian notions of matter (that of matter as the ultimate
substratum, common to all the materials of which things are made, and
that of matter as a pure potentiality) with Augustine's notion
of *rationes seminales*, the "germinative"
principles of natural species. According to Paul, with the exception
of those forms directly created by God, such as celestial
intelligences and human souls (see *In Metaph*., V, tr. 2, ch.
4, fol. 193ra), all substantial forms derive from some passive potency
(defined as the capacity to undergo change) present in prime matter
and really distinct from it. Such potencies are universal (so to
speak), in the sense that the continuous generation of singular things
to which they give rise is aimed at the maintenance in being of a
specific nature. Every potency is capable of producing a form of a
certain kind an infinite number of times. Hence, no natural form
passes from absolute non-being to being, but from potency to act,
since it has always had its own kind of existence (*potentialiter
et seminaliter*) as a sort of disposition in prime matter. Such
potencies (or dispositions) are perpetual, ingenerable, and
incorruptible, coeternal with matter itself. As a consequence,
according to Paul, the generation of natural forms is like a passage
from an indefinite and potential being, typical of what is universal,
to the full and actual existence of what is singular. In order to
produce a complete thing (namely, a thing composed by matter and form)
from matter, in addition to the raw material with its dispositions (or
potencies), the intervention of natural agents, both singular and
universal, is required. The potencies of matter, inasmuch as they
order matter to the production of complete things different in species
are, in a broad sense, "germinative" principles of the
natural species. On the contrary, a *ratio seminalis* in the
strictest sense of the term is that disposition, caused by an agent in
a suitable material, which predisposes that material to receive a form
of the same kind of the form proper to the agent itself - a
disposition which is by nature capable of operating even without the
natural agent. Thus the potencies of matter are like the primordial
seeds of the species (that are to be produced) "sown" in
the matter itself (*SN*, pars vi, ch. 6, fol. 96va)



According to Paul of Venice, such "germinative" principles
(*rationes seminales*) are of three types: substantial,
qualitative, and relative (*SN*, pars vi, ch. 7, fol. 97rb).
All of them are really distinct from matter and are based on a unique
passive potency (i.e., a disposition) that is identified with the
essence, so to speak, of prime matter (*SN*, pars vi, ch. 7,
fol. 97vb) - and in this reference to a sort of essence of prime
matter we can see the influence of Scotism. As a consequence, this
basic potency is a kind of second-order potency, since the forms it
brings into being are nothing but the potencies of prime matter, which
in themselves are dispositional properties. Moreover, this general
potency of prime matter consists precisely in the property of being in
potency with respect to any kind of form, and therefore in being able
to receive all of them (*ibidem*). The ultimate outcome of
Paul's approach is a form of necessitarianism *ex
hypothesi*, in that every possible object, although not necessary
in itself, would nevertheless be necessary with respect to the
conditions and circumstances that bring it into being, since
conditions and circumstances have to produce it, if they have the
capacity to do so.



Paul is aware of the particular form of necessitarianism inherent in
his approach to that issue; hence, he tries to mitigate its effects,
in order to safeguard the contingency of human events as well as
divine freedom, and to loosen, at the level of individuals, the rigid
causal chain implied by his theory of potency, act, and prime matter.
In the last part of his *Quaestio de universalibus*, where he
expounds his conception of divine exemplarism (*decima
conclusio*) and in his commentary on the *Isagoge* (cap.
*de specie*) and in that on the *Categories* (cap.
*de substantia*), where he speaks of individual substances, he
states that (1) the properties and dispositions proper to individuals
are not precisely determined, but vary randomly within a more or less
wide spectrum of possibilities whose limits are fixed by the specific
form (*In Metaph*., IX, tr. 1, ch. 2, fol. 341vb). And, (2)
although reasoning as natural philosophers we should recognise that
the models according to which God created things are finite in number
and correspond to the types of things that actually exist, reasoning
as theologians we come to understand that God did not create all
possible species, but only some of them, because divine ideas as
*rationes* (i.e., principles of knowledge and not models for
creation) are infinite in number and correspond to the purely
possible, i.e., to that whose notion is not contradictory
(*QsU*, *decima conclusio*, ms. Paris, BN 6433B, fol.
135ra). This means, for example, that Socrates' height, weight,
and actions are not established *a priori* in their individual
nature or measure, and neither is Socrates' life, but their
typical form is. As a human being, Socrates' features and
behavior cannot deviate from certain physical-biological parameters
and certain laws, but the concrete ways of their realisation are not
given *a priori* and determined by his individual substance. As
a whole, human beings would actualise, i.e., make real, in time (if
they had endless time at their disposal) all the infinite
possibilities inherent in their nature (a sort of 'weak'
principle of plenitude applied to species only), but no human
individual as such (i.e., as an individual) is obliged by nature to
actualise precisely those potentialities/possibilities that he/she
makes real.



In this way, Paul of Venice implicitly states two theses concerning
individuals: (1) the thesis of the partial indeterminacy of their
features and properties, and (2) that of the substantial
unpredictability of their behavior. According to him, the only way to
ascertain the presence of some potency, i.e., of a real possibility,
is to ascertain its realisation, i.e., the passage to actuality.
Moreover, he seems to admit the existence in individuals of
potencies/possibilities that will not reach actuality - that is,
of capacities that will never be developed. All men can laugh, and
this potency/possibility is real even in those who have never laughed
and never will (commentary on the *Isagoge*, cap. *de
proprio*). Yet, we can reasonably infer the presence in a given
individual of a undeveloped potency/possibility if we have previously
observed its actualisation in many other individuals of the same
species. What is absolutely inconceivable from this perspective is the
possibility of a real novelty, i.e., a real change, in the universe.
In this view, whatever effect is produced (the 'act') is
immediately traced back to a pre-existing reality (the
'potency') which is not different from the effect it is
intended to explain, but is, in some way, the effect itself at an
incomplete stage of being. What is now real was already present in
reality, but in a different way. Creation itself, as we have seen, is
interpreted according to this scheme by means of the theory of divine
exemplarism. In conclusion, it can be said that *in a sense*
the world has always existed, if not in act then at least virtually
(as a real and not merely logical possibility) in God's mind and
omnipotence.