## 1. History of the Pragmatic Theory of Truth



The history of the pragmatic theory of truth is tied to the history of
classical American pragmatism. According to one standard account, C.S.
Peirce gets credit for first proposing a pragmatic theory of truth,
William James is responsible for popularizing the pragmatic theory,
and John Dewey subsequently reframed truth in terms of warranted
assertibility (for this reading of Dewey see Burgess & Burgess
2011: 4). More specifically, Peirce is associated with the idea that
true beliefs are those that will withstand future scrutiny; James with
the idea that true beliefs are dependable and useful; Dewey with the
idea that truth is a property of well-verified claims (or
"judgments").


### 1.1 Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Truth



The American philosopher, logician and scientist Charles Sanders
Peirce (1839-1914) is generally recognized for first proposing a
"pragmatic" theory of truth. Peirce's pragmatic
theory of truth is a byproduct of his pragmatic theory of meaning. In
a frequently-quoted passage in "How to Make Our Ideas
Clear" (1878), Peirce writes that, in order to pin down the
meaning of a concept, we must:



> 
> 
> Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical
> bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
> conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the
> object. (1878 [1986: 266])
> 
> 
> 



The meaning of the concept of "truth" then boils down to
the "practical bearings" of using this term: that is, of
describing a belief as true. What, then, is the practical difference
of describing a belief as "true" as opposed to any number
of other positive attributes such as "creative",
"clever", or "well-justified"? Peirce's
answer to this question is that true beliefs eventually gain general
acceptance by withstanding future inquiry. (Inquiry, for Peirce, is
the process that takes us from a state of doubt to a state of stable
belief.) This gives us the pragmatic meaning of truth and leads Peirce
to conclude, in another frequently-quoted passage, that:



> 
> 
> All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of
> investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain
> solution to every question to which they can be applied....The
> opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
> investigate, is what we mean by the truth. (1878 [1986: 273])
> 
> 
> 



Peirce realized that his reference to "fate" could be
easily misinterpreted. In a less-frequently quoted footnote to this
passage he writes that "fate" is not meant in a
"superstitious" sense but rather as "that which is
sure to come true, and can nohow be avoided" (1878 [1986: 273]).
Over time Peirce moderated his position, referring less to fate and
unanimous agreement and more to scientific investigation and general
consensus (Misak 2004). The result is an account that views truth as
what would be the result of scientific inquiry, if scientific inquiry
were allowed to go on indefinitely. In 1901 Peirce writes that:



> 
> 
> Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal
> limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring
> scientific belief. (1901a [1935: 5.565])
> 
> 
> 



Consequently, truth does not depend on actual unanimity or an actual
end to inquiry:



> 
> 
> If Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any *actual*
> satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction which *would*
> ultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and
> indefeasible issue. (1908 [1935: 6.485], emphasis in original)
> 
> 
> 



As these references to inquiry and investigation make clear,
Peirce's concern is with how we come to have and hold the
opinions we do. Some beliefs may in fact be very durable but would not
stand up to inquiry and investigation (this is true of many cognitive
biases, such as the Dunning-Kruger effect where people remain
blissfully unaware of their own incompetence). For Peirce, a true
belief is not simply one we will hold onto obstinately. Rather, a true
belief is one that has and will continue to hold up to sustained
inquiry. In the practical terms Peirce prefers, this means that to
have a true belief is to have a belief that is dependable in the face
of all future challenges. Moreover, to describe a belief as true is to
point to this dependability, to signal the belief's scientific
bona fides, and to endorse it as a basis for action.



By focusing on the practical dimension of having true beliefs, Peirce
plays down the significance of more theoretical questions about the
nature of truth. In particular, Peirce is skeptical that the
correspondence theory of truth--roughly, the idea that true
beliefs correspond to reality--has much useful to say about the
concept of truth. The problem with the correspondence theory of truth,
he argues, is that it is only "nominally" correct and
hence "useless" (1906 [1998: 379, 380]) as far as
describing truth's practical value. In particular, the
correspondence theory of truth sheds no light on what makes true
beliefs valuable, the role of truth in the process of inquiry, or how
best to go about discovering and defending true beliefs. For Peirce,
the importance of truth rests not on a "transcendental"
(1901a [1935: 5.572]) connection between beliefs on the one hand and
reality on the other, but rather on the practical connection between
doubt and belief, and the processes of inquiry that take us from the
former to the latter:



> 
> 
> If by truth and falsity you mean something not definable in terms of
> doubt and belief in any way, then you are talking of entities of whose
> existence you can know nothing, and which Ockham's razor would
> clean shave off. Your problems would be greatly simplified, if,
> instead of saying that you want to know the "Truth", you
> were simply to say that you want to attain a state of belief
> unassailable by doubt. (1905 [1998: 336])
> 
> 
> 



For Peirce, a true belief is one that is indefeasible and
unassailable--and indefeasible and unassailable for all the right
reasons: namely, because it will stand up to all further inquiry and
investigation. In other words,



> 
> 
> if we were to reach a stage where we could no longer improve upon a
> belief, there is no point in withholding the title "true"
> from it. (Misak 2000: 101)
> 
> 
> 


### 1.2 James' Pragmatic Theory of Truth



Peirce's contemporary, the psychologist and philosopher William
James (1842-1910), often gets credit for popularizing the
pragmatic theory of truth. In a series of popular lectures and
articles, James offers an account of truth that, like Peirce's,
is grounded in the practical role played by the concept of truth.
James, too, stresses that truth represents a kind of satisfaction:
true beliefs are satisfying beliefs, in some sense. Unlike Peirce,
however, James suggests that true beliefs can be satisfying short of
being indefeasible and unassailable: short, that is, of how they would
stand up to ongoing inquiry and investigation. In the lectures
published as *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of
Thinking* (1907) James writes that:



> 
> 
> Ideas...become true just in so far as they help us get into
> satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, to summarize
> them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of
> following the interminable succession of particular phenomena. (1907
> [1975: 34])
> 
> 
> 



True ideas, James suggests, are like tools: they make us more
efficient by helping us do the things that need to get done. James
adds to the previous quote by making the connection between truth and
utility explicit:



> 
> 
> Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry
> us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part,
> linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving
> labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true
> *instrumentally.* This is the 'instrumental' view
> of truth. (1907 [1975: 34])
> 
> 
> 



While James, here, credits this view to John Dewey and F.C.S.
Schiller, it is clearly a view he endorses as well. To understand
truth, he argues, we must consider the practical difference--or
the pragmatic "cash-value" (1907 [1975: 97]) of having
true beliefs. True beliefs, he suggests, are useful and dependable in
ways that false beliefs are not:



> 
> 
> you can say of it then either that "it is useful because it is
> true" or that "it is true because it is useful".
> Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing. (1907 [1975: 98])
> 
> 
> 



Passages such as this have cemented James' reputation for
equating truth with mere utility (something along the lines of:
"< *p* > is true just in case it is useful to
believe that *p*" [see Schmitt 1995: 78]). (James does
offer the qualification "in the long run and on the whole of
course" (1907 [1975: 106]) to indicate that truth is different
from instant gratification, though he does not say how long the long
run should be.) Such an account might be viewed as a watered-down
version of Peirce's account that substitutes
"cash-value" or subjective satisfaction for
indefeasibility and unassailability in the face of ongoing inquiry and
investigation. Such an account might also be viewed as obviously
wrong, given the undeniable existence of useless truths and useful
falsehoods.



In the early twentieth century Peirce's writings were not yet
widely available. As a result, the pragmatic theory of truth was
frequently identified with James' account--and, as we will
see, many philosophers did view it as obviously wrong. James, in turn,
accused his critics of willful misunderstanding: that because he wrote
in an accessible, engaging style his critics "have boggled at
every word they could boggle at, and refused to take the spirit rather
than the letter of our discourse" (1909 [1975: 99]). However, it
is also the case that James tends to overlook or intentionally
blur--it is hard to say which--the distinction between (a)
giving an account of true ideas and (b) giving an account of the
concept of truth. This means that, while James' theory might
give a psychologically realistic account of why we care about the
truth (true ideas help us get things done) his theory fails to shed
much light on what the concept of truth exactly is or on what makes an
idea true. And, in fact, James often seems to encourage this reading.
In the preface to *The Meaning of Truth* he doubles down by
quoting many of his earlier claims and noting that "when the
pragmatists speak of truth, they mean exclusively something about the
*ideas*, namely their workableness" (1909 [1975: 6],
emphasis added). James' point seems to be this: from a practical
standpoint, we use the concept of truth to signal our confidence in a
particular idea or belief; a true belief is one that can be acted
upon, that is dependable and that leads to predictable outcomes; any
further speculation is a pointless distraction.



What then about the concept of truth? It often seems that James
understands the concept of truth in terms of verification: thus,
"true is the name for whatever idea starts the
verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in
experience" (1907 [1975: 98]). And, more generally:



> 
> 
> Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes,
> just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes
> connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them.
> (1907 [1975: 104])
> 
> 
> 



James seems to claim that being verified is what makes an idea true,
just as having a lot of money is what makes a person wealthy. To be
true is to be verified:



> 
> 
> Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is
> *made* true by events. Its verity *is* in fact an event,
> a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its
> veri-*fication*. Its validity is the process of its
> valid-*ation*. (1907 [1975: 97], emphasis in original)
> 
> 
> 



Like Peirce, James argues that a pragmatic account of truth is
superior to a correspondence theory because it specifies, in concrete
terms, what it means for an idea to correspond or "agree"
with reality. For pragmatists, this agreement consists in being led
"towards that reality and no other" in a way that yields
"satisfaction as a result" (1909 [1975: 104]). By
sometimes defining truth in terms of verification, and by unpacking
the agreement of ideas and reality in pragmatic terms, James'
account attempts to both criticize and co-opt the correspondence
theory of truth.


### 1.3 Dewey's Pragmatic Theory of Truth



John Dewey (1859-1952), the third figure from the golden era of
classical American pragmatism, had surprisingly little to say about
the concept of truth especially given his voluminous writings on other
topics. On an anecdotal level, as many have observed, the index to his
527 page *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938 [2008]) has only
one reference to "truth", and that to a footnote
mentioning Peirce. Otherwise the reader is advised to "*See
also* assertibility".



At first glance, Dewey's account of truth looks like a
combination of Peirce and James. Like Peirce, Dewey emphasizes the
connection between truth and rigorous scientific inquiry; like James,
Dewey views truth as the verified result of past inquiry rather than
as the anticipated result of inquiry proceeding into an indefinite
future. For example, in 1911 he writes that:



> 
> 
> From the standpoint of scientific inquiry, truth indicates not just
> accepted beliefs, but beliefs accepted in virtue of a certain
> method....To science, truth *denotes* verified beliefs,
> propositions that have emerged from a certain procedure of inquiry and
> testing. By that I mean that if a scientific man were asked to point
> to samples of what he meant by truth, he would pick...beliefs
> which were the outcome of the best technique of inquiry available in
> some particular field; and he would do this no matter what his
> conception of the Nature of Truth. (1911 [2008: 28])
> 
> 
> 



Furthermore, like both Peirce and James, Dewey charges correspondence
theories of truth with being unnecessarily obscure because these
theories depend on an abstract (and unverifiable) relationship between
a proposition and how things "really are" (1911 [2008:
34]). Finally, Dewey also offers a pragmatic reinterpretation of the
correspondence theory that operationalizes the idea of
correspondence:



> 
> 
> Our definition of truth...uses correspondence as a mark of a
> meaning or proposition in exactly the same sense in which it is used
> everywhere else...as the parts of a machine correspond. (1911
> [2008: 45])
> 
> 
> 



Dewey has an expansive understanding of "science". For
Dewey, science emerges from and is continuous with everyday processes
of trial and error--cooking and small-engine repair count as
"scientific" on his account--which means he should
not be taken too strictly when he equates truth with scientific
verification. (Peirce and James also had expansive understandings of
science.) Rather, Dewey's point is that true propositions, when
acted on, lead to the sort of predictable and dependable outcomes that
are hallmarks of scientific verification, broadly construed. From a
pragmatic standpoint, scientific verification boils down to the
process of matching up expectations with outcomes, a process that
gives us all the "correspondence" we could ask for.



Dewey eventually came to believe that conventional philosophical terms
such as "truth" and "knowledge" were burdened
with so much baggage, and had become so fossilized, that it was
difficult to grasp the practical role these terms had originally
served. As a result, in his later writings Dewey largely avoids
speaking of "truth" or "knowledge" while
focusing instead on the functions played by these concepts. By his
1938 *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* Dewey was speaking of
"warranted assertibility" as the goal of inquiry, using
this term in place of both "truth" and
"knowledge" (1938 [2008: 15-16]). In 1941, in a
response to Russell entitled "Propositions, Warranted
Assertibility, and Truth", he wrote that "warranted
assertibility" is a "definition of the nature of knowledge
in the honorific sense according to which only true beliefs are
knowledge" (1941: 169). Here Dewey suggests that
"warranted assertibility" is a better way of capturing the
function of both knowledge and truth insofar as both are goals of
inquiry. His point is that it makes little difference, pragmatically,
whether we describe the goal of inquiry as "acquiring more
knowledge", "acquiring more truth", or better yet,
"making more warrantably assertible judgments".



Because it focuses on truth's function as a goal of inquiry,
Dewey's pragmatic account of truth has some unconventional
features. To begin with, Dewey reserves the term "true"
only for claims that are the product of controlled inquiry. This means
that claims are neither true nor false before they are tested but
that, rather, it is the process of verification that makes them
true:



> 
> 
> truth and falsity are properties only of that subject-matter which is
> the *end*, the close, of the inquiry by means of which it is
> reached. (1941: 176)
> 
> 
> 



Second, Dewey insists that only "judgments"--not
"propositions"--are properly viewed as truth-bearers.
For Dewey, "propositions" are the proposals and working
hypotheses that are used, via a process of inquiry, to generate
conclusions and verified judgments. As such, propositions may be more
or less relevant to the inquiry at hand but they are not, strictly
speaking true or false (1941: 176). Rather, truth and falsity are
reserved for "judgments" or "the settled outcome of
inquiry" (1941: 175; 1938 [2008: 124]; Burke 1994): reserved for
claims, in other words, that are warrantedly assertible. Third, Dewey
continues to argue that this pragmatic approach to truth is "the
only one entitled to be called a correspondence theory of truth"
(1941: 179) using terms nearly identical to those he used in 1911:



> 
> 
> My own view takes correspondence in the operational sense...of
> *answering*, as a key answers to conditions imposed by a lock,
> or as two correspondents "answer" each other; or, in
> general, as a reply is an adequate answer to a question or
> criticism--; as, in short, a *solution* answers the
> requirements of a *problem*. (1941: 178)
> 
> 
> 



Thanks to Russell (e.g., 1941: Ch. XXIII) and others, by 1941 Dewey
was aware of the problems facing pragmatic accounts of truth. In
response, we see him turning to the language of "warranted
assertibility", drawing a distinction between
"propositions" and "judgments", and grounding
the concept of truth (or warranted assertibility) in scientific
inquiry (Thayer 1947; Burke 1994). These adjustments were designed to
extend, clarify, and improve on Peirce's and James'
accounts. Whether they did so is an open question. Certainly many,
such as Quine, concluded that Dewey was only sidestepping important
questions about truth: that Dewey's strategy was "simply
to avoid the truth predicate and limp along with warranted
belief" (Quine 2008: 165).



Peirce, James, and Dewey were not the only ones to propose or defend a
pragmatic theory of truth in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Others, such as F.C.S. Schiller (1864-1937), also put
forward pragmatic theories (though Schiller's view, which he
called "humanism", also attracted more than its share of
critics, arguably for very good reasons). Pragmatic theories of truth
also received the attention of prominent critics, including Russell
(1909, 1910 [1994]), Moore (1908), and Lovejoy (1908a,b) among others.
Several of these criticisms will be considered later; suffice it to
say that pragmatic theories of truth soon came under pressure that led
to revisions and several successor approaches over the next
hundred-plus years.



Historically Peirce, James, and Dewey had the greatest influence in
setting the parameters for what makes a theory of truth
pragmatic--this despite the sometimes significant differences
between their respective accounts, and that over time they modified
and clarified their positions in response to both criticism and
over-enthusiastic praise. While this can make it difficult to pin down
a single definition of what, historically, counted as a pragmatic
theory of truth, there are some common themes that cut across each of
their accounts. First, each account begins from a pragmatic analysis
of the meaning of the truth predicate. On the assumption that
describing a belief, claim, or judgment as "true" must
make some kind of practical difference, each of these accounts
attempts to describe what this difference is. Second, each account
then connects truth specifically to processes of inquiry: to describe
a claim as true is to say that it either has or will stand up to
scrutiny. Third, each account rejects correspondence theories of truth
as overly abstract, "transcendental", or metaphysical. Or,
more accurately, each attempts to redefine correspondence in pragmatic
terms, as the agreement between a claim and a predicted outcome. While
the exact accounts offered by Peirce, James, and Dewey found few
defenders--by the mid-twentieth century pragmatic theories of
truth were largely dormant--these themes did set a trajectory for
future versions of the pragmatic theory of truth.


## 2. Neo-Pragmatic Theories of Truth



Pragmatic theories of truth enjoyed a resurgence in the last decades
of the twentieth century. This resurgence was especially visible in
debates between Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) and Richard Rorty
(1931-2007) though broadly pragmatic ideas were defended by
other philosophers as well (Bacon 2012: Ch. 4). (One example is
Crispin Wright's superassertibility theory (1992, 2001) which he
claims is "as well equipped to express the aspiration for a
developed pragmatist conception of truth as any other candidate"
(2001: 781) though he does not accept the pragmatist label.) While
these "neo-pragmatic" theories of truth sometimes
resembled the classical pragmatic accounts of Peirce, James, or Dewey,
they also differed significantly, often by framing the concept of
truth in explicitly epistemic terms such as assertibility or by
drawing on intervening philosophical developments.



At the outset, neo-pragmatism was motivated by a renewed
dissatisfaction with correspondence theories of truth and the
metaphysical frameworks supporting them. Some neo-pragmatic theories
of truth grew out of a rejection of metaphysical realism (e.g., Putnam
1981; for background see Khlentzos 2016). If metaphysical realism
cannot be supported then this undermines a necessary condition for the
correspondence theory of truth: namely, that there be a
mind-independent reality to which propositions correspond. Other
neo-pragmatic approaches emerged from a rejection of
representationalism: if knowledge is not the mind representing
objective reality--if we cannot make clear sense of how the mind
could be a "mirror of nature" to use Rorty's (1979)
term--then we are also well-advised to give up thinking of truth
in realist, correspondence terms. Despite these similar starting
points, neo-pragmatic theories took several different and evolving
forms over the final decades of the twentieth century.



At one extreme some neo-pragmatic theories of truth seemed to endorse
relativism about truth (whether and in what sense they did remains a
point of contention). This view was closely associated with
influential work by Richard Rorty (1982, 1991a,b). The rejection of
representationalism and the correspondence theory of truth could lead
to the conclusion that inquiry is best viewed as aiming at agreement
or "solidarity", not knowledge or truth as these terms are
traditionally understood. This had the radical consequence of
suggesting that truth is no more than "what our peers will,
*ceteris paribus*, let us get away with saying" (Rorty
1979: 176; Rorty [2010a: 45] admits this phrase is provocative) or
just "an expression of commendation" (Rorty 1991a: 23).
Not surprisingly, many found this position deeply problematic since it
appears to relativize truth to whatever one's audience will
accept (Baghramian 2004: 147). A related concern is that this position
also seems to conflate truth with justification, suggesting that if a
claim meets contextual standards of acceptability then it also counts
as true (Gutting 2003). Rorty for one often admitted as much, noting
that he tended to "swing back and forth between trying to reduce
truth to justification and propounding some form of minimalism about
truth" (1998: 21).



A possible response to the accusation of relativism is to claim that
this neo-pragmatic approach does not aim to be a full-fledged theory
of truth. Perhaps truth is actually a rather light-weight concept and
does not need the heavy metaphysical lifting implied by putting
forward a "theory". If the goal is not to describe what
truth is but rather to describe how "truth" is used, then
these uses are fairly straightforward: among other things, to make
generalizations ("everything you said is true"), to
commend ("so true!"), and to caution ("what you said
is justified, but it might not be true") (Rorty 1998: 22; 2000:
4). None of these uses requires that we embark on a possibly fruitless
hunt for the conditions that make a proposition true, or for a proper
definition or theory of truth. If truth is "indefinable"
(Rorty 2010b: 391) then Rorty's approach should not be described as
a definition or theory of truth, relativist or otherwise.



This approach differs in some noteworthy ways from earlier pragmatic
accounts of truth. For one thing it is able to draw on, and draw
parallels with, a range of well-developed non-correspondence theories
of truth that begin (and sometimes end) by stressing the fundamental
equivalence of "*S* is *p*" and
"'*S* is *p*' is true". These
theories, including disquotationalism, deflationism, and minimalism,
simply were not available to earlier pragmatists (though Peirce does
at times discuss the underlying notions). Furthermore, while Peirce
and Dewey, for example, were proponents of scientific inquiry and
scientific processes of verification, on this neo-pragmatic approach
science is no more objective or rational than other disciplines: as
Rorty put it, "the only sense in which science is exemplary is
that it is a model of human solidarity" (1991b: 39). Finally, on
this approach Peirce, James, and Dewey simply did not go far enough:
they failed to recognize the radical implications of their accounts of
truth, or else failed to convey these implications adequately. In turn
much of the critical response to this kind of neo-pragmatism is that
it goes too far by treating truth merely as a sign of commendation
(plus a few other monor functions). In other words, this type of
neo-pragmatism can be accused of going to unpragmatic extremes
(e.g., Haack 1998; also the exchange in Rorty & Price 2010).



A less extreme version of neo-pragmatism attempts to preserve
truth's objectivity and independence while still rejecting
metaphysical realism. This version was most closely associated with
Hilary Putnam, though Putnam's views changed over time (see
Hildebrand 2003 for an overview of Putnam's evolution). While
this approach frames truth in epistemic terms--primarily in terms
of justification and verification--it amplifies these terms to
ensure that truth is more than mere consensus. For example, this
approach might identify "being true with being warrantedly
assertible under ideal conditions" (Putnam 2012b: 220). More
specifically, it might demand "that truth is independent of
justification here and now, but not independent of *all*
justification" (Putnam 1981: 56).



Rather than play up assertibility before one's peers or
contemporaries, this neo-pragmatic approach frames truth in terms of
ideal warranted assertibility: namely, warranted assertibility in the
long run and before all audiences, or at least before all
well-informed audiences. Not only does this sound much less relativist
but it also bears a strong resemblance to Peirce's and
Dewey's accounts (though Putnam, for one, resisted the
comparison: "my admiration for the classical pragmatists does
not extend to any of the different theories of truth that Peirce,
James, and Dewey advanced" [2012c: 70]).



To repeat, this neo-pragmatic approach is designed to avoid the
problems facing correspondence theories of truth while still
preserving truth's objectivity. In the 1980s this view was
associated with Putnam's broader program of "internal
realism": the idea that "*what objects does the world
consist of?* is a question that it only makes sense to ask
*within* a theory or description" (Putnam 1981: 49,
emphasis in original). Internal realism was designed as an alternative
to metaphysical realism that dispensed with achieving an external
"God's Eye Point of View" while still preserving
truth's objectivity, albeit internal to a given theory. (For
additional criticisms of metaphysical realism see Khlentzos 2016.) In
the mid-1990s Putnam's views shifted toward what he called
"natural realism" (1999; for a critical discussion of
Putnam's changing views see Wright 2000). This shift came about
in part because of problems with defining truth in epistemic terms
such as ideal warranted assertibility. One problem is that it is
difficult to see how one can verify either what these ideal conditions
are or whether they have been met: either one might attempt to do so
by taking an external "god's eye view", which would
be inconsistent with internal realism, or one might come to this
determination from within one's current theory, which would be
circular and relativistic. (As Putnam put it, "to talk of
epistemically 'ideal' connections must either be
understood outside the framework of internal realism or it too must be
understood in a solipsistic manner " (2012d: 79-80).)
Since neither option seems promising this does not bode well for
internal realism or for any account of truth closely associated with
it.



If internal realism cannot be sustained then a possible fallback
position is "natural realism"--the view "that
the objects of (normal 'veridical') perception are
'external' things, and, more generally, aspects of
'external' reality" (Putnam 1999: 10)--which
leads to a reconciliation of sorts with the correspondence theory of
truth. A natural realism suggests "that true empirical
statements correspond to states of affairs that actually obtain"
(Putnam 2012a: 97), though this does not commit one to a
correspondence theory of truth across the board. In other words,
natural realism leaves open the possibility that not all true
statements "correspond" to a state of affairs, and even
those that do (such as empirical statements) do not always correspond
in the same way (Putnam 2012c: 68-69; 2012a: 98). While not a
ringing endorsement of the correspondence theory of truth, at least as
traditionally understood, this neo-pragmatic approach is not a
flat-out rejection either.



Viewing truth in terms of ideal warranted assertibility has obvious
pragmatic overtones of Peirce and Dewey. In contrast, viewing truth in
terms of a commitment to natural realism is not so clearly pragmatic
though some parallels still exist. Because natural realism allows for
different types of truth-conditions--some but not all statements
are true in virtue of correspondence--it is compatible with the
truth-aptness of normative discourse: just because ethical statements,
for example, do not correspond in an obvious way to ethical state of
affairs is no reason to deny that they can be true (Putnam 2002). In
addition, like earlier pragmatic theories of truth, this neo-pragmatic
approach redefines correspondence: in this case, by taking a pluralist
approach to the correspondence relation itself (Goodman 2013; see also
Howat 2021 and Shields (forthcoming) for recent attempts to show the
compatibility of pragmatic and correspondence theories of truth).



These two approaches--one tending toward relativism, the other
tending toward realism--represented the two main currents in late
twentieth century neo-pragmatism. Both approaches, at least initially,
framed truth in terms of justification, verification, or
assertibility, reflecting a debt to the earlier accounts of Peirce,
James, and Dewey. Subsequently they evolved in opposite directions.
The first approach, associated with Rorty, flirts with relativism and
implies that truth is not the important philosophical concept it has
long been taken to be. Here, to take a neo-pragmatic stance toward
truth is to recognize the relatively mundane functions this concept
plays: to generalize, to commend, to caution and not much else. To ask
for more, to ask for something "beyond the here and now",
only commits us to "the banal thought that we might be
wrong" (Rorty 2010a: 45). The second neo-pragmatic approach,
associated with Putnam, attempts to preserve truth's objectivity
and the important role it plays across scientific, mathematical,
ethical, and political discourse. This could mean simply "that
truth is independent of justification here and now" or
"that to call a statement of any kind...true is to say that
it has the sort of correctness appropriate to the kind of statement it
is" (2012a: 97-98). On this account truth points to
standards of correctness more rigorous than simply what our peers will
let us get away with saying.


## 3. Truth as a Norm of Inquiry and Assertion



More recently--since roughly the turn of the twenty-first
century--pragmatic theories of truth have focused on
truth's role as a norm of assertion or inquiry. These theories
are sometimes referred to as "new pragmatic" theories to
distinguish them from both classical and neo-pragmatic accounts (Misak
2007b; Legg and Hookway 2021). Like neo-pragmatic accounts, these
theories often build on, or react to, positions besides the
correspondence theory: for example, deflationary, minimal, and
pluralistic theories of truth. Unlike some of the neo-pragmatic
accounts discussed above, these theories give relativism a wide berth,
avoid defining truth in terms of concepts such as warranted
assertibility, and treat correspondence theories of truth with deep
suspicion.



On these accounts truth plays a unique and necessary role in
assertoric discourse (Price 1998, 2003, 2011; Misak 2000, 2007a,
2015): without the concept of truth there would be no difference
between making assertions and, to use Frank Ramsey's nice
phrase, "comparing notes" (1925 [1990: 247]). Instead,
truth provides the "convenient friction" that "makes
our individual opinions engage with one another" (Price 2003:
169) and "is internally related to inquiry, reasons, and
evidence" (Misak 2000: 73).



Like all pragmatic theories of truth, these "new"
pragmatic accounts focus on the use and function of truth. However,
while classical pragmatists were responding primarily to the
correspondence theory of truth, new pragmatic theories also respond to
contemporary disquotational, deflationary, and minimal theories of
truth (Misak 1998, 2007a). As a result, new pragmatic accounts aim to
show that there is more to truth than its disquotational and
generalizing function (for a dissenting view see Freedman 2006).
Specifically, this "more" is that the concept of truth
also functions as a norm that places clear expectations on speakers
and their assertions. In asserting something to be true, speakers take
on an obligation to specify the consequences of their assertion, to
consider how their assertions can be verified, and to offer reasons in
support of their claims:



> 
> 
> once we see that truth and assertion are intimately
> connected--once we see that to assert that *p* is true is
> to assert *p*--we can and must look to our practices of
> assertion and to the commitments incurred in them so as to say
> something more substantial about truth. (Misak 2007a: 70)
> 
> 
> 



This would mean that truth is not just a goal of inquiry, as Dewey
claimed, but actually a norm of inquiry that sets expectations for how
inquirers conduct themselves.



More specifically, without the norm of truth assertoric discourse
would be degraded nearly beyond recognition. Without the norm of
truth, speakers could be held accountable only for either insincerely
asserting things they don't themselves believe (thus violating
the norm of "subjective assertibility") or for asserting
things they don't have enough evidence for (thus violating the
norm of "personal warranted assertibility") (Price 2003:
173-174). The norm of truth is a condition for genuine
disagreement between people who speak sincerely and with, from their
own perspective, good enough reasons. It provides the
"friction" we need to treat disagreements as genuinely
needing resolution: otherwise, "differences of opinion would
simply slide past one another" (Price 2003: 180-181). In
sum, the concept of truth plays an essential role in making assertoric
discourse possible, ensuring that assertions come with obligations and
that conflicting assertions get attention. Without truth, it is no
longer clear to what degree assertions would still be assertions, as
opposed to impromptu speculations or musings. (Correspondence theories
should find little reason to object: they too can recognize that truth
functions as a norm. Of course, correspondence theorists will want to
add that truth also requires correspondence to reality, a step
"new" pragmatists will resist taking.)



It is important that this account of truth is not a definition or
theory of truth, at least in the narrow sense of specifying necessary
and sufficient conditions for a proposition being true. (That is,
there is no proposal along the lines of "*S* is true
iff..."; though see Brown (2015: 69) for a Deweyan
definition of truth and Heney (2015) for a Peircean response.) As
opposed to some versions of neo-pragmatism, which viewed truth as
"indefinable" in part because of its supposed simplicity
and transparency, this approach avoids definitions because the concept
of truth is implicated in a complex range of assertoric practices.
Instead, this approach offers something closer to a "pragmatic
elucidation" of truth that gives "an account of the role
the concept plays in practical endeavors" (Misak 2007a: 68; see
also Wiggins 2002: 317).



The proposal to treat truth as a norm of inquiry and assertion can be
traced back to both classical and neo-pragmatist accounts. In one
respect, this account can be viewed as adding on to neo-pragmatic
theories that reduce truth to justification or "personal
warranted assertibility". In this respect, these newer pragmatic
accounts are a response to the problems facing neo-pragmatism. In
another respect, new pragmatic accounts can be seen as a return to the
insights of classical pragmatists updated for a contemporary audience.
For example, while Peirce wrote of beliefs being "fated"
to be agreed upon at the "ideal limit" of
inquiry--conditions that to critics sounded metaphysical and
unverifiable--a better approach is to treat true beliefs as those
"that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we
fruitfully could on the matter" (Misak 2000: 49). On this
account, to say that a belief is true is shorthand for saying that it
"gets thing right" and "stands up and would continue
to stand up to reasons and evidence" (Misak 2015: 263, 265).
This pragmatic elucidation of the concept of truth thus attempts to
capture both what speakers say and what they do when they describe a
claim as true. In a narrow sense the meaning of truth--what
speakers are saying when they use this word--is that true beliefs
are indefeasible. However, in a broader sense the meaning of truth is
also what speakers are doing when they use this word, with the
proposal here that truth functions as a norm that is constitutive of
assertoric discourse.



As we have seen, pragmatic accounts of truth focus on the function the
concept plays: specifically, the practical difference made by having
and using the concept of truth. Early pragmatic accounts tended to
analyze this function in terms of the practical implications of
labeling a belief as true: depending on the version, to say that a
belief is true is to signal one's confidence, or that the belief
is widely accepted, or that it has been scientifically verified, or
that it would be assertible under ideal circumstances, among other
possible implications. These earlier accounts focus on the function of
truth in conversational contexts or in the context of ongoing
inquiries. The newer pragmatic theories discussed in this section take
a broader approach to truth's function, addressing its role not
just in conversations and inquiries but in making certain kinds of
conversations and inquiries possible in the first place. By viewing
truth as a norm of assertion and inquiry, these more recent pragmatic
theories make the function of truth independent of what individual
speakers might imply in specific contexts. Truth is not just what is
assertible or verifiable (under either ideal or non-ideal
circumstances), but sets objective expectations for making assertions
and engaging in inquiry. Unlike neo-pragmatists such as Rorty and
Putnam, new pragmatists such as Misak and Price argue that truth plays
a role entirely distinct from justification or warranted
assertibility. This means that, without the concept of truth and the
norm it represents, assertoric discourse (and inquiry in general)
would dwindle into mere "comparing notes".


## 4. Common Features



Pragmatic theories of truth have evolved to where a variety of
different approaches are described as "pragmatic". These
theories often disagree significantly with each other, making it
difficult either to define pragmatic theories of truth in a simple and
straightforward manner or to specify the necessary conditions that a
pragmatic theory of truth must meet. As a result, one way to clarify
what makes a theory of truth pragmatic is to say something about what
pragmatic theories of truth are not. Given that pragmatic theories of
truth have often been put forward in contrast to prevailing
correspondence and other "substantive" theories of truth
(Wyatt & Lynch, 2016), this suggests a common commitment shared by
the pragmatic theories described above.



One way to differentiate pragmatic accounts from other theories of
truth is to distinguish the several questions that have historically
guided discussions of truth. While some have used decision trees to
categorize different theories of truth (Lynch 2001a; Kunne 2003),
or have proposed family trees showing relations of influence and
affinity (Haack 1978), another approach is to distinguish separate
"projects" that examine different dimensions of the
concept of truth (Kirkham 1992). (These projects also break into
distinct subprojects; for a similar approach see Frapolli 1996.) On
this last approach the first, "metaphysical", project aims
to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for "what it
is for a statement...to be true" (Kirkham 1992: 20; Wyatt
& Lynch call this the "essence project" [2016: 324]).
This project often takes the form of identifying what makes a
statement true: e.g., correspondence to reality, or coherence with
other beliefs, or the existence of a particular state of affairs. A
second, "justification", project attempts to specify
"some characteristic, possessed by most true
statements...by reference to which the probable truth or falsity
of the statement can be judged" (Kirkham 1992: 20). This often
takes the form of giving a criterion of truth that can be used to
determine whether a given statement is true. Finally, the
"speech-act" project addresses the question of "what
are we *doing* when we make utterances" that
"ascribe truth to some statement?" (Kirkham 1992: 28).
Unfortunately, truth-theorists have not always been clear on which
project they are pursuing, which can lead to confusion about what
counts as a successful or complete theory of truth. It can also lead
to truth-theorists talking past each other when they are pursuing
distinct projects with different standards and criteria of
success.



In these terms, pragmatic theories of truth are best viewed as
pursuing the speech-act and justification projects. As noted above,
pragmatic accounts of truth have often focused on how the concept of
truth is used and what speakers are doing when describing statements
as true: depending on the version, speakers may be commending a
statement, signaling its scientific reliability, or committing
themselves to giving reasons in its support. Likewise, pragmatic
theories often focus on the criteria by which truth can be judged:
again, depending on the version, this may involve linking truth to
verifiability, assertibility, usefulness, or long-term durability.
With regard to the speech-act and justification projects pragmatic
theories of truth seem to be on solid ground, offering plausible
proposals for addressing these projects. They are on much less solid
ground when viewed as addressing the metaphysical project (Capps
2020). As we will see, it is difficult to defend the idea, for
example, that either utility, verifiability, or widespread acceptance
are necessary and sufficient conditions for truth or are what make a
statement true (though, to be clear, few pragmatists have defended
their positions in these exact terms).



This would suggest that the opposition between pragmatic and
correspondence theories of truth is partly a result of their pursuing
different projects. From a pragmatic perspective, the problem with the
correspondence theory is its pursuit of the metaphysical project that,
as its name suggests, invites metaphysical speculation about the
conditions which make sentences true--speculation that can
distract from more central questions of what makes true beliefs
valuable, how the truth predicate is used, and how true beliefs
are best recognized and acquired. (Pragmatic theories of truth are not
alone in raising these concerns (David 2022).) From the standpoint of
correspondence theories and other accounts that pursue the
metaphysical project, pragmatic theories will likely seem incomplete,
sidestepping the most important questions (Howat 2014). But from the
standpoint of pragmatic theories, projects that pursue or prioritize
the metaphysical project are deeply misguided and misleading.



This supports the following truism: a common feature of pragmatic
theories of truth is that they focus on the practical function that
the concept of truth plays. Thus, whether truth is a norm of inquiry
(Misak), a way of signaling widespread acceptance (Rorty), stands for
future dependability (Peirce), or designates the product of a process
of inquiry (Dewey), among other things, pragmatic theories shed light
on the concept of truth by examining the practices through which
solutions to problems are framed, tested, asserted, and
defended--and, ultimately, come to be called true. Pragmatic
theories of truth can thus be viewed as making contributions to the
speech-act and justification projects by focusing especially on the
practices people engage in when they solve problems, make assertions,
and conduct scientific inquiry. (For another example, Chang has argued
that claims are true "to the extent that there are operationally
coherent activities that can be performed by relying on it" (2022:
167).) Of course, even though pragmatic theories of truth largely
agree on which questions to address and in what order, this does not
mean that they agree on the answers to these questions, or on how to
best formulate the meaning and function of truth.



Another common commitment of pragmatic theories of truth--besides
prioritizing the speech-act and justification projects--is that
they do not restrict truth to certain topics or types of inquiry. That
is, regardless of whether the topic is descriptive or normative,
scientific or ethical, pragmatists tend to view it as an opportunity
for genuine inquiry that incorporates truth-apt assertions. The
truth-aptness of ethical and normative statements is a notable feature
across a range of pragmatic approaches, including Peirce's (at
least in some of his moods, e.g., 1901b [1958: 8.158]), Dewey's
theory of valuation (1939), Putnam's questioning of the
fact-value dichotomy (2002), and Misak's claim that "moral
beliefs must be in principle responsive to evidence and
argument" (2000: 94; for a dissenting view see Frega 2013). This
broadly cognitivist attitude--that normative statements are
truth-apt--is related to how pragmatic theories of truth
de-emphasize the metaphysical project. As a result, from a pragmatic
standpoint one of the problems with the correspondence theory of truth
is that it can undermine the truth-aptness of normative claims. If, as
the correspondence theory proposes, a necessary condition for the
truth of a normative claim is the existence of a normative fact to
which it corresponds, and if the existence of normative facts is
difficult to account for (normative facts seem ontologically distinct
from garden-variety physical facts), then this does not bode well for
the truth-aptness of normative claims or the point of posing, and
inquiring into, normative questions (Lynch 2009). If the
correspondence theory of truth leads to skepticism about normative
inquiry, then this is all the more reason, according to pragmatists,
to sidestep the metaphysical project in favor of the speech-act and
justification projects.



As we have seen, pragmatic theories of truth take a variety of
different forms. Despite these differences, and despite often being
averse to being called a "theory", pragmatic theories of
truth do share some common features. To begin with, and unlike many
theories of truth, these theories focus on the pragmatics of
truth-talk: that is, they focus on how truth is used as an essential
step toward an adequate understanding of the concept of truth (indeed,
this comes close to being an oxymoron). More specifically, pragmatic
theories look to how truth is used in epistemic contexts where people
make assertions, conduct inquiries, solve problems, and act on their
beliefs. By prioritizing the speech-act and justification projects,
pragmatic theories of truth attempt to ground the concept of truth in
epistemic practices as opposed to the abstract relations between
truth-bearers (such as propositions or statements) and truth-makers
(such as states of affairs) appealed to by correspondence theories
(MacBride 2022). Pragmatic theories also recognize that truth can play
a fundamental role in shaping inquiry and assertoric
discourse--for example, by functioning as a norm of these
practices--even when it is not explicitly mentioned. In this
respect pragmatic theories are less austere than deflationary theories
which limit the use of truth to its generalizing and disquotational
roles. And, finally, pragmatic theories of truth draw no limits, at
least at the outset, to the types of statements, topics, and inquiries
where truth may play a practical role. If it turns out that a given
topic is not truth-apt, this is something that should be discovered as
a characteristic of that subject matter, not something determined by
having chosen one theory of truth or another (Capps 2017).


## 5. Critical Assessments



Pragmatic theories of truth have faced several objections since first
being proposed. Some of these objections can be rather narrow,
challenging a specific pragmatic account but not pragmatic theories in
general (this is the case with objections raised by other pragmatic
accounts). This section will look at more general objections: either
objections that are especially common and persistent, or objections
that pose a challenge to the basic assumptions underlying pragmatic
theories more broadly.


### 5.1 Three Classic Objections and Responses



Some objections are as old as the pragmatic theory of truth itself.
The following objections were raised in response to James'
account in particular. While James offered his own responses to many
of these criticisms (see especially his 1909 [1975]), versions of
these objections often apply to other and more recent pragmatic
theories of truth (for further discussion see Haack 1976; Tiercelin
2014).



One classic and influential line of criticism is that, if the
pragmatic theory of truth equates truth with utility, this definition
is (obviously!) refuted by the existence of useful but false beliefs,
on the one hand, and by the existence of true but useless beliefs on
the other (Russell 1910 [1994] and Lovejoy 1908a,b). In short, there
seems to be a clear and obvious difference between describing a belief
as true and describing it as useful:



> 
> 
> when we say that a belief is true, the thought we wish to convey is
> not the same thought as when we say that the belief furthers our
> purposes; thus "true" does not mean "furthering our
> purposes". (Russell 1910 [1994: 98])
> 
> 
> 



While this criticism is often aimed especially at James' account
of truth, it plausibly carries over to any pragmatic theory. So
whether truth is defined in terms of utility, long-term durability or
assertibility (etc.), it is still an open question whether a useful or
durable or assertible belief is, in fact, really true. In other words,
whatever concept a pragmatic theory uses to define truth, there is
likely to be a difference between that concept and the concept of
truth (e.g., Bacon 2014 questions the connection between truth and
indefeasibility).



A second and related criticism builds on the first. Perhaps utility,
long-term durability, and assertibility (etc.) should be viewed not as
definitions but rather as criteria of truth, as yardsticks for
distinguishing true beliefs from false ones. This seems initially
plausible and might even serve as a reasonable response to the first
objection above. Falling back on an earlier distinction, this would
mean that appeals to utility, long-term durability, and assertibility
(etc.) are best seen as answers to the justification and not the
metaphysical project. However, without some account of what truth is,
or what the necessary and sufficient conditions for truth are, any
attempt to offer criteria of truth is arguably incomplete: we cannot
have criteria of truth without first knowing what truth is. If so,
then the justification project relies on and presupposes a successful
resolution to the metaphysical project, the latter cannot be
sidestepped or bracketed, and any theory which attempts to do so will
give at best a partial account of truth (Creighton 1908; Stebbing
1914).



And a third objection builds on the second. Putting aside the question
of whether pragmatic theories of truth adequately address the
metaphysical project (or address it at all), there is also a problem
with the criteria of truth they propose for addressing the
justification project. Pragmatic theories of truth seem committed, in
part, to bringing the concept of truth down to earth, to explaining
truth in concrete, easily confirmable, terms rather than the abstract,
metaphysical correspondence of propositions to truth-makers, for
example. The problem is that assessing the usefulness (etc.) of a
belief is no more clear-cut than assessing its truth: beliefs may be
more or less useful, useful in different ways and for different
purposes, or useful in the short- or long-run. Determining whether a
belief is really useful is no easier than determining whether it
is really true: "it is so often harder to determine whether a
belief is useful than whether it is true" (Russell 1910 [1994:
121]; also 1946: 817). Far from making the concept of truth more
concrete, and the assessment of beliefs more straightforward,
pragmatic theories of truth thus seem to leave the concept as opaque
as ever.



These three objections have been around long enough that pragmatists
have, at various times, proposed a variety of responses. One response
to the first objection, that there is a clear difference between
utility (etc.) and truth, is to deny that pragmatic approaches are
aiming to define the concept of truth in the first place. It has been
argued that pragmatic theories are not about finding a word or concept
that can substitute for truth but that they are, rather, focused on
tracing the implications of using this concept in practical contexts.
This is what Misak (2000, 2007a) calls a "pragmatic
elucidation". Noting that it is "pointless" to offer
a definition of truth, she concludes that "we ought to attempt
to get leverage on the concept, or a fix on it, by exploring its
connections with practice" (2007a: 69; see also Wiggins 2002).
It is even possible that James--the main target of Russell and
others--would agree with this response. As with Peirce, it often
seems that James' complaint is not with the correspondence
theory of truth, *per se*, as with the assumption that the
correspondence theory, by itself, says much interesting or important
about the concept of truth. (For charitable interpretations of what
James was attempting to say see Ayer 1968, Chisholm 1992, Bybee 1984,
Cormier 2001, 2011, Chang 2022, Pihlstrom 2021, and Perkins
1952; for a reading that emphasizes Peirce's commitment to
correspondence idioms see Atkins 2010.)



This still leaves the second objection: that the metaphysical project
of defining truth cannot be avoided by focusing instead on finding the
criteria for truth (the "justification project"). To be
sure, pragmatic theories of truth have often been framed as providing
criteria for distinguishing true from false beliefs. The distinction
between offering a definition as opposed to offering criteria would
suggest that criteria are separate from, and largely inferior to, a
definition of truth. However, one might question the underlying
distinction: as Haack (1976) argues,



> 
> 
> the pragmatists' view of meaning is such that a dichotomy
> between definitions and criteria would have been entirely unacceptable
> to them. (1976: 236)
> 
> 
> 



If meaning is related to use (as pragmatists generally claim) then
explaining how a concept is used, and specifying criteria for
recognizing that concept, may provide all one can reasonably expect
from a theory of truth. Deflationists have often made a similar point
though, as noted above, pragmatists tend to find deflationary accounts
excessively austere.



Even so, there is still the issue that pragmatic criteria of truth
(whatever they are) do not provide useful insight into the concept of
truth. If this concern is valid, then pragmatic criteria, ironically,
fail the pragmatic test of making a difference to our understanding of
truth. This objection has some merit: for example, if a pragmatic
criterion of truth is that true beliefs will stand up to indefinite
inquiry then, while it is possible to have true beliefs, "we are
never in a position to judge whether a belief is true or not"
(Misak 2000: 57). In that case it is not clear what good it serves to
have a pragmatic criterion of truth. Pragmatic theories of truth might
try to sidestep this objection by stressing their commitment to both
the justification and the speech-act project. While pragmatic
approaches to the justification project spell out what truth means in
conversational contexts--to call a statement true is to cite its
usefulness, durability, etc.--pragmatic approaches to the
speech-act project point to what speakers do in using the concept of
truth. This has the benefit of showing how the concept of
truth--operating as a norm of assertion, say--makes a real
difference to our understanding of the conditions on assertoric
discourse. Pragmatic theories of truth are, as a result, wise to
pursue both the justification and the speech-act projects. By itself,
pragmatic approaches to the justification project are likely to
disappoint.



These classic objections to the pragmatic theory of truth raise
several important points. For one thing, they make it clear that
pragmatic theories of truth, or at least some historically prominent
versions of it, do a poor job if viewed as providing a strict
definition of truth. As Russell and others noted, defining truth in
terms of utility or similar terms is open to obvious counter-examples.
This does not bode well for pragmatic attempts to address the
metaphysical project. As a result, pragmatic theories of truth have
evolved often by focusing on the justification and speech-act projects
instead. This is not to say that each of the above objections have
been met. It is still an open question whether the metaphysical
project can be avoided as many pragmatic theories attempt to do (e.g.,
Fox 2008 argues that epistemic accounts such as Putnam's fail to
explain the value of truth as well as more traditional approaches do).
It is also an open question whether, as they evolve in response to
these objections, pragmatic theories of truth will invite new
lines of criticism.


### 5.2 The Fundamental Objection



One long-standing and still ongoing objection is that pragmatic
theories of truth are anti-realist and, as such, violate basic
intuitions about the nature and meaning of truth: call this "the
fundamental objection". The source of this objection rests with
the tendency of pragmatic theories of truth to treat truth
epistemically, by focusing on verifiability, assertibility, and other
related concepts. Some (see, e.g., Schmitt 1995; Nolt 2008) have
argued that, by linking truth with verifiability or assertibility,
pragmatic theories make truth too subjective and too dependent on our
contingent ability to figure things out, as opposed to theories that,
for example, appeal to objective facts as truth-makers. Others have
argued that pragmatic theories cannot account for what Peirce called
buried secrets: statements that would seem to be either true or false
despite our inability to figure out which (see de Waal 1999, Howat
2013, and Talisse & Akin 2008 for discussions of this). For
similar reasons, some have accused pragmatic theories of denying
bivalence (Allen-Hermanson 2001). Whatever form the objection takes,
it raises a common concern: that pragmatic theories of truth are
insufficiently realist, failing both to account for truth's
objectivity and to distinguish truth from the limitations of actual
epistemic practice. What results, accordingly, is not a theory of
truth, but rather a theory of justification, warranted assertibility,
or some other epistemic concept.



This objection has persisted despite inspiring a range of responses.
At one extreme some, such as Rorty, have largely conceded the point
while attempting to defuse its force. As noted earlier, Rorty grants
that truth is not objective in the traditional sense while also
attempting to undercut the very distinction between objectivity and
relativism. Others, such as Putnam, have argued against metaphysical
realist intuitions (such as "the God's Eye view"
1981: 55), while defending the idea of a more human-scale objectivity:
"objectivity and rationality humanly speaking are what we have;
they are better than nothing" (1981: 55). Another response is to
claim that pragmatic accounts of truth are fully compatible with
realism; any impression to the contrary is a result of confusing
pragmatic "elucidations" of truth with more typical
"definitions". For example Peirce's steadfast
commitment to realism is perfectly compatible with his attempting to
describe truth in terms of its practical role: hence, his notion of
truth



> 
> 
> is the ordinary notion, but he insists on this notion's being
> philosophically characterized from the viewpoint of the practical
> first order investigator. (Hookway 2002: 319; see also Hookway 2012
> and Legg 2014)
> 
> 
> 



Even James claimed "my account of truth is realistic"
(1909 [1975: 117]). Likewise, Chang argues that this objection
"ignores the realist dimension of pragmatism, in terms of how
pragmatism demands that our ideas answer to experience, and to
realities" (2022: 203). Finally, others attempt to undercut the
distinction between realism and antirealism though without making
concessions to antirealism. Hildebrand argues for embracing a
"practical starting point" (Hildebrand 2003: 185) as a way
of going "beyond" the realism-antirealism debate (see also
Fine 2007). Similarly, Price, while admitting that his theory might
seem "fictionalist" about truth, argues that its bona
fides are "impeccably pragmatist" (2003: 189) and, in
fact, "deprive both sides of the realism-antirealism debate of
conceptual resources on which the debate seems to depend" (2003:
188; but see Atkin 2015 for some caveats and Lynch 2015 for a
pluralist amendment). Da Costa and French (2003) offer a formal
account of pragmatic truth that, they argue, can benefit both sides of
the realism-antirealism debate (though they themselves prefer
structural realism).



We find, in other words, an assortment of replies that run the gamut
from embracing antirealism to defending realism to attempting to
undermine the realist-antirealist distinction itself. Evidently, there
is no consensus among pragmatic theories of truth as to the best line
of response against this objection. In a way, this should be no
surprise: the objection boils down to the charge that pragmatic
theories of truth are too epistemic, when it is precisely their
commitment to epistemic concepts that characterizes pragmatic theories
of truth. Responding to this objection may involve concessions and
qualifications that compromise the pragmatic nature of these
approaches. Or responding may mean showing how pragmatic accounts have
certain practical benefits--but these benefits as well as their
relative importance are themselves contentious topics. As a result, we
should not expect this objection to be easily resolvable, if it can be
resolved at all.



Despite being the target of significant criticism from nearly the
moment of its birth, the pragmatic theory of truth has managed to
survive and, at times, even flourish for over a century. Because the
pragmatic theory of truth has come in several different versions, and
because these versions often diverge significantly, it can be
difficult to pin down and assess generally. Adding to the possible
confusion, not all those identified as pragmatists have embraced a
pragmatic theory of truth (e.g., Brandom 2011), while similar theories
have been held by non-pragmatists (e.g., Dummett 1959; Wright 1992).
Viewed more positively, pragmatic theories have evolved and matured to
become more refined and, perhaps, more plausible over time. With the
benefit of hind-sight we can see how pragmatic theories of truth have
stayed focused on the practical function that the concept of truth
plays: first, the role truth plays within inquiry and assertoric
discourse by, for example, signaling those statements that are
especially useful, well-verified, durable, or indefeasible and,
second, the role truth plays in shaping inquiry and assertoric
discourse by providing a necessary goal or norm. (While pragmatic
theories agree on the importance of focusing on truth's
practical function, they often disagree over what this practical
function is.)



The pragmatic theory of truth began with Peirce raising the question
of truth's "practical bearings". It is also possible
to ask this question of the pragmatic theory of truth itself: what
difference does this theory make? Or to put it in James' terms,
what is its "cash value"? One answer is that, by focusing
on the practical function of the concept of truth, pragmatic theories
highlight how this concept makes certain kinds of inquiry and
discourse possible. In contrast, as Lynch (2009) notes, some accounts
of truth make it difficult to see how certain claims are
truth-apt:



> 
> 
> consider propositions like *two and two are four* or
> *torture is wrong*. Under the assumption that truth is always
> and everywhere causal correspondence, it is a vexing question how
> these true thoughts *can* be true. (Lynch 2009: 34, emphasis in
> original)
> 
> 
> 



If that is so, then pragmatic theories have the advantage of
preserving the possibility and importance of various types of inquiry
and discourse. While this does not guarantee that inquiry will always
reach a satisfying or definite conclusion, this does suggest that
pragmatic theories of truth do make a difference: in the spirit of
Peirce's "first rule of reason", they "do not
block the way of inquiry" (1898 [1992: 178]).