## 1. Abhidharmikas / Sarvastivada (Vaibhasika)



In the fourth century, Vasubandhu undertook a comprehensive survey of
the Sarvastivada School's thought, and wrote a compendium,
*Treasury of Knowledge*,
(*Abhidharmakosakarika* [AK]; *Mngon pa*
ku 1b-25a) with his own *Commentary on the Treasury of
Knowledge* (*Abhidharmakosabhasya* [AKB],
*Mngon pa* ku 26b-258a). This commentary not only offers
an excellent account of the Sarvastivadin views, including
the theory of the two truths, but also offers a sharp critique of many
views held by the Sarvastivadins. Vasubandhu based his
commentary on the *Mahavibhasa* (*The
Great Commentary*), as the Sarvastivadins held their
philosophical positions according to the teachings of the
*Mahavibhasa*. Consequently,
Sarvastivadins are often known as
Vaibhasikas.



The Sarvastivadin's
 ontology[2]
 or the theory of the two truths makes two fundamental claims.


1. the claim that the ultimate reality consists of irreducible
spatial units (e.g., atoms of the material category) and irreducible
temporal units (e.g., point-instant consciousnesses) of the five basic
categories, and
2. the claim that the conventional reality consists of reducible
spatial wholes or temporal continua.



To put the matter straightforwardly, for the Sarvastivadins,
wholes and continua are only conventionally real, whereas the atoms
and point-instant consciousness are only ultimately real.


### 1.1 Conventional truth



To see how the Sarvastivadins defend these two claims, we
shall have a close look at their definitions of the two truths. We
will examine conventional truth first. This will provide the argument
in support of the second claim. In the *Abhidharmakosa*
Vasubandu defines conventional truth/reality as follows: "An
entity, the cognition of which does not arise when it is destroyed
and, mentally divided, is conventionally existent like a pot and
water. Ultimate existence is otherwise." ([AK] 6.4, *Mngon
pa* khu 7ab) Whatever is, on this definition, designated as
"conventionally existent" is taken to be
"conventionally real" or conventional truth when the idea
or concept of which ceases to arise when it is physically destroyed,
by means of a hammer for instance. Or its properties such as shape are
stripped away from it by means of subjecting it under analysis,
thereby conceptually excluding them. A pot and water are designated as
conventionally existent therefore conventionally real for the concept
"pot" ceases to exist when it is destroyed physically, and
the concept "water" no longer arises when we conceptually
exclude from it its shape, colour etc.



On the Sarvastivadin definition, for an entity to be real,
it does not need to be ultimately real, exclusively. For a thing to be
ultimately real is for that thing to be "foundationally
existent" (dravya-sat / rdzas
 yod)[3]
 in contrast with being "compositely existent"
(avayavidravya / rdzas grub). By "foundationally existent"
the Sarvastivadin refer to the entity which is fundamentally
real, the concept or the cognition of which is not dependent on
conceptual construction, hence not conceptually existent
(prajnaptisat) nor a composition of the aggregative phenomena.
In the case of foundational existent there always remains something
irreducible to which the concept of the thing applies, hence it is
ultimately real. A simple entity is not reducible to conceptual forms,
or conventional designations, nor is it compositely existent entity.
We will have lot more to say on this point shortly.



Pot and water are not the foundational entities. They are rather
composite entities (avayavi-dravya / rdzas grub). By composite entity,
we mean an entity or existent which is not fundamental, primary or
simple, but is rather a conceptually constructed
(prajnaptisat), composition of various properties, and is thus
reducible both physically and logically.



Hence for the Sarvastivadin, conventional reality
(samvrtisatya), composite-existence (avayavi-dravya / rdzas
grub), and the lack of intrinsic reality (nihsvabhava) are
all equivalents. A conventional reality is therefore characterised as
a reducible conventional entity on three grounds: (i) conventional
reality is both physically and logically reducible, as it
disintegrates when it is subjected to physical destruction and
disappears from our minds when its parts are separated from it by
logical analysis; (ii) conventional reality borrows its identity from
other things including its parts, concepts etc., it does not exist
independently in virtue of its intrinsic reality
(nihsvabhava), the exclusion of its parts and concepts thus
affects and reduces its inherent nature; and (iii) conventional
reality is a product of mental constructions, like that of
conventionally real wholes, causation, continuum etc, and it does not
exists intrinsically.


### 1.2 Ultimate truth



The definition of the ultimate reality, as we shall see, offers the
Sarvastivadin response to the claim that ultimate reality
consists of irreducible atoms and point-instant moments. In glossing
the [AK] 6.4 verse his commentary explains that ultimate reality is
regarded as ultimately existent, one that is both physically and
logically irreducible. Vasubandhu supplies three arguments to support
this: (i) ultimate reality is both physically and logically
irreducible, as it does not disintegrate when it is subjected to
physical destruction and that its identity does not disappear when its
parts are separated from it under logical analysis; and (ii) ultimate
reality does not borrow its nature from other things including its
parts. Rather it exists independently in virtue of its intrinsic
reality (*svabhava*), the exclusion of its parts thus does
not affect its inherent nature; and (iii) it is not a product of
mental constructions, like that of conventionally real wholes,
causation, continuum etc. It exists intrinsically ([AKB] 6.4,
*Mngon pa* khu 214a).



Ultimate reality is of two types: the compounded
(samskrta) ultimate, and the uncompounded
(asamskrta) ultimate. The uncompounded ultimate consists
of (a) space (akasa), and (b)
nirvana--analytical cessation
(pratisamkya-nirodha) and non-analytical cessation
(apratisamkhya-nirodha). These three ultimates are
uncompounded as each is seen as being causally unconditioned. They are
nonspatial concepts. These concepts do not have any physical referent
whatsoever. Space is a mere absence of entity. Analytical and
nonanalytical cessations are the two forms of nirvana,
which is simply freedom from afflictive suffering, or the elimination
of afflictive suffering. These concepts are not associated in positing
any thing that can be described as remotely physical. They are thus
the concepts that are irreducible physically and logically.



The compounded ultimate consists of the five aggregates--material
aggregate (rupa), feeling aggregate (vedana),
perception-aggregate (samjna), dispositional
aggregate (samskara), and consciousness-aggregate
(vijnana)--since they are causally produced, and the
ideas of each aggregate are conceived individually rather than
collectively. If the aggregates, the ideas of which are conceived
collectively as a whole(s) or a continuum/continua, they could not be
ultimately real. The collective concepts of the aggregate as a
"whole" or as a "continuum" subject to
cessation as they cease to appear to the mind, get excluded from the
conceptual framework of the reality of the five aggregates when they
are logically analysed.


## 2. Sautrantika



The
 philosophers[4]
 who championed this view are some of the best-known Indian logicians
and epistemologists. Other great names who propogated the tradition
include Devendrabuddhi (?), Sakhyabuddhi (?), Vinitadeva
(630-700), Dharmottara (750-810), Moksakaragupt (ca.
1100-1200). Dignaga (480-540) and Dharmakirti
(600-660) are credited to have founded this school. For the
theory of the two truths in the Sautrantika we will need to rely
on the following texts:


1. Dignaga's *Compendium of Epistemology*
(*Pramanasamuccaya*, *Tshad ma* ce
1b-13a),
2. Dignaga's *Auto-commentary on the Compendium of
Epistemology* (*Pramanasamuccayavrtti, Tshad
ma* ce 14b-85b),
3. Dharmakirti's *Verses on Epistemology*
(*Pramanavarttikakarika* [PVK];
*tshad ma* ce 94b-151a),
4. Dharmakirti's *Commentary on the Verses of
Epistemology* (*Pramanavarttikavrtti*
[PVT]; *tshad ma* ce 261b-365a),
5. Dharmakirti's *Ascertainment of Epistemology*
(*Pramanaviniscaya, tshad ma* ce
152b-230a),
6. Dharmakirti's *Dose of Logical Reasoning*
(*Nyayabindu*, *tshad ma* ce 231b-238a).



Broadly, all objects of knowledge are classified into two realities
based on the ways in which right-cognition (pramana)
engages with its object. They are either directly accessible
(*pratyaksa*), which constitutes objects that are obvious
to cognition, or they are directly inaccessible
(*paroksa*), which constitutes objects that are occulted,
or obscured from cognition. A directly accessible object is
principally known by a direct perceptual right-cognition
(pratyasa-pramana), whereas a directly inaccessible
object is principally known by an inferential right-cognition
(anumana-pramana).


### 2.1 Ultimate truth



Of the two types of objects, some are ultimately real while others are
only conventionally real, and some are not even conventionally real,
they are just unreal, or fictions. In defining ultimate truth in the
Sautrantika tradition, we read in Dharmakirti's Verses on
Epistemology: "That which is ultimately causally efficient is
here an ultimately existent (paramarthasat). Conventionally
existent (samvrtisat) is otherwise. They are declared as
the definitions of the unique particular (svalaksana) and
the universal (samanyalaksana)"
(Dharmakirti [PVK] *Tshad ma* ce 118b).



Ultimate truth is, on this definition, a phenomenon (dharma) that is
ultimately existent, and ultimately existent are ultimately causally
efficient. Phenomenon that is ultimately causally efficient is
intrinsically or objectively real, existing in and of itself as a
"unique particular"
 (svalaksana).[5]
 By "unique particular" Dharmakirti means ultimately
real phenomenon--dharma that is self-defined, uniquely
individual, objectively real, existing independent of any conceptual
fabrication, ultimately causally efficient (artha), a dharma which
serves as an objects of direct perception, dharma that presents itself
to the cognitions as distinctive/unique individuals.



In the Commentary on the Verses of Epistemology, Dharmakirti
characterises (*Tshad ma* ce 274b-279b) all ultimately
real unique particulars exist as distinct individuals with their own
intrinsic natures. And they satisfy three criteria:


1. They have determinate spatial locations (desaniyata / yul
nges pa) of their own, as real things do not have a shared property
amongst themselves. The real fire we see is either near or far, or at
the left or the right, or at the back or in the front. By contrast,
the universal
 fireness[6],
 that is, the concept of being a fire, does not occupy a determinate
position.
2. Unique particulars are temporally determinate (kalaniyata /
dus nges pa or dus ma 'dres pa). They are only momentary
instants. They spontaneously go out of existence the moment they have
come into existence. This is not the case with the universals. Being
purely conceptually constructed, they remain uninfluenced by the
dynamism of causal conditions and hence are not affected by time.
3. Unique particulars are ontologically determinate
(akaraniyata / ngo bo nges pa / ngo bo ma 'dres pa) as
they are causally conditioned; the effects of the aggregation of the
causal conditions that have the ability to produce them. When those
causal conditions come together at certain points in time, unique
particulars come into existence. When those conditions disintegrate
and are not replaced by new conditions, unique particulars go out of
existence. When the conditions have not yet come together, unique
particulars are yet to obtain their ontological status.



So "determinate intrinsic natures of the unique
particulars," Dharmakirti argues in Commentary on the
Verses of Epistemology, "are not accidental or fortuitous since
what is not determinate cannot be spatially, temporally and
ontologically determinate" (*Tshad ma* ce 179a).



The unique particulars are, Sautrantika claims, ultimately real,
and they supply us four arguments to support the claim:



(1) Unique particulars are causally efficient phenomena
(arthakriyasamartha) ([PVT] *Tshad ma* ce 179a) because:
(a) they have ability to serve pragmatic purpose of life--fulfil
the objectives in our life, and (b) ability to produce a variety of
cognitive images due to their remoteness or proximity. (Dharmottara's
*Nyabindutika Tshad ma* we 36b-92a)
Both of these abilities must be associated exclusively with objects of
direct perception (*Tshad ma* we 45a).



(2) Unique particulars present themselves only to a direct perceptual
cognition as distinct and uniquely defined individuals because unique
particulars are, as Dharmakirti's *Nyayabindu* points
out "the objects whose nearness or remoteness presents the
difference of cognitive image" (*Tshad ma* ce 231a) and
that object alone which produces the impression of vividness according
to its remoteness or proximity, exists ultimately
(Dharmottara*Tshad ma* we 44b-45a).



(3) Unique particulars are not denotable by language since they are
beyond the full grasp of any conceptual mind
(sabdasyavisaya). Although unique particulars are
objective references of language and thought, and we may have firm
beliefs about them, conceptual mind does not fully grasp their real
nature. They are ultimately real, directly cognisable by means of
certain perceptions without reliance on other factors (nimitta) such
as language and thought. Therefore they must exist. They are the sorts
of phenomena whose cognition would not occur if they are not
objectively real.



In the Sautrantika ontology ultimately real/existent (synonymous)
unique particulars are classified into three kinds:


1. momentary instants of matter (rupa),
2. momentary instants of consciousness (vijnana) and
3. momentary instants of the non-associated composite phenomena,
which are neither matter nor minds or mental factors
(*citta-caitta-viprayukta-samskara*).



The Sautrantika's theory of ultimate truth mirrors its ontology
of flux in which unique particulars are viewed as spatially
infinitesimal atoms constituting temporally momentary events
(ksanika) or as successive flashes of consciousnesses,
cognitive events, all devoid of any real continuity as substratum.
Unique particulars are ultimately real, although they are not enduring
substances (dravyas) inhering in it's qualities (gunas) and
actions (karmas) as the Naiyayika-Vaisesika claims.
They are rather bundles of events arising and disappearing instantly.
Even continuity of things and motion are only successive events
closely resembling each other. On this theory ultimate realities are
momentary point instants, and Vasubandhu and Dharmakirti both
argue that no conditioned phenomenon, therefore, no ultimately real
unique particulars, endure more than a single moment--hence they
are momentary instants (ksanika).



Four closely interrelated arguments provide the defence of the
Sautrantika's claim that ultimately real unique particulars are
momentary instants. Vasubandhu and Dharmakirti both employ the
first two arguments. The third argument is one Dharmakirti
specialises in his works.



(1) Ultimately real unique particulars are momentary instants because
their perishing or destruction is spontaneous to their becoming. This
follows because (i) unique particulars are inherently self-destructive
(Vasubandhu [AKB], *Mngon pa* khu 166b-167a), and (ii)
their perishing or cessation is *intrinsic* and does not depend
on any other *extrinsic* causal factors (Dharmakirti,
[PVK] *Tshad ma* ce 102a; [PVT], *Tshad ma* ce
178ab).



(2) The ultimately real unique particulars are momentary instants
because they are motionless, and do not move from one temporal or
spatial location to another. They perish just where they were born
since nothing exists later than its acquisition of existence
(Vasubandhu [AKB] *Mngon pa* khu 166b).



(3) The third argument proves momentary instants of unique particulars
from the inference of existence (sattvanumana). This is a
case of the argument from identity of existence and production
(svabhavahetu). All unique particulars which are ultimately
existent, are necessarily produced, since only those that are
ultimately existent, insofar as Dharmakiriti is concerned, are
able to a perform causal function--i.e., to produce effects. And
causally efficient unique particulars imply constant change for the
renewal and the perishing of their antecedent identities, therefore,
they are momentary.



Finally (4), unique particulars are ultimately real not only on the
ground that they constitute the final ontological status, but also
because it forms the basis of the Sautrantika soteriology. The
attainment of nirvana -- the ultimate freedom from the
afflictions of life--for the Sautrantika, according to
Dharmakirti's *Vadanyaya*, has an immediate
perception of the unique particulars as its necessary condition
(*Tshad ma* che 108b-109a).


### 2.2 Conventional truth



Dharmakirti defines conventional truth, in his [PVK], as dharma
which is "conventionally existent" and he identifies
conventional truth with the "universal"
 (samanya-laksana)[7]
 just as he identifies ultimate truth with unique particular
(*Tshad ma* ce 118b). When a Sautrantika philosopher
describes a certain entity as a universal, he means a conceptual
entity not apprehended by virtue of its own being. He means a general
property that is conceptually constructed, appearing to be something
common amongst all items in a certain class of objects. Unlike
Nyaya-Vaisesika view where universals are regarded as
objectively real and eternal entities inhering in substances,
qualities and particulars, universals, for the Sautrantika are
pure conceptual constructs. Sautrantika holds the view known as
nominalism or conceptualism--the view that denies universals any
independent extramental objective reality existing on their own apart
from being mentally constructed.



While unique particulars exist independently of linguistic convention,
universals have no reality in isolation from linguistic and conceptual
conventions. Thus, universals and ultimate reality are mutually
exclusive. Universals are therefore only conventionally real, lacking
any intrinsic nature, whereas unique particulars are ultimately real,
and exist intrinsically.



The Sautrantika defends the claim that universals
(samanya-laksana) are only conventional reality
for the following reasons (*tshad ma* ce 118b):


1. Universals are domains of inferential cognition since they are
exhaustively grasped by conceptual mind by means of language and
thought (Dharmakirti, *Nyayabindu*, *tshad ma*
ce 231a).
2. Universals are objects of the apprehending cognition which arises
simply out of having beliefs about the objects without the need to see
any real object.
3. Universals are causally inefficient. By "causal
inefficiency," the Sautrantika, according to Dharmottara's
*Nyayabindutika*, (*Tshad ma we*
45ab) means three things: (a) universals are purely conceptually
constructed, hence unreal; (b) universals are unable to serve a
pragmatic purpose as they do not fulfil life's objectives; and (c)
cognitive images produced by universals are independent of the
proximity between objects and their cognitions since production of
image does not require seeing the object as it is in the case of
perception and unique particulars.
4. Universals are products of unifying or mixing of language and
their referential objects (unique particulars), and thus appearing
them to conceptual minds as generalities, unified wholes, unity,
continuity, as phenomena that appear to conceptual mind to having
shared properties linking with all items in the same class of
objects.
5. Universals, consequently, obscure the individualities of unique
particulars from being directly apprehended. This is because, as we
have already seen, universals, according to Dharmakirti's [PVK]
(*Tshad ma* ce 97ab) and [PVT] (*Tshad ma* ce 282ab),
are only conventionally real since they are conceptual constructs
founded on unifying and putting together the distinct individualities
of unique particulars as having one common property being shared by
all items in the same class.



According to the Sautrantika philosophy, language does not
describe reality or unique particulars positively through real
universals as suggested by the Naiyayikas. The Sautrantika
developed an alternative nominalist theory of universal called the
apoha-theory in which language is seen to engage with reality
negatively by means of elimination or exclusion of the other
(anyapoha / gzhan sel). On this theory, the function of language,
specifically *naming*, is to eliminate object from the class of
those objects to which language does not apply.



In brief the Sautrantika's theory of the two truths rests on
dichotomising objects between unique particulars, which are understood
as ultimately reals, dynamic, momentary, causally effective, the
objective domain of the direct perception; and universals, which are
understood as only conventionally reals, conceptually constructed,
static, causally ineffective and the objective domain of the
inferential cognition.


## 3. Yogacara



The Vaibhasika's realistic theory of the two truths and the
Sautrantika's representationalist theory of the two truths both
affirm the ultimate reality of physical objects constituted by atoms.
The Yogacara rejects physical realism of both the
Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika, although it agrees
with the Sautrantika's representationalist theory as far as they
both affirm representation as the intentional objects in perception
and deny in perception a direct access to any external object. Where
they part their company is in their response to the questions: what
causes representations? Is the contact of senses with physical objects
necessary to give rise to representations in perception? The
Sautrantika's reply is that external objects cause
representations, given that these representations are intentional
objects there is indeed a contact between senses and external objects.
This affirmative response allows the Sautrantika to affirm
reality of external objects. The Yogacarin however replies
that "subliminal impressions" (vasanas) from
foundational consciousness (alayavijnana) are the
causes of the mental representations, and given that these impressions
are only internal phenomena acting as intentional objects, the contact
between senses and external objects is therefore rejected even
conventionally. This allows the Yogacarin to deny even
conventional reality of all physical objects, and argue that all
conventional realities are our mental representations, mental
creations, cognitions etc.



The central thesis in the Yogacara philosophy, the theory of
the two truths echoes is the assertion that all that is conventionally
real is only ideas, representations, images, creations of the mind,
and that there is no conventionally real object that exists outside
the mind to which it corresponds. These ideas are only objects of any
cognition. The whole universe is a mental universe. All physical
objects are only fiction, they are unreal even by the conventional
standard, similar to a dream, a mirage, a magical illusion, where what
we perceive are only products of our mind, without a real external
existence.



Inspired by the idealistic tendencies of various sutras
consisting of important elements of the idealistic doctrines, in the
third and the fourth centuries many Indian philosophers developed and
systematised a coherent Idealist School. In the beginning of the
*Vimsatika* Vasubandhu treats *citta*,
*manas*, v*ijnana, vijnapti* as
synonymous and uses these terms as the names of the idealistic school.
The chief founders were Maitreyanath (*ca*. 300) and
Asanga (315-390), propagated by Vasubandhu
(320-380), Dignaga (480-540) Sthiramati (*ca*.
500), Dharmapala (530-561), Hiuan-tsang (602-664),
Dharmakirti (600-660), Santaraksita
(ca.725-788) and Kamalasila (ca.740-795). The
last two are Yogacara-Madhyamikas in contrast with the
earlier figures who are identified as Yogacarins.



Like other Buddhist schools, the theory of the two truths captures the
central Yogacara doctrines. Maitreyanath asserts in his
*Verses on the Distinction Between Phenomena and Reality*
(*Dharmadharmatavibhanga-karika*,
*DDVK; Sems tsam* phi 50b-53b)--"All this is
understood to be condensed in two categories: phenomena (dharma) and
reality (dharmata) because they encompass all."
(*DDVK* 2, *Sems tsam* phi) By "All"
Yogacarin means every possible object of knowledge, and they
are said to be contained in the two truths since objects are either
conventional truth or ultimate truth. Things are either objects of
conventional knowledge or objects of ultimate knowledge, and a third
category is not admitted.


### 3.1 Conventional Truth



Etymologically the term conventional truth covers the sense of what we
ordinarily take as commonsensical truths. However, in contrast with
naive realism associated with common sense notions of truths, for
the Yogacara the term "conventional truth" has
somewhat a negative connotation. It exclusively refers to objects of
knowledge like forms, sound etc., the mode of existence or mode of
being which radically contradicts with the mode of its appearance, and
thus they are false, unreal, and deceptive. Forms, sounds, etc., are
defined as conventional entities in that they are realities from the
perspective of, or by the force of, three forms of convention:


1. fabrication (asatkalpita),
2. consciousness (vijnana), or
3. language, signifier, a convenient designator (sabda).



A conventional truth is therefore a truth by virtue of being
fabricated by the conceptual mind; or it is truth erroneously
apprehended by means of the dualistic consciousness; or it is true
concept, meaning, signified and designated by a convenient
designator/signifier.



Because the Yogacarins admit three conventions, it also
admits three categories of conventional truths:


1. fabricated phenomena;
2. mind/consciousness; and
3. language since conventional truths exist due to the force of these
three conventions.



The first and the last are categories of imaginary phenomena
(parikalpita) and the second is dependent phenomena (paratantra).



The Yogacara's claim that external objects are not even
conventionally real, what is conventionally real are only our
impressions, and mental representations is one Vasubandhu closely
defends by means of the Yogacara's theory of the three
natures (*trisvabhava*). In his *Discernment of the
Three Natures* (*Trisvabhavakarika*, or
*Trisvabhavanirdesa* [TSN]; Sems tsam shi
10a-11b), Vasubandhu explains that the Yogacara
ontology and phenomenology as consisting of the unity of three natures
(*svabhava*):


1. the dependent or other (*paratantra*);
2. the imaginary / conceptual (*parikalpita*); and
3. the perfect / ultimate (*parinispanna*) ([TSN] 1,
*Sems tsam* shi 10a)



The first two account for conventional truth and the latter ultimate
truth. We shall consider the import of the three in turn.



First, Vasubandhu defines the dependent nature as: (a) one that exists
due to being causally conditioned
(pratyayadhinavrttitvat), and (b) it is the basis
of "what appears" (yat khyati) mistakenly in our
cognition as conventionally real, it is the basis for the
"unreal conceptual fabrication" (asatkalpa) which is the
phenomenological basis of the appearance of reified subjects and
objects ([TSN] 2 *Sems tsam* shi 10a). The implications of the
Yogacarin expression "what appears" to describe
the dependent nature are therefore twofold: (a) that the things that
appear in our cognitions are exclusively the representations, which
are the manifest forms of the subliminal impressions, and (b) that the
entire web of conventional reality, which presents itself to our
cognitions phenomenologically in various ways, is exclusively the
appearance of those representations. Apart from those representations,
consciousnesses, which appear to be external objects, there is no
conventionally real external content which corresponds to what
appears.



Second, in contrast with the dependent nature which is the basis of
"what appears" (yat khyati), the imaginary nature
(*parikalpita*), as Vasubandu defines it, is the mode of
appearance "as it appears" (sau yatha khyati) on
the ground that its existence is only an "unreal conceptual
fabrication" (asatakalpo) ([TSN] 2, *Sems tsam* chi 10a).
The imaginary nature is only an "unreal conceptual
construction" because of two reasons: (i) it is the dependent
nature--representations--merely dually reified by the mind
as an ultimately real subject, or self, or eg, and (ii) the imaginary
nature is dualistic reification of beings and objects as existing
really and externally, there is no such reality.



Third, given the fact that the dependent nature is devoid, or free
from this duality, the imaginary nature is a mere superimposition on
it. Hence nonduality, the perfect nature (parinispanna) is
ultimate reality of the dependent nature.


### 3.2 Ultimate truth



In the *Commentary on the Sutra of Intent*
(*Arya-samdhinirmocana-sutra*, *Mdo sde*
ca 1b-55b) it is stated that "Reality as it is, which is
the intentional object of a pure consciousness, is the definition of
the perfect nature. This must be so because it is with respect to this
that the Victorious Buddha attributed all phenomena as natureless,
ultimately." (*Mdo sde* ca 35b) Vasubandhu's [TSN]
defines "the perfect nature (*parinispanna*) as the
eternal nonexistence of 'as it appears' of 'what
appears' because it is unalterable." ([TSN] 3, *Sems
tsam* chi 10a) "What appears" is the dependent
nature--a series of cognitive events, the representations.
"As it appears" is the imaginary nature--the unreal
conceptual fabrication of the subject-object duality. The
representations, (i.e., the dependent nature) appear in the cognition
as if they have in them the subject-object duality, even though the
dependent nature is wholly devoid of such subject-object duality. The
perfect nature is therefore this eternal nonexistence of the imaginary
nature--the duality--in the dependent nature.



Vasubandhu defines the perfect nature as the ultimate truth and
identifies it with mere-consciousness. "This is the ultimate
(paramartha) of the dharmas, and so it is the reality
(tathata) too. Because its reality is like this all the time, it
is mere consciousness." (*Trim* 25, *Sems
tsam* shi 3b) Accordingly Sthiramati's *Commentary on the
Thirty Verses* (*Trimsikabhasya*
[TrimB], *Sems tsam* shi 146b-171b), explains
"ultimate" (paramartha) here as referring to
"' world-transcending knowledge'
(*lokottara-nirvikalpa-jnana*) in that there is
nothing that surpasses it. Since it is the object of [the transcendent
knowledge], it is the ultimate. It is even like the space in having
the same taste everywhere. It is the perfect nature, which is
stainless and unchangable. Therefore, it is known as the
'ultimate.'" ([TrimB], *Sems tsam* shi
169ab)



So, as we can see the dependent and the imaginary natures together
explain the Yogacara's conventional reality and the perfect
nature explains its conception of the ultimate reality. The first two
natures provide an argument for the Yogacara's empirical and
practical standpoints (vyavahara), conventional truth and the
third nature an argument for its ultimate truth. Even then the
dependent nature alone is conventionally real and the perfect nature
alone is ultimately real. By contrast, the imaginary nature is unreal
and false even by the empirical and practical standards. This is true
in spite of the fact the imaginary nature is constitutive of the
conventional truth.



So, the perfect nature--nondual mind, i.e., emptiness
(sunyata) of the subject-object duality--is the
ultimate reality of the Yogacara conception. Ultimate truth
takes various forms as it is understood within the Yogacarin
tradition. As Maitreyanatha states, ultimate truth takes three
primary forms--as emptiness it is the ultimate object, as
nirvana it is the ultimate attainment, and as nonconceptual
knowledge it is the ultimate realization ([MVK], *Sems tsam*
phi 42B).



*Yogacara Arguments*



The core argument in support of the only mind thesis is the
impossibility of the existence of external objects. Vasubandhu
develops this argument in his *Vim* 1-27 as does
Dignaga in his *Examination of the Intentional Object*
(*Alambanapariksavrtti*,
*APV* 1-8, *Tshad ma* ce 86a-87b)
against the atomists (Naiyayikas-Vaisesika and
 Abhidharmikas[8]).
 Against the Yogacara idealist thesis the realist opponents,
as Vasubandhu observes, raise three objections:--"If
consciousness (does) not (arise) out from an object (i) neither the
determination or certainty (niyama) in regard to place (desa) and
time (kala), (ii) nor the indetermination or unexclusiveness
(aniyama) in regard to the series of (consciousness) (iii) nor the
performance of the (specific) function (krtyakriya) are
logically possible (yukta)" (*Vim* 2, *Sems
tsam* shi 3a).



Vasubandhu offers his Yogacara reply in the
*Vim* to these realist objections and insists that the
idealist position does not face these three problems. The first
problem is not an issue for the Yogacara since dreams
(svapna) account for the spatio-temporal determination. In dreams, in
the absence of an external object, one still has the cognition of a
woman, or a man in only determinate / specific time and place, and not
arbitrarily and not everywhere and not in any moment. Neither is the
second problem of the lack of an intersubjective agreement an issue
for the Yogacara. The case of the pretas (hungry-ghosts)
account for intersubjective agreement as they look at water they
alone, not other beings, see rivers of pus, urine, excrement, and
collectively hallucinates demons as the hell guardians. Although pus,
urine, excrement and hell guardians are nonexistent externally, due to
the maturation of their collective karma, pretas exclusively
experience the series of cognitions (vijnapti), other beings do
not encounter such experience (*Vim* 3, *Sems
tsam* shi). Nor is the lack of causal efficacy of the impressions
or representations in the consciousness a problem for the
Yogacara. As in the case of wet dreams, even without a union
of the couple, the emission of semen can occur, and so the
representations in the consciousness are causally efficient even
without the externally real object.



Yogacara's defensive arguments against the realist
challenges are quite strong. However unless Yogacara is able
to undermine the core realist thesis--i.e., reality of the
external objects--and its key supporting argument--the
existence of atoms--then the debate could go either way.
Therefore Yogacara shows the nonexistence, or unreality of
the atoms as the basis of the external object to reject the realist
position.



Yogacara's impressions-only theory and the
Sautrantika's representationalist theory both explain our sensory
experience (the spatio-temporal determinacy, intersubjective
agreement, and causal efficacy). They agree on what the observables
are: mental entities, including mental images but also emotions such
as desires. They also agree that karma plays vital role in explaining
our experience. The realist theory, though, according to
Dignaga's *Investigation About the Support of the
Cognition* (*Alambanapariksavr
tti* [AlamPV]) has to posit the reality of additional
physical objects, things that are in principle unobservable, given
that all we experience in the cognition are our impressions
([AlamPV], *Tshad ma* ce 86a).



If the realist thesis were correct, then there would be three
alternatives for the atoms to act as the intentional objects of
cognition.


1. Atoms of the things would be either *one* in the way the
Nyya-Vaieika conceives the *whole* as something constituted by
parts but being single, *one*, different from the parts that
compose it, and having a real existence apart from the existence of
the parts. Or
2. things would have to be constituted by *multiple* atoms
i.e., a number or a group of atoms coexisting one besides the other
*without forming a composite whole* as a result of mutual
cohesion between the atoms. Or
3. things would have to be atoms *grouped* *together*,
massed together as a unity among themselves with a tight cohesion.
Yogacara contends that these are the only three alternatives
in which the reality of the external objects can functioning as the
objects of cognition.



Of the three alternatives: (1) points to the *unity* of a thing
conceived as a whole; and (2) and (3) point to the
*multiplicity* looking at the things as loose atoms, i.e.,
composite atoms. Not one of the three possibilities is, on
Yogacara's account, admissible as the object of cognition
however. The first is inadmissible because nowhere an external object
is grasped as a *unity*, *whole*, *one* apart
from its parts ([AlamPV] *Tshad ma ce* 86b). The second is
inadmissible because when we see things we find that the atoms are not
perceived individually as one by one ([Vim] 13, *Sems
tsam* shi 3b). The third alternative is also rejected because the
atoms in this case cannot be proved to exist as an indivisible
([Vim] 14, *Sems tsam* shi 3b).



Further, if there were a simultaneous conjunction of an atom with
other six atoms coming from the six directions, the atom would have
six parts because that which is the locus of one atom cannot be the
locus of another atom. If the locus of one atom were the locus of the
six atoms, which were in conjunction with it, then since all the seven
atoms would have the same common locus, the whole mass constituted by
the seven atoms would be of the size of a single atom, because of the
mutual exclusion of the occupants of a locus. Consequently, there
would be no visible mass (*Vim*12, *Sems tsam* shi
3b).



Since unity is an essential characteristic of being the whole, or
composite whereas indivisibility an essential characteristic of being
an atom when both the unity and individuality of the atoms are
rejected, then the whole and indivisible atoms are no longer
admissible. Therefore, Vasubandhu sums up the Yogacara
objections against the reality of the external sense-objects
(ayatanas) as: "An external sense-object is unreal because
it cannot be the intentional object of cognition either as (1) a
single thing or (2) as a multiple in [isolated] atoms; or (3) as a
aggregate because the atom is not proven to exist"
(*Vim*11, *Sems tsam* shi 3b).



The realist insists that the external sense objects are real and that
their reality is ascertained by the various means of knowledge
(pramanas) of which perception (pratyaksa) is the
most important. If the external sense objects are nonexistents, there
can be no intentional objects, then cognition would not arise. Since
cognitions do arise, there must be external objects as their
intentional objects.



To this objection, Yogacara employs two arguments to refute
the realist claim and to establish the mechanism of cognition, which
takes place without the atoms of an external object. The first
argument shows that atoms do not satisfy the criterion of being the
intentional object, therefore they do not cause the perception.
"Perceptual cognition [takes place] just like in dreams and the
like [even without an external object]; moreover, when that
[cognition] occurs, the external object is not seen; how can it be
thought that this is a case of perception?"
(*Vim*16, *Sems tsam* shi 3b).



The second is the time-lag argument, according to which, there is a
time-gap between the perceptual judgement we make and the actual
perceptual process. When we make a perceptual judgement, at that time
we do not perceive the external object as it is in our mental
consciousness (manovijnana) that carries out the judgement
and since the visual consciousness that perceives the object has
already ceased. Hence at the time when the mental consciousness
delivers it judgment, the perceptual cognition no longer exists since
all things are momentary. Therefore the atoms of an external object is
not the intentional object of perceptual cognition, since it has
already ceased and does not now exist therefore it is not responsible
for the cognition's having the content it has, like the unseen events
occurring on the other side of the wall (Vasubandhu's
*Vimsatika-karikavrtti*
[VimKV] 16-17).



Yogacara therefore concludes that we cannot postulate the
reality of an external object through direct perception. However since
in perceptual cognition we are directly aware of something, there must
be an intentional object of the perceptual cognition. That intentional
object of perceptual cognition is, according to the
Yogacara, none other than the subliminal impressions
(vasanas) passing from their latent state contained in the
storehouse consciousness (alayavijnana) to their
conscious level. Therefore the impressions are the only things that
are conventionally real.



Vasubandhu's [TSN] 35-36 inspired by the Buddhist traditional
religious beliefs also offers others arguments to defend the idealism
of Yogacara:


1. one and the same thing appears differently to beings that are in
different states of existence (*pretas*, men, and gods);
2. the ability of the *bodhisattvas* and
*dhyayins* (practitioners of meditation) who have attained
the power of thinking (*cetovasita*) to visualise
objects at will;
3. the capacity of the *yogins* who have attained serenity of
mind (*samatha*) and a direct vision of dharmas as they
really are (*dharma-vipasyana*) to perceive things at
the very moment of the concentration of mind
(*manasikara*) with their essential characteristics of
flux, suffering, nonself, empty; and
4. the power of those who have attained intuitive knowledge
(*nirvikalpakajnana*) which enables them not to
block the perception of things.



All these arguments based on the facts of experience show that objects
do not exist really outside the mind, that they are products of mental
creation and that their appearance is entirely mind dependent.
Therefore the Yogacara's theory of the two truths concludes
that the whole world is a product of mind--it is the collective
mental actions (karma) of all beings. All living beings see the same
world because of the identical maturation of their karmic
consequences. Since the karmic histories of beings are same, there is
homogeneity in the way in which the world is experienced and
perceived. This is the reason there is an orderly world instead of
chaotic and arbitrariness. This is also the reason behind the
impressions of the objectivity of the world.


## 4. Madhyamaka



After the Buddha the philosopher who broke new ground on the theory of
the two truths in the Madhyamaka system is a South Indian monk,
Nagarjuna (ca. 100 BCE-100 CE). Amongst his seminal
philosophical works delineating the theory are
Nagarjuna's


* *Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way*
(*Mulamadhyamakakarika* [MMK],
* *Seventy Verses on Emptiness*
(*Sunyatasaptati*),
* *Rebutting the Disputes*
 (*Vigrahvyavartani*[9]
 and
* *Sixty Verses on Logical Reasoning*
(*Yuktisastika*).



Aryadeva's work
*Catuhsatakasastrakarika*
(*Four Hundred Verses*) is also considered as one of the
foundational texts delineating Madhyamaka's theory of the two
truths.



Nagarjuna saw himself as propagating the dharma taught by
the Buddha, which he says is precisely based on the theory of the two
truths: a truth of mundane conventions and a truth of the ultimate.
([MMK] 24.8, *Dbu ma* tsa 14b-15a) He saw the theory of
the two truths as constituting the Buddha's core teaching and his
philosophy. Nagarjuna maintains therefore that those who do
not understand the distinction between these two truths would fail to
understand the Buddha's teaching ([MMK] 24.9, *Dbu ma* tsa
15a). This is so, for Nagarjuna, because (1) without relying
on the conventional truth, the meaning of the ultimate cannot be
explained, and (2) without understanding the meaning of the ultimate,
nirvana is not achieved ([MMK] 24.10, *Dbu ma* tsa
15a).



Nagarjuna's theory of the two truths is fundamentally
different from all theories of truth in other Indian philosophies.
Hindu philosophers of the Nyaya-Vaisesika,
Samkya-Yoga, and
Mimamsa-Vedanta--all advocate a
foundationalism of some kind according to which ultimate reality is
taken to be "substantive reality" (drayva) or foundation
upon which stands the entire edifice of the conventional ontological
structures where the ultimate reality is posited as immutable, fixed,
irreducible and independent of any interpretative conventions. That is
so, even though the conventional structure that stands upon it
constantly changes and transforms.



As we saw the Buddhist realism of the Vaibhasika and the
representationalism of the Sautrantika both advocate ultimate
truth as ultimately real, logically irreducible. The idealism of
Yogacara holds nondual mind as the only ultimate reality and
the external world as merely conventional truths. On
Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka all things including ultimate truth
are ultimately unreal, empty (sunya) of any intrinsic nature
(svabhava) including the emptiness (sunyata)
itself, therefore all are groundless. In this sense a Madhyamika
(a proponent of the Madhyamaka thought) is a an advocate of the
emptiness (sunyavadin), advocate of the intrinsic
unreality (nihsvabhavavadin), groundlessness,
essencelessness, or carelessness. Nevertheless to assert that all
things are empty of any intrinsic reality, for Nagarjuna, is
not to undermine the existential status of things as simply
*nothing*. On the contrary, Nagarjuna argues, to
assert that the things are empty of any intrinsic reality is to
explain the way things really are as causally conditioned phenomena
(*pratityasamputpanha*).



Nagarjuna's central argument to support his radical
non-foundationalist theory of the two truths draws upon an
understanding of conventional truth as tied to dependently arisen
phenomena, and ultimate truth as tied to emptiness of the intrinsic
nature. Since the former and the latter are co-constitutive of each
other, in that each entials the other, ultimate reality is tied to
being that which is conventionally real. Nagarjuna advances
important arguments justifying the correlation between conventional
truth vis-a-vis dependent arising, and emptiness
vis-a-vis ultimate truth. These arguments bring home their
epistemological and ontological correlations ([MMK] 24.14; *Dbu
ma* tsa 15a). He argues that wherever applies emptiness as the
ultimate reality, there applies the causal efficacy of conventional
reality and wherever emptiness does not apply as the ultimate reality,
there does not apply the causal efficacy of conventional reality
(*Vig*.71) (*Dbu ma* tsa 29a). According to
Nagarjuna, ultimate reality's being empty of any intrinsic
reality affords conventional reality its causal efficacy since being
ultimately empty is identical to being causally produced,
conventionally. This must be so since, for Nagarjuna,
"there is no thing that is not dependently arisen; therefore,
there is no such thing that is not empty" ([MMK] 24.19, *Dbu
ma* tsa 15a).



*Svatantrika / Prasangika and the two
truths*



The theory of the two truths in the Madhyamaka in India took a great
resurgence from the fifth century onwards soon after Buddhapalita
(ca. 470-540) wrote *A Commentary on [Nagarjuna's]
Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way*

(*Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti*,[10]*Dbu
 ma* tsa 158b-281a). Set forth in this text is a
thoroughgoing non-foundationalist philosophic reasoning and
method--*prasanga* arguments or *reductio ad
absurdum* style without relying upon the *svatantra*,
formal probative argument--to elucidate the Madhyamaka
metaphysics and epistemology ingrained in theory of the two truths.
For this reason, Buddhapalita is often identified later as the
founder of the Prasangika Madhyamaka, although elucidation
of the theory itself is set out in the works of Candrakirti.
Three decades later
 Bhavaviveka[11]
 (ca. 500-570) challenged Buddhapalita's interpretation of
the two truths, and developed a Madhyamaka account of the two truths
that reflects a significant ontological and epistemological shift from
Buddhapalita's position, which was later defended in the works of
Candrakirti to whom we shall return shortly.



Many later commentators ignore the philosophical contents of the
debate between the Prasangika and the Svatantrika and
claim that their controversy is confined only to pedagogical or
methodological issues. There is another view according to which the
contents of the debate between the Prasangika and the
Svatantrika--Buddhapalita versus Bhavavevika
followed by Bhavavevika versus Candrakirti--is
essentially philosophic in nature. Underpinning the dialectical or
methodological controversy between the two Madhyamaka camps lies a
deeper ontological and epistemological divide implied within their
theories of the two truths, and this in turn is reflected in the
different methodological considerations they each deploy. So on this
second view, the variation in the methods used by the two schools of
the Madhyamaka are not simple differences in their rhetorical devices
or pedagogical tools, they are underlain by more serious philosophical
disagreements between the two.



According to this view the philosophical differentiations between the
Svatantrika and the Prasangika is best contained
within the discourse of the two truths. Prasangika's theory
of the two truths we leave aside for the time being. First we shall
take up the Svatantrika's account.


### 4.1 Svatantrika Madhyamaka



Bhavaviveka wrote some of the major Madhyamaka treatises
including


* *Lamp of Wisdom
(*Prajnapradipamulamadhyamakavrtti*
[PPMV], Dbu ma* tsha 45b-259b),
* *Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way
(Madhyamakahrdayakarika* [MadhHK],
* *Blazes of Reasoning: A Commentary on Verses of the Heart of
the Middle Way* (*Tarkajvala*).



In these texts Bhavavevika rejects the Brahmanical systems of
Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya-Yoga,
Mimamsa-Vedanta on both metaphysical and
epistemological grounds. All the theories of truth and knowledge
advanced in these systems from his Madhyamaka point of view are too
rigid to be of any significant use. Bhavavevika's critiques of
Abhidharmikas--Vaibhasika and
Sautrantika--and Yogacara predominantly target the
ontological foundationalism which underpins their theories of the
ultimate truth. He rejects them on the ground that from an analytic
cognitive perspective, which scrutinises the nature of reality,
nothing--subject and object--is found to be ultimately real
since all things are rationally reduced to spatial parts or temporal
moments. Thus he proposes the view that both the subject and the
object are *conventionally* intrinsically real as both are
conventional truths, where as both are *ultimately*
intrinsically unreal as both are empty of ultimate reality, hence
emptiness alone is the ultimate reality.



Although Bhavavevika is said to have founded the Svatantrika
Madhyamaka, it is important to note that there exists two different
subschools of the Svatantrika tradition:


1. Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamaka
2. Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamaka



The two schools of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka take
Bhavavevika's intepretation of the two truths, on the whole, to
be more cogent than the Prasangika's. Particularly both
schools reject *ultimate* intrinsic reality while positing
*conventional* intrinsic reality. As far as the presentation of
ultimate truth is concerned both schools are in
agreement--nonself or emptiness alone is the ultimate reality,
and the rest--the entire range of dharmas--are ultimately
empty of any intrinsic reality. Nevertheless, the two schools differ
slightly on the matter related to the theory of conventional truth,
specifically concerning reality or unreality of the external or
physical objects on the conventional level. The Sautrantika
Svatantrika Madhyamaka view held by Bhavavevika himself, and
his student Jnanagarbha, affirms intrinsic reality of the
conventional truths of both the outer domains and the inner domains
and mental faculty along with their six respective
consciousnesses.



The arguments that affirm the conventional reality of the external
objects are the same arguments that Bhavavevika employed to
criticise the Yogacara arguments rejecting the reality of
external objects. Bhavavevika's [MadhHK] 5.15 points out
Yogacara's arguments are contradicted by perception
(pratyaksa), tradition (agama) and commonse sense
(lokaprasiddha), since they all prove the correctness of the cogniton
of material form ([MadhHK] 5.15 Dbu ma dza 20b and
*Tarkajvala* 5.15 Dbu ma dza 204ab).
Yogacara's dream argument is also rejected because,
according to Bhavavevika, dream-consciousness and so forth have
*dharmas* as their objects (alambana / dmigs pa) ([MadhHK]
5.19 Dbu ma dza 20b). And dharmas are based on intrinsically real
conventional objects, because they are the repeated impression of the
objects that have been experienced previously, like memory
(Tarkajvala 5.19 Dbu ma dza 205a).



The Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamaka view held by
Santaraksita and his student Kamalasila
affirms conventionally intrinsic reality of the inner domains and
rejects the intrinsic reality of the outer domains and it claims the
external objects are mere conceptual fictions.


#### 4.1.1 Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamaka



Of the two schools of Svatantraka we shall first take up the
theory of the two truths presented in the Sautrantika
Svatantrika Madhyamaka. Bhavavevika's position represents
the theory of the two truths held by this school which was later
promoted by his disciple Jnanagarbha. The cornerstones of
the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamaka theory of the two
truths are the following theses:


1. That at the level of conventional truth all phenomena are
intrinsically real (svabhavatah), because they are
established as intrinsic realities from the perspective of the
non-analytical cognitions of the naive ordinary beings. Allied to
this thesis is Bhavavevika's claim that the Madhyamaka accepts,
conventionally, the intrinsic reality of things, for it is the
intrinsic reality that defines what is to be conventionally real.
2. That at the level of ultimate truth, all phenomena, with the
exception of the emptiness which is ultimately real, are intrinsically
unreal (nihsvabhavatah), or ultimately unreal,
because they are established as empty of any intrinsic reality from
the perspective of analytical exalted cognition (i.e., ultimate
cognition of arya-beings). Allied to this thesis is
Bhavavevika's claim that Madhyamaka rejects intrinsic reality at
the ultimate level since ultimate reality constitutes that which is
intrinsically unreal, therefore empty.


##### Conventional truth



We shall consider Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamaka's
defence of the two claims in turn. We will begin first with
Bhavavevika's definition of the conventional truth. In the
*Tarkajvala*, he defines conventional truths as an
"incontrovertible (phyin ci ma log pa) linguistic
convention." (*Dbu ma* dza 56a) Such conventional truth
on Bhavavevika's Svatantrika takes two forms--unique
particulars (svalaksana / rang mtshan) and universals
(samanyalaksana / spyi mtshan) as the
*Tarkajvala* III.8, explains:



Phenomena have dual characteristics (laksana / mtshan nyid),
differentiated as being universal or unique. Unique particular
(svalaksana / rang mtshan) is a thing's intrinsic reality
(svabhavata / rang gi ngo bo), the domain of engagement
which is definitively ascertained by a non-conceptual cognition
(nirvikalpena jnanena / rnam par rtog pa med pa'i shes
pa). Universal (samanyalaksana) is a
cognitive domain to be apprehended by an inferential cognition
(anumanavijnanena / rjes su dpog pa'i shes pa) which is
conceptual (*Dbu ma* dza 55b).



In this passage Bhavavevika essentially summarises some of the
key features of conventional truths which are also critical to
understanding the differences between the Svatantrika and
Prasangika.


1. Bhavavevika accepts, based on this passage, unique particular
(svalaksana) as an integral part of the ontological
structure of the conventional truth. The Prasangika, by
contrast, rejects the concept of unique particular even at the level
of conventional truth.
2. Bhavavevika ascribes unique particular an ontological
qualification of being "intrinsically real"
(svabhavata), or "inherently real" as its given
status, explicitly affirming a form of foundationalism of unique
particulars at the level of conventional truth, which the
Prasangika totally rejects.
3. Bhavavevika endorses the Pramanika's epistemology
in which unique particular, which is intrinsically real,
conventionally, is considered as the domain of engagement ascertained
by a non-conceptual cognition. The universal
(samanyalaksana) is considered as the
domain to be apprehended by a conceptual inferential cognition.



Bhavavevika's defence of the thesis that conventionally things
are intrinsically real can be summed up in two arguments. First, as
far as things are conventional realities they are also intrinsic or
inherent realities, for being intrinsically real is the reason why
things are designated as "conventional reality," since
from a conventional standpoint--i.e., non-analytical cognitive
engagements of the ordinary beings--things do appear to be
inherently real. This means that being "intrinsic" is, for
Bhavavevika, what makes *conventional reality* a
reality.



Bhavavevika's second argument states that as long as a
Madhyamika accepts conventional reality it must also accept
things as intrinsic in order to avoid the nihilism charge, for
conventional reality is defined in terms of its being intrinsically
and uniquely real (svalaksana). Denying intrinsic reality
of things at the conventional level, would therefore entail the denial
of their conventional existence, since it would entail the denial of
the defining characteristics of the conventional reality. This follows
says Bhavavevika because "The Lord (bhagvan / bcom
ldan ldas) has taught the two truths. Based on this [explanatory
schema] conventionally things are posited in terms of their intrinsic
natures and [unique] particulars ([sva]laksana / mtshan
nyid). It is only ultimately that [things are] posited as having no
intrinsic reality" ((*Dbu ma* dza 60a).


##### Ultimate truth



Bhavavevika's second thesis is that at the level of ultimate
truth, all phenomena are intrinsically unreal
(nihsvabhavatah), therefore Madhyamaka rejects
intrinsic reality ultimately. Bhavavevika's
*Tarkajvala* 3.26 offers three ways to interpret the
compound paramartha "ultimate domain" or
"ultimate object" literally. In the first, both the terms
"ultimate" (param) and "domain" (artha) stands
for the object--emptiness (sunyata)--because
it is both the "ultimate" or "final" as well
as an "object to be known," "analysed"
(pariksaniya / brtag par bya ba) and
"understood" (pratipadya / go bar bya ba). In the
second compound, paramartha stands for "object of the
ultimate" (paramasya artha / dam pa'i don) where
"object" refers to emptiness and "ultimate"
refers to a non-conceptual exalted cognition
(nirvikalpajnana / rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes) of the
meditative equipoise (samahita / mnyam bzhag). In the third
compound paramarth stands for a concordant ultimate (rjes su
mthun pa'i shes rab), a cognition that accords with the knowledge of
the ultimate since it has the ultimate as its domain.



The first two etymological senses of the term paramarthas have in
them the sense of emptiness as an objective domain since it is both
the final ontic status of things and it is the ultimate object of a
non-conceptual exalted cognition. Bhavavevika's third
etymological sense of the term paramartha has it identified with
cognition that accords with the knowledge of the ultimate truth on the
ground that such cognition has emptiness as its object and such
knowledge is a means through which one develops a non-conceptual
knowledge of ultimate reality. This third sense of paramartha
allows Bhavavevika to argue that a cognition of the subsequent
attainment (prsthalabdhajnana / rjes
thob ye shes) which directly follows from the non-conceptual
meditative equipoise, while it is conceptual in character, is
nevertheless a concordant ultimate ([PPMV] *Dbu ma* tsa
228a).



So for Bhavavevika then, "the ultimate is of two kinds: one
is transcendent (lokuttara / 'jig rten las 'das pa),
undefiled (zag pa med pa), free from elaboration (aprapanca /
spros med) which needs to be engaged without a deliberative effort.
The second one" as he explains in *Tarkajvala*
3.26 "is elaborative (prapanca / spros pa), hence it
can be engaged with a deliberative effort by means of a correct
mundane cognitive process (dag pa'i 'jig rten pa'i ye shes) that
is sustained by the collective force of virtues (bsod nams) and
insights (ye shes)" (Dbu ma dza 60b).



Bhavavevika advances several arguments to defend the thesis that
ultimately all are intrinsically unreal. The first is the
conditionality argument pertaining to the four elements, according to
which, all the four elements are ultimately empty of any intrinsic
reality, for they all are conditioned by the causal factors
appropriated for their becoming and their existence.



The second is Bhavavevika's non-foundationalist ontological
argument which demonstrates all phenomena, including the atoms, are
ultimately non-foundational, for ultimately there is nothing that can
be taken as the foundational entity (dravya) or intrinsically real
since the ultimate analysis reveals that all phenomena are composed of
the atomic particles that are themselves composites.



Bhavavevika's third non-foundationalist epistemological argument
shows that ultimately the objects are not the domain of cognitions.
The argument says that "A visible form is not ultimately
apprehended by the visual faculty because it is a composite (bsags)
like a sound and because it is a product of the elements like the
sound." ([MadhHK] 3.33 *Dbu ma* dza 5a) The reasons
provided to justify the thesis are twofold: (i) being composite and
(ii) being a product of the elements. Given that being
*composites* and *products* equally apply to visible
form and sound, these two reasons cannot warrant the validity of the
argument justifying the thesis that a visible form is ultimately
apprehended by the visual faculty. If they did, they would equally
warrant the validity of the argument justifying the thesis that a
sound is ultimately apprehended by the visual faculty (*Dbu ma*
dza 65ab).



In conclusion: mirroring these two critically important philosophical
positions Bhavavevika introduces a type of method or pedagogical
device that is unique to the Svatantrika contra to his
Prasangika counterpart.


#### 4.1.2 Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamaka



In the early eighth century Bhavavevika and
Jnanagarbha's theory of the two truths was adopted and
elucidated in the works of the latter's
 student[12]
 Santaraksita (705-762) and his student
Kamalasila (ca. 725-788). Santaraksita
wrote:


* *Verses on the Ornament of the Middle Way
(Madhyamakalamkarakarika* [MAK], *Dbu
ma* sa 53a-56b),
* *Commentary on the Verses of the Ornament of the Middle Way
(Madhyamakalamkaravrtti,*  [MAV], *Dbu
ma* sa 56b-84a).



In these works he argues for the synthesis of Madhyamaka and
Yogacara's theories of the two truths which resulted in the
formation of the Yogacara-Svatantrika
Madhyamaka--a subschool within the Svatantrika Madhyamaka.
Kamalasila, who is a student of
Santaraksita, held the same conception of the two
truths in his works:


* *Subcommentary on the Ornament of the Middle Way*
(*Madhyamakalamkarapanjika*, Dbu ma
sa 84a-133b),
* *Light of the Middle Way*
(*Madhyamakalokah* [MA], *Dbu ma* sa
133b-244a),
* *Discussion on the Light of Reality*
(*Tattvaloka-nama-prakarana*, *Dbu ma* sa
244b-273a),
* *Establishing the Non-intrinsic Reality of All Phenomena*
(*Sarvadharmasvabhavasiddhi*, Dbu ma sa
273a-291a),
* *Stages of Meditation* (*Bhavanakrama*,
Dbu ma ki 22a-68b).



Unlike Jnanagarbha and Bhavavevika's realistic
Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamaka which presents
conventional truth in agreement with the epistemological realism of
the Sautrantika and ultimate truth in agreement with
non-foundationalist ontology of the Madhyamaka,
Santaraksita and Kamalasila advocate the
Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamaka. They each maintain a
basic presentation of conventional truth in agreement with the
epistemological idealism of Yogacara and the presentation of
ultimate truth in agreement with the ontological non-foundationalism
of the Madhyamaka. Therefore Santaraksita concludes:
"By relying on the Mind Only (cittamatra / sems tsam) one
understands that external phenomena do not exist. And by relying on
this [i.e., Madhyamaka] one understands that even [the mind] is
thoroughly nonself." ([MAK] 23 Dbu ma sa 56a) "Therefore,
one attains a Mahayana [path] when one is able to ride the
chariots of the two systems by holding to the reigns of logic."
([MAK] 24 Dbu ma sa 56a) By "the two systems"
Santaraksita meant, Yogacara's account of
the conventional truth with Madhyamaka's account of the ultimate
 truth.[13]



Underlying this syncretistic view of the two truths lay two
fundamental theses that Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamaka
are committed--namely:


1. that there is no real external object, mind is the only thing that
is conventionally real, hence Yogacara is right about its
presentation of the conventional truth; and
2. that even mind is unreal and empty of any intrinsic nature under
ultimate analysis, therefore nothing is ultimately real, hence
Madhyamaka is right about its presentation of the ultimate truth.



And it is precisely the synthesis of these two theses that defines the
characteristic of the theory of the two truths in the
Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamaka.
Santarasita and Kamalasila attempt to
achieve this distinctive syncretistic characteristic in their works to
which we turn our discussion.


##### Ultimate truth



We will follow Santaraksita and Kamalasila
and first take up the second major thesis--ultimately everything,
including the mind, is unreal and empty. Therefore, ultimate truth is
the emptiness of any intrinsic reality. According to
Kamalasila ultimate truth has three senses: ([MA], *Dbu
ma* sa 233b)


1. reality, the nature of which is characterised as "nonself of
person" and "nonself of phenomena," is etymologically
both ultimate (param / dam pa) and object (artha / don).
2. transcendent knowledge (lokottaram
jnanam), reliable cognition of the ultimate since it
is directly engaged with ultimate reality.
3. mundane knowledge, while not in itself ultimate knowledge, but
because it is a complementary means of transcendent knowledge, it is
also identified as the ultimate.



Both Santaraksita and Kamalasila maintains
that the emptiness of intrinsic reality is the ultimate truth, and in
order to demonstrate that this is so, Kamalasila deploys
five forms of arguments--namely:


1. The diamond-sliver argument (vajrakanadiyukti / irdo
rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs) which shows that all things are empty of
intrinsic reality because things are analytically not found to
arise--neither from themselves, nor from another nor both nor
causelessly ([MA], *Dbu ma* sa 190a-202b).
2. The argument refuting the arising of existent and non-existent
entities (*sadasadutpadapratisedhahetu / yod med skye
'gog gi gtan tshigs*) which shows that all things are empty
of intrinsic reality because their intrinsic reality is not found to
arise either from things that exist or from things that do not exist
([MA], *Dbu ma* sa 202b).
3. The arguments refuting the four modes of arising
(*catuskotiyutpadapratisedhahetu / mu bzhi
skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs*) which shows that things are empty
of intrinsic reality for the reason that such reality is neither found
anaytically in existence (or being) nor in nonexistence (or nonbeing)
nor both existence-nonexistence (being-nonbeing) nor neither existence
nor nonexistence (neither being nor nonbeing) ([MA], *Dbu ma*
sa 210b).
4. The neither-one-nor many argument (*ekanekaviyogahetu /
gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs*) which shows all phenomena are empty
of intrinsic reality because they all lack the characteristics of
being intrinsically one or intrinsically many ([MA], *Dbu ma*
sa 218b).
5. The argument from dependent arising
(*pratityasamutpadahetu / rten 'brel gyi gtan
tshigs*) which shows that things are produced from the association
of multiple causes and condition, and therefore showing that things do
not have any intrinsic reality of their own ([MA], *Dbu ma* sa
205b).



The most well-known of Santaraksita's arguments is the
neither-one-nor many
 argument,[14]
 which seeks to examine the final (or ultimate) identity (*ngo bo
la dpyod pa*) of all phenomena. In his [MAK] and [MAV]
Santaraksita develops this argument in a great detail.
The essential feature of the argument is as follows: "The
entities that are proclaimed by our own [Buddhist] schools and the
other [non-Buddhist] schools, lack intrinsic identity because in
reality their identity is neither a (1) singular nor a (2)
plural--like a reflection." ([MAK] 1, *Dbu ma* sa
53a) In this argument:


* The subject (*rtsod gzhi cos can*): the entities that are
proclaimed by our own Buddhist schools and the other non-Buddhist
schools (from here on 'all entities.)
* The property to be proved (*sadhyadharma* / *sgrub
bya'i chos*) : the lack of intrinsic identity.
* What is being proved (*sadhya* / *sgrub bya*) :
all entities lack the intrinsic identity.
* The reason (hetu / rtags) or means of proof (*sadhana*
/ *sgrub byed*) : in reality their identity is neither a
singular nor a plural.
* Example: like a reflection.



According to Santaraksita the validity of the
neither-one-nor many argument depends on whether or not it satisfies
the triple criteria (*trirupalinga / tshul gsum*) of
formal probative reasoning. The first criterion
(*paksadharmata / phyogs chos*) shows that the
reason qualifies the subject (*phyogs / paksa or chos can /
dharmin*), i.e., that the subject must be proven to have the
property of the reason. That is, all entities must be shown, in
reality, as neither singular nor plural. And therefore this argument
consists of two premises:


1. the premise that shows the lack of singularity
("unity") and
2. the premise that shows the lack of plurality (or
"many-ness")



In [MAK] and [MAV] Santaraksita develops the argument
showing the lack of singularity in two parts: (i) the argument that
shows the lack of the *non-pervasive singularity* in (a)
permanent phenomena, and (b) in impermanent entities; and (ii) the
argument that shows the lack of *pervasive singularity* by (a)
refuting the indivisible atomic particles which are said to have
composed the objects, and (b) by refuting the unified consciousness
posited by Yogacara.



The premise that shows the lack of plurality is based upon the
conclusion of the argument that shows the lack of singularity. This is
so, argues Santaraksita, because "When we
analyse any entity, none is [found] to be a singular. For that for
which nothing is singular, there must also be nothing which is
plural" ([MAK] 61, *Dbu ma* sa 55a). This argument of
Santaraksita proceeds from understanding that being
singular and being plural (manifold) are essentially
interdependent--if there are no singular entity, one must accept
that there are no plural entity either since the latter is the former
assembled.



According to Santaraksita the argument from
neither-one-nor many satisfies the triple criteria of valid reasoning.
It satisfies the first criterion because all instances of the subject,
namely the intrinsic identities of those entities asserted by the
Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents, are instances of entities which
are neither singular nor plural. The second criterion of a valid
reason--the proof of the forward entailment
(*anvayavyapti / rjes khyab*), i.e., the proof that the
reason occurs in only "similar instances"
(*sapaksa / mthun phyogs*) where all instances of the
reason are the instances of the predicates--is also satisfied
because the reason--all phenomena are neither singular nor
plural--is an instance of the predicate--phenomena which
lack identity. The third criterion of a valid reason--the proof
of the counter entailment (*vyatirekavyapti / ldog khyab /
ldog khyab*), or the proof that the reason is completely absent
from the dissimilar instances of the predicate (*vipaksa / mi
mthun phyogs*)--hold because there are no instances of the
predicate which are not instances of the reason.



There are no instances of phenomena, which lacked intrinsic identity,
which are not also instances of phenomena, that are neither singular
nor plural. Therefore "the counter entailment holds since there
are no entities that could be posited as existing in other possible
alternatives" ([MAV] 62 *Dbu ma* sa 69b).



Thus the second and the third criteria which are mutually entailing
prove the entailment of the neither one-nor many argument. Once the
 entailment[15]
 of the argument is accomplished, in Santaraksita's
view, all potential loopholes in this argument are addressed. And
therefore the argument successfully proves that all phenomena are
empty of any intrinsic reality, since they all lack any singular or
plural identity.



It is clear, then, that the arguments of Santaraksita
and Kamalasila have the final thrust of demonstrating the
reasons why all phenomena *ultimately* lack any intrinsic
reality, and are therefore geared towards proving the emptiness of
intrinsic reality as the ultimate truth, in each argument a specific
domain of analysis is used to prove the final ontological
position.


##### Conventional Truth



Let us now turn to the first thesis and look at the
Yogacara-Svatantratika Madhyamaka defence of the theory
of conventional truth. As we have seen from the arguments such as
neither-one-nor many, Santaraksita and
Kamalasila draw the conclusion that entities are ultimately
empty of reality, for ultimately they do not exist either as a
singular or as a plural. They then move on to explain the way things
do exist, and Santaraksita does this with an explicit
admission that things do exist conventionally--"Therefore
these entities are only conventionally defined. If [someone] accepts
them as ultimate, what can I do for that?" ([MAK] 63 *Dbu
ma* sa 55a). Why is it that all entities are defined as only
conventionally real? To understand the answer to this question, we
need to look at Santaraksita's definition of
conventional reality, which consists of three criteria:


1. it strictly appeals to its face-value and cannot be subjected to
reasoned analysis (*avicaramaniya*);
2. it is causally efficient; and
3. it is subjected to arising and disintegration ([MAK] 64, *Dbu
ma* sa 55a).



Elsewhere in [MAV] Santaraksita also provides a
broader definition of conventionality (samvrti / kun
rdzob), and argues that conventionality is not simply a linguistic
convention (sabda-vyvahara / sgra'i tha snyad), it also
includes what is conventionally real, those that are seen and accepted
by the Madhaymikas as dependently coarisen
(pratityasamutpanna / rten cing 'brel 'byung), and
those which cannot be rationally analysed ([MAV] 65, *Dbu ma*
sa 70a).



Kamalasila's definition of conventional truth stresses
epistemic error (branta jnana / rnam shes khrul ba)
in as much as he does stress on non-erroneous epistemic perspective
(abranta jnana / rnam shes ma khrul ba) in his
definition of the ultimate truth. So on his definition, the nature of
all entities, illusory persons and the like, is classified into two
truths by virtue of erroneous (branta / khrula ba) and
non-erroneous cognition through which they are each represented.



Kamalasila's definition of conventional truth makes
explicitly clear the synthesis between Madhayamaka and
Yogacara. The Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamaka
claims that the Yogacara is right about the presentation of
the conventional truth as mere mental impressions, and that this can
be seen from the way in which Santarasita and
Kamalasila defend this synthesis textually and rationally
through relying heavily on the
*sutras--Samdhinirmocannasutra,
Lankavatarasutra,
Saddharmapundarikasutra* and so
forth--traditionally supporting Yogacara idealism. The
claim is made here, and Santaraksita does this
explicity, that the Madhyamaka and the idealistic doctrines taught in
these scriptures are all "consistent." ([MAV] 91 *Dbu
ma* sa 79a) The works of these two philosophers produce abundant
citations from these *sutra* literatures stressing the
significance of the passages like this from the
*Lankavatarasutra*: "Material forms
do not exist, one's mind appears to be external."



In terms of the argument, Santaraksita argues
"that which is cause and effect is mere consciousness only. And
whatever is causally established abides in consciousness."
([MAK] 91, *Dbu ma* sa 56a) Therefore phenomena that appear to
be real external objects like a blue-patch are not something that is
distinct from the nature of the phenomenological experience of
blue-patch, even so, as the material form experienced in dreams is not
distinct from the dreaming experience ([MAV] 91 *Dbu ma* sa
79a).



Briefly, then, it is clear the two Svatantriak
schools--Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamak and the
Yogacara-Svatantrika Madhyamaka--both uphold the
standard Madhyamaka position in terms of treating emptiness as the
ultimate truth, although, they vary somewhat in their presentation of
conventional truth since the former is realistic and the latter
idealistic about the nature of the conventional truth.


### 4.2 Prasangika Madhyamaka



Bhavaviveka's Svatantrika Madhyamaka theory of the two
truths soon came under attack from Candrakirti (ca.
600-650) who, among other works, wrote the following:


* *Clear-word Commentary on the Fundamental Verses of the Middle
Way* (*Mulamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada*
[PP], known simply as *Prasannapada*, *Dbu ma*
'a 1b-200a),
* *An Introduction on Madhyamaka*
(*Madhyamakavatara* [M], *Dbu ma* 'a
201b-219a),
* *Commentary on Introduction on Madhyamaka*
(*Madhyamakavatarabhasya* [MBh], *Dbu
ma* 'a 220b-348a),
* *Commentary on Four Hundred Verses*
(*Catuusatakatika*, *Dbu ma* ya
30b-239a),
* *Commentary on Seventy Verses on Emptiness*
(*Sunayatasaptativrtti*, *Dbu ma*
tsa 110a-121a),
* *Commentary on Sixty Verses on Reasoning*
(*Yuktisasthikavrtii*, *Dbu ma*
ya 1b-30b), and
* *Discussion on the Five Aggregates*
(*Pancaskandhaprakarana*, *Dbu ma* ya
239b-266b)



In these philosophical works, Candrakirti rejects the theories of
the two truths in both Brahmanical and the Buddhist schools of
Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara and
Svatantrika Madhyamaka. His chief reason for doing this is his
deep mistrust of the varying degrees of metaphysical and
epistemological foundationalism that these theories are committed to.
For example Candrakirti rejects Bhavavevika's reading of
Nagarjuna's theory of the two truths and explicitly
vindicates Buddhapalita's Prasangika approach to
understanding Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka. He does this by
demonstrating the groundlessness of the fallacies Bhavavevika
attributed to Buddhapalita, and thereby rejecting
Bhavavevika's admission and imposition upon Nagarjuna's
non-foundationalist ontology of a kind of independent formal
svatantra argument, which Candrakirti saw as one encumbered
by foundationalist metaphysics, and is incompatible with
Nagarjuna's ontology. Instead of relying on the two truths
theories of other schools, Candrakirti proposes a distinctive
non-foundationalist theory of the two truths in the Madhyamaka, and he
defends it against his foundationalist opponents. This school later
came to be known as the Prasangika Madhyamaka.



At the core of the Prasangika's theory of the two truths
are these two fundamental theses:


1. Only what is *conventionally* non-intrinsic is causally
effective, for only those phenomena, the conventional nature of which
is non-intrinsically real, are subject to conditioned or dependent
arising. Conventional reality (or dependently arisen phenomenon),
given it is causally effective, is therefore *always*
intrinsically unreal. Hence that which is conventionally (or
dependently) coarisen is always conventionally (or dependently)
arisen.
2. Only what is *ultimately* non-intrinsic is causally
effective, for only those phenomena, the ultimate nature of which is
non-intrinsically real, are subject to conditioned arising. Ultimate
truth (or emptiness), given it is causally effective, is therefore
intrinsically unreal. Hence ultimate truth is ultimately unreal (or
emptiness is always empty).



Although these two theses are advanced separately, they are mutually
coextensive. There is a compatible relationship between conventional
truth and ultimate truth, hence between dependent arising
(pratityasamutpada / rten 'brel) and emptiness
(sunyata / stong pa nyid), and there is no tension
between the two. We shall examine the Prasangika arguments
in defence of these theses.


#### 4.2.1 Conventional Truth



Let us turn to the first thesis. Earlier we saw that both the
Vaibhasika and Sautrantika argue that only
*ultimately* intrinsic reality (svabhava) enables things
to perform a causal function (arthakriya). The Svatantrika
Madhyamaka rejects this, and it instead argues that things are
causally efficient because of their *conventionally* intrinsic
reality (svabhava) or unique particularity
(svalaksana). The Prasangika Madhyamaka,
however, rejects both these positions, and argues only what is
*conventionally* non-intrinsic reality (nihsvabhava)
is causally effective, for only those phenomena, the conventional
nature of which is non-intrinsic, are subject to conditioned or
dependent arising. Conventional reality (here treated as dependently
arisen phenomenon), given it is causally effective, is therefore
*always* intrinsically unreal, and hence lacks any intrinsic
reality even conventionally. Hence that which is conventionally (or
dependently) coarisen is always conventionally (or dependently) arisen
and strictly does not arise ultimately.



In his etymological analysis of the term "convention"
(samvrti / kun rdzob) in [PP] Candrakirti attributes
three senses to the term convention:


1. confusion (avidya / mi shes pa) for it obstructs the mundane
cognitive processes of the ordinary beings from seeing the reality as
it is by way of concealing (*samvrti* / *kun
rdzob*) its nature;
2. codependent (*paraparasambhavana / phan tshun brtan
pa*) for it is an *interdependent* phenomenon; and
3. Signifier (samket / rda) or *worldly convention
(lokavyavahara / 'jig rten tha snyad*) in the sense of
dependently designated by means of expression and expressed,
consciousness and object of consciousness, etc ([PP] 24.8 *Dbu
ma* 'a 163a).



Candrakirti's claims that in the case of mundane cognitive
processes of the ordinary beings, the first sense of convention
eclipses the force of the second and the third senses. As a result,
far from understanding things as dependently arisen (the second sense)
and dependently designated (the third sense), ordinary beings reify
them to be non-dependently arisen, and non-designated. Due to the
force of this cognitive confusion, from the perspective of mundane
cognitive processes of the ordinary beings, things appear real, and
each phenomenon appears intrinsically real in spite of their
non-intrinsic nature. Consequently this confusion, according to
Candrakirti, defines epistemic practices of the ordinary beings.
For this reason, the epistemic norms or the standard set by
*mundane convention* of the ordinary beings, is poles apart
from the epistemic norms set by mundane convention of the noble beings
(aryas / 'phags pa) whose mundane cognitive processes are
not under the sway of afflictive confusion.



In order to illustrate this distinction, in his commentary [MBh] 6.28
Candrakirti introduces the concept: *mere convention* (kun
rdzob tsam) of the noble beings to contrast with *conventionally
real* or *conventional true* (kun rdzob bden pa) of the
ordinary beings. Ordinary beings erroneously grasp all conditioned
phenomena as intrinsically real, therefore things are
*conventionally real* and thus are categories of conventional
truth. For noble beings, however, because they no longer reify them as
real, things are perceived as having the nature of being
*created* (bcos ma) and *unreal* (bden pa ma yin pa)
like the reflected image ([MBh] 6.28 *Dbu ma* 'a
255a).



According to Candrakirti's definition of the two truths, all
things embody dual nature, for each is constituted by its conventional
nature and its ultimate nature. Consequently, all entities, according
to this definition, satisfy the criterion of the two truths, for the
definition of the two truths is one based on the two natures. The two
truths are, therefore, not merely *one* specific nature
mirrored in two different perspectives ([MBh] 6.23 *Dbu ma*
'a 253a). Conventional nature entails conventional truth and
ultimate nature entails ultimate truth, and given each entity is
constituted by the two natures, the two truths define what each entity
is in its ontological and epistemological terms.



Conventional nature is defined as conventional truth because it is the
domain of mundane cognitive process, and is readily accessible for
ordinary beings, including mundane cognitive process of noble beings.
It is a sort of *truth*, while *unreal* and illusory in
reality, it is yet erroneously and non-analytically taken for granted
by mundane cognitive processes of the ordinary beings. Ultimate
nature, on the other hand, is defined as ultimate truth because it is
domain of the exalted cognitive process which engages with its object
analytically, one that is directly accessible for noble beings
(aryas) and only inferentially accessible for ordinary beings. It
is this sort of truth, both *real* and non-illusory, that is
correctly and directly found out by exalted cognitive processes of
noble beings, and by analytic cognitive processes of ordinary
beings.



Mundane cognitive process that is associated with the definition of
conventional truth and therefore allied to the perception of
*unreal* entities is of two kinds ([M] 6.24 *Dbu ma*
'a 205a):


1. correct cognitive process, and
2. fallacious cognitive process.



Correct cognitive process is associated with an acute sense faculty,
which is not impaired by any occasional extraneous causes of
misperception (see below). Fallacious cognitive process is associated
with a defective sense faculty impaired by occasional extraneous
causes of misperception. In [PP] Candrakirti introduces us to a
similar epistemic distinction:


1. mundane convention (*lokasamvrti* /
'*jig rten gyi kun rdzob*) and
2. non-mundane convention (*alokasamvrti /'jig
rten ma yin pa'i kun rdzo*).



Candrakirti's key argument behind to support the distinction
between two mundane epistemic practices--one *mundane*
convention and the other *non-*mundane convention--is that
the former is, for mundane standard, epistemically reliable whereas
the latter is epistemically unreliable. Consequently correct cognitive
processes of both ordinary and awakened beings satisfy the epistemic
standard of mundane convention, being non-*deceptive* by
mundane standard, thus they set the standard of mundane convention;
whereas fallacious cognitive processes of defective sense faculties,
of both ordinary and awakened beings, do not satisfy the epistemic
standard of mundane convention, and therefore, they are
*deceptive* even by mundane standard. They are thus
"non-mundane convention" as Candrakirti characterises
them in [PP] 24.8 (*Dbu ma* 'a 163ab).



Just as they are two kinds of sensory faculty--nonerroneous and
erroneous--their objects are, according to Candrakirti, of
two corresponding kinds:


1. conventionally real and
2. conventionally unreal.



First, cognitive processes associated with sense faculties that are
unimpaired by extraneous causes of misperception grasp the former
objects, and because this kind of object fulfils realistic mundane
ontological standard, it is thus *real* for ordinary beings,
(not so for the noble beings the issue to which we turn later). Hence
it is only *conventionally real*.



Second, cognitive processes associated with sense faculties that are
impaired by extraneous causes of misperception grasp conventionally
unreal objects, and because this kind of object does not meet
realistic mundane ontological standard, they are thus
*conventionally unreal*.



Although Candrakirti recognises that conventional reality
satisfies the ontological standard of ordinary beings, he,
importantly, argues that it does not satisfy the ontological criterion
of the Madhyamaka (here synonymous for noble beings). Just as illusion
is *partly real* although *partly unreal*, all objects
that are considered commonsensically as conventionally real, are
*unreal*. The major difference between the two is that a
knowledge of illusion being unreal is available to mundane cognitive
processes of ordinary beings where as a knowledge of unreality of
conventionally real entities is not available to mundane cognitive
processes of ordinary beings.



However, for Candrakirti *illusory objects* are
conventionally real and causally efficient, and that the
*conventionally real* entities themselves are illusion-like.
Candrakirti develops this argument using the two tier theory of
illusion.


1. The argument from the first tier of the theory of illusion
demonstrates a causal efficiency of conventionally illusory objects.
This, Candrakirti does by identifying *conventionally
illusory* entities with the so-called *conventionally real*
entities.
2. The argument from the second tier of the theory of illusion
demonstrates an *illusory* nature of *conventionally
real* entities. This, Candrakirti does by means of showing
that entities that are *conventionally real* are conventionally
empty of *intrinsic reality*, and by denying conventional
reality the ontological status of the so-called *intrinsic
reality*.



Candrakirti support his argument from the theory of illusion by
means of applying four categories of the conventional entities:


1. Partly unreal entities--illusory objects (e.g. mirage,
reflection, echoe etc.);
2. Partly real entities--non-illusory objects (e.g. water, face,
sound etc.);
3. Intrinsic reality (e.g. substance, essence, intrinsic nature
etc.,) and
4. Conventionally unreal entities (e.g. the rabbit's horn, the
sky-flower etc). ([MBh] 6.28 *Dbu ma* 'a
254b-255a).



Candrakirti accepts conventional reality of both
entities--partly unreal (i) and partly real (ii)--on the
ground that they both appear in mundane cognitive processes who are
confused about their ultimate ontological status. Candrakirti
rejects conventional reality status of those entities that are
supposedly intrinsically real (iii) and conventionally unreal (iv),
although for different reasons. Conventional reality of intrinsically
real entity is rejected in [MBh] 6.28 on the ground that its existence
does not, forever, appear to a mundane cognitive processes.



Candrakirti argues that there is a critical epistemic
differentiation to be made between the two
entities--conventionally real and conventionally illusory.
Deceptive, unreal, and dependently arisen nature of conventionally
real entities is beyond the grasp of mundane cognitive processes. By
contrast, deceptive, unreal and dependently arisen nature of
conventionally illusory, partly unreal, entities is grasped by mundane
cognitive processes. Therefore illusory objects are regarded as
deceptive, and unreal by the standard of mundane knowledge, whereas,
conventionally real things are regarded as nondeceptive and real by
the standard of mundane knowledge.



So the argument from the first tier of the illusory theory shows that
mundane cognitive processes of ordinary beings fail to *know*
illusory and unreal nature of conventionally real entities, they
instead grasp them to be intrinsically real. The argument from the
second tier of the illusory theory offers Candrakirti's reason
why this is so. Here, he argues, the presence of the underlying
confusion operating beneath mundane cognitive processes of the
ordinary beings is the force by which ordinary beings intuitively and
erroneously reify the nature of conventional entities. Hence they grasp
conventional entities as intrinsically real, although they are in
actual fact on a closer analysis, only non-intrinsic, unreal or
illusory.



Therefore intrinsic reality is not a conventional reality and grasping
things to be intrinsically real is only a confused belief, not a
knowledge. Hence Candrakirti clearly excludes it from the
ontological categories of conventional reality, for the reason that
intrinsic reality is a conceptual fiction fabricated by confused minds
of the ordinary beings and that it is a conceptual construct thrust
upon non-intrinsic entities ([MBh] 6.28 *Dbu ma* 'a
255a). In addition Candrakirti argues that if things were
intrinsically real, even conventionally, as the Svatantrikas take
them to be, in Candrakirti's view, things would exist by virtue
of their intrinsic reality, at least *conventionally*. If this
were the case then intrinsic reality would become the ultimate nature
of things. That would be absurd.



For Madhyamikas, things cannot have more than one final mode of
existence--if they exist, they must exist qua only
conventionally. Consequently, given the mutually exclusive relation of
intrinsic reality and emptiness, if intrinsic reality is granted even
a conventional reality status, Candrakirti contends, one has to
reject emptiness as the ultimate reality ([M] 6.34, *DBu ma*
'a 205b). But since the Madhyamika asserts emptiness to be
the ultimate reality, and given that emptiness and intrinsic reality
are mutually exclusive, Madhyamika must reject intrinsic reality
in all its forms--conventionally as well as ultimately ([MBh]
6.36, 1994: 118).


#### 4.2.2 Ultimate truth



We now turn to Candrakirti's second thesis--namely, only
what is *ultimately* non-intrinsic is causally effective, for
only those phenomena, an ultimate nature of which is non-intrinsic,
are subject to conditioned arising. Ultimate reality (or emptiness),
given it is causally effective, is therefore intrinsically unreal.
Therefore ultimate reality is ultimately unreal (or put it
differently, emptiness is ultimately empty).



Candrakirti defines ultimate reality as the nature of things
found by the perception of reality ([M] 6.23 *Dbu ma* 'a
205a). In the commentary Candrakirti expands this definition.
"Ultimate is the object, the nature of which is found by
*particular* exalted cognitive processes (yishes) of those who
perceive reality. But it does not exist by virtue of its *intrinsic
objective reality* (svarupata / bdag gi ngo bo
nyid)." ([MBh] 6.23 *Dbu ma* 'a 253a) Of the two
natures, the object of the perception of reality is the way things
really are, and this is, Candrakirti explains, what it means to
be ultimate reality ([MBh] 6.23 *Dbu ma* 'a 253ab).



Candrakirti's definition raises a couple of important points
here. First, by defining ultimate reality as "the nature of
things found by particular exalted cognitive processes (yeshes) of
those who perceive reality," he means ultimate reality is not
found by *any* exalted cognitive processes, it must be found by
a particular exalted cognitive processes--analytic--that
knows things just as they are. Second, by stating that "it does
not exist by virtue of its *intrinsic objective reality"*
(svarupata / bdag gi ngo bo nyid), he means ultimate reality
is not intrinsically real just as much as conventional reality is not
intrinsically real. Third, he says that ultimate reality is the first
nature of the two natures of things found by perception of reality.
This means ultimate reality is ultimate nature of all conventionally
real things. For they all have an ultimate nature representing
ultimate status, just as they have conventional nature representing
conventional status.



Ultimate truth, according to Candrakirti, for the purpose of
liberating all sentient beings ([M] 6.179 *Dbu ma* 'a
213a). 'a 213a) is differentiated by the Buddha into two
aspects:


1. nonself of person (pudgalanairatmya) and
2. nonself of phenomena (dharmanairatmya)



As we shall see Candrakirti's arguments come from two domains of
analysis which he employs to account for his theory of ultimate truth:
analysis of personal self (pudgala-atmya / gang zag gi bdag) and
analysis of phenomenal self (dharma-atmya / chos kyi bdag). The
analysis will demonstrate whether or not conventionally real phenomena
and persons are more than what they are conventionally. So we shall
consider Candrakirti's arguments under this rubrics:


1. The not-self argumnent: unreality of conventionally real
person;
2. The emptiness argument: unreality of conventionally real
phenomena;
3. The emptiness is emptiness argument: unreality of ultimate
reality.



Let us begin with the first. The not-self argumnent demonstrates, as
we shall see, unreality of conventionally real person. We shall
develop this argument of Candrakirti progressively in three
steps:


* correlation between personal self and the five aggregates;
* arguments against personal self; and
* reasons for positing personal self as merely dependently
designated.



In order to appreciate Candrakirti's not-self argument, or the
argument that shows unreality of conventionally real person, we need
to understand Candrakirti's purpose of refuting personal self.
According to Candrakirti it is important that we look into the
question: from where does the assumption of self arise before we go
any further. He argues, like all the Buddhist philosophers do, the
notion of self or the assumption of self arises in relation to
personhood. After all it is a personal identity issue. To analyse the
self therefore requires us to look closely among the parts that
constitute a person, and given that the conception of self is embedded
in personhood which is constituted by the five aggregates, we need to
examine its relation to our conception of self.



Suffice it here to highlight the important relation that exists
between the aggregates and the notion of self. According to
Candrakirti, the five aggregates are primary categories upon
which we will draw to examine the phenomenal structure of sentient
beings, because of the following reasons: because (1) it serves as a
phenomenological scheme for examining the nature of human experience,
(2) the way in which human beings construct conceptions of the self is
based upon different existential experiences within the framework of
the five aggregates, (3) they are the basis upon which we develop the
sense of self through the view that objectifies the five aggregates
which are transient and composites
(satkayadrsti / 'jig tshogs la lta
ba), either through an appropriation or falsely identifying the
aggregates to be self ([MBh] 6.120, *Dbu ma* 'a 292ab),
(4) they are the objective domain of the arising of defilements that
cause us suffering since the false view objectifying the aggregates
(satkayadrsti / 'jig tshogs la lta
ba) to be real self lead to the arising of all "afflictive
defilements", and finally (5) the five aggregates are the
objective domain of the knowledge of unreality of personal self. For
the simple reason that confusion and misconceptions of self arise in
relation to the aggregates, thus it is within the same framework that
the realisation of nonself must emerge.



Therefore, for Candrakirti, it is clear that within the range of
the five aggregates exhaust "all" or
"everything" that could be considered as the basis for
developing the misconception of a reified *self* and also the
basis for correct knowledge of non-self--i.e., reality of person
or self.



Candrakirti develops his arguments against personal self in a
great detail in [M]/[Mbh] chapter six. Suffice it here to consider one
such argument called "the argument from the sevenfold analysis
of a chariot" (shing rta rnams bdun gyi rigs pa). This argument
however is more or less a way of putting all his arguments together.
In it, Candrakirti concludes: "the basis of the conception
of self, when analysed, is not plausible to be an entity. It is not
plausible to be different from the aggregates, nor identity of the
aggregates, nor dependent (skandhadhara) on the aggregates. The
'basis' (skandhadhara) at issue is a compound that
exposes the implausibility of self as both the container
(adhara / rten) and the contained (adheya / brten pa). The
self does not own the aggregates. This is established in codependence
on the aggregates" ([M] 6.150, *Dbu ma* 'a 221b).
Putting this argument analogically, Candrakirti asserts that the
self is, in terms of not being intrinsically real, analogous to a
chariot. "We do not accept a chariot to be different from its
own parts, nor to be identical [to its parts], nor to be in possession
of them, nor is it *in* the parts, nor are the parts in it, nor
is it the mere composite [of its parts], nor is it the shape [or size
of the those parts]" ([M] 6.151 *Dbu ma* 'a
221b).



So the structure of the nonself "chariot" argument that
demonstrates unreality of a conventionally real person can be briefly
stated as follows:


* P1  Self is not distinct from the aggregates.
* P2  Self is not identical to the aggregates.
* P3  Self and the aggregates are not codependent upon each
other.
* P4  Self and the aggregates do not own each other.
* P5  Self is not the shape of the aggregates.
* P6  Self is not the collection of the aggregates.
* P7  There is nothing more to a person than the five
aggregates.
* C  Therefore a real personal self does not exist.



There is no ultimately real self that can be logically proven to
exist. If it did exist it has to be found when it is subjected to
these sevenfold analyses. But the self is not found either to be
different from the aggregates, nor identical to the aggregates, nor to
be in possession of them, nor is the self *in* the aggregates,
nor are the aggregates *in* the self, nor is the self the mere
composite of the aggregates; nor is the self the shape or sizes of the
aggregates. Since there is no more to a person any more than
dependently designated self upon basis of the five aggregates, they
exhaust all that there is in a person, Candrakirti therefore
concludes that there is no real self anywhere whatsoever to be found
in the five aggregates.



From this argument, Candrakirti concludes that both ultimately
and conventionally, any intrinsic reality of a personal self must
remain unproven. Therefore according to any of the sevenfold analysis
a personal self is unreal, and empty of any intrinsic reality. What
Candrakirti does not conclude from this argument, though, is the
implausibility of a conventionally real self for everyday purpose. As
matter of fact, Candrakirti argues, the argument from the
sevenfold analysis reinforces the idea that only conventionally real
self makes sense. For such a self constitutes being dependently
designated on the aggregates in as much as a chariot is dependently
designated on its parts (*M / MBh* 6.158). Just as the chariot
is conveniently designated in dependence on its parts, and it is
referred to in the world as "agent," even so, a
conventionally self which is established through dependent designation
serves as a conventionally real moral agent. Therefore, although the
argument from the sevenfold analyses denies the existence of
intrinsically real self or ultimately real self, the argument does not
entail a denial of conventionally real self. (*M / MBh*
6.159).



It turns out therefore that a self is merely a convenient designation,
or a meaningful label given to the five aggregates, and taken for
granted in the everyday purpose as a agent. And it is this nominal
self that serves the purpose of moral agent. This nominal or
conventional self is comparable to anything that exists
conventionally. Candrakirti compares it to a chariot.



Second, Candrakirti's argument from emptiness demonstrates the
unreality of the conventionally real phenomena by means of appealing
to causal processes at work in producing these entities. The
understanding here is that the way in which things arise and come into
existence definitively informs us about how things actually are. This
argument is an extension of Nagarjuna's famous tetralemma
argument which states: "neither from itself nor from another nor
from both, nor without cause does anything anywhere, ever
arise." ([MMK] 1.1) Candrakirti develops this argument in
great detail in chapter 6 of [M]/[MBh], we shall only have a quick look
at its overall strategy without delving into its details.



If entities are intrinsically real there are only two alternative ways
for them to arise: either they arise (a) causally or (b) causelessly.
If one holds that intrinsically real things arise causally, then there
are only three possible ways for them to arise: either they should
arise from (1) themselves, or from (2) another or from (3) both.



> 
> 
> P1 If intrinsic entity arise from itself it would absurdly follow that
> cause and effect would be identical and they would exist
> simultaneously. In which case, the production of an effect would be
> pointless for it would be already in existence. It is thus
> unreasonable to assume that something already arisen might arise all
> over again. ([M] 6.8) If an entity in existence still requires arising
> then an infinite regress would follow ([M] 6. 9-13).
> 
> 
> 
> P2 If an intrinsically real entity arises from another, anything could
> arise from anything (like a fire from pitch-darkness), given that
> cause and effect would be distinct, all causes would be equally
> 'another' ([M] 6. 14-21).
> 
> 
> 
> P3 If an intrinsic entity arises from both itself and another then
> both *reductio ad absurdums* in P1 and P2 would apply ([M] 6.
> 98).
> 
> 
> 
> P4 If an intrinsic entity arises causelessly, then anything could
> arise from everything ([M] 6. 99-103).
> 
> 
> 
> Thus it is not possible for any intrinsic entity to exist because no
> such entity could be causally produce either from itself or from
> another or both or causelessly. It follows therefore that any entity
> that arises causally is not intrinsically real, hence it is
> dependently originated entity ([M] 6. 104).
> 
> 
> 



Candrakirti therefore insists that entities that are
intrinsically unreal are not nonexistent unlike intrinsically real
entities which are nonexistent analogous to the rabbit's horn. Even
though they are not intrinsically real, hence remain unproduced
according to the four analyses, unlike the rabbit's horn,
intrinsically unreal entities are objects of mundane cognitive
processes, and they arise codependently ([M] 110-114). Hence, in
summarising the argument, Candrakirti states: "Entities do
not arise causelessly, and they do not arise through causes like God,
for example. Nor do they arise out of themselves, nor from another,
nor from both. They arise codependently." ([M] 6.114, Dbu ma
'a 209b) So because entities arise codependently, according to
Candrakirti, reified concepts such as intrinsic entities cannot
stand up under logical analysis. The argument from dependent arising
therefore eliminates the web of erroneous views presupposing intrinsic
reality. If entities are intrinsically real, then their arising could
be through themselves, from another or from both, causelessly. However
upon critical analysis the entity as such proves to be nonexistent
([M]/[MBh] 6. 115-116).



Third, Candrakirti's argument from the emptiness of emptiness
demonstrates the unreality of ultimate reality. The
"emptiness-argument" and the
"nonself-argument" show that all conventionally real
phenomena and persons are empty of intrinsic reality. As we have seen
from a critical rational point of view, it is demonstrated that there
is no ultimately real or ultimately existent entities or real self of
person to be found. The two arguments do not however show that
emptiness *per se* is empty, nor do they show that the
selflessness is itself selfless. This raises an important question:
does this mean that *emptiness* is the intrinsic reality of
conventionally real entities and selflessness is the intrinsic reality
of conventionally real persons? Putting the question differently:
could a Madhyamika claim that emptiness and selflessness are
ultimately real or are intrinsically real? This question is
reasonable. We tend to posit ultimate reality to be something that is
timeless, independent, transcendent, nondual etc. So if emptiness is
the ultimate reality of all phenomena and if selflessness is the
ultimate reality of all persons,could we say that emptiness and
selflessness are *nonempty*, *ultimately* *real or
intrinsically real*?



In order to answer this question Candrakirti maintains that the
Buddha reclassifies emptiness and nonself under various
aspects--"He elaborated sixteen emptinesses and
subsequently he condensed these into four explanations which are
adopted by the Mahayana." ([M] 6.180 *Dbu ma*
'a 213a) We shall consider one example here: Candrakirti
argues "The eye is empty of eye[ness] because that is its
reality. The ear, nose, tongue, body and mind are also to be explained
in this way." ([M] 6.181 *Dbu ma* 'a 213ab)
"Because each of them are *non*-*eternal (ther zugs tu
gnas pa ma yin*) not *subject to disintegration*
(*'jig pa ma yin pa*) and their reality is
*non-intrinsic* [the emptiness of] the eye and the other six
faculties is accepted as 'internal emptiness'
(*adhyatmasunyata*)"([M] 6.181
*Dbu ma* 'a 2213b).



On Candrakirit's view just as the chariot, self and other
conventionally real phenomena are intrinsically unreal, so too is the
emptiness and the nonself. Emptiness is also empty of intrinsic
reality. Candrakirti explains the emptiness of emptiness as:



> 
> The emptiness of intrinsic reality of things is itself called by the
> wise as 'emptiness,' and this emptiness also is considered
> to be empty of any intrinsic reality. ([M] 6.185 *Dbu
> ma* 'a 213b) 
> 
> 
> The emptiness of that which is called
> 'emptiness' is accepted as 'the emptiness of
> emptiness' (sunyatasunyata). It is
> explained in this way for the purpose of controverting objectification
> of the emptiness as intrinsically real (bhava). ([M] 6.186
> *Dbu ma* 'a 213b)
> 
> 
> 



Also consider Candrakirti's argument against positing emptiness
as ultimately real that he develops in his commentary on [MMK] 13.7.
If emptiness is ultimately real, emptiness would not be empty of the
intrinsic reality--the essence of conventionally real objects. In
that case we will have to grant emptiness as existing independently of
conventionally real entities, as their underlying substratum. If this
is granted the emptiness of a chariot and the empty entity, the
chariot itself, would be quite distinct and unrelated. Moreover if the
emptiness of the chariot is nonempty, i.e., if it is ultimately real,
whereas the chariot itself is empty i.e., ultimately unreal, then, one
has to posit two distinct and contradictory verifiable realities even
for one conventionally real chariot. But since there is not even the
slightest nonempty phenomenon verified in the chariot--not even
the slightest bit of entity withstanding critical
analysis--emptiness of the chariot, like the chariot itself, is
implausible to be ultimately real. Like the chariot itself, the
emptiness of the chariot is also ultimately empty.



Therefore, while emptiness is the ultimate truth of the conventionally
real entities, it is not plausible to posit emptiness to be ultimately
real. Similarly, while nonself is the ultimate truth of the personal
self, nonself is implausible to be ultimately real. Therefore nonself
is not considered as the essence of persons or self.



So, to wind up the discussion on the Prasangika's theory of
the two truths, just as conventional truth is empty of intrinsic
reality, hence ultimately unreal, even so, is ultimate truth empty of
intrinsic reality, hence ultimately unreal. It is, therefore,
demonstrated that nothing is ultimately real for Candrakirti,
hence everything is empty of intrinsic reality. The heart of
Candrakirti's two truths theory is the argument that only because
they are empty of intrinsic reality can conventionally real entities
be causally efficient. Only in the context of a categorical rejection
of any foundationalism of intrinsic reality--both conventionally
and ultimate, Candrakirti insists, can there be mundane practices
rooted in the mutually interdependent character of *cognitive
processes* and *objects cognised*. For this reason
Candrakirti concludes that whomsoever emptiness makes sense,
everything makes sense. For whomsoever emptiness makes no sense,
dependent arising would not make sense. Hence nothing would make sense
([PP] 24.14, *Dbu ma* 'a 166b).


## 5. Conclusion



To sum up, though this entry provides just an overview of the theory
of the two truths in Indian Buddhism discussed overview, it
nevertheless offers us enough reasons to believe that there is no
*single* theory of the two truths in Indian Buddhism. As we
have seen there are many such competing theories, some of which are
highly complex and sophisticated. The essay clearly shows, however,
that except for the Prasangika's theory of the two truths,
which unconditionally rejects all forms of *foundationalism*
both conventionally and ultimately, all other theories of the two
truths, while rejecting some forms of foundationalism, embrace another
form of foundationalism. The Sarvastivadin (or
Vaibhasika) theory rejects the substance-metaphysics of the
Brahmanical schools, yet it claims the irreducible spatial units
(e.g., atoms of the material category) and irreducible temporal units
(e.g., point-instant consciousnesses) of the five basic categories as
ultimate truths, which ground conventional truth, which is comprised
of only reducible spatial wholes or temporal continua. Based on the
same metaphysical assumption and although with modified definitions,
the Sautrantika argues that the unique particulars
(svalaksana) which, they say, are ultimately causally
efficient, are ultimately real; whereas the universals
(samanyalaksana) which are only
conceptually constructed, are only conventionally real. Rejecting the
Abhidharmika realism, the Yogacara proposes a form of
idealism in which which it is argued that only mental impressions are
conventionally real and nondual perfect nature is the ultimately real.
The Svatantrika Madhyamaka, however, rejects both the
Abhidharmika realism and the Yogacara idealism as
philosophically incoherent. It argues that things are only
intrinsically real, *conventionally*, for this ensures their
causal efficiency, things do not need to be ultimately intrinsically
real. Therefore it proposes the theory which states that
*conventionally* all phenomena are intrinsically real
(svabhavatah) whereas *ultimately* all phenomena are
intrinsically unreal (nihsvabhavatah). Finally, the
Prasangika Madhyamaka rejects all the theories of the two
truths including the one advanced by its Madhyamaka counterpart,
namely, Svatantrika, on the ground that all the theories are
metaphysically too stringent, and they do not provide the ontological
malleability necessary for the ontological identity of conventional
truth (dependent arising) and ultimate truth (emptiness). It therefore
proposes the theory of the two truths in which the notion of intrinsic
reality is categorically denied. It argues that only when conventional
truth and ultimate truth are both *conventionally* and
*ultimately* non-intrinsic, can they be causally effective.