## 1. Life and Works



Gorampa was born in 1429 in eastern Tibet. At age nineteen, he
traveled to central Tibet to pursue monastic studies. He briefly
attended Nalendra monastery, one of the prominent Sakya monastic
institutions in Tibet, where he studied Madhyamaka texts with the
scholar Rongton Sheja Kunrig (Rong ston Shes bya Kun rigs,
1367-1449). Rongton passed away the following summer, and
Gorampa began to travel throughout central Tibet, studying with a
number of other teachers. In addition to becoming a skilled
philosopher, Gorampa mastered a variety of Tantric practices,
including the *Lamdre* (lam 'bras), the defining practice
of the Sakya School.



After completing his studies, Gorampa became a teacher, and in 1473 he
founded Thubten Namgyal Ling Monastery, developing a curriculum that
emphasized both rigorous philosophical education and thorough training
in meditative practices. Gorampa later spent four years as the sixth
abbot of Ewam Choden, the primary institution of the Ngor subsect of
the Sakya school. He died in 1489.



Gorampa lived during a period of political instability in Tibet. From
1244 until 1354, the Sakya sect had held political control over Tibet,
and was backed by the support of the Mongol army. Eventually the
Mongolian court's interest in Tibet weakened, and the Pagmodruk
sect of Tibetan Buddhism ousted the Sakyapas from power in a violent
confrontation. The Pagmodrukpas continued to rule over Tibet for over
a century, but by the latter half of Gorampa's life, they had
fallen from power, resulting in a number of groups fiercely competing
for religious and political dominance.



Gorampa composed his philosophical texts, therefore, at a time in
which the Sakya sect was struggling to re-assert its dominance.
Although verifiable information about the political motivations of the
Sakyapas remains elusive, the unstable political situation in Tibet
could have at least partially accounted for the overtly polemical
nature of some of Gorampa's philosophical writings. When the
Gelugpas eventually ascended to political power in the sixteenth
century, the fifth Dalai Lama ordered that Gorampa's texts,
which were so critical of Tsongkhapa, be destroyed or otherwise
removed from monastic institutions. However, many of Gorampa's
texts continued to be studied in eastern Tibet, beyond the Central
Tibetan government's scope of influence.



When work began on the republication of Gorampa's writings in
1905, thirteen volumes of texts were recovered from monasteries
throughout Tibet. In addition to his works on Madhyamaka philosophy,
Gorampa composed a number of treatises on Abhidharma, several
commentaries on the Indian text the
*Abhisamayalankara*, and various practice texts
based on Tantra. Gorampa's complete Madhyamaka texts comprise
only two of these thirteen volumes. These are:


1. *Distinguishing the View* (*lta ba'i shan
'byed*), a polemical text distinguishing Gorampa's own
view from those of Tsongkhapa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang Grags pa,
1357-1419) and Dolpopa (Dol po pa Shes rab rGyal mtshan,
1292-1361);
2. *Elucidating the View* *(lta ba ngan sel*), a
commentary on the Indian scholar Candrakirti's
*Madhyamakavatara;*
3. *Synopsis of Madhyamaka* (*dbu ma'i spyi
don*), an encyclopedic text outlining Gorampa's views on the
major points of Madhyamaka, as well as the views of a number of Indian
and Tibetan scholars with whom he both agrees and disagrees.

 The main difference in these texts concerns the ways in which
Gorampa presents his philosophical view. *Distinguishing the
View* is a polemical text in which Gorampa focuses on the
metaphysics of Madhyamaka, positioning his own interpretation as a
sort of middle way between other interpretations that cast Madhyamaka
in terms of nihilism or eternalism. *Elucidating the View*
focuses on the process through which a follower of Madhyamaka
transforms her mind as she progresses toward complete awakening.
*Synopsis of Madhyamaka* presents Gorampa's interpretation
of Madhyamaka in three ways: ontologically, in terms of its grounding
(*bzhi*) in the two truths; ethically, in terms of the path
(*lam*) that a Buddhist must follow; and epistemologically, in
terms of the mental content that a Buddha experiences as a result
(*'bras bu*) of complete awakening.


Despite the different emphases of these three texts, Gorampa's
general presentation of Madhyamaka remains consistent throughout his
writings. This is especially striking when compared to Gorampa's
rough contemporaries, including Tsongkhapa and Sakya
Chokden, whose views evolved over the course of their careers. The
relative stability of Gorampa's views over his lifetime is one
reason why he is held in such high regard among proponents of the
Sakya tradition.


## 2. Gorampa's Madhyamaka



Gorampa, like all of his Madhyamika interlocutors, appeals to the
authority of Nagarjuna. As such, most disagreements between
Gorampa and his opponents primarily concern the correct ways to
interpret the works of Nagarjuna and his commentators. While
Gorampa and his opponents generally agree that a Buddhist must
understand the nature of reality by eliminating ignorance and
realizing emptiness, what sets Gorampa apart from other
Madhyamikas is the way in which he articulates reality, and the
processes by which he argues that one must eliminate ignorance and
realize emptiness.



With this in mind, there are four defining characteristics of
Gorampa's philosophy that set him apart from other Tibetan
philosophers. They are his understandings of: (1) the two truths; (2)
negation and the tetralemma; (3) the role of logic and reasoning; and
(4) proper methods of argumentation on the path to awakening.


### 2.1 The Two Truths



The theory of the two truths, or two realities, is fundamental to
Madhyamaka philosophy. Reality can be classified in terms of the
conventional truth (or conventional reality), which corresponds to the
way that things appear to ordinary persons, and the ultimate truth (or
ultimate reality), which corresponds to the way that things really
are. While Madhyamikas tend to disagree about the nature of and
relationship between the conventional and ultimate truths, the final
goal of Madhyamaka philosophy involves realizing the ultimate truth
- seeing things not just as they appear, but as they really
are.



Gorampa argues that the distinction between the two truths is made
based on the ways in which a subject (*yul can*) apprehends an
object (*yul*). That is, the way in which one engages with the
world determines whether one perceives things conventionally or
ultimately. Broadly speaking, the conventional truth is mediated by
concepts, logic, and reasoning, while the ultimate truth is outside of
the realm of conceptual thought. As long as one is engaged in
concepts, one is interacting with conventional reality. Once all
concepts have been eliminated by following the Buddhist path (as will
be explained below), one is said to have realized the ultimate
reality.



Gorampa defines "conventional truth" as that which appears
to ordinary beings with ordinarily functioning sense faculties.
Objects, words, smells, and ideas are all sorts of things that can be
conventionally true, or conventionally real. They are true or real in
the sense that they appear to be true or real to ordinary persons,
without any sort of philosophical analysis. Most people in Paris, for
example, can point to the Eiffel Tower and agree, "That is the
Eiffel Tower." The existence of the Eiffel Tower is thus
conventionally true. It appears to ordinary people with fully
functioning sense faculties, and these ordinary people identify it by
means of the linguistic convention, "Eiffel Tower."



It is not, however, necessarily the case that anything that can be
identified or described in words is conventionally true. If a tourist
in Paris drinks too much wine and starts seeing double, for example,
this does not mean that the existence of two Eiffel Towers is suddenly
conventionally true. The drunk person's perception is skewed; he
is no longer operating with ordinary faculties. After he sobers up, he
will once again see that really, there is only one Eiffel Tower. To
illustrate this point in his texts, Gorampa refers to
Candrakirti's well-known Madhyamaka analogy of a person
with an eye disorder (*rab rib can*) mistakenly thinking that the
floaters in his field of vision are actually hairs on his dinner
plate. But the truth of the matter - the conventional truth,
that is - is that the hairs are not really there, as a person
with normally functioning eyes can affirm.



The conventional truth, therefore, is true in the sense that it is
something upon which all ordinary persons with normally functioning
faculties can agree. The conventional truth is what allows for people
to travel to Paris to visit the Eiffel Tower, to talk about the
weather, and to engage in debates about politics. It is also, most
importantly for Gorampa, what allows people to understand conceptually
what a realization of the ultimate truth is like, and what enables
Buddhist practitioners to correctly develop logical reasoning and
engage in proper types of meditative practices. In other words, some
features of the conventional - such as reasoning and
language - can be used to approach an understanding of the
ultimate, even though the ultimate itself transcends those
features.



In contrast to the conventional, the ultimate truth is understood as
the way things really are, independent of the concepts and conventions
with which ordinary persons engage. Gorampa contends that the
conventional truth is mired in ignorance - the cause of
*samsara*, which keeps sentient beings cycling from
one birth to the next, lifetime after lifetime. When this ignorance is
removed, one is capable of realizing the ultimate truth, and through
that realization, one can attain freedom from the cycle of
rebirth.



Based on this account, then, when philosophers attempt to describe or
even label "the ultimate truth," they fail to capture it
in its entirety; when identifying and describing the ultimate truth,
concepts and language must be used, and Gorampa's definition of
the ultimate truth is that it is beyond all concepts and language.
Still, Gorampa argues that it is important to begin the process of
realizing the actual ultimate truth by developing a conceptual
understanding of the general features of the ultimate. In other words,
forming a concept of the ultimate is not the final goal of awakening
itself, but it gives one a sense of what awakening is *like*.



In order to explain the difference between a conceptual understanding
and a nonconceptual realization of the ultimate truth, Gorampa divides
it into two types: the ultimate that is taught (*bstan pa'i don
dam*) and the ultimate that is realized (*rtogs pa'i don
dam*). The ultimate that is taught corresponds to an ordinary
person's concept of the ultimate, while the ultimate that is
realized is directly and nonconceptually ascertained by awakened
beings.



When the ultimate is divided in this way, Gorampa makes the case that
ordinary persons and awakened beings are capable of recognizing each
of the two truths, but in different ways. An ordinary person can
conceptually understand the ultimate that is taught, while still
perceiving the conventional realm as true or real. From this
perspective, the conventional is called "the conventional
*truth*" (*kun rdzob bden pa*). But once an awakened
being nonconceptually apprehends the ultimate that is realized, the
conventional no longer appears as real or as solid as it once was. The
awakened being, having had a direct experience of the way things
really are, no longer experiences the conventional as *true*, but
rather as *merely* conventional (*kun rdzob tsam*).



In other words, we can say that the conventional *truth* is that
which is true for ordinary, unawakened beings. The *merely*conventional, however, is perceived after an awakened being
realizes the ultimate truth. There merely conventional is not false;
it is simply a mode of perception that is subordinated to the ultimate
truth that an awakened being has directly experienced.



Unlike some other Tibetan philosophers, Gorampa stresses that the
difference between conventional truth and mere convention is based
entirely on the subject who apprehends these objects. The same table
appears as truly existent to an ordinary being, and as a merely
conventional imputation to an awakened being. The conventional and
ultimate truths, similarly, are distinguished on the basis of the ways
in which they are apprehended. (This approach differs from someone
like Tsongkhapa, who distinguishes the two truths on the basis of the
object, arguing that every appearing thing consists of conventional
and ultimate aspects.)



In short, ordinary beings perceive the conventional *truth*, and
understand the ultimate that is *taught*. Awakened beings
experience the *merely* conventional, and directly realize the
ultimate that is *realized*. Based on this model of the two
truths, Gorampa argues that the Buddhist path involves a process of
transforming one's perspective. One begins by correctly
identifying and understanding the conventional truth. Then, through
logical reasoning and meditative practices, one gradually begins to
realize that this so-called truth is merely conventional and that it
is based entirely on concepts that are rooted in ignorance; in this
way one comes to a conceptual understanding of the ultimate that is
taught. Through more analysis and practice still, one eventually
recognizes that the conventional truth is only merely conventional,
and directly realizes the ultimate truth, which does not depend on
ignorance and concepts.



By working through this process to transform one's mind, Gorampa
argues that a Buddhist practitioner on the Madhymaka path will finally
arrive at a state of freedom from conceptual proliferations (*spros
pa dang bral ba*). This is a mental state in which conceptual
thought does not occur, and one directly and immediately apprehends
the ultimate that is realized. Gorampa is explicit in pointing out
that this state of freedom from conceptual proliferations is different
from a state of unconsciousness. In order to cultivate a state of
freedom from conceptual proliferations, one must eliminate concepts
gradually, through particular methods that involve both logical
reasoning and meditative practices. As we will see below, Gorampa
outlines a very specific fourfold process for eliminating concepts in
order to arrive at this desired state of nonconceptuality.


### 2.2 Negation



In order to cultivate an awakened mind that realizes the ultimate
truth, the Madhyamaka school of philosophy advocates a fourfold
process of analyzing the conventional truth that is commonly referred
to as a tetralemma (*catuskoti*, *mtha'
bzhi*). While this fourfold analysis is not unique to Buddhism, its
use as a tool in Buddhist philosophical traditions can be traced to
Nagarjuna's *Mulamadhyamakakarika*, in
which he famously remarks, "Neither from itself, nor from
another, nor from both, nor without a cause, does anything, anywhere,
ever, arise" (MMK I:1). This fourfold rejection of one extreme,
its opposite, both, and neither, is adopted and expanded upon by later
Madhyamikas, and is frequently used as a tool in order to
demonstrate the Madhyamaka view.



Nagarjuna's commentator Aryadeva applies this
fourfold negation to an analysis of existence in his
*Jnanasarasamuccaya*, writing, "There is
no existence, there is no nonexistence, there is no existence and
nonexistence, nor is there the absence of both." Gorampa
frequently cites this passage in order to illustrate the Madhyamaka
view as that which is free from conceptual constructs. He contends
that a proper understanding and application of this passage allows a
practitioner to successfully transition from the state of an ordinary
person who sees conventional truth, to an awakened buddha who directly
and nonconceptually realizes the ultimate.



Most Tibetan Buddhist philosophers agree that the tetralemma is a tool
that can help one to realize the ultimate, but they differ in their
explanations of the ways in which this tool functions. Gorampa argues
that one must negate each of the four extremes in succession by using
logic and reasoning, and then one must subsequently realize the
negation of all four extremes simultaneously through meditative
practices.


#### 2.2.1 The Process of Refuting the Four Extremes



As Gorampa formulates the tetralemma, the process begins by analyzing
and refuting existence. This is done by using the "Five
Madhyamaka Reasonings" (*dbu ma gtan tshigs lnga*). These
five types of reasoning are:


1. Neither one nor many (*gcig du dral*), which analyzes the
essence (*ngo bo*) of things.
2. Diamond splinters (*rdo rje'i gzegs ma*), which analyzes
causes.
3. Refuting the arising of something existent or nonexistent (*yod
med skye 'gog*), which analyzes effects.
4. Refuting the four possibilities of arising (*mu bzhi skye
'gog*), which analyzes causes and effects together.
5. Dependent arising (*rten 'brel*), which shows that
phenomena cannot exist independently.



These points are generally agreed upon by all Madhyamikas, and
entire essays can be devoted to each of these five types of reasoning,
so they will not be discussed in detail here. The basic thrust of
these five types of reasoning is that when we analyze the things that
appear in the conventional truth, and try to find some kind of
essential qualities that underpin those conventionally appearing
things, nothing whatsoever can be found. In other words, if one
searches for an ultimate truth that exists beyond conventional
appearances, nothing whatsoever can be found.



After one has refuted the concept that things truly exist, Gorampa
concedes that a person's natural inclination might be to assume
that things are therefore nonexistent. He argues, however, that if one
were to affirm the nonexistence of things, this would amount to a view
of nihilism, which is antithetical to the Madhyamaka position. In
order to show that the acceptance of nonexistence is untenable,
Gorampa argues that existence and nonexistence are concepts that
depend upon each other, just like left and right, or big and small;
one makes no sense without the other. So, once the concept of
existence is eliminated completely, it makes no sense to conceive of
nonexistence independently of that. Things cannot be nonexistent
unless they stand in contrast to things that are existent.



Once he has shown that existence and nonexistence are each untenable,
Gorampa refutes the third possibility of the tetralemma, that things
can somehow simultaneously both exist and not exist. He dismisses this
possibility quite succinctly, stating that if existence and
nonexistence have each been refuted individually, then it makes no
sense that they could somehow exist together.



The refutation of the fourth lemma, neither existence nor
nonexistence, yet again depends upon the successful refutation of the
previous three. Gorampa argues that to conceive of something as
"neither existent nor nonexistent" is to conceive of
something that is somewhere between the two extremes of existence and
nonexistence. He contends, however, that if one has any concept of
anything at all - even if it is some sort of concept of
quasi-existence - this is still a wrong view. Once the extremes
of existence, nonexistence, and both have been completely refuted,
there is no viable position left. To somehow claim that things are
neither existent nor nonexistent after having refuted the first three
possibilities is illogical.



With the refutation of these four positions in succession, Gorampa
shows that *any* possible way of conceiving of the ultimate
reality of a thing is impossible. Gorampa stresses the importance of
understanding the refutation of each of these four lemmas in
succession; the logic that refutes the concept of nonexistence depends
upon the successful refutation of the existence, the refutation of the
third concept (both existence and nonexistence) depends on the
refutation of the first two, and the refutation of the fourth (neither
existence nor nonexistence) depends upon the refutation of the first
three concepts. Existence, nonexistence, both, and neither are the
only possible ways of conceiving of the ultimate status of a thing, so
once each of these possible ways is eliminated, there is no way to
conceive of things that remains.



The refutation of each of the four extremes of the tetralemma is a
logic-oriented process that helps a follower of Madhyamaka to
cultivate a conceptual understanding of the ultimate truth that is
taught. But Gorampa argues that logic alone will not bring about a
realization of the actual ultimate truth. For this, one must also
incorporate meditative practices. Gorampa argues that through repeated
meditation on the refutation of each of the four lemmas in succession,
one will eventually come to realize all four refutations
simultaneously. We might describe this style of meditative practice as
a kind of "turning off" of concepts. After one
conceptually understands the negation of existence, for example, one
meditates on this negation and eventually stops having concepts of
things existing altogether. This process continues through all four
possibilities in the tetralemma, until one no longer conceives of
things at all. Again, it is important to note that this is distinct
from simply arresting the process of thought.


#### 2.2.2 The Role of Negation and the Function of the Tetralemma



According to Gorampa, the tetralemma is a tool that is used to
investigate the ultimate status of appearances. Through the logic of
this fourfold negation, one cultivates a conceptual understanding of
the ultimate that is taught, and then, through subsequent meditative
practices, one eventually cultivates a direct, nonconceptual
realization of the actual ultimate truth. In short, the logical
reasoning involved in the fourfold negation is implemented by ordinary
persons in order to understand what the ultimate truth is *like*,
but logic alone is not sufficient to arrive at a direct realization of
the ultimate.



Although tetralemmic analysis is employed by all Madhyamika
philosophers, Gorampa's interpretation of this fourfold negation
is unique in that it amounts to a complete eradication of conceptual
thought. Other Madhyamikas, such as Tsongkhapa, qualify each of
the negations in the tetralemma in ways that eliminate only certain
kinds of concepts. For someone like Tsongkhapa, the tetralemma is a
tool that can be used to eliminate *wrong* concepts; for Gorampa,
however, it is a tool that eliminates *all* concepts.



Gorampa's particular interpretation of the tetralemma is based
on the ways that he understands negation to function within this
fourfold analysis. For him, the negations of existence, nonexistence,
both, and neither are each complete and total non-affirming negations
(*med dgag*); that is, each limb of the tetralemma is negated in
its entirely, without the existence of anything else being affirmed in
its place. The result of this process is, again, the complete
eradication of any concepts of existence, nonexistence, both, or
neither.



Some of Gorampa's opponents - again, including Tsongkhapa
- understand negation differently. Tsongkhapa and his supporters
adhere to the law of double negation, and understand the negations
within the tetralemma to be qualified in certain ways. As such, while
the negation of existence is interpreted to mean that nothing exists
ultimately, the negation of nonexistence is interpreted to mean that
something does, nevertheless, exist. For Tsongkhapa, this
"something" is the conventional truth. Because of this,
Tsongkhapa's understanding of the tetralemma involves a complex
system of logical statements, each qualified according to one of the
two truths. If one accepts double negation elimination, then it makes
no sense for both existence and nonexistence to be negated, unless
these negations are qualified in certain ways.



Gorampa, on the other hand, does not adhere to double negation in the
context of the tetralemma. Instead, he understands the tetralemma as a
succession of four negations that are applied to the four possible
ways of conceiving of the status of the ultimate truth. Because the
ultimate truth is nonconceptualizable, Gorampa contends that
Tsongkhapa's understanding of the tetralemma is incomplete,
because it doesn't negate enough - literally, it
underpervades (*khyab chung ba*). While Tsongkhapa's model
successfully refutes the extreme view of existence at the ultimate
level, Gorampa argues that it does not eliminate all extreme views
ultimately and in their entirety.



Tsongkhapa argues that a negation of all four extremes at the ultimate
level defies logic, but Gorampa contends that a transcendence of logic
is specifically the tetralemma's purpose. By negating all
possibilities for logical, conceptual thought, the only recourse is to
abandon concepts completely. True freedom from conceptual
proliferations lies outside of the scope of conceptual thought, and is
therefore inexpressible. Gorampa maintains, however, that because
ordinary persons utilize conceptual thought, they necessarily construe
the ultimate truth as an object of conceptual constructs (that is,
they construe it as the ultimate that is taught). As such, one must
first use conceptual reasoning to refute each of the four extremes,
but these concepts must eventually be abandoned.



In other words, because all four extremes are negated under the
analysis of the tetralemma, Gorampa concludes that a correct
realization of the ultimate truth must be something that is other than
these conceptualizations of and dichotomizations into existence and
nonexistence. As such, the ultimate truth cannot be described using
these terms. And, since these are the only possible ways of speaking
of or conceptualizing the status of the existence of things, once they
are all negated, one is forced to conclude that the ultimate truth
cannot be described linguistically or conceptually. The ultimate truth
that is realized transcends the boundaries of language and conceptual
thought. However, Gorampa still maintains that logic and analysis are
essential in arriving at a state of nonconceptuality.


### 2.3 The Role of Logic



Gorampa's understanding of the relationship between the two
truths and the use of negation in the tetralemma reinforce his
understanding of the ways in which a practitioner should proceed on
the Buddhist path toward awakening. Through the logic of the
tetralemma, Gorampa demonstrates that the final goal of awakening is
beyond conceptual thought.



Conceptual thought comes from ignorance, so by eradicating ignorance,
one eradicates conceptual thought. In other words, since an awakened
being is completely free from ignorance, she has no concepts
whatsoever. This claim is quite controversial for obvious reasons:
buddhas are understood as consisting of perfect wisdom, and are
described in scriptures as omniscient beings. How, then, can a buddha
have no concepts at all, but still be considered omniscient?



Tsongkhapa and his fellow Gelugpa opponents criticize Gorampa for this
very reason. They contend that Gorampa's philosophy negates too
much - it "overpervades" (*khyab che ba*). They
argue that if the final goal of awakening is really a complete
elimination of concepts, then one ought to be able to attain awakening
by simply falling asleep or otherwise becoming unconscious. Gorampa
contends, however, that in order to successfully eliminate all
concepts in their entirety, it is absolutely essential that one begins
by using logic and reasoning. The end result is indeed nonconceptual,
but it differs from the quietism that is a result of simply
not-thinking, without any prior analysis.



The issue underlying this debate concerns the status of conceptual
content in the minds of fully awakened buddhas. Gorampa contends,
citing Candrakirti, that fully awakened buddhas have no
conceptual content whatsoever; they have completely eliminated
ignorance in its entirety, and therefore do not actively engage in the
conventional world. They do not conceive of things as existent,
nonexistent, both, or neither. In fact, they do not conceive of things
at all. They do, however, *appear* to be omniscient from the
perspective of ordinary beings, and because of their previous karma
and the compassion that they have cultivated on the path to
enlightenment, they continue to function in the world for the benefit
of ordinary unenlightened beings for a period of time.



The implications of Gorampa's view are significant. While
Tsongkhapa's model stresses the eradication of only certain
kinds of concepts - e.g., concepts relating to the ultimate
existence of things - Gorampa's model shows that
*all* concepts must be eliminated, first through the logical
reasoning of the tetralemma, and then through subsequent meditative
practices. Because Gorampa is not concerned with the preservation of
certain kinds of concepts, he is more tolerant of variations in styles
of argumentation that might be used to arrive at a state of freedom
from conceptual proliferations.


### 2.4 Methods of Argumentation



Gorampa's emphasis on the possibility for different acceptable
styles of argumentation occurs in the context of his analysis of the
so-called Prasangika and Svatantrika subschools of
Madhyamaka thought. These two subschools were understood by Tibetan
thinkers as being developed by the Indian Madhyamikas
Buddhapalita and Bhaviveka, the former advocating the
Prasangika position and the latter that of the
Svatantrika. Candrakirti is understood as upholding the
Prasangika tradition, because he defended
Buddhapalita's views against Bhaviveka's
criticisms. It is important to note, however, that none of these
Indian scholars labeled themselves as adherents of particular
subschools of Madhyamaka, and that the terms rang gyud pa
(Svatantrika) and thal 'gyur ba (Prasangika)
were coined centuries later by Tibetans.



Regardless of whether Buddhapalita, Bhaviveka, or
Candrakirti actually understood themselves to be advocating these
distinct positions, the differentiation between Svatantrika and
Prasangika became reified in medieval Tibetan Buddhist
discourse. Because Tibetans held Candrakirti's Madhyamaka
in high regard, they purported to be Prasangikas
themselves, and many constructed detailed explanations of the division
between the Svatantrika and Prasangika systems, always
upholding Prasangika as the highest form of Madhyamaka.



Tsongkhapa famously composed a list of "eight difficult
points" (dka' gnad brgyad) distinguishing his own
Prasangika view from that of the Svatantrika. Based on
these eight points, Tsongkhapa concluded that the two schools to
differ in terms of their views regarding the nature of the ultimate
truth.



Gorampa also considers himself a Prasangika, but insists
that the distinction between these two Madhyamaka subschools is a
matter of method, not view. Because Gorampa's interpretation of
the two truths and negation informs a process by which the
Madhyamika begins with logic and analysis, and ends in a state of
nonconceptuality, Gorampa contends that there can be no differences
between Madhyamikas with respect to their final view. There
cannot be different types of nonconceptuality; the end result of any
true Madhyamaka analysis is freedom from conceptual proliferations.
Once one has successfully eradicated conceptual thought, the methods
that she has used to arrive at such a state are no longer relevant.
The differences between these Madhyamaka subschools, therefore, occur
with respect to the ways in which they understand the conventional
truth, and utilize logic and reasoning.



In short, Gorampa's particular brand of Madhyamaka is
characterized by his understanding of the two truths, and the ways in
which negation functions within the logic of tetralemmic analysis.
Because the ultimate truth is entirely free from concepts, one
utilizes negation to eliminate all concepts in their entirety. The
ways in which one employs Madhyamaka reasoning in order to negate
these concepts are ultimately not as important as actually arriving at
a state of nonconceptuality. Thus, unlike Tsongkhapa, who concludes
that there is one correct final view, Gorampa contends that the final,
ultimate view is actually no view at all.


## 3. Influence on Other Philosophers



Gorampa's harsh criticisms of Tsongkhapa resulted in his works
being banned throughout Tibet for centuries. When these texts were
recovered and reprinted, however, Gorampa's philosophy
experienced a resurgence of sorts, not only among fellow Sakyapas, but
also among some scholars belonging to the Kagyu and Nyingma schools.
Gorampa's emphasis on logic and reasoning, combined with his
view that different methods can successfully be applied to arrive at
the same result of freedom from conceptual proliferations, appealed to
non-Sakya scholars who had historically placed more of an emphasis on
meditative practices, but wished to counter Gelugpa-style logical
arguments.



Just as Gorampa argues that the distinction between Svatantrika
and Prasangika is a matter of method, but not of a
Madhyamika's final view, later Tibetan commentators have
extended this reasoning to apply to other, non-Sakya schools within
Tibetan Buddhism. Gorampa's philosophy has become influential
within what has recently come to be known as the "nonsectarian
movement" (*ris med*) of Tibetan Buddhism.



Kagyu and Nyingma scholars managed to appropriate some of
Gorampa's philosophy and incorporate it into their own systems.
Not only did Gorampa provide a compelling refutation of
Tsongkhapa's particular understanding of Madhyamaka, but his
philosophical arguments also proved compatible with Kagyu and Nyingma
styles of meditative practice. Today, Kagyu and Nyingma scholars study
Gorampa's philosophical texts at Sakya monastic institutions,
and some even teach Gorampa's philosophy in their own
monasteries.