## 1. The Place of Hegel's Social and Political Thought



Hegel's social and political thought has been a subject of
several debates in terms of its form and content.


### 1.1 Conservativism and Progressive Readings



One such debate concerned whether or not his views endorsed a
dangerous conservativism, sometimes described as quietest or
reactionary. His double-saying (*Doppelsatz*) in the Preface to
the *Philosophy of Right* that the "the rational is actual
and actual is rational" was read by some as saying that the
absolutist Prussia that Hegel lived under was somehow rational and so
justified (Haym 1857). Yet, the more detailed comments found in the
main body of the *Philosophy of Right* consistently favour the
aims of the Prussian Reform era which were opposed by the newly
ascendant reactionaries after 1819 making it difficult to situate this
work politically at that time.



This position was taken even further to some extremes by Karl Popper
(1966) who claimed that Hegel was "the father of modern
historicism and totalitarianism." This view looked selectively at
different remarks we can find in the *PR* about how the state is
"the march of God in the world" found not in Hegel's
own text, but in the published lecture note "Additions" (or
Zusatze) by his students included in most editions of the
*PR* today (SS258 Addition). Moreover, it was motivated by a
philosophical and political stance that had little, if anything, to do
with what is actually found in Hegel's work. 



This "conservative" reading of Hegel was challenged
later by a more "liberal" interpretation that highlighted
the reforms and divergences both cultural and political between Prussia
and the *PR* that make clear that Hegel did not support an
authoritarian government, but a new form of democratic institutions
complete with jury trials that was more progressive (Avineri 1972, Knox
1970). Hegel held a lifelong admiration for the French Revolution
toasting the fall of the Bastille throughout his adult life.



Today, most commentators agree that Popper and others were wrong to
claim Hegel endorsed some view of authoritarianism. At the same time,
Hegel's social and political philosophy is more ideologically
moderate than the conservativism versus progressivism debate had often
admitted. While he did advocate for more democratic and progressive
elements than a reality at his time, Hegel did also defend the
traditional family and constitutional monarchy. Perhaps purposefully,
Hegel's thought is notoriously difficult to categorize given his
interest to overcome and transform ordinary distinctions with a
virtual consensus today that his work resists tidy classification as
conservative, progressive or anything else.


### 1.2 Metaphysical and Non-Metaphysical Readings



A second long-standing debate among Anglo-American commentators has
concerned the relation of Hegel's social and political thought to
his logic and wider philosophical system. For many decades, the
non-metaphysical reading has been the dominant approach. The central
position was summed up by Z. A. Pelczynski (1964: 136-37) who said:
"Hegel's political thought can be read, understood, and
appreciated without having to come to terms with his metaphysics
... some intellectual curiosity may be unsatisfied when
metaphysics is left out; a solid volume of political theory and
political thinking will still remain." The non-metaphysical
reading follows a broadly analytic philosophical post-Kantian
interpretation which sees Hegel as accepting, and even extending,
Kant's critical philosophy (Neuhouser 2000, Pinkard 1994, Pippin
2012). This work is notable for typical focusing attention on the
*PR* grasping it philosophically separately from other parts of
Hegel's system which are sometimes deemed to be overly dark with
avoidable metaphysical commitments (Knowles 2002, Wood 1990).



In contrast, the metaphysical reading counters that
anti-metaphysical interpretations take a one-sided approach to
Hegel's work (Beiser 2005, Rosen 1984, Taylor 1975). Hegel
conceived his *PR* to be a part of a wider system. Isolating any
one text from its wider context may appear to inoculate any such
reading from metaphysical claims elsewhere in Hegel's system.
However, only a reading that grasps the full metaphysical foundations
of his thought will do justice to his self-understanding (Houlgate
2005).


### 1.3 Systematic and Non-Systematic Readings



More recently, scholars have focused on a core contention between
metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings about what relation, if any,
Hegel's *PR* has to his wider philosophical system. Most
non-metaphysical readings interpret the *PR* independently of
Hegel's system whereas all metaphysical readings attempt to
situate the *PR* within Hegel's system. Viewing the debate
from this perspective, the core contention is not about the place of
metaphysics but the interpretive place of any work within the
system.



A non-systematic reading interprets Hegel's *PR*
explicitly separately from his wider system. This view has few
adherents. It runs clearly against Hegel's own self-understanding
stated in the *PR*'s Preface where he says the *PR*
"is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic,
exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part
of philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to
accompany my lectures, namely my *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical
Sciences*" (*PR*, p. 9). The *PR* is explicit
that it serves as an elaboration of the section "Objective
Spirit" within his philosophical system, and so a part of it.



The now orthodox view is the systematic reading which accepts that
Hegel's logic and system have explanatory force in interpreting
the *PR* (Brooks 2013). There is no denying their connection,
only its character and strength. There remain differences about how
much the system does or should figure as well as related metaphysical
issues (Wood 2017). For example, there is a
consensus that Hegel's political philosophy should be understood
within its systematic context, but there remains disagreement about
whether we need to accept his arguments for the wider philosophical
system in order to accept his contributions to political philosophy.
This entry will broadly follow the dominant systematic reading, but
acknowledges there is not a consensus on how strongly a justificatory
role the system plays for his political thought.


### 1.4 The *Philosophy of Right*



Hegel's main work of social and political thought was the
*PR*. It was published in 1821 when Hegel taught in Berlin. This
entry surveys his primary contributions in this work, but with
reference to his other texts and political writings.



Hegel says the *PR* "is a more extensive"
exposition of "Objective Spirit," a section within his
philosophical system called his *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical
Sciences* (see *PM*). The relevant sections of
the *Encyclopaedia* were intended to accompany the lectures that
became published as the *Philosophy of Right*. The full
*Encyclopaedia* begins with an examination of logic and then
applies itself to an understanding of nature and the human spirit,
where the latter incorporates analyses of psychology, art, history,
religion and philosophy in addition to social and political
thought.



His approach to form and content is unique. The *PR* is
mostly divided into numbered sections (SS). These are occasionally
supplemented by later Remarks (R) where Hegel elaborated further in a
later edition or Additions (A) which took the form of edited lecture
notes of what Hegel had said by his students when teaching the
*PR*. Hegel argues his positions in a dialectical way that is
not linear and designed to show how seemingly different perspectives
can have their opposition somehow dissolve within a new and higher
perspective.



For example, our first apperception of some thing or object of
thought might be as a pure being. As it is pure, it may appear to lack
determinations - and so be nothing. In this way, Hegel holds that
our thought has moved from pure being to pure nothingness. But yet what
we apperceive is a something and so this is seen as helping overcome
the false opposition of pure being and nothingness to a new, higher
category of becoming as what is before is taking further shape as we
sharpen our grasp of it. This dialectical method is infused throughout
the *PR* and Hegel says he has "presupposed a
familiarity" with his approach found in his logic and wider
system (*PR*, p. 10, see *SL*, *EL*).



Similarly, the *PR* moves from basic building blocks that
have a somewhat "pure" nature not yet grounded in reality
to their negation and then brought together in a higher, concrete
reality. After an introduction establishing the *PR* as
primarily a work concerned with freedom, the *PR* is divided
into three parts. The first pure part is Abstract Right covering
property and punishment followed by an opposite in Morality covering
issues of conscience and moral responsibility. They become unified in a
final part Ethical Life providing a more concrete reality that examines
the family, civil society, law, the state and ending with war and
international relations. Each part shall be discussed in turn.


## 2. Freedom and Right



Hegel conceives the *PR* primarily as a philosophy of
freedom. This is made clear in the *PR*'s Introduction,
which starts by declaring that "the subject-matter of the
philosophical science of right is the Idea of right - the concept
of *right* [*Recht*] and its actualization"
(*PR* SS1). The *PR*'s aim to provide a
philosophical account of "right" and its realization in the
world.



Hegel admits the existence of *right* is presupposed from his
philosophical system, of which the *PR* elaborates one part
(*PR* SS2). The *PR*'s Introduction proceeds to
summarise the dialectical argument for the free will discussed at
greater length elsewhere in Hegel's philosophical system. Our
will "determines itself" (*PR* SS4 Addition).
The challenge is determining whether or not its content is a product of
freedom or mere arbitrariness. We must be able to discern the bare
pursuit of being a slave to our passions like, for Hegel, the animal
world from the rational world of human beings. Hegel sees the
*PR* as an examination into how "the free will which wills
the free will" can be known in form and content (*PR*
SS27).



Hegel defines "right" [*Recht*] as the existence
of the free will in the world (*PR* SS29). So a philosophy
of right is necessarily a philosophy of freedom that seeks to
comprehend freedom actualized in how we relate to each other and
construct social and political institutions.



Following his dialectical method, Hegel approaches the development
of our comprehension of right through these stages: Abstract Right,
Morality and Ethical Life. We progress from one stage to the next in a
distinctive way where apparent contradictions arising in each stage are
dissolved through attaining a higher stage, where this cycle is
repeated and progress made since the beginning remains present where
what was abstract and opaque at first becomes more concrete as we
advance to the end of this work. This multi-layered, dialectical nature
of Hegel's argument does give his philosophical work an added
complexity, but also a richness that close study rewards - while
this entry only focuses on the broad outlines of his arguments.


## 3. Property



The first substantive stage is Abstract Right. Somewhat misleading
its sections are entitled "Property,"
"Contract" and "Wrong" giving the false
impression that Hegel is discussing actual possession of property, its
sale or punishment for breach of contract. Typically for Hegel, he uses
common terminology in uncommon ways.



We must recall the main aim of Hegel's project is to
understand how the free will wills the free will, and not mere
arbitrariness. This requires Hegel to find some ground for helping
decide when the free will wills freely, versus when it does not. Hegel
first turns to taking possession of property. It is noticeable that
Hegel's account is aimed at using property possession as a first
step towards finding this ground rather than for building an economic
system. For example, Hegel says that "what and how much I possess
is...purely contingent as far as right is concerned"
(*PR* SS49). This is because Hegel does not intend to
develop a full theory of property yet, but rather to locate a ground
for the free will's freedom.



The importance of property at this stage is its development of our
self-consciousness (Benhabib 1984). For Hegel, I give my free will an
external existence that others can engage with. My ownership of
property is not determined by me alone, but something determined
"within the context of a common will" shared between two
persons (*PR* SS71).



Hegel calls the mutual recognition between two persons about
property ownership a "contract" (*PR* SS71-75).
This is no ordinary contract. The context in Abstract Right is a
hypothetical space of two persons. There is no money or sale of goods.
The "contract" is not a written agreement. All common
terminology, but given different usages.



The key point, for Hegel, is that only the free will of an
individual can ground the free will of another (Stillman 1980).
Something is mine when mutually recognized as my possession by another.
This is the first appearance of right where the activity of my free
will in taking possession is free, and not mere arbitrariness. It is
this agreement between two individuals forming a kind of contract which
is so important for Hegel. This is because mutual recognition becomes a
vehicle for how we can develop further a more concrete understanding of
freedom as right in the world. If such recognition was under threat,
this would unsettle how we can ground our free will in a free will of
another.


## 4. Punishment



This failure of mutual recognition is taken up next at the end of
Abstract Right in a section entitled "Wrong"
[*Unrecht*]. This section has been widely interpreted by many
scholars to offer a clear retributivist theory of crime and punishment
(Cooper 1971, Primoratz 1989). At first glance, it is easy to see
why.



Hegel distinguishes three kinds of wrongs. The first is
unintentional (*PR* SS84-86). This is where both individuals
are adhering to what they believe has been mutually recognized, but one
is unwittingly incorrect. This kind of wrong is thought to be
unpunishable - and the reason is because both sides see
"the recognition of right as the universal and deciding
factor" (*PR* SS85). One side is in error, but there
is a strict appeal to the proper recognition of right.



The second kind of wrong is deception (*PR* SS87-89).
This is more serious than unintentional wrongs because while both
parties claim to each other that they appeal to right, one side does so
insincerely. Thus deception has a different and more serious character
than unintentional wrongs.



The third and final kind of wrong is described as
"crime" (*PR* SS90). This is where one party
makes no appeal at all to right. The wrong [*Unrecht*] that they
seek is to deny an appeal to right. This is a direct and tangible
threat to mutual recognition as one party is not merely insincere, but
acts regardless of right - and to that extent acts arbitrarily,
and so unfreely.



Hegel describes crime as an infringement of right, of mutual
recognition (*PR* SS95 Remark). This requires what Hegel
calls punishment as "the restoration of right" whereby what
was infringed is reasserted and reaffirmed (*PR* SS99). For
example, the punishment of theft sends a message to the thief and wider
community that this crime should not have happened - and in
punishing the crime Hegel believes it can help to restore the right
violated.



His theory of punishment is widely characterized as retributivist
and it is easy to see why. In this section, Hegel is critical of
deterrence and rehabilitation approaches claiming "they take it
for granted that punishment in and for itself is just"
(*PR* SS99 Remark). Indeed, Hegel says the cancellation of
crime "is retribution" (*PR* SS101).



But this commonly held view is controversial for several reasons.
Hegel may call this third kind of wrong "crime," but this
view of crime is understood in a specific way (Nicholson 1982). There
is no state or laws, no police or judiciary (Stillman 1976). A
hypothetical scenario lacking prisons is hardly any complete theory of
punishment. In fact, there is neither judge nor jury in Abstract Right
to say who is right or wrong. This is because, when we view this
section in its systematic context, Hegel is drawing attention to
certain foundational ideas about wrongs more generally (e.g., that they
are of three kinds) and how we should respond (e.g., that crimes can
deserve punishment) without yet giving his full view at this point in
the *PR*.



However, Hegel does foreshadow his later and more substantive
discussion of punishment with a non-retributivist character at this
point (Brooks 2017a). He highlights how determinations of crimes
"such as danger to public security" have relevance in
determining what punishment is ultimately justified (*PR*
SS96 Remark). While he says crimes "more dangerous in
itself" are a more serious infringement of right, Hegel is clear
from the start that consequentialist factors are relevant to the
determination of punishment related to crime's impact on society
although he says little more at this point (*PR* SS96
Remark). Hegel also rejects the view he is offering a
full theory of punishment at this point claiming - in the absence
of laws and courtrooms - any action taken by an individual
against another to punish takes the form of "revenge" which
"becomes a new infringement" creating new problems
(*PR* SS102). It is important to note at this point that
these sections discussing commonly used concepts like property and
contract as well as crime and punishment in uncommon ways all reappear
when Hegel turns his attention to the final part of Ethical Life.


## 5. Morality



When Hegel concludes Abstract Right, he seeks to resolve a tension.
Abstract Right had been focused purely on the external appearance of
right through taking possession and forming a contract through mutual
recognition. In reasserting and restoring right through
"punishment," we do not merely honour the
*universality* of right for us all but this move "is also
at the same time a further advance in the inner determination of the
will by its concept" (*PR* SS104). While we have
discussed taking ownership and wrongs in relation to the mutual
recognition of external property, this points us forward to our having
to grasp the *particularity* of our inner ownership of right.
This perspective leads Hegel to open a new, second stage he calls
Morality, but again using common terms in uncommon ways.



The main point about Hegel's theory of morality is he
redefines it in an unusual way. For Hegel, "the moral point of
view" is a purely abstract and hypothetical exercise that is
logically prior and separate to how morality is related to the world
(*PR* SS105). Hegel focuses on the
individual's power of choice. To this end, Hegel is a champion,
not an enemy, of individual liberty as he is clear that there must be
space for subjective freedom.



The problem with our individual power of choice is that we may well
be mistaken about what we choose (*PR* SS140 Remark).
Recalling our separateness from others in Morality, he says we may
intend good but our only guide is our individual conception of the good
(*PR* SS140 Addition). A more substantive guide awaits
reflecting about ourselves acting in relation to others concretely in
Ethical Life.



Otherwise, the danger arising from such pure, inward abstraction is
that morality is an "abstract universality ... without
content" (*PR* SS135). Thus, for Hegel, moral
philosophy of any kind is by its nature empty.



Perhaps no area of the *PR* has attracted more controversy
than Hegel's so-called "emptiness charge" against
Kant: Kant is accused of offering no more than an empty formula of
"duty for duty's sake" where our task is to avoid
contradicting a set formula (*PR* SS135, see Hoy 1989,
Freyenhagen 2012, Stern 2012). Hegel's criticisms centre on
Kant's Formula of Universal Law stating we should "act only
in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it become a universal law" (Kant 1997, 4:421).
Undoubtedly, Kant does offer Hegel some ammunition for this criticism.
For example, Kant says "All I need for morality is that freedom
does not contradict itself and hence can at least be thought; I do not
need to have any further insight into it" (Kant 1996, B xxix). At
first glance, it might appear Kantian morality is about following a
formula and no more.



But, of course, as Kant's defenders are correct to point out,
Hegel's criticism is unfair and misses its mark (Wood 1989). In
fact, Kant purposefully offers multiple versions of his formula to help
draw our considerations of morality away from a purely rationalist
exercise and bring it "nearer to feeling" (note 15). Our
anthropology matters for Kant and he does not see our living ethically
as merely living without contradiction.



We should recall that Hegel's emptiness charge might be made
against moral philosophy. This is because Hegel has redefined morality
as a purely hypothetical armchair exercise that by itself is
"without content" (*PR* SS135). Of course, this
is not how the targets of Hegel's criticism conceive of morality
- and, to some degree, Hegel is using his own redefinition of
morality to critique how others understand the same term defined
differently.



A more appropriate comparison might be drawn in relating
Kant's principled approach with Hegel's comments about the
relation of religion to the state (*PR* SS270 Remark). Hegel
claims a religious point of view can help furnish individuals with
ethical principles and help us lead a more ethical life (*PR*
SS270 Addition). This kind of formulaic thinking in *PR* to
help guide individuals to ethical, law abiding behaviour is perhaps
closer to the kind of moral project that Kant was engaged in where
there are clearer areas of commonality than in Hegel's critique in
Morality (Brooks 2013).



As should be clear, Morality can only make so much progress in
individual abstraction. What is required is a transition bringing
together the *universality* of Abstract Right enveloping us all
and providing a foundation in mutual recognition with the
*particularity* of Morality where we both outwardly and inwardly
grasp the development of right. This bridge is to the concrete
*individuality* found in comprehending right - not in
abstraction - but now in the world and its institutions.


## 6. Ethical Life



Hegel's concept of 'Ethical Life'
[*Sittlichkeit*] plays a pivotal role in his political and legal
thought. It is here that Hegel takes other concepts considered earlier
found in Abstract Right (such as contract, property and punishment) and
Morality to grasp them anew but now in their social - and more
"concrete" context. The following discussion retains an
abstract character insofar as Hegel discusses institutions that existed
at his time - like the family, civil society and the state
- but in ways meant to bring out the rational within the actual
(and actual within the rational) (see Stern 2006). For example, core
ideas about what constitutes a wrong from his discussion of punishment
return, but with a deeper and evolved understanding of their place in a
social context that brings out a different character and complexity to
his views - which is intended to unpack the character and
complexity of the inner rationality that Hegel believes we can discern
in the world.



Ethical Life is divided into three parts where each builds off of
the analysis thus far into the nature of Abstract Right and Morality,
but where each part, in turn, develops after the other. This ordering
is not chronological, but dialectical. We are not a member of civil
society or the state after we join a family, but the concepts of the
former are further developments from the latter as the following
sections bear out.


## 7. Family



Hegel begins his discussion of the first emergence of right embodied
in the world through the sphere of Family. As we should expect, Hegel
uses common terminology in uncommon ways again.



In Abstract Right, separate abstract individuals connect together
through mutual recognition by acknowledging the ownership of property.
In Ethical Life, the Family is a sphere where concrete individuals come
together bound in a love for each other (*PR* SS158). This
connection is not purely arbitrary, like animals seeking only to
satisfy their needs and then seek another. For Hegel, the Family is a
connection that, at least in principle, aims at a permanence he calls
"marriage" (*PR* SS161).



These marriages are not defined in contractual terms, but ethical. A
contract is an agreement that different parties can enter or exit on
mutual consent. Any shared commitment or unity has a temporary
character. This is little better than the kind of mutual recognition we
saw in Abstract Right.



However, in marriage, a more substantive unity is created that is a
permanent bond unlike most contracts. This does not mean that Hegel
forbids divorce. The termination of a marriage is seen as an
unfortunate possibility born from marriage's foundation in our
feelings, like love, which can be unstable over time (*PR*
SS163 Addition).



While divorce is permitted, arranged marriages are not (*PR*
SS162). This is because marriage is a further development of our
freedom - and it requires our being able to choose a life
partner. In this way, marriage is an advance of our mutual recognition
from a contract where we agree ownership of some thing to where we
choose to create a unity with another longer term.



For Hegel, the Family achieves unity through its creation of
children (*PR* SS173 Addition). To this extent, he plainly
endorses the traditional family model (see Haldane 2006). However, this
is done on very non-traditional grounds. What guides
Hegel's thinking is his logic which brings together opposites in
a creative unity producing some new, higher concept (*PR*
SS165). Likewise, Hegel saw men and women as embodying different
features with their sexual union able to create children, not unlike
the universal and particular giving birth to the concrete individual
(*PR* SS165).



These views have rightly been subjected to widespread criticism by
feminists and others (Halper 2001, Knowles 2002, Ravven
1988, Stone 2002). A common argument is that Hegel's
justification of the Family is a poor defence of privileging men over
women on the basis of his controversial dialectical method. Only men
have the opportunity to engage outside the home in civil society and
fully participate in the state. These critics claim that such a
privilege should not be reserved for men alone for many, often obvious,
reasons. It is also argued that his broad views about the essence of
marriage as a permanent bond built on love can be achieved by
non-traditional families, too. It is worth pointing out that
Hegel's talk of the Family is of an ideal. Hegel fathered a child
outside of wedlock who he supported throughout his life. He sees
himself as revealing the full development of right wherever it may take
us, and what it requires from us or our institutions may be different
from how we find them.


## 8. Civil society



Hegel's civil society is primarily the place of work, as well
as where he situates law and the legal system (see Sect. 5). Whereas
the Family is ideally a relation of unity from a natural law for each
other, this gives way to the pursuit of the particular individual
within the system of needs (*PR* SS182). The Family is a
sphere where it is all for one and one for all. In civil society, the
needs of all are met where I make my particular contribution in a
pro-market economic vision accepting a natural division of labour
(*PR* SS189, 198).



Hegel sees the world of work as a home away from home, or
"second family" (*PR* SS252). Instead of
familial love, there is a kind of brotherly love fostered through an
individual's connection to a corporation, grouped by the kind of
trade all are engaged in which educates and supports its member.



Interestingly, Hegel sees market relations in modern society as a
foundation for the acquisition by free individuals of social identities
including social solidarity. We develop our sense of selves through our
economic activities and the myriad of interconnections we forge with
others in an extra-familial but non-political way.



A key problem is the problem of poverty. If possession of property
is essential for the development of my sense of right and satisfaction
of needs, a capitalist economic system which, Hegel accepts, makes
poverty for at least some unavoidable raises a serious concern about
whether Hegel's ideal social and political philosophy is ideal
for all its citizens.



The problem of poverty is more than a concern about material needs.
Hegel describes those in poverty as forming a "rabble"
saying "poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; a
rabble is created only by the disposition associated with poverty, by
inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government,
etc" (*PR* SS244, Addition). Thus we can understand
the rabble as having a conviction about their alienation that may be
more likely to find among those who are poorer, but not exclusively
them. To be in poverty is to be alienated and see one's state as
a separate, unfriendly other (Brooks 2020). While Hegel was a strong
believer that through work we could develop our freedom to become
reconciled to our social and political work, he lacks any convincing
solution to how the problem of poverty might be overcome short of
changing the economic system (Plant 1972).


## 9. Law



Part of Hegel's examination of civil society concerns law and
the administration of justice. Hegel's theory of law has been
notoriously difficult to characterize. This is likely, in part, because
Hegel uses common terms in an uncommon ways.



Hegel clearly accepts a strong link between morality and law
suggesting he endorses some variety of natural law. Like other natural
lawyers, Hegel claims "what is law [*Gesetz*] may differ
in content from what is right in itself" (*PR* SS212).
Something can be lawful yet unjust - and this having a higher
standard of justice by which he can assess posited law is a common
feature of natural law jurisprudence.



But what is different is that, traditionally, natural lawyers have
developed their understanding of the standard of moral justice to be
applied to an assessment of law prior to that assessment. For example,
the moral standard would be worked out first and then applied
afterwards. This leads some critics of natural law to claim that this
approach uses extralegal standards and reasoning to assess law and so
really engaging in moral philosophy rather than legal thought.



Hegel's perspective is unique (Brudner 2017). He accepts the
positivist view that our understanding of law must be centred on the
law itself rather than extralegal considerations. He says "what
is *legal* [*gesetzmassig*] is ... the
source of cognition of what is right [*Recht*], or more
precisely, of what is *lawful* [*Rechtens*]"
(*PR* SS212 Remark). So we start first from a close look at
the law before us - whatever it is - and not develop some
normative standard separately beforehand. For Hegel, we do not
comprehend this standard separately from the law, but immanently within
it.



He says: "the scope of the law [*Gesetz*] ought on the
one hand to be that of a complete and self-contained whole, but on the
other hand, there is a constant need for new legal determinations
[*gesetzlicher* *Bestimmungen*]" (*PR*
SS216). Hegel is claiming the law aspires to be a complete whole
and, where we find gaps or inconsistencies, our task is to work out how
these can be addressed within the law as a self-contained whole in
language echoing Ronald Dworkin's (1977) use of legal principles
a century later. Thus, Hegel looks to the law for the ethical
principles that can be used to continually reform our legal system into
the complete whole it aspires to be. This
"natural law internalism" discerns its principles from
within the law rather than from outside it (Brooks 2017b).



The development of law is crucially not a project for professionals
alone. Hegel makes a powerful case for the right to trial by jury
(*PR* SS228 Remark). His argument is that
without a jury of ordinary citizens there is no guarantee that a
citizen would have a reasonable chance of understanding the charges,
evidence and outcome, especially if convicted and punished. This is
because the law is a technical language which risks becoming the
exclusive property of a professional class. The best guarantee of
law's publicity and connection to a public view of right is to
ensure a jury is convinced - if they can understand the trial and
come to a view, then Hegel finds it reasonable to expect the defendant
on trial can, too.



It is here that Hegel revisits the justification of punishment. We
now consider crime and punishment not in abstraction, but their
concrete reality. Hegel begins by noting that the "outward
existence" of a crime and its impact may not change the nature of
a crime in its concept, but it does impact how we respond. This
suggests that the same kind of crime can be punished more or less
severely based, at least in part, on the circumstances. Such a view is
starkly at odds with most retributivists where punishment should only
be considered in relation to what an offender deserved on account of
his moral responsibility for an offence.



Hegel makes clear that a crime's "danger to civil
society is a determination of its magnitude" where circumstances
impact in how we determine whether to punish, how much to punish and
what form this might take. He notes "a penal code is therefore
primarily a product of its time and of the current condition of civil
society" (*PR* SS218 Remark). He adds that
"punishments are not unjust in and for themselves, but are
proportionate to the conditions of their time" (*PR*
SS218 Addition). So the same crime committed in different
circumstances would be punished differently. For example, a crime
committed during civil war poses a greater threat to civil society than
when at peace - and so the former would see the crimes punished
more harshly. There is no difference in the offender or her
responsibility. While desert matters, it is not the only factor which
does.



These comments make clear a non-retributivist picture. This is
consistent with a passage in his *Science of Logic*
(*SL*), the text Hegel claims is presupposed as the foundation
for the *PR*:



> 
> Punishment, for example, has various determinations: it is
> retributive, a deterrent example as well, a threat used by the law as a
> deterrent, and also it brings the criminal to his senses and reforms
> him. Each of these different determinations has been considered the
> *ground of punishment*, because each is an essential
> determination, and therefore the others, as distinct from it, are
> determined as merely contingent relatively to it. *But the one which
> is taken as ground is still not the whole punishment itself*
> (*SL*, p. 465)



Hegel's argument is clearer here. Desert grounds punishment:
only the deserving can be liable to be punished. But it does not have a
monopoly on the amount or form that punishment can take. This picture
is consistent with Hegel's comments in the *PR* where the
outward existence of punishment may be different depending on
circumstances. It should be unsurprising to find that Hegel, who
repeatedly defends various groupings of three in his work would seek to
combine retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation in a new format
- taking common concepts in uncommon ways. This was not lost on
his earliest interpreters in the UK, as British Idealists like Green,
Bradley and others held similar three-in-one views on punishment and
rejected traditional accounts of retributivism (Brooks 2003,
2011). This view has been called the "unified theory of
punishment" (Brooks 2017a).


## 10. The State



Hegel's final section of "Ethical Life" is the state.
The love for others based on feeling in the family and then on the
satisfaction of needs in civil society is transformed to a patriotic
love for fellow citizens in support of a shared community, embodied by
the modern state (see *PR* SS268). Moreover, the individual
pursuit of the satisfaction of needs leads to the development of the
state.



For Hegel, it is only in the state that the family develops into
civil society and where civil society gains greater
"actuality" (*PR* SS256-57). The state is where
our "concrete freedom" is realized as we conceive of
ourselves in our full social and political reality (*PR*
SS260). It is only here that the individual is conceived at once as
a member of a family, as a part of civil society and as a citizen of a
state. While the stage where our freedom is realized most concretely,
it is not the case that individual freedom is somehow a problem -
our individual freedom has greatest actuality when mutually recognized
by others in law. Hegel reflects that "it has often been said
that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is
certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their subjective
ends are not satisfied, and if they do not find that the state as such
is the means to this satisfaction, the state itself stands on an
insecure footing" (*PR* SS265 Addition). Hegel's
state is a community where individuals and their individuality are
meant to flourish.



Hegel's conception of the state's composition is
controversial. He seeks to unify the three traditional models of
government - aristocracy, democracy and monarchy - under a
new form of representative government with a constitutional monarch
(Deranty 2001). Hegel proposes an Estates Assembly with the natural
aristocracy of the agrarian class in one chamber and representatives
from different trades in another. Hegel believed that representing a
locality based on geography was arbitrary and lacking substance. He
claimed a stronger ethical relation could be formed through
representation of people through their work.



Hegel's state is headed by a hereditary monarch (SS273
Remark, Brudner 1981, Redding 1994). He claims the state requires
someone to provide unity as an individual to the individual state, a
someone to declare the state confirms a law as its law or agrees
treaties with foreign countries. An elected monarch or president as
head of state is objectionable because such a person would represent
the interests of supporters. This would create a barrier for the
monarch to truly speak with one voice on behalf of the country -
and so the monarch should be above such partisanship. A hereditary
monarch would provide some basis for there being a head of state that
could represent all and provide the unity required.



While virtually no commentator is convinced by Hegel's
justification of constitutional monarch, the orthodox view is that the
monarch is a rubber stamp (Yack 1980). Hegel remarks that "in a
fully organized state ... all that is required in a monarch is
someone to say 'yes' and to dot the 'I'; for
the supreme office should be such that the particular character of its
occupant is of no significance" (*PR* SS280 Addition).
Some have drawn comparisons with the UK's constitutional
monarchy, where laws require the Assent of Her Majesty The Queen but
where this is automatically done when requested by Parliament for
example (Findlay 1958).



The real power is behind the throne and held by an educated
governing cabinet [*Ministerium*], often referred to as the
bureaucracy. It is these advisors to the monarch who propose new laws,
via the responsible cabinet minister. These ministers, and not the
monarch, are answerable to the legislature whose role is to consider
proposals and either enact or reject them.



There is reason to doubt this picture (Brooks 2007). The monarch
cannot act arbitrarily. In being "bound by the concrete content
of the advice he receives," he must be able to discern this
content (*PR* SS279 Addition). And Hegel is critical of the
UK's constitutional monarchy post-Civil War noting that
"since 1692 there has never been a case of the king's
vetoing a parliamentary decree" with the consequence that it
"reduces him virtually to a cipher" and he should be more
active on state matters - and, presumably, making his own
judgements whether to support proposed legislation or not in
recommending it for approval to the legislature (*LNR* SS133
Remark*)*. While the ministers advising him should be of rough
equality making little difference who is in which role, the monarch has
full discretion to hire and fire anyone at will from an eligible pool.
Moreover, it is the monarch advised by his relevant minister who agree
treaties and decide all matters of war and peace (*PR*
SS329). Given the monarch cannot be removed from office, this gives
him considerable powers in foreign affairs raising questions about how
relatively powerless, if at all, he really is.


## 11. War and International Relations



The state has an "immediate actuality" in terms of its
internal organization as discussed above, but it further determines
itself internationally in relation to other states (*PR*
SS259). This part of the *PR* is the least worked out and
detailed.



Hegel accepts a broadly Westphalian and realist view of
international relations whereby the primary actors are states each
prioritizing the pursuit of their individual welfare (*PR*
SS336, Smith 1983). States interact with each other like
individuals in an anarchic global space. Without any governing global
authority, states can come into conflict with each other. He says
"wars must be regarded as necessary because independent peoples
exist alongside one another" (*LNR* SS160 Remark).
This is not a justification or glorification of war, but a recognition
that states are in a state of nature where war is occasionally
unavoidable (see *LNR* SS162 Remark). States should aim to
enable other states "to live at peace with it" and
"war is that of something which ought to come to an end"
(*PR* SS338).



But it is also the case that Hegel saw war as testing the relative
health of states where those most rationally organized should triumph
over less well ethically structured states. Combined with his rejection
of Kant's proposals for perpetual peace, it has led some to
question whether or not war plays a positive, and troubling, role in
his philosophy (Avineri 1961, Black 1973, Shelton 2000, Walt 1989).
Hegel also comments that "modern wars are accordingly waged in a
humane manner, and all persons do not confront each other in
hatred" which can give the impression that modern wars are of an
improved ethical quality than past wars - when the opposite
appears true (*PR* SS338 Addition).



The only judge of relative rights and wrongs in the international
sphere is "world history as the world's court of
judgement" (*PR* SS340). The *PR* then
transitions to the start of an account of the philosophy of history in
the next part of his system, which presupposes all parts preceding it
not least the *PR* itself.