## 1. Life and Works



Born sometime in the 50s C.E. in Hierapolis, a Greek city of Asia
Minor, Epictetus spent a portion of his life as the slave of
Epaphroditus, an important administrator in the court of Nero. The
date at which he came to Rome is unknown, but it must have been either
prior to 68, at which time Epaphroditus fled the capital, or after the
accession of Domitian in 81, under whom Epaphroditus was allowed to
return and perhaps to resume his position. The circumstances of
Epictetus's education are likewise unknown, except that he
studied for a time under Musonius Rufus, a Roman senator and Stoic
philosopher who taught intermittently at Rome. Eventually receiving
his freedom, he began lecturing on his own account but was forced to
leave the city, presumably by the edict of Domitian (in 89) banning
philosophers from the Italian peninsula. He then established his own
school at Nicopolis, an important communications hub and
administrative center in Epirus, on the Adriatic coast of northwest
Greece, and remained there teaching and lecturing until his death
around 135. The teaching represented in the *Discourses* is
that of his later career, around the year 108 by Millar's (1965)
dating, at which time he walked with a limp attributed variously to
arthritis or to physical abuse during his time of slavery. Epictetus
never married, but for reasons of benevolence he late in life adopted
a child whose parents could not provide for its maintenance.



The major compilation of Epictetus's teaching is the work
standardly referred to in English as the *Discourses*; it was
variously titled in antiquity. The work we have is in four books, or
volumes, but the original work comprised eight or more books.
According to their preface, the *Discourses* are not the
writing of Epictetus but are ghostwritten by the essayist and
historiographer Arrian of Nicomedia in an effort to convey the
personal impact of his instruction. Although we lack independent means
of verification, we have reason to be confident that the works we have
represent Epictetus's thought rather than Arrian's own:
first, because the language employed is *koine* or common
Greek rather than the sophisticated literary language of
Arrian's other writings; and second because the brusque,
elliptical manner of expression, the precise philosophical vocabulary,
and the intellectual rigor of the content are quite different from
what Arrian produces elsewhere. A few scholars, including especially
Dobbin (1998), argue that Epictetus must have composed them himself,
the role of Arrian being merely to preserve a mild fiction of
orality.



The shorter *Encheiridion* (titled in English either
*Manual* or *Handbook)* is a brief abridgment of the
*Discourses*. As such it offers a much attenuated account which
is of little independent value for the understanding of
Epictetus's thought and which at some points gives a misleading
impression of his philosophical motivations. There are also some
quotations by other ancient authors from the *Discourses* as
they knew them. A few of these fragments, notably those numbered by
Schenkl 8, 9, and 14, are useful supplements to our knowledge of
Epictetus.



The standard Greek edition of all the above works is by Schenkl
(1916); there is also a valuable Loeb edition by Oldfather (2 volumes,
1926-28), and, for the *Discourses,* an edition by
Souilhe (4 vols., 1948-65) which includes a French
translation. Important English translations include, besides
Oldfather, the one occasionally quoted in this article, a revision by
Robin Hard (1995) of the classic translation by Elizabeth Carter
(1759). There is also a slightly-abridged translation by Robert Dobbin
(2008). Dobbin (1998) provides an extensive general introduction and
notes to accompany a translation of *Discourses* Book I. For a
reliable overview of Epictetus's main ideas with observations on many
specific points, the first port of call is Long (2002). The more
detailed treatments by Bonhoffer (1890 and 1894), though
superseded by more recent studies on many points, retain considerable
value.



The so-called "Golden Sayings" is a later compendium of
aphorisms drawn from the *Discourses* and
*Encheiridion*.


## 2. Antecedents



The essentials of Epictetus's thought derive from the early or
foundational period of Stoicism, from the third-century writings of
Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. Treatises he mentions by
title include Chrysippus' *On Choice, On Impulse*, and
*On the Possibles*, and he also mentions reading in works by
Zeno, Cleanthes, and the second-century Stoics Antipater and
Archedemus. Extant reports and fragments of these and other Stoic
works offer many points of congruence with what we find in him.



It may still be the case that he accepts influence from other currents
in philosophy, or that he develops some ideas on his own. The clearest
instance of such influence concerns Plato, for Epictetus draws much
inspiration from the Socrates depicted in Plato's shorter
dialogues. Comparisons can be drawn especially to the Socrates of
Plato's *Gorgias*, with his fondness for argumentative
give and take, his willingness to challenge the hearer's
presuppositions, and his optimism about what can be achieved through
values clarification. The  *Theaetetus* may also have been
influential on Epictetus's thinking about contemplation and the
relation of human to divine; see Benatouil 2013. Epictetus
also knows the Master Argument from Megarian philosophy
(3rd c. BCE) and even names Diodorus and Panthoides,
although this knowledge might easily have been drawn from Stoic
treatises on logic (2.19.1-11; see further Barnes 1997 ch. 3 and
Crivelli in Scaltsas and Mason 2007).



An argument has sometimes been made for Aristotelian influence,
primarily because Epictetus's favored term *prohairesis*
(see section 4.3 below) is prominent in *Nicomachean Ethics*
3.1-5 as a quasi-technical term (there usually translated
"choice" or "decision"). In particular, Dobbin
(1991) has suggested that Epictetus's use of this term reflects
the influence of the early Aristotle commentaries (1st c.
BCE-1st c. CE), none of which has survived for our
inspection. But neither Aristotle nor any author in the Aristotelian
tradition is ever mentioned in the *Discourses*. It is better
to make the provisional assumption that his interest in volition
derives, like other main elements of his philosophy, from the early
Stoa, though with greater emphasis. Although the term
*prohairesis* is only barely attested in surviving accounts of
early Stoic philosophy, there is some evidence to suggest that it did
play a significant role; see Graver 2003.



Epictetus never refers by name to the second century BCE Stoics
Panaetius and Posidonius, and although he has something in common with
Panaetius's reported interest in practical ethics and role-based
responsibilities, the evidence hardly suffices for an influence claim.
References to other philosophers or schools are only in passing. He is
impressed with Cynicism, but sees it as a vocation to itinerant
teaching and bare-bones living rather than as a body of doctrine
(3.22). Epicureanism he identifies with the pleasure principle and
accordingly despises (3.7).


## 3. Preliminaries to interpretation



Any effort to come to grips with Epictetus's thought must
proceed from an awareness of his chosen objectives. The philosopher we
meet in the *Discourses* seeks above all to foster ethical
development in others, keeping his personal intellectual satisfaction
strictly subordinate. Consequently we possess no point-by-point
exposition of his views. The themes he regards as most difficult for
students to internalize appear repeatedly and are developed and
expanded in many different ways. Other issues he either treats
sporadically--even if passing references suggest he has knowledge
of them--or omits altogether, if he regards them as inessential
to moral development. His apparent inclination to hold back some of
his thinking, as well as the incomplete condition in which the
*Discourses* have been transmitted to us, make it quite unsafe
to draw any assumption about his views from silences or gaps in the
account we have. On the other hand, the recursive manner of
presentation makes it unlikely that the non-extant volumes broached
any entirely new themes.



Interpreters must be careful not to prejudge the question of
Epictetus's relation to earlier Greek philosophy. While it is
evident that his principal contentions are substantially related to
earlier philosophical developments, claims concerning his relation to
the earlier Stoics, or possible philosophical innovations or shifts of
emphasis, must be governed by a healthy respect for the fragmentary
nature of our sources. We possess no comparable record of the oral
teaching that took place in the Hellenistic Stoa. Where corroborating
evidence exists in literary or doxographical works, we are justified
in describing his views as reformulations of the Stoic tradition;
otherwise the question of continuity should generally be left
open.


## 4. Main contentions


### 4.1. Rationality



The linchpin of Epictetus's entire philosophy is his account of
what it is to be a human being; that is, to be a rational mortal
creature. "Rational" as a descriptive term means that
human beings have the capacity to "use impressions" in a
reflective manner. Animals, like humans, use their impressions of the
world in that their behavior is guided by what they perceive their
circumstances to be. But human beings also examine the content of
their impressions to determine whether they are true or false; we have
the faculty of "assent" (1.6.12-22).



Assent is regulated by our awareness of logical consistency or
contradiction between the proposition under consideration and beliefs
that one already holds: when we are not aware of any contradiction, we
assent readily, but when we perceive a conflict we are strongly
constrained to reject one or the other of the conflicting views
(2.26.3). Thus Medea kills her children because she believes it is to
her advantage to do so; if someone were to show her clearly that she
is deceived in this belief, she would not do it (1.28.8). Our hatred
of being deceived, our inability to accept as true what we clearly see
to be false, is for Epictetus the most basic fact about human beings
and the most promising (1.28.1-5).


### 4.2. Kinship with god



Epictetus is also very concerned to situate the rationality of the
human being within a maximally rational universe. His confidence in
the fundamental orderliness of all things is expressed in frequent
references to Zeus or "the god" as the designer and
administrator of the universe. There seems to be no question of
competition with any other deities or powers. Epictetus does sometimes
speak, conventionally for a Greek, of "gods" in the
plural, but Zeus remains unquestionably supreme: he enjoys having some
company, just as we do (3.13.4), but does not require assistance and
cannot be opposed.



Immanent rather than transcendent, Zeus inheres in, and may indeed be
identified with, the natural order. As such he is in theory fully
accessible to human comprehension in the same way as all objects and
events are accessible to our comprehension. With effort, rational
beings can come to understand Zeus as a person, a rational being with
thoughts and intentions like ours. That recognition inspires awe and
gratitude, a "hymn of praise" that it is our duty to offer
in each occasion of life (1.16.19).



God is the creator of humankind as of all else, and his attitude
toward us is one of complete benevolence. It is by his gift that we
are rational beings, and our rational nature qualifies us as his
kindred. More: our minds are actually fragments of Zeus's mind,
"parts and offshoots of his own being" (1.14.6,
2.8.10-12). When we make choices on our own account, we exercise
the very same power as governs the universe. Hence it can be said that
Zeus has ceded to us a portion of his governance (1.1.12).


### 4.3. Volition



It is, again, the capacity for choice that makes us accountable for
our own actions and states. Epictetus is particularly fond of
exploring the implications of this essentially Stoic conception. In
studying his usage it is helpful to remember that his favored term
*prohairesis* refers more often to the capacity for choice than
it does to particular acts of choosing. The word is variously
translated; the rendering "volition" is adopted here as in
Long 2002.



Volition, Epictetus argues, is "by nature unimpeded"
(1.17.21), and it is for this reason that freedom is for him an
inalienable characteristic of the human being. The very notion of a
capacity to make one's own decisions implies as a matter of
logical necessity that those decisions are free of external
compulsion; otherwise they would not be decisions. But humans do have
such a capacity and are thus profoundly different from even the higher
animals, which deal with impressions merely in an unreflective way
(2.8).



It is the volition that is the real person, the true self of the
individual. Our convictions, attitudes, intentions and actions are
truly ours in a way that nothing else is; they are determined solely
by our use of impressions and thus internal to the sphere of volition.
The appearance and comfort of one's body, one's
possessions, one's relationships with other people, the success
or failure of one's projects, and one's power and
reputation in the world are all merely contingent facts about a
person, features of our experience rather than characteristics of the
self. These things are all "externals"; that is, things
external to the sphere of volition.


### 4.4. Value



This distinction between what is internal to the sphere of volition
and what is external to it is the foundation of Epictetus's
system of value. What is ultimately worth having, the "good of
humankind," consists in "a certain disposition of one's
volition" (1.8.16). More explicitly, this disposition is the
condition of virtue, the proper expression of our rational nature, in
which we not only act correctly and on the basis of knowledge, but
also recognize our kinship to god and witness with joy god's
orderly management of the universe.



We are not wrong to believe that whatever is good is advantageous to
us and worthy of unconditional pursuit, for this is just the
"preconception" (*prolepsis*) of good which
all human beings possess (1.22). But we err in applying that
preconception to particular cases, for we frequently assume that
external objects have unconditional value. In reality, the various
circumstances of our lives are merely what the volition has to work
with and cannot in themselves be either good or bad. "The
materials of action are indifferent, but the use we make of them is
not indifferent" (2.5.1).



Admittedly some external things are more natural to us than others,
just as it is natural for a foot, considered solely for itself, to be
clean rather than muddy, and for an ear of grain to continue growing
rather than being cut. But this is only when we consider ourselves in
isolation rather than as parts of a larger whole. As Chrysippus says,
the foot if it had a mind would welcome becoming muddy for the sake of
the whole (2.6.11). Even one's own death is of no particular
concern if that is what the orderly workings of the universe
require.



This does not mean that one should be heedless of externals.
"Externals must be used with care, because their usage is not an
indifferent matter, yet at the same time with composure and
tranquility, because the material being used is indifferent"
(2.5.6). One can recognize that a thing is without ultimate value and
still act vigorously in pursuit of it, when doing so is in accordance
with one's rational character. Epictetus offers the analogy of
ball players who recognize that the ball they are running after is of
no value in itself, and yet exert their full energy to catch it
because of the value they set on playing the game properly (2.5).


### 4.5. Emotional adjustment



The revaluation of external objects brings with it a tremendous sense
of confidence and inner peace. Grief, fear, envy, desire, and every
form of anxiety, result from the incorrect supposition that happiness
is to be found outside oneself (2.16, 3.13.10, etc.). Like earlier
Stoics, Epictetus rejects the supposition that such emotions are
imposed on us by circumstances or internal forces and are largely
beyond our control. Our feelings, as well as our behavior, are an
expression of what seems right to us, conditioned by our judgments of
value (1.11.28-33). If we correct our judgments, our feelings
will be corrected as well. (See Long 2006, 377-394.)



The analysis is applicable also to feelings like anger and betrayal
which relate to the conduct of other people. The choices made by
others are of ethical significance only for the agents themselves; to
anyone else they are externals and so of no consequence. One should
not, then, be angry at Medea for her bad decision. Pity would be
better than that, though the really proper response, if one has the
opportunity, would be to help her to see her mistake (1.28).



Epictetus's conception of emotional adjustment is not that one
should be "unfeeling like a statue" (3.2.4). Even the
wisest person may tremble or grow pale at some sudden danger, though
without false assent (fragment 9). More importantly, there are
affective responses it is right to have. "It is fitting to be
elated at the good"; that is, at the goods of soul (2.11.22;
3.7.7), and one should also experience the aversive feeling he calls
"caution" (*eulabeia*, 2.1.1-7) when
considering potential bad choices. Gratitude toward god is also
affective in nature (2.23). In addition, it is appropriate during the
period of ethical training to experience the pain of remorse as a
stimulus to ethical development (3.23.30-38; see Kamtekar
(1998)).


### 4.6. Appropriate other-concern



In our relations with other people we are to be governed by the
attitudes Epictetus calls "modesty" (*aidos*)
and "love of humanity" (*philanthropia*).
Modesty consists in an awareness of the perspective of others and a
readiness to curtail one's own unseemly behavior; love of
humanity is a willingness to exert oneself on others' behalf.
The latter extends especially toward those with whom we are associated
by our particular role in life: toward children if one is a parent,
toward husband or wife if one is married, and so on (2.10, 2.22.20).
While our best service to others is in helping them develop their own
rational nature, it is also entirely appropriate that we should act to
further the interests of those to whom we are connected by birth or
situation.



Epictetus does not believe that there is any conflict between
other-regarding behavior and appropriate self-concern. We are
naturally oriented toward our own well-being, but acting for our own
sake often entails contributing to the common good (1.19.11-14). More
particularly, the preservation of our relationships
(*scheseis*) belongs to our own good, though only insofar as it
is possible to preserve them by right behavior. If maintaining a
connection to a family member requires giving up external possessions,
one can do so without hesitation, since one is not thereby sacrificing
such real goods as modesty and fidelity. See 3.3.5-10, with Magrin
(2018) and Johnson (2014). 



It is a misconception to suppose that proper affection for friends and
family members necessarily leaves us vulnerable to debilitating
emotions when their welfare is threatened. Just as one can be fond of
a crystal goblet and yet not be upset when it breaks, having realized
all along that it was a fragile thing, so we should love our children,
siblings, and friends while also reminding ourselves of their
mortality (3.24). The primary relationship is with god; our human
relationships should never give us reason to reproach god but should
enable us to rejoice in the natural order. Concern for others, and
enjoyment of their company, is indeed part of human nature (3.13.5);
whereas irresponsible behavior driven by emotion is not. The father
who remains at the bedside of a desperately sick child behaves more,
not less, naturally than the one who runs away to weep (1.11).


### 4.7. Self-cultivation and autonomy



Achieving the correct disposition of one's capacity for choice
requires more than inclination. The learner must also undertake an
extensive program of self-examination and correction of views. While
ethical development is made easier by the direct instruction and
self-help techniques a teacher like Epictetus himself might provide,
it is also possible without such aid. It is indeed a capability
inherent in human nature, for the faculty that perceives and corrects
errors of judgment is the reasoning faculty itself. Through reason, we
may learn to avoid precipitancy in pursue our ends "with
reservation" (*Encheiridion* 2), mindful that god may not
bring them to fruition; and to avoid precipitancy in action and
assent. It is even possible to alter such emotional dispositions as
timorousness or quickness of temper, through repeated practice in
giving more appropriate responses (2.16, 2.18).



Our ability to improve our own dispositions also provides the implicit
answer to any question that might be asked about human autonomy in a
Zeus-governed universe. Since for Epictetus action is determined by
character (what seems right to an individual; 1.2) and not by
spontaneous impulses, some readers might be inclined to object that
this autonomy is only of a limited kind, for a person's
character must itself have been assigned to him by Zeus, through the
circumstances of his birth and education. Epictetus would reply that
autonomy is guaranteed not by the absence of antecedent causes but by
the very nature of the reasoning faculty. Specific skills like
horsemanship make judgments about their own subject matter; the
reasoning faculty judges other things and also its own prior
judgments. When it performs this function well, the inherited
character will improve over time; otherwise it will deteriorate.


### 4.8. Mind and body



Zeus's power is limited in that he cannot do what it is
logically impossible to do. He could not cause a person to be born
before his parents (1.12.28-29), and he could not have made
volition execute any choices but its own (1.1.23, 1.17.27). For the
same kind of reason, he could not, for all his benevolence, cause a
person's body to be unimpeded in the way volition is unimpeded
(4.1.100). Our bodies do not in fact belong to us, since we cannot
always decide what will happen to them. There is therefore a clear
contrast in status between body and mind or soul. Epictetus repeatedly
uses language belittling the body or representing it as a mere
instrument of the mind: it is "pathetic little flesh,"
"cleverly molded clay," a "little donkey"
(1.1.10, 1.3.5, 4.1.79). At least once he speaks of the body and
possessions together as "fetters" upon the mind (1.9.11),
language that recalls the image in Plato's *Phaedo*
82d-83b of the body as prison house.



Like other Stoics, Epictetus regards the mind not as a separate
incorporeal entity but as consisting of *pneuma*("breath" or "spirit"), a material
substance with certain remarkable powers. Thus he explains the faculty
of vision by the activity of *pneuma* infused by god into the
eyes, as well as by the energy and tensility of the air through which
things are seen (2.23.3-4). In an especially striking analogy in
3.3.20-22, he compares the mind to a vessel of water and mental
impressions to rays of light entering the water. When the water is
disturbed, the ray of light appears to move, but in fact does not; and
likewise when a person experiences vertigo, it seems as if the skills
and virtues are disrupted, but in fact the disruption is only in the
*pneuma* in which they exist.


## 5. Educational method



Epictetus draws a sharp distinction between book learning, i.e.
mastering the content of particular treatises, and what may be called
education for living, in which one acquires the attitudes and habits
that enable correct behavior. The latter is of paramount importance;
the former may be of instrumental value but if overemphasized may
prove a hindrance to ethical development.



The program of study offered in the school at Nicopolis included the
reading of philosophical treatises by Stoic authors of the Hellenistic
period, for instance the work *On Impulse* by Chrysippus
(1.4.14) and the logical writings of Archedemus (1.10.8). Frequent
references to formal logical schemata suggest that these, too, were
taught, as they had been in the curriculum of Musonius Rufus,
Epictetus's own teacher at Rome (1.7.32; cf. 1.7.5-12).
Finally, there is some evidence for instruction in what the ancients
called physics (philosophy of nature); for this, see 1.6.19-22
with Magrin (2012).



Education for living is primarily self-education, a function of that
capacity for self-correction which is inherent in our rational nature.
Epictetus rejects the way of thinking that says moral improvement is
achievable only by divine assistance.



> 
> Have you not hands, fool? Has not god made them for you? Sit down now
> and pray your nose may not run! Wipe it, rather, and do not blame god.
> (2.16.11)
> 



The example of Socrates serves to remind the hearer that intellectual
independence remains the primary objective. For while Socrates teaches
others, he is himself untaught or rather self-taught; his unshakeable
comprehension of ethical issues has been attained through rigorous
application of methods anyone might use. Admittedly, Socrates was
exceptionally gifted, and yet his achievement is what all are born for
and can at least hope to match (1.2.33-37).



Direct coaching by a philosophical teacher may nonetheless be of
assistance to persons seeking to correct their own dispositions.
Epictetus explains the process in *Discourses* 3.2. Above all,
one must attend to "desire and aversion": one must correct
one's emotional responses by pondering questions of value and
indifference, for desire or fear of objects outside one's own
control results in a host of strong emotions that make one
"incapable of listening to reason" while experiencing
them. Further, one must study "the impulse to act and not to
act," for vigorous action may be part of proper relations to the
gods, to family members, and to the state, and those actions should be
orderly and well-considered. Finally, one must attend to one's
own reasoning processes, to "freedom from deception and hasty
judgment and in general whatever is concerned with assent." This
last entails some study of logic, to prevent the conclusions reached
in the two principal areas of study from being dislodged "even
in dreams or drunkenness or melancholy."



These three topics have rightly been regarded as the foundation of
Epictetus's educational system, although (*pace* Hadot (1978)),
they are not to be identified with the three divisions of
philosophical discourse discussed by the early Stoics (viz. physics,
ethics, and logic; Diogenes Laertius 7.39-40). As presented in
3.2, the schema seems intended primarily to deemphasize the role of
logic; that is, of the sterile conundrums and oversubtle analyses
enjoyed by some of Epictetus's contemporaries. As Barnes (1997)
has shown, however, Epictetus is not at all averse to the study of
logic provided it is given its proper supporting role. Learning of
this kind may be instrumental in developing one's intellectual
acumen, just as the weights used by athletes in their training serve
to develop the muscles (1.4.13; 1.17).



The actual process of self-improvement is initially a matter of
consciously slowing down one's thought processes to allow for
reflection prior to assent. "Impression, wait for me a little.
Let me see what you are, and what you represent" (2.18.24). As
the habit of screening impressions becomes established, correct
responses will begin to come automatically. Yet constant vigilance is
still required, to guard against backsliding (4.3). One can never rely
solely on habituation.



More specific therapeutic techniques may also be of use to the one
making ethical progress. Epictetus recommends that pupils refrain from
using the terms "good" and "bad," not because
those terms have no application in human life, but because they are
too easily misapplied. Thus one should "suppress" desire
and aversion, and use only plain, emotionally unadorned impulse and
counter-impulse (*Encheiridion* 2). To combat some individual
bad habit, one should practice the opposite behavior: for instance, if
one is quick tempered, one should accustom oneself to bearing insults
with patience (3.12.6-12). Regular self-examination at
bedtime--a practice borrowed from the Pythagorean
tradition--will enable one to correct errors before they become
ingrained (3.10.1).



Occasionally Epictetus offers pre-professional advice to pupils who
intend to pursue a teaching career of their own. He chastises the
teacher who assigns a technical treatise in logic without providing
any preliminary training or assessing the pupil's capabilities
(1.23.13). In *Discourses* 3.23.33 he distinguishes three
"modes" or "characters" of philosophical
discourse. The "protreptic" mode is that which convinces
hearers, singly or in groups, to care about philosophical study as a
means toward personal ethical development. The "elenctic"
mode, named from the Socratic *elenchos*, is more
confrontational and is aimed at removing false convictions, while the
"instructional" mode imparts sound doctrines. As Long
(2002) has noted, the three modes are associated respectively with
Diogenes the Cynic, with Socrates, and with Zeno of Citium, the
founder of the Stoic school (3.21.19; cf. 2.12.5).


## 6. Influence



Though much cultivated in person by the nobles of local Greek cities
(as Brunt 1997 describes), Epictetus exerted far more influence
through the written works produced by Arrian. The emperor Marcus
Aurelius was never in fact his pupil, but was so deeply impressed with
what he had read as to consider himself a follower of the freedman
philosopher. In the early third century Origen remarks on the
popularity of Epictetus with his own contemporaries, which he finds to
rival that of Plato (*Contra Celsum* 6.2). Whether Origen was
himself much influenced by Epictetus's version of Stoicism is
another matter, for Origen had studied the writings of Chrysippus on
his own account and the strands cannot easily be separated. More
demonstrable is the homage paid to Epictetus by Simplicius, the
sixth-century Aristotle commentator, who composed a long philosophical
commentary on the *Encheiridion* combining Stoic elements with
his own Neoplatonism.



The *Encheiridion* was translated into Latin by Poliziano in
1497 and during the subsequent two centuries became exceptionally
popular in Europe. Spanneut (1972) traces its use in monasteries in
superficially Christianized form. Seventeenth-century intellectuals
like Guillaume du Vair, Justus Lipsius, and Thomas Gataker generally
found Epictetus's Stoicism to be fully compatible with
Christianity; see the discussion in Brooke (2006). Pascal reacted
against this perception; he admired Epictetus as a moralist but
regarded it as sheer arrogance to believe that the human psyche is
part of the divine and can be perfected by one's own efforts.
Descartes adopted a recognizably Epictetan value system as part of his
personal ethics. An engagingly satirical portrayal of the potential
impact of Epictetus's philosophy in contemporary American life
may be found in Tom Wolfe's 1998 novel *A Man in
Full.*