## Benjamin Whichcote



The oldest member of the group, Benjamin Whichcote, is usually
considered to be the founding father of Cambridge Platonism. During
the Civil War period, Whichcote was appointed Provost of King's
College, Cambridge, and he served as Vice Chancellor of the University
in 1650. However, he was removed from his post at King's College
at the Restoration in 1660, and was obliged to seek employment
elsewhere, as a clergyman in London. The interruption to his academic
career may explain why he never published any philosophical treatises
as such. The main source for his philosophical views are his
posthumously-published sermons and aphorisms. Whichcote's
tolerant, optimistic and rational outlook set the intellectual tone
for Cambridge Platonism. Whichcote's philosophical views are
grounded in his repudiation of Calvinist theology. He held that God
being supremely perfect is necessarily good, wise and loving.
Whichcote regarded human nature as rational and perfectible, and he
believed that it is through reason as much as revelation that God
communicates with man. 'God is the most knowable of any thing in
the world' (Patrides, 1969, p.58). Without reason we would have
no means of demonstrating the existence of God, and no assurance that
revelation is from God. By reason Whichcote did not mean the
disputatious logic of the schools but discursive, demonstrative and
practical reason enlightened by contemplation of the divine. He held
that moral principles are immutable absolutes which exist
independently of human minds and institutions, and that virtuous
conduct is grounded in reason. Whichcote's *Aphorisms*
amount to a manual of practical ethics which amply illustrates his
conviction that the fruit reason is not 'bare knowledge'
but action, or knowledge which 'doth go forth into act'.
It is through reason that we gain knowledge of the natural world, and
recognise natural phenomena as 'the EFFECTS OF GOD'.
Although Whichcote's published writings do not discuss natural
philosophy as such, his recognition of the demonstrative value of
natural philosophy for the argument from design anticipates the use of
natural philosophy in the apologetics of Cudworth and More.


## Culverwell, Smith and Sterry



Whichcote's optimism about human reason and his conviction that
philosophy properly belongs within the domain of religion, are shared
by the other Cambridge Platonists, all of whom affirmed the
compatibility of reason and faith. The fullest statement of this
position is Henry More's *The Apology of Henry More*
(1664) which sets out rules for the application of reason in religious
matters, stipulating the use of only those 'Philosophick
theorems' which are 'solid and rational in themselves, nor
really repugnant to the word of God'. Like Whichcote, Peter
Sterry, John Smith and Nathaniel Culverwell are known only through
posthumously published writings. The first published treatise by any
of the Cambridge Platonists was Nathaniel Culverwell's *An
Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature* of 1652.
Like the other Cambridge Platonists Culverwell emphasises the freedom
of the will and proposes an innatist epistemology, according to which
the mind is furnished with 'clear and indelible
Principles' and reason an 'intellectual lamp' placed
in the soul by God to enable it to understand God's will
promulgated in the law of nature. These innate principles of the mind
also include moral principles. The soul is a divine spark, which
derives knowledge by inward contemplation, not outward observation.
Like the other Cambridge Platonists, Culverwell held that goodness is
intrinsic to all things, and that moral principles do not depend on
the will of God. He nevertheless underscored the importance of natural
law as the foundation of moral obligation..



John Smith taught mathematics at Queen's College until his
premature death in 1652. His posthumously published *Select
Discourses* (1659) discusses a number of metaphysical and
epistemological issues relating to religious belief - the
existence of God, immortality of the soul and the rationality of
religion. Smith outlines a hierarchy of four grades of cognitive
ascent from sense combined with reason, through reason in conjunction
with innate notions, and, thirdly, through disembodied,
self-reflective reason; and finally divine love.



Peter Sterry's only philosophical work, his posthumously-published
*A Discourse of the Freedom of the Will* (1675), is the most
visionary of all the writings of the Cambridge Platonists. Sterry was
deeply involved with events outside Cambridge as chaplain first to the
Parliamentary leader, Lord Brooke, and then to Oliver Cromwell. After
the death of Cromwell he retired to a Christian community in East
Sheen. In his *Discourse* Sterry argues that to act freely
consists in acting in accordance with ones nature, appropriately to
ones level of being, be that plant, animal or intellectual entity.
Human liberty is grounded in the divine essence and entails liberty of
the understanding and of the will.


## Henry More



A life-long fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, Henry More
was the most prolific of the Cambridge Platonists. He was also the
most directly engaged in contemporary philosophical debate: not only
did he enter into correspondence with Descartes (between 1648 and
1649) but he also wrote against Hobbes, and was one of the earliest
English critics of Spinoza (whom he attacks in *Demonstrationum
duarum propositionum ... confutatio* and *Epistola altera*
both published in his *Opera omnia*, 1671). Although he
eventually became a critic of Cartesianism, he initially advocated the
teaching of Cartesianism in English Universities. More's
published writings included, besides philosophy, poetry, theology and
bible commentary. His main philosophical works are his *An Antidote
Against Atheism* (1653), his *Of the Immortality of the
Soul* (1659), *Enchiridion metaphysicum* (1671), and
*Enchiridion ethicum* (1667). Like the other Cambridge
Platonists, More used philosophy in defence of theism against the
claims of rational atheists. The most important statement of More's
theological position his *An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of
Godliness* appeared in 1660. In opposition to Calvinist
pessimistic voluntarism, this propounds a moral, rational
providentialism in which he vindicates the goodness and justice of God
by invoking the Origenist doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul.
It also makes the case for religious toleration. 



In his philosophical writings, More elaborated a philosophy of spirit
which explained all the phenomena of mind and of the physical world as
the activity of spiritual substance controlling inert matter. More
conceived of both spirit and body as spatially extended, but defined
spiritual substance as the obverse of material extension: where body
is inert and solid, but divisible; spirit is active and penetrable,
but indivisible. It was in his correspondence with Descartes that he
first expounded his view that all substance, whether material or
immaterial, is extended. He went on to argue space is infinite,
anticipating that other native of Grantham, Isaac Newton, and that God
who is an infinite spirit is an extended being (*res extensa*).
In *Enchiridion metaphysicum*, he argues that the properties of
space are analogous to the attributes of God (infinity, immateriality,
immobility etc.).



Within the category of spiritual substance More includes not just the
souls of living creatures and God himself but the main intermediate
causal agent of the cosmos, the Spirit of Nature (or 'Hylarchic
Principle'). Conceived as the interface between the divine and
the material, the Spirit of Nature is a 'Superintendant
Cause' which combines efficient and teleological causality to
ensure the smooth-running of the universe according to God's plan.
It can also be understood as encapsulating 'certain general
Modes and Lawes of Nature' (More, *A Collection*,
Preface, p. xvi) since it is the Spirit of Nature that is responsible
for uniting individual souls with bodies, and for ensuring the regular
operation of non-animate nature. More sought, by this hypothesis, to
account for phenomena that apparently defy the laws of mechanical
physics (for example the inter-vortical trajectory of comets, the
sympathetic vibration of strings and tidal motion). More underpinned
his soul-body dualism by his theory of 'vital congruity'
which explains soul-body interaction as a sympathetic attraction
between soul and body engineered by the operation the Spirit of
Nature.



The most consistent theme of his philosophical writings, are arguments
for demonstrating the existence and providential nature of God. The
foundation stone of More's philosophical and apologetic
enterprise is his philosophy of spirit, especially his arguments for
the existence of incorporeal causal agents, that is, souls or spirits.
Furthermore, More attempted to answer materialists like Thomas Hobbes
whom he regarded as an atheist. More's strategy was to show that
the same arguments that materialists use demonstrate the existence and
properties of body, also support the obverse, the existence of
incorporeal substances. In this way More sought to demonstrate that
the *idea* of incorporeal substance, or spirit, was as
intelligible as that of corporeal substance, i.e. body. Like Plato (in
*Laws* 10), More argues that the operations of the nature
cannot be explained simply in terms of the chance collision of
material particles. Rather we must posit some other source of
activity, which More identifies as 'spirit'. It is a short
step, he argues, from grasping the concept of spirit, to accepting the
idea of an infinite spirit, namely God.



More underpins these *a priori* arguments for the existence of
spirit, with a wide range of *a posteriori* arguments, taken
from observed phenomena of nature to demonstrate the actions of
spirit. Through this excursus into observational method he accumulated
a wide variety of data ranging from experiments conducted by Robert
Boyle and members of the Royal Society, to supernatural effects
including cases of witchcraft and demons. He was censured by Boyle for
misappropriating his experiments to endorse his hypothesis of the
Spirit of Nature. Although his belief in evil spirits appears
inconsistent with his otherwise rational philosophy, it should be
remembered that belief in witchcraft was (a) not unusual in his time,
and (b) was entirely consistent with the theory of spirit according to
which to deny the existence of spirits good or evil, leads, logically
to the denial of the existence of God. As he put it, alluding to James
I's defence of episcopacy, "That saying is no less true in
Politicks 'No Bishop, no King,' than this in Metaphysicks,
'No Spirit, no God' " (More, 1662,
*Antidote*, p. 142). His most well-known fellow-believer was
Royal Society member, Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680), whose
*Sadducismus triumphatus*, More edited.



More also published a short treatise on ethics entitled
*Enchiridion Ethicum* (1667, translated as *An Account of
Virtue*), which was probably intended for to be used as a
textbook. Indebted to Descartes' theory of the passions this
argues that knowledge of virtue is attainable by reason, and the
pursuit of virtue entails the control of the passions by the soul.
Motivation to good is supplied by rightly-directed emotion, while
virtue is achieved by the exercise free will or *autoexousy*
(More uses the same term as Cudworth), that is the 'Power to act
or not act within ourselves'. Anticipating Shaftesbury's
concept of moral sense More posits a special faculty of the soul
combining reason and sensation which he calls the 'Boniform
Faculty'.



More used a number of different genres for conveying his philosophical
ideas to non-specialist readers. The most popular among these were his
*Philosophical Poems* (1647) and his *Divine Dialogues*
(1668). In *Conjectura cabbalistica* (1653), he presented core
themes of his philosophy in the form of an exposition of occulted
truths contained in the first book of Genesis. Subsequently he
undertook a detailed study of the Jewish Kabbalist texts translated
and published by Knorr von Rosenroth in *Kabbala denudata*
(1679). These studies were based on the belief, then current, that
kabbalistic writings contained, in symbolic form, original truths of
philosophy, as well as of religion. Kabbalism therefore exemplified
the compatibility of philosophy and faith. In addition to philosophy
More published several studies of biblical prophecy (e.g.
*Apocalypsis apocalypseos,* 1680, *Paralipomena
prophetica*, 1685). In 1675, More prepared a Latin translation of
his works, *Opera omnia* which ensured his philosophy reached a
European audience as well as an English one.


## Ralph Cudworth



Like his friend Henry More, Ralph Cudworth spent his entire career as
a teacher at the University of Cambridge, ending up as Master of Clare
College. Cudworth published only one major work of philosophy in his
lifetime, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*
(1678). Among the papers he left at his death, were the treatises
published posthumously as *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and
Immutable Morality* (1731) and his *A Treatise of Freewill*
(1848). These papers also included two further manuscript treatises on
the topic of 'Liberty and Necessity', which have never
been printed.



Cudworth's *True Intellectual System* propounds an
anti-determinist system of philosophy grounded in his conception of
God as a fully perfect being, infinitely wise and good. The created
world reflects the perfection, wisdom and goodness of its creator. It
must, therefore be orderly, intelligible, and organised for the best.
This anti-voluntarist understanding of God's attributes is also
the foundation of epistemology and ethics, since God's wisdom
and goodness are the guarantors of truth and of moral principles. By
contrast, a philosophy founded on a voluntaristic conception of the
deity would have no ground of certainty or of morality because it
would depend on the arbitrary will of God who could, by arbitrary
fiat, decree non-sense to be true and wrong to be right. It follows
that misconceptions of God's attributes, which emphasise his
power and will, result by definition in false philosopical systems
with sceptical and atheistic implications.



Much of *The True Intellectual System* amounts to an extended
*consensus gentium* argument for belief in God, demonstrable
from an analysis of ancient sources which showed that most ancient
philosophers were theists, and therefore that theism is compatible
with philosophy. Among the non-theists, Cudworth (1678, p. 165)
identifies four schools of atheistic philosophy, each of which is a
type of materialism: Hylopathian atheism or materialism,
'Atomical or Democritical' atheism, Cosmo-plastic atheism
(which makes the world-soul the highest numen), and Hylozoic atheism
(which attributes life to matter). Each of these ancient brands of
atheism has its latter-day manifestations in philosophers such as
Hobbes (an example of a Hylopathian atheist) and Spinoza (a latter-day
Hylozoist).



The philosophy constitutive of Cudworth's intellectual system
combines atomist natural philosophy with Platonic metaphysics.
Cudworth conceives this as having originated with Moses from whom it
was transmitted via Pythagoras to Greek and other philosophers,
including Descartes whom Cudworth regarded as a reviver of Mosaic
atomism. For Cudworth, as for Plato, soul is ontologically prior to
the physical world. Since motion, life, thought and action cannot be
explained in terms of material particles, haphazardly jolted together,
there must be some guiding originator, namely soul or spirit. In order
to account for movement, life and orderliness in the operations of
nature, Cudworth proposed his hypothesis of 'the Plastick Life
of Nature'. Similar in conception to More's Spirit of Nature,
Cudworth's Plastic Nature is a formative principle which acts as an
intermediary between the divine and the natural world, as the means
whereby God imprints His presence on his creation and makes His wisdom
and goodness manifest (and therefore intelligible) throughout created
nature.



The Platonist principle that mind precedes the world lies at the
foundation of Cudworth's epistemology which is discussed in
*A Treatise of Eternal and Immutable Morality*. This is the
most fully developed theory of knowledge by any of the Cambridge
Platonists, and the most extensive treatment of innatism by any
seventeenth-century philosopher. For Cudworth, as for Plato, ideas and
moral principles 'are eternal and self-subsistent things'.
The external world is, intrinsically, intelligible, since it bears the
imprint of its creator in the order and relationship of its component
parts, as archetype to ectype. Cognition depends on the same
principles, for just as the created world is a copy of the divine
archetype, so also human minds contain the imprint of Divine wisdom
and knowledge. Since the human mind mirrors the mind of God, it is
ready furnished with ideas and the ability to reason. Cognition
therefore entails recollection and the ideas of things with which the
mind thinks are therefore 'anticipations'- for which
Cudworth adopts the Stoic term *prolepsis*. Cognition is not a
passive process, but involves the active participation of the mind.
Although innate knowledge is the only true knowledge, Cudworth does
not reject sense knowledge because sensory input is essential for
knowledge of the body and the external world. However, raw sense data
is not, by itself, knowledge since it requires mental processing in
order to become knowledge. As Cudworth puts it, we cannot understand
the book of nature unless we know how to read.



Cudworth's theory of the mind as active is matched by an
anti-determinist ethics of action, according to which the soul freely
directs itself towards the good. In *A Treatise* Cudworth
argues not only that ideas exist independently of human minds, but
also the principles of morality are eternal and immutable. In a
concerted attack on Hobbesian moral relativism, Cudworth, argues that
the criteria of right and wrong, good and evil, justice and injustice
are not a matter of convention, but are founded in the goodness and
justice of God. Like Plato in the *Euthyphro*, Cudworth argues
that it is not God's will that determines goodness, but that God
wills things because they are good. The exercise of virtue is not,
however, a passive process, but requires the free exercise of the
individual will. Cudworth sets out his theory of free will in three
treatises on 'Liberty and Necessity', only one of which
has been published, and that posthumously - *A Treatise of
Freewill* (1848). According to Cudworth, the will is not a faculty
of the soul, distinct from reason, but a power of the soul which
combines the functions of both reason and will in order to direct the
soul towards the good. Cudworth's use of the terms
'hegemonikon' (taken from Stoicism) and
'autexousion' (taken from Plotinus) underlines the fact
that the exercise of will entails the power to act. It is internal
direction, not external compulsion that induces us to act either
morally or immorally. Without the freedom (and therefore power) to of
act, there would be no moral responsibility. Moral conduct is active,
not passive. Virtuous action is therefore a matter of active internal
self-determination, rather than determination from without.



In *A Treatise of Freewill*, Cudworth elaborates his conception
of the *hegemonikon*, an integrative power of the soul, which
combines the the higher intellectual functions of the soul, will and
reason with the lower, animal, appetites of the soul. Furthermore,
Cudworth conceives of the *hegemonikon* not simply as the soul
but the whole person, 'that which is properly we
ourselves' (Cudworth, 1996, p. 178). Cudworth's concept of
*hegemonikon* lays the basis for a concept of self identity
founded in a subject that is at once thinking, autonomous and
end-directed. Cudworth did not (as far as is known) develop a
political philosophy. However, the political implications of his
ethical theory set him against Hobbes, but also, in many ways
anticipate John Locke.


### Legacy



Among the immediate philosophical heirs of the Cambridge Platonists,
mention should be made of Henry More's pupil, Anne Conway
(1631-1679), one of the very few female philosophers of the
period. Her *Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern
Philosophy* (1692) includes a critique of More's dualistic
philosophy of spirit, proposing instead a metaphysical monism that
anticipates Leibniz. Another figure linked to More was John Norris
(1657-1712) who was to become the leading English exponent of
the philosophy of Malebranche. Whichcote's philosophical wisdom was
admired by Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury who
published his *Select Sermons* in 1698. Shaftesbury's tutor,
John Locke was the intimate friend of Cudworth's philosophical
daughter, Damaris Masham. 



The Cambridge Platonists have yet to receive full recognition as
philosophers. Evidence from publication and citation suggests that
their philosophical influence was more far-reaching than is normally
recognised in modern histories of philosophy. Culverwell's
*Discourse* was reprinted four times, including at Oxford. The
impact of Cudworth on Locke has yet to be fully investigated. Richard
Price, and Thomas Reid were both indebted to Cudworth. As the first
philosophers to write primarily and consistently in the English
language (preceded only by Sir Kenelm Digby), their impact is still
felt in English philosophical terminology, through their coinage of
such familiar terms as 'materialism',
'consciousness', and 'Cartesianism'.



The intellectual legacy of the Cambridge Platonists extends not just
to philosophical debate in seventeenth-century England and to Scottish
Enlightenment thought, but into the European Enlightenment and beyond.
Leibniz certainly read Cudworth and More, whose works were known
beyond the English-speaking world thanks to Latin translations
More's *Opera omnia* appeared in 1675-9, and Cudworth's
entire printed works were translated into Latin by Johann Lorenz
Mosheim and published in Jena in 1733. Cudworth's theory of Plastic
Nature was taken up in vitalist debates in the French enlightenment.
Although their critique of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza has ensured that
the Cambridge Platonists are never completely ignored in philosophical
history, they deserve to be considered an important strand in English
seventeenth-century philosophy.