## 1. Life and Works



Zhu Xi was born in Youqi in Fujian in October 1130. Many anecdotes
attest that he was a highly precocious child. It was recorded that at
age five he ventured to ask what lay beyond Heaven, and by eight he
understood the significance of the *Classic of Filiality*
(*Xiaojing*). As a youth, he was inspired by Mencius'
proposition that all people could become a sage. In Zhu Xi's
childhood, his father Zhu Song (1097-1143) arranged for several
old friends to educate Zhu Xi after his passing. Consequently, Zhu Xi
was educated by several eclectic scholars who had delved into Daoism
and Buddhism as well as Confucianism, and inclined him to be deep and
wide-ranging in his intellectual predilections and cultural interests.
Later he studied Chan (Zen) Buddhism with the monk Dao Qian of the
Kaishan Temple, and reputedly met with the Chan master Da Hui (Dahui
Zonggao,
 1089-1163).[2]
 Traces of Huayan's holistic thought can also be discerned in
the formation of Zhu Xi's system (Makeham 2018). Remarkably, Zhu
passed the official *jinshi* exam (the "presented
scholar" exam) at just nineteen, drawing on Chan Buddhism in his
 answers.[3]
 He continued to pursue Daoism and Buddhism until he met the
Neo-Confucian master Li Tong (1093-1163) a decade later, and
formally became his student in 1160. In fact, Zhu's father had
recommended that he conduct his advanced studies under Li Tong, but
Zhu postponed seeing Li for years until he finally admitted to himself
that he was no longer making progress in his eclectic cultivation and
suffered spiritual doubts. Li Tong was a master in the southern Yang
Shi (1053-1135) lineage of the Cheng brothers' school,
partial to the teachings of Cheng Yi. Importantly, Li Tong convinced
Zhu of the cogency and superiority of the Confucian Way and
cultivation. Meanwhile, having passed the *jinshi* examination,
Zhu was eligible to hold office, and had been assigned to several
prefectural administrative posts. But, since he disagreed with central
court policy on several major issues, he preferred to hold temple
guardianships, which gave him the leisure to conduct Confucian studies
and cultivation in earnest, and shielded him from the ruthless court
politics. Having chosen this career path, Zhu Xi had the leisure to
study and reflect, so over time he made numerous contributions in
classical studies, historical inquiries, literary studies, and
philosophic reflections. He moreover developed into a man of letters
and wrote subtle prose and elegant verse.



A renowned teacher in later life, Zhu taught the classics and
Neo-Confucian thought and practice to hundreds if not thousands of
students. His oral discourses and discussions are preserved in the
*Classified Dialogues of Master Zhu* (*Zhuzi yulei*),
and his poetry, essays, correspondence, and other prose works are
collected in the *Collected Works of Master Zhu* (*Zhuzi
wenji*). He also published critical, annotated editions of several
classics, including the *Book of Change* (*Yijing*) and
the *Book of Odes* (*Shijing*), essential works of
Neo-Confucianism, including by Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, and the Cheng
brothers, and a vital Neo-Confucian anthology, *Reflections on
Things at Hand* (*Jinsilu*). He also edited and annotated
an important early text of inner alchemy Daoism; the *Cantong
qi* (*Unity of the Three*) by Wei Boyang (3rd
cent. CE), which combines the cosmology of the *Yijing* and the
Daoist teaching of *wuwei* (non-intentional action) with inner
alchemy. Zhu Xi remained devoted to his spiritual and intellectual
work virtually to his last breath, pondering and discussing
problematic passages in the *Great Learning* during the last
several days of his life. Throughout his life, Zhu Xi sought to
reestablish the fundamental concepts and values of Confucianism to
restore China's cultural and political integrity as a Confucian
society, especially since people in search of spiritual guidance and
solace were increasingly looking to Daoism and Buddhism rather than
Confucianism, which was perceived as a state ideology and orthodoxy
and had lost spiritual and ethical purchase. Moreover, Zhu believed
that the empire needed the spiritual *elan* of
Confucius' original ethical ideas and values to meet the
challenge of barbarian encroachments. His own sincere patriotism,
commitment to the tradition, and devotion to learning and scholarship
have remained an inspiration to this day in East Asia and throughout
the world.


## 2. Philosophy of Human Nature and Approach to Self-Cultivation



Zhu Xi developed a theory of basic human propensities (nature,
*xing*) to account for both the possibility of human evil and
that of human goodness and perfectibility. On this theory, while
(following Mencius, 372-289 BCE) insisting that people are
basically good (well intended and sensitive to the sufferings of
others), he accepted that the manner in which a person's basic
disposition is manifested is conditioned and at times contained by
their specific *qi* endowment (native talents and
gifts, *qizhi*), family and social environment, and other
factors. Such factors together yield their empirical personality,
intelligence, and aptitude for spiritual-ethical cultivation. Zhu
accepted that there are real differences in individual disposition,
character, as well as aptitude for ethical self-cultivation and
realization, owing to individual variations in
*qi* endowment, environment, etc. Furthermore, he argued that
people can become bad or evil due, for example, to a coarse or sensual
*qi* endowment, the bad influence of ruthless kin or friends, a
selfish or harsh social environment, a cruel streak, etc. Nonetheless,
following Mencius, he firmly believed that anyone who was sincerely
committed to moral self-cultivation and was fervent in their moral practice
would surely make progress in achieving moral realization if not sagehood.



Zhu Xi's teacher, Li Tong, and friend, Zhang Shi (1133-1180),
presented him with different approaches to cultivation based on the
premise of basic still and active mindsets, respectively. But, Zhu
found that both of these approaches were one-sided and flawed. How is
one to leap from quiet-sitting and stillness to making timely moral
responses? When does one have the composure to introspect morally when
their mind is constantly active and engaged? If neither the meditative
approach nor the active approach to cultivation and practice were
efficacious, what path remained open to Zhu Xi? Recent research shows
that Zhu Xi embarked on a careful reading of the works of Zhou Dunyi
during this period of spiritual-philosophical crisis in the course of which he
rediscovered Zhou's doctrine of "the interpenetration of
stillness and activity" for the human mind and spirit (Adler
2014). With this idea, Zhou Dunyi was advocating that whereas the
states of action and rest are mutually exclusive in the case of
physical objects, such states interpenetrate and are mutually
implicative in the case of human mental and spiritual phenomena (Adler
2014). This doctrine piqued Zhu Xi's interest, and he came to
see it as offering a way out of the dilemma between Li Tong's
stress on stillness and Hu Hong's stress on activity in
cultivation and practice, and their respective shortcomings. Zhou
Dunyi's doctrine was particularly exciting to Zhu Xi for it
highlighted the distinctness and potential religiosity of the human
mind and spirit, which Zhou describes as not subject to the same
limitations and restrictions as are physical phenomena. Zhou Dunyi
moreover associates this idea with a vital and well integrated model
of human mind and spirit, self-cultivation, and cosmos. Inspired by
Zhou Dunyi's doctrine of the interpenetration of stillness and
activity and related ideas, Zhu Xi worked out a twofold cultivation
effort that incorporated at once nurturing one's feeling of
reverence (*jing*) to purify mind while investigating things to
discern their determinate or defining patterns (*li*).
Cultivation of reverence, originally a religious virtue associated
with ancestor worship and ceremonial rites, as described in the
classics and taught by Confucius (551-479 BCE), serves to purify
the mind, attune one to the promptings of the original good nature,
and set one to act with appropriateness (*yi*). Moreover, by
grasping the defining patterns (*li*) of relationship and
intercourse that constitute the world, society, people, and proper
conduct, one gains the master key to acting with utmost propriety
(*zhongyong*). The mind that is imbued with reverence and
comprehends these patterns will develop into a good will
(*zhuzai*) dedicated to acting appropriately and with utmost
propriety. Since *jing* takes on connotations of focus,
concentration, and alertness, as well as reverence in Zhu Xi's
discourses, mindfulness has been suggested as the English translation
that covers the fullness of the term *jing* (Kalton 1988) in
Zhu Xi's thought.



In later life, Zhu started to regard this twofold approach to
cultivation and realization as too complicated, gradual, and difficult
to carry out in practice. Like Confucius before him and anticipating
Wang Yangming after him, Zhu Xi came to accept that the sincere
Confucian adept must, on embarking on his or her project of ethical
self-cultivation, first strive to establish his or her sincere
determination (*lizhi*) to realize the cardinal Confucian
virtues and become an exemplary person (*junzi*), that is to
say, a master of appropriateness in interpersonal conduct and human
affairs generally.


## 3. Ethical Philosophy



Zhu Xi's methodology for achieving perspicacity (*ming*)
in ethical judgment and "appropriateness" (*yi*) in
practice can be summed up in his call to investigate things to extend
knowledge (*gewu zhizhi*). Zhu advocated this methodology to
stress the need for people, as prospective moral agents, to notice the
fine details, the distinguishing features of particular situations and
to fashion on that basis the most discerning, appropriate response.
These distinguishing features can suggest alternative moral
considerations to be weighed (Pincoffs 1986). This call lay behind
Zhu's promotion of the *Great Learning* (*Daxue*)
and call for life-long learning and moral reflection in a bid to
achieve a modicum of objectivity and break free of the moral
intuitionism and resultant subjectivism typical of Neo-Confucians of
his generation.


### 3.1 Investigating Things for Ethical Discernment and Practice



Throughout his career, Zhu Xi focused on the twin problems of 1)
determining the conditions of moral agency, and 2) setting forth a
viable program of moral self-cultivation on that basis. Zhu saw moral
agency as the expression of a moral will, which he understood to be
the achievement of an inner self-mastery (*zhuzai*) that forms
the core of a person's moral character, perceptivity,
cognizance, and responsiveness. On this view, self-cultivation that is
aimed at nurturing self-mastery must include forming a concentrated,
reverential mind-set (*jing*) and a discerning sense of
appropriateness. Early on, Zhu had emphasized the need to attain a
working knowledge of the constitutive patterning (*li*) of
reality and society in the light of which the norms and ritual action
(*li*) prescribed for proper interpersonal relationships and
intercourse are devised. He later found that establishing the
determination (*lizhi*) to seek self-realization and conduct
oneself appropriately counted for as much as the long-term cultivation
process itself, during which one can lose sight of one's purpose
and be side-tracked (see Qian Mu 1986: 123-127). Moreover, while
still maintaining the importance of the norms and ritual action for
character-building and the social order, Zhu began to emphasize the
need to build up a sympathetic but realistic grasp of the warp and
woof of real daily human life viewed in the perspective of such broad
Confucian ethical ideals as humaneness (*ren*) and fairness
(*gong*). He understood that, although the norms and ritual
action are broadly applicable and reliable, many situations call for
specifically tailored
 responses.[4]



Consequently, against the moral intuitionism prevalent at the time in
Neo-Confucianism, as espoused by his teacher Li Tong
(1093-1163), his intellectual rival Lu Jiuyuan
(1139-1193), and others, Zhu argued that intuitionism is
inadequate for dealing effectively with the complex human affairs that
people are apt to encounter in their
 lives.[5]
 Rather, he advocated dedicating oneself to the observation and study
of the patterning/patterns (*li*) of relationship, interaction,
and change among all things, among human beings in particular. He
regarded "investigating things to extend knowledge" as the
surest way to deepen and broaden one's discernment of the
patterns that constitute the lived-world. Such knowledge, importantly,
would sharpen one's sense of appropriateness by attuning oneself
to the actual, subtle, distinguishing features of particular
situations.



Again, Zhu Xi conceived the world as a patterned (*li*)
totality made up of a cosmic vapor (*qi*) that under various
conditions condenses and solidifies into countless permutations, from
the purest transparent *yuanqi* (primordial *qi*), to
the *Yin-Yang* poles modulated by the primal *taiji*
(supreme polarity) pattern, to the *wuxing* (five phases), each
of which bears an identifying inner pattern and set of propensities
(*xing*) that involve interconvertability and recombination
with the other four phases, and finally to the phenomenal world:
Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things (*tiandi
 wanwu*).[6]




For Zhu Xi, the world presents a vital tapestry of relationships,
cycles, processes, events, and things that are spontaneously arrayed
in aesthetic order. In the nexus of these arrays, *li* are
manifested three dimensionally and present different faces from
different angles (Graham 1986a: 148; Qian Mu 1986: 133). *Li*
are inherently perspectival. Zhu adopts metaphors of the grains in
wood, the lines in jade, the "veins" in a leaf, the lines
in marble, and even the sinewy texture of beef, to stress that *li*
are manifested immanently rather than abstractly, and thus are to be
sought concretely by observing phenomena in the world, not by pure,
disengaged, abstract ratiocination (Needham 1956a: 473). Moreover,
*li* are never presented in their putative optimal pure form.
They always appear conditioned by the degree of purity of the
*qi* through which they are manifested and of the environing
conditions (Wade 2003).



*Li* also structure the human mind, thought, and language, such
that human beings are predisposed to grasp and attempt to respond
appropriately to the things and situations they
 encounter.[7]
 Objective learning on this view can be understood as a facet of
self-learning: indeed, by the principle of continuity, objective
understanding enhances self-understanding, for by comprehending the
warp and woof of the outer *li* of things, one gains insight
into the inner *li* constituting one's mind and character
(Qian Mu 1971: II 31-38). For Zhu Xi, while *li*
structure the mind, thought, and language, this is not just at the
cognitive level: *li* also structure the inner patterning
(*xing*) and basic impulses that predispose us to have
characteristically human emotions (*qing*), relationships, and
responses (*ganying*) under various sets of conditions (Graham
1986a: 152-154; Qian Mu 1971: II. 25-30). In Zhu's
Confucian view, *li* and *xing* predispose one to be
sensitive and responsive; metaphorically, they provide the hardware of
human nature. Self-cultivation and moral reflection are the means by
which one actively conditions and fine-tunes these predispositions of
sensitivity and response. They thus function as indispensable software
for cultivating personhood. 



These are the contours of Zhu Xi's approach to moral
self-cultivation and interpersonal ethics. The standard ethical norms
work well in standard situations, normal families, good communities,
and ordinary social circumstances. But, Zhu also understood that
people are richly complicated and that human affairs often become
complex, get out of hand, and go awry. Life is just not that ideal,
not that simple. We sometimes encounter ethically anomalous situations
to which the standard sets of feelings and responses as prescribed by
the received norms and ritual actions simply do not fit. In many
instances, standing on the norm and being moralistic simply would make
matters worse. Zhu himself said that one must have ample experience
and self-cultivation so that,



> 
> 
> If, by chance, an anomalous affair should come up, one could
> comprehend it. One wants to be in a position to grasp such affairs
> thoroughly in order to understand their unfamiliar aspects. (YL: ch.
> 19)
> 
> 
> 



Zhu Xi considered how to tailor responses appropriate in problematic
situations under the rubric of *quan* (weighing things up,
discretion, expedient
 means).[8]
 He noted several kinds of situations in which recourse to discretion
and expedient means might be advisable: 1) extraordinary situations
that cannot be covered by the standard norms and ritual actions, 2)
urgent situations that require a direct violation of the received
norms and ritual actions to be satisfactorily resolved, and 3)
situations in which it would be more humane and prudent not to observe the relevant
norms and ritual actions (see Wei 1986). Situations of the first kind
include those that call for a disruption of the given human order, for
example the removal of an evil authority figure, such as a psychotic
parent or a sociopathic tyrant. For situations of the second kind, Zhu had
in mind emergencies when one would have to violate a norm in order to
perform an emergency action, such as grasping the hand of a drowning
sister-in-law, or shoving an old lady out of the path of a runaway
 oxcart.[9]
 Finally, the third kind of situation includes those in which it would
be more compassionate to waive or overlook the ritual prescriptions,
such as in cases of condoning the remarriage of a widow who would
otherwise be destined to isolation and destitution.



Clearly, such considerations lead us into unmapped ethical terrain.
How far can one justifiably take such sidestepping of the received
applicable norms and ritual actions? What qualifications and
restrictions might apply? For his part, Zhu Xi mentioned at least two
qualifications: a weak qualification that the expedient adopted not be
otherwise ethically objectionable, and a stronger qualification
stipulating that the expedient adopted be in compliance with the Way,
i.e., that it satisfy some basic moral value, at least as basic as the
values expressed in the relevant received norm and ritual action.
Thus, any exercise of discretion that is undertaken in light of
one's sense of appropriateness (*yi*), if exercised with
sufficient probity and care, should satisfy the moral values embodied
in the Way more adequately than would a routine observance of the
standard norm. Humaneness is the core moral value that was invoked
most often in such cases, but there are a number of others: filial
piety, fraternity, fidelity, empathy, compassion, appropriateness,
etc. Famous examples from the Confucian tradition include
Mencius' reminder that one should overturn the propriety of not
grasping the hand of a member of the opposite sex in order to rescue a
drowning sister in law (*Mencius* 4A.17), and Cheng Yi argued
for an exception to the impropriety of widows remarrying on the basis
of filial piety (Rosenlee 2006: 134). Similarly, Socrates showed that
Justice is not always realized by observance of the proprieties of
truth-telling and faithfully returning a friend's property
(Plato *Republic* 331c).



Nonetheless, ever cognizant of temptation and moral weakness, Zhu
insisted on the well established probity and integrity of anyone who
would venture to use discretion and exercise expedient means. He
stated:



> 
> 
> Intending to weigh up a situation carefully [in order to exercise
> expedient means], one must have cultivated the inner root daily, so
> that one's mind is sensitive, perspicacious, pure, and
> integrated; [even in that case,] one still must naturally weigh up
> such situations most carefully. As Cheng Yi (1033-1107) said: Be
> reverent in order to straighten oneself within; practice
> appropriateness in order to square situations without. One's
> sense of appropriateness comprises the moral fiber which one expresses
> through sincere ritual action (YL 37, 37:6a, par. 36).
> 
> 
> 



Only those who have extensively "investigated things to extend
knowledge", and who are conversant with the subtle patternings
of the human heart and human affairs would be qualified to consider
exercising expedient means over simply following the norms. (Zhu knew
that this ethical knowledge is as much a matter of practical
experience as of book learning. At times, he told his occasionally
priggish students that well-disposed people, even if morally
untutored, can be more discerning and have better discretion than are
some academicians!)



While Zhu stressed making careful observations in situations in order
to tailor the most fitting responses in context, at the same time he
envisioned a cultivation process whereby one discerns ever more
fundamental and yet far-reaching patterns (*li*) that shape
nature and moral value. That is, Zhu sometimes construed the project
of investigating things to extend knowledge as an ascendant movement
whereby the learner finally arrives at the
pinnacle--*taiji* (supreme polarity) that embraces and
subsumes all derived patterns. To Zhu, grasping *taiji* in this
sense was tantamount to grasping the master key, for it represented to
him the apex of being and value, and bestowed realization and sagehood
on those who sincerely and authentically comprehended and embraced
 it.[10]
 While this conception charts an ideal path to the pure, compassionate
mind-set of sagehood, it obscures Zhu Xi's usual emphasis on
fine-tuning and sharpening one's moral discernment and
responsiveness in the midst of things--in full view of the
situatedness of people in their daily life. This conception also
neglects Zhu's equal emphasis on the claim that patterns as
inborn propensities (*xing*) are manifested only in concrete
specific *qi* formations, and thus that 1) patterns are to be
discerned in their fine particularity, that 2) the moral impulses are
to be nurtured in the stream of human life, and that 3) the emotions,
when not obscured by desires or obsessions, for the most part are
immediate expressions of the basic natural impulses.



How, too, to square this broad vision of probing inquiry and deep
understanding with the potentially constrictive Confucian moral
psychology constructed tightly round the virtues of humaneness,
appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom, and their attendant
emotions? Zhu Xi likely realized that these virtues functioned as
thematic foci for cultivation as one establishes ones moral
orientation and bearings and a balanced interpersonal stance. One
needs to go through an initial stage of mastering these basic virtues
in order to 1) reinforce one's altruistic impulses and curtail
the egoistic ones, 2) be inclined to seek principled rapport and
harmony in interpersonal affairs, and 3) be moved by a sense of
oneness with others and all things. Subsequently, the more ethical
human phenomena one observes and considers in advanced level learning
and cultivation, the more one feels a broad sympathy for others that
transcends the narrowly-graded love, the so-called love with
distinctions that is attributed to the notion of *ren*
(humaneness) in Confucianism (see *Mencius*, 1A.7, 3A.5, and
7A.45). The more one observes the nuances of human affairs and the
springs of human action, the more one will express deference and
respect in ways that do not necessarily coincide exactly with the
general prescriptions of the norms and ritual actions. In this way,
one will build up a repertoire of conduct that reflects one's
personal ethical discernment and discretion, which expresses
one's personal ethical attainment and style.



Zhu Xi on occasion modeled his ethical conception of observing
situations and fashioning the most appropriate response
naturalistically on the butcher character, Cook Ding, portrayed in the
Zhuangzi as a skilled artisan: just as the sure blade of Cook
Ding's cleaver goes straight to the cartilage between the bones,
the cultivated sense of appropriateness (*yi*) of Zhu
Xi's moral adept strikes right at the heart of interpersonal
situations (see Thompson 1988: 39-40). A.C. Graham once
contrasted Zhu's perception/response model (*gan-ying*)
of ethical action with that of Zhuangzi by suggesting that Zhu's
notion of appropriate response was informed by rigorous adherence to
rules and principles, whereas Zhuangzi's was relatively
intuitive and spontaneous (Graham 1986a: 143-145). This apparent
contrast can be resolved by separating the stages of cultivation and
mastery: Zhuangzi's skilled artisans, such as Butcher Ding, all
had to undergo prolonged periods of rigorously controlled
apprenticeship before they could "forget" the
"knowing that" in an integrated, spontaneous process of
"knowing how". For his part, Zhu Xi knew that the years of
learning and practice--one's moral
apprenticeship--culminates in a responsive moral agent who can
operate as intuitively and spontaneously in his or her personal and
social ethical sphere as do Zhuangzi's skilled artisans in
 theirs.[11]
 Zhu's moral adept is in effect an artisan of interpersonal
intercourse. Zhu could rightfully claim Confucius as a prime model for
this view. After decades of cultivation, Confucius could say,
"At sixty, my ear was attuned. At seventy, I could give my heart
free rein and without overstepping the mark" (*Analects*
2.4).



Viewed as a quest for knowledge as responsive pattern (*li*)
discernment, enhanced by association, analogical reasoning, and
generalization, Zhu Xi's approach to inquiry dovetails with
recent studies on strategies for learning for effective, ethical
living. Neuroscientist and gerontologist Daniel J. Levitin writes
concerning intelligence and wisdom,



> 
> Humans excel at... making associations, taking information... and
> seeing how it interacts with other information. Whenever we encounter
> new information, our brains place it in a conceptual frame and then
> seek to associate it with other things we have experienced. The brain
> is a giant pattern detector.... Our brains add to that the
> ability to form analogies, ... [to perform] analogical
> reasoning. The wisdom we find in older adults follow[s] from ...
> these four things: association, experience, pattern recognition, and
> the use of analogies. And, this is why we we gain more and more wisdom
> as we age. Wisdom comes from the accumulated sets of things we've seen
> and experienced, our ability to detect patterns in those experiences,
> and our ability to predict future outcomes based on them. (And what is
> intelligence if not that?) Naturally, the more you have experienced,
> the more wisdom you are able to tap into.... [Old-timers] have
> been witness to so many things that seem to cycle around again and
> again. Wisdom enables you to handle some problems more quickly and
> effectively than the raw firepower of youth. [In sum, m]aking
> associations underpins learning. To assimilate new information we need
> to associate it with what we've seen before. Life experience gives us
> more associations to make, more patterns (*li*) to
> recognize. (Levitin 2020, pp. 119-120)



On the surface, it appears that while Zhu Xi's method of inquiry
is specialized and prescriptive, Levitin's presentation is
merely descriptive of normal human learning. However, Levitin is
describing the optimal learning strategies of people who remain
sensitive, alert, discerning, and responsive throughout mature life,
traits that some people nurture going forward and that others ought to
make efforts to cultivate themselves in order to be more vital, understanding, and effective human actors and lead more fulfilling lives.



Zhu Xi's appropriateness approach to ethics has several distinct
features. First, one is to be well-versed in the received norms and
rituals that circumscribe interpersonal relationships and prescribe
proper behavior in family and society. Second, one is to have made
ample observations and responses in real life situations. Third, one
is to have examined and reflected on ways in which others act and
respond in situations, for reference. Fourth, through extensive
observation and experience, one is to be cognizant of the range of
considerations that come into play in real life situations: moral
principle, utility, fairness, sympathy, compassion, and so
 forth.[12]
 Fifth, one is to remain flexible and open-minded as well as avoid
making surmises, being insistent, stubborn, or self-centered
(*Analects* 9.4). According to this view, while observing the
ethical norms and rules of thumb in his or her community, the moral
adept possesses a store of personal ethical sensitivity,
responsiveness, and resourcefulness, by which to fashion the most
fitting responses to situations.


### 3.2 Moral Cosmic Synthesis



In his watershed essay, *A Treatise on Humanity*
(*Renshuo*), Zhu Xi discourses on the classical Confucian
teaching of humanity (*ren*) in a unified cosmic and human
perspective. In concluding, he criticizes alternative accounts of
humanity, i.e., Confucius' spirit of humaneness, on various
conceptual and ethical
 grounds.[13]
 Following the early Han tradition, Zhu opens by associating humaneness with
cosmic creativity. In its most basic manifestation, humaneness is
characterized as the impulse of "heaven and earth" (the
cosmos) to produce things. By extension, this impulse yields the cycle
of seasons and the pervasive fecundity of nature. Advocates of this
doctrine had found confirmation in the rich, productive Chinese soil
and temperate climate, which supported their assumption that nature
was generally fertile and afforded the right conditions for human
flourishing. Pervasive, the impulse to produce appears in each and
every one of the myriad creatures while in human beings it is refined
into the virtue of "humaneness", which, when fully
realized, involves one's caring attitude and dedicated
responsibility toward others. Zhu Xi moreover correlates
"origination, growth, flourishing and firmness", the
fourfold initial stages of creativity and production in the cosmos and
human nature first mentioned in early commentaries on the *Book of
Change*, with humaneness, appropriateness, ritual conduct and
wisdom, the four cardinal virtues enunciated by Confucius. Zhu Xi thus
portrays the fully cultivated person as at once a complement to heaven
and earth, a vital participant in cosmic creativity, and a catalyst
for the flourishing and self-realization of others. On this basis, he
goes on to formulate the definition of *ren* (humanity,
humaneness) for the subsequent tradition: "the essential
character of mind" and "the essential pattern of
love". The virtue of humaneness thus grounds the disposition of
mind as commiserative and describes the core of moral self-realization
as love for others (other-directed concern), to be appropriately
manifested.



In the closing argument of the *Treatise on Humanity*, Zhu Xi
stresses that while the stillness and activity phases of the emotions
provide emotive stage setting for one's dedicated cultivation,
realization, and practice of humaneness, what is crucial is the
profound insight that,



> 
> 
> If one could but truly *practice love and maintain it* (italics
> added), one would possess the well-spring of all virtues and the root
> of all good deeds. (based on Chan 1963, 212-227, edited) 
> 
> 
> 



Under this premise, Zhu cites Confucius' advice to Yan Hui,
"Master the self by practicing ritual propriety"
(*Analects* XII.1). For Zhu Xi, one masters oneself to rein in
one's naive self-centeredness by paying ritual respect to
others, which in turn spurs a change in the axis of one's moral
concern to other people, especially those with whom one is related and
daily interacts. What is important, then, is *the moral-ethical
axis of one's motivations*. But, how is one to sustain and
manifest this humanity consistently in attitude and practice? Zhu Xi
does not appeal to philosophic reflection but recommends mindful
(*jing*) daily cultivation and practice, i.e., being calm and
focused, respectful in personal life, diligent in conducting affairs,
and dedicated to upholding interpersonal
 relations.[14]
 Moreover, he considers that the emotions play a fundamental role in
ethical cultivation and performance. After stressing serving
one's parents with filiality and one's elder brother with
fraternal respect, Zhu Xi urges: "Be loving in dealing with all
things", which goes well beyond standard filtered and restrained
"graded" Confucian love.



Humaneness is not just a matter of being thoughtful and considerate and paying one's due respect to others ; Zhu Xi underscores the rigors of conducting oneself sincerely and authentically with humaneness, citing Confucius' examples of not only ministers who had declined official posts to maintain their
integrity but of times when the exemplary person is willing to
sacrifice his or her own life to fulfill humanity (*Analects*
15.8). Nonetheless, the animating spirit of Zhu Xi's
*Treatise* remains: "love people gently and benefit
things", as reflected in Mencius' four incipient ethical
impulses and Confucius' four cardinal
 virtues.[15]


## 4. Natural Philosophy


### 4.1 Investigating Things for Natural Knowledge and Action



While Shao Yong and Cheng Yi in the Northern Song had introduced and sketched out the
idea of observation in terms of *guanwu* (observing things),
*fanguan* (reflective perception), and *gewu*
(investigating things), Zhu Xi not only discussed the idea of
observation but offered a multitude of actual observations of
celestial and terrestrial phenomena. In addition, his penchant for
hierarchy and systemization led modern commentators in the twentieth
century to draw comparisons with Plato, Aristotle, and even Thomas
Aquinas. Around the mid-twentieth century, Joseph Needham vividly
presented Zhu's system in terms of process philosophy as bearing
organismic patterns of conceptualization and distinct parallels with
scientific thinking:



> 
> 
> I am prepared to suggest, in view of the fact that the term
> *Li* always contained the notion of pattern, and that Chu Hsi
> himself consciously applied it so as to include the most living and
> vital patterns known to man, that something of the idea of
> 'organism' was what was really at the back of the minds of
> the Neo-Confucians, and that Chu Hsi was therefore further advanced in
> insight into the nature of the universe than any of his interpreters
> and translators, whether Chinese or European, have yet given him
> credit for. (Needham 1956a: 474)
> 
> 
> 



Soon thereafter, after undertaking a careful study of Zhu's
dialogues (*Zhuzi yulei*), Hu Shih presented Zhu's method
of inquiry, *gewu zhizhi* (investigate things to attain
knowledge) as essentially a process of "hypothesis and
verification by evidence" (Chan 1989: 566), consistent in spirit
with a scientific approach to inquiry. Needham and Hu effectively cast
Zhu's thought and method in a new light, as more creative,
scientific, holistic, and practical than previously thought. Since then, many
have discussed Zhu as a process thinker, but little has been written
to consider the extent to which his system could accommodate a
scientific worldview, and the extent to which his method of inquiry
was consistent with a scientific approach. Yung Sik Kim offers an in-depth inquiry into the
extent to which Zhu Xi anticipated genuine scientific methods of
observation and conceptualization in *The Natural Philosophy of Chu
Hsi* (2000).



Zhu from childhood displayed a genuine interest in natural phenomena
and in raising speculative questions. Later he tended to rein in this
interest, for example by relating features of observed natural
phenomena to human analogues for didactic purposes and by refraining
from pressing his speculations very far, i.e., beyond the scope of
verifiable knowledge and applicability. Zhu lived during a tumultuous
period in Chinese history when Neo-Confucian scholars tended to draw
upon the resources of their own tradition to revitalize the empire, an
effort in which Zhu's *ouvre* constituted a watershed. He
sought to wed the objective and subjective trends of the earlier
movement into a practical synthesis in which objective inquiry played
a key role in subjective cultivation. Subsequently, however, as his
disciples refined his thought into a scholastic doctrine, subjective
cultivation began to prevail over objective inquiry, which was increasingly
redirected into the narrow limits of reading and interpersonal
conduct.



A Neo-Confucian master of the Ming dynasty, Wang Shouren (Yangming;
1472-1529), spurned Zhu's method of inquiry altogether
after he made a futile attempt to observe the *li* (patterning) in the
bamboo outside his gate. Holding that facts are obvious to a
perceptive observer and do not require endless further investigation, Wang
went on to formulate an idealist pragmatism that became influential.
Intending to counter the scholasticism and careerism of his day, Wang,
a military man, stressed volitionism and activism and spurned the sort
of careful objective inquiry Zhu thought necessary to making balanced
judgments and appropriate responses.



Zhu conceptualized nature and natural phenomena in terms of
*li* (pattern, patterning) and *gewu* (the investigation
of things), *qi* (primal vapor), *yin-yang*,
*wuxing* (five phases), *shu* (number, probability,
ratio), *xiang* (images); figures from the *Book of
Changes*), ghosts and spirits (*gui-shen*), heaven and the
sage (*tian-shengren*), stimulus-response (*ganying*),
and transformation and change (*bianhua*). In this context, it
was important to treat *li* matter-of-factly as the intrinsic
patterning of things and events. While the *li* involved with
the identities of things are those facets of intrinsic patterning that
pertain to their basic interactive propensities and functions, the
*li* of a concrete thing form "a gestalt totality"
(Kim 2000), nearly as complex as the thing itself. Thus, whereas
scholars tend to take Zhu's assertion that "for a certain
(kind of) thing to exist, there first must be that *li*"
or "there must be this *li* for there to be that (kind
of) thing" as indicative of a metaphysical principle of
sufficient reason, in this context *li* simply affirm that
things of identifiable kinds bear identifying patterns (*xing*)
that make them what they are and interact as they do. *Li*
indicate reference points for identities of things that influence
their typical patterns of interaction with other things. *Li*
thus conceived do not amount to principles of explanation and are more
involved with definition, so references to the *li* of
phenomena do not add anything cognitive or
 scientific.[16]
 At times, Zhu did present the idea of investigating things in chapter
5 of the *Great Learning* (*Daxue*) as involving a
step-by-step approach, with an eye to discerning ever higher levels of
commonality among the myriad *li* (patterns), aiming at an
ultimate comprehension of the most basic form of pattern,
*taiji* (supreme polarity). Although this approach lacks the
rigor of a logical categorical system, when viewed together with
Zhu's comments on Zhou Dunyi's *Diagram of the Supreme
Polarity* (*Taiji tu*), it is suggestive for viewing
phenomena and forms in a developmental, almost evolutionary context.
As Needham comments:



> 
> 
> Chu Hsi [Zhu Xi] wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> > 
> > If one peers into the mystery, the *thai chi* [*taiji*,
> > supreme polarity] seems a chaotic and disorderly wilderness lacking
> > all signs of an arranger..., yet the *Li* (fundamental
> > pattern) of motion and rest, and of Yin and Yang, is fully contained
> > within it.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 
> 
> Innumerable smaller organisms were also contained within it, and
> indeed composed it. Some of them more highly organized than others. In
> fact, the world was no more undifferentiated for the Neo-Confucians
> than for modern organic philosophy; it manifested a series of
> integrative levels of organization, wholes at one level being parts on
> the next. A clear statement of this conception appears in the ninth
> paragraph of the *Thai chi Thu Shuo* [Explanation of the
> diagram of the supreme polarity], which indicated the inapplicability
> of categories outside the level to which they belong. (Needham 1956a:
> 466)
> 
> 
> 



For Zhu, investigating things to attain knowledge involves arriving at
a grasp of their constituent *li*; "knowing" or
"understanding" such phenomena, thus, is a matter of
grasping their *li*. While Zhu often speaks of knowing or
comprehending something in terms of the metaphor of seeing it clearly,
of having a clear discernment of it, which is nothing like rigid
propositional knowledge, he does recognize several forms or levels of
knowing, and regards the basic steps of learning in analytical
propositional terms and the higher levels in more synthetic insight
terms. That is, one first learns facts about the building blocks of
the world and human life, e.g., what things are, what they mean, how
they fit together; then, gradually, one gains insights into the
broader patterns of relationship and intercourse that comprise the
world and human life and that eventually afford sensitive glimpses of
the inner root as well as the larger picture. Zhu's discourses
are as full of detailed accounts of phenomena as they are of synthetic
insights, which should be expected given that Zhu gives equal status
and value to the various sorts of qualities that the Western tradition
divides into primary (quantitative), secondary (qualitative), and
tertiary (qualitative effects).



As noted, Zhu drew on notions of *qi, yin-yang*, the five
phases, *shu* (numbers, probablilities), and images as
conceptual and categorical resources for classifying, characterizing,
and understanding the world, especially cycles, processes, and
particular things and events. Chinese thinkers, especially during the
Han dynasty, used such notions to arrange categories of reality and
compile lists of qualities for each category. While some of the
associated qualities are directly or causally linked, many of them are
arbitrary--perhaps assigned in light of long forgotten events or
decrees. These sets of categories were compiled as systematic indices
for grasping things and events in terms of categorical associations
and imputations. Inevitably, these sets of categories bore a strongly
cultural stamp and bias but were applied equally to natural phenomena,
as if the natural world were an extension of the human world, not
*vice versa*.



Zhu often classified a natural phenomenon in terms of these categories
and associations, and left it at that, unconcerned that the categories
were haphazard and the associations arbitrary and inexplicable. Likely
Zhu recognized that these categories and associations often were
arbitrary and not particularly informative regarding physical reality
but did not find it necessary or practical to pursue the matter. He presumably
contented himself with assigning phenomena to these culturally colored
sets of categories and associations because in those speech contexts
those associations were more significant and interesting than the
probing of purely physical categories and explanations would have
been. These sorts of examples reflect the cultural common sense and
conditions of common speech of his age.



The question arises whether these sets of categories and associations
were more a help or a hindrance to the development of science in
traditional China. On the one hand, their loose criteria and arbitrary
design allowed for easy classifications and "accounts" of
phenomena that would have stymied serious scientific investigation
while, on the other, the associations thus attributed to these
phenomena sometimes might have yielded expectations or hypotheses of
sorts, thus stimulating further inquiry. Interestingly, Zhu often
sidestepped these sets of categories altogether in his serious
thinking about natural phenomena and judged them by what he took to be
the deciding factors in the cases themselves, often in light of
analogies. Striking cases of this are Zhu's discussions on the
structure of the cosmos (heaven and earth) and insightful explanations
of phases of the moon and eclipses of the sun and moon. For example,
Zhu often said that the earth was floating on water; both below the
earth and surrounding its four sides were water, but he also said that
*qi* surrounded the earth. And, he also spoke of vortices,
centrifugal forces, and occasionally of the earth's motion. Zhu
was interested in these accounts of the formation of the world, but
saw no way to confirm any of them. He perhaps thought it was important
to present such accounts as representative of an objective approach to
a question that was more amenable to mystical or religious
approaches.



Zhu's notions of stimulus-response and transformation and change
are noteworthy, for they are counterparts to the concepts of causation
and change in Western science. Construing phenomena as resonant and sensitive,
perhaps perceptive in a rudimentary sense, the notion of
stimulus-response reinforces the interdependence of things. Assuming a
resonance among things in terms of parallelisms among their forms, and
affinities among their *qi*, this notion presents phenomena on
a biological model and conduces to an ecological rather than a
mechanical outlook. While providing an interactive way of talking
about phenomena, it doesn't open the way or impel the inquirer
to uncover the nuts and bolts of causation and change. Also, since the
idea of stimulus-response was usually tied to the aforementioned sets
of categories and associations, it was often vague and applied in
arbitrary and superstitious ways. As might be expected, Zhu's
notions of transformation and change also reflected biological and
human-life models, with transformation indicating gradual change, as
in the growth of a child or the passage of summer, and change
indicating a sudden transformation, as from a caterpillar to a
butterfly or from summer to winter and life to death. From the
standpoint of developing science, by making change seem to be
natural and inevitable, these notions of transformation and change
tended to make further inquiry appear to be unwarranted. In contrast,
Western ideas of eternal substance and inert matter, for example, made the observed
changes on the earth and in the skies problematic and in urgent need
of further inquiry and explanation. More pragmatic in spirit, the
Chinese were concerned mainly with registering and grasping the
observed patterns and sequences of change in and around them so as to
be able to adapt their lives to the ever-changing circumstances.
(The *Book of Changes* was a guide to making such adaptations.)



Zhu Xi posits an ontological and causal continuity between the
celestial and terrestrial realms, as well as between the animal and
plant species and humanity. Indeed, there is no categorical difference
between human beings and other life forms. Against this backdrop, Zhu
carefully observed anomalies and sketched explanations based on the
general ideas available to him. For example, when observing fossils of
seashells atop a mountain, Zhu noted that the area had once been a
seabed and hypothesized that the earth formerly was softer and more
fluid and that, through wave motions, this seabed later rose to become
a mountain top. Meanwhile, the entire earth dried as it grew older.
While this explanation was not rigorous or determinate enough to count
as a scientific hypothesis; Zhu appealed only to naturalistic concepts
and principles in his comments. Zhu also made quantitative measurements of
plant growth. Zhu once heard about a monk's claim that oould see
evidence of the nourishing powers of "night vapor" by
observing bamboo sprouts, which grow twice as fast at night as during
the day. Later, during a stay at a Buddhist residence on Jade
Mountain, Zhu observed that the bamboo sprouts there displayed the
"same rate of growth day and night, exactly the opposite of the
monk's claim". Qian Mu observes that Zhu's practice
of *gewu* (investigating things) was fruitful because he made
observations with questions or hypotheses in mind, adding that Wang
Shouren's observations of bamboo had been fruitless and in vain because he
had no question or hypothesis in mind to test. Wang was just undertaking
bland looking (Qian 1986: 215f, 219).



In contrast to analytical Western concepts used in studying the
natural world, including matter, material quality, motion, and change,
Zhu Xi adopted a holistic approach to understanding the physical world
and phenomena. He drew upon received notions of *li* (pattern)
and *qi* (cosmic vapor) to describe and account for the
material, dynamic, and formal features of perceived phenomena.
*Li* (pattern) refer to the inner patterns of both interaction
and identifying form. As noted, *li* are not general
overarching principles, but inner patternings implicated in things and
events, from the discernible textures--grains in wood, veins in
leaves--to the postulated identifying forms, *xing*, of
things. In terms of dynamic interaction, *li* structure the
primal *yin-yang* intercourse as *taiji*, and the
intercourse among the five phases as their constitutive identifying
forms. Zhu thus conceived of the cosmos as emerging from incipient
*yin-yang* interaction in the initially formless primal
*qi* (*yuanqi*). *Yin-yang* interaction and
further permutations give rise to the five phases, which bear the full
range of material and perceptual qualities and whose interaction gives
rise to heaven, earth, and the myriad things, i.e., the cosmos.



The Chinese system of five phases differs from traditional Western
atomism on several counts. As *qi* (*yin-yang*) operates
in essentially a wave-like manner, the world is manifested as a field
of interacting *qi* forces. Change is a function of the
attunement of forms and resonance of *qi*, and transformation
is viewed according to chemical and biological models. That is, not
only are the five phases derived from *yin-yang* interaction;
they are divisible and inter-convertible. Moreover, while Western
atoms bear only primary qualities in themselves, each of the five
phases exhibits a range of perceptual qualities and effects, and the
tradition attributes a plethora of qualities and associations to
*yin* and *yang*. These flexible and adaptable concepts
do not create the sorts of problems, the kinds of conflicts with
observation, that prompt rethinking and further, more precise
investigations of phenomena. Because perceptual properties of all sorts
are propagated from the formation of the five phases, Zhu Xi and
others in his tradition did not draw the critical distinction between
primary and secondary qualities that formed a crucial linchpin in
physical analysis in the West from antiquity. To be sure, Zhu spoke of
a threshold between perceptible and imperceptible phenomena in terms
of the expressions "above forms" (*xing er shang*)
and "within forms" (*xing er xia)*. "Above
forms" refers not to general principles or primary qualities but
essentially to the immanental moral underpinnings of nature and
humanity, i.e., the inner roots of order and harmony, ecologically
conceived, primary examples of which are *dao* and *li*.
Characterizing these fundamental notions as "above forms",
Zhu insisted that people needed to comprehend them in light of their
manifestations in perceived phenomena "within forms".
Lacking the critical distinction between primary and secondary
qualities, Zhu treated perceptual qualities, such as color and taste,
as equally basic, innate, and real in material substances as any
other, and as such he did not look to underlying principles, causes,
or mechanisms in terms of which to explain these manifest
qualities.



Zhu Xi didn't feel the need to formulate a theory of motion as
such either, because the factors were glossed in his commonsense grasp
of the world and he didn't see any advantage in explicating
them. Importantly, he couldn't conceive of their theoretical
ramifications or especially of their practical implications, such as
for engineering and technology. At the same time, Zhu did have a grasp
of inertia and the relativity of motion, keys to solving the problems
of motion, but it was not adequate to the task. The capacity to
imagine ideal cases and relationships would have been necessary: for
example, Galileo had to conceive of the paradigmatic case of motion in
terms of an object moving in a straight line on a frictionless plane
at a constant velocity, something that can never occur in nature, for
any actual object inevitably will be environed and influenced by a
variety of forces, such as gravity and friction. Essential, too, was
the mathematical plotting of motions in nature that approximate the
paradigmatic motions, such as Kepler's plotting of planetary
motion and Galileo's plotting of the trajectories of
projectiles, to produce precise representations of near-paradigmatic
motions. Necessary, too, was an awareness of the possibility of
mathematical calculation and precise predictions. Zhu's
philosophy involved viewing all things interactively in relative
context. If he had had a notion of paradigmatic (perpetual) motion, it
would have been something like wave motions in the sea or the cyclical
pumping action of the traditional Chinese waterwheel used for
irrigation with rising full troughs of water complemented by the
falling empty troughs (receptacles), which he had used to depict the
*yin-yang* operation of *taiji*. Zhu also lacked the
necessary notions of precise mathematicization, measurement, and
calculation in terms of which to make the theory of motion bear fruit.
Consequently, it is hardly to be expected that Zhu or any one else in
his intellectual circle should have had occasion to formulate anything
like a scientific theory of motion.



Several features of Zhu Xi's thought and his notion of
observation discouraged him from forming a genuinely scientific theory
or making scientific observations. Zhu was loath to investigate the
sorts of fundamental abstract concepts, such as element, compound,
infinity, space, time, void, causality, and law, that were necessary
for making breakthroughs in the scientific revolution. Because of the
Confucian commonsense approach to things, Zhu was disinclined to
pursue or investigate such abstract, intangible, and seemingly
ephemeral notions. He tended to think that focusing on concepts like
void, nothingness, infinity, and space would draw people away from the
world of human affairs and ultimately incline them toward pointless
introspection. Zhu's concern with the real world itself stymied
his investigations into the very abstract concepts necessary for
constructing a better grasp of this so-called real world.



Zhu Xi had a "particularistic" tendency to investigate
each phenomenon on its own terms, without attempting to relate it to
more general explanatory principles, as in his treatment of inertia
and the relativity of motion. In another case, he discussed the
difficulty of boiling rice atop a particular mountain in terms of the
characteristics of the *qi* (cosmic vapor) of that mountain,
without relating the phenomenon generally to characteristics of
*qi* (as air pressure) at high altitudes. Inevitably, this
ignoring of general principles made Zhu less sensitive to the
contradictions that arose when he offered more than one explanation of
a single phenomenon.



Why did Zhu Xi go to the trouble of constructing his elaborate system
and making and discussing all these observations if they didn't
carry him beyond common sense to a deeper and more accurate perception
and account of reality, to go beyond the details of particular cases
to more general principles and truths? Zhu's ultimate purpose
was pragmatic rather than epistemic; that is, he was laying out the
concepts, framework, and practices that he deemed most conducive to
self-cultivation, self-realization, and ethical practice, rather than
formulating objectively accurate concepts, systems, and methods for
ascertaining objective truths about the world. So, he did not have a
practical interest in pushing his inquiries in purely scientific
directions. But, this way of putting it is not completely right
because Zhu had considered a variety of philosophic positions and did
think he had selected the best and most accurate of the concepts and
systems at his disposal. And, he did attempt to render his ideas in a
manner that was faithful to reality, the devotion to which was one of
his core cultivation
 themes.[17]
 Clearly, he did not have the requisite concepts, framework, or style
of thinking through which to conceive the world under overarching
scientific principles and abstract generalities.



Zhu Xi's working concepts and thought were typified by
immanental patterns (*li*) rather than by transcendental
principles. He regarded reality, the world, not in terms of logical
order, but as manifesting aesthetic order. Reality for him was not
composed of independent atoms operating under general laws; rather it
formed a field in which particulars appeared as foci determined in
context. To Zhu, ours is not an absolute, objective universe in which
particular individuals are subsumed under generalities and behave
according to universal laws; rather, the world unfolds before us in
light of our increasing, expanding perception of the arrays of
particular phenomena around us. The world we experience is a function
of, a field manifested as, the tapestry formed through the resonance
among the foci making up that field. Consequently, the task of
investigating things is a process of unfolding (rather than an
inductive process), an exhausting of the *li* constituting
particular things and events, from their gestalt forms, such as the
symmetrical bilateral forms of most biological entities, to their
identifying forms to their functions and typical patterns of
interaction. Proceeding in this way, we seek not the most general laws
or principles governing particular atomic individuals, but rather the
most basic or common patterns of interaction and formation among
particulars as foci in fields. Consequently, for example, the ultimate
pattern in Zhu's thought, *taiji*, the supreme polarity,
is not an abstract ideal like a platonic form or a law of nature; it
is an immanental pattern that is realized ubiquitously but
distributively, not overarchingly or generally. Zhu was not working
toward a scientific conception of the world, of reality, as
constituted on general principles and abstract equations; he was
traversing an alternative route by eliciting the formations of things
and events in ecological context in a way that would open one's
mind to the intimate resonance and intercourse among particulars as foci in fields. At
the same time, by stressing the expression "*gewu
qiongli*" (investigate things to exhaust their *li*),
Zhu maintained a measure of analyticity in his insights to ensure that
the knowledge people gleaned was nuanced and textured enough to
contribute to life understanding and appropriate conduct.


### 4.2 Philosophic Synthesis



Zhu Xi erected a philosophical synthesis that has been compared
broadly to the systems of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Whitehead,
and others. These "Great Chain" systems are hierarchical
and rooted in the distinction between form and matter. Recent
immanental readings of Zhu Xi's thought have stirred comparisons
with Spinoza and even Husserl (Choi 1999; Yeo 2013). Zhu Xi preserved
the immanental character of his hierarchy by incorporating Zhou
Dunyi's conception of world (and self) as shown in the
*Diagram of the Supreme Polarity* (*Taiji tu*), as a way
to combine the Cheng brothers' concept of *li* (pattern)
with Zhang Zai's notion of *qi* (cosmic vapor) as
organically integrated in a holistic system. In Zhou's treatise,
*Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity* (*Taiji
tu shuo*) (Adler 2014), Zhu discerned a viable account of the
formation of the world in stages from the original unformed
*qi*, to *yin* and *yang*, the five phases,
earth, wood, fire, water, and metal, and on to heaven, earth and the
ten thousand things. Zhu blended this conception with ideas from the
*Book of Change* and its commentaries in setting forth a
comprehensive philosophy of cosmic and human creativity and providing
philosophical grounds for the received Confucian concepts of human
nature and self-cultivation. 



Zhu Xi's penchant for thinking in polarities, *li* and
*qi*, in particular, has continued to stir critics to regard
him as a dualist who used two fundamental concepts to explain reality.
For his part, any viable account of the complexity of phenomena must
involve two or more facets in order to register their complexity,
variety, and changes. Zhu generalized the organic understanding of
*li* and *qi* implied in Zhou Dunyi's
*Explanation* under a principle of complementarity, inspired by
Cheng Hao's observation that all things have their complement
(discussed in the next section). At first, Zhu thought this principle
only governed *qi* phenomena as patterned by *li*, but
eventually he admitted that not only were *yin* and
*yang* paradigmatic polar complements but that the supreme
polarity (*taiji*) complemented the *yin-yang* polarity,
and inferred that *li* and *qi*, as the references of
*taiji* and *yin-yang*, respectively, too had to be
complements. This meant that *li* and *qi* were
functionally on a par and mutually implicative. Zhu still felt the
need to prioritize *li* ontologically and ethically, however,
for the reason that *li* underwrites both the possibility of
*qi* ordering (to yield a world and phenomena) and the
possibility of moral feelings and norms (to yield ethics and a system
of rites). Treating *li* and *qi* as full ontological
complements would quite possibly entail a Daoist conception of nature
as pure spontaneity and ethics as just perspectival while prioritizing
*qi* over *li* would be inadequate for understanding the
world and phenomenal orders, and reduce ethics to the received
norms.


## 5. Complementarity between *li* and *qi*, and among related terms



Recognizing *li* and *qi* as complements serves to
underscore their unity in difference and their implicatedness in not
just the forms but in the flow of events comprising the
 world.[18]
 This complementary relationship, moreover, underscores the basic
holism and power of Zhu's thought regarding the formation of the
world and things.



Zhu Xi was inspired by Cheng Hao's formulation of the principle
of complementarity, which he placed prominently in sec. 1 of the authoritative
Neo-Confucian anthology, *Reflections on Things at Hand* (par.
25):



> 
> 
> Master Cheng Hao said: The *li* of heaven, earth and the myriad
> things is that nothing exists in isolation; everything certainly has
> its opposite/complement. This is spontaneously so and not artificially
> arranged. When I reflect on this truth late at night, I feel delighted
> as if my hands were waving and my feet were dancing. (based on Chan
> 1967, edited) 
> 
> 
> 


Zhu Xi regarded this complementary pattern as describing the most
fundamental ordering tendency of cosmos, phenomena, and self. Notably,
this is *li* (pattern) in a new sense, now more as a
*pattern of creative intercourse* than just as inherent
patterning or order. It generalizes the significance of
*taiji*, though it *prima facie* lacks
*taiji*'s insistent implication of *li* into
*qi* intercourse and derived phenomena. Zhu remarks that Cheng
Hao felt delighted about his insight into this *li*
because,



> 
> 
> Once he had grasped deeply the truth that, "nothing exists in
> isolation but certainly has its opposite/complement," it seemed
> to him marvelous and joyous. (based on Chan 1967, edited) 
> 
> 
> 



*Zhuzi yulei* (Classified Dialogues of Master Zhu),
*juan* 95, contains Zhu's discussions with students on
this Cheng Hao quotation. As mentioned, Zhu usually construes this as
a *li* pattern underlying the complementary relationships among
*qi* phenomena, which *li* itself transcends, hence
implying a vertical bifurcation between *li* and *qi*.
When a disciple asks Zhu whether the complements have to be
"things" or whether, "*Li* too could have a
complement?" The Master replies,



> 
> 
> As to the categories of above and below, small and great, clear and
> turbid, they also pertain to *things*. But, if we were to say,
> "having the above, there must be the below; having the large,
> there must be the small", that would be purely a matter of
> *li*, that is to say it *has to be* like this, as a sort
> of logical necessity. For example, in nature's production of
> things, there cannot only be *yin*, there must also be
> *yang*; there cannot only be *yang*, there must also be
> *yin*. These [*yin* and *yang*] are mutual
> complements. The contexts of these complements are not themselves
> complementary *li*. Rather, the *li* are the very reason
> by which there are these complements. (trans. by the author)
> 
> 
> 



Zhu also applies this *li* pattern creatively to number,
speech, objects, and games. According to this pattern, "One
complements two", "above forms" complements
"within forms". Any word will bear its semantic complement
within.[19]
And, this object before your eyes has its complements of back, front,
top, and bottom. Moreover, each side has its complement.... Any
single thing bears its complement
within.[20]
For example, the paths on a checkerboard form series of complementary
pairs. In the end, when only one path remains open and it seems that
no other complement remains, this very path still complements the 360
other
 paths.[21] 
 This is called a 'one-many
complement', like the 'Way-implement complement'
(*Zhuzi yulei*, *juan* 95).



At the same time, Zhu hesitates to accept that *li* and
*qi* themselves are complementary, but this primarily reflects
his ethical
 concerns.[22]
 On the ontological side, he eventually does affirm that *li*
and *qi* are complementary by saying:



> 
> 
> As to what would be the complement of *taiji*, it is said that
> *taiji* is *wuji* (free of polarity)....
> *Taiji* also complements *yin-yang*.... [Regarding]
> the Way above forms and... utensil within forms... these are
> '*horizontal* oppositions'.... (trans. by the
> author)
> 
> 
> 



This is just like,



> 
> 
> Having the tranquility of the pre-aroused emotions of pleasure and
> anger, grief and joy, there is the harmony of these emotions when
> aroused in due degree. (trans. by the author) 
> 
> 
> 



*Taiji* and *wuji* are opposed, apparently
contradictory, expressions. Signifying the most basic complementarity,
namely, that between *yin* and *yang*, *taiji* is
the most primitive and original form of *li.* It is
quintessential *li*, or elementary form (patterning).
Signifying something unbounded and free of polarity, *wuji*
describes the unformed primal *qi* whence *yin* and
*yang* emerge through the *taiji* impulse. It is
quintessential *qi*, pure potentiality. Hence, Zhou
Dunyi's proposition, "*Wuji er taiji*" (Free
from polarity, and yet the supreme polarity), expresses the identity
of opposites (*li* and *qi*) that gives rise to the
initial impulse of
 phenomena.[23]
 In the next step of this impulse, *yin* and *yang* are
formed. They complement *taiji* as pure energy to pure form,
thus expressing another dimension of the *li-qi*
complementarity.



Although the distinction between "above forms" and
"within forms" does not strictly mark the distinction
between *li* and *qi*; nevertheless, as the way is
*correlated with li,* and implement is embodied *qi*,
their "*horizontal* complementarity" implies a
similar pattern for *li* and *qi*. Strikingly, whereas
those who take this above-below forms distinction as
"metaphysical" and "physical" would have to
describe the opposition as "*vertical*", Zhu says
plainly that it is *horizontal*, thus imputing a closer, more
interactive relationship between these complements than could obtain
had their relationship been strictly vertical.



A final reason why Zhu Xi's ideas of *li* and *qi*
ought to be taken as horizontal and not vertical complements, that is,
as a complex unity and not as a metaphysical duality, is found when
Zhu makes two seemingly contradictory claims about *li* and
*qi*: (1) *Li* is prior to *qi.* 2) *Li*
is not present apart from *qi* formations. Whereas 1) is
usually regarded as a positive metaphysical claim, it means rather
that *li* in this sense refers to "permanent
possibilities of *qi* formation". For example, for any
particular *qi* formation to have come about, it had to have
been possible for the *qi* constituents to combine in that
particular way to yield those properties and
 capacities.[24]
 Whereas (2) is often taken to mean that *li* subsist until
instantiated, it means rather that *li* are the patterning of
real processes and things; they exist immanently in processes and
things, though they can be analyzed and discussed separately from
their real contexts. This is why, methodologically, Zhu insists that
learners acquaint themselves with the *li* of things, processes,
affairs, ethics, etc., by examining actual things, processes,
phenomena, etc. He regards the study of *li* in abstraction
from phenomena to be wooden, hollow, empty, etc. Hence, Zhu's
claims (1) and (2) and his methodological strategy all indicate that,
for him, the relation of complementarity between *li* and
*qi* is essentially horizontal.



The "*li*" pattern in the Cheng Hao quotation thus
turns out to be a "meta-*li*" *about* the
dynamic *li-qi* complements that originate and comprise the
world and its constituents, that is, as a second-order abstraction
from the *li* and *qi* that are actually implicated in
phenomena. Again, this meta-*li* confirms the basic unity and
dynamism of Zhu's *li-qi* system. It reveals the pulse of
life at the heart of *li* and affirms the possibilities of form
in the vagaries of *qi* movement. It enlivens Zhu's
system and makes it flexible and conceptually adaptable to experience
and thinking.



We may reflect that Zhu's original notion of *li* as
pattern involves restrictions that conflict with experience or
expression, so he reconfigures it in light of Zhou Dunyi's
*Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity* and the
Cheng Hao
 quotation.[25]
 To work as intended, *li* has to tolerate and express
simultaneous assertions of "contradictory" complementary
terms. At the same time, this reconfiguration marks a step away from
primarily immanental aesthetic pattern of the *li* conception
to a
 more
 abstract, more self-consciously meta-pattern.


## 6. Major Interpreters of Zhu Xi



Zhu Xi was an active scholar-intellectual who held discussions and
disputes with other scholars, both in correspondence and in person.
His thought can be understood by contrast with the thought of his
intellectual rivals as well as through his positive views. For
example, his series of letters with Zhang Shi on the topic of
self-cultivation and moral psychology, preserved in the *Collected
Writings of Master Zhu* (*Zhuzi wenji*), provides an
illuminating record of these two dedicated Confucians' quest for
a well-grounded, efficacious approach to self-cultivation. He debated
with Lu Zuqian (1134-1181) on the nature of education. Zhu
focused on the Confucian Way and moral practice in education while Lu
argued for a broader-based humanities approach. Zhu held a series of
debates with Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan: 1139-93) on the nature of
realization and moral conduct. Whereas Zhu advocated regimens of
study, reflection, observation, and practice, Lu spoke simply of
reflecting on self and clarifying the mind, considering that once the
mind was clear one would know spontaneously what to do in any
situation. Zhu also corresponded with the "utilitarian"
Confucian scholar Chen Liang (1143-94), who disputed Zhu's
focus on individual moral realization and the received
"Way" with a broader institutional approach that was more
sensitive to empirical facts and conditions. Zhu generally eclipsed
all of the other scholars of his day, partly because he outlived them
and had so many students but mainly because his system was so
compelling. It was comprehensive yet nuanced, tightly reasoned yet
accommodating of individual differences. It preserved the essential
Confucian Way, yet ramified it to meet the challenges of Buddhism and
Daoism as spiritual teachings. Zhu's influence rose at the end
of the Southern Song dynasty and became decisive during the Yuan
dynasty when his edition of the *Four Books* was adopted as the
basis of the imperial examination system arranged by scholars trained
in his approach.



While raising his standing in pedagogy, this focus on the *Four
Books* came at the expense of Zhu's deeper, more nuanced
texts and dialogues, and opened the door to undue philosophic
criticism. The schematic presentation of Zhu's broad theory of
*li* pattern and *qi* cosmic vapor that lay in the
background of his commentary to the *Four Books* easily opened
him to charges of dualism and of reading abstract categories into the
down to earth, essentially practical ancient texts. Because his
commentary was focused on reading and understanding the meaning,
intent, and cultivation message of the *Four Books,* critics
generalized that Zhu and his method were essentially scholastic and
would be myopic and stilted in facing real situations. Anyone who
peruses the corpus of Zhu's writings and dialogues, however,
will find that his ontology is not a crude dualism but a holism built
of complementary, mutually implicative elements that never exist in
separation. Also, his reflections are always informed by knowledge of
history, current events, practical observation, and personal
reflection, as his method of observation applies generally to objects
(and self) and phenomena while respecting texts, which he took to be
handbooks of ethical insight and practice, after all. Even Zhu's
comments on Confucius and Mencius often refer back to the person and
the speech context, and thus are not entirely scholastic. His method
of observation opened the door to breakthroughs beyond the
"verities" of the classics, though he was careful not to
play up this fact because most of his intellectual colleagues
primarily sought the truth in the texts, thinking empirical facts were
distractions from the essential Natural-patterning (*tianli*)
that was reflected most adequately in the canonical texts.



Whereas early generations of Zhu's followers were acquainted
with his broad learning, incisive style, and open spirit, Confucians
of the Ming and Qing dynasties knew him mostly through his edition of
the *Four Books*, through which they targeted their criticisms
of his thought. Zhu's most eminent critic was the Ming
scholar-official Wang Yangming (1472-1529). He rejected
Zhu's approach to observation as too objective and open-ended,
as outward and diffuse and neglectful of concentration and inwardness. It could
be said that, in his criticisms, Wang was reacting more to the
scholastic attitudes fostered by the examination system than to Zhu Xi
himself. Wang ultimately respected Zhu and went on to compile a text
in which he argued that, in later life, Zhu's thought had taken a 
a subjective, practical turn that anticipated Wang's
approach.



Scholars of the late Ming through the early Qing period
(mid-seventeenth to early eighteenth century), notably, Wang Fuzhi
(1619-92) and Dai Zhen (Tai Chen, 1723-77), disputed Zhu
on philosophical and textual grounds. Whereas Zhu had allegedly insisted on the
priority of "pattern" over *qi*, (roughly, form
over matter), Wang and Dai followed the Northern Song thinker Zhang
Zai in affirming the priority of *qi*, viewing patterns as
*a posteriori* evolutionary realizations of *qi*
interactions. They thought this account dissolved the threat of any
hint of dualism in cosmology, ontology, and human nature. For his
part, Zhu Xi would have responded that, fundamentally,
"pattern" is implicated in the very make-up and possible
configurations of *qi*, which is why the regular *a
posteriori* patterns can emerge. *Li*
"patterning" provides for the standing orders and
processes, based on the steady interactions of *yin-yang*, five
phases, etc., that give rise to the heaven-earth world order, with its
full complement of ten thousand things. The fundamental *a
priori* patterns are necessary to the world order and provide the
fecund context in which the *a posteriori* forms emerge
continuously. Wang and Dai's *qi*-based view could not
account for existence and the variegated yet systematic given world
order in this sense. At the same time, Zhu did not think that
"patterns" were absolutely determinative. They just set
certain "possibilities of order" that are realized when
the necessary *qi* conditions obtained. For the most part, he
registered the range of randomness and free flow in *qi*
activity that is best exemplified in the randomness of weather systems
and seismic events.



As to textual grounds, Wang and Dai argued that Zhu was so enamored of
his metaphysics of pattern and *qi* that he constantly read
them into the classical texts. For example, Dai said Zhu blandly
associated Confucius' term *tian* (heaven) with his own
notion of *li* (pattern), quoting *Analects* 11:9 where
Confucius, in sorrow over the death of his disciple Yan Hui, cried
that "Heaven has forsaken me". Da questioned how Zhu Xi could 
reasonably claim that Confucius was crying that *li* had
forsaken him? Critics tend to find this counter-intuitive
example of Dai's against Zhu's approach to be compelling. However,
consulting Zhu's original commentary, we find that he noted that
this phrase was not literally about heaven but rather expressed
Confucius' utmost sorrow, that Confucius felt Yan Hui's
death as if it was his own son's, without mentioning
"pattern". This example does not support Wang and
Dai's claim in the least. It illustrates that Zhu's
commentary was nuanced and sensitive to pragmatic, situational usages
despite his penchant to see his own notion of "pattern" in
some of Confucius' usages of "heaven". Moreover, as
the intellectual historian Daniel Gardner shows, Zhu's
commentary was not intended as simply a glossary with comments. It was
intended as a guide to self-cultivation. Hence, Zhu sometimes recast
passages in the *Analects* more generally to show their broader
implications for self-cultivation and realization, often with the
isolated countryside student in mind. Gardner shows how Zhu had
effectively enriched the text as a tool for self-cultivation whereas
earlier commentaries of the Han and Tang dynasties had just given
glosses necessary for answering examination questions.



Known in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the West through
the work of Jesuits in China, Zhu Xi's thought and texts were
made more widely available to western scholarship in the late
nineteenth century. Notably, James Legge (1815-1897) based his
translations of the Chinese Classics on Zhu Xi's commentaries,
which he quoted and discussed at length in his footnotes to the texts. Early in
the twentieth century, a Chinese student of John Dewey
(1859-1951) at Cornell, Hu Shi (1891-1962), initially
followed the empirical, textual Qing scholars in viewing Zhu as a
scholastic metaphysician. But, after reading Zhu's
*Dialogues* for himself in old age, Hu contended that Zhu's method of
observation was not scholastic but essentially scientific in nature.
J.P. Bruce, who translated a book of Zhu's collected writings in
the 1920s, viewed Zhu's notion of *li* (pattern;
principle) in light of Stoic natural law. From the 1930s, the eminent
historian of Chinese philosophy, Feng Youlan, interpreted *li*
along the lines of platonic Forms making Zhu Xi appear to be an
idealist and abstract thinker. In the 1950s, Carsun Chang naturalized
the notion of *li* by aligning it with the Aristotelian
"nature" or "essence", thereby locking
Zhu's thought into a sort of rigid descriptive metaphysics.



From the 1960s, Mou Zongsan interpreted and criticized Zhu's
ontology and ethics on Kantian grounds, claiming Zhu had erected an
*a priori* framework but then illicitly sought to derive
further *a priori* knowledge (of patterns) by *a
posteriori* means (observation). In the 1970s, the intellectual
historian, Qian Mu examined and explained Zhu Xi's thought
directly in traditional indigenous terms, without reading western
concepts and logical patterns into his system. Scholars wanting to
read Zhu Xi on his own terms, largely unmediated by western thought,
turn to the five volume Zhu Xi anthology edited by Qian Mu as a rich
starting point.



In 1956, Joseph Needham, a chemist, made a significant breakthrough by
interpreting Zhu's system in terms of a process philosophy,
Whitehead's organic naturalism. Needham successfully recast much
of Zhu's language in naturalistic rather than metaphysical
terms. The cultural, moral dimension of Needham's account has
been developed by Cheng-ying Cheng and John Berthrong while the
scientific dimension has been examined by Yung Sik Kim. In the 1980s,
A.C. Graham offered the most insightful and apt account of Zhu's
terminology and pattern of thought in, "What Was New in the
Ch'eng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?" and other writings.
Graham showed decisively that the term *li* refers to an
embedded contextual "pattern", rather than to any sort of
abstract form or principle. He reminded us that the term *li*
never figures in propositions or logical sequences, as would be
natural for "principle". Rather, *li* are always
conceived as structuring, balancing, modulating, guiding phenomena,
processes, reflection and human discernment and response. For example,
one never finds moral syllogisms in Zhu Xi's writings. Many of
Zhu's discussions thus concern moral emotional intelligence:
attunement, sensitivity, discernment, and response. Joseph Adler views
*li* as indicative of an "ordering" tendency that
may be manifested as "pattern" or as
"principle" in differing contexts. (We might say that
people devise principles in the light of observed patterns.) Adler
also examines the key roles played by the *Book of Change* and
Zhou Dunyi in the formation of Zhu's thought, and joins Thomas
Wilson and Hoyt Tillman in showing the extent to which Zhu Xi
re-visioned, revised, and recast the Confucian Way. Adler shows how
Zhu Xi made Zhou Dunyi a pivotal figure in the succession of the
Confucian Way while Wilson is interested in Zhu's account of the
Way as a sort of educational-ideological revision, and Tillman is
interested in how Zhu's account of the Way eventually outlasted
other competing versions that might have offered more practical and
liberal openings in late imperial China.



Advances continue to be made in Zhu Xi studies in the present century.
On the one hand, intellectual historians, such as Yingshi Yu, examine
Zhu Xi's historical, political, and cultural backgrounds, as well as
his intellectual milieu. Other intellectual historians, such as Hoyt
Tilman and Hans van Ess study Zhu Xi's intellectual collaborators and
rivals. Still others, such as Chun-chieh Huang and his colleagues
examine the differing receptions and adaptations of Zhu Xi's thought by
Confucian scholars around East Asia. On the other hand, philosophical
interpreter Brook Ziporyn has developed a "coherence" reading of
*li* (pattern). Drawing on the parallel model of *li*
and *shi* in Huayan Buddhism, he views Zhu Xi's *li* as
the organizing, cohering element in *qi* phenomena, writ large and small.
Given the intimate connection between *li* and truth in Zhu
Xi's thought, the coherence account of *li* recalls the
coherence theory of truth in 20th century Western philosophy. While
"coherence" is an apt and suggestive account of the organizing and
cohering function of *li*, it cannot serve as a direct
translation of the term *li*. Ethicists, such as Stephen Angle, Yong
Huang, and Justin Tiwald examine Confucian ethics in general and Zhu
Xi's ethics in particular as species of virtue ethics, as conceived in
recent Anglo-American ethical thought. They have identified overlaps
and similarities between these ethical approaches. Other scholars,
such as Ming-huei Lee and the present author have identified Kantian
elements in Zhu Xi's efforts to justify Confucian ethics and
cultivation. Finally, Shui Chuen Lee and others find support in Zhu
Xi's system of thought for a viable Confucian approach to
environmental ethics.



In summary, the depth and range of Zhu Xi's thought were
unparalleled in the Chinese intellectual tradition and around East
Asia. Zhu Xi studies globally continue to be vital, wide-ranging, and
contentious, and continue to attract increasing interest around the world.