## 1. The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence and the Principle of Sufficient Reason




In 1715 a series of written exchanges began between Gottfried Leibniz
and Samuel Clarke. Halted by Leibniz's death in 1716, the series was
edited and published by Clarke in 1717. (See Leibniz-Clarke
Correspondence, 1956 [1717]). [References to the Leibniz-Clarke
Correspondence will be incorporated in the text as L-C, followed by
the appropriate page number in Alexander's edition.]




Clarke and Leibniz agreed that human reason can demonstrate that there
necessarily exists an essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly
good being who has freely created the world. But their accounts of
divine freedom were profoundly different. It is helpful, therefore, to
highlight their differences over divine freedom and to consider
whether either conception of divine freedom can be reconciled with the
absolute perfection of the creator. Thecentral issue is whether either
conception of divine freedom can be fully reconciled with the
requirement imposed by God's perfect goodness, (in Clarke's words)
"the necessity of always doing what is best."




An important issue in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence concerns the
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), particularly its implications
for how we must understand divine and human freedom. In his second
letter Leibniz advances the principle and pronounces on its
implications for theology and metaphysics. "Now, by that single
principle, viz. that there ought to be a sufficient reason why things
should be so, and not otherwise, one may demonstrate the being of a
God, and all the other parts of metaphysics or natural theology"
(L-C, 16). Leibniz elsewhere expresses PSR more fully as the
principle "...that no fact can be real or existent, no
statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and
not otherwise,..." (1714, paragraph 32). He illustrates PSR
by citing the example of Archimedes who observed that if there be a
perfect balance, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that
balance, the balance will not move. Why? Leibniz answers: "It is
because no reason can be given, why one side should weigh down, rather
than another" (L-C, 16). It was perhaps unfortunate for Leibniz
to use this example. For it enabled Clarke to charge him with treating
an agent no differently from a balance: just as the balance cannot
move without a greater weight on one side, and must move downward on
the side with the greater weight, so the agent cannot choose without
some motive to choose, and must choose in accordance with the
strongest motive. But, Clarke argues, this is to deny the agent any
power to act in the absence of a motive, and to deny the agent any
power to act in opposition to the strongest motive. It is, in Clarke's
view, to deny that there are any genuine agents at all. For it is the
nature of an agent to have the power to act or not act. A balance has
no such power; it is simply acted upon by whatever weights are placed
upon it. As Clarke concludes in his fifth and final reply:



> There is no similitude between a balance being moved by
> weights or impulse, and a mind moving itself, or acting upon the view
> of certain motives. The difference is, that the one is entirely
> passive; which is being subject to absolute necessity: the other not
> only is acted upon, but acts also; which is the essence of liberty
> (L-C, 97).




Clarke's rejection of any "similitude" between the
movements of a balance and the acts of an agent is closely connected
to his disagreement with Leibniz over PSR. In his response to the
second letter Clarke appears to accept PSR. Thus he says: "It is
very true, that nothing is, without a sufficient reason why it is, and
why it is thus rather than otherwise" (L-C, 20). Clearly, if
when writing "nothing is" Clarke means to include any fact
or truth whatever, then he cannot consistently go on, as he does, to
exempt certain facts or truths from the necessity of having a
sufficient reason. Leibniz may have read Clarke's "nothing
is" as encompassing any fact or truth whatever, which would
approach Leibniz's own understanding of PSR. If so, this would explain
why in his third letter Leibniz complains that although Clarke grants
him this important principle, "he grants it only in words, and
in reality denies it. Which shows that he does not fully perceive the
strength of it" (L-C, 25). However, despite his statement
"nothing is without a sufficient reason why it is," it is
clear that Clarke cannot have intended to agree with Leibniz that
every fact or truth has a sufficient reason. Nor could he have agreed
that every contingent fact or truth has a sufficient reason. For he
immediately goes on to say that "this sufficient reason is
oft-times no other, than the mere will of God," citing as an
example God's volition to create this system of matter in one
particular place within absolute space, rather than in some other
place in absolute space. There is simply nothing to recommend one
particular place in absolute space over another. Hence, in this case
there can be no other reason than the mere will of God. (Presumably,
Clarke would say that God had a sufficient reason to create this
system of matter in some place or other in absolute space, but He did
not have a sufficient reason to create it in this particular place.)
In his third letter Leibniz cites this case as just the sort of thing
that PSR rules out as impossible. On his understanding of PSR there
can be no situations at all in which a choice has been made without a
sufficient reason for making that particular choice. To think
otherwise is to suppose an exception to PSR. (Leibniz does allow that
there are many human acts that appear to lack a sufficient
reason. There are acts for which we cannot find a sufficient
motive. For example, no motive is apparent for why an agent stepped
over the threshold with his left foot rather than his right. But he
supposed in all such cases there is some unconscious perception or
passion that provides the sufficient reason.) It is clear that Clarke
allows for such exceptions.




A deeper and more important disagreement concerning PSR is also
reflected in Clarke's reaction to Leibniz's analogy between the
sufficient reason for the balance to move and the sufficient reason
for an agent to do one thing rather than another. For Clarke agrees
with Leibniz that often enough the agent has a sufficient reason for
her action. So, he allows that PSR is satisfied for a vast array of
human and divine acts. What he denies is that the sufficient reason
for the agent doing one thing rather than another operates on the
agent in the way in which the heavier weight operates on the
balance. Clearly, the heavier weight on one side of the balance is a
determining cause of the movement of the balance. Given the
circumstances and the placement of that weight on the one side of the
balance, nothing else could happen than what did happen, it was
necessary that the balance move as it did. But to suppose that the
reason or motive that is the sufficient reason for the agent to do one
thing rather than another is a determining cause of the agent's act is
to deny any power on the agent's part to perform or not perform that
particular act. It is to render the agent's act necessary and to deny
the agent's freedom of will. Thus, for Clarke, a reason or motive may
be the sufficient reason for the agent's action. But, unlike the
weight in the balance that is the determining cause of the movement of
the balance, the reason or motive is not the determining cause of the
agent's act. As he puts it elsewhere:



> Occasions indeed they (reasons and motives) may be, and
> are, upon which that substance in man, wherein the self-moving
> principle resides, freely exerts its active power. But it is the
> self-moving principle, and not at all the reason or motive, which is
> the physical or efficient cause of action. When we say, in vulgar
> speech, that motives or reason determine a man; it is not but a figure
> or metaphor. It is the man that freely determines himself to act
> (1978. IV. 723).




What we've seen is that Clarke's conception of what it is to be a free
agent requires first that the agent may act in some particular way
even in the absence of his having a sufficient reason to act in that
particular way. Thus, there are exceptions to PSR. Second, we've seen
that when the agent has a sufficient reason to do a particular act and
freely does that act, the sufficient reason or motive is not a
determining cause of the agent's act. At the time of the act the agent
had the power not to perform that act. So, on Clarke's libertarian
view there is a profound difference between the sufficient reason for
the balance moving in a particular way and the sufficient reason for
an agent's free act. In the first case the sufficient reason is a
determining cause, in the second it is not. Leibniz, however, sees no
need to suppose there are exceptions to PSR and no need to treat the
motive for the agent's free act as anything other than a determining
cause of that act.


## 2. Leibniz's problem with Divine Freedom: the necessity of God's choosing what is Best.




With this background in place, we can now look at the problem of
divine perfection and freedom and then consider the very different
solutions proposed by Clarke and Leibniz to that problem. Following
Leibniz, we can imagine God considering a variety of worlds he might
create. One might be a world in which there are no conscious creatures
at all, a world composed solely of dead matter. (Of course, given that
the actual world includes everything that exists, including God, the
world in question is here being considered apart from God.) Another
might be a world composed (at some stage in its history) of living,
conscious creatures whose lives are meaningful, morally good, and
happy. If we imagine God making a choice between these two worlds, it
seems evident that he would create the latter. Surely, a world with
conscious creatures living morally good, satisfying lives is, other
things being equal, a very good world, and better than a world
consisting of nothing but dull bits of matter swirling endlessly in a
void. And isn't it absolutely certain that an omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly good being would create the better world if he could? But if
we pursue this line of thought, problems begin to emerge. Assume, as
seems evident, that the second world is the better world. If God were
limited to these two worlds, he would face three choices: creating the
inferior world, creating the superior world, creating no world at all.
For God to decide to create no world over creating a world that is,
all things considered, a very good world, would be for God to do less
than the best that he can do. If so, it seems that God's perfect
goodness would require him to create the very good world. But if God's
perfect goodness requires him to create the very good world, rather
than creating the inferior world or not creating a world at all, what
are we to make of that part of the idea of God that declares that he
created the world freely? To say that God freely created the good
world seems to imply that he was free not to do so, that he could have
created the inferior world, or refrained from creating either
world. But if his perfect goodness requires him to create the good
world, how is it possible that he was free to create the inferior
world or not to create any world? This is a simple way of picturing
the problem of divine perfection and divine freedom.




Initially, one may be tempted to solve this problem by viewing God's
perfect goodness (which includes his absolute moral perfection) as
analogous to our goodness. A morally good person may actually do the
very best action available to her while being free not to do it, or
free to do something bad instead. Of course, had she freely done the
bad thing, she would have exhibited some sort of moral failing. But
the mere fact that she was free to have done the bad thing doesn't
impugn whatever degree of moral goodness she possesses. So why should
God's perfect goodness preclude his being free to create a less good
world, or even a bad world? Had he done that, he would have ceased
being the morally perfect being he is, just as the morally good person
would have diminished somewhat her moral goodness had she freely done
the wrong thing.




This solution fails because, although a human person can become less
good or even bad, God cannot become less than absolutely perfect.
Although we may achieve a certain degree of moral virtue in our lives,
we can lose it and sink back into being the morally mediocre persons
we perhaps once were. This is because it is not part of our very
nature to be at a certain level of goodness. According to the
historically dominant view in Western religions, however, God, by his
very nature, is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. He cannot
become weak, ignorant, or ignoble. Just as the number two is
necessarily even, God is necessarily supreme in power, goodness, and
knowledge. He is not some infant deity who by earnest striving slowly
acquired these perfections and, like us, can diminish his goodness by
intentionally acting badly. He necessarily has these perfections from
all eternity, and he cannot divest himself of them anymore than the
number two can cease to be even. God's perfections are constituents of
his nature, not acquired characteristics. So, while we may be free to
lose our degree of goodness by using our freedom to pursue the bad,
God is not free to lose his perfections by using his freedom to pursue
the bad. Indeed, he is not free to pursue the bad. For if he were free
to pursue the bad, then he could become less perfect than he is. And
that is simply impossible.




The problem of divine perfection and freedom was particularly acute
for Leibniz. Since God necessarily exists and is necessarily
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, it seems he would
necessarily be drawn to create the best. If this be so, then when God
surveyed all the possible worlds, he must have chosen the best, with
the result that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds.
Leibniz embraced the conclusion of this reasoning: the actual world is
the best of all possible worlds. But how then could God be free in
choosing to create the best? As a first step in the direction of
answering this question, it should be noted that two different views
of divine freedom have emerged in western thought. According to the
first view, God is free in creating a world or in acting within the
world he has created provided nothing outside of him determines him to
create the world he creates or determines him to act in a particular
way in the world he has created. According to the second view, God is
free in creating or acting within his creation provided it was in his
power not to create what he did or not to act within his creation as
he did.




The first of these two views has the advantage of establishing beyond
question that God possesses freedom from external forces with respect
to his selection of a world to create. For given that he is omnipotent
and the creator of all things other than himself, it is evident that
nothing outside of him determines him to create whatever he does
create. And given that whatever he creates is within his control, it
would seem that he is completely at liberty to act as he sees fit
within the world he has created. So, the fact that nothing outside of
God determines him to create or act as he does clearly shows that God
is an autonomous agent; he is self-determining in the sense that his
actions are the result of decisions that are determined only by his
own nature. But is this sufficient to establish that God is genuinely
free? It is generally believed that a human being may not be free in
performing a certain action even when it is clear that the person was
not determined to perform that action by external forces. Perhaps the
person was in the grip of some internal passion or irresistible
impulse that necessitated the performance of that action, overcoming
the person's judgment that the action was wrong or unwise. With
respect to human beings, the defender of the first view of divine
freedom can agree that the mere absence of determining external agents
or forces is not sufficient for an individual's action to be free. But
in the case of God, as opposed to humans, the defender can argue that
it is sufficient. For in God there is no possibility of his passions
overcoming the judgment of reason. As Leibniz remarks:



> the Stoics said that only the wise man is free; and one's
> mind is indeed not free when it is possessed by a great passion, for
> then one cannot will as one should, i.e. with proper deliberation. It
> is in that way that God alone is perfectly free, and the created minds
> are free only in proportion as they are above passion. (1982,
> 175).




The chief objection to this view of divine freedom is that it doesn't
sufficiently recognize the importance of agents having control over
their free acts. An action was performed freely only if the agent was
free to perform the action and free not to perform it. It must have
been up to the agent whether to perform or not perform that act. If
some external force or internal passion was beyond the control of the
agent, and the agent's action was inevitable given that external force
or internal passion, then the agent did not act freely in performing
that action. Since God is a purely rational being and not subject to
uncontrollable passions that sometimes compel human agents to act, it
is tempting to conclude that God enjoys perfect freedom of action. But
this will be so only if there are no other features in God that both
necessitate his actions and are not within his control. Because human
agents are generally thought to have the power to act against the
counsel of reason, we credit their acts due to reason -- as
opposed to those acts due to irresistible impulses -- as acts
they perform freely. For we believe they were free to reject the
counsel of reason and act otherwise. But what if God cannot reject the
counsel of his reason as to what action to perform? A human agent who
is morally good and rational may yet have -- or previously had
-- the power to refrain from acting as his goodness and reason
direct. But can this be true of God? And, if it cannot be, how can we
then say that God acts freely?




Leibniz was well aware of the problem posed by the fact that God's
choice of the best is necessary, given that he is necessarily
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. In fact, his most
well-known solution to the problem of divine perfection and freedom
recognizes that if God's choice of the best is absolutely necessary
then God is not free with respect to creation. In his Theodicy and in
his correspondence with Clarke, he is careful to distinguish absolute
necessity, hypothetical necessity, and moral necessity, arguing that
it is morally necessary but not absolutely necessary that God chose to
create the best world. To determine whether Leibniz can solve the
problem of divine perfection and freedom it is important to examine
his distinction between moral and absolute necessity and to determine
whether he succeeds in escaping the charge that on his view of things
it is absolutely necessary that God chooses to create the best.




In discussing this matter it will be helpful to consider the
following argument:


1. If God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise and good,
then he chooses to create the best of all possible worlds. [That
Leibniz is committed to (1) follows from (a) his view that God is
determined by the best, and (b) his view that among possible worlds
there is a unique best world.]
2. God exists and is omnipotent, perfectly wise, and perfectly good.
[Leibniz endorses the Ontological Argument which purports to be a
proof of (2).]



therefore,
3. God chooses to create the best of all possible worlds.




Leibniz must deny that (3) is absolutely necessary. For whatever is
absolutely necessary cannot logically be otherwise. Hence, if (3) is
absolutely necessary, it would be logically impossible for God to
choose to create any world other than the best. It would not be a
contingent matter that God chooses to create the best. Nor, of course,
could God be free in choosing to create the best.




Leibniz contends that God's choosing to create the best is morally
necessary, not absolutely necessary.



> God is bound by a moral necessity, to make things in such a
> manner that there can be nothing better: otherwise ... he would
> not himself be satisfied with his work, he would blame himself for its
> imperfection; and that conflicts with the supreme felicity of the
> divine nature. (1710, 201)




What is it for it to be morally necessary for God to choose to create
the best of all possible worlds? It seems clear that its meaning is
such that if God were to choose to create less than the best it would
logically follow that he is lacking in wisdom, goodness or power.
Indeed, Leibniz says that "to do less good than one could is to
be lacking in wisdom or in goodness", that the most perfect
understanding "cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and
consequently to choose the best" (1710, 201). Consider again
proposition (1) in the above argument. What Leibniz says about moral
necessity implies that (1) is itself absolutely necessary. For he
clearly holds that from the fact that a being does less good than it
could it logically follows that the being in question is lacking in
wisdom or goodness. And one cannot hold this without being committed
to holding that the consequent of (1) logically follows from the
antecedent of (1). [Actually, the consequent of (1) logically follows
from the antecedent of (1) only if it is absolutely necessary that
there is a best possible world. Leibniz does think it is absolutely
necessary that there is a unique best among possible worlds.] That is,
Leibniz is committed to holding that (1) is a hypothetical necessity.
An if -- then proposition is a hypothetical necessity provided
the consequent logically follows from the antecedent. Of course, the
mere fact that a particular consequent logically follows from a
certain antecedent -- as, for example, 'John is
unmarried' logically follows from 'John is a
bachelor' -- is insufficient to render the consequent
absolutely necessary. It is not logically impossible for 'John
is unmarried' to be false. So, although his asserting the moral
necessity of God's choosing to create the best commits Leibniz to the
absolute necessity of the hypothetical proposition (1), in itself this
commitment still leaves him free to deny that God's choosing to create
the best is absolutely necessary. Two further points show that he
cannot escape the conclusion that God's choosing to create the best is
absolutely necessary. First, proposition (2) [God exists and is
omnipotent, perfectly wise, and perfectly good.], the antecedent of
(1), is itself absolutely necessary. We've already noted that both
Clarke and Leibniz are committed to the view that (2) is not a
contingent truth; it is absolutely necessary. Second, it is a rule of
logic that if a hypothetical proposition is itself absolutely
necessary, and its antecedent is also absolutely necessary, then its
consequent must be absolutely necessary as well. Thus, if both (1) and
(2) are absolutely necessary, (3) must be absolutely necessary as
well. Since Leibniz is committed to the view that both (1) and (2) are
absolutely necessary, it appears that his view commits him to the view
that (3) is absolutely necessary. [The early Leibniz toyed with
denying the logical rule that what logically follows from what is
absolutely necessary is itself absolutely necessary. See Adams, 1994,
Ch.1.]




Before turning to Clarke's attempt to solve the problem of divine
perfection and freedom, we should note that Leibniz often insists that
the act of will must be free in the sense of not being necessitated by
the motives that give rise to it. His often repeated remark on this
matter is that motives "incline without necessitating"
(L-C, 57). This view appears to conflict with the view I have ascribed
to him: that the strongest motive in the agent determines the agent to
choose as he does. It suggests instead that the agent had the power to
will otherwise even though the motive and circumstances be unchanged.
For, as he says, the motives don't necessitate but only incline the
agent to will as he does. But this seems not to be what he means by
his phrase "motives incline without necessitating". On his
view, motives and circumstances necessitate the act of will in the
sense that it is logically or causally impossible that those motives
and circumstances should obtain and the act of will not occur.
Leibniz's claim that they don't necessitate the act of will means only
that the act of will itself is not thereby rendered something that is
absolutely necessary. [For a more extended account of this
interpretation of Leibniz's dictum, "motives incline but do not
necessitate," see Parkinson, 1970, 50-53.] That is, he is simply
noting that even though there be a necessary connection between the
motive and the act of will, this does not mean that the act of will
cannot itself be contingent. As we saw above, God's being omnipotent,
omniscient, and perfectly good necessitates God's choice of the best.
However, the fact that there is a necessary connection between his
being perfect and his choice of the best does not imply that his
choice of the best is itself absolutely necessary. Leibniz registers
this point (in a somewhat misleading fashion) by saying that God's
motives "incline without necessitating" his choice of the
best. We should not be misled by this phrase into thinking that he
holds that the connection between his being perfect and his choice of
the best is anything less than absolutely necessary. And when we then
note that God's being perfect is absolutely necessary, the logical
rule dictates the conclusion that his choice of the best is itself
absolutely necessary. This being so, we can conclude that God's choice
to create the best is not free; it is absolutely necessary.


## 3. Clarke's Problem with Divine Freedom: the power to choose otherwise is required for freedom.




In contrast to Locke, who characterized freedom as the power to carry
out the action that we choose (will) to do, leaving the choice
(volition) itself to be causally necessitated by the agent's motives,
Clarke locates freedom squarely at the level of the choice to act or
not act. "... the essence of liberty consists in [a
person's] having a continual power of choosing whether he shall act or
whether he shall forbear acting" (1738, 101). The implication of
Clarke's view is that freedom (liberty) would be impossible should a
person's choices be causally necessitated by his motives or desires.
For if a person's choice to act is causally necessitated by earlier
states of his body or mind, then at the time of that choice it was not
in the agent's power to choose to not act. It is for Clarke a
secondary matter whether the agent is able to carry out his
choice. Indeed, Clarke goes so far as to declare that a prisoner in
chains is free to will to leave or will to stay. That he cannot
successfully execute his choice doesn't rob him of the power to choose
(Presumable, he would allow that one who knows he is in chains may
well see the pointlessness of choosing to leave and, therefore, not
exercise his power so to choose.) Of course, since God is omnipotent,
his power to carry out the action he chooses to do is unlimited. But
our question is whether God has it in his power to choose to refrain
from following what he knows to be the best course of action. Should
he lack that power, it follows from Clarke's conception of freedom
that God does not freely choose the best course of action. In fact, it
would follow for Clarke that in this instance God is totally passive
and not an agent at all. It would also follow for Clarke that it would
make no sense to praise or thank God for choosing the best course of
action. We must now see how Clarke endeavors to avoid the absolute
necessity of God's choosing in accordance with his knowledge of what
is the best course of action.




Clarke's overall view is clear enough. He distinguishes between the
intellect (understanding) and the will. It is the function of the
understanding to determine what course of action to pursue. It is the
function of the will (the power we have to will this or that) to
initiate the action specified by the understanding. It is one thing,
however, to arrive through deliberation at the judgment that doing a
certain thing is best, and quite another thing to choose (will) to do
that thing. Since such a judgment terminates the process of
deliberation about what to do, Clarke and others referred to it as
"the last judgment of the understanding." It is the
judgment that terminates deliberation and is followed by the act of
will to perform (or not perform) the action specified in the judgment.
Often enough, our motives and desires are sufficiently clear and
strong to causally necessitate the judgment as to what to do. No other
judgment is possible in the circumstances. In short, there may be no
freedom at all with respect to the judgment as to what action to
perform. On Clarke's view, freedom enters only when the will chooses
to act or not act in accordance with the judgment of the
understanding. Thus, when there is a best course of action for God to
perform, his judgment that it is the best course to pursue is, Clarke
tells us, absolutely necessary. But God's choice to act in accordance
with what his understanding approves is completely free; he always has
the power to choose otherwise.



> God always discerns and approves what is just and good,
> necessarily, and cannot do otherwise: But he always acts or does what
> is just and good freely; that is, having at the same time a full
> natural or physical power of acting differently. (1978. IV,
> 717)




It is instructive to contrast Clarke's view of freedom with a stream
of thought in Christian theology, dating back at least to Augustine,
according to which the saints in heaven are perfected to the degree
that they not only do not sin, they no longer are able to sin, a
perfection that is found in God and the angels. In our earthly state
we have the freedom to turn from the good and do evil, but in the life
to come we shall have a superior sort of freedom, a freedom that does
not include the ability to do evil. Thus Augustine says:



> For the first freedom of will which man received when he
> was created upright consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an
> ability to sin; whereas this last freedom of will shall be superior,
> inasmuch as it shall not be able to sin. This, indeed, shall not be a
> natural ability, but the gift of God. For it is one thing to be God,
> another thing to be a partaker of God. God by nature cannot sin, but
> the partaker of God receives this inability from God. (1948, Bk. 12,
> Ch. 30)




In his book, *A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human
Liberty*, Anthony Collins had appealed to this stream of thought
in support of his view that freedom does not require any power to
choose or do otherwise. Clarke wrote a rather devastating response to
Collins's book. In the course of his response to Collins we find the
following remark:



> Neither saints, nor angels, nor God himself, have in any
> degree the less liberty upon account of the perfection of their
> nature: Because between the physical power of action and the
> perfection of judgment which is not action (which two things this
> author constantly confounds) there is no connection. God judges what
> is right, and approves what is good, by a physical necessity of
> nature; in which physical necessity, all notion of action is
> necessarily excluded. But doing what is good is wholly owing to an
> active principle, in which is essentially included the notion of
> liberty. (1978. IV, 731)




Clearly, Clarke rejects this stream of thought in Christian
theology. He allows that the saints in heaven no longer have any
desire to sin and take no delight in it. Indeed, it may be absolutely
certain that with purified desires and a perfected judgment they will
always freely do what is right. (See 1738, 124) And this will be an
enormous difference from life on earth where we are often tempted to
sin by bad desires and faulty judgment. But what cannot be is that the
saints or the angels, or God for that matter, cease to have the
ability or power to choose to do other than what is right. For then
they would not be free in choosing and doing what is right. To lose
the power to choose otherwise is to lose the power to choose
freely. And if one loses that power one ceases to be an agent at
all.




We can begin to get at the difficulty in Clarke's view of divine
freedom by considering God's perfections and their implications for
whether he can freely choose to do evil. Clarke readily sees that were
a perfectly good, omniscient being to freely choose to do some evil
deed, it would thereby cease to be perfectly good. And it would cease
to be perfectly good even if, as could not happen in God's case, it
were prevented from carrying out the evil deed it chose to do. For the
free choice to do evil is itself inconsistent with continuing to be a
perfectly good, omniscient being. A being who freely chooses to do
what it knows to be an evil deed thereby ceases to be a perfectly good
being. So, if God were to freely choose to do an evil deed, he would
cease to be perfectly good. In short, it is not logically possible for
God both to freely choose to do evil and to continue to be perfectly
good. Now, since Clarke holds with Leibniz that God necessarily exists
and necessarily is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, we can
advance to the simpler conclusion that it is not logically possible
for God to freely chose to do evil. It is not logically possible
because it is inconsistent with what is logically necessary: the
existence of a being (God) who is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient,
and perfectly good.




An essential attribute of a being is an attribute that the being
necessarily possesses. Clarke holds that the moral perfections of the
deity are essential aspects of the divine nature. "...
justice, goodness, and all the other moral attributes of God are as
essential to the divine nature as the natural attributes of eternity,
infinity, and the like" (1738, 120).




Consider now the question: Does God ever freely choose not to do evil?
I think we can see that Clarke's own views commit him to a negative
answer to this question. For God chooses freely not to do something
only if it is in his power to choose to do that thing -- choosing
freely, Clarke insists, logically requires the power to choose
otherwise. But it cannot be in anyone's power to make a certain choice
if it is logically impossible that the person make that choice. (If
there is no possible world in which a person makes a certain choice,
it cannot be that the person, nevertheless, has it within his power to
make that choice.) Therefore, since it is logically impossible for God
to choose to do evil, it is not in God's power to choose to do evil.
And since it is not in God's power to choose to do evil, it cannot be
that God's choice not to do evil is a free choice. If God chooses not
to do evil, he so chooses of necessity, not freely. And this being so,
it makes no sense for us to thank God, or to be grateful to him, for
choosing not to do evil. He could not have chosen otherwise.




Since the claim that God does not freely choose not to do evil is
rather central to the examination of Clarke's views on divine
perfection and freedom, it is useful to consider another argument in
support of it.


1. If *p* logically implies *q*, and *q* is
false, it is in an agent's power to bring it about that *p*
only if it is in that agent's power to bring about that
*q*. [For a defense of this principle see Hasker, 96-115.]
2. That God chooses to do evil logically implies that God is not
perfectly good.
3. It is false that God is not perfectly good. 



therefore,
4. If it is in God's power to bring it about that he chooses to do
evil then it is in his power to bring it about that he is not perfectly
good. (from 1, 2, and 3)
5. It is not in God's power to bring it about that he is not perfectly
good. 



therefore,
6. It is not in God's power to choose to do evil. 



therefore,
7. If God chooses not to do evil, God chooses not to do evil of
necessity, not freely.




Before examining two attempts by Clarke to avoid any limitations on
the scope of divine liberty, consider whether it is in God's power to
choose contrary to what he judges to be best. Clearly, God cannot
choose to do evil. But to choose contrary to what is judged to be best
is evil or morally wrong only if choosing to do what is judged to be
best is morally obligatory. To claim that it is morally obligatory
ignores the real possibility that choosing what is best is
supererogatory, beyond the call of duty. There are choices which are
good to make but not required as our duty. It would be a mistake,
therefore, to infer God's inability to choose to act contrary to what
he judges to be best from his inability to choose to do evil.
Nevertheless, it does seem to be logically impossible for perfect
goodness to choose to act contrary to what is best. And this seems to
be Clarke's own view of the matter. Thus he declares "that
though God is a most perfectly free agent, yet he cannot but do always
what is best and wisest in the whole" (1738, 120-121). To choose
otherwise, he thinks, is to act contrary to perfect wisdom and
goodness.




How does Clarke endeavor to avoid the conclusion that God's perfect
goodness precludes his being free in many of his choices? His general
approach to this difficulty is to distinguish two sorts of
necessities: moral and physical. If one state or event physically
necessitates another state or event, then the second state or event
cannot occur freely. Thus he would say that hanging a greater weight
on the left end of an accurate balance physically necessitates the
downward movement on the left side of the balance. Here, even if the
balance were endowed with consciousness, there would be no possibility
of the balance freely moving downward on the left. For the balance has
no power to do other than move downwards on the left side. To
illustrate the other sort of necessity, he offers the example of God's
promising that on a given day he will not destroy the world. The
promise morally necessitates God's refraining from destroying the
worldon that particular day. But, says Clarke, it would be absurd to
think that God therefore lacked the physical power on that day to
destroy the world.



> God's performing his promise is always consequent upon his
> making it: Yet there is no connection between them, as between cause
> and effect: For, not the promise of God, but his active power, is the
> alone physical or efficient cause of the performance (1978. IV,
> 9).




God's refraining from destroying the world on that day is both
morally necessary and free. For he both retains the physical power to
destroy the world on that day and also cannot (morally speaking) break
his promise.




The trouble with this solution is that it doesn't focus on the
particular act of choosing to break his promise. If we accept, as it
seems we must in God's case, that it is logically impossible for God
to choose to break his solemn promise, then it follows that it is not
in God's power to break his solemn promise. Indeed, for God to choose
to break his solemn promise is for God to divest himself of his
absolute perfection. And, clearly, it is not logically possible for
God to cease to be absolutely perfect.




In a revealing passage Clarke appears to recognize that there are some
choices that do not lie within God's power because they logically
imply the destruction of his essential perfections. He begins the
passage by noting that there are necessary relations among things,
relations that God eternally knows. By this he means that some states
of things are necessarily better than other states of things. (For
example, there being innocent beings who do not suffer eternally is
necessarily better than there being innocent beings who do suffer
eternally.) By knowing these necessary relations, God knows the
choices required by his perfect wisdom and goodness. Noting that God
cannot but choose to act always according to this knowledge, he
continues:



> It being as truly impossible for such a free agent, who is
> absolutely incapable of being deceived or depraved, to choose, by
> acting contrary to these laws, to destroy its own perfections; as for
> necessary existence to be able to destroy its own being (1738,
> 122).




He then draws the obvious conclusion.



> From hence it follows, that though God is both perfectly
> free and infinitely powerful, yet he cannot possibly do any thing that
> is evil. The reason of this also is evident. Because, as it is
> manifest infinite power cannot extend to natural contradictions, which
> imply a destruction of that very power by which they must be supposed
> to be elected; so neither can it extend to moral contradictions, which
> imply a destruction of some other attributes, as necessarily belonging
> to the divine nature as power. I have already shown that justice,
> goodness and truth are necessarily in God; even as necessarily as
> power, understanding, and knowledge of the nature of things. It is
> therefore as impossible and contradictory to suppose his will should
> choose to do any thing contrary to justice, goodness, or truth; as
> that his power should be able to do any thing inconsistent with power
> (1738, 122).




The conclusion implied by these remarks is that God's liberty is
curtailed by his perfect goodness. If choosing to do something rules
out his being perfectly good, then it is not in his power to choose to
do that thing. He necessarily, not freely, chooses not to do that
thing. This is the conclusion stated above. Clarke, however, rejects
this conclusion, insisting instead that God's liberty is not in the
least diminished.



> It is no diminution of power not to be able to do things
> which are no object of power. And it is in like manner no diminution
> either of power or liberty to have such a perfect and unalterable
> rectitude of will as never possibly to choose to do anything
> inconsistent with that rectitude (1738, 122).




Our final question is whether Clarke can successfully defend this
response. As is clear, the response depends on an analogy between
being perfectly powerful (omnipotent) and being perfectly free. His
argument can be understood as follows. There are some things God
cannot do. He cannot make a square circle. Nor can he choose to do
evil. In the first case, his making a square circle is impossible
because the idea of a square circle is contradictory. In the second
case, the contradiction is in the idea of a perfectly good being
choosing to do evil. Since a contradiction is involved in each case,
God's power is held to extend neither to making a square circle nor to
choosing to do evil. For God's power extends only to what is not
contradictory for a maximally perfect being to do. Clarke then claims
that the fact that God's power does not extend to making a square
circle or choosing to do evil does not imply any diminution of
power. And by analogy he infers that it does not imply any diminution
of liberty in God.




Suppose we agree that God's inability to choose to do evil is not a
diminution of power. Can it also be true that his inability to choose
to do evil is no diminution of freedom? No. For on Clarke's account of
the nature of freedom, the power to choose otherwise is necessary for
a choice to be free. Therefore, if it is not in God's power to choose
to do evil, God does not freely choose not to do evil. And if it is
not in God's power to choose to act contrary to what is best, God does
not freely choose to do what is best. Perhaps Clarke can save God's
omnipotence by saying that his power does not extend to acts
inconsistent with any of his essential attributes. But this won't
leave his perfect freedom intact. So long as he lacks the power to
choose to do evil, he lacks freedom in choosing not to do evil. And so
long as he lacks the power to choose contrary to what is best, he
lacks freedom in choosing to do what is best. It won't matter whether
this lack of power results from a deficiency in his power or from the
fact that his power does not extend to such choices. Clarke might be
able to patch this up by changing his account of the nature of
freedom: declaring instead that one chooses freely just in case one
has the power to choose otherwise provided infinite power extends to
the choice to do otherwise. This move will avoid the immediate
conclusion that God does not freely choose to do the best. For Clarke
holds that God's infinite power does not extend to choosing contrary
to what he knows to be best. But since God's choosing to do what is
best is absolutely necessary for God, we are left with no reason at
all to insist that his choice is really free. Nor are we left with any
reason to thank God or be grateful to him for choosing and acting in
accordance with his knowledge of what is best. Thus, Clarke's valiant
effort to reconcile God's perfect liberty with his perfect goodness is
unsuccessful. [Most of the material in sections 1-3 is taken (with
permission) from my essay: "Clarke and Leibniz on Divine
Perfection and Freedom," Enlightenment and Dissent, (Special
Issue on Samuel Clarke), No. 16, 1997, 60-82.]


## 4. Can God be free with respect to causing his own nature?




On the assumption that God (the supremely perfect being) exists and
that there is a best, creatable world, it appears that God is neither
free not to create a world nor free to create a world less than the
best creatable world. Indeed, it appears that God would of necessity
create the best of the creatable worlds, leaving us with no basis for
thanking him, or praising him for creating the world he does. For
given that God exists and that there is a best creatable world, God's
"nature" as an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good
being would require him to create that best world. Doing less than the
best he can do -- create the best world -- would be
inconsistent with his being the perfect being he is. But what if,
strange as it may seem, God is causally responsible for having the
perfect nature that he has? What if God creates his nature, and, by
virtue of having created it, is thereby causally responsible for his
own nature? Such a view, if it were correct, might provide a way out
of the problem of divine freedom. For the problem seems to rest on
the plausible assumption that no being is, or can be, responsible for
having the nature it has. And, given that this assumption is correct,
what logically follows from God's possessing the nature (being
supremely perfect) he does -- i.e, his creating the best possible
world -- can no more be up to him, something he is responsible
for, than is his nature as a supremely perfect being something that is
up to him, something he is responsible for. But against this
assumption, Thomas Morris (Morris, 1987) has argued that God does
create his nature and, therefore, is causally responsible for his
nature. Suppose Morris is right: that God is responsible for his own
nature. Well then, since God is responsible for his nature, he may
then be responsible for what is required by his nature. In short, God
may be responsible for his creation of the best world. So, it seems to
matter whether God is responsible for having the nature he has.




Of course, in the broad sense of the expression "a person's
nature" someone may be responsible for his nature, or at least
part of it. A person with a naturally friendly disposition toward
strangers may have played a role in developing his
"nature" to be friendly toward strangers, and thus may
bear some responsibility for his "nature" to be friendly
toward others. But no one, it seems, is responsible for being the
basic sort of entity one is -- a human being, for example. Thus,
even God, so it is generally thought, is not causally responsible for
his basic nature -- his being omnipotent, omniscient, and
perfectly good. Of course, unlike humans, God, if he exists, does not
inherit his nature from prior beings. For God is eternal and not
generated by other gods. From eternity this uncreated being has been
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. These properties
constitute his intrinsic nature. Thus it seems that no one, including
God, could be causally responsible for God's having the basic
properties that are constitutive of his nature. Against this view,
however, Thomas Morris has argued that there is nothing logically or
metaphysically objectionable about God's creating, and thereby being
causally responsible for, his own basic nature. He does, however, wish
to avoid having to claim that God is the cause of himself. As he says,
"the very idea of self-causation or self-creation is almost
universally characterized as absurd, incoherent, or worse." What
Morris means here is that although it is absurd to think that God
causes himself to exist from all eternity, it is not absurd, in his
judgment, to suppose that God (1) causes there to be such properties
as omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness, and (2) causes
himself to eternally possess these properties.




In Morris's proposal, God is said to be the cause of something (his
nature) that God cannot possibly exist without. But it may seem
impossible for any being to be the cause ofsomething (its nature)
which that very being cannot exist without. Therefore, it may seem
impossible for God to be causally responsible for his nature. Indeed,
(to stress the point again) since God's nature consists of his
essential properties, properties he must have in order to exist, it
seems absurd to even suggest that God is causally responsible for
these properties and for his possession of them. Morris responds to
this objection by noting that God necessarily exists and therefore
always has his essential properties. So, we should not think that God
could exist without his nature and then cause the properties
constituting his nature (absolute goodness, absolute power, and
absolute knowledge) and cause himself to possess them. Nevertheless,
Morris claims that the fact that God can exist only if his nature also
exists doesn't preclude God's being causally responsible for his
nature. He simply is always causally responsible for these properties
and his essential possession of them. As Morris puts it: "It
just seems to be that there is nothing logically or metaphysically
objectionable about God's creating his own nature ...."
(Morris, 48)




Suppose Morris is right about this issue -- that God is
creatively responsible for the existence of properties, relations,
mathematical truths, logical truths, necessary states of affairs,
possible states of affairs, etc. Nevertheless, it may still be true
that God's causing of his nature was not itself up to God. For, on
Morris's view, although God creates the entire framework of reality,
it was not up to God whether to create the framework he did or some
other framework instead, or even not to create any part of the
framework he created. God never had a choice about creating this
framework or any part of it for, in Morris's words, "God's
creation of the framework of reality is both eternal and necessary
-- it never was, never will be, and could not have been, other
than it is." (Morris, 170) Clearly, if God's creation of the
framework of reality never could have been other than it is, then God
never had any choice about creating the framework of reality. He
created it of necessity, and not freely.




Morris is very much aware of the difficulty just noted. His response
to it is direct and to the point. Referring to God's creation of the
framework of reality, he writes:



> But there is a sense, a different sense, in which even it
> can be considered free. It is an activity which is conscious,
> intentional, and neither constrained nor compelled by anything
> existing independent of God and his causally efficacious power. The
> necessity of his creating the framework is not imposed on him from
> without, but rather is a feature and result of the nature of his own
> activity itself, which is a function of what he is. (Morris,
> 170-171)




Morris recognizes, apparently, that the primary sense in which an
agent is free in performing an action requires that the agent either
(a) could have refrained from performing that action or, at least, (b)
could have refrained from causing his decision to perform that action.
And it is this sense of being free in performing an action that
constitutes a necessary condition for an agent's being morally
responsible for an action he performs. (Morris shares the view
expressed here: that the libertarian idea of freedom is essential to
moral responsibility.)




In the primary sense of 'being free in performing an
action,' -- the sense required for moral responsibility
(according to the libertarian view of moral responsibility) --
the power not to have caused the decision to act is necessary. For
without such power the agent has no control over her performing an
action. It is not up to the agent whether she causes or does not cause
her decision and subsequent action. And without such power on God's
part with respect to his "creation" of the framework of
reality, it makes no sense to thank God or praise God for creating
that eternal framework. Only in some Pickwickian sense could we view
God as "morally responsible" for the creation of the
framework of reality. This is not to deny the distinction Morris draws
between God and the necessary truths constituting the framework of
reality. God is causally active in a way in which a necessary truth
such as Clarke's example -- there being innocent beings who do
not suffer eternally is necessarily better than there being innocent
beings who do suffer eternally -is not. But for all Morris says about
the matter, God has no choice but to form the thought that there being
innocent beings who do not suffer eternally is necessarily better than
there being innocent beings who do suffer eternally. And God has no
choice but to acknowledge the truth of this thought. Neither of these
doings on God's part -- having that thought, acknowledging its
truth -- is any more up to God than it is up to a leaf whether or
not it moves when the wind blows against it. Neither the leaf nor God
has any choice in the matter.




Morris believes that God can be the cause of his own nature. By this
he means that God is both the cause of the properties (omniscience,
omnipotence, and perfect goodness) and the cause of God's having those
properties. Indeed, Morris holds that God is the cause of all the
elements constituting the framework of reality. Furthermore, Morris is
well aware that God has no control over either his causing the divine
properties or his having those properties. The primary sense in which
we say that an agent is free in doing something requires that at the
time he did it the agent could have avoided doing what he did or could
have avoided causing his decision to do that thing. It is this sense
of having control that many philosophers hold to be essential if an
agent is to be morally responsible for his decision and action. [I
ignore here cases of "derivative responsibility," where an
agent freely and knowingly causes himself to be in a situation where
he is caused to will to do *X* and cannot refrain from willing
to do *X*. In such cases the agent can be said, in a derivative
sense, to be morally responsible for what he now must do, for the
agent freely put himself in circumstances that he knew would
necessitate his act.] And it is because God is not free (in the sense
required for moral responsibility) when he performs actions
necessitated by his absolute perfections that it makes no sense to
thank God or praise him for doing those actions. It is true, however,
as Morris points out, that God's having no choice either about
creating the framework of reality or about having the properties of
absolute power, knowledge, and goodness, does not result from
something else imposing this framework and properties upon him. And
this seems to distinguish God from the leaf that has no choice about
moving when the wind blows. The necessity of the leaf's moving is
imposed on it by something else (the wind). The necessity of God's
doing what is best is imposed by God's nature, his being perfectly
good, something that is internal to God and something that, on
Morris's account, God himself causes, but had no choice about
causing. So, unlike the leaf's being caused to move by something else
(the wind), God, we may say, necessarily does what is best because
given his perfect nature he cannot do other than the best. And
although God causes his eternal possession of his perfect nature he
had no choice about eternally causing himself to be perfect. Consider
the question: Does God have any more of a choice about doing what is
best than the leaf, were it endowed with consciousness, would have
about moving when the wind blows? It is apparent that the answer must
be "No." For each necessarily does what it does as a
result of factors over which neither has any control. And that being
so, it may be that God is no more morally responsible for choosing to
do what is best than the leaf is for moving when the wind blows. But
even it this should be so, the view Morris presents is a significant
addition to the literature on the problem of divine freedom.


## 5. Alternatives to creating the best possible world.




In an important and influential essay, Robert Adams argues that even
if there is a best creatable world, God need not create it. He
supposes that the world God creates contains creatures each of whom is
as happy as it is in any possible world in which it exists. Moreover,
no creature in this world is so miserable that it would be better had
it not existed. Adams then supposes that there is some other possible
world with different creatures that exceeds this world in its degree
of happiness, a world that God could have created. So, God has created
a world with a lesser degree of happiness than he could have. Has God
wronged anyone in creating this world? Adams argues that God cannot
have wronged the creatures in the other possible world, for merely
possible beings don't have rights. Nor can he have wronged the
creatures in the world he has created, for their lives could not be
made more happy. Adams notes that God would have done something wrong
in creating this world were the following principle true.



> It is wrong to bring into existence, knowingly, a being
> less excellent than one could have brought into existence (Adams, 1972,
> 329).




But this principle, Adams argues, is subject to counter-examples.
Parents do no wrong, he points out, when they refrain from taking drugs
that would result in an abnormal gene structure in their children, even
though taking the drugs would result in children who are superhuman
both in intelligence and in prospects for happiness. As opposed to the
incorrect principle just cited, Adams does support the more plausible
principle:



> It is wrong for human beings to cause, knowingly and
> voluntarily, the procreation of an offspring of human parents which is
> notably deficient, by comparison with normal human beings, in mental
> and physical capacity (Adams, 1972, 330).




From these sensible observations concerning what would be right or
wrong for humans to do in producing offspring, Adams infers that God
would not be doing something wrong in bringing into existence humans
who are less excellent than he could have brought into existence. But
before we accept this inference, we should note an important
difference between God's situation in considering creating human
beings and the situation of parents who are considering taking drugs
in order to bring into existence children who are superhuman both in
intelligence and in prospects for happiness. In the latter case there
is an inherited background of existing children who are brought about
in normal ways and who establish what is normal with respect to human
intelligence and prospects for happiness. Against this established
background both of normal ways of producing children and of what is
normal in the way of intelligence and prospects of happiness, it is
quite sensible to conclude that parents are under no obligation to
produce non-normal children who are superhuman both in intelligence
and in prospects for happiness. For we cannot help but think that they
would be producing beings who would be strangely different, if not
estranged, from much of the human race, the humans who are normal both
in intelligence and in prospects for happiness. But in creating human
creatures it is God himself who establishes what the norm of human
intelligence will be and what the prospects for human happiness will
be. There is no already existing norm from which God may choose to
deviate either by creating beings who are subhuman or superhuman in
the way of intelligence and prospects of happiness. Within the limits
of what it is to be human it is up to God to set the norm for human
intelligence and prospects for happiness. And if we suppose there is a
lower and upper limit for human intelligence and happiness, the
question is whether God would be doing something wrong in creating
humans whose prospects for intelligence and happiness are rather low,
or in the middle, given that he could have created other humans with
prospects for a considerably higher level of intelligence and
happiness. We grant that God may not have wronged the humans he did
create, since, as Adams supposes, they could not have been created
with any greater prospects for a good and happy life. But it remains
difficult to see how God would be justified in creating creatures
whose prospects for a good life are known by him to be mediocre in
comparison with other creatures of the same species whose prospects
for a good life are known by him to be much greater -- given that
this knowledge is all that is relevant to God's decision about which
creatures to create. In my judgment, Adams's analogy fails to address
this more serious question and, by implication, fails to address the
serious question of whether God would be obligated to create the best
world.




Suppose, however, that we set aside whatever disagreements we may have
with Adams on these points and accept the conclusion of his
reasoning. Suppose, that is, that we agree with Adams that God is not
morally obligated to create the best world that he can, that it would
be morally permissible for God to create the best world he can, but
also morally permissible for God to create any of a number of other
good worlds of the sort Adams describes. If so, can't we conclude that
there is no unresolvable conflict between God's being essentially
morally perfect and his enjoying a significant degree of genuine
freedom? For it now appears that God's moral perfection does not
require him to create the best world. In short, he is free to create
(or not create) any of a number of good worlds.




As forceful and persuasive as Adams's arguments may be, I don't think
they yield the conclusion that God's perfect goodness leaves God free
to create less than the best world that he can create. What Adams's
arguments show, at best, is that God's moral perfection imposes no
moral obligation on God to create the best world he can. His arguments
establish, at best, that God need not be doing anything morally wrong
in creating some world other than the best world. But this isn't quite
the same thing as showing that God's perfect goodness does not render
it necessary that he create the best world he can. For, even conceding
the points Adams makes, there still may be an inconsistency in a
morally perfect being creating some world other than the best world he
can create. The point here is this. One being may be morally better
than another even though it is not better by virtue of the performance
of some obligation that the other failed to perform. It may be morally
better by virtue of performing some supererogatory act -- a good
act beyond the call of duty -- that the other being could have
but did not perform. Analogously, a being who creates a better world
than another being may be morally better, even though the being who
creates the inferior world does not thereby do anything wrong.
Following Philip Quinn, I'm inclined to think that if an all-powerful,
all-knowing being creates some world other than the best world it can
create, then it is possible there should exist a being morally better
than it is. Quinn remarks: "An omnipotent moral agent can
actualize any actualizable world. If he actualizes one than which
there is a morally better, he does not do the best he can, morally
speaking, and so it is possible that there is an agent morally better
than he is, namely an omnipotent moral agent who actualizes one of
those morally better worlds" (Quinn, 213). (We should note that
my version of Quinn's principle is presented in terms of the overall
goodness of a world, not just its moral goodness. Thus, my version of
the principle states that if an omniscient being creates a world when
there is a better world it could create, then it would be possible for
there to be a being morally better than it. I do not, as Quinn does,
focus solely on the moral status of a world. For some good states of
affairs include nonmoral goods such as happiness, as well as moral
goods such as the exercise of virtue. It could be, however, that the
difference is merely terminological, for Quinn may hold that the moral
status of a world depends on both the moral and nonmoral good the
world contains.) For it would be possible for there to be an
omnipotent being who creates the best world that the first being could
create but did not. Shouldn't we then conclude that if an essentially
all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being creates any world at
all, it must create the best world it can? For although a being may do
no wrong in creating less than the best it can create, a being whose
nature is to be perfectly good is not such that it is possible for
there to be a being morally better than it. If, however, a being were
to create a world when there is a better world it could create, then
it would be possible for there to be a being morally better than
it.




The heart of Adams's essay, however, proposes a reason for rejecting
the view we have just stated: that if a being were to create a world
when there is a better world it could create, then it would be
possible for there to be a being morally better than it. For that view
implies, in Adams's words, that "the creator's choice of an
inferior world must manifest a defect of character." And his
response to this objection is that "God's choice of a less
excellent world could be accounted for in terms of His grace, which is
considered a virtue rather than a defect of character in
Judeo-Christian ethics" (Adams, 1972, 318-319). It is Adams's
understanding of the Judeo-Christian view of grace that lies at the
core of his objection to the Liebnizian view that the most perfect
being "cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and
consequently to choose the best." So, any answer to Adams's view
that God need not choose to create the best world must take into
account his view that the Judeo-Christian view of grace implies that
God may create a world less than the best.




Adams's defines the concept of grace as "a disposition to love
which is not dependent on the merit of the person loved" (Adams,
1972, 324). Given this definition and given two worlds,
*W*1 and *W*2, that differ in that
the persons in *W*1 are happier and more disposed to
behave morally than are the persons in *W*2, with
the result, let us suppose, that *W*1 is a better
world than *W*2, it is clear that a gracious God
would not love the persons in *W*1 more than the
persons in *W*2. Or, at the very least, it is clear
that were God to love the persons in *W*1 more than
the persons in *W*2 it would not be because they are
morally better and/or happier. As Adams remarks: "The gracious
person loves without worrying about whether the person he loves is
worthy of his love" (Adams, 1972, 324). So, by virtue of his
grace, either God would love all persons to an equal degree or the
fact that he might love one person more than another would have
nothing to do with the fact that the one has a greater degree of merit
or excellence than another. As Adams puts it: "the gracious
person sees what is valuable in the person he loves, and does not
worry about whether it is more or less valuable than what could be
found in someone else he might have loved" (Adams, 1972,
324). And he tells us that in the Judeo-Christian tradition grace is
held to be "a virtue which God does have and men ought to
have" (Adams, 1972, 324).




Given that grace is as Adams has defined it and that grace is a virtue
God possesses, what may we infer about the world God creates? Can we
infer with Leibniz that if there is a best world God must create that
world? It is difficult to know what to say here. All that we've
learned from Adams thus far is that it would be something other than
love that would motivate God to choose the best world, or any other
world for that matter. For since grace is a disposition to love
without regard to merit, God will be unable to select one world over
another if all he has to go on is his grace. His grace (love toward
creatures independent of their degree of merit) will leave him free to
create any world that has creatures able to do moral good or evil,
regardless of how good or bad they may be in that world. So, if God
has a reason to choose one creaturely world over another --
rather than blindly picking one out of the hat, so to speak --
that reason will have little or nothing to do with his grace. For
given the doctrine of grace, God's love for creatures is not based on
the quality (moral, religious, etc.) of the lives they lead; and it
is difficult to see what else about their lives it could be based
on. In fact, the implication of the Judeo-Christian doctrine of grace
for God's selection of a world to create seems to be entirely negative
-- rather than giving a reason why he might select a particular
creaturely world, or rule out other creaturely worlds, it simply tells
us that if God creates a world with creatures, his love of the
creatures in that world cannot be his reason for creating it. For his
love for creatures is entirely independent of who they are and the
kind of lives they lead. To base his love on who they are and the
kinds of lives they lead would be to take those persons and their
lives as more deserving of his love than other persons and their
lives.




What we've seen thus far is that God's grace -- his love of
creatures without respect to their merit -- cannot provide God
with a reason to create the best world, or any particular world less
than the best. And what this means is that whatever reason God has for
choosing to create one creaturely world over another cannot be found
in his gracious love for creatures (For further argument in support of
this point see Thomas, 1996.) In what then, given that God has a
reason for creating one world over another, would that reason reside?
It would reside not in God's gracious love but, I suggest, in his
desire to create the very best state of affairs that he can. Having
such a desire, I believe, does not preclude gracious love. It does not
imply that God cannot or does not equally love the worse creatures
along with the best creatures. Let me explain by using an analogy of
my own. Loving parents may be disposed to love fully any child that
is born to them, regardless of whatever talents that child is capable
of developing. But such love is consistent with a preference for a
child who will be born whole, without mental or physical impairment, a
child who will develop his or her capacities for kindness toward
others, who will develop his or her tastes for music, good literature,
etc. And in like manner, God will graciously love any creature he
might choose to create, not just the best possible creatures. But that
does not rule out God's having a preference for creating creatures who
will strive as creatures not only to have a good life but also to lead
a good life, creatures who will in their own way freely develop
themselves into "children of God." Indeed, although God's
gracious love extends to every possible creature, it would be odd to
suggest that he, therefore, could have no preference for creating a
world with such creatures over a world in which creatures use their
freedom to abuse others, use their talents to turn good into evil, and
devote their lives to selfish ends. Surely, God's graciously loving
all possible creatures is not inconsistent with his having a
preference to create a world with creatures who will use their freedom
to pursue the best kind of human life. How could he not have such a
preference? Furthermore, as I've suggested, if God had no such
preference, his gracious love for creatures would give him no reason
to select any particular possible world for creation. For his gracious
love for each and every creature fails to provide a reason to create
one creature rather than another, or to create the creatures in one
possible world rather than those in another. So, if God is not reduced
to playing dice with respect to selecting a world to create,there must
be some basis for his selection over and beyond his gracious love for
all creatures, regardless of merit. And that basis, given God's nature
as an absolutely perfect being, can only be, as Leibniz and Clarke
maintained, to do always what is "best and wisest" to be
done. And surely the best and wisest for God to do is to create the
best world he can. Moreover, doing so seems to be entirely consistent
with God's gracious love of all creatures, regardless of their
merit.




Adams, however, flatly rejects the view just described, a view that
sees God's gracious love of creatures without respect to merit as
entirely consistent with his having an all things considered
preference to create the best world he can. After noting that divine
grace is love which is not dependent on the merit of the person loved,
Adams proceeds to draw the conclusion that although God would be free
to create the best creatures, he cannot have as his reason for
choosing to create them the fact that they are the best possible
creatures.



> God's graciousness in creating does not imply that the
> creatures He has chosen to create must be less excellent than the best
> possible. It implies, rather, that even if they are the best possible
> creatures, that is not the ground for His choosing them. And it
> implies that there is nothing in God's nature or character which would
> require Him to act on the principle of choosing the best possible
> creatures to be the object of His creative powers (Adams, 1972,
> 324).




By my lights, God's disposition to love independent of the merit of
the persons loved carries no implication as to what God's reason for
creating a particular world may be, other than that his reason cannot
be that he loves the beings in this world more (or less) than the
beings in other worlds. Moreover, having an all-things considered
preference for creating the best world need not be rooted in a greater
love for beings who are better than other beings. For, owing to the
Principle of Organic Unities (see Moore, pp. 187ff.) the best whole
may have some parts that are not the best. Therefore, the best world
may contain some human beings who are not better than, or even as good
as, their replacements in the closest world to the best world. And God
may select creatures to create who will choose to grow morally and
spiritually, rather than creatures who will choose not to grow morally
and spiritually, and select them for that very reason without his
thereby loving the former persons more than the latter, or loving them
because of there greater merit. God's grace does rule out choosing to
create the best world because he loves its inhabitants more than the
inhabitants of some lesser world. But it does not rule out God's
choosing to create the best world because he prefers to create the
best persons, so long as he does not love them more than he loves the
inhabitants of lesser worlds. Adams, of course, must be supposing that
if God's reason for creating one world rather than another is the fact
that the creatures in the first world are much better than the
creatures in the second world, it somehow logically follows that God
must love the creatures in the first world more than he loves the
creatures in the second. But there is nothing in his presentation of
the view that God's love for creatures is independent of their merit
that yields this result. It seems, then, that there is no good reason
to think that the Judeo-Christian concept of grace rules out the view
of Leibniz and Clarke that God must create the best world, provided
there is a best world.




Finally, it should be noted that there may be no best possible
world. Instead, it may be that for any world there is a better world.
Or perhaps there are several equally good worlds than which no world
is better. Still another seeming possibility is that there are
incommensurate worlds,worlds such that no comparison in terms of
better than is possible. Each of these possibilities has implications
for the question of divine freedom with respect to creation.