## 1. Emotions, Affective Sensitivity, and Chinese Philosophy


### 1.1 Emotions in Western Philosophy and Psychology



In Western philosophy and psychology, emotions are defined as inner
psychological states with subjective feelings that are contrasted with
cognitive states and processes of the mind. If one believes that
'1+1=2', this cognitive state, in itself, does not come
with particular feelings, motivate specific actions, or facilitate
observable embodied expressions. Nor does it draw any evaluative
judgments. Regardless of one's feelings or motivations, one can
simply believe that '1+1=2' is true. In addition, emotions
are often associated with strong desires or passions that can conflict
with rational reasoning and reflective thinking. In his
*Republic* (Book IV), Plato argues that the soul
(*psyche*) consists of three distinctive components, reason
(*logistikon*), spirit (*thumoeides*), and appetite
(*epithumetikon*). He puts reason against the affective
components of the mind. Stoic philosophers characterized emotions as
inexplicable passion, uncontrollable urge, or irrational fear.
According to Arius Didymus (a Stoic philosopher of the early Roman
Empire), emotional states are "excessive impulses which are
disobedient to reason" (translated in Pomeroy 1999: 65A).
Descartes (1649 [1989: 385]) believed that passion is internal
dispositions and tendencies moved by external events that can go
against rational understanding of the world. Although recent
publications demonstrate strong academic interest in emotions in
Western philosophy and psychology (Damasio 1994; De Sousa 1987;
Gibbard 1990; Haidt 2001; Lutz 1988; Nichols 2004; Nussbaum 2001;
Prinz 2004; Solomon 1984), emotions are still understood from the viewpoints of
subjectivity, phenomenality, motivation, passion and desire. 


### 1.2 Emotions in Chinese Philosophy



In Chinese philosophy, however, emotions are not necessarily or fully
understood as subjective feelings. Nor is it characterized as an
irrational or excessive urge of passion that disrupts or challenges
rational thinking. Instead, emotions play broad psychological and
moral roles in the cultivation of virtue and the political order and
stability of society. From this unique Chinese perspective, one can
understand that one's affective interaction with the personal,
social, and physical environments constitutes one's moral agency
and an essential property of the interdependent and communal self. For
example, Confucius states that the duty of serving one's parents
(filial piety) has no meaning if one does not have genuine affection
toward one's parents (*Analects*, 2.7) and ritual
propriety becomes a blind rule following behavior if one does not have
caring heart for others (*Analects*, 3.3). Mozi (*Mozi*,
13.1) states that a ruler cannot govern his or her state successfully
without understanding the affective dispositions and circumstances of
people. That is, emotions are not simply inner subjective feelings but
interactive, perceptual, cognitive, motivational, and affective states
of the mind in their constant dealings with the world that in itself
is affectively constituted and embedded. As Virag (2017: 194)
states, emotions in early Chinese philosophy "did not simply
represent the individual realm of subjective experience" but
constitute "the crucial interface between self and the world,
mind and cosmos". Cheng (2001: 79) captures this holistic and
interactive viewpoint with a broad notion of the mind in Chinese
philosophy. 



> 
> 
> Mind is not simply an intellectual entity or a mechanism for thinking
> or reasoning. It is rather an inter-linked entity of sensibility,
> feeling, awareness, thinking and willing as testified by common
> experience of reflective subjectivity of the self-identified as the
> "I". 
> 
> 
> 



Therefore, emotions, in Chinese philosophy, are understood as the
holistic affectivity of the sensing, thinking, and feeling mind that
is always related to and interactive with the world.


### 1.3 *Qing* and Chinese Philosophy



At the center of this broad, interactive, and holistic understanding
of the mind and emotions in Chinese philosophical traditions, one can
observe a unique notion of *qing* (Qing ). *Qing* is
commonly understood, in modern Chinese, as affective states of the
mind but, in classical Chinese philosophy, it is neither contrasted
with cognitive states nor distinguished from intellectual functions of
the mind (Marchal 2013; Perkins 2002; Wong 1991). Specifically, in
early Chinese philosophy, *qing* refers to a broad category of
objective properties of the world and their interaction with the mind
resulting in diverse forms of psychological states such as feelings,
motivations, desires and hopes. It means nature, essence, reality,
situations, and circumstances, as well as affective dispositions and
interactive reactions (Bruya 2003; Eifring 2004b; Graham 1990;
Harbsmeier 2004; Hansen 1995; Puett 2004; Seok 2013).
*Qing*'s broad semantic scope can be summarized as
one's concrete understanding of the world, living sense of
reality, and realization of the interdependent and interactive self
that resonates with others and their circumstances. That is,
*qing* is not simply subjective feelings that resides in a
private, solipsistic mind but a comprehensive mode of one's
conative, cognitive, intentional and embodied dealings with the
world.



Many Chinese philosophers discuss *qing* and its interactive
responsiveness and affective sensitivity as a core foundation of moral
agency and the communal self. Confucius explains that the virtue of
*ren* (benevolence, compassion) is based on one's love
for others (one's other-caring emotion) and *xiao*
(filial piety) comes out of one's genuine feeling for
one's parents (*Analects*, 2.7, 3.3). Mozi talks about
impartial caring (*jian ai*) (*Mozi*, 16.2). Laozi asks
for loving kindness and non-contention toward others (*Laozi*,
67, 68) and Zhuangzi focuses on our inborn nature and spontaneous
affective dispositions (*Zhuangzi*, 24.1). Mencius's four
moral sprouts (*siduan* Si Duan ) are innate emotional
inclinations deeply rooted in the moral mind (*Mencius* 2A6).
Xunzi's discussion of self-cultivation through ritual and music
focuses on the affective and interactive sensitivity of the mind
(*Xunzi*, Chs. 19, 20; Sung 2012; Wang 2015). The same affective
approach to the mind and morality can be witnessed in Neo-Confucian
philosophy and contemporary Chinese philosophy, for example, in Zhu
Xi's discussion of Mencius's moral sprouts
(*siduan*) (Marchal 2013; Zhu 2011) and Wang Yangming's
discussion of *xin* (Xin the heart-mind) and *liangzhi*
(moral awareness or conscience) (Lu 2019; Wang 1963). In his theory of emotion
as foundational substance (*qing benti lun* Qing Ben Ti Lun ), a
renowned contemporary Chinese philosopher Li Zehou (1998) takes
*qing* as the foundational substance (*benti* Ben Ti ) of
morality and humanity.


## 2. Emotions and *Qing* in Early Chinese Philosophy


### 2.1 Emotions and *Qing*



Many psychologists and philosophers report that emotions have
particular psychological properties such as phenomenology,
intentionality, motivation, embodiment, and appraisal (Charland 2002;
Fehr & Russell 1984; Goldie 2002; Russell 1980). For example,
one's emotional state of anger against unfair discrimination can
be explained by one's feeling (distress, frustration),
intentionality (unfair discrimination), motivation (complaint,
protest), embodiment (rapid heartbeat, high blood pressure), and
appraisal (oppose, dislike). An emotional state, therefore, is a
psychological complexity consisting of multidimensional or
multifactorial processes of the mind. On the basis of these
psychological properties, one can easily understand Blackburn's
(1996: 117) definition:



> 
> 
> The typical human emotions include love, grief, fear, anger, joy. Each
> indicates a state of some kind of arousal, a state that can prompt
> some activities and interfere with others. These states are associated
> with characteristic feelings, and they have characteristic bodily
> expressions.
> 
> 
> 



In the *Liji* (Li Ji  *the Book of Rites*), one of
Confucian classics, one can find comparable categories (such as joy,
anger, and love) and characteristics (such as feeling, arousal, and
activity) of emotions:



> 
> 
> What are the feelings [*qing*] of men? They are joy, anger,
> sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking. These seven feelings
> belong to men without their learning them. (*Liji,* 9.18; Legge
> 1885a: 379)
> 
> 
> 
> Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it
> is called equilibrium (*chung* [*zhong*], centrality,
> mean). When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due
> measure and degree, it is called harmony. (*Liji*, 31.1;
> *Zhongyong*, 1; Chan 1963: 98)
> 
> 
> 



It seems that ancient Chinese notions of *qing* and feelings
are comparable with the Western psychological categories and
characterizations of emotions as illustrated in Blackburn's
definition and the passages of the *Liji*. In many ancient
Chinese texts, however, this similarity does not hold. *Qing*
does not always refer to inner feelings or emotional states. It refers
to many different things, some of which have little to do with inner
psychological states.


### 2.2 Meanings of *Qing*



*Qing*, in modern Chinese, means emotions and subjective
feelings. Gan Qing  (*ganqing*) means feeling and Qing Xu 
(*qingxu*) means affective mood. In early Chinese texts in the
pre-Han (500 to 200 BCE) period, however, the term *qing* does
not always refers to emotional states of the mind. It can mean real
facts, truth, or essence that does not seem to have any relation to
inner subjective states of the mind. Graham (1990: 59-65) argues
that, in pre-Han literature, *qing* should not be understood as
"passions". Instead, it should be understood as "the
facts" or what is "genuine". Although in some texts,
the *Xunzi*, for instance, *qing* is used in the
contexts of feelings and emotions, in other texts, such as the
*Mozi* and the *Sunzi bingfa* (Sun Zi Bing Fa  *the Art
of War*), it means essence, nature, genuineness, situation, and
reality with little semantic affinity to emotions or subjective
feelings. For this reason, many sinologists and comparative
philosophers (Bruya 2003; Eifring 2004b; Graham 1990; Hansen 1995;
Harbsmeier 2004; Middendorf 2008; Puett 2004; Virag 2017)
discuss the polysemy of *qing* in early Chinese texts and
analyze its peculiar patterns of emergence and development in the
pre-Han period. Regarding the meaning of *qing* in pre-Han
texts, Graham (1990: 59) states that "As a noun it
[*qing*] means 'the facts'..., as an adjective
'genuine'..., as an adverb
'genuinely'". By following Graham's (1990)
interpretation of *qing*, Eifring (2019: 190) develops a
non-psychological interpretation of *qing* (i.e., *qing*
as nature, essence, or genuineness) in pre-Han Confucian and Daoist
texts. He states that 



> 
> 
> *qing* is hardly used in the sense of 'emotion' at
> all...The term itself has a number of different meanings, most of
> them clearly related, and when the meaning 'emotion'
> gradually emerges, some of these meanings still continue to vibrate
> along, suggesting that emotions are genuine and that they belong to
> human nature. 
> 
> 
> 



Following the same line of interpretation, Ivanhoe and Van Norden
(2001: 391) define *qing* as "'the genuine',
'essence', or 'disposition'". They state
that 



> 
> 
> The *qing* of something is what it genuinely is, as opposed to
> what it might appear to be. This is often conceived of in terms of how
> it would spontaneously behave and develop if given a proper
> environment and support. More specifically, some interpreters have
> argued that the *qing* of a thing can be the essential
> characteristics of that thing. Toward the end of the Warring States
> period, *qing* came to refer to human emotions or dispositions
> (perhaps because some thinkers regarded these as essential to human
> beings). 
> 
> 
> 



Adding more semantic details, Santangelo (2007: 296) states that the
most common Chinese term, *qing* is 



> 
> 
> a polysemous word that basically means: "feeling or affective
> state of mind", "inclination or desire",
> "circumstances", "authenticity". Even if we
> consider the most common terms that are usually translated into
> English as "emotion", *qinggan* or
> *ganqing*, in fact they express a semantic space different from
> the English or Italian equivalents. 
> 
> 
> 



As these interpretations and reports show, *qing*, unlike the
common meaning of emotion in modern Chinese, has non-psychological
meanings (nature, essence, reality etc.) in pre-Han Chinese texts that
may coexist with psychological meanings (feelings, inclinations,
desires, etc.) of *qing*. Seok (2013: 140), therefore, explains
the meanings of *qing* in three dimensions: ontological
(dynamic nature, human existence), epistemological (sense of reality
and experience), and psychological/moral (emotional expressions and
feelings) dimensions. He states that 



> 
> 
> different meanings of *qing* such as the essential identity of
> things, affective states of the mind, and the concrete understanding
> of situation/reality are all related to the open interactive and
> embodied interaction between the self and the world. 
> 
> 
> 



Harbsmeier (2004: 71) provides probably the most comprehensive list of
*qing*'s meanings. According to him, *qing* has
following meanings in the pre-Buddhist (before 1st century CE)
China.


1. Factual: The basic facts of a matter. This particularly common in
historical and "scientific" prose.
2. Metaphysical: Underlying and basic dynamic factors. This is
particularly common in YI [*Yijing*, the *Book of
Changes*] and philosophical writings.
3. Political: Basic popular sentiments/responses. This occurs in
writings on political theory.
4. Anthropological: General basic instincts/propensities. This is
particularly common in writings on ritual and philosophy.
5. Positive: Essential sensibilities and sentiments, viewed as
commendable. This is particularly cultivated in Taoist writings.
6. Personal: Basic motivation/attitude. This is particularly common
in historical texts and texts on political philosophy.


### 2.3 Semantic Dimensions of *Qing*



Underneath the polysemy of *qing*, there are two semantic
dimensions: one is the ontological and objective dimension
(*qing* as nature, essence, or reality) and the other is the
psychological and subjective dimension (*qing* as inner
feelings or subjective emotions). Regarding the two semantic
dimensions of *qing*, Bruya (2003: 157) states that 



> 
> 
> *qing* carried a range of meaning, from mere facts on one end
> of a spectrum, to pure emotion on the other. 
> 
> 
> 



The two seemingly contrastive or even conflicting semantic dimensions
caught the academic interest of many sinologists and comparative
philosophers. Why does *qing* have the seemingly contrastive or
conflicting meanings? Are the two semantic dimensions incompatible
with each other? What is the conceptual or philosophical foundation of
*qing*'s polysemy? The polysemy of *qing* will
guide us to discover the underlying conceptual foundations of emotions
in early Chinese philosophy, specifically its diverse viewpoints on
the affective nature of the mind.


## 3. Interpretations of *Qing*



Various attempts have been made to explain the semantic, conceptual,
historical, and philosophical relations among different meanings of
*qing*, specifically the onto-objective (*qing* as
essence, nature or reality) and the psycho-subjective (*qing*
as inner subjective feelings) meanings that early Chinese philosophers
discussed in their theories of the mind and morality.


### 3.1 *Qing* as Nature, Essence or Genuineness



Graham (1990: 59) argues that *qing* should never be
interpreted as feelings or passions (i.e., inner subjective states of
the mind) in early Chinese philosophy. According to him, the
internalized or psychologized meanings of *qing* became fully
and explicitly available later in the Song dynasty (960 CE and after)
when *qing* is paired with *xing* (Xing  objective nature
or essence) in Neo-Confucian metaphysics. He states that *qing*
as a noun in the context of pre-Han literature means "'the
facts'...as an adjective 'genuine'".
However, he explains in the contexts of the *Xunzi* and the
*Liji* how *qing* is associated with emotions as
expressions of genuine of human nature. He (1990: 64) states that 



> 
> 
> In these texts [the *Xunzi* and the *Liji*], but nowhere
> else in pre-Han literature, the word [*qing*] refers only to
> the genuine in man which it is polite to disguise, and therefore to
> his feelings. 
> 
> 
> 



According to him, Xunzi uses *qing* in the sense of the genuine
or essential nature and explained its affective expressions from the
viewpoint where the nature of human beings can be found in inner
affective states. In this way, Graham defends his interpretation of
*qing* as essence or genuineness even in the contexts of
subjective feelings in some early Chinese texts.


### 3.2 *Qing* as the Inputs from Reality



In Hansen's non-belief or non-doxastic approach to Chinese
philosophy, specifically to Chinese epistemology and philosophy of
mind in pre-Buddhist period, *qing* is an intriguing example of
semantic duality. He (1995: 182) discusses two different, almost
opposite definitions of *qing* in a typical Chinese English
dictionary. 



> 
> 
> A typical Chinese-English dictionary...has two entries under
> *qing*feeling: The first is "affections, the
> feelings, desires"; translations of character compounds under
> this meaning include *love*, *desire*, *emotion*,
> and *sentiment*. The second definition is "circumstances;
> facts of a case"; examples of compounds under this meaning
> include *truth*, *situation*, *reason*,
> *origin*, *real facts*. 
> 
> 
> 



He (1995) characterizes this semantic duality of *qing* as an
intriguing combination of the two contrastive properties of
*qing*: *qing* is understood partially as a subjective
inner state and partially as an objective and external state of
affairs. He argues that the two meanings of *qing* poses a
conceptual conflict only under the exclusive and dichotomous schemes
of Western philosophy, i.e., the distinction between the
inner-subjective-psychological mind and the outer-objective-material
world and the contrastive or confrontational relation between emotion
and reason. He states (1995: 183) that 



> 
> 
> Chinese views of language, mind, and action do not center on an inner
> subjectivity or a conception of a mental/intellectual world populated
> by mental/intellectual objects set off against an external world of
> physical objects or matter. Nor do they make the familiar
> Indo-European faculty and functional distinction between cognitive and
> affective states. A single faculty/organ, the
> *xin*heart-mind, guides action rather than separate
> faculties of heart and mind.
> 
> 
> 



From the viewpoint of these dichotomies, the semantic duality of
*qing* becomes puzzling or confusing. However, if, as Hansen
argues, Chinese philosophy does not subscribe the dichotomies of
subjectivity-objectivity and emotion-reason, one can find a way to
combine the two meanings of *qing* in a consistent and
meaningful manner. Following this unique Chinese approach to language,
mind and action, Hansen explains how different meanings of
*qing* coexist in Chinese philosophy. According to him (1995:
196), *qing*, in early Chinese philosophy, should be understood
as "the *inputs from reality*" or "reality
induced discrimination or distinction-making reactions" such as
dark-light, left-right, sweet-sour-salty-bitter, and high-low pitch.
That is, *qing* refers to the inputs from our reaction or
interaction with reality. From this broad meaning of *qing*,
one can understand, as Hansen argues, how *qing* is discussed
in early Chinese texts. On the basis of this interpretation of
*qing*, he argues that the semantic transition from
*qing*reality to *qing*emotion can
be explained by the introduction of Buddhism to Chinese philosophy. He
(1995: 183) states that 



> 
> 
> I implicitly accept the possibility that the introduction of Buddhism
> imported an Indo-European psychological theory and thus introduced new
> theoretical roles for *qing*feelings and
> *yu*desire. 
> 
> 
> 



Hansen argues that, with the introduction of Buddhism, Chinese
philosophers found a way to understand the mind from the perspective
of the inner, subjective, representational states, and this
psychological viewpoint of Buddhism facilitated the development of a
new semantic dimension of *qing* (i.e., *qing* as
subjective feelings) in Chinese philosophy.


### 3.3 *Qing* as Mutual Arousal and Response among Things



Bruya (2003) reports that, in many pre-Han texts, *qing* refers
to affective states of the mind. Although he does not disagree with
Graham (1990) that *qing*, in some contexts of pre-Han
literature, means nature, essence, or genuineness of things, he points
out that *qing* also means feelings or emotions in other
contexts. In fact, *qing* is closely related to affective
states in several pre-Han texts such as the *Mencius* and the
*Xunzi*. He states that "the defining of
'*qing*' in terms of emotions can be now be seen
explicitly as early as Mencius..." and argues that the
"implicit early cosmology of spontaneous interrelation among
things (humans included)" is in the background of the polysemous
nature of *qing* (Bruya 2003: 163). He explains that
*qing* has at least two different meanings, one being facts or
situations and the other being feelings and emotions. However the two
meanings, although contrastive or distinctive, are not necessarily
incommensurable or incomparable to each other because *qing*
has "implicit emotional overtones in early usage" and
these implicit connections between the two meanings became apparent
and explicit in Chinese texts in the late Warring States period such
as the *Mencius* and the *Xunzi* (Bruya 2003: 152n3).
According to him, the gradual transition or perhaps transformation
from the onto-objective pole (i.e., *qing* as nature or
reality) to psycho-subjective pole (i.e, *qing* as an
interactive psychological state of the mind) of *qing* took
place in Mencius's period and clearly observed in the
*Xunzi*. He (2003: 169) states that 



> 
> 
> *qing* is closely associated with mutual arousal and response,
> the processes of transformation through interpenetration 
> 
> 
> 



and this general (albeit vague and implicit) understanding of the
universe and human affairs precedes the philosophical discussions of
*qing* as an affective state of the mind in the Warring States
period (Bruya 2003: 168-169). For example, he (2003: 163) states
that 



> 
> 
> the defining "*qing*" in terms of emotions can now
> be seen explicitly as early as Mencius, and its implicit content can
> be seen as far back as the *Shujing* [Shu Jing  *the Book of
> Documents*]. 
> 
> 
> 



It is important to note that, in Bruya's explanation, the
semantic transition or conceptual change of *qing* is not
understood as a sudden shift of viewpoints from the external to
internal dimensions of *qing*. Rather, it is understood as a
gradual process of the integration and interpenetration of the
external and internal aspects of *qing* via a particular form
of philosophical psychology, i.e., understanding of the mind and its
inner states as a resonating and interactive flow that derives from
the generative and interpenetrative cosmological force.


### 3.4 Semantic Transition and Transformation of *Qing*



Following this semantic divide and transition from the onto-objective
to psycho-subjective meanings of *qing*, one can understand the
polysemy of *qing* and its semantic change in early Chinese
philosophy. First, *qing* had or acquired many different
meanings over several centuries in ancient Chinese philosophy. Second,
there are two major semantic dimensions (onto-objective and
psycho-subjective dimensions) of *qing*. Third, the meanings of
*qing* had been expanded from the first dimension to the second
dimension. Fourth, regarding the period of the semantic transition or
expansion of *qing*, different views are proposed: the semantic
transition had occurred during the Warring States period (specifically
around the time of Mencius and Xunzi, i.e., 300 BCE) (Bruya 2003),
after the introduction of Buddhism to China (the Han Dynasty around
250 CE) (Hansen 1995) or during the Song dynasty (around 960 CE)
(Graham 1990). Regardless of the exact timeline of the semantic
transition, Chinese philosophy is greatly influenced by its
philosophical reflection on the nature of *qing* through its
broad semantic spectrum of objective nature and subjective feelings.
Cai (2020: 424-425) summarizes the polysemy and the semantic
transition of *qing* in the following way. 



> 
> 
> The Chinese thinking about *qing* basically follows an
> objective-to-subjective trajectory. It begins with philosophical
> investigations into the nature of the myriad things or *wanwu*
> Wan Wu  (ten thousand things) during the late Spring and Autumn period
> and the early Warring States period (roughly the late sixth and fifth
> century BCE). This is followed by a shift of attention from the
> objective nature of the things to the subjective nature of
> humans--their emotion and moral nature--during the middle
> and late Warring States period (roughly fourth and third centuries
> BCE). From the Han onward, the locus of *qing* discussions
> shifts from philosophy to music and literature, with emotion being
> *qing*'s core referent.
> 
> 
> 


## 4. Categories and Lists of Emotions in Early Chinese Texts



Although *qing* does not always mean emotions and feelings in
many Chinese texts in the pre-Han period, it is sometimes discussed in
the context of cataloging or categorizing psychological states.
Probably, the most common list of emotions in ancient Chinese texts is
*xi nu ai le* (Xi Nu Ai Le  joy, anger, sadness, and pleasure).
They appear in many Chinese texts as representative terms or
categories of inner affective states. There are other lists of
emotions in early Chinese texts but they are somewhat similar to each
other.


### 4.1 Lists of *Qing* as Emotions



The following lists show the general scope of emotions in early
Chinese philosophy and how these emotions are compared against Western
categories of emotions such as those of Descartes's (1648
[1989]) list of passions and Ekman's (1999) basic emotions.


* *Liji* (9.18) (Fourth Century BCE)
  

Xi Nu Ai Ju Ai E Yu 
  

joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking (hate), and liking
(desire).
* *Xunzi* (17.4, 22.2) (Third Century BCE)
  

Hao E Xi Nu Ai Le 
  

liking, disliking (hate), joy, anger, sadness, pleasure
* *Xunzi* (22.5) (Third Century BCE)
  

Shuo Gu Xi Nu Ai Le Ai E Yu 
  

persuasions and reasons, joy and anger, sadness and pleasure, love and
dislike (hate), liking (desire)
* *Zhuangzi* (2.2) (Third Century BCE)   

Xi Nu Ai Le  Lu Tan Bian Zhi 
Yao Yi Qi Tai    
 joy, anger, grief, delight,
worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, willfulness,
candor, insolence
* *Xing Zi Ming Chu* [Human] Nature comes from the [Heavenly]
Decree (1.1) (Fourth Century BCE)
  

Xi Nu Ai Bei 
  

joy, anger, sadness, sorrow
* *Nei yei* (*Inward Training*; Roth 1999: 51) (Fourth
Century BCE)
  

You Le Xi Nu Yu Li 
  

worry, pleasure, joy, anger, desire, profit (material interest)
* *Bai Hu Tong* (8.2) (First Century CE)
  

Xi Nu Ai Le Ai E 
  

joy, anger, sadness, pleasure, love, disliking (hate)
* *The Passions of the Soul* (*Les Passions de
l'ame*) (Descartes 1649)
  

wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, sadness
* "Basic Emotions" (Ekman 1999)
  

joy, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, surprise



These lists demonstrate that ancient Chinese philosophers used
categories of emotions that are comparable to those of Western
philosophy and psychology. In his *The Passions of the Soul*
(*Les Passions de l'ame*), Descartes (1649)
designates six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy,
and sadness. Except wonder, one can see his primitive passions in
early Chinese texts. Ekman's (1999) list of the basic emotions
(emotions that are universally perceived and recognized across
cultures and societies, i.e., joy, anger, sadness, fear, disgust,
surprise) also overlap substantially with those of early Chinese
philosophers. Although the notion of *qing* is quite
idiosyncratic and polysemous, the individuation of emotions in early
Chinese philosophy seems comparable to that of Western philosophy and
psychology.


### 4.2 Unusual Categories of *Qing*



In the Chinese lists of emotions, however, one can see some unusual
categories: "persuasion and reason" (Shuo Gu ) in the
*Xunzi* (22.5) and profit (material interest) (Li ) in the
*Nei yei*. They do not look like categories of emotions. In
addition, it is unclear whether these lists of emotions refer to the
designated emotions or the whole spectrum of emotions. For example,
Eifring (2019: 190) suggests that *xi nu* (Xi Nu  joy and
anger), a pair of antonyms, should be understood broadly as the whole
spectrum emotions, not simply as the two specific emotions (joy and
anger). He states that *xi nu* 



> 
> 
> is used as a simple two-character phrase...usually referring to
> emotions in general rather than to these two specific emotions. 
> 
> 
> 



It is also unclear whether these lists provide a set of mutually
exclusive or jointly exhaustive emotions. Since some of the lists
include overlapping categories of emotions. For example, love
(*ai* Ai ) and liking (*hao* Hao ) seem very similar to
each other so that they have the same antonym, i.e., disliking
(*e* E ) in their contrastive pairs. In the *Liji*,
*ai* (love) is paired with *e* (disliking) but in the
*Xunzi*, *hao* (liking) is paired with *e*
(disliking). In addition, motivational states such as desire
(*yu* Yu ) and liking (*hao* Hao ) seem to share some
common psychological elements. Therefore, the lists and categories of
emotions in early Chinese texts should not be understood as complete
and exhaustive lists of emotions because they are composed of
overlapping categories that are not mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive. It make little sense to compare them directly against
Descartes' primitive passions or Ekman's basic emotions
although they have some similarities with the Western
counterparts.


### 4.3 Terms of Emotions in Early Chinese Texts



These lists of emotions do not appear in ancient Chinese texts before
the Warring States period such as oracle bone inscriptions (Jia Gu Wen ,
*jiaguwen*) and bronze script of the Shang dynasty (second
millennium BCE). They began to show up in the mid to late Warring
states period. For example, the *Analects* and the
*Mencius*, although they discuss affective states of the mind,
do not list emotions in the form of *xi nu* (Xi Nu ) or *xi
nu ai le* (Xi Nu Ai Le ). The *Xunzi* and the
*Zhuangzi*, however, list emotions in various forms that
include *xi nu ai le* (Xi Nu Ai Le ) (Bruya 2003; Eifring 2019;
Harbsmeier 2004; Puett 2004). Harbsmeier (2004: 70) reports that terms
that refer to emotions such as *xi* (Xi  joy), *nu* (Nu 
anger), *ai* (Ai  sadness), *ju* (Ju  fear), *ai*
(Ai  love), *wu* (E  disliking), and *yu* (Yu  desire)
are not used in ancient Chinese oracle bone inscriptions. (*Xi*
[Xi ] was only used as a proper name but not as a name for an
emotion.) He also lists the following terms and points out that they
are "absent in oracle bones and gradually emerge in the bronze,
bamboo and silk inscriptions of later times" (Harbsmeier 2004:
70).



* *xin* Xin  heart
* *si* Si  think of, long for
* *nian* Nian  think about
* *zhi* Zhi  ambition, aspiration
* *shen* Shen  be careful about
* *zhong* Zhong  impartial, honest
* *gong* Gong  respect
* *ci* Ci  be loving
* *wu* Wu  understand
* *wei* Wei  console
* *mu* Mu  admire
* *xu* Xu  show compassion
* *yu* Yu  be stupid
* *dai* Dai  be lazy
* *wang* Wang  forget
* *huo* Huo  be confused
* *ji* Ji  resent
* *yuan* Yuan  resent
* *nu* Nu  be angry
* *hui* Hui  regret
* *bei* Bei  be sad
* *gan* Gan  be moved
* *kong* Kong  be terrified
* *lian* Lian  love




The absence of these terms in the ancient Chinese inscriptions, as
Harbsmeier (2004) explains, do not imply that ancient Chinese had no
conceptions of emotions or other psychological states. Nor does it
mean that these terms were not used in ancient China outside the
record keeping purposes of the inscriptions. It simply means that the
conception and the public discourse of emotions (including writing and
compiling texts with these psychological terms) had been changed and
new terms had been developed in ancient China, specifically during the
Warring States period. It is important to note that some of the terms
in this list (such as "to be lazy" and "to be
terrified") are related to behavioral or embodied states, i.e.,
states that are experienced by or manifested in the body. That is, in
ancient Chinese texts, the domain of the mind is not limited to the
internal or representational states. It is extended to bodily states
as well.


## 5. Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophical Texts



Major philosophical texts of early Chinese philosophy such as the
*Analects*, the *Mozi*, and the *Laozi,* were
written in the Warring States period, the historical period known as
the period of the "Hundred Schools of Thought" (Bai Jia ).
Many philosophical schools competed against one another for their
visions for personal happiness, virtue, ideal society, stable
government, and the peaceful world. Some of these schools of
philosophy developed inspiring and stimulating theories of the mind
and emotions. The following sections will survey and explain how
philosophical texts of the Warring States period, specifically those
of Confucianism, Daoism, and Mohism, describe and discuss emotions in
their theories of the mind, morality, and human nature.


### 5.1 The *Analects*



In many passages of the *Analects*, Confucius (551-479
BCE) states that true virtue comes out of a genuine affective state of
the mind. He emphasizes that carefully focused affective state is an
essential component of Confucian virtue. Although Confucius does not
make any explicit connection between *qing* and emotions, his
general approach to emotions and virtue through the genuineness or
sincerity of the mind makes an implicit connection between
*qing* and emotions in the cultivation of virtue: virtue should
reflect the affective genuineness that emerges from the essence
(*qing*) of humanity. From this moral-psychological viewpoint,
one can understand how *qing* comes to include subjective
feelings and emotions and, at the same time, still refers to the
essential human nature in early Confucian philosophy.



Feelings and emotions are discussed in many passages of the
*Analects*. Confucius believes that having appropriate
emotional states is essential in cultivating and perfecting ideal
virtues. True filial piety, according to him, is not just one's
behavior of supporting one's parents but sincere respect and
care for them (*Analects*, 2.7). What distinguishes true filial
piety from a mere act of fulfilling one's duty to serve
one's parents is this inner state of sincere love for
one's parents. When Fanzi asked about *ren* (benevolence,
the central virtue of Confucianism), Confucius answered that
*ren* is to love others (*Analects*, 12.22). When Lin
Fang asked about ritual propriety, Confucius states that 



> 
> 
> In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better that there be deep sorrow
> than a minute attention to observances. (*Analects*, 3.4; Legge
> 1960a: 156) 
> 
> 
> 



He stresses an appropriate state of the mind, i.e., deep sorrow and
sincere sadness, not the formal details of the ceremony in ritual
propriety. At the foundation of Confucian virtues such as filial piety
(*xiao* Xiao ), benevolence (*ren* Ren ), and ritual
propriety (*li* Li ), one can always see genuine and
appropriate emotional states with the fully dedicated mind.



A diverse group of emotions such as *le* (Le 
joy), *ai* (Ai  sorrow), *hao* (Hao  liking),
and *you* (You  worry) are discussed in
the *Analects*. Confucius always sees, underneath the
observable actions and behaviors, deep emotional flow as a critical
element of humaneness and moral excellence.



> 
> 
> The Master said, "High station filled without indulgent
> generosity; ceremonies performed without reverence; mourning conducted
> without sorrow (*ai* Ai  sorrow)--wherewith should I
> contemplate such ways?" (*Analects*, 3.26; Legge 1960a:
> 164)
> 
> 
> 
> The Master said, "They who know [*zhi* Zhi ] the truth are
> not equal to those who love [*hao* Hao  liking] it, and they who
> love it are not equal to those who delight [*le* Le  joy] in
> it". (*Analects*, 6.20; Legge 1960a: 191)
> 
> 
> 



Confucius not only explains virtues through emotional states but also
expresses the excitement of cultivating and perfecting virtues through
learning (*xue* Xue ). The beginning chapter of the
*Analects* starts with Confucius's excitement of
learning: 



> 
> 
> Is it not pleasant [*le* Le ] to learn with a constant
> perseverance and application? Is it not delightful to have friends
> coming from distant quarters? Is he not a man of complete virtue, who
> feels no discomposure though men may take no note of him?
> (*Analects*, 1.1; Legge 1960a: 137) 
> 
> 
> 



The excitement and delight in this passage are not simple hedonic
states of the mind but a fully engaged sense of one's virtuous
mind. Confucius also expresses his sadness when his beloved disciple
Yan Yuan died. Confucius 



> 
> 
> bewailed him exceedingly, and the disciples who were with him said,
> "Master, your grief is excessive!" "Is it
> excessive?" said he. "If I am not to mourn bitterly for
> this man, for whom should I mourn?" (*Analects*, 11.10;
> Legge 1960a: 240). 
> 
> 
> 



He does not hide his naturally aroused emotions as expressions of his
genuine heart-mind. In the *Analects*, therefore, Confucius
shows that emotions and feelings are essential components of virtue
and self-cultivation, and highlights the affective nature of the moral
mind.



None of these emotions and feelings, however, are explicitly linked to
*qing* in the *Analects*. *Qing* appears twice in
the *Analects*, in the contexts where it means genuineness,
truthfulness, situations or circumstances. For example, there is no
direct connection between *qing* and emotions in the following
passages of the *Analects*. 



> 
> 
> If he [a superior person] love good faith, the people will not dare
> not to be sincere [*qing*, truthful]. (*Analects*, 13.4;
> Legge 1960a: 265)
> 
> 
> 
> The rulers have failed in their duties, and the people consequently
> have been disorganized, for a long time. When you have found out the
> truth [*qing*, situation] of any accusation, be grieved for and
> pity them, and do not feel joy at your own ability.
> (*Analects*, 19.19; Legge 1960a: 345)
> 
> 
> 



In these passages, *qing* means genuineness, truthfulness and
objective reality. It seems that when Confucius's teachings were
recorded around 500 BCE, *qing* had little relation to
subjective inner feelings even though Confucius discussed emotions and
feelings in the *Analects*. As Graham (1990) and Hansen (1995)
argue, *qing* gets associated with emotions and feelings in the
later stages of Chinese philosophy. This does not mean that emotions
are not important or not discussed in Chinese philosophy in the
Warring States period. In fact, the *Analects* is filled with
Confucius's teachings on emotions and feelings. *Le* (Le 
joy) appears 23 times in the *Analects* when filial piety
(*xiao* Xiao ) and righteousness (*yi* Yi ) show up 14 and
20 times respectively.


### 5.2 The *Mozi*



Mozi's (480-390 BCE) vision for the peaceful and
prosperous world lies in his philosophy of *jian ai* (Jian Ai ),
impartial caring or impartial concern for all. He believes that all
the major problems of the world such as war, violence, and poverty are
caused by the unregulated psychological tendency of partiality and the
relentless pursuit of self-interest. According to him, subjective
feelings or emotions for others, although they can promote love for
others and care for their wellbeing, can become partial and biased
because emotions are typically aroused, expressed, and shared in small
communities of personal relations and social networks. He believes
that spontaneously aroused emotions, because of their tendencies of
partiality, inconsistency, and bias, do not help people to deal with
their hardships and fix the calamities of the world. He states
that



> 
> 
> It is things such as great states attacking small states, great
> families wreaking havoc with lesser families, the strong robbing the
> weak, the many doing violence to the few, the clever deceiving the
> ignorant, and the noble acting arrogantly toward the humble. These are
> some of the great harms being done in the world. In addition, there
> are rulers who are not kind, ministers who are not loyal, fathers who
> are not loving, and children who are not filial. These too are some of
> the great harms being done in the world.... If we try to discover
> the origin of these different harms, where do we find they come
> from?...it is those who are partial in their dealings with others
> who are the real cause of all the great harms in the world.
> (*Mozi*, 16.1; Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2001: 68)
> 
> 
> 



Mozi proposes, therefore, *jian ai*, impartial caring i.e., a
sense of broad, fair, and consistent moral interest for others'
wellbeing beyond one's narrow confinement of personal relations
and local networks. Generally, *ai* (Ai ) means love or care.
In the context of Mozi's philosophy, however, it means universal
love, i.e., one's unbiased and impartial interest for
others' wellbeing. It is love, concern, or care without
affective partiality such as one's strong feeling for
one's parents but lack of concern for strangers. For this
reason, *ai* does not seem to be a typical emotion of care and
concern. Graham (1989: 31-32) states that it is
"unemotional will to benefit and avoid harming people".
However, *ai* does not necessarily exclude the affective
elements of caring or concern. As Shun explains (1997: 31), it can
include "reacting affectively in response to negative conditions
of the objects of concern". Virag (2017: 59) also points
out that 



> 
> 
> *Jian ai* possesses a spectrum of meanings in the text [the
> *Mozi*], from strong affection to a more detached concern for
> the well-being of others. 
> 
> 
> 



The unique aspect of Mozi's *jian ai* is that it seems to
be an affective duty constructed out of his argument to overcome
partiality and bias. If *jian ai* is an emotion, it is not a
spontaneous feeling but a cultivated emotion, i.e., one's
carefully developed, unbiased, impartial, and affective interest for
the benefit of others and the world.



Mozi presents his famous argument for impartial love in the following
passage.



> 
> 
> If people were to regard others' states as they regard their own
> state, then who would still mobilise their own state to attack the
> states of others? They would regard others' [states] as they
> regard their own. If people were to regard the capital cities of
> others as they regard their own capital city, then who would still
> raise their own capital city to strike at the capital cities of
> others? They would regard others' [capital cities] as they
> regard their own. If people were to regard the houses of others as
> they regard their own house, who would still stir their own house to
> bring disorder to the houses of others? They would regard
> others' [houses] as they regard their own. Now if states and
> cities did not attack and strike at each other, and if people's
> houses did not bring disorder to and damage each other, would this be
> harmful to the world? Or would it be beneficial to the world? This
> must be beneficial to the world. For the moment let us think about the
> origin of these many benefits, what it is they arise from....We
> must say that it is from loving people and benefiting people that they
> arise. And, if we were to distinguish and name those in the world who
> love people and benefit people, would it be as
> "discriminating" or as "universal"? We must
> say it would be as "universal". In this case, then, it is
> "mutual and universal" which gives rise to the
> world's great benefits. (*Mozi*, 16.2; Johnston 2010:
> 147-149)
> 
> 
> 



Mozi's argument, in this passage, does not seem to prove the
existence of an emotion of universal love and mutual caring. Instead,
the argument attempts to prove the importance of impartiality and the
necessity of an emotional dedication for the universal love. It is a
rational justification that calls for a reciprocal and universal
viewpoint where one should take equal interest for oneself and others.
In this context, one can suspect the psychological reality and
practical effectiveness of Mozi's universal love. The main
theoretical challenge is to explain the motivation of impartial caring
on the basis of a reasoning that impartial caring is morally justified
and a rationally right thing to do (Graham 1989: 31-32; Nivison
1996: 84; Virag 2017: 61-62). Can the affective
motivation of *jian ai* come out of a rational argument or
doxastic moral justification? Although one does not need to
distinguish rationality and emotionality of *jian ai* and can
accept the diverse forms of moral motivation (Fraser 2011; Robins
2012), Mozi's approach to emotion is clearly different from that
of Confucians, such as Confucius and Mencius. The Confucians believe
that natural or genuine emotional states can align themselves with
moral will and ideal virtues through the process of self-cultivation,
learning or other mental practices. Mozi seems to focus primarily on
reasoning and rational justification for *jian ai*, although he
does not completely reject or devalue the affective elements of
*jian ai* and the various means of its cultivation. According
to him, *jian ai* makes rulers kind, ministers loyal, and
fathers compassionate, and the gentleman carefully examining it and
diligently practicing it (*Mozi*, 16.2; Johnston 2010:
165).



*Qing* appears 26 times in the *Mozi* but it does not
refer to inner affective states of the mind. Instead, it is used in at
least three different ways. Mozi states that



> 
> 
> Every creature living between Heaven and earth and within the four
> seas partakes of the nature [*qing* Qing ] of Heaven and
> earth and the harmony of the Yin and the Yang. Even the greatest sages
> cannot alter this. How do we know? When they taught about Heaven and
> earth, they dwelt on the upper and the lower spheres and the four
> seasons, the principles of Yin and Yang and human nature [*ren
> qing* Ren Qing ], the phenomena of men and women, birds and
> animals, and that of the sexes. Even the early kings could not escape
> from the fundamentals of nature. (*Mozi*, 6.8; Mei 1929:
> 26).
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Mozi describes *qing* (Qing ) as the firm
and objective nature of the world (Tian Rang Zhi Qing )
including human nature (*ren qing* Ren Qing ), that is
unalterable and unmodifiable even by the sage kings. The whole passage
explains the natural order of the universe (time, space, living and
non-living things) and the natures of human beings and
animals. Here, *qing* has no relation to emotions or
feelings.



In another passage, Mozi uses *qing* to explain the
sociopolitical environment of a state. He states that those rulers who
understand the *qing* of common people will be successful
leaders but those who do not understand the *qing* will bring
chaos (*Mozi*, 13.1; Mei 1929: 70). Here *qing* means a
broad sociopolitical environment, specifically the living (economic,
cultural, social and political) conditions of people. Mozi states that
understanding people's *qing* is a critical element of
successful leadership. Rulers should carefully observe the
socio-political reality of their states and the living conditions and
opinions of their people. This type of *qing* falls in the
semantic category of situations, circumstances, or reality. Cai (2020:
403) interprets it as existential conditions of people and
Virag (2017: 56) takes it as sentiment or affective
dispositions of people.



*Qing* also means truth or truthful in the *Mozi*
(36.1). When Mozi explains the (epistemological) standard of
judgments, he states that 



> 
> 
> Now that the truth and error [*qing wei* Qing Wei ] (of a
> doctrine) in the world is hard to tell, there must be three tests.
> (*Mozi*, 36.1; Mei 1929: 189) 
> 
> 
> 



Mei (1929) translates *qing wei* as truth and error but it can
be understood as genuine (truthful) and artifice (deceiving), i.e., a
contrastive pair of epistemological properties. *Qing* is also
used adverbially. It means sincerely, earnestly, seriously, or really.
Mozi states that if 



> 
> 
> the rulers now really [*qing* Qing ] desire gain and avert loss,
> desire security and avert danger, they cannot but condemn offensive
> wars (*Mozi*, 18.4; Mei 1929: 104) 
> 
> 
> 



Although, the adverbial meaning is related to *qing*'s
nounal meaning, i.e., genuineness, it reveals a unique way emotions
relate to their objects. Emotions, like beliefs and perceptions, have
their own intentionality, i.e., their own way of referring to their
target objects. For example, people are not just angry. They are angry
about certain things or events (someone stole their cars, for example)
in certain ways (highly stressful and frustrating ways). Regarding
this unique form of affective intentionality, Bockover (1995: 174) states that 



> 
> 
> the difference between beliefs and emotions...is that emotions
> entail distinctively affective ways of being conscious about things.
> 
> 
> 
> 



In its adverbial use in the *Mozi*, *qing* shows this
unique aspect of affective intentionality. Emotions do not simply
relate to their targets: they can relate to their targets with diverse
adverbial modes (i.e., strongly, weakly, sincerely, or superficially
etc.).


### 5.3 The *Mencius*



By following Confucius's views on the genuineness of emotion in
moral virtues, Mencius (372-289 BCE) develops a
moral-psychological explanation of the heart-mind (*xin*
Xin ) and its innate moral foundations with spontaneous arousal
and motivational purity. He puts moral emotions at the center of his
philosophy and argues that the affective genuineness of Confucian
virtues emerges from innately given affective inclinations. His four
moral sprouts (*siduan* Si Duan , the four
moral-psychological foundations of Confucian virtues) are the
heart-mind of pity and compassion (Ce Yin ), shame and
dislike (Xiu E ), modesty and compliance (Ci Rang ),
and approve and disapprove (Shi Fei ) (*Mencius*, 2A6,
6A6). For example, one cannot bear to see the suffering of others and
quickly develops empathic concern for them. This naturally aroused
affective inclination is the foundation of the Confucian virtue of
benevolence (*ren*) (*Mencius*, 2A6). He often compares
the cultivation of the moral sprouts to an agricultural process: the
sprouts can grow naturally because of their inborn nature under the
particular external conditions (such as water, soil, and nutrition)
for their full maturation. From this onto-generative and innate
viewpoint of moral emotions, one can see the moral-psychological
connection between *qing* and emotions. Even though no
explicit connection between *qing* and emotions is made in
the *Mencius*, the genuineness of the human mind in Confucian
virtues such as *ren* (Ren  benevolence), *yi*
(Yi  righteousness), *li* (Li  ritual propriety), and
*zhi* (Zhi  wisdom) is traced back to the inborn nature or
essence, (i.e, *qing*) of humanity that manifests itself in
such emotional reactions as *buren* (Bu Ren  not bearing to see
others' suffering) or *ceyin* (Ce Yin  pity and
compassion).



> 
> 
> When I say that all men have the mind which cannot bear to see the
> suffering of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: Now, when men
> suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they all have a
> feeling of alarm and distress, not to gain friendship with the
> child's parents, not to seek the praise of their neighbors and
> friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack of humanity
> if they did not rescue the child]. From such a case, we see that a man
> without the feeling of commiseration is not a man; a man without the
> feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; a man without the feeling
> of deference and compliance is not a man; and a man without the
> feeling of right or wrong is not a man. (*Mencius*, 2A6; Chan
> 1963: 65)
> 
> 
> 



As one can see in Mencius's discussion of the four moral sprouts
in this passage, Mencius's moral psychology of the heart-mind
focuses on the psychological and ontological foundation of moral
emotions. According to him, Confucian virtues derive from the innate
foundations (*siduan*) and these foundations are naturally
given affective moral inclinations. As Confucius stresses the
significance of sincere emotions in the cultivation of virtues,
Mencius highlights their innate emotional foundations. However, these
are not just psychological foundations. They are ontological
foundations, too. He (2A6) states, for example, lacking the heart-mind
of *ceyin* means lacking the essence of humanity. This
foundational and ontological approach in Mencius's moral
philosophy provides a stimulating opportunity to connect emotions
(affective inclinations) and *qing* (genuine nature) in the
context of the four moral sprouts.



According to Mencius, certain emotions are aroused by innately given
psychological orientations of the mind that flow spontaneously from
the original nature of human beings. The four moral sprouts
(*siduan*) are such emotions that deserve careful cultivation
because their genuineness derives from human nature. Mencius (2A6,
6A6) believes that emotions, like living organisms, have roots and
foundations, grows and expands, and reaches out to realize their
natural potential. They begin and grow like a fire that starts to
spark and a spring that breaks out (2A6). They should not be
obstructed or stopped. They should be developed and cultivated to
realize their full potential. This is Mencius's
moral-psychological nativism that highlights the affective and
generative moral sprouts at the foundation of the heart-mind and human
nature (Seok 2008).



Flanagan (2014) characterizes Mencius's moral psychology of the
four moral sprouts as natural teleology because the moral emotions
have deep foundations in human nature with the designated endpoints,
i.e., Confucian virtues. This ontological and teleological approach to
emotions shows why emotions are important in Confucian philosophy and
how emotions and *qing* can relate to each other. For example,
*qing* appears four times (3A4, 4B46, 6A6, 6A8) in the
*Mencius* and they mean nature/essence or situation/reality.
Generally, the semantic content of *qing* in the
*Mencius* follows that of the *Analects*: *qing*
is not *directly* related to inner subjective feelings. *Wu
zhi qing* (Wu Zhi Qing ) means nature of things (3A4)
and *ren zhi qing* (Ren Zhi Qing ) means the nature
or natural disposition of human beings (6A8). In 6A6,
however, *qing* is used to explain the goodness of human nature
in the context of affective feelings, i.e., the four moral sprouts. He
states that "From the feelings [*qing*] proper to it
[nature], it is constituted for the practice of what is good"
(6A6; Legge 1960b: 402). In this passage, *qing* refers to the
foundation or root of the moral emotions. Mencius explains that all
humans, despite their individual differences, have the same foundation
of goodness such as the four moral sprouts which are basically moral
feelings. These feelings are the foundational essences (*qing*)
of humanity that can become virtuous through the process of
cultivation and learning. Although
*qing* in this passage does not refer to inner subjective
states of the mind, it means genuine and truthful dispositions of
human beings such as the affective orientations of the mind that can
be observed in the four moral sprouts. In this passage, *qing*
(nature/essence) comes close to emotions and feelings, not just random
feelings but certain feelings with specific innate inclinations that
reflect underlying nature of human beings. Here, Mencius opens the
door to emotional *qing* in his discussion of how human beings
can become virtuous through the innately given affective sprouts of
morality.



Other than the four moral sprouts and their foundational nature,
Mencius discusses emotions and subjective feelings of love, concern,
and sadness. For example, he discusses king Shun's (Shun )
emotions such as sorrow and love to his parents and brother and
explains true filial piety (5A1). Shun's parents and brother
tried to kill him but he kept his sincere feelings for them. Like
Confucius, Mencius believes that genuine emotions are critical
component of ideal moral virtues. He also points out how emotions
change our sense of appropriateness and motivate to adopt certain
norms. He states that



> 
> 
> Anciently, there was no rule for the size of either the inner or the
> outer coffin. In middle antiquity, the inner coffin was made seven
> inches thick, and the outer one the same. This was done by all, from
> the sovereign to the common people, and not simply for the beauty of
> the appearance, but because they thus satisfied the natural feelings
> of their hearts [*ren xin* Ren Xin ]. (*Mencius*, 2B16;
> Legge 1960b: 221)
> 
> 
> 



It seems that the thickness of coffin has little to do with emotions
or feelings but Mencius explains that our feelings for deceased people
is the reason why the inner coffin has certain thickness. It is not
because of an aesthetic consideration, a universal principle, or a
sense of duty but because of an affective sense for others that
motivated the decision to adopt the particular thickness. From this
perspective, one can easily understand Mencius's criticism (3B9)
of Yang Zhu's and Mo Di's views (Yangism and Mohism).
Yang's view is egoism that promotes one's self-interest
but does not acknowledge the authority of one's ruler.
Mo's view is impartial caring that supports the benefit of
others but does not recognize one's feelings and respect for
one's parents. Mencius states that "to acknowledge neither
king nor father is to be in the state of a beast" (3B9; Legge
1960b: 282). It is important to note that what Mencius criticizes here
is not simply their rejection of the authority of ruler and father.
Rather it is their denial of the caring heart at the center of
morality that renders humanity little more than bests. Mencius
explains why feelings and emotions for others, specifically for our
parents, is important and why Yangism and Mohism fail: they propose
uncaring ways of life. This is clearly presented in Mencius's
comment on Mohist thinker Yi Zhi's (Yi Zi ) view. Mencius
discusses the following example.



> 
> 
> In great antiquity there were some who did not bury their parents.
> When their parents died, they took them up and threw them into a
> ditch. Later when they passed by them and saw foxes and wild cats
> eating them and flies and gnats eating them, their perspiration
> started out upon their foreheads, they looked askance and could not
> bear to look straight. Now the perspiration was not for the sake of
> other people. It was something at the bottom of their hearts that
> showed in their expressions. Their immediately went home and returned
> with baskets and spades and covered the bodies. If it was indeed right
> to cover them, then there must be certain moral principles which made
> filial sons and men of humanity inter their parents.
> (*Mencius*, 3A5; Chan 1963: 71)
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Mencius clearly states that the physical changes in
the body are not caused by one's deliberation or consideration
of reputation and reward. They simply come out from the bottom of the
heart (*zhong xin* Zhong Xin --the center or core of the
heart-mind) in their feelings for others. He believes that Yangism and
Mohism miss this critical element of the affective moral mind.
According to him, we are moral creatures because of the feelings and
emotions that flow from our genuine nature in its caring heart-mind
for others.


### 5.4 The *Xunzi*



Xunzi (310-235 BCE) approaches emotions from the perspective of
the functions and processes of the mind. The mind, according to him,
is a functional complexity consisting of diverse processes of feelings
and its nature is not to draw upon the innate moral orientation but to
manifest affective sensitivity and reactivity in expressible forms. If
the mind has the spontaneous reactivity to external stimuli, emotions
and feelings show how the mind interacts with or reacts to the world
(*Xunzi*, 11.10). Therefore, his approach to emotions and
feelings, in comparison to Mencius's foundational and moral
approach, is naturalistic and psychological. Unlike Mencius, he does
not investigate and analyze the innate foundations of Confucian
virtues. Instead, he discusses how emotions and feelings are aroused
in the mind to serve particular perceptual, conative, and moral
functions.



Xunzi focuses on naturally given inclinations of the mind without
necessarily implicating the underlying norms of ideal virtues. He
states that



> 
> 
> The natural disposition [*qing* Qing ] of people is that for food
> they want meats, for clothes they want embroidered garments, for
> travel they want chariots and horses, and moreover they want the
> riches of surplus wealth and accumulated goods. Even if provided these
> things, to the end of their years they would never be satisfied; this
> is also the natural disposition [*qing* Qing ] of people.
> (*Xunzi*, 4.11; Hutton 2014: 29)
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Hutton translates *qing* as "the natural
disposition". It is important to note that the meaning of
*qing* as the natural disposition does not necessarily mean
normative or teleological sense of nature (i.e., nature as an ideal
standard or ultimate goal of human life) but spontaneous, unregulated
and uncultivated tendencies of human behavior in Xunzi's
philosophy because human *qing* (Ren Zhi Qing ) can
be disruptive and disorderly (*Xunzi*, 23).



From this naturalistic viewpoint, Xunzi actively links *qing*
with psychological states and dispositions. In earlier Chinese texts
such as the *Mozi*, for example, *ren qing* does not
refer to inner psychology or affective states. In the *Xunzi*,
however, *ren zhi qing* (Ren Zhi Qing , *qing* of human
beings) or *ren qing* (Ren Qing , human *qing*) refers to
psychological dispositions or affective states. Cai (2020: 407)
reports that *qing* appears 119 times in the *Xunzi* and




> 
> 
> Of the 119 appearances of *qing*, fewer than 20 carry the
> neutral or positive import of "the nature of things". 
> 
> 
> 



Specifically, Xunzi connects *qing* with inner subjective
states. He states that 



> 
> 
> The feelings of liking and disliking, happiness and anger, and sadness
> and joy in one's nature are called the dispositions
> [*qing* Qing ]. (*Xunzi*, 22.2; Hutton 2014: 236) 
> 
> 
> 



Among Chinese texts in the Warring States period, this is one of the
passages where *qing* is discussed explicitly in the context of
inner subjective feelings. However, the passage, in itself, does not
necessarily show that *qing* is understood or identified as
emotions in Xunzi's philosophy. Instead, emotions can be
understood as expressions, derivations, or one of the manifestations
of the underlying nature or essence of human beings, as Graham (1990:
64) suggests. Whether one takes Graham's interpretation or not,
it is clear that Xunzi brings *qing* close to the affective
dimension of the mind. In fact, the careful observation, modification,
and cultivation of *qing* as an affective disposition is a key
element of Xunzi's moral philosophy as illustrated in his
chapters on ritual and music. 



According to Xunzi, human *qing* has a distinctive inclination
of *yu* (Yu  desire). People like to satisfy their desires for
material goods such as fancy food and fine clothes. 



> 
> 
> The natural disposition [Qing ] of people is that for food they want
> [*yu* Yu ] meats, for clothes they want embroidered
> garments.... (*Xunzi*, 4.11; Hutton 2014: 29) 
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, *yu* (Yu ) means desire for material values
and one's interest in maximizing one's self-interest.
Xunzi believes that *yu* is an inborn disposition of human
psychology and human beings are self-interested individuals who seek
to satisfy their desires that are not completely satisfied. As a
result, *yu* generates competitive struggle and violence. He
states that 



> 
> 
> They [people] are born with desires of the eyes and ears, a fondness
> for beautiful sights and sounds. If they follow along with these, then
> lasciviousness and chaos will arise.... (*Xunzi* 23.1;
> Hutton 2014: 248) 
> 
> 
> 



Unlike Mencius' optimistic approach to innate dispositions such
as the four moral sprouts, Xunzi's approach to the natural
disposition of *yu* is cautious and despairing if not
completely hopeless: *yu* is a major threat to the orderliness
and stability of human living. Human nature is evil, he declares
(*Xunzi*, 23.1), because of this natural but self-interested
psychological disposition of the human mind.



*Yu* is typically understood as a conative state, a state of
wanting or seeking (*Xunzi*, 4.11, 23.1). However, Xunzi
explains it in the context of perceptual states such as seeing,
hearing, and tasting, i.e., how our sensory organs search for their
objects.



> 
> 
> As for people's natural dispositions [*qing* Qing ], their
> eyes desire [*yu* Yu ] the utmost in sights, their ears desire
> the utmost in sounds, their mouths desire the utmost in flavors, their
> noses desire the utmost in smells, and their bodies desire the utmost
> in comfort. These "five utmosts" are something the natural
> dispositions [*qing* Qing ] of people cannot avoid desiring.
> (*Xunzi*, 11.10; Hutton 2014: 104)
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Xunzi describes the way our sensory organs are
related to their targets. Perceptual states have their objects, i.e.,
what they see, hear, and smell. *Yu* describes this relational
property (i.e., intentionality) of the mind in addition to its
original function of desiring "five utmost objects". That
is, *yu* is not just a natural tendency to satisfy one's
desires but also perceptual intentionality that resides at a
foundational (perceptual) level of the human mind. If intentionality,
as Brentano (1874) explains, is a distinctive and an essential nature
of the mind, Xunzi's *yu* and *qing* include this
foundational aspect of the mind (the relationality or about-ness of
the mind) from an affective viewpoint.



The relation between *qing* and *yu*, therefore, should
be understood at a deeper level of human nature or perhaps the nature
of the universe. Xunzi provides such an explanation. He states
that



> 
> 
> Human nature [*xing* Xing  nature] is the accomplishment of
> Heaven [*tian* Tian ]. The dispositions [*qing* Qing 
> natural disposition or essential property] are the substance of the
> nature [*xing* Xing  nature]. The desires [*yu* Yu ] are
> the responses of the dispositions [*qing* Qing ] to things.
> Viewing the objects of desire as permissible to obtain and seeking
> them are what the dispositions [*qing* Qing ] cannot avoid.
> (*Xunzi*, 22.15; Hutton 2014: 244)
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Xunzi explains that *yu* derives from
*qing* and *qing* comes from *xing* (the
foundational nature of things). Against this broad process of
derivation from *tian* (Heaven) to *yu* through
*xing* and *qing* (as indicated in the schematic diagram
below), *yu* can be understood as an unavoidable inborn
disposition of human beings. 



> 
> 
> *Tian* (Tian  Heaven) - *Xing* (Xing  nature) -
> *Qing* (Qing  natural disposition) - (*Qing*'s
> Response [*Ying* Ying ] to external stimulation) -
> *Yu* (Yu  desire)
> 
> 
> 



This cosmological process can help us understand how *qing*
came to include a new semantic dimension, i.e., psychological
disposition of desire or emotion from its original meaning of nature
or essence. According to Xunzi, *qing* is related not only to
objective and essential nature of things (*xing* Xing ) but also
to the psychological inclinations of human beings (*yu* Yu ),
because *qing* derives from *xing* (nature) and
generates *yu* (desire). In this process of
*qing*'s origination and projection, one can understand
that *qing* does not simply refer to objective, static, and
eternal nature of things but also to the interactive and responsive
dispositions of human beings. A similar approach to *qing* can
be found in *Xing Zi Ming Chu*
(Xing Zi Ming Chu  Human Nature comes from the
Mandate), an excavated Confucian text written in the mid-fourth to
early third century BCE. According to *Xing Zi Ming
Chu*, *qing* is aroused when *xing* (human nature)
is stimulated by external objects. 



> 
> 
> Emotional (*xi*, *nu*, *ai*, *bei*
> [delight, anger, grief, sadness]) *qi* [material force or
> physical energy] is due to *xing*. When it manifests
> externally, it is due to sensual contact with things (*wu qu
> zhi* Wu Qu Zhi ). (*Xing Zi Ming Chu*, 1.1;
> Tang, Bruya, and Wen 2003: 275; Middendorf 2008: 152) 
> 
> 
> 



From this broad perspective of foundational *xing* and
responsive *qing*, one can understand how the objective and
subjective aspects of *qing* are integrated in Xunzi's
philosophy through the interactive responsiveness or resonance among
things.



Xunzi's naturalistic and psychological approach, however, does
not imply that emotions are just subjective feelings and the mind is
only amoral or immoral. The genuineness of emotion is still important
in Xunzi's moral psychology, as in Confucius's and
Mencius's. Xunzi discusses, for example, why it is important to
pay full respect to deceased people with loyalty, generosity and the
full decoration of coffins. He explains that people have genuine
feelings for deceased people because treating life and death with one
and the same care is what people all wish for (*Xunzi*, 19.17;
Hutton 2014: 207). He also explains how genuine emotions can be
cultivated through the affective transformation. According to him,
emotional genuineness can be developed through various means of social
and cultural activities such as ritual and music because affective
states, through careful adjustment and modification, can be enriched
and refined to become sincere states of the mind. For example, people
find joy in music with their deep and affective resonance with musical
performance. Xunzi states that "Sounds and music enter into
people deeply and transform people quickly" (*Xunzi*,
20.5; Hutton 2014: 219). Even though emotions are influenced by the
natural disposition of *yu*, they can transform the heart-mind
to follow the way of the sages through the process of responsive
refinement in music and ritual. Xunzi's philosophy shows this
developmental and transformative nature of emotions.


### 5.5 The *Laozi* (*Dao De Jing*)



The *Laozi* (Lao Zi ), also known as *Dao De
Jing* (Dao De Jing , *The Book of Dao and De*),
is a Daoist text in the Warring States period. Laozi (Lao-tzu or Lao
Dan) is believed to be its single author although many scholars today
believe that it is a composite work by several authors and/or
editors. In the
*Laozi*, the term *qing* is not found. There is no
discussion of particular natures and dispositions of human beings
under a single term such as *qing* (Qing ) or *xing*
(Xing ). However, individual emotions or affective states such as anger
(*nu* Nu ), resentment (*yuan* Yuan ) courage
(*yong* Yong ), loving kindness (*ci* Ci ) and desire
(*yu* Yu ) are discussed in the *Laozi*. Laozi believes
that emotions have lasting influence on human behavior and destructive
emotions can threaten the wellbeing of people and damage their
harmonious social interactions. Although he does not discuss seriously
whether emotions are genuine or superficial or whether they change or
transform the inner states of the mind as Mencius or Xunzi does, he
discusses how emotions affect behaviors of people and motivate them to
help or harm themselves and others.



He states that



> 
> 
> I have three treasures that I hold on to and preserve:
>   
> 
> The first I call loving kindness [*ci* Ci ];
>   
> 
> The second I call frugality [*jian* Jian ];
>   
> 
> The third I call never daring to put oneself first in the world.
>   
> 
> The kind can be courageous [*yong* Yong ];
>   
> 
> The frugal can be generous;
>   
> 
> Those who never dare to put themselves first in the world can become
> leaders of the various officials.
>   
> 
> Now to be courageous without frugality,
>   
> 
> To put oneself first without putting oneself behind others,
>   
> 
> These will lead to death. (*Laozi*, 67; Ivanhoe 2002:
> 70)
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Laozi mentions loving kindness, frugality and not
being self-interested or self-centered as the three treasures and
explains how they influence the success and failure of people. Among
them, loving kindness and courage are affective dispositions that help
individuals to be successful leaders but lacking them would lead to
failure and death.



Following the same line of thinking, he explains that emotions can
help or harm people depending on their circumstances. Like rain helps
people when the land is dry but harms people when the river is
flooding, emotions should be carefully aroused and expressed. He
states that 



> 
> 
> To be courageous in daring leads to death, To be courageous in not
> daring leads to life. These two bring benefit to some and loss to
> others. (*Laozi*, 73, Ivanhoe 2002: 76) 
> 
> 
> 



Laozi also warns us about harmful or destructive emotions. Some of
these are negative emotions, emotions that have negative valence such
as anger and resentment. Laozi suggests that one should carefully deal
with anger and resentment. He states that one should "repay
resentment with Virtue [*de* De ]" (*Laozi*, 63;
Ivanhoe 2002: 66) and "Those good at attack are never enraged
[*nu* Nu ]" (*Laozi*, 68; Ivanhoe 2002: 71).
Specifically, he talks about confrontational or contentious attitudes
and dispositions: they are antagonistic or hostile toward others and
their interest by focusing exclusively on one's own interest. He
states that 



> 
> 
> Those good at conquering their enemies never confront them. Those good
> at using others put themselves in a lower position. This is called the
> Virtue of noncontention. (*Laozi*, 68; Ivanhoe 2002: 71)
> 
> 
> 



One of the frequently discussed emotions in the *Laozi* is
desire (*yu* Yu ). Desire, specifically a natural tendency
to satisfy one's basic needs, is not necessarily negative or
evil but Laozi mentions it 26 times in this relatively short text and
carefully explain its potentially harmful effects because of its
exclusive nature (its selfish or self-centered orientation that
excludes or disregards others' interests or viewpoints). Laozi
states that "the great Way [Da Dao ] is always without
desires [Yu ]" (*Laozi*, 34) and "those who
preserve the Way [Dao ], do not desire [Yu ]
fullness". (*Laozi*, 16). He emphasizes that one should
minimize one's desire (*Laozi*, 1, 19) to understand and
follow the Way (*dao*). Virag characterizes
Laozi's rather cautionary and reproving approach to emotions,
specifically desire, as one of the salient features of
the *Laozi*. She (Virag 2017: 76) states that




> 
> 
> One of the salient features of this text [the *Laozi*] is its
> negative account of emotions and desires as fundamentally contrary to
> the realization of the perfected life--a life in accordance with
> the natural process of the cosmos.
> 
> 
> 



Laozi's reproving approach to desire, however, should be
carefully understood since he does not say that one should simply
reject or suppress one's desire. In the first chapter of the
*Laozi*, he makes a paradoxical statement about desire and
desirelessness in their relations to the ultimate Way:



> 
> 
> A Way that can be followed is not a constant Way.
>   
> 
> A name that can be named is not a constant Way.
>   
> 
> Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven and earth.
>   
> 
> Named, it is the mother of the myriad creatures.
>   
> 
> And so,
>   
> 
> Always eliminate desires in order to observe its [Way's]
> mysteries;
>   
> 
> Always have desires in order to observe its [Way's]
> manifestations.
>   
> 
> (*Laozi*, 1; Ivanhoe 2002: 1).
> 
> 
> 



Laozi, as he does in many chapters of the *Laozi*, presents an
intriguing paradox of desire and desirelessness in this passage. The
passage can be interpreted in many different ways. From a contextual
viewpoint, desire (*yu*) can be beneficial or harmful, or
cultivated or eliminated as courage (*yong*) can be beneficial
or deadly in certain situations to certain people (*Laozi*,
73). From a psychological viewpoint, certain aspects of desire (such
as exclusive promotion of self-interest, sensual indulgence, or
self-centered viewpoint) is harmful but others (such as a natural
inclination to satisfy one's basic needs) are acceptable.
However, considering the significance of this chapter, i.e., the
beginning chapter of the *Laozi* where the ultimate Way and the
linguistic or conceptual limitation of properly identifying and
describing it are discussed, the paradox of desire and desirelessness
can be understood from the viewpoint of the intriguing relation
between desire and the Way. The relation between the two can be
explained in two opposite ways: desire may distort the Way (in this
case, desirelessness is needed) but it helps us to initiate our
journey toward the Way (in this case, desire is needed). These
conflicting approaches to desire show both the limitation and the
openness of desire in our journey to understand the Way. Perhaps the
relation between the Way and desire can be characterized as a form of
affective intentionality where emotions open up, guide, and change our
emotional projection to the world and the Way. Regardless of these
interpretations of desire, it is clear that Laozi's view is not
simply ascetic and eliminative toward desire, even though he cautions
against its potentially harmful and destructive nature, specifically
the exclusive pursuit of self-interest and self-centered viewpoint
that can generate the confrontational, narrow-minded and myopic
understanding of the self and others.



Overall, the *Laozi* develops a stimulating view on the nature
of emotions and affective dispositions. It provides a seemingly
negative but cautiously practical and ingenuously encouraging
discussion of how emotions affect people. Some emotions, specifically
anger and desire, can be harmful and destructive in certain contexts,
not just because of their negative valance but because of the
exclusive and self-oriented viewpoints. In addition, the
*Laozi* focuses on how emotions interact with other emotions,
how they affect behaviors, and how they contribute to the wellbeing of
people and the stability of their communities.


### 5.6 The *Zhuangzi*



The *Zhuangzi* is a Daoist text in the late Warring States
period. It is believed to be written by a Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi
(369-286 BCE) but his authorship is debated especially in the
outer chapters (*wai pian* Wai Pian , chapters 8 through
22) and the miscellaneous chapters (*za pian* Za Pian ,
chapters 23 through 33) of the text. It consists of stories and
anecdotes that deliver the insightful and intriguing messages of
Daoism and the Daoist way of life. It also develops an inspiring
approach to emotions and their foundations in the natural inclinations
of the human mind. Although *qing* refers to the essential
nature of things in some passages of the *Zhuangzi*, in other
passages it refers to the psychological foundation of affective
dispositions. Therefore, it is important to see how he
understands *qing* and how
*qing* and emotions are related in the *Zhuangzi*.



Zhuangzi believes that emotions are natural phenomena like wind, rain,
and thunder. As we cannot change wind, rain, and thunder, we cannot
avoid naturally arising feelings. He states that



> 
> 
> Joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility,
> modesty, willfulness, candor, insolence-- music from empty holes,
> mushrooms springing up in dampness, day and night replacing each other
> before us, and no one knows where they sprout from. Let it be! Let it
> be! (*Zhuangzi*, 2.2; Watson 2013: 8)
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Zhuangzi lists emotions along with natural events
such as growing mushrooms and alternating day and night.
Zhuangzi's point in this passage is that, like natural
phenomena, emotions are aroused spontaneously without any plans or
forethoughts. This naturalistic approach, however, does not imply that
emotions are unpredictable and unregulated chaos and one should not
feel or react to any emotions. Rather, it suggests that one should
feel emotions without any expectations or suppositions. Unlike early
Confucian philosophers such as Mencius or Xunzi who searches for the
ontological or moral foundation of emotions in *qing* (Qing ) or
*xin* (Xin  the heart-mind), Zhuangzi, in this passage, takes
emotions as they are without relating them to their foundations or
analyzing them with their originations. He suggests that one should
not judge or inculcate them with social conventions or moral
norms.



It is, therefore, meaningless to feel emotions as positive, negative,
attractive or repulsive as it is equally meaningless to describe day
and night as positive or negative. Zhuangzi believes that developing
likes or dislikes (affective interpretations or evaluations of our
sensory and perceptual interaction with the world) is an inappropriate
way to feel or understand naturally arising emotions and can hurt
individuals who are caught by their likes and dislikes. Thus, he says
that one should not "by his likes and dislikes do any inward
harm to himself" (*Zhuangzi*, 5.6). In the following
conversation, he explains his thoughts on how one should approach
feelings and emotions.



> 
> 
> Huizi said to Zhuangzi, "Can a man really be without feelings
> [*qing*]?"
> 
> 
> 
> Zhuangzi: "Yes".
> 
> 
> 
> Huizi: "But a man who has no feelings [*qing*] --how
> can you call him a man?"
> 
> 
> 
> Zhuangzi: "The Way gave him a face; Heaven gave him a
> form--why can't you call him a man?"
> 
> 
> 
> Huizi: "But if you've already called him a man, how can he
> be without feelings [*qing*]?"
> 
> 
> 
> Zhuangzi: "That's not what I mean by feelings
> [*qing* ]. When I talk about having no [*qing*]
> feelings, I mean that a man doesn't allow likes or dislikes to
> get in and do him harm. He just lets things be the way they are and
> doesn't try to help life along". (*Zhuangzi*, 5.6;
> Watson 2013: 40-41)
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, Zhuangzi distinguishes two different forms of
*qing*. When he says "a man has no feelings", he is
talking about the feelings of likes and dislikes. This type of
feelings can affect us and motivate us to accept and follow certain
viewpoints, rules, or norms. However, natural feelings come to
one's mind without bringing in any suppositions or judgments of
acceptance and rejection. In their analysis of this passage, Ma and
van Brakel (2021: 137) state by quoting Graham (1981 [2001: 82]) that




> 
> 
> Zhuangzi himself says explicitly that Huizi's and his
> understandings of *qing* are different: "You are
> misunderstanding what I mean by *qing*" (Legge 1891:
> 235); "*shifei*" [evaluative judgments such as
> likings and dislikings] is what I mean by
> "*qing*".
> 
> 
> 



Here one can see Zhuangzi's naturalistic or phenomenological
approach to emotions. According to him, having no feelings does not
mean that one should feel no emotions. Instead, he suggests that one
should take emotions simply as spontaneously and naturally arising
feelings so that sadness and pleasure cannot find a way in to disturb
and hurt one's mind. Thus he states that "If you are
content with the time and willing to follow along, then grief and joy
have no way to enter" (*Zhuangzi* 3.5; Watson 2013: 21).
Zhuangzi, therefore, does not promote asceticism, fatalism, or apathy.
Instead, he emphasizes one's full acceptance of naturally given
*qing* (*xing ming zhi qing*
Xing Ming Zhi Qing  naturally given affective
disposition). Emotions come and go like day and night and we should be
happy and sad as they show up and strike us with certain moods and
feelings.



For this reason, Zhuangzi warns about one's desire (*yu*
Yu ) to satisfy and extend one's likes and dislikes and
emphasizes the importance of accepting and accommodating the naturally
arising feelings of emotion. He states that 



> 
> 
> If you try to fulfill all your appetites and desires and indulge your
> likes and dislikes, then you will bring affliction to the true form of
> your inborn nature and fate [*xing ming zhi qing*
> Xing Ming Zhi Qing , naturally
> given *qing*]. (*Zhuangzi*, 24.1; Watson 2013: 199) 
> 
> 
> 



In this passage, he argues that one's desire is the foundation
of one's likes and dislikes that cause the deviance from or
distortion of naturally flowing emotions. Once one's likes and
dislikes distort or mislead one's natural feelings, one is
likely to be caught by mental struggle and psychological illness such
as frustration, depression, and stress. Therefore, he suggests one
should preserve and follow the spontaneous nature of the mind in
one's feelings and emotions. He states that 



> 
> 
> People of today, when they come to ordering their bodies and
> regulating their minds, too often do it in a manner like that which
> the border guard described. They turn their backs on the Heavenly
> part, deviate from the inborn nature, destroy the true form
> [*qing*], and annihilate the spirit, just to be doing what the
> crowd is doing. (*Zhuangzi*, 25.6; Watson 2013: 220)
> 
> 
> 



Perhaps one of the stimulating ways to understand Zhuangzi's
view on emotions and naturally given *qing* (*xing ming zhi
qing* Xing Ming Zhi Qing ) is to compare his approach to *qing*
with that of Xunzi's. Xunzi believes that *qing* can be
perfected by ritual, music, or other means of self-cultivation. To
Zhuangzi, the whole idea of modifying or transforming *qing*
through Confucian propriety and self-cultivation for the purpose of
social order and moral edification misses critically important
properties of *qing*, i.e., its natural spontaneity and
unbiased openness. According to him, our feelings and emotions are
important to us not because they can be perfected or matured but
because they help us to sense and feel things without any premeditated
or predetermined viewpoints or biases imposed upon by social
conventions and moral norms. He stresses that one should preserve
one's naturally given *qing* because one's
achievement of the ultimate rightness consists in not losing
one's natural *qing*. (*Zhuangzi*, 8.1).
Therefore, he criticizes Confucian virtues of benevolence
(*ren*) and righteousness (*yi*) by stating that 



> 
> 
> My definition of expertness has nothing to do with benevolence and
> righteousness; it means following the true form of your inborn nature
> [*xing ming zhi qing* Xing Ming Zhi Qing  naturally given
> *qing*]. (*Zhuangzi*, 8.3; Watson 2013: 63) 
> 
> 
> 



Hansen (1995: 21) explains these contrastive approaches to
*qing* by stating that 



> 
> 
> Zhuangzi...is normally positive about Qing 
> *qing*reality responses. Xunzi is notoriously
> negative. Zhuangzi is negative about Confucian traditions and
> conventions. Xunzi is positive about them. 
> 
> 
> 



As Hansen describes in his comparison between Xunzi's and
Zhuangzi's views, there are at least two contrastive approaches
to emotions in early Chinese philosophy. According to Xunzi's
Confucian approach, emotions are understood as the manifestations of
human nature and the developmental potential of virtue. According to
Zhuangzi's Daoist approach, however, the ontological foundation
and moral cultivation of emotions are neither important nor necessary
in understanding and feeling emotions. Emotions are spontaneously and
naturally arising feelings that we should not attempt to judge and
modify for the sake of human nature, moral norms or social
conventions.