## 1. *Abstractiones*




The title "*Abstractiones*" was apparently meant to
capture the "excerpted" nature of this collection of
sophisms that are presented in a somewhat summary 
 fashion.[1]
 This collection of sophisms became a kind of logical textbook used to
teach students to identify sophistical fallacies. This book was
probably used in several medieval universities for several decades,
from the late thirteenth well into the fourteenth centuries. Richard
is often referred to as "Magister Abstractionum" or
"Magister Richardus Sophista" to give emphasis to the
masterful, albeit summary, treatment of a very large collection of
over three hundred such sophism
 sentences.[2]
 The title "*sophista*" simply meant
"logician".




The seven known manuscripts of the *Abstractiones* date from
the late thirteenth to the early fourteenth 
 centuries:[3]



> 
> 
>  Ms B = Brugge, Stedelike Bibliotheek, 497
>   
> 
>  Ms C = Oxford, Corpus Christi College, E 293B
>   
> 
>  Ms D = Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 24
>   
> 
>  Ms K = Kobenhavn, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Fragm.1075
>   
> 
>  Ms O = Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 2
>   
> 
>  Ms P = Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale lat. 14069
>   
> 
>  Ms R = London, British Library, Royal 12.F.xix
> 
> 




Only two of these manuscripts (B, D) are complete; the remaining five
are in varying degrees of fragmentation. Two manuscripts (O, R) appear
to be derivative texts, or redactions, of the *Abstractiones*.





The dating of the composition of the *Abstractiones* appears to
have been around the 1230's or 40's. Earliest references to the
*Abstractiones* appear from the late thirteenth century in a
manuscript at Worcester Cathedral Library, Q. 13, which is confidently
dated no later than 1295, and probably as early as 
 1270.[4] 
 Worcester Q. 13 contains four references to the "Magister
Abstractionum." Another reference to the *Abstractiones* can be
found in a Quodlibetal Question of William of Alnwick, "Does God
know infinitely many things (*Utrum Deus cognoscat
infinita)*?", q. 9 probably dating from around 1320. Walter
Burley's tract, *De Exceptivis*, edited by L. M. de Rijk,
contains a reference to the Magister 
 Abstractionum.[5]
 An interesting reference can also be found in William of Ockham's
*Summa Logicae* and additional references can be found in
Ps. Richard of Campsall, John of Reading and Adam 
 Wodeham.[6]




The fact of the existence of two derivative texts of the
*Abstractiones* as well as the numerous known references by
accomplished logicians some seventy years after its composition
indicate that the *Abstractiones* was a quite popular book that
survived the test of time. Although as compared to sophism literature
of the fourteenth century Richard's analysis of sophisms appears
somewhat unsophisticated, as compared to treatments of sophisms of his
contemporaries Richard's analyses are qualitatively similar. Richard's
greatest accomplishment lay, perhaps, in his ability to encapsulate
and summarize a huge number of such logical puzzles, presenting for
the student a handy reference book filled with examples of a host of
logical fallacies.




An edition of Richard's *Abstractiones* finally appeared in 2016,
edited by Sten Ebbesen, Mary Sirridge, and E. Jennifer Ashworth,
published by Oxford University Press in the series *Auctores
Britannici Medii Aevi*.


## 2. Examples of Sophisms




In order to give the reader a better understanding of the content of
this book of *Abstractiones*, it might be helpful to list a few
examples of the sophism sentences discussed in it and to illustrate
Richard's treatment of just one of these. As noted above, our book
contains over three hundred sophism sentences. A random sampling
includes these examples:



> 
> 
> 
> (1) Every man is every man (*Omnis homo est omnis
> homo*) 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (16) Whatever exists or does not exist exists (*Quicquid est vel
> non est est*)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (39) Everything other than an animal which plus Socrates are two
> differs from Socrates (*Omne aliud quam animal quod et Sortes sunt
> duo differt a Sorte*)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (79) The whole Socrates is less than Socrates (*Totus Sortes est
> minor Sorte*)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (96) If you know that you are a stone you do not know that you are a
> stone (*Si tu scis te esse lapidem tu non scis te esse
> lapidem*)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (157) Nothing is true about nothing (*De nihilo nihil est
> verum*)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (187) You have not ceased to eat iron (*Tu non cessas comedere
> ferrum*)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (215) All ten except one are nine (*Omnia X praeter unum sunt
> IX*)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (278) It is impossible that you know more than you know
> (*Impossibile est te scire plura quam scis*)
> 
> 
> 




From the above rather small list of sophisms, it can already be
noticed that some sentences are more complex, and thus more logically
puzzling, than others. Some sentences do not seem puzzling in
themselves at all, but become puzzling only within a certain
"context" that is set up within which arguments proving
and disproving the sophism must be developed. Such a context was
called a 
 "*casus*".[7]
 It seems likely that the proving and disproving of the sophism
sentence was done along the lines of a medieval oral
"*disputatio*" within the classroom setting. This
is the way Richard writes up his summaries: Proposal of the sophism,
sometimes within a *casus*; arguments establishing the truth of
the sentence; arguments establishing the falsity of the sentence;
resolution of the sophism along with identification of the sophistical
fallacy involved.




The very first sophism sentence treated is one of the least
complicated (this sophism involves no *casus*):



> 
> 
> 
> Every man is every man 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Proof: This man is this man, that man is that man and so forth for
> each individual man, therefore every man is every man.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Another proof: No proposition is more true than one in which the
> same thing is predicated of the same thing....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Disproof: This proposition is true, "some man is not every
> man" and, similarly, "no man is every man"; therefore it
> is false that every man is every man.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Solution: The solution to the sophism is to note that "every
> man" is equivocal as to reference to every man taken singularly
> (as in "any man") and as to every man taken as a whole (as
> in "all men"). Mixing the two senses of
> "every" from subject to predicate causes the logical
> puzzle.
> 
> 
> 




As noted, this sophism sentence is relatively uncomplicated and it is
easy to spot the obvious fallacy involved, but Richard's text proceeds
with increasingly more difficult and intricate sophism sentences, many
of which engage the mind in complex mental acrobatics. The fallacies
noted throughout are the standard ones discussed in Aristotle's *De
Sophisticis Elenchis*: the fallacy of equivocation; the fallacy of
accident; the fallacy of the composite and divided senses; the fallacy
of the consequent; the fallacy of absolute and qualified senses; the
fallacy of many causes of truth; amphiboly; improper supposition.


## 3. Richard's Identity



There is still no certainty as to the identity of the Magister
Abstractionum. Because of the colophon appended to the two complete
manuscripts of the *Abstractiones*, we know, of course, that
his name was "Richard":



> 
> *Expliciunt ista, quae tu, Ricarde Sophista,
>   
> 
>  fecesti, morum flos et doctor logicorum.
>   
> 
>  Dirige scribentis, Spiritus alme, manum.
>   
> 
>  Expliciunt Abstractiones*.
>   
> 
>  (Digby 24, f.90rb) 
> 
> 
> 
> (These [sophisms] are complete, which you, Richard the Sophister,
>   
> 
>  Flower of virtue and teacher of logic, have produced.
>   
> 
>  Turn the scribe's hand [from its task], nurturing Spirit.
>   
> 
>  The *Abstractiones* are complete.)
> 
> 
> 




De Rijk suggested the name Richard Fishacre, disagreeing with the
suggestion of Richard Fitz-Ralph offered by Macray on the basis that
the dating of the text within the second quarter of the thirteenth
century is more consistent with Fishacre's 
 chronology.[8]
 Jan Pinborg suggested the name Richard Rufus also on grounds that the
dating of the *Abstractiones* is consistent with Rufus' being
at 
 Oxford.[9]
 It is generally assumed that the author is English. Pinborg offered
one further bit of evidence for the name Richard Rufus in that there
is some reason to think that certain doctrines of Richard Rufus, as
criticised by Roger Bacon, are in the *Abstractiones*. The
primary doctrine in question attributed to Richard Rufus and
criticised by Roger Bacon is, in general terms, that the signification
of a name can remain in the absence of any actual thing signified by
that name, although, as Bacon suggests, the proponents of this view
must supply some kind of "habitual being" for the lost
actual significate of such names. It is this doctrine of the
"*esse habituale*" that Bacon finds
objectionable. That Richard Rufus does seem to have such a doctrine
appears clear in his discussion of the question "Whether Christ
while three days in the tomb was a man" ("*Utrum
Christus in triduo mortis fuerit homo*") in distinction 22,
book III of his *Sentences
 Commentary*.[10]





It would be beyond the scope of this essay to deal with the
complexities of both Richard Rufus' treatment of this question as well
as Roger Bacon's voiceful criticisms of the notion of the
"*esse habituale*." The important question here is
whether the doctrine espoused by Richard Rufus exactly parallels
anything that can be found in the *Abstractiones* of Richard
the Sophister. It is important to find not only terminological
similarities but also doctrinal similarities. The terminology within
which Richard Rufus makes the above noted distinction is
"*esse in habitu*" versus "*esse in
actu*", the former he also labels "*esse
simpliciter*", the latter "*esse ut
 nunc*."[11]
 Bacon seems to substitute the expression "*esse
habituale*" for the expression "*esse in
habitu*." Rufus does not use the expression "*esse
habituale*." As referenced above, Pinborg noticed the
expressions "*esse consequentiae sive habitudinis*"
and "*esse quod est operatio entis*" in the
Abstractiones. Bacon also uses the expression "*esse
habitudinis*", but he seems to recognize a distinction
between "*esse habituale*" and "*esse
habitudinis*"; the latter, he says, "is used about
propositions and will be destroyed later when there is talk about
 propositions."[12]
 This remark might indicate that Bacon finds the same doctrinal
problem with the "*esse habitudinis*" that he finds
with the "*esse habituale*" (i.e., it introduces a
foil for some kind of fictive being), but we cannot be certain of
this, since he never returned to this topic in the
Compendium. Richardus Sophista does not use the terminology of
"*esse habituale*/*esse actuale*",
"*esse in habitu/esse in actu*" that we find in
Bacon and Rufus 
 respectively.[13]
 Pinborg also noted that William of Ockham criticizes those who make
the distinction between "*esse consequentiae sive
habitudinis*" and "*esse quod est operatio
entis*" as ignorant of the simple distinction between
hypothetical and categorical propositions, which according to Ockham
is all that the distincition amounts 
 to.[14]
 Pinborg sees Ockham's criticism as possibly making the same point as
Bacon, i.e., the terminology invites some kind of talk of fictive
being. Although Ockham is probably right to want to eliminate the old
terminology in favor of less problematic language, the important
questions are whether Richard the Sophister's use of the distinction
"*esse habitudinis*/*esse quod est operatio
entis*" entails anything other than a distinction between
types of propositions and whether his use of the distinction comes
under the attacks of Roger Bacon on the same way in which these
attacks seem relevant to a terminologically similar distinction in
Richard Rufus.




A complete answer to these questions would require not only a
detailed examination of the use of this distinction in the resolution
of sophisms in the *Abstractiones*, but also an examination of
Richard's position regarding terms that "assert non-being" and his
account of negation and negatives 
 generally.[15]
 These tasks are clearly beyond the scope of this essay. With respect
to the first question, it will have to suffice to record here that
there are only three places in the *Abstractiones* where
Richard employs the distinction in the resolution of sophisms and in
none of these is it clear that this is his favored 
 solution.[16]
 More importantly, Richard's use of the distinction in the resolution
of sophisms seems to match the use made of the same distinction (under
the terminology "*esse habituale*/*esse
actuale*") by William of Sherwood, that is, as essentially a
way of marking a distinction between hypothetical and categorical
 propositions.[17]
 It has been successfully argued by Braakhuis that the attacks of
Roger Bacon do not apply to William's use of the distinction, even
though, of all the authors noted so far, only William's terminology is
exactly the same terminology used by 
 Bacon.[18]
 Thus, if the doctrine under attack by Bacon cannot be attributed to
William, neither can it be attributed to Richard the Sophister. It
appears, then, that Richard Rufus and Richard the Sophister cannot be
identified, at least on the basis of these alleged doctrinal and
terminological similarities.