## 1. Life of Dietrich of Freiberg




Little is known with certainty about the life of Dietrich of
Freiberg. He was born in Freiberg in Saxony around the year 1250. He
is sometimes referred to as "Dietrich of Saxony," and
often as "Theodoricus Teutonicus." He is also mentioned in
medieval documents as "Magister" or "Master,"
indicating that he had advanced university training. He joined the
Dominican order at a young age. We know that he was still a youth when
Albertus Magnus was coming to the end of his career. But it is not
known whether Dietrich studied under Albert or ever met him. Around
the year 1271 he served as lector in the Dominican convent at Freiberg
in Saxony. That he studied at Paris is clear, that it was sometime
during the period between 1272-1274 is probable. But it is not
known with whom he studied. There is evidence provided by Dietrich's
own hand, found in chapter thirty of the second part of his
*Tractatus de intellectu et intelligibili* and in other places
in his works that suggests he may have studied under Henry of Ghent.
Dietrich mentions a certain "solemn master" whom he heard
dispute in Paris. Henry was known to his students as "doctor
solemnis" and perhaps "magister solemnis" as
well. An examination of Dietrich's writings suggests some themes that
could possibly owe their origins to Henry of Ghent. But the matter is
uncertain, and it does not seem that a careful study of the writings
of either of these great masters will reveal their historical
relations to one another.




Dietrich returned to Germany in 1280 and held the post of lector in
the city of Trier until 1281. He returned to Paris in 1281 in order to
hold lectures on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, perhaps at
Saint-Jacques. He may have remained in Paris until 1293. Although the
documents are not clear, most historians agree that he was appointed
prior of the Dominican convent in Wurzburg. In 1293 he was named
Provincial Superior of his order for the province of Germany, Albert
the Great's old post. Somewhere between 1296 and 1297 he was made
"Master of Theology" at Paris. He continued to teach in
Paris until 1300. In 1304 he was present at the general chapter of the
Dominican order held at Toulouse. His name last appears in the acts of
the general chapter of the order held in Piacenza in 1310. There he
was appointed Vicar Provincial of Germany. After this time his name
drops out of the documents.(Eckert 1957/1959; Kandler 2009)


## 2. Philosophical Works




Dietrich was a prolific writer. His writings include compositions on
nearly every branch of theology, philosophy, and natural science known
to his period. His philosophical and scientific works far outnumber
his strictly theological treatises. His *Opera omnia*,
published in the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii
Aevi*, occupy four volumes. Among his theological writings are
included his treatises on the beatific vision (*De visione
beatifica*), on the nature of Christ's body after the crucifixion
(*De corpore Christi mortuo*), on the nature of glorified
bodies (*De dotibus corporum gloriosorum),* on spiritual
substances and the resurrection (*De substantiis spiritualibus et
corporibus futurae resurrectionis*).




His philosophical writings, allowing that some may be classified also
as scientific works, include: *De habitibus*, *De ente et
essentia*, *De magis et minus*, *De natura
contrariorum*, *De cognitione entium separatorum et maxime
animarum separatarum*, *De intelligentiis et motoribus
caelorum*, *De corporibus caelestibus quoad naturam eorum
corporalem*, *De animatione caeli*, *De
accidentibus*, *De quiditatibus entium*, *De origine
rerum praedicamentalium*, *De mensuris*, *De natura et
proprietate continuorum*, and the *De intellectu et
intelligibili*.




Dietrich's scientific treatises are famous. His treatises on light
(*De luce*), on color (*De coloribus*), and on the
rainbow (*De iride*) contributed greatly to the development of
optics and were composed in the scientific spirit of Albertus Magnus.
Fr. William A. Wallace in his *The Scientific Methodology of
Theodoric of Freiberg*, one of the few studies of Dietrich in
English, demonstrates the dependence of Dietrich's scientific
methodology on his philosophical theories, and particularly his
logical writings. This dependence reveals the Albertist tendency in
Dietrich, leaving no doubt that in some way he was influenced by the
writings and spirit of Albert the Great.




It is important in the consideration of any of Dietrich of Freiberg's
writings to remember that he was the kind of philosopher who
constructed his various works from a metaphysical point of view,
whether they were scientific studies on light or theological treatises
on the beatific vision. For care and attention to developing a correct
account of the nature of being, he tells us, will allow the
philosopher to avoid many errors. The concept of being (*ens*),
he notes, is the most fundamental of notions, distinguishing a thing
from nothingness. Indeed, one can find many places in his writings
where an important philosophical point or crucial distinction hinges
on what Dietrich understands to be the correct notion of being, or
essence, or quiddity. It is best then to begin the development of an
account of Dietrich as a philosopher by attending to his
metaphysics.




Fortunately Dietrich concentrated his analysis of the key concepts of
his metaphysics in two relatively short treatises, *De ente et
essentia* and *De quiditatibus entium*. As a result it is
not necessary to reconstruct his metaphysics by searching for the
metaphysical presuppositions of the entire body of his philosophical
writings, as is often the case with other philosophical writers. In
fact one of the characteristics of Dietrich as a thinker is the
systematic way in which he not only orders his thoughts but his
treatises as well. And so we need only consider these two works in
order to discover his particular view of being, essence and quiddity
that specifies his philosophical thinking.


## 3. Existence and Essence




Dietrich's *De ente et essentia* which bears the same title as
Thomas Aquinas' opuscule is indeed a work that gives much evidence of
having been prepared as a kind of rebuttal to certain doctrines of
Aquinas. Both works open with a reference from Aristotle to the effect
that care and caution must be taken early in the study of metaphysics
with regard to fundamental notions. In fact Dietrich divides his
treatise into two parts, devoting the first part to an analysis of the
key metaphysical terms *esse*, *ens*, *entitas*,
*quid*, and *quiditas*. In opposition to Aquinas he
proposes the thesis that there is no real distinction between
existence (*esse*) and essence (*essentia*). The
existence of a thing expresses its essence and vice versa. The two
notions differ only in the way they denote the thing of which they are
predicated (*in modis significandi*)--existence expressing
being in the mode of an act, essence in the mode of a possession and
the term of an act.




The second part of the *De ente et essentia* proposes
arguments, mainly based on Aquinas that deny the identity of essence
and existence. Dietrich refutes each one of these arguments. The
principal argument from Aquinas that Dietrich refutes is based on the
premise that it is possible to understand what something is without
knowing that it exists. Thus it follows according to Aquinas that
*esse* is not included in the understanding of a thing's
*essentia*, and therefore must be distinct from it. Dietrich
responds to this argument by challenging its premise. An essence is
such only because it refers to an existent. That this is so is seen
from the very etymology of the word "essence" as accounted
for by St. Augustine who argued that "*essentia*"
is derived from "*esse*". But the issue that lies
between Dietrich and his confrere is not one of words but of
principles. Armand Maurer, in his important article "The De
Quidditatibus Entium of Dietrich of Freiberg and its Criticism of
Thomistic Metaphysics", sums the matter up well when he
observes:



> 
> 
> For St. Thomas, essence is a principle in created being other than
> esse and receptive of it. As potential to, and receptive of esse,
> essence is thus a principle through which and in which a thing exists.
> Not so for Dietrich. Essence, in his view, is not subject to an influx
> of esse. It is the very beingness of the thing, and hence that through
> which it may be said to be outside of nothingness.
> 
> 




Dietrich correlates his thesis of the real identity of existence and
essence with his concept of being, both in its concrete form as ens or
particular being and its abstract form as *entitas*.
*Ens* denotes the essence of whatever is a determinate existing
individual, while *entitas* denotes the same thing in
abstraction. *Ens* is the most basic of all metaphysical
concepts for Dietrich. It is that which first distinguishes a thing
from nothingness. Both *ens* and *entitas* identify with
essence. So one could say according to Dietrich that in considering a
white ball for example, its *ens* is white, its
*entitas* is whiteness, and its essence is that through which
it is white and participates in whiteness.


## 4. *Quid* and Quiddity




Dietrich's account of *quid* and *quiditas* is more
limited. He takes up these concepts in his *De quiditatibus
entium*. Where *ens*, *entitas*, *esse*, and
*essentia* are all existential terms answering the question
whether something exists, in the *De quiditatibus* he considers
the question "What is it that exists?" He begins the
treatise by distinguishing *quid* and *quiditas* from
the existential terms, and then proceeds to consider the differences
with respect to being in substance, in logical concepts or intentions,
and in accidents. Again, unlike Aquinas who equated *essentia*
and *quiditas*, Dietrich sees these metaphysical concepts are
being different, but not totally unrelated.And while Aquinas accepts
the separability of accidents, Dietrich rejects the notion.




The analysis which *De quiditatibus* provides is subtle. The
term "*quid*" denotes the essential mode of the
being of a thing, that is, the mode of being by which it exists as a
being of a certain kind. It answers the question "What is
it?" On the other hand, *quiditas* denotes the formality
by means of which a thing is a quid. It is tempting to see a
connection here between *ens*, *entitas* and
*quid*, *quiditas* such that the second is the condition
of the first. This may lead unwary reasoners, as Dietrich no doubt
felt Thomas Aquinas and others were, into equating *entitas*
and *quiditas*. But *quiditas* denotes the formal
determination of a thing. This is something over and above the being
of the thing. It is a form, the form of a thing. But it is not the
same as the thing. Hence it cannot be equated with either the
*ens* or the *entitas* of the thing. Of course quiddity
presupposes *ens* and *esse*; without its existence
there could be no determination of a thing.




According to Dietrich quiddity is properly defined as the formal
determination of a being, giving it its specific intrinsic character
by means of which it can also be known. Strictly speaking, therefore,
quiddity is found only in composite beings since it implies a formal
aspect of a being. Unlike Aquinas Dietrich will not allow quiddity to
designate the whole composite, even if the designation is understood
to be abstract. Strictly speaking, therefore, quiddity is not applied
to simple beings. Maurer suggests that the reason for this is
Dietrich's adhering closely to Aristotle who in the seventh book of
the *Metaphysics* maintains that predication with respect to
quiddity must be of another thing, hence of a composite, because it
answers the question why "this" of "that"?
There must be a "that" in order meaningfully to ask the
question "why this?" In everything having a quiddity it is
thus necessary that there be a distinction between the quiddity and
that which possesses the quiddity.




One consequence of Dietrich's metaphysics of quiddity is that God and
what the medievals call the "intelligences" do not have
quiddities since they are simple beings. Aquinas on the other hand
insisted that for God *essentia*, *esse* and
*quiditas* are identical while for all creatures the
*esse* is other than the quiddity or the essence. Indeed, this
is how Aquinas distinguishes a creature from the creator. The essence
of the creator alone is the same as his act of existing. But, besides
the arguments Dietrich has raised against Thomas concerning the lack
of such identity in creatures Dietrich finds that Aquinas' system
fails to properly account for intelligences because as simple beings
there is nothing that distinguishes their essence from their act of
existing--nothing except their being creatures. But to introduce
creaturehood as the distinguishing feature is to render useless the
importance of defining creatures in terms of the lack of identity of
their essence and their act of existing. This is not a problem for
Dietrich. For him some creatures are composite, some not, but in both
simple and composite beings *esse* is the same as
*essentia*. What remains problematic is the distinction of
simple and composite creatures in terms of quiddity. To solve this
problem Dietrich turns to the traditional Christian Neoplatonic notion
of the hierarchy of being.


## 5. The Universe of Being




Dietrich did not devote any one specific work to an analysis of
hierarchy. However, he makes extensive use of the notion in three
treatises in particular: *the De animatione caeli*, the *De
visione beatifica*, and the *De intellectu et
intelligibili*. It is clear from reading these works as well as
Dietrich's other scientific and philosophical writings in which he
established the nature of the metaphysical elements of *esse*,
*ens*, *entia*, and *quiditas* that he concerned
himself with what might be called the metaphysical structure of
reality.




A consideration that is an ever occurring theme in Dietrich is the
unity of being, both created and uncreated, a unity he expressed in
the term *universitas entium*, or universe of being. Dietrich
does not tell us why he chooses the term *universitas* over the
more common term *universum*. *Universitas* of course
can mean "universality" so that *universitas
entium* would mean the universality of being. But from the
contexts in which Dietrich uses the terms such a meaning does not seem
to be implied. Of course the term was used in the Middle Ages, just as
it is today, to refer to an institution of higher learning, a
university. Such an institution traditionally has the goal of turning
(from the Latin *versus*) all the disciplines toward one thing
or one state (*unum* meaning one), which is wisdom. But to
render *universitas entium* as university of beings with its
heuristic connotation would have an odd or confusing connotation. But
the term *universitas* can also mean a whole community or a
commonality of things. This is very close to the modern term universe
and it seems to fit the context of Dietrich's own usage. Consequently,
we have rendered Dietrich's term as universe of beings.




But why did Dietrich insist on this particular term? It is interesting
to notice that the term is not found in the works of St. Thomas
Aquinas. Perhaps Dietrich wanted to emphasize that the universe as he
understood it included all beings, even the divine being. For Aquinas,
*universum* was synonymous with *creatura*, there being
a radical difference between creative being and created being, a
distinction that Aquinas highlights by equating the totality of
created being with the universe. Dietrich, however, does not do
this. He wishes to emphasize the unity of being, created and
uncreated. There is thus a community, or if you will, a university of
being. And so he most likely used this term *universitas* to
express this community of being.


## 6. The Distinction between God and Creatures




How then does Dietrich distinguish God from creature? We have already
seen that according to his basic metaphysics Dietrich insists on the
equation of existence and essence for all beings. The Thomistic
distinction of essence and existence will not be permitted. Nor does
Dietrich wish to distinguish God from creatures by postulating a
theory of universal hylomorphism, which is the view that all
creatures, even spiritual ones, are marked as creatures by the
possession of some form of materiality. Spiritual creatures, Dietrich
argues in a question devoted to this topic, possess no form of
materiality. How then do we distinguish uncreated being from created
being and the various forms of created being? The answer involves a
reference to their essential relations to each other in the universe
of beings, that is by the essential place they occupy in the chain of
beings in which every being is essentially ordered to some other being
as either its cause or its effect. God is at the top of this
chain. "God," Dietrich tells us in the first part of
*De intellectu* *et intelligibili*, "means that
than which nothing is superior, which stands in need of nothing with
respect to either being or operation." All other beings are
ordered under God and to each other in an essential ordering. This is
what Dietrich means by place. He does not mean some accidental
relation like being to the left or to the right of something--a
relation that can change without changing the nature of the being
enjoying the relation. Hierarchical location for Dietrich is
essential. It might be referred to as the dignity of beings, denoting
the unique set of relations a being occupies. We can see this concept
of place or dignity in the definition of God mentioned above: God
means that than which nothing is superior. This description uniquely
defines his place in the hierarchy of being. Following an ancient
tradition Dietrich also tells us that God is called unity and is the
first cause because he is beyond all human language to describe. In
other words Dietrich identifies God with the ineffable One that he
found mentioned in the *Liber de causis*. But even this
ineffability defines God's place with respect to the universe of
beings.




Of course the simplest answer to the question of how God is
distinguished from the rest of the universe of beings is in terms of
God's being its creator. Dietrich is careful to preserve the
philosophical intention of his exposition when he refers to the
creative nature of God within the context of Proclean
Neoplatonism. God as the One, he says, exhibits an interior
overflowing (*interior transfusio*). "By means of this
super-blessed nature (*superbenedicta natura*) he overflows
through his own fecundity beyond himself into the whole of being,
establishing it out of nothing through creation and governance."
The whole of being then is created out of nothing by God. Dietrich is
careful not to say the universe of being because he then would leave
himself open to the theological error of implying that God's being is
created, albeit self-created. Furthermore, by introducing creation
into his hierarchy with respect to the One he avoids the charge of
pantheism that so often plagued earlier Christian Neoplatonists such
as Scotus Eriugena. Dietrich was perfectly capable of identifying God
and his creatures as he does in his treatise on measurement, the
*De mensuris*, where he writes, "...all things
insofar as they are in him are God himself and he for his part is in a
certain way all things..." But he is quick to point out to
the reader that the way God is all things is in the mode of an
essential cause (*per modum causae essentialis*), meaning that
whatever is in the effect, even the being of the effect, is in the
cause in a more eminent mode. Dietrich explains this principle in the
second part of *De intellectu* when he tells us that
"... an agent as an agent can contain in itself its own act
or what is caused by it not only virtually, but also essentially,
insofar as it is the same as its effect, but with a distinct existence
(*aliud esse*)." Thus God and creatures do not enjoy the
same being. God's being is not created, but creative. And this
property is unique to God. No creatures can create because as a
creature it has a non-creative being which is different from God's
being, an *aliud esse*.




Some creatures have the capacity to produce things, but this is not
the same as the power of creation. Here Dietrich is following a
distinction he finds in the *Liber de causis*, where creation
is understood as the bestowal of being while production is taken to be
a formative causality proper to creatures. The ability to produce or
reproduce things is vital to Dietrich's metaphysics of the intellect.
For in the order of things intellect comes immediately after God and
is a mirror of divine omnipotence insofar as it is the universe of
beings in the order of knowing; as God can create the totality of
beings, the intellect can reflect or reproduce this totality,
including God himself, as ideas.


## 7. The Hierarchy of Being




Dietrich of Freiberg thus presents us with a bifurcated universe of
beings, but one that is nonetheless a hierarchy of beings. For he
describes in the very opening words of his *De visione
beatifica* the traditional hierarchy of the Christian Middle Ages,
even invoking the great authority of Dionysius the Areopagite:



> 
> 
> We have it from Saint Dionysius that the universe of beings is
> divided into the highest, the middle, and the lowest with respect to
> the disposition of its order; its tripart division being capable of
> even greater distinction in relation to the most general modes and
> grades of beings. Thus in each of these three divisions there is
> clearly found a higher, a middle, and a lower. This does not go on to
> infinity, but must reach its limit at two extremes, at something
> highest on the one hand and something lowest on the other. On these
> depend the grade and order of all the things located between the two
> according to the proximity to or distance from these extremes.
> 
> 




R.D. Tetreau calls attention to the fact that the invocation of
the Ps-Dionysius is vague and somewhat deceptive. He notes that no
specific text of Dionysius is cited. Furthermore the great Church
Father is not mentioned again throughout the rest of the treatise and
is not cited at all in the *De intellectu* and the *De
animatione caeli*. E. Krebs in his study, *Meister Dietrich:
Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft*, notices that in the
*De animatione caeli* Dietrich cites Boethius in establishing
the procession of beings that marks his hierarchy. Dietrich, he
argues, identifies himself with a particular school of Neoplatonists
which sees the One as the ultimate and final principle of not only
hierarchy but of created being itself. This school includes Proclus
and the author or authors of the *Liber de causis*.




Dietrich develops a particular version of the hierarchy of being based
on this Neoplatonic One. By identifying the One of Proclus'
*Elements of Theology* with the creative God of Christian
theology he introduces a dynamic element into the hierarchy of being
whereby God brings beings into existence out of nothing and marks them
with a resemblance or similitude to himself. The universe is thus like
God and each productive being in its hierarchically ordered series of
causes is also like God. Dietrich specifically cites propositions 146
and 147 of Proclus which emphasize the role of similitude in
this hierarchy:



> 
> 
> Prop. 146: In the procession of all divine things the ends are
> assimilated to their beginnings, sustaining a circle without beginning
> and without end by turning to the beginning.
> 
> 
> 
> Prop. 147: The highest of all the divine orders are assimilated to the
> last of those positioned above them
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Comment to Prop. 147: For if there must be continuity of the divine
> procession and each order must be connected by the proper middle terms,
> it is necessary that the highest terms of the secondary ranks be joined
> to the last terms of the first ranks. Conjunction, however, occurs
> through likeness. Thus likeness occurs between the first of the lower
> ranks and the last of the higher ranks.
> 
> 
> 




Proposition 146 makes it clear that at each stage of the hierarchy of
being the effect is like the cause just as each creature is like
God. Furthermore, just as there is a built-in bias, as if were, of an
effect in relation to its cause in terms of a "turning" to
its principle, so all creatures have a bias to return to the source or
principle of their being. Proposition 147, along with its comment,
assures Dietrich that his hierarchy is continuous and that this
continuity is due solely to the likenesses that exist between the
ranks of being. But in addition to assimilating the Proclean doctrine
of similitude in order to secure continuity of being, Dietrich
introduces his own astonishing principle of linkage in the *De
intellectu*. There he identifies the operation of a creature with
its end. "This operation," he tells us, "is the end
of the thing, for the sake of which the thing exists." Then he
goes on to reveal how he conceives this operation to link one being
with another: "By means of this operation a thing tends beyond
itself. It is due to this operation that there is found in each thing
not only being and truth, but also goodness. Thus each thing is
interchangeably being, true, and good. Consequently, it is a being
with respect to itself, true as ordered to the intellect, and good
insofar as it actively overflows into something beyond itself."
This is a remarkable view of operation and end. The operation of a
creature always lies in moving beyond itself and this is its end or
purpose. Nothing is static in Dietrich's universe, everything is
moving, attempting to return to its initial principle. Creatures do
not have their end in themselves; everything is for the sake of
something else and that something else is ultimately God. Insofar as
a creature follows its proper operation it will be led out of itself
and back to God.




There is something worth pausing and reflecting about here; the
natural means of salvation, if you will, are built right into the very
structure of things. The *opus restaurationis* is located
within the *opus conditionis*. While it initially sounds odd to
say that a thing's operation is its end, the oddness disappears as
soon as one realizes that all operations are ultimately reditive. And
as such they must lead a being beyond itself. One could put it another
way by saying that for Dietrich the proper operation of every creature
is to return to God. Dietrich's use of the Augustinian triad of being,
truth and goodness confirms this. A thing's being gives it
self-reference and dignity with respect to the hierarchy of being. Its
truth gives it reference to intellect, thus opening it up to what
Dietrich calls *ens conceptionale*, being as conceived by the
intellect, which in its own way reflects the universe of beings. But
in its goodness, a thing is like God, overflowing into another,
imparting itself to those below it in an act which might be called a
cooperation with the redemption of all things.




Similitude thus gives a dynamic structure to the entire hierarchy of
being and at the same time acts as the essential link between the
intellect and the rest of the hierarchy. It is thus at one and the
same time a principle of being and a principle of knowing. But the
similitude to the whole of being is not something that the intellect
acquires by some effort on its own part; rather, such similitude is
part of the very nature of intellect. "One should
consider," Dietrich remarks in the *De intellectu*,
"that every intellect is a likeness of the whole of being, or of
being as being, and it is such by reason of its essence."


## 8. The Procession and Reversion of Beings




In distinguishing the various kinds of beings that constitute the
hierarchical universe, Dietrich again follows Proclus. First there is
God, Proclus' One, followed by the intelligences, then souls and
finally bodies. Using material found in Proclus, the *Liber de
causis*, and Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, Dietrich explains
the order of the procession of these four kinds of beings as follows:
From God there proceeds that which is called the first
intelligence. Here the first stage in the procession has been reached
and a kind of rank is established which corresponds to the traditional
*nous* of classical Neoplatonism. From the first
intelligence the second intelligence flows forth along with the soul
of the first celestial sphere and the first celestial sphere
itself. This is the second stage. Then the process is repeated with
the procession of the third intelligence, the soul of the second
heaven, the second heaven itself, on down through all the celestial
worlds until the intelligence and soul of the lowest heaven and the
lowest heaven itself is reached. This intelligence, Dietrich informs
us, causes the substance of the sublunary beings that undergo
generation and corruption, that is, bodies. Thus all four kinds of
beings are accounted for and are ordered according to their place in
the celestial procession.




The entire universe of beings is thus in a state of active procession
of all creatures from God. Each of the four orders of being is in a
dynamic state, even God when viewed as the creator. God exhibits a
"certain interior relational overflowing" which of course
is his creativity. He establishes the rest of the universe of being
out of nothing, Dietrich tells us. And at the lowest rank of the order
of beings, at the level of bodies there is also a dynamic at work. For
bodies in their natural desire for form are in the process of
returning to their source. Consequently there is a hierarchical
principle at work that consists in God who is an eternal outpouring
who, being the source of all emanation, has no need to return, bodies
that are only in the state of return but have nothing further into
which they can proceed, and intellects and souls that are both in the
state of procession and reversion, since they both receive being and
pass it on to those below.




Dietrich seems to suggest that reditive activity is not found in
God. He says that all things are turned back to God, but he does not
say that God in any way turns back upon himself. One should remember,
however, that by restricting himself to giving a purely philosophical
account of the nature of being and the universe Dietrich was not free
to speculate theologically about whether *exitus* or
*reditus* had any role to play in the life of the
Trinity. That Dietrich is very close to making the commonplace
identity of the second hypostasis, the first intelligence, with the
Second Person of the Blessed Trinity is hinted at when he talks about
intellect and desire being the principles of return. Quoting directly
from Proclus he remarks that what is desirable to all things is
intellect and that all things proceed from intellect as well as return
through it. But he restrains himself from making any theological
identity. It is clear, however, that love marks all the ranks of the
hierarchy, every member of which is driven to return to its source by
desire for intellect. Tacitly he has left the door open for the
interpretation that the God who is love as reported in Sacred
Scripture has left the mark of that love in the universe of beings and
that intellect (often identified by the earlier Christian
Neoplatonists with the Second Person of the Trinity) is the crucial
agent in both the unfolding and retrieval of being.


## 9. Conceptional Being




The tie between the intellect and the rest of Dietrich's universe is
thus very close. This explains why the treatise on the intellect and
the intelligibles is of such importance in understanding his
metaphysics and cosmology. The identity of *ens reale* and
*ens conceptionale* is essential to the very nature of things
as Dietrich understands them. Dietrich tells us in the *De visione
beatifica*, that the distinction between conceptional and real
being is the first division of being. Furthermore, conceptional being
includes for Dietrich not just the objects of the intellectual act but
the act itself. This act is not simply a reception or a reproduction
in some fashion of an object coming to it from outside, but is what
might be called semi-creative, that is, the act of the intellect is
the act of conceiving its object. Intellectual conception is analogous
to the conception of offspring by living things in the sense that a
new reality is brought into being. Of course the intellective act is
also reproductive, it does establish a mirror of external reality (the
meaning of *ens reale* for Dietrich). Tetreau points out
that *ens conceptionale* is really coextensive with the
universe of beings because it exemplifies in itself all the modes of
natural being. That is, intellect exhibits the distinctions of act and
potency, oneness and multiplicity, cause and effect and so
on. Furthermore, *ens conceptionale* forms a conceptional
hierarchy of its own, a hierarchy which mirrors the greater one and at
the same time causes and participates in it. At the bottom of this
conceptional order are the external senses, followed by the interior
senses, the discursive power, the possible intellect, and finally the
agent intellect at the very top.




The procession of creatures in the order of conceptional reality moves
through three modes of being (specific character, ideal form, and
image) culminating in beings that are specific in character, and are
images, but without the proper character of individuation. These are
the intelligences. They proceed from God as an image of God and
constitute the very flower of the universe. The agent intellect of
man, Dietrich tells us, belongs to this mode of being. The various
modes of being within the entire hierarchy of being as well as the
three kinds of beings subordinate to the first being all bear a
likeness to God; indeed, intellect, the very apex of the universe, is
an image of God. But the various members of Dietrich's hierarchy of
being are also bound together into a universe of beings by the
similitude they bear to each other. This similitude, however, is the
result of the essential order of causation, according to which every
being in the universe of beings is ordered to every other being either
as cause or effect. Thus the totality of beings are bound together
making up a universe where every creature bears a relation of
similitude to every other creature and to the primary unifying
principle from which they emanate, God.




God's power of emanation, which is creative, although simple in its
origins and principle, is complex in its effects. Divine emanation
gives rise to the vast complexity of both *ens reale* and
*ens conceptionale*. We have already seen that Dietrich viewed
this vast complexity as itself a likeness to God--the world in
all of its wonderful complexity revealed something of God to a mind
willing to inquire into it. It gives glory to God in its very
complexity. Perhaps Dietrich's metaphysical vision of the universe
explains his keen interest in science, an interest that led him to
write treatises summing up his research into light and color and into
the material elements of the universe. All these things revealed
something of the first cause to him. There was no chasm between his
metaphysics and his science. The link between the two is perhaps
discovered in his theory of mind. For it is mind that is most like
God. And thus, just as God as first cause is the source of a creative
emanation so is the intellect.




Intellect gives rise to an order of emanation that is just as vast as
that of the creative emanation of God in the order of real beings. In
fact intellect mirrors this order perfectly. It is itself identified
with the universe of beings. Furthermore, it is like God's creativity
in that it does not depend upon a pre-existing material substratum
from which ideas are formed by abstraction. But it does depend upon
God having made it the kind of being that in the order of
understanding, the *ens conceptionale*, is able to
"conceive" being. For no other being except God can do
this.


## 10. Intellect




So intellect in its similitude to divine creation possesses an
emanative activity. But in its unlikeness to God and its dependence
upon him it is a confined or restricted emanation. Dietrich calls this
*emanatio simplex* and he claims that it constitutes an analogy
to the creative emanation of God. Intellect is obviously a crucial
aspect of Dietrich's metaphysics. It would be well then to say
something about his view of intellect in general before turning
specifically to an analysis of his *De intellectu*.




In the realm of intellects, Dietrich tells us, we discover a fourfold
order in which intellectual reality stands: at the top of this order
is found what Dietrich calls intellects existing through their
essence, followed by intelligent spiritual substances that are called
angels, and then species and finally the individual realities included
in species that are known to mind. There are three kinds of intellects
that exist through their essence: the separated intelligences,
celestial bodies, and human intellects.




Intellects possess unique attributes according to Dietrich. We have
already remarked on one of these: their likeness to God and to the
universe of beings--a property shared by no other creatures. We have
seen that intellect is like God in that it is what we have called
semi-creative or conceptional. In what way, however, can intellect be
the likeness of the universe of beings, and to such a degree that it
becomes identified with it so that we can say that the intellect is
the universe of beings in the order of *ens conceptionale*? One
could answer of course by saying that the intellect is this likeness
by its very act of knowing the universe of beings. But there is a
difficulty here--one that Dietrich is well aware of from studying
Aristotle. For the question how the intellect knows the universe of
beings is like the question how the eye can see colors. If the eye
were any one particular color, then it would see only that
color. Aristotle, who raises this question, replies that the eye must
be colorless so it can see every color. Likewise for the mind or
intellect. Thus it is wrong to say that the intellect is the likeness
of the universe of beings by its very act of knowing the universe of
beings because the very reverse is true. The intellect is no one of
the beings it knows. It is truly the universe of beings, but in the
conceptional order. Thus it can be like the universe of beings in the
so-called real order. Its nature then must be general and
universal. Noting its object provides evidence for this:



> 
> 
> The intellect is a general and universal nature in accord with the
> property of its intellectual essence, which is not determined to
> understand only this or that thing. This is clear from its object,
> which is not this or that quiddity, but universally any quiddity and
> being as being, that is, whatever possesses the character of
> being.
> 
> 




One should notice that Dietrich does not raise a question which may
appear obvious: if the intellect is not identified with any one being,
is it proper to call it a being at all? Nor does he formally consider
the hypothesis that Meister Eckhart advanced in his *Quaestiones
parisienses*, namely that intellect might belong to a different
order than being. But, of course, this is just where the answer lies.
The intellect belongs to a different order of reality than being. In
effect, Dietrich's categories of *ens reale* and *ens
conceptionale* imply as much. In fact, the way Dietrich uses the
notion of *ens conceptionale* as a superior mode of reality is
exactly the position Eckhart takes.


## 11. The Resplendence of the Intellect




Due to its superiority and to the fact that it is no being, the
intellect is resplendent with the universe of beings. "All
beings shine forth (*resplendent*) in its essence," he
says. One must be careful here, however, not to misunderstand what
Dietrich means by beings "shining forth". He is not
advocating a doctrine of divine illumination of the intellect. To be
sure this phrase might be rendered "All beings are
intellectually illuminated in its essence," and then interpreted
to mean that Dietrich holds some doctrine of divine illumination for
the intellect. When Albertus Magnus refers to resplendence it is
usually safe to construe what he says in terms of some form of divine
illumination. But this will not do for Dietrich of Freiberg. He simply
does not hold a doctrine of illumination--at least not in the sense
that Albert or other earlier medieval philosophers did. Martin
Grabmann made the observation many years ago that the doctrine of
divine illumination was used less and less as the 13th Century drew to
a close. Dietrich shows evidence of disavowing the doctrine in his
philosophical study of the intellect and its normal operations. In the
passage mentioned above we have to clearly understand that Dietrich is
trying to say that the intellect reflects all things--they shine
forth in it, not because the intellect is undergoing an act of divine
illumination, but because in the order of *ens conceptionale*
the things are in the intellect first as conceptions and are
exemplified there as part of the nature of intellect. The conclusion
that Dietrich wishes to draw is that the intellect, being always in
act through its essence, contains in itself the whole universe of
beings, which shine forth from it into the cosmos.




Dietrich makes a very interesting and important application of this
doctrine of the resplendence of the intellect. Man, according to
Dietrich, is cut off from his own intellect. He does not explain why
this is, but no doubt it involves the theological doctrine of the
fall. He does say, however, that man is not fully joined to his
intellect, an intellect that is always in act and resplendent with the
universe of beings. Were he to be fully joined to his intellect, were
the intellect to become man's form, then man would understand
everything all at once. This, Dietrich suggests, is exactly what
happened in the famous vision of St. Benedict in which he saw the
whole universe.


## 12. Empirical and Transempirical Consciousness




Does the disassociation of man from his intellect mean that human
beings have knowledge of which they are unaware? How is this possible
given that the intellect has the property of consciousness? After all,
it does not make any sense to say that one knows something of which he
is totally unaware. And yet this is precisely what Dietrich claims.
Burkhard Mojsisch draws attention to the fact that in identifying the
agent intellect with the *abditum mentis* (the hiddenness of
the mind) of St. Augustine Dietrich establishes a distinction between
what Mojsisch calls "transempirical consciousness" and
empirical consciousness. Mojsisch argues that Dietrich held such a
position because it is the agent intellect itself that grounds
empirical consciousness. Since empirical consciousness is the function
of the possible intellect according to Dietrich, and since in his
Neoplatonic hierarchy the agent intellect being the cause of the
possible intellect must be superior to it, it follows that empirical
consciousness is due to the causal action of the agent
intellect. Although this is not the place to pursue a detailed
philosophical analysis of Dietrich's theory, it should be
pointed out that his position fits the facts of common sense and is
concordant with some contemporary theories of mind. We surely maintain
that we know things that we are unaware of when we are, for example,
asleep or simply not thinking of them at the moment but could recall
them from memory. Peter Geach in his book *Mental Acts*
develops an analysis of concepts as capacities that are exercised or
consciously manifest themselves in acts of judgment. And capacities,
one could argue, need not be continuously exercised to be
capacities. Thus it is with regard to Dietrich's theory of the
agent intellect; it need not always and everywhere be completely
operative upon the possible intellect. Indeed, it can remain a
"hiddenness of the mind" for the entirety of a
person's life and still be a reality about the person. Anyone
who has ever had the dubious privilege of teaching in a modern
university knows this to be a truism that borders on the obvious.


## 13. The Agent Intellect and the Soul




Dietrich's account of the relationship of consciousness to the agent
intellect in terms of causation raises another question for his theory
of intellect, namely, what kind of causal relationship exists between
the agent intellect and the soul? Dietrich gives a very precise answer
to this question based no doubt on his acceptance of Proclus'
exposition of the principles of generation within the hierarchy of
being. The agent intellect, according to this explanation, is the
intrinsic efficient cause of the soul. That it cannot be the material
cause Dietrich thinks is self-evident. It cannot be the final cause
since a final cause perfects a thing, but does not establish it in
being, which is what the agent intellect does for the soul. But it is
more important to understand, Dietrich insists, that the agent
intellect cannot be the formal cause of the soul--at least not in the
natural order of things. He argues that if it was the formal cause of
the soul, given that the soul by definition is the formal cause of the
human person, then it would follow that there would be a form of a
form in the same genus, man. But this is contrary to the natural order
of things because whatever is the form of something in the genus of
substance is by the whole of itself the act of its subject. Thus the
same thing cannot be in potency to more than one form in its genus.
Perhaps we can understand Dietrich's remarks about the vision of St.
Benedict mentioned above in terms of this analysis. Man is not
"fully joined" to his intellect in the sense that the
intellect is not his form. If it were his form, he, like Benedict,
would understand the entire universe of beings in a single mental
act. But such a vision belongs to the order of grace, not to the order
of natural providence.




The soul of man, then, living in time, only participates in its agent
intellect. It acquires the universe of beings only piecemeal as it
were. More and more with each act of understanding it approaches the
understanding of the universe of beings, a universe that is its
universe, which it possesses as a capacity of its own nature.


## 14. The Separation of the Intellect




The causal relationship that the agent intellect enjoys with respect
to the soul of man raises one last question for Dietrich: to what
extent if any is the intellect separated in its existence from man?
This question of course had been debated in the schools by the
generation of scholars that immediately preceded Dietrich. But it was
still a question that attracted attention in his own day. There were
philosophers then, as there probably always will be, who wanted to
argue that the intellect was a function of the soul, having no
existence outside of the soul. Dietrich, however, basing his position
squarely upon an old Augustinian tradition, argued just the opposite.
Separation is a characteristic of intellect as such, and in man it is
identified with the "interiority" which Augustine claimed
was not joined to the body as its form. Tetreau points out that
Dietrich never attempts to prove his doctrine of separation, but
assumes it on the basis of a passage in Aristotle's *De
anima* (III, 5, 430a17-18) where Aristotle claims that mind
and its act of thought cannot be subjected to temporality. This,
however, is not exactly accurate. It has already been shown that
Dietrich has in mind Augustine's notion of a separate
interiority in man that he identifies with his agent intellect. But
the fact that Dietrich does not offer a proof for his doctrine is not
due to his appeal to the authority of Aristotle and Augustine. Rather,
as Mojsisch shows, the separation of the intellect is due to its
essential intellectuality. Since Dietrich claims that the agent
intellect is intellect through its own essence, he need not
demonstrate its property of separateness when it acts as efficient
cause of the human soul. Separateness is a property of its essential
intellectuality.


## 15. Conclusion




On the basis of the survey of Dietrich of Freiberg just given one
might surmise that his philosophy in general is consummated in his
doctrine of intellect. Such a conclusion, however, would not be
strictly correct. Although Krebs in his study of Dietrich concludes
that the theory of the intellect was the culmination of his entire
philosophical project, William Wallace has shown that Dietrich's
qualitative methodology, especially as applied in his optical studies,
is a valuable contribution to scientific methodology, a fact that can
be appreciated independently of his theory of the intellect. It is
also possible to argue that his contribution to the discussion
concerning the metaphysical status of essence and existence in
creatures can be understood without reference to his analysis of
intellect. And yet one would not wish to undervalue the importance of
Dietrich's doctrine of mind not only in terms of his own philosophical
enterprise but also in terms of its influence on the later course of
medieval German philosophy, beginning with Meister Eckhart and ending
with Nicholas Cusanus.




Kurt Flasch attempts to put Dietrich's contributions to the philosophy
of mind in its proper perspective. To see what Dietrich has
accomplished we must try to understand how he introduces a new element
into medieval scholastic speculations concerning mind. To begin with,
Flasch notes, Dietrich's distinction between *ens reale* and
*ens conceptionale* replaces the old scholastic distinction
between *ens naturae* and *ens rationis* in such a way
that it is no longer possible to claim that being as found in the mind
is dependent upon extra-mental reality. Where Thomas Aquinas claimed
an exclusive distinction between the two categories of being, Dietrich
with his doctrine of coextentionality insists on an inclusive
distinction. The result of this new perspective on the priority of
*ens conceptionale*, Flasch argues, not only grounds a new
metaphysics but also establishes a new methodology for studying nature
based upon an inclusive understanding of natural being. Looked at in
this way Dietrich's theory of mind can indeed be seen as the
culmination of his philosophy.