## 1. Introduction


The phenomenal intentionality theory is a theory of
intentionality, the "aboutness" of mental states, on which phenomenal consciousness plays a central role in accounting for intentional states. Unlike many other contemporary theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of causal relations, information, functional roles, or other "naturalistic" ingredients, the phenomenal intentionality theory's main ingredient is phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or "what it's like" (Nagel 1974) aspect
of mental life. Accordingly, Pautz (2013) describes the general approach as taking a
"consciousness first" approach to intentionality, since it claims that consciousness either grounds or is explanatorily prior to intentionality, and Kriegel (2011a, 2013a) describes the approach as one
on which consciousness is the "source" of intentionality. (These ways of characterizing the phenomenal intentionality theory suggest a reductive picture, on which intentionality is reduced to or explained in terms of consciousness,
but in section 2.3 we will see that some versions of the phenomenal intentionality theory are not reductive.)




By explaining intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, the phenomenal intentionality theory challenges the received view of the past few decades that the mind divides into two
mutually exclusive and independent types of states: intentional states
and phenomenal states (see Kim 1998 for a clear articulation of the
received view). According to the phenomenal intentionality theory, intentional states and phenomenal
states are intimately related. Some intentional states are constituted by phenomenal states, and the rest are in some way importantly related to phenomenal states.



Phenomenal intentionality has been discussed under that label only
recently (see, e.g., Horgan and Tienson 2002 and Loar 2003, and related
influential work by Searle, Siewert, and others), but many modern
philosophers have suggested a close relation between thought, which is
characteristically intentional, and perception, which is
characteristically phenomenal, or consciousness itself. For example, rationalists
such as Descartes held that all cognition is conscious, while empiricists such as Hume and Locke held that all cognition is grounded in perceptual experience. Later, Brentano, Husserl and the phenomenologists that they influenced conceived of intentionality
primarily as a conscious phenomenon. Like the phenomenal intentionality theory, the views of these figures can
be understood as taking a "consciousness first" approach. For more on the history of the phenomenal intentionality theory, see Kriegel (2013a) and the entry Consciousness and Intentionality.
 



In this article we describe various versions of the phenomenal intentionality theory, their
motivations, the challenges they face, and their relations to other views.


## 2. The phenomenal intentionality theory


### 2.1 The general view



*Intentionality* is the "aboutness" or "directedness"of mental
states. For example, a thought that snow is white "says" or represents that snow is white. Similarly, your
current visual experience might represent a blue cup or that there is
a blue cup in front of you. When a state exhibits intentionality, it involves the instantiation of an *intentional
property*, a property of representing something. What the state
represents is its *(intentional) content*. In this article, we
use the term "state" for instantantiations of properties,
which are sometimes called *token states*. (See the entries 
 Intentionality
 and
 Mental Representation.)
 



*Phenomenal consciousness* is the felt, subjective, or
"what it's like" aspect of mental states (see Nagel
1974). Paradigmatic examples of phenomenal states include perceptual
experiences, pains, emotional feelings, episodes of mental imagery,
and cognitive experiences such as the experience of deja
vu. Each of these states has a characteristic phenomenal character--there is something that it's like to be in it. When there is
something that it is like for a subject, we can say that she
instantiates a *phenomenal property*, or that she has a
*phenomenal state*. (See the entry
 Consciousness.)
 



*Phenomenal intentionality* is intentionality that is
constituted by phenomenal consciousness. A *phenomenal intentional
state* is an intentional state that is constituted by a subject's phenomenal states. For example, someone who accepts phenomenal intentionality might say that a perceptual intentional state representing a red cube is constituted by a reddish-cube-ish phenomenal state--the reddish-cube-ish phenomenal experience automatically and necessarily results in the representation of a red cube. We will call intentional states that are not phenomenal intentional states *non-phenomenal intentional state*.


PIT takes phenomenal intentionality to play a central role in accounting for intentional phenomena. The next subsections discuss ways that this initial gloss on PIT can be precisified. 


A central idea common to phenomenal intentionality theories is that phenomenal intentionality plays an important role in the mind. The next subsections discuss ways that this idea can be precisified. 


### 2.2 Weak, Moderate, and Strong PIT


The following three theses about the relationship between phenomenal
intentional states and intentional states are ways of precisifying the idea that phenomenal intentionality plays an important role in the mind:




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Strong PIT: | All intentional states are phenomenal intentional
states. |
| Moderate PIT: | All intentional states either are phenomenal intentional states
or are at least partly grounded in phenomenal intentional
states. |
| Weak PIT: | Some intentional states are phenomenal intentional
states. |



The "all" in the above theses should be
understood as quantifying over all actual intentional states, not all
metaphysically possible intentional states. In the same way that some
physicalist theories of intentionality allow that there are merely
possible forms of intentionality that are independent of physical
properties, PIT can allow that there are non-actual intentional states
that have nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness. Of course, more
specific versions of PIT might make stronger claims. 


Of the three views mentioned above, Strong PIT asserts the strongest
possible relationship between phenomenal intentionality and
intentionality: it claims that phenomenal intentionality is the only
kind of intentionality there is. Relatively few hold this view, but
versions of it have been defended by Pitt (2004), Farkas (2008a), and
Mendelovici (2010, 2018). The difficulty with this view, as we will see
below, is that it is not clear that there are enough phenomenal states
or phenomenal states of the right kind to constitute all intentional
states. For example, it is not easy to see how standing beliefs like
your belief that grass is green could be constituted by phenomenal
states.


Moderate PIT is significantly weaker than Strong PIT. It is compatible with the
existence of non-phenomenal intentional states but claims that any
such non-phenomenal intentional states are at least partly grounded in
phenomenal intentional states. 



There are different ways of explicating the intuitive notion of
grounding used in the definition of Moderate PIT. For our purposes
here, we can say that *A* grounds *B* when *B* obtains
in virtue of *A*. This gloss is itself in need of further
analysis, but for now it is enough to know that grounding is an
asymmetric relation of metaphysical determination (see Trogdon 2013
for an introduction to grounding). An example of grounding that is
similar to the grounding relation posited by some proponents of
Moderate PIT is the (alleged) grounding of linguistic meaning in
speaker intentions: on many views of language, words have their
meanings in virtue of speakers' intentions toward them. To say
that *A* is *partly grounded* in *B* is to that say
that *A* is grounded in the combination of *B* and other
factors.



There are different views of how phenomenal intentionality might
partly ground non-phenomenal intentionality:



One view is that non-phenomenal intentional states are simply
dispositions to have phenomenal intentional states and that these
dispositions get their contents from the phenomenal intentional states
that they are dispositions to bring about (Searle 1983, 1990, 1991,
1992). On this view, standing beliefs about grass that are not
phenomenal intentional states are dispositions to have phenomenal intentional states with the same or related contents.



Another view is that non-phenomenal intentional states get their
intentionality from functional relations they bear to phenomenal
intentional states (Loar 2003a, Horgan & Tienson 2002, Graham,
Horgan, & Tienson 2007). On this view, a standing belief that
grass is green might have its content in virtue of being suitably
connected to a host of phenomenal intentional states.



A third view is that non-phenomenal intentionality is a matter of
ideal rational interpretation (Kriegel 2011a,b, Pautz 2013). On Kriegel's view, for example, the relevant phenomenal intentional states are in the mind of a possible ideal
rational interpreter.



More versions of Moderate PIT will be discussed below. Proponents of
Moderate PIT (or something close to it) include Loar (1987, 1988,
1995, 2003a, 2003b), Searle (1983, 1990, 1991, 1992), Goldman
(1993a,b), Siewert (1998), McGinn (1988), Kriegel (2003, 2011a,b),
Horgan, Tienson & Graham (2003, 2004, 2006, 2007), Georgalis
(2006), Pitt (2004, 2009, 2011), Farkas (2008a,b, 2013), Mendola
(2008), Chalmers (2010: xxiv), Bourget (2010), Pautz (2010, 2013),
Smithies (2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014), and Montague (2016).



Weak PIT merely claims that there is phenomenal intentionality. It
allows that there are non-phenomenal intentional states that have
nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness. The proponents of Weak
PIT are too many to list. As we will see below, Weak PIT is entailed
by some widely accepted views in philosophy of mind, including many
forms of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness, the view
that phenomenal states are identical to intentional states (perhaps that meet certain further conditions).



Since Moderate PIT is the strongest view that is endorsed by most
proponents of the general approach, it is the view that
has the best claim to being *the* phenomenal intentionality
theory. For this reason, this article will focus mainly on Moderate
PIT. Unless otherwise indicated, we will use "PIT" to
refer to Moderate PIT. (Note that Strong PIT is a version of Moderate PIT, while Weak PIT is not a version of PIT at all, but rather a weakening of the view.)


### 2.3 Grounding, Identity, and Reductive PIT



Our definition of phenomenal intentional states is neutral between two
types of views regarding how phenomenal states constitute intentional
states. On *grounding views*, phenomenal intentional states are
grounded in phenomenal states (either in individual states or in sets
of such states). Since grounding is asymmetric, this view implies that
phenomenal intentional states are distinct from the phenomenal states
that ground them. In contrast, *identity views* take the
relation that obtains between phenomenal intentional states and
phenomenal states (in virtue of which the former are constituted by
the latter) to be that of identity: certain instantiations of
intentional properties are identical to instantiations of phenomenal
properties. On this view, phenomenal intentional states are identical
to individual phenomenal states or sets of phenomenal states. 



Farkas (2008a,b), Pitt (2004) (though not in Pitt 2009), and Woodward (2016, forthcoming-a) defend a
grounding version of PIT. It is also possible to read Horgan and
Tienson (2002) as holding a grounding version of PIT, since they take
the relevant relation between phenomenal intentionality and phenomenal
consciousness to be that of "constitutive determination",
which might be understood as a kind of grounding relation. Other
proponents of PIT, such as Mendelovici (2018), favor an identity view. 



We can also distinguish between versions of PIT that are reductive and
versions that are not. To a first approximation, a theory of
intentionality is reductive if it specifies the nature of
intentionality in terms that are supposed to be more basic or
fundamental. A theory that is not reductive
might either be neutral on the question of reduction or incompatible with
reduction. 



All grounding versions of (Moderate or Strong) PIT are reductive. Such
views entail that all intentionality is ultimately grounded in
phenomenal states. Since grounding is asymmetric, the grounding
phenomenal states cannot themselves be intentional and are more
fundamental than intentional states. 


An identity version of (Moderate
or Strong) PIT will be reductive if it holds or entails that
phenomenal intentional states are identical to phenomenal states and
that phenomenal descriptions are more fundamental than intentional
descriptions (just as "H2O" descriptions are
more fundamental than "water" descriptions). If such views
are correct, it should be possible to understand phenomenal states
independently of intentionality.



Versions of (Moderate or Strong) PIT that identify phenomenal intentional
states with phenomenal states can also be nonreductive. On such
nonreductive views, phenomenal descriptions of intentional states are
not more fundamental then intentional descriptions. Exactly which
versions of PIT that identify phenomenal intentional states with
phenomenal states are reductive or nonreductive is an open
question.



Regardless of whether PIT provides a reductive account of
intentionality in general, versions of Moderate PIT that allow for
non-phenomenal intentional states aim to reduce such states to
phenomenal intentionality and other ingredients, so they provide a
reductive account of at least some intentional states. We will discuss
some of these views below.


### 2.4 Other dimensions of variation



An important dimension of variation between versions of PIT
concerns the extent of phenomenal intentionality. The disagreement here
cuts across the disagreement between Moderate and Strong PIT.
For example, Loar (2003a), who falls in the Moderate PIT camp, mostly
limits phenomenal intentionality to perceptual and other sensory
states. In contrast, other advocates of Moderate PIT (for example,
Strawson (1994) and Pitt (2004)) claim that many thoughts have phenomenal
intentionality. Most theorists maintain that unconscious subpersonal
states, such as states in early visual processing or unconscious
linguistic processing, lack phenomenal intentionality, though Bourget
(2010, forthcoming-b), Pitt (2009,
 Other Internet Resources), and Mendelovici (2018)
 claim that some such states might have phenomenal intentionality that
we are unaware of. 



Phenomenal intentionality theorists also disagree on which mental
states, if any, have non-phenomenal intentionality. Horgan &
Tienson (2002) and Kriegel (2011a) claim that at least some
unconscious subpersonal states have non-phenomenal intentionality,
while Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) and Mendelovici (2018) deny this.
Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) takes at least some standing states, such as
non-occurrent beliefs and desires, to have non-phenomenal
intentionality, which Strawson (2008) and Mendelovici (2018) deny.



Another important question concerns the structure of phenomenal intentionality. Some proponents of phenomenal intentionality hold that it has a relational structure (Pautz 2010, 2013; Speaks 2015; Bourget forthcoming-a, forthcoming-c), while others (Farkas 2008a,b; Kriegel 2011a,b, 2013; Mendelovici 2018; Pitt 2009) deny this. We briefly discuss this question in Section 4.6.


## 3. The place of PIT in logical space



This section outlines some important relations between PIT and other
views.


### 3.1 Alternative theories of intentionality



Reductive PIT stands in contrast with two well-known classes of
reductive theories of intentionality: *tracking theories*
(Stampe 1977, Dretske 1988, 1995, Millikan 1984, Fodor 1987), which
take the content of mental states to be a matter of
causal-informational-historical links between them and things in the
environment (see the entries on
 causal theories of mental content
 and
 teleological theories of mental content),
 and *conceptual role theories*, which take the content of
mental states to be a matter of their relations to other mental states
and sometimes to the external world (Block 1986, Harman 1987,
Greenberg & Harman 2007). (See the section
 Conceptual role
 in the entry on
 narrow mental content.)
 Reductive PIT also contrasts with primitivism, the view that
intentionality cannot be reduced.


Reductive PIT is a competitor to
tracking, conceptual role, and primitivist theories in that it is an
alternative account of the grounds of intentionality.
Versions of PIT that are not reductive are also competitors to these
theories, but to a more limited extent: they only offer an alternative
explanation of the grounds of non-phenomenal intentional states. Such
views are compatible with reducing phenomenal intentional states to
tracking states and similar states. 



While PIT offers a different account of the grounds of intentionality
than conceptual role and tracking theories, it is noteworthy that all
versions of PIT are, strictly speaking, compatible with these theories.
It could turn out that PIT is true but phenomenal consciousness
reduces to conceptual role or tracking, making both PIT and the tracking
or conceptual role theory true. 


### 3.2 Other views of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality



*Representationalism* (or *intentionalism*) is the view
that phenomenal states are intentional states that meet certain
further conditions (Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Lycan 1996, Tye 2000,
Byrne 2001, Chalmers 2004; see also the entry
 Representational Theories of Consciousness).
 As in the case of PIT, some versions of representationalism are
reductive while others are not. When one says that phenomenal states
are intentional states that meet certain conditions, one might intend
this as a reduction of phenomenal consciousness or one might merely
intend to point out a true identity. As in the case of PIT, many
proponents of representationalism take the view to be reductive. 



The reductive versions of representationalism and PIT are
incompatible: if consciousness reduces to intentionality, then
intentionality does not reduce to consciousness, and vice-versa.
However, versions of PIT and representationalism that are not
reductive are compatible. It is common for the two views to be
combined: many advocates of PIT also endorse a version of
representationalism, claiming that all phenomenal states are also
representational states (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Graham, Horgan, and
Tienson 2007, Pautz 2010, Mendelovici 2013, 2018, Bourget 2010). In the
other direction, representationalism, as we are understanding the
view, is committed to Weak PIT, because it entails that some
intentional states are phenomenal states.



Another view of the relationship between intentionality and
consciousness is what Horgan & Tienson dub
"separatism", the view that consciousness and
intentionality are wholly distinct mental phenomena (see e.g., Kim
1998). On this view, consciousness and intentionality do not bear
interesting metaphysical relations to each other. For example, there
is no identity or grounding relation between them (separatists reject
both PIT and representationalism). Separatism is typically associated
with the view that consciousness is limited to perceptual and sensory
states, and intentionality is limited to beliefs, desires, and other
propositional attitudes. 


## 4. Arguments for PIT



This section overviews the main arguments and motivations for PIT.


### 4.1 The phenomenological case



Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue for the claim that "[t]here is a
kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is
constitutively determined by phenomenology alone" (2002: 520).
This is a (fairly strong) version of Weak PIT. They do so by arguing
for the following two principles:




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| IOP: | (The intentionality of phenomenology) Mental states of the sort
commonly cited as paradigmatically phenomenal (e.g.,
sensory-experiential states such as color-experiences, itches, and
smells) have intentional content that is inseparable from their
phenomenal character. (Horgan and Tienson, 2002: 520)  |
| POI: | (The phenomenology of intentionality) Mental states of the sort
commonly cited as paradigmatically intentional (e.g., cognitive states
such as beliefs, and conative states such as desires), when conscious,
have phenomenal character that is inseparable from their intentional
content. (Horgan and Tienson, 2002: 520) |



We take IOP to say that each paradigmatic phenomenal property has an
associated intentional content such that, necessarily, all instances
of the property have this associated content. We take POI to say that each
paradigmatic intentional property has some associated phenomenal character such
that, necessarily, all instances of the property have this associated phenomenal
character.



Horgan and Tienson defend IOP by appealing to broadly phenomenological
considerations:



> 
> 
> You might see, say, a red pen on a nearby table, and a chair with red
> arms and back a bit behind the table. There is certainly something
> that the red you see is like to you. But the red that you see is seen,
> first, as a property of objects. These objects are seen as located in
> space relative to your center of visual awareness. And they are
> experienced as part of a complete three-dimensional scene--not
> just a pen with table and chair, but a pen, table, and chair in a room
> with floor, walls, ceiling, and windows. This spatial character is
> built into the phenomenology of the experience. (Horgan & Tienson
> 2002: 521, footnote suppressed) 
> 
> 
> 


The basic idea is that introspective consideration of paradigmatic phenomenal states suggests that they are intentional. This argument echoes the transparency
considerations for representationalism (see the entry Representational Theories of Consciousness).



Horgan and Tienson's case for POI (the phenomenology of
intentionality) rests primarily on detailed phenomenological
observations purporting to show that there are phenomenological
features corresponding to most contents of propositional attitudes as
well as the attitudes of belief and desires. We discuss these arguments
in
 section 5.



With IOP and POI in hand, Horgan and Tienson proceed to argue for the
widespread existence of phenomenal intentionality. The following is a reconstruction of the key steps of their argument: 


1. The perceptual phenomenal states of a pair of
phenomenal duplicates (creatures that have the same phenomenal experiences throughout their existence) necessarily share some contents, including many
perceptual contents (from IOP).
2. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily have
the same perceptual beliefs.
3. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily share
many of their non-perceptual beliefs.
4. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily share
many of their intentional contents at the level of perception,
perceptual beliefs, and non-perceptual beliefs.



The general idea is that phenomenal states, with their phenomenally
determined intentionality, bring in their train much of the rest of
the "web of belief".



Horgan and Tienson argue for the transition from
 (1)
 to
 (2)
 by articulating in some detail how the contents of perceptual
experiences, either individually or in groups, bring in their train
perceptual beliefs. A key idea, supported by POI, is that perceptual
beliefs and other attitudes towards perceptible contents have
phenomenal characters closely associated with them. For example, there
is a phenomenology of accepting various contents as true. The
suggestion is that once one has a vast number of perceptual
experiences with their associated perceptual contents and feelings of
accepting and rejecting some of these, one qualifies as having a number of perceptual beliefs.



Regarding the transition from
 (2)
 to
 (3),
 a key idea, again derived from POI, is that non-perceptual beliefs
have extensive phenomenology. For example, according to Horgan and
Tienson, there is something that it's like to wonder whether to
cook meatloaf for dinner. The phenomenology of such non-perceptual
thoughts, together with one's vast collection of perceptual
beliefs and perceptual experiences, fixes a large number of
non-perceptual beliefs and other non-perceptual propositional
attitudes.
 (4)
 combines conclusions
 (1)-(3).



The following considerations, while not exactly Horgan and
Tienson's, seem to go in the same direction as their line of
argument: If all beliefs and desires have phenomenal characters unique
to them, as Horgan and Tienson take themselves to have established,
then phenomenal duplicates will share these phenomenal characters. By
IOP, these phenomenal characters must determine contents. Plausibly,
they determine the contents of the beliefs and desires that they
characterize. So if an individual has a given belief with content *C*,
then his or her phenomenal duplicate has this content as the content
of a phenomenal experience. Moreover, the duplicate has a feeling of accepting
*C*. It is then quite plausible that the duplicate believes
*C*.



Horgan and Tienson's argument establishes Weak PIT, but it does
not yet establish any version of Moderate PIT. It could be that many
intentional states are phenomenal intentional states but some
intentional states are neither phenomenal intentional states nor
grounded in phenomenal intentionality (Bailey and Richards (2014)
point out related limitations of the argument). However, when combined
with Horgan and Tienson's arguments for the claim that many
non-phenomenal intentional states are grounded in phenomenal
intentionality (more on this view below), we have some support for
Moderate PIT. 


Mendelovici (2018) also argues for Moderate PIT on the grounds of metaphysical sufficiency: The ingredients invoked by alternative theories of intentionality, such as tracking and functional role theories, are not metaphysically sufficient for intentionality. For instance, it is unclear why having internal states
playing certain functional roles should result in those internal states representing a particular content, or any content at all. Likewise, while tracking relations relate us to items that may seem to be well-suited to playing the role of content, such as objects, properties, and states of affairs, it is mysterious how tracking such items could make them psychologically relevant to us. For instance, it is unclear how merely tracking such items can make them introspectively accessible, available to reason with, or in any sense "entertained". (See also BonJour 1998 for similar worries with tracking and functional role theories.) In contrast, PIT's central ingredient, phenomenal consciousness, is arguably metaphysically sufficient for intentionality. For instance, it is arguably inconceivable for there to be someone with a reddish phenomenal experience who does not thereby represent redness. If all this is right, then there is reason to think that phenomenal consciousness alone is metaphysically sufficient for intentionality, which supports Moderate PIT.


### 4.2 Assessability for accuracy



Siewert (1998) argues for Weak PIT by arguing that phenomenal states are
automatically assessable for accuracy. A key element of
Siewert's argument is his assumption that phenomenal characters
can be identified with "how it seems for it to look some way to
someone". We take this to mean that phenomenal states are states
of things seeming a certain way, where the relevant kind of seeming is
the kind we are familiar with from cases where things look a certain
way in perception (perhaps there are other kinds of seemings that are
not phenomenal states). Siewert's argument is contained in the
following passage, in which we have added numbers corresponding to the
premises:



> 
> 
> First, consider some instance of its seeming to you as it does for it
> to look as if something is shaped and situated in a certain way, such
> as its seeming to you just as it does on a given occasion for it to
> look as if there is something X-shaped in a certain position. (1) If
> it seems this way to you, then it appears to follow that it does look
> to you as if there is something X-shaped in a certain position. (3) If
> this is right, then its seeming this way to you is a feature in virtue
> of which you are assessable for accuracy--(5) that is to say, it
> is an intentional feature. For, from what we have said, (2) if it
> seems to you as it does for it to look this way, then, if it is also
> the case that there is something X-shaped in a certain position, it
> follows that the way it looks to you is accurate. (Siewert 1998: 221)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Siewert suggests that this argument straightforwardly generalizes to a
large number of perceptual experiences. 



Let *S* be the phenomenal state in which it seems to you just as
it does on a given occasion for it to look as if there is something
X-shaped in a certain position. The argument in the above quotation can be
broken down as follows: 


1. Necessarily, if you are in *S*, it looks to
you as if things are a certain way *W*, in virtue of being in
*S*.
2. Necessarily, if it looks to you as if things are in
way *W*, things being (or not being) *W* would make you
accurate (or inaccurate).
3. Therefore, if you are in *S*, you are
assessable for accuracy with respect to things being *W*, in
virtue of being in *S*.
4. If you are assessable for accuracy in virtue of
being in a certain state, this state has intentional content.
5. Necessarily, *S* has intentional content.



Siewert does not explicitly defend premises
 (1)
 and
 (2).
 (4) is defended in section 6.2 of the book.



One might object that
 (3)
 does not follow from
 (1)
 and
 (2).
 Perhaps *S* is such that, necessarily, things being a certain
way (or not) would make the bearer of *S* accurate (or not), but
it is not *in virtue of being in *S** that its bearer is
assessable for accuracy. The assessability might come from the
inevitable addition of an interpretation to *S* in all
circumstances. Siewert argues against this possibility extensively
between pages 222 and 245, ruling out various sources of
interpretation. 



Gertler (2001) objects that there is an alternative explanation of
Siewert's observations about the co-occurrence of phenomenal and
intentional properties: intentional properties automatically give rise
to phenomenal properties. Gertler argues that Siewert has not ruled
out this alternative, and so fails to establish PIT. See Siewert 2004 for a response.


### 4.3 Internalism and brains in a vat



It is possible to argue for PIT on the basis of *internalism*
about mental content, the view that what a subject's mental
states represent is fully determined by her intrinsic properties. (The
alternative to internalism is *externalism*. Intentional
content that is determined by a subject's intrinsic properties
is said to be *narrow* as opposed to *wide*. See the
entries on
 narrow mental content
 and
 externalism about mental content.)



Loar (2003a) argues from internalism to PIT.
First, Loar proposes the following two desiderata for a theory of
intentionality: (1) The theory should be a non-referential theory,
where a non-referential theory is a theory that does not take
intentionality to be a matter of reference to external entities, for
example, concrete or abstract objects. This desideratum is motivated
by internalism. (Note that, for Loar, intentionality is not the same
thing as reference, and so a non-referential theory of intentionality
does not commit one to denying that there is such a thing as
reference.) (2) The theory should accommodate externalism about
reference and truth-conditions (see, e.g., Putnam 1975, Burge 1979,
Kripke 1980). 



Loar then argues that internalist views that do not appeal to phenomenal consciousness fail to meet
desiderata (1) and (2). The first view he considers is short-arm
functionalism, the view that causal interactions between brain states
give rise to intentionality. The second view is a version of
 the descriptivist theory of reference
 combined with short-arm functionalism about its primitive
representations. Having excluded these views, he argues that a version
of PIT can meet his two desiderata. Phenomenal properties are
inherently intentional in that they exhibit directedness, or purport
to refer. Since purporting to refer is not the same thing as
referring, the result is non-referential mental content. This
satisfies the first desideratum. 



Loar argues that his view satisfies the second desideratum by arguing
that phenomenal properties do not by themselves secure reference or
truth-conditions. Instead, reference and truth-conditions are a matter
of externally-determined relations, as externalists such as Putnam
(1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1980) claim. However, which
externally-determined relations matter for reference depends on a
subject's non-referential internalist content. Horgan, Tienson,
& Graham (2004) also suggest that PIT is the best available theory
of narrow content and suggest that phenomenal intentionality can provide a basis for externalist content.



Another argument for PIT involves appeal to brain in a vat scenarios (see Loar 2003a and Horgan, Tienson & Graham 2004). A *brain in a
vat duplicate* is an exact physical duplicate of a normally
embodied human brain that is kept in a vat of life-sustaining liquids
and is hooked up to a computer that delivers to it the same kinds of
stimulation its embodied twin receives. It intuitively seems that a
brain in a vat would have a mental life "matching" that of
its embodied twin. The brain in a vat and its twin would have matching
perceptual experiences, perceptual judgments, and beliefs. For
example, when the embodied twin believes that she is lying on the
beach sipping a frappe, the brain in a vat twin believes that
they are lying on the beach sipping a frappe. However, while
the normal subject's belief might be true, the envatted
subject's beliefs, and many other of their mental states, would
be false or non-veridical.



Farkas (2008a) agrees with Loar and Horgan et al. (2004) that PIT is
the best available theory of narrow content but criticizes Loar
(2003a) and Horgan et al. (2004) for making a concession to
externalism by allowing for externally-determined
reference, truth-conditions, or broad content. Instead,
Farkas argues that internalist, phenomenally-constituted
intentionality is all that a theory of intentionality needs.



Wilson (2003) objects to Loar's appeal to brains in vats,
claiming that intuitions concerning them are theoretical intuitions
and are likely to be rejected by many of PIT's opponents. 


### 4.4 Aspectual shape



In an early defense of PIT, Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) puts forth an
argument based on the "aspectual shapes" of intentional
states. The argument is rather complex and open to several
interpretations, but here is one simplified way of understanding it:
Searle begins by noting that all intentional states have an aspectual
shape, where an *aspectual shape* is a matter of how something
is represented. For example, there is a difference between
representing Hesperus and representing Phosphorus, or representing
Superman and representing Clark Kent. The differences lie not in
*which* objects are represented, but in *how* they are
represented--these are differences in their aspectual shapes. 



Searle then argues that no internal or external unconscious physical
or functional facts can determine aspectual shapes. The only thing
that can determine aspectual shape is consciousness. If that is so,
then it looks like unconscious states can only have their aspectual
shapes in virtue of their connections to conscious states. Searle
concludes, more specifically, that unconscious intentional states
involve dispositions to have conscious states, a thesis that he calls
*the connection principle*. (Sometimes he says that unconscious
states are *potentially accessible to consciousness*,
apparently meaning that they can be *introspected consciously*
(1992, p. 156), but other times he says what we say here: that
unconscious states involve dispositions to have conscious states
(1992, p. 159, 161-162). The latter is what Searle says as part
of his argument for the connection principle, and this interpretation
is more in line with the argument he deploys.) 



In sum, the argument seems to go as follows:



1. All intentional states have aspectual shape.
2. Only states that are conscious or involve dispositions to have
conscious states have aspectual shape.
3. Therefore, all intentional states are either conscious or involve
dispositions to have conscious states.




According to the argument's conclusion, all intentional states
are either phenomenal intentional states or involve dispositions to
have such states. This is a version of Moderate PIT.



Searle's arguments have elicited a large number of responses.
Fodor and Lepore (1994) argue that there is no suitable way of cashing
out what it would take for a state to be *potentially*
conscious such that Searle's claims are both plausible and
tendentious (i.e., that they entail, as Searle claims, that much of
cognitive science's appeal to non-conscious intentional states
is misguided). For a response, see Searle 1994. Davies
(1995) argues that Searle might be right about a kind of
intentionality but that there are other kinds of intentionality
invoked in cognitive science that are not dependent on consciousness.
Van Gulick (1995) argues that Searle's notion of aspectual shape
smuggles in the notion of consciousness, and that on a less
contentious understanding of aspectual shape, his argument that
consciousness is the only way of accounting for aspectual shape does
not succeed. Baaren (1999) also takes issue with the notion of
aspectual shape. See also the commentaries accompanying Searle 1990.



### 4.5 Arguments from content determinacy



Another line of argument for PIT similar to Searle's aspectual shape argument is an argument from content determinacy. Graham, Horgan & Tienson (2007) and
Horgan & Graham (2012) argue that it is difficult to see how
unconscious neural activity, functional role, dispositions to
behavior, and other possible physical bases of intentionality can
yield the sorts of determinate contents we manifestly represent (see
also Dennett 1987, Quine 1960: ch. 2, and Kripke 1982). For example,
no causal, functional, or purely physical features of one's
brain or environment seem to make it the case that one is thinking
about *rabbits* rather than *undetached-rabbit-parts*. A
Martian looking down on Earth with complete knowledge of all
Earthly physical facts could not tell whether we are representing
rabbits or undetached rabbit parts. Thus, it appears that a
physical-functional theory of intentionality will predict that
one's concept RABBIT is indeterminate between the two contents.




Similarly, nothing about our brains, their finite dispositions, or
their environments indicates that our word "plus" means
the *plus* operator rather than a Kripkean *quus*
operator, an operator that works just like plus when the operands are
less than 57 and returns 5 when either operand is 57 or greater (see
Kripke 1982). If we do determinately represent *plus* and
*rabbits*, something other than tracking relations,
dispositions towards behaviors, internal functional roles, or brain
states has to determine this. Along similar lines, Strawson (2008)
argues that phenomenal intentional facts about what we take an
intentional state to refer to play a key role in determining what an
intentional state refers to. 



Some argue that phenomenal consciousness is capable of explaining
content determinacy. According to Graham, Horgan and Tienson, there is
a phenomenal difference between representing rabbits and representing
undetached-rabbit-parts. Since PIT claims that phenomenal intentional
content is determined by phenomenal character, it allows that the two
states have distinct contents. The supposition that there is
high-level *cognitive phenomenology* corresponding to such
abstract contents as *rabbits* and
*undetached-rabbit-parts* is key to this argument. This is a
controversial claim, but one that is quite central to many versions of
PIT. We discuss this claim in
 section 5.
 



Arguments for PIT from content determinacy rely on the strong claim
that the totality of physical facts do not fix content determinately
and that content is fixed determinately. While PIT does not entail
dualism about consciousness, PIT combined with this claim does (see Pautz 2013, who objects to arguments for PIT from content determinacy for related reasons). This claim will be resisted by anyone who thinks that physicalism about the mind is
well-motivated. One might say that the intuition that physical facts
cannot fix determinate contents arises from the fact that we do not
have a suitably good understanding of how intentionality arises from
physical facts; had we such an understanding, the intuition would
disappear. 


### 4.6 Intentional states about non-existents



*Relationalism* about intentionality is the view that
intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing entities that
serve as contents. *Non-relationalism* about intentionality
is the view that
intentionality is not a relation to distinctly existing entities that
serve as contents. 



Kriegel (2007, 2011a) argues that a non-relational view of intentionality
provides the best explanation of how we can represent things that
don't exist, such as Bigfoot, and that PIT is the best candidate
non-relational view of intentionality. Kriegel first argues that the
following three intuitively appealing claims are inconsistent:


* (a) One
can represent non-existents.
* (b) One
cannot bear a relation to non-existents.
* (c) Representing
something involves (constitutively) bearing a
relation to it. (Kriegel 2007: 308)



One of these claims needs to be rejected. Kriegel argues that it is
 (c),
 the claim that asserts relationalism. His's argument
proceeds by a process of elimination.



Kriegel considers rejecting
 (a).
 On this proposal, when we seem to represent dragons, Bigfoot, or
Santa Claus, we either fail to have an intentional state or we
represent something else. One reason Kriegel rejects the first option
is that it implies that there is a gap between trying to represent and
representing, which he takes to be implausible. On the second option,
when we seem to represent non-existent concrete entities, we are
really just representing something else, such as existent abstract
entities (e.g., universals or propositions), existent mental entities
(e.g., sense data or ideas), or existent possible but non-actual
entities. But Kriegel takes this option to be highly counterintuitive.
When we seem to be thinking about concrete flesh-and-blood Bigfoot, we
are in fact thinking about an abstract or mental entity. (See, however, Mendelovici 2018, section 9.3.1 for a response to this line of argument.)
Another worry
is that accounting for the representation of non-existents seems like
the wrong kind of reason to accept the existence of these abstract,
mental, or merely possible entities.



Another option is to reject
 (b).
 Kriegel argues that just as a monadic property cannot be instantiated
without an existing particular that instantiates it, so too a relation
cannot be instantiated without existing particulars that instantiate
it. In short, it is a general rule that relations require relata.
Rejecting
 (b)
 is tantamount to claiming that the intentionality relation is an
exception to this general rule, which is implausible.



Kriegel concludes that we should reject
 (c).
 He calls his non-relational view "adverbialism", since it
draws its inspiration from the adverbialist views of perception of
Ducasse (1942) and Chisholm (1957). According to Kriegel's
adverbialism, representing Bigfoot is not standing in a relation to an
entity, but rather instantiating a non-relational intentional
property, which we might describe as the property of representing
Bigfoot-wise.



So far, this only motivates adverbialism. The final step of the
argument motivates PIT: One objection to adverbialism is that it is
mysterious what non-relational intentional properties are. What is it
to represent Bigfoot-wise? Kriegel suggests that a plausible account
of these properties is that they are phenomenal properties. Phenomenal
properties are usually taken to be non-relational and there is
independent reason to think they give rise to intentionality (see the
other arguments in this section). The resulting picture is one on
which phenomenal intentionality is non-relational. Kriegel suggests
that this view can be combined with the view that non-phenomenal
intentionality is derived from phenomenal intentionality and is
relational. 



In short, Kriegel's argument attempts to show that PIT is the
best way to account for the representation of non-existents.



This argument motivates non-relational versions of PIT. However, it
does not motivate relational versions of PIT, on which intentionality
is relational. Loar (2003a), Pitt (2009), Kriegel (2007, 2011a), and
Mendelovici (2010, 2018) hold non-relational versions of PIT, while Pautz
(2013) and Bourget (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-c) defend a relational version of PIT, on which both phenomenal properties and intentional properties are relational. Speaks (2015) also defends a relational view of phenomenal representation (without endorsing PIT).



Arguing in the direction opposite the preceding considerations, some have challenged PIT on the grounds that intentionality is relational. Ott (2016) raises worries for PIT along such lines, arguing that most versions of PIT fail to adequately explain how phenomenal consciousness can give rise to intentionality, which he takes to necessarily involve a relation to extra-mental reality.


There are two lines of response open to phenomenal intentionalists: One is to maintain that phenomenal consciousness is itself relational in the relevant way. Pautz (2010) and Bourget (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-c) argue that consciousness is a relation to items in extra-mental reality, such as clusters of abstract properties or abstract propositions. Of course, this response gives up on the benefits of non-relational PIT alleged by Kriegel. (Bourget (forthcoming-c) responds to some of Kriegel's arguments against relationalism.)


Another response is to deny that intentionality secures the required relation to extra-mental reality. Along such lines, Mendelovici (2018, sections 1.3.4 and 9.3.4) argues that it is a substantive question whether intentionality on its own or with the help of additional ingredients secures such a relation. Of course, whether this is so depends on what exactly we mean by "intentionality". If intentionality involves such a relation by definition, then there is no further substantive question to be asked. But if, as Mendelovici (2010, 2018) and Kriegel (2010) suggest, the core notion of intentionality leaves open this aspect of its nature, it might very well turn out that intentionality does not involve such relations. 


Even if intentionality does not involve a relation to extra-mental reality, one might worry that it should at least play a role in facilitating such a relation and that PIT cannot allow for this. But Ott (2016) suggests that PIT can in fact connect us to extra-mental reality through relations of resemblance. Similarly, Mendelovici (2018, chapter 9) argues that intentionality does not involve a connection to extra-mental reality but that truth and reference do and that truth and reference are a matter of a special kind of superficial resemblance called "matching". Woodward (forthcoming-b) and Bourget (forthcoming-b) challenge Mendelovici's account of truth and reference for non-relational versions of PIT. 


### 4.7 The argument from predictive accuracy


Another line of argument for PIT begins by noting that theories of intentionality, combined with certain facts about the world, often make predictions as to what particular intentional states represent. For example, a causal theory of intentionality combined with the fact that cows often cause tokens of the concept COW might predict that COW represents the content *cow*, which might be the property of being a cow. 


One line of argument for PIT is based on the claim that PIT makes correct predictions in certain paradigm cases of intentionality that other theories fail to accommodate. One such case is that of color experience: It is plausible (though not undisputed) that color experiences represent what Chalmers (2006) calls "Edenic colors"--primitive, non-physical, qualitative properties (see also Pautz 2006a, 2009). This might be supported by introspection, epistemic considerations, and considerations of psychological role. But since Edenic colors are arguably not instantiated, it is difficult for causal, informational, teleological, and other "tracking" theories of intentionality to allow us to represent them. Instead, such theories predict that perceptual color representations represent the likes of particular dispositions to reflect, emit, or transfer light of particular wavelengths. In contrast, since Edenic colors "match" the phenomenal characters of color experience, PIT has the resources to make the correct predictions in the case of color experiences. Mendelovici (2018) refers to this as the *argument from matching* for PIT. Pautz (2006b) makes a related argument against tracking representationalism and for primitivist representationalism based on a structural mismatch between the contents represented by color experience and the properties color experiences track. See also Causal Theories of Mental Content.



The argument from predictive accuracy purports to show that PIT is the only theory of intentionality that stands a chance of being empirically adequate (whether it can indeed handle all the cases depends on whether it can deal with challenging cases, such as those discussed in section 6). It does not make a complete case for PIT, but it is an important consideration as part of the overall case for PIT. 



### 4.8 Other arguments for PIT


We will briefly mention a few other lines of argument for PIT.


One revolves around the idea that norms of rationality are
constitutive of (non-phenomenal) intentional states. Pautz writes:



> 
> 
> Consciousness grounds rationality because it is implicated in basic
> epistemic norms. ... In turn, the facts about rationality help to
> constitutively determine belief and desire (Davidson, Lewis). So
> consciousness also ultimately grounds belief and desire. (Pautz 2014:
> 176) 
> 
> 
> 



This line of argument combines two claims that have been defended
independently. The first is a view of non-phenomenal states (chiefly,
propositional attitudes) on which they derive their contents from
norms of rationality (Davidson 2001, Lewis 1983, Chalmers 2012). The
second is the view that consciousness plays a role in determining
rational norms (Siewert 1998, Campbell 2002, Smithies 2012, 2014). In
addition to the above passage from Pautz, this argument for PIT is
also made in Chalmers 2012: 467 and Pautz 2013: 226.



Another line of argument for PIT is that there is nothing to determine
who a given non-conscious state of mind belongs to unless that state
consists in a disposition to produce a conscious mental state of the
right sort (Ludwig 1996). Kriegel (2003) similarly argues that only
PIT can account for the fact that intentional states have a subjective
or "for-me" character. 


## 5. Cognitive phenomenology



Many defenses and elaborations of PIT maintain that occurrent thoughts
have a rich and varied phenomenology. Such a view of thought is
required by versions of PIT that claim that the contents we normally
attribute to thoughts are phenomenal contents (see
 section 6.2).
 Cognitive phenomenology is also a widely debated topic independently
of any connection to PIT (see, e.g., *Cognitive Phenomenology*,
edited by Bayne and Montague 2011).



Advocates of PIT that take thought content to be phenomenal content
mainly focus on arguing for the following two claims: 




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| (Proprietary) | Thoughts have proprietary phenomenal characters.  |
| (Individuative) |  Thoughts have individuative phenomenal characters.  |



The term "proprietary" is due to David Pitt (2004).
Thought has a *proprietary* phenomenal character just in case
the phenomenal characters of thoughts are special or unique to
thought, i.e., they are not perceptual, verbal, bodily, or affective
phenomenal characters, or other phenomenal characters that are present
in mental states other than thoughts. Following current usage, we call
all of the aforementioned kinds of phenomenology *sensory
phenomenology* and the putative proprietary phenomenology of
thought *cognitive phenomenology*. The claim that thought has a
proprietary phenomenology is then just the claim that it has a
non-sensory phenomenology.



Thoughts have *individuative* phenomenal characters just in
case thoughts with different intentional contents have different
phenomenal characters and thoughts with different phenomenal
characters have different intentional contents. (We use
"individuative" in the way Bayne and Montague (2011: ch.
1) use it. Pitt (2004) uses the term "distinctive" for a
similar notion and the term "individuative" to mean
something else.) 




While most advocates of PIT take thoughts to have individuative
phenomenal characters, this isn't required by PIT. Grounding PIT can allow
that there is a one-many grounding relation between contents and
phenomenal characters. For example, phenomenal properties *r1*
and *r2* might both ground the intentional property of
representing *red*421. If all intentional properties
were grounded in this way, PIT would be true, but (Individuative)
might not be.



It is possible for thoughts to have proprietary but not individuative
phenomenal characters. For example, suppose every thought came with
either a generic feeling of understanding or a generic feeling of
confusion. These phenomenal characters might be proprietary in that
they do not occur outside of thoughts, but they are not individuative,
since thoughts with different intentional contents might have the same
phenomenal characters.



It is also possible for thoughts to have individuative but not
proprietary phenomenal characters. For example, suppose every thought
came with a different kind of perceptual imagery. Then thoughts with
different contents would have different phenomenal characters, but
these phenomenal characters would not be special to thoughts, since
perceptual states could have them too.



In addition to the claims that there is a proprietary and an
individuative phenomenology of thought, advocates of PIT usually aim
to establish that thought's content is phenomenal intentional
content and thus that thought's intentional properties are
obtained in the requisite way from phenomenal properties. 



While much of the discussion of the phenomenology of thought involves
careful argumentation and consideration of cases, it is worth
mentioning that many advocates of a proprietary phenomenology of
thought find the view obvious and the negation of the view clearly
false or even absurd. Strawson writes:



> 
> 
> To deny this [cognitive phenomenology], one must hold that the total
> lifelong character of our lived experience--everything that life
> is to us experientially--consists entirely of bare or pure
> sensation or feeling of one kind or another. It must, for example, be
> false to say that anguish at someone's death includes
> *conscious comprehending believing entertaining* of the
> proposition that he is dead. (Strawson 2011a: 295, italics in
> original) 
> 
> 
> 



In a similar vein, Kriegel writes:



> 
> 
> For my part, I am persuaded of the existence of cognitive experience
> [...] most vividly by something like everyday experiential
> overwhelm: it simply seems that my inner life is much more interesting
> to me than it would be if my conscious experience consisted merely in
> perceptual experiences. (Kriegel 2011a: 50) 
> 
> 
> 



In what follows we discuss the main arguments that have been offered
to supplement such appeals to the alleged obviousness of cognitive
phenomenology.


### 5.1 Phenomenal contrast cases



*Phenomenal contrast* cases are cases of two thoughts that are
alike in sensory phenomenal character but differ in thought content.




Siewert (1998) asks his readers to compare an experience of hearing or
reading a sentence *without* understanding, as when one reads a
difficult passage without paying attention to it, and an experience of
hearing or reading a sentence *with* understanding. There is
clearly a phenomenal difference between these cases. Siewert argues
that the difference is not a difference in verbal or perceptual
imagery, since the verbal and perceptual imagery might be the same in
both cases. The best explanation of the phenomenal contrast is that
thought involves proprietary cognitive phenomenology. 



Strawson (1994) argues for a kind of "understanding
experience" by contrasting the cases of a monolingual English
speaker and a monolingual French speaker listening to the news in
French. The experiences of the two subjects differ in a way that is
not fully explained by a difference in sensory phenomenology. The best
explanation involves a difference in cognitive phenomenology. Siewert
(1998) also employs examples involving the comparison of hearing
sentences in familiar versus unfamiliar languages. 



As it stands, Strawson's argument can only establish that
thought has a proprietary phenomenology, but Kriegel (2011a: 49)
extends it to argue that thought has an individuative phenomenology.
He asks us to imagine a case of two languages involving graphically
and phonetically identical words such that the same report can be
interpreted in one language as describing a faraway war and in the
other language a children's bedtime story. Monolingual speakers
of each language will experience different phenomenal characters upon
reading or hearing this report. The best explanation of this involves
a difference in cognitive phenomenology. This supports the claim that
cognitive phenomenology is individuative. 



Other arguments from phenomenal contrast cases aim to create the
contrasting experiences in the reader herself. Horgan and Tienson
(2002) present the reader with sentences that are likely to give rise
to two different interpretations, such as the following: 




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| (Relatives) | Visiting relatives can be boring. |



On one reading, the sentence is about the act of visiting relatives.
On another reading, the sentence is about relatives that visit. Both
readings are likely to generate the same verbal imagery, but they
differ in content. Horgan and Tienson encourage the reader to notice
that they also differ in phenomenal character. If this is right, then
this suggests that thought has a proprietary and individuative
phenomenology. 



The following sentences are also used to generate phenomenal contrast
cases:




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| (Dogs) | Dogs dogs dog dog dogs. (Horgan and Tienson 2002) |
| (Time) |  Time flies! (Horgan and Tienson 2002) |
| (Bar) | Before she had a chance to pass the bar, she decided to change
directions, but she was not so pleasantly surprised with where she
wound up. (Siewert 1998: 279) |



(Dogs)
 might at first be read without understanding, but might
subsequently be read with understanding, giving rise to a phenomenal
contrast case.
 (Time)
 can be read as a cliche or as a command at the insect races.
 (Bar)
 can be read as being about an aborted legal career or a trip around
town. Again, the claim is that these different readings of the
sentences give rise to different phenomenal experiences and that the
best explanation of this is that thought has a proprietary and
individuative phenomenology. 



Though instances of pairs of thoughts differing in intentional content
and differing in phenomenal character provide some evidence for the
existence of individuative cognitive phenomenology, in order for the
thesis that thought has a individuative phenomenology to be true,
there have to be no cases of thoughts that are alike in content but
that differ in phenomenal character. This latter kind of case would be a counterexample to (Individuative). Wilson (2003) responds to Horgan
and Tienson by accepting their observations in their phenomenal
contrast cases but attempting to provide such a counterexample: 



> 
> 
> In the spirit of Horgan and Tienson's appeal for a reader to
> "pay attention to your own experience" ([2002] p. 521), I
> have just done the decisive experiment: I thought first that George
> Bush is President of the United States, and had CNN-mediated auditory
> and visual phenomenology that focussed on one of his speeches. I then
> took a short break, doodled a little, wandered around the room, and
> then had a thought with that very same content and ... nothing.
> Or at least nothing distinctly Bush-like, as in the first case.
> (Wilson 2003: 417) 
> 
> 
> 



If Wilson is right, this not only shows that arguments based on
phenomenal contrast ultimately fail, but also provides positive
considerations against (Individuative), since it shows that there can
be thoughts with the same contents that fail to have the same
phenomenal character. 



Versions of PIT that
 require only a one-many relation
 between phenomenal intentional content and phenomenal character, and
hence that do not need to endorse (Individuative), can accommodate
observations such as Wilson's putative observation, since they
allow that multiple phenomenal characters can ground or constitute the
same phenomenal intentional content. 



Another kind of objection to arguments from phenomenal contrast involves agreeing
that there is a phenomenal difference between the relevant cases but
claiming that this difference is exhausted by sensory phenomenology,
where this might include the phenomenology of perceptual imagery,
affective experience, or verbal imagery (see, e.g., Lormand 1996, Tye
and Wright 2011, Levine 2011, Robinson 2011, Carruthers and Veillet
2011). What makes the phenomenal contrast cases described above
vulnerable to this kind of objection is that they do not control for
all potential accompanying perceptual imagery. This leaves open the
possibility that the observed phenomenal differences are fully
accounted for by such imagery. 



Chudnoff (2013) provides a phenomenal contrast case that he claims
avoids this reply. He asks his readers to compare the experience of an
array of dots to an experience of the same array of dots experienced
as part of a proof for a mathematical theorem. In the second
experience, but not in the first, the perceptual experience involves
cognitive phenomenology. The array of dots is in some sense
experienced as part of a larger whole, representative of something, or
in some sense meaningful. (Chudnoff 2015a,b also contain extensive
critical discussions of phenomenal contrast cases.)



One might worry that, like the original phenomenal contrast cases,
Chudnoff's case does not control for certain forms of
accompanying imagery, in this case, verbal imagery. The adamant
opponent of cognitive phenomenology might insist that just as the
phenomenal differences in the phenomenal contrast cases involving
sentences might be explained by perceptual imagery, the differences in
Chudnoff's cases can be accounted for by differences in verbal
phenomenology. 



It might seem that what is needed is a phenomenal contrast case that
plausibly controls for both verbal and perceptual phenomenology, as
well other kinds of sensory phenomenology. Mendelovici (2010: 107)
argues that thoughts about chiliagons (one-thousand sided figures) and
megagons (one-million sided figures) might involve the same mental
imagery (both shapes effectively look like circles) and so might
provide the basis for such cases. Imagine a person who mistakenly uses
the word "megagon" to mean *chilliagon*. Compare
her experience of viewing a chilliagon and thinking that it is a
chilliagon with your experience of viewing a megagon and thinking that
it is a megagon. Since you both use the word "megagon" to
describe the shape you are thinking about, and since the two
shapes are perceptually similar, you will likely have the same
perceptual and verbal imagery. If there is a phenomenal difference
between the two cases, it is plausibly attributed to a difference in
thought content.


### 5.2 Spontaneous thoughts



Siewert (1998, 2011) claims that sudden realizations are cases in
which cognitive phenomenology is particularly noticeable. 



> 
> 
> [Y]ou are standing at the door to your house, reaching in your pants
> pocket for the door key, and find it empty. You feel a sudden panic;
> you think perhaps you have locked yourself out; you try to remember
> where you put the keys, then recall switching them to your coat pocket
> earlier; you reach and find them there--relief. (Siewert 1998:
> 277) 
> 
> 
> 



> 
> 
> I meet a friend, and she asks me, "Did you bring the
> book?" For a moment I am at a loss as to what book she's
> talking about--and then I realize in an instant what book it is.
> (Siewert 2011: 258) 
> 
> 
> 



Siewert claims that such realizations needn't involve any verbal
or perceptual imagery. In the case of the first example, you
don't think the words "I have locked myself out" or
visualize your keys. Siewert takes these and other similar examples to
show that thought has a proprietary phenomenology. 



Similarly, in order to argue that the phenomenal properties of thought
are not merely associated with verbal imagery, Horgan and Tienson
(2002) point to examples of spontaneous thoughts we have when engaging
in activities such as cooking or working in a garage or woodshop:



> 
> 
> There is something that it is like to think that a certain tool is
> just there--in that cabinet, say--but such beliefs are
> typically not verbalized either vocally or subvocally or by way of
> verbal imagery. (Horgan and Tienson 2002: 523) 
> 
> 
> 



Like Siewert's examples, this example helps motivate the claim
that thought has a proprietary phenomenology. 



This line of argument relies heavily on introspection. Unfortunately, detractors of
cognitive phenomenology (for example, Robinson 2011 and Tye &
Wright 2011) claim that their own observations of sudden realization
reveal less phenomenology, resulting in an apparent stalemate. 


### 5.3 The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon



Some experiences with a cognitive character seem to make a fairly good
case for a minimal amount of proprietary phenomenology of thought. For
example, Goldman (1993a) invokes the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon to
argue that thought has a proprietary phenomenology, an argument he
attributes to Jackendoff (1987). 



> 
> 
> When one tries to say something but can't think of the word, one
> is phenomenologically aware of having requisite conceptual structure,
> that is, of having a determinate thought-content one seeks to
> articulate. What is missing is the phonological form: the sound of the
> sought-for word. The absence of this sensory quality, however, does
> not imply that nothing (relevant) is in awareness. Entertaining the
> conceptual unit has a phenomenology, just not a sensory phenomenology.
> (Goldman 1993a: 24) 
> 
> 
> 



The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon occurs when one cannot think of a
word, so it involves the *absence* of verbal phenomenology
corresponding to that word. But instances of this phenomenon do
involve *some* phenomenology. Goldman proposes that this
phenomenology is non-sensory. 



Lormand (1996) responds to this suggestion by providing an alternative
account of the relevant phenomenology on which it is sensory, which he
also takes to be supported by Jackendoff 1987. According to Lormand,
the relevant phenomenology involves a sensory phenomenal experience of
a void, which is akin to hearing silence, along with an experience of
effort, whose phenomenology is also sensory. 


### 5.4 Epistemic markers of consciousness



Phenomenal consciousness has various epistemic markers: It gives rise
to (at least the appearance of) an explanatory gap (see Levine 1983
and the entry on
 consciousness),
 it is susceptible to zombie thought experiments (see Chalmers 1996
and the entry on
 zombies),
 and it is susceptible to the knowledge argument (see Jackson 1982 and
the entry Qualia: The Knowledge Argument).
 These arguments usually focus on sensory phenomenal consciousness.
For example, Levine's central example is that of pain and
Jackson's is that of experiencing red. 



The initial plausibility of these kinds of arguments might be taken to
serve as an indicator of phenomenal consciousness: plausibly, if these
arguments have some traction with some mental state, then that mental
state is likely to have phenomenal properties. Some have used the
presence or absence of such markers to argue for or against cognitive
phenomenology.



Goldman (1993b) argues that a version of Jackson's (1982)
thought experiment can be run with propositional attitudes, such as
doubt and disappointment: 



> 
> 
> Jackson's example is intended to dramatize the claim that there
> are subjective aspects of sensations that resist capture in
> functionalist terms. I suggest a parallel style of argument for
> attitude types. Just as someone deprived of any experience of colors
> would learn new things upon being exposed to them, viz., what it feels
> like to see red, green, and so forth, so (I submit) someone who had
> never experienced certain propositional attitudes, e.g., doubt or
> disappointment, would learn new things on first undergoing these
> experiences. There is "something it is like" to have these
> attitudes, just as much as there is "something it is like"
> to see red. (Goldman 1993b: 365) 
> 
> 
> 



In other words, Goldman argues that Jackson's thought experiment
is compelling in the case of propositional attitudes and that this
supports the claim that propositional attitudes have proprietary
phenomenal properties above and beyond functional properties.
(Presumably, Goldman intends his argument to apply only to occurrent
propositional attitudes, since he takes standing states to be purely
dispositional (1993b: 366).) Goff (2012) makes similar observations.




Horgan (2011a) also uses epistemic indicators of phenomenal
consciousness to argue for cognitive phenomenology. He argues that
since partial zombies lacking cognitive phenomenology are conceivable
and phenomenally different from us, we have cognitive phenomenology.




Interestingly, Carruthers and Veillet (2011) use epistemic indicators
to argue against cognitive phenomenology. They claim that thought is
not susceptible to the explanatory gap, and thus that there is no
cognitive phenomenology. 


### 5.5 Self-knowledge



Pitt (2004) argues that there is a kind of self-knowledge that can
only be explained by cognitive phenomenology. Pitt's argument
not only aims to establish that there is a proprietary and
individuative cognitive phenomenology but also that this
phenomenology is *constitutive* of thought's content,
i.e., that thought's content is phenomenal intentional content.




Pitt's argument runs as follows: Normally, we can consciously,
introspectively, and non-inferentially (1) distinguish an occurrent
thought from other mental states, (2) distinguish an occurrent thought
from other occurrent thoughts, and (3) identify which occurrent
thoughts we are thinking. Pitt considers various explanations of these
abilities, and argues that the only plausible explanation is that
thought has a proprietary, individuative, and constitutive
phenomenology. Thought's proprietary phenomenology explains how
we can tell the difference between thoughts and other kinds of mental
states, thought's individuative phenomenology explains how we
can tell the difference between one thought and another, and
thought's phenomenology being constitutive of its content
explains how we can identify which thoughts we are thinking. 



Levine (2011) argues that Pitt (2004) fails to rule out an alternative
explanation of the relevant kind of self-knowledge: immediate
self-knowledge is a matter of non-inferentially coming to have an
intentional state that represents that one is thinking what one is in
fact thinking. In having such a state, one is automatically aware of
its content. Pitt (2011) responds that, when properly understood,
Levine's proposal can't work unless there is the contested
kind of cognitive phenomenology. 



Goldman (1993a,b) also uses considerations from self-knowledge to
argue for a phenomenology of thought. He argues that the way we can
tell what mental states we are in is not through their functional
roles or neural properties, but through their phenomenal properties.
In the case of cognitive states, the best explanation for how we can
discriminate between different strengths of desires or degrees of
belief is that thoughts have an accompanying phenomenology. 


## 6. Challenges for PIT


PIT faces both in-principle challenges and empirical challenges. We
have already discussed the in-principle worry that phenomenal
consciousness is not metaphysically sufficient for intentionality
(see section 4.1). Here, we
focus on the empirical challenges PIT faces in accommodating specific
kinds of mental states. 


The problematic mental states are those that might reasonably be taken to have intentionality without having *phenomenal* intentionality. Here we will discuss four types of mental
state that give rise to challenges of this kind: thoughts, standing
propositional attitudes, wide intentional states, and occurrent
unconscious states. These states don't seem to be phenomenal
intentional states, so it is not immediately clear how PIT can accommodate
them.



There are three general strategies for handling a problematic state:
eliminativism, inflationism, and derivativism. *Eliminativism*
consists in denying the existence of the putative intentional state
(or denying that it is an *intentional* state).
*Inflationism* consists in claiming that the state in question
is a phenomenal intentional state. In the case of thought, this
strategy often involves arguing for rich cognitive phenomenology (see
 section 5).
 *Derivativism* agrees that the problematic state is not a
phenomenal intentional state, but maintains that it nonetheless
derives its content in part from phenomenal intentional states and so is at least partly grounded in such states. We will now discuss these
strategies in more detail in relation to the four problematic kinds of
states. 


### 6.1 Thoughts



Thoughts are occurrent conceptual states, the kinds of states we have when we think, reflect, or muse over something. Examples of thoughts include
judgments, occurrent beliefs, and occurrent desires. Thoughts, especially thoughts
about abstract ideas such as democracy and the square root function,
might seem to lack phenomenal properties. Even if thoughts have
phenomenal properties, it does not seem that these phenomenal
properties are rich or determinate enough to fully account for their
intentional properties. For example, these phenomenal properties might seem to be
limited to verbal and visual imagery. 



Inflationism is the most widely endorsed strategy for dealing with
occurrent thoughts, at least in cases of thoughts that do not seem to
have wide contents (see
 6.3 below
 for the latter). Strawson (1994, 2008), Siewert (1998), Horgan &
Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson & Graham (2004), and Pitt (2009)
all hold that occurrent thought has a phenomenology that is rich and
determinate enough to fix its intentional contents. Horgan &
Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson & Graham (2004), and Pitt (2009)
also argue that the difference between beliefs, desires, and other
kinds of attitudes is phenomenally constituted. The case for this
approach rests on the
 arguments for cognitive phenomenology
 we discuss above. 



In contrast, Loar (2003a,b), Bourget (2010, 2015), and Mendelovici (2010, 2018) maintain
that thoughts have a fairly impoverished phenomenology that cannot
fully constitute all the contents we might want to attribute to them.
Loar (2003a,b) endorses a derived content strategy on which much of
thought's content is determined by the "lateral
connections" between thoughts and other mental states. The
network of interconnected states eventually derives its content from
phenomenal intentional states. Bourget (2010) adopts a derived content
strategy on which thoughts derive their contents from phenomenal
intentional states through a variety of derivation mechanisms.



Mendelovici (2010, 2018) has a largely eliminativist take on the
intentionality of thought. Like Pitt (2004, 2009), she holds that all
intentional states are phenomenal intentional states, but unlike Pitt, she
maintains that the phenomenology of thought is too impoverished to
capture all the contents we might pre-theoretically want to attribute
to thoughts. However, she recognizes the existence of derived
representational contents, which capture the rich contents we tend to
attribute to thoughts. Derived representational states are not strictly
speaking intentional states, but they fill the role that intentional
states with rich contents have been thought to play.


### 6.2 Standing propositional attitudes



Standing propositional attitudes are states one is in independently of
what one is thinking about or experiencing at the time (i.e., independently
of one's occurrent states). For example, five minutes ago you
had the standing belief that monkeys like bananas even though you
weren't occurrently thinking that content. Standing
propositional attitudes do not seem to have phenomenal properties, and
so, it seems their intentionality is not phenomenal
intentionality.



As far as we can tell, no one has applied the inflationist strategy to
standing propositional attitudes--no one claims that they are
phenomenal intentional states. 



Strawson (2008) and Mendelovici (2010, 2018) adopt the eliminativist
strategy as part of their defenses of PIT: they deny that standing
beliefs and other standing propositional attitudes are intentional
states. As Strawson puts it, "To have a belief is not to be in
any contentful mental state." (p. 271) Rather, it is to be
*disposed* to be in such a state. Horgan & Tienson (2002)
are not eliminativists about the intentionality of standing states,
but they do not consider them part of the scope of their version of
PIT. 



Searle (1990, 1991, 1992), Bourget (2010), and Kriegel (2011a,b) favor
derivativism about standing states. Searle holds that non-phenomenal
intentional states have their intentionality in virtue of
subjects' dispositions to have conscious states. This account
applies most naturally to standing propositional attitudes. Bourget
(2010) holds a similar but more nuanced view according to which
standing propositional attitudes derive from connections to occurrent
thoughts, which themselves either are phenomenal intentional states or
derive their contents from distinct phenomenal intentional states (see
the next section on the derivativist strategy for thoughts).



The simple derived content approach defended by Searle and Bourget is
open to well-known objections. One of these objections, discussed by
Peacocke (1998), is that a state that causes occurrent thoughts to the
effect that *P* is not a belief that *P* unless it is
accompanied by the right behavior. Imagine someone who claims not to
be sexist and tends to form occurrent non-sexist thoughts but who
behaves in demonstrably sexist ways. Such an individual is naturally
said to have unconscious sexist beliefs.



Kriegel's (2011a,b) account aims to explain standing states and
unconscious occurrent states in a unified way. On his account, which
he calls *interpretivism*, a non-phenomenal state *s* has
a certain derived intentional content *C* just in case an ideal
interpreter is disposed to ascribe *C* to *s*. An ideal
interpreter is a being that is perfectly rational and knows all the
phenomenal and non-phenomenal (but not derivatively intentional) facts
about the world. On the resulting derivativist view, non-phenomenal
intentional states derive from an ideal interpreter's phenomenal
intentional states.



The disagreement between eliminativism and derivativism about standing
states might be partly terminological. Most of the above-mentioned
theorists agree that standing states are a matter of a certain kind of
disposition to have phenomenal states. What they disagree on is
whether the potentially conscious or dispositional states count as
intentional states. 


### 6.3 Wide intentional states



Wide intentional states are intentional states that depend on
relations to items in our environments. They are states for which externalism is true
(see
 section 4.3). Prime candidates of wide
intentional states are thoughts about natural kinds (e.g.,
H2O) and thoughts about individual objects (e.g., Bill Gates).
Arguably, subjects that are phenomenally alike and have all the
same phenomenal intentional states can nonetheless differ in their
wide intentional states. So, it seems that wide intentional states are
not phenomenal intentional states. 



A Twin Earth case helps illustrate the options available in the case
of wide intentional states (see Putnam 1975). Consider two
individuals, Alice and Twin Alice. Alice lives on Earth, while Twin
Alice lives on a copy of Earth located far away from us in this world.
Let us suppose that Alice and Twin Alice are phenomenal
duplicates: they instantiate all the same phenomenal properties throughout their existences.



Alice and Twin Alice each have a brother called "Bob". When
Alice thinks a thought that she would express by making the sounds
"Bob is happy", it seems that her thought is true at just
the worlds where Bob is happy. By contrast, it seems that the thought
that Twin Alice expresses with "Bob is happy" in her
idiolect is one that is true at just the worlds where *Twin
Bob* is happy. So it looks like the Alices' thoughts have
different truth conditions. This suggests that the Alices'
thoughts have different contents. Alice's thought represents
that Bob is happy, while Twin Alice's thought represents that
Twin Bob is happy. The Alices' "Bob"-thoughts are
paradigmatic examples of putatively broad intentional states. 



Few advocates of PIT seem to endorse an inflationist strategy for
broad intentional states. Even advocates of PIT who take consciousness
to be relational seem to agree that what a subject gets
related to in consciousness depends solely on her intrinsic properties
(Pautz 2010). However, Campbell (2002) holds that perceptual
experience is broad and intentional, and his view might be counted as
a type of phenomenal intentionality theory. 



Siewert (1998), Kriegel (2007), and Farkas (2008a) adopt an
eliminativist strategy with respect to broad intentional states. Their
views are the same in broad outline. On their views, the two
Alices' thoughts have the same content, and that content is
narrow. We can account for the fact that the two Alices'
thoughts are made true by different Bobs by adding contextual
parameters to their shared content: their shared content is not a
function from possible worlds to truth values but a function from
possible worlds and relevant elements of context to truth values. The
introduction of contexts enables us to account for the fact that the
Alices' thoughts are true at different worlds. For example, one
(over-simplistic) view along these lines could state that the shared
content of the two Alices' thoughts can be modeled as a function
from worlds *W* and contexts of use *C* that returns true
just in case the person that bears the name "Bob" in
*C* is happy in *W*. Given that different contexts are
relevant to Alice and Twin Alice, different worlds can satisfy the
common thought they express as "Bob is happy". If this is
the right way to think about content, the Bobs' case and other
cases motivating broad content do not force us to recognize broad
contents. 



Pitt (1999, 2011) also endorses an eliminativist strategy, arguing
against externalist intuitions. Mendelovici (2010, 2018) also endorses
eliminativism but claims that she can capture many externalist
intuitions through the notion of derived mental representation (see
the previous section). 



Derivativist strategies have also been applied to broad
contents (Loar 2003a,b, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Horgan, Tienson &
Graham 2004, Bourget 2010, Chalmers 2010). The idea here is that broad
intentional states have two contents: a phenomenally constituted
narrow content, and a broad content that is determined by the narrow
content together with relevant factors in the environment. So
Alice's thought has two contents: one narrow and one broad. The
broad content of her thought is true at just the worlds where Bob is
happy. The narrow content is true at the worlds where a person bearing
certain Bob-like characteristics is happy. The relevant Bob-like
characteristics might, for example, centrally involve being called
"Bob" by people of a certain community. 



Of course, such a derivativist approach is compatible with other accounts of the narrow content of Alice's
thought. The options available to proponents of PIT are the
same as for theories of narrow content in general. For instance, this
derivativist approach can draw on all the resources of
two-dimensional theories of narrow content (see Chalmers 2002a and the
entries on
 two-dimensional semantics
 and
 narrow mental content).
 



Pautz (2008, 2013, 2017) offers a related derivativist approach that he dubs
*consciousness-based best systems theory*. On this view, facts about (sensory)
phenomenal states and their internal causal roles fix the facts about
what is rational for an agent to believe. These facts about
rationality in turn fix the narrow contents of an individual's
beliefs. Wide contents are fixed by causal relations between beliefs
and the environment.


### 6.4 Unconscious occurrent states



Cognitive science posits various kinds of occurrent unconscious
representation, e.g., dorsal stream states and internal
representations of syntactic structures. It seems that such states
have intentional properties but lack phenomenal properties, so their
intentionality cannot be phenomenal intentionality. 



Some supporters of PIT adopt an eliminativist strategy towards such
unconscious states. Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) argues, roughly, for the
claim that only conscious or potentially conscious states exhibit
intentionality. Since most unconscious states posited by cognitive
science are not potentially conscious, they are not intentional.
Searle presents this view of unconscious states as being in conflict
with cognitive science. In contrast, Graham, Horgan, and Tienson
(2007) and Mendelovici (2018) highlight the agreement between the
assumptions of cognitive science and eliminativism about unconscious
states: everyone agrees that unconscious states play functional roles,
bear tracking relations to things in the environment, and have no
phenomenal properties. Everyone also agrees that it can be fruitful to
treat unconscious states as if they represented certain contents. The
main disagreement is over whether unconscious states really do qualify
as intentional. 



Bourget (2010, 2015) and Pitt (2009,
 Other Internet Resources)
 suggest that an inflationist strategy may be acceptable in case of at
least some unconscious occurrent states. On their views, we can have
phenomenal states that we are not aware of. Unconscious occurrent
states could be such states.



A derived content strategy is also an option in the case of some
unconscious occurrent states. Bourget (2010) argues for this strategy
by arguing for the claim that the low-level systems that allegedly support
unconscious occurrent intentional states don't seem intentional
when they are taken out of the organisms in which they belong.
Kriegel's interpretivism (2011a,b) is also meant to apply to
unconscious occurrent states (see
 section 6.2).