## 1. Individuation and the identity of indiscernibles



The possible existence of such non-qualitative properties as
explanations of numerical distinction between substances can perhaps
be made plausible by considering a modern equivalent to the medieval
thought-experiment about angels, namely, the famous counterexample to
the identity of indiscernibles suggested by Max Black. *A*
wants to defend the principle, and *B* attack it, and
*B* does so by proposing the following case:



> 
> Isn't it logically possible that the universe should have contained
> nothing but two exactly similar spheres? We might suppose that each
> was made of chemically pure iron, had a diameter of one mile, that
> they had the same temperature, colour, and so on, and that nothing
> else existed. Then every quality and relational characteristic of the
> one would also be a property of the other. Now if what I am describing
> is logically possible, it is not impossible for two things to have all
> their properties in common. This seems to me to *refute* the
> principle. (Black [1952], 156)
> 



Clearly, if the identity of indiscernibles is understood - as
Leibniz intended - to assert that any two individuals must
differ in some qualitative or relational way, *B*'s
counterexample seems sufficient to refute it. But it seems that there
is an easy answer available to *A*. For *A* could assert
that the two spheres differ in some property or constituent that is
neither qualitative nor relational: they could differ by
*haecceity*. This leaves intact a trivial reading of Leibniz
(that if individual *x* is distinct from individual *y*,
then there must be some property had by *x* and not by
*y*, or vice versa), and thus an apparently true version of the
principle secure. Haecceities may not be the only way to preserve the
principle against *B*'s counterexample. But the solution gives
some *prima facie* plausibility to the possibility of
haecceities. After all, if haecceities are required at least in cases
of exact replicas, then it seems hard to resist the conclusion that
they are responsible for individuation, period.



Here I assume, with Scotus, that a haecceity is a constituent of the
item it individuates. I will return later on to theories that make the
individuation of particulars primitive. Scotus believes that the
haecceity must be a constituent, and the reason is that he grants some
kind of reality to universals too (common natures, in the technical
medieval parlance) - and that the reality of a common nature
requires the reality of the haecceity, and that both be constituents
of the particular. So, haecceities are bare particulars, but they are
not supposed to underlie properties. Some medieval Aristotelians hold
that matter, construed as a substrate for forms and properties,
individuates; and it would be possible to hold that the individuation
of a substance is explained by some bare particular that underlies
properties. Scotus rejects the view that matter could be responsible
for individuation, on the grounds that we require too an explanation
for the individuation of (chunks of) matter (Scotus,
*Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 187 (Scotus [OO],
7:483; Spade (1994), 106-107)). Neither would Scotus have been
able to make any sense of a bare particular in the sense of a bare
possessor of qualities, a view that would doubtless have struck him as
inconsistent with essentialism (on this, see Park [1990]). Given that
the argument for the reality of haecceities (as constituents of
particulars) rests on the reality of common natures, we have first to
provide an explanation of Scotus's theory of common natures, followed,
in a third section, by a description of the theory of haecceity and
the relation of these two theories to each other.


## 2. Common natures



Building on insights gained through the thirteenth century, Scotus
distinguishes two closely related issues in individuation: explaining
how a particular is such that it cannot be instantiated (explaining
its individuality, its "indivisibility in itself"), and
explaining how a particular is such that it is distinct from other
particulars (explaining its "division from others"; on
this see Park [1988]). The first of these is on the face of it the
more complex issue. For various historical reasons, medieval realists
tend to suppose that common (shared) natures or essences are somehow
*divided* into their instantiations - as Scotus puts it,
divided into "subjective parts." It is not easy to explain
precisely what this divisibility amounts to. Explaining both
divisibility and its opposite, Scotus states the problem of
individuation as follows:



> 
> *Because there is among beings something indivisible into
> subjective parts - that is, such that it is formally
> incompatible for it to be divided into several parts each of which is
> it* - the question is not what it is by which such a
> division is formally incompatible with it (because it is formally
> incompatible by incompatibility), but rather what it is by which, as
> by a proximate and intrinsic foundation, this incompatibility is in
> it. Therefore, the sense of the questions on this topic [viz. of
> individuation] is: What is it in [e.g.] this stone, by which as by a
> proximate foundation it is absolutely incompatible with the stone for
> it *to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone,
> the kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided
> into its subjective parts*? (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3,
> p. 1. q. 2, n. 48 (Scotus [OO], 7:412-413; Spade (1994), 69))
> 



I have italicized the relevant portions here. A common nature is
"divided into several parts each of which is it." As
Scotus sees it, individuality and numerical unity or singularity are
co-extensive. As something that is divisible in the required way, it
follows that the nature is not of itself numerically one thing: it has
"less-than-numerical" unity:



> 
> In the thing [viz. in extramental reality] the nature according to
> [its primary] entity has true real being outside the soul. And
> according to that entity, it has a unity [viz. less than numerical
> unity] in proportion to it... . That unity is a proper attribute
> of the nature according to its primary entity. Consequently, the
> nature is intrinsically *this* neither from itself nor
> according to its proper unity, which is necessarily included in the
> nature according to its primary entity. (Scotus, *Ordinatio*
> II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 34 (Scotus [OO], 7:404-405; Spade (1994),
> 64-65))
> 



The basic thought is that a common nature cannot be numerically
singular - if it were, it would be a particular, and the
distinction between the common and the particular would simply break
down. But it must have some kind of unity, since it has some kind of
being or reality. The result of the relevant kind of division is that
in some sense the whole common nature is in each instantiation of it.
But the whole common nature is not to be understood to be identically
(numerically) the same in each instantiation, as Scotus makes clear
elsewhere, and as in any case we might expect, given the part-whole
language that Scotus uses in the passage just quoted. It seems as
though there are both intensional and extensional aspects to the
nature: intensionally, it is fully in each instantiation, but
extensionally the nature somehow becomes many on instantiation. (Not
just: comes to exist in many things, unless this be construed to mean
that the nature becomes many when it comes to exist in many things.)
At least from an extensional point of view, there is more to humanity
than just what is found in me. Another way of thinking about the
relevant relation might be to think of natures as in some sense
'content,' and each individual as the
'carrier' of this content. The nature, as far as its
content is concerned, is fully in each carrier of the content, but is
multiplied in its carriers (such that each carrier bears fully the
same content, and so the same content becomes many in its carriers,
just as the content of a book is multiplied in its several
copies).



Why should we accept this sort of account of common natures? Scotus
defends it in the context of a rejection of a theory according to
which the singularity of a nature requires no explanation other than
the nature itself. The theory is in principle capable of development
in one of two different directions, and Scotus seems to regard it as a
matter of indifference which of these two directions his opponent has
in mind. One direction is nominalist: there could be individual
natures (of the same kind), and each such nature be of itself
particular. The other is extreme realist: there could be indivisible
Platonic universals, and each such universal be of itself numerically
singular. As Scotus sees it, the only way to explain both
instantiability and commonality of kind is to posit the existence of
entities (viz. natures) that are divisible. It is the divisibility of
the nature that allows its instantiability, and the unity of the
nature that explains commonality of kind. Platonism lacks
instantiability, and nominalism lacks an explanation for commonality
of kind. Scotus makes the crucial claim about natures as follows:



> 
> Anything with a real, proper, and sufficient unity less than numerical
> is not of itself one by numerical unity - that is, it is not of
> itself a *this*. But the proper, real or sufficient unity of
> the nature existing in this stone is less than numerical unity.
> Therefore [the nature existing in this stone is not of itself one by
> numerical unity]. (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1, n.
> 8 (Scotus [OO], 7:395; Spade (1994), 59))
> 



Here the premises speak of Scotus's "less than numerical
unity," the unity of something that is divisible into
numerically many subjective parts. Scotus provides a total of seven
arguments in favor of the minor premise - in favor, in other
words, of the position that there is something with
less-than-numerical unity. Four of these appeal to Aristotelian
authority, and of these the third is most interesting:



> 
> According to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* V, the chapter on
> relation [c. 15, 1021a9-12], the same, the similar
> and the equal are all based on the notion of one, so that even though
> a similarity has for its foundation a thing in the genus of quality,
> nevertheless such a relation is not real unless it has a real
> foundation and a real proximate basis for the founding. Therefore, the
> unity required in the foundation of the relation of similarity is a
> real one. But it is not numerical unity, since nothing one and the
> same is similar or equal to itself. (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d.
> 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 18 (Scotus [OO], 7:398; Spade (1994), 61))
> 



The point is that relations of similarity between two particulars
cannot be self-explanatory; they must have some explanation (some
"real foundation") in the things that are similar. This is
amongst other things an argument against resemblance nominalism. But
it is also supposed to be an argument against the view that a common
nature could be numerically identical in each instantiation. As Paul
Vincent Spade helpfully comments *in loc*. (ftnt. 8), "for
mediaeval authors ... a thing *x* is not (qualitatively)
similar *to itself* ... but just has a quality."
Similarity between different instances of the same kind requires that
they have less-than-numerical unity.



Of the arguments from reason (rather than from the authority of
Aristotle), one particularly focuses on a claim with which Ockham
will, a few years later, sharply disagree:



> 
> If every real unity is numerical unity, then every real diversity is
> numerical diversity. The consequent is false. For every numerical
> diversity, in so far as it is numerical, is equal. And so all things
> would be equally distinct. In that case, it follows that the intellect
> could not abstract something common from Socrates and Plato any more
> than it could from Socrates and a line. Every universal would be a
> pure figment of the intellect. (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3,
> p. 1, q. 1, n. 23 (Scotus [OO], 7:400-401; Spade (1994), 62))
> 



The obvious claim here is supposed to be that not all real diversity
is numerical, and Scotus supports it by arguing that, if the only way
in which things differed were numerical, then all things would be
equally distinct. But there are degrees of diversity: Socrates and
Plato are not distinguished in species, for example. Unity and
diversity here are inter-definable contradictories, so it is not the
case that every real unity is numerical unity.



The reason that the common nature has some kind of entity is that the
nature is supposed to be subject to the accidental modification of
existing as this or that particular, and it is not possible for the
subject of a real modification not itself to be real:



> 
> Although it [viz. the nature] is never without some of these features
> [viz. being in extramental particulars or being thought of], yet it is
> not any of them of itself, but is naturally prior to all of them.
> (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 32 (Scotus [OO],
> 7:403; Spade (1994), 63))
> 



So in order to possess in itself this non-numerical unity, the nature
must have, in itself, some sort of being too, proportional to it (such
that the real entity of the nature is diminished in proportion to the
diminished real unity that it has). Scotus does not mean that the
nature is some sort of universal *ante rem*; if there were no
instantiations, there would be no nature, but once there are
instantiations there is too some subject for instantiation (the
nature), and this subject has some sort of being in itself. Indeed,
this subject is in some sense prior (but not temporally prior) to its
instantiations: while the identity of its instantiations depends on
it, its identity does not depend on those of its instantiations. (It
makes no difference to the identity of human nature whether or not I
exist, though the reality of human nature certainly requires that at
least one human being exist: see Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3,
p. 1, q. 1, n. 34 (Scotus [OO], 7:404; Spade (1994), 64).) As
instantiated, the nature receives the (accidental) modification of
being numerically many in numerically many things.



Much of the account of common natures can be found *in nuce* in
Aquinas's *De ente et essentia*. But Scotus's account is
usually thought to diverge from Aquinas's in at least one crucial way.
According to both Scotus and Aquinas - following some
suggestions in Avicenna - it is possible to consider a nature in
itself, abstracting both from its existence as a universal concept and
as the particulars into which it is divided. (Hence Avicenna's famous
slogan "equinity is just equinity": Avicenna, *Liber de
scientia divina*, V, c. 1 (Avicenna [LPP], 2:228-229).)
Aquinas is clear that this bare nature lacks numerical unity (see
Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c. 3 (Aquinas [DEE],
24-25)), and it seems that it lacks any kind of entity too. So
where Scotus ascribes to the nature a kind of entity, and unity short
of numerical unity, Aquinas does neither. It is perhaps worth noting,
in passing, that a plausible case can be made for tracing this
moderate sort of realism on the question of universals to the
Aristotelian tradition (specifically, Alexander of Aphrodisias: see
Tweedale [1993]). One might also argue, as his famous commentator
Cajetan did, that Aquinas would be willing to attribute some sort of
unity and proportionally some sort of being to the absolutely
considered nature. For Cajetan's exposition of the issue, carefully
distinguishing Aquinas's from Scotus's position, and for useful
references to both authors, see Cajetan [CBE], c. 4 (nn. 55-62),
pp. 134-155. Scotus, while clearly in this same tradition,
evidently considers the sort of account found in Aquinas to be
insufficient, and thus is more clearly to be placed in the realist
camp than Aquinas on this question. Far from holding that the nature
in itself lacks any kind of reality, Scotus holds that the primary
reality of the nature belongs to the nature in itself.


## 3. Haecceity in Duns Scotus



Common natures have non-numerical unity, and are thus in the relevant
sense divisible. As Scotus sees it, the fundamental issue to be
explained by haecceity is that of indivisibility: what is it about
individuals that makes them indivisible into subjective parts, in
contrast to the divisibility of the common nature:



> 
> I explain what I understand by individuation or numerical unity or
> singularity: Certainly not the indeterminate unity by which anything
> in a species is said to be one in number. Rather, I mean designated
> unity as a *this*, so that just as it was said above that an
> individual is incompossible with being divided into subjective parts
> and the reason for that incompossibility is asked there, so too I say
> here that an individual is incompossible with not being a designated
> *this* by this singularity and the cause is asked not of
> singularity in general but of this designated singularity in
> particular - that is, as it is determinately *this*.
> (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 76 (Scotus [OO],
> 7:426-427; Spade (1994), 76); see too q. 2, n. 48 [Scotus
> (1950-), 7:412-413]; qq. 5-6, n. 165 (Scotus [OO],
> 7:473))
> 



The point is not just that an account of numerical singularity in
general is required (the "indeterminate unity by which anything
in a species is said to be one in number"). What is required,
rather, is an account of the individuality of any given particular,
and this account will explain its being indivisible into subjective
parts. (Scotus does not use the term 'haecceity'
[*haecceitas*] in the work that I am using here - the
*Ordinatio*. He talks rather about the individual difference,
or individual entity. But he does elsewhere talk about this entity as
a *haecceitas* [a term of Scotus's own invention]: for the
change in terminology, see Dumont [1995]).



Divisibility into subjective parts, of course, is on the face of it
very different from the question of division from all other things, so
nicely exemplified in Black's example of the qualitatively identical
spheres. Scotus's assumption, however, is that both questions can be
answered in the same way. Thus Scotus supposes that the explanation
for distinction is the explanation for indivisibility, and the rough
outline of what he is thinking looks as follows. The explanation for
distinction is primary, in the sense that what distinction needs is
explanation by items (haecceities) that are irreducibly numerically
distinct from each other - as Scotus puts it, "primarily
diverse" (*primo diversa*) - and have nothing real
whatever in common: "they agree in nothing the same"
(Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 186
(Scotus [OO], 7:483; Spade (1994), 106)). (This does not entail that
the things thus distinguished, as opposed to the haecceities that
distinguish these things, have nothing whatever in common.
Scotus's point is that the haecceity is needed as a constituent
of a being that shares its nature with something else in the manner
described in the previous section.) According to Scotus, merely
numerical distinction - as opposed to (say) specific distinction
- entails that each of the things distinguished has numerical
singularity. And numerical singularity entails indivisibility (into
subjective parts), for what allows a common nature to be divided (into
subjective parts) is its possession of less-than-numerical unity.



The claim that the explanations for indivisibility and distinction are
the same gains some plausibility from an analogy with the distinction
between different specific differences in relation to a genus -
an analogue that Scotus evidently regards as less controversial, and
more familiar to his readers. A specific difference distinguishes two
different species of a genus from each other. A specific difference is
something indivisible in such a way that is explanatory of a species's
indivisibility into further species (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d.
3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 177 (Scotus [OO], 7:478; Spade (1994),
103-104)). Equally, an ultimate specific difference is
"primarily diverse" from any other, in the sense that such
a specific difference "has a concept that is absolutely
simple" (and thus cannot even overlap with the concept of any
other such difference) (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq.
5-6, n. 183 (Scotus [OO], 7:481; Spade (1994), 105)). It does
not seem overly puzzling that a specific difference could perform
these two functions: the absolute conceptual simplicity of any
ultimate specific difference seems to entail both distinction from
every other specific difference, and its possessing the relevant sort
of indivisibility. And Scotus believes that these sorts of
consideration can help explicate the function of a haecceity relative
to individuation too. That is to say, he believes that something
wholly devoid of common (shared) content - a haecceity -
can explain not only indivisibility into further particulars, but also
distinction from all other particulars (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II,
d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 177 (Scotus [OO], 7:478; Spade (1994),
103-104); n. 183 (Scotus [OO], 7:481; Spade (1994), 105)).



So Scotus holds that the explanations for indivisibility and
distinction are the same. To understand why he supposes that this
explanation needs to be something real, we need to keep in mind his
account of the reality of common natures, outlined in the previous
section, for the reality of common natures is a premise in
Scotus's defense of the existence of haecceities. Since such
natures are real, Scotus reasons, the haecceities that tie such
natures to individuals must be equally real too:



> 
> Just as unity in common follows *per se* on some entity in
> common, so too does any unity follow *per se* on some entity or
> other. Therefore, absolute unity (like the unity of an individual
> ... that is, a unity with which division into several subjective
> parts is incompatible and with which not being a designated
> *this* is incompatible), if it is found in beings (as every
> theory assumes), follows *per se* on some *per se*
> entity. But it does not follow *per se* on the entity of the
> nature, because that has a certain *per se* real unity of its
> own, as was proved.... Therefore, it follows on some other entity
> that determines this one. And that other entity makes up something
> *per se* one with the entity of the nature, because the whole
> to which this unity belongs is perfect of itself. (Scotus,
> *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 169 (Scotus [OO],
> 7:474-475; Spade (1994), 101))
> 



And later Scotus notes that it "does not seem probable"
that the common nature has some kind of entity and yet that the
individuating feature does not. (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3,
p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 178 (Scotus [OO], 7:478-479; Spade
(1994), 104))



Scotus elsewhere considers the view of Henry of Ghent that the
explanation for individuation could be merely a negation. The point
about a negation is that it is not in any way *real*: it is not
a thing, or a real form or property of a thing. As Scotus sees it,
claiming that individuation could be by a negation is just a way of
restating the problem, not of proposing an explanatory solution to it
(Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 49 (Scotus [OO],
7:413; Spade (1994), 69)). In fact, Scotus takes himself to have not
merely an explanation for individuation, but also an explanation for
identity. The contrast with modern accounts of haecceities is thus
quite sharp. In much modern literature, an item's haecceity is simply
the primitive property of being that item, or being identical with
that item. For Scotus, the haecceity is supposed to *explain*
that property. (See further discussion of this in section 6
below.)



Supposing that a haecceity is something real, where does it fit into
the range of things that there are? Is it, for example, a form, or
something else? According to Scotus, it is something like a form, and
sometimes, indeed, he calls it such (while elsewhere denying the same
claim: on these insignificant terminological shifts, see Dumont
[1995]). The reason is that a haecceity is clearly something like a
property of a thing - hence like a form - but is at the
same time wholly devoid of any correspondence to any conceptual
contents. It is not at all a qualitative feature of a thing -
not at all a "quidditative" feature, in the technical
vocabulary. As irreducibly particular, it shares no real feature in
common with any other thing. This does not mean that haecceities
cannot fall under the extension of a concept. *Being an
individuating feature* is not a real property of a haecceity (it
cannot be, since any haecceity is wholly simple, and shares no real
features with any other thing); but any concept of what a haecceity is
certainly includes among its components *being an individuating
feature*. A concept of a haecceity includes representations merely
of logical, not real, features of any haecceity.



Scotus's position on the reality of both the nature and the haecceity
seems to raise a number of problems. Perhaps the most acute - a
problem which Scotus himself raises - is this:



> 
> If there is some real unity less than numerical unity, it belongs to
> something that is either in what is numerically the same or in
> something else. Not in what is numerically the same, because whatever
> is numerically the same is numerically one. Neither is it in two,
> because there is nothing really one in those two. (Scotus,
> *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 171 (Scotus [OO],
> 7:476; Spade (1994), 102))
> 



This is what has come to be known as Ockham's problem (see King
[1992], 51): how can the nature as instantiated retain its
non-numerical unity? Scotus's apparent solution is that the nature in
itself has non-numerical unity, but that as existent in particulars it
has, in each particular, numerical unity. Scotus thus -
consistent with his basic insight - believes that the nature has
two different sorts of extramental entity:



> 
> In the same item that is one in number there is some kind of entity
> from which there follows a unity less than numerical unity is. Such
> unity [viz. less-than-numerical] is real, and what such unity belongs
> to is of itself formally one by numerical unity. I grant therefore
> that this real unity [viz. less-than-numerical] does not belong to
> anything existing in two individuals, but in one. (Scotus,
> *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 172 (Scotus [OO],
> 7:476; Spade (1994), 102))
> 



Scotus explains his position by exploiting the analogy between a
haecceity or individual difference, and a specific difference:



> 
> Color in whiteness is specifically one, but it is not so of itself or
> *per se* or primarily but only denominatively. But a specific
> difference is primarily one, because it is primarily incompatible with
> it to be divided into what are several in species. Whiteness is
> specifically one *per se* but not primarily, because it is
> specifically one through something intrinsic to it (for example,
> through the difference). So I grant that whatever is in this stone is
> numerically one, either primarily or *per se* or
> denominatively. Primarily, say, as that through which such a unity
> belongs to this composite. *Per se*, the stone itself, of which
> what is primarily one with this unity is a *per se* part. Only
> denominatively, what is potential and is perfected by the actual and
> is so to speak denominatively related to its actuality. (Scotus,
> *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, nn. 174-175
> (Scotus [OO], 7:477-478; Spade (1994), 103))
> 



There are three things here: the nature in the particular, the
haecceity, and the particular itself. Each of these is numerically one
(and thus numerically distinct from the corrrelative items in any
other particular). The haecceity is 'primarily' numerically one,
because its numerical unity is a basic feature of its. The particular
is *per se* numerically one because it includes the component
in virtue of which it is numerically one. The nature in the particular
is denominatively numerically one. Denominative predication obtains in
the case that the predicate is true of the subject as the result of
the subject's possession of some further, accidental, feature. Thus,
qualifying the predication as "denominative" in this way
does not make the predication any less real. Being accidentally
numerically one is a case of being numerically one, not of being
non-numerically one, and what Scotus is really trying to say is that
the nature *in this particular* is indeed really (though
accidentally) numerically one. Note that the denominative numerical
singularity of the nature in the particular is still compatible with
the common nature's being numerically one in some other particular,
and this is because the nature in itself (not as in this or that
particular) is less-than-numerically one (Scotus, *Ordinatio*
II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 34 (Scotus [OO], 7:404-405; Spade (1994),
64)).



Being non-numerically one, then, is compatible with being accidentally
numerically one in any one instantiation. But a problem immediately
arises: is being non-numerically one compatible with being
accidentally numerically many in many instantiations? On the one hand,
thinking this seems a natural way of understanding the theory, given
its realist character; on the other, we have just seen Scotus deny
that this kind of unity belongs "to anything existing in two
individuals." Perhaps we should say that the nature is really in
many individuals, but does not "exist" in many individuals,
since existence is precisely a property of concrete particulars.
Elsewhere, indeed, Scotus draws an analogy with the Christian doctrine
of the Trinity, according to which there is numerically one nature
shared by three distinct persons (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3,
p. 1, q. 1, n. 39 (Scotus [OO], 7:408; Spade (1994), 44)). And this
suggests, contrariwise, that just as something numerically one is in
three persons, so something with less-than-numerical unity is in many
individuals. Perhaps there are just no principled rules for counting
items with less-than-numerical unity. (For an excellent discussion of
some of these problems, see Paasch (2014).)



We run into an analogous problem with the question of the common
nature's entity. Scotus persistently refuses to reduce it to the
entity of the particulars to which it belongs: as we saw in the
previous section, this entity "has true real being outside the
soul." But it nevertheless somehow belongs to the entity of the
particulars: as we have just seen, "Such unity [viz.
less-than-numerical] is real, and what such unity belongs to is of
itself formally one by numerical unity." Setting aside the
particular and the haecceity, we might wonder how many entities there
are. Perhaps the entity of the common nature is nothing over and above
the entity of the nature in the particular. But perhaps not. So it
seems to me that it is hard to come to an assessment of the strength
of Scotus's realism, since it is hard to come to an appraisal of his
view on the reality of the common nature.



I have spoken about consituents in this context: the nature in the
particular and the haecceity are in effect constituents of the
particular. So there must be some kind of distinction between them.
This distinction cannot be real, since according to Scotus real
distinction requires separability, and the features are not separable
from each other any more than they are separable from themselves.
Neither are they anything like discrete parts of some whole. They are,
as Scotus puts it, "formally distinct":



> 
> This individual entity is not matter or form of the composite,
> inasmuch as each of these is a nature. Rather, it is the ultimate
> reality of the being that is matter or that is form or that is the
> composite. Thus whatever is common and yet determinable can still be
> distinguished (no matter how much it is one thing) into several
> formally distinct realities of which this one is not formally that
> one. This one is formally the entity of singularity and that one is
> formally the entity of the nature. These two realities cannot be
> distinguished as *thing* and *thing*. ... Rather
> when in the same thing, whether in a part or in the whole, they are
> always formally distinct realities of the same thing. (Scotus,
> *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5-6, n. 188 (Scotus [OO],
> 7:483-484; Spade (1994), 107))
> 



The formal distinction in this context is fundamentally a way of
distinguishing the necessary properties of a particular substance, in
cases where the natures of which the substances are instantiations are
not coextensive. Given this, what sort of relation "ties"
these two formally distinct components together? Scotus suggests that
this relation is real (i.e. numerical) sameness, a kind of unity
falling short of absolute identity (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d.
2, p. 2, qq. 1-4, n. 403 (Scotus [OO], 2:356)). This sameness is
presumably something rather like the relation of compresence found in
Russell and others, though unlike compresence, real sameness is not
only symmetrical but also transitive (see Tweedale [1999],
2:463-464). Scotus is able to claim transitivity for the
relation of real sameness since, as we have seen, he believes that the
common nature instantiated in two distinct particulars does not itself
have real (i.e. numerical) identity (see Tweedale [1999], 488). The
haeeceity and the nature in the particular can thus be really the same
without different concrete particulars of the same kind being really
the same as each other.



What should we say about the indiscernibility of identicals in these
kinds of case (real identity, formal distinction)? Haecceities explain
the identity of the complete concrete objects that they compose. So
complete concrete objects have self-identity. So too does each of the
formalities that compose such a concrete object. But these formalities
are discernible from each other. Real sameness falls short of absolute
identity. (I discuss some of these issues, and others related to the
varieties of distinction in Scotus, in Cross [2019].)



Given the huge problems that an account of haecceities seems to raise,
it is worth seeing just why Scotus believes he needs to accept this
view of individuation as opposed to a rival one. Scotus defends
haecceities by rejecting all alternative theories of individuation
known to him. Rejecting qualitative theories is easy for the
scholastics. Suppose that all things of a given kind in some sense
share the same nature. The nature as such cannot explain
individuation. So the explanation must be somehow non-essential. But
non-essential qualitative or accidental features of a thing are
posterior to the thing itself, since although the substance must have
some accidental features, precisely which ones it has is a matter of
historical chance (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n.
87 (Scotus [OO], 7:432-433; Spade (1994), 79)). Things are not
identical with their life-stories (on this, see Cross [1999b]).
Indeed, Scotus goes so far as to suggest that the accidents of a
substance - at least, its quantities, qualities, and relations
- are individuated by their own haecceities, something that is
not often spotted in the commentaries (on this, see Scotus,
*Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 89 (Scotus [OO], 7:434;
Spade (1994), 79-80)). The great 17th century Scotist, John
Poncius, extends this claim to cover even so-called *propria*,
necessary but non-defining properties: paradigmatically, a capacity to
smile in human beings (see Poncius, *Disputatio Metaphysica*
VI, q. 9 [Poncius (1659), 138b]).



But this far from exhausts the options, and Scotus considers a number
of non-qualitative theories too. In addition to the two theories
discussed above, to the effect that things just are individuals
(either through the nature itself, or through the negation of
division), he considers a view according to which existence
individuates, and two views according to which the explanation for
individuation is matter, respectively matter as such, and matter +
extension. Actual existence, perhaps a *prima facie* plausible
non-qualitative or non-essential feature of a thing, is rejected by
Scotus as an individuator on the grounds that existence as such
- as opposed to the things that exist - does not seem to
be different from case to case: in itself, it seems wholly
undifferentiated (Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n.
61 (Scotus [OO], 7:418-419; Spade (1994), 72-73)). Nothing
about existence seems irreducibly particular in the way required.
Indeed, Scotus supposes that there is a sense in which existence is
posterior to the haecceity: the whole hierarchy of division into
individuals is antecedent to questions of those individuals' existence
(Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q, 3, n. 65 (Scotus [OO],
7:420; Spade (1994), 73-74). But that is another story.



Perhaps the most interesting non-qualitative approach is the theory,
often associated with Aquinas (but attacked by Scotus in the forms
presented by Godfrey of Fontaines and Giles of Rome), that
individuation is by extended matter: by, as we might say,
*chunks* of matter. Scotus's way of understanding the problem
of individuation becomes important in his rejection of this theory.
For his fundamental strategy against this sort of material
individuation is that such a theory, while it may be able to explain
numerical distinction, certainly cannot explain indivisibility:



> 
> Quantity is not the reason for divisibility into individuals....
> For a universal whole, which is divided into individuals and into
> subjective parts, is predicated of each of those subjective parts in
> such a way that each subjective part is it. But the quantitative parts
> into which a continuous whole is divided never admit of the
> predication of the whole that is divided into them. (Scotus,
> *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 106 (Scotus [OO], 7:443;
> Spade (1994), 85))
> 



(The 'whole' here is not water as such, taking 'water' as a mass term;
it is the individual body of water, with which no proper part of the
body is identical.) Scotus has other arguments too, most notably
variants of the theme that the same chunk of matter (matter +
extension) seems to persist through substantial change, and thus not
to be sufficient as an account of individuation (see Scotus,
*Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, nn. 77-81 (Scotus [OO],
7:427-429; Spade (1994), 77)). Individuation on Scotus's
view is not, fundamentally, a case of instantiating forms in
 matter



## 4. Later medieval and early modern accounts of haecceities



Acceptance of haecceities is a distinctive feature of the thought of
many followers of Scotus, though there are some sixteenth-century
scholastics who accept haecceities without accepting many other
distinctively Scotist teachings. Having said this, some early
followers of Scotus reject haecceities and the theory of the common
nature altogether, and of those who accept haecceities, some found the
correct understanding of the nature of the distinction between an
individual's nature and its haecceity a troublesome matter. One of the
earliest Scotists, Francis of Meyronnes, writing his commentary on the
*Sentences* around 1320, accepts the theory of the
non-numerical unity of common natures (*In Sent*. II, d. 34, q.
3 [Francis of Meyronnes (1520), 157rbG]), and the claim
that individuation is by haecceity (*In Sent*. II, d. 34, q. 4
[Francis of Meyronnes (1520), 157vaK-L]; I, d. 3, q. 4
[Francis of Meyronnes (1520), 18raA]). But he holds that it
is inappropriate to talk of a formal distinction in this context.
Formal distinction obtains only between things that have some sort of
quidditative content (*In Sent*. I, d. 8, q. 5 [(1520),
48vbQ-49raB]). Haecceities have no such
quidditative content (*In Sent*. I, d. 8, q. 5 [(1520),
48rbG]), and thus cannot be formally distinct from their
nature. Rather, a haecceity is *modally* distinct from its
nature (*In Sent*. II, d. 34, q. 3 [(1520),
157vaL]). A modal distinction, according to Meyronnes,
obtains between a thing and an intrinsic mode of that thing, where an
intrinsic mode is something which "when added to a thing does
not vary its formal definition ... since it does not of itself
imply any quiddity or formal definition" (*In Sent*. I,
d. 42, q. 3 [(1520), 120vaL; 120vbO]; see too
*In Sent*. I, d. 8, q. 5 [(1520), 49rbE]). A
haecceity does not affect a thing's kind; it is thus an
intrinsic mode of the thing.



It may look as though this is just a terminological shift, but it is
not so in at least the following way: a modal distinction is a lesser
kind of distinction than a formal distinction. Formal distinctions
obtain between genus and specific difference; thus, the difference
between species/nature and haecceity, for Meyronnes, is less than the
difference between genus and difference. Scotus, contrariwise, makes
no such distinction between degrees of difference in this context (for
this contrast between the two thinkers, see Dumont [1987], 18). Still,
without some principled way of spelling out degrees of difference,
this contrast between Scotus and Meyronnes amounts to nothing of any
philosophical interest. To this extent the difference between the two
thinkers might as well be merely terminological, and Meyronnes needs
to do more work if he is to make any significant philosophical point
here.



Amongst baroque scholastics, the most notable adherent of haecceities
is the Jesuit Peter Fonseca (1528-1599), whose monumental
commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Fonseca [1599])
includes an extensive discussion of haecceities. (Fonseca, with
something of a humanist background, worries about the barbarous nature
of Scotus's neologism, and suggests in passing that 'haeccity'
[*haeccitas*] would have been a more comfortable formulation
[*In Met*. V, c. 6, q. 5, sect. 1 (Fonseca [1599], vol. 2, col.
381D)] - compare 'quiddity.') Like many of the
sixteenth and seventeenth-century scholastics, Fonseca - most
notable for coming up with a theory of divine "middle
knowledge" at much the same time as Molina - is not a
follower of any one earlier philosopher, preferring to learn from any
of his predecessors on various points as he sees fit. According to
Fonseca,



> 
> the principle of individuation is a certain positive difference,
> primarily incommunicable, which, when added to the species, in itself
> constitutes the individual ... which difference others call
> haecceities. (Fonseca, *In Met*. V, c. 6, q. 5, sect. 1
> [Fonseca (1599), vol. 2, col. 181C-D])
> 



Fonseca engages particularly with the rejection of haecceities in the
Thomist Cajetan (most notably in Cajetan's commentary on Aquinas's
*De ente*, c. 2, q. 5, nn. 33-36 (Cajetan [CBE],
94-98)). Cajetan worries that haecceities need to be in some
sense similar to each other - and specifically that the
haecceities of Socrates and Plato must be more similar than the
haecceities of Plato and some white patch (Cajetan, *In de
ente*, c. 2, q. 5, n. 36 (Cajetan [CBE], 97); see Fonseca, *In
Met*. V, c. 6, q. 5, sect. 2 [Fonseca (1599), vol. 2, col.
185C-D]). According to Fonseca, haecceities are similar to each other
without having anything real in common: they are thus primarily
diverse in the required sense, even though the haecceities of Socrates
and Plato are more similar than the haecceities of Plato and some
white patch (Fonseca, *In Met*. V, c. 6, q. 5, sect. 2 [Fonseca
(1599), vol. 2, col. 185E-F]). More generally, Fonseca (rightly) holds
that exact similarity between two haecceities would entail that the
two haecceities were numerically identical (Fonseca, *In Met*.
V, c. 6, q. 5, sect. 2 [Fonseca (1599), vol. 2, col. 185B]).



Fonseca is convinced of the reality of haecceities because he accepts
the view that common natures have in themselves a certain sort of
unity prior to instantiation. Fonseca proposes that, in order to have
real existence, something needs to be added to the nature - a
haecceity (Fonseca, *In Met*. V, c. 28, q. 3, sect. 4 [Fonseca
(1599), vol. 2, col. 966A]). Again, Fonseca's discussion is informed
by the criticisms of Cajetan, though in this case the position that
Cajetan adopts on the question of the *unity* of the common
nature seems closer to the broadly Thomist and Scotist tradition than
that proposed by Fonseca. In other words, Fonseca adopts an account of
the common nature that seems quite distinct from the closely related
views of Aquinas and Scotus. To this extent, Fonseca's account
represents an acceptance of haecceities in the context of a theory of
universals that is not really Scotist. According to Cajetan, common
natures in themselves have "formal" unity: indivisibility
into further more specific kinds, compatible with division into
numerically many instances or subjective parts (Cajetan [CBE], nn.
134-155 [nn. 55-62]; see Fonseca, *In Met*. V, c.
28, q. 3, sect. 4 [Fonseca (1599), vol. 2, col. 967B, D-E]). Fonseca
agrees that the nature must have this formal unity - a unity
that he identifies as Scotus's less-than-numerical unity (Fonseca,
*In Met*. V, c. 28, q. 3, sect. 4 [Fonseca (1599), vol. 2, col.
968A]). But, in addition to this unity, he holds that the nature has a
proper unity of its own that cannot be communicated to its
instantiations. This unity is *numerical*, and belongs to the
nature absolutely (unqualifiedly) (Fonseca, *In Met*. V, c. 28,
q. 3, sect. 4 [Fonseca (1599), vol. 2, col. 968A]). The reason is
that, if a nature lacked such additional unity, then it would not be
possible to speak of (say) humanity as just one species. After all,
the formal unity of the nature is compatible with division into
numerically many instances; some other unity must be the basis for the
assertion that humanity is not many natures or species (Fonseca,
*In Met*. V, c. 28, q. 3, sect. 1 [Fonseca (1599), vol. 2, col.
959F]). The picture is admittedly not entirely clear, but Fonseca's
distinction of instantiable from non-instantiable unity is presumably
supposed to explain how there can be some unity proper to common
natures; this unity is distinguished from instantiable unity, and it
is the existence of haecceities that explains how the instantiable
unity is in fact instantiated.


## 5. Rejecting haecceities



Setting aside the complexities of a later thinker such as Fonseca, the
years immediately after Scotus saw something of a move towards a more
nominalist view on the question of universals - the view (on the
understanding of 'nominalism' relevant here) that
universals are just concepts. Amongst opponents of Scotus, the most
common strategy was to adopt the view that substances themselves are
primarily diverse, such that their distinction is not explained by any
real feature or property of them other than merely the substance
itself. For example, according to Peter Auriol writing in the decade
after Scotus' death,



> 
> objects are singular by themselves, and ... this singularity is a
> basic fact that needs no further explanation.... Maintaining that
> an object is singular or individual because it results from or is
> endowed with a proper principle of individuation which is itself
> singular, amounts to nothing more than duplicating what should be
> explained. (Nielsen [2003], 498)
> 



Primitive distinction must occur somewhere - so why not make it
at the level of the substance itself, rather than of some constituent
of the substance? Rejection of Scotus's view was not confined to such
manifest opponents of Scotus's system. Amongst the earliest students
of Scotus, various found his views on the haecceity and its formal
distinction from the nature unpalatable. William of Alnwick, the
foremost of Scotus's students working through the second decade of the
fourteenth century, holds at least two different positions, neither
the same as Scotus's. In an early disputed question on individuation,
William holds that natures are individual of themselves (Stella
[1968], 363); later, in his *Ordinatio* on the
*Sentences*, William accepts something akin to Henry of Ghent's
position that individuation is by a negation, though adding the
clarification that this negation represents nevertheless a perfection
- it is better not to have the positive feature of divisibility
(Stella [1968], 630-631). The reason for the shift in view is an
apprehension that the fact that natures can be multiplied (i.e.
exemplified many times) entails that a nature cannot be
self-individuating (Stella [1968], 628). But William cannot see how
the added feature could be anything positive, since he does not see
how an individual could be anything, necessarily, other than its
nature (Stella [1968], 631). In both works, William objects to
Scotus's view that the common nature is somehow prior to its
instantiations, on the grounds that this priority entails that the
common nature could exist without any of its instantiations (Stella
[1968], 352, 625). This in effect amounts - in Scotist terms
- to the claim that the nature is really distinct, not just
formally distinct, from any of its instantiations. For Scotus, the
mark of a formal distinction is inseparability: no individual is
separable from its nature, and there is thus no more than a formal
distinction in any individual between nature and haecceity. Ockham
puts his finger on this misinterpretation on the part of Alnwick:



> 
> On this question there is one theory attributed by some people [viz.
> William of Alnwick] to the Subtle Doctor [i.e. Scotus] .... This
> is the theory that the universal is a true being outside the soul,
> really distinct from a contracting difference but really multiplied
> and varied by such a contracting difference. (Ockham,
> *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 5, n. 6 (William of Ockham [OT], 2:154,
> ll. 1-2, 3-7; Spade (1994), 149))
> 



As Ockham rightly implies, this is not Scotus's view. A position not
dissimilar to William's earlier, nominalist, view can be found in
another prominent early student of Scotus's - Henry of Harclay
(see Henninger [1994]; for Ockham's rejection of the way in which
Harclay develops his nominalist theory, see Ockham, *Ordinatio*
I, d. 2, q. 7, nn. 11-12, 63-82 (William of Ockham [OT],
2:227, l. 15-p. 228, l. 20, p. 241, l. 21-p. 248, l. 21;
Spade (1994), 191-192, 200-204); see too Adams
[1982]).



Ockham himself, writing 1321-1323, raises an array of arguments
against Scotus's position. Ockham was a thinker explicitly influenced
by Scotus in all sorts of ways, while nevertheless rejecting the
fundamental feature of Scotist metaphysics and semantics, namely
realism on the question of common natures. Without exception, the
arguments target one of the following two Scotist positions: the
commonality of the nature, and the formal distinction. As such, Ockham
does not attack haecceities, though in so far as Scotus's account of
haecceities requires both his distinctive account of the divisibility
of a nature, and the formal distinction between nature and haecceity,
Ockham's attacks will harm Scotus's haecceities too. Ockham offers no
fewer than four arguments against common natures with less than
numerical unity (Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 6, nn. 51, 62,
78, 82 (William of Ockham [OT], 2:181, ll. 8-13, p. 184, ll.
11-13, p. 189, ll. 10-14, p. 190, ll. 18-22; Spade
(1994), 161, 163, 166, 167)). The key one is the second: humanity in
Socrates and humanity in Plato are numerically distinct, and
essentially so. So there is nothing in common between these
humanities. Ockham's first and longest argument against Scotus takes
issue with the formal distinction. Against the formal distinction of
really identical entities, Ockham persistently appeals to the
indiscernibility of identicals, arguing that there is no kind of
identity mid-way between real identity and real distinction: see
Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 6, nn. 25-8, 83 (William
of Ockham [OT], 2:173, l. 11-p. 174, l. 12, p. 190, l. 23-p.
191, l. 4; Spade (1994), 118, 127)). As Marilyn Adams has pointed out,
this strategy seems to beg the question against Scotus (Adams [1982],
420).



Ockham's more parsimonious ontology is important in the attempt to
understand the nature of the opposition to Scotus just outlined.
Ockham is sometimes presented as though his distinctive position on
the question of individuation is simply the result of his distinctive
nominalist position on the question of universals. Thus Armand Maurer,
in a generally very helpful account of Ockham's position:



> 
> The problem of individuation, in the usual sense of the term, does not
> arise in Ockham's philosophy. The problem occurs when a philosopher
> maintains that there are natures or essences in individuals, in some
> way common the individuals and yet diversified in them.... Given
> the commonness of [e.g] animality, what makes the individual animal to
> be the individual it is? (Maurer [1994], 373)
> 



This is not quite right. For while Ockham does not need an account of
indivisibility (since a tenet of Ockham's nominalism on the question
of universals is that nothing real is divisible into subjective
parts), he certainly needs an account of the distinction of one
substance from another, as Black's reflections on the principle of the
identity of indiscernibles forcefully show. In fact, Ockham claims
that a substance is singular *through itself* ("se
ipso": Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 6, n.
105-107 (William of Ockham [OT], 2:196, ll. 2-12; Spade
(1994), 171)). And it seems to me that this claim does indeed
constitute an attempt at a solution to the problem of distinction. For
Ockham is a nominalist about many more properties than Scotus is, as
well as being a nominalist on the question of universals. Thus, Ockham
believes that the set of those predicates that involve no ontological
commitment (that is to say, predicates that do not signify anything
extramental other than merely the substance itself) includes the
Aristotelian genus, specific difference, and *proprium*
(necessary but non-defining property) (see e.g. Moody [1935], 97-106,
145-51). Substances themselves are primarily diverse according
to Ockham - their distinction from each other is not explained
by anything other than their own self-identity, and *ipso
facto* not by any qualitative or relational feature of themselves.
Self-identity is not, however, a real feature of the substance in any
sense distinct from itself or its nature. And this is the result not
of Ockham's nominalism on the question of universals, but of his
nominalism on the question of inseparable properties. And much the
same seems true of the other opponents of Scotus mentioned above.



Ockham's position thus turns out to be a variety of haecceitism (in a
more modern sense of the word). Maintaining that substances are
primarily diverse does not amount to having no theory of
individuation. Indeed, it presumably entails that their diversity is
not explained by, say, qualitative distinction. Thus, Ockham holds
that two things, each *per se* singular, can be
"precisely similar" to each other (Ockham,
*Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 6, n. 108 (William of Ockham [OT],
2:196, l. 17; Spade (1994), 171)). And this seems to entail some form
of haecceitism. The difference between this view and that of Scotus is
that the haecceity defended by Scotus is - in some minimal way
- *hypostatized*. Some modern accounts of haecceities
resemble Ockham's view more than Scotus's: the uniquely instantiable,
non-qualitative property of (say) being identical with Socrates
- Socrates's haecceity (in the modern terminology) - does
not carry the kind of ontological weight that Scotus wants to place on
haecceities as he understands them:



> 
> It may be controversial to speak of a 'property' of being
> identical with me. I want the word 'property' to carry as
> light a metaphysical load here as possible. 'Thisness' is
> intended to be a synonym or translation of the traditional term
> 'haecceity' (in Latin, '*haecceitas*'),
> which so far as I know was invented by Duns Scotus. Like many medieval
> philosophers, Scotus regarded properties as components of the things
> that have them. He introduced haecceities (thisnesses), accordingly,
> as a special sort of metaphysical component of individuals. I am not
> proposing to revive this aspect of his conception of a haecceity,
> because I am not committed to regarding properties as components of
> individuals. To deny that thisnesses are purely qualitative is not
> necessarily to postulate "bare particulars," substrata
> without qualities of their own, which would be what was left of the
> individual when all its qualitative properties were subtracted.
> Conversely, to hold that thisnesses are purely qualitative is not to
> imply that individuals are nothing but bundles of qualities, for
> qualities may not be components of individuals at all. We could
> probably conduct our investigation, in somewhat different terms,
> without referring to thisnesses as properties. (Adams [1979],
> 6-7)
> 



Note, of course, that Scotus's account of the common nature also
entails something stronger than Adams is proposing: indeed, it entails
precisely the sort of minimal hypostatization that Scotus advocates.
And the reason for this, of course, is Scotus's view that individual
substances cannot themselves be primarily diverse - a fact that
is explained by his claim that common natures have some sort of unity
in their instantiations: the nature in Socrates is (non-numerically)
*the same* as the nature in Plato. Natures, for Scotus, cannot
be primarily diverse; substances must include more than natures. But
individual natures in Ockham's view can indeed be primarily diverse,
and this surely amounts to a form of haecceitism - nothing other
than an individual nature's own self-identity explains its distinction
from all other such natures. Maintaining that individual natures are
primarily diverse amounts not to having no theory of individuation,
but to accepting a form of haecceitism that, like Adams's, does not
involve ontological commitment to the existence of haecceities as
distinct real constituents of things. The result, as in Adams, is that
the identity of indiscernibles is false even in Scotus's rather
trivial sense.