## 1. Conceptual Background



To our knowledge, al-Farabi was the first philosopher in the Islamic
world who not only displayed a serious interest in philosophy of
society and religion, but also developed a highly differentiated
account thereof. He did not, however, start from scratch. At his time,
the majority of those philosophical texts which were actually
translated from Greek (mostly through Syriac) into Arabic were
available, and al-Farabi was obviously an avid reader of his
predecessors. Accordingly, his writings display *(a)* intimate
familiarity with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*;
*(b)* acquaintance with the essentials of Plato's
*Politeia* (probably mediated by Galen's
*Compendium*; cf. Gutas 2012: 85); and, apparently,
*(c)* some knowledge of Aristotle's *Politica*, of
which only parts were available in Arabic (Pines 1975).
Al-Farabi's philosophy of society and religion can be described
as an intelligent and original synthesis, particularly, of these
oeuvres, a synthesis which shares the late-ancient commentators'
concern for harmonizing the positions of Aristotle and Plato.
Moreover, al-Farabi's philosophy of society and religion turns
out to be a clever adaptation of Greek ethico-political thought to the
needs and demands of its new context, the Islamic world of the
10th century.



Al-Farabi's Greek heritage is already visible on the most basic
conceptual level. A society, on his account, is an association of
human beings collaborating "[i]n order to preserve [themselves]
and to attain [their] highest perfections" (*Perfect
State* V, 15, 1: 229). Without collaboration, he insists,
"man cannot attain the perfection, for the sake of which his
inborn nature [*fitra*] has been given to him" (ibid.).
In function of their size, associations can or cannot furnish the
basis for a "perfect [*kamil*] society"
(*Perfect State* V, 15, 2: 229-31). Thus, the smallest
unit suited to harbor a perfect society is a city (*madina*).
Smaller associations, such as villages, quarters, streets, and houses
are *per se* imperfect; larger ones, like nations and the
"union of all the societies in the inhabitable world"
(ibid.), by contrast, are perfect.



The dependence of al-Farabi's thought thus far, particularly on
Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politica* is
obvious. Both the notion that societies only of a certain size can
accommodate their members independent of external supplies, and the
idea that human beings strive for some sort of perfection, can be
traced back to the Stagirite's work. Moreover, just like
Aristotle, al-Farabi is convinced that attaining the highest possible
degree of perfection entails happiness, a key concept of his thought.
Inspired perhaps by the *Politica*, he further elaborates on
the concept of human perfection: first, he links it with the notion
that people live in societies and, second, draws the conclusion that
these societies serve a specific purpose, beyond the mere allocation
of daily needs, such as food, shelter, and protection. Societies have
their own 'natural *telos*' which consists,
according to al-Farabi, in guiding their members towards their end:
true felicity. As a consequence, a city



> 
> 
> ... in which people aim through association at co-operating for
> the things by which felicity in its real and true sense can be
> attained, is the excellent city [*madina fadila*], and the
> society in which there is a co-operation to acquire felicity is the
> excellent society [*ijtima' fadil*]. (*Perfect
> State* V, 15, 3:
>  231)[2]
> 
> 
> 



[Unless indicated otherwise, material within square brackets in
quotations is added by the author of this entry.]



It is for this reason that society for al-Farabi constitutes an
indispensable object of philosophical inquiry. Basically, along with
anthropology (*'ilm al-insan*, a term al-Farabi himself
occasionally employs) and cosmology, philosophy of society seeks to
reveal humanity's final end as well as the means required to
achieve this goal (cf. *Enumeration* 1: 76). Accordingly, this
new 'discipline' is the main branch of practical
philosophy, centered on some core elements which, therefore, shall be
discussed in more detail in this entry, more precisely: the notions of
happiness and the afterlife; the idea of a similitude between society
and natural organisms as well as the cosmos as a whole; the moral
obligations, both cognitive and practical, entailed by the natural
givens; and the methods of directing the citizens of the *madina
fadila* towards their natural *telos*, the most prominent
of which being religion.


## 2. What is 'philosophy of society'?


### 2.1 Happiness and the afterlife



In line with Aristotle, al-Farabi leaves no doubt whatsoever that
there is one kind of happiness which constitutes the *telos* of
every human being. Occasionally, he distinguishes between
"earthly" and "ultimate felicity"
(*Attainment* i, 1: 13), however, from the majority of his
writings it is clear that happiness in the strict sense of the word,
that is, as the concomitant of the highest human perfection, is
ultimate
 felicity.[3]
 Yet, in contrast to Aristotle's notion of *eudaimonia*,
al-Farabi's ultimate happiness is a state associated with the
afterlife, when, according to his theory of the soul, the soul has
separated from the body (see the entry on
 al-Farabi's psychology).
 The achievement of this state is contingent upon a number of
 preconditions.[4]
 However, before these preconditions can be broached (see
 section 2.2),
 further scrutiny of al-Farabi's concepts of human perfection
and the afterlife is required.



Human perfection is defined by humanity's place within the
cosmic order. Prior to death, human beings are hybrids--corporeal
entities, on the one hand, yet also immaterial, on the other, due to
their intellects, that is, the rational faculty of their souls which
can survive death--and as such exposed to two sets of powers.
Just like every other inhabitant of the sublunary
 world,[5]
 human beings are subject to the natural laws determining corporeal
substances. In contrast, however, to all the other species belonging
to the sphere of generation and corruption, human beings moreover
experience a certain influence by the so-called 'active
intellect', an immaterial, incorruptible, supralunary entity
whose existence is pure
 thinking.[6]
 This active intellect does not affect the body of a human being, but
rather her intellect and imagination, i.e., those psychic faculties
involved in thinking. The most fundamental influence which the active
intellect exerts on the human soul consists in, first, the provision
and, second, the basic 'formatting' of the rational
faculty:



> 
> 
> ... [the active intellect] gives the human being a faculty and a
> principle by which to strive, or by which the human being is able to
> strive on his own for the rest of the perfections that remain for him.
> That principle is the primary sciences and the primary intelligibles
> attained in the rational part of the soul. (*Political Regime*
> B, 1, 68: 62)
> 
> 
> 



Only due to these "primary sciences" and "primary
intelligibles" can human beings think in an abstract and
universal fashion and thus acquire knowledge about what there
 is.[7]
 And precisely in the realization of this activity, i.e., thinking,
and its perfection--ideally, the attainment of its most sublime
level, i.e., science--consists humanity's *telos*.
Human beings, hence, are born with the natural obligation to perfect
their rational faculty. While they are equipped by the active
intellect with this faculty and the principles of thought, their task
consists in actualizing this potential, i.e., their intellects,
"by which a human being is a human being" (*Political
Regime* A, 2, 8: 32). Becoming an intellect in actuality, just
like the active intellect and the other separate intelligences,
therefore, constitutes humanity's perfection. Once a human being
reaches this level of perfection, she acquires the state of ultimate
happiness:



> 
> 
> When the rational faculty attains to being an intellect in actuality,
> that intellect it now is in actuality also becomes similar to the
> separate things and it intellects its essence that is [now] intellect
> in actuality. .... Through this, it becomes such as to be in the
> rank of the active intellect. And when a human being obtains this
> rank, his happiness is perfected. (*Political Regime* A, 2, 8:
> 33; square brackets thus in the
>  translation)[8]
> 
> 
> 



Across al-Farabi's various writings, it remains unclear whether
this stage of ultimate felicity can already be reached during
one's lifetime, when the soul is still linked with the human
body, or only in the hereafter, once the soul has separated from the
body due to this latter's
 death.[9]
 Still, in striking contrast to Islamic teachings, al-Farabi is
convinced that the afterlife is exclusively psychic or rather
intellectual. In his thought there is no room for corporeal
resurrection. Instead, the felicity of the hereafter, according to
him, means purely intellectual pleasures, a state, however, which
requires preparation during one's lifetime, a state, moreover,
which allows for individual differences. In function of the excellence
an individual has achieved during her life, the felicity of her
afterlife will be greater or lesser. This excellence now, on
al-Farabi's account, can be measured against a number of
'natural duties', prerequisite for the attainment of
happiness, but differentiated in accordance with the individual
citizens' natural endowments:



> 
> 
> The people of the excellent city have things in common which they all
> perform and comprehend, and other things which each class knows and
> does on its own. Each of these people reaches the state of felicity by
> precisely these two things .... The same is true of the actions
> by which felicity is attained: the more they increase and are repeated
> ..., the stronger and more excellent and more perfect becomes the
> soul ..., until it arrives at that stage of perfection in which
> it can dispense with matter so that it becomes independent of it
>  ....[10]
>  |4: 265| When one generation passes away, their bodies cease to exist
> and their souls are released and become happy and when other people
> succeed them in their ranks ..., they occupy in their turn the
> same ranks in felicity as those who passed away before, and each joins
> those who resemble him in species, quantity and quality. ... |5:
> 267| The kinds of felicity are unequal in excellence and differ in
> three ways, in species, quantity and quality .... (*Perfect
> State* V, 16, 2: 261-3; 4: 265; 5:
>  267)[11]
> 
> 
> 



True individual happiness, as al-Farabi sees it, thus turns out to be
a peculiar blend of Aristotelian, Platonic, and Neoplatonic elements.
It simultaneously embraces the idea of the individual felicity
attained by the philosophers, the notion of a purification and,
ultimately, deification of the human soul, and a theory of intellect
which largely intertwines cosmic and epistemic dimensions. While the
just-quoted passage from the *Perfect State* shows that, beyond
the knowledge of certain things, particular actions must be performed
as a precondition for the attainment of individual happiness,
al-Farabi's emphasis on cognition cannot be overestimated. For,
whatever he has in mind regarding activities, from the above it is
clear that the human *telos* is located at the level of
rationality. Happiness, consequently, consists in the
as-perfect-as-possible assimilation of the human soul to the active
intellect, whose unique activity is thinking.



This being said, a number of questions remain open and must be
addressed in what follows: first, the things every citizen of the
*madina* is expected to know; second, the role activities play
in the attainment of individual felicity; and, third, how
al-Farabi's just-discussed concept of happiness squares with his
distinction between different "classes" of citizens as
well as various degrees of felicity.


### 2.2 The preconditions of happiness



As the last citation from the *Perfect State* conveys, when
discussing the preconditions of felicity, al-Farabi distinguishes
between *(a)* common and *(b)* specific duties of the
citizens, as well as between *(i)* knowledge and *(ii)*
activities. His most detailed indications concerning these
preconditions address *(a.i)* the common things that everyone
must know and are spelled out in the following list:



> 
> 
> The things in common which all the people of the excellent city ought
> to know are: (1) In the first place to know the First Cause and all
> its qualities; (2) then the immaterial existents [including the above
> mentioned active intellect] ...; (3) the celestial substances
> ...; (4) [without number in Walzer's translation] then the
> natural bodies which are beneath them, and how they come to be and
> pass away ...; (5) then the generation of man; (6) then the first
> ruler ...; (7) then the rulers who have to take his place
> ...; (8) then the excellent city and its people and the felicity
> which their souls ultimately reach .... (*Perfect State*
> V, 17, 1: 277-9)
> 
> 
> 



From this list it follows that al-Farabi presupposes a quite profound
knowledge of cosmology, physics, anthropology, and philosophy of
society. This is rather astounding in view of the fact that, as he
himself admits, only a minority of people are sufficiently gifted
intellectually to do science, which is to say, to understand those
things al-Farabi mentions in his
 list.[12]
 This raises the question of whether or not felicity is in effect
attainable by everyone, a question that will be pursued in
 section 3.2
 of this entry. Regarding the preconditions of happiness, however, it
can be concluded that, as far as the common knowledge requirements
*(a.i)* are concerned, al-Farabi sets the bar fairly high: only
accomplished philosophers will be able to fulfill these criteria.



As for the remaining preconditions, al-Farabi is far less explicit.
There are some indications regarding the common activities
*(a.ii)*. It appears that, once again in unison with Aristotle,
these embrace all sorts of exercises suited to purify one's soul
while it is still unified with 'its' body, as
al-Farabi's references to the soul's disposition as well
as his recurrent comparisons with arts and crafts suggest. Thus, he
intimates, in connection with the last quoted passage:



> 
> 
> When each of [the people of the excellent city] acts in this way
> [i.e., according to the citizens' common duties], these actions
> of his make him acquire a good and excellent disposition of the soul,
> and the more steadily he applies himself to them, the stronger and
> better becomes that disposition of this and increases in strength and
> excellence--just as steadily applying himself to performing the
> actions of writing well make a man acquire proficiency in the art of
> writing .... (*Perfect State* V, 16, 2: 261)
> 
> 
> 



In the background of this notion of acquiring a better psychic
disposition by virtue of repeatedly performing certain activities, is
(in addition to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*) the
ancient medical tradition. Accordingly, even the (immaterial) rational
faculty of the soul can be positively affected, if those faculties of
the soul which operate by virtue of corporeal organs (such as sense
perception and imagination) are improved. This concerns, at the most
basic level, the mixture of the temperaments, which is directly
related to the nutritive faculty: the better one's temperaments
are in balance, the fewer are the negative influences by the body on
the soul, and the more easily this human being will, hence, be able to
use her rational faculty. On a slightly more complex level, this idea
of balance or harmony as a means to purify the soul also concerns the
realm of moral virtues. For while one's character is
fundamentally predisposed by her temperament, al-Farabi maintains that
virtues can be trained and improved. Thus, just as keeping the bodily
humors in check, being able to find the 'golden mean' in
ethical matters usually prepares the ground for a swifter and less
distracted application of one's rational
 faculty.[13]



That al-Farabi in fact envisages moral virtues as one of the
preconditions of individual happiness, is further corroborated by his
assessment of deficient cities and societies. Among these communities
are the "immoral cities" whose inhabitants, despite
knowing better, "through their passion and will [are] inclined
toward" what al-Farabi considers to be wrong or presumed goods,
such as "status, honor, domination" (*Political
Regime* C, 3, 120: 90; cf. also *Book of Religion* 11:
101), which distract from humanity's natural *telos*.
Other examples of misguided ambitions include the quest for "the
enjoyment of pleasures" imagined to be found in gluttony,
drinking, and sexual intercourse (*Political Regime* C, 3, 119:
89). Al-Farabi's verdict regarding these communities is
unambiguous: "No one at all among the inhabitants of these
cities gains happiness" (ibid. 120: 90). As these examples and
al-Farabi's assessment evince, just like the balance of
one's temperaments, her character is significant in the pursuit
of happiness not for its own sake, but insofar as it fulfills a
preparatory task. It prepares the human being's soul so that it
can, to the best of its ability, perform its proper activity, i.e.,
reasoning.



Regarding, finally, those things which citizens are supposed to know
and do in accordance with their respective classes (referred to as
 *b.i* and *b.ii* above,
 first paragraph of this section), al-Farabi seems to think of the
various trades and professions performed in the
 *polis*.[14]
 As the next section will reveal, he differentiates between the
individual skills and weaknesses with which each human being is born.
He is convinced that, equipped with these specific talents, each human
being possesses her natural place and duty within society. Actualizing
her individual potential to the best of her capacities, hence,
contributes to the functioning and well-being of the community. This,
in fact, does not immediately lead towards individual happiness, but
is a necessary precondition as it contributes to covering the daily
needs and, thus, warranting the basis for society to aspire for its
own natural *telos* (see
 section 1
 above).


## 3. The principle of similitude


### 3.1 Being: man, society, cosmos



Al-Farabi's notion of ultimate felicity has tremendous impact on
his philosophy of society. In the light of humanity's particular
*telos*, a society can be "excellent
(*fadil*)", in the sense introduced
 above,[15]
 if and only if its cooperation pursues society's natural
*telos*, i.e., if it seeks to equip its members with the
necessary means for the attainment of individual happiness. Therefore,
the primary goal of governing a society must consist in providing the
means so that everyone can acquire theoretical
 knowledge,[16]
 learn about her natural duties, and put them into practice. In order
to explain his notion of the excellent society, al-Farabi falls back
on two recurrent examples, natural organisms and the cosmos. At first
glance, this comparison might appear inappropriate, linking voluntary
behavior in the case of human beings and society with the strictly
natural and causal processes characterizing the functioning of
organisms and the cosmos as a whole. However, al-Farabi's aim is
not to deny the distinction between the voluntary and the
natural--quite the contrary.



While human beings, on his account, are in fact endowed with free will
and, hence, can organize their own lives as well as their communities
*ad
 libitum*,[17]
 there is, as seen above, a natural norm for humanity distinguishing
the good life from the bad life and, in terms of eschatology, the
attainment of happiness from failure to do so. In this sense,
al-Farabi clearly subscribes to what nowadays would be called a
natural law ethics. And it is precisely at this level that his two
examples, organisms and the cosmos, come into play and lend his
notions of society and happiness a conspicuously Platonic flavor. In
al-Farabi's view, organisms and the cosmos are the perfect
models which human beings--for themselves as well as for their
social lives--are well advised to emulate:



> 
> 
> Both the city and the household have an analogy with the body of the
> human being. The body is composed of different parts ..., each
> doing a certain action, so that from all their actions they come
> together in mutual assistance to perfect the purpose of the human
> being's body. In the same way, both the city and the household
> are composed of different parts of a definite number ..., each
> performing on its own a certain action, so that from their actions
> they come together in mutual assistance to perfect the purpose of the
> city or the household. (*Selected Aphorisms* 25: 23)
> 
> 
> 



Essentially, al-Farabi applies Aristotle's notion of
*ergon* to the cosmos and each of its members. Accordingly, the
cosmos as such is not only determined by a certain order, it actually
represents the best of all possible structures, as it is the effect of
the over-perfect first
 cause.[18]
 Consequently, every part of the cosmos possesses a specific function
which it must perform in order to keep the *perpetuum mobile*
cosmos running smoothly, without interruptions and disturbances. While
everything else executes its function by nature, human beings,
equipped with reason and free will, must choose to do so. Therefore,
they must understand the cosmic order and their own place and duty, or
rather *ergon*, in the frame of this all-embracing structure,
which, once again, underscores the significance attached to knowledge
in al-Farabi's thought.



And yet, the implications of the two paradigmatic examples, organisms
and the cosmos, reach further, inasmuch as both examples represent
complex entities with a diversified internal makeup. Granted, every
element of the cosmos or an organism in general contributes to the
well-being of the whole, nonetheless, each one has its peculiar
activity. The heart, for instance, is in charge of pumping the blood
through the blood vessels and thus keeping the body alive, whereas the
kidneys are responsible for filtering the blood and regulating water
fluid levels. Similarly, al-Farabi gives to understand that each human
being has a particular task within the framework of society, in view
of her specific skills (cf. above,
 section 2.2,
 regarding the citizens' specific knowledge and activities
 [*b.i* and *b.ii*]):



> 
> 
> The excellent city resembles the perfect and healthy body, all of
> whose limbs co-operate .... Now the limbs and organs of the body
> are different and their natural endowments and faculties are unequal
> in excellence, there being among them one ruling organ, namely the
> heart, and organs which are close in rank to that ruling organ
> .... The same holds good in the case of the city. Its parts are
> different by nature, and their natural dispositions are unequal in
> excellence: there is in it a man who is the ruler, and there are
> others whose ranks are close to the ruler, each of them with a
> disposition and a habit through which he performs an action ....
> (*Perfect State* V, 15, 4: 231-3)
> 
> 
> 



This analogy constitutes the core of al-Farabi's philosophy of
society, creating, however, several remarkable tensions within his
thought. Thus, as seen above, in the vein of Aristotle, he maintains
that humanity's specific difference is rationality and that the
natural *telos* of every human being consists in perfecting
this feature. Meanwhile, he also holds that human beings differ with
regard to their natural endowments. Accordingly, some are highly
intelligent, while others are not. Some have the potential to become
philosophers and recognize the makeup of the world, happiness, and the
natural norm encapsulated in these ontological givens;
others--actually the majority, as al-Farabi believes--do not
possess these capacities. This raises the two interrelated questions
of, first, how these individuals can nevertheless attain felicity, if
at all; and, second, how society must be set up in order to achieve
its own natural *telos* and offer each member an equal
opportunity for attaining individual happiness.


### 3.2 Knowing: things *versus* symbolic representations



In order to approach these questions, it is imperative to have a
closer look at al-Farabi's anthropology (*'ilm
al-insan*) which represents the backbone of his philosophy of
society and religion. In line with the Greek medical tradition,
particularly Galen, al-Farabi is convinced that individual natural
endowments depend chiefly on two factors, first, the region of the
world in which one happens to be born and, second, one's bodily
constitution, i.e., the body's concrete mixture of elements (cf.
above,
 section 2.2).[19]
 For although the human soul as such is immaterial, so long as it is
coupled with 'its' body, it depends for its activities
(including, in a way, thinking) on corporeal organs like the external
senses, allowing for sense perception and imagination. Notably,
one's temperament or natural disposition--determining
primarily those processes which can be associated with moods,
emotions, and, in general, character traits--thus turns out to be
the limiting factor defining whether a human being will be
sharp-witted or rather dull and, hence, able to perfect for herself
humanity's specific *ergon*, i.e., reasoning.



While at first glance this seems to imply natural predestination,
providing the happy few, on the one hand, with the means to attain
*eudaimonia*, but dooming the unfortunate many, on the other,
to misery, al-Farabi insists that every human being is equipped with
the necessary requirements to attain ultimate felicity, even those
whose natural disposition does not allow them to become philosophers.
For, according to him, people



> 
> 
> ... whose innate character is sound share in an innate character
> that disposes them to receive the intelligibles in which they all
> share and by which they strive toward objects and actions common to
> all of them. Then, afterward, they diverge and differ, thereby coming
> to an innate character that is particular to each one of them and to
> each group. So one among them is disposed to receive certain other
> intelligibles that are not shared, but are particular to him ....
> (*Political Regime* B, 1, 74: 65)
> 
> 
> 



Accordingly, provided one is not born a fool or a madman but a
*compos
 mentis*,[20]
 every human being has the means to "strive toward objects and
actions common to all". These objects and actions common to all,
meanwhile, along with "other things which each class knows and
does on its own" (*Perfect State* V, 16, 2: 261)
precisely correspond to the prerequisites for the attainment of
happiness discussed above, in
 section 2.2.
 However, as likewise seen above, these prerequisites, and
particularly those things which all human beings ought to know, set
fairly high intellectual standards. Nonetheless, according to
al-Farabi, the requirement of knowing these common objects does not
exclude anyone from attaining happiness, because they



> 
> 
> ... can be known in two ways, either by being impressed on [the
> people's] souls as they really are or by being impressed on them
> through affinity and symbolic representation. (*Perfect State*
> V, 17, 2: 279)
> 
> 
> 



Every human being, thus, can attain the individual felicity of the
 hereafter,[21]
 provided, that is, that she learns about the common objects in one of
these two ways. It is the duty of society or, more precisely, of the
ruler of the excellent city to ensure that everyone is taught these
things according to her capacities. In this connection, now, as will
be discussed in
 section 4,
 religion as the 'art of persuasion' has its specific
place and significance. Concerning al-Farabi's notion of
society, however, it is important to note that the chief duty ascribed
here to society and the excellent city has notable implications for
the nature of its government. Government, as can now be concluded and
is corroborated by various passages throughout al-Farabi's
 oeuvre,[22]
 must primarily be described as 'offering guidance',
'teaching', or 'habituating'.



At this point, the second aspect mentioned above, i.e., the
"innate character that is particular to each [individual] and to
each group" must be further elucidated (cf. the first quote in
this section). Human beings, as noted before, have the same
relationship to society as organs to the body. Owing to their
particular "innate character" or specific natural
disposition, they hold a particular natural place within the
'organism society', with a specific *ergon* they
ought to perform, so that the entire 'body' can function
well. Consequently, human beings not only have a natural duty towards
themselves, entailing individual felicity, but also towards society
and, even beyond, the cosmic order as a whole, contributing both to
the proper functioning of their society and to the happiness of the
'organism cosmos' and its various
 parts.[23]
 Hence, in correspondence with the particular trades and professions
implied by the members' individual skills, society is structured
by nature in an at once organic and hierarchical fashion:



> 
> 
> The ruling organ in the body is by nature the most perfect and most
> complete of the organs in itself and in its specific qualification
> ...; beneath it, in turn, are other organs which rule over organs
> inferior to them ...; they rule and are ruled. In the same way,
> the ruler of the city is the most perfect part of the city in his
> specific qualification and has the best of everything which anybody
> else shares with him; beneath him are people who are ruled by him and
> rule others. (*Perfect State* V, 15, 5: 235)
> 
> 
> 



The natural hierarchy underlying a well-ordered society is spelled out
in terms of al-Farabi's distinction between ruling and serving
functions. In the excellent city, itself the perfect image of a
natural body as well as the cosmos as a whole, the criterion for
rulership, in the vein of Plato's *Politeia*, is
intelligence and wisdom. This is to say that there is a ruler by
nature who distinguishes herself by her intimate understanding of the
cosmic order, its normative implications, human nature, and how to
realize the discovered normative implications in view of the diverse
talents and limitations determining the citizens' "innate
characters". Ruling the city, as was already stated before,
consists in providing precisely this kind of guidance: actualizing the
various potentials in a well-coordinated manner which faithfully
resembles the functioning of organisms, and thus seeking to facilitate
every citizen's pursuit of
 happiness.[24]



The excellent ruler, as can now be inferred, is not only the most
accomplished philosopher possessing a comprehensive theoretical
knowledge of all there
 is.[25]
 She is also and particularly the one who is able to ensure, first,
that every citizen is taught the things they need to do and to know,
thus inducing individual felicity; and, second, that everyone is
instructed in and carries out those "things which each class
knows and does on its own" (*Perfect State* V, 16, 2:
261; cf. also *Political Regime* B, 2, 78: 68), in this manner
simultaneously bringing about the well-being of the city and
contributing to the happiness of the organism cosmos. With this
background, al-Farabi's account of religion, i.e., the art of
persuasion or of teaching by virtue of "affinities and symbolic
representations" can be addressed.


## 4. Religion and the art of ruling


### 4.1 What is 'religion'?



> 
> 
> Religion is opinions and actions, determined and restricted with
> stipulations and prescribed for a community by their first ruler, who
> seeks to obtain through their practicing it a specific purpose with
> respect to them or by means of them. .... If the first ruler is
> excellent and his rulership truly excellent, then in what he
> prescribes he seeks only to obtain, for himself and for everyone under
> his rulership, the ultimate happiness that is truly happiness; and
> that religion will be the excellent religion. (*Book of
> Religion* 1: 93, slightly modified)
> 
> 
> 



As this quotation amply evinces, al-Farabi has a fairly peculiar
notion of religion. First, it embraces "opinions" and
"actions" and, hence, those two elements which, as seen
above
 (section 2.2),
 play a significant role in connection with the attainment of
individual felicity. Accordingly, human beings need to know certain
things (in one of the two mentioned ways) and perform certain actions
in order to become truly happy. Second, religion is described as the
result of a first ruler's activities. More precisely, this ruler
is depicted as the one who first established the opinions and actions
to be held and performed by the community she
 rules.[26]
 Furthermore, in so doing she pursued a specific purpose. In other
words, these opinions and actions are supposed to be defended and
carried out, not for their own sake, but--provided "the
first ruler is excellent"--for the sake of ultimate
happiness. Religion, therefore, is not a goal in and of itself; it is
an instrument, more specifically, it is an instrument of
 rulership.[27]



At first glance, al-Farabi's concept of religion may appear as
depreciative, particularly from the perspective of existing religions,
such as Islam. He bluntly denies religion the status of an autonomous
sphere of knowledge and wisdom; he rejects its claim to exclusive
truth; and he reduces it to a mere tool. However, these features
cannot be assessed *tel quel*, but require their specific
context, namely, al-Farabi's basic ontological and
epistemological views. According to him, the givens of
reality--the things constituting reality, their behavior, and the
underlying natural laws--are the effects of certain primary
principles, such as intelligence, soul, and matter, which are
ultimately all founded in a single, first cause (cf. above,
 section 2.1).[28]
 These facts now, on al-Farabi's account, can be known by human
beings, just as the moral obligations they entail (as discussed above,
 section 3.1).
 Accordingly, there is one objective reality and, epistemologically,
one objectively true account of it. There are, however, several
methods for appropriating this true account and, in turn, imparting it
to others, namely, "either ... as [these things] really are
or ... through affinity and symbolic representation"
 (section 3.2).



Precisely this latter method of symbolic representation is identified
with religion, while its counterpart, teaching and knowing things as
they "really are", corresponds to philosophy. Doubtlessly,
philosophy is therefore superior to religion, as is often underscored
by scholarship and acknowledged by al-Farabi himself (cf. *Book of
Religion* 5: 97-8). This superiority, however, concerns only
the respective epistemic levels. While 'philosophy' is the
name of a knowledge based on demonstration and resulting in objective
certitude, 'religion' is the name for a knowledge based on
dialectical and rhetorical means and resulting only in probable
opinion and
 conviction.[29]
 From a pragmatic point of view, by contrast, the coordinate system
shifts considerably. From this angle, it is religion which turns out
to be no less important than philosophy, due to the givens of
anthropology: for by far the majority of people depend on
"symbolic representation" as the avenue to the knowledge
and activities required for the attainment of felicity, while only a
minority can grasp the things as they "really are".



The relation of religion to philosophy, therefore, is like the
relation of human beings to organisms, and of society to the cosmos:
that of similitude--provided, that is, it is an excellent
 religion.[30]
 It is a similitude of philosophy in various respects, on the one
hand, concerning its immanent structure, on the other, regarding its
mode of operation. Just like philosophy, it embraces a body of
theoretical knowledge (a creed) from which it derives practical rules
(the law); and just like philosophy, its principal purpose consists in
teaching and, thus, providing a means of governance to the ruler. From
this particular setting it can be concluded that what religion
teaches, or rather, what the ruler teaches by virtue of religion, is a
metaphorical account of what philosophy presents scientifically. This
is already conspicuous, for example, in the way al-Farabi presents the
theoretical doctrines (creed) conveyed by religion:



> 
> 
> Among the theoretical [things taught by the excellent religion] are
> those that describe God, may He be exalted. Then there are some that
> describe the spiritual beings, their ranks in themselves, their
> stations in relation to God, may He be exalted .... (*Book of
> Religion* 2: 94)
> 
> 
> 



Even without presenting the entire list, it is obvious that al-Farabi
refers to the same issues as those detailed in his *Perfect
State* (see
 section 2.2
 above). However, while the *Perfect State* employed a
terminology reminiscent of philosophical jargon, the *Book of
Religion* falls back on religious terms. Instead of the first
cause, it speaks of God; instead of cosmology, it refers to theology;
instead of the separate intellects, it evokes angels and demons as
spiritual beings. The same kind of shift can be observed in connection
with the activities the excellent religion determines (law):



> 
> 
> As for actions, they are, first of all, the actions and speeches by
> which God is praised and extolled. Then there are those that praise
> the spiritual beings and the angels. Then there are those that praise
> the prophets, the most excellent kings, the righteous rulers, and the
> leaders of the right way who have gone before. (*Book of
> Religion* 3: 96, slightly modified)
> 
> 
> 



Once again, already the formulas used by al-Farabi to indicate the
type of activities determined by religion, without giving a single
example, evoke associations with existing religions, particularly,
Islam. Thus, with God's praise one will easily connect the five
daily prayers demanded of Muslims; the "prophets",
"righteous rulers", and "leaders of the right
way" are reminiscent of the prophet Muhammad and his
predecessors; of the first four caliphs; and of either the imams of
Shi'ism or other spiritual leaders of Islam (e.g., sufis).



Notably, in light of the above
 (section 2.2),
 it is evident that a religion's holy scripture, like the
Qur'an, serves two functions--provided that the respective
religion fulfills the excellence criterion. With regard to the
doctrines it imparts, it offers a similitude of the objects people
actually ought to know in order to achieve their natural
 *telos*.[31]
 As to its practical implications, i.e., the rites and norms it
conveys, it executes the aforementioned preparatory function: it
trains the faithful in a behavior which is suited to foster exactly
the same moral virtues as those addressed by the *Nicomachean
Ethics* and referred to by al-Farabi himself: virtues which
improve the soul's disposition so as to realize, to the best of
one's capacities, its natural
 *ergon*.[32]


### 4.2 Religion and rulership



The natural ruler of the excellent city, nation, or "union of
all the societies in the inhabitable world"
 (section 2.1,
 first quotation) is, against the backdrop of al-Farabi's
philosophy of society and religion, someone who is at once an
accomplished philosopher, prophet, supreme ruler, lawgiver, and imam.
She truly understands reality and its underlying principles and is
able to verify her knowledge demonstratively. However, she also has
the ability to 'translate' her knowledge into metaphors
and symbolic representations and present them, by means of rhetorical
devices, in a convincing
 fashion.[33]
 From the perspective of the majority of people, this metaphorical
account appears to be some sort of supernatural, divine revelation. In
a way, it is certainly 'divine', given al-Farabi's
cosmology. However, from the perspective of philosophy, it is clearly
not supernatural; it is merely a symbolic representation faithfully
encapsulating the essentials of metaphysics, natural philosophy,
anthropology, and philosophy of
 society.[34]



Religion, embracing a doctrinal as well as a legal branch, is thus the
most important element of rulership. It is an enterprise that must be
carried on beyond the death of the first ruler, fostered and further
developed by subsequent rulers and those savants who in a given
society are situated fairly high in the natural hierarchy, being
intelligent and erudite themselves, and thus 'naturally'
in charge of disseminating the knowledge required for happiness. In
particular, those actions which the first ruler, for whatever reason,
did not determine, will have to be legislated at some
 point.[35]
 Notably, even though the supposed similitude of society with the
cosmos, as well as al-Farabi's own parlance, suggest that the
'natural' form of government would be a monarchy, he
remains fairly noncommittal on this
 topic.[36]



Obviously, if there is at a given time in a given society a human
being unifying the required qualities, she will be the natural leader.
And in agreement with Plato's *Politeia*, al-Farabi seems
to believe that the founding act of creating a religion suited to
serve as the 'constitution' of an excellent
*polis*, presupposes a single, first ruler acting as the
original lawgiver. However, if subsequently there is nowhere in the
*madina* a single person incorporating these qualities, several
people with complementary properties should team up and henceforth
guide the community. This clearly exhibits that al-Farabi was not
particularly interested in concrete political structures and systems.
His attention, instead, was directed towards the metaphysical
principles underlying human associations and their normative
implications.



This peculiar stance is clearly displayed in al-Farabi's
discussion of deficient cities and societies. While the details differ
across his various treatises dedicated to this topic, the scale by
means of which he assesses 'excellence' and
'deficiency' is consistently those two factors identified
above: knowledge and action, on both the common and the class-related
levels. Thus, for instance, in the *Political Regime* he
distinguishes six deficient forms of cities, among which he lists the
"necessary societies" (*Political Regime* C, 2, 93:
76, substituting 'societies' for
'associations'). This kind of society or city, he
explains,



> 
> 
> ... is the one in which there is mutual assistance for earning
> what is necessary to constitute and safeguard bodies. .... Among
> the necessary cities, there may be some that bring together all of the
> arts that procure what is necessary. Their ruler is the one who has
> fine governance and excellent stratagems for using [the citizens] so
> that they gain the necessary things and fine governance in preserving
> these things for them or who bestows these things on them from what he
> has. (*Political Regime* C, 2, 94: 77)
> 
> 
> 



At first glance, this seems just fine and precisely what good
rulership ought to accomplish. All the trades and professions required
for the *polis* to subsist are extant. The ruler is by no means
a tyrant exploiting her subjects, but rather excels in helping them to
gain these goods, preserving them and distributing them among the
latter. Nevertheless, what is deficient in this type of society is
adumbrated in the first phrase of the quote: the mutual cooperation
described here is directed exclusively towards the well-being of
bodies. It thus neglects society's proper purpose, namely, the
promotion of humanity's natural *telos*, which certainly
presupposes but cannot be reduced to well-functioning bodies.



Society, according to al-Farabi, as can be deduced from these
observations, ought to be a joint venture, grounded in the true
understanding of reality and its principles, and guided by a religion
which translates this understanding, first, into generally
comprehensible doctrines, i.e., similitudes, and, second, activities
suited to purify and prepare the citizens' souls in their quest
for felicity. Thus, it clearly ought to transcend the mere
satisfaction of daily needs and wants. Therefore, al-Farabi
concludes,



> 
> 
> ... the first ruler of the excellent city must already have
> thorough cognizance of theoretical philosophy; for he cannot
> understand anything pertaining to God's, may He be exalted,
> governance of the world so as to follow it except from that source. It
> is clear, in addition, that all of this is impossible unless there is
> a common religion in the cities that brings together their opinions,
> beliefs, and actions; that renders their divisions harmonious, linked
> together, and well ordered; and at that point they will support one
> another in their actions and assist one another to reach the purpose
> that is sought after, namely, ultimate happiness. (*Book of
> Religion* 27: 113, slightly modified)
> 
> 
> 


## 5. Final remarks



Philosophy and religion turn out to possess a fairly peculiar relation
to one another in al-Farabi's thought. Philosophy, or rather
metaphysics, is the only way to advance to the most profound
explanation of all there is as well as humanity's natural duties
entailed by the natural givens. Accordingly, an excellent philosopher
can do without religion in her pursuit of happiness. Religion,
however, cannot do without philosophy and, *a fortiori*,
neither can society. In view of what is at stake in the case of
failure to grasp and convey the truth, the pressure put on philosophy
and, to some lesser extent, on religion in this theory is enormous.
Society cannot fulfill its *ergon* without either philosophy or
religion, nor without a government conscientiously imparting the
theoretical and practical duties; with the consequence that, apart
from a few 'born' philosophers, human beings will fail to
attain individual felicity.



While these are serious threats on the practical level, it appears
that as far as the underlying anthropology is concerned, al-Farabi
endorses a profoundly optimistic view. He is convinced that everything
which needs to be known and done to reach individual happiness is
attainable by virtue of humanity's natural endowments. As such,
there is no need for revelation of a supernatural kind. Instead, as
al-Farabi gives to understand, there is plenty of evidence to be found
in reality and its principles, which teach humanity about happiness.
There are, furthermore, abundant models, ranging from the cosmic order
to the makeup of the most primitive organisms, which need only be
emulated to guide humanity towards its final goal. And, last but not
least, there are philosophers who discovered and understood these
natural givens and implications already centuries
 ago.[37]
 Hence, the only thing that remains to be done, on his account, is to
put these insights into practice.