## 1. Judgments



While the distinction between judgments and principles may intuitively
correspond to that between the particular and the general,



> 
> 
> [p]eople have considered judgments at all levels of generality, from
> those about particular situations and institutions up through broad
> standards and first principles to formal and abstract conditions on
> moral conceptions. (Rawls 1974: 8)
> 
> 
> 



A first distinction is, then, that while principles necessarily
generalize to more than one case (List & Valentini 2016; Slavny et
al. 2021), judgments may be either general or particular. A second
distinction is that judgments express an agent's moral outlook
while principles are candidate representations of that outlook (cf.
Brun 2014). In reflective equilibrium, judgments are the views
actually held by the moral deliberator while a "scheme of
principles represents their moral conception and characterizes their
moral sensibility" (Rawls 1974: 7; see also Rawls 1971: 48).
This section examines judgments, while the next considers
principles.


### 1.1 Considered Judgments



The method of reflective equilibrium starts with judgments. An initial
question is which of these judgments should be allowed entry to the
process.



An obvious position with some appeal is to allow *any*
judgments or intuitions. A permissive view says that



> 
> 
> [o]ur "intuitions" are simply opinions; our philosophical
> theories are the same. Some are commonsensical, some are
> sophisticated; some are particular, some general; some are more firmly
> held, some less. But they are all opinions, and a reasonable goal for
> a philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium ... If our
> official theories disagree with what we cannot help thinking outside
> the philosophy room, then no real equilibrium has been reached. (Lewis
> 1983: x; cf. Goodman 1965: 63-64)
> 
> 
> 



This might seem cavalier, but we are at the moment only discussing the
starting point of the method. If reflective equilibrium does its job,
our initial judgments may be transformed, and will at any rate cohere
with theoretical considerations.



The mainstream view, by contrast, suggests that only *considered
judgments* should be used in reflective equilibrium. These are
"those judgments in which our moral capacities are least likely
to be displayed without distortion" (Rawls 1971: 47). We should
(1) be capable of reaching the right decision (e.g., be reasonably
well informed), (2) be in circumstances where we can do so (e.g., not
be scared or upset), and (3) be motivated to do so (e.g., not stand to
gain or lose from the results of our deliberations). In short, we
should have the ability, opportunity, and desire to make the right
decision (Rawls 1971: 48). In moral and political philosophy, the
judgments used in reflective equilibrium are usually these Rawlsian
considered judgments.



Intuitions are frequently used interchangeably with considered
judgments in the critical literature on reflective equilibrium. But
intuitions as typically described have characteristics that are not
generally true of considered judgments, especially non-inferentiality
(Brun 2014; Greenspan 2015; Cath 2016: 228-229). This entry will
therefore focus on considered judgments rather than intuitions.


### 1.2 The Confidence Constraint



Rawls proposes that "we can discard those judgments made with
hesitation, or in which we have little confidence" (Rawls 1971:
47). In other words, considered judgments are subject to a
*confidence constraint.* Relatedly, Rawls frequently refers to
considered judgments as "convictions" (e.g., Rawls 1971:
19-21, 45, 48, 53, 246, 318-320, 447, 520, 580). The
confidence constraint extends to *revisions* of judgments,
which must be made "with conviction and confidence" (Rawls
1974: 8). A more modest version of the confidence constraint is a
compromise between the ideal of accounting for all judgments and
practical limitations (Scanlon 2003: 144).



An alternative view suggests that, if, as Rawls supposes, we are
trying to describe our moral capacity, it may appear self-defeating to
exclude some of our moral judgments from consideration. Our lack of
confidence in some judgments means they are likely to be rejected
during the reflective process but gives no reason to dismiss them out
of hand (Raz 1982: 318-319). Such a move may increase rather
than decrease the distortion of moral sensibilities that reflective
equilibrium is supposed to address (Knight 2017: 47-48).
Consider someone with certain far right commitments, but not so far
gone that they don't recognize some appeal to such values as
equality and liberty, though they have little confidence in them or a
clear idea of their contours. It may seem peremptory to exclude the
unconfident judgments supporting these values from consideration in
reflective equilibrium, where they might have found principled
support.


### 1.3 The Epistemic Constraint



Considered judgments, even those that satisfy the confidence
constraint, are not limited as to their content. One might have the
ability, opportunity, and desire to make the right decision, yet make
a grossly mistaken decision, and be confident in it (see Sternberg
[ed.] 2002). This may motivate an *epistemic constraint.* A
modest version would exclude judgments that are logically inconsistent
or founded on empirical error. A more ambitious constraint excludes
any unjustified or unwarranted beliefs (Kelly & McGrath 2010). For
example, Gerald Gaus comments that "clearly unjustified beliefs
are, if anything, epistemic liabilities," approvingly quoting
Quine and Ullian's suggestion that "insofar as we are
rational, we will drop a belief when we have in vain tried to find
evidence for it" (Gaus 1996: 86; Quine & Ullian 1970:
16).



Friends of reflective equilibrium largely reject such a constraint.
The basic complaint is that it makes epistemological determinations in
advance of the reflective process where these are rather the proper
upshot of that process. Reflective equilibrium can be viewed as a
negative method, i.e., as what we're left with when we decide
that positive criteria for epistemic success cannot be laid out prior
to fully considering our substantive topics (Walden 2013: 255). On
this view, what counts as justification, warrant, or consistency
should be decided with all relevant theory on the table as part of the
process of reflective equilibrium and is not prescribed by the method
itself.


### 1.4 Initial Judgments



Cutting across the issue of which constraints, if any, to put on
judgments is the question of the priority of *initial*
judgments over those arising during the reflective process.



Narrow reflective equilibrium, described but not endorsed by Rawls and
Daniels, matches principles to initial judgments, with only minor
changes allowed (Rawls 1971: 49; Rawls 1974: 8; Daniels 1996: 22, 49).
A more moderate position is that "initially tenable commitments
have a presumption in their favor" (Elgin 1996: 107). On this
view, "independently motivated, initially tenable commitments
must underwrite coherence," for however coherent the components
of reflective equilibrium may be, "their mutual support may
derive from a judicious disregard for contravening
considerations" (Elgin 1996: 107; see also Baumberger & Brun
2021). Initial judgments anchor reflective equilibrium to something
outside itself. A similar suggestion is that inchoate initial
judgments are "a central constraint" (Schroeter 2004:
122).



An opposing view gives initial judgments no priority over subsequent
judgments. Moral beliefs may be formed that are not just different
from but discontinuous with one's initial beliefs, which may be
rejected. One may, for instance, undergo a moral conversion, becoming
convinced by the worldview of a Marx or Nietzsche (DePaul 1993: ch.
1). This "radical" version of reflective equilibrium
allows the moral deliberator to comprehensively change their mind.



Though Michael DePaul states the radical position most clearly,
contrasting it with a "conservative" reflective
equilibrium that he takes as dominant (DePaul 1993: 31), the radical
view seems more in line with canonical reflective equilibrium, which
encourages revision of judgment on theoretical grounds (see, e.g.,
Daniels 1996: 2-4, 26-28, 60-61, 70-71). While
Rawls' applications of reflective equilibrium assume that we
have certain "convictions" (such as those opposing racial
discrimination or religious intolerance), in explaining the method he
is clear that "a person's sense of justice may or may not
undergo a radical shift" (Rawls 1971: 49)--and on closer
inspection we see that convictions are only
"*provisional* fixed points" (Rawls 1971: 20; Rawls
2005: 8, emphasis added; see also Rawls 1974: 8). Even Elgin allows
that "considerations with no initial tenability sometimes
dislodge initially tenable commitments"; it's just that
the latter "are not to be given up without reason" (Elgin
1996: 108, 107).



There is, then, significant agreement that initial judgments can be
overridden by subsequent ones, with a residual disagreement as to
whether they nevertheless receive weak presumptive priority.


## 2. Principles and Theories



Reflective equilibrium, at least on its classic construal, arises
where judgments are brought together with their representation in
principles. Theories play a dual role as agglomerations of the
principles and priority rules that are the outputs of reflective
equilibrium, and as sources of argument for selecting those
principles. This section considers the role of principles and theories
in reflective equilibrium.


### 2.1 Wide Reflective Equilibrium



As mentioned above, a *narrow* reflective equilibrium is
reached where principles are matched to initial judgments, allowing
only for the "smoothing out of certain irregularities"
(Rawls 1971: 49). In moral and political philosophy this is of
interest mainly as a contrast with the *wide* reflective
equilibrium endorsed by Rawls, Daniels, and many others in their wake
(but see Beisbart, Betz, & Brun 2021). A wide reflective
equilibrium is achieved where the deliberator has brought judgments
and principles into agreement having reflected on a wide range of
considerations. Wide reflective equilibrium contrasts with narrow
reflective equilibrium in several respects.



First, we are not merely looking for principles that look like our
initial judgments, giving our pre-theoretical opinions a philosophical
sheen. Rather, *a wide range of principles* should be
considered. Indeed, we should consider all principles to which our
judgments might plausibly conform, though "it is doubtful
whether one can ever reach this state" (Rawls 1971: 49). We will
return to this contrast between the ideal and the practical.



Second, our initial judgments are *revisable.* If you encounter
a principle that seems to fit many of your most important judgments,
or even that does not fit them but has appeal nonetheless, you are
free to change judgments that disagree with that principle. Perhaps a
principle even ranges over terrain on which you had no prior judgments
(e.g., moral dimensions of generative AI), in which case you can make
new judgments that agree or disagree with it, as you see fit.
Everything is up for grabs. (Note that this second feature is
consistent with giving initial judgments either no priority or weak
presumptive priority as discussed earlier.)



Third, we are to consider not just a very wide range of principles,
but *a wide range of* *arguments* for them. Ideally we
should consider all such arguments (Rawls 1971: 49). We are also to
consider arguments *against* principles. The arguments show the
strengths and weaknesses of the principles under consideration
(Daniels 1996: 82). One important kind of argument is the thought
experiment. For instance, in relation to the principle of utility, one
might consider utilitarian sheriffs, utility monsters, experience
machines, trolley problems, and repugnant conclusions, among countless
others. A "directed reflective equilibrium" offers a
sequencing for consideration of such cases (Slavny et al. 2021). Note
that such arguments may not only support one principle over another,
but generate new principles, such as variant forms of
utilitarianism--and there will be new arguments for and against
these variants, which generate their own variants, and so on.



Fourth, as well as arguments, we should consider "devices of
representation" (Rawls 2005: 23-28) or
"justificatory devices" (Daniels 1996: 59-60). It
may be that we have greater confidence in certain conditions on the
selection of principles than we antecedently have in any particular
principles. Prominent examples of such justificatory devices are
Rawls' original position, other contemporary (Scanlon 1998) and
historical (Locke 1689; Rousseau 1762) contractualist devices, as well
as their contractarian (Hobbes 1651; Gauthier 1986) and ideal observer
(Hume 1740, book 3; Smith 1759) counterparts. Whether we find any such
device useful is a matter of whether it fits our judgments in wide
reflective equilibrium. If we do, we may have a powerful new argument
for the principles that the device supports.



Finally, moral and non-moral *background theories* can inform
our equilibrium. Arguments for and against principles referred to
above are "inferences from relevant background theories"
(Daniels 1996: 82). Background theories can similarly be used to
inform our assessment of justificatory devices. For instance, our view
of Rawls' contract device may be informed by our view of
personal identity (Daniels 1996: 60). Indeed, Rawls



> 
> 
> went to great lengths to insure that the principles of justice did
> 'fit' with what we know about psychology, biology,
> evolutionary theory, economics, and other social and natural sciences.
> (Freeman 2007: 40)
> 
> 
> 



A wide reflective equilibrium achieves coherence not only between
judgments and principles regarding the issue at hand, but across the
full breadth of the deliberator's thought that might have
implications for it.



To summarize, wide reflective equilibrium consists of agreement
between revisable judgments and principles following reflection on a
wide range of principles, arguments, justificatory devices, and
background theories. In its pure form, it is an impossibly demanding
method, drawing a vast and ever-growing expanse of principles,
arguments and theories within its ambit. This exacting standard can
nevertheless inform our approach to a more modest reflective
equilibrium, as where Rawls compares his theory of justice's
"principles and arguments with a few other familiar
views," which "moves us closer to the philosophical ideal;
it does not, of course, achieve it" (Rawls 1971: 49, 50; see
also Rawls 2005: 97).


### 2.2 The Independence Constraint



A large part of the appeal of wide reflective equilibrium is its
appeal to deeper background theories. For example, my principles of
justice may depend in part on my views of individual agency; and my
views on agency may in turn depend on my views about free will and
causation. But isn't there a danger that this broad coherence is
bought at the cost of circularity?



Suppose, for instance, that I have the conviction that no one should
be very badly off. This judgment might support a sufficientarian
principle of justice requiring that no one is very badly off (e.g.,
Frankfurt 1987). But suppose I now claim that this principle is also
supported by the combination of the luck egalitarian background theory
that no one should be badly off through no genuine choice of their own
(Cohen 1989) with the hard determinist background theory that no one
is responsible for their choices, and my basis for the latter theory
is the original judgment no one should be very badly off. In such a
case it seems that the background theories give no independent support
for the sufficientarian principle, i.e., no support that was not
already there in the bare judgment that no one should be very badly
off. If it were not for that judgment, I would not have a basis for my
hard determinist background theory, and the luck egalitarian
background theory alone would not support the sufficientarian
principle, as it is consistent with some being very badly off due to
choice.



In response to such cases we can utilize an *independence
constraint* (Daniels 1996: 22-24)*.* Suppose we
distinguish *principle* *judgments*, which support the
principles, from *background judgments*, which support the
background theories. The independence constraint requires that
principle judgments are not also background judgments. Background
theories must draw on their own judgments and cannot
"recycle" principle judgments. As Daniels puts it,



> 
> 
> [t]he background theories in (c) should show that the moral principles
> in (b) are more acceptable than alternative principles on grounds to
> some degree independent of (b)'s match with relevant considered
> moral judgments in (a). If they are not in this way independently
> supported, then there seems to be no gain over the support the
> principles would have had in a corresponding narrow equilibrium, where
> there never was any appeal to (c). (Daniels 1996: 22)
> 
> 
> 



He applies this to Rawls' theory of justice, arguing that
Rawls' theories of the person and the role of morality are not
just redescriptions of the judgments that support Rawls' two
principles of justice and thereby satisfy the constraint (Daniels
1996: 23-24, 50-62).



Some commentators consider the independence constraint objectionable,
for instance suggesting that it encourages holding back some principle
judgments so they can be used as background judgments to create a wide
reflective equilibrium (Haslett 1987: 307-308). Yet the
independence constraint doesn't allow judgments to be held back
in this way--if they support the principles they are necessarily
principle judgments and cannot be used as background judgments (Knight
2006: 211).



Others argue that the constraint is superfluous, as



> 
> 
> [a] person who explicitly cooked up all her relevant background
> beliefs on the basis of her considered moral judgments would not be
> following the method of reflective equilibrium in the first place.
> (DePaul 1993: 15)
> 
> 
> 



But perhaps the more serious problem the constraint addresses is not
deliberate circularity. We want to ensure that our moral principles
are not merely "accidental generalizations" of
"moral facts," and we can do this by independently testing
them against background theories, just as scientific generalizations
that inadvertently correspond to observations can be distinguished
from scientific laws by their lack of coherence with connected theory
(Daniels 1996: 22). Critics suggest accidental generalizations might
alternatively be weeded out simply by considering a sufficiently large
number of cases (DePaul 1993: 15). A combination of the two approaches
may be preferable (Holmgren 1989: 59).


### 2.3 Coherentist or Foundationalist?



A commonsense form of justification is *inferential* and
*linear.* It is inferential because each belief is justified by
another, and it is linear because beliefs cannot justify any of their
antecedent beliefs. A is justified by B, which is justified by C, and
so on. The problem with such inferential and linear justification is
that it falls into infinite regress. For anything to be justified at
all, it seems we have to give an endless chain of justification that
we cannot possibly proffer. The regress can be ended either by
permitting non-inferential justification, as *foundationalism*
proposes, or by permitting non-linear justification, as
*coherentism* proposes (Brink 1989: 105-106). Some have
interpreted reflective equilibrium as foundationalist, but most
interpret it as coherentist.



Support for the foundationalist interpretation comes from considered
judgments' clear justificatory role in reflective equilibrium.
All justification in reflective equilibrium relies on the
deliberator's actual considered judgments. The most powerful
principle or elegantly coherent theory must be rejected if they do not
agree with judgment. Principles and theories have no influence on the
process except through the medium of considered judgments--if the
deliberator is not won around to them, they do not move the
equilibrium one iota. For the foundationalist, a judgment does not
need to prove itself as a principle or theory does. The mere fact that
the deliberator holds it is enough for it to guide equilibrium. That
said, the kind of foundationalism at hand is clearly rather modest
(Ebertz 1993; Cath 2016: 219-220). Judgments are treated as
revisable even where they are viewed as empirical data (Floyd 2017).
The method, at least in its usual, wide form, gives no place to the
unrevisable beliefs of traditional foundationalism or intuitionism
(DePaul 1993: 34).



The prevalence of the coherentist interpretation is, in part, based on
the obvious contrast with this traditional foundationalism. Wide
reflective equilibrium is, furthermore, an exemplar of the broadly
coherentist idea that beliefs can be justified by their coherence with
a system of beliefs (Rawls 1974: 8; Daniels 1996: 60-61; Tersman
2008: 398-400). The deliberator is not expected to consider a
principle in isolation, but rather to consider its connections with
other principles as well as a wide range of moral and non-moral
background theories. A principle can be justified by its fit with a
comprehensive system of thought exhibiting logical, probabilistic, and
explanatory relations among its members (Brink 1989: 103). For
example, and as we have seen, Rawls' theory of justice justifies
its principles of justice by appeal to theories of the person and of
morality, among other background theories. Coherentists claim that
moral beliefs alone are not enough for reflective equilibrium; they
rely on theory-grounded second-order beliefs about the reliability of
first order beliefs (Brink 1989: 127; Tersman 2008: 399).


### 2.4 Reflective Equilibrium without Principles?



The standard construal of reflective equilibrium seeks a
theoretically-driven balance between judgments and principles. It is
therefore unsurprising that it has been opposed by
*anti-theorists*, who set themselves against "an approach
to ethical enquiry that seeks a systematizing account of correct
ethical thought and practice" (Robertson 2017: 678). Bernard
Williams objected that Rawls' reflective equilibrium failed to
deliver mutually acceptable principles (Williams 1985: 110-116),
while Annette Baier was



> 
> 
> not content, like Rawls (1971: 50) to retreat to the aim of finding a
> theory that accommodates all *my* considered judgments, while
> resigning myself to the likelihood that yours are different and
> require a different theory. (Baier 1985: 140)
> 
> 
> 



This criticism of reflective equilibrium may be misplaced. Williams
appears to "conflate Rawls's contractualism with his
coherentist justification" (Clarke 1987: 243). It is
Rawls' original position, not his reflective equilibrium, which
aims to provide principles for a well-ordered society. Reflective
equilibrium has no commitment to contractualism or justificatory
devices generally; these are useful, where they are, simply because
they place conditions on practical reason that the individual
deliberator finds appealing. This may, however, seem to put reflective
equilibrium in Baier's sights, and in danger of solipsism; this
concern is addressed below in the discussion of public reflective
equilibrium.



While reflective equilibrium is not committed to devices of
justification, it is usually understood as being committed to
principles. Rawls and Daniels understand an equilibrium as between
judgments and principles, so if there are no principles, there can be
no equilibrium. This could, nevertheless, be seen as an arbitrary
restriction on moral deliberation. Someone might be convinced by
anti-theory, so that their considered judgments will settle on no
moral principles, maintaining that ethics should be more local and
practical. A supplementary line of thought inspired by foundationalism
might suggest that principles are superfluous to the method because
the real balance is struck between judgments. Such principle-less
moral conclusions do not seem admissible on the standard understanding
of reflective equilibrium. It is not clear why the formal category of
principles should be considered untouchable when everything else,
including the entire content of all principles and the background
theories by which they are assessed, is available for revision.



We might, then, consider whether reflective equilibrium is possible
without principles. On one view the core of reflective equilibrium is
inspired by Socrates' transformation of his pupils'
"inarticulate hunches into fully explicit beliefs"
(Schroeter 2004: 121). This "maieutic reflection" makes
our inchoate moral notions more precise; sometimes we will endorse
them, but at other times we may find they conflict and revise some of
them. Maieutic reflection is a valuable tool of moral enquiry even if
there is no "stable resting point" and no intention to
build a moral theory (Schroeter 2004: 122). Even antitheorists could
use this method. An apparent qualification is that
constructivists--those that hold that "moral facts are
epistemically constrained" (Schroeter 2004: 111)--are
committed to moral theory after all.



Curiously, the index of Rawls' *Political Liberalism*
provides a concise statement of a principle-less method:
"Reflective equilibrium: defined as when judgments at all levels
of generality are in line on due reflection" (Rawls 2005: 514).
Rather than bringing principles and judgments into agreement, as per
Rawls' official position, this variant would only bring
judgments into agreement with each other. This would still allow us to
retain major justificatory elements of wide reflective equilibrium,
arriving at a coherent set of considered judgments revised in light of
a wide range of competing principles, arguments, and background
theories. The only difference is that our judgments are not
necessarily represented in principles. Deliberators are free to follow
the classic mutual adjustment of principles and judgments should they
wish, but the output that is measured is judgments alone, "at
all levels of generality": utilitarians' one big judgment,
anti-theorists' countless smaller ones, and every position in
between.


### 2.5 Public Reflective Equilibrium



The mainstream reflective equilibrium of the early Rawls and Daniels
is *individualist.* It is a method for a philosopher to work
out her views (Rawls 1971; Daniels 1996). Further, they claim it is a
method that makes those views reasonable or justified. Yet it might be
claimed that a single philosopher's views on a topic of public
interest, such as Rawls' and Daniels' main substantive
topic of social justice, cannot really be justified in that way. That
individual may have justified their view to themselves, but they have
not justified it to other people, who have different considered
judgments and find different principles and theories appealing.



One response here is to insist that, if you have followed the method
correctly, it does justify one's principles, and not only to
oneself (see the discussions of credibility and relativism below). It
might nevertheless be urged that, if our views are to have some impact
in the real world, they should move other people as well as ourselves
(Anderson 2015). This is a challenge to reflective equilibrium from
political practice rather than moral epistemology, and philosophers
may feel it is not their role to address it--it is enough for
them to set out justified views. Still, those with policy ambitions
for reflective equilibrium have described three broad forms of
*public reflective equilibrium.*



The first keeps individualist reflective equilibrium as its starting
point, but aims to achieve convergence between equilibria (Daniels
1996: 33-39). The later Rawls particularly appeals to the idea
of an "overlapping consensus" (Rawls 2005). The broad
motivation here is that in a plural society with a diversity of
comprehensive moral doctrines we cannot rely on any one comprehensive
doctrine, such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, or a specific religious
faith, to support our political principles. Rather, the reflective
equilibria of adherents of each of these comprehensive doctrines can
converge on a specific set of liberal principles, each for different
reasons. The later Rawls continues to assume that reflective
equilibria are wide, but now maintains that they should be
*general:* "the same conception is affirmed in
everyone's considered judgments" (Rawls 2005: 384 n. 16).
He refers to wide and general reflective equilibrium as *full
reflective equilibrium.*



An alternative form of public reflective equilibrium appears to reject
individualism even as a starting point, drawing on empirical work to
form judgments and principles. One version of this approach is
quantitative, drawing on survey data (Savulescu et al. 2021). Another
version is qualitative, using interviews or "semi-structured
discussions" (Wolff & de Shalit 2007: 11). For instance, in
a study on social disadvantage, the researchers



> 
> 
> consulted our interviewees about our views and we learnt from them. In
> this process we revised and modified our theory according to the
> theories and intuitions expressed by the interviewees. (Wolff & de
> Shalit 2007: 12)
> 
> 
> 



The specific topic might make particular interviewees
appropriate--in the disadvantage case, those that provide
services to the disadvantaged as well as disadvantaged people
themselves--or more informal selection methods may be used:



> 
> 
> If possible, the decision with whom to talk should be done by
> strolling in different parts of the city, bumping into people every
> now and then, and asking them to enter into a discussion. (de Shalit
> 2020: 19)
> 
> 
> 



A difficulty with this approach is that it may be too ambitious in its
expectations of the general public's theorizing, as it takes not
only judgments but theories from consultees. Yet the general public
may not have moral and political principles, if they do have such
principles they may conflict, and their views certainly do not mirror
theoretical divides in philosophy (e.g., between Kantians and
utilitarians) (Baderin 2017: 11-12).



This may motivate a final form of public reflective equilibrium, which
uses the public's judgments but not their theories, and in
particular their case-specific judgments (Baderin 2017; see also
Miller 1999). The merit of using the public's judgments is that
they are *independent of principles*, which might be considered
an essential requirement if a meaningful balance is to be struck
between judgments and principles, but one which can hardly be met by
philosophers' judgments (Baderin 2017: 15-19). The point
is similar to Elgin's reason for giving priority to initial
judgments--principles can enslave as well as enlighten. The
philosopher remains the one undergoing reflective equilibrium, and is
free to reject the public's judgments, but a persistent refusal
to adapt theory to public judgment suggests a refusal to earnestly
engage in reflective equilibrium (Baderin 2017: 19-20). Among
challenges for such a view are the lack of *mutual* adjustment
of judgments and principles where judgments are the public's
rather than the individual's.


## 3. Objections



Given its central role in contemporary ethics, it is no surprise that
reflective equilibrium has been confronted with many objections. Here
we will consider a selection of the main objections along with
responses put forward by reflective equilibrium's defenders.


### 3.1 Initial Credibility



Critics have queried the epistemic value of the considered judgments
or "intuitions" that underpin reflective equilibrium
(Williamson 2022: 246-248). While reflective equilibrium may
deliver a coherent set of beliefs, the objection is that there are no
grounds for supposing that this set is credible:



> 
> 
> In the case of normative beliefs, no reason has been offered why we
> should think that initial credence levels, for a person, correspond to
> credibilities. (Brandt 1979: 20)
> 
> 
> 



The outcome of reflective equilibrium may be believed, but that is
consistent with it being coherent fiction. Indeed, some considered
judgments seem plainly unreasonable. The judgment that killing at
random is morally required would have to be accepted as a considered
judgment on the standard account of reflective equilibrium that
rejects an epistemic constraint on considered judgments (Kelly &
McGrath 2010).



This objection arguably foregrounds considered judgments to the extent
of neglecting the justificatory heart of the method, which is its
*process.* This



> 
> 
> involves identifying our considered judgments, learning more about
> them, and perhaps modifying them in the process of considering
> principles that would account for them. (Scanlon 2014: 84)
> 
> 
> 



Indeed, the objection seems directed more at narrow reflective
equilibrium, where the reflective process has little effect on the
outcome. Consider the coherentist interpretation of reflective
equilibrium discussed above, which highlights that judgments and
principles in equilibrium cohere with the deliberator's entire
system of thought, which has arisen from reflection on all relevant
principles and argument. It is hard to claim that this is not at least
something in favour of their position. Someone who has not followed
the method, and whose judgments and principles are only partially
formed, extend only to a few cases, are flagrantly contradictory in
some of those cases, and result from consideration of a limited range
of principles and argument, does not, at least typically, have a view
that is as credible.



It is true that there is little about wide reflective equilibrium that
would prevent implausible considered judgments from entering the
process, but this is because it is supposed that this filtering is
properly conducted with all relevant theory on the table. Filtering in
advance would require epistemic and (given the above examples) moral
criteria that could well conflict with the theories accepted in wide
reflective equilibrium.



To be sure, it is possible that some of those who claim to follow the
method start with such unreasonable views (e.g., a cast iron
commitment to random killing) that they will still have unreasonable
views in equilibrium, but this could be seen as analogous to a
scientist having such unreasonable views (e.g., a cast iron commitment
to creationism or climate change denial) that their findings are
unreasonable despite apparently following scientific procedure (Knight
2017: 53-54). It might be held that, for people starting with
such radically different beliefs from our own, it is not unreasonable
to reach seemingly perverse equilibria (Cath 2016: 225-226).
Alternatively, and as explored below, the method might allow that
their views are unjustified even though they are in equilibrium.


### 3.2 Relativism



Several critics object that there is no *unique* reflective
equilibrium. There are two objections here, one interpersonal, one
intrapersonal. The interpersonal objection is considered first.



Some advocates of reflective equilibrium combine the view with moral
realism, maintaining that the method can provide evidence of objective
moral truth (Brink 1989 and more tentatively Daniels 1996:
37-39). Rawls takes a less metaethically ambitious approach, his
constructivist theory providing "objectivity for its limited
political purposes" (Rawls 2005: 110; see also Nielsen 1993;
Brandstedt & Brannmark 2020). On either view reflective
equilibrium can offer objective support for moral principles.



Critics disagree, claiming that reflective equilibrium falls victim to
*relativism.* The objection starts with the observation that
different people following the method may reach different, conflicting
equilibria (Dworkin 1973 [1975: 34-36]; de Maagt 2017:
450-451). How can it be the case that each of two or more
conflicting views are objectively justified? The justification rather
looks to be relative to the deliberator.



But reflective equilibrium is properly understood as a
*potential* source of justification. There is no need to claim
that it always offers evidence of moral truth or practical guidance.
Hence, the mere existence of conflicting equilibria does not mark the
descent into relativism. As Scanlon notes,



> 
> 
> accepting that some person is well informed and has carried out the
> search for reflective equilibrium conscientiously does not even commit
> one to the conclusion that this person is justified in accepting the
> principles that result, let alone the conclusion that those principles
> are justified. (Scanlon 2003: 152)
> 
> 
> 



He asks us to enquire as to the reasons for divergences between our
equilibrium and that of another. Did we start with different
considered judgments? Did the divergence arise due to later
adjustments in considered judgments? Is it due to consideration of
different moral principles? At each stage we are to ask whether we
feel we made the better decisions or whether we might now revise our
judgments and principles (Scanlon 2003: 152-153; Scanlon 2014:
79-81).



What if we are content with the decisions leading to *both*
equilibria? Two conflicting views being equally justified is not
really suggestive of relativism, but rather supports a pluralistic
position (Scanlon 2014: 79). It seems no less objective to judge that
two equilibria are equally justified than it is to judge that one is
more justified than the other.


### 3.3 Indeterminacy



On, then, to the objection to the lack of a unique
*intra*personal equilibrium. Just as different people may reach
different equilibria, the same person may reach different equilibria
at different times, as their judgments are revisable. The ethical
deliberator can simply change their mind even if the relevant facts
stay the same, the claimed standard of justification being a drifting
one (Copp 1985: 165). Alternatively, there may be multiple
simultaneous equilibria even for a single person, where principles and
judgments can be made to fit each other in different combinations
(Haslett 1987: 310). Critics worry that such an indeterminate
procedure cannot tell us what to believe or results in an arbitrary
outcome (McPherson 2015: 662-663; List & Valentini 2016:
542).



This line of objection is largely anticipated by Rawls, who
acknowledges that there may be no unique equilibrium even for one
person, and that the judgments we start with, or the "course of
reflection itself," may affect the principles we settle on
(Rawls 1971: 50). He simply sets such questions aside, saying that
reflective equilibrium "is, if you wish, a kind of psychology
and does not presuppose the existence of objective moral truths"
(Rawls 1974: 9). For reasons parallel to those in the interpersonal
case, it may also be that the truth of moral realism, and the
existence of objective moral facts, are compatible with drifting
equilibria (Knight 2006: 220). Advocates of reflective equilibrium do
not claim that it gives direct access to or perfectly tracks moral
truth, only that it can justify moral beliefs. Even where the ultimate
facts are static, a belief can become more justified by becoming
endorsed by the deliberators' judgments and cohering with their
reflectively-derived system of beliefs.


### 3.4 Bias



The further objection might then be raised that reflective equilibrium
is vulnerable to arbitrary order or framing biases (McPherson 2015:
662-663; List & Valentini 2016: 542). One study found that
professional philosophers were vulnerable to order and framing
effects, and that this was not reduced by reflection or expertise on
the topics in question (Schwitzgebel & Cushman 2015). The
judgments of participants in reflective equilibrium might be
considered unreliable in the sense that they vary with factors that
they themselves consider irrelevant (Paulo 2020: 335-336).



Additional biases are suggested by experiments bringing out the
emotional nature of moral reasoning. They show, for instance, that
there is greater activation of brain areas associated with emotional
processing in personal cases, such as the variant of the trolley
problem where a large person is pushed from a footbridge, than in
otherwise similar impersonal cases, such as the original trolley
problem (Greene et al. 2001). Peter Singer suggests that considered
judgments in such cases are emotionally-driven evolved responses to
circumstances that no longer obtain:



> 
> 
> the salient feature that explains our different intuitive judgments
> concerning the two cases is that the footbridge case is the kind of
> situation that was likely to arise during the eons of time over which
> we were evolving; whereas the standard trolley case describes a way of
> bringing about someone's death that has only been possible in
> the past century or two, a time far too short to have any impact on
> our inherited patterns of emotional response. But what is the moral
> salience of the fact that I have killed someone in a way that was
> possible a million years ago, rather than in a way that became
> possible only two hundred years ago? I would answer: none. (Singer
> 2005: 348)
> 
> 
> 



He therefore concludes that reflective equilibrium is mistaken in
giving considered judgments a central role in moral theorizing. Other
critics similarly suggest that considered judgments may be based on
prejudice (Brandt 1979: 22; Hare 1981: 12; Anderson 2015).



Wide reflective equilibrium may be able to take on board these
concerns, and revise judgments accordingly. For instance, if we are
moved by Singer's argument about the strongly emotional and
evolutionary character of some of our moral judgments, we could use a
revised conception of considered judgments that excludes judgments
distorted in this way (Tersman 2008: 398). Alternatively, we could
allow such judgments to enter the process, but revise them given the
background theory that Singer introduces (see Tersman 2008: 397).
Order or framing effects would similarly be highlighted by
psychological background theories, allowing the deliberator to take
compensatory measures.


### 3.5 An Empty Method?



By this point the critic may be exasperated. If you identify a problem
with someone's way of doing philosophy, and they agree that
it's a problem, you might expect them to change how they do it.
But the adherent of wide reflective equilibrium accepts the criticism
but maintains their method, saying that they have adopted the
criticism within the method. To critics this suggests that the method
is "close to vacuous" (Singer 2005: 349), absorbing
methodological controversies rather than adjudicating them (McPherson
2015: 661; Paulo 2020: 346; de Maagt 2017: 458). It just takes us



> 
> 
> back to the usual philosophical argument about the merits and demerits
> of various methods of argument and of various theories. The method of
> reflective equilibrium is then not a method in moral philosophy at
> all. (Raz 1982: 309)
> 
> 
> 



Defenders of wide reflective equilibrium describe it in similar terms
to the critics, while rejecting their negative evaluation. Its ability
to absorb apparent rivals is seen as a feature, not a bug:



> 
> 
> This charge of emptiness seems to me to be largely correct, but
> nonetheless mistaken in one important respect, and therefore not as
> damaging as it sounds. The charge is largely correct because the
> search for wide reflective equilibrium, as Rawls describes it, allows
> for what might have been seen as alternative methods of justification
> to be incorporated within it. ... What the method of reflective
> equilibrium prescribes is, so to speak, a level playing field of
> intuitive justification on which principles and judgments of all
> levels of generality must compete for our allegiance. It thus allows
> all possible sources of justificatory force to be considered. But the
> method is not vacuous because it is incompatible with some views about
> these sources. It is incompatible, first, with the idea that any
> particular class of judgments or principles can be singled out in
> advance of this process as justified on some other basis and, second,
> with the idea that any class of considered judgments should be left
> out of this process. (Scanlon 2003: 151).
> 
> 
> 



It might be added that critics of reflective equilibrium are rich
sources of methods incompatible with reflective equilibrium. For
instance, Brandt's cognitive psychotherapy, Hare's
universal prescriptivism, Anderson's pragmatism, or de
Maagt's transcendentalism describe methods for justifying moral
views prior to, or without, reflective equilibrium (Brandt 1979; Hare
1981; Anderson 2015; de Maagt 2017). Reflective equilibrium rules
out



> 
> 
> moral skepticism and nihilism and other doctrines that doubt our
> capacities for morality altogether, as well as naturalism and other
> reductionist efforts to justify moral principles purely on the basis
> of factual, linguistic, or metaphysical claims. (Freeman 2007: 37; see
> also Rawls 1971: 51)
> 
> 
> 



Given the many methods and theories at odds with reflective
equilibrium, it is hard to maintain that it is devoid of content, or
nearly so. If it looks that way it may be because its assumptions are
widely accepted in moral and political philosophy, a victim of its own
success.