## 1. The Two Faces of Morality: Values and Duties



Moral discourse is normative in nature, that is, concerned with
guiding behavior rather than describing the world. But this normative
character of moral judgment falls broadly speaking under two
categories, the axiological and the deontic. The former refers to
goodness, ideals and virtues; the latter to what ought to be done, to
duties and obligations, to justice and rights. Whereas the object of
axiological assessment is primarily states of affairs and human
agents, the object of deontic evaluation is human actions. For
instance, the state of affairs of a world with no war is a moral ideal
and the individual Socrates is virtuous, whereas the practice of
paying back debts is obligatory and acts of theft prohibited.



The axiological face of morality, unlike its deontic counterpart, is
open-ended. Virtuous character traits, ethical ideals, or the goal of
promoting human happiness have no fixed measure and can in principle
be always improved and further perfected or realized. Moral
requirements are relatively fixed and well defined, having clear
criteria of fulfillment and violation. Consequently, the deontic
sphere of morality is often taken as describing the *minimal*
conditions of morality, the basic requirements of social morality that
secure a just society, while the axiological sphere aims at higher
ideals which can only be commended and recommended but not strictly
required. In its deontic nature, morality is closely associated with
the legal, while the axiological is closer to the ideal or the
ideological (sometimes referred to as "the ethical").
Furthermore, the way in which deontic norms are fixed and universally
expected of all members of society presupposes the general
*ability* of all moral agents to act in the light of these
norms. Ideals of goodness and virtue, in their open-ended texture,
cannot be similarly expected of everyone and their determination is
not subjected to the strict condition of "'ought'
implies 'can'."



Most ethical theories maintain some form of this two-tier structure of
the moral system, although admittedly in different versions and
emphases. But this double role of normative discourse inevitably
raises the idea of supererogation, the category of actions that are
praiseworthy (either in creating good states of affairs or in
reflecting a particularly virtuous trait of character) yet at the same
time not obligatory. Supererogation lies at the intersection of the
axiological and the deontic, the 'good' and the
'ought'. Since moral theories of the past (like Aristotle,
Kant and utilitarianism) all appeal in some form to both deontic and
axiological concepts, the scant and cursory discussion of
supererogation in those theories is all the more surprising.



The most notable exception to this historical generalization is the
long-standing and elaborate Roman Catholic doctrine of *opera
supererogationis*. The general background of this doctrine is the
recognition of the two faces of morality under the concepts of
"precepts" and "counsels." The origins of this
distinction go back to the New Testament, in which to the question
what one should do to gain eternal life, Jesus replies: "if thou
wilt enter into life, keep the commandments," but adds "if
thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast and give to the poor and
thou shalt have treasure in Heaven" (Matthew xix, 16-24).
Beyond charity, the Church Fathers detected in the New Testament two
additional evangelical counsels, chastity and obedience: taking a wife
is no sin, but virginity has a superior value; the life of an ordinary
Christian cannot be blamed, but that of absolute monastic dedication
is far better. Forgiveness and love of one's enemies are also
religious ideals that originate in the New Testament and were
sometimes given a supererogatory interpretation in later Church
doctrine.



The Old Law of the Old Testament is regarded by early Catholic
thinkers as reflecting the rigid and minimal demands of religious
morality, typically formulated in the negative terms of prohibitions
and precepts (the violation of which entails punishment). The New Law,
that of the New Testament, sometimes called the Law of Liberty, leaves
the individual free to pursue more edifying ideals of perfection.
Tertullian called this freedom *licentia*. According to the
Catholic doctrine, the special merit of supererogatory acts accredited
to their agent can be used both for that individual's own
salvation and for the salvation of others. The "superabundant
merit," most typically collected by the actions of Jesus and the
saints, who far exceeded what was required for their own salvation, is
deposited in the Spiritual Treasury of the Church to be disposed by
the Pope and the bishops for remitting the sins of other, ordinary
believers. This is how the institution of Indulgences gradually
developed in the late middle ages: sinners could buy the remission of
their sins, first by joining the Crusades and later by contributing
money to the coffers of the Church.



The most articulate exposition of the doctrine of supererogation in
the Christian tradition is found in Thomas Aquinas (*Summa
Theologica*). Thomas mentions two distinct sources of merit of
supererogatory behavior. On the one hand supererogation serves as a
more expedient or guaranteed way of achieving everlasting life; on the
other, it is intrinsically good in being aimed at higher ends than the
mere fulfillment of the commandments. Precepts are universal in their
scope, whereas counsels are addressed to the few who have the capacity
and inclination to pursue the life of perfection. For Thomas, the
open-texture character of the counsels of supererogation is what makes
the morality of love superior to the authoritarian nature of the
strict law. But Thomas does not draw a clear borderline between duty
and supererogation. It is, for example, not clear whether "love
thy enemy" is a precept or a supererogatory counsel. It is
similarly unclear whether beneficence (almsgiving) is a duty or lies
beyond duty. Nor is the role of virtue in demarcating the
supererogatory from the obligatory explained. Thomas says that both
natural law and positive law prescribe acts of virtue in general but
they do not prescribe every specific virtuous act (except for those
that promote the social good of justice and peace). And as for divine
law, it prescribes also other, non-social actions that belong to the
relations between man and God but leaves those actions of perfect
virtue to the realm of supererogatory counsel.



The Catholic doctrine of supererogation met with an extremely fierce
opposition in the times of the Reformation. Luther, Calvin and
Anglican theologians attacked both the theory of
"super-meritorious" actions and the corruption involved in
the commercialization of the institution of indulgences for which the
theory served as a cover. No human being, not even a saint, can do all
that is strictly required as a duty, let alone hope to go beyond that.
The way to salvation is not through "works" but through
divine grace alone (Luther 1957). Even the most dramatic acts of
martyrdom and self-sacrifice, which served the Catholics as paradigm
examples of supererogation, are strictly speaking obligatory.
Protestant ethics thus undermines the distinction between the two
faces of morality: on the one hand, normative requirements cannot be
defined in terms of rules fixing minimally prescribed behavior; on the
other hand, every religiously good behavior is obligatory. Saints and
sinners are equally dependent on God's grace for their
salvation. Paradoxically, it may be noted, exactly because human
actions can never fulfill God's commandments, divine grace is
never *due* or ethically called for: it is typically
supererogatory, a free gift of God!



An interesting parallel to the Christian concept of supererogation can
be found in Jewish thought in the notion of "lifnim mishurat
hadin". Typically, the rabbis dispute its philosophical meaning
since it could be literally understood as either "within the
line of law" or -- as it is more often understood --
"beyond the line of law". Some philosophers (like
Nahmanides) follow the former reading, arguing that moral acts of
piety or charity are obligatory, that is to say duties that apply to
everybody. Others (notably Maimonides) adhere to the latter, more
supererogatory understanding, holding that such acts are either
obligatory only for the "pious" few or even not obligatory
for anyone (Shilo 1978). This debate regarding the possibility of
supererogatory acts reflects the deep underlying problem of the whole
normative discourse in Jewish thought, namely is there an independent
system of moral norms and ideals which is not directly derived from
the Halakhic, commandment-based, legally binding (and enforceable) law
(Lichtenstein 1975).



The hostile attitude of the Reformation to supererogation and the
disappearance of the institution of indulgences in the Catholic Church
led to the rapid decline in the theological and philosophical interest
in the concept of supererogation in the modern era. However, the great
theological debates about actions beyond the call of duty set the
stage for the contemporary discussion of the subject. The revived
interest in supererogation since the 1960s has completely shifted the
focus from the theological context to the ethical, but the structure
of the argumentation is often reminiscent of the traditional Christian
debate.


## 2. What is Supererogation: Problems of Definition



The conceptual question of what we *mean* by supererogation and
the substantive question of whether there actually *are*
supererogatory acts (and how their normative value can be justified)
are inextricably interrelated. Consequently, although the following
discussion will try to separate the two questions, addressing first
the conceptual issue and only later the normative, the division is
only didactic. Much of the disagreement about the nature of
supererogation and its proper definition is informed by normative
views about the scope of moral duty, the legitimate expectations of
altruistic behavior, and the value of the autonomy of the individual
in pursuing personal goals. This interdependence of the meta-ethical
and the normative levels of discourse on supererogation becomes
particularly evident when paradigm examples are discussed: for
instance, is forgiveness obligatory or supererogatory is both a
conceptual and a normative issue, and the same applies to charity, to
acts of self-sacrifice and even to toleration, as will be shown
below.



J.O. Urmson opened the contemporary discussion of supererogation
(although hardly mentioning the term itself!) by challenging the
traditional threefold classification of moral action: the obligatory,
the permitted (or indifferent) and the prohibited (Urmson 1958). A
more general schema of this classification runs thus (Chisholm
1963):


1. actions that are good to do and bad not to do
2. actions that are neither good to do nor bad not to do
3. actions that are bad to do and good not to do



Urmson argued that a morally significant class of actions, to which he
referred as saintly and heroic (such as throwing oneself on an
exploding hand grenade in order to save the lives of others), does not
fall under any of these categories. He referred to this class as
praiseworthy though non-obligatory acts, or in terms of the above
general schema as


4. actions that are good to do but not bad not to do



The scope of this further category became, however, the focus of
debate. Supererogatory acts in Urmson's sense (which is
reminiscent of the Catholic doctrine) include only actions that are
morally praiseworthy, valuable, although not obligatory in the sense
that their omission is not blameworthy. But the general formulation
(iv) could consist also of small acts of favor, politeness,
consideration and tact, which are good though not morally
praiseworthy, which can be expected of people even though not strictly
demanded. The latter, wider, definition of supererogation, covers a
larger scope of actions that we tend to view as
good-though-not-obligatory; but the former, narrow, definition of
supererogation as having a unique moral merit better captures the
essential value and hence justification of supererogation as a
distinct category of moral action, to which Urmson referred as saintly
and heroic.



The general schema underlying (iv), i.e. the combination of some
positive assessment of the action with a non-negative assessment of
its omission, can be filled in various ways. "Good to do, but
not bad not to do" appears to be too weak a definition for
supererogation, at least in the sense that some omissions of
supererogatory action are (or lead to) bad states of affairs.
"Right to do, but not wrong not to do" responds to this
concern but seems an equally weak definition for supererogatory
action, this time due to the overly wide characterization of the
positive condition (e.g. "right" falls short of the proper
description of the act of volunteering to risk one's life in
order to save a stranger). "Praiseworthy to do, but not
blameworthy not to do" seems closer to what we wish to say about
supererogatory acts. However, praiseworthiness is associated with the
evaluation of the agent rather than the act, while supererogation
refers primarily to the act. Furthermore, we often praise agents for
doing their duty (e.g. in overcoming obstacles like natural fear) and
we often do not praise agents of supererogatory action (e.g. when no
particular effort, cost, or risk is involved). There is no necessary
connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness, as some
philosophers argue (Archer 2015). It seems, therefore, that the neat
schema of deontic logic, comprising of pairs of normative concepts
applied symmetrically to commission and omission must be broken if we
hope to arrive at a more useful characterization of supererogation
(Schumaker 1972). This can be done by either mixing concepts from
different pairs, such as "good to do but not wrong not to
do," or by enriching the schema itself by adding further
conditions, such as the beneficent intentions of the agent and her
altruistic motives (Heyd 1982, Zimmerman 1996).



Definitions that are motivated by a skeptical attitude to
supererogation often try to salvage the three-fold classification of
obligation-permission-prohibition as exhausting the realm of moral
actions. Some philosophers identify supererogation with imperfect
duty, or with a weak duty, or with duty that is personal and
non-universalizable, or with duty that has no correlative right, or
with an ethical rather than legal duty, or with an "ought"
which is not enforceable. Some even use the oxymoronic term
"supererogatory duty" in trying to do justice to the
phenomenon of supererogation without giving up the typically Kantian
framing of all moral judgments in terms of duty. These are, however,
mostly unsuccessful attempts. Imperfect duties, as many Kant scholars
have noted, are no less compelling than perfect duties and the
distinction between perfect and imperfect duty lies only in the mode
of application (to what degree the conditions of its fulfillment are
fixed or left to personal choice) rather than in the prescriptive
force of the duty itself. And since Kant sometimes defines imperfect
duties as duties to adopt ends (rather than engage in particular
acts), supererogation and imperfect duty do not belong to the same
level of discourse: by doing many acts of charity one does not act
supererogatorily, since one cannot *be* more charitable than
required (Guevara 1999, Baron 1987). Furthermore, if supererogation is
a personal (rather than universal) duty, then is it by a subjective
judgment that it is made to be so? If not, there must be some
(universalizable) characteristic which lays the duty on this
*kind* of individual. Finally, there are many duties that have
no correlative rights that have nothing to do with supererogation
(e.g., at least for some philosophers, duties to animals or to future
people), so the test of the correlativity of duties to rights cannot
account for the distinction between obligation and supererogation.



Another issue raised by attempts to subject the concept of
supererogation to some version of the general schema is that of
"offence" or "suberogation": if there are
non-obligatory well-doings (supererogation), are there also -- as
their mirror image -- non-prohibited wrong-doings
("permissive ill-doings")? Or in other words, are
there


5. actions that are bad to do but not good not to do



Some philosophers (Chisholm 1963, Richards 1971,  Forrester 1975,
and Driver 1992) were attracted to the logically neat symmetry of
supererogation and suberogation, but a critical examination of this
artificially invented category demonstrates both the difficulty in
filling it with content and flaws in the general schema itself (Heyd
1982, Mellema 1992). Examples for typical "offences" are
hard to come by. At most one can think of permissible bad action in
relatively trivial cases, like taking too long in a restaurant while
others are waiting, which is inconsiderate rather than immoral
(Ullmann-Margalit 2011). These are uninteresting cases from a moral
point of view as are their supererogatory counterparts of small favors
or acts of politeness. An interesting, though controversial, example
is ingratitude, which is traditionally considered as a grave sin
(gratitude being a duty), but which some treat as typically
suberogatory (Wellman 1999). But once we look for examples of morally
vicious or villainous action that is nevertheless permissible (which
is the counterpart of a morally heroic action), we find it difficult
to come up with an example. This should hardly be surprising. By its
nature, a moral system does not leave patently bad action as morally
permissible. In that respect, good and bad, the virtuous and the
vicious, are *not* symmetrical from the deontic point of view:
the good is open-ended in a way that the bad is not. The extremely
good cannot be required, but the extremely bad (vicious) is the prime
target of prohibition. However, more recently Paul McNamara has
suggested a rich conceptual analysis of the supererogatory which
although leaving the question of asymmetry open, points to important
analogies between the supererogatory and the suberogatory. These can
be shown once we switch our attention from the agent-evaluative
component of suberogation as "offence" to the objective,
act-evaluative element of "permissible suboptimality"
(McNamara 2011).



Wider definitions of supererogation, which refer to *any*
non-obligatory good action, are at risk of losing sight of the
specifically *moral* value usually associated with
"acting beyond the call of duty" or "going the
second mile." Although "supererogatory" in English
also means superfluous, the technical Roman-Catholic meaning of the
concept is closer to what moral philosophy wishes to highlight as a
separate category of action. A typical ethically informed definition
of supererogation relates both to the element of over-subscription
(doing literally more than duty requires) and to the high cost or risk
involved in the action (Feinberg 1968). There is a debate whether cost
to the agent is a necessary condition of supererogation, for some
minor supererogatory acts do not seem to involve costs, let alone
risks. However *some* cost to the agent, even if marginal, is
part and parcel of supererogatory behavior, even if the agent enjoys
engaging in it (Benn 2018b). But risk is not necessarily the source of
the *value* of supererogation. Yet it is true that, unlike
definitions offered by deontic logicians, an ethical definition of
supererogation must include a condition that the action be of a
particularly moral value. The source of this particular value is
double: the good intended *consequences* on the one hand, and
the *optional* nature of the act on the other. The good
promoted is typically of an altruistic nature and thus an act may be
supererogatory even if the overall good in the world is not promoted
(as might be the case in extreme acts of self-sacrifice for the sake
of another). Supererogatory behavior is typically other-regarding:
even if there are duties "to oneself" (which many ethical
theorists doubt), it is hard to see how they can be transcended in a
supererogatory way. In that respect, most definitions of
supererogation in modern ethics diverge from the Christian tradition:
whereas for the latter paradigm examples of supererogation are piety
and chastity, for the former these are altruistic deeds of extreme
beneficence. There are, however, contemporary non-religious views
which leave room for self-regarding actions of supererogation (Kawall
2003). 



An illustrative case for this altruistic characterization of
supererogation is the understudied issue of whether governments can
act supererogatorily (for an exception, see Weinberg 2011). Weinberg
examines all the possible objections to such a possibility, primarily
in terms of the government's exclusive role to implement
justice, but still wishes to leave the door open for some possible
governmental acts which go beyond duty -- such as throwing a
block party or investing money in the preservation of the historical
legacy of the nation. But these examples are not intuitively clear
cases of government supererogation and even if they were, they would
always be entangled (as the author admits) with questions of the way
the money for these projects was collected and now spent (which is
typically a matter of justice). Furthermore, if the definition of
supererogatory action consists of a condition of beneficent intention
or altruism (like in Heyd), governments cannot be considered as agents
able to show these attitudes. For they are impersonal institutions.
For that reason it is dubious whether governments, or other
institutions like the courts, can show forgiveness since their
function is to do justice and promote the good according to the law
rather than break the rules from an altruistic intention. And of
course it is hard to see how the government can "sacrifice
itself" or its own interests for the sake of another individual
or state.



As for the second source of value of supererogatory action, its
optional nature, it should first be noted that such action must be
voluntary (unlike obligatory action, which is often forced or
enforced). But again, the neutral deontic description of
"neither obligatory nor forbidden" fails to capture the
kind of freedom involved in such action. The agent has full discretion
whether to go beyond what is required and makes a personal choice to
do so. She is neither under any external constraint (like the law),
nor under internal demands (of rationality or of the Kantian moral
law). In other words, supererogatory behavior is fully optional. Thus,
it would be absurd to force a person to do a supererogatory act, even
if that act had extremely beneficial consequences. The permission not
to do the best we can is not derived from the unenforceability of
supererogatory conduct but from agent-centred restrictions which limit
the force of the impersonal maximizing principle (Haydar 2002). This
does not mean that the agent herself necessarily believes that her
action is optional. Many agents of supererogatory acts report that all
they did was what they felt they "had to do," or what they
thought was their duty (although when asked whether they would expect
such an action to be performed by everybody else in the same
circumstances they would probably answer in the negative, thus getting
entangled in an inconsistency typical of moral modesty).



Doing one's duty does not win the agent any credit. She only did
what she had to do. But going beyond the call of duty is meritorious
exactly in the sense that the agent did something "extra,"
breaking the balance of justice or that of respect for claim-rights
and the fulfillment of duties. This merit of supererogatory action
should be held distinct from the praise we often assign to the agent.
Praise is a subjective assessment or recognition of the particular way
in which the agent faced a moral challenge and acted as she did (e.g.
overcoming special difficulties or obstacles, or sacrificing herself
in the course of doing either what was her duty or what lay beyond
it). Merit is an objective property of the act itself. It is typically
attached to heroic and saintly acts, but it can also be gained by
minor supererogatory acts of kindness or gifts, and is thus not
necessarily associated with particular praise for the agent (cf.
Montague 1989, Trianosky 1986). Recent works on supererogation refer
to "moral-merit-conferring reasons" for action, i.e.
reasons which are neither "requiring" nor
"justifying" as a way to untie "the knot" (or
alleged paradox) of supererogation (Horgan and Timmons 2010, Dreier
2004). But unlike the Catholic doctrine, few theorists of
supererogation believe that this merit is transferable or can serve as
compensation for other people's moral failures. And although
supererogation cannot be hoped to simply offset even one's
*own* violations of duty, the merit of actions beyond the call
of duty definitely plays an important role in the overall evaluation
of one's moral record. In cases of a high potential benefit we
may sometimes even be permitted to act supererogatorily rather than do
our duty (Kamm 1985). Furthermore, the traditional idea of merit (or
"superabundance") associated with supererogation is
reflected in secular ethical theory in the duty of *gratitude*:
acknowledging the meritorious nature of a gift or any non-obligatory
well doing is the morally obligatory response (irrespective of the
moral praise which might or might not accrue to the agent of the
supererogatory act).



The characterization of supererogatory acts is highly controversial
and cannot be captured by a strict formal definition. Furthermore, as
has already come up in the discussion in this section, the way we
describe supererogation is closely dependent on the way we justify (or
deny) its moral value. Most typically, definitions of supererogation
that introduce conditions of altruistic intention, free choice and
good consequences are constructed in a way that betrays an underlying
view about its special moral value and hence justification. On the
other hand, definitions that are merely formal (deontic) in nature are
not committed to the intrinsic value, indeed to the very existence of
supererogatory actions.


## 3. Three Views of Supererogation: Problems of Justification



The modern debate whether there actually are supererogatory acts has
lost its traditional fervor typical of the great religious disputes
between Catholics and Reformers in the 16th and
17th centuries. One reason is that there are no direct
political or institutional stakes involved in the contemporary
discussions, such as Church power in granting indulgences (although
there is a supererogatory dimension in the contemporary idea of Truth
and Reconciliation Commissions). Yet, the issue between
supererogationists, as they are often called, and their opponents
still runs deep and involves the general relationship between the
"good" and the "ought".



The views about the possibility and value of supererogatory acts can
be grouped under three categories:


1. Anti-supererogationism: since all morally good action is
obligatory, there cannot be a separate class of morally good action
the omission of which is not wrong.
2. Qualified supererogationism: there are actions which lie beyond
the call of duty, but their value is derived from their being
hypothetical duties, subjective duties, duties from which one may be
excused, that is, duties in a weaker sense.
3. Unqualified supererogationism: supererogatory actions lie entirely
and without qualification beyond the requirements of morality and that
is the source of their unique value.



Like any classification, this one is somewhat artificial and
arbitrary. Some particular views of supererogation cannot be easily
and neatly subsumed under one of its categories. The distinction
between (1) and (2) hinges on the nature of the relevant
"qualification": even the rigorous deniers of
supererogation are willing to accept some form of excuse for not
engaging in particularly difficult or demanding moral action, and
qualified supererogationists may often admit that a heroic action is
obligatory even if it is unrealistic for society to expect individuals
to perform it. The borderline between (2) and (3) is also often vague,
since when one tries to explain what makes a class of actions
supererogatory, in the unqualified sense of being fully optional, one
is often drawn back to the difficulty or risk in performing it, to the
particular personal virtue required to do so, or in general terms to
certain qualifying conditions which justify leaving them beyond the
demands of morality.



The three views of supererogation are three responses to the
"paradox of supererogation," namely how can the moral good
not be required as a duty. The first view recognizes the paradox and
addresses it by denying the very possibility of supererogation; the
second resolves what it sees as an apparent paradox by explaining the
conditions under which duty loses its prescriptive force; the third
view denies that there is in the first place any paradox in the gap
between the "good" and the "ought," thus
leaving room for an independent category of supererogation.


### 3.1 Anti-supererogationism



The denial of supererogation is basically associated with the
rejection of the idea of the two faces of morality. Normativity is one
and cannot be split into two levels, that of the good (the desirable,
the ideal, the recommended) and that of the required (the obligatory,
the prescribed). What "ought to *be* the case" also
"ought to be *done*." A possible good state of
affairs creates a reason for action. Furthermore, the fact that human
beings, due to their limitations and flawed character, often fail to
live up to the standards of the ideally good behavior is a deplorable
fact that does not undermine the normative power of the moral
demands.



This "good-ought tie-up" is a theoretically attractive
principle: whatever is good, ought to be done. If an action is good,
then there must be reasons for doing it. If it is the best possible
action, the reasons for doing it are conclusive, that is outweighing
all other reasons for not doing it (or doing something else). Failing
to do the best action cannot therefore be immune from blame or
condemnation. Or, in other words, doing the best is always obligatory,
never optional. Supererogation is impossible (Moore 1948, New 1974,
Feldman 1986, Pybus 1982).



The principled denial of supererogation was central in the theological
conception of Lutherans and Calvinists. The demands of God are so
extensive that human beings have not the slightest chance of ever
satisfying them, let alone going beyond them. But there are also
non-theological adherents to this idea of the
"totalitarian" dominion of duty. Kantian ethics is based
on the general idea of an all-encompassing moral *law* and
conceives of duty as the only expression of moral value in human
action. Universalizability of the maxim of action and acting from the
sense of duty (or respect for the law) as a motive are two
constitutive hallmarks of moral action according to Kant. But the two
are incompatible with the nature of supererogatory action, which is
optional and personal on the one hand and not motivated by the
subjection to the moral law on the other. Classical utilitarianism may
also be interpreted as denying any space for supererogation. If
promoting the overall good in the world is the fundamental principle
of action, there can be no (non-utilitarian) exemption from the duty
to do so. Both Kantians and utilitarians are highly suspicious of acts
of great personal self-sacrifice (typical of some paradigm examples of
supererogation). For Kant they may reflect moral self-indulgence and
vanity unbound by the moral law or even be a violation of one's
duties to oneself (Kant 1949, Timmermann 2005). For utilitarians such
acts may end up decreasing the overall happiness in the world (since
the loss to the agent could outweigh the gain for the beneficiary,
either in the specific individual case, or when adopted as a general
rule of behavior). It should, however, be noted that there are serious
attempts to interpret Kant's theory as leaving some room for
supererogation (Hill 1971, Eisenberg 1966, Heyd 1983) and there are
utilitarians like Mill who specifically hail the value of
non-obligatory meritorious action (Mill 1969). Furthermore, the idea
of "satisficing" (rather than optimizing or maximizing),
i.e. aiming at the good enough rather than at the best, is a
contemporary version of utilitarianism which leaves ample room for
supererogation (Slote 1989, Vessel 2010).



The denial of the value of supererogatory action also appeals to its
incompatibility with the fundamental requirement of impartiality.
Actions beyond the call of duty are not expected of everybody on an
equal basis and are not bestowed on everybody in an impartial way. In
other words, there are no general *rules* regarding either the
agent or the recipient of supererogatory conduct. Thus, no general
specification as to who deserves or is entitled to be the recipient of
supererogatory giving can be formulated, and those who, for instance,
are not given charity cannot complain for being discriminated against.
Furthermore, some philosophers have noted (Wolf 1982) that despite the
traditional aura associated with saintly action, "moral
saints" are not very attractive human characters and most of us
do not take them as role models for the way we lead our lives. They
are fanatically one-track minded in their pursuit of moral ideals,
tending to disparage the more personal (non-moral) values which we
tend to appreciate in ourselves and in others (such as achieving
athletic excellence or dedicating one's life to music). We feel
similar repugnance towards a person who always goes beyond her duty as
we feel towards the person who never does anything beyond what is
strictly required of her.



Despite its theoretical and moral purity, the anti-supererogationist
view is open to criticism. The good-ought tie-up rests on an ambiguity
in the concept of *ought*, which may be interpreted either in a
commendatory sense or in a prescriptive sense. "You ought to see
the current Caravaggio exhibition" provides one with *a*
reason for action, an advice, a recommendation that is not binding.
"You ought to attend the next faculty meeting" may be a
*conclusive* reason for action, a prescription. To further
complicate matters, "ought" is often used impersonally, as
in "it ought to be nice weather for our picnic tomorrow,"
but also personally, as in "you ought to buy wine for the
picnic." And "the picnic ought to have been better
organized" lies between the personal and the impersonal senses
of "ought," referring to *some* unspecified agent
without addressing a prescription to any particular individual.



The good-ought tie-up works for the commendatory use of
"ought" as well as for the impersonal, but not for the
prescriptive and personal. "Ought" in the personal sense
involves human agency as well as personal responsibility. Laying a
duty on an individual requires both having a particularly strong (not
just *a*) reason and showing how the reason is related to the
particular agent. Just being a good state of affairs (even the best)
does not create a reason *for x* to bring it about. X must
stand in a particular position to the desirable state of affairs to
make her have a (conclusive) reason to bring it about. Once the
good-ought tie-up is broken in those central prescriptive contexts of
personal "ought," anti-supererogationism loses much of its
bite. Supererogation is exactly what one does not personally have to
do, even if it either ought to be done by *some*one or would
lead to a state of affairs which "ought to exist." However
it remains for the supererogationist view to explain why the personal
ought does not extend to the whole scope of the good.


### 3.2 Qualified Supererogationism



Completely denying the existence and value of supererogatory action
does not fit with most people's intuitions. One way to account
for supererogation without giving up the moral and theoretical
principle relating the 'good' to the 'ought',
value to duty, is to distinguish between different kinds of duties and
obligations or to specify conditions and limits of the application of
duties. Supererogation is a legitimate class of moral action but only
in a qualified sense, i.e. due to certain conditions that make the
moral 'ought' inapplicable or not fully prescriptive. This
intermediate position seems to be the most common in the literature on
supererogation, but it has many forms and variations.



Accounts of supererogation belonging to this group typically appeal to
the linguistic hybrid "supererogatory requirements" or
even "supererogatory duties." Thus, for instance, contract
theorists (Richards 1971) describe principles of supererogation as
those that ideal contractors in the original position would consent
not to *enforce* in society. Supererogatory behavior is a
requirement, but punishing those who do not fulfill the requirement
would be too costly in terms of the relative pain incurred to the
agent as against the benefit to the potential beneficiary. Failure to
act supererogatorily is blameworthy and wrong, but lends itself only
to informal criticism rather than to institutionalized sanction.
Supererogation is justified only in qualified, circumstantial terms
relating to the limited effectiveness of its enforcement. It has no
intrinsic value. The idea of 'Forced supererogation'
belongs to this kind of account: there are actions which are
praiseworthy and although their omission not blameworthy it is plainly
wrong not to do them (Cohen 2013).



Another line of justifying supererogation without relinquishing the
principle of 'good'-entails-'ought' goes back
to Thomas Aquinas but has some contemporary followers who sometimes
speak in terms of *vocation*. Supererogatory behavior is
required, but not of *everybody*. It can be expected only from
those who subjectively feel the commitment to do it or from those who
are objectively blessed with the necessary strength of character and
virtue. Unlike the previous view, which distinguished between duty and
supererogation in terms of the overall costs of enforcing duty, this
approach is based on a principle of *excuse*: most human
beings, due to their frail moral nature and imperfection are excused
from omitting what from an ideal (religious, ethical) point of view is
prescribed as a duty. The problem with this excused-based view of
supererogation is that it is either subjectivist (the individual
chooses her duties) or aristocratic (distinguishing between classes of
moral agents). Furthermore, it fails to distinguish between the common
appeals to excuses from obligatory action based on the particular
difficulty or risk involved in its performance and the general
exemption from supererogatory action that is sometimes easy and
possible for everybody (like doing a small favor or showing
forgiveness). Rawls' analysis of supererogation also appeals to
an argument from exemption: "Supererogatory acts are not
required, though normally they would be were it not for the loss or
risk involved for the agent himself. A person who does a
supererogatory act does not invoke the exemption which the natural
duties allow" (Rawls 1971, p. 117).



A structurally similar analysis of supererogation is offered in terms
of reasons for action. We may have a good (even a conclusive) reason
to act in a certain way, but also a second-order permission not to act
on that good reason. This permission, called
"exclusionary," is based on a second-order reason and
allows the agent to disregard the balance of first order reasons for
action. An agent acts supererogatorily if despite the permission to
ignore these reasons, decides to act on them (Raz 1975). Typically,
other-regarding considerations such as promoting the overall good
serve as the kind of first-order conclusive reasons for an action
(making it prima facie obligatory), whereas self-regarding
considerations of the individual's autonomy to pursue her own
goals in life support the second-order permission not to engage in
that action. Self-sacrifice is again a paradigm example of
supererogation. Although personal autonomy is not strictly speaking an
excuse, it creates a kind of *exemption* from doing the morally
required act. But the autonomy of the individual cannot serve to break
the good-ought tie-up, since it *presupposes* the independent
value of the personal good from what ought to be done rather than
establish it (Dancy 1988). Furthermore, supererogationists of the
unqualified kind would resist this exemption-based analysis as playing
down the positive moral value of supererogation and relegating it to
the morally neutral category of the "permitted" (Heyd
1992).



There is an interesting suggestion that supererogatory action is
grounded in moral reasons which are opposed by rational reasons of a
nonmoral kind (Portmore 2003, Portmore 2008). Thus, I have a perfectly
good moral reason to help an AIDS stricken community, but such a
choice would, all things considered, be irrational due to the risk to
my life and health or to the loss in achieving personal projects with
which I identify. Thus, nonmoral reasons can prevent moral reasons
from having a *morally* requiring force. Theoretically this
analysis opens a wide gap between rationality and morality which
philosophers are reluctant to accept. Moral requirements according to
this view have force only when they are backed not only by direct
moral reasons but also by the entire scheme of reasons by which I make
practical choices and these might point to a conclusive reason not to
act morally. "Supererogatory actions just are those that are morally
good, but for which one does not have decisive practical reason"
(Dorsey 2013, pp. 381-2). Critics of this approach have pointed out
that first, not all supererogatory action is irrational and secondly,
a moral theory which encourages us to perform irrational action is
defective (Postow 2005). But note that this critique implies a
qualified form of supererogationism since the only way to explain why
we are free not to act on the best reason overall is that we are
excused or exempted from the action supported by the set of moral
*and* rational reasons.



Qualified versions of supererogationism try to salvage a prescriptive
element in the analysis of the concept without collapsing
supererogation into duty (which would amount to denying its separate
existence). Identifying supererogation with a weaker kind of duty, an
imperfect duty, a non-universalizable duty, an 'ought'
rather than a duty are all forms of recognition of supererogatory acts
but only as being an integral part of an overall conception of duty.
They maintain the deontic integrity of the moral system but by that
run the risk of losing sight of what makes supererogatory action
uniquely meritorious, sometimes praiseworthy, and often touching.


### 3.3 Unqualified Supererogationism



Imagine a world in which all morally good acts are also obligatory and
in which individuals are capable of carrying out their duties with
ease (and with no conflict with their personal goals and aims). Is
something of moral value missing in such a world? Both
anti-supererogationists and qualified supererogationists would answer
in the negative. Those who believe in the intrinsic value of
supererogatory conduct would disagree. What would be missing in such a
world is what Tertullian referred to as *licentia*, that
special field of liberty, which allows human beings to exercise their
power of moral choice. Even Kant, who suggests the ideal of the
Kingdom of Ends in which members of the moral community exercise their
free will (Wille) by the necessity of their nature, believes that
imperfect moral creatures like us have a free choice (Willkur)
between good and evil. In this discretionary power to adopt the moral
law (or reject it) lies the particular value of morality, at least for
human beings. Going beyond duty might be considered as a display of
this power of free choice. The pure or unqualified version of
supererogationism highlights the moral potential of good human action
not prescribed or commanded, imposed or demanded in any sense. In
other words, supererogation is good, not only due to the promotion of
overall value in the world (which would not be denied by the other two
views either), but also due to the kind of liberty in which it is
performed. If that is the case, then an inherent part of the value of
supererogation lies exactly in its lying *beyond duty*. The
supererogatory is something that is not required in any sense and its
omission does not call for an appeal to a special permission,
exemption or excuse.



Rather than argue that a supererogatory act is that which the agent is
*permitted* not to do, the unqualified analysis argues that it
is an *option* for the agent. Permissions, at least
"strong permissions," are given to people to act in a way
which there is some reason not to, whereas options are the positive
counterparts of permissions. Options, as the etymology of the term
attests, are actions the agent *wishes* to do, actions that
seem to him good and worthy of choice. The point of supererogatory
action lies, accordingly, in the good will of the agent, in his
altruistic intention, in his choice to exercise generosity or to show
forgiveness, to sacrifice himself or to do a little uncalled favor,
rather than strictly adhering to his duty. Supererogatory action is a
matter of personal initiative; it is spontaneous (i.e. originating in
personal choice rather than in any external or universal demands). It
allows for the expression of personal care or concern for another
individual and thus may either reflect a particular personal
relationship to another or create such a relationship. Supererogation
is valuable because we believe that beyond the impersonal and
egalitarian social web created by the universal morality of duty,
there is space left for particular relationships that are not governed
by the principles of justice and rights. From society's point of
view, leaving a separate space for supererogatory action may
strengthen mutual trust and communal bonds since it often indicates
and promotes love and personal concern rather than mere respect for
persons and a sense of justice. This view of supererogation locates it
in the open-ended dimension of morality, that of ideals rather than
principles, what Urmson calls "the higher flights of
morality" and Bergson "the morality of aspiration."
The Talmud suggests this idea epigrammatically: "Jerusalem was
only destroyed because judgments were given strictly upon Biblical Law
and did not go beyond the requirements of the law".



Furthermore, supererogation is closely related to the ideal of moral
perfection. For the anti-supererogationist we are under a duty to do
the very best, to be perfect. But this may be a demand with which
people would not be always able to comply but a counter-productive
expectation which would lead to despair and constant fear of failure
(Benn 2018a). Allowing space for the supererogatory enables human
beings to try to go beyond the required and towards perfection without
a sense of guilt and failure.



The justification of a principled (rather than pragmatic or
circumstantial) demarcation between duty and supererogation is
reminiscent of the analogous demarcation between the legal and the
moral. Beyond the obvious reasons for avoiding the legal enforcement
of all moral duties, many philosophers believe that part of the value
of acting on one's moral duty has to do with the intention to do
the right act, with acting for duty's sake. This serves as a
principled ground for leaving morality free from legal enforcement.
Similarly, unqualified supererogationists argue that the value of some
virtuous actions like giving and forgiving would be lost if these
become morally obligatory, demands whose omission entails blame and
condemnation. The optional nature of supererogatory behavior is one
step beyond the Kantian-like freedom of acting from moral duty. The
moral non-enforcement of the supererogatory is analogous to the legal
non-enforcement of the moral.



All this leaves the question of the substantive demarcation of duty
and supererogation unsettled. Those who deny the existence of
supererogation are not bothered by the issue. Those who explain it in
terms of exemptions and excuses can appeal to cost-benefit analyses of
the enforcement of high standards of behavior on morally weak human
beings. But for those who ground supererogation in the intrinsic value
of individual autonomy and altruistic intention, personal concern and
the expression of virtue, there are no easy criteria for establishing
the limits of duty and the space of the supererogatory. One method of
drawing this line is phenomenological, that is to say to proceed from
"the inside of the agent" and her experience which attests
to the difference between the sense of external requirement and the
free choice of the individual (Horgan and Timmons 2010). However
advocates of this method are fully aware that it can at most serve as
an empirical support to the possibility of supererogation, but not as
its philosophical justification.



The recent renewal of interest in virtue ethics led philosophers to
examine whether there is a place for supererogation in such
virtue-based theories. On the face of it, Aristotelian ethics cannot
accommodate supererogation since it does not share the deontic
conditions on which the idea of transcending duty is based. However,
Roger Crisp argues that this view is based on a misreading of
Aristotle, for whom both doing the virtuous act (fitting the
circumstances) and being a virtuous person are obligatory. It is the
duty of a virtuous person to become angry when it is fitting to feel
so. Thus, Crisp is led to a sharp anti-supererogationist view. Since
virtue is itself a kind of excess, one cannot go beyond it (Crisp
2013). But then, one may wonder, how would Aristotle (according to
Crisp's reading) evaluate the act of throwing oneself on a
hand-grenade in order to save the lives of others? Aristotle should
either judge it as plainly wrong, wasteful or unfitting (and hence
contrary to duty), or as "a noble" deed which is
ultimately self-serving, adding glory to the agent, even if only
posthumously. This understanding of virtue ethics is extremely
demanding in comparison to theories which recognize the separate realm
of the supererogatory. However, there are proponents of virtue ethics
who believe that supererogation is not only possible but can be
analyzed in Aristotelian terms (Stangl 2016).



It should be noted that in virtue-based ethics (for example
Aristotle's) the demarcation issue becomes moot: supererogatory
transcendence of the demands of morality does not play a major role
since ethical norms do not consist of well-defined moral duties with
which supererogation is correlated. There are contemporary attempts to
analyze supererogation in terms of virtue (Kawall 2009), but they seem
to fall into circularity: if the supererogatory is defined as what the
(idealized) perfectly virtuous person would judge to be so, we still
have to decide, independently of a theory of supererogation, who this
ideal moral agent is. The ideal of virtue is therefore not very
helpful in providing us with criteria for supererogation and for its
demarcation from duty.



Thirty years after publishing his ground-breaking article
"Saints and Heroes", J. O. Urmson (1988) expressed regret
for having introduced the theological term
"supererogation" into moral philosophy since he reached
the conclusion that it only replaced "the old over-simple
trichotomy" with "a new over-simple tetrachotomy".
This change of heart for the philosopher most associated with the
modern revival of the debate on supererogation is striking. His late
view cannot, however, be categorized as anti-supererogationist since
he does not deny the special moral value of saintly and heroic actions
which are by no way obligatory. Yet, he wishes "to
dissociate" himself from using the concept of supererogation as
a "blanket-term" which covers both saintly and heroic acts
and acts of considerateness, decency, chivalry and self-denial. Urmson
believes that these kinds of actions are too heterogeneous to be
treated under a distinct category in moral theory. The response to
Urmson's (self) critique is that the less dramatic cases of
"non-obligatory well doings" are a significant challenge
to deontological theory no less than the rare acts of extraordinary
sacrifice and altruism. At least this seems to be the assumption in
most of the literature on the subject following Urmson's
retraction.



There is no knockout argument for any of the three views of
supererogation. The relative merits and defects in each have to do
with the kind of definition of the supererogatory as well as with some
fundamental beliefs about the nature of morality and the source of
moral value. However, a more "local," less abstract,
discussion of paradigm examples of supererogatory action may be of
help in the overall assessment of the three views.


## 4. Paradigm Examples



The analysis of concrete cases or examples is methodologically
important in the philosophical discussion of supererogation. Unlike
other subjects in ethics, like justice or duty, in which there is wide
agreement about some core cases, supererogation is a concept the
applicability of which is controversial. Unlike the concepts of
justice and duty, which have deep roots in both ordinary language and
everyday moral judgment, the idea of supererogation is only tenuously
anchored in common moral discourse and the concept itself is a
theoretical construct. Examples cannot in themselves prove the truth
of any of the previously discussed analyses of supererogation, but
they can definitely help in revising the various definitions of the
concept as well as make a case for one or another of its
justifications. Admittedly, some measure of circularity is inevitable
in such a method, since the way examples are understood and analyzed
is also informed by the definition and the construction of the
theoretical concept.



Beneficence and charity are often considered as typical examples of
supererogation. Unlike giving what is the recipient's
*due* (or what is owed to him as his right), charity is not
required by justice, lies beyond one's duty. As the term
"gratuity" indicates, it is not necessary but optional.
Charity is typically open-ended (i.e. there is no specified limit to
how much one may give), is driven by altruistic intention, and is
judged to be morally praiseworthy in a different sense than the
fulfillment of a duty or respect for others' rights. But
anti-supererogationists hold a harsher view of charity. Some regard
charity as a condescending attitude; others expose the underlying
expectation of return involved in any system of gifts (Mauss 1954) or
even the logical impossibility of a real, free and gratuitous gift
relationship, since every giving involves an expectation of return
-- of both gratitude and a future gift (Derrida 1992). There are
ethical theorists who believe that our standards of distributive
justice are far too minimalist and that much of what is considered
supererogatory in the transference of wealth from the rich to the poor
should really be considered obligatory. The more extreme version of
this critique suggests a principle of giving according to which one
should give all one's luxuries in order to satisfy the basic
needs of others. Thus, the realm of the supererogatory is radically
narrowed down, although it is hard to see how anti-supererogationists
can completely abolish it. Supererogationists for their part argue
that some distinction between justice and charity, between market
exchange and voluntary giving, is good for both society and
individuals because it creates a sense of community and good will, not
to speak of more utilitarian benefits. One classical example is the
system of the provision of blood for medical purposes. Social
scientists as well as philosophers have argued for the advantages of a
completely voluntary (supererogatory) system of blood donation over
the commercialized or "enforced" systems (Titmuss 1973).
But it seems that the issue of the deontic status of charity is often
of a normative rather than conceptual kind. It focuses on the
demarcation line between the obligatory and the gratuitous, both on
the personal level of the behavior of the individual and on the social
and political level (e.g. how much do rich countries owe poor
countries and how much should be left to voluntary charity).



The problem of demarcation also plagues the paradigm case of
supererogatory behavior, the so-called saintly and heroic acts. Fire
fighters rushing to a burning house to save its residents risk their
lives in a way that moves every spectator. But are they not paid for
it? Is it not "their job"? Are they not justified when in
a later response to a journalist's question they insist that
they only did their duty? The supererogationist might respond by
turning our attention to a similar risk taken by a by-stander who
joins the professional emergency forces and literally jumps into the
fire. Deniers of supererogation might argue that although such an
action is heroic, it ought not to have been performed, since the
slight chances of saving the victims of the fire do not justify the
very high risk of loss of life of the volunteer. Kant at one point
expresses his doubts about the moral motive behind some of the extreme
cases of moral heroism and warns against moral fanaticism and
sentimentalism (Kant 1949).



There are however examples of morally good actions which can be denied
a supererogatory status only with much difficulty. Volunteering is a
typical act that cannot be reduced to a duty, even not in a
hypothetical manner as qualified supererogationism might try to do.
When a job or a task must be done by a group of people, the group
might select the individual who will do the job on the basis of some
principle of justice or desert or, in the absence of such principle,
by lot. In extreme cases, such as taking part in a highly risky
medical experiment, it may be the case that no selection process,
including lottery, should be deployed. If an individual volunteers to
take upon herself the task rather than leaving it to the selected
person, and particularly when it is wrong to select *anyone*,
then clearly her act is supererogatory. Volunteering highlights the
optional nature of supererogatory action in its purest form (the agent
can hardly hide behind the morally modest expression "I only did
my duty"). Promising is similar to volunteering in its optional
nature which is not associated with the demarcation problem. One ought
to fulfill one's promises, but making them in the first place is
supererogatory. This might solve a paradox which has been raised: is a
promise to do a supererogatory act possible? It seems not, since the
promise fulfilling act cannot be both an obligatory act of promise
keeping and a supererogatory act at the same time (Kawall, 2005). This
may lead us to the conclusion that it is impossible to promise to do a
supererogatory act since no act can secure the bare minimum of the
obligation created by the promise maker: only a supererogatory act
would be considered as promise fulfilling and such an act is by
definition not obligatory (Benn 2014). However, if the act of
promising itself is supererogatory, then so is its fulfillment, even
though the expectation created by the promise means that after being
made it must be fulfilled. The paradox may prove to be illusory once
we distinguish between the general supererogatory nature of the
content of the act (e.g. giving you a ride to the airport in the
middle of the night) and the obligatory nature of its performance
under the specific circumstances of having promised to do so (Heyd
2005). 



Of course, anti-supererogationists could argue that volunteering and
promising are both imperfect duties, i.e. not obligatory in any given
individual case but nevertheless general requirements of virtue.
People who never volunteer are morally condemnable; people who never
commit themselves by promising are morally defective and fall short of
standards of friendship and social behavior.



There are cases in which the supererogatory response is expressed in
omission rather than in action. Forgiveness is a prime example of
supererogatory forbearance. The offended party refrains from reacting
negatively to the wrong done to him. Rather than the morally justified
hostility and resentment that he was entitled to express, he shows
forgiveness. There is, however a heated debate in ethical theory about
the deontic nature of forgiveness. Many philosophers and
non-philosophers alike believe that forgiveness is a moral
*duty*, particularly if certain conditions like expressions of
regret by the offender have been satisfied (e.g. Rashdall 1924). An
unforgiving person is, accordingly, morally blameworthy. But for
others, forgiveness is the epitome of supererogatory action since it
is completely gratuitous, dependent on the good will of the offended
party (Heyd 1982). There is also a middle way (Gamlund 2010) which
considers "unconditional forgiveness" (that which is shown
to unrepenting wrongdoers) as typically supererogatory, but
"conditional forgiveness" (granted to offenders who
express regret) as possibly a duty (depending on other
considerations). For supererogationists the touching aspect of
forgiveness lies exactly in its optional nature. Since the offender
deserves punishment (or at least resentment), he cannot at the same
time deserve (or have the right to) forgiveness. Despite the close
similarity between giving and forgiving, it seems that the latter is a
purer example of supererogatory act since it has a better chance of
breaking what Derrida refers to as an endless circle: while a gift
imposes a duty (debt) which can be satisfied only by a slightly larger
counter-gift (which would initiate yet another round of giving),
forgiveness is more a matter of attitude and has no measure.



It has also been suggested that toleration is, like forgiveness, an
act of supererogatory forbearance: although the tolerator has a good
reason for intervening in the wrong behavior of another, she chooses
to refrain from such interference, letting the other lead her life as
she wants (Newey 1997, Benbaji & Heyd 2001). Thus, an analysis of
toleration as supererogatory is a possible solution of the
"paradox of toleration," viz. how can refraining from
intervening in the wrong beliefs or behavior of others be considered
desirable. Note, though, that if toleration is taken as as
supererogatory, it cannot, for the reasons discussed above, be
ascribed to governments but only to individuals and groups of
individuals.



However, even if certain acts of forgiveness and toleration exemplify
a supererogatory response, there surely are cases in which both are
forbidden (the unforgivable and the intolerable) and there may be
cases in which they are both obligatory (persistent pleas of the
offender to be forgiven or the political demands of toleration of
minorities in a multi-cultural society). A conceptually neat case for
testing our intuitions about the deontic status of forgiveness (and
toleration) is God's attitude to human sinners: is God
*bound* by the principles of just retribution, i.e. not to
forgive? Does he have a duty to forgive? Or is divine forgiveness a
pure act of gratuitous grace? If God can act supererogatorily, how
does that reflect on the perfection of divine justice that it
transcends? The application of the concepts of forgiveness on the
political level raise further questions. Even if the universal and
unbiased rules of justice can be surpassed by individuals who show
forgiveness or toleration, can institutions like the state or the
courts exercise such supererogatory restraint without violating the
demands of impartiality and equality before the law (Heyd 1978)? Legal
pardon granted by kings and presidents reflects this tension between
the wish to leave some measure of individual discretion in showing
mercy to some public figures and the concern for the impartial
application of such supererogatory grace.



There are of course many other examples of supererogatory action
although the length and nature of the list is dependent on the
definition of supererogation we adopt and the view of its value. But
to the extent that actions and forbearances are supererogatory we may
summarize their source of value as belonging either to their good
consequences (as in the case of giving and charity) or to the strength
of character or virtue of the agent (as in the risky acts of heroism)
or to the pure good will involved in choosing to do what lies beyond
duty (volunteering, forgiveness, small favors).



Beyond the complex philosophical debate about the nature and scope of
supererogation, the discussion of paradigm examples indicate that any
ethical system which does not allow for any actions beyond the call of
duty would prove to be distressingly impoverished, even if
coherent.


## 5. Complications and Extensions



As early as 1982 Derek Parfit raised the following question: imagine
that you can save the right arm of another person at a great cost to
yourself; but if you decide to do so, you can save also his left arm
at no *extra* cost to you; are you under a duty to save both
arms? Parfit's answer is the intuitive one: yes, you ought to do
so (Parfit 1982, pp. 131-2). Yet this answer does not easily fit
theories of supererogation according to which if saving one arm is
supererogatory, saving two arms must *a fortiori* be
supererogatory. This question gave rise to more recent debates about
"Effective Altruism". The idea is that even if there is no duty to
give to charity, it is wrong to give to a charity which is
ineffective; or in other words, once the bounds of duty are crossed
and one's action is supererogatory, it ought to be optimal,
especially if the extra costs and risks are only marginal or
non-existent (Pummer 2016). If two children are stranded in a burning
house and you risk your life by entering the house and save one child,
you ought to save also the other child if that does not incur further
risk to you. The two children have no claim on you as long as you
stand outside just doing what your duty demands (calling the fire
fighters); but once you are inside, the second child has a claim on
you to be saved too. The same justification not to save a child from a
burning house (the extreme risk) must apply to both children. But once
you are inside the house and have already risked your life, this
justification does not work if you choose not to save the other
(Horton 2017). Against this demand for optimization (limited only by
agent-relative qualifications) there is the unqualified,
non-consequentialist argument that one needs no excuse or exemption
from avoiding entering the burning house and that optimization is not
a duty. Thus neither the two children together, nor the second child
separately, have a claim against the bystander for not acting in the
optimal way (Sinclair 2018). Although for the non-consequentialist
there is no duty of optimization of the good, he or she admits that
once one gave up the justification for not entering the burning house,
one cannot use the risk in order to avoid saving the second child
because the risk has already been undertaken in saving the first child
(Sinclair 2018).



A similar case of effective altruism is the following: By donating $0
you save no one; by donating $50 you save 1 person; by donating $5000
you save 500 people (which is proportionate to the previous option);
by donating $10,000 you save 101 (which is irrational and a waste of
money in comparison to the previous option); by donating $10,050 you
save 200 people (Wessels 2015, p. 90). Now, although the last option
is very "effective" and makes excellent use of the extra $50 (in
comparison to the second option), the question is whether adding the
extra $50 donated by the generous donor who gives $10,000 is
obligatory. The poor person is commended for his supererogatory act of
giving $50 to save one person; cannot we regard the extra $50 of the
rich person who donated $10,000 as his duty, especially in light of
the possibility of saving 100 more people by this small sum? Once you
donate $10,000 it is reasonable to expect of you to give the extra
marginal addition of another $50 so as to double the benefit of your
donation (i.e. saving 200 people). This demonstrates that the
threshold conception of the supererogatory as everything lying beyond
the obligatory requires some refinement. There are circumstances in
which in the realm of the supererogatory some new obligations may be
created (Wessels 2015). As we have seen, such circumstances exist in
the case of promises: promising itself is supererogatory; but once a
promise is made, actions fulfilling the promise become obligatory.



In recent years there have been attempts to extend the scope of the
category of the supererogatory to *non-moral* normative domains.
Some discuss the idea of *epistemic* supererogation, the idea
that in one's search for knowledge one goes beyond some
reasonable measure of epistemic responsibility by being more diligent
or looking for more evidence than is usually required in such search
(Hedberg 2014). All that is needed for such an extension of the
applicability of the supererogatory is a normative domain which has a
scale of value on the one hand (e.g. degrees of epistemic
responsibility) and standards of expected time and energy involved in
the search of the relevant value (e.g. knowledge). Similarly one may
also speak of supererogation in the context of *prudence*, when
one does more than can be expected of a normal level of care and
self-control in sticking to a medically desirable diet (McElwee 2017).
Even in *business ethics* the category of supererogation is used
to describe behavior of firms which not only go beyond legal and
economic norms but also beyond corporate social responsibility and
"positive deviance" (such as philanthropic activities). One example is
Johnson&Johnson's decision to the recall of Tylenol after
the 1982 poisoning affair, in which legal counsels, consumers and even
the media did not consider it as morally necessary. This was an
unprecedented decision which meant a huge financial sacrifice on part
of the firm. Finally, supererogation is also applied in the sphere of
*professional ethics*, such as the behavior of doctors. As
against Rawls and Heyd, it is argued that supererogatory behavior is
not confined to the domain of natural duties but may hold also in
cases of surpassing professional duties. For example, a nurse who
brings books from home to a patient in her ward is acting beyond her
professional duty but she is still acting as a nurse and in that sense
her act is "continuous" with her professional duties. The good
promoted beyond the normal professional standard is "profession
specific" (Eriksen 2015).



These complications and possible extensions of the category of the
supererogatory challenge the "standard model" of supererogation by
questioning the assumptions about the specifically moral nature of
supererogation and the clear demarcation between the obligatory and
the supererogatory.