## 1. The Thomistic Doctrine of Practical Reason



When one chooses through one's free will to live
'honorably and rightly' in accordance with divine law, one
can reasonably be thought to live a moral life. Despite the human
ability to reason according to divine principles, the human condition
does not permit the attainment of moral perfection through natural
means alone. Augustine asserts that only through grace, sent freely by
God to assist the human will can one achieve true moral goodness.
Prudence, which is the ability to choose good and avoid evil,
intellectual contemplation, moral and political virtue, friendship,
education and character (all essential elements in Aristotle's
ethics) are subsumed in Augustine's moral theology under the
command to love God. For Augustine the complexity of Greek moral
thought can be reduced to the simple rule of conformity to divine
law.



Despite the contributions of Anselm in the eleventh century on
questions concerning free choice, divine foreknowledge and
predestination, and Peter Abelard's startling assertion in the
twelfth century that morality arises from the agent's intention
alone, it is not until the thirteenth century that a thoroughly
scientific approach to human moral reasoning takes shape.
Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, newly translated into
Latin, provides a philosophical basis on which a fresh examination of
Augustine's doctrines could be based (Wieland, 1981). The first
great medieval commentary on Aristotle's ethics, which was the
result of Albert the Great's teaching activity at the Dominican
House of Studies in Cologne, marks the beginning of 'moral
science' in the Middle Ages. Albert's careful exposition
of Aristotle's text and his clarification of the concepts of
natural law, moral reasoning and human virtue, and its influence on
his most famous pupil, Thomas Aquinas, led directly to a consideration
of the question of practical reasoning in the Middle Ages.



The notion of medieval practical reason can be investigated in two
ways: 1) in light of the distinction between practical and theoretical
sciences in the writings of the medieval university masters in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; 2) in comparison to the modern
understanding of practical reason as described by Immanuel Kant. The
first method allows for a strict adherence to the texts themselves,
wherein the concept of 'ratio practica' is strictly
limited to a type of philosophical reasoning. The second approach
permits a deeper philosophical consideration of the parallels between
the medieval understanding of the nature of moral goodness and the
modern view of the will as practical reason. Both approaches are
helpful in gaining a fuller understanding of the meaning of practical
reason in the Middle Ages.



In its strictest sense the term 'practical reason'
(*ratio practica*) refers specifically to a type of reasoning,
which is analogous to the deductions of speculative or theoretical
science. When discussing human knowledge of the precepts of natural
law Thomas Aquinas argues that these commands are related to practical
reasoning as the first principles of demonstration are related to
speculative reasoning; in each science there are certain principles of
demonstration which are known in themselves (*principia per se
nota*). These principles, which comprise the universal laws of
moral behavior direct all subsequent moral reasoning. Thomas bases his
theory of correct reasoning on the human ability to discover an
underlying order in any field of inquiry. The order of reasoning which
determines metaphysical knowledge is derived from a recognition of the
principle of non-contradiction. Reasoning from the notion that being
and non-being are contradictory terms, a metaphysician argues for
certain conclusions about the nature of being. In practical reason one
begins with the principle that all human acts are directed to an end
and then comes to recognize the fundamental element of ethics to be
'do good and avoid evil':



> 
> Therefore the first principle in practical reason is that which is
> based on the nature of the good which is: the good is that which all
> things seek. This therefore is the principle of law: that good must be
> done and evil avoided. And on this <precept> all other precepts
> of natural law are based so that everything which is to be done or
> avoided pertains to the precepts of natural law. Practical reason
> naturally understands these precepts to be human goods. (*S.
> th.* I-II, 94, 2).
> 



Although Albert sees a closer connection between prudence and
practical reason than Thomas ("prudence and practical reason
have the same acts in that reason gives the act while prudence informs
the act by reason of justice, expediency and honesty." *De
bono* # 443), Albert essentially agrees with Thomas'
description of the method of practical reasoning (*Super
Ethica*, VI, 7, pp. 436-437).



Thomas argues from the basic principle that what is a good always has
the nature of the end to the conclusion that human beings seek to
discover particular good acts as consequences of the determined end.
Since practical reason mimics the deductive process of theoretical
reasoning, the term, '*ratio practica*', primarily
refers to a type of human knowledge. There is, however, a fundamental
difference between the conclusions of theoretical and practical
science:



> 
> Because speculative reason is especially concerned with what is
> necessary and cannot be otherwise, the truth found in its conclusions
> is without flaw, just <the truth> in its general principles. But
> practical reason concerns what is contingent whose domain is human
> acts; and so even if there is some necessity in its general
> <principles>, the more one descends to its proper conclusions
> the more one finds a defect <in truth>. In speculative reasoning
> the truth is the same for all, both in principles and in conclusions.
> In operative reasoning there is not the same truth or practical
> rectitude according to its proper <conclusions>, but only
> according to its common principles. (*S. th.* I-II, 94,
> 4; *Super ethica*, VI, 7, p. 441).
> 



Since the goal of practical reason is action not knowledge, the truth
attained by the intellect must be caused by its conformity to right
desire. There can be no necessary science of practical reason, since
virtuous activity allows for variety and derivation from the universal
rule in particular instances. Moral matters, which are within the
domain of practical reason, are varied and inadequate
(*deformis*), and cannot therefore provide the certainty which
is expected in theoretical reasoning. If we are to have any science of
practical reason at all, we must be content to apply the principles to
various conclusions and proceed from rough arguments which demonstrate
truth in a general way.



The variety and differences among the will's acts lead Thomas
Aquinas to use the term '*ratio practica*'
specifically to distinguish the method of moral reasoning from that of
strictly scientific knowledge:



> 
> Therefore one finds something in practical reason which is related to
> operations just as a proposition in speculative reason is related to
> conclusions. (*S. th.* I-II, 90, 1 ad 2).
> 



Albert argues that despite the similarities in method between the two
types of reasoning, the force of a practical conclusion depends more
on a particular desire than a universal principle. Since human desires
differ so greatly, moral arguments are merely general and imperfectly
formulated. (*Super ethica*, VI, 16, p. 491). These
distinctions which are derived from Aristotle's analysis of the
nature of human knowledge, do not approach the understanding of
science found in the philosophy of Kant. For Kant, speculation does
not, and cannot, give us knowledge of being, nor should we begin with
being as the object of science, as is seen in the medieval principle
of existential non-contradiction. Kant restricts speculative science
to a consideration of the laws of appearance. Practical science, or
practical reason, in Kant's philosophy, however, is concerned
with freedom rather the natural good or the human end. Kant's
practical reason attains the kind of rigor, based on pure *a
priori* principles, which would be impossible in the ethics of
Aristotle, Albert and Thomas who are content with a science of
practical reason whose domain is contingent and changeable acts. The
secure foundation which Kant sought for every moral choice would be
considered beyond the scope of practical reason as formulated by the
medieval commentators on Aristotle's ethics.



Despite their enthusiastic reception of Aristotle's works, the
medieval moralists did not grant him complete authority in moral
reasoning. The flexibility of Aristotle's ethics, which Thomas
himself acknowledges, did not lead medieval writers to construct a
moral theory which, like Aristotle's, is based on societal
norms, tradition and human actions. The medieval moralists sought a
more secure foundation for determining ethical action than
Aristotle's appeal to the man of practical wisdom
(*phronimos*). A modern author recognizes the tensions that
exist in medieval ethical theory when he writes of Thomas Aquinas:
'How is it that Aquinas can seem so Aristotelian in his
description of human action and yet be so Augustinian in his
insistence on the need for conformity to the eternal law?'
(Westberg, 34). The answer to this question lies the account of the
genesis of the human moral act and the conditions for its rectitude.
Practical reason requires a foundation more secure than the accepted
practice of human actions. In the search for that basis, Thomas and
his contemporaries construct a theory of practical reason far more
complex than the mere designation of a type of intellectual reasoning;
it becomes an account of the nature of moral goodness itself.



The designation of the will as rational appetite, its end as goodness
and its relationship to the intellect are well-known features of
medieval followers of Aristotle and need not be treated at length
here. What is of more interest in a discussion of practical reason is
the analysis of those first principles which regulate moral reasoning.
Thomas in developing the ideas of his former teacher, Albert, insists
that the will must be moved by an end that is perceived as good.
(*S. th*. I-II, 6, 1 & 8, 1; *Super ethica,*
VI, 7, pp. 436-437). More specifically he argues that:



> 
> ... the good in common, which has the nature of the end, is the
> object of the will. Therefore because of this element the will moves
> the other powers of the soul to their acts. (*S. th*.
> I-II, 9, 1)
> 



Even though the intellect moves the will by presenting the object to
be desired, the will itself has a natural inclination toward the good.
The ultimate human end, or supreme good, is beatitude, the perfect,
all-encompassing human good. Such a supreme good could never be
perceived by practical reason as evil. (*S. th.* I-II,
13, 6 & 10, 2 ad 3; *Super ethica*, VI, 17, p. 497). The
determination of the human end as beatitude says very little about the
first principles of practical reason upon which specific moral
judgments should be based. When the will desires, it seems to want
more specific objects than the vague longing for beatitude. Thomas and
Albert specify their theory of volition by means of the doctrines of
natural law, synderesis, and prudence.



The source of the first principles in any science is a critical
element in determining the validity and nature of that science. In
moral reasoning the origin of the principles of actions not only
reveals the understanding of the nature of goodness, but directs also
all subsequent analysis as well. In Thomas' theory of practical
reason the first principle of human actions is that of law:



> 
> Just as reason is the first principle of human acts, so too in this
> reason something is the principle with respect to every other act.
> Thus it is necessary for law to pertain principally and most
> extensively. The first principle in actions, for which there is
> practical reason, is the ultimate end. The ultimate end of human life
> is happiness or beatitude. It is necessary for law to reflect in the
> highest degree that order which leads to beatitude. (*S.th*.
> I-II, 90, 2)
> 



The dictates of natural law have a direct bearing on the attainment of
human fulfillment. Despite an overly optimistic view of how
Aristotelian happiness leads to eternal beatitude, R. McInerny (p. 34)
recognizes the connection between natural law and the goal of human
life: "Of course natural law cannot be discussed without
presupposing what was said earlier about the ultimate end. The
precepts of natural law have to do precisely with the end. In its
proper sense, a precept is command to do precisely what will lead to
an end." McInerny views the Aristotelian admonition to regard
beatitude as possible only insofar as it pertains to human beings to
be an admission that the ideal of happiness can only be imperfectly
attained in this life. This statement allows for Thomas to subsume
what Aristotle had to say of the good life into a richer vision of the
ultimate goal that overcomes the vicissitudes of life (McInerny, p.
33). This interpretation is common among those who wish to see an
orderly progression from the life of virtue to perfect beatitude, but
Thomas' position is more complex. Thomas's comments on
Aristotle's text rightly distinguishes between happiness in its
essential activity and a type of earthly beatitude that includes the
benefits of good fortune. On Aristotle's own position concerning
human moral perfection Thomas claims that the Philosopher left the
question of eternal bliss open because he did not deem it entirely
within the sphere of philosophy. The role of prudence in the
production of human happiness becomes more restricted in Thomas'
theory than it does in Aristotle's ethics, since the prudential
person must follow the logical progression from the principles of
natural law to the deduction of specific actions. The freedom of the
practically wise person to chose a life with elements from practical
and theoretical activities is restricted by the obligation to pursue
the precepts of eternal law (Celano, 2007).



Albert formulates this position succinctly when he says,
"prudence is regulated by divine and human law."
(*Super ethica*, VI, 4, p. 417). While no other law than the
dictates of practical reason guides human choices, the eternal law
(*lex aeterna*) primarily and principally orders a human being
to the end and determines the corresponding means. As a result, acts
that are at odds with the eternal law must always be considered as
contrary to the dictates of practical reason. (*S. th*.
I-II, 71, 6 ad 3).



The insistence upon the binding force of eternal law and the natural
human inclination towards, and participation in, it (which is called
natural law) marks a decisive step away from Aristotle's ethics
of *phronesis*. The ground of moral action is no longer thought
to be the conformity of conduct to that of an outstanding person
(*phronimos*); it is found in an external and universally
binding source (eternal law). The process of correct practical
reasoning is governed, and measured, by the conformity of acts to the
precepts of this law:



> 
> A similar process is found in practical and speculative reason...
> just as in speculative reason conclusions of diverse sciences are
> produced from indemonstrable principles naturally known... so too
> from the precepts of natural law as if from certain common and
> indemonstrable principles human reason proceeds necessarily to those
> things to which it should be more particularly disposed. (*S.
> th*. I-II, 91, 3)
> 



The recognition of the principles of natural law allows practical
reason to demonstrate how a human being naturally participates in
eternal law according to its common principles.



Developing ideas found in Albert's work, Thomas argues that the
will must be determined by its acceptance of the dictates of practical
reason, which necessarily conform to the precepts of natural law:



> 
> that human reason rules the human will, by which its goodness is
> measured, comes from the eternal law, which is divine reason. Thus the
> goodness of the human will clearly depends much more on eternal law
> than on human reason, and where human reason is deficient it is
> necessary to turn to eternal reason. (*S. th*. I-II,
> 19,5; *Super ethica*, VI, 4, p.417)
> 



The content of the precepts, the way they are known and their
influence on volition are the final elements in the natural law theory
of practical reason. The assertion that natural law reflects eternal
law gives little indication as to its specific precepts, but it does
indicate that according to the order of natural inclinations an order
of the precepts of natural law exists. There is in a human being, as
in all other types of being, a primary inclination to
self-preservation. It is, however, in the discussions of synderesis
that Thomas and Albert most clearly identify those principles which
are the foundation of human moral reasoning. Synderesis was introduced
into Latin by Jerome, perhaps as a variant of the Greek term,
'*syneidesis*' (insight), and has no meaning
whatsoever in Greek. While Albert compares the moral principles of
synderesis to the innate natural seeds of law (*seminaria
iuris*), Thomas defines synderesis as "the law of our
intellect insofar as it is a *habitus* containing the precepts
of natural law which are the principles of human acts."
(*S.th.* I-II, 94, 1, ad 2). In an earlier work Thomas
explains synderesis either as a natural habit similar to the habit of
principles, or as the power (*potentia*) of reason with such a
habit. He sees little difference in these two designations, since each
describes the universal natural ability of reason to recognize the
first principles of morality. The parallels to speculative reasoning
that marked practical reasoning are also a feature of deriving
conclusions from the dictates of synderesis. Thomas' claim that
the function of synderesis is to recognize universal moral laws leaves
little doubt that he understood the first principles of practical
reason, natural law and synderesis to be the same:



> 
> Just as there is a certain natural habit of the soul whereby it knows
> the principles of speculative science, which we call the understanding
> of the principles, so too in the soul is there a certain natural habit
> of the first principles of actions, which are the natural principles
> of natural law; and this habit pertains to synderesis and exists in no
> other power than reason. (*De veritate*, q. 16, a. 1)
> 



The specific dictate of synderesis which refers to the eternal law is
that one must obey God; the primary imperative with respect to the
natural law is that one should avoid evil and seek the good. These
principles are obviously not mutually exclusive, 'but the
dictate of reason to pursue good is rationally and necessarily derived
from the command to obey God.' Synderesis is the ability of
reason that never errs in the recognition of those universal rules of
moral action, since a denial of their universal validity contravenes
human reason. Reason can, however, err in the application of the
universal principle to a particular action. Moral wrong is then the
result of an imperfect, or false, deduction from the principle. So
properly speaking, error is not ascribed to universal principles
(synderesis), but rather to conscience which may incorrectly apply a
universal judgment. (*De veritate*, q. 16, a. 2, ad 2;
*Super ethica* VI, 7, p. 441; Hoffmann, 2012; Trottmann,
2000).



The ability to apply correctly the principles of practical reason to
specific acts in particular circumstances is the function of the
intellectual virtue of prudence, defined succinctly as *recta ratio
agibilium*. Prudence "represents the agent's ability
to deliberate, decide and properly to order the process of practical
reason to action." (Westberg, p. 187). Prudence does not,
however, direct the will infallibly to right conclusions. Since it
merely directs choices, but does not determine them, the will can be
said to remain free. Thomas argues that the will can choose freely in
three ways, although it could never express a desire contrary to the
primary moral rule of pursuing good. The will can be mistaken 1) with
respect to its own act in that it can either will or not will; 2) with
respect to its object in that it can either want or not want a
particular thing; 3) with respect to what is ordered to the end
insofar as it wills a particular good or evil act. (*De
veritate*, q. 16, a. 2, ad 2 & q. 16, a. 1). Thomas'
description of the will's freedom seems at times to be
overwhelmed by his insistence upon the will's determination by
the human intellect. This theory of freedom seems to consist merely in
the human tendency for faulty reason, since both Albert and Thomas
think it unlikely, or even impossible, for a human being to choose
contrary to knowledge of the first principles and their application to
particular circumstances:



> 
> It should be said that the root of liberty is the will as subject, but
> reason as its cause. The will therefore can be freely drawn to diverse
> things, since reason can be drawn to diverse things, since reason can
> have various conceptions of the good. (*S. th*. I-II, 17,
> 1)
> 



For Albert the delight that arises from intemperate desire does not
corrupt the natural habit of prudence, but rather its rule, when
prudence fails in drawing the proper moral conclusion. In other words,
no one can act contrary to the universal principles of morality, but
only in their particular application. (*Super ethica*, VI, 7,
p. 441).



According to these views human freedom could never lead a human being
to act contrary to his own interests. To choose against the principles
of natural law would not constitute freedom, but rather foolishness.
Although the will's natural inclination to pursue the good
presented by the intellect does not compel the will to act, the
moralists of the natural law theory think it psychologically
impossible to choose something incompatible with a properly deduced
conclusion of practical reason:



> 
> A second necessity can be imposed on the will, namely the will must
> necessarily chose *x*, if *x* must be pursued as good or
> *x* is to be avoided as evil. (*De veritate*, q. 17, a.
> 3)
> 


## 2. The Franciscan Critique



The ethics of natural law, with its impressive union of the
Augustinian theory of eternal principles and the Aristotelian method
of moral reasoning, did not remain long unchallenged. Franciscan
theologians, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, were especially
critical of a theory which they considered too restrictive of human
freedom. Although Scotus and Ockham never produced treatises
specifically devoted to moral theory, the main lines of their
critiques may be sketched from their theological works.



Scotus' main concern in his arguments against the
intellectualism of Albert's and Thomas' ethics is his
doctrine of the supremacy and freedom of the human will. He claims
that there could be no basis for judging an action right or wrong if
the will were not free to choose against the dictates of the
intellect. The will, even if it should act 'with reason'
still is able to choose between opposite courses of action that lie
within its power; the intellect however, has no power of
self-determination, since it must assent to what it recognizes as
true. Only the will acts freely, for it has the power of
self-determination. Scotus argues that a theory of practical reason in
which judgments about actions were restricted to the type of reasoning
characteristic of speculation not only restricts freedom, but also
removes any basis for merit or blame. If the moral agent must act in
accordance with intellectual deduction, then he can only be praised
for his intellectual prowess, and not for his moral goodness.



Scotus is influenced by Aristotle's assertion that the end of
practical knowledge is truth in agreement with right desire. For
Scotus this philosophical expression of the natural law leads him to
assert one fundamental universal moral principle: 'God should be
loved'. This law is so deeply rooted in human reason that even
God's power cannot release a human being from its obligations.
This principle allows Scotus to view his moral theology as consistent
with Aristotle's ethics, since reason leads man to obey
God's commands. The will necessarily and perpetually seeks
happiness and the will naturally desires its own perfection. The
primary universal command informs the will's natural desire for
perfection, and so particular actions, regardless of circumstances,
are judged in accordance with the will's conformity to the
precept to love God.



Scotus' primary consideration as a moral theologian is the
nature of freely determined volitional choices. Only secondarily does
he consider the goodness of the desired end of the action. When the
will freely chooses in accordance with right reason only then can the
act be considered morally good. Scotus does have some difficulty
explaining the relationship between the will and the intellect. If a
human being realizes intellectually that the most desirable goal is
union with God, it seems that human intellectual reason would compel
him to pursue such an end. If the will does not act in agreement with
the rationally derived first principle then it must be necessarily
wrong. It is thereby difficult to see how the will's absolute
freedom can be maintained.



Faced with such a dilemma, Scotus argues that although the will
pursues an object rationally determined by the intellect, this does
not mean that the will is conditioned by 'natural
necessity'. The apprehension of a possible action is offered to
the will as something neutral, while the will remains always free.
(*Ordinatio*, IV, d. 46). In Scotus' view the natural law
is comprised of self-evident *a priori* principles, whose
validity the intellect immediately recognizes from the coherence of
terms. The will then is naturally inclined to assent to their
dictates, but is not compelled to do so. For Scotus the clearest
expression of natural law is the decalogue, which directs all human
actions towards the attainment of beatitude. The commands of natural
law are not good merely because they are commanded, but are commanded
because they are good. (*Ordinatio* IV, 17) Scotus considers
the first two commandments, that God must be worshipped and revered,
to be absolutely unalterable. God himself could never negate such
moral principles and human beings are morally bound to their
adherence.



Despite his unrelenting criticisms of many of Scotus' positions,
William of Ockham's moral theology develops, rather than
dismisses, the main lines of Scotus' ethical deliberations.
Ockham too is concerned primarily with the preservation of volitional
freedom, both divine and human. Ockham specifically rejects the theory
of natural law for determining human acts invariably toward an
intellectually determined end. His insistence upon the dignity of
human nature and the absolute power of the will for self-determination
lead Ockham to reject his predecessors' morality of natural law.
Ockham's critique of the metaphysics of common nature was not
limited to logical and metaphysical speculation; it pertains also to
his moral doctrine, wherein the will must be free even to choose
'evil which is neither really or apparently good.'



The autonomy of the will is so great that it can absolutely refuse to
pursue beatitude even when it is presented either as a general or
particular idea. Even after death (*in patria*) the will can
refuse to desire its own perfection. Volitional freedom is absolute in
Ockham's moral theology; it can be defined as a natural
inclination to an end, only insofar as it is an observed general human
tendency. The human will can just as easily reject its end, as it can
pursue it. (*Ordinatio* I, d. 1, q. 6).



The natural foundation of morality, so essential to Albert and Thomas
and still an important element of Scotus' thought, is rejected
by Ockham in favor of a more complete notion of volitional freedom.
Still Ockham does not advocate an ethics of relativism. The basis for
human moral judgments lies in the will's conformity to divine
commands. Impressed by Scotus' dictum, 'Deus nullius est
debitor' (God is indebted to no one), Ockham extends the power
of God to reformulate all moral laws. Not only can the commandments
that regulate human interactions be altered, but also those that
determine the relationship between God and man. God could command
human beings to hate him and such a precept must be considered as
morally binding. Ockham's use of the more common language of
medieval moral theory does not prevent him from emphasizing the
contingency of human morality. His belief in the power of human reason
to discern the rational principles of an ordered life cannot overcome
his desire to preserve the unlimited power of God, on whose will all
moral principles depends and are subject to change. Both Scotus and
Ockham construct a moral theory of volitional freedom, rather than one
that they believe to be the moral determinism of Aristotle and his
followers.


## 3. The Place of Practical Reason in Moral Theory



The question remains as to how the doctrine of practical wisdom
relates to the general moral theory of medieval thinkers. Writers such
as Eckhart and Taler rejected Aristotelian virtues in favor of more
religious ones, acceptance (*Gelassenheit*) and detachment
(*Abgeschiedenheit*), but even Thomas Aquinas had difficulty
incorporating the rational theory of practical wisdom into his overall
understanding of the moral life. Confronted with the conflicting
claims of Aristotelian Ethics and the Augustinian doctrine of grace,
he asserts in a sermon to young Dominicans:



> 
> The faith teaches all that is needed for living well. This is clear
> because no philosopher with all his efforts before the coming of
> Christ could know as much about God and what is necessary for life as
> an old woman does through faith...
> 



When faced with a clear choice between the two often conflicting moral
doctrines Thomas, like his contemporaries, preferred the religious
doctrines to the rationally based ethics of practical wisdom.



The earliest thirteenth-century interpretations of Aristotle's
notion practical wisdom emphasized the intellectual nature of moral
virtue. The pre-1250 commentators on the NE understood
*phronesis* as a means whereby a human being could be united to
the supreme good, happiness. These early interpreters of Aristotle
made the moral life an essentially passive one, in that the
*felix* is elevated to happiness by divine causality. With the
appearance of the work of Robert Kilwardby, Albert the Great, and
Thomas Aquinas a deeper understanding of Aristotle's moral
thought infused the commentaries of the second half of the thirteenth
century. These thinkers, however, were also troubled by the relation
between *felicitas* and *prudentia*.



Thomas follows the lines sketched by his former teacher, and
transforms the nature of Aristotelian ethics into a moral doctrine
that is more easily aligned with Christian moral theology. Albert and
Thomas were not content with the unspecified nature of the principles
of the moral syllogism as described by Aristotle. They left the formal
structure of the Aristotelian moral act the same, but altered the
content by adding the specific formulations of the fundamental
principles of natural law that direct all action toward the human
good. The moral agent is no longer free to determine from the
observation of customs and practices the principles of actions that
direct the practical syllogism. The precepts of natural law, which are
recognized through the natural power (Albert), or the natural habit
(Thomas), of synderesis, ensure a universally binding code of conduct.
Prudence becomes a mechanism whereby one deduces specific actions from
determined laws. The science of morality becomes closer to speculative
theory because of the unerring process of determining singular
decisions from universal commands. The Franciscan critics of the
intellectualism of the Dominican commentators on Aristotle emphasized
the volitional nature of the will's desire for goodness. Despite
their agreement that all human moral actions lead ultimately to union
with God, the commentators differ upon the natural moral means by
which such a union is caused.


## 4. Comparison with Kant



The final question remains: can the medieval explanations of practical
reason be aligned with Kant's description of practical reason?
Kant's well known definition of practical reason is:



> 
> Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being
> has the ability to act in accordance with the concept of laws, that is
> according to principles; in other words, only a rational being has a
> will. Since reason demands the derivation of actions from laws, the
> will is nothing other than practical reason. (*Grundlegung zur
> Metaphysik der Sitten*, II, 37)
> 



For Kant the aim of moral philosophy is to discover ideas and
principles that would constitute as pure a concept of will as possible
and not to determine the actions and conditions of willing, which are
mainly the concerns of psychology (*Grundlegung*, Intro., XII).
The good will is good not through its result or its capacity to attain
a predetermined end, but only by means of the willing itself.
(*Grundlegung*, I, 3). The will's ability for
self-determination according to universally binding laws conveys the
objectivity demanded by the proper concept of reason. Since a rational
nature declares itself by the self-imposition of the end, morality is
the relationship of actions to the autonomy of the will; and this
autonomy is the relation of the will to the most universal mandating
(*Gesetzgebung*) possible. (*Grundlegung*, II, 83 &
85-86). The will purified of any inclination and desire for an
ulterior end is the proper matter for practical reason.



The differences between Kantian and medieval theories of practical
reason are obvious even from such a short description of their
elements. The adherence of Albert and Thomas to the Greek view of
human nature led them to their conviction of the will's natural
inclination toward the good. Such a notion permits Thomas to advise us
to seek naturally what is useful to us. (*De veritate*, q. 24,
a. 8). What is truly advantageous to human beings must always be
conducive to attaining the human end, beatitude; utility in this sense
will always be a reliable guide to correct moral choice. Thomas claims
that every thing to which man has a natural inclination human reason
apprehends as good. For Kant human beings cannot be permitted to
pursue their inclinations which are to be viewed as subjective
desires. Such desires lead to moral error at least as often as they
produce right action. The objectivity of the pure concept of the human
will precludes the recognition of human inclination as a measure of
human goodness.



Despite their insistence upon volitional freedom, which in some
aspects anticipates Kant's thought, Scotus and Ockham argue that
the true measure of morality lies in the conformity of the human will
with the commands of God. Such precepts may change if God so desires
and so Scotus and Ockham produce an ethics quite different in spirit
from that of Kant's theory of universal imperatives. Ockham in
his rejection of the intellectual basis for morality argues that an
act in total conformity with right reason may not be virtuous, since
God could possibly create such an act without human volitional
consent. The act would be completely rational and in conformity with
divine commands, but would lack any merit or virtue. For Ockham the
goodness of any action lies completely in the will's desire to
obey divine commands (*De connexione virtutum*, III, 11). When
Kant describes practical reason as a necessary law for all rational
beings, whose actions are always to be judged according to maxims
completely bound to the concept of the will of a rational being, one
may see parallels to the Franciscan doctrine of the autonomy of the
will. As Thomas and Albert describe the genesis of moral action as a
process in which practical reason has the ability to accept,
understand and obey the principles of a universal law consonant with
human nature, they approach Kant's description of the dignity of
the will more closely than those who insist upon the necessity for
adherence to the possibly arbitrary precepts of God. Practical reason
as the desire for the good as good, as expressed in the first
principle of natural law or obedience to divine commands, and the
conformity of the will through free choice to the universally binding
principles of practical reason indicate that in some important
elements of their moral theories medieval philosophers approach the
spirit of Kant as they move away from the legacy of Aristotle.