## 1. Life and Works


Born on the island of Cherso, or Cres, off the coast of Dalmatia,
in 1529, Francesco Patrizi began his initial scholarly training in his
home city, followed by studies in Venice and Ingolstadt, before
enrolling at the University of Padua in 1547. Although he initially
intended to study medicine, he quickly turned to the humanities,
learning Greek and beginning the systematic analysis of philosophical
texts which would come to be the major preoccupation of his
professional life. He spent seven years at Padua working with an
outstanding faculty in Aristotelian philosophy while engaging in
discussions with thinkers devoted to the study of Plato and other
alternative philosophical sources. He later travelled to several other
Italian cities and moved to Cyprus, where he was able to strengthen
his knowledge of Greek and assemble a collection of Greek manuscripts
(Muccillo 1993). Following two excursions to Spain, during which he
sold a major portion of his Greek manuscripts to Philip II, he was
offered an appointment to teach Platonic philosophy at the University
of Ferrara in 1578, a position he held until invited by Cardinal
Ippolito Aldobrandini to accept a similar assignment at the University
of Rome, the "Sapienza", in 1592. He spent the last years
of his life as one of the very few philosophers teaching Platonism in
a university setting in late sixteenth-century Italy, passing away in
1597 while still engaged in defending his controversial work,
"The New Universal Philosophy" (*Nova de universis
philosophia*), from the theological criticisms that had led it to
be condemned by the Congregation of the Index shortly after it
appeared in print in 1591. Upon his death, his chair in Platonic
philosophy was awarded to the other major university teacher of
Platonism in Italy at the time, Patrizi's contemporary and
correspondent, Jacopo Mazzoni (Kristeller 1964, 113-116; Muccillo
1992).


Based on the published and unpublished works he wrote during his
career, it is clear that Patrizi's range of interests was quite
broad, reflecting both the artistic, historical and literary influence
Renaissance humanism continued to enjoy in scholarly circles during
the sixteenth century as well as the emergence of a devotion to
practical scientific and engineering issues on the part of many
philosophers. A brief survey of his works amply reveals the scope of
his concerns [see Bibliography]. Among his earliest publications was a
collection of works which appeared at Venice in 1553, including his
utopian "The Happy City" (*La citta
felice*), a dialogue on honor (*Il Barignano*) and a
discourse on the diversity of poetic inspirations (*Discorso della
diversita de' furori poetici*). He composed poetic works of
his own. In 1560 he published his ten dialogues on history and, two
years later, ten dialogues on rhetoric. He also engaged in exchanges
on literary subjects with some of the leading authors of his day.


It was not until 1571 that Patrizi put forward his first major
philosophical work in a more narrowly construed sense, when the first
part of his "Peripatetic Discussions" (*Discussiones
peripateticae*) appeared at Venice; a greatly expanded version
would be published at Basel ten years later. The *Discussiones*
would constitute one of Patrizi's most important contributions
to Renaissance philosophy. It provided a thoroughgoing analysis and
critique of Aristotle's thought, which continued to be the most
influential source in theological as well as secular philosophical
settings in the sixteenth century. In addition to taking on the
leading philosophical tradition of his day, Patrizi's work would
serve as the basis for his own development of an anti-Aristotelian
philosophy in the years ahead. [see section 2].


By actively seeking to compare Aristotle's philosophical
views with those of other ancient thinkers, the *Discussiones*
earns Patrizi a place in the history of a major philosophical genre
which has its roots in classical antiquity and which flourished again
during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in large part due
to the increased availability of translations and commentaries of the
works of Plato and other ancient sources. This
'Comparatio' tradition would not only attain popularity in
printed works but would provide an alternative model for teaching
philosophy and natural science in university settings, where
Peripatetic views had long held the field. Unlike the
'Conciliatio' approach adopted by such thinkers as
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, which sought to reconcile the apparent
differences between the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, authors like
Patrizi and contemporaries such as Jacopo Mazzoni and Paolo Beni
attempted to use a direct confrontation of the opposing views as a
method for arriving at a position which was most defensible
philosophically. In his own major works Patrizi did not hesitate to
emphasize his opposition to Aristotelianism and his preference for a
Platonic approach. [see section 3.]


The publication of the *Discussiones* did not by any means
signal an end to Patrizi's broader literary and historical
interests, however. In 1583 he published a major study on the ancient
Roman army, based on his reading of Polybius, Livy and Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, following it up a decade later with a two-volume
comparison of ancient Roman military tactics and strategies with those
of his own day, probably in attempt to encourage an improvement in
Italian military standing. He translated works of Platonic thinkers
such as Proclus, the pseudo-John Philoponus, and various tracts in
magical philosophy, now recognized as spurious, which were associated
with the ancient Egyptian sage Hermes Trismegistus and his
followers. His attention to the latter sources placed him in the
middle of the growing debate on the authenticity and philosophical
merit, if any, of the "ancient theology" and the practice
of spiritual and demonic magic by such contemporary thinkers as the
unfortunate Giordano Bruno. [see section 4].


Shortly before being called to Rome by Pope Clement VIII to teach
Platonic philosophy at the University of Rome, the Sapienza, Patrizi
published the first edition of his philosophical masterpiece, the
*Nova de universis philosophia* (Ferrara, 1591; an edition with
significant variants was printed at Venice with a spurious retrodating
of 1593). In sum, it brings together many of the major themes that had
dominated his philosophical career: the opposition to Aristotle and
the Peripatetic philosophical method, the admiration for Platonism as
a philosophical alternative, together with the incorporation of
insights derived from other ancient and modern sources to form a novel
system that Patrizi was proud to call his own and seek to have
established as a new basis for philosophical instruction in the
universities of Europe. Not surprisingly, opposition to his goals was
determined, with critics on both the theological and philosophical
sides voicing their concerns. In spite of his having produced a series
of emendations in response to criticisms by theological and
philosophical critics, his work was condemned by the Congregation of
the Index of prohibited Books "until corrected" in
1592. He was to spend the last years of his life trying to defend his
views, which in some cases hindsight shows to have pointed toward some
of the ways in which science and philosophy would move in the
Seventeenth Century and beyond. [see section 5.]


## 2. Critique of Aristotelianism




Given that his earliest development of an interest in logic and
philosophy occurred at the University of Padua, it is surely no
surprise that a close familiarity with the works of Aristotle and his
interpreters would form a major part of his training. It is perhaps
worth stressing that in philosophy as in other areas such as art,
architecture, science and literature, the Renaissance was a
"retrospective" age. From roughly the mid-Fourteenth
through the late Sixteenth centuries, many of the leading scholars of
Europe were engaged in attempting to recover the high levels of skills
and learning that characterized late classical antiquity. 
Humanists trained in the ancient languages sought to recover texts
which had been lost or ignored for a millennium or more. We owe the
very concept of the "Middle Ages" (not to mention the more
pejorative notion of the "dark ages") to this
movement. Patrizi's early mastery of Greek and his interest in
assembling a library of classical Greek manuscripts (Muccillo 1993)
places him well within the tradition of seeking to restore the legacy
of antiquity as a precondition for moving ahead to a "new"
era.




Aristotle's works had, of course, been made available to
scholars via translation from Greek and Arabic sources during the
medieval period (Twelfth through Fourteenth centuries), and a
familiarity with Aristotle's logic and natural philosophy became
a requirement for an Arts degree at medieval universities and thus an
integral part of the training of those who wished to pursue advanced
studies in medicine, theology or canon or civil law. But the number of
philosophers or theologians who could access the Aristotelian
*corpus* in the original Greek was quite small, and there was
an extensive body of works in Greek devoted to commentaries and
criticisms of the Stagirite's positions that would not become
available to a majority of readers until the Renaissance provided
accessible translations. It is not surprising that Patrizi devoted
much of his time and effort to these endeavors, and his doing so would
have a profound effect on the way in which he and many of his
contemporaries and successors would come to interpret the Peripatetic
system.




It is perhaps significant that Patrizi's earliest works,
produced while he was still in close contact with teachers and
colleagues at Padua, reveal a far less critical view of Aristotle and
his doctrines than his later writings would, generally attempting to
utilize Plato and other earlier thinkers to complement rather than
refute Peripatetic positions (see the article by F. Bottin in the
Other Internet Resources). In this regard, it is quite likely that
Patrizi may be said to have undergone a philosophical development from
an earlier, more sympathetic, view of Aristotle's philosophy to
a more critical attitude as his familiarity with Platonic and other
earlier sources increased and he became aware of the debates among the
contemporary Aristotelians themselves, such as Pietro Pomponazzi and
Agostino Nifo, over such basic doctrines as the immortality of the
soul and the nature of the physical cosmos. Add to this the ongoing
exchanges he had with thinkers committed to developing a philosophical
and scientific method outside both the Platonic and Aristotelian
"mainstreams" and it becomes clear why Patrizi came to
play the major role he did in the move from an entrenched Peripatetic
approach to the search for a "new" method which would come
to characterize the leading philosophers and scientists of the
Seventeenth Century and beyond.




Beginning with the first edition of his *Discussiones
peripateticae* in 1571, Patrizi initiated a more critical
assessment of the character and philosophical reasoning of Aristotle
than had characterized his earlier writings. That work, followed
by the expanded edition of 1581, provided a close comparison of the
views of Aristotle and Plato on a wide range of philosophical issues,
arguing that Plato's views were preferable on all counts
(Kristeller 1964, 115), although it should be noted that the three
books added to the 1581 edition exhibit a far more aggressive tone than
the initial edition. In addition, Patrizi echoes the theme put
forward earlier by Christian Platonists such as Augustine,
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and his own Renaissance predecessor
Marsilio Ficino, that Platonism is more in harmony with Church doctrine
than the Stagirite's were. Later, by including the spurious
work *Theology of Aristotle*, derived largely from the
Neoplatonist Plotinus, as an appendix to his *Nova de universis
philosophia* (1591), he implied that Aristotle in fact agreed with
many of the Platonic doctrines he openly attacked in his
*corpus* of attributed works, thus suggesting an underlying
duplicity on Aristotle's part in order to bolster his own
philosophic credentials as an independent thinker. And
Patrizi's own "novel" philosophical system would
underscore the anti-Aristotelian attitude he had expressed throughout
his career.




What were some of the major issues on which Patrizi took Aristotle
to task? In his *Della poetica* (Aguzzi-Barbagli
1961-1971) he evaluated and rejected the Stagirite's analysis of
poetry as a form of imitation, seeking to replace it with his own view,
influenced at least in part by Platonic sources (Bolzoni 1980, 1983;
Spedicati 1986). With regard to Aristotle's views on
metaphysics and natural philosophy, he rejected the notion that the
three basic "principles" of form, matter and privation
could provide an adequate account of the nature of being, especially
given that matter was conceived in terms of pure potentiality and form
as incapable of existing except as embodied in a material substrate
(Vasoli 1996). Within the broader range of scientific and
cosmological issues discussed in his major work on his
"New" philosophy, Patrizi rejects Aristotle's denial
of the possibility of a vacuum, arguing instead for a position closer
to the atomistic view that a material void is possible, although
couched in terms of his own conception of space. In that work he
would also argue for replacing the four standard Aristotelian material
elements - earth, air, fire and water - with his own
alternatives - space (*spatium*), light (*lux*),
heat (*calor*) and humidity (*fluor*). He rejected
the finitude of the physical universe and the concept that heavenly
bodies moved in conjunction with fixed celestial spheres. In sum,
by drawing upon a series of ancient, late medieval and Renaissance
sources, Patrizi sought to replace the dominant Aristotelianism of his
era with a new and challenging alternative - one which showed at
many levels his preference for a Platonic conception of reality.


## 3. Defense of Platonism




In rejecting the Peripatetic conceptions so dominant in philosophy
and science, Patrizi was clearly motivated not only by his desire to
replace what he took to be incorrect views contained in the
Aristotelian works but by his wide reading and critical study of many
of the major sources associated with the Platonic tradition. In
addition to the translations of and commentaries on the Platonic
dialogues and the works of Plotinus published by Marsilio Ficino,
Patrizi's knowledge of Greek gave him access to a body of
writings from other relevant authors. Besides translating John
Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,
Proclus' *Elements of Theology* and *Physical
Elements*, he was well versed in the works of thinkers such as
Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero, Ammonius Saccas, Boethius and Augustine,
who actively sought to incorporate Platonic teachings as an essential
part of their own views, as well as Platonically-influenced
contemporaries such as Francesco Verino il Secondo and Jacopo
Mazzoni. He argued actively for the replacement of
Aristotle's works as the model for philosophical and scientific
education at the University level, and his holding chairs in Platonic
philosophy at both Ferrara and Rome indicates his success in bringing
his ideal to fruition.




What were some of the major advantages Patrizi felt Platonism had
over Aristotelianism and how does his own scientific-philosophical
synthesis reflect this conviction? This is best illustrated in
his major work, the *Nova de universis philosophia* (Patrizi
1591, reprint with variants dated 1593). The work consists of
four major parts, combining, as he claims in the title, Aristotelian,
Patrizian and Platonic methods to produce a new philosophy. This
new system involves three stages, initially ascending, as
Aristotle's had, to the First Cause, but not by using motion to
reach the "Unmoved Mover", but rather by employing light
(*lux*) and illumination (*lumen*) to attain to the
Father of Lights. Then the Patrizian method will provide an
analysis of the Divinity, followed by the employment of a Platonic
method to show how all creation is derived from God. Although on
the surface such a program could be seen as falling within the
boundaries of the conciliatory model which many of his contemporaries
used to incorporate both Platonic and Aristotelian elements into their
thought, a closer analysis reveals the underlying Platonic nature of
his undertaking.




The four major sections of the *Nova ... Philosophia* are
as follows: *Panaugia*, or "All-Splendor";
*Panarchia*, or "All Principles";
*Pampsychia*, or "All-Soul" and *Pancosmia*,
or "All-Cosmos". It has been emphasized (Kristeller 1964,
120) that Patrizi's selection of light as the basis of his initial
"Aristotelian" method of establishing the existence of God
as "First Light" involves a departure from an Aristotelian
approach in favor of a more Platonic one, although this has been
called into question (Ryan 2002, 192-195). The key point seems to be
why light rather than motion is elevated by Patrizi to the status of
the primary basis for an *a posteriori* proof of God's
existence as First Cause. From a Platonic perspective, the answer
seems clear. Plato's use of the Sun as the physical counterpart of
the Good in the *Republic* and his extensive use of visual
metaphors for intellective processes (rather than, for example, the
tactile images that later Stoic thinkers would employ in arguing that
the mind can "grasp" certain appearances) strongly suggest
that Patrizi was seeking to replace the Aristotelian model with a
Platonic one. The fact that the notion of "seeing" the
truth would become standard in later Platonic sources such as Plotinus
and lead to the development of what has been termed Neoplatonic Light
Metaphysics only strengthens the case. In the *Panaugia*
Patrizi construes light as an intermediary between the corporeal and
incorporeal realms. The existence of light in the corporeal realm
argues for the existence of a purely incorporeal light, and indeed
Patrizi construes God as the *Lux Prima* from which by
illumination proceeds the entire realm of incorporeal entities. God
is also the ultimate source of corporeal light as well (Vasoli
1991).




 In contrast to the *Panaugia*'s emphasis on the
centrality of light, the *Panarchia*, constituting as it does
the initial application of the overtly "Patrizian" method
mentioned in the title of the work, builds upon a pattern more familiar
to students of the Platonic tradition. Dedicated to showing how
the levels of reality flow from the ultimate cause, Patrizi's
ontology draws upon such Platonic predecessors as Plotinus, Proclus and
Marsilio Ficino to present a ten-level system. Beginning with
God, whom he terms the "One-All" (*Un'omnia*),
he establishes Unity, Essence, Life, Intelligence, Soul, Nature,
Quality, Form and Body as the succeeding categories which constitute
the incorporeal and corporeal universe. Such a pastiche would
doubtless resonate with students of the history of Platonism. God
thus is viewed as having both internal and external products in
Patrizi's version of what might be termed the "chain of
being".




The third section of the *Nova ... Philosophia*, the
*Pampsychia*, focuses on Soul as an intermediary between the
spiritual and corporeal realms. As has been pointed out
(Kristeller 1964, 122), Soul thus plays a role similar to that assigned
to Light in the *Panaugia*, but the precise relationship between
the two is not dealt with. The soul of an individual living being
has the same connection to its body as the World Soul has to the
universe as a whole; thus the *Anima mundi* is not simply a
collection of individual souls but a separate entity which vivifies the
universe as a distinct reality.




The fourth and final part of Patrizi's work, the
*Pancosmia*, shows how the physical world derives its existence
from the supramundane realities discussed previously and how a
"Platonic" method may be used to arrive at an understanding
of the connections between the two realms. Thus Patrizi puts
forward a model for the understanding of the universe which bridges the
gap between philosophy and science and incorporates methodologies for
explaining physical and astronomical phenomena which would resonate
with thinkers seeking to establish an alternative approach to the study
of nature from the largely qualitative analysis embodied in
Aristotle's natural philosophy. [see Section 5].


## 4. Use of Pre-Platonic Sources




Surely one of the most interesting aspects of Patrizi's
philosophical works is his ongoing dedication to the study of sources
in the history of philosophy as an essential part of his developing his
own philosophical views. Not content merely to interpret the
major sources such as Aristotle and Plato, nor even to limit himself to
the "comparatio" tradition which sought to delineate the
major differences between those two schools of thought, Patrizi used
his linguistic, historical and humanistic skills to recover, study and
make available a great many sources which he believed (rightly or
wrongly) to have dated from the pre-Platonic and pre-Socratic
period. He may thus be said to have exemplified an interest in
two themes prevalent in other Renaissance authors - the notion of
a "perennial philosophy" which reappears in different
guises at different periods in the history of thought, and that of an
"ancient theology" traceable back to pre-Hellenic
civilizations (Schmitt 1966; Vasoli, 1981; Muccillo, 1996). His
systematic collection of pre-Aristotelian sources as part of his
attempt to determine the Stagirite's true place in the history of
philosophy put valuable textual materials in the hands of future
generations of scholars in a way that anticipated the modern
collections of resources in the last two centuries.




Patrizi's concern with early sources was not strictly
scholarly or historical, as can readily be seen by examining his works
and the ways in which those texts were employed. An independent
thinker, he was willing to consider as wide a range of views as
possible on subjects of interest to him, whether they were scientific,
philosophical, historical, or dealt with concrete problems in
engineering or hydrology. And he made use of them in his own way,
unwilling to adhere unquestioningly to the theories and practices of
contemporaries who dealt with the same works in different ways. 
To cite a concrete example, Patrizi accepted the authenticity of the
body of works attributed to the pseudo-Egyptian sage Hermes or
Mercurius Trismegistus, as had Marsilio Ficino before him and many of
his own contemporaries, such as Giordano Bruno (Yates 1964). He
printed some Hermetic works and the *Chaldaean Oracles*
attributed to Zoroaster (Patrizi 1593). It was, ironically,
within Patrizi's own lifetime that serious textual and historical
arguments would finally be put forward to undermine the authority of
many of these spurious works, and his own commitment to the
authenticity of the *Hermetica* can now be seen to have played a
major role in leading some of his critics and defenders to single out
and publicize some of the historical and textual grounds for rejecting
them as spurious (Purnell 2002; Mulsow, ed. 2002). 




But what is most interesting is that Patrizi did not employ these
texts in the way that fanatical Hermeticists like Bruno did, who saw
therein a justification for the practice of spiritual and demonic magic
and a basis for undermining the authority of the Christian church as a
"triumphant beast", perverting the "true"
religion of the ancient Egyptians. Instead, Patrizi found in
those works themes which he felt would be echoed by "later"
Greek authors such as Plato and his followers, adding additional
support to their appeal. Yet it is clearly no coincidence that
Patrizi's own difficulties with the Church over the *Nova
... Philosophia* would occur while Bruno was languishing in
prison in Rome prior to his execution in February 1600 and that Galileo
Galilei and other innovative cosmologists would face similar
confrontations with the Congregation of the Index and the
Inquisition.




Given the "retrospective" character of the Renaissance
in general, it is not surprising that what were believed to be the
oldest texts to have survived from antiquity would enjoy the audience
they did. Such works would have a profound effect on how the more
familiar and "standard" philosophical and scientific
sources were interpreted. And the coupling of critical
historiographical and etymological skills as developed by Renaissance
humanists with the philosophical and scientific interests of thinkers
like Patrizi would usher in a new age of systematic analysis of the
intellectual legacy of the ancient world.


## 5. The Relation of Philosophy to Science




One of the most intriguing aspects of Francesco Patrizi's
heritage as a forebear of early modern science and philosophy is his
ongoing attempt in his major works to incorporate a systematic account
of the natural world within an overall methodological and metaphysical
context, anticipating by doing so some of the defining characteristics
of such thinkers as Galileo, Descartes and Leibniz. Perhaps
nowhere is this more clearly displayed than in his later writings,
especially the *Pancosmia* section of the *Nova ...
Philosophia* and in his discussion of mathematical and physical
space (Brickman, tr. 1943; Vedrine, ed. 1996).




In the *Pancosmia* Patrizi is intent upon replacing the four
Aristotelian elements with his own alternatives - space, light,
heat and humidity. Space (*spatium*) is viewed as
preferable to the Aristotelian conception of "place",
construed as the inner surface of the body surrounding any
object. Patrizi elevates the notion of space to make it the first
principle of the corporeal world. Space is construed as prior to
all bodies, even light, and constitutes two distinct realms. 
Mundane space is finite in extent and contains the physical
cosmos. It is surrounded in turn by an infinite external space
empty of all bodies. The universe consists of three separate
worlds: the "Empyrean", an infinite space filled with
light; the "Aetheric", which contains all the stars and
other heavenly bodies down to the Moon; and the
"Elementary", which embraces the sublunar realm. 
Patrizi holds that the stars and planets move freely through the
*aether*, doing away with the fixed celestial spheres which had
dominated cosmology from antiquity and had even been accepted by
Copernicus. 




One can easily see numerous sources in the history of science which
may have influenced Patrizi's conception of the universe. 
The infinity of space and the existence of a vacuum were maintained by
the ancient atomists, and, as noted, the centrality of light as an
intermediary level between the corporeal and incorporeal has solid
roots in the Platonic tradition. In some ways Patrizi's
cosmology may well reveal the influence of similar attacks on the
Aristotelian position put forward by his contemporary and
correspondent, Bernardino Telesio of Cosenza. But it is equally
clear that his system represents his own unique blend of metaphysics
and physics. He does not embrace a Brunonian schema which couples
the notion of an infinite universe with that of an infinite number of
world-systems spread throughout it. Patrizi's universe is
still geocentric, though it places the Earth at the center of an
infinite expanse of light-filled space beyond the material realm. 
And although it rejects the Sun-centered universe, it does accept the
Earth's diurnal rotation. An innovative production, it
could hardly help but influence later theories (Filippona La Bruna
1965; Grant 1981; Petkovic 2002).




Another fundamental distinction Patrizi introduces is that between
mathematical and physical space, a view which will have profound import
for the main figures identified with early modern thought, such as
Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Descartes and Leibniz. In
Patrizi's system, mathematical space is a pure reality,
ontologically prior to all bodies; its primary unit is the geometrical
point. Physical space, on the other hand, contains bodies, which
are not purely three-dimensional geometrical forms, but provide the
additional factor of resistance, a view which can be seen as
anticipating Leibniz's addition of the notion of force to
Descartes' conception of bodies as geometrically definable
(Kristeller 1964, 123). Thus Patrizi can be counted among the
Renaissance thinkers such as Jacopo Mazzoni, Galileo's mentor at
the University of Pisa, who posited mathematics as prior to physics and
quite probably opened the doors to the mathematized physics which would
come to dominate early modern science (Purnell 1972; Wallace
1998). Yet for Patrizi it is geometry which is the most valuable
tool for the study of the physical world, not arithmetic. Perhaps
oddly for someone with a background so deeply rooted in Platonism,
Patrizi considered numbers to be merely products of thought, not
constitutive or revelatory of the ultimate character of the natural
world. Perhaps it would take the development of analytic geometry
to alter such a view in due course. 




Although space was put forward as the main principle of the
physical, the three derivative principles also play important roles in
Patrizi's model. The primary occupant of space is light;
from it in turn heat is produced, which is construed as a formal and
active principle. It is probably no coincidence that heat had
been one of the three basic principles underlying his colleague
Telesio's system of nature, together with cold and matter,
although Telesio's was a qualitative rather than quantifiable
universe, as Patrizi's would be. The final constituent of
Patrizi's physics is humidity (*fluor*), which is passive
and material and somewhat akin to the elements associated with
pre-Socratic thinkers such as Empedocles.




In sum, then, given the innovative, retrospective, Platonic and
Aristotelian/anti-Aristotelian aspects of Patrizi's thought, what
is the best way to "categorize" him as a Renaissance
philosopher? Humanist, scientist, mathematician, literary critic
and poet, historian, engineer and utopian theorist, it is hard to find
one category which fills the bill. Perhaps there is a message
here, not just about Francesco Patrizi of Cherso but about many
Renaissance thinkers of his day. Confronted by so many models
from previous ages and seeking to discover the best means to move into
the future, it is hardly surprising that many of the most open-minded
thinkers of the time can best be viewed more appropriately as
transitional figures, rather than Platonists, Aristotelians or
"philosophers of nature" as many have been claimed to have
been. For example, to characterize Patrizi as a
"Renaissance Platonist" with such thinkers as Marsilio
Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola is to ignore or understate the
significant differences among them. And to see him as a
"philosopher of nature" with such contemporaries as
Bernardino Telesio and Giordano Bruno hardly fits as well. That
he should be so hard to define - both looking back and looking
forward - should not disturb us. He was, after all, a
"Renaissance" thinker, helping to usher in a new age.