## 1. Biography



Born in Le Havre on November 15, 1607, Madeleine de Scudery was
born into a minor Norman aristocratic family, often dismissed as
bourgeois by her critics. Her later efforts to conquer the
aristocratic and court society of Paris often appeared tied to
insecurity concerning her familial rank. Orphaned at the age of six,
Scudery entered into the care of her uncle, an ecclesiastic who
provided her with an extensive education. She studied reading,
writing, drawing, painting, music, and dancing. She received
instruction in the practical arts of medicine, agriculture, and
domestic economy. Her most notable achievement was mastery of Spanish
and Italian; the domestic library featured numerous volumes written in
each language. A voracious reader, she discovered the epic serial
novels which would become her preferred literary genre as an author.
Scudery also began her philosophical initiation with the
reading of Montaigne, who would influence her later sympathy with
skepticism, and Plutarch (in the French translation by Jacques Amyot),
who introduced her to the Stoic philosophy of reason, will, and
virtue.



In 1637 Scudery joined her brother Georges at his residence in
Paris. A burgeoning playwright, Georges introduced his sister to the
literary salons of Paris. Mademoiselle de Scudery quickly
became a frequent guest at the Hotel de Rambouillet, where
Catherine de Vivonne presided over her salon, the celebrated
*chambre bleue* [blue room]. Notable salon authors included
Pierre
 Corneille,[1]
 Jean-Louis Guez de
 Balzac,[2]
 Valentin
 Conrart,[3]
 Jean
 Chapelain,[4]
 Gilles
 Menage,[5]
 Mademoiselle de
 Montpensier,[6]
 Madame de
 Sevigne,[7]
 Madame de
 Lafayette,[8]
 and Catherine
 Descartes.[9]
 Although eclectic in their philosophy, several authors evinced a
clear sympathy for moral libertinism. In later writings, the salon
libertine would often serve as the object of Scudery's
censure.



During the Rambouillet years, Scudery launched her own literary
career. Printed under the name of her brother Georges, she published
an historical novel, *Ibrahim or the Ilustrious Basa*, in 1641
and *Illustrious Women or Heroic Harangues* in 1642. With the
publication of *Artamene or the Great Cyrus*, a novel
printed in ten volumes from 1648 until 1653, Mademoiselle de
Scudery acquired literary fame. One of the world's
longest novels, containing more than two million words, the work
attracted a broad European reading public still avid for serial
historical romances. Although it is set in ancient Assyria, the work
was clearly a *roman-a-clef* which depicted various
members of Rambouillet's literary circle through pseudonyms.
Scudery herself appears under the title of Sappho. Now an
acclaimed author, Scudery participated enthusiastically in the
capital's literary quarrels. In 1651 she was involved in a
dispute over the relative merits of Isaac de Benserade's sonnet
*Job* and Vincent Voiture's sonnet
 *Urania*.[10]
 In political disputes, Scudery remained faithful to the French
crown. During the *Fronde* (1648-53), the intermittent
civil war opposing old aristocratic families and the Parisian
parliament to the monarchy, Scudery sided with the throne,
despite her personal admiration for the women who had led the military
resistance to the Bourbons in certain areas of the country. Her
royalist sympathies would later harden into an admiration of Louis XIV
that bordered on sycophancy.



In 1653 Madeleine and Georges Scudery established a new
residence in the Marais neighborhood of Paris. It is here that
Mademoiselle de Scudery conducted her famous Saturday salon:
the *samedis*, where a large literary circle assembled to
discuss disputed questions, especially those concerning the nature of
love. The writings of Montaigne, Pierre Charron, and Marguerite de
Navarre were discussed in the debates on the nature of true
 friendship.[11]
 Prominent participants in the salon included Madame de
 Sable,[12]
 Madame de Lafayette, Madame Scarron (the future Madame de
 Maintenon),[13]
 Valentin Conrart, Paul
 Pellisson,[14]
 Jean-Francois
 Sarasin,[15]
 Gilles Menage, Jean Chapelain, and Antoine Gombaud, chevalier
de
 Mere.[16]
 Many of Scudery's philosophical dialogues reflect
Mere's ideal of *honnetete*,
the virtue of decency, fairness, and tolerance, especially in the
realm of disputed ideas. *Salonnieres* debated the
"new philosophy" of Descartes; Scudery opposed the
mechanistic theory of matter in Cartesianism. 



Scudery continued to work as a prolific author. The ten-volume
*Clelie or a Roman History* (1654-61) contained
Scudery's most celebrated passage, the *Carte de
Tendre*, a map of love, which describes the various obstacles
(depicted as rivers, deserts, and mountains) affection must overcome
as it attempts to reach the summit of spiritual love. Sensing the
public's disaffection for the older serial novels,
Scudery published several novellas: *Celinte*
(1661), *Mathilde d'Aguilar* (1667), and *Promenade at
Versailles* (1669). Later in life, Scudery published her
most philosophical works. Labeled as "conversations,"
these works were a series of dialogues presenting the philosophical
and literary issues commonly debated in the salons; the anthologies
contained dialogues extracted from the earlier novels, reworked
dialogues, and dialogues created expressly for the new collections.
The works included *Conversations on Different Subjects*
(1680), *New Conversations on Different Subjects* (1684),
*Moral Conversations* (1686)*, New Moral Conversations*
(1688), and *Moral Dialogues (1692)*.



Scudery's prolific authorship and influential salon
brought her numerous honors. The Academie francaise
awarded her its first literary prize for her essay *On Glory*
in
 1671.[17]
 The Academy of the Ricovrati in Padua elected her to membership in
1684. But opponents strongly contested the literary and intellectual
worth of Scudery. Moliere's *Les
Precieuses ridicules* (1659), Furetiere's
*Le Roman bourgeois* (1666), and Boileau's *Satire
X* (1667) mocked Scudery as the model
 *precieuse*.[18]
 According to this caricature, Scudery's erudition was
pedantry, her profligacy redundancy, her philosophical theories
second-hand and incoherent. This dismissal of Scudery as a
risible *arriviste* would long dominate her image among
literary critics and close her books to generations of potential
readers.



Mademoiselle de Scudery died on June 2, 1701. She was interred
in the Parisian church of Saint-Nicolas-des-Champs.


## 2. Works



The works of Mademoiselle de Scudery fall into several distinct
genres: the novel, the novella, the dialogue, the oration, and the
letter.



The novels follow the conventions of the serial epic novel established
earlier in the seventeenth century. Each features an exotic locale.
*Ibrahim or the Illustrious Basa* (1641) sprawls over the
ancient Mediterranean basin. *Artamene or the Grand
Cyrus* (1649-1653) takes place in ancient Assyria.
*Clelie, a Roman History* (1654) is set in classical
Rome. Each is of extraordinary length to present its intricate twists
in plot. *Ibrahim* has four volumes, *Cyrus* ten,
*Clelie* ten. The novels feature numerous abductions of
the heroine, a trait which was the cause of mockery by early and later
critics. Philosophically, the novels provide a critical portrait of
the abuses of power in the relationship between the sexes, especially
in the practices of rape and forced marriage, and in the relationship
between ruler and ruled, notably in the practice of enslavement.



The novellas represent a concession to the changed tastes of the
French literary public. New miniature genres (the maxim, the tale, the
fable) had replaced the outmoded genre of the prolix romance novel.
*Celinte* (1661) and *Mathilde d'Aguilar*
(1667) explore the distinctive traits of female psychology, especially
in the area of the passions and the propensity toward curiosity.
*Promenade at Versailles* (1669) exemplifies
Scudery's royalist political philosophy at its most
militant; Louis XIV is praised as the model of virtues and Versailles
is depicted as a terrestrial paradise.



The dialogues published toward the end of Scudery's life
represent the most philosophical of her works. Labeled as
"conversations," the dialogues reflect the debates and
favored topics of the salon Scudery hosted at the celebrated
*samedis*. A series of characters informally discuss a disputed
issue of the moment; the conversation usually leads to a consensus on
the correctness of a particular position but occasionally the debate
ends in intellectual deadlock. Many dialogues focus on philosophical
issues: the nature of the virtues, the nature of the passions, the
problem of free will, arguments for God's existence. Numerous
conversations treat literary issues: the comparative merit of French
poets, the proper method of letter-writing, the nature of artistic
mimesis. Several dialogues deal with scientific questions. *On
Butterflies* and *History of Two Chameleons* defend a
vitalist theory of animal life and contest the mechanistic theory of
the animal-machine.



One of the more unusual genres invented by Scudery is the
rhetorical oration used in *Illustrious Women or Heroic
Harangues* (1642). In this series of discourses by famous women,
Scudery creates fictitious diatribes pronounced by powerful
women in a moment of crisis, often on the verge of death. Prominent
characters include Cleopatra and Sappho. Many of the harangues
criticize the reduction of women to silence by political oppression
and the need for women to express themselves forcefully through spoken
and written speech. Placed in the mouths of socially prominent women,
the orations also defend the right of women to exercise political
authority.



The letters of Mademoiselle de Scudery involve two distinct
types. The first are fictitious: *Amorous Letters from Various
Contemporary Authors* (1641). Imitating Ovid, this collection
provides model-letters for the expression of love by interested
parties, including women expressing affection for each other. The
actual correspondence of Scudery is currently dispersed among
various anthologies and archives. A prolix epistler, Scudery
corresponded with the intellectual elite of French society. Bossuet
and Fenelon figure among her
 correspondents.[19]
 Of special philosophical interest is Scudery's
correspondence with Catherine Descartes, the niece of Rene
Descartes. Both correspondents reject the uncle's mechanistic
explanation of animal life. 


## 3. Philosophy



Interpreting the philosophy of Mademoiselle de Scudery requires
certain cautions. First, a lifelong disciple of Montaigne,
Scudery repeatedly expresses skepticism concerning the
enterprise of philosophy itself. The disputes of philosophical schools
often appear to be nothing more than a Babel of discordant
authorities. Despite the furor, no definitive solution to
philosophical disputes can impose itself. The contemporary dispute
over Descartes's theory of vortices illustrates the obscure,
endless controversies generated by philosophical pride. 



> 
> 
> This argument will go on forever. The problem is so complicated. Any
> resolution of it is beyond the power of the human mind. The result
> will always be an unstable mixture of half-truths and unanticipated
> difficulties. This problem arises because philosophers generally try
> to say something new rather than saying something true. [*EM*,
> 1: 211] 
> 
> 
> 



Despite her periodic endorsements of skepticism, Scudery
clearly maintains that some philosophical theses are true. Her
religious philosophy insists that God's existence can be
demonstrated through an argument from design; her moral philosophy
emphatically praises certain moral qualities as virtuous and condemns
other moral dispositions as vicious. The skeptical cast of
Scudery's rhetoric, nonetheless, indicates the
tentativeness with which her philosophical positions are often
affirmed.



Second, Scudery's dialogical form of philosophy can make
it difficult to discern which philosophical position Scudery
actually supports. In the typical "conversation," multiple
speakers defend contrasting views on a given theoretical topic. In
this open-ended dialogue, each speaker's position usually
contains certain merits and defects; theories are corrected, altered,
or abandoned as the exchange progresses. Certain dialogues, such as
*Of Lying*, end on an inconclusive note; the disputants cannot
agree as to whether lying is a universally evil act. In most
dialogues, however, the speakers clearly concur on a certain
philosophical issue or one of the positions defended by a particular
disputant is clearly more convincing than the positions defended by
others. Unlike the philosophical essay, with its mono-authorial voice,
the multiple voices of the philosophical dialogue make the
determination of the author's actual philosophical position a
complicated enterprise. The irony employed in many Scudery
dialogues renders this determination of philosophical position even
more delicate. 


### 3.1 Moral Philosophy



Virtue theory constitutes the primary object of Scudery's
moral philosophy. Many of her dialogues analyze the moral virtues and
vices typical of the aristocratic world of the salon and the court. In
examining these virtues, the dialogues emphasize the distinctive ways
in which women possess these moral qualities. The dialogues also
stress the ambiguity of virtue. Using the *distinguo* [a
refined distinction between similar qualities], Scudery
highlights the multiple gradations of a single virtue and how certain
moral dispositions can function as either virtues or vices according
to context.



The aristocratic bent of Scudery's virtue theory appears
in her treatment of three moral virtues: magnanimity, politeness, and
discretion. Each of the virtues presupposes a certain amount of
culture, affluence, and social rank. Magnanimity requires a rational
estimate of one's proper worth and an acute estimation of
one's rank within the social hierarchy. 



> 
> 
> True magnanimity as I consider it is a good opinion of oneself,
> founded on reason and on the solid merit of one who aspires to great
> things and contemns the petty. One cannot be truly magnanimous if one
> does not esteem oneself as much as is proper in comparison to things
> beneath oneself. [*CN*, 1: 70] 
> 
> 
> 



In Scudery's neo-Aristotelian version of the virtue,
magnanimity encompasses ambition, self-esteem, and pride in social
position. At the same time, magnanimity must avoid contempt for the
mysterious workings of fate or divine providence, since such
overweening pride leads to self-destruction.



The dialogue *Of Politeness* conceives politeness primarily as
the capacity to engage in proper conversation with persons of elevated
social rank. 



> 
> 
> True politeness consists in knowing how to live properly and always
> knowing how to speak properly....It is the avoidance of any
> rudeness or injury to anyone. It is not saying to others what you
> would not want them to say to you. It is wanting not to be the tyrant
> of conversation by always speaking without letting others speak.
> [*CN*, 1: 127] 
> 
> 
> 



Politeness entails more than proper etiquette in speech; it must be
motivated by a genuine charity toward the neighbor, rooted in the
golden rule of reciprocity.



Discretion is a virtue particularly prized at the court. *Of
Discretion* explains how this virtue is diversely expressed
according to one's position in the social hierarchy. 



> 
> 
> Concerning our superiors, we do not exercise discretion; rather, we
> express respect. Concerning our inferiors, we do not exercise
> discretion; rather, we exercise goodness and indulgence, especially
> when we abstain from doing something pleasing to us but displeasing to
> them. [*MM*, 2: 613] 
> 
> 
> 



Just as gossip damages court society, the discretion of the courtier
strengthens it. The variations on the exercise of discretion reflect
the stratification of the aristocratic society for which
Scudery writes.



In many dialogues Scudery insists that women as well as men can
possess the full range of moral virtues. Against those who hold that
only men can practice magnanimity because of its public and political
nature, Scudery argues that women also can possess the virtue.
"This great quality [magnanimity] is not banned from appearing
in certain extraordinary women" [*CN*, 1: 64]. As an
example, the dialogue cites Portia, wife of Brutus. Although both
sexes can possess the most rarified moral virtues, each sex tends to
practice the virtues in a distinctive way. The virtue of kindness is
more imperative in the personality of a woman than in that of a man.




> 
> 
> Kindness is the most essential quality for women. It reinforces the
> charm of their beauty and of their mind. In fact, kindness is so
> necessary for them that they cannot be admirable without possessing it
> in an eminent degree. [*CN*, 1: 233]
> 
> 
> 



Scudery's treatment of the virtue of glory also insists
that women are not excluded from its practice. *Of Glory*
rejects the thesis that glory is preeminently a military virtue and,
consequently, that it can only be acquired by men. The dialogue
insists that women can manifest glory by intellectual and moral
achievement. 



> 
> 
> Ladies have glory when their mind exceeds their beauty and when they
> have so much moral merit that one can still love them when they have
> lost everything that made them physically beautiful. [*CN*, 2:
> 563] 
> 
> 
> 



Paralleling the military glory of men, women often manifest glory
through the romantic wars they wage. Poetic descriptions of romance
rightly use martial language to describe its operations. "Love
also has its combats, victories, conquests, chains, irons, crowns,
slaves, prisons, prisoners, defeats and triumphs" [*CN*,
2: 577]. In fact, glory is present in the emergence of any moral
virtue, whether applauded by an external public or not. "Glory
is something which necessarily arises from any act of virtue just as
light necessarily arises from the sun which produces it"
[*CN*, 2: 571-72]. In particular, glory accompanies the
moral victory over oneself through the conquest of one's
passions.



Notwithstanding the authentic moral value possessed by the natural
virtues of classical antiquity, Christianity has elevated the natural
values through the work of grace. Modesty is exemplary. The properly
Christian virtue of humility has refined the generic virtue of
modesty. 



> 
> 
> The word *humility* is a Christian term, because this virtue,
> like all the others, has been better known since the rise of
> Christianity than it was among the pagans....In Christian
> humility, Christians know their weaknesses and faults through the
> precepts of divine law. Developing a genuine remorse for not having
> accomplished it, they hate themselves and only themselves. They cannot
> feel the same way about the burden of the faults of others.
> [*EM*, 1: 14] 
> 
> 
> 



Although Scudery evinces little interest in the properly
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, she repeatedly
emphasizes the purifying role of grace in the transition from pagan to
contemporary Christian exercises of virtue.



Just as the moral virtues bear an aristocratic cast in
Scudery's works, the moral vices carry a distinctive
aristocratic stamp. The dialogues criticize vices which commonly
appear in a court setting: flattery, dissimulation, mockery, envy, and
vanity. In their sophistication, the vices of the courtier are
frequently hidden beneath the appearance of virtue. *Of Hope*
analyzes how the ambition of the courtier distorts the Christian
virtue of hope. 



> 
> 
> The entire life of the court is nothing but hope; that is where one
> always dies in hoping for something. In every court in which
> I've been, I've seen courtiers puffed up with vain hopes,
> which at the end turned into bitter disappointments. [*MM*, 1: 36]
> 
> 
> 
> 



The vices criticized in the dialogues often represent a species of
mendacity. Assaults on the order of truth, essential for the cohesion
of society itself, constitute particularly grave moral transgressions
in Scudery's hierarchy of values.



In Scudery's analysis, many virtues are capable of minute
variations in quality and operation. *Of Kindness* details
numerous subspecies of the virtue of kindness, such as habitual,
respectful, friendly, courtly, urbane, vivacious, eloquent, true, and
false. In fact, kindness admits of so many variations that it can turn
into a vice in certain contexts. 



> 
> 
> Kindness, which is a peaceful and pleasant virtue, one necessary for
> society and rightly admired, becomes a vice if it lacks certain
> limits. This virtue is different from others. There is only one sort
> of justice and there is only sort of generosity and of wisdom;
> however, there are a hundred sorts of kindnesses. [*CDS*, 1: 320]
> 
> 
> 
> 



Kindness is not alone in the moral ambiguity of certain virtues.
*Of Anger* ends on a note of irresolution concerning the
vicious nature of anger. While the dialogue's interlocutors
agree that anger is usually a serious vice, especially when the moral
agent deliberately prolongs it, they cannot rule out the possibility
that certain angers might be justified under the category of justified
retribution.



Despite the ambiguous moral status of certain virtues and vices,
Scudery rejects moral relativism. In several dialogues she
argues that certain actions are patently evil, no matter how popular
they are in particular cultures or governments. *Of Lying*
rejects the use of deception or murder to advance the interests of the
state. No *raison d'etat* can justify the use of
immoral means, even to justify a substantial national good. "In
order for an action to be heroic, it is not only necessary that the
motive be just; it is necessary that its methods be noble and
innocent" [*CN*, 1: 443]. Despite widespread social
approval, certain customs are intrinsically immoral. Although modern
European voyagers have revealed the widespread acceptance of polygamy,
for example, the practice is censured by Scudery as oppressive.




> 
> 
> Neither nature nor reason could have authorized this custom. It is
> only the tyranny of custom authorized by a grave voluptuousness that
> has authorized this multiplicity of wives and the imprisonment of the
> Sultan's consorts in the Seraglio. [*MM*, 1: 271] 
> 
> 
> 



The moral ambiguity of certain virtues should not lead to the
acceptance of immoral practices which are only abuses of power
sanctified by custom. Irrational customs which oppress women, such as
polygamy and foot-binding in China, merit Scudey's
particular scorn. 


### 3.2 Moral Psychology



In several dialogues Scudery examines the psychology animating
the moral life. This psychology consists primarily of the interplay
between personal temperament, largely determined by biological
factors, and the personal exercise of free will. In this theory,
temperament shapes the moral tone of a particular personality but
moral character rests largely on how a moral agent exercises his or
her personal freedom.



The variations in human personality derive largely from the different
temperaments human beings possess. Contrasting temperaments conceive
pain and pleasure in divergent ways; judgments concerning the worth of
a particular action or object naturally vary. 



> 
> 
> The diversity of temperaments causes the variations in pleasure. The
> pleasures are different according to such factors as one's age
> and one's personal qualities. Ordinarily the only thing which
> determines this divergence are the different passions which govern the
> various pursuits of pleasure. [*CDS*, 1: 79] 
> 
> 
> 



Predominantly determined by biological factors, temperament colors a
moral agent's distinctive perspective and inclinations toward
action. Even the wise use of reason to discipline one's action
cannot alter the basic temperament with which the moral agent must
confront ethical dilemmas.



Scudery's account of temperament rests squarely on the
classical-medieval theory of the humors. Despite idiosyncratic
variations, human personality expresses four basic humors: choleric,
melancholic, sanguine, and phlegmatic. 



> 
> 
> The humors often carry the mind away and seduce it according to their
> caprices. This is what accounts for the great diversity of sentiments
> among the most reasonable people. Without the humors, all reasonable
> people would like equally everything meriting to be liked, whether in
> the sciences, in the arts, or in simple pleasures. In fact, different
> temperaments, which reflect different humors, tend to prefer different
> objects, despite the weight of reason. This is what explains this
> variety of emotional inclinations of which society is full.
> [*CN*, 2: 458] 
> 
> 
> 



This differential in humor explains how equally rational human agents
can have very different experiences of and judgments concerning the
same external object or activity. It also explains the unusual power
of moods, such as ennui, on the moral perception and decisions of the
human person.



Temperament is particularly powerful in influencing the moral agent
when it fabricates strong desires. Unlike ideas or even simple wishes,
desires rarely submit to the discipline of reason. 



> 
> 
> Wishes must be the work of reason, but desires are nearly always blind
> powers which are born from temperament. Several times in my life
> I've had desires for several things I never wished for, because
> reason was opposed to them. [*MM*, 1: 344] 
> 
> 
> 



The arational empire of desire can easily motivate violent action in
the interest of neither the moral agent nor his or her neighbor. 



Despite the power of temperament, the moral agent can correct it
through the use of free will. It is precisely in the emergence of free
will's combat against the inclinations of temperament that
personal moral responsibility arises. *Of Inclination*
describes the emergence of the moral responsibility which rightly
merits the moral agent praise or blame for actions. 



> 
> 
> We are born with the inclinations which heaven was pleased to give us,
> but we enter into the possession of praise or blame only at the moment
> we begin to act through reason. Up to this point, nothing is truly up
> to us; after that point, we are responsible for everything we do,
> whether good or evil. Therefore, it is up to us to see what
> inclinations we should follow and those we should change. Having known
> the true path of glory and virtue, we should walk in it despite all
> the repugnance we might find within ourselves. [*CN*, 1: 319]
> 
> 
> 
> 



In the transformation of temperament to suit the demands of the moral
order, reason must often contradict the pull of emotions surrounding a
distorted humor.



To illustrate the mastery of temperament by reason, *Of Anger*
depicts the obligatory transformation of excessive anger by the agent
who possesses such a temperament. 



> 
> 
> Excessive anger is the ordinary fault of all weak people. As
> repentance is the greatest manifestation of human reason, it is
> necessary from the earliest moments to habituate oneself to overcome a
> passion which is practically always followed and which makes the
> bearer of it hated and despised. [*MM*, 1: 359] 
> 
> 
> 



Rather than abolishing the passions, a morally mature reason
transforms them. In the case of a choleric temperament, the flames of
anger are transformed into the sentiments of restraint, remorse, and
repentance for the damage inflected by excessive anger.


### 3.3 Epistemology



Influenced by Montaigne, Scudery often expresses skepticism
concerning claims to knowledge. Social custom in particular often
tempts the noetic agent to mistake prejudice for authentic knowledge.
The complex psychology by which human beings experience the world
often tinges their claims to knowledge with subjectivity.
Scudery's skepticism, however, is a mitigated one.
Especially in the religious domain, the noetic agent can acquire
certain knowledge and overcome the limits to knowledge tied to the
fallible senses and social bias.



Many claims to knowledge are so doubtful that one can easily endorse
skepticism as the proper position concerning knowledge itself. The
experience of error and subsequent correction reveals how thin are the
foundations of all noetic claims. 



> 
> 
> I think sometimes that everything is so doubtful that one can only
> support one position concerning knowledge. If I had to establish one
> sect in this area, I would like to start one where it would be
> permitted to doubt everything. The one exception would be the things
> of religion. [*CN*, 1: 167] 
> 
> 
> 



The exception to the rule of skepticism concerns religious truths. In
numerous writings Scudery argues that certain religious
knowledge involves both philosophical demonstrations of God's
existence and the theological and moral truths unveiled by God in
sacred revelation.



*Of Incertitude* explores the psychological sources of this
widespread doubt and error. Subjective emotions and social custom
constitute major obstacles to the disinterested use of reason in the
quest for objective knowledge. 



> 
> 
> As soon as one wants to use one's reason and tries to examine
> carefully things in themselves, one realizes that one believes only
> with great doubt most of those things one thought one knew with the
> greatest certitude. In the conduct of life, one is carried away by
> some blind inclination or by some custom one lazily follows without
> knowing why. [*MM*, 1: 373] 
> 
> 
> 



Like Montaigne and Descartes, Scudery emphasizes how social
custom can easily induce the noetic agent into error. But she also
stresses how the more interior and elusive powers of temperament and
emotion can color noetic judgment and block the agent from objective
perception of the external world.



Another limit to noetic certitude arises from the experiential nature
of human knowledge. One can only know an object well through personal
experience of it. But personal experience entails an irreducible
subjectivity of perception. 



> 
> 
> Experience is good for everything. Without it we would have only the
> most imperfect knowledge of anything. In my opinion, the only thing we
> cannot actually experience is death, because we can only die once.
> Consequently, we cannot know it very well. [*EM*, 1: 248] 
> 
> 
> 



Ironically, the very experience requisite for thorough knowledge of an
object places the knowledge under a veil of doubt since experience
inevitably carries the imprint of the noetic agent's subjective
history, emotions, and desires.



One particular problem in epistemology concerns self-knowledge. In
*Of the Knowledge of Others and of Oneself*, Scudery
argues that self-knowledge can be attained only if one meets certain
moral conditions for self-scrutiny. The virtues of justice, sincerity,
and courage constitute the prerequisites for authentic self-knowledge.




> 
> 
> One must begin by the desire to know oneself free of all flattery.
> Principally, one must observe oneself concerning four things: if one
> is just; if one is sincere; if one is capable of true friendship; if
> one has courage [*CDS*, 1: 103] 
> 
> 
> 



Unlike Descartes, who proposes an intellectualist path to attain
knowledge of the internal *cogito*, Scudery insists on
the moral requirements for authentic disclosure of the self. It is the
frank desire for an unvarnished and valid knowledge of oneself, a
knowledge that may reveal the need for moral conversion, which permits
the noetic agent to arrive at authentic knowledge of one's soul.
Opposed to the Cartesian path of introspection, Scudery insists
that self-knowledge can emerge only through scrutiny of one's
social interaction under the rubric of virtue and vice. 


### 3.4 Philosophy of Religion



Scudery develops her philosophy of religion through two
principal strategies. Positively, she argues that God's
existence can be demonstrated through the philosophical use of reason.
She favors a cosmological argument from design. Negatively, she
criticizes the religious skepticism of salon libertines as irrational.
Their dismissal of theological claims to truth is incoherent with
their avid acceptance of many weaker claims to truth in the secular
domain.



God's existence can be known through a rational scrutiny of the
cosmos, which ultimately reveals itself to be the handiwork of a
supreme being. The Neo-Epicurean argument that the cosmos's
existence and design can be explained through the random play of
physical atoms is untenable, since purely physical substances cannot
create the elaborate laws which govern the universe. Moreover, matter
cannot create the spirit which is obviously operative in human actions
of intellect and will. 



> 
> 
> I strongly believe that undepraved human reason can and must know God
> through his works and that one can never reasonably think that these
> alleged Atoms--which they are called in order to gain reverence
> for them--could create the eternal principles of the universe.
> [*MM*, 1: 432] 
> 
> 
> 



Typically, Scudery argues that moral defect (depravity) could
blind someone to God's existence. Authentic recognition of God
entails moral judgment, repentance, and conversion. The superficial
thought of materialists has failed to employ the higher reason of
metaphysics in determining the ultimate cause of the existence of the
physical and moral worlds. Like moral defect, defective reason can
prevent someone from recognizing God's existence.



The strongest argument for God's existence is found in the
design of the universe and of the human person. The complex and
intelligent structure of the physical cosmos and of the human soul can
only be explained by the action of a supreme being who possesses
divine attributes. 



> 
> 
> How then can it happen that when human beings consider the admirable
> structure of the universe and the admirable structure of themselves,
> they are not inclined to believe they have been created by an
> intelligent, eternal, omnipotent, and unchangeable Being? This Being
> merits all of our admiration. [*MM*, 1: 431] 
> 
> 
> 



Scudery suggests that the refusal to recognize God as the
ultimate cause of the exquisite structure of the physical universe and
of the human person is incomprehensible. The refusal to recognize
God's existence in light of this supremely intelligent design
can only be explained by a mysterious willfulness.



For Scudery, the religious skepticism of the libertines in the
period's salons merits little intellectual respect. Not only is
this skepticism generated by the moral license of the libertines; it
contrasts badly with the credulity they exhibit in other areas of
knowledge. 



> 
> 
> The very people who don't want to believe in an invisible
> Divinity are very inclined, on the word of a few travelers, to tell
> unbelievable things, such as what they tell us about this marvelous
> stone--called Heliotrope, I believe--which Croesus possesses
> among his treasures and which they claim can make one invisible.
> [*CDS*, 1: 176] 
> 
> 
> 



Whereas Christian revelation relies upon the inspired witness of
Scripture and Tradition, the tales of Croesus and other mythical
figures rely on the flimsiest hearsay. The libertine case for
religious skepticism rests on little more than a credulous,
inconsistent reason allied with a moral depravity impervious to the
evangelical call to repent.


### 3.5 Aesthetics



In the dialogues Scudery develops a philosophy of art that
largely adheres to neoclassical aesthetics. Art is the imitation of
nature; nature itself possesses an internal harmony reflective of the
hidden divine beauty. In her emphasis on the individuality of artistic
perception and of the individual work of art, however, Scudery
adds her own subjectivist account of art to the classical mimetic
theory to which she subscribes.



*Of Magnificence and Of Magnanimity* presents
Scudery's mimetic theory of art in capsule form. All art
represents an imitation of nature, "nature" here being
understood as the physical world. "Art has imitated what Nature
has made in different places of the world" [*CN*, 1: 23].
Each art imitates a particular section of nature. Dance, for example,
imitates the motion of the stars. "The people who invented dance
took the order and movement of the stars as their model"
[*CN*, 1: 38]. Through artistic mimesis, a distinctive sector
of the natural world is transmuted into a particular genre of art. It
is this specialized study of material nature that explains the
demarcation among the various genres constituting the *beaux
arts*.



Beauty does not lie solely in the work fashioned by the artist; nature
itself manifests a complex beauty in each of its discrete parts.
*Observations on Butterflies* details the beauty to be found in
the structure of the butterfly, one of Scudery's favored
objects of scientific observation. 



> 
> 
> The wings of these little animals account for what is most admirable
> in them. Each butterfly has four wings; their wings are so well
> coordinated that it seems the butterflies have only two wings when we
> watch them flying. Their structure is marvelous. They are made of a
> kind of cartilage...which colors the wings of these little
> animals. It makes them appear thin and transparent, like a fine piece
> of parchment or like a very dry and very clear stroke of the brush.
> [*EM*, 2: 309] 
> 
> 
> 



The artistic construction of a work of art rests on the careful
imitation of a nature whose intricate structure already expresses a
harmony matching the beauty produced by the finest artisans and
artists.



The artistic mimesis defended by Scudery does not entail a
servile imitation of nature. On the contrary, each work of art
represents an idiosyncratic interpretation of nature which reflects
the unique temperament, style, history, and skill of the individual
artist. The practice of painting reflects the individual differences
which emerge in works based on careful observation of the same
physical object in the same studio setting. 



> 
> 
> In celebrated academies of painting they have often presented one
> single model to the same view of all the artists. They saw him; they
> observed him; he gave them all the time they wanted without changing
> his position. Still, I can assure you that even those who depict him
> from the same angle will show notable differences in their works.
> [*CN*, 1: 450] 
> 
> 
> 



Scudery adds a subjectivist note to the mimetic account of art.
Although the artist imitates external nature, in fact a single precise
external object in nature, the final work of art portraying that
nature will bear the idiosyncratic stamp and style of the individual
artist. Even at its most realistic, the artwork cannot be reduced to a
facsimile of the physical cosmos.



As in the rest of her philosophy, moral considerations weigh heavily
in Scudery's philosophy of art. Since art powerfully
shapes the moral imagination of those who view it, the artist must
produce an art that reflects the moral order as well as the physical
order of nature. Her strictures on the composition of fables, a
favorite salon literary genre, express Scudery's concern
for the moral rectitude of the artwork. 



> 
> 
> It [the fable] should censure vice and reward
> virtue....Imagination should always be subordinate to judgment.
> Extraordinary events should be clearly justified....The style
> should be neither too elevated nor too low. Nowhere should social
> conventions or morals be offended. [*CDS*, 2: 475] 
> 
> 
> 



The moral strictures on art also reflect the rationalism of
Scudery's aesthetics. Even in the realm of the fable, the
reasonable and the measured should trump the imaginative and the
fantastic.



Given its moral pedagogical power, art should be a major political
concern. The state should vigorously promote art that both edifies and
pleases by its aesthetic quality. Good public art is particularly apt
to promote the aristocratic virtues. "When the prince promotes
them, the love of science and the *beaux arts* is very helpful
in establishing the practice of politeness" [*CN*, 1:
185]. In her censure of the vice of sloth, Scudery singles out
for criticism the indolent artists who do not make the contribution
they could make to society's artistic heritage and moral
atmosphere.


### 3.6 Nature and Science



During her lifetime, Scudery acquired a reputation as an
amateur botanist and zoologist. Her celebrated garden contained many
exotic trees and flowers considered difficult to cultivate in the
Parisian climate. Like other pet lovers, she rejected
Descartes's theory of the animal as a soulless machine. Her
dialogue *History of Two Chameleons* indicates her rejection of
Descartes's mechanistic theory of nature in favor of a vitalist
account of nature which attributes emotions and even moral qualities
to non-human animals. The dialogue reflects Scudery's own
experimentation on two chameleons imported from Alexandria and
entrusted to her care.



Knowledge of the chameleon is acquired by careful observation of its
physical features over time. Scudery is especially attentive to
the eyes of the chameleon, which pivot in a much wider range than that
possible for human eyes. Experiments with different types of food
gradually reveal the chameleon's eating habits. Careful
observation in different environments and lightings cannot resolve the
question of the precise causes of the chameleon's changes of
color but does yield surprising evidence that changes in temperature
appear to effect substantial alterations in coloration. Months-long
observation leads Scudery to the conclusion that classification
of the chameleon as a reptile is mistaken: 



> 
> 
> It is wrong to call [the chameleon] a reptile. Its stomach never
> touches the earth, not even when it is walking or even sleeping. At
> those times it rests on its feet and on its tail. [*CN*,
> 2:503]
> 
> 
> 



For Scudery, proper observation of nature is necessarily an
aesthetic observation. In her study of the chameleon, she often
recounts the animal's beauty. "This animal has a slow,
grave, and majestic walk" [*CN*, 2: 503]. She repeatedly
records the beauty of the varied spotting manifest by the chameleon.




> 
> 
> Nearly everyday at several different moments, it had the most
> beautiful spots in the world: from the top of its head to the end of
> its tail and to the bottom of its little fingers. [*CN*, 2: 513]
> 
> 
> 
> 



The chameleon also manifests emotional and moral qualities.
Scudery claims that her two chameleons showed a clear affection
for each other. 



> 
> 
> During the five weeks I had the animals together, I noticed an intense
> affection between them. Neither ever showed the least chagrin.
> [*CN*, 2: 515] 
> 
> 
> 



The older chameleon even seems to possess moral as well as emotional
traits. Happiness appears to be maximal in midday. 



> 
> 
> It seems to me that when my chameleon had the best spotting was the
> moment when he seemed the happiest and at is his best. This was
> usually midday from ten in the morning until three or four in the
> afternoon. [*CN*, 2: 528] 
> 
> 
> 



Sadness and even a certain sloth seem to characterize early morning.




> 
> 
> When I saw him the next day I found him very sad. Still, he heard me
> and recognized who I was, as he usually did. But I saw that he was
> very lazy in his rising. [*CN*, 2: 532] 
> 
> 
> 



Scudery's interpretation of the natural world is not only
empirical; it involves a sympathetic and aesthetic embrace of material
nature. 


### 3.7 Philosophy of Gender



Questions of gender and sexuality suffuse the entire corpus of
Scudery. Her prolix novels celebrate an egalitarian love
between men and women. Despite their exotic settings, they condemn the
typical oppressions endured by the era's women: forced marriage,
abduction, and domestic violence. Her fictitious orations emphasize
the right of women to exercise political authority.
Scudery's defense of the right of women to participate in
the public sphere of civil society is particularly emphatic in her
writings focused on the figure of the poet Sappho. As Newman argues in
her edition of these writings (2003), *The Story of Sappho*,
embedded in the novel *Artamene or the Great Cyrus*, and
the *Harangue of Sappho*, the twentieth of the speeches
presented in *Illustrious Women or Heroic Harangues*, clearly
indict the social repression of women. The institution of marriage
itself serves as an object of censure.



The *Harangue of Sappho* presents Scudery's
philosophy of gender in lapidary form. Speaking to her auditor Erinne,
Sappho condemns the denial of women's rights to education and
self-expression through a cult of false humility. A distorted virtue
of modesty has reduced women to silence. 



> 
> 
> You must overcome the doubt concerning yourself that is planted in
> your soul. It is this false modesty which prevents you from employing
> your mind to achieve all that it is capable of attempting.
> [*FI*, 1, 423-424] 
> 
> 
> 



This anti-intellectual modesty, which women are supposed to cultivate
as one of the distinguishing traits of their sex, has only made women
doubt their own worth. Modesty has condemned self-expression to the
status of a sin.



Even graver in this silencing of women is society's sharp
demarcation between gender roles in the public square. Women are to
excel in the cultivation of physical beauty and the social graces; men
are to excel in the pursuit of art and science. 



> 
> 
> People who claim that beauty is woman's sphere and that the arts
> and letters and all the liberal and rarified sciences belong to
> men--and that we women are barred from them--are very far
> from either truth or justice. [*FI*,1: 424] 
> 
> 
> 



To contest this gendered differentiation in the sphere of study and
work, women must recognize that the set of beliefs supporting this
sexual segregation is simply a "custom and corruption of our
time" [*FI*, 426]. In fact, society offers numerous
counter-examples of men who focus on the development of physical
beauty and social charm and of women who excel in scientific culture
and intellectual debate. Both men and women can develop the powers of
analysis and judgment as well as those of imagination. To refuse women
the right to develop their intellectual gifts is to oppose Nature
itself, which has clearly equipped women with such capacities. 



> 
> 
> The gods have made nothing useless in all nature....Now, why
> should we women be the only ones supposed to rebel against this
> natural order as if we were ungrateful to the gods? Why should our
> minds be kept in a perpetual state of uselessness and
> mediocrity?....No reason could possibly justify the belief that
> what is infinitely admirable in itself is supposedly wrong and
> criminal in ourselves. [*FI*,1: 432] 
> 
> 
> 



The development of women's intellectual capacity requires the
refutation of the social prejudices concerning gender differentiation.
This refutation must demonstrate how these damaging prejudices
contradict the order of nature itself.



To liberate women's intellectual gifts, Scudery
privileges the role of writing. In writing and publishing her work, a
woman attracts acclaim in the future as well as in the present. The
act of writing is far superior to being written about by others in the
fashionable literary portraits of the time. 



> 
> 
> It is better to grant immortality to others than to receive it from
> others. It is better to find glory within yourself than to borrow it
> from somewhere else....Poetry has many advantages. You only have
> to encourage others to speak about you in order to make yourself known
> to posterity. If you simply speak with good grace, you will be known
> well enough....You have only to condemn the vices of your time
> and society will not fail to laud you. [*FI*,1: 438] 
> 
> 
> 



The writing of social criticism is especially appropriate for women
who have overcome the social stereotypes imprisoning women in the
private sphere of sentiment. 


## 4. Reception and Interpretation



Toward the end of her long life, Scudery faced the mixed
reception which would be the destiny of her works for centuries to
come. Her writings, especially her novels, reached an enormous
cultivated public. Thousands of readers anxiously awaited the
appearance of a new chapter in the serials. The royalties and
government pensions attached to her writings permitted her to live
comfortably in the fashionable Marais neighborhood. The translation of
her works into English, Spanish, Italian, German, and Arabic indicates
the breadth of her appreciative public. But an influential literary
elite dismissed her works as illegible and unintelligible.
Moliere, Furetiere, and Boileau caricatured
Scudery as a pendant whose picaresque tales and inconclusive
dialogues only masked intellectual confusion. A leading literary
critic, Nicolas Boileau's criticism proved especially
influential in subsequent dismissals of the thought of Scudery.
In *Satire X*, Boileau argues that the type of love celebrated
by Scudery is immoral. 



> 
> 
> You can see this in *Clelie*, where the heroine receives
> her lovers under the delicate name of friend. At first, she only takes
> small, permissible liberties. But soon you are in deep waters on the
> river of *Tendre* and you can navigate at will. [*OC*,
> 67] 
> 
> 
> 



Boileau's critique in *Dialogue on Heroes of the Novel*
is more categorical. He denounces Scudery's works 



> 
> 
> for their lack of seriousness, for their airs, for their vague and
> superficial dialogues, for their fawning portraits of quite mediocre
> people, even on occasion very ugly people, and for their interminable
> and verbose effusions on love. [*OC*, 445] 
> 
> 
> 



This critical portrait has remained influential in the negative
appraisal of Scudery down to the present.



In the nineteenth century, the rehabilitation of
Scudery's intellectual reputation began. President of the
Sorbonne, Victor Cousin (1858) studied how Scudery's writings
reflected the salon society of the period. Despite his own
philosophical pedigree, however, Cousin evinced more interest in
Scudery's role as salon hostess than in her own
philosophical theories. The current revival of interest in
Scudery is tied to the contemporary feminist expansion of the
canon of the humanities in order to include the voices of women
authors who had been neglected due to misogynist bias. The new English
translations and commentaries by Newman (2003) and Donawerth and
Strongson (2004) focus on the writings of Scudery treating
issues of gender. Recent studies by Beasley (1990), De Jean (1991),
Duggan (2017), Goldsmith (1988), Harth (1992), and Timmermans (1993)
have situated the works and theories of Scudery in the context
of women's writing, salon culture, and the various attitudes
toward women in the France of early modernity. Burch (2013) examines
in what sense she can be considered a philosopher, specifically a
"femme philosophe" of the period. Hogg (2018) and Suzuki
(2018) analyze her political theory while Duggan (2016) and Sahlins
(2015) explore her approach to science. Although these contemporary
editions of and commentaries on Scudery have underscored the
gendered nature of Scudery's philosophy, they have tended
to neglect other dimensions of her thought. Scudery's
philosophy of virtue, religion, art, and knowledge invites further
exploration.