## 1. Life, Works, and Philosophical Affiliation


### 1.1 The Dating of Jayarasi Bhatta



The first serious attempt to date Jayarasi
Bhatta was undertaken by Sukhlalji
Samghavi and Rasiklal C. Parikh, who brought
the Tattvopaplava-simha to light, in their 1940 edition
(p. iv-xi) of the treatise, assign the work to 8th century (p. x).
This dating was slightly modified by Sukhlalji
Samghavi (1941) who placed Jayarasi's
Tattvopaplava-simha between 725-825, which, in turn, is
accepted by Eli Franco (1987: 12-13). However, the latter, in
the 'Preface to the second edition' of 1994, modifies the
date of Jayarasi Bhatta and assigns him to the
period of 770-830 on the basis of what he thinks are
Jayarasi's indirect references (primarily terminological
grounds) to the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara (ca.
740-800).



In fact, that dating of the Tattvopaplava-simha could be
slightly modified to perhaps 800-840. I would place
Jayarasi Bhatta after the Digambara Jaina
philosopher Akalanka Bhatta (c. 720-780) and
before Vidyananda Patrakesarisvamin (c. 850), a
philosopher in the same tradition who commented on Akalanka. As
Franco (1994: XI) himself notices, the Buddhist Kamalasila
(c. 740-795) nowhere refers to Jayarasi in his
encyclopedic commentary of the Tattva-sangraha. Further, we
find no mention of Jayarasi in the oeuvre of Akalanka
Bhatta, although he was very well acquainted with current
ideas of his contemporaries. It would be especially surprising in the
case of Akalanka Bhatta not to mention an author who
greatly influenced the way Jaina thinkers argued and formulated their
thoughts, because both of them seem to belong to South India. On a few
occasions Akalanka did have a chance to either allude or even
directly refer to such an original thinker as Jayarasi
certainly was, but he nowhere does it. A good instance is
Akalanka's work Asta-sati 'In Eight
Hundred Lines' (itself a commentary on the work
Apta-mimamsa, 'An Examination of An
Authoritative Person') of Samantabhadra, c. 580-640). In
it, (the commentary on verse 1.3 of
Apta-mimamsa, AsSp.2 = AsS
29.20), Akalanka refers to a materialist argument: '[The
opponent]: "For this reason it has been said that there is no
omniscient person, because truth claims [of various teachers competing
for primacy] turn out to be wrong cognitive criteria, inasmuch as
there is no difference between them (i.e., all are equal in their
convincing force). Since one accepts that [it is not possible to
decide for or against a view among a few competing ones], there is
nothing wrong [in rejecting the idea of an omniscient person]."
[Akalanka:] Ergo this decision of some [thinkers, i.e.,
materialists] is itself void of any rational basis. For, as we know,
the scope of perception [which could prove the materialist's rejection
of an omniscient person] cannot itself demonstrate that there cannot
be any other proof of an omniscient person, because this would have
too far-reaching consequences. Neither can [the materialist prove that
an omniscient person cannot exist] with the help of inference
 (anumana), because it has no validity [for him]'.
Akalanka clearly has in mind a typical materialist philosopher
who rejects the idea of omniscience, but at the same time accepts
perception (pratyaksa) as the only valid instrument of
knowledge, while rejecting the validity of inference (anumana).
That is a standard account of a materialist (Carvaka /
Lokayata) thinker in India and there is really nothing to suggest
that what Akalanka had here in mind as the target of his
criticism was a 'qualified sceptic' (like
Jayarasi) who rejected the ultimate validity also of
perception.



However, the account changes in what Vidyananda (c. 850) has to
say on Akalanka's passage. Vidyananda is, to our knowledge,
the first Indian philosopher to know of and to directly refer to
Jayarasi. In his Asta-sahasri 'In
Eight Thousand Lines', Vidyananda (AsS 29.20-36.6)
takes the passage '"Since one accepts that [it is not
possible to decide for or against a view among a few competing ones],
there is nothing wrong [in rejecting the idea of an omniscient
person]." [Akalanka:] Ergo this decision of some
[thinkers, i.e., materialists] is itself void of any rational
basis' (tathestatvad adosa ity
ekesam
apramanikaivestih) as
explicitly implying two kinds of approaches to the same question.
First (AsS 29.20 ff.), he says some nihilistic thinkers (eke)
are the Laukayatika (the followers of Lokayata, the
materialist school), who do not admit any instrument of knowledge
which would could go beyond the perceptible world, i.e., they accept
perception as the only cognitive criterion. Second, Vidyananda
says (AsS 31.2 ff.), there are also 'those who propound
the dissolution of [all] categories'
(tattvopaplava-vadin), a term which could hardly be more
univocal in its clearly referring to Jayarasi. Had
Akalanka known of Jayarasi, his 'qualified
scepticism' and rejection of the validity of perception also, he
would have included him among those who rejected the idea of an
omniscient being.



That Jayarasi postdates Akalanka is evident also from
the fact that, in his Ascertainment of Perfection
(Siddhi-viniscaya), Akalanka refers to
'heretics' (nastika) and to the materialist
tradition, which maintains that the world is composed of the four
elements, but at the same time accepts only one valid cognitive
procedure (pramana), namely perception (pratyaksa),
not even inference (anumana), and therefore cannot demonstrate
such element-based structure of the universe, or alternatively
entertains a possibility that there are no valid cognitive procedures
at all (pramanabhava) or finds problems with
defining what perception is
(pramana-laksananupapatti; SVi 4.12, p.
272.3-5). These are clearly the forerunners of the ideas
elaborated by Jayarasi, however at the time of
Akalanka they are still in an undeveloped form, and clearly the
Jaina philosopher does not refer to Jayarasi. However, his
commentator Anantavirya (SViT, p. 277.6-278.22)
immediately recognizes in these nascent ideas the elaborated system of
Jayarasi, retroactively projecting them onto
Akalanka's passage, and refers to Jayarasi and
his treatise by name.


### 1.2 Native Place of Jayarasi Bhatta



As little as we know of the exact dates of his life even less we know
about the place where he flourished, and we are actually left to
speculations, for no hard evidence, such as inscriptions etc., can be
found to help us. There are three points that might suggest
Jayarasi was of South India, all being rather weak. The
strongest evidence is the circulation and reception of the
Tattvopaplava-simha: the first mention of the work is made
by South Indian Digambara authors Vidyananda (c. 850) and
Anantavirya (turn of 10th and 11th centuries). Another equally
weak piece of evidence is that Jayarasi's critical method of
argument (see below), which the Jainas adopt, first penetrates the
works of South Indian Digambara authors, incidentally the same who are
the first to make reference to Jayarasi. This method of
critique becomes the standard one among Gujarati Jainas only at a
later stage. The third argument in favour of South Indian origin of
Jayarasi (Samghavi-Parikh 1940,
xi), even weaker that the two above, is his title Bhatta,
regularly appended to the names of a number of South Indian
philosophers and often used as an official title of South Indian
Digambara high rank clerics (bhatta,
bhattaraka). Jayarasi's title might suggest
he was both South Indian and a Brahmin by social class (varna).
However, the title Bhatta is not exclusively used by
Brahmins or exclusively in South India, though there is indeed a
certain tendency of this kind. However, since there seems nothing at
all to suggest that Jayarasi was born in North India, even
such slight hints gain some evidential weight.


### 1.3 Works of Jayarasi Bhatta



The only preserved work of Jayarasi is the
Tattvopaplava-simha ('The Lion [Destroying] the
Delusion of Categories', often interpreted as 'The Lion of
the Dissolution of [all] Categories' or 'The Lion which
Annihilates [all] Principles'). Its palm leaf manuscript was
discovered in 1926 in a manuscript library at Patan by
Sukhlalji Samghavi and Rasiklal C.
Parikh, and the text remained virtually unknown until its
publication in 1940.



The work was quite well known in mediaeval philosophical milieu, both
in the South and North of India, but hardly ever treated in a way a
serious and original philosophical treatise deserves: Indian
philosophers of established traditions do not, as a rule, refer to the
work directly or refute its contents, not to mention any attempt at
the providing a genuine appraisal of the work or entering into
discussion with its author. They simply ignored it.



Two reasons might be mentioned for such a situation. First, Indian
philosophers did not principally engage in discussions with
representatives of the materialist school, except for standardised
dismissive refutations of a few basic materialist theories, which are
mentioned by Indian philosophers in their works in order to render a
'complete' picture of the philosophical spectrum. These
standardised, habitually repeated refutations were not applicable to
Jayarasi, who was not a typical representative of the
Carvaka / Lokayata school. New powerful philosophical
machinery would have to be applied to engage in a discussion with
Jayarasi. And that is precisely the second reason: the
arguments Jayarasi consistently applies, his rigid and
coherent lines of argumentation proved to be an extremely hard piece
of cake to swallow for those whose views he criticised. It seems,
therefore, that the general approach of Indian philosophers
vis-a-vis Jayarasi was that of disregard and failure
to notice the weight of his work. A few exceptions can be mentioned
though of those who attempted to engage with
Jayarasi's arguments, notably two Jaina philosophers,
Vidyananda and Anantavirya, and a propounder of the
Nyaya system, Bhasarvajna (Franco (1994: 
553-586)). Jayarasi is occasionally mentioned in a
positive light when Indian authors acknowledge his powerful method of
critical analysis, and these are primarily, or even exclusively, Jaina
authors. Sometimes they even refer to Jayarasi as an expert
in some fields, e.g. by Mallisena (c. 1229), who says:
'A refutation of all cognitive criteria in details should be
consulted from the Tattvopaplava-simha' (SVM,
p.118.1-2).



The text of Tattvopaplava-simha was preserved without any
commentary and it seems that its was never commented upon. We cannot
say with absolute certainty whether its author had any followers or
whether he established an independent school, but that is not unlikely
because we occasionally come across the expression
tattvopaplava-vadin in the plural: 'those who
propound the dissolution of [all] categories' in philosophical
literature, and across the single term Tattvopaplava used as if
it denoted a separate school.



It is not certain whether Jayarasi composed any other work.
He himself refers to a treatise entitled Laksana-sara
('The Quintessence of the Definition [of Cognitive Criteria
(pramana)]') on one occasion, while refuting the
usage of the term 'non-verbal' (avyapadesya) in the
definition of the cognitive criterion (pramana, or
'veridical instrument of knowledge') of the Nyaya
school. There, he says that the inapplicability of the term has
already been shown in the Laksana-sara and one should
consult that work. It is highly probable that he indeed refers to his
own text for the simple reason that he generally does not mention any
works of any other authors either in support of his own views or in
favourable light, except for the materialist teacher Brhaspati
and his Brhaspati-sutra. Still, it is not impossible that
the text he referred to under the title Laksana-sara
might have been penned by another representative of the
Carvaka / Lokayata school who had been held in esteem
by Jayarasi, e.g. his own guru.


### 1.4 Philosophical Affiliation of Jayarasi Bhatta



There has been some controversy concerning whether Jayarasi
could at all be ranked among the representatives of the Indian
materialist school, i.e., among the Carvakas /
Lokayatas. Until the publication of the
Tattvopaplava-simha, Jayarasi was considered a
typical representative of the materialist school. It all changed when
the publication of the work in 1940 made the text available to
scholars. The publication revealed that Jayarasi's view are
far from what one considered  'standard' or
'orthodox' materialism and hardly compatible with what we
so far knew about the schools of the Carvakas /
Lokayatas. As a result, a wide range of conflicting
interpretations abound as to how to classify
Jayarasi's philosophy.



Sukhlalji Samghavi and Rasiklal C.
Parikh (1940: xi-xii) take the text as 'a work of the
Lokayata or Carvaka school, or to be more precise
- of a particular division of that school', emphasising
that Jayarasi 'is developing the doctrine of the
orthodox (!) Lokayata'  with a 'critical
method' (p. xii). The tradition of ascribing the view to
Samghavi and Parikh that the
Tattvopaplava-simha is 'a genuine Carvaka
work' relies rather on the misreading of what both the authors
say: they are well aware that Jayarasi develops an original
and independent school within what he himself considered a materialist
tradition. This view, adopted also by Ruben (1958), is somewhat
modified by Franco (1987: 4-8), who speaks of a 'radical
change from a rather primitive materialism to a highly sophisticated
form of scepticism', and also recently by Ethan Mills (2018),
who claims that Jayarasi developed 'materialist
strains' and represented 'skepticism about
philosophy', or 'skepticism about epistemology'
(Mills (2015), (2018)).



Thus, a group of other researchers (e.g., Koller (1977), Matilal
(1985: 482), Matilal (1986: 27), Solomon (2010: xvi), Jha (2013: vii),
Gokhale (2015: 156-157), Mills (2018)) classify
Jayarasi as a sceptic, either loosely affiliated to the
Carvaka / Lokayata tradition or not at all, even as an
anti-religious sceptic (Matilal (1985: 482)), a radical sceptic
(Franco (1987: 3-8)), 'the full-fledged form of Indian
Skepticism' (Solomon (2010: xvi)), an extreme sceptic who
represents 'a kind of anarchism in the realm of values'
(Gokhale (2015: 180, 155)), sometimes also as an agnostic (Ruben
(1958); Matilal (1985: 483, n. 10)), or a combination of both, being
an author of 'a work in defence of scepticism, or at best,
agnosticism' (Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's
"Editor's Note" to
Chattopadhyaya-Gangopadhyaya (1990: xiv)). A rather unusual
stance on Jayarasi's affiliation is represented by
K.K. Dixit (1962: 103) / (1990: 529), who claims that he was both a
materialist and... 'a worshipper of illogic'
(sic!).



Still another line of researchers disagree that Jayarasi
belonged to the materialist tradition at all, typical proponents of
this opinion being Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1959), (1989) and Karel
Werner (1995). Chattopadhyaya (1989) argues that since
Jayarasi criticises all philosophical views and schools, he
cannot be reckoned as an adherent of the Carvaka /
Lokayata tradition, because one can either be a materialist or
sceptic; and clearly Jayarasi's philosophical views do not
fit into the typical materialist framework. Karel Werner (1995) seems
to support such an approach, although with some reservations, but
without any solid rational argument, except for an subjective
impression. Recently, also Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2009: 51, 76 n.
43) follows this line of interpretations and argues that
'Jayarasi was not a
Carvaka/Lokayata', suggesting that he was not a
sceptic but represented 'a fundamental idealist (solipsist)
position'. To this group belong also both A.K. Warder (1956:
52), who accepts that he was neither a materialist nor sceptic but a
positivist instead, and K.N. Jayatilleke (1963: 82), who interprets
him as 'not a sceptic but an absolute nihilist in his
metaphysics' and 'a pragmatic materialist' and
'a logical sceptic' (p. 91).



There could hardly be a better source of information on the true
affiliation of Jayarasi than the author himself. He nowhere
states in his work that he is a Carvaka / Lokayata, in
which he does not differ from all other Indian authors who nowhere
mention their philosophical affiliations in the form: 'The
author of the present work is Buddhist' or 'I am a
follower of the Nyaya school'. In most cases, such
affiliations are communicated through the opening sections, e.g. in
the introductory verses (mangalacarana), or in the
colophons, but usually an indirect manner, e.g. by paying homage to
the Awakened One (buddha) or to a guru or Mahesvara, or
through some other hint, but it is hardly ever done directly, in an
unequivocal manner. Unfortunately, the preserved text of
Tattvopaplava-simha does not contain any introductory
verses (probably there were none). The only concealed information in
the opening section of the work could be found the first verse that
occurs in the very beginning which says: 'The worldly path
(laukiko margah) should be followed.../ With respect
to everyday practice of the world (loka-vyavahara), the fool and
the wise are similar' (TUS, p.1.9-10 = Franco (1987:
68-6-7)  = Solomon (2010: 1-2) = Jha (2013: 2)),
quoted from some other source, taken as authoritative by
Jayarasi. The expression 'the worldly path'
(laukiko margah) often occurs as a reference to the
Lokayata ('the followers of the worldly [practice]'),
e.g. by Haribhadra in his SVS1.64. Most importantly, however,
Jayarasi on several occasions quotes verses of
Brhaspati in order to either support his own opinion or to show
that there is no disagreement between the
Tattvopaplava-simha and the tradition of Brhaspati
 (cf. Franco (1987: 5)). Further, he explicitly mentions the
materialist teacher by name and refers to him with reverence
'Honourable Brhaspati' (bhagavan
brhaspatih, TUS, p.45.10-11 = Franco (1987: 228.10)
 = Solomon (2010: 229) = Jha (2013:
 187)),[1]
 the reverential term occurring only once in the whole work. This is
rather unique, for Jayarasi does not seem to follow any
authorities or to quote passages and opinions which he unreservedly
views in favourable light. There can hardly be any doubt, that
Jayarasi placed himself within that tradition and apparently
acknowledged that he was originally trained within it.



In the colophon of the treatise (TUP, p. 125.13-18 = Franco
(1987: 7) = Solomon (2010: 98) = Jha (2013: 463-464)),
Jayarasi explicitly pays homage to Brhaspati, here
referred to by his traditional epithet 'preceptor of gods'
(sura-guru; cf. Bhattacharya (2009: 25, 51, 76)), and so does the
author refers to himself as 'preceptor of deities (gods)'
(deva-guru):



> 
> 
> 'Even [all] such unshakeable reductio arguments (vikalpa) that
> escaped the attention of the  preceptor of gods (i.e.
> Brhaspati) find their way into this lucid [treatise] that
> crushes the conceit of charlatans. This [lucid treatise], titled
> "The Lion [Destroying] the Delusion of Categories", which
> contributes to great advantage and will gain excellent reputation, has
> been composed by [me], the preceptor of deities (gods) [known as]
> Bhatta Sri
>  Jayarasi.[2]
>  [These] reductio arguments of Jayarasi [found] in this
> [treatise] are efficacious in annihilating the charlatans, are
> elaborated by [Jayarasi who is] the ocean of knowledge, [and
> are meant to] vanquish disputants.'
> 
> 
> 



The idea which Jayarasi here expresses is clear: he follows
the footsteps of his own preceptor, Brhaspati (both
'preceptor of gods'), developing the latter's
arguments and augmenting them with his own, more sophisticated.



Jayarasi criticises basically all philosophical schools with
two exceptions: the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara and the
Carvaka / Lokayata school. The reason for being silent
on the tradition of Sankara was that the latter was either
contemporaneous or posterior to Jayarasi, but there would
have been no reason not to formulate any criticism against the
Carvaka / Lokayata school, if that had not been
Jayarasi's own tradition. Further, even though
Jayarasi is generally very cautious not to express his own
positive views and theories, there are several exceptions, which
clearly reveal his materialistic outlook (see 
 Section 2.3 Positive Views below).



There is also some external evidence corroborating to a certain degree
the thesis about Carvaka / Lokayata affiliation of
Jayarasi. Vidyananda who first mentions
Jayarasi brings some interesting details to light (alluded
to above). In his Asta-sati (AsS
29.20-36.7), he explicitly indicates a category of nihilistic thinkers
who reject a number of vital principles and claim that 'There is
no [reliable] omniscient authority (tirtha-kara), there is
no [reliable] cognitive criterion (pramana), there is no
[reliable] authoritative doctrine (samaya) or [reliable] Vedas, or any
kind of [reliable] reasoning (tarka), because they contradict each
other,' and he quotes a popular verse: 'Reasoning is not
established, testimonies differ, there is no sage whose words are a
cognitive criterion (i.e., authoritative), the essence of the moral
law (dharma) is concealed in a secret place (i.e., is not available).
The [proper] path is that taken by the majority of
 people'[3].
 Whether the verse comes from an unidentified Lokayata source,
which is not impossible, or not, it is echoed by Jayarasi in
the above mentioned verse at the beginning of his work and the
expression 'the worldly path' (laukiko margah).
Interestingly, the verse has an obvious sceptical underpinning. The
category of such 'nihilists' includes (1) the followers of
the Lokayata school (laukayatika, AsS 29.26), also
known as the Carvaka (AsS 30.25), who are associated
with the view that there is just one cognitive criterion, i.e.
perception, and (2) the category of 'those who propound the
dissolution of [all] categories'
(tattvopaplava-vadin, AsS 31.2). Vidyananda
(AsS 31.2 ff.) explains who the latter are: 'Some who are
those who propound the dissolution of [all] categories take (1) all
the categories of cognitive criteria such as perception etc. and (2)
all the categories of the cognoscibles as dissolved (i.e., not
established)'. Throughout his text, Vidyananda keeps these
two traditions - the Lokayata and the Tattvopaplava --
separate, although he does acknowledge that they are genetically
related, the main difference between them being whether one recognises
at least one cognitive criterion (Carvaka / Lokayata)
or none (Jayarasi). Further on, Vidyananda begins the
exposition of materialism (AsS, p. 35.22 ff.) which is
designated with a generic term 'cognitive criteria-free
assumption' (apramanika ...
isti), among which the first variety represents standard
materialists who accept perception as the only cognitive criterion
(AsS, p. 35.19-37.9), and the second variety concerns
'those who propound the dissolution of [all] categories'
(tattvopaplava-vadin) who do not accept any cognitive
criteria (pramana) (AsS, p. 37.10 ff.). Also
Anantavirya explicitly classifies Jayarasi as a
materialist by making a pun the the word carvaka: 'The
author of "[The Lion Destroying] the Delusion of
Categories'" says what is charmingly chastised by the
Carvakas' (SViT, p. 277.19:
tattvopaplava-krd aha -
carvakais caru carcitam...).



A typical charge against Jayarasi's affiliation to
materialists (Carvaka / Lokayata), known for two main
claims - that there is only one cognitive criterion
(pramana), namely perception, and the four elements compose
all the universe, including consciousness - would the apparent
paradox: Jayarasi seems to acknowledge neither. This led
Bhattacharya (2017: 353-354) to dispute, on philologically
implausible grounds, that Jayarasi refers to Brhaspati
and the Brhaspati-sutra as his own tradition. However, the
earliest external recipients of Jayarasi's ideas, the
Jaina thinkers Vidyananda and Anantavirya, importantly
ascribe to Jayarasi or to his immediate materialist
tradition a saying that 'Brhaspati's aphorisms are
primarily meant to refute the opponents with respect to all
 [issues].'[4]
 This serves as an external evidence that Jayarasi did
acknowledge the authority of  Brhaspati and his aphorisms
but interpreted them in the spirit of his own methodological
scepticism.



That there must have been some strain among the materialists prior to
Jayarasi which both admitted that the world is composed of
the four elements and at the same time apparently doubted that there
is any cognitive criterion (pramana) is reflected by
Akalanka, who points to the following paradox such a materialist
would have to face: 'As a result of the absence of cognitive
criteria (pramana) [the materialist] cannot ascertain that
perception, and nothing else, is the only one [cognitive criterion],
or [ascertain] the essence of cognoscible objects. Since, when other
cognitive criteria are negated, a [proper] definition of perception
becomes inexplicable, what [cognoscible objects] by what [cognitive
criteria] could be established or negated, on account of which [one
could maintain that] the world is composed of the four
elements?' (SVi 4.12, p. 272.3-5).



Of significance is that Vidyananda puts Jayarasi on par
with the Buddhist doctrine of Emptiness (sunya-vada),
as represented by Nagarjuna, and with Vedantic
idealists (brahma-vada), as three kinds of self-refuting theories
(TSVA 80.22-81.14; 195.14-16). This might
theoretically be taken as evidence that all three represented
scepticism. However, since there is no hint that Vedantic
idealists were sceptics at all at that
 time,[5]
 and we have strong evidence that Jayarasi was not a
sceptic, what Mills (2018) takes to be the three pillars of skepticism
in classical India, namely Nagarjuna, Jayarasi and
Sriharsa, represented here by a forerunner, cannot be
classified as sceptics, despite their commonalities, as noticed by
Vidyananda.



Jayarasi can be therefore taken as a genuine representative
of an offshoot of the Carvaka / Lokayata tradition,
primarily because he himself thought he was a follower of
Brhaspati's materialist tradition, and probably because he had
originally been trained in the materialist system. It also seems very
likely that the representatives of the Carvaka /
Lokayata system occasionally had sceptical inclinations prior to
Jayarasi, which helped him to abandon typically materialist
claims and undertake his sceptical project. However, neither he nor
his work can be taken as typical representatives of the
Carvaka / Lokayata school or a first-hand source of
information about that tradition. Despite this, the work remains the
only authentic, albeit not 'orthodox' treatise of the
Carvaka / Lokayata tradition that has come down to
us.


## 2. The Method and Philosophy of Jayarasi



Jayarasi can be classified as a sceptic  only in a
qualified sense ('qualified sceptic'), namely as a kind of
methodological sceptic, who consistently avails himself of a
particular method to analyse theories and the contents of
propositions, but at the same time retains a set of positive
beliefs.


### 2.1 Use of Reductio Arguments



The point of departure of his methodology is a sophisticated and
highly elaborated reductio type of argument (prasanga),
developed earlier within the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism and its
prominent adherent Nagarjuna (c. 150 CE).



In his method, Jayarasi analyses a particular thesis T of
his opponent by, first, listing all logical implications or all
doctrinally possible conclusions C1, C2,
C3, ... C*n*, admissible within the
opponent's system, that follow from thesis T. Then he demonstrates how
and why each of such conclusions C1, C2,
C3, ... C*n* either leads to an
undesired consequence (logically problematic or unwelcome within the
opponent's system) or contradicts the initial thesis T:



> 
> 
> 
> |  |  |
> | --- | --- |
> | (1) | T - C1 [?] C2 [?] C3
> [?] ... [?] C*n* |
> | (2) | |C1| = 0
> 
> |C2| = 0
> 
> |C3| = 0
> 
> ...
> 
> |C*n*| = 0 |
> | (3) | |T| = 0 |
> 
> 
> 



where '0' stands not simply for 'false'
(logically), but may also stand for 'not admissible within the
opponent's specific set of beliefs', or 'not compatible
with the opponent's specific set of beliefs'. To analyse the
truth value or admissibility of each of the conclusions C1,
C2, C3, ... C*n*, if their
structure is complex, Jayarasi analyses the conclusions in
their turn using exactly the same method.



What may look like a well-known logical law that underlies the
reductio ad absurdum argument, i.e.,



> 
> [(~*p*-*q*) [?] ~*q*] - *p*,
> 



or like other typical laws of the proof by contradiction, i.e.,



> 
> 
> [(~*p*-*q*) [?] (~*p*-~*q*)] -
> *p*,
> 
> 
> 
> [~*p* - (*q*[?]~*q*)] - *p*, or
> 
> 
> 
> [~*p* - (*q*[?]~*q*)] - *p* ,
> 
> 
> 



seems at first closely mirrored by Jayarasi. However, his
approach is significantly different in one particular aspect. First,
Jayarasi analyses positive theses in order to disprove them.
Secondly, the reductio or the proof by contradiction, whereby p is
rejected, does not commit one to admitting ~p in the sense of
accepting a positive state of affairs contrary to p.
Jayarasi is satisfied merely with a rejection of a thesis,
without postulating his own solution to a problem. In other words,
when Jayarasi disproves thesis T by demonstrating that its
conclusions C1, C2, C3, ...
Cn are all wrong (either false or doctrinally
inadmissible), he does not commit himself to the contrary thesis ~T
with some kind of ontological entailment. The better way to describe
his method would be the following patterns:



> 
> 
> [(*p*-*q*) [?] ~*q*] - ~*p*,
> 
> 
> 
> [(*p*-*q*) [?] (*p*-~*q*)] -
> ~*p*,
> 
> 
> 
> [*p* - (*q*[?]~*q*)] - ~*p*, or
> 
> 
> 
> [*p* - (*q*[?]~*q*)] - ~*p* ,
> 
> 
> 



To give an example, Jayarasi first skillfully demonstrates
that the universal cannot exist by mentioning three possible
conclusions: If (T) the universal exists, then (C1) the
universal is different from the individuals in which it is
instantiated, (C2) it is not different from the
individuals, or (C3) it is different from the individuals
in some aspects and it is not different from the individuals in other
aspects. Each of these options is then analysed into further options,
all being eventually shown as wrong or impossible. Since all the three
conclusions C1, C2 and C3 are
rejected, the initial thesis T ('the universal exists') is
also rejected. However, he does not say what at all exists, if there
are no universals.



In his method, Jayarasi does not mention all logically
conceivable conclusions entailed by a thesis he wants to disprove. In
most cases, he limits himself just to those implications which are
relevant to the discussion with a particular philosophical school, and
all other logical or thinkable implications of which we know that the
opponent would never admit for a variety of reason are simply
ignored.



Interestingly, the critical method of analysis of the reductio type
(prasanga) which Jayarasi so amply uses is basically
absent in the works of the Digambara philosopher Akalanka,
whereas the method is regularly used by his commentator
Vidyananda and all subsequent Jaina thinkers, which may have its
historical relevance and suggest that Jayarasi was posterior
to Akalanka.



The reductionist tactics, which Jayarasi shared with the
Madhyamika Buddhists, was traditionally classified by Brahmanic
philosophers, e.g. the Naiyayikas, as an eristical dispute or
refutation-only debate (vitanda) and considered as a
non-genuine argument, because the goal of an authentic debate was to
strive for truth, understood of course in positive terms. Were such
criticisms denying Jayarasi a genuine argumentative value
justified? Clearly not, and for a variety of reasons, the most
important being that the main objective of Jayarasi is
indicated in the title of his treatise: the dissolution of all
categories. How should we understand it? Was his approach purely
negative, eristical, nihilistic or agnostic? His main objective, it
seems, was not necessarily the strong claim that no truths can ever be
known. Rather his intention was to show the fundamental dependence of
our knowledge of reality on cognitive means and categories we accept
more or less arbitrarily. The dissolution of all categories implies
that the criteria on which all philosophical systems and theories of
the world rest are in need of further evidence, which itself is not
possible without adopting some of these categories or some other
categories which again call for further evidence, but which categories
and methods we chose is ultimately our arbitrary decision. To engage
in what Brahmanic philosophers would call a 'genuine
debate' (vada) one would necessarily have to accept that
such an arbitrary decision is ultimate and justified, thus giving up
the further search for truth, even though the process would be
infinite and doomed to terminate untimely. In other words,
contradictions and inconsistencies are, in fact, inherently systemic
in the sense that they are generated by a body of propositions each
adopted arbitrary for this or other reason, and the systemic knowledge
ultimately lacks reliable and coherent foundations. Just as with
Pyrrhonism in Sextus' interpretation, Jayarasi seems to be a
perpetual investigator: he discards all theories and propositions that
are neither consistent nor proof-tight, for which there is also no
compelling evidence. But it would probably be far-fetched to claim
that the idea of truth did not represent any value for him.


### 2.2 Scepticism and Definitions



Jayarasi may be arguably claimed to represent what has been
once labelled epistemological scepticism, or ontological scepticism
(Hankinson 1995, 13ff), i.e., the position in which one refuses to
accept the truth of some proposition or to affirm the existence of
something, without denying it, as distinguished from negative
(ontological) dogmatism, i.e., the attitude in which one actually
rejects the truth of some proposition and denies the existence of the
alleged objects. Further, Jayarasi's qualified methodological
scepticism should not be confused with what is covered by the term
e.g. in the case of Descartes' approach to seek ultimately firm
foundations after all beliefs liable to doubt have been successfully
eliminated. Jayarasi seeks neither ultimate foundations for
his system or firm basis for his epistemology, ontology or ethics,
because he never, even vaguely, intimates he would have any. He is
satisfied with demonstrating that all we, the philosophers, have so
far established, does not hold. But contrary to Descartes'
methodological scepticism, Jayarasi does not really cast
doubt on what comes to us from the senses.



At the outset of his work (TUS 1), he points out the major deficiency
of our knowledge: 'To establish cognitive criteria
(pramana, instruments of knowledge) depends on proper
definitions. Further, to establish objects of cognitive criteria
depends on cognitive criteria. When proper definitions are absent, how
is it possible that one would treat both the cognitive criteria and
their objects as genuinely real?' To adopt certain definitions
we first have to adopt certain definitions and criteria of validity.
That has to be done vis-a-vis the external reality and tested
for validity with respect to phenomena that have all the appearance of
real, for Indian philosophers en bloc accepted the correspondence
theory of truth. To test the definitions, criteria of validity and
cognitive criteria with respect to real objects, we should first know
what these real objects really are. To know that we have to have
reliable instruments of knowledge (cognitive criteria) and criteria of
validity at our disposal. We land in vicious circle: we can neither
know cognizable real objects nor determine what genuine cognitive
criteria are, nor be actually able to define them without having the
idea of validity first. Without it we cannot even properly distinguish
between valid cognitive procedures and invalid ones.



Since it is vital to have a proper definition of a cognitive
criterion, or a valid cognitive procedure and criterion of truth for
philosophical enterprise, Jayarasi analyses such definitions
which were formulated within most important philosophical schools in
India. The cognitive criteria whose various definitions are one by one
examined are perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana),
presumption (arthapatti), reasoning based on analogy
(upamana), negative proof based on absence (abhava),
equivalence (sambhava), tradition (aitihya), and verbal or
scriptural testimony (sabda, agama). In terms of
argumentative structure and nature, they all can be reduced to three:
perception, inference and testimony. The philosophical schools which
Jayarasi most frequently refers to and criticises their
definitions of the cognitive criteria are the Nyaya,
Vaisesika, Samkhya, Mimamsa
as well as Buddhist and Jaina schools.



He demonstrates that no one so far has offered an irrefutable
definition of perception (which does not have to mean that perception
as such has to be completely unreliable). All definitions of
perception are seriously flawed and we cannot rely on it in the way it
is defined: we do not have even a reliable method or a dependable
criterion to distinguish a genuine perception from a mirage, optical
illusion or a mental image (e.g. in hallucination, reminiscence or
dream). However, Iit is not the case that Jayarasi argues
that 'there is simply no way ... to know that our
sense-perceptions are true' (King 1999: 19). What he is up to is
to demonstrate that, given our present definitions of perception and
categories on which our epistemology rests, there is no way to
determine which of our sense-perceptions are true.



What is considered inference (anumana) relies on data provided by
perception which makes inference doubtful. But inference the way it
has so far been defined is flawed for a number of other reasons. There
is no reliable way to relate properties or facts in a truth-conducive
way. For instance, to infer the cause from the effect one would have
to first define what causality is, which as Jayarasi
demonstrates cannot be done with the categories we have at our
disposal: there is actually no reliable way to relate A and B as cause
and effect. Further, what do we relate in inference: universals with
universals, universals with a particular, or a particular with a
particular? Since universals do not exist, inferences which are based
on such notions are intrinsically flawed. We are left with the idea
that inferences depend on particular-to-particular relation. That
being the case, there is no method to establish any kind of valid
relationship of universal  character between two particulars
which could allow us to draw any sound inferences from
single-instantiated cases. Further, inferences will have to rely on
cases of inductive reasoning which are logically not valid and cannot
be demonstrated to be universally valid. Also testimony of an
authority cannot be a legitimate source of knowledge because, first,
such testimony would have to rely on other cognitive criteria and,
second, we would have no means to determine what a reliable testimony
is or who an authoritative person can be. Therefore, given all
available definitions and criteria admitted by the tradition,
nothing can be known for certain (Balcerowicz (2019:
918-924)).



Jayarasi's undertaking is not restricted to the examination
of valid cognitive procedures, or cognitive criteria
(pramana) and their definitions. In the course of his work,
he analyses a number of fundamental ideas and demonstrates that their
definitions are inadequate and they cannot exist as understood and
defined by philosophers. These include such notions as validity and
nonerroneousness, sublation of previous knowledge by a subsequent
experience, universals, the relation of composite wholes to their
parts, production of cognitions, ontological categories such as
inherence of properties in their substrata, the nature of illusion,
the definition of what exists (e.g. the real object's ability to
execute causally efficient action, artha-kriya), the nature of
sense-object contact, memory and recollection, momentariness and
permanence, conceptuality or conceptual state of mind, relation of the
conceptual image in cognition to the external thing represented, the
nature of consciousness (rejection of non-material character), rebirth
and karmic retribution, causality, visible and invisible objects,
absences, rules of inference etc. All these ideas, as
Jayarasi demonstrates, stand in need of proper definition
and as long as we do not have them cannot be maintained in their
present form.



Importantly, as a recent publication demonstrates, he strictly applies
fundamental principles of logic, including a range of standard,
classical laws of logic, such as: the law of non-contradiction, the
law of excluded middle,  the law of identity,  De
Morgan's laws,  Leibniz's law (the indiscernibility
of identicals), and other basic axioms of logic, including patterns of
a priori reasoning whose validity is solely determined by their
logical form and structure, and not necessarily by their empirical
relevance or validation through empirical observation. At least on one
occasion he also makes use of the fourfold division of logically
possible alternatives of p, i.e. the tetralemma
(catus-koti) in an argument directed against the Buddhists
(who themselves accept the tetralemma as a standard procedure):
*p*, ~*p*, *p*[?]~*p*, ~(*p*[?]~*p*)
(Balcerowicz (2019: 924-931). He also takes the conclusions
derived from premisses through such reasoning based on logic
principles and range of rules (formulated as laws of logic) as valid.
Ergo, he accepts inference - but not anumana -
as legitimate means of arriving at truth, and these consistently
remain beyond his criticism. This analysis sheds important light on
the nature of his criticism of what was traditionally accepted in
classical India as 'inference' (anumana), which is
deficient for two main reasons: its definitions formulated by
philosophers are faulty, and its validity is rooted in empirical
conditions. Indian anumana is just a sub-theory of logic and
should be understood as inference in a qualified sense and of a
narrower scope, applied to empirically relevant claims, based on
empirically observed regularities and advancing arguments involving
the problem of induction; anumana completely excludes deduction
and all varieties of a priori reasoning and analytic judgements. What
is termed anumana should therefore be called 'disputational
inference' or 'debational inference', in view of its
origins in the context of debate. We can observe that
Jayarasi's case does not present that of a genuine
sceptic who would put to doubt the possibility of arriving at truth
per se and would point to fundamental impossibility to know facts. His
approach is not scepticism, which questions the epistemic principles
he himself also employs. Instead, with the logical apparatus that
rests in one domain the validity of which he takes for granted,
Jayarasi finds fault with another, quite different domain:
that of the principles of traditional Indian epistemological and
logical model, rooted in reasonings which are based on empirical
observation and are not a priori (Balcerowicz (2019:
931-943).


### 2.3 Positive Views



Jayarasi, as we noted, is cautious not to affirmatively
state anything, and nowhere does he use such expressions as
'thus it was established that' (iti sthitam) or similar
expressions typical of all other philosophical works. Despite this,
can we reconstruct any positive views he affirms or is his scepticism
all-embracing? It seems there a few such views. His clear rejection of
karmic retribution, afterlife and the supernatural ('human
actions do no bring otherworldly results, such as rebirth in heaven
etc.') and the claim the ultimate reality for us is what we
experience and what surrounds us concerns both metaphysics and ethics.
Metaphysically, there is no supernatural reality of any relevance to
us. Ethically, the only criterion to determine what is right and wrong
is what people agree to accept as such ('the worldly path should
be followed'). Quite frequently, he uses examples of
non-existent entities such as demons (pisaca), atoms
(paramanu) and god (mahesvara), taking their
fictitious character for granted, which indicates that he apparently
rejected invisible reality which is intrinsically beyond our
senses.



A recent publication enumerates altogether more than a dozen such
positive views that can be possibly reconstructed and ascribed to
Jayarasi (Balcerowicz (2020: 599-600)). On one
occasion (in the Buddhist section, TUP, p.57-88 = Franco (1987:
269-271) = Solomon (2010: 120) = Jha (2013: 228-229)),
while refuting the view that 'the first moment of consciousness
[of the newly born], immediately after the exit from the mother's
womb, is preceded by another moment of consciousness', he
concludes that 'the first moment of consciousness in the womb
etc. [i.e., of the newly born], must come from the combination of the
elements', which is a typically materialist view. He further
takes consciousness to be a product of matter; rejects the existence
of the soul or any kind of conscious entity that might exist
independently of the material body, and all that is supernatural and
imperceptible, such as demons (pisaca), atoms
(paramanu) or god (mahesvara); dismisses
afterlife, transmigration, karmic retribution (karman), virtue
(punya) or vice (papa); denies heavens, hells, liberation,
omniscient beings and omniscience; rejects ritualism and and the
purposefulness of religious cult, religious revelation, religious
authority (apta), the concept of righteousness (dharma);
dismisses the validity of the pramana model of
epistemology, but accepts the validity of direct experience
(anubhava).



He plainly states that 'universals do not exist' (TUP, 4.5
ff.), which does not seem to be a mere thesis which he rejects just
for the sake of argument, because throughout his work he will refer to
this claim ('we have already shown that universals do not
exist'). He is a nominalist in accepting only particulars which
for him are external, macroscopic, non-momentary and material objects.
On another occasion (TUS 24) he criticises the view that composite
macroscopic wholes cannot exist, and what exists instead are their
parts only (a typical Buddhist nominalist position). He concludes
there is no way to demonstrate that composite wholes are non-existent.
Interestingly, he nowhere links the idea of composite wholes (and the
paradox of the whole and its parts), which he seems to accept, to idea
the universal (and the paradox of the universal and the particulars as
its instantiations), which he clearly rejects. These two concepts, the
wholes and universals, were generally analysed in India jointly as two
aspects of the same problem: just as the whole exists (or does not
exist) through its parts, in the very same way also the universal
exists (or does not exist) through its particulars. Interestingly,
Jayarasi never links these two issues, precisely because, it
seems, he admitted the existence of macroscopic objects of our
experience (i.e., composite wholes) whereas he rejected the existence
of universals. Being a sceptic, he does seem to accept a
'commonsensical view' of the world that consists of such
macroscopic objects, but not of invisible atoms or universals, demons
and god. In line with this approach, he seemed also to maintain that
consciousness is a product or combination of the four elements (see
above). It should not come as a surprise to discover that all these
views he shared with genuine materialists of the Carvaka /
Lokayata tradition.



What may appear as a truly sceptical thesis is his assumption that all
philosophical claims are always made within a particular set of
beliefs, i.e., within a particular system which is based on
arbitrarily accepted criteria, definitions and categories. His
pragmatic, 'commonsensical attitude' is highlighted in a
verse he quotes: 'with respect to everyday practice of the
world, the fool and the wise are similar' (see above), because
ultimately we all have to rely on our experience and defective and
partial knowledge of reality.



The conclusion of his work: 'Thus, when all categories are
completely dissolved in the above manner, all practical actions (which
entails thought, speech and activity) can be enjoyable, without being
reflected upon', is quite meaningful. On the one hand it could
be taken to imply some kind of a carpe diem attitude: given our
limitations and intrinsic inability to know with certainty, the only
option we are left with is to enjoy the world the way it appears to
us. On the other hand, the statement could also suggest that what
Jayarasi had in mind was that for all our practical
activities, including thinking, verbal communication, behaviour or
ordinary life, the world of our actions -- as long as it is
relevant to us -- is 'here and now' and retains its
ultimate validity, even though we are incapable of its proper
philosophical analysis.