## 1. Wisdom as Epistemic Humility



 
Socrates' view of wisdom, as expressed by Plato in *The
Apology* (20e-23c), is sometimes interpreted as an example of a
humility theory of wisdom (see, for example, Ryan 1996 and Whitcomb,
2010). In Plato's
*Apology*, Socrates and his friend Chaerephon visit the oracle
at Delphi. As the story goes, Chaerephon asks the oracle whether
anyone is wiser than Socrates. The oracle's answer is that Socrates is
the wisest person. Socrates reports that he is puzzled by this answer
since so many other people in the community are well known for their
extensive knowledge and wisdom, and yet Socrates claims that he lacks
knowledge and wisdom. Socrates does an investigation to get to the
bottom of this puzzle. He interrogates a series of politicians, poets,
and craftsmen. As one would expect, Socrates' investigation reveals
that those who claim to have knowledge either do not really know any
of the things they claim to know, or else know far less than they
proclaim to know. The most knowledgeable of the bunch, the craftsmen,
know about their craft, but they claim to know things far beyond the
scope of their expertise. Socrates, so we are told, neither suffers
the vice of claiming to know things he does not know, nor the vice of
claiming to have wisdom when he does not have wisdom. In this
revelation, we have a potential resolution to the wisdom puzzle
in *The Apology*. 



 
Although the story may initially appear to deliver a clear theory of
wisdom, it is actually quite difficult to capture a textually accurate
and plausible theory here. One interpretation is that Socrates is
wise because he, unlike the others, believes he is not wise, whereas
the poets, politicians, and craftsmen arrogantly and falsely believe
they are wise. This theory, which will be labeled Humility Theory 1
(H1), is simply (see, for example, Lehrer & Smith 1996, 3):



> 
> **Humility Theory 1 (H1)**:  
> 
> *S* is wise iff *S* believes s/he is not
>  wise.



 
This is a tempting and popular interpretation because Socrates
certainly thinks he has shown that the epistemically arrogant poets,
politicians, and craftsmen lack wisdom. Moreover, Socrates claims that
he is not wise, and yet, if we trust the oracle, Socrates is actually
wise. 



 
Upon careful inspection, (H1) is not a reasonable interpretation of
Socrates' view. Although Socrates does not
*boast* of his own wisdom, he does believe the oracle. If he
was convinced that he was not wise, he would have rejected the oracle
and gone about his business because he
would not find any puzzle to unravel. Clearly, he believes, on
some level, that he is wise. The mystery is: what *is* wisdom if he has
it and the others lack it? Socrates nowhere suggests that
he has become unwise after believing the oracle. Thus, (H1) is not an
acceptable interpretation of Socrates' view.



 
Moreover, (H1) is false. Many people are clear counterexamples to
(H1). Many people who believe they are not wise are correct in their
self-assessment. Thus, the belief that one is not wise is not a
sufficient condition for wisdom. Furthermore, it seems that the belief
that one is not wise is not necessary for wisdom. It seems plausible
to think that a wise person could be wise enough to realize that she
is wise. Too much modesty might get in the way of making good
decisions and sharing what one knows. If one thinks Socrates was a
wise person, and if one accepts that Socrates did, in fact, accept
that he was wise, then Socrates himself is a counterexample to
(H1). The belief that one is wise could be a perfectly well justified
belief for a wise person. Having the belief that one is wise does not,
in itself, eliminate the possibility that the person is wise. Nor does
it guarantee the vice of arrogance. We should hope that a wise person
would have a healthy dose of epistemic self-confidence, appreciate
that she is wise, and share her understanding of reality with the rest
of us who could benefit from her wisdom. Thus, the belief that
one is not wise is not required for wisdom.



 
(H1) focused on believing one is not wise. Another version of the
humility theory is worth considering. When Socrates demonstrates that
a person is not wise, he does so by showing that the person lacks some
knowledge that he or she claims to possess. Thus, one might think
that Socrates' view could be better captured by focusing on the idea
that wise people believe they lack knowledge (rather than lacking
wisdom). That is, one might consider the following view:



> 
> **Humility Theory 2 (H2):**  
> 
> *S* is wise iff *S* believes *S* does not know
> anything.




Unfortunately, this interpretation is not any better than (H1). It
falls prey to problems similar to those that refuted (H1) both as an
interpretation of Socrates, and as an acceptable account of
wisdom. Moreover, remember that Socrates admits that the craftsmen do
have some knowledge. Socrates might have considered them to be wise if
they had restricted their confidence and claims to knowledge to what
they actually did know about their craft. Their problem was that they
professed to have knowledge beyond their area of expertise. The
problem was not that they claimed to have knowledge. 




Before turning to alternative approaches to wisdom, it is worth
mentioning another interpretation of Socrates that fits with the
general spirit of epistemic humility. One might think that what
Socrates is establishing is that his wisdom is found in his
realization that human wisdom is not a particularly valuable kind of
wisdom. Only the gods possess the kind of wisdom that is truly
valuable. This is clearly one of Socrates' insights, but it does not
provide us with an understanding of the nature of wisdom. It tells us
only of its comparative value. Merely understanding this evaluative
insight would not, for reasons similar to those discussed with (HP1)
and (HP2), make one wise.



Humility theories of wisdom are not promising, but they do, perhaps,
provide us with some important character traits associated with wise
people. Wise people, one might argue, possess epistemic
self-confidence, yet lack epistemic arrogance. Wise people tend to
acknowledge their fallibility, and wise people are reflective,
introspective, and tolerant of uncertainty. Any acceptable theory of
wisdom ought to be compatible with such traits. However, those traits
are not, in and of themselves, definitive of wisdom. 


## 2. Wisdom as Epistemic Accuracy



 
Socrates can be interpreted as providing an epistemic accuracy, rather
than an epistemic humility, theory of wisdom. The poets, politicians,
and craftsmen all believe they have knowledge about topics on which
they are considerably ignorant. Socrates, one might argue, believes he
has knowledge when, and only when, he really does have knowledge.
Perhaps wise people restrict their confidence to propositions for
which they have knowledge or, at least, to propositions for which they
have excellent justification. Perhaps Socrates is better interpreted
as having held an Epistemic Accuracy Theory such as:



> 
> **Epistemic Accuracy Theory 1 (EA1)**:  
> 
> *S* is wise iff for all *p*, (*S* believes
>  *S* knows
> *p* iff S knows *p*.)




According to (EA1), a wise person is accurate about what she knows and
what she does not know. If she really knows *p*, she believes she knows
*p*. And, if she believes she knows *p*, then she really does know
*p*. (EA1) is consistent with the idea that Socrates accepts that he is
wise and with the idea that Socrates does have some knowledge. (EA1)
is a plausible interpretation of the view Socrates endorses, but it is
not a plausible answer in the search for an understanding of
wisdom. Wise people can make mistakes about what they know. Socrates,
Maimonides, King Solomon, Einstein, Goethe, Gandhi, and every other
candidate for the honor of wisdom have held false beliefs about what
they did and did not know. It is easy to imagine a wise person being
justified in believing she possesses knowledge about some claim, and
also easy to imagine that she could be shown to be mistaken, perhaps
long after her death. If (EA1) is true, then just because a person
believes she has knowledge when she does not, she is not wise. That
seems wrong. It is hard to imagine that anyone at all is, or ever has
been, wise if (EA1) is correct. 



 
We could revise the Epistemic Accuracy Theory to get around this
problem. We might only require that a wise person's belief is
*highly justified* when she believes she has knowledge. 
That excuses people with bad epistemic luck.



> 
> **Epistemic Accuracy 2 (EA2)**:   
> 
> *S* is wise iff for all *p*, (*S* believes
>  *S* knows
> *p* iff *S*'s belief in *p* is highly
> justified.)




(EA2) gets around the problem with (EA1). The Socratic Method
challenges one to produce reasons for one's view. When
Socrates' interlocutor is left dumbfounded, or reduced to
absurdity, Socrates rests his case. One might argue that through
his questioning, Socrates reveals not that his opponents
lack knowledge because their beliefs are false, but he
demonstrates that his opponents are not justified in holding the
views they profess to know. Since the craftsmen, poets, and
politicians questioned by Socrates all fail his interrogation,
they were shown, one might argue, to have claimed to have knowledge
when their beliefs were not even justified. 



 
Many philosophers would hesitate to endorse this interpretation of
what is going on in *The Apology*. They would argue that a
failure to defend one's beliefs from Socrates' relentless questioning
does not show that a person is not justified in believing a
proposition. Many philosophers would argue that having very good
evidence, or forming a belief via a reliable process, would be
sufficient for justification.



Proving, or demonstrating to an interrogator, that one is justified is
another matter, and not necessary for simply being
justified. Socrates, some might argue, shows only that the craftsmen,
poets, and politicians cannot defend themselves from his questions. He
does not show, one might argue, that the poets, politicians, and
craftsmen have unjustified beliefs. Since we gain very little insight
into the details of the conversation in this dialogue, it would be
unfair to dismiss this interpretation on these grounds. Perhaps
Socrates did show, through his intense questioning, that the
craftsmen, poets, and politicians formed and held their beliefs
without adequate evidence or formed and held them through unreliable
belief forming processes. Socrates only reports that they did not
know all that they professed to know. Since we do not get to witness
the actual questioning as we do in Plato's other dialogues, we should
not reject (EA2) as an interpretation of Socrates' view of wisdom
in *The Apology*. 



 
Regardless of whether (EA2) is Socrates' view, there are problems for
(EA2) as an account of what it means to be wise. Even if (EA2) is
exactly what Socrates meant, some philosophers would argue that one
could be justified in believing a proposition, but not realize that
she is justified. If that is a possible situation for a wise person to
be in, then she might be justified, but fail to believe she has
knowledge. Could a wise person be in such a situation, or is it
necessary that a wise person would always recognize the epistemic
value of what he or she 
 believes?[1]
 If this situation is impossible,
then this criticism could be avoided. There is no need to resolve this
issue here because (EA1) and (EA2) fall prey to another, much less
philosophically thorny and controversial problem.



 
(EA1) and (EA2) suffer from a similar, and very serious,
problem. Imagine a person who has very little knowledge. Suppose
further, that the few things she does know are of little or no importance. She
could be the sort of person that nobody would ever go to for
information or advice. Such a person could be very cautious and believe that
she knows only what she actually knows. Although she would have
accurate beliefs about what she does and does not know, she would not
be wise. This shows that (EA1) is flawed. As for (EA2), imagine that
she believes she knows only what she is actually justified in
believing. She is still not wise. It should be noted, however, that
although accuracy theories do not provide an adequate account of
wisdom, they reveal an important insight. Perhaps a necessary
condition for being wise is that wise people think they have knowledge
only when their beliefs are highly justified. Or, even more simply,
perhaps wise people have epistemically justified, or rational, beliefs. 


## 3. Wisdom as Knowledge




An alternative approach to wisdom focuses on the more positive idea
that wise people are very knowledgeable people. There are many views
in the historical and contemporary philosophical literature on wisdom
that have knowledge, as opposed to humility or accuracy, as at least a
necessary condition of wisdom. Aristotle (*Nichomachean
Ethics* VI, ch. 7), Descartes (*Principles of Philosophy*),
Richard Garrett (1996), John Kekes (1983), Keith Lehrer & Nicholas
Smith (1996), Robert Nozick (1989), Plato (*The Republic*),
Sharon Ryan (1996, 1999), Valerie Tiberius (2008), Dennis Whitcomb
(2010) and Linda Zagzebski (1996) for example, have all defended
theories of wisdom that require a wise person to have knowledge of
some sort. All of these views very clearly distinguish knowledge from
expertise on a particular subject. Moreover, all of these views
maintain that wise people know "what is important." The
views differ, for the most part, over what it is important for a wise
person to know, and on whether there is any behavior, action, or way
of living, that is required for wisdom. 




Aristotle distinguished between two different kinds of wisdom,
theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. Theoretical wisdom is,
according to Aristotle, "scientific knowledge, combined with
intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature"
(*Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 1141b). For Aristotle, theoretical
wisdom involves knowledge of necessary, scientific, first principles
and propositions that can be logically deduced from them. Aristotle's
idea that scientific knowledge is knowledge of necessary truths and
their logical consequences is no longer a widely accepted view. Thus,
for the purposes of this discussion, I will consider a theory that
reflects the spirit of Aristotle's view on theoretical wisdom, but
without the controversy about the necessary or contingent nature of
scientific knowledge. Moreover, it will combine scientific knowledge
with other kinds of factual knowledge, including knowledge about
history, philosophy, music, literature, mathematics, etc. Consider the
following, knowledge based, theory of wisdom:



> 
> **Wisdom as Extensive Factual Knowledge (WFK)**:  
> 
> *S* is wise iff *S* has extensive factual knowledge about
> science, history, philosophy, literature, music, etc.




According to (WFK), a wise person is a person who knows a lot about
the universe and our place in it. She would have extensive knowledge
about the standard academic subjects. There are many positive things
to say about (WFK). (WFK) nicely distinguishes between narrow
expertise and knowledge of the mundane, from the important, broad, and
general kind of knowledge possessed by wise people. As Aristotle puts
it, "...we think that some people are wise in general, not
in some particular field or in any other limited
respect..." (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 6,
1141a). 




The main problem for (WFK) is that some of the most knowledgeable
people are not wise. Although they have an abundance of very important
factual knowledge, they lack the kind of practical know-how that is a
mark of a wise person. Wise people know how to get on in the world in
all kinds of situations and with all kinds of people. Extensive
factual knowledge is not enough to give us what a wise person
knows. As Robert Nozick points out, "Wisdom is not just knowing
fundamental truths, if these are unconnected with the guidance of life
or with a perspective on its meaning" (1989, 269). There is more to
wisdom than intelligence and knowledge of science and philosophy or
any other subject matter. Aristotle is well aware of the limitations
of what he calls theoretical wisdom. However, rather
than making improvements to something like (WFK), Aristotle
distinguishes it as one kind of wisdom. Other philosophers would be
willing to abandon (WFK), that is, claim that it provides insufficient
conditions for wisdom, and add on what is missing.




Aristotle has a concept of practical wisdom that makes up for what is
missing in theoretical wisdom. In Book VI of the *Nicomachean
Ethics*, he claims, "This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales,
and men like them have philosophic but not practical wisdom, when we
see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say
that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and
divine, but useless; viz. because it is not human goods they
seek" (1141a). Knowledge of contingent facts that are useful to
living well is required in Aristotle's practical wisdom. According to
Aristotle, "Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of
practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and
expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what
sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts
of thing conduce to the good life in general" (*Nichomachean
Ethics*, VI, 1140a-1140b). Thus, for Aristotle, practical
wisdom requires knowing, in general, how to live well. Many
philosophers agree with Aristotle on this point. However, many would
not be satisfied with the conclusion that theoretical wisdom is one
kind of wisdom and practical wisdom another. Other philosophers,
including Linda Zagzebski (1996), agree that there are these two types
of wisdom that ought to be distinguished.



Let's proceed, without argument, on the assumption that it is possible
to have a theory of one, general, kind of wisdom. Wisdom, in general,
many philosophers would argue, requires practical knowledge about
living. What Aristotle calls theoretical wisdom, many would contend,
is not wisdom at all. Aristotle's theoretical wisdom is merely
extensive knowledge or deep understanding. Nicholas Maxwell (1984),
in his argument to revolutionize education, argues that we should be
teaching for wisdom, which he sharply distinguishes from standard
academic knowledge. Similar points are raised by Robert Sternberg
(2001) and Andrew Norman (1996). Robert Nozick holds a view very
similar to Aristotle's theory of practical wisdom, but Nozick is
trying to capture the essence of wisdom, period. He is not trying to
define one, alternative, kind of wisdom. Nozick claims, "Wisdom
is what you need to understand in order to live well and cope with the
central problems and avoid the dangers in the predicaments human
beings find themselves in" (1989, 267). And, John Kekes
maintains that, "What a wise man knows, therefore, is how to
construct a pattern that, given the human situation, is likely to lead
to a good life" (1983, 280). More recently, Valerie Tiberius (2008)
has developed a practical view that connects wisdom with well being,
requiring, among other things, that a wise person live the sort of
life that he or she could sincerely endorse upon reflection. Such
practical views of wisdom could be expressed, generally, as
follows.



> 
> **Wisdom as Knowing How To Live Well (KLW)**:   
> 
> *S* is wise iff *S* knows how to live well.




This view captures Aristotle's basic idea of practical wisdom. It also
captures an important aspect of views defended by Nozick, Plato,
Garrett, Kekes, Maxwell, Ryan, and Tiberius. Although giving an
account of what it means to know how to live well may prove as
difficult a topic as providing an account of wisdom, Nozick provides a
very illuminating start.



> 
> 
> Wisdom is not just one type of knowledge, but diverse. 
> What a wise person needs to know and understand constitutes a varied
> list: the most important goals and values of life - the ultimate
> goal, if there is one; what means will reach these goals without too
> great a cost; what kinds of dangers threaten the achieving of these
> goals; how to recognize and avoid or minimize these dangers; what
> different types of human beings are like in their actions and motives
> (as this presents dangers or opportunities); what is not possible or
> feasible to achieve (or avoid); how to tell what is appropriate when;
> knowing when certain goals are sufficiently achieved; what limitations
> are unavoidable and how to accept them; how to improve oneself and
> one's relationships with others or society; knowing what the true and
> unapparent value of various things is; when to take a long-term
> view; knowing the variety and obduracy of facts, institutions, and
> human nature; understanding what one's real motives are; how to cope
> and deal with the major tragedies and dilemmas of life, and with the
> major good things
>  too. (1989, 269) 




With Nozick's explanation of what one must know in order to live well,
we have an interesting and quite attractive, albeit somewhat rough,
theory of wisdom. As noted above, many philosophers, including
Aristotle and Zagzebski would, however, reject (KLW) as the full story
on wisdom. Aristotle and Zagzebski would obviously reject (KLW) as
the full story because they believe theoretical wisdom is another kind
of wisdom, and are unwilling to accept that there is a conception of
one, general, kind of wisdom. Kekes claims, "The possession of
wisdom shows itself in reliable, sound, reasonable, in a word, good
judgment. In good judgment, a person brings his knowledge to bear on
his actions. To understand wisdom, we have to understand its
connection with knowledge, action, and judgment" (1983, 277). Kekes
adds, "Wisdom ought also to show in the man who has it"
(1983, 281). Many philosophers, therefore, think that wisdom is not
restricted even to knowledge about how to live well. Tiberius thinks
the wise person's actions reflect their basic values. These
philosophers believe that being wise also includes action. A person
could satisfy the conditions of any of the principles we have
considered thus far and nevertheless behave in a wildly reckless
manner. Wildly reckless people are, even if very knowledgeable about
life, not wise.



Philosophers who are attracted to the idea that knowing how to live
well is a necessary condition for wisdom might want to simply tack on
a success condition to (KLW) to get around cases in which a person
knows all about living well, yet fails to put this knowledge into
practice. Something along the lines of the following theory would
capture this idea.



> 
> **Wisdom as Knowing How To, and Succeeding at, Living
> Well (KLS)**:   
> 
> *S* is wise iff (i) *S* knows how to live well, and
>  (ii) *S* is successful at living well.
>  




The idea of the success condition is that one puts one's knowledge
into practice. Or, rather than using the terminology of success, one
might require that a wise person's beliefs and values cohere with
one's actions (Tiberius, 2008). The main idea is that one's actions
are reflective of one's understanding of what it means to live well.
A view along the lines of (KLS) would be embraced by Aristotle and
Zagzebski (for practical wisdom), and by Kekes, Nozick, and
Tiberius. (KLS) would not be universally embraced, however (see Ryan
1999, for further criticisms). One criticism of (KLS) is that one
might think that all the factual knowledge required by (WFK) is
missing from this theory. One might argue that (WFK), the view that a
wise person has extensive factual knowledge, was rejected only because
it did not provide sufficient conditions for wisdom. Many philosophers
would claim that (WFK) does provide a necessary condition for
wisdom. A wise person, such a critic would argue, needs to know how to
live well (as described by Nozick), but she also needs to have some
deep and far-reaching theoretical, or factual, knowledge that may have
very little impact on her daily life, practical decisions, or
well being. In the preface of his *Principles of Philosophy*,
Descartes insisted upon factual knowledge as an important component of
wisdom. Descartes wrote, "It is really only God alone who has
Perfect Wisdom, that is to say, who has a complete knowledge of the
truth of all things; but it may be said that men have more wisdom or
less according as they have more or less knowledge of the most
important truths" (*Principles*, 204). Of course, among
those important truths, one might claim, are truths about living well,
as well as knowledge in the basic academic subject areas.




Moreover, one might complain that the insight left standing from
Epistemic Accuracy theories is also missing from (KLS). One might
think that a wise person not only knows a lot, and succeeds at living
well, she also confines her claims to knowledge (or belief that she
has knowledge) to those propositions that she is justified in
believing. 


## 4. Hybrid Theory



One way to try to accommodate the various insights from the theories
considered thus far is in the form of a hybrid theory. One such idea
is:



> 
> *S* is wise iff 1. *S* has extensive factual and theoretical knowledge.
> 2. *S* knows how to live well.
> 3. *S* is successful at living well.
> 4. *S* has very few unjustified beliefs.
> 
> 
> 




Although this Hybrid Theory has a lot going for it, there are a number
of important criticisms to consider. Dennis Whitcomb (2010) objects
to all theories of wisdom that include a living well condition, or an
appreciation of living well condition. He gives several interesting
objections against such views. Whitcomb thinks that a person who is
deeply depressed and totally devoid of any ambition for living well
could nevertheless be wise. As long as such a person is deeply
knowledgeable about academic subjects and knows how to live well, that
person would have all they need for wisdom. With respect to a very
knowledgeable and deeply depressed person with no ambition but to stay
in his room, he claims, "If I ran across such a person, I would
take his advice to heart, wish him a return to health, and leave the
continuing search for sages to his less grateful advisees. And I
would think he was wise despite his depression-induced failure to
value or desire the good life. So I think that wisdom does not
require valuing or desiring the good life." 



In response to Whitcomb's penetrating criticism, one could argue that
a deeply depressed person who is wise, would still live as well as she
can, and would still value living well, even if she falls far short of
perfection. Such a person would attempt to get help to deal with her
depression. If she really does not care at all, she may be very
knowledgeable, but she is not wise. There is something irrational
about knowing how to live well and refusing to try to do so. Such
irrationality is not compatible with wisdom. A person with this
internal conflict may be extremely clever and shrewd, one to listen to
on many issues, one to trust on many issues, and may even win a Nobel
Prize for her intellectual greatness, but she is not admirable enough,
and rationally consistent enough, to be wise. Wisdom is a virtue and
a way of living, and it requires more than smart ideas and
knowledge.




Aristotle held that "it is evident that it is impossible to be
practically wise without being good" (*Nicomachean
Ethics*, 1144a, 36-37). Most of the philosophers mentioned
thus far would include moral virtue in their understanding of what it
means to live well. However, Whitcomb challenges any theory of wisdom
that requires moral virtue. Whitcomb contends that a deeply evil
person could nevertheless be wise.




Again, it is important to contrast being wise from being clever and
intelligent. If we think of wisdom as the highest, or among the
highest, of human virtues, then it seems incompatible with a deeply
evil personality. 



 
There is, however, a very serious problem with the Hybrid Theory.
Since so much of what was long ago considered knowledge has been
abandoned, or has evolved, a theory that requires truth (through a
knowledge condition) would exclude almost all people who are now long
dead, including Hypatia, Socrates, Confucius, Aristotle, Homer, Lao
Tzu, etc. from the list of the wise. Bad epistemic luck, and having
lived in the past, should not count against being wise. But, since
truth is a necessary condition for knowledge, bad epistemic luck is
sufficient to undermine a claim to knowledge. What matters, as far as
being wise goes, is not that a wise person has knowledge, but that she
has highly justified and rational beliefs about a wide variety of
subjects, including how to live well, science, philosophy,
mathematics, history, geography, art, literature, psychology, and so
on. And the wider the variety of interesting topics, the better.
Another way of developing this same point is to imagine a person with
highly justified beliefs about a wide variety of subjects, but who is
unaware that she is trapped in the Matrix, or some other skeptical
scenario. Such a person could be wise even if she is sorely lacking
knowledge. A theory of wisdom that focuses on having rational or
epistemically justified beliefs, rather than the higher standard of
actually having knowledge, would be more promising. Moreover, such a
theory would incorporate much of what is attractive about epistemic
humility, and epistemic accuracy, theories.


## 5. Wisdom as Rationality




The final theory to be considered here is an attempt to capture all
that is good, while avoiding all the serious problems of the other
theories discussed thus far. Perhaps wisdom is a deep and
comprehensive kind of rationality (Ryan, 2012).



> 
> **Deep Rationality Theory** (DRT):   
> 
> *S* is wise iff 
> 
> 1. *S* has a wide variety of epistemically justified beliefs
> on a wide variety of valuable academic subjects.
> 2. *S* has a wide variety of justified beliefs on how to live
> rationally (epistemically, morally, and practically).
> 3. *S* is committed to living rationally.
> 4. *S* has very few unjustified beliefs and is sensitive to
> her limitations.
> 
> 
> 


In condition (1), DRT takes account of what is attractive about
some knowledge theories by requiring epistemically justified beliefs
about a wide variety of standard academic subjects. Condition (2)
takes account of what is attractive about theories that require
knowledge about how to live well. For example, having justified
beliefs about how to live in a practically rational way would include
having a well-reasoned strategy for dealing with the practical aspects
of life. Having a rational plan does not require perfect success. It
requires having good reasons behind one's actions, responding
appropriately to, and learning from, one's mistakes, and having a
rational plan for all sorts of situations and problems. Having
justified beliefs about how to live in a morally rational way would
not involve being a moral saint, but would require that one has good
reasons supporting her beliefs about what is morally right and
wrong, and about what one morally ought and ought not do in a wide
variety of circumstances. Having justified beliefs about living in an
emotionally rational way would involve, not dispassion, but having
justified beliefs about what is, and what is not, an emotionally
rational response to a situation. For example, it is appropriate to
feel deeply sad when dealing with the loss of a loved one. But,
ordinarily, feeling deeply sad or extremely angry is not an
appropriate emotion to spilled milk. A wise person would have
rational beliefs about the emotional needs and behaviors of other
people.


Condition (3) ensures that the wise person live a life that
reflects what she or he is justified in believing is a rational way to
live. In condition (4), DRT respects epistemic humility. Condition
(4) requires that a wise person not believe things without epistemic
justification. The Deep Rationality Theory rules out all of the
unwise poets, politicians, and craftsmen that were ruled out by
Socrates. Wise people do not think they know when they lack
sufficient evidence. Moreover, wise people are not epistemically
arrogant.



The Deep Rationality Theory does not require knowledge or perfection.
But it does require rationality, and it accommodates degrees of
wisdom. It is a promising theory of wisdom.