## 1. Life and Works


### 1.1 Life



Anthony Collins was born in Heston, Middlesex on June 21, 1676 into a
family of lawyers. He went to Eton and then King's College,
Cambridge in 1693. Though he had not graduated from Cambridge, Collins
went to the Middle Temple in 1694 to study law. He didn't like
the law and was never called to the Bar. In 1698 he married the
daughter of a rich London merchant, Sir Francis Child. She died in
childbirth in 1703. At the time of his marriage he received some
property in Essex from his father. Together with his wife's
dowry, this made him a very rich man indeed. Collins met John Locke on
a visit to Oates in Essex in 1703, visited Locke five times over the
next 18 months and carried on a correspondence with him about various
philosophical topics. In one of his letters to Collins Locke remarked:




> 
> 
> Believe it, my good friend, to love truth for truth's sake is
> the principal part of human perfection in this world, and the seed bed
> of all other virtues; and if I mistake not, you have as much of it as
> I have ever met with in anybody. 
> 
> 
> 



Collins was a lifelong bibliophile with a large private research
library. In the article on Collins in Birch's Dictionary, Birch
notes that his 



> 
> 
> large and curious [library] was open to all men of letters, to whom he
> readily communicated all the lights and assistance in his power, and
> even furnished his antagonists with books to confute himself, and
> directed them how to give their arguments all the force of which they
> were capable. (Birch, quoted in Berman 1975: 50) 
> 
> 
> 



During this period Collins also met Samuel Bold and John Toland. From
1703 until 1706, after his wife's death, Collins spent the
winters in London and the summers at his fine summer mansion in
Buckinghamshire--where Queen Anne and her court visited him. In
1707 Collins began a pamphlet controversy with Samuel Clarke, a
prominent British philosopher and member of Newton's inner
circle, over the question of whether matter can think. The controversy
continued until 1708. In 1707 Collins also published anonymously the
*Essay Concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions, the evidence
whereof depends on human testimony*. During this period Collins
frequented the London coffee shops where the deists and free-thinkers
met. Berkeley apparently met him at such a gathering in 1713. In 1710
Collins made his first trip to the Continent, spending his time buying
books in Holland and meeting John Churchill, first Duke of
Marlborough, and Prince Eugene. Back in England, Collins met several
times with Samuel Clarke and William Whiston at the house of Lady
Calverly and Sir John Hubern for "frequent but friendly debates
about the truth of the Bible and the Christian Religion"
(Whiston, quoted in O'Higgins 1970: 77). In 1713 he published
*A Discourse Concerning Free-Thinking*. The *Discourse*
was his most controversial work. He made a second trip to the
continent about the time that the *Discourse* was published.
Again he went to Holland and France and planned to go on to Italy. The
trip was cut short by the death of a close kinsman. In 1715 Collins,
in effect, took root in Essex, moving into Mowdon Hall. Collins
probably owned a good 2000 acres in Essex, much of it prime
agricultural land. In 1717 he published *A Philosophical Enquiry
Concerning Human Liberty* in which he argues for a compatibilist
form of determinism and rejects freedom of the will. Samuel Clarke
reviewed the book, continuing the argument that had begun during the
Clarke Collins correspondence of 1707-08.



From 1717 on Collins spent most of his time in the country, but still
had a keen interest in national politics at a distance, and local
politics in person. Collins was a Whig and became a spokesman for the
Whigs in the country. Collins took a serious role in the government of
Essex--serving as a justice, a commissioner for taxes, and then
Treasurer of the County. He examined roads and bridges. He was
involved in finding a place for housing county records. As Treasurer
he was a model of integrity. In considering the relation between
Collins, the County official and Collins the writer, O'Higgins
notes that Collins was probably less tolerant towards Catholics than
other justices (O'Higgins 1970: 128-9). Collins the writer
is consistently anti-Catholic. So, while one might hope that the use
of reason would produce a higher degree of toleration towards all
religious groups than one would expect to find among true believers,
there seems to be little conflict here between the writer and the
jurist.



In December 1723 Collins' only son suddenly became ill and died.
His father was grief-stricken. Collins remarried in 1724 and he
published what is perhaps his most successful book, *A Discourse on
the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* as well as
*An Historical and Critical Essay on the Thirty Nine Articles of
the Church of England*. From 1725 until 1729 Collins' health
began to deteriorate. Still, in 1726 he published *The Scheme of
Literal Prophecy Considered*. In 1729 Collins published *A
Discourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing*. He was
suffering from gall stones and finally died of his disease on December
13, 1729. His second wife Elisabeth and his two daughters survived
him. He willed his unpublished manuscripts to Pierre Desmaizeaux but
Desmaizeaux took an offer from Collins' widow to buy them.
Desmaizeaux quickly regretted his decision, but it was too late. He
accused Elisabeth Collins of giving some of Collins unpublished papers
to the Bishop of Lincoln. She denied that the story was true. She
willed some or all of Collins unpublished papers to a friend. What
became of them is still a mystery.


### 1.2 Chief Works


* *An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason*, 1707
* Collins contributions to the Clarke Collins controversy:
	+ A Letter to Mr. Dodwell, 1706
	+ A Reply to Mr. Clarke's Defence of His Letter to Mr.
	Dodwell
	+ Reflections on Mr. Clarke's Second Defence of His Letter to
	Mr. Dodwell
	+ An Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence of His Letter to Mr.
	Dodwell, 1708
* *Priestcraft In Perfection* 1710
* *A Vindication of the Divine Attributes, in some Remarks on His
Grace the Archbishop of Dublin's sermon intitled "Divine
Predestination Consistent with the Freedom of Man's
Will"*, 1710
* *A Discourse of Free-Thinking*, 1713
* *Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty*, 1717
* *A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian
Religion*, 1724
* *An Historical and Critical Essay on the Thirty Nine Articles
of the Church of England*, 1724
* *The Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered*, 1726
* *A Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing*,
1729


## 2. The Clarke Collins Correspondence (1707-08)


### 2.1 Background: Consciousness and Material Systems



The chief topic of the Clarke Collins controversy of 1707-08 is
whether consciousness can inhere in a material system, a highly
controversial issue largely inspired in this case by Locke's
notorious speculation about thinking matter. In Book IV of *An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, in stressing the limits of
human knowledge of substances, Locke writes: 



> 
> 
> We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be
> able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; it being
> impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without
> revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some
> System of Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or
> else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial
> Substance.... (Locke 1690 IV, iii, 6 [1975: 540-1]) 
> 
> 
> 



Locke then went on to conjecture that it might be just as easy for God
to add the power of thought to a system of matter organized in the
right way as for God to connect an immaterial thinking thing to a body
(Ibid.). Clearly, the difficulties in explaining how an immaterial
mind could relate to a material body play a significant role in
leading Locke to this position. This "thinking matter"
passage "raised a storm of protest and discussion that lasted
right through to the last years of the eighteenth century"
(Yolton 1983: 17). One of the first of these protests came from Bishop
Stillingfleet and Locke's response helps us better understand
the thinking matter hypothesis. Starting with God's creation of
matter, Locke goes through a series of superadditions of motion to
matter, life and the excellencies of vegetation such as those of a
rose or a peach tree, then sense and spontaneous motion and the other
properties of an elephant. Then he notes that if there are no
objections to God performing these actions upon matter, why object to
the next step which is superadding the powers to matter to make a
thinking, intelligent material thing. Thus, superaddition seems to
involve the creation of organizations out of matter that have
particular functional powers characteristic of different kinds of
living things.



Locke and Collins discussed some of the responses to the thinking
matter passage that were published before Locke's death in 1704.
Locke's conjecture about thinking matter is, in effect, the
centerpiece of the debate between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins
between 1707 and 1708, although the issue was also discussed on the
continent. Still, as Ann Thompson writes in *Bodies of
Thought:* 



> 
> 
> Here I shall only observe that despite the undeniable importance of
> Locke's hypothesis and the arguments put forward in his second
> reply to Stillingfleet, they should not be seen as a starting point
> for speculations about the soul, but as part of an ongoing
> philosophical and theological discussion. While Locke's
> arguments probably provided a new stimulus for discussion, claims that
> his hypothesis constituted the sole impetus for the late seventeenth
> century materialistic works ignore the preceding theological debates.
> (Thompson 2008: 58) 
> 
> 
> 



There were some diverse strands to this debate.



The Catholic Church at the Fifth Lateran Council in 1553 had declared
the soul immaterial and therefore immortal. Philosophers were invited
to produce proof of the soul's immateriality. There was a
tradition going back to Plato that the soul is a unity without parts.
Presumably having no parts it cannot fall apart. The kind of substance
dualism that one finds in Descartes, for example, was intended to
distinguish humans from animals. In England, the new science was both
regarded suspiciously by some religious conservatives while its
proponents saw it as an ally of religion. In his will, Robert Boyle
provided for a series of lectures that would use the new science to
defend religious orthodoxy. These Boyle lectures were aimed at
defending religion against atheists, deists, Epicurean philosophers,
as well as Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers. One of Richard
Bently's sermons in 1692 was titled *Matter and Motion Cannot
Think*. Bently claimed that even God's omnipotence could not
produce a cognitive body (Thompson 2008: 61). This claim that there
was a limit to God's omnipotence was shocking to some. Samuel
Clarke gave the Boyle lecture two years in a row, 1704 and 1705, and
these were published together as *A Discourse Concerning the Being
and Attributes of God and the Obligations of Natural Religion and the
Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation*. It is quite
likely that Collins had read this work and so when he opposed Clarke,
he surely knew who and what philosophical positions he was dealing
with.



On the other side, the mechanical philosophy of Descartes, Mersenne
and Gassendi played a role on the materialist side of the debate.
Insofar as animals could be treated like machines, it became possible
for one to argue that humans were sufficiently like other animals that
they too could be treated as machines. Thus an immaterial soul could
be dispensed with. There were also medical treatises that suggested
that matter is active and that the soul dies with the body. There were
the works of Hobbes and Spinoza which argued for a materialistic
monism. In 1704 John Toland published his *Letters to Serena*
in which he argues that motion is essential to matter. Finally, there
was a Christian mortalist strand in Protestantism. One strand of these
Christian mortalists claimed to derive their mortalism from scripture
alone and urged that the immaterial soul was a Platonic invention that
had been foisted on Christianity and should be dispensed with. In
England, this movement can be traced back as far as William Tindale in
the sixteenth century and included such luminaries as Overton, Milton,
and Hobbes. Henry Dodwell, a well respected biblical scholar, was one
such figure in this tradition.


### 2.2 The Correspondence



The correspondence between Clarke and Collins took its rise from a
book published in 1706 by Henry Dodwell. Dodwell claimed on the basis
of various passages from the Bible that without divine intervention
the soul would perish at death. Clarke wrote a public refutation of
Dodwell's book. Besides rejecting Dodwell's interpretation
of scripture, Clarke gave a single argument to show that consciousness
could not be a property of a material system since the most plausible
reason, apart from appeals to scripture, for the soul being naturally
mortal is that it is material. Clarke claims 



> 
> 
> matter being a divisible substance, consisting always of
> separable--nay of actually separate and distinct parts--it
> is plain, unless it were essentially conscious--in which case
> every particle of matter must consist of innumerable separate and
> distinct consciousnesses--no system of it in any possible
> composition or division can be an individual conscious being. (Clarke
> 1738 [1928: 757]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 48) 
> 
> 
> 



Clarke went on to pose a thought experiment in which we are to imagine
"three or three hundred particles at a mile, or any given
distance, one from another" (ibid.). Clarke claims that this
collection of particles could not constitute one individual conscious
being. Then he has us supposes these particles brought together so as
to touch one another. 



> 
> 
> Will they, thereby, by any motion or composition whatever, become any
> whit less truly distinct beings than they were at the greatest
> distance? How, then, can their being disposed in any possible system,
> make them one individual conscious being? (ibid.) 
> 
> 
> 



Clarke's argument in effect denies that organization can play
any role in unifying parts into a whole. Clarke's argument,
without mentioning Locke by name, is a refutation of Locke's
thinking matter hypothesis.



Collins, writing to Dodwell concerning matters about which they
disagreed, noted that he would be happy to see Dodwell have the
liberty "to publish whatever he thinks fit" (Dybikowski
2011: 188). Collins then wrote a public "Letter to Mr.
Dodwell" in which he claimed to show that Clarke's
philosophical argument against the mortality of the soul was
inconclusive. Clarke responded with "A Defence of a Letter to
Mr. Dodwell". Over the next two years, Clarke wrote three more
defenses of his original letter to Henry Dodwell and Collins wrote
three replies. Each of these was longer than its predecessor. Clarke,
who became increasingly irritated as the debate continued, got the
final word in "The Fourth Defence of A Letter".



While the central issue of the correspondence is whether it is
possible for consciousness to inhere in a material system and thus for
matter to think, the discussion toward the end turned to other issues
such as free will and determinism and the adequacy of Collins'
account of personal identity. Rather than explain the Correspondence
in detail, what follows is a discussion of Collins' position in
respect to two central issues, that of emergent properties and
personal
 identity.[2]


#### 2.2.1 Clarke's categories



To give a materialist account of life and consciousness, Collins needs
to show that from lifeless and unthinking matter one can get life and
thought. In his "Letter to Dodwell" Collins claims that
there are material systems all about us whose parts do not have the
properties found in the whole. He gives the example of a rose that has
the power to produce its sweet scent in us, while the particles that
compose it individually do not have this power (Clarke 1738 [1928:
751]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 48-9). These material systems
provide models and analogies to understand how life and consciousness
can arise from lifeless and thoughtless particles. Thus, from the
beginning, Collins is arguing that consciousness is an emergent
property, i.e. a property had by the whole, but not by the parts that
compose that whole.



In his First Defence, Clarke responds by giving an argument to show
that there are no real emergent properties. He does this by giving an
enumeration of all of the kinds of properties. It turns out that there
are only three categories. These categories correspond roughly to the
primary, secondary and tertiary qualities of the mechanical philosophy
(Attfield 1977: 46). The correspondence is not precise because Clarke
claims to be categorizing *all properties,* not just properties
that belong to matter. Thus, he includes consciousness in the first
category, though on a different basis than the first category
properties of matter such as magnitude and motion. Clarke claims that
only properties of the first kind are real. Properties of the second
kind are 



> 
> 
> not *really Qualities* of the System, and evidently do not in
> any *proper Sense* belong to it, but are only *Effects*
> occasionally produced by it in some other Substance, and truly are
> Qualities or Modes of that other Substance in which they are
> produced.... (Clarke 1738 [1928: 759]; Clarke and Collins 2011:
> 56) 
> 
> 
> 



Heat, light, taste, and sound are examples of this class of
properties. Clarke claims that these properties are largely irrelevant
to the question about consciousness because they are modes of the
other substance in which they are produced. He claims, inaccurately
that Collins's example of the smell of a rose belongs to this
class. The properties of the third kind are fictional. They 



> 
> 
> are not *real Qualities* at all, residing in any subject, but
> *merely abstract Names* to express the Effects of some
> determinate Motions of certain streams of Matter.... (Clarke 1738
> [1928: 760]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 57) 
> 
> 
> 



The examples that Clarke gives of third category properties are
magnetism, electrical attractions, and gravity.



What conditions are required for belonging to Clarke's first
class? In respect to material wholes, Clarke is a reductionist who
holds that whatever real property one finds in the whole must be found
proportionally in the parts. The height of the bricks and the mortar
in a wall sum to the height of the wall as a whole. Thus, all the
properties in a material whole are compositions of the properties of
the parts. Call this Clarke's Composition Principle. Any
property of a material system that fails to conform to this pattern is
not a real property. It follows that emergent properties, properties
possessed by the whole but not by the parts, cannot be real. As a
result of his examination of the kinds of categories, Clarke claims
that all properties of a whole which are not proportionally present in
the parts belong in his third class, the class of fictional
properties. It follows that since consciousness is a real property it
cannot be an emergent property.



Since consciousness is a real property it must belong in
Clarke's first class of properties. This being so, it would seem
that it could not violate the Composition Principle. But
consciousness, on Clarke's account, is so strongly unified that
it cannot be either compounded or divided. This is why it cannot
belong to any material system. So, there must be a second sufficient
condition for belonging to Clarke's first category. Clarke
second sufficient condition is that 



> 
> 
> *an Individual Power*, properly and strictly
> speaking...can only *proceed from or reside in, an Individual
> Being*. (Clarke 1738 [1928: 750]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 58).
> 
> 
> 
> 



To be an individual power, Clarke tells us, a power must be truly
unitary, and thus not composed of parts. Call this the Individual
Power Principle. So, consciousness is an individual power, which
belongs to an individual being, the soul. The soul, too, is so unified
that it does not have parts. Magnitude, in contrast, satisfies the
Composition Principle but is not an individual power. This is because
the matter to which it belongs can always be divided, or more
precisely, actually is divided.



Underlying Clarke's categories and his rejection of the
possibility that wholes have properties not possessed by their parts
is a principle that from material properties such as magnitude,
motion, or solidity, only other material properties, or properties of
the same kind, may result. The same kind of restriction can be said to
apply to mental properties. Call this the Homogeneity Principle. This
Principle, in turn, is related to what has been called an heirloom
theory of causality. The idea here is that whatever ends up in an
effect, must have been in the cause of that effect. Otherwise one gets
contradictions such as that something has come from nothing, or there
is more of a given property in the whole than there is in the parts,
and so
 on.[3]
 Later, in "A Third Defense of an Argument" Clarke calls
Collins's attention to the fact that in his proof for the
existence of God in Book IV of *An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding*, Locke invokes the Homogeneity Principle to argue
that an eternal, immaterial thinking being could not arise from matter
(Clarke 1738 [1928: 837]; Clarke and Collins, 2011: 170-171).
Clarke holds that this puts an end to Locke's claim that God
could as easily make matter organized in the right way to think. We
will return to this when we consider the outcome of the debate.



Marleen Rozemond, in her article of 2008, writes that Clarke's
position is that something made out of matter can never constitute a
genuine individual because it is infinitely divisible, and so lacks
the required unity. She notes the similarity on this score of
Clarke's position with that of Leibniz (Rozemond 2008: 175). One
might think that a whole, at least one that obeyed the Composition
Principle, would be a real individual being. But, it turns out that
this is not the case. The magnitude of the collected particles is a
real property but such a whole is not a genuine individual. The only
real individuals have no parts. So, while Locke and Collins agree with
Clarke that matter is infinitely divisible, they disagree on the role
that organization plays in producing real, unified wholes that have
parts. Clarke holds that organization cannot unify such wholes into
individuals, and Locke and Collins hold that it can, both at a time
and over time; notably in cases of living things, where the matter
composing that individual changes while the organization
persists. Clarke holds that as soon as a whole loses or gains a single
particle it becomes a different substance.



In his "Reply to Mr. Clarke's Defense of A Letter to Mr.
Dodwell" Collins challenges the enumeration of categories of
properties with which Clarke seeks to prove that consciousness cannot
belong to a material system (Clarke 1738: Vol. 3: 751; 767-70;
Clarke and Collins 2011: 69-72). He continues to maintain that
consciousness is a real emergent property. He also challenges the
Individual Power Principle.


#### 2.2.2 Real emergent properties



In responding to Clarke's Defense, Collins claims that Clarke
has not properly enumerated the kinds of properties. He claims that
Clarke needs to show that his enumeration is complete but has not done
so. There may be powers unknown to Clarke that need to be included in
order to give a complete enumeration of the properties and powers of
matter. In order to effectively defend his materialist account of
consciousness, however, Collins points out a new class of properties
that are arguably real and that are emergent and do not fit
Clarke's composition model for real properties of matter.



Collins' chief strategy for showing that there are real emergent
properties is likely derived from Locke's claim in the Chapter
"Of Identity and Diversity" in the *Essay* that
living things are individuated not by the matter that composes them at
a time but by their functional organization (Locke 1975: ii. xxvii
3-4: 330-331; see also Attfield 1977:
 52).[4]



Collins begins by considering the different roles that matter and
organization may play in producing all the different kinds of things
in the universe. He starts with the hypothesis that different parts of
matter are different from one another. If this is so the particles of
matter may work in the way different parts of a clock work--the
parts of the clock are different from one another and consequently
have different powers. The whole to which they contribute will have
powers that none of the parts have (Clarke 1738 [1928: 768]; Clarke
and Collins 2011: 72). The second hypothesis Collins puts forth is
that all matter is the same and therefore completely interchangeable.
Collins prefers this hypothesis because it makes it easy to argue that
all of the differences between the various kinds of things are a
result of their organization. The distinction between matter and its
organization is useful for Collins' purposes because the
properties that result from the organization of matter are different
from the properties of the particles. As Collins notes:



> 
> 
> ...if the powers of a System of Matter may intirely cease upon
> the least Alteration of a Part of that System, it is evident that the
> Powers of the System inhere not in the Parts in the same Sense with
> Magnitude and Motion: for divide and vary the Parts of Matter as much
> as you will, there will be Magnitude and may be Motion; but divide or
> vary the least Part of the Eye, and the Power of contributing to the
> Act of Vision is intirely at an end. (Clarke 1738 [1928: 768]; Clarke
> and Collins 2011: 72)
> 
> 
> 



The organization of the eye is essential to its proper functioning and
indeed to it being an eye at all (Clarke 1738 [1928: 769]; Clarke and
Collins 2011: 72). It is an emergent property. Collins does not
explicitly make the point that since the organization of the eye is an
essential property it must also be a real property. Perhaps he thought
this obvious. Clarke's response was to claim that the power of
the eye to see is a fictional and not a real property (Clarke 1738:
790]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 100).



Serious engagement with emergent properties did not really take place
until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There are now a variety
of different versions of emergentism, both scientific and
philosophical, many of which bear hardly any resemblance to Collins
account of properties had by wholes which are not had by the parts of
that whole. However, in an article "Aggregativity: Reductive
Heuristics for Finding Emergence" William Wimsatt describes a
version of the distinction between emergent and non-emergent
properties, coming from Complexity theory, that both improves on and
articulates the insight that makes Collins' account so
interesting, though Wimsatt was unaware of the historical precedent
(Wimsatt 1997 [2008]). That insight is that properties that are a
result of the organization of parts are essentially emergent. Even if
they can ultimately be explained, this will not change their status as
emergent properties (see also Uzgalis 2018: 272).


#### 2.2.3 Personal Identity



The topic of personal identity comes up as early as Clarke's
Second Defence of an Argument because Clarke objects to consciousness
being an emergent property of the brain and also objects to the brain
being the bearer or seat of personal identity (Clarke 1738 [1928:
787]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 96). Correspondingly, there are
important connections between Collins' account of emergent
properties and his account of personal identity. Consciousness, for
Collins is both an emergent property and constitutive of personal
identity. In addition, Collins claims that because of the mind-body
problem, dualist views do not serve the ends and purposes of religion.
Clarke replies that it is Collins' materialist views that not
only are useless, but have dangerous consequences for the ends and
purposes of religion. Many of these consequences have to do with
personal identity.



What are the connections between Collins' account of emergent
properties and his account of personal identity? The most important
connection is the Lockean distinction between the matter that composes
a material thing at any given time and the organization of matter. The
distinction comes from Locke's account of the individuation of
masses of matter and living things in his chapter "Of Identity
and Diversity" in Book II of the *Essay Concerning Human
Understanding*. A mass of matter is individuated by the particles
that compose it, however organized. If the mass gains or loses a
single particle it becomes a different substance. Living things, by
contrast, are individuated by their functional organization (Locke
1690: II. xxvii 3 [1975: 330). Collins' summary of his views on
identity and personal identity make it clear that he agrees almost
completely with Locke's account of identity and the
individuation of masses, living things and persons (Clarke 1738 [1928:
875]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 231-232). But Clarke insists that
in order for something to remain the same, it must remain the same
substance. In the case of material things like oaks, this means that
the matter that composes it must remain the same or it is not the same
oak. Only atoms, souls and God fulfill this same substance condition
for Clarke. So, oaks are only identical in a fictional sense. In
addition, it is not possible for any entity to have the same
properties it had previously if its substance has changed, because it
is not possible to transfer properties from one substance to another
(Clarke 1738 [1928: 798]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 113). So, just as
Clarke holds that emergent properties are fictional, so he holds that
any identity not based on identity of substance is fictional. The
clash between the two over the metaphysical importance of organization
is fundamental to their different views of emergent properties,
identity, and personal identity.



Collins accepts Locke's revolutionary view that consciousness
and not the substantial soul is the bearer of personal identity. Again
agreeing with Locke, he regards memory as crucial to personal identity
and feelings of pleasure and pain as important concomitants of
consciousness. Still, Collins' account of personal identity is
not exactly the same as Locke's. Locke's account is
officially neutral in regard to whether "the substance that
thinks in us" is material or immaterial, simple or compounded
(Locke 1690: II, xxvii. 17 [1975: 341). Collins, by contrast, is
giving an account that makes "the substance that thinks in
us" material and compounded. But the neutrality of Locke's
account of personal identity ought to allow Collins to adopt it
without significant change, and this is what he does. Collins also
defends the view against attacks addressed to the concept of memory
involved. Clarke holds that Collins' account of memory violates
a basic principle of Clarke's substantialist account of
identity--that properties cannot be transferred from one
substance to another. So, if the particles of the brain have changed,
a memory cannot be a veridical memory of that new substance. Locke and
Collins,by contrast hold that representations of events can be
transferred from one substance to another and these constitute genuine
memories (Clarke 1738 [1028: 787]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 96).



Collins' response to this is to claim that annexing
consciousness to the brain explains the phenomena of consciousness far
better than positing an unchanging immaterial substance. There is also
a perfectly reasonable sense for properties to be transferred from one
substance to another. In his Reflections on Mr. Clarke's Second
Defence he writes:



> 
> 
> For if we utterly forget, or cease to be conscious of having done many
> things in former Parts of our Lives which we certainly did, as much as
> any of those which we are conscious that we have done; and if in fact
> we do by degrees forget everything which we do not revive by frequent
> Recollection, and by again and again imprinting our decaying Ideas;
> and if there be in a determinate Time a partial or total flux of
> Particles in our Brains: What can better account for out total
> Forgetfulness of some things, our partial Forgetfulness of others,
> than to suppose that the Substance of the Brain in constant Flux?
> (Clarke 1738 [1928: 787 and 809]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 130)
> 
> 
> 



As for the problem of transferring consciousness from one substance to
another he writes:



> 
> 
> I will suppose myself conscious at Forty of having been carried to a
> Market or Fair at Five Years old, without any Particle of Matter about
> me, the same which I had at that Age: now in order to retain the
> Consciousness of that Action, it is necessary to revive the Idea of it
> before any considerable Flux of Particles, (otherwise I must totally
> lose the Memory of it (as I do of several things done in my Childhood)
> and by reviving the Idea of that Action, I imprint afresh the
> Consciousness of having done that Action, by which the Brain has a
> lively an Impression of Consciousness (though it be not entirely
> composed of the same Particles) as it had the day after it did the
> Action.... (ibid.)
> 
> 
> 



This account of how memory works nicely fits the model of the
preservation of an organization through a change of matter that Locke
uses to explain the identity of living things. However, Clarke does
not accept this explanation because he holds that only a theory of the
substantial soul can provide the underpinnings for an account of
veridical memory (Clarke 1738 [1928: 787; Clarke and Collins 2011:
180).


### 2.3 Evaluating the Clarke Collins Correspondence



One might ask who won the debate? In the eighteenth century, the
answer largely depended on whether you were a dualist or a
materialist. If you were a dualist you saw Clarke as the winner. If
you were a materialist you saw Collins as the winner. In her 2009
article focusing on Collins' emergentism, Marleen Rozemond gives
an account of the way she thinks the dialogue proceeded and concludes
that Clarke was the victor. She holds that Collins, in fact, conceded
a crucial point and as a result subsequently changed his position.



In order to understand why she thinks this we need to grasp the
distinction Collins makes between numerical and generical powers in
his "Reflections on Mr. Clarke's Second Defence of his
Letter to Mr Dodwell". He writes: 



> 
> 
> By *numerical powers* I understand such powers as motions and
> figures of the same species. The power of the eye to contribute
> towards seeing is a species of motion, and the roundness of a body is
> a species of figure. By *generical powers* I understand all the
> several species of *numerical powers*--as motion signifies
> all the various species of motion, and figure all the various species
> of figure. (Clarke 1738 [1928: 805-806]; Clarke and Collins
> 2011: 124-125) 
> 
> 
> 



Rozemond notes that after making this distinction Collins admits that
all generical powers conform to the Homogeneity Principle. In her 2008
article, Rozemond claims that Locke did not accept that emergent
properties are possible, because in his proof for the existence of God
in Chapter 10 of Book IV of *An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding* he invokes the Homogeneity Principle to show that
an eternal and Intelligent Being could not be created by matter
(Rozemond 2008:163). In fact, Clarke draws Collins' attention to
this very passage in the Essay (Clarke 1738 [1928: 837]; Clarke and
Collins 2011: 170-171). If this were the only reference to the
Homogeneity Principle in the Essay it would be difficult to see how
Locke could also maintain that it would be possible for God to cause
matter to think even if it were arranged in the right
way. Clarke's point to Collins is that on this basis he should
give up the idea that thinking matter is possible. I take it that this
is Rozemond's point as well and she holds that in saying that
the Homogeneity Principle applies to all generical powers, Collins is
conceding the crucial point.



Rozemond notes that there is one other way that Collins could have
proceeded. 



> 
> 
> One way to reject Clarke's position is to reject his qualitative
> constraints on causation. One could do this by becoming a Humean about
> causation. Collins did not do this and the world had to wait another
> while for Hume. (Rozemond 2009: 186-7) 
> 
> 
> 



So, on her view, Collins gives up the possibility of emergent
properties and does not have the kind of empiricist theory of
causality that Hume has. And there seem to be no other alternatives.
She claims that after this Collins substantively changes his position
by suggesting that consciousness is a mode of motion. She takes this
to be a quite unattractive version of mind-brain identity theory
(Rozemond 2009: 187).



There is, however an alternative view of how the Correspondence ends.
This view is that Collins has not changed his position, or at least
not changed it in the way Rozemond suggests. He is conceding nothing
to Clarke. In introducing the distinction between numerical and
generical powers he writes that 



> 
> 
> having set forth the entire strength of what can be said against my
> instances, an answer to it will set this dispute in a clearer light
> than possibly it has hitherto been, and perhaps give Mr.
> *Clarke* particular satisfaction with relation to the
> inconclusiveness of hiss argument, by detecting what I conceive has
> previously imposed upon him. (Clarke 1738: [1928: 805], Clarke and
> Collins 2011: 124) 
> 
> 
> 



His response to Clarke's attack on his examples is to make the
distinction between numerical and generical properties. This is hardly
the words of someone who is about to concede the decisive point being
debated.



There are a couple of possibilities about what Collins has in mind for
numerical powers. One is that numerical powers would include both
powers that conform to the Composition Principle (figure and motion),
and powers that do not (the power of the eye to see). Generical
powers, by contrast, simply treat powers that are numerically
different (such as different kinds of motion) just as motions. Thus,
all material powers, treated as generical, conform to the Homogeneity
Principle (Clarke 1738 [1928: 806-807]; Clarke and Collins 2011:
28-30).



The second possibility, which is what the examples Collins gives
really suggest, is that all numerical powers are emergent and do not
conform to the Composition Principle. All generical powers, on the
other hand, do conform to the Homogeneity Principle. If the second
interpretation is true, Collins thinks that all of Clarke's
first category powers, or at least his favorite ones, can be treated
as wholes that have properties not had by the parts. This would indeed
be a change of position, but in just the opposite direction to the one
that Rozemond supposes. But, even on this second interpretation, all
generical properties conform to the Homogeneity Principle. So, why
isn't Collins in trouble in the way Rozemond claims? The answer
is that the use of the Homogeneity Principle in Locke's proof
for the existence of God is not the only reference to that principle
in Locke's Essay.



In replying to Clarke in "An Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third
Defense of A Letter to Mr. Dodell", Collins points out to Clarke
that Locke had distinguished two situations involving the Homogeneity
Principle (Clarke 1738 [1928: 868]; Clarke and Collins 2011:
220-221). In the proof for the existence of God as an immaterial
intelligence, the Principle applies in full force to show that matter
could not create an eternal, immaterial, intelligent being. The second
case is the creation of human thought. In this second case, Locke
supposes that an omnipotent, immaterial God exists and that God,
because He is omnipotent, could violate the Principle of Homogeneity.
In fact, Locke claims that God has in fact done so - in the case
of secondary properties, such as color and sound, where what is
produced in the mind bears no resemblance to the causes of those ideas
in the material world or motions in the brain. Thus, Locke holds,
there is good reason to think that God could produce thinking
matter. He is explicit that there is no contradiction between the two
cases, knowing as he did that some people thought his use of the
Homogeneity Principle in the proof for the existence of God ruled out
the possibility of thinking matter (Locke 1690: IV. iii. 6 [1975:
541). Collins adopts this position as well (Clarke 1738 [1928: 837];
Clarke and Collins 2011: 170-171; see also Uzgalis 2018:
270-271). If this is right Collins can continue to maintain that
emergent properties are possible as they are all numerical properties
and so need not conform to the Homogeneity Principle and actually
exist and that God's omnipotence allows him to make matter duly
arranged to think. Clarke, in his next Defense, rejects both
Collins' distinction between numerical and generical powers and
the Lockean distinction concerning the Homogeneity Principle (Clarke
1738 [1928: 829-830]; Clarke and Collins: 158-159). He
claims in respect to the Homogeneity principle that the reasoning is
the same in both cases. Clarke's view is that even an omnipotent
God cannot violate the Homogeneity Principle (Clarke 1738: 901; Clarke
and Collins 2011: 268-269). As a consequence, he holds that
emergent properties are not possible, nor can matter think. So. on
this alternative view of who won the debate, if the criteria for
victory is a concession by one side or the other, the Correspondence
ends not in a victory for Clarke, but in a stand-off. 



In evaluating the controversy, one would have to say that of all the
encounters between the Newtonians and the free thinkers, the one
between Collins and Clarke was the most philosophically significant
and influential. O'Higgins holds that Collins is important to us
mainly because he defends an early version of materialism. While there
is surely some truth to this, O'Higgins is clearly damning
Collins with faint praise. What we should recognize is that Collins
was indeed a pioneer in trying to show that consciousness is a real
emergent property of the brain and in this regard certainly showed
much more originality than O'Higgins gives him credit for (see
 note 2).
 One need only compare Locke's claim that we would need
revelation to understand how matter could think and his use of the
term 'superaddition' with Collins account of emergent
properties to see what an improvement in explanatory power the latter
has over the former. O'Higgins also claims that Collins'
arguments are not very good. This also does not give Collins enough
credit. It is true that Collins does give some arguments that are not
very good. On the other hand, Collins forced Clarke to clarify his
position in a number of respects. He also uncovered a number of weak
points in Clarke's position. Clarke's poor treatment of
Collins' example of the power of a rose to produce a sweet smell
in us is one example. He answered as if Collins was talking about the
smell of the rose and claims that this secondary quality belongs in
his second class of properties. But Collins properly objects that he
was talking about the organization of the particles of the
rose--the cause of this effect, and not the effect on us.
Clarke's response is weak. One of Collins' strongest
points was his critique of Clarke's doctrine that though the
soul is immaterial it is extended (Vailati 1993). One can also see how
much pressure Collins is applying to Clarke's system as the
number of properties in Clarke's third class--fictional
properties--continues to mount in the course of the
correspondence.



In respect to the central issues of the debate, Collins is struggling
to articulate a materialist and empiricist metaphysics that can
compete with the well developed dualist, *a priori* metaphysics
that Clarke deploys. As Barresi and Martin comment: 



> 
> 
> His faltering, but often successful attempts to reformulate
> traditional metaphysical issues empirically, embodies the birth pangs
> of a new approach. (Martin and Barresi 2000: 51) 
> 
> 
> 



But perhaps most strikingly, Collins is attempting to defend a
doctrine of emergent properties that does not become prominent in
English philosophy until Mill's *System of Logic* (1843)
and the twentieth century British Emergentism movement.


## 3. Determinism and Free Will


### 3.1 Background



Collins deals in passing with determinism and freedom of the will in
the 1707-08 correspondence with Samuel Clarke and in his 1707
book *An Essay concerning the Use of Reason*. His *A
Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Liberty* of 1717 is entirely
devoted to the issue. From the beginning, Collins is a determinist
with a compatibilist account of free action (Clarke 1738 [1928: 872];
Clarke and Collins: 226-227). Clarke attacked Collins'
determinism in the 1707-08 correspondence. He also reviewed the
1717 book and defended a doctrine of libertarian free will as he had
in the earlier correspondence.



Since the nature of human choices and actions are central to debates
about free will and determinism there is a close connection between
positions about these issues and positions about consciousness and
personal identity. The kind of determinism that Collins advocates is a
natural extension of his materialist, empirical, and naturalistic
account of consciousness. In his account of consciousness, Collins
makes the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain the most basic
motives of action. This makes happiness and misery necessary
concomitants of consciousness, and thus conscious beings are endowed
with a desire for happiness. This is true as much of animals as it is
of human beings and accounts for a large number of similarities in the
behavior of humans and animals. Collins holds that if the behavior of
animals is determined, then that of humans must be as well. 


### 3.2 Determinism in Collins' early works



In the Clarke Collins correspondence of 1707-08 Collins claims
that Clarke's argument for dualism is useless to religion and
morality because of the problem of explaining how the immaterial mind
and the material body interact. One of Clarke's counter-charges
is that Collins' materialism is not just useless but dangerous
to religion and morality because it implies a determinism that is
destructive of religion and morality (Clarke 1738 [1928: 831], Clarke
and Collins: 192).



Collins claims that human action is caused in much the same way as the
actions of clocks. Both are necessary agents, though the causes that
produce the action, in either case, are very different. 



> 
> 
> Both are necessarily determined in their Actions: the one by the
> Appearances of Good and Evil, the other by a Weight or Spring. (Clarke
> 1738 [1928: 872]; Clarke and Collins 2011: 226) 
> 
> 
> 



Collins also attacks the free will position. He holds that the same
causes will always produce the same effects and claims that the free
will explanation of being able to do otherwise violates this basic
principle of causal explanations (Clarke 1738 [1928: 873 and 874];
Clarke and Collins 2011: 227 and 230).



Collins also expressed determinist views in his first
book--*An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason*, 1707. He
does this in the context of the problem of reconciling God's
foreknowledge with human free will. As O'Higgins puts it: 



> 
> 
> He solved the problem to his own satisfaction by saying that all
> things, including human choices, are determined in their causes and as
> such can be foreseen by an all-knowing God. (O'Higgins 1976: 6)
> 
> 
> 
> 



This view also plays a role in Collins' 1710 critique of
Archbishop King's views about the problem of evil and the
epistemological status of the attributes of God. King claimed that
God's attributes, including his foreknowledge of events, was
analogical. In the case of God's foreknowledge, he did this to
avoid contradictions between God's knowing what was to come and
the contingency of events and human free will. Collins is content to
reject human free will and to suppose that 'foreknowledge'
has a univocal meaning when used with reference to God or humans.


### 3.3 *A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty*, 1717



At the beginning of his discussion of Collins and determinism Jacopo
Agnesina remarks: "Determinism is the aspect of Anthony Collins
thought that has always met with the most success" (Agnesina
2018: 97). In *A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human
Liberty* Collins briefly states his position. He rejects the view
that there is any freedom from necessity and claims that insofar as
there is human freedom it is "liberty or freedom from outward
impediment to action". Such freedom is compatible with
necessity. Collins holds that every action has been caused and must
necessarily have occurred. The future is as much determined as the
past. He then gives six arguments for this form of determinism.



The first of Collins' arguments has to do with experience.
Defenders of free will hold that the experience of even ordinary
people shows that they choose freely. Collins' response is much
the same as that of Hobbes and Spinoza. He claims that those who say
such things are either not attending to, or not seeing, the causes of
their actions. Collins goes on to claim that some defenders of free
will admit that the issues are tangled and not to be resolved by
appeals to vulgar experience (Collins 1717: 12-31 [1976:
60-69]).



William Rowe notes that Collins and Clarke share a volitional theory
of action. Rowe describes the theory in this way: 



> 
> 
> According to this theory, actions are of two sorts: thoughts and
> motions of the body. What makes a thought or bodily motion an action
> is its being preceded by a certain act of will (volitions) which bring
> about the thought or motion. Volitions, then, are "action
> starters". (Rowe 1987: 54) 
> 
> 
> 



Rowe also notes that Collins and Clarke share the assumption that if a
volition is causally determined then the person doing the act does not
have free will (Rowe 1987: 53). Rowe says that as the two antagonists
agree on these points, they play little or no part in the debate. But
they do explain the strategy that Collins uses to argue that
experience actually shows that we are determined. He examines
experience under four topics relating to choice and action: (1)
Perception of Ideas; (2) Judging of Propositions; (3) Willing; and (4)
Doing as we will. Collins argues that each of these is causally
determined.



He holds that perception of ideas of sensation and reflection are not
voluntary. So, perception can hardly be free. In respect to judging,
he claims that we judge in terms of how things appear to us and that
we can't change these appearances. In respect to the will, he
claims that there are two questions to be considered. One is whether
we are at liberty to will or not. The second is whether we are at
liberty to will "one or the other of two or more objects".
In respect to the first question, he claims that Locke made a mistake
in holding that people are at liberty to will because they can suspend
willing. So, Collins holds that Locke's answer to the first
question would be affirmative. Collins claims that suspense of willing
is as much an act of will as any other. So, his answer is negative. In
respect to the second question, Collins argues for a value determinism
that makes the answer to the second question negative as well. In
defining willing, he remarks: "Willing or preferring is the same
with respect to good and evil, that judging is with respect to truth
or falsehood". So, if something seems better than the
alternatives we will choose it. Collins is thus a moral determinist
who holds that we must do what seems best to us. In giving his
negative answer to his second question, Collins is also rejecting the
claim that we could have done otherwise in cases where we have decided
which of the alternative choices is best (Collins 1717: 31-40
[1976: 69-73]). Collins then proceeds to consider cases where we
can see no difference between the objects we are to choose among,
e.g., which of two eggs we will take. Collins' response is
that:



> 
> 
> It is not enough to render things equal to the will, that they are
> equal or alike in themselves. All the various modifications of the
> man, his opinions, prejudices, temper, habit, and circumstances, are
> to be taken in and considered as causes of the election no less than
> the objects without us among which we chuse; and these will ever
> incline or determine our wills, and make the choice we do make,
> preferable to us, though the external objects of our choice are ever
> so much alike to each other. (Collins 1717: 47 [1976: 77])
> 
> 
> 



If one were truly indifferent one simply would not choose. But once
there is a will to choose, the cascade of causes that leads to action
will determine the choice one way or the other. What Collins means by
"doing as we will" is what we do consequent to willing.
Here again, he finds no freedom from necessity. We do what we have
willed unless some external impediment or intervening cause hinders us
from doing so. Finally, he compares the actions of animals to those of
men. He claims that while animals are supposed to be necessary agents
and humans free agents, there is no perceivable difference between
their actions that would allow us to make this distinction (Collins
1717: 53-57 [1976: 80-82]).



Collins' second argument is that man is a necessary agent
because all his actions have a beginning. He holds that whatever has a
beginning has a cause and all causes are necessary. Collins (as he had
in the Clarke Collins controversy) also rejects the proposition that
the same causes could produce different effects. Thus Collins rejects
the doctrine of free will because it violates the basic principle of
causal explanations. The third argument claimed that liberty is an
imperfection. Going back to judging propositions, Collins points out
that if we were free, we would be able to judge probable what is
improbable, and so on. This is the analog of moral determinism to the
epistemic realm. Just as we are not free to knowingly choose the worse
over the better, we cannot affirm that what seems improbable to us is
probable. If we could we would be worse off than we are. The fourth
argument is that liberty is inconsistent with God's
foreknowledge. This is again similar to the view that Hobbes held and
repeats the assertions of Collins' first book *An Essay
concerning the Use of Reason*. The fifth is that if man were not a
necessary agent, and determined by pleasure and pain, there would be
no foundation for rewards and punishments. The sixth is that if a man
were not a necessary agent he would be ignorant of morality and have
no motive to practice it. These last two arguments make the point that
causality is necessary for the operation of morality in the world, and
to introduce a causeless free will is to make the teaching of morality
or its motivation by punishment or reward pointless (Collins 1717:
57-108 [1976: 82-108]).



James Harris and Jacopo Agnesina have both argued that the *An
Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty* was in fact a response to Dr.
Clarke and rational theology. They claim that Collins was attempting
to demonstrate that determinism follows from Clarke's first
principles (Agnesina 2011, 2018: 105; Harris 2005: 58). Agnesina has
also been at pains to argue that Collins' determinism is a
logical and not just a causal determinism.



Agnesina characterizes the distinction between these two kinds of
determinism in this way. Causal determinists maintain: 



> 
> 
> ...that present and future events are determined causally by
> their antecedents. This theory has its roots in the principle of
> causality or the *principle of sufficient reason*: all events
> have a sufficient cause that determines them. Thus causal determinism
> excludes events that arise *ex abrupto*, but without stating
> that this is the only possible and conceivable world: unrealized
> possibilities exist that, though they are not logically contradictory,
> cannot come about because they are incompatible with *the law of
> nature*, that is with the causal chain of events of this world.
> Necessitarianism strengthens causal determinism from just this latter
> standpoint: all unrealized possibilities are excluded and it is held
> that the current law of nature is the only possible one. (Agnesina
> 2018: 98)
> 
> 
> 



In this regard, he thinks Collin' position is that of a logical
determinist, and so close to that of Spinoza. O'Higgins claimed
that it was possible that Collins did not understand the Spinozistic
implications of his position (Collins 1717 [1976: 45 note 114]).
O'Higgins seems to be suggesting that Collins, if he read
Spinoza's  *Ethics*, might have been confused by the
book, even though Collins had also read the critiques of Spinoza by
Pierre Bayle and G. W. Leibniz. Agnesina counters that even if Collins
had not read the *Ethics*, he had read the critiques of Spinoza
by Bayle and Leibniz and that these critics of Spinoza had clearly
spelled out the implications of the kind of logical determinism that
Collins seems perfectly willing to adopt (Agnesina 2018:
120-125). One problem with taking Collins to be a logical
determinist is that Collins is a compatibilist, thus regarding freedom
as freedom from outside obstruction. But it would seem that while
compatibilism is possible under causal determinism; it is not under
logical determinism. But, Hobbes too claimed to be a compatibilist and
had the same kind of tendencies towards logical determinism that
Collins has.



Interestingly, there was only one response to Collins' book in
England. Samuel Clarke reviewed it and argued that the notion of a
'necessary agent' was incoherent, for to be an agent one
must be active and Collins' position was that the humans are
completely passive and thus (in Clarke's sense) not agents at
all. Clarke charges that in discussing being able to do otherwise,
Collins fails to distinguish between physical and moral necessity (see
Harris 2005: 59). Clarke also complained that Collins treated
perception as actions, when in fact, perception is passive (Clarke
1738 [1928: 722]). Clarke develops his own account of free will
arguing that motives, pleasures and pains, reasons and arguments, are
simply occasions for the self-moving power that is active to freely
determine action. What we have again is a competing set of
explanations for the same phenomena. It appears that Clarke failed to
take a number of Collins' arguments seriously, because the free
will arguments being refuted were not his arguments.



In a series of letters, Collins discussed Clarke's review of his
book with his long time friend and collaborator Pierre Desmaizeaux. He
had written up a reply. Eventually, however, Collins concluded that
Clarke had been threatening him with civil action, and that to reply
would provide Clarke with the opportunity to do so (Dybikowski 2011:
260-1, 269 and 281). Consequently, Collins made no reply to
Clarke's review.



In 1729 a short book, *A Dissertation of Liberty and
Necessity*, with the initials A.C. on the title page, was
published. For a number of reasons O'Higgins holds that Collins
is not the author of this work. O'Higgins first reason for
rejecting Collins' authorship is that the book treats the
substance of the soul as unknown--a Lockean doctrine that Collins
had rejected. O'Higgins also cites contemporary reviews that
claim the arguments of the book are weak compared to the
*Inquiry*. Jacopo Agnesina agrees with O'Higgins that the
work is not by Collins and gives a full discussion of the argument
over attribution (Agnesina 2018: 125-132, see also Harris 2005:
60). Still while making claims that Collins would not make about the
soul and substance, the arguments are certainly consistent with the
determinist position that Collins was holding in the earlier work. The
author also takes into account at least one of Clarke's
criticisms of the *Inquiry*.



The author of *A Dissertation* remarks that he will 



> 
> 
> attempt to solve the Point of Free Will, by tracing the progress of
> the Soul through all its Operations which we are conscious of, and
> examining in each whether "tis Active or Passive".
> (Collins 1729: 1) 
> 
> 
> 



The point is that at every stage in the process, from perception to
action, we are passive. The author apparently accepted Clarke's
point in his review of Collins' *Inquiry* that perception
is not an action, for he calls it not an 'action' but an
'operation.' The author explicitly takes up Clarke's
views when he argues that we are passive in judgment. He quotes Clarke
at length. Clarke holds that judgment is passive but distinguishes
between judging and acting. The author continues: 



> 
> 
> But I conceive the doctor here begs the Question, by asserting the
> Self-motive Power in the Soul without proving it, and then reasons
> from it as granted to him. (1729: 6) 
> 
> 
> 



The author of *A Dissertation* thus returns to Clarke a charge
that Clarke had made about Collins in his 1717 review of *A
Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty*.


## 4. Collins, Deism and Freethinking



The seventeenth and early eighteenth century in England saw a
rationalist treatment of theology that spanned many competing groups
from the Latitudinarians to the Dissenters to the Deists. Samuel
Hefelbower in *The Relation of John Locke to English Deism*
remarks that among the progressives--theologians, philosophers
and deists--all accepted a rationalistic religion. The question
then becomes what exactly is the role of reason vis a vis
revelation. The discussion of the relation of reason to revelation
goes back at least to Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas--that is
to the scholastic authorities. Albert held that reason has a role to
play in religion, but there are questions where philosophy has no
final answer and revelation must decide. Revelation is above reason
but not contrary to it. Thomas has a similar position (Hefelbower
1918: 47). Locke holds that reason is responsible for determining what
counts as a genuine revelation. Locke also holds the view that there
is revelation that tells us about things above reason but not contrary
to it. 



> 
> 
> Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against GOD, and thereby lost
> their first happy state: And that the dead shall rise, and live again:
> These, and the like, being beyond the Discovery of Reason, are purely
> matters of Faith, with which Reason has directly, nothing to do.
> (Locke 1690: IV. xviii. 7. [1975: 694]) 
> 
> 
> 



The Deists tend to hold a more radical view than the one that Locke
advocates.



Samuel Clarke in his Boyle lectures of 1704 distinguishes four grades
of deists. First there were those who acknowledged a future life and
other doctrines of natural religion. Second were those who while
denying a future life, admitted the moral role of the deity. Third are
those who acknowledged providence in natural religion, but not in
morality. And finally, those who denied providence altogether. Where
does Collins fit, in these grades of deism? According to
O'Higgins: 



> 
> 
> In his books, Collins came to emphasize the part that morality should
> play in religion and to assert the importance of natural religion.
> (O'Higgins 1970: 40) 
> 
> 
> 



Collins claims to believe in a future life (if not natural
immortality). Collins rejects Revelation. So, if O'Higgins is
right, Collins fits Clarke's first grade of deists.



David Berman has disputed this view, arguing that Collins is, in fact,
an atheist (Berman 1988: 801). Jacopo Agnesina in his book *The
Philosophy of Anthony Collins: Free Thought and Atheism* strongly
agrees with Berman. Agnesina's strategy is to take the whole of
Collins' work and by putting the pieces together makes clear
what the parts only partially display--Collins atheism (Agnesina
2018: 192).


### 4.1 *An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason*, 1707



*An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason*, Collins' first
book, was published anonymously in 1707 a little before his *Letter
to Mr. Dodwell.* The main thrust of the book is to reject
religious mysteries. Collins starts his approach to the issues of
religion and reason along the same lines that Locke does. He defines
reason as "that faculty of the Mind, whereby it perceives the
truth, Falsehood, Probability or Improbability of Propositions"
(1707 [1984: 3]). Propositions consist of words "which stand for
Ideas concerning which some agreement is affirm'd or
deny'd" (1707 [1984: 3-4]). Thus he accepts
Locke's definition of knowledge. He also distinguishes in the
way Locke does intuitive, demonstrative and probable truths, and
treats claims about revelation as probable propositions that largely
derive from testimony. Perhaps one diversion from Locke is that
Collins distinguishes between two different kinds of probability. The
stronger kind resembles demonstration but the connection between ideas
is merely probable. The weaker kind of probability is a testimony.
Collins' position is that a person is not expected to believe
anything that is not comprehensible by the human intellect. So, if
terms take on meanings that cannot be understood, humans cannot be
expected to believe them.



O'Higgins sees a strong affinity between Collins' book and
John Toland's *Christianity Not Mysterious*, which had
been published in 1696. He quotes Toland's remark that:



> 
> 
> We hold that reason is the only foundation of all
> certitude...that nothing reveal'd, whether as to its manner
> or to its existence, is more exempted from its disquisitions, than the
> ordinary phenomena of nature...that there is nothing in the
> gospel contrary to or above it.
> 
> 
> 



O'Higgins claims that this is very much the position that
Collins is taking in the *Essay*. In *An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding* Locke allowed that there were some truths
that were above reason but compatible with it. Some scholars regard
this as a mere verbal commitment to truths above reason, while others
regard it as substantive. What is clear is that Locke would not accept
truths above and contrary to reason. On this point, Locke, Toland, and
Collins are in complete agreement. Toland, however, has a more radical
position than Locke in that he rejects truths above reason, even where
these truths are compatible with reason (see Woolhouse 2007: 372).
Thus Toland would not accept the story of the rebellion of the angels
or the claim that the dead shall rise. Collins, on the other hand,
seems to hold the same position Locke does. He quotes with approval a
passage from Robert Boyle who uses an analogy of a deep-sea diver to
make the distinction between above reason and contrary to reason
plausible. If the diver asks you if you can see to the bottom of the
ocean and after you have declared that you cannot, brings up oysters
with pearls in them, you will have no objection to the claim that
there are oysters with pearls in them at the bottom of the sea. If, on
the other hand, the diver claims that the pearls he shows you are
larger than the shells containing them, "you would doubtless
judge what he asserts contrary to the information of your eyes"
(Collins 1707 [1984: 25-6]). This sounds like Locke's
position. But Agnesina points out that Collins gives this analogy a
twist. He writes: 



> 
> 
> ...Collins reduces Boyle's example to its conceptual
> scheme: it is simply a matter of acquisition of knowledge, not of a
> different type or degree of knowledge. (Agnesina 2018: 149) 
> 
> 
> 



Thus Agnesina agrees with O'Higgins that Collins holds the same
position as Toland: there are no truths above or contrary to
reason.



Turning from analogy to theological doctrines, we find that Collins
rejecting transubstantiation (1707 [1984: 24]). Collins also objects
to the doctrine of the Trinity because it is not understandable and on
some interpretations involves contradictions. Acceptance of the
doctrine of the Trinity is the first of the Thirty-nine Articles to
which an Anglican was supposed to subscribe. It is plain that Collins,
like Locke, Newton, Clarke, Whiston, Toland, and others, objected to
this article. Many of these men concealed their views about the
Trinity and claimed that they were orthodox Anglicans.



Given that Collins rejects mysteries and the claims that there are
truths above reason why should we accept any part of Holy Scripture?
Collins holds that it is on account of testimony. Collins writes: 



> 
> 
> There are ideas join'd in Propositions, which the Mind perceives
> to agree or disagree by the testimony of others. (Collins, 1707: 5)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Testimony gives rise to a particular kind of knowledge,
*faith.* We learn about facts, current events, historical,
scientific ones, and so on by having them communicated to us by
others. But testimony itself is not enough to produce faith or assent
unless the people and events themselves are credible. Collins, like
Spinoza in the *Theological-Political Treatise* concludes that
the writers of the Bible were not writing for philosophers, but
adapted their expressions to the capacity of understanding of the bulk
of mankind (Collins 1707: 14). Agnesina points out the similarity in
Collins' conclusions not only with Spinoza, but Locke, Le Clerc,
Richard Simon, and Toland. He remarks that these similarities:



> 
> 
> ...show what enormous pressure the Bible was subjected to in
> those years. Freed from the Holiness that made it untouchable, it was
> now minutely examined with the tools of philology. As may easily be
> imagined, this operation was exploited by the most radical thinkers,
> who discredited its contradictions and inconsistencies, in order to
> gain credit for their own positions. From the opposing side, in a sort
> of contrasting action, the desire was growing to preserve the Bible
> and to 'update' according to the findings of science.
> (Agnesina 2018: 151)
> 
> 
> 



Besides the kinds of pressure just noted, there was the act of
toleration which came along with the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The
Anglican Church in the 1690s was on edge as it saw its revenues
falling and debates about the fundamental doctrines of the Church were
at a fever pitch. Thus, the advent of the Boyle Lectures to defend the
views of the Anglican Church and show their compatibility with
Newtonian science is hardly surprising.


### 4.2 Analogical language



In *A Vindication of the Divine Attributes, in some Remarks on His
Grace the Archbishop of Dublin's sermon intitled "Divine
Predestination Consistent with the Freedom of Man's
Will"*, (published in 1710) Collins takes on another way of
evading his demand that whatever we believe must be comprehensible to
us. This is the doctrine of analogy that goes back to St. Thomas
Aquinas. The form in which Collins finds it in the works of Archbishop
King of Dublin, is the doctrine that not only does God not have hands
and feet and a beard in a literal sense, he does not have wisdom,
benevolence or justice in any sense that we can understand these
terms. Thus King remarked: 



> 
> 
> It does not follow from hence, that any of these are more properly or
> literally in God after the manner they are in us, than hands or eyes,
> than mercy, than love or hatred are. 
> 
> 
> 



Collins rejects the claim that God's wisdom and benevolence
could have meanings that we do not comprehend. He asserts that
God's knowledge and his attributes are univocal with ours
(O'Higgins 1970: 63).



David Berman in his *A History of Atheism in Great Britain*,
gives a number of reasons to take Collins as an atheist rather than a
deist. He sees Collins' account of the creation of matter *ex
nihilo* in the Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence in the
Clarke Collins correspondence as an argument for atheism disguised as
an argument against atheism (Berman 1988: 80-81). He sees
Collins as using Bayle to raise the problem of evil in the
*Vindication of the Divine Attributes* and then showing that
both the solution offered by Bayle and Dr. King are unacceptable.
Collins' official position at the end of the
*Vindication* is that King is wrong but atheism is avoidable.
Berman asks what the actual conclusion of the *Vindication* is.
He continues:



> 
> 
> It is simply that there are very formidable, or insuperable,
> difficulties in the theistic conception of God--revealed by the
> Manichean problems--and that the latest attempt to cope with, or
> solve, these difficulties, i.e. King's theory, has failed; for
> the medicine is as bad as the disease. But the disease remains!
> (Berman 1988: 84)
> 
> 
> 



Collins clearly rejects theism based on revelation. But one could also
be a theist based on arguments from natural religion. Berman sees the
*Vindication* as aimed at the heart of natural religion (1988:
84). If this were so, we would have good reason to regard Collins as
an atheist. On the one hand, Collins' position about analogical
language may seem to strongly support natural religion. Insofar as the
meaning of the divine attributes is univocal with our use of the same
words about human beings, the analogy that natural religion relies on
would work at its best. (The basic analogy on which natural religion
depends is that humans are to the machines they make as God is to the
world.) Archbishop King's position, on the other hand, would
completely undermine the analogy. There is, however, a second
consideration. Insofar as the problem of evil is left unresolved in
natural religion, it would suggest that it can provide no effective
answer to this fundamental difficulty in theism. This is
Berman's point. O'Higgins, by contrast, claims that in the
*Vindication* Collins simply sets aside the problem of evil
(O'Higgins 1970: 63).


### 4.3 *A Discourse of Free Thinking*, 1713



Like Locke, Collins is an advocate of the use of reason to determine
religious truths. One necessary condition for being able to think
freely is not to be persecuted for considering views that are
different from the accepted ones. Only in such an environment can one
genuinely consider alternatives. It must be possible to adopt
whichever of the possibilities turns out to be the most reasonable.
Collins, like Locke, is committed to the view that one should
proportion assent to a proposition on the basis of the evidence for
it. Religious persecution aims to limit the possibilities and the
evidence that one can consider. Though Collins was strongly
anti-clerical, he does distinguish between good priests and bad
priests. The good priests are the ones who advocate freedom of
thought; the bad priests, on the other hand, are persecutors who want
to prevent people from thinking through the truths of religion for
themselves. In his own time, Collins' most controversial work
was his *A Discourse of Freethinking* (1714).



Concerning the *Discourse*, J.M. Robertson writes that it 



> 
> 
> ...may be said to sum up and unify the drift not only of previous
> English freethinking, but of the great contribution of Bayle, whose
> learning and temper influence all English deism from Shaftesbury
> onward. (Robertson 1915: 123) 
> 
> 
> 



Perhaps the motto of *A Discourse of Free-Thinking* ought to be
"Where experts disagree, any person is free to reason for
themselves". Collins is chiefly concerned with religion, so the
vast bulk of the disagreements he cites have to do with religious
issues, from whether one religion is better than another, down to the
details of Anglicanism. Looking at conflicting claims often leads to
skepticism. Where exactly this approach leads Collins is a question
that we will have to consider.



In *A Discourse of Free-thinking* Collins defines free-thinking
as 



> 
> 
> The Use of the Understanding, in endeavouring to find out the Meaning
> of any Proposition whatsoever, in considering the nature and Evidence
> for or against it, and in judging of it according to the seeming Force
> or Weakness of the Evidence. (Collins 1713 [1984: 5) 
> 
> 
> 



Collins claims that we have a right to think freely. Richard Bently in
his *Remarks about a Late Discourse of Free-Thinking* charges
that this definition is too broad--that it amounts to a
definition of thinking. James O'Higgins in his study of Collins
agrees with Bently. This, however, is not a good evaluation.
Collins' account is surely intended to rule out believing
without evidence, or against the evidence, or without carefully
considering conflicting evidence. Either these are not going to be
admitted as thinking at all, or Collins' definition is not too
broad.



The *Discourse* is divided into three sections. In the first
two Collins gives a series of arguments in favor of free-thinking and
in the third he answers objections to free-thinking and gives a list
of historical figures who he views as free-thinkers. The arguments
treat thinking effectively as like a craft or art and a number of the
early arguments work on this analogy. He claims that just as putting
restrictions on painting would reduce the proficiency of the painter,
so putting restrictions on thinking can only reduce the proficiency of
the thinker. To fail to think freely leads to the holding of absurd
beliefs and superstition. Collins gives a brief history of the efforts
of priests to control what people believe by fraud from the ancient
world to the Reformation. Collins then claims that free-thinking is
responsible for the decline in the belief in witchcraft.



Section 2 begins with Collins arguing that right opinion in matters of
religion is supposed to be essential to salvation and errors to lead
to damnation. But if one is not to think freely oneself about such
subjects, then one must simply take up the opinions of those among
whom one happens to live. But this means that they will only be right
by accident. On the other hand, if people think freely, they will have
"the evidence of things to determine them to the side of
truth" (Collins 1713 [1984: 33). There are in all ages an
infinite number of pretenders to revelations from Heaven, supported by
miracles. These pretenders offer new notions of the Deity, new
doctrines, commands, ceremonies and modes of worship. To decide which
of these are genuine and which spurious requires that one think freely
about the competing evidence that would show that one is genuine while
the other an imposter. Collins remarks that since the Anglican Church
has an organization to support foreign missionaries (The Society for
Propagating the Gospel in Foreign Lands) this really requires
supporting free-thinking throughout the world and therefore at home as
well. Indeed: 



> 
> 
> As there can be no reasonable change of opinions among men, no
> quitting of any old religion, no reception of any new religion, nor
> believing any religion at all, but by means of free-thinking; so the
> Holy Scriptures agreeably to reason, and to the design of our blessed
> Savior of establishing his religion throughout the whole universe,
> imply everywhere and press in many places the duty of free thinking.
> (Collins 1713 [1984: 43-46]) 
> 
> 
> 



Finally Collins claims that the conduct of the priests 



> 
> 
> who are the chief Pretenders to be the Guides to others in matters of
> Religion, makes free-thinking on the nature and attributes of the
> eternal being of God, on the authority of the scriptures, and on the
> sense of scriptures, unavoidable. (Collins 1713 [1984: 46]) 
> 
> 
> 



He goes on to list disagreements and differences of opinion among
priests on all these topics.



In section 3 Collins takes up various objections to free-thinking. To
suppose that all men have a right to think freely on all subjects is
to suppose that they have the capacity to do so. But they do not. So
it is absurd to think that they have a duty to think freely. Collins
replies that to suppose a right to a thing "also implies a Right
in him to let it alone, if he thinks fit" (Collins 1713 [1984:
100). As for free-thinking being a duty, Collins responds that it is
so only in cases where those who contend "for the Necessity of
all Men's assenting to certain Propositions, must allow that men
are qualify'd to do so" (ibid.). If it were the case that
the great bulk of mankind lacked the capacity to think freely on
matters of speculation, then the priests should conclude that men
should in no way be concerned about truth and falsehood in speculative
matters. In short, they should hold no opinion. Even in this case,
however, the right to think freely would remain untouched in those
disposed to think freely. The second objection is that to encourage
free-thinking "will produce endless Divisions of Opinion and by
consequence Disorders in Society". Collins suggests that the
consequence is false and that any remedy is worse than the disease.
Third, free-thinking may lead to atheism. Collins points out that many
divines hold that there never was a real atheist in the world while
Bacon holds that contemplative atheists are rare. Still, even if
free-thinking were to produce many atheists, the number of those who
are superstitious or enthusiastic that will be produced in the absence
of free-thinking is even greater. And these are worse evils for
society than atheism. Fourthly, priests are the experts who are to be
relied upon in their subject as doctors and lawyers are to be relied
upon in theirs. Collins argues that the analogy between doctors and
lawyers and priests does not hold. First, while doctors and lawyers
act for us, we need not believe the principles or opinions on which
one prescribes and the other acts. But in matters of religion,
"I am obliged to believe certain opinions myself. No man's
belief will save me except my own" (Collins 1713: 109). Finally,
free-thinkers are "the most infamous, wicked and senseless of
all mankind" (Collins 1713: 118). Collins answers this objection
in various ways--arguing that in fact free-thinking makes one
virtuous. He ends by listing a variety of men he considers
free-thinkers whose moral character was impeccable--Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Plutarch, Cicero, Varo and others among
the ancients. Among the moderns he includes, Bacon, Hobbes and
Archbishop Tillotson.


### 4.4 Interpreting *A Discourse of Free Thinking*



The *Discourse* leaves us with a variety of questions. What
exactly is Collins trying to achieve in this book? Reflecting on the
first two sections of the *Discourse*, James O'Higgins
notes: 



> 
> 
> A good deal of what he wrote can be interpreted as the writing of an
> anti-clerical protestant, insisting on private judgment for the laity.
> A few other passages...such as those from Varo and Socrates, seem
> to imply a bias against Christianity itself, or at least against
> Revelation. (O'Higgins 1970: 89) 
> 
> 
> 



Some of Collins' critics accused him of being an atheist. But,
unless one gives the work an esoteric reading, this hardly seems
warranted. Collins is, however, clearly extolling a universal religion
based on reason.



The *Discourse* received a good number of replies. Steele
commented that the author of the *Discourse* deserved "to
be denied the common benefits of air and water" (quoted in
O'Higgins 1970: 78). The *Guardian* campaigned against
the *Discourse*. Among the articles it published were some by
the young George Berkeley. There is a certain amount of scholarly
debate about how effective these replies were. From early on,
historians have often claimed that Richard Bently in his *Remarks
about a late Discourse of Freethinking* delivered a crushing
rejoinder to Collins. James O'Higgins in his book-length study
of Collins probably gives the most balanced assessment.
O'Higgins admits that Bently, on the whole, makes a strictly
*ad hominem* attack on Collins. He attacked Collins'
scholarship and accused him of atheism. O'Higgins thinks that
Bently succeeded in showing that "Collins was not the man to
produce a critical edition of the Bible" (O'Higgins 1970:
84). O'Higgins also remarks that Bently correctly points out
that Collins did not understand the role of textual variants in
reducing (rather than increasing) our uncertainty about the meaning of
a text. Since Collins is maintaining that everyone capable of doing so
should reason about religious matters, claims that he failed to reason
correctly may have more bite to them than other *ad hominem*
arguments. But while these are good points, set against the fact that
Bently completely failed to address the main issue of religious
authority, this can hardly amount to a crushing rejoinder.


## 5. Collins and Religion



Edward and Lillian Bloom note in their introduction to *A Discourse
Concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing* that: 



> 
> 
> For several years and in such works as *Priestcraft in
> Perfection* (1710) and *A Discourse of Free-Thinking*
> (1713), he was a flailing polemicist against the entire Anglican
> hierarchy. Not until 1724 did he become a polished debater, when he
> initiated a controversy that made "a very great noise" and
> which ended only with his death. The loudest shot in the persistent
> barrage was sounded by *Grounds and Reasons* and its last
> fusillade by the *Discourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony in
> Writing*. (Collins 1729 [1970: iii])
> 
> 
> 



In *Priestcraft in Perfection*, 1710, and *An Historical and
Critical Essay on the Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of
England*, 1724, Collins attacks the first clause of Article 20 of
the 39 articles: "The Church hath power to decree rites or
ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith". Collins
goes over the history of the clause in considerable detail to argue
that it is a forgery. Clearly if this were a forgery, the church would
have no power to decree rites nor authority in controversies of faith.
The point is that: 



> 
> 
> ...the just and true establishment of religion lies, in allowing
> every man to have a conscience of his own; to use and follow his own
> private judgment; and particularly, to understand, profess and
> practice, what he thinks God teaches in the holy scriptures. (Collins,
> Preface to the *Essay*, quoted in O'Higgins 1970:
> 143-4) 
> 
> 
> 



O'Higgins notes that this might be the position of any
dissenting minister. He gives a detailed summary of the controversy in
Chapter IX of his study of Collins.



In *A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian
Religion*, 1724, Collins attacks the basis of Christianity as a
revealed religion. In *The Reasonableness of Christianity*,
Locke had made the messiahship of Christ the single fundamental tenet
for being a Christian. In the *Discourse* Collins rejects it.
The argument is that Christianity is founded on Judaism, or the New
Testament on the Old. The New Testament is only of importance in this
regard insofar as it shows that the prophecies of the Old are
fulfilled. Collins rejects the claim that they are fulfilled in the
New Testament. This, he asserts, is the only proof for Christianity.
Collins' critics disputed this claim; there was the proof from
miracles. But Collins rejected such proofs.



In rejecting the argument from prophecies Collins is once again
jousting with the Newtonians. William Whiston (1667-1752) was a
close associate of Newton's and was probably influenced by
Newton's interest in prophetic arguments. Stephen Snobelen
points out in his review of the controversy that Whiston hoped to set
up an exact science of prophecies. As Snobelen notes: "For
Whiston, fulfilled prophecy was as certain as a Boylean experiment or
a Newtonian demonstration" (Snobelen 1996: 205). Collins shared
much of Whiston's desire for precision. Often it was allowed
that a prophecy in the Old Testament had dual fulfillments, one in the
prophet's own day and one in the more remote future. One of
these was supposed to be literal, the other allegorical. Both Whiston
and Collins reject 'allegorical' interpretations for
literal ones. But while Whiston regarded the later fulfillment as
literal and the earlier as allegorical, Collins insisted that it was
the earlier one that should be regarded as literal.



Using the catalog of Collins' library produced by Giovanni
Tarantino, Jacopo Agnesina has persuasively argued that *A
Discourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing* published in
1729 is a genuine work of Anthony Collins, though O'Higgins in
his biography of Collins doubted its authenticity (Agnesina 2009).
Edward and Lillian Bloom in their introduction to their reprint of the
*Discourse* remark that:



> 
> 
> For the modern reader, the *Discourse concerning Ridicule and
> Irony* is the most satisfying of Collins's many pamphlets
> and books. It lacks the pretentiousness of the *Scheme*, the
> snide convolutions of the *Grounds and Reasons*, the argument
> by half-truths of the *Discourse of Free-Thinking*. His last
> work is free of the curious ambivalence which marked so many of his
> earlier pieces, a visible uncertainty that made him fear repression
> and yet court it. On the contrary, his last work is in fact a
> justification of his rhetorical mode and religious beliefs; it is an
> *apologia pro vita sua* written with all the intensity and
> decisiveness that such a justification demands. (Collins 1729 [1970:
> xv])
> 
> 
> 



The aim of the *Discourse* is to refute a claim by Nathanael
Marshall that while serious arguments about religious issues should be
allowed, ridicule and irony in attacks on established religion should
be prosecuted by the magistrate. This is a clear indication of how
much his Anglican opponents had let Collins' irreverent wit,
biting satire and ironical remarks get under their skin.
Collins' opponent was vulnerable on a number of points and
Collins makes telling arguments against his claim. He notes that the
best writers on religion will be found to be committing these crimes
in disputation; that the best punishment would be either to be ignored
or to return ridicule with ridicule--rather than to be punished
by the magistrate. He points out that when Mr. Marshall discovers how
many of those who practice these crimes are of his party and are
encouraged in these practices he will give up his position, and so on.
The theme of allowing liberty of discourse in public debates about
religion is the over-arching theme of the *Discourse*, and it
is certainly one of the main themes of Collins' work throughout
his life.


## 6. Influences


### 6.1 In England



We have already considered in some detail Samuel Clarke's
reaction to Collins' views about emergent properties, personal
identity and issues about determinism and free will in the early
eighteenth century. The Clarke Collins correspondence of 1707-08
was reprinted twice and referred to many times in the course of the
eighteenth century (Martin and Barresi 2000: 33). The conservative
reaction to Locke and Collins concerning personal identity and
materialism represented by Clarke continued to be maintained by many
thinkers in eighteenth century England as well as on the continent. In
fact, we can see an on-going debate between the materialists and
dualists on these topics all the way through the eighteenth and into
the early nineteenth century in England.



Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) a protege of Samuel Clarke
attacked the Locke/Collins account of personal identity in the
Appendix on Personal Identity to his *Analogy of Religion*.
Butler largely accepted Clarke's substantialist account of
identity and personal identity. Indeed he clarified Clarke's
position by summarizing it briefly and naming the distinction Clarke
had been making between real and fictional identity. He called it the
distinction between identity in the strict and proper sense and
identity in the loose and popular sense (Ducharme 1986: 370). He
reiterates Clarke's claim that Collins' account of
personal identity is dangerous to religion and in particular the
doctrine of the resurrection. He accused Collins of taking
Locke's doctrines "to a strange length" (Butler as
quoted in Perry 2008: 102). By this Butler meant that Collins'
account of personal identity would not allow a person's identity
to persist for more than a moment and thus that Locke's account
of personal identity implied and that Collins explicitly stated a
doctrine of successive persons. Butler claimed that such a doctrine
would destroy both morality and any doctrine of the resurrection. This
has been an influential misinterpretation of Collins (see Uzgalis
2008a: 322-326).



George Berkeley (1685-1753) met Collins at a freethinking coffee
house meeting and later told his American follower, Samuel Johnson,
that Collins was an atheist. As noted earlier, Berkeley attacked the
*Discourse of Free-Thinking* in Steele's
*Guardian*, and continued his attacks on Collins in
*Alciphron*. While Berkeley holds a quite distinct set of
philosophical views from those of Clarke, together they represent a
conservative Anglican response to Locke and Collins on the issue of
personal identity. Berkeley agrees with Clarke about the substantial
nature of persons.



Scholars are still debating the influence of Collins on David Hume
(1711-1776). How much influence is attributed to Collins depends
largely on the interpretation given to Hume's philosophy (see
McIntyre 1994, Russell 1995, and Harris 2005). McIntyre and Russell
despite their differences agree that in *A Treatise Of Human
Nature* Hume was systematically attacking Clarke's position
on the mind/body relation as articulated both in Clarke's Boyle
lectures and the Clarke Collins correspondence of 1707-08 and
that many of Hume's arguments resemble those of Collins. Harris,
focusing on the issue of free will and determinism and using the
*Enquiries* to interpret the *Treatise*, has a
contrasting view. He argues that Hume's account of necessity is
weaker than "that defended by Collins and before him by
Hobbes", and he goes on to claim that in giving this weaker
account Hume is giving the same kind of account that Bramhall and
Clarke gave in trying to find a middle way between necessitarianism
and the liberty of indifference (Harris 2005: 73). Harris may be
correct in noting a variety of ways in which Hume's account of
causality and necessity differs from that of Hobbes, Locke and
Collins. On the other hand, central to Hume's analysis of
causality is the total rejection of the *a priori* Homogeneity
Principle and the necessary connection implicit in heirloom theories
of causality. Collins also rejects the Homogeneity Principle, and
heirloom theories of causality that underlie it. He strenuously denies
that any of the contradictions that are supposed to follow from
violating the Principle actually occur. These are clear similarities
between Collins' account of causality and
Hume's that Harris fails to note. I think these considerations
tend to weaken Harris' judgement that while Collins is a
dogmatist on these issues, Hume is a skeptic (see Harris 2005: note 22
p. 79). 



Thomas Reid (1710-1796) holds positions on materialism, personal
identity and free will that have much in common with the views of
Clarke. Reid deploys reduplication arguments in objecting to the views
about personal identity of Joseph Priestly (see Martin and Barresi
2000: 47). Priestly's views have strong connections to those of
Locke and Collins.



Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) was sufficiently impressed with
Collins' *Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Free Will* to
arrange the publication of a new edition of that work. Priestley also
held that matter can think, but his views were based on a different
conception of matter than the one which Collins and Clarke shared.
Priestley had an active conception of matter derived from Boscovich.
Priestley was also impressed by Collins' work on the prophecies
(Yolton 1983: 108-113).


### 6.2 On the continent



Collins' influence on the continent in the second half of the
eighteenth century was much more considerable than his influence in
England. O'Higgins remarks that 



> 
> 
> Small though his part in English literature may have been, during his
> own lifetime there were few English writers who were more fully
> reported in the continental journals, or more noted in foreign
> universities. (O'Higgins 1970: 203)
> 
> 
> 



Pierre Desmaizeaux knew Collins for some 26 years and was his friend
and collaborator. Desmaizeaux played an important role in raising
Collins' reputation both in England and on the continent.
Collins discussed Clarke's response to his book on determinism
with Desmaizeaux and Desmaizeaux kept Collins in contact with the
intellectual life on the continent and also served as a publicist for
Collins. He had Collins' *Inquiry* translated into French
and handled the printing of his other books. In 1720, under
Collins' direction, Desmaizeaux published *A collection of
several pieces of Mr. John Locke, never before printed, or not extant
in his works. Pub. by the author of the Life of the ever-memorable Mr.
John Hales, &c* which contained a number of Locke's
letters to Collins. There was considerable interest on the continent
in the thinking-matter controversy. There is a certain amount of
debate about the influence of Collins' book on free will and
determinism on Voltaire. O'Higgins accepts the evidence produced
by Torrey in *Voltaire and the English Deists* that Voltaire
was converted to determinism by reading Collins (O'Higgins 1970:
219-20). As time passed free-thinking came out into the open in
France and Collins' name was associated with it. Finally, his
works on the materiality of the soul, determinism and free will and
the prophecies influenced the group around Baron d'Holbach. (For
a detailed treatment of Collins' influence on the continent, see
O'Higgins 1970: Chapter XI.) Whether Collins would have been
happy with this depends on whether we view him as a deist with
O'Higgins, or as an atheist with David Berman and Jacopo
Agnesina. This disagreement over whether to regard Collins as a deist
or as an atheist (or someone whose views changed over time or were
unclear even to himself) is our most serious unresolved problem in
determining Collins' proper place in the history of ideas.