## 1. Concepts and Definitions




The philosophical discussion of miracles has focused principally on
the credibility of certain claims in the Jewish and Christian
scriptures. But inquiry into the credibility of specific miracle claims
inevitably raises questions regarding the concept of a miracle, and
arguments regarding particular claims cannot be evaluated until the
nature of that concept has been at least reasonably clarified.


### 1.1 Miracles as events that exceed the productive power of nature




A common approach is to define a miracle as an interruption of the
order or course of nature (Sherlock 1843: 57). Some stable background
is, in fact, presupposed by the use of the term, as William Adams
(1767: 15) notes:



> 
> 
> An experienced uniformity in the course of nature hath been always
> thought necessary to the belief and use of miracles. These are indeed
> relative ideas. There must be an ordinary regular course of nature,
> before there can be any thing extraordinary. A river must flow, before
> its stream can be interrupted.




As it stands, however, this definition leaves us wanting a more
precise conception of what is meant by the order or course of nature.
We might therefore try to tighten the definition by saying that a
miracle is an event that exceeds the productive power of nature (St.
Thomas Aquinas, *SCG* 3.103; *ST* 1.110, art. 4), where
"nature" is construed broadly enough to include ourselves
and any other creatures substantially like ourselves. Variations on
this include the idea that a miracle is an event that would have
happened only given the intervention of an agent not wholly bound by
nature (Larmer 1988: 9) and that a miracle is an event that would have
happened only if there were a violation of the causal closure of the
physical world.


### 1.2 Miracles as violations of the laws of nature




David Hume (Hume 1748/2000; cf. Voltaire 1764/1901: 272) famously
defined a miracle as "a violation of the laws of nature,"
and this definition has been the focus of lively discussion ever since.
Hume evidently means to denote something beyond mere changes in the
regular course of nature, raising the bar higher for something to
qualify as a miracle but also raising the potential epistemic
significance of such an event if it could be authenticated.




Bringing the concept of natural laws into the definition of
"miracle" is, however, problematic, and for a variety of
reasons many writers have found it untenable (Brown 1822:
219-33; Beard 1845: 35; Lias 1890: 5-7; Huxley
1894:154-58; Joyce 1914: 17; Hesse 1965; Montgomery 1978; but
see Wardlaw 1852: 27-41). First, the concept of a miracle
predates any modern concept of a natural law by many centuries. While
this does not necessarily preclude Hume's concept, it does raise the
question of what concept or concepts earlier thinkers had in mind and
of why the Humean concept should be thought preferable (Tucker 2005).
One benefit of defining miracles in terms of violations of natural law
is that this definition entails that a miracle is beyond the
productive power of nature. But if that is the key idea, then it is
hard to see why we should not simply use that as the definition and
leave out the problematic talk of laws.




Second, it becomes difficult to say in some cases just which natural
laws are being violated by the event in question (Earman 2000). That
dead men stay dead is a widely observed fact, but it is not, in the
ordinary scientific use of the term, a law of nature that dead men stay
dead. The laws involved in the decomposition of a dead body are all at
a much more fundamental level, at least at the level of biochemical and
thermodynamic processes and perhaps at the level of interactions of
fundamental particles.




Third, there are deep philosophical disagreements regarding the
nature and even the existence of natural laws. On Hume's own
"regularity" view of natural laws, it is difficult to see
what it would mean for a natural law to be violated. If the natural
laws are simply compendious statements of natural regularities, an
apparent "violation" would most naturally be an indication,
not that a supernatural intervention in the course of nature had
occurred, but rather that what we had thought was a natural law was, in
fact, not one. On metaphysically rich conceptions of natural laws,
violations are problematic since the laws involve relations of
necessity among universals. And on the view that there are no natural
laws whatsoever, the set of events satisfying the Humean definition of
a miracle is, trivially, empty.




Speaking of miracles as *violations* of the laws of nature
also raises questions about the nature of violation. Richard Swinburne
(1970) has suggested that a miracle might be defined as a
non-repeatable counter-instance to a law of nature. If a putative law
has broad scope, great explanatory power, and appealing simplicity, it
may be more reasonable, Swinburne argues, to retain the law (defined as
a regularity that virtually invariably holds) and to accept that the
event in question is a non-repeatable counter-instance of that law than
to throw out the law and create a vastly more complex law that
accommodates the event.




One way to get around all of these problems and still retain the
Humean formulation is simply to redefine the laws of nature. J. L.
Mackie sums up this perspective neatly:



> 
> 
> The laws of nature ... describe the ways in which the
> world--including, of course, human beings--works when left to
> itself, when not interfered with. A miracle occurs when the world is
> not left to itself, when something distinct from the natural order as a
> whole intrudes into it. (Mackie 1982: 19-20)




With the notion of "natural law" thus redefined, the
"violation" definition becomes virtually equivalent to the
earlier definition of a miracle as an event that exceeds the productive
power of nature. And in Mackie's formulation it has the desirable
feature that it makes evident the connection between a miracle and
supernatural agency.


### 1.3 The relevance of religious context




Beyond all of these considerations, some authors have made a case for the
restriction of the term "miracle" to events that are
supernaturally caused and have some palpable religious significance. An
insignificant shift in a few grains of sand in the lonesome desert
might, if it exceeded the productive powers of nature, qualify as a
miracle in some thin sense, but it would manifestly lack religious
significance and could not be used as the fulcrum for any interesting
argument. Considerations such as this have led many authors to build
both the type of agency and some intimation of the purpose into the
definition of a miracle. Thus, Samuel Clarke (1719: 311-12) writes
that



> 
> 
> the true *Definition* of a *Miracle*, in the
> *Theological* Sense of the Word, is this; that it is a work
> effected in a manner *unusual*, or different from the common and
> regular Method of Providence, by the interposition either of God
> himself, or of some Intelligent Agent superiour to Man, for the Proof
> or Evidence of some particular Doctrine, or in attestation to the
> Authority of some particular Person.




Hume also, in one of his definitions of "miracle,"
speaks of an event brought about "by a particular volition of the
Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent" (Hume
1748/2000: 87). Since the paradigmatic cases under discussion are for
the most part claims that, if true, would answer to the theological
dimension of Clarke's description, one might take a supernatural
cause to be a necessary condition for an event's being a
religiously significant miracle and use the word "miracle"
in this sense where there is no danger of confusion. On the other hand, Basinger (2018: 4) argues that incorporating the condition of supernatural agency into the definition of a miracles would have the awkward consequence that the question of whether an event is considered miraculous would depend upon an individual's psychological sense; and while such definitions are possible, they are out of the main stream of discussion in the literature on miracles.




On the whole, then, the project of giving a definition for the term
"miracle" appears to have reached a point where further refinements offer only diminshing returns. A miracle is an event that
exceeds the productive power of nature, and a religiously significant
miracle is a detectable miracle that has a supernatural cause. For
practical purposes, we need nothing further. The paradigmatic claims
under discussion--that a man who has died was raised to life again
several days after his death, for example, or that water was changed
instantaneously into wine--satisfy not only this definition but
also most of the alternative proposals that have been seriously
advanced.


## 2. Arguments for Miracle Claims




"Miracles, indeed, would prove something," admits the
eponymous skeptic in Berkeley's *Alciphron*. "But
what proof have we of these miracles?" (Berkeley 1732/1898: 364) There
is no lack of answers in the literature. But the variety of premises,
the multiplicity of argumentative structures, and the diversity of aims
employed to this end can be bewildering.




Many arguments for miracles adduce the testimony of sincere and able
eyewitnesses as the key piece of evidence on which the force of the
argument depends. But other factors are also cited in favor of miracle
claims: the existence of commemorative ceremonies from earliest times,
for example, or the transformation of the eyewitnesses from fearful
cowards into defiant proclaimers of the resurrection, or the conversion
of St. Paul, or the growth of the early church under extremely adverse
conditions and without any of the normal conditions of success such as
wealth, patronage, or the use of force. These considerations are often
used jointly in a cumulative argument. It is therefore difficult to
isolate a single canonical argument for most miracle claims. The
various arguments must be handled on a case-by-case basis.


### 2.1 Categorical and confirmatory arguments




Two dimensions of classification help to bring into focus the nature
of the various arguments that have been advanced on behalf of miracle
claims, one having to do with the aims of the arguments and the other
having to do with their structure.




We may first distinguish between arguments designed to show that
their conclusions are true, reasonable, or justified, on the one hand,
and arguments designed to show that their conclusions are *more*
reasonable or *more* justified than they were apart from the
considerations adduced. The former we may stipulatively call
*categorical* arguments; the latter, *confirmatory*
arguments. When the arguments are probabilistic in nature, this reduces
to Richard Swinburne's terminology of P-inductive and C-inductive
arguments, the former intending to show that the conclusion (in this
case that the miracle in question has actually occurred) is probable to
some specific degree, or at least more probable than not, and the
latter intending to show that the conclusion is more probable given the
evidence presented than it is considered independently of that
evidence (Swinburne, 2004). But the broader distinction between
arguments that purport to command our rational assent and arguments
that have the more modest goal of showing their conclusions to be to
some (perhaps specified) extent confirmed is one that can be employed
independently of the use of the language of probability.


### 2.2 Four types of arguments




In addition to this classification of the aims of an argument, there
is a more common distinction among arguments in terms of their
structure. Broadly speaking, most arguments for miracle claims fall
into one of four structural categories: deductive, criteriological,
explanatory, or probabilistic. A valid deductive argument is one in
which, given the truth of the premises, the conclusion must also be
true. A criteriological argument sets forth some criteria ostensibly
met by the claim in question and concludes that the satisfaction of
those criteria reflects well on the claim--that it is certain, or
true, or likely to be true, or plausible, or more plausible than it
would have been had it not met the criteria. An explanatory argument is
typically contrastive: it aims to show, for example, that one
hypothesis is a better explanation of a certain body of facts than any
rival hypothesis or than the disjunction of all rival hypotheses. A
probabilistic argument aims to show that the conclusion is more
probable than not, or that it is more probable than some fixed standard
(say, 0.99), or that it is far more probable given the evidence adduced
than it is considered independent of that evidence.




The latter three categories are not mutually exclusive. An argument
may be put forward as criteriological but be best analyzed, on
reflection, as explanatory; an explanatory argument may be best
analyzed in probabilistic terms. But the fourfold classification will
do for a first rough sorting.


#### 2.2.1 Deductive arguments




Deductive arguments for miracle claims are relatively rare in
serious modern discussions, since they are subject to peculiar
liabilities. Here, for example, is a deductive reconstruction of an
argument given by William Paley (1859), broadly modeled on the version
given by Richard Whately (1870: 254-258) and other Victorian
logicians:


1. All miracles attested by persons, claiming to have witnessed
them, who pass their lives in labors, dangers, and sufferings in
support of their statements, and who, in consequence of their belief,
submit to new rules of conduct, are worthy of credit.
2. The central Christian miracles are attested by such evidence.



> 
> Therefore,


3. The central Christian miracles are worthy of credit.




There are several strategies available for pressing a critique of
this argument. In ancient times, premise 2 was generally conceded,
while premise 1 was contested; since the Enlightenment, it has become
somewhat more common for critics to contest premise 2 as well. There
are also indirect approaches that exploit the deductive structure of
the argument to argue that something must be wrong with the argument
without getting bogged down in the details of a specific critique.
Adding further true premises does not reduce the support that a
deductive argument gives to its conclusion; but the addition of such
premises may bring to light some awkward consequences. One
interpretation of one part of Hume's strategy in "Of
Miracles," part 2 is that he has in mind the addition of a
further premise:



> 
> 
> 2\*. Various non-Christian miracles are attested by such (or better)
> evidence,




the conclusion envisaged being, of course, that



> 
> 
> 3\*. Various non-Christian miracles are worthy of credit.




The strategy is intended as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the
first premise, since *prima facie* it is not the case that both
the Christian miracles and the non-Christian miracles are worthy of
credit. Paley does not cast his own argument into a deductive form, but
he does attempt to forestall this sort of criticism by adding, in rounding
out Part 1, an additional claim for which he offers several lines of
argument:



> [T]here is *not* satisfactory evidence, that persons
> professing to be original witnesses of other miracles, in their nature
> as certain as these are, have ever acted in the same manner, in
> attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and properly in
> consequence of their belief of those accounts. (Paley 1859: 181)
> 


#### 2.2.2 Criteriological arguments




A classic formulation of a criteriological argument for miracles is
employed by Charles Leslie (1697/1815: 13), who argues that we may safely
believe an historical claim that meets four criteria:


1. That the matters of fact be such, as that men's outward
senses, their eyes and ears, may be judges of it.
2. That it be done publicly in the face of the world.
3. That not only public monuments be kept up in memory of it, but
some outward actions to be performed.
4. That such monuments, and such actions or observances, be
instituted, and do commence from the time that the matter of fact was
done.




The first two criteria, Leslie explains, "make it impossible
for any such matter of fact to be imposed upon men, at the time when
such fact was said to be done, because every man's eyes and
senses would contradict it." The latter two criteria assure those
who come afterwards that the account of the event was not invented
subsequent to the time of the purported event. Leslie points out that
these criteria are not necessary conditions of factual truth, but he
insists that they are--taken jointly--sufficient. Hence we
may speak of Leslie's principle: If any reported event meets all
four of these criteria, then its historicity is certain.




In assessing a criteriological argument, we need to ask not only
whether the event in question meets the criteria but also whether the
criteria themselves are good indicators of truth. An argument for the
criteria that Leslie gives cannot proceed wholly *a priori*,
since there is not a necessary connection between an event's
satisfying the criteria and its being true. In this case, perhaps the
most promising approach would be to argue that the criteria effectively
rule out explanations other than the truth of the claim. Leslie's
remarks suggest that this is the direction he would go if challenged,
but he does not offer a fully developed defense of his criteria.




Leslie's argument is, in the sense outlined above,
categorical--he holds that, as the claim of the resurrection meets
all four criteria (the memorials being supplied by the Christian
commemoration of the last supper and the transfer of the day of worship
from the Sabbath (Saturday) to the first day of the week (Sunday)), the
certainty of the matter of fact in question is
"demonstrated." This rather bold claim opens the
possibility of refutation of Leslie's principle by
counterexample, though reportedly Conyers Middleton, a contemporary of
Hume whose critique of the ecclesiastical miracles was notable for its
thoroughness, searched vainly for years for a counterexample to
Leslie's principle. Be that as it may, a criteriological argument
may also be constructed on the basis of a more modest principle, such
as that if any reported event meets all four of these criteria, then it
is reasonable to accept its historicity.




The chief difficulty with criteriological arguments, whether bold or
modest, is that they provide no means for taking into account any other
considerations that might weigh against the historical claim in
question. Intuitively, extreme antecedent improbability ought to carry
some weight in our evaluation of the credibility of a factual claim. A
defender of a criteriological argument might respond that so long as
the bar is set high enough, antecedent improbability will be
overwhelmed by the fact that the event does indeed meet the stipulated
criteria. But this is a claim that requires argument; and the bolder
the conclusion, the more argument it requires.


#### 2.2.3 Explanatory arguments




A third approach to arguing for a miracle claim is to argue that it
is the best explanation for a small set of widely conceded facts. A
typical "minimal facts" argument for the resurrection of
Jesus starts with a list of facts such as these (Habermas 1996:
162):


1. Jesus died by crucifixion.
2. His disciples subsequently had experiences which they believed
were literal physical appearances of the risen Jesus.
3. The disciples were transformed from fearful cowards into bold
proclaimers who were willing to face persecution and death for their
message.
4. Paul, who had previously been a persecutor of the Christians, had
an experience that he also believed was an appearance of the risen
Jesus.




None of these four facts is, in itself, a supernatural claim, and
virtually all critical scholars with relevant expertise concur in these
facts on ordinary historical grounds. The explanatory argument starts
with this scholarly consensus and contends that all alternative
explanations for these facts are inferior to the explanation that Jesus
actually did rise from the dead. The conclusion is therefore typically
categorical.




One advantage of this approach over the criteriological approach is
that the inference is explicitly contrastive: the argument engages
directly with alternative explanations of the data. Such engagement
brings with it the burden of examining a variety of alternative
explanations, a burden that is sometimes discharged by reference to
established criteria of historical explanation (Craig 2008: 233).




This sort of explanatory argument may be contested in at least five
ways, a number of which have been explored. First, one might try, the
scholarly consensus notwithstanding, to dispute the facts asserted.
(Crossan, in Copan 1998) If successful, this strategy would undermine
the positive argument. Second, one might grant, if only for the sake of
the argument, the *prima facie* force of the positive argument
but attempt to neutralize it by widening the factual basis to include a
matching set of facts, equally well attested, for which the
*falsehood* of the resurrection account is the best explanation.
Third, one might argue that the relative merits of the miraculous and
non-miraculous explanations have been improperly assessed and that,
rightly considered, one or more of the non-miraculous explanations is
actually preferable as an explanation of the facts in question.
(Ludemann, in Copan and Tacelli 2000) Fourth, one might produce a
non-miraculous explanation not addressed in the explanatory argument
and argue that it is superior to the miraculous explanation (Venturini
1800; cf. O'Collins and Kendall 1996). Fifth, one might contest
the implication that an explanation that is superior to its rivals in
pairwise comparisons is actually more reasonable to believe than not.
It is not difficult to imagine (or even to find) cases where one
explanation is marginally better than any given rival but where the
disjunction of the rival explanations is more believable. This final
criticism applies only when the explanatory argument is categorical;
but in that case, a further argument would be necessary to close off
this line of criticism.


#### 2.2.4 Probabilistic arguments




A fourth method of arguing for a miracle claim is to employ the
machinery of Bayesian probability and argue that some fact or set of
facts renders the conclusion probable (for a categorical argument) or
significantly more probable than it was taken apart from those facts
(for a confirmatory one). The argument could be cast in categorical
form using the odds form of Bayes's Theorem. It is a simple
consequence of Bayes's Theorem that, where '\(M\)' is
the claim that a miracle has taken place and '\(E\)'
is some evidence bearing on that claim, and where all of the relevant
terms are defined,



\[
\frac{P(M\mid E)}{P({\sim}M\mid E)} = 
 \frac{P(M)}{P({\sim}M)} \times \frac{P(E\mid M)}{P(E\mid {\sim}M)}
\]



Verbally, this says that the posterior odds on \(M\) (that is,
the ratio of the posterior probability of \(M\) to the posterior
probability of its negation) equal the product of the prior odds and
the Bayes factor. More colloquially, \(M\) becomes more
plausible when we take into account evidence \(E\) that is more
to be expected if \(M\) is true than if \(M\) is false. A
categorical argument of this sort would involve plugging in values
(either point-valued or interval-valued) for each term in this
equation and concluding that \(P(M\mid E)
\gt k\), where \(k\) is some constant with a value
greater than or equal to 0.5. The evaluation of such an argument is
likely to turn principally on the relative magnitudes of \(P(M)\) and
\(P(E\mid {\sim}M)\), since in many contexts the
disputants will grant that the other two probabilities that appear on
the right side of the equation--\(P({\sim}M)\)
and \(P(E\mid M)\)--are very close to 1. A
confirmatory probabilistic argument might proceed from the same
premises but dispense with the ratio of the priors, focusing on the
fact that the ratio \(P(E\mid M)/P(E\mid {\sim}M)\)
is top heavy.




The equation may give the impression that what is going on is rather
arcane. In fact, the mathematics is simply a means of making explicit a
common process of reasoning described well by Joseph Butler (1736/1819:
194):



> 
> 
> [T]he truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is to
> be judged of by all the evidence taken together. And unless the whole
> series of things which may be alleged in this argument, and every
> particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been by
> accident (for here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies);
> then is the truth of it proved: in like manner, as if in any common
> case, numerous events acknowledged, were to be alleged in proof of any
> other event disputed; the truth of the disputed event would be proved,
> not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly
> imply it but, though no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the
> acknowledged events taken together could not in reason be supposed to
> have happened, unless the disputed one were true.




Allowing for the change in terminology over the centuries,
Butler's description can be read as a verbal explication of the
categorical form of the Bayesian argument. If the facts can be
accounted for without difficulty on the supposition of \(M\) but
not, without great implausibility, on the assumption of \({\sim}M\),
then they provide significant evidence in favor of \(M\). On this
reading, Butler is tacitly assuming that the prior probability
of \(M\) is not so low as to overcome the cumulative force of the
evidence in its favor.




Historically, probabilistic arguments for miracles have centered on
the credibility of eyewitness testimony to the miraculous. Where
\(T\_i (M)\) stands for
"Witness \(i\) testifies that \(M\)," we may
write the relevant form of Bayes's Theorem as



\[\begin{align}
&\frac{P(M\mid T\_1 (M) \amp \ldots\amp T\_n (M))}{P({\sim}M\mid T\_1 (M) \amp \ldots \amp T\_n (M))} = \\
&\qquad \frac{P(M)}{P({\sim}M)} \times 
 \frac{P(T\_1 (M) \amp \ldots \amp T\_n (M)\mid M)}{P(T\_1 (M) \amp \ldots \amp T\_n (M)\mid {\sim}M)}
\end{align}\]



If we assume that these testimonies are independent of each other
relative both to \(M\) and to \({\sim}M\)--an assumption that should not be
made casually (Kruskal 1988)--we can replace the final term on the
right with the product



\[
\frac{P(T\_1 (M)\mid M)}{P(T\_1 (M)\mid {\sim}M)} \times \ldots \times 
 \frac{P(T\_n (M)\mid M)}{P(T\_n (M)\mid {\sim}M)}
\]




On the further simplifying assumption that all of the testimonies
are of equal weight, this product reduces to



\[
\left[\frac{P(T\_1 (M)\mid M)}{P(T\_1 (M)\mid {\sim}M)}\right]^n
\]



If \(P(T\_1 (M)\mid M)/P(T\_1 (M)\mid {\sim}M) \gt 1\), it follows at
once that the claim, arguably attributable to Hume, that the evidence
of testimony can never overcome the antecedent presumption against a
miracle, is false. As Charles Babbage puts it:



> 
> 
> [I]f independent witnesses can be found, who speak truth more
> frequently than falsehood, *it is* ALWAYS *possible to assign
> a number of independent witnesses, the improbability of the falsehood
> of whose concurring testimony shall be greater than the improbability
> of the alleged miracle*. (Babbage 1837: 202, emphasis original; cf.
> Holder 1998 and Earman 2000)
> 
> 




Ahmed (2015) argues that the anti-Humean argument leveled by Babbage
(1837), Holder (1999), and Earman (2000) requires an assumption of the
conditional independence of successive testimonies to the putative
event, an assumption that is plausibly always violated both
conditional on the assumption of its truth and conditional on the
assumption of its falsehood. In the abstract to his article, Ahmed
summarizes his point by saying that "even multiple reports from
non-collusive witnesses lack the sort of independence that could make
trouble for Hume." This enthusiastic promise is tempered,
however, by Ahmed's recognition later in the same article that
something very much like the same critique can be leveled granting
that conditional independence fails in both cases, provided that the
ratio of the likelihoods does not converge to 1 too quickly. So in his
own summary, his arguments "do not after all realize the
'everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion'
that Hume envisaged" (Ahmed 2015: 1042).




The evaluation of a serious cumulative argument for a particular
miracle claim requires the consideration of historical details that go
beyond the bounds of philosophy as a discipline (McGrew and McGrew
2009). But some general points regarding its structure are of
philosophical interest. If the argument is categorical, then its
conclusion is (at least) that, where "\(E\)" stands for
the sum of the relevant evidence, \(P(M\mid E) \gt 0.5\). But where
"\(G\)" stands for "God exists" (where
"God" is conceived classically, as an eternal, personal
being of maximal power, knowledge, and goodness who created the
universe), it is generally acknowledged that \(P(M\mid G) \gg
P(M\mid {\sim}G)\) and that either \(P(M\mid {\sim}G) = 0\) (if
miracles are strictly the prerogative of God) or at least \(P(M\mid
{\sim}G) \approx 0\). The evaluation of the claim that a miracle has
occurred will therefore be sensitive to the probability of the claim
that God exists, and the evaluation of the categorical form of the
argument will therefore depend on the overall evaluation of the
evidence of natural theology and of atheological arguments such as the
problem of evil. By far the most sophisticated and elaborate
development of such an argument is to be found in the work of Richard
Swinburne (1970, 1977, 1979, 1992, 2003), who has pioneered the
application of Bayesian probability to questions in the philosophy of
religion and whose work spans the full range of natural theology.




The confirmatory form of the probabilistic argument is more modest;
it aims to show that there is a considerable contribution to the
argument for \(M\) arising from the facts indicated (McGrew and McGrew
2009). It has been objected (Oppy 2006: 5-6) that probabilistic
arguments of this sort are of no interest unless they are founded on
*all* of the relevant available evidence. But this objection
would, if legitimate, count equally against the use of arguments from
comparison of likelihoods in scientific reasoning, where they are
ubiquitous. More cautiously, one might ask why an argument that places
no definite restrictions on the probability of \(M\) should be of
any interest. One answer would be that a successful confirmatory
argument may shift the burden of proof. If there is a substantial body
of evidence in favor of \(M\), it is incumbent on those who
deny \(M\) to explain in some detail either (1) why the
antecedent presumption against \(M\) should override this
evidence or (2) what the other evidential considerations are that
mitigate against \(M\).


## 3. Arguments against Miracle Claims




Arguments against miracle claims, like arguments in their favor,
come in a variety of forms, invoke diverse premises, and have distinct
aims. We may distinguish general arguments, designed to show that all
miracle claims are subject in principle to certain failings, from
particular arguments, designed to show that, whatever may be the case
in principle, such miracle claims as have historically been offered are
inadequately supported.


### 3.1 General arguments




General arguments against miracle claims fall into two broad
classes: those designed to show that miracles are impossible, and those
designed to show that miracle claims could never be believable.


#### 3.1.1 Arguments that miracles are impossible




The boldest claim that could be made against reported miracles is
that such events are impossible. Insofar as the definition of
"miracle" in question is one that involves divine agency,
any argument that demonstrated the non-existence of God would be *eo
ipso* a demonstration that miracles do not take place; and an
argument that demonstrated that the existence of God is impossible
would demonstrate that miracles are likewise impossible. But the more
common arguments for this conclusion are more modest; rather than
setting out to show the existence of God to be impossible, they
typically invoke theological premises to show that if there were a God,
then miracles would not occur.




In chapter 6 of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Baruch
Spinoza sets out to argue for the claim that nature cannot be
contravened, but that she "preserves a fixed and immutable
course," in consequence of which a miracle is "a sheer
absurdity" (Spinoza 1670/1862: 123, 128). His argument for this
claim is somewhat difficult to follow, but it appears to run
approximately like this:


1. The will of God is identical with the laws of nature.
2. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.
3. Necessarily, God's will is inviolable.



> 
> Therefore,


4. Miracles cannot happen.




Spinoza's argument is unlikely to persuade anyone who does not
start out with his identification of the laws of nature with the will
of God. From a more traditional theistic standpoint, the argument is
simply an elaborate exercise in begging the question.




A non-theological version of this argument, sometimes mistakenly
attributed to Hume, is actually due to Voltaire (1764/1901: 272):



> 
> 
> A miracle is the violation of mathematical, divine, immutable,
> eternal laws. By the very exposition itself, a miracle is a
> contradiction in terms: a law cannot at the same time be immutable and
> violated.




The trouble with this crude argument is once again in the definition
of "miracle," which here goes beyond a mere violation
concept in adding immutability, which generates the contradiction. One
retort that historically proved attractive is to accept the violation
concept but deny that the laws of nature are immutable; instead the
truly immutable laws are higher laws--laws that govern not only
the behavior of physical entities but the interactions of physical and
non-physical entities--and what appear to us to be violations of
the laws of nature are really nothing less than instances of a higher
law (Trench 1847:14-17; cf. Venn 1888: 433 ff).




A more subtle version of a theological objection can also be found
in the entry "Miracles" in Voltaire's
*Philosophical Dictionary* (1764/1901: 273):



> 
> 
> [I]t is impossible a being infinitely wise can have made laws to
> violate them. He could not ... derange the machine but with a view
> of making it work better; but it is evident that God, all-wise and
> omnipotent, originally made this immense machine, the universe, as good
> and perfect as He was able; if He saw that some imperfections would
> arise from the nature of matter, He provided for that in the beginning;
> and, accordingly, He will never change anything in it.




It is therefore impious to ascribe miracles to God; they would
indicate a lack of forethought, or of power, or both.




This argument was popular during the deist controversy of the early
and mid 18th century, and the orthodox response is summed up well by
Paley (1859: 12): "[I]n what way can a revelation be made but by
miracles? In none which we are able to conceive." Paley's
point is not merely negative; rather, it is that only by setting up a
universe with regularities that no mere human can abrogate and then
suspending them could God, if there were a God, authenticate a
revelation, stamping it with divine approval by an act of sovereignty.
If there is a God who wishes to authenticate a communication to man in
an unmistakable fashion, then, in Paley's view, an authenticating
miracle is *inevitable*. It is therefore not at all impious to
ascribe miracles to God, and they imply no limit either on His
knowledge or on His power; they are both a sign of His approval and
evidence of His benevolent foresight.


#### 3.1.2 Arguments that miracle claims could never be rationally believed




The principal argument against the rational credibility of miracle
claims derives from Hume. "A miracle," he writes,



> 
> 
> is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable
> experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle,
> from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from
> experience can possibly be imagined. (Hume 1748/2000:
> 86-87)
> 
> 




He ends the first Part of his essay "Of Miracles" with a
general maxim:



> 
> 
> The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our
> attention), "That no testimony is sufficient to establish a
> miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood
> would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to
> establish: And even in that case, there is a mutual destruction of
> arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that
> degree of force, which remains, after deducting the
> inferior."




The maxim itself is open to interpretive disputes. George Campbell
(1762/1839) considers it to be trivial, a judgment with which Earman
(2000) concurs. One simple way to arrive at it from a Bayesian point of
view is to take the initial equation



\[
\frac{P(M\mid E)}{P({\sim}M\mid E)} = 
 \frac{P(M)}{P({\sim}M)} \times \frac{P(E\mid M)}{P(E\mid {\sim}M)},
\]



where \(E\) is the proposed evidence for a miracle, and make the
simplifying approximation that \(P(E\mid M) \approx P({\sim}M)\),
since both terms are close to 1. Then the right side reduces to the
ratio of the two remaining "small" terms, \(P(M)/P(E\mid
{\sim}M)\), which will be a fair approximation of the posterior
odds. Then the posterior probability of M will exceed 0.5 just in case
\(P(M) \gt P(E\mid {\sim}M)\). This interpretation is endorsed by
Holder (1998) but challenged by Millican (2002), who also surveys
various other probabilistic interpretations of Hume's maxim.




Millican (2011) argues that many interpreters of Hume have overlooked a critical distinction between a type of testimony and a token of that testimony, where the latter is a particular instance of testimony asserting the occurrence of one particular event. Under the token interpretation, Millican grants, Hume's maxim would be trivial. But on the former interpretation, all testimony belongs to a type that has a characteristic or typical probability of falsehood. According to Millican, it is that typical probability that Hume has in view when constructing his maxim rather than the particular probability of falsehood of a specific piece of evidence.




Hume immediately illustrates this maxim by applying it to the case
of testimony to a resurrection:



> 
> 
> When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I
> immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that
> this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact,
> which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle
> against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover,
> I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the
> falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event
> which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my
> belief or opinion. (Hume 1748/2000: 87-88)
> 
> 




Is this an argument, or even an elliptical statement of one premise in
an argument? And if so, what is its structure? The traditional
interpretation has been that it is an argument from the nature of the
case, the conclusion being that a miracle story could not be believed
on testimony even under the most favorable circumstances. As far as we
can tell, all of Hume's contemporaries, including John Leland (1755),
William Adams (1767), Richard Price (1777), and George Campbell
(1762/1839), read him this way. There is, however, considerable recent
disagreement as to whether Hume intended Part 1 of his essay as an
argument, disagreement that arises in part from the apprehension on
the part of some of Hume's defenders that if it is an argument, it is
not very good. The interpretive issues are too extensive to summarize;
see Flew (1961), Levine (1989: 152), Johnson (1999), Earman (2000),
Fogelin (2003), McGrew (2005), and Hajek (2008). But it is
beyond contesting that some such argument, widely attributed to Hume,
has been tremendously influential.




A very simple version of the argument, leaving out the comparison to
the laws of nature and focusing on the alleged infirmities of
testimony, can be laid out deductively (following Whately, in Paley
1859: 33):


1. Testimony is a kind of evidence very likely to be false.
2. The evidence for the Christian miracles is testimony.



> 
> Therefore,


3. The evidence for the Christian miracles is likely to be
false.




This is, however, much too crude an argument to carry any weight,
since it turns on a simple ambiguity between *all* testimony and
*some* testimony. Whately offers an amusing parody that makes
the fallacy obvious: Some books are mere trash; Hume's Works are
[some] books; therefore, etc.




Another crude argument that focuses solely on the improbability of
miracle claims (Ehrman 2003: 228-229) may be laid out thus:


1. A miracle is by definition the most improbable of events; the
probability of a miracle is infinitesimally remote.
2. An historian can establish only what probably happened in the
past.



> 
> Therefore,


3. An historian can never establish that a miracle happened.




Waiving the tendentious definition in premise 1, the supposed
contradiction involved in denying the conclusion--"that the
most improbable event is the most probable" (Ehrman 2003:
229)--is merely verbal, arising from a failure to distinguish
between the probability of a miracle claim considered apart from the
evidence and the probability of the claim given that evidence.




Flew (1966: 146; cf. Bradley 1874/1935) offers a more sophisticated
criticism, arguing from the nature of historical inquiry that rational
belief in miracles is precluded:



> 
> 
> The basic propositions are: first, that the present relics of the
> past cannot be interpreted as historical evidence at all, unless we
> presume that the same fundamental regularities obtained then as still
> obtain today; second, that in trying as best he may to determine what
> actually happened the historian must employ as criteria all his present
> knowledge, or presumed knowledge, of what is probable or improbable,
> possible or impossible; and, third, that, since *miracle* has to be
> defined in terms of practical impossibility the application of these
> criteria inevitably precludes proof of a miracle.




The most obvious rejoinder here is that the believer in miracles
does not generally believe that there are no dependable regularities in
the physical world; it is in the nature of a miracle to be an exception
to the ordinary course of nature. The feared undermining of the
principles of historical inquiry is therefore an illusion generated by
exaggerating the scale on which the order of nature would be disrupted
were a miracle actually to occur.




An alternative reading of Hume, proposed by Dorothy Coleman (1988:
338-339), is that



> 
> 
> an event that has no ready natural explanation is not necessarily an
> event that has no natural cause. To be a miracle, an event must be
> inexplicable not in terms of what appears to us to be the laws of
> nature but in terms of what laws of nature actually are.... [O]ne
> must ask if it is always more likely, i.e., conformable to experience,
> that those claiming the event to be a miracle are mistaken rather than
> that the event is a genuine violation of a law of nature.
> Counterinstances of what are taken to be natural laws are not by
> themselves evidence establishing that no natural law could possibly
> explain them: at most they provide grounds for revising our
> formulations of natural laws or seeking an improved understanding of
> the nature of the phenomena in question. At the very least they provide
> grounds for suspending judgments about the nature of their cause until
> more evidence is available. On the other hand, past experience shows
> that what are at one time considered violations of natural laws are
> frequently found at some later time not to be so. Proportioning belief
> to evidence, therefore, it is more reasonable to believe that the claim
> that an event is a miracle is mistaken than it is that the event is a
> violation of natural law.




There is not much to commend this line of argument as a reading of
Hume; both the casual attitude toward our identification of the laws of
nature and the willingness to grant the occurrence of the event jar
with Hume's own presentation of his view. As Hajek (2008: 86-87)
stresses, Hume is unambiguously arguing that we should
*disbelieve* testimony to an event's occurrence, when that
event really would be miraculous.




As an independent objection to belief in reported miracles,
Coleman's argument has limited force. On a *ceteris
paribus* conception of natural laws, apparent counterevidence to a
putative law may, depending on circumstances, reduce the probability of
the law only slightly, the majority of the impact of the evidence going
to raise the probability that all else is not, in the present case,
equal. There is no general principle that would license the conclusion
that it is more reasonable to accept the falsehood of the putative law
than to suppose the causal closure of nature to be violated. Everything
depends on the details of specific cases.




A more faithful representation of Hume's reasoning brings back
in the comparison between "two opposite experiences,"
reconstructing his argument along these lines:


1. The argument against a miracle,
from the nature of the case, is as strong as any argument from
experience could possibly be.
2. The argument for a miracle, from
testimony, is at best a strong but somewhat weaker argument from
experience.
3. In any case where two arguments
from experience point to contradictory conclusions, the stronger
argument must prevail.
4. A conclusion is credible only if
the argument supporting it is not overcome by a stronger argument for a
contradictory conclusion.



> Therefore,


5. The argument for a miracle, from
testimony, cannot even under the most favorable circumstances render
belief in a miracle credible.




Hume's early critics objected vigorously to the claims
embodied in the first two premises. Price (1777: 402; cf. Adams 1767:
10-11 and Paley 1859: 13-14) retorts against the claim in premise 1
that "a miracle is more properly an event different from
experience than contrary to it." The presumptive case against the
resurrection from universal testimony would be as strong as Hume
supposes only if, *per impossible*, all mankind throughout all
ages had been watching the tomb of Jesus on the morning of the third
day and testified that nothing occurred. Even aside from the problems
of time travel, there is not a *single piece* of direct
testimonial evidence to Jesus' non-resurrection. Premise 1 is
therefore a wild overstatement.




Adams (1767: 37) mounts an attack on premise 2 by drawing attention
to the manner in which the lives of the apostles corroborate their
testimony:



> 
> 
> That men should love falshood rather than truth--that they
> should chuse labour and travail, shame and misery, before pleasure,
> ease, and esteem--is as much a violation of the laws of nature, as
> it is for lead or iron to hang unsupported in the air, or for the voice
> of a man to raise the dead to life: but this, I have granted to the
> author, is, not miraculous, but impossible, and shall therefore have
> his leave, I hope, to assert, that falshood, thus attested, is
> impossible--in other words, that testimony, thus tried and proved,
> is infallible and certain.




And he drives home the point by a quotation from Hume himself:



> 
> 
> We cannot make use of a more convincing argument, than to prove that
> the actions ascribed to any person are directly contrary to the course
> of nature, and that no human motives, in such circumstances, could
> ever induce him to such a conduct. (Adams 1767: 48, quoting Hume
> 1748/2000: 65)
> 
> 




This argument, of course, proves at best only the sincerity of the
witnesses. But in the present case, he goes on to argue, the nature of
the facts attested precludes the possibility that the witnesses are
themselves deceived (Adams 1767:37-38; cf. Jenkin 1708: 488-93).




Alan Hajek (2008: 88) offers a more detailed reconstruction
of this argument. The first stage corresponds to the argument in
"Of Miracles," Part I:


1. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.
2. A law of nature is, *inter alia*, a regularity to which no
exception has previously been experienced.



> Thus,


3. There is as compelling a 'proof' from experience as
can possibly be imagined against a miracle.
4. In particular, the proof from experience in favour of testimony
of any kind cannot be more compelling.
5. There is no other form of proof in favour of testimony.



> Therefore,


6. The falsehood of the testimony to a miraculous event is always at
least as probable as the event attested to (however good the testimony
seems to be).



> However,


7. *Hume's balancing principle*. The testimony should
be believed if, and only if, the falsehood of the testimony is less
probable than the event attested to.



> 
> 
> Therefore, (by 7 and 8):


8. Conclusion 1. Testimony to a miraculous event should never be
believed--belief in a miracle report could never be justified.




Hajek makes a strong case that this is a faithful
reconstruction of Hume's reasoning. But as he goes on to point
out, this argument is problematic at multiple points. The definition in
1 is at the least not forced upon us; and the inference from 1 and 2 to
3 overlooks the possibility that a regularity to which no
*exception* has previously been experienced is also a
regularity of which no *instance* has previously been
experienced--a possibility that is countenanced on some major
conceptions of laws--or that the law in question has not been
instanced very often (Hajek 2008: 91). Hume might reply that,
while this is theoretically possible, it does not hold in the cases of
interest. But even granting that reply, Hajek points out that 5
may be questioned; and 6 is deeply problematic, since lack of analogy
is at best an obscure reason for concluding that an event is maximally
improbable. For if strength of analogy is a critical determinant in a
rational agent's probability function, then he should be comparably
skeptical regarding all spectacular scientific
discoveries--"And that is absurd" (Hajek
2008: 103).




Larmer (2013) surveys a wide range of in-principle objections to justified belief in miracle claims in general and argues that all of them fail to deliver the promised conclusion.


### 3.2 Particular arguments




Because the field of arguments for miracles is so wide, a
consideration of all of the criticisms that have been leveled against
particular arguments for miracles would fill many volumes. But four
particular arguments raised by Hume are sufficiently well known to be
of interest to philosophers.




In Part 2 of his essay "Of Miracles," Hume argues that
there never was a miraculous event established on evidence so full as
to amount to an "entire proof." The considerations Hume
marshals in this section had, for the most part, been canvassed
thoroughly during the deist controversy in the preceeding half century;
Hume's credit in this Part is not that of originating the
arguments but rather that of stating them clearly and forcefully.


#### 3.2.1 The argument from inauspicious conditions




First, Hume lists a set of conditions that would, in his view, be
necessary in order for an argument from testimony to have its full
force, and he argues that no miracle report has ever met these
conditions:



> 
> 
> [T]here is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by
> a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, education,
> and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of
> such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any
> design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of
> mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being
> detected in any falsehood; and at the same time attesting facts,
> performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the
> world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances
> are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.
> (Hume 1748/2000: 88)




Hume does not elaborate on these conditions, and it is difficult to
say how he might have responded to Leland's charge that they are
not necessary and would in some cases cut the other direction. For
example, Leland argues that meeting the condition of "credit and
reputation" would actually have weakened the evidence for the
Christian miracles:



> 
> 
> It might have been said with some shew of plausibility, that such
> persons by their knowledge and abilities, their reputation and
> interest, might have it in their power to countenance and propagate an
> imposture among the people, and give it some credit in the world.
> (Leland 1755: 90-91; cf. Beckett 1883: 29-37)


#### 3.2.2 The argument from the passions of surprise and wonder




Thomas Morgan (1739: 31) raises a second charge in these words:



> 
> 
> Men are the more easily imposed on in such Matters, as they love to
> gratify the Passion of *Admiration*, and take a great deal of
> Pleasure in hearing or telling of Wonders.




The implication is twofold: miracle stories are more likely than
other falsehoods to be *told*, since they cater to a natural
human desire to be amazed; and they are more likely than other
falsehoods to be *believed*, since the same passions conduce to
their uncritical reception. Hume, perhaps following Morgan, makes much
the same point in nearly the same words. But he goes beyond Morgan in
specifying a further exacerbating factor: the religious context of a
miracle claim, he urges, makes the telling of a miracle story even more
likely.



> 
> 
> [I]f the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there
> is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances,
> loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast,
> and imagine he sees what has no reality: He may know his narrative to
> be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the
> world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: Or even where this
> delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation,
> operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any
> other circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. (Hume
> 1748/2000: 89)
> 
> 




But as George Campbell points out (1762/1839: 48-49), this
consideration cuts both ways; the religious nature of the claim may
also operate to make it *less* readily received:



> 
> 
> [T]he prejudice resulting from the religious affection, may just as
> readily *obstruct* as *promote* our faith in a religious
> miracle. What things in nature are more contrary, than one religion is
> to another religion? They are just as contrary as light and darkness,
> truth and error. The affections with which they are contemplated by the
> same person, are just as opposite as desire and aversion, love and
> hatred. The same religious zeal which gives the mind of a Christian a
> *propensity* to the belief of a miracle in support of
> Christianity, will inspire him with an *aversion* from the
> belief of a miracle in support of Mahometanism. The same principle
> which will make him acquiesce in evidence *less* than sufficient
> in one case, will make him require evidence *more* than
> sufficient in the other....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ... [T]hat the evidence arising from miracles performed in proof
> of a doctrine disbelieved, and consequently hated before, did in fact
> surmount that obstacle, and conquer all the opposition arising thence,
> is a very strong presumption in favour of that evidence; just as strong
> a presumption in its favour, as it would have been against it, had all
> their former zeal, and principles, and prejudices, co-operated with the
> evidence, whatever it was, in gaining an entire assent.
> 
> 
> 




Moreover, as Campbell (1762/1839: 49) immediately points out,



> 
> 
> there is the greatest disparity in this respect, a disparity which
> deserves to be particularly attended to, betwixt the evidence of
> miracles performed in proof of a religion *to be* established,
> and in *contradiction* to opinions generally received; and the
> evidence of miracles performed in support of a religion
> *already* established, and in *confirmation* of opinions
> generally received.




It is, therefore, a debatable question whether the consideration of
the passions evoked by tales of the miraculous works for or against the
miracle claim in any given instance. This is not an issue that can be
settled in advance of a detailed consideration of the facts.


#### 3.2.3 The argument from ignorance and barbarism




A third general argument is that miracle stories are most popular in
backward cultures. As John Toland (1702: 148) puts it,



> 
> 
> it is very observable, that the more ignorant and barbarous any
> People remain, you shall find 'em most abound with Tales of this
> nature ...




The unstated moral to be drawn is that both the production and the
reception of miracle stories are due to a failure to understand the
secondary causes lying behind phenomena, while increasing knowledge and
culture leaves no room for such stories. Hume (2000: 90-91) also
borrowed this line of reasoning.




But the supposed trajectory of societies from ignorant superstition
to enlightened rationalism owes a good deal more to selective
illustration than one would suspect from reading Toland and Hume.
Campbell (1762/1839: 70) points out that in the *Qur'an*
Mohammed made no claim to work public miracles, though by
Toland's (and Hume's) reasoning the circumstances would
have been most propitious for such tales. Coming forward in time,
miracle stories abounded in the 18th century, as Hume well knew. And
renowned scientists such as Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle were well
known defenders of the Christian miracle claims. Other forces are at
work in the creation and acceptance of miracle stories besides the
relative level of civilization and education.


#### 3.2.4 The argument from parity




As a fourth and final argument, Hume sketches some accounts of
purported miracles outside of the canonical Christian
scriptures--two cures ascribed to Vespasian, one Catholic miracle
reported to have been worked at Saragossa, and some cures ascribed to
the influence of the tomb of the Jansenist Abbe Paris in the early
1700s--and suggests that their affidavits are in various respects
as good as one could wish for. Hume clearly expects his Protestant
readers to reject these stories with disdain. He leaves unstated the
obvious conclusion: by parity, his readers should also reject the
miracles of the New Testament.




Setting Protestants and Catholics by the ears over the miracles of
later ecclesiastical history was an old game by Hume's time, and
a small industry had grown up on the Protestant side providing criteria
for sifting the genuine apostolic miracles from their Catholic
counterfeits (Leslie 1697/1815, Douglas 1757, Warfield 1918). Hume's
contemporary critics rose to the challenge and argued vigorously that
his descriptions of the alleged "miracles," Pagan,
Catholic, and Jansenist, distorted the historical sources and were
hopelessly one sided (Leland 1755: 102 ff, Adams 1767: 74 ff, Campbell
1762/1839: 96 ff, Douglas 1757: 96 ff).




Aside from these specific criticisms, one important general line of
argument emerges in the criticisms, articulated well by Adams (1767:
73):



> 
> 
> There is a wide difference betwixt establishing false miracles, by
> the help of a false religion, and establishing a false religion by the
> help of false miracles. Nothing is more easy than the former of these,
> or more difficult than the latter.




All attempts to draw an evidential parallel between the miracles of
the New Testament and the miracle stories of later ecclesiastical
history are therefore dubious. There are simply more resources for
explaining how the ecclesiastical stories, which were promoted to an
established and favorably disposed audience, could have arisen and been
believed without there being any truth to the reports.


### 3.3 The impact of Hume's "Of Miracles"




Hume's critique of the credibility of reported miracles
provoked a tidal wave of responses, of which the most important are
Adams (1767), Leland (1755), Douglas (1757), Price (1777), and Campbell
(1762/1839). There is not yet anything approaching a comprehensive
survey of these responses. For limited but still useful historical
discussions of Hume and his influence, see Leland (1755: 47-135),
Lechler (1841: 425 ff), Farrar (1862: 148 ff), Stephen (1876: 309 ff),
Burns (1981: 131 ff), Craig (1985), Houston (1994: 49-82), Tweyman
(1996), Earman (2000), and Beauchamp's introduction to the
critical edition of Hume's *Enquiry* (Hume 1748/2000).




As Charles Sanders Peirce notes (Peirce 1958: 293), the Humean
in-principle argument has left an indelible impression on modern
biblical scholarship. Humean considerations are expressly invoked in
the work of the great German critic David Friedrich Strauss (1879:
199-200), transformed into one of the "presuppositions of
critical history" in the work of the philosopher F. H. Bradley
(1874/1935), rechristened as the "principle of analogy" in
the writings of the theologian Ernst Troeltsch (1913), and endorsed,
explicitly or implicitly, in many contemporary studies of the
historical Jesus (Dawes 2001: 97-106) and the New Testament (Ehrman
2003: 228-30). Commitment to something like Hume's position lies
on one side of a deep conceptual fault line that runs through the
discipline of biblical studies.




The Humean objection has also been vigorously contested as destructive
not only of miracle stories but of common sense as well. The 19th
century saw a proliferation of satires in which Humean scruples about
accepting testimony for extraordinary tales were applied to the events
of secular history, with consequences that are equally disastrous and
humorous (Whately 1819/1874, Hudson 1857, Buel 1894). Whately's
satire, which is the most famous, "establishes" on the
basis of many historical improbabilities that Napoleon never existed
but was a mythic figure invented by the British government to enhance
national unity. Each of these satires makes the same point. One may
legitimately require more evidence for a miracle story than for a
mundane story (Sherlock 1729/1843: 55); but in exaggerating this
sensible requirement into an insuperable epistemic barrier, Hume and
his followers are applying a standard that cannot be applied without
absurdity in any other field of historical investigation.




A curious feature of recent discussions is that Hume's
critique of reported miracles has itself come under heavy fire and is now viewed in some
quarters as requiring defense. For a range of views on the matter, see
Levine (1989: 152 ff), who maintains that Part 1 contains an argument
but that the argument is a failure, Johnson (1999), who argues that
Part 1 is confused and unclear and that various attempts to clarify it
have failed to elicit a compelling line of argument, Earman (2000), who
argues that Part 1 is an "abject failure," Fogelin
(2003), who aims to rehabilitate Hume against the critiques of Johnson
and Earman in particular, and Millican (2013), who argues vigorously that the interpretation of Hume's argument offered in Earman (2000) is flawed in multiple ways. Millican (2011) offers a sympathetic reconstruction of Hume's critique in the wider context of Hume's other metaphysical and epistemological work.



## 4. Arguments from Miracles




Granting for the sake of argument that a reported miracle, in the
sense of an event beyond the productive capacity of nature, has been
established, what follows? Historically, many participants in the
discussion have been ready to grant that, at least when the religious
significance of the event is obvious and the doctrine or claim it
ostensibly attests is not otherwise objectionable, the miracle must
have been worked by God and that it provides significant confirmation
for the doctrine or claim. Indeed, the enduring popularity of the
argument from miracles underscores the truth of Butler's
observation that miracles are one of the "direct and fundamental
proofs" of Christianity (Butler 1736/1819: 173).


### 4.1 Would miracles be evidence for the existence of God?




There are two exceptions to this general acquiescence in the
evidential value of miracles. First, there is a question regarding the
identity of the cause. If God alone can work miracles, this is easily
settled; but this claim has been a point of contention in the
theological literature, with some writers (Clarke 1719: 305 ff; Trench
1847) maintaining that lesser, created spirits may work miracles, while
others (e.g. Farmer 1771, Wardlaw 1852, Cooper 1876) vigorously deny
this. The point is of some interest to the evaluation of arguments for
miracles, since as Baden Powell points out, there is a
distinction



> 
> 
> between an *extraordinary fact*,--which is a proper
> matter for human *testimony*--and the belief in its being
> *caused by Divine interposition*, which is a matter of
> *opinion*, and consequently not susceptible of support by
> *testimony*, but dependent on quite other considerations.
> (Powell 1859: 287-88, following up on a distinction made in Less 1773:
> 260-62)




Powell is quite right to say that testimony is not the proper source
for evidence of the supernatural nature of the event. But it does not
follow that all opinions on the point are equally reasonable. The very
description of the event--and even more, of the context in which
it occurs--might render any naturalistic alternatives
non-starters. Whether this is the case will depend, not on general
considerations, but on the details of the case in question.




Second, it is occasionally argued that, contrary to what most
philosophers and theologians have assumed, actual confirmed cases of
miracles could not count in favor of the existence of God. George
Chryssides (1975) argues that a miracle, conceived as a violation of a
scientific law, could never be attributed to any agent, divine or
otherwise, since the assignment of agency implies predictability. This
bold contention has not attracted many defenders. Gregory Dawes (2009)
pursues a related but more moderate line of argument, urging that it is
difficult to meet the standard necessary to attribute particular events
to the personal agency of God. But Dawes does not present this as an
absolute barrier to theistic explanations.




Overall (1985) argues for the more radical contention that a miracle
would count as evidence *against* the existence of God, on three
grounds: (1) if order and harmony are evidence for the existence of
God, then a miracle, which entails a breach in the order and harmony of
the universe, must count against the existence of God; (2) the
inevitable controversies over the identification and authentication of
a miracle are an impediment to the growth of scientific knowledge and
philosophical comprehension; and (3) an omnipotent God who does
intervene in His creation would be obliged, on pain of moral defect, to
intervene more often and more evenhandedly than He is supposed to have
done in the Christian tradition.




These considerations have not, however, moved many philosophers to
endorse Overall's position. Argument (1), besides giving a
tendentious characterization of a miracle, exemplifies a fallacy in
probabilistic reasoning, assuming that if \(F\) entails \({\sim}E\)
and \(E\) is evidence for \(H\), then \(F\) is evidence against \(H\),
which is not in general true. Claim (2) is arguably simply false, as
such controversies do not appear noticeably to have impeded the
progress of science or philosophy. Argument (3) will be effective
against a certain sort of theological position, but it is not one that
many believers in miracles actually hold. For further discussion of
this issue, see the exchanges between Larmer and Overall (Larmer 1988:
75-82, Overall 1997, Overall 2003, and Larmer 2004).


### 4.2 How much would credible miracle reports establish?




In the final analysis, the relevance of background beliefs looms
large. To say this is not to endorse a lazy and unprincipled
relativism; rather, the point is that one's considered rational
judgment regarding the existence and nature of God must take into
account far more than the evidence for miracle claims. That is not to
say that they could not be an important or even, under certain
circumstances, a decisive piece of evidence; it is simply that neither
a positive nor a negative claim regarding the existence of God can be
established on the basis of evidence for a miracle claim alone, without
any consideration of other aspects of the question.




For the evidence for a miracle claim, being public and empirical, is
never strictly demonstrative, either as to the fact of the event or as
to the supernatural cause of the event. It remains possible, though the
facts in the case may in principle render it wildly improbable, that
the testifier is either a deceiver or himself deceived; and so long as
those possibilities exist, there will be logical space for other forms
of evidence to bear on the conclusion. Arguments about miracles
therefore take their place as one piece--a fascinating
piece--in a larger and more important puzzle.