## 1. Conceptual Matters



In analyzing gratitude and the conditions under which it is called
for, philosophers have generally tried to account for all the cases in
which we find it natural to use gratitude terms
("grateful", "thankful", etc.). We use such
terms in a broad range of circumstances: it sounds natural to say, for
instance, "I am grateful that it did not rain on my wedding
day;" "grateful someone happened to walk by as I was being
mugged;" "grateful to someone for trying unsuccessfully to
help me;" "grateful for someone's
well-wishes." The breadth of circumstances in which we invoke
gratitude terms would suggest that gratitude, generally, is the
response a person should have to something good--that is, to
benefit or "favour" (Walker 1980-1981).



In the last 40 years, philosophers have begun paying attention to a
fundamental distinction in how we use gratitude terms (Walker
1980-1981; Card 1988; McAleer 2012; Manela 2016a). On one hand,
such terms can be used just before the preposition "to",
as in



*Y* is grateful *to* *R* *for*
ph-ing,



where *Y* is some beneficiary, *R* is some benefactor,
and ph is (at least paradigmatically) something *R* has done
that was beneficial for *Y*. Tony Manela (2016a) calls the
attitude expressed by this type of locution *prepositional*
gratitude. On the other hand, gratitude terms are sometimes followed
by the word "that" and a proposition, as in



*Y* is grateful *that* *p*, 



where *p* represents some state of affairs *Y* finds
beneficial. Sean McAleer (2012) calls the attitude expressed by this
type of locution *propositional* gratitude. Prepositional
gratitude is essentially a "triadic" or three-place
relation between *Y*, *R*, and ph. Propositional
gratitude, by contrast, is a "dyadic" or two-place
relation between *Y* and some good state of affairs *p*.
Propositional gratitude is best understood as the proper response to a
good state of affairs. Prepositional gratitude, on the other hand, is
the proper response to something more specific: a benefactor's
doing or having done something beneficial for the beneficiary. Unlike
propositional gratitude, prepositional gratitude is an essentially
interpersonal phenomenon.



A consensus is emerging that analyses of the concept of gratitude
should be concerned only with the phenomenon expressed by the
prepositional sense of the term (Carr 2013; Gulliford, Morgan et al.
2013; Manela 2016a; Roberts and Telech 2019). The consensus is based
on the observation that the propositional sense of
"gratitude" is more or less identical to another concept:
the concept called *appreciation* or *gladness*. To say
that I am grateful *that* it did not rain on my wedding day,
for instance, is just to say that I am *glad* it did not. To
say that I am grateful *that* my cancer went into remission is
just to say I am *glad* that it did and that I
*appreciate* the extra life and health that state of affairs
entails. By contrast, to say I am grateful *to* a good
Samaritan for saving my life implies more than that I am glad, or
appreciate the fact, *that* I was saved by her. To be grateful
*to* such a person seems to imply, for instance, a desire to
see her fare well, or a commitment to helping her out in the future,
should she ever find herself in dire circumstances. (Other ways in
which appreciation and gratitude are different can be found in
 section 3.)
 As the good Samaritan case suggests, prepositional gratitude and
appreciation are called for in many of the same situations. Indeed,
appreciation may be called for in every situation in which
prepositional gratitude is called for. But as the earlier examples
suggested, there are times when appreciation is called for but
gratitude is not. Insofar as philosophers are interested in analyzing
gratitude proper, without having their analyses contaminated by such
cases of *mere* or *bare* appreciation, they should
focus their attention on all and only instances of the essentially
interpersonal kind of gratitude--instances where a beneficiary is
grateful *to* a benefactor *for* something she did. In
keeping with this emerging consensus, the remaining sections of this
entry will be concerned only with the concept of prepositional
gratitude: the response called for in a beneficiary to a
benefactor's having done something beneficent for him.


## 2. When Gratitude is Owed



Philosophers debate the specific conditions under which gratitude is
called for in a beneficiary--that is, the conditions under which
beneficiary *Y* owes gratitude to benefactor *R*, and
*R* deserves gratitude from *Y*, as a result of
*R*'s ph-ing. This debate focuses on several features
of *Y*, *R*, and *R*'s ph-ing.



*Whether R must be an agent*. Most philosophers agree that at
the very least, benefactor *R* must be an *agent* in
order for *Y* to owe gratitude to *R* for ph-ing.
Indeed, this is suggested by the fact that ph in the formulation of
prepositional gratitude (*Y* is grateful to *R* for
ph-ing) paradigmatically represents an intentional verb. Two
notable skeptics of the "agency requirement" on gratitude
are Sean McAleer (2012) and Karen Bardsley (2013). McAleer points out
that people sometimes purport to be grateful to inanimate objects. He
gives the example of a prospector who finds gold on a mountain and
then claims to be grateful to that mountain for yielding its bounty to
him. The plausibility of the prospector's claim in that case need not
imply that gratitude to inanimate objects is appropriate, however. The
plausibility of his claim could be chalked up to his implicitly
anthropomorphizing the "benefactor", attributing to it the
ability to *give* a benefit when it, strictly speaking, lacks
the agency to do so. Manela (2016a) argues that the prospector in
McAleer's example might, on reflection, be just as accurately
described as glad or appreciative *that* he found gold on the
mountain. A more recent critique of the "agency
requirement" comes from Karen Bardsley (2013), who argues that
*Y*'s gratitude can be appropriate toward something,
*R*, when two conditions are met: 1) *R* has benefited
*Y* in a way *Y* did not deserve, and 2) that benefit
was not the result of an accidental or regrettable feature of
*R*. Insofar as conditions 1) and 2) are sufficient for
gratitude to be warranted, and *R*'s being an agent is
not necessary for 1) and 2), *R*'s being an agent is
not necessary for gratitude to be warranted. This argument, if
successful, has important implications for environmental ethics,
because it implies the possibility of appropriate gratitude to
beneficial natural non-agents like non-sentient organisms, ecosystems,
or the whole of nature. Manela (2018) has objected to Bardsley's
argument by putting forward counterexamples to the claim that her
conditions 1) and 2) are sufficient for the appropriateness of
gratitude. If Manela is right, then 1) and 2) entail the
appropriateness of appreciation and praise but not gratitude; and we
can only be appropriately grateful to natural objects that exhibit
some kind of agency, like dolphins.



*Whether ph must be an action*. Among philosophers, there is
general agreement that benefactor *R* must *act* in some
way that concerns beneficiary *Y* in order to deserve
*Y*'s gratitude. Two exceptions in the literature are
worth noting. In the first place, Saul Smilansky (1997) argues that
*Y* sometimes should be grateful to *R* for
*abstaining* from harming *Y*, at least when certain
conditions are met--e.g., in cases when abstaining from harming
someone goes beyond the call of duty, or requires effort and sacrifice
(see the remainder of this section for a more detailed analysis of
those conditions). In these cases, *R*'s ph-ing, for
which *Y* would be grateful, would be an omission or a
refraining rather than an act. A second exception is Kant
(1775-1780 [1981]), who writes that something like gratitude is
owed or called for in response to mere "heartfelt
benevolence", even in the absence of any acts or attempts on the
part of the benefactor. Kant refers to this response as
"gratefulness" rather than gratitude.



*Whether R must have ph-ed intentionally.* Most philosophers
hold that *Y* owes *R* gratitude only if *R*
ph-ed intentionally. Some philosophers have argued that gratitude
is not warranted in response to all intentional acts, but only those
that are *voluntary* (Simmons 1979). On this view, if
*R* benefits *Y* only because *R* has a gun to
her head, she does not deserve *Y*'s gratitude, even if
she benefited *Y* intentionally. Other philosophers specify
that in order for gratitude to be warranted, *R*'s
ph-ing must have been intentional under the description
"benefiting *Y*" (Manela 2016a). On this view, if
*R* phs unintentionally, or intentionally under the
description "harming *X*", and thereby incidentally
happens to benefit *Y*, *Y* would not owe *R*
gratitude for ph-ing (though *Y*'s
*appreciation* for *R*'s ph-ing may be
warranted). This view, if correct, might have an intriguing
implication for children's gratitude to their parents. Some
philosophers have argued that to intentionally create a child does not
amount to benefiting that child, since to benefit someone is to make
him better off than he was before, and when one chooses to bring a
child into existence, there was no child there before that choice who
could be made better off by it. If this is true, then parents who
intentionally bring children into existence cannot do so under the
description "benefiting those children", insofar as we
cannot intend the impossible; and if intention to benefit is necessary
for gratitude to be warranted, children's gratitude to their
parents for bringing them into existence is never warranted.
Philosophers who hold this view (e.g., McConnell 1993) can of course
still hold that children owe their parents gratitude for benefits
their parents conferred on their children after bringing them into
existence.



Not all philosophers accept the "intentionality
requirement" on gratitude. Those who do not endorse it include
Bardsley (2013), for reasons mentioned earlier in this section, and
Patrick Fitzgerald (1998), who denies that *R* must have
ph-ed intentionally under the description "benefiting
*Y*" in order for gratitude to be warranted. According to
Fitzgerald, *Y*'s gratitude to *R* for harming him
might be called for if there was some benefit that came about for
*Y* because of that harm. Thus it might be the case that the
Dalai Lama, Fitzgerald argues, should be grateful to the Chinese
government for persecuting him, insofar as that persecution gave him
the opportunity to become more virtuous. Manela (2016a) disputes this,
arguing that it is more accurate to say that the Dalai Lama should
*appreciate* the opportunity the Chinese gave him by trying to
harm him but should not be grateful *to* them for
"*providing*" it.



There is some disagreement among philosophers about whether
*R*'s intention to benefit *Y* must be
*R*'s *only* motive in ph-ing. Most
philosophers allow that *R* may have other motives for
ph-ing, noting that our motives are almost always mixed (see, e.g.,
McConnell 1993). Some philosophers argue, however, that the presence
of certain intentions might render a particular act of beneficence
less than gratitude-worthy. Weiss (1985) argues that whatever her
other motives, *R* must not benefit *Y* with the
intention of gaining standing to demand a return in the future, as
this would render *R*'s ph-ing a sort of lending,
rather than a gratitude-worthy act of beneficence. Berger (1975),
McConnell (1993) and Manela (2015) also argue that such an intention
might reduce or eliminate the amount of gratitude owed to
*R*.



*Whether R's ph-ing must be supererogatory*. There is
also debate over whether *Y* can owe *R* gratitude for
ph-ing if *R* was *obligated* to ph, or if
*Y* had a *right* to *R*'s ph-ing. Heyd
(1982), Weiss (1985), Walker (1980-1981), Card (1988), and
Macnamara (2019) all argue that *Y* does not owe gratitude to
*R* for doing something *R* was already obligated to do
anyway or that *Y* had a right to, and that gratitude is owed
only in response to *supererogatory* acts. Other philosophers
disagree, citing various counterexamples. Simmons (1979), for
instance, claims that I owe gratitude to a good Samaritan who stops to
offer me assistance, even though such acts are obligatory. Lyons
(1969) argues that while I may not owe gratitude to a lifeguard for
saving my life, I may owe him gratitude for having freely taken up the
obligation to do so. Seneca (*On Benefits*) claims that
gratitude may be owed for an obligatory act if the benefactor had
gratitude-worthy motives beyond the motive to fulfill her obligation,
and these gratitude-worthy motives were decisive in motivating her.
Bennett Helm (2019) argues that I can owe gratitude to someone who
dutifully upholds (but does not necessarily exceed) an obligatory
social norm, when his upholding that norm is "notable" and
demonstrates recognition respect for me. Finally, it might be argued
that a benefactor who benefits me in fulfilling her duty deserves
gratitude insofar as living up to her duty required extraordinary
sacrifice on her part (McConnell 1993: 16; Seneca *On
Benefits*: III.19.12-13), or insofar as her living up to her
duty makes her a "moral standout" among so many other
similarly situated people who fail to fulfill such duties (McConnell
2017). The captured soldier who resists torture long enough for her
companions to reach safety seems to deserve gratitude, despite doing
no more than her duty (refraining from giving the enemy valuable
information). These examples suggest that perhaps ph's
*praiseworthiness*, rather than ph's
supererogatoriness, is a necessary condition for *Y*'s
owing gratitude to *R*. This possibility is challenged by the
fact that sometimes, it seems a beneficiary *Y* may owe
gratitude to a benefactor who was obligated to give away some
particular benefit to someone, and happened to choose *Y* as
the recipient. McConnell (1993) gives the example of a student who is
required by her instructor to volunteer at a charitable organization
of her choice. When she chooses *Y*'s organization, her
action is neither supererogatory nor praiseworthy; but it seems she
still deserves gratitude from *Y*.



*Whether R must incur some liability in ph-ing*. Several of
the examples in the last paragraph suggest that gratitude is owed to
*R* only if *R* *incurred some liability* in
ph-ing. On this view, gratitude is due only when the benefactor
incurs some cost, sacrifice or risk in ph-ing (Simmons 1979: 178;
Weiss 1985: 495). Upon reflection, this condition may be too
stringent. It would seem to rule out, for instance, the possibility of
gratitude to an omnipotent god, who, in virtue of his omnipotence,
would sacrifice little or nothing in acting beneficently. It also
seems to rule out the possibility of gratitude in McConnell's
example at the end of the last paragraph. In response to these
worries, it might be pointed out that agents (perhaps even an
omnipotent god) always incur opportunity costs in deciding to bestow
benefits on one beneficiary and not another.



*Whether R's ph-ing must actually benefit R*. Most
philosophers agree that *R*'s ph-ing need not result
in *Y*'s *actually* being benefited in order for
*R* to deserve *Y*'s gratitude. Some philosophers
suggest that the mere offer of a benefit, even if it is not accepted,
calls for gratitude in the offeree (Camenisch 1981). Others argue that
gratitude may be called for in response to *R*'s
*attempt* at benefiting *Y*, even if the attempt does
not succeed. There is a parallel here with the conditions under which
resentment or blame are deserved. If one agent intends, plans and
attempts to harm another, then it seems he deserves resentment and
blame, even if his attempts were thwarted at the last minute by
chance. By the same token, if *R* intends, plans and sacrifices
in an attempt to benefit *Y*, but finds her attempts thwarted
at the last minute by chance, it seems she still deserves gratitude.
This claim may not be absolute. Dowling (1995), for instance, argues
that if *R* inadvertently harms *Y* in attempting to
benefit him, gratitude may not be owed. This may be true especially in
cases where *R* knew, or should have known, that ph-ing
would expose *Y* to non-negligible risk of harm.



*Whether Y wants or accepts R's ph-ing*. Philosophers
also debate whether certain features of the beneficiary are necessary
for gratitude to be owed. Simmons (1979), for instance, claims that
*Y* owes *R* no gratitude for benefits *R* forced
on *Y* against *Y*'s will. Furthermore, it seems,
*Y* must *want* *R*'s benefit in order for
gratitude to be called for. If *R* delivers a benefit without
*Y*'s desire or consent to receive it, this may betray a
disregard for *Y*'s autonomy that would ultimately
undermine *R*'s desert of gratitude (Berger 1975;
Camenisch 1981; Meilaender 1984: 168). This condition seems too
stringent in cases where a beneficiary desperately needs a benefit but
is not able to accept it, say, because of incapacitation. In response
to such worries, Simmons adds the proviso that if *Y* does not
*actually* want the benefit, it may suffice for gratitude to be
owed that *Y* *would* want the benefit if certain
"impairing conditions" (such as drunkenness, mental
disorder or ignorance) were removed. Still, some philosophers think
gratitude may be called for in the absence of both *Y*'s
desire and such impairing conditions. McConnell (1993), for instance,
argues that a child who accepts an offer of college tuition from a
benefactor owes that benefactor gratitude, even if she does not want
to go to college.



Simmons (1979) argues for a further necessary condition for
*Y*'s owing gratitude to *R*: that *Y* must
not want the benefit in question *not* *to come from R*.
*Y* may not want his once-abusive father to pay for his college
education, for example, in which case *Y* would not owe his
father gratitude for doing so, even if *Y* might have been
happy to accept the same benefit from anyone else. McConnell (1993)
and Weiss (1985) disagree, arguing that while it may sometimes be
emotionally difficult for a beneficiary to be grateful to a particular
benefactor for ph-ing, beneficiaries might still owe their
benefactors gratitude under such circumstances (especially if the
beneficiary accepts the benefit).



*Two remarks about the role of these conditions*. In
considering the conditions under which beneficiary *Y* owes
gratitude to benefactor *R* for ph-ing, two points should be
noted. The first is that the question of whether gratitude is owed is
not necessarily settled once and for all in the moment that *R*
ph's. Even if *R*'s ph-ing makes it the case
that *Y* owes *R* gratitude, some future harm or wrong
on *R*'s part might render *Y*'s gratitude
for *R*'s ph-ing no longer called for (McConnell 1993:
29-30). This might happen if, for example, *R* recklessly
or malevolently destroys a gift she gave *Y*. Gratitude may
also cease to be called for if *R*, subsequent to
gratitude-worthily ph-ing, demands a return or compensation for
having ph-ed (insofar as such a demand would seem to render
*R*'s ph-ing more of a loan than a gratitude-worthy
act of benevolence or beneficence) (Weiss 1985), or tries to use the
fact of his having ph-ed to manipulate *Y* by guilting him
into doing something (Berger 1975). 



A second point worth noting is that while these conditions are often
discussed as necessary (and perhaps jointly sufficient) conditions for
gratitude's being called for, they can also be seen as factors
that *modulate* how much and what sort of gratitude is owed.
The proper response to mere "heartfelt benevolence" on
*R*'s part might be no more than a similar feeling of
goodwill from *Y* to *R*. On the other hand, if
*R* sacrifices greatly in voluntarily and successfully
conveying substantial and much-needed benefit on *Y*, the
gratitude *Y* owes *R* may take the form of a strong
intention or willingness to sacrifice to a similar degree if
*R* ever finds herself in need.


## 3. The Elements of the Grateful Response



Gratitude, understood as the response called for in *Y* to
*R*'s ph-ing when certain conditions (discussed in
 section 2)
 are met, is a complex phenomenon. It consists of certain beliefs,
feelings and behavioral tendencies, without each of which a
beneficiary fails to count as fully grateful. The elements of the
grateful response can be broken down into four categories: cognitive,
affective, communicative, and conative.


### 3.1 Cognitive Elements



As a response to beneficence, gratitude seems to include certain
*judgments* or *beliefs*--at the very least, the
belief that an act of beneficence has occurred (Berger 1975: 302;
Walker 1980-1981: 51; Manela 2019). In the absence of such
judgments, we would be hard pressed to call a beneficiary grateful. A
beneficiary who failed to judge that an act of beneficence had been
performed would be unlikely to have the feelings or exhibit the
behaviors a grateful person ought to have and do (see sections
 3.2,
 3.3, and
 3.4
 below). Such feelings and behaviors, after all, do not arise *ex
nihilo* in normal people, so without a sufficient reason, we would
expect them not to arise.



The precise content of grateful beliefs may vary, depending on the
nature of the act of beneficence in response to which they are called
for. They may, for instance, include the belief, on *Y*'s
part, that benefactor *R* is especially brave, or especially
thoughtful, or especially self-sacrificing. They may include the
belief, on *Y*'s part, that *R* cares a great deal
about *Y* (Berger 1975), and perhaps, relatedly, that
*Y* is *worthy* of being cared about to such an extent
(Shaw 2013, Manela 2019). Some have argued that all instances of
gratitude have a certain cognitive element in common: a belief in or
an awareness of one's dependence on others--the sort of
awareness typically associated with humility (McAleer 2012; Roberts
2014). These philosophers argue that humility is an essential part of
gratitude, and that being humble is always part of being grateful.
Manela (2016a) argues that this generalization may be overstated.
Humility-related beliefs may be a part of a grateful
beneficiary's response to a benefit that he desperately needed
and could not provide for himself. But if *R* benefits
*Y* by doing something that *Y* was perfectly capable of
doing for himself (and something *Y* himself has done for
others in the past), then *Y* could be grateful to *R*
without, in that instance, being aware of any dependence he might have
on others.



Though the content of grateful beliefs may vary, a beneficiary must
form more than just the belief that something good has happened to
him, if he is to qualify as grateful *to* *R*. If a
benevolent stranger saves my life at great risk to herself, and I
consequently form no beliefs about her as an agent (e.g., that she is
a benevolent or brave person, or that she cares about me), then I fail
to be grateful *to* her--though I may be grateful
*that* she saved me if I form the belief that something good
has happened to me. The difference in the content of the beliefs
called for in response to benefit from an agent, on the one hand, and
benefit more generally, on the other, is yet another way in which
prepositional gratitude is distinguished from propositional
"gratitude", or appreciation (see
 section 1).



Gratitude calls not only for the formation of certain beliefs, but for
their *persistence* as well. A beneficiary who forgets an act
of beneficence (or, at least, forgets too quickly) seems to fall short
of what gratitude calls for (Aquinas II-II, q. 104, art. 1;
Seneca *On Benefits*: II.10.4; III.5.2). In fact, according to
Seneca, a beneficiary who forgets a benefit is "the worst and
most ungrateful" of beneficiaries--perhaps because merely
remembering a benefit is the easiest part of being grateful (Seneca
*On Benefits*: III.5.2).


### 3.2 Affective Elements



Most philosophers agree that in addition to certain beliefs, gratitude
calls for certain *feelings* or *affects* in a
beneficiary, without which he fails to count as grateful. One notable
exception is Hichem Naar (2019), who argues that mere grateful
beliefs, unaccompanied by feelings, can constitute a shallow kind of
gratitude he calls "generic gratitude", typically
appropriate in response to trivial favors. Even Naar, however,
acknowledges that "deep gratitude" includes certain
feelings.



Philosophers largely agree that feelings of gratitude--the
feelings that partly constitute a beneficiary's being
grateful--are positive and agreeable feelings (Fitzgerald 1998;
Bruton 2003). Some philosophers claim that an act of beneficence
should incite feelings of *joy* and *pleasure* in the
grateful beneficiary--and not just because of the benefit, but
because he has benefited as a result of someone's benevolence
toward him (Camenisch 1981; Card 1988; McConnell 1993; Seneca *On
Benefits*). Still others claim that gratitude entails a certain
*affection* for the benefactor (Bruton 2003). These
generalizations may not apply to gratitude in all cases, however. As
Manela (2016b) notes, feelings of gratitude can sometimes be quite
negative (i.e., painful or disagreeable): a beneficiary whose
benefactor sacrifices terribly in conferring her benefit on him should
probably feel grief or sadness, rather than joy or pleasure, insofar
as he is grateful to her. And the proper response to a benefit from a
benefactor one finds loathsome need not amount to affection.



Several philosophers suggest that as far as feelings go, gratitude
requires some degree of *goodwill* toward a benefactor,
understood as wishing a benefactor well (Walker 1980-1981;
Herman 2012). Goodwill in this sense should be understood not strictly
speaking as an affect, but as a *disposition* to have certain
affects in certain situations--what we might call an
*affective disposition* (Manela 2016b). For a beneficiary to
have goodwill toward his benefactor is for the beneficiary to have
dispositions to be pleased if things go well for her and a disposition
to be sad or upset when things go poorly for her (Manela 2016b).
Insofar as goodwill is necessary for gratitude, it may mark another
distinction between prepositional gratitude and propositional
"gratitude" (Manela 2016a). I can be perfectly grateful
*that* it did not rain on my wedding day without wishing anyone
well. By contrast, it seems that I fail to be grateful *to* a
benefactor if I fail to wish her well after she does me a good
turn.



Gratitude seems to call not only for the presence of certain affective
elements, but the *diminution* or *absence* of certain
affective elements as well. In particular, one affective disposition
thought to be inconsistent or incompatible with gratitude is
*resentment*: an affective disposition to feel pleasure when a
benefactor suffers, and displeasure when she fares well (Camenisch
1981: 24; McConnell 1993: 83; Fitzgerald 1998: 131, fn 143; Bruton
2003: 3; Roberts 2004: 69; Costello 2006: 270). Insofar as there was
resentment between a benefactor and beneficiary before an act of
benevolence, a grateful beneficiary will be inclined to experience
less resentment after the fact. A beneficiary who, in response to an
act of benevolence, forms proper grateful beliefs but experiences
*increased* resentment toward his benefactor (perhaps out of
envy for her virtuously benevolent disposition) is guilty of an
especially vicious kind of ingratitude (see
 section 3.5).
 The fact that a beneficiary could form appropriate grateful beliefs
but still instantiate ingratitude (by consequently resenting his
benefactor) undermines the claim that grateful beliefs are sufficient
for a beneficiary to count as grateful in any meaningful sense--a
claim Naar (2019) has tried to argue regarding what he calls
"generic gratitude".


### 3.3 Communicative Elements



In addition to feelings and beliefs, gratitude also seems to require
an act of or tendency to *acknowledge* a benefactor's act
of benevolence, and/or to *communicate*, *demonstrate*
or *express* grateful beliefs and feelings to the benefactor. A
beneficiary who lacks any motivation to show or inform his benefactor
of his grateful attitudes (perhaps, say, because he is overly
prideful) seems to fall short of what gratitude requires, even if he
has the appropriate feelings and beliefs regarding her.



Gratitude is generally communicated verbally, by thanking; but the
demonstration, expression or communication of gratitude can occur
through certain behaviors as well--such as presenting a
benefactor with a thank-you gift, or doing her a return-favor. Some
philosophers argue that expression or demonstration of grateful
attitudes may in fact *require* certain such nonverbal
behaviors. Berger (1975) and Swinburne (1989), for instance, argue
that if a benefactor's act of benevolence was especially great,
only a return-favor or thank-you gift that is obviously costly to the
beneficiary will suffice as an adequate demonstration of especially
intense feelings and beliefs of gratitude. Whether the acts of
presenting a benefactor with a thank-you gift or doing her a favor in
the future serve *only* this demonstrative or expressive
function is disputed (see
 section 3.4.2).



As far as verbal expressions of thanks go, philosophers agree that the
grateful beneficiary's thanks should be sincere; but what
exactly sincerity consists in will depend on what sort of speech-act
thanking turns out to be. For philosophers who consider thanking an
*expressive*, thanks will be sincere insofar as they accurately
reflect grateful beliefs and feelings that are actually present in a
beneficiary. Other philosophers suggest that thanks might be sincere
even if a beneficiary lacks the requisite grateful feelings and
attitudes at the time of thanking. Camenisch (1981), for instance,
suggests that thanking might sometimes be a
*commissive*--a speech-act through which a beneficiary
commits himself to developing grateful beliefs, feelings and other
dispositions that he may not have at the time of thanking. There is a
parallel here with forgiveness, which may sometimes be granted even
when the forgiver has not yet rid himself of resentful feelings toward
his malefactor. In such cases, it might still be fair to say the
forgiver was sincere in his utterance, if we understand "I
forgive you" to imply the forgiver's commitment to ridding
himself of such feelings (Griswold 2007).


### 3.4 Conative Elements



In addition to certain beliefs, certain feelings, and thanking,
gratitude seems to require certain *behaviors* (or
*tendencies*) on the part of the beneficiary, such as the
giving of thank-you gifts or the doing of return-favors. There is
debate among philosophers about exactly what behaviors are required
for a beneficiary to count as grateful and about how such behaviors
should be motivated in a conscientious beneficiary.


#### 3.4.1 Grateful Behavior



Several philosophers argue that a beneficiary must treat a
benefactor's benefit in certain ways in order to count as
grateful. Seneca (*On Benefits*), for instance, claims that
*accepting the benefactor's gift* in the first place is
necessary for gratitude, since turning down a gift is likely to
frustrate or disappoint a benefactor, or signal an unwillingness to
advance a friendship. (Whether turning down a gift actually
constitutes ingratitude is discussed in
 section 4.3,
 below.) Once beneficiaries accept or receive gifts or favors,
Camenisch (1981) argues that beneficiaries must respect certain
"use conditions" on the benefits they receive--i.e.,
not treat such benefits in a way obviously repugnant to the
benefactor, or antithetical to her reasonable hopes for how the gift
would be enjoyed. If I accept a rare edition of Kant's works,
and then summarily toss it in the trash, this may instantiate a sort
of ingratitude. In certain cases, gratitude might also require that a
beneficiary *compensate* his benefactor for certain costs she
incurred in providing the benefit. If a good Samaritan damages her car
in rushing me to the hospital, offering to pay for the damage might be
called for (Simmons 1979).



Gratitude also seems to require a desire, tendency or willingness to
benefit the benefactor in the future--say, by returning a favor,
or buying a thank-you gift. Some philosophers argue that such a
tendency of *reciprocity* is ultimately fundamentally different
from gratitude (Feinberg 1966). It might be fairer to say, however,
that while reciprocity can be conceptualized apart from gratitude
(e.g., as a component of justice), gratitude *entails*
reciprocity. After all, a beneficiary who is devoid of any inclination
to reciprocate a favor seems to fall short of gratitude--even if
he has the appropriate beliefs and feelings toward his benefactor, and
has expressed thanks (Manela 2016a). This seems especially clear in
cases where a benefactor requests a reasonable favor from a
beneficiary, and the beneficiary refuses to accede to it (Bruton
2003). Outside the case of requests, though, benefactors seem to have
a great deal of latitude in when and how they return a favor or
present a thank-you gift to a benefactor (Simmons 1979). If *R*
gives *Y* an unexpected gift, *Y* should be inclined to
do something nice, of roughly equal magnitude, for *R* in the
future; but he seems to have a great deal of discretion in what he
does and when. Within this latitude, however, it has been argued that
a truly grateful beneficiary would not return a benefit too soon, or
too similar in kind, or too close in value (Camenisch 1981; Meilaender
1984). Such responses might be interpreted by the benefactor as
"payment" for the "gift", and might be taken
as an attempt to reject the benefit *qua* benevolent gift or
favor.



Aside from an inclination to reciprocate a benefit, grateful
beneficiaries should also be especially inclined to refrain from
harming their benefactors (Walker 1980-1981). We can call this
tendency grateful *nonmaleficence* (Manela 2015). Beneficiaries
should be disinclined to harm anyone, of course, insofar as harming
others is generally morally wrong. But there are circumstances in
which harming others is not necessarily wrong; and in these
circumstances, we might expect a grateful beneficiary's special
disinclination to harm a benefactor to make a difference in his
behavior. Imagine that *Y* is a morally upstanding and
successful businessman in a fair market, whose legitimate business
activities have begun driving his nearby competitors out of business.
Driving competitors out of business under such conditions certainly
amounts to harming them, though this sort of harm is not necessarily
wrong. Imagine, however, that *Y* discovers one of his
vulnerable competitors to be *R*, a former benefactor who
sacrificed greatly in performing an act of benevolence for him years
earlier. It seems plausible that *Y*, insofar as he is
grateful, should go out of his way to spare her from financial harm
(perhaps, say, by refraining from marketing his products in her
region). At the very least, if *Y* had no special compunction
about driving *R* out of business, we would be hard-pressed to
say he was fully grateful to her. A beneficiary, then, should be
especially disinclined to harm a benefactor, and should perhaps
refrain from harming her in certain situations where he might
reasonably be willing to harm a stranger. 


#### 3.4.2 Grateful Reasons and Motivation



In order to instantiate gratitude, each of these behaviors must be
done for certain reasons and must be motivated in a certain way.
Consider first the sorts of reasons a grateful beneficiary should have
for behaving gratefully--the sorts of considerations he should
take as counting in favor of returning a favor, say, or buying a
thank-you gift. Virtually all philosophers agree that a beneficiary
who benefits a benefactor merely for *prudential reasons* falls
short of gratitude. For example, a beneficiary who returns a favor
because he is afraid of being labeled an ingrate, or because he wants
to keep a benefactor's benevolence flowing, seems to fall short
of gratitude (McConnell 1993). Beyond this, however, there is some
disagreement among philosophers about what reasons count as legitimate
ones for performing grateful behavior.



According to some philosophers, the fact that grateful behavior, like
returning a favor, can demonstrate or express grateful beliefs and
feelings should count in favor of doing them (see
 section 3.3).
 But such *demonstrativeness reasons* cannot be the only
legitimate reasons that count in favor of grateful behavior. As Walker
(1980-1981) notes, if the only legitimate reason a beneficiary
might have to perform grateful behavior was to express or communicate
gratitude, then a beneficiary should take himself to have no special
reason to do a favor for a benefactor secretly or anonymously. And
yet, intuitively, a beneficiary who takes himself to have no reason to
do a good turn for a benefactor upon realizing he won't get
credit for it seems to fall short of gratitude. This suggests that a
beneficiary should be motivated to do certain things for a benefactor
for reasons other than demonstrating or communicating gratitude.



Walker (1980-1981) suggests that the main reason a grateful
beneficiary should take to count in favor of performing some grateful
behavior, ps, is that ps-ing will advance the interests of the
benefactor in some way. We might think of these as *reasons of
grateful beneficence* (Fitzgerald 1998). Walker's suggestion
is supported by the fact that all the grateful behaviors in the
previous subsection have in common the fact that each tends to advance
or protect the interests of the benefactor. Grateful reciprocity and
nonmaleficence advance or protect a benefactor's
*welfare* interests, while respecting use conditions and
accepting benefits advance a benefactor's *ulterior*
interests. Even certain paradigmatically expressive
"behaviors", like verbally thanking, mentioned in
 section 3.3,
 can be construed as advancing the interests of a benefactor, insofar
as benefactors have interests in being recognized for their
benevolence, or knowing that their benevolence accomplished its
goal.



Aside from reasons of demonstrativeness and grateful beneficence,
philosophers have proposed several other types of reasons a grateful
beneficiary might take to count in favor of grateful behaviors.
Fitzgerald (1998), for instance, claims that there are six types of
potentially legitimate reasons for performing grateful actions.
*Juridical* reasons are cited when a benefactor deserves or
merits gratitude. *Beneficent* or *nonmaleficent*
reasons are cited when showing gratitude will help someone, or spare
her from harm. *Caring* reasons are cited when the
justification for grateful action is primarily to enhance or preserve
a special relationship. *Civic* reasons are cited when
gratitude is shown to enhance communal relationships.
*Perfectionist* justifications are cited when a beneficiary
acts gratefully in order to develop certain other virtues within
himself. Ultimately, Fitzgerald may be guilty of conflating moral
reasons a beneficiary might legitimately take into account in
deliberation about grateful behavior, on one hand, with reasons why it
would be good if a beneficiary were to act gratefully, on the other.
In general, just because my having some attitude or intention will
have morally good consequences does not necessarily constitute the
right kind of reason for me to have that attitude. An analogy with
beliefs is helpful here. There might be all sorts of reasons why it
would be good for me to believe that *p*; but the only reasons
that will count as the right sorts of reasons for me to believe that
*p* are reasons that speak in favor of *p*'s
truth. By the same token, while many good effects may follow from a
beneficiary's performing acts of gratitude, not all of those
facts will count as the right sorts of reason for a deliberating
beneficiary to take into account. Caring reasons, civic reasons, and
perfectionist reasons may ultimately fail to count as the right sort
of reasons to be grateful. A beneficiary who returns a favor to a
benefactor for civic reasons, for instance, may be a good citizen; but
if he does not believe his benefactor deserves a return-favor, or does
not think the return-favor will actually benefit his benefactor, it is
hard to see how he counts as grateful.



Reasons aside, philosophers are also concerned with the way in which
grateful behavior is actuated. Several philosophers argue that a
grateful beneficiary must be "naturally inclined" to
benefit his benefactor (Wellman 1999b) and will do so spontaneously
(Camenisch 1981). On this view, a beneficiary who has to deliberate
about whether to act gratefully, and then exert an effort of will to
act on the outcome of his deliberation, falls short of gratitude.
There may be room to question whether grateful behavior must always
flow from natural inclination, however. Consider an analogy with
friendship. We expect a good friend to be naturally inclined to help a
friend in need; but sometimes, a person may need to muster an effort
of will to come to his friend's aid--specifically, when and
if his first-order natural inclinations to help his friend are
overwhelmed. This will happens inevitably even to the best of friends
at times, since even the best of friends will have other legitimate
commitments, interests and desires that might sometimes outweigh their
natural inclination to come to the aide of a friend (Telfer
1970-1971; Owens 2012). By the same token, it can be argued that
even the most grateful of beneficiaries will sometimes find their
inclinations to benefit a benefactor overwhelmed by competing
legitimate inclinations (Manela 2015). A beneficiary might have to
muster an effort of will, for instance, to pull himself away from his
daughter's birthday party in order to help a benefactor in need.
But exerting an effort of will in such cases need not be inconsistent
with being grateful, just as exerting an effort of will to help a
friend under similar circumstances would not make one a bad friend.
The friendship analogy suggests, then, that acting spontaneously on
first-order natural inclinations is not always necessary for an act to
count as an act of gratitude.



The friendship analogy suggests, further, that the presence of
first-order natural inclinations is not sufficient for gratitude. We
expect a good friend to be naturally inclined to help a friend in
need; but we also expect him to recognize that his natural
inclinations might sometimes be overwhelmed. A true friend, then,
should be prepared to muster an effort of will to come to his
friend's aid in circumstances when his natural inclinations
fail. A friend who is not so prepared is one type of fair-weather
friend. By the same token, some (e.g., Manela 2019) have argued that a
beneficiary who merely has the natural inclination to act gratefully,
but is not prepared to exert an effort of will to ensure grateful
action when first-order inclinations fail, might not instantiate
fullest gratitude, but what we might call "fair-weather
gratitude". Still, though, it seems plausible that a beneficiary
who *never* acts gratefully from natural inclination, and must
always exert an effort of will, almost certainly falls short of
gratitude, regardless of whether he acts for the right reasons.


### 3.5 Ingratitude and Overgratitude



Clarity on the elements of the grateful response is critical for
developing an accurate account of what gratitude actually is (see
 section 4
 below); but it also helps clarify several ways in which a beneficiary
who owes gratitude can fail to be properly grateful. In the first
place, knowing the elements of the grateful response sheds light on
all the ways a beneficiary can be *ungrateful*.
*Ingratitude* (the state of being ungrateful) can be thought of
as the absence or deficiency of one or more of the elements of the
grateful response when gratitude is in fact called for in a particular
beneficiary. A beneficiary, then, can be ungrateful in one (or more)
of several ways. Forgetfulness, apathy, pride and laziness, for
instance, are all generally characterized as vices or shortcomings in
themselves; but when they result in the absence or deficiency of
grateful memory, grateful feelings, a willingness to acknowledge a
benefactor's benevolence, or grateful reciprocity in a
beneficiary, they may very well also amount to species of ingratitude
(Aquinas II-II, q. 104, art. 2; Manela 2019). We might label
these species of ingratitude with reference to the shortcomings in the
elements by which they are constituted: *cognitive*
*ingratitude* for the inattentive or forgetful beneficiary;
*affective ingratitude* for the coldhearted or apathetic
beneficiary; *expressive ingratitude* for the overly prideful
beneficiary, and *conative* or *motivational
ingratitude* for the lazy beneficiary. Ungrateful beneficiaries
may, of course, instantiate more than one species of ingratitude in
response to the same instance of beneficence.



Within the category of ingratitude, Aquinas (II-II, q. 104, art.
3) points to another helpful distinction. A beneficiary can be
ungrateful by having a certain element of the grateful response to an
insufficient degree (e.g., not being willing enough to help a
benefactor in need; not being quite pleased enough when a benefactor
fares well; etc.). Manela (2019) calls this *sub-gratitude*. A
beneficiary can also be ungrateful by having and instantiating the
*opposite* or *negation* of some particular element. For
instance, in response to a genuine act of benevolence, a beneficiary
might actually come to resent his benefactor; and rather than feeling
any motivation to benefit her in the future, he may find himself
inclined to set back her interests. These tendencies might arise out
of envious reflection on how morally superior a benefactor's
benevolence makes her. Manela (2019) labels this type of ingratitude
*anti-gratitude*. 



Ingratitude is not the only way a beneficiary might reprehensibly fail
to have an appropriate degree of the elements of the grateful
response. Several philosophers have noted that an
*overabundance* of any of the elements of gratitude, beyond the
level called for by some genuine act of benevolence, might also
constitute a moral failing of a certain kind. Card (1988), for
instance, writes that grateful beliefs or feelings toward someone who
has not earned them might be a mark of *servility*, or a lack
of self-respect, on the part of the beneficiary who has them. Manela
(2018; 2019) calls this moral failing *overgratitude*. It is
important to note, however, that a beneficiary may go beyond what
gratitude calls for without being servile. An extravagant thank-you
gift might not necessarily signal servility on the part of a
beneficiary, if he did not sacrifice excessively in giving it, or
overestimate the favor his benefactor did for him, even if he might
have been properly grateful in presenting his benefactor with a less
extravagant gift.


## 4. Accounts of Gratitude



Informed by philosophical reflection on the elements of the grateful
response
 (section 3),
 philosophers have developed various accounts of gratitude that
conceptualize and classify it as a certain kind of phenomenon. This
section critically summarizes four prominent ways philosophers have
tried to conceptualize and classify gratitude. All of these accounts
highlight important features of gratitude and its relationship to
other concepts, like the vices of ingratitude or pride, or the
negative reactive attitude of resentment. Each conceptualization,
however, does an imperfect job of accounting for all the elements of
the grateful response (though not all of them purport to be
comprehensive conceptualizations that account for every element of the
grateful response).


### 4.1 Gratitude as Emotion



Gratitude is often conceptualized as an *emotion* (see, e.g.,
Macnamara 2019). Emotions, such as fear and sadness, are occurrent
complex mental states that arise in response to certain stimuli. They
are more than just *feelings,* in that emotions are
intentional, or *about* something, while feelings (like the
feeling of euphoria) need not be; and emotions imply or include
beliefs and motivational tendencies, while feelings need not. On the
other hand, emotions differ from *moods*, like anxiety, in that
an emotion is usually more short-lived than a mood, which can be
longer lasting, and not about anything in particular. Emotions are
often thought to involve certain propositional content, and thus to
serve the function of representing the world (and, particularly, their
stimulus) as being a certain way. To say that gratitude is an emotion,
then, is to say that gratitude is a particular complex of beliefs,
feelings and motivational tendencies arising in a beneficiary in
response to, and targeted at, an act of beneficence from a benefactor.
Gratitude as an emotion may involve propositional content (e.g., that
benefactor *R* performed some benevolent act for me), and may
represent its target as being a certain way (e.g., benefactor
*R* is benevolent, brave, cares about me).



Conceiving of gratitude as an emotion has a certain plausibility. The
concept of emotion provides a familiar framework for integrating many
of the cognitive, affective and conative elements of the grateful
response under one conceptual roof. Nevertheless, conceptualizing
gratitude as an emotion (and nothing more) comes at certain
theoretical costs. The first stems from the fact that emotions are
*episodic*: an emotion is typically not the sort of thing we
experience or undergo continuously for years at a time. But though a
beneficiary might go years without instantiating or experiencing the
emotion of gratitude, he might still all that time *be*
grateful to some benefactor for a genuine act of benevolence performed
in the past, insofar as he is properly disposed to believe, feel and
act toward her as a grateful beneficiary should. An analogy with the
emotion of love is helpful here. It is (often) true that I love my
mother in moments when I do not experience any emotion of love
regarding her (in moments when my full attention is on some other
emotionally salient object, say). This suggests that whatever love is,
it must be more than the emotion of love. So too for gratitude.



In the second place, conceiving of gratitude as an emotion might
incline us to overlook a certain way in which the grateful beneficiary
is sometimes motivated to grateful action. An emotion influences
behavior in a particular way--that is, by providing or
constituting a certain natural inclination. A grateful beneficiary,
however, might sometimes find his natural inclinations to benefit a
benefactor overwhelmed by other natural inclinations; and in these
cases, a truly grateful beneficiary will be prepared to muster an
effort of will to act against the balance of his natural inclinations
(see
 section 3.4.2
 above). Most conceptions of emotion, however, do not allow that
emotions can motivate in this particular way. Insofar as this
preparedness to muster an effort of will is necessary for true
gratitude, then, it may be misleading to claim that gratitude is
(nothing more than) an emotion. It might be fairer to say that many of
the elements of gratitude can be explained by or accounted for in an
emotion (what we might call the emotion *of* gratitude), but
there is more to gratitude (the proper response to an act of
beneficence from an agent) than can be accounted for in an
emotion.


### 4.2 Gratitude as Reactive Attitude



Gratitude is sometimes described as a *reactive
attitude*--a term originally coined by P.F. Strawson (1974)
to characterize certain natural responses we as humans have to the
goodwill, ill will or disregard other persons evince for us.
Resentment, for instance, is the fitting reactive attitude to a lack
of goodwill, or presence of ill will, toward oneself from another
person. For Strawson, the reactive attitudes also include
*vicarious* attitudes--reactions to the ill will others
evince toward third parties. The vicarious reactive analog to
resentment, for instance, would be indignation. Reactive attitudes can
be had toward oneself as well, as in the guilt a wrongdoer might feel
upon committing a resentment-worthy act of ill will or disregard. What
the reactive attitudes have in common, according to Strawson, is that
they "rest on" and "reflect" expectations and
demands for minimal levels of goodwill we make of others. In this way,
the reactive attitudes are expressed in (and perhaps constitutive of)
treating other agents as morally responsible. The reactive attitudes
thus fundamentally differ from the "objective" attitudes
we might take toward inanimate objects, or toward others'
behavior that does not evince any ill will. Such events and behaviors
might make us angry or joyful; but only when they reflect a
responsible agent's goodwill or ill will as falling below or
rising above a normative expectation is a reactive attitude, like
resentment or gratitude, appropriate. To conceptualize gratitude as a
Strawsonian reactive attitude, then, is to see it as the proper
reaction to another person's exceeding minimum expectations of
goodwill toward oneself--a reaction which is the positive
correlate of resentment (Strawson 1974: 6); the second-personal analog
of praise and pride; and the participant or reactive analog of the
objective attitudes of joy or appreciation.



Conceiving of gratitude within Strawson's framework of reactive
attitudes fruitfully highlights certain distinctions and parallels
that are easily overlooked. For example, it nicely highlights the
distinction between gratitude proper (a response to the agency of
another person) and appreciation or joy (the objective counterpart to
the reactive attitude of gratitude), emphasizing that the former is a
response to goodwill (see
 section 1
 above). It also highlights the fact that gratitude can sometimes,
like blame and resentment, play a complex communicative role: just as
blame can both 1) recognize a person's conduct as blameworthy
and 2) call for that person to hold herself accountable, gratitude can
1) recognize a person's conduct as benevolent and 2) call for
the benefactor to recognize her benevolent act as worthy of
approbation (Macnamara 2013). Treating gratitude within the
Strawsonian framework also presents several theoretical challenges and
pitfalls. For instance, it may tempt us to overstate the similarities
and overlook the asymmetries between gratitude and resentment, several
prominent examples of which are pointed out by Justin Coates (2019).
In this vein, some philosophers have suggested that the traditional
Strawsonian picture of gratitude is problematic insofar as it implies
that gratitude, like resentment, is an attitude through which we hold
others responsible (Bennett 1980: 42; Wallace 1994: 27). Strawson
(1974) suggests that gratitude is a reactive attitude, and that the
reactive attitudes have an essential connection to the practice of
holding others to normative expectations. Resentment, indignation and
guilt, for instance, are proper reactions when someone has fallen
short of such expectations. Pride, approval and gratitude, on this
view, would be the proper reactions to an exceeded expectation (Martin
2014: 120). Gratitude, however, may not always be called for in
response to an exceeded expectation, and sometimes gratitude seems
called for when no expectation has been exceeded (see
 section 2).
 If this is true, then gratitude is fundamentally different from
resentment, indignation and guilt, in that gratitude is not
conceptually tied to normative expectations. Instead, it may be
conceptually tied to another form of interpersonal engagement, like
"normative hope" (Martin 2014).


### 4.3 Gratitude as Relationship Enhancement



Some philosophers have conceptualized gratitude, and the benevolence
to which it is a response, in terms of the relationships they enhance.
On these accounts, a genuine act of benevolence is thought to signal a
desire or intention to start or to deepen a friendship (Swinburne
1989: 65), and gratitude is the reciprocation of this intention, which
enhances or advances the relationship. Wellman (1999b: 287), for
instance, writes that a beneficiary who has accepted a genuine act of
benevolence should "naturally be inclined to take a more active
interest both in [the benefactor's] well-being and in their
friendship", and Blustein (1982: 190) writes that while
gratitude does not presuppose a preexisting personal relationship,
"it *establishes* one by some form of
reciprocation." That reciprocation, which he calls gratitude,
encourages friendship. Most recently, Scanlon (2008: 151) has
advocated a similar "relationship-enhancement" view of
gratitude. For Scanlon, gratitude



> 
> is not just a positive emotion but also an awareness that one's
> relationship with a person has been altered by some action or attitude
> on that person's part.
> 



That awareness is reflected in appropriately modified intentions,
expectations, and other attitudes on the part of the beneficiary.



Relationship-enhancement views of gratitude underscore the important
(perhaps even necessary) role that benevolence and gratitude play in
initiating and deepening relationships, like friendships and romantic
relationships. Relationship-enhancement views also highlight the
important role acts of benevolence and gratitude might play in
relationship repair--the process of rebuilding a relationship
after wrong or harm has been committed. But while
relationship-enhancement views may paint an accurate picture of
gratitude between relative strangers or within growing friendships,
they seem to leave little room for gratitude within friendships that
are already sufficiently deep and healthy. Between two extremely close
friends, most of the elements of a grateful response might already be
in place. Each might already believe that the other would sacrifice
greatly to help him if he were in need, might already feel profound
goodwill for the other, and might already be willing to sacrifice
substantially in order to save the other from harm. When one friend
actually performs a genuine act of benevolence for the other, the
beneficiary would have no reason to *revise* his expectations
or intentions or affective dispositions vis-a-vis his
benefactor in light of that; and yet a great deal of gratitude may be
owed. This suggests that gratitude must be something more than a
change in these elements.



Another problem faced by certain relationship-enhancement views is the
implication that a beneficiary who does not want to develop a
friendship with the benefactor is, for that reason, ungrateful. This
implication does not seem warranted. It is possible, after all, for a
beneficiary to be grateful but uninterested in deepening a bond with
his benefactor. Perhaps he finds his benefactor irritating to be
around. Perhaps he is too busy to spend time cultivating a new
relationship. Perhaps he is simply a loner. All these possibilities
seem, intuitively, to be consistent with such a beneficiary avoiding
ingratitude; and insofar as they are, gratitude must be something more
than the tendency to develop relationships, at least in the sense of
friendship or romance.


### 4.4 Gratitude as Virtue



Several philosophers have argued that gratitude is best construed as a
virtue (Meilaender 1984; Wellman 1999b). Virtues are morally positive
character traits--stable dispositions to think, feel and act in
certain ways under certain circumstances. Construed as a virtue,
gratitude would be the stable disposition to respond to
gratitude-worthy acts of beneficence with the beliefs, feelings and
behavioral tendencies (outlined in
 section 3)
 that characterize the properly grateful response (Manela 2019).
Conceiving of gratitude as a virtue has some plausibility. Like the
concept of emotion, virtue as a concept seems well-suited to
integrating the affective and motivational elements of the grateful
response. Unlike emotions, though, virtues are *dispositions*,
not episodes, so they can be possessed without being occurrent.
Conceiving of gratitude as a virtue thus allows us to attribute
gratitude to a beneficiary who may not be experiencing any grateful
feelings, beliefs or motivations in a given moment. Moreover,
construing gratitude as a virtue captures nicely the moral
phenomenology of how we tend to respond to evidence of ingratitude.
When we respond critically to a beneficiary's act of ingratitude
or lack of grateful feeling on some particular occasion, we are often
criticizing his character rather than some specific action or inaction
or decision on his part (Wellman 1999b: 285). Furthermore, gratitude
fits nicely into Aristotle's picture of virtue as a mean between
an excess and a deficiency, with gratitude being a mean between the
vices of arrogant, prideful or envious ingratitude, on one hand, and
the obsequiousness or servility of overgratitude, on the other (see
 section 3.5).
 Construing gratitude as a character trait that straddles two vices
has allowed philosophers to contribute to practical debates about
teaching or training children to be properly grateful (see, e.g., Carr
et al. 2015; Manela 2019). And construing gratitude as a character
trait may provide a way for environmental ethicists to argue that we
ought to be grateful to nature even if, strictly speaking, nature is
not the sort of thing that can deserve gratitude (Hill 1983; cf.
Manela 2018).



Conceptualizing gratitude as a virtue, however, presents certain
theoretical pitfalls and drawbacks. For instance, conceptualizing
gratitude as a virtue has tempted some philosophers (e.g., Wellman
1999b) to infer that there is no such thing as an *obligation*
of gratitude, though this inference may not be warranted (Manela
2019). Furthermore, if gratitude were a virtue, then it should be
natural to ascribe it to certain people as a general, global character
trait, the way temperance, patience, or thoughtfulness might be
ascribed to someone. More often than not, however, people are not
grateful or ungrateful *tout court*, but grateful only
vis-a-vis certain people, and ungrateful vis-a-vis
certain others. A man might be reliably predisposed to form and
maintain grateful feelings, beliefs and conations in response to
benevolence from strangers, but radically disinclined to form them in
response to, say, a sibling or a parent. A person might not generally
be disposed to form grateful dispositions toward anyone, but might
still form a proper and lasting grateful disposition toward a
particular benefactor for a particular act of beneficence she
performed for him. Alternatively, a person might be generally inclined
to form grateful dispositions toward the right people at the right
times, but might lapse and fail to do so toward a particular person on
a particular occasion. Are such beneficiaries grateful? The lack of an
easy answer, and the commonness of such cases, reminds us that when it
comes to gratitude, we are often interested in particular episodes or
instances of gratitude, not always global character traits like the
virtue of gratitude (Carr 2013; Manela 2019). 


## 5. Gratitude and Obligation



The deontic status of gratitude (whether we can have moral obligations
of gratitude) is a topic of continued debate. In this debate, much
depends on how "moral obligation" is defined. The term is
sometimes used loosely in moral philosophy to refer to anything we
morally ought to do or be; but such a loose use of the term misses the
heart of the disagreement between philosophers of gratitude. Virtually
no philosopher denies that beneficiaries morally ought to be grateful.
Philosophers are split, however, on whether gratitude implies
obligations in the stricter, more specific way one might have an
obligation to keep a promise, say, or to refrain from lying to another
person. To say that something is obligatory in this stricter sense is
to say that it is *binding*. It something that *must* be
done. It admits of little or no latitude, and failing to do it is not
just bad or lousy, but prima facie *wrong*.



Definitions of obligation aside, much also hinges on the precise
question being asked. Some philosophers start with what we might call
the *broad question*: whether gratitude itself is an obligation
(Camenisch 1981: 10; Blustein 1982; Heyd 1982: 109-111;
Meilaender 1984: 156; Swinburne 1989: 65-66; Wellman 1999b:
291). This question, however, is infelicitous. Gratitude is a complex
phenomenon (see
 section 2),
 consisting of cognitive, affective and conative elements. Some of
these elements may be obligations, others not--and the broad
question is problematic insofar as it rules out this possibility.
Another question philosophers sometimes use to begin an inquiry into
the deontic status of gratitude is whether gratitude is a
*source* of obligations (Carr 2013). This question too is
misleading, since if any of the elements of the grateful response are
obligatory, then technically, the source (cause or basis) of such
obligations would be the benefactor's ph-ing, not the
beneficiary's response itself. Rather than asking whether
gratitude *is* an obligation, or whether it *is a
source* of obligation, a more fruitful question to ask is whether
there are obligations *of* gratitude (and, if so, what they
are). This question allows for the possibility that only certain
elements of the grateful response may be obligatory, the way
promise-keeping is, and it does not obscure the fact that the source
or root of such obligations would be a benefactor's
beneficence.


### 5.1 Arguments For and Against Obligations of Gratitude



It is widely held that the cognitive and affective elements of the
grateful response cannot be obligatory. Most philosophers agree that
in order for some ps to qualify as a moral obligation (in the
strict sense that there are moral obligations of promise-keeping),
ps must be something over which an agent has direct control; and
insofar as agents do not have direct control over their beliefs and
feelings, they cannot have obligations to have grateful beliefs and
feelings (Berger 1975: 306; Simmons 1979: 166-167; Camenisch
1981: 11; McConnell 1993: 83). Two points are worth noting, however,
regarding obligation and grateful feeling and belief. The first is
that even if beliefs and affects cannot be obligatory, the absence of
such attitudes may still be *blameworthy* or
*reprehensible*, at least insofar as we can be blamed or held
responsible for things beyond our direct control. A second point worth
noting is that we may have an obligation to *cultivate* such
attitudes, insofar as trying to bring them about is within our direct
control (Dyck 1973: 48; Weiss 1985: 494).



Thanking seems a more plausible candidate for an obligation of
gratitude than grateful affects and beliefs, since doing or saying the
things necessary to express, demonstrate or communicate one's
grateful attitudes appears to be within a beneficiary's direct
control. Against this, it might be argued that beneficiaries cannot
have an obligation to thank, since thanking implies *sincere*
expression, demonstration or communication of beliefs and affects, and
whether a beneficiary has these attitudes (and thus whether his thanks
are sincere) is beyond his control. In response, it might be pointed
out that certain "expressions" seem sometimes to be
obligatory, regardless of whether they are sincere. For instance, it
seems plausible that offenders can be obligated to express contrition
by apologizing for wrongs they've done, even if they lack
apologetic beliefs and affects. It might also be pointed out that if
thanking can serve as a commissive (see
 section 3.3),
 then thanking might be made sincere simply by forming the intention
to develop grateful attitudes, if they are lacking at the time of
thanks. Insofar as forming such an intention is within the direct
control of the beneficiary, the sincerity of thanks would be under his
direct control, and thanking might be a candidate for an obligation of
gratitude.



The most plausible candidates for obligations of gratitude are
instances of grateful behavior (see
 section 3.4).
 Ordinary language seems to speak in favor of some of these behaviors
being obligatory. The metaphor of *debts* of gratitude, which a
beneficiary pays to a benefactor by returning a favor, dates back
centuries, at least in the Anglophone linguistic tradition (Brandt
1964: 386); and philosophers and writers throughout history have
condemned acts and omissions of ingratitude as among the most vicious
of wrongs. Hume (1738 [2007]: III.I.I), for instance, wrote that
"Of all crimes that human creatures are capable of committing,
the most horrid and unnatural is ingratitude..." Kant wrote
that ingratitude was (along with envy and malice) "the essence
of vileness and wickedness" (Kant 1775-1780 [1981]). And
Seneca (*On Benefits*) ranked ingrates below thieves, rapists
and adulterers.



*Obligation skeptics* about gratitude present several arguments
against the possibility that grateful behaviors can be obligatory. The
first, which we might call the *vagueness argument*, says that
while beneficiaries may have an obligation to return a favor upon a
benefactor at some point, the beneficiary has substantial latitude in
deciding when and how to bestow his grateful favor (Camenisch 1981:
15-16; Fitzgerald 1998: 138). This latitude is consistent with
his having a certain sort of imperfect obligation (McConnell 1993);
but it does not amount to the sort of strict obligation had by a
promisor or a debtor, who have little or no latitude in fulfilling
their obligation by the agreed-upon time. In response to this,
*obligationists* about gratitude (e.g., Manela 2015) have
pointed out that there are indeed certain acts of gratitude that seem
to admit of no latitude--specifically, acceding to a reasonable
request from a benefactor in need or refraining from harming a
benefactor in certain ways that might be permissible if done to a
stranger (see
 section 3.4.1).



A second argument against the possibility of obligations of gratitude
relies on what is sometimes referred to as the *correlativity
thesis*: if one person owes an obligation to another, then
paradigmatically, the person to whom the obligation is owed has a
*right* to the obligation's fulfillment, and thus has
standing to demand or exact fulfillment of the obligation. If
*Y* makes *R* a promise, for instance, then *Y*
has an obligation *to R* to keep the promise, and from this it
follows that *R* has a right that the promise be kept. If
beneficiaries had obligations of gratitude, the argument goes, these
obligations would certainly be owed to their benefactors, and we would
expect benefactors to have a right to the fulfillment of such
obligations. But no benefactor has a right to gratitude--the
standing to demand or exact a return favor. Therefore, there are no
obligations of gratitude (Wellman 1999b). Acts or omissions of
ingratitude, on this view, are not morally wrong or forbidden, though
they might be what Julia Driver (1992) calls
*suberogatory*--bad to do, but not obligation-breaching
(Wellman 1999b). In response to this argument, some obligationists
about gratitude have suggested modifying the correlativity thesis to
allow that directed obligations need not entail standing to enforce or
exact, but only standing to hold the obligee responsible in some
weaker way. Darwall (2012), for instance, suggests that benefactors
can appropriately respond to ingratitude with a reactive attitude like
resentment. Manela (2015) argues that benefactors can appropriately
respond to especially egregious instances of ingratitude by
reproaching or remonstrating (though not demanding). He labels the
standing to remonstrate (though not demand) an "imperfect
right", and he holds that benefactors can have imperfect rights
to certain acts of gratitude.



Two final arguments against the possibility of obligatory grateful
behavior concern the motivation and reasons on which the grateful
beneficiary acts. The first begins with the premise that acts of
gratitude must be done spontaneously, or from natural inclination, in
order to count as acts of gratitude. Moral obligations, however, are
supposed to be the sorts of things we can fulfill even if natural
inclination is lacking, by exerting an effort of will. For example, I
can fulfill an obligation of justice even if I do not act from natural
inclination, when I grudgingly repay a steep loan, for instance; and
so it seems I can have obligations of justice. By contrast, the
possibility of a moral obligation to laugh at a joke seems absurd, in
part, because laughter is something that can only be done
spontaneously or from natural inclination (Card 1988). Insofar as acts
of gratitude must be done from natural inclination, the argument goes,
such acts cannot be done by exerting an effort of will, and thus
cannot be morally obligatory (Card 1988; Wellman 1999b). This argument
may be vulnerable to the objection that the initial premise (that acts
of gratitude must be done from natural inclination to count as such)
is false (see
 section 3.4.2).



A final argument against the possibility of obligations of gratitude
runs as follows: whether grateful acts must be done from natural
inclination, beneficiaries must act from certain reasons in order for
their actions to count as acts of gratitude (see
 section 3.4.2).
 But no one has direct control over what reasons he acts from (Ross
2002). Beneficiaries, then, cannot have direct control over whether
they act gratefully; and if we can only be obligated to do what is in
our direct control, no beneficiary can be obligated to act gratefully.
Obligationists about gratitude might object that this argument targets
a straw man understanding of obligations of gratitude. Obligations of
gratitude, if they exist, are not obligations to
ps-and-ps-for-the-right-reasons, but simply obligations to
ps--just as promissory obligations are simply obligations to
do as promised, not obligations to
do-as-promised-and-do-so-for-the-right-reasons. We might criticize a
promisor if she does as promised for "wrong" reasons
(e.g., reasons of self-interest); but we still believe that such
obligations exist, and that one need not act for the right reason to
avoid breaching or violating them (though one may thereby fail to
*respect, fulfill* or *discharge* such obligations)
(McConnell 1993; Owens 2012). So too, an obligationist might argue,
with gratitude.


### 5.2 Reluctance to Receive Beneficence



If there are indeed obligations of gratitude, this might be taken to
imply the strange conclusion that we should do our best to avoid
accepting or receiving favors or gifts. The spirit of this conclusion
dates back at least to Aristotle, who wrote that the
*megalopsychos*



> 
> is the sort of person who does good but is ashamed when he receives
> it; for doing good is proper to the superior person, and receiving it
> to the inferior. (*Nicomachean Ethics*: 1124b1110-1114)
> 



In the modern era, Kant suggested in the *Lectures on Ethics*
that beneficiaries should cringe at receiving favors, since in doing
so, a beneficiary becomes the debtor of his benefactor--a
shameful position (Kant 1775-1780 [1981]: 118-119). For
Kant, owing an obligation of *gratitude* is especially bad,
since duties of gratitude are *sacred* duties--duties
which can never be fully discharged. This is because any attempt on a
beneficiary's part to "pay off" the debt of
gratitude will always be done essentially as a reaction to the
original act of benevolence. The benefactor alone has the honor of
having acted benevolently in a purely proactive way. Insofar as we
would want to avoid being in such an eternally imbalanced
relationship, we should be wary of accepting gifts and favors.



Kant's worries about obligations of gratitude in the
*Lectures on Ethics* may be overstated. For one thing, it may
well be possible to discharge an obligation of gratitude, if by this
we mean get back on equal footing with a benefactor. A beneficiary
might one day bestow an act of benevolence for a stranger, only to
find out after the fact that the stranger was a benefactor of his from
long ago. Here, the beneficiary has benefited his benefactor, and has
done it not as any sort of reaction, but with the same sort of
original proactive benevolence that motivated the original
benefactor's benevolence in the first place. Furthermore, even
if it may be impossible ever to "pay off" an obligation of
gratitude, it is usually not especially difficult to avoid
*violating* any such obligations, especially if the original
favor was small (Hewitt 1924). A beneficiary need not shape his life
around respecting his obligations of gratitude, insofar as living up
to those obligations might require only occasional minor return favors
on his part. Sacred duties of gratitude, then, need not be as
burdensome as Kant originally suggested. And indeed, Kant himself
seemed to soften his claims about accepting favors and the
psychological effects of being under an obligation of gratitude. In
the *Doctrine of Virtue*, he noted that while it may be natural
to feel shamed at being made a beneficiary, this shame is not
rationally justified, and it results from a misunderstanding of the
legitimate sources of one's moral worth (Smit and Timmons
2011).



A more plausible picture of obligations of gratitude paints them as
obligations that we ought not be upset at having. Even if those
obligations sometimes land us in situations we find unpleasant, we
should not regret the benevolence that gave rise to those obligations.
A similar point could be made about parenthood, love, or friendship.
In all such relationships, a parent, lover or friend will sometimes
find himself tightly constrained by certain obligations and
commitments. Such constraints may be in themselves unpleasant; but a
good parent, lover or friend will not take that unpleasantness as
reason to regret the special relationship they stem from (Owens 2012).
By the same token, it might be argued that a good beneficiary will not
regret or avoid having been shown benevolence, despite what
obligations may arise as a result. Indeed, insofar as we incur moral
obligations in accepting or receiving favors, we might even find
pleasure or pride in such obligations. Card (1988) argues that in
bestowing a favor upon a beneficiary, we should see the benefactor as
expressing her faith in the beneficiary as someone worthy of
benevolence, and as someone who can be trusted to return a favor in
the future. Beneficiaries should see themselves not as debtors, with
the constant need to prove to benefactors that they are indeed
grateful, but as *trustees*, who already have the confidence of
their depositors. On this "trusteeship paradigm",
obligations of gratitude are obligations we are proud and honored to
have been given.



Still, there may be wisdom in the point Kant makes in the
*Lectures*. We may want to be careful who we accept favors
from, insofar as there are people whose interests we would not want to
have to consider in our future practical deliberations (Camenisch
1981). Furthermore, even a competent trustee open for business will be
reluctant to take on too many deposits, lest he find himself having to
pay too many back at the same time. That this reluctance may be
reasonable finds support in the claim that sometimes, it seems,
benefactors may need to ask for permission before doing a favor (Card
1988).


### 5.3 Gratitude and Political Obligation



One question that hinges on gratitude's deontological status is
the question of whether *political
obligation*--subjects' obligations to their
state--can be derived from subjects' gratitude to the
state. Political obligation is often understood in the specific sense
of obligation to obey the laws and decrees of the state. With this
understanding in mind, the argument from gratitude for political
obligation runs roughly as follows:



(1)The state benefits its subjects.
(2)Subjects therefore owe obligations of gratitude to the
state.
(3)Among these is the obligation not to harm the
state.
(4)Disobeying the state's decrees and laws harms
the state.
(5)Therefore, subjects have an obligation to obey the
state's laws and decrees.


This argument has an ancient pedigree (depending on how one interprets
Plato [*Crito*]), and it boasts certain theoretical advantages
over other derivations of political obligation. It explains, for
instance, why subjects have obligations to their own particular state,
rather than, say, to every state that is just or legitimate. It also
does a better job than other theories of political obligation at
explaining why refugees seem to have prima facie obligations to obey
the laws of their host countries, at least when those refugees are
treated generously, fairly and respectfully (D'Cruz 2014). The
argument from gratitude for political obligation has also been the
target of many objections.



One set of objections targets the inference from (1) to (2), arguing
that even if the state benefits its subjects, it does not do so in a
way that calls for gratitude (see
 section 2).
 Some might doubt, in the first place, whether a state, as a non-human
entity, is capable of *intentionally* benefiting anyone. In
response to this objection, A.D.M. Walker (1988) points out that we
sometimes feel gratitude to schools or universities we've
attended for what we take to have been their goodwill or benevolence
toward their students. It might be doubted whether states can be the
proper objects of obligations--that is, whether they are capable
of having obligations owed to them. As Terrance McConnell (1993)
notes, though, we seem to be able to owe obligations of repayment to
corporations that have lent us money. Furthermore, the fact that
institutions seem to be able to owe gratitude to individuals suggests
that they should be capable of deserving it from individuals as well
(McConnell 1993: 196).



States' agential capacities aside, there are several reasons to
doubt whether states have the primary intention of benefiting their
subjects and whether states actually sacrifice in granting the
benefits they grant (Simmons 1979: 185-188). In the first place,
the fact that states receive taxes from their citizens in exchange for
the benefits they confer seems to undermine the claim that beneficence
is a state's primary intention, and that states make sacrifices
in order to benefit their subjects. Defenders of the link between (1)
and (2) might point out that many states spend more money conferring
benefits on their subjects than they take in from taxes. They might
also note that many subjects receive great benefits from the state
despite paying few or no taxes (Walker 1988: 209). Critics, however,
point out that every tax-paying subject--even those who pay
minimal taxes--is forced by the state to pay them (Klosko 1989:
354; Wellman 1999a: 73). Someone who forces benefits on me, and forces
me to pay a share for them, may thereby undermine his desert of
gratitude. Finally, it might be argued that even if the state provides
some benefits to its subjects, and provides them intentionally, the
state may still lose its claim to gratitude if it subsequently harms
those subjects, which many states do through unjust laws or other
types of repression and persecution.



Other critics of the argument from gratitude might concede (2), that
subjects owe gratitude to the state, and (3), that this entails a
specific obligation not to harm the state, but deny (4), that
disobeying the state's decrees and laws actually harms the
state. Such critics could argue that while flouting a state's
laws and decrees might undermine general compliance with those laws,
disobeying them secretly or privately need not lead to this
consequence. They might also argue that publicly disobeying laws and
decrees might not harm the state insofar as those laws and decrees are
unjust. Public acts of civil disobedience against unjust laws might
actually improve the state, insofar as they hasten the abolition of
those laws, and those laws are detrimental to the state.



In light of these objections, several philosophers have fallen back on
a version of the argument from gratitude with a weaker and more
limited conclusion. Considerations of gratitude, they argue, might
ground the claim that *some* subjects have *some*
obligations of gratitude to the state. McConnell (1993) suggests that
only those who have been benefited by the state, and not subsequently
treated unfairly by it, might owe the state obligations of gratitude.
As for the specific obligations these subjects owe to the state, they
may not include the obligation to obey laws and decrees (cf. D'Cruz
2014); but they may include certain other obligations of wider
latitude, e.g., to aid one's own country in various ways,
participate in civic organizations, vote, or volunteer for a year of
national service (McConnell 1993: 207). Ingratitude to the state may
also justify special punishment for treason, or for acts aimed
squarely at the destruction of the state. Insofar as the state claims
the right to compel every subject's obedience to the laws,
though, obligations of gratitude could not be the whole justification
for political obligation generally (Klosko 1989: 358).



The argument from gratitude for political obligation, even in its
weaker form, might have important ramifications for questions of
political obligation and political authority more generally. For
instance, if some subjects have obligations of gratitude to the state,
and obligations of gratitude cannot be exacted or demanded, then the
question of political obligation (what obligations a subject owes to
the state) and the question of political authority (what the state has
a right to demand of its subjects) do not have coextensive answers
(McConnell 1993: 208).