## 1. Life and works


### 1.1 Life



Burley was born in 1275, probably in or close to the village of
Burley-in-Wharfedale, Yorkshire. He studied at Oxford University,
where he was a fellow of Merton College, though he may have studied
first at Balliol. His regency as Master of Arts at Merton College was
long, from 1300 to 1310. Burley's clerical career began in 1309, when
he was admitted as rector of Welbury, Yorkshire. Along with the income
from his first rectory, he received permission to study and take holy
orders at Paris, where he became associated with Thomas Wylton, whom
he refers to as his *socius* and reverend master in his *De
comparatione specierum* (*On the Comparison of Species*).
He held a quodlibetal disputation at Toulose in 1322, became Master of
Theology at Paris in 1324, and entered the service of Edward III in
1327. Around 1333, he joined the circle of Richard de Bury, Bishop of
Durham. In 1341, he held a quodlibetal disputation in Bologna. He died
in 1344 or shortly thereafter.


### 1.2 Works



Burley's philosophical and theological production is very impressive.
Unfortunately, his Parisian commentary on the *Sentences* has
not survived, but almost all of his works on logic and philosophy are
extant, among which the following can be listed, along with their
approximate dates of composition (if known):


* *Quaestiones circa tertium De anima* (*Questions on the
third book of 'De anima'*) - before 1301
* *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* (*Questions on
'De Interpretatione'*) (= *QP*) -
1301
* *Tractatus de suppositionibus* (*Treatise on [the kinds
of] suppositions*) (= *De sup*.) - 1302
* *Tractatus super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* (*Treatise
on Aristotle's Categories*, or *Middle Commentary on the
Categories*) (= *TsP*) - before 1310 (provisional
edition by A.D. Conti, available online, see the Other Internet
Resources section below)
* *Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias* (*Commentary on
'De interpretatione'*, or *Middle Commentary on De
interpretatione*) (= *CP*) - before 1310
* *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum* (*Questions on
the Posterior Analytics*) (= *QPo*) - before
1310
* *Expositio super libros Topicorum Aristotelis* (*On
Aristotle's Topics*) - before 1310
* *Expositio libri De anima* (*On 'De
anima'*) (= *Ean*) - before 1310
* *Expositio librorum Physicorum* (*On the Physics*)
- before 1316
* *De potentiis animae* (*On Soul's Faculties*) -
before 1320
* *De relativis* (*On relatives*) - before 1320
* *Tractatus de abstractis* (*Treatise on the
abstract*) - before 1320
* *Expositio in libros octo Physicorum Aristotelis* (*On
the eight books of Aristotle's Physics*) (= *EPhys*)
- after 1324
* *Tractatus de formis* (*Treatise on forms*) -
after 1324
* *De puritate artis logicae. Tractus longior* (*On the
purity of the art of logic. Longer treatise*) (= *De
puritate*) - between 1325 and 1328
* *Expositio librorum Ethicorum* (*On the [Nicomachean]
Ethics*) - 1334
* *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*
(*On Porphyry's and Aristotle's Old Art [of Logic]*) -
1337. This work is made up of the following commentaries: *On
Porphyry's 'Isagoge'* (= *EIs*); *On the
Categories* (= *EP*); *On the Book on the Six
Principles* (= *LsP*); *On 'De
interpretatione'* (= *EPh*)
* *Tractatus de universalibus* (*Treatise on
universals*) (= *TdU*) - after 1337
* *Expositio super libros Politicorum Aristotelis* (*On
Aristotle's Politics*) - 1343


## 2. Preliminary Remarks



Burley's views are especially interesting for historians of logic and
metaphysics because of their originality, wide influence, and
development. Twice during the course of his academic career, in the
first and third decades of the fourteenth century, Burley worked out
slightly different versions of the same semantic theory in connection
with two different conceptions of reality. The first version
(elaborated in *De sup*., *QP*, the middle commentaries
on Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione*,
and *Ean*) is somewhat less sophisticated than the second
(elaborated in *De puritate artis logicae, tractatus longior*,
the last commentaries on the *Physics* and *Ars Vetus*,
and the*TdU*). Whereas in his early works Burley was able to
differentiate the intension of an expression (the universal form) from
its extension (the individuals instantiating that universal form), in
his last commentary on the *Ars Vetus* he distinguishes between
sense (the mental universal existing in the mind as an object of
understanding) and reference (*significatum*) of an expression,
which in turn is divided into its intension (the universal) and
extension (the individuals).



Nevertheless, the three main principles of his semantic theory
remained the same throughout his academic career:


1. An abstract term, such as 'humanity'
('*humanitas*') or 'whiteness'
('*albedo*'), signifies a common form, which is
part of the essential nature of numerous individuals, and which has
the same kind of existence (extramental or mental) as these
individuals.
2. Concrete accidental terms do not signify simple objects, but
aggregates composed of a substance and accidental form.
3. A sentence is true if and only if it is the sign of "the
truth of things" (*veritas rerum*), that is, if it
describes how the things are in the world.



But in developing the ontology behind his first semantic system,
Burley did not subscribe to the same theses that eventually came to
characterize his radically realist ontology, but different ones,
consistent with the canons of the moderate realism:


1. Only absolute categories (substance, quantity, and quality) are
real things; the other categories are said to be "real
aspects" (*respectus reales*) of the absolute
categories
2. Universals have being in individuals, as constitutive parts of
their essence
3. Real propositions (*propositiones in re*) properly exist in
our mind "objectively" (*obiective*), that is, as
objects of its act of judgment



On the other hand, Burley's approach to the matter does not differ
from the one he took in his late maturity. It can be defined as
analytical, since he believes that ontologies must be developed in
relation to the resolution of semantic problems, and that a
philosophical explanation of reality must be preceded by a semantic
explanation of the structure and function of our language, even if we
can only give meaning to linguistic expressions by correlating the
expressions of our language with objects in the world.



Burley's change of mind about universals was brought about by Ockham's
critique of the traditional realist conception, which demonstrated
that the common moderate realist account of the relation between
language and the world is inconsistent. There is no sign in Burley's
works prior to 1324 that he regarded Ockham as an opponent, but
beginning with the prologue to his final commentary on the
*Physics* (a work presumably rewritten in response to Ockham's
criticisms), his main writings on logic and metaphysics always feature
an analysis of Ockham's views together with a serious attempt to
refute his arguments.



What Ockham had argued was that the common realist account of the
relation between universals and particulars is inconsistent with the
standard definition of identity, and also that particular substances
and qualities have only an extramental kind of existence, whereas the
ten Aristotelian categories serve to classify mental, written and
spoken terms, but not things outside the mind. Two facts prove clearly
that Burley changed his mind because of his having come into contact
with Ockham. First, the problem of universals is not even mentioned in
his first commentary on the *Physics* (before 1316), but
receives extensive treatment in the prologue of his second commentary
on the *Physics*, where he quotes, analyses, and rejects
arguments advanced by the *Venerabilis Inceptor*. Second,
Burley's final commentaries on the *Physics*, *Ars
Vetus*, and the *TdU* contain critiques of Ockham's views
on universals, truth, and categories, as well as replies to his
arguments against the standard moderate realist doctrine. Moreover,
Burley seems to believe that Duns Scotus's strategy of drawing formal
distinctions does not work, since it implies a rejection of the
standard definition of identity according to which two things are
identical if and only if whatever is predicated of one is also
predicated of the other (*EP*, ch. *de oppositione*,
fol. 44rb; *TdU*, p. 22).



The result was a new theory of reality based on the following
theses:


1. The categories are really distinct from each other (*EP*,
ch. *de sufficientia praedicamentorum*, fol. 21ra-b).
2. Universals and particulars are really distinct from each other
(*EPhys*, *prol*., fol. 9rb; *EP*, ch. *de
substantia*, *passim; EPh*, ch. *de oppositione
enuntiationum*, fol. 74rb-va; *TdU*, pp. 14-40);
3. The external world contains real propositions that are the
*significata* of true sentences (*EP*, *prooem*.,
fols. 17vb-18va; ch. *de priori*, fol. 47va; *EPh*,
*prol*., fol. 66ra-b);



It must be pointed out here that this 'new' theory is the most
discussed point of Burley's philosophical system: Joel Biard,
Alessandro D. Conti, Christian Rode, and Hans-Ulrich Wohler defend
the thesis of a plurality of theories, whereas Laurent Cesalli, Alain
de Libera, and Stephan Meier-Oeser claim that Burley develops the same
theoretical intuition from 1301 (the date of composition of his
*Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*) to 1337. Furthermore,
the real proposition described in the final commentary on the
*Categories* is considered by Cesalli to be a sort of complex,
immanent, intentional object rather than an extramental state of
affairs or a fact; other scholars, such as Gabriel Nuchelmans, Biard,
and Rode, believe it to be a kind of mixed entity, partly mental,
partly extra mental; finally, and a third group of scholars, such as
Conti, de Libera, Meier-Oeser, and Jan Pinborg, think of it in terms
of a state of affairs or a fact. 



The three theses mentioned above suggest a kind of identification of
logic and metaphysics, especially since Burley wanted logic to be the
theory of discourse on Being. Logic must be metaphysically grounded in
the correspondence between the structural features of discourse (both
between the subject and predicate of a proposition, as well as between
the premises and conclusion of a syllogism) and the structure of
reality. Burley maintains that logic is nothing but an analysis of the
general structures of reality. In discussing the nature, status, and
subject of logic in the introduction to his final commentary on the
*Ars Vetus* (fol. 2rb-va), he claims that logic is about things
of second intention as such, second intentions being those concepts of
things (*conceptus rei*) that arise when we see the common
nature in relation to the things that instantiate it. Logic is
accordingly about structural forms, which are, as forms, independent
of the mental acts through which they are acquired. Through these
structural forms, the connections between the basic constituents of
reality (individual and universals, substances and accidents) are
disclosed.


## 3. Ontology (before 1324): categories and universals



The first important feature of Burley's earlier ontology is his belief
that apart from substances, quantities, and qualities, the categories
do not contain entities in the full sense of the term, but
*respectus reales*, i.e., real aspects of absolute things. In
the fourth chapter of his middle commentary on the *Categories*
(ch. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, ed. Conti,
pp. 25-28), Burley mentions two previous accounts of the problem of
the number and distinction of the ten categories. The first (from
Simon of Faversham's commentary, q. 12) claims that the categories
really divide entities according to their modes of being. The second,
inspired by Henry of Ghent, admits that
being-in-relation-to-something-else (*esse ad aliud*), i.e.,
the mode of being of the seven non-absolute categories, does not
involve a *res* distinct from substance, quantity, and quality,
but only their real aspects. Although Burley does not explicitly
endorse either interpretation, he is not exactly neutral on the
matter. In fact, his introductory comments together with the amount of
space he devotes to each suggest that he agrees with those authors who
think that, properly speaking, only the three absolute categories are
fully things (*res*). Consequently, Burley presents Henry's
interpretation as emerging from the lack of supporting proof for
Simon's thesis (*TsP*, ch. *de numero et sufficientia
praedicamentorum*, ed. Conti, pp. 26-27). Moreover, he states that
the ten categories can be ordered in terms of their degrees of reality
and independence, since the non-absolute categories are caused by and
grounded in the three absolute ones (*TsP*, ch. *de numero
et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, ed. Conti, p. 27).



At the beginning of his philosophical career, Burley seems to have
been attracted by Henry of Ghent's theory rather than by the more
radical one he was to support some thirty years later. As far as the
constitutive and distinctive principles of the categories are
concerned, however, in the middle commentary on the
*Categories* Burley advances the same ideas that he defends in
his final commentary. He thinks that what characterizes each category
is its peculiar mode of being and that this is much more important
than the differentiation of essences (*TsP*, ch. *de
substantia*, ed. Conti, p. 29--the formulation of this
thesis corresponds almost *verbatim* to that of the final
commentary).



Regarding the relation of the ten categories to being (*ens
transcendens*) and the determination of what properly belongs in
the categories, Burley's position is unchanged between his earlier and
later commentaries on the *Categories* and *Physics*. On
the former question, his *Categories* commentaries are
influenced by Albert the Great. They contain only the brief remark
that being, as a transcendental, is predicated analogically of the
categories (see the ch. *de aequivocatione*). By contrast, the
two *Physics* commentaries provide an exhaustive treatment of
both questions, with some terminological differences. With regard to
the first (see the question from book I, *utrum ens sit aequivocum
ad decem praedicamenta*--whether being is equivocal in
relation to the ten categories, pp. 192-94), Burley affirms that
being is both univocal and analogical with respect to the categories:
univocal because the items falling under the categories are called
'beings' according to a single concept, and analogical
because being is possessed by the categories in different 
ways--directly by substance and secondarily by accidents. In his final
commentary on the *Physics* (book I, fols. 12vb-13ra), Burley
maintains that being is both univocal and equivocal with respect to
the ten categories: univocal broadly speaking because a single concept
corresponds to it (even though categorial entities are subsumed under
it in different ways), and equivocal, though not most strictly,
because this single concept is attributed to beings (*entia*)
according to a hierarchy of value. In short, the two commentaries
differ only in their use of the terms 'analogical' and
'equivocal'. In the first commentary, Burley uses the term
'equivocal' for those terms Boethius, in his own
commentary on the *Categories*, defines as equivocal by chance
(*a casu*), and the term 'analogical' for those
Boethius calls deliberately equivocal (*a consilio*). In the
second, Burley calls 'equivocal properly speaking'
(*proprie*) those terms Boethius refers to as '
deliberately equivocal', and 'equivocal most
strictly' (*magis proprie*) those Boethius calls
'by chance'.



More interesting is Burley's solution to the problem of which entities
properly fall under which categories. Unlike most medieval thinkers,
he was well aware of the importance of this question, which he
discusses in his middle and final commentaries on the
*Categories* (ch. *de relatione*), as well as in his
*LsP* (ch. *de quando*, fol. 57va). According to the
common realist view, not only simple accidental forms (such as
whiteness), but also the compound entities they cause when inhering in
substances (a white thing--*album*) belong to the nine
categories of accident. Burley denies this, since he regards the
entities resulting from the combination of substance and accidental
forms as mere aggregates: accidental beings (*entia per
accidens*) lacking in any real unity. He claims that what is
signified by abstract terms, i.e., simple forms such as whiteness and
fatherhood, properly falls under the categories, whereas what is
signified by concrete accidental terms does not. An aggregate may be
said to belong, improperly and reductively, to the category to which
its accidental form belongs (*Tsp*, ch. *de relatione*,
ed. Conti, pp. 60-61; *EP*, chs. *de relatione* fol.
35va, and *de qualitate*, fol. 41rb). Concrete substance-terms
(such as 'man') are different, however. For even though
they signify composites, they signify beings with a real, *per
se* unity that properly belongs to the category of substance. In
this case, the abstract forms connoted by concrete substance terms
(e.g., the form of humanity by 'man') do not lie outside
the nature of the things themselves, i.e., the individual substances
for which the concrete substance-terms supposit. Thus, both the form
and its substance belong to the same categorial field (*EP*,
ch. *de denominativis*, fol. 19va-b). In this case, the
individual substances are the bearers (*supposita*) of the form
and not its subject (*subiecta*), as they are instantiations of
it and not mere vessels of inherence (*TdU*, p. 58; see also
*De relativis*, p. 168).



Burley's earlier position on the question of the number of categories
implies a 'soft' attitude towards the problem of defining
and classifying the types of identity, since it is evident that the
non-absolute categories could be considered similar to the absolute
ones. Burley does not deal with this subject in his middle commentary
on the *Categories*, however, but in the *Quaestiones in
librum Perihermenias* (q. 4), following Henry of Ghent, he
maintains that (1) there are three different kinds of identity: real
(*realis*), notional (*secundum rationem*), and
intentional (*secundum intentionem*); (2) intentional
difference is something between real and notional difference; and (3)
two things differ intentionally if and only if they are constitutive
of the same thing without their definitions overlapping, such that
each can be understood independently of the other, and even together
with the negation of the other (*QP*, q. 4, p. 273). Even so,
he does not use this logical machinery to explain the relationship
between absolute and non-absolute categories, but only to clarify the
relations between genus and difference, essence and being
(*esse*). He maintains that there is no real distinction
between essence and being (as Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome had
taught), but that they are only intentionally distinct.



The most important feature of Burley's early ontology is his claim
that the being (*esse*) of universals coincides with the being
of their instantiations as particulars, so that universals can be said
to be everlasting because of the succession of these particulars, not
because of a peculiar kind of *esse* (*TsP*, ch. *se
substantia*, ed. Conti, p. 34; see also *Ean*, the question
in book I, *utrum universale habeat esse extra 
animam*--whether what is universal has real being outside the 
mind--,fols. 9ra-11ra). In his middle commentary on the *De
interpretatione* (pp. 53-56) Burley also speaks of mental
universals, i.e., the concepts through which our mind relates general
names to their *significata*. We might sum up his position on
universals in these texts as follows: (1) universals exist in a
twofold way, as common natures in extramental reality and as concepts
in our minds; (2) real universals are naturally suited to be present
in many things as their primary metaphysical components; (3) mental
universals are partially caused in our minds by common natures
existing outside our minds; and (4) real universals have no being
(*esse*) outside the being of their particular
instantiations.



Burley's theory of universals is obviously a form of moderate realism,
but it differs from that defended by other authors such as Thomas
Aquinas. According to Aquinas, universals exist *in potentia*
outside the mind, but *in actu* within the mind, whereas on
Burley's account they exist *in actu extra animam*, since their
being is the same as the being of individuals, which is actual. For
Burley, a universal is *in actu* if and only if there is at
least one individual instantiating it. Therefore, our mind does not
give actuality to universals, but only a separate mode of
existence.


## 4. Ontology (before 1324): essences and substantial forms



Generally speaking, for a medieval realist the essence of a thing is
the main metaphysical component of that thing, namely that in virtue
of which that thing is something of a certain kind: a human, a cat, or
a stone. Therefore, essences are connected with being taken only in
the sense of that which is real, that is to say, actually existing.
Since being taken in this sense is divided into the ten categories and
is absolutely and primarily said of substances and only secondarily of
accidents, essences were usually viewed as something (1) common to a
multiplicity of items in virtue of which these various items belong to
their species and genera, as humanity is the essence of humans; and
(2) present primarily and properly in substances, but in accidents
secondarily and derivatively.



In the second half of the 13th century, the debate on essence was
focused on the relation between substantial essence (the so called
'*forma totius*', e.g., humanity) and the singular
substantial form which, together with the singular matter, brings the
substantial composite about (the so-called '*forma
partis*', e.g., human souls, which in union with human bodies
give rise to human beings). Medieval authors disputed a lot about
whether or not the essence (the *forma totius*) of a thing had
to be somehow identified with the singular substantial form (the
*forma partis*). Following Averroes' commentary on the
*Metaphysics* (book VII, t.c. 34), some authors maintained that
it was so. Others, such as Thomas Aquinas (*Summa theologiae*,
I, q. 75, a. 4), supported the thesis that the substantial essence of
a thing and its singular form are somehow distinct entities, since the
essence includes the common matter of the species, namely the material
proper to all the members of the species connected with the essence
(flesh and bones for human beings).



Burley deals with these topics for the first time in his juvenile
middle commentary on the *Categories* and *Tractatus de
abstractis* (still unedited). In former work, he claims that
substantial essences have no being (*esse*) outside the being
of their instantiations (*TsP*, ch. *de substantia*,
ed. Conti, pp. 34-35). Individual substances are unique metaphysical
entities, located at a particular place and time, and substantial
essences are their specific forms, apt to be common to several
singulars at the same time, present in them, and having no independent
existence. An individual substance, such as the substance of Socrates,
is compounded not only by singular form and matter, but also by any
substantial essence which is over-ordered to the singular substance
and therefore predicated *in quid* of it. Furthermore, in his
opinion, singular substances can be acknowledged as members of a given
(natural) species by virtue of their conformity to the abstract
essence they instantiate (*TsP*, ch. *de substantia*,
ed. Conti, pp. 36-37; see also pp. 32-33). 



In both the treatises, Burley follows Averroes in solving the question
of the relationship between the essence as *forma totius* (in
human beings, the humanity) and the *forma partis* (in human
beings, the soul). In his opinion, the *forma totius* of a
thing is the same entity as the *forma partis* of that thing.
But we can refer to this entity by means of two different concepts,
depending on two different points of view. So according to him, the
noun 'humanity' and the expression 'intellective soul' have
the same reference, but different senses. 'Humanity' means the
intellective soul considered as completing and perfecting a certain
kind of body, and not by itself, as such and such an entity. On the
contrary, 'intellective soul' does refer to the intellective soul
insofar as it is such and such an entity, and not insofar as it is the
entity complementing such and such a body. Hence 'humanity' is
equivalent to the expression 'intellective soul informing a body'
(*Tractatus de abstractis*, Vatican City, Bibliotheca
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 2146, fol. 249rb). In this way, through
the reference to body, Burley tried to preserve Thomas Aquinas's
idea (*De ente et essentia*, ch. 2) that the definition of the
essence of a thing must contain not only its form, but its matter as
well. 



Burley argues that if the *forma totius* were a distinct entity
in relation to the *forma partis*, then these two clearly
unacceptable consequences would follow: firstly, a whole thing
(*totum*) would be part of itself; secondly, there would be an
infinite regress of *formae totius* for each and every singular
substance in the world (*Tractatus de abstractis*, fol.
249rb).



This view had been already supported in the *Tractatus super librum
Predicamentorum*, where, in commenting on the third chapter of the
*Categories*, Burley had also pointed out that the body which
is traditionally seen as a part of the human composite is an aggregate
(*aggregatum*) of prime matter and the general form of
quantity, and therefore not properly speaking part of the substance.
Rather, it is part of the macro-object (*obiectum sensus*),
namely the whole aggregate compounded by the substance and all of its
accidental forms (*TsP*, ch. *de regulis
praedicationis*, ed. Conti, p. 24). On the contrary, those authors
who admit a plurality of substantial forms in the primary substance
must concede that the body which is part of the substance is a
composite (*compositum*) of prime matter and the imperfect
substantial form of corporeity (*corporeitas*; see
*TsP*, ch. *de regulis praedicationis*, ed. Conti, pp.
24-25).



The same ideas concerning *forma partis* and *forma
totius* are restated in the first part of the later *Tractatus
de formis*, where Burley continously identifies the human form
with the intellective soul (pp. 9, 10, and 15). In this work, he deals
with the nature and ontological status of prime matter and the
distinction between substantial and accidental forms. The thesis of
the real distinction between the essence and its individuals is not
yet supported, and Averroes's influence is still heavy. Burley
defines substantial forms as those forms which immediately perfect
matter and give existence (*esse simpliciter*) to the
composite, whereas accidental forms presuppose the existence of the
composite, and perfect it. As a result, individuals belonging to the
same natural species differ from each other because of their own
matter, substantial form (or essence), and accidental forms (p.
9).



What characterizes Burley's opinion on essence in the period 1300-23
seems to be the acceptance of the Averroistic thesis of the
identification of the *forma totius* with the *forma
partis*. It is evident that in the human composite the essence is
nothing but the intellective soul which informs the body. This choice
allows Burley to justify the interpretation of the relation between
predicate and subject of an essential predication in terms of
identity, and gives him a strong criterion for distinguishing
substantial from accidental forms. Furthermore, it also allows him to
have an ontology rather lacking in kinds of entities: he admits the
extramental existence of secondary substances, and so the extramental
existence of substantial essences, but even if they are real from a
certain point of view, absolutely considered (namely, from the point
of view of their being) such essences have to be identified with the
substantial forms which constitute the substantial composites. As a
consequence, the macro-objects (or *obiecta sensus*) are
aggregates made up by singular matter and (substantial) form and a
congeries of singular accidental forms inhering in the composite of
matter and form -- a description of the (metaphysical) structure of
things with which even a nominalist could have agreed. Yet, for
Burley, the substantial form displays and transmits to the composite
its own genetic inheritance (so to speak), namely the string of (real)
properties (the specific differences) which give rise to that
substantial form from the generic and simple property of
being-a-substance. And so, if considered from the point of view of its
"genetic inheritance", the form is the essence, or *forma
totius*, of the composite, and, as such, somehow differs from
itself viewed as *forma partis* of the composite. 


## 5. Semantics



The basic idea of Burley's theory of meaning is that the simple
expressions in our language (i.e., names) are distinct from complex
expressions (i.e., sentences) by virtue of their own
*significata*, that is, by virtue of the different kinds of
objects they signify. In fact, the objects signified by complex
expressions are composites of those signified by simple expressions,
together with a relation of identity (or non-identity, in the case of
a true negative sentence) holding between them. A simple object is any
item in a category: a particular substance, substantial form, or
accidental form (*De sup*., p. 31; *TsP*, ch. *de
subiecto et praedicato*, ed. Conti, pp. 18-19; *EPhys*.,
*prol*., fol. 5vb; *EP*, ch. *de subiecto et
praedicato*, fol. 20ra). Furthermore, only complex expressions can
be literally true or false, whereas simple expressions are true or
false only metaphorically (*TsP*, ch. *de substantia*,
ed. Conti, pp. 41-42; *QP*, q. 3, p. 248; *EP*, ch,
*de oppositione*, fol. 45va; *Eph*, *prol*. fol.
66rb). As a result, Burley assumes that every simple expression in our
language is like a label naming just one object in the world, and that
semantic distinctions are derived from ontological differences between
signified objects. He recognizes that general terms such as
'man' name a set of objects, whereas proper names such as
'Socrates' and expressions such as 'a certain
man' ('*aliquis homo'*), name just one object
belonging to a set. This difference is explained not by appealing to
some semantic distinction between terms, but by means of the different
modes of existence of their *significata*. Proper names and
individual expressions name individuals (i.e., object tokens), but
general terms name common natures (i.e., object types), which are the
metaphysical constituents of the set of individuals instantiating
them. For instance, the general name 'man' names and can
stand for each and every man only because it primarily signifies the
universal form of humanity that is present in each and every man and
constitutive of his essence (*TsP*, ch. *de substantia*,
ed. Conti, pp. 37-38; *EP*, ch. *de substantia*, fols.
25vb-26ra). In his middle commentary on *De interpretatione*,
Burley remarks in connection with the opening lines of the chapter
seven of Aristotle's text (17a38-b7) that a linguistic
expression is a general name (*nomen appellativum*) if and only
if it signifies a universal, that is, a thing (*res*) common to
many individuals (p. 85). The same idea is expressed in his final
commentary on *De interpretatione* (ch. *de oppositione
enuntiationum*, fol. 74rb-va; see also *EP*, ch. *de
substantia*, fol. 26ra).



Since the criterion for distinguishing linguistic expressions is based
on ontological differences among their *significata*, Burley's
semantic system includes a third kind of expression falling between
the simple and the complex. These are concrete accidental terms (such
as 'white' or 'father'), whose
*significata* are not absolutely simple but not exactly complex
either. Quite often in the middle (ed. Conti, pp. 12, 14-15, 19, 33,
38, 60, 78) and final commentaries on the *Categories* (chs.
*de sufficientia praedicamentorum*, fol. 21ra; *de
substantia*, fol. 24rb; *de relatione*, fol. 34rb; see also
*LsP*, ch. *de ubi*, fol. 59vb) he affirms that instead
of signifying simple objects, concrete accidental terms signify
aggregates of substance along with the accidental form primarily
signified by the term itself. Such aggregates are lacking in numerical
unity and hence do not fall under any of the ten categories; they are
not properly beings (*entia*). For this reason, although
concrete accidental terms are not simple from a grammatical point of
view, they do not count as names (*TsP*, ch. *de subiecto et
praedicato*, ed. Conti, pp. 19-20; *EP*, chs. *de
relatione*, fol. 37ra-b; *de qualitate*, fol. 41rb). The
metaphysical constituents of such aggregates (substance and accidental
form) are related to the concrete accidental term in different ways:
on the one hand, the form is the primary *significatum*, even
if the concrete accidental term is not the name of the form; on the
other, the concrete accidental term can only supposit for the
substance. In other words, concrete accidental terms name substances,
but indirectly, through the accidental forms from which they take
their names, so that they name substances only insofar as they are
subject (*subiecta*) to a form. This fact accounts for both the
difference between the general names in the category of substance
(such as 'man') and concrete accidental terms, and the
presence of the relation of identity (or non-identity) in so-called
'real propositions' (*propositiones in re*).
General names in the category of substance are concrete terms as well,
but the form they primarily signify is really identical to the
substances they name. Therefore, in this case, the name of the form is
the same as the name of the substance (*TsP*, ch. *de
substantia*, ed. Conti, p.38; *EP*, ch. *de
denominativis*, fol. 19va-b). This implies a difference in meaning
between abstract and concrete substantial terms
('humanity' vs. 'man'). 'Humanity'
is not the name of the form considered in its entirety, but only of
its essential principle, that is, the intensional content carried by
'man', seeing that abstract substantial terms signify
substantial forms apart from their own being (*esse*). In the
extramental world, this being coincides with those token-objects
(i.e., individual substances) which instantiate the form (*QP*,
q. 4, pp. 271-273).



These differences mean that in Burley's system a distinction can be
drawn between the intension and the extension of an expression. We
usually think of the intension of a term as the set of essential
properties that determines the applicability of the term itself, and
its extension as the set of things to which it is properly applied.
From an epistemological point of view, this makes our ability to pick
out the extension of a term dependent on our knowledge of its
intension. If we treat common natures and particular things as the
intension and extension of terms, respectively, we come very close to
Burley's account, with the possible exception of the ontological
status of intensions (if we are 'nominalists'), since
Burley regards both common natures and particular things as entities
in the world. Hence Burley distinguishes what a term signifies (*id
quod terminus significat*) from what it denotes (*id quod
terminus denotat*), which is reflected in the distinction between
simple and personal supposition. According to him, the sentence
'the father and the son are simultaneous by nature' is
true if the two subjects have simple supposition and so refer to their
*significata*, i.e., the two aggregates compounded by substance
and accidental form. On the other hand, if we assume that the subjects
have personal supposition and so refer only to the two substances,
'father' and 'son', then the sentence is false
(*TsP*, ch. *de relatione*, ed. Conti, pp. 71-72;
*EP*, ch. *de relatione*, fol. 37ra-b). In the *De
suppositionibus* and *De puritate* the same idea is
expressed by the definition of formal supposition as the supposition
that a term has when it supposits for its *significatum* or for
the singular objects that instantiate it. In the first case, we
properly speak of simple supposition, and in the second, we speak of
personal supposition (*De Sup*., pp. 35-36, *De
puritate*, pp. 7-8).



This kind of approach to the problem of the meaning of simple
expressions has two interesting consequences: (1) proper names have no
intension, unlike individual expressions (such as 'a certain
man'--'*aliquis homo*'); and (2)
abstract terms in the category of substance (such as
'humanity'--'*humanitas*') are
like proper names of intentions, as they have intension but no
extension.



As far as the problem of the meaning and truth of complex expressions
is concerned, Burley thinks that real propositions (*propositiones
in re*) are the *significata* of true sentences, just as
individuals (both substantial and accidental) are the
*significata* of singular names and universals the
*significata* of general names. The real proposition is the
last of the four kinds of propositions mentioned by Burley: written,
spoken, mental, and real.



According to his *first* theory, (elaborated in the first
decade of the 14th century), these so-called
'real' propositions do not properly exist in the
extramental world, although they do exist in our minds as objects of
acts of intellection or judgment. Burley clearly states that whereas
mental propositions exist in our minds as subjects of inherence
(*habent esse subiectivum in intellectu*), real propositions
exist in our minds as intentional objects (*habent esse obiectivum
in intellectu solum*) (*QP*, q. 3, pp. 248-49;
*CP*, p. 61; see also *QPo*, q. 2, p. 63). Real
propositions are complex entities formed by the things to which their
subjects and predicates refer, together with an identity relation (if
the proposition is affirmative) or a non-identity relation (if the
proposition is negative). The things signified exist in the
extramental world, but the identity relation is produced by our minds
and exists only in them. This identity relation is a sort of
intellectual composition by which we understand that the thing
(*res*) signified by the subject term and the thing signified
by the predicate term of a proposition belong to the same substance(s)
(*QP*, q. 3, p. 250). On the other hand, it is correct to call
the *significatum* of a sentence a 'real
proposition', since the fact that two or more things share the
same substance does not depend on our minds (*CP*, pp.
61-62). As the subject of a standard philosophical sentence must
be the name of a substance and the predicate a general expression
signifying a substantial common nature or an aggregate of substance
and accidental form, it is clear that the identity relation can hold
only between the things which the subject and predicate of a true
affirmative proposition stand for in personal supposition, i.e.,
between the particular substances named by the subject and predicate
expressions of the proposition. In a standard proposition, the
*significata* of a subject and predicate are diverse, but what
they stand for has to be the same if the proposition is true. Since
the things a term stands for are not established *a priori* but
dependent on propositional context, the analysis of the structure of a
proposition in terms of the identity relation requires a
correspondence theory of truth. In his middle commentary on the *De
Interpretatione* (pp. 59-60), Burley speaks openly of truth
in terms of the "adequation" or congruity between thought
and reality (*adaequatio intellectus ad rem*--see also
*EPh*., *prol*., fol. 66ra). Every being (*ens*)
is true (*verum*) in itself, insofar as its structure and inner
organization are plainly revealed to the mind. This structural truth
(*veritas rei*) corresponds to a mental truth (*veritas in
intellectu*) (*CP*, p. 60): when our minds successfully
reproduce the internal structure of what is signified by a simple
expression or when they grasp the lack of any relationship between the
*significata* of two simple expressions, a diminished being
(*ens diminutum*), which has our mind as its subject of
inherence, is generated by the mind. This diminished being is the
*veritas in intellectu*, which corresponds to the *veritas
rei*. If our attempt fails, falsity (*falsitas*) is
generated instead (*CP*, p. 61).



It is to Burley's credit that he is also able to distinguish between
the intension and extension of complex expressions, as indicated by
his distinction between a proposition *habens esse subiectivum in
intellectu* and *habens esse obiectivum in intellectu*. In
fact: (1) although the mental proposition exists in the mind as in a
subject, the real proposition is present in the mind only *qua*
object of the act of understanding; (2) the real proposition provides
the objective content which the other kinds of proposition aim to
express; and (3) the mental proposition is the semantic link between
the spoken and written propositions on the one hand, and the real
proposition they refer to on the other.



Burley's *first* semantics of complex expressions runs into
difficulties on some fronts, however. If no real proposition matches
spoken, written, and mental propositions that are false, what is
grasped when we understand the meaning of a false proposition?
Moreover, real propositions have an indeterminate ontological status,
since they exist partly inside the mind, partly outside, and are yet
entirely independent of it. In this last case, the problem can be
traced to deficiencies in his ontological system, which does not allow
him to bring into focus the relation between the substantial unity and
the multiplicity of real aspects of a thing (*res*). Thus, the
real proposition, the ultimate *significatum* of a sentence
that exists in our minds *qua* object of an act of judgment,
can be equated with a state of affairs only in relation to its
structure and semantic value, but not ontologically. In this way,
Burley's first theory of meaning, as far as the semantics of
propositions is concerned, looks to be a compromise between the
theories of Walter Chatton, who treats meaning as an individual thing
(*res*), and Adam Wodeham, who argues that the meaning of a
proposition is the state of affairs signified by the proposition
(*complexe significabile*), which is not a thing.



It was in order to solve the problems mentioned above that Burley
modified his theory of semantics in his final commentary on the
*Ars Vetus*--as we are going to see in the next
section.


## 6. The "Platonic" turn (after 1324): the new ontology (and semantics) of the macro-objects



Although he defended moderate realism at the beginning of his career,
Burley turned to an original form of radical, somehow Platonic,
realism after 1324. This can be found in the prologue to his final
commentary on the *Physics*, in his final commentary on the
*Ars Vetus*, and in *TdU*, where he fully develops and
explains his new semantic and ontological view. As noted above, the
change was brought about by Ockham's critique of the traditional
realist view. In his *Summa Logicae* (pars I, chs. 14-15,
and 40-41) and *Commentary on the Categories* (prologue,
and chs. 7, SS1 and 8, SS1), the *Venerabilis Inceptor*
had shown that many unacceptable consequences follow from the idea
that universals are something existing *in re*, really
identical with their particulars considered as instances of a type
(e.g., the universal man *qua* man is identical with Socrates),
but different considered as properly universal (e.g., man *qua*
universal is different from Socrates). That is because whatever is
predicated of the particulars must be predicated of their universals
too, and so a unique common nature would possess contrary attributes
simultaneously via the attributes of different particulars. Also, God
could not annihilate Socrates or any other singular substance without
at the same time destroying the whole category of substance and
therefore every created being, since every accident depends on
substance for its existence. For these and other similar reasons,
Ockham concluded that the thesis that universals exist *in re*
must be rejected.



Burley was persuaded that Ockham's objections are sufficient to show
that the traditional realist account of the relation between
universals and particulars is unacceptable, but not that realism as a
whole is untenable. Thus, in his later years he developed an ontology
of macro-objects based on a threefold *real* distinction
between categorial items or simple objects and state of affairs (his
*propositiones in re*), between universals and individuals, and
among the ten categories.



On Burley's later view, macro-objects (i.e., what is signified by a
proper name or definite description such as Socrates or some
particular horse) are basic components of the world. They are
aggregates made up of primary substances together with a host of
substantial and accidental forms, both universal and singular,
existing in them and through them. Primary substances and substantial
and accidental forms are simple objects or categorial items, each
possessing a unique, well-defined nature. These simple objects belong
to one of ten main types or categories, each really distinct from the
others. Although they are simple, some of these components are in a
sense composite because they are reducible to something 
else--for example, primary substance is composed of a particular form and
matter (*EP*, ch. *de substantia*, fol. 22ra). Primary
substance differs from the other components of a macro-object because
of its peculiar mode of being as an autonomous and independently
existing object--in contrast to the other categorial items,
which necessarily presuppose it for their existence (*EP*, ch.
*de substantia*, fol. 22ra-b). Primary substances are therefore
substrates of existence and predication in relation to everything
else. The distinction between substantial and accidental forms derives
from their different relations to primary substances, which
instantiate substantial forms (which in turn, *qua*
instantiated, are secondary substances), so that such universal forms
disclose the natures of particular substances. By contrast, those
forms that simply affect primary substances without being actually
joined to their natures are accidental forms. In Burley's words, the
forms in relation to which particular substances are the
*supposita* are substantial forms (or secondary substances),
whereas those forms in relation to which particular substances are the
*subiecta* are accidental forms (*TdU*, pp.
58-59). As a result, the macro-object is not simply a primary
substance but an orderly collection of categorial items, so that
primary substance, even though it is the most important element, does
not contain the whole being of the macro-object.



The main feature of this metaphysical conception is Burley's claim
that universals fully exist outside the mind and are really distinct
from the individuals in which they are present and of which they are
predicated. According to him, if universals are no longer actual
constituent parts of their particulars, then the inconsistencies
pointed to by Ockham vanish. Furthermore, from a metaphyisical point
of view, causes must be proportional to their effects. But the causes
of a particular thing must be particular, whereas those of a common
nature must be universal. Therefore, individual substances cannot be
composed of anything except particular forms and matter, whereas
universals are composed of a genus and specific difference as well as
by any other universal form above the genus. Consequently, the lowest
species is not a constitutive part of the individuals in which it is
present and of which it is predicated, but only a form coming together
with their essences, making their metaphysical structure known
(*EP*, ch. *de substantia*, fol. 23rb-va). Hence, Burley
sharply distinguishes between two main kinds of substantial form: one
singular (*forma perficiens materiam*) and the other universal
(*forma declarans quidditatem*). The former affects (a
particular) matter and, together with it, brings the substantial
composite (or *hoc aliquid*) into existence. The latter, the
lowest species, discloses the nature of the particular substance in
which it exists and of which it is predicated, but it is not one of
its constituent parts. So particular substances are in and of
themselves really distinct from their species and from each other.
Every individual really differs from its species because the latter is
not part of its essence, but a form existing in it, as well as really
distinct from other individuals belonging to the same species because
of its own particular form and matter (*EIs*, ch. *de
specie*, fol. 10va; *EP*, chs., *de substantia*,
fol. 23va-b; *de quantitate*, fol. 31rb; see also *Tractatus
de formis*, pp. 9-10). Secondary substances belong to the
category of substance only insofar as they are predicated of the
essence of particular substances (*in quid*) (*EP*, ch.
*de substantia*, fol. 22ra), whereas particular substantial
forms and particular matter do not properly belong to the category of
substance because they do not fulfill the above conditions for being a
substance (*EP*, ch. *de substantia*, fol. 22ra).
Burley's exposition here amounts to equating the essence of a thing,
its *forma totius* (qua really different from the *forma
partis*), and its universal (or secondary) substance (namely, the
species of the thing at issue) with one another. The essence so viewed
includes substantial form and matter in equal measure. It is
interpreted as the main common, immanent form of a certain set of
individuals and represents the unchanging and basic properties of that
set of things. Although the essence is one and the same item in all
the singulars of which it is predicated, it is not one in number, but
one according to the species (*una et eadem res secundum
speciem*). It has some sort of unity and identity other than
numerical, specifies Burley. As a consequence, it can be present in
different places, say in Rome and in Oxford, at the same time, since
this is compatible with its other-than-numerical unity. The unity of
the essence is a transcendental (and so trans-categorial and merely
intelligible) and not a numerical (i.e, quantitative) unity.
Therefore, universal essences cannot be counted with their
individuals.



Burley uses the standard 13th-century division of
universals into *ante rem*, *in re*, and *post
rem* (*LsP*, ch. *de forma*, fol. 53rb;
*TdU*, *passim*), but he follows Auriol and the earlier
Ockham in positing another mental universal, distinct from the act of
understanding (the 'standard' *post rem* conceptual
universal), and existing in the mind only as its object (*habens
esse obiectivum in intellectu*--*EP*, ch. *de
priori*, fol. 48vb; *TdU*, pp. 60-66). By introducing
a second mental universal existing *obiective* in the mind,
Burley hopes to account for the fact that we can grasp the meaning of
a general noun even though we have not experienced any of its
supposits, and thus without properly knowing the universal it directly
signifies.



Burley identifies secondary substance with the *quale quid* and
primary substance with the *hoc aliquid*, but *quale
quid* and *hoc aliquid* are what are signified by general
and discrete nouns, respectively, of the category (*EP*, ch.
*de substantia*, fols. 25vb-26ra). Therefore, he argues that
secondary substances are metaphysical entities existing outside our
minds that are necessary conditions for our language to be meaningful,
as general names would be meaningless if they did not signify
something that both exists in reality, and have the peculiar feature
of being common to (i.e., present in) many individual things. Only by
associating general names with such objects as their proper
*significatum* did Burley think we could explain how a general
name can stand for many things at once and name all of them in the
same way. According to him, a general name supposits for and names
(*appellare*) a set of individual things only through the
common nature or universal which it directly signifies and which is
present in that set of individuals (*EP*, ch. *de
substantia*, fol. 26ra). Since common natures connect general
names with their extensions by determining the class(es) of the things
to which they are correctly applied, and since they are what general
names stand for when they have simple supposition (see *De
puritate*, tr. 1deg, pars 1a, ch. 3, pp. 7-9),
they are actually the intensions of general names--or rather,
the hypostatizations of these intensions, seeing that they are
independent entities existing outside our minds. On the other hand,
from a merely ontological point of view, universals and particulars
are connected by the relation of instantiation, so that primary
substances are tokens of secondary substances, since each particular
instantiates its associated universal and is recognizable as a token
of a given type by virtue of its conformity to it and its likeness to
other particular substances (*EP*, ch. *de substantia*,
fol. 26ra-b). Therefore, in Burley's system, common natures (i.e.,
universals) and particulars (or simple objects) are related both as
intensions to extensions and as types to tokens. A certain type or
universal is nothing but the intension of a general name when it is
considered in relation to the extension itself, and conversely, the
extension of a general name (i.e., a class of individuals) is nothing
but the set of tokens of a given type considered in relation to the
simple expressions that name them. Thus, the relation holding between
the intension and extension of a term is the same as between types and
tokens. It is a sort of categorization, which can be described in
terms of the elaboration and acquisition of patterns of
identification. Moreover, since Burley now admits two kinds of mental
universals, the first of which is an act of understanding and the
second of which is the object of the former (i.e., its semantic
content apprehended by the mind), the intension and the extension of a
general term (i.e., the universal nature and the individuals which
instantiate it), considered together, are the *significatum* of
the general term, while the concept *habens esse obiectivum in
intellectu* provides its sense, or cognitive meaning. Therefore,
according to Burley's final view, the sense/*significatum*
dichotomy is not equivalent to the intension/extension dichotomy, the
latter being a sub-division of the former. This result makes his
theory of meaning very similar to the one developed recently by R.
Cann (*Formal Semantics*, Cambridge 1993; see especially pp.
10-12; 215-224; and 263-69).



An analogous schema holds for complex expressions, since Burley adds a
fifth kind of proposition to the ones he recognized before,
correlating them in a similar way, since he now admits spoken,
written, two kinds of mental, and real propositions.



As we saw above, the distinction between simple and complex objects,
or (roughly) between objects and states of affairs, is fundamental to
Burley's ontology. This distinction is the objective counterpart of
the linguistic distinction between simple and compound expressions
(i.e., nouns vs. sentences or propositions). Thus, Burley can view
states of affairs as propositions existing *in re*. In the
prologue to his final commentary on the *Categories*, he claims
that a mental proposition is what is signified by a spoken (or
written) sentence. The mental proposition in turn signifies something
else, because it is composed of concepts, which are themselves signs.
As a result, the ultimate *significatum* of this chain must be
something that is signified but does not signify, and which has the
same logical structure as the mental proposition--i.e., it must
be a proposition *in re* (fols. 17vb-18ra; see also ch. *de
priori*, fol. 47va). Such a real proposition is an *ens
copulatum* formed by the entity for which the subject and the
predicate stand together with an identity-relation, if the proposition
is affirmative, or a non-identity relation, if the proposition is
negative (*EP*, *prooem*., fol. 18va; *EPh*,
*prol*., fol. 66ra-b). These complex objects differ from
aggregates (the *significata* of concrete accidental terms),
which are also made up of items belonging to different categories
since mere aggregates do not include the identity (or non-identity)
relation, and, like simple objects, cannot be true nor false
(*EP*, ch. *de oppositione*, fol. 45va). In the chapter
*de priori*, he maintains that there are four kinds of
proposition, written, spoken, mental, and real, and specifies that the
mental proposition is twofold: the first, existing in the mind as in a
subject (*habens esse subiectivum in intellectu*), is composed
of acts of understanding; the second, existing in the mind as the
object of the preceding complex act of understanding (*habens esse
obiectivum in intellectu*), is what we grasp by means of the mind
and compare with reality to determine the truth or falsity of a
proposition. This is the semantic link between the written, spoken,
and (first) mental propositions on the one hand, and the real
proposition (the state of affairs) they signify on the other. It
exists even if the written, spoken, and (first) mental propositions
are false and nothing corresponds to them in reality (fol. 48vb).
Accordingly, the proposition *habens esse obiectivum in
intellectu* is now the sense of a sentence, and not its extension.
On the other side, the *new* real proposition is the
*significatum* of the sentence and its truth-maker, since those
sentences that signify a complex object existing in reality are true,
whereas those sentences that do not signify such a complex object, but
to which only the two (simple) objects designated by the subject and
predicate correspond in reality, are false.



The problems connected with his first theory of the semantics of
propositions are thereby solved. The real proposition of his first
theory is split into the mental proposition *habens esse obiectivum
in intellectu* and the (new) proposition *in re*, both of
which have a well-defined semantic and ontological status. In
addition, false propositions have meaning (i.e., the mental
proposition *habens esse obiectivum in intellectu*), but no
reference, as no real proposition matches them. However, a new
question could arise: if universals and singulars, and the ten
categories, are really distinct, how can Burley maintain that there
must be an identity relation holding between the things signified by
the subject and predicate of every true affirmative sentence?



Burley's solution is the same as in his first version of the theory:
in a true, affirmative statement, the *significata* of the
subject and predicate are different, but the things for which they
stand in personal supposition (i.e., the individual substance or
substances) are the same (*EP*, *prooem*., fol. 18va;
ch. *de relatione*, fol. 37ra; *EPh*, *prol*.,
fol. 66ra-b). This obviously implies that an affirmative proposition
is true if and only if its extremes have personal supposition for the
same thing or things. For example, '*Sortes est
homo*' ('Socrates is a man') is true if and only
if '*homo*' in this context has personal
supposition for Socrates, that is, if the abstract form of humanity
(*humanitas*) is present in Socrates. In this way, the real
distinction between universals and particulars, and among the ten
categories, is safe, without affecting his theories of correspondence
and identity.



Complex objects (or states of affairs--Burley's
*propositiones in* re, the ultimate *significatum* of a
written, spoken or mental proposition) and what we have called
'aggregates' (the *significatum* of a concrete
accidental term) are not identical with macro-objects, but definite
aspects of them. An aggregate is nothing but the union of one of the
countless accidental forms of a macro-object with its primary
substance, and a complex object is the union of two forms of a
macro-object (one of which, i.e., the one designated directly or
indirectly by the subject-term of the proposition, must be
substantial) *with and by means* of the primary substance. This
is trivially true not only for propositions *in re*, such as
*hominem esse animal* (man being an animal) or *hominem esse
album* (man being white)--where the two connected forms are
humanity and animality or whiteness respectively, and where what
unites them is each particular substance that instantiates both of
them in the case of *man being animal*, and which instantiates
the form of humanity *and* is the substrate of inherence of the
form of whiteness in the case of *man being white*--but
also for propositions *in re*, such as *Sortem esse
hominem* (Socrates being a man). In this case, the two forms
involved are the *forma perficiens materiam* of Socrates (i.e.,
his soul) and the related but distinct *forma declarans
quidditatem* (i.e., the species man). What unites them is Socrates
himself, since he has the *forma perficiens materiam* as an
essential element and instantiates the *forma declarans
quidditatem*.


## 7. The "Platonic" turn (after 1324): the 'regional' ontologies



Since Burley conceives of primary substances as the ultimate
substrates of existence and subjects of predication in relation to
anything else (*EP*, ch. *de substantia*, fols. 24va-b,
and 25va), the only way to demonstrate the reality of beings in other
categories is to treat them as forms and attributes of substances.
Since Burley wanted to preserve the reality of quantity and its real
distinction from substances and other accidents, he insists that
quantity is a form inherent in the material part of a composite
substance (*EP*, ch. *de quantitate*, fol. 29rb). This
is problematic, however, for if the highest genus of the category is a
form, Aristotle's seven species of quantity (line, surface, solid,
time, space, number, and speech), mentioned in the sixth chapter of
the *Categories*, are not. Burley tries to meet this difficulty
by reformulating the notion of a quantified thing (*quantum*).
Encouraged by the Aristotelian distinction between strict and
derivative quantities (*Categories* 6, 5a38-b10), he
distinguishes two different modes of being quantified: in-itself
(*per se*) and in-virtue-of-something-else (*per
accidens*). The seven species of quantity are quantified by
themselves, whereas other quantified things (e.g., corporeal
substances) are quantified in virtue of one or more of the seven
species (*EP*, ch. *de quantitate*, fol. 29va). In other
words, Burley considers the seven species not as quantitative forms,
but as the most proper and primary bearers (*supposita*) of the
quantitative properties revealed by the supreme genus of the category.
Any other kind of quantified thing is simply a subject
(*subiectum*) of quantitative forms.



Another distinguishing mark of quantity is its characteristic
(*proprium*). In the *Categories* (6, 6a26-35),
Aristotle identified it through the fact that only quantities are said
to be equal or unequal. Burley does not wholly agree with him because
*quanta per accidens* also are said to be equal or unequal,
though in a derivative way (*EP*, ch. *de quantitate*,
fol. 32rb). Thus, Burley turns to two texts from Aristotle's
*Metaphysics* (books V, ch. 13 and X, ch. 1) for an alternative
account of the *proprium* of quantity as the measure of what is
quantified (*EP*, ch. *de quantitate*, fol. 28rb).
Moreover he employs this property as the common principle from which
the seven species of quantity can be derived (*EP*, ch. *de
quantitate*, fol. 30ra). In this way, he tries to show that the
category of quantity, like that of substance, has an ordered internal
structure, and he reasserts the reality and real distinction of
quantity against authors such as Peter Olivi and Ockham, who had
attempted to reduce quantity to an aspect of material substance.
Burley quotes at length from Ockham's commentary on the
*Categories* (ch. 10, SS 4), where the Franciscan master
tries to demonstrate that quantity is really nothing distinct from
substance and quality. He then proceeds to reject Ockham's arguments
(*EP*, ch. *de quantitate*, fol. 30rb-vb).



Ockham had claimed that it was superfluous to posit quantitative forms
really distinct from substance and quality, since quantity presupposes
what it is intended to explain, i.e., the extension of material
substances and their having parts outside parts. As an accident,
quantity presupposes substance as its substrate of inherence. Burley
denies that material substances can be extended without the presence
of quantitative forms, thereby affirming their necessity. He admits
that the existence of any quantity always implies the existence of a
substance, but he also believes that the actual existence of parts of
a substance necessarily implies the presence of a quantitative form in
it. He does not provide any sound metaphysical reason for this
preference. But it makes sense when one considers his semantic theory,
according to which reality is the interpretative pattern of
(philosophical) language, so that the structure of language is a
mirroring of reality. In Burley's opinion, therefore, abstract terms
in the category of quantity (such as 'extension',
'duration', 'magnitude', and so on) must
correspond to realities in the world that are distinct from those
signified by the abstract substantial terms.



As we have seen, Burley thinks that what falls under any categorial
field are simple accidental forms; therefore, the things of the *ad
aliquid* category are relations (*relationes*) and not
relatives (*relativa* or *ad aliquid*), which are merely
aggregates formed by a substance and a relation. Accordingly, the
relationship between relation and relatives is like that between
quantity and what is quantified, or quality and what is qualified. The
relation is the cause of the nature of the aggregate (that is, the
relatives), of which it is a constituent. Unlike modern logicians,
Burley denies that a relation is a two-place predicate, and views it
instead as a monadic function, arguing that like the other accidental
forms, relation inheres in a single substrate and makes reference to
another thing without inhering in it. This thesis is based on the
following principle, which Burley states in his commentary on the
*Book of Six Principles* (*LsP*, ch. *de habitu*,
fol. 63ra): there must always be equivalence and correspondence
between the accidental form and its substrate of inherence, so that no
accidental form can completely inhere at the same time in two or more
different substrates--not even numbers, the different parts of
which inhere in their own distinct substrates. Unlike other accidental
forms, however, relations do not directly inhere in their substrates,
but are present in them only by means of another accidental form that
Burley calls the foundation of the relation (*fundamentum
relationis*--*EP*, ch. *de relatione*, fol.
34va). Among the nine categories of accidents, only quantity, quality,
action, and affection can be the foundations of relations.



Consequently, Burley claims that in the act of referring one substance
to another we can distinguish five constitutive elements: (1) the
relation itself (e.g., the form of paternity); (2) the substrate of
the relation, i.e., the substance that denominatively receives the
name of the relation (the animal which begets another similar to
itself); (3) the foundation (*fundamentum*) of the relation,
i.e., the absolute entity in virtue of which the relation inheres in
the substrate and makes reference to another substance (in this case,
the generative power); (4) the antecedent term (*terminus a
quo*) of the relation, i.e., the substrate of inherence of the
relation considered as the subject of that relation (the father); and
(5) the consequent term (*terminus ad quem*) of the relation,
i.e., the substance with which the substrate of the relation is
connected, considered as the object with which the antecedent term is
correlated (in our example, the son). The foundation is the main
component, since it joins the relation to the underlying substances,
permits the relation to link the antecedent to the consequent term,
and transmits some of its properties to the relation (*EP*, ch.
*de relatione*, fol. 35rb-vb). Even though the relation depends
for its existence on the foundation, its being is completely distinct
from it, so that when the foundation fails the relation also fails,
but not vice versa (*EP*, ch. *de relatione*, fol.
35ra).



From this analysis Burley draws some rather important consequences
about the nature and ontological status of relations and relatives:
(1) the existence relations have is feebler than that of any other
accident, as it depends upon the simultaneous existence of three
different things: the substrate, the consequent term, and the
foundation; (2) relations do not add any absolute perfection to the
substances in which they occur; (3) relations can inhere in substances
without any change in the latter, through a change in the consequent
term of the relation (e.g., given two things, one white and the other
black, if the black thing becomes white then because of the change, a
new accident, a relation of similarity, will inhere in the other
without any other change in it; (4) there are two main kinds of
relatives: real (*secundum esse*) and linguistic (*secundum
dici*). Linguistic relatives (such as 'knowledge' and
'knowable') are connected only by the mutual reference of
the nouns signifying them. Real relatives are linked as well by a
relation which inheres in one of them and entails a real reference to
the other. Linguistic relatives in reality belong to the category of
quality. Real relatives are aggregates compounded by a substance and a
relation, so that they fall under the category of relation only
indirectly (*per reductionem*) because of their accidental
form. Finally (5), all true relatives are simultaneous by nature
(*simul natura*), so Aristotle was wrong in denying that some
pairs of relatives are mutually simultaneous, but one prior and the
other posterior. In fact, the real cause of being a relative is the
relation, which at the same time inheres in one thing and entails a
reference to the other, thereby making both things relatives
(*EP*, ch. *de relatione*, fols. 32va-b, 34ra,
37ra).



Among the 'regional' ontologies Burley developed in his
final commentary on the *Ars Vetus*, the one which deals with
the categorial field of quality is, in many ways, the least complex
and problematic. Here Burley follows the Aristotelian doctrine very
closely, does not argue against Ockham, and sometimes offers rather
superficial analyses.



The main topics he deals with are: (1) the internal structure of the
category; (2) the relationship between quality and what is qualified
(*quale*); (3) the nature of the four species of quality
Aristotle lists in the *Categories* (states and dispositions,
natural capacities or incapacities to do or suffer something,
affective qualities and affections, shapes and external forms); and
(4) the distinctive characteristic (*proprium*) of the category
of quality, i.e., the fact that two or more things can be described as
*similar* only because of quality and in respect of it. We will
focus on the first two only, since the questions they raise are more
general.



Following the opinion of Duns Scotus (q. 36 of his *Quaestiones in
librum Praedicamentorum*--*Questions on the Book of the
Categories*), Burley maintains that the four 'species'
of quality mentioned by Aristotle are not properly species but modes
(*modi*) of quality. That is because unlike real species, they
are not completely separate classifications, since many things
belonging to the first species also belong to the second and/or the
third (*EP*, ch. *de qualitate*, fol. 38vb).



As far as the nature of *qualia* and their relation to quality
are concerned, Burley thinks that *qualia* are aggregates
composed of a substance and a quality inhering in it. They do not
belong to any categorial field because they lack in real unity.
Nevertheless, since they are *qualia* in virtue of a
qualitative form, they can be included in the category of quality
indirectly (*per reductionem*--*EP*, ch. *de
qualitate*, fol. 41rb). *Qualia* share qualities to
different degrees. While no qualitative form admits of more or less,
their substrates of inherence do (*EP*, ch. *de
qualitate*, fol. 41vb). In this way, Burley advances two important
theses of his metaphysics as logical corollaries of his theories of
universals and substances: (1) no universal form can be shared in
different degrees by the individual instantiating it; (2) no
individual form can be subject to change, except, of course, through
generation and corruption.


## 8. The theories of knowledge



During his long career, Walter Burley worked out two different
accounts of the standard realist theory of knowledge, both of which
are critical of the most common theories of his time. Burley himself
places much more stress on the question of the proper object of human
knowledge and the intellective cognition of individuals. The first
account is developed in his commentary on Aristotle's *De
anima* (before 1316), and the second in the prologue of his last
commentary on the *Physics* (around 1324).



In the commentary on *De anima*, Burley deals with the problems
of the object of knowledge and the possibility of direct intellective
cognition of singulars, especially in questions 5 and 6 of Book III:
"*utrum intellectus intelligat singulare* [Does the
intellect understand what is singular]?" and "*utrum
universale sit obiectum intellectus* [Is what is universal an
object of the intellect]?" (fols. 69rb-70va). In order to answer
these two questions, Burley, like Averroes, begins by distinguishing
three different aspects and one state of the soul which can be
designated by the term 'intellect': the elementary thought
(*virtus cogitativa*--which, for Burley, as for Thomas
Aquinas and Giles of Rome, is a purely sensory faculty); the active
intellect; the possible intellect (which, following Averroes's
terminology, Burley calls "*materialis*"); and the
intellect *in habitu*, i.e., that state of the intellect in
which, thanks to the union of the active intellect with the material
intellect, an intelligible species comes into being in the material
intellect, generating an effective act of cognition. Since, in
Burley's view, both the active intellect and the intellect *in
habitu* are not strictly speaking faculties of the soul, but the
primary cause of understanding and a state of the soul, respectively,
it is necessary for him to offer two distinct accounts depending on
whether it is the elementary thought or the material intellect which
is in question. In the first case, the material singular is the direct
and sufficient object of the intellect, insofar as elementary thought,
like common sense and imagination, is directed exclusively towards
individuals, both substantial and accidental. But in the second case,
it is the universal that is the direct and appropriate object of the
intellect, because the intentional representation (*species* or
*intentio*) produced by the singular in the soul is not formed
or 'taken in' by the material intellect, as the only
*species* present in the material intellect is the universal.
Nevertheless, Burley acknowledges that the material intellect also has
knowledge of the singular in an indirect and derivative way
(*indirecte et ex consequenti*). Accordingly, he disagrees with
those authors who, on the basis of the Aristotelian assertion that
"sensation is of singulars; but understanding is of
universals", affirm that the singular cannot in any way be the
object of intellective knowledge. According to Burley, what the
Aristotle means is that the senses can grasp directly and
appropriately only the singular, whereas the universal can be known in
a direct and proper manner only by the material intellect (cf. also
*In De an*., I, q.5: "*utrum intelligere sit propria
operatio animae vel totius coniuncti* [Is understanding the proper
activity of the soul or of the entire conjunct <of body and
soul>?", fol. 13va; and *De potentiis animae*, p.
111). What is more, were the material intellect unable to know the
singular, it would be impossible for us to distinguish what is
individual from what is universal. As a matter of fact, even though
the species present in the material intellect is universal, and cannot
by itself point to any particular individual, the material intellect
can know the singular by means of intentional representations
(*phantasma*) present in the elementary thought, since the
phantasm is nothing but the intentional representation of a single
individual substance obtained through the accidental properties it
exhibits. Thanks to such a representation the (material) intellect can
assimilate itself in the act of knowing to singular things attested to
by the senses.



But Burley's explanation, however interesting, has a weak point, since
it does not clarify how it is possible for the material intellect to
know an individual existing outside our mind by means of a singular
intentional representation that is not present in it, but in
elementary thought. The solution to this problem lies in what he says
in the aformentioned q.5 of Book I, as well as in q.10 of Book III
("*utrum intellectus materialis copuletur nobis solum per
phantasma* [Is the material intellect joined to us only through an
image]?", fol. 76va-b), concerning the problem of the union
(*copulatio*) of singular human beings with the material
intellect, which is assumed to be separate and unique for the whole
human species. In his view, the material intellect is by nature united
with human individuals from birth, as the perfection of their being.
But a further kind of union takes place when the material intellect
performs an act of understanding (*in operando*), i.e., when
the active intellect illumines both the phantasm and the material
intellect, thereby impressing on the latter the *species
intelligibilis* abstracted from the former--intelligible
species by means of which the material intellect can grasp the common
nature of the singular substance which began the process of knowing.
This close connection between the phantasm and the intelligible
species (which originates from it) is why (1) the material intellect
can know singulars through a representation that is not properly
present in it; and conversely, (2) the elementary thought can know,
indirectly and derivatively, common natures (or universals)
("*homo per virtutem cogitativam potest cognoscere
universalia et quidditates rerum*", fol. 13va), even though
its proper and adequate object is the singular.



This account of the knowing process provides a twofold origin of human
knowledge: the first empirical, from the senses; the other
transcendental, from the active intellect. On the one hand, the
external and internal senses collect, decode, and elaborate
information that comes from a singular material thing present to the
senses. The result is the formation of a phantasm of a thing. On the
other hand, the active intellect impresses on the material intellect
the intelligible species, when the phantasm inhering in the elementary
thought is presented to the material intellect itself. Intellection
seems thus to consist in the matching, so to speak, of a phantasm with
an intelligible species, a sort of classification of world items, in
virtue of which any given singular item is referred back to its type.
This entails that for Burley, the cognitive process is aimed at the
second operation of the intellect, namely judgment (e.g.,
"*Sortes est homo*"), and not simply to
abstraction, since it is by means of judgment that the intellect
subsumes a given token (the material thing) under its type (the
natural species). This fact also explains why the answer to the
question concerning the proper object of the intellect is
complicated.



As far as the problem of the primary object of knowledge is concerned,
in the commentary on the *De anima*, Burley distinguishes (1) a
triple mode in which something can be the primary object of the
intellect: by origin (*via generationis*), by intrinsic
perfection (*via perfectionis*), and by proportion (*via
adaequationis*); and (2) two different kinds of knowledge:
analytic (*distincta*) and vague (*confusa*). From the
point of view of analytic knowledge, i.e., adequately articulated and
developed knowledge, being is the first object of the intellect by
origin. But from the point of view of vague knowledge, i.e., knowledge
which is not yet articulated and developed, the first objects of the
intellect by origin are the universals corresponding to those
individuals perceived by our senses. The first object of the intellect
by intrinsic perfection is the first cause from the perspective of
absolute perfection; but in terms of relative perfection, it is the
universal which corresponds to the individual present to our senses.
Finally, the object by proportion of a given faculty is that item
under which all things known by that faculty fall. In the case of the
intellect, being in its widest generality is such, as only that which
is can be known. 



Moreover, Burley also distinguishes between the object which gives
rise to the process of knowledge (*obiectum motivum*) and the
object that contains within itself all known things (*obiectum
contentivum*). The first is always singular, whereas the second is
always universal. In other words, what we come to know is a common
nature, but this is possible just because there are particular things
that strike our senses (fol. 70ra-b). 



Although Burley seems to accept the existence of a separate material
intellect, unique to the whole human species, he emphasizes the fact
that without the contribution of elementary thought, which provides us
with the phantasm, the material intellect cannot be united to the
active intellect in knowing. It is true that individual men could not
reach an intellective knowledge of anything without the material
intellect; but it is also true that the material intellect on its own,
or with the mere contribution of the active intellect, would not be
capable of elaborating any form of knowledge.



This particular reconstruction of the process of knowledge is
justified at the ontological level too. Burley's earlier view about
the metaphysical composition of corporeal beings accounts for the way
he approaches questions concerning knowledge. He claims that corporeal
beings are constituted by an individual substance and a host of
accidental forms inhering in it. Individual substance is then the
result of the union of particular matter and form (cf. *Quaestiones
in librum Perihermeneias*, q.4, p. 272). Particular form is itself
constituted by a specific form (that is, the essence of the singular
thing at issue) and by all of its metaphysical constituents. As we
have already seen, it is precisely in the commentary on the *De
anima* (Book I, q.3) that Burley affirms that universals in the
category of substance are constitutive parts in the essence of their
individuals, and have being in their individuals. All of this enables
us to understand better why in his *De anima* commentary,
Burley grants some level of intelligibility to singulars as such,
though indirectly and derivatively, and also why he describes
elementary knowledge in terms of a classification of things according
to which a given singular object is referred back to its ideal
type.



Nonetheless, about ten years later, in the prologue to his last
commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, Burley completely reversed
his position on knowledge. In partial agreement with Thomas Wilton,
who had been his *socius* in Paris, he maintained that our
intellect is capable of knowing singulars qua singulars (*sub
propria ratione singularis*) primarily and directly (*primo et
directe*), and not simply as items belonging to a certain species
or type. Indeed, he now argued that the universal can be grasped by
the intellect indirectly and by reflection (*In Phys*. I, fol.
10va), an openly anti-Avverroistic statement which would steer him
closer to Ockhamist nominalism, were it not for his denial of any form
of intuitionism. 



In his discussion of the question, "*utrum magis universalia
sint nobis prius nota quam minus universalia vel quam singularia*
[Is what is more universal more known to us than what is less
universal, or than singulars]?" (fol. 9va-b), Burley deals once
again with the problems of the intelligibility of singulars and the
object of our knowledge. The question arises from the passage in the
*Physics* (I.1, 184a23-24), where Aristotle affirms that
our knowledge must proceed from what is universal to what is
particular (or singular). According to Burley, it is false that what
is more universal is known by us before (*prius nota*) what is
less universal, as Thomas Aquinas had taught. Anyone who holds this,
he argues, implicitly assumes that the passage from ignorance to
perfect cognition (*notitia perfecta*) is mediated by the
knowledge of all the substantial forms of the object in question, from
the more general to the more particular. But this assumes that in
order to know something, it is necessary to know everything that can
be predicated of it. This seems false to Burley, since it is openly
contradicted by experience: e.g., a person can know that the animal
standing in front of him is a horse, and what a horse is, without
knowing all the other universal forms that are predicated of it (fol.
9vb). A cognition of the latter kind is almost impossible, for it
would be necessary to acquire systematic knowledge of all animal
species and of any possible grouping they could form--something
that no human being can achieve (fols. 9vb-10ra). Nor is Burley
convinced by Ockham's interpretation of this passage in the latter's
commentary on the *Physics* (cf. *Expositio in libros
Physicorum Aristotelis* I, c.1, SS2, *O.Ph*. IV,
24-25), according to which the Aristotelian principle applies
only to complex knowledge and referring to humanity as a whole,
although for each of us taken singularly the contrary is true, because
the object of our simple and exhaustive knowledge (*notita
incomplexa perfecta*) is the singular. Burley contends that what
is true for individual human beings must also be true for humanity as
a whole, and therefore that at the level of human species as well, the
knowledge of what is less universal comes before the knowledge of what
is more universal (cf. fol. 10rb). 



Burley concludes this first part of his discussion, devoted to the
analysis and refutation of the opinions of Aquinas and Ockham, with a
remark concerning the way in which general concepts are structured and
related one to another. He presents a categorization of the different
types of knowledge and reappraises to some extent the role of
definition in knowledge. Burley affirms that the more universal
concepts are not closely connected with less universal concepts; they
do not form a logically or essentially ordered (*essentialiter
ordinata*) series. Definition provides us with better knowledge of
a thing than the knowledge we acquire from the mere apprehension of
its name; nevertheless, the simple cognition which derives from the
confused and indistinct knowledge of the nominal notion of a given
thing is sufficient for all practical purposes, and prior by origin to
the knowledge which results from its definition, as what is more
simple is prior to what is less simple. Thus, for Burley, we first
grasp the meaning of simple terms and then that of composite
expressions such as definitions. However, from the point of view of
quantity of information or exhaustiveness, the most perfect definition
(*perfectissima definitio*), i.e., the definition enumerating
all four causes of the definiendum and not just its proximate genus
(material cause) and specific difference (formal cause), is superior
to any other form of knowledge (fol. 6rb). 



In this (new) discussion of the nature of human knowledge, Burley
distinguishes between complex cognition (*notitia complexa*)
and simple cognition (*notitia incomplexa*) (cf. fols. 5va-b),
as well as between two different types of exhaustive complex cognition
(*notitia perfecta complexa*): (i) absolute
(*simpliciter*) and (ii) relative to the general kind of thing
in question (*in genere*) (see fols. 5vb-6ra). He also
distinguishes between appropriate (*distincta*) (or perfectly
appropriate--*distinctissima*) cognition and discrete or
discriminative cognition (*distinctive seu discretiva*) (cf.
fols. 10vb-11ra). A complex cognition of a thing is contained in and
manifested by one or more statements about it, both affirmative and
negative (fol. 5va). A simple cognition, on the other hand, is
contained in and manifested by simple concepts and expressions, namely
terms (fol. 5vb). Complex exhaustive cognition *simpliciter* is
what enables us to know all the intrinsic constitutive principles of a
thing along with all the essential predicates and characteristic
features (*propria*) associated with these principles
themselves. Relative exhaustive complex cognition is what makes
possible for us to know all the essential predicates and all the
characteristic features associated with them in relation only to the
natural species (or type) of a thing (fol. 6ra). We have an
appropriate cognition of a thing when we are able to list most of its
constitutive elements, and a perfectly appropriate knowledge when we
can specify all of its constituent elements (fol. 10vb). Finally, we
have discriminative knowledge of a thing when we are able to
distinguish the thing at issue from other similar things by virtue of
one or more peculiar aspects which make it different from all others
of the same kind (fol. 11ra).



Keeping these distinctions in mind, we can now move on to examine how
Burley articulates his solution to the problem of the object of human
knowledge. According to him, determining whether what is more
universal is known by us before what is less universal is equivalent
to establishing what is the primary and direct object by origin of
confused and appropriate cognitions. He thinks that from the point of
view of the origin of our confused knowledge, the intellect grasps
first what is singular. The argumentation he develops to support this
claim is articulated in two stages: (1) he demonstrates that the
intellect is able to know what is singular, since it can easily
distinguish universals from singulars. If the intellect were unable to
know singulars, it would be impossible for it to distinguish what is
universal from what is singular. This was the most important proof
that he had utilized in his *De anima* commentary to
demonstrate that the material intellect has some kind of singular
knowledge, however indirect and derivative. Next, (2) he proves that
the primary object by way of generation (*via generationis*) of
confused knowledge is the singular, as it would be otherwise
impossible to explain how the intellect can obtain some kind of
singular knowledge on the basis of previous universal knowledge. If we
knew what is universal before what is singular, we could never acquire
knowledge of any singular, given that the universal species cannot
direct our intellect toward any particular individual, since it is
tied to each individual by the same relation of similarity (fol.
11rb). 



In the *De anima* commentary, this remark did not prevent
Burley from stating the exact opposite of what he intends to prove
here. He had held that the (material) intellect does not know
singulars through universal species, but through the intentional
representation of a given singular present in the elementary thought
and accessible to the intellect only at the moment of the active union
of a single individual man with the material and active intellects in
the soul. This means that the complex explanation of the process and
nature of human knowledge developed in the *De anima*
commentary is completely rejected here, and replaced by a new theory
modelled not on Averroes's commentary but on Burley's own semantic and
ontological program. What is more, in Burley's new way of thinking,
the intellect does know the universal only by abstraction from
singulars; but abstraction always proceeds from what is already known
to what is not yet known; therefore, singulars are known by us before
universals (cf. fol. 11va). It is thus not surprising that Burley
concludes this first part of his answer, devoted to confused
knowledge, by supporting a thesis diametrically opposed to what was
proposed in his *De anima* commentary, namely that universals
are known by the intellect indirectly and derivatively, through
reflection. According to Burley, our intellect grasps what is
universal only after having known at least one of the corresponding
singulars, even though it knows the lowest species of each singular
almost immediately, from the singular itself, whereas all the other
universals contained in the lowest species (from the proximate genus
up to the highest genus in the category to which the singular thing
belongs) are known only through reflection on the lowest species
itself. The most immediate consequences of the adoption of this view
are (1) a new theory concerning the object of intellective knowledge,
different from that presented in Book III of his *De anima*
commentary; and (2) a new definition of the function of the active
intellect in the process of knowledge.



Burley now distinguishes a four-fold way in which something can be
considered the first object of the intellect: by origin, by
proportion, by intrinsic perfection, and by exclusion (*primitate
exclusionis*)--the latter being the way a determinate
object can be known by a certain faculty and by that faculty alone,
excluding all others. The singular, and not the universal, is now
considered the first object of the intellect by origin--which
was obvious from what had been stated in the previous passages. Being,
taken in its broadest generality, is the first object of the intellect
by proportion, but now Burley explains that being, understood in this
way, is equivalent to intelligible being. The first object of the
intellect by intrinsic perfection is God. In this case as well, there
is a rather marked difference from the *De anima* commentary in
that Burley abandons the distinction between absolute and relative
perfection (which had enabled him, once more, to introduce the
universal as primary object of the intellect), and replaces the more
impersonal and abstract Aristotelian first cause with God (presumably
the Christian God). Finally, the universal is the object of the
intellect by exclusion insofar as the intellect is the only faculty
capable of knowing it. 



Furthermore, as far as the role of the active intellect is concerned,
the claim that the singular is now intelligible in principle requires
that the job of the active intellect should no longer be the one
traditionally attributed to it of removing the individuating
conditions from the phantasm; rather, it must now act on the possible
intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). The active intellect
makes the possible intellect move from a state of purely potential
intellection to a state of actual intellection (given by the presence
in it of the intelligible species)--a state which the phantasm
would not, on its own, be able to bring about in the possible
intellect (cf. fol. 11vb). It is worth noting Burley's change in
terminology, from the orthodox Averroistic expression
"*intellectus materialis*", as it appears in the
*De anima* commentary, to the expression more commonly used by
opponents of the Averroists: "*intellectus
possibilis*".



The analysis of the question of the primary and direct object by
origin of appropriate cognition is far shorter and less problematic.
Appropriate cognition is the knowledge we obtain once we are capable
of enumerating in an orderly way all the elementary metaphysical
components of a thing. Consequently, the starting points of this kind
of knowledge cannot but be the most general universals, as their
notions constitute the basis from which the notions of less general
universals and of singulars themselves will have to be
"built" and understood. The reason is that what is
subordinated to something else cannot be known in an appropriate
manner if those things which are above it in the categorial hierarchy
and which constitute its essence are not known (fols. 10vb-11ra).



In this way, Burley points towards a double movement in the process of
knowing: a first movement, connected with the activity of abstraction
or generalization of the intellect (namely, the kind of knowledge he
calls 'confused'), which goes from the bottom to the top
of the categorial hierarchy, i.e., from what is singular to the
highest genus. Then there is a second movement, tied to the
definitional activity of the intellect (namely the knowledge that he
calls appropriate'), which goes from top to bottom of the categorial
hierarchy, proceeding from what is more universal and therefore
intensionally more simple and primitive to that which is less so,
finally reaching singulars, which are intentionally richer and
ontologically more complex than any universal.



As we have seen, within Burley's new theory of understanding the
singular can be placed either at the beginning of the chain of
knowledge, as its origin, or at its end, as its result. In both cases,
what remains unchanged is that intellective knowledge is at stake and
not simply sense knowledge. This means that for Burley, the singular
is one of the primary objects of the cognitive activity of the human
intellect. This result is historically significant because it brings
Burley's later theory of knowledge into line with the other great
epistemological doctrines of the fourteenth century, almost all of
which were aimed at re-evaluating the singular as a possible object of
knowledge. The way for this was prepared by the ontological turn in
Burley's last commentary on the *Physics*: the move from an
ontology developed according to the canons of moderate realism to the
radically realist ontology of macro-objects, based on a real
distinction between universals and singulars and among the ten
Aristotelian categories. Such a conception derives from the assumption
of a hermeneutical principle which is clearly formulated by Burley for
the first time in the latter work, where he observes that the causes
of a particular effect must be particular as well, and those of a
universal effect must be universal. Accordingly, he denies that a
universal cause can have a particular effect and vice-versa, and
therefore that what is singular can be directly constituted by those
universal forms placed above it in the hierarchy of categorial
predication (cf. fol. 9rb-va).



At the cognitive level, negating any real identity between universals
and singulars (which, on the contrary, had been assumed to hold in the
*De anima* commentary) brought with it a unification of the
levels of knowledge (sense cognition and abstractive cognition)
through the intellectualization of the knowledge of singulars and a
doubling of the object of knowledge (the singular and the universal).
This was necessary so that the real distinction between universal and
individual at the ontological level did not make it impossible to
explain how sense knowledge (fully centered on singulars) and
intellective knowledge (centred on universals) could
"meet" in judgments concerning individuals, as in
"Socrates is a man". This was possible in the *De
anima* commentary precisely because of their real identity in the
extra-mental world of universals and individuals; once this identity
failed, however, there was the risk of making the passage from the
intentional representation of singulars to the intelligible species of
the common nature (or universal) into a sort of arbitrary distortion
of the data coming from reality. The relation, now more slippery and
fragile, between the (substantial) universal and the singular required
that singulars be moved from the sphere of imperfect and piecemeal
sense knowledge and made available to the cognitive faculty that is
concerned with universals. Indeed, in the ontology of the later
Burley, universal substantial forms are distinguished from accidental
forms not because their being is somehow identified with the being of
those singular substances which are their substrates, but because they
alone are capable of manifesting the deep metaphysical structure of
the singular substances themselves. The type, which in Burley's
earlier writings was only something exhibited by singular substances,
is now a reality distinct from them, though not totally separated or
existentially independent of them. Consequently, Burley's theory ends
up putting substantial and accidental forms on the same level, and
cancelling every qualitative difference in predication. This makes his
logical system considerably different from the
Aristotelian/Neo-Platonic systems of the Middle Ages, since for the
latter the predicative relation of any sentence of the
subject/copula/predicate form had to be understood as modally
determined by the particular nature of the predicable corresponding to
the predicate (i.e., its species, genus, difference,
*proprium*, accident). On the other hand, this makes Burley's
logical system the medieval system that is the most similar to modern
ones.