## 1. Introduction



In 1926, the Austrian philosopher Ernst Mally (1879-1944) proposed the
first formal system of deontic logic. In the book in which he
presented this system, *The Basic Laws of Ought: Elements of the
Logic of Willing*, Mally gave the following motivation for his
enterprise:



> 
> In 1919, everybody was using the word self-determination. I wanted to
> obtain a clear understanding of this word. But then, of course, I
> immediately stumbled on the difficulties and obscurities surrounding
> the concept of Ought, and the problem changed. The concept of Ought is
> the basic concept of the whole of ethics. It can only serve as a
> usable foundation for ethics when it is captured in a system of
> axioms. In the following I will present such an axiomatic
>  system.[1]
> 



As Mally's words indicate, he was not primarily interested in deontic
logic for its own sake: he mainly wanted to lay the foundation of
"an exact system of pure ethics" (*eine exakte reine
Ethik*). More than half of his book is devoted to the development
of this exact system of ethics. In the following, we will, however,
concentrate on the formal part of his book, both because it is its
"hard core" and because it is the part that has attracted
the most interest.


## 2. Mally's Formal Language



Mally based his formal system on the classical propositional calculus
as formulated in Whitehead's and Russell's *Principia
Mathematica* (vol. 1, 1910).



The non-deontic part of Mally's system had the following vocabulary:
the sentential letters A, B, C, P and Q (these symbols refer to states
of affairs), the sentential variables M and N, the sentential
constants V (the *Verum*, Truth) and L (the
*Falsum*, Falsity), the propositional quantifiers [?] and
[?], and the connectives !, &, [?], - and -.
L is defined by L = !V.



The deontic part of Mally's vocabulary consisted of the unary
connective !, the binary connectives f and [?], and the sentential
constants U and [?].


* Mally read !A as "A ought to be the case" (*A soll
sein*) or as "let A be the case" (*es sei
A*).
* He read A f B as "A requires B" (*A fordert
B*).
* He read A [?] B as "A and B require each
other."
* He read U as "the unconditionally obligatory" (*das
unbedingt Geforderte*).
* He read [?] as "the unconditionally forbidden"
(*das unbedingt Verbotene*).



f, [?] and [?] are defined by:




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Def. f . | A f B = A - !B (Mally 1926, p. 12) |
| Def. [?] . | A [?] B = (A f B) & (B f A) |
| Def. [?]. | [?] = !U |



Mally did not only read !A as "it ought to be the case that
A." Because a person's willing that a given state of affairs A
be the case is often expressed by sentences of the form "A ought
to be the case" (for example, someone might say "it ought
to be the case that I am rich and famous" to indicate that she
wants to be rich and famous), he also read !A as "A is
desirable" or "I want it to be the case that A." As
a result, his formal system was as much a theory about *Wollen*
(willing) as a theory about *Sollen* (ought to be the case).
This explains the subtitle of his book. In modern deontic logic, the
basic deontic connective O is seldom read in this way.



We have just described one respect in which Mally's deontic logic was
different from more modern proposals. There are two other conspicuous
differences:


* Mally was only interested in the deontic status of states of
affairs; he paid no special attention to the deontic status of
actions. Thus, his *Deontik* was a theory about
*Seinsollen* (what ought to be the case) rather than
*Tunsollen* (what ought to be done). Modern authors often
regard the concept of *Tunsollen* as fundamental.
* In modern deontic logic, the notions of prohibition F, permission
P and waiver W are usually defined in terms of obligation O: FA =
O!A, PA = !FA, WA = !OA. Such definitions are not to be
found in Mally's book.


## 3. Mally's Axioms



Mally adopted the following informal deontic principles (Mally 1926,
pp. 15-19):




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| (i) | If A requires B and if B then C, then A requires C. |
| (ii) | If A requires B and if A requires C, then A requires B and
C. |
| (iii) | A requires B if and only if it is obligatory that if A then
B. |
| (iv) | The unconditionally obligatory is obligatory. |
| (v) | The unconditionally obligatory does not require its own
negation. |



Mally did not offer much support for these principles. They simply
seemed intuitively plausible to him.



Mally formalized his principles as follows (Mally 1926,
pp. 15-19):




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| I. | ((A f B) & (B - C)) - (A f C) |
| II. | ((A f B) & (A f C)) - (A f (B & C)) |
| III. | (A f B) - !(A - B) |
| IV. | [?]U !U |
| V. | !(U f [?]) |



Axiom IV is strange:


* !U is a more natural formalization of (iv).
* Axiom IV seems redundant: !A - !A is a tautology, so we
have !A f A by Def. f, whence !(!A - A) by
Axiom III(-), whence [?]M !M by existential
generalization. Axiom IV seems to add nothing to this.
* Axiom IV is the only axiom or theorem mentioned by Mally in
which U occurs as a bound variable: in Axiom V and in theorems
(15)-(17), (20)-(21), (23), (23') and
(27)-(35) (to be displayed below), U is either a constant or a
free variable. One should treat it in the same way in the
formalization of (iv).



For these reasons, we replace Axiom IV by the following
 axiom:[2]




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| IV. | !U |



Mally could hardly have objected to this version of Axiom IV
because it is equivalent with his theorem (23'), i.e., V f U, in
virtue of Def. f. In the following "Axiom IV"
will always refer to our version of Axiom IV rather than Mally's.




Using Def. f, Axioms I-V may also be written as follows
(Mally 1926, pp. 15-19 and p. 24):




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| I'. | ((A - !B) & (B - C)) - (A - !C) |
| II'. | ((A - !B) & (A - !C)) - (A - !(B &
C)) |
| III'. | (A - !B) - !(A - B) |
| IV'. | V f U |
| V'. | !(U - ![?]) |


## 4. Mally's Theorems



Mally derived the following theorems from his axioms (Mally 1926,
 pp. 20-34).[3]




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| (1) | (A f B) - (A f V) |
| (2) | (A f L) - [?]M (A f M) |
| (3) | ((M f A) [?] (M f B)) - (M f (A [?] B)) |
| (4) | ((M f A) & (N f B)) - ((M & N) f (A & B)) |
| (5) | !P - [?]M (M f P) |
| (6) | (!P & (P - Q)) - !Q |
| (7) | !P - !V |
| (8) | ((A f B) & (B f C)) - (A f C) |
| (9) | (!P & (P f Q)) - !Q |
| (10) | (!A & !B) - !(A & B) |
| (11) | (A [?] B) - !(A - B) |
| (12) | (A f B) - (A - !B) - !(A - B) -
!!(A & !B) - !(!A [?] B) |
| (13) | (A - !B) - !(A & !!B) - (!A [?]
!B) |
| (14) | (A f B) - (!B f !A) |
| (15) | [?]M (M f U) |
| (16) | (U - A) - !A |
| (17) | (U f A) - !A |
| (18) | !!A - !A |
| (19) | !!A - !A |
| (20) | (U f A) - (A [?] U) |
| (21) | !A - (A [?] U) |
| (22) | !V |
| (23) | V [?] U |
| (23') | V f U |
| (24) | A f A |
| (25) | (A - B) - (A f B) |
| (26) | (A - B) - (A [?] B) |
| (27) | [?]M ([?] f !M) |
| (28) | [?] f [?] |
| (29) | [?] f U |
| (30) | [?] f L |
| (31) | [?] [?] L |
| (32) | !(U f L) |
| (33) | !(U - L) |
| (34) | U - V |
| (35) | [?] - L |


## 5. Surprising Consequences



Mally called theorems (1), (2), (7), (22) and (27)-(35)
"surprising" (*befremdlich*) or even
"paradoxical" (*paradox*). He viewed (34) and (35)
as the most surprising of his surprising theorems. But Mally's reasons
for calling these theorems surprising are puzzling if not
confused.



Consider, for example, theorem (1). Mally interpreted this theorem as
follows: "if A requires B, then A requires everything that is
the case" (Mally 1926, p. 20). He regarded this as a
surprising claim, and we agree. However, Mally's interpretation of (1)
is not warranted. (1) only says that if A requires B, then A requires
the *Verum*. The expression "if A requires B, then A
requires everything that is the case" is to be formalized as




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| (1') | (A f B) - (C - (A f C)) |



This formula is an immediate consequence of (1) in virtue of
Axiom I. In other words, Mally should have reasoned as follows:
(1') is surprising; but (1') is an immediate consequence
of (1) in virtue of Axiom I; Axiom 1 is uncontroversial; so
(1) is to be regarded as surprising.




A similar pattern is to be seen in many of Mally's other remarks about
theorems which surprised him. He generally read too much into them and
confused them with some of the consequences they had in his
system:


* Mally was surprised by (2) because he thought that it says that if
A requires B and B is not the case, then A requires every state of
affairs whatsoever (Mally 1926, p. 21). But (2) says no such
thing. Mally's paraphrase is a paraphrase of (A f B) - (!B
- (A f C)) (a consequence of (2) in virtue of Axiom I)
rather than (2).
* Mally paraphrased (7) as "if anything is required, then
everything that is the case is required" (Mally 1926,
p. 28), which is indeed surprising. However, Mally's paraphrase
corresponds with !A - (B - !B) (a consequence of (7) in
virtue of Axiom I) rather than (7).
* Mally paraphrased (22) as "the facts ought to be the
case" (Mally 1926, p. 24). We grant that this is a
surprising claim. But the corresponding formula in Mally's language is
A - !A (a consequence of (22) in virtue of Axiom I), not
(22).
* Mally read (27) as "if something which ought not to be the
case is the case, then anything whatsoever ought to be the case"
(Mally 1926, pp. 24, 33), but this is a paraphrase of !!A
- (A - !B) (a theorem of Mally's system) rather than
(27).
* Mally paraphrased (33) as "what is not the case is not
obligatory" (Mally 1926, p. 25) and as "everything
that is obligatory is the case" (Mally 1926, p. 34). These
assertions are indeed surprising, but Mally's readings of (33) are not
warranted. They are paraphrases of !A - A rather than (33).
* Mally made the following remark about (34) and (35):


> 
> 
> The latter sentences, which seem to identify being obligatory with
> being the case, are surely the most surprising of our
> "surprising
>  consequences."[4]
> 
> 
> 



However, (34) and (35) do not assert that being obligatory is
equivalent with being the case, for the latter statement should be
formalized as A - !A. The latter formula is a theorem of Mally's
system, as will be shown in a moment, but it is not to be found in
Mally's book.



Mally regarded theorems (28)-(32) as surprising because of their
relationships with certain other surprising theorems:


* (28)-(30) are instantiations of (27). But this is not sufficient
to call these theorems surprising. Mally actually viewed (28) as less
surprising than (27): one might use it to justify retaliation and
revenge (Mally 1926, p. 24).
* (31) implies (28)-(30) and is therefore at least as surprising as
those theorems.
* Mally viewed (32) as surprising because the surprising theorem
(33) is an immediate consequence of (32) and the apparently
non-surprising theorem (25).



Mally's list of surprising theorems seems too short: for example, (24)
is equivalent with A - !A in virtue of Def. f. But A -
!A may be paraphrased as "the facts ought to be the case,"
an assertion which Mally regarded as surprising (Mally 1926,
p. 24). So then why didn't he call (24) surprising? Did it not
surprise him after (22)?



Even though Mally regarded many of his theorems as surprising, he
thought that he had discovered an interesting concept of
"correct willing" (*richtiges Wollen*) or
"willing in accordance with the facts" which should not be
confused with the notions of obligation and willing used in ordinary
discourse. Mally's "exact system of pure ethics" was
mainly concerned with this concept, but we will not describe this
system because it belongs to the field of ethics rather than deontic
logic.


## 6. Menger's Criticism



Mally's enterprise was received with little enthusiasm. As early as
1926, it was noted that "Mr. Mally's deductions are frequently
so amazingly obtuse and irrelevant that (despite his elaborate
symbolic apparatus) it is only necessary to state one or two of them
to show how far his discussion has strayed from its self-appointed
task" (Laird 1926, p. 395).



In 1939, Karl Menger published a devastating attack on Mally's system.
He first pointed out that A - !A is a theorem of this system. In
other words, if A is the case, then A is obligatory, and if A ought to
be the case then A is indeed the case. As we have already noted in
connection with theorems (34) and (35), Mally made the same claim in
informal terms, but the formula A - !A does not occur in his
book.



Menger's theorem A - !A may be proven as follows (Menger's proof
was different; **PC** denotes the propositional
calculus).



First, A - !A is a theorem:




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | A - ((!B - !B) & (B - A)) | [ **PC**
 ][5] |
| 2. | ((!B - !B) & (B - A)) - (!B
- !A) | [ I' ] |
| 3. | A - (!B - !A) | [ 1, 2, **PC** ] |
| 4. | !B - (A - !A) | [ 3, **PC** ] |
| 5a. | !U | [ Ax. IV ] |
| 5b. | !(!A - A) | [ III'(-), **PC** ] |
| 6. | A - !A | [ 4, either 5a or 5b, **PC** ] |
|  |



Second, !A - A is a theorem:




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | ((U - !A) & (A - [?])) - (U -
![?]) | [ I' ] |
| 2. | !((U - !A) & (A - [?])) | [ 1, V', **PC** ] |
| 3. | !((U - !A) & (A - [?])) - (!A -
A) | [ **PC**
 ][6] |
| 4. | !A - A | [ 2, 3, **PC** ] |



Because A - !A and !A - A are theorems, A - !A is a
theorem as well.



Menger gave the following comment:



> 
> 
> This result seems to me to be detrimental for Mally's theory, however.
> It indicates that the introduction of the sign ! is superfluous in the
> sense that it may be cancelled or inserted in any formula at any place
> we please. But this result (in spite of Mally's philosophical
> justification) clearly contradicts not only our use of the word
> "ought" but also some of Mally's own correct remarks about
> this concept, e.g. the one at the beginning of his development to the
> effect that p - (!q or !r) and p - !(q or r) are not
> equivalent. Mally is quite right that these two propositions are not
> equivalent according to the ordinary use of the word
> "ought." But they are equivalent according to his theory
> by virtue of the equivalence of p and !p (Menger 1939,
> p. 58).
> 
> 
> 



Almost all deontic logicians have accepted Menger's verdict. After
1939, Mally's deontic system has seldom been taken seriously.


## 7. Where Did Mally Go Wrong?



Where did Mally go wrong? How could one construct a system of deontic
logic which does more justice to the notion of obligation used in
ordinary discourse? Three types of answers are possible:


* Mally should not have added his deontic axioms to classical
propositional logic;
* Some of his deontic principles should be modified; and
* Both of the above. Menger advocated the latter view: "One of
the reasons for the failure of Mally's interesting attempt is that it
was founded on the 2-valued calculus of propositions" (Menger
1939, p. 59).



The first two suggestions turn out to be sufficient, so the third
proposal is overkill.




In the following we will point out three facts:




First, if Mally's deontic principles are added to a system in which
the so-called paradoxes of material and strict implication are
avoided, many of the "surprising" theorems (such as (34)
and (35)) are no longer derivable and A - !A is no longer
derivable either (section 8).




Second, if Mally's deontic principles are added to a system in which
the so-called law of the excluded middle is avoided, the unacceptable
consequence A - !A is no longer derivable, but almost all
theorems that Mally derived himself are still derivable (section 9).




Third, if Mally's deontic principles, e.g., Def. f and
Axiom I, are slightly modified, the resulting system is almost
identical with the system nowadays known as standard deontic logic
(section 10).



## 8. Alternative Non-Deontic Bases 1: Relevance Logic



Mally's informal postulates (i)-(iii) and (v) are conditionals or
negations of conditionals, i.e., of the form "if ... then
--" or "not: if ... then --."
Follesdal and Hilpinen (1981, pp. 5-6) have suggested that
such conditionals should not be formalized in terms of material
implication and that some sort of strict implication would be more
appropriate. But this suggestion is not altogether satisfactory, for
both A - !A and A - !A are derivable in the very weak system
**S0.90** plus I' and III', where
- is the symbol of strict
 implication.[7]



In systems of strict implication the so-called paradoxes of material
implication (such as A - (B - A)) are avoided, but the
so-called paradoxes of strict implication (such as (A & !A)
- B) remain. What would happen to Mally's system if *both*
kinds of paradoxes were avoided? This question can be answered by
adding Mally's axioms to a system in which none of the so-called
"fallacies of relevance" can be derived (see the entry on
 relevance logic).



In the following, we will add Mally's axioms to the prominent
relevance logic **R**. The result is better than in the
case of strict implication: most of the theorems which Mally regarded
as surprising are no longer derivable, and Menger's theorem A -
!A is not derivable either. But many "plausible" theorems
can still be derived.



Relevant system **R** with the propositional constant t
("the conjunction of all truths") has the following axioms
and rules (Anderson & Belnap 1975, ch. V; - is defined
by A - B = (A - B) & (B - A)):




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Self-implication. | A - A |
| Prefixing. | (A - B) - ((C - A) - (C - B)) |
| Contraction. | (A - (A - B)) - (A - B) |
| Permutation. | (A - (B - C)) - (B - (A - C)) |
| & Elimination. | (A & B) - A, (A & B) - B |
| & Introduction. | ((A - B) & (A - C)) - (A
- (B & C)) |
| [?] Introduction. | A - (A [?] B), B - (A [?] B) |
| [?] Elimination. | ((A - C) & (B - C)) - ((A [?] B) -
C) |
| Distribution. | (A & (B [?] C)) - ((A & B) [?] C) |
| Double Negation. | !!A - A |
| Contraposition. | (A - !B) - (B - !A) |
| Ax. t. | A - (t - A) |
| Modus Ponens. | A, A - B / B |
| Adjunction. | A, B / A & B |



A relevant version **RD** of Mally's deontic system may
be defined as follows:


* The language is the same as the language of **R**,
except that we write V instead of t, add the propositional constant U
and the unary connective !, and define L, [?], f and [?]
as in Mally's system.
* Axiomatization: add Mally's Axioms I-V to the axioms and
rules of **R**.



**RD** has the following properties.


* Axioms I, II and III may be replaced by the following three
simpler
 axioms:[8]

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| I\*. | (A - B) - (!A - !B) |
| II\*. | (!A & !B) - !(A & B) |
| III\*. | !(!A - A) |
* Formulas I'-V', (3), (4), (6), (8)-(11), (14),
(16)-(18), (23') and (30) are theorems of
 **RD**.[9]
* Formulas (1), (2), (5), (7), (12), (13), (15), (19)-(23),
(24)-(29), (31)-(35), A - !A and !A - A are not
 derivable.[10]
* There are 12 mismatches between **RD** and Mally's
expectations: (5), (12)-(13), (15), (19)-(21), (23) and (24)-(26) are
not derivable even though Mally did not regard these formulas as
surprising, and (30) is a theorem even though Mally viewed it as
surprising.
* Formulas (34) and (35) (the formulas which Mally viewed as the
most surprising theorems of his system) are in a sense stranger than
Menger's theorem A - !A because the latter theorem is derivable
in **RD** supplemented with (34) or (35) while neither
(34) nor (35) is derivable in **RD** supplemented with A
-
 !A.[11]



Although most of Mally's surprising theorems are not derivable in
**RD**, this has nothing to do with Mally's own reasons
for regarding these theorems as surprising. They are not derivable in
**RD** because they depend on fallacies of relevance.
Mally never referred to such fallacies to explain his surprise. His
considerations were quite different, as we have already described.



**RD** is closely related to Anderson's relevant deontic
logic **ARD**, which is defined as **R**
supplemented with the following two axioms (Anderson 1967, 1968,
McArthur 1981; Anderson used the unary connective O instead of !):




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ARD1. | !A - (!A - [?]) |
| ARD2. | !A - !!!A |


* All theorems of **RD** are theorems of
 **ARD**.[12]
* ARD1( - ) is not a theorem of
 **RD**+ARD2.[13]
 This formula does not occur in Mally's book. According to Anderson,
Bohnert (1945) was the first one to propose
 it.[14]
* ARD2 is not a theorem of
 **RD**+ARD1.[15]
 This formula does not occur in Mally's book, but Mally endorsed the
corresponding informal principle: "a person who wills correctly
does not will (not even implicitly) the negation of what he wills;
correct willing is free of
 contradictions."[16]
* **RD** supplemented with ARD1( - ) and ARD2 has
the same theorems as
 **ARD**.[17]



Anderson's system has several problematical features (McArthur 1981,
Goble 1999, 2001) and **RD** shares most of these
features. But we will not go into this issue here. It is at any rate
clear that **RD** is better than Mally's original
system.


## 9. Alternative Non-Deontic Bases 2: Intuitionistic Logic



It was recently pointed out that it is also possible to base Mally's
deontic logic on intuitionistic propositional logic
**IPC** rather than classical propositional logic
(Lokhorst 2013; see also Centrone 2013).



Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus **IPC**
has the following axioms and rules (see Van Dalen 2002 and the entry
on
 intuitionistic logic):




|  |
| --- |
| A - (B - A) |
| (A - (B - C)) - ((A - B) - (A -
C)) |
| (A & B) - A |
| (A & B) - B |
| A - (B - (A & B)) |
| A - (A [?] B) |
| B - (A [?] B) |
| (A - C) - ((B - C) - ((A [?] B) -
C)) |
| [?] - A |
| *modus ponens* |
| *substitution* |
|  |



If we add to these axioms and rules the following:



Abbreviations: ! A = A - [?], A - B = (A - B)
& (B - A), T = A - A,



then we can formulate **ID** (an intuitionistic
reformulation of Mally's deontic logic) as **IPC** plus
Mally's axioms I - V and




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| (34) | U - T |
| VI | !(A [?] ! A) |
|  |



Axiom VI follows from Mally's theorem (12d) (see Mally 1926, ch. 2,
sec. 5, p. 29 and Morscher 1998, p.
 122).[18]



FACT 1. **ID** can alternatively be axiomatized as
**IPC** plus axioms !A - ! ! A and
 (34).[19]


 Classical propositional logic, **CPC**, is
**IPC** plus A [?] ! A. **MD**
("Mally's *Deontik*") is **ID** plus
**CPC**.


FACT 2. A - !A is a theorem of
 **MD**.[20]



In modern deontic logic, P A ("it is permitted that A") is
defined as P A = ! !! A. If we adopt this definition,
**ID** provides !A - P A (because
**IPC** provides ! ! A - ! ! !
! A). Mally did not discuss permission. His approval of !A -
! !! A (which is usually regarded as characteristic for
deontic logic) is clear from Mally 1926, ch. 4, sec. 10, p. 49,
*ad* (V).



Mally objected to !(A [?] B) - (!A [?] !B) and Menger objected
to A - !A (see Mally 1926, ch. 2, sec. 4, p. 27, *ad* (II)
and the quote in Section 6 above). **ID** avoids these
objections:



FACT 3. Neither !(A [?] B) - (!A [?] !B) nor !A - A is a
theorem of
 **ID**.[21]




Only one of the theorems presented by Mally is *not* derivable in
**ID**, namely (13b): ! (A & ! !B) -
(! A [?]
 !B).[22]



FACT 4. For any extension X of **ID** (in the language of
**ID**): X provides (13b) if and only if X provides !(A
[?] B) - (!A [?]
 !B).[23]




**ID** plus (13b) does not provide !A -
 A.[24]



The intuitionistic reformulation of Mally's deontic logic that we have
proposed is successful in so far as it avoids both Menger's and
Mally's own objections while preserving almost all the theorems that
Mally noticed himself. However, it is unacceptable as a system of
deontic logic in its own right. We mention only two reasons:



1. Theorem A - !A is intuitively invalid. No deontic system,
except Mally's, has this theorem.



2. It is unclear how permission is to be represented. If we use the
standard definition (P A = ! !! A), then P A - !A is a
theorem, but P A and !A are not equivalent according to the ordinary
use of the words "permitted" and
"obligatory."



The relevantist reformulation of Mally's system that was discussed
above does not have these defects.



Although **ID** is unacceptable as a system of deontic
logic, it does make sense as a system of *lax logic*, as we will
now show. Lax logic is used in the areas of hardware verification in
digital circuits and access control in secure systems, where !
expresses a notion of correctness up to constraints. The term
"lax" was chosen "to indicate the looseness
associated with the notion of correctness up to constraints"
(Fairtlough and Mendler 1997, p. 3). There is a considerable
literature on lax logic (Goldblatt 2011).



Propositional lax logic **PLL** is defined as
**IPC** plus (A - !B) - (!A - !B)
(Fairtlough and Mendler 1997, p. 4, Lemma 2.1). Lax logic
**PLL\*** is **PLL** plus !A - !
! A (Fairtlough and Mendler 1997, p. 23).



FACT 5. **ID** is an alternative axiomatization of lax
logic **PLL\*** plus
 (34).[25]




Mally's deontic logic and lax logic arose from quite different
considerations. It is therefore remarkable that the intuitionistic
reformulation of Mally's logic that we have discussed is identical
with lax logic **PLL\*** plus (34).


## 10. Alternative Deontic Principles



Instead of changing the non-deontic propositional basis of Mally's
system, one might also modify the specifically deontic axioms and
rules. This might of course be done in various ways, but the following
approach works well without departing too much from Mally's original
 assumptions.[26]



First, regard f as primitive and replace Mally's definition of f in
terms of - and ! (Def. f, the very first specifically
deontic postulate in Mally's book) by the following definition of ! in
terms of V and f :




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Def. !. | !A = V f A |



Second, replace Axiom I, which may also be written as (B -
C) - ((A f B) - (A f C)), with the following *rule of
inference*:




|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Rule f. | B - C / (A f B) - (A f C) |



We may then derive:




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | B - C / !B - !C | [ Def. !, R f ] |
| 2. | (!A & !B) - !(A & B) | [ Def. !, Ax. II ] |
| 3. | !V | [ 1, Ax. IV, **PC** ] |
| 4. | !!L | [ 1, Ax. III(-), Ax. V, **PC** (ex
falso) ] |



The so-called standard system of deontic logic **KD** is
defined as **PC** supplemented with 1-4 (except that ! is
usually written as O: see the entry on
 deontic logic),
 so the new system is at least as strong as **KD**. It is
not difficult to see that it is in fact identical with
**KD** supplemented with OU (Mally's Axiom IV) and
the following definition of f : A f B = O(A - B). In modern
deontic logic, the notion of *commitment* is sometimes defined
in this way.



In the new system, Mally's theorems have the following status.


* II', IV', (1)-(5), (7)-(11), (13)-(15), (17),
(20)-(24) and (27)-(32) are derivable.
* I', III', V', (6), (12), (16), (18)-(19),
(25)-(26), (33)-(35), A - !A and !A - A are not
derivable.
* There are 20 mismatches with Mally's deontic expectations: 10
"plausible" formulas are no longer derivable, namely
I', III', V', (6), (12), (16), (18)-(19) and
(25)-(26), and 10 "surprising" theorems are still
derivable, namely (1), (2), (7), (22) and (27)-(32).
* Although (34) and (35) are not derivable, adding them would by no
means lead to the theoremhood of A - !A.



There were only 12 mismatches in the case of **RD**, so
the new system does less justice to Mally's deontic expectations than
**RD** did. But it agrees better with his general outlook
because it is still based on classical propositional logic, a system
to which Mally did not object (not that he had much choice in the
1920s).



Many of Mally's surprising theorems are derivable in
**KD**, but they have, as it were, lost their sting:
those theorems lead to surprising consequences when combined with
Mally's Axiom I and his definition of f , but they are completely
harmless without these postulates.



The standard system of deontic logic has several problematical
features. The fact that each provable statement is obligatory is often
regarded as counterintuitive, and there are many other well-known
"paradoxes." The revised version of Mally's system shares
these problematical features. But we will not discuss these issues
here. The standard system is at any rate better than Mally's original
proposal.


## 11. Conclusion



Mally's deontic logic is unacceptable for the reasons stated by Menger
(1939). But it is not as bad as it may seem at first sight. Only
relatively minor modifications are needed to turn it into a more
acceptable system. One may either change the non-deontic basis to get
either a system that is similar to Anderson's system or a system that
is identical with intuitionistic or constructive propositional logic
with double negation as an obligation-like operator, or apply two
patches to the deontic postulates to obtain a system similar to
standard deontic logic.



Some authors have refused to view Mally's deontic logic as a
"real" deontic system and say that they "mention it
only by way of curiosity" (Meyer and Wieringa 1993, p. 4).
The above shows that this judgment is too harsh. It is only a small
step, not a giant leap, from Mally's system to modern systems of
deontic logic, so Mally's pioneering effort deserves rehabilitation
rather than contempt.