## 1. Attributes in the *Ethics*



Before discussing the theory of attributes in the *Ethics*, it
will be helpful to keep in mind a rudimentary sketch of the general
structure of Spinoza's
 ontology:[2]





|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Attributes/Substance: | Thought --- God
--- Extension |
|  | | |  | | |
| Infinite Modes: | Infinite Intellect |  | Motion and Rest |
|  | | |  | | |
| Finite Modes: | A Mind |  | A Body |



There is only an infinite substance (1P14), that is, there are no
created substances. The infinite substance consists of infinite
attributes (1D6). Every mode, be it finite or infinite, must be
conceived through an attribute (1D5, 1P10Schol, 2P6 and 2P6Dem).
Finally, what other philosophers consider to be "created
substances," such as my mind (as well as my body), are finite
modes for Spinoza
 (1P11).[3]



### 1.1 What are Attributes?



Spinoza is not the first to furnish his metaphysics with attributes
and in that he is following a very long tradition. He is, though,
mostly influenced by Descartes, and in some ways is trying to keep
with Descartes' notion of "attribute." It therefore
will be useful to look back and get a sense of what Descartes had in
mind and thus get a preliminary grasp (which will be revised) of what
Spinoza means by "attribute." Descartes states in the
*Principles of Philosophy* that attributes are the essence of a
thing, so the essence of mind is thought or thinking, and the essence
of body is to be extended (*Principles*, I, SS53, CSM, I,
p. 210, AT 25). To see why this is so, it is worth revisiting the
first and second *Meditations*, even if very briefly. Let us
begin with body and Extension. To understand the essence of body, we
can look to the famous wax example in *Meditation Two* (CSM,
II, p. 20-21, AT 30-32). While sitting by the fireplace,
Descartes inspects a piece of wax and asks himself what he knows of
the wax. He begins by listing all the sensory properties of the wax:
it is white, has a certain smell, makes a certain sound when one raps
it with one's finger, is hard, and has a certain taste. After
listing all its sensory properties, he then places the piece of wax by
the fire and sees how it loses *all* those properties: it
changes color, smell, texture, taste, etc. Descartes concludes, among
other things, that the essence of the wax, insofar as it is a body, is
that it is *extended* in length, breadth, and depth since that
is the only thing that remains constant about the wax. In this
respect, the piece of wax is no different from any other
body--that is, its essence is to be extended. Extension, then,
according to Descartes, is the essence of body. In the
*Meditations* we also, famously, come to recognize our own
essence as thinking things. We realize this by recognizing that we
cannot doubt that we are doubting while doubting. Furthermore, we
realize that doubting in this sense is no different from
understanding, affirming, denying, willing, unwilling, imagining, and
having sense perceptions (seeming to see, etc.) (CSM, II, p. 19, AT
28). Descartes then reaches the conclusion that the essence of the
mind is Thought. For these reasons, Descartes claims that Thought and
Extension are the principal attributes of mind and body and that they
are "really distinct", that is, they exist independently
one from the
 other.[4]
 It is important to note that for Descartes, any *created
substance* has only one principal attribute, as opposed to God who
has infinite attributes.



Spinoza adopts some aspects of the Cartesian set up while rejecting
others. He agrees that Thought and Extension are attributes (2P1, 2P2)
and are related to essences (1D4). He agrees they are "really
distinct" from each other
 (1P10Schol).[5]
 Furthermore, he agrees that "mind" has to be conceived
through Thought, and "body" through Extension. (2P5 and
its demonstration make the case with regard to ideas and Thought; 2D1
establishes it for bodies and Extension. This is also made very clear
in 3P2 and its demonstration.) However, he does not agree that they
are attributes of *created substances*, since he rejects the
possibility of created substances altogether (1P6Cor., 1P8Schol1,
1P14). One way to understand Spinoza is to see how he can hold both
Thought and Extension (and other attributes, if there are others) to
be divine attributes or attributes of one and the same (infinite)
 substance.[6]



### 1.2 Definition of Attribute



Spinoza defines the term "attribute" thus:
*"*By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives
of substance as constituting its essence" (1D4). This definition
is reminiscent of Descartes' notion of attributes as it appears
in the *Principle of Philosophy* insofar as attributes are
related to the essence (or essences) of substance. However, as many
have noticed, it is not clear from the definition alone what exactly
Spinoza means. There are several, by now famous, ambiguities in the
 definition.[7]
 These, together with the different interpretative options, are
discussed in Section 1.8.


### 1.3 Real Distinction



Spinoza makes a very important claim about attributes in the Scholium
to Proposition 10 of Part One: "...although two attributes
may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived
without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that
they constitute two beings, *or* two different
substances." Spinoza here is explaining something about the
relationship among attributes--one may be conceived without the
aid of the other--and about the relation of the attributes to the
substance, namely, that conceiving attributes independently is not
evidence of the existence of independent substances.



To understand why this scholium is so important, it is helpful to
recall Descartes' definition of a "real
distinction." In the *Principles of Philosophy,*
Descartes says: "Strictly speaking, a *real distinction*
exists only between two or more substances; and we can perceive that
two substances are really distinct simply from the fact that we can
clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the other"
(*Principles*, I, SS60, CSM, I, p. 213, AT 28). For
Descartes, this anchors the strict epistemological and ontological
separation between mind and body. One of the things we learn from
going through the *Meditations* is that we are capable of
clearly and distinctly perceiving ourselves without a body--the
*cogito* in the *Second Meditation*, and we clearly and
distinctly perceive body without thinking in the *Fifth
Meditation.* (Of course, in retrospect, we realize that we already
did this in a sense with the wax as well). Descartes thus concludes
that mind and body are really distinct, that is, one can
*exist* without the other.



One important implication of this distinction is that it allows for a
fully mechanistic explanation of the physical world. To explain the
interaction between two bodies requires alluding only to their
physical properties (size, shape and motion) without the need to take
recourse to any Aristotelian explanation involving
 final causes.
 Making room for mechanistic explanations, that is, for the New
Science, was one of Descartes' chief motivations for writing the
*Meditations*. Spinoza preserves this aspect of Cartesian
doctrine (cf. appendix to Part One of the *Ethics* and
discussion below).



Having separated the mind so sharply from the body, Descartes is left
with having to explain their evident unity. More specifically, he is
burdened with trying to explain how two really distinct substances
seem to interact causally. Their causal interaction seems problematic
because, according to Descartes, each substance is independent; the
infinite substance depends on nothing but itself (*Principles*,
I, SS51, CSM, I, p. 210, AT 24), while created substances depend
on *nothing but God* for their existence (*Principles*,
I, SS52, CSM I, p. 210, AT 25). If distinct substances interact
causally then they seem to depend on one another, and this would go
against their nature *qua* substances. This is why the
*union* of the mind and body is a thorny issue for Descartes,
and was and continues to be a source of much debate (Cf. for example,
Hoffman, 1986). For some, a version of this problem translates into
Spinoza's metaphysics (cf. Section 1.9.4). The issue of the
nature of the "real distinction" for Spinoza is discussed
in the subsequent section.


#### No Cross-Attribute Causation or Conception



For Descartes, then, there is the epistemological claim that
perceiving Thought does not involve perceiving Extension and vice
versa. Each is explanatorily independent from the other, (although not
from God). Spinoza adopts this aspect of Cartesian philosophy and
holds, as well, that there is what Della Rocca calls, "a
conceptual barrier" between Thought and Extension as Spinoza
states in the scholium "i.e., one may be conceived without the
aid of the other" (Della Rocca, 1996, 9-17). Spinoza holds
Thought and Extension to be explanatorily self-contained. Physical
changes are to be understood in terms of other physical items, and
ideas are to be understood in terms of other ideas. What is ruled out
is what can be called "cross attribute explanations." For
example, explaining the movement of my hand by my desire to move my
hand. According to Spinoza, the movement of my hand is to be explained
purely physically by alluding to other bodies and their motions, while
my desire is to be explained by other desires and ideas. Spinoza makes
this very clear in 3P2, its demonstration and scholium:



> 
> 
> 3P2: The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind
> cannot determine the body to motion, to rest, or to anything else (if
> there is anything else).
> 
> 
> 
> Dem.: All modes of thinking have God for a cause, insofar as he is a
> thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by another
> attribute (by 2P6). So what determines the mind to thinking is a mode
> of thinking and not of extension, that is (by 2D1), it is not the
> body. This was the first thing.
> 
> 
> 
> Next, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another
> body...whatever arises in the body must have arisen from God
> insofar as he is considered to be affected by some mode of extension,
> and not insofar as he is considered to be affected by some mode of
> thinking (also 2P6), that is, it cannot arise from the mind, which (by
> 2P11) is a mode of thinking. This was the second point. Therefore, the
> body cannot determine the mind, and so on, q.e.d.
> 
> 
> 



Although this is reminiscent of Descartes in some respects, there is,
of course, one crucial difference. For Descartes the fact that one can
conceive Thought distinctly from Extension is evidence for the
existence of two substances--mind and body. For Spinoza, this is
not the case, and this is the point he is making in this central
proposition (1P10), namely, that although two attributes may be
conceived independently--one without the other--this does
*not* imply that there are two substances existing separately.
For Spinoza there is only one substance with infinite attributes, and
although each attribute is conceived independently from the other/s
they still are, nonetheless, all attributes of one and the same
substance. It is possible then to conceive, think, or completely
explain the entire universe, or everything that exists, under each one
of the attributes. That is, we can give a complete physical
description of everything that exists, or alternatively explain,
describe, or conceive everything as ideas or thought. Being able to
explain the entire universe under the attribute of Extension is what
allows Spinoza to preserve Descartes' effort of providing room
for progress in the New Science (Cf. Appendix to Part One).



Spinoza and Descartes agree about the epistemological separation
between Thought and Extension, but not about the ontological one.
Descartes calls the distinction between attributes of the same
substance, and between a given attribute and its substance a
"rational distinction," (*Principles*, I, SS62,
CSM, I, p. 214, AT 30) and so, insofar as Thought and Extension belong
to the same substance for Spinoza, they would be, in Descartes'
terminology, *rationally*
 distinct.[8]
 Spinoza however, says that they are "*really*
distinct." How exactly to understand the "reality"
of the distinction among the attributes is a crucial interpretative
matter and is discussed in Sections 1.8.1-1.8.2.


### 1.4 The Identification of Attributes with Substance



Another claim that has to be taken into account in an analysis of
Spinoza's view on attributes is that God *is* his
attributes: 1P4: "Therefore, there is nothing outside the
intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from
one another except substance, *or what is the same* (by 1D4),
their attributes, and their affections" (italics added), 1P19:
"God is eternal, *or* [*sive*] all God's
attributes are eternal," 1P20Cor.: "It follows second,
that God, *or* [*sive*] all of God's attributes,
are immutable." Some might consider 1P29Schol to be making an
identity claim as well: "But by *Natura Naturata* I
understand whatever follows from the necessity of God's nature,
*or* [*sive*] from any of God's
attributes..." Spinoza in these places seems to be claiming
that there is an identification of the substance with its attributes.
However, this identification can be understood in several ways and in
various degrees of strictness. How one reads this claim depends on
other considerations discussed in Section 1.9.3.


### 1.5 Extension as a Divine Attribute



One of the important things that Spinoza does in the first two parts
of the *Ethics* is to establish Extension as a divine attribute
(elements of this view are evident already in KV I/25). Although
Spinoza adopts many important aspects of Cartesian metaphysics, he
collapses the divide between the infinite and created substances. This
means that principal attributes that were at the "created
substance" level in the Cartesian set-up are "moved
up", so to speak, to the infinite substance level for Spinoza.
One of these attributes is, of course, Extension. Spinoza has to
explain to a resistant audience how Extension can be considered a
*divine* attribute.



The important steps that will allow Spinoza to claim that Extension
can be an attribute of God are the following. He defines God as a
substance consisting of infinite attributes
 (1D6).[9]
 He shows that substances cannot share attributes (1P5), that every
substance is infinite (1D8), that a single substance can have several
attributes (1P10schol), and that an infinite substance exists (1P11).
With an eye towards specifically establishing Extension as a divine
attribute, he claims in 1P12: "No attribute of a substance can
be truly conceived from which it follows that the substance can be
divided." In 1P13, he states: "A substance which is
absolutely infinite is indivisible," and in the corollary, he
makes the point especially clear with respect to Extension:
"From these propositions it follows that no substance, *and
consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is a
substance,* is divisible." In 1P14, he establishes that
there is only one substance (or rather, that there are no created
substances). Finally in 1P15 he claims: "Whatever is, is in God,
and nothing can be or be conceived without God." With this, the
stage is set for Extension being a divine attribute or applicable to
God, if in fact it is a genuine attribute (which is established only
in Part Two).



Spinoza is aware that this will be received with great resistance. The
possible objection he imagines is that since Extension is divisible by
its very nature then, if Extension were an attribute of God, God would
be divisible. God, of course, cannot be divisible, for then he would
not be infinite. In the Scholium to 1P15 he shows the ensuing
contradictions if one holds Extension to be by its very nature
divisible. It is important for him to show that Extension cannot imply
divisibility in answer to possible objectors holding traditional
views. Moreover, he has just shown that there is only one substance,
which is indivisible (1P12 and 1P13), and so whatever attributes it
has, none of them can imply divisibility in the only substance.
Spinoza then shows that if Extension is an attribute, it is applicable
to God, and there is no danger of that implying any real division in
the substance. One important result of this is that what appear to be
individuated bodies cannot be really individuated in the Cartesian
sense of implying real distinction and the existence of multiple
substances. Rather, what appear to be individuated bodies are only
modes of substance under the attribute of
 Extension.[10]
 Only in Part Two does Spinoza show that Extension (as well as
Thought) are in fact attributes of God: "Thought is an attribute
of God, *or* [*sive*] God is a thinking thing"
(2P1) and "Extension is an attribute of God, *or*
[*sive*] God is an extended thing" (2P2).


### 1.6 The 2P7 Doctrine



A very important characteristic regarding attributes is established in
2P7 and its scholium, which is sometimes referred to in the literature
as the "parallelism doctrine." However, as will be
discussed in Section 1.9.2, this nomenclature is laden with a
significant amount of interpretative bias and the term is nowhere to
be found in the *Ethics* itself. It is thus advisable to stay
clear of it and simply refer to it as "the 2P7 Doctrine."
2P7 states: "The order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of things," (*"ordo, &
connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo & connexio rerum")*.
Spinoza explains this proposition in the scholium:



> 
> For example, a circle existing in Nature and the idea of the existing
> circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is
> explained through different attributes...Therefore, whether we
> conceive Nature under the attribute of extension, or under the
> attribute of thought, or under any attribute, we shall find one and
> the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, that is,
> that the same things follow one another.
> 



Spinoza is claiming here that a mode *X* under the attribute of
Thought is one and the same as mode *X* under
Attribute*y*. A good way to get some intuitive sense
of this is to see how this works with respect to ourselves. Under the
attribute of Thought, I am a finite mode--an idea or mind. Under
the attribute of Extension, I am a finite mode, that is, a body. The
claim in 2P7 and its scholium is that my mind (a mode of Thought) and
my body (a mode of Extension) are one and the same. This is the case
for all modes. Furthermore, whatever causal relation my body, say,
bears to other modes of Extension, my mind will bear to the other
modes of Thought. The understanding of this doctrine and its
implications in more depth depends, probably more than any other
doctrine, on how one construes other central elements of
Spinoza's theory of attributes (e.g. the number of attributes).
In Section 1.9.2 different directions of interpretation are considered
regarding 2P7 and its scholium.


### 1.7 The Two Known Attributes



Spinoza famously claims that we, human minds, only know two
attributes--Thought and Extension. This can be seen as arising
from the axioms in Part Two: 2A2: "Man thinks," 2A4:
"We feel a certain body is affected in many ways," 2A5:
"We neither feel nor perceive any singular things, except bodies
and modes of thinking," as well as 2P13: "The object of
the idea constituting the human mind is the body, *or*
[*sive*] a certain mode of extension which actually exists,
*and nothing else*" [italics added] (this is true already
in KV, 1/27). In Letter 64 Spinoza tries to explain why we can only
perceive these two attributes, and he does so by referring back to
2P13 and claims in the letter: "Therefore, the mind's
power of understanding extends only as far as that which this idea of
the body contains within itself, or which follows therefrom. Now this
idea of the body involves and expresses no other attributes of God
than extension and thought." Although some have found this line
of argumentation unsatisfying (e.g. Bennett, 1984, 78-79) it is
worth noting that Spinoza here is relying on axioms.


### 1.8 Ambiguities and Interpretative Directions



The attempt to understand Spinoza's doctrine regarding the
attributes has traditionally led interpreters in two main directions,
although others have been proposed (e.g. Lennon, 2005. 12-30;
Shein,
 2009).[11]
 The first is what is known as the "subjective"
interpretation which follows Hegel, and is given its paradigmatic
expression by Wolfson. More recently, Michael Della Rocca as been
advocating a more idealistic interpretation of the attributes, which
shares certain important features with the subjectivist camp. The
other, which has become the standard, is the "objective"
interpretation. These two principal avenues stem from some important
ambiguities in the definition of "attribute": "By
attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance as
constituting its essence"
 (1D4).[12]
 The first term that is ambiguous is "intellect," since it
can refer either to the finite intellect or the infinite one (cf.
diagram in Section 1). The second important ambiguity lies in the
Latin term *tanquam*, since it can mean either "as if,
but not in fact," or "as in fact." The definition
can therefore be read, either as stating that attributes are what the
intellect perceives of substance *as constituting its actual
essence*, or that attributes are what the intellect perceives only
*as if they are what constitute the essence* but are not what
in fact constitutes it or them. The subjectivists accordingly claim
that attributes are what the finite intellect perceives of substance
*as if* constituting its essence. The objectivists, by and
large, instead claim that it is the infinite intellect that perceives
the attribute *as in fact* constituting the essence of
substance. In the following sections the different interpretative
options are explained *a grosso modo*. The ways in which the
different interpretative avenues affect other Spinozistic doctrines
are discussed in Sections 1.9.1-1.9.4.


#### 1.8.1 Subjective Interpretations



As is well known, Hegel, in various respects, considered himself to be
modifying Spinoza's doctrine ("to be a follower of Spinoza
is the essential commencement of all philosophy") and his
interpretation of Spinoza was extremely influential. In
his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel says that
what has utmost reality for Spinoza is the absolute (or the infinite
substance) and that anything else (finite modes, in particular) are
ways of negating this absolute. He goes on to explain that the
understanding [or "intellect"] grasps the reality of
substance through attributes, but "it is only reality in view of
the understanding." He stresses that understanding in terms of
attributes is due to the nature of the understanding and not because
of the nature of the absolute (or the infinite substance) as such. It
is clear that he considers the understanding to be the understanding
of finite minds, because he goes on to explain that Spinoza's
claim that there are "infinite attributes" has to be
interpreted as "infinite in character" and not in number
and that there are only the two attributes known to finite
minds--Thought and Extension.



What is referred to in the literature as the subjectivist reading,
following Hegel, holds that the intellect perceiving the attributes is
the finite intellect and that the attributes are projections of the
finite mind onto the infinite substance which it cannot fully
comprehend. In other words, according to the subjectivist
interpretation, the definition of attribute states that attributes are
what the finite intellect perceives of substance *as if (but not in
fact)* constituting its essence. In contrast, the objectivist
reading takes the intellect in question to be the infinite one, and
the *tanquam* to mean "as in fact," and so it read
the definition as claiming that attributes are what the infinite
intellect perceives of substance *as (in fact)* constituting
its essence. Wolfson summarizes the difference between the two
positions thus:



> 
> According to the former interpretation [subjectivism], to be perceived
> by the mind means to be *invented* by the mind, for of
> themselves the attributes have no independent existence at all but are
> identical with the essence of the substance. According to the latter
> interpretation [objectivism], to be perceived by the mind means only
> to be *discovered* by the mind, for even of themselves the
> attributes have independent existence in the essence of substance
> (Wolfson, 1934, 146).
> 



One of the motivations behind Wolfson's view is that he
considers Spinoza to be the last of the medieval Jewish rationalists,
and in following with that tradition, Spinoza locates all multiplicity
not in the infinite substance (God), but rather in the human mind.
That is, the fact that God has multiple attributes is explained not by
his having multiple essences, natures, or aspects, but rather because
of the nature of the human mind. This is based on the conviction that
God's true nature is simple and any multiplicity is merely
apparent but not real. It is because of the limitations of the finite
mind that it attributes multiplicity to the infinite substance, when
in reality the infinite substance is simple. In this view there is a
gap between the attributes and the infinite substance. The infinite
substance as it is in itself, so to speak, is unknowable to the finite
mind. With respect to the "real distinction," the
distinction between the attributes in this view is grounded in the
different ways the finite mind has of conceiving the infinite
substance. That is, the distinction between the attributes is not
based on the nature of the infinite substance itself, but it reveals,
in a way, something about the nature of finite perception. It is in
these terms that the "reality" of the distinction is to be
understood, i.e., as if but not in fact.


##### 1.8.1.1 Objections to Subjectivism



Two main objections have been brought forth against the subjectivist
interpretation. These are considered by most commentators to be
forceful enough for rejecting subjectivism as a serious contender for
a satisfying interpretation of Spinoza's theory of attributes.
The first objection to subjectivism is that, finite minds can never
have true knowledge of God, but only knowledge "as if."
All knowledge is rendered illusory. The reason for this is quite
clear. In the subjectivist interpretation the attributes are
projections of the finite mind, therefore the finite mind can never
come to know the infinite substance as it is in itself. This seems to
contradict Spinoza's claim that the finite mind can have
adequate, that is, perfect knowledge of God's essence (2P47).
The second objection is that this interpretation seems irreconcilable
with those places in the text where Spinoza identifies the attributes
and God (cf. 1P4, 1P19 and 1P20Cor.). Again, as projections of the
finite intellect, the attributes do not properly pertain to the
substance, and therefore cannot be identical to it. For these reasons,
among others, the subjective interpretation (understood in these
terms) has fallen out of
 favor.[13]
 Michael Della Rocca, however, has been advocating more recently that
attributes (and diversity more generally), are mind-dependent yet not
illusory. Thus he aims to overcome some of the traditional objections
to subjectivism (primarily "illusory knowledge"
objections) while insisting on the mind-dependent status of
attributes. He takes the mind-dependant nature of diversity (be it of
attribute or modes) to be an inevitable consequence of Spinoza's
adoption of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (cf. Della Rocca,
2012).


#### 1.8.2 Objective Interpretations



In light of these kinds of criticisms to the subjectivist
interpretation, commentators have turned towards what are known as
"objectivist" accounts. Although the details of these
accounts are quite diverse, there are a few key elements they
share--all related to the fact that they do not wish to be
subjectivist. The first of these characteristics is that they hold
that knowledge in the system cannot be illusory. That is, knowledge
through attributes must yield true, or adequate, knowledge. One way to
do this is to claim that it is the infinite intellect that perceives
the attributes, and so knowledge through attributes is the kind of
knowledge the infinite intellect has, and therefore is not illusory
(e.g. Bennett, 1984, 147; Delahunty, 1985, 116; Della Rocca 1996, 157;
Haserot, 1972, 32-35). Therefore, the *tanquam* in the
definition is to be read "as in fact" and not "as
if."



As opposed to subjectivism, which does not emphasize the
"reality" of the distinction between the attributes, or
rather, does not ground the distinction in the nature of the infinite
substance, objectivist interpretations place ontological weight on the
"real distinction" between the attributes. In other words,
for the multiplicity to have a certain reality and not be illusory, it
must somehow be grounded not in the perceiver but in the thing
perceived, namely, the infinite substance. The danger of this kind of
interpretation is that if the distinction is stressed too strongly,
the unity of the substance is lost. If the infinite substance has
"really distinct" attributes, and this distinction is
grounded in, say, distinct natures or essences of the infinite
substance, then there has to be an explanation of how a multiplicity
of natures or essences can be united to form one substance. (This
issue is addressed in further detail in Section 1.9.4 as it emerges in
the discussion of the nature of the union of mind and body).



Any interpretation of Spinoza must characterize the relation between
any given attribute and the substance. As mentioned, in the
subjectivist account there is a problematic gap between the substance
and any given attribute. The alternative is to deny this gap. For
example, Bennett claims the following:



> 
> I think that here [Ep. 9] he is saying that substance differs from
> attribute only by the difference between a substance and an adjectival
> presentation of the very same content. If we look for how *that
> which is extended* (substance) differs from *extension*
> (attribute), we find that it consists only in the notion of *that
> which has...* extension or thought or whatever; and that,
> Spinoza thinks, adds nothing to the conceptual content of
> *extension*, but merely marks something about how the content
> is logically structured. As I did in SS12.7, he is rejecting the
> view that a property bearer is an item whose nature qualifies it to
> have properties, in favour of the view that the notion of a property
> bearer, of a thing which..., is a bit of formal apparatus,
> something which organizes conceptual content without adding to it.
> According to this view, there is an emptiness about the difference
> between substance and attribute (Bennett, 1984, 62-63).
> 



Although Bennett claims there is an emptiness about the distinction
between the two, he does not consider it an absolute identity either.
He finds an identity claim to be irreconcilable with the claim that
attributes are really distinct. Della Rocca has suggested
intentionality as a way of denying the gap and treats "...
is extended" and "... is thinking" as
referentially opaque. In other words, what is being picked out by the
infinite intellect in either instance is the same, but the way in
which it is picked out is different. Yet another way of denying the
gap is to claim, along with Descartes, that the distinction between an
attribute and the substance is only a rational distinction. That is,
*in reality* there is no distinction, but in the finite mind we
can separate, *contra natura*, the attribute from the
substance. Or in other words, the finite mind can abstract the
attribute from the substance, but *in reality* they are not
separated. This type of view must be supplemented by an account, then,
of what is meant by the "real distinction" among the
attributes.


### 1.9 Implications of the Various Readings on Other Spinozistic Doctrines


#### 1.9.1 Number of Attributes



Although Spinoza claims that there are infinite attributes, a question
arises as to how many there are, because "infinity" may
not necessarily refer to numeric
 infinity.[14]
 Bennett, among others, has made the case that infinity in early
modern philosophy means totality (Bennett, 1984, 75-79).
Spinoza's claims, then, that the infinite substance has infinite
attributes can be understood as the claim that the infinite substance
has all the attributes there are to be
 had.[15]
 This is consistent with there being, say, only the two known
attributes. There are sections in the text, on the other hand, that
seem to suggest that infinity means a numerical infinity, and thus the
infinite substance has as attributes Thought and Extension, as well as
infinitely many other unknown attributes. The places used as evidence
for those wishing to claim there are more than two attributes are the
following:



> 
> 
> 1D6: By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a
> substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one
> expresses an eternal and infinite essence.
> 
> 
> 
> Exp.: I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind; for if
> something is only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite
> attributes of it; but if something is absolutely infinite, whatever
> expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its
> essence*.*
> 
> 
> 
> 2P7Schol: Therefore whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of
> Extension, or the attribute of Thought, or any other attribute, we
> shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of
> causes, that is the same things follow one another.
> 
> 
> 
> Letter 56: To your [Hugo Boxel] question as to whether I have as clear
> an idea of God as of a triangle, I reply in the affirmative. But if
> you ask me whether I have as clear a mental image of God as of a
> triangle, I reply in the negative. We cannot imagine God, but we can
> apprehend him by the intellect. Here it should also be observed that I
> do not claim to have complete knowledge of God, but that I do
> understand some of his attributes--not indeed all of them, or the
> greater part--and it is certain that my ignorance of very many
> attributes does not prevent me from having knowledge of some of them.
> When I was studying Euclid's *Elements*, I understood
> early on that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right
> angles, and I clearly perceived this property of a triangle although I
> was ignorant of many others.
> 
> 
> 



This issue can be linked to the previous discussion regarding the
ambiguities in the definition of attribute, although this is not
always done. If one holds that it is the infinite intellect that is
doing the relevant perceiving, there seems to be no reason to limit
the number of attributes it perceives. Conversely, it might be claimed
that if the infinite intellect perceives only two attributes, there
must be a sufficient reason why there are only two, and why they are
Thought and Extension and not other attributes. If, on the other hand,
one holds that it is the finite intellect that conceives the
attributes, and it only conceives Thought and Extension, then these
are the only two attributes there are. In the literature, however,
this line of reasoning is not always followed, and examples can be
found of interpreters who hold that it is the infinite intellect that
does the perceiving, but that there need not be more than two
attributes (Bennett, 1984, 75-76). At the same time, there are
interpreters who claim it is the finite intellect that perceives the
attributes while there are infinitely many attributes (Wolfson, 1934,
226). How many attributes there are affects how one reads another
central doctrine in Spinoza's metaphysics, such as 2P7 and
2P7Schol, to which we turn next.


#### 1.9.2 The Metaphysical Structure of 2P7 and its Scholium



A crucial role in Spinoza's system is played by 2P7 and its
scholium, since they lay the ground for solving, or rather dissolving,
the mind-body problem. Therefore, the understanding of the
nature of the union of mind and body depends on one's
interpretation of Spinoza's theory of attributes and 2P7 and its
scholium in particular. (For a discussion of the issues regarding the
union of Mind and Body, see Section 1.9.4). The interpretation of the
metaphysical structure of what is expressed in 2P7 and its scholium is
affected greatly by the number of attributes one believes there are in
Spinoza's system and how one understands the relation between
the attributes and the substance. The general description of 2P7 and
its scholium is discussed above in Section 1.6.



2P7 and its scholium can be understood in very different ways. In what
follows three types of interpretive directions are described. This is
not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but it will provide a sense
of the kinds of options that have been offered by commentators. Let us
begin with the simplest option first. If one holds that there are only
two attributes, Thought and Extension, the metaphysical structure of
2P7 and its scholium is quite straightforward. Every mode under the
attribute of Thought is associated with a mode in Extension, and
*vice versa* and the relations between modes in one attribute
are mirrored in the other. Those that hold this kind of view must, of
course, provide a convincing argument to the effect that there are
only two attributes.



However, if one takes there to be more than two attributes, the
structure gets quite a bit more complex. One option that has been
advanced is that Thought is a special attribute and encompasses ideas
of all the modes in all the other attributes (Cf. for example Curley,
1969, 146; and more recently, Melamed, 2009, Chapters 1-2).
Thought turns out to be "special" in this kind of
interpretation because there are many more modes (ideas) or facets of
modes in Thought than there are under any other attribute. Another way
of expressing this is by saying that 2P7 is not a biconditional. The
requirement of an associated mode goes only in one direction from any
mode in any attribute to a mode in Thought. The burden on this type of
view is that it must account for the favoring of Thought over the
other attributes, and perhaps also for the relation between all the
non-Thought modes in the other attributes.



Another option (or class of options) that is available is to claim
that attributes come in pairs: an object-like attribute coupled with a
thought-like attribute (Curley entertains this option as well; Curley,
1969, 146). Under this type of interpretation we would get Thought and
Extension following the structure of the first alternative, that is,
each idea in Thought is associated with (one and the same) a mode in
Extension. Taking there to be more than just two attributes, we also
get Thoughtx coupled with Extensionx in which
each ideax is one and the same as bodyx under
Extensionx, and Thoughty coupled with
Extensiony, and so on. Letter 66 provides some support for
this view. This kind of account has to be supplemented, of course,
with an account of the relations among these Thought-like /
Extension-like pairs of attributes.


#### 1.9.3 The Nature of the Identification of Substance and the Attributes



As mentioned earlier, Spinoza identifies God, or the infinite
substance with the attributes (1P4, 1P19 and 1P20Cor.). The nature of
this identification is also affected by one's interpretative
stance regarding the attributes. The traditional subjectivist view,
since it claims that the attributes are a projection of the finite
mind onto the substance, cannot hold this identification to be strict.
Objectivist views, which stress the distinctness of attributes, also
cannot accept these claims literally (E.g., Bennett, 1984, 64; Curley,
1988, 13; Gueroult, 1968, 50). The reason for this is as follows: if
the substance is strictly identical to any one of its attributes, then
attributes will be identical to each other (by transitivity), and
therefore no longer distinct, as Spinoza claims. Different objectivist
interpretations address this issue differently. Curley, for example,
holds that the identity is not one that holds between any given
attribute and the substance, but rather between the totality of the
attributes and the substance (Curley, 1988, 30). Bennett, on the other
hand, believes Spinoza is simply overstating the case (Bennett, 1984,
64).



This identity can be understood strictly if the distinction between
the attributes and the substance is taken to be only rationally
distinct, that is identical *in reality*, and at the same time
taking the distinction between attributes to be only epistemological
and not ontological.


#### 1.9.4 The Nature of the Union of Mind and Body



Another doctrine that is heavily affected by how one understands the
attributes is the union of mind and body. For Descartes, the issue was
how to unite two really distinct created substances--uniting
minds with bodies. Descartes' reply is that God unites these two
substances, and we have tools by which to recognize that we are united
in this way, i.e., sensory experience (*Meditation Six)*.
Spinoza, of course, cannot allude to God as creator to unite minds and
bodies, since what is being united are not *created substances*
but *finite* *modes*. The possible problem can be
articulated as follows: How can Spinoza claim, on the one hand, that
there are modes of really distinct attributes, e.g., my mind and my
body, and therefore there is a real distinction between my mind and my
body, and, on the other, claim in the Scholium to 2P7 that my mind and
body are one and the same?



This problem which arises for the objectivist interpretations has been
addressed in a variety of ways. It is worth noting that this problem
does not arise for subjectivist views. This possible tension in
Spinoza does not present itself for the subjectivists, since they do
not claim that the "real distinction" between the
attributes has ontological weight. That is, there are no two things
that have to be united. Commentators wishing to stress the
"distinctness" of the attributes find themselves having to
explain the sense in which Spinoza can mean that the mind and the body
are "one and the same." A common strategy among
commentators has been to appeal to a structure that is
attribute-neutral in order to account for the unity. To better
understand this issue it is useful to consider a few examples.



One important example is Bennett, who claims that the unity is to be
understood as a unity of properties, but not of the modes
themselves:



> 
> ...his [Spinoza's] thesis about the identity of physical
> and mental particulars is really about the identity of properties. He
> cannot be saying that physical *P*1=mental
> *M*1; that is impossible because they belong to
> different attributes. His thesis is rather that if
> *P*1 is systematically linked with
> *M*1, then *P*1 is
> extension--and--*F* for some differentia *F*
> such that *M*1 is
> thought--and--*F*. What it takes for an extended
> world to contain my body is exactly what it takes for a thinking world
> to contain my mind (Bennett, 1984, 141)
> 



That is, Bennett thinks that there is some trans-attribute feature
(what he calls "differentia *F*") such that it can
be added to Extension to get extended-*F*, and added it to
Thought to get thinking-*F*. Bennett admits that nothing like
this is found anywhere in the text, but he believes that this way we
can make sense of Spinoza's holding that the attributes are
"really distinct" from each other and, at the same time,
that thinking-*F* and extended-*F* are one and the
same.



Della Rocca, while holding a view different from that of Bennett
regarding Spinoza's theory of attributes, also finds himself
having to account in some way for the unity of mind and body, and so
he suggests that modes are said to be numerically identical when they
share all of their *neutral properties*, where "neutral
properties" are those properties which do not involve being
thought under any particular attributes. This is contrasted with
"intentional properties" which are attribute-dependent
such as "being of a certain volume." As an example of a
neutral property, Della Rocca offers "having five immediate
effects." He then claims that if modes share all of their
neutral properties, they are identical (that is, one and the same).
Therefore, since my mind and my body share all of their neutral
properties, they are identical (Della Rocca, 1996, 133-38).



The final example that shall be considered is Gueroult's
interpretation. Gueroult, in order to account for the professed
identity between modes of different attributes in 2P7 and its
scholium, considers 1P28 which states:



> 
> Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a
> determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce
> an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by
> another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence;
> and again, this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to
> produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an
> effect by another, which is also finite and has a determinate
> existence, and so on, to infinity.
> 



To explain this proposition, Gueroult draws a distinction between
"modes of substance" and "modes of
attributes." The claim is that 1P28 treats only modes of
substance and not attributes, and is therefore unique. In other words,
the identity is then understood in reference to "modes of
substance" and not "modes of attributes" (Gueroult,
1968, 338-39). Again, we see an attribute-independent
structure--the chain of modes of substance--that is meant to
account for the "one and the sameness" of modes of
different attributes.



It has been pointed out, however, that this type of solution is not
without serious problems (Shein, 2009). Briefly, the issue is as
follows: The main reason for rejecting the subjectivist view is that
in that type of interpretation, God, as he is in himself, remains
unknowable, and this conflicts with Spinoza's view that adequate
knowledge is possible. However, as Spinoza makes clear in 1P10Schol,
nature must be conceived under attributes. In light of this, an
attribute-independent structure, by its very nature as
"attribute-independent," is unknowable as well. Therefore,
in this view, knowledge of the union or the nature of the identity
between mind and body, is in principle unknowable, and, in that
respect, does not provide any advantage over subjectivist views.



An alternative mentioned above that has been suggested is to deny the
gap between the attributes and the substance by claiming that, along
with Descartes, Spinoza holds there to be a rational distinction
between them, that is, *in reality* they are identical (Shein,
2009). This avoids the kind of problems that are raised for the
subjectivist view, since, in this interpretation to know the
attributes is to know the substance. Since in this view the attributes
are only rationally distinct from the substance, the "real
distinction" between the attributes, that Spinoza states in
1P10Schol, is understood as being only an epistemological claim, as he
states in the text--"i.e., one may be conceived without the
other" (1P10Schol). That is, it does not carry additional
ontological weight as the objectivists hold. This avoids having to
impose onto the Spinozistic system an attribute-independent structure
to account for the unity which does not seem to fit with his
epistemology.


## 2. Attributes in the *Short Treatise*



In the *Short Treatise* Spinoza develops ideas that will come
to a full articulation later on in the *Ethics*, such as the
idea that, strictly speaking, there are only two attributes through
which we can properly come to have knowledge of God--Thought and
Extension. However, unlike in the *Ethics,* he does not simply
dismiss the more traditional attributes such as omnipotence,
eternality, immutability, and infinity. To maintain some sense of
these traditional divine attributes, Spinoza explains that they are
not attributes strictly speaking, but rather *propria* of God.
This is stated first clearly in the first footnote to Chapter III
("How God is the Cause of All Things"):



> 
> The following are called *Propria* because they are nothing but
> *Adjectives* which cannot be understood without their
> *Substantives.* I.e., without them God would indeed not be God;
> but still, he is not God through them, for they do not make known
> anything substantial, and it is only through what is substantial that
> God exists.
> 



Spinoza then, is distinguishing between that which gives us knowledge
of God, or better yet, through which God can be known--Thought
and Extension--and things that can be said of God, that is,
adjectival, but give us no knowledge--what he terms
*propria.* This is explained most explicitly in Chapter VII of
the *Short Treatise*. The difference Spinoza wishes to draw
between these is that although these traditional divine attributes can
be said of God, they do not teach us anything about what God is really
like. An analysis of these traditional attributes (*propria*)
shows them either to be said of God when considering all of the
attributes or to be only modes of attributes. For example, Spinoza
claims that when statements such as that "God is one,"
"eternal" and "immutable" are said of God,
they are said "in consideration of all his attributes." On
the other hand, something like "omniscience" is only a
mode of an attribute, since it is only said of God when he is
conceived through, or considered under, the attribute of Thought. That
is, only when God is thought of as a thinking thing, can he be said to
be omniscient. Similarly, when God is said to be
"omnipresent," it is only when he is conceived of through
Extension. In the *Ethics* though, Spinoza does away with the
talk of *propria* and does not accord them really any status as
such.


## 3. Conclusion



With the collapse of the divide between created substances and the
infinite substance, attributes play a new role for Spinoza;
traditional divine attributes are eliminated while attributes
traditionally associated with created substances (Extension in
particular) are attributed to the infinite substance. Furthermore,
with the elimination of this divide and the establishment of the
infinite substance as the only substance, Spinoza hopes that
attributes account for variety in the substance without jeopardizing
its unity. All interpreters and readers of Spinoza are forced to
wrestle with making sense of this double role since it sits at the
very core of his metaphysics. It is vital to realize that this
endeavor is necessarily and beautifully linked to other fundamental
aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics such as the "real
distinction" between the attributes, the proclaimed identity of
the substance and its attributes, the nature of the conceiving
intellect in the definition of 'attribute', the nature of
this intellect's conceptions (illusory or not), the number of
attributes, the structure of 2P7 and its scholium, and finally the
nature of the union of mind and body. These inter-connections are a
reflection of the fully systematic nature of Spinoza's
metaphysics.