## 1. Life and Work


Christian Julius Leopold Karl, Freiherr von Ehrenfels, was born in
Rodaun near Vienna. He grew up in his father's castle in Brunn
am Walde (see Valent 2016 for more biographical details on
Ehrenfels' youth). Though he was the eldest son and accordingly
the rightful heir to the family estate, he decided in 1882, when he
was 23 years old, to give away his birthright to his younger brother
and to devote himself entirely to philosophy, poetry, and music. At
first Ehrenfels went to Vienna in 1877 to undertake agricultural
studies, but in the winter semester 1879/80 he enrolled at the
university where he began his studies in philosophy with Franz
Brentano, Thomas Masaryk, and the young Alexius Meinong, while also
attending lectures of Franz Exner, Ludwig Boltzmann, and Ernst Mach
(Valent 2016, 179). At the same time he also began to study
composition with Anton Bruckner. As an enthusiastic follower of
Richard Wagner he was to write librettos for Wagnerian-style music
dramas. Ehrenfels then also links his loss of
Christian faith to the start of his academic studies and the discovery
of Wagner (Hofer 2017, 25). In 1882 Ehrenfels undertook a
"pilgrimage" to Bayreuth in order to attend the first
performance of Wagner's *Parzifal*. This visit triggered
both the end of his uncritical personal admiration of Wagner (though not
of his art) and the insight that his own musical abilities were
inadequate, ending his lessons with Bruckner (Hofer 2017, 26).



As regards Ehrenfels' philosophical pursuits, his interest in
Brentano's philosophy gave way to a receptivity to the ideas of
Meinong, the new young lecturer who had also studied with Brentano,
but who was already developing views of his own, particularly in the
theory of relations, which diverged from Brentano's orthodox
teachings (see Rollinger 2008). According to Ehrenfels' later
account, Brentano's smooth and polished delivery did not impress
him nearly as much as Meinong's cumbersome search for the truth
(Ehrenfels in PSIV, 426-429). Another student who also preferred
Meinong over Brentano was Alois Hofler (also a Wagnerian), who
became a close friend of Ehrenfels after first meeting him in Brunn in
1876 (Valent 2016, 178). Having started to lecture in Vienna only in
1878, Meinong was awarded a position in Graz in 1882, where Ehrenfels
followed him in the winter semester of 1884/1885, after a year of
military service. Ehrenfels wrote his dissertation on *Relations of
Magnitude and Numbers. A Psychological Study* in Graz under
Meinong's guidance, likely based on an extensive commentary on
Meinong's 1882 article "Hume Studien II: zur
Relationstheorie" (see Ierna 2017a, 165 and Ehrenfels 2017).
Ehrenfels returned to Vienna, where he completed his *Habilitation*
(a second thesis, in addition to the doctoral thesis, in order to
qualify for a teaching position) "On Feeling and Willing"
(Ehrenfels 1887, in PSIII, 15-97), in which he opposed the
Brentanian doctrine concerning emotions and also laid down the
psychological foundation for his later theory of value.


Despite such opposition, it must not be overlooked that
Ehrenfels' basic orientation is unquestionably Brentanian,
insofar as he never gives up thinking that consciousness is inwardly
perceived and is directed at objects. He shares this psychological
basis for philosophy with other prominent students of Brentano, such
as Meinong, Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Edmund Husserl, Kasimir
Twardowski, and Thomas Masaryk. In addition it should be pointed out
that, though Ehrenfels did not accept Brentano's own peculiar
version of theism, he shared with Brentano a concern for the more
"spiritual" side of things. There is, by contrast, hardly
any trace of such a concern in the thought of Meinong.


Ehrenfels lectured in Vienna during the summer semesters from 1891,
while travelling in the winter semesters. In 1894 he met the young
widow Emma von Hartmann at a meeting of the *Academic Wagner
Society* and married her in the same year. In 1896 he was awarded
a position at the University of Prague (PSII, 21 ff.) where he would
become a full professor in 1899 and, despite initial misgivings,
remain until his retirement. This of course meant that he was a
colleague of Marty (in large measure an orthodox follower of
Brentano), who in fact found Ehrenfels' non-cognitivist
orientation in value theory completely reprehensible. When Ehrenfels
supported hiring Hofler in Prague as a professor of pedagogy,
this brought him into bitter conflict with Marty, who even ascribed
"naive egoism" to him (Dolling 1999, 141; Valent
2016, 194; Janousek and Rollinger 2017, 314). Ehrenfels
maintained a close relationship with Meinong and, unlike Meinong
himself and Hofler, managed to stay on good terms with
Brentano. However much Ehrenfels drew upon ideas of Meinong or anyone
else, however, he spent his years in Prague as an independent thinker
and teacher. Both Franz Kafka, Felix Weltsch, and Max Brod were
familiar with Ehrenfels as a teacher and found him to be a rather
colorful and interesting figure (see also the quotation from Emma von
Ehrenfels' biographic sketch in PSII, 26).


As pessimism began to grow in the early twentieth century,
Ehrenfels became increasingly concerned with reviving European culture
(Valent 2016, SS 9). According to Max Brod, Ehrenfels'
*Cosmogony* "was a document of this generation [the
"Generation nevertheless" (*Generation des
Trotzdem*)], which for the first time embodied a mood of impending
doom, tough without vanishing into fear" (quoted from Frechette
2017, 325). It is also in this context that he developed his ideas for
reforming sexual ethics. In essence he advocated polygamy for the
superior men, in order to increase the population of people with
higher qualities. He was at the same time opposed to those who
advocated racial purity and was instead all in favor of mixed
races. He did not see Jews as a threat to the "Aryan race"
and in fact acknowledged their great cultural achievements (PSIII,
262), although he did fear "the yellow peril" (see
Ehrenfels 1908, Dickinson 2002). His proposal for a new sexual ethic
in order to enhance the European stock was, however, not well
received. As the years went on, Ehrenfels himself lost enthusiasm for
it, but was instead more concerned with developing a new religion. He
did not think that Christianity, with its demands for faith where
reason could no longer be effective, was viable. The new religion was
to be built upon a thoroughly rational dualistic principle of
cosmogony, which also to a large extent drew upon the concept
of *Gestalt* qualities that he had developed early in his
career. It should also be mentioned here that Ehrenfels found the same
concept to be fruitful in the domain of mathematics.


Ehrenfels died just one year before Adolf Hitler, who was of course
fanatical in advancing racial purity, came to power in Germany.
Ehrenfels was thus spared the agony of seeing the prospect of western
civilization becoming something diametrically opposed to his own
vision. Unlike many a philosopher of the twentieth century, however, it
should be kept in mind that Ehrenfels indeed had a vision. In this
regard he was more comparable to a Leibniz or a Hume as opposed to our
present-day specialists in this or that particular domain of
philosophical inquiry. Nevertheless, much of his philosophical work
also exhibits detailed analysis and rigorous argumentation and may well
be appreciated by contemporary philosophers who do not share his
driving concerns.


## 2. *Gestalt* Qualities


"*Gestalt*" is probably the best known
contribution of Ehrenfels to philosophy and psychology. As Ehrenfels
himself points out in his 1890 article "*Uber
'Gestaltqualitaten'*" ("On '*Gestalt* Qualities'"), he was inspired by a series of
remarks in Ernst Mach's 1886 book
*Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen* (*Contributions to
the Analysis of Sensations*), in particular Mach's claim that
we would be able to sense spatial shapes and melodies ("tone
shapes") directly. Mach begins by discussing the comparison of
geometrical shapes: "In examining two figures which are alike
[*gleiche Gestalten*] but differently colored (for example, two
letters of the same size and shape, but of different colors), we
recognize their sameness of form [*gleiche Form*] at the first
glance, in spite of the difference of color-sensation." (Mach
1886, 43, translation from Mach 1914, 105, the same example can be
found already in Stumpf 1883, 115, which Ehrenfels had read
previously.) However, Mach then also proceeds to apply the
term *Gestalt* in a metaphorical sense to the qualitative moments
of melodies.
*Gestalten*, for Mach, appear thanks to an equality
(*Gleichheit*) in the sensations, which can be noticed "at
a glance", i.e., they are given directly, not deduced or
abstracted. Mach argues that the geometrical similarity of two whole
figures would be given by the lower level equality of their elements
(lengths, angles, etc.) (Mach 1886, 47; Mach 1914, 109). In analogy to
his considerations about space, Mach also applies this analysis to
time, finding the same "immediate" perception of
*Gestalt* in rhythm and melody (Mach 1886, 128; Mach 1914, 285).
In this way, Mach used the term *Gestalt* to indicate the
characteristics of a whole that depend on the specific configuration of
its parts. This formed one of the starting points for Ehrenfels'
much more focused discussions of *Gestalten* in 1890. The other
starting point is of course the discussion in the School of Brentano
about parts and wholes, "relations of relations" and higher
order objects in general (in various terminologies). In particular,
Ehrenfels' teacher Alexius Meinong had dedicated a work
specifically to the theory of relations (Meinong 1882), which is also
repeatedly referred to by Ehrenfels, underscoring that relations are
crucially important to his discussion and explicitly pointing out that
relations themselves are nothing but *Gestalt* qualities
(Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 101). At the same time, and due to more or
less the same set of influences, Husserl also had used the term
*Gestalt* and *Gestaltmoment* to indicate higher-order
quasi-qualities and the unitary framework of the whole intuition (in a
lecture from January 1890, see Husserl 2005, and in the 1891
*Philosophy of Arithmetic*, where he switches his terminology to
"figural moment"). Despite such anticipations and parallels
(see also the critical remarks by Zimmer in Albertazzi et al. 2001, 135
ff.), it was Ehrenfels' work that thematized this whole topic and
brought such diverse approaches into focus, thereby turning the
psychology of *Gestalten* into a topic in its own right and
fixating the terminology, problems, and scope of the debate about
higher order objects and relations for the years to come.


 It is likely that Ehrenfels' musical interests, particularly
Wagner's music and the concept of
"*Leitmotiv*", influenced his idea of
*Gestaltqualitat* and his choice of melodies as a main
example. Through Wagner there may be an implicit undercurrent of German
Idealism and romanticism that in Ehrenfels obtains a
(Brentanist/Meinongian) psychological formulation (Hofer 2017,
34-38).


The fundamental question with which Ehrenfels begins is the
following: "Is a melody (i) a mere sum [*Zusammenfassung*]
of elements, or (ii) something novel in relation to this sum, something
that certainly goes hand in hand with but is distinguishable from the
sum of elements?" (Ehrenfels 1890, tr. Smith 1988, 83) According
to Ehrenfels, insofar as Mach spoke of *Gestalten* as objects of
sensation, he could not have considered them as "mere sum of
elements", but rather as something new. Indeed, Stumpf had
formulated a similar conclusion, claiming that with fusion the simple
elements in sensation appear as parts of one greater whole: "the
qualities are not in the least changed [... ] but a new relation
is introduced between them, which establishes a closer unity than that
between members of a mere sum" (Stumpf 1890, 64). According to
Ehrenfels, as soon as one is committed to the idea that something other
than the sum of the tones makes up the melody, "one has in effect
accepted what we call the tonal *Gestalt*" (Ehrenfels
1890; Smith 1988, 91). More precisely:



> Let us suppose, on the one hand, that the series of
> tones *t*1,
> *t*2, *t*3, ..., *t**n*, on being sounded, is
> apprehended by a conscious subject *S* as a tonal *Gestalt*
> (so that the memory-images of all the tones are simultaneously present
> to him); and let us suppose also that the sum of these *n* tones,
> each with its particular temporal determination, is brought to
> presentation by n unities of consciousness in such a way that each of
> these *n* individuals has in his consciousness only one single
> tone-presentation. Then the question arises whether the
> consciousness *S*, in apprehending the melody, brings more to his
> presentation than the *n* distinct individuals taken together.
> (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 85)


Ehrenfels argues that a *Gestalt* is more (or at least other)
than the sum of its parts, which helps to explain how people can
remember melodies without having absolute pitch and in different keys,
which would be incompatible with the view of melodies as mere sums of
tones (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 90 ff.). Based on these preliminary
observations and the rejection of simplistic objections, Ehrenfels
introduces his definition of a *Gestalt*:



> By a *Gestalt* quality we understand a positive
> content of presentation bound up in consciousness with the presence of
> complexes of mutually separable (i.e., independently presentable)
> elements. That complex of presentations which is necessary for the
> existence of a given *Gestalt* quality we call the foundation
> [*Grundlage*] of that quality. (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith
> 1988, 93)


Furthermore, he introduces an important distinction here: "We
can however exhaustively partition all possible *Gestalt*
qualities into the two non-overlapping categories of temporal and
non-temporal." Specifically, in the case of temporal
*Gestalt* qualities "at most one element can be given in
perceptual presentation", the rest being available only in memory
or anticipation, while non-temporal *Gestalt* qualities
"are qualities whose foundation can be given completely in
perceptual presentation" (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 94).


Harmony and timbre would be examples of non-temporal
*Gestalt* qualities and with respect to chords, among others,
Ehrenfels points out that "the *Gestalt* quality may
sometimes force itself into the foreground, i.e., may make demands on
our attention to such an extent that it is difficult to resolve its
foundation into elements" (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 95). This
shows the need for abstraction to identify the various layers of tonal
complexes, as we find in Stumpf's (1883, 101) characterization of
fusion of consonant tones as "less easily and completely
recognized as a multiplicity". Indeed, Ehrenfels also speaks of
fusion, and like Stumpf (1890, 65 ff., 193), even of fusion (and hence
*Gestalten*) among different senses:



> The intimate fusion of touch, temperature and sometimes also
> taste and smell sensations into a single unified total impression
> raises the question of whether we do not have here *Gestalt*
> qualities which are built up upon a foundation belonging to several
> sensory regions. [...] we must also accept the possibility of
> *Gestalt* qualities comprehending complexes of elements of
> different categories. (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 97)


Temporal *Gestalt* qualities, on the other hand, are
generated by "every change of any kind in a presentational
complex, providing it proceeds in some definite direction",
specifically, if such change "reveals a unified character, so
that we have (or could have) a name to designate it" (Ehrenfels
1890; Smith 1988, 97 ff.), it identifies a *Gestalt* quality.
However, not only change, but also persistence, such as the sustaining
of a note, can give rise to a peculiar *Gestalt* quality
(Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 101).


Similarly to Husserl, who points to collective nouns as identifying
the figural moments that characterize *Inbegriffe* (swarm,
flock, herd, etc.), Ehrenfels also tries to find helpful indicators in
ordinary language, but cannot but lament the poverty of the available
terminology:



> We have to make do with a few words for isolated examples
> from the whole range of possible colour changes (e.g. blushing,
> blanching, darkening, glowing, etc.). [...] Beside the musical
> temporal qualities already considered we have to recognize also such
> noise or resonance *Gestalten* as, say, thundering, exploding,
> rustling, splashing, etc. (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 98,
> 100)


Ehrenfels proceeds to highlight *Gestalt* qualities in almost
every domain. First of all, relations also fall "under the
concept of Gestalt quality" (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 101),
since they consist in a presentational complex of separable elements
(as in the case of the similarity relation between red and orange),
though the two categories cannot be straightforwardly be equated
(Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 102). Also in the case where elements
cannot be combined, i.e., logical incompatibility (as in the case of a
round square), there is nevertheless an unintuitive unity to the
whole, which is again a *Gestalt* quality: "If I am to
deny the existence of a round square, then I must be in a position to
think this round square. i.e., to combine the two determinations
roundness and squareness in some way or other." (Ehrenfels 1890;
Smith 1988, 103). Moreover, since one can form unintuitive
presentations also when the elements are compatible, Ehrenfels argues
that the movement of going from an unintuitive to the corresponding
intuitive presentation gives rise to a *Gestalt* quality.



> Thus anyone confronted with, say, a complicated description
> of a work of architecture will first of all form a merely indirect
> presentation of it, which will then be rounded out by gradual execution
> or fulfilment of the various merely intended components, to yield an
> intuitive total picture. But this process of formation of the intuitive
> presentation directly from the indirect presentation is something that
> happens, a process of change, which serves as the foundation for a
> specific temporal *Gestalt* quality. (Ehrenfels 1890, tr.
> Smith 1988, 104)


Given the *Gestalt* nature of relations, including in
particular relations of comparison, Ehrenfels argues that
*Gestalten* can themselves also be compared to one another and
hence give rise to increasingly higher order *Gestalt*
qualities. Ehrenfels suggest among other things, that temporal
*Gestalten* can be compared with respect to their rhythm or that
we can recognize the composer due to similarities in the melodies
(Ehrenfels 1890, tr. Smith 1988, 105 ff.).


Importantly, Ehrenfels also argues that temporal *Gestalt*
qualities are not limited to outer perception, but also occur in inner
perception, where the growing or diminishing of desires, fears,
expectations, etc. are compared to a crescendo or diminuendo in music
(Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 101). With respect to the possibility of
higher-order *Gestalten*, Ehrenfels adds to this the
"intimate unity with which we combine presentational contents of
physical and psychical occurrences" as in all cases of deliberate
actions "expressed by means of common nouns (kindness, service,
rivalry, marriage, theft, war, etc.) or verbs (entreat, complain, help,
rob, avenge, etc.)" (Ehrenfels 1890;. Smith 1988, 107).


If we accept any such "union of the physical and the
psychical" as the basis for a *Gestalt* quality, then of
course *Gestalten* are to be found everywhere: "all
designations of human individuals or groups of whatever kind (Hans and
Paul, priests, manual workers, Scotsmen, rogues, etc.), as well as most
designations for human corporations and institutions (state, authority,
the insurance market, etc.), all names of places and territories, and
equally all names of animal species" (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988,
107). This leads straight to Ehrenfels' remarkable claim that
"the larger part of both our everyday and our scientific
vocabulary designates *Gestalt* qualities". Not only does
every verb (with the partial exception of being and having and few
others) designate a (temporal) *Gestalt*, but also "every
noun and adjective having reference to more than a single
presentational element" (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 108).


Yet a problem remains, namely whether *Gestalt* qualities
arise as a result of some activity on our part when confronted with the
relevant complex of elements or without any contribution of the
intellect. Mach held the latter view, that "*Gestalten*
are objects of 'sensation' just as soon as their respective
foundations are given to consciousness" (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith
1988, 111). Ehrenfels points out first of all that *Gestalten*
are not always noticed (e.g. proverbially seeing the trees but not the
forest) and some effort seems to be required in grasping a shape by
filling out and complementing the *Gestalt* suggested by the
foundations, e.g. when "seeing" the third dimension
suggested by the cues of a perspectival drawing (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith
1988, 111 ff.). While we do not actually generate the *Gestalt*
in a separate act, specifically meant to add it to the foundation, we
do expend effort in completing the required set of presentational
elements needed for the *Gestalt*, which then arises
spontaneously. This, however, does not exclude that different
*Gestalten* may supervene on the same foundations and that we
can switch between them by changing the focus of our attention. By
bringing a different complex of presentational elements into the
foreground, i.e., by varying the foundations, we can also (indirectly)
vary the *Gestalt* (Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 112 ff.).


Having now found *Gestalt* qualities nearly everywhere,
Ehrenfels suggests "that the theory of *Gestalt* qualities
would perhaps be qualified to bridge the gulf between the various
sensory regions, and indeed between the various categories of the
presentable in general" (Ehrenfels 1890, Smith 1988, 114), which
ultimately "would yield the possibility of comprehending the
whole of the known world under a single mathematical formula"
(Ehrenfels 1890; Smith 1988, 116). Indeed, Ehrenfels will go on to
apply the concept of *Gestalt* in very disparate fields, ranging
from mathematics to cosmology, thereby also bestowing a peculiar unity
to his entire oeuvre (see Ierna 2017b).


## 3. Theory of Values


Soon after publishing his article on *Gestalt* qualities,
Ehrenfels produced a series of articles under the title
"Werttheorie und Ethik" (1893-1894) which were followed by
his two-volume *System der Werttheorie* (1897-1898). The first
volume in particular, entitled *Allgemeine Werttheorie, Psychologie
des Begehrens*, concerns us in this section.


It is most appropriate, according to Ehrenfels, to begin a
philosophical investigation by taking into account what is indicated by
ordinary language. However, by no means is it obligatory to leave the
matter there. Sometimes a revision of the concept in question is
needed. Such a revision he finds to be necessary regarding the concept
of value. While ordinary language seems to indicate that the value of
something is among its objective properties, such a value-property is
not to be found in reality. Rather, as long as we adhere to such a
conception of value, it seems to be mystical. Though we ordinarily
think that we desire objects because they are "valuable"
(i.e., because they supposedly have this "mystical,
incomprehensible essence"), the fact of the matter, says
Ehrenfels, is that we ascribe value to objects because we desire them
(Ehrenfels 1897, 2, also see Fabian in Albertazzi et al. 1996,
166; Reicher 2017, 284 f.).


Besides the view that value is some sort of mystical property of
objects, other ones are identified by Ehrenfels in opposition to his.
Among these views is the one put forward by the so-called "first
school" of Austrian value theory, as put forward by certain
outstanding economists (specifically C. Menger, E. Bohm von
Bawerk, and F. von Wieser, as mentioned in Ehrenfels 1897, 3 n.). On
this view the value of objects "is neither a property nor an
essence of them, considered as such, but rather merely their
indispensability in the satisfaction of our desires" (Ehrenfels
1897, 3). While Ehrenfels fully appreciates this school's
contribution to the understanding of value (Smith 1994, 282), he
nonetheless thinks that it does not provide a satisfactory theory of
value in general due to its narrow focus on economic value. There are
for him other types of value besides this, as exhibited by
counter-examples (as when the lock of hair belonging to one's
mother is kept as a thing of value). A general theory of value on his
view is to illuminate economic value and not vice versa.


Yet another attempt to characterize value without assigning it the
status of a mystical property of certain objects is the one that had
been put forward by Brentano, which Ehrenfels formulates as
follows:



> Not all desired things are valuable, but rather only those
> which are *worthy* of being desired. Whether this worthiness
> belongs to a thing, however, is not in the particular case yielded from
> the investigation of the objective nature of the thing, but rather from
> the subjective consideration of the desire directed at the thing. From
> the examination of our own mental activity in the act of desire we
> discern whether this is directed at something valuable or not.
> (Ehrenfels 1897, 3-4)


In contemporary terms, Brentano is a cognitivist, for he maintains
that loving and hating (the acts of valuing on his view) can be
characterized as correct (Brentano 1889). The "second
school" of Austrian value theory, to which the early Meinong
(1894) as well as Ehrenfels belong, distanced itself from
Brentano's cognitivism, while building on his method of
descriptive psychology (Grassl in PSI, 5). Here we should note,
however, that Ehrenfels came to develop views in aesthetics that can be
contrasted with the non-cognitivism found in his early work. This later
development will be discussed further at the end of the present
section.


An important aspect of Ehrenfels' value theory is his view
regarding the relation of desire to feeling. He characterizes feeling
as anything that occurs on the scale that ranges from pleasure to pain
(Ehrenfels 1897, 5 ff.). Indifference is the central point in this
scale. Desire also encompasses a range of phenomena, consisting of
wishing, striving, and willing (Ehrenfels 1897, 6 ff.). There is,
according to Ehrenfels, clearly a difference between feeling and
desire, though they are also connected in a psychologically interesting
way. While Brentano seems to think that his inclusion of feeling and
desire in a single class of psychical phenomena is supported by inner
perception, Ehrenfels points out how ineffective an appeal to inner
perception is in such matters of dispute (this, however, does not
prevent Ehrenfels from making similar appeals at crucial junctures of
his value theory). Moreover, Brentano argues for his classification of
desire together with feeling by presenting us with a range of phenomena
which seem to shade off into each other, beginning with a feeling and
ending with not only a desire, but with a full-fledged instance of
willing (Brentano 1874, 308 ff.; Brentano 1995, 183 ff.). Nevertheless,
Ehrenfels maintains that instances in which there occurs feeling
without desire and desire without feeling serve to demonstrate that
they do not belong together in the same class of psychical phenomena
(Ehrenfels 1897, 10 ff.). It is, in addition, on his view desire rather
than feeling that determines what is valuable. It was Meinong who first
insisted on the distinction between feeling and desire, although he
regarded feelings rather than desires to be determinative of values
(Meinong 1894, SSSS 5-6). Ehrenfels' general theory of
value thus stands in contrast with those that were advocated by both of
his mentors (also see Reicher 2017, 285 f.).


Ehrenfels also criticizes the traditional view (especially prominent
in Kantian ethics) that reason (*Vernunft*) can direct our
desires (Ehrenfels 1897, 8 ff.). On his view reason may be used to
construct complexes of presentations, which are then set as goals by
our desires, though reason itself is unable to set these as goals.
Ehrenfels also thinks that reason can determine the means whereby a
goal is to be achieved, but this is again not the same as setting
goals. Aside from its involvement in shaping the presentations of ends
and the determination of the means to them, Ehrenfels rejects any
suggestion that reason plays any additional role in valuation.


While the view that desire and not reason determines value will
suggest to many that Ehrenfels wants to assert that nothing is valuable
for each individual aside from its own pleasure, the underlying
assumption that one desires only one's own feeling of pleasure.
Our experience, however, shows us that this assumption is false.
"In the most common circumstances of our everyday life our
desiring aims directly at certain routine external tasks such as
eating, drinking, waiting, sitting, sleeping, etc., without there being
presented thereby the state of feeling which corresponds to
these" (Ehrenfels 1897, 27; Smith 1994, 283 ff.). Nevertheless,
obtaining what we desire does result in an increase of pleasure
relative to the state that would be experienced without the desire
being satisfied (Ehrenfels 1897, 31 ff.).


Far from desire being aimed at such concrete things as feelings, it
is rather described by Ehrenfels in the following way:



> Desiring a thing means either desiring the existence of a
> thing, or possession of it, in which case the desire is directed at an
> existence, though not of the thing itself, but rather of its
> availability, and at the same time at a non-existence, the absence of
> all disturbances which obstruct that availability. (Ehrenfels
> 1897, 53)


We can of course have "negative" desires that are as
such directed at the non-existence of something. Though Ehrenfels does
not use any technical term in application to the correlate of desire,
it is understandable to suggest that he has "states of
affairs" (*Sachverhalte*) in mind here (Smith 1994,
286).


It has been said that the theory of value that Ehrenfels developed
in his early work was non-cognitivist in his general theory of values.
In his aesthetics, however, we find a very different view regarding
values of works of art. This view is expressed in a posthumously
published dialogue, "Was ist Schonheit?", where he
says "that absolute beauty is given and comes about wherever we
grasp with feeling or sensation a certain lawfulness
[*Gesetztmassigkeit*] that we cannot
yet comprehend with the understanding" (PSII, 164). There
are, according to Ehrenfels, no differences in taste in art. As regards
music, for instance, the apparent difference in taste among people is
characterized as follows:



> Most fundamentally much rather difference in the capacity for
> musical perception, that is to say, the faculty of apprehension, of
> imagination and memory for tonal forms [*Tongestalten*] -
> furthermore difference in inner rhythm and inner gestures with which we
> unconsciously accompany our speech, thoughts, and feelings -
> difference in our instinctual life [*Triebleben*], even in the
> formation of our senses. (PSII, 164-165.)


In short, absolute beauty is the same for all of us, though our
differences in the apprehension of works of art misleads us into
thinking that beauty is merely relative, just "a matter of
taste". While this development in Ehrenfels aesthetics away from
his earlier non-cognitivism has not gone unnoticed (Reicher 2006, 2009)
it is a domain that he himself left open for further investigation. It
apparently calls for revision of his earlier non-cognitivism as well as
explorations of connections between the theory of *Gestalt*
qualities and aesthetics.


While Ehrenfels' early work on value theory and ethics remained
for the most part within the domain now called
"metaethics", he did make an effort in his later work to
develop a theory of normative ethics. His most passionate attempt to do
so will be considered in the following section.


## 4. Sexual Ethics


While Ehrenfels' treatise on sexual ethics of 1907 might
understandably be considered extremely controversial and inappropriate
by today's standards, it was much less so at the time it was
written. Most of the seemingly radical ideas and proposals were
relatively popular and widespread in educated society at the time, and
the controversial nature of his article is rather due to the original
way in which Ehrenfels combines and connects them, taking them to
considerably farther reaching conclusions (compare Dickinson 2002,
265-268). The general tenor of this treatise was already anticipated in
literary form by Ehrenfels' choral drama *Siegmar und
Heliea* from 1898/1899 (see PSII, 28 ff.).


Ehrenfels aimed at a recuperation of a "natural sexual
morality", which would preserve and advance the healthy
constitution of a species, as opposed to the cultural sexual morality
of his time, which would instead corrupt it (Ehrenfels 1907, 8). This
could be effected by recognizing that the main biological function of
the sexual drive, namely reproduction, is not the only one. Sexuality also
serves selection, not in the sense of natural selection as survival of
the fittest, but selection aimed at ensuring reproduction by the best,
leading to the progressive improvement of the species (Ehrenfels 1907,
9 ff.). This selection is the first and foremost function of male sex
drive, which is why Ehrenfels speaks of "virile selection"
(Ehrenfels 1907, 79, compare Dickinson 2002, 258). Since according to
Ehrenfels males represent the active sex, not just among humans, but
"in the entire bisexual animal kingdom", and the
females' sex drive is only operative as a response to the
males', the male sex drive is the biologically more important
one, and hence the basis for re-establishing the natural sexual
morality.


As the males' sex drive exceeds the females', the males
will and should compete with one another for the possibility of
reproducing with as many females as possible (Ehrenfels 1907, 46). For
a sexually well-endowed man ("*einen sexual
vollkraftigen Mann*"), it is advisable
to have regular, pleasurable intercourse with healthy women or girls
(Ehrenfels 1907, 62), leading to polygyny, which is the only
"healthy natural sexual life" (Ehrenfels 1907, 13). For
Ehrenfels, this would actually present a "solution to virtually
all the major problems confronting European societies" (Dickinson
2002, 257) in his time. Thanks to competition and polygyny, only the
best males will reproduce and will do so in greater numbers than in a
monogamous culture, in which virile selection is absent (Ehrenfels
1907, 11, 30) and where knights and knaves alike rule as lords in their
families. Conversely, since monandric women have more children than
polyandric ones (Ehrenfels 1907, 14), and men will only want to care
for children that they can be sure to have fathered, females should
remain monandric and even avoid serial polyandry (Ehrenfels 1907, 12).
Besides the biological reasons, another concern for Ehrenfels is the
well-being of the children in successive marriages, i.e., serial
polyandry, which would destroy the trust among parents and children, as
a stepfather and alimony would never be a satisfactory replacement
(Ehrenfels 1907, 68).


According to Ehrenfels, women would remain so impressed and
overwhelmed by their first sexual experience, that not even the hottest
fires of passion will ever consume that memory, and hence they should
avoid pre-marital sex to ensure future happiness in married life
(Ehrenfels 1907, 65). On the other hand, abstinence is not suitable for
men, who should certainly have some previous experience so as to be
fully aware of their sexual duties and to avoid becoming hypersensitive
to intimate physical contact (Ehrenfels 1907, 69). Nevertheless, the
youth should abstain from sex, not just actual but also fantasized, for
moral and hygienical reasons until reaching full sexual maturity
(Ehrenfels 1907, 61). What Ehrenfels considered "unnatural"
sexual activities, such as masturbation and homosexuality, should be
avoided and condemned, although they can be tolerated as long as they
do not damage anyone's health (Ehrenfels 1907, 56). Indeed,
autoeroticism, when practiced in moderation, does not cause any
noticeable harm (Ehrenfels 1907, 61), and both autoeroticism and
homosexual relationships among females, being the passive sex, would
not be as harmful as among men, and can hence be considered as lighter
transgressions (Ehrenfels 1907, 16).


Monogamy, however, is a serious danger to the well-being of society,
according to Ehrenfels. Not only does a monogamous society morally and
legally sanction (Ehrenfels 1907, 78), even "sanctify"
(Ehrenfels 1907, 81), female possessiveness and jealousy, by
establishing an unnatural and merely culturally justified exclusive
right on the father of her children (Ehrenfels 1907, 79), but also
thereby engenders all kinds of sexual corruption and general
degenerations. By enforcing an unnatural sexual morality, it leads to
double standards (Dickinson 2002, 259), where men are driven by their
sexuality to prostitutes, pornophilia and hyperaesthesia. Due to the
demand their appetites generate, men who buy sexual satisfaction are
complicit in the human trade and the corruption of young women who
enter into prostitution, though it would go too far to forbid
prostitution altogether (Ehrenfels 1907, 62). The natural sex drive of
men, which cannot be satisfied through monogamy, drifts into extremes,
both toward pornophilia ("*die Freude am
Schweinischen*"), i.e., pure sensualistic, even animalistic
stimulation, disregarding the function of reproduction, through
masturbation or in brothels (with all the risks of STDs), and in the
other direction toward incessant search for variety and exotic
eroticisms (Ehrenfels 1907, 49).


The one positive side effect of monogamy is that it has led to the
"sublimation of sexual affects", as modern psychology has
it, among sexually frustrated males. Since males cannot find full
satisfaction for their sex drive in monogamous marriage, they divert
their superfluous energy into other pursuits, such as cultural
achievements of various sorts: "accumulation of ownership and
possessions, economical and social organization, artistic and
scientific achievements, indeed in works of charity and neighborly
love" (Ehrenfels 1907, 31).


Ehrenfels connects these themes of gender and sexuality to larger
issues of economy, sociology and politics. For instance, while
historically the institution of monogamy enabled women (and their
children) to join the workforce as partners in the family business
(Ehrenfels 1907, 37), the changing economical situation, which favors
larger enterprises, puts monogamy at a distinct disadvantage by
limiting the opportunities for married women to work. This also
negatively affects the overall composition and growth of the workforce,
since the advanced techniques available for family planning (Ehrenfels
1907, 42 ff.) and the rising age (especially among the higher educated)
at which couples marry and have children, leads to lower birthrates
(Ehrenfels 1907, 35 ff.). Monogamy, Ehrenfels argues, leads to a
decrease both in quality as well as the quantity of the population
(compare Dickinson 2002, 259), and hence a deficit in the workforce
that can be compensated for only through immigration (Ehrenfels 1907,
43). This has repercussions on a global scale, because Ehrenfels
feared, as many did at the time, the competition of other races,
specifically the "Mongolian" or yellow race. In particular
the Chinese would be an indomitable competitor economically, as they
could sink wages by offering lower cost labor thanks to their greater
number and fertility (Ehrenfels 1907, 86 ff.). The "Mongol
tsunami" ("*Mongolenflut*") would interrupt
cultural development for centuries and for Ehrenfels the only
remedy was to adopt his newly developed sexual ethics as soon as
possible in order to increase quantity and quality of the population.
Ehrenfels regarded his reform as absolutely crucial for humanity at
large in the long term, noting that in the end also the Mongol hordes
would have to adopt it, when they would eventually face the same
problems down the road (Ehrenfels 1907, 94).



Ehrenfels had the opportunity to present his proposal in the Vienna
Psychoanalytic Society on December 23, 1908, where Isidor Sadger
observed not only that "all of this seems like an adolescent
sexual fantasy", but more significantly that behind
Ehrenfels' views there would seem to be a personal history,
regarding the author's own sexuality (cf. Dickinson 2002,
268-270). In reply to this, Ehrenfels pointed out that his
proposal had grown out of the realization that it was not necessarily
he who needed to curb his sex drive, but that the dominant morality
was a distortion of the natural one.



The sexual and social reforms he proposed in numerous articles,
opinion pieces, and lectures spanning more than a decade (PSII, 30,
n. 29), were for the most part met with deafening silence (PSII, 35,
40; Valent 2016, 193).


## 5. Philosophy of Mathematics


Like most of Brentano's students, Ehrenfels also wrote various
works on the philosophy of mathematics: first of all his 1885
dissertation on
"*Grossenrelationen und Zahlen:
eine psychologische Studie*" ("Relations of Magnitude
and Numbers: a Psychological Study"), then his article
"*Zur Philosophie der Mathematik*" ("On the
Philosophy of Mathematics") in 1891, the same year as
Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, and finally in 1922
his booklet on *Das Primzahlengesetz* (*The Law of
Prime Numbers*). As Simons (1988, 10) observes, his early
mathematical works are representative of the Brentanian approach as it
can also be found in Husserl's and Stumpf's habilitation
works.


Indeed, in his (Ehrenfels 1885, Ierna 2017a) dissertation Ehrenfels
presents an account of the concept of number and the philosophy of
mathematics that is for the most part the traditional Brentanian one,
though unsurprisingly including many Meinongian elements. Ehrenfels
claims that by abstracting from all particularities of two objects and
considering them merely as the foundations of a relation of difference,
we obtain the concept of two. If we then add another object, we need to
compare and distinguish not only the first-order relations among the
foundations, but also the second-order relation of difference among the
first-order relations of difference, and so on for every additional
element. This leads to a rapid increase in complication, as illustrated
in Husserl's critique of such an approach in the second chapter
of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. Ehrenfels likewise concludes
that this process of distinction soon leads beyond our limited
presentational capacities and requires more convenient, though
indirect, ways of presenting numbers. Hence, he argues that higher
numbers can only be reached by successive presentations of partial
numbers, e.g. nine by three times three.


Ehrenfels presents an interesting account of the golden ratio
(1:1.618) as the point where the relations of similarity and difference
are in balance, i.e., two magnitudes that stand to each other in the
golden ratio are as similar as they are different. Towards the end of
the work Ehrenfels' discussion of higher-order relations and of
comparisons of relations independently of their foundations leads him
into formulations that could be seen as anticipating his later concept
of *Gestalt* qualities.


In his article on the philosophy of mathematics Ehrenfels starts
with an analysis of the presentation of number and the concepts of
unity and multiplicity. He denies an empirical basis to number
presentations: "The presentation of number is not extracted from
external perception, but is actually inserted into it" (Ehrenfels
1891, 287). Ehrenfels takes relations of difference as the foundation
for the concept of multiplicity and goes on to describe the
construction of numbers through counting, by successive addition of
unities (Ehrenfels 1891, 289 ff.). Like other Brentanists, he comments
on the limits of our cognitive capacities and points out that we can
have a presentation of higher numbers only indirectly, i.e.,
symbolically (Ehrenfels 1891, 292, also see 289 where he refers to
Husserl 1887). Ehrenfels here chooses the Meinongian terminology,
speaking of indirect or founded contents (see his notes on 292 ff.), but
also follows Brentano's approach when remarking on the power of
signs to function as surrogates for presentations (Ehrenfels 1891,
296). He gives an extensive critique of Kant's famous doctrine
that "7+5=12" would be an example of a synthetic
proposition a priori, with a quite idiosyncratic argumentation, stating
that the a priori or a posteriori character of the
sum would depend on the possibility of a direct intuition of its
elements, i.e., a proper presentation. If we have to externalize the
process by use of signs when the numbers exceed our cognitive
capacities, then how can we claim to be able to perform such
calculations a priori? Ehrenfels lists several examples that
involve external aids, such as the use of logarithmic tables: looking
up a number on a list is hardly an "a priori"
cognitive act (Ehrenfels 1891, 329). The interesting aspect of his
approach is that he takes mathematics in this way as an essentially
computational science, relying on external artifacts ("physical
aides") and hence as a science which necessarily has a large
a posteriori component (Ehrenfels 1891, 331). In the second
half of the article, however, Ehrenfels provides a critique of J.S.
Mill and empiricism in mathematics, along the same lines as Stumpf had
done in his habilitation work. Like Husserl and fellow Meinong-student
Konrad Zindler, he points out that in the progress of calculation with
signs one often hits on "unpresentable" combinations, i.e.,
combinations of signs that cannot be combined into a proper
presentation (Ehrenfels 1891, 342). Yet, these "impossible"
combinations do then lead to correct results. (This paragraph is based
in part on Ierna 2011).


Ehrenfels himself assigns an important biographical role to his
last major work in the philosophy of mathematics, while its actual
philosophical and mathematical significance is much more modest, as we
will see. Ehrenfels states in the preface to *Das
Primzahlengesetz* that, after a long depression following WWI, the
contemplation of the "field of numbers and their eternal,
necessary connections" soothed his agonized spirit
("*Weltangst*") (Ehrenfels 1922, III). In the preface
to the work he retraces the development of the core idea of the book,
describing very poetically how in April 1919 the idea
"blossomed" in his mind about the distribution of prime
numbers (Ehrenfels 1922, IV: "An einem warmen Aprilvormittag
1919 ist mir - in der Sonne gelagert neben der Gruft meines
Vaters - ,,der Knopf aufgegangen" fur das
Wesentliche der Losung.") Ehrenfels himself at first took
it only as a rediscovery of already well-established mathematical
insights, but having been informed by his friend and colleague the
mathematician Gerhard Kowalewski that the matter of the distribution
of primes was far from settled, Ehrenfels tried to work out his idea
in a more systematic fashion, convinced to have hit on something new
and worthwhile.


Ehrenfels' core idea in *Das Primzahlengesetz*
is to apply the notion of *Gestalt* to number series to find the
law-like regularities in the distribution of prime numbers. Therefore
Ehrenfels decided to include the entire text of his 1890 article
"*Uber Gestaltqualitaten*" in the work,
unchanged, though split into two parts. In the course of his
discussion, Ehrenfels once again goes down the familiar road of
Brentanist mathematics: a discussion of proper and symbolic
presentations of number, the limits of our presentational capacity,
proper number conceptions as based on (higher order) relations of
distinction, etc. (Ehrenfels 1922, 30 ff.) He explicitly considers the
proper number presentations as *Gestalt* qualities, and to be
precise, as presentations of "second order". Collections of
numbers, which he calls *Zahlenfiguren*, would be of third
order. These number figures play a central role in, literally,
"figuring out" the prime numbers: by generating series of
number figures corresponding to all multiples of a base number, which
can then be combined in such a way as to filter out the primes.


However, in the end the result of this procedure turns out to be
quite trivial from a mathematical perspective: "It actually
merely leads to a simplification of the method known as the
"Sieve of Eratosthenes" already being practiced for more
than 2000 years" (Ehrenfels 1922, 48). The method of the sieve
consists in identifying and then eliminating all divisible numbers by
generating them from multiplications of primes. If one wants to find
all the prime numbers between 0 and 100, one would proceed by striking
all multiples of two, then all multiples of three, etc. until only the
primes remain. Ehrenfels' approach shortens the process by
avoiding repeated strikings, as would happen e.g. with 6 as multiple of
both 2 and 3 (Ehrenfels 1922, 49). As Simons (1986, 112) argues, this
is merely computationally faster than the traditional method of the
sieve of Eratosthenes (but slower than other methods, as experimentally
verified by Simons 1988, 12), but not a substantially new
algorithm.


## 6. Cosmology


In his 1916 *Kosmogonie*, Ehrenfels aims at laying out the
fundamental *Gestalt* of the world as a whole. Ehrenfels wants to
elucidate the origin, development, and ultimate destiny of the
universe. On the one hand, he considers it as a *Kosmos* in the
classical sense of an ordered, harmonious whole, governed by an
ordering principle that establishes the wholeness and unity of the
world. However, Ehrenfels also acknowledges a principle of disunity
and entropy: chaos and chance. For Ehrenfels, the world as we know it
is generated through the complementary activity of these two cosmic
principles (compare PSII, 44 ff.; Valent 2016, 195; Hofer 2017,
46; Ierna 2017b, SS3).


This results in a religious dualism. The contraposition of chaos and
cosmos explains the presence of both good and evil, reason and chance,
etc. in the world, allowing Ehrenfels to provide a theodicy.
Nevertheless, the cosmic principles themselves cannot be
straightforwardly regarded as absolutely good or evil. Moreover,
although Ehrenfels calls the ordering principle "God", it
cannot be understood as the omnipotent creator of western monotheism
(also dubbed "solotheism" by Ehrenfels), since neither
cosmic principle is absolute in itself. Creation can only be achieved
by both principles working in tandem and consists in God ordering and
"shaping" or "forming"
("*Gestalten*" in its verbal form) the world in
perpetual contrast with chaos. Hence, the *Kosmogonie* does not
carry the tone of a typically Christian religious work, nor is it
simply a transposition of ancient or eastern mythologies into modern
Europe. Rather, Ehrenfels had the ambition to formulate a general
framework for a (utopian) future world-spanning religion, based on a
firm scientific foundation (Ehrenfels 1916, 150, also see PSII,
52). Indeed, Ehrenfels presents his dualism explicitly as a scientific
hypothesis to be investigated and proven, and concludes that it can in
fact explain the world as it is and can be confirmed by experience
(Ehrenfels 1916, 23, 35).


In the fourth paragraph of the sixth chapter, Ehrenfels formulates
six dogmas for his new religion: 1) The world is the combined product
of the active principle of order and form
("*Gestaltung*") and the passive principle of chaos.
2) The world has a beginning but no end. Order and form are eternally
progressing and increasing. 3) The principle of unity is bodiless and
rather "soul-like". 4) The eternal progress of the world
proceeds from an eternal internal development in the principle of
unity. 5) The world is not a result of a purposeful will, but of a
blind forming ("*Gestalten*"). 6) We human beings
are part of the divine and hence collaborators in the divine works.


These last two points are particularly relevant, because Ehrenfels
will conclude the *Kosmogonie* with the admittedly
unsubstantiated claim that the principle of unity and order is coming
to self-awareness through the human mind and that it is in and through
human beings that its blind creative impulse can acquire a purpose
(Ehrenfels 1916, 86, 207).


The mere formulation of the six dogmas, as Ehrenfels clearly states
at the end of the fourth paragraph of the sixth chapter, cannot have
the pretension to constitute without further ado a fully formed
religion. In his 1922 *Gedanken uber die
Religion der Zukunft*, Ehrenfels then sketches in more detail what
is still missing in the *Kosmogonie*. Here, as well as in the
*Kosmogonie*, he provides a description or morphology of
religion rather than a definition (in the *Kosmogonie* he spoke
of a physiognomy as *Weltbeschreibung*). Religions in general
consist of four aspects:


1. a *Weltanschauuung*, an encompassing vision of the world
based on metaphysical assumptions, that address the "big
questions" of why, whence, and whereto;
2. a *Morallehre* or moral standard that tells us which actions
are good or evil, allowed or reprehensible;
3. a *Kultus*, or a system of traditional practices that allow
the faithful to relate to whichever powers of the cosmos they
acknowledge;
4. exemplary *Idealgestalten*, imaginary or historical figures
to emulate, i.e., heroes and saints.


However, Ehrenfels in this writing renounces
the soul-like nature of the divine and formulates a new theory of the
"superposition of units of consciousness". Ehrenfels claims
that wherever there is a living cell, there we can speak of some form
of "consciousness". This would hold not only for
unicellular organisms, but also for plants, animals and humans. If
every living cell of my body is somehow conscious, then also the
individual cells in my brain must be. Yet while each and every
individual neuron is conscious in itself, collectively they also
constitute my unitary consciousness as a human being. This leads
Ehrenfels through analogy to formulate the idea of "personalities
of higher order", indeed a *Volksseele* would be more than
a mere poetic fiction. As support for this thesis Ehrenfels points to
organic metaphors for social processes (such as competition for limited
resources) as well as the purposeful unity displayed by bee swarms that
collectively act like a single organism. Similarly, a few years later
in *Die Religion der Zukunft*, he also states explicitly that
all intellects participate in the divine intellect (Ehrenfels 1929, in
PSIV, 286).


Ehrenfels' thoughts and writings about cosmology and religion
didn't remain at the level of mere academic
"armchair" speculations. Besides his engagement for sexual
reform and the racial question in opinion pieces and speeches, he also
actively sought to concretely establish the new religion sketched
above. Indeed, Ehrenfels went so far as to publicly appeal in an open
letter to the president of Czechoslovakia, his former fellow
Brentano-pupil Thomas Masaryk, to act as the founder of the new
religion (Ehrenfels 1929, in PSIV, 289 ff.). Although
sympathetic to his concerns, Masaryk politely rebuffed him, clearly
distinguishing between his personal religious thoughts and his public
political role (see Masaryk's letter to Ehrenfels in PSIV,
294 ff.).


## 7. Legacy


Inevitably, what comes to mind first and foremost when speaking of
Ehrenfels' legacy, is the idea of *Gestalt*. Whatever the
inspiration by Mach or parallel developments in Husserl, it was
Ehrenfels' seminal paper "*Uber
Gestaltqualitaten*" that gave rise to
the ensuing debates in the school of Brentano and beyond. As Smith
(1988, 12) observes: "The importance of Ehrenfels' paper
rests on the fact that it contains the first concentrated reflections
on the question 'what complex perceived formations such as
spatial figures or melodies might be'." Ehrenfels'
original proposal of
"*Gestaltqualitaten*" still
left many issues open or unclear, which were soon taken up in various
ways by his fellow Brentanians. Despite opposition against his
terminological choice and the development of alternative terminologies,
such as Meinong's "founded contents" (1891, 253) and
Husserl's "figural moments" (1891, 236 n. 1) or
"moments of unity" (1901, 230), Ehrenfels' article
fixed the terminology and many of the conceptual categories. At
variance with Brentano's other pupils, Ehrenfels did not manage
to establish a school or movement of his own, although he was the first
teacher of Max Wertheimer in Prague. While Ehrenfels' work
sketched the larger picture and provided a general framework to
approach *Gestalt* phenomena, many of the details were worked
out subsequently by the Graz and Berlin schools of *Gestalt*
psychology, formed by the students of Stumpf (Max Wertheimer, Kurt
Koffka and Wolfgang Kohler) and Meinong (Stephan Witasek and
Vittorio Benussi). Systematically, the schools differ mainly in their
views on how *Gestalt* qualities originate. Contra Ehrenfels,
the Graz school argued that *Gestalten* are actively produced by
our intellect on the basis of the *Gestalt* switch phenomenon
(see, among others, Smith 1994, 259 ff.).


However, the results that may be regarded as Ehrenfels' most original and
influential contributions, both the original article on
*Gestalt* as well as his engagement with value theory, were
mostly products of his early career (compare PSII, 21 ff.). The
endeavors Ehrenfels passionately pursued later on, even though
partially related to and building on his earlier work, ended for the
most part in failure. His proposals for sexual and social reforms fell
flat, the idea of establishing a new religion went nowhere, and the
discovery of the one and only law of primes turned out to be a very
minor accomplishment (cf. PSII, 53).


The notion of *Gestalt*, to the contrary, obtained great
influence also beyond the school of Brentano and its offspring (compare
Zimmer in Albertazzi et al. 2001, 141 ff.). In particular, the idea of
*Gestalt* switch and a holistic interpretation of higher-order
phenomena in various contexts, has served as a metaphor and inspiration
for (among others) the idea of incommensurability of scientific theories in
Thomas Kuhn and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle,
particularly Rudolf Carnap's holism, which in turn influenced
W. V. O. Quine's. While increasingly removed from its original
formulation, the historical starting point for it all is
Ehrenfels' article on *Gestalt* qualities.