## 1. Outweighing Goods and Noseeum Inferences



Skeptical theism is a cluster of responses to arguments from evil. One
major argument from evil is what we'll call the
"Outweighing Goods" argument. This section explains a
basic outweighing goods argument, a standard way of defending it using
"noseeum inferences," and a skeptical theistic critique of
that defense.


### 1.1 Basic Outweighing Goods Argument



A simple thought is that if God exists, there would be no evil. After
all, God could prevent any evil there is; God would know about any
evil there is; and God would want to prevent any evil there is. But
this simple thought is too simple. For even if God exists, it need not
be the case that God wants to prevents any evil there is. For God may
have a justifying reason for permitting evil.



Frequently, in life, agents are justified in permitting evil if there
is some reason that justifies their permission of it. A common and
well-known kind of reason is that the permission of the evil is
necessary for either bringing about some greater good or preventing
some worse evil from occurring. (We'll use the term
'outweighing goods' to refer inclusively to the greater
goods or worse evils.) Indeed, the complexity of trading off
permitting evils for outweighing goods is not just a part of
consequentialist thinking but pervades most ordinary ethical and legal
thinking. There may be other kinds of reasons that justify an agent in
permitting evil. (For instance, perhaps the agent does not have the
appropriate authority to prevent the evil or the actions necessary to
prevent the evil would go against the agent's character or
personal projects.) But justifying reasons involving outweighing goods
have dominated discussions of arguments from evil; so this entry will
focus on them. Keeping these points in mind, one important argument
from evil is this (compare Rowe 1979, 1984, 1986; Martin 1978):



**Not-Outweighed**

**N-O1.1**
If God exists, then for any evil *e*, God is justified in
permitting *e* only if God's permission of *e* is
necessary for some outweighing good.
**N-O1.2**
There is at least one evil *e* such that God's
permission of *e* is not necessary for some outweighing
good.
**N-O1.3**
Therefore, there is no God.



This argument is deductive; thus, defenses of it focus primarily on
the premises. **N-O1.1** is seen as a
plausible claim articulating God's obligations to the rest of
us. **N-O1.2** is an existential claim,
stating that some evil is, crudely put, not outweighed. A
straightforward way of defending it is existential generalization:
find *specific* evils such that God's permission of them
is not necessary for some outweighing good, and then generalize to
**N-O1.2**.


### 1.2 Noseeum Inferences



Consider two situations given in the literature: a fawn, caught in a
forest fire, that burned to death (cf. Rowe 1979), and a five-year-old
girl who was raped and then strangled to death (cf. Russell 1989).
Their sufferings are paradigms of evil. Now one might reflect on their
suffering, and try hard to identify God's reasons for permitting
their suffering. An important sub-argument for
**N-O1.2** follows:



**Not-Outweighed**

**N-O1.21**
After extensive reflection, it seems that there is no outweighing
good that would justify God's permission of the fawn's
suffering and the girl's suffering.
**N-O1.22**
Therefore, it is *prima facie* reasonable to believe that
there is no outweighing good that would justify God's permission
of the fawn's suffering and the girl's suffering.
**N-O1.2**
There is at least one evil *e* such that God's
permission of *e* is not necessary for some outweighing
good.



This argument is not valid, but inductive in nature. In defense of
**N-O1.21**, authors like Rowe argue that the
suffering of the fawn and the girl seem unconnected from the concerns
of traditional theodicies. Their suffering isn't the result of
their own free will, for instance; nor does their suffering contribute
to their "soul-building" of creating a superior moral
character. And while eternal union with God may be extremely good, it
is hard to see how this suffering would be connected to it. Reflecting
on their suffering, it is hard to identify outweighing goods that
would justify God's permission of that suffering.



This way of defending **N-O1.2** is sometimes
called a "noseeum" inference (Wykstra 1996). From the
claim that we "no see" an outweighing good, one infers
that there is no such outweighing good and, thus, there is no God.
(Wykstra's inspiration for this term comes from the name of an
insect - a 'no-see-um' - that is normally too
small to be seen, but can still leave a nasty welt.) Alternatively,
this way of defending **N-O1.2** is called an
argument from "failure of theodicy" (Draper 2013), since
it is the apparent failure of theodicies that make
**N-O1.2** reasonable to believe.


### 1.3 CORNEA-based Criticisms



Some skeptical theists critique noseeum arguments by using what is
called a CORNEA-based criticism (Wykstra 1984, 1996). Like many
skeptical theistic critiques, this critique has two components--a
general epistemic principle and some claims in philosophy of religion.
By combining the two components, skeptical theists aim to undermine
some argument.



The term 'CORNEA' is an unprincipled acronym: Condition On
ReasoNable Epistemic Access. A CORNEA principle is an epistemic
principle stating conditions on when it is reasonable for a person to
claim or believe *p* on the basis of something *q*.
Wykstra himself formulated a range of principles that are not
obviously equivalent. A simple CORNEA principle is:



**Simple-CORNEA** (**S-C**)
  

A person is *prima facie* reasonable in believing *p* on
the basis of *q* only if, given their cognitive abilities, it
is reasonable for them to believe that if *p* were different,
then *q* would likely be different as well.



To illustrate the plausibility of CORNEA principles, consider the
following case. A doctor accidentally drops a needle on the floor. The
doctor picks up the needle, visually inspects it, and announces that
the needle is free of viruses and bacteria. Is the doctor *prima
facie* reasonable in believing the needle is free of viruses and
bacteria on the basis of his visual experience? Intuitively not. A
principle like **S-C** is well-suited to explain why. It
is not reasonable for the doctor to believe that, given his cognitive
abilities, if the needle were contaminated with bacteria or viruses,
then his visual experience would likely be different as well.



A CORNEA principle like **S-C** is a general epistemic
principle that can be applied to any range of cases. Skeptical theists
apply it to the inference from **N-O1.21** to
**N-O1.22**. Suppose we are *prima
facie* reasonable in believing that God's permission of the
fawn's suffering and the girl's suffering would not be
necessary for some outweighing good on the basis of our failure to see
an outweighing good connected to their suffering by reflecting. Then,
by **S-C**, it must be reasonable for us to believe that
if God's permission of the fawn's suffering and the
girl's suffering *were* necessary for some outweighing
good, then we would likely not fail to identify an outweighing good
connected to their suffering by reflecting.



But skeptical theists argue that this is *not* reasonable for
us to believe. That is, they argue that even if God's permission
of the fawn's suffering and the girl's suffering were
necessary for some outweighing good, then it is likely that we would
fail to identify an outweighing good connected to their suffering
simply by reflecting. Skeptical theists give analogies to support
these claims. One extended analogy is a parent/child analogy (compare
Wykstra 1984: 88; 1996: 142-5). A baby infant is in no position
to evaluate its parent's plans for its life. But our cognitive
abilities are like a baby infant's in comparison to God's.
So too, we are in no position to evaluate all of God's plans.
Similarly, parents with increased intelligence, understanding of
goods, and abilities are more likely to plan for goods in their
children's future--a future which their children are not
yet able to see. God, having maximum intelligence, understanding, and
ability, is thus likely to make plans where many goods will be in the
future in ways we cannot expect to understand. Another analogy
involves the "physical depth" of the universe (cf. Russell
and Wykstra 1988: 146-8; see also Alston 1991 [1996]: 109). If
God created the universe, God created it with "physical
depth," where many of the features of the universe are difficult
to learn about. So too, if God has plans for creation, God is likely
to have created it with "moral depth," where many of the
goods that play a role in God's plan are not
"surface" goods easily identified but rather more obscure
to
 us.




Thus, by **S-C**, believing
**N-O1.22** on the basis of
**N-O1.21** is reasonable only if it is
reasonable to believe that, given our cognitive faculties, if
God's permission of their suffering were necessary for an
outweighing good, we'd identify that good by reflecting. But
that's not reasonable for us to believe--even if there is
an outweighing good justifying God's permission of their
suffering, then we likely wouldn't see it by reflecting. So
it's not reasonable to believe
**N-O1.22** on the basis of
**N-O1.21**. Thus, according to this line of
reasoning, the sub-argument for **N-O1.2**
fails.


## 2. Outweighing Goods and Inductive Inferences



One of the key claims of the outweighing goods argument is
**N-O1.2**: there is at least one evil e such
that God's permission of e is not necessary for some outweighing
good. One way of defending this premise is to appeal to how things
seem to us. But another way to defend
**N-O1.2** is to eschew talk of how things
seem to us and use more traditional inductive inferences.


### 2.1 Representative-based Inductive Inferences



Suppose I have a garden. I like spicy food, so every year I plant hot
peppers. I plant a variety of hot peppers--differences in size,
heat-level, place of origin, etc. And suppose that each year I notice
that my hot peppers only begin flowering in late summer, early
fall--never early spring. I might reason as follows:



**No-Known-Pepper** (**NKP**)
  

No hot pepper I know of flowers in early spring.



**None-at-all-Pepper** (**NaaP**)
  

Therefore, no hot pepper at all flowers in early spring.



The reasoning in this case is inductive. I have a sample
size--hot peppers I know of--and they have a certain
property--they don't flower in early spring. I infer from
this sample size to a larger group--all hot peppers--that
they have the same property. Since my sample size is representative of
the larger group, this inductive inference is a reasonable one.



Analogously, suppose we consider whether we know of any outweighing
goods that would justify God's permission of the girl's
suffering and the fawn's suffering. We are familiar with a
variety of outweighing goods in life. Suppose we think that none of
the outweighing goods we know of would justify God's permission
of the girl's suffering and the fawn's suffering. We might
reason inductively as follows (compare Rowe (1988, 1991):



**No-Known-Goods** (**NKG**)
  

No outweighing goods we know of would justify God's permission
of the fawn's suffering and the girl's suffering



**None-at-all-Goods** (**NaaG**)
  

Therefore, no outweighing goods at all would justify God's
permission of the fawn's suffering and the girl's
suffering.



From **NaaG** it is a short-step to
**N-O1.2** and then atheism. This way of
defending **N-O1.2** avoids noseeum inferences
and so might be thought to side-step the CORNEA-based criticisms of
the previous section.


### 2.2 Representative Goods



Skeptical theists have critiqued the inference from
**NKG** to **NaaG** (see Alston 1991 [1996],
1996; Christlieb 1992: 48-54; Sennett 1993; Bergmann 2001). Once
again, the critique can usefully be divided into two parts--an
epistemological principle and some claims in philosophy of
religion.



Skeptical theists have spent less time developing the epistemic
principle used in this critique. But they assume a principle something
like this: an inference from a sample of a group to the group
*vis-a-vis* some property is reasonable only if one is
in a position to reasonably believe that the sample is representative
of the group *vis-a-vis* that property. (See Alston
1996: 326-7; Howard-Snyder 1996b: 297-9; Tucker 2014:
49ff.) for worries about how best to formulate such a principle.)
Again, this principle can be intuitively supported by cases. If I
plant in my garden only one kind of pepper--say,
habaneros--then it would be unreasonable and irresponsible for me
to generalize to all kinds of hot peppers.



Skeptical theists then apply something like that principle to the
inference from **NKG** to **NaaG**. It is
reasonable to infer **NaaG** from **NKG**
only if it is reasonable for us to believe that the outweighing goods
we know of are representative of all potential outweighing goods when
it comes to the property of justifying God's permission of
evil.



But skeptical theists argue that it is *not* reasonable for us
to believe that. Some skeptical theists reason by analogy. Sometimes,
it is reasonable to believe our sample size is representative because
it is sufficiently large and chosen at random. Other times, we have
already "charted" the relevant group and we know what
proportion our sample is from that group. But these are not the case
here. The outweighing goods we know of aren't picked at random.
Nor have we "charted" the relevant group of all possible
God-justifying outweighing goods. The standard techniques for
generating representative samples don't seem to apply to
**NKG**.



Bergmann summarizes these ideas in a more careful statement as follows
(2001: 279; cf. 2009: 376):



**ST1**
We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we
know of are representative of the possible goods there are.
**ST2**
We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we
know of are representative of the possible evils there are.
**ST3**
We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations
we know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils
are representative of the entailment relations there are between
possible goods and the permission of possible evils.


Notice that these theses do not claim that we have *good*
reason for thinking they are *not* representative. They are
more skeptical than that. Bergmann sees these claims as independently
plausible, so that both theists and non-theists should endorse them,
writing: "it just doesn't seem unlikely that our
understanding of the realm of value falls miserably short of capturing
all that is true about that realm. One can recognize this even if one
is not a theist." (2001: 279).



Thus, given a relevant epistemic principle, the inference from
**NKG** to **NaaG** is reasonable only if it
is reasonable to believe that the outweighing goods we know of are
representative of all outweighing goods when it comes to justifying
God's permission of evil. But, skeptical theists argue, that is
*not* reasonable for us to believe. So the inference from
**NKG** to **NaaG** is not reasonable. Thus,
this representation-based inductive argument for
**N-O1.2** also fails.


### 2.3 Connecting Goods



Skeptical theists object to the inference from **NKG** to
**NaaG**. But some skeptical theists also object directly
to **NKG** (see Alston 1996: 315-6; Plantinga 1998: 53;
Bergmann 2009: 382). Given **ST3**, it may be
that some outweighing goods we know of *would* justify
God's permissions of the fawn's suffering and the
girl's suffering. It may simply be that the connection between
the outweighing goods we are familiar with and God's permission
of suffering is not known to us. Again, skeptical theists might appeal
to analogies to clarify their position. A novice chess player knows
that a grandmaster's objective is to win the game. But it
doesn't follow that the novice chess player understands how each
move the grandmaster makes might contribute to the grandmaster's
objective. In fact, it might even seem to the novice player that
various moves by the grandmaster don't contribute to that
objective at all.


## 3. Noseeum Arguments



Noseeum evils (or seemingly unjustified evils) are a type of
evil--evils such that God's permission of them do not seem
necessary for an outweighing good. One might argue that those evils
are good evidence for another type of evil that is inconsistent with
the existence of God--evils such that God's permission of
them would *not* be necessary for an outweighing good.
Alternatively, one might argue that noseeum evils are evidence against
theism on their own--regardless of whether or not they are also
evidence for evils of another kind. This section looks at two
arguments of that kind and skeptical theistic critiques of them.


### 3.1 Individual Case Argument



To understand the first argument, some background in confirmation
theory will be useful. On one standard understanding, a claim \(E\) is
evidence against a hypothesis \(H\) just in case the probability of
\(H,\) given \(E,\) is less than the probability of \(H\) on its own.
More formally: \(E\) is evidence against \(H\) just in case \(Pr(H\mid
E) \lt Pr(H)\). Furthermore, the *lower* the difference between
\(Pr(H\mid E)\) and \(Pr(H),\) the *stronger* \(E\) is evidence
against \(H\). To determine if \(E\) is evidence against \(H,\) one
considers two key conditional probabilities: first, the probability of
\(E\) given \(H,\) and second, the probability of \(E\) given the
denial of \(H\). More formally, \(Pr(E\mid H)\) and \(Pr(E\mid \neg
H),\) respectively. Now if \(Pr(E\mid \neg H)\) is greater than
\(Pr(E\mid H)\) then \(E\) will be evidence against \(H\). And the
greater \(Pr(E\mid \neg H)\) is than \(Pr(E\neg H)\) the stronger
\(E\) will be evidence against \(H\).



Next, reconsider:



**No-Known-Goods** (**NKG**)
  

No outweighing goods we know of would justify God's permission
of the fawn's suffering and the girl's suffering.



(We'll ignore the objection of 2.3 and assume
**NKG** is true.) **NKG** is a noseeum
claim, since it asserts that we "no see" any outweighing
goods that would justify God's permission of that specific
suffering. To determine if **NKG** is evidence against
theism, we need to consider two conditional probabilities: how likely
is it given the denial of theism and how likely is it given theism.
Rowe (1996: 267-70) argues that the probability of
**NKG** given atheism is 1. For if there is no God, then
God doesn't permit anything. Thus, if there is no God, then
nothing justifies God's permission of anything, since God
doesn't permit anything. Thus, if there is no God, then no
outweighing good we know of would justify God's permission of
anything--including the fawn's suffering and the
girl's suffering.



If the probability of **NKG** given atheism is 1, then
the lower probability it has given theism, the stronger the evidence
**NKG** is against theism. And one might argue that the
probability of **NKG** given theism is not high--at
least below 0.5--because God would not let us suffer in silence.
That is, if God permitted the suffering of the fawn and the girl for
some outweighing good, then God would at least tell us what those
goods are or--if that's not possible for whatever
reason--at least offer some kind of comfort for the suffering in
some way (cf. Rowe 2006: 86-7). So given theism, we
shouldn't expect that no good we know of would justify
God's permission of these evils--God would tell us about
those goods or at least comfort us.



Skeptical theists object to this argument that the probability of
**NKG**, given theism, is not high (cf. Bergmann 2001).
Presumably, God would not let us suffer in silence because such
silence serves no outweighing good. But it is hard to see how one
could establish that it serves no outweighing good, if
**ST1** and **ST2**
are true. After all, even if no good we know of would justify God
letting us suffer in silence, given **ST1**
and **ST2**, it would not be reasonable to
infer that no such good would. So this argument fails to show that
**NKG** is not high given theism.


### 3.2 Cumulative Case Argument



An alternative argumentative strategy doesn't focus on
individual cases of evils that seem such that God's permission
of them is unnecessary for an outweighing good. Rather, it focuses on
a larger class of such evils. One kind of argument that focuses on a
larger class of these evils is a cumulative case argument like
this:



**Noseeum**

**N1.1**
Each individual seemingly unjustified evil is, on its own, slight
disconfirming evidence against theism.
**N1.2**
There are many seemingly unjustified evils.
**N1.3**
Therefore, the collection of all seemingly unjustified evils is
strong evidence against theism.
**N1.4**
Therefore, theism is probably false.



But some skeptical theists object to **N1.1**
on general methodological grounds (see Perrine and Wykstra 2014:
157-163). Evidence of a specific type might disconfirm a
hypothesis by eliminating some specific version of that hypothesis
that does not fit that type of evidence. But that evidence won't
disconfirm other specific versions of that hypothesis that do fit that
type of evidence. Thus, evidence of the same type might initially
disconfirm a hypothesis by eliminating specific versions of it; but
that type of evidence won't continue disconfirming that
hypothesis, since the only remaining versions of the hypothesis
accommodate that evidence. To give an example, the sun rises and sets
every day. This type of evidence disconfirms heliocentrism by
disconfirming a specific version of heliocentrism on which the earth
revolves around the sun while always facing the sun. But this type of
evidence won't disconfirm other versions of heliocentrism on
which the earth revolves around the sun, but regularly spins on an
axis. Thus, the sun rising and setting each day might initially
disconfirm heliocentrism--by eliminating some versions of
heliocentrism--but that type of evidence won't continue
disconfirming heliocentrism. For the remaining versions of
heliocentrism fit that type of evidence.



Analogously, some skeptical theists might allow that the existence of
some seemingly unjustified evils disconfirms theism. Insofar as they
do disconfirm theism, it is by disconfirming specific versions of
theism on which God always explains, or indicates, the justifying
reasons for the permission of evils. But the existence of seemingly
unjustified evils won't disconfirm versions of theism on which
God's justifying reasons for permitting suffering are
frequently, even normally, beyond our ken. Thus, this type of
evidence--the existence of seemingly unjustified
evils--might disconfirm some versions of theism but won't
disconfirm other versions of theism. So, it won't be the case
that each seemingly unjustified evil is slight disconfirmation for
theism in general and **N1.1** is false.


## 4. Skeptical Theism and Other Responses



Skeptical theism is one family of responses to arguments from evil.
But there are a number of other responses. Following Plantinga's
terminology (1974: 28), a *theodicy* purports to provide
God's justifying reasons for permitting suffering and evil. By
contrast, a *defense* purports to provide potential reasons
that would justify God's permission of suffering and evil, even
if those reasons may not be God's own. By contrast, a skeptical
theistic critique does not offer God's actual or potential
justifying reasons for permitting suffering and evil. Indeed,
skeptical theists oftentimes find themselves agreeing with
atheologians that they cannot identify connections between potential
goods and evils that would justify God's permission of specific
evils.



Initially, it may seem that there is a tension, if not inconsistency,
between skeptical theism on the one hand and defense and theodicies on
the other (compare Stump 2010: 13-5; Coley 2015). However, there
are many types of arguments from evil, utilizing different facts about
evil. For the same argument from evil, utilizing specific facts about
evil, it may be inconsistent to combine responses. That is, it may be
inconsistent to respond with both (i) we know of reasons that do (or
could) justify God's permission of that type of evil and (ii) we
don't know of any reasons that do (or could) justify God's
permission of that type of evil. But some skeptical theists (e.g.
Perrine and Wykstra 2014; DePoe 2014: 33) suggest that it may be
reasonable to use different responses for different arguments from
evil. Whether skeptical theistic critiques can be combined with other
responses to various arguments from evil is a place in the literature
that needs more attention.



Many authors who utilize skeptical theistic critiques also assume that
God has obligations to us. That is, they tend to assume that God is
permitted in letting us experience suffering and evil only if God has
some kind of justifying reason. Many skeptical theists accept
**N-O1.1**; they assume the justifying reason
must involve outweighing goods. Others might reject
**N-O1.1**. Nonetheless, they think God must
still have some kind of justifying reason; the reason just may not
involve outweighing goods (compare van Inwagen 2006 (lecture 6),
Mooney 2019). The claim that God has obligations to us is not normally
a requirement of skeptical theistic critiques. Nonetheless, the
particular way that skeptical theists critique arguments from evil
indicates they assume that God does have obligations to us.



Recently, there have been other, more extreme responses to arguments
from evil that deny that God has obligations to us. Various arguments
have been offered for this view (see Adams (2013) and Murphy (2017)
for some representative examples). But these responses deny that from
the claim that God exist it necessarily follows that God would promote
goods, prevent evils, or permit evils only if God has a justifying
reason. These responses may be technically consistent with skeptical
theistic responses, since the different responses will frequently
object to distinct premises. Nonetheless, these responses do not sit
well with the assumptions skeptical theists tend to bring to bear in
evaluating arguments from evil.


## 5. Epistemological Objections



A number of authors have raised epistemological objections to
skeptical theism. Some of these objections are to the epistemic
principles skeptical theists use. Others are that the claims of
skeptical theistic critiques may, themselves, produce skeptical
problems.


### 5.1 Objections to CORNEA Principles



CORNEA principles state a necessary condition on it being reasonable
to claim or believe *p* on the basis of something *q*.
The condition (roughly) is that it is also reasonable for one to
believe that, given one's cognitive faculties, if *p*
were different, then *q* would likely be different as well. A
standard worry for epistemic principles like this is that they will
create an infinite regress (cf. Alston 1980, Fumerton 1995 (chapter
2), Leite 2008). And some have objected to CORNEA principles for
exactly this reason (Swinburne 1998: 32-3). To see how the
regress might go, suppose I'm reasonable in believing *p*
on the basis of *q*. Then, by a CORNEA principle, I am also
reasonable in believing that, given my cognitive faculties, if
*p* were false, then *q* would likely be different. But
suppose *that* belief is reasonable but based on something
*r*. Well, applying a CORNEA principle again, it must be
reasonable for me to believe that, were that belief different, then
*r* would likely be different... *ad
infinitum*.



A different objection is that CORNEA-principles are inconsistent with
forming reasonable beliefs on the basis of inductive evidence
(McBrayer 2009; Almeida 2014: 122ff). For instance, suppose the day
care center informs me that each day, for the past three months, my
child has been sleeping during nap time. On the basis of this
inductive evidence, it is reasonable for me to infer that
*today* my child will sleep during nap time. But if my child
were *not* sleeping during nap time today, would my inductive
evidence be different? Using standard possible-world semantics, it
would not. For in the closest worlds in which my child is not
sleeping, it is likely a fluke or random event. And in those worlds, I
would still have my inductive evidence from the past. Thus, in this
case, **S-C** implies that it is *not* reasonable
to infer my child is sleeping today on the basis of my inductive
evidence. But this example of inductive reasoning is not particularly
distinctive. So **S-C** is inconsistent with forming
reasonable beliefs on the basis of inductive evidence.



Several attempts have been made to clarify CORNEA-principles in ways
that avoids these problems while still being strong enough for
responding to arguments from evil (see Wykstra 1996, 2007; Wykstra and
Perrine 2012; Perrine 2022). One clarification is that CORNEA
principles are restricted to a specific kind of case: where the
grounds or evidence for belief is "levering evidence,"
which is (crudely put) evidence strong enough to reasonably
"lever" one from agnosticism or disbelief about *p*
to belief about *p*. The restriction of CORNEA-principles to
this type of evidence or grounds is appropriate, since it is the kind
of evidence that Rowe (1979) initially tried to provide. Restricting
CORNEA-principles in this way may also block an infinite regress,
since the CORNEA-principles are not fully general. A second
clarification is that the condition in CORNEA-principles should
*not* be interpreted as involving a subjunctive-conditional,
but rather a conditional probability. That is, the condition is that
it is reasonable to believe, given one's cognitive faculties,
that the conditional probability of one's grounds or evidence,
given one's belief is false, is below .5. Though some of the
details are technical, Wykstra and Perrine argue that a probabilistic
understanding of CORNEA's requirement handles cases of inductive
evidence. But whether or not these clarifications ultimately help
defuse objections is still a topic of debate. (For further discussion
of CORNEA-principles, see Howard-Snyder (1992), Graham and Maitzen
(2007), Stone (2011), Draper (2014a).)


### 5.2 Common Sense Epistemology



Some authors have worried that skeptical theism is inconsistent with
"Common Sense Epistemology" (see Dougherty 2008). More
precisely, some might worry that the epistemological principles used
in skeptical theistic critiques are inconsistent with epistemological
principles that are part of Common Sense Epistemology. Such principles
include Swinburne's Principle of Credulity (2004: 303ff.) and
Huemer's Phenomenal Conservativism (2001: 99):



**Principle of Credulity**
  

If it seems to a subject *S* that *p*, this is good
grounds for *S* to believe *p*.



**Phenomenal Conservativism**
  

If it seems to a subject *S* that *p*, then *S*
is *prima facie* justified in believing *p*.



One might object to skeptical theism by arguing that these principles
of Common Sense Epistemology are true, and thus their inconsistency
with skeptical theism is a problem for skeptical theism.



In response, some authors argue that skeptical theistic critiques are
consistent with various principles of Common Sense Epistemology. For
even if one is *prima facie* justified in believing something,
one's *prima facie* justification might be defeated. For
instance, I may be *prima facie* justified in believing my
boss' explanation of the new departmental policy just because he
said as much; but that *prima facie* justification might be
defeated when I recall the many times he has misled me about such
policies. So too, skeptical theistic critiques might permit that
individuals are *prima facie* justified in believing things
like **N-O1.2**. Nonetheless, that *prima
facie* justification is defeated by considering skeptical theistic
critiques of arguments from evil. (For discussion, see Matheson 2011,
2014; McBrayer and Swenson 2012: 147; Coffman 2014: 83-4; Tweedt
2015; Rutledge 2017a; Hendricks 2018.)



Alternatively, other authors argue that the epistemological principles
of skeptical theistic critiques are inconsistent with various
principles of Common Sense Epistemology (see Wykstra 1984, Senor 2013,
Perrine 2022). These authors argue that the inconsistency is not a
problem for skeptical theistic critiques because those principles are
false. For instance, Perrine argues that there are reasons independent
of arguments from evil for thinking that these various principles of
Common Sense Epistemology are false. For those principles are
consistent with an agent having *prima facie* justification for
believing something even if the belief was not formed in a responsible
or reliable manner.


### 5.3 External World Skepticism



A frequent criticism of skeptical theism is that it leads to
skepticism about the external world (see Russell and Wykstra 1988:
158-9; Weisberger 2007: 170-171; Wilks 2013; Law 2017;
Russell 2017; 2018: 111ff). This criticism turns on the possibility of
divine deception. More specifically, consider the following
hypothesis:



**Deceiving God** (**DG**)
  

God is deceiving us into believing the earth is extremely old, when in
reality it is quite young.



If **DG** is true, then we are mistaken about the age of
the earth. Now atheists can reject **DG** because it
implies God exists; but clearly theists who are skeptical theists
cannot reject **DG** for that reason. Theists, who are
not skeptical theists, might reject **DG** by reasoning
as follows: we can see no reason that would justify God in deceiving
us in this way; so there is no such reason. But theists who are
skeptical theists cannot rely on that line of reasoning. After all, as
learned from their critiques of noseeum inferences, from the mere fact
that it seems to us that God has no reason to (e.g.) deceive us about
the age of the earth, it does not yet follow that we are *prima
face* justified in believing God has no reason to deceive us about
the age of the earth. So skeptical theists who are theists cannot use
either of these line of reasoning to rule out **DG**. But
this claim about the age of the earth is merely illustrative of any
number of claims about the external world. Thus, skeptical theists who
are theists cannot use either of these lines of reasoning to rule out
any number of skeptical hypothesis about the external world that
involve divine deception.



One type of response is to argue that, for skeptical theists to know
about the external world, they do not have to first rule out
hypotheses like **DG**. Otherwise put, there are other
routes to knowledge about the external world that don't involve
inferences about potential divine deception (cf. Bergmann 2009: 391;
2012: 15). For instance, skeptical theists might embrace externalism
about knowledge. According to that position, in order for one to know
facts about the external world, one does not need to have access to
what explains that one knows. Thus, one could know facts about the
external world without producing an argument or first ruling out that
one is not being deceived (cf. Bergmann 2008, Hendricks 2020). But
there are other routes skeptical theists might explore. For instance,
they might accept theories of perception on which we are antecedently
justified in trusting our perceptual experiences, unless we are given
evidence that our experiences are misleading in some way (cf. Boyce
2014). Such antecedent justification need not require first ruling out
skeptical hypotheses like **DG**.


### 5.4 Religious Skepticism



A similar objection is that skeptical theism leads to religious
skepticism (Beaudoin 2000, 2005; Rowe 2006: 90-1; Wielenberg
2010; Hudson 2014). Skeptical theists might respond to the previous
criticism by claiming that we have many ways of knowing about the
external world that don't, on the face of them, involve God
telling us something and not deceiving us. But a staple of many
religious traditions is that there are certain things we know about
*only because* God has told us. For instance, consider a claim
like:



**Afterlife** (**Af**)
  

There is an eternal afterlife of union with God, full of bliss and
free of suffering.



Many religious traditions hold that, insofar as we know or are
reasonable in believing **Af**, it is only because God
has told us, revealing it to us through a prophet, text, or direct
religious experience.



Critics argue that theists who are skeptical theists are not
reasonable in believing **Af**. The criticism here
mirrors the one of the previous section. It is possible that God is
deceiving us about these matters; but skeptical theists are unable to
reasonably rule out the possibility of divine deception. Additionally,
in the case of the external world, agents may have a variety of ways
of coming to know about the external world. But that kind of response
is less plausible here. Since it seems that for claims like
**Af**, our only way of knowing them *is* to
depend upon God--and depend upon God not deceiving us.



A different type of criticism focuses on knowledge of God's
commands. One starting point for this criticism is that many religious
texts and traditions contain a wide range of commands that purport to
be divine commands (Maitzen 2007). Nevertheless, most religious
adherents do not think they are obligated to follow all of those
purported commands. Perhaps the commands are issued by the wrong text
or tradition; or perhaps the commands had been
"superseded" or "updated" by God; or perhaps
the commands *seem* to be issued by God but couldn't be
given the immoral content of the commands; or maybe the commands are
just plain silly or arbitrary.



A natural way that a theist might sift through these purported
commands is to consider what God would have reason to command. If the
theist sees no reason why God would command (e.g.) not cooking goat in
its mother's milk, then the theist might conclude that such a
command is not actually God's. But this way of reasoning about
divine commands looks incredibly similar to the noseeum argument for
**N-O1.2**! Thus, if theists who are skeptical
theists are skeptical about whether that noseeum inference is
reasonable, so too they should be skeptical that *this*
inference about God's commands is reasonable as well.


## 6. Moral Objections



A number of authors have argued that skeptical theism--especially
when combined with theism--leads to various forms of moral
problems, including moral skepticism. However, there are several
distinct criticisms that are not always distinguished. I will
distinguish three important objections involving morality.


### 6.1 Moral Deliberation



One criticism is that theists who accept skeptical theism should
deliberate about acting in problematic ways (see Almeida and Oppy
2003: 505-7; Piper 2007: 71ff; Rancourt 2013). More
specifically, they should reason that they should never intervene in
preventing seemingly unjustified evils, even if it would be easy for
them to do so. For (as theists) they believe that for any seemingly
unjustified evil, there is a justifying reason for it. They might fail
to identify the justifying reason for some seemingly unjustified evil.
But (as skeptical theists) they do not regard this failure as
providing *prima facie* justification that the justifying
reason does not exist. So they should reason that they should not
intervene in preventing seemingly unjustified evils. But, the
objection goes, it is clearly *unreasonable*--and
*immoral*--to reason that we should never prevent a
potential seemingly unjustified evil.



This basic objection can be extended. For instance, theists who are
skeptical theists frequently believe that they have been commanded by
God to act in various ways. Thus, in some concrete situation, a theist
who is a skeptical theist may believe both that she should
*not* prevent the suffering (because of her skeptical theism)
and that she *should* prevent the suffering (because of her
theism). The combination of her views leads to a kind of moral
paralysis or *aporia* (see Piper 2007: 72-3). (Again, for
the reasons mentioned in section IV.3, atheists and theists who are
not skeptical theists have straightforward ways of resisting these
objections.)



Skeptical theists have offered a number of responses. Some skeptical
theists who are theists claim that God has commanded them to act in
various ways. Therefore, when deliberating about how to act, it is
reasonable to prevent evils since they have been commanded by God to
prevent evils (compare Bergmann and Rea 2005: 244-5, Schnall
2007). This response requires knowledge or reasonable belief of
God's commands; but some critics of skeptical theism claim that
skeptical theists who are theists do not have knowledge of God's
commands (see previous section).



Other skeptical theists argue that the objection misrepresents their
position (Anderson 2012). Specifically, it neglects a distinction
Wykstra drew (1984: 75-6) between different justifications for
permitting evil (cf. Alston 1991 [1996: 101]). God may be justified in
permitting an evil because the evil itself is necessary for some
greater good. But it may be that God is justified in permitting an
evil because the possibility of the evil--that is, not preventing
it--is necessary for some good, such as developing moral
character. A parenting analogy is apt here. A parent is able to
prevent an embarrassingly low score on her child's school work
by forcing her child to do the homework. But by permitting the
possibility of that low score, the parent gives her child an
opportunity to achieve something of value--a more responsible
character. In this case, the suffering--the embarrassingly low
score--is not necessary for any further good; rather, the
parent's permission of it is necessary for a further good,
namely, increased responsibility. Thus, some skeptical theists reject
the claim that for any evil, there is a greater good that outweighs
that evil. Rather, God may permit some evil may occur, not because
that evil is necessary for some greater good, but because God's
permission of it is.


### 6.2 All-things-considered Value



Some have objected that skeptical theism is committed to
*all-things-considered* value skepticism (Jordan 2006, Hasker
2010, Ekstrom 2021: ch. 4). Crudely put, the all-things-considered
value of something--a state of affairs, action, attitude,
etc.--is the overall value or disvalue of it and all of its
consequences. Some have argued that if skeptical theism is true, then
it is frequently not reasonable to make all-things-considered value
judgements about specific things, that is, specific states of affairs,
actions, attitudes, etc. Given skeptical theism, we are frequently
reasonable in judging that some specific thing is on its own valuable
or disvaluable, good or bad. But, the objection goes, we are not
reasonable in judging that things have all-things-considered value.
Again, this objection might be extended to cases of obligations, since
being unable to make reasonable all-things-considered value judgments
may also undermine knowledge of our obligations (see next
section).



In response, some skeptical theists concede their position undermines
certain ways of arriving at all-things-considered value judgments (cf.
Bergmann 2009: 379-80, 389; 2012: 25-6). Specifically,
just as skeptical theistic claims undermine Rowe's nosseum
inferences, so too they will undermine nosseum inferences that certain
things are all-things-considered valuable or disvaluable. But
skeptical theists might also maintain that this all-things-considered
value skepticism is unproblematic. One reason why it might be
unproblematic is that there are reasons for accepting
all-things-considered value skepticism independently of skeptical
theism. For instance, no one knows all of the causal consequences of
their action. Thus, no one knows all of the valuable or disvaluable
consequences of their actions. Thus, no one knows the
all-things-considered value of their actions. This line of reasoning
supports all-things-considered value skepticism, but does not assume
that skeptical theistic critiques are successful.


### 6.3 All-things-considered Obligations



Many authors have argued that skeptical theism leads to skepticism
about our obligations (see Jordan 2006: 409ff; Piper 2007: 68; Sehon
2010; Maitzen 2013: 448-451; Street 2014). Skeptical theists can
be reasonable in believing that certain things are good and bad; and
skeptical theists can be reasonable in believing that agents have
certain *pro tanto* obligations (e.g. to bring about what is
good, prevent what is bad, keep our promises, etc.). But oftentimes in
ordinary life we take ourselves to reasonably believe--if not
know--what we *ought* to do, what our
*all-things-considered* obligations are. And some authors argue
that skeptical theism leads to skepticism about our
all-things-considered obligations.



The simplest form of this objection assumes maximizing act
consequentialism. According to that view, an agent ought to act to
bring about the outcomes with the greatest possible good. However, if
skeptical theists cannot be reasonable in forming beliefs about the
all-things-considered value of outcomes, then they cannot be
reasonable in believing which outcomes have the greatest possible
good. Thus, assuming maximizing act consequentialism, skeptical
theists cannot be reasonable in believing some action is the one they
ought to perform. But, arguably, skeptical theism leads to skepticism
about our all-things-considered obligations assuming other moral
theories as well. For instance, some robust forms of virtue ethics
suggest that agents ought to perform the action that a perfectly
virtuous person would perform; but presumably a perfectly virtuous
person would not neglect salient outcomes of their actions. Similarly,
some forms of Kantian ethics test moral principles by considering
whether "universalizing" them in various ways results in
some kind of contradiction; but presumably determining whether there
is some kind of contradiction requires knowing the various outcomes of
actions in those hypothetical scenarios.



Skeptical theists might respond by drawing a distinction between
considerations relevant to God's action and our own (compare
Howard-Snyder 1996b: 292-3; Bergmann 2009: 393; Jeffrey 2019: section
3.1.3). For all we know, our knowledge of good and evil is not
representative when it comes to considerations that determine what God
ought to do; but it may be that our knowledge of good and evil is
representative when it comes to considerations that determine what
humans ought to do. While this response may be promising, skeptical
theists haven't developed it at great lengths, and some critics
(notably Street 2014) have argued it is less promising than it might
seem.



Howard-Synder (2009, 2014) offers a dilemma argument in defense of
skeptical theism. On some moral theories, the facts that determine our
all-things-considered obligations are frequently inaccessible to us.
(Maximizing act consequentialism is one example.) Thus, given
skeptical theism and those theories, we should frequently be in doubt
about our all-things-considered obligations--but not in virtue of
skeptical theism, but rather in virtue of those theories. By contrast,
on other moral theories, the facts that determine our
all-things-considered obligations are frequently accessible to us.
Thus, given skeptical theism and those theories, we frequently should
*not* be in doubt about our all-things-considered
obligations--but not in virtue of skeptical theism, but rather in
virtue of those theories. Either way, skeptical theism *itself*
doesn't lead to skepticism about our all-things-considered
obligations.


## 7. Scope of Skeptical Theism



Many skeptical theistic critiques focus on "noseeum"
inferences. These inferences might be used to infer that God's
permission of some evil lacks a justifying reason or even that there
is no God. A natural thought is that skeptical theistic critiques, if
successful at all, are only successful against arguments that make a
"noseeum" inference. Other arguments from evil, using
alternative lines of reasoning, may be immune from skeptical theistic
critiques. This natural thought is not a criticism of skeptical
theistic critiques *per se*. Rather, it suggests a certain
limitation of skeptical theistic critiques. Such critiques have a
limited scope in defending theism from arguments from evil.



A number of authors have argued that there are arguments from evil
that are immune to skeptical theistic critiques. We next focus on
three types of arguments--non-inferential arguments, Humean
arguments, and Hiddenness Arguments.


### 7.1 Non-inferential Arguments



Non-inferential arguments from evil begin with a standard observation.
For a given proposition, sometimes we can be either inferentially
justified in believing it--perhaps on the basis of some beliefs
or argument--or non-inferentially justified in believing it. For
instance, I am inferentially justified in believing my partner is home
by inferring this from other things I am justified in believing like:
the door is unlocked, the mail has been taken, her keys are on the
ring, and her jacket is hanging on the wall, etc. But I can also be
non-inferentially justified in believing my partner is home by seeing
her in the home as well.



One way of defending **N-O1.2**-- there
is at least one evil e such that God's permission of e is not
necessary for some outweighing good--is inferentially, by giving
an argument. Skeptical theists have critiqued various arguments for
**N-O1.2**. But even if those critiques
succeed, then at best what follows is that we do not (yet!) have
inferential justification for believing
**N-O1.2**. But it is conceivable that we have
non-inferential justification for believing
**N-O1.2**.



However, a non-inferential argument from evil still needs to show that
we do have non-inferential justification for believing
**N-O1.2** (or a similar kind of claim). While
there might be a variety of ways of doing this (see Gellman 2013,
2017), a simple and straightforward way is to appeal to epistemic
principles of Common Sense Epistemology like Phenomenal Conservativism
(see Tucker 2014: 58f; Ekstrom 2021: 103ff). However, this way of
defending a non-inferential argument from evil gets embroiled in the
issues of section IV.2. Specifically, some skeptical theists will
simply reject the epistemic principles; others may concede them but
argue that skeptical theistic critiques provide defeaters. Regardless,
whether or not non-inferential arguments from evil avoid skeptical
theistic critiques--and are otherwise successful--is one of
the more active areas of research on this topic in recent years.


### 7.2 Humean Arguments



Some of the most powerful arguments from evil are Humean arguments
from evil (see Hume 1779 [2007], Draper 1989, Draper 1992:
313-317, Dougherty and Draper 2013, Morriston 2014). Humean
arguments have several distinctive features. First, they appeal to
facts about *good and evil*, such as the distribution of
pleasure and pain we observe. Second, they are comparative: they
compare theism with some alternative, inconsistent hypothesis like a
"hypothesis of indifference" (roughly: it is not the case
that life on earth as we observe it is the result of actions by either
a benevolent or maleficent creator). Third, they are normally
abductive, arguing that the inconsistent hypothesis does a better job
of explaining certain facts than theism.



Humean arguments normally have a central premise like:



**Distribution** (**Dist**)
  

The hypothesis of indifference does a much better job predicting the
distribution of pleasure and pain we observe than theism.



On its own, **Dist** isn't enough to make it
reasonable to believe theism is false; after all, perhaps the
hypothesis of indifference is worse off in other respects--it is
very implausible or we have other excellent reasons for accepting
theism (cf. Plantinga 1996: 247-250). So defenders of Humean
arguments normally add additional premises to their argument to show
that their rival to theism isn't worse off in other respects as
well (see Dougherty and Draper 2013: 69ff; Morriston 2014: 227). But
the inclusion of a comparative premise like **Dist** is
part of what makes Humean arguments distinctive.



**Dist** may be defended in various ways. One standard
way appeals to our background knowledge of the biological role of
pleasure and pain (Draper 1989). Simplifying, we antecedently know
that pleasure--a good--and pain--an evil--play
biological roles. For instance, pleasure will play a role in
reinforcing adaptive behavior, whereas pain will play a role in
deterring non-adaptive behavior. The hypothesis of indifference does
not undermine predictions about the biological role of pleasure and
pain. But theism will. For given theism it is expectable that pleasure
and pain would play additional roles beyond biological ones such as
moral or religious roles (e.g., the virtuous receive pleasure, the
vicious pain). So theism, but not the hypothesis of indifference, will
undermine the predictions about the biological role of pleasure and
pain. Further, the argument goes, those predictions are accurate.
Thus, the hypothesis of indifference does a better job of explaining
**Dist** than theism.



Most skeptical theists object to claims like **Dist** by
focusing on what theism predicts or explains. Some skeptical theists
express general skepticism of our ability to effectively compare these
hypotheses. For instance, Perrine (2019) argues that if theism is
true, then skeptical theistic claims--like
**ST1**-**ST3**
from above--are also very likely true. Thus, if
**Dist** is true, then so is:



**Distribution+** (**Dist+**)
  

The hypothesis of indifference does a much better job predicting the
distribution of pleasure and pain we observe than theism and skeptical
theistic claims.



But it is doubtful that we are able to effectively predict the
pleasure and pain we might observe given both theism and skeptical
theistic claims. For skeptical theistic claims undermine our ability
to create precise enough predictions about theism to effectively
compare them with other hypotheses like the hypothesis of
indifference.



Other skeptical theistic critiques of **Dist** focus on
specific hypotheses that, it seems, we cannot reasonably rule out. For
instance, consider the following claim (compare Van Inwagen 1991
[1996]; and 1996: 225-234):



**Necessary Distribution** (**ND**)
  

A distribution of pleasure and pain for organisms similar to the one
we observe is necessary for great goods associated with higher-level
organisms *and* for avoiding disvaluable worlds that are
massively irregular.



If **ND** is very probable, given theism, then it is not
unlikely that we *would* observe a distribution of pleasure and
pain similar to the one we observe. For if theism is true, God likely
wants to bring about various greater goods. But if **ND**
is true, God couldn't bring about those greater goods without
allowing for a distribution of pleasures and pains similar to the one
we observe. Thus, if **ND** is very probable, given
theism, then theism may predict the distribution of good and evil we
observe just as well as the hypothesis of indifference. Thus, if it is
reasonable to believe **Dist** it must also be reasonable
to believe that **ND** is *not* very probable,
given theism. But that hypothesis--that **ND** is
not very probable, given theism--is not one we can reasonably
rule out. To do that, we would have to have a greater understanding of
goods, evils, their connections to organisms, laws of natures,
irregularities, etc. than we in fact have. So it is unreasonable to
believe **Dist**, since to reasonably believe it we would
have to reasonably believe **ND** is not very probable
given theism, and that's not reasonable for us to believe.


### 7.3 Divine Hiddenness



Divine hiddenness arguments use facts about the apparent
"hiddenness" or "absence" or
"silence" of God to argue against the existence of God
(cf. Schellenberg 1993, 2007, 2015). A simple argument from divine
hiddenness is:



**Hiddenness**

**H1**
If God exists, there is no non-resistant, non-belief.
**H2**
There is non-resistant, non-belief.
**H3**
Therefore, God does not exist.



Non-resistant, non-belief refers to people who meet two conditions.
First, they do not believe in God. Second, they are not resistant to
belief in God, where not being resistant may include both having the
conceptual and emotional abilities to have a relationship with God as
well not having intentionally and culpably resisted such a
relationship. **H1** can be defended in
various ways, including: according to theism, being in a personal
relationship with God is the greatest good for people. However, the
argument goes, such a personal relationship requires belief. Thus, if
God exists, and a person is not resistant to such a
relationship--the person's greatest good--then God
would "make his presence known" to the person so they
might reasonably believe that God exists and enter into such a
relationship. In other words, God would not remain hidden from those
who are receptive to a relationship with God. But
**H2** claims there *are* such
people--who are not resistant yet do not believe. Thus, there is
no God.



Unsurprisingly, some authors claim this argument for
**H1** is vulnerable to skeptical theistic
critique (see Bergmann 2009: 382, McBrayer and Swenson 2012). So far
as we can tell, there is no reason that would justify God in remaining
hidden to people who are receptive to a relationship with God. But
from the mere fact that we cannot identify such a reason, it does not
follow that there *is* no such reason. Thus, attempts to
establish **H1** by appealing to our knowledge
of how God might plan to bring about certain goods--like a loving
personal relation--may be vulnerable to skeptical theistic
critique.


## 8. Theory Development



Theism is a cornerstone of many major religious traditions. But it is
also a metaphysical view, being an ontological claim about what
exists. It is also one potential way of filling in a
"supernatural" worldview on which the world is not
exhausted by "natural" things but also contains
"supernatural" things. Many philosophers evaluate
metaphysical claims in a manner similar to scientific claims, such as
their ability to explain phenomenon, be well-confirmed, exhibit
theoretical virtues (such as simplicity), etc.



However, there is a well-known lesson in scientific theorizing about
how *not* to avoid a theoretical problem. Suppose we are
evaluating a hypothesis *H* (say, Mars revolves around the
Earth). But there is some data *D* that seems to strongly
disconfirm *H* (say, Mars exhibits "retrograde
motion"). One could *expand* or *enrich*
*H* by adding further hypotheses to H that would predict the
data *D* (say, Mars orbits the earth using epicycles on an
orbit). The resulting expanded or enriched hypothesis may perfectly
well predict the data *D*. But if the resulting expanded or
enriched hypothesis is random, unprincipled, independently
implausible, or otherwise *ad hoc*, it may not be plausible to
believe the expanded hypothesis in virtue of these additions or
expansions. The lesson here--crudely put--is that one should
*not* respond to a problem for a hypothesis by *just*
adding claims to that hypothesis. At the very least, one should also
explain why those additional claims are also expectable given the
hypothesis in question. In that way, one can show that the additional
claims are not random, unprincipled, or *ad hoc*.



Among other things, theism is a metaphysical hypothesis. Many authors
have argued that various facts about good and evil are strong evidence
that disconfirms this hypothesis. In response, some authors have
adduced skeptical theistic critiques, composed of further claims about
God and human limitations. However, the lesson from above is that
simply *adding* further claims is insufficient to defend a
hypothesis from a theoretical problem. Thus, if these skeptical
theistic claims are random, *ad hoc*, or unprincipled when
added to theism, then even if the expanded theism adequately
neutralizes the disconfirming evidence, the expanded theism may be too
implausible to be reasonably believed.



Though not always framed in this way, skeptical theists have been
sensitive to these points. Some skeptical theists argue that their
skeptical theistic claims are independently plausible--that is,
plausible independent of whether or not theism is true. Other
skeptical theists argue that their skeptical theistic claims are quite
plausible *given theism*. Skeptical theists offer various
defenses, by appealing to considerations of human limitations or moral
progress or ruminations about historical complexity or analogies
involving expertise in various fields (see, *inter alia*,
Alston 1996: 317ff; Howard-Snyder 1996b: 301ff; Durston 2000; Bergmann
2001: 284-6; Perrine 2019: 124-126; Hendricks 2020).
Either way, these arguments can be used to try to show that skeptical
theistic claims are not random, *ad hoc*, or unprincipled ways
of "expanding" or adding to theism.



The issue of how to develop a theory was incipient in some of the
exchanges between Rowe and Wykstra (see Rowe 1986: 246-7; Rowe
2006: 85ff; Wykstra 1984: 91ff; 1996: 142-5; Russell and Wykstra
1988: 159-160; Wykstra 1996: 140ff). For instance, Rowe concedes
that certain claims are entirely expectable given theism, such as:
there might be goods and evils beyond our ken but not beyond
God's. But other claims are not expectable given theism, such
as: there is suffering that is necessary for goods beyond our ken
*and* God would not tell us this. Rowe defends these claims by
appeal to Wykstra's parent-child analogy. A parent may allow a
child to undergo a painful surgery for reasons that the child cannot
yet understand; but a *loving* parent will surely not be absent
while the child suffers (see also Dougherty 2012, Rutledge 2017b).
Wykstra argued that such claims *are* expectable given theism
by means of his analogy with scientific depth. More recently, other
authors have tried to give other reasons why, even given theism, we
should expect seemingly unjustified suffering *without* divine
comfort or acknowledgement of that suffering (see DePoe 2014, 2017;
Shields 2021)). These disputes can be understood as disputes over
whether theism can be "expanded" by skeptical theistic
considerations in a way that is both plausible *and* undermines
arguments from evil, or whether the only plausible and principled ways
of expanding theism do not undermine such arguments (compare Perrine
and Wykstra 2014, 2017: 104-7).



The issue of theory development is important for two further reasons.
First, many skeptical theists defend their claims and critiques by
arguing that critics misunderstand them or that their positions are
analogous to other cases that are perfectly unproblematic. However, as
philosophers of science like Kuhn and Lakatos have suggested, many of
our best scientific theories offer recommendations (implicitly or
explicitly) for how to *develop* or *expand* hypotheses.
Skeptical theists have spent less time making positive proposals for
how to develop or expand a theistic worldview. Unless they do so, some
critics may worry that skeptical theism makes theism into a
"degenerating research program" (to use Lakatos'
charming phrase).



Second, many skeptical theists are not simply theists; they are
adherents to some religious tradition. Religious traditions normally
make many more claims than (mere) theism, and religious traditions
normally reject other alternative religious traditions. Some
philosophers of religion--such as Richard Swinburne--have
continued the project of natural theology to not only defend theism
but a specific religious tradition as well (Christianity, in
Swinburne's case). But many--including some skeptical
theists--worry that such projects are undermined by skeptical
theistic considerations. If so, skeptical theists who are theists need
to explore alternative routes for explaining the justification of
religious belief, such as reformed epistemology (see Plantinga and
Wolterstroff 1983; Plantinga 2000). At the very least, more work could
be done exploring positive models that incorporate justified belief in
both skeptical theism and specific religious traditions.