## 1. The Dispensability Debate



The defense of methodological holism dates back to at least the turn
of the nineteenth century. Around this time, Emile Durkheim advocated
the indispensability of holist explanations in a number of writings
(see e.g., Durkheim 1938[1895], 1951[1897]). He famously stated that
the



> 
> 
> *determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the
> social facts preceding it and not among the states of the individual
> consciousness*. (Durkheim 1938 [1895]: 110--italics in the
> original)
> 
> 
> 



His work is typically juxtaposed to that of Max Weber, who is regarded
as the main proponent of methodological individualism during this
period. In the subsequent history of the debate, there are two phases
that particularly stand out. The first began around the 1950s, when
Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper, and J.W.N. Watkins argued ardently in
support of methodological individualism. In response, Ernest Gellner,
Leon G. Goldstein, Maurice Mandelbaum, and others maintained that
there were alternative ways of cashing out, and defending,
methodological holism that were left unscathed by Hayek's,
Popper's and Watkins' objections (see Gellner 1973 [1956];
Goldstein 1973a [1956], 1973b [1958]; Mandelbaum 1955, 1973 [1957].
They all appear in O'Neill 1973, which also contains other
important contributions from this period).



The second significant period stretches from around the 1980s up until
today. From the perspective of methodological holism, this phase is
marked by the appearance of a number of new, or new versions of,
arguments in support of the indispensability of holist explanations.
In this phase, seminal contributions to the dispensability debate were
made by Roy Bhaskar, Alan Garfinkel, Harold Kincaid, Frank Jackson and
Philip Pettit to mention just a few (see Bhaskar 1979; Garfinkel 1981;
Kincaid 1996, 1997; Jackson and Pettit 1992a, 1992b). The following
section focuses on the most important arguments advanced during this
last--and still unfolding--period. (See Zahle and Collin
2014a for a collection of papers from this period.) The remainder of
the present section is concerned with the further introduction of the
positions at play within the dispensability debate. As noted above,
special attention will be paid to the methodological holist
stance.



There are three basic views within the debate:



> 
> 
> *Strong methodological holism*: Holist explanations alone
> should be offered within the social sciences; they are indispensable.
> Individualist explanations may, and should, be dispensed with.
> 
> 
> 
> *Moderate methodological holism*: In certain cases, holist
> explanations should be advanced; in other cases individualist
> explanations should be advanced; both holist and individualist
> explanations are indispensable within the social sciences.
> 
> 
> 
> *Methodological individualism*: Individualist explanations
> alone should be put forward within the social sciences; they are
> indispensable. Holist explanations may, and should, be dispensed
> with.
> 
> 
> 



Among these positions, the thesis of strong methodological holism has
enjoyed relatively little support and today it has few, if any,
proponents. The vast majority of methodological holists are of the
moderate variety. Accordingly, the debate has mainly played itself out
between the moderate holist view and the individualist position.
Because both parties agree that individualist explanations should be
advanced, their efforts have first and foremost been directed toward
the question of whether holist explanations are indispensable or
not.



The three basic positions may be further characterized in three ways.
First, each relies on a distinction between holist and individualist
explanations. This raises the issue of exactly how to differentiate
between these two categories of explanation. The answer to this
question is a matter of dispute among participants in the debate. One
possible formulation of the distinction is that holist explanations
appeal to social phenomena, whereas individualist explanations invoke
individuals, their actions, beliefs, etc. To elaborate further on this
suggestion, it may be specified that holist explanations contain
social terms, descriptions, or predicates set apart by their reference
to, and focus on, social phenomena. By contrast, individualist
explanations contain individualist terms, descriptions, or predicates
distinguished by their reference to, and focus on, individuals, their
actions, beliefs, desires, etc.



One issue still left open by this supplementary characterization is
how to understand the notion of a social phenomenon. Methodological
holists commonly take the following list of items to exemplify social
phenomena: (a) Organizations--like universities, firms, and
churches; (b) social processes--like revolutions and economic
growth; (c) statistical properties--like the literacy rate or the
suicide rate within a group; (d) cultures and traditions--like
the Mayan culture or a democratic tradition; (e) beliefs, desires, and
other mental properties ascribed to groups--like the
government's desire to stay in power; (f) norms and
rules--like the proscription of sex with family members and the
rule requiring cars to drive on the right-hand side of the road; (g)
properties of social networks--like their density or cohesion;
(h) social structures, typically identified with one or more of the
items already listed; and (i) social roles--like being a bus
driver or a nurse. The list includes social phenomena in the form of
social entities, social processes, and social properties. The latter
are first and foremost properties ascribed to social groups or
constellations of individuals. Yet social properties also include
certain features ascribed to individuals, such as an
individual's social role. These properties are social
properties, it is sometimes suggested, because they presuppose the
social organization of individuals, or the existence of social
entities. (For a discussion of different kinds of social properties,
see also Ylikoski 2012, 2014.)



Methodological individualists typically disagree that all the items
listed above constitute social phenomena. They contend that some
exemplify individualist properties because they are properties of
individuals. For instance, some methodological individualists maintain
that norms and rules are individualist properties since they express
individuals' beliefs as to how they should--or should
not--act. Likewise, many hold that social roles are individualist
properties because they are ascribed to individuals. (For holist
defenses of the view that social roles should be classified as social
properties, see e.g., Kincaid 1997; Lukes 1968; Elder-Vass 2010;
Hodgson 2007.) In this fashion, the dispute about how to distinguish
between holist and individualist explanations translates into a
difference in opinion concerning what constitutes social phenomena.
Methodological holists consider more phenomena to be social and hence
they classify more explanations as holist, whereas methodological
individualists view fewer phenomena as social, the result being that
they categorize fewer explanations as holist and more as
individualist. Due to such disagreements, methodological holists and
individualists often talk past one another: each offers arguments
presupposing a distinction between holist and individualist
explanations that is at odds with that relied upon by their opponent
(see Zahle 2003, 2014).



The question of how to differentiate between holist and individualist
explanations may also be approached by drawing on the analysis of
explanations as consisting of an explanans, i.e., what does the
explaining, and an explanandum, i.e., what is in need of explanation.
Consider the following options: (a) both the explanans and the
explanandum are expressed in terms of social phenomena (e.g., the
government's decision to lower the national minimum wage led to
protests from the unions); (b) the explanans is stated in terms of
social phenomena while the explanandum is described in terms of
individuals, their actions, etc. (e.g., the government's
decision to lower the national minimum wage resulted in several
individuals writing public letters of protest); (c) both the explanans
and the explanandum are expressed in terms of individuals, their
actions, etc. (e.g., because the small children started crying, a
number of people came over to help out); (d) the explanans is stated
in terms of individuals, their actions, etc. while the explanandum is
described in terms of social phenomena (e.g., the fact that many
individuals withdrew their money at once had the result that the bank
exhausted its cash reserves). With these options in mind, three
different ways of circumscribing holist and individualist explanations
may be registered:



(1)


-
*Holist explanations*: The explanans is stated in terms of
social phenomena; the explanandum is expressed either in terms of
social phenomena, or in terms of individuals, their actions, etc.
-
*Individualist explanations*: The explanans is stated in
terms of individuals; the explanandum is expressed either in terms of
social phenomena, or in terms of individuals, their actions, etc.
 
(2)


-
*Holist explanations*: The explanans is stated in terms of
social phenomena; the explanandum is described in terms of social
phenomena.
-
*Individualist explanations*: The explanans is stated in
terms of individuals, their actions, etc.; the explanandum is
described in terms of social phenomena.
 
(3)


-
*Holist explanations*: The explanans is stated in terms of
social phenomena; the explanandum is expressed in terms of social
phenomena.
-
*Individualist explanations*: The explanans is stated in
terms of individuals, their actions, etc.; the explanandum is
expressed in terms of individuals, their actions, etc.
 


All three conceptions have been advocated in the dispensability
debate. Among them, the first position is the most inclusive, while
also being the most widespread.



Second, the basic positions of strong methodological holism, moderate
methodological holism and methodological individualism can be further
characterized by noting that holist and individualist explanations may
be categorized into different types. For instance, both holist and
individualist explanations may be classified according to whether they
are functional, intentional, or straightforward causal explanations.
This point may be illustrated in relation to holist explanations.
Holist explanations of the functional variety state that the continued
existence of a social phenomenon is explained by its function or
effect. For instance, it may be suggested that "the state
continues to exist because it furthers the interests of the ruling
class". In the past, but no longer today, methodological holism
has often been associated with the advancement of holist explanations
of this type. (On the use of functional holist explanations, see e.g.,
Macdonald and Pettit 1981: 131ff.) Intentional holist explanations
purport to explain an action ascribed to a group by reference to the
group's reasons for performing it. For example, it may be
affirmed that "the government decided to call a general election
in May because it believed this would increase its chances of being
reelected". (On the use of intentional holist explanations, see
e.g., Tollefsen 2002; List and Pettit 2011.) Nowadays, both functional
and intentional explanations are often regarded as special kinds of
causal explanation to be distinguished from more straightforward
causal explanations. This latter kind of causal explanation is
illustrated by assertions such as "the rise in unemployment led
to an increase in crime", or "the government's
lowering of the taxes led to an increase in the consumption of luxury
goods".



Alternatively, to note an additional example, holist and individualist
explanations may be categorized by reference to their focus. In this
spirit, holist explanations may be classified according to whether
they focus on, say, the statistical properties of social groups, on
social organizations and their actions, and so on. Likewise,
individualist explanations may be categorized according to whether,
say, their descriptions of individuals are informed by rational choice
models, by accounts that stress how actions are largely habitual and
based on various forms of tacit knowledge, etc. The advocacy of a
basic position may go together with the favoring of certain types of
holist or individualist explanations over others.



Third, the positions of strong methodological holism, moderate
methodological holism and methodological individualism can be further
explicated by observing that each stance may either be formulated as a
claim about explanations in general, that is, all explanations
advanced within the social sciences, or as pertaining to final
explanations only, that is, explanations that are satisfactory rather
than being merely tolerable in the absence of better ones. Sometimes
methodological individualists tend to regard the discussion as
revolving solely around final explanations. Accordingly, they maintain
that though holist explanations may be advanced, they are only
tolerable as stopping points that are temporarily acceptable in
anticipation of individualist explanations that, alone, will qualify
as final explanations. Among both strong and moderate methodological
holists, it is less commonly maintained that the debate concerns final
explanations only.



There are additional dimensions along which the three basic positions
within the dispensability debate may be clarified. For instance, each
stance is compatible with different views of what constitutes an
explanation, different notions of causation, and so on. Occasionally,
the divergence of opinion with respect to these issues will surface in
the discussion that follows.


## 2. Why Holist Explanations are Indispensable



This section examines some of the most important arguments offered in
support of the claim that holist explanations are indispensable within
the social sciences. All the arguments have been advocated by moderate
methodological holists. Only the first version of the first argument
has also, and perhaps mainly, been propounded by strong methodological
holists. The arguments should all be read as defenses of the
indispensability of holist explanations understood as final
explanations.


### 2.1 The Argument from Social Phenomena as Causes



The argument from social phenomena as causes takes it that holist
explanations are indispensable if social phenomena are causally
effective. The basic structure of the argument is as follows. First, a
characterization of social phenomena as causally effective is
presented. Next, it is maintained that in order to explain the events
generated by the causally effective social phenomena, holist
explanations must be offered: holist explanations alone state how
social phenomena bring about certain events. Lastly, it is concluded
that since the events brought about by social phenomena should not be
left unexplained, holist explanations are indispensable. The argument
comes in various versions set apart by the way in which they
characterize social phenomena as causally effective.



According to one line of reasoning, social entities like nations and
societies have causal powers that are independent of, and override,
the causal powers of the individuals who comprise these entities. For
instance, it is held that nations develop in such a way so as to
realize some goal, yet without the implicated individuals having any
influence on this development. Alternatively, it is contended that
societal structures may ensure that individuals perform certain
functions in society; the individuals have no choice in this matter.
However specified, social phenomena that have these independent and
overriding causal powers produce effects that cannot be accounted for
by offering individualist explanations; individuals are simply not
causally responsible for these effects. The explanation of such social
phenomena is only possible by way of holist explanations that lay out
how the phenomena brought about the effects in question.



The contention that social entities have independent and overriding
causal powers is often ascribed to Comte, Hegel, Marx, and their
followers. Today the claim enjoys very few adherents. One important
reason for this is that the claim is regarded as incompatible with the
widely held view that social phenomena are noncausally determined by
individuals and their properties, and sometimes by material artifacts
too. Particularly since the 1980s, the notions of supervenience,
realization, and emergence have received a lot of attention as ways of
spelling out this non-causal dependency relation between social
phenomena, on the one hand, and individuals and their properties, on
the other. These notions have served as the basis for alternative
versions of the argument from social phenomena as causes.



Consider first the notions of supervenience and realization.
Supervenience is a relationship between properties, kinds, or facts.
Roughly speaking, social properties supervene upon individualist
properties if and only if there can be no change at the level of
social properties unless there is also a change at the level of
individualist properties. Otherwise put, the individualist properties
fix the social properties. Too see how this works, assume that a
football club supervenes on a constellation of individuals with
certain beliefs, bearing certain relations to each other, and so on.
This being the case, the football club cannot transform into a golf
club, say, unless the individuals change some of their beliefs, the
relations they stand in, or the like. The individuals' beliefs,
relations, etc. fix the property of their being a football club. The
notion of supervenience is often used interchangeably with the notion
of realization. Thus, it is said that a constellation of individuals
with certain beliefs, relationships, etc. realizes the property of
being a football club. Several moderate methodological holists have,
in varying ways, expanded on the account of social properties as
supervenient properties by presenting considerations in support of
supervenient social properties being, in certain cases, causally
effective properties (see e.g., Kincaid 1997, 2009; List and
Spiekermann 2013; Sawyer 2003, 2005). Their reflections are a response
to the so-called exclusion argument, which states that supervenient
properties are epiphenomenal because all the causal work is done by
the properties that they supervene upon (on this argument, see e.g.,
Kim 2005). Here is how Christian List and Kai Spiekermann purport to
establish that some supervenient social properties are causally
effective (List and Spiekermann 2013).



List and Spiekermann begin by appealing to the difference-making or
counterfactual conception of causation, which asserts that "a
property *C* (within a system of interest) is the cause of
another property *E* if and only if *C* systematically
makes a difference to *E*" (2013: 636). By implication, a
supervenient social property, *S*, qualifies as a cause of
*E*, when *S* makes a systematic difference to
*E*. This means that, other things being equal, if *S*
occurred *E* would do so too, and that if *S* did not
occur, then neither would *E*. Now assume that *S* is
microrealization-robust: *S* would also have brought about
*E* if it had been realized by a compound of individualist
properties other than the one that actually realizes it. In situations
of this sort, the compound of individualist properties that realizes
*S* does not make a systematic difference to *E*. While
it is the case that if the particular compound occurred then so would
*E*, it is not the case that if the compound did not occur,
*E* would not occur either. Hence it is *S*, rather than
the compound of individualist properties realizing *S*, that
qualifies as the cause of *E*. List and Spiekermann underline
that in these circumstances, a holist explanation--that is, an
explanation describing how a given supervenient social property
brought about some effect--is needed.



As an anecdotal illustration of these points, they refer to the failed
climate summit in Copenhagen in 2010 (2013: 637). They suggest that
the summit failed at least in part because there were so many parties,
and no common interest. Moreover, they note that these--and
other--social properties of the situation are
microrealization-robust: even had they been realized by individuals
with somewhat different individualist properties, the social
properties would have still resulted in a failed summit. The social
properties of the meeting should thus be regarded as the cause of the
failure; that is, a holist explanation must be offered in order to
explain why the summit was unsuccessful.



Turn now to the notion of emergence. While emergent properties are
sometimes regarded as identical to, or as a special class of,
supervenient properties, emergent properties may also be differently
characterized. These alternative specifications of social properties
as emergent properties have similarly served as the basis for
insisting that holist explanations are indispensable. Currently, this
line of reasoning is often associated with the social scientific
school of Critical Realism, founded by Roy Bhaskar and further
developed by many others (see e.g., Archer 1995, 2000; Bhaskar 1979,
1982; Elder-Vass 2007, 2010, 2014). Main representatives of the
movement have offered a variety of specifications of the notion of
emergence. Among these, Dave Elder-Vass' account will be briefly
discussed.



According to Elder-Vass, social entities like firms and universities
are composed of individuals (and sometimes material things as well)
that stand in certain relations to one another (Elder-Vass 2007: 31).
In virtue of being composed, at a given moment in time, of
interrelated individuals, social entities have various causally
effective social properties. Most notably, they have emergent social
properties, of which there are two kinds. The first is constituted by
emergent social properties that are ascribed to social entities as
wholes. These are exemplified by a government's power to
introduce a new tax, or a quartet's ability to deliver a
harmonized performance. The second kind consists in emergent social
properties that are ascribed to individuals. These are illustrated by
a boss's power to hire or fire employees. Individuals have these
properties in virtue of being interrelated so as to form a social
entity, and that's why they constitute emergent *social*
properties (Elder-Vass 2010: 74). Individuals who form part of social
entities have non-emergent properties too. These are the causally
effective properties, like the ability to read or talk, which
individuals have independently of being, at a given moment in time,
part of a social entity. From these reflections, Elder-Vass contends,
it follows that holist explanations cannot be dispensed with. The
effects of emergent social properties should be explained. To this
end, it is necessary to offer holist explanations--that is,
explanations that state how a social property partially brought about
some effect. Individualist explanations are not up to this task
inasmuch as they are confined to describing how individuals, in virtue
of their non-emergent properties, partially brought about some effect.
Simply pointing to the properties that individuals have independently
of being, at a given moment in time, part of social entities, does not
add up to an explanation of the effects of emergent social properties
(see 2010: 66).



Contemporary moderate methodological holists largely agree that social
phenomena are non-causally determined by individuals and their
properties, and occasionally by material artifacts too. As illustrated
in the foregoing, some defend the claim that thus conceived, social
phenomena are causally effective, while such defenses often depend
heavily on the particular notion of causation espoused. Many moderate
methodological holists, however, see no need for arguments in support
of social phenomena being causally effective. They simply assume this
to be the case while pursuing alternative strategies in the attempt to
establish that holist explanations are indispensable.


### 2.2 The Argument from the Impossibility of Translation



The argument from the impossibility of translation takes it that the
indispensability of holist explanations is a matter of these
explanations being untranslatable into individualist explanations. The
argument begins by observing that holist explanations contain social
descriptions or concepts, and goes on to note that the meaning of
social descriptions cannot be captured by specifications that contain
descriptions of individuals alone. Or, put otherwise, social concepts
are not reductively definable solely in terms of individualist
concepts. As a result, it is impossible to translate holist
explanations into individualist ones: holist explanations cannot be
replaced by individualist explanations through translation. Finally,
the argument concludes that since the events accounted for by holist
explanations should not go unexplained holist explanations are
indispensable.



The argument from the impossibility of translation is famously
presented by Maurice Mandelbaum in a paper from 1955 (Mandelbaum
1955). Here Mandelbaum defines social concepts as concepts that refer
to forms of organization within a society. He remarks that concepts of
this sort "cannot be translated into psychological [i.e.,
individualist] concepts *without remainder*" (1955:
310--italics in the original). In order to drive this point home,
Mandelbaum considers the social concept of a bank teller. In order to
specify what a bank teller is, it is necessary to invoke the social
concept of a bank. The definition of a "bank", in turn,
must contain social concepts such as "legal tender" and
"contract". And these social concepts, too, can only be
defined in ways that involve yet other social concepts, such that the
definition of a social concept inevitably contains other social
concepts. Given that the distinctive feature of holist explanations is
their very containment of social concepts, these explanations can thus
not be translated into, and as such replaced by, individualist
explanations.



Mandelbaum's argument, including his example of the bank teller,
is widely cited in subsequent contributions to the debate between
moderate methodological holists and individualists (see e.g., Bhargava
1992; Danto 1973 [1962]; Epstein 2015; Gellner 1973 [1956]; Goldstein
1973b [1958]; James 1984; Kincaid 1986, 1997; Zahle 2003). However,
few moderate methodological holists have followed Mandelbaum in
holding that holist explanations are indispensable if they indeed
cannot be translated into individualist explanations.


### 2.3 The Argument from the Impossibility of Intertheoretic Reduction



The argument from the impossibility of intertheoretic reduction
presumes that holist explanations cannot be dispensed with if holist
theories are irreducible to individualist ones. The argument rests on
the view that holist explanations draw on social theories, whereas
individualist explanations involve individualist theories. From within
this context, it is argued that social theories are oftentimes
irreducible to, and hence irreplaceable by, individualist theories.
Accordingly, when holist explanations make use of irreducible social
theories, they cannot be substituted by individualist explanations
that appeal to individualist theories. Since the events that are
explained by appeal to irreducible social theories should not go
unexplained, holist explanations are therefore indispensable.



Typically, discussions of the argument rely on some version of the
Nagelian model of intertheoretic reduction. The model conceives of
theories as statements issued mainly in the form of laws. Adapted to
the present focus, it requires that two conditions be fulfilled in
order to reduce a social theory to an individualist one. The first
requirement is the condition of connectability, which must be met
because it is assumed that holist theories are distinguished by their
use of social predicates or descriptions, whereas individualist
theories are characterized by containing individualist predicates or
descriptions only. Following one common interpretation, the condition
states that the social predicates in the social theory to-be-reduced
must be linked, on a one-to-one basis, to individualist descriptions
in the reducing individualist theory. The resulting bridge laws, as
they are called, express that the linked descriptions are
co-extensive, that is, that they have the same reference, in a
law-like manner. (Note that this is a weaker condition than the demand
considered in
 2.2,
 requiring that the meaning of social terms must be captured by
specifications that contain descriptions of individuals only.) The
condition of connectability implies that if, say, the social term
"church" occurs in the social theory to-be-reduced, then
it must be demonstrated that this term is co-extensive, in a law-like
manner, with a single individualist description of individuals and
their properties as realizing a church. Once this condition has been
met, the second requirement, the condition of derivability, should be
fulfilled. It states that the social theory to-be-reduced must be
deduced from, and in that sense explained by, the reducing
individualist theory, plus the bridge laws.



Moderate methodological holists have primarily focused on
demonstrating that social theories cannot be reduced to individualist
theories because of difficulties that relate to meeting the
requirement of connectability. The most prominent argument to this
effect is the argument from multiple realization (other arguments
include, e.g., Kincaid 1996, Wahlberg 2019). The argument from
multiple realization originates from within philosophy of mind, from
whence it was developed into a generalizable argument against
intertheoretic reduction (see Putnam 1967 and Fodor 1974). In the
1980s, it began to appear as an argument against the possibility of
reducing social to individualist theories (see e.g., Kincaid 1986,
1996, 1997; Little 1991; Rios 2005; Sawyer 2002, 2005, Wright et al.
1992; Tollefsen 2002, 2015).



The argument begins by noting that social properties supervene on, or
are realized by, individualist properties. It is then pointed out that
this relationship between social and individualist properties is
compatible with social properties being realizable not only by a
single compound of individualist properties, but by different--in
fact indefinitely many--compounds of individualist properties. An
empirical claim is made next, asserting that many social properties
are indeed multiply realizable. This point is typically supported by
way of example. For instance, Kincaid lists several social predicates
such as "revolution", "bureaucracy", and
"peer group", and remarks that "any number of
different relations between individuals, individual psychological
states, beliefs, etc. could realize the referent of these terms"
(Kincaid 1986: 497). In a similar vein, Keith Sawyer states that
"'being a church' could be realized in disjunctive
[and hence multiple] ways in different cultures and social
groups" (Sawyer 2002: 550). Finally, it is observed that the
condition of connectability cannot be met whenever social theories
contain social predicates that refer to social properties that have
multiple and highly different, or indefinitely many, realizations. In
these cases, the social predicates cannot be linked via bridge laws to
single individualist descriptions. Instead, they will have to be
linked to a disjunction of individualist descriptions. To see this,
return to the example of the social property of being a church.
Insofar as a church is multiply realizable, the term
"church" will have to be linked up with a disjunction of
individualist descriptions, each characterizing a possible compound of
individualist properties that may realize a church. The upshot is that
social theories that refer to multiply realizable social properties
cannot be reduced to individualist theories. Thus, holist explanations
that appeal to these theories cannot be substituted by individualist
explanations.



Within recent discussions in the philosophy of science, the Nagelian
model of intertheoretic reduction has been criticized on a number of
grounds that likewise challenge its suitability as a model of
reduction in the context of the dispensability debate. Insofar as the
model is deemed inadequate, arguments in favor of the indispensability
of holist explanations that rest on this model lose their
significance.


### 2.4 The Argument from Explanatory Regress



The argument from explanatory regress focuses on the tenability of a
standard reason for holding that holist explanations should be
dispensed with. The standard reason in question is the following.
Given that holist explanations focus on larger units in the form of
social entities and processes, they are less preferable than
individualist explanations that zero in on the components of these
larger units, viz. individuals, their actions, etc. The argument from
explanatory regress states that this claim may likewise be used to
justify the contention that individualist explanations are less
preferable than explanations that focus on the biological components
of individuals. The claim may be further used to motivate the
assertion that these explanations, too, should be dismissed in favor
of explanations that concentrate on the chemical components of
individuals' biological units, and so on. To avoid this
undesirable consequence, the argument continues, the standard reason
for holding that holist explanations are always less preferable than
individualist ones should be dismissed. Accordingly, since explanatory
practices should not be changed unless there are good reasons to do
so, the existing practice of offering holist explanations should not
be discontinued. From the perspective of carrying on existing
explanatory practices, holist explanations are indispensable.



Considerations of this sort have been presented by a number of
theorists (see e.g., Hodgson 2007; Jackson and Pettit 1992a; Jones
1996; Tannsjo 1990). It should be noted that the regress argument
makes a purely negative point in that it offers no guidance as to
when--and why--holist explanations are indispensable in the
social sciences as they are currently practiced. In this respect, the
argument differs from the others considered in this section.


### 2.5 The Argument from Differing Explanatory Interests



The argument from differing explanatory interests asserts that holist
explanations are indispensable insofar as they are capable of
satisfying explanatory interests that are distinct from the interests
that individualist explanations are able to satisfy. The argument has
the following basic structure. First, it is made clear that a certain
notion of explanation is adopted. By appeal to this notion, it is then
argued that some holist explanations may serve explanatory interests
that cannot be satisfied by individualist explanations. It is
concluded that since the social sciences should satisfy these
explanatory interests, holist explanations are indispensable.



The argument has mainly been advanced since the early 1980s. One
common version of it relies on the erothetic model of explanation,
according to which an explanation is an answer to a why-question. It
has been presented by Alan Garfinkel, and subsequently by other
theorists as well (see e.g., Garfinkel 1981; Haslanger 2016, 2018;
Kincaid 1996, 1997; Risjord 2000; Weber and Van Bouwel 2002). The
principal point made is that some why-questions can only be adequately
answered by offering holist explanations. Consequently, since an
interest in answers to these why-questions should be met, holist
explanations are indispensable. Another well-known version of the
argument from differing explanatory interests relies on the causal
information view of explanation. It states that an explanation
provides information about the causal process leading to the event in
need of explanation. The key idea is that some information can only be
provided via holist explanations. Since an interest in this
information should be satisfied, holist explanations are thus
indispensable. This version of the argument has been presented by
Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (see Jackson and Pettit 1992a, 1992b;
for a comparison of the erothetic and the causal information view of
explanation, see Marchionni 2007). Their influential account will be
examined in more detail.



Equipped with the causal information view of explanation, Jackson and
Pettit consider the explaining of particular events (Jackson and
Pettit 1992a). A holist explanation provides information about the
manner in which the instantiation of a social property, *S*,
resulted in a certain event. Now, due to social properties being
supervenient on individualist ones, it is always possible to offer a
corresponding individualist explanation of the same event: the
individualist explanation offers information as to how the individuals
who realized *S* produced the event in question. For example,
assume that the particular event in need of explanation is a rise in
crime. Here, the holist explanation might be that the rise in crime
was the result of a rise in unemployment, whereas the individualist
explanation might state that the crime rate went up because individual
*a*, *b*, *c,* etc. lost their jobs, and felt
frustrated about having little money and no job opportunities.



The key claim made by Jackson and Pettit is that these two
explanations provide different information. The holist explanation
conveys that given the rise in unemployment, an increase in crime was
almost bound to occur. The reason is that



> 
> 
> had the motivations and opportunities of those particular individuals
> not changed, the motivations of others would have done so. (1992a:
> 11)
> 
> 
> 



Thus the holist explanation provides modally comparative information,
that is, information that brings out that what happened in the actual
world would also have taken place in a variety of possible worlds. By
contrast, the individualist explanation confines itself to pointing
out that these particular individuals, with their changed job
situations and altered motivations, were responsible for the rise in
crime. As such, it offers modally contrastive information, that is,
information that sets the actual world apart from other possible
worlds. Because of this divergence in the information provided,
Jackson and Pettit conclude that holist explanations are
indispensable. Unlike individualist explanations, holist explanations
may satisfy an explanatory interest in modally comparative
information, and an interest in this sort of information should be
met.



Jackson and Pettit's version of the argument from differing
explanatory interests has been criticized for not taking into account
that pragmatic considerations may determine whether the information
provided by a holist explanation is considered to be of more--or
less--interest than that offered by an individualist explanation
(see Weber and Van Bouwel 2002). The idea that pragmatic
considerations have a role to play is given center stage in the
argument from pragmatic concerns.


### 2.6 The Argument from Pragmatic Concerns



The argument from pragmatic concerns states that whether holist
explanations are indispensable is a matter of whether they are
pragmatically preferable to individualist explanations. The argument
rests on the assumption that whenever a holist explanation of an event
is possible, an individualist explanation of that same event is
likewise feasible. It is claimed that the choice between these two
explanations should be made by appeal to pragmatic considerations. It
is maintained, moreover, that it is sometimes preferable from a
pragmatic perspective to offer a holist, rather than an individualist
explanation. On this basis, it is concluded that holist explanations
are indispensable.



An argument along these lines has been offered by Jones (1996). He
notes that it is sometimes less costly to establish a holist rather
than an individualist explanation of some event (1996: 126). What he
likely has in mind is that gathering evidence about individuals, their
doings, intentions, etc. with the aim of offering an individualist
explanation may take more time, and hence come with a higher monetary
cost, than producing the evidence needed to advance a holist
explanation. Jones additionally asserts that a holist explanation is
sometimes easier to teach: because holist explanations tend to be
simpler in that they do not include an abundance of detail about
individuals, their doings, beliefs, etc. (1996), they may be easier
for individuals to grasp. In these sorts of situations, Jones contends
that holist explanations are preferable to individualist ones: in view
of pragmatic concerns like those outlined above, holist explanations
are indispensable.


## 3. The Microfoundations Debate



The microfoundations debate gained prominence around the beginning of
the 1980s when a number of philosophers and social scientists began to
defend the view that purely holist explanations, as they may be
termed, should be supplemented by an account of the underlying
individual-level mechanisms. Jon Elster and Daniel Little, among
others, argued in favor of this view in the context of Marxist social
theorizing (Elster 1983, 1985, 1989; Little 1986, 1991, 1998). Raymond
Boudon was also an early and important proponent (Boudon 1976, 1979).
Their contention that social theorists must pay attention to
individual-level microfoundations was soon met by opposition from
methodological holists, and a debate developed. Within current
philosophical discussions, the advocacy of the methodological
individualist stance is often associated with the approach of
analytical sociology or with key representatives thereof
(Hedstrom 2005; Hedstrom and Swedberg 1996; Demeulenaere
2011). Yet the view is also defended by others, both from within and
outside sociology. Arguments in support of the opposing holist stance
are not tied to any specific approach within the social sciences or
philosophy.



There are two basic positions within the microfoundations debate:



> 
> 
> *Methodological holism*: Purely holist explanations may
> sometimes stand on their own; they need not always be supplemented by
> accounts of the underlying individual-level microfoundations.
> 
> 
> 
> *Methodological individualism*: Purely holist explanations may
> never stand on their own; they should always be supplemented by
> accounts of the underlying individual-level microfoundations.
> 
> 
> 



The debate may be further characterized by considering its key
notions, possible qualifications of the individualist stance, and the
standard motivation behind the demand for microfoundations.



To begin, purely holist explanations are ones in which both the
explanans and the explanandum are expressed in terms of social
phenomena. They are exemplified by claims such as "the
protestant ethic caused the rise of capitalism in Western
Europe", or "the country's high economic growth was
partly due to its stable political environment". Drawing on the
discussion of holist explanations in connection with the
dispensability debate, the explanans and explanandum may be said to be
in terms of social phenomena when they contain social terms,
descriptions, or predicates set apart by their reference to, and focus
on, social phenomena. In turn, social phenomena may then be specified
as social entities, social processes and social properties as
exemplified by universities, revolutions, the literacy rate, and so
on. Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between different types of
purely holist explanation. For instance, purely holist explanations
may be classified according to whether they are of the functional,
intentional, or straightforward causal type, as introduced above. Or,
purely holist explanations may be individuated according to their
focus on, say, organizations, the statistical properties of groups,
etc.



Turn now to the accounts of the individual-level microfoundations.
These are specifications of the underlying individual-level mechanisms
understood as causal chains of events, that occur at the level of
individuals, and that link some cause in the form of a social
phenomenon to its effect in the form of another social phenomenon.
Very often, accounts of this sort are taken to consist of three parts.
Part I lays out how a social phenomenon resulted in individuals
forming various beliefs and desires, and having certain opportunities.
Part II states how these beliefs, desires, and opportunities gave rise
to individuals acting and interacting in a certain manner. Part III
outlines how these actions and interactions, intentionally or
unintentionally, brought about a certain social phenomenon. As an
illustration of an account along these lines, consider the example of
the purely holist explanation that "the protestant ethic caused
the rise of capitalism in the West". A very rough three-part
account of the underlying individual-level mechanisms might go as
follows. The protestant ethic compelled individuals to adopt certain
values. These, in turn, induced them to engage in certain new forms of
economic behavior. Those, finally, caused the rise of capitalism in
the West. Frequently, Coleman's well-known boat model is used to
depict how purely holist explanations must include such three-part
accounts of the underlying individual-level mechanisms (Coleman 1986,
1990). The model uses a boat form to illustrate the move from one
social phenomenon down to individual-level events and up again to
another social phenomenon.



As may already be clear, the accounts of the underlying mechanisms are
individual-level accounts in the sense that they invariably contain
descriptions of what happens to, and what is made to happen by,
individuals. It is standard to invoke descriptions of individuals by
reference to their roles and other properties they possess as a result
of being part of social organizations. In this sense, a permissive
notion as to what counts as individual-level descriptions is endorsed.
The accounts of individuals may draw on different theories of the
actor. In earlier phases of the debate, there was a clear tendency to
base the accounts on rational-choice models. Today, other models are
used as well.



The claim that purely holist explanations are in need of
microfoundations may be qualified in various ways. Sometimes, it is
made clear that purely holist explanations should always be
accompanied by accounts of the underlying individual-level mechanisms.
Very often, this position is motivated by appeal to the
"mechanism model" of explanation. It states that to
explain is to show how one phenomenon, via underlying mechanisms,
brought about another phenomenon; to borrow Elster's words, to
explain is "to provide a mechanism, to open up the black box and
show the nuts and bolts, the cogs and wheels" (Elster 1985: 5).
Accordingly, purely holist explanations do not actually constitute
explanations unless they are supplemented by accounts of the
underlying individual-level mechanisms. In other instances, it is only
held that purely holist explanations must be supplemented by accounts
of the underlying individual-level mechanisms in order to qualify as
*satisfying* or *complete* explanations. This view is
commonly motivated by a weaker version of the mechanism model of
explanation, according to which a satisfactory or complete
explanation, rather than an explanation as such, must describe how one
phenomenon, via underlying mechanisms, brought about another.



However qualified, the assertion that purely holist explanations are
always in need of microfoundations is a weaker form of methodological
individualism than the one defended within the indispensability
dispute. Methodological individualists who are engaged in the
microfoundations debate do not insist that holist explanations should
be dispensed with. The target is only purely holist explanations,
i.e., ones in which both the explanans and the explanandum are
expressed in terms of social phenomena, and it is simply held that
these explanations are in need of supplementation by accounts of
individual-level mechanisms. Also, there is no objection to the use of
holist explanations in which the explanans is stated in terms of
social phenomena and the explanandum is described in terms of
individuals, their actions, etc. In fact, explanations along these
lines are offered as part of the accounts of the individual-level
mechanisms when it is specified how a social phenomenon resulted in
individuals forming various beliefs and desires, and having certain
opportunities. Even though the demand for microfoundations is a weaker
form of methodological individualism, the position has nonetheless met
with opposition. As noted, methodological holists who are engaged in
the microfoundations debate insist that purely holist explanations may
sometimes stand on their own in that they need not be supplemented by
accounts of the individual-level mechanisms; purely holist
explanations qualify as explanations, or as satisfying or complete
explanations.


## 4. Why Purely Holist Explanations Can Sometimes Stand on Their Own



Methodological holists have offered a number of arguments in support
of the claim that purely holist explanations can sometimes stand on
their own. In the following, some of their main arguments are
examined.


### 4.1 The Argument from Underlying Social-Level Mechanisms



The argument from underlying social-level mechanisms purports to
establish that purely holist explanations may sometimes be accompanied
by underlying social-level rather than individual-level mechanisms
(see e.g., Kaidesoja 2013; Kincaid 1997: 111; Mayntz 2004; Vromen
2010; Wan 2012; Ylikoski 2012).



The argument begins by noting that social phenomena are at a higher
level of organization than individuals. Note that this is why accounts
of individual-level mechanisms qualify as specifications of the
*underlying* mechanisms. What is sometimes overlooked, the
argument continues, is that social phenomena may themselves be at
higher or lower levels of organization. For instance, a nation or a
state is typically at a higher level of organization than a small firm
or a school. This observation paves the way for the contention that a
purely holist explanation should sometimes be accompanied by an
account of the underlying mechanisms involving lower-level social
phenomena. These explanations are still holist explanations.
Accordingly, it is concluded, holist explanations may sometimes stand
on their own in that they do not need *individual-level*
microfoundations.



The argument from underlying social-level mechanisms makes it plain
that the adoption of the mechanism model of explanation does not lend
support to the view that purely holist explanations need always be
accompanied by accounts of individual-level microfoundations. The
model states that an explanation, or a satisfactory or complete
explanation, describes how one phenomenon, via underlying mechanisms,
brought about another phenomenon, and this is perfectly compatible
with accounts of the underlying mechanisms consisting in descriptions
of mechanisms at the level of other (though lower-level) social
phenomena. Thus the argument from underlying social-level mechanisms
does not challenge the mechanism model of explanation. Other arguments
offered by methodological holists, however, aim to do exactly
this.


### 4.2 The Argument from Mechanism Regress



The argument from mechanism regress is directed at the mechanism model
of explanation. The endorsement of this model is taken to support the
insistence that purely holist explanations must always be accompanied
by accounts of the underlying individual-level mechanisms (see e.g.,
Van Bouwel 2006; Norkus 2005; Kincaid 1997: 26; Opp 2005).



The starting point of the argument involves the observation that when
two social phenomena are linked by a causal chain of events at the
level of individuals, then these events are themselves connected by
underlying mechanisms involving events that are, in turn, linked by
underlying mechanisms, and so on. In this fashion, it is mechanisms
all the way down until some physical bottom-level mechanisms are
probably reached. According to the argument from mechanism regress,
this point brings into view a problem faced by the mechanism model of
explanation. The model requires that the underlying mechanisms that
causally link two phenomena must be specified. Consequently, due to
social phenomena being connected by underlying mechanisms that extend
all the way down to some bottom physical level, the model seems to
require that all such mechanisms be specified each time a purely
holist explanation is offered. But, of course, this is an absurd
requirement, and so the mechanism view of explanation should be
rejected. Without it, there is no longer any basis for holding that
purely holist explanations can never stand on their own.


### 4.3 The Argument from Explanatory Practices



The argument from explanatory practices likewise targets the mechanism
view of explanation that is taken to underwrite the claim that purely
holist explanations must be complemented by accounts of the underlying
individual-level mechanisms. The argument has been presented by
Kincaid, who observes that both in everyday and scientific contexts,
we offer explanations that lack specifications of the underlying
mechanisms while still regarding these explanations as being perfectly
acceptable (Kincaid 1997: 28). For instance, that a flying ball hit
the window is typically regarded as a successful explanation as to why
the window broke, even though no account of the underlying mechanisms
is offered. This shows that our standard explanatory practices
conflict with the mechanism model of explanation and, on this ground,
the model should be dismissed. If this is so, there is no longer any
reason for holding that purely holist explanations must always be
accompanied by accounts of the underlying individual-level
microfoundations.



The argument from explanatory practices and the earlier argument from
mechanism regress intend to reject the mechanism model of explanation,
so that it cannot serve as justification for the claim that purely
holist explanations can never stand on their own. This makes it
natural to wonder whether the demand for accounts of individual-level
microfoundations may be upheld without appeal to this model of
explanation. This issue has also been addressed in the debate.


### 4.4 The Argument from Non-Mechanistic Explanatory Considerations



The argument from non-mechanistic explanation purports to show that if
non-mechanistic considerations as to what constitutes an explanation
(or at least a satisfactory or complete explanation) are adopted, then
purely holist explanations may sometimes stand on their own.



One version of the argument takes as its starting point the erothetic
model of explanation, according to which explanations are, roughly
speaking, answers to why-questions. Equipped with this model of
explanation, Jeroen Van Bouwel considers the contrastive question as
to why the French Revolution broke out in 1789, and not in 1750 (Van
Bouwel 2006). Following Theda Skocpol's work, he suggests that
certain structural conditions made the revolution possible in 1789,
and that these conditions were not present in 1750. In 1789, but not
in 1750, the French state was economically weak because of the
substantial resources that had gone into the American War of
Independence, and because of the growing economic competition with
England. This contrastive explanation is expressed in purely holist
terms. Moreover, Van Bouwel contends that it constitutes a perfectly
satisfactory--and complete--answer to the contrastive
question. Adding an account of how the state's weakness led
various individuals to adopt certain beliefs and desires, and to act
in ways that ultimately led to the French Revolution, would not render
the explanation any better. Elaborating on this point, Van Bouwel
concludes that in response to contrastive questions, purely holist
explanations do not invariably need to be complemented by accounts of
the underlying individual-level mechanisms.



Another version of the argument has been offered by Julian Reiss, who
draws attention to the fact that two types of social phenomena may be
causally linked by many different types of underlying individual-level
mechanisms (Reiss 2013: 111). As an illustration of this point, he
notes that an increase in the supply of currency tends to make prices
go up, and that this may happen via multiple types of underlying
individual-level mechanisms. Consequently, when faced with the task of
explaining a particular case of prices having gone up, there are two
options. One option is to appeal to the tendency of an increase in the
money supply to make the prices go up; the other is to refer to this
tendency while supplementing this with an account of the underlying
individual-level mechanisms. The point is that we may sometimes prefer
explanations that are applicable to a large number of individual
cases, in which case we should opt for the purely holist explanation.
If an account of the underlying individual-level mechanisms is
included, the explanation will not hold for all the cases in which the
mechanisms are of a different type (2013: 114). Therefore, Reiss
argues, it is not correct that purely holist explanations should
always be accompanied by accounts of the individual-level
microfoundations; sometimes purely holist explanations may stand on
their own.