## 1. For Which Entities Does the Question of Moral Status Arise?



A variety of applied ethics debates regarding how certain beings
- human beings, non-human animals, and even ecosystems -
should be treated hinge on theoretical questions about their moral
status and the grounds of that moral status. It is these theoretical
questions that are the focus of this entry, but a quick survey of the
applied ethics debates helpfully allows us to identify which entities
have been thought to have moral status.



It is usually taken for granted that all adult cognitively unimpaired
human beings have FMS. Of course, historically the moral status of
people falling into a group perceived as "other," such as
foreigners, racial minorities, women, the physically disabled, etc.
has been routinely denied. Either they were not seen as having any
moral status, or if they were granted some status, it was not FMS.
However, accounting for their status does not pose much of a
theoretical challenge (see section 5.1) and nowadays their status is
rarely explicitly and directly denied on principled moral grounds.



By contrast, constructing plausible theories that account for the
moral status of other human beings - not only the degree of
their status, but in some cases also whether they have it at all
- is more challenging (see section 5). Debates about disability
rights and the permissibility of eugenics rest in part on theoretical
disagreements about the moral status of cognitively impaired humans.
These issues include controversies regarding the treatment of
cognitively disabled infants, such as the past U.S. practice of
allowing infants with Down syndrome to die. Debates concerning
abortion, stem cell research (see the entry on the
 ethics of stem cell research),
 and the question of what to do with unused frozen embryos from in
vitro fertilization also rest on the theoretical question of the moral
status of extremely underdeveloped human beings at various stages of
development: zygote, embryo, and fetus (see section 5.2). The moral
status of both underdeveloped and cognitively impaired human beings is
often taken to be at issue when it comes to the use of
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and amniocentesis. In addition,
medical advances that prolong life, as well as debates about
euthanasia, have led people to question the moral status of humans
incapable of consciousness, such as those in a persistent vegetative
state and anencephalic babies (born without the higher brain).



Humans are not the only beings about whom we might ask if they have
moral status, and if so, to what degree. The
 moral status of animals
 is also of concern. Debates regarding the treatment of livestock
(e.g., raising calves for veal, burning off the beaks of chickens,
etc.), management of wild animals (e.g., killing wolves to protect
livestock, killing deer in response to their overpopulation, etc.),
and the creation and design of zoos rest, in part, on the moral status
of domesticated and wild animals. In some cases the ethical question
of an animal's treatment arises because of the discovery of
their cognitive sophistication (e.g., dolphins, elephants, and great
apes), which is taken to have a bearing on the theoretical issue of
their moral status.



We have already noted that, while there are disagreements from one
culture to another, and even within a single culture, both
historically and at any given time, there is also significant
agreement, at least among non-philosophers, that all cognitively
unimpaired human adults have the highest degree of moral status. But,
in addition, non-philosophers in principle, if not always in practice,
accept the same view regarding all cognitively unimpaired human
infants as well as human infants and adults with mild to severe
cognitive impairments (as we use the term, "severe cognitive
impairment" excludes those incapable of consciousness). That is,
they hold that infants and the cognitively impaired, whether their
impairment is intellectual or emotional, have not merely higher moral
status than most animals, but also have FMS. We will call this the
commonsense view. By contrast, there is no such consensus about the
moral status of human fetuses, humans incapable of consciousness, and
even sophisticated animals like great apes.



Nonetheless, providing an adequate theory to account for the FMS of
unimpaired infants and cognitively impaired human beings (whether
infants or adults) without attributing the same status to most animals
has proven very difficult. In fact, our survey in section 5 suggests
that this challenge has not been fully met by any of the existing
accounts of the grounds of moral status. Some philosophers have, as a
result, questioned or even abandoned this seemingly commonsense view,
including the aspect that holds that all adult cognitively
*un*impaired human beings have FMS (see the end of section
4).



It is important to note that questions of moral status - having
it at all as well as the degree to which it is had - arise not
only for humans and non-human animals, but also for any living
being/entity (such as a tree), as well as for entire species,
ecosystems, and non-living entities, such as mountains or a natural
landscape (see the entry on
 environmental ethics).



In section 5 we will discuss how a range of humans (developed, and in
various stages of underdevelopment, unimpaired and impaired),
non-human animals, species, and ecosystems fare with respect to
various accounts of the grounds of moral status.


## 2. What Is Full Moral Status (FMS)?



In this section, we will discuss what having FMS amounts to - a
notion key to many non-utilitarian accounts of moral status. With
respect to this highest degree of moral status, the literature is the
most developed and detailed. Those with FMS are often called
"moral persons." Standardly, FMS is understood to involve
(i) a very stringent moral presumption against interfering with the
being in various ways - destroying the being, experimenting upon
it, directly causing its suffering, etc. While the strong presumption
against interfering is the main aspect of FMS, some philosophers
include as part of FMS (ii) a strong, but not necessarily stringent,
reason to aid and (iii) a strong reason to treat fairly. Since there
is no higher moral status, all beings with FMS are owed the same
protections and entitlements. That is, all beings with FMS have equal
moral status (see the entry on
 egalitarianism).



Note that while the label "FMS" comes from views that
allow degrees of moral status, some non-utilitarian philosophers (Kant
[GMM], Regan 2004) see the same protections as comprising the one and
only possible moral status.


### 2.1 Stringent Presumption against Interference



All who employ the concept of FMS agree that, under most
circumstances, we are morally prohibited from interfering in various
ways with a being with FMS even for the sake of another valued
creature and its interests, or for the sake of any other value, such
as art, justice, or world peace. For instance, we are prohibited from
killing a being with FMS for the sake of saving one or several other
such beings. Some philosophers discuss this stringent presumption
using the terminology of duties and
 rights
 and focus mainly on the right not to be killed (e.g., Feinberg 1980,
pp. 98-104).



Note that FMS is not typically considered to preclude paternalistic
interference. A seven-year-old human being is typically granted FMS
(as we will see below) but it is nevertheless permissible to treat her
paternalistically in some respects (see the entry on
 paternalism).



The stringent moral presumption against interfering with a being with
FMS, as it is typically understood, has at least these features:


1. It is an extremely strong moral reason against interfering,
regardless of whether this interference results in harm. This
extremely strong reason can be overridden only in a narrow set of
special circumstances and might altogether silence many types of
conflicting reasons. For example, while pleasure is a legitimate
reason for action in numerous circumstances (e.g., when choosing a
leisure activity), the fact that someone might receive pleasure from
killing a being with FMS is altogether removed from consideration as a
reason for this action.
2. Despite its strength, the presumption not to interfere with beings
with FMS may be overridden, perhaps, for example, when the lives of a
very large number of others are at stake. But, crucially, even when
the presumption is legitimately overridden in such special
circumstances a moral residue remains, so that, for example, there is
still reason to strongly regret the circumstances that called for such
action.
3. The reason not to interfere with beings with FMS is stronger than
the reason not to similarly interfere with beings that have some, but
not full, moral status. For example, the reason not to kill a being
with FMS in medical experiments is much stronger than the reason (if
there is one) not to kill a similarly situated rabbit, which some
consider to have lesser moral status. (See section 3 below for further
discussion.)



As noted earlier, those with FMS have equal moral status. This entails
that when two beings both have FMS, the reason not to interfere with
them is equally strong, all relevant factors held equal, and so one
equally wrongs them when acting against these reasons, all relevant
factors held equal. This idea has been dubbed the "equal
wrongness thesis" and it is open to various interpretations.
McMahan (2002, p. 235) focuses on the equal wrongness of killing
(rather than the more general idea of the equal wrongness of acting
against all the stringent protections that two beings with FMS merit).
According to McMahan, a variety of factors are thought not to affect
the wrongness of killing of beings with FMS (and hence it does not
matter whether they are held equal), in cases when killing is wrong:
the being's age, level of intelligence, temperament, social
circumstances, etc. For example, for a young and an old person who
both have FMS, the reasons not to kill them are claimed to be equally
strong despite the fact that the young person stands to lose much more
in dying than the old. This is consistent with holding (1) that other
factors, unrelated to the level of harm to the being, such as the mode
of agency, defeaters, the number of people affected, and special
relationships, do make a difference to the degree of wrongness of
killing; and (2) that when killing is not wrong, as well as in the
context of saving, factors related to harm (e.g., age, etc.) do make a
difference to what's best to do (McMahan 2002, pp. 236-7).
McMahan (2008) acknowledges that there are many challenges to the
equal wrongness thesis. While the equal moral status of beings with
FMS entails the equal wrongness of killing such beings when all
relevant factors are held equal, one can disagree about how best to
interpret it, i.e., which factors are or are not relevant to the
degree of wrongness of killing beings with FMS.


### 2.2 Strong Reason to Aid



While this is less commonly associated with FMS, some philosophers
believe that there is a strong reason to provide aid to beings with
FMS (e.g., Jaworska 2007 and Quinn 1984). This reason is not as strong
as the stringent presumption discussed above. For example, the set of
circumstances which can override the reason to aid a being with FMS is
much broader compared to the stringent presumption against killing.
Also, the reason not to aid might not silence many (or any) other
conflicting considerations. As for which reasons override or are on a
par with this strong reason to aid, there are many differing accounts
(e.g., Greenspan 2010 and the entry on
 moral reasoning,
 section 2.5).



The strength of this reason to aid can also be understood in
comparison with the reason to aid beings with lesser moral status,
since beings with FMS merit the strongest reason to aid (see McMahan
2002, pp. 223-224, for a contrary interpretation of ordinary
moral intuitions). Imagine a context in which one is saving
individuals from a certain level of harm, such as pain, discomfort, or
death. When faced with a choice of saving either a being with FMS or
one without FMS, barring further reasons that may complicate the moral
picture (e.g., indirect consequences of saving the being without FMS
for other beings with FMS), there is a stronger reason to pick the
being with FMS. Further, even in cases where aiding is not in fact
possible or the reason to aid is overridden, it is a graver moral
misfortune, *ceteris paribus*, to leave a being with FMS
unaided, as compared to a being without FMS. Of course, what aid is
appropriate for a being depends on the context and on the
being's stage of development. FMS is about the strength of the
reason to aid and not about what type of aid to give.



Note that even if FMS entails strong reasons to aid, the reverse is
not necessarily the case. Stronger reason to aid one being rather than
another does not necessarily entail that the aided being has a higher
moral status. See more general methodological cautions along these
lines in section 2.4.


### 2.3 Strong Reason to Treat Fairly



While this is even less commonly explicitly associated with FMS, some
views emphasize that comparable interests of beings with FMS matter
equally in moral decisions, giving rise to strong reasons to treat
such beings fairly (Broome 1990-1991 and Jaworska 2007). For
example, when distributing goods among such beings, in
circumstances when they can all benefit similarly, barring special
purposes, relationships, or independent claims on the goods, we have
strong reason to distribute the goods equally (or in another way
that's fair, depending on the account of fairness). In some
cases one will be distributing goods that meet needs and in other
cases the goods being distributed are not needed, but will
nevertheless be useful or appreciated. In either case, there is a
strong reason to distribute the goods fairly among beings with FMS.
This reason does not necessarily apply to beings that lack FMS; for
example, a farmer need not worry about being fair in distributing food
to his cows and chickens.


### 2.4 Distinguishing Reasons Constitutive of Moral Status from Other Reasons



It is helpful to bring out two points about FMS, the second of which
is not discussed in the literature, but both of which, once made
explicit, would likely be accepted by those who work on FMS.



First, the reasons mentioned in sections 2.1-2.3 ought to be
understood as independent of special relationships, contracts, and
joint commitments. They are impartial reasons, that is, every moral
agent (human, intelligent Martian, etc.) has reason to act or forbear
acting in the ways thus far discussed (McMahan 2005). So, for
instance, a parent has at least two reasons not to kill his own child:
a reason in virtue of the child's FMS, and a reason in virtue of
the parental relationship, which generates a special obligation for
this particular agent not to kill this particular child. In addition,
these reasons are independent of other facts about the action, for
example, the action's possible bad long-term effects. Instead,
they are reasons to treat the being this way for the being's own
sake.



Second, it is important, methodologically speaking, not to infer moral
status (full or otherwise) simply from the degree of wrongness or
badness of an act, from the existence of rights, or from the strength
of reasons in favor of the act (including omissions). For example, it
might be worse for a parent to kill his own child than a
stranger's child, but that does not mean that the children have
different moral status. The child has a right that her parent not kill
her, in virtue of the special relationships between parents and their
children, but this is in addition to, and separate from, the right not
to be killed that the child has in virtue of her moral status. Or, to
take another example, there may be a large difference in the strength
of reasons to save each of two beings from death, but this difference
may have little to do with the moral status of the beings. Both
McMahan (2002) and Singer (1993) hold, on quite different grounds,
that death is not very bad for most animals, while it is very bad for
ordinary adult human beings. Accordingly, on their views, the reason
to save an ordinary adult human being from death is much stronger than
the reason to save, say, a rabbit from death. But this is not itself
evidence of a higher moral status of the human being. The vast
difference in the benefits of aid in the two cases could, *on its
own*, lead to a difference in the strength of reasons, which would
be fully compatible with the claim that the human and the rabbit have
the same moral status. (Of course, one can hold, on other grounds,
that they in fact have different status, as McMahan himself does.)



Certain views might acknowledge that some humans lack FMS and yet
emphasize that we ought, nevertheless, to treat them as though they
have FMS due to the bad effects that would otherwise follow. One bad
effect would be the mistreatment of those who really do have FMS. For
example, someone might think that, for practical purposes, we need a
very straightforward, stable, and difficult to misinterpret criterion
of moral status (such as treating being human as a sufficient
condition for FMS). If we don't treat all human beings as if
they have FMS, unclarity and moral confusion would ensue. It would
open the floodgates for different people to set the threshold capacity
required for FMS differently, and thereby lead to mistaken
underinclusion and consequent mistreatment of vulnerable humans (such
as drug convicts) who do in fact have FMS. Kant's remarks about
the treatment of animals can be interpreted along these lines. He
argued that we have reasons to avoid cruelty to animals, and thus to
treat animals better than their (lack of) moral status implies, since
otherwise we might develop psychological propensities that could lead
us analogously to mistreat humans who have FMS (Kant [LE], pp.
212-13). Similarly, one might think that if we do not treat
those humans without FMS as having FMS, we might develop psychological
propensities that could lead us to mistreat humans who have FMS.
Another bad consequence that can arise, at least were we to fail to
treat neonates as having FMS by permitting infanticide, is depriving
would-be adoptive parents of the opportunity to adopt (Warren 1996,
Postscript).



There are also more self-interested possible bad consequences to
consider. Failure to treat infants as having FMS might lead to a lack
of tenderness toward them, and thereby contribute to their turning
into people who will mistreat us when they are older (Feinberg 1980,
p. 198). Moreover, a rule of treating cognitively impaired human
beings as having FMS would ensure that we will be treated well should
we ever suffer from cognitive impairment (considered without
endorsement by McMahan 2002, pp. 227-8).



Regardless of the details, on all such proposals, the requirement of
treating a being as if it had FMS, or some other degree of moral
status, to avoid bad consequences is not equivalent to that
being's having this moral status: while the reasons adduced
might indeed be good reasons to treat the being as if it had the
requisite moral status, these reasons are not for the sake of that
being, but rather for the sake of other beings.



Other types of reasons for treating beings as if they had a certain
degree of moral status have also been offered. Some virtue ethicists
claim that we ought to avoid harming animals because harming them is
incompatible with displaying the virtuous character traits we ought to
display (see the entry on the
 moral status of animals
 for details). Several contractualists (see section 6 below and the
entry on
 contractualism)
 have argued that one may reasonably opt out of any agreement that
does not afford sufficient moral status to one's children and
others one cares about, including those who are severely cognitively
impaired (Morris 2011, pp. 265-267 and Carruthers 2011, pp.
387-394). Critics and proponents disagree whether these
considerations can establish reasons (e.g., reasons not to interfere)
that are for these beings' sake; hence, it is unclear whether
they can establish the moral status of the beings in question.


## 3. Degrees of Moral Status



Those who accept that moral status comes in degrees have not developed
fine-grained accounts of what each degree of status would involve.
Their emphasis has been on the difference in status between creatures
or entities that have some moral status (dogs, rabbits, etc.), and
those who deserve the highest degree of moral status (FMS). However,
with the above account of FMS made explicit, one can delineate
different paradigms for capturing degrees of moral status, which we
will list here simply in the spirit of marking out possible positions,
and thus without addressing the pros, cons, and implications of each
position.



One way to capture degrees of moral status is to vary the strength of
the reasons outlined in section 2 (and hence also the degree of
wrongness involved in acting against these reasons - see
DeGrazia 2008). For example, while there is a very stringent moral
presumption against killing an unimpaired adult human being, there
might be only strong but non-stringent reasons not to kill a dog, and
very weak reasons not to kill a fish. The weaker the reason not to
kill is, the broader the set of circumstances are that can override
this reason. In addition, it will silence fewer, if any, conflicting
considerations. The other categories of reasons would be handled
similarly: when the benefit to be received, the cost of providing that
benefit, and other similar factors are on a par, there is a strong
reason to aid an unimpaired adult human being, but only some reason to
aid a dog, and very little reason to aid a fish, and so on.



Alternatively, one could treat FMS as involving a stringent reason not
to be killed of the type that, in cases of conflict, would override
what maximizes the overall good, whereas, for a being with lesser
moral status, what maximizes the overall good - with this
being's good included in the calculus - does settle how
this being should be treated (McMahan 2002, pp. 245-247).



Another way to capture degrees of moral status is to vary not the
strength of the reasons but which reasons apply. Instead of the three
categories of reasons discussed above, lesser moral status might
involve two kinds of reasons (a stringent moral presumption against
interference and a strong reason to aid, but no reason to treat
fairly) or only one (a stringent moral presumption against
interference, but no reason to aid or treat fairly). This, of course,
is compatible with other reasons, in a given context, to aid or treat
fairly that do not derive from the being's moral status (see
section 2.4).



Alternatively, lesser moral status might involve fewer presumptions
against different types of interference. For example, there might be
only a presumption against causing a chicken pain but not a
presumption against killing it.



Of course, one could combine these approaches. For example, to have
the highest degree of moral status is for there to be very strong
reasons of all three types, an intermediate level of moral status
(e.g., the status of a dog) might involve some reason not to kill the
being but no reason to aid it or treat it fairly, while the lowest
degree of moral status would involve a very weak reason of just one
type. Although having the lowest degree of moral status would not
afford much protection, it nevertheless is different from having no
moral status at all. A fingernail has no moral status and so no
reasons of any kind need be given for cutting it up and discarding it.
But sufficient justification must be provided for doing this to a
being with even very low moral status.


## 4. Scalar versus Threshold Conceptions of Moral Status



One could hold either a threshold or scalar conception of moral
status, although FMS is a threshold conception. Suppose, for example,
that the capacity to value (which we will use as shorthand for the
capacity to make an evaluative judgment) were a sufficient ground for
having a high degree of moral status. According to the threshold
conception, if the capacity to value grounds a high degree of moral
status, then any being that has this capacity, regardless of how often
or how well it can exhibit this capacity, has the same moral status as
any other being with this capacity. A being that could recognize only
one value among many, and could only value it on rare occasions, would
have the same moral status as a being that could recognize many
valuable things and value them on every relevant occasion. If the
capacity to value is not only sufficient but necessary for a high
degree of moral status, then all beings lacking this capacity would
not have this high degree of moral status. However, the threshold
conception would nevertheless leave it open whether having some other
feature, such as the mere capacity to have preferences, might be
grounds for a lesser degree of moral status. (Having preferences is
different from making an evaluative judgment; only the latter involves
thinking of something as good, worthy, and requiring defense [Watson
1975]. As Watson notes, the strength of one's preference
needn't at all reflect that one values it or the degree to which
one values it.)



The threshold conception is not tied to any particular account of the
grounds for moral status. Different grounds, discussed in section 5,
might involve membership in a group, the capacity for sentience, and
so on. To put the threshold conception more broadly, so as to cover
any ground for moral status, and any degree of moral status, whether
high or low, one could state it thus: for any X that is a sufficient
ground for having n-degree of moral status, this status is not altered
by factors such as how much of X a being has, how well it displays X,
or the number of other features sufficient for n or lower degrees of
moral status the being possesses. The threshold conception leaves it
open whether having some other feature (e.g., parts of X or something
lesser but akin to X) might be grounds for a lesser degree of moral
status and whether yet other features (e.g., more complex capacities)
might be grounds for higher degrees of moral status. FMS is a central
example of this approach: all beings that meet the threshold
qualifications for FMS have the same status and this status is
full.



In contrast, the scalar conception highlights the importance of, for
example, how often and how well one can exhibit or exercise a capacity
to value. Put alternatively, if the possession of a generic capacity
to value makes a difference to moral status, then the possession of
different specific levels of this capacity (e.g., being able to value
a greater number valuable things or to value them more fully) confers
differential status. As Arneson (1999) would put it, a higher degree
of the capacity entails a higher status. And so, two beings with the
same (generic) capacity might not have equal moral status; only two
beings with the same (specific) capacity level would have equal moral
status. Arneson also thinks that if two beings have the specific
capacity, but only one of them ever exercises it, then that being will
have a higher moral status.



Keep in mind that, as with the threshold conception, the scalar
conception of moral status is not tied to any particular account of
what grounds moral status - it applies to any X that is proposed
to ground moral status. Moreover, a scalar conception might not only
pay attention to (i) how much of X a being has or displays, as
described in the case above with the capacity to value. It also might
attend to (ii) how many morally relevant features a being has. One
version of (ii) focuses on features that on their own give rise to the
same degree of moral status (Arneson [1999] alludes to such a view).
Suppose, for example, that the capacity to value and being a member of
the human species each on their own grounded n-degree of moral status.
A scalar approach might hold that if a being has both these features,
it has a higher moral status than a being that has only one. Another
version of (ii) would allow for cases like this: suppose the capacity
for preferences grounds a certain degree of moral status, while the
capacity for consciousness grounds a lesser moral status. Yet, someone
of a scalar frame of mind might think that the two together give a
slightly higher degree of status than the capacity for preferences
alone.



Lastly, the scalar conception might consider that a being's
moral status might be greater, not because it has additional less
sophisticated morally relevant features, as in the previous example,
but (iii) because the being has additional more advanced morally
relevant features. (iii) works this way. Suppose the capacity to
employ means-ends reasoning combined with being a member of the human
species grounded n-degree status. The capacity to value is more
sophisticated than the capacity to employ means-ends reasoning. Then,
according to (iii), a human being with the capacity to value has an
even higher moral status.



While both threshold and scalar conceptions of moral status allow for
degrees of moral status, each faces its own set of difficulties. For
example, it is not enough for those who hold the threshold view to
stipulate that, for example, the capacity to do an activity well does
not affect one's status. Once the importance of some feature,
such as the capacity to value, is highlighted, it seems that not only
the possession of the capacity but also how well one can exercise it
is morally relevant to one's status. This is especially
compelling when we compare, for example, an ordinary human
adult's capacity to set many ends (i.e, to value and pursue many
objects and states of affairs) with the capacity of an impoverished
being who, in its lifetime, "can set just a few ends and make
just a few choices based on considering two or three simple
alternatives" (Arneson 1999, pp. 119-120). The problems is
essentially the same regardless of whether the capacity is actual,
potential, or incompletely realized (e.g., when we compare an
unimpaired baby's potential - ability to have an ability
- to set many ends with an impaired baby whose potential is far
more limited).



Analogous problems also arise for accounts on which the status
conferring feature is species membership or being in a special
relationship. Possession of the features that qualify one for species
membership may be incomplete and a matter of degree (consider Turner
Syndrome where one is missing or partially missing the X chromosome)
and relationships can be stronger or weaker. The strength of a
relationship might depend, for example, on how robustly one
instantiates the features defining the relationship (e.g., how
robustly one qualifies as a member of a community) or on how well one
actively relates (e.g., a child is a more active participant in a
relationship than a fetus).



Furthermore, on views that allow for multiple threshold qualifications
for the same degree of status (e.g., the capacity to value and being a
member of the human species), whether an individual meets only one or
both qualifications seems morally relevant to the degree of their
status. Also, some individuals possess features more advanced than the
threshold qualification. Threshold views need to provide an
explanation for why such differences do not matter.



Additionally, the threshold conception allows for the possibility of
discontinuities in degrees of moral status that might seem arbitrary.
The difference, for example, between a being with a capacity, but who
can only exercise it very poorly (e.g., a being that can recognize
only one value among many and can only recognize this value on very
rare occasions), and a being without this capacity (who cannot value
but can only form preferences) might not seem to be very great. And
yet, if the capacity to value grounds FMS, then the former being will
have FMS while the latter will have considerably lesser or perhaps no
moral status. The advocate of the threshold view could respond that if
this capacity is important, then a being with a capacity to do it
poorly has achieved something important compared to a being without
this capacity. In addition, if there are multiple grounds for lesser
degrees of moral status (e.g., the capacity to feel pain, the capacity
to have preferences, the capacity to feel emotions, etc.), which
threshold views could allow, then this might remove any large gap in
status between beings with that capacity and those who lack it but who
have other capacities conferring only somewhat lesser status. See
McMahan (2008) for related discussion.



Scalar conceptions, on the other hand, can easily account for
continuous lesser degrees of moral status, but may defy commonsense
intuitions. For example, if intelligence grounded FMS, then the scalar
conception would claim that those who are more intelligent have a
stronger right not to be killed than those who are not quite as
intelligent. But this is highly at odds with the commonsense intuition
that all such beings have an equally strong right not to be killed
(see Wikler 2009 for a discussion of whether degrees of intelligence
are relevant to civil rights). Distinguishing and elevating the moral
status of cognitively unimpaired adult humans compared to other
animals thus comes at the price of denying that all cognitively
unimpaired adult humans have equal moral status.


## 5. Grounds of Moral Status



Accounts differ on what it is about the individual that grounds or
confers moral status and to what degree. This section will focus
primarily on the grounds of FMS. We begin with the Sophisticated
Cognitive Capacities accounts and their main strengths and
shortcomings, especially when it comes to capturing the
"commonsense view" discussed in section 1. We then show
that alternative accounts also face troubles. So, the challenge
remains to provide a plausible unified account of the grounds of FMS,
especially for those who wish to defend the commonsense view. The
order of presentation is, roughly, dialectical, not historical.


### 5.1 Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities



According to this type of account, a being has FMS if and only if the
being has very sophisticated cognitive capacities. These capacities
might be intellectual or emotional. Historically, the most famous
sophisticated intellectual capacities account was given by Kant,
according to whom autonomy, the capacity to set ends via practical
reasoning, must be respected (see the entry on
 respect)
 and grounds the dignity of all rational beings ([GMM], pp. 434, 436,
Prussian Academy pagination). Beings without autonomy may be treated
as a mere means (p. 428). For a contemporary version, see Quinn (1984,
pp. 49-52) who claims that the capacity to will (his term for
autonomy) is sufficient for rights of respect. Other intellectual
capacities that have been suggested, even if not always embraced, as
grounding what we call FMS include the following: the capacity for
self-awareness (McMahan 2002, pp. 45 and 242) or awareness of oneself
as a continuing subject of mental states (Tooley 1972, p. 44); being
future-oriented in one's desires and plans (one could draw on
Singer 1993, pp. 95 and 100, though insofar as his own view is
utilitarian it does not fall into section 5.1); capacity to value, or,
more specifically, "to appreciate the value of valuable
things" (Buss 2012, p. 352); "being good for ourselves in
virtue of the capacity to value" (Theunissen 2020, pp.
126-127); capacity to bargain, and to assume duties and
responsibilities (all part of a longer list in Feinberg 1980, p. 197).
On the emotional side, one sophisticated capacity that has been
proposed is the capacity to care, as distinguished from the mere
capacity to desire. (Jaworska (2007) posits this as sufficient but
perhaps not necessary for FMS.) There are also combination views that
appeal to both intellectual and emotional sophisticated cognitive
capacities as necessary and sufficient for FMS (Feinberg 1980, p.
197).



According to Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities accounts, the feature
grounding FMS is not relational: the source of moral status is neither
a relation the individual stands in (e.g., membership in a species)
nor a capacity whose exercise requires active participation of another
(e.g., the capacity to relate to others in certain mutually responsive
ways). In some versions, the exercise of the relevant capacities does
not even require the existence of anyone else, while in others (as in
the case of caring about someone) it, at most, involves the presence
of another being but not necessarily that being's active
participation. Individuals have FMS solely because they can engage in
certain cognitively sophisticated acts or responses on their own.



A being of any type that has these sophisticated cognitive capacities
has FMS, and so the accounts avoid anthropocentrism. However, since
most (but not necessarily all) animals lack sophisticated cognitive
capacities, they are not accorded the same moral status as an
unimpaired adult human. Similarly, in the case of a living organism
such as a redwood tree or a fetus, as well as non-individual entities,
such as species and ecosystems, they would not have FMS on these
views.



Some of these views (e.g., Kant's) do not allow for any moral
status other than FMS, and so would hold that beings who don't
meet the threshold for FMS have no moral status at all. Other views
are silent on this question and compatible with lower degrees of moral
status for beings or entities that are not cognitively sophisticated.
Yet others (e.g., McMahan 2002) explicitly insist that all sentient
beings have some degree of moral status.



A stock objection to Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities accounts is
their underinclusiveness. Not only will some environmentalists and
animal activists find the view underinclusive, but so too will those
who subscribe to the "commonsense view" articulated in
section 1. For example, infants lack sophisticated cognitive
capacities, and so fail to meet this necessary condition for FMS. The
versions that offer only a sufficient condition for FMS seem more
plausible since they leave open alternative routes to FMS. But such
accounts still leave the moral status of infants unaccounted for, and
possibly on a par with that of dogs and rabbits. Of course, these
views nevertheless allow that there are very strong reasons not to
kill human infants: it would be disrespectful and harmful to the
infant's parents, it would likely cause psychological harm to
the killers, etc. But these reasons, as explained in section 2.4, have
nothing to do with the moral status of infants, since they are not
reasons for the infants' own sake (Feinberg 1980, p. 198 and
McMahan 2002, p. 232).


### 5.2 Capacity to Develop Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities



The problem, at least from the standpoint of the commonsense view, of
5.1's underinclusion of infants can be avoided while still
retaining a shared source of FMS. The accounts can be modified as
follows: sophisticated cognitive capacities *or* the capacity
to develop these sophisticated capacities (without losing one's
identity) are necessary and sufficient for FMS. This is usually
labeled the "potential" account in the literature (e.g.,
Stone 1987), although some authors do not use this terminology, but
rather speak, for example, of the wrongness of killing due to the loss
of a "future like ours" (Marquis 1989 and 1995). One can
also treat potentiality as a ground for some, but not full, moral
status (Harman 1999, notwithstanding the revisions in Harman 2003) or
as only an enhancer of moral status (Steinbock 1992, p. 68). Views
differ in their interpretation of potentiality. For example, some deny
that a fetus that will die while still a fetus (of any cause) has the
relevant potential (Harman 1999, p. 311).



These potentiality accounts, like the accounts in 5.1, avoid
anthropocentrism without according most animals the same elevation in
moral status. But, unlike the accounts in 5.1, they also include very
underdeveloped human beings: not only infants and one-year-olds, but
even early fetuses have the capacity to develop sophisticated
cognitive capacities (barring unusual cases). (Of course, these
accounts are of no help to those interested in according moral status
to non-human animals, trees, species, and ecosystems.)



Although Boonin (2003) denies that his view is a potentiality account
(p. 62), his view does implicitly appeal to potentiality, albeit with
somewhat different implications than those above. He defends having
the conjunction of "a future-like-ours" (a kind of
potentiality) and "actual conscious desires that can be
satisfied only if [one's] personal future is preserved" as
sufficient for FMS (p. 84). Barring early death, most two-year-olds
and older children meet both conditions: they have a future like ours
while also having conscious desires (e.g., for avocado tomorrow),
which can only be satisfied if the child lives until the next day.
Early fetuses also typically have a future like ours, but they lack
mental states such as desires, and thus are excluded from FMS. Boonin
is explicitly neutral on the question whether animals have a
future-like-ours, so his proposal is compatible with several different
views about the moral status of animals (p. 84, note 36).



Any attempt to ground moral status in potentiality introduces its own
challenges. One could argue that mere potential cognitive capacity is
insufficient for FMS or even a weaker moral status. A potential US
president has neither rights nor even a claim to command the military;
likewise in the case of potentially cognitively sophisticated beings
and the rights associated with moral status (Feinberg 1980, p.193).
While this particular analogy has been contested (Wilkins 1993, pp.
126-127 and Boonin 2003, pp. 46-49), one can appeal to
other analogies: a small child (a potential adult) doesn't have
the rights of adults to own property or to watch any television
program it wants (Boonin 2003, p. 48).



Still, there is room to press back on some aspects of this objection.
We do, after all, often treat people with potential differently from
those without it. We provide extra music instruction, music
scholarships, and create music camps for those with the potential to
become great musicians, whereas we do not do so for those lacking such
potentiality. While being a potential adult human does not give one a
right to vote, perhaps it gives us reason to act as trustees with
regard to childrens' future status and interests and thus to
educate and prepare them to become voters by the time they are adults;
it does seem that children would be wronged if we neglected to so
prepare them. In this way, we treat children differently from dogs who
lack the potential to become adult humans, even though neither is now
an adult human. And perhaps this difference in treatment would extend
even to not taking certain actions (e.g., killing) that would result
in the loss of the relevant potentiality. But this line of response
might only go so far when it comes to fetuses. With respect to a
future-like-ours, some argue that the loss of this potentiality is
morally problematic only if the being is sufficiently psychologically
connected to that future person, and a fetus arguably lacks this
sufficient connection (McInerney 1990).



Even though the potentiality accounts come closer to capturing the
commonsense view than the Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities accounts,
they still are, from that point of view, underinclusive. Many
conscious human beings whose cognitive impairment is both severe and
permanent cannot meet these accounts' conditions for an elevated
moral status. It might be that humans who currently suffer from
severe, permanent cognitive impairment, but once had sophisticated
cognitive capacities, have FMS in virtue of the past possession of
these capacities. But it is unclear how to defend such a claim.
Moreover, the moral status of permanently severely cognitively
impaired humans who *never* had sophisticated cognitive
capacities remains unaccounted for (see the entry on
 cognitive disability and moral status).
 Even the versions of the accounts that offer only sufficient
conditions for FMS still leave their moral status open and possibly on
a par with animals who similarly lack both the sophisticated cognitive
capacities and the capacity to develop them. In Boonin's case,
since he is agnostic about animals and so, presumably, about
cognitively impaired human beings with similar prospects, his view
will either overinclude the former or underinclude the latter, as both
types of beings will be treated on a par.


### 5.3 Rudimentary Cognitive Capacities



In response to the criticisms just discussed, one could lower the
standards for the kind of cognitive capacities that are necessary and
sufficient for FMS. If the relevant cognitive capacities were
rudimentary enough, even severely cognitively impaired human beings
would qualify. Such an account might appeal to the capacity to
experience pleasure or pain (sentience), to have interests or basic
emotions, or the capacity for consciousness. Whether fetuses at
various stages of development will thereby have FMS depends on which
rudimentary capacity is appealed to. For example, an early fetus has
interests but not consciousness.



This accommodation does not fit well with the commonsense view, which
would see it as overinclusive. Most (but not all) animals meet these
lowered standards for FMS - they have the capacity for pleasure,
pain, interests, and consciousness - and so their moral status
would be on a par with most human beings (namely all those who possess
these rudimentary capacities). For example, some authors claim that
respecting rational nature entails respecting beings that have only
parts of rational nature or necessary conditions of it (Wood 1998, p.
197). Such a view seems to treat animals, infants, and severely
cognitively impaired humans, all of whom exhibit only parts of
rational nature, as morally on a par with each other and with
unimpaired adult humans. (See O'Neill 1998 for additional
critiques of this kind of Kantian approach.) Many advocates of such
views explicitly and gladly embrace this inclusiveness and reject the
commonsense view of the status of animals (Regan 2004).



Some philosophers only indirectly focus on rudimentary capacities.
Their focus is on the "equal moral consideration" of
interests, but they make it clear that possessing rudimentary
cognitive capacities is a necessary condition for having interests.
Utilitarianism is the best known equal consideration view, e.g.,
maintaining that equal amounts of suffering and pleasure should be
factored equally into the utilitarian calculus, regardless of whether
the suffering and pleasure is that of a human or animal. Equal
consideration may be interpreted this way: since equal interests are
treated equally, the beings with those interests are of equal moral
status. Singer (1993), famously associated with the equal
consideration view, might fit this interpretation. However, because he
thinks that self-conscious beings have interests that merely conscious
beings lack, he allows that the former beings might have rights that
the latter lack. Interestingly, DeGrazia (2008) embraces the same
ideas but goes further by saying that beings who have additional
rights due to more complex interests have a higher, and thus unequal,
moral status compared to beings lacking those interests and rights.
Some non-utilitarian philosophers adopt the terminology of equal moral
consideration (e.g., Regan 2004), as do philosophers who wish to
transcend the dichotomy between utilitarian and rights-based
approaches (DeGrazia 1996).



While 5.3 accounts and the equal moral consideration approach may seem
to imply treating human beings and most animals alike, many of the
defenders deny this counterintuitive implication by showing that two
beings can have equal moral status (or deserve equal consideration)
and yet require differential treatment due to differences in the
interests impacted. What an unimpaired adult human stands to lose in
being killed, for example, is much weightier than what a bird would
lose. The capacity of foresight, for example, can make for weightier
interests, and so human beings with this or other forms of cognitive
sophistication are harmed more by death (Rachels 1990,
pp.186-194; Regan 2004, pp. 304 and 324; and DeGrazia 1996).
Potentiality can also explain differential treatment of two beings
based on interests impacted, while maintaining the beings' equal
moral status. For example, there is a stronger reason not to harm a
baby as opposed to a cat, given the potential of the baby and not the
cat for a cognitively sophisticated future (Harman 2003, p. 187,
although this is not explicitly an equal consideration view).
Admittedly, in some cases comparative judgments of whose interests are
morally weightier, and hence judgments about differential treatment,
can be difficult, in part due to the difficulties in knowing the
capabilities of minds very different from ours and of comparing
well-being across species (DeGrazia 1996).



In spite of allowing for differential treatment of morally equal
beings, the above accounts remain unable to capture a key aspect of
the commonsense view: they are unable to account for the differential
treatment of both conscious humans with severe irreversible cognitive
impairments and infants who will die due to disease before acquiring
cognitive sophistication, as compared with many animals (such as a
dog), since here the affected interests are similar. Thus, while one
may grant that rudimentary capacities ground some moral status, one
must look beyond such capacities to explain the difference in moral
status between humans and most animals.



Anderson (2004), although not an advocate of equal consideration,
might seem to have a way around this last criticism. She points out
that one can have an interest in being dignified in the eyes of the
human community. While both dogs and humans have this interest, what
it takes for a human with severe cognitive impairments to be dignified
might be quite different from what it takes for an animal with similar
cognitive abilities to be dignified, possibly leading to different
rights (pp. 282-3). However, she doesn't explain how the
interests in dignity can lead to the strong protections associated
with FMS, such as the right not to be killed.



Irrespective of whether Anderson succeeds, all equal moral
consideration views, despite their name, seem to be incompatible with
McMahan's interpretation of the equal wrongness thesis
(discussed in section 2.1). Admittedly, these views are explicitly
concerned with what should be done rather than with how to evaluate an
action's degree of wrongness when one fails to do what one
should. Nonetheless, in allowing or even requiring differential
treatment based on differences in the interests impacted, such views
seem to also imply that an action (such as killing) is more wrong if
it impacts the victim's interests more severely, whereas McMahan
holds that the victim's age or level of intelligence should not
affect the wrongness of killing.



Notice that an even more rudimentary feature, which is not cognitive,
would have to be considered if one were to accord any moral status to
all living beings. For example, one can appeal to having a good or
well-being of one's own that can be enhanced or damaged as a
ground of moral status (Taylor 1986, p. 75, and Naess 1986, p. 14). If
"interests" are understood broadly enough, then
nonconscious entities, such as plants, species, and ecosystems have
interests (e.g., an interest in fulfilling their nature) and thus some
moral standing (Johnson 1993, pp. 146, 148, 184, 287). Of course, the
central challenge for such views is to explain how and why inevitable
conflicts among all those with a well-being or interests should be
settled. It is not enough to provide principles adjudicating these
conflicts (as does Taylor 1986, p. 261); one must justify these
principles in a way that is not grounded in the moral status of the
beings under consideration (since their status is taken to be equal).
For additional discussion and critique of these and other views, see
the entry on
 environmental ethics.


### 5.4 Member of Cognitively Sophisticated Species



One way to avoid the key problems of the previous accounts is to posit
membership in the human species as a sufficient condition for FMS.
This is not the view that the human species itself has FMS, but rather
that membership in the species gives an individual FMS. Feinberg
(1980) discusses this view, whereas Dworkin (1993, ch. 3) actually
posits it, although without distinguishing between this version and
the modified version addressed below. Benn (1967, pp. 69-71)
considers membership in the human species necessary and sufficient for
FMS. Note that belonging to the human species is a relational feature
(the relation of being a member of a kind), unlike the features
invoked by the accounts considered thus far.



If there are non-human cognitively sophisticated individuals, such as
higher animals or alien species, they would seem to deserve a high
moral status equal to that of human beings. Thus, this account should
not make human species membership a necessary condition for FMS, but
rather be disjunctive: having sophisticated cognitive capacities or
belonging to the human species is necessary and sufficient for
FMS.



By introducing the latter condition (human species membership), such a
view can establish FMS not only for infants and severely cognitively
impaired human beings but even for fetuses and permanently unconscious
human beings. Moreover, any non-human individual who lacks cognitively
sophisticated capacities, which includes most (but not all) animals,
lacks FMS. Thus this view accounts rather nicely for much of the
commonsense view described in section 1. However, it is of no help
grounding the claim that non-human animals, trees, species, or
ecosystems have any moral status.



One possible cost of this approach is the loss of a unified account of
FMS. That is, there are now two routes to FMS: having sophisticated
cognitive capacities or belonging to the human species. Whether one is
cognitively sophisticated is determined purely by psychology, while
whether one belongs to the human species is determined purely by
biology. Of course, it is true that the human species (as opposed to
its membership criteria) is characterized both psychologically and
biologically, and so in this sense the second route to FMS is related
to the first.



A second problem is an arbitrary distinction between severely
cognitively impaired humans and members of other similarly cognitively
sophisticated species, were they to exist, who have analogous severe
cognitive impairments. Imagine, for example, a cognitively
sophisticated biological species of "Martians," which has
some severely cognitively impaired members. Even if an impaired
Martian and an impaired human have similarly limited cognitive
capacities, and even though they bear the same metaphysical relation
to members of their species (they are both tokens of a biological type
whose unimpaired members are cognitively sophisticated), this account
nevertheless treats them as having a different moral status. This is
unacceptably arbitrary.



One could modify this account by substituting membership in a
cognitively sophisticated species for membership in the human species
as the second sufficient condition for FMS (Cohen 1986; possibly
Scanlon 1998, pp.185-86; and Finnis 1995). This approach is
often implicit rather than explicitly stated and defended. For
example, Korsgaard (2004) regards infants and severely cognitive
impaired human beings as rational agents - presumably in the
sense of being members of the kind "rational agents"
- and hence deserving of respect.



This version of the account is now more unified and avoids the above
charge of arbitrariness, while retaining the alignment with the
commonsense view. Both sufficient conditions of FMS now ultimately
appeal to the value of cognitively sophisticated capacities, and
cognitively impaired members of all cognitively sophisticated species
have the same moral status. Moreover, most animals still lack FMS
since neither they nor their species are cognitively
sophisticated.



Despite its advantages, even this modified version has problems.
First, whether one belongs to a given species depends on biological
criteria, such as whom one can mate with, whom one is born of, or
having the relevant DNA. But it is unclear why these biological
criteria are relevant for moral status. The point can be sharpened
this way. The human species, for example, is a morally relevant
category because the species is characterized, in part, by morally
relevant properties such as sophisticated intellectual and emotional
capacities, and not merely by biological criteria (e.g., mating
abilities). But it is unclear why a token member of a species, a token
lacking any of these morally relevant capacities, should get the moral
status from the type it belongs to (the species). If membership in the
type does not require any of the morally relevant features, how can
the membership be morally relevant? Consequently, this modified
account has its own problem of arbitrariness (Feinberg 1980, p. 193;
Sumner 1981, pp. 97-101; and McMahan 2002, pp. 212-214,
216). McMahan provides an especially interesting imaginary example
involving cognitively enhanced Superchimps, which, on the account
under consideration, generates counterintuitive consequences for the
moral status of the unenhanced chimps. For example, if the Superchimps
came to outnumber ordinary unenhanced chimps, the norm for the chimp
species would have changed and for this reason alone the unenhanced
chimps would have gained higher moral status. A related
counterintuitive consequence, not mentioned by McMahan, is the
following: if the Superchimps become their own species (via gene
therapy and interbreeding), a cognitively impaired member of this
newly created Superchimp species with the same cognitive capacities as
a non-impaired ordinary chimp (assumed here not to be sufficiently
cognitively sophisticated to have FMS) would have a very different
moral status from the ordinary chimp. And yet the two chimps would be
alike in every respect other than their species classification.



Notice also that, on this account, an anencephalic human baby (born
without the higher brain) is a member of the human species and so
would have FMS. But some might find this inclusion
counterintuitive.



The possibly problematic inclusion of anencephalic infants does not
seem to apply to the view underlying Little's (2008) claim that
FMS is achieved late in pregnancy (pp. 332 and 348), when the fetus,
which was a human organism, becomes a human being (pp. 339-341).
She does not state what the criteria are for being a human being, but
she may be partially following Quinn 1984 and conceiving of a human
being as one who belongs to the human species *and* has the
capacity to learn (see her page 340), where the latter feature would
exclude the anencephalics. While on this view being a human being is
not a merely biological matter, the view is still open to the problem
of arbitrariness insofar as it holds that the morally irrelevant,
merely biological feature of membership in the human species does make
a difference to moral status.



One may think that the above objections can be overcome if the
relevant criterion for FMS is not conceived of at all in terms of
membership in a cognitively sophisticated *biological species*,
but rather in terms of membership in a cognitively sophisticated
*kind*. However, this approach faces a dilemma: either (a) a
cognitively sophisticated kind does not include members who can never
be cognitively sophisticated and thus leaves out many severely
cognitively impaired human beings or (b) cognitive sophistication is
not a requirement of membership in a cognitively sophisticated kind
(e.g., membership requires merely having the relevant genes even if
their expression is blocked by other genes or the environment), but
then this membership does not seem to require any morally relevant
features (e.g. the genes themselves are not morally relevant -
see criticisms along these lines in McMahan 2008), and its moral
relevance becomes dubious.


### 5.5 Special Relationships



Some views attempt to ground strong reasons not to interfere, and
perhaps also to aid and treat fairly, not only by appeal to
sophisticated cognitive capacities but also by appeal to special
relationships (these are therefore disjunctive accounts). On such
accounts, *specific agents* must not interfere with an
individual or must respect that individual's rights in virtue of
being in a relationship with that individual. On one popular version,
the relevant relationship is being a fellow member of a community,
where the community is composed of all those of the same biological
species (Nozick 1997 and possibly Scanlon 1998, p.185).



The motivation for this version of the Special Relationship account
comes from thinking about the species relationship as analogous to
other relationships (biological, social, etc.) that generate special
duties and rights. For example, the relationship between a parent and
his child creates an especially strong reason for the parent not to
kill and to aid his child. Also, some people believe that even a
gamete donor has special reason to aid the resulting child.



Other authors focus on non-species relationships, either as sufficient
conditions for FMS or as merely enhancers of moral status. Kittay
(2005) holds that the biosocial relation of being someone's
child is sufficient for FMS while Stienbock (1992, pp.9, 13, and
69-70) maintains that being someone's child only enhances
one's moral status. So, for example, having a well-being,
sentience, or consciousness (all of which both animals and humans
have) might be sufficient for some moral status (e.g., weak rights not
to be harmed and to be aided), but the status is full (e.g., the
rights are at full strength) when the individual is in a specific
relationship with a moral agent. Instead of being someone's
child, the relationship might be co-belonging to a community where the
community's membership requirements need not be strictly
biological, but could be both biological and cognitive (see
Quinn's discussion of rights of humanity 1984, pp.32-33
and 50-54), or both biological and social (Warren 1997, p.
176).



According to Anderson (2004), the capacity for reciprocal
accommodation with moral agents is a necessary (not sufficient)
condition of having rights (pp. 287-9). This may appear to be a
5.3 type of view. However, unlike the capacities in 5.3, a rat, for
example, might fail to have this mutual accommodation capacity
vis-a-vis most humans, and so would not have the right to be
killed by these humans; but the rat might nonetheless have this
capacity vis-a-vis other moral agents (human rat lovers,
angels, etc.), and so might be able to gain this right from these
agents based on additional conditions. When this capacity for mutual
accommodation is combined with membership in the human society (which
does not require being a human), then, according to Anderson, this is
sufficient for a relationship that grounds rights to non-interference
and aid from human beings, though perhaps not as strong as those
associated with FMS (p. 284).



All of these Special Relationship accounts escape one drawback of the
Member of a Cognitively Sophisticated Species account. The reason not
to interfere (or aid, etc.) is not based on being a token of a type
with morally irrelevant criteria for membership. Merely belonging to a
species or other type of group is not the source of the reason not to
interfere. Instead, by being a member of a species or another group, a
token individual is thereby in a relationship with another token
member of the group and this relationship is taken to be the source of
the reason not to interfere.



Instead of the *capacity* for reciprocal accommodation, Gilbert
(2018) holds that if the rights associated with FMS involve the
authority to demand respect for these rights, then such rights must be
grounded in an actual joint commitment (p. 332).



A central problem with these approaches is that they do not truly
offer an account of moral status, but only of particular agents'
reasons vis-a-vis the individual at issue. A being's
moral status should give every moral agent, whether human or not,
reasons to protect that being (see section 2.4). But on these
accounts, by contrast, only those moral agents who are members of the
same species, or are in some other special relationship with the
being, have a reason, let us say, not to kill the being (McMahan 2005,
p. 355). For example, a human being, in virtue of being in a special
relationship (via species community) with a human infant, has a reason
not to kill the infant, but a Martian, if there were one, would not
have this reason, since he would lack this special relationship with
the human infant. Similarly, a human being does not have a reason not
to kill an ape infant, even if adult apes are cognitively
sophisticated, because the two are not in a special species-based
relationship. Reasons of this sort, constitutive of special
obligations, are different in kind from, and contrasted with, reasons
constitutive of moral status, which are impartial. Recall the contrast
between two reasons a parent has not to kill his child: the reason
constitutive of his parental obligation versus the impartial reason
constitutive of the child's moral status (section 2.4).



Perhaps some Special Relationship accounts (e.g., Quinn's
discussion of rights of humanity as distinct from rights of respect)
do not take themselves to be offering an account of FMS but rather
only to be capturing, e.g., a strong right against others to not be
killed (the key component of FMS). If so, they leave behind both the
term "moral status" and the concept of impartiality. Other
special relationship accounts (Steinbock's and Kittay's)
do use the term "moral status" leaving it unclear whether
they think that special relationships could somehow generate impartial
reasons.



Another concern with those Special Relationship accounts that attempt
to ground rights and requirements analogous to those of FMS is that
they are overinclusive (although see exceptions below). If the
relevant relationship is one with those in one's social
community then, depending on how this is interpreted, any animal
incorporated into human social communities (e.g., dogs) would gain
strong rights, contrary to the commonsense view. If the relevant
relationship is instead one with those in one's species
community, then all humans are in a special species relationship with
an anencephalic human baby and so, according to such an account, owe
it a high level of moral protection. But, as noted earlier, some would
find this counterintuitive. A related problem emerges once we notice
that humans might have more of a relationship with other
"embodied minds" (i.e., any being with both a body and
mind, such as an animal) than with human organisms that lack minds
(such as an anencephalic baby). The Special Relationship approach
would then be committed to claiming that animals have stronger rights
than some cognitively impaired humans (McMahan 2002, pp.
225-226). But the account would not welcome these implications
of its own approach and, if it did so, it would then suffer the
problem of overinclusiveness with respect to animals.



Quinn's view (1984), although quite similar to the species
community relationship view, may not be overinclusive with respect to
anencephalics or animals. Though Quinn does not consider this case, he
would likely conclude that anencephalic infants are mere human
organisms, not human beings (because they lack the capacity to learn),
or are at most partially, rather than fully, existent human beings.
Thus, they do not stand in a special relationship with other human
beings to the degree that unimpaired infants or cognitively impaired
human beings with the capacity to learn do. Moreover, it is plausible
to accept that we have more of a relationship with human beings in
Quinn's sense, which are human embodied minds, than with
non-human embodied minds, such as animals. Steinbock's view also
would not be overinclusive with respect to anencephalics or animals,
since the full strength of rights she discusses requires both
consciousness and being someone's child.



It is less clear whether a view like Gilbert's (2018) is under-
or overinclusive from the commonsense point of view. Making a joint
commitment requires exercising sophisticated cognitive capacities. If
only those who actually make joint commitments (to recognize the
rights associated with FMS) thereby get such rights, then the view is
even more underinclusive than those described in 5.1, since not all
those who can make such joint commitments actually do so (pp.
341-342). However, if the recipients of rights do not need to be
members of the joint commitment that bestows such rights on them, then
the view could end up being overinclusive - the rights
associated with FMS could be extended to anencephalics and all
animals.



Insofar as Special Relationship accounts intend to ground the notion
of FMS without denying that cognitive sophistication alone can ground
FMS, they will also suffer from another problem encountered earlier:
they are not unified since they offer two unconnected routes to FMS
(sophisticated cognitive capacities or special relationships).


### 5.6 Incompletely Realized Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities



Almost all the accounts we have considered so far recognize
cognitively sophisticated capacities as sufficient qualifications for
FMS. The search for additional sufficient qualifications for FMS,
meant to secure the justification for the commonsense view of who
should have this highest status, has run into considerable
difficulties, chiefly: overinclusion, appeal to criteria of
questionable moral relevance, and loss of the impartiality
characteristic of FMS.



Jaworska and Tannenbaum (2014) offer an alternative approach, anchored
in the idea that cognitively sophisticated capacities can be realized
incompletely. If cognitively sophisticated capacities are sufficient
to elevate a being's moral status, so too should the same
sophisticated capacities incompletely realized.



To understand this proposal, let's begin with incompletely
realized activities. These are activities one engages in when one
learns X "by doing": e.g., a novice piano player learns to
play by slowly reading simple note sequences and pressing (at least
some) corresponding piano keys, guided by the end of mastering the
instrument. With certain background conditions in place, the pressing
of the keys is best thought of not as playing the piano badly, but
rather as incomplete realizations of what piano playing amounts to.
Jaworska and Tannenbaum interpret certain activities of cognitively
unsophisticated humans analogously. With certain background conditions
in place, when a child or a cognitively impaired adult models, even in
a most rudimentary way, a cognitively sophisticated activity, guided
by a mentor's (parent's, caretaker's) end of the
mentee acquiring cognitive sophistication, the mentee incompletely
realizes the corresponding cognitively sophisticated activity. For
instance, playing a simple game like
"I-smile-then-you-smile" becomes rule following as an
incomplete realization of practical reasoning.



The key background conditions are: (1) it must be reasonable for the
mentor to adopt this end and (2) the mentee's activities must be
feasible means of achieving the mentor's aim. These conditions
ensure a sufficiently firm connection between the mentee's
rudimentary activities and the mentor's end of the mentee
mastering the sophisticated activity.



Now consider capacities, since they, and not activities, ground moral
status. Unimpaired babies' activities with their caretakers
*can* straightforwardly fit the above template, so babies have
the *capacity* to incompletely realize cognitively
sophisticated activities, and thus have the corresponding elevated
moral status. Perhaps more surprisingly, even many human beings
incapable of achieving cognitive sophistication can fit the above
template. A caretaker of such impaired humans is required, in virtue
of that role, to have that human's flourishing as an end, and
the flourishing of a human being encompasses developing sophisticated
cognitive capacities. When circumstances are unfavorable and the
caretaker cannot reasonably hold the latter, subsidiary end as an aim
to be realized, the caretaker can still reasonably hold this end as a
standard (meeting condition 1), i.e. as a guide as to what next best
aim to adopt. The activities of many cognitively impaired human beings
can be feasible means to the caretaker's next best aim guided by
this standard (meeting condition 2). In this way, these beings have
the capacity to incompletely realize cognitively sophisticated
activities and so also have the corresponding elevated moral status.
By contrast, it would never be reasonable for a dog's caretaker
to hold the standard of developing the dog's cognitive
sophistication, since the dog can fully flourish without such
sophistication. Moreover, typically it is also unreasonable to hold
the end of making the dog cognitively sophisticated as an aim (not
merely as a standard). But even in some odd circumstances a caretaker
could reasonably adopt this aim, the activities of the dog would fail
the feasibility condition (2). So, either way, dogs lack incompletely
realized cognitively sophisticated capacities.



Thus, this account overcomes the under- and overinclusion problems of
the accounts canvassed above. Moreover, the capacities this account
appeals to are modest extensions of the capacities deemed morally
relevant by a broad spectrum of views. In addition, the account
grounds impartial rather than relationship-based reasons for moral
regard: the feature grounding status is not a relationship but rather
is vested in the individual, just as the capacity to play a squash
match is vested in the individual even though this requires that
someone could play with her. The main shortcoming of this account is
that, although it provides grounds for an elevation of moral status,
there is no guarantee that this elevated status reaches the full array
(and strength) of protections and entitlements associated with FMS.
The goal of this particular account was to show that two beings (e.g.
a baby and a dog) who are otherwise cognitively on a par, can have
differing moral statuses in virtue of the fact that one, and not the
other, currently has cognitively sophisticated capacities incompletely
realized. The account assumes that cognitively sophisticated
capacities are sufficient for FMS but does not address whether such
incompletely realized capacities ground FMS or only a somewhat lesser
moral status.


### 5.7 Other Grounds



In addition to some of the features noted in section 5.3 (e.g., having
interests, having a good, etc.), some philosophers have attempted to
ground the moral status of an entity on features that do not connect
with interests in any way. One such feature is not being designed by
anyone to fulfill any purpose, which some philosophers hold as a
ground for being treated as an end and not a mere means, and thus
having at least some degree of moral status (Brennan 1984, pp. 44 and
56 and Katz 1997, pp. 129-131). Naturalness, that is, being
unaltered by humans, has also been proposed as itself a ground of
intrinsic value, and so as grounding at least some degree of moral
status (Elliot 1997, p. 80). Perhaps harmony and beauty might be yet
other features one could appeal to as grounds of the moral status of
ecosystems (Leopold 1949 and Callicott 1980). These views do not
discuss whether moral status comes in degrees and provide no guidance
for how to adjudicate the numerous conflicts that would arise among
entities with moral status. Insofar as these two issues are addressed
by supplementing these views with one (or more) of the accounts
discussed in sections 5.1-5.6, the views will inherit the
problems of those accounts. For elaboration of these and other such
views as they arise in environmental ethics, along with critiques, see
the entry on
 environmental ethics.


## 6. Justifying the Grounds of Moral Status



The survey in section 5 of the various proposed grounds of moral
status largely sidestepped the question of *why* the proposed
grounds can play their purported role in grounding moral status. What
is so special about these grounds that they can confer special status
on their possessors? For most of the proposed grounds this issue is
not addressed in the literature. However, this issue is addressed
extensively by some views that take sophisticated cognitive
capacities, especially the capacity for autonomy, to ground FMS, and
also by some views that take rudimentary cognitive capacities, such as
sentience, to ground some moral status. So these are the views we will
briefly summarize here.



Authors working within the Kantian tradition have elaborated and
defended various versions of the claim that autonomy, or the capacity
to set ends according to reason, is unconditionally valuable and the
ultimate condition of value of everything else (see the entry on
 autonomy in moral and political philosophy,
 sections 2 and 2.1). Numerous variants of the argument for this claim
can be found in the literature, and the most prominent ones take the
transcendental form (see the entry on
 transcendental arguments,
 section 5). On one version, in rationally choosing or valuing
anything at all one must presuppose the supreme value of one's
own rational capacities, and, by extension, the supreme value of
rational capacities in general (Korsgaard 1996a and 1996b). On this
picture, rational agents must recognize the supreme value of rational
capacities as a condition of valuing anything else, and this
recognition takes the form of affording FMS to beings with rational
capacities. This argument has spawned numerous responses from both
critics and proponents. For critiques, see, for example, Regan (2002)
and Bukoski (2018). For alternative defenses and responses on the
Kantians' behalf, see Sussman (2003).



Some philosophers have attempted to establish that the capacity to
value confers special status on those who have it due to its
instrumental usefulness. For example, Buss (2012) traces the value of
this capacity to the value of non-instrumentally valuable things
(e.g., works of art, beautiful landscapes, animal species) that must
be valued (appreciated for their value) in order to be given
"their due" (p. 350, see also p. 358). She claims that
though the capacity is merely instrumental, and that beings with this
capacity are "very special instruments" (p. 347, see also
p. 353), nevertheless such beings are to be treated with "awe
admiration, and deference" (p. 347) and not merely as a means to
an end (p. 349). This view is incomplete without an explanation of why
human beings qua instruments ought to be treated with the deference
owed to what they appreciate (p. 353), given that we do not generally
hold instruments in the high regard that we hold what they are
for.



There are also those who, inspired by the ancient Greek tradition,
turn to the "good for" relation as the underpinning of all
value to defend the claim that the capacity to value confers special
status on those who have it. According to Theunissen (2020), whatever
is genuinely good for human beings is of value in the sense that it
generates reasons to act accordingly. The capacity to value is good
for human beings (is beneficial to them regardless of anyone's
attitude or opinion about it) and that explains this capacity's
special value (p. 127). A daunting challenge for this view is to
explain - without slipping into circularity by claiming that
humans have a special moral status - why the "X is good
for humans" relation confers value on X while, in general, the
"Z is good for Y" relation (e.g., a rabbit is good for
itself) does not confer analogous value on Z.



Contractualist conceptions of morality attempt to derive all of
morality, together with full moral status of individuals, from a
hypothetical reciprocal agreement (entered into under conditions
specified variously by different versions) among rational agents (see
the entry on
 contractualism).
 The claim is that all able parties would agree (make a contract) to
be bound and to bind others to treat them in the agreed-upon ways
(that encompass FMS). These views work well to explain why the
capacity to enter and adhere to such a reciprocal agreement, which
includes the capacity to both demand moral status for oneself and to
respect the moral status of others by assuming duties and
responsibilities, would confer FMS on an individual.



Related views, such as Gilbert's (2018), explain the normativity
of agreements by interpreting them as joint commitments and ground
rights in actual joint commitment. These views also offer a ready
explanation of why those deemed to have the rights do have them, but
they do not correlate rights with capacities. If such views were to
ground rights in hypothetical joint commitments, they could explain
why those possessing the sophisticated cognitive capacities required
to make joint commitments would have the rights.



More generally, on views that conceive of morality as at least partly
originating from rational agents actively binding, obligating, or
imposing authority on one another, it is easy to see why those with
sufficient cognitive capacity to impose their authority on others
would have FMS that others are bound to respect. For example, Quinn
(1984) speaks of a "picture of morality as a nexus of
independent spheres of authority to permit, forbid, and require"
(49) and, because he sees the capacity to will as sufficient for such
authority, it is also sufficient for FMS.



Utilitarians and those sympathetic to utilitarian approaches often see
the protection and promotion of interests, where this is understood to
presuppose consciousness, as the central subject matter of morality
(e.g., DeGrazia 1996, p. 39). On such views it is straightforward why
the capacity to have interests is crucial to having any moral status
at all. On some views, the capacity to experience pleasure or pain
(sentience) is a prerequisite of having interests and this explains
why sentience is a ground of moral status (Singer 1993, p. 57).
Environmentalists, unlike Utilitarians, do not assume consciousness is
a necessary condition for having interests and hence use the term in a
broader fashion. However, they do not explain why interests, broadly
construed in this way, give rise to moral status.