## 1. Actions and Forbearances


For Locke, the question of whether human beings are free is the
question of whether human beings are free *with respect to their
actions and forbearances*. As he puts it:



> [T]he *Idea* of *Liberty*, is
> the *Idea* of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any Action,
> according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either
> of them is preferr'd to the other. (E1-4 II.xxi.8: 237)
> 
> 
> 


 In order to understand Locke's conception of freedom, then,
we need to understand his conception of action and forbearance.


There are three main accounts of Locke's theory of action.
According to what we might call the "Doing" theory of
action, actions are things that we *do* (actively), as
contrasted to things that merely *happen* to us (passively). If
someone pushes my arm up, then my arm rises, but, one might say, I did
not raise it. That my arm rose is something that *happened* to
me, not something I *did*. By contrast, when I signal to a
friend who has been looking for me, I *do* something inasmuch
as I am not a mere passive recipient of a stimulus over which I have
no control. According to some interpreters (e.g., Stuart 2013: 405,
451), Locke's actions are *doings* in this
sense. According to the "Composite" or
"Millian" theory of action, an action is "[n]ot one
thing, but a series of two things; the state of mind called a
volition, followed by an effect" (Mill 1974 [1843]: 55). On this
view, for example, the action of raising my hand is composed of (i)
willing to produce the effect of my hand's rising and (ii) the
effect itself, where (ii) results from (i). According to some
interpreters (arguably, Lowe 1986: 120-121; Lowe 1995:
141--though it is possible that Lowe's theory applies only
to *voluntary* actions), Locke's actions are composite in
this sense. Finally, according to what we might call the
"Deflationary" conception of action, actions are simply
motions of bodies or operations of minds.


Some of what Locke says suggests that he holds the
"Doing" theory of action: "when [a Body] is set in
motion it self, that Motion is rather a Passion, than an Action in
it", for "when the Ball obeys the stroke of a
Billiard-stick, it is not any action of the Ball, but bare
passion" (E1-5 II.xxi.4: 235--see also E4-5 II.xxi.72:
285-286). Here Locke is clearly working with a sense of
"action" according to which actions are opposed to
passions. But, on reflection, it is unlikely that this is what Locke
means by "action" when he writes about
voluntary/involuntary actions and freedom of action. For Locke
describes "a Man striking himself, or his Friend, by a
Convulsive motion of his Arm, which it is not in his
Power...to...forbear" as "acting" (E1-5
II.xxi.9: 238), and describes the convulsive leg motion caused by
"that odd Disease called *Chorea Sancti Viti* [St.
Vitus's Dance]" as an "Action" (E1-5
II.xxi.11: 239). It would be a mistake to think of these convulsive
motions as "doings", for they are clearly things that
"happen" to us in just the way that it happens to me that
my arm rises when someone else raises it. Examples of convulsive
actions also suggest that the Millian account of Locke's theory
of action is mistaken. For in the case of convulsive motion, there is
no volition that one's limbs move; indeed, if there is volition
in such cases, it is usually a volition that one's
limbs *not* move. Such actions, then, cannot be composed of a
volition and the motion that is willed, for the relevant volition is
absent (more on volition below).


We are therefore left with the Deflationary conception of action,
which is well supported by the text. There are, Locke says, "but
two sorts of Action, whereof we have any *Idea*, *viz.*
Thinking and Motion" (E1-5 II.xxi.4: 235--see also E1-5
II.xxi.8: 237 and E4-5 II.xxi.72: 285); "Thinking, and
Motion...are the two *Ideas* which comprehend in them all
Action" (E1-5 II.xxii.10: 293). It may be that, in the sense in
which "action" is opposed to "passion", some
corporeal motions and mental operations, being produced by external
causes rather than self-initiated, are not actions. But that is not
the sense in which all motions and thoughts are "called and
counted *Actions*" in Locke's theory of action
(E4-5 II.xxi.72: 285). As seems clear, convulsive motions are actions
inasmuch as they are motions, and thoughts that occur in the mind
unbidden are actions inasmuch as they are mental operations.


What, then, according to Locke, are forbearances? On some
interpretations (close counterparts to the Millian conception of
action), Locke takes forbearances to be voluntary not-doings (e.g.,
Stuart 2013: 407) or voluntary omissions to act (e.g., Lowe 1995:
123). There are texts that suggest as much:



> 
> *sitting still*, or *holding one's peace*,
> when *walking* or *speaking* are propos'd, [are]
> mere forbearances, requiring...the determination of
> the *Will*. (E2-5 II.xxi.28: 248)
> 
> 
> 


 However, Locke distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary
forbearances (E2-5 II.xxi.5: 236), and it makes no sense to
characterize an involuntary forbearance as an involuntary voluntary
not-doing. So it is unlikely that Locke thinks of forbearances as
voluntary not-doings. This leaves the Deflationary conception of
forbearance, according to which a forbearance is the opposite of an
action, namely an episode of rest or absence of thought. On this
conception, to say that someone forbore running is to say that she did
not run, not that she voluntarily failed to run. Every forbearance
would be an instance of inaction, not a refraining.


In E2-5, Locke stipulates that he uses the word
"action" to "comprehend the forbearance too of any
Action proposed", in order to "avoid the multiplying of
words" (E2-5 II.xxi.28: 248). The reason he so stipulates is not
that he literally takes forbearances to *be* actions (as he
puts it, they "pass for" actions), but that most
everything that he wants to say about actions (in particular, the
distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions, and the account
of freedom of action) applies *pari passu* to forbearances (see
below).


## 2. Will and Willing


Within the category of actions, Locke distinguishes between those
that are voluntary and those that are involuntary. To understand this
distinction, we need to understand Locke's account of the will
and his account of willing (or volition). For Locke, the will is a
power (ability, faculty--see E1-5 II.xxi.20: 244) possessed by a
person (or by that person's mind). Locke explains how we come by
the *idea* of power (in Humean vein, as the result of
observation of constant conjunctions--"like Changes [being]
made, in the same things, by like Agents, and by the like ways"
(E1-5 II.xxi.1: 233)), but does not offer a theory of
the *nature* of power. What we are told is that
"*Powers* are Relations" (E1-5 II.xxi.19: 243),
relations "to Action or Change" (E1-5 II.xxi.3: 234), and
that powers are either active (powers to make changes) or passive
(powers to receive changes) (E1-5 II.xxi.2: 234). In this sense, the
will is an active relation to actions.


Locke's predecessors had thought of the will as intimately
related to the faculty of desire or appetite. For the Scholastics
(whose works Locke read as a student at Oxford), the will is the power
of rational appetite. For Thomas Hobbes (by whom Locke was deeply
influenced even though this was not something he could advertise,
because Hobbes was a pariah in Locke's intellectual and
political circles), the will is simply the power of desire
itself. Remnants of this desiderative conception of the will remain in
Locke's theory, particularly in the first edition of
the *Essay*. Here, for example, is Locke's official E1
account of the will:



>  This *Power* the Mind has to prefer
> the consideration of any *Idea* to the not considering it; or
> to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest. (E1
> II.xxi.5: 236)
> 
> 
> 


 And here is Locke's official E1 account
 of preferring:



>  Well, but what is this *Preferring*?
> It *is* nothing but the *being pleased more with the
> one*, *than the other*. (E1 II.xxi.28: 248)
> 
> 
> 


 
So, in E1, the will is the mind's power
to be more pleased with the consideration of an idea than with the
not considering it, or to be more pleased with the motion of a part
of one's body than with its remaining at rest. When we lack
something that would deliver more pleasure than we currently
experience, we become uneasy at its absence. And this kind of
uneasiness (or pain: E1-5 II.vii.1: 128), is what Locke describes as
desire (E1-5 II.xx.6: 230; E2-5 II.xxi.31-32: 251) (though also
as "joined with", "scarce distinguishable
from", and a "cause" of
desire--see Section 8 below). So, in E1,
the will is the mind's power to desire or want the
consideration of an idea more than the not considering it, or to
desire or want the motion of a part of one's body more than its
remaining at rest. (At E2-5 II.xxi.5: 236, Locke adds
"and *vice versa*", to clarify that it can
also happen, even according to the E1 account, that one prefers not
considering an idea to considering it, or not moving to
moving.)[1]


In keeping with this conception of the will as desire, Locke in E1
then defines an exercise of the will, which he calls
"willing" or "volition", as an "actual
preferring" of one thing to another (E1 II.xxi.5: 236). For
example, I have the power to prefer the upward motion of my arm to its
remaining at rest by my side. This power, in E1, is one aspect of my
will. When I exercise this power, I actually prefer the upward motion
of my arm to its remaining at rest, i.e., I am more pleased with my
arm's upward motion than I am with its continuing to rest. This
is what Locke, in E1, thinks of as my willing the upward motion of my
arm (or, as he sometimes puts it, my willing or volition *to move
my arm upward*).


In E2-5, Locke *explicitly* gives up this conception of the
will and willing, explaining why he does so, making corresponding
changes in the text of the *Essay*, even while leaving passages
that continue to suggest the desiderative conception. He writes:
"[T]hough a Man would preferr flying to walking, yet who can say
he ever *wills* it?" (E2-5 II.xxi.15: 241). The thought
here is that, as Locke (rightly) recognizes, my being more pleased
with flying than walking does not consist in (or even entail) my
willing to fly. This is in large part because it is necessarily
implied in willing motion of a certain sort that one exert dominion
that one takes oneself to have (E2-5 II.xxi.15: 241), that "the
mind [endeavor] to give rise...to [the motion], which it takes to
be in its power" (E2-5 II.xxi.30: 250). So if I do not believe
that it is in my power to fly, then it is impossible for me
to *will* the motion of flying, even though I might be more
pleased with flying than I am with any alternative. Locke concludes
(with the understatement) that "*Preferring* which seems
perhaps best to express the Act of *Volition*, does it not
precisely" (E2-5 II.xxi.15: 240-241).


In addition, Locke points out that it is possible for
"the *Will* and *Desire* [to] run
counter". For example, as a result of being coerced or
threatened, I might will to persuade someone of something, even though
I desire that I not succeed in persuading her. Or, suffering from
gout, I might desire to be eased of the pain in my feet, and yet at
the same time, recognizing that the translation of such pain would
affect my health for the worse, will that I not be eased of my foot
pain. In concluding that "*desiring and willing* are two
distinct Acts of the mind", Locke must be assuming (reasonably)
that it is not possible to will an action and its contrary at the same
time (E2-5 II.xxi.30:
 250).[2]


With what conception of the will and willing does Locke replace the
abandoned desiderative conception? The answer is that in E2-5 Locke
describes the will as a kind of directive or commanding faculty, the
power to direct (or issue commands to) one's body or mind: it
is, he writes,


> 
>  a *Power* to begin or forbear, continue
> or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our Bodies, barely
> by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were
> commanding the doing or not doing such or such particular
> action. (E2-5 II.xxi.5: 236)
> 
> 
> 


 Consonant with this non-desiderative, directive conception of the
will, Locke claims that



> 
> *Volition*, or *Willing*, is an act of the Mind
> directing its thought to the production of any Action, and thereby
> exerting its power to produce it, (E2-5 II.xxi.28: 248)
> 
> 
> 


that 



> 
> *Volition* is nothing, but that particular determination of the
> mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise,
> continuation, or stop to any Action, which it takes to be in its
> power. (E2-5 II.xxi.30: 250)
> 
> 


Every volition, then, is a volition *to act* or *to
forbear*, where willing to act is a matter of commanding
one's body to move or one's mind to think, and willing to
forbear is a matter of commanding one's body to rest or
one's mind not to think. Unlike a desiderative power, which is
essentially passive (as involving the ability to be more pleased with
one thing than another), the will in E2-5 is an intrinsically active
power, the exercise of which involves the issuing of mental commands
directed at one's own body and mind.


## 3. Voluntary vs. Involuntary Action/Forbearance


Within the category of actions/forbearances, Locke distinguishes
between those that are voluntary and those that are involuntary.
Locke does not define voluntariness and involuntariness in E1, but he
does in E2-5:



> The forbearance or performance of [an] action,
> consequent to such order or command of the mind is
> called *Voluntary*. And whatsoever action is performed without
> such a thought of the mind is called *Involuntary*. (E2-4
> II.xxi.5: 236--in E5, "or performance" is omitted
> from the first sentence)
> 
> 


Locke is telling us that what makes an action/forbearance voluntary
is that it is consequent to a volition, and that what makes an
action/forbearance involuntary is that it is performed without a
volition. The operative words here are "consequent to" and
"without". What do they mean? (Henceforth, following
Locke's lead, I will not distinguish between actions and
forbearances unless the context calls for it.)


We can begin with something Locke says only in E1:



> Volition, or the Act of Willing, signifies
> nothing properly, but the actual producing of something that is
> voluntary. (E1 II.xxi.33: 259)
> 
> 


On reflection, this is mistaken, but it does provide a clue to
Locke's conception of voluntariness. The mistake (of which Locke
likely became aware, given that the statement clashes with the rest of
his views and was removed from E2-5) is that not every instance of
willing an action is followed by the action itself. To use one of
Locke's own examples, if I am locked in a room and will to
leave, my volition will not result in my leaving (E1-5 II.xxi.10:
238). So willing cannot signify the "actual producing" of
a voluntary action. However, it is reasonable to assume that, for
Locke, willing will "produce" a voluntary action if
nothing hinders the willed episode of motion or thought. And this
makes it likely that Locke takes a voluntary action to be not merely
temporally consequent to, but actually caused by, the right kind of
volition (Yaffe 2000; for a contrary view, see Hoffman 2005).


Understandably, some commentators have worried about the problem of
deviant causation, and whether Locke has an answer to it (e.g., Lowe
1995: 122-123; Yaffe 2000: 104; Lowe 2005: 141-147). The
problem is that if I let go of a climbing rope, not as a direct result
of willing to let it go, but as a result of being
discomfited/paralyzed/shaken by the volition itself, then my letting
go of the rope would not count as voluntary even though it was caused
by a volition to let go of the rope. The solution to this problem, if
there is one, is to claim that, in order for an action to count as
voluntary, it is not sufficient for it to be caused by the right kind
of volition: in addition, it is necessary that the action be
caused *in the right way* (or non-deviantly) by the right kind
of volition. Spelling out the necessary and sufficient conditions
for *non-deviant* causation is a steep climb. Chances are that
Locke was no more aware of this problem, and was in no better position
to answer it, than anyone else was before Chisholm (1966), Taylor
(1966) and Davidson (1980) brought it to the attention of the
philosophical community.


Locke's view, then, is that an action is voluntary inasmuch
as its performance is caused by a volition. The volition, as we have
so far presumed, must be of the right kind. For example, Locke would
not count the motion of my left arm as voluntary if it were caused by
a volition that my right arm move (or a volition that my left arm
remain at rest). Locke assumes (reasonably) that in order for an
action *A* to be voluntary, it must be caused (in the right way)
by a volition *that *A* occur* (or, as Locke sometimes
puts it, by a volition *to do *A**).


What, then, on Locke's view, is it for an action to
be *involuntary*? Locke says that an involuntary action is
performed "without" a volition. This might suggest that an
action of mine is involuntary only when I have no volition that the
action occur. Perhaps this is what Locke believes. But it is more
reasonable to suppose that Locke would also count as involuntary an
action that, though preceded by the right kind of volition, is either
not caused by the volition or caused by the volition but not in the
right way.[3]


Some commentators have worried that Locke's "locked
room" example is a problematic illustration of his theory of
voluntariness, at least as applied to forbearances (e.g., Lowe 1986:
154-157; Stuart 2013: 420). Locke imagines a man who is
"carried, while fast asleep, into a Room, where is a Person he
longs to see and speak with", but who is "there locked
fast in, beyond his Power to get out: he awakes, and is glad to find
himself in so desirable Company" and "stays
willingly" in the room. Locke makes clear that, on his view, the
man's remaining in the room is a voluntary forbearance to leave
(E1-5 II.xxi.10: 238). But one might worry that if the man is unable
to leave the room, then it is false to say that his volition not to
leave *causes* his not leaving. At best, it might be argued,
the man's not leaving is overdetermined (Stuart 2013: 420).
But, as some authors have recently argued, cases of overdetermination
are rightly described as involving two (or more) causes, not a single
joint cause or no cause at all (see, e.g., Schaffer 2003). On such a
view of overdetermination, it is unproblematic for Locke to describe
the man in the locked room as caused to remain both by his volition to
remain *and* by the door's being
locked.[4]


Another problem that has been raised for Locke stems from his
example of a man who falls into a river when a bridge breaks under
him. Locke describes the man as willing not to fall, even as he is
falling (E1-5 II.xxi.9: 238). The worry here is that Locke holds that
the objects of volition are actions or forbearances, so the man would
need to be described as willing to forbear from falling. But, it might
be argued, falling is not an action, for it is something that merely
happens to the man, and not an exercise of his agency; so his
willingly forbearing from falling would be willingly forbearing from
something that is not an action, and this is impossible (Stuart 2013:
405). The answer to this worry is that falling *is* an action,
according to Locke's Deflationary conception of action, which
counts the motion of one's body in any direction as a *bona
fide* action (see Section 1 above). 


## 4. Freedom and Necessity


Some commentators think that Lockean freedom (or, as Locke also
calls it, "liberty") is a single power, the power to do
what one wills (Yolton 1970: 144; D. Locke 1975: 96; O'Higgins
1976: 119--see Chappell 1994: 103). However, as Locke describes
it, freedom is a "two-way" power, really a combination of
two conditional powers belonging to an agent, that is, to someone
endowed with a will (see Chappell 2007: 142). (A tennis ball, for
example, "has not *Liberty*, is not a free Agent",
because it is incapable of volition (E1-5 II.xxi.9: 238).) In E1,
Locke's definition reflects his conception of the will as a
power of preferring *X* to *Y*, or being more pleased
with *X* than with *Y*. But in E2-5, Locke's
definition reflects his modified conception of the will as a power to
issue commands to one's body or mind
(see Section 2 above):



> 
>  [S]o far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move,
> or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own
> mind, so far is a Man *Free*. (E2-5 II.xxi.8: 237) 
> 
> 
>  So that the *Idea* of *Liberty*, is
> the *Idea* of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any
> particular Action, according to the determination or thought of the
> mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd to the other. (E2-5
> II.xxi.8: 237) 
> 
> 
>  *Liberty is not an* Idea *belonging to Volition*, or
> preferring; but to the Person having the Power of doing, or forbearing
> to do, according as the Mind shall chuse or direct. (E2-5 II.xxi.10:
> 238)
> 
> 
>  *Liberty*...is the power a Man has to do or forbear
> doing any particular Action, according as its doing or forbearance has
> the actual preference in the Mind, which is the same thing as to say,
> according as he himself *wills* it. (E1-5 II.xxi.15: 241)
> 
> 
> 


The central claim here is that a human being (person, agent) is
free with respect to a particular action *A* (or forbearance to
perform *A*) inasmuch as (i) if she wills to do *A* then she
has the power to do *A* and (ii) if she wills to forbear
doing *A* then she has the power to forbear doing *A* (see,
e.g., Chappell 1994: 
 103).[5]
 So, for example, a woman in a locked room is
not free with respect to the act of leaving (or with respect to the
forbearance to leave) because she does not have the power to leave if
and when she wills to leave, and a woman who is falling (the bridge
under her having crumbled) is not free with respect to the forbearance
to fall (or with respect to the act of falling) because she does not
have the power to forbear falling if she wills not to fall (E1-5
II.xxi.9-10: 238). (Locke describes agents who are unfree with
respect to some action as acting under, or by, necessity--E1-5
II.xxi.8: 238; E1-5 II.xxi.9: 238.) But if the door of the room is
unlocked, then the woman in the room is able to stay if she wills to
stay, and is able to leave if she wills to leave: she is therefore
both free with respect to staying and free with respect to
leaving. 


Notice that freedom, on Locke's conception of it, is a
property of substances (persons, human beings, agents). This simply
follows from the fact that freedom is a dual power and from the fact
that "*Powers* belong only to *Agents*,
and *are Attributes only of Substances*" (E1-5 II.xxi.16:
241). At no point does Locke offer an account of performing actions
or forbearances *freely*, as if freedom were a way of
performing an action or a way of forbearing to perform an action. (For
a contrary view, see LoLordo 2012: 27.)


Locke does write that



> [w]here-ever any performance or forbearance
> are not equally in a Man's power; where-ever doing or not doing,
> will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it,
> there he is not *Free*. (E2-5 II.xxi.8: 237)
> 
> 


The "follow upon" language might suggest a
counterfactual analysis of the claim that an agent has the power to
do *A* if she wills to do *A*, namely, that if she were to
will to do *A* then she would do *A* (e.g., Lowe 1995: 129;
Stuart 2013: 407--for a similar account that trades the
subjunctive conditionals for indicative conditionals, see Yaffe 2000:
15). The counterfactual analysis is tempting, but also unlikely to
capture Locke's meaning, especially if he has a Deflationary
conception of action/forbearance (see Section 1
above). It might happen, for example, that I am prevented (by chains
or a force field) from raising my arm, but that if I were to will that
my arm rise, you would immediately (break the chains or disable the
force field and) raise my arm. Under these conditions, I would not be
free with respect to my arm's rising, but it would be true that
if I were to will that my arm rise, then my arm would rise. So
Locke's dual power conception of freedom of action is not
captured by any counterfactual conditional or pair of counterfactual
conditionals.


Does Locke think that there is a conceptual connection between
freedom of action and voluntary action? It might be thought that
freedom with respect to a particular action requires that the action
be voluntary, so that if an action is not voluntary then one is not
free with respect to it. In defense of this, one might point to
Locke's falling man, whose falling is not voluntary and who is
also not free with respect to the act of falling (Stuart 2013:
408). But the falling man's unfreedom with respect to the act of
falling is not *explained* by the involuntariness of his
falling. In general, it is possible for one's action to be
involuntary even as one is free with respect to it. Imagine that you
let your four-year old daughter raise your arm (just for
fun). According to Locke's conception of voluntariness, the
motion of your arm is not voluntary, because it is not caused by any
volition of yours (indeed, we can even imagine that you do not even
have a volition that your arm rise). But, according to Locke's
conception of freedom, you are most certainly free with respect to
your arm's rising: (i) if you will that your arm rise, you have
the power to raise it, and (ii) if you will that your arm not rise,
you have the power to forbear raising it.


Voluntariness, then, is not necessary for freedom; but it is also
not sufficient for freedom, as Locke's "locked room"
and "paralytick" cases show. The man in the locked room
wills to stay and talk to the other person in the room, and this
volition is causally responsible for his staying in the room: on
Locke's theory, his remaining in the room is, therefore,
voluntary. But the man in the locked room "is not at liberty not
to stay, he has not freedom to be gone" (E1-5 II.xxi.10:
238). The reason is that even if the man wills to leave, he does not
have the power to leave. Similarly, if the paralyzed person wills to
remain at rest (thinking, mistakenly, that he could move if he willed
to move) and his remaining at rest is caused (at least in part) by his
volition not to move, then his "sitting still...is truly
voluntary". But in this case, says Locke, "there is want
of *Freedom*" because "a Palsie [hinders] his Legs
from obeying the determination of his Mind, if it would thereby
transferr his Body to another Place" (E2-5 II.xxi.11: 239): that
is, the paralyzed person is unable to move even if he wills to
move.


Thus far, we have been focusing on freedom with respect to motion
or rest of one's *body*. But, as we have seen, Locke
thinks that actions encompass acts of mind (in addition to acts of
body). So, in addition to thinking that some acts of mind are
voluntary (e.g., the mental acts of combining and abstracting ideas
involved in the production of abstract ideas of mixed modes--E2-5
II.xxxii.12: 387-388), Locke thinks that we are free with
respect to some mental actions (and their forbearances). For example,
if I am able to combine two ideas at will, and I am able to forbear
combining two ideas if I will not to combine them, then I am free with
respect to the mental action of combining two ideas. It can also
happen that we are not free with respect to our mental acts:



> A Man on the Rack, is not at *liberty*
> to lay by the *Idea* of pain, and divert himself with other
> Contemplations. (E4-5 II.xxi.12: 239)
> 
> 


In this case, even though the man on the rack might will to be rid
of the pain, he does not have the power to avoid feeling
it.[6]


## 5. Free Will


Is the will free? This question made sense to Scholastic
philosophers (including, e.g., Bramhall, who engaged in a protracted
debate on the subject with Hobbes), who tended not to distinguish
between the question of whether the will is free and the question of
whether the mind or soul is free with respect to willing, and, indeed,
some of whom thought that acts cannot themselves be free (or freely
done) unless the will to do them is itself free. But, according to
Locke, the question, if literally understood, "is altogether
improper" (E1-5 II.xxi.14: 240). This follows directly from
Locke's account of the will and his account of freedom. The will
is a power (in E2-5, the power to order the motion or rest of
one's body and the power to order the consideration or
non-consideration of an idea--see Section 2
above), and freedom is a power, namely the power to do or not do as
one wills (see Section 4 above). But, as Locke
emphasizes, the question of whether one power has another power is
"a Question at first sight too grosly absurd to make a Dispute,
or need an Answer". The reason is that it is absurd to suppose
that powers are capable of having powers, for



> 
> *Powers* belong only to *Agents*, and *are Attributes
> only of Substances*, *and not of Powers* themselves. (E1-5
> II.xxi.16: 241)
> 
> 


The question of whether the will is free, then, presupposes that
the will is a substance, rather than a power, and therefore makes no
more sense than the question of whether a man's "Sleep be
Swift, or his Vertue square" (E1-5 II.xxi.14: 240). To suppose
that the will is free (or unfree!) is therefore to make a category
mistake (see Ryle 1949: chapter 1).


## 6. Freedom in Respect of Willing


The fact that it makes no sense to suppose that the will itself is
free (or unfree) does not entail that there are no significant
questions to be asked about the relation between freedom and the
will. Indeed, Locke thinks that there are two such questions, and that
these are the questions that capture "what is meant, when it is
disputed, Whether the *will* be free" (E2-5 II.xxi.22:
245). The first (discussed at E1-5 II.xxi.23-24) is whether
agents (human beings, persons) are free with respect to
willing-one-way-or-another; more particularly, whether agents are
able, if they so will, to avoid willing one way or the other with
respect to a proposed action. The second (discussed at E1-5 II.xxi.25)
is whether agents are free with respect to
willing-a-particular-action. The majority of commentators think that
Locke answers both of these questions negatively, at least in E1-4
(see Chappell 1994, Lowe 1995, Jolley 1999, Glauser 2003, Stuart 2013,
and Leisinger 2017), and some think that Locke then qualifies his
answer(s) in E2-5 in a way that potentially introduces inconsistency
into his moral psychology (e.g., Chappell 1994). Other commentators
think that Locke answers the first question negatively for most
actions, but with one important qualification that is clarified and
made more explicit in E5, and that he answers the second question
positively, all without falling into inconsistency (Rickless 2000;
Garrett 2015). What follows is a summary of the interpretive
controversies. In the rest of this Section, we focus on the first
question. In the next, we focus on the second question.


In E1-4, Locke states his answer to the first question thus:



> [*A*] *Man in respect of willing any
> Action in his power once proposed to his Thoughts cannot be
> free*. (E1-4 II.xxi.23: 245)
> 
> 


His argument for the necessity of having either a volition that
action *A* occur or a volition that action *A* not occur,
once *A* has been proposed to one's thoughts, is simple and
clever: (1) Either *A* will occur or *A* will not occur; (2)
If *A* occurs, this will be the result of the agent having
willed *A* to occur; (3) If *A* does not occur, this will be
the result of the agent having willed *A* not to occur;
therefore, (4) The agent necessarily wills one way or the other with
respect to *A*'s occurrence (see Chappell 1994:
105-106). It follows directly that "in respect of the act
of *willing*, a Man is not free" (E1-4 II.xxi.23:
245). For, first, "*Willing*, or *Volition* [is]
an Action" (E1-5 II.xxi.23: 245--this because actions
comprise motions of the body and operations of mind, and volition is
one of the most important mental operations--E1-5 II.vi.2: 128),
and, second, freedom with respect to action *A*, as Locke defines
it, consists in (i) the power to do *A* if one wills to
do *A* and (ii) the power not to do *A* if one wills not to
do *A*. Thus, if an agent does not have the power to avoid
willing one way or the other with respect to *A* (even if the
agent wills to avoid willing one way or the other with respect
to *A*), then the agent is not free with respect to willing one
way or the other with respect to *A*.


In his *New Essays on Human Understanding* (ready for
publication in 1704, but not published then because that was the year
of Locke's death) Gottfried Leibniz famously questions premise
(3) of this argument:



> I would have thought that one can suspend
> one's choice, and that this happens quite often, especially when
> other thoughts interrupt one's deliberation. Thus, although it
> is necessary that the action about which one is deliberating must
> exist or not exist, it doesn't follow at all that one
> necessarily has to decide on its existence or non-existence. For its
> non-existence could well come about in the absence of any decision.
> (Leibniz 1704 [1981]: 181)
> 
> 


Leibniz's worry is that, even if one is thinking about
whether or not to do *A*, it is often possible to postpone
willing whether to do *A*, and the non-occurrence of *A*
might well result from such postponement. Under these conditions, it
would be false to say that *A*'s non-occurrence results
from any sort of volition that *A* not occur. Leibniz illustrates
the claim with an amusing reference to a case that the Areopagites
(judges on the Areopagus, the highest court of appeals in Ancient
Athens) were having trouble deciding, their solution (i.e., *de
facto*, but not *de jure*, acquittal) being to adjourn it
"to a date in the distant future, giving themselves a hundred
years to think about it" (Leibniz 1704 [1981]: 181).


It is something of a concern, then, that Locke himself appears
committed to agreeing with Leibniz's criticism of his own
argument, at least in E2-5. For in E2-5 (but not in E1) Locke
emphasizes his acceptance of the doctrine of suspension, according to
which any agent has the "power to *suspend* the execution
and satisfaction of any of its desires", during which time the
will is not yet "determined to action" (E2-5 II.xxi.47:
263). That is, Locke acknowledges in E2-5, even as he does not remove
or alter the argument of II.xxi.23 in E2-4, that it is possible to
postpone willing with respect to whether to will one way or the other
with respect to some proposed action (see Chappell 1994:
106-107).


However, Locke makes changes in E5 that have suggested to some
commentators how he would avoid Leibniz's criticism without
giving up the doctrine of suspension. Recall Locke's answer to
the first question:



> [A] Man in respect of willing any Action in
> his power once proposed to his Thoughts cannot be free. (E1-4
> II.xxi.23: 245)
> 
> 


Here, now, is Locke's restatement of
 his answer in E5:



> [A] Man in respect of willing*, or the Act
> of Volition, when* any Action in his power is once proposed to his
> Thoughts*, as presently to be done,* cannot be free. (E5
> II.xxi.23: 245--added material italicized)
> 
> 


The crucial addition here is the phrase
"as presently to be done". In E5, Locke is not saying that
it is with respect to willing one way or the other with respect
to *any proposed action* that an agent is not free: what he is
saying is that it is with respect to willing one way or the other with
respect to *any proposed action as presently to be done* that
an agent is not free. Some actions that are proposed to us are to
occur *at the time of proposal*: as I am singing, a friend
might propose that I stop singing *right now*. Other actions
that are proposed to us are to occur *at a time later than the time
of proposal*: at the beginning of a long bicycle trip, a friend
might propose that we take a rest once we have reached our
destination. Locke is telling us in E5 that premise (3) is supposed to
apply to the former, not to the latter, sort of actions. If this is
right, then it is no accident that Locke's own illustration of
the argument of II.xxi.23 involves "a Man that is walking, to
whom it is proposed to give off walking" (E1-5 II.xxi.24:
246). 


So, as Locke incipiently recognizes as early as E1 but explicitly
underlines in E5, his initial answer to the first question is an
overgeneralization, and needs to be restricted to those actions that
are proposed to us as presently to be done (see Rickless 2000:
49-55; Glauser 2003: 710; Garrett 2015: 274-277). But it
is also possible that Locke comes to recognize, and eventually
underline, a second restriction. At the moment, I am sitting in a
chair. In a few minutes, my children will walk in and propose that I
get up and make dinner. I am busy, my mind is occupied, so I will
likely postpone (perhaps only for a few minutes) making a decision
about whether to get up. The result of such postponement is that I
will not get up right away, but this will not be because I
have *willed* not to get up right away. Again, it seems that
premise (3) is false, for reasons similar to the ones described by
Leibniz. But this time, the relevant action (getting up) is proposed
as presently to be done. Locke's E5 emendations do not
explicitly address this sort of example.


However, in E2-5, but not in E1, Locke emphasizes the fact that in
his "walking man" example, the man either "continues
the Action [of walking], or puts an end to it" (E2-5 II.xxi.24:
246). This suggests a different restriction, on top of the "as
presently to be done" restriction. It may be that Locke is
thinking that premise (3) applies, not to actions of all kinds, but
only to processes in which one is currently engaged. The walking man
is already in motion, constantly putting one leg in front of the
other. When it is proposed to him that he give off walking, he has no
option but to will one way or the other with respect to whether to
give off walking: if he stops walking, this will be because he willed
that his walking cease; and if he continues to walk, this will be
because he willed that his walking continue. Either way, he must will
one way or the other with respect to whether to stop walking. By
contrast, when I am sitting in my chair, I am not engaged in a
process: I am (or, at least, my body is) simply at rest. It is for
this reason that it is possible for me to avoid willing with respect
to whether to get up right now: processes require volition to secure
their continuation, but mere states (non-processes) do not (see
Rickless 2000: 49-55; for a contrary view, see Glauser 2003:
710).


Locke's considered answer to the first question, then, is
this: (i) when an action that is a process in which the agent is
currently engaged is proposed as presently to be continued or stopped,
the agent is not free with respect to willing one way or the other
with respect to its continuing, but (ii) when an action is not a
process in which the agent is currently engaged or is proposed as to
be done sometime in the future, then it is possible for the agent to
be free with respect to willing one way or the other with respect to
its performance or non-performance. Given that, as Locke puts it in
E5, the vast majority of voluntary actions "that succeed one
another every moment that we are awake" (E5 II.xxi.24: 246) are
(i)-actions rather than (ii)-actions, it makes sense for him to
summarize his answer to the first question as that it is "in
most cases [that] a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the act of
volition" (E5 II.xxi.56: 270). But, as Locke also emphasizes,
one has the ability, at least with respect to (ii)-actions, to suspend
willing. So there is no inconsistency at the heart of Locke's
theory of freedom in respect of willing.



## 7. Freedom to Will


The second question regarding the relation between freedom and the
will that Locke takes to be significant is "*Whether a Man be
at liberty to will which of the two he pleases*, *Motion or
Rest*" (E1-5 II.xxi.25: 247). Consider a particular
action *A*. What Locke is asking is whether an agent is free with
respect to the action of *willing that *A* occur*. For
example, suppose that I am sitting in a chair and that *A* is the
action of walking to the fridge. Locke wants to know whether I am free
with respect to willing the action of walking to the fridge.


Most commentators think that Locke's answer to this question
is NO. The main evidence for this interpretation is what Locke says
about the question immediately after raising it:



> This Question carries the absurdity of it so
> manifestly in it self, that one might thereby sufficiently be
> convinced, that Liberty concerns not the Will. (E5 II.xxi.25: 247)
> 
> 


It is tempting to suppose that the thought that "Liberty
concerns not the Will" is the thought that agents are not free
to will, and that Locke is saying that we are driven to this thought
because the second question is absurd, in the sense of demanding a
negative answer.


But it is difficult to make sense of what Locke goes on to say in
II.xxi.25 if he is interpreted as answering the second question
negatively. Section 25 continues:



> For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to
> will either Motion, or Rest; Speaking, or Silence; which he pleases,
> is to ask, whether a Man can *will*, what he *wills*; or
> be pleased with what he is pleased with. (E1-5 II.xxi.25: 247)
> 
> 


Locke says that the second question reduces to another that can be
put in two different ways: whether a man can will what he wills, and
whether a man can be pleased with what pleases him. (The reason it can
be put in these two different ways, at least in E1, is that Locke
there adopts a desiderative theory of willing, according to which
willing an action is a matter of being more pleased with the action
than with its forbearance.) But asking whether a man can will what he
wills, or whether a man can be pleased with what he is pleased with,
is similar to asking whether a man can steal what he steals. And the
answer to all of these questions is: "OF COURSE!"


It is *obvious* that whatever it is that a
man *actually* steals he *can* steal. Similarly, it
is *obvious* that whatever it is that a man *actually*
wills (or is actually pleased with) is something that he *can*
will (or *can* be pleased with). The reason is that it is a
self-evident maxim (just as self-evident as the maxim that whatever
is, is--see E1-5 IV.vii.4: 592-594) that whatever is actual
is possible. Locke, it seems, wishes to answer the second question in
the affirmative! 


This raises the issue of what Locke could possibly mean, then, when
he describes the second question as "absurd". One
possibility is that, for Locke, a question counts as absurd not only
when the answer to it is *obviously in the negative* (think:
"Is the will free?"), but also when the answer to it
is *obviously in the affirmative* (think: "Is it possible
for you to do what you are actually doing?"). But it also raises
the issue of why Locke would think that the second question actually
reduces to an absurd question of the latter sort. One possible
solution derives from Locke's theory of freedom of action. As
we have seen, Locke thinks that one is free with respect to
action *A* if and only if (i) if one (actually) wills to
do *A*, then one can do *A*, and (ii) if one (actually)
wills not to do *A*, then one can avoid doing *A*. Applying
this theory directly to the case in which *A* is the action
of *willing to do *B**, we arrive at the following: one is
free with respect to willing to do *B* if and only if (i) if one
(actually) wills to will to do *B*, then one can will to
do *B*, and (ii) if one (actually) wills to avoid willing to
do *B*, then one can avoid willing to do *B*. Suppose, then,
that willing to will to do an action is just willing to do that
action, and willing to avoid willing to do an action is just not
willing to do that action. In that case, one is free with respect to
willing to do *B* if and only if (i) if one (actually) wills to
do *B*, then one can will to do *B*, and (ii) if one
(actually) avoids willing to do *B*, then one can avoid willing
to do *B*. Given that actuality obviously entails possibility, it
follows that (i) and (ii) are both obviously true. This is one
explanation for why Locke might think that the question of whether one
is free with respect to willing to do *B* reduces to an absurd
question, the answer to which is obviously in the affirmative. It may
be for this reason that Locke says that the question is one that
"needs no answer" (E1-5 II.xxi.25: 247).


Locke goes on to say, at the end of II.xxi.25, that



> they, who can make a Question of it [i.e., of
> the second question], must suppose one Will to determine the Acts of
> another, and another to determinate that; and so on *in
> infinitum*. (E1-5 II.xxi.25: 247)
> 
> 


It is unclear what Locke means by this. One possibility, consistent
with the majority interpretation that Locke provides a negative answer
to the second question, is that Locke is providing an argument here
for the claim that the proposition that it is possible to be free with
respect to willing to do an action leads to a vicious infinite regress
of wills. The thought here is that being free with respect to willing
to do an action, on Locke's theory, requires being able to will
to do an action if one wills to will to do it; that being free with
respect to willing to will to do an action then requires being able to
will to will to do it if one wills to will to will to do it; and so
on, *ad infinitum*. But another possible interpretation,
consistent with the minority interpretation that Locke provides an
affirmative answer to the second question, is that Locke's
argument here is not meant to target those who answer the question
affirmatively, but is rather designed to target those who would
"make a question" of the second question, i.e., those who
think that the answer to the second question is *un*obvious,
and worth disputing. These people are the ones who think that willing
to will to do *A* does not reduce to willing to do *A*, and
that willing to avoid willing to do *A* does not reduce to
avoiding willing to do *A*. *These* are the people who are
committed to the existence of an infinite regress of wills, each
determining the volitions of its successor. According to Locke, who
accepts the reductions, the infinite regress of wills can't get
started (see Rickless 2000: 56-65; Garrett 2015:
269-274).


## 8. Determination of the Will


The next important question for Locke is "what is it
determines the Will" (E2-5 II.xxi.29: 249--the question is
also raised in the same Section in E1). Locke gives one answer to this
question in E1, and a completely different answer in E2-5. The E1
answer is that the will is always determined by "*the greater
Good*" (E1 II.xxi.29: 251), though, when he is writing more
carefully, Locke says that it is only "the appearance of Good,
greater Good" that determines the will (E1 II.xxi.33: 256, E1
II.xxi.38: 270). Regarding the good, Locke is a hedonist:



> Good and Evil...are nothing but Pleasure
> and Pain, or that which occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to
> us. (E1-5 II.xxviii.5: 351--see also E1-5 II.xx.2: 229 and E2-5
> II.xxi.42: 259)
> 
> 


So Locke's E1 view is that the will is determined by what
appears to us to promise pleasure and avoid pain.


When in 1692 Locke asks his friend, William Molyneux, to comment on
the first (1690) edition of the *Essay*, Molyneux expressly
worries that Locke's E1 account of freedom appears to
"make all Sins to proceed from our Understandings, or to be
against Conscience; and not at all from the Depravity of our
Wills", and that "it seems harsh to say, that a Man shall
be Damn'd, because he understands no better than he does"
(de Beer 1979: 601). Molyneux's point is well taken, and Locke
acknowledges as much in his reply (de Beer 1979: 625). The source of
the problem for the E1 account is that, with respect to the good (at
least in the future), appearance does not always correspond with
reality: it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is apt to
produce the greatest pleasure and the least pain. Sometimes this is
because we underestimate how pleasurable future pleasures will be
(relative to present pleasures) or overestimate how painful present
pains are (relative to future pains); and sometimes this is because we
just make simple mistakes of fact, thinking, for example, that
bloodletting will ease the pain of gout. As Molyneux sees it, we are
not responsible for many of these mistakes, and yet it seems clear
that we deserve (divine) punishment for making the wrong choices in
our lives (e.g., when we choose the present pleasures of debauchery
and villainy over the pleasures of heaven). Our sins, in other words,
should be understood to proceed from the defective exercise of our
wills, rather than from the defective state of our knowledge.


Part of Locke's answer in E2-5 is that what determines the
will is not the appearance of greater good, but rather "always
some uneasiness" (E2-4 II.xxi.29: 249--the word
"uneasiness" is italicized in E5).
"Uneasiness" is Locke's word for "[a]ll pain
of the body of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind" (E2-5
II.xxi.31: 251). On this view, then, our wills are determined by pains
(of the mind or of the body). How this answer is supposed to address
Molyneux's concern is not, as yet, entirely clear.


What, to begin, does Locke mean by "determination"? On
a "causal" reading, for a will *W* to be determined
by *X* is for *X* to cause *W* to be exercised in a
particular way. One might say, for example, that fear of the tiger
caused Bill to choose to run away from it, and, in one sense, that
Bill's volition to run away from the tiger was determined by his
fear of it. On a "teleological" reading, for a
will *W* to be determined by *X* is for the agent to will
the achievement or avoidance of *X* as a goal. One might say, for
example, that the pleasure of eating the cake determined my will in
the sense of fixing the content of my volition (as the volition to
acquire the pleasure of eating the cake) (see Stuart 2013: 439;
LoLordo 2012: 55-56).


It would be anachronistic to suppose that Locke is using the word
"determine" as we do today when we discuss causal
determinism (see the entry on 
 causal determinism). And the desire
to avoid anachronism might lead us to adopt the teleological
interpretation of determination. But there are many indications in
E2-5 II.xxi that Locke has something approaching the causal
interpretation in mind. Locke's picture of bodies, both large
and small, is largely a mechanistic one (though he allows for
phenomena that can't be explained mechanistically, such as
gravitation, cohesion of body parts, and magnetism): bodies, he
writes, "knock, impell, and resist one another,...and that
is all they can do" (E1-5 IV.x.10: 624). And there are
indications that this mechanistic model of corporeal behavior affects
Locke's model of mental phenomena. Throughout the Sections of
II.xxi added in E2-5, Locke talks of uneasiness moving the mind (E2-5
II.xxi.29: 249; E2-5 II.xxi.43-44: 260), setting us upon a
change of state or action or work (E2-5 II.xxi.29: 249; E2-5
II.xxi.31: 251; E2-5 II.xxi.37: 255; E2-5 II.xxi.44: 260), working on
the mind (E2-5 II.xxi.29: 249; E2-5 II.xxi.33: 252), exerting pressure
(E2-5 II.xxi.32: 251; E2-5 II.xxi.45: 262), driving us (E2-5
II.xxi.34: 252; E2-5 II.xxi.35: 253), pushing us (E2-5 II.xxi.34:
252), operating on the will, sometimes forcibly (E2-5 II.xxi.36: 254;
E2-5 II.xxi.37: 255; E2-5 II.xxi.57: 271), laying hold on the will
(E2-5 II.xxi.38: 256), influencing the will (E2-5 II.xxi.38: 256; E2-5
II.xxi.39: 257), taking the will (E2-5 II.xxi.45: 262), spurring to
action (E2-5 II.xxi.40: 258), carrying us into action (E2-5 II.xxi.53:
268), and being counterbalanced by other mental states (E2-5
II.xxi.57: 272; E2-5 II.xxi.65: 277). It is difficult to read all of
these statements without thinking that Locke thinks of uneasiness as
exerting not merely a pull, but also a push, on the mind.


Locke's view, then, seems to be that our volitions are caused
(though not, perhaps, deterministically, i.e., in a way that is fixed
by initial conditions and the laws of nature) by uneasinesses. How is
this supposed to work? As Locke sees it, either "all pain causes
desire equal to it self" (E2-5 II.xxi.31: 251) or desire is
simply identified with "*uneasiness* in the want [i.e.,
lack] of an absent good" (E2-5 II.xxi.31: 251). So the desire
that either is or is caused by uneasiness is a desire for the removal
of that uneasiness, and this is what proximately spurs us to take
means to secure that removal.


Locke provides evidence from observation and from "the reason
of the thing" for the claim that it is uneasiness, rather than
perceived good, that determines the will. Empirically, Locke notes
that agents generally do not seek a change of state unless they
experience some sort of pain that leads them to will its extinction. A
poor, indolent man who is content with his lot, even one who
recognizes that he would be happier if he worked his way to greater
wealth, is not *ipso facto* motivated to work. A drunkard who
recognizes that his health will suffer and wealth will dissipate if he
continues to drink does not, merely as a result of this recognition,
stop drinking: but if he finds himself thirsty for drink and uneasy at
the thought of missing his drinking companions, then he will go to the
tavern. That is, Locke recognizes the possibility of akratic action,
i.e., pursuing the worse in full knowledge that it is worse (E
II.xxi.35: 253-254). (For more on Locke on akrasia, see Vailati
1990, Glauser 2014, and Moauro and Rickless 2019.)


Regarding "the reason of the thing", Locke claims that
"we constantly desire happiness" (E2-5 II.xxi.39: 257),
where happiness is "the utmost Pleasure we are capable of"
(E2-5 II.xxi.42: 258). Moreover, he says, any amount of uneasiness is
inconsistent with happiness, "a little pain serving to marr all
the pleasure" we experience. Locke concludes from this that we
are always motivated to get rid of pain before securing any particular
pleasure (E2-5 II.xxi.36: 254). Locke also argues that absent goods
cannot move the will, because they don't exist yet; by contrast,
on his theory, the will is determined by something that already exists
in the mind, namely uneasiness (E2-5 II.xxi.37:
254-255). Finally, Locke argues that if the will were determined
by the perceived greater good, every agent would be consistently
focused on the attainment of "the infinite eternal Joys of
Heaven". But, as is evidently the case, many agents are far more
concerned about other matters than they are about getting into
heaven. And this entails that the will must be determined by something
other than the perceived greater good, namely, uneasiness (E2-5
II.xxi.38: 255-256). (For interesting criticisms of these
arguments, see Stuart 2013: 453-456.)


So far, Locke has argued that the wrong turns we make in life do
not usually proceed from defects in our understandings. What spurs us
to act or forbear acting is not perception of the greater good, but
some uneasiness instead. This answers part, but not the whole, of
Molyneux's worry. What Locke still needs to explain is why
agents can be justly held responsible for choices that are motivated
by uneasinesses. After all, what level of pain we feel and when we
feel it is oftentimes not within our control. Locke's answer
relies on what has come to be known as the "doctrine of
suspension".


## 9. The Doctrine of Suspension


Having argued that uneasiness, rather than perception of the
greater good, is what determines the will, Locke turns to the question
of which of all the uneasinesses that beset us "has the
precedency in determining the *will* to the next
action". His answer:



> that ordinarily, which is the most pressing of
> those [uneasinesses], that are judged capable of being then
> removed. (E2-5 II.xxi.40: 257)
> 
> 


Locke therefore assumes that uneasinesses can be ranked in order of
intensity or strength, and that among all the uneasinesses importuning
an agent, the one that ordinarily determines her will is the one that
exerts the greatest pressure on her mind. The picture with which
Locke appears to be working is of a mind that is the playground of
various forces of varying strengths exerting different degrees of
influence on the will, where the will is determined by the strongest
of those forces.


Notice, however, Locke's use of the word
"ordinarily". Sometimes, as Locke emphasizes, the will
is *not* determined by the most pressing uneasiness:



> For the mind having in most cases, as is
> evident in Experience, a power to *suspend* the execution and
> satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is
> at liberty to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides,
> and weigh them with others. (E2-5 II.xxi.47: 263)
> 
> 


This is the doctrine of suspension. On this view, we agents have
the "power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from
determining the *will*, and engaging us in action" (E2-5
II.xxi.50: 266). As Locke makes clear, this power to prevent the
will's determination, that is, this power to avoid willing, is
absent when the action proposed is to be done presently and involves
the continuation or stopping of a process in which one is currently
engaged (see Section 6 above). But when it
comes to "chusing a remote [i.e., future] Good as an end to be
pursued", agents are "at Liberty in respect
of *willing*" (E5 II.xxi.56:
270).[7]


Some commentators (e.g., Chappell 1994: 118) think that, at least
in E5, Locke comes to see that the doctrine of suspension conflicts
with his answer to the question of whether we are free to will what we
will (raised in II.xxi.25). This is because they take Locke's
answer to the latter question to be negative, and take the doctrine of
suspension to entail a positive answer to the same question, at least
with respect to some actions. But there are good reasons to think that
there is no inconsistency here: for Locke's answer to the
II.xxi.25 question is arguably in the affirmative
(see Section 7
above).[8]


Commentators also wonder whether the doctrine of suspension
introduces an account of freedom that differs from Locke's
official account, both in E1 and in E2-5. The problem is that Locke
says that "in [the power to suspend the prosecution of
one's desires] lies the liberty Man has", that the power
to suspend is "the source of all liberty" (E2-5 II.xxi.47:
263), that it is "the hinge on which turns the *liberty*
of intellectual Beings" (E2-5 II.xxi.52: 266), and that it is
"the great inlet, and exercise of all the *liberty* Men
have, are capable of, or can be useful to them" (E2-5 II.xxi.52:
267). These passages suggest that Locke takes freedom to *be*
(something intimately related to) the power to suspend our desires, a
power that cannot simply be *identified* with the two-way power
that Locke identifies with freedom of action at II.xxi.8 ff. (see
Yaffe 2000: 12-74).


But there is a simple interpretation of these passages that does
not require us to read Locke as offering a different account of
freedom as the ability to suspend. The power to suspend is the power
to keep one's will from being determined, that is, the power to
forbear willing to do *A* if one wills to forbear willing to
do *A*. This is just one part of the freedom to will to
do *A*, according to Locke's definition of freedom of
action applied to the action of willing to do *A*. (The other
part is the power to will to do *A* if one wills to will to
do *A*.) Thus if, as Locke seems to argue in II.xxi.23-24,
we are (except under very unusual circumstances) free with respect to
the act of willing with respect to a future course of action, then it
follows immediately that we have the power to suspend. Locke's
claims about the power to suspend being the source of all liberty and
the hinge on which liberty turns can be understood as claims that the
power to suspend is a particularly important aspect of freedom of
action as applied to the action of willing. What makes it important is
the fact that it is the misuse of this freedom that accounts for our
responsibility for actions that conduce to our own unhappiness or
misery.


How so? Locke claims that the power of suspension was given to us
(by God) for a reason, so that we might "examine, view, and
judge, of the good or evil of what we are going to do" (E2-5
II.xxi.47: 263) in order to discover



> whether that particular thing, which is then proposed,
> or desired, lie in the way to [our] main end, and make a real part of
> that which is [our] greatest good. (E2-5 II.xxi.52:
> 267)
> 
> 


When we make the kinds of mistakes for which we deserve punishment,
such as falling into gluttony or envy or selfishness, it is not
because we have, after deliberation and investigation, perhaps through
no fault of our own, acquired a mistaken view of the facts; it is
because we engage in "a too hasty compliance with our
desires" (E2-5 II.xxi.53: 268) and fail to "hinder blind
Precipitancy" (E2-5 II.xxi.67: 279). What matters is not that
we have failed to will the forbearing to will to go to the movies or
clean the fridge. What matters is that we have failed to will the
forbearing to prosecute our most pressing desires, allowing ourselves
to be guided by uneasinesses that might, for all we know, lead us to
evil. If we have the power to suspend the prosecution of our desires
(including our most pressing desire), then we misuse it when we do not
exercise it (or when we fail to exercise it when its exercise is
called for). So, not only is Locke's doctrine of suspension
consistent with his account of the freedom to will, it also provides
part of the answer to Molyneux's worry:



> And here we may see how it comes to pass, that
> a Man may justly incur punishment...: Because, by a too hasty
> choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of
> good and evil...He has vitiated his own Palate, and must be
> answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from
> it. (E2-5 II.xxi.56: 
>  270-271)[9]
> 
> 


## 10. Compatibilism or Incompatibilism?


Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with
causal determinism, and incompatibilism is the thesis that free will
is incompatible with causal determinism. Is Locke a compatibilist or
an incompatibilist?


The fact that Locke thinks that freedom of action is compatible
with the will's being determined by uneasiness might immediately
suggest that Locke is a compatibilist. But, as we have seen
(Section 8 above), it is illegitimate to infer
compatibility with causal determinism from compatibility with
determination of the will by uneasiness. Still, the evidence strongly
suggests that Locke would have embraced compatibilism, if the issue
had been put to him directly. Freedom of action, on Locke's
account, is a matter of being able to do what one wills and being able
to forbear what one wills to forbear. Although we sometimes act under
necessity (compulsion or restraint--E1-5 II.xxi.13: 240), the
mere fact (if it is a fact) that our actions are determined by the
laws of nature and antecedent events does not threaten our freedom
with respect to their performance. As Locke makes clear, if the door
to my room is unlocked, I am free with respect to the act of leaving
the room, because I have the ability to stay or leave as I will. It is
only when the door is locked, or when I am chained, or when my path is
blocked, or something else deprives me of the ability to stay or
leave, that I am unfree with respect to the act of leaving.
Determinism *by itself* represents no threat to our freedom of
action. In this respect, Locke is a forerunner of many other
compatibilist theories of freedom, including, for example, those of
G.E. Moore (1912) and A.J. Ayer (1954). (For a contrary view, see
Schouls 1992: 121. And for a response to Schouls 1992, see Davidson
2003: 213 ff.)