## 1. The Scope of Medieval Political Philosophy



"Medieval" refers primarily to Europe (the term being
applied to other cultures by analogy). Medieval philosophy includes
the "pre-scholastic", "scholastic" and
"late scholastic" periods.



"Scholasticism" refers to the intellectual culture
characteristic of the medieval schools. In the twelfth century
schooling became a flourishing industry in Paris, Bologna and many
other places. By the early thirteenth century the masters of the
schools in some places had formed corporations generally called
 universities.[3]
 The working language of the schools was Latin, and teachers and
students were clergy. The universities got a great boost from the
translation into Latin of the works of
 Aristotle,
 commentaries on Aristotle and related works in Greek or Arabic. These
translations were made and copied because there was a public whose
interest in Aristotle had been formed by the schools of the twelfth
century, in which some works of Aristotle that had been translated
earlier (part of the *logica vetus*, the "old
logic") were already objects of close study. In the
universities, philosophy was studied in the Arts faculties, but
philosophy was developed and employed also in the faculties of
theology. The study of law was important in medieval universities and
ideas derived from the law were influential in political thinking.
Writers on political philosophy used a number of the literary genres
characteristic of scholasticism, such as the commentary, the disputed
question, the dialogue, and the treatise (see the entry on
 literary forms of medieval philosophy).



"Late scholasticism" conventionally begins with the
fourteenth century and overlaps with the early modern period. The
people we think of as the early modern philosophers were trained in
the universities (or, in Descartes' case, in a Jesuit school),
but they wrote mostly outside the universities and mostly in
vernacular languages. Philosophy of the scholastic kind continued,
taught and written in Latin, throughout the seventeenth century in the
universities, especially in Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, in the
Jesuit schools in many countries, and in some Protestant schools.



The "pre-scholastic" medieval period includes
 Abelard
 (1079-1142), and
 Anselm
 (1033-1109) and the writers of the Carolingian age, but it is
difficult to say how far back this period should be traced. Perhaps it
should include
 Boethius
 (c. 475/7-526) and Augustine, who were deeply influential in
Europe from their own time until the end of the middle ages (and
beyond), though they might also be regarded as belonging to late
Antiquity. Boethius had written or translated from Greek into Latin
some of the logical works studied in the twelfth century schools;
Augustine was the dominant influence in medieval theology. Boethius
wrote nothing directly relevant to political philosophy, but Augustine
certainly did, so for the purposes of this article
"medieval" begins with Augustine.



By medieval *political* philosophy we understand the medieval
writings on politics that are recognizably akin to the modern writings
we class as political philosophy. Their authors were usually academics
who wrote with university-educated readers in mind; they drew upon
ideas explored in the schools and they wrote in an academic way. Some
wrote commentaries on Aristotle's *Politics* and academic
"disputed questions" related to topics of political
philosophy. However, political philosophy was not part of the
university core curriculum (Miethke 2000b). The authors of political
writings generally did not write these works in the course of their
teaching duties. Generally they wrote in response to some political
event. Some wrote for the edification of a king or other ruler, others
sought to influence conflicts between the Church and secular rulers,
others were concerned with conflicts within the Church about the
constitution of the Church and the powers of popes and councils. Often
they were committed to one or other side in these conflicts--many
clerics supported secular rulers in their conflicts with the
Church.



This article describes the most important sources of medieval
political ideas and the work of some of the most interesting writers.
The main sources were the Bible, the Fathers of the Church, the
textbooks of canon and civil law, and the works of Aristotle,
especially the *Politics*. Sections 2 and 3 will outline what
medieval political thought took from the Bible and the Fathers.
Sections 4 and 5 will sketch the ideas of political thinkers of the
pre-scholastic period, including Augustine. Sections 6 and 7 will
sketch the sources that became influential during the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, namely Aristotle and the law textbooks. Section
8 will outline one of the main issues of medieval political thought
from the thirteenth century onwards, namely the political power of the
pope. Section 9 will outline the work of a major thirteenth century
writer, Thomas Aquinas. Sections 10-14 will be concerned with
writers on political philosophy during the 14th and
15th centuries, including Marsilius of Padua and William of
Ockham.


## 2. The Bible



For medieval Christians the Bible was what we call the Vulgate, a
Latin translation of the Old Testament (as Christians called the
Jewish scriptures) and the New
 Testament.[4]
 The Protestant reformers have persuaded many that the Bible was
neglected during the middle ages--according to Luther the Bible
"has come to lie forgotten in the dust under the bench"
(see Luther [1539] 1915: vol. 1, 7; cf.
 2 Kings 22:8).
 However, the many copies of the Bible made during the middle ages,
the many commentaries on books of the Bible made by medieval scholars
and the constant references to the Bible in their writings show that
the Bible was a very familiar book.


### 2.1 Obedience to the Powers That Be



Political ideas conveyed by the Bible include the following:


* The human race is normally ruled by kings or emperors. There are very
few traces of republican institutions in the Bible. (There is one
exception:
 1 Machabees 8:14-16
 is an admiring description of Roman republican government.)
* Kings are very often wicked tyrants and enemies of God. The peoples
often share the vices of their rulers.
* The kingship of King David is a model (though David also often
sinned).
* Subjects must obey rulers, even the wicked. It is wrong to rebel, and
especially to make any attack on the person of the ruler--see
 2 Samuel 1:14-16.
* But obedience to rulers is always limited by obedience to the commands
of God.



The New Testament writers teach that Christians must obey their
rulers: 



> 
> 
> Let every soul be subject to higher powers: for there is no power but
> from God: and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that
> resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that
> resist, purchase to themselves damnation. ... For he is
> God's minister to thee, for good. But if thou do that which is
> evil, fear: for he beareth not the sword in vain. For he is
> God's minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth
> evil. Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but also
> for conscience' sake.
>  (Romans 13:1-5)
>  
> 
> 
> 
> Be ye subject therefore to every human creature for God's sake:
> whether it be to the king as excelling; or to governors as sent by him
> ... For so is the will of God.
>  (1 Peter 2:13-15)
>  
> 
> 
> 



In the seventeenth century most Protestants and some Catholics
inferred from these texts that subjects always have a religious duty
to obey their rulers, reconciling this with the text "We ought
to obey God, rather than men"
 (Acts 5:29)
 by means of a doctrine of "passive
 obedience".[5]
 Some of the Fathers and the Carolingian writers held a similar
position, but most scholastic authors, under the influence of ideas
drawn partly from Aristotle and partly from the law texts, held that
under some circumstances disobedience and rebellion may be
justified.


### 2.2 Slavery



New Testament writers say that whether a Christian is slave or free is
a matter indifferent: 



> 
> 
> Let every man abide in the same calling in which he was called. Wast
> thou called, being a bondman? care not for it ... For he that is
> called in the Lord, being a bondman, is the freeman of the Lord.
> Likewise he that is called, being free, is the bondman of Christ.
>  (1 Corinthians 7:20-22)
> 
> 
> 
> There is neither Jew nor Greek: there is neither bond nor free: there
> is neither male nor female. For you are all one in Christ Jesus.
>  (Galatians 3:28)
>  
> 
> 
> 



The ancient Cynics and
 Stoics
 also held that a slave may attain virtue and happiness, since the
essential freedom of a human being is not incompatible with external
constraint.



Since being a slave is a matter indifferent, Christianity did not
condemn slavery. Several New Testament texts exhort slaves to
obedience (the Vulgate *servi*, which is normally and properly
translated "slaves", is in the Douai version translated
"servants"): 



> 
> 
> Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the
> good and gentle, but also to the froward.
>  (1 Peter 2:18)
> 
> 
> 
> Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the
> flesh, with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as to
> Christ.
>  (Ephesians 6:5;
>  cf.
>  Colossians 3:22)
>  
> 
> 
> 



Paul wrote a letter to the Christian slave owner, Philemon, exhorting
him to treat well a fugitive slave "whom I have sent back to
thee"
 (Philemon 1:12).


### 2.3 Property



"Thou shalt not steal" was one of the ten commandments
 (Exodus 20:15).
 Medieval writers assumed that the institution of private property was
normal and right and that property should be respected. However, the
New Testament encouraged voluntary poverty: 



> 
> 
> Jesus saith to him: If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast,
> and give to the poor...Then Jesus said to his disciples: Amen, I
> say to you, that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of
> heaven. And again I say to you: It is easier for a camel to pass
> through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the
> kingdom of heaven.
>  (Matthew 19:21-24;
>  cf.
>  Luke 18:22)
>  
> 
> 
> 



The New Testament also seemed to recommend voluntary communism as an
ideal. The early Christian community in Jerusalem 



> 
> 
> had but one heart and one soul: neither did any one say that aught of
> the things which he possessed, was his own; but all things were common
> unto them. ... neither was there any one needy among them. For as
> many as were owners of lands or houses, sold them, and brought the
> price of the things they sold, and laid it down before the feet of the
> apostles. And distribution was made to every one, according as he had
> need.
>  (Acts 4:32-35;
>  cf.
>  Acts 2:44-45)
>  
> 
> 
> 



The leading institutions of medieval Europe included monasticism and
other forms of religious life based on a vow of poverty and communal
living.


### 2.4 Pacifism



The New Testament included texts that seemed to forbid Christians to
use force: 



> 
> 
> But I say to you not to resist evil: but if one strike thee on thy
> right cheek, turn to him also the other...Love your enemies: do
> good to them that hate you: and pray for them that persecute and
> calumniate you.
>  (Matthew 5:39-44).
> 
> 
> 


### 2.5 Christ's Kingdom



Medieval Christians held that Christ was in some sense a
 king.[6]
 However, Jesus said "My kingdom is not of this world"
 (John 18:36),
 and he seemed to recommend obedience to the Roman Emperor:
"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's;
and to God, the things that are God's"
 (Matthew 22:21).
 None of Christ's followers would have power over the others:




> 
> 
> You know that the princes of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they
> that are the greater, exercise power upon them. It shall not be so
> among you.
>  (Matthew 20:25-26)
>  
> 
> 
> 
> Be not you called rabbi. For one is your master, and all you are
> brethren. And call none your father upon earth: for one is your
> father, who is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters: for one is
> your master, Christ.
>  (Matthew 23:8-10)
>  
> 
> 
> 



Despite these texts the clergy accepted titles of honour and claimed
authority and power: the Church saw itself as Christ's kingdom
on earth, and claimed a share in Christ's power.



Paul's text, 



> 
> 
> For what have I to do to judge them that are without? Do not you judge
> them that are within? For them that are without, God will judge,
>  (1 Corinthians 5:12-13)
>  
> 
> 
> 



was usually taken to imply that the Church has no jurisdiction over
non-Christians ("them that are without", i.e., outside the
Church).


## 3. The Fathers of the Church



The Christian theologians of late antiquity are referred to as the
Fathers of the
 Church.[7]
 The most influential of them in medieval Europe was Augustine; others
included Cyprian, Ambrose and Gregory. The Greek Fathers (Origen,
Chrysostom, etc.) were not so influential at first, but during the
scholastic period many of their writings were translated into
 Latin.[8]
 The Fathers were influential partly through their *originalia*
(i.e., their original writings in their complete text), but perhaps
more through extracts included in "glosses" on the Bible
and in anthologies and through extensive quotations made by later
writers. Many of the Fathers were influenced by the Platonism and
 Stoicism
 that every educated person became acquainted with in the ancient
world. Augustine was particularly influenced by Platonism, in the
version modern scholars call
 Neoplatonism,
 and by
 Plotinus
 especially.



The Fathers passed down to the middle ages the idea that certain key
social institutions were not part of God's original plan for
mankind, namely the institutions of coercive government, slavery and
property. The idea found in
 Seneca
 and other ancient Stoics of a Golden Age had a parallel in Christian
thinking, namely the age of innocence in the Garden of Eden, from
which mankind were expelled because of the sin of Adam and Eve (the
 "Fall").[9]
 Just as Seneca ([c. 60 CE] 1917-25: vol. II, 397,
*Letter* 90) held that originally there would have been no need
for coercion, since human beings would voluntarily have accepted the
guidance of the wise, and no need for property, since no one would
have sought to control more resources than they needed to support a
temperate way of life, and no slavery, since a slave is a human being
treated as property, so, according to the Fathers, these institutions
would not have existed if Adam had not sinned. But because of sin they
do exist, both as a result of sinfulness (the power-hungry and greedy
amass coercive power and property), and as a necessary and justified
remedy for sin--ideally, governments should use coercion to
repress wrongdoing, with slavery used only as a punishment, milder
than execution, for wrongdoing, and property should be of moderate
extent, its purpose being to protect possession of necessities from
the greed of those who would otherwise try to control everything.



The common opinion on coercive government and slavery was expressed by
Augustine. God 



> 
> 
> did not intend that ...[man] should have lordship over any but
> irrational creatures: not man over man, but man over the beasts.
> Hence, the first just men were established as shepherds of flocks,
> rather than as kings of men. (*City of God*, XIX.15, p. 942;
> page references are to the translation by Dyson [1998]) 
> 
> 
> 



He goes on to say that slavery is a just punishment for sin, and that
*servi* are so called because "those who might [justly]
have been slain under the laws of war were sometimes spared"
[*servabantur*].



On property, Gratian's *Decretum* (c. 1140) included a
passage from Ambrose: 



> 
> 
> But he says, 'Why is it unjust if I diligently look after my own
> things as long as I do not seize other people's? O impudent
> words! ... No one should say 'my own' of what is
> common; if more than what suffices is taken, it is obtained with
> violence. Who is as unjust and as avaricious, as he who makes the food
> [*alimenta*] of the multitude not for his own use, but for his
> abundance and luxuries? The bread which you hold back belongs to the
> needy. (D. 47 c. 8; Tierney 1959: 34) 
> 
> 
> 



Thus even now that property exists, things are in some sense
"common", and the amount of property individuals may
legitimately keep for their own use is limited.


## 4. Augustine


### 4.1 The City of God



The work of Augustine's most likely to be known to modern
students of political thought is *The City of God*. Although
this work was often copied in the middle ages (382 manuscripts have
 survived),[10]
 a reading of the whole work was never part of the university
curriculum. Extracts from it were included in influential anthologies,
such as Gratian's *Decretum* and Peter Lombard's
*Sentences* (c.
 1150).[11]




Two cities, the city of God and the earthly city, are distinguished by
two loves, love of God and (misdirected) love of self, and by two
destinies, heaven and hell. Augustine's most famous contribution
to theology was the doctrine of predestination, a position that only
became pronounced later in life. God has decreed from all eternity
that to some he will give the grace (special help) needed to attain
eternal salvation, while the rest of mankind (the majority) will go to
eternal damnation--the *massa damnata* (*City of
God*, XXI.12, p. 1070). Salvation requires the grace of
"final perseverance", i.e., the grace of being in
friendship with God at the moment of death. Some who live well for
most of their lives may fall away at the very end. Thus we cannot tell
for sure who is predestined to salvation. Since the city of God
consists of those predestined to salvation, we cannot be sure of its
membership. The city of God is not identical with the Church, since
not all members of the Church will be saved. The earthly city is not
identical with any particular state, since some members of a state may
be predestined to salvation. A particular state may include citizens
of both cities.



Although the members of the two cities have different ultimate values,
they may have intermediate ends in common--for example, they all
desire peace on earth. Insofar as any particular state serves such
common ends it will have the cooperation of members of the city of God
(*City of God*, XIX.17, p. 945-7). As a Platonist
Augustine thought in terms of a hierarchy of levels of reality, in
which lower levels imitate or reflect the higher levels.
Augustine's is not a philosophy of "black and
white", of stark opposition between the forces of light and the
forces of darkness--this was the Manichean philosophy, to which
Augustine at one time subscribed, until the reading of certain works
of the Platonists had led him to reject it. According to Augustine
there is no absolute evil (see *City of God* XI.22, XII.2, 3,
7;
 *Confessions* VII.xii.18-xiii.19;
 Enchiridion 11-12). Anything evil must be to some extent good, or it could
not exist at all. Its evil consists in disorder or misdirection, in
its failing to attain all the goodness appropriate to it. 



> 
> 
> The peace of all things lies in the tranquillity of order, and order
> is the disposition of equal and unequal things in such a way as to
> give to each its proper place. (*City of God*, XIX.13, p. 938)
> 
> 
> 
> 



There are many orderings and sub-orderings, and there are therefore
different kinds or levels of peace, and (for beings capable of moral
choice) different kinds or levels of virtue, justice and
 happiness.[12]




True virtue presupposes obedience to the true God. But something like
true virtue, namely love of honour, may lead to something like justice
and peace, as it did in the Roman Republic (*City of God*,
V.12). Earlier, Augustine had offered to prove that by Cicero's
definition, the Romans never had a republic: "I shall attempt to
show that no such commonwealth ever existed, because true justice was
never present in it" (*City of God* II.21, p. 80; see
also the entry on
 ancient political philosophy
 (SS6. Cicero and the Roman Republic), since the Romans did not
obey the true God (cf. XIX.21). But this is only an *argumentum ad
hominem*. As Augustine says, "There was, of course,
according to a more practicable definition, a commonwealth of a
sort" (II.21, p. 80). It is only by an unduly narrow definition
that it can be said that non-Christians cannot form a commonwealth.
Motivated by love of honour, the Romans were able to live together in
an approximation to peace, justice and happiness, though not in
"true" peace, justice and happiness. Justice in some
measure is essential to anything that deserves to be called a
commonwealth. 



> 
> 
> Justice removed, then, what are kingdoms but great bands of
> robbers?... It was a pertinent and true answer which was made to
> Alexander the Great by a pirate whom he had seized. When the king
> asked him what he meant by infesting the sea, the pirate defiantly
> replied: "The same as you do when you infest the whole world;
> but because I do it with a little ship I am called a robber, and
> because you do it with a great fleet, you are an emperor".
> (*City of God*, IV.4, p. 147-8)
> 
> 
> 



Some medieval writers, whom some modern historians have called
"Political
 Augustinians",[13]
 inferred from Augustine's discussion of Cicero's
definition of a republic that among non-Christians there can be no
community. According to
 Giles of Rome
 (d. 1316), among others, non-Christians can have no property rights
and no political rights, since such things presuppose membership of a
community, and only Christians can form a true community. But the
views of these so-called Political Augustinians were generally
rejected by other medieval political thinkers.



We should not infer that Augustine believed only good Christians can
be rulers. Nevertheless, he believes that Christian virtue, if
observed, makes for better government (*City of God*, V.24, p.
232).



Among medieval Christians there were at least three views of the goods
and evils of government:


* Government may be, and should be, rule by the ideal Christian ruler,
whom Protestants later called "the godly prince"; such a
ruler would lead his people in obedience to God.
* Government may be simply a wicked tyranny, an expression of the
"earthly city". As Pope Gregory VII (1081) once wrote:




> 
> 
> Who does not know that kings and dukes had their rulership from those
> who, not knowing God, strove from blind greed and intolerable
> presumption to dominate their equals, namely mankind, by pride,
> rapine, perfidy, murder, and crimes of all sorts, urged on by the
> ruler of the world, i.e., the devil? (Gregory VII 1081: 552; see also
> Poole 1920: 201, fn. 5)
> 
> 
>
* Government exists to organise the cooperation of "men of good
will" (to use a modern phrase), i.e., citizens of the two cities
united by an interest in earthly peace and other earthly goods valued
by both Christians and others. Such a limited view of the goals of
government is found in Marsilius and Ockham (McGrade 1974:
109-33).



All three views could find support in *The City of God*.


### 4.2 Warfare



Augustine insists, against the Manichees, that the God of the Old
Testament is the same God as the God of the New Testament. One of the
most striking differences between the two testaments was in relation
to warfare. In the Old Testament God permits, in fact requires, the
Israelites to engage in massacres. In the land God has given to the
Israelites, the inhabitants of a city that surrenders will be
enslaved, but if the city resists, "you shall not leave a single
soul alive"
 (Deuteronomy 20:11, 16).
 "You must utterly destroy them; you shall make no covenant with
them, and show no mercy to them"
 (Deuteronomy 7:2).
 If in some Israelite city some inhabitants practice idolatry,
"you shall surely put the inhabitants of that city to the sword,
destroying it utterly, all who are in it and its cattle"
 (Deuteronomy 13:16).
 Moses himself carried out a massacre of Israelites who had practiced
idolatry
 (Exodus 32:25-9).
 Moses was angry when the Israelites spared women and children, and
ordered them to kill all the prisoners except the virgins, whom they
could keep for themselves
 (Numbers 31:13-18).
 Samuel was angry with Saul when the army let some animals live; for
that sin, God deprived Saul of the kingdom
 (1 Samuel 15).
 Samuel himself hewed a prisoner to pieces
 (1 Kings 15:32-3).
 In the New Testament, in contrast, Christ says: "if one strike
thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other"
 (Matthew 5:39).
 Can the New Testament be reconciled with the Old Testament? On
Augustine's view, the two Testaments must be reconcilable, since
everything in the Bible is true.



According to Augustine, God may treat his creatures as he pleases, and
the Israelites accordingly did no wrong in carrying out God's
commands. (As medieval authors often put it, God is "lord of
life and death".) On the other hand, the New Testament's
apparently pacifist injunctions relate to inner attitude, rather than
to outward act. 



> 
> 
> These precepts pertain rather to the inward disposition of the heart
> than to the actions which are done in the sight of men, requiring us,
> in the inmost heart, to cherish patience along with benevolence, but
> in outward action to do what seems most likely to benefit those whose
> good we ought to seek. ([412]
>  *Letter* 138.2.13)[14]
> 
> 
> 
> 



Those whose good we ought to seek include ourselves, and also our
enemies, and coercion and punishment may benefit them, so we may war
against them for their own good, as well as for our own. Private
individuals may not make war, but rulers, including Christians, may do
so, and Christian soldiers may serve in such wars in obedience to a
ruler, even a pagan. Augustine emphasizes that both rulers and those
who do military service in obedience to rulers must avoid hatred,
greed and other dispositions incompatible with love. Although
scattered across different texts, thanks in part to the success of the
*Decretum*, Augustine offered later writers a Christianised
version of the Roman theory of the just
 war.[15]



### 4.3 Coercion of Heretics



In accordance with Augustine's view of warfare, Christians were
entitled to ask the Roman authorities, including those among them who
were Christian, for military protection against the violence of
heretics and anti-Christians. But it was a further step to ask the
authorities to coerce heretics to convert them to orthodox
 Christianity.[16]
 At first Augustine disapproved of such coercion: "A man cannot
believe unless he is willing"
 (*Tractates on the Gospel of John*, XXVI.2).
 But after a while he was persuaded and became an advocate of the use
of force to "compel them to come in"
 (Luke 14:16-24).[17]
 He was persuaded by converted Donatists who expressed gratitude to
those who had compelled them to convert
 (*Letter* 93 V.17-19).



According to Augustine, the property of heretical sects may rightly be
confiscated
 (*Tractates on the Gospel of John*, VI.25),
 in which Augustine justifies government seizure of Donatist property.
He does not argue that only orthodox Christians can rightly possess
property. Rather, his point is that whoever possesses property
possesses it only by virtue of human laws made by kings and emperors.
Therefore, if the ruler decides to confiscate the property of
heretics, he has the right to do so. This passage, which Gratian
quoted in the *Decretum* (D. 8 c. 1), was often used in the
middle ages to support the doctrine that property exists only by human
law. Gratian's extensive use of Augustine in the
*Decretum* arguably greatly increased Augustine's
influence on the topic of warfare, property, and the coercion of
heretics (for Augustine's views on property, see MacQueen
1972).


## 5. Carolingian Political Thought



The period in the history of Latin Europe after that of the
"Fathers of the Church" has traditionally been called the
"dark age", because very few writings were produced then.
It was followed by what has sometimes been called "The
Carolingian Renaissance", associated with the court of
Charlemagne, toward the end of the eighth century. The political
writers of the ninth century--e.g., Hincmar of Rheims (c.
805/6-81), Rabanus Maurus (780-856), Jonas of
Orleans (c. 780-842/3)--are not household names, yet
they gave expression to ideas that were important throughout the rest
of the middle ages, in particular ideas about the role of a king and
the difference between king and
 tyrant.[18]




According to these writers, the king is in some sense a religious
figure (Oakley 2010: 143ff.). This meant that the king could involve
himself in religious matters much more than would later be acceptable
to the medieval church, but it also meant that the king was to be
instructed in his duties by the clergy. Some of the writings of this
period belong to what modern scholars call the "mirror of
princes" genre. An early example was written by Jonas of
Orleans (1983) in about 831, which is a good example, too, of
how the genre was rarely limited to only discussions of the secular
 power.[19]
 Writers taught the king that he had a duty to do justice. This was
often construed as meaning that the king had a duty to enforce and
also to obey the law, and the law was thought of as partly custom,
partly royal decree, but also as something based on the consent of the
 people.[20]
 It was suggested--notably, e.g., by Hincmar of Rheims--that
a king might be deposed if he failed to obey the laws and lost the
consent of the people (Carlyle and Carlyle 1903: vol. 1,
242-52).


## 6. Civil and Canon Law



Historians point to another "renaissance" (i.e., another
stage in the re-appropriation of the culture of antiquity) during the
twelfth century. This "renaissance of the twelfth century"
included a revival in the study of civil law, i.e., the Roman law as
codified and digested by Justinian and his officials (the *Corpus
iuris civilis*, 533/4),[21]
 and this stimulated and influenced the study of canon law, beginning
with Gratian's
 *Decretum*.[22]




Ideas that medieval political thinkers took--in different ways
and to different degrees--from the law texts included the
following:


* A distinction among kinds of laws, namely natural law (*ius
naturale*), law of nations (*ius gentium*), and civil law
(i.e., the law of a particular community). The law textbooks were
perhaps the main source of the idea of natural law, so important to
later medieval political thought. This idea can be traced back to
Cicero, to the Stoics, and to Aristotle, but most medieval political
philosophers encountered it in Gratian's *Decretum*. (As
a rule, medieval theologians and philosophers evince a greater
familiarity with the collections of canon law than with the *Corpus
iuris civilis*.)
* A notion of rights, including natural rights ("human
rights" as we would say), attributable to individuals. It is
noteworthy that the language of rights, without which many people
these days would not know how to talk about politics, did not fully
enter political philosophy until the fourteenth century as a borrowing
from the
 law.[23]
* A belief in "the one liberty of all men", that is, the
idea that human beings are basically equal and that slavery is
contrary to natural law, though in accordance with the law of
 nations.[24]
* An account, or rather two accounts, of the origin of property:
according to some Roman law texts, property originated by natural law;
according to others by the law of
 nations.[25]
 According to canon law, property exists by human law (which includes
the law of nations and the civil law); compare Augustine's
statement that property exists by the laws of the emperors
 (SS4.3
 above).[26]
* A canon law doctrine that human law cannot altogether abolish the
original commonness of things under natural law. Property owners must
help the poor (see Ambrose, end of
 SS3
 above), and in cases of necessity, a person may assert the natural
right to use anything needed to sustain
 life.[27]
* The doctrine that the source of political authority is the people, who
have, however, entrusted their power to the emperor or other
 ruler.[28]
* The doctrine that either the pope or emperor (or both) has a
"fullness of power" (see
 SS8
 below).
* The doctrine that natural law permits an individual to resist force by
force (*Digest* 1.1.3; D. 1 c. 7, trans. in Gratian [c. 1140]
1993: 7). This doctrine would provide a premise for arguments for the
right to resist a tyrannical government, used later by
 Locke.
* A distinction between Church and State--more exactly, between the
priesthood and the power of the emperor, each independent in its own
sphere, though the priesthood has the higher function. The classic
place for this doctrine is the canon *Duo
 sunt*.[29]
 Another canon, *Cum ad verum*, gave reasons for the
separation: mutual limitation of their powers would restrain the pride
of priest and emperor, and those on God's service (the clergy)
should be kept free of worldly entanglements (D. 96 c. 6; translated
in Tierney 1980: 14-15). This was also the force of the canons
*Sicut enim* and *Te
 quidem*.[30]
* Various legal ideas relating to
 corporations[31]
 and representation (including the distinction between a head's
capacity as head and his private capacity), the need for meetings to
deal with common concerns ("what touches everyone must be
discussed and approved by
 everyone"),[32]
 and majority decision (or some qualified version thereof) when there
is no unanimity (decision by "the greater and sounder
 part").[33]



Of these points, what was probably most important for medieval
political philosophy was the idea of natural law.


### 6.1 Natural Law and Natural Rights



Complex reflections on natural law were prompted by a text of Isidore
of Seville (quoted in D. 1 c. 7; Gratian 1993: 6-7). According
to Isidore, natural law includes 



> 
> 
> the common possession of all things, the one liberty of all, and the
> acquisition of what is taken from air, land and sea; also, the
> restitution of a thing or money left for safekeeping. 
> 
> 
> 



The common possession of all things seems inconsistent with the
acquisition and restitution of property.



One of the early commentators on Gratian, Rufinus, distinguished
within natural law between commands or prohibitions, to which there
can be no exceptions, and "indications"
(*demonstrationes*) pointing out what is better but not always
obligatory. Thus natural law not only lays down rules but also
recommends ideals. The "one liberty of all men" and
"common possession of all things" belong to the
"indications". Since the indications do not impose strict
obligations, human laws can for good reasons set them aside. To do so
may even serve the recommended ideals, under some circumstances. 



> 
> 
> For example... it was established that those who pertinaciously
> rebelled against those who have authority over them would be
> perpetually slaves when defeated and captured in war... that
> [they]... should thereafter become gentle... 
> 
> 
> 



--a purpose recommended by natural law (trans. Lewis 1954: vol.
1, 38; see Tierney 2014: 23-8).



One of the founders of Franciscan theology, Alexander of Hales,
reported Rufinus's distinction and a similar distinction by Hugh
of St Victor (Alexander of Hales [c. 1240] 1948: vol. 4, 348,
351-2) but also suggested another way of resolving the
inconsistency in Isidore's list, based on Augustine's
explanation of how the same God can be the author of the Old Law and
of the New: namely, that the same principles may require different
particular rules for different
 circumstances.[34]
 According to Alexander, Isidore's list is not inconsistent
after all, since natural law prescribes community for the state of
innocence and respect for property for the fallen
 state.[35]
 The leading Franciscan theologian of the next generation,
Bonaventure, adopted a similar
 position.[36]




Building on these ideas, Ockham developed a distinction between three
kinds of natural law, according to which some principles of natural
law apply everywhere and always, some applied only in the state of
innocence, and some apply only "on supposition", viz. on
the supposition of some voluntary act (e.g., an agreement or an act of
legislation), unless those concerned agree on something else. Thus
"the common possession of all things, the one liberty of
all" belonged to the natural law in the state of innocence, but
"the acquisition of what is taken from air, land and sea; also,
the restitution of a thing or money left for safekeeping"
belonged to natural law "on supposition"--supposing
Adam's sin, and supposing that human law has since made a
division of property, it is a requirement of natural law to respect
others' property (William of Ockham, *Letter*:
286-93; commentary in Kilcullen 2001a, Tierney 2014:
103-16). Many things that belong to the law of nations are also
natural laws of the third kind.



Besides natural law, scholastic thinkers developed a notion of natural
rights, borrowing the notion of a right from the canon lawyers. A
natural right may be simply something that natural law requires or
permits. But according to some, natural rights to certain freedoms
belong to natural law "positively", in the sense that
there is a presumption in their favour, so that they cannot be
abolished, at least not for all circumstances, or cannot be abolished
except for good reasons. Medieval natural rights foreshadow modern
"human rights" (Tierney 1997; Makinen and Korkman
2006; Makinen 2010; Kilcullen 2010c,d; and Robinson 2014a).


## 7. Aristotle's Politics



Another aspect of the "renaissance of the twelfth century"
was the translation into Latin of many Greek and Arabic philosophical
and scientific writings (see the section on "new
translations" in the entry on
 medieval philosophy).
 The market for these translations included the teachers, students and
alumni of the urban schools, which in the early thirteenth century
began to form universities. The universities set the curriculum
followed in the schools of the town, and, given Aristotle's
fame, competition for students between the schools of different towns
soon meant that Aristotle's works became the main element in the
Arts curriculum (despite the misgivings of the theologians, who noted
the conflicts between Aristotle's philosophy and Christian
belief).



In their interpretations of Aristotle's natural philosophy and
metaphysics and in philosophical thinking generally, the medieval
schools were much influenced by Muslim and Jewish thinkers. This was
not true, however, in political philosophy. By some accident of
transmission, the Islamic world does not seem to have known
Aristotle's *Politics*, but the Muslims did become
acquainted with Plato's *Republic*--which, however,
was not translated into Latin during the middle ages. In Arabic there
was a good deal of political philosophy showing the influence of Plato
(for some information, see the entry on
 Greek Sources in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy),[37]
 but it had little or no influence over political philosophy in
medieval Europe.



Aristotle's *Politics* was translated into Latin for the
first time in the mid-1260s by William of Moerbeke (Schutrumpf
2014) (An incomplete translation had been made a few years earlier,
possibly by Moerbeke, and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, some parts
of which relate to politics, had been translated by
 Robert Grosseteste
 a little earlier.) Although the *Politics* did not become part
of the core curriculum, it was closely studied by many of the leading
philosophers of the scholastic period (Flueler 1993). Notable
commentaries on the *Politics* were written by Thomas Aquinas
and Peter of
 Auvergne.[38]
 Ockham drew on their commentaries to give a clear and concise summary
of Aristotle's political theory (William of Ockham [c. 1334]
*Letter*: 133-143; Lambertini 2000: 269ff.). (For a
modern account of the work see the entry on
 Aristotle's political theory.)



Ideas which medieval political writers took from Aristotle (or which
Aristotle reinforced) include the following:


* It is natural for human beings to form cities.
"Political" [i.e., city] life is natural to human
 kind.[39]
 On the face of it, this is in conflict with Augustine (see
 SS4
 above).
* The city or state exists not just for security and trade, but to
foster the "good life", the life according to virtue
 (*Politics* III.9, 1280 a32-b35).
* Some human beings are slaves "by nature", i.e., there
are, or may be, human beings marked out by nature for subordination to
the interests of others. Natural slaves are human beings naturally
lacking in intelligence and in capacity to achieve virtue or
 happiness.[40]
 This conflicted with the thinking of the New Testament (see
 SS2.2),
 the lawyers
 (SS6)
 and the Stoics and the Fathers of the Church
 (SS3).
* Women should, in general, be ruled by men
 (*Politics* I.5, 1254 b13).
 The inferiority of women was already the general opinion, but
Aristotle reinforced it, not only by what he said in the
*Politics* but also by his biological theories.
* There are various forms of government, of which some are good and
some are perversions. The good forms seek "the common
good", i.e., the good of both ruler and ruled. The best is
kingship, the worst
 tyranny.[41]
 "The common good" became a basic conception in medieval
political philosophy (Kempshall 1999; McGrade, Kilcullen, and
Kempshall 2001).
* There is a "best" regime, the form of government that
best fosters the common good. The "ideal polity" was not a
topic of pre-Aristotelian medieval thought, but it became a common
theme (e.g., William of Ockham, *Letter*: 311-23; see
Blythe 1992).
* "The rule of law" is better than "the rule of
 men",[42]
 i.e., it is better to have rules impartially applied than to leave
every decision to the unfettered discretion of the rulers. This
accorded with the earlier medieval idea that the difference between a
king and a tyrant is that the king observes the law (see
 SS6).
* However, since no legislator can foresee every case that may
arise, the rule of law must be tempered by *epieikeia*,
"equity", the making of exceptions to general rules when
exceptional cases arise
 (*Nicomachean Ethics* V.10,
 and
 *Politics* III.16, 1287 a23-28, 1287 b15-27).
* A good form of government must be stable, not liable to revolution
 (*Politics* V,
 and
 VI.5).
 Medieval Aristotelians gave some thought to precautions against the
degeneration of kingship into
 tyranny.[43]
 Marsilius presents *Defensor pacis* as a supplement to
Aristotle's discussion of the causes of revolution.
* Although Aristotle regarded kingship as ideally best (and medieval
writers agreed), Aristotle also gives an argument for
democracy--or, more exactly, an argument that in good government
there is a role for ordinary people. If ordinary people deliberate as
a body they may make sound decisions
 (*Politics* III.11).
 Marsilius (and others) used Aristotle's remarks to support the
proposition that the people are the ultimate political authority, an
idea also found in the Roman law.
* All of Aristotle's works supported one of the central
institutions of medieval university life, disputation, in which the
master states opposing positions and supports them with strong
arguments, then evaluates the arguments by criticism. The practice of
disputing about important questions, including questions relating to
politics, was deeply ingrained in medieval
 culture.[44]


## 8. Papal Fullness of Power



So much for the sources of medieval political philosophy and its early
stages. Let us turn now to the contributions made by scholastic and
late scholastic writers, who often became involved in conflict between
secular rulers and the papacy.



One focus of controversy was the papal claim to "fullness of
power". Originally the claim meant that the pope had
preeminently whatever power any other authority had within the Church,
so that he could intervene by full right in any Church affair
(Riviere 1925). Pope Innocent III (1198-1216), whose
decretals repeatedly "exalted papal political power"
(Pennington 2007: 165), provided the fodder for subsequent jurists to
develop the notion of papal fullness of
 power.[45]
 During the thirteenth century this conception was also invoked when
the pope authorised the mendicant friars to preach and perform
religious functions in a diocese even without the consent of the
diocesan bishop. Such interventions were strongly opposed by many
secular clerics who argued that bishops had their authority by divine
law and were not merely agents of the
 pope.[46]




During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries popes also claimed the
right to intervene in affairs normally the province of secular rulers.
This claim was made especially in reference to the Roman Empire. Pope
Leo III had crowned Charlemagne as Roman Emperor in 800, and in 962
Pope John XII gave the title "Roman Emperor" to the German
prince Otto I. From then until 1806 a succession of German princes
claimed the title. The popes took the view that they had transferred
the Empire from the Greeks to the Franks in the person of Charlemagne,
and from the Franks to the Germans in the person of Otto I, thereby
showing that the Roman Empire was subject to the popes, and in
particular that the pope had a right to approve or reject the
candidate elected to be emperor. (The emperor was elected by the
German princes who constituted the electoral college--like the
pope, the emperor was a monarch chosen by an electoral college to hold
office for life.) The subject of the "translation" of the
empire often became a subject of intense
 debate.[47]
 Spain, France, England and some other places rejected the authority
of the "Roman Empire", but incidents in the history of
various kingdoms supported papal claims to authority over kings.



Besides the historical arguments there were theological or
philosophical arguments. If "there is no power but from
God"
 (Romans 13:1,
 SS2.1 above) and the pope is God's representative on
earth, then it seems that power comes to Christian kings through the
pope. Medieval writers were not well acquainted with Plato's
notion of a "philosopher king"
 (*Republic*, 473d),
 since very little of Plato had been translated into
 Latin,[48]
 but in effect pro-papal theologians were arguing that the pope was a
"theologian king", an expert on the meaning of life whose
guidance was authoritative in all matters.



The popes did not in fact wish to take on the burdens of day-to-day
government throughout the world. Their claim was that, while ruling
was normally the business of secular rulers, the pope could intervene
by full right in governmental matters whenever he saw good reason to
do so. Canon lawyers drew up lists of circumstances in which the pope
might intervene (for examples, see Tierney 1980: 153-4), but
some items in the list were so comprehensive as to leave no area in
which popes could not intervene. For example, intervention *ratione
peccati*, "by reason of sin", meant that if a secular
ruler commits an injustice (which is a sin) then the pope might
intervene.



Papal claims were opposed by secular rulers, by clerical writers who
saw some interest in defending the secular rulers, and by theologians
unconvinced by the pro-papal arguments and concerned about the likely
effects of papal encroachment. Most of the political writers of the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were involved in controversy about
the extent and limits (or absence of limits) of papal authority
(Miethke 2000a; Oakley 2012: 173ff. and 2015: 14ff.).


## 9. Thomas Aquinas



Thomas Aquinas wrote a work in the "mirror of princes"
genre, namely *On Kingship, to the King of Cyprus*, but
otherwise his political writing was incidental to his academic work,
and not, as was the case with most medieval political writers, an
attempt to influence contemporary events. The *Summa
theologiae* includes discussions of dominion in the state of
innocence, natural law and other kinds of law, property, the best form
of government, the duty of obedience, war, coercion of heretics and
infidels, and other political matters. These discussions are not
organised into a separate treatise on politics but distributed through
the work in accordance with its plan as a summary of
 theology.[49]




Whereas Augustine had held that in the state of innocence there would
have been no lordship of man over man, Thomas says that there would
have been *dominium* [lordship] in the state of innocence
 (*Summa*, 1, q. 96, a. 4).
 This has sometimes been taken as a rejection of Augustine in favour
of Aristotle's doctrine that politics is natural. However,
Thomas says that in the state of innocence there would have been no
coercion, but there would have been government in the sense of wise
leadership voluntarily accepted by the less wise. This is a view found
not in Aristotle but in earlier Latin writers, for example Seneca (see
 SS3),
 and the contradiction with Augustine is merely verbal--for
Augustine *dominium* implies coercion, for Thomas its sense is
broader.



On natural law and other kinds of law Thomas again follows not
Aristotle but the tradition of civil and canon law going back to the
Roman
 Stoics.[50]
 He distinguishes divine law (eternal and positive) from human law,
and among human laws he distinguishes natural law from the law of
nations and civil law (see
 *Summa*, 1-2, q. 95, a. 4).
 Law is concerned with direction to the common good, which belongs to
the whole people
 (*Summa*, 1-2, q. 90, a. 3).
 All positive human law must be in accordance with natural law, though
its prescriptions will depend upon choice and circumstances (for
example, natural law prescribes that we must not kill, but human
positive law makes additional rules to prevent killing, rules that may
depend on arbitrary choice--e.g., there may be a rule requiring
motorists to drive on the left and not the right, or vice versa (see
 *Summa*, 1-2, q. 95, a. 2).
 Natural law is in effect morality, and according to Thomas the human
mind, reflecting on and analysing human experience, can see the truth
of various fundamental moral principles, which are thus
"self-evident", not in need of proof, and too fundamental
to be capable of proof
 (*Summa*, 1-2, q. 91, a. 3,
 and
 q. 94, a. 2).[51]




On property, Thomas follows the view of the Stoics and the Fathers
that property exists by human positive law. Natural law permits us to
use things
 (*Summa*, 2-2, q. 66, a. 1),
 but property goes beyond power to use: it includes a power to exclude
others from use, and this power is conferred by human positive law
 (*Summa*, 2-2, q. 66, a. 2).
 Property rights give way to extreme need (see above), so in time of
extreme need using another's property without permission is not
theft
 (*Summa*, 2-2, q. 66, a. 7).



The best form of government, according to Thomas, is a mixed
government combining elements of democracy, aristocracy and kingship
 (*Summa*, 1-2, q. 105, a. 1).
 This is reminiscent of Aristotle's preference for mixed
government over either democracy or oligarchy, but in fact many
ancient writers, including Cicero, advocated mixed government, and on
this topic Thomas is closer to Polybius--whom he did not
know--than to Aristotle (Blythe 1992: 57-8).



On the duty to obey government, Thomas does not adopt the position
that many others found in the New Testament, that disobedience is
never justified. According to Thomas Aquinas, though there is a
general duty to obey the law and the government, an unjust law is not
a law
 (*Summa*, 1-2, q. 96, a. 4;
 see also
 2-2, q. 104, a. 5).[52]




On war, Thomas is an exponent of a version of the "just
war" theory Augustine took from the ancient Romans. For a war to
be just, it must be commanded by someone in authority, there must be a
just cause, and it must be carried on without disproportionate
violence. It is not justifiable to lie to an enemy, since that would
destroy the trust that will be needed to restore peace
 (see *Summa*, 2-2, q. 40, a. 1, a. 3).



On questions relating to the coercion of heretics and unbelievers,
Thomas supports the practice of the medieval Church. A heretic (i.e.,
someone who has been baptised as a Catholic but has since rejected
orthodox Catholic doctrine) can rightly be compelled to return to the
Church, but a Jew or unbeliever who has never been a Catholic should
not be converted by force
 (*Summa*, 2-2, q. 10, a. 8).
 Simple people should not be exposed to the opinions of unbelievers
 (*Summa*, 2-2, q. 10, a. 7, 9).
 The children of Jews should not be taken from them and brought up as
Catholics, since this would violate natural justice, which gives
parents control over under-age children
 (*Summa*, 2-2, q. 10, a. 12).
 The religious rites of Jews may be tolerated, but not those of other
unbelievers, except to avoid strife or in hope of their gradual
conversion
 (*Summa*, 2-2, q. 10, a. 11).


### 9.1 Secular and Spiritual Power



The relationship between secular and spiritual power is discussed
briefly at the end of an early work, the *Scripta super libros
sententiarum* (see
 2, dist. 44, *Expositio textus*).
 When two authorities conflict, Thomas asks, how should we decide
which to obey? He answers that if one authority originates totally
from the other (as, he says, the authority of a bishop derives from
the pope), greater obedience in all matters is due to the originating
authority. If, however, both powers originate from a higher authority,
the higher authority will determine which of them takes precedence on
which occasion. Spiritual and secular power, he says, both come from
God, so we should obey the spiritual over the secular only in matters
which God has specified, namely matters concerning the salvation of
the soul, and in civic matters we should obey the secular power--




> 
> 
> unless spiritual and secular power are joined in one person, as they
> are in the pope, who by God's arrangement holds the apex of both
> spiritual and secular powers. 
> 
> 
> 



In other words, the pope has supreme authority in both secular and
spiritual matters.



In *De regno* Thomas constructs an Aristotelian teleological
argument to the same conclusion. A polity has an end, purpose or goal,
which may be sought in a variety of ways, effectively or not, and it
is a composite entity consisting of many individuals with their own
individual purposes. For both reasons there is needed some directing
agency to guide the potentially conflicting individuals effectively to
their common goal. Every being is in some way one; a composite entity
has a unity of order, i.e., of direction to a single end. In
preserving its being, therefore, the directing agency has to preserve
the polity in peace and unity by ordering it to a common goal. There
is a hierarchy of goals, that is, there are intermediate ends which
are also means to higher ends. A polity exists to secure its
citizens' lives, but above living there is living well, i.e.,
virtuously, and above that there is living so as to attain the
"beatific vision" of God (the Christian heaven). If all
these ordered ends were attainable simply by human effort, the one
supreme directing agency would be concerned with them all; however, to
attain the beatific vision requires "grace", i.e.,
God's special help, which natural human activity cannot earn.
Besides the state, humanity therefore needs the Church, a human agency
God has established to confer grace through the sacraments. Hence
there is a distinction between secular government, which uses
naturally available means to guide citizens to their final goal, and
ecclesiastical government, which uses supernatural means, the
sacraments. Secular rulers must be subject to the pope, "for
those to whom pertains the care of intermediate ends should be subject
to him to whom pertains the care of the ultimate end".



For more detail see the section on Political Community in the entry on
 Aquinas's moral, political and legal philosophy.


## 10. Giles of Rome



Philip IV, King of France (1285-1314), was one of the most
ruthless of medieval rulers. He came into conflict with Pope Boniface
VIII (1294-1303), one of the most arrogant of medieval popes,
and with Pope Clement V (1305-1314), one of the most timid.
Clement acquiesced in Philip's attack on the Templar Order and
other outrages to evade the king's pressure to condemn his
predecessor, Boniface, as a heretic. These conflicts gave rise to a
body of writings of great interest to the history of political
 thought.[53]
 Of these the most important were Giles of Rome's *De
ecclesiastica potestate* (*On Ecclesiastical
 Power*)[54]
 and John of Paris's *De potestate regia et papali*
(*On Royal and Papal Power*), both c.
 1302,[55]
 respectively an assertion of supreme papal power and an attempt to
restate the dualism of *Duo sunt* (see
 SS6
 and
 note 29).



Giles argues that the pope's fullness of power extends to
political matters, so that the pope is the supreme ruler of the world,
God's deputy on earth, who delegates power to governments and
supervises their activities. Giles's term for governmental power
is *dominium*, which was also a term for property; Giles
assimilates the two kinds of *dominium*, so that he holds that
the pope is also the supreme owner. He supports his position with many
arguments, of which the following two are perhaps most significant.
(1) He appeals to the idea that the universe is a single unity with a
hierarchical ordering in which the pope is the supreme hierarch among
mankind: there are two swords, but the temporal sword must be subject
to the spiritual, i.e., secular rulers must be subject to the
 pope.[56]
 (2) He applies Augustine's discussion of the question whether
the Romans had a true republic (see
 SS4.1)
 to argue that no one who does not submit to Christ's
*dominium*, and therefore to the *dominium* of the pope
as Christ's vicar, can have any just *dominium* himself.
As Augustine said, property is possessed by the laws of emperors and
kings
 (SS4.3),
 which presupposes the authority of a community: so, Giles argues,
since people who fail to honour the true God cannot belong to a
community, only members of the community of the faithful can have any
right to political power or
 property.[57]
John Wyclif (c. 1330-84) later took these arguments further to
the conclusion that no sinner, indeed only the predestined, can have
any just *dominium*, a doctrine condemned by the Council of
Constance. The thesis that only Christians can have lordship was
inconsistent with the theological tradition and was generally
 rejected.[58]




Giles of Rome may have had a hand in drafting Boniface's
document *Unam sanctam* (see
 Other Internet Resources),
 generally regarded as the most extreme statement of papal authority.
Whether he drafted it or not, the ideas and language of *Unam
sanctam* are reminiscent of Giles's work (see Ubl 2004).


## 11. John of Paris



John of Paris (d. 1306) reasserts the traditional distinction between
ownership and
 rulership.[59]
 The fact that a ruler adjudicates property disputes does not make him
supreme owner. A community (a state, or the Church, or particular
communities) acquires property only from individuals, and the head of
the community is the administrator of the community's property,
not its owner. This is true also of the pope, who does not have
unrestricted power over Church property, still less over the
properties of lay people
 (96-105).[60]
 John's assumption that original appropriation is by
individuals, and his remark that individuals acquire property by
"labour and industry" (86, 103), have led to suggestions
that he anticipated Locke's theory of property. However, John
indicates that individuals acquire property under human law (148, 154,
 225-6),[61]
 which is the view traditional among medieval theologians, following
Augustine (see
 SS4.3).
 Property is acquired under human law, but it is acquired by
individuals, not directly by rulers.



As for rulership, John argues that the pope cannot be the supreme
temporal ruler because the spiritual and temporal powers should be
held by different persons. John gives the traditional reasons (see
 SS6),
 emphasizing the argument that the priest should be exclusively
devoted to spiritual affairs (117-8). The temporal power is not
established by, or in any way caused by, the spiritual power. Both
come from God, but neither comes through the other. The spiritual is
in some sense superior, but not as being the cause of the temporal
power (93, 192). The basis of the distinction between the two powers
is not subject matter or ends, but means. Each power is limited to its
own appropriate means of action; the secular power uses natural means,
the Church uses supernatural means (142-61). This is very much
like Thomas Aquinas's picture of two powers leading mankind
toward the goals of human life in ordered hierarchy, one using natural
means and the other supernatural. Thomas infers from the fact that the
Church is concerned with the highest end the conclusion that the pope
ought to direct the secular ruler (see above,
 SS9.1).
 John explicitly rejects this line of argument. Teaching is a
spiritual function, but in a household the teacher does not direct the
physician. The physician exercises a higher art than the pharmacist,
but, though the physician guides the pharmacist, he cannot give
authoritative directions or dismiss the pharmacist. Such officials in
a great household do not direct one another, but are all under the
direction of the head of the family. Similarly both pope and prince
derive their authority from God, who sets the limits of their power,
and he has not subordinated one to the other (182, 184-93).


## 12. Marsilius of Padua



Another upsurge in writing about politics was prompted by the actions
of Pope John XXII (r. 1316-34). John's opponents included
Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham. Pope John rejected the
Franciscan doctrine that those who practice the highest form of
religious poverty, like Christ and the Apostles, will own nothing
whatever, either as individuals or as a body. Relying on arguments
drawn from the civil law, John held that no one can justly use
consumables, such as food, without owning what they use. Since no one
can live without using things, at least food, no one can justly live
without property, as the Franciscans claimed to do (Robinson 2012:
29ff.; Miethke 2012). John also became involved in conflict with
Ludwig of Bavaria. Relying on the papal claim that the emperor-elect
requires papal approval, John rejected the electors' choice of
Ludwig as Roman Emperor (see
 SS8;
 Lambertini 2012).



Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor pacis*
 (1324)[62]
 set out to refute the doctrine of papal fullness of power and, in
particular, to prove that the pope is not the source of government
power. He argues that all coercive power comes from the people
(44-9, 61-3/65-72, 88-90), and that no people
can have more than one supreme ruler, who is the source of all
coercive power in that community (80-6/114-22). (Marsilius
is the first exponent of the doctrine of sovereignty later put forward
by Hobbes and many others, i.e., the doctrine that there must be
ultimately just one coercive power in a state.) The supreme ruler
cannot be a cleric, since Christ has forbidden the clergy to become
involved in temporal affairs (113-40/159-92). And the
supreme ruler does not enforce divine law as such, since God wills
that divine law should be enforced by sanctions only in the next
world, to give every opportunity for repentance before death (164,
175-9/221, 235-9). The supreme ruler is therefore not an
enforcer of religion and his rule is not subject to direction by the
clergy. Within the Church, the pope has from Christ no more authority
than any other cleric. Christ did not appoint Peter as head of the
Church, Peter never went to Rome, the bishop of Rome is not
Peter's successor as head of the Church (44-9/61-3).
As for religious poverty, Marsilius sides with the Franciscans and
takes their doctrine further: not only is it legitimate for religious
to live entirely without ownership of property (they can use what they
need with the owner's permission), but this is what Christ
intended for all the clergy (183-4, 196-215/244-6,
262-86). Thus on his view the pope and clergy should have no
lordship at all, either in the sense of coercive jurisdiction or in
the sense of ownership of property. His position is diametrically
opposite that of Giles of Rome.



Marsilius did believe that the Church exercised some authority over
its members, but, so far as this was a doctrinal authority, it was
exercised not by the pope but by a general council (Marsilius held
that the Bible and general councils are infallible, but not the pope
(274-9/360-66)). Now that Europe is Christian a general
council cannot be convened or its decisions enforced except by the
Christian lay ruler (287-98/376-90). The establishment of
a hierarchy and the division of the Church into bishoprics and other
acts of Church government are also done by authority of the lay ruler.
Rather than secular government being subordinated to the Church, the
Church is subordinated to the secular government in all that concerns
coercive
 power.[63]



## 13. William of Ockham



When his authorship of *Defensor pacis* was discovered,
Marsilius hastily left Paris and took refuge at the court of Ludwig of
Bavaria in Munich. Not long afterwards a number of dissident
Franciscans also took refuge in Munich, among them William of Ockham.
From about 1332 until his death in 1347 Ockham wrote a series of books
and pamphlets, now usually called his political writings, arguing that
Pope John XXII and his successor Benedict XII ought to be deposed.


### 13.1 Property



In the first of these, the *Work of Ninety Days*, Ockham
defended against Pope John XXII the Franciscan claim that the highest
form of religious poverty is to live without property or any other
right enforceable by a human court. John had argued that no one can
justly consume something without owning it. Marsilius and others had
answered that we can justly consume things we don't own if we
have the owner's permission. It was objected that permission
confers a right, and permission to consume transfers ownership. Ockham
answers by means of a distinction between natural rights and legal
 rights.[64]
 In the state of innocence ownership would have been contrary to
natural law because everyone had a natural right to use any thing
(27.80-3, 313), but after the Fall natural law gave (or God
gave) to human communities the right to enact human law assigning
 property,[65]
 i.e., assigning to individuals or groups the right to exclude others
from using certain
 things.[66]
 This law binds morally, since we must respect agreements. Thus the
institution of property morally "ties" or impedes the
natural right to use things, so that in ordinary circumstances we
cannot justly use another's things. However, the original
natural right is not altogether abolished; on some occasions we can
still exercise it. For example, if an object is unappropriated, we can
use it without asserting property rights over it. In circumstances of
extreme need, we can use another's property to sustain life.
Even outside a situation of necessity, we can use another's
property with the owner's permission, not only to preserve life
but for any legitimate purpose. Permission sometimes confers a legal
right, but sometimes the person giving permission does not intend to
give, nor does the person granted the permission intend to accept, any
right enforceable in a human court; in such a case, if the permission
is withdrawn, for good reason or not, the person who previously had
permission has no legal remedy. Such permission to use property does
not confer ownership or any other legal right, or any new right of any
kind, but merely "unties" the natural right to use. The
natural right is enough to make use, even consumption, just. The
Franciscans can therefore justly use and consume things that belong to
others without having any legal rights, relying on the natural right
to use untied by the owner's
 permission.[67]




Echoes of the debate over property continued to reverberate down the
centuries, thanks in part to the inclusion of several of Pope John
XXII's bulls in what became the *Corpus iuris canonici*.
Notable figures in this regard include
 Richard FitzRalph,
 John Wyclif, Conrad Summenhart (Varkemaa 2012), Fernando
Vazquez de Menchaca (1572 [post.]),
 Francisco Suarez
 (1548-1617),
 Hugo Grotius,
 Samuel Pufendorf, and
 Locke.
 (See also Kilcullen 2001b.)


### 13.2 Papal Power Limited



Soon Ockham began to write about the conflict between John and the
Roman Empire, and, like Marsilius, he saw the papal claim to fullness
of power as the root of many
 evils.[68]
 Unlike Marsilius, however, he did not reject the idea of papal
fullness of power in every sense. Against Marsilius (whom he quotes
extensively on this
 topic),[69]
 Ockham defended the traditional belief that Christ appointed Peter as
head of the Church, and he held that the pope, as Peter's
successor, has supreme power in the Church. The pope and other clergy
must not become involved in secular affairs, regularly, but in
exceptional circumstances, Ockham says, when no lay person is able or
willing to take the lead in some matter necessary to the welfare of
the Christian community, the pope may intervene in secular matters.
This is an application of Aristotle's notion of
*epieikeia* (see
 SS7).
 The pope's regular power in religious matters and occasional
power to intervene in secular matters justify the traditional
ascription to the pope of fullness of power. However, this fullness of
power is not omnipotence. Not only must the pope respect the moral law
and the teachings of the Church, but he must also respect rights based
on human law and compact, and he must respect the Gospel liberty of
 Christians.[70]
 A pope who oversteps these bounds may be deposed; indeed, if his
action involves heresy, he is deposed *ipso facto*--and
according to Ockham, Popes John XXII and Benedict XII were
 heretics.[71]



### 13.3 Secular Power also Limited



Besides disagreeing with Marsilius over the status of Peter and the
extent of the pope's power, Ockham rejected his thesis that a
community cannot be well governed unless all coercive power is
concentrated in one sovereign authority (*Octo quaestiones*
3.3, in *Letter*: 309ff.) Ockham argues that, on the contrary,
such concentration is dangerous and incompatible with freedom. Just as
he had argued that the extreme version of the doctrine of papal
fullness of power would make Christians the pope's slaves,
contrary to the gospel liberty, so he argues that the corresponding
doctrine of fullness of power for the emperor would be incompatible
with the best form of government, in which subjects are free persons
and not slaves. Accordingly, Ockham argues for limitations on the
power of the secular ruler. He glosses the famous absolutist texts of
the Roman law (see above
 SS6
 and
 note 28).
 That the emperor is "released from the laws" (*legibus
solutus*) is not true, because he is bound not only by natural and
divine law but also by the law of nations (a branch of human positive
law), according to which some are not slaves but
 free.[72]
 "What pleases the prince has the force of law", but only
when it is something reasonable and just for the sake of the common
good and when this is manifestly expressed
 (3.2 *Dialogus* 2.26-28).


### 13.4 Rights of the Community



According to the canon "*Ius civile*" (D. 1 c. 8),
"Civil law is the law proper to itself that each people or city
establishes, for divine and human reason". Ockham took this as a
statement of a natural right belonging to each "free"
community, i.e., one not already under government, to establish its
own law and its own
 government.[73]
 This right exists by natural law in the third sense
 (SS6.1
 above), i.e. "on supposition", namely on the supposition
that the community needs law and government. This is true of every
community after the Fall. After the Fall natural law gave (or God
gave) the human race the power to establish both property and
government; God gave these powers not only to believers but also to
unbelievers. A particular community exercises the power to establish
government by choosing a ruler and a form of government; the
ruler's power therefore comes from God, but also "from the
people", i.e. from the community. But although power comes to
the ruler by the community's agreement, disagreement is not
enough to remove it: the ruler has a right to the power the community
has conferred as long as he exercises it properly, and he cannot
normally be corrected or removed. But in exceptional circumstances, if
the ruler becomes a tyrant, or if there is some other pressing reason
in terms of the common good, the community can depose its ruler or
change its form of government (*Breviloquium* 6.2; trans.
*Short Discourse*: 158-63; *Octo questiones* 3.3,
in *Letter*, 310-11; Miethke 2004). This is true also of
the Church. Although Christ gave headship in the Church to Peter and
his successors, each Christian community has power by natural law to
elect its own head. The Christian community can depose a wicked pope
and could perhaps even change the constitution of the Church, at least
temporarily, from the papal monarchy Christ established to some other
form
 (3.2 *Dialogus* 3. 6;
 3.1 *Dialogus* 2.20-28; in *Letter*: 290-3, 171-203).



According to Paul, "there is no power but from God"
 (Romans 13:1),
 and according to a gloss on a canon from the *Decretum*, the
emperor's power is "from God alone" (D. 96 c. 11,
s.v. "divinitus"). Ockham quotes these texts, and says
that although the secular ruler's power is "from the
people", yet it is also "from God alone", and not
only indirectly (i.e., from God as ultimate cause) but directly,
"without intermediary". These propositions are not
obviously reconcilable. In a work apparently not circulated during the
middle ages, the *Breviloquium*, Ockham tries to reconcile
them: political power comes from God, but God confers it on the ruler
selected the community; once rulership has been conferred, the ruler
is subject to God alone--regularly, though on occasion a
community can correct or depose its ruler (*Breviloquium*
4.2-8; *Short Discourse*: 110-21;
Potesta 1986).


### 13.5 Freedom of Discussion within the Church



In part I of his *Dialogus,* books
 3
 and
 4
 (c. 1334) Ockham discusses heresy and heretics, arguing that for
someone to be a heretic it is not enough that something that person
believes is heresy, he or she must also believe it
"pertinaciously", and to discover pertinacity it is often
necessary to enter into discussion to find whether the person is ready
to abandon the error when it is shown to be such. For example, a
layperson who believes undogmatically a doctrine that is in fact
heresy, until it has been shown to be heresy in a way adapted to that
person's understanding, may maintain it "a thousand
times", even in the face of contradiction by bishop or pope,
without being a heretic
 (1 *Dialogus* 4.23).
 On the other hand, a pope who tries to impose a false doctrine on
others is known to be pertinacious precisely from the fact that he is
trying to impose false doctrine on others, and a pope who becomes a
heretic automatically ceases to be pope. Thus ordinary Christians (or
a pope arguing as a theologian and not purporting to exercise papal
authority) can argue for a heresy as long as they are open to evidence
and make no attempt to impose their belief on others, whereas a pope
who tries to impose a heresy immediately ceases to be pope and loses
all authority. Christians must defend dissidents who are upholding a
position that may possibly be the truth against a possibly heretical
pope, until the uncertainty is resolved by discussion. This is an
argument for freedom of discussion within the Church, though not for
toleration in general (McGrade 1974: 47-77; McGrade, Kilcullen,
and Kempshall 2001: 484-95; Kilcullen 2010a).


## 14. The Conciliar Movement



In 1378 some of the cardinals who had elected Pope Urban VI met again
and elected another pope, claiming that their earlier choice had been
coerced. This was the beginning of the Great Western Schism. Various
possible solutions were debated. One proposal was to call a General
Council of the Church to end the schism. To this it was objected that
only a pope could call a council and that its decisions needed papal
confirmation. The prominent French churchman and academic, Jean Gerson
(1363-1429), argued that such requirements were a matter of
human ecclesiastical law, which should be set aside if it impedes the
reformation of the Church. The arguments of Gerson and others
prevailed, and the schism was in the end healed by a council. The
Council of Constance, 1414-1418, deposed two rival popes (by
then there were three, one of whom resigned) and elected a new pope.
The Council also passed the decrees *Sacrosancta* (otherwise
called *Haec Sancta*), which claimed that a council has power
over a pope in all matters pertaining to faith and the reformation of
the Church and in particular the present
 schism,[74]
 and *Frequens*, which required the calling of a council every
ten years (both in
 Other Internet Resources).



The conciliarists were those who argued that, at least in
extraordinary circumstances, a council could be called, if necessary
without papal permission, to deal with schism, with authority over
even a true pope. They included Pierre d'Ailly, Jean Gerson,
Henry of Langenstein, John Maior, Jaques Almain, Nicholas of Cusa, and
others. They argued that every corporation has the power to take the
measures that may be necessary if its survival is endangered by
failure in its head. The Church must be able to deal with situations
in which the papacy is vacant or uncertain or corrupt; otherwise its
existence would be more precarious than the existence of a secular
body politic, which can replace its head if necessary. The analogy
between the Church and a secular body politic ran through much
conciliarist thinking.



As the conciliar movement developed, some argued, more radically, that
even in ordinary circumstances the judgment of a council prevailed
over that of a pope. Later popes (though they owed their position to
Constance) opposed conciliarism, at least in its more radical form,
and warned secular rulers that conciliarist ideas also threatened the
power of kings--they were aware of the analogy between
conciliarist views of church government and anti-monarchical views of
secular government. The analogy was also noticed by some of those who
wrote during the quarrel between Parliament and the King in
seventeenth-century England (Oakley 1962: 3-11). Despite its
possible anti-monarchical implications, the notion that the pope was
subordinate to a council remained attractive to the French monarchy,
and in France conciliarism was one of the sources of Gallicanism.



There were a number of strands in conciliarist thought. One important
influence was the tradition of canon law, in which it had been
acknowledged that a pope could be judged and deposed if he became a
heretic or notorious sinner (Tierney 1955). Ockham had likewise argued
that "on occasion" anyone able to do so could rightly do
whatever was necessary to preserve the Church, for example by deposing
a pope who had become a heretic or notorious sinner. An unacknowledged
influence was Marsilius, who had argued that the ultimate authority in
the Church was the Christian people, that councils should be convened
by the secular ruler and that a council could not err in matters of
 faith.[75]
 Many conciliarists held that Christ's commission
 (Mark 16:15,
 "Go ye into the whole world, and preach the gospel to every
creature") was primarily to the Church as a whole, and held
either that the authority of the whole Church is vested in the pope,
or in the council when papal power is obstructed or abused, or else
that the authority of the whole Church is normally vested in a council
(while a council is in session). On either view, the council could
depose an unsatisfactory pope, but on the second view the council is
the chief organ of Church authority even in normal circumstances.
Ockham's view was that the normal constitution of the Church is
monarchical (according to Ockham, Christ had appointed Peter as sole
head of the Church), and a council or indeed someone else may acquire
power over a pope, or in place of a pope, only in exceptional
 circumstances.[76]



## 15. The Medieval Tradition of Political Philosophy



Although political philosophy was not part of the core curriculum in
the universities, and although the writings surveyed above were
generally not produced with the idea of contributing to a
philosophical discipline, by the end of the middle ages the discipline
of political philosophy (or political theology) had attained
self-consciousness and a sense of constituting a tradition. Manuscript
copies of political writings by different authors were often bound
together as volumes (Ouy 1979). There was a readership to which such
works could be addressed (Miethke 1980, 2000b). Suarez and
other late scholastic writers gave an outline of the history of a
problem and surveyed what others had said about it. In the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries a number of collections of political
writings were published, e.g., by Dupuy (1655) and Goldast
 (1611-4).[77]
 Early modern writers such as Hooker, Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke could
easily find the works of at least some writers who had written on
politics during the middle ages or would know of their ideas at least
by
 hearsay.[78]




If there is a theme to this history, it is perhaps the development of
political
 liberalism,
 though, to be sure, ideals of
 constitutionalism
 (see, e.g., Tierney 1982, Pennington 1993a, Lee 2016),
 civic humanism,
 and
 republicanism
 (on these last two, see, e.g., Skinner 1978; Hankins 2000) may be
found among different medieval
 authors.[79]
 The liberal trend was helped, perhaps paradoxically, by the close
interweaving of religion with other threads of medieval life. This
meant not only that religion influenced all aspects of life, but also,
reciprocally, that the other departments of life influenced religious
thinking. The influence of the Roman Law and Aristotle, and of the
culture of late antiquity familiar to the Fathers of the Church, also
meant that ideas originating outside the framework of the Christian
religion had an impact on religious thinking. The duality between
kingship and priesthood (perhaps originally due merely to the fact
that Christians had no political power), and the conflicts that
resulted from that duality, meant that religious thinking had to
accommodate the concerns of powerful people who were not officials in
the religious institutions.



From the time of Constantine, and in the west especially from the time
of Augustine, Christians practiced the coercion of heretics and the
repression of unbelief. However, their regime was never completely
repressive. Among medieval political philosopher-theologians there was
always some acknowledgment of the rights of unbelievers (e.g., of the
rights of Jewish parents, the Church's lack of jurisdiction over
"those without", the property rights of unbelievers).
There was a recognition of the duty to reason and persuade ("A
man cannot believe unless he is willing"). In social relations
there was a belief in an underlying liberty and equality, and a belief
that originally government and slavery did not exist, an idea that
government, law, and property arose by "pact" or custom,
and an idea that originally government belonged to "the
people" and was entrusted to rulers by the consent of the
people. These beliefs were akin to the modern liberal presumption in
favour of personal liberty. There was a belief in the "rule of
law", in a distinction between good government and tyranny, in
"natural rights". There was a belief in limited government
(see Ockham in
 SS13.3)
 and in a distinction (not yet a separation) between Church and State.
Concerning the constitution of the Church, a strong claim for
unfettered papal power was made by some popes and their supporters,
but this was strongly resisted by writers who argued that a heretic or
sinful pope, including one who violated the rights of the laity and of
unbelievers, could be deposed. Something like freedom of speech was
embodied in the practice of disputation. Ockham explicitly advocated
free discussion of disagreements among Christians. Where all this
still fell short of political liberalism was the absence of any
argument for equal freedom of all religions. Locke,
 Bayle,
 and others in the seventeenth century advocated toleration, though
not for Catholics, since Catholics themselves rejected equal freedom
of religion and were dangerous to others.



The arguments of medieval political philosophers are only partly
available in modern political philosophy. Non-believers cannot make
much use of arguments with theological premises. But even for us,
there is perhaps some value in the reminder that, under some
circumstances, a religious tradition is capable of
developing--not only in response to external pressure but even
out of its own resources--in the direction of peace and
cooperation between members of the two cities.