## 1. Life and Writings




Godfrey of Fontaines was born in present day Belgium in the
principality of Liege, very likely at the chateau of the noble
family of which he was a member, at Fontaines-les Hozemont,
probably shortly before 1250. This approximate date can be inferred
from the fact that he conducted his first quodlibetal dispute as a
Master of Theology at Paris in 1285, and that one could not become a
Master in this faculty before reaching the age of 35. While nothing is
known with certainty about his life prior to his arrival at Paris, he
must have pursued philosophical studies there in the Faculty of Arts in
the early 1270s. University statutes required one to spend at least
eight years in studying theology before becoming a Master, and it is
also known that he was inscribed at the Sorbonne before August 15,
1274. Hence his theological studies should have begun by that date (De
Wulf, 1904, 3-16; Wippel, 1981, xv-xviii).




Godfrey was evidently a great lover of books, and among the surviving
37 manuscripts he left to the Sorbonne is a valuable "Student
Notebook" (Paris: Bibl. Nat. lat. 16.297) which he himself compiled
during his student days at Paris, and into which he entered many
writings in his own hand. While it was not completed by 1274 or
earlier as was previously proposed, the most recent research indicates
that it was formed by Godfrey almost entirely between the end of 1276
and 1278, with the exception of the final small portion copied at the
earliest between 1278-1280 and at the latest between 1280-1281
(Aiello-Wielockx, 2008, 167). It reflects his interests in the 1270s
during his time as a theology student at Paris and includes works by
Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, other anonymous
Questions on various works of Aristotle which are clearly by some
Master(s) of Arts of the time, still others by Giles of Rome, some
extracts from Albert the Great and from Henry of Ghent, as well as
other purely theological writings (Duin, 1959; Wippel, 2001, 360-67;
and now an exhaustive study by Aiello-Wielockx, 2008). An anonymous
set of Questions on Bks. I-II of Aristotle's *De anima*
contained in this same Student Notebook has recently been assigned to
Boethius of Dacia and edited (Wielockx, 2009). Godfrey's interest in
the writings of Radical Aristotelian Arts Masters at Paris in the
1260s and 1270s is also indicated by other works of Arts Masters
included in additional manuscripts in his library
(Bibl. Nat. lat. 15.819, 16.096). Also noteworthy is the inclusion in
his Student Notebook of one of the oldest and most reliable copies of
Thomas Aquinas's controversial *De aeternitate mundi*, which
itself dates probably from 1271.

 And Godfrey's interest in and reaction to the thought of important contemporary members of the Theology Faculty at Paris such as Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome and others is evident from the contents of various manuscripts containing writings by them in his personal library (Wielockx, 2014). 

 Godfrey continued to teach as a Master of Theology at the
University until ca. 1303/1304 when he conducted his fifteenth and
last Quodlibetal Disputation, and he was in Paris for a meeting at the
Sorbonne in February 1304. He may have been away from Paris for some
more extended periods after completing Quodlibet XIV
ca. 1298-1299. It is known that he maintained close connections
with Liege during his career at Paris and, indeed, that he
served as Canon of Liege. He also served as Provost of San
Severin at Cologne, and as Canon of Tournai although some doubt has
been raised about the last mentioned point (Field, 2009, 138,
n. 11). It has also been reported that he was elected Bishop of
Tournai in 1300 but renounced his rights to the See when the election
was contested. While some question about the accuracy of this has also
been raised (Field, ibid.), it is certain that he was involved in
negotiating a settlement for the disputed election and that this
required him to travel to Rome to present the case to the Roman
Curia. The year of his death is not known with certainty but has been
proposed as probably 1306 (or 1309 which seems to be too late), even
though the day is known, i.e., October 29 according to the necrology
of the Sorbonne.




Godfrey selected the quodlibetal disputation as his major vehicle for
publication. These solemn disputations were conducted twice during the
academic year, i.e., before Christmas and before Easter. They were
open to all members of the learned public and questions could be put
to the presiding Master by anyone in attendance. During the first
day's disputation, preliminary answers would be given to these many
and disparate questions. On the following day or at least on some
following day, the Master, having in the meantime imposed some logical
organizing plan upon the various questions, would return for another
session where he would present his definitive response or
"determination" for each of them. Subsequently he would prepare this
version for publication and, when it was completed, would submit it to
the University Bookseller. Masters were not required to conduct these
open disputations and since they were regarded as onerous, not all
did. Godfrey's 15 Quodlibets have all been edited, although only
*reportationes* of the first four remain, i.e., copies taken
down by an auditor. Brief versions (*abbreviationes)* of
Quodlibets III and IV have also been edited. Since medieval times
there has been some difficulty about the literary form of Quodlibet
XIV concerning whether it really is a Quodlibet or some other kind of
disputed question. Wippel (2006) concludes it is more probable that it
is indeed a Quodlibet, but one that is unique in terms of its
organizing plan and structure. As a Master of theology Godfrey also
conducted ordinary Disputed Questions, and some of these have been
preserved.


## 2. Subject of Metaphysics




Godfrey was surely familiar with the controversy concerning whether
one should with Avicenna stress the nonparticular and therefore the
universal character of being as being and hence make this the subject
of metaphysics or rather with Averroes emphasize it as the science
which has the highest kind of being, the divine, as its subject. On
this Godfrey clearly agrees with Avicenna, even though he devotes
little explicit attention to the controversy itself. Thus in Quodlibet
X, q. 11 he holds that being as being is the object (or subject) of
metaphysics (PB 4.349), and in Quodlibet VI, q. 6 that the concept of
being is first and simplest because it enters into every other concept
(PB 3.137). Therefore it is also the most general concept or, one may
say, transcendental. At times Godfrey also describes the object of the
intellect as being as being (Quodlibet II, q. 8). He denies that God is
the subject of metaphysics, even though God is the first and primary
being and must be studied within metaphysics (Quodlibet I, q. 5). He
distinguishes a metaphysical study of God, which he says may be
described as a kind of theology, from the theology that is based on
Sacred Scripture. This does not have being as being as its subject, but
God himself (Quodlibet IX, q. 20; Wippel, 1981, 3-15).


## 3. Division of Being




In opposition to Henry of Ghent's division of real being into
essential being (*esse essentiae*) and existential being
(*esse existentiae*), in Quodlibet VIII, q. 3 Godfrey proposes
his own division. Being (*esse*) may be divided into being in
the mind ("cognitive" being) which is a lesser or diminished being, and
real being, i.e., being outside the mind or knower. Real being is
subdivided into real being in potency and real being in act. A thing
possesses real being in potency insofar as it has being by reason of
its cause or causes. It has real being in act insofar as it is realized
in its own nature in completed or perfected form. A thing may have real
being in potency either by reason of its intrinsic cause (e.g., if
matter preexists which may enter into the thing's constitution), or by
reason of an extrinsic cause (e.g., if an agent preexists which can
produce it). Godfrey illustrates this with the example of a rose that
does not yet actually exist. Prior to the creation of the world and
hence of matter it possessed real being in potency only by reason of
God, its extrinsic cause. After creation it possessed real being in
potency by reason of preexisting matter as well, an intrinsic cause.
And now it may also possess real potential being by reason of some
created extrinsic cause (or causes). Both before and after the world's
creation it enjoys cognitive being insofar as it was and is known by
the divine mind (PB 4.38-40; Wippel, 1981, 15-17).


## 4. Analogy of Being




In describing being as being as the object of the intellect in
Quodlibet II, q. 8, Godfrey also states that being is taken
analogically and not univocally. It is affirmed first and foremost of
substance, especially of first substance, and of everything else as
related to substance. Hence both substance and accident are included
under this analogous notion of being and this single object of the
intellect (PB 2.135-36; Wippel, 1981, 19-24). In Quodlibet III, q. 1 he
attempts to establish the analogical character of being by arguing at
some length that it cannot be either univocal or purely equivocal.
Central to his rejection of univocity of being is his denial that it is
a supreme genus. It must apply not only to the generic and specific
aspects in which different things share, but also to the differences,
including the individual differences between them (PB 2.162-63). In
Quodlibet XV, q. 3, while responding to an objection perhaps taken from
Meister Eckhart's Parisian Disputed Question 1, he maintains that, if
being is applied to accidents insofar as they are related to substance
in some way, this does not mean that being is not intrinsically present
in accidents. So, too, when it is applied to creatures viewed as
effects and to God their cause, it applies intrinsically to God. There
is an analogy and proportion in reality between these different
instantiations of being and corresponding to this, there is analogy in
meaning as well. It is this that is grasped by the analogous concept of
being (PB 14.18-20; Wippel, 2001, 381-82).


## 5. Transcendentals




In Quodlibet III, q. 1 Godfrey identifies the one, the true, and the
good as properties of being that are really identical and convertible
with it, and hence as transcendental characteristics of being. These
properties are not really distinct from being itself (PB 2.163-64). In
Quodlibet VI, q. 16 he distinguishes between the one or the kind of
unity that serves as a principle for number and which is based on
discrete quantity (numerical unity in the strict sense), and the kind
that is convertible with being. While the former is restricted to
corporeal being, the latter applies to every subsisting substance and
to every accident that exists in such a substance. Hence it alone is
transcendental (PB 3.256-58). Regarding the true, in Quodlibet VI, q. 6
Godfrey indicates that truth adds nothing real to being but only a
(conceptual) relationship to mind or intellect. To assign this kind of
truth to a thing is simply to acknowledge that it can be grasped by
intellect or that it is intelligible. Consequently, Godfrey holds that
truth is present in being virtually insofar as it has the capacity
(*virtus*) to produce truth in the intellect. But he favors the
view that when taken formally truth resides in the intellect (PB
3.137-41; Wippel, 1981, 25-34). Hence here he is recognizing the
distinction later referred to as that between ontological truth and
logical truth.


## 6. Essence and Existence




Already during Godfrey's student days in Arts and in Theology at
Paris there was considerable discussion concerning the exact
relationship between essence and existence in finite or created beings.
Closely associated with the metaphysical thought of Aquinas was the
view that in all finite beings there is a real, i.e., not merely a
conceptual or mind-dependent distinction and composition of an essence
principle and an act of existing (*esse*) or existence
principle. Already in the 1270s Giles of Rome was developing his own
theory of real distinction between essence and existence, and was soon
engaged in ongoing controversy with Henry of Ghent. At times Giles
referred to essence and existence as distinct "things" (*res*)
and, while he denied that either could exist in separation from the
other or that existence is an essence, his terminology left its mark on
the theory and open to such misinterpretations; for it invited critics
to view existence or the act of being as an entity rather than as a
principle of an existing entity, as Aquinas had envisioned it. While
Henry of Ghent rejected any real distinction between essence and
existence, he defended something more than a merely conceptual
distinction between them, namely a new and third type that would fall
between the real distinction and the merely conceptual, an
"intentional" distinction (Wippel, 1981, 40-45).




Godfrey briefly refers to this issue in Quodlibet II, q. 2, while
attempting to determine whether the essence of a creature is
indifferent to existence and nonexistence. He comments that either
essence is really identical with existence and differs from it (1) only
conceptually or (2) intentionally, or else (3) existence is a distinct
thing, i.e., the act of the essence and really distinct from it (PB
2.60). In Quodlibet IV, q. 2, he was asked to determine whether to hold
that predicamental things are eternal by reason of their quiddity is
also to hold that the world is eternal. In preparing his response he
presents in greater detail these three different views on the
relationship between essence and existence (*esse*). According
to some they are really distinct from one another and enter into real
composition with one another. But one is not separable from the other
so as to be able to exist apart from it. Consequently, if a thing lacks
or loses its existential being, it also lacks or loses its essential
being. According to a second view they are really identical, but differ
intentionally. Hence when a thing loses its existential being, its
essence cannot be said to exist; but it does retain its true
predicamental or essential being (*esse essentiae*). Finally, a
third position, which Godfrey himself embraces, maintains that they are
really identical and differ only conceptually. They do not enter into
composition with one another. Therefore, to the extent that something
enjoys essential being, to that same degree it enjoys actual existence.
And, adds Godfrey, whatever is understood of one is also understood of
the other (PB 2.235).




In Quodlibet III, q. 1, dating from 1286, Godfrey considers the
argumentation offered for each of these positions. First he presents
the theory that distinguishes really between essence and existence in
language that reflects the terminology of Giles of Rome. Thus he
refers to existence both as "something" (*aliquid*)
and as a "thing" (*res*) that is added to
essence. He then presents a number of arguments in support of this
view which seem to be taken from Giles, especially from his
*Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia*, q. 11. One of
these is reminiscent of the first part of Aquinas's much discussed
reasoning in *De ente et essentia*, c. 4, which begins from
the fact that one can understand what something is without knowing
whether it actually exists. However, Giles's presentation (and
Godfrey's repetition) of the argument makes a stronger claim. One can
understand what something is and also know that it does not exist. But
because nothing can be understood with the opposite of itself, essence
and existence must be really distinct. After presenting a series of
arguments against this theory and refuting the arguments he had
initially offered in support of it, Godfrey resolutely rejects any
real distinction between essence and existence. For him they are
identical, and differ only in the way they signify, just as the
concrete noun "a being" (*ens*), the abstract noun
"essence" (*essentia*), and the verb "to
be" or "to exist" (*esse*) differ in their
mode of signifying, but designate one and the same reality (PB 3.304
[brief version]; Wippel, 1981, 45-66).




In presenting Henry's theory of intentional distinction Godfrey
traces this back in large measure to what he regards as an incorrect
interpretation of Avicenna's notion of nature or essence when it is
considered simply in itself or "absolutely" rather than as existing in
the mind or in an individual entity. As Godfrey explains in his later
Quodlibet VIII, q. 3, according to Henry's position real being is
divided into essential being (*esse essentiae*) and existential
being (*esse existentiae*). A thing possesses essential being
from eternity insofar as it corresponds to its appropriate exemplar
idea within the divine intellect. Because of this it is a true or real
quiddity or essence from eternity and falls into its appropriate
predicament even though it is not an actual existent. Existing entities
receive actual existence only in the course of time when the divine
will intervenes to cause this. Within an actually existing being,
therefore, its essence and existence are not really distinct. But Henry
denies that they are identical. They are "intentionally" distinct
(Wippel, 1981, 67-79; Marrone, 2001, 39-52; Porro, 1996, 211-53).
Godfrey rejects Henry's new and intermediary kind of distinction out of
hand. A distinction must either be real or purely conceptual.
Accordingly, in Quodlibet III, q. 1 he argues at length against Henry's
application of the intentional distinction to essence and existence
(Wippel, 1981), 85-88.




As already noted, for Godfrey essence and existence are really
identical and only differ conceptually. Whatever is true of essence is
true of existence, and vice versa. It is not necessary to posit two
really distinct or even two intentionally distinct principles to
account for the fact that one may be aware of something as a possible
existent when it does not actually exist. It is enough to distinguish
between potential being and actual being. If something is in potency in
terms of its essence, it is in potency in terms of its existence. And
if it is actual in terms of its essence, it is actual in terms of its
existence.




Godfrey proposes a different kind of act-potency "composition" in
order to meet one argument in support of real distinction between
essence and existence. If, as Aquinas, Giles, and Godfrey all hold, the
angels of Christianity are purely spiritual and not composed of
(spiritual) matter and form, then it seems that they must be composed
of essence and existence. Otherwise they would be perfectly simple and
equal to God. Godfrey responds that one and the same being, even if
purely spiritual, may be regarded as actual insofar as it exists, but
as potential insofar as it falls short of the actuality enjoyed by a
higher being and, above all, by the First Being, God. He quotes
Proposition 2 from Proclus's *Elementatio theologica*: "What
participates in the One is both One and not-One." As Godfrey reads
this, anything that is different from the One can fall short of it only
by approaching (*accessus*) the not-one. Hence it is simply by
reason of the fact that such a being recedes from the One that it is
not the One itself. In this way more perfect beings such as angels are
distinct from the One, or God, without being composed either of matter
and form or of essence and existence. Nonetheless, actuality and
potentiality are present in them because they possess a certain
intermediary nature and hence are likened or "assimilated" to something
higher and more actual, and to something lower and more potential.
Therefore they are "composed" of potency and act, not really, but
conceptually. This composition is not merely imaginary. It applies to
such entities by their being related to something higher and to
something lower (Quodlibet III, qq. 1, 3; Quodlibet VII, q. 7; Wippel,
1981, 90-97).




Godfrey's library contains two likely sources for this theory, first a
rudimentary version found in the abbreviated text of Siger of
Brabant's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* included in Godfrey's
Student Notebook, and second, an anonymous set of questions contained
in the manuscript Bibl. Nat. lat. 16.096. While Godfrey
literally borrows certain parts of his theory from the second text, he
does not follow this anonymous Radical Aristotelian Arts Master when
he goes on to argue that separate entities do not depend upon God as
their efficient cause, but only as their final cause (Wippel, 1984,
231-44).


## 7. Philosophical Knowledge of God's Existence




According to Godfrey, insofar as a natural knowledge of God is
accessible to human reason, it belongs more properly to metaphysics
than does knowledge of any other being. And he clearly holds that God's
existence can be established by philosophical reasoning. But Avicenna
and Averroes had differed concerning whether it belongs to natural
philosophy (physics) or to metaphysics to demonstrate this conclusion.
Avicenna had maintained that this task pertains to metaphysics and only
to metaphysics, whereas Averroes had defended the opposite position
that only physics can demonstrate the existence of God, the First Mover
(Wippel, 1981, 102-3). As will be seen more fully in the following
section, Godfrey defends something of a compromise position. In
Quodlibet XI, q. 1 he mentions that the metaphysician's consideration
of God in himself is more perfect than that of the natural philosopher,
who simply views him as the First Mover of the first mobile being,
i.e., the outermost heavenly sphere. But, Godfrey adds, by reason of
all that God is in himself, he is also the First Mover (PB 5.3). In
Quodlibet V, q. 10 he writes that one can know by reasoning from
natural things that God is the first being which depends on nothing
whatsoever and upon which everything else depends and, therefore, that
he is the causal and productive principle of all other things (PB 3.41;
Wippel, 1981, 105). And in Quodlibet IX, q. 20, he refers to different
things that natural reason can know in metaphysics with certainty about
God--that because he is the first being he is simple; that he is
being in actuality; that he is an intellectual being, etc. (PB
4.288).


## 8. Quidditative Knowledge of God and the Divine Attributes




In Quodlibet VII, q. 11 Godfrey considers the view of some,
presumably Thomas Aquinas, who say that in this life we can know that
God is, but not what he is. Godfrey makes a clear but implicit
reference to ST I, q. 3, a. 4 where Thomas writes that even when we
recognize that God is, the "is" which we understand is not the act of
being whereby God subsists in himself, but only that indicating that
the proposition "that he is" is true (PB 3.383).




Godfrey finds this too restrictive. And so after offering a detailed
explanation of the different ways in which one can know of something
"what it is" and "that it is," he writes that
just as in knowing material things we move from more confused to less
confused knowledge, so it is in the case of our natural knowledge of
God. Just as we find that some things are the principal causes of
others, and some are governed by others, so we impose the name
"God" to signify something in the universe which is the
one first cause of everything else and than which nothing greater can
be thought. But such nominal knowledge is not enough to prove that
what we express by the name "God" exists in reality or
"that he is." Next we may follow Aristotle's procedure in
*Physics* VII where by eliminating recourse to an infinite
regress of moved movers he concludes that one First Mover or God
exists. And from the continuous motion of the first mobile sphere
Aristotle shows in *Physics* VIII that God is perpetual and
pure act. This tells us that God is in reality, but not what he is in
any real sense. In the *Metaphysics* (Bk XII), continues
Godfrey, Aristotle accepts the knowledge "that God is" as
proved in the *Physics* and now proceeds to show that certain
perfections are present in God to the preeminent degree. According to
Godfrey, Aristotle uses these perfections as quasi-differences and
thereby progresses from knowledge "that God is" to
knowledge "what he is" by passing from a confused and
quasi-generic knowledge to a more determined and quasi-specific
knowledge. And so, too, proposes Godfrey, we may reason, for instance,
first by knowing him as a substance, then as an incorporeal substance,
then as a living and intelligent incorporeal substance. He
acknowledges that God does not really fall into any genus or
species. Nonetheless, he maintains against Aquinas that we can know
"what God is" in some real sense, even though he
recognizes that in this life such knowledge will always be imperfect
(PB 3.384-86; Wippel, 1981, 108-15).


 Consistent with the above, Godfrey defends the presence of a
plurality of attributes in God even though, because of the divine
simplicity, these are only conceptually distinct from the divine
essence and from one another. In Quodlibet VII, q. 1 he distinguishes
two ways in which the term "attribute" may be taken. It
may be used to signify a divine perfection in the sense that some
perfection in a creature which does not imply any imperfection in and
of itself, in other words a pure perfection, is assigned to God to an
eminent degree. Or it may be taken as signifying a pure perfection
which is realized in God as a "quasi-quality" which
perfects the divine substance in a "quasi-accidental"
fashion. Godfrey comments that it is in this second sense that
attributes are usually applied to God, even though this is not
intended to imply any real distinction or composition of substance and
attribute in him. When taken in this second sense, Godfrey holds that
there are many such quasi-qualities which perfect God in this
quasi-accidental way, and therefore, many divine attributes. They are
assigned to God in preeminent fashion because of his infinite
perfection (PB 3.265).




In this same question Godfrey was asked to resolve a still more
fundamental issue. Because of God's absolute simplicity, divine
attributes signify perfections that are really identical with the
divine essence and with one another. The conceptual distinction between
them can only arise from an intellect's consideration. But what is the
ultimate foundation for this conceptual distinction? Does it arise from
a consideration of God simply as he is in himself, or does it only
result from some reference to really distinct realizations of these
perfections in creatures? Godfrey replies that if one takes an
attribute in the first sense as implying that every pure perfection
present in creatures is to be assigned to God to an infinite degree,
the answer is clear. The intellect, especially a created intellect, can
arrive at such a conceptual distinction of divine attributes only by
reasoning from the really distinct instantiations of such perfections
in creatures (PB 3.267-70; Wippel, 1981, 116-18). But what about the
divine intellect? Godfrey then refers to and rejects the view of Henry
of Ghent, according to whom attributes, when taken in the second sense,
can be recognized as distinct and as multiple by God himself insofar as
he views himself directly and without any reference to creatures.
Against Henry, Godfrey maintains that not even God himself can be aware
of this conceptual distinction between the divine attributes without
referring to other beings in which these perfections are present in
really distinct fashion. To hold otherwise would be to introduce too
much distinction and diversity into the divine essence itself and would
thereby compromise the divine simplicity (PB 3.267-73; Wippel, 1981,
118-23; Maurer, 1999, 192-200).


## 9. Eternity of the World




Together with his Christian contemporaries, Godfrey believed that
the world began to be. But much debated was the question whether
natural reason can prove this, or whether it can be held solely on the
grounds of religious faith. Probably best known for holding that it
cannot be demonstrated that the world began to be was Thomas Aquinas
who in his *De aeternitate mundi* went a step beyond his earlier
writings and maintained not only this but also that an eternally
created world is possible (Wippel, 1984a, 203-14). Bonaventure had
presented a series of arguments to prove that the world began to be,
and many others strongly defended this position, including Henry of
Ghent (Dales, 1990; Wippel, 1981, 153-58). Thus it is not surprising
that in his Quodlibet II, q. 3 of Lent, 1286, Godfrey was asked to
determine whether the world or any creature could be or exist from
eternity.




Godfrey develops his position in conscious opposition to Henry of
Ghent, and with a considerable but unacknowledged dependency on
Aquinas's *De aeternitate mundi* which, as noted above, was
contained in his Student Notebook. But after he has, with Aquinas,
shown that there is no contradiction in holding that something can be
created and still not have begun to be, Godfrey considers certain
objections against this position. One of these objections clearly gives
him pause. If the world had been created from eternity, on every given
day extending backward into a beginningless past God could have created
some material object such as a stone. But if that had happened, an
actual infinity of stones would now exist and God could unite all of
them into one infinite body. But an infinite body is an impossibility,
and so too is an infinity of simultaneously existing finite bodies and,
therefore, so is an eternally created world (PB 2.68-69, 76; Wippel,
1981, 160-63).




Godfrey comments that this objection can also be formulated more
forcefully in terms of human souls, i.e., the actual infinity of human
souls that would have resulted from an eternal world eternally
populated by human beings with immortal souls. Aquinas had considered
this form of the objection in his *De aeternitate mundi*, and
had noted that it has not yet been demonstrated that God could not
produce an actual infinity of spiritual beings. Godfrey does not adopt
this solution, presumably because he is convinced that an actual
infinity of entities whether spiritual or material is impossible.
Instead he proposes as a possible alternative an eternally populated
world involving the transmigration of a finite number of souls to an
infinity of bodies, and ordered only to their natural perfection. But
because this world seems to be intended primarily for human beings
destined to enjoy eternal happiness in soul and body, Godfrey grants
that it may be argued with probability that this world could not have
been created from eternity under the present dispensation by God's
ordained power. But, he also remarks, this does not prove that no
creature or no world could have been eternally created. He concludes
that it cannot be demonstrated either that an eternal world is not
possible, or that it is possible. Either side may be regarded as
probable, and neither is to be rejected as theologically erroneous (PB
2.79-80; Wippel, 1981, 167-68).


## 10. Substance, Accidents, Human Action




In Quodlibet XIV, q. 5 Godfrey contrasts mental being with
extramental being and then divides the latter into being *per
se* and being *per accidens*. Being *per se* is
divided into substance and the nine genera of accidents. The latter may
be regarded as real modes of substance or of being in the unqualified
sense (*ens simpliciter*). As Godfrey indicates elsewhere, a
substance enjoys a separate being or exists in itself, while it is of
the nature of an accident to be ordered to and to exist in something
else. An accident is not so much a being as "of a being" (PB 5.427) For
practical purposes Godfrey accepts the number of predicaments as ten,
but indicates that determination of their precise number is a matter of
probability rather than certainty (Wippel, 1981, 174-75). For Godfrey
substance and accident are related as potency and act since substance
serves as a subject for its accidents. Because of this he denies that
any substance can be the efficient cause of the accidents that inhere
in it, for it would then be in act with respect to them (as their
efficient cause) and in potency (as receiving them) at one and the same
time. He would always insist that nothing can be in act and in potency
at one and the same time with respect to the same thing for this would
be to assign being and nonbeing to it simultaneously. He also holds
against many of his contemporaries that the powers of the soul are
really distinct from the essence of the soul and from one another
(Wippel, 1981, 176-84, 202-7).


An unusual theory to account for the increase or decrease in the
intensity of an accidental quality such as the whiteness of an object
or an increase or decrease of charity in the human soul was attributed
to Godfrey by medieval critics of this view such as John Duns Scotus
or a few years later (ca. 1323) by Walter Burley as well as by many
others. According to this position, when such a quality increases or
decreases in intensity, the previous quality is completely corrupted
and replaced by a newly generated and numerically distinct
quality. There is a textual problem concerning Godfrey's personal
position because his explicit discussion of this in his Disputed
Question 18 is incomplete in the two known surviving manuscripts that
contain it. Modern scholars are divided about the accuracy of the
attribution of this view to Godfrey. Anneliese Maier (Maier, 2nd ed.,
1951, 3rd rev. ed., 1968) and John Wippel (Wippel,1979) challenged the
reliability of this attribution. Edith Dudley Sylla published an
article dealing with Godfrey's explanation of changes in the quantity
of the Eucharistic species after transubstantiation which, she
maintained, indicated that Godfrey defended a similar "succession
theory" to account for changes in quantity, and suggested that this
may have led Scotus to attribute to him the succession theory in
changes of qualities (Sylla, 1981). More recently, in two jointly
authored studies Jean Celeyrette and Jean-Luc Solere argue that
Godfrey did indeed defend the succession theory in accounting for
increases or decreases in qualities (Ceyerlette and Solere,
2002, 2009). Stephen Dumont has recently published a lengthy study
drawing upon discussions by Scotus, Burley, and many other medieval
writers to support this claim as well (Dumont, 2009). In light of
these recent and well documented contributions, I myself would
certainly grant that Godfrey could have defended such a position, and
even that he may have done so, but in the absence of any known text in
which he explicitly and clearly defends this position, I do not think
that this has yet been conclusively demonstrated. One hopes that one
day the complete text of his Disputed Question 18 will be found in
some manuscript, and that then the historical issue can be
definitively resolved. Until that happens I would recommend a healthy
skepticism about this issue, even as one of the texts cited by Dumont,
taken from a known critic of Godfrey's views on many points (Bernard
of Auvergne), expresses doubt concerning whether Godfrey really held
this position, and rejects it if indeed he did, but not if Godfrey was
referring to different degrees of a quallty rather than to different
qualities themselves in such changes (Dumont, 2009, 80, 118).



 

If the soul's immanent operations such as thinking or willing inhere
in their respective powers, the intellect and the will, those powers
themselves cannot be the efficient causes of such acts. Against Henry
of Ghent and later in Quodlibet XV against the Franciscan Gonsalvus of
Spain, Godfrey denies that any exception can be made to the
act-potency axiom. Therefore the will cannot reduce itself from potency to act
or immediately efficiently cause its acts of volition. The efficient
cause of volition can only be the object presented to the will by the
intellect. Against the charge of intellectual determinism sometimes
attributed to this position by its critics, Godfrey grounds human
freedom in the radical indeterminacy, he even speaks of the freedom,
of the intellect itself. And in his final Quodlibet XV, q. 4, he
argues that if, *per impossibile*, the will could move itself
directly without being moved by its object, freedom would be less well
preserved than if one maintains with him that the will is moved by its
object and then moves the apprehensive powers to their respective acts
and, by means of such motions, indirectly moves itself with respect to
secondary objects of volition (PB 14.20-23; Putallaz, 1995,
184-87, 198-208, 233-47; Kent, 1995,
108-9, 141-42; Osborne, 2015; Hartman, 2014). 

In Quodlibet VII, q.5 Godfrey was asked whether a supposit (a concrete existing subject) adds any reality (*res*) to essence or nature. He maintains that in terms of their primary meaning or denotation, supposit and nature are really one
and the same, but in terms of its connotation, the term 'supposit'
signifies something more than does the term 'nature', that is, those
accidents without which a supposit would not exist in the concrete
order, and the exclusion of dependence upon another subject or center
of existence. This has important implications for his theological
discussion of the union of human nature and a divine person in Christ
according to Christian faith (Wippel, 1981, 227-46; Cross, 2002, 69-70, 114-19, 290-95)


## 11. Theory of Abstraction




According to Godfrey the agent intellect and the possible intellect
are distinct powers of the individual human soul. His theory of
intellectual knowledge is based on the agent intellect's ability to
abstract potentially intelligible content from phantasms (images)
produced by the imagination, an internal sense. The imagination depends
upon the external senses for the data preserved in the phantasms. In
Quodlibet V, q. 10 he makes a studied effort to explain in what the
process of abstraction from phantasms consists as he responds to the
question whether the agent intellect produces any positive disposition
in the phantasm. One of the functions of the agent intellect is to
illuminate phantasms so that they can move the possible intellect to
understand. Because the possible intellect is at times only in potency
with respect to an intelligible object, and because nothing can reduce
itself from potency to act, it must be reduced to the act of
understanding by something else. Hence the agent intellect must in some
way enable phantasms to move or to actualize the possible
intellect.




But, argues Godfrey, because phantasms exist in the imagination and
are organic and individuated and therefore incapable of moving a
purely spiritual power which knows in universal fashion, the agent
intellect does not introduce any positive disposition into the
phantasms. Such a disposition would itself be individuated and organic
and incapable of moving the possible intellect. He concludes,
therefore, that the agent intellect operates on the phantasm simply by
removing or separating or isolating one factor present
therein--the quiddity of the thing, from another--its
individuating characteristics. What has been so removed or separated
or abstracted is thereby rendered universal and capable of moving the
possible intellect. In what would become a frequently cited
illustration, he draws an analogy with milk which possesses both color
(white) and taste (sweet). Without the influence of light, however, it
could not manifest itself or be perceived under the species of color
(as white) without also manifesting itself under the species of taste
(as sweet). Because of the influence of light one can speak of a kind
of "abstraction" of the white from the sweet, although not in the
sense that one would then exist apart from the other.


 So, too, in the order of consideration although not in the order
of reality, the agent intellect separates or frees the quiddity
presented in a phantasm from its individuating conditions and thereby
reduces it from being potentially intelligible to being actually
intelligible and capable of moving the possible intellect to
understand. This freeing or abstracting process takes place because of
a kind of spiritual contact with the light of the agent intellect
(Wippel, 1986). And, according to Godfrey the abstracted quiddity or
intelligible object is really the efficient cause of the possible
intellect's actual cognition of that object, just as the object of a
sense power is the efficient cause of that sense power's actual
perception of its object. In both cases this is again because nothing
can reduce itself from potency to act (Quodlibet VIII, q. 2, PB
4.30-33; Quodlibet IX, q.19, PB 4.276-78; Quodlibet XIII,
q. 3, PB 5.191-94, 200-202; Wippel, 1981,194-200;
Cote, 2007, especially on Quodlibet XII, q. 1; Hartman, 2014).


## 12. Prime Matter




Godfrey defends the matter-form composition of corporeal beings but
rejects any kind of spiritual matter and therefore any matter-form
composition of spiritual entities (Wippel, 2012). He also opposes the strong tendency
within the Franciscan tradition, also promoted by Henry of Ghent, that
would assign some minimum degree of actuality to prime matter.
According to Godfrey prime matter is pure potentiality and can never be
kept in existence without some substantial form, not even by God. Prime
matter and substantial form are directly related to one another as
potency principle and act principle. Neither is a being in its own
right, but both are principles of one and the same composite entity
(Quodlibet XIV, q. 5, PB 5.404-05).


## 13. Unicity vs. Plurality of Substantial Form




Heatedly debated in the 1270s and 1280s both at Paris and Oxford was
the question concerning whether there is one or more than one
substantial form in one substance, and especially in a human being.
Godfrey devotes considerable attention to this, especially in Quodlibet
II of Easter, 1286 and then again in Quodlibet III of Christmas, 1286.
These dates are significant because alleged theological difficulties
with the theory of unicity of substantial form as advanced by Aquinas
and others had led to prohibitions and condemnations of this by the
Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, O.P. on March 18, 1277, a
reissuing of this by his successor in that see, John Pecham, O.F.M. in
1284, and finally a new and resounding condemnation by Pecham on April
30, 1286.




In Quodlibet II, q. 7 Godfrey considers three theories that defend
plurality of forms in all material substances, or at least of duality
of substantial forms in human beings (Henry of Ghent). Godfrey severely
criticizes all three theories. Most fundamental among his many
arguments against them is his conviction that a substantial form
confers substantial being upon a composite substance. Therefore, the
presence of more than one substantial form in such a being would
undermine its substantial unity. Already in this discussion Godfrey
addresses alleged theological issues raised against unicity of
substantial form, especially one concerning the continuing numerical
identity of Christ's body during the period between his death on Good
Friday and his resurrection on Easter Sunday. At this point Godfrey's
philosophical preference is for unicity of form in all material
entities, including humans. He regards theories that defend plurality
of forms in all material substances as more improbable, and Henry's
theory of duality of forms in human beings as less improbable. He
maintains that the theological question remains open to a defense
either of unicity or of plurality of substantial forms.




In Quodlibet III, q. 5, after Pecham's condemnation of April, 1286,
Godfrey examines the theological aspects of this issue in detail. Again
he insists on one's freedom, theologically speaking, to defend either
unicity or plurality of forms in human beings, especially at Paris, but
does not commit himself definitively to either side (PB 2.197-211). In
sum, when he is primarily concerned with the philosophical issues
involved, he favors unicity of substantial form in all material
substances. When discussing the theological issues, he is more hesitant
and, without embracing either side in any definitive way, continues to
argue for one's freedom to defend either side pending some future
decision by the Church (Wippel, 1981, pp, 321-47).


## 14. The Principle of Individuation




Together with many of his contemporaries, Godfrey attempts to
identify the principle within material entities that accounts for their
being multiplied numerically within species. In discussing this he
returns to the distinction he had drawn in Quodlibet VI, q. 16 between
the kind of unity which serves as a principle of number and which is
based on discrete quantity, and the kind that is convertible with
being, transcendental unity. Because the substantial form is the
determining principle within a corporeal entity and makes its essence
capable of being defined, Godfrey holds that it is by reason of its
form that such a substance enjoys transcendental unity.




Nonetheless, in Quodlibet VII, q. 5 he comments that if different
individuals within the same species share in the same specific nature,
that nature cannot itself serve as the principle that renders them
numerically distinct from one another. Something else seems to be
needed, perhaps quantity. But to make quantity the principle of
individuation will not resolve the problem, for this would be to reduce
the principle that distinguishes one substance from others within the
same species to the level of an accident. Godfrey notes that in the
case of created immaterial beings (angels), their substantial form is
also that by which they are individuals. He proposes, therefore, that
in corporeal substances it is also the substantial form that serves as
their principle of individuation. Nonetheless, quantity has its role to
play as well since it is required in order to divide matter into
distinct parts and thereby enable it to receive and individuate
substantial forms of the same kind. In other words, quantity disposes
matter so as to enable it to function as the material principle of
individuation. The formal cause or principle of a thing's individuation
is its substantial form. Quantity is not the formal principle of
individuation, but by disposing matter so that it can receive different
substantial forms, it may be described as a quasi-material disposing
cause of individuation (Wippel, 1981, 349-64).