## 1. Semiotics: its place in the framework of scholastic disciplines




To speak of medieval semiotics is not to speak of a precisely
defined discipline besides, and distinct from, other medieval arts and
sciences; it is rather to speak of a complex field of more or less
-- mostly more -- elaborate reflections on the concept of
sign, its nature, function, and classification. In order to understand
the enormous extent to which such theories grew during the Middle Ages
some basic formal features of the scholastic organization of knowledge
has to be kept in mind. First, scholastic learning is essentially a
commentary tradition. Most of the writings either are explicit
commentaries on what at a time were taken to be canonical texts (as
e.g., the works of Aristotle, the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard,
the *Grammar* of Priscian, or the *Summulae Logicales* of
Peter of Spain or Buridan) or are at least composed with constant
reference to the topics treated there. A second point, closely related
to the first, is the common scholastic practice of putting great effort
into the conceptual analysis of the basic terms and notions. Thus,
wherever terms like 'sign' (*signum*) or
'representation' (*repraesentatio*) appeared in the
texts commented on, scholastic authors felt obliged either to give an
explicit account of these concepts or at least to be able to refer to a
place where this has been done. In view of this, the fact that
Aristotle in his *On Interpretation* had incidentally called the
word a 'sign' (*semeion, symbol*) of the mental
concept or that Augustine had termed the sacrament a 'sacred
sign' (*signum sacrum*) became most important for the
later development of semiotics. For in both cases the outcome was a
large number of detailed explorations of the nature and divisions of
sign. Both points combined resulted in a general tendency towards an
increasing complexity and refinement of the scholastic discourse. For
it is part of the intrinsic logic of any commentary tradition -- a
close parallel can be found in the Indian tradition of logic and
semiotics that we do not discuss here -- that all later
commentaries, which in many cases are actually meta-commentaries, have
to compete with the previous ones and to surpass them in elaboration by
taking up, evaluating, or commenting on their arguments and
terminological distinctions.




There are various areas within the scholastic system of arts and
sciences where a rich tradition of semiotic questions and answers
accumulated over the centuries (Maieru 1981; Meier-Oeser 1997,
42-170; Fuchs 1999). Most important are those places located in the
realm of the so-called *trivium* (i.e., grammar, rhetoric and
logic), especially in logic where already the determination of its
primary subject as well as the discussion of the basic logical notions
(like 'term' or 'signification') gave rise to
explicit remarks on the concept of sign. The most relevant *loci
classici* of logical contributions to a general theory of sign and
signification are: the comments on Aristotle's introductory chapter of
*On Interpretation* (esp. 1. 16a3-8), "the common starting
point for virtually all medieval theories of semantics" (Magee
1989, 8), as well as the commentaries (especially from the
15th and early 16th century) on the first tract
of the so-called *Summulae Logicales* of Peter of Spain, and all
texts or parts of logical textbooks that are related to one of the
aforementioned passages. Further considerations with relevance to
semiotics within the sphere of logic are to be found, though less
frequently, in the commentaries on the final chapter of the *Prior
Analytics* (2, 27 70a-b) where Aristotle had outlined his doctrine
of inference from
 signs.[1]
 Still within the sphere of *trivium*,
various efforts to develop grammar into a regular science matching the
Aristotelian standards led, during the second half of 13th
century, to approaches to language either starting from the general
concept of sign (Bacon, Ps.-Kilwardby) or taking grammar as a theory
reflecting on the fundamental structure of sign systems (*grammatica
speculativa*).




A rich source of semiotic material is also to be found in the
theologico-philosophical tradition. The *loci classici* of
semiotic discussions in the Commentaries on the *Book of
Sentences* (*Liber Sententiarum*) of Peter Lombard,
*the* basic scholastic textbook in theology, are particularly
the comments on book 1, distinction 1: the sign as subject and means of
all instruction; bk. 1, dist. 3: the differences between images and
traces and their respective epistemic value; bk. 1, dist. 27: mental
concepts, spoken words and their signification; bk. 2, dist. 10: the
communication of
 angels;[2]
 and, last but not least, bk. 4, dist. 1: the
sacramental sign and the sign in
 general.[3]
 Outside the
philosophical and theological discourse, the notion of sign
traditionally played an important role in the theory and practice of
medical diagnostics (Maieru 1981: 64ff).


## 2. The late ancient sources of medieval semiotics




The core set of ideas and doctrines from which medieval philosophers
developed their semiotic theories was provided to them mainly by two
late ancient authors. Besides Boethius (480-528), who transmitted
Aristotelian semantics to the Latin Middle Ages, Augustine's (354-430)
doctrine of sign is the most important junction of ancient and medieval
theories of sign and signification. Augustine's doctrine also has to be
seen as a decisive turning point in the history of semiotics.


### 2.1 Augustine (354-430)




Augustine's assertions and remarks, even though they do not offer a
completely uniform concept of sign, were fundamental to the development
of medieval semiotic, and they constituted the only elaborate theory of
signs until the 13th century (apart from the original theory
of Peter Abelard). In his incomplete early work, *De
Dialectica*, Augustine massively draws on the terminology of the
Stoic philosophy of language, though in many points fundamentally
modifying its sense.[4]
 It is especially in the concept of sign
where his difference from Stoic doctrines becomes apparent. For
according to the most refined theory of Stoic logicians, a sign in the
proper technical sense (*semeion*) was seen as the abstract
propositional content of a sentence insofar it is functioning as the
antecedent in a true implication by means of which a hitherto unknown
truth is revealed. By contrast, Augustine is favoring a reifying
concept of sign. A sign, as he defines it in line with the descriptions
given by Cicero and the Latin tradition of
 rhetoric,[5]
 is "something that shows itself to the senses and something other
than itself to the mind" (*Signum est quod se ipsum sensui et
praeter se aliquid animo ostendit*) (Augustine *De dial.*
1975, 86). The concept of sign, thus defined in terms of a triadic
relation (a sign is always a sign *of* something *to*
some mind), provides the general basis for Augustine's theory of
language: "To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice"
(*Loqui est articulata voce signum dare*) (Augustine *De
dial.* 1975, 86). Speech, in further contrast to Stoic semantics,
is essentially characterized by its communicative function. A word, by
definition, is a "sign of something, which can be understood by
the hearer when pronounced by the speaker" (*uniuscuiusque rei
signum, quod ab audiente possit intelligi, a loquente prolatum*)
(Augustine *De dial.* 1975, 86). The communicative
function[6]
 is thus essential to the linguistic sign:
"There is no reason for signifying, i.e., for giving signs except
to convey into another's mind what the sign-giver has in his own
mind" (*Nec ulla causa est nobis significandi, id est signi
dandi, nisi ad ... traiciendum in alterius animum id quod animo
gerit qui signum dat*) (Augustine *De doctr. chr.* II 3,
1963, 34: 17-20). In his dialogue *De Magistro* (*On the
Teacher*), however, written shortly after *De Dialectica*,
Augustine denies that words or signs have the power of
'showing' anything in the sense of making something present
to the understanding (*Non ... mihi rem, quam significat,
ostendit verbum...*) (Augustine *De magistro* X 32,
1974, 191). For this reason, still influenced by the tenets of the
skeptical tradition at that
 time,[7]
 Augustine was limiting
the capacity of the sign to its admonitory or commemorative function
(Augustine *De magistro* XI 36, 1974, 194).




But in *De Doctrina Christiana*, after abandoning the
skeptical position, Augustine redefines the sign accordingly, claiming
that "a sign is something which, offering itself to the senses,
conveys something other to the intellect (*Signum ... est res
praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in
cogitationem venire*) (Augustine *De doctr. chr*. II 1,
1963, 33). In contrast to his former view, he is now attributing a
fundamental epistemic function to the sign, claiming that "all
instruction is either about things or about signs; but things are
learnt by means of signs" (*Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel
signorum, sed res per signa discuntur*) (Augustine *De doctr.
chr*. I 1, 1963, 9). The borderline between things and signs and
thus the sign itself is defined functionally rather than ontologically:
signs are things employed to signify something (*res ... quae
ad significandum aliquid adhibentur*) (Augustine *De doctr.
chr*. I 1, 1963, 9). Augustine divides the sign into the two main
classes of natural signs (*signa naturalia*) and given signs
(*signa data*). "Natural signs are those which, apart from
any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the
knowledge of something
 else",[8]
 as, for example, smoke
when it indicates fire, the footprint of an animal passing by, or the
countenance of an angry or sorrowful man. "Conventional signs, on
the other hand, are those which living beings mutually exchange in
order to show, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, or
their perceptions, or their
 thoughts."[9]
 Whether and to what
extent such an "intention to signify" (*voluntas
significandi*) can be assumed in cases of animal sign communication
Augustine leaves
 open.[10]




The signs used in human communication are further subdivided with
regard to the senses to which they address themselves: "some
relate to the sense of sight, some to that of hearing, a very few to
the other senses". The preeminent role among all sorts of
"given signs", that Augustine is claiming for the words,
does not result from their quantitative preponderance but rather from
the fact that, as he points out, everything that is indicated by
nonverbal signs can be put into words but not *vice versa*
(Augustine *De doctr. chr*. II 7, 1963, 35). 'Word'
(*verbum*) in its proper sense means -- at least for the
early Augustine -- 'spoken word'. Writing
(*litterae*), introduced by man in order to impart permanency to
spoken language, is just a secondary system of signs, consisting of
"signs of words" (*signa verborum*) rather than of
words itself (Augustine, *De doctr. chr*. II 8, (Ibid.); *De
dial*. 1975, 86f.).




In close analogy to this devaluation of the written word against the
spoken one, Augustine in his later theory of *verbum mentis*
(*mental word*) is advocating the devaluation of the spoken word
and the external sign in general against the internal sphere of mental
cognition. It is now the mental or *interior word* (*verbum
interius*), i.e., the mental concept, that is considered as word in
its most proper sense, whereas the spoken word appears as a mere sign
or voice of the word (*signum verbi*, *vox verbi*)
(Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV 11 20, 1968,
 486f.).[11]
 Thoughts
(*cogitationes*) are performed in mental words. The *verbum
mentis*, corresponding to what later was called the *conceptus
mentis* or *intellectus*, is by no means a
'linguistic' entity in the proper sense, for it is
"nullius linguae", i.e., it does not belong to any
particular spoken language like Latin or Greek. So we are confronted
with the paradoxical situation that linguistic terminology (e.g.,
*verbum, locutio, oratio, dicere*, etc.) is used to describe a
phenomenon whose independence from any language is strongly emphasized
at the same time.




Despite all the internal ruptures and inconsistencies, Augustine's
doctrine of sign is based on a definition of the sign that, for the
first time, intends to embrace both the natural indexical sign and the
conventional linguistic sign as species of an all-embracing generic
notion of sign, thus marking a turning point in the history of
semiotics.


### 2.2 Boethius (480-528)




Even though Boethius, in line with the Aristotelian writings he
commented on, focuses on the concept of linguistic signification and
hardly ever explicitly speaks of signs (*notae*) in general
(Magee 1989, 61ff.), he is, besides Augustine, the main source for
medieval theories of signs. This is explained by the fact that, due to
Augustine's influence, the semantics of linguistic signs became the
focus of semiotic theory, and that Boethius with his translations of
and comments on parts of the Aristotelian *Organon* (especially
*Peri Hermeneias*) is the most important, and for a long time
the only available, source for medieval acquaintance with the semantics
of Aristotle and his Neoplatonic commentators of late antiquity. Thus,
the medieval philosophers viewed Aristotle's logic at first through the
eyes of Boethius, who has made some influential decisions concerning
semantic terminology (Engels 1963), as well as the interpretation of
the Aristotelian text. What they learned through his writings were
*inter alia* the insight into the conventional character of
language, the view that meaning is established by an act of
'imposition', i.e., name-giving or reference-setting, and
the influential idea that to signify (*significare*) is to
"establish an understanding" (*intellectum
constituere*).
  

  





Especially in his more elaborate second commentary on *Peri
Hermeneias*, Boethius discusses at length the interrelations
between the four elements of linguistic semeiosis mentioned by
Aristotle, i.e., between external objects or things (*res*),
mental concepts or representations (*passiones*,
*intellectus*), spoken words (*voces*), and written words
(*scripta*). These elements are arranged so that they build up
what Boethius calls the "order of speaking" (*ordo
orandi*) (Magee 1989, 64-92) which is characterized by the fact
that among the elements mentioned the former in each case ontologically
precedes the latter. Thus, without the existence of things there would
be no concepts, without concepts no spoken words, and without spoken
words no written ones. This, however, is not reversible in that sense
that the use of written characters in any case demands the knowledge of
the vocal expressions denoted by them, that there is always a concept
behind a spoken word, and that every concept refers to a real thing as
its object (Boethius *In Periherm. ed. sec.*, 1880: 21, 28-30).
In any case, the *ordo orandi* determines the direction of
linguistic signification: written characters signify spoken words,
whereas spoken words primarily signify mental concepts and, by means of
the latter, secondaryly denote the things. Thus, *scriptura*
left aside, the remaining three elements are structurally organized
along the lines of the prominent 'semiotic triangle'
according to which signs refer to things by means of concepts (Boethius
*In Periherm. ed. sec.*, 1880: 24, 33). In his further
discussion of the *ordo orandi* Boethius divides, with reference
to Porphyrius and the Aristotelians (*peripatetici*), three
levels of speech: besides -- or rather at the fundament of --
written and spoken discourse there is a mental speech (*oratio
mentis*) in which thinking is
 performed.[12]
 It is, just like the
Augustinian mental word, not made up from words of any national
languages but rather from transidiomatic or even non-linguistic mental
concepts which are, as Aristotle has claimed, the same for all men.


## 3. Semiotic beginnings in the 11th and 12th century




In the late 11th century Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)
revived the Augustinian doctrine of the *verbum mentis*,
combining it with the Aristotelian view on mental concepts outlined in
the opening chapter of *Peri Hermeneias*. Thus, the two aspects
of the mental word -- which are found more or less implicitly in
Augustine's work already -- became explicit in Anselm. First:
mental words are natural words and thus identical for all human beings
(they are "*verba ... naturalia ... et apud omnes
gentes eadem*") (Anselm of Canterbury, *Monolog*.,
1968: 25); and second: they are similitudes and mental images of things
(*similitudines et imagines
 rerum*).[13]
 Due to this, they
signify their objects in a more expressive way (*expressius
signant*) than any other kind of words, and thus they are, as
Anselm agrees with Augustine, what has to be termed 'word'
in its most proper sense (Anselm of Canterbury, *Monolog*.,
1968: 25).




A constitutive factor of the emergence of a medieval theory of signs
within the context of grammar and logic is the resumption of
Augustine's practice of embedding the concept of language into the
generic notion of sign. Already Peter Abelard (1079-1142), in many
respects the most important author of the 12th century,
points out, that the phenomenon of linguistic signification
(*significatio vocum*), falling into the sphere of competence of
logic, does not cover the whole range of sign processes (Abelard:
*De dial.*, 1956: 111). For things in the broadest sense may
function as signs, too, if they are connected to each other in such a
way that the perception of one leads to the cognition of the other.
This can be the case when the one thing is an image of the other, when
things are either arbitrarily imposed to exercise the function of
signifying (*significandi officium*), as for instance the famous
*circulus vini*, a wreath of foliage, attached outside the
tavern, indicating that wine is sold inside, or the conventional
gestures of monastic sign
 languages,[14]
 or when two things, by being repeatedly noticed in conjunction, are
customarily (*secundum consuetudinem*) associated with each
other, or, finally, when they bear some sort of relationship to each
other (*secundum aliquam earum ad se
 habitudinem*).[15]




Abelard apparently is well aware of the fact that the concept of
sign that results from taking into account all these cases as instances
of signification is not only general but also unspecific. In order to
be able to single out cases of "properly signifying"
(*proprie significare*) from such a 'pansemiotic'
setting, he introduces a distinction, distinguishing between signs that
simply signify (*signa significantia*) and signs that are, as
significative signs (*signa significativa*), i.e., as bearers of
meaning, involved in processes of intended sign-giving (Abelard *De
dial.*, 1956: 111; *Log. 'Ingredientibus'*,
1927: 336ff).


## 4. The genesis of an elaborate theory of signs in the second half of 13th century




The genesis of an elaborate theory of signs in the second half of
the 13th century is the result of a complex interplay of
Aristotelian and Augustinian influences. Since the mid-13th
century Augustinian views, until then effective mainly in theological
discussions, begin to invade the faculties of arts. Due to this, the
sign is increasingly taken as the basic concept of the
'linguistic science' (*scientia
sermocinalis*):[16]
 "Speech is nothing but a sign"
(*Sermo totaliter signum est*), Robert Kilwardby asserts
(Kilwardby *De ortu scientiarum*, 1976, 160). Roger Bacon
praises the sign even as the principal instrument of all Liberal
 Arts.[17]
 It is true, the consciousness of words
being signs is nothing new. From this point onward, however, it gives
rise, at first in the framework of grammar theory, to semiotic
reflections that go beyond what is known from earlier centuries.


### 4.1 Ps.-Robert Kilwardby




The unknown author, now commonly named Ps.-Robert Kilwardby, opens
his commentary on *Priscianus maior* (written somewhere between
1250 and 1280)[18]
 by modifying Augustine's prominent dictum
that "all instruction is either about things or about
signs" into the stronger and more 'semiotic-minded'
thesis that "every science is about signs or things
signified" (*scientia omnis aut est de signis aut de rebus
significatis*) (Ps.-Robert Kilwardby: *Comment. on "Prisc.
Maior"*, 1975, 1). This statement he takes as starting point
of a detailed discussion of the questions of whether there can be a
(special) science of
 signs[19]
 and, if so, what its relationship towards
the sciences dealing with things would be
 like.[20]
 Ps.-Kilwardby points
out that there are several 'sciences of signs'
(*diversae sunt scientiae de signis*) according to the various
kinds of signs (Ps.-Robert Kilwardby: *Comment. on "Prisc.
Maior"*, 1975, 3). Since, however, any discipline, in order
to meet the Aristotelian standard of science as it began to be accepted
at that time, must have a general subject matter, the *scientia de
signis* necessarily contemplates the sign "in terms of a
universal notion abstracted from the particular signs" (*sub
ratione universalis abstracti a particularibus signis*) (Ps.-Robert
Kilwardby: *Comment. on "Prisc. Maior"*, 1975, 4).
In case of natural signs (*signa naturalia*) as well as
"moral signs" (*signa moralia*), as e.g., actions in
relation to the good or bad will, the theory of signs cannot be
separated from the theory of things signified; therefore, these signs
fall under natural and moral science, respectively (Ps.-Robert
Kilwardby: *Comment. on "Prisc. Maior"*, 1975, 6).
The linguistic signs, however, produced by the human understanding for
the purpose of communicating its ideas, are the subject-matter of a
rational science (*scientia rationalis*), the science of
signs.


### 4.2 Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-ca. 1293)




Roger Bacon is probably the most important medieval theorist of sign
-- at least he is the author of the most extensive medieval tract
on signs known so
 far.[21]
 Starting from a minute analysis of the
notion of sign and its various divisions, Bacon develops both in *De
signis* (ca. 1267) and in his *Compendium studii theologiae*
(1292) a general conception of signification as well as a detailed
theory of the linguistic sign, so that here, as in Augustine, semantics
is integrated into a broader theory of sign in general. According to
Bacon, the concept of sign belongs to the category of relation. To be
more precise, a sign, as it was pointed out already in Augustine's
definition, is a triadic relation, such that it is -- in principle
-- a sign *of* something *to* someone. This way of
putting the point, however, gives rise to the question of whether both
*relata* of this relation are equally essential for its
existence. What would happen if one of these *relata* did not
exist? What if the designated thing ceased to exist? And what if there
were no cognitive power taking notice or even being able to take notice
of the sign?




Bonaventura (ca. 1217-1274), one of the most renowned theologians of
the time, explicitly places emphasis on the sign's relation to the
significate, claiming that



> ... a sign has a twofold comparison: both to that
> which it signifies, and to that to which it signifies; and the first is
> essential and the sign always has it in act, but the second it has in
> habit; and it is from the first that it is called a *sign*, not
> from the second. Whence a circle above a tavern is always a sign, even
> if no one looks at
>  it.[22]




In direct opposition to this commonly accepted manner of
presentation, Bacon lay stress on the 'pragmatic' relation
to the sign-interpreter, for the notion of sign is, as he claims,
"essentially predicated with respect to someone to whom it
signifies. ... For if no one could conceive something through the
sign, it would be void and vain, nay, it wouldn't be a sign."
(Roger Bacon, *De signis*, 1978, 81). Other than the essential
relation of an actual sign to its interpreter, which must be in any a
case what was called a 'real relation' (*relatio
realis*), the relation to the significate can be a so-called a
'relation of reason' (*relatio rationis*), for, as
Bacon adds: "It does not follow 'a sign is in act,
therefore the thing signified exists', because nonentities can be
signified by words just like entities" (Roger Bacon, *De
signis*, 1978, 81). There are other important points in which Bacon
deviates from the common opinion: He defines the sign as "that
which upon being offered to the sense or intellect designates something
to the intellect itself" (*illud quod oblatum sensui vel
intellectui aliquid designat ipsi intellectui*), and emphasizes
that, contrary to what the common description says, there are signs
which are offered only to the
 intellect.[23]




Bacon presents a detailed classification of
 signs[24]
 by
taking up, combining, and modifying elements of several prior sign
typologies. The division of the two main classes of natural and given
signs is taken from Augustine, the distinction between necessary and
probable signs is borrowed from Aristotle (an. pr. II, 27, 70a3-b5),
and their subdivision according to their temporal reference is a
traditional element in the theories of the sacramental
 sign.[25]


* 1. NATURAL SIGNS
	+ 1.1 signifying by inference, concomitance, consequence
		- 1.1.1 signifying necessarily
			* 1.1.1.1 signifying something present (large extremeties -
			strength)
			* 1.1.1.2 signifying something past (lactation - birth of a
			child)
			* 1.1.1.3 signifying something future (dawn - imminent
			sunrise)
		- 1.1.2 signifying with probability
			* 1.1.2.1 signifying sth. present (to be a mother - love)
			* 1.1.2.2 signifying sth. past (wet ground - previous rain)
			* 1.1.2.3 signifying sth. future (red sky in the morning -
			rain)
	+ 1.2 signifying by configuration and likeness (images, pictures,
	species of colour)
	+ 1.3 signifying by causality (tracks - animal)
* 2. SIGNS GIVEN AND DIRECTED BY A SOUL
	+ 2.1 signifying instinctively without deliberation (sigh -
	pain; laughter - joy)
	+ 2.2 signifying with deliberation (words)
	+ 2.3 interjections




The general class of natural signs signifying unintentionally by
their essence (1) is divided according to the relation between a sign
and its significate into the three subclasses of (1.1) inferential
signs based on a more or less constant concomitance of sign and
significate, (1.2) iconic signs, based on similarity in appearance, and
(1.3) signs based on a causal relation between the sign and the
signified thing. The signs of inference (*illatio*) are
subdivided into (1.1.1) necessary and (1.1.2) probable signs, both of
which are further differentiated according to the three possible
directions of temporal reference (present, past, future). Bacon gives
to understand that he takes inferential and iconic signs to be signs
more properly than the members of third class, i.e., signs based on a
causal relation (later in the *Compendium studii theologiae* he
will drop this class entirely). He justifies this by pointing to the
fundamental difference between sign relations and causal relation:
whereas sign relations are necessarily constituted by an interpreter,
causal relations exist independently of any such one alone by reason of
the order of
 nature.[26]




The general class of signs given and directed by a soul (*signa
ordinata ab anima*) (2) is divided according to whether the living
being brings forth the sign (2.1) together with a deliberation by
reason and choice of will (*cum deliberatione rationis et electione
voluntatis*), or (2.2) by a natural instinct or impulse
(*instictu naturali et impetu naturae*). The reason for
distinguishing two modes of natural signifying, as they appear in (1)
and (2.1), is, on the one hand, an equivocation of the concept of
nature, meaning "substance or essence of something"
(*substantia sive essentia cuiuslibet*), as well as "force
acting without deliberation" (*virtus agens sine
deliberatione*) (*De signis*, 1978, 85f.) and, on the other
hand, the insight that, contrary to what holds for the natural signs in
the first sense, in the case of the latter there is always a
sign-giver, not only someone taking something as a sign. Interjections
(2.3) are considered as a hybrid of the two other sorts of given
signs.




It has to be noticed that in Bacon's, as well as in any other
medieval sign-typology, the classes of signs -- even though this
is not explicitly stated by the authors themselves -- distinguish
modes of signifying rather than signs in the sense of sign-vehicles.
Therefore, one and the same thing, fact, or event may, in different
respects, fall under various and even opposite sign-classes. This fact
is especially important for the full account of sign-processes in which
spoken language is involved.




The primary intention of Bacon's semiotic analyses is, as it was
already with Augustine, to provide the foundations for the semantics of
spoken language.[27]
 According to Bacon, an adequate and
complete account of the "difficult issue" (*difficilis
dubitatio*) of what the significate of a vocal expression is has to
consider three different aspects: 1) the signification of vocal
expressions apart from *impositio*, i.e., apart from their being
endowed with (conventional) meaning by 'imposition', 2)
their signification according to imposition, and 3) their signification
over and above imposition.




1) Each vocal expression may serve independently from its imposition
as a natural sign (*De signis*, 1978, 86f.) Words indicate for
instance the speaker being close, and they may 'tell'
something about him in the same way as an artwork is indicating the
skills of the artist. Furthermore, the spoken word is a natural sign
implying that the speaker possesses the concept of the object meant by
the word according to its regular meaning. For the significative use of
language presupposes the presence of a concept in the speaker's mind
that corresponds to the object denoted (*De signis*, 1978, 85f.,
*Comp. studii theol*., 1988, 64). Thus, the relation between the
vocal expression and the mental concept is, contrary to what was the
common opinion since the days of Augustine and Boethius, not a relation
of expression but rather of indexical signification.




2) In his account of signification of words regarding their
'impositio' Bacon accentuates the arbitrariness of
meaning.[28]
 But even though the first
'impositor' (name-giver) is free to impose a word or sign
on anything whatsoever, he does perform the act of imposition according
to the paradigm of baptism: "all names which we impose on things
we impose inasmuch as they are present to us, as in the case of names
of people in
 Baptism".[29]
 Contrary to the venerable tradition of
Aristotelian, Boethian or Porphyrian
 Semantics,[30]
 holding that spoken
words, at least immediately, signify mental concepts, Bacon favors the
view that words, according to their imposition, immediately and
properly signify the things themselves. With this account of linguistic
signification Bacon abandons the model of the semantic
 triangle[31]
 and
marks an important turning point on the way from the traditional
intensionalist semantics to the extensionalist reference semantics as
it became increasingly accepted in the 14th
 century.[32]




Bacon is, however, well aware of the fact that the use of names and
words in general is not restricted to the meaning endowed through the
first act of imposition (the term 'homo' does not only
denote those men that have been present when the original act of its
imposition took place); nor do words cease to be used when their
original *significata* (things signified) no longer physically
exist (Bacon, *De signis*, 1978, 128). Bacon intends to solve
the resulting difficulties (which every causal theory of meaning based
on the concepts of 'reference setting' and 'reference
borrowing' has to face) by distinguishing two modes of
imposition. This can be seen as his most inventive contribution to
semantics.[33]
 Besides the 'formal' mode of
imposition conducted by a 'perlocutionary' vocal expression
like "I call this ..." (*modus imponendi sub forma
impositionis vocaliter expressa*) there is another kind taking
place tacitly (*sine forma imponendi vocaliter expressa*)
whenever a term is applied (*transumitur*) to any object other
than the first name-giver has 'baptized' (Bacon, *De
signis*, 1978, 130). Whereas the formal mode of imposition refers
either to the mythical situation of a first invention of language or to
the act of explicitly coining a new word, the second kind of imposition
describes what actually happens during the everyday use of language.
This modification of the meaning of words is constantly taking place
without the speaker or anyone else being actually aware of it. For just
by using language we "all day long impose names without being
conscious of when and how" (*nos tota die imponimus nomina et
non advertimus quando et quomodo*) (Bacon, *De signis*,
1978, 100, 130f.)




3) Even if *impositio* in the described sense is of pivotal
importance for the constitution of linguistic meaning, the
signification of words is by no means limited to it: "a vocal
expression signifies many things for which it is not imposed, as it
signifies all those things that bear an essential relation to the thing
for which the word is
 imposed."[34]
 In this way, Bacon
claims, words signify, as it were, infinitely many
 things.[35]


## 5. Grammatica Speculativa and its critics




The idea, fundamental both for Bacon and Ps.-Kilwardby, that grammar
is a regular science rather than a propaedeutic art, is shared by the
school of the so-called "modist grammarians"
(*modistae*) emerging around 1270 in the Faculty of Arts of the
University of Paris and culminating in the *Grammatica
Speculativa* of Thomas of Erfurt around 1300. The members of this
school, taking it for granted that the objective of any regular science
was to explain the facts by giving reasons for them rather than to
simply describe them, make it their business to deduce the grammatical
features common to all languages from universal modes of being by means
of corresponding modes of understanding. Thus the tradition of
speculative grammar (*grammatica speculativa*) develops the
commonly accepted Aristotelian claim (*De Interpretatione*
1.16a3-9) that the mental concepts, just as the things, are the same
for all men (*eadem apud omnes*) further to the thesis of a
universal grammar based on the structural analogy between the
"modes of being" (*modi essendi*), the "modes
of understanding" (*modi intelligendi*), and the
"modes of signifying" *(modi significandi*) that are
the same for all languages. Along this line, Boethius Dacus (Boethius
the Dane), one of the most important theoreticians of speculative
grammar,[36]
 states that



> ... all national languages are grammatically
> identical. The reason for this is that the whole grammar is borrowed
> from the things ... and just as the natures of things are similar
> for those who speak different languages, so are the modes of being and
> the modes of understanding; and consequently the modes of signifying
> are similar, whence, so are the modes of grammatical construction or
> speech. And therefore the whole grammar which is in one language is
> similar to the one which is in another
>  language.[37]




Even though the words are arbitrarily imposed (whence arise the
differences between all languages), the modes of signifying are
uniformly related to the modes of being by means of the modes of
understanding (whence arise the grammatical similarities among all
languages). Focusing on the terms of 'sign' and
'signification', speculative grammar, as a science of
general cognitive-linguistic structures, prescinds from all the
different national languages -- and even from vocal language as
such. For it is, as Martinus Dacus points out, not essential for
speculative grammar to deal with vocal expressions or with structures
of vocal sign systems, because any kind of signs could be the object of
the considerations of a modist grammarian. The fact that he is
concerned with linguistic signs rather than with gestures or the
"language of eyes" is only due to the fact that vocal
expressions are, compared to other kind of signs, more apt for human
communication.[38]




Soon after 1300 the modistic approach came under substantial
criticism. The main point that critics like Ockham oppose is not the
assumption of a basic universal grammar, for such a claim is implied in
Ockham's concept of mental grammar, too. Two other aspects of modism
are in the focus of these criticisms: (1) the assertion of a close
structural analogy between spoken or mental language and external
reality (*consimilis distinctio inter voces vel intentiones in anima
significantes et inter ipsa significata*) (William of Ockham,
*Expos. in lIbid. Porphyrii de praed.*, 1978, 158); (2) the
inadmissible reification of the *modus significandi* adherent to
its description as some quality or form added to the articulate voice
(*dictioni superadditum*) through the act of imposition. To say
that vocal expressions 'have' different modes of signifying
is, as Ockham points out, just a metaphorical manner of speaking; for
what is meant is simply the fact that different words signify whatever
they signify in different
 ways.[39]
 According to John
Aurifaber (fl. ca. 1300), a vocal term is significative, or is a sign,
solely by being used significatively, not on grounds of something
inherent in the
 sound.[40]
 In order to assign signification a proper
place in reality, it must be ascribed to the intellect rather than to
the vocal sound (*significare est accidens intellectus; sed vox est
illud quo significat intellectus*) (Aurifaber, *Determ. de modis
signif.*, 1967, 226). The criticism of modist grammar is based on a
fundamental redefinition of the concept of sign, coming about after the
mid-13th century. For the translocation of signification in
the proper sense from the word to the intellect is based on the
presupposition that, whatever Augustine may have said, mental concepts
are signs themselves.


## 6. Mental concepts as signs




In 12th- and early 13th-century logical
textbooks the concept of sign does not play an important role yet.
'Sign' in its technical sense is taken as the name of the
so-called syncategorematic terms (e.g., *omnis* [every],
*nullus* [no] as *signa universalia* or universal signs,
*quidam* [a certain], *aliquis* [some] as *signa
particularia* or particular signs) (L. M. de Rijk, 1965-67,
II/2.383).[41]
 In line with the text of Aristotle's
*Peri Hermeneias* and its translation by Boethius, only written
and spoken words were said to signify. Mental concepts (*passiones
animae*, *intellectus*, *conceptus*) were seen as
likenesses (*similitudines*) rather than as signs of things.
Once again, it is the mid-13th century where a conceptual
change is taking place which, although at first it may seem to be a
matter of nuance, turns out to be one of the most important junctures
in the history of semiotics: mental concepts -- without at first
losing their status of being likenesses of things -- begin to be
characterized as signs of things (*signa rerum*). It is true
that there are some few passages in Boethius, Anselm, and Abelard
already pointing in this direction (Boethius, *In Periherm. ed.
sec.*, 1880, 24; cf. Magee, 1989, 71; Anselm of Canterbury,
*Monolog*., 1968, 25; Abelard, *Log.
'Ingredientibus'*, 1927, 315f.). But it is not until
the second half of 13th century that this idea achieves
general acceptance and gains relevance to the theory of
 sign.[42]




The consequences of this view are many: for instance, the rejection,
or at least the modification, of Augustine's venerable definition of
the sign, and the new possibility to describe the relationship between
the concept and its object without referring to the notion of
similitude. Furthermore, in the semantic triangle, the Boethian
*ordo orandi* now can be described entirely in terms of sign and
significate.[43]
 Insofar as concepts agree with vocal
expressions in their function of being signs, it makes sense to
conceive of thought processes as a kind of mental speech (*oratio
mentalis*) showing close analogies to spoken discourse. This again
paves the way for the development of a mentalist logic, the principal
objects of which are not the vocal terms and propositions any longer,
but rather the corresponding mental acts. The definition of mental
concepts as *signa rerum* also provides the basis of a close
interconnection of logic and epistemology as it is characteristic
especially of the later Middle Ages. In conjunction with this, a
redefinition of the notion of signification (*significare*) is
taking place. For where the mental concepts, i.e., the acts of
understanding (*intellectus*), are considered to be signs
themselves, the Aristotelian definition of *significare*
(signifying) as to constitute an understanding (*constituere
intellectum*) can no longer be regarded as adequate. As a result,
the terminology of 'representation'
(*repraesentatio*, *repraesentare*, *facere
praesens*), originally used mainly in epistemological contexts,
achieves an increasing importance for logical semantics by being fused
with the terminology of 'signification'. Finally, the
description of mental concepts as signs can also be seen as one of the
main motifs for the general account of signs as it emerges in late
medieval logic. For it is only under this condition that logic is no
longer concerned exclusively with arbitrary signs but also -- and
even primarily -- with natural signs.


## 7. The sign as a central notion in 14th-century logic




Even though in 13th-century terminist logic
'significatio' is seen as the foundation of all
'properties of terms' (*proprietates terminorum*),
the generation of William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain is not
particularly interested in the concept of signification.
*Significatio* is shortly described as "presentation of
some form to the intellect" (*praesentatio alicuius formae ad
intellectus*)[44]
 or as "representation of a thing by
means of a conventional vocal expression" (*rei per vocem
secundum placitum repraesentatio*) (Peter of Spain, *Summule
logicales*, *1972, 79)*. But the detailed logical discussion
starts right away with the concept of *suppositio*
(supposition), i.e., from the capacity of substantive terms to stand
for something in a propositional context.




With William of Ockham (ca. 1285-1347/49), however, the concepts of
sign and signification begin to take center stage in logic (Biard
1981, 452; Biard 1989, Lenz 2003, Panaccio 2004). Logic is seen as
exclusively concerned with signs, primarily with mental signs,
secondarily with vocal or written signs. Ockham integrates the
concept of supposition into his definition of sign. He recognizes that
the general notion of sign as something that makes something else come
into cognition is too broad to be useful in logic and semantic theory;
therefore, he adds to the definition the criterion that a sign, as far
as its use in logic is concerned, has to be apt to stand for the thing
it makes come into cognition, or else it has to be such that it could
be added to such a sign standing for something (*natum est pro illo
supponere vel tali addi in propositione*) (William of
Ockham, *Summa log.*, 1974, 9).[45] Thus, Ockham's logical concept of sign is
restricted to what later will be termed a 'propositional
sign' (*signum propositionale*) (John Raulin, *In log.
Arist. comment*., 1500, fol. a5rb). Due to the central
position of the notion of sign in his logic, one is entitled to
characterize Ockham's logic as "ruled by the concept of
sign" ("regie par le concept de signe")
(Biard 1989, 102). Ockham, constantly referring to the notion of sign,
ventures in many cases a semiological redefinition of basic logical
concepts (Biard 1989, 102-25), which in turn allows him to reformulate
traditional ontological issues, as for instance the questions of
universals, the number of categories, or the ontological status of
relations, as semantic questions.




Ockham's logic marks an important, though not the only important,
step in the process that might be described as a progressive
'mentalization' of sign. The idea behind this process is
the contention that without some sort of 'intentionality'
the phenomena of sign, signification and semiosis in general must
remain inconceivable. This tendency of relocating the notions of sign
and signification from the realm of spoken words to the sphere of the
mind is characteristic of the mentalist logic arising in the early
14th century, and remaining dominant throughout the later
Middle Ages. Words or signs, insofar as they concern rational
discourse, were traditionally held to be the essential subject matter
of logic. According to mentalist logic, however, the
'words' or 'signs' primarily relevant to logic
are not the spoken words, but the trans-idiomatic mental words
(*verba mentis*) or mental concepts. Thus, in later medieval
logic, as already in Burleigh and Ockham, the mental sign will be the
focus of logical semantics. According to a distinction introduced by
Peter of Ailly (1330-1421) in the second half of 14th
century,



> ...a thing can be called a sign in two senses. In the
> first sense, because it leads to an act of knowing the thing of which
> it is a sign. In a second sense, because it is itself the act of
> knowing the thing. In the second sense we may say that a concept is a
> sign of a thing of which such a concept is a natural likeness --
> not that it leads to an act of knowing that thing, but because it is
> the very act itself of knowing the thing, [an act that] naturally and
> properly represents that thing (Peter of Ailly, *Concepts*,
> 1980, 17).




Even if Ockham's semantics, as well as his theory of mental language
governed by a trans-idiomatic mental grammar transforming the theorems
of terminist logic into a theory of thought processes (William of
Ockham, *Summa log.*, 1974,
 11ff),[46]
 was by no means
undisputed, and came under severe criticism by his opponents as well as
no less severe modifications by his 'followers'. What,
despite all the differences, logical authors from the
14thcentury on generally have in common is their awareness
of the importance of the concept of sign -- even though, of
course, there were exceptions to this rule. Some realistic-minded
theologians, such as John Wyclif (1330-1384) or Stanislas of Znoymo
(fl. ca. 1400), harshly criticize the alleged overestimation of the
sign by the "teachers of signs" (*doctores
signorum*), as the latter calls them. According to Stanislas, the
human 'errantry through the vain and useless signs' of
logic is nothing but the necessary consequence of the fall of mankind
(*in penam peccati sumus necessitati in his vacuis et inanis signis
erranter ambulare*) (Stanislas of Znoymo, *De vero et
falso*, 1971,
 207).[47]


## 8. The concept of sign in scholastic logic of 15th and early 16th-century




With Ockham, the concept of sign becomes a central notion of logical
theory. However, as a result of Ockham's focus on the propositional
sign as the only sign relevant to logic, initially only a narrow
section of semiotic topics were dealt with in logic. In contrast to
Ockham, late scholastic terminist logic is characterized by an approach
of discussing logico-semantic topics on the basis of a most general
understanding of the pertinent vocabulary (e.g., *terminus*,
*significare*, *repraesentare*, *signum* etc.).
Due to this practice, topics of semiotic relevance, even though not of
direct logical concern, began to accumulate at the margins of the
logical discourse. The culmination point of this development is reached
in the Paris school of John Major (John Mair, 1469-1547), the most
important and most influential center of late-scholastic logical
studies.[48]




The members of this school take signification or "to
signify" in the general sense of to "make (someone) know
(something)" (*facere cognoscere*) (Petrus Margallus,
*Log. utriusque scholia*, 1520,
 148),[49]
 and conceive it along
the lines of the older description of 'repraesentare' in
its broadest sense according to which the function of representation
could be ascribed to all which "in some way contributes to a
thing being known" (*quod aliquo modo facit ad hoc quod res
cognoscatur*).[50]
 Consequently, "to signify"
often is characterized as "to represent something to an
intellect" (*aliquid intellectui respraesentare*) (Albert
of Saxony, *Quaest. in artem vet*, 1988, 472; John Raulin,
*In log. Arist. Comment*, 1500, fol. g4vb). In order
to make this definition cover cases of non intellectual sign
interpreters (animals)[51]
 as well as the so-called syncategorematic
terms which do not properly signify 'something'
(*aliquid*), a still more general version was put forward,
defining the act of signifying as "to represent something or some
things or somehow to a cognitive power (*aliquid vel aliqua vel
aliqualiter potentiae cognitivae repraesentare*) (Gaspar Lax,
*Parve divis. term.*, ca. 1502, fol a4vb). This
definition roughly expresses what is basically uncontroversial
regarding the concept of signification among logicians from late
14th to early 16th century. Even if there were
numerous definitional variants of the concept of signification, which
often gave occasion to controversies, nevertheless, common to all these
variations was their primarily epistemological orientation. Contrary to
Ockham's concept of sign, it is not the logical function of referring
to a *significatum* that stands in the foreground, but rather
the sign's relation to a cognitive power. In other words, the sign is
not primarily characterized by its appropriateness to fulfill a
semantic function in the context of a proposition, but rather by its
capability to act in an epistemologically efficient way on a cognitive
power: "A sign is something that makes think" (*signum
est res faciens cogitare*) (Petrus Margallus, *Log. utriusque
scholia*, 1520, 146). Unlike Ockham's semantic concept of sign, the
one favored by the later authors is predominantly pragmatic.




This tendency is already obvious when Peter of Ailly defines the act
of signifying as "to represent something, or some things, or
somehow to a cognitive power by vitally changing it" (*aliquid
vel aliqua vel aliqualiter potentiae cognitivae ipsam vitaliter
immutando repraesentare*) (Peter of Ailly, *Concepts*, 1980,
16).[52]
 With the particle "vitally changing
it" (*vitaliter immutare*) entering into the definition of
'*significare*' the relatedness to cognition or to a
cognitive power becomes an essential factor of signification. For, as
John Gebwiler later underlines: "without such a vital change
nothing is signified to whomsoever" (*absque vitali
immutatione nihil cuipiam significatur*) (John Gebwiler,
*Magistralis totius parvuli artis log. compil.*, 1511, fol.
h4r-h4v).




In view of this it should be clear that the widespread opinion
according to which in medieval philosophy the sign was characterized by
the "classical definition" or the "famous formula of
*aliquid stat pro aliquo*" (something stands for
something)[53]
 is mistaken. It is *suppositio*,
not *significatio*, that is characterized by that
formula.[54]
 Even in Ockham's concept of sign, which
comes closest to such a description, the aptitude 'to stand for
something' is just one component of the whole function of the
sign. In no case has the sign or act of signifying been conceived as a
simple two-term relation of "something standing for
something".




On the basis of an extended notion of sign, the authors of late
15th- and early 16th-century logic discussed at
length topics like the different kinds of signification and
representation (Gaspar Lax, *Parve divis. term.*, ca. 1502, fol.
a5[55]
 or the traditional distinction of natural
and conventional signs, showing that there exist intermediate forms,
like those signs that signify by custom (*ex consuetudine*)
(Hagenau, *Comment. in prim. et quart. tract. Petri Hisp*, 1495,
fol. a7v; Conrad Pschlacher, *Compendiarius parv. log.
Liber*, 1512, fol. 6r-6v), which are
instituted neither by nature nor by an act of imposition, but rather
are established by repetition (*frequentatio*) (Juan de Oria,
*Summul. vol. Primum*, 1987, 109).




The universality of the concept of sign, according to which in some
respect "anything in the world is a sign" (*omnis res
mundi est signum*) (Peter Margallus, *Logices utriusque
scholia*, 1520, 146f.), is counterbalanced by the emphasis laid on
the mental sign (*signum mentale*) providing the basis for the
whole range of sign processes. Spoken words, just like any external
signs in general, can signify only by mediation of an immediate
signification, provided by the mental
 concepts.[56]
 Thus, as Petrus a
Spinosa says, the whole signification depends on the mental term
(*tota significatio dependet a* [*termino*]
*mentali*) (Pedro de Espinosa, *Tractatus terminorum*,
cited in Munoz Delgado, 1983, 152f.) In some respect this claim
even goes beyond John Gerson's thesis, that "signification is not
properly or aptly understood except with respect to an intellectual
nature that is able to use the sign" (*Significatio nec
proprie nec convenienter accipitur, nisi per respectum ad naturam
intellectualem, quae potest uti signo*) (John Gerson, *De modis
significandi*, 1706, 816). For what makes any signification
possible, the cognitive act, is conceived to be a sign or an act of
signification in the most proper sense, so that any other sign or
signification can be termed a such only with reference to the mental
sign (*ipsa cognitio formalis... est propriissima significatio,
ita quod alia dicuntur significare per attributionem ad istam*)
(Hieronymus de S. Marcho, *Compendium praeclarum*, 1507, fol.
B1[57]




Whereas according to Augustine the sign, being an external entity by
definition, was precluded from the sphere of the mind, it is now the
mental sign, i.e., the mental concept or mental term (*terminus
mentalis*), that is seen as the primary and most principal sign
(*signum mentale est primum et principalissimum signum, sine quo
voces et scripta significare non possunt*) (Florentius Diel,
*Modernorum summulae log*., 1489, fol. a5v) as well
as the ultimate ground of all
 signification.[58]
 Without such an
ultimate and immediate signification instantiated in the formal
signification of the mental concept, there would be, as John Raulin
remarks, an infinite regress (*processus in infinitum*) in any
signification, something like a Peircean 'infinite
semeiosis'.[59]
 Unlike the infinite semeiosis of Peirce,
however, such a regress, according to late medieval authors, would not
have the character of a steady and permanent differentiation of
signification but rather would be, as John Major calls it, an
"abyss in signifying" (*abyssus in significando*)
(John Major: *Introd. perutile in Arist. dial.* (1527: fol.
14ra), i.e., a process never resulting in a actual
signification.




Together with the deliberately extended notions of
'sign' and 'term' and the emphasis of the role
of the mental sign, a fundamental redefinition of written signs, i.e.,
inscriptions is emerging in logic around 1500. Taking their cue from
the view introduced by Peter of Ailly, the later authors free the
written sign from its traditional subordination to the vocal sign by
immediately subordinating it to the mental sign (Florentius Diel,
*Modernorum summulae log*., 1489, fol. d5v; Peter
Tartaretus, *Expos. in summulas Petri Hisp*, 1514, fol.
37rb-va; Antonius Coronel, *Termini*,
1506, fol. B3ra-b; Hieronymus Pardo, *Medulla
dyalect.*, 1505, fol. 7rb; John Eck, *In summulis
Petri Hisp.*, 1516, fol. 5 vb). Thus *scriptura*,
no longer viewed as a secondary sign system and as a mere supplement of
vocal speech, is no longer restricted to alphabetic writing. This in
turn provides the ground for a dramatic generalization of the notion of
written sign as well. When logical discourse extends its boundaries in
order to give an account of all sorts of signs, integrating the whole
range of signs into the traditional framework of logic and, at the same
time, these signs have to be described along the lines of the
traditional distinction of mental, vocal, and written terms, then it is
the written term (*terminus scriptus*) that provides the most
suitable opportunity for such an integration. This, of course,
presupposes a radically extended notion of inscriptions as it arose in
Parisian logic around 1500, where an inscription is no longer
characterized in terms of its derivative relation to spoken language,
but rather in terms of its specific relation to the human sensory
apparatus. In this sense, John Major and others define the written term
as a "term that can be perceived by a corporeal eye"
(*terminus scriptus est terminus qui oculo corporali percipi
potest*) (John Major, *Libri quos in artibus in collegio Montis
Acuti Parisius regentando compilavit*, 1508, fol.
 4[60]
 And Juan
de Oria more explicitly states: "A written term is not called so
because of being an inscription made up from characters or letters but
rather because of representing something to the cognitive faculty by
means of sight" (*non enim dicitur terminus scriptus, quia sit
scriptura ex caracteribus aut litteris constans, sed quia potentie
cognitive aliquid proprie representat, mediante visu*) (Juan de
Oria, *Summul. vol. Primum*, 1987, 106). The written term being
thus defined, even the *circulus vini* can count as a written
term (John Maior , *Libri*..., 1508, fol. 4va).
Some authors extend the notion of writing even further and call
*terminus scriptus* "a term perceptible by senses other
than haering" (*terminus alio sensu quam auditu
perceptibilis*) (Peter Margallus, *Log. utriusque scholia*,
1520, 92) so that every corporeal being perceivable by one of the four
external senses different from hearing may be an instance of written
terms (*omne sensibile corpus quattuor externis sensibus posse esse
terminum scriptum*) (Peter Margallus, *Log. utriusque
scholia*, 1520, 162f.)




The basic idea behind this theoretical extension of the notion of
inscription is the indifference of de sign-function to the material
instantiation of the sign. This arbitrariness of the medium of the sign
holds for the signs not only with regard to their communicative
capacity, but also with regard to their function in logical operations.
As Paul of Venice points out, in principle it would be possible to form
syllogisms or to draw conclusions by using sticks and stones instead of
words or sentences (*... possemus cum baculis syllogizare et
cum lapidibus concludere*) (Paul of Venice, *Logica magna, prima
pars, Tract. de terminis*, 1979, 78). The fact that we, in general,
do not do so, and that we do not communicate by means of sensible
qualities like warms or smell, but rather use vocal or written terms in
the strict sense, is only due to their greater operability (Paul of
Venice, *Logica magna, prima pars, Tract. de terminis*, 1979,
78).[61]
 For we can utter articulated sounds
whenever we want to but cannot produce with the same ease and
distinctness the possible objects of the other senses like certain
colors or smells.[62]




Extending the notion of *terminus* opens the horizon for
taking into account further semiotic issues, such as the distinction
between terms that signify absolutely (*terminus absolute
significans*) and terms that signify on account of circumstances
(*terminus ex circumstantia significans*) (Juan de Oria,
*Summul. vol. Primum*, 1987, 106f.) Whereas spoken or written
words are members of the first class, the second class is made up from
any other kind of conventional signs, like the toll of bells, the
crucifix or the *circulus vini*. With this distinction, Johannes
de Oria underscores the influence of the situational context on the
signification of non-linguistic signs. As he notices, it depends on the
circumstances of time and place whether the toll of a bell is an
invitation to go to the chapter congregation or to a meal; an image of
the crucified Christ denotes that he has to be adored only in the
situational context of a church building, but not in the studio of the
painter or sculptor (*imago crucifixi in ecclesia posita,
representat quod est adoranda, ubi non sic representaret in domo
pictoris vel statuifici*) (Juan de Oria, *Summul. vol.
Primum*, 1987, 106f.); a wreath of foliage denotes the vine-selling
only when attached outside a tavern, but not in the woods (Peter
Margallus, *Log. utriusque scholia*, 1965, 166). Moreover, the
terms that signify on account of circumstances are characterized
according to John of Oria by the fact that they regularly signify a
state of affairs and thus function as propositional signs (*terminus
ex circumstantia significans regulariter representat aliquid esse vel
non esse. Ex quo fit quod omnis talis terminus est propositio*)
(Juan de Oria, *Summul. vol. Primum*, 1987, 106).




Whereas in Western Europe, under the growing influence of humanism,
the scholastic tradition of terminist logic came to an end in the third
decade of the 16th century, it had a vigorous, though not
unaltered, continuation on the Iberian Peninsula until the
18th century. From there it was re-imported to the
universities and academic schools in Western Europe, after the late
16th and early 17th century, mainly but not
exclusively in Catholic areas. Even if the scholastic doctrine of signs
was presented in a so to speak "light version" by authors
like Domingo de Soto[63]
 and Franciscus Toletus, the rudiments of
medieval semiotics transmitted through their writings, provided the
groundwork on which a great number of 17th-century logicians
were developing a highly elaborated sign theory (Meier-Oeser 1997,
171-335). The most important of these are the so-called Conimbricenses,
John of St. Thomas (alias John Poinsot), Peter of Candamo and Silvester
Aranha, but a large number of texts is still awaiting to be
explored.