## 1. Method



This section describes the philosophical method that
Sriharsa employs in *The Sweets of Refutation*,
and explains what he sought to achieve by it.


### 1.1 The Method of Definition



Throughout *The Sweets of Refutation*,
Sriharsa's target is a theory of rational
inquiry laid down in the Nyaya system. As defined by the
commentator of the *Aphorisms on Inquiry*
(*Nyayasutra*), Vatsyayana (5th
century CE), the term 'nyaya' stands just for
critical or rational inquiry. He tells us, 



> 
> 
> *Nyaya* is the examination of an object using methods of
> knowing, consisting in reasoning based on perceptual and scriptural
> evidence. It is inquiry, where inquiry is just the examination of that
> which has been presented by perception or scripture. (Thakur 1967: 3)
> 
> 
> 
> 



The opening sentence of the *Aphorisms on Inquiry* is a list of
sixteen items that constitute the subject-matter of the Nyaya
system.



> 
> 
> The highest good is achieved through the knowledge of the nature
> of:
> 
> 
> 1. methods of knowing and knowable entities;
> 2. uncertainty, purpose, public examples, settled opinion,
> extrapolative demonstration, suppositional reasoning, final
> conclusion;
> 3. truth-directed debate, victory-directed debate, destructive
> debate, defective reasoning, tricks, checks, defeat situations
> (*Nyayasutra* 1.1.1, Thakur 1967: 2).
> 
> 
> 



In his commentary, Vatsyayana explains this text as follows.
Every area of learning is concerned with a proprietary highest good,
and makes available the kind of knowledge that is conducive to
achieving that good; for instance, the science of the self
(*adhyatmavidya*) is concerned with the goal of
liberation, and helps us achieve liberation by leading us to the
knowledge of the true nature of the self (Thakur 1967: 5). But in
order to gain the knowledge that any area of learning has to offer,
one must inquire. A properly conducted episode of inquiry begins with
an initial state of uncertainty regarding the nature of an object
presumably in the domain of knowable entities, involves the
application of various methods of knowing (such as perception,
inference, testimony, etc.), and terminates in a final conclusion,
which constitutes knowledge of the relevant object's nature. The items
listed under (i) and (ii) are components of any such inquiry. When
inquiry is conducted by several parties aloud in speech, it becomes a
debate. The items listed under (iii) describe different styles of
debate, and various strategies that one may employ in response to
one's opponent within the arena of debate.



Vatsyayana helpfully delineates the philosophical method
that the Nyaya system, as laid out in the *Aphorisms on
Inquiry*, uses in treating its subject matter. It proceeds in
three steps (Thakur 1967: 181). The first step consists in
*enumeration* (*uddesa*), which involves mentioning
the various items to be treated in the theory, e.g., in the lists (i),
(ii), and (iii) given above. The second step consists in *definition*
(*laksana*) which involves laying down a
*defining* property, i.e., a property that distinguishes the
nature of the definiendum (*tattvavyavacchedaka-dharma*)
 (Ibid.).[7]
 The third consists in *examination*
(*pariksa*), i.e., checking whether or not a
certain definition is adequate. The philosopher's project, on
this view, is therefore to define a kind *K* by articulating
*necessary* and *sufficient* conditions for being an
instance of *K*, where *K* may be a method of knowing, a
kind of knowable entity, a component of rational inquiry, a style of
debate, or a dialectical strategy. This project was developed by the
commentators and sub-commentators of the *Aphorisms on
Inquiry*, and was ultimately absorbed into a larger syncretic
tradition that combined the epistemological commitments of Nyaya
with the ontological scheme of Vaisesika philosophy and
therefore came to be known as Nyaya-Vaisesika.



There are two distinct purposes that Nyaya-Vaisesika
philosophers ascribe to definitions.


1. *Specifying the Definiendum*. According to Vacaspati
Misra (9th century CE), a definition 



> 
> 
> specifies the definiendum [i.e., the object to be defined] by
> distinguishing it from things of similar and dissimilar kinds
> (*samanasamanajatiyebhyo vyavacchidya
> laksyam vyavasthapayati*). (Thakur 1967: 186)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Suppose--following the early Vaisesika
philosophers--we define earth as the kind of substance that has
the property of having smell. On the basis of this definition, we can
make the following inference: 



> 
> 
> The kind of substance under discussion is distinct from anything that
> isn't earth; for it has smell. And anything that isn't
> earth lacks smell, e.g., water. 
> 
> 
> 



Thus, we are able to distinguish earth from non-earth in this
manner.
2. *Establishing the Use of the Definiendum Term.* In his *Row
of Light-Beams* (*Kiranavali*), the later
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher Udayana (10th
century CE) describes a different purpose that a definition may serve:




> 
> 
> alternatively, the purpose of a definition (or a defining property) is
> to establish the use [of the *definiendum term*, i.e., the
> expression that picks out the definiendum] (*vyavaharasiddhir
> va laksana-prayojanam*). (Sarvabhouma 1911 [1989:
> 194]) 
> 
> 
> 



To establish the use of the definiendum term is to specify the range
of entities to which it is ordinarily applied. At least on one
interpretation of Udayana, a definition does this by specifying the
reason for which the relevant expression is applied
*(pravrtti-nimitta*), i.e., the application-conditions of
that expression (Bhattacharyya 1990: 98-99; Granoff 1978: n.
74). Here, the application-conditions of an expression just consist in
a property possessed by all and only referents of that expression.
Take the definition of earth as that which possesses
*earthhood*: this specifies the application-conditions of the
expression 'earth' since people commonly apply the
expression to things that possess earthhood. Using the definition,
therefore, one can make an inference of the following sort, 



> 
> 
> The kind of substance under discussion is commonly called
> 'earth'; for it possesses earthhood. Whatever isn't
> commonly called 'earth' doesn't possess earthhood,
> e.g., wind. 
> 
> 
> 



This inference, in turn, specifies the extension of the term
'earth' as it is commonly used.



Both these uses of definitions are important for understanding
Sriharsa's dialectical strategy in *The
Sweets of Refutation.*


### 1.2 Refutation-Arguments



Throughout *The Sweets of Refutation*
Sriharsa's aim is to argue against
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers by means of what he calls
*refutation-arguments* (*khandana-yukti*).
Refutation-arguments against definitions are supposed to reveal that
the relevant definitions are inadequate. In cases where no adequate
definition is available for an entity, the relevant entity to be
defined cannot be specified, i.e., distinguished from those things
that are distinct from
 it.[8]
 This follows from the thesis, endorsed by Vacaspati Misra,
that the purpose of a definition is to specify the definiendum by
distinguishing it from things that are distinct from it. So, if
Sriharsa's refutation-arguments are successful
in showing that there exists no adequate definition for any of the
ontological, logical, and epistemological categories that the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher seeks to define, then she
will have failed to specify those categories that are essential to her
theoretical enterprise.



Sriharsa describes two ways in which his
refutation-arguments could be useful. First of all, they are supposed
to favor the kind of non-dualism--defended by supporters of
Advaita Vedanta--which says that the self or consciousness
is the only thing that is ultimately exists. According to
Sriharsa, the refutation-arguments show that we cannot
establish the ultimate reality of the variegated world as it appears
in perceptual experience, the world which appears to be constituted by
a plurality of things and whose existence we assume for our everyday
practical purposes (KKh 63). This is because we cannot adequately
define the various ontological and epistemological
categories--such as *difference*, *causation*,
*relation*, *knowledge*, *perception*,
etc.--using which we make sense of that world and our epistemic
relationship with it. It is in this sense that the variegated world as
it appears to us in perception is *indeterminable*
 (*anirvicaniya*).[9]
 And in the absence of such definitions, the *distinctions*
amongst these constituents of reality and our methods of knowing them
cannot be treated as ultimately real. This in turn will clear room for
non-dualism.



Second, even though the main purpose of refutation-arguments is to
show that the plurality of things in the world shouldn't be
treated as ultimately real, Sriharsa claims that they
may also prove useful for the opponents of non-dualism. For instance,
if one is a Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher who admits the
reality of methods of knowing, etc., then one may use at least some of
the refutation-arguments to rule out alternative views held by other
philosophers, including the views of their predecessors within the
same school as well as their opponents. Moreover, even in the kind of
debate where one is engaged in the pursuit of truth and doesn't
merely seek to defeat one's opponent, one would have to respond
to refutation-arguments before one could arrive at one's own
view. Thus, refutation-arguments have universal application (KKh
123-125).



While offering his arguments, Sriharsa explicitly
appeals to three criteria of adequacy for definitions which he takes
to be common ground between himself and his opponents.


1. The first is a criterion of *extensional adequacy*: an
adequate definition of a kind *K* should state the conditions
that are necessary and sufficient for being an instance of *K*.
First of all, the definition shouldn't fail to apply all
instances of *K*. Second, it shouldn't be
*underextended*, i.e., there shouldn't be cases of
*K* where the definition doesn't apply. Third, it
shouldn't be *overextended*, i.e., there shouldn't
be things that are not of kind *K* where the definition
applies.
2. The second criterion of adequacy for definitions--also widely
endorsed by Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers- is the
*criterion* of *non-circularity*: an adequate definition
must not be circular, i.e., a definition of a kind *K* must not
mention any kind *K*\* such that in order to know what *K*\*
is, an agent would (directly or indirectly) need a prior understanding
of what *K* is.
3. The third criterion of adequacy that Sriharsa
invokes is slightly more controversial. It is the *criterion of
uniformity* (*anugama*): an adequate definition of a kind
*K* should identify a single property that uniformly
characterizes all instances of *K*. This criterion entails that
an adequate definition of a kind *K* should be
*non-disjunctive*, i.e., it should not list a number of
different properties *A*, *B*, *C*,..., satisfying
one of which is sufficient for being an instance of *K*, but
satisfying any one of which may not be necessary for being an instance
of *K*.



The latter two criteria of adequacy seem to appeal to the two
different conceptions of definitions mentioned above.



The criterion of non-circularity seems to follow straightforwardly
from the conception of definition on which a definition is supposed to
lay down a distinguishing property of a kind *K*, which in turn
can help us distinguish instances of *K* from all other objects.
This seems to entail that the definition of *K* can't
appeal directly or indirectly back to *K* itself; for then it
would be unhelpful when it comes to distinguishing instances of
*K* from other entities. But if the purpose of a definition is to
capture the application-conditions of the definiendum term, then the
criterion of non-circularity doesn't make much sense; for the
concept on the basis of which the definiendum term is used might be
unanalyzable independently of itself, so no non-circular definition
might be available for it.



By contrast, the criterion of uniformity seems to be connected with
the second conception of definition on which the purpose of a
definition is to establish the use of the definiendum term. If the
expression is applied to a number of distinct entities, we might
expect that these entities share some unifying property in virtue of
which the same expression is applied to them. A
definition--insofar as it is intended to capture the
application-conditions of the definiendum term--would be
inadequate if it didn't capture this unifying
 property.[10]
 But if the purpose of a definition is only to lay down a
distinguishing property for the definiendum, then the criterion of
uniformity doesn't make much sense; for the only distinguishing
property for the definiendum may well be a motley disjunction of
different properties.


## 2. Epistemology



This section examines Sriharsa's treatment of
definitions of *knowledge* (*prama*).


### 2.1 The Challenge of Epistemic Luck



The very first definition of knowledge that Sriharsa
attacks is offered by Udayana in his *Garland of Definitions*
(*Laksanamala*) (Jha 1963: 3).



* knowledge i Knowledge is non-mnemonic
awareness of the truth (*tattvanubhuti*).




After offering a long series of objections against the definitions of
*truth* (*tattva*) and *non-mnemonic awareness*
(*anubhuti*), Sriharsa proceeds to give a
general argument against this definition: it overextends to the case
of accidentally true (*kakataliya-samvada*)
awareness (KKh 207-208). He then proceeds to give some examples
of such accidentally true awareness that we can flesh out as
follows.



> 
> 
> *Shells.* Holding five shells in his closed fist, a bookie asks
> the gambler, "How many shells do I have in my hand?" The
> gambler hasn't seen the contents of the bookie's hand,
> but, for some reason, he has a hunch that there are five shells in the
> bookie's hand. On that basis, he judges that there are five
> shells in the bookie's hand. So, he replies, "Five."
> Does that mean that he knows this claim? Surely not: the gambler has
> hit the truth merely accidentally (KKh 208).
> 
> 
> 
> *Mist.* You look at a far-away hill, and see what looks like
> smoke emerging from it. So, you judge that there is smoke on the hill.
> Since you know that fire always accompanies smoke, you infer,
> "There's fire on the hill." In fact, what you saw
> was just mist, but there is in fact fire on the hill. Your awareness
> therefore is true, but is it knowledge? Once again, you have only
> accidentally hit the truth, and therefore you lack knowledge (KKh
> 211).
> 
> 
> 
> *Horns*. An animal comes into your view, but you are unable to
> tell what it is. A little later, as you get closer, you see horns on
> the animal's head. Falsely, you believe that only cows have
> horns. So, you infer, "That animal is a cow." Your
> awareness is true, but only accidentally so. That is why you lack
> knowledge (KKh 213).
> 
> 
> 



These are cases of epistemic luck: in each case, the protagonist hits
the truth, but only luckily so. That is why he or she lacks knowledge.
Sriharsa's discussion of these counterexamples
to the "true awareness" account of knowledge is
significant for two reasons.



First of all, *Mist* and *Horns* clearly conform to the
structure of standard Gettier cases; similar examples are also
discussed by classical Indian philosophers such as Dharmottara,
Kumarila, and Sridhara (Matilal 1986: ch. 4; Ganeri 2007:
ch. 5; Stoltz 2007). Even though Sriharsa
doesn't intend these examples to be counterexample to any
"justified true belief" account of knowledge, he does seem
to think that in order to rule out cases of this kind from the scope
of knowledge, we need to impose an anti-luck condition on knowledge.
And this is precisely the lesson that philosophers have drawn from the
cases of epistemic luck described by Gettier (1963). What this suggests is that
the kind of intuitions that Gettier and others were trying to
elicit with such cases are not intuitions shared by a narrow group of
Anglophone philosophers. This, in turn, casts doubt on
arguments--offered by early researchers in experimental
philosophy (Weinberg et al 2001; Weinberg 2007)--which sought to
debunk Gettier intuitions by showing that they might just have been
artifacts of a certain culture. The history of Indian philosophy in
Sanskrit shows that even in classical India, Gettier phenomena were
recognized as a potential problem for theories of knowledge that
didn't include any anti-luck condition. This, one might argue,
should bolster our confidence in treating such intuitions as evidence
in philosophical inquiry.



Second, and perhaps more importantly, Sriharsa uses
these cases to argue that there may not after all be any satisfactory
definition of knowledge. Even though Sriharsa's
criticisms are directed against proposals of knowledge defended by his
predecessors and contemporaries, his arguments remain relevant to
today's discussions of knowledge. On the one hand, he
anticipates some of the problems that arise for recent attempts at
solving the Gettier problem, e.g., conditions like
*sensitivity* and *safety* and theories like the
*relevant alternatives theory*. On the other hand, he also
claims that the problem posed by cases of epistemic luck cannot be
avoided simply by treating knowledge--as Williamson (2000)
does--as analytically primitive. The following three sections
survey some of these arguments.


### 2.2 Knowledge as Awareness Produced by the Right Method



Immediately after considering *Shells*,
Sriharsa entertains the following modification of the
"true awareness" account of knowledge.



* knowledge ii An awareness-episode has the
status of knowledge if and only if it is a true, non-recollective
awareness-episode that is produced by a method which never produces
false awareness-episodes

(*avyabhicarikaranajanya*).[11]




Sriharsa goes on to gloss this proposal as saying that
knowledge consists in non-recollective awareness of the truth produced
by a set of *causal conditions*
(*karana-samagri*)--which includes
the method (*karana*) as well as background causal
conditions--that never produce false awareness (see
 footnote 11).
 Presumably, the defender of this proposal would want to say that in
cases of accidentally true awareness, the causal conditions that
produce the awareness-episode could easily have given rise to false
awareness. For instance, in *Shells*, the causal conditions
that give rise to the relevant episode of awareness could also have
produced the awareness that the bookie had five shells in his hand
when he in fact had four. In this respect, knowledge
ii resembles anti-luck conditions like *safety* and
*sensitivity*, both of which appeal to methods that don't
produce false beliefs in nearby
 possibilities.[12]



Sriharsa sees a danger of extensional inadequacy here:
the new clause in the definition of knowledge is unable to rule out
accidentally true awareness from the scope of knowledge.
Sriharsa's argument relies on the following
principle.



* the sufficiency principle If an
awareness-episode is true and non-recollective, then the causal
conditions that give rise to the relevant awareness-episode are
together causally sufficient to give rise to a *true*
awareness-episode, i.e., they couldn't give rise to a false
 awareness-episode.[13]




The principle in fact falls out of Sriharsa's
Nyaya-Vaisesika opponent's view. For most
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers, the status of an
awareness-episode as knowledge and therefore its status as true and
non-recollective is causally explained solely by certain epistemic
virtues (*guna*) that reside in the causal conditions
that give rise to
 it.[14]
 If this is the case, then the truth of a non-recollective
awareness-episode should be explained solely in terms of those
epistemic virtues. Hence, if an awareness-episode is true and
non-recollective, then the causal conditions that give rise to the
relevant awareness-episode--in virtue of the epistemic virtues
that reside in them--should suffice to give rise to a
*true* awareness-episode in every case, i.e., they
couldn't give rise to a false awareness-episode.



Now, if the sufficiency principle is correct,
then the same set of causal conditions that gives rise to an
accidentally true awareness-episode couldn't possibly give rise
to a false awareness-episode. Otherwise, we would be committed to
something absurd, namely that even false awareness-episodes are true.
The only other option is to grant that the set of causal conditions
that gives rise to a true awareness-episode can only give rise to true
awareness-episodes. In that case, the proposed definition of knowledge
would be incapable of ruling out instances of accidentally true
awareness.



However, one might suspect that the sufficiency
principle is not true after all. For instance, in cases like
*Shells*, it does seem as if the causal conditions that give
rise the agent's awareness could also produce false awareness.
Moreover, nothing Sriharsa says in fact decisively
supports this
 principle.[15]
 But it is worth pointing out that Sriharsa needs
nothing as strong as the sufficiency principle
to make the point that he wants to make. The general objection seems
to be this. Suppose we explain the status of any awareness-episode as
knowledge by appealing to the good-making features of the relevant
causal mechanism--the putative epistemic virtues of the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher--that gives rise to
it. We may say that these epistemic virtues are the ones that
guarantee that the awareness-episode won't be false. But an
accidentally true awareness-episode is one which is produced by a
causal mechanism that lacks all of these knowledge-conducive epistemic
virtues, and that is why it isn't guaranteed to be true. This
explains why such awareness-episodes seem true as a matter of luck.
But the problem is this. No matter what these truth-guaranteeing
epistemic virtues are, it will always be possible to find episodes of
awareness which are produced by causal mechanisms that possess all
these virtues, but nevertheless only accidentally true. In this sense,
even if the new definition of knowledge is fleshed out in terms of
knowledge-conducive epistemic virtues, it won't be able to rule
out cases of knowledge-destroying epistemic luck. So, the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher's appeal to causal
conditions that would never give rise to false awareness-episodes
seems mistaken. 



Here is another kind of method-based solution that
Sriharsa takes up a little later in the text (KKh
238).



* knowledge iii Knowledge is the
non-mnemonic awareness of the truth produced by a non-defective method
(*adustakaranajanya*).




The rationale for the proposal, once again, is clear. In cases like
*Shells*, there is something defective about the manner in
which the agent arrives at his or her final awareness: in the first
case, it is a blind guess, and in the latter two, it is a perceptual
error.



Sriharsa notes that this definition won't be
informative unless his opponent specifies what defectiveness consists
in. Suppose a defender of knowledge iii says,




> 
> 
> It is a distinctive property which is conducive to the production of
> *contrary* awareness-episodes and which is possessed by the
> causal conditions that give rise to such awareness-episodes
> (*viparitajnanaprayojakas taddhetugato
> visesah*). (KKh 238) 
> 
> 
> 



But what are contrary awareness-episodes? The opponent cannot say that
contrary awareness-episodes are just *false*
awareness-episodes, because that would make this proposal equivalent
to knowledge ii; for, now, knowledge
iii will just entail that knowledge is
non-mnemonic awareness of the truth produced by a method that
doesn't possess a property that is conducive to the production
of false awareness-episodes. If the qualifier "contrary"
is supposed to rule out knowledge, then the opponent won't be
able to define knowledge in knowledge-independent terms. Therefore,
her definition of knowledge will be circular.



Once again, the charge of circularity generalizes quite nicely to
other proposals that appeal to the notion of *method* or
*causal process*. The general argument is that if we want to
rule out accidentally true awareness from the scope of knowledge by
appealing to the non-defectiveness of methods, then we need a
non-circular account of epistemic defects that can be stated in
knowledge-independent terms. Sriharsa is skeptical
that such a non-circular account is available.


### 2.3 Knowledge as Discrimination



Sriharsa considers another proposal--defended by
Udayana and Bhasarvajna (10th century
CE)--according to which knowledge is "proper
circumscription" (*samyak-paricchitti*)
(Upadhyaya & Sastri 1957: 475;
Svami Yogindrananda 1968: 11). In explaining this definition, Sriharsa
says that "proper circumscription" can't just mean
*true* or *correct awareness*; for then this proposal
will inherit all the problems that the "true awareness"
account of knowledge faces. So, he reconstructs this proposal on the
basis of some remarks that Udayana makes elsewhere while discussing
knowledge of one's
 knowledge.[16]




According to the reconstructed proposal, knowledge is proper
circumscription of an object in the sense that it involves an
awareness of an object *along with* (or *on the basis
of*) its distinctive mark
(*visesasahita-dharmi-paricchitti)*. The best
version of this proposal--which Sriharsa arrives
at after considering a series of initial refinements--seems to be
this.



* knowledge iv Knowledge is proper
circumscription of an object, i.e., an agent knows that an object
*o* is *F* if and only if she is aware of *o as having a
property *X* which it in fact has*, such that *X*
distinguishes *o* from all
 non-*F*s.[17]




On this picture, knowledge involves *discrimination*: in order
to know that an object *o* is *F*, one must be able to
discriminate *o* from things that are not *F*. Knowledge
gives the agent this ability insofar as it involves an
awareness-episode that puts the agent in touch with a genuine feature
of the object *o* in virtue of which she can distinguish *o*
from non-*F*s. We can see how this definition rules out cases
like *Shells*, *Mist*, and *Horns*. In
*Shells*, since the agent's awareness-episode arises from
a blind guess, he or she isn't aware of any distinctive mark
*X* in virtue of which she could tell whether the number of
shells in the gambler's hand is five rather than, say, three or
four. Similarly, in *Mist*, the agent mistakes mist for smoke.
Even though smoke is a distinctive mark of fire, the smoke that she
ascribes to the mountain isn't a property that the mountain
actually has. Finally, in *Horns*, the agent infers that the
animal before her is a cow on the basis of the fact that it has horns.
But horns aren't a distinctive mark of cows.



Sriharsa argues that this definition of knowledge
fails to satisfy the criterion of uniformity; for the relevant
distinctive mark--the awareness of which is necessary for
knowledge--will vary from one case to another. For example, when
it comes to an awareness of a clod of earth as earth, the distinctive
property *X* would have to be a property distinctive of earth,
e.g., *earthhood* or *having smell*, etc. But when it
comes to recognizing a cow as a cow, the distinctive property *X*
would have to be something else: a property that is distinctive of
cows, e.g., *cowhood* or *having a dewlap*,
*etc*. In general, Sriharsa claims that there
is no way of uniformly characterizing this distinctive property
*X* that an agent needs to be aware of in order to have
 knowledge.[18]



More importantly, Sriharsa suggests that even if there
are uniform characterizations of the notion of a *distinctive
mark*, such characterizations will inevitably be uninformative. To
show this, he considers a minimal pair of cases which we may flesh out
as follows.



* *Castor and Pollux*. Uma and Una are talking to two
distinct speakers: Una is talking to a reliable speaker Castor, while
Uma is talking to an unreliable speaker Pollux. Both Castor and Pollux
correctly inform them that there are five fruits hanging from the tree
on the river-bank. However, on the basis of the relevant bits of
testimony, only Una knows that there are five fruits hanging from the
tree on river-bank, but Uma doesn't (KKh 230).




The challenge is this. Both Uma and Una get the same information from
the relevant speakers. But in order to explain the difference in
epistemic status between their awareness-episodes, the defender of
knowledge iv needs to show that Una is aware
of a distinctive mark *X* in virtue of which she can tell that
there are five fruits hanging from the tree on the river-bank, but Uma
isn't aware of any such distinctive mark. But we could just
stipulate that in *Castor and Pollux*, there is no property
*X* such that Una is aware of *X* on the basis of
Castor's testimony, but Uma is not aware of *X* on the
basis of Pollux's testimony. This shows that we cannot clearly
identify the distinctive mark *X* in every case of knowledge.



For Sriharsa, without any adequate *uniform*
and *informative* characterization of the distinctive mark
*X*, the definition of knowledge as proper circumscription of the
object ought to be rejected (for other objections that he offers, see
Ganeri 2016). This charge seems to be getting at something general
about a class of different approaches towards defining knowledge.
Several contemporary theories of knowledge involve a conception of
knowledge as involving a discriminatory capacity of some kind. Take,
for instance, the *relevant alternatives theory* which says
that in order to know a proposition *P*, an agent must be able to
rule out relevant possibilities where *P* is false (Stine 1976;
Goldman 1976; Dretske 1981; Lewis 1996). However, as it turns out,
which possibilities count as relevant will vary from one scenario to
another, and perhaps also from one context of knowledge-attribution to
another. In particular cases, we might indeed be able to tell whether
a certain alternative counts as relevant or not. But it is unclear
that we could systematize these intuitions enough to produce a single
unified criterion of relevance; or, even if we did manage to do so, it
is unclear whether such a criterion would be informative enough to
generate predictions about every possible scenario. Thus, once again,
Sriharsa's worry generalizes.


### 2.4 Knowledge as Primitive



These problems are not the only problems that Sriharsa
raises for various definitions of knowledge, but they are useful
insofar as they give us a clear understanding of what he takes to be
an adequate definition of knowledge. He seems to think that a
definition of knowledge should give us a unified decision procedure
which will allow us to correctly predict whether any particular
awareness-episode is an instance of knowledge without appealing back
to the notion of knowledge itself. Moreover, insofar as he appeals to
our intuitions about cases, he also seems to assume that this decision
procedure should respect (to some extent) our ordinary concept of
knowledge. But one might respond to Sriharsa by
pointing out that this approach only makes sense if we assume that the
concept of knowledge is analyzable in terms of more basic concepts
that do not refer back to knowledge. What if we deny this assumption
and claim, with writers like Williamson (2000), that the ordinary
concept of knowledge is unanalyzable in that manner?



Sriharsa entertains a proposal that connects up nicely
with this question (KKh 245). He imagines an opponent who says
that



* knowledge v An awareness-episode
constitutes knowledge if and only if it is an instance of the natural
kind property (*jati*) *knowledgehood*.




Sriharsa is skeptical of the idea that knowledgehood
is a natural kind property. But even if we set that topic aside, it is
not difficult to see that this proposal essentially seeks to avoid
Sriharsa's objections against the definability
of knowledge, by treating the concept of knowledge as unanalyzable in
knowledge-independent terms.



Sriharsa imagines the defender of this proposal to be
someone who thinks that our ordinary self-ascriptions of knowledge
reliably track the presence of knowledgehood in various
awareness-episodes. But this can only be the case if there is some
kind of causal connection between knowledgehood and our
self-ascriptions of knowledge, i.e., if knowledgehood causally
regulates our self-ascriptions of knowledge. But surely,
Sriharsa argues, knowledgehood can only give rise to
self-ascriptions of knowledge insofar as we are aware that
knowledgehood is instantiated in various awareness-episodes. When we
sincerely say that some awareness-episode constitutes knowledge, we
*have* to be antecedently aware of knowledgehood as
instantiated in that awareness-episode.



Then, the question will be: How do we determine whether an
awareness-episode is an instance of knowledgehood? Even when the
awareness-episode is our own, we cannot ascertain whether it is
knowledge by introspection alone; for, even though we may be aware of
an awareness-episode by introspection, we could still doubt or be
mistaken as to whether it is knowledge. So, it seems that we can only
determine whether an awareness-episode constitutes knowledge by means
of inference on the basis of some kind of *symptom*. Are there
many such symptoms or one? If there is just one symptom distinct from
knowledgehood, we should just treat that as the defining property of
knowledge; so, defining knowledge in terms of knowledgehood makes no
sense. But if there are many such symptoms, we need to say which ones
they are; for Sriharsa has already argued that the
widely accepted definitions of knowledge are inadequate and therefore
cannot be reliable symptoms of knowledge.



The upshot is this. Anyone who defines knowledge in terms of
knowledgehood and therefore abandons the project of defining knowledge
in knowledge-independent terms cannot offer any satisfactory story
about how we in fact ascribe knowledgehood to various
awareness-episodes. In the absence of such a story, there is no reason
to think that there is a genuine property of knowledgehood that we are
tracking through our practices of knowledge-attribution. Thus, the
project of defining knowledge in terms of knowledgehood fails.


## 3. Metaphysics



A significant part of *The Sweets of Refutation* is devoted to
the question of whether various items in the
Nyaya-Vaisesika ontology can be satisfactorily
defined. In the *Aphorisms on the Vaisesika System*
(*Vaisesika*-*sutra*), Kanada
(2nd century CE) offered an ontological scheme that
included six positive categories
(*bhava-padartha*-s), namely, substance
(*dravya*), quality (*guna*), action
(*karma*), universal (*samanya*), ultimate
differentiator (*visesa*), and the relation of
inherence (*samavaya*). In *Of the Seven
Categories* (*Saptapadarthi*), the later
Vaisesika philosopher Sivadityamisra
(12th century CE) added the negative category of absence
(*abhava*) to the list. This scheme of seven ontological
categories was adopted by Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers
like Udayana who combined this ontological scheme with the
epistemological commitments of Nyaya. In the fourth chapter of
*The Sweets of Refutation*, Sriharsa sets
himself the task of dismantling this ontological scheme: he begins by
attacking the notion of a positive category, and then attacks the
definitions of substance, universal, ultimate differentiator,
relation, and absence.



Along the way, he focuses attention on two key items in the
Nyaya-Vaisesika ontology: *causation* and
*distinctness*. Without these two items, the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher cannot defend the claim
that there is a plurality of things in the world that are distinct
from consciousness or the self. Once causation is out of the picture,
the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher cannot explain how our
conscious awareness-episodes can be brought about by mind-independent
objects. Analogously, without distinctness, the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher cannot claim that we have
any reason to believe that there is a plurality of objects in the
world. This section shall outline Sriharsa's
discussion of causation and distinctness.


### 3.1 Causation



On the standard picture that almost all classical Indian philosophers
work with, the relata of the causal relation are not just
*events*, but are rather *things* (which may include
events). When a lumberjack chops down a tree with his axe, the relata
of the relevant causal relation are not the *event* of the
tree's falling (i.e., the effect) and the *event* of the
lumberjack hitting the tree with his axe. Rather, the causal relation
holds between the *event* of the tree's falling (i.e.,
the effect) and a set of distinct entities, e.g., the axe, the
lumberjack who wields the axe, the contact between the tree and the
axe, etc. Call these causally relevant factors the *causal
conditions* (*karana*) for the falling of the
tree.



In the fourth chapter of *The Sweets of Refutation*,
Sriharsa argues that the notion of a causal condition
cannot be defined. This section takes a closer look at
Sriharsa's arguments against one definition of
causal conditions offered originally by Udayana in his *Flower
Offerings of Reason* (*Nyayakusumanjali*)
under verses 1.13 and 1.19.



* causation=invariable conjunction A causal
condition relevant to the production of an effect *e* is an
entity that *invariably* (*niyatatvena*) precedes
*e*.




As Sriharsa notes (KKh 710), this definition can be
fleshed out in at least two ways, depending on how we understand the
expression 'invariably.' Here is the first
interpretation.



* causation=invariable conjunction i A
causal condition relevant to the production of an effect e is an
entity *c* which is *unconditionally*
(*anaupadhikatvena*) present before *e* is
produced.




An effect *e* is *unconditionally* preceded by a condition
*c* if and only if there is no third condition *c*\* such
that *c* is present only when *c*\* is also present, but,
sometimes e is produced without *c*\* being present before it. In
other words, a condition *e* is *unconditionally* preceded
by a condition *c* if and only if whenever *e* is produced,
*c* is present before
 it.[19]



Sriharsa argues that this proposal falls prey to what
we may call the *problem of spurious correlations*. Take a
scenario where an entity *c* and an effect *e* share a
common cause, e.g., the first unclear symptoms of a disease and the
later more pronounced symptoms of it. Here, there is a common cause
for both sets of symptoms: the disease itself (or perhaps, the
conditions that produce the disease). The first set of symptoms
accompanies the second set unconditionally. There is no third
condition *c*\* such that the first set of symptoms are produced
only if *c*\* is present, but *c*\* is sometimes absent from
cases where the second set of symptoms is present. This makes the
connection between the two sets of symptoms unconditional, but that
doesn't make the first set of symptoms causally relevant to the
second.



The other interpretation of causation=invariable
conjunction cashes out the expression 'invariably'
using modal vocabulary. 



* causation=invariable conjunction ii A
causal condition relevant to the production of an effect *e* is
an entity *c* which is *necessarily*
(*avasyambhavitvena*) present before *e* is
 produced.[20]




According to Sriharsa, this definition doesn't
work because it suffers from the *problem of irrelevance* (even
though the problem also seems to arise for the previous proposal). It
would predict that even intuitively causally *irrelevant*
factors which are necessarily present before the production of an
effect *are* causally relevant to the production of that
effect. For instance, it predicts that just as the threads that
constitute a cloth are causally relevant to the production of the
cloth, so also is the color of those threads causally relevant to the
production of the cloth, when it intuitively isn't.



In order to care of problems of this kind, one might modify this
proposal in the following manner (KKh 705).



* causation=invariable conjunction ii\* A
causal condition relevant to the production of an effect *e* is
an entity *c* which is *necessarily* and
*non-superfluously* (*ananyathasiddhatvena*)
present before *e* is produced.




A proposal of this kind was possibly first defended by
Sasadhara (fl. 1125 CE), and became popular amongst later
Nyaya-Vaisesika
 philosophers.[21]
*Non-superfluity* (*ananyathasiddhi*) is defined
as the property of *not being established otherwise, i.e.,
independently of the effect* (*karyad
anyaprakarena na siddhih*). causation=invariable
conjunction ii\* is supposed to
take care of the *problem of irrelevance*. The general thought
is that factors that are intuitively causally irrelevant to an effect
are established not on the basis of the effect, but on the basis of
something else. For example, the color of the threads is established
on the basis of the threads themselves, and therefore established
independently of the effect.



But this move won't work (KKh 705-706). There are two
salient ways of interpreting the definition of non-superfluity,
depending on how we understand the notion of
"establishing" (*siddhi*). According to the first,
a non-superfluous condition is one which isn't *brought
about* independently of the effect (*karyad
anyaprakarena na nispattih*). But clearly a
causal condition isn't brought about by the effect; rather, it
is the causal factor that contributes to the production of the effect!
According to the second interpretation, a non-superfluous condition is
one which isn't *cognized* independently of the effect
(*karyad anyaprakarena na
jnaptih*). But if this is correct, then our
definition of causal relevance should predict that we always become
aware of causal conditions on the basis of their effects. That's
just not true. Sometimes, we infer the existence of rain-bearing
clouds on the basis of rain, but at other times, we know it simply by
looking up at the sky. Setting aside these interpretations, one might
claim that a condition that is non-superfluous with respect to an
effect is one which isn't brought about or known in any way
other than as a *causal condition relevant to that effect*. But
then the definition would be circular; for, now, in trying to define
the notion of a causal condition, we are appealing back to that very
notion.



As in the case of knowledge, Sriharsa is eventually
led to consider the question of whether we should treat the property
of causal relevance (*karanatva*) as primitive.
Could we define a causal condition as just that which possesses the
property of causal relevance? Sriharsa says that this
would only be a reasonable strategy if there were some independent
reason for thinking that there is such a property. But neither
perception nor inference gives us any reason to believe this. Here,
Sriharsa addresses an argument--offered by
Udayana in *The Flower Offering of Reason*
(*Nyayakusumanjali*) 1.5--for the claim
that the existence of causal conditions can be established by a form
of inference. Udayana's main premise is that any putative effect
is an occasional (*kadacitka*) entity, i.e., an
entity that only arises at certain times and not at others. In order
to explain this occasionality, we need to posit a causal condition
that brings the putative effect into existence. If that were not the
case, then the production of the putative effect--its coming into
existence (*bhavana*)--wouldn't depend on anything;
then, it would be produced all the time (Upadhyaya &
Sastri 1957: 51).



Sriharsa offers two responses to this simple, yet
powerful, argument. The first response takes issue with the notion of
explanation that Udayana invokes in his argument (KKh 715-716).
Sriharsa subscribes to the following principle.



* principle of explanation If a property
*X* explains a property *Y*, then *X* and *Y* must
be properties of the same entity.




The intuitive motivation for this principle seems to be that we cannot
explain the property *Y* possessed by an entity *e* by
appealing to a property *X* possessed by a completely distinct
entity. For instance, in order to explain Devadatta's obesity,
we shouldn't appeal to the gluttony of some person other than
Devadatta, but rather to Devadatta's own overconsumption of
food. But Udayana is essentially trying to explain the occasionality
of a putative effect by appealing to the property of *causal
relevance* that something else possesses. This violates the principle
of explanation.



Now, one might attempt to resolve this problem by pointing out that
just as putative effects are occasional entities, i.e., they appear
now and then, so also are all their causal conditions occasional
entities. So, causal relevance and occasionality can indeed be
properties of the same entity. Thus, there is no violation of the
principle of explanation.
Sriharsa shows that this leads to an infinite regress
of explanations. To explain the occasionality of a putative effect, we
appeal to another occasional entity, namely its causal condition. But
then in order to explain the occasionality of this causal condition,
we would have appeal to yet another causal condition, thus launching
us on an explanatory regress.



However, the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher might bite
the bullet on this challenge. She might say that not all cases of
explanatory regress are bad, so there is no harm in positing a
beginningless chain of causes and effects. In response,
Sriharsa is happy to grant that not all explanatory
regresses are vicious. But if an explanatory regress involving
occasionality and causal relevance is to get off the ground, we would
have to cite at least one case where the occasionality of a putative
effect *e* is in fact explained by the causal relevance of a
distinct entity *c*. The Nyaya-Vaisesika
philosopher is yet to show that; in fact, she is appealing to the
infinite explanatory regress in order to establish that claim.



Moreover, even if one denies the principle of
explanation, there is second, much shorter, response to
Udayana's argument. In Udayana's argument, the
occasionality of the putative effect is the explanandum, while the
causal relevance of the causal condition is the explanans.
Sriharsa asks whether there is a relation between
these two properties. If there is no relation, the explanandum could
indeed obtain without the explanans. In that case, the explanation
wouldn't really work. If there is a relation,
Sriharsa could offer another regress argument that
applies to relations in general. The thought is this. Suppose there
are two entities *a* and *b* such that whenever *b*
occurs, *a* also occurs. So, there must be a relation *R*
between *a* and *b* that explains this pattern of
co-occurrence. The question is this: How is *R* related to
*a* and *b*? If we say that there is no further relation
*R*\* by which *a* or *b* is related to *R*, then,
again, we would be unable to explain the correlation between *a*
and *b*. If we acknowledge that there is such a relation, we
could ask again how *a* or *b* is related to *R*\*.
Thus, an infinite regress will be unavoidable.


### 3.2 Distinctness



Sriharsa's discussion of
*distinctness*--the property in virtue of which an object
is recognized as distinct from another--is deeply connected with
his commitment to a form of non-dualism. In the first chapter of
*The Sweets of Refutation*, Sriharsa raises the
question of how one knows that the self alone is ultimately real. The
answer is simple: the Upanisads--insofar as they literally
proclaim that there is no plurality of objects in the
world--provide evidence for this claim. But this answer runs into
trouble pretty quickly: the Upanisads cannot be trusted with
regard to their literal content, since that content is contradicted by
the deliverances of perception. The world, as we see it, is populated
by a plurality of objects (KKh 74). It is this objection that
motivates Sriharsa to argue against the ultimate
reality of distinctness of
 objects.[22]



Sriharsa offers several arguments against
distinctness, the first and the most important of which appears in the
first chapter of the *Sweets of Refutation* (for a more
elaborate treatment discussion, see Phillips 1995: 103-110).
Sriharsa claims that distinctness of one object from
another must either be (a) the very nature of the object
(*svarupa*), (b) mutual absence
(*anyonyabhava*), (c) difference in properties
(*vaidharmya*), and (d) something else, like separateness
(*prthaktva*). Proposals (a), (b) and (c) are accepted by
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers such as Udayana
(Sastri 1940: 255), and (d) is accepted by
Bhasarvajna (Yogindrananda 1968: 160) and Bhatta
Mimamsakas (Kunhan Raja & Sastri 1933: 242).
Sriharsa's contention is this: Irrespective of
how we define distinctness, no awareness--perceptual or
otherwise--can present one object as distinct from another,
without also presenting them as non-distinct (KKh 96-110). This,
in turn, shows that even perceptual awareness of distinctness cannot
contradict the Upanisadic testimony about non-distinctness of all
objects.



Consider, for instance, proposal (a): namely, the distinctness of an
entity *x* from an entity *y* is just the nature of
*x*. Now, note that the distinctness of an entity *x* from
an entity *y* is a *relational property* of *x*,
i.e., *x* has that property only in virtue of being related in
some way to *y*. But this relational property is constituted by
*y*. So, if this relational property is the very nature of
*x*, then *y* constitutes the very nature of *x*. By
similar reasoning, if *y* is distinct from *x*, and this
distinctness is a relational property of *y*, then *x*
constitutes the very nature of *y*. For any two entities *x*
and *y*, if *x* constitutes the very nature of *y* and
*y* constitutes the very nature of *x*, then they are
identical. Thus, Sriharsa arrives at his desired
conclusion: a perceptual awareness of the difference of a cloth from a
pot, would also reveal that the pot and the cloth are in fact
identical.



Now, take proposal (b): namely, that distinctness consists in mutual
exclusion. In treating distinctness as mutual exclusion,
Sriharsa's opponent essentially has said that to
ascribe to an entity *x* the distinctness from *y* is to
ascribe to *x* an absence of the property of being identical to
*y*. But this raises a problem for his
Nyaya-Vaisesika opponent: by the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher's own doctrine, the
*counter-positive* (*pratiyogin*) of an
absence--the entity that an absence is an *absence
of*--must be ultimately real. For instance, according to the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher, it makes no sense to say
that there is an absence of turtle-fur on the ground (since turtles
don't really have fur), but it does make sense to say that a
turtle doesn't have fur (since fur in fact does exist). So, if a
cloth is to be characterized by the absence of the property of being
identical to a pot, the cloth's identity with the pot must be
ultimately real. Once again, Sriharsa gets what he
wanted: a perceptual awareness of the distinctness of a cloth from a
pot would also reveal the identity between the pot and the cloth.



A similar result can be obtained for proposal (c) by means of a
regress argument. According to proposal (c), distinctness consists in
a difference in properties. If the distinctness of the pot from the
cloth is a matter of their having different sets of properties, then
we must ask what it is in virtue of which the relevant properties are
recognized as distinct. If it's because the properties have
different sets of higher-order properties, then we will be launched on
a regress; for we can raise the same question with respect to these
properties. In order to stop the regress, if we say that some of the
distinguishing higher-order properties needn't themselves have
distinguishing higher-order properties, then we would end up with the
result that the entities lower down in the hierarchy cannot be really
be recognized as distinct. So, the pot and the cloth will be presented
in awareness as non-distinct or identical.



The same line of reasoning will also apply to proposal (d), which
claims that distinctness is a matter of possessing a property like
separateness. If the pot is distinct from the cloth in virtue of
possessing the property of cloth-separateness, and the cloth is
distinct from the pot in virtue of possessing the property of
pot-separateness, then we may ask what is it in virtue of which
pot-separateness and cloth-separateness are distinct properties. This
will launch us on a regress. In order to block it, we would have to
accept that the relevant separateness-properties are not really
distinct; so, the cloth and the pot will turn out to be identical.
That's exactly what Sriharsa wants.


## 4. Philosophy of Mind



Sriharsa is eager to point out that he is not
skeptical of all commonsense ontological categories (KKh 62-63).
Consciousness, for him, *is* ultimately real; only the world,
insofar as it appears distinct from consciousness, isn't. What
reason do we have for treating consciousness as ultimately real?
Sriharsa answers this question by defending a positive
proposal about self-knowledge and intentionality. This section
discusses that proposal. 


## 4.1 Self-Knowledge



Sriharsa's view, in a nutshell, is this. All
conscious mental occurrences are *self-intimating*: when
someone is undergoing a conscious mental occurrence, that very mental
occurrence constitutes a veridical awareness of itself. Therefore, an
agent needs nothing other than a conscious mental occurrence in order
to know consciousness is ultimately real. In this respect,
Sriharsa endorses a form of *reflexivism*, a
view commonly associated with the Yogacara school of Indian
Buddhism, on which conscious mental states are reflexively aware of
themselves (Ganeri 1995, 2012; Williams 1998; Yao 2005; Arnold 2005;
Garfield 2006; MacKenzie 2007, 2008; Thompson 2011; Kellner 2011;
Coseru 2012: Ch. 8).



Sriharsa opens his defense of reflexivism with the
following argument (KKh 41-42). Whenever a person undergoes a
conscious mental occurrence, she neither doubts whether she is
undergoing that mental occurrence, nor does she mistake that mental
occurrence for a different one, nor does she become sure of its
absence. So, the agent must have a veridical awareness that the
relevant mental occurrence exists. Now, suppose conscious mental
occurrences don't constitute an awareness of themselves. Hence,
an agent can only become awareness of such conscious mental
occurrences by some other means, e.g., on the basis of some episode of
higher-order awareness. If this were the case, then it would be
possible for the first-order conscious mental occurrence to be present
without there being any higher-order awareness of it. But then the
agent could doubt or be mistaken about whether she is undergoing the
relevant conscious mental occurrence. In order to block this
conclusion, therefore, we must accept the conclusion that conscious
mental occurrences constitute a veridical awareness of their own
existence. An agent needs nothing further in order to know that such
occurrences are ultimately real.



However, this argument doesn't seem great. The
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher, who thinks that our
awareness of our conscious mental occurrences always involves an
episode of introspective higher-order awareness, could offer a
different explanation of why we cannot doubt or be wrong about whether
we are undergoing certain conscious mental occurrences. She could say
that whenever an agent is in a conscious mental state, there is a
veridical higher-order awareness-episode in virtue of which the agent
is aware that she is undergoing the relevant mental occurrence.



Sriharsa responds to this objection with a regress
argument. Suppose an agent is undergoing a conscious mental
occurrence. Ordinarily, when we are aware of a conscious mental
occurrence, we are also aware that we are aware of it, we are aware
that we are aware that we are aware of it, and so on. Since the
"higher-order awareness" (henceforth, HOA) theorist
explains such awareness of one's own mental occurrences by
appealing to episodes of higher-order awareness, she faces a choice:
either she should posit an infinite hierarchy of such episodes of
higher-order awareness, or she shouldn't. If she takes the
second route, she would have to say that for any conscious mental
occurrence, an agent is aware of that conscious mental occurrence, and
aware that she is aware of that mental occurrence, and aware that she
is aware that she is aware of that mental occurrence,..., and so
on, until she reaches some higher-order awareness-episode which isn't
the object of any further higher-order awareness-episode. But if that
is the case, the agent can indeed doubt whether that final
higher-order awareness-episode exists. On that basis, she can doubt
the existence of the higher-order awareness-episode that the final
higher-order awareness-episode has as its object, and so on. In this
way, the agent can indeed come to doubt whether she is undergoing to
the relevant conscious mental occurrence. Therefore, the HOA theorist
must posit an infinite hierarchy of higher-order awareness episodes.
But then there will be a regress. So, the HOA awareness theorist
cannot really explain why conscious mental occurrences are immune to
doubt (KKh 43).



This regress argument isn't airtight either: the HOA theorist
might just reject the premise that conscious mental occurrences are
not subject to doubt or error. She might just be comfortable with the
claim that sometimes, even though we are undergoing a certain
conscious mental occurrence, we are not aware that we are undergoing
that conscious mental occurrence. Sriharsa thinks that
this move will be difficult to pull off.



In response, Sriharsa offers an argument that starts
out from the following principle:



* awareness-existence principle If an agent
is not aware of her own awareness-episode *e*, then she cannot
rationally ascertain that the object that *e* is about
 exists.[23]




The awareness-existence principle is a
principle about rationality: it says that a rational
(*pramanika*) agent--i.e., someone who
doesn't overstep the bounds of her evidence
(*pramana*)--cannot be sure that the object of
her awareness exists if she is not aware of her own awareness. This is
because in order to ascertain the existence of the object of her
awareness, the rational agent will have to cite evidence for the
existence of that object. But in the absence of any awareness of her
awareness, she won't be able to appeal to her own awareness as
evidence for the existence of the object. As a result, she won't
be able to ascertain that the relevant object exists.



Sriharsa's final argument is this (KKh
45-46). It is uncontroversial that even in rational agents,
conscious awareness-episodes can be *action-guiding*: a
rational agent's conscious awareness of an object is capable of
making her engage in physical and linguistic behavior under the
presupposition that the relevant object exists. For instance, a
rational agent's perceptual experience as of there being a chair
before her could motivate her to perform certain chair-related
linguistic and physical acts, e.g., saying, "That's a
chair!", or trying to grab the chair and sit on it. However, if
the agent weren't aware of her experience as of there being a
chair before her, then, by the awareness-existence
principle, she couldn't ascertain that there is a chair
before her. And if she couldn't ascertain the existence of the
chair, the relevant patterns of physical and linguistic behavior
wouldn't arise. The upshot is that if object-directed conscious
awareness-episodes, e.g., perceptual experiences, are to be
action-guiding in the case of rational agents, rational agents must be
aware of such mental occurrences whenever they take place. 



But now, if this awareness of awareness is an episode of higher-order
awareness (as the HOA theorist intends it to be), then there will be a
regress (KKh 45-46). Unless the HOA theorist posits an infinite
hierarchy of awareness-episodes, by the awareness-existence
principle, no rational agent
will be able to ascertain the existence of her initial
awareness-episode, and therefore also won't be able to ascertain
the existence of its object. Since that's bad, the HOA theorist
has to accept the conclusion that at least all object-directed
conscious awareness-episodes of rational agents involve awareness of
themselves. But if the HOA theorist is comfortable with this
conclusion, it might just be better for her to accept the more general
thesis that all awareness-episodes (or even conscious mental
occurrences) involve awareness of themselves.


## 4.2 Intentionality



Sriharsa's reflexivism poses a challenge: How
can a conscious mental occurrence constitute awareness of itself?
According to a simple notion of intentionality, the object of an
awareness-episode is always distinct from the awareness-episode. But
if this view is correct, then conscious mental occurrences cannot be
self-intimating. For if conscious mental occurrences were
self-intimating, then awareness-episodes wouldn't be distinct
from their own objects.



Sriharsa replies to this worry with a regress argument
that is similar to F. H. Bradley's argument against external
relations (Bradley 1893: ch. II):



> 
> 
> The relation between an object and its awareness cannot be distinct
> from the nature of its relata. If it were distinct, then, on pain of
> regress, one would have to accept that the relation between the first
> relation and its relata is in the end identical to its own loci [i.e.,
> its relata]. If this is right, one would have to accept that the
> awareness of this second relation arises without any awareness of a
> distinction between the relata and the relevant relation; for a
> relation that is identical to its own loci oversteps the limitations
> of other relations. Analogously, the relation between an object and
> its awareness obtains even in the absence of any distinction between
> its relata, and the awareness of that relation also arises without any
> awareness of the relevant distinction. Where is the inconsistency?
> (KKh 56-57)
> 
> 
> 



Here is the idea. Suppose an object *a* is
*R*1-related to an object *b* which is distinct
from *a*. Let us suppose that *R*1 is distinct
from both *a* and *b*. If *R*1 is distinct
from *a* and *b*, then *R*1 itself would
somehow have to be related to *a* and *b*. But then we would
have to posit another relation, *R*2, thus launching
ourselves on an infinite regress. The only way to escape this regress
would be to say that there is some relation *Ri* which
is not distinct from its relata. But there is no reason to think that
this relation isn't *R*1 itself. So, for any
relation *R*, we may conclude that it isn't distinct from
its relata. So, the *aboutness* relation
(*visaya-visayi-bhava*) that connects an
object with its awareness also cannot be distinct from its relata. If
the object is identical to the aboutness relation that connects it to
its awareness, and the aboutness relation is identical to the
awareness, then the object must also be identical to its
awareness.



However, the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher has a stock
response to the regress argument Sriharsa uses to
motivate his view: it is to posit a *self-linking relation*
(*svarupa-sambandha*). The underlying thought is that
sometimes, when one entity *a* is related to another entity
*b*, this state of affairs isn't decomposable into three
elements which are distinct from each other, i.e., *a*, *b*,
and a relation *R* that is distinct from both *a* and
*b*. Rather, the relation *R* may just be non-distinct from
either *a* or *b*. Yet, since it connects *a* or
*b* to something else, it still remains a relation; it is thus a
*self*-linking relation. This will block the regress argument
that Sriharsa wishes to run. In *The Discrimination
of the Truth about the Self* (*Atmatattvaviveka*),
Udayana endorses a view of this kind (Sastri 1940: 224).



* aboutness The property of being about an
object is the particular nature of an awareness-episode, namely, just
its *being-of-that-ness* (*prakasasya satah
tadiyatamatrarupah
svabhavavisesah*).




The underlying thought is that the aboutness relation is a
self-linking relation: it is the particular nature that an
awareness-episode *e* possesses, namely, its nature of being an
awareness of the relevant object *o*.



Sriharsa's main objection against this
definition of aboutness involves a threat of idealism
(*vijnanavada*) (KKh 650ff). He points out
that the property of *being-of-that-ness* that Udayana speaks
of is decomposable into two elements: the part picked out by the
expression 'that', namely the object of awareness
*o*, and the part picked out by "being of", which
corresponds to the relation *R* by which the awareness-episode is
related to the object. If both these elements are part of the nature
of the awareness-episode--the definition claims--then the
object *o* wouldn't be external to the awareness-episode
*e*. The Nyaya-Vaisesika view, therefore, would
collapse into idealism!



Perhaps, the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher could claim
that it is not the object *o* that is the part of the
awareness-episode's nature, but only the relation *R*. This
doesn't satisfy Sriharsa. He points out that
since *R* could be a relation with multiple instances and
therefore could hold between a different awareness-episode *e\**
and a different object *o\**, the fact that *R* is part of
the nature of *e* wouldn't explain why it constitutes an
awareness of *o*. Perhaps, we could say that *R* also
possesses a certain *being-of-that-ness* in virtue of which it
is merely a relation between *o* and the awareness-episode
*e*. This proposal, as Sriharsa seems to suggest,
tries to explain the *being-of-that-ness* that the
awareness-episode possesses, by positing another kind of
*being-that-ness* in the relation *R* that connects the
awareness-episode e with its object *o*. Quite predictably,
therefore, Sriharsa asks whether this second variety
of being-of-that-ness is part of the nature of the relation *R*,
or external to it.



If this being-of-that-ness is part of the nature of *R*, a line
of reasoning similar to the one that led to the worry about idealism
could be run again. If the *being-of-that-ness* is part of the
nature of the relation, then, since 'that' refers to the
object here, the object too should be part of *R*'s nature.
And since *R* is part of the nature of the awareness-episode
*e*, the object *o* too should be part of the nature of
*e*. Thus, the threat of idealism will arise again! (Moreover, if
we say that *o* is not part of the nature of the relation
*R*, but only some further relation *R*\* is, then the same
move could be made again, thus launching us on an infinite
regress).



But suppose this *being-of-that-ness* that *R* has is
external to *R*. What is that property? It cannot be anything
distinct from (the nature of) the object of awareness *o*; if it
were, then another regress argument could be run. So, let's
suppose this being-of-that-ness which *R* has is identical to
*o*. The question, again, is this: How is this being-of-that-ness
related to *R*? If it is not related by a self-linking relation,
an infinite regress will be unavoidable. If it is related by a
self-linking relation, then the object *o* will be part of the
nature of *R*, which in turn is part of the nature of the
awareness-episode *e*. Thus, the problem of idealism will arise
again.



More generally, Sriharsa's view is that there
are no cases where the aboutness relation connects distinct objects.
For him, ordinary aboutness relations that seem to connect distinct
objects, e.g., the pot and its awareness, are ultimately unreal. What
really exists is the self-intimating consciousness. So, there is
nothing wrong with treating the relata of the aboutness relation as
identical in every case.


## 5. The Futility of Inquiry



Sriharsa offers his refutation-arguments with the aim
of undermining the dualistic ontology accepted by
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. However, these arguments
also serve another aim, which he gestures at, and which seems to drive
many of the arguments in *The Sweets of Refutation*. It is to
show that rational inquiry into the nature of reality--i.e.,
inquiry that proceeds through the exchange of arguments directed
towards settling some question--is in fact futile.


## 5.1 The Paradox of Inquiry



Let us grant that Sriharsa's
refutation-arguments are in fact successful in undermining the
Nyaya-Vaisesika project of defending a dualistic
ontology on which the world is populated by things that are distinct
from the self or consciousness. Can Sriharsa himself
defend the kind of non-dualism that he endorses? Somewhat
surprisingly, Sriharsa argues that inquiry into the
question of non-duality--the question of whether only the self or
consciousness is ultimately real--is futile. His argument is a
version of Meno's paradox (Carpenter & Ganeri
 2010).[24]
 He imagines an opponent who asks, "What is the method of
knowing non-duality, i.e., the non-distinctness of everything from the
self?" The response is this: when asked by someone who rejects
the doctrine of non-duality, this question doesn't make sense
(KKh 69-73). The argument takes the form of a dilemma: either
the opponent is aware of what non-duality is, or she is not.



Focus on the second horn. If the opponent is not aware of non-duality,
it will be impossible for her to perform the very speech act of asking
the question that she in fact has asked. This is because,
Sriharsa claims, the following principle holds: 



> 
> 
> Any speech act must be produced by an awareness-episode such that if
> the speech act is about an object *o*, the awareness-episode is
> also about that object *o*. (KKh 70) 
> 
> 
> 



But if the opponent isn't aware of non-duality, she
couldn't perform a speech act on the basis of an awareness of
non-duality. So, she couldn't ask the relevant question at
all.



Now, focus on the first horn. The question is this: If the opponent is
aware of non-duality, does her awareness-episode constitute knowledge
or not? If it does constitute knowledge, then the method by which that
knowledge arises is the means of knowing non-duality. So, asking the
question is futile. Now, an opponent might argue, 



> 
> 
> Yes, we have established *in general* that there is some way of
> knowing non-duality. But, given that there is a lot of disagreement,
> we haven't quite pinned down precisely which means of knowing
> would allow us to know non-duality. So, the task of the inquirer is to
> settle that question. 
> 
> 
> 



Sriharsa's reply is that this is a useless
exercise. If we have already demonstrated in general that non-duality
can be known, then that by itself entails that there is a particular
method of knowing non-duality. In order to know what it is, we can
either pick the best one amongst the already well-known methods of
knowing, or posit a new one.



But now suppose the opponent says that her awareness of non-duality in
fact doesn't constitute knowledge. But surely, says
Sriharsa, if non-duality isn't an object of
knowledge, then how could there be a method of knowing non-duality? Of
course, the opponent could clarify her position by saying that she is
just committed to treating her own awareness of non-duality as a case
of non-knowledge, not her interlocutor's. Since her
interlocutor--i.e., Sriharsa--is committed
to thinking that non-duality can be known, she can indeed legitimately
ask what means of knowing gives rise to the knowledge of
non-duality.



Sriharsa's reply is subtle: even though he is
committed to the doctrine of non-duality, Sriharsa
denies that the burden is upon him to show that the method by which
one becomes aware of non-duality is in fact a means of knowing. This
is because, sometimes, an agent can become aware of the truth even by
means of a procedure that doesn't yield knowledge, and
therefore, doesn't count as a *means of knowing*. For
instance, in *Mist*, the agent correctly infers the presence of
fire on a mountain after mistaking mist for smoke. For some defenders
of Advaita Vedanta, such as Mandana Misra
(8th century CE), there is at least a structural similarity
between cases of this kind and the case where an agent becomes aware
of the non-distinctness of the world from the self on the basis of
experience of hearing Upanisadic sentences that proclaim that
non-duality (Kuppuswami Sastri 1984: 41; Thrasher 1993: ch. V; Ganeri
2007: ch. 5). As in *Mist*, in this case too, the agent moves
from error to truth; for the experience of hearing Upanisadic
sentences is laden with the differences amongst the hearer, the
hearing, and that which is heard. Sriharsa seems to
suggest here that the defender of non-dualism--committed as she
may be to the claim that there is nothing in the world that is
distinct from the self--needn't have to cite a method of
knowing that will produce the knowledge of that truth.


## 5.2 Scripture and the Limits of Reason



In the last assessment, Sriharsa is happy to concede
that the Upanisads--which literally proclaim that
everything is non-distinct from the Brahman or the self--are the
means of knowing non-duality. However, Sriharsa thinks
that one cannot call Upanisadic testimony into question by appealing
to perceptual evidence. The ordinary perceptual awareness of
plurality, as we have already seen in
 Section 3.2,
 is incapable of defeating the awareness of non-duality that is
generated by Upanisadic testimony. Neither can inference of any kind
defeat that awareness of non-duality. For Sriharsa,
this just shows that one cannot inquire further into the truth or the
falsity of the doctrine of non-duality on the basis of evidence that
is independent of Upanisadic testimony. As he puts it, 



> 
> 
> that awareness of non-duality [produced by the Upanisadic sentences]
> cannot be refuted by the wise even by means of a hundred arguments
> (*tarka*). (KKh 118)
> 
> 
> 



His advice to the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher
therefore is to withdraw from the project of inquiry and rather to
adopt an attitude of faith (*sraddha*) towards the
content of the Upanisadic sentences.



> 
> 
> You, who are fond of reveling in ignorance, ought to have faith in the
> doctrine of non-duality, presented to you by these arguments which, by
> your own lights, have the features of good reasoning. Consequently,
> your faith in the content of the Upanisads will induce in you a
> desire to know the self. Slowly, as your consciousness is freed from
> ordinary mental states, you yourself shall become acquainted with the
> ultimate truth, to which reflexive self-knowledge bears witness, and
> which is sweeter than honey. (KKh 120)
> 
> 
> 



This passage is suggestive: it reveals that for
Sriharsa, rational inquiry--unconstrained by
faith in scripture--cannot be a guide to the truth. The professed
goal of the Nyaya system was to lay down a system of rational
inquiry which, irrespective of the domain of inquiry, would allow one
to progress towards to the truth in that domain. But
Sriharsa thinks this is impossible. On the one hand,
his refutation-arguments are supposed to illustrate that such systems
of rational inquiry are self-undermining: their own rules can be used
to undermine the fundamental ontological and epistemological
categories that these systems rely on. On the other hand,
Sriharsa wants to show that we cannot even engage in
inquiry in good faith, and that arguments presented in the course of
such inquiry--framed independently of scriptural
testimony--cannot have any defeating force against scriptural
testimony. The best way of making progress towards the truth is to
have faith in scripture, and let reason occupy a secondary place.



This attitude towards reason is something that
Sriharsa shares with some other classical Indian
thinkers (Murty 1959: pt. II ch. IV; Halbfass 1983: ch. II). In *Of
Sentences and Words* (*Vakyapadiya*),
Bhartrhari claims that reason, without the guidance of
scripture, is unreliable: 



> 
> 
> As in the case of the blind man who, guided solely by the touch of his
> hand, rushes down an uneven path, it is not rare for a person who
> relies primarily on reason to fall. (Subramania Aiyer 1976: 1.42) 
> 
> 
> 



But why is reason unreliable? The only clear argument that
Bhartrhari offers is an *argument from instability*: even
if one presents a skillfully prepared argument in favor of a view, the
conclusion of the argument can always be undercut or rebutted; for it
is possible that someone else who is more skilled at argumentation
might explain the matter differently (Ibid., 1.34). Samkara
alludes to Bhartrhari's argument while commenting on
*Aphorisms on Brahman* 2.1.11: 



> 
> 
> Regarding matters that can be known from scripture, claims are not to
> be established by reasoning. This is because reasoning--when
> uninformed by scripture and based only on human
> imagination--lacks stability; for such imagination is
> unconstrained. Moreover, even when experts prepare arguments by
> employing imagination with care, such arguments may appear unsound to
> others who have greater expertise. Given that arguments imagined up by
> someone may later appear unsound to another, arguments cannot acquire
> any stability due to human disagreement. (Shastri 1980: 366-367)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Owing to this instability, reason alone cannot decisively establish
anything; only reason informed by scripture
(*srutyanugrhita-tarka*) can (1980: 361).



On at least one way of reading *The Sweets of Refutation*,
Sriharsa's project is just to illustrate the
instability of reason: for any argument the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher may offer for their
favorite ontological and epistemological categories, there is a
refutation-argument that defeats it. The deliverances of
reason--thus never immune to rational defeat--can only
constitute inconclusive evidence. The important difference between
Samkara and Sriharsa, however, lies in this. For
Samkara, even on matters that are established by scripture,
there is some room for inquiry, and reason informed by scripture can
indeed help the inquirer understand the nature of ultimate reality. By
contrast, Sriharsa takes his refutation-arguments to
show that rational inquiry--whether or not informed by
scripture--establishes nothing; faith alone can take us to the
truth. Rational inquiry, for Sriharsa, is futile.