## 1. Metaphysics



Mary Astell designed her metaphysics around an account of God and
God's creation. She was a dualist, maintaining that the two
kinds of beings--minds and bodies--come in various degrees
of finitude and corruptibility: God is the infinite and incorruptible
mind; human minds and corporeal particles are finite, naturally
incorruptible beings; and human bodies and physical objects are
finite, naturally corruptible beings.


### 1.1 God



According to Astell, God is the "First Intelligence," the
being whose nature is to be infinite in all perfections. When writing
about God's perfections, Astell often lists wisdom, goodness,
justice, holiness, intelligence, presence, power, and self-existence.
In keeping with rationalist views of the period, Astell maintains that
the correct understanding of metaphysics turns on the correct
understanding of God. For this reason, much of her work is dedicated
to demonstrating not only what God is, but also how a correct
understanding of God can be attained.



Her earliest such account is in *A Serious Proposal to the
Ladies*, where she demonstrates the existence, perfection, and
necessary creative power of God. There she gives an example of the
correct method for attaining knowledge, one similar to those developed
by Descartes in *Discourse on the Method* and by Arnauld and
Nicole in *Logic or the Art of Thinking* (see section 3.2 of
this entry). Her proof of God's existence includes an account of
simple and composed ideas; clear and distinct perceptions; obscure and
confused perceptions; adequate and inadequate ideas; proofs by
intuition and proofs by comparison of ideas; God's perfections
and our ideas of them; and the relation between ideas and terms
(Astell SP, 176-182). In *Christian Religion*, she frames
other arguments for God's existence in terms of what we can and
cannot doubt; God's perfections and our ideas of them;
causality; and the beauty of the created universe (Astell 1705,
7-10 [sections 7-10]).



At times, Astell privileges some of God's perfections over
others: sometimes emphasizing self-existence above all perfections,
other times focusing no goodness and wisdom over omnipotence. For
example, in *Christian Religion*, when stating her ontological
argument for God's existence, she notes that "I find that
the notion I have of GOD, contains those and all other perfections.
Among which Self-existence is most remarkable, as being the original
and basis of all the rest" (Astell 1705, 8 [section 7]). This
claim is about the order of ideas: her idea of God's
self-existence allows her to understand God's other perfections.
A few lines later, she makes the analogous claim about the order of
reality: "And Self-existence is such a Perfection as necessarily
includes all other perfections" (section 8).



Broad (2002a, 103) presents evidence that Astell privileges
God's wisdom and goodness over his omnipotence. There are two
ways that philosophers of the period thought about God's
attributes of wisdom, power, and goodness. Some held
"intellectualist" theories, according to which God
exercises his will in accordance with the true nature of things;
others held "voluntarist" theories, according to which God
exercises his will to create both things and the truth of things. In
showing that Astell maintains an intellectualist theology, Broad
refers to a number of passages, one of which is the following:



> 
> This is then the sum of the matter; GOD who is Infinite in all
> Perfections, in Justice and Holiness, as well as in Goodness and
> Mercy, always does what is best and most becoming His Perfections, and
> cannot act but according to the Essential Nature and Reason of things;
> nor is it possible that our Wishes or Actions shou'd make any
> alteration in the immutable Rectitude of His Conduct. (Astell 1705, 95
> [section 105] see also 416 [section 407]; see also Astell SP, 205)
> 


### 1.2 Individuation among Beings: Minds, Bodies, and Mind-Body Unions



Throughout her texts, Astell is concerned with giving an account of
how created beings are individuated from each other. Ultimately, she
maintains that there are four kinds of created beings: minds, bodies,
mind-body unions, and the particles that compose bodies.



About finite minds considered on their own, Astell holds that God
creates minds with intrinsic differences. She gives a number of
reasons for this view. One has to do with the relationships that God
wants minds to have with each other: humans form community only if
their minds have different intellectual capacities. Another concerns
the relationship between created minds and God: minds were made to
contemplate and enjoy God, and God needs their adoration and love. But
each mind is limited and, thus, can only love God by adoring a limited
amount of his works. So God creates many minds, each with an ability
to understand a specific collection of truths, and in this way all of
his creation is attended to (Astell SP, 144-146,
154-155).



Though Astell discusses minds as if they are sometimes isolated from
bodies, holding that human beings are mind-body unions, she
notes that we cannot comprehend the connection between the mind and
body: "We know and feel the Union between our Soul and Body, but
who amongst us sees so clearly, as to find out with Certitude and
Exactness, the secret ties which unite two such different Substances,
or how they are able to act upon each other?" (148) The union
between the mind and body is mysterious; though we "know and
feel" it, we do not have perfect knowledge of it or of how the
mind and body interact causally. In *Christian Religion*,
Astell presents this same position by way of a parallel between, on
the one hand, our lack of knowledge of the mind-body union, and,
on the other hand, our lack of knowledge about the relation between
God and humans: "Again, tho' I do not understand the
Philosophy of the Union between the Divine and Human Nature; (neither
do I comprehend the Vital Union between my Soul and Body, nor how and
in what manner they are joyn'd, tho' I am sure that so it
is) ..." (Astell 1705, 51 [section 62]). (See section 2.2
for an additional discussion of these passages.)



Astell presents an array of points about how mind-body unions
differ from each other with respect to their abilities. At one point,
she writes that perhaps activity in this lifetime is the cause:



> 
> For as the Diligent-hand maketh Rich, whil'st the Slothful and
> Prodigal come to nothing, so the Use of our Powers improves and
> Encreases them, and the most Observing and Considerate is the Wisest
> Person: For she lays up in her Mind as in a Store-house, ready to
> produce on all Occasions, a Clear and Simple Idea of every Object that
> has at any time presented itself. And perhaps the difference between
> one Womans Reason and anothers may consist only in this, that the one
> has amass'd a greater number of such Ideas than the other, and
> dispos'd them more Orderly in her Understanding so that they are
> at hand, ready to be apply'd to those Complex Ideas whose
> Agreement or Disagreement cannot be found out by the means of some of
> 'em. (Astell SP, 175-176)
> 



A second possible cause of the variety among human abilities is rooted
in God's creation--God makes some minds with larger
"capacities" than others: "The Primary Cause of this
is that Limitation which all Created Minds are Subject to, which
Limitation appears more visible in some than in others, ...
because some Minds are endow'd by their Creator with a larger
Capacity than the rest..." (159). This point about capacity
is discussed in greater detail in section 2.2 below. In brief, Astell
holds a distinction between "just" and
"capacious" thinking. Whereas she describes just thinking
as equally distributed among people in that everyone has the same
ability to think in harmonious and well-ordered manners, she describes
"capacious" thinking as unevenly distributed among people
in that some people have more time and training to attain the vast
amounts empirical knowledge that go into this kind of mental
activity.



A third possible cause of the variety of human abilities is the one
familiar to rationalist philosophers, namely that bodies impede minds
from having perfect ideas, for "the Indisposition of the Bodily
Organs... cramps and contracts the Operations of the Mind"
(159). Also: "For did we consider what we Are, that Humane
Nature consists in the Union of a Rational Soul with a Mortal Body,
that the Body very often Clogs the Mind in its noblest Operations,
especially when indulg'd" (210). Here Astell valorizes the
mind over the body. The following passage illustrates another way
Astell emphasizes this point:



> 
> For I question not but that we shoul'd be convinc'd that
> the Body is the Instrument of the Mind and no more, that it is of such
> a much Inferiour Nature, and therefore ought to be kept in such a Case
> as to be ready on all occasions to serve the Mind. That the true and
> proper Pleasure of Human Nature consists in the exercise of that
> Dominion which the Soul has over the Body, in governing every Passion
> and Motion according to Right Reason, by which we most truly pursue
> the real good of both, it being a mistake as well of our Duty as our
> Happiness to consider either part of us singly, so as to neglect what
> is due to the other. For if we disregard the Body wholly, we pretend
> to live like Angels whilst we are but Mortals; and if we prefer or
> equal it to the Mind we degenerate into Brutes. (Astell SP,
> 210-1)
> 



Whereas the body has merely an "instrumental" role with
respect to the mind, the mind has "dominion" over the
body, and a governing role over the passions. Humans should correctly
employ their minds and bodies so that their humanness does not
degenerate into brutishness, or so that they do not presumptuously
conduct their lives as if they were angels.



Astell's account of the mind-body union allows her to
argue against the popular view of the period about women, according to
which women do not demonstrate the same kinds of intellectual
abilities as do men because women are inherently more closely united
to their bodies than are men. Equipped with the rationalist account of
the mind-body union, Astell can show that much of the uniformity
of women's inabilities is rooted not in the nature of their
souls, but rather arises because of social practices that have
improperly directed their attentions. Thus the difference between the
abilities of women and men should be explained not metaphysically, but
epistemologically. For this reason, discussion of this issue is left
to section 3.2 of this entry.



In addition to developing an account of the mind-body union,
Astell also maintains that the mind and body are "really
distinct." Here she again sees how this view is useful to people
in their spiritual growth. When people realize that the mind and body
are really distinct from each other, they will also realize that the
mind is immortal. That is, they will realize that it has a
"future state" beyond this "present life."
When they reflect on this future state, they will be prompted to want
a "happy eternity, by knowing and doing the will of our
maker." In this way, God will become more important to them.
(Astell 1705, CR 246-247 [section 256]).



In presenting her account of the real distinction between the mind and
body in *Christian Religion*, Astell demonstrates first that
the mind is immaterial; then she uses this result to show that it is
immortal. Her argument is thus: she maintains that the mind is
immaterial in that it has no parts, and so is indivisible; given that
it is indivisible, it is incorruptible, and therefore immortal (247
[section 257]). Having ruled out the natural annihilation of minds,
Astell turns to the question of whether God would supernaturally
annihilate minds. She argues that he would not, for God does nothing
in vain, thus he would not create something only to annihilate it
(248-249 [sections 257-258]).



Within her discussion about the immortality of minds, Astell contrasts
minds with bodies, and she also contrasts different kinds of bodies
with each other. In doing so, she explains that human bodies and other
physical objects have parts, that is, particles that make them up. As
beings with parts, human bodies and physical objects are
"perishable," corruptible. There are several things to say
about these corruptible beings in contrast with the particles that
make them up. First, the particles that make up the corruptible beings
are not themselves corruptible. That is, they do not go in and out of
being as they do not have parts. But the corruptible beings do come in
and out of being when those particles that make them up change in
their configurations. She writes:



> 
> Because, tho' this System of Bones, Flesh, and Skin, &.
> which I call my body, shall within Threescore Years; and this Wood
> which is now upon the Fire, shall in an Hour or two; and all other
> Material Beings shall in their proper Seasons be no more; yet not the
> least Particle doth totally perish. (Astell 1705, 247-248
> [section 257])
> 



She continues to describe the individuality of corruptible beings:



> 
> So that a Being is Mortal and Corruptible, or ceases to Be, when those
> parts of which it consists, and whose particular Composition and
> Figure is that which denominates it *this* or *that*
> Being, and which distinguishes it from all other Beings, are no longer
> thus or United, but ceasing to appear under their first Texture and
> Figure, are therefore very properly said to Be no more. (Astell 1705,
> 248 [section 257])
> 



Notice here that Astell is talking about how we
"denominate" corruptible beings as "*this or
that"* kind of being. In addition, note that in explaining
this denomination, she is not merely talking about objective features
of objects. Though she mentions "Composition and Figure,"
which seem like objective features, she is writes about how these
"Textures" *appear*. These qualifications give
reason for viewing Astell as holding that a body's individuality
is based at least in part on how perceivers regard it and thus warrant
us to consider Astell as a kind of phenomenalist about the
individuation of bodies. This kind of view not entail that perceivers
are the sources of beings, for it is consistent with the position that
God is the ultimate source of all beings, whether they are human
beings, pieces of wood, or the small particles that compose these
mortal beings. Rather, on this view, the existence of each of these
beings depends first and foremost on God, even though perceivers may
play a role in assigning them some aspects of their individuality.




Astell discusses additional related issues that are hotly contested in
the period. For example, she offers proof of the real distinction
between the mind and body is based on the claims that the nature of
the mind is thought and the nature of the body is extension
(249-252 [sections 259-261]). (Her view can be compared to
Descartes's; see Atherton, 1993.) In addition, she uses her
account of the real distinction between the mind and body to show that
matter does not think. (Here she likely has in mind Locke's view
about the possibility of thinking matter; see Bryson (1988), Squadrito
(1987; 1991), Taylor (2001), O'Neill (1998a, 528-529), and
Broad (2002a, 151-153), who discuss these arguments in
detail.)


### 1.3 The Relation between God and His Creatures



According to Astell, there are several ways in which humans stand in
relation to the divine. We may distinguish these by calling them
causal, ontological, and ethical relationships. It is significant that
Astell maintains each one of these, and each has different
implications for other aspects of her systematic philosophy. Briefly,
what I'm calling the causal relation between God and humans is
based in God's creation of humans; what I'm calling the
ontological relation is based in how humans are imbued with a particle
of God; what I'm calling the ethical relation is based in the
human obligation to love God.


#### 1.3.1 Causal Relationship



The issue of God's creation of humans and what this means for
humans animates a major thread in Astell's exchange with Norris
about two popular views in England at the time--namely those
offered by Occasionalists and Cambridge Platonists. Each of these
developed different solutions to a purported problem with
Descartes's ontology. According to Descartes, God created two
different kinds of substances--mental and corporeal. He held
that, on the one hand, these are "really distinct" from
each other in virtue of their essences, and, on the other hand, these
are sometimes united together to form mind-body unions. When so
united, minds and bodies interact with each other, for instance during
sensation. The purported problem can now be stated: how can two
substances that have completely different essences--essences that
render them "really distinct" substances--interact
with each other?



With an eye toward resolving this problem, the Cambridge Platonists
retained an account of the interaction between the mind and body, and
they also presented a quite different interpretation of the number and
nature of substances that exist. Henry More, for example, maintained
that, in addition to the souls of God and living creatures, there is
the "Spirit of Nature," which is the causal agent that
allows human minds and bodies to interact.



The occasionalist philosophers resolved the problem another way: they
agreed with Descartes that the mind and body are really distinct
because of their quite different natures, but they denied that there
is any interaction between them. Instead, they maintained that God
orchestrates a harmonious correlation between events of the mind and
events of the body, and he is the efficient (and so direct) cause of
human sensations.



Throughout *Letters*, Norris defends his occasionalism against
Astell's critiques, which were based on Cambridge Platonist
views about the nature of the mind-body union. In the
appendix--written after Norris convinced Astell to allow him to
publish the letters as a volume--Astell presents two final
criticisms of Norris's account. First, occasionalism makes much
of God's creation vain: if God is the efficient cause of all of
our sense perceptions, then his creation of material objects is
superfluous, for they play no direct role in our sense perceptions
(Astell, Norris 1695, 278-80). Second, occasionalism offends
God's majesty, for according to it he repeatedly interferes in
creation in order to move bodies and create mental events (Astell,
Norris 1695, 278). Astell's own view about the causation of
sensation involves an account of a "sensible congruity"
between features of external bodies and powers of the soul that are
employed in sensations. See O'Neill (2007) for a discussion of
Astell's views and also for the history of these arguments in
St. Thomas' critiques of medieval Islamic occasionalists. See
also Ackworth (1979, 174, 178), Taylor (2001, 511-2), Broad
(2002a, 109) on Astell's views on sensible congruity.


#### 1.3.2 Ontological Relationship



Astell holds not only that God creates humans, but that God gives
humans a "particle of divinity" that then exists within
the self (Astell SP, 53). (Note that this is the case even though the
mind is indivisible, as described above in section 1.2.) That is, God
and humans share some being with each other. Here Astell follows in
the tradition of the Cambridge Platonists, maintaining that human
beings are "deiform" in this manner. This point has
implications for Astell's theory of education (described below
in section 3.1).



Note that it might seem as though the ontological and causal relations
are the same relations. They are, indeed, both metaphysical
relationships. However, there are important differences between these
two relationships. For example, it is possible to hold that humans are
caused by God without holding that humans have something of God in
them. In such a case, there is a causal relationship, but not an
ontological one. For Astell, though, humans are not just Divinely
caused, they are also Divinely imbued. Thus humans are in both causal
and ontological relationships with God. 


#### 1.3.3 Ethical Relationship



According to Astell, in addition to being in causal and ontological
relationships with God, they are also in an ethical relationship with
God: they are to love God. (Additional ethical and theological
ramifications of Astell's view about this obligation are
discussed in section 4.3.)



Why humans should love God and what this love "looks like"
constitutes a major thread of discussion between Astell and John
Norris in *Letters Concerning the Love of God*. Here Astell
debates with Norris about the nature of God's causality and
human's subsequent obligation to love God, discussing the pros
and cons of occasionalist and Cambridge Platonist accounts. (See
Wilson, 2004, for a detailed discussion of this text.) Norris had
claimed in *Practical Discourses upon Several Divine Subjects*
(1693) that we should love God because he alone is the source of our
sensation, and so the source of our pleasure, and so the source of our
good. Note here Norris holds that the causal relationship humans have
with God determines the ethical relationship that humans have to God.
Astell objects: our reason for loving God should not depend on the
occasionalist tenet about God's direct causal role in the
universe. As their discussion continues, they touch on a range of
issues, including the extent of God's causal role in creation,
the causal powers of physical objects, the workings of human sense
perception, the mind-body union, and the ways humans can and
should love God and his creation.



Though Astell and Norris disagree on the philosophical basis of why
humans should love God, they agree on many aspects of their account of
what love is. According to their view, they hold that love is an
integral aspect of minds: as bodies have motion so minds have love.
They also agree that there are two basic kinds of love and that these
are differentiated in part with respect to the objects on which the
love is focused, whether human or God. They hold that humans are to
offer each other "benevolence" and offer God
"desire." Why? First it is useful to understand how these
two forms of love differ: benevolence is a love in which one being
wishes another well; desire is a love a being has when some other
being is their good and can satisfy their need. 



Humans, like any created being, lacks the causal power to ultimately
satisfy the metaphysical needs of other created beings. Thus, it does
not make sense for them to desire each other. They can, though, wish
each other well. This kind of love is marked by its disinterestedness
(that is, the well-wisher does not expect anything to be given in
response) and it is motivated by altruism and charity.



Whereas humans cannot satisfy the metaphysical needs of each other,
God can satisfy humans' needs. Thus God merits human
"desire," which is a love of something insofar as it is
our good. However, though we properly "desire" God, we do
not properly offer him "benevolence": God does not need
our well-wishing, for God does not lack anything that we could
offer.


## 2. Epistemology



Astell develops three themes common to rationalism: an emphasis of the
mind over the body; a theory of innate ideas as the origin of
knowledge; and a methodology that leads the novice from confusion to
clarity. Section 1 above on metaphysics, addresses Astell's
emphasis of the mind over body. This section reconstructs her accounts
of mind, ideas, knowledge, belief, and method.


### 2.1 Mind and Ideas



Astell holds that the mind has two faculties: the understanding and
the will. The understanding is the capacity to receive and compare
ideas, and the will is the power of preferring and directing thoughts
and motions (Astell SP, 205). Each faculty has a proper object: the
proper object of the understanding is truth, which has "being
from Eternity in the Divine Ideas" (137); the proper object of
the will is the good, which is God's will (206). When the
understanding is healthy, it has knowledge (130); when the will is
healthy, it is regular--that is, it is guided by the
understanding (205, 209). The task of the understanding is to govern
the will by obtaining truth (130). 



Astell holds a view according to which there are not merely innate
ideas, but also innate inclinations. She explains that the innate
ideas are "rudiments of knowledge" (128) that are
"inseparable" from the understanding and are the sources
of our other ideas (Astell SP, 205). In addition, she states that we
are born with inclinations that are "inseparable" from the
will (205). She explains that our innate ideas make us rational
creatures. Irrational creatures, on the other hand, act according to
the will of God and by mechanism. But equipped with reason, humans are
voluntary agents: we choose our actions according to principles in the
understanding, and we determine our wills (128).



Astell provides two accounts of ideas, one general and one strict. In
doing so, she presents her views on knowledge and clear and distinct
perceptions. Here is the general account of ideas, which is broad
enough to encompass all thinking:



By Ideas we sometimes understand in general all that which is the
immediate Object of the Mind, whatever it Perceives; and in this large
Sense it may take in all Thought, all that we are any ways capable of
Discerning: So when we have no Idea of a thing, 'tis as much as
to say we know nothing of the matter. (168)



In the general sense, ideas--the immediate objects of the
mind--are required for knowledge insofar as we need to have some
idea of a thing in order to have knowledge of it in the sense that we
are familiar with it. But Astell also gives a stricter, more
restricted account of the term 'idea' when she is talking about the
more philosophical notion of knowledge as that which is clear and
distinct:



> 
> Again, it [the word 'idea'] is more strictly taken for
> that which represents to the Mind some object distinct from it,
> whether Clearly or Confusedly; when this is its import, our Knowledge
> is said to be as Clear as our Ideas are. For that Idea which
> represents a thing so Clearly, that by an Attent and Simple View we
> may discern its Properties and Modifications, at least so far as they
> can be Known, is never false; for our Certainty and Evidence depends
> on it, if we Know not Truly what is thus represented to our Minds we
> know nothing. (Astell SP, 168)
> 



Ideas in the strict sense represent what is distinct from the mind. As
such, ideas must be clear in order for them to afford knowledge. 



For Astell, though ideas can be confused, they are not themselves the
sources of error. Rather, Astell locates falsity and error in both
judgments and in language (169, 171). About judgment: she holds that
judgment involves the comparison of two ideas; error arises when we
lack an "intermediate idea" (a "middle term")
in order to make a judgment (146-7, 172-3) (see section
2.2 for a discussion of middle terms). It will help us to avoid this
kind of error in judgment if we properly use our words that are
associated with ideas (172). To do this kind of work, we need to first
examine ideas about morality and religion, separating the ideas we
apprehend through philosophical reflection from those we have adopted
by custom, the latter of which are so often not true ideas. For
example, Astell stresses that women need to release the false ideas
they have about their natures (ideas they gained from their society)
and come to understand that they have immortal natures based in the
"particle of Divinity" that they have within their selves
(53). Ultimately all reasonings and deductions should begin from ideas
that are clear and are "as distinct as the nature of the subject
will permit" (169-72). (This issue has implications for
Astell's ethics, as explained in section 4 below.)


### 2.2 Intuition and Authority, Knowledge and Faith



Astell offers her account of knowledge and faith in order to explain
that people should become aware of how these two different ways of
apprehending truth are not just different, but rather that there are
ways in which faith is superior to knowledge. Many people hold that
knowledge should be praised over faith because knowledge cannot be
disbelieved, whereas faith can. But Astell resists this view. She
explains that there are some aspects of faith that make it even more
praiseworthy than knowledge, even though what is grasped by faith can
be disbelieved. Her account of knowledge is explained first, then her
account of faith, then her discussion of the different "modes of
understanding" that can arise from these when used in
combination. We conclude with a practical reason for why Astell finds
this discussion so important--it is integral to current
discussions about education and privilege, namely about the education
of workers of all sexes and women of the gentry. 



One of the first things to note about Astell's account of
knowledge is how different it is from the view that is so often held
by analytic philosophers of the 20th and 21st
centuries. According to the latter's view, knowledge is true,
justified belief. Astell, however, holds a view of knowledge according
to which it is marked by its origin, clarity, distinctness, and the
means by which it is affirmed. On her view, the highest form of
epistemic grasp that we have of truth is via an ability she calls
"intuition" (146). She writes that intuition yields just a
few truths, each of which is self-evident (150). At one point she
describes intuition as an "immediate View" (Astell SP,
149). As such, intuition is a capacity that directly apprehends
truths; this means that these direct apprehensions are not first
beliefs that later are found to be justified. Rather Astellian
intuitions are themselves self-evident, not needing external
justification. In the context of this discussion, Astell directly
cites Descartes's words from *Principles of Philosophy*,
Part I, section 45 (AT VIIIA 21-2; CSM I 207):



That (to use the Words of a Celebrated Author) may be said to be
"Clear which is Present and Manifest to an attentive
Mind;" so as we say we see Objects Clearly, when being present
to our Eyes they sufficiently Act on 'em, and our Eyes are
dispos'd to regard 'em. And that Distinct, which is so
Clear, Particular, and Different from all other things, that it
contains not any thing in it self which appears not manifestly to him
who considers it as he ought. (Astell SP, 172)



Though Astell uses some of Descartes's language when describing
intuitions, she diverges from his views on issues of which ideas are
clear and distinct, holding that ideas of God and of our own souls are
clear, but not distinct (173), noting that although we can know some
of the attributes of these substances, we cannot know their true
natures (173). In addition, she explains that we do not have a
distinct idea of God because he is infinite, and she notes that there
are additional reasons for offering this view, though the
"Reasons [are] too long to be mentioned here" (173).



She does, however, explain that the idea of God is gained by
intuition, and that according to this intuition we apprehend that
"GOD is One Simple Essence, Undivided, and Infinite in all
Perfection" (147). Astell explains that once we have some
intuitions, we can draw deductions from them and thus attain
additional truths that themselves cannot be doubted. Astell uses the
term 'science' to describe this kind of knowledge (149).
Astell does not give an example, but perhaps she has in mind
Descartes's deductions of the laws of physics from the clear and
distinct perceptions of God and corporeal substance, for example, his
deduction of the law of conservation of motion and the law of inertia
(*Principles* II, 36 and 37; CSM I 239-40; AT VIIIA
61-3).



But there is another kind of truth that we hold, one apprehended in a
quite different way from how we apprehend via intuition. This is
faith. Truths apprehended by faith are brought to us via authority
versus intuition. When the authority is Divine (that is, when it is
brought by revelation), then we gain "Divine faith" (149).
Our perceptions of these truths are clear or distinct (149). Astell
uses the term 'opinion' to describe these apprehensions
and all the additional truths that are deduced from them. 



In some cases, we apprehend two truths, but we do not have a third
"middle" term to compare them. For example, we apprehend
(by *both* intuition and authority) that God is one simple
essence that is undivided and infinite. In addition, we also apprehend
by authority that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (147). How can
these both be true? Astell explains that we have no third idea that we
could use to compare them. She explains that God did not impart this
third idea to us because it would be "too dazzling, too bright
for Mortality to bear." Does this mean that it is unreasonable
to accept these two truths? Not for Astell. She explains that we know
both, though we do not know *the manner* in which both are true
(148). Though Astell does not give further explanation here of how a
"middle term" would function to help us know the manner in
which they are both true, she likely has in mind something like the
following: though we can apprehend both a triangle and a straight
angle, we might be perplexed if someone told us that they were
equivalent. Our confusion would be relieved once we realized that each
one measured 180 degrees. Thus "amount of degrees" is the
*manner* in which the triangle and straight angle are
equivalent. Similarly, we lack an idea that allows us to square (so to
speak) the seemingly opposed truths that God is simple and undivided
with the truth that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Thus we must
hold the congruity of two truths as a matter of faith. Astell gives
additional examples: we know and feel the mind-body union, but we know
neither the "secret ties" that unite them nor how they
interact; we know we have liberty and we know God governs all, but we
do not have a middle term to reconcile these (see section 1.2 for a
related discussion of these passages).



We can now address Astell's claim that knowledge (science) and
faith (opinion) are not merely on a par, but that there are ways in
which faith is superior to knowledge. Note first that the two are
different in at least two ways: (1) they are the results of different
abilities--intuition (for knowledge/science) and authority (for
faith/opinion); and (2) they have different aspects to them, science
being immutable and opinion being variable (150). However, as Astell
explains, these differences do not imply that one is rationally proved
and thus certain and that the other is not. Rather, Astell emphasizes
that they are proved in different ways: "Science Demonstrates
things that are Seen, so Faith is the Evidence of such as are *Not
Seen*" (150; note that Astell here references Hebrews
11:1-6 from the Christian Bible). We should not expect that
knowledge and faith work in the same way, as they are the results of
such different capacities; as every sense has its proper object (the
eyes have colors, the ears have sounds, etc.), so every capacity of
the understanding has its proper object: science has as its objects
truths that can cannot be disbelieved (because of their clarity and/or
distinctness), whereas faith has as its objects truths that are not
marked by distinctness or clarity, and thus can admit of disbelief
(151). Thus faith requires a deliberate activity of the will that
knowledge does not: when we have knowledge, our will is compelled by
the clarity of the perception; but when we have faith, our will is not
so compelled. Given this, faith has a special result that knowledge
lacks; that is, faith involves an activity of the will that is capable
of reward (151).



In addition, Astell explains that we should not claim that science is
somehow more certain than faith. In comparison with truths held by
science, we can gain as much if not more certainty when we hold a
truth via faith if we show (1) that God gave us the truth and (2) God
is not deceived or a deceiver (151). Indeed, Astell holds that
revelation is an improvement on reason (147). 



For Astell, what is most important is that we align our abilities with
their proper objects: we should believe objects of faith, we should
know objects of knowledge (152). That is, we should not place faith in
what is an object of science, nor should we adhere "blindly to
the Dictates of some famous Philosopher in Physical Truths, the
Principles of which we have as much right to examine, and to make
deductions from 'em as he had" (152). 



This connects to Astell's view on wisdom: "to Know what is
to be Known, and to Believe what is to be Believ'd is the
property of a Wise person" (152). It also provides one of the
theoretical bases for Astell's views on education, which focuses
in part on how to grasp truths that can be self-evident (see section
3.2). Astell points out how this distinction between knowledge and
belief was playing a role in current controversies about gender,
education, and social rank (close to what we today understand as
social class). Some of this discussion centered around issues of
people's free time that could be used for study. Locke, for
example, thought that men of the gentry and nobility had the time and
means to gain knowledge, but that everyone else without these
gendered, financial, and social privileges who lacked this time and/or
the means to improve themselves (and their "capacities")
could make do with belief. Consider what Locke writes in *On the
Reasonableness of Christianity*: 



> 
> The greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for
> demonstration, nor can they carry a train of proofs, which in that way
> they must always depend upon for conviction, and cannot be required to
> assent to till they see the demonstration. Whenever they stick, the
> teachers are always put upon proof, and must clear the doubt, by a
> thread of coherent deductions from the first principle, how long, or
> how intricate soever that be. And you may as soon hope to have all the
> day-labourers and tradesmen, the spinsters and dairy-maids, perfect
> mathematicians, as to have them perfect in ethics this way: hearing
> plain commands, is the sure and only course to bring them to obedience
> and practice. The greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must
> believe. (*Reasonabless of Christianity*, section 243 in
> Locke's *Works*, vol 7, p. 143, and see also
> *Reasonableness,* section 302; see also *Essay Concerning
> Human Understanding* 4.20.2-3; for a discussion of these
> issues, see Wolterstorff 1996, p. 71 ff.)
> 



With his reference to "day-labourers,"
"tradesmen," "spinsters," and
"dairy-maids," Locke is explicitly speaking of people of
all genders who work with their hands. But the term
'spinster' can also refer to the single gentry
woman--that is, to someone like Astell herself. Thus
Locke's statement lends itself to the following interpretation:
whereas people with greater gendered, financial, and social privilege
should think for themselves, people who are without such privilege
should listen "to plain commands." That is, they should be
told what to think without fully understanding why they should think
those things. In other words, they should follow authority, whether
that be God's authority or human authority. 



There are important issues of consent involved here. Consider even on
the most charitable reading of Locke's statement, according to
which he is speaking about wanting to make life easier for people who
do not have time and resources to gain education in religious matters
and thus aim to serve them in their best interests. Who is to prevent
the kind of manipulation that can happen when a religious teacher
oversteps their bounds and issues "plain commands" that
manipulate people against their best interests? Shouldn't the
socially marginalized people be able to defend themselves against this
kind of situation by fully understanding for themselves the truths
that are in their best interests? 



It is for these kinds of reasons that Astell resists this view. In
contrast to Locke's view, she argues that *all* people,
regardless of gender and social station (and thus temporal
constraints), have the ability to have clear and distinct ideas that
are obtained by spiritual practices like the ones of philosophical
meditation that she and Descartes each offers. As she puts it,
"For the difference between a plow-man and a Doctor does not
seem to me to consist in this, That the Business of the one is to
search after Knowledge, and that the other has nothing to do with
it" (Astell SP, 153). Further she writes: "The Meanest
Person shou'd Think as *Justly*, tho' not as
*Capaciously,* as the greatest Philosopher" (168).
According to Astell, no matter where a person is situated within the
social strata of society and no matter what their gender is, they
should be able to have well-ordered thoughts--that is, thoughts
that are "just." She admits that everyone may not have
time to have *as many* thoughts as someone else--that is,
they may not have time to do vast amounts of empirical study, book
learning, and language learning as someone else who has more time to
dedicate to these kinds of endeavors that would give them
"capacious" learning. But for Astell, such
*capacious* thinking is not as important as *just*
thinking. In addition, the process of attaining just thinking does not
take a long amount of time, and everyone should be given the
opportunity to think in this way. Thus, Astell advocates for
everyone's need to have the kind of philosophical meditation
that yields well-ordered, harmonious thinking. 


## 3. Method: Philosophy of Education



One thread that runs through rationalist philosophies concerns the
relation between knowledge and method. Methods are pedagogical
strategies that lead novices from confusion to knowledge (clarity). As
long as novices are confused, it is because they lack a method that
leads them from their particular forms of confusion to knowledge. The
job of the philosopher is to understand the confusions and to devise a
method that will support the novices on their journeys (see Nelson
2005). For example, Plato explains how the body confuses the soul, and
he illustrates how the dialectic can lead his interlocutor to grasp
the forms. Descartes agrees with Plato about the body's
confusion of the soul, adding that scholastic teachings lead to
further confusion, especially in that they reinforce childhood
prejudice, which is rooted in an overemphasis on the senses. His
famous method of doubt is one instantiation of his general account of
method, encapsulated in the four rules he presents in Part II of
*Discourse on the Method* (AT VI 18-9; CSM I 20). In
*Discourse on the Method* and *Meditations on First
Philosophy*, the meditator utilizes the method of doubt so she can
move from confusion and obscurity to clarity and distinctness. This
issue relates to epistemology (because it is about knowledge, see
section 2) and ethics (insofar as confusion and knowledge inform moral
agency and action, see section 4).



Like Plato and Descartes, Astell provides an explanation of the
novice's initial confusion and offers a method that can be
employed to resolve the condition. In doing so, she focuses on the
trajectory of a very specific group of female novices, namely the
"Ladies" she names in the title of her text *A Serious
Proposal to the Ladies.* These are the gentry and noble women of
her social circle, women who are predominantly English and likely
identify as White, which is a new racial category just being
constructed during Astell's century. Thus, Astell is not
theorizing the condition of *all* women, for she is not talking
about, for example, the women of various races and national origins
whom she and her peers paid, indentured, and/or enslaved to serve
them, both at home and abroad (see Perry, 1986, 253-62, for a
discussion of the ways in which Astell's patrons were involved
in colonialist ventures). In what follows, the women Astell is
theorizing are referred to in ways that continue to make it clear that
they were a specific group of women--they were, for example,
"Astell's novices," "the women of
Astell's intended audience," or (simply) the
"Ladies."



Astell theorizes what is specific about her novice's initial
confusions and she constructs a method tailored specifically for them.
In doing so, she theorizes some of the political issues about power
that are intertwined with how these epistemic problems arise, and she
also theorizes how they can be resolved. Note that Astell theorizes
"some" of the political issues. On the one hand, she
addresses how these women are disadvantaged and dominated by men of
their rank and race, as well as by the institutions that support these
men. But on the other hand, she does not theorize the ways in which
these women themselves--herself included--were advantaged
and elevated by their gender, sexuality, race, rank, and national
origin, as well as by the colonial institutions that supported Astell
and her audience. That is, Astell is theorizing her own and her
audience's domination by men, but not these women's
privilege.



As Astell sees it, the problem that faces her novice is that this
woman has a diseased mind as the result of social conditioning in a
hierarchy that disadvantages her because of (what we today call) her
gender. This diseased mind manifests in part as a particular skeptical
predicament: she has a radical doubt about her nature, for she
believes God made her with a degraded reason and a natural pride and
vanity. That is, she adopts the prejudice that she is incapable of
improving because she sees herself as naturally proud and vain (Astell
SP, 58, 62). Gripped with this skeptical predicament, she has no
desire to improve her mind, and she lacks an ability to understand her
perfections, which would otherwise guide her in living a virtuous life
(80-1, 200, 202, 228). Thus she develops an account of (what has
been called by Sowaal [2007, 2016]) the *Women's Defective
Nature Prejudice,* and develops strategies for how to resolve it
(see sections 3.1 and 3.2). (See Forbes for how this view of prejudice
connects with contemporary feminism.)



Another way Astell frames the problem facing the women of her audience
is in terms of an account of the passions. She maintains that all
"Rational Natures" have within them both generosity and a
striving for perfection (62). Here we assume she is using the term
'generosity' in the Cartesian sense. Descartes writes:



> 
> The first consists in his knowing that nothing truly belongs to him
> but this freedom to dispose his volitions, and that he ought to be
> praised or blamed for no other reason than his using this freedom well
> or badly. The second consists in his feeling within himself a firm and
> constant resolution to use it well--that is, never to lack the
> will to undertake and carry out whatever he judges to be best. To do
> that is to pursue virtue in a perfect manner. (AT 11 445-6; CSM
> I 364)
> 



For our purposes, this passage can be glossed in the following manner:
a person has generosity when she realizes that she is merely her will
and she has the resolution to use it well. For Descartes, generosity
is both a passion and a virtue. It is the keystone passion in that
when one has it, one does not have vices. This is so because vices
rest on a misunderstanding of what one is and what one's goods
are. (See Sowaal 2017 for a longer discussion of Astell on
generosity.)



Astell explains that because the women of her audience are not
provided with effective educations in the knowledge of what things
exist and what their properties are (that is, an education in
metaphysics), they do not develop the knowledge of what they truly are
(their wills), nor do they develop the resolution to use their wills
well. Instead, they focus on creating physical perfection and also on
the praises that accompany it. Thus they develop vanity and pride, the
"feminine vices" (Astell SP, 62-64).



Ultimately, Astell has in mind two goals regarding the transformation
of the women she addresses: one for their "temporal"
lifetimes, one for their "eternal" lifetimes, namely their
salvation.



For this lifetime: these women need to gain "empire" over
their selves. Indeed, Astell employs the term 'empire'
many times in *Serious Proposal* to mean self-control (56, 58,
72, 86). Of course, for Astell, this empire is the result of divine
grace (not human effort), which may be occasioned when a person
engages in spiritual practices of surrender. (See Kotva for a
discussion of effort and grace in the early modern period.)



With respect to salvation: these women need to learn to separate their
minds from their bodies while on earth. If they do not learn to
perfect their rational capacities by forming clear and distinct
perceptions--thereby polishing their innate ideas and ordering
and employing them correctly--, then they will not be able to
separate their minds from their bodies when they die, and their souls
will not reach heaven. She writes:



> 
> And since our Happiness in the next World, depends so far on those
> dispositions which we carry along with us out of this, that without a
> right habitude and temper of mind we are not capable of Felicity; and
> seeing our Beatitude consists in the contemplation of the divine Truth
> and Beauty, as well as in the fruition of his Goodness, can Ignorance
> be a fit preparative for Heaven? Is't likely that she whose
> Understanding has been busied about nothing but froth and trifles,
> shou'd be capable of delighting her self in noble and sublime
> Truths? (80-81)
> 



In this way Astell's rationalist education remedies a practical
problem of the individuation of the body and soul at death by
suggesting a path for a specific group of women. This elucidates the
kind of education Astell promotes: it is not preparation for a career
as a doctor, lawyer, curate, or scientist; nor is it the precursor to
what we today call a "liberal education." Instead it is an
education that teaches the women of her rank and race how to cultivate
intellectual enjoyment and perfection, and ultimately generosity and
virtue.



Astell recognizes that these women need to employ a method to aid them
in these practices that will prepare them for grace. These women have
been raised to be idle and to concern themselves with frivolous
things. When they seek to better themselves, they do not know how to
do so, and so they are quickly discouraged: "they want [lack]
the method of doing it; they know not how to look into their Souls, or
if they do, they find so many disorders to be rectified, so many wants
to be supplied, that frightened with the difficulty of the world they
lay aside the thoughts of undertaking it" (124).



Astell offers two proposals for the education of the women she
directly addresses and seeks to teach. One takes place at a
women's monastery she calls the Religious Retirement, the other
can be done outside such an institution.


### 3.1 Method for Inhabitants of a Monastic Community



Astell is keen to offer a method for a person who is living in a
monastic-like community to use to gain knowledge. She also explains
how and why this method works; in doing so, she employs her account of
human nature and the way that it can degenerate into ignorance.



For Astell, the issue of knowledge and ignorance is always also an
issue of health and disease. As stated above, Astell, like the
Cambridge Platonists, holds that the human being is
"deiform," it is divinely imbued with a "particle of
Divinity" that exists "within" it's soul
(Astell SP, 53). (For a discussion of deiform in Cambridge Platonists,
see Gill, chapters 1-3.) When a person is healthy, this divinity
within expresses itself as a "spark of Piety" (107). But
when people internalize prejudices that they have learned from the
"Tyrant Custom" (67), they do not nurture this particle of
Divinity, but rather they develop a "spiritual"
"disease" (84, 88, 102, 74), a disease which comes with
many prejudices. Healing will come to the Ladies who enter the
Religious Retirement when they learn how to transform every
"Spot" that has turned into a prejudice that is marring
"the beauty of [their] lovely Soul[s]" (87).



In order to heal, the "Ladies" at the Religious Retirement
will engage in individual and communal spiritual practices that teach
them how to "look into" their own souls (41),
"into" each other's souls (100), and into the
"Soul" of the "happy Society" itself (87).
When a person practices "looking into" the souls of
oneself, one's fellow, and one's community, her body and
soul will gather with these additional bodies and souls such that they
form into "one body, whose Soul is love" (87). When each
person in the group does this, then each person's spark gathers
with each other person's spark. Together, these sparks unite
into one, "breathing forth it self in flames of holy desires
after GOD and acts of Benevolence to each other" (87).



Astell maintains that as these Ladies engage in these practices, they
will get closer to attaining a perfected spiritual condition that
consists in piety, apprehension of truth, generosity, and friendship,
each of which is needed for these Ladies to engage in their proper
vocations.


### 3.2 Method for People Living Outside a Monastic Community



Though Astell thinks that communal prayer, like that described above,
is one way of gaining access to the truth, she also recognizes
additional methods that will lead a person to metaphysical knowledge.
In doing so, she suggests in *Serious Proposal to the Ladies,*
Part II, that the women of her audience employ six rules that will aid
them in their metaphysical reflections (176-9).



*Rule 1*: "Acquaint our selves thoroughly with the State
of the Question, have a Distinct Notion of our Subject whatever it be,
and of the Terms we make use of, knowing precisely what it is we drive
at."
  

*Rule 2*: "Cut off all needless Ideas and whatever has
not a necessary Connexion to the matter under consideration."
  

*Rule 3*: "To conduct our Thoughts by Order, beginning
with the most Simple and easie Objects, and ascending by Degrees to
the Knowledge of more Compos'd."
  

*Rule 4*: "Not to leave out part of our Subject
unexamin'd."
  

*Rule 5*: "Always keep our Subject Directly in our Eye,
and Closely pursue it thro all, our Progress."
  

*Rule 6*: "To judge no further than we Perceive, and not
to take anything for Truth, which we do not evidently Know to be
so."



Like many of Astell's views and distinctions, these rules are
ripe for comparison with Descartes's, as well as with those
presented by Arnauld and Nicole. Indeed, these rules are part of
Astell's version of Arnauld and Nicole's *Port-Royal
Logic*, which she designs specifically for the women of her
audience so that they can escape their everyday skepticism; only once
they resolve their skeptical predicaments can they begin to embark on
a project of reflection involving philosophical skepticism, as
Descartes presents it in *Discourse on the Method* and
*Meditations on First Philosophy* (see Sowaal 2007).



The method encapsulated in these six rules is to be employed when a
meditator addresses a particular subject of inquiry. Astell recognizes
that even prior to such reflections, the meditator must first
disengage from the skeptical predicament that can arise from having
adopted the social prejudice that they are defective (see section 3).
Instead of holding beliefs because authorities told them to, and
instead of continuing to hold them because they once did, these women
should learn to maintain beliefs because they are self-evident. To
learn how to reveal self-evident truths, Astell suggests a number of
strategies. One strategy involves reflecting on how the former
prejudices led to mischief, promoted error, and hindered the free
range of thought. Another strategy involves reflecting on how the
prejudices provided a means for skepticism to take root. For example,
when one holds a belief, one often draws further conclusions from it.
But when one finds that the conclusion is false, one often questions
the whole group of claims, concluding that nothing can be known
(Astell SP, 133-4). Here Astell's treatment is largely
Cartesian.



However, Astell departs from the Cartesian project when she presents
another strategy her novice can use to release herself from the
skeptical predicament. This strategy involves reflecting on
teleological arguments about the design of God's creation
(153-4, 168). These arguments are designed to help the novice
realize that God would not have created her so that she is naturally
defective (that is, naturally proud, vain, and unimprovable). Such
reflection will lead the novice to search for the perfections God has
bestowed upon her and the role they play in her life, as well as in
her community and creation as a whole. Through these considerations,
she will be drawn to the conclusion that she is a rational being who
can and ought to improve her rationality in order to fulfill
God's plan for creation.



Ultimately Astell's novice will benefit from metaphysical
reflection on what truly exists--God, mind, and body--for
such reflection will result in her correctly understanding what she is
and how she stands in relation to God. A central aspect of this will
be her new comprehension of the understanding, the will, and the
origin of error. She will come to grasp that the limitation of the
understanding is not a defect, but rather that limitations are natural
and necessary; thus, while ignorance cannot be avoided, error can. She
will realize that the understanding is passive and that
judgment--and therefore error--belongs to the will. She will
learn to suspend her judgment until she has clarity and to direct her
will to a good end (159). With this new understanding of her will and
her new resolution to develop better habits in employing her will, her
generosity (which formerly degraded into pride, vanity) will be
restored, as will her virtue.


## 4. Ethics



Astell can also be read as contributing to several different kinds of
ethical frameworks and theories.


### 4.1 Ethics as Care of the Self



Astell can be read as part of a long-standing ethical tradition that
is focused on the self and how it relates to its own moral agency.
This has been described recently by Hadot and Foucault as
"philosophy as a way of life." Like philosophers in this
tradition, Astell focuses on the self and its condition (see sections
1.3, 3.1), articulates spiritual practices that the self can use to
further its relationship with truth (see sections 3.1, 3.2), offers
ways for the self to critique social customs (see section 2.1), and
attends to ways the self can continue to grow in freedom from
domination (see section 3). In philosophizing in this manner, Astell
is steeped in Christian theology and the traditions of monasticism.
(See Webb 2020 for a reading of Astell as a "care of the
self" philosopher; see Kendrick 2018 for a reading of Astell as
informed by Christian theology.)


### 4.2 Virtue Theory



Astell can be read as working within the virtue theory tradition,
which focuses on the character of the moral agent, for she writes
about themes like virtue, moral education, moral judgment, character,
friendship, and the role of passions in moral action. However, it can
be argued that Astell should be considered a virtue
"theorist"--and not be considered a virtue
"ethicist"--because she does not hold the tenet that
goodness is metaphysically prior to rightness. (See Broad 2016 for a
reading along these lines.)



When discussing the passions, Astell draws on Descartes, explaining
that passions arise out of the mind-body union. Like Descartes, she
holds that we will always have passions, for we are embodied souls.
Given that we will always have passions, it is a good practice to
learn how to properly direct them and even remedy them, if needed.
This task involves properly aligning passions correctly with reason
such that they develop into virtues.



Astell develops her account of the passions by arguing that specific
passions are not naturally connected with men versus women. That is,
women and men do not necessarily have virtues or vices that align with
(what we today call) the gender of their bodies. Rather,
anyone--despite their gender--can have any passion, virtue,
or vice. This means that even men can develop the so-called
"feminine vices." This point is important to Astell
because of (what can be called) the *Women's Defective Nature
Prejudice*, described above (in section 3), according to which
Astell's "Ladies" are seen as naturally having
"feminine vices" such as imprudence, vanity, and pride.
Astell shows that such vices are not natural or inherent features of
the souls of women. (See Sowaal 2007 and 2016 for a reading along
these lines.)



The passion that is central to Astell's theory is love. Her
account of love draws on neo-Platonic Christian ethics and traditions
of monasticism (especially practices of communal contemplation,
meditation, simplification, and prayer). According to Astell, humans
have both an ability and duty to love. Section 1.3 above discussed the
metaphysical implications Astell draws from this; here and in the next
section, we turn to the ethical and religious implications.



For Christian philosophers, Astell included, the love of God is
central to theological ethics, for it is one of the two lessons that
Jesus emphasized from his Jewish education and commanded of his
followers: love God and love your neighbor as yourself (Matthew 22:
36-40). Thus the philosopher can ask: what makes it possible for
us to discharge these duties? That is, how is the world made such that
we *can* love God and love each other? As mentioned above,
Astell addresses these issues by describing two kinds of
love--that of desire and benevolence. We can now say a bit more
about her view: for Astell, the human ability to *desire*
God--that is, to stand before God and ask that God complete the
human self--allows for the possibility for humans to offer
*benevolence* to each other--that is, to truly wish each
other well. These are the grounds for Astell's account of
friendship, which is a theory that allows for universal friendship
that does not require either partiality or reciprocity (unlike what is
required for Aristotelian friendship). In writing about friendship,
Astell is especially interested in giving an account of how women can
be "spiritual" friends with each other. Thus she examines
same-sex friendship, and she considers women's social bonds as
they exist outside of the family unit. (See Kendrick 2018 for a
reading along these lines.)


### 4.3 Deontological Ethics



Given that Astell discusses *duties* to love God and neighbor,
it is possible to read Astell as part of the deontological tradition.
This tradition focuses on moral agents insofar as they have duties
they must discharge. Such a reading may develop along the following
lines.



Humans have duties to God based on their relationship with God: the
human originates in God and God communicates his
perfections--namely those of freedom and rationality--to the
human; thus humans have the duty to understand and obey God's
will, participate in the divine, contribute to the world's moral
perfection, and bring glory to God.



Humans also have duties to themselves and their fellows, namely to
cultivate their own rational capacities and to help others do the
same. This discharge has social ramifications: a human with perfected
rationality and freedom has the ability to engage properly in
friendships and marriages.



In this way, Astell's educational plans for the
"Ladies" can help these women develop rationality and
freedom such that they can properly discharge their duties to
themselves, their fellows, and God. (See Lascano 2016 for a reading
along these lines.)