## 1. Modesty and Humility




The feature of modesty and humility that has most captivated
philosophers is its elusive nature. It seems as though knowing that
you're modest somehow spoils it; the modest person, it seems,
must be unaware of their own modesty. Modesty can seem to be, as
Sorensen (1988) puts it, a kind of ethical blindspot: If you have it
you won't know it (and if you seem to know you have it, you
probably don't really!)




The fact that knowing about your own modesty seems to spoil it
suggests what seems, to some at least, to be a troubling tension
between epistemic and moral goods. Can there really be something
morally good about forming biased beliefs about your own goodness? Many
imagine that perfect moral virtue must be compatible with perfect
knowledge. An extreme version is Plato's identification of virtue
and knowledge in the *Meno*, but even less extreme views can
find the idea that moral virtues might require epistemic defects to be
troubling, or at least interesting.




This raises a few general issues. The first is what, if any, special
requirements there are regarding how we relate to ourselves. Perhaps
forcing myself to skip lunch to finish the job is not morally different
from forcing someone else to skip lunch to finish the job, but they
certainly feel different. This suggests that we cannot always relate to
ourselves in the same way as we relate to others.




These issues are related to debates about what makes modesty or
humility morally virtuous at all. Debates about modesty and humility
are often battles in larger wars about the nature of virtue more
generally.


### 1.1 Varieties and Distinctions




Philosophical work on modesty and humility brackets several senses
of these terms. Philosophical accounts typically do not aim, for
example, to capture uses of 'modest' that apply to objects
as when we say "He lives in a modest house" or "She
has a modest income". The sexual sense of modesty, involving
dress and behavior that presents a non-sexual image, is typically also
bracketed (see Driver 1989, Statman 1992, Bommarito 2013), though some
accounts aim to capture this use of the term as well; see Schueler
(1997, 482), McMullin (2010, 785-786), and Wilson (2014, 79).




There is disagreement about both terms and concepts. Many theorists
treat the terms 'modesty' and 'humility' as
interchangeable. Hare (1996), Schueler (1997), Hurka (2001), Raterman
(2006), Garcia (2006), Kellenberger (2010), and Um (forthcoming), to
name just a few, all treat the terms as referring to more or less the
same phenomenon. Others take the different terms to refer to very
different concepts. There is some historical precedent for this;
Aquinas, for example, considers both modesty and humility to be types
of temperance (see *Summa Theologica* 2.2 Q.160 and Foley 2004).




Among those who do draw a distinction between the concepts, there is
little agreement about what exactly the difference is. For some, the
difference is between public and private domains. Statman (1992,
438n45) claims that modesty has an external domain while humility does
not and Sinha (2012, 265) says that modesty is public while humility is
private. For others, they have different epistemic requirements:
Ben-Ze'ev (1993, 240) and Nuyen (1998, 101) claim that humility
involves underrating oneself, while modesty does not. Driver (1998,
378f5), however, claims the opposite making modesty involve underrating
and humility not. This article will take both terms to refer to a
general response to one's own goodness or achievements and will
use the term that the author under consideration uses when discussing
particular views.


### 1.2 Key Features




Modesty has several key features that theoretical accounts aim to
capture. These are explicitly stated in Driver (1989 and 2001) and are
taken up in most work on modesty since then.



**Dependent Virtue:** Slote (1983, 61ff) notes that
modesty is a dependent virtue. One is modest *about* something
else that is good, about their success or intelligence. In this sense,
modesty requires the existence of another good quality. This is
typically taken to be something objectively good rather than simply
something that the person *thinks* is good, though most views
can accommodate either intuition. Most views assume that the good
quality in question is a good quality of the person who is modest,
though Bommarito (2013, 94) broadens the scope to allow modesty about
the good qualities in others when they reflect on us, as when one is
modest about the achievements of their child, nation, or local sports
teams. Others, such as Ben-Ze'ev (1993) and Um (forthcoming), go
further and deny that modesty is a dependent virtue at all.



**False Modesty:** Theories of modesty also need to be
able to distinguish modesty from false modesty. That is, some people
who are not modest can act as if they are. This rules out accounts of
modesty that are entirely behavioral. If being modest is simply a
matter of certain external behaviors, then there would be no way to
distinguish modesty from false modesty. Modesty and humility require
certain mental states in addition to overt behaviors.



**Self-Attribution Strangeness:** Self-predications of
modesty and humility are, at least in general, self-undermining. This
is highlighted by Sorensen (1988, 120ff) and Driver (1989, 375) who
note that the sentence "I am modest" is a distinctly
*im*modest thing to say. Though Raterman (2006, 232) and
Bommarito (2013, 113) describe contexts in which saying "I am
modest" is not self-undermining, self-ascriptions of modesty are,
in general, self-undermining. It is important to note that this need
not be about public utterances; a person seems less modest for
*thinking* about how modest they are. Bernard Williams, for
example, writes that "... it is a notorious truth that a
modest person does not act under the title of modesty" (1993,
10). That is, a modest person does not think of themselves as acting
modestly, while a just person typically does think of themselves as
acting justly.


### 1.3 Normative Status




In addition to the descriptive features outlined above, accounts of
modesty and humility also aim to explain its normative
status--why does modesty or humility count as a virtue? Most
contemporary work assumes that modesty and humility are genuine moral
virtues. Of course, not all philosophers have agreed. Aristotle and
David Hume in particular are often singled out as denying that modesty
or humility really are virtuous.




Raterman (2006, 222) and Brennan (2007, 112) both claim that
Aristotle denies that modesty is a virtue, as he thinks that a virtuous
person is justified in making claims about their own merit. Some have
also had a hard time squaring virtues like modesty and humility with
Aristotle's ideal of the great-souled man
(*megalopsuchos*), who deserves honors and knows it (see
*Nicomachean Ethics* IV.3). 
Those working in a religious context influenced by Aristotle have to
balance these competing ideals; see Foley (2004, 407ff.) and McCloskey
(2006, 183). Some passages used to support the idea that Aristotle
denies modesty is a virtue (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1108a32 and
1128b10-35) concern the Greek term *aidos*, which is
sometimes translated as 'modesty' but also commonly
rendered as 'shame'. Some modern interpreters have drawn
from Aristotle to support the idea that modesty *is* a virtue:
Driver (1989, 380) notes that Aristotle says the truthful person is
inclined to understate the truth (*Nicomachean Ethics*
1127b4-8), Winter (2012) draws heavily from Aristotle in
defending modesty as a virtue, and Hazlett (2012) defends intellectual
humility as an Aristotelian mean state between dogmatism and
timidity. Whatever Aristotle's view of modesty, other Greek
philosophers use the term
*aidos* to name a virtue. Epictetus, for example, uses it
to refer to a good quality that involves taking other people's
 point of view into consideration; see
 Epictetus: Appropriate Other-Concern
 and the discussion in Kamtekar (1998).




Hume is another historical figure who at least doubted whether modesty
is a virtue. Hume includes modesty in his list of "monkish
virtues"--various non-virtuous traits associated with
self-denial that masquerade as virtues. Other examples of monkish
virtues given by Hume include celibacy, fasting, silence, and
solitude. According to Hume these pseudo-virtues "...
stupefy the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and
sour the temper" (*Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals* sec. IX). Elsewhere, however, Hume seems more positive
about modesty as when he writes:



> 
> 
> But its [modesty's] most usual meaning is when it is opposed to
> impudence and arrogance, and expresses a diffidence of our own
> judgement, and a due attention and regard for others. In young men
> chiefly, this quality is a sure sign of good sense; and is also the
> certain means of augmenting that endowment, by preserving their ears
> open to instruction, and making them still grasp after new
> attainments. But it has a further charm to every spectator; by
> flattering every man's vanity, and presenting the appearance of
> a docile pupil, who receives, with proper attention and respect, every
> word they utter. (*Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*
> sec. VIII)




Hume takes virtues to be qualities that are useful or agreeable but
seems to have had mixed feelings about modesty at least. Davie (1999)
and Reed (2012) have argued that the so-called monkish virtues may
count as virtues even by Hume's standard.




Modesty's status as a virtue has been liminal for other figures
too. Benjamin Franklin initially excluded humility when drawing up a
list of virtues he wished to develop. He added it only after a Quaker
friend mentioned that Franklin was often overbearing and insolent in
conversation (1771/1982, 84). His description of humility reads
simply: "Imitate Jesus and Socrates" (77). This
anticipates contemporary discussion of intellectual humility and its
role as both a moral and epistemic virtue.




Again, the bulk of contemporary work assumes that modesty and humility
are virtues and sees the main challenge as explaining why. For many it
was seen as valuable because of its theological role: Aquinas says
that humility is important because it makes one open to God's
grace (see *Summa Theologica* 2.2 Q.161 and Keys 2003). Others
have found it virtuous because of the non-religious good effects it
produces, like combating jealousy and making social interactions run
more smoothly. Others locate the source of its virtuousness in the
underlying attitude it manifests, things like kindness and concern for
others. Still others argue that it is virtuous because it is a fitting
response to certain morally relevant features of the world like the
equal moral status of all people. What modesty is and why it is
valuable are related questions and the following sections will give an
overview of contemporary views on both questions.




The following presentation of the various contemporary views of
modesty and humility will focus on presenting only the positive
accounts and not objections to the various positions. The dialectic of
the literature typically takes the form of examples and
counter-examples, many of which require a good deal of description to
be compelling. So in the interest of space, the descriptions of the
various views will focus on presenting only the positive accounts.


## 2. Doxastic Accounts




Doxastic accounts explain modesty and its value by appeal to the
presence or absence of certain beliefs. The relevant beliefs are
typically self-evaluations, beliefs about our own value, skill, or
goodness. The content of the relevant beliefs is sometimes taken to be
comparative and sometimes not--think of the difference between
thinking that you're really great and thinking that you are
better than others.




Ignorance accounts explain modesty by appeal to states that are
epistemically defective in some way; the modest person either lacks
certain beliefs about their own goodness or has false beliefs that
involve underrating themselves. Accuracy accounts, on the other hand,
aim to remove any tension between epistemic and moral virtue and so
explain modesty via beliefs that are epistemically good. On these
views, modesty is at its heart about getting it right about
one's place in the world. Strong accuracy accounts make modesty
incompatible with ignorance. For these views modesty is essentially
about having accurate beliefs. Weak accuracy accounts deny that
modesty requires an epistemic defect, but leave it open whether moral
virtue is compatible with epistemic vices.


### 2.1 Ignorance




Julia Driver's account of modesty kicked off a modern revival in
work on the virtue. For Driver (1989 and 2001), the modest person is
someone who is ignorant of their own good qualities in certain ways.
This was hinted at, but not developed, by Henry Sidgwick:
"humility prescribes a low opinion of our merits: but if our
merits are comparably high, it seems strange to direct us to have a
low opinion of them" (1907/1981, 334). He later denies that
there is anything virtuous about having a low self-opinion, but Driver
develops this idea and discusses a range of moral virtues that require
ignorance: blind charity (seeing the good in others while remaining
ignorant of the bad), impulsive courage, certain refusals to hold
grudges, some types of innocence, and of course, modesty.




Driver's account is sometimes called an 'ignorance'
account and other times an 'underestimation' account as
the modest person need not be completely ignorant of their own good
qualities, just underestimate them. As she points out (1999, 828),
this need not require a low estimation as one can underestimate a good
quality while still thinking it pretty good overall. The modest
person, on this account, is someone who wrongly believes that they are
not as good as they really are in some respect. This is taken to
explain the key features of modesty: it is a dependent virtue since
there is another quality one is ignorant of, it is not purely
behavioral so allows for false modesty, and it recognizes
self-attribution strangeness, since modesty itself is a good
quality.




This account is set against the background of a more general account
of virtue. Driver defends a consequentialist account of virtue where
traits are virtuous when they, in general, produce good effects
(Driver, 2001). This view of virtue makes it easy to accommodate
morally virtuous traits that involve epistemic defects since some
epistemic defects might turn out to produce better effects in the long
run.
 Accounts of virtue inspired by Aristotle,
 however, make virtue a matter of
practical wisdom which makes moral virtue incompatible with epistemic
defects. It's important to note that while Driver's early
work makes modesty require ignorance, the weaker claim that moral
virtue is compatible with ignorance is enough to make problems for
Aristotelian accounts of virtue (see Driver 1999). Accuracy accounts of
modesty and humility are largely responses to Driver that are typically
motivated to deny the idea that moral virtue can require, or even be
compatible with, ignorance and false belief.


### 2.2 Strong Accuracy




Strong accuracy accounts not only deny that modesty is compatible
with ignorance, but defend the idea that modesty is, at its heart,
about having certain true beliefs. On some views, humility does involve
underestimation, but only as a means to accurate self-assessment. Foot
(1978/2002, 9) and Slote (1983, 61-62) both note that humility is a
corrective to a general human tendency to think too highly of
ourselves. No evidence is offered in support of this empirical claim,
but its truth will require considering how self-evaluation works in
different contexts, skill levels, cultures, and temperaments.




Many strong accuracy accounts are called 'egalitarian' or
'equitable' views. These accounts make modesty a matter of
a particular kind of correct belief. Drawing on Kantian ideas about
the equal moral status of all rational agents, these views root
modesty in a the accurate recognition of people's equal moral
status. So for Ben-Ze'ev (1993) modesty is a matter of knowledge
of the equal moral worth of everyone and accurately seeing that
particular good qualities do not affect this worth. Hare (1996, 240)
distinguishes one's "moral worth as a person" (a
static and invariable value) from one's "worth as a moral
person" (a value that can be affected by good qualities) and
sees modesty as rooted in a recognition of the former.




Since modesty is a matter of knowing the equal moral worth of all
people, defenders of this view sometimes deny that modesty is a
dependent virtue since one can have the relevant knowledge while
lacking any good qualities oneself (see Ben-Ze'ev 1993). They
also sometimes deny that immoral people, or people who deny the equal
moral worth of everyone, can ever be modest at all; see Nuyen (1998,
107) and Statman (1992, 434).




Another type of strong accuracy view appeals to different scales of
evaluation. This type of view is defended by Brennan (2007), who
attributes it to Adam Smith (see *Theory of Moral Sentiments* 6.3.22-23; it is also considered and rejected by Sidgwick 1907/1981,
334-5). On this view, modest people evaluate themselves relative to an
ideal but evaluate others relative to practical norms. So modest people
rightly think of themselves as not very good (compared to an ideal like
a saint), and can rightly think of other people as being good (relative
to how good most people actually are). Having two scales allows the
modest person to make accurate assessments of themselves and others,
 albeit with regard to different evaluative standards. (See also
 asymmetry accounts
 below).




A third type of strong accuracy account requires accuracy about both
our own good qualities and how those qualities are received by others.
McMullin (2010) defends this type of account, requiring that the modest
person acknowledge both the legitimacy of public standards and that
one's worth is not fully defined by them. Though she also
 requires tendencies to foster the welfare of others (as in
 kindness accounts
 below), these are rooted in an
accurate understanding of oneself and one's place in the social
world.




Strong accuracy accounts, by explaining modesty and humility by
appeal to knowledge, not only deny that modesty requires ignorance or
false belief, but make modesty incompatible with it. 


### 2.3 Weak Accuracy




Weak accuracy accounts are typically motivated by the wish to deny
that moral virtues can require epistemic defects like ignorance or
false beliefs. They differ from strong accuracy accounts, however, in
that they strictly speaking allow that modesty or humility is
compatible with epistemic defects. For most defenders of these views,
however, the ideal case will be of moral virtue without any ignorance
or false belief.




Non-overestimation accounts deny that modesty or humility requires
underestimation and instead claim that all that is required is not
overestimating one's own good qualities. Flanagan (1990) defends
this kind of account for modesty and Richards (1988) for humility. This
kind of account allows that the modest or humble person can have
accurate self-knowledge. It also makes the virtue compatible with
ignorance since one way of not overestimating one's good
qualities is to underestimate them, though Flanagan claims that
"ideally" this will not happen (1990, 427).




Another type of weak accuracy account is the de-emphasis account.
Defended by Ridge (2000) this account makes modesty a matter of
de-emphasizing one's good qualities for the right reasons.
De-emphasizing here includes things like not going out of your way to
stress the significance of your good qualities. This kind of account
allows modesty to be compatible with accurate self-knowledge, though
de-emphasis is also compatible with inaccurate self-assessment too.




Finally, Raterman (2006) defends a reluctance account of modesty. On
this account a person is modest when they are reluctant to evaluate
themselves in terms of their good qualities. This allows the modest
person to have accurate self-knowledge as long as they are reluctant to
evaluate themselves through the lens of their good qualities. Though it
does not require ignorance, various inaccurate self-assessments are
compatible with being reluctant to self-evaluate in these ways. This
account has the benefit of providing a more nuanced view of when
self-ascriptions of modesty are self-undermining; Raterman points out
that his account allows that saying "I am modest" in a
quiet conversation with a close friend need not be self-undermining
(2006, 232).


## 3. Non-Doxastic Accounts




Non-doxastic accounts do not attempt to explain modesty or humility by
appeal to beliefs or belief-like states at all. For these accounts the
virtue may be compatible with ignorance or it may not
be--it's not about one's beliefs at all. There is a
wide range of such accounts and they see modesty or humility as being
rooted in very different kinds of states and relations.




How compatible these various views are is an interpretive issue.
Read as highlighting a key feature of modesty or humility, many do not
rule the others out; attention, proportion, and kindness can all be
critical features of modesty. They may also be read, and often are
intended, as describing the fundamental feature that explains all
others and in this sense they are genuine rivals that rule each other
out.


### 3.1 Proportion




Hurka (2001, 110-111) sees modesty and humility as virtues of
proportion. For him, attitudes should be proportionate to the absolute
goodness of their object. This involves a denial of an asymmetry that
some (Maes 2004) see as central to modesty; one's responses
should track absolute goodness regardless of whether the object is our
own good qualities or those of another. Though he acknowledges that
this will involve some cognitive states, what must be proportionate for
Hurka are positive responses like pleasure or enjoyment. This account
requires accuracy in the sense that one's responses must be
accurately proportioned to the goodness of the object, but not in the
sense that it requires accurate beliefs about one's own good
qualities.


### 3.2 Indifference




Many theorists have seen modesty as rooted in a special kind of
indifference. Typically this is an indifference to praise, the high
ranking relative to others, or positive evaluation by others. Schueler
(1997), for example, sees modesty as being indifferent to being
evaluated highly on the basis of one's good qualities. Though he
assumes that the modest person will have an accurate self-image, this
is not entailed by his account. A similar account is given by Arpaly
and Schroeder (2014, 245-250) who see being modest as not caring about
how you are ranked relative to others. Often, they note, this will have
ignorance as a side effect, but what is essential to modesty is a kind
of indifference.




Roberts and Wood (2003) give a similar account of humility, opposing
it to the vices of vanity and arrogance. For them, lacking vanity means
being unconcerned with the opinions of others and lacking arrogance
means being unconcerned with entitlements that come along with social
recognition of good qualities. Again, this is not doxastic but instead
discussed as a kind of emotional insensitivity (2003, 261).




Though not explicitly discussing modesty or humility, many Buddhist
thinkers defend virtues rooted in a similar kind of indifference. To
oppose pride or arrogance (Sanskrit *mana*), Buddhist
thinkers often advocate for a kind of equanimity that involves a kind
of indifference to external resentment and approval as it counteracts
forms of self-attachment that are thought to produce suffering. See
Buddhaghosa's *Path of Purification* IX.91, chapter seven
of Santideva's *Training Anthology*, and the
discussion in McRae (2013 and 2016, 101ff.).


### 3.3 Asymmetry




Asymmetry accounts explain modesty not in terms of particular
states, but in different norms governing self and other. Maes (2004)
emphasizes differences between what we can acceptably say or think
about ourselves and others. So, for example, saying "I deserve a
standing ovation" is very different from "She deserves a
standing ovation" (2004, 489). Utterances and thoughts about
ourselves have special norms that are different from those concerning
others.




This is in stark contrast with views that see modesty rooted in
attitudes that apply to everyone, like egalitarian accounts. Modesty on
this view is not about seeing some features of the world that apply to
everyone, but instead seeing how different norms apply to
self-references. What explains modesty's self-attribution
strangeness on this view is a more general difference in self-regarding
attitudes; Maes (2004, 490ff.) also discusses, for example, gift-giving
and receiving compliments in this way too.


### 3.4 Kindness




Many accounts see modesty or humility as a special type of
benevolence or kindness. On these views, it is a way of valuing and
promoting the wellbeing of others. These views make modesty not merely
a trait of an individual, but deeply social in nature. So Woodcock
(2008) sees modesty as about balancing one's own welfare with the
welfare of others. Wilson (2014) describes it as a type of kindness, a
sensitivity to the well-being of others when presenting our own good
qualities. Sinha (2012, 261) makes a similar claim about humility
describing "public humility" as not claiming credit out of
concern for the feelings of others.




In addition to making modesty or humility more strongly social in
nature, these accounts make modesty compatible with epistemic defects
but do not require them. One can exhibit the kindness and concern for
others these accounts associate with modesty regardless of the accuracy
of one's self-assessments.


### 3.5 Attention




Attention accounts of modesty see it as rooted in patterns of
motivated conscious attention. Bommarito (2013) argues that being
modest is a matter of motivated inattention to one's own good
qualities and attention to external factors that brought them about.
It's not that the modest person doesn't know about their
good qualities, it's that they don't think about them very
often. And when they do think about them, they tend to emphasize the
role of situational factors in bringing them about, emphasizing things
like having good teachers, supportive parents, or fortunate
circumstances. A similar proposal is hinted at by Hastings Rashdall
when he describes immodesty as "... habitual dwelling with
satisfaction upon one's own capacities or one's own
merits" (1907, 205).




Such habits of attention are compatible with, but do not require
ignorance. This view allows Bommarito (2013, 113) to highlight cases
where uttering the sentence "I am modest" does not seem
self-undermining as when others are publicly discussing one's
modesty and only an admission will allow the conversation to move on
to other topics. He later discusses modesty as an "inner
virtue" that can be involuntary and lack any outward behavioral
expression; see Bommarito (2018, 160-169).


### 3.6 Executive




Some have seen modesty as being essentially related to the execution
of other virtues. Statman (1992, 435) calls modesty a
"will-power" virtue and likens it to courage, self-control,
and patience. These virtues help one to overcome inclinations that are
contrary to virtue and so serve to help one overcome moral
obstacles.




Various philosophers have seen modesty as functioning as a brake on
certain bad tendencies. Iris Murdoch, for example, sees humility as a
brake on pride; see Milligan (2007) for a detailed discussion of
humility in Murdoch. Foley (2004) highlights a similar strand in
Aquinas, who describes modesty and humility as moderating desires for
personal excellence. Kant sometimes describes humility as moderation
not of our personal desires, but of our demands on others
(*Doctrine of Virtue* 6:462). While Sidgwick (1907/1981, 335)
describes the function of humility as, in part, repressing certain
emotions of self-admiration.




Um (forthcoming) sees modesty as an "executive
virtue"--one that, like courage, helps to promote the ends
of other virtues. Though on this account modesty itself has no
positive aim, he highlights that this does not mean that modesty has
merely a negative function; it is not merely a brake on inclinations,
but has a positive role of promoting the ends of other moral
virtues.


## 4. Epistemology




Modesty and humility concern how we relate to our own good
qualities. In an epistemic context, they concern how we relate to the
truth or rationality of our own beliefs rather than good qualities more
generally. Discussions of intellectual humility or modesty involve how
we relate to our own beliefs, views and judgements. Though sometimes
discussed in a purely epistemic context, these often blur the line
between moral and epistemic virtues, as in the case of
open-mindedness.


### 4.1 Anti-Expertise




 To be an
 anti-expert
 about a topic is to be reliably wrong about that topic. Egan and Elga
(2005) distinguish being unreliable, as when a compass does not point
north when facing north, from being anti-reliable, as when a compass
points south when facing north. They also give the example of
directions while driving: When someone is an anti-expert about
directions, whenever they think they should go left they should really
go right and whenever they think they should go right, they should
really go left.




Sorensen (1988) argues that one's own anti-expertise is a
blindspot; it is a true proposition that one cannot rationally accept.
He argues that one cannot rationally believe that their own beliefs are
false since the anti-expert's belief in something counts as
evidence against believing it. Egan and Elga (2005) also argue that one
cannot rationally believe oneself to be an anti-expert. So in the
driving case, they say that one should withhold belief about which way
to go.




But suppose that whenever the person withholds, it turns out they
should go left. In this case, withholding does not escape the problem.
Like modesty, there are special issues with self-ascription; one can
accept that others are anti-experts with no problems, but
self-ascription seems self-undermining. In this sense, it can be seen
as a limit on epistemic modesty--rationality prohibits one from
thinking that their own faculties are anti-reliable. So, in the more
difficult directions example, Sorensen (1987, 308ff.) claims one cannot
rationally believe that one is in such a situation. Gilbert (1971)
makes a similar claim in the moral domain, arguing that there are
rational limits on the self-ascription of moral vices.




Others have argued that it is possible to self-ascribe
anti-expertise. Conee (1987) does this by suggesting that one can
believe the premises of a valid argument but not its conclusion and
Richter (1990) claims that one can believe general claims without
believing particular instances of it. Bommarito (2010) highlights cases
where the most rational option for non-ideal agents is to self-ascribe
anti-expertise.


### 4.2 Disagreement




Anti-expertise highlights the limits of what attitudes we can take
 to our own epistemic states and faculties.
 Disagreement
 raises similar issues in a social context by considering how one should
respond to disagreement with others who have similar evidence and
faculties as you. For conciliation views, the disagreement itself is a
type of higher-order evidence that warrants you to be less confident in
your own position (see Christensen 2010). For steadfast views, such
disagreement should not alter your confidence in your own view (see
Kelly 2005 and 2010).




Like modesty, the epistemology of disagreement in part turns on
whether or not we have a special relationship with our own states aside
from more general agent-neutral considerations (see Christensen 2007,
335ff.). This affects how we should relate to our own beliefs and how
to respond when such beliefs conflict with those of others. This is
relevant to responding to rival philosophical views; see Barnett
(forthcoming).


### 4.3 Intellectual Humility




Intellectual humility concerns similar issues as modesty more
generally, but in the epistemic domain. Roberts and Wood (2003) defend
an account that roots intellectual humility in low concern for status
due to a high concern for epistemic goods. Like the indifference views
described in 3.2, on this view the intellectually humble person
doesn't care about the social status of intellectual activities
or the social status of believers.




Whitcomb et al. (2015) defend a "limitations-owning"
view. On this view the intellectually humble person attends to and owns
their own limitations. Rushing (2013) defends a similar view of
humility in a Confucian context arguing that it is about learning and
facing one's own limitations. These accounts tend to presume that
there is something special about our own limitations that warrant
special attitudes beyond concern for epistemic limitations more
generally.




Other views defend more doxastic accounts of intellectual humility,
making it about particular higher-order epistemic states and not about
general abilities or attitudes. Hazlett (2012) sees intellectual
humility as having proper beliefs about the status of first-order
beliefs and Church (2016) sees it as accurate tracking of the
non-culpable positive epistemic status of one's own
beliefs. 




These views treat intellectual humility as an epistemic virtue.
Dalmiya (2016, 115ff.), however, sees it as deeply linked with moral
virtue. Drawing on Indian philosophy and ethics of care, she sees
humility as both a disposition to embrace others as partners in
cognitive activity and an awareness of our own ignorance and
limitations. This makes intellectual humility strongly relational as it
involves not only a single person's beliefs and awareness but a
focus on the epistemic agency of others. This gives intellectual
humility both epistemic and moral aspects.


### 4.4 Open-Mindedness




Open-mindedness raises similar issues to modesty and humility in
that it involves taking a special attitude to oneself. Some deny this;
Hare (1985), for example, argues that open-mindedness is nothing more
than treating evidence in an impartial way. Others take it to be
strongly related to one's own epistemic position: Adler (2004)
sees it as a way of responding to counter-evidence to one's own
beliefs, Riggs (2010) sees it as a type of self-knowledge and
self-monitoring, and Baehr (2011) sees it as involving a detachment
from one's default point of view because one wants to get to the
truth.




Though it is often talked about as an epistemic view (see Zagzebski
1996), it is also discussed as a moral virtue too. Arpaly (2011) sees
it as a disposition to change our beliefs without being opinionated out
of moral concern. McRae (2016) also sees it as involving moral concern
but also a willingness to consider alternate self-narratives, linking
it with equanimity in the Buddhist tradition. This casts
open-mindedness as a freedom from certain mental habits involving the
self and its place in the world.


## 5. Conclusion




Modesty and humility touch on a variety of more general issues in
philosophy. It relates to moral issues about self and other: Whether
there are special moral requirements regarding our self-orientation and
if so, what underlies them?




It also touches on a variety of debates within virtue theory: What
kinds of self-attitudes enable the exercise of virtue? What features of
the self are salient to a virtuous person? What features make the
states associated with modesty and humility virtuous in the first
place?




Finally, it involves questions that arise at the intersection of
ethics and epistemology: Are there moral or rational limits on the
kinds of goodness or badness I can attribute to myself? Can moral
virtue be compatible with, or even require, epistemic failings? Careful
theorizing about the nature of modesty and humility helps to shape and
inform these larger questions in ethics and epistemology.