## 1. Life and Works



Nicolaus Taurellus (Oechslein) was born on November 26, 1547 in
Montbeliard/Mompelgard into the family of a poor city
clerk (for biographic information, see Baier 1728: 1-14; Bayle
1730: vol. 4, p. 327; Schmid 1860: 1-22). At the time, the city
was politically affiliated with the duchy of Wurttemberg, and
patronage by the Duke of Wurttemberg allowed Taurellus to study
philosophy at the University of Tubingen with the eminent
Aristotelian logician and natural philosopher Jacob Schegk (on the
intellectual scene in sixteenth-century Tubingen, see Methuen
1998; on Schegk, see Kusukawa 1999). After completing his master of arts in philosophy (1565), he began
to study theology but soon moved on to medicine and completed his
medical doctorate at the University of Basel (1570). In 1573, he
published his first and most comprehensive work in metaphysics,
*The Triumph of Philosophy* (PT), which pursued the plan to
provide a unified account of philosophical and theological truth and
thereby to offer a philosophical defense of the doctrine of creation
(PT: 220-222, 250-252; for overviews of Taurellus's
metaphysics, see Petersen 1921: 219-258; Mayer 1959; Leinsle
1985: 147-165; Wollgast 1988: 148-153). In spite of its
pious intention, and although it appeared with one of Europe's
leading academic publishers of the time, the Henricpetri press, the
work was perceived as a provocation and, career-wise, initially turned
out to be a failure.



After several difficult years, Taurellus took up a professorship in
ethics at the University of Basel in 1579, and in 1580 he accepted a
professorship in natural philosophy and medicine at the University of
Altdorf, the university of the city of Nuremberg (on his activity at
Altdorf, see Mayer 1960). In accordance with his teaching duties, he
published a massive volume on medical prognostics (Taurellus 1581) and
an annotated edition of the works of the thirteenth-century physician
Arnaldus of Villanova (Arnaldus of Villanova 1585). He returned to
philosophy in 1586 with a critical commentary (VML) on
Aristotle's *On Life and Death*. In 1596 he published a
short overview and evaluation of Aristotelian metaphysics, followed in
the next year by a 1000-page response to the Averroistic philosophy of
Andrea Cesalpino (1524/25-1603), whose work became influential
at the University of Altdorf (see Mulsow 2004: 7-9). In a group
of three last monographic works, *Cosmology* (1603 [KOS]),
*Uranology* (1603) and *On the Eternity of Things* (1604
[DRA]), Taurellus gives detailed responses to central themes of late
scholastic cosmology, especially as developed by the Paduan
philosopher Francesco Piccolomini (1520-1604). Also a 1604
dissertation, *On the Origin of Rational Souls* (TRA), is
marked by its preface and references to earlier metaphysical works as
a text authored by Taurellus (which corresponds to academic practice
in early modern Germany). Apart from his scholarly publications, he
produced two volumes of poetry (Taurellus 1592, 1595), one of which is
regarded as a significant contribution to early modern emblematics
(see Homann 1971: 105-122). On September 28, 1606 Taurellus
succumbed to the plague at the age of 58.


## 2. Immaterialism and the Compositional Structure of the World



In his *Triumph of Philosophy*, Taurellus accepts the
traditional claim that the elements (earth, water, air, fire) are the
basic constituents of the natural world. However, he develops an
intricate argument for denying the received view that prime matter
enters into the constitution of elements (see Blank 2014). Thereby, he
offers a reinterpretation of the nature of the elements. The argument
starts with a consideration of the motivation for introducing the
notions of form and prime matter. As he describes it, the motivation
arises out of the view that in natural things there are contrary
properties: active properties such as the capacity of bringing forth
changes in other things, and passive properties such as the capacity
of undergoing change through the agency of other things. If these
properties are understood as contrary, then they seem to require two
different origins. For this reason, the active properties of natural
things were seen as requiring the existence of forms, while the
passive properties of natural things were seen as requiring the
existence of primary matter (PT: 202).



However, Taurellus challenges the assumption that active and passive
properties of natural things should be regarded as contraries. This is
why: "Nothing takes on its contrary but rather cedes when the
contrary comes; but passivity increases with the increase of
activity" (PT: 284). Hence, his argument against the contrary
nature of active and passive properties is that an increase of passive
power is compatible with an increase of active power. But if activity
and passivity are not contraries, "they are present in the same
subject and proceed from the same cause" (PT: 292). At the same
time, Taurellus holds on to the assumption that the active properties
of things have to be explained by the existence of an active
principle. This is why he does not eliminate the notion of form from
his ontology. On the contrary, because active and passive properties
are not contraries, he believes that they proceed from forms alone:




> 
> 
> We say that a thing is active and passive with respect to the same
> form; but in such a way that action is its proper effect, while the
> other does not arise from matter conjoined with it but from an
> externally existing contrary principle. (PT: 294)
> 
> 
> 



Regarding forms as the unique kind of origin of the active and passive
properties of natural things also leads to a reinterpretation of the
compositional structure of the world. In Taurellus's view, forms
are the only beings underlying the compositional structure of the
world: "Matter plainly does not exist, and nothing but forms can
be and can enter composition" (PT, 280). Accordingly,
"mixture or composition is ... a mere conjunction of forms
that in no way changes them" (PT: 276). At the same time,
understanding composition in this way implies that no substantial form
can be understood as a composition of other forms (PT: 274). Rather,
every composition is accidental (PT). This is why Taurellus formulates
the provocative claim that a human being does not possess substantial
unity but rather is an aggregate of a plurality of forms (PT:
110).



Taurellus continues to use the term "matter". Obviously,
however, his immaterialism about the basic constituents of the natural
world leads to a reinterpretation of the meaning of the term. One of
the reinterpretations that he offers derives from his view that
complex natural beings contain a plurality of hierarchically ordered
substantial forms. His reinterpretation of matter in terms of
subordinate forms allows Taurellus to continue to talk about bodies
(*corpora*) and corporeal beings (*entia corporalia*)
(PT: 160-162; 182; 352-354; 552-554). As he puts it,
"if it is not understood as a less noble form, ... matter
does absolutely not compose anything" (PT: 278). Thus, there is
a sense in which one can talk about matter in which one uses a
traditional connotation of the notion of matter, namely, that it is
something less noble that underlies something nobler (PT: 296). Thus,
even if the idea that prime matter underlies form is given up, the
structure of something less noble underlying something nobler can be
upheld. More specifically, less noble forms can be understood as the
subjects of nobler forms. In Taurellus's view, things receive
the character of subjects 



> 
> 
> for the same reason that makes that they are less noble, such that
> forms that are within nothing else but serve as subjects for something
> else are the most ignoble, but those that do not serve as subjects for
> anything else but are within something else are nobler. (PT: 330)
> 
> 
> 



As Taurellus explains, a form is nobler than other forms if it is more
prone to cause changes in other forms, and form is less noble than
other forms if it is more prone to receive the effect of the
activities of other forms. Passive changes of forms thus are seen as a
result of the contingent activity of other forms together with the
internal constitution of the forms that have undergone change (PT:
298). In this sense, in Taurellus's view the subordination
relation between substantial forms reduces to relations of efficient
causation between substantial forms. Consequently, Taurellus regards
the activities of substantial forms as the origin of all of the forces
found in the natural world: 



> 
> 
> Nature is the unique principle of corporeal things and consists in a
> single substance, not in two or three substances. This substance seems
> to be manifold because it expresses itself in various forces. (PT:
> 376)
> 
> 
> 



There is still another sense in which the notion of matter retains a
function in Taurellus's metaphysics. This becomes clear when
Taurellus suggests a metaphorical usage of the notion of prime matter.
As he puts it, with respect to God prime matter is "the
NOTHING" (in capital letters) out of which God creates the world
(PT). The connection that Taurellus establishes between the notion of
prime matter and the notion of nothing strongly differs from the use
of the term "nothing" that often designates matter in the
Neoplatonic tradition (see Bovillus 1510: fol. 63v-64r).
Taurellus denies that prime matter is a constituent of created beings
and holds that immaterial forms have active and passive
characteristics of their own. His point is not that matter, due to its
lack of determination, is "close to" nothing, nor that
matter is undetermined except for its three-dimensional
characteristics. Rather, when he calls prime matter
"nothing" he has in mind a strict identity statement. This
is why it is a suitable metaphor for what is there before the divine
act of creation, namely, no created being. Prime matter in this
metaphorical sense is absolute non-being.


## 3. Substantiality and Ontological Dependence



Taurellus's immaterialism about the basic constituents of the
natural world derives from considerations concerning the
substantiality of created beings. Taurellus maintains that creatures,
in one sense, are not separated from God and that, in another sense,
they are separated from God. As to the first sense, he argues that
"since an infinite substance fills out everything, nothing can
be separated from it". As to the second sense, we differ
numerically from God "not with a view to God's being in us
and our being in him but in the respect that we differ due to our
substance" (PT: 412). Hence, God is characterized as a being
that extends throughout the whole of space. And this means that no
creature can be spatially separated from God. The only sense in which
creatures can be understood to be separated from God thus must have to
do with the nature of their substance. And to differ from God with
respect to substance presupposes that creatures are substances. This
is why establishing the sense in which creatures can be understood to
be substances is central for Taurellus's project.



Taurellus considers the alternative hypothesis that natural beings are
conjoined with their cause in such a way that if their essences would
not be sustained by their cause they could not persist. However, he
objects that this hypothesis would lead to a kind of substance monism
according to which the world would be an accident of the divine
substance: 



> 
> 
> If the world is not separated by its substance from God but always
> exists conjoined with him and in the same way will persist to
> eternity, it does not subsist in itself ... But it will be an
> accident of God that can neither be separated from him nor persist
> separately. (PT: 428) 
> 
> 
> 



In Taurellus's view, the world cannot be an accident of the
divine substance both due to the nature of God and due to the nature
of natural things. As to the nature of God, Taurellus argues that
regarding the world as a divine accident has the absurd consequence
that one would have to ascribe to God finite accidents: 



> 
> 
> The absurdity cannot be avoided that an infinite substance will be
> defined by finite accidents, for the nature of accidents consists in
> limiting substances or to define them is some other way. (PT: 430)
> 
> 
> 
> 



In particular, 



> 
> 
> it would follow ... that we are the perfection of the substance
> of God because actions perfect the substance from which they proceed
> (PT: 492) 
> 
> 
> 



Taurellus argues that this cannot be right because, due to his
infinity, God cannot be said to have accidents at all: 



> 
> 
> Because God exists infinitely with respect to substance, he does not
> receive anything through which he could be defined, which is the
> reason why accidents are as foreign to him as possible since they
> limit or define substances. (PT: 454)
> 
> 
> 



Taurellus's view that forms are the only beings that underlie
the compositional structure of the world contributes to explicating a
sense in which the world differs by its substance from God. Taurellus
points out that there is a close connection between his criticism of
the theory of prime matter and his theological aim of defending the
doctrine of creation. This connection has to do with a consequence
that, in his view, follows from the theory of prime matter, namely,
that prime matter is an accidental being. As he remarks, the
Aristotelian principles "want matter which is nothing by itself
to be something accidentally. For if this is true, it will be an
accident, not a substance" (PT: 240). As Taurellus argues,
something analogous holds for the conception of form in the
hylomorphic tradition: 



> 
> 
> The natural philosophers have stated that natural forms cannot subsist
> without a subject; if this were admitted, they would not be substances
> but accidents, because substances are not in something or from
> something but subsist through their own force, while one says of
> accidents that they do not subsist but rather are in something. (PT:
> 318)
> 
> 
> 



What is more, Taurellus does not think that a conception of matter and
form as accidental beings could be given a consistent formulation. As
he argues, a theory of mutual existential dependence between primary
matter and form leads to the absurd consequence 



> 
> 
> that the effect is in this case its own cause. For what gives essence
> to something else is a cause, a form that cannot subsist without
> matter is its effect; and conversely because matter is absolutely
> nothing without form, its subsistence depends on its own effect. (PT:
> 320) 
> 
> 
> 



A theory of immaterial forms is exactly what yields an analysis of the
substantiality of elements. This is so because, once the assumption
that form depends existentially on prime matter is given up, there is
no need to regard form as an accidental being: 



> 
> 
> Tell me, does nature subsist by itself or does it subsist in something
> other? If you say that nothing underlies it, why shouldn't one
> be allowed to ascribe the same to form, such that it is nature and
> subsists without matter? (PT: 376) 
> 
> 
> 



Taurellus's immaterialism about the basic constituents of the
compositional structure of reality thus explicates a sense in which
these basic constituents are substances.



The ensuing view of the relation between God and creatures accepts
creation dependence of creatures on God but denies the dependence of
creatures' continued subsistence on God. Taurellus gives the
following characterization of physical change: 



> 
> 
> Nothing happens accidentally if not something that is in itself is
> presupposed. The natural philosophers propose this as an axiom, that
> something active does not have any effect unless the subject on which
> this action is directed possesses the disposition to receive this
> activity. (PT: 266-268) 
> 
> 
> 



Thus, in Taurellus's view natural things possess are active
potencies that bring forth changes in other natural things and passive
potencies that make them capable of undergoing changes through the
agency of other natural things. These natural changes are determined
by natural active and passive potencies of immaterial forms, but these
natural potencies cannot bring about any kind of change for which
immaterial forms do not have a disposition.



This is why these changes do not carry with them any threat to the
subsistence of the world: 



> 
> 
> Because the world is substance and because one says that something is
> changed naturally when it is changed in a direction for which it has
> some disposition in it, it follows that if the world does not decay in
> this way, it does not carry any potency [for decay] in itself. (PT:
> 498) 
> 
> 
> 



In this sense, the existence of natural things is due to a divine act
of creation but the subsistence of these natural things does not
require any continuous divine concurrence: "Things ... have
received substance from him, but they do not continue to receive
it" (PT: 492). This is the crucial point that Taurellus's
rejection of prime matter is meant to make. Only if the subsistence of
the forms that underlie the compositional structure of the world as
well as their active and passive potencies does not depend on
continued divine agency can the hypothesis that the world is an
eternal accident of the divine substance be refuted.


## 4. Living Beings and the Origin of Souls



Still, using the notion of form in this way to characterize the
substantiality of the ultimate constituents of reality still leaves
much to be explicated with respect to the origin of living beings.
Taurellus considers a creation theory of the origin of human souls
(PT: 144), but he also voices doubt concerning such a theory. In
particular, he cautions that an act of divine creation would render
the imperfection of human souls inexplicable (PT: 166). Therefore, he
offers an integrated naturalistic account of the origin of the souls
of non-human animals and humans.



Here, the connection between Taurellus and his teacher Jacob Schegk
becomes relevant. Schegk maintains that both inanimate forms and
animate forms depend on the mixture of elements. As he points out,
such a conception of the origin of animate forms has the consequence
that "an animate form also is a physical form ..."
(PT). In fact, such a view of the origin of souls is found in
Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. ca. 200 CE), upon whose work Schegk has
commented extensively. According to Alexander, the soul 



> 
> 
> is a power and form, which supervenes through such a mixture upon the
> temperament of bodies; and it is not a proportion or a composition of
> the temperament. (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1568: 78, 2008: 104) 
> 
> 
> 



As Victor Caston has argued, talk about supervenience should here be
taken in the technical sense of a co-variation of mental states with
bodily states (Caston 1997: 348-349). Moreover, Caston
emphasizes that, for Alexander, the soul possesses causal powers that
are more than the aggregates of the causal powers of the elements
(1997: 349-350). In the sense that Alexander ascribes distinct
new powers to souls as well as to the forms of non-animate composites
such as chemical blends, Caston characterizes Alexander as one of the
ancient thinkers who were committed to emergentism (1997).



Taurellus adopts a similar line of argument. He holds that 



> 
> 
> when by mutual action and passion mixed things are changed in such a
> way that none of them remains entirely the same, but some new form
> arises out of it that related to the forces of all of them, without
> doubt there exist mixed forms that have the forces of many, bring
> about different effects, which is most evident in the changes of
> things and especially in the use of medicaments. (PT: 272) 
> 
> 
> 



Also, he is clear that what arises in genuine mixture is not only a
composition of simple compounds but also a simple form. In his view,
this form is simple "because it is not composed but rather
generated" (PT: 42). Consequently, it cannot undergo a process
of being split up, although it can perish when the basis from which it
emerges is changed (PT). This is why the simplicity and immateriality
of emergent forms is compatible with their capability of being
destroyed (PT: 44; 276). 



This conception of the emergence of new forms is what underlies
Taurellus's analysis of the structure of plants and animals. He
ascribes soul and life only to the latter since only they possess
sense and self-motion (PT: 350), but this should not obscure the
fundamental analogy between the emergence of forms in plant and the
emergence of forms in animals. In his view, what possesses life in the
proper sense are higher kinds of forms--the souls of animals
(PT). The organic body of an animal, constituted by a plurality of
less noble substantial forms, possesses life only in a derivative
sense, since it possesses active and passive properties that derive
from the active and passive properties of the animal soul (PT: 352).
But even if he follows the Galenic tradition in denying life to plants
(VML: sig. B3r), he ascribes to each plant a substantial form that
accounts for some of the activities of the organic plant
body--activity that cannot be explained by the temperament of
elementary qualities (VML: sig. G3r). Something analogous holds for
plant seeds and animal seeds: They do not possess a soul but a natural
form that is capable of generating plants and animals (VML: sig. B5r;
TRA: 11). As Taurellus argues, it is necessary to postulate the
existence of such natural forms because not all kinds of attraction
relevant for operation of plants and seeds can be explained by the
agency of elementary heat (VML: sig. B5v). Thus, even plant forms and
seed forms possess new causal potencies that go beyond the causal
potencies of the elements that function as the matter of the emerging
form.



As Taurellus characterizes it, there is a circle of causation between
the emergent form and the elements from which it emerges: The life of
the soul is communicated to the body (VML: sig. Gr), but the life of
the souls is also perfected by actions that it can only carry out by
means of the body (VML: sig. Gv). Consequently, the soul perfects the
body and the body perfects the soul (VML: sig. G2r). Astonishingly,
Taurellus applies such a conception of the mutual dependence between
forms and organic bodies even to the case of humans. As he claims,
"the human soul by itself is capable of ceasing to be"
(VML: sig. F4v). Thus, they have in common with the soul of brutes
that "they necessarily have their essence and life in a
body" (VML: sig. G4r; see TRA: 11). Taurellus does not challenge
the theological idea of immortality but concludes that if human beings
are immortal, the relevant supernatural divine agency responsible for
resurrection must relate to soul and body alike (TRA: 26).


## 5. The Problem of Substance Monism Revisited



Taurellus returns to the problem of substance monism in his extended
critical response to Cesalpino (see Muratori 2014; Blank 2015:
194-199). Taurellus makes clear that one of his main targets of
criticism is Cesalpino's conception of God. As Taurellus points
out, in a crucial respect Cesalpino goes beyond Averroes: 



> 
> 
> What [Averroes] said about the assisting intellect, Cesalpino extends
> to the souls of humans and of the other animals, and of the entire
> world, for he asserts a single soul that exists by itself and is
> multiplied according to the bodies of living beings. And through
> participating in it, the bodies are animated and substances. (AC: 25)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Taurellus is clear that such a conception implies that God is not
separated from matter and also not an efficient cause of things;
rather, God is understood as a constituent cause (AC: 25-26).
What is more, Cesalpino's conception of God seems to imply
substance monism not only with respect to all animate beings but also
with respect to the world as a whole.



Substance monism seems to be an implication of a combination of views
held by Cesalpino: (1) the view that the active intellect is a
substance that is capable of self-reflection; (2) the view that the
active intellect "perfects everything"; and (3) the view
that the active intellect "implants into things a striving for
perfection insofar as it is intellection" (Cesalpino 1593: fol.
35v). Thus, the substantiality of the active intellect is
characterized as being due to its capability of self-reflection, and
it is this specific activity that is understood as the origin of the
activity of natural things, not only of minds. Consequently, Cesalpino
maintains that the plurality of substances cannot be based on
considerations concerning human self-reflection. His argument invokes
the possibility of a temporary split in the self-consciousness of the
active intellect--the possibility that during the life-time of a
living being the part of the active intellect that animates this
living being undergoes a stream of acts of self-reflection that are
isolated from the stream of acts of self-reflection that other parts
of the active intellect undergo at the same time. If so, individual
minds would be "included in a unique intelligence as parts are
contained in a whole or as a smaller number is contained in a larger
number" (Cesalpino 1593: fol. 36r).



One of the most interesting criticisms that Taurellus levels against
Cesalpino concerns exactly this issue. As Taurellus argues, the claim
that reflexive acts are due to parts of the active intellect could be
construed in two ways. The first way would be to understand the
relation between the activities of the parts of the active intellect
and the activities of the active intellect as a whole as analogous to
the relation between the activities of the parts of a stone in motion
and the activity of the whole stone in motion. Here, the activities of
the parts of the moving stone are of the same kind as the activities
of the moving stone as a whole: self-motion with the same direction
and speed. If this were the relevant analogy, Taurellus argues, the
activities of the parts of the active intellect would be of the same
nature as the activities of the active intellect as a whole (AC:
270-271). Evidently, this is contrary to the assumption that
Cesalpino makes, namely, that one part of the active intellect does
not have reflexive access to the activities of any other part of the
active intellect.



By contrast, the second way of understanding the relation between the
parts of the active intellect and the active intellect as a whole
would be to use the analogy of the relation between the parts of a
clock and the clock as a whole. Here, we have in fact different kinds
of activities. But, as Taurellus argues, the difference between the
activities of the parts of a clock is exactly what justifies regarding
these parts as separate entities of a different kind. Analogously,
what speaks in favor of regarding human minds as separate substances
is not just the fact that reflexive acts occur but also that the
content of one series of reflexive acts is not accessible from the
perspective of another series of reflexive acts (AC: 271). The
cognitive inaccessibility of one series of reflexive acts from the
perspective of another series of reflexive acts would thus be
inexplicable when one assumes, as Cesalpino does, that these acts
derive from a unique intelligence. This is why Taurellus believes that
the structure of reflexive acts speaks in favor of the existence of a
plurality of active substances.


## 6. Emanative Causation and the Problem of the Eternity of the World



Taurellus's conception of a separation between God and creatures
with respect to substance is challenged not only by Cesalpino's
version of a theory of a unique intellect but also by theories of
emanation prominent in early modern Platonism. This is why in
*Cosmology* (1603 [KOS]) and *On the Eternity of Things*
(1604 [DRA]) Taurellus discusses Piccolomini's views on
emanative causation (see Blank 2009). Like Taurellus, Piccolomini
raises numerous objections against thinking about the relation between
God and the world in terms of emanative causation. However, Taurellus
criticizes Piccolomini on two levels: he thinks that many of
Piccolomini's arguments are flawed in matters of detail and,
hence, do not lend support to the desired conclusion; and he
reproaches Piccolomini for conceding too much to the
Platonists--such as the view that elementary forces derive from
the agency of a Platonic world soul. No doubt, Taurellus's books
were highly informative for his contemporaries in that they show how a
theory of emanative causation might work. However, understanding the
relation between God and the world as an emanation relation turns out
to be incompatible with his own view of the subsistence independence
of elements.



In Taurellus's view, several arguments provide reasons against
understanding subsistence dependence of created beings in terms of
formal emanation. Taurellus holds that elements possess forms and
forces that are independent of any continued divine agency. That he
ascribes formal properties to elements that are independent of a
continuous conserving activity of God becomes clear, where he
discusses Piccolomini's claim that every part of the world
depends on God (Piccolomini 1596b: bk. II, ch. 2). Taurellus points
out that Piccolomini derives this claim from Marsilio Ficino, who held
that corporeal mass cannot exist on its own since otherwise it would
form itself (see Ficino 2001-2006: vol. 1, 18-27). As
Ficino and Piccolomini argue, conveying form onto a corporeal
substance is not a property of body since all active beings act by
means of some incorporeal faculty.



Ficino and Piccolomini conclude that the world depends in all its
parts on an incorporeal principle of agency in such a way that, since
it depends always on this principle, it can be said to be created
continually (DRA: 448-449). Taurellus agrees that bodily mass
cannot convey form onto itself. However, he does not believe that
bodily mass, once it is formed, requires any *external* active
principle to preserve its form (DRA: 449). Likewise, he holds that
elements have their own forces--forces that are derived from the
elements, not from any being external to them. In his view, the
heavens not only do not have the force to convey form to elements,
they are also unnecessary to explain the forces that elements possess.
Taurellus takes issue with Piccolomini's claim that God imparts
forces on things in the world by means of a Platonic world soul (see
Piccolomini 1596a: ch. 30). Contrary to Piccolomini, Taurellus holds
that in addition to general forces that influence all bodies on earth
in a uniform way, there are specific forces that belong to the
elements (DRA: 275).



Taurellus develops some further considerations against understanding
subsistence dependence in terms of the emanation of the essences of
natural beings from the essence of God. Suppose that the heavens are
preserved by means of continuous creation or by means of a perpetual
efflux of divine essence. In this case, Taurellus argues,
Heraclitus' view of the perpetual flux of all things would be
confirmed since nothing would remain intact beyond the duration of a
moment. If emanation is thought of as a "flow" of essence,
as much essence as is conveyed to a particular object at a given
moment has to be previously withdrawn from its source (KOS:
235-236). In this way, emanation of essence implies the constant
change both of created things and their source. Taurellus argues that
such a conception of the mutability of all created things is contrary
to the Aristotelian conception of the regular and stable motions of
the stars--motions which become inexplicable once one assumes
that stars are unstable and momentary objects. The same holds,
according to him, for the fixed and stable figure of stars (KOS:
236).



Taurellus discusses two ways in which something "flows"
from one being to another: the "flowing" of substance, and
the "flowing" of accidents (KOS: 238). According to the
late scholastic concepts of accident and substance shared by Taurellus
(see, e.g., AC: 48-49), accidents are entities that inhere in
another being, while substances are entities that do not inhere in
another being. If a new accident of a substance is produced by this
substance, we have an instance of immanent causation: a causal
relation within one and the same being. If a substance produces a new
accident, one could plausibly assume that such a causal relation does
not diminish the substance from which the new accident arises, because
it is an effect that inheres in it. Taurellus holds that this is the
only conceivable conception of how something can to be said
"in" God: divine attributes "complete" the
divine essence (DRA: 458). But he maintains that such a conception of
the "flowing" of accidents is of no help when it comes to
analyze the relation between God and natural beings. As he argues, due
to the self-sufficiency of elements, elements are the true subjects of
inherence of their accidents. Hence, they belong to the category of
substance, not to the category of accidents. Therefore, also a world
composed of elements does not belong to the category of accidents
(KOS: 62-63). Consequently, a world composed of elements cannot
inhere in the divine substance (KOS: 238; DRA: 459).


## 7. Aftermath



Although Taurellus's publications in metaphysics can be read as
a sustained philosophical defense of the Christian doctrine of
creation, his work triggered polemical opposition from orthodox
Lutheran theologians (see Feuerlein 1734). Apart from blatantly
misguided but highly derogatory allegations of atheism, some of his
contemporaries saw a connection between Taurellus's views and
the views of two other controversial thinkers. One of them is the
atomistic natural philosopher David Gorlaeus (1591-1612), the
other is the Arminian theologian Conrad Vorstius (1569-1622)
(Luthy 2001: 278-286, Luthy 2012: 122-129, and
Luthy 2018).



The connection between Taurellus and Gorlaeus seems to be particularly
direct because Gorlaeus develops a long series of arguments in support
of the claim that a human being is "one being by aggregation,
not by essence" (Gorlaeus 1620: 222-234; on Gorlaeaus, see
Lasswitz 1890: vol. 1, pp. 455-463; Gregory 1966: 46-51;
Luthy 2012). Moreover, to spell out the implications of such a
view of composites Gorlaeus presents a fully developed theory of
material atoms, according to which nature is constituted by minimal,
quantitative, indivisible, and corporeal particles interspersed with
small regions of vacuum (Gorlaeus 1620: 239-243). The close
connection between the endorsement of the existence of material atoms
and the denial of the existence of composite unities in Gorlaeus made
it tempting for Taurellus's contemporaries to conjecture that
such a close connection could be found also in Taurellus (see Voetius
1643: 28). However, a close look into Taurellus's account of
elements (see above
 section 2)
 shows that the unities that produce beings "by
aggregation" are not to be understood in analogy to material
atoms. The supposed closeness between the views of Taurellus and
Gorlaeus thus rests on a misinterpretation of the ontology of the
*Triumph of Philosophy*.



In critical responses to Vorstius, Taurellus has also been charged
with having been the author of the view that God is a limited
quantitative being--a view that his critics also ascribed to
Vorstius ([Anonymous] 1611: 8-9; Vorstius 1611: 22-23; see
Shriver 1970). As to the view that Vorstius's critics ascribed
both to Vorstius and to Taurellus (the view that God is a
*quantum* that is limited and possesses accidents), it turns
out, that such a reading does not adequately represent either
Vorstius's or Taurellus's views concerning divine
extension. Vorstius holds that God is infinite not only with respect
to duration and potency but also with respect to omnipresence
(Vorstius 1610: 221). Because God is omnipresent, there is a
quantitative aspect to his nature; however, Vorstius is clear that




> 
> 
> this does not relate to physical or corporeal and sensible quantity
> but has to be understood with respect to the true and by no means
> fictional but evidently for us imperceptible and spiritual magnitude
> of God. (Vorstius 1611: 2) 
> 
> 
> 



Also, Vorstius emphasizes that he 



> 
> 
> never claimed that God is finite unless perhaps in the sense that God
> is a definite being, that is, a determinate being on its own that is
> distinct from other beings. (1611: 2-3) 
> 
> 
> 



Accordingly, when Vorstius talks of the "place" of God, he
does not mean any physical place in the Aristotelian sense--a
place defined by the boundaries of other bodies--but rather
wishes to express the view that God extends throughout the whole of
space (1611: 3).



On first sight, the views of Vorstius may seem to differ from
Taurellus's conception of divine infinity, because
Taurellus's conception seems to involve a sense in which God is
a material being. Consider the following passage: 



> 
> 
> We say that God is almighty both in the sense that he has an infinite
> potency due to his substance, and in the sense that he also has
> infinite matter due to his essential characteristics, that is, one
> that in no way hinders the agent through any potency of acting. (PT:
> 484) 
> 
> 
> 



However, although infinite matter, in a certain sense, seems to be
included among the essential characteristics of God, Taurellus here
gives an explication that clearly marks talk of "infinite
matter" as metaphorical. "Infinite matter" as a
metaphor for the infinite divine potencies indicates that there are no
further potencies that could function as an external impediment to
divine agency. Such a metaphorical usage of the notion of infinite
matter evidently does not imply that God has material (and, hence,
limited) properties.



Taurellus thus cannot be understood as an atheist, an atomist, or a
proponent of a theory of a material God. Nevertheless, the opposition
that Taurellus met during his lifetime was highly successful in
raising suspicions in the minds of his contemporaries, and there are
virtually no references to his thought in subsequent publications by
Protestant metaphysicians (on Taurellus's immediate successors,
see Sparn 1976). However, his work was by no means forgotten. It is
documented that Jacob Thomasius (1622-1684), one of
Leibniz's academic teachers, owned most of Taurellus's
books (Schmid 1860: 19). Leibniz himself gave to Taurellus the epithet
of "the Scaliger of the Germans" (Feller 1718:
142)--no small compliment given the fact that the young Leibniz
regarded Julius Caesar Scaliger as one of his models for an eclectic,
conciliatory approach to philosophy (Leibniz 1923-: II, 1, p.
90).



Although there are only some very few explicit references to Taurellus
in Leibniz's writings, the nineteenth-century German philosopher
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) has suggested that the similarities
between Taurellus and Leibniz may run much deeper than one would
expect. Feuerbach's suggestion is based on two considerations:
(1) Taurellus's view of the active powers of the human mind
bears similarities to Leibniz's conception of the inherently
active nature of human cognition; and (2) Taurellus's defense of
substance pluralism and creation theory against Cesalpino bears
similarities to Leibniz's defense of substance pluralism and
creation theory against Spinoza (Feuerbach 1981: 192-193). If
one adds to Feuerbach's observations the similarities between
Taurellus's conception of immaterial form-like unities as the
ultimate constituents of reality and Leibniz's conception of
immaterial, simple substances as grounding the physical world, then
Taurellus may emerge as the thinker who, within the context of
Protestant metaphysics, came closest to anticipating central elements
of Leibniz's metaphysics.