## 1. Introduction



The etymology of perception in Sanskrit underlines a major and,
perhaps the most controversial, issue in classical Indian
epistemology, viz. is the sensory core *all* there is to the
content of a perceptual experience? Put differently, it is asked
whether the *content* of a perceptual experience is restricted
to being unconceptualized (*nirvikalpaka*), or can any part of
it be conceptualized (*savikalpaka*) as well? The
Naiyayikas generally take perception to be a two-staged process:
first there arises a non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) perception
of the object and then a conceptual (*savikalpaka*) perception,
both being valid cognitions. For Buddhists, non-conceptual perceptions
alone are valid, while Grammarians (Sabdikas) deny their
validity altogether. Samkhya and
Mimamsa agree with the Nyaya position. These
two realist schools, Nyaya and Mimamsa,
contest the Grammarian as well as the Buddhist positions. Advaita
Vedanta position on perception seems to agree, in spirit, with
the Buddhists, but their reasons for supporting non-conceptual
perceptions alone as ultimately valid (*paramarthika
satta*) are very different. This debate, on the role of concepts
in perception, is discussed in detail in section 3.



Yet another debate about the nature of universals and concepts looms
in the background of this debate. How do we know universals or
concepts? The Buddhist introduce the doctrine of apoha to provide the
resources for constructing concepts from sensory content to further
the nominalist project of explaining thought and language in a world
of particulars. In response to Buddhist nominalism, Nyaya
philosophers present a defense of realism in the course of which they
argue for a theory of real perceivable universals. This debate will be
the focus of secion 4.



A very critical question germane to these epistemological issues is
raised by the Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu (c. 4th century CE): how
do we distinguish veridical perceptions from the non-veridical ones?
This is taken up in the last section.



Before we start out with the definitions, the following observation
may be noted. It is true that the classical Indian philosophers were
seriously concerned with the notions of enlightenment, the highest
good, freedom from the cycle of rebirth and the attainment of ultimate
bliss, etc. Therefore, some even question whether they were concerned
with any epistemological questions at all, much less the ones raised
here? But they were! For Naiyayikas, in particular, this was a
major focus: the reason offered in the early Nyaya tradition, in
Vatsyayana's (c. 450-500 CE) commentary on the
*Nyaya-sutra*, is that without knowledge of objects
there is no success in practical response to them. Not very
enlightening, perhaps. However, a much sharper justification comes
from Gangesa (c. 12th century CE), the founder of the
Navya-Nyaya school, in the introduction to his great work,
*Jewel Of Reflection On The Truth*
*(Tattvacintamani*):



> 
> In order that discerning persons may have interest in studying the
> work, Aksapada Gautama (c. 2nd century CE) laid down the
> *sutra*: 'Attainment of the highest good comes from
> right knowledge.'.
> 



It should not then be surprising that one of the most sophisticated
classical Indian treatises dealing with perception,
Kumarila's (c. 7th century CE)
*Pratyaksapariccheda* (a portion of
*Slokavarttika* pertaining to the fourth
*sutra* of
*Mimamsa-sutra*), discusses the
nature and validity of perception without any consideration of its
role in the ascertainment of religious and moral truth; in fact, the
*Mimamsa-sutra* itself characterizes
perception as not being a *means* of knowing righteousness
(*Dharma*). It is true that epistemological debates in
classical Indian philosophy arose in the religio-philosophical
context; however, there is plenty of evidence on record to show that
classical Indian philosophers were haunted by the very same
epistemological concerns that have troubled the minds of Western
philosophers through the ages. The controversial classical Indian
epistemology issue--whether perception is conceptualized or
not?--continues to be debated in the Western and Indian
philosophy journals even today. That said, what makes this historical
inquiry significant is that the epistemological issues in classical
Indian philosophy are introduced against the backdrop of radically
different metaphysical and ethical presuppositions.


## 2. Perspectives on Perception



Most classical Indian philosophical schools accept perception as the
primary means of knowledge, but differ on the nature, kinds and
objects of perceptual knowledge. Here we first survey Buddhist and
orthodox Hindu schools' definitions of perception (excluding
Vaisesika and Yoga schools since they simply take on board
Nyaya and Samkhya ideas, respectively) and note the
issues raised by these definitions. As mentioned above, the orthodox
schools generally accept both non-conceptualized (indeterminate) and
conceptualized (determinate) perceptual states in sharp contrast to
the Buddhist view that perception is always non-conceptualized or
indeterminate awareness.


### 2.1 Buddhist nominalism



The oldest preserved definition of perception in the Buddhist
tradition is the one by Vasubandhu (c. 4th century CE),
"Perception is a cognition [that arises] from that object [which
is represented therein]" (Frauwallner, 1957, p. 120). However,
the more influential and much discussed view is that of later Buddhist
Yogacara philosopher Dinnaga (c. 480-540
CE) for whom perception is simply a cognition "devoid of
conceptual construction (*kalpanapodham*)".
Taber (2005, p. 8) notes two important implications of this
definition. First, perception is non-conceptual in nature; no seeing
is seeing-as, because that necessarily involves intervention of
conceptual constructs, which contaminate the pristine given.
Perception is mere awareness of bare particulars without any
identification or association with words for, according to
Dinnaga, such association always results in falsification
of the object. Referents of the words are universals which, for the
Buddhist, are not real features of the world. Second,
Dinnaga's definition only indicates a
phenomenological feature of perception; it says nothing about its
origin and does not imply that it arises from the contact of a sense
faculty with the object. Therefore, for the Buddhist idealist, the
object that appears in perceptual cognition need not be an external
physical object, but a form that arises within consciousness itself.
Both these ideas led to vigorous debates in classical Indian
philosophy between the Hindus and the Buddhists. The first of these
ideas relates to the notion of non-conceptual perception, the second
to idealism. Dinnaga's philosophy is
idealist-nominalist in spirit and his epistemological position is in
sync with the Buddhist metaphysical doctrines of no-self, evanescence
of all that exists and emptiness which, expectedly, evoke strong
reaction from the realist Nyaya-Vaisesika and
Mimamsa schools.



In recent literature, there has been a scholarly debate on whether the
Indian Yogacara philosophy is a form of idealism or not.
This debate is murky because there are various versions of idealism
discussed in the literature in Buddhist philosophy. At least three
versions have been discussed in recent literature in Buddhist
philosophy: subjective idealism (the view that there are no
mind-independent objects); metaphysical idealism (the view that
external objects do not exist); and, epistemic idealism (the view that
what we are immediately aware of is intrinsic to cognition). Lusthaus
(2002) and Coseru (2012) have argued, respectively, for a
"phenomenological" and "phenomenalist
naturalist" interpretation of Yogacara in opposition
to the standard idealist interpretation. The main argument for the
phenomenological reading is that the epistemic claims made by the
Yogacara philosophers do not commit them to ontological
claims. This would avoid the charge of metaphysical idealism but is
still open to being interpreted as offering an epistemic or subjective
idealism. Lusthaus sees Yogacara philosophers' denial
of solipsism and affirmation of other minds as a fatal blow to the
subjective idealist interpretation of Yogacara. Idealism
does not necessitate solipsism as is made clear in Berkeley's
version of subjective idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism
which explicitly requires other minds. Thus, there is reason to think
that the epistemic idealist interpretation of Yogacara is
not threatened by its commitment to other minds.



Kellner and Taber (2014) have argued that Vasubandhu's argues
for a standard metaphysical idealist position, which is to deny the
existence of physical objects outside of consciousness.Kellner and
Taber (2014) also present a new reason for the revival of the standard
idealist reading of Yogacara. Their argument for this
reading is based on Vasubandhu's argumentative strategy rather
than the logical structure of individual proofs. They claim that in
the *Vimsika* Vasubandhu uses the argument from
ignorance, according to which, the absence of external objects is
derived from the absence of evidence for their existence. They also
note that Vasubandhu uses the same strategy to refute the existence of
the self in the *Abhidharmakosabhasya* IX. The
argument from ignorance seems like a bad strategy. It is often listed
as a logical fallacy of the general form: since statement *P* is
not known or proved to be true, *P* is false. But because the
general form of the argument is bad, it does not necessarily follow
that every argument of that form is unsuccessful. It may well succeed
because of other features, for example the semantic meanings of the
terms or when the arguments are arguments to the best explanation.
Kellner and Taber emphasise that some arguments from ignorance are
successful when they function as arguments to the best explanation
especially in contexts where there are agreed-upon standards of
verification. For example, the medical community agrees that the most
accurate and sensitive test for typhoid is testing the bone marrow for
Salmonella typhi bacteria. If it turns out that it cannot be proven
that one has typhoid (because of the lack of Salmonella typhi bacteria
in one's bone marrow), then it is false that one has typhoid. No
matter how suggestive the symptoms are, if the specific bacteria do
not show up in the bone marrow within a specific time period, then one
does not have typhoid. So, then, the question is: Is
Vasubandhu's argument from ignorance successful for establishing
idealism? I fear not. That is because there are no universally
agreed-upon criteria among Classical Indian philosophers (not even
among fellow-Buddhists) as to what counts as evidence for the
existence of external things.



More recently in a series of papers on Buddhist idealism, Kellner
(2017a) revisits Vasubandhu's argument from ignorance to
establish the non-existence of external objects and
Dharmakirti's objections to it. Dharmakirti was among
the first Indian logician's to pay attention to how we can know
about non-existence. Dharmakirti is worried about the validity of
arguments from ignorance in general and was the first to argue that
these arguments cannot be used to establish the absence of a class of
entities. He posits non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) as a
special kind of reason (*hetu*) to prove non-existence of
objects, but is careful to qualify again that non-apprehension can
only prove the situationally specific absence of particular objects,
it cannot prove the non-existence of an entire class of objects.
Arguments from ignorance and non-apprehension cannot prove the
ontological non-existence of objects. Dharmakirti thus is only
interested in supporting the weaker epistemic idealist position that
external objects are imperceptible. As far as his arguments go they
never establish anything beyond this conclusion. Some, for example
Ratie (2014, 361) argue that Dharmakirti does not need to
add anything to this to establish the stronger metaphysical idealism.
The stronger thesis follows because of his ontological principle
"to be is to be causally efficacious"
(*arthakriya*). If external objects are completely
imperceptible in that they cannt even produce the minimal effect of
perceptual awareness, then they are as good as being non-existent.
Kellner, however, notes that such a conclusion is excluded by
Dharmakirti's logical theory which highlights the
evidential gap between imperceptibility and non-existence. For him,
absence of evidence does not equate to evidence of absence.



Dharmakirti's target is to show that external objects are
imperceptible, any further conclusion about the existence or otherwise
is totally irrelevant, only to be oursued by those interested in
futile metaphysical arguments. Following Kellner (2017b) his argments
for the imperceptibility of external obejcts can be divided into two
groups. The first group of arguments point to defects in the realist
theory of perception supported by the Hindus and fellow Buddhists. The
second group focuses on positive argument against the imperceptibility
of external objects based on the nature of cognition. It is this group
which contains Dharmakirti's distinctive and novel
contribution to the debate and deserve much more attention than they
have received in the contemporary philosophical literature. The first
group of arguments leads Dharmakirti to conclude the
self-reflexive nature of cognition. Cognition is 'aware of
itself' and of nothing else. The second group of arguments then
defends this conclusion by appeal to the nature of cognition.



Dharmakirti begins by pointing to the well-known fact that there
is incongruence between the external object and our perception of it.
Visual perception, for example, is limited to certain aspects or
features of the object. The external object as a whole is never
visually perceived. We do not perceive cups and pots, but only its
colour, shape, size and so on. So, he asks, what reason is there to
cup and pots over and above visual perception of shapes, sizes and
colours. This incongruence allows him to conclude that perception does
not have the form of the external object or it's form is
deviant. Next he questions whether the realist commitment to causation
and resemblance between the form (image, impression) and the external
object establishes that perception must have external objects.
Causation cannot work on its own by virtue of the well-known fact that
our cognitions can and do have internal mental causes. And the notion
of resemblance is too weak and vague to do any real work in
indexically linking particular forms to objects in front of
one's eyes. These two negative arguments suggest the conclusion
that there is no external object to be experienced by cognition. This
conclusion is then supported by two further positive arguments
referred to as *samvedana*-argument and the
*sahopalambhaniyama*-inference in the literature. The
*samvedana*-argument appeals to the nature of cognition
as that which appears in a certain way. And this
"appearing-to-in-a-certain-way" highlights the
intransitive nature of cognition. Cogniton by its nature is
self-illuminating, it shines forth itself. This argument is no doubt
terse and can do with further explication but Dharmakirti does
not elaborate. The second argument,
*sahopalambhaniyama*-inference is also tersely encapsulated in
a single sentence in the text: "No object [is observed] without
awareness, nor is an awareness observed being experienced without an
object; thus they are not different"
(*Pratyaksapariccheda*, 390). Taber (2010, 292-3)
presents a useful reconstruction of the argument. The argument draws
on the logical principle of Identity of Indiscernibles: two things
having exactly the same properties are identical. However, the
argument at issue just points to sharing of one crucial propert: the
property of being perceived at the same time. This crucial property is
regarded as sufficient evidence to establish that the two things are
"non-different". Both these arguments deserve further
elaboration before we can properly assess whether they are succesful
in establishing the conclusion. This new literature in ceratinly a
start in the right direction and opens up new research questions for
contemporary philosophers.


### 2.2 Nyaya realism



The most comprehensive, and the most influential, definition of
perception in classical Indian philosophy is offered in
Gautama's *Nyaya-sutra* 1.1.4:



> 
> Perception is a cognition which arises from the contact of the sense
> organ and object and is not impregnated by words, is unerring, and
> well-ascertained.
> 



Expectedly, each part of this definition has raised controversy and
criticism. If perception is a cognition (and non-erroneous), then it
is a state of knowledge, rather than a means to knowing! How does that
constitute a primary means of knowledge? Some Naiyayika
commentators, Vacaspati Misra (c. 900-980 CE) and
Jayanta Bhatta (c. 9th century CE) among them, suggest
that the *sutra* is to be understood by adding to it the
term 'from which (*yatah*),' since the
preceding *sutra-s* indicates that Gautama's
formulation of this *sutra* was intended to define an
instrument of knowledge. Another issue has been the interpretation of
the word 'contact'. In what sense are the eye and the ear,
the sense organs for vision and auditory perception, respectively, in
contact with their objects? Here a careful look at the term
'sannikarsa,' generally translated as
*contact*, helps resolve the issue;
'Sannikarsa' literally means 'drawing
near,' and can be interpreted as being in *close*
connection with or in the *vicinity of*. Thus perception is
that which arises out of a close connection between the sense organ
and its object.



More substantial debates on the nature of perception focus on the
adjectives in the latter part of the *sutra*, viz.,
non-verbal (*avyapadesyam*), non-erroneous or
non-deviating (*avyabhichari*), and well-ascertained or
free from doubt (*vyavasayatmaka*). There is some
disagreement among the Naiyayika commentators about the
interpretations of the adjectives non-verbal and well-ascertained.
Vatsyayana, in his commentary on the
*Nyaya-sutra*, argues that the adjectives non-verbal
and well-ascertained are really part of the definition; non-verbal to
point out that perceptual knowledge is not associated with words
(Bhartrhari, the famous Grammarian, on the other hand, holds
that awareness is necessarily constituted by words and apprehended
through them) and well-ascertained to affirm that perceptual knowledge
is only of a definite particular and specifically excludes situations
in which the perceiver may be in doubt whether a perceived object
'a' is an *F* or a *G*. Vacaspati
Misra, argues that the adjective well-ascertained need not be
used to exclude the so-called perception in the form of doubt, as
doubtful knowledge, being invalid, is already excluded by the
adjective non-erroneous. Rather, the term
*vyavasayatmaka* stands for determinate perceptual
judgment. Thus understood, the adjectives *non-verbal* and
*determinate* seem to be complementary; a piece of
*non-verbal* perceptual knowledge cannot be said to be, at the
same time, *determinate.* Vacaspati Misra posits that
these two adjectives indicate two different forms of perceptual
cognition and are not to be regarded as its defining characteristics.
According to him, Gautama included these adjectives to identify two
*kinds* of perceptual knowledge: *avyapadesyam*
indicates non-conceptual or non-verbal perception and
*vyavasayatmaka* indicates conceptual or determinate
perceptions. He contends that by the term non-verbal, Gautama refutes
the Grammarian view and includes non-conceptual perception and, by the
term well-ascertained, he refutes the Buddhist view and includes
conceptual or judgemental perceptions as valid. Pradyot Mondal (1982)
traces the history of this controversy among Naiyayikas. He
offers overwhelming scholarly evidence in favor of the view that
Naiyayikas mostly regard the adjectives as part of the definition
of perception and do not agree with Vacaspati's
interpretation. For most Naiyayikas "non-verbal" is
included to deny the causal role of words in origination of perceptual
cognition and, therefore, it applies to non-conceptual and conceptual
perceptions both, the difference being that the former is
inexpressible in language, while the latter is not. Thus Mondal claims
that the adjective "non-verbal" is sufficient on its own
to reject the Grammarian and the Buddhist views of perception. The
Nyaya pphilosophers seek the middle ground between these
positions to defend their thoroughly realist view. They argue that
their is some mental shaping in almost all perceptual events, memory
dispositions acquired on account of previous experiences are among the
causal factors contributing to the current perception. Perceptual
experience in this sense is laden with or infused by concepts. This,
however, does not compromise the realism, since the concepts
themselves are repeatable features of real objects and are
perceptually acquired in past encounters with these features. For
perception to be a source of knowledge it must be concept-laden, such
that it is verbalizable and determinate (Phillips, 2019). The exact
role of concepts in perception--in dispute in the
Nyaya/Buddhist debate--will be discussed in the next
section.



The early Naiyayikas held that perception is determinate, but
under pressure from the the Buddhists opponents Vacaspati
Misra (in about the 10century AD) conceeds that there is also
concept-free indeterminate perception. In his commenatry on the
*Nyayasutra* 1.1.4, Vacaspati interprets the
qualifiers non-verbal (*avyapadesyam*) and
well-ascertained or free from doubt
(*vyavasayatmaka*) as indicating two types of
perception: indeterminate and determinate. Indeterminate perception is
thus conceived as the first stage of sensory processing without any
mental shaping. The indeterminate sensory percept generated at this
stage is then classified by the mind resulting in a determinate
perception of a whole object qualified by its parts (or features).
This idea is later taken up by the Navya-Naiyayika
Gangesa, according to whom, indeterminate perception is
indispensable for explaining how our concepts originate in reality.
Determinate perception of a thing as qualified by its features, e.g.,
That's a cow, requires a prior grasp of the qualifier
'cowness'. The usual explanation will turn to memory
dispositions acquired by previous encounters with cow. This
explanation however cannot be extended to a child's perception
of a cow for the first time. In the first instance, Gangesa
claims, the 'cowness' is grasped indeterminately in that
cowness is grasped but not as related to a particular cow.



Gangesa also objects to the notion 'sensory
connection' in the classical *Nyayasutra* definition
of perception, arguing that this makes the definition too wide and too
narrow at the same time: too wide because it implies that
*every* awareness is perceptual being produced by virtue of a
connection with the 'inner' sense faculty or mind
(*manas);* too narrow because it fails to include divine
perception, which involves no sensory connection. Gangesa
offers a simpler definition of perception as an awareness which has no
other awareness as its chief instrumental cause. Being concerned that
his definition may be interpreted as ruling out conceptualized or
determinate perception that may have non-conceptual or indeterminate
perception as one of it causes, he argues that indeterminate
perception can never be *the* chief instrumental cause of
determinate perception, although it *is* a cause, since it
supplies the qualifier or the concept for determinate perception. This
simpler definition has other problems. Perception is a source of
knowledge so Gangesa must explain how this definition rules
out non-veridical perceptions. So, he spends the longest Section in
the Chapter on Perception in his *Tattvacintamani Jewel
of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology* on giving a general
account of illusion as "appearance of something other than it
is".


### 2.3 Mimamsa realism



The *Purva* *Mimamsa-sutra*
(MS) were originally composed by Jamini around 200 BCE. The fourth MS
1.1.4 says:



> 
> The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sense
> faculties of a person with an existing (*sat*)
> object--that (*tat*) is perception; it is not the basis of
> the knowledge of *Dharma*, because it is the apprehension of
> that which is present. (Taber, 2005:44)
> 



There is no consensus among Mimamsa commentators
on whether this is intended as a definition of perception, even while
an initial reading of it suggests that it may be. Kumarila, the
noted Mimamsa commentator argues that the first
part of the *sutra* is *not* intended as a
definition because of the context in which it figures; the
*sutra-s* preceding it are concerned with an inquiry into
righteousness (*Dharma*). Moreover, the *sutra*
construed as a definition of perception, results in too wide, and not
too accurate, a definition, because it only says that perception
arises from a connection between the sense faculty and an existing
object and does not exclude perceptual error or inferential cognition.
Taber (2005, 16), on the other hand, suggests that it is possible to
construe MS 1.1.4 as a valid definition, and indeed such a construal
was proposed by an earlier commentator, the so-called
*Vrttikara* quoted at length by Sabara in
his *Sabarabhasyam*. This, the most
extensive commentary on the
*Mimamsa-sutra*, suggests that the
words of the *sutra* (*tat* = 'that'
and *sat* = 'existing') be switched around for a
different reading for the first part of the *sutra*, which
would then state that, "a cognition that results from connection
of the sense faculties of a person with that (*tat*) [same
object that appears in the cognition] is true (*sat*)
perception". This switch rules out perceptual error and
inference; both these present objects other than those that are the
cause of the perception.


### 2.4 Samkhya definition



In the oldest Samkhya tradition, perception is the
functioning of a sense organ. This is clearly inadequate, as the
ancient skeptic Jayarasi Bhatta (c. 8th century
CE) is quick to point out. Perception in this sense cannot be a means
of knowledge (*pramana*) as it does not distinguish
between proper and improper functioning of sense organs and,
therefore, between valid and erroneous perceptions. A more
sophisticated definition is later devised wherein perception is
"an ascertainment [of *buddhi* or intellect] in regard to
a sense faculty (*Samkhyakarika* 5 in
*Yuktidipika*)". This implies that perception
is a modification of the intellect in the form of selective
ascertainment of an object, brought about by the activity or
functioning of a sense faculty. In some respects, this
characterization of perception as an "ascertainment" of
the intellect neatly captures the idea that perception, being an
instrument of knowledge, is the primary means of knowledge.
Ascertainment residing in the intellect is regarded as the instrument
of perception, while residing in the self it is regarded as the result
of the process of perception. Furthermore, the
*Samkhyakarika* states that the function
of the senses with regard to the objects is "a mere
seeing" (*Samkhyakarika*, 28b), and
the function of the intellect, referred to as ascertainment, can be
thought of as "identification" of the object as in
"this is a cow", etc.
(*Samkhyakarika* 5ab). This suggests a
two-stage process: first the functioning of the sense faculty results
in "mere seeing" of the object (non-conceptualized
awareness) and, later this mere seeing is acted upon by the intellect
or mind and results in a conceptual identification of the object. This
two-stage process is very similar to the detailed account of
conceptual (*savikalpaka*) perception offered by the
Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas.


### 2.5 Advaita Vedanta: direct knowledge



According to Advaita Vedanta the defining characteristic of
perception is the directness of knowledge acquired through perception
(Bilimoria, 1980:35). In highlighting the directness of the perceptual
process, the Advaitin differs from Nyaya and
Mimamsa proponents for whom the contact of the
sense faculty with its object is central to the perceptual process.
Vedanta Paribhasa (ed. 1972: 30) cites pleasure
and pain as instances of perception that are directly intuited without
any sense object contact. For the Advaitin perception is simply the
immediacy of consciousness; knowledge not mediated by any instrument
(Gupta et. al., 1991, p. 40). It is worth noting that this definition
is very close to that accepted by Navya-Naiyayikas. Like the
latter, the Advaitins regard the role of the sensory connection as
accidental, rather than essential, to the perceptual process. The
Neo-Advaitins accept the distinction between conceptual or determinate
perception (they refer to it as *visayagata
pratyaksa*) and non-conceptual or indeterminate perception
(*nirvikaplapka* *pratyaksa*), but do not think of
non-conceptual perception as simply a prior stage of conceptualized
perception, as other Hindu schools do.
 



## 3. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyaksa



The Sanskrit term *kalpana* is variously translated as
imagination or conceptual construction and is meant to be the source
of '*vikalpa*', roughly translated as concepts, but
which may stand for anything that the mind adds to the
'given'. The time-honored differentiation of perception
into conception-free perception (*nir-vikalpa pratyaksa*)
and conception-loaded perception (*sa-vikalpa*
*pratyaksa*) is made on the basis of concepts
(*vikalpa*) (Matilal, 1986: 313).


### 3.1 The basis of Buddhist nominalism



The distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual was first drawn
by Dinnaga who contended that all perception is
non-conceptual because what constitutes seeing things as they really
*are* must be free from any conceptual construction. The claim
is that a verbal report of proper perception is strictly impossible,
for such a report requires conceptualization, which is not perceptual
in character; the objects of conceptual awareness are spontaneous
constructions of our mind and are essentially linguistic in character.
On the other hand, what is seen, 'the given', does not
carry a word or a name as its label and neither is such a label
grasped along with the object, nor inherent in it, nor even produced
by it; objects-as-such, the real particulars
(*svalaksanas*), do not, as Quine would say, wear
their names on their sleeves. Furthermore, the sense faculty cannot
grasp a concept or a name; if I have never smelt garlic before I first
encounter it, I cannot smell it *as garlic*, though I can smell
IT; an olfactory awareness can only grasp a *smell* present in
the olfactory field. The Buddhists argue that a perceiver apprehends
only the real particulars, *arbitrarily* imposes concepts/words
on them and believes, mistakenly, that these are *really there*
in the objects and integral to them. The conceptual awareness conceals
its own imaginative quality and, because it results directly from
experience, the perceiver takes it to be a perceptual experience. The
perceiver fails to notice that imagination is involved and mistakenly
thinks that he really perceives the constructed world. From the
Buddhists standpoint, therefore, a perceiver can only perceive real
particulars so that any perceptual experience is always and only at
the non-conceptual level.


### 3.2 The development of Hindu realism: the Nyaya mission



The Nyaya view evolves in response to Buddhist account of
perception. They regard perception as a cognitive episode triggered by
causal interaction between a sense faculty and an object. This
interaction first results in a sensory impression, nothing more than
mere physiological change. This preliminary awareness, non-conceptual
perception, is a necessary first step in the process of perception and
is invariably followed by a structured awareness leading to conceptual
perception. A cognition that is independent of preliminary sensory
awareness cannot result in a perceptual judgment. The first awareness
does not destroy the perceptual character of the second; rather, it
facilitates this subsequent awareness. Non-conceptual perception is an
indispensable causal factor for generation of conceptual perception,
although memory, concepts and collateral information may also be
required. It is important to note that the Nyaya notion of
*vikalpa* (in their distinction of *nir-vikalpa* and
*sa-vikalpa*) is different from that of the Buddhists. Unlike
the latter, the Naiyayikas do not think of *vikalpa-s* as
mental creations or imaginative constructions but as objectively real
properties and features of objects. *Vikalpa* in this sense
indicates the operation of judging and synthesizing rather than
imagining or constructing. Thus conceptual perceptions *truly*
represent the structure of reality. Of the five types of concepts
(*vikalpa-s*) recognized by the Buddhists, viz.
*nama* (word), *jati* (universal),
*guna* (quality), *kriya* (action) and
*dravya* (substance), the Naiyayikas, regard all but the
first *vikalpa* as categories of reality (Mondal, 1982, p.
364). Unlike the Grammarians, the Nyaya schools do not accept the
objective reality of words; words are not inherent to the object
presented in perception. Rather, the Naiyayikas hold that the
relation between word and object is created by convention in a
linguistic community. Although a concept is associated with a word
(*nama-vikalpa*) by means of a convention, it is not
merely a fabrication. For example, when someone brings garlic clove
near my nose and teaches me by pointing to it that it is called
garlic, then subsequently confronted with the garlicky odor and a
similar clove, I can see it and smell it *as garlic*. Thus
perceptual awareness includes knowledge of words but, insofar as it is
perceptual awareness, it is brought about by sensory contact with the
object and, its properties which exists independently of words.



The Buddhists reject this argument on the basis that the conventional
meaning of a word relates the word with the concept or the universal.
Universals or concepts cannot be objects of our perception; they
cannot be sensed. Universals, attributes and concepts are theoretical
constructs for the Buddhists; what is sensed is the actual object, the
exclusive particular, the ultimate existent. The Buddhists offer two
arguments in favor of the claim that only particulars are real. First,
knowledge by means of words or verbal testimony is very different from
perceptual knowledge, for what we are aware of when we hear the words
"garlic is pungent" is very different from what we are
phenomenologically aware of when we smell garlic; words do not denote
or stand-in for actual objects and can be uttered in the absence of
any objects, but perception cannot arise in the absence of objects.
Second, the particulars are real or existent because they have causal
efficacy (*arthakriyasamarthya*). Only particular
real garlic can flavor one's food or ruin it, but the universal
garlichood cannot do any of these; in this sense, only the particulars
are real for they fulfill the purposes (*artha*) of humans.



The foregoing discussion shows that the epistemological debate between
the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas regarding the nature of
perception rests on, and brings to the fore, their metaphysical
disagreement about the nature of universals. The Naiyayikas are
realists about universals; universals are objective features of the
world that impress themselves upon minds; they are not mere figments
of our imagination. The Naiyayikas hold that particulars are
qualified propertied wholes and we directly perceive them *as they
are*, without any kind of manipulation or imposition; we do not
impose universals on property-less real particulars, rather we find
stable, durable, relational wholes in reality that do not require any
imposition or manipulation. They argue that there is no evidence of a
world of bare particulars, as claimed by the Buddhists. Therefore
conceptual or determinate perception does not involve distortion of
reality; rather it presents things as they really are. To see a piece
of sandalwood as it *really* is, we do not need to see the
sandalwood as a colorless, odorless pure particular; indeed, since the
piece of sandalwood is *really* brown and *really*
fragrant, to see it as a propertied whole is to see it as it
*really* *is*.



The idea that the world consists of propertied particulars seems to
put pressure on the notion of non-conceptual perception. If there are
no indeterminate particulars, what is the object of indeterminate
perception? Indeed some Navya-Nyaya thinkers hold that the raw
data of perception ('real particulars' in the Buddhists
sense) is too inchoate and elusive to count as objects of knowledge.
Recently, Arindam Chakrabarti (2000), a prominent contemporary
Navya-Nyaya thinker offered seven reasons for altogether
eliminating non-conceptual, or immaculate perceptions as he calls
them, from Nyaya epistemology in an attempt to understand the
"deeper relation between direct realism and concept-enriched
perception". Chakrabarti's skepticism about non-conceptual
perception as a cognitive state stems from the fact that we cannot
assign an intentional role to the object of indeterminate perception
because the object of non-conceptual perception is incapable of being
apperceived or directly intuited in any fashion. Chakrabarti's
gauntlet has been picked by several Nyaya enthusiasts (Phillips,
2001 and 2004; Chadha, 2001, 2004 and 2006) and defenders of Buddhist
doctrine (Siderits, 2004). This debate brings to the fore an important
feature of non-conceptual perception first highlighted by
Gangesa, suggesting that while there is no direct,
apperceptive evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is posited as
the best explanation for the availability of the qualifier (property,
feature), since the cognizing subject is not immediately aware of the
object of non-conceptual perception. Phillips (2001: 105) presents
Gangesa's argument for the inclusion of
non-conceptual perception as an essential part of Nyaya
epistemology:



> 
> ...it [nirvikalpa pratyaksa] is posited by the force of the
> following inference as the first step of a two step argument.
> "The perceptual cognition 'A cow' (for example) is
> generated by a cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition of
> an entity as qualified (by that qualifier appearing) like an
> inference". The second step takes a person's first
> perception of an individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., as
> having some such property) as the perceptual cognition figuring as the
> inference's subject (*paksa*) such that the
> cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could
> not possibly provide the qualifier cowhood. The qualifier has to be
> available, and the best candidate seems to be its perception in the
> raw, a qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some are wont to
> misinterpret the point) as divorced from its *qualificandum*
> (Bessie) but rather as neither divorced nor joined, and, furthermore,
> not as qualified by another qualifier (such as being-a-heifer) but
> rather just the plain, unadorned entity. In the particular example,
> the entity is the universal, cowhood, or being-a-cow, although, again,
> it would not be grasped as a universal. Or as anything except itself.
> 



The Navya-Nyaya notion of non-conceptual perception differs from
that of the Buddhists in many respects, two of which are very
important. First, according to Navya-Naiyayikas, there is no
apperceptive evidence for non-conceptual perception, unlike the
Buddhists who contend that conception-free awareness is necessarily
self-aware. The Navya-Naiyayikas, as is obvious from the quote
above, emphasize that the evidence for a non-conceptual sensory grasp
of universals comes in the form of an inference. Second, according to
Navya-Nyaya, the object of non-conceptual perception is a
qualifier (concept), although not given as that in the first instance,
but not a bare particular as the Buddhists hypothesize. It is, as the
above quote explains, posited by the force of an inference; the
'bare object' of non-conceptual perception
*becomes* the qualifier in a resultant determinate perception.
While this does not satisfactorily address Chakrabarti's concern
that lack of apperceptive evidence implies that the subject cannot
assign an intentional role to the object of non-conceptual perception,
Chadha (2006) argues that the subject's not being in a position
to assign an intentional role to the object of non-conceptual
perception is no hindrance to the intentionality of non-conceptual
perception itself. Non-conceptual perception is awareness *of*
a "non-particular individual" (Chakrabarti, 1995) and can
be assigned the intentional role of a qualifier in virtue of the
recognitional abilities acquired by the subject on the basis of the
perceptual episode. The subject *sees* a non-particular
individual but, since there is no apperceptive or conscious awareness,
the subject does not see it *as* an instance of a universal or
a qualifier. Chadha explicates Gangesa's insight that
a qualifier is given as a non-particular individual, neither divorced
from nor joined to the *qualificandum* and, therefore it is
wrong to suggest that lack of apperceptive evidence implies that
non-conceptual perception is not an intentional perceptual state.



More recently, Chaturvedi (2020) analyses counter-arguments against
Gangesa's defense of non-conceptual perception
offered by the sixteenth century Dvaita Vedanta scholar
Vyasatirtha. Chaturvedi argues that
Vyasatirtha's objection undermine
Gangesa's main inferential proof of non-conceptual
perception to show that it has a necessary role to play in generating
concept-laden determinate perception. In addition,
Vyasatirtha's questions the internal consistency of
Gangesa's that the contents of indeterminate
perception is not available for introspection. Despite all the
problems pointed out by the Vedantin, Chaturvedi argues that there is
still hope to reconstruct Gangesa's account of
indeterminate perception with some help from recent empirical science
can help to restore the overall plausibility of the view.


### 3.3 The Mimamsa advance in realism



Kumarila argued against the Buddhist position to show that
perception is not always devoid of concepts. In
*Pratyaksapariccheda*, he principally targets
Dinnaga's theory, while simultaneously addressing
some of Dharmakirti's ideas and arguments. Kumarila,
like Naiyayikas, holds both the two kinds of perception as valid.
For him the initial non-conceptualized perception is borne of the
undifferentiated pure object (*suddhavastu*) and is
comparable to the perception of an infant and others who lack a
language. The 'pure object' is the substratum for the
generic and specific features of the object, but the subject is not
distinctly aware of any of these and simply cognizes the object as an
indeterminate particular, as "this" or
"something". Although Kumarila agrees with the
Buddhists that the object of immediate perception is inexpressible in
language, he maintains that it is different, in at least one respect,
from the real particular (*svalaksana*) of the
Buddhists; the latter being a structure-less unitary whole, whereas
the former is non-unitary and grasps both the particular and the
universal aspects of the object. Otherwise, Kumarila argues, it
could not give rise to conceptual awareness, which explicitly
identifies such features. Dinnaga's counterpoint to
this is that conceptual awareness at second stage cannot be a
perception, since it involves application of concepts and words which,
in turn, requires memory. If we admit conceptual awareness as
perception, we are forced to accept that a sense faculty is capable of
remembering (since perception is a cognition brought about by the
functioning of the sense faculty) but that cannot be the case because
a sense faculty, being a mere instrument of cognition, is in itself
unconscious and cannot remember anything. Kumarila admits that
conceptual awareness is aided by memory and concepts, but argues that
that does not rob it of its perceptual character for the sense faculty
is still functioning while in contact with the very same object. He
further suggests that we should not expect a perceptual cognition to
arise as soon as there is contact between a sense faculty and its
object. He uses the analogy of entering a dimly lit room after walking
in the blazing sun; even though the contents of the room are directly
available to the sense faculties of the subject who has just walked
in, he does not immediately apprehend the objects in front of him.
However, the subject may become distinctly aware of the objects in the
room and their features in the following moments. The perceptual
character of the latter awareness is maintained so long as the
connection between the sense faculty and the object is intact, even
when other conceptual awarenesses or memories intervene between the
initial contact with the object and the subsequent awareness. A
conceptual awareness can be referred to as a perception even though
the mind, *qua* memory, is involved because the functioning of
the sense faculty is the factor responsible for arising of the
awareness. Furthermore, he insists that the mind must be involved in
all perceptions since it functions as a link between the sense faculty
and the self; the sense faculty is turned on or activated by a
connection with the self and, the self as the subject of knowledge is
involved in all cognitions. He points out that even Buddhists do not
deny this, since they hold that self-reflexive awareness accompanies
every cognition. He contends that the Buddhists are wrong to insist
that only a cognition arising directly from the functioning of a sense
faculty is perception; they agree that we perceive inner states, e.g.,
pleasure and pain, and if the mind is accepted as the operative sense
faculty in the self-reflexive awareness of such cognitions, it follows
that they should admit that the mind is also the sense faculty that
gives rise to conceptualized cognitions. He, however, clarifies that
not every cognition that follows a contact between a sense faculty and
an object is a perception, for if one were to open one's eyes
momentarily (in the above analogy) and construct a judgment such as
"that was table" with eyes closed again, it would not be a
perceptual cognition since it solely depends on the memory of a
fleeting sensory contact.



Later, Dharmakirti, using a methodology very different (and akin
to proof by contradiction) from his predecessor Dinnaga,
raises new problems for the Nyaya-Mimamsa
view. Assuming, he says, for the sake of the argument, that universals
are real. Then the judgments "This is a cow," "It is
an animal," relate two distinct entities, namely a particular
(or object) and a universal (or concept) arguably via a non-relational
tie as in being substratum and superstratum, with the proviso that the
substratum object has the power to let the universal reside in it.
This leads to all the universals (such as cowness, animalhood, etc)
then being tied to the object by this simple and single power. In such
a scenario, any perceptual judgment involving the universal cowhood as
in the case of "This is a cow" makes subsequent judgments
"This is an animal," "This is a substance,"
etc., superfluous. For, if one perceives an object along with its
power to let any one universal reside in it, one must be able to
perceive its power to attract all other universals that reside in it.
Thus, there would be no distinction between "This is a
cow" and "This is a substance"; clearly an
unacceptable thesis. Matilal (1986, 326) notes two points in
connection with this argument. First, Dharmakirti assumes that an
object, or a unique particular, is perceived in its entirety and no
part of it is left unperceived. Second, the realist has objectified
all the universals including the relation-universal. If, as the
realist believes, the object of perception--the
particular--has the power to accommodate all universals in it,
then the onus is on him to show why only a single universal manifests
itself in a perceptual judgment. This concern is pertinent, especially
against the Nyaya philosophers who admit only one single
relation-universal: inherence, which supposedly unites all nesting
universals with the object. The Naiyayikas readily respond to
this argument by pointing out that the redundancy objection rests on
Dharmakirti's assumption that an object is grasped in its
entirety in perception. This assumption is false; perception is
perspectival, we never see all sides of an ordinary three-dimensional
object, but we still see *it*.



Furthermore, Dharmakirti's argues that conceptual or
judgmental awareness is phenomenologically distinct from
non-conceptual awareness. In the latter we are confronted with the
object of perception which is vivid and immediate, while in the former
no object is present. In the judgment "this is a cow",
even the 'subject' of the judgment does not refer to the
object of perception, since words do not refer to perceived
particulars but to universals which extend across space and time.
Dharmakirti admits that the words we apply to things have some
objective basis in those things; we call something a cow because it
has a certain effect, it gives milk, is gentle, or it calls forth a
certain cognition, etc. This effect, in turn, inclines us to associate
the word 'cow' with other things that have the same effect
and we do that by jointly dissociating them from things that lack that
effect. Universals, according to the Buddhists are arbitrarily
constructed "exclusions" (*apoha*); words serve the
purpose of separating things off from other objects. For example, the
word 'cow' singles out a class of things by excluding them
from things they are not, all things assembled together under the
concept 'cow' are distinct from each other and do not
share a single nature that the word 'cow' names. A
conceptual awareness insofar as it imputes a word to a particular
object and, therefore a universal nature it shares with all others of
the same universal-kind, essentially falsifies the object.
Kumarila objects to the Buddhists theory of universals
(*apoha*) on the grounds that it is counterintuitive and
circular. The theory of universals (*apoha*) contradicts our
intuition that meaning of a positive word is positive; there is
nothing negative about the word 'cow'. A negative entity
can be the meaning of a word only where something is negated.
Moreover, if we accept that understanding *x* requires
eliminating non-*x*, then in turn we presuppose knowledge of
non-*x*, which entails an understanding of non-non-*x*,
and so on (Drefyus, 1997, 215). The Mimamsakas also
take on board the concerns raised by the Naiyayika philosopher
Uddyotakara (c. 7th century CE), who questions the theory of
exclusions on the specific grounds that it fails to offer an adequate
theory of reference and relation between concepts and reality. He
argues if the word 'cow' primarily designates a negative
entity, either this entity is a cow in disguise or is different from a
cow. If it is a cow in disguise then the Buddhist view of universals
is no different from the Nyaya common sense realism that words
are used to single out phenomena in the world. If the negative entity
is different from a cow, then the word 'cow' does not
refer to real cows, making it difficult to explain how any word can
refer to real objects or classes thereof. This last point begs the
question because the Buddhist denies that words refer to the objects
in the real world. For him words refer to universals, and that is
precisely what the world does *not* contain. The onus is put
back on the realists to show that universals, which serve as meanings
of words, are real properties of objects rather than imagined or
mentally constructed features. This challenge is taken up by the
Naiyayikas and their position against the nominalist stand of
both the Buddhists and the Grammarians is presented later below.


### 3.4 The Sabdika (Grammarian) nominalism and realist objections



Bhartrhari, the most notable Grammarian, highlights the intimate
relation between language, thought, and knowledge. Two aspects of his
theory have important implications for the nature of perceptual
experience. First, there is no non-linguistic cognition in the world;
all knowledge appears permeated by words. Though
Bhartrhari's theory may leave room for extraordinary, or
other-worldly, cognitions, there is no scope for pure
non-conceptualized perception in this world. The essence of his theory
is: words do not designate objects in the external world directly, but
through the intervention of universals, which are inherent in words.
Thus universals constitute the basis of our knowledge of the external
world, since they are intimately connected with language and mind on
the one hand, and the world on the other. Given this, the Grammarians
question the very possibility of non-conceptual perception? The second
aspect is underscored by Kumarila who ascribes the so-called
Superimposition Theory to Bhartrhari (Taber, 2005, 27),
according to which, a word has its "own form" superimposed
upon its meaning. This has implications for determinate conceptual
perception, which (for the pluralists and direct realists of
Mimamsa and Nyaya persuasions) arises purely
out of the object itself and involves discrimination and determination
of its nature.



Bhartrhari's argument can be thought of as an attack, on
the adjective 'non-verbal' (*avyapadesyam*) in
the Nyaya definition of perception, aimed at their belief that
for cognitive comprehension language is an inessential detail. For
him, bare sense-impressions cannot count as awarenesses because they
are nor effective enough, nothing is accomplished by them and, they do
not result in appreciable mental activity. Bhartrhari gives an
example: a man walking along a village path to approach his house
would invariably touch some grass on the road, and in some sense this
would be tactile awareness at a pre-linguistic level
(*Vakyapadiya*, Ch.1, verse 123). But this would not
count as an awareness unless combined with the further ability to sort
it out or verbalize it; consciousness cannot reveal an object to us
unless we discriminate it, and the process of discrimination requires
verbalization. What about a baby's awareness, or that of a mute
person, asks Vatsyayana? Bhartrhari points out that a
baby's sensations or a mute person's awarenesses may still
count as cognitive because they are linguistically potent. A
pre-linguistic state of an infant can be cognitive if and only if it
has speech potency, which is the cause of verbal language. So also, in
the non-conceptual perceptual awareness (in adults and even some
animals) speech-potency is latent; it is an essential trait of human
consciousness and the defining characteristic of cognitive awareness
(*Vakyapadiya*, Ch.1, verse 126). All knowledge of
what is to be done in this world depends on speech-potential; even an
infant has such knowledge due to residual traces from previous births
(*Vakyapadiya*, Ch.1, verse 121). The initial sensory
awareness of external objects which does not grasp any special
features of them, nonetheless illuminates them in a non-specific
manner as mere things by such expressions as 'this' or
'that' (Bhartrhari; 123 and 124). Thus, insofar as
the initial sensation is an awareness, it can be verbalized. The
following analogy is offered as an argument for positing the presence
of speech-seed (verbal disposition, as some modern philosophers call
it) in pre-linguistic awareness: think about the experience of trying,
but failing, to remember a verse heard before. Bhartrhari claims
that the entire verse exists in the cognitive faculty as
speech-potency but because of lack of other contributory factors there
is no verbalization. Similarly, a non-linguistic experience of a
mute-person is an awareness because of the presence of verbal
disposition or speech-seed even though there is no actualization of
speech. There are no non-conceptual perceptions, because ordinary
objects are not given to us without a concept (*vikalpa*) or
some mode of presentation; verbalization makes the concept explicit.
There are infinite concepts associated with an object, none integral
to it. However, we always perceive an object in *a* concept as
an instantiation of a universal; it is a cow, white, bovine,
four-legged, etc. The point to note is that concepts or universals
(*vikalpa-s*) are word-generated and superimposed on the
objects; there are no 'thing-universals' or real
universals over and above these. Bhartrhari's defends
linguistic nominalism, according to which, words are the only
universals that exist; thing-universals are word-generated illusions.
As Matilal remarks, for Bhartrhari there is not much of a
distinction between words and concepts, they are two sides of the same
coin (Matilal, 1986, 396).



Naiyayikas and Mimamsakas, the common sense
realists, raise specific objections to the Grammarian view on the
grounds that it is not borne by experience. We have separate
awarenesses of words and universals. While we may not perceive
something as a cow prior to acquiring the word 'cow,' we
are surely aware of cowness before we acquire the linguistic
expression, just as we are aware of and can discriminate shades of red
even before we acquire the names of some of those shades. A
non-conceptual awareness of the object is implied by the subsequent
occurrence of a conceptual awareness with determinate content.
Kumarila also points to other phenomena which indicate that the
awareness of the meaning of a word (the object) is independent and
distinct from the word itself. Furthermore, awareness of the meaning
and that of the word are usually different kinds of representations;
there is no possibility of confusing or conflating these.
Kumarila brings to attention linguistic phenomena that reinforce
the point that words and meanings must be distinct representations,
e.g., homonymy, synonymy, categorizing and recognizing grammatical
parts of speech, etc. The ability to distinguish and discriminate
types is perhaps enhanced by knowledge of language and concepts, but
is not completely dependent on it. Those who are not trained in music
can certainly hear the difference between distinct notes, even though
they are unable to identify them by name. Vatsyayana also
appeals to the ordinary experience of people who are conversant with
words. Ordinarily, words are apprehended as names of objects. The
knowledge of the word-object association comes after the perceptual
knowledge derived through sense-object contact. Such contact results
in a perceptual awareness which, in turn, provides the occasion for
recalling the appropriate word, if indeed the appropriate word exists
in the experiencer's linguistic repertoire. Perceptual knowledge
is antecedent to verbal knowledge and cannot owe its existence to
words. Vacaspati Misra specifically objects to
Bhartrhari's claim that infants and adults who lack a
language perceive objects by memory impressions of their names from
previous births. Objects are vividly and clearly given to us in
perception, but the memory-impressions of previous births are at best
vague and indistinct. Vacaspati Misra asks, "How can
such a vague and unclear thing be identified with a clear and distinct
perception?"
(*Nyayavarttikatatparyatika*,
127). His other argument against Bhartrhari is the obvious point
that words do not necessarily refer to their objects, for example
words in quotation marks do not refer to objects, only to themselves.
Moreover, if the word and its denotation were identical, a blind man
would grasp red or redness when he grasps the word 'red'
and a deaf person would grasp the word 'red' when he
grasps a red thing
(*Nyayavarttikatatparyatika*,
129).



The Naiyayikas also have a general response to
nominalists--Buddhists as well as Grammarians. They posit monadic
universals that correspond to natural and metaphysical kinds and one
dyadic universal, viz. inherence. The main nominalist objection is
that once we accept real universals in our ontology we risk
overpopulating the world with entities corresponding to every
expression that designates a property. For example, if we accept
horsehood and cowhood as universals, we also need to accept
universalhood as another universal. The Naiyayikas propose that
not every expression which designates a property generates an
objective universal (*jati*); some property-expressions
correspond to subjectively constructed categories
(*upadhi*), which though useful for analysis, are not
ontologically real. Uddyotakara argues that to correspond to a real
universal a general term must meet two conditions: (i) a general term
should be based on a ground, which accounts for the common awareness
of a number of different objects, that makes the application of the
term possible, and (ii) that ground should be a simple (non-compound),
unitary property or entity that cannot be analyzed or explained away
otherwise (Commentary on *Nyaya-sutra*, 2.2.65).
Universalhood is a *bogus* universal; it violates the second
condition. There is no simple basis or ground for universalhood as
opposed to universals such as cowhood and horsehood; the ground of
being one-in-many can be analyzed in terms of inherence. The same
applies to universals like 'barefooted',
'cook', 'reader' etc.; the basis for their
application is presence of compound features such as bare feet, etc.
However, this stratagem forces the Naiyayikas to admit that many
general terms designate bogus universals and, consequently, they start
succumbing to the nominalist pressure. Matilal (1986, 420-421)
notes that there is another way in which it happens to
Navya-Nyaya: A real universal *must* partake of the nature
of 'one-in-many'. The Navya-Naiyayika, Udayana (c.
10th century CE), lists a third necessary condition for disqualifying
a property from being regarded as a real universal. Under this
condition, an abstract property that belongs only to one individual is
also a bogus universal even though it is simple and unanalyzable;
skyness in the sky is bogus because it is only a nominal attribute.
However, since both cowhood and skyness are simple properties, they
are grasped *as such* in perception without further
qualification. In this sense, Naiyayikas maintain that some real
universals are directly perceptible. When we see a cow, we do not
necessarily see 'it' as a 'cow', the cow and
the cowness are not given as separate entities in our awareness,
rather they appear fused. This leads to the peculiar Nyaya view
that real universals and basic properties are grasped in our awareness
as 'epistemic firsts' or ultimates (Matilal, 1986, 421).
Gangesa calls such perception, in which universals are
grasped as such, non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*)
perception.


### 3.5 The Advaita Vedanta: a compromise on Hindu realism



The Advaita Vedanta theory compromises on the realism of earlier
classical Hindu philosophy. Their early view on perception is akin to
the Buddhists, although arrived at from a different perspective.
Mandana Misra says:



> 
> Perception is first, without mental construction, and has for its
> object the bare thing. The constructive cognitions which follow it
> plunge into particulars. (*Brahma-Siddhi*, 71.1-2)
> 



He draws a distinction between perceptual cognition and constructive
cognition, but is careful to use *vikalpa-buddhi*, rather than
*savikalpaka pratyaksa*, for the latter cognition. For
him perception is always non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*)
perception and it is of a universal, indeed of the highest universal,
Being (*sat*). According to early Vedantins, the real is
bereft of all character since its nature is non-differentiated
consciousness or Brahman. Therefore, perceptual cognition, which
presents the real, must be non-conceptual or indeterminate for it is
the knowledge of the existence of a thing without any qualifications
or predications. Mandana Misra also denies the thesis
that non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) perception is non-verbal.
This surprising claim is clearly owed to Bhartrhari's
influence, as is evidenced by the example used by Mandana
Misra in the argument. Confronted by an opponent with the claim
that verbal knowledge involves duality and relation, and therefore
must involve concepts, Mandana Misra replies that
verbal knowledge is not necessarily relational: a baby's
non-verbal knowledge of its mother's breast, grasps it merely as
'this' (of course we do not assume that the baby
articulates the word 'this'; the word, as in
Bhartrhari's account, has a more subtle form in the
baby's mind) and, therefore, the highest knowledge of the
Ultimate reality (*Brahman*) in which there is no duality, no
relations, no concepts, may still be verbal.



Neo Advaita-Vedantins, however, accept a distinction between
non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) perception and conceptual
(*nirvikalpaka*) perceptions from empirical or practical
(*vyavaharika*) standpoint; from ultimate
(*paramarthika*) standpoint such distinction is untenable.
A brief description of conceptual (*visayagata*,
Advaita-Vedanta term for *savikalpaka*) perception will
help put in perspective Applebaum's (1982) reconstruction of
their notion of non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*) perception
later. Determinate perception is the result of the activity of mind
(*manas*) or *antahkarana* (literally
translated as 'inner vehicle')--the terms are
frequently used interchangeably. Advaitins maintain that the mind
(*antahkarana)* 'goes out' through the
respective sense organ (the eye, say) and pervades the object of
attention. As a result of this contact, the object presents itself as
data to the receptive mind (*antahkarana*) which,
in turn, transforms into mental state (*vrtti*)
(Bilimoria, 1980, 38). As soon as the data are presented to inner
faculty, there is an identification of consciousness associated with
the mental state (*antahkarana-vrtti*) with
the consciousness associated with the object. To say that vrtti
and data are identified is to say that the form of the mental state,
if all goes well, corresponds one-to-one with the form of the object;
the mental state is a reflection of the object of perception, and as
such is non-different from the object. Thus results a determinate
judgment (*vrttijnana*) of the form
"this is a jar". Furthermore, according to them, we do not
perceive our mental states; we directly perceive the objects
themselves. Bilimora explains,



> 
> The *vrtti* in the form of the object impresses itself as
> it were in the mode of the subject itself, and thereby comes to be
> apprehended, but as a predicate--and not as the pure
> subject-content which is the 'I-notion'--in the
> subject's apperception. (Bilimoria, 1980, 41)
> 



The initial mental state subsides and the subject becomes directly
aware of the object itself; the cognition is self-evident to the
subject, just like the cognition of pleasure and pain. In this
reflective stage, the mind (*antahkarana*)
integrates the mental contents corresponding to the object with
familiar or recognized percepts. Determinate perception of the
totality of the object occurs with the completion of the assimilative
process.



David Applebaum (1982) notes that Bilimoria's discussion of the
Advaitin's notion of perception focuses on the necessary
conditions or criteria for valid or veridical perceptions. According
to him, this approach while justified in the light of
perception's inclusion among the means of knowledge
(*pramana-s*) is mistaken because it only focuses on
sensation as a species of mental state (*vrtti*). For the
Advaitin, sensation is not a mode exhausted by the judgmental content
of a mental state (*vrtti*), it has epistemic value
independently of its role in judgmental perception. Applebaum quotes
from the Upanisadic texts to support this view:



> 
> *Manas* is for men a means of bondage or liberation ... of
> bondage if it clings to objects of perception (*visayasangi*),
> and of liberation if not directed towards these objects
> (*nirvisayam*). (Applebaum, 1982, 203)
> 



Non-conceptual perception furnishes us with knowledge of pure
existence (*sanmatra*) rather than with protodata to
construct imagined particulars. Therefore, it is not simply a prior
stage of conceptual perception and so also not necessarily a mental
state produced in cooperation with the object. Applebaum (1982, 204)
suggests that non-conceptual perception in this sense focuses
attention on sensing, in which consciousness turns its attention
inwards to the activity of the sense-organs resulting in deepening and
broadening their proprioceptive content. Proprioception, he claims,
points the way to the soul or self (*atman*); mind
(*antahkarana*) returns to its presentational
activity, its function of monitoring and unfolding the sensory
manifold to create conditions for the emergence of self
(*atman*), which according to the Advaitin, is identical
with the Ultimate reality (*Brahman*). In non-conceptual
(*nirvikalpaka*) perception, consciousness is returned to
itself and opens up the possibility of manifesting or seeing the
*Seer* (*atman*) or knowing the Ultimate reality
(*Brahman*).


## 4. Constructing Concepts or Knowing Universals?



The problem of universals, as we have seen, is at the epicentre of the
debate between Hindu philosophers and their Buddhist opponents. The
doctrine of exclusion (*apoha*) is the Buddhist attempt to
account for the relation between concepts and sensory content. The
doctrine of apoha basically claims that the term 'cow'
does not refer to the universal 'cowness' or
'cowhood' because there is no such general entity; rather,
the term refers to every individual that is not a non-cow. The
*apoha* theory of meaning is originally propounded by
Dignaga and his followers is an attempt to explain the
functioning of language, conceptual thought and inference without
appeal to real universals. For these Buddhists, universals are merely
imaginary constructs which lack causal efficacy and the awarenesses
that they produce are faint (*asphutabha*). The
unique particulars alone are ultimately real, but they do not have any
common properties, and thus cannot be brought under any concept, nor
can they be expressed by words. They are inexpressible. Dignaga
explains that language functions through what is known as
"exclusion of the other"
(*an*y*apoha*/*apoha*). This claim needs to be
unpacked. Matilal explains,



> 
> [A] word expresses a concept, and a concept, being a fiction, cannot
> POSITIVELY qualify or characterize the particular ... but it can
> NEGATIVELY disqualify the particular from being claimed by other
> fictions or concepts. Thus, construction and verbalization are to be
> understood as "exclusion" of all rival claims. If we
> associate the name cow, or the cow, with a particular, it means that
> it is not what we cannot call a cow (1971, 44-45).
> 



The idea is that the meaning of the word 'cow' is a
negation: not non-cow. If you exclude all the things that are not
cows, you have the reference of the word 'cow'. The
Hindus, in particular the Nyaya philosopher Uddyotakara and the
Mimamsa philosopher Kumarila raise many
epistemological and metaphysical objections to Dignaga's
*apohavada*. The basic problem metaphysical problem is how to
understand *apoha* as a non-existence. Both the Hindu schools
regard non-existence as a real property of a thing (absence of a pot
in a room) and therefore are not convinced that by introducing
*apohas* the Buddhist will be able to ultimately avoid reference
to universals. The epistemological issues concern how it is possible
to know *apohas* as they cannot be known by perception and any
appeal to inference would be circular. These philosophers also raise
linguistic concerns that are important because the apoha doctrine does
double duty as a Buddhist theory of meaning. First, since *apoha*
is basically an absence, the meanings of all words would be
synonymous. Second, how is it possible to learn which *apoha* a
word refers to?



More recently, two new annotated translations of primary texts, the
first by Eltschinger et al. (2018) and the second by Taber and Kataoka
(*forthcoming*) have become available. These translations
offernew insights into the debates between the Hindus and Buddhists.
In the text Kumarila takes up the linguistic concerns raised
above. He notes that if the relation between a word and a meaning is
established by not observing that the word is applied to certain
things, and one never observes what the word is applied to, then the
word simply would have no meaning at all (*Apohavada*, 75).
Kumarila developed this concern into what is known as the mutual
presupposition argument. The objection goes: If someone is taught the
meaning of the word 'cow' by being told, "The word
'cow' refers to what is not non-cow," then one must
know what a non-cow is. But how can one comprehend what a non-cow is
if one does not already know what 'cow' means. The meaning
of 'cow,' it seems, presupposes the meaning of
'non-cow,' while the meaning of 'non-cow'
presupposes the meaning of 'cow' (*Apohavada*,
83-85ab, reprinted in Taber). The *apoha* theory, as we can see
in the examples, is introduced using general terms like cow, white and
so on. The theory may seem to work in the case of general terms
because there are entities that are cow and others that are not cow,
there are entities that are white and others that are not white and so
on. But such a dichotomy does not hold in the case of every word. Sen
(2011) offers the example of the word 'all'
(*sarva*). There is no entity called 'not all'
(*asarva*), which may be obtained by negating the meaning of the
word 'all'. Nor can it be suggested that the expression
'not all' is applicable to unity, duality, etc., because
the word 'all' stands for a collection, the components or
constituents of which may be things that are one, two, and so on in
number; and once all the constituents of this collection are negated,
the word 'all' will become an empty expression (Sen, 2011,
182). Kumarila also argues that the Apohavada is unable to
account for words which designate actions, connectives like
'and', 'or' 'not' and
'but', verbal prefixes and prepositions, adjectives like
'knowable' and 'cognizable' and so on (Taber
and Kataoka *forthcoming*).



The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti (a follower of Dignaga)
takes up these concerns on behalf of the Buddhist in his
Pramanavarttikasvavrtti (PV(SV) heceforth).
Dharmakirti responds to this concern but rather than addressing
all the categories separately; he offers a general argument. He claims
that all meaningful discourse serves to rule things out: "an
utterance is inseparably related to delimitation" (PV(SV)
122-123). The point is illustrated by using examples of commands
(PVSV61, 20-26). If one desires only water and does not care how it is
brought one says "Bring water", but if one desires a pot
of water, one would have to say, 'Bring water in a pot'.
Similarly, one mentions 'water' to rule out other
substances, 'bringing' to rule out other actions. Taber
and Kataoka (forthcoming) summarise it thus: "a word is only
uttered when certain things are to be excluded by uttering it, not
otherwise, and presumably this would be true of all parts of
speech". Dharmakirti adds two other conditions. First,
words are uttered only when there is some doubt. Second, words are
almost always uttered in a sentence and their excluding function is
specified by the context and relation to other words in the context.
Dharmakirti's also responds to the first concern raised
above: aren't all words synonymous on the Buddhist view? No,
says Dharmakirti, because *apohas* are not real properties,
rather they are "differences". *Apohas* are contrasts
that distinct individuals share by differing from the same (more
exactly, qualitatively similar) other things. They are not properties
that things in themselves have by virtue of belonging to a class (say
of cows). Rather, they are absences things have in virtue of not
having certain properties. So, for example, a certain individual
-say a spotted cow--has one absence (that of being a not
non-cow) insofar as it is viewed, together with certain other
individuals as different from non-cows, and has another absence (that
of being not non-spotted) insofar as it is viewed together with
certain other not non-spotted individuals which may include cows,
horses, humans. Different words that are applied to the same object
- cow and spotted - have different meanings depending on
the corresponding differences or exclusions from other things.
Explaining these stanzas in his PV(SV)Dharmakirti
says,



> 
> Therefore, although the nature [of a particular, which might serve as
> the subject of an inference] is undivided, the
> "difference" (*visesa*) [that is,]
> distinction that is known through any "property"
> (*dharma*) [that is,] name whatsoever cannot be imparted by
> another [property or word] (because that other word would exclude
> other things). Thus, all words do not have the same meaning (25, 24-25
> ).
> 



There is an unusual view of the nature of particulars expressed in
this passage. Dharmakirti, following Dignaga, holds that
the nature of a particular is one, unified. Sometimes he expresses
this misleadingly by saying that a thing is "without
parts" or "without aspects", when what he probably
means is that the different aspects of its nature are fused into one;
they are inseparable, completely integrated. If one apprehends any
part of the nature of a thing one must apprehend the thing in its
entirety, because its nature is undivided. This is exactly what
happens in perception, a thing is grasped completely. It is only
inference (and other conceptual cognitions) we ascertain *apohas*
which are not intrinsic properties of the thing nor aspects of their
natures. Perception is always veridical owing to its direct link with
real thing, provided that all of its causes are in place. Conceptual
cognition or inference is characteristically erroneous insofar as it
mistakes the general features that it abstracts from and superimposes
on a particular for the thing in itself. Still, some conceptual
cognitions are 'correct' in a sense. Kellner clarifies the
sense in which they are correct is that they identify things correctly
and can serve as a solid basis for successful action, whereas others
are incorrect because they misidentify things and lead people astray -
identifying a mirage as a reflection caused by sun's rays is in
this sense correct, whereas identifying it as a water body is false
(2004, 2). In addition, Kellner clarifies that there is a kind of
perceptual ascertainment, over and above sensory perception, which
enables us to superimpose or ascribe features/properties of the
object. We may superimpose them correctly or incorrectly depending on
the environmental factors (lighting, distance, etc.) as well as the
cognisor's mind being focussed in ascertaining certain aspects
of perceived reality (Kellner, 2004, 42). Concepts, in this Buddhist
sense, are well-formed rules for identifying exclusions. Even though
the Buddhists talks about the awareness produced by concepts as faint
impressions, it is not meant to be taken in the sense of Hume's
ideas which are a blurry expression of the real thing. Rather, the
point is that the concepts are constructed from abstracting general
features of objects and then superimposing them back on the objects.
General features or properties cannot be known in sensory perception
as the Nyaya and the Mimamsa opponets
believe. Rather, as we see, general features can be correctly or
incorrectly superimposed on the particulars in the perceptual or
inferential ascertainments. They are correctly ascertained when they
lead to successful action, incorrectly ascertained when they lead us
astray.



In the secondary literaure discussing the apoha theory, Tillemans
(2011) draws a useful distinction between the two versions of the
apoha doctrine offerd by Dinnaga and Dharmakirti: the
top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The former is presented
by Dinnaga. According to the top-down version, the negation
operator in the exclusion, the *apoha* somehow manages pick out
real particulars in the world while avoiding any commitment to
universals. *Apoha*, in this sense functions like a sense or
meaning, a not-non X expressed by the word X, which enables us to pick
out real particulars while at the same time avoiding a commitment to
real universals in virtue of the special features of double negation.
The latter is presented by Dharmakirti who uses the causal
approach to link language and the world. According to this version of
the doctrine, *apoha* provides a way to bridge the gap between
sensory perception of particulars and expressions of belief and
judgement in thought and language. The top-down version of the apoha
doctrine was subjected to various criticisms from the Hindu realists,
especially by Kumarila who criticised the doctrine on grounds of
circularity. The thought is that in order to understand the exclusion
class of non-cows, we have to first have an idea that some particulars
are cows. In other words, one must be able to refer to cows before one
can refer to non-cows. The bottom-up approach developed by
Dharmakirti was basically a response to this circularity worry.
His version of the apoha doctrine is developed as a strategy to bridge
the gap between non-conceptual perceptual content and conceptual
content. Dreyfus (2011) develops Dharmakirti's naturalized
account of concept formation by elucidating the mediating role of
representations that link reality to conceptuality. Representations,
in this sense, stand for agreed-upon fictional commonalties and are
projected on to discrete individuals (Dreyfus, 2011, 216).



The top-down approach is promising but there is a concern that a
bottom-up account might not succeed in offering a completely reductive
story about concepts. In response to this concern, Ganeri (2011)
develops a hybrid account that combines the resources of the top-down
and bottom-up approaches. The idea is that we work up from basic
sentience and down from the language of reference and predication to
meet at the middle-ground of feature-placing in the formation of
proto-concepts (Ganeri, 2011, 244). These proto-concepts show that
sense experience can normatively constrain belief and judgement,
though it does not give us a full-blown reductive account of concepts
in non-conceptual terms.



The doctrine of *apoha* and Ganeri's hybrid version may
well be ingenious, but it is a far cry from what would satisfy the
Hindu realist. According to Nyaya-Vaisesika,
universals exist in this very world of ours. We do not need to
construct concepts from sensory content, rather universals are part
and parcel of this sensory content. Chadha (2014, 289) explains that
according to Nyaya, for a universal to exist all that is required
is that it be exemplified; in a Quinean twist - to be is to be
exemplified. There is no further requirement that it exist
independently as an abstract entity or in Plato's heaven;
universals are given directly in perception insofar as their loci are
perceived. Taber (2017) develops the Mimamsa views
about how universals are cognised. In the first verse of his
Akrtivada, the Kumarila explains what is at stake for
the Mimamsakas in the debate about universals. Unlike
the Naiyayikas, the Mimamsa philosophers are not
motivated merely by epistemological requirements, their main aim is to
defend the eternality of the Vedas. This requires that the language,
and in turn the words and their meanings are eternal. Therefore, the
meaning of a word cannot be a particular which is perishable. It must
be a universal that exists eternally. But like the Naiyayikas,
the Mimamsa philosophers believe that universals are
not merely inferred, but are directly perceived. Kumarila's
argument for the perceptibilty of universals s developed in response
to the Buddhist doctrine of apoha. To the Buddhist who says that we
cannot perceive universals distinct from particulars, because
perception can only cognise particulars. Kumarila replies by offering
example. When we perceive a man at a distance and wonder whether he is
a Brahmin or some other kind of man, we do so because we perceive the
universal humanity directly. This would be possibble if at least some
universals were not directly given in perception.



It is useful to think of a universal in this sense as a non-particular
individual (Chakrabarti, 1995). Examples abound: Dusky is what many
particulars are, though they may be spatiotemporally separated by many
miles and years; rainy is what several days of the year can be at the
same time in different places and at different times in the same
place. If we are not thinking of universals as abstract entities in
Platonic heaven or in the mind, but as individuals out there in the
world, it is easier to grasp the idea that they can be perceived. The
Nyaya equation of universals and properties might tempt one to
think that Nyaya conceives of universals as natural properties in
David Lewis' sense of the term (Lewis, 1983), but such is not
the case. Nyaya universals are as robust as Armstrong's
universals: they capture facts of resemblance and the causal powers of
things. Naiyayikas will happily endorse Armstrong's
'One over Many' argument as the main reason for including
universals in their ontology (Armstrong, 1978). Udayana puts the point
thus: "Causality is regulated by universals, so is effect-hood.
It is a natural universal if there is no obstruction [in establishing
it]; it is a conditional [nominal] universal when we have to establish
it through effort [construction?]"
(*Kiranavali*, in Prasastapada
1971, 23).



Although Gautama mentions universals in the
*Nyayasutras* as the meaning of general terms,there is
no explanation in these original *sutras* as to how they
might be known. Prasastapada was the first to argue that
universals are sensorily given. He argues that universals, when they
inhere in perceptible loci (e.g., 'cowness' in an
individual cow), are perceived by the same sense organs that also
perceive those loci (*Padarthadharmasamgraha*, 99).
This thesis is explicated in detail by Jayanta Bhatta in
*Nyayamanjari* where he argues against the
Buddhist nominalists as well as the holistic monist pan-linguist
Bhartrhari and his followers. Jayanta makes an allusion to the
view that universals are given in indeterminate perception, a view
later developed in detail by Gangesa in
*Tattvacintamani* (the chapter on
"Perception," the section on "Indeterminate
Perception"). Most of Jayanta's arguments against the
Buddhist nominalist are discussed in detail in Chakrabarti (2006),
however, he does not discuss the issue about universals being given in
indeterminate perception. This is, as we have mentioned in the above
sections, because Chakrabarti is sceptical about the coherence of the
notion of indeterminate perception. Chadha (2014) argues that
Gangesa makes a unique contribution to this debate in
proposing the idea that universals or qualifiers are given as objects
in indeterminate perception. He spells out his argument in terms of
qualifiers rather than real universals, because the logical and
epistemological role of a real universal is the same as that of a
simple nominal property. Gangesa is concerned with basic,
unanalyzable properties that can be grasped as such in our awareness.
Basic properties in this sense are simple; they can be grasped without
further qualification. They are, according to Nyaya, the
'epistemic firsts' comparable to non-conceptual perception
in Buddhist epistemology. Gangesa's argument is
presented by Bhattacharya (1993, 10-11) using a specific form of
inference (*pararthanumana*) developed in
Nyaya for convincing others. It has a five-proposition
structure:


1. Proposition: The determinate perception of the form 'a
cow' (or 'that's a cow') is produced by the
cognition of the qualifier.
2. Reason: Because this is a qualificative cognition.
3. Pervasion with an example: Every qualificative cognition is
produced by a prior cognition of the qualifier, for example,
inference.
4. Application: The perception of the form 'a cow' is a
qualificative cognition.
5. Conclusion: Hence, it is produced by the cognition of the
qualifier.



The weight of the argument rests on the third sentence.
Gangesa supports it offering various examples of
qualificative cognition, namely inference, recognition, analogy,
verbal testimony, and so on. The point is that unless some awareness
of dung is present in a person, (s)he cannot infer that there is dung
on the hill on the basis of seeing some animals grazing on the hill.
Universals like fireness and dungness are given directly in
indeterminate perception. Gangesa's argument
maintains a causal uniformity among pramana-generated cognitions
of an entity as qualified (Phillips and Tatacharya 2004, p. 398).
However, there is a problem: if anything that is known through a
qualifier requires a prior cognition of the qualifier, there will be a
regress of cognitions. Gangesa's answer is that an
indeterminate perception blocks the threat of such a regress, because
the qualifier is then grasped directly rather than through another
qualifier. In other words, the object is perceived through the
property, but the property itself is perceived directly rather than
through another property. The indeterminate perception, which precedes
the determinate perception of an object through a mode, that is, as
possessing a certain property, is not itself a perception through a
mode. Simply put, we need to grasp the universal cowness in order to
have an awareness of a particular as qualified by cowness. Chadha
(2014) argues that Gangesa's argument thus shows that
the postulate of indeterminate perception of universals is a necessary
requirement for realism.


## 5. Perceptual Illusion



The skeptics challenge strikes at the claim made by the
Naiyayikas that perception should be non-erroneous
(*avyabhichari*) and well-ascertained or free from doubt
(*vyavasayatmaka*). They ask: how do we distinguish
between veridical perceptions and the non-veridical ones? In case of a
perceptual doubt, say, seeing something at a distance which looks like
a pole or an old tree-trunk, we are uncertain which it is but are
*a priori* sure it cannot be both. In case of perceptual
illusion, I see a snake but I misperceive as there is only a rope in
front of me. Illusoriness of the experience (seeing a snake) is
exposed with reference to another veridical experience (seeing a
rope), but again, we are *a priori* sure that both cannot be
true together. Then, the Buddhist skeptic, Vasubandhu, raises the ante
with the question: could they not both be false simultaneously? The
skeptical argument is premised on a denial of the realist thesis that
experiences refer to a mind-independent reality. Vasubandhu's
argument for idealism appears right at the beginning of
*Vimsatika*, when he states:



> 
> This [the external world] is consciousness only, because there is
> appearance of non-existent things, just as a person with cataracts
> sees non-existent hairs, moons et cetera. (Feldman, 2005, p. 529).
> 



Vasubandhu offers many other examples of dreams, delusions,
hallucinations, etc., where we are aware of non-existent objects that
are products of our imagination and not objects external to the mind.
If it is possible for awareness to create its own object and then
grasp it (as in a dream) then, Vasubandhu argues, everything that we
seem to be aware of could be a making of awareness.



The standard reply to this view appeals to the intuition that illusory
experience is parasitic on veridical experience. The Naiyayika,
Vatsyayana explains that an erroneous cognition depends on a
principal cognition as its basis. "This is a man" for a
tree-trunk, which is not a man, has for its basis a principal
cognition of a man. If a man has never been perceived in the past, an
erroneous cognition of a man, in what is not a man, can never be
produced (*Nyaya-Sutra-Bhasya*, 4.2.35). A
similar argument is put forth by the Advaita-Vedanta founder
Sankara. He challenges Vasubandhu's view on the ground that
it is incoherent; when the Buddhists say "that which is the
content of an internal awareness appears *as though*
external," they are



> 
> assuming the existence of an external thing even while they deny it
> ... For they use the phrase 'as though' ...
> because they become aware of a cognition appearing externally ...
> For nobody speaks thus: Visnumitra appears like the son of a
> barren woman. (*Brahma-Sutra-Bhasya*, 2.2.28)
> 



Feldman (2005, p. 534) argues that this does not suffice to defeat
Vasubandhu's idealism. The illusory experience of *x*, no
doubt requires a memory impression which can be produced by a previous
cognition, but there is no further requirement that the previous
experience be veridical, because such impressions can be produced by
illusory experiences. Feldman uses the case of someone who has only
experienced snakes in dreams. He can mistake a rope for a snake,
because the previous dream experience provides the necessary memory
impression. Feldman's argument ignores the gravity of the
concern raised by Vatsyayana and Sankara, however. They
reject Vasubandhu's argument on the grounds that we cannot
imagine (dream, hallucinate, etc) an absolutely unreal thing, like a
barren woman's son. The Nyaya theory of imagination,
working in the background here, says that to imagine something is to
superimpose or attribute properties belonging to one kind of thing to
a thing of different kind, provided that there is some resemblance
between the two kinds of objects (Uddyotakara's
*Nyaya-Sutra-Bhasya*, 3.1.1). For example,
to imagine a centaur is to attribute a property belonging to the
human-kind to a thing of the horse-kind. There is some general
resemblance between the two kinds: both are animals and have legs.
However, an 'absolutely unreal' thing can have no
properties, and hence *a fortiori* no properties in common with
an existing thing. They, therefore, cannot be an object of
imagination.



Uddyotakara presents an even stronger argument against the skeptics.
In his *Nyaya-Varttika* he turns Vasubandhu's
own argument against him. Uddyotakara asks: how do we know that the
object of a dream experience is non-existent? Vasubandhu accepts that
the dreamer does not know that he is dreaming; the knowledge that the
object is non-existent occurs only when he awakens and no longer
apprehends the object. If non-apprehension of an object in the waking
state is required to support the claim that the objects of dream
experience do not really exist out there, then apprehension in the
waking state must be an indicator of their existence, otherwise there
would be no contrast between what is apprehended and what is not
(*Nyaya-Varttika*, 4.2.33). If there is no such
contrast, then Vasubandhu's argument fails because there is no
support for the claim that objects of dream experiences do not exist
in the external world. And, if there is such a contrast between
apprehension and non-apprehension, then at least some external objects
must exist. Clearly, Vasubandhu's argument for thesis of
universal delusion (or idealism) does not succeed completely, nor are
the realists totally defeated.



We close this entry on the note that *Sutra-s* were
primarily composed in the seven centuries from 5th BCE to
2nd CE and, thereafter, for the next millennium and more,
the philosophical work was carried forward by *Sutra*
commentators (*tikakar-s*) from respective schools.
This latter period saw these epistemological debates rage among
scholars from these schools. Note also that there is no consensus on
the dates given here; most Western scholars accept these, while Indian
schools place them further back in antiquity.