## 1. Background



Much of the most prominent philosophy in the Han period in China was
closely associated with the state. Philosophical discussions and texts
were commissioned by state or imperial representatives and
organizations, to help resolve problems or guide political action. By
the Han, there had long been a tradition of philosophy associated with
advisors to the state. Many of the most well-known philosophers in
earlier periods had been political advisors, with some notable
exceptions such as the "Dao-tradition" figures represented
in texts such as the late Warring States Period (475-221 BCE)
text *Zhuangzi*. While prior to the Han, we find a variety of
philosophical "schools" associated with different states
and individuals (as there was no imperial structure), many (but not
all) of the surviving philosophical texts from the Han are associated
in some way with the Han state. Some well-known examples of philosophy
closely linked to Han imperial concerns and issues are the treatises
of the early Han advisors Lu Jia (240-170 BCE) and Jia Yi
(200-169 BCE), the *Huainanzi*, commissioned by Liu An
(179-122 BCE), the vassal ruler of the Huainan state and uncle
of Emperor Wu of Han (156-87 BCE), the *Yantielun*
("Salt and Iron Discourses"), the account by Huan Kuan of
a series of discussions organized by Emperor Zhao of Han concerning
state production of goods, and the *Baihutong*, recounting a
similar group of imperially sanctioned discussions. It is not quite
right, however, to say that in the Han, philosophy becomes the purview
of the state. Religion, divination, medicine, and other areas of
thought all contained a great deal of philosophical content. And as we
will see, philosophical discussions in the later part of the Han were
increasingly independent of the state.



In the Han we also find the origins of the commentarial tradition on
philosophical texts. There was already an established commentarial
tradition by the time of the Han on the historical and ritual texts
known as the *Five Classics*. The commentarial tradition on the
ancient historical text *Chunqiu*, in particular, became
central in the early Han. A new commentarial tradition developed in
the Han, however, connected to philosophical texts such as the
*Analects*, *Daodejing*, *Zhuangzi*, and others.
The commentarial tradition surrounding these texts became a major
source of philosophical development throughout the rest of the history
of philosophy in China (see Makeham 2003).



An additional important feature of Han philosophy is what we might
call the "naturalistic shift". Scientific developments in
the Han, particularly in astronomy and medicine, linked philosophical
concerns to those of areas that were newly developing at the time and
more empirical in nature (see entries on
 Chinese philosophy and Chinese medicine
 and on
 science and Chinese philosophy).


## 2. Western Han (202 BCE-9 CE)


### 2.1 Political Thought: Lu Jia and Jia Yi



Political philosophy was central to the Han Dynasty from its very
beginning. In the *Han Shu* (Book of the Han), we read that the
first Han emperor, Gaozu (formerly Liu Bang, 256-195 BCE),
commissioned a number of scholars to construct texts on subjects
valuable for the operation of empire. Lu Jia (d. 170 BCE), one of
Gaozu's ministers, wrote the *Xinyu* ("New
Discussions"), the earliest extant treatise on political
philosophy and practical government of the Han period. The
organization of the text follows a pattern that would become common in
political texts throughout the period and into later Chinese history.
It begins with theoretical foundations discussing the connection of
political concerns to broader metaphysical concerns, then expands on
this to show how the practical application of political ideas
follows.



The first chapter of the *Xinyu* discusses the foundation of
the political project (and the human project more generally) in
nature, or "heaven" (*tian* Tian ), borrowing a
well-known and contentious concept from earlier Chinese philosophical
discourse. The *dao* Dao  (way) of proper action and
governance here is associated with understanding the patterns
(*li* Li ) of heaven and earth. Lu Jia offers a
"realist" conception of political and ethical principles
(which early Chinese thinkers see as continuous for the most part).
These principles are based in the mind-independent world, rather than
dependent on human construction. Of course, the distinction between
mind and world is not heavily stressed in early China. Although early
Chinese philosophers did draw a distinction between mind and body
(Slingerland 2019; McLeod 2021), we do not find the strong distinction
between mind-dependence and independence that ground conceptions of
antirealism and realism in contemporary Western philosophical
discourse. The construction of *dao* (as political and ethical
principles) is dependent on the nature of the world, including facts
about patterns (*li*) as they exist within and determine human
activity. Both "mind" and "world", that is,
are responsible for the *dao*. This is expressed in the
*Xinyu* as a matter of the ancient sages' expression of
what they discern in the cosmos/heaven (*tian*). Lu Jia gives
us a succinct explanation of this:



> 
> 
> In order to determine the Way (*dao*) of human beings, the
> first sage looked up to observe Heaven's pattern, looked down to
> examine the configuration of the ground, and then delineated the
> hexagrams Qian and Kun. The people began to become aware, understood
> the affection between father and son, right conduct between ruler and
> minister, separation between men and women, and proper order of senior
> and junior. Thereupon the numerous offices were established and the
> Kingly Way was born. (*Xinyu* 1.6, Goldin and Sabattini [trans]
> 2020: 23)
> 
> 
> 



After this initial establishment of the Way based on understanding the
patterns inherent in the world and human nature, more conventional
norms still proved necessary. All of the particular manifestations of
culture were then created by various sages, including the well-known
Confucian concepts *li* Li  (ritual) and *yi*
Yi  (appropriateness). The first stage of construction of the Way
required the coordination of the sage and the patterns of the
world--the sage had to make known and usable these patterns.
After this, a more "antirealist" conception was
offered--more conventional moral and political norms still had to
be created from this more basic and abstract conception of the Way.
The sages thus established ritual (*li* Li ) and
appropriateness (*yi* Yi ). Through the sages'
construction of institutions and social systems, as well as their
moral and political instruction, they helped people to follow the
Way.



Lu Jia did not treat ethics and politics as distinct from one another
or from human culture (*wen* Wen ) more generally. The
human *dao* includes elements we might distinguish as
political, ethical, aesthetic, etc. Thus, music and dress are
discussed in terms of "proper" and "improper",
alongside considerations of respect for elders and superiors, and
other principles that we would consider political and ethical. Neglect
of one of them would inevitably lead to decay in the others.



Following the example or direction of the sage is continually
necessary because of the human tendency to diverge from the
*dao*, according to Lu Jia (*Xinyu* 1). Seemingly
influenced by the *Xunzi* and legalist texts such as
*Hanfeizi* and *Shangjunshu*, Lu Jia held that having
the right structure between ruler and ministers was key to maintaining
order of the state and moral action. Most importantly, the ministers
who serve under a ruler must be morally upright. The ideal ruler,
following earlier Daoist and Confucian ideas, should be
"non-active" (*wu wei* Wu Wei ), employing
the right people with the proper motivations and abilities, to ensure
the commitment of the rest of society to moral activity. The ministers
work in this way as exemplars and influences on those below in
society.



Jia Yi (200-168 BCE) was a Han official who served as tutor to a
number of vassal kings associated with the Han--first to the
ruler of the distant southern region of Changsha, and later to the
ruler of the region of Liang (more on this system of government below
in discussion of the *Huainanzi*). His political thought is
presented in the text *Xinshu* ("New Writings").
Despite debates as to whether the *Xinshu* was written by Jia
or later authors in his name, we can take it as representative of an
important strain of Han political thought (Sanft 2005: 6).



The most famous section of the *Xinshu* is Jia Yi's
criticism of the Qin, the first imperial dynasty of China which
unified the "Warring States" in 221 BCE. Jia's
criticism stresses the Qin state's failure to treat the people
(*min* Min ) with sufficient consideration. The Qin's
harsh treatment of people led to the loss of the obedience required to
maintain order in a state. Jia Yi stressed that successful rule was
only possible with the consent and obedience of the people--a
position referred to as "taking the people as root"
(*min ben* Min Ben ). Jia wrote about the Qin
rulers:



> 
> 
> [They] made penalties many and punishments severe. The officers'
> handling of cases was harsh to an extreme. Rewards and punishments
> were not appropriate and taxation lacked proper measure. (translated
> in Sanft 2016: 54)
> 
> 
> 



To ensure successful rule, a ruler must govern with
"humanenness" (*ren* Ren ), a concern for the
wellbeing of the people that was a major topic of discussion in
Pre-Han Confucian texts. Unlike these earlier Confucians, however, Jia
Yi's interest in humaneness was mainly with its practical
benefits for ensuring the stability of the ruler's position.
Earlier Confucians were more concerned with the issue of moral
development and the role of humaneness in the development of the
person. Jia Yi's concern with humaneness was about political
expediency. Lacking humaneness, as he claims the Qin rulers did, will
inevitably lead to the collapse of one's rule. Securing the
cooperation and support of the people is necessary to maintain a
state, and thus the good ruler must attend to this. (Sanft 2005:
35-6) While concern for the people is necessary, Jia does not
take the assent of the people to being governed as the ground or
justification for the ruler's authority. This authority,
according to Jia, is independent of the people. The "people as
root" position developed in the *Xinshu* is fully based
in pragmatic considerations of rulership. In this way, Jia Yi links
the ideas developed in early Confucian texts with the pragmatic
"amoralism" of Legalists like Han Feizi who argued for the
appropriateness of political strategies on the basis of their success
in maintaining the power of the ruler, rather than on the basis of
moral considerations. Jia's political thought thus represents a
new trend in the Han period, one that forms the basis for the ideology
of what Dingxin Zhao calls "the Confucian-Legalist state"
(Zhao 2015). The origins of the political philosophy that would guide
Chinese dynasties through much of the rest of Chinese history are
found in the Han.


### 2.2 Correlative Metaphysics: Chunqiu Fanlu



The *Chunqiu Fanlu* is one of the earliest and most prominent
Han examples of so-called "correlative cosmology". The
text has been traditionally associated with the well-known Han court
scholar Dong Zhongshu (b. ~195 BCE), an advocate of the tradition
based on the *Gongyang* commentary on the classic history
*Chunqiu*, a text believed to be essential for understanding
philosophy. Three major commentaries on the text, *Gongyang*,
*Zuo*, and *Guliang*, offered different interpretations
and explanations of the *Chunqiu*, itself a very sparse and
direct text. Different scholastic traditions developed around these
commentaries, as groups accepted one or the other of the commentaries
as authoritative. In early China, particularly in the Han period,
intellectual "schools" are better understood in terms of
commitments to the centrality of certain *texts* rather than
commitment to certain concepts or theories.



In the *Chunqiu Fanlu* we also find the development of two
important categories--the "five phases" (*wu
xing* Wu Xing ) and *yin-yang*
Yin Yang --as well as discussion of their connection to
the concept of *qi* Qi . The ethical and political content
of the *Chunqiu Fanlu* does not differ considerably from the
standard "Confucian" views of the time as found in texts
such as those of Lu Jia and Jia Yi, so I here focus on the metaphysics
of the *Chunqiu Fanlu,* where we find its most original
contribution.



In what we can call a "naturalistic shift" in Han thought,
which began in the earlier texts of the late Warring States period
such as the *Xunzi*, we see a move toward the development of
correlative cosmology and new uses of concepts such as *qi*
(vital energy) to explain human behavior and guide ethical and
political activity.



Developing an older distinction, the *Chunqiu Fanlu* uses the
contrast of *yin* and *yang*, the qualities associated
with each, and their transformations, to make sense of properties of
the world and humans. One of the key features of this naturalistic
shift of the Han is the view that "heaven/nature and humanity
are as one" (*tian ren yi ye*
Tian Ren Yi Ye , CQFL 49.1). The principles and
patterns that explain the operation of the natural world, such as
*yin-yang* and the five phases, also explain human
characteristics, society, and conduct. There is some debate as to
whether *yin* and *yang* are something like properties
of their own that belong to objects and events, or whether they are
qualities or types of *qi*. In some parts of the text,
*yin* and *yang* are discussed as if they are particular
and concrete elements of the world, and in other parts of the text
*yin* and *yang* are discussed as features of
*qi*. The *Chunqiu Fanlu*, unlike earlier Daoist texts,
takes a partisan stance here, arguing that we should value
*yang* over *yin*. *Yang* is associated with
positive features such as virtue, humanity, and life, while
*yin* is understood as absence, and associated with the
opposing features of vice, violence, and death. This contrasts with
earlier "Daoist" texts, which generally take *yin*
and *yang* to be mutually valuable principles of change, which
should be followed as situations call for. The *Chunqiu Fanlu*
argues instead that we should "honor *yang* and denigrate
*yin*" (CQFL 43.1), and that "*yang* is
lofty, *yin* is lowly." (CQFL 43, Queen & Major 2016:
393)



Everything from the change of seasons to the movement of planets and
alternation of emotions can be understood in terms of *yin* and
*yang*. The pair gives us a way to make sense of the
constructive and deconstructive aspects involved in any change. We can
understand any change or any state as involving contrastive elements
that alternate with one another during change. These two complementary
and oppositional principles of *yin* and *yang* (not
forces or substances but something more like causally efficacious
qualities or categories) explain the movement and change of things in
the world. In most early Chinese texts, *yin* and *yang*
are given a balanced priority. They are equally responsible for the
emergence of things, each governs half of the year, the day, and
growth. The *Chunqiu Fanlu* makes the unusual move of elevating
the position of *yang*, making it responsible for a greater
amount, of more potency, and thus ultimately higher value.



In addition to *yin* and *yang,* the *Chunqiu
Fanlu* also uses the concept of the "five phases"
(*wu xing*) to understand change. The five phases are at the
center of what is known as *correlative cosmology*--the
explanation of things in the world by reference to their correlative
associations with other things. A thing is associated with a
particular phase or element, with principles of change built into the
phases or elements, as each has a transformational principle
determined by the phase into which it changes. *Xing* Xing 
is in this context generally translated as "phase" because
of this focus on change. A phase describes not only the nature of a
thing in its current state, but more importantly the future states of
this thing, that into which it transforms. In this sense, the phases
had value as *predictive* features of things. The five phases
situate things with respect to their relationships with other
things--in terms of their becoming other things, their location,
roles, and coordinating activities. Chapter 42 of the *Chunqiu
Fanlu* explains this use of the phases. After explaining the
ordering of the five phases: wood, fire, earth, metal, and water, the
chapter then discusses their relationships, in terms of
transformation, location, reciprocal activity, and reliance.



> 
> 
> Metal gives birth to fire; fire gives birth to earth; earth gives
> birth to metal; metal gives birth to water; water gives birth to wood.
> This is their father-son relationship. Wood dwells on the left; metal
> dwells on the right; fire dwells in the front; water dwells in the
> rear; earth dwells in the center. This is their father-son sequence.
> The phases receive from and distribute to one another. [...] To
> constantly rely on the father to direct the son is the Way of Heaven.
> Therefore once wood is born, fire nurtures it; once metal dies, water
> buries it. Fire delights in wood and nourishes it with yang, water
> overcomes metal and nourishes it with yin. Earth's managing of
> the affairs of fire fully expresses its loyalty. Thus the five phases
> exemplify the conduct of the filial son and loyal minister. (Queen
> & Major [trans] 2016: 367-8).
> 
> 
> 



We see here that *Chunqiu Fanlu* combines the five phases
explanation of change and interaction with *yin* and
*yang* principles. *Yin* and *yang* operate
within the five phases, and are properties of the phases explaining
their relationships to one another. It is in the *Chunqiu
Fanlu* that we find the fusion of these two previously distinct
correlative systems in an overarching correlative synthesis (even
though the synthesis is not perfect--the systems are still very
much treated separately in particular areas of the text, likely due to
the composite nature of the text).



The five phase makes possible both explanation and prediction. When we
understand the interaction of the five phases, it becomes possible to
understand how things will change, which gives us the ability to make
use of them. The phases govern activity as well, including human
activity. Through understanding the phases we come to understand which
kinds of activity will be most effective at performing certain kinds
of tasks, attaining certain kinds of ends. This is all relevant for
those in government, particularly the ruler (such people are the
text's primary audience), as understanding of the phases will
allow the ruler to properly evaluate and appraise others, knowing who
to elevate to particular positions, based on their abilities as
determined by the phases.


### 2.3 Knowledge and Method: The Syncretism of the Huainanzi



One of the major developments of the Han was the formation of what is
commonly known as "Han Syncretism", associated by some
with "schools" such as Huang-Lao and texts such as the
*Huainanzi*. The development and nature of Huang-Lao are topics
still debated by scholars (see Graham 1991; Major 1993: 10; Chen &
Sung 2015). While the syncretic or synthetic tendency, its ascent, and
its pinnacle was reached during the Han, such thinking actually had
its origins much earlier in Chinese history. In Warring States texts
such the *Guanzi* and *Lushi Chunqiu*, we find the first
developments of syncretism. It is in the Han that this trend really
takes off, and the *Huainanzi* represents its high-water
mark.



Earlier forms of syncretism involved the intentional combination of
aspects of different schools and textual traditions, such as
Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism. While we see this to some extent
in texts like the *Chunqiu Fanlu*, these forms of syncretism
were often not explicit. The *Huainanzi*, on the other hand,
openly discusses its synthesis of ideas from across previously
opposing schools and traditions. In the *Huainanzi*, we find a
specific methodology for and justification of synthesis built from a
framework using ideas primarily from the *Zhuangzi* and
*Daodejing*, but involving Confucian, Legalist, and even Mohist
ideas as well. Numerous scholars have debated the ultimate purpose of
the *Huainanzi*'s syncretism (see Goldin 1999;
Vankeerberghen 2001). Clearly there is a political aim of the overall
project. Liu An (179-122 BCE), the vassal ruler of the territory
of Huainan, brought together the scholars who constructed the text.
Liu was concerned with the ideology of empire. His primary aim was the
development of a system synthesizing the numerous and diverse peoples,
cultures, systems, languages, and ways of life throughout the still
relatively new Han empire. The ways of governance and social
ideologies of the past, Liu recognized, may have been acceptable in
the smaller-scale societies in which they developed. But these
societies were already unified by language, culture, and social norms.
Imposing the norms and ideology of a single people on others simply
would not work in a territory as large and diverse as that controlled
by the Han. What was needed was a political, ethical, and metaphysical
system that unified the variety of peoples in a single social project
while at the same time allowing for the independence and individuality
of their local approaches. What resulted from this reflection by the
committee of scholars at Liu An's court was one of the most
comprehensive and powerful syntheses in the history of human thought.
Liu An's scholars almost seamlessly combined all of the known
philosophical, political, scientific, and religious systems of their
day into one overarching explanation of the cosmos.



Ostensibly the purpose of this, according to Liu An, was to instruct
his nephew, Emperor Wu of Han, in the proper ways to maintain the
empire, unifying the people while allowing for their differences,
which would prove much more effective than attempting to eliminate
these differences or impose norms. There was likely another more
personal purpose behind the text as well. In the mid to late second
century BCE, the central Han government began moving away from an
older model of imperial control in which vassal rulers were given
independent control of distant states. These vassal kingdoms were
generally handed out to family or those otherwise demonstratively
loyal to the Han, such as Liu An, who was the uncle of the Emperor Wu.
In the early days of the Han empire, such a political structure was
necessary because of the inexperience of the Han court (or any
political entity for that matter) in administering a vast and diverse
empire. By the time of the *Huainanzi*'s construction,
however, the Han had developed the experience, organizational
structure, and centralized power to more directly administer the
various regions. The central Han government began to take direct
control of these regions, moving away from the older system of vassal
rulership. Liu An, as one of these vassal rulers in the dying years of
the practice, wanted to secure the practice in order to keep his
position and lands. Thus the pluralistic argument of the
*Huainanzi* was to a large extent also an argument to Emperor
Wu for why he should leave the vassal kingdoms intact, rather than
bringing them under the direct control of the Han.



A number of new themes in early Chinese thought are discussed in the
*Huainanzi*. The methodology of philosophy is a central concern
of the text, as discussed in the first two chapters and the final
chapter in particular. Using a framework that seems to borrow most
from Daoism (Roth 2015: 342), the text aims to create a synthesis of
not only other existing intellectual schools, but a variety of other
multiplicities. The first two chapters of the text, as well as the
final "overview" chapter offer the main structure for the
synthesis of the text, which is explored in specifics in the other
chapters (Murray 2004). The two main images used are the distinction
between root (*ben* Ben ) and branches (*mo*
Mo ), and the appeal to a unifying "pattern"
(*li* Li ). The *Huainanzi* argues that the
unification of all things is explained by the origination of all
things in "the one" (*yi* Yi ), which it
associated with *dao*. Things emerge from *dao* in
particular patterns, following *yin* and *yang* change.
We gain understanding and mastery over ourselves and nature by
following the myriad things (*wan wu* Wan Wu ) as they
develop and change, and their patterns. To do this, we must follow the
way of *tian* Tian  (heaven) rather than that of the human.
Following earlier views of texts such as the *Zhuangzi*, the
distinction drawn between *tian* and the human (*ren*
Ren ) in the *Huainanzi* is one of wide vs. narrow focus.
It seems to parallel a kind of distinction between the natural and the
human that takes what is associated with the human to be modifying
nature, with nature as the untouched and separate. The nature/human
distinction in the *Huainanzi* is not total--humanity is
ultimately seen as originating in the same source as the rest of
nature, somehow operating on the stuff of nature--which later
chapters (such as ch. 3) understand in terms of the human
"completion" (*cheng* Cheng ) of nature. In
chapter one, however, a valuation seems to be made, contrasting the
human as the narrow and flawed with the natural as the broad and pure.
A key passage in Chapter One reads:



> 
> 
> what we call nature is pure and untainted, unadorned and plain, and
> has never begun to be tainted with impurities. What we call human is
> askew because of wisdom and precedent. It is what looks back to past
> generations and interacts with the vulgar. (*Huainanzi* 1.10,
> Major, Queen, et al. [trans] 2010: 37)
> 
> 
> 



The human is associated here with desire, intention, artifice, and
agency, and contrasted with the non-agentive and
"spontaneous" activity of *tian*. We have the
ability to act as *tian* acts by following along with
*tian*. This idea is developed in the *Zhuangzi* and a
number of earlier texts, in which *tian* and *dao* are
sometimes used interchangeably. The *Huainanzi*, like Daoist
texts, locates the problem of human failure, in terms of individual
thriving, skill and achievement, knowledge, or political organization,
in the existence of specifically human *agency*. Like texts
such as the *Daodejing* and *Zhuangzi*, the
*Huainanzi* presents action in concert with nature
(*tian*) and undermining of the specifically human activity
guided by intention as the keys to ensuring success in all of the
above measures. In order to act in this way, however, we must have an
understanding of the patterns of nature, so as to align ourselves with
them.



The *Huainanzi* has a difficult balancing act to maintain here,
however. While it accepts the Daoist view outlined above concerning
the efficacy of following nature and the corrosive nature of
specifically human activity, artifice, and tools such as ritual, moral
norms, and righteousness (*Huainanzi* 2.3), it also endorses
the Confucian view of the value and necessity of ritual and other such
human inventions. This is partially explained by the account of human
development given in Chapter 2. The ancients, according to the text,
were able to act in accordance with nature, and thus did not require
the artifice of ritual, humanity, and righteousness. In later ages,
there was a decline such that ritual and the tools of humanity became
necessary. The key to using these artifacts well is to use them
consistently with the *dao*.



The main argument for synthesis of the *Huainanzi* is that the
knowledge to be gained about the world that ultimately allows one to
attain success can be best attained through understanding what is
correct in all schools and perspectives. The assumption here is that
each of the competing schools had *something* right, and was
properly responding to some aspect of the world or human life. The
mistake the various schools made was in their commitment to
*partiality*, and the idea that the aspects of the world they
had uncovered were the only ones to uncover. When we move beyond this
partiality, we recognize that each of the myriad schools, teachings,
customs, etc. have some value, if we understand the perspectives from
which they are useful and the aspects of the world they illuminate. A
key passage in Chapter Two reads:



> 
> 
> The Hundred Schools have different theories, and each has its own
> origins. For example, the relationship of Mozi, Yang Zhu, Shen Buhai,
> and Lord Shang to the Way of Governing is like that of an individual
> umbrella rib to the whole canopy and like that of an individual spoke
> to the whole chariot wheel. If you have any one of them, you can
> complete the number; if you are missing any one of them, it will not
> affect the utility of the whole. Each one thought that he alone had a
> monopoly on true governing; he did not understand the genuine
> disposition of Heaven and Earth. (*Huainanzi* 2.10, Major,
> Queen, et al. [trans] 2010: 93-94 [modified])
> 
> 
> 



The solution the *Huainanzi* offers to the partiality of the
myriad schools is to take the entirety of them, understand how they
are individually useful, and use them in the right ways. The
*Huainanzi* takes this same approach to all areas of human
knowledge, people, customs, rituals, and things in the world. The sage
aims to understand *all* of these myriad ways and to thus make
use of them, through organizing them in the proper ways. This opens up
a problem, however. How can one possibly understand *all*
schools, traditions, peoples, customs, etc? There is far too much
diversity and material in the world for any given person to know. The
*Huainanzi*'s bold claim is that one can and should
strive to attain a summative awareness of all human knowledge. How is
this possible?



The *Huainanzi* offers a number of ways out of this difficulty,
but the most developed one is the use of the distinction between
*root* (*ben* Ben ) and *branch* (*mo*
Mo ) as applied to areas of knowledge. Each of the various
schools, areas of human knowledge, and things in the world can be
considered a "branch", where the branches are connected to
one another via their grounding in the same "root". This
root can be understood as the *pattern* (*li*) of nature
that links the branches. The image of the umbrella and rib above shows
us one example of this, and there are many others in the text. A
passage in Ch. 2 reads:



> 
> 
> When the myriad things differentiate and branch off, when the hundred
> affairs proliferate and diverge, all have their foundation in a single
> root, despite their ten million branchings. (*Huainanzi* 2.11,
> Major, Queen, et al. [trans] 2010: 94)
> 
> 
> 



The key to understanding (and thus also knowing how to employ) all
forms of human knowledge is to understand the nature and pattern of
the root in which these myriad ways are grounded. The same patterns
are manifest not only in different areas of human knowledge, subjects,
people, customs, languages, etc., but also in the rest of the world.
One of the key features of Han syncretic thought and
"correlative cosmology" is the linking of the general
structure of humanity and the cosmos (*tian*), such that the
very same patterns govern both. This insight is behind much of what I
have called the "naturalistic shift" of the Han, and the
origins of much of early Chinese science in the Han period. Some
examples of this are the development of the medical tradition, found
in early texts such as the *Huangdi Neijing*, and the
systematization of astronomy, geography, calendrics, and mathematics.
The earliest texts in these areas date to the Han period, and we find
general discussions of these areas in texts such as *Huainanzi*
that attempt to organize all human knowledge. Thus we have chapters on
astronomy (*Tianwen*, ch. 3), calendrics and seasons
(*Shize*, ch. 5), and other areas of natural science.



The application of this understanding of the root, according to the
Liu An's scholars, is in managerial acumen. The ruler who
understands the root will also understand the value and role of the
variety of different regions, people, customs, languages, disciplines,
schools, and other things that make up the vast collection of things
in the empire. Only a ruler with such vast understanding could hope to
be successful in maintaining order in an empire as broad and diverse
as the Han. Thus, the art of learning the root underlying all human
knowledge is part of the art of rulership, which is the central
concern of the *Huainanzi*. As many noticed, however (and was
surely intended), this general framework is applicable beyond the case
of the ruler. The individual reader can benefit from the
*Huainanzi*'s model of learning and understanding, for
their own purposes.



One interesting feature of the *Huainanzi* is its position on
the role of humanity in completing (*cheng* Cheng ) the
cosmos, through such activity as measurement (ch.3), naming (ch. 1),
and construction of customs (ch. 11). The *Huainanzi* focuses
on the role of the human in both understanding the patterns inherent
in nature, and also in shaping and completing things on the basis of
these patterns. In comparison in particular with accounts of agency
and free will emerging in philosophical contexts of the post-Abrahamic
West, the *Huainanzi*, and Han philosophy in general, has a far
easier time squaring human activity and that of the extra-human
world.



The *Huainanzi* represents the most sophisticated expression of
the tendency toward synthesis popular in the early Han period, as well
as the high-water mark of the trend, before it began to recede in the
years after the Han political consolidation of vassal states. Despite
this, a strong current of the kind of syncretism found in the
*Huainanzi* would continue to thrive in Chinese thought,
ultimately facilitating the construction of the unique kinds of
Buddhist thought that emerged in China in later centuries, which
heavily borrowed from both Daoist and Confucian ideas.


### 2.4 Human Nature: Yang Xiong



Yang Xiong (53 BCE-18 CE) was one of the last major
philosophical figures before the end of the Western Han Dynasty, whose
life spanned into the short-lived "interregnum" period of
Wang Mang's *Xin* Dynasty (9-23 CE). Yang's
late work represents a crucial pivot point toward the new kind of
philosophical thought that would come to dominate in the Eastern Han
period. Though the naturalism of the early Han remained, later Han
thought moved back toward the kind of metaphysically sparse realism of
the pre-Han period, away from the elaborate correlative systems of the
earlier Han. Yang Xiong's *Fayan* ("Model
Sayings") returns to the style and ideas of early texts such as
the *Analects*.



While Yang's early scholarly reputation was based on his
*fu* poems (a genre of polemic poetry generally aimed at
influencing political policy during this time), his best known work
today is his philosophical work, produced later in his life. The
earlier of these texts, the *Taixuanjing* ("Classic of
Supreme Mystery") is a very much continuous with the correlative
metaphysical trends of earlier Han philosophy. The text is an
divinatory and philosophical manual in the style of the early
divination classic *Yijing*, and develops a similar correlative
metaphysics to ones found in earlier texts such as *Chunqiu
Fanlu* and *Huainanzi*. *Fayan*, perhaps his most
famous work, was one of his later works, written during period of Wang
Mang's Xin Dynasty. While this work is innovative in its return
to an older style of presentation as well as its presentation of new
theories of *xing* Xing  (human nature/inborn
characteristics), moral cultivation, and political organization,
it's legacy led to the sidelining of Yang Xiong in the later
Chinese tradition. Song Dynasty Neo-Confucians such as Zhu Xi
(1130-1200 CE) criticized Yang on the basis of what they saw as
the presumptuousness of his use of the style of the *Analects*
for the construction of *Fayan*. Because of this, Yang's
work was not included as one of the essential Confucian texts by these
later scholars, and this led to the neglect of Yang's work from
this time, given the influence of the Neo-Confucians (Nylan 2014:
2).



The correlative model of the *Taixuanjing*, as it follows in
general the kind of "Five Phases" thought found in earlier
works, is presented in the style of the *Yijing*, as short
descriptions of divinatory tetragrams. It is a notoriously difficult
text, written in the same terse, poetic, and suggestive way as the
*Yijing* itself, and its main focus is divinatory, although
Yang develops some philosophical positions in the text as well.



Arguably the most well-known of Yang's philosophical positions
is his view of *xing* Xing  (human nature/inborn
characteristics), a view later criticized by Neo-Confucians in the
Song Dynasty because of its inconsistency with Mengzi's view,
which had by that time become the "orthodox" Confucian
position. Contrary to the earlier Confucian philosophers Mengzi and
Xunzi, Yang held that human inborn characteristics contain both good
and evil, and that moral development is a matter of cultivating the
good aspects of it, while allowing the evil elements to wither. The
fact that a particular characteristic is inborn or part of our nature,
according to Yang, does not necessitate that we act according to it.
Humans have the ability (through ritual and other tools) to shape our
dispositions. Agreeing with earlier Confucians, Yang argues that what
is contained in our nature must be developed in order to become either
virtue or vice. The contents of our nature can be called good or evil,
but an individual only becomes virtuous or vicious in connection with
these characteristics once they are developed. The key passage in
*Fayan* reads:



> 
> 
> Human *xing* is a mixture of good and evil. If one cultivates
> the good aspects one becomes good, while if one cultivates the evil
> aspects one becomes evil. As for *qi*--is it not the horse
> that carries one to either good or evil? (*Fayan* 3.2,
> author's translation)
> 
> 
> 


## 3. Eastern Han (25-220CE)


### 3.1 The Development of Late Han Naturalism: Huan Tan



Although Huan Tan (43 BCE-28 CE) was a contemporary of Yang
Xiong (with whom he interacted), he can be considered the first of the
philosophers of the Eastern Han. Like Yang Xiong, Huan was associated
with the Xin court of Wang Mang, and was for this reason criticized by
a number of later figures, but unlike Yang, Huan's life and work
stretched a few years into the Eastern Han, and Huan's
reputation was salvaged to some extent by his continued service as an
official in the second Han Dynasty.



Huan Tan receives a special section here, unlike other of his
contemporaries such as Liu Xin, because of his influence on the
philosophy of the rest of the Eastern Han, both in argumentative style
and in content. In Huan's major philosophical work,
*Xinlun* ("New Discourses"), which only exists
today in fragmentary form, he offered a naturalistic and physicalistic
view of mind/spirit (*jingshen* Jing Shen ), arguing that
the spirit is dependent on and linked to the body, and that it thus
dies with the death of the body. In this way, Huan criticizes what he
takes to be superstitious views accepting the existence of ghosts or
disembodied spirits. He also objected to the popular practices of the
time of seeking of immortality through alchemy, physical techniques,
or intellectual cultivation. We cannot, Huan argued, forestall the
natural decline and ultimate death of the human organism. This
critical spirit taking aim at earlier non-physicalistic views comes to
mark a number of thinkers in the Eastern Han, most prominently Wang
Chong. Huan describes the connection between the conscious spirit
(*jingshen*) and the body (*xing*) thus, in discussing
what he takes to be the wrongheadedness of the life-extension
techniques of esoteric Daoists:



> 
> 
> The conscious spirit inhabits the body as a flame does a candle. If
> the candle is properly tended and turned so that it follows the flame
> need not be extinguished until the candle is all used up. Of course,
> if the candle has no flame, it cannot become active in the void, nor
> can its ashes be lighted later. (fragment from *Hongming Ji*
> 5.18, Pokora [trans.] 1975: 76-77).
> 
> 
> 



While the literature of criticism had long been a part of Chinese
intellectual culture, in Huan's work we begin to see more direct
and incisive criticism, rather than the carefully expressed, indirect,
and suggestive criticism we see earlier in the Western Han, when
*fu* poetry was a dominant form of presentation of critique and
literary subtlety and indirectness were prized. Such indirect
criticism through *fu* poetry was still practiced in the
Eastern Han, by masters of the art such as Cai Yong, but the more
direct critical literature of scholars like Huan Tan came to play a
larger role in this period. Huan's critical stance undermined
many earlier traditional practices, such as divination, and he does
not, unlike many previous thinkers, rely on historical precedent and
appeals to the figures of the past. This aligns him to some extent
with the realist pragmatism of the Legalists, although it is incorrect
to see Huan in terms of this older school designation that had no
cache in the Han. His thought is representative of the critical,
rationalist, and more insistently naturalist mode of thinking that
became more prominent in the Eastern Han. Huan and others criticized
what they saw as the excesses of the metaphysics of correlative
cosmology of the Western Han, and its tendency to proliferate entities
in its ontology, many of which Huan thought were imaginary.
Huan's critical style is clearly echoed in later thinkers of the
Eastern Han such as Wang Fu and Wang Chong. Particularly in his
approach to the classical texts, we find influence on later thinkers
such as Wang Chong. Huan advocated a piecemeal approach rather than
acceptance or rejection of a text as a whole. We should accept what is
true and reject what is false in the writings of the past.



> 
> 
> Although there are unfounded and outrageous passages in...those
> other books, we must use what is best in them. How dare we talk of
> rejecting them completely? (*Xinlun*, Pokora [trans.] 1975:
> xvi, 2)
> 
> 
> 



Huan's political and ethical program followed this critical and
piecemeal approach. While he did not, as early Legalists such as Han
Feizi, completely reject the way of the sages of the past as a guide
for current political practice, he did follow the Legalists in holding
that the features of current situations should ultimately determine
practice, and that at least some of the models of the past should be
rejected.


### 3.2 New Methods in Epistemology and Metaphysics: Wang Chong



While the critical and naturalistic thought of Huan Tan is only today
known through fragments, we have far more material from Wang Chong
(27-100 CE), a somewhat similar thinker of the Eastern Han whose
work was likely influenced by Huan. While Wang Chong was a somewhat
marginal figure in his time (a situation about which he complains in
his work), his thought became influential indirectly in later years,
particularly in the leadup to the *Xuanxue* movement in the
Wei-Jin period. Wang's writing was not only voluminous, but
contained a wealth of historical references, quotes, and citations of
earlier thinkers. Wang apparently studied a wide range of texts, and
wrote about many of them. Thus, his work survived mainly due to being
collected and used as a kind of encyclopedia by figures in the late
Han and Wei-Jin periods. A number of these figures became prominent in
the "*Qingtan*" (pure talk) discussion movement
that preceded *Xuanxue*, and Wang's ideas influenced the
movement via this direction (see McLeod 2020).



Wang's most original contributions were his views on methodology
and criticism, truth and knowledge, and human nature and agency. A
number of scholars have written in recent years on Wang's views
on these topics (including Klein & Klein 2016; McLeod 2018; and
Song 2020).



Wang developed a critical method he referred to as *wen nan*
Wen Nan  ("questioning and challenging"), built of
two parts (*Lunheng* 28). According to Wang, to discern the
truth in the texts of the sages of the past, we begin with an
investigation of their words, subjecting them to questioning so as to
clarify them. The statements or teachings (*yan* Yan )
found in texts that are unclear or interpretively ambiguous, Wang
claims, should be subjected to clarifying questioning. This
questioning aims to remove any lack of clarity and derive a position
that can be evaluated on its merits. Once we have clear and evaluable
statements, we can then apply the method of "challenging",
which more directly evaluates statements by presenting them with
counterexamples, looking for cases in which they do not hold, testing
their plausibility, considering their practicability, etc. Wang offers
a general statement of the need for this method in his chapter
"Questioning Confucius", in which he criticizes his
contemporaries for their unwillingness to challenge the words of sages
of the past:



> 
> 
> When the worthies and sages wrote their works, they used their
> thoughts to make a detailed investigation of things. We cannot say
> that they completely attained the truth (about everything) even then.
> Given this, how could it possibly be that their everyday and idle
> statements are completely true? These statements cannot all be true,
> but the people of today don't know how to challenge them. Or if
> some of these statements are true and the ideas imparted are unclear
> and hard to make out, the people of today do not know how to question
> them. (*Lunheng* 28.1, author's translation)
> 
> 
> 



According to Wang, this inability is in part explained by the
unwillingness of scholars to innovate and to break with the sages. In
the chapter *Duizuo* (Replies on Creation), Wang confronts the
commonly held view, expressed in the *Analects* of Confucius,
that it is best to transmit the teachings of the ancient sages rather
than to create or innovate. "Creation" (*zuo*
Zuo ) as such was looked at in a negative way in the Han, despite
a wealth of innovation in this period. Using his proposed method, Wang
aimed to distinguish true (*shi* Shi ) statements from
false (*xu* Xu ) statements. Wang understood false
statements as ones that tend to have a grip on us for a variety of
reasons. Wang was not concerned with falsehoods that we have no
inclination to believe, but rather with ones that have an intrinsic
attractiveness. He argued that "flowery" (*hua*
Hua ) words have this feature, attracting us due to their style,
rather than their veridicality. A whole host of human biases
contributes to making certain kinds of falsehoods attractive to us. In
addition to having a preference for flowery words, we are also
inclined toward those statements and teachings that present us in a
good light, feeding our sense of superiority, our vanity, or advancing
our personal interests. It is this category of statement for which
Wang reserves the category of "false" (*xu*), using
a term that also has the sense of "empty". *Xu*
statements are attractive statements that lack the important features
that make statements true. What makes a statement true (*shi*)
is that it has the features we *generally* seek in evaluating
statements, rather than only in particular cases with certain options
attractive to us. These features will be different depending on the
kind of statement we are evaluating. A true moral statement will have
different truth-making features than a statement of medicine or
geology.



Another important issue dealt with in Wang's work is that of
human nature or inborn characteristics (*xing* Xing ), which
is intertwined with a number of concepts, including agency and
allotment (*ming* Ming ). Wang develops an account of human
agency that is remarkably innovative for his time, drawing a contrast
between agency and "spontaneity" or self-action
(*ziran* Zi Ran ). Wang is concerned with the ways in
which the kind of moral cultivation discussed in earlier texts such as
those of the Confucians can make a difference in human behaviors and
in the outcomes resulting from these behaviors. Can we, through the
kinds of practices the Confucians enjoin, rectify and change our
behavior so as to produce different effects than those that otherwise
would have resulted? To accept that human activity can make such a
difference in the world seems to conflict with another idea of
antiquity, that all of us are bound by our allotment (*ming*),
which is governed by the world. Wang attempts to square these two
conflicting ideas in numerous chapters of the *Lunheng*.



According to Wang, human inborn characteristics (*xing*) are
determined by the allotment (*ming*) provided to humans by
nature. This process is one absent of agency of any kind, and happens
"spontaneously" (*ziran*). Wang uses the image of
generation in nature to describe such spontaneous or non-agentive
activity. The act of human procreation, for example, displays both
agentive and non-agentive features. While individuals decide to engage
in the procreative act, the generation of the embryo that becomes a
child happens spontaneously (*ziran*), without effort and
intention. Wang seems to go even further than this toward determinism,
however. He writes that even human behavior is ultimately determined
by non-agentive features of the world, even bypassing the inborn
characteristics generally taken to explain our behavior, and itself
determined by non-agentive features of the world. Wang writes, in the
*Zhiqi* (Periods of Government) chapter of
*Lunheng*:



> 
> 
> When grain is sufficient and there is enough to eat, adherence to
> ritual and righteousness are born in the heart. When ritual flourishes
> and righteousness is abundant, the foundations of peace are
> established. Therefore in the spring of a year of famine, one does not
> even feed one's relatives, whereas in the autumn of a year of
> abundance, one calls together one's neighbors from the four
> directions to feast. Not to feed relatives is evil conduct, while to
> call together neighbors from the four directions is good, righteous
> conduct. The formation of good or bad conduct is not a matter of the
> substantive character of the person (*zhi xing*
> Zhi Xing ), but is rather a matter of the collection of grains.
> (*Lunheng* 53.6, author's translation)
> 
> 
> 



While attributing human behavior to such non-agentive external
circumstances, Wang also makes room for inborn characteristics
(*xing*). These characteristics, which differ by individual on
the basis of that individual's allotment (*ming*) from
nature, determine the moral quality of a person's actions. Wang
writes:



> 
> 
> ...in the natural characteristics of persons there is good and
> bad, just like concerning the talents of persons there is high and
> low.....Natural characteristics and the receipt of one's
> allotment (*ming*) are one in the same. Allotment determines
> whether one is wealthy or impoverished, natural characteristics
> whether one is virtuous or vicious. (*Lunheng* 13.19,
> author's translation)
> 
> 
> 



In linking inborn characteristics concerning the moral quality of
behavior to naturally allotted features such as certain kinds of
talent, Wang attempts to explain the origins of character in terms of
ultimately spontaneous, non-agentive aspects of the world. Despite a
seemingly deterministic view of human activity, however, Wang attempts
to make room for agency and the efficacy of human activity in altering
patterns. Wang argues that moral education can play a role in
transforming human behavior, through transforming one's
character, and this involves concerted effort (agentive effort) on the
part of the individual (*Lunheng* 5). Wang recognizes that on
the face this view seems to conflict with his statements of
determinism elsewhere. To attempt to solve this problem, he relies on
a distinction between three types of allotment (*ming*). In
some earlier texts, *ming* is understood in a more clearly
deterministic way, which is why we commonly see the term translated as
"destiny" or "fate". Wang abandons this strict
determinism here. Human agency can play a role in certain types of
allotment and not others. Wang writes:



> 
> 
> Tradition says that there are three types of allotment: natural
> allotment, consequent allotment, and incidental allotment. Natural
> allotment is said to be when good outcome issues from the original
> constitution of itself. Based on natural characteristics in themselves
> the bones are healthy, therefore one does not have to move away from
> and transform one's conduct to seek good fortune, but a good
> outcome is achieved from one's own characteristics. This is why
> it is called natural allotment. Those with consequent allotment exert
> effort to control their conduct and through this achieve good fortune
> and outcome. If they were to allow free rein to their emotions and
> desires they would come upon misfortune. This is why it is called
> consequent allotment. As far as those with incidental allotment, their
> conduct is good but they obtain evil, and they are without any hope
> for help. Meeting with incident externally, they obtain misfortune.
> This is why it is called incidental allotment. (*Lunheng* 6.4,
> author's translation)
> 
> 
> 



The role of agency is emphasized in the second of these three types of
allotment, consequent allotment (*sui ming* Sui Ming .
We begin with a natural allotment (*zheng ming*
Zheng Ming ) such that particular features of our lives are
determined. This allotment can be altered either by human effort
(which gives us consequent allotment) or meeting with accidents in the
world--incidental allotment (*zao ming* Zao Ming ).
While human agency can alter our allotment and thus the outcomes of
our lives and behaviors, the scope and effect of this activity is
still limited by our natural allotment. Indeed, Wang argues that this
external limitation is key to understanding the value and effect of
moral instruction and cultivation. This is the case for both
individual moral self-cultivation and for the moral instruction of the
people by the state and the ruler. Wang writes, in his discussion on
government in the chapter *Zhiqi* (Periods of Government):



> 
> 
> A good doctor is able to use needles and medicines and is successful
> in his arts when he meets with a person who has not yet died who has
> an illness that does not lead to death. If the person's illness
> is terminal, the doctor can do nothing, even if he is a master. The
> allotment connected to a serious illness is such that it cannot be
> cured, just as disorder among the people cannot be undone. Medicine
> cures illness just as instruction guides and pacifies the people. They
> are both a matter of allotment (*ming*) and the times, and
> cannot be attained by ordering or using force. (*Lunheng* 53.3,
> author's translation).
> 
> 
> 


### 3.3 Ban Zhao and the Scholarship of Women



Ban Zhao (c. 45-116 CE) is an interesting figure in early
Chinese history for a number of reasons. The younger sister of the Han
court historian Ban Gu and the grandniece of the famous concubine
known as Ban Jieyu (*jieyu* being a rank title) noted for her
scholarship, Ban Zhao had an unusually scholarly upbringing for a
woman of the era. She became an important scholar of the period,
composing numerous works on ethics, politics, history, and astronomy.
Her most well-known works are the *Nujie* (Instructions
for Women), a guide to norms concerning virtue and conduct for women,
and her completion of the official court history of the Western Han,
the *Han Shu*, after her brother Ban Gu died in prison in 92 CE
before its completion.



The *Nujie* is a compendium of norms for women, social and
moral, in line with traditional Confucian views. One of these views
was that virtue was relative to role and position in society. Not only
would a virtuous ruler and a virtuous servant look different because
of their different ways of manifesting particular kinds of virtue, but
the virtues exemplified by the virtuous ruler and servant were
different. There was a heavy focus in early Confucianism on roles
connected to relationships, with the central relationships in human
life being seen as those between parent and child, ruler and servant,
and husband and wife--part of the so-called "Five
Relationships" (*wu lun* Wu Lun ). Ban's
*Nujie* focused specifically on the virtues proper to the
woman *as wife*, that is, mainly in relationship to her
husband, and to a lesser extent toward her children. As with
discussions of role norms for other individuals in Confucian texts,
the focus in the *Nujie* is very much on the
responsibilities of the wife toward the husband. The earlier Western
Han author Liu Xiang's *Lienu Zhuan*
("Biographies of Exemplary Women") contained many examples
of virtuous women, including Ban Zhao's ancestor Ban Jieyu. It
seems that despite the focus on presenting women as ideally
subordinate in key ways to men, particularly with respect to a
husband, there was no strict regulation against women engaging in
scholarship. Indeed, Ban's description of her own situation and
her motivation for writing the *Nujie* gives us a window
onto the lives and expectations of women in the Eastern Han
period:



> 
> 
> ...at the age of fourteen I was in charge of the work of dustpan
> and broom in the Cao family. Now, more than forty some years have
> passed; during these years, trembling with fear, I was constantly
> afraid that I may be dismissed or humiliated. Such an incident, if it
> happened, would have brought disgrace upon my parents and burdened
> members of my husband's family, as well as my natal family.
> [...] It grieves me to see you, my daughters, who have just
> reached the age of marriage, to not have been gradually taught more
> nor have you learned proper rituals of being a married woman.
> [...] For this reason, I have composed the seven chapters of the
> *Nujie*. (Preface to *Nujie*, Pang-White
> [trans.] 2018: 41)
> 
> 
> 



While it is interesting and unique in the history of this period to
see women associated with scholarship as these two famous women of the
Ban family, the virtues of women according to these texts were very
different than those of men in most roles, with perhaps the exception
of the role of subordinate to ruler. It is also important to note
that, while the responsibilities of women, according to texts like the
*Nujie*, tends to be other-directed in nature, most of the
responsibilities of men share these features as well. One has the
responsibility to subordinate oneself to people such as parents,
superiors in society, and the ruler, whether man or woman. The end
goal of this is both social harmony and a good name, in terms of
contribution to overall harmony (*Nujie* 7, Pang-White
[trans.] 2018: 64).



According to Ban, humility is one of the main virtues women should aim
to cultivate. Humility here is understood as "putting others
before oneself" (*xian ren hou ji*
Xian Ren Hou Ji ). This seems to be an extension of
the view expressed in the *Analects* of Confucius (12.1), that
"restraining the self and returning to ritual" is the key
to developing virtue. Despite Ban's following of traditional
norms throughout the *Nujie*, there are certain passages
where we see criticism of common practices of her society, including
the neglect of education of women and girls. She writes:



> 
> 
> ...only to educate men and not to educate women--are they
> not being partial in their treatment of the two sides? According to
> the *Liji*, at the age of eight, children should begin
> receiving instruction on the classics. At the age of fifteen, they
> should receive an adult education. Why is women's education
> alone not following this as a principle? (*Nujie* 2,
> Pang-White [trans.] 2018: 48)
> 
> 
> 


### 3.4 Politics of Reclusion: Wang Fu



The work of Wang Fu (82-167 CE) represents one of the strains of
Confucian thought that began to gain new ground in the Eastern Han as
the dynasty went into decline leading toward the series of
catastrophes that would end with the collapse of the Han in the late
second and early third centuries CE. The tradition of social criticism
had long been part of Confucian scholarship, but Wang Fu's work
*Qianfulun* (Discourses of a Hermit) revived the theme of
Confucian reclusion, a controversial idea, though one suggested in
texts such as the *Analects* itself. Perhaps the most famous
example of such reclusion (in Wang's time and our own) was that
of the Warring States Period scholar Qu Yuan (c. 340-278 BCE),
the subject and purported author of the poems of the Han period
compilation *Chuci* (Songs of Chu). Qu Yuan, faced with the
decline of society past the point of reformation, went into exile in
the distant wilds, composing his laments including the famous poem
*Li Sao* (compiled in the *Chuci*), and eventually
committing suicide by drowning himself in the river as a final act of
righteous protest (see Berkowitz 1992; Schneider 1980).



Wang Fu's *Qianfulun* is in part a revival of the
approach of Confucian disengagement, offering a solution to the
tension between social concern and personal virtue. Early Confucians,
hundreds of years before Wang Fu's time, stressed the importance
of strong commitment to the development and moral rectification of
society as a whole. The morally developed person, according to these
thinkers, has a commitment to the community that is not contingent on
the goodness of the community. This must be the case for all of the
communities that one is part of and that make up vital facts about who
one is--the state, the village, the family. One cannot abandon or
turn one's back on a corrupt or vicious family, but instead must
put their effort into trying to rectify this community. To do less
than this would be a failure of one's humanity. We find many
passages in the early texts committing to such a view (for example
*Analects* 4.18). At the same time, we find an alternative
response developed in these same texts, including the
*Analects* (8.13; 15.6) and *Xunzi* (32.7). The
committed and morally developed person has a responsibility to take an
active role in the community when the times (*shi* Shi )
are such that either the moral way prevails or it is possible that one
can bring it about. But when the times are such that the moral way is
abandoned and it is impossible to bring it about, the morally
developed person should stay away from taking an active role, lest
they become morally soiled.



In the late Han, the theme of disengagement and reclusion due to
morally corrupted government, which had been popular in the Warring
States but had declined through the years of the earlier Western and
Eastern Han, was revived, with thinkers like Wang Fu at the forefront
of this movement. Wang Fu's advocacy of retreat from society is,
like those of the Confucian recluses of the past, ultimately aimed at
restoring virtue to society. Wang recognized that when a community
passes a certain threshold of viciousness and disorder, it is not
possible for the individual to transform it. The only possible outcome
in such a case, if the individual engages with the society, is for the
individual to be transformed, to become vicious and disordered like
the community. Despite the loftiest intentions and the most developed
character, one cannot withstand the transformative power of the
community. Thus, remaining within a corrupt community with the
intention of changing it would lead only to the corruption of the
individual rather than the moral salvation of the community.



Wang Fu's response is to advocate continuation of the work of
attempting to morally rectify the community, from the outside, through
such activity as scholarship and writing. Even if this is for the
benefit of future generations rather than one's own, one's
responsibility to the community and commitment to it should not
diminish even when one is forced to withdraw from society due to its
viciousness. While the theme of Confucian reclusion is perhaps the
most important aspect of Wang Fu's work, we find a number of
other standard Confucian ideas developed in the *Qianfulun*,
including views on rulership, virtues, learning, ritual, and even some
further development of the correlative metaphysics of the earlier
Han.


### 3.5 Philosophy of Language: Xu Gan on Name and Actuality



Xu Gan (170-217 CE) might be considered the last major
philosophical figure of the Han period. He was one of a group of
scholars active in during the *Jian An* reign period
(196-220 CE) in the late Han, during which the Han emperor was a
mere puppet and figurehead, and the region was torn in warfare between
competing warlords such as the famous Cao Cao (whose son would
establish the Wei state in 220 CE), Liu Bei (who established a new
state also named Han, today referred to as Shu Han, in the same year),
and Sun Quan (who founded the state of Wu). Known as the "Three
Kingdoms", these states would vie for supremacy for almost a
century, until the reunification by the Jin Dynasty in 280 CE. This
was one of the most famous periods of Chinese history, immortalized by
the fourteenth century CE writer Luo Guanzhong's classic novel
*Sanguo Yanyi* ("Romance of the Three Kingdoms").
Xu Gan was one of the scholars known as the "Seven Masters of
Jian An". Five of the seven died in the plague of 217 CE,
including Xu Gan, only 47 years old at the time.



While he was concerned with many of the standard Confucian issues,
such as the efficacy of ritual, the need for moral self-cultivation,
and creating proper moral motivation (among others), his most unique
contribution was in the area of language, particularly in the
consideration of the connection between language, reality, and moral
behavior. Xu followed the kind of critical evaluative methodology
developed by philosophers such as Huan Tan and Wang Chong. A number of
the essays of his major work, *Zhonglun* (Discourses Hitting
the Mark), focus on criticisms of common views and practices Xu saw as
ultimately harmful to the individual and society, such as
"disputing" without aiming at truth. In a passage
reminiscent of Wang Chong, in his chapter *Hebian* ("An
Examination of Disputation"), Xu writes:



> 
> 
> What the vulgar person calls "disputation" is not
> disputation at all. That he should call it disputation, though it is
> not, is probably because he has heard the name
> "disputation" but does not know its actuality.
> Accordingly, we regard this as preposterous. The person who is
> commonly referred to as "disputer" is, in fact, a glib
> person. The glib person readily embellishes the tone of his voice and
> multiplies his retorts, just like the onset of a gale, or the downpour
> of a rainstorm. Disregarding the inherent rights and wrongs of a
> situation, and not understanding the principles of truth and
> distortion, he fixes it so that he is never at a loss for words and
> works at securing certain victory. [...] Disputation is about
> persuading people in their hearts; it is not about verbal submission.
> Hence disputation is to articulate distinctions, and also to separate
> and distinguish different categories of affairs skillfully, so as to
> arrange them clearly. Disputation does not mean being quick-witted in
> one's words and speech to talk over people's heads.
> (*Zhonglun* 8.1, Makeham [trans] 2002: xxiv-xxv)
> 
> 
> 



Xu's theory of the connection between names (*ming*) and
actualities (*shi*) drew on but further developed earlier views
of the efficacy of language in moral development. Names, or terms,
should be applied to things in particular ways that suggest proper
uses. We can improperly apply names when we apply them not with the
aim of communal harmony or individual moral instruction, but with the
aim of advancing our own reputations or selfish interest. When we use
names in these unsatisfactory ways, this reduces their efficacy in
creating the kinds of motivational effect that is the fundamental use
of names. The key in using names correctly is to ensure that names are
tied to the actualities with which these names are associated. Xu
describes the connection between name and actuality:



> 
> 
> A name is that which is used to name an actuality. When an actuality
> has been established, its name follows after it; it is not the case
> that a name is established and then its actuality follows after it.
> Thus if a long shape is established, then it will be named
> "long", and if a short shape is established, it will be
> named "short". It is not the case that the names
> "long" and "short" are first established and
> then the long and short shapes follow after them. That which Confucius
> valued were those "names" which truly name actualities. In
> so valuing names, he thereby valued actualities. Names are tied to
> actualities just as plants are tied to the seasons. In the spring,
> plants blossom into flower; in summer, they are covered in leaves; in
> autumn, their foliage withers and falls; and in winter, they bear
> fruit. This is not acting for a specific purpose and yet the plant
> completes itself. If a plant is forced, its natural tendencies will be
> harmed. It is the same with names. Hence, false name makers are all
> those who would harm names. People are aware only of the good that is
> done by names and are ignorant of the bad that is done by false name
> makers. (*Zhonglun* 11.5, Makeham [trans.] 2002:
> 149-150)
> 
> 
> 



Actualities (*shi* Shi ), for Xu Gan, are independent of
human activity and "established" (*li* Li ) by
the world itself. John Makeham defines Xu Gan's conception of
actuality as



> 
> 
> a state of development peculiar to an entity or state of affairs by
> virtue of which that entity or state of affairs is what it is.
> (Makeham 1994: 27)
> 
> 
> 



A name or term is attached naturally to this--while our language
is in some sense conventional, actualities are described by particular
names independently of the way we accord these names to objects.
Xu's example in the above passage of "long"
demonstrates this. When we describe a particular object as
"long", we use an already existent term, with an
independent meaning, to describe a particular actuality. The
connection between this name and the actuality of an object is
determined independently of our determination. We can choose to
correctly use the term "long" to describe the object or
incorrectly use the term "short", but the latter term does
not match the actuality of the long object (setting aside here the
issue of the issue of the conventional or comparison-relative nature
of concepts such as long and short). A name, according to Xu, follows
or it attached naturally to a particular actuality, and to improperly
use a name (to call the long thing "short", for example)
is to damage the nature (*xing* Xing ) of that name. Its
nature is damaged due to improper associations based on incorrect use.
When we use the term "short" to describe things that are
long, this throws people into confusion concerning the term
"short" as well as the term "long". We can no
longer clearly describe the actualities of things, because of the
obfuscation of associations. Using the term "short" will
after time become unable to express the actuality, as its application
to things without the actuality corresponding to the name will become
part of the accepted or expected usage of the name, and the name will
lose its proper meaning. "Short" will come to mean
"long" to some, "short" to others, and
"an open question as to long or short" to many as
well.



For Xu, as for Confucians more generally, creating confusion
concerning names is most harmful because it impedes the process of
moral cultivation and maintenance of social harmony. One important
source of incorrect use of names is disputation by those seeking to
gain a name for themselves rather than seeking the truth. When
one's goal is simply to look better than others in disputation,
respecting the connection between names and actualities is not
important. Those whose focus is on disputation for this reason are
dangerous. Proper disputation, according to Xu, aims to attain truth
so as to achieve individual and social moral development. Xu
writes:



> 
> 
> The glib person readily embellishes the tone of his voice and
> multiplies his retorts, just like the onset of a gale, or the downpour
> of a rainstorm. Disregarding the inherent rights and wrongs of a
> situation, and not understanding the principles of truth and
> distortion, he fixes it so that he is never at a loss for words and
> works at securing certain victory. [...] The words used in
> disputation should be terse and to the point, unconvoluted and
> informative. The tempo of their delivery needs to be modulated so that
> they do not transgress the ritual teachings and their import should
> serve as a worthy complement to those teachings. (*Zhonglun*
> 8,1. Makeham [trans] 2002: 99-100)
> 
> 
> 



Instead of looking to further one's reputation by means of
duplicitous application of names and thus reducing the efficacy and
meaning of names, one should strive to cultivate virtue (*de*
De ), which is the actuality of the exemplary person
(*junzi* Jun Zi ). With the elevation of one's
actuality, both reputation and authority will increase naturally (as
moral influence is gained with name and fame).



As with previous Confucian thinkers, Xu recognizes that those who are
authentically virtuous are not always successful. Indeed, he thinks
that the situation in the Eastern Han is such that those with the
highest positions are far from virtuous. He explains this in the
standard Confucian way by explaining that the times (*shi*)
make a difference, and that even the most virtuous scholar will not
meet with fortune if encountering the wrong time. What constitutes the
time (*shi*) is a matter of communal habits, beliefs, quality
of rulership, and natural state. If one is born into a time of decay
in a state, with weak and unvirtuous leadership, disasters like
drought, and communal apathy, then one will likely not advance to a
high state of reputation, even with the highest virtue. This is a
situation that Confucians from the earliest times worried about, and
we see it discussed in all of the thinkers mentioned here from the
Eastern Han as well. Echoing Wang Fu, however, Xu Gan holds that if
the times are such that the virtuous person cannot thrive in society,
one should abandon society and focus on developing his own qualities
(Makeham 1994: xii).



Xu Gan uses the structure of *ben-mo* Ben Mo  (roots
and branches) developed in earlier Han texts such as the Huainanzi to
explain the relationship between virtue (*de* De ) and
human arts (*yi* Yi ). He reverses what we see in thought
of Jia Yi, who takes virtue to be an adornment and guide for
governing. Xu argues that the arts (including ritual and even
presumably governing) cannot be perfected without virtue. At the same
time, he asserts that virtue also cannot be completed (*cheng*
Cheng ) without the arts. The two are interdependent
(*Zhonglun* 7.1).



One aspect of Xu Gan's thought which have led some to declare
him (and some similar Han thinkers) as a "Legalist"
(*fajia* Fa Jia ) philosopher is his endorsement of
the view that timely and consistent reward and punishment are
essential tools for governing, shared by Warring States legalist
thinkers such as Han Feizi, Shang Yang, and Shen Buhai (Makeham 1994:
264, *Zhonglun* 19). While, as I mention above, school
categories are of limited use in categorizing Eastern Han thinkers, Xu
certainly has much more in common with early Confucians than with
Warring States Legalists, even though it becomes more popular in the
Eastern Han to adopt the Legalist position concerning reward and
punishment.


## 4. The Transition to Three Kingdoms and Wei-Jin



Toward the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty and into the fractious
"Three Kingdoms" period, a commentarial and collective
scholarly literature surrounding Confucius (rather than later
exponents of the tradition such as Mengzi or Xunzi) became popular. A
number of volumes emerged that collected (and added) stories about
Confucius and extant sayings purported to be of Confucius, from a
number of earlier sources. Two of these volumes, the *Kongzi
Jiayu* (Discussions of the Confucius School) and *Kong
Congzi* (Collected Sayings of Confucius) were compiled just after
the end of the Han Dynasty, during the revolts of the Three Kingdoms
period, by the Cao Wei court scholar Wang Su (195-256 CE). This
compilation was part of a general concern with and debate surrounding
commentaries on the classics. It became common in the modern period to
dismiss Wang Su's collections as "forgeries", but
this makes little sense, given that Wang's compilations drew
together passages from a host of other well-known sources. The
commentarial tradition on such texts as the *Analects* and
*Laozi* took hold in the Han, with one of the most famous
commentarial collections, the *Lunyu Jijie* ("Collected
Explanations of the *Analects*") produced by a team of
Cao Wei scholars associated with He Yan, who played a major role in
the development of the *Xuanxue* (Neo-Daoist) movement in the
Wei-Jin period.



A number of other important texts dealing with philosophically
important topics were written or compiled in the Han as well. The
etymological dictionary *Shuowen Jiezi* of Xu Shen
(58-147 CE) had a major influence on later understandings of
important philosophical terms, despite its sometimes fanciful and
questionable etymologies, and is still consulted today. The
*Baihutong Delun*, an account of an important council held in
58 CE, was compiled by Ban Gu, brother of Ban Zhao and the primary
author of the *Han Shu* (Book of the Han). In addition, it is
in the Eastern Han that we see the first references to Buddhism, a
religious and philosophical tradition that would come to play an
enormous role throughout the rest of Chinese history. Though knowledge
of Buddhist teachings seems to have been relatively limited at the
time, we find references to the Buddha as a seemingly Daoist-like
figure. In the minister Xiang Kai's (d. 184 CE) memorial to
Emperor Huan in 166 CE, recorded in the *Hou Han Shu*, we find
one of the earliest references to Buddhism. Discussing an image of the
Buddha found in the palace, Xiang gives a brief account of Buddhist
views and links them with the Huang-Lao teachings, focusing on
emptiness, eliminating desires, and "non-forced action"
(*wu wei* Wu Wei ).



Moving into the Three Kingdoms and the Wei and Jin periods, we see the
rise of Buddhist thought (and philosophy) in China and the development
of "religious Daoism", as personal and individual concerns
start to take central stage, over the communal and political concerns
that had been central to earlier periods of Chinese history. The
reasons for this shift are not altogether clear, but one plausible
story is that the breakdown of Han government and the roots of the
shift to the internal with its roots in Eastern Han withdrawal and
culminating in Xuanxue thought of figures like Guo Xiang
(252-312 CE) and Wang Bi (226-249 CE) are partly
responsible for this shift (Holcombe 1994: 87-90). Many of the
concerns and themes of Eastern Han endure throughout the history of
Chinese thought. Particularly, the conflict between individual
retirement from worldly concerns (in either Confucian or Buddhist
mode) and the duty to engage in the social project, as well as
eremeticism as a form of protest, remain major features of Chinese
intellectual life down to the current day.