## 1. Definition of "Daoism"



Definitions of Daoism are controversial because of the complex twists
in its development as it played its role in the long history of China.
Even the coining of the term creates ambiguity about what counts as
'Daoism'. Three to seven centuries after they were
supposed to have lived, Han dynasty (around 100 BCE) historians
identified Laozi and Zhuangzi as Daoists. The historians postulated
six schools of classical thought--Confucian, Mohist, Yin-yang,
Legalist, Daoist and school of names. They coined the term
*dao-jia* (*way*-school) or (*dao-de jia*) (way
and virtue school) and came to identify Laozi and Zhuangzi as
paradigms of the study of 
*dao*way[2].
 Other texts were linked by their incorporation of themes from the two
classics including the *Liehzi*, the *Baopuzi* and the
*Huinanzi*. After it was linked to the interpretation of the
*Laozi* by Wang Bi, the *Yijing* came to be thought of
as a classic of Daoism. 



The Qin had brought a sudden end to the institutions that generated
the sophisticated classical period of Chinese philosophy. At first,
their ideologies, "Legalist" and Huang-Lao thought,
dominated an impoverished intellectual life. When the Han Dynasty
began trying to reconstruct China's classical history , its historians
coined the term "Daoism," probably thinking of Huang-Lao
*content*. However, they implicitly fixed its
*reference* by pointing to Laozi and Zhuangzi as exemplars. So
an *operative* definition of philosophical Daoism could be
"what
 Laozi
 and
 Zhuangzi
 taught" leaving details to interpretation. Other early Han
writers using their own interpretations, cribbed and copied from the
original texts but, under Huang-Lao influence, exhibited little
further philosophical reflection. The products of this
"recovery" have also come to be thought of as Daoist texts
and include the *Huinanzi* (around 140 BCE) and the
*Liezi* (third Century AD) and the *Yijing*. The
operative definition if we included these texts would, of course,
change. 



During the early Han, Confucianism became an official orthodoxy.
Quasi-supernatural cosmological speculation (five-phase theory and
portentology) dominated Han thought and the intellectual lives of
Chinese thinkers for four centuries. When the Han declined, the
sterile Confucianism lost much of its appeal to intellectuals who
turned to Lao-Zhuang for fresh inspiration--but now read through
cosmological Confucian lenses. Western scholars identify this movement
as
 Neo-Daoist
 but since it fixed the enduring forms of a "traditional
text" and provided the first systematic commentaries, that
cosmological conception has come to dominate traditional Chinese views
of Daoism. The Neo-Daoist movement also overlapped and facilitated the
introduction and spread of
 Buddhism
 in China. Neo-Daoist discourse practices were vehicles for the
conceptually alien Buddhist ideas and Daoism probably influenced the
emergence of distinctively Chinese forms of Buddhism, particularly
Chan (Zen). This development so blended Neo-Daoism and Mahayana
Buddhism in the intellectual consciousness that the Neo-Confucians
eventually took the two to be essentially similar
religious-metaphysical outlooks. 



Meantime, "Daoist" religious groups adopted the
institutions of Buddhism (Nuns, monks, monasteries etc.) and became
linked to martial-arts, to alchemy, and to popular movements (often
rebellious or millenarian movements) that emerged in subsequent
dynasties. Because of Daoism's "naturalistic" and
anti-authoritarian ethos, its inherent focus on "ways,"
the term 'Daoism' could encompass virtually any such
movement or "local" religion with its familiar natural
"Gods." 'Daoist' is a natural characterization
of the ideology behind any non-Confucian or anti-conformist strains of
thought. The result is that 'Religious Daoism' has become
a deeply malleable concept. Creel's famous question "What is
Taoism?" (1970) remains as difficult as ever for Daoist
religion. We defer to scholars of religion to sort out the conceptual
limits of Daoist religion and baldly focus on what philosophical
content can be extracted from the classical exemplars: Laozi and
Zhuangzi. 



This somewhat arbitrary conceptual division leaves ample ambiguity to
sort out in interpretation. The two texts, in both style in content,
invite lines of elaboration that are congenial to the religious
impulse and those that are more philosophical. That is partly because
the subject matter of religion and philosophy overlap. We distinguish
philosophy from religion better by pointing to philosophy's
disciplinary commitment to reflectively warranted norms guiding its
theorizing and its critical assessment of theories. The norms
themselves are subject to discursive, norm guided reflection and
revision--which gives philosophy the familiar open,
"meta" character that underwrites its image as
"thinking about thinking." Relatively religious approaches
(even within philosophy) rely on appeals to "higher"
transcendent or hyper-human perspectives to guide thinking. This
disciplinary difference in the approach to areas of overlap, e.g.,
metaphysics and ethics, emerges from philosophy's relatively greater
focus on logic and epistemology. 



Traditional accounts of Daoism deal with two areas of overlap:
metaphysics and ethics. Philosophical interpretations that are
hospitable to religious movements include transcendent monism,
mysticism, and ethical intuitionism or supernaturalism (identifying
right with attitudes of transcendent ethical judges). Absent a Chinese
or Daoist logic, the challenge for a more critical philosophical view
is showing that Daoists took a reflective, second level, meta-stance
in discussing these issues and how (or whether) the more religious
conclusions could survive reflection according to the norms of
reasoning enshrined in the philosophical high-tide of the classical
period of thought. Is there a classical basis for a warranted Chinese
skepticism and could the more credulous readings of the text withstand
the critical challenge of such a skepticism? The central sections of
this article will trace the conceptual basis for a fully philosophical
interpretation of the two core texts of Daoism while pointing out
along the way where the more religious readings find footing in the
texts. The effects of these religious readings will be traced in
surveying later Daoist movements and impacts.



Though tradition has treated Laozi and Zhuangzi as the Socrates and
Plato of 'Daoism,' the use of Lao-Zhuang to identify a
strain of thought may have become common only as with Neo-Daoism in
the 3rd Century AD. Not only is it true that
"Zhuangzi never knew he was a Daoist", (Graham 1981, 128)
he *probably* also didn't know anything about the
*Laozi*. However, writers responsible for later chapters of the
*Zhuangzi* established the first connection between the two
texts. A large chunk of the "outer" chapters use the
character of Laozi as spokesman for a closely related meta-ethical
position and occasionally echoes the style and attitudes of the
*Daode Jing*--*though it seldom quotes directly from
any extant version*. Common themes, tropes and modes of expression
seem to link the authors of the outer chapters with *Daode
Jing*. One plausible speculation is that anonymous students of the
*Zhuangzi*, working after his death, were
"developing" the *Zhuangzi* text while in contact
with the group anonymously composing the *Daode Jing.* They
seemingly shaped each other's themes, expressions and ideas. See
further discussion in
 Texts and Textual Theory.
 



The underlying basis for our distinction between the philosophical and
religious poles is epistemic. Both species of Daoism start from a
common critique of "ordinary" knowing of
*dao*way:guide. From this
mildly skeptical or relativist base, philosophical Daoism tends toward
pluralism, perspectivalism, skepticism, political equality and
freedom. Religious "mysticism" usually is accompanied by a
credulous assertion of supernatural epistemic abilities--control
of some abstruse or magical *way* of overcoming skepticism.
This is often explained by a supposed Daoist correlate of Confucian
*cultivation* and the *sage*. It is typically the
associated with some intuitive or "superlative" direct
access to *a single correct dao*way:guide.
As its special insight cannot be
justified to those with "ordinary" perspectives and/or
cannot be put into language and argument, it tends to generate the
esoteric, hierarchical and authoritarian attitudes familiar in
religions as well as the institutions that initiate and cultivate the
common human into the idealized adept. 



The Confucian-like emphasis on "cultivating" this special
epistemic ability, obediently following teachers and traditions
contrasts with the philosophical strain's emphasis on natural
spontaneity, freedom and egalitarianism which seems to Confucians like
a plea for anarchy. This is because in the context of Ancient China,
the assumed role of government is cultivating moral character, that
is, instilling the *same* moral *dao*way:guide
in everyone whether by education,
attraction or force. (The gap between the religious and philosophical
versions of the political attitudes can be partially closed if it
treats the **content** of the transcendent *dao*
as egalitarian, empty or anarchist--hence available equally to
all with no need of hierarchy or training).



Confucianism argues that the shared interest in cultivating a
hyper-normal epistemic status means that Confucianism and Daoism are
ultimately compatible. Both have at their core a dogmatic asseveration
of their "special," cultivated ability of direct (not
mediated by language or reasons) access to the single, correct,
*dao*--which cannot be cast in the form of
"fixed" principles. So even if they disagree about the
ethical details, they share a similarly anti-skeptical, unreflective
authoritarian epistemology. The supposedly shared presupposition is
the possibility of mysteriously cultivating an infallible or
superhuman intuitive guidance system. The question is: can an asserted
commitment to that view survive the the philosophical arguments found
in two Daoist texts--the worrisome sections that fuel skeptical
or relativist interpretations? Insofar as they can answer those
arguments in justifying their claims to special access, such
tendencies in dogmatic absolutist directions can still count as
'philosophical'. We draw the line distinguishing
philosophy from religion where the claim to special insight rests on
simple assertion, unexplained intuition, special pleading, appeal to
either authority or "revelation" or naive
supernaturalism. 



The domination of Confucianism in Chinese intellectual life has
brought with it the wide acceptance of this "friendly"
orthodox religious interpretation of Daoism. History does little to
settle which line of interpretation is "original" since
lines of thought leading in each direction can be found in early
classical sources. This difficulty is compounded by the diffidence of
the writing styles in both the *Daode Jing* and the
*Zhuangzi*--which is so marked that it is often tempting
to suspect the writers intended to be ambiguous, to invite divergent
interpretation as an object lesson in the "inconstancy" of
any discourse-based *dao.* Conceivably, therefore, both trends
may have drawn "support" from reading the early texts as
expressing ideas compatible with their own. See
 Origins of Daoism.



The plethora of strains of Daoism makes any specific content
attributed to philosophical Daoism controversial to others who are
equally attracted to the texts and their ideas. Treatments range from
interpreting Daoism as a sophisticated metaethical position rooted in
analytic studies of language tending toward ethical skepticism and
relativism at one end and "praising" Daoism as an
anti-logical, deliberately self-contradictory mysticism--a
cultural rebuke of Western rationality--at the other. Despite (or
because of?) their "Rorschach" quality, the two main texts
remain among the most popular in Chinese philosophy. No one doubts
their literary qualities and attractive style which, combined with
their lighthearted humor, leaves readers with a compelling inkling
that these texts are *somehow* philosophically profound. See
the section
 Philosophical Daoism: A Primer.
 



This entry will focus on exploring that hint of philosophical depth in
Daoism and touch on the familiar religious interpretations mainly for
context and contrast. We will look at a range of loosely related
philosophical positions and some of the interpretive theory fueling
them. The philosophical side of Daoism takes the
*ru-mo*Confucianism-Mohism
debate about *dao* as a model of what goes wrong in trying to
formulate a "constant *dao* ." This critique takes
the form of metaethics--a study of the nature or metaphysics of
*dao*ways as well as
*dao'*s knowability and objectivity as well as the pragmatics
of dispute about *dao*. This strategy generates a distinctive
analysis of key normative concepts of Ancient China. See the section
 Important Daoist Concepts.



Philosophical Daoist interest in *dao*ways:guides
is thus distinct from the
first-order normative focus of Confucians and Mohists, who certainly
used the word *dao* as **often** as did the
classical Daoist thinkers. We distinguish Daoism here as
meta-theorizing rather than direct advocacy of some first-order
*dao* . Often the reflections have (or seem to have)
implications for how to choose which first-order *dao* to
follow (or whether to abandon all of them). Meta-reflection
constitutes the umbrella that covers this wide range of first-order
options and the meta-positions include nihilism, relativism,
skepticism, intuitionism, mysticism, primitivism, value contrarianism
and naturalist stoicism. Echoes of all these can be found in both
texts--often, as we noted, as if the various contributors to the
texts were divided on what follows from such a philosophical ascent to
meta-critique. The metaethical views also motivate some of the
commonly attributed first-order political *dao*s, e.g.,
*dao*s of suspicion of political authority (anarchism), social
convention and traditional mores. The philosophical focus thus
construes Daoism as a meta-level *challenge* to Confucianism,
while the religious focus tends to treat it as a sibling--with
similar emphasis on cultivation, direct intuition, sages and a prosaic
interest only in guilelessly asserting their alternative first-order
normative *dao*.


## 2. Philosophical Daoism: A Primer



Ancient Chinese thinkers discussed mainly three parts of *dao*:
human (or social) dao, *tian*natural
*dao*, and great *dao*.
When I instruct you to put your hand on your partner's head, I am
delivering some *human* dao. Human *dao* is typically
enshrined in a language--which may include the language of
planning. Human *dao*s are normative space-time
structures--*recommended* possible histories. Natural
*dao* (often translated heavenly *dao*) is akin to what
we would consider the constancies of science. It is the ways things
*reliably* (constantly) have happened and will happen. Great
*dao* refers to the entire actual history of
everything--whatever has happened, is happening or actually will
happen in the universe constitutes the great *dao*. 



Daoists, however, do not formulate these categories
explicitly--partly because they *may* seem to overlap. A
form of determinism, for example, would treat *tian dao* and
great *dao* as identical--the laws of nature make
**only** one world-history possible. Common sense
*indeterminism* would regard many possible world histories as
consistent with *tian dao*. In general, however, it is best to
think of Great *dao* as simply the counterpart of
Wittgenstein's "All that is the case"--the extended
actual space-time world. One of the insights of the *Zhuangzi*,
not as clearly reflected in the *Laozi*, is that human
*dao* is embedded in, part of and consistent with, both great
dao and natural *dao* (*tian dao*). 



Daoist philosophers typically express their doubts about first-order
human *dao* (paradigmatically Confucian and Mohist
*dao*) by considering them in relation to natural *dao*
and/or great *dao* (the **actual** *dao*).
This plays on the tendency of rival schools of ancient Chinese
moralists to treat *tian*nature:sky
as the authority for their favored
human *dao*s. Mature Daoist analysis centers on the insight
that while human *dao*s are normative, neither the natural nor
the actual *dao* are. Natural *dao* and Great
*dao* are
 "constant"
 while human *dao* are inherently changeable and subject to
interpretation. This insight is most famously expressed in the first
line of the *Daode Jing* "*dao*guides
that can *dao*guide
are not constant *dao*guides."



Given the shared *ru-mo*Confucian-Mohist
assumption that normative
authority for their competing first-order *dao*s comes from
some form of *endorsement* by *tian*nature:sky,
Daoists aver that nature does not
authorize or endorse any *particular* social *dao*. This
claim has two versions: pluralist and primitivist. Denying that it
endorses a particular *one* is compatible with its
*allowing* either *many* or *none*. The
nihilistic answer might take the form of an assertion that reality is
an amorphous chaos and all *dao*s impose an illusory or unreal
social structure on Chaos. This version, however, has no obvious
normative implications. 



To answer "none" and still treat *tian*nature:sky
as the normative authority generates
a dichotomy between human and natural *dao*. The metaphysical
type of human social *dao* is guiding discourse, so this line
of thought motivates Daoist "silence"--the notorious
reluctance to use language. The philosophical quietism is also
motivational and intentional quietism--essentially an extreme
form of stoicism. This treats accepting natural *dao* as not
using guidance or identifying the "highest" guidance with
"whatever happens" the quintessential position of Shen
Dao. Technically, however, Shen Dao does not formulate a doctrine of
determinism (the identity of naturally possible dao and the actual
"Great" *dao*. The appearance of fatalism comes
from concluding that we have no moral responsibility--to
*enact* the *Great dao* in our actions.



The Zhuangzi strain, informed by contact with Chinese philosophy of
language, recognized that a blanket anti-language position was
self-censuring. The instruction not to follow any *dao* is
itself a *dao* and thus enjoins against following
itself--a prescriptive paradox. The pluralist reading is that all
*de facto* rival practices are natural *dao*s in virtue
of their being **actual** practices. Human *dao*s
in general are a part of natural *dao*. That they "are
walked" shows they are, in that sense, compatible with natural
constancies. Similarly, all *actual* rival *dao*s are
part of great *dao* simply in virtue of being followed--as
the *Zhuangzi* says, "*dao*s are made by walking
them". 



Both pluralist and primitivist Daoism would reject the
Confucian-Mohist conclusion that political authority should be used to
bring about a harmony of *dao*s--making everyone follow a
single *dao*. The social world survives as well (or better)
when people follow different ways of life. Focus on either
*tian*nature:sky *dao*
or Great *dao* helps to undermine the sense that it is
**imperative** to master or impose any
**particular** first-order *dao*.
*Tian*nature *dao*,
like great *dao* justifies no particular judgment whatever.



The primitivist version of Daoism, however, can religiously take a
more assertive form that nature **does** endorse a
particular normative *dao*, albeit **not** a
**human** one (particularly one in discourse form). There
is a single, constant, correct way of life that cannot be expressed or
presented in practices, rules, narratives, maps, examples, songs or
any other *human* or social form of communication and advocacy.
It implicitly must be a super-human *dao* accessed via
super-human epistemic capacities--mystical or esoteric
*dao*. Though it is usually expressed as **the**
natural *dao*, there is no obvious reason why there might not
be multiple super-human *dao*s. 



A different version of the primitivist interpretive line is that there
are fully natural ways but that they require finer or more complex
discriminations than normal humans are capable of. Humans could follow
them, as it were, by luck or accident, but not reliably via any
learnable pattern. If one subtracts the claims to superhuman epistemic
capacities, then an interpretive hypothesis would yield a combination
of both natural realism and skepticism. Still another possibility
would be of naturalistic ways to do something that
**are** humanly accessible--but in different ways to
each different human or in each situation. There would be no learnable
*social* formula that could be of any use and no one's having
successfully done *it* could count as "knowing"
*it* in the sense of being reliably able to do it again or in
the sense of being able to teach others. In that case, the
interpretation would be both realistic *and* relativist and
mildly skeptical--most of us don't actually know and, though in
principle we could do it on occasions, no one could know a reliable
shareable process or content for acquiring that *dao*.



A contrarian version expresses itself via deliberate flaunting or
"reversing" all the norms and attitudes in the
conventional *dao*. Laozi's is the most famous example of this
*dao* of reversal, though overtones can be found in Zhuangzi's
description of "the perfect" person or ability as one that
is so incomprehensible and so irrelevant to our concerns that he
appears as the opposite whatever we normally respect. The political
consequence is still a government guided by a discourse
*dao*--the systematic reversal of the dominant Confucian
*dao*.



Relativist (pluralist) or skeptical versions need not deny that there
are norms for endorsing some *dao*s over others, but would
acknowledge that the norms of endorsing a *dao* constitute a
distinct *dao* that we presuppose in choosing it. This
meta-dao, by hypothesis, is also natural in being "actual"
so the relativism involved need not be irrealism. Such relativism
deserves the 'Daoist' appellation on the further ground
that it entails that normative authority comes from higher-level
*dao*, not from the Confucian-Mohist
 *tian*nature:sky.
However, actual nature gives us
*many* candidate *dao*s. It's conclusion, thus, is not
that we should flaunt or violate nature, but that we simply cannot
flaunt it. Any of the options actually available to us for guidance
are components of both the natural and Great *dao*s. Hence,
"follow the natural *dao*" is empty (tautological)
as a normative guide--a *dao* that does not *dao*.
Whatever *dao* we choose will be a natural one, in virtue of
being one we in fact *can* choose and "walk". 



The naturalist, mystical, and intuitionist versions similarly draw
differently nuanced conclusions from this analysis of the role of
*dao*s in nature and actual history. Intuitionism teeters
toward the religious strain's claim of special epistemic access, but
could be developed in an egalitarian and even a naturalistic way.
Naturalism is inherently more egalitarian but tends, uncritically, to
confuse being neutral with rejecting actually existing social
*dao*. Mysticism's implications are, by definition, unclear.
Daoist mysticism tends toward what some call "external
mysticism." It arises from reflections on the context
sensitivity and normative complexity of *dao* rather than from
some "inner" experience as of an inexpressible
"oneness." If combined with some doctrine or a particular
(discourse or non-discourse) *dao*, it tends to foster
religious claims of superlative "access" to a mystically
"correct" penetration of the complexity--though it
may still claim that the insight is equally accessible to everyone.
This access need not be mystical if it consists simply in giving up
any attempt to determine how to guide one's behavior but even that
counts as a *dao*--but probably contains a prescriptive
paradox. 



Despite the divergence in these versions of Daoism, all can claim to
underwrite a theme of harmony with nature--the pluralist sees the
point of such harmony as permissive and tolerant, while the
primitivist sees it as a more intolerant **rejection** or
**prohibition** of any conventional *dao*.



Metaphysically, Daoism is naturalistic in that any first-order moral
*dao* must be rooted in natural *ways*. It doesn't
characterize the natural *dao* as either physical or mental.
Like the varieties of metaphysical naturalism that eschew both a
commitment to realism or anti-realism, it simply accepts natural
*dao* without a separate theory of whether it is real or not.



## 3. The Origins of Daoism


* 3.1 Attitudinal Daoism I: Anarchism
* 3.2 Attitudinal Daoism II: Authoritarian Intuitionism
* 3.3 Pre-Laozi Daoist Theory



Much of the thrust of Daoism, as we have seen, naturally motivates a
reaction against the moralistic and elitist inclinations of
Confucianism. Confucianism stood for a rigid, detailed, traditional
pattern of hierarchical social behavior. Duties were assigned to all
of one's social roles--and a person typically had many such
roles, e.g., husband, father, minister, younger brother, teacher,
student, etc. One could escape this heavy scheme of obligations mainly
in retirement or, paradoxically, the traditional duty to spend three
years "in mourning" for the death of one's father. The
withdrawal from society, the antipathy toward ritual roles,
traditional "morality," and any social structures or
traditional culture suggests a kind of Daoist "ethos" as
an antithesis to Confucianism in China. We can trace the origin of
Daoism, accordingly, in two ways. One is attitudinal, the other
theoretical. The theoretical mark of Daoism is an interest in the
meaning or nature of *dao* which may inform or encourage Daoist
attitudes. In view of the religious strain, however, we have to
recognize two attitudes as marks of proto-Daoism in China. The first
is the vague reaction against the demanding scheme of traditional
Confucian rules. The second is interest in techniques for cultivating
the adept to achieve an elevated epistemic status resulting in with
some special or transcendent access to a *dao* that is
impenetrable to those who have not had this
"cultivation."


### 3.1 Attitudinal Daoism I: Anarchism



Traditionally scholars have traced the first "Daoist
spirit" back to "proto-Daoist" hermits who crop up
sporadically in the *Analects*, confronting Confucius and his
disciples as they traveled to or fled from various rulers. Their
approximate message was an early version of Yangist purification by
withdrawal from society. Robert
 Eno[3]
 argues that Confucius himself had a heavy dose of this
"Daoist" attitude and his "political" theory
was actually a justification of his staying remote from
government--at least until a sage is in power! This attitude
tends to be expressed as anti-moral or amoral mainly because it
targets a Confucian conception that systematically elides morality and
conventional mores. It also seems to include some of the attitudes
that led to the agriculturalists with their opposition to the division
of labor, the differential social status and ranks to which it gives
rise. These, however, seem to involve no meta-theory of *dao*
of the type traced in the *Zhuangzi* history although they can
be seen as early indications of the value of Daoist egalitarianism and
impartiality.



Another candidate for this "proto-Daoist" status, Yang
Zhu, we know mainly from Mencian attacks. According to Mencius, Yang
Zhu derived opposition to society and politics from an ethical egoism
(emphasizing "me"). Angus Graham has influentially (and
controversially) reconstructed Yang Zhu's ideas, but they too do not
include explicit meta-theorizing about the nature of *dao*.
Yangism mainly proposes a (shocking!) rival first order normative
*dao*--egoism. Yangist echoes surface prominently in the
*Laozi* and in huge chunks of the "outer chapters"
of the *Zhuangzi*. At its core is an arguably Daoist worry that
social conventions and structures damage our natural spontaneity and
interfere with efficient functioning of our natural powers. Early
Chinese moral theory flowed too easily between *mores* and
*morality* and we may see the lure of Daoist impartiality in
the Yangist desire to dispense with relative social mores.


### 3.2 Attitudinal Daoism II: Authoritative Intuition



Others credited as precursors of Daoism seemed to reflect a version of
the moralists' confidence that they had achieved some non-linguistic
or
 intuitive
 access to a *dao*guide that
resists "ordinary" formulation. It amounts to direct
access to what, for ordinary people, is the product of
*interpreting* a first order dao. Thus it lacks the inherent
vagueness of a formulaic *dao*. The Confucian value of
*ren*humanity is the
moralists' most prominent manifestation of this tendency. Such
intuitionism, while cursorily evading interpretive variability, led
instead to insoluble conflicts of authority. They disagreed with each
other about who else had such access and any attempt to resolve that
transmuted into an attempt to formulate or theorize about the
intuition, thus threatening to abandon their hard won interpretive
constancy. This is because the common formulation of these disputes
constitutes a theory or *dao* of how to cultivate the unerring
interpretive access to other *dao*. 



Hal Roth emphasizes this line of thought and follows Graham in linking
it to two recently prominent chapters of an early *Legalist*
text, the *Guanzi* (*neiye*inward
training and *xin shu*heart-mind
methods). The writers claim to have
achieved this direct access to *dao* and Roth links the
"achievement" to evidence of early Chinese interests in
meditative practices including breath control, fasting (and
notoriously wine and possibly other hallucinogens). Victor Mair,
suggests that Yogic techniques, already transmitted from India, played
this role. The epistemic commitment both hypotheses impute to their
proto-Daoists, however, is that these techniques help achieve
incorruptible practical access to the correct normative
*dao*guide. Usually this
access was direct and unmediated by language or culture. So they might
echo the anarchists rejection of rules or principles but for quite
different reasons, i.e., that they can neither formulate nor
inferentially defend their intuitively "correct"
*dao*. 



The inferred interpretive reliability in this stream of Daoism
reflects a kind of impartiality, the irresolvability of rival claims
to infallible practical guidance threatens that goal. It can be
developed in an egalitarian way (i.e., everyone has such immediate,
unerring guidance) that also removes any conflict by inviting a
radically subjective relativism or romantic, primitivist
 optimism.[4]
 But it is more routinely developed into esoteric and authoritative
directions, requiring adepts to subject themselves to the some version
of the dogmatic cultivation techniques. Both may, however, share
Daoism's implicit enmity toward the first-order moralists and Daoism
may draw from its suspicion of traditional texts and normative
precepts.



There can be little doubt that this dogmatic, self-congratulatory
trend of "authoritarian intuitionism" existed in classical
thinking. One can, however, doubt that it is either a necessary or
sufficient distinguisher of Daoism. It finds a more comfortable home
in proto-Legalist texts and arguably blends the ingredients of
Huang-Lao ruler-worship. It is also quite obviously manifest in
authoritarian and intuitionistic Confucianism with its emphasis on
cultivation. Confucian interpretations, like religious ones, typically
treat Daoists as making Confucian-style, elitist cultivation claims.




Philosophical interpretations are naturally less comfortable taking
these authoritarians as forerunners of Daoism and usually require some
version of them that pushes them toward relativism or optimistic
primitivism. The esoteric or authoritarian developments seem too
cavalierly to brush-off the skeptical doubts that generated
philosophical reflection on *dao* and the impulse to seek an
impartial resolution. A characteristically religious excuse for
coercive indoctrination is available. After "proper
cultivation," the rebellious person would "see" and
appreciate their wisdom in thus coercing him. Thus the Huang-Lao
tradition could mesh with the authoritarian Confucian and Legalist
elites who dominated the Han. With the Mawang Dui discovery (see
 Texts and Textual Theory)
 came more evidence of Huang-Lao theory. Just how far back its history
extends into the classical period remains controversial. It was highly
influential in the Qin and Han, when it seemed to be highly favored by
the superstitious rulers. Han historians categorized many of the
figures in the Daoist history as students of Huang-Lao. 



Many scholars have treated the Mawang Dui discovery as proving the
*Laozi* stems from such authoritarian forerunners of this cult.
The arguments are inconclusive, necessarily so since the
*Laozi*'s emergence remains so obscure. In the definitional
texts, the *Laozi* and the *Zhuangzi*, the epistemic
grounds are arguably more skeptical and perspectival than dogmatic.
There is little unambiguous appeal to direct mystical experience or
insight. In these texts, hypothetical exemplars of such authoritative,
superlative knowledge of dao are typically described as being both
incomprehensible and irrelevant to us and our practical questions. In
any case, the ambiguous style of both texts comports poorly with the
implicit authoritarianism of the religious movement and it is very
hard to show how philosophically the use of breathing techniques,
meditation, proto-yogic practices or hallucinogens could vouchsafe
such supernatural epistemic achievements. They do nothing to explain
or justify the sophisticated philosophical understanding of
*dao* we can find in these texts. 



Ultimately, the philosophical question is whether these assertions of
intuitionist access would or would not be refuted by the skeptical
arguments that Zhuangzi directed against the Confucians. Given their
similarities, it's difficult to imagine how these religious
conclusions could escape his analysis. Modern champions of
irrationalist Daoism, of course, would not be disturbed by this
inconsistency, of course, since, they allege, that Daoists refuse to
think logically. Finally, like the attitudinal Daoist stream, the
authoritarian intuition approach deals with the epistemology of access
to *dao* rather than to an analysis of its nature and how
insight into that nature can illuminate and correct disputes about
first order *dao*.


### 3.3 Pre-Laozi Daoist Theory



We have alluded to the earliest known "history of thought"
in ancient China comprising Chapter 33 (*Tianxia*under
heaven) of the *Zhuangzi.* It
surveys the streams of thought leading from the "ancients"
(the Chinese golden age?) to Zhuangzi. After introducing the idealized
ancient *dao*, it implies a "fall," then lists a
series of groups of thinkers, each striving for impartial objectivity,
leading eventually to a Laozi group and then to Zhuangzi. 



The list takes key thinkers to be motivated by goals of neutrality,
universality, freedom from bias and natural "spontaneity"
in action. The list starts with a group that includes Mozi (universal,
impartial utilitarians), then discusses anti-conventionalists headed
by Song Xing, third came Shen Dao's group (metaphysical anti-knowledge
stoics), then Laozi and Zhuangzi. Its last topic however is not
Zhuangzi but his friend and frequent philosophical debating companion,
Hui Shi, who along with other members of the school of
 names,
 is introduced mainly for condemnation as if (contrary to all other
evidence) he were irrelevant to the motivation and understanding of
Zhuangzi's thought. Clearly, we can use this history only with some
caution. It does serve as a "manifest history of thought"
that helps us appreciate the philosophical agenda of the writer. We,
however, must blend this internal Daoist history with external
information about these groups and their thought to get a plausible
explanatory justification for the classic Zhuangzi position. 



Initially, it is a surprise to see Mozi listed as a
"forerunner" of Daoism since in many respects, passages in
the *Zhuangzi* take the Mohist dispute with Confucianism as a
critical target (examples of question-begging rival first-order
theories of *dao*). However, in both our theoretical senses,
Daoism could be said to have roots in the anti-Confucian Mozi
(5th Century BCE). First, his early challenge to
Confucianism initiated higher level philosophical reflections on
*dao*, its role and the kind of thinking it involved. Mozi, for
example, theorized that a *dao* should be constant, not a
matter of a special history or arbitrary social convention. He
supported his use of a utilitarian standard to evaluate social
*dao*s on grounds of the impartiality and constancy of the
benefit-harm distinction. He taught this "constant"
feature of utilitarianism was evidence that it was
*tian*nature's standard. He
thought of this as an objective *fa*standard
for making *shi-fei*this-not
this distinctions.



Mozi's challenge to Confucianism focused on his crucial insight that
the fact that traditional norms are our own, do not warrant taking
them as correct. Mozi thus launched the meta-search for a way
*impartially* to select a first-order *dao*. He
formulates the initial version of the goal of unbiased, constant
universality in morality. Both of these results, further, involved
important theoretical insights into the concept of *dao*. The
Mohists developed much of the terminology of analysis that other
Chinese thinkers, including Mencius and Zhuangzi, adopted. (See
 Concepts.)
 Zhuangzi deployed this language with considerable skill in his
skeptical undermining of all claims to special moral authority. 



However, Mohism did advocate a first order normative *dao* and
followed Confucianism in the assumption that an orderly society needs
to follow a single **constant** *dao*. Though they
developed an account of how to justify a *dao* and first
formulated the standard of *dao* adequacy (constancy). What
they did not notice was that those standards constituted a
meta-*dao*--a *dao* for selecting and interpreting
a first-order dao. This reflects their failure to reflect on the
nature of *dao*, and then to address whether and how such a
*dao* was knowable. They disagreed with Confucianism mainly on
the content of the *dao*guide
to be imposed on society by authority while addressing only from their
own perspective how that disagreement should be resolved. Theoretical
Daoism focused on the insolubility of this *ru-mo*Confucian-Mohist
debate.



We know far less of the doctrine of the next figure cited in the
development--Song Xing. Our main sources are the
*Zhuangzi* description here and a lengthy attack on Song Xing
in the *Xunzi* . He is said to have specialized in a theory of
the *xin*heart-mind and to
have argued that socialization in conventional attitudes injected
destructive values into the heart. The *qing*pre-social
*yu*desires
are relatively few and easy to satisfy.
Socialization creates a plethora of desires for "social
goods" such as status, reputation, and pride. Song Xin suggested
that the conventional values, because of their social,
*comparative* nature incite competition and then violence. The
way to social order is for people to eliminate these socialize
ambitions, which create attitudes of resentment and anger. Hence his
slogan that being insulted (conventional value) is no
(*qing*real) disgrace. The
slogan aims to eliminate the violence occasioned by "honor and
moral rectitude." In effect, names do not harm me. 



Mozi had also seen different *dao*s as a source of conflict,
but advocated unifying the social *dao* rather than abandoning
it. The abandonment theme is developed with some skill in Laozi's
*Daode Jing*. It has roots in the search for impartiality and
universality that also motivated Mozi since it contrasts changeable
social values with pre-social or *natural* ones. The theme,
however can have both elitist, dogmatic and supernatural elaborations.
We might treat the ability to forget social conditioning (returning to
nature) as something only some are capable of, ignore the
self-rebutting threat of the attempt, and romanticize the abilities or
moral purity that would result from removing socialization. 



Zhuangzi built on a related view--that people develop different
moral attitudes from different *natural* upbringings and each
*feels* his own views are obvious and natural. But his version
treats all as equally natural, not regarding some as more able than
others to avoid being "blinded by socialization." Zhuangzi
also adopts a closely related view of how *xin*heart-mind
is shaped by socialization. So there
is a role for Song Xing, along with Mozi in the motivations for Daoist
theorizing. However, again we find little hint that Song Xing
reflected on the concept of *dao* itself and how it is involved
in this analysis of how society injects attitudes into
*xin*heart-mind.



The first plausible candidate for a theoretical Daoist comes next in
the *Zhuangzi* historical survey. We will pick Shen Dao as the
best-known representative of this group of scholars. He is sometimes
included in the list of Huang-Lao thinkers and cited as a source of
Legalist thinking. We will not attempt here to reconcile this latter
with the essentially Daoist view presented in the *Zhuangzi*
history. Shen Dao's theory (perhaps unwittingly) lays the foundation
for Daoism's rejecting the authority of *tian*nature:sky
in favor of *dao*guide:way.
(In religious language, we can
describe this as worshipping *dao*guide
rather than *tian*nature:sky.)
The key insight here is that (like
God and Nature) appeal to *tian*nature:sky
is normatively empty. All authority
presupposes some *dao*guide.
(God's moral authority presupposes we accept a *dao* of
"obey God.") The Later
 Mohists[5]
 dialecticians also noticed this problem. They even more clearly argue
that the appeal to *tian*nature:sky
could justify the thief as well as
the sage. 



Here is the *Zhuangzi* "Tianxia" account of Shen
Dao's group: 



> 
> 
> For the general public, not cliques; changing and without selfishness;
> decisive but without any control; responsive to things without
> dividing in two. Not absorbed with reflection. Not calculating in
> knowing how. Not choosing among natural kinds and flowing along with
> them. 
> 
> 
> 
> They took bonding all the natural kinds together as the key. They
> said, "*tian*nature:sky
> constancies can cover but cannot sustain; Earthly cycles can sustain
> but cannot cover it. Great *dao*guide
> can embrace it but cannot distinguish
> it." We know the myriad natural kinds all have both that which
> is acceptable and that which is unacceptable. So they said, "If
> you select then you cannot be comprehensive, if you teach you cannot
> convey all of it. *Dao*guide
> does not leave anything out." 
> 
> 
> 
> Hence Shen Dao "abandoned knowledge and discarded
> 'self'." He flowed with the inevitable and was
> indifferent to natural kinds ... . He lived together with
> *shi* and *fei*, mixed acceptable and avoidable. He
> didn't treat knowing and deliberation as guides, didn't know front
> from back. He was indifferent to everything. 
> 
> 
> 
> If he was pushed he went, if pulled he followed--like a leaf
> whirling in the stream, like a feather in a wind, like dust on a
> millstone. He was complete and distinguished (*fei*) nothing
> ... . So he said, "reach for being like things without
> knowledge of what to do. Don't use worthies and sages. Even a clod of
> earth cannot miss Dao." 
> 
> 
> 
> The worthy officials all laughed at him and said, "Shen Dao's
> dao does not lead to the conduct of a living man but the tendency of a
> dead man. It is really very strange... ."
> (*Zhuangzi* Ch. 33)
> 
> 
> 



Shen Dao's conception of *great* *dao* reminds us of the
actual world among possible worlds--it is the actual history of
the universe. Shen Dao avers that there is just one such total
history--one actual past and one actual future. The actual is,
obviously, natural so the great *dao* (the natural pattern of
behaviors, events and processes) requires no learning, no knowledge,
no language or *shi-fei*this-not
this distinctions. "Even a clod of earth cannot
miss the great dao." Shen Dao's insight undermines all these
guiding schemes that claim *tian*nature's
approval as justification. The crucial
implication of his approach is that great *dao* has no
normative force. To say "follow great *dao*guide"
is as trivial as "do what
you actually will do." When we think of *dao* as the
actual course of all nature, it is obvious we *will* follow it.




This reasoning drives Shen Dao's slightly different stoicism. His
slogan was "abandon knowledge; discard self."
"Abandon knowledge" means do not guide your behavior using
prescriptive discourse--a learned *dao*guide.
"Discard *self*"
prescribes the corollary that even Yang Zhu's *dao* of
self-preservation is not natural. Our death is part of great
dao--down to its very moment. Egoistic guidance is a
*dao*guide similarly
committed to right-wrong, normative guiding distinctions rooted in a
distinction between 'self' and 'other'. It
recommends a particular possible future history. So to **abandon
knowledge** is to also **discard** '**self**' as a
prescriptive term--to give up using 'self-other' as a
guiding distinction. Yangzhu's egoism violates Shen Dao's
anti-language naturalism as much as does Confucius's traditionalism or
Mozi's utilitarianism.



Why does Shen Dao think we should give up guiding ourselves by shared
moral prescriptions? His stoic attitude and some of his slogans
suggest that like the Stoics, he was a fatalist. However Shen Dao's
argument has no predictive capacity or law-like basis. It is simply
logical determinism: "what will be will be." The account
above also has no hint of any concept of free will, but Shen Dao does
advocate a parallel to giving up moral responsibility. We should not
make *shi-fei*this-not this
judgments. Consequently, he *should* not be saying that we
*should* follow the great dao, because that would be to
*shi*this:right whatever
actually happens. He avoids this inconsistency and thus is not
committed to the Stoic view that the natural/actual course of events
is rational or good. It simply **happens**.



However, another inconsistency is rampant in Shen Dao's theory of
*great dao*. In using the notion of the actual dao to motivate
avoiding any prescriptive discourse, Shen Dao is saying to Confucians
and Mohists, "if you allege to speak for the nature of things,
say nothing!" Nature does not prescribe. What about Shen Dao's
naturalism itself, however? Is it other than "natural"
(and part of *great dao*) that humans use language to
coordinate behavior, to order their interactions, to accumulate and
transmit knowledge? Further, his injunction against shi-fei judgments
is an injunction--a negative prescription. His
"slogan" is expressed as a guide, as something we can
learn and follow. "Abandon knowledge" amounts to a
prescriptive paradox. The concept of knowledge it uses is prescriptive
knowledge. In form and intent, it is a prescription--a
*dao*guide. If we obey it, we
disobey it. This is our first example of Daoist paradox! Shen Dao's
*dao*guide is a
*dao*guide that can't
*dao*guide us. 



The *Zhuangzi* history, where we find this account of Shen
Dao's doctrine, criticizes Shen Dao's position along these lines.
Still, it places Shen Dao in the dialectic just before Laozi, who
directly precedes Zhuangzi. Laozi has a different line of reasoning to
"abandon knowledge." He avoids the fatalist
implications--and, with it implicitly, the concept of great
*dao* as a guide (though he keeps *tian*nature's
*dao*). We can view the Laozi
persona as combining Song Xing and Shen Dao. His reason to
"abandon knowledge" is that knowledge is a form of social
control that instills *unnatural* desires, stimulates
*unnatural* action thus it constrains and distorts natural
spontaneity. The *Zhuangzi* ordering is theoretically
informative, though chronologically inaccurate.


## 4. *Dao* and Names: The *Laozi* or *Daode Jing*



We will discuss, here, mainly the contributions the *Laozi*
makes to this Daoist dialectic. For a more complete and detailed
treatment of the philosophy of the text, see the entry under Laozi.




The *Zhuangzi* history lists Laozi (along with Guan Yin)
between Shen Dao and Zhuangzi. Whatever its actual date and manner of
composition, the *Laozi* is assigned a role in the development
of Zhuangzi's thought that best fits in that slot. The most famous
line of Daoist meta-theory of *dao* opens the *Daode
Jing.* "*Dao* that can be *dao*-ed is not
constant *dao*." Though the text betrays no hint of
exposure to the
 School of Names,
 this famous slogan is duplicated with *ming*name
replacing *dao*. It thus shifts the
focus of meta-discourse about *dao* from grounding its
authority in nature to issues of language and the role of
*ming*words in
*dao*-ing. Since words are not constant, no *dao* that
can be conveyed using words can be.



What is being denied in saying such *dao* are not
 constant?
 The text does not elaborate on the concept, however the issue in
ancient Chinese thought emerges as the crux of the dispute between
Mohists and Confucians. Mohists attempted to regiment the debate by
insisting on *fa*standards
for interpreting guiding language. They argued *tian*nature:sky's
standard lies in the distinction
between benefit and harm--which was by association a
*constant* standard. The writers of the *Confucian
Analects* inclined toward a notion of an administrator
"rectifying names." A name is rectified when an
instruction containing it (a ritual or a law) *correctly*
guides peoples action. "If names are not rectified ...
people will not know how to move hand or foot"
(*Analects* 13:3). The typical Confucian *way* of
rectifying a name is to set an example--either of correct use of
the term or correct action in following a *dao* that contains
the term. 



So what is Laozi denying when he is made to say "names that can
be named are not
 constant
names?" The skepticism here can be read in two ways. One
is there is no *correct way* to use a name so contrary to
Mohism, no standard is "nature's" constant standard of
choice of a *dao*. The other reading is interpretive--no
pattern of correct past use (no social practice) uniquely determines
what concrete behavior counts as correct *here-now* (*or in
the future*). So, as Mozi had argued, tradition cannot determine
what is the correct *dao*, but, the *Laozi* seems to
add, that is so even *presupposing a tradition*. There is no
*constant* (correct) way to interpret that
practice/*dao* into action.



The negative result may be read in several ways. 


1. It may be pure nihilism--there is no such thing as correct
*dao*.
2. It may be skepticism--correct *dao* can never be
known;
3. Or as anti-language--correct *dao* cannot be put in
words or conveyed as guidance to another.



The second and third are compatible with their being a correct or
*constant *dao** and the third even with someone's
knowing it. It simply cannot be conveyed. The rest of the
text--the very fact that there is more to the text--makes
these two readings, particularly the last, the most common ones.
However the traditional story of Laozi undermines the argument for
placing too much emphasis on the fact that after this opening stanza,
he goes on to write a text. It suggests that he writes *only*
because compelled to do so by the keeper of the pass. 



Adopting readings 2 or 3 doesn't remove all paradox from Laozi's
position. Laozi is still left with his variation on Shen Dao's
"abandon knowledge." The text, however, does develop a
different motivation for it. We find few traces of Shen Dao's
fatalistic or stoic reasoning. Laozi's opposition to knowledge derives
more from Song Xing's insights about how social knowledge shapes our
values and desires. We can attribute to the *Laozi* the next
development in Chinese pragmatics of language, how language shapes
action.



*Laozi* draws illustrations using *ming* (word)
pairs--opposites. He draws analogies between naming and cutting
or "carving" (hence the symbol of the nameless
 *pu*simplicity--uncarved,
raw wood). When we
learn a way of using a word (e.g. watching teachers
"rectify" names) we internalize a community practice of
"cutting" stuff and assigning names to the portions. This
is how we pick out how to act--what to pick up, put down, go
toward and so on. We *interpret* a *dao* by dividing
things up into types. We learn this in concrete practice as we avoid
or pursue the things named. Thus, with the names we acquire a
disposition to behavior toward that type--we acquire a socialized
value or desire for one of the two discriminants. These acquired
desires then shape our *wei*deeming:action.




Much of the further reasoning found in the *Laozi* follows that
of Song Xing. The artificially created desires lead to unnecessary
competition and strife. When we see that they are not natural,
acquiring socialized desires (e.g. for status, reputation, for rare
objects) starts to look ill advised. He hints at places that acquiring
the system of names dulls our capacity for appreciation or reaction to
nature--"the five colors blind the eye ..."
(*Daode Jing* Ch. 12). And most important, acquiring knowledge
in this way is losing the natural spontaneity and becoming subject to
social control. 



The text, accordingly, entices us to free ourselves from this system
signified by the slogan *wu-wei*lack-action.
We are to set about forgetting all
our socialization and return to the state of a newborn babe. The
slogan is famously paradoxical and is even formulated in the text in a
paradoxical way--"lack acting and yet lack
'don't-act'." 



The bulk of the *Daode Jing* is thus given over to motivating
this paradoxical attitude. Its familiar strategy centers on the notion
of "reversal." In passage after passage, advice is given
that reverses conventional values (usu. in Confucian-Mohist
discourse)--either rejecting the usual positive value term
(benevolence, sages, morality, social activism) or motivating valuing
the opposite (non-being, water, the female, the lower position etc.).




The result is a fascinating exercise in normative advocacy including
Laozi's famous political theory--which you can find elaborated
more fully in the Laozi entry. Clearly, such advocacy is inconsistent
with the meta-theory and its purpose must be indirect--perhaps to
induce us to "see" one of the three negative positions
considered above. Still it gives the text a tone that we referred to
above as primitivism--nullifying socialization and cultivating
only the "natural" attitudes and actions.


## 5. Impact of the School of Names



One stark difference between the two main texts of Daoism is the
relation to the School of Names. The *Laozi*, though clearly
having a theory of the pragmatics of naming, betrays neither exposure
to the doctrines nor the analytical terminology developed by the
dialectical Mohists for dealing with theory of language. The
*Zhuangzi* clearly does reveal that exposure. To understand
this phase in the development of Daoism, we note briefly what the
outstanding linguistic issues were and how they were formulated, then
we will look at the implications of Daoist
responses--particularly those found in the *Zhuangzi.*




The focus on *ming*words:names
grows from recognizing the
interpretive problem concerning acting on some guide. The disputes
about *dao* are intimately tied to issues about words--in
particular, what is to count as a correct use and what action or
objects count as following the guidance.



The early Mohists advocated using a utilitarian standard to determine
both the correct application of words to actions and the choice of
word order in social guiding discourse. "Which *dao*
should we follow" became "which words shall we use to
socialize people and how should we interpret the words of social
guiding discourse in guiding our behavior?" In effect, the early
Mohist answer to both questions is settled by making allegedly
"natural" distinctions between benefit and harm. Thus
language content and conventions of interpretation should be governed
by the utility principle.



Later Mohists formulated a more "realistic" theory of what
counts as the normatively correct way to use names. We should mark the
distinctions that underlie names in ways that trace patterns of
objective similarity and difference in things. This realism governs
the correct ways both to use terms and to interpret them. We rely on
utility to determine how we structure terms into strings in
guidance--in discourse *dao* . So, for example, a thief is
a man--is governed by the rules of similarity. Still, we allow
guidance that includes both the guiding strings "don't kill
men" and "you may kill thieves." 



This realism led the later Mohists to linguistic conclusions that
challenged any anti-language attitude--including those expressed
by early Daoists. First, the later Mohists argued that in any
disagreement about how to distinguish realities with names, there was
a right answer. It may, however, be hard to know or prove. So, for
example, if we are disputing about whether to use "ox" or
"non-ox" of some obscure object, one of the answers will
be correct. This undermines both the nihilistic and the anti-language
options to understanding Laozi. Second, Mohists argued that any
attempt to formulate the anti-language position was self condemning.
"All language is bad" must be a "bad" thing to
say.



Other figures classified in the School of Names responded to the
Mohist realists. Gongsun Long (mentioned sporadically in the
*Zhuangzi*) took himself to be defending Confucian accounts of
rectifying names and Hui Shi constructs what looks like a relativist
challenge to Later Mohist accounts. We will look only at Hui Shi's
account here because he plays such a significant role in the text of
the *Zhuangzi* .



Hui Shi implicitly addressed the claim that the correct use of words
depends on objective patterns of similarity and difference. What we
know of his writings (which the *Zhuangzi* history suggests
were prodigious) is mainly a sequence of theses cited at the end of
the *Zhuangzi* history. These focused on propositions about
comparative "names"--e.g., large and small. Clearly
some things properly termed 'large' are objectively
smaller than other things properly called 'small'. A small
elephant is considerably larger than a huge ant! So correct naming
must not be based on objective distinctions in the world, but on our
projections from a point of view or purpose in using them. Similarly,
'tall', 'short', and time words (e.g.,
'before' and 'after', 'today' and
'tomorrow') are implausibly attributed to objective
distinctions



From this, according to the list of propositions in the
*Zhuangzi* history, Hui Shi apparently concluded that we can
cluster things in arbitrary ways. This insight is not taken to be
about sets and members, but about divisions into parts and wholes. So
we can speak of a great "one" that is a kind of everything
concept--nothing lies outside it and of a small "one"
which cannot be further distinguished or divided. Objectively there
are no distinctions--the cosmos is one, and we should direct the
same guiding attitudes toward the whole--"love all things
equally."


## 6. Mature Daoism: The *Zhuangzi*



From internal evidence, we would judge Hui Shi to have had much more
influence on Zhuangzi than his knowledge of Laozi or of the contents
of the *Daode Jing* as we know it. Hui Shi appears more often
in dialogue with Zhuangzi than any other figure and in ways that
suggest a long-term philosophical involvement and interaction, like
relationship of philosophical
 friends.[6]
 And, as we observed, the inner chapters of the *Zhuangzi* show
mastery of the technical terminology and state of the art theories of
language in ancient China. Still the tone seems "Daoist"
in the senses we've identified. Zhuangzi marks the high point of
mature Daoist philosophical theory as he finds a better way to answer
later Mohist challenges than did Hui Shi. 



Zhuangzi finds a "naturalist" position that coherently
explains why *dao* has normative priority over
*tian*nature:sky. The way to
avoid the anti-language trap is:


1. To acknowledge that language is natural, which Zhuangzi does in
his beloved image of the "pipes of *tian*nature:sky."
2. To resist concluding that, in being natural, all language is right
or permissible.



The first may superficially appear to give in to the Confucians and
Mohists--allowing them to claim that *tian*nature's
endorses their respective social
*way*s. However, its Daoist thrust consists in depriving the
absolutists of what they *really* want--the ability to
declare that their opponent *violates* *tian*nature:sky
or lacks its similar approval. The
strategy draws on the correct lesson to be learned from Shen Dao's
notion of great *dao*--that "follow nature"
has no normative significance. 



We can only answer normative questions from within *dao*, not
from the perspective of nature or any other authority. The point is
that 'authority' is a normative concept within some
*dao* so any appeal presupposes a *dao* of following it.
Thus Zhuangzi's first step does not warrant treating all discourse
*dao* as right or as wrong--or even as equal. We make
normative or evaluative judgments only against the background of a
presupposed way of justifying and interpreting them. The judgments
depend on some *discourse dao*.



The priority of *dao* over *tian*nature:sky
underwrites the themes of dependency
and relativism that pervade the *Zhuangzi* and ultimately the
skepticism, the open-minded toleration and the political anarchism (or
disinterest in political activity or involvement). Yet, while nature
is not a standard, Daoism does countenance natural *dao*s.
Mohism had presupposed one (a natural impulse to benefit) as had the
Confucian intuitionist, Mencius (a natural moral tendency in the
heart-mind). Zhuangzi's accepts there must be some natural or
 innate guides,
 but notes:


1. There are many such natural *way*s, and
2. We presuppose further *ways* when we choose among natural
ones as we do again when we cultivate them in one *way* rather
than another.



So the dependence on *dao* multiplies endlessly. The
*Zhuangzi* hints at this in a famous image, humans live and act
in ways as fish live and act in water. We don't notice in how many
*ways* we depend on *ways*. Being in a sea of ways is
being human. (This insight has inspired many writers to draw a
parallel with Heidegger's *Dasein*.) We cannot get outside of
*dao* to any more ultimate kind of authority. 



These meta-reflections inform relativist (perspectival or pluralist)
and skeptical themes in the inner chapters of the *Zhuangzi.*
The style furthers both themes. Rather than speaking with an authorial
voice, the text is filled with fantasy conversations between
perspectives, including those of millipedes, convicts, musicians and
the wind. A *Zhuangzi* reflective passage is more likely to end
with a double rhetorical question ("is it ... or isn't it
... ?") than a strong conclusion. 



Does Zhuangzi then have anything to teach us? His is an example of the
key lesson--open-minded receptivity to all the different voices
of *dao*--particularly those who have run afoul of human
authority or seem least authoritative. Each actual (naturally)
existing *dao* has insights. They may be surprisingly
valuable--as viewed from within our different *ways*. On
the flip side, we gain nothing from trying to imagine a perfect or
ultimate source of guidance. If there were a perfect man or ideal
observer-actor, we probably could not understand him. Would his ways
have any relevance for us with our limits? Perfection may well look
like its opposite to us. 



Laozi may have been tempted to postulate a perfect *dao*. It
would be a *dao* with no social contribution. So the
*Zhuangzi* differs in this important attitude from the
*Laozi*--we need not try to escape from social life and
conventions. Conventions underlie the possibility of communication and
are, thus, useful. This gives Zhuangzi's Daoism less of the primitive
thrust of the *Daode Jing* (the term *wu-wei* virtually
disappears in the inner chapters). 



The most dramatic message of the *Zhuangzi* is a theme that
links Daoism to Zen (Chan--the distinctively Daoist influenced
branch of Buddhism)--the "mysticism" of losing
oneself in activity, particularly the absorption in skilled execution
of a highly cultivated *way* . His most famous example concerns
a butcher--hardly a prestige or status profession--who
carves beef with the focus and absorption of a virtuoso dancer in an
elegantly choreographed performance. The height of human satisfaction
comes in achieving and exercising such skills with the focus and
commitment that gets us "outside ourselves" and into such
an intimate connection with our *dao* . 



Other examples include lute players, cicada catchers, wheelwrights and
logicians. Each description has a hint of realism in the recognition
we must put in effort to acquire the skills and then to convert them
to "second nature." We come to see them as natural and as
ourselves being at one with nature. Yet in the throes of skillful
performance, we still can perfect them more and no matter how good we
may become at one thing, may be miserable at others--particularly
at conveying the skills to others.



Finally politically, Zhuangzi famously prefers fishing to high status
and political office. He asks what a turtle would choose if offered
the option of being nailed in a place of veneration an honor in some
place of worship or staying at the lake and "dragging his tail
in the mud." However this anti-political stance is unlikely to
be grounded in simple self-preservation. The openness of Zhuangzi's
pluralism does undermine the justification of political authority that
was assumed in ancient China. Confucians and Mohists disagreed
bitterly about what *dao* to follow in a society, but agreed
without question that proper order was achieved only when a society
followed a single *dao* . Zhuangzi's stance suggests that
society could function with people following many ways of acting.
Nothing requires suppressing or eliminating a dao that works from some
point of view. 



The *Zhuangzi* text, as we noted, contains the writings of a
range of thinkers loosely allied with these Daoist themes. Large
sections lean toward the primitivism of Laozi and others emphasize the
relativism, and still others become eclectic and uncritical in their
openness. For a more complete account see the entry on Zhuangzi and
 Texts and Textual Theory
 below.


## 7. Neo-Daoism



The establishment of an authoritarian empire and the long-lived but
philosophically dogmatic (Confucian) Han dynasty temporarily drained
the vibrancy from Chinese philosophical thought. Classical Daoist
philosophy was successfully extinguished by the imperial suppression
of analytic thought. Confucian authoritarians like Xunzi argued that
analysis of names leads to confusion and disorder. The substitution of
the Qin ruler's superstitious search for long life through alchemy and
his consequent fostering of Huang-Lao religion combined with
suppression of dialectic thought initiated China's philosophical
"Dark Age." The later substitution of Confucianism as the
official orthodoxy during the Han cemented the intellectual stagnation
firmly in place. Only Huang-Lao thinking remained as a live influence
and archivist of Daoist texts. Its superstitions and cosmologies
mingled in the emerging eclectic Han-Confucianism. 



The fall of the Han some 400 years later saw the emergence of a
modified worldview drawing on the preserved texts which we call
Neo-Daoism (See Neo-Daoism). Its most influential writers, Wang Bi and
Guo Xiang who wrote commentaries respectively on the *Daode
Jing* and the *Zhuangzi*, were avowed Confucians. Their
philosophy reinvested a stoic spirit which they interpreted as the
point of their new-Daoism. They expressed their combination of
Confucian social activity with their version of Daoist quietism in the
enduring slogan "Sage within, king without." They framed
their Daoism as a kind of inner emptiness or non-commitment coupled
with a meticulous conformity to one's actual role in the
times--whatever fate might have it. Thus they were Confucians on
the outside and Daoists inside. This elaborated, for Neo-Daoists, the
concept of *wu-wei* (non-deeming action).



They buttressed this social stoicism with metaphysical systems focused
on the puzzle of "being and non-being." The drew this
topic from one of Laozi's frequent inclusion of this pair to
illustrate his contrast theory of language. Trying to figure what the
background of a being and non-being contrast was formed a central
issue for their "abstruse studies." Wang Bi (ca. 300) took
non-being to be the background and thus to "give rise to"
being. He interpreted the *Laozi* alongside a Confucianized
cosmological divination manual, *The Book of Changes* (*I
Ching* or *Yijing*). The Book of Changes with its
*yin-yang* account of change and its generational cosmology
thus entered the list of Daoist texts and the *Daode Jing* was
transformed in conventional wisdom into a detached cosmology.



Wang Bi identified *dao* with non-being while still treating it
as the source of all creation--the basic substance (which he
associated with the *taiji*Great
ultimate of the *Yijing*).
While the basic substance is nothing, its "function" is
being--thus being depends on non-being, from which it is
constantly produced as a kaleidoscopic function of an unchanging,
paradoxical reality of nothing. (The ideal Daoist-Confucian person
mirrors this cosmology--an expression of being a "Sage
within; king without".)



The second famous Neo-Daoist, Guo Xiang commented on the
*Zhuangzi* . His cosmology developed an interesting twist on
that of Wang Bi. Non-being, he argued, did not, after all, exist. It
was simply nothing and thus could not create anything. Simply put,
there is no non-being--there is only being. And so there is no
"giving rise to." Being always was and comes of itself. It
generates and changes itself constantly by the totality the
interrelations among its parts. These differences in emphasis partly
reflect the differences in the original texts--the *Daode
Jing's* emphasis on *wu*non-being-values
and the *Zhuangzi's*
diverse pluralism and sense of freedom from any ultimate cosmic source
of guidance.



Pragmatically, the two pictures were not very different. Each still
had nothing at the center (Daoist sage) and being (Confucian King)
around the edges, but Guo Xiang deemphasized any lines of force from
non-being to being and emphasized instead the situation and contextual
relations within the realm of being. Both similarly read their
cosmologies as ways of viewing things that support and help achieve
the shared lifestyle slogan "sage within, king without."



## 8. Daoism and Buddhism



Buddhism came to China at a time when the intellectuals were hungry
for fresh ideas, but it arrived with massive handicaps. It was saddled
with the Indo-European focus on an appearance-reality metaphysics and
epistemology, with with approximations to concepts of
'truth', sense-data experience, mind as a container of a
subjective world populated by counterparts of sensible objects,
propositional knowledge, representational belief, a belief-desire
psychology together with a logic-informed concept of
'reason' as both a human faculty and a property of beliefs
and concepts. The highly developed Buddhist arguments had little
purchase on Chinese intellectuals and the only available common form
of discourse that could "domesticate" this alien system
was Neo-Daoist "abstruse learning" which focused on the
metaphysical notions of being and non-being. That issue resonated
superficially with a Buddhist puzzle about the nature of Nirvana. If
Nirvana was the opposite of Samsara (the eternal cycle of rebirth or
reincarnation) then was it a state of being or of non-being? Nirvana
is the achievement of the Buddha--the expression of
Buddha-nature. So the cosmology of this version of Buddhism, like that
of the Neo-Daoists, aided achievement of some goal. Realization of the
puzzling nature of this state led to Buddhahood.



Meantime, Buddhism came armed with a paradox that would delight
thinkers of a Daoist turn of mind--the fabled paradox of desire.
Rebirth was caused by desire and Nirvana could be achieved only by the
cessation of desire. That meant that in order to achieve Nirvana, one
had to cease to want to achieve it. This argument informs the Mahayana
notion of a Bodhisattva, who qualifies for Nirvana but voluntarily
stays behind in the cycle of rebirth to help the rest of us.
Enlightenment could only be achieved all at once. (This conclusion was
also a consequence of the Buddhist view that the ego is an illusion.)
The Mahayana wing of Buddhism was the more successful in China because
this implicit egalitarianism--everyone could be Buddha, just as
everyone can be a Daoist or Confucian Sage.



The other Buddhist philosophy that had the greatest appeal in China
was Madyamika, which answered the question of the nature of Nirvana or
the Buddha nature by not answering it--Neo-Daoist quietism. The
realization of this emptiness was a kind of non-realization, a giving
up, or an inexpressible, mystical, *prajna*-knowledge which
contrasts with "ordinary" knowledge. This helped blend
discussion of *dao* and Buddha-nature even more and fueled the
eventually widespread Confucian bias that they were the same basic
religion.



Meantime, the introduction of a more "Western" religious
model (monasticism) to China and coincided with the launch of
organized "Daoist" religions. Modeled thus in style and
progressively in content, Daoist religion, the quasi-religious
Neo-Daoist stoical quietism began to blend with Buddhism. 



In China, the two dominant theoretical Buddhist sects reflect the
cosmological structures of the two Neo-Daoists. Tian-tai is
"center dominated" with a single thought (the
inexpressible Madyamika Buddha-nature) determining everything. Hua-yan
shifts emphasis to the inter-relations of all "dharmas."
It's a cosmos of interaction that constitutes the expression of Buddha
nature. 



The most Daoist of Chinese sects is famously the Chan (Japanese
'Zen') sect. We can understand its Daoist character by
returning to the paradox of desire. Laozi's analysis says artificial
desires are those created by learned distinctions. If we are to
eliminate the desire for Nirvana, it must be by
"forgetting" the dichotomy of Nirvana-Samsara. This
realization is both the inner reality of enlightenment and corresponds
to a mystical answer to the being/non-being of Nirvana. It underwrites
the Chan/Zen emphasis on *practice*, the here and
now--"every moment Zen"--and the signature
"realization" that we are already Buddha. The Buddha
nature is your self-nature--again exemplifying the Neo-Daoist
"Sage within, King without" spirit.



Daoist *simplicity* stimulated Chan's abandonment of Buddhist
theory and was accompanied by another traditional Daoist
feature--the emphasis on total absorption in practice of a highly
cultivated skill. Chinese Zen was dominated by the notion of
"sudden enlightenment" which consists of the denial that
any process leads anyone closer to the Buddha-nature. You can't get
any closer--you're just there. Pay attention! 


## 9. Important Daoist Concepts



Some important concepts that have played a role in the doctrines of
Daoism are: 


* 9.1 Dao and *de* : The Ethical Concepts
	+ 9.1.1 Dao (Way, Guide, Road)
	+ 9.1.2 De (Virtuosity, Virtue, Power)
* 9.2 Ming (Name)
* 9.3 Chang (Constant)
* 9.4 Wei & wu-wei (Deeming Action & Non-deeming Action)
* 9.5 *Pu*simplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity)


### 9.1 Dao and *de*: The Ethical Concepts


#### 9.1.1 Dao (Way, Guide, Road) Dao 



Daoism has a reputation of being impenetrable mainly because of its
central concept, *dao*. Yet surprisingly, the almost universal
translation in English uses one of the smallest, simplest, most
familiar and least consciously noticed terms of the
language--'way.' This common translation,
'way', is apt in several ways. *Dao* (Tao) is a
pivotal concept of ancient Chinese thought. 'Way' is
similarly primitive (it resists analytic definition). We can only
offer synonyms: e.g., 'course', 'method',
'manner', 'mode', 'style',
'means', 'practice', 'fashion',
'technique' and so on. We discover the circularity when we
try to analyze one of the synonyms without recourse to the term
'way' with which we began.



The partial synonyms, however, remind us of a second way in which
'way' is an apt translation of *dao*. A way is the
answer to a "how" or "what-to-do" question. We
typically use talk of ways in advising someone. Ways are deeply
practical (i.e., prescriptive or normative). 



Dao is also used concretely to refer to a road or path in Chinese,
e.g., Queen's Road. Again, 'way' fits this metaphorical
role--as in *highway* and *Broadway*. In figurative
English use they are interchangeable--the road/way to salvation.
Roads guide us and facilitate our arrival at a desired destination.
They are, as it were, physically real guiding or
**prescriptive** structures.



Though practical, describing something as a *dao* or a way need
not be to recommend it. The *Zhuangzi* reminds us that thievery
has a *dao* . We can use both *dao* and
'way' mainly to describe--as when a Confucian
undertakes to pursue his father's *dao* for three years after
his death or we say "I saw the way you did that." 



There are interesting differences between *dao* and
'way'. Chinese nouns lack pluralization, so *dao*
functions grammatically like a singular or mass term and semantically
like a plural. The first tempts translators to render all occurrences
as "*the* way." One is better advised to treat
*dao* as a collective noun--as the part-whole sum of ways.
What we think of as **one** way would be one
**part** of *dao*. 



We partition *dao* by modification. So we can talk about, e.g.,
my-*dao*, Sage-King's-*dao*, natural-*dao*,
past-time's-*dao* and so forth. This feature explains why
*dao* appears more metaphysical than 'way' and
invites the familiar Daoist spatial metaphors like "humans
interact in *dao* as fish do in water" (*Zhuangzi*
Ch. 6). *Dao* **is** a little like the
water--an expanse constituting the realm in which humans live,
work and play. To be human is to be in a realm of ways to guide us.
Daoists are more likely to play with these metaphysical metaphors than
are Confucians or Mohists--who mainly point to (their favored
part of) *dao*. 



Another difference is that while both *dao* and
'way' are almost ineliminable terms in their respective
languages, We have hardly noticed the word 'way' in
philosophy. It's barely visible in the history of Western
philosophy--more like a bit of grammatical filler. Western
philosophers have endlessly analyzed and dissected a cluster of terms
thought to be central to our thinking, e.g., 'good',
'right', 'being' (to be), 'know',
'believe', 'true', 'beautiful',
'reason', 'change', 'subject',
'mind', 'meaning', 'refer',
'object', 'property', and so forth. Some
trends have focused on sub-types and partial counterparts like
'methods', 'modes', 'practices',
'manners', 'plans' and in some sense even
'forms'. Yet one looks in vain to find a Western
philosopher showering her analytic attention on the more general
concept of 'way'. 



*Dao*, by contrast, was the **center** of Chinese
philosophical discussion. It occupies the position at the center of
thought that in Western philosophy is filled by terms like
'being' or 'truth'. The centrality tempts
interpreters to identify *dao* with the central concepts of the
Western philosophical agenda, but that is to lose the important
difference between the two traditions. Metaphysics and epistemology
dominated early Western philosophy while ethics, politics and
philosophy of education/psychology dominated Chinese thought. Although
it's insightful to say humans live in *dao* as fish do in
water, the insight is lost if we simply treat *dao* as being or
some pantheistic spiritual realm. *Dao* remains essentially a
concept of guidance, a prescriptive or normative term. In the late
Classical period, *dao* paired with *de*virtuosity
to form the Chinese term for
'ethics' "*dao*-de." *Dao* is
the pivot of Chinese philosophy--but it still translates as
'way', not 'being'.



A third difference is that unlike 'way', *dao* may
be used as a verb. The best known example is the famous first line of
the *Dao*de Jing. Literally "*dao* can be
*dao* not constant *dao.*" For the *dao* in
the middle of the three *dao*s in the passage, roughly one out
of three translators uses 'speak', another third use
'tell' and the rest use near synonyms such as
'expressed', "defined in words", or
'stated'. In a famous Confucian example of this use,
Confucius criticizes *dao*-ing the people with laws rather than
*dao*-ing them with ritual. (This verbal sense is now often
marked by a graphic variation *dao*to
direct).



Throughout classical texts, we find that *dao*s are spoken,
heard, forgotten, transmitted, learned, studied, understood and
misunderstood, distorted, mastered, and performed with pleasure.
Different countries and historical periods have different
*dao*. Footprints of the linguistic component of the concept of
*dao* are scattered through all kinds of modern Chinese
compound words. 'Preach' is *jiang*-*dao*--speak a
*dao*. To know is to know a *dao*. The character
*dao* is part of compounds translated as
'doctrine', 'truth', 'principle',
'law' and of course, 'morality' or
'ethics', 'reason', 'religion',
'philosophy', 'orthodoxy',
'thank', 'apologize', 'tell',
'explain', 'inform' and so on. 



Is 'speak' the right way to translate these verbal uses of
*dao*? It is in some ways too narrow and in others too broad.
We can write, gesture, point, and exemplify as well as speak
*dao*s. On the other hand, not all speaking (writing etc.) is
*dao*-ing--particularly not if we think of language as
describing, representing, picturing, expressing, defining, or
"capturing" some reality. The Chinese verbal use, is more
accurately translated normatively as "to guide", "to
recommend, advocate, acknowledge, endorse", etc. The activity of
*dao*-ing is primarily normative: giving guidance. To
*dao* is to put guidance into language--including body
language (e.g. pointing as meaning something in our "form of
life.") 



Consider, again, the concrete translation for *dao*:
'road' or 'path'. A woodsman with an ax
*dao*s when he chops bark from the trees as he enters the
forest; He is *dao*-ing when "blazing" the trail.
We grasp this concept best if we resist treating roads as simple
natural objects--they are, like the woodman's blazes, akin to
texts that we "read" for guidance as we proceed that
**way**. Roads or paths are embodied in a physical
reality, but are not simply the reality. They are objectively real
normative structures that guide or invite us to "pass this
*way*". 



One feature that *dao* and speech share is the need for
interpretation. But with *dao* the interpretation takes the
form of *xing*walk:conduct,
not that of a theory or a belief. In this respect, the relevant notion
of interpretation is aesthetic. It is the kind of interpretation done
when a conductor interprets a score, an actor a character in a play, a
soldier his orders in the course of battle. A complete metaphysics of
*dao* requires a distinction between normative way
*types* and interpretive, real-time *tokens* . Daoist
theory does introduces the tokens most dramatically with Shen Dao who
focuses on what he calls Great Dao--the actual history of the
world past, present and future. That image draws our attention to a
purely descriptive way--a way that is not a (normative) way (not
a guide). 



To talk, however, about a way of interpreting a way, is to remind
ourselves of Zhuangzi's point. That we can never free normative ways
from ways of choosing and interpreting them. In selecting it from the
alternative "invitations" open to us, and then in
interpreting in our actual "walking" we always rely on
some higher-order *dao* to justify our choice and execution of
it. We are in a sea of *dao*. 



Besides the Great *Dao* (the actual history of the universe),
we can speak of *tian*nature:sky
*daos*, *which* are
also descriptive. *Dao*s that advise us to accept or live by
our nature, in effect, choose among equally natural *dao*s.
Since we have natural ways to reform or compensate for our natures.
Any *dao* we can choose or interpret is natural in the sense
that it has for us at the time some physical realization--sound
waves or pixels on a computer screen. All *dao*s available for
choice or recommendation are natural. If determinism is true, the
Great Dao is the only *tian*nature:sky
*dao* and every available
*dao* for normative choice is a proper part of Great Dao. 


#### 9.1.2 De (Virtuosity, Virtue, Power) De 



A Daoist formula for *de* is "*dao* within."
It may be the result of innate skill or of careful cultivation and
training. Translators most commonly use "virtue" as a
translation but hurry to remind us that it is 'virtue' in
the ancient Greek sense of an excellence. 'Power' is an
alternative translation that reflects the link between *de* and
successful action or achievement for its possessor. Given our use of
an aesthetic conception of interpretation of *dao*, we may
think of one's *de* as her 'virtuosity'. Virtuosity
exhibits itself in a performer by making his
"interpretation" of the thing performed (a ceremony, chant
or ritual) work in the context. Thus *de* links *dao*
with correct performance. This elegantly blends in the perceived
overtones of "power" in the form of the performer's
ability to respond to clues in the context that make the performance
"work." The "powerful" performance achieves
the *dao*'s goal in real time.


### 9.2 Ming (Name) Ming 



The character *ming*names
really includes all words. Grammatically, Chinese common nouns share
more features with proper names and one-place predicates (transitive
verbs and adjectives) than do familiar Indo-European nouns. Chinese
common nouns lack case and gender markings and Chinese grammar
requires no grammatical noun-verb agreement. Like mass nouns, Chinese
common nouns do not undergo pluralization and can stand alone as noun
phrases. For related reasons, Chinese analysis postulated no
substance-attribute structure to adjective-noun relations. So the
translation 'name' is not inept nor is the ancient Chinese
theory assumption that all words name the part of reality which the
word "picks out"--roughly "naming" what
we think of as its denotation or scope. Thus 'white' is a
name and 'horse' is a name. Each *names* a region
or part of the world. 



The most familiar statement of a widely shared implicit theory of
names in ancient China is expressed beautifully in the *Daode
Jing*. Call it the "contrast theory" of names. It
treats all words (norms or values) as "coming with" a
complement, converse or opposite. To learn and understand a word is to
know what is **and** what is not picked out by it. In the *Daode
Jing*, the theory lends itself to a linguistic idealist
interpretation. Names literally "create" things. This line
of interpretation informs the "chaos" interpretation of
Daoist metaphysics in which reality is an undifferentiated stuff which
humans divide into "things" by the use of
*ming*names. 



An interesting near homonym is *ming*command-fate
which was routinely used as a
verbal form of *ming*names.
The familiar practice is to translate it as either
'command' (reminding us of the Chinese view that the role
of language and names is guiding and coordinating behavior) or as
'fate'. Another meaning-related near homonym is
*ming*discerning:clear.


### 9.3 Chang (Constant, Eternal) Chang 



There is less controversy about the meaning of
*chang*constant, but its uses
and importance in Chinese thought are not well understood. We can
better appreciate the uses of *chang*constant
in ancient Chinese by analogy with
causal and reliability theories in epistemology and semantics. Hu Shih
speculated that in this use, *chang*constant
resembled a pragmatic conception of
'true'. He pointed to a related use in the *Mozi*
which advocates that we should *chang*constant
language that promotes [good?]
behavior. This quasi-imperative use underlies its role in Daoist
relativistic and skeptical analysis. The *Daode Jing* has the
most famous example of its use in the parallel opening couplet where
it modifies both *dao* and *ming*names.




*Mohist* use of the concept is instructive.
*Tian*nature:sky is a
paradigm of constancy. The Mohists alluded to its regularity and
universality to contrast with the temporary and local authority of
social conventions and guidance by authority. They cast their
disagreement with Confucians in terms of who offered a constant
*dao*. This seems to bridge three measures of constancy. 


1. A constant *dao* should apply equally to people of all
cultures, times, and levels of social development.
2. A constant *dao* should be operationally
unambiguous--like measurements operations. Its interpretation
into action should not invite variability.
3. A constant *dao* should be consistent with natural
tendencies; it should reinforce and draws reinforcement from them
rather than encounter resistance in practice.



Daoists, as the *Laozi* famously puts it, suggest that any
*dao* that can *dao* (guide or be used as a guide) will
not be a constant *dao*. It follows this claim with a parallel
claims about *ming*names. Any
name that can name is an inconstant name. This is arguably offered as
the explanation of the inconstancy of *dao asserted in the earlier
sentence*. 


### 9.4 Wei & Wu-wei (Deeming Action & Non-deeming Action) Wu Wei 



Laozi's famous slogan has puzzled interpreters for centuries and has
given rise to numerous analyses. The first character is not the main
problem. *Wu* is simply "does not exist." In this
phrase, however, interpreters treat it as a negative prescription:
"avoid *wei*." The harder problem is to understand
*wei*.



In modern Mandarin, the character has two different tones. The fourth
tone reading is usually translated as "for the sake of."
In the second tone reading, the character would normally be translated
as 'to act'. Textbook interpretations say *wei*
means 'purpose' as well as 'action', so the
slogan means "non-purposive action." The second tone
reading, however, has another important use. Some grammar textbooks
call it the *putative* sense--"to deem, regard or
interpret." *Wei* functions in this sense in Literary
Chinese belief ascriptions which focus on the predicate. So a belief
that S is P takes the de re form [believer] takes S *to be*
(*wei*) *P*. Wei also figures in a related way in
knowledge contexts with nominal predicates--"know to deem
as (*wei*) [noun]." 



Ancient Chinese has several meaning-related homonyms, including *wei*is-only,
*wei*to
be called, and *wei*artificial.
The latter adds a
'human' radical to *wei*do:deem.
Typical translations of this character
include 'artificial' or 'false'. The cluster
of concepts correspond to the pivotal Daoist contrast between
*tian* (nature) and *ren* (the human). *Wei* is
something done by human conceptualizing rather than something
"natural." If we include this content in our explanation
of Laozi's use of *wei*, we can explain its role more fully
than does the theory on acts while lacking 'purpose' or
deliberation. Little in the *Laozi* (or earlier Chinese
thought) suggests any development of a distinction between voluntary,
deliberate, or purposive action and its opposite. To act without
*wei* is to remove the social, conceptual character from our
behavior and act on "natural" instinct or intuition. This
makes the concept cohere nicely with Laozi's analysis of names and
knowledge as forms of social control.



As we noted, the "inner chapters" of the *Zhuangzi*
rarely mentions the slogan. However, its use in the "outer
chapters" invites us to construct a possible Zhuangzi version of
the slogan. One tempting view associates *wu-wei* with the
"inner chapter" discussions of skillful behavior that
develops into a kind of satisfying and tranquil state of harmony with
action that we might describe as "second nature." In
effect one acts while in an aesthetic or performative trance. The most
famous expression of this ideal comes in the paean to the butcher who
carved oxen with the grace of a dancer. Such behavior requires a focus
and absorption that is incompatible with ordinary self-consciousness,
purpose and rehearsal of instructions. Besides this loss of a sense of
the ego, the experience is credited with creating a unity between the
actor and the external world, and with a sense of heightened awareness
and tranquility that comes with the masterful practice of an acquired
skill. We experience mastery as "becoming one with the
activity." In some sense, our *wei*ing has become
[second?] natural!



The *wu-wei* ideal also informs the Neo-Daoist slogan
"Sage within; king without." It suggests (following
Zhuangzi) that Daoist *wu-wei* may be consistent with being a
good Confucian. Being a scholar-official is as much a skill as being a
butcher and one may practice it with the same attitude of inner
emptiness. As long as one takes the "right" attitude, one
**may** pursue **any** activity consistent
with Daoism. Neo-Daoists conform to Confucian roles without regarding
or interpreting them as ultimately right--or as anything
else.



With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India,
*wu-wei* started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual
apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the
modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It
became the target of attack among "modern" Chinese who
regarded Daoist "non-striving" or
"purposelessness" as the source of Chinese passivity. The
activist 19th century reformer, Kang *You*-wei (Kang
have-*wei*) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly
name.


### 9.5 *Pu*simplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) Pu 



The Daoist "primitivist" ideal as expressed mainly in the
*Laozi.* It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting
*ming*names and desires (See
 *Wu-wei*).
 Translations include simplicity, "raw" wood, and D. C.
Lau's more elaborate "uncarved block." The detailed
translation more sensitively expresses Laozi's point in using the
metaphor in the context of a view of names as "cutting"
things into types and Laozi's distinctive theory that such socially
constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our
desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to
instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the
name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting
names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the
socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness
in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence:
"The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from
desire." (*Daode Jing* 37)


## 10. Texts and Textual History



Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern
scholarship. They include these kinds of questions.


* Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist)
* Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?)
* Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?)
* Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)



Traditional "fantastic" textual stories dominated
explanations of religious Daoism. This effectively replaces
philosophical content with mythical narrative and claims of pedigree
or status of the founder. This aversion to exposition is compounded
with the traditional view that Daoist philosophy defies rational
clarification. This philosophical site, accordingly, will give only
abbreviated attention to these textual theories. 



The traditional story centers on Laozi and the *Daode Jing.* It
credits the text to Laozi who was stopped at the pass while attempting
to leave China (to go to India and come to be known as Buddha). The
keeper of the pass required him to leave his *dao* behind so
Laozi dashed off 5000-odd quick characters of poetry. Zhuangzi
inherited the insights and developed the Daoist outlook in parable
form. 



Modern text detectives, Chinese and Western, have successfully cast
doubt on this traditional view. However, their alternative scenarios,
while collectively more plausible than the traditional story, are
diverse enough to lead a skeptic to conclude that no one
*knows* the correct textual theories--even if some of them
turn out to be true. The time is too remote and the evidence too
scarce to warrant using "know" of any detailed textual
theory.



Textual theorists themselves tend more toward interpretive skepticism.
They argue that textual theory is prior to and more certain than
interpretation--which they treat as subjective projection. They
would reject textual skepticism as defeatism and as self-defeating for
an interpretive theorist. 



Current textual thinking tends toward the view that all the classical
Chinese texts were being continuously edited and maintained in textual
communities over sometimes hundreds of years. This editing and
emendation often reflected interaction with other text communities as
they worked out alternative answers to shared questions. Clearly such
an accretion theory undermines the traditional goal of uncovering the
"original" in the sense of the earliest version of the
text. Text selection for interpretive and theoretical purposes becomes
a more normative issue--which text is best? 



Textual theory was further complicated when archeologists unearthed
new copies of the *Daode Jing*. The traditionally dominant text
was named after one of the earliest commentators--the Wang Bi
version. Most translations deviated only slightly from that
traditional version prior to the first archeological discovery in
1973. In that year, two versions of the *Daode Jing* were
unearthed in a Mawang Dui tomb site. The discovery energized textual
theorists who reasoned that as the earliest physically extant text,
the Mawang Dui must be closer to the original should be treated as
authoritative. The discovery was quickly followed by a rash of new
translations of the *Dedao Jing* (the two parts of the text
were reversed in the newly discovered manuscripts). 



The argument for its authoritative status was weak. The enthusiasm
rested on the traditional attachment to an "original" text
(earlier in time). In fact, the discovery tended to confirm the
evolutionary, multiple-editor view, while this enthusiasm treated
textual evolution as if it took place by successive operations on a
single physical text item. Like physiological evolution, text
evolution more probably operated on a population or
"stream" of copies, abridgements and additions. 



Wang Bi probably had access to a range of that population in selecting
his version. The archeological discovery was of a single
instance--a branch of the stream. The historical circumstances of
the presumed time of burial further undermined the optimistic
assumption that the Mawang Dui was the original. The tomb's date
places the texts after a radical disruption of textual
husbandry--in 200 BCE when the Qin "burned books and buried
scholars." 



The Qin had set out to destroy traditional learning. The later Han
ostensibly cherished and tried to recover textual scholarship. In the
succeeding Han, text collection, veneration preservation (and copying)
became the norm. The theory that the Mawang Dui was the authoritative
text assumes that the destructive political frenzy at the end of
classical period had not affected the integrity of transmission that
produced the Mawang Dui instances. Then it must insist that in the
**succeeding** period of textual veneration and
preservation, radical changes were introduced into the **entire
population** of copies and versions of the text so that all
those on which Wang Bi drew on after the Han were corrupted--and
in similar ways--from the orthodox Mawang Dui version. 



The opposite story is more probable--the sample was a version
written with punctuation and interpretive emendation for a member of
the superstitious ruling class. Taking it as representing of the whole
population of texts at the time is an elementary sampling error. 



The Mawang Dui fervor was further undermined in 1993 when another
discovery of a still older pair of abridged texts (dating from before
200 BCE) turned out to be more like the traditional text (the order of
selection reflected the traditional *daode* arrangement). Even
more notably, it strongly confirmed the gradual accretion view of the
text suggesting that the *Daode Jing* was still in the process
of being compiled at that late date. This locates the composition of
the *Daode Jing* and the *Zhuangzi* almost
side-by-side.



Laozi's existence is widely disputed partly because the traditional
story seems impossible for one person to satisfy. That only entails,
however, that not all the things in the story are true of him, not
that he didn't exist. On the other hand, there is little positive
evidence that he did and there are many alternative stories of how he
came to be regarded as the author of the *Daode Jing.* It is
common for theorists to treat 'Laozi' as a definite
description referring to "whoever wrote the *Daode
Jing.*--"Many thus regard the question of his existence
as equivalent to the question of his authorship of at least a part of
the text--hence improbable given current textual theory. The
issues, however, are also separate. Laozi could have existed and not
written any of the text attributed to him. On balance, the existence
of Zhuangzi is considerably more probable, though little is known of
him that is not from the text bearing his name--many of whose
stories are obviously fanciful. 



In China today, parts of the traditional theory have been resurrected.
Some scholars are arguing for a pre-Confucius date for Laozi on
various textual grounds (especially poetic structure). Traditional as
well as modern scholarship tends to attribute the first eight
"inner" chapters to Zhuangzi and there has been little
doubt about his existence. So far, one important implication of modern
textual theory has had little effect on popular interpretations. If we
inevitably rely on the stories in the *Zhuangzi*--*for
our knowledge about him*, then the known chief intellectual
influence on Zhuangzi should be treated as the sophist and linguistic
theorist, Hui Shi, not Laozi or the *Daode Jing.*



Textual theories of the *Zhuangzi* are more elaborate and
consistent. Though they differ in details and identification of parts,
text scholars largely converge on attributing the chapters, outside of
the eight assigned to Zhuangzi himself, to students of Zhuangzi, to
primitivists who are associated with Yang Zhu (Yangists), and to other
more eclectic and religious writers associated probably with the
production of the other texts associated with Daoism. To be strict,
however, despite the prevalence of the opinion, there is nothing
resembling a convincing argument that Zhuangzi wrote all eight of the
so called "inner chapters." 



Probably the association of the Laozi and Zhuangzi texts began when
students of Zhuangzi noticed some shared or reinforcing themes
expressed in a contemporary *anonymous* textual group working
on the evolving *Daode Jing.* Perhaps both groups appreciated
the affinity and began to exchange themes, expressions, and related
lines of thought. Graham argued that the association of Laozi with the
*Daode Jing* dates from a conspiratorial attempt to gain
authority over Confucianism by claiming that the *Daode Jing*
stemmed from Confucius' teacher who was known in legend as Laozi.



This is a rough table of the state of textual theories of the two
defining texts of Daoism. There are four main questions; the table
lists, for each question, the traditional story, the range of
theories, and the most plausible answer to the question.


* Existence
	+ **Traditional story**: Laozi and Zhuangzi like
	teacher-student or prophet-disciple.
	+ **Range of theories**: Zhuangzi inspired the
	formulation of the myth of Laozi and the attribution.
	+ **Most plausible answer**: Zhuangzi knew only the
	Confucian story of Laozi. Laozi's actual existence merely
	possible.
* Authorship
	+ **Traditional story**: Laozi wrote the *Daode
	Jing* before traveling to India to found Buddhism. Zhuangzi wrote
	the *Zhuangzi*.
	+ **Range of theories**: Zhuangzi wrote only chapter
	two. *Daode Jing* a product of Huang-Lao ruler-mysticism.
	+ **Most plausible answer**: Both books the product of
	textual communities who continually edit and add to the text. Zhuangzi
	wrote at most eight chapters.
* Dating
	+ **Traditional story**: The *Daode Jing* was
	written before Confucius. Zhuangzi inspired to expand on its mystical
	insight.
	+ **Range of theories**: *Daode Jing* being
	edited well into the Han dynasty. Miscellaneous and Outer chapters of
	the *Zhuangzi* edited or composed into the Han.
	+ **Most plausible answer**: Both being edited through
	and beyond the classical period.
* Relation
	+ **Traditional story**: Laozi prophet/teacher,
	Zhuangzi disciple/pupil.
	+ **Range of theories**: Zhuangzi formulated his
	theories first and the chief influence was his sophist friend Hui
	Shi.
	+ **Most plausible answer**: Textual communities began
	to borrow from each other after the inner chapters completed.



Other textual theories address the authorship, dating and relations to
the two canonical Daoist texts to the later "religious"
texts mentioned above. Essentially the upshot is that they borrowed
heavily from the two classical texts, often changing the context and
failing to understand the philosophical point. The quotations they
used were embedded in popular cosmological and religious contexts.