## 1. What is Constructivism?



The term 'constructivism' entered debates in moral theory
with John Rawls' seminal Dewey Lectures "Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory" (Rawls 1980), wherein Rawls
offered a reinterpretation of the philosopher Immanuel Kant's
ethics and of its relevance for political debates.



According to Rawls, these debates fail to effectively address the
political problem of ethical disagreements because they adopt
metaphysical standards of objectivity, which appeal to the independent
reality and truth of values. In his view, such standards are
inadequate to address disagreement in a political debate in which all
the parties in the dispute claim to be defending the only true view,
because they lead to a stalemate in the discussion, with each party
accusing its opponent of being 'blind' to the moral
truth.



Rawls is especially concerned with coordination problems that arise in
pluralistic contexts, wherein citizens hold different and to some
extent incommensurable moral views. The need for objectivity,
according to Rawls, is *practical*: it arises in contexts in
which people disagree about what to value and need to reach an
agreement about what to do. He attributes to Kant the idea that we
ought to approach objectivity as a practical problem and that we can
fruitfully address moral disputes by reasoning about them (Rawls 1971:
34, 39-40, 49-52). Rawls thus turns to Kant in order to
argue for a conception of objectivity that is not metaphysical, that
is, a conception of objectivity that avoids claims to universal and
fundamental moral truths that are independent of our fully rational
judgments. On this conception, nobody is assumed to have a privileged
access to moral truth, but all have equal standing in reasoning about
what to do. To this extent, Kant's theory is regarded as
providing a metaethical alternative both to realism and skepticism
about the existence and nature of moral truths.



Rawls' account of Kantian constructivism in moral theory (1980)
generated a large literature, and produced several varieties of
constructivism. Some of these views depart from Rawls'
conception of constructivism.


## 2. Varieties of Kantian Constructivism



Kantian constructivism is defended in a variety of ways, but its
distinguishing feature is that it understands the nature of moral and
normative truths based on considerations about the basic features of
rational agency. On this view, reasons for being moral do not spring
from our interests or desires; instead, they are rooted in our nature
as rational agents. Insofar as moral obligations are justified in
terms of rational requirements, they are universally and necessarily
binding for all rational beings. Because of its claim about the
universal authority of reason and obligations, Kantian Constructivism
is regarded as the most ambitious form of metaethical constructivism.
In this section, we will consider three main varieties, starting with
the constructivist interpretation of Kant's ethics.


### 2.1 Kant's Constructivism



John Rawls first proposed a constructivist interpretation of
Kant's account of moral obligation and practical reason (Rawls
1980, 2000). On Rawls' reading, Kant's analysis of
obligation commits him to a kind of constructivism, which is best
understood in contrast to competing views of moral obligation (Rawls
1980, 1989, 2000). Kant holds that all previous ethical theories have
failed to account for moral obligation because they have failed
*as* theories of practical reason (Kant *G* 4:
441-444; *C2* 5: 35-41, 153, 157). They fail to
explain how reason plays a role in our lives because they
misunderstand its practical function and mischaracterize its relation
with the ends of choice. Kant's charge is directed against all
previous moral doctrines, but his arguments specifically address
sentimentalism and 'dogmatic rationalism'. Sentimentalism,
championed by Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, holds
that ethical judgments stem from sentiments and regards reason as
incapable of moving us to action on its own. According to the
sentimentalist, the role of reason is solely instrumental. That is,
reason merely finds the means to satisfy an agent's ends, and it
is not capable of indicating which ends are worth pursuing. This claim
exposes sentimentalism as a "heteronomous" doctrine, which
fails to establish the objectivity of moral obligations. This is
because sentimentalism treats moral obligations as conditional upon
our interests, and thus as having limited authority.



Kant raises the same objection against dogmatic rationalism,
championed by Christian Wolff and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, which
holds that there are real moral truths that we apprehend by rational
insight (Kant *G* 4: 443; Rawls 2000: 50, 228). This view
appears to be an intuitionist form of moral realism according to which
reason recognizes objective values or moral ends that exist prior to
and independently of our reasoning and of the kinds of agents that we
are. In discovering such ends, moral agents do not actively exercise
reasoning; they are as passive as in sensory perception. For Kant,
dogmatic rationalism fails to secure the conclusion that moral
obligations have unconditional authority over us (Kant *G*, 4:
441). This is because, for dogmatic rationalism, moral truths guide us
only on the condition that we have a corresponding desire to be guided
by what is rational (Rawls 1980: 343-46; Rawls 1989:
510-13).



Kant's diagnosis is that all such doctrines fail to capture the
practical function of reason because they are heteronomous. They deny
the authority and efficacy of reason, either holding that reason can
only recognize objective ends that exist independently of its
operations, or claiming that reason can bind agents only with the help
of inclination or interest. For Kant heteronomy is a form of moral
skepticism, understood as skepticism about the power of reason to
establish moral truths and their authority. On this reading, then,
constructivism is part of Kant's overall argument for grounding
ethics in reason, against the skeptical view that there are no
normative truths (Korsgaard 1996a; Stern 2013; Wallace 2012).
Skepticism is avoided only if reason is accounted as autonomous, and
its authority does not derive from anything outside it. Reason is
autonomous if its authority rests on its proper activity, rather than
being derived from elements of the world outside of reason. Thus, the
norm governing the activity of reason must be internal to reason,
rather than dependent on any given value, interest, or desire. That is
to say that reason is a "self-legislative activity" (Kant
*G* 4: SS2), and its legislative activity is governed by a
norm, which Kant calls the 'Categorical Imperative.' The
Categorical Imperative expresses the autonomy of reason and is its
governing principle. It is not a mere decision-procedure to determine
what to do, but the 'constitutive norm' of reason, that
is, the basic standard of rationality in thinking and acting (Rawls
1989: 498-506; Rawls 2000: 166, 240-244; Korsgaard 1996a:
36-37; O'Neill 1989b: 18-19, 59n, 128, 180; Bagnoli
2013b; Reath 2006: 221-222; Reath & Timmermann 2010;
Engstrom 2009: Chapter 5).



Kant gives several formulations of the Categorical Imperative, which
he regards as equivalent (*G* 4: 421, 429, 431, 433); but
ultimately, it is the requirement that in deliberating, we test our
motives by considering whether the principle they express can be
endorsed as a universal law, a principle that applies to and binds all
agents endowed with rational capacities. Kant is committed to the
"constitutivist view" that the source of the categorical
force of moral obligations lies in the constitutive features of
rational agency (Rawls 2000: 263-265; O'Neill 1989a,
Korsgaard 1996a: 236ff). We will return to this point in
 section 7.



Scholars are divided about the significance of the arguments in
support of a constructivist interpretation of Kant's theory of
practical reason, even though nobody denies that, for Kant, the laws
of the mind are laws of reason (compare Guyer 2013 and Engstrom 2013;
Bagnoli 2013b). The most general source of reservations about the
constructivist interpretation is that constructivism builds upon the
critique of realism, but Kant's claims about objective moral
knowledge seem best vindicated by moral realism. In this dispute,
constructivism is generally taken to be a form of antirealism (Ameriks
2003: 268, 274; Wood 2008: 108, 337, 374-375). It should be
noted, however, that Rawls introduced Kant's constructivism as a
novel alternative to both realism and antirealism, where the latter
includes subjectivism and relativism (Rawls 1980; O'Neill 1989a:
1; Engstrom 2013: 138ff).



According to some interpreters, Kant's defense of the autonomy
of reason takes place within a project of identifying the foundation
of morality, which is realist in spirit because it appeals to the
absolute value of humanity (Wood 1999: 157, 114; Rauscher 2002;
Langton 2007; Johnson 2007; Hills 2008; Krasnoff 1999; Kain 2006a,b;
Irwin 2009; Galvin 2011). There are different ways to argue for this
point. First, critics point out that Kant's defense provides a
transcendental argument, an argument that highlights the conditions
under which it is possible for something to be the case. The value of
humanity is the condition of the possibility of all valuing. To such
critics, the appeal to a transcendental argument for the value of
humanity already counts as a markedly realist move (Larmore 2008: 121;
Watkins & Fitzpatrick 2002; Fitzpatrick 2005; Tiffany 2006). The
issue revolves around the nature of transcendental arguments, and
whether they commit us to moral realism, something that
constructivists deny.



Second, critics hold that the constructivist interpretation of Kant
heavily rests its case on a text that contains seemingly realist
arguments. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant refers
to our consciousness of the moral law as "the fact of
reason" (Kant *C2* 5: 46-48). We know the moral law
as a "fact", and we feel its pull in the guise of
reverence for the law. This immediate consciousness of the moral law
also shows that we have an interest in morality, which arises
independently of self-interested motives (Kant *C2* 5:
42-43). Realist interpreters take the argument from the fact of
reason to show that Kant's claim about the objectivity of moral
obligations ultimately relies on perception of some moral facts (the
fact of reason), hence on a realist foundation (Ameriks 2003:
263-282; Kleingeld 2010: 55-72). By contrast,
constructivist interpreters tend to downplay the role of the fact of
reason in Kant's general argument for the objectivity of moral
obligations (O'Neill 2002: 81-97; Lukow 1993:
204-221). Rawls takes the fact of reason to show that Kant
develops "not only a constructivist conception of practical
reason, but a coherentist account of its authentication" (Rawls
1999: 524; Rawls 2000: 268-273). In his view, the fact of reason
indicates that the deliverances of practical reason cohere with our
moral experience. This congruence is an integral part of Kant's
vindication of ethical objectivity, but it is no commitment to
realism. Rather, it simply confirms that there is no discrepancy
between the requirements of practical reason (which are expressed by
the Categorical Imperative) and our ordinary experience of morality
(Rawls 1980: 340; Rawls 1989: 523-524; Rawls 2000:
253-272, 268, 273; Kant *C2*, 5: 15). Rawls thinks that
the realist notion of objectivity is "unnecessary for
objectivity" (1980: 570). But Rawls' argument in support
of a coherentist conception of practical reason may seem too weak to
capture Kant's view of moral obligations as objective rational
requirements (Larmore 2008: 83-84; Stern 2012a: 7-40). For
this reason, some interpreters argue that Kant is constructivist about
the authority of moral obligations and practical laws for finite
agents, but not about the contents of such laws, which apply to all
rational agents as such (Engstrom 2009, 2013; Bagnoli 2009; Sensen
2013).



Understanding this scholarly debate is important for assessing the
prospects of constructivism, especially as a metaethical view distinct
from realism (Bagnoli forthcoming: SS1). First, critics dispute
the force and the target of the objection of heteronomy. Some doubt
that 'moral realism' is Kant's own intended target,
hence suggesting that Kant's constructivism does not build upon
a critique of moral realism (Stern 2012a: 7- 68, 2012b).
Relatedly, they deny that claims about the autonomy of reason or its
practical function commit one to constructivism.



The constructivist interpretation is meant to capture Kant's
distinctive insights about practical reason and the
self-authenticating nature of reason as a self-legislative activity.
The distinctive character of this conception resides in the idea that
reason itself should be scrutinized by reason in order for its
verdicts to be justified. Constructivists hold that practical reason
itself is constructed in the sense that its legitimacy and authority
are established by reasoning, rather than by appeal to some facts
about the way the world is (O'Neill 1989b; Rawls 2000: 238;
O'Neill 2015; Bagnoli 2013b).



Contemporary constructivists have largely emphasized the
antimetaphysical implications of Kant's views. Kant embarks on
the project of vindicating reasoning, starting from very modest
considerations about rational agency. Such starting points are not
sufficient "to sustain or revive classical philosophical
ambitions to build vast metaphysical structures on reason alone"
(O'Neill 2015: 3; C1: A xiii). The constructivist interpretation
of Kant's ethics emphasizes the cooperative nature of the
standards of reasoning: 



> 
> 
> Kant's repeated use of metaphors of *construction* and
> *collaboration* in his discussion of reasoning make it natural
> to speak of his approach and method as *constructivist*, and of
> his aim as the *construction* of reason's authority, and
> thereby of a basis for offering others reasons for truth claims and
> moral claims, reasons for favouring some rather than other practical
> and political aims. (O'Neill 2015: 4) 
> 
> 
> 



Basically, the standards of reasoning are justified by their function:
they must ensure that reasoning is followable by others, "it
must exhibit patterns that others could discern, and thus it must be
law-like" (O'Neill 2015: 4).


### 2.2 Constructivism as Procedural Realism



The anti-metaphysical orientation of constructivism is apparent in
early defenses of metaethical constructivism. For instance, Christine
Korsgaard characterizes Kantian constructivism as a form of
"procedural realism" - the view that "there
are answers to moral questions *because* there are correct
procedures for arriving at them"; and she contrasts procedural
realism with "substantive realism" - the view that




> 
> 
> there are correct procedures for answering moral questions
> *because* there are moral truths or facts, which exist
> independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track.
> (Korsgaard 1996a: 36-37, see also Korsgaard 1983: 183) 
> 
> 
> 



Substantive realism holds that there are objective criteria of
correctness for moral judgments only if such judgments represent
matters of fact about the way the world is. By contrast, the
constructivist view is that there are objective criteria of moral
judgment insofar as there are objective criteria about how to reason
about practical matters. There are objective reasons that prohibit
deceiving and manipulating others, but such reasons are the result of
practical reasoning, rather than discovered by empirical
investigation, grasped by the intellect, or revealed by some god. What
makes this view "Kantian" is that there is ultimately one
criterion for reasoning on practical matters, which is the Categorical
Imperative. By reasoning according to this criterion, we objectively
ground moral obligations, which are requirements of practical reason.




Korsgaard's case for constructivism parallels Kant's
argument for the autonomy of practical reason, as Rawls reconstructs
it. It starts by objecting that substantive realism fails to respond
to the skeptical challenge that there really are no reasons to be
moral. This is because realism simply assumes the existence of
objective standards for morality without offering a rational basis for
them; hence the realist affirms what the skeptic denies. As a
consequence, the realist also fails to show why we really ought to do
as morality says, and thus fails as an account of the authority of
moral obligations (Korsgaard 1996a; Korsgaard 2008: 30-31,
55-57, 67-68; Stern 2012a; Brady 2002). Realists presume
that, in order to fend off skepticism, one has to anchor practical
reasons in facts that are in themselves normative. But no appeal to
such 'normative facts' can explain how they count as
reasons and motivate rational agents. Suppose we agree that it is a
normative fact that deception is morally wrong. How does awareness of
this fact rationally compel us to refrain from deceiving? This is not
only a psychological question about the impact that such a fact might
have on our minds, but also, and most importantly, a normative
question that concerns its authority.



According to Korsgaard, humans are self-reflective agents, capable of
reflecting on themselves and considering their thoughts and desires
from a detached perspective. Reflection makes room for raising
questions about what there is reason to do or to believe (1996a:
10-11, 17, 93). That is, in reflection, rational agents call
into question the legitimacy of particular thoughts and desires and
suspend their pull. Because they are reflective, rational agents have
ideals about the sort of persons they want to be, and they can guide
their minds and actions accordingly. They are capable of
self-governance because they are capable of governing themselves by
endorsing universal standards. The appropriate form of self-governance
is thus self-legislation (Korsgaard 1996a: 36, 91, 231-232;
Korsgaard 2008: 3).



Rational agents are guided by universal principles that they have
legislated. However, this is not to say that particular agents
arbitrarily determine the moral law; otherwise, evil people would not
be bound by the moral law (Korsgaard 1996a: 234-235;
O'Neill 2003c; Reath 2006: 112-113, 92-170;
Korsgaard 2008: 207-229). On the contrary, the claim is that
rational agents are guided by universal principles (Korsgaard 1996a:
36, 234-236; Korsgaard 2008: 207-229; Reath 2006:
112-113, 92-170). But the moral law obliges us only
insofar as it is self-legislated. That is, one can autonomously act on
the moral requirements only if one legislates them. Furthermore,
universal principles guarantee that action is expressive of an
agent's integrity, rather than driven by unreflective
preferences or desires. This is because universal principles are the
constitutive principles of rational actions, on the Kantian view.
Correspondingly, an agent that acts mindlessly or compulsively lacks
the sort of integrity that is characteristic of rational agents. That
said, it is possible for rational agents to act in the pursuit of
desires, when they have survived due reflection. 



A canonical objection to the attempt to ground morality on rationality
alone is that it fails to account for the special bonds and ties we
have with our loved ones and thus fails to capture the nature of
integrity and morality (Williams 1981: chapters 1-2). To address
these worries, Korsgaard introduces the notion of "practical
identities", which specify roles as sources of special
obligations (Korsgaard 1996a: 101, SS3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009: 20).
For instance, Guy values himself and finds his life worth living and
his actions worth undertaking under the description of being a teacher
of music, an American citizen, and Robert's best friend. These
practical identities govern Guy's choices, sustain his
integrity, and are sources of specific obligations to his pupils,
fellows, and friends. However, we do not have obligations just because
we occupy certain roles as teachers, citizens, or friends. Rather,
such roles become practical identities, and sources of reasons,
insofar as we reflectively endorse them (Korsgaard 1996a: SS3.3.1;
Korsgaard 2009: 22). Reflective endorsement, in turn, requires that we
test our loyalties and allegiances according to the principle of
universality, which commits us to morality. In order to value
ourselves under these specific descriptions, we must value humanity in
ourselves and in others (Korsgaard 2008: Lecture 6, 25-26).



Korsgaard (1996a) offers a transcendental argument for the conclusion
that what we ought to do is justified by the norms that govern and
constitute our rational agency. She argues that valuing humanity,
where humanity is understood as the capacity for rationality, is the
condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all (Korsgaard
1996a: 121-123; Korsgaard 1998: 60-62). In deliberating,
we attribute to ourselves the power to confer value on our ends
*by* rationally choosing them. According to Korsgaard, in
valuing we are also, at the same time, attributing a fundamental kind
of value to ourselves. The conclusion is that the value of any objects
thus ultimately depends on the rational capacity of evaluators.
'Humanity' is the name of a distinctive value, which is
unconditional and counts as the condition of the possibility of
valuing anything at all. Since humanity is embodied in all rational
beings, we should value humanity in ourselves as well as in others, on
pain of incoherence. Special obligations and bonds that derive from
our practical identities are insufficient to sustain our integrity
when they are inconsistent with valuing humanity. For instance, the
conduct of a Mafioso cannot be coherently justified on the basis of a
universal principle. The Mafioso thus fails as a rational agent and
leads a life that is not autonomous, because his life is not the
product of reflective self-government. A systematic failure to be
guided by universal principles of self-government amounts to a loss of
agency. Insofar as agency is inescapable, we are necessarily bound by
the norms of rationality and morality. Korsgaard argues that some kind
of integrity is necessary to be an agent and cannot be achieved
without a commitment to morality, which is founded on reason.



Some critics argue that Korsgaard's argument rests on realist
premises, and thus it is not a complete alternative to moral realism
(Watkins & Fitzpatrick 2002; Fitzpatrick 2005; Ridge 2005; Stieb
2006; Kain 2006a,b; Papish 2011; O'Shea 2015; Schafer 2015a. To
this extent, her defense of Kantian constructivism does not offer a
distinctive reply to skeptical challenges to ethical objectivity.
According to others, Korsgaard's argument is vulnerable to the
objection of 'regress on conditions', which says that it
is not logically necessary that the condition of a thing's value
be valuable itself (Rabinowicz & Ronnow-Rasmussen 2000;
Kerstein 2001; Ridge 2005; Coleman 2006). That is to say that humanity
may be the condition of the possibility of value and yet lack value
itself.



However, according to Korsgaard "there need be no such regress
if there are principles that are *constitutive* of the very
rational activities that we trying to perform" (2008: 5, 1996b:
164-67, 2009) In this formulation, the principles of practical
rationality are constitutive of rational agency, in the sense that
they are standards arising from and justified by the nature of the
object in question (i.e., the rational agent). More specifically,
unless the object conforms to the standard, it ceases to be the kind
of object that it is. This is called the 'constitution
requirement.' If the function of the house is to serve as a
habitable shelter, then it must conform to the standard of being a
habitable shelter. A thing that does not serve this purpose is not a
house. Secondly, some objects *make themselves* into the kind
of objects that they are *by* conforming to their constitutive
standards. This is called the 'self-constitution
requirement.' Rational agents make things happen, that is, they
are efficacious. They exert their efficacy in a specific way, i.e.,
autonomously. Autonomous agents must conform to the categorical
imperative, and in order to be efficacious, they must conform to the
hypothetical imperative. It is by conforming to these principles,
Korsgaard argues, that one makes oneself into an agent.



Korsgaard's constitutivist strategy of grounding normativity in
the constitutive features of agency raises worries that will be
discussed in
 section 7.
 Her more recent works point toward a new direction in the debate
about constructivism, which combines Aristotelian and Kantian features
(Korsgaard 2009). Korsgaard argues that an Aristotelian account of the
virtues as excellences of character should play an important role in a
complete account of what makes a good moral agent. However, she
remains convinced that the Kantian idea of self-constitution is
indispensable for giving an account of agency, and therefore of moral
agency, itself.


### 2.3 Constructivism for Finite Rational Agents



Onora O'Neill defines metaethical constructivism as a third
alternative between realism and subjectivism (O'Neill 1989b:
279). She departs from the versions of Kantian constructivism
discussed above because she makes no appeal to transcendental
arguments and rejects the idealized conceptions of rational agency
that are at play in other versions of Kantian constructivism. In her
view, "finite rational beings" should not be construed as
"beings whose rationality is finite", but as "finite
beings who are rational". Finitude does not entail any
limitation on strategic reasoning, even though there is no way to
establish that finite rational agents have access to all sorts of
reasoning that infinite or disembodied rational agents may have. The
key thesis is that instrumental principles are not the only principles
of rationality, and more importantly, they never operate in isolation
(O'Neill 1989b: 74).



According to O'Neill, this more austere constructivism is closer
to Kant's own theory than other varieties (O'Neill 1989a;
O'Neill 2015). In her view, Kant's constructivism is
motivated by the vivid awareness of interdependency, finitude, and
mutual vulnerability. Humans are prone to mistakenly rely on claims
that are not warranted, and thus they need to check and criticize the
unjustified and arbitrary assumptions they make in reasoning
(O'Neill 1989b). O'Neill shares Kant's claim that




> 
> 
> reasoning is fundamentally practical: it aims to provide
> *standards* or *norms* that thought, action and
> communication can (but often fail) to meet. (O'Neill 2015: 2)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Second, she shares Kant's claim that reasoning is necessary
because humans are finite and interdependent beings. Third, she agrees
with Kant that the principles of reason are not revealed to us by
intuition or introspection: We must use our rational powers to figure
out what these principles are. Finally, she adopts Kant's claim
that to fulfill its distinctive function, norms of reasoning must be
universal. The differences between Kant's and
O'Neill's views concern the justification of the claim
about universality. According to O'Neill, universality is a
requirement of reasoning because reasoning is to be used by a
plurality of finite, inter-dependent agents whose action and
communication are not antecedently coordinated (e.g., by instinct,
divine providence, or law).



The requirement of universality or followability sets minimal
constraints on processes that count as reasoning (O'Neill 2015:
3). By following this reasoning, we find out that no plurality of
agents can choose to live by principles that aim to destroy or
undermine the agency (of whatever determinate shape) of some of its
members (O'Neill 1989a: 10; see also O'Neill 1989b, 2015).
As a result, practical reasoning justifies the prohibition to harm,
coerce, and deceive others. This is not to say that by appealing to
the requirement of followability we can solve all problems and fully
determine the content of all duties. On the contrary, O'Neill
thinks that there are large varieties of moral issues for which we
need to offer more substantive arguments. However, her account
promises to vindicate reason's ability (and right) to
distinguish sound justifications from mere rationalizations.



O'Neill agrees with Kant that only reason itself can verify the
credentials of its own claims. The process of figuring out what the
principles of reason are is *avowedly* circular. This
circularity is not worrisome because the process of verification is
reflexive, as it involves reason critiquing the claims of reason
itself. More specifically, the critique of reason uncovers a basic
principle of reasoning: we should rely only on those principles that
other rational agents can share. The authority of reason is thus
conferred by public communication among free, rational agents, and
consists in the fact that the principles that govern our thoughts are
neither self-serving nor self-defeating. We find out what these
principles say by submitting our claims to free and critical debates,
which constitute "the public use of reason" (O'Neill
1989b: 70-71, 206).



Since the critique of reason is a continuous, progressive, and
reflexive process, reason exhibits a history, which coincides with the
development of practices of tolerance and mutual recognition
(O'Neill 1999: 174, 2002). Such practices establish the
authority of reason. This 'developmental' view of
practical reason and of its autonomy accounts for change and progress.
Arguably, this is a significant explanatory advantage over competing
views, which do not fully appreciate the historical and dialectical
dimension of truth and reason (O'Neill 1989b: 70-71;
Arruda 2016). As we shall see in
 section 6,
 it requires the constructivist to provide an account of truth and
objective knowledge as altering in time.



O'Neill's defense of the virtuous circularity of
constructivism identifies a solution to a problem that affects
constructivism in general, which we shall consider in
 section 7.


## 3. Humean Constructivism



The case for Humean constructivism rests on the alleged inadequacy of
competing views: "it is what we are forced to by the
untenability of realism plus the failure of Kantian versions of
metaethical constructivism" (Street 2010: 371). Humean
constructivism denies that normative truths are independent of the
deliverances of practical reasoning (Bagnoli 2002: 131; Street 2008a,
2010, 2012; Velleman 2009; Lenman 2010, 2012). To this extent, Humean
constructivism builds on the Kantian insight that normative truths are
not simply "out there", as realists suppose. In contrast
to Kantian constructivism, however, Humean constructivists abandon the
claim that moral obligations are requirements of practical reason. The
constitutive norms of practical reason may favor morality, but do not
require it (Street 2012; Velleman 2009: 150-154; Lenman 2010:
192). Thus, Humeans maintain that an ideally coherent Caligula who
values torturing people for fun is conceivable. Such a person would
have reasons for torturing people, which is just to say that the value
of humanity is not a constitutive norm of reasoning (Street 2010: 371;
Street 2009, 2012). Humean constructivism also rejects the Kantian
claim that there are universal rational norms that bind all rational
agents. For instance, Street argues that "the substantive
content of a given agent's reasons is a function of his or her
particular, contingently given, evaluative starting points"
(Street 2010, see also Lenman 2010: 180-181). Consequently,
"truth and falsity in the normative domain must always be
relativized to a particular practical point of view" (Street
2008a: 224). Agreement among various practical standpoints is possible
but it is not guaranteed by facts about the nature of reason or the
principles of reason that are authoritative for all rational agents.
Humeans hold that there is nothing alarming about the sort of
relativism that their position implies (Street 2008a: 245). Even
though moral norms are not necessary requirements of reason, there is
a sense in which they are not contingent because they play a large
role in our lives. Furthermore, by analogy with attitudes such as
love, which is both contingent and compelling, Street argues that the
fact that moral commitments are contingent does not weaken their
normative force. The latter claim has been disputed on the ground that
the driving force of love should be distinguished from its normative
authority (Bratman 2012).



Humean constructivism has established itself as a prominent variety of
metaethics, which avoids any commitment to moral realism. In
 section 6
 we will consider how this form of constructivism relates to
anti-realism and expressivism.


## 4. Aristotelian Constructivism



Aristotelian constructivism is a metaethical view about the nature of
normative truths, according to which our true normative judgments
represent a normative reality, but this reality is not independent of
the exercise of moral and practical judgment (LeBar 2008: 182;
2013a,b). Like the Kantian varieties of constructivism, Aristotelian
constructivism appeals to constitutive features of practical reason:




> 
> 
> practical truth is constructed, not discovered, because it is activity
> in accordance with the norms of practical rationality, which are
> themselves constitutive of agency. (LeBar 2008: 191) 
> 
> 
> 



To this extent, this metaethical view shares the ambitions of Kantian
constructivism to ground normative truths in features of rational
agency. In contrast to Kantian models, however, Aristotelians hold
that the principles of sound practical reason are neither formal nor
procedural. Rather, they are grounded in a substantive account of the
good life, which is inspired by ancient eudaimonism. The wise and
virtuous agents form the standard of practical rationality through the
exercise of their virtues of intellect and character (Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics, II.6.



The negative case for Aristotelian constructivism consists in the
critique of the Kantian account of practical reasoning, its form,
reach, and powers. Under attack is the claim that practical reasoning
is law-like, i.e., governed by the requirement of universality.
According to some critics, Kantians have a difficult time explaining
how to apply universal rational principles to concrete cases
(Hoffe 1993; LeBar 2013b; Millgram 2005: chapter 6). In this
respect, the Aristotelians claim to have a significant advantage
because Aristotelian constructivism allows practical reasoning to
adapt to particular cases. Aristotelian constructivism works out a
story about the norms for success in judgment, which is considered a
problem for Kant and an unrecognized lacuna in contemporary Kantian
ethics (Millgram 2005: chapter 6). Because of its appeal to moral
laws, Kantian ethics is often criticized either for entailing rigorism
or for empty formalism. In either case, Kantian ethics seems incapable
of accounting for the relevance of circumstances for ethical
judgments. This is a problem that Kantian constructivists address
(O'Neill 1975; Herman 1993), but inadequately, according to the
Aristotelians (LeBar 2013b.



To identify the substantive standards of practical reasoning,
Aristotelian constructivism starts with a study of the complexity of
our rational animal nature, which excludes that the principles
constitutive of human rationality can be merely formal. In contrast to
Kantian self-legislation, Aristotelian constructivism emphasizes the
interplay between rational and animal nature, focusing especially on
training and shaping the affective and sensitive aspects of our
nature. In particular, it emphasizes the transformative effects of
reflection on passions and desires, and the possibility of developing
a 'second nature', thanks to complex processes such as
habituation and education (LeBar 2008: 197). The key feature of this
account is the claim that practical rationality does not merely direct
our affective responses toward adequate objects but also structurally
transforms our animal sensibility into character. The relevant norms
and their applications to practical reasoning are the work of
practical wisdom (*phronesis*), in conjunction with the
excellences of character, as Aristotle suggests (LeBar 2013a).


## 5. Constructivism About Moral Principles



Some constructivist theories define their scope more narrowly than the
theories discussed in
 sections 2-4.
 They seek to provide objectivist accounts of the basic principles of
morality, rather than of all normative principles. Most
constructivists about morality hold that the relevant sort of
agreement of which moral reasons are the product is best captured in
terms of a hypothetical contract (Scanlon 1998; Hill 1989, 2001; Milo
1995). 'Contractualism' is thus the normative theory that
is typically associated with metaethical constructivism, even though
it is not accepted by all Kantians (compare O'Neill 1989a: 10;
O'Neill 2015). Hobbesian theories occupy a prominent place in
the contractualism debate. To explain the nature of morality and of
moral truths, Hobbesians do not use the term
"construction", but "hypothetical contract".
However, many think of construction as a form of hypothetical
procedure akin to contract (Street 2010: 365; Darwall, Gibbard, &
Railton 1997: 13, and see section 3. In
 5.1
 and
 5.2,
 we shall discuss two prominent varieties of constructivism whose
scope is restricted to moral judgment; in
 5.3
 other emerging varieties will be briefly presented.


### 5.1 Constructivism About Right and Wrong



Thomas Scanlon defends a restricted constructivist account of
justification for a specific class of moral judgments of right and
wrong (Scanlon 1998: 11-12, chapter 4, SS7.2; 2008,
2014>: 94-98). In contrast to Korsgaard and O'Neill,
Scanlon rejects Kantian constructivism as a broad metaethical view
about all normative truths. Part of his argument is that moral matters
cannot be resolved by appealing to the bare structure of rationality
(the constitutive norm of practical reason) and instead, need to be
addressed by engaging in substantive arguments (Scanlon 2003b:
14-15, Scanlon 2014: 90-104), although this is something
that many Kantians would concede. His aim is to elucidate the truth of
claims concerning right and wrong in terms of their being entailed
from the point of view of a certain contractual situation.



Scanlon's method of construction is the contractualist formula
according to which an act is wrong if its performance under the
circumstances would be prohibited by any set of principles that no one
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general
agreement. This test of rejectability specifies the content of moral
principles, and tells us why it is rational for us to adopt them. The
correctness of moral principles is explained in terms of a
hypothetical agreement among the relevant set of individuals specified
in terms of their motivation and the process of reasoning they employ.
There are no correct moral principles independently of the rational
agreement that the criterion of rejectability specifies. The property
of being right is constituted by what a group of reasonable agents,
under certain specified conditions, would find non-rejectable (Scanlon
1998: 380 n 48).



The test of rejectability is compatible with several kinds of
disagreement about right and wrong, in particular, with disagreement
about the standards for assessing conduct, and about the reasons for
supporting these standards. To acknowledge the latter sorts of
disagreement does not lead to relativism: it does not entail that
there is no answer to the question of which side is correct about the
reasons people have or that all answers are equally valid.



Scanlon argues that the constructivist account of general normativity
is exposed to the objection of bootstrapping, because it tries to
justify the normativity of reasons by a method that already assumes
the normativity of reason (Scanlon 2014: 96-104). Thus, unlike
Korsgaard and Street, Scanlon holds that truths about reasons for
action are not true in virtue of being arrived at through some
specified procedure of "construction". We can arrive at
conclusions about reasons by engaging in normative reasoning, (for
example employing the method of reflective equilibrium.) But the steps
in reasoning of this kind involve making substantive judgments about
what reasons we have. Because it requires such judgments as inputs,
reasoning of this kind is not a process through which all facts about
reasons are constructed (Scanlon 2014: 102-103).



According to Scanlon, in order for there to be truths about reasons,
it is not necessary for these normative facts to have a kind of
metaphysical reality that good normative reasoning might not
guarantee. There is no question "external" to ordinary
first-order normative thinking about whether such facts really exist,
just as there is no such "external" question about
mathematical facts (Scanlon 2014: 16-26.) In this regard,
Scanlon's view bears some deep similarities with Rudolph
Carnap's theory (Carnap 1956). Scanlon's normative realism
is thus less "robust" than what some other realists such
as David Enoch believe is required (Scanlon 2014: 14, compare Enoch
2011a: 112-113).


### 5.2 Society-Based Constructivism



Society-based constructivism - elaborated by David Copp, holds
that there are true moral standards, which are the output of a
decision procedure that takes into account the needs and values of the
society and facts about the society's circumstances (Copp 1995,
2007). Accordingly, the theory accounts for moral truth as depending
on what would be rational for societies to choose. Copp's view
shares some important features with Kantian constructivism. First,
society-based constructivism holds that societies need their members
to endorse some suitable moral code in order to facilitate
cooperation. It thus takes morality to be a cooperative enterprise,
and implies that the need for objective moral standards is practical.
Second, this view explains the nature of moral truth in procedural
terms, and thus it implies that there are no moral facts independently
of the procedure (Rawls 1980: 307). Third, it also shares the claim
that to be adequate, any metaethics should make sense of the
normativity of moral claims and their practical relevance (Copp 2007:
4-7, 2013). Like Kantian constructivism, it holds that we are
bound by moral obligations independently of our actual motivational
states. Finally, society-based constructivism also claims that any
plausible metaethics should be at least compatible with
naturalism.



However, society-based constructivism differs from the various Kantian
constructivisms because of its account of the decision procedure from
which moral standards are said to result, and its different
explanation of normativity. While the procedure specifies a function
of practical rationality, it does not commit to any specific view
about autonomy.



In contrast to the antirealist varieties of metaethical
constructivism, Copp defends society-based constructivism as both a
decisively realist and naturalistic theory. It is realist insofar as
it claims that moral propositions are truth-evaluable, and that some
moral properties are instantiated; and it is naturalistic because it
claims that such moral properties are natural properties (Copp
1995).


### 5.3 Other Varieties



It is worth mentioning that conventionalism, the view that moral
claims are based on social convention, often uses the metaphor of
construction: it is defended as the view that moral truths are
constructed by the actual agreement of some groups within specific
traditions (Wong 2008).



Other varieties of metaethical constructivism are emerging, building
upon the insights of philosophers other than Kant: the Spinozian
variety (Zuck 2015), the Smithian variety (Stueber 2016), the Hegelian
variety (Westphal 2013; Rockmore 2016; Laitinen 2016, and the
Nietzschean variety (Katsafanas 2013; Silk 2015). Not all of them
claim a place in metaethics, independently of existing forms of
realism and antirealism. But they all find that the notion of
construction is a distinctive explanatory device for capturing the
objectivity and normativity of ethical truths.


## 6. Constructivism's Place in Metaethics



Constructivism has become a major view in contemporary practical
philosophy. However, scholars are divided about its place, promise and
prospects as a metaethical theory. The appeal of constructivism as a
metaethical theory is often thought to consist in its promise to offer
a minimalist account of moral objectivity that retains the benefits of
nonnaturalist realism, while avoiding its epistemological and
ontological costs (Darwall, Gibbard, & Railton 1992; Shafer-Landau
2003: chapter 4). But this is hardly distinctive of constructivism
just as such. Naturalist realism, an alternative to constructivism,
also promises objectivity without the epistemological and ontological
costs of nonnaturalist realism. And the defense of objectivity on
non-ontological grounds has also been a preoccupation of antirealism
(Hare 1952; Gibbard 1990; Wright 1992: 6 ff). A better way to present
what constructivism purports to offer is to say that it claims to be
the best candidate for reconciling various tensions among the apparent
features of normative truths: their objectivity, our knowledge of
them, and their practical significance for us, including the authority
they have or claim (Scanlon 2014: 91). Constructivists think that
traditional metaethical theories cannot account for these features
because they misunderstand the nature of practical reason. Thus, their
claim is that to solve metaethical problems about the nature of
ethical judgments and normative truths, one should start with an
account of practical reason, that which has been left out by standard
metaethics. To this extent, constructivists regard standard metaethics
as misguided. 


### 6.1 The Constructivist Approach to Normative Discourse



Thus far, constructivists have not elaborated a distinctive account of
the meaning and logical behavior of moral and normative terms and
concepts. Absent a distinctively constructivist semantics, some think
that constructivism is best understood as "a family of
substantive moral theories" (Darwall *et al*. 1992: 140;
Hussain & Shah 2006, 2013; Enoch 2009; Hussain 2012; Ridge 2012).
For some this means that constructivism does not qualify as a
metaethical theory: in seeking to understand normative concepts as
referring to solutions to practical problems, constructivism does not
move "up to metaethics", insofar as this talk of problems
and their solutions "is itself normative talk" (Ridge
2012).



This criticism rests on the assumption that there is a sharp division
between normative ethics and metaethics. The constructivist project is
to advance our understanding of moral principles and their limits by
"clarifying our understanding of the reasons that make familiar
moral principles ones that no one could reasonably reject"
(Scanlon 1998: 246-247; 2003a: 429-435). The purpose of
theorizing in ethics is partly interpretive and partly normative.
Thus, there seems to be a disagreement between constructivists and
their critics about what it takes to engage in a metaethical inquiry.
For the constructivist, there is an interesting continuity between
normative discourse and metaethics.



Furthermore, some constructivists account for their lack of interest
in semantics with the conviction that the semantic task with which
traditional metaethics is preoccupied is positively misguided
(Korsgaard 1996a, 2003; Street 2008a: 239). The philosophical issue
worth thinking about is normativity, and this is not something that we
can explain solely via semantics. For Kantians, explaining normativity
requires philosophers to engage in philosophical investigation into
the ideas of autonomy, agency, and practical rationality (see
 section 7).



While also preoccupied with explaining normativity, other
constructivists view the semantic task as worthwhile (Street 2010;
Richardson 2013). In fact, they take themselves to discharge the
semantic task with their account of what is constitutive of the
attitude of valuing. By identifying the constitutive norms that one
must be following in order to count as a rational valuer at all, some
constructivists have sketched 



> 
> 
> a so-called inferentialist semantics for normative terms: the meaning
> of normative terms is explained by identifying the kinds of inferences
> (for example, about means and ends) one must be making in order to
> count as employing normative concepts at all. (Street 2010:
> 239-242) 
> 
> 
> 



This reply commits the constructivist to showing that her proposal has
some advantages over its competitors.


### 6.2 A Constructivist Account of Truth?



Another question about constructivism is whether it is committed to
any theory of truth. Constructivists must deny the correspondence
theory of truth, the view that truth is correspondence to a fact. On
the other hand, constructivism can take on board the idea that
normative judgments are truth-apt. This view is hospitable to the
constructivist claim that moral and normative truths may alter over
time, as a result of ongoing rational deliberation and revision
(Richardson 2013; LeBar 2013b; O'Neill 1992, 2015; Laitinen
2016). Some attempts to deal with semantic issues bring to light a
resemblance between constructivism and pragmatism, which holds that a
proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, and that the meaning
of a proposition is to be found in the practical implications of
accepting it (Misak 2000; Richardson 1998, 2013). Like pragmatism,
constructivism appeals to the practical point of view to account for
truth, in contrast to standard forms of realism about truth (Proulx
2016; Elgin 1997; Richardson 2013; Schwartz 2017). Some critics are
skeptical about the possibility of developing a constructivist account
of truth (Hussain 2012: 189ff; Dorsey 2012).


### 6.3 Constructivism and the Realism-Antirealism Debate



Both Rawls (1980) and O'Neill (1989a) present Kantian
constructivism as a third option between realism and relativism (see
also Korsgaard 1996a: 36). However, not all constructivists share this
view. In fact, some place constructivism in the realist camp (Copp,
LeBar), and others in the antirealist camp (Lenman). Scanlon sides
with realism about reasons but defends a constructivist account of the
nature and truth of moral judgments (Scanlon 1998, 2014, 2003b: 18).
Street admits to some kind of relativism. This shows that it would be
a mistake to judge constructivism's impact in metaethics solely
in terms of its contribution to the realism-antirealism debate
(Korsgaard 2008: 312, 325 n. 49; Copp 2013; Engstrom 2013: 138ff).



Efforts to situate constructivism in relation to realism and
antirealism are complicated by the fact that there are different
definitions of 'realism' (e.g., Sayre-McCord 2015; Joyce
2015; Miller 2014). Realists agree that (a) moral discourse is
cognitivist like non-moral discourse, (b) there are moral properties,
such as rightness, (c) moral properties are sometimes instantiated,
and (d) moral predicates express properties. But there is a
disagreement as to whether in order to be a form of realism, a theory
must hold a stronger claim that (e) moral properties are
mind-independent. A further division, internal to realism, concerns
the commitment to naturalism, which includes the claims that (f) moral
properties are like any ordinary property and have the same
metaphysical status as non-moral properties, whatever that is, and
that (g) moral assertions express ordinary beliefs regarding the
instantiation of these properties. All constructivists share a
commitment to naturalism, but reject (e), holding that the
instantiation of properties depend on features of our sensibility or
rational agency, rather than being mind-independent. In general,
constructivism shares with both realist naturalism and antirealism
broadly defined the commitment to metaphysical parsimony. This is
where it differs from classical and "robust" moral realism
(Enoch 2011a).



Korsgaard points to an assumption she believes that realists and
antirealists share and that constructivists reject, namely, that the
primary function of concepts deployed in judgments that can be true or
false is to represent things as they are, so if normative judgments
are true, they must represent something real out there in the world.
By contrast, constructivists think that normative concepts, which are
deployed in judgments that can be true or false, have a practical
function: they name solutions to practical problems, rather than
represent features of reality (Korsgaard 2008: 302 ff.). For instance,
the concept equity does not stand for a property; instead, it proposes
a response to the practical problem of how to distribute goods.
Korsgaard draws the contrast between constructivism and other
metaethical theories as follows. Unlike substantive realism, which
holds that moral judgments are true insofar as they represent a
mind-independent normative reality, and antirealism, which denies that
there are normative truths because it denies that there are normative
properties, constructivists hold that practical judgments can be true
or false without representing mind-independent normative facts about
the world (Korsgaard 2003: 325 n 49).



This way of characterizing constructivism fails to neatly mark the
contrast between constructivism and other metaethical views. First,
Korsgaard's characterization takes realism to be committed to
claim (e) about mind-independence. But not all define realism in this
restrictive way (Sayre-McCord 1988; Copp 2007: 7). When realism is
defined more capaciously, it includes views according to which moral
judgments are made true by facts that depend on some mental states.
Second, Korsgaard's way of drawing the contrast seems to
overlook the fact that some contemporary versions of antirealism do
not deny that moral judgments are truth-apt. Instead, they adopt a
deflationary conception of truth as a semantic notion (Ridge 2012;
Lenman & Shemmer 2012b). Constructivism stakes out a middle ground
between forms of realism that are committed to mind-independent
normative truths and forms of antirealism that deny that there are any
normative truths. To this extent, it agrees with other kinds of
metaethics, which are qualified forms of realism or
'sophisticated forms of subjectivism' (Wiggins 1993;
McDowell 1985). However, sophisticated subjectivism importantly relies
on sensibility, while Kantian constructivism requires that normative
truths be dependent on features of rational agency. In this sense,
there is an interesting contrast to be drawn between Kantian
constructivism and reductivist versions of sophisticated subjectivism
or response-dependent realism.



Some say that constructivism is best understood as a form
'expressivism,' which holds that normative terms function
to guide action rather than represent matters of fact and are used to
express states of mind that differ from belief (Chrisman 2010; Lenman
2012; Lenman & Shemmer 2012b; Meyers 2012). Furthermore, Lenman
argues that embracing expressivism would promise to solve a basic
problem for constructivism, specifically, the problem of identifying
the kinds of mental state that normative judgments are (Lenman 2012).
This suggestion is not shared. Humean constructivist Street has
forcefully argued that expressivism fails to fully explain the
normative function of normative discourse, which cannot be reduced to
expressing normative states (Korsgaard 2003, 2008: 312, 325 n. 49,
2009: 309; Bagnoli 2002: 130-132; Magri 2002; Street 2010:
239-242).


## 7. The *Euthyphro* Question



Constructivism's insight is that practical truths should be
explained in terms of the constitutive features of practical
reasoning, which the notion of 'construction' is supposed
to capture. But critics argue that the constructivist conception of
practical reasoning is either arbitrary or parasitic on independent
moral values. The objection often takes the form of a metaethical
dilemma similar to the dilemma discussed by Plato in the
*Euthyphro* (10a). Either the practical standpoint is subject
to moral constraints or it is not. If it is not, then 



> 
> 
> there is no reason to expect that the principles that emerge ...
> will capture our deepest convictions, or respect various platitudes
> that fix our understanding of ethical concepts. (Shafer-Landau 2003:
> 42) 
> 
> 
> 



If it is, then the constraints are not themselves constructed and
acceptance of them commits one to realism (Shafer-Landau 2003: 42).
Constructivism thus either grounds moral truths on arbitrary standards
or collapses into realism.



There are at least two ways of formulating and motivating this
objection. First, the objection can be that constructivism relies on
moral intuitions, which it never proves. Second, the objection can be
that the appeal to unconstructed norms that govern and constitute the
activity of rational choice commits one to realism.


### 7.1 Constructivism and Congruence with Intuitions



Consider the first objection that constructivism relies on an
"unconstructed", hence unjustified - set of
normative constraints on theorizing (Hare 1983). For instance, Kantian
constructivism appears to be grounded on the value of moral
impartiality, which demands equal respect for persons (Scanlon 1998:
22-33; 287-290; Rawls 1993: 38-54). The worry is
that, in the final analysis, constructivism is vacuous because
"its test yields results only by presupposing moral views which
can only be established independently of it" (Raz 2003: 358;
Timmons 2003; Cohen 2003; Brink 1987, 1989; Hare 1983). Furthermore,
there is 



> 
> 
> no non-question-begging feature to which the constructivist can help
> herself in breaking symmetry among the various competing sets of
> constructed principles. (Timmons 2003: SS3)
> 
> 
> 



Kant is keenly aware of the air of paradox surrounding the claim that
the moral concepts, such as good and evil, are not determined prior to
engaging in practical reasoning, but only as a result of engaging in
practical reasoning. This is known as the 'paradox of the
method' (Kant *C2*, 5: 62 ff.) As Rawls explains it, 



> 
> 
> The difficulty is that Kant appears to know in advance of critical
> reflection how a constructivist doctrine might look, but this makes it
> impossible to undertake such reflection in good faith. In reply to
> this quite proper worry, we interpret constructivism as a view about
> how the structure and content of the soundest moral doctrine would
> look once it is laid out after due critical reflection. (Rawls 2000:
> 274) 
> 
> 
> 



Practical reasoning does not serve the purpose of discovering an order
of values independent of its verdicts. Nonetheless, for Kantian
constructivists there is some sort of practical knowledge, which
displays a self-conscious character, can only be accommodated by
accounts that represent the operation of the cognitive capacity as
self-conscious activity (Rawls 2000: 148, see also 218; Engstrom 2013;
Bagnoli 2013b; Jezzi 2016: SS5). From this perspective, the
novelty of constructivism consists in providing an account of
objective practical knowledge that does not presuppose an independent
moral reality to which the mind must conform, but accounts for such
reality in terms of the cognitive activity of reason.



Constructivists and their critics disagree about the role to accord to
intuitions in rational justification. According to Scanlon, a valid
method of justification in ethics consists in testing the congruence
between theoretical assumptions and intuitive moral judgments, that
is, judgments to which we normally accord initial credence. It is
doubtful that we could avoid all appeal to intuitions as unpromising
(Scanlon 1998: 241-247). However, the intuitions on which
constructivism relies are not independent moral truths and do not
serve as an external foundation for morality (Rawls 2000: 178, 273).
Not all constructivists view intuitions as playing a role in rational
justification (O'Neill 1989b). But all agree that an adequate
metaethics should not be totally revisionary; rather, it should be
congruent with common understandings of rationality and morality
(Smith 2013: 313). Arguably, this commitment sets constructivism apart
from those kinds of projectivist and error theories (Blackburn 1993;
Mackie 1977, which claim that evaluative discourse involves a
systematic error (Bagnoli 2002; Street 2010; Lillehammer 2011.


### 7.2 Constitutivist Strategies



The second way to construe the objection that constructivism tacitly
relies on realism focuses on the constitutivist strategy, which is
adopted by many constructivists. This strategy appeals to constitutive
hence "unconstructed" features of agency to ground a set
of normative constraints. Constructivists hold that the appeal to such
constraints is neither arbitrary nor does it commit constructivism to
moral realism. But how does constructivism justify the norms it claims
to be constitutive of practical reason? Again, the objection says,
either they are arbitrary or they are realist and depend on some
normative features of reality, which are unconstructed (Fitzpatrick
2013; Stern 2013; Baiasu 2016; Bratu & Dittmeyer 2016).



While this criticism is addressed especially to Kantian
constructivism, in some sense it threatens all views that appeal to
constitutive norms of reasoning (Ripstein 1987; Enoch 2006,
2011b).



Is there anything ultimately at stake in whether we call the appeal to
constitutive norms realist, rather than constructivist? In addressing
the question "Why does *x* count as a reason for doing
*y*?" both realists and constructivists deploy
unconstructed or underived elements. Non-naturalist realists say:
"It just does", it is "simply true" that facts
such as *x* count as a reason for doing *y*, and
"there won't be any illuminating explanation of what makes
them true" (Shafer-Landau 2003: 47, 48). In other words,
realists take the normativity of reasons as a primitive feature that
does not require any explanation and for which no further explanation
will be useful. By contrast, naturalist realists hold that normative
facts are just natural facts, which can be investigated by ordinary
empirical methods, for example, facts about the responses of agents
under idealized (naturalistically described) circumstances (see Smith
2012, 2013).



Constructivists would disagree with both views. The aim of
constructivism is not the reduction of moral properties to natural
properties; rather, this theory proposes a self-authenticating account
of the standards of practical reason (O'Neill 1989b; Korsgaard
2003, 2009; Street 2010; Velleman 2009, compare Smith 2012, 2013).



In contrast to some kinds of realism, constructivism does not seek
axioms or first principles or objective values on which to ground
moral truths (Bagnoli 2014, 2016). Rather than providing an external
foundation for morality, it holds that in forming our intentions and
beliefs, we are answerable to criteria of correctness that are
internal to and constitutive of the very exercise of rationality
(Korsgaard 2008: 13-15, 110-126, 207-229).
"Constitutive standards are opposed to external standards, which
mention desiderata for an object that are not essential to its being
the kind of thing that it is" (Korsgaard 2008: 8). The
constructivist conviction is that appeal to standards constitutive of
agency explains with ease why such standards are normative (Korsgaard
2008: 8). They are normative because in the very activity of reasoning
we are committing ourselves to being guided by them (Wallace
2012).



As O'Neill remarks, the constructivist vindication of reason is
"avowedly circular": 



> 
> 
> If the standards of practical reasoning are fundamental to all human
> reasoning, then any vindication of these standards is either circular
> (since it uses those very standards) or a failure (since it is not a
> vindication in terms of the standards that are said to be
> fundamental). (O'Neill 1989b: 29) 
> 
> 
> 



This kind of reply is shared by Kantians (Bagnoli 2016), Humeans
(Velleman 2009: 138-141) and other constitutivists (Ferrero
2010a; Katsafanas 2013; Smith 2013; Arruda 2016).



The constitutivist strategy appears to be particularly problematic for
the varieties of Kantian constructivism that derive moral obligations
from structural features of rational agency. Many contend that
understood as a constitutive standard the categorical imperative is
not rich enough to identify moral obligations (Cohen 1996; Bratman
1998; Gibbard 1999: 149, 152-153; Fitzpatrick 2005). Some
constructivists offer similar grounds for rejecting Kantian
constructivism about reasons (see
 sections 3,
 4,
 5.1).
 In fact, most Kantian constructivists deny that moral obligations can
be derived from universal features of bare rationality alone and also
deny that appeal to constitutive norms of rationality is sufficient to
provide a complete system of moral duties (Bagnoli forthcoming).



There is room for disagreement concerning the principles that are
thought to be constitutive of rational agency. Arguably, the principle
of logical consistency is one such principle but it is generally
thought to be too thin to help in rational choice. By itself,
consistency does not seem to account for the kind of constraints that
rational agents need to impose on the dynamic process of goal
management (Shemmer 2012; Gibbard 1999; Smith 1999). To account for
these normative constraints, some add a broad principle of coherence,
which demands a unified account of the agent's goals, and thus
goes beyond strict logical consistency (Shemmer 2012). Others argue
for additional but related principles, which regulate attention and
disregard (James 2007, 2012), respect for others having equal standing
(Bagnoli 2013b), benevolence and non-interference (Smith 2013: 322,
328). Kantians hold that the normativity of instrumental principles of
rationality rests on the normativity of non-instrumental principles
(O'Neill 1989b: 73-74; Korsgaard 1997, 2008: esp.
67-69).



The differences among these views can be illustrated by comparing
their respective diagnoses of a fictional Caligula whose state of mind
is completely coherent but who values torturing people for fun (Street
2010: 371). For realists, he is in error about some true moral value.
There are some reasons--for example, the reason not to torture
others for fun--that we have quite independently of our
evaluative attitudes and practical reasoning. Kantians agree with
realists that fictional Caligula has no good reasons for torturing
anyone, but differ in explaining why this is so. Some Kantians think
that fictional Caligula is incoherent, even though not obviously so.
His incoherence can be shown by spelling out the norms that are
constitutive of valuing. Such constitutive norms entail valuing
humanity, and this shows that fictional Caligula is making a mistake
by his own lights, even though he may never fully realize this, due to
poor reflection, ignorance of the non-normative facts or some other
limitation (Korsgaard 1996a: 121-123). A different Kantian
argument establishes that an internally coherent Caligula is
conceivable, that is, he can be thought without contradiction, but his
case is blocked by general facts about moral sensibility (Engstrom
2009: 243, SS III.7, Bagnoli 2009). Such a Caligula would have no
reason to torture others. By contrast, Humean constructivists hold
that an internally coherent Caligula is possible and that such a
person has reasons for torturing others (Street 2009).


### 7.3 Objections to Constitutivism



Recent debates about constructivism focus on its "constitutivist
strategy", which explains the normativity of (practical or
moral) reasons in terms of what is constitutive of agency. For
instance, Korsgaard (2009) argues that the principles governing action
are "constitutive standards" of agency, that is, standards
arising from the nature of agency itself. The marks of agency are
autonomy and efficacy, and the categorical and hypothetical
imperatives are norms grounded on these two properties. These norms
are "constitutive" of agency in that (i) they determine
what an agent is ("constitution requirement"), (ii) an
agent makes herself into an agent, and into the particular agent who
she is, by conforming to those standards ("self-constitution
requirement"). According to Korsgaard (2019), Kantian
constructivism is uniquely positioned to vindicate the
self-constitution requirement while Humean and Aristotelian theories
fail to meet it. But there is a disagreement about whether
constitutivism is compatible with Kant's ethics. While some
scholar hold that the constitutivist strategy is a distinctively
Kantian move in response to moral skepticism (O'Neill 1989,
Korsgaard 2019, Engstrom 2009, Bagnoli 2019, Shafer 2019), others hold
that it does not serve the Kantian agenda (Gobsch 2019, Saemi 2016,
Tenenbaum 2016).



Constitutive standards are supposed to be partly descriptive of the
very activity that they have to assess (Korsgaard 2008: 9). Critics
object that it is unclear whether and how they can be violated (Cohen
1996: 177; Lavin 2004; Kolodny 2005). For an agent to be correctly
said to have norms, she must be able to break those norms. Suppose
that there is a norm that prevents deception. To say that a rational
agent is guided by such a norm is to say that she can violate it. But
if the norm is constitutive of reasoning, how can she break the norm
by reasoning? If constitutive norms cannot be violated, constitutivism
implies that immoralism and irrationality are impossible. Korsgaard
replies that to count as acting at all, we must at least be trying to
follow the principles of practical reason, but she allows that we may
fail to do so adequately or fully (Korsgaard 2009: 45-49,
159-176. For instance, while adopting the moral end of
benevolence, we may lack grace and understanding, so as to provoke
resentment, rather than elicit gratitude. Herman proposes that in
defective instances of acting, the constitutive norms are not
misapplied but misrepresented (Herman 2007: 171-172,
245-246). For instance, by making a poor judgment about what to
do in self-defense, one mischaracterizes and misunderstands what
self-defense is and what it requires.



A second objection is that the constitutivist strategy partly depends
on the claim that agency is inescapable, but critics think that agency
is as optional as any other particular activity (Enoch 2006; Tiffany
2012, Leffner 2019). Constitutivists have tried to answer
Enoch's "schmagency" objection by arguing that it
fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency itself. While it is
possible to disengage from any particular ordinary activities, some
sort of agency continues to operate (Ferrero 2010a; Velleman 2009:
138-141; James 2012). In this sense, agency is not optional.
Enoch has further objected that, even when some sort of activity is
always in place, this is not enough to say that the norms constituting
the activity produce normative reasons for action for any one agent
(Enoch 2011b). But the constitutivist point is that questions about
reasons to be agents must be taken up within agency (Velleman 2009:
204-206). One does not need a reason to be an agent rather than
not, and so Enoch's question is not a live question (Rosati
2016: 201 n. 71; Silverstein 2015: 1136-1138). A similar reply
is produced on the basis of considerations about the desires that are
appropriate to idealized agents (Smith 2012, 2013; Lindeman 2019).
Finally, 0'Hagan (2014) defends a minimal conception of
constitutivism against Enoch's shmagency objection, arguing that
agential constitutivism has the resources to take morality, normative
and ethical deliberation seriously. She provides an analysis of the
inescapability and nature of deliberation to support the conclusion
that constitutivism coheres with the phenomenology of first-personal
deliberation and supports a non-realist but robust account of moral
objectivity.



Although these replies are effective against some versions of the
shmagency objection, several authors point out that they leave
constitutivism vulnerable to other worries. For instance, Tenenbaum
(2019) contends that the constitutivism leaves us alienated from the
moral norms that it claims we must follow. For Ferrero (2019) the
appeal to inescapability works best as a defensive move, but fails to
sustain robust normativity.



Whether agents have conclusive reasons to be agents, however, might
depend on the particular version of constitutivism. For most
constitutivists, this involves grounding authoritative norms in the
teleological structure of agency (Korsgaard 2009, Engstrom 2009). For
others, the constitutivist project can be salvaged only if it is
supplemented with a reductive metanormative account of reasons for
action, which links reasons to sound or successful practical reasoning
(Silverstein 2016).



A third worry is voiced by Bratman (2012). He criticizes
constructivists for imposing excessive constraints on rational
deliberation, which eventually put agents in tension with their own
pre-reflective normative judgments. As a consequence, reflective
agents may find themselves holding incompatible (prereflective and
reflective) judgments. For instance, one might be required to
reflectively give up one's loyalties and attachments because
they do not cohere with one's impartial duties, even though such
loyalties shape one's life. This is a problem even when the
constitutive norm is a formal requirement of consistency, as it is for
Street. Furthermore, if the input judgments include attitudes such as
love and caring, which are not necessarily responsive to
intersubjective pressures, agents may end up endorsing reflective
judgments that are not aligned with their unreflective judgments. This
objection points to a difficulty for constructivism insofar as it
adopts constitutive strategies, but it also indicates the importance
of the temporal dimensions of rational agency (James 2012; Ferrero
2009, 2010b; Smith 2013: 315ff). Relatedly, s new significant line of
research develops varieties of constructivism that take into account
the predicaments of contingency,the possibility normative revisions
(Baldwin 2013, Richardson 2018), moral progress (Arruda 2016), and
concrete forms of normativity (Gledhill and Stein 2020).



In the last thirty years, constructivism emerged and established
itself as one recognizable form of metaethics. As with other
metaethical theories, it faces serious objections, but it also makes a
significant contribution to many debates, some of which originated
from constructivist challenges to traditional metaethics.