## 1. Introduction



It may not be a mere coincidence that in 1991 Oswaldo Porchat, a
leading Brazilian philosopher, and in 1994 Robert J. Fogelin coined
the word "neo-Pyrrhonism" to describe their respective
philosophical positions. That coincidence reflects both the increasing
significance of the scholarship on skepticism, in Latin American and
in Anglo-American philosophy, and a more sympathetic attitude toward
this venerable tradition.



To write about skepticism in Latin America is more difficult than one
may expect. First, the phenomena to be described are complex and
multifarious. Interest in skepticism is widespread in this part of the
world, and by no means confined to one country or to a small group of
philosophers. On the one hand, the significance of skepticism in the
philosophy of each country seems to vary wildly; on the other, the
history of studies on skepticism in each country has its own internal
development, despite many connections among the various countries
involved. Second, interest in skepticism is so recent in Latin America
that not enough time has elapsed to provide some perspective on the
issue. It is perhaps still too soon to give an entirely balanced view
of skepticism in the region. But we will attempt our best to achieve
that.



An interesting feature of the Latin American way of approaching
skepticism is by not taking it just as the embodiment of an opponent
to be refuted. At the very least, there is not a widespread prejudice
against skepticism. On the contrary, many Latin American philosophers
have strong sympathy for the skeptical proposal, and even those who
are not skeptics themselves do not think that if the assumption of a
philosophical thesis leads to skepticism, this constitutes a kind of
*reductio ad absurdum* of the initial assumption. Skepticism
is, for many Latin American philosophers, at least a *prima
facie* tenable position. That does not mean, of course, that the
majority of those Latin American philosophers who deal with skepticism
are skeptics, but we do find many that consider themselves as such.
Even for those who are not skeptics, the significance of philosophical
skepticism is undeniable, and Latin American philosophers have made
efforts to understand carefully its meaning and historical role.



The best way to introduce skepticism in Latin America is not to
explain what goes on in each country, but to report what Latin
American philosophers have said concerning those topics that caught
their attention. However, we will begin by presenting a brief
historical background and the thought of the two founding fathers of
Latin American work on skepticism: Oswaldo Porchat (Brazil) and
Ezequiel de Olaso (Argentina). Special care must be taken with their
work, because together they set the stage for a proper understanding
of what happens in all other Latin American countries. We will then
examine what Latin American philosophers have been doing both in
contemporary skepticism and in the history of this philosophical
tradition. Ours is not an exhaustive account, and being selective, it
is unable to accommodate every proposal in the field. We hope,
however, to give a fair idea of what has happened and is currently
taking place, in order to situate the reader and prompt additional
research in the area.


## 2. Historical Background



Contemporary studies of skepticism began in Latin America thanks to
the works of Oswaldo Porchat and Ezequiel de Olaso, a distinguished
Argentinian historian of philosophy. Due to their works, skepticism
has attracted a significant, although somewhat scattered, amount of
attention in Latin America. Both were already interested in skepticism
before they met for the first time. In 1968, Porchat gave a famous
lecture, published in the following year, in which he called attention
to a basic skeptical problem that every philosopher should try to
overcome: the problem of the conflict of philosophies (roughly, the
fact that philosophical doctrines often disagree on their answers to
any given philosophical question). Given his B.A. in classics and his
Ph.D. dissertation on Aristotle's conception of science, it is
not surprising that Porchat came to know ancient skepticism very well.
His perspective was philosophical, and he identified his own
philosophical experience with that of the ancient skeptics. In the
same year of 1969, Olaso defended his Ph.D. dissertation on
"Leibniz and the Ancient Skeptics" at Byrn Mawr College
(Pennsylvania), in which he showed that Leibniz had a deep knowledge
of Greek skepticism, whose modes he clearly identified in the
Cartesian arguments. Thus, one can say that skepticism in Latin
American began in the end of the 1960s.



In 1975, invited by Porchat, Olaso went to Brazil where he became a
professor at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP) until 1977.
This fact had a profound influence on the development of the studies
of skepticism in both countries and even in other Latin American
countries. Their mutual collaboration proved very fruitful.
Philosophers interested on skepticism soon got in touch, for they
organized seminal conferences on the topic (1986, in Campinas, Brazil;
in 1992, in Buenos Aires, Argentina; unfortunately, no proceedings
were published). Throughout the years, many other conferences on
skepticism were held (in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico) in which
philosophers from many countries took part and collective books on
skepticism appeared.



Porchat's and Olaso's influence was huge. They were the
founding fathers of skepticism in Latin America. One can speak of a
second generation that was in touch from the 1990s onwards because
they paved the way first. Philosophers in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico,
and Colombia have been collaborating in the last twenty years because
they both inaugurated a friendly, collaborative way of doing
philosophy that has been preserved by their followers. Though Olaso,
Porchat and some of their disciples were in touch with many
philosophers from other countries and had a far-reaching influence,
there is no single, integrated explanation for that widespread
interest.



There is no doubt that skepticism flourished in Brazil like in no
other Latin American country. It is perhaps not amiss to say that
Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism is the most important achievement of
Latin American skepticism, providing material for further systematic
discussions. In Brazil, an important group of philosophers around
Porchat was organized throughout the country in the 1980s, and they
were devoted not only to understand the history of skepticism but also
to discuss contemporary skepticism, by developing it and criticizing
it. The group held conferences every year, sometimes twice a year, and
many books, individual monographs and edited collections, were
published. Moreover, Porchat was professor and supervisor of a number
of young philosophers as well as a reference to all other philosophers
studying skepticism. Even philosophers who were not primarily
interested in skepticism found the group's way of doing
philosophy quite attractive. In fact, the group has always
systematically invited non-skeptical philosophers to enrich its
discussions. As a result, as time went by, the group grew larger and
larger.



Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia have also shown a lot of interest in
skepticism with many important contributions to it, albeit perhaps not
as systematically as in Brazil. In Argentina, work on skepticism
remained at first somewhat confined to Olaso and to some historians of
modern philosophy around him. Later, there has been a growing interest
in Argentina, this time from philosophers belonging to the analytic
tradition, who were (and still are) also in touch with the Brazilian
group, including, more recently, a new impulse to the study of ancient
skepticism.



In Mexico, there is also a deep interest in skepticism. History of
skepticism was not neglected, as we can be seen from the works of
Laura Benitez and Jose Antonio Robles, among others,
both of whom worked with Olaso (and Popkin). Their focus is on modern
skepticism. Some Mexican philosophers, working within a Kantian
tradition, focused on transcendental arguments as weapons against
skepticism. Others work on contemporary skepticism in connection to
questions such as disjunctivism and perception. Finally, skepticism
and its connections to fallibilism and skeptical or epistemic
concepts, such as *doubt* and *certainty*, were a major
theme of some Mexican philosophers.



There has also been some interest in skepticism in many other
countries, most notably in Colombia. Usually, this interest is
combined with a classic author, such as Descartes, Hume, or Kant, or
with an analytic philosopher, like Wittgenstein or Dennett. More
recently, an interest in ancient skepticism has also arisen. In other
countries such as Peru, Chile and Uruguay, the interest in skeptical
issues is more scattered. No more than a minor or incidental interest
in either the history of skepticism or in current epistemological
questions that bear on the skeptical challenge is found.


## 3. Skepticism rediscovered



The study and diffusion of skepticism in Argentina and in other
countries such as Brazil and Mexico owes a great deal to Ezequiel de
Olaso. When Olaso died, Porchat noted that, despite not being a
skeptic himself, Olaso "was indeed the father of Brazilian
skepticism" (Porchat 1997). But his leadership and influence was
vast, as Popkin testified:



> 
> 
> Ezequiel de Olaso was one of the most prominent historians of
> philosophy. He contributed enormously to arousing interest in a wide
> range of topics in the history of philosophy through his writings, his
> teachings and his lectures in Latin America, North America and Europe.
> (Popkin 1997)
> 
> 
> 



Olaso taught in many universities both in Argentina and elsewhere. His
Ph.D. dissertation has not been published, but many papers resulted
from it. Olaso wrote a number of important papers on skepticism, both
ancient and modern. He explored many authors in the 17th
and 18th centuries: Hume, Benito Jeronimo
Feijoo, Rousseau, Hobbes, and Leibniz. These developments were
summarized in Olaso 1994. Many of his papers are dedicated to
Hume's skepticism. Olaso argued that Hume was an Academic
skeptic, not a Pyrrhonist, as Popkin had supposed. More importantly,
his study of certain Enlightenment authors made Popkin revise his
interpretation that, apart from Hume, there was no interest at all in
skepticism during the 18th century.



Olaso's work was not limited to the presence of skepticism in
modern philosophy. He also devoted his efforts to interpret certain
concepts of the main lexicon of skepticism. He was not only interested
in skepticism from a historical point of view, but also from a
philosophical perspective: he argued vigorously against the coherence
of the skeptical position in "Zetesis" (Olaso 1988)
a detailed paper on ancient Pyrrhonism, in which he displayed both an
accurate understanding of this philosophical stance and a highly
critical attitude toward the Pyrrhonian conception of investigation.
His assessment of the concept of *zetesis* was very
influential. Olaso interpreted it as an inquiry whose goal was
suspension of judgment, which defined Pyrrhonism, and contrasted it to
the open inquiry led by Academic and modern skeptics, whose goal is
truth. Among his contributions, one finds also the distinction between
the concept of *doubt*, or suspension of the mind, and the
concept of *epokhe*, or suspension of judgment, which
would be the proper attitude of a skeptic, because it is beyond doubt
itself and tries to overcome it. These new interpretations were part
of his debate with scholars like Naess, Chisholm, Mates, Frede and, of
course, Porchat in order to find an acceptable form of contemporary
skepticism. Based on Ortega y Gasset's distinction between
belief and knowledge, he proposed new accounts of Moore's
notions of common sense and certainty (Olaso 1975a) and the critical
analysis carried out by Wittgenstein (Olaso 1999).



Olaso's work on skepticism opened up two main directions that
were followed by many philosophers, whether under his direct influence
or not. First, skepticism emerged as an epistemological problem and,
in the light of the linguistic turn, he set the task of reinterpreting
and making sense of this philosophical stance. Second, he initiated a
scholarly investigation of the history of skepticism; particularly of
modern skepticism, but also both versions of its ancient form.


## 4. Neo-Pyrrhonism



It is now time to present in some detail Porchat's
neo-Pyrrhonism, for it is arguably the most important contribution to
Latin American skepticism. His seminal paper, "On What
Appears", was published in 1991, laying the foundations and the
outline of his skeptical stance. Later, in a number of papers, he
explored the main ideas further, corrected minor points, developed new
aspects, and wrote some introductory and accessible texts.



One of the merits of Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism is that it
provides a general, articulated philosophical stance that one can
adopt. Skepticism is not, as it is usually presented in
epistemological circles, a mere doubt on this or that topic that
should be superseded, that is, it is not a methodological doubt or an
expedient to strengthen a dogmatic position. For most philosophers
concerned with skepticism, the coherence and intelligibility of the
skeptical position is not really important. Any doubt, however crazy, may be useful, if it allows the philosopher to learn something about
an argument. But Porchat does not think so. For him, skepticism is
thought of as an articulated, plausible stance proposed by some
philosophers. Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism is not even confined to a
broad epistemological doctrine, since it is meant to be a general
philosophical attitude, which includes epistemological aspects, but is
not restricted to them.



One should also emphasize that his neo-Pyrrhonism has to be sharply
distinguished from Cartesian skepticism. Porchat makes it clear that
neo-Pyrrhonian *aporiai* are a different sort of argument from
Cartesian doubts. In particular, neo-Pyrrhonism is not committed to
mentalism (the doctrine that one can conceive the mind, and its
representations, as independent from the body) and does not it invite
any sort of solipsism. Thus, most of the criticisms leveled against
Cartesian skepticism do not apply to neo-Pyrrhonism.



Neo-Pyrrhonism has two parts: one negative, and the other positive.
The two most important concepts of the negative part are
*diaphonia* (the conflict among the various
philosophical doctrines) and *epokhe* (the suspension of
judgment). For Porchat, *ataraxia*, or tranquility of
mind, is not an essential ingredient of Pyrrhonism and it is more of
historical interest. Given the conflict of philosophies, Porchat draws
the skeptical conclusion: being genuinely unable to choose between the
various philosophical views, he suspends his judgment. He argues
vigorously that the disagreement between philosophies is undecidable.
Not even his previous "philosophy of the common view of the
world" (Porchat 1975, 1979) is able to solve or avoid the
conflict. The conflict involves the dogmatism not only of philosophers
of the common view of the world, but also of ordinary people. However,
not all philosophies are part of the conflict, since some philosophies
are not dogmatic: they do not intend to describe the ultimate nature
of things.



Porchat (1993) distinguishes between two kinds of skeptical arguments:
dialectical and empirical. This is a significant contribution of
Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism to skepticism. Let us consider, first,
dialectical arguments. The mode of *diaphonia*, in
Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism, is the crucial one. But, of course,
Porchat also considers the other modes of Agrippa as important
skeptical weapons against dogmatism. More importantly, he recognizes
that for ancient Pyrrhonism the skeptical method of antinomies
(arguing both pro and con with equal persuasiveness) is indispensable
against the dogmatic claim that some doctrines and arguments are
*felt* stronger than others. That is, the method is
indispensable to neutralize that dogmatic experience of unbalanced
arguments, by making stronger the weaker arguments. By arguing on both
sides of an issue, the skeptic experiences them as being equally
strong. Why do they seem equally powerful in the skeptic's
intellectual experience? For the following reason: any criterion
proposed to decide the issue will itself be part of the dispute, and
disagreement about it re-emerges. Skeptics do not commit themselves to
these dialectical arguments. They just use what dogmatists admit
against dogmatism. Their whole point is to induce suspension of
judgment in dogmatists while still maintaining their own
*epokhe*.



There is, however, another route toward suspension of judgment.
Skeptics can employ arguments they are able to endorse, which lead to
the conclusion that one ought to suspend judgment. As skeptics
(Pyrrhonists) live their ordinary life like everyone else, they can
also reason like everyone else. They can search for the conjunction of
phenomena in the world, establish empirical correlations, and infer
the presence of fire from the fact of smoke or the occurrence of a
wound from the presence of a scar. Empirical reasoning leads us from
one phenomenon to another. Couldn't it be the case that such
empirical arguments lead to suspension of judgment? These arguments
have as premises what is apparent, and they do not indicate a
conclusion beyond the phenomena, since *epokhe*, their
conclusion, is an intellectual experience. According to Porchat
(1993), Aenesidemus' modes are empirical, not dialectical,
arguments in support of *epokhe*.



With regard to the positive part, neo-Pyrrhonism presents a detailed
account of the crucial notion of *phainomenon*. Porchat
thought, in an earlier phase, that *phainomenon* was to
be identified with, or assimilated to, *phantasia*
(Porchat 1985, 1986). That explains why he once construed that notion
as implying some form of mentalism: what appears was conceived of as a
mental representation. He later rejected that identification (Porchat
1991). On his new explanation, *phainomenon* is best
accounted for by another crucial notion: *bios*, or
common life. After all, says Sextus Empiricus, what appears is
*bios*. Thus, Sextus' explanation of the skeptical
standard of action is also an explanation of the notion of
*phainomenon*. By paying close attention to the fourfold
everyday observances, one may understand better what the
*phainomenon* is. At the same time, common life is to be
understood as what is apparent (what appears to those who live it),
not as a reality in itself.



According to Porchat, phenomena are a kind of residue from suspension
of judgment; they are what is left after we have suspended judgment
about dogmatic discourse. And once dogmatism is left behind, life is
what is left for us. The phenomena impose themselves to us, and it is
not up to us to accept them or not. One could say that phenomenon is
what is "given" to us, but that is misleading, for in one
sense it is not "given" at all. At first, Porchat asserted
that language is a kind of constitutive ingredient of the phenomena
and language permeates all our experience (Porchat 1991); later,
perhaps to avoid some Kantian or idealist connotation, he preferred to
talk of an association between what appears and language (Porchat
1995, 2013). Thus, phenomena are impregnated by language, not given to
us.



One important comment Porchat makes concerning phenomena is that they
are always relative to someone. In fact, they may be personal or
public. Something may appear to someone or to more than one person,
maybe even to all of us. For instance, it may appear to you right now
that your are reading this article; and it may appear to many of us
that Brasilia is the capital of Brazil; and it may appear to all of us
that there are trees in the world. Here it can be noted that there is
no solipsistic tendency in neo-Pyrrhonism, since many people in fact
share most phenomena. That solipsism is not an inherent tendency in
neo-Pyrrhonism can already be seen due to the connections between the
phenomena and common life. After all, what is apparent to us are
objects and events in the world, part of the life all of us live.



Another remark is that phenomena are sensible or intellectual. When
something appears to the senses, such as the perception of a table in
front of you, it is a sensible phenomenon; when it appears to the
intellect, such as a law, it is an intellectual phenomenon. For
Porchat, there is no sharp line between these two kinds of phenomena.
A sensible phenomenon also has some intellectual aspect: when you see
a table in front of you, the very idea of a table includes in it
something that goes beyond what is present in your sensory modalities.
However, although Porchat does not develop this idea explicitly, most
intellectual phenomena seem to have a reference to something sensible,
or at least to have something sensible in its origin. Therefore, many
phenomena are typically of one kind, always including both a sensible
and an intellectual aspect in them. Very recently, however, Porchat
dropped that doctrine, and he now prefers to distinguish between two
kinds of phenomena (Porchat 2013).



Porchat's interpretation of Pyrrhonism seems closer to
Frede's (1997) than to Burnyeat's (1980). It seems that,
for him just like for Frede, skeptics have many beliefs in ordinary
life, but are not committed to philosophical beliefs (beliefs about
the truth of various philosophical views about the world). His
neo-Pyrrhonism, therefore, would seem to be an urbane form of
skepticism (cf. Barnes 1992). However, the very distinction at the
basis of that dispute between Frede and Burnyeat presupposes what
Porchat rejects: a contrast between philosophers and ordinary people.
From a neo-Pyrrhonist point of view, both are typically, though not
always, dogmatists: most philosophers are dogmatists and so are
ordinary folk; dogmatic philosophers only tend to be more refined in
some of their conceptions.



The crucial distinction is that between dogmatism and non-dogmatism.
Sometimes, ordinary people are not dogmatic, and neither are some
philosophers, such the skeptics (Pyrrhonists). For Porchat, many
contemporary philosophers are skeptics or have a skeptical tendency
without knowing it (Porchat 2001). Thus, what matters for a
neo-Pyrrhonist is not whether the skeptic has no beliefs whatsoever or
only ordinary beliefs, but whether he has dogmatic beliefs (concerning
*adela*) or non-dogmatic beliefs (concerning what
appears, that is, the world or *bios*). Frede would have
missed the point concerning the scope of *epokhe* for
not having understood properly the notion of
*phainomenon* (Porchat 1991).



Accordingly, the basic neo-Pyrrhonian distinction is that between the
phenomena and what is said about the phenomena. Dogmatic discourse is
*about* the phenomena. When dogmatists say "roses are
red" they mean "roses are *really* red", and
they have a theory to explain what that alleged reality consists in.
Thus, they are no longer talking about the world, but about a further
reality posited by their theory. No one disputes whether a rose
appears red, but whether it is in fact red. Not all discourse,
however, is about the phenomena and some merely *expresses* the
phenomena. Such is ordinary language in daily life, and such is also
the use of language by neo-Pyrrhonists: they use language to express
what appears to them (or to us, if the phenomenon is a common one),
but not to state how things really are. In this sense, "roses
are red" expresses how roses appear to us; and in this sense,
neo-Pyrrhonists may even say it is *true* that roses are red
and that we *know* it. Therefore, neo-Pyrrhonism is not, in one
sense of the word, a form of relativism, since it accepts an objective
knowledge about the world.



Two other Pyrrhonian concepts are updated by the neo-Pyrrhonist in the
positive part: *hairesis* and *zetesis*.
According to Porchat, neo-Pyrrhonists have a doctrine or "a
skeptical view of the world". This skeptical view of the world
is an elaboration of how things appear to neo-Pyrrhonists. Skeptical
discourse should be understood as an expression of phenomena. Thus,
neo-Pyrrhonists may articulate explicitly their own view of the world.
Since most phenomena are common, especially those that concern
philosophical issues, neo-Pyrrhonists will try to make explicit our
ways of thinking, at least as they see them. However, each skeptic
will have his or her own skeptical view of the world, since this view
depends also on the circumstances in which they live.



Lastly, it should be noted that neo-Pyrrhonists are empiricists, but
their empiricism is improved by current philosophy of science. For
instance, they may endorse the hypothetic-deductive method. For them,
we can explore the world empirically, and in their skeptical view of
the world they may incorporate scientific results. For instance, we
think that the earth moves, and we no longer think that the earth is
at the center of the universe. Scientific results may and do have
important impacts on our view of the world, including on the
neo-Pyrrhonists'. Porchat went as far as to distinguish between
a philosophical realism and a scientific realism (Porchat 1991, 1994),
asserting that neo-Pyrrhonists need not be instrumentalists, but could
hold scientific realism, although not, of course, philosophical
realism. If there is objective knowledge of the common world, it seems
that the sciences can improve on that knowledge being guided by an
experimental method such as the hypothetic-deductive. Neo-Pyrrhonian
*zetesis* is not only a philosophical inquiry to destroy
dogmatism, as in the case of Sextus, but also an empirical exploration
of the world of phenomena.


## 5. Reactions to neo-Pyrrhonism



Neo-Pyrrhonism provoked a lot of different reactions in Brazil and
elsewhere. Since it is impossible to review them all here, our purpose
will be to give a fair idea of them.



The first important reaction came from philosophers concerned with
scientific knowledge. Hilan Bensusan and Paulo Souza (1994) thought
that Pyrrhonism was an outdated philosophy. In the face of
contemporary science, Pyrrhonism would no longer be a viable
alternative, for it had not the adequate concepts to explain that
science. Therefore, the fact that science has evolved in unforeseeable
ways is an objection to neo-Pyrrhonism. Luiz Henrique de Araujo
Dutra (1993, 1995, 1996, 1997b), also criticizing Porchat's
conception of science, came to propose another skeptical position,
which he called "alethic skepticism". Dutra thought that
the metaphysical notion of truth is indispensable to scientific
research. Both held that modern science establishes theories that
cannot be doubted by the neo-Pyrrhonist. Otavio Bueno has a
more sympathetic proposal toward skepticism and develops a
neo-Pyrrhonist approach to contemporary science by combining it with
van Fraassen's view (Bueno 2015). Neo-Pyrrhonian empiricism
emphasizes the notion of empirical adequacy.



A second kind of response was given by those who want to develop or
improve on basic features of neo-Pyrrhonism. Some, such as
Plinio Junqueira Smith (1995b), tried to purify neo-Pyrrhonism
from what still looked like a dogmatic notion. For instance, the idea
that dogmatism is a disease and that the skeptic (Pyrrhonist) offers a
better way of life by curing dogmatists of their disease may be mere
prejudice. Therefore, the skeptical idea of therapy is perhaps
dogmatic. The notion of common life as used by the neo-Pyrrhonist also
seems to be an inheritance of Porchat's "philosophy of the
common view of the world" (Porchat 1975, 1979). The skeptical
view of the world has an undeniable personal aspect. Waldomiro
Jose da Silva Filho explored, on the one hand, skeptical
difficulties in common life neglected by the neo-Pyrrhonist (Silva
Filho 2015) and, on the other, difficulties in self-knowledge, thereby
trying to extend neo-Pyrrhonism to subjects not touched upon by
Porchat (Silva Filho 2007, 2008).



Another important discussion intended to correct and improve on
neo-Pyrrhonism concerns the neo-Pyrrhonist view on truth. Porchat
developed in an important paper a skeptical doctrine of truth (Porchat
1995). According to Porchat, once they have divorced from a
metaphysical notion of reality, neo-Pyrrhonists can defend a
correspondence theory of truth: what we say and what appears would be
correlated in our experience; it appears that there is a link between
what we say and what appears to us. Eduardo Barrio (2000), however,
thinks that the only alternative to a neo-Pyrrhonist is to adopt a
deflationist theory of truth, like the redundancy theory, and that any
correspondence theory would imply dogmatism.



An unexpected and important development of neo-Pyrrhonism came from
philosophers who were also concerned with political philosophy. They
were interested in knowing what would be the skeptical (Pyrrhonian)
proposal in politics. Porchat (in conversation) has always been very
clear on this issue, for he holds that the skeptic could have any
political doctrine, including a radical one: from extreme right to
extreme left. After all, skepticism would not exclude any content of
*phainomena*. But most think that not all alternatives are
accessible to a skeptical position. Renato Lessa (1995) argues that
the neo-Pyrrhonist would be a liberal; Paulo Jonas de Lima Piva (2002)
thinks he could be a social democrat or a socialist; Cicero
Romao Araujo (2007, 2008) connects the notion of
skepticism with the notion of citizenship. This debate opened up a new
line of research concerning skepticism.



Very recently, an internal criticism of neo-Pyrrhonism emerged and it
deserves to be mentioned. Vitor Hirschbruch Schvartz (2015) and Diego
Machuca (2013a) argue for a rustic version of neo-Pyrrhonism,
according to which Pyrrhonists hold no beliefs, and do not stop short
of all the consequences that one should derive from the force of the
skeptical attack on dogmatism. A truly skeptical position would
destroy all beliefs, whether ordinary or philosophical. Accordingly,
Schvartz and Machuca see themselves as rustic neo-Pyrrhonists, and do
not accept Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism with its non-dogmatic
beliefs.



But there have been many external criticisms whose intention is to
reject neo-Pyrrhonism. Roberto Bolzani Filho developed an incisive
criticism of Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism. Bolzani (1996, 2003)
identified a sort of "naturalized reason" or some dogmatic
presuppositions in the idea of a "healthy philosophy" in
Porchat's thinking. One could apply to skepticism the same kind
of argument that the skeptic uses against other philosophies. In the
end, skepticism would be part of the conflict among philosophies it
tries to avoid. Bolzani also attempted to show that, despite
Porchat's intention, neo-Pyrrhonism is an outdated way of
philosophizing. Roberto Horacio de Sa Pereira (2003)
presented a Kantian answer to Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism. He
raised a number of difficulties to understand Porchat's
conception of phenomena, and argued that an acceptable solution would
come only from a transcendental philosophy. These two criticisms, if
sound, should make one reconsider neo-Pyrrhonism. More recently,
Pereira (2015) came to defend naive realism against Pyrrhonism.


## 6. Contemporary skepticism



Just as in many other parts of the world, contemporary skepticism in
Latin America deals with epistemological issues within analytic theory
of knowledge. Many anti-skeptical strategies, such as contextualism
and externalism, deserved close scrutiny by Latin American
philosophers. Also the transcendental strategy has captured the
attention of many philosophers interested in skepticism. But
contemporary skepticism is not confined to epistemology alone and it
engages with, more broadly, analytic philosophy as a whole. Analytic
worries about language and, more specifically, the notion of meaning
have led to the development of a new form of skepticism, known as
meaning skepticism. We will review some of the discussions on these
topics, beginning with the connections between skepticism and analytic
philosophy.



Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho (Brazil) developed some skeptical
concepts using Austin's pragmatist view of language, and he also
identified many common ideas between Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism
(Marcondes de Souza Filho 1988, 1996a,b). Thus, Marcondes was
articulating Pyrrhonism further in a similar spirit as Porchat.
Another groundbreaking work on skepticism derived from the linguistic
turn is that of Samuel Cabanchik (Argentina). Cabanchik was interested
in the possibility of a linguistic form of skepticism or skepticism
about meaning not only in Wittgenstein, but also in Aristotle and
Francisco Sanchez. His main focus, however, was Wittgenstein, about
whom he wrote two books (2003, 2010) and many papers (1990,
2008a,b).



Marcondes' and Cabanchik's concern with analytic
philosophy and its relation to skepticism was truly a guide to other
philosophers. The connections between skepticism and the philosophy of
the later Wittgenstein have been highlighted by many scholars.
Plinio Junqueira Smith (1994) tried to show the strong
affinities between Wittgenstein's later philosophy and ancient
Pyrrhonism, to which Paulo Roberto Margutti (Brazil) (Pinto 1996a)
offered a criticism. In the same spirit, Guadalupe Reinoso (Argentina)
(2006, 2008, 2009) calls our attention to the value of skepticism in
both Sextus and Wittgenstein as an *ars vivendi*: their
criticism of language's bewitchment, anti-theoretical
perspective, and conception of philosophy as a therapy. Magdalena
Holguin (Colombia) (1997) and R. Melendez (Colombia)
(2014) also analyze the relations between skepticism and Wittgenstein.
Pamela Lastres (Peru) (2011) has recently been doing some promising
work on Wittgenstein and Moore, but also on Pyrrhonian skepticism. It
is also worth noting that Oscar Nudler (Argentina) (2010) has
developed what he calls a "philosophy of the limits",
inspired both by Wittgenstein and the Socratic awareness of our
ignorance, which, although not properly skeptic, is a doctrine at
least closely associated with skepticism.



More recently, Glenda Satne (Argentina) (2003, 2005a,b, 2008) also
pursued a line of research based on analytic theories of meaning and,
more specifically, on meaning skepticism. She has been busy with
skeptical arguments derived from contemporary semantics, such as
Quine's argument from the indeterminacy of radical translation,
Putnam's model-theoretic argument, Dummett's argument from
the manifestation of linguistic knowledge and, above all,
Kripke's (or Kripkenstein's) skeptical arguments. Meaning
skepticism was also the subject of a very well informed book by Silvio
Mota Pinto (Brazil/Mexico) (2009, 2014), and Efrain Lazos
(Mexico) (2002) published interesting papers on Wittgenstein, Kripke,
and meaning skepticism as well.



Thus, the connection between skepticism and analytic philosophy became
a topic to be further explored by Latin American philosophers. Porchat
had argued that contemporary analytic philosophy was to a good extent
skeptical without knowing it. According to him, many analytic
philosophers don't understand very well what skeptics had said
and what they call a skeptic does not correspond to skepticism,
properly understood. If they had the appropriate knowledge of the
history of skepticism, they would perhaps acknowledge the skeptical
orientation of their doctrines. It is not clear, however, that that is
the case in analytic philosophy. One debate that has received some
attention is how far this or that analytic philosopher is close to
skepticism. For instance, against Porchat's opinion about Quine,
Marcos Nascimento Bulcao (Brazil) wrote a book on Quine's
naturalistic realism, denying that he is a skeptic (Bulcao
2008). However, the perception of a skeptical Quine still persists in
some places.



Davidson is another analytic philosopher whose connections to
skepticism have been assessed by Latin American philosophers. Eleonora
Orlando (Argentina) (2000) wrote a paper criticizing Davidson, for his
conception of language would end up, despite his intentions, into a
kind of semantic skepticism. Cristian Barturen (Peru), on the
other hand, is interested on Davidson's critique of global
Skepticism. Otavio Bueno (Brazil/USA) criticized the way in
which Davidson tries to respond to skepticism (Bueno 2005).



The relation between P.F. Strawson and skepticism has also been
assessed by a number of Latin American scholars on contemporary
skepticism or on analytic philosophy. Perhaps the most important
contribution comes from a Mexican group. We will talk more about them
below, when we discuss transcendental arguments as an anti-skeptical
strategy. Sergio Sanchez (Argentina) (2006), Marco Franciotti (2009)
and Plinio Junqueira Smith (2015) have also done some work in
this topic.



Other analytic philosophers engaged with the issue further. To give
but one example, Miguel Angel Fernandez (Mexico) (2014)
criticized the incoherence of the anti-skeptical epistemology of
belief attribution developed by Crispin Wright. According to
Fernandez, Wright intends to combine two *desiderata* in
a single anti-skeptical strategy, to wit, a *concessive*
element to the skeptic, on the one hand, and a *rescue*
element, on the other. However, he argues, that combination is
impossible.



Perhaps one should note that contemporary skepticism was also
developed along other philosophical traditions, not only of an
analytic orientation. Under the influence of Wittgenstein, but also of
Stanley Cavell, Mario Gensollem (Mexico) (2006) explored the role of
skepticism not only in philosophy, but also in common life. He came to
embrace the Cavellian thesis that philosophical skepticism is the best
expression of the intrinsic finitude of human nature. Sergio
Sanchez (Argentina) (2006) called attention not only to
Strawson's but also to Heidegger's assessment of skeptical
arguments. Jonadas Techio (Brazil) (2013) also investigated,
from a Cavellian and Heideggerian points of view, the importance of
philosophical skepticism.



Skeptical worries are usually linked to epistemological issues. We
find in Mexico a group of philosophers who have a very strong
connection to skepticism. They go as far as proposing new forms of
skepticism. Armando Cintora (Mexico) (2010), for instance,
holds a Pyrrhonian position in philosophy of science. According to
Cintora, a methodological Pyrrhonism would be of great help to
liberate scientists from the dogmas that keep them captive when they
try to develop their scientific research. Just like in Sextus'
case, Cintora argues that this kind of methodological
Pyrrhonism is not an epistemic paralysis: Pyrrhonian scientists can
practice science, since they are aware of the non-dogmatic (temporal)
character of their ontological, methodological and semantic
principles. Such acknowledgment will keep them safe from a dogmatic
outlook.



Jorge Ornelas (Mexico) (2012, 2014a; Cintora and Ornelas
2013a), a younger member of that group, focused on the main
anti-skeptical strategies in contemporary philosophy (contextualism,
belief-attribution epistemology, dogmatism, transcendental approach,
externalism, etc.). Ornelas tried to show that none of these
strategies succeed or dislodge the traditional skeptical challenge,
chiefly because they lack a satisfactory diagnosis of the motivations
behind the skeptical problematic. Therefore, they fall prey to a
double error: not only do they fail to eradicate the basic motivations
behind skepticism, but also they pay no attention to the fact that the
traditional skeptical problematic emerges only for theories and
concepts of knowledge that do not threaten ordinary knowledge
attributions.



Fallibilism and skepticism were the topics of some papers written by
Guillermo Hurtado (Mexico). Hurtado (2002a) holds that, although these
two positions are closely related, one must keep them apart; he
rejects fallibilism because it is revisionist. Not much later, he
argues in favor of using more fine-grained epistemic terms. According
to Hurtado (2005), one should distinguish various senses of
"doubt", introduce the notion of "suspicion",
and accept various degrees of certainty. His basic idea is to enrich
the vocabulary of epistemology, including more sophisticated skeptical
terms.



Many, of course, reject the skeptical position. Paulo Francisco
Estrella Faria (Brazil) (2007, 2012), for instance, argued against
skepticism. In fact, he thinks, skepticism is committed to a kind of
idealism, even in the case of Porchat and despite his explicit
rejection of this philosophical view. According to Faria, any
assertion implies a claim to absolute truth and, if skeptics assert
anything, as they do in ordinary life, then they are committed to what
they would rather avoid. The skeptic view of language is, therefore,
untenable, and there is a type of pragmatic contradiction in the
skeptic's position. That criticism has been endorsed by Roberto
Horacio de Sa Pereira (Brazil) (2003, 2015).



The works of Eleonora Cresto (Argentina) and Alejandro Miroli
(Argentina) also distance themselves from the skeptical position.
Cresto (1996, 1997) focused on anti-skeptical strategies that arise
from naturalistic positions, whether along Wittgensteinian lines or
following F. Dretske and other reliabilists. Miroli (2007, 2008,
2010), in turn, dealt with scientific skepticism, addressing both
general cases and socially important ones. He also examined
Dretske's relevant alternatives argument, and tried to determine
which kinds of alternatives one should exclude and which one can
neglect in knowledge attributions.



Several additional epistemological strategies were put under close
scrutiny by Latin American epistemologists. Here are a few of them.
Diana Hoyos (Colombia) (2006) works on contemporary theory of
knowledge, linking the concepts of epistemic responsibility, Gettier
examples and skepticism. Jorge Gregorio Posada (Colombia) (2007) has
responded to her work. Ignacio Avila (Colombia) (2003)
confronts Davidson's thesis that most of our beliefs are true
with the corresponding skeptical challenge. Another popular
anti-skeptical strategy is contextualism. Flavio Williges
(Brazil) devoted his Ph.D. dissertation to that subject, from which
resulted a paper (Williges 2013), and Andre Joffily Abath
(Brazil) (2012) uses contextualism to refute Cartesian skepticism.



Among the anti-skeptical strategies, the one that invokes
transcendental considerations deserves special mention. A group of
philosophers in Mexico is the most distinguished one concerning this
Kantian-Strawsonian-inspired answer to skepticism. Pedro Stepanenko
(Mexico) explored the anti-skeptical potential of the Kantian concept
of the synthetic unity of apperception in many papers (2001, 2002a,
2006, 2007, 2008). According to his interpretation, this unity should
be considered as the unity of our mental states that is possible only
through the inferential relations to their contents. This unity makes
possible the self-consciousness that any argumentative practice
requires. If we could suspend judgment with respect to any subject, we
would renounce to establish inferential relations among the contents
of our mental states; in that case, there would be no consciousness
unity, nor knowledge of our mental states.



In that same Kantian group, the works of Efrain Lazos
(Mexico) are outstanding. Lazos (2002, 2014) was able to
combine Kantian and Wittgensteinian anti-skepticism to produce new
perspectives on the skeptical challenge. More recently, Lazos appealed
to a transcendental strategy based on the works of Barry Stroud to
show the anti-skeptical force of transcendental arguments. Isabel
Cabrera (Mexico) (1999) edited a book on transcendental arguments, in
which the force and limits of such arguments as tools against
skepticism are assessed. Cabrera (2002) also worked out the relations
between Buddhism and skepticism. In particular, she showed that both
in Buddhism and in Humean skepticism there is an attack on the notion
of substance, and that the lack of commitment to substances in
one's understanding of the world has a therapeutic function,
namely, to avoid suffering.



The so-called Agrippan trilemma is an important argument for
contemporary skepticism. Some Latin American philosophers have tried
to answer this deep, difficult skeptical challenge. Jose de
Teresa (Mexico) (2000, 2013, 2014) developed an anti-skeptical
strategy inspired in Plato's dialectic. According to de Teresa,
Plato's strategy is effective against the trilemma presented by
the skeptic, because it escapes the three alternatives under
consideration.



Among the Agrippan modes, however, the most important for Latin
American skepticism seems to be *diaphonia* or
disagreement. We saw how important it is to Porchat's
neo-Pyrrhonism (1969, 1991, 1993). Some efforts have recently been
made to compare the skeptical, Agrippan mode of
*diaphonia* to contemporary reflections on disagreement.
Of particular importance is Diego Machuca's (Argentina) (2013a)
idea that *diaphonia* is different from disagreement.
Machuca accuses contemporary epistemologists who defend that
disagreement leads to suspension of judgment of dogmatism. According
to Machuca, they base their arguments on dogmatist principles to reach
suspension of judgment. It also deserves to be noted Otavio
Bueno's (Brazil) defense of *diaphonia* from
recent attacks, such as Barnes' criticism (Bueno 2013). Bueno
offers an interpretation of *diaphonia* free from the
problems that arise from faulty interpretations. Perhaps this is
another topic in which one may discover some original contributions
from Latin American skepticism. There has also been some efforts to
extend the mode of disagreement in contemporary skepticism into
logical matters (Barrio 2015), as well as some discussion concerning
evaluative judgments and the notion of relative truth (Orlando
2014).


## 7. History of modern skepticism



The history of skepticism has also attracted the attention of many
scholars throughout Latin America. As in most places, historical
investigation tended to concentrate in the modern period, mostly on
Cartesian and Humean skepticism, though many other authors, such as
Montaigne, Bacon, Bayle, and Kant, were also on the spot. Although
Brazilian scholarship has perhaps made more contributions, one should
not neglect the huge and widespread interest in modern skepticism
throughout Latin America.



The most important work on the history of skepticism is arguably that
of Jose Raimundo Maia Neto (Brazil), who worked with Popkin.
Maia Neto got interested in skepticism through his contact with Danilo
Marcondes and, some time later, with Porchat's works. His main
contribution is that Academic skepticism played a more important role
in modern skepticism than Popkin's interpretation recognizes
(Maia Neto 1997a, 2005, 2013a). According to Maia Neto, Popkin
emphasized the importance of Pyrrhonism for modern philosophy, but
neglected the fact that Academic skepticism was also widely known and
used by many philosophers. In order to defend this interpretation,
Maia Neto wrote a number of papers on philosophers like Montaigne
(Maia Neto 2004, 2012), Pierre Charron (Maia Neto 2014), Descartes
(Maia Neto 2001), Gassendi (Maia Neto 1997b) and Pierre-Daniel Huet
(Maia Neto 2008a,b). In fact, he explored the whole modern skepticism
from Montaigne onwards, with important texts on Pascal (Maia Neto
1995), Bayle (Maia Neto 1996), and Hume (Maia Neto 1991).



Another important contribution is that of Luiz Antonio Alves Eva
(Brazil), who has studied in great detail Montaigne's
*Essays*, publishing two books (2004, 2007b) and a number of
papers in Brazil and elsewhere (2001a, 2012, 2013a). Still in Brazil,
Renato Lessa (Brazil) (1995, 2003) has done some work on
Montaigne's political skepticism, showing that skeptics, by
acknowledging the role of habit, would be realists in politics. Smith
(2012a), criticizing Eva's interpretation, who insists on the
affinities between Montaigne and ancient skeptics, tries to uncover
more differences. In Argentina, there has also been some work on
Montaigne's skepticism. In addition to Fernando Bahr
(Argentina), to whom we shall return, Soledad Croce (Argentina) (2006,
2007), for instance, has published many papers on what she takes as
the practical skepticism of Montaigne.



Luiz Eva (Brazil) (2006, 2008, 2011) also focused on the relations
between Francis Bacon and skepticism. He proposed some careful
interpretations of the Theory of the Idols and skeptical arguments
stemming from ancient Pyrrhonism and from Montaigne and Sanchez. He
showed not only the skeptical origins of most Baconian idols, but also
how their structure changed the skeptical Modes, thereby revealing
what is properly new in Bacon. Silvia Manzo (Argentina) (2009) wrote
on the same subject, holding a balanced view, in which there is a
double attitude in light of the skeptical threat. More recently, she
returned to that topic (Manzo forthcoming), providing a reconstruction
of Francis Bacon's reception of Academic skepticism. She deals
with the assessment of ancient skepticism throughout Bacon's
writings and argues that he, on the one hand, approved of the state of
doubt and the suspension of judgment and, on the other hand, rejected
the notion of acatalepsia. Plinio Junqueira Smith (Brazil)
(2012b), referring to both scholars, showed that Bacon's main
focus is on the propositions "nothing is known" and
"nothing can be known", to which he devoted careful
attention. According to him, Bacon used skeptical weapons to reject
the whole traditional philosophy (including skepticism), not only to
criticize dogmatism, thereby distancing himself from it.



Danilo Marcondes (Brazil) (2009, 2012) has been doing original,
important research on the ancient Modes and the discovery of the New
World. This discovery offered not only many more examples of the same
kind of diversity Europeans were familiar with, but also of a
different, more radical kind, strengthening the force of the skeptical
Modes. That is a vast and rich literature not yet explored by scholars
on the history of skepticism.



As expected, Cartesian skepticism is one of the main objects of study.
In almost every country we find scholars trying to understand its
sources, the nature of its arguments, their force and persuasiveness.
One decisive contribution, already noted above, is that of Porchat,
who credited Descartes's methodological use of skepticism a
special place in the philosophy. In Porchat's view of the 1980s
(Porchat 1985, 1986), there was a strong affinity between ancient
skepticism and Cartesian doubt, so that one could speak properly of a
skeptic-Cartesian model. The problem of the external world became,
thereby, a crucial issue for those concerned with skepticism, because
it was thought of as a skeptical problem. Following his lead, many
other philosophers in Brazil, like Paulo Francisco Estrella Faria
(2007), Luiz Eva (2001b, 2013b), Alexandre Noronha Machado (2007a),
Flavio Williges (2007), among others, wrote papers on the
topic.



In Mexico, concern with Cartesian skepticism was once the dominant
focus of research on skepticism. One reason for this predominance is
the connection between the group of Laura Benitez (Mexico) and
Jose Antonio Robles (Mexico) with Ezequiel de Olaso and Richard
Popkin. This group was strongly oriented toward the work of Descartes
and modern science. Consequently, Cartesian skepticism or
methodological skepticism was an important subject to them. Many
members of the group shared, perhaps implicitly, the belief that the
Cartesian anti-skeptical strategy was successful to avoid disastrous
skeptical consequences. Benitez (1987), for instance, has
devoted many of her works to Cartesian studies, and explored the
positive methodological aspects of Cartesian skepticism to reach plain
certainty, as well as the relevance of skepticism for discussions
concerning the nature of human knowledge.



Something similar can be said about the situation in Colombia, where
Jean Paul Margot (2003) and Adolfo Leon Gomez (2002)
gave a lot of attention to Cartesian skepticism. Also very important
are the contributions of Mauricio Zuluaga, who has examined
contemporary interpretations of Cartesian skepticism, especially those
based on the closure principle (Zuluaga 2012), the Agrippan Trilemma
(Zuluaga 2005) and the relations between Pyrrhonism and Cartesian
skepticism (Zuluaga 2014). Zuluaga published an important book that
emerged from his Ph.D. dissertation (Zuluaga 2007) and, with Margot,
edited a collection (Margot and Zuluaga 2012), in which one finds many
papers on modern skepticism, including on Montaigne, featuring
scholars from Colombia and elsewhere.



In Peru we also find some interest in the relation between Descartes
and skepticism. Jorge Secada (2000) has done work on Descartes and
Suarez, but focused on Descartes with regard to skepticism. Humberto
Quispe (1996) has also done research on this topic, mainly under the
influence of Jorge Secada.



French skepticism of the 17th century was given some
attention, although not as much as one would like. Besides the already
noted contribution by Jose Raimundo Maia Neto (Brazil), the
works of Flavio Fontenelle Loque (Brazil) (2012) and Fernando
Bahr (Argentina) deserve to be highlighted. Loque's book is on
the relation between skepticism and religion, more specifically on the
very notion of a Christian skepticism. He devoted attention not only
to Montaigne and Pierre Charron, but also to Francois de la
Mothe Le Vayer. Bahr (1999, 2000a,b, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2010) focused
mainly on Pierre Bayle, whose skeptical arguments touch on three main
points: the problem of evil, the foundations of religious belief and
civil tolerance. These topics led Bahr to study both the
18th century, where he examines the influence of Bayle on
Hume (that was the topic of his Ph.D.), and to the first half of the
17th century, where he focused his attention on the
relation between La Mothe Le Vayer and Descartes. Plinio Junqueira
Smith (2013) shows the importance of the skeptical method both in
Bayle's historical work and in his philosophical thinking.
Sebastien Charles (Quebec, Canada) (forthcoming a,b) has
also been working recently on some French skeptics, namely Simon
Foucher and Pierre-Daniel Huet. His historical research follows the
current trend of erudition, discovering and exploring less known
figures, but who were very important at their time.



Berkeley's reaction to skepticism or his alleged skepticism did
not go unnoticed, despite not having received enough attention. One
exception is Jose Antonio Robles (Mexico). Robles (1996) shows
that the Berkeleyan skeptical thesis that rejects the existence of a
material substance has important consequences, such as the rejection
of many other subsidiary problems: matter's indivisibility and
the idea of an extended God. Jaimir Conte (Brazil) (2008) also
explored the connections between Berkeley and skepticism in an
important paper. Sebastien Charles (Quebec, Canada)
(2003) wrote a book on the early reception of Berkeley's
immaterialism in France. At that time, Berkeley was considered the
greatest skeptic, until Kant pronounced Hume to be even greater.
Charles shows, with plenty of erudition, how this image of Berkeley
was created in France.



Not much attention was given to skepticism in the 18th
century French materialist philosophy. However, Paulo Jonas de Lima
Piva (Brazil) (2007, 2008a,b) has done some work focusing especially
on Diderot. Sebastien Charles (Quebec, Canada) (2007)
called attention to some clandestine skeptical manuscripts as well as
to many less known skeptics of the period, not only in France, but
also in Germany. Charles (2012) and Rodrigo Brandao (2008)
explored the relations between Voltaire and skepticism.



An important contribution to understand Hume's skepticism was
provided by Plinio Junqueira Smith, who published a book
(1995a) on that topic and many papers (2011a,b). His main idea is that
the debate between Hume's skepticism and Hume's naturalism
presupposes a false dichotomy. What commentators call Hume's
naturalism is what Hume himself called his skepticism. Moreover,
commentators tend to think of skepticism as a mere negative doctrine,
not paying enough attention to its positive side. He also devoted much
effort to show how Hume's mitigated skepticism was connected to
ancient skepticism, in both its forms, and to modern skepticism. One
should also note the works of Livia Guimaraes (Brazil) (1996,
2008) who has devoted her career to the study of Hume's thought,
not only his skepticism, but also many other aspects of the philosophy
of the greatest modern skeptic. Humean scholarship has increased so
much in Brazil that it is not possible to give a fair survey of its
status in a limited space.



Interest in Hume's skepticism is not confined to Brazil.
Lisandro Aguirre (Argentina) (2007, 2008, 2010a,b), for instance, has
published many papers on Hume. His main point is that Hume follows
Pyrrhonism precisely when he thinks he is avoiding it, i.e., when Hume
is saved by nature, he thinks he is not a Pyrrhonian, but in fact that
would be the hallmark of a Pyrrhonist. Humean skeptical arguments are
also studied in Colombia, for instance by Catalina Gonzalez (2010,
2011). Humean skepticism was perhaps what generated Peruvian interest
in modern skepticism. Although Juan Bautista Ferro Porcile (Peru) was
mainly concerned with logic, he lectured extensively on modern
philosophy, especially in the empiricist tradition and in the Humean
branch of skepticism, on which he published an influential paper.



The relations between Kant and skepticism attracted much attention in
Latin America, most of all in Mexico. We have already seen that a
group of philosophers, most notably Pedro Stepanenko (2002a, 2006,
2007), Efrain Lazos (2014), Isabel Cabrera (1999), and Jorge
Ornelas (2005), combined historical scholarship with systematic
worries, producing a number of publications on transcendental
arguments and skepticism, discussing the works of Wittgenstein, P.F.
Strawson and Barry Stroud, among others, from a Kantian point of view.
Stepanenko, in particular, was more historically orientated. Roberto
Horacio de Sa Pereira (2003) and Marco Franciotti (1994,
1995), in Brazil, follows a similar path. In Colombia, Alejandro Rosas
(Colombia) (1990) opened up this field of research with an influential
paper. Following this path, Catalina Gonzalez (Colombia) (2010)
developed a historical study of the relations between Kant and his
ancient skeptical sources.



More recently, still in Mexico, Ornelas (2014a, 2015) developed an
interpretation of Kantian anti-skepticism, according to which the
"Refutation of Idealism" is not relevant, as is commonly
assumed, but the "Fourth Paralogism" is. Plinio
Junqueira Smith (2008a) holds a similar view, while at the
same time offering a wider interpretation. According to Smith, Kant
responded to three different kinds of modern skepticism: Cartesian
skepticism concerning the external world (which Kant came to
recognize, in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure
Reason*, as an idealist problem, not a skeptical one); Baylean
skepticism and the antinomies, and Humean skepticism on the objective
validity of the categories.



Luis Eduardo Hoyos (Colombia) (2001) has already published his
important book *El escepticismo y la filosofia
trascendental* in which he assesses the argumentative potential of
the transcendental argument against Humean skepticism as received in
the philosophical German scene of the 18th century. Hoyos
works motivated a number of Colombian philosophers to devote their
attention to the subject and the period. Ignacio Avila
(Colombia) (1996) explored this same vein, while Carlos Patarroyo
(Colombia) sides with the Kantian position against Humean skepticism.
Catalina Gonzalez (Colombia) (2011) worked out the distinction
between Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonism in Kant.



As many scholars have perceived the fundamental importance of Kant to
modern skepticism (and *vice versa*), it should not come as a
surprise that many others also perceived what is now called
post-Kantian skepticism. Perhaps the first important study on the
topic is that of Luis Eduardo Hoyos (Colombia) (1995), when he
publishes his Ph.D. dissertation, followed by two papers (Hoyos 1998,
1999), to which Raul Melendez (Colombia) (2000) replied.
Interest in post-Kantian skepticism is spreading around. Eduardo
Brandao (Brazil) (2013) devotes his attention to skepticism in
philosophers such as G.E. Schulze, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Fichte.
Ricardo Cattaneo (Argentina) (2009, 2010) focuses both on discussions
on skepticism in Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy (Jacobi, Schulze)
and on the interpretation and assimilation of skepticism in Hegel and
German Idealism. Luiz Fernando Barrere Martin (Brazil)
(2007a,b, 2011) has written his Ph.D. dissertation and published some
papers on Hegel and skepticism.



Sergio Sanchez (Argentina) is an important reference for
studies concerning skepticism in the 19th and
20th century. Sanchez (2010) focused on the presence
of skepticism in Nietzsche, especially the influence of Sextus and
Cicero. In his papers, one important topic is that of
Nietzsche's analysis of belief and its relation to skepticism.
In connection with Nietzsche, Kathia Hanza (Peru) (2011) has explored
different sides of skepticism. The works of Rogerio Lopes
(Brazil) (2006, 2012) on Nietzsche and skepticism, very similar in
spirit to those of Sanchez and Hanza, also deserve to be
mentioned.


## 8. History of ancient skepticism



Ancient skepticism has also attracted a lot of attention, though, like
in almost all places, it has received less attention than modern
skepticism. Roberto Bolzani Filho (Brazil) published a book (Bolzani
2013) and a number of papers on the topic (Bolzani 1990, 1998, 2000,
2005a). His book on Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonism is very
carefully written, well informed, and presents a detailed account of
the relationship between these two forms of ancient skepticism. Vitor
Hirschbruch Schvartz (2012) defends a rustic interpretation of
Sextus Empiricus. Recent scholarship is improving, as is shown by the
works of Rodrigo Pinto de Brito (Brazil) (2014) on Sextus.



More recently, studies on ancient skepticism grew thanks to the works
of Diego Machuca (Argentina) (2006a,b, 2009, 2013a). His Ph.D.
dissertation was on Sextus' ethics. Afterwards, he has published
many papers and reviews, as well as organized events. He has also
edited a number of important collections on the history of skepticism
(2011a,b, 2013b). It is fair to say that no one gave more impulse to
improve Latin American scholarship on ancient skepticism than he did.
With Duncan Pritchard, Machuca is the editor of the *International
Journal for the Study of Skepticism*. Thus, both for his personal
papers and books and for his involvement in organizing research,
Machuca is a leading figure in ancient skepticism.



Colombia has also given its contribution to the field. In
*Cuadernos de Filosofia y Letras*, we find not only the
first book of the *Esbozos Pirronicos* of Sextus
Empiricus translated by the philologist and Hellenist Jorge
Paramo (1989), but also many papers by scholars such as Popkin,
Giorgio Tonelli, Porchat and Olaso, together with an examination of
the importance of philosophical skepticism by Carlos B.
Gutierrez (Colombia) (1989). In Mexico, Ornelas (Mexico) (2013,
2014b) read Sextus' works carefully, and found theoretical
resources that can help with the engagement with contemporary
epistemological issues.



Studies on the history of skepticism before the modern period are not
restricted to Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism. It should not go
unmentioned Mauricio Pagotto Marsola's paper (Brazil)
(2007) on Plotinus and skepticism, for this is a very unexpected
aspect of Plotinus' philosophy. In connection to the origins of
Medieval Philosophy, and especially Augustine and Descartes, Luis
Bacigalupo (Peru) (1999) has also done some research. Rodrigo Pinto de
Brito (Brazil) (2015) has been working on the impact of skepticism in
Christian thought.



One should also pay attention to Mauricio Beuchot (Mexico) (1996,
2003) who devoted two papers to skepticism in the Middle Age. His
point is that skepticism attracted some attention even before
Renaissance. According to him, many medieval authors developed
skeptical positions. Among them, Augustine's Platonic
Christianity appealed to Academic skepticism in its theory of
illumination, in which Augustine emphasized the fallibility of human
knowledge; Averroes' theory of double truth, according to which
there are two kinds of truth (truths for science and truths for faith)
similarly has a skeptical tone, and those who thought that God could
perhaps fool us were considering skeptical argument (Ockham, Pedro
Lombardo, Tomas de Aquino and Buenaventura, among others).
Beuchot also remembers that Nicolas d'Autrecourt, a
French monk (1300-1350 approximately), active in the University
of Paris, anticipated Humean skepticism concerning causality.


## 9. Skepticism and literature



Perhaps it should also be mentioned some other studies on the history
of skepticism. On the one hand, there are some literary studies.
Machado de Assis, one of the best Brazilian writers, has been seen as
a skeptic by many people. One reason is that Machado read and used
extensively Montaigne's skepticism. Jose Raimundo de Maia
Neto (1994) published a book on the topic. The novelty of his book is
that it was the first discussion on Machado's skepticism based
on the history of skepticism. Paulo Roberto Margutti Pinto (2007) and
Gustavo Bernardo Krause (2007a) discussed Maia Neto's
interpretation, and Maia Neto replied to them. Krause is a Brazilian
novelist as well as a professor of literature who published many books
and papers on skepticism and literature (Krause 2004), on Machado
(Krause 2006) and other writers such as the well-known Brazilian poet
Carlos Drummond de Andrade (Krause 2007b). On the other hand, Paulo
Roberto Margutti Pinto has been studying the history of Brazilian
philosophy, in which he sees an important role for skepticism long
before Porchat brought it to center stage. In Pinto 2010, he argues
for the influence of Francisco Sanches on Brazilian colonial thought.
One of the reasons for Porchat's success is that it seems that
Brazilian thought has always had, at least in some places, a tendency
towards skepticism. Machado de Assis would not be an exception.