## 1. Life of Elijah Del Medigo



Elijah Del Medigo was born in Candia (nowadays Heraklion), in the
island of Crete, in 1458 or shortly before that. Crete being a
Venetian colony, Del Medigo traveled to Venice around 1480. The
reasons for this move cannot be determined with certainty; one
suggestion is that Del Medigo moved to Padua in order to study
medicine (Cassuto 1918: 222; Ross 1984: 18). However and whatever were
his initial motives, Del Medigo's activity while in Italy
concentrated around the instruction of philosophy and the composition
of philosophical works. More specifically, during his long stay in the
Italian peninsula Del Medigo earned his fame as translator of and
commentator on works by Averroes, and as the author of original
treatises aimed at clarifying Averroes' doctrines in various
fields. The target audience of these works were leading Christian
figures within the intellectual circles of Padua and Venice, among
them Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Domenico Grimani. During the
academic year 1480/81 Del Medigo composed his *Quaestio de primo
motore* and *Quaestio de efficientia mundi* following a
public discussion in Padua, which led scholars to speculate that Del
Medigo held an official role in that university (Montada 2013: 165).
It seems however that while Del Medigo did play a major role in the
intellectual life in the Veneto in that period, he was not officially
affiliated with the university of Padua. Around 1482 Del Medigo moved
to Venice, returned again to Padua, and in the years 1484-85
stayed with Pico della Mirandola in Florence. During the academic year
1485/86 we find Del Medigo again in Padua (Ross 1984: 20), and it is
around that time he composed his commentary on the *De substantia
orbis*. Del Medigo then continued to travel throughout the cities
of Northern Italy, spending some time in Venice in 1488 under the
patronage of Domenico Grimani. During his Italian sojourn Del Medigo
composed four original works, wrote two commentaries on works by
Averroes, and translated about nine works by Averroes from Hebrew into
Latin.



At around 1490 Del Medigo returned to Crete. As is often the case with
details concerning Del Medigo's life, the reasons for his return
are not entirely clear. According to Ross, Del Medigo experienced
general discomfort with a growing intellectual trend of the Italian
Renaissance, oriented more towards Neoplatonic and Kabbalistic
tendencies than towards the rationalist speculation of the
Aristotelian schools of the Middle Ages (see Ross 1984: 24-25).
Be it as it may, it was following his return to Crete and during the
last years of his life that Del Medigo composed what would become his
most famous work, *Behinat ha-Dat*, which will be
discussed in detail below. Del Medigo died in Candia around 1492/1493
(Ross 1984: 21-22; Licata 2013a: 48),



A common trait of Del Medigo's literary output is a clear taste
for Aristotelian philosophy in its Averroist guise. This is manifested
both in his translations and commentaries on Averroes, as well as in
the *Behinat ha-Dat* (although Averroes' name is
not mentioned in that work, for reasons which will be discussed
below). Despite this overarching feature, Del Medigo's
*oeuvre* is also characterized by a dichotomy, geographical in
as much as it is linguistic, religious and intellectual: Crete vs.
Italy, Jewish thought vs. Paduan Aristotelianism, Hebrew vs. Latin. We
will examine Del Medigo's activity as cohesive whole yet in
light of these different backgrounds and circumstances.


## 2. The Italian Period



As mentioned above, the bulk of Del Medigo's creative period was
spent in Northern Italy, approximately between the years
1480-1490. This fact is significant, as the Italian intellectual
environment had a decisive impact on the shaping of Del Medigo's
philosophical taste. Padua, in which Del Medigo lived, wrote, and
taught, was at that time a major center for the study of the works of
Averroes, with his works being widely circulated, discussed and
commented upon. Averroes' impact was so significant there that
that modern scholars later coined the term "Paduan
Averroism". While the validity of a robust notion of a Paduan
Averroist school has been put into question, it is beyond doubt that
Del Medigo's Italian works reflect the intellectual climate of
his time and place (see Engel 2015: 496). What set Del Medigo
additionally apart from his fellow Christian scholars was his ability
to read the works of Averroes which had survived in medieval Hebrew
translations. Del Medigo therefore could bridge these philosophical
traditions, commenting upon Averroes' works that circulated
among the Latin readers in Christian Padua while also relying on works
by Averroes which only survived in Hebrew. In addition, Del Medigo was
translating these Hebrew versions into Latin, engaging in a
"twofold exercise of translation and commentary" (Montada
2013: 163). The full list of Averroes' works translated by Del
Medigo from Hebrew into Latin includes the following (source in
brackets):


* Epitome of the *Meteorologica* (Vat lat. 4550, ff.
1v-52r)
* Middle Commentary on the *Meteorologica* (Vat. lat. 4550,
ff. 53r-61v)
* Preface to the Long Commentary on *Metaphysica* XII (Del
Medigo translated the preface twice. BnF lat. 6508, ff. 78r-81r
and the 1488 edition of *In meteora Aristotelis*)
* Quaestiones in *Analitica priora* (Vat. lat. 4552 and
several Renaissance editions)
* Middle Commentary on the *Metaphysica* , books I-VII
and a fragment of book VIII (1560 printed edition)
* Fragment from the Epitome of the *Metaphysica* (BnF lat.
6508)
* *De spermata*
* Sections from the Middle Commentary on the *De partibus
animalium* (Vat. lat. 4549, ff. 21r-57v)
* Epitome of Plato's *Republic* (modern critical
edition, 1992)
* A section from Averroes' Epitome of the *De anima*
(Vat. lat. 4549, ff. 11r-18r)
* *Liber de proprietatibus elementorum* (Vat. lat. 4549, ff.
1-6r, Giunta edition 1496)



Del Medigo's activity as a translator was part of a larger wave
of Hebrew-into-Latin translations of Averroes during the fifteenth and
the sixteenth centuries (see Hasse 2006). In addition to the
translations themselves, we also find correspondences between Del
Medigo and his patrons, in which the translations were discussed.


## 3. Original Works



Apart from translating the works of Averroes, Del Medigo also wrote
original compositions aimed at elucidating Averroes' doctrines,
as well as commentaries on works such as the *Physics* and
*De substantia orbis*. The aim of these works and commentaries
was to clarify and elucidate the views of Averroes on various themes,
and to contextualise these views as widely as possible within the
context of the Averroist corpus. Mirroring a common medieval practice,
Del Medigo's originality as philosopher rested not in the
introduction of a new metaphysical scheme, i.e., departing from the
foundations of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, but in
interpreting and reinterpreting an existing body of works and
doctrines. From a methodological perspective, Del Medigo shared with
his fellow Paduan Averroists a polemical tendency, arguing that a true
understanding of Averroes' doctrines required the rejection of
previous interpretations. Such false interpretations, in Del
Medigo's view, were carried forward either by anti-Averroists
(most notably Thomas Aquinas) as well as by followers of Averroes,
past and present, who misunderstood and misconstrued the
latter's doctrines. Among those, Del Medigo's chief target
was the fourteenth century Averroist John of Jandun, whom Del Medigo
repeatedly attacks in his works and commentaries. John of Jandun was
one scholar frequently cited in the works of other Paduan Averroists,
most often to reject his interpretations (Hasse 2007: 324-25;
Mahoney 1997: 140; Engel 2017: 20-23). Other scholastic authors
mentioned by Del Medigo were Albert the Great, Giles of Rome, William
of Ockham and Walter Burleigh (Montada 2013: 165-66, 169). Del
Medigo's reference to these authors, as well as his open
critique of John of Jandun, portrays him as a prominent Jewish
representative of the Latin scholastic tradition, and in particular of
the Averroist Paduan school of the late fifteenth century (see Zonta
2006).



Thematically, Del Medigo's Italian works concern Aristotelian
physics, metaphysics, and psychology. The works are mutually related,
as metaphysical discussions rely on physical notions such as matter,
form, and causality. Thus, for instance, in his physical works, in his
psychological work the *Two Investigations*, and in Del
Medigo's personal correspondence with Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola, one comes across the denial of the possibility of creation
*ex nihilo* (Kieszkowski 1964: Licata 2013a: 63; 72; Engel
2017: 39). Therefore, and despite their diverging thematic
orientation, Del Medigo's works ought to be perceived as a
cohesive whole, aimed at clarifying Averroes' positions in a
variety of fields.


### 3.1 Physics and Metaphysics



Del Medigo's physical and metaphysical works are the *De
primo motore*, *Quaestio de efficientia mundi*, *De esse
et essentia et uno* as well as his *Annotationes in librum De
phisico auditu super quibusdam dictis Commentatoris*. These works
were collected and printed during the sixteenth century (now available
as a modern facsimile edition, see bibliography below). Another work
by Del Medigo which concerns physical themes is his commentary on
Averroes' *De substantia orbis*. This work has survived
in two manuscripts, a Latin autograph and a Hebrew translation of the
Latin text, made by Del Medigo himself (a Hebrew-Latin bilingual
critical edition of this work is currently under preparation).



A reoccurring theme in Del Medigo's physical works is the nature
of Divine causality. This is the main theme of both the *Quaestio
de efficientia mundi* as well as *the De primo motore*.
Divine causality was a popular theme throughout the Middle Ages and
the Renaissance, and by participating in this
discussion--clarifying and endorsing Averroes' view on the
matter--Del Medigo is again shown to be participating in what was
essentially a Christian scholastic debate (Licata 2013a: 61; Montada
2013: 158). The *Quaestio de efficientia mundi*, composed in
1480 at the request of Girolamo Donato, asks whether God, the prime
mover, is only the cause of the celestial bodies' movement, or
of their essence and existence as well (Licata 2013c: 59-60). In
his discussion Del Medigo is relying, among other sources, on the
short, middle and long commentaries on the *Metaphysics* as
well as on Averroes' *De substantia orbis*. Del Medigo
himself translated the introduction of book XII of the
*Metaphysics* from Hebrew into Latin (Montada 2013: 164), and
his tendency to include in his original compositions citations from
treatises which he himself translated is characteristic of Del
Medigo's work in general (see Engel: 2017: 18). At Del
Medigo's own admission, the *Quaestio de efficientia
mundi* consists of arguments collected from the works of Averroes,
leading to the conclusion that God is not only the mover of the
celestial spheres, but their efficient cause as well. Here Del
Medigo's discussion is echoing an internal Averroist debate,
arguing against the interpretation of John of Jandun, who held that
God is only the final cause of the universe, not its efficient cause
(Licata 2013a: 60). God is the efficient cause of the spheres, Del
Medigo explains, not by creating them *ex nihilo*, but by
guaranteeing their movement, which in turn constitute their being. He
therefore endorses a qualified sense of efficient causality, according
to which whoever grants a thing its essence--as God eternally
grants the spheres their movement--may be considered an efficient
cause in congruence with Averroes' position as expounded in
works such the *Destructio destructionum* and *De substantia
orbis*. (Del Medigo 1480a: f. 140r; Licata 2013c: 62-63;
Licata 2013a: 53-54). Closely related to the *Quaestio de
efficientia mundi* is Del Medigo's *De primo motore*,
written around the same time. In that work, Del Medigo arrives at the
same conclusion, i.e., God as the efficient as well as the formal and
final cause of the universe. Creation is interpreted as eternal act of
creation, and the eternity of the world becomes compatible with the
existence of a creator (see Del Medigo 1480a: f. 134r; Licata 2013a:
57, 62):



The being of the celestial bodies exists and endures because of
movement, and what gives movement, makes the movement, and since the
being of these celestial bodies is not accomplished except by
movement, who gives movement accomplishes their being (Del Medigo
1480a: f. 129, translation in Montada 2013: 178-79)



The question concerning the nature of God's agency also has
bearing on the nature of matter and form in the translunar world.
Matter and form are attributed to worldly beings and to the celestial
bodies only equivocally--otherwise celestial beings would suffer
generation and corruption as beings in the sublunar world. The
immaterial form of the celestial spheres guarantees their eternal
movement, and by eternally moving them God is constituted as their
efficient cause (Montada 2013: 179). The nature of translunar matter
and form was also discussed by Averroes in his *De substantia
orbis*, a work on which Del Medigo wrote a lengthy commentary
where he discusses the equivocal meaning of matter and form. Del
Medigo references *De substantia orbis* throughout his works,
again exemplifying the unified nature of his works, having at its
focal point the works and doctrines of Averroes (see Licata 2015:
94).



Other contested physical themes which Del Medigo discusses are
movement and infinity. Del Medigo endorses Averroes' position in
the long commentary on the *Physics*, where the latter argues
that, according to Aristotle, movement is predicated equivocally as it
is found in different categories: substance (a thing moving from
non-being into being) or quality (a white thing becoming black), to
mention two examples (Montada 2013: 170). Regarding infinity, Del
Medigo's starting point is Aristotle's assertion that
every magnitude is potentially subject to infinite division, yet that
this is not the case with addition, as yet every magnitude is not
subject to infinite addition (Montada 2013: 172). In his
*Annotationes in librum De phisico auditu*, Del Medigo sides
with Averroes and argues against Walter Burley's interpretation.
Division, Del Medigo holds, is intrinsically related to matter. It
thus follows that the type of potency associated with division is
permanent, and hence can never be realized. In other words, division
entails permanent potency, yet the type of potency associated with
addition may be fully realized. Whereas division is associated with
matter, addition is associated with form, and whereas division is
inherently potential, addition is a process which may achieve
completion. Therefore one cannot construe infinite addition, not even
potentially (Del Medigo 1486: f. 140r-v; Montada 2013:
174-75).



Del Medigo's most distinct metaphysical work is his *De ente
et essentia et uno*, composed following his conversations with
Pico on being, essence and unity, siding with Averroes against
Avicenna (Montada 2013: 163-64). Yet the lengthiest of all Del
Medigo's original composition is the *Two Investigations on
the Nature of the Human Soul*, a work on Aristotelian psychology
which concentrates on the nature and destiny of the human
intellect.


### 3.2 Psychology



As the opening and closing lines of the *Two Investigations*
indicate, Del Medigo composed the work at the request of his friend
and Patron, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Apart from being Del
Medigo's lengthiest and most complex work, it also serves as the
most striking evidence for the latter's affinity with Paduan
philosophical circles, as the nature of human intellect, and in
particular its ontological status, was among the most hotly debated
themes in Padua in Del Medigo's time (see Hasse 2007, 2004: 115;
Engel 2017: 20)



The unicity controversy was a philosophical and metaphysical as well
as hermeneutical debate. The metaphysical aspect is reflected in the
discussion concerning the nature of the human material
intellect--i.e., our potential disposition for receiving
thoughts--whether it is a single substance or multiple
substances, and whether it is corporeal or separate from corporeal
matter. Hermeneutically, the work attempts to discern the correct
interpretation of certain passages from Averroes' *Long
Commentary on the De anima* and, more fundamentally, of certain
passages in Aristotle's *De anima*. In that work, it is
not quite clear what Aristotle's own position concerning the
ontological status of the human intellect is. On the one hand, the
material intellect is described as *our* intellect, by virtue
of which *we* think. On the other hand, some of
Aristotle's remarks seem to indicate that the material intellect
is separate in its existence from the individual human being.
Throughout antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,
Aristotle's interpreters debated this question, with
Averroes' discussion of it in his *long commentary on the De
anima* the focal point of many of the later discussions. In
chapter 3.5, commenting upon lines 429a21-24 in the *De
anima*, Averroes in the long commentary stresses those aspects in
Aristotle's text which suggest that the intellect, despite
possessing a certain relation to human individuals, is nonetheless a
separate substance, shared by all humans. Once the long commentary on
the *De anima* was translated into Latin, this interpretation
was picked up by philosophers in the Latin west from the thirteenth
century onwards, among them Elijah Del Medigo.



Del Medigo's first investigation thus concerns the question
whether the material intellect is a single substance, shared by all
human beings, or whether each of us possesses her own intellect (Del
Medigo 1482: f. 1r). Del Medigo's method in discussing the
question is a dialectical one, close to that of a Scholastic
*quaestio--*considering the arguments for and against the
proposed thesis (that the material intellect is one in number), before
arriving at his own (Del Medigo's) conclusion, following
Averroes' lead in the long commentary on the *De anima.*
Del Medigo's *Two Investigations* is therefore, at its
core, an attempt to both clarify Averroes' unicity thesis to
Pico as well as illustrating its validity, and Del Medigo does so
initially by a *reductio ad absurdum* of competing
interpretations. Del Medigo first argues against those who claimed the
intellects are many in number, i.e., that each of us possesses her own
intellect. This, in turn, can be interpreted in two ways, which Del
Medigo identifies as two concrete positions in the history of
philosophy:


1. The intellect is individuated as a material disposition (The view
of Alexander of Aphrodisias)
2. The intellect is individuated yet not as material disposition but
as separate substance (A view which Del Medigo attributes to the
"Theologians" but which in all likelihood is aimed at the
Paduan Thomists)



Having refuted these two positions, i.e., the two ways according to
which the intellect can be individuated, Del Medigo arrives at the
remaining logical option: that the intellect is a separate substance,
shared by all humans. This was the conclusion of Averroes, and Del
Medigo then moves to illustrate the validity and coherence of this
position.



In the second investigation, Del Medigo explores the nature of human
conjunction with the agent intellect, again following Averroes'
interpretation of Aristotelian principles.


### 3.3 *Behinat ha-Dat*



*Behinat ha-Dat* is Del Medigo's last and best
known work, which received more scholarly attention than all of his
other works combined. Unlike his Italian works, *Behinat
ha-Dat* was composed in Hebrew at the request of Del
Medigo's pupil, Shaul Ashkenazi, following Del Medigo's
return to Crete. The overarching theme of the work is an attempt to
legitimise philosophical practice within the Jewish religious realm.
This attempt brings to mind Maimonides' *Guide of the
Perplexed*, though the most immediate source--which Del
Medigo does not acknowledge for reasons which we will discuss
below--is Averroes' *Decisive Treatise*. The
relation between *Behinat ha-Dat* and Averroes'
*Decisive Treatise* was discussed by various authors throughout
the generations (see Ivry 1983: 251; Montada 2013: 158). And most
recently by Giovanni Licata, who has convincingly illustrated Del
Medigo's reliance on the *Decisive Treatise* by citing
parallel passages from the two works (see Licata 2013a:
129-86).



While the works composed during Del Medigo's stay in Italy
concern themes in Aristotelian natural sciences and metaphysics,
*Behinat ha-Dat* may be described as meta-philosophical,
as it discusses the relation between rational discourse and revealed
religion. Del Medigo begins his discussion by presenting his main
motivation in composing the work: to determine whether the study of
philosophy is permissible, forbidden, or mandatory (Del Medigo 2013:
292). His conclusion (2013: 292-93) is that while the study of
philosophy is not obligatory as such, it is mandatory for those who
are capable of engaging in philosophical speculation. Such engagement
will strengthen the student's belief, as the philosophical
sciences concern created beings, and the knowledge of created beings
leads to the knowledge of the creator (2013: 294). Del Medigo
emphasises that philosophical speculation alone is insufficient from a
religious standpoint, as the Jewish philosopher still shares with the
masses a belief in the words and instructions of the *Torah*
(2013: 294). The philosopher ought to supply the true interpretation
of the biblical narrative, to be circulated only among those capable
of philosophical reflection (2013: 294). Exceptions are the
fundamental tenets of the Jewish belief, the validity of which ought
not be grounded in reason, let alone questioned. Such tenets, which
are beyond the reach of philosophical speculation, are the possibility
of prophecy, reward and punishment, and the possibility of miracles
(2013: 310).



The investigation concerning valid modes of interpreting the
*Torah* leads Del Medigo to discuss Kabbalistic
interpretations, and to present his general stand concerning the
Kabbalistic trend in Judaism (see Bland 1991). The majority of Jewish
sages and Talmudists, Del Medigo argues (322-323), rejected the
Kabbalistic interpretations and were drawn instead to philosophy and
rational speculation. Del Medigo rejects the traditional attribution
of Sefer ha-Zohar, the authoritative Kabbalistic work, to
Shim'on Bar Yohay, and adds other arguments opposing the
Kabbalistic-mystical interpretation of the *Torah*. Del
Medigo's criticism of the Kabbalah appears in his other works as
well, for instance in his Hebrew version of the commentary on *De
substantia orbis* (Del Medigo 1485: f. 41; Ross 1984: 20). Yet
according to Ross, more than the Kabbalah itself, it was the Christian
Kabbalah that Del Medigo was attacking in the *Behinat
ha-Dat* (Ross 1984: 13).



Another related theme discussed by Del Medigo concerns the reasons for
the commandments. Following Maimonides, Del Medigo argues that there
is a rational foundation for prescribing the commandments to the
Jewish people, even if not all reasons are entirely known, and that
one major aspect is to "direct people to the Good, in so far as
they are able to" (Del Medigo 2013: 336-38). The theme of
the reasons for the commandments in fact encompasses all themes
mentioned earlier: the place of philosophical reflection within the
religious realm, the application of rational/philosophical
interpretation of the biblical narrative, and Del Medigo's
criticism of the Kabbalistic interpretation of the *Torah*.
Here, Del Medigo's anti-Kabbalistic stand is manifested in his
criticism of the Kabbalistic interpretation of the commandments:
"for we humans can hardly improve ourselves, and how can we
improve the divine worlds" (Del Medigo 2013: 342). Lastly,
*Behinat ha-Dat* also discusses the rational status of
the Christian creed, arguing that unlike the fundamental principles of
Judaism, the Christian belief is fundamentally irrational (Lasker
2007: 25-28; Ross 1984: 26).



According to Del Medigo, his role model in composing *Behinat
ha-Dat* was Maimonides, who inspired him in defining the relation
between philosophical speculation and religious belief. While the
influence of Averroes' *Decisive Treatise* is apparent,
Del Medigo never mentions the latter in *Behinat ha-Dat*.
This is in sharp contrast to the Italian works, where Averroes was the
ultimate philosophical authority (besides Aristotle) and Maimonides is
rarely mentioned. The discrepancy between Del Medigo's
philosophical and meta-philosophical works is therefore manifested
also in the authorities on which he relies. While Averroes was a
leading philosophical authority among Scholastic circles in fifteenth
century Padua, Maimonides' position concerning the function of
philosophical discourse within the religious realm had a profound
impact on Jewish sages all throughout the middle ages, and Maimonides
therefore serves Del Medigo in *Behinat ha-Dat* as his
chief authoritative source (see Ross 1984: 11).



Considering all the above, it is not surprising that *Behinat
ha-Dat* caught the attention of Jewish readership and Jewish
scholars throughout the generations, and the debates between these
scholars summed up recently in an article by Carlos Fraenkel (Fraenkel
2013). Certain scholars, starting with Adolph Hubsch, have argued
that for Del Medigo the religious and the philosophical truths were in
fact identical. Others, beginning with Julius Guttmann, who responded
to Hubsch, argued that Del Medigo was in act influenced by the
Christian "double truth" theory. Fraenkel himself argues
that Del Medigo's



> 
> 
> stance on the relationship between philosophy and religion
> fundamentally agrees with that of Averroes, according to which
> "the truth does not contradict the truth". (Fraenkel 2013:
> 312; for Fraenkel's discussion on Hubsch and Guttmann see
> 2013: 219)
> 
> 
> 



It is a significant fact that these scholars, while debating Del
Medigo's position on the relation between philosophy and
religion, rely mostly on Del Medigo's account in
*Behinat ha-Dat.* The latter did, however, treat
meta-philosophical issues present in the Italian works as well. In his
*Quaestio de efficientia mundi*, for instance, Del Medigo
clearly differentiates the realm of religious belief--where one
may endorse the belief in creation *ex nihilo--*and the
philosophical truth which seems to contradict this view. Del Medigo
speaks in this context of two truths, one religious ("*via
legis*") and one philosophical ("*via
philosophica*") (Licata 2013a: 62). Yet this treatment,
which appears as a formulation of the "double truth"
theory, was being introduced in the form of a side remark, mainly to
appease the mind of his Christian readers, and was nothing like the
systematic treatment of the theme in *Behinat ha-Dat*
(Licata 2015: 92). The question whether Del Medigo in fact held a
coherent doctrine concerning the relation between revealed and
scientific doctrines, or whether one should examine his statements on
the subject on an *ad hoc* basis, still remains open and
requires further study (Engel 2016).


## 4. Conclusion: Impact and Legacy



In the Hebrew versions of his philosophical works, as well as in
*Behinat ha-Dat*, Del Medigo explicitly refers to himself
as a Jewish sage and disciple of Maimonides, and often downplays the
importance of his own Aristotelian compositions. Del Medigo would
therefore have been pleased to discover that in modern scholarship he
is mainly remembered as a Jewish thinker. Yet by judging the content
of his Italian works, which constitute the bulk of his literary
output, Del Medigo's contribution to the history of philosophy
is manifested in that he was among the first to merge, in his
translations as well as in his original works, the Hebrew and Latin
Averroist schools, which until his day existed as two separate
philosophical traditions. By doing so, Del Medigo contributed to the
creation of a unified corpus of Averroes' works, which had a
decisive impact on the Aristotelian Renaissance tradition and up until
the early modern period. In other words, despite his religious
affiliation, Del Medigo's contribution lies clearly within the
realm of the Aristotelian tradition, which, *qua* philosophical
tradition, transcends religious and linguistic boundaries.