## 1. Key Components of Political Representation



Political representation, on almost any account, will exhibit the
following five components:


1. **some party that is representing** (the
representative, an organization, movement, state agency, etc.);
2. **some party that is being represented** (the
constituents, the clients, etc.);
3. **something that is being represented** (opinions,
perspectives, interests, discourses, etc.); and
4. **a setting within which the activity of representation is
taking place** (the political context).
5. **something that is being left out** (the opinions,
interests, and perspectives not voiced).



Theories of political representation often begin by specifying the
terms for the first four components. For instance, democratic
theorists often limit the types of representatives being discussed to
formal representatives -- that is, to representatives who hold
elected offices. One reason that the concept of representation remains
elusive is that theories of representation often apply only to
particular kinds of political actors within a particular context. How
individuals represent an electoral district is treated as distinct
from how social movements, judicial bodies, or informal organizations
represent. Consequently, it is unclear how different forms of
representation relate to each other. Andrew Rehfeld (2006) has offered
a general theory of representation which simply identifies
representation by reference to a relevant audience accepting a person
as its representative. One consequence of Rehfeld's general
approach to representation is that it allows for undemocratic cases of
representation. 



However, Rehfeld's general theory of representation does not
specify what representative do or should do in order to be recognized
as a representative. And what exactly representatives *do* has
been a hotly contested issue. In particular, a controversy has raged
over whether representatives should act as *delegates* or
*trustees*.


### 1.1 Delegate vs. Trustee



Historically, the theoretical literature on political representation
has focused on whether representatives should act as
*delegates* or as *trustees*. Representatives who are
delegates simply follow the expressed preferences of their
constituents. James Madison (1787-8) describes representative
government as "the delegation of the government...to a small
number of citizens elected by the rest." Madison recognized that
"Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."
Consequently, Madison suggests having a diverse and large population
as a way to decrease the problems with bad representation. In other
words, the preferences of the represented can partially safeguard
against the problems of faction.



In contrast, trustees are representatives who follow their own
understanding of the best action to pursue. Edmund Burke (1790) is
famous for arguing that



> 
> Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile
> interests, which interest each must maintain, as an agent and
> advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a
> deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the
> whole... You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen
> him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament
> (115).
> 



The delegate and the trustee conception of political representation
place competing and contradictory demands on the behavior of
representatives. [For a discussion of the similarities and differences
between Madison's and Burke's conception of
representation, see Pitkin 1967, 191-192.] Delegate conceptions
of representation require representatives to follow their
constituents' preferences, while trustee conceptions require
representatives to follow their own judgment about the proper course
of action. Any adequate theory of representation must grapple with
these contradictory demands.



Famously, Hanna Pitkin argues that theorists should not try to
reconcile the paradoxical nature of the concept of representation.
Rather, they should aim to preserve this paradox by recommending that
citizens safeguard the autonomy of both the representative and of
those being represented. The autonomy of the representative is
preserved by allowing them to make decisions based on his or her
understanding of the represented's interests (the trustee
conception of representation). The autonomy of those being represented
is preserved by having the preferences of the represented influence
evaluations of representatives (the delegate conception of
representation). Representatives must act in ways that safeguard the
capacity of the represented to authorize and to hold their
representatives accountable *and* uphold the capacity of the
representative to act independently of the wishes of the
represented.



Objective interests are the key for determining whether the autonomy
of representative and the autonomy of the represented have been
breached. However, Pitkin never adequately specifies how we are to
identify constituents' objective interests. At points, she
implies that constituents should have some say in what are their
objective interests, but ultimately she merely shifts her focus away
from this paradox to the recommendation that representatives should be
evaluated on the basis of the reasons they give for disobeying the
preferences of their constituents. For Pitkin, assessments about
representatives will depend on the issue at hand and the political
environment in which a representative acts. To understand the multiple
and conflicting standards within the concept of representation is to
reveal the futility of holding all representatives to some fixed set
of guidelines. In this way, Pitkin concludes that standards for
evaluating representatives defy generalizations. Moreover,
individuals, especially democratic citizens, are likely to disagree
deeply about what representatives should be doing.


### 1.2 Pitkin's Four Views of Representation



Pitkin offers one of the most comprehensive discussions of the concept
of political representation, attending to its contradictory character
in her *The Concept of Representation*. This classic discussion
of the concept of representation is one of the most influential and
oft-cited works in the literature on political representation. (For a
discussion of her influence, see Dovi 2016). Adopting a
Wittgensteinian approach to language, Pitkin maintains that in order
to understand the concept of political representation, one must
consider the different ways in which the term is used. Each of these
different uses of the term provides a different view of the concept.
Pitkin compares the concept of representation to " a rather
complicated, convoluted, three-dimensional structure in the
middle of a dark enclosure." Political theorists provide
"flash-bulb photographs of the structure taken from different
angles" [1967, 10]. More specifically, political theorists have
provided four main views of the concept of representation.
Unfortunately, Pitkin never explains how these different views of
political representation fit together. At times, she implies that the
concept of representation is unified. At other times, she emphasizes
the conflicts between these different views, e.g. how descriptive
representation is opposed to accountability. Drawing on her flash-bulb
metaphor, Pitkin argues that one must know the context in which the
concept of representation is placed in order to determine its meaning.
For Pitkin, the contemporary usage of the term
"representation" can signficantly change its meaning.



For Pitkin, disagreements about representation can be partially
reconciled by clarifying which view of representation is being
invoked. Pitkin identifies at least four different views of
representation: formalistic representation, descriptive
representation, symbolic representation, and substantive
representation. (For a brief description of each of these views, see
chart below.) Each view provides a different approach for examining
representation. The different views of representation can also provide
different standards for assessing representatives. So disagreements
about what representatives ought to be doing are aggravated by the
fact that people adopt the wrong view of representation or misapply
the standards of representation. Pitkin has in many ways set the terms
of contemporary discussions about representation by providing this
schematic overview of the concept of political representation.



> 
> **1. Formalistic Representation**:
> 
> * **Brief Description**. The institutional arrangements
> that precede and initiate representation. Formal representation has
> two dimensions: authorization and accountability.
> * **Main Research Question**. What is the institutional
> position of a representative?
> * **Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives**.
> None.
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> > (**Authorization**):
> > 
> > * **Brief Description**. The means by which a
> > representative obtains his or her standing, status, position or
> > office.
> > * **Main Research Questions**. What is the process by which
> > a representative gains power (e.g., elections) and what are the ways
> > in which a representative can enforce his or her decisions?
> > * **Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives**. No
> > standards for assessing how well a representative behaves. One can
> > merely assess whether a representative legitimately holds his or her
> > position.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > (**Accountability**):
> > 
> > * **Brief Description**. The ability of constituents to
> > *punish* their representative for failing to act in accordance
> > with their wishes (e.g. voting an elected official out of office) or
> > the *responsiveness* of the representative to the
> > constituents.
> > * **Main Research Question**. What are the sanctioning
> > mechanisms available to constituents? Is the representative responsive
> > towards his or her constituents' preferences?
> > * **Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives**. No
> > standards for assessing how well a representative behaves. One can
> > merely determine whether a representative can be sanctioned or has
> > been responsive.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
>  **2. Symbolic Representation**:
> 
> * **Brief Description**. The ways that a representative
> "stands for" the represented -- that is, the meaning
> that a representative has for those being represented.
> * **Main Research Question**. What kind of response is
> invoked by the representative in those being represented?
> * **Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives**.
> Representatives are assessed by the degree of acceptance that the
> representative has among the represented.
> 
>  **3. Descriptive Representation**:
> 
> * **Brief Description**. The extent to which a
> representative resembles those being represented.
> * **Main Research Question**. Does the representative look
> like, have common interests with, or share certain experiences with
> the represented?
> * **Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives**.
> Assess the representative by the accuracy of the resemblance between
> the representative and the represented.
> 
>  **4. Substantive Representation**:
> 
> * **Brief Description**. The activity of
> representatives--that is, the actions taken on behalf of, in the
> interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the
> represented.
> * **Main Research Question**. Does the representative
> advance the policy preferences that serve the interests of the
> represented?
> * **Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives**.
> Assess a representative by the extent to which policy outcomes
> advanced by a representative serve "the best interests" of
> their constituents.
> 
> 
> 



One cannot overestimate the extent to which Pitkin has shaped
contemporary understandings of political representation, especially
among political scientists. For example, her claim that descriptive
representation opposes accountability is often the starting point for
contemporary discussions about whether marginalized groups need
representatives from their groups.



Similarly, Pitkin's conclusions about the paradoxical nature of
political representation support the tendency among contemporary
theorists and political scientists to focus on formal procedures of
authorization and accountability (formalistic representation). In
particular, there has been a lot of theoretical attention paid to the
proper design of representative institutions (e.g. Amy 1996; Barber,
2001; Christiano 1996; Guinier 1994). This focus is certainly
understandable, since one way to resolve the disputes about what
representatives should be doing is to "let the people
decide." In other words, establishing fair procedures for
reconciling conflicts provides democratic citizens one way to settle
conflicts about the proper behavior of representatives. In this way,
theoretical discussions of political representation tend to depict
political representation as primarily a principal-agent relationship.
The emphasis on elections also explains why discussions about the
concept of political representation frequently collapse into
discussions of democracy. Political representation is understood as a
way of 1) establishing the legitimacy of democratic institutions and
2) creating institutional incentives for governments to be responsive
to citizens.



David Plotke (1997) has noted that this emphasis on mechanisms of
authorization and accountability was especially useful in the context
of the Cold War. For this understanding of political representation
(specifically, its demarcation from participatory democracy) was
useful for distinguishing Western democracies from Communist
countries. Those political systems that held competitive elections
were considered to be democratic (Schumpeter 1976). Plotke questions
whether such a distinction continues to be useful. Plotke recommends
that we broaden the scope of our understanding of political
representation to encompass interest representation and thereby return
to debating what is the proper activity of representatives.
Plotke's insight into why traditional understandings of
political representation resonated prior to the end of the Cold War
suggests that modern understandings of political representation are to
some extent contingent on political realities. For this reason, those
who attempt to define political representation should recognize how
changing political realities can affect contemporary understandings of
political representation. Again, following Pitkin, ideas about
political representation appear contingent on existing political
practices of representation. Our understandings of representation are
inextricably shaped by the manner in which people are currently being
represented. For an informative discussion of the history of
representation, see Monica Brito Vieira and David Runican's
*Representation*.


## 2. Changing Political Realities and Changing Concepts of Political Representation



As mentioned earlier, theoretical discussions of political
representation have focused mainly on the formal procedures of
authorization and accountability within nation states, that is, on
what Pitkin called formalistic representation. However, such a focus
is no longer satisfactory due to international and domestic political
transformations. [For an extensive discussion of international and
domestic transformations, see Mark Warren and Dario Castioglione
(2004).] Increasingly international, transnational and
non-governmental actors play an important role in advancing public
policies on behalf of democratic citizens--that is, acting as
representatives for those citizens. Such actors "speak
for," "act for" and can even "stand for"
individuals within a nation-state. It is no longer desirable to limit
one's understanding of political representation to elected
officials within the nation-state. After all, increasingly state
"contract out" important responsibilities to non-state
actors, e.g. environmental regulation. As a result, elected officials
do not necessarily possess "the capacity to act," the
capacity that Pitkin uses to identify who is a representative. So, as
the powers of nation-state have been disseminated to international and
transnational actors, elected representatives are not necessarily the
agents who determine how policies are implemented. Given these
changes, the traditional focus of political representation, that is,
on elections within nation-states, is insufficient for understanding
how public policies are being made and implemented. The complexity of
modern representative processes and the multiple locations of
political power suggest that contemporary notions of accountability
are inadequate. Grant and Keohane (2005) have recently updated notions
of accountability, suggesting that the scope of political
representation needs to be expanded in order to reflect contemporary
realities in the international arena. Michael Saward (2009) has
proposed an innovative type of criteria that should be used for
evaluating non-elective representative claims. John Dryzek and Simon
Niemayer(2008) has proposed an alternative conception of
representation, what he calls discursive representation, to reflect
the fact that transnational actors represent discourses, not real
people. By discourses, they mean "a set of categories and
concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgments, contentions,
dispositions, and capabilities." The concept of discursive
representation can potentially redeem the promise of deliberative
democracy when the deliberative participation of all affected by a
collective decision is infeasible. 



Domestic transformations also reveal the need to update contemporary
understandings of political representation. Associational life --
social movements, interest groups, and civic associations--is
increasingly recognized as important for the survival of
representative democracies. The extent to which interest groups write
public policies or play a central role in implementing and regulating
policies is the extent to which the division between formal and
informal representation has been blurred. The fluid relationship
between the career paths of formal and informal representatives also
suggests that contemporary realities do not justify focusing mainly on
formal representatives. Mark Warren's concept of citizen
representatives (2008) opens up a theoretical framework for exploring
how citizens represent themselves and serve in representative
capacities. 



Given these changes, it is necessary to revisit our conceptual
understanding of political representation, specifically of democratic
representation. For as Jane Mansbridge has recently noted, normative
understandings of representation have not kept up with recent
empirical research and contemporary democratic practices. In her
important article "Rethinking Representation" Mansbridge
identifies four forms of representation in modern democracies:
promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogacy. Promissory
representation is a form of representation in which representatives
are to be evaluated by the promises they make to constituents during
campaigns. Promissory representation strongly resembles Pitkin's
discussion of formalistic representation. For both are primarily
concerned with the ways that constituents give their consent to the
authority of a representative. Drawing on recent empirical work,
Mansbridge argues for the existence of three additional forms of
representation. In anticipatory representation, representatives focus
on what they think their constituents will reward in the next election
and not on what they promised during the campaign of the previous
election. Thus, anticipatory representation challenges those who
understand accountability as primarily a retrospective activity. In
gyroscopic representation, representatives "look within"
to derive from their own experience conceptions of interest and
principles to serve as a basis for their action. Finally, surrogate
representation occurs when a legislator represents constituents
outside of their districts. For Mansbridge, each of these different
forms of representation generates a different normative criterion by
which representatives should be assessed. All four forms of
representation, then, are ways that democratic citizens can be
legitimately represented within a democratic regime. Yet none of the
latter three forms representation operates through the formal
mechanisms of authorization and accountability. Recently, Mansbridge
(2009) has gone further by suggesting that political science has
focused too much on the sanctions model of accountability and that
another model, what she calls the selection model, can be more
effective at soliciting the desired behavior from representatives.
According to Mansbridge, a sanction model of accountability presumes
that the representative has different interests from the represented
and that the represented should not only monitor but reward the good
representative and punish the bad. In contrast, the selection model of
accountability presumes that representatives have self-motivated and
exogenous reasons for carrying out the represented's wishes. In
this way, Mansbridge broadens our understanding of accountability to
allow for good representation to occur outside of formal sanctioning
mechanisms.



Mansbridge's rethinking of the meaning of representation holds
an important insight for contemporary discussions of democratic
representation. By specifying the different forms of representation
within a democratic polity, Mansbridge teaches us that we should refer
to the *multiple* forms of democratic representation.
Democratic representation should not be conceived as a monolithic
concept. Moreover, what is abundantly clear is that democratic
representation should no longer be treated as consisting simply in a
relationship between elected officials and constituents within her
voting district. Political representation should no longer be
understood as a simple principal-agent relationship. Andrew Rehfeld
has gone farther, maintaining that political representation should no
longer be territorially based. In other words, Rehfeld (2005) argues
that constituencies, e.g. electoral districts, should not be
constructed based on where citizens live.



Lisa Disch (2011) also complicates our understanding of democratic
representation as a principal-agent relationship by uncovering a
dilemma that arises between expectations of democratic responsiveness
to constituents and recent empirical findings regarding the context
dependency of individual constituents' preferences. In response
to this dilemma, Disch proposes a mobilization conception of political
representation and develops a systemic understanding of reflexivity as
the measure of its legitimacy.



By far, one of the most important shifts in the literature on
representation has been the "constructivist turn."
Constructivist approaches to representation emphasize the
representative's role in creating and framing the identities and
claims of the represented. Here Michael Saward's *The
Representative Claim* is exemplary. For Saward, representation
entails a series of relationships: "A maker of representations
(M) puts forward a subject (S) which stands for an object (O) which is
related to a referent (R) and is offered to an audience (A)"
(2006, 302). Instead of presuming a pre-existing set of interests of
the represented that representatives "bring into" the
political arena, Saward stresses how representative claim-making is a
"deeply culturally inflected practice." Saward explicitly
denies that theorists can know what are the interests of the
represented. For this reason, the represented should have the ultimate
say in judging the claims of the representative. The task of the
representative is to create claims that will resonate with appropriate
audiences.



Saward therefore does not evaluate representatives by the extent to
which they advance the preferences or interests of the represented.
Instead he focuses on the institutional and collective conditions in
which claim-making takes place. The constructivist turn examines the
conditions for claim-making, not the activities of particular
representatives.



Saward's "constructivist turn" has generated a new
research direction for both political theorists and empirical
scientists. For example, Lisa Disch (2015) considers whether the
constructivist turn is a "normative dead" end, that is,
whether the epistemological commitments of constructivism that deny
the ability to identify interests will undermine the normative
commitments to democratic politics. Disch offers an alternative
approach, what she calls "the citizen standpoint". This
standpoint does not mean taking at face value whomever or whatever
citizens regard as representing them. Rather, it is "an
epistemological and political achievement that does not exist
spontaneously but develops out of the activism of political movements
together with the critical theories and transformative empirical
research to which they give rise" (2015, 493). (For other
critical engagements with Saward's work, see Schaap et al, 2012
and Nasstrom, 2011). 


## 3. Contemporary Advances



There have been a number of important advances in theorizing the
concept of political representation. In particular, these advances
call into question the traditional way of thinking of political
representation as a principal-agent relationship. Most notably,
Melissa Williams' recent work has recommended reenvisioning the
activity of representation in light of the experiences of historically
disadvantaged groups. In particular, she recommends understanding
representation as "mediation." In particular, Williams
(1998, 8) identifies three different dimensions of political life that
representatives must "mediate:" the dynamics of
legislative decision-making, the nature of legislator-constituent
relations, and the basis for aggregating citizens into representable
constituencies. She explains each aspect by using a corresponding
theme (voice, trust, and memory) and by drawing on the experiences of
marginalized groups in the United States. For example, drawing on the
experiences of American women trying to gain equal citizenship,
Williams argues that historically disadvantaged groups need a
"voice" in legislative decision-making. The "heavily
deliberative" quality of legislative institutions requires the
presence of individuals who have direct access to historically
excluded perspectives.



In addition, Williams explains how representatives need to mediate the
representative-constituent relationship in order to build
"trust." For Williams, trust is the cornerstone for
democratic accountability. Relying on the experiences of
African-Americans, Williams shows the consistent patterns of betrayal
of African-Americans by privileged white citizens that give them good
reason for distrusting white representatives and the institutions
themselves. For Williams, relationships of distrust can be "at
least partially mended if the disadvantaged group is represented by
its own members"(1998, 14). Finally, representation involves
mediating how groups are defined. The boundaries of groups according
to Williams are partially established by past experiences -- what
Williams calls "memory." Having certain shared patterns of
marginalization justifies certain institutional mechanisms to
guarantee presence.



Williams offers her understanding of representation as mediation as a
supplement to what she regards as the traditional conception of
liberal representation. Williams identifies two strands in liberal
representation. The first strand she describes as the "ideal of
fair representation as an outcome of free and open elections in which
every citizen has an equally weighted vote" (1998, 57). The
second strand is interest-group pluralism, which Williams describes as
the "theory of the organization of shared social interests with
the purpose of securing the equitable representation ... of those
groups in public policies" (*ibid*.). Together, the two
strands provide a coherent approach for achieving fair representation,
but the traditional conception of liberal representation as made up of
simply these two strands is inadequate. In particular, Williams
criticizes the traditional conception of liberal representation for
failing to take into account the injustices experienced by
marginalized groups in the United States. Thus, Williams expands
accounts of political representation beyond the question of
institutional design and thus, in effect, challenges those who
understand representation as simply a matter of formal procedures of
authorization and accountability.



Another way of reenvisioning representation was offered by Nadia
Urbinati (2000, 2002). Urbinati argues for understanding
*representation as* *advocacy.* For Urbinati, the point
of representation should not be the aggregation of interests, but the
preservation of disagreements necessary for preserving liberty.
Urbinati identifies two main features of advocacy: 1) the
representative's passionate link to the electors' cause
and 2) the representative's relative autonomy of judgment.
Urbinati emphasizes the importance of the former for motivating
representatives to deliberate with each other and their constituents.
For Urbinati the benefit of conceptualizing representation as advocacy
is that it improves our understanding of deliberative democracy. In
particular, it avoids a common mistake made by many contemporary
deliberative democrats: focusing on the formal procedures of
deliberation at the expense of examining the sources of inequality
within civil society, e.g. the family. One benefit of Urbinati's
understanding of representation is its emphasis on the importance of
opinion and consent formation. In particular, her agonistic conception
of representation highlights the importance of disagreements and
rhetoric to the procedures, practices, and ethos of democracy. Her
account expands the scope of theoretical discussions of representation
away from formal procedures of authorization to the deliberative and
expressive dimensions of representative institutions. In this way, her
agonistic understanding of representation provides a theoretical tool
to those who wish to explain how non-state actors
"represent."



Other conceptual advancements have helped clarify the meaning of
particular aspects of representation. For instance, Andrew Rehfeld
(2009) has argued that we need to disaggregate the delegate/trustee
distinction. Rehfeld highlights how representatives can be delegates
and trustees in at least three different ways. For this reason, we
should replace the traditional delegate/trustee distinction with three
distinctions (aims, source of judgment, and responsiveness). By
collapsing these three different ways of being delegates and trustees,
political theorists and political scientists overlook the ways in
which representatives are often partial delegates and partial
trustees.



Other political theorists have asked us to rethink central aspects of
our understanding of democratic representation. In *Inclusion and
Democracy* Iris Marion Young asks us to rethink the importance of
descriptive representation. Young stresses that attempts to include
more voices in the political arena can suppress other voices. She
illustrates this point using the example of a Latino representative
who might inadvertently represent straight Latinos at the expense of
gay and lesbian Latinos (1986, 350). For Young, the suppression of
differences is a problem for *all* representation (1986, 351).
Representatives of large districts or of small communities must
negotiate the difficulty of one person representing many. Because such
a difficulty is constitutive of representation, it is unreasonable to
assume that representation should be characterized by a
"relationship of identity." The legitimacy of a
representative is not primarily a function of his or her similarities
to the represented. For Young, the representative should not be
treated as a substitute for the represented. Consequently, Young
recommends reconceptualizing representation as *a differentiated
relationship* (2000, 125-127; 1986, 357). There are two main
benefits of Young's understanding of representation. First, her
understanding of representation encourages us to recognize the
diversity of those being represented. Second, her analysis of
representation emphasizes the importance of recognizing how
representative institutions include as well as they exclude.
Democratic citizens need to remain vigilant about the ways in which
providing representation for some groups comes at the expense of
excluding others. Building on Young's insight, Suzanne Dovi
(2009) has argued that we should not conceptualize representation
simply in terms of how we bring marginalized groups into democratic
politics; rather, democratic representation can require limiting the
influence of overrepresented privileged groups.



Moreover, based on this way of understanding political representation,
Young provides an alterative account of democratic representation.
Specifically, she envisions democratic representation as a dynamic
process, one that moves between moments of authorization and moments
of accountability (2000, 129). It is the movement between these
moments that makes the process "democratic." This fluidity
allows citizens to authorize their representatives and for
*traces* of that authorization to be evident in what the
representatives do and how representatives are held accountable. The
appropriateness of any given representative is therefore partially
dependent on future behavior as well as on his or her past
relationships. For this reason, Young maintains that evaluation of
this process must be continuously "deferred." We must
assess representation dynamically, that is, assess the whole ongoing
processes of authorization and accountability of representatives.
Young's discussion of the dynamic of representation emphasizes
the ways in which evaluations of representatives are incomplete,
needing to incorporate the extent to which democratic citizens need to
suspend their evaluations of representatives and the extent to which
representatives can face unanticipated issues.



Another insight about democratic representation that comes from the
literature on descriptive representation is the importance of
contingencies. Here the work of Jane Mansbridge on descriptive
representation has been particularly influential. Mansbridge
recommends that we evaluate descriptive representatives by contexts
and certain functions. More specifically, Mansbridge (1999, 628)
focuses on four functions and their related contexts in which
disadvantaged groups would want to be represented by someone who
belongs to their group. Those four functions are "(1) adequate
communication in contexts of mistrust, (2) innovative thinking in
contexts of uncrystallized, not fully articulated, interests, ...
(3) creating a social meaning of 'ability to rule' for
members of a group in historical contexts where the ability has been
seriously questioned and (4) increasing the polity's de facto
legitimacy in contexts of past discrimination." For Mansbridge,
descriptive representatives are needed when marginalized groups
distrust members of relatively more privileged groups and when
marginalized groups possess political preferences that have not been
fully formed. The need for descriptive representation is contingent on
certain functions.



Mansbridge's insight about the contingency of descriptive
representation suggests that at some point descriptive representatives
might not be necessary. However, she doesn't specify how we are
to know if interests have become crystallized or trust has formed to
the point that the need for descriptive representation would be
obsolete. Thus, Mansbridge's discussion of descriptive
representation suggests that standards for evaluating representatives
are fluid and flexible. For an interesting discussion of the problems
with unified or fixed standards for evaluating Latino representatives,
see Christina Beltran's *The Trouble with Unity*.



Mansbridge's discussion of descriptive representation points to
another trend within the literature on political representation
-- namely, the trend to derive normative accounts of
representation from the representative's function. Russell
Hardin (2004) captured this trend most clearly in his position that
"if we wish to assess the morality of elected officials, we must
understand their function as our representatives and then infer how
they can fulfill this function." For Hardin, only an empirical
explanation of the role of a representative is necessary for
determining what a representative should be doing. Following Hardin,
Suzanne Dovi (2007) identifies three democratic standards for
evaluating the performance of representatives: those of
fair-mindedness, critical trust building, and good gate-keeping. In
*Ruling Passions*, Andrew Sabl (2002) links the proper behavior
of representatives to their particular office. In particular, Sabl
focuses on three offices: senator, organizer and activist. He argues
that the same standards should not be used to evaluate these different
offices. Rather, each office is responsible for promoting democratic
constancy, what Sabl understands as "the effective pursuit of
interest." Sabl (2002) and Hardin (2004) exemplify the trend to
tie the standards for evaluating political representatives to the
activity and office of those representatives.


## 4. Future Areas of Study



There are three persistent problems associated with political
representation. Each of these problems identifies a future area of
investigation. The first problem is the proper institutional design
for representative institutions within democratic polities. The
theoretical literature on political representation has paid a lot of
attention to the institutional design of democracies. More
specifically, political theorists have recommended everything from
proportional representation (e.g. Guinier, 1994 and Christiano, 1996)
to citizen juries (Fishkin, 1995). However, with the growing number of
democratic states, we are likely to witness more variation among the
different forms of political representation. In particular, it is
important to be aware of how non-democratic and hybrid regimes can
adopt representative institutions to consolidate their power over
their citizens. There is likely to be much debate about the advantages
and disadvantages of adopting representative institutions.



This leads to a second future line of inquiry -- ways in which
democratic citizens can be marginalized by representative
institutions. This problem is articulated most clearly by
Young's discussion of the difficulties arising from one person
representing many. Young suggests that representative institutions can
include the opinions, perspectives and interests of some citizens at
the expense of marginalizing the opinions, perspectives and interests
of others. Hence, a problem with institutional reforms aimed at
increasing the representation of historically disadvantaged groups is
that such reforms can and often do decrease the responsiveness of
representatives. For instance, the creation of black districts has
created safe zones for black elected officials so that they are less
accountable to their constituents. Any decrease in accountability is
especially worrisome given the ways citizens are vulnerable to their
representatives. Thus, one future line of research is examining the
ways that representative institutions marginalize the interests,
opinions and perspectives of democratic citizens.



In particular, it is necessary for to acknowledge the biases of
representative institutions. While E. E. Schattschneider (1960) has
long noted the class bias of representative institutions, there is
little discussion of how to improve the political representation of
the disaffected -- that is, the political representation of those
citizens who do not have the will, the time, or political resources to
participate in politics. The absence of such a discussion is
particularly apparent in the literature on descriptive representation,
the area that is most concerned with disadvantaged citizens. Anne
Phillips (1995) raises the problems with the representation of the
poor, e.g. the inability to define class, however, she argues for
issues of class to be integrated into a politics of presence. Few
theorists have taken up Phillip's gauntlet and articulated how
this integration of class and a politics of presence is to be done. Of
course, some have recognized the ways in which interest groups,
associations, and individual representatives can betray the least well
off (e.g. Strolovitch, 2004). And some (Dovi, 2003) have argued that
descriptive representatives need to be selected based on their
relationship to citizens who have been unjustly excluded and
marginalized by democratic politics. However, it is unclear how to
counteract the class bias that pervades domestic and international
representative institutions. It is necessary to specify the conditions
under which certain groups within a democratic polity require enhanced
representation. Recent empirical literature has suggested that the
benefits of having descriptive representatives is by no means
straightforward (Gay, 2002).



A third and final area of research involves the relationship between
representation and democracy. Historically, representation was
considered to be *in opposition with* democracy [See
*Dahl* (1989) for a historical overview of the concept of
representation]. When compared to the direct forms of democracy found
in the ancient city-states, notably Athens, representative
institutions appear to be poor substitutes for the ways that citizens
actively ruled themselves. Barber (1984) has famously argued that
representative institutions were opposed to strong democracy. In
contrast, almost everyone now agrees that democratic political
institutions are representative ones.



Bernard Manin (1997)reminds us that the Athenian Assembly, which often
exemplifies direct forms of democracy, had only limited powers.
According to Manin, the practice of selecting magistrates by lottery
is what separates representative democracies from so-called direct
democracies. Consequently, Manin argues that the methods of selecting
public officials are crucial to understanding what makes
representative governments democratic. He identifies four principles
distinctive of representative government: 1) Those who govern are
appointed by election at regular intervals; 2) The decision-making of
those who govern retains a degree of independence from the wishes of
the electorate; 3) Those who are governed may give expression to their
opinions and political wishes without these being subject to the
control of those who govern; and 4) Public decisions undergo the trial
of debate (6). For Manin, historical democratic practices hold
important lessons for determining whether representative institutions
are democratic.



While it is clear that representative institutions are vital
institutional components of democratic institutions, much more needs
to be said about the meaning of democratic representation. In
particular, it is important not to presume that all acts of
representation are equally democratic. After all, not all acts of
representation within a representative democracy are necessarily
instances of democratic representation. Henry Richardson (2002) has
explored the undemocratic ways that members of the bureaucracy can
represent citizens. [For a more detailed discussion of non-democratic
forms of representation, see Apter (1968). Michael Saward (2008) also
discusses how existing systems of political representation do not
necessarily serve democracy.] Similarly, it is unclear whether a
representative who actively seeks to dismantle democratic institutions
is representing democratically. Does democratic representation require
representatives to advance the preferences of democratic citizens or
does it require a commitment to democratic institutions? At this
point, answers to such questions are unclear. What is certain is that
democratic citizens are likely to disagree about what constitutes
democratic representation.



One popular approach to addressing the different and conflicting
standards used to evaluate representatives within democratic polities,
is to simply equate multiple standards with democratic ones. More
specifically, it is argued that democratic standards are pluralistic,
accommodating the different standards possessed and used by democratic
citizens. Theorists who adopt this approach fail to specify the proper
relationship among these standards. For instance, it is unclear how
the standards that Mansbridge identifies in the four different forms
of representation should relate to each other. Does it matter if
promissory forms of representation are replaced by surrogate forms of
representation? A similar omission can be found in Pitkin: although
Pitkin specifies there is a unified relationship among the different
views of representation, she never describes how the different views
interact. This omission reflects the lacunae in the literature about
how formalistic representation relates to descriptive and substantive
representation. Without such a specification, it is not apparent how
citizens can determine if they have adequate powers of authorization
and accountability.



Currently, it is not clear exactly what makes any given form of
representation consistent, let alone consonant, with democratic
representation. Is it the synergy among different forms or should we
examine descriptive representation in isolation to determine the ways
that it can undermine or enhance democratic representation? One
tendency is to equate democratic representation simply with the
existence of fluid and multiple standards. While it is true that the
fact of pluralism provides justification for democratic institutions
as Christiano (1996) has argued, it should no longer presumed that all
forms of representation are democratic since the actions of
representatives can be used to dissolve or weaken democratic
institutions. The final research area is to articulate the
relationship between different forms of representation and ways that
these forms can undermine democratic representation.