## 1. An Outline of Brentano's Theory



In this section, we start with an overview of Brentano's theory
of judgement, as far as it is contained in the first edition of the
 *Psychology*.[2]
 It will be convenient to divide the material covered by Brentano in
chapter 7 of this work (and the final section of chapter 6) into four
parts. The first part tries to establish the fundamental difference
between judgements (*Urteile*) and presentations
(*Vorstellungen*); the second part pertains to the relation
between judgement and truth; the third part deals with existential
judgements and their intentional objects; and the fourth part proposes
a reduction of categorical and hypothetical judgements to the
existential form.


### 1.1 Part I: Judgements Versus Presentations



As a philosopher of mind, Brentano takes it to be his task to develop
specific accounts of whatever phenomena one finds in inner experience.
To do so, one has to pay close attention to the different ways in
which phenomena are directed toward something (see PES 197 [II 32; SVS
1, 218]), and Kriegel 2017: 99ff). Applying this method to the case of
judgement, Brentano arrives at the claim that judgements are clearly
distinguishable from presentations. The question that concerns him is
*how* precisely they differ. Brentano invokes three negative
claims to draw that distinction:

 

(1)
Combining two ideas/marks (*Merkmale*)[3]
 in thought is not sufficient for making a judgement.


When someone asks me "Is any tree red?" I will combine
these ideas in pondering the question, but how much I combine them, I
might still remain undecided whether they exist together or not. That
suffices to make claim (1) plausible.



Claim (1)
 is compatible with the view that judging always means to hold true a
proposition. For Brentano, that is not the right way to understand
claim (1) however. In order to rule out that interpretation, Brentano
invokes the following pair of claims:



(2)
Combining two ideas/marks (Merkmale) in thought is not necessary
for making a judgement.
(3)
Combining two ideas/marks (Merkmale) is necessary in formulating a
sentence or a proposition.


Together, claims (2) and (3) imply that judgements can be made without
judging a sentence or proposition to be true. That is what Brentano
tries to establish. Let us see how he tries to achieve this goal.



Brentano considers three possible ways of conceiving of the difference
between presentations and judgements. There may be (i) an intrinsic
difference between them, (ii) they may differ in their contents
(Inhalte), or (iii) in a perfection [*Vollkommenheit*] with
which these objects are thought (PES 204, [II 42f.; SVS 1, 226]).



Let's start with (i). What would it mean that the distinction
between judgement and presentation is *not* intrinsic, i.e.,
extrinsic? It would mean that the distinction between judgement and
presentation consists in a relational property that one of these
mental phenomena has while the other lacks it. In this sense the
distinction between a bachelor and a husband is extrinsic: bachelors
lack the relational property of being married to someone; husbands
have it. Nothing else distinguishes bachelors and husbands from each
other: there is no intrinsic property of husbands or bachelors that
grounds the relational difference. Is the distinction between
judgement and presentation like the distinction between husbands and
bachelors? According to Alexander Bain, it is. For Bain there are two
kinds of ideas (presentations): those that dispose one to
act--this is the extrinsic or relational property--and
others that don't. The former are judgements and beliefs, the
latter are mere presentations (see Bain 1872: 372f). Mill (1878:
403-4) criticized Bain's proposal as incomplete. In
general, a dispositional property like disposing one to act on an
object is grounded in its categorical properties. Hence, the
belief-constituting disposition to act must be grounded in categorical
properties of ideas and these properties seem to be intrinsic. The
relational difference is not brute as in the husband/bachelor
case.



Brentano finds Mill's line of thought persuasive (see PES 202f.
[II 40; SVS 1,
 224]).[4]
 By Brentano's lights, any explanation of the distinction
between judgement and presentation in terms of a difference in
"impact" on mental states or actions is
 unsatisfactory.[5]
 Like Mill, he goes for the first of the three options above: the
difference between presentations and judgement is an intrinsic
one.



On to (ii). Is the intrinsic difference between judgement and
presentation one that concerns the content of the mental mental
phenomena under consideration? According to the view opposed by
Brentano, every judgement is a combining or separating of marks
[Merkmale]. The content of a judgement is the combination of at least
two marks that are either divided or combined in it. Possessing a
content is an intrinsic property of a judgement: every judgement must
have a content and the content distinguishes a judgement, in part,
from other mental phenomena. Do judgements and presentations differ in
content (cf. PES 205 [II 44; SVS 1, 227])? Again Brentano's
answer is NO. If I wonder whether there are red trees, the content of
my presentation is a combination of the marks redness and tree(hood).
My judgement that there are red trees has the same content as the mere
presentation of a red
 tree.[6]



This brings us to (iii). Is the intrinsic difference between judgement
and presentation one that concerns a perfection in which mental
phenomena that have the same object differ? Brentano identifies the
perfection as *strength*, *intensity* or
*vivacity* of the mental phenomena concerned. Is, as Brentano
says, "a judgement a stronger presentation and a presentation a
weaker judgement"? (PES 204 [II 44; SVS 1, 226]; author
translation) Brentano says NO. A strong presentation is no judgement.
This argument, while suggestive, is not persuasive because the notion
of strength, vividness or intensity seems unclear. However, in the
second edition Brentano adds an important consideration that improves
the argument. If presentation and judgement were distinguished in
strength, both would need to have positions on a scale of strength.
However, Brentano now doubts that there is one scale of intensity or
strength on which presentations and judgements both lie. Different
degrees of conviction that may accompany an act of judgement should
not be confused with the degrees of intensity with which an object can
be presented to the mind, e.g., in sensation (PES 286f. [II 151ff.;
SVS 1, 401). If there is not one dimension of strength in which both
judgement and presentation can differ, strength cannot distinguish
between them.



Brentano concludes that the distinction between judgement and
presentation is intrinsic and irreducible to other distinctions
between these mental phenomena. Hillebrand (1891: 26-7) called
Brentano's view therefore an "idiogenetic" theory of
judgement--it takes judgement to be a fundamental kind of mental
phenomenon--while "allogenetic" theories take
judgements to be composed out of other mental phenomena that belong to
fundamental kinds.


### 1.2 Part II: Judgement and Truth



But are things not much easier? Brentano himself says:



> 
> 
> By "judgement" we mean, in accordance with common
> philosophical usage, acceptance [*annehmen*](as true) or
> rejection [*verwerfen*] (as false). We have already noted,
> however, that such acceptance or rejection also occurs in cases in
> which many people would not use the term "judgement," as,
> for example, in the perception of mental acts and in remembering. (PES
> 198 [II 34; SVS 1, 219])
> 
> 
> 



Brentano acknowledges that "accepting as true" or
"rejecting as false" is the natural way to describe an act
of judgement (PES 201 [II 38; SVS 1, 223]). Meanwhile philosophers
have changed their habits. While it is still true, of course, that
judgements can be true or false, most philosophers are swayed by
Frege's or Reinach's argument that all judgements are
acceptances as
 true.[7]
 When one rejects a proposition as false, e.g., that there is
extraterrestrial life, this is still a positive judgement for them,
because in making the judgement one takes it to be *true* that
no life exists beyond earth. Brentano would contest this by saying
that their point only concerns the linguistic expression of our
judgements, not the judgements themselves. We can find for each
judgement a sentence that is true if and only if the judgement
expressed in it is correct, but that does not show that the judgement
itself always has a positive quality.



Why does the characterization of judgement as either an accepting as
true or a rejecting as false not suffice to distinguish judgement from
presentation? After all, one can present something without accepting
it as true. Because saying that in judgement we take something to be
true is potentially misleading. The following passage shows what
Brentano is aiming at:



> 
> 
> If we say that every acknowledging judgement [*anerkennendes
> Urteil*] is an act of taking something to be true, and every
> rejecting judgement [*verwerfendes Urteil*] an act of taking
> something to be false, this does not mean that the former consists in
> predicating truth of what is taken to be true and the latter in
> predicating falsity of what is taken to be false. Our previous
> discussions have shown, rather, that what the expressions denote is a
> particular kind of intentional reception of an object, a distinctive
> kind of mental reference to a content of consciousness. The only
> correct interpretation is that anyone who takes something to be true
> will not only acknowledge the object, but, when asked whether the
> object is to be acknowledged, will also acknowledge the object's
> to-be-acknowledgedness [*das Anzuerkennensein*], i.e., *its
> truth* (which is all that is meant by this barbarous expression).
> (PES 240 [II 89; SVS 1, 259]; emphasis added and translation
> improved).
> 
> 
> 



The point that Brentano wants to get across is a delicate one and
requires a careful wording. It is no coincidence that Brentano prefers
here the term "*anerkennen*" over
"*annehmen*", which would be closer to common usage
in philosophy. The reason is that Brentano thinks that the more common
way of speaking wrongly suggests that one predicates truth when one
accepts something as true. According to Brentano, as will become clear
later, judgement requires no predication (not even a predication of
existence). Hence, the difference in meaning between "accepting
(*annehmen*)" and "acknowledging
(*anerkennen*)" becomes important for
 him.[8]



Brentano's observation leads to an important result: To say that
something is true does not mean that there is an object, a
proposition, of which one predicates a property, being true. Rather,
we can take the act of judgement itself as the vehicle which is true.
To say that a judgement is true means to make a judgement of
higher-order, namely to acknowledge that the object of the first
judgement is worthy of either being acknowledged or rejected.
Propositions are not needed for making sense of the concept of
truth.


### 1.3 Part III: Existential Judgements



Existential judgements play a fundamental role in Brentano's
arguments against other views of judgement as well as in his positive
account of judgement. Brentano's discussion of existential
judgements aims to show that such judgements cannot be conceived as
predications of properties (see
 section 1.1)
 and that such judgements are either acknowledgments or rejections of
objects.



The argument focuses on existential propositions and tries to
establish that a mental act of denial is on a par with an act of
acceptance. Note, that by an existential proposition we do not mean
here the *content* of a judgement, but *sentences* of
the following form:




*A* exists, an *A* exists, *A*s exist.



*A* does not exist, an *A* does not exist, *A*s
do not exist.




The argument developed by Brentano relies on the following
principle:



> 
> 
> [W]henever someone acknowledges [*anerkennen*] a combination of
> marks he simultaneously acknowledges each particular element of the
> combination. (PES 208 [II 49; SVS 1, 231]; authors translation)
> 
> 
> 



Applying the principle to the case of judgement, Brentano says:



> 
> 
> If this judgement were the acknowledgement of the combination of a
> mark "existence" with *A*, then it would include
> the acknowledgement of each individual element in the combination, and
> hence would include the acknowledgement of *A*. (ibid.)
> 
> 
> 



A note of caution: Brentano reiterates here his claim that combining
marks is not sufficient to make a judgement. He also raises a new
question: what does 'A' stand for? If we combine two marks
and then acknowledge each element of this combination, 'A'
must stand for a mark. But sometimes he talks as if 'A'
designated a particular object. We take this way of talking therefore
to be a convenient abbreviation. Now back to the main topic.
Acknowledging *A* already does all the work that judging that
*A* exists is supposed to do: to commit one to the existence of
*A*. Since one cannot judge that *A* exists without
acknowledging *A*, judging that *A* exists is
necessarily
 redundant.[9]
 Thus, we get as an intermediary conclusion of the argument the
following claim:



(4)
There is no predication involved in existential judgements.


What Brentano wants to show is this:



(5)
Positive and negative existential judgements do not differ in
their 'objects'.


The order in which we list the two claims might suggest that (5)
somehow follows from (4). But nothing said by Brentano actually
warrants this assumption. Brentano takes (5) to be an independent
claim supported by the testimony of inner experience:



> 
> 
> The same object is present to consciousness whether a person affirms
> it, denies it, or uncertainly asks about it; in the last case it is
> merely presented, in the first two cases it is simultaneously
> presented and acknowledged or denied. And every object which is the
> content of a presentation can possibly also become the content of a
> judgement. (PES 221 [II 63; SVS 1, 241]; in part authors
> translation)
> 
> 
> 



Inner experience is supposed to show us that, when we reject,
acknowledge or keeps an open mind about an object, we have 'the
same object in consciousness'. Brentano then moves from
'same object' to the conclusion that a judgement, either
negative or positive, and a presentation can have exactly the same
content so that the difference between judgement and content does not
lie in a difference in content. As remarked before, Brentano sometimes
talks as if objects are contents. If we read Brentano's remark
charitably, he appeals to introspective knowledge that a presentation
can purport to be directed on an object in terms of marks. The
judgement that is based on this presentation and rejects the object
the presentation purports to be directed on as well as the judgement
that acknowledges it, share the content of the presentation (the marks
in terms of which the presentation is directed on something). Hence,
negative and positive judgements can have the same content. This gives
Brentano a reason to endorse
 claim (5).
 His argument once more rules out a propositional analysis of these
judgements, and may thus buttress his arguments in favor of
 claim (4).
 We will encounter further reasons that speak for accepting (5) later
(in
 section 5),
 where we discuss Brentano's reasons for rejecting negative
properties.



At this stage, the structure of Brentano's theory already leaves
open several possible interpretations. Neither the significance of
 (4)
 nor of
 (5)
 in Brentano's theory are completely clear. That is to say: it
is not completely clear that Brentano actually needs these two claims
for backing up his theory, in particular for backing up his claim that
combining two ideas in thought is not necessary for making a judgement
(=
 claim 2).
 While Brentano presents his theory as a single whole in which claims
(2), (4), and (5) form a tight package. one may unravel that package
and accept (2) on the basis of (4) alone or independently of (4) and
(5) altogether.


### 1.4 Part IV: The Reductionist Claims



In the final part of his theory Brentano turns to so-called
categorical propositions. These are the sentences with which
traditional logic is primarily concerned: sentences of the form
"All *S* are *P*", "No *S* is
*P*", "Some *S* are *P*" and
"Some *S* are not *P*". With respect to
these propositions, Brentano takes the same view as Leibniz:



> 
> 
> It can be shown with utmost clarity that every categorical proposition
> can be translated without any change of meaning into an existential
> proposition (PES 214, [II 56; SVS 1, 236]).
> 
> 
> 



In order to prove this claim, Brentano offers examples for the
following translation schemes:



> 
> 
> A proposition of the form "All *S* are *P*"
> means the same as "An *S* that is not *P* does not
> exist."
> 
> 
> 
> A proposition of the form "No *S* is *P*"
> means the same as "An *S* that is *P* does not
> exist."
> 
> 
> 
> A proposition of the form "Some *S* are *P*"
> means the same as "An *S* that is exists."
> 
> 
> 
> A proposition of the form "Some *S* are not
> *P*" means the same as "An *S* that is not
> *P* exists."
> 
> 
> 



These are semantic claims about the meanings of sentences. In this
case, Brentano trusts our linguistic intuitions and takes them to tell
us something about the *judgements* expressed by these
propositions. The translations are meant to reveal to us the true
forms of judgement expressed by categorical propositions. Thus,
Brentano advances the following reduction thesis:



(6)
Categorical propositions can be reduced to propositions of the
form "*A* exists" and "*A* does not
exist". More explicitly: An utterance of a categorical
proposition always expresses a judgement in which the existence of an
object is acknowledged or rejected.


Notice that whereas the above translation schemes are symmetrical, the
reduction thesis involves an asymmetry claim. It does *not* say
that existential propositions express categorical judgements, but
conversely that categorical propositions express existential
judgements. There is no explicit argument in Brentano for this
interpretation of the translation schemes. Rather, it is the context
in which Brentano puts forward the reduction thesis that must provide
a justification for it.



How might this work? Well, consider the following argument which
Brentano constructs with the help of
 claim (6):



(7)
Everyone agrees that in categorical propositions of the form
"All *S* are *P*", "Some *S*
are *P*", "No *S* is *P*" and
"Some *S* are not *P*" the copula
"is" or "is not" merely indicates the quality
of the judgement and has no meaning of itself.
(6)
Categorical propositions can be reduced to propositions of the
form "*A* exists" and "*A* does not
exist".
(8)
Therefore: The notion "exists" in existential
judgements does not have a meaning of itself either.


In running this argument, Brentano advances from a claim about the
meaning of the copula "is" that he takes to be
incontestable to a (contestable) claim about the meaning of
"exists". It is the direction of this argument that
requires the reduction claim made in the second premise. Thus, it is
the purpose of the argument that fixes for Brentano the direction in
which the reduction has to go.



If one accepts the premises, the argument is sound. However, it still
leaves open how one evaluates the entire argument because there are
hidden assumptions in the premises that Brentano does not disclose. To
make them explicit, one has to read the argument as follows:



> 
> 
> The copula does not add anything to the meaning of the terms
> *S* and *P*, and hence nothing to the subject matter of
> the expressed judgement *if the subject matter is fixed by these
> concepts*. Therefore, given (6), the term "exists"
> adds nothing to the subject matter of an existential judgement *if
> the subject matter is identified with the subject matter of the
> categorical proposition which forms the basis of the
> reduction*.
> 
> 
> 



The parts in italics are the tacit assumptions that Brentano makes in
this argument. Anyone who takes the subject matter of judgements to be
propositions would deny them and hence the soundness of the argument.
That would not immediately disprove the reduction
 claim (6),
 but it would deprive Brentano of a good reason for introducing an
asymmetry into his translation schemes. Because of this problem, it
seems questionable whether Brentano's reduction project in the
third part of his theory succeeds. Apparently, Brentano himself
changed his mind on the validity of his argument when he later
developed his theory of double judgement (see
 section 5
 below). That means that he no longer can make use of his initial
argument to show that "existence" has no meaning by
itself.


## 2. Brentano and His Precursors on Existential Judgement



We have seen that Brentano heavily relies on the special case of
existential judgements in developing a general account of judgement
and criticizes other views because they do not work for those cases.
While Brentano's approach is original, he also draws on a range
of sources. He finds in Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant anticipations of
the idea that existential judgements involve no predication (=
 claim 4).
 However, none of the named philosophers goes as far as Brentano and
takes all judgements to be existential. Hence, Brentano can indeed
claim that his own theory fills a gap in the history of ideas.
Let's consider what Brentano took from his predecessors in
historical order.



In *Psychology* (PES 212 fn, [II 54 fn; SVS 1, 234 fn 246])
Brentano says in a long footnote that Aristotle hinted at the right
conception of existential judgement in *Metaphysics* and in
*De Interpretatione*. In *Metaphysics* Book IX (th)
10 Aristotle is faced with a problem. He has told his readers that one
judges truly if one separates in thought what is separated in reality
and combines in thought what is combined in reality. For example, if
Plato and foolishness are separated--the former does not have the
latter--one judges truly if one separates Plato and foolishness
in thought, that is, judges that Plato is not foolish. But now
Aristotle goes on to tell us that there are *incomposites* that
are not combined with anything. How can one make true or false
judgements pertaining to such
 things?[10]



Aristotle introduces in response a further, different notion of truth
and judgement. Judgements pertaining to *incomposites* are
"touchings" of or put us into "contact" with
these things, a notion that Brentano renders as
"perception":



> 
> 
> In fact, as truth is not the same in these cases, so also being is not
> the same; but truth or falsity is as follows--contact and
> assertion are truth (assertion not being affirmation), and ignorance
> is non-contact. (*Metaphysics*,
>  1051b21-25)[11]
> 
> 
> 



In Brentano's eyes, Aristotle's "redefinition"
of judgement and truth is highly suggestive. It shows that the
strategy to explain judgement and truth in terms of combining and
separating runs into a problem. Aristotle's appeal to the idea
of touching an object suggests a non-propositional form of
judgement--good from Brentano's perspective--while the
postulation of two different kinds of judgement, propositional as well
as non-propositional, results in a non-uniform account of
judgement--bad from Brentano's perspective. We want a
uniform account of judgement. But such an account may not be
available, as Brentano later came to see. In his theory of double
judgement he accepts, like Aristotle did, the pattern of recognition
of non-predicative judgement combined with postulating other kinds of
judgement (see
 section 5).



Brentano refers also with approval to the third chapter of *De
Interpretatione*. There Aristotle says about the copula "to
be" or "to be not" that "by itself it is
nothing, but it additionally signifies some combination, which cannot
be thought of without the components." Brentano renders this
as



> 
> 
> the "being" of the copula does not in itself signify
> anything, as a name does, but simply completes the expression of a
> judgement.
> 
> 
> 



As a correct reading of Aristotle this is dubious. Aristotle has the
copula signifying some *combination*. It is not merely
"completing" the expression of a judgement, that is,
"to be" is not only a syncategorematic expression. But we
can use Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle to shed further
light on his own positive view. He wants to say that the meaning of
"is" is the same in the following sentences:



(a)
God is almighty.
(b)
God is.


In both sentences "is" has meaning or reference of its
own. Hence, one cannot understand the judgement expressed by (b) as a
predication of a property: "is" does not name the property
of being.



What does "is" then do in "God is"? In his
answer of this question Brentano took inspiration from St. Thomas and
Kant:



> 
> 
> In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas came as close as Kant to the truth,
> remarkably enough by reflecting upon the same proposition, "God
> exists". According to him, the "is" is not a real
> predicate but merely a sign of affirmation (*Summa Theologica*,
> P. I, Q. 3, A. 4 ad 2). (PES 211 fn, [II 53 fn; SVS 1, 234 fn
> 244])
> 
> 
> 



What is telling here is Brentano's use of the word
"merely". It implies that one can use a sign for
affirmation without using that very same sign also as a sign for
predication. Following Brentano's own suggestion, we can make
this clear by introducing a simple formalism. Let us use the sign
"+" as a sign for a mere affirmation (like a question mark
is a mere sign for asking a question), and let us use
"+is" as a sign that expresses both a judgement and a
predication. Then we can symbolize the two judgements above as
follows:



(a)
God (+is) almighty
(b)
God
 (+)[12]


That is the inspiration that Brentano gets from St. Thomas. But,
again, there is something in St. Thomas that Brentano finds
 objectionable.[13]
 As Brentano notes, Aquinas wants to uphold Aristotle's theory
of truth which requires that every judgement is a comparison between a
representation and its object. He does not admit that existential
judgements simply do not fit this description.



It is important to note that "+" is a sign of affirmation
and not a predicate. For example, Sundholm (2009: 274) argues that
Brentano simply "rediscovered" an idea of Bolzano.
According to Sundholm, Bolzano takes "A exists" to express
the propositions that the idea [A] has an object; "A does not
exist" expresses the negation of this property. The appearance
that Brentano recycles this view is dispelled when we notice that
"+" does not express a presentation, but only determines
in which mode a content is to be thought.



Let us now turn to Kant. Brentano disagrees with Kant's
epistemology on almost every single point. With respect to the nature
of judgement, Brentano points out that Kant overlooks their essential
character by putting them together with presentations into a single
category: acts of thinking. He also takes Kant to task for holding on
to the mistaken view that a judgement always unifies several
representations (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A
68-9/B93-4). Thus it may come as a surprise that there is
also a strong agreement between their views. Kant anticipates
Brentano's claim that a "single mark [einzelnes Merkmal]
which is the object of a presentation can be acknowledged or denied,
too" (PES 208 [II 49; SVS 1, 230]; translation changed). The
insight can be found in Kant's seminal discussion of
existence:



> 
> 
> Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something
> that could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of
> a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. (*Critique of
> Pure Reason*, A 598)
> 
> 
> 



Kant's slogan "being is not a real predicate" has
been interpreted as saying that "exists" is no first-order
predicate of objects, but a second-order predicate true of concepts.
Whether this is the correct interpretation is not important for our
purposes. Primed by Aquinas's remarks on "to be",
Brentano reads Kant's remark
 differently.[14]
 When I judge that God exists, I posit an omniscient being, but I do
not add something to the concept of an omniscient being. Instead of
saying "exists" is not a real predicate, Kant should have
said that it is not a predicate at all, but a force-indicator: it has
positing force.



From Brentano's point of view, Kant commits the same mistake as
St. Thomas. He too tries to make existential judgements agree with the
traditional view that every judgement is a combination of
representations. To fit into Kant's category of synthetic
judgement, the existential judgement that God exists must add
something to the concept of God. "This is," remarks
Brentano, "an unclear and contradictory semi-truth" (PES
211 [II 54; SVS 1, 234]; translation improved).



Kant may be forgiven his oversight, if one realizes how many logicians
followed his path and found it equally incomprehensible to reach the
position that Brentano advocates. A telling example of such
incomprehension is provided by John Stuart Mill in his letter to
Brentano:



> 
> 
> 1. I agree with you that Belief is the essential constituent in a
> Differentia of judgment, and that the putting together of two ideas is
> merely a prerequisite or antecedent condition.
> 
> 
> 
> 2. I cannot, however, think that one idea is a sufficient prerequisite
> for a judgment. I cannot see how there can be Belief without both a
> subject and a predicate. If you say that the idea of an elephant
> suffices for belief in an elephant, belief in an elephant can only
> mean belief that there is such a thing as an elephant--that an
> elephant exists: or, in other words, that under some circumstances,
> and in some place known or unknown, I should perceive by my senses a
> thing answering the definition of an elephant. Now this, which is the
> truth really believed, is a fact, in two terms, not in one
>  only.[15]
>  (Mill 1872 [1972: 1928-9])
> 
> 
> 



The one philosopher that came closest to Brentano's view on
judgement was Johann Friedrich
 Herbart.[16]
 Herbart does not try to assimilate existential and so-called
"subjectless" statements ("It rains") to
categorical one's of the form "*S* is
 *P*".[17]
 And he takes "is" in "God is" to be the sign
of "absolute positing" (*unbedingte Aufstellung*)
(Herbart 1813: 49). While Brentano praises Herbart for holding this
view, he does not pick up his terminology, expecting little insight
from the associations it encourages.



These comparisons are not only historically instructive. They give us
a good sense of how radical Brentano's position really is. It is
radical in its demand that a theory of judgement must accommodate and
not explain away existential judgements. And it is even more radical
in its refusal to make existential judgements satisfy any version of
the view of judging as a combinatory or synthetic act, which would
nicely fit with the correspondence theory of truth. In refusing to
take this step that most philosophers considered to be inevitable,
Brentano put a heavy burden on a theory of judgement that tries to
give a uniform account of existential and subjectless judgements as
well as categorical judgements. Brentano thought that he can pull off
this trick by turning the traditional approach to this problem inside
out: instead of trying to show that in fact all judgements are
categorical ones, he tries to show that all judgements are
existential. If all judgements are reducible to existential ones, no
judgement applies a property or concept to an object. That may sound
ludicrous, but it is the only alternative left, unless one is willing
to sacrifice the goal of giving a uniform account of judgement as a
distinct mental category.


## 3. Brentano's Argument from Perception



We have now introduced the idea that animates Brentano's theory
of judgement: predication is one thing, judgement another. We have
seen which views inspired Brentano to disentangle judgement and
predication. However, so far we lack a reason to follow
Brentano's lead. How can he convince his readers that
predication is not necessary for judgement, since we already judge
when we merely acknowledge or reject an object?



Sometimes Brentano simply trusts his readers to agree with him if they
pay sufficient attention to their own judgements and compare them
with, for example, presentations. Consider, for instance, the
following passage from the opening section of Brentano's
discussion of judgement in PES:



> 
> 
> It is [...] true that nothing is an object of judgement which is
> not an object of presentation, and we maintain that when the object of
> presentation becomes the object of an affirmative or negative
> judgement, our consciousness enters into a completely new kind of
> relationship with the object. [...] *This, we maintain, is
> revealed clearly to us by inner perception and the attentive
> observation of the phenomena of judgement in memory*. (PES 201 [II
> 38-9; SVS 1, 223, emphasis added)
> 
> 
> 



So, if we are able to episodically remember judging something, we can
come to know that the same object given in a presentation can be
acknowledged or rejected in judgement and that acknowledging and
rejecting are distinct in kind from presentation.



But merely encouraging a philosopher who is in the grip of the idea
that judging is predication to pay more attention when recalling his
judgements will not yield the intended results. Is there an argument
that will establish Brentano's view on the basis of
uncontroversial premises? Brentano thinks there is an argument that is
based on premises his opponents find
 compelling:[18]



> 
> 
> That predication is not the essence of every judgement emerges quite
> clearly from the fact that all perceptions are judgements. For it
> [perception] is either knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] or at least a
> mistaken taking to be true [*Furwahrnehmen*]. And this is
> not denied by those thinkers who hold that every judgement consists in
> a conjunction of subject and predicate. [...] [I]t is hard to
> think of anything more obvious and unmistakable than the fact that a
> perception is not a [connection] of a concept of the subject and a
> concept of a predicate, nor does it refer to such a connection.
> Rather, the object of an *inner* perception is simply a mental
> phenomenon, and the object of an *external* perception is
> simply a physical phenomenon, a sound, odor, or the like. We have
> here, then, a quite obvious justification of the truth of our
> assertion. (PES 209 [II 50-51; SVS 1, 232], translation
> changed.)
> 
> 
> 



*Everyone*--even predication theorists of
judgement--believe that in perceiving we don't connect the
concept of a subject with that of a predicate. *No
one*--even predication theorists of judgement--denies
that every perception is a judgement. So, everyone accepts that there
are some judgements that don't predicate a property of something
(connect a concept of a subject with a concept of a predicate). *A
fortiori* the predication theorist of judgement is rationally
compelled to accept that there are non-predicational judgements. If he
does not do so, his view of judgement is not in harmony with the right
view of perception. Hence, the view of judgement as predication must
be revised.



How obvious is Brentano's "quite obvious"
justification? Let's consider Brentano's first premise
first: perception does not involve predication. A charitable reading
of Brentano should assume that by "perception" he means
what philosophers following Fred Dretske now call "non-epistemic
perception". I can see something *without* having any
beliefs about it to the effect that it is so-and-so. I see the yellow
canary because it looks distinct from its immediate environment; I
can't see the chameleon because it does not look distinct from
its environment. Note that it does not matter at this point whether
one takes ordinary material objects such as birds or, as Brentano
himself prefers, physical phenomena such as colours and shapes to be
the (primary) objects of perception.



Is non-epistemic seeing a form of predication? *Prima facie*,
it isn't. When I see the yellow canary, I am directed towards an
object and it appears distinct from its environment. The canary is
given to me in such a way that I can attend to it in perception, but I
might abstain from making any predicative judgement about it for the
time being.



Brentano takes it to be beyond doubt that such a perception is a
judgement, only not a predicative one. This is controversial. For
example, Brentano's *modus ponens* is Moritz
Schlick's (1925, 80/1974, 87) *modus tollens*: perception
is not judgement, hence, a perception cannot be knowledge. Sowhy should one think of seeing a yellow canary or hearing a
sound as a judgement in the first place? Consider again your
perception of the yellow canary. The canary looks different from its
surroundings to you and you can train your attention on it. In this
situation you will, to use a non-committal phrase, "take the
canary to be real". Seeing the canary is a particular kind of
"taking the canary to be", namely as something real; in
Brentano's terminology that is "an acknowledging of the
canary". If this is right, there are judgements that do not
predicate any properties of an object and merely acknowledge it.



Let us consider three objections to firm up our understanding of
Brentano's line of thought.



Objection 1: But one cannot "take something to be real",
yet not predicate any property of it. Taking something to be real is
just predicating existence of it. Brentano considers this objection
 himself:[19]



> 
> 
> Because we say not only that we perceive a color, a sound, an act of
> seeing, an act of hearing, but also that we perceive the existence of
> an act of seeing or of an act of hearing, someone might be led to
> believe that perception, too, consists in the acknowledgement
> [*Anerkennung*] of the conjunction of the attribute
> "existence" with the phenomenon in question. Such a
> misunderstanding of obvious facts seems to me almost inconceivable.
> (PES 210 [II 51-52; SVS 1, 232])
> 
> 
> 



As said before, Brentano's claim that the facts are obvious
bears little argumentative weight. But the view that every
(non-epistemic) perception is a judgement to the effect that something
exists over-intellectualizes non-epistemic perception. Infants and
dogs see and hear things. Does Brentano's opponent really want
to say that they make judgements to the effect that the objects
perceived exist? Yet, a dog certainly takes the canary to be real when
it chases it.



Brentano also provides a more theoretical reason against the view that
(non-epistemic) perception consists in predications of existence (PES
210 [II 51-52; SVS 1, 232]). The view makes it difficult to
explain how we manage to acquire the concept of existence. If we
exercise the concept in every (non-epistemic) perception, the concept
of existence must come with the capacity to perceive objects and
qualities. Brentano finds this unbelievable.



In turn, if acknowledging an object does not presuppose possession of
the concept of existence, our introspective knowledge of
acknowledgement may be used to introduce the concept of existence.
Brentano pursued this strategy following Aristotle:



> 
> 
> Aristotle had already recognized that [the concept of existence] is
> acquired by reflection on the acknowledging judgement. (TE 27 [45],
> translation
>  improved)[20]
> 
> 
> 



Objection 2: Seeing the yellow canary is not the same thing as
acknowledging it. For instance, one can see an object without
acknowledging it "if one does not trust one's eyes."
I see the canary before me, but since you have given me misleading
evidence that I am now hallucinating, I do not trust my senses and do
not take the canary to be real. So, seeing and judging are
related--maybe (consciously) seeing something prompts one to
judge that it is--but these mental acts are distinct.



In later work Brentano suggested that in such cases we do acknowledge
the bird as well as judge that there is no object in the scene
perceived. Just as we can love and hate an object, we can accept and
reject an object at the same time:



> 
> 
> An affect that is reined in by a contradicting higher love still truly
> persists. Similarly, an acceptance of an object given in sensation,
> which is disapproved of by a higher judgement, could persist. Indeed,
> it is not at all clear, how the lower activity should be changed in
> its intrinsic character because of the occurrence of the higher
> activity; if the lower activity had a relation of acceptance to the
> outer object before, it will have it later. (VNV 26, author
> translation.)
> 
> 
> 



It is thus possible to acknowledge and reject an object at the same
time, although this is clearly not a mental state one prefers to be
in. But sometimes things are not as we like them to be.



With this in mind Brentano can say that when we mistrust our senses we
acknowledge an object, but this judgement conflicts with other
judgements or beliefs that we have with regard to this matter.



Objection 3: We have already seen that Brentano subscribes to a
Polarity Thesis: Acknowledging an object *x* has an opposite:
rejecting *x* (see
 section 1, claim 5).
 These attitudes are directed towards the same object, yet only one of
them can be correct even if they may co-exist, as Brentano allows. The
correctness of acknowledging *x* is incompatible with the
correctness of rejecting it. Hence, if non-epistemic perception is a
kind of acknowledgement, it must have an opposite. But what could be
the opposite of
 seeing?[21]
 According to Peter Geach, there is nothing here to be found except
the exclusion relation between (instances of) properties that we
see:



> 
> 
> Believing, like seeing, has no polar opposite, though contrary dogmas
> may be believed, as contrary colours may be seen. (Geach 1965:
> 455)
> 
> 
> 



However, Brentano's view of perception could gain plausibility
by contrasting it with a form of doubt that is also non-epistemic and
directly opposed to it. If I see a yellow canary, that very act could
make it incorrect to raise a doubt of a non-epistemic kind. If
doubting can be like acknowledging an object-directed act with a
non-propositional content, then Brentano's Polarity thesis
stands. If not, we must either revise the Polarity Thesis or
Brentano's view of perception.



Let us sum up the discussion and put its result into perspective.
Brentano tells us that perceiving an object is acknowledging it. Such
perceptions are for Brentano the prime example of existential
judgements. In such judgements we acknowledge an object without
predicating anything of it. Based on this observation, Brentano argues
that simple existential judgements are not of the categorical form
"*S* is *P*" or "*S* has the
property *P*". In other words, simple judgements do not
have a propositional content. In making such judgements we may
acknowledge a content, a combination of marks or a single mark and
thereby an object that possesses these marks, but we do not affirm
*that* the object that is so-and-so exists.



The consequences of this move are indeed far reaching. Even when we
predicate a property of an object, Brentano can say that the
predication need not change the character of the *judgement*
that we are making. One may conceive of predication as a two-step
process: one first connects the property *P* with the subject
*S*, thus forming a complex representation of an
*S*-that-is-*P*; then one acknowledges the complex
content and thus forms a judgement. The content is complex, but the
judgement itself is the same simple act of acknowledgement.



If judging is either acknowledging or rejecting of contents, the
notion of acknowledgement/rejection is fundamental in philosophy of
mind. In response to Brentano's move, philosophers at the end of
the 19th and beginning of 20th century engaged with his view of
acknowledgement. Wilhelm Jerusalem (1895, 67-72) discussed
Brentano's and Marty's view of judgement and argues for a
view of judgement as a complex 
 activity.[22] 
Adolf Reinach (1911, sect. I) distinguished different related notions of
'acknowledgement' and criticises Brentano for running them
together. Karelitzki (1914) is a (short) monograph devoted to find a
plausible concept of acknowledgement and takes Brentano's as its
starting point (see ibid., 13-28). The central figure of the
Vienna circle, Moritz Schlick (1925, 50/1974, 43) took Brentano to be
right about the psychological nature of judgement, but not its logical
role. For this reason he argues against the reduction thesis that we
will examine below.


## 4. The Reduction Thesis and Brentano's Logic Reform



So far Brentano's theory seems to have a sound footing. Now we
need to make a big step when we consider Brentano's most radical
thesis: what we called his reduction thesis (see
 section 1, claim 6):
 "The reducibility of categorical propositions, indeed the
reducibility of all propositions which express a judgement, to
existential propositions is therefore indubitable" (PES 218 [II
60; SVS 1, 239). Before we can ask on what basis Brentano makes this
claim, we need to get clear about its meaning.



Brentano introduces the notion of "reduction" at a
linguistic level, applying it to sentences (or
"propositions"), but what he is aiming at is a reduction
at the level of mental phenomena. At the linguistic level, the claim
is that any categorical proposition can be transformed without change
of meaning into an existential proposition. At the level of judgement,
the claim is that all judgements are in fact existential in character
(and hence non-propositional). That shows for Brentano how language
disguises the true nature of our judgements. When somebody asserts,
for instance, that all *S* are *P*, he *seems* to
make a positive judgement about all *S*. In fact, however, his
judgement is negative and of the form "No
*S*-that-is-not-*P* exists". The point of the
reduction thesis is to remove the linguistic disguise and to uncover
the true form of our judgements. It also ensures that the judgements
expressed by categorical and existential propositions are of the same
kind. While such unification could also be achieved by saying that
existential propositions express categorical judgement,
Brentano's thesis reverses that claim by declaring categorical
propositions to express existential judgements.



That is the view that Brentano puts forth in the first edition of his
*Psychology* (1874). However, Brentano had second thoughts on
this matter. While holding on to his view that existential
propositions express categorical judgements, and that categorical
propositions *can* express existential judgements, Brentano
later dropped the reduction thesis. At least since 1889, Brentano no
longer thought that categorical propositions *only* express
existential judgements. He states the result of this change of view in
print first in *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*:



> 
> 
> The judgement expressed in the sentence "The rose is a
> flower" is composed out of two judgements of which one is the
> acknowledgement of the subject [...] (OKRW fn. 22 [SVS 3,
> 67f.])
> 
> 
> 



It turns out that I make two judgements in one--a "double
judgement"--when I seem to make only one: the judgement
that the rose is a flower. Furthermore, higher-order judgements about
the correctness and incorrectness of judgements exhibit the same
complexity and come to play a prominent role in Brentano's
theory.



These new ideas complicate Brentano's theory and force one to
rethink the entire project of reducing categorical propositions to
existential ones. We will do this in two steps. In this section, we
take a closer look at the reduction thesis in the context in which it
originally appears. In
 section 5
 we explain why Brentano gave up this project.



We already noted that Brentano's *Psychology* is not just
a book about mental phenomena. It also includes fundamental
considerations pertaining to logic and epistemology. In that sense
Brentano is no doubt a "psychologist". He takes judgements
to be the primary bearers of truth, he defines logical inferences as
relations between judgements, and he considers validity to emerge from
the evidence of our judgements about such relations. In taking this
approach, Brentano sets himself apart from the rising
"mathematical logic" (see PES Appendix x). Instead of
applying mathematical tools in logic, Brentano believed that logic
will advance better by applying the tools of descriptive psychology.
To prove his case, Brentano sketches a reform of traditional logic
based on his reduction thesis.



To begin with, Brentano challenges the logic contained in the
traditional square of opposition. This square is made up of the four
categorial propositions:


* A ("All *S* are *P*"),
* E ("No *S* are *P*"),
* I ("Some *S* are *P*"), and
* O ("Some *S* are not *P*").



Among others, the following logical relations have been claimed to
hold among these propositions (see Parsons 2017):


1. A contradicts O, and vice versa.
2. E contradicts I, and vice versa.
3. A and E can be false but not true together (= law of
contrariety)
4. I and O can be true but not false together (= law of
subcontrariety)
5. A implies I (= subalternation)
6. E implies O (= subalternation)
7. I converts into "Some *P* are *S*"
(simple conversion)
8. E converts into "No *P* is *S*" (simple
conversion)



Brentano rejects almost all these principles. After translating the
categorical propositions into existential form, he concludes that (i)
and (ii) are the only rules correctly identified by traditional logic.
(iii) to (vi) turn out to be mistaken if *S* is an empty term.
(vii) and (viii) are correct principles, but no real conversion of a
judgement takes place. The converted propositions simply express
*one* judgement in two ways. This is why Brentano says that his
theory



> 
> 
> leads to nothing less than a complete overthrow, and at the same time,
> a reconstruction of elementary logic. Everything then becomes simpler,
> clearer, and more exact. (PES 230 [II 77; SVS 1, 251])
> 
> 
> 



The core idea from which Brentano starts is very simple: traditional
logic takes the A-form and the I-form to express positive judgements,
and the E-form and the O-form to express negative ones. According to
Brentano, that is a confusion. All universal propositions (both A and
E) express negative judgements and therefore lack existential import,
whereas all particular propositions (both I and O) express positive
judgements with existential import. The reduction thesis fits in
nicely with this idea, or so it seems. It helps us to correctly
interpret the principles of traditional logic and to see which of them
one should retain. In turn, the simplification of the square of
opposition lends support to the reduction thesis. Everything seems to
fit
 nicely.[23]



But a closer look reveals that this tight fit between Brentano's
theory of judgement and his reform of logic is illusory. With the
advance of quantificational logic, it became clear that in order to
correct the square of oppositions in the way in which Brentano
suggests, all one needs to do is to use existentially quantified
formulas instead of categorical propositions (see Church 1947: 56).
This observation contains both good and bad news for Brentano. The
good news is that Brentano's logical intuitions find support in
quantificational logic. The bad news is that his reduction thesis
ceases to play a role in reforming logic. Surely, a quantified formula
*may* express an existential judgement with a non-propositional
content, as Brentano conceived it, but it may also express a judgement
with a propositional content. To put it in other words:
Brentano's revision of traditional logic can be replicated
without making use of his reduction thesis.


## 5. The Theory of Double Judgements



When one reads the first edition of Brentano's
*Psychology*, the reduction thesis appears to be the backbone
of Brentano's theory of judgement. But that is in fact not so.
In the second edition (1911) Brentano added several appendices, one of
which is entitled "On genuine and fictitious objects" (PES
appendix ix). Here Brentano recapitulates his theory of judgement and
turns his back on the reduction thesis. Neither is it true, Brentano
now says, that all categorical propositions can be transformed without
change of meaning into existential propositions. Nor is it true that
all judgements are of existential form.



It takes a careful reading to fully appreciate the significance of
Brentano's change of mind. While the change is dramatic, it does
not undermine Brentano's theory completely. On the contrary. All
of the following claims still remain in place: in perception we make
simple existential judgements by affirming or rejecting an object that
we perceive (PES 295 [II 164; SVS 1,
 413]);[24]
 categorical propositions can be equivalent with existential
propositions (PES 298 [II 168; SVS 1, 416]; existential propositions
can express concepts with a complex subject matter (ibid.). While
these claims all remain unchanged, what Brentano gives up is the idea
of uniformity in the realm of judgement. That is what Brentano's
anti-reduction turn comes to:



*Anti-reduction*  

It is false that all judgements can be given a uniform
psychological treatment.




Why did Brentano turn away from a unified theory of judgement?
Consider first a line of reasoning that Brentano may have used in one
of his
 lectures:[25]



> 
> 
> [...] since Aristotle, the categorical form has been considered
> as the basic form of judgement, while the other doctrine that the
> basic form of judgement is the existential form emerged only in recent
> times. Yet there can be no doubt that the absolute majority of our
> judgements take the form "A is B", not the existential
> form, and that the Aristotelian logic made the right decision to
> ground its logical developments on that form [of judgement]. This
> apparent contradiction we must try to resolve. (LRU 113f., author
> translation)
> 
> 
> 



Whether it was Hillebrand or Brentano who made the point, it is a very
good question: Why should one bother to reduce categorical to
existential judgements, if most of our judgements are expressed in
categorical form? That is to say: Why not take such propositions at
face value instead of claiming that language disguises the nature of
our judgements?



However, there is also a good answer to this question. We usually do
not make simple judgements, but what Brentano now calls "double
judgements", and in order to express such judgements we make use
of the categorical form. In a double-judgement one affirms the
existence of some object and then adds a second judgement that
presupposes that the first judgement has been made.



The novel idea here is that judgements become more complex when they
are built up in *three* steps: First one presents an object
*S* and acknowledges its existence. Then one presents a
property *P* and identifies *P* with the object
*S* in thought that one has acknowledged, and finally one
acknowledges *S* with the addition of [*mit der Zugabe*]
*P*. (see PES 295 [II 164; SVS 1, 413]



What is it to identify *P* with *S* in thought? Brentano
tells us that identification is not a kind of judgement and that the
result of an identification is a presentation (PES 317, [II
 206]).[26]
 A natural way to understand Brentano is to think of identification as
a way of forming complex presentations. Brentano seems mainly to have
conjunction in mind. We can conjoin the presentation of [warm] and
[round] to the presentation of [something warm & round].
Conjunction is here a primitive operation on presentations that is
independent of
 judgement.[27]



But what is the point of this complication? Why does Brentano not
stick with the simpler two-step procedure that we are already familiar
with: first, one combines *S* and *P* in an act of
presentation, prior to making any judgement, and then one acknowledges
"*S*-that-is-*P*" as a complex object? Is
there a special way of identifying *S* and *P* which
presupposes that the object *S* has to be acknowledged before
such an identification can be
 made?[28]



Demonstrative judgements are a good case to support Brentano's
new idea:



> 
> 
> A sentence of the form "That thing is *P*"
> expresses a double judgement consisting of (i) an acknowledgement of
> the object picked out by the demonstrative "that thing"
> and (ii) the conjoining of the idea [That] and [*P*] (read as
> "the thing which is that and *P*" and (iii) an
> acknowledgement of the thing which is that and *P*.
> 
> 
> 



The formulation of the second judgement must be chosen with care. One
would miss Brentano's point, if one took the second judgement to
have as content "that the thing just acknowledged is
*P*". Acknowledging an object and judging that one
acknowledges it are not the same thing. Therefore, one could make the
latter judgement without actually making the first affirmation. That
is ruled out if one describes the second judgement as affirming of
that thing *that has been acknowledged*, that it is *P*.
Only thus one capture's Brentano idea that in a double-judgement
the second judgement is inseparable from the first: one can affirm
something of an object only after one has actually affirmed its
existence (see PES 296 [II 165; SVS 1,
 414]).[29]



Another possible misunderstanding is worth mentioning at this point.
We have earlier seen that Brentano, like Frege, distinguishes
predication from judgement. Now it may seem that Brentano backtracks
on this agreement. On his new theory it seems that predication occurs
when one affirms *P* of *S*, which means when one judges
of *S* that it is *P*. But Brentano does not backtrack
on this point. He still holds that predication occurs prior to and
independently of judging. That is what the three-step process in a
double-judgement guarantees: after acknowledging *S*, one must
first identify *P* with *S*, i.e., predicate *P*
of *S*, before one can judge that *S* is *P*,
i.e., acknowledge *S* in conjunction with *P*.



Let us now turn to a second line of reasoning with which Brentano
motivates his new theory. This line involves a thorough
reconsideration of the categorical propositions of traditional logic.
Following the model of singular propositions just elaborated, Brentano
suggests that propositions of the I-form and the O-form also express
double-judgements:



> 
> 
> Looked at more closely [...a judgement of the form "Some
> *S* is *P*"] signifies a double judgement
> (*Doppelurteil**),* one part of which acknowledges the
> subject, and, after the predicate has been identified in presentation
> with the subject, the other part acknowledges the subject which had
> been acknowledged all by itself by the first part, but with this
> addition--which is to say it ascribes to it the predicate
> *P*. (PES 295 [II 164; SVS 1, 413], translation amended)
> 
> 
> 



Likewise, the O-form "Some *S* is not
*P*":



> 
> 
> consists of the acknowledgement of *S*, and this is the basic
> constituent of the double judgements. The second part relates to it
> and presupposes it in such a way as to be inseparable from it. And
> this second part is negative: it does not [...] ascribe an
> attribute to the *S*, [...] but rather denies one of it.
> (ibid.)
> 
> 
> 



What is the rationale behind these claims? It is obviously no
coincidence that Brentano makes them in the context of discussing the
distinction between genuine and fictitious objects. This distinction
becomes important for him because judgements are intentional mental
acts, and as such they can be both about real things or about
inventions of our own minds. These invented or
"fictitious" objects can be of various kinds. We may
invent something in hallucination or by imagining it in our dreams,
like a magical island, or we may read about a mythological figure
described in a story, like Pegasus, or we may invent non-existing
objects by our way of speaking or as part of a metaphysical
theory.



In the present context, Brentano is concerned particularly with
fictitious objects invented by language or metaphysics: he calls them
"negatives", since they are denoted by negative terms
which may occur either in the subject-position or the
predicate-position of a categorical proposition. Such terms are
regularly used in common language when one speaks of an
"unintelligent man", or an "unattractive
thing" (PES 298 [II 169; SVS 1,
 417].[30]
 Or they may be introduced by artificial terms like "a non-white
thing" or a "non-human". Brentano denies that such
terms actually have a denotative function and denote something that
could be made an object of judgement. The following consideration may
be taken as supporting Brentano's point: When we count the
properties of an object, only genuine properties should count. The
properties of a flower may include being red and being a rose; but in
addition to that the rose does not also have the further properties of
being not-black and being not a daisy. It is of course correct to
*say* that the flower is neither black nor a daisy, but in
saying this one does not ascribe negative properties to it. One simply
denies that it has the properties of being black and being a daisy.
That is why Brentano insists that negation belongs to the mode of
judgement, not to its content (see
 section 1, claim 5).



Brentano requires from a theory of judgement that it stays away from
postulating fictitious entities of any kind. In this respect his
earlier analysis of propositions of the O-form and the A-form turns
out to be deficient. His claim about the O-form was that in judging
that *S* is not *P*, one affirms the existence of an
*S*-that-is-not-*P*. That conflicts with his restriction
against negative properties because when one affirms a complex like
*S*-that-is-not-*P*, one affirms all of its parts (see
PES 208 [II 49; SVS 1, 231]). Thus, in affirming an
*S*-that-is-not-*P*, one would affirm not only the
entire complex, but also both of its "parts": *S*
and not-*P*. Note that the problem cannot be solved by joining
the negation with the copula "is", because the copula
indicates the quality of the judgement and propositions of the O-form
express *positive* judgements according to Brentano.



The way out of this problem is provided by Brentano's theory of
double-judgement. On the new analysis, judgements of the O-form are
partially positive and partially negative. They affirm the existence
of the subject *S*, and then deny the predicate *P* of
that subject. Now the negation belongs to the mode of judgement, not
to its subject matter.



Brentano considers this new analysis to provide a further insight into
the way how language disguises the nature of
 judgement.[31]
 Obviously, we cannot read off from the linguistic expression whether
a given proposition expresses a simple or a double-judgement. It takes
the scalpel of a philosopher to figure this out. In some cases,
however, no decision may be reached. Then Brentano advises us to
consider the proposition to be homonymous. This seems to be the proper
verdict with propositions of the I-form. They can be interpreted
either as expressing a simple judgement ("an SP exists")
or a double-judgement ("an *S* exists and that *S*
is *P*") (see LRU 114, and Hillebrand 1891: 98).



A further ambiguity of this kind arises in the case of propositions of
the E-form ("No *S* is *P*"). Their explicit
negative quality speaks against an interpretation that takes them to
express a double-judgement like propositions of the
 O-form.[32]
 Brentano therefore ventures another idea what these propositions
express: judgements of higher-order or
"meta-judgements":



> 
> 
> Anyone who says, "No *S* is *P*" is thinking
> of someone judging that "An *S* is *P*", and
> declaring that in thinking of him in this way he is thinking of
> someone who judges incorrectly. (PES 298 [II 168; SVS 1, 416])
> 
> 
> 



Brentano here exploits the principle that judgements of the E-form
contradict judgements of the I-form. Denying that someone judges
correctly that *S* is *P*, therefore means to judge that
no *S* is *P*. Likewise, Brentano exploits the principle
that A-judgements contradict O-judgements when he says that
propositions of the A-form also express meta-judgements:



> 
> 
> If the O-form means the double-judgement "There is an *S*
> and it is not *P*", then the proposition "Every
> *S* is *P*," says that anyone who makes both of
> those judgements is judging falsely. (PES 298 [II 168; SVS 1,
> 416])
> 
> 
> 



In this way, Brentano again manages to satisfy the restriction on
negative properties. His earlier theory takes propositions of the
A-form to express simple existential judgement. Brentano now considers
that to be a mistake because it introduces the complex
*S*-that-is-not-*P*, which includes the negative part
"not-P". Again, the "not" here cannot be taken
as an indicator of the quality of the judgement, since one would then
deny the existence of an *S*-that-is *P*. With
propositions of the E-form this problem does not arise. In this case,
two interpretations are admissible, which makes "No *S*
is *P*" an ambiguous proposition: it either expresses the
simple negative existential judgement that no
*S*-that-is-*P* exists, or the higher-order judgement
that someone who accepts an *S*-that-is-*P* judges
incorrectly.



In sum, Brentano's theory of double-judgement shows why a
reduction of all categorical propositions to existential judgements is
 impossible.[33]
 On the other hand, there is no way for Brentano of reducing
existential propositions to propositions expressing double-judgements.
Brentano is therefore forced to abandon the project of giving a
uniform treatment of all judgements within the constraints of his
 theory.[34]