## 1. Key Terms and Distinctions


### 1.1 Nature Is A Feminist Issue



A feminist issue provides ways of understanding, eliminating, and
creating alternatives to the oppression of women. Minimally, nature
(used interchangeably in this essay with "the
environment") is a feminist issue because an understanding of
nature and environmental problems often helps one understand how and
why women's oppression is linked with the unjustified domination or
exploitation of nature. (The distinction between
"oppression" and "domination" is discussed
in Section 3.2.) For example, data show that
women--especially poor, rural women in less developed countries
(LDCs) who are heads of households--suffer disproportionate harms
caused by such environmental problems as deforestation, water
pollution, and environmental toxins. Knowing this helps one understand
how the lives and status of women are connected to contemporary
environmental problems. (Greta Gaard and Lori Gruen 2005). Such data
make deforestation, water pollution, and environmental toxins a
feminist issue. In fact, some have claimed that "nature is a
feminist issue" might be the informal slogan of feminist
environmental philosophy (Warren 2000).


### 1.2 Canonical Western Philosophy



As used throughout the essay, "canonical Western
philosophy" refers to the Western philosophical tradition
traceable to Ancient Greece. It includes the works by the philosophers
who are most commonly taught at the majority of colleges and
universities throughout the English speaking Western world. In this
tradition, there is a striking degree of agreement about the
"conceptual framework"--the basic beliefs, values,
attitudes, assumptions, and concepts--that define "the
canon". These include the following: (a) a commitment
to *rationalism,* the view that reason (or rationality) is not
only the hallmark of being human; it is what makes humans superior to
nonhuman animals and nature; (b) a conception of *humans* as
rational beings who are capable of abstract reasoning, entertaining
objective principles, and understanding or calculating the
consequences of actions; (c) conceptions of both the ideal moral agent
and the knower as *impartial*, *detached*
and *disinterested*; (d) a belief in
fundamental *dualisms*, such as reason versus emotion, mind
versus body, culture versus nature, absolutism versus relativism, and
objectivity versus subjectivity; (e) an assumption that there is
an *ontological divide* between humans and nonhuman animals and
nature; and (f) *universalizability* as a criterion for
assessing the truth of ethical and epistemological principles (see
Warren 2009).


Many of these key features of canonical Western philosophy are
challenged by positions in feminist environmental philosophy. When,
where and how this occurs is addressed throughout the essay.


### 1.3 Three Kinds of Positions in Feminist Environmental Philosophy



There are three distinct kinds of positions 
*within* feminist environmental
philosophy. They are: (1) positions whose historical beginnings
are located in non-feminist Western environmental philosophies; (2)
positions that were initially identified with
"ecofeminism" (or "ecological feminism")
generally, but, since the late 1980s and early 1990s, are more
accurately identified with
"ecofeminist *philosophy,*" specifically; and (3)
new or emerging "stand alone"
positions that offer novel or unique perspectives on
"women-nature connections" that are not identified with
either (1) or (2). Discussion of these three sorts of positions
constitutes the subject matter of Section 2.


## 2. First Kind of Position in Feminist Environmental Philosophy: One Historically Associated with a Non-Feminist Environmental Philosophy


Although environmental issues have been addressed by philosophers
since Ancient Greece, Western environmental philosophies did not take
shape until the early 1970s (e.g., Arne Naess 1973; John Passmore
1973). Increasingly, unsettling empirical data surfaced concerning
human mistreatment of nonhuman animals (e.g., factory farming), nature
(e.g., clear-cutting old growth forests), and destructive human-nature
relationships (e.g., human creation of unmanaged toxic landfills,
especially in communities of color). In addition, many canonical
assumptions were called into question, such as the view that humans
and culture are superior to nonhuman animals and nature. Western
environmental philosophies, both feminist and non-feminist, emerged
from such applied and theoretical concerns.


### 2.1 Western Environmental Philosophy


The historical beginnings of Western environmental philosophy are
in environmental ethics. Unlike canonical Western ethics, Western
*environmental* ethics (both feminist and non-feminist) is
predicated on the claim that humans have moral responsibilities (or
obligations) to nonhuman animals and/or nature, although they disagree
about the basis of these responsibilities. Some argue that the basis
is the intrinsic (or inherent) value of nonhuman animals and/or
nature, in contrast with the canonical view that they have merely
instrumental (or extrinsic) value. Some argue that there are
properties that nonhuman animals and/or nature have (such as,
sentiency, rights, or interests) by virtue of which they deserve moral
consideration in their own right (or, have moral standing). Despite
disagreements about the basis of these human responsibilities, Western
environmental philosophy asserts what canonical philosophy
denies-- that humans have moral responsibilities to nonhuman
animals and/or nature themselves, and not just to humans where
nonhuman animals and/or nature are concerned. As a kind of Western
environmental philosophy, feminist environmental philosophy supports
the claim that canonical Western philosophy does not generate
a *bona fide* environmental philosophy, since it fails to
recognize that humans have moral obligations (or responsibilities) to
nonhuman animals and/or nature themselves. (Throughout the remainder
of the essay, any reference to philosophy, environmental philosophy or
feminist environmental philosophy is to Western philosophy.)


### 2.2 Revised Environmental Philosophy: Feminist Perspectives on Animal Ethics


A "revised" environmental philosophy is one that uses
key concepts and theories of canonical philosophy,
but *extends* them to include nonhuman animals in the moral
community. It does so by granting moral status (or, moral standing) to
nonhuman animals. "Animal Ethics" is one such revised
position (see the entry on the
 moral status of animals).


Feminist animal ethicists oppose the same practices (e.g., factory
farming, vivisection, and hunting) that are opposed by the two
original non-feminist versions of animal ethics, Peter Singer's
utilitarian version (1975) and Tom Regan's right-based version
(1982). Singer opposes these practices because they cause unnecessary
pain and suffering to sentient beings. Regan opposes them because they
violate the rights to life of what he calls "subjects of a
life". But feminist animal ethics goes further by providing a
gendered perspective on such practices and on animal protection
generally (see feminist animal ethics of care discussed in Section 3.8).




How does it do this? There are six ways feminist animal ethics has
made distinct contributions to traditional, non-feminist positions in
animal ethics: (1) it emphasizes that canonical Western philosophy's
view of humans as rational agents, who are separate from and superior
to nature, fails to acknowledge that humans are also animals--even
if rational animals--and, as such, are a part of nature; (2) it
makes visible the interconnections among violence against women,
violence against nature, and pornography (see Adams 1990, 2004; Carol
Adams and Josephine Donovan 1995; Susan Griffin 1981; Pattrice Jones
2011); (3) it demonstrates the role played by language in creating,
maintaining, and perpetuating the interconnected exploitations of
women and animals (See Section 3.3); (4) it shows how bedrock dualisms
in canonical philosophy--such as culture versus nature and mind
versus body--have historically not been gender-neutral; they have
associated males/men with superior culture and mind, and both
females/women and animals with inferior nature and body (Gruen and
Kari Weil 2011); (5) it locates the exploitation of women and animals
in mutually reinforcing systems and practices of unjustified
domination, particularly sexism and speciesism (or, the prejudicial
discrimination against other beings based on their membership in
(allegedly) inferior nonhuman species) (Gaard 2011); and (6) it raises the
issue whether the absence of a gendered perspective in traditional
animal ethics makes those positions on the mistreatment of nonhuman
animals incomplete or inadequate (see Adams 1994; Adams and Donovan
1995; Gaard 1993; Gruen 1996; Slicer 1991).


### 2.3 Expanded Environmental Philosophy: Feminist Philosophical Perspectives on Leopold's Land Ethics


An "expanded" environmental philosophy is one that does
two things: it retains some of the key features of *revised*
environmental philosophy (e.g., consequentialist and rights-based
theories) while also introducing genuinely new features--ones
that had not yet been part of a moral theory. This essay considers
only one "expanded" environmental philosophy, Aldo
Leopold's "land ethic", published as an essay, "The
Land Ethic", in his 1949 book *The Sand County
Almanac*. Many environmental philosophers consider Leopold's land
ethic the first genuinely *environmental* ethic (not just an
"animal ethic"). It is discussed here because many
feminist environmental philosophers defend positions that draw on
Leopold's land ethic (e.g., Chris Cuomo 1998; Deane Curtin 1999;
Warren 2000).


Leopold's land ethic advances four key claims (stated here roughly
as Leopold stated them): (1) the moral community should include soils,
waters, plants, and animals, or, what Leopold calls, collectively,
"the land" (Leopold 1949 [1977]: 204); (2) the role
of *homo sapiens* should be changed from conqueror to plain
member of the land community (204); (3) we can be moral only in
relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, respect,
admire, or otherwise have faith in (214, 223, 225); and (4) "a
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends
otherwise" (224-225), what some regard as Leopold's
ultimate moral maxim.



Many environmental philosophers regard claim (4) as the moral maxim of
Leopold's land ethic; it claims that the rightness or wrongness of
actions is determined by reference to the consequences of those
actions--a familiar consequentialist ethical principle. However,
for Leopold, the relevant consequences are the "integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community". Since these
consequences are new to ethics, Leopold's land ethic expands ethics
into new territory--territory beyond even revised environmental
philosophy. The same is true for the other three claims,
(1)-(3): they introduce moral concepts that go beyond those made
by either canonical philosophy or revised environmental ethics (such
as animal ethics). It is this "going beyond" feature that
makes Leopold's land ethic an expanded ethic.




Many feminist environmental philosophers adopt key aspects of
Leopold's land ethic. For example, many defend a notion of the self as
a relational, ecological being who is a member of the larger biotic
(living, organic, ecological) community. Many agree that "moral
emotions", such as empathy and care, are important to any ethic,
including any environmental ethic (see, for example, Cuomo 2005;
Vrinda Dalmiya 2002; Mathews 1994b; Plumwood 1993; Warren 2000). In
addition, many feminist environmental philosophers acknowledge that
embryonic forms of a *gendered* environmental ethic can be
found in the opening lines of "The Land Ethic", where
Leopold wrote, "The girls [Odysseus's slave girls] were
property. The disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of
expediency, not of right and wrong" (Leopold 1949 [1977]:
201). Lastly, some feminist environmental philosophers endorse
Leopold's understanding of the interconnections between cultural
diversity and ecological (or "bio") diversity. Consider
why and how understanding these interconnections is important to
feminist environmental philosophy.





Leopold claimed that an ecological interpretation of history shows
that "the rich diversity of the world's cultures reflects a
corresponding diversity in the wilds that gave them birth" (1949
[1977]: 188). For example, Leopold wrote that cultural diversity is
"often based in wildlife. Thus the plains [sic] Indian not only
ate buffalo, but buffalo largely determined his architecture, dress,
language, arts, and religion" (1949 [1977]: 177). Cultural
diversity reflects ecological diversity. Assuming that the
preservation of the rich diversity of the world's
cultures--cultural diversity--is a good thing, then
understanding the connections between that and the preservation of
ecological (or "bio") diversity is also a good thing. The
converse is also true: ecological diversity reflects cultural
diversity. For example, many Western development projects in Asia and
Africa replace ecologically diverse (multispecies) indigenous
forests--forests that are managed by women and are integral to
maintaining subsistence (not money-based) economies--with
monoculture eucalyptus and teak plantations that are managed by men
and where trees are primarily a cash crop for export. Many feminist
environmental philosophers argue against these development projects;
the loss of ecological diversity (provided by indigenous forests)
directly and disproportionately harms women, subsistence economies,
and the cultural communities to which women belong. These examples
illustrate ways that Leopold's insightful awareness of the
interdependencies between cultural diversity and ecological (bio)
diversity informs a feminist environmental perspective on women-nature
connections (see also Sections
 3.5 and 3.6).


### 2.4 Radical Environmental Philosophy: Feminist Philosophical Perspectives on Deep Ecology



A "radical" environmental philosophy challenges
foundational assumptions and claims of canonical philosophy in the
context of environmental issues. These challenges are
"radical" in the etymological sense that they "go to
the roots" of environmental problems--typically, the
conceptual roots--and in the historical sense that they had never
before been part of a moral theory. (This description permits that
what was "radical" at one time may no longer be radical.)
One of the most influential radical positions is "deep
ecology". 




Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess coined the term "deep
ecology" to refer to the (deep) conceptual roots of the
environmental crisis (Naess 1973). Naess contrasted deep ecology with
"shallow ecology". Both are concerned, for example, with
resolving such "applied" environmental problems as air and
water pollution, use of natural resources, human overconsumption and
overpopulation. But, according to Naess, only deep ecology provides an
understanding of these issues in terms of false or problematic
underlying assumptions, concepts, beliefs and values of canonical
philosophy.




Historically, the emergence of ecofeminist philosophy was intimately
linked to deep ecology. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, that
link was contested; the so-called "deep ecology-ecofeminism
debate" that emerged took centerstage in discussions of environmental
philosophy (see Jim Cheney 1987; Cuomo 1994; Kheel 1990; Plumwood
1993; Salleh 1984; Warren 1999).


The ecofeminism-deep ecology debate focused on two features of
special significance to ecofeminist philosophy. The first is deep
ecology's criticism of canonical Western philosophy for its
*anthropocentric* (human-centered) thinking about human-nature
relationships. The second is the notion of the self that is described
by deep ecology's basic "principle of
self-realization". Both features are critiqued by Val Plumwood,
one of the pioneers of ecofeminist philosophy (Plumwood 1993). Her
critique is summarized here since it provides insight into some basic
claims of ecofeminist philosophy
(Section 3). 


According to deep ecology, canonical Western philosophy's
unacceptable anthropocentrism is rooted in several
problematic value dualisms, including
the "culture versus nature" dualism. Plumwood argues that
deep ecology's criticism of anthropocentrism fails to see that
canonical philosophy's *anthro*pocentrism has functioned
historically as *andro*pocentrism (male-centered thinking). She
claims that its failure to see this leads deep ecologists to make two
false assumptions--that one can disentangle anthropocentrism and
andropocentrism as distinct and separate ways of thinking, and that
one can critique the "culture versus nature" dualism
without providing a gendered analysis of how this dualism has
functioned historically to "justify" the dominations of
women and nature. (This criticism of the "culture versus
nature" dualism is discussed
throughout Section 3.)


The second problematic feature of deep ecology concerns the
principle of *self-realization*, which claims that the
human *s*elf (small 's') is actualized only when it
becomes merged with the cosmos, a *S*elf (capital
'S'). Plumwood argues that this principle is false because
it keeps intact "the discontinuity thesis"--the
thesis that there is a clear ontological divide between humans (or the
sphere of culture) and nature. Culture and nature are
"discontinuous" because humans are separate from and different
in kind from nature. For Plumwood, the discontinuity thesis is false
and any environmental philosophy that assumes it is conceptually
flawed. Plumwood argues that since deep ecology assumes, rather than
denies (as deep ecologists claim), the discontinuity thesis, deep
ecology is a conceptually flawed environmental philosophy.


How does deep ecology do this--presuppose a thesis that it
sets out to deny? Plumwood's answer is that the discontinuity thesis
is kept intact by deep ecology's commitment to three faulty
conceptions of the self. She calls them "the Indistinguishable
Self", "the Expanded Self", and "the
Transcendent Self" (Plumwood 1993).


The "Indistinguishable Self" rejects any and all
boundaries between humans and nature; humans are just one strand in a
greater biotic web. This conception of the self presumes what Plumwood
calls an "identity thesis:" the human self *is* an
ecological self. The problem with the identity thesis is that it
mistakenly solves the discontinuity problem by
obliterating *all* divisions between humans and nature. For just
this reason, Plumwood rejects the identity thesis and the notion of
the Indistinguishable Self. If the principle of self-realization is
about the Indistinguishable Self, the principle is false. In contrast,
Plumwood defends a conception of the self that makes
humans *both* continuous with and distinct from nature, both
individual selves (who are different from nature) and ecological
selves (who are a part of nature).


The "Expanded Self" distinguishes between the
particular, individual human *s*elf and an expanded, greater
"cosmic" *S*elf. Plumwood claims that whatever is
meant by a "cosmic Self" (it isn't clear), the Expanded
Self denies the importance of individuals *as*
individuals--as distinct human beings who have their own
particular attachments and are in various dependency relationships
(such as parent and child, care giver and the cared for) that are
unique to each self. Plumwood argues that, given that most of the
world's women lack many of the human rights, civil liberties, and
educational opportunities that men have (as individual selves), it is
far too early to abandon a notion of the human self as an individual
(a *s*elf) in favor of some nebulous, undifferentiated,
expanded, "cosmic" *S*elf. If the principle of
self-realization is about the Expanded Self, the principle is
false.


The "Transcendent Self" refers to the individual self
who overcomes its particularity to become a more self-aware,
transformed self. Plumwood claims that the Transcendent Self
presupposes a "triumph-over thesis"--the Transcendent
Self triumphs over highly particularistic attachments, emotions,
wants, and desires that individual selves have toward themselves and
each other. The Transcendent Self falsely rejects a view of selves
that Plumwood defends: human selves are emotionally interdependent,
ecological, relational beings whose actualization requires a rejection
of rationalism (the identification of humans with reason or
rationality) and mind-body dualism. Plumwood's conception of the self
is *not* a rejection of particularity and individuality; it is
a recognition that individual selves are also interdependent
beings-in-relationships, not Transcendent Selves who triumph over such
interdependencies and relationships. If the principle of
self-realization is about the Transcendent Self, the principle is
false.


## 3. Second Kind of Position in Feminist Environmental Philosophy: Ecofeminist Philosophy


We already have been introduced to ecofeminist philosophy in connection
with animal ethics (Section 2.2),
Leopold's Land Ethic 
(Section 2.3), and deep ecology
 (Section 2.4). This section explores
 the nature of ecofeminist philosophy
as a distinct kind of environmental philosophy.


### 3.1 Characterization of Ecofeminist Philosophy


French feminist Francoise d'Eaubonne coined the term
"*ecological feminisme*" in 1974 to call attention
to women's potential to bring about an ecological revolution.
Initially, "ecofeminism" referred generically to a wide
variety of "women-nature" connections, often based in
different disciplinary perspectives (such as History, Literary
Criticism, Political Science, Sociology, and Theology). This is
important because ecofeminism did not emerge as a
distinctly *philosophical* position until the late 1980s and
early- to mid 1990s.


For purposes of this essay, a general, common-denominator
characterization of "ecofeminist philosophy" is that it:
(1) explores the nature of the connections between the unjustified
dominations of women and nature; (2) critiques male-biased Western
canonical philosophical views (assumptions, concepts, claims,
distinctions, positions, theories) about women and nature; and (3)
creates alternatives and solutions to such male-biased views.


A note about terminology is relevant here. Many ecofeminist
philosophers distinguish between the *oppression* of women and
the (unjustified) *domination* of nature. They do so on the
grounds that only those beings that have such characteristics as
rationality, cognitive capacity, or sentiency can be oppressed. In
Western contexts, nonhuman natural entities such as rocks, plants,
rivers, or (generically) nature are presumed to not have any such
characteristics. As such, unlike women, they cannot be oppressed
(although they can be unjustly dominated). What about nonhuman
animals? Many ecofeminist philosophers include animals, especially
domesticated animals, among those beings that are capable of being
oppressed, but deny that nature has this capability. They talk about
the oppression of animals (but not of nature). For purposes of this
essay, the word "oppression" will not be applied to
nature; its applicability to animals will be left an open question.
Accordingly, for example, ecofeminist philosophical perspectives on
women-nature connections will not refer to "the oppression of
nature", "the twin oppressions of women and nature,"
or "the mutually reinforcing oppressions of women and
nature". However, they will refer to the unjustified dominations
of women, nonhuman animals, and nature.


### 3.2 Oppressive Conceptual Frameworks


A conceptual framework is a set of *basic* beliefs, values,
attitudes, and assumptions that shape and reflect how one sees oneself
and one's world (Warren 2000, 2005). Some conceptual frameworks
are *oppressive.* An oppressive conceptual framework is one
that functions to explain, maintain, and "justify"
institutions, relationships and practices of unjustified domination
and subordination. When an oppressive conceptual framework
is *patriarchal*, it functions to justify the subordination of
women by men.


Sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, and ethnocentrism are
examples of what Warren calls unjustified "isms of
domination" (1990, 2000). Warren argues that these isms of
domination share conceptual roots in five features of an oppressive
conceptual framework. The first feature is *value-hierarchical,
Up-Down thinking* that attributes greater value to that which is
"Up" than to that which is "Down". In
canonical philosophy, value hierarchical thinking (typically) puts men Up and
women Down, culture Up and nature Down. By attributing greater value
to that which is higher, the Up-Down organization of reality serves to
legitimate inequality "when, in fact, prior to the metaphor of
Up-Down, one would have said only that there existed diversity"
(Elizabeth Dodson Gray 1981: 20)




The second feature is *oppositional* (rather than
complementary) *and mutually exclusive* (rather than
inclusive) *value dualisms*, which place greater value (status,
prestige) on one disjunct over the other. In canonical Western
philosophy, the dualisms of male versus female and culture versus
nature have historically done this; they have ascribed greater value
to that which is identified with males or culture than to that which
is identified with females or nature. According to these value
dualisms, it is better to be male or culture-identified than to be
female or nature-identified.


The third and fourth features of oppressive conceptual frameworks
are that they conceive of *power* and *privilege* in
ways that systematically advantage the Ups over the Downs (whether or
not the Ups choose to exercise that power and privilege). In a
classist society, wealthy people have the power and privilege to
mobilize resources to self-determined ends. Sometimes this power and
privilege enables the wealthy to not notice the ways socioeconomic
status is a significant challenge to equality of opportunity. For
example, poor people may be viewed as inferior, and thereby
undeserving of the same opportunities or rights of the wealthy, often
on the grounds that their poverty is "their own
fault".


The fifth and philosophically most important feature of an
oppressive conceptual framework is the *"logic of
domination".* This is the moral premise that *superiority
justifies subordination*. The logic of domination provides the
(alleged) moral justification for keeping Downs down. Typically this
justification takes the form that the Up has some characteristic
(e.g., reason) that the Down lacks and by virtue of which the
subordination of the Down by the Up is justified.


Note that it is possible to have the first four features of an
oppressive conceptual framework yet *not* have a case of
oppression or unjustified domination. For example, responsible parents
may exercise legitimate power and privilege over their children (such
as the power to decide when to put their child to bed or have the
privilege to drive), without thereby being involved in any sort of
oppressive parent-child relationship. Parent-child relationships are
only oppressive if the logic of domination is in place; it is what
provides the (alleged) justification for treating children as inferior
and justifiably dominated.


Warren argues that the five features of an oppressive conceptual
framework spotlight some of the shared conceptual roots of the
unjustified dominations of women, nonhuman animals, and nature. Many
ecofeminist philosophers explore the ways these shared conceptual
roots function in real life to keep intact unjustified institutions
and practices of oppression and domination.


### 3.3 Linguistic Perspectives



Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that the language one uses mirrors and
reflects one's view of oneself and the world--one's conceptual
framework. According to ecofeminist philosophers, language plays a key
role in the formation of problematic concepts of women, animals, and
nature--concepts that reinforce the five features of an
oppressive conceptual framework and contribute to the
"justification" of the dominations of women, animals, and
nature. Consider some examples of how language does this.


The English language *animalizes* and *naturalizes*
women in cultural contexts where women and nonhuman animals are
already viewed as inferior to men and male-identified culture. Women
are referred to pejoratively as dogs, cats, catty, pussycats, pussies,
pets, bunnies, dumb bunnies, cows, sows, foxes, chicks, bitches,
beavers, old bats, old hens, old crows, queen bees, cheetahs, vixen,
serpents, bird-brains, hare-brains, elephants, and whales. Women
cackle, go to hen parties, henpeck their husbands, become old biddies
(old hens no longer sexually attractive or able to reproduce), and
social butterflies. Animalizing women in a sexist (or, patriarchal)
culture that views animals as inferior to "humans"
reinforces and attempts to legitimate women's alleged inferior
status to men (see Adams 1990; Joan Dunayer 1995; Warren 2000).
Similarly, the English language *feminizes* nature in cultural
contexts that view women and nature as inferior to men and
male-identified culture. Mother Nature (not Father Nature) is raped,
mastered, controlled, conquered, mined; her (not his) secrets are
penetrated, and her womb (men don't have one) is put into the service
of the man of science (not woman of science, or simply
scientist). Virgin timber is felled, cut down. Fertile (not potent)
soil is tilled, and land that lies fallow is useless or barren, like a
woman unable to conceive a child.


In these examples, the exploitations of nature and animals are
justified by *feminizing* (not masculinizing) them; the
exploitation of women is justified by *animalizing* (not
humanizing) and *naturalizing* (not "culturizing")
women. As Carol Adams argues (1990), language that feminizes nature
and naturalizes women describes, reflects, and perpetuates unjustified
patriarchal domination by failing to see the extent to which the
dominations of women, nonhuman animals, and nature are culturally (not
just metaphorically) analogous and sanctioned.


The point of these examples is not to claim that only females are
denigrated by use of animal or nature language. That would be
false. In the English language, animal terms also are used
pejoratively against men. For example, men are called wolves, sharks,
skunks, snakes, toads, jackasses, old buzzards, and goats. Nor is it
to claim that all uses of animal or nature language are
derogatory. That would also be false. In Western culture, it is
generally complimentary to describe someone as busy as a bee,
eagle-eyed, lion-hearted, or brave as a lion. Rather, the point is
that, *within patriarchal contexts*, the majority of animal and
nature terms used to describe women, and the majority of female terms
used to describe animals and nature, function differently from the
animal and nature terms used to describe men. Within a
patriarchal context, they function to devalue women, animals, and
nature in a way that reinforces the unjustified dominations of all three.



### 3.4 Historical Perspectives


Historical perspectives on the causes of the unjustified
dominations of women and nature are conflicting and inconclusive. One
of the earliest and most widely referenced is ecofeminist historian
Carolyn Merchant's perspective (Merchant 1980). Merchant argues that
the separation of culture from nature (or, the culture/nature dualism)
is a product of the scientific revolution. She describes two
conflicting images of nature: an older, Greek image of nature as
organic, benevolent, nurturing female, and a newer,
"modern" (1500-1800s) image of nature as inert, dead, and
mechanistic. Merchant argues that the historical shift from an organic
to a mechanistic model helped to justify the exploitation of the earth
by conceiving of it as inert matter. For example, mining was
prohibited in antiquity because it was thought to be "mining the
earth's womb"; early Greek metaphors of nature as alive and
"nurturing female" supported the view that mining was
wrong. According to Merchant, a conception of nature as inert matter
removed moral barriers to mining that were in place when nature was
conceived as organic, nurturing female. For many ecofeminist philosophers,
Merchant's historical perspective informs their analyses of the deep
conceptual roots of the unjustified dominations of women and nature.




### 3.5 Socioeconomic Perspectives


According to Marxist-informed "materialist
ecofeminism", socioeconomic conditions are central to the
interconnected dominations of women and nature (see Rosemary Hennessy
and Chrys Ingraham 1997; Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva 1993; Ariel
Salleh 1997). Mellor argues that while both men and women mediate
between culture and nature, they do not do so equally. She argues
against "capitalist patriarchy" by drawing on the Marxist
notions of the *means* of production, which includes the raw
materials, land and energy resources, and the *forces* of
production, which includes the factories, machinery, technology, and
accumulated skills of the workers. Mellor argues that the system of
predominantly male ownership of the *means* and *forces*
of production results in a male-biased allocation and distribution of
a society's economic resources that systematically disadvantages women
economically and exploits nature (Mellor 1997, 2000, 2005).


Socioeconomic conditions are also central to Vandana Shiva's
account of Western development as "systematic
underdevelopment" or "maldevelopment" (1988). Shiva
argues that this maldevelopment began with European colonization
throughout Asia and Africa; it resulted in the creation of cash-based
economies that were modeled after Europe. The colonizers replaced
native food crops and forests with such monoculture crops as
sunflowers, eucalyptus, and teak, which were cash crops created
primarily for export. In addition, the colonizers introduced a
gendered division of labor, where men were employed in cash-based
economic relationships with the colonizers and women were responsible
for all the household duties associated with (non-money based)
subsistence economies. By destroying subsistence economies,
maldevelopment projects created material poverty where, before, there had been
none. According to Shiva, it thereby contributed to the very real
"feminization of poverty", subordination of women, and
degradation of nature.


### 3.6 Epistemological Perspectives


Ecofeminist epistemology extends feminist epistemology's concerns
with ways that gender influences conceptions of knowledge, the knower,
and methods of inquiry and justification (see the entry on 
 feminist epistemology and philosophy of science).
 It does so by showing how these concerns involve women-nature
 connections.




Consider an example often discussed by ecofeminist philosophers. In 1974,
twenty-seven women of Reni in northern India took simple but effective
action to stop tree felling of indigenous forests. They threatened to
hug the trees if the lumberjacks attempted to cut them down. The
women's protest, known as "the Chipko Movement"
("chipko" in Hindi means "to embrace" or
"hug"), saved 12,000 square kilometers of sensitive
watershed. The Chipko movement also gave visibility to two main
complaints of local people: commercial felling by contractors damages
a wide variety of species of trees, and it replaces valuable,
multispecies indigenous forests with monoculture plantations of teak
and eucalyptus. This commercial felling also disproportionately
harmed women by: increasing the amount of time women spent collecting
firewood; reducing women's abilities to maintain household economies
that are dependent upon trees for food, fuel, fodder, and products for
the home; and, decreasing opportunities for women to make
income-generating wood products for sale at local markets (Louise
Fortmann and Diane Rocheleau 1985; Fortmann and John Bruce 1991).


The Chipko movement shows that often it is rural women (such as the
Chipko women), not the "outside" Western-trained forester,
who are the experts ("the knowers") on how to use
indigenous forests for multiple purposes (e.g., for food, fuel, fodder
for cattle, dyes, herbs, medicines, building materials, and household
utensils). Similarly, in Sierra Leone a study by feminist foresters
revealed that, on the average, local men could name only eight
different uses of local species of trees, while local women could name
thirty-two uses of the same species of trees. The epistemological
claim is that women of Sierra Leone have "indigenous technical
knowledge" (ITK) about forest uses and production *that is
based on* their daily, lived, gendered experiences in connection
with forest use and management (Sally Fairfax and Fortmann 1990:
267). Their knowledge is borne from their situated, gendered,
concrete, daily experiences as women.


An ecofeminist epistemology also shows that a *gendered
environmental* perspective is important to understanding
epistemological methods of inquiry and forms of justification
concerning women and nature. Consider orthodox Western forestry. Too
often it has assumed that activities that fall outside the realm of
commercial fiber production are less important than those that fall
inside that realm. Yet the latter are precisely the activities that
rural women in many parts of Africa and India engage in on a daily
basis. Failure to understand the importance of these activities often
makes women "invisible". This invisibility helps explains
why many orthodox, Western foresters




> 
> literally do not see trees that are used as hedgerows or living
> fence poles; trees that provide materials for basketry, dyes,
> medicines, or decorations; trees that provide sites for honey barrels;
> trees that provide fodder; trees that have religious significance;
> trees that provide shade; or trees that provide human food. 
> 
> 
> 
> Because many foresters literally do not see the enormous variety in
> the use of trees, they frequently do not see the vast number of
> species that are useful ... that men and women may have very
> different uses for the same tree or may use different trees for
> different purposes. (Fairfax and Fortmann 1990: 268-9)
> 
> 
> 


When Western foresters literally do not see these activities, they
also do not see different methods women have for using different trees
for different purposes. They do not see gendered environmental
knowledge that is based on what local women do and know best.


These examples and data challenge canonical conceptions of
knowledge as objective and of the knower as impartial, detached, and
gender-neutral. They also challenge traditional research
methodologies by encouraging researchers to situate themselves and
their research projects within specific historical, cultural, and
economic contexts. They also illustrate ways theory and practice are
interdependent: theory must "fit the facts" and "the
facts" (e.g., the empirical data) must inform the theory.


### 3.7 Political Perspectives


Feminist political philosophy critiques ways in which traditional
understandings of the political world, including the nature of the
public sphere, freedom, democracy, political speech, solidarity, and
participation, fail to adequately address feminist concerns (see entry
on 
 feminist political philosophy).
 Ecofeminist political philosophy tends to
expand these critiques to include ecologically informed visions for
conceptualizing politics, political analyses, and the nature of
democracy. 


During the 1980s, women's activism in a variety of social
movements--the environmental, peace, animal liberation, and
environmental justice movements--came together and a new form of
activism emerged, *ecofeminist* political activism. By the
1990s, this political activism had given rise to a diversity of
ecofeminisms: liberal, Marxist, socialist, radical,
cultural/spiritual, and social ecofeminisms. These different
ecofeminisms are mentioned here because each is grounded in a
different ecofeminist political perspective--liberalism, Marxism,
socialism, radical feminism, indigenous and spiritual politics,
anarchism, and social ecology. And each political perspective provides
a different answer to questions about the nature of ecofeminist
activism, green politics, and ecofeminism political philosophy.


Ariel Salleh, for example, claims that the basic premise of ecofeminist political
analysis is that the ecological crisis




> 
>  is the inevitable effect of a Eurocentric capitalist
> patriarchal culture built on the domination of nature, and domination
> of Woman 'as nature'. Or, to turn the...equation
> around the other way, it is the inevitable effect of a culture
> constructed on the domination of women, and the domination of Nature,
> 'as feminine'. (Salleh 1997: 12-13)
> 
> 


Catriona Sandilands' ecofeminist political perspective starts with




>  the premise that ecofeminism contains an inherently
> democratic vision...[that] needs to be located in the context of
> contemporary democratic theory. (Sandilands 1999: xvii)
> 
> 
> 



Sandilands argues that traditional understandings of democracy, the
public sphere, political speech, and coalition-building fail to
adequately address the need for an ecologically informed democratic
politics-- an "ecological democracy". For both Salleh
and Sandilands, ecofeminist political analysis is not "politics
as usual"; it is a gendered, ecologically informed perspective
that uses its understanding of the unjustified dominations of women,
animals and nature to reconceive notions of the public sphere,
democracy, citizenship, and free speech. 


Deane Curtin (1999) agrees that the environmental crisis is a
crisis of citizenship and of traditional democracy. Unlike the sense
of "democracy" that refers to culturally specific
institutions created by Western liberalism, a feminist informed
"ecological democracy" refers to a vision of democracy
that recognizes that we all live in both cultural and ecological
communities--in familiar, enduring, socially diverse
relationships to people and places, culture and nature. Ecological
communities are democratic when they are committed to reconciling
culture with nature in ways appropriate to what it is to be an
ecological citizen--one who exercises civic virtues that foster
the health of all humans and the planet (see also Katherine Pettus
1997; Sherilyn MacGregor 2004).


There is a very different sort of ecofeminist political philosophy
that is developing within Continental philosophy and phenomenology. It
advances views of nature as a subject with agency, subjectivity,
"voice", and the ability to enter into political dialogue
as co-interlocutor with humans. This approach to ecofeminist political
theory deserves to be acknowledged, though it is not discussed further
here (see Patricia Glazebrook 2001, 2008; Chaone Mallory 2008;
Sandilands 1999, 2002).


### 3.8 Ethical Perspectives


"Ecofeminist philosophical ethics" (henceforth,
"ecofeminist ethics") is the sub-field of ecofeminist
philosophy that has received the most scholarly attention. (It has
already been discussed in connection with animal ethics, Leopold's
land ethics, and deep ecology.) Ecofeminist ethics is a kind of
feminist ethics. As such, it involves a twofold commitment to critique
male bias in ethics wherever it occurs and to develop ethics that are
not male-biased. As a feminist ethic, it also involves articulation of
values (e.g., values of care, empathy, and friendship) often lost or
underplayed in mainstream Western ethics. What makes its critiques of
traditional ethical theories "ecofeminist" is that they
focus on women-nature connections.


There is not one definition of ecofeminist ethics. However, there
are some themes that run through ecofeminist ethics. These themes are
about the nature of ecofeminist ethics generally, not about any particular
ecofeminist ethic.


One theme is that ecofeminist ethics is a critique and elimination
of time-honored, mutually exclusive value dualisms, especially the
culture versus nature dualism. As Plumwood argues
(Section 2.4), a rejection of the
culture-nature dualism has implications for an ecofeminist conception
of the self: humans are both individual selves that are distinct from
nature and ecological selves that are continuous with nature (see also
Mathews 1994b; Cuomo 2005).


A related second theme is that ecofeminist ontologies take selves
to be




>  fundamentally relational, and therefore deeply social,
> historical, and ecological, without losing sight of the great ethical
> and political significance of individual experience, intentions and
> volitions. (Cuomo 2005: 203)
> 
> 
> 



As Chris Cuomo argues, if one begins with the awareness that
relational selves are interdependent selves, then "the stage is
set to discuss the relationships between selves and others, and
between community and individuality, without replicating inaccurate
ideas about humans " (2005: 203). Inaccurate views include those
based only on positing human identity in terms of individual
interests, autonomy, and separation from nature. Caring for oneself,
for example, will involve more than protection of individual rights
and liberties; it will also involve protection of the ecological
well-being of others (including nature) with whom we are in
relationship. For ecofeminist ethicists, *relationships
themselves,* and not just the moral status of
the *relators* in those relationships, have moral value and are
subject to moral critique. This means that *how* humans are in
relationship to others (including nature) matters morally.


A third theme is that ecofeminist ethics is (or at least aims to
be) both inclusive and contextual: it views ethical discourse and
practice as emerging from a diversity of "narratives" or
"voices" (especially women's voices) of beings located in
different historical and cultural circumstances. This contrasts with a
view of ethical theory and discourse as imposed on situations as a
derivation from some predetermined abstract rule or principle. The
contextual inclusivity of ecofeminist ethics involves a shift in
ethics from a monist focus on absolute ethical rules, principles,
rights, and duties to a pluralist focus on a variety of values, rules,
and principles in ethics, ethical decision-making, and ethical
conduct.


A fourth theme is that ecofeminist ethics makes no attempt to
provide an "objective" moral point of view, since it
assumes that, in contemporary culture, there really is no such point
of view. As such, it does not claim to be "unbiased" in
the sense of gender-neutral. But it does assume that the gender bias
it has is a better bias than those of other environmental ethics that
do not recognize or include in their ethical theories anything about
the varieties of women-nature connections that have been described in
this essay.


These themes provide a general characterization of ecofeminist
ethics. Consider now three kinds of positions in ecofeminist ethics
that have not yet been addressed: care-focused ethics, environmental
virtue ethics, and environmental justice ethics. Of these, the most
widely defended positions in ecofeminist ethics are care-focused ethics
(see, for example, Adams and Donovan 2008; Gruen
2011; Kheel 2007; Warren
2000).


Ecofeminist care-focused ethics hails back to the work of Carol
Gilligan (1982); it often
revolves around "the justice versus care debate" (see
the section on care-focused approaches in the entry on
 feminist ethics).
 That debate was about two
different perspectives: the "justice perspective" of
canonical ethics, which emphasized individual rights and duties and
appealed to universalizable rules (or principles), ascertainable through
reason, for a morally assessment of human conduct; and the "care
perspective", which emphasizes such values as care and empathy
that are neither reducible to individual rights or duties nor
ascertained through appeal to ahistorical rules or principles.


As ecofeminist care-focused ethics matured, it included a defense
of care and empathy as "moral emotions" that are necessary
to ethics, ethical-decision making, and ethical conduct. It drew on
the emerging body of research on "emotional
intelligence"--a form of intelligence that is different
from but connected to reason or "rational
intelligence"--by cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists,
and neurosurgeons (e.g., Daniel Goleman 1995). According to this
research, "The intellect (rational mind) simply cannot work
effectively without emotional intelligence" (Goleman 1995:
28). What we do and ought to do in life is determined by both. This
research provides scientific evidence that those who are unable to
empathize or care (e.g., because of damage to the part of the
brain--the amygdala--where care and empathy reside) do not
simply engage in bad ethical reasoning; they do not engage in ethical
reasoning at all.


This research on emotional intelligence validated the care-focused
nature of ecofeminist ethics (see Warren 2000). It affirmed, on
scientific grounds, that the ability to care and empathize is
necessary for ethical reasoning or practice; a failure to care about
others (for example, to care about animal suffering or destruction of
the planet) is a moral wrong. Humans are beings who can and must learn
to care about the health or well being of others, including animals
and nature.


A second kind of ecofeminist ethic is a version of environmental
virtue ethics. Ecofeminist virtue ethics asks what a morally good or
virtuous person would do, and which character traits, attitudes or
dispositions a virtuous person would exhibit, in order to predispose
the nonhuman natural environment to survive and "flourish"
in a healthy way. Chris Cuomo (1998) defends a virtue-based
"ethic of flourishing". She argues that humans ought to
act in ways that nurture and enhance the health and well being (or
"flourishing") of individuals, species, and communities,
including ecological communities.


A third kind of ecofeminist ethic is environmental justice-focused
ethics. This kind of ethic appeals to (mainly) distributive models of
social justice to show why, for example, the disproportionate
distribution of environmental harms to women and children
(particularly poor women of color who are single heads of households
with children under the age of eighteen) constitutes a social and
environmental injustice. They focus on ways these harms are caused by
such environmental problems as unsanitary water, the location of
hazard waste sites, and environmental toxins (Gaard and Gruen 2005;
Warren 2000).



## 4. Third Kind of Position in Feminist Environmental Philosophy: New or Emerging Positions and Perspectives



The scholarship in feminist environmental philosophy is expanding in a
variety of novel ways. This expansion reveals a wide diversity in
range of topics and theoretical perspectives beyond those discussed
in this essay. Their mention here is intended mainly to identify and highlight
some additional, and in some cases surprising, ways that feminist
environmental philosophy is continuing to expand and unfold.


Some theoretical perspectives within feminist environmental
philosophy (not mentioned before in this essay) that are emerging are:


* ecofeminism as embodied materialism (Mellor 2005)
* ecofeminist phenomenology (Glazebrook 2008)
* ecofeminist pragmatism (Mary Jo Deegan and Christopher Podeschi 2001)
* ecofeminist process philosophy (Christ 2006)
* queer ecofeminism (Gaard 1998; Wendy Lynn Lee and Laura Dow 2001; Sandilands 1997;
Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson 2010)



The diversity of topics or areas of research for which an ecofeminist
(or, feminist environmental) philosophical perspective is provided
include the following:


* business (Chris Crittenden 2000)
* children and educational systems (Ruthanne Kurth-Schai 1997)
* cities and the urban environment (Catherine Gardner 1999)
* cloning and homophobia (Victoria Davion 2006)
* death (Ophelia Selam 2006)
* the digital environment (Julia Romberger 2004)
* ecology (Warren 1987, 2000; Warren and Jim Cheney 1991)
* environmental jurisprudence (Mallory 1999)
* environmentally related consumption (Susan Dobscha 1993)
* globalization (Heather Eaton 2000)
* marketing (Pierre McDonagh and Andrea Prothero 1997)
* rhetoric (Daniel Vakoch 2011)
* sustainability and eco-sufficiency (Salleh 2009)
* teaching literacy (Donald McAndrew 1996)
* wheelchairs and disability (Alison Kafer 2005)
* work and leisure (Karen Fox 1997, Sessions 1997)



The evolving scholarship also provides unique feminist environmental
philosophical perspectives on many historical figures:


* Theodor Adorno (D. Bruce Martin 2006 )
* Alfred North Whitehead (Carol Christ 2006)
* Charlotte Perkins Gilman (Deegan and Podeschi 2001)
* Immanuel Kant (Wendy Wilson 1997)
* Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wendy Lee-Lampshire 1996, 1997)
* Martin Heidegger (Glazebrook 2001)
* Mary Wollstonecraft (Sylvia Bowerbank 2003; Karen Green
 1994)
* Sigmund Freud (Green 1994)



This sampling of new or evolving perspectives in feminist environmental
philosophy illustrates that feminist environmental philosophy is an
expanding field of scholarship--one rich with possibilities of
new ways of thinking about women, animals, and nature.