## 1. Life and Works



Johannes Sharpe (Scharp, Scharpe) was from the diocese of Munster
in Westphalia, where he was born presumably around 1360. He received
his Bachelor of Arts from the University of Prague in 1379, but spent
the greatest part of his academic life in Oxford, where he was fellow
at Queen's College from 1391 to 1403, and where he became a
Master of Arts and a Doctor of Theology. In 1415 he was *lector
ordinarius* in Luneburg (Saxony) (see Conti 1990, p. xvii).
The date of his death is unknown.



He established a reputation as a philosopher and a theologian. The
number of extant manuscripts of his works and their widespread
distribution attest to his importance and notoriety throughout the
15th century. The following writings are attributed to
him:


* a treatise on universals (*Quaestio super universalia*
[*QsU*] - his only edited work);
* a commentary by questions on Aristotle's *On the
Soul* (*Quaestio super libros De anima* [*In De
anima*] - 8 mss.; all references are to the ms. Oxford, New
College 238);
* a commentary by questions on Aristotle's *On Physics*
(*Quaestio super libros Physicorum* - 7 mss.);
* a treatise on the properties of being (*De passionibus
entis* - 3 mss.);
* a treatise on formalities (*De formalitatibus* - one
ms. only);
* an abbreviation of Duns Scotus' *Quodlibeta* (6
mss.);
* a group of six short treatises on theological subjects (one ms.
only).


## 2. The Oxford Realists



Realism and nominalism were the two major theoretical alternatives in
the later Middle Ages concerning the reality and kinds of general
objects, and the status and mutual relationships of the basic items of
the world (individual and universal substances, individual and
universal accidents) as well as their connection to language. Realists
believed in the extra-mental existence of common natures (or
essences); nominalists did not. Realists held that Aristotle's
table of categories was first of all a partition of things grounded on
ontological criteria and only secondarily a classification of (mental,
written, and spoken) terms, and therefore that the world is divided
into ten kinds of things (in a broad sense of 'thing'),
not one of which can be reduced to any other. Nominalists maintained
that the division into ten categories was a partition of terms on the
basis of semantic criteria, and that there are only two or three real
categories (substance and quality, and perhaps quantity too). Realists
believed that thought was linguistically constrained by its own
nature, and accordingly they considered thought to be related to
reality in its elements and constitution, and deemed language,
thought, and external reality to be of the same logical coherence.
Nominalists sharply distinguished between things as they exist in the
external world and the various forms by means of which we think-of and
talk-about them, since for them our (mental, spoken, and written)
language does not reproduce the world, but merely regards it, as our
(mental, spoken, and written) language and the world are logically
independent systems.



In the third decade of the fourteenth century, Ockham argued that the
common realist account of the relationship between universals and
individuals was inconsistent with the standard definition of real
identity, according to which two items a and b are identical if and
only if for all *x*, *x* is predicated of *a* if
and only *x* is predicated of *b*. If universals are
something existing in the world, really identical with their
individuals considered as instances of a given type (e.g., the
universal man *qua* man is identical with Socrates), but
different considered as properly universals and individuals (e.g., man
*qua* universal is different from Socrates considered qua
individual), then whatever is predicated of the individuals must be
predicated of their universals too, and so a unique general object
(say, the human nature) would possess contrary attributes
simultaneously via the attributes of different individuals.
Furthermore, a same thing would be in different places at the same
time, since, for example, the universal-man (*homo universalis*)
would be present at the same time in this man here (in Rome) and in
that man there (in Oxford) (cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 8.1, in *Opera
philosophica*, vol. 2, p. 166; and *Summa logicae*, p. I,
cap. 15, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, p. 51).



Later medieval Realists were persuaded that Ockham's criticism
was sufficient to show that the traditional realist account of the
relation between universals and particulars was unacceptable, but not
that realism as a whole was untenable. Thus, they tried to remove the
unclear and aporetic points stressed by Ockham by two fundamental
strategies: (1) the real distinction between universals and
individuals; (2) new notions of identity and distinction. The first
strategy is that of Walter Burley, who in his later years (after 1324)
many times claimed that universals fully exist outside the mind and
are really distinct from the individuals in which they are present and
of which they are predicated, so moving toward a sort of Platonism.
The second strategy was that most commonly developed in the later
Middle Ages all over the Europe. There were two main lines of this
strategy. The first was that of some Italian Dominican masters, such
as Francis of Prato and Stephen of Rieti in the 1340s, who worked out
new definitions for identity and distinction that were inspired by
Hervaeus Natalis's notion of conformity (see Amerini 2005). The
second approach was that of the most important school of later
medieval realists: the so-called "Oxford Realists,"
started by John Wyclif. Besides Wyclif himself, this school includes
the Englishmen Robert Alyngton, William Milverley, William Penbygull,
Roger Whelpdale, and John Tarteys, as Johannes Sharpe (or Scharpe) and
Paul of Venice. According to the Oxford Realists, universals and
individuals are really identical but formally distinct. In addition,
they claimed that (1) the two notions of formal difference and real
identity are logically compatible; (2) predication is a real relation
between things; and (3) the ten Aristotelian categories are ten really
distinct kinds of things (res in the strict sense of the term).


## 3. The *Quaestio super universalia*: structure of the work



Sharpe's *Quaestio super universalia* aspires to be a
veritable *summa* of the discussion on universals and related
topics that developed during the 14th century. This explains its size
and the particular arrangement of its subject matter. The work can be
divided into five main parts.


The first part (pp. 3-24) lists
twenty-one arguments in support of the nominalist thesis that the
existence of universals in re should not be postulated. These
arguments are disparate and not systematically arranged. Thirteen of
them can also be found in treatises on universals by other
fourteenth-century realist authors, specifically in the treatises by
Burley, Penbygull and Whelpdale. Eight, however, do not seem to be
found in other authors, and therefore they can be considered original.


In the second part (pp. 24-49) twenty arguments in favour of the
realist thesis are presented. From the very beginning of this section
Sharpe declares his adherence to the realist thesis with regard to
universals. Five of the arguments in this section seem to come from
the prologue of Walter Burley's commentary on *Physics*,
where universals are discussed (cf. Burley, *Expositio in libros
octo Physicorum Aristotelis*, *prologus*, Venice 1501,
fols. 8vb-9ra) and one from Burley's treatise on universals.
Sharpe, however, freely reworks this material and often enriches it
with long deductive chains, with which he attempts to prove the two
premises of the main syllogism and/or show the correctness of the
*consequentia*. Two other arguments seem to be inspired by similar
arguments of Scotus (*Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1-4 n.
398: ed. Vat., II, pp. 354 ff.), taken up and refuted by Ockham in his
*Summa logicae* (p. I, c. 17: *O.Ph*., I, pp. 57 and
59). In the remaining twelve arguments, however, Sharpe probably uses
more recent material, as the points of contact with Penbygull's
*De universalibus* and Alyngton's commentary on the
*Categories* show.


The third part (pp. 49-68) serves as an
introduction to the detailed and reasoned solution of the problem that
Sharpe proposes in the following section. With the exception of the
opening pages (49-50), which are devoted to the identification of the
entities designated by the term 'universal' (see SS 5
below), this part consists of an examination of eight opinions on the
problem of universals. Most of them are anonymous. Sharpe does not
appear to be interested in criticising this or that particular author,
but rather in giving an overview of the most important doctrines that
have developed on universals since the middle of the 13th century, and
thus providing a background against which to situate and characterise
his own position. A further confirmation of this attitude is given by
the order in which the eight opinions are presented, which
is not a chronological but a systematic order. The first opinion (pp.
50-51) - anonymous - is that of Buridan (or of his school). According
to Sharpe, this opinion adopts the thesis of the denial of the
existence of universals *in rerum natura* and that of the rejection of simple supposition, even in the anomalous formulation given by
Ockham. The second opinion (p. 52), also anonymous, but qualified as
very famous, is Ockham's: universals are signs of things that
are naturally produced in our intellect and referring to several
individuals at once. The third opinion (p. 55), according to which
universals only have *esse obiectivum* in the soul, is that of
Aureol, as Sharpe himself declares. The fourth (p. 58) is that of the
moderate realism of the 13th century. According to this view, universal
forms exist outside the soul, but only in potency in individuals, and
become actually universal by the intervention of our intellect, by means
of the process of abstraction. Sharpe attributes its authorship to
Averroes and lists Albert the Great and Giles of Rome as its most
famous proponents. The fifth opinion (p. 60) is that of Plato, in the
traditional formulation given in the Middle Ages: universals exist in things or *ex
parte rei*, and are incorruptible forms completely separate from and
independent of their singulars. The sixth (p. 62), anonymous, could
be the opinion of Scotus or a Scotist. If it is indeed Scotus, it
should be noted that Sharpe does not characterise his position in its
generality, but only captures some particular aspects. He reports
that, according to the proponents of this view, universals exist
*ex parte rei* and are those forms, signified by the abstract
terms of language (such as 'humanity'), that constitute
the very essences of singulars. The seventh opinion (p. 63),
anonymous, is Burley's: universals are the essential forms
present in the singulars, from which, however, they are really
distinct. The eighth opinion (pp. 65-66), also anonymous, is that of
Wyclif, for whom universals (1) exist *extra animam* and in act
in individuals, with whom they are really (*realiter*)
identical and formally (*formaliter vel secundum rationem*)
distinct, and (2) can be signified by concrete terms, such as
'*homo*' ('human being'), by abstract
ones, such as '*humanitas*'
('humanity'), by compound expressions, such as
'*homo communis*' ('universal-man') or
'*species humana*' ('human species'),
and by infinitive expressions such as '*hominem
esse*' ('being a man').


In the fourth part of
the work (pp. 68-84), Sharpe sets out in detail his theory of
universals. He begins by stating that he admits the existence of
universals both *in meant* and *extra mentem*. The following are mental
universals: first and second intentions, and the acts of cognition
(*intellectiones*) themselves. Extramental universals are the
written and spoken terms and the universal forms existing in things. After
discussing this assertion and presenting some possible objections
with answers to them, Sharpe puts forward three conclusions, which he
discusses in the same way as the previous general thesis. The three
conclusions are: (1) the transcendentals (i.e.
*ens*, *aliquid*, *res*, etc.) are common to each
existent, but are not properly universals (pp. 74-80); (2) the
universal forms are of five different kinds: genera, species,
differences, *propria* and accidents, according to the
different ways in which the singular substances participate in them
(pp. 81-82); (3) there are no real universals that correspond to
accidental concrete terms, such as '*album*'
('white'), '*dulce*'
('sweet'), etc. (pp. 83-84).


In the fifth, final, and most
extensive part (pp. 85-145), Sharpe offers a point-by-point rebuttal of the twenty-one
arguments initially presented in support of the nominalist thesis and
introduces several other interesting features of his theory of
universals and meaning, on which we shall focus in the following
paragraphs.


The *Quaestio super universalia* is, therefore, a
well-structured and original work in its basic approach and in many of
the theses it supports, since Sharpe, unlike other realist authors
of the second half of the 14th century, tackles the problem of
universals from a purely semantic point of view. This attitude leads
him to place the question of universals in the wider context of the
problem of meaning and to treat it in relation to the latter. Hence,
he frequently rejects as worthless certain solutions typical of the
realism of the period. In other ways, however, the *Quaestio*
is also a 'school' product, as it represents one of the
most interesting results of the process of revision of the principles
and theses of realism by their most open-minded and intelligent
supporters - a process of revision begun in the early years of
the 14th century due to Ockham's devastating criticisms of
traditional realist strategies. There are also evident similarities
between Sharpe's doctrine and those of Alyngton, Whelpdale,
Penbygull, Milverley, and Tarteys, with whom he shares a certain
dependence on Wyclif, whose theory of universals and predication
appears to be the main point of reference for the metaphysics of these
thinkers. However, for Sharpe, unlike other Oxonian thinkers who were his
contemporaries, Wyclif's *Tractatus de
universalibus* and, in general, his writings on logic and
metaphysics, are a point of reference in theory only - this despite the fact that he is clearly familiar with Wyclif, discussing and criticizing his views elsewhere. Although many of the
arguments he lists *quod sic*  and *quod non* are to be
found in other 14th and early 15th century authors (though in linguistically quite different forms), we have no positive evidence
that Sharpe had their works in front of him when he wrote his
*Quaestio super universalia*. It seems rather that he draws on
a whole repertoire of arguments, examples, questions, and opinions on
universals that were in general circulation at Oxford during the
time and which appears to have been largely drawn from the works of
the most famous English masters of the 14th century: Scotus, Ockham,
Burley, and Wyclif himself.


## 4. The Theory of Meaning



The basic idea of the standard medieval realist theories of meaning
was that semantic classifications derive from ontological differences
among the signified objects. So, according to this approach, the
simple expressions of our language (i.e., names) are distinct from the
complex expressions (i.e., sentences) by virtue of their own
*significata*, that is by virtue of the different kinds of
objects they make known. In fact, the objects signified by complex
expressions are compounds of (at least) two of the objects signified
by simple expressions and a relation of identity (or non-identity, in
the case of a true negative sentence), while a simple object is an
item in a category (i.e., either a singular substance, or a
substantial form, or an accidental form). Furthermore, every simple
expression of our language is like a label naming just *one*
object in the world, but whereas proper names and singular expressions
label individuals (i.e., token-objects), general terms label common
natures (i.e., type-objects), which are the main metaphysical
constituents of the set of individuals instantiating them. For
instance, the general expression 'man' labels and can
stand for each and every man only because of its primarily signifying
the universal form of humanity *qua* being present in each and
every man as the main constitutive principle of his essence.



Sharpe rejects the standard realist criteria for the generality (or
universality, according to his terminology) of terms, and
substantially accepts the sense of nominalist criticisms. In his
opinion, to be matched by a common nature really existing in the world
is no longer the necessary and sufficient condition for being a
general term. Rather, signifying universally (that is, signifying a
unitary concept that in turn refers to a multiplicity of things
displaying at least a similar mode of being [*QsU*, pp.
129-30]) is a condition for semantic universality of equal
importance. He thinks that those terms which signify universally have
to be viewed as common, as well as those signifying a common nature
existing outside the intellect (*ibid.*, p. 69). Thus,
according to Sharpe, there are six different kinds of general
expressions, both spoken and written:


1. those that universally signify a common nature really existing in
the world (*in re*), like the term 'humanity';
2. those that universally connote a common nature really existing in
the world, without directly signifying it, like the term
'white' ('*album*'), which refers to
white things and connotes the form of whiteness;
3. those that do not refer to anything really existing in the world,
but are somehow correlated with a universal concept, like the terms
'void' and 'chimaera';
4. those to which no common nature really existing in the world
corresponds, but rather a common transcategorial negative concept,
under which a multiplicity of things can be collected, like the term
'individual' (the negative concept involved here is the
concept of *incommunicabilitas*, or
impossibility-of-being-common, which characterizes individuals);
5. equivocal terms as such, since they are connected with a
multiplicity of different notions;
6. demonstrative pronouns, like 'this (one)'
('*hoc*'), when used to supposit for (refer to) a
common nature, even though they can signify in a singular manner
(*discrete*) only (*ibid.*, pp. 69-71).



As is evident, Sharpe's analysis of the types of universality
for linguistic terms is based on two distinct but compatible criteria:
(i) the existence of a common nature directly or indirectly signified
by them, and (ii) the universal mode of signifying - the latter
being more important than the former. Thus, based on the satisfaction
of these two criteria, Sharpe himself reduces the preceding division
of the kinds of universality to a threefold partition: (i) terms that
signify in a universal mode a common nature existing *in re*
and which are thus properly common, such as
'*homo*'; (ii) terms that signify in a universal
mode but do not refer to any common nature *in re* and which
are thus common in a less proper way, such as
'*chimaera*' and '*persona*';
finally, (iii) terms that do not signify in a universal mode and which
are thus common in an improper way whenever they refer to a common
nature existing *in re* , such as '*hoc*'
and other demonstrative pronouns (*QsU*, p. 71).



In turn, mental concepts are common in four ways only, corresponding
to the first four ways of universality peculiar to spoken (and
written) terms, since there are no universal concepts that correspond
to demonstrative pronouns or equivocal terms as such
(*ibidem*).



The fourth kind of general term deserves particular attention, since
it is connected with Sharpe's solution to the question of the
semantic and ontological status of terms of second intention like
'individual' or 'singular. This was a highly
controversial question in Oxford at the end of the 14th
century. The most common explanation was that proposed by Robert
Alyngton, a fellow of Queen's College in the 1380s. According to
Alyngton, terms like 'individual' have to be considered
singular expressions; more precisely they are
"range-narrowed" expressions, like 'this man',
because they identify a singular referent as a member of a given set
of individuals. In fact, a term like 'individual'
presupposes a general concept (that of being), the range of which is
narrowed to a unique object among beings by an act of our intellect
- to one object that is not common. Sharpe, however, argues that
Alyngton's answer goes against linguistic usage as well as an
established fact: if Alyngton were right, then the following argument
(which everybody will admit) would be formally incorrect:



> 
> 
> 
> |  |  |
> | --- | --- |
> | man runs  | (*homo currit*) |
> | and not the universal-man  | (*et non homo communis*) |
> | therefore, an individual man runs  | (*ergo homo singularis currit*) |
> 
> 
> 



just like this one:



> 
> 
> 
> |  |  |
> | --- | --- |
> | man runs  | (*homo currit*) |
> | and not the universal-man  | (*et non homo communis*) |
> | therefore, Socrates runs  | (*ergo Sortes currit*), |
> 
> 
> 



since the syntagm 'an individual man' ('*homo
singularis*') would be a singular term standing precisely
for one individual, e.g., 'Socrates'
('*Sortes*'). Furthermore, it is a fact that anyone
can understand the sentence 'an individual man runs' even
without knowing the identity of the man who is running - which
is required according to Alyngton's theory. Therefore, Sharpe
regarded second intentions of this kind as common ones
(*ibid*., pp. 132-33).



In this way, Sharpe admits that the nominalist explanation of the
universality of signs holds in the particular context of second
intentions, implicitly rejecting Alyngton's reduction of
epistemology to ontology, since according to Sharpe's account
the former has its own range and rules partially independent of the
latter. Furthermore, he restores the semantic rank that intuitively
would be assigned to the 'individual'-like terms
(something Alyngton was unable to do). On the other hand, his defence
of realism on the problem of universals is partially invalidated by
his qualified acceptance of the nominalist principle of the autonomy
of thought in relation to the world. In fact, it is evident that from
a semantic and/or epistemological point of view, he can no longer
justify the extra-mental reality of universals.



Like Burley, Sharpe's semantics lists a third kind of expression
between simple and complex expressions: concrete accidental terms
(like 'white' or 'father'), whose
*significata* are neither simple nor complex objects but
something in between. He affirms that concrete accidental terms do not
signify simple objects but aggregates composed of a substance and an
accidental form. Such aggregates are lacking in numerical unity, and
hence do not fall into any of the ten categories, because they are not
properly beings (*entia*). For that reason concrete accidental
terms, although simple expressions from a merely grammatical point of
view, are not names. The two metaphysical components of such
aggregates (i.e., substance and accidental form) are related to the
concrete accidental term as follows: although the concrete accidental
term connotes the accidental form, this is not its direct
*significatum,* so that the concrete accidental term can
supposit for the substance only. In other words, the concrete
accidental terms label substances by means of the accidental forms
from which they draw their names, so that they name substances only
*qua* bearers (*subiecta*) of a form. This fact accounts
for the difference between general names in the category of substance
(like 'man') and concrete accidental terms. General names
in the category of substance are concrete terms as well, but the form
they primarily signify is really identical with the substances they
label. Therefore, in this case, the name itself of the form can be
used as a name of the substance. This obviously implies a slight
difference in meaning between abstract and concrete substantial terms,
such as 'humanity' ('*humanitas*') and
'man' ('*homo*'). While
'humanity' is not the name of the form considered in its
totality, but rather the name only of the essential principle of the
form, that is, of the intensional content carried by the term
'man', this latter term signifies the substantial form
considered as a constitutive element of the reality (*esse*) of
a certain set of individual substances that instantiate it. As a
consequence, according to Sharpe, 'man is humanity'
('*homo est humanitas*') is a well formed and true
sentence, since both subject and predicate signify the same entity,
but 'white is whiteness' ('*album est
albedo*') is not, since 'white' does not
directly signify the accidental form, but only the substrate in which
it inheres, as bearer of that form, and therefore 'white'
cannot stand for such a form in any sentence (*ibid*., pp.
71-73).


## 5. Universals and Predication



The core of Sharpe's metaphysics lies in his theory of
universals. He is a realist, since he defends the extra-mental
existence of universals (*ibid*., p. 68), but he is open to
nominalism, as he thinks that there is not a close correspondence
between the elements and structures of language and elements and
structures of the world. His approach to the whole matter can be
defined as "analytical," since he seems to believe that
(i) any ontology has to be built up in relation to the resolution of
semantic problems, (ii) any philosophical explanation of reality has
to be preceded by a semantic explanation of the function of our
language.



Sharpe wrote the most interesting treatise on universals of the late
Middle Ages other than those of Wyclif and Paul of Venice, arguing
about logic and metaphysics, explaining his positions on being and
essence, universals, singulars, predication, identity and distinction,
and truth and falsity. His tract is very similar to that of Paul of
Venice with regard to many metaphysical theses supported, the
structure of the work, the textual material utilized, and the opinions
discussed. In his *Quaestio super universalia* Sharpe lists
eight opinions on universals (Buridan, Ockham, Auriol, Albert the
Great and Giles of Rome, Plato, Duns Scotus, Burley, and Wyclif) and
so does Paul of Venice in his *Quaestio de universalibus*
(Ockham, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, Auriol, Burley, Wyclif,
Plato, and two other unidentified realist authors). Yet, there are
some noteworthy doctrinal differences between them and the other
Oxford realists, which testify to Sharpe's (and Paul of
Venice's) independence of thought.



The starting point of Sharpe's theory of universals and
predication (as well as identity and distinction) is the theory worked
out by Wyclif and some of his Oxford successors, such as Alyngton and
Penbygull. Like Duns Scotus and Walter Burley, Wyclif held that
universals *in re* (or formal universals) exist outside our
minds *in actu* and not *in potentia*, as moderate
realists thought. On the other hand, unlike Burley, he maintained that
they are really identical with their own individuals, thus accepting
the very core of the traditional realist account of the relationship
between universals and individuals. According to Wyclif, since (1)
universals and individuals share the same empirical reality, which is
that of individuals, but (2) have opposite constituent principles,
when properly considered as universals and individuals, they are
really the same but formally distinct. On his view, because of this
formal distinction, not everything predicable of individuals can be
directly predicated of universals and *vice versa*, although an
indirect predication is always possible. As a consequence, Wyclif
distinguished three main non-mutually exclusive types of predication
(which he conceives as a real relation holding between metaphysical
entities), each more general than the preceding one (or ones). In the
*Tractatus de universalibus* they are the following: formal
predication, predication by essence, and habitudinal predication (see
the entry on Wyclif, SS2.3). Since habitudinal predication does
not require any kind of identity between the entity signified by the
subject-term and the entity signified by the predicate-term, but
formal predication and essential predication do, the ontological
presuppositions of the most general type of predication, implied by
the other types, are completely different from those of the other
two.



The final result of this way of approaching the problem of universals
was a system of intensional logic where (1) the copula of (almost) any
standard (philosophical) proposition, such as 'Socrates is
white' or 'man is an animal', has to be interpreted
in terms of degrees of identity between the things signified by the
subject-term and the predicate-term; and (2) individuals and
universals, considered *qua* beings, appear to be a sort of
hypostatization of intensions, since they are what is signified by
proper and common nouns respectively.



Sharpe shares the metaphysical view and principles of Wyclif's
philosophical system. His position on the problem of universals can be
summed up as follows.


1. We can count the following entities as universal: (1.1) those
causes that have a multiplicity of effects; (1.2) ideas in God; (1.3)
the universal quantifier (*syncategorema universaliter
distributivum*); (1.4) universal propositions, both affirmative
and negative; (1.5) universal forms, or real universals ; and (1.6)
universal signs, both mental and spoken (or written) (*QsU*.,
pp. 49-50).
2. Real universals are naturally apt to be present in many things as
their main metaphysical components.
3. Real universals exist *in actu* outside the mind, since
their being is the same as the being of individuals, which is
actual.
4. Mental universals are partially caused in our mind by the common
natures existing outside.



As the being of real universals coincides with the being of their
corresponding individuals, real universals can be said to be
everlasting because of the continuous succession of their individuals,
and also really identical with them. But universals and individuals
are also formally different from each other, as they have distinct
constitutive formal principles, and therefore different properties
(*ibid*., pp. 91-92). The most important among universal
signs are mental universals, which are both the acts of intellection
through which our mind grasps the nature of universal forms and the
concepts through which it connects general names with the things to
which they refer (*ibid*., pp. 68-69).



The description of the relationship between universals and individuals
in terms of real identity and formal distinction entails (i) that not
all that is predicated of individuals can be *directly*
(*formaliter*) attributed to their universals and *vice
versa*, but (ii) that all that is predicated of individuals has to
be in some way or another attributed to universals and *vice
versa*. Therefore, a redefinition of the standard kinds of
predication was required.



Like Alyngton, Penbygull, Tarteys, and Whelpdale, Sharpe modifies
Wyclif's theory. Agreeing with Alyngton, but against the others,
he divides real predication into formal predication (*praedicatio
formalis*) and predication by essence (*praedicatio essentialis
vel secundum essentiam*), removing habitudinal predication, as it
is not homogeneous with the first two. According to him, predication
by essence (1) shows a partial identity between the subject-thing and
the predicate-thing, which share some metaphysical component parts,
and (2.1) does not require (or even (2.2) excludes) that the form
connoted by the predicate-term is directly present in the essence
signified by the subject-term. '(What is) singular is (what is)
universal' ('*singulare est universale*') is
an instance of predication by essence. Formal predication, on the
contrary, requires such a direct presence. 'Man is an
animal' and 'man is white' are instances of formal
predication (*ibid*., pp. 89-91).



As is evident from his formulations, Sharpe does not explicitly divide
formal predication into formal essential and formal accidental
predication, and offers two different readings of the distinction
between formal predication and predication by essence. According to
the common view, predication by essence is more general than formal
predication. As a consequence, in the standard theory of the Oxford
realists, formal predication is a sub-type of predication by essence.
Sharpe introduces another interpretation, according to which the two
kinds of predication at issue are complementary and mutually
exclusive. This happens when predication by essence excludes the
form connoted by the predicate-term being directly present in the
essence signified by the subject-term (*ibid*., p. 91).
Although, according to the latter reading, formal predication is not a
kind of predication by essence, this reading nevertheless implies an
interpretation of the 'is' of predication in terms of
identity and, therefore, a new definition of the pair of antonymous
notions of identity and difference (or distinction).


## 6. Identity, Distinction, and Individuation



Sharpe's theory of identity and distinction combines in an
original way those of Duns Scotus, Wyclif, and Penbygull.



Penbygull (*De universalibus*, pp. 189-90) had (1)
distinguished between the notion of non-identity and that of
difference (or distinction); (2) denied that the notion of difference
implies that of non-identity; (3) affirmed that the two notions of
difference and real identity are logically compatible, thus admitting
that (3.1) there are degrees in distinction, and (3.2) that the
degrees of distinction between two things can be read as the inverse
measure of their (partial) identity; and (4) suggested the following
definitions for these three notions, that is non-identity, difference
(or distinction), and (absolute) identity: (4.1) an entity *a*
is non-identical with an entity *b* if and only if there is not
any form *F* such that *F* is present in the same way in
*a* and *b*; (4.2) an entity *a* differs from an
entity *b* if and only if there is at least a form *F*
such that *F* is directly present in *a* but not in
*b*, or *vice versa*; (4.3) an entity *a* is
absolutely identical with an entity *b* if and only if for any
form *F*, it is the case that *F* is present in *a*
if and only if it is present in the same way in *b* (see the
entry on William Penbygull, SS3).



Like Penbygull, Sharpe considers identity and distinction (or
difference) as the two possible inverse measures of the coincidence of
the metaphysical components of two given entities (*QsU*., p.
92). Moreover, he speaks of formal and real (or essential) identity,
and formal and real (or essential) distinction (or difference), and
states that formal identity is stronger than real (or essential)
identity, since the former entails the latter, while, on the contrary,
real difference is stronger than formal distinction, since the latter
is entailed by the former (*ibid*., pp. 91-92).



Finally, he admits degrees in formal distinction, as he recognizes two
different types, the first of which comes very close to that proposed
by Scotus in his *Ordinatio*, while the second is drawn from
Wyclif's *Tractatus de universalibus* (ch. 4, pp.
90-92). The first type of formal distinction holds among things
such as the intellective faculties of the soul, whereas the second
holds between such things as the essence of the soul and its
intellective faculties and a species and its individuals (*Quaestio
super libros De anima*, q. 2, fol. 236r-v).



The two different sets of conditions for the formal distinction can be
formalized as follows:


1. two entities *x* and *y* are formally distinct if
and only if (i) both of them are constitutive elements of the same
reality, but (ii) neither of them can exist by itself, or (iii) is
part of the definite description of the other.
2. two entities *x* and *y* are formally distinct if
and only if (i) there is at least one *z* such that *z*
is predicated of *x* and not of *y*, or *vice
versa*, but (ii) *x* and *y* are really identical,
as one is directly predicated of the other *qua* its main
intrinsic metaphysical component.



Accordingly, real identity, which is presupposed by the formal
distinction, has to be defined in these terms (*QsU*, p.
98):



> 
> *a* is really identical with *b* if and only if both are
> constitutive elements, or material parts, of the same reality, or one
> of them is directly predicated of the other *qua* its superior
> in the categorial line (that is, *qua* its main intrinsic
> metaphysical component).
> 



As a result, Sharpe's world consists of finite beings (that is,
"things" like men, horses, stones etc.), really existing
outside the mind, made up of an individual substance and a host of
formal entities (common substantial natures and accidental forms, both
universal and singular) existing in it and through it, since none of
these formal entities can exist by themselves. They are real only
insofar as they constitute individual substances or are present in
individual substances *qua* their properties. Specific
substantial natures (or essences) can be conceived from two points of
view: intensionally (*in abstracto*) and extensionally (*in
concreto*). Viewed intensionally, specific substantial natures are
nothing but the set of essential properties that individual substances
are to instantiate, but considered without any reference to such
instantiations. Viewed extensionally, specific substantial natures are
those same forms conceived of as instantiated by at least one singular
substance. For instance, human nature considered intensionally is
humanity *(humanitas*), extensionally the universal-man
(*homo in communi*). Humanity is properly a form, or more
accurately, the essential principle of a substantial form, that is,
something existentially incomplete and dependent; the universal-man is
this same form considered according to its own mode of being, and
therefore as a sort of existentially autonomous and independent entity
(*ibid*., p 102). Consequently, like Wyclif, Sharpe holds that
a formal universal actually exists outside the mind if at least one
individual instantiates it, so that without individuals, common
natures (or essences) are not really universals (*ibid*., pp.
105-06). This means that the relationship between common natures
and singulars is ultimately based on individuation, since no actual
universality and no instantiation is possible without individuation.
On this subject Sharpe seems to accept the essentials of
Aquinas' doctrine, since he affirms that (i) the universal-man
is compounded of both common matter and form and that (ii) matter as
affected by dimensive quantity and other accidental properties
(*materia quanta et accidentibus substrata*) is the very
principle of individuation, since it causes the passage from the level
of universals to that of singulars (*ibid*., pp. 137-39).
Thus, according to Sharpe, explaining individuation means explaining
how a multiplicity of individuals can be obtained from a single
specific nature, the problem at issue being the dialectical
development from one to many and not the passage from abstract to
concrete.



Sharpe's world counts many types of entities: universal and
individual substances and accidents (like *homo in communi* and
Socrates, and like the general form of whiteness and this particular
form of whiteness), universal abstract substantial essences (like
humanity), universal and individual substantial forms (like the human
soul in general and the soul of Socrates), general and individual
differences (like the universal-rationality and the rationality proper
to Socrates) - each one characterized by its own mode of being.
This world is certainly very complex, but its complexity is exceeded
by complexity in language. Sharpe denies that there is a close
correspondence between language and the world, as he believes that our
thought is caused by the world, and our language by our thought, and
the relation between causes and effects is a relation of one to
many.


## 7. Psychology and Theory of Knowledge



The sources of Sharpe's psychological and epistemological
theories are St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and Ockham, although the latter
is chiefly a polemical source, as Kennedy 1969 pointed out (pp. 253
and 270). Like Aquinas, Sharpe


* maintains that the intellectual soul is the immediate form of the
human body, so that the whole being of the latter totally depends on
the former, although souls are individuated by bodies (*In De
anima*, fols. 217v-218r), and
* claims that each man has his own intellect, arguing against
Averroes' thesis of the unicity and separate character of the
passive intellect for the whole human species (*ibid*., fols.
210r-212v).



Like Duns Scotus, Sharpe thinks there is not a real distinction
between the soul and its intellective faculties (i.e., the active
intellect, the passive intellect, and the will) or among the
intellective faculties themselves, but only a formal distinction. On
the other hand, the soul's corporeal powers (*potentiae
incorporatae*), which depend on bodily organs for their
operations, are really distinct from the soul and from each other
(*ibid*., fol. 236v).



Like Aquinas and Duns Scotus, and against Ockham, Sharpe affirms that
intelligible species are required for intellection (*ibid*.,
fol. 244r). The main arguments he uses in favor of this thesis are the
following:


1. Our mind's objects of intellection are the universal
essences or common natures. But they cannot be present themselves to
the mind. Therefore, some sign of them, that is, the intelligible
species, has to be directly present in the intellect.
2. A universal principle of intellection is necessary in order to
understand a universal object, like a common nature. The phantasm is
particular, since it is the mental representation of a singular
object. Therefore a universal species, abstracted from the phantasm,
is required.
3. If there were no species, nothing would be retained by the
intellect after an act of intellection. Therefore we could not
understand each other, or understand more easily the second time,
since there would be no objects for our memory (*ibid*., fols.
239v-240v).



Finally, like Duns Scotus and Ockham, and against St. Thomas, Sharpe
states that our intellect can know perfectly even individual material
things (*ibid*., fol. 253r). What is more, it can know
immaterial beings as well, since the most general and proper object of
our intellect is being in all its amplitude (*ibid*., fol.
253v). Sharpe here distinguishes perfect knowledge from complete
knowledge. For a perfect knowledge of something it is sufficient that
our intellect is able to single out the object in question against
others by means of a proper concept. For a complete knowledge of
something it is necessary that our intellect is able to list all the
properties, both substantial and accidental, of the object at issue.
It is therefore evident that we can have a perfect knowledge of
something without completely knowing it, as is the case with
individual material things and immaterial beings (*ibid*., fol.
254r-v).


## 8. Natural Philosophy: the Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*



Sharpe's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (ms.
Oxford, New College 238, fols. 53r-208v) contains nine large
questions, one for each book of Aristotle's work, except for the
fourth book to which two questions are dedicated, one concerning place
and one time. Each question is divided into two main parts: in the
first, Sharpe lists a series of arguments against the question itself
(*contra questionem in se*), namely, in general, for supporting a
negative answer to the main question. In the second part, he expounds
his own opinion and refutes the arguments *quod non*.



The first question (fols. 53r-88v) is whether, from the point of view
of the natural philosophy, material things have three constitutive
principles only, that is: matter, form, and privation, or not.
Sharpe's answer is affirmative, but he points out that the
constitutive principles of material things are three by species and
not in number. Indeed, material things have more than three principles
in number, but each of them is reducible to matter, or form, or
privation.



The second question (fols. 89r-128v) is whether there are four kinds
of causes in the natural world or not. According to Sharpe, the
efficient, formal, material, and final causes alone are properly
causes, while chance and fortune are accidental, and therefore
improper (*per accidens*) causes. 



The third question (fols. 128v-143v) is whether motion (*motus*),
which is an imperfect act of those beings that are *in potentia*
to something, is the same item *in essentia* as action and
passion. Before answering, Sharpe remarks that we can consider action
and passion in two ways: either materially or formally. In the first
case, the answer is affirmative, since action and passion share the
physical reality of the motion itself. But formally conceived, action
and passion are different from each other and from the motion, since
they are distinct relational properties (*respectus*) of the
motion.



The fourth question (fols. 144r-160r) is whether the immobile place of
a certain body is the ultimate surface of what that contains that body
or not. According to Sharpe, it is false that the last surface of the
containing body is absolutely immobile, as only the ninth and tenth
heavens are such.



The fifth question (fols. 160v-175r), but second related to the fourth
book of Aristotle's *Physics*, is whether time is the
measure of change in respect of the before and after. Sharpe's
answer is affirmative, as always, but he specifies that this is not
properly the definition of time, but rather the description of its
nature. In his view, it follows from this description that (1) time
measures mutable things only, but not immutable; and (2) time is
closely connected exclusively with that kind of motion which entails a
before and an after.



The sixth question (fols. 175r-185r) is whether continuity and
contrariety of motion (*continuitas et contrarietas motuum*) are
present only in the categories of quantity, quality, and where. Sharpe
thinks it is so, as only these three categories are properly
characterized by the existence in them of distance. As a matter of
fact, in these three categories are present sequences of items such
that in order to move from one term to the other of the series, it is
necessary to pass through intermediate terms.



The seventh question (fols. 185v-195r) is whether continuous physical
magnitudes are compounded by atomic elements not further divisible.
Sharpe's answer is negative, for continuous magnitudes are
divisible ad infinitum by definition.



The eight question (195v-201r) is whether, in order to compare two
motions belonging to the same genus (of motion), it is necessary that
the mover and the mobile be simultaneous. Sharpe's answer is
affirmative, but he specifies that it is not always possible to
compare two motions belonging to the same genus. This is possible only
when the motions that have to be compared belong to the same kind
(*species specialissima*).



The last question (fols 201v-208v) is whether the perpetual motion of
the heavens depends on the prime mover or not. Sharpe's answer
is affirmative and very short. Almost all of the second part of the
question deals with the problem of the nature and properties of the
prime mover.