## 1. Periodization



Following van der Kuijp (1989) one can periodize the Tibetan tradition
of epistemology by relying on the one hand on the Indian sources taken
as focus of interpretation by Tibetan scholars, on the other on the
type of scholarly activity involved (translation, composition of
commentary or of independent treatises). One can thus distinguish:


1. *The ancient period*. Corresponding to the time of the
First Diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet (starting in the 7th c.), it is marked
mainly by the translation of some Indian treatises on the subject.
This early interest in the topic might be connected to the invitation
to Tibet of the Indian master Santaraksita, famous for
his integration of logico-epistemological tools in the discussion of
Madhyamaka themes.
2. *The pre-classical period*. It starts with the Later
Diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet in the late 10th c., a
period which sees the translation (in some cases revision) of the
sevenfold collection of Dharmakirti's works, and of a
selection of commentaries, as well as of independent works by the
authors of these commentaries. Tibetan scholars devise new literary
genres to apprehend the contents of these works (notably,
"Topical outlines" analyze Indian treatises according to a
hierarchical structure, "Concise guides" offer an
orientation into the contents, explaining Indian treatises paragraph
by paragraph), write commentaries, and also start composing
independent works. Typical of this period are the so-called Summaries
of epistemology (*tshad ma'i bsdus pa*). While these claim
to present the essence of Dharmakirti's seven-fold
collection, they actually mainly (if not exclusively) rely on
Dharmakirti's *Pramanaviniscaya*.
Apart from the commentarial works of the "Great
translator" and pioneer exegete Ngok Loden Sherap
(*rNgog Blo ldan shes rab*, 1059-1109), Tibetan
epistemological commentaries in this period are limited to the
*Pramanaviniscaya*. This trend extends to the
13th c., overlapping with the beginning of the classical
period.
3. *The classical period*. Its start can be identified with
the crucial contribution of Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyeltsen (*Sa
skya Pandita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan*,
1182-1251) in his *Treasure of Reasoning* (*Tshad ma rigs
gter*), composed in 1219. The focus shifts from
Dharmakirti's *Pramanaviniscaya* to
his *Pramanavarttika*, with the first
commentary on the latter being composed in the middle of the
13th c., after Sakya Pandita had revised its Tibetan
translation together with the Kashmirian scholar
Sakyasribhadra (1127-1225) around 1210.
Another characteristic of this period is that it sees the beginning of
a tradition of Tibetan commentaries on Tibetan epistemological works,
starting with commentaries on Sakya Pandita's *Treasure of
Reasoning*.
4. *The post-classical period*. Starting in the
15th c., it is characterized by a reappraisal of ideas
developed in the pre-classical period, criticism of Sakya
Pandita's work and, respectively, defense of the latter. The
composition of commentaries on Indian and Tibetan epistemological
works co-exists with that of independent treatises, including manuals
known as "Collected topics" (*bsdus grwa*), of
which the oldest available instance is the *Rwa stod bsdus
grwa* composed by Jamyang Chokla Oser (*'Jam dbyangs
mChog lha 'od zer*, 1429-1500).



In the pre-classical period, the lineage of epistemology initiated by
Ngok Loden Sherap at the Kadampa (*bKa' gdams pa*)
monastery of Sangpu (*gSang phu Ne'u thog*) played the
leading role. Ngok Loden Sherap himself and influential figures
among his successors--notably Chapa Chokyi Sengge
(*Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge*, 1109-1169) and Tsang Nakpa
Tsondru Sengge (*gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus
seng ge*, ?-after 1195)--set interpretative milestones.
The "Ngok tradition" (*rngog lugs*) of epistemology
represented the mainline interpretative stream up to the
13th century, when Sakya Pandita, advancing the need to
treat the Indian sources more faithfully and more exhaustively,
embarked on a generalized critique of his Tibetan predecessors and
contemporaries, and initiated the "Sakya tradition"
(*sa lugs*). The rupture was not total, as Sakya
Pandita's epistemological system retained many features
developed in the Ngok tradition, but a dividing line was set on
specific issues. These remain points of dissent between authors whose
lineage goes back to Sakya Pandita and authors belonging to the
Gandenpa (*dGa' ldan pa*) and subsequent Gelukpa (*dGe
lugs pa*) traditions (both referred to as "Gelukpa"
here for simplicity's sake). The former includes thinkers such
as Gorampa Sonam Sengge (*Go rams pa bSod nams seng
ge*, 1429-1489) and Serdok Panchen Sakya Chokden
(*gSer mdog pan chen Sakya mchog ldan*,
1428-1508). Representative for the Gelukpa tradition are the
works of the disciples of Tsong Khapa Lobsang Drakpa (*Tsong kha pa
Blo bzang grags pa*
(1357-1419)--Khedrupje (*mKhas grub rje
dGe legs dpal bzang*, 1385-1438), Gyeltsapje
(*rGyal tshab rje Dar ma rin chen*, 1364-1432),
Gedundrup (*dGe 'dun grub*, 1391-1474)--as
well as the "Collected topics" manuals used in monastic
education. These prolonged, to some extent, ideas found in the Ngok
tradition, although one should avoid hasty claims of continuity.


## 2. Epistemology



The examination of "reliable cognition" (*tshad
ma*) is the core subject of Buddhist epistemological works in
India and Tibet. In the Tibetan tradition, it is subsumed under the
broader enterprise of classification of "mind" or
"mental episodes" (Tib. *blo*) and involves the
determination of the objects which the respective cognitions bear on.
Tibetan authors typically proceed by establishing various typologies
of objects and of mental episodes and elucidating the various ways in
which mental episodes are related to objects. Mental episodes are
associated with different operations and are categorized via
progressive subdivisions based on criteria that are also instrumental
in defining reliable cognition. The characterization of the different
types of objects, in particular within the typology of
"apprehended objects" (see 2.1.2, a), is tied with the
adoption of a specific ontological and epistemological framework. 



### 2.1 Objects


#### 2.1.1 Ontological framework


##### a. The scope of reality



Tibetan epistemologists are primarily Buddhist thinkers who follow the
Madhyamaka views. A pertinent question for them is whether reliable
cognitions bear on objects pertaining to conventional reality and/or
ultimate reality.



While some authors seek to include knowledge of the ultimate within
the scope of reliable cognitions, the view of the majority is that
reliable cognitions concern the conventional realm. A further debate
is about whether reliable cognitions should be limited to what, in the
conventional realm, is held to be real. The definition of an
ontological position in epistemological works thus concerns
conventional reality; the ultimate is beyond the reach of reasoning.
What Indian Buddhist epistemologists categorized as
"ultimate" and "conventional" is transposed
into the Madhyamaka framework of the Two Truths under the categories
of "correct conventional" (*yang dag pa'i kun
rdzob*) and "incorrect conventional" (*log
pa'i kun rdzob*), with varying repartitions of objects
between the two according to the ontological model that is adopted.




Tibetan authors define their position--in some cases a
provisional one adopted as a mere interpretative tool for dealing with
Dharmakirti's texts--on the basis of models associated
with Indian Buddhist schools. A fourfold typology of philosophical
tenets is set forth along two lines of distinction. The first
separates external-realist positions from idealist
(Vijnanavada)ones; the second separates
representationalist positions from non-representationalist ones.
External-realist models agree in positing the existence of
extra-mental entities, but differ in their account of the way that a
cognition of such objects takes place. According to the
non-representationalists (commonly associated with the views of the
Vaibhasika school), extra-mental entities exist
simultaneously to their cognition and are cognized directly by the
latter. According to the representationalists (associated with the
Sautrantika school), extra-mental entities are the cause of their
cognition but, being momentary, they have ceased to exist at the time
cognition arises. 



Early treatises attest to various choices among these models. For
instance, Chapa refutes the idealist and the Sautrantika
external-realist models and settles for a Vaibhasika-like
position, whereas Chumikpa Senggepel (*Chu mig pa Seng ge
dpal*, 13th c.) opts for an idealist framework. Sakya
Pandita's position, shared by Gelukpa authors, is to arrange
these positions along a gradual ascending scale; the lowest, the
Vaibhasika model is refuted in favor of the adoption of the
Sautrantika model, which is itself replaced by an idealist one on
a higher scale of analysis.


##### b. The extension of the real



While real particulars (what Dharmakirti calls
"*svalaksana*"), characterized by their
capacity to bring about an effect, are allotted conventional existence
(extra-mental or exclusively mental, according to the model adopted),
Tibetan scholars are divided as to the spatial and temporal extensions
of such particulars.



The spatial options range from an infinitesimal particle (the atom
being considered the smallest size unit) to a macroscopic object up to
a commonsense object; the temporal ones from a momentary entity to a
continuum of indeterminate (although not infinite) duration. The
adoption of extended objects is subject to the criticism brought
forward by Dharmakirti against Indian philosophers who admit
wholes as distinct from their parts, and would, in a general way,
conflict with the Buddhist idea that compounds only have nominal
existence. On the other hand, the infinitesimalist view has
difficulties to account for the fact that macroscopic objects appear
to our cognition rather than individual atoms. The latter difficulty
leads, in Dharmakirti's works, to the refutation of
extra-mental reality in favor of an idealist position. An intermediate
view is to grant reality to objects that have some spatial extension:
not commonsense objects, but aggregations of atoms within the scope of
a specific sense-sphere (Skt. *ayatana*, Tib. *skye
mched*), such as, for the visual sense-sphere, patches of
color.



Regarding the temporal extension of real particulars, momentary
entities pose a challenge to transactional usage: once known, they
have already ceased and hence cannot be used nor acted upon.
Transactional usage is better grounded in objects that have some
duration. Continua, however, bring about the same critique as
macroscopic objects: what really exists is a particular at each
moment, but the chain of causally related moments, even though it may
appear to the ignorant mind as an object having duration, only exists
nominally. A limited temporal extension is not an option, for, in
difference to aggregated atoms, the different moments in a series do
not co-exist--only the present one exists and is causally
efficient; they hence cannot be considered to contribute collectively
to the cognition of an object.



Few Tibetan authors, among them Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen
(*sTag tshang Lo tsa ba Shes rab rin chen*, b. 1405),
adopt the infinitesimal-momentary view. The intermediate view is
prescribed by Sakya Pandita and adopted, for instance, by Lowokenchen
Sonam Lundrup (*Glo bo mkhan chen bSod nams lhun
grub*, 1456-1532), while Gelukpa authors and some Sakyapa
ones such as Ngawang Chodrak (*Ngag dbang chos grags*,
1572-1641) extend their view of reality to commonsense objects
and continua, which are held to possess their own causal capacity.
They are described as collections, but distinguished from the partless
wholes distinct from their parts advocated by the more extreme realist
Indian philosophers who are the target of Dharmakirti's
criticism.


#### 2.1.2 Typologies



Objects (Tib. *yul*) are primarily considered as cognitive
objects, in relation to cognitive episodes (Tib. *blo*). In the
common vocabulary of Tibetan epistemology, several sorts of objects
are distinguished:


1. the "appearing object" (*snang yul*)
2. the "apprehended object" or "grasped
object" (*gzung yul*)
3. the "intentional object" or "conceived
object" (*zhen yul*)
4. the "engaged object" or "object of
application" (*'jug yul*)



While the terminology, which reflects different kinds of mental
operations, is shared among Tibetan epistemologists, they disagree as
to the definition of each sort and as to the equivalence of some of
them, in particular of the appearing object and the apprehended
object.


##### a. The appearing and apprehended objects



Regarding the appearing object and the apprehended object, a major
cause of dissension lies in the model adopted to account for the
process of a cognition of an object. Two options are in competition in
the external-realist model: (i) direct realism (associated with the
Vaibhasika model) advocates a direct contact with reality;
in this model the object and its cognition exist simultaneously,
albeit distinctly; (ii) a causal theory (associated with the
Sautrantika model) according to which an object acts as a cause
for the emergence of its cognition but, being momentary, has ceased to
exist once this cognition arises.



(i) For an adherent of the first model such as Chapa, the appearing
object, the object that manifests itself in cognition, and the
apprehended object, what cognition apprehends, are one and the same
thing ("appearing object" does not even figure as a
distinct category of cognitive object). "Appearing"
(*snang ba*) is held to be a mental operation shared by all
types of cognition. As such, each cognition is held to have its
apprehended object, and a threefold typology of awareness is
established on the basis of three sorts of apprehended objects, which
are exhaustive of what can appear in cognition:


* particulars (mental or extra-mental)
* hallucinations/illusions (i.e., something that appears to a
non-conceptual cognition while being nonexistent)
* concepts (*don spyi*)



These three are distinguished and paired with three sorts of mental
episodes by relying on two corresponding sets of criteria:


1. The characteristic of existence (associated with the notion of
causal efficacy) separates particulars (real entities) on the one hand
and concepts and hallucinated objects on the other; it matches the
identification of the corresponding mental episodes as
"non-erroneous" and "erroneous" respectively.
Here, the notion "erroneous" (*'khrul pa*)
conveys a specific type of error, distinct from a mistaken
determination (such as identifying a rope as a snake, or identifying
something impermanent as permanent), an error which is simply due to
the object not being real.
2. The characteristic of vividness, associated with that of
specificity, separates real entities and hallucinated objects from
concepts, and is the ground for the distinction between non-conceptual
and conceptual mental episodes.



The correspondence plays out as follows:




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | object | cognition |
|  | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |  |
| particular | vividly appearing;

specific | causally efficient | non-conceptual | non-erroneous | perception |
| hallucinated object | vividly appearing;

specific | not causally efficient | non-conceptual | erroneous | pseudo-perception,

e.g., dream or hallucination |
| concept | not vividly appearing;

not specific | not causally efficient | conceptual | erroneous  | any conceptual cognition |



The kind of awareness depends on the kind of object that it
apprehends. Mental episodes may be phenomenologically
indistinguishable but still be of different types because their object
is different. For instance, the perception of a fire (a non-conceptual
non-erroneous cognition) and the hallucination of a fire (a
non-conceptual erroneous cognition) are of different types, because
the object of the first is a particular and the object of the second
is not. As such, Chapa can be said to endorse a form of experiential
and phenomenal disjunctivism, and an externalist account of cognition.




(ii) The premise that every cognition has its apprehended object does
not hold for an adherent of the causal model such as Sakya Pandita: a
mental episode for the arising of which no real entity acted as a
direct cause must be held to have, strictly speaking, no object, or at
least, no "apprehended object" (*gzung yul*). In
other words, only non-conceptual non-erroneous cognitions (namely,
perceptions) have a grasped object.



The causation-model further has the consequence that the apprehended
object cannot be identical with the appearing object: the apprehended
object has ceased at the time of the arising of its effect, a
cognition in which an object manifests itself. Additionally, Sakya
Pandita understands "appearance" in the restricted sense
of the mode of operation proper to non-conceptual cognitions. There
can be no "appearance" in the case of a conceptual
cognition, for the latter does not apply to reality by way of an
appearance reflecting real objects, but by way of exclusion, namely by
determinations that consist in eliminations of the opposite. Thus,
according to Sakya Pandita, the distinction between non-conceptual and
conceptual amounts to a difference in the mode of operation of the
respective cognitions, namely, via appearance (or vivid appearance)
for the first, via exclusion for the second, while the distinction
between non-erroneous and erroneous relies on the existence of an
apprehended object, understood as a real object causing this
cognition.



Adherents of the direct realist model are thus criticized by those of
the causation model for admitting improper, non-existent apprehended
objects (namely, the concept and the hallucinated object), and for
blurring the difference between the respective modes of operation of
non-conceptual and conceptual cognitions. In return, the causation
model is criticized in that it does not enable direct access to real
objects; those can, at best, be inferred.



Although later Gelukpa authors, who take causality and the time-gap
problem it involves seriously, adopt the causation model, they mostly
preserve Chapa's typology, together with the identification of
apprehended object and appearing object. This leaves them in a
difficult situation as they adopt a typology of objects that precisely
avoids a model in which the object grasped by cognition would be
different from the object that appears to it. Their solution is to
invoke the notion of "aspect": a cognition caused by an
object takes a form similar to its cause. This aspectualism differs
from a representationalist view in that it does not involve, strictly
speaking, a representation which would stand as a curtain between
cognition and the object. Cognition still cognizes its object directly
by taking its aspect.


##### b. The intentional object



While "appearance" is passive, the "intentional
object" is associated with an intentional operation of
determination (*zhen pa*) that involves the (involuntary)
blurring of the distinction between the mental appearance and an
extra-mental particular by way of an unconscious error inherent to the
thought process of ordinary beings. Such operation is restricted to
conceptual cognitions, and is what allows action based on concepts,
insofar as via intentional determination the concept is conceived as
having the nature of something external.


##### c. The engaged object



The "engaged object" is usually identified with the object
of reliable cognition, and hence understood differently according to
the definition of reliable cognition adopted by each author. In some
versions, the "engaged object" stands out as a real,
extra-mental particular considered to be the object that is likely to
be acted upon at the outcome of a reliable cognition (for instance, a
fire when perceiving a fire or when inferring that there is a fire on
a mountain pass as one perceives smoke on a mountain pass). According
to other authors, such as Chapa, the engaged object is the
"object with regard to which opposite superimpositions have been
eliminated," without reference to any transactional
"application."



One can identify, at the source of this typology of objects of
cognition, the need to specify the scope of reliability for reliable
cognitions, in view of problematic cases--an issue already dealt
with by the Indian epistemologist Dharmottara. One such case is that
of inference, which qualifies as a reliable cognition, but is strictly
speaking "erroneous" due to its conceptual nature. Namely,
the thought-content of an inferential cognition is a universal, which
bears no correspondence whatsoever with extra-mental reality.
Distinguishing between different types of objects allows making sense
of this by considering inference to be erroneous with regard to its
apprehended object (for those that admit that it has one), or just
erroneous qua conceptual cognition (for those who do not admit that it
has an apprehended object), but reliable with regard to its engaged
object, a real particular. 


### 2.2 Cognitions



Typical of Tibetan epistemology is the classification of mental
episodes, which gives rise to the specialized literature of
"Lorik" (*blo rigs*), "types of mental
episodes." The typologies adopted depend on the authors'
respective views on objects, the model they adopt to account for their
cognition, and how they define reliable cognition.



The threefold typology met with above, which distinguishes between
conceptual and non-conceptual mental events, and among the latter
between erroneous and non-erroneous ones, is generally accepted, but
not its correspondence with a threefold typology of apprehended
objects.



More fundamental in view of the focus of epistemological works is the
distinction between reliable and non-reliable cognitions. There is
agreement as to which cognitions are reliable
cognitions--precisely those prescribed by Dharmakirti,
namely, perception and inference--although not as to what defines
them as reliable cognitions. As for non-reliable cognitions, one finds
an opposition between a fivefold typology, which is the trademark of
works of the pre-classical period, and a more basic threefold typology
prescribed by Sakya Pandita.


#### 2.2.1 Reliable cognition (*tshad ma*)



Following Dharmakirti, Tibetan epistemologists restrict the
number of reliable cognitions to two sorts: perception and inference.
The first is defined as "non-erroneous and devoid of
conceptualization," the second as the "understanding
coming from a triply characterized logical reason." Both share
the status of being "reliable cognitions" (*tshad
ma*), a status that Dharmakirti associatedin his
*Pramanavarttika* with the characteristics of
being (1) "non-belying" and (2) "revealing an
unknown object." In addition to a prolongation of the
commentarial dispute on the verses in which these characteristics are
given, a notable confrontation is found in the Tibetan tradition
between two models that can be distinguished in view of the
understanding of perception that they entail: (a) a model in which
perception retains a passive status insofar as, being devoid of
conceptualization, it cannot itself achieve a determination of its
object, and (b) a model that seeks to give a more active role to
perception without however stepping back on its characterization as
"non-conceptual." Two versions of the "active
perception" model are found: an "indirectly active
perception" model and an innovative "directly active
perception" model.


##### a. The "passive perception" model



The "passive perception" model can also be termed the
"classic" model in that it claims to offer a more literal
reading of Dharmakirti. This model, adopted for instance by Sakya
Pandita, takes "non-belying," combined with
"novelty," as definiens of reliable cognition. Without
giving a pragmatic view of reliability, this model involves the
capacity to fulfill a goal, or to have some causal efficacy, as a
criterion for the non-belying character of cognition. Although being
non-belying and novel is sufficient to qualify as reliable, in a
transactional context, conventional reliable cognitions are expected
to lead to an ascertainment (*nges pa*). While inference
ascertains its object by itself, perception is unable to do so,
because ascertainment--a conceptual operation, equivalent to the
elimination of opposite superimpositions--is incompatible with
its being "devoid of conceptualization." Such an
ascertainment, should it occur (this requires a number of
circumstantial elements), must be performed by a conceptual cognition
that follows perception. In other words, perception is reliable in
itself, but has to rely on a subsequent conceptual mental episode for
ascertainment. This "two-tier" way of accounting for both
reliability and determination keeps a strict division as to the role
and capacity of non-conceptual and conceptual cognitions, which Sakya
Pandita compares respectively by way of illustration to "a
seeing mute" and "a speaking blind." Should a
subsequent ascertainment not arise immediately (due to the nature of
the object, competence and mindfulness of the cognizer, visibility,
etc.), the preceding episode of perception still qualifies a a
reliable cognition, but its reliability has to be ascertained
extrinsically.


##### b. The "active perception" model



Some interpreters, already in India, were dissatisfied with this
"passive" status of perception. Tibetan epistemologists in
the pre-classical period similarly argued in favor of a more active
role for perception for it to qualify as a reliable cognition.


###### b1. The "indirectly active perception" model



One version of the "active perception" model was upheld by
Ngok Loden Sherap, who included in his understanding of
reliable cognition the requirement of a conceptual determination,
while upholding the classical tenet that perception itself cannot
conceptually determine its object. The model of reliable perception he
proposes is thus indirectly active. It follows the two-tier way of
accounting for determination in the "passive perception"
model, but sets determination as a necessary condition for
reliability.



An important consequence of this move is that it implies a distinction
between perceptual cognitions that are reliable in this sense and
perceptual cognitions that are not. Perceptual episodes that are such
that no subsequent determining cognition immediately arises, which, in
the passive model, were considered reliable cognitions whose
reliability nevertheless had to be ascertained extrinsically, fail
here to qualify as reliable cognition. A further consequence is that
this model leaves room for mental episodes that are both reliable and
non-reliable. For instance, the perception of an impermanent patch of
blue, which is followed by the determination "blue" but
not by the determination "impermanent," is only partially
reliable.


###### b2. The "directly active perception" model



The "directly active perception" model, which was
propounded by Chapa, brings revolutionary changes, first by
introducing in the definition of reliable cognition the notion of
"elimination of opposite superimpositions," then by
claiming that perception itself (not a subsequent conceptual
cognition) performs such a function.



Chapa formulates a new definition of reliable cognition in terms of
the "understanding of a veridical object" (*don bden
rtogs*). The object considered here is the "engaged
object," and its being veridical is explained as a
correspondence to the status of reality supported by the absence of
opposition. The long version of this definition brings to the fore
elements that are systematized by later authors in a threefold
list:


1. the elimination of opposite superimpositions
2. novelty
3. the mode of apprehension--to be reliable, a cognition must
depend on its object in a way that it does not occur when the object
is absent.



In the later Gelukpa tradition, which draws on this model, the
definition whose short version is formulated in terms of "newly
non-belying" also includes the requirement of "eliminating
superimpositions."



In the Dharmakirtian system, the "elimination of
superimpositions" is tantamount to ascertainment (*nges
pa*). This is to be understood in the framework of the
"*apoha*" (lit. "exclusion") theory:
any positive determination proceeds via the elimination of what is
other. For instance, determining a patch of colour as
"blue" does not consist in identifying some blue property
or some blueness shared by blue things, but in differentiating this
patch from the "other," namely from things that are
not-blue. Determination as "blue" amounts to eliminating
actual superimpositions of "non-blue" (for instance, if
one thought that the patch was yellow), or potential ones; in the
former case, the determination eliminates a mistaken judgment and
replaces it by a correct one, in the latter it prevents the subsequent
arising of a mistaken judgment. Both sides of the process,
superimposition and its elimination, are, for Dharmakirti,
exclusively conceptual operations.



The adoption of the criteria of "eliminating
superimpositions" in the definition of reliable cognition does
not affect inference. According to Chapa, however, "elimination
of superimpositions" is not limited to conceptual cognition in
general. It has a broader scope than the kind of conceptual operation
that follows an intentional determination (*zhen pa*).
Perception, although it does not perform any intentional
determination, is indeed capable of eliminating superimpositions. It
does so via a causal process: perception gives rise, at the next
moment, to another non-conceptual mental episode in which the
potential of the wrong superimposition to arise has been neutralized,
thus preventing its subsequent arising. By the third moment, there are
no more superimpositions. Insofar as it, by this means, eliminates
opposite superimpositions, perception is reliable and can be held to
ascertain (*nges pa*) its object, without involving any
conceptual element. Whether a conceptual determination occurs
subsequently or not is irrelevant to the reliability of the preceding
perceptual awareness.



The set of circumstances invoked in the passive model and the
indirectly active model to explain the lack of a conceptual
determination subsequent to a perceptual episode is now invoked to
explain why, although all aspects of the object appear, not all
superimpositions opposite to these aspects are eliminated. In
particular, Chapa identifies as an objective condition preventing the
elimination of superimpositions the case when a feature is
non-manifest (for instance, "non-blue" can be eliminated,
but "permanent" cannot be eliminated when perceiving an
impermanent patch of blue, because the feature blue is manifest, but
impermanence is not). 



A further specificity worth noting is that the "elimination of
opposite superimpositions" can bear on an object which is not
the appearing object. For instance, a perception which has a patch of
blue as its appearing object can eliminate the superimposition
"non-blue" and thereby ascertain "blue," but
it can also eliminate the superimposition "presence of a patch
of yellow" and thereby ascertain "absence of a patch of
yellow" even though the absence of yellow does not appear to
this perception. The first process is termed "direct
realization" (*dngos rtogs*), the second "indirect
realization" (*shugs rtogs*). A particular application of
the "direct/indirect realization" model regards the
realization or ascertainment that can be achieved via reflexive
awareness (*rang rig*). Reflexive awareness allows the
ascertainment of a range of features pertaining to the episode of
awareness that is its apprehended object, and directly permits the
indirect ascertainment of features pertaining to the object of that
episode of awareness.



The main criticism addressed by advocates of the "passive"
model to the "directly active" model is that it attributes
to perception an operation that is restricted to conceptual
cognitions; in their view indeed, "elimination of
superimpositions" amounts exclusively to the "exclusion of
what is other," the mode of operation of conceptual cognitions.
Proponents of the "directly active" model are not,
however, guilty of attributing to perception a conceptual operation.
It is thus, rather, their new conception of "elimination of
superimpositions" that is at stake here, for which the more
traditionally oriented proponents of the "passive" model
do not see a grounding in Dharmakirti's system.



As hinted at in the last discussion, the fundamental disagreement
between advocates of the respective models with regard to perception
and more generally with regard to the definition of reliable cognition
has consequences for their understanding of non-reliable
cognitions.


#### 2.2.2. Non-reliable cognitions


##### a. Fivefold typology



By embedding the discussion of reliable cognition within a general
examination of mental episodes, Tibetan epistemologists were led to
develop a typology of non-reliable cognitions. A fivefold typology is
shared by the majority of scholars in the pre-classical period and is
mostly adopted in later Gelukpa textbooks. Thinkers who adopt it
frequently disagree, however, about the phrasing of the definition of
each type and the specific cases they cover or not.


1. Non-ascertaining perception (*snang la ma nges pa*). These
are typically cases of non-conceptual cognitions that fail to
eliminate opposite superimpositions with regard to their appearing
object. This failure can result from a lack of attention, of wit, of
familiarity, or can be due to the nature of an appearing aspect; the
latter might be non-manifest, or too "subtle." Such
cognitions do not qualify as reliable since an elimination of opposite
superimpositions does not take place, but still qualify as perceptions
insofar as they are non-erroneous and devoid of conceptualization.
Alternatively, they are defined in terms of their inability to bring
about a subsequent determining conceptual cognition.
2. Post-knowledge cognition (*bcad pa'i yul can*, or
*bcad shes*). Such cognition, either conceptual or
non-conceptual, applies to an object with regard to which opposite
superimpositions have already been eliminated. It thereby fails to
fulfill the criterion of "novelty."
3. Factive assessment (*yid dpyod*). Such a cognition
correctly ascertains an object conceptually, but not via a proper
inferential process. Although it is novel and eliminates opposite
superimpositions, it does not qualify as reliable in view of its mode
of apprehension. Indeed, factive assessment is held to entail truth,
while still not depending on its object either via a relation of
causality or identity.
4. Mistaken cognition (*log shes*). A cognition can be
mistaken from the point of view of its apprehended object or of its
intentional object. In both cases, the error consists in not
apprehending--respectively, not conceiving--in concordance
with reality. Any cognition in which something that is not real, i.e.,
not causally efficient, appears is "erroneous." This
includes perceptual errors such as hallucinations and dreams, as well
as all conceptual cognitions since their apprehended object is a
concept, i.e., something that is merely superimposed. Determination
(*zhen pa*) is in itself erroneous in that it confuses what is
conceived and what is real. More restrictively, "erroneous with
regard to the intentional object" indicates that a determination
is faulty in that it does not relate to a state of affairs, for
instance, if one determines sound as permanent whereas it is in
reality impermanent.
5. Doubt (*the tshom*). Doubt occurs when one fails to choose
between two alternative possibilities, leaving both options open.
Doubt is usually considered a conceptual cognition. It may be held to
involve an intentional operation of determination (*zhen pa*),
but does not bring about a conclusive ascertainment (*nges
pa*), either mistaken or non-mistaken. This case thus appears as
the conceptual pendent of non-ascertaining perception.


##### b. Threefold typology and critique of the fivefold typology



Opponents to the new definition of reliable cognition and the
"active perception" model, starting with Sakya Pandita,
instead adopted a threefold typology of non-reliable cognitions:


1. Non-understanding (*ma rtogs*)
2. Mistaken understanding (*log shes/log rtog*)
3. Doubt (*the tshom*).



These share as definiens the failure of being
"non-belying" and can be ultimately reduced to the unique
category of non-understanding.



The critique of the fivefold typology of non-reliable cognition
targets in particular the categories of non-ascertaining perception,
post-knowledge cognition, and factive assessment. 



Sakya Pandita argues from the perspective of the "passive
perception" model, relying on the understanding of perception as
a passive cognition which does not itself ascertain its object, but
whose reliability is actually independent of this subsequent
ascertainment. The category of "non-ascertaining
cognition" is thus denied the status of independent category:
according to proponents of the "passive perception" model,
every perception is a non-ascertaining perception; ascertainment (when
it takes place) is always the deed of a subsequent conceptual
cognition. There is thus no such thing as an "ascertaining
perception" if what is implied is ascertainment by perception
itself.



Post-knowledge cognition is also rejected as a distinct category.
Non-conceptual post-knowledge cognition is in particular held to be
impossible. Indeed, any subsequent perception necessarily has a new
object since the object of the previous perception, being a momentary
particular, has already ceased to exist when the subsequent perception
arises. More generally, a post-knowledge cognition would have no
cognitive role, for its object would not be something that is to be
understood; it is accordingly judged to amount to
non-understanding.



Cases of factive assessment are subsumed under the category of doubt.
Doubt should not be understood here in the sense of
"hesitation," between two options but as the lack of
decisive ascertainment. Indeed, that an episode of factive assessment
is actually correct--which can only be ascertained
extrinsically--does not amount to its constituting a decisive
ascertainment. If no evidence at all is adduced, such "lucky
guesses" are not worth any certitude, and if faulty evidence is
adduced, they are to be interpreted as pseudo-inferences.


### 2.3 Universals



An important issue at the crossing of ontology and epistemology that
also has consequences for the philosophy of language is that of
universals. Two main trends can be distinguished among Tibetan
authors: The first, which is termed below "antirealism,"
is a literal interpretation of Dharmakirti's thought
denying reality to universals and properties. The second, which one
can describe as "moderate realism," holds that not all
universals are non-existent. In particular, it concedes some reality
to predicates, thereby granting reality to the universals that are
their referents.


#### 2.3.1 Antirealism



The antirealist position, held by Sakya Pandita and his epigones,
insists on the radical distinction between the conceptual domain and
reality, between universals and particulars. Only particulars are
real--the criterion for reality being causal efficiency.
Universals are mere mental constructions; they are superimpositions
that do not reflect reality, but veil the individuality of particulars
under the cover of an imagined shared property. Conversely, the
distinct properties that one ascribes to a particular are equally not
part of the fabric of reality, but mental constructions that veil the
unity of that particular.



The question of the why and the how of concept formation is dealt with
within the framework of the theory of *anyapoha*
("exclusion of the other," Tib. *gzhan sel*)
propounded by Dharmakirti. According to Dharmakirti,
conceptual thought proceeds by applying distinctions among particulars
in a way that reflects some subjective intention and beginningless
habits acquired in countless past lives. One accordingly ends up
grouping things by excluding them from other things. What is implied
by the term "exclusion" is that what particulars
apprehended under the cover of a universal have in common is merely
that they are all excluded from a complementary domain. In short, what
*x*s have in the common is that they are not non-*x*s.
By subsuming a particular under an imagined universal, or by ascribing
a property to it, mentally or verbally, one is not identifying a real
feature of this object, but merely distinguishing it from other
particulars.



Although universals and properties are conceptual constructions, we
mistakenly identify them as something real. This mistaken conflation
of the conceptual and reality that we spontaneously apply when forming
or using concepts provides a bridge between the two domains, prompting
practical action, interaction with reality, based on fictions. The
success of such interaction is accounted for by the causation involved
in the process of concept formation which guarantees an indirect link
between universals and the particulars they are taken to stand for:
concepts are formed as the result of experiences involving causally
active particulars; however, only the individual causal capacities of
particulars are involved, not any shared potential that would
determine natural kinds. Thus, for instance, the universal
"fire" is conceived following experiences of particulars
that one excludes from other particulars that are held not to burn. By
acting on the basis of the inference that there is "fire"
on a mountain pass when one perceives smoke in this locus, although
the object of this inference is the universal "fire," not
a real fire, when one acts on the basis of this inference one obtains
a particular that fulfills the expected function of burning, as the
previously experienced particulars that one excluded from non-fire
did.


#### 2.3.2 Moderate realism



The Gelukpa tradition as well as some Sakyapa thinkers instead adopted
a moderate realist position with regard to universals. Their argument
is that if universals were not real, reasoning based on universals
would not apply to reality. In other words, reasoning cannot lead to
practical success by relying on mere fictions. Moderate realism thus
presents itself as an attempt to account for the soundness of
conceptual cognitions, and to do so in a way that is more intuitive
than the antirealist model.



In Gelukpa textbooks, universals and specific instances are defined in
terms of each other: a universal is something instantiated by its
instances, the instances are what is subsumed by a kind, or universal.
To qualify as an instance, three criteria must be satisfied, namely,
*x* is a specific instance of *y* if


1. *x* is *y*
2. *x* has a relation of essential identity with *y*
3. there are other instances of *y* different from
*x*.



There is thus no intrinsic difference between particular and
universal, those are relative notions. For instance, "pen"
is a universal with regard to "red pen," which is its
particular (a red pen is a pen, and is essentially identical with pen,
and there are other instances of pen, such as a blue pen, that are not
a red pen). But "pen" is also a particular with regard to
"impermanence," and "red pen" is a universal
with regard to "plastic red pen."



Further, the instantiation of a universal by its specific instance is
taken to be a relation that obtains in reality, rather than amounting
to a constructed superimposition. The red pen really is a pen; it is
not merely apprehended under the superimposed universal
"pen" due to its being excluded from non-pen.



The relation between the instance and the universal is expressed by
the formula "one nature and distinct exclusions" (or
"distinct distinguishers for one nature," Tib. *ngo bo
gcig la ldog pa tha dad*). The term "exclusion" brings
us back to the theory of *apoha*. When proponents of
antirealism use this formula, they mean that various conceptual
distinctions can be made with regard to a unique particular, by
distinguishing it from various complementary domains; for instance,
one can conceive of a particular as excluded from non-blue, from
non-impermanent, from non-material, etc. For the moderate realist,
however, this distinction is not a mere conceptual one, it extends to
reality, although it does not entail a distinction pertaining to the
substance. There are thus real properties that can be predicated, but
they are not intrinsically distinct from their subject. If one accepts
real predicates, then the universals that are the referents of the
corresponding expressions must also be accepted.



Both the antirealist and the moderate realist models attempt to bridge
the gap between universals and particulars by grounding universals in
reality, the antirealist one by involving causality in the process of
concept formation, the moderate realist one by implying a
correspondence in reality to our conceptual distinctions. The second
model, although it provides a more intuitively acceptable explanation,
meets with difficulties. If taking conceptual divisions as actual
divisions is not without tensions, the mere fact of positing real
universals is problematic in the commentarial tradition of an
antirealist forefather. A key move in this regard is to distinguish
the idea of a universal qua mental construct, and a universal qua a
phenomena common to several instances. In the second sense, a
universal needs not be unreal.



Other models of moderate realism were developed in the Sakyapa
tradition, that also invoke the necessity for the existence of a real
shared property without which our thinking would be arbitrary. Uyukpa
Rikpe Sengge (*'U yug pa Rigs pa'i seng
ge*, 13th c.), who adopts such a line of
interpretation, explains Dharmakirti's refutation of real
universals as referring to a "mental universal," the
mistaken conflation of distinct things under a unitary appearance. His
view of an "objective universal" involves the theory of
*apoha*, in a way that takes the exclusion from non-x as a fact
rather than as a mental construct.



Another Sakyapa author who adopts moderate realism is Podong
Chokle Namgyel (*Bo dong Phyogs las rnam rgyal*,
1376-1451). He qualifies as a realist insofar as he
distinguishes between universal qua construct and universal qua common
phenomena, and accuses the antirealists of nihilism. He nonetheless
criticizes other Tibetan versions of moderate realism, which he
considers to be prone to Dharmakirti's critique against
real universals. His solution, akin to Uyukpa's, is to
reformulate the universal negatively as a real elimination; a solution
which, however, does not escape the faults he himself addressed
against the positive version of real universals.



Moderate realism is traditionally ascribed to Chapa and scholars of
the Sangpu school in general. However, the earliest occurrence of
explicit arguments in favor of real universals identified so far is in
the works of Chumikpa in the last phase of the pre-classical period
that already overlaps with the classical one.


## 3. Philosophy of language


### 3.1 The object of words



Language is dealt with in Tibetan epistemological treatises in terms
of the relationship between "what expresses" (*rjod
byed*) and "what is expressed" (*brjod
bya*)--two notions that come quite close to the Saussurian
distinction between "signifier" and
"signified."



According to the basic presuppositions of Buddhist ontology,
"words" consist in singular sound emissions uttered at a
specific place and time, and the "objects" that are
interacted with as a consequence of language use are momentary and
unique particulars. Although words and objects appear to be what
expresses and what is expressed, the success of language cannot rely
on a relation between particular words and particular objects, for
this would not provide the generalizability necessary for language to
have any practical utility. Particular words express particular
objects only in virtue of the conventional relation established,
within a linguistic community, between generic words and meanings.



Accordingly, Tibetan models distinguish between (i) a "direct
signifier" and a "directly signified"--a
generic word (*sgra spyi*) and a generic object, identified as
a "*don spyi*" (the term was previously translated
as "concept" when discussing the apprehended object of
conceptual cognition)--and (ii) a "conceived
signifier" and a "conceived signified," the
particular sound emission and the particular object.




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| (i) |  direct signifier

(*dngos kyi rjod byed = sgra spyi*) | directly signified

(*dngos kyi brjod bya = don spyi/sgra don*) |
| (ii) | conceived signifier

(*zhen pa'i rjod byed = sgra [rang gi mtshan nyid]*) | conceived signified

(*zhen pa'i brjod bya = don [rang gi mtshan nyid]*) |



There are two main issues with this model, one is the relation between
the direct signifier and signified and the conceived ones, the other
is the understanding of what is the "directly
signified."



(a) The question of establishing relations between generic words and
meaning whereas there exist, in reality, only particular sound
utterances and objects, and the question of interaction with these
particulars relying on generic words and meanings echo the issue
already met with in the context of conceptual processes and actions
relying on them, namely, bridging the gap between the conceptual realm
and reality. The expression "conceived" (*zhen pa*)
is here also indicative of a process of intentional determination that
involves the mistaken identification of the conceptual fiction with
extra-mental reality. Sakya Pandita distinguishes the context of
"explanation," where one differentiates between
"direct" and "conceived" signifier and
signified, between generic and specific words and objects, and the
context of "action," that is, practical language use. In
the context of "action"--this includes
convention-setting and application of conventions--these
differences are blurred for speakers and hearers. The double
articulation of the conceptual and reality thus holds together thanks
to spontaneous mistaken identifications that take place while learning
and applying linguistic conventions.



The divergences discussed in the section on universals between
antirealists and moderate realists are reflected when it comes to
language: while antirealists hold that language, just like conceptual
thought, merely deals with fictions, moderate realists argue that
language captures real features of the world, even if only in a
distorted fashion. They thereby admit real properties shared by
discrete instances. These properties are (due to commentarial
requirements) presented in negative terms, as "objective
exclusions." For later Gelukpa authors, the "not being
non-x" (some authors do not bother with the double negation)
shared by several instances is the main object of the convention,
while the corresponding concept, the *don spyi*, is its
secondary object.



For a justification of the success of language, antirealists can
appeal to the theory of *apoha* and the explanation involving
causality in concept formation. Indeed, words reflect conceptual
distinctions that can also be understood as constructed universals;
language can only occur within a system of concepts. In
Dharmakirti's system, which is here presupposed, words are
associated via conventions not with an object, but with a
"distinction" which requires a bipartition of particulars
in two complementary domains. A word can be associated to this
distinction of *x*s from non-*x*s at the time of an
agreement. Subsequently, any use of an utterance that is a token of
this word indicates nothing else than the elimination of
non-*x*s, but can lead to obtain a particular excluded from
non-*x*s. The causal process involved in the process of concept
formation is what ensures success, provided that conventions are
established and learned successfully.



(b) The identification of the "directly signified" prompts
divergences among Tibetan scholars.



For authors who accept that conceptual cognition has an apprehended
object, this object (the concept [*don spyi*]) is also what is
directly signified by a word. A word utterance triggers the emergence
of such an appearing object in the mind of the hearer. The distinction
between "direct" and "conceived" signified
supports a distinction between sense and reference. Distinct words
trigger the emergence of distinct "generic
objects"--there are distinct "directly
signified." The corresponding "conceived signified"
can be distinct as well (for instance for the emergence of the generic
objects "pot" and "pillar") or the same (for
instance a particular blue pot is the conceived signified for both the
generic objects "pot" and "blue"). Some
authors of the pre-classical period contend that some distinct
words--true synonyms--generate the apparition of the same
generic object, thus parting with the ultra-intensionality that reigns
in Dharmakirti's system, where each word is ascribed a
unique way of excluding something from what it is not.



Note that the generic object is not unanimously accepted as the
signified even among authors that admit that it is the apprehended
object of conceptual awareness. Chumikpa for instance prescribes as
signified "a generic object mixed with a generic word."
Accordingly, what appears in conceptual cognition upon hearing a
particular word is a mixed aspect of the corresponding generic word
and generic object. The extra-mental entity is obtained via an
operation of determination pertaining to the generic object, which is
the apprehended object of conceptual awareness.



That conceptual cognitions have an apprehended object is not admitted
by all Tibetan scholars, and, as seen above, is criticized in
particular by Sakya Pandita. The latter nevertheless adopts the same
basic linguistic model as his predecessors, using for the
"directly signified" the more Dharmakirtian
expression "verbal object" (Tib. *sgra don*, Skt.
*sabdartha*) alternatively to the expressions
"generic object" (*don spyi*). However, the point
of contention discussed in the context of the threefold typology of
objects re-emerges, as this author insists that such a signifier
actually does not exist (it is not a causally efficient particular)
and is not even properly speaking an "object." Still Sakya
Pandita adopts, phenomenologically speaking, a view that is quite
similar to the one he criticizes: while his opponents speak of a
"generic object appearing to conceptual awareness," Sakya
Pandita accepts that there is the emergence of an "image"
or "reflection" (Tib. *gzugs brnyan*, Skt.
*pratibimba*/*pratibha*) in conceptual thought. But
as far as meaning is concerned, Sakya Pandita holds the more radical
view that words actually do not signify anything: a word does not have
any object, because nothing qualifies as such. One can speak, but only
metaphorically, of the extra-mental particular as being
"signified" insofar as it is what one obtains when acting
upon the determination in which generic and specific, conceptual and
real, are confused. This extra-mental particular alone can provide the
basis for intersubjective agreement about the object of words. The
generic object could not play this role: being private, it would in
any case not be able to play any epistemic role.



This model is constructed as a way to bridge the gap between
conceptual processes and reality, and, consequently, focuses on
language use in transactional usage involving real entities. If the
use of words expressing non-entities can be accounted for, it however
turns out to be problematic, in a model where meaning is only acquired
indirectly through a mistaken process of conflating a conceptual
fiction and reality, to talk about abstract entities, such as first-
or second-order properties. For instance, the word "red"
could only acquire a meaning in the sense of a red particular, i.e.,
as "something red," but not as the "property
red." As a consequence, heterological predicates are ruled out,
for both the word for the subject and the word for the property are
related to the same particular in the process of mistaken
identification with an extra-mental entity. For instance, expressing
the idea that "(the particular) sound is audible but (the
property) audible is not audible" would be problematic if
"audible" only means "what is audible." In
contrast, advocates of concepts being the apprehended object of
conceptual cognition can account for metalinguistic discussions by
keeping open the possibility that, via the operation of intentional
determination, the concept is conceived as a concept (and not
systematically as an extra-mental particular).


### 3.2 The theory of definition



A significant contribution of Tibetan epistemology which can be
included within the philosophy of language is the discussion of
definition and the related issue of predication. The specificity of
the Tibetan theory of definition is that it takes into account not two
elements--a definiens and a definiendum--but three
elements--the definiens, the definiendum, and the definitional
basis--along a model which bears many similarities with that of
inference. "Defining" thus relies on the relation between
the definiens and the definiendum, but actually consists in the
establishment that some definiendum is fit to be applied to some
definitional basis on account of the relevant definiens; for instance,
that "John is fit to be called 'man' because he is a
rational animal," or to take a more indigenous example, that
"the white calf is fit to be called 'cow' because it
has a hump and a dewlap."



Discussions on definition focus on the identification of the instances
of each of the three elements (what can be a definiens, a definiendum,
or a definitional basis) and on their respective definition, leading
in particular to the question whether a definiens requires a
definiens. Another issue is that of the nature of the distinction
between the three elements.



The evaluation of a definition relies on three criteria that a correct
definiens must fulfill: (i) the definiens applies to the definitional
basis, (ii) the definiens can be understood without relying on an
extrinsic motive, and (iii) the definiens has the same connotation and
denotation as the definiendum.



The second requirement underlines a difference between the definiens
and the definiendum, expressed in Tibetan in terms of the first being
"substantially existent," the second "nominally
existent." The latter thus depends on the understanding of
something else--here the definiens. According to the third
requirement, definiens and definiendum must be co-extensive, but only
a single definiens provides the specific denotation of the
definiendum. For instance, "causally efficient" is not the
definiens of "impermanent" even though everything that is
causally efficient is impermanent and vice-versa, because it is not
held to be directly contradictory to "permanent," the way
"not remaining for a second moment" (the accepted
definiens of "impermanent") is.