## 1. Preliminaries


### 1.1 Some Further Examples of Indexicals, Some Terminology, and a Contrast with Ambiguity




The indexicals that philosophers have studied most are the pronouns
'I', 'he', 'she', 'it',
'this', and 'that'; the adverbs
'here', 'now', 'today',
'yesterday', 'tomorrow', and
'actually'; and the adjectives 'my',
'his', 'her', 'present',
'past', and 'actual'. The items on this list
come mostly from David Kaplan's influential work on indexicals,
*Demonstratives* (Kaplan 1989a).




Indexicals are commonly called *context-sensitive
expressions* (or *context-dependent expressions*) but the
two terms tend to be used differently. The term 'indexical'
tends to be restricted to simple expressions, such as 'I'
and 'today'. The term 'context-sensitive',
however, is commonly applied both to simple indexicals and to complex
expressions that contain simple indexicals, for example, the definite
description 'the dog she is looking at', the verb phrase
'sat next to me', and the sentence 'He is
standing'.




The rough characterization of indexicals in the first sentence of
this article might be rejected by some theorists, for it relies on the
notion of a linguistic *expression* (such as 'you')
varying in reference, and content, among *contexts*. But some
theorists instead describe indexicality in terms of expressions varying
in reference or content relative to *utterances* or other sorts
of speech acts, such as assertions. Other theorists speak of
*utterances* or *tokens* varying in reference or content,
without any relativization to context or speech act. Some theorists
speak several ways. The differences may be theoretically significant,
and more will be said about them below. In addition, some philosophers
would prefer to speak entirely about shifts in extension, rather than
shifts in reference, from context to context. Some theorists, for
instance, hold that 'you' is not a singular term that
refers to an individual in a context. Rather, it is a quantifier
phrase, and so its extension, in a context, is not an individual, but
rather a certain sort of set. (See section 5.2 below for an analogous
view of complex demonstratives.) Such a theorist may also wish to use
the term 'reference' only for expressions whose extensions
are individuals. This article, however, will use
'reference' and 'extension' more-or-less
interchangeably. On this use of 'reference', the word
'you' varies in reference from context to context, even if
it is a quantifier phrase whose extension, in a context, is not an
individual, but a set.




Indexicality should be distinguished from *ambiguity*.
Ambiguous simple expressions, such as 'bank' and
'bat', have a fixed, limited number of different meanings
determined by linguistic convention. Indexicals, by contrast, seem to
have a single linguistic meaning that is fixed by linguistic
convention, but also another sort of meaning (content) that varies from
occasion to occasion, or context to context. For instance, it seems that
'you' has a single meaning fixed by linguistic convention,
and it is because of this fixed linguistic meaning that the sentence
'You are hungry' can have a virtually unlimited number of
contents, in different contexts.


### 1.2 Indexical and Non-Indexical Uses of Pronouns




Some of the expressions in the earlier list of indexicals have both
indexical and non-indexical uses. In particular, the pronouns
'he', 'she', 'his', and
'hers' appear to have three different types of use:
indexical uses (sometimes called *deictic* or
*demonstrative* uses), *bound variable* uses, and
*unbound anaphoric* uses (Kaplan 1989a, pp. 489-90; Partee
1989).




The pronouns in (1)-(2) would typically be used as indexicals in
utterances of (1)-(2) that are accompanied by pointing gestures.


* (1)

He was born in Detroit. [Pointing at John]
* (2)

Her paper was published. [Pointing at Mary]




When used demonstratively, the extensions and contents of
'he', 'her', and sentences (1) and (2) can vary
from context to context, depending in some way on the speaker's
demonstrations or referential intentions or other contextual
factors.




By contrast, the occurrence of 'he' and
'her' in (3) and (4), on the relevant ways of understanding
them, function like occurrences of variables bound by quantifier
phrases.


* (3)

Every young boy thinks that he will go to school.
* (4)

Every young girl rode her bike.




Consequently, we could reasonably symbolize (3) and (4) with (5) and
(6) below.


* (5)

(Every \(x: x\) is a young boy) \(x\) thinks that \(x\) will go to school.
* (6)

(Every \(x: x\) is a young girl) \(x\) rode \(x\)'s bike.




The contents of (5) and (6) do not vary from context to context (or
at least do not do so in virtue of the occurrences of the
pronouns).




Finally, these same pronouns are also sometimes used as *unbound
anaphors*. That is, some occurrences seem not to be used
demonstratively, and not to be within the scope of prior explicit
quantifier phrases or other binding linguistic expressions, and yet
seem to depend for their interpretation on prior occurrences of
linguistic expressions. (See the entries on 
 anaphora and 
 discourse representation theory.) 
For example, 'he' appears to be used as an unbound anaphor
in discourse (7) and 'she' seems to be so used in (8).


* (7)

Johnny was riding a bike. He was having a good time.
* (8)

A woman came to my office today. She worked for Gigantic Academic
Press. She tried to persuade me to adopt their logic book.




These three uses of pronouns seem quite different. Consequently,
Kaplan (1989b, p. 572) sometimes says that 'he' is
lexically ambiguous, and that the demonstrative 'he' and
the anaphoric 'he' are homonymous expressions (Kaplan
1989b, p. 593). Most theorists, however, do not hold that these
pronouns are ambiguous or that these uses involve distinct homonymous
words. Many theorists who work on demonstratives and anaphora
emphasize their similarities to variables. For demonstratives and
variables, see Heim and Kratzer 1998, chapter 9; for anaphora and
variables, see Kamp and Reyle 1993, Chierchia 1992, and Salmon
2006. For related discussion, see Partee (1989), Condoravdi and Gawron
(1996), and Neale (2005).




For the rest of this article, we concentrate exclusively on
demonstrative uses of the above pronouns.


### 1.3 Distinctions among Types of Indexicals




Various theorists classify indexicals into types, depending
(roughly) on how their references and contents are determined in a
context. Kaplan (1989a), for instance, distinguishes between *pure
indexicals* and *true demonstratives*. The pure indexicals,
he says, include 'I', 'today',
'tomorrow', 'actual', 'present',
'here', and 'now'. The true demonstratives
include 'he', 'she', 'his',
'her', and 'that'. Kaplan claims that the
reference and content of a true demonstrative, in a context, depends
(roughly) on the speaker's accompanying demonstrations or
intentions. For example, Kaplan says that the reference and content of
'that' in a context is determined (in part) by the
speaker's pointing gestures or by the speaker's intention
to refer to a particular object. The reference and content of a pure
indexical does not. For example, the reference of 'I' in a
context is always the speaker, whether or not she points at herself,
and the reference of 'tomorrow' is always the day after the
day of the context, no matter which day the speaker intends to refer
to.




John Perry (1997; 2001, pp. 58-62) makes a closely related
distinction between *automatic* and *discretionary*
indexicals. Automatic indexicals include 'I' and
'tomorrow'; Perry says they are indexicals whose references
are determined by their linguistic meanings and *public*
contextual facts, such as the speaker and the day of utterance;
intentions (other than the intention to use the indexical with its
usual meaning) are irrelevant. Discretionary indexicals include
'he', 'she', 'that', and
'this man'; they depend for reference on speakers'
intentions. Perry also makes an orthogonal distinction between
*narrow* and *wide* indexicals. Narrow indexicals are
those whose references are determined by *narrow contexts*,
where narrow contexts include only a speaker, a time, and a location.
Wide contexts include other facts, such as speakers' intentions,
assumptions made by conversational participants, and so on. The
expressions that Kaplan calls 'true demonstratives' Perry
would call 'wide discretionary indexicals'.




Various complications arise in categorizing indexicals as pure
indexicals and true demonstratives, or as automatic and discretionary.
Kaplan (1989) classifies 'here' and 'now' as
pure indexicals, though he thinks that the temporal and spatial extents
of their extensions depend on speakers' intentions (Kaplan 1989a,
419, n.12). Perry (1997, 2001) thinks that this sort of variation
justifies classifying them as discretionary rather than automatic.
Other indexicals may raise similar issues. For example,
'today' may initially appear to be an automatic indexical
in Perry's sense, but sometimes it is seemingly used to refer to
temporal periods longer than a single day, as in 'Today we ride
in automobiles rather than in horse-drawn carriages'. For further
discussion of these distinctions, and their viability, see Mount
(2008).


### 1.4 Reference-Fixing, and Content-Fixing, for True Demonstratives




Many theorists accept a distinction between true demonstratives and
pure indexicals, or some similar distinction, such as Perry's
distinction between automatic and discretionary indexicals. Thus
many think that true demonstratives (from here on, simply
*demonstratives*) require something more than pure indexicals to
acquire a reference and content. The nature of this "extra
something" is controversial, but two widely discussed candidates
are *demonstrations* (or *pointing gestures*) and
*speakers' intentions*.




In his 1989a, Kaplan emphasizes the role of pointing gestures in
fixing the reference (and content) of a demonstrative. More precisely,
he says that the reference of a demonstrative in a context is fixed by
a *demonstration*, which he describes as "typically,
though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local object
discriminated by a pointing." (1989a, p. 490). Kaplan changes his
mind in his 1989b. He there states that he had always thought that a
demonstration is "typically directed by the speaker's
intention to point at a perceived individual on whom he has
focused." He then calls such intentions *directing
intentions* and says that he has come to "regard the
directing intention, at least in the case of perceptual demonstratives,
as criterial, and to regard the demonstration as a mere
*externalization* of this inner intention." (1989b,
p. 582)




Other theorists have proposed other accounts. Michael Devitt (1981)
says that the referent of an utterance of 'that' is the
item that stands in a certain causal relation to the utterance. Colin
McGinn (1981) proposes that the referent of an utterance of 'that
\(F\)' is the first \(F\) to intersect the line
projected from the speaker's pointing finger. Howard Wettstein
(1984) says that the reference of 'that' is determined by
the cues that a competent and attentive addressee would reasonably take
the speaker to be exploiting. Marga Reimer (1991a, 199b) argues that
demonstrative utterances can refer to objects that are not the targets
of the speaker's directing intentions, contrary to what she takes
Kaplan (1989b) to be arguing. Kent Bach (1992a, 1992b) claims that the
object to which a speaker refers with a demonstrative is fixed by
certain of the speaker's communicative intentions. Perry (2009,
p. 60) argues that the referent of an utterance of a demonstrative is
the object of a directing intention, and offers a rather elaborate
theory of directing intentions that is inspired by some brief remarks
from Kaplan. Jeffrey King (2012) argues that the semantic value of a
demonstrative in a context is the object such that (a) the speaker
intends it to be the demonstrative's semantic value and (b) an
attentive hearer would take it to be the speaker's intended
semantic value.




One *prima facie* problem for demonstration-theories is that
demonstratives sometimes refer in contexts in which the speaker does
not produce a pointing gesture. If 'here' and
'now' are true demonstratives, or discretionary indexicals,
then they may present a particular difficulty for
demonstration-theories, for pointing gestures often seem irrelevant to
determining their referents and contents in contexts. One *prima
facie* problem for intention-theorists is that speakers typically
have many intentions when they use demonstratives, and these intentions
may conflict (Bach 1992a, 1992b; Perry 1997, 2001 p. 60, 2009; King
2013). For example, a speaker who utters 'he' may intend to
speak about Joe, about the man that she sees, about the man that others
are referring to, and about the man at whom she is pointing. The
speaker may think these are the same person when they are not.


## 2. Which Expressions are Indexicals?




Nearly all semantic theorists would agree that the list of simple
indexicals given in section 1.1 is incomplete. Nearly all would agree
that a more complete list includes the plural terms 'we',
'us', 'ours', 'they',
'them', 'theirs', 'these' and
'those', and most would be willing to add the adjective
'current' and the adverbs 'then',
'presently', 'currently', and
'there'. Many theorists have proposed further additions to
the list of simple indexicals, but these additions are
controversial.


### 2.1 Some Expressions that Have Been Said to Be Indexicals




A semantic theory that says that an expression is context-sensitive,
or is an indexical expression, is a *contextualist* theory of
that expression. A theory that says that an expression is
context-*in*sensitive is an *invariantist* theory. Below
is a list of types of expressions for which contextualist theories have
been proposed, along with some discussion.



*Tense* Some theorists hold that sentences containing verbs
in the present tense vary not only in truth-value from time to time,
but also in content, from context to context. For example, some hold
that the content of 'Fred is hungry' at a context whose
associated time is \(t\) is (roughly) that Fred be hungry at
\(t\). The variation in content is said to be due to the
occurrence of 'is', which is context-sensitive. More
generally, tense markers and tense morphology are claimed to be
context-sensitive expressions. See Reichenbach 1947, Partee 1973, Enc
1987, Salmon 1989, Ogihara 1996, and King 2003.



*Modals* Paradigmatic modal terms include
'necessary' and 'necessarily',
'possible' and 'possibly',
'contingent' and 'contingently',
'must', 'might', 'could',
'may', 'can', and 'able'. Some
theorists would include many more expressions (Portner 2009). Speakers
who utter a modal may mean different sorts of modality on different
occasions. Examples: (a) Someone who utters 'Sue can go to the
party' may mean (roughly) that her going to the party is
consistent with her plans (*practical*
or *circumstantial* possibility) or instead that her going is
(merely) consistent with the laws of nature (*nomological*
possibility). (b) If Jill utters 'Joe might have been in London
this morning', she may mean that Joe's being in London is
consistent with her knowledge, whereas if Bill utters that same
sentence, he may mean that Joe's being in London is consistent
with his (Bill's) knowledge. In both cases, *epistemic*
possibility is involved. (c) If Susan utters 'Alice might have
run three miles', she might mean that Alice's having run
three miles is consistent with Alice's metaphysical essence
(*metaphysical* possibility) or that Alice's having run
is consistent with her (Susan's) knowledge. (d) Someone who
utters 'Mary may go to school' may mean that her going to
school is morally permissible or instead that it is legally
permissible. In both cases, a variety of *deontic* possibility
is involved. Many theorists attribute the preceding sorts of variation
to context-sensitivity in the relevant modals. Those who think that
modals are semantically like quantifiers over possible worlds
typically hold that the content of a modal, in a context, is the same
as a restricted quantifier over possible worlds, where the relevant
restriction varies from context to context. See Kratzer 1977, 2012;
and Lewis 1979b.



*Gradable Adjectives* Paradigm examples of gradable adjectives
are 'tall', 'old', 'rich',
'fast', 'smart', and 'hot'. They
are called 'gradable' because they can be felicitously
modified with adverbs such as 'fairly' and
'very'. Suppose that Susan is both a professional
philosopher and a professional basketball player. A speaker who utters
'Susan is tall' might use 'tall' to mean (very
roughly) *tall for a philosopher*. That same speaker, on
another occasion, might utter 'Susan is not tall' and use
'not tall' to mean (roughly) *not tall for a basketball
player*. Some theorists explain the variability by holding that
gradable adjectives are context-sensitive. See Kennedy 2007.



*Adjectives and Nouns that Optionally Take Complements*
Paradigm examples of adjectives of this sort are 'ready',
'late', 'relevant', 'local', and
'eligible', and paradigm examples of nouns of this sort are
'neighbor' and 'enemy'. A speaker who utters
'Tipper is ready' typically means that Tipper is ready for
\(X\), where \(X\) is some event or activity the speaker has
in mind. In one context, a speaker might mean that Tipper is ready to
work; in another context, he might mean that Tipper is ready for a
certain party. Therefore, some theorists hold that 'ready'
is context-sensitive. Somewhat similarly, a speaker who utters
'Smith is a neighbor' may mean that Smith is a neighbor of
his (the speaker's) or that Smith is a neighbor of someone else (say,
Jones). Again, it may be claimed that 'neighbor' is
context-sensitive. See Partee 1989, Condoravdi and Gawron 1996,
Bach 2005, Gauker 2012.




'*Know*' Speakers in some contexts may judge that
the sentence 'John knows that the bank will be open on
Saturday' is true. Speakers in other contexts who are aware of
the same facts about John may, at the same time, judge that this same
sentence is false. Consequently some philosophers hold that
'know' has different contents in different contexts,
depending on the standards of justification that speakers of the
context take for granted, or depending on the epistemic alternatives
that are salient to the speakers of that context. See Cohen 1988,
DeRose 1995, Lewis 1996, and the entry on 
 epistemic contextualism.



*Quantifier phrases* Examples of *quantifiers* are
'every', 'all', 'some',
'no', 'most', 'many', and
'few'. *Quantifier phrases* are (roughly) noun
phrases or determiner phrases that include both a quantifier and a
common noun or noun phrase, for example, 'every student',
'some dog', and 'no black cats'. Two speakers
who utter the same sentence containing a quantifier phrase may mean
different things. If Smith is teaching a class of first-graders and
utters 'Every student has a pencil', he means something
like *every student in Smith's first-grade class has a
pencil*'. If Jones is proctoring a multiple-choice exam in a
large college course, and utters that same sentence, then she means
something like *every student taking exam E has a pencil*,
where \(E\) is the relevant exam. This phenomenon is often
called *quantifier-domain restriction*. Some theorists propose
to explain this variation by hypothesizing that quantifier phrases are
context-sensitive. See von Fintel 1994, Stanley and Szabo 2000.




Theorists have proposed contextualist theories for many other
expressions, including: Conditionals (Lewis 1973, Kratzer 2012,
 and the entry on 
 conditionals); deontic terms, such as 'ought' and
'should' (Lewis 1973, Kratzer 2012, Portner 2009);
perspectival expressions, such as 'come', 'go',
'left', 'right', and 'behind'
(Lewis 1979b); weather predicates, such as 'rain' and
'hot' (see Sennett 2008 for an overview); propositional
attitude verbs, such as 'believe' (Richard 1990,
and the entry on 
 propositional attitude reports); common nouns, such as
'student' and 'table' (Stanley and Szabo 2000);
and vague expressions, which include nearly all expressions in natural
languages (Raffman 1996, Soames 1999, Fara 2000, 
and the entry on 
 vagueness).




If the above expressions are indexicals, then their contents seem to
depend (at least in part) on speakers' intentions. They are not,
however, appropriately called 'true demonstratives', for
pointing gestures seem completely irrelevant to fixing their contents
and references. Perry's term 'discretionary
indexical' would be more apt.


### 2.2 Strict Contextualism, Invariantism with Hidden Indexicals, and Invariantism with Unarticulated Constituents




Contextualist theories for an expression should be distinguished
from invariantist theories that hypothesize *hidden indexicals*.
On views of the latter sort, the expression itself is
context-*in*sensitive, but its occurrences are (often)
accompanied by occurrences of an unpronounced expression that is
context-sensitive. These context-sensitive expressions are sometimes
said to be, or to resemble, indexicals, pronouns, or variables. For
illustration, consider the gradable adjective 'rich'. A
*strict* contextualist theory would claim that this adjective is
a unary predicate whose content in any context is a *unary
property*. In some contexts, the content of 'rich' is
(roughly) the property of being rich for a philosopher, while in others
its content is the property of being rich for the CEO of a large
company. By contrast, an *invariantist theory* *with hidden
indexicals* for 'rich' would claim that the content of
'rich' does not vary from context to context: its content,
in every context, is the same *binary relation*, roughly
*rich for*, that can hold between a person and (roughly) a
property. Sometimes the predicate 'rich' appears in
sentences in which it has two (linguistic) arguments, as in
'George is rich for a philosopher'. But in sentences in
which there is no *pronounced* second argument, as in
'George is rich', the predicate 'rich' is
accompanied by an unpronounced occurrence of a context-sensitive
expression that resembles a pronoun. In some contexts, the content of
the hidden indexical is the property of being a philosopher and in
others it is the property of being a CEO of a large company. See Partee
(1989), Condoravdi and Gawron (1996), Stanley and Szabo 2000.




A third type of theory for 'rich' is an invariantist
theory with *unarticulated constituents* (Perry 2000, Chapter
10). On such views, 'rich' is a binary predicate whose
content in all contexts is the previously mentioned binary relation
*rich for*, but the word is never accompanied by a hidden
indexical. Thus the content of the sentence 'George is
rich', in all contexts, is less than fully propositional.
However, according to some views of this sort, a speaker who utters
that sentence typically asserts a full proposition, such as the
proposition that George is rich for a philosopher. For discussion, see
Bach 1994, 2005.


### 2.3 Strategies for Resisting Attributions of Context-Sensitivity




Some theorists , as we have seen, hold that indexicality extends far
beyond Kaplan's list, and pervades natural language. Others deny
this. Many opponents of pervasive context-sensitivity rely heavily on
pragmatics and speech act theory to explain away the phenomena that
others take to be evidence for pervasive context-sensitivity. For
example, Bach (2001) and Soames (2009) argue that quantifier phrases
are context-*in*sensitive. The content of 'every
student', in all contexts, quantifies over absolutely all
students. So, the content 'Every student has a pencil', in
all contexts, is equivalent to the content of 'Every student
*in the entire universe* has a pencil'. But Bach and
Soames say that speakers who utter that sentence almost always
*mean*, *convey*, or *assert* a proposition other
than the content of the sentence. When Smith utters 'Every
student has a pencil' he asserts or means that every student
*in Smith's first-grade class* has a pencil (or some
similar proposition), though this is not the content of the sentence in
his context. Cappelen and Lepore (2005) similarly hold that
'tall' is context-insensitive. The content of 'Mary
is tall', in every context, is simply the proposition that Mary
is tall, with no relativization to a property (or scale or comparison
class). However, a speaker who utters that sentence usually asserts or
means a richer proposition, such as that Mary is tall *for a
philosopher*. For discussions of related views, see Bach 1994,
Carston 2002, Borg 2007, Recanati 2004, Gauker 2012, Braun 2012.




Other theorists resist pervasive context-sensitivity by appealing to
shiftiness in extension without shiftiness in content. To obtain
shiftiness in extension without shiftiness in content, these theorists
*relativize* extensions of expressions to non-traditional
parameters. Such views are often called *relativist*. For
example, Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (2005) and MacFarlane (2011)
argue for relativist theories of epistemic uses of 'might'.
On their views, 'Susan might be in Boston', when used
epistemically, has the same content in all contexts, but the
truth-value of this content varies not only from one possible world to
another, but also from one body of knowledge to another within a single
possible world. Lasersohn (2005) similarly argues that predicates of
personal taste, such as 'tasty' and 'fun', do
not vary in content from context to context, but do vary in extension
with respect to *judges*, or *standards of taste*, within
a single world. See also Stephenson 2007, Richard 2008, Cappelen and
Hawthorne 2009.


### 2.4 Proposed Tests for Indexicality




Given the disagreements about the context-sensitivity of various
expressions, one might wonder whether there is a reliable *test*
for context-sensitivity. In practice, many philosophers seem to employ
the following tests.




Sentence \(S\) is context-sensitive iff it is possible for
there to be two speakers who utter \(S\) (at the same time) and
say different things.




Sentence \(S\) is context-sensitive iff it is possible for
there to be a speaker who utters \(S\) and another speaker who
utters the negation of \(S\) (at the same time), and yet the speakers do
not contradict each other.




Sentences that contain paradigm indexicals pass these tests. But
some opponents of pervasive context-sensitivity would reject them. For
instance, Soames and Bach might admit that Smith and Jones say
different things when they utter 'Every student has a
pencil', but they would not attribute this variation to the
alleged context-sensitivity of the sentence and its quantifier phrase.
Rather, they would claim that Smith and Jones can use the sentence to
say, or assert, propositions that are distinct from the
sentence's constant content.




Another test for context-sensitivity uses attitude ascriptions
(Cappelen and Lepore 2005). Paradigmatic indexicals behave differently
from non-indexicals in attitude ascriptions. Consider the following
utterances.


* (9)

Smith: "Mary is a philosopher."
  
Jones: "Smith said that Mary is a philosopher."
* (10)

Smith: "I am hungry."
  
Jones: "Smith said that I am hungry."




Jones *disquotes* Smith in both of these cases: that is,
Jones utters a says-that ascription whose embedded clause contains the
very sentence that Smith utters. But Jones's says-ascription in
(9) is true (in Jones's context), whereas Jones's
says-ascriptions in (10) is false (in Jones's context). So,
disquotation can fail when the subject of the ascription utters a
context-sensitive sentence. Thus, Cappelen and Lepore propose roughly
the following test for context-sensitivity.




\(S\) is context-sensitive iff: it is possible that [(i)
\(A\) utters sentence \(S\) and yet (ii) "\(A\)
said that \(S\)" is false in some context].




If this test is accepted, then it could be used to argue against the
context-sensitivity of many simple expressions that do not appear on
Kaplan's list. Consider, for instance, the gradable adjective
'rich'. At first glance the following seems impossible:
Smith utters 'George is rich' and yet 'Smith said
that George is rich' is false in some context. If so, then the
above test entails that the sentence is not context-sensitive. The
disquotation test, however, is controversial. For discussion of this
test and others, see Cappelen and Lepore 2005, Cappelen and Hawthorne
2009, Leslie 2007.


## 3. Kaplan's Theory of Indexicals




As mentioned above, Kaplan's theory of indexicals is highly
influential and serves as a starting point for much current theorizing
about indexicals. This section presents some details of his theory.


### 3.1 An Example (Again) and Kaplan's Distinctions




Let us consider again an example that can motivate Kaplan's
theory.


* (11)

Mary: "I am a philosopher."
  
John: "I am a philosopher."




Mary and John utter the same unambiguous sentence, yet they say
different things, for Mary says that she is a philosopher whereas John
says that he is a philosopher. Moreover, we can imagine that Mary is a
philosopher and John is not, so *what Mary says* is true whereas
*what John says* is false. In view of these considerations,
Kaplan (1989a) proposes a distinction between two kinds of meaning,
*character* and *content*. The sentence 'I am a
philosopher' has a single character, but has different contents
with respect to different contexts. Kaplan usually identifies character
with linguistic meaning, which is a kind of meaning fixed by linguistic
convention.


### 3.2 Some Basics of Kaplan's Theory




On Kaplan's (1989a) theory, indexicals have contents
*in*, or *with respect to*, *contexts*. Each
context has associated with it at least an agent, time, location, and
possible world. The content of 'I' with respect to a
context \(c\) is the agent of \(c\). The content of
'here' is the location of \(c\). The content of
'now' is the time of \(c\). The content of
'actually' is (roughly) the property of being the case
(being true) with respect to the world of \(c\).




Kaplan extends his theory of content to linguistic expressions in
general, both simple and complex. On his view, the content of a
predicate, with respect to a context, is a property or relation. The
content of a sentence, with respect to a context, is a *structured
proposition*, that is, a proposition with a constituent structure
whose ultimate constituents are individual, properties, and relations.
(See the entry on 
 structured propositions.) 
The content of a sentence
\(S\) with respect to a context \(c\) has, as its ultimate
constituents, the contents of (roughly) the words in \(S\) with
respect to \(c\).




To illustrate, consider the sentence 'I am a
philosopher'. Suppose that the agent of context
\(c\_1\) is Mary. Then the content of 'I' in
\(c\_1\) is Mary herself, while the content of 'is
a philosopher' in \(c\_1\) is the property of being
a philosopher. The content of the whole sentence, in
\(c\_1\), is a proposition whose constituents are just
those two items. We can represent this proposition with the ordered
pair \(\langle \text{Mary},\) \(\text{being a philosopher} \rangle\). 
A structured proposition which, like the preceding one, has an
individual as a constituent, is a
*singular proposition*. The content of 'I' with
respect to another context \(c\_2\), in which John is the
agent, is John, and the content of 'I am a philosopher' in
\(c\_2\) is the singular proposition 
\(\langle \text{John},\) \(\text{being a philosopher} \rangle\).




(Before continuing, we need a few interpretive qualifications. The
description of contents in the two previous paragraphs, and in the rest
of this subsection, follows the informal parts of Kaplan's work
(1989a, 1989b), in which he often identifies contents with individuals,
properties, relations, and structured propositions. See especially the
preface to *Demonstratives*. But when Kaplan turns to more
technical matters, he represents contents with intensions: see the end
of this section below and also section 3.7. Kaplan even goes so far as
to assert that singular propositions are not a part of his theory
(1989a, p. 496). He might mean by this that they are not a part of his
formal logic of demonstratives; or he may wish to emphasize that one
could accept the core of his theory of indexicals, including his
distinction between character and content, while rejecting structured
contents. In any case, for the rest of this section, we will continue
to describe a version of Kaplan's theory that uses structured
propositions.)




Propositions, on Kaplan's theory, have truth-values with
respect to *circumstances of evaluation*, which Kaplan
identifies with pairs of times and possible worlds, 
\(\langle t, w \rangle\). A single proposition may be true with respect to one
circumstance of evaluation and false with respect another. For example,
the proposition \(\langle \text{Mary}, \text{being a philosopher} \rangle\) may be true at
\(\langle t\_1, w\_1 \rangle\) and yet false at
\(\langle t\_1, w\_2 \rangle\) because, in
\(w\_1\), Mary is a philosopher at time
\(t\_1\), whereas in world \(w\_2\) she is not
a philosopher at time \(t\_1\). Similarly, if time
\(t\_0\) is a time before Mary became a philosopher in
\(w\_1\), and \(t\_1\) is a time after
which she became a philosopher in \(w\_1\), then
\(\langle \text{Mary},\) \(\text{being a philosopher} \rangle\) is false at
\(\langle t\_0, w\_1 \rangle\) but true at
\(\langle t\_1, w\_1 \rangle\). In the remainder
of this section, we will usually, for the sake of simplicity, pretend
that Kaplan's circumstances of evaluation are just possible
worlds, and ignore variation in truth-value over time.




On Kaplan's theory, we can speak not only of the truth-values
of propositions at worlds, but also of the truth-values of
*sentences* at pairs of worlds *and* contexts. The reason
we can do this is that a context determines the content of a sentence,
and the content of that sentence determines a truth-value at a world.
For example, the content of the sentence 'I am a
philosopher' in the context \(c\_1\) described
above is the singular proposition that Mary is a philosopher. This
proposition is true with respect to world \(w\_1\). So,
the *sentence* 'I am a philosopher' is true with
respect to \(c\_1\) *and* \(w\_1\). By
contrast, the content of the sentence 'I am a philosopher'
at the context \(c\_2\) (in which John is the agent) is
the singular proposition that John is a philosopher, and this
proposition is false at \(w\_1\) (let's suppose).
So, the *sentence* 'I am a philosopher' is false
with respect to \(c\_2\) *and* \(w\_1\). So,
the truth-value of the *sentence* 'I am a
philosopher' is *doubly relativized* to both context and
world. This sort of double-relativization is often called
*double-indexing*. (See Vlach 1973 and Kamp 1973 for early
examples of semantic theories that use double-indexing.)




Each context \(c\) is associated with a world, called
'the world of \(c\)'. When a sentence is true with
respect to context \(c\) *and the world of* \(c\), we say
simply that the sentence is *true at* \(c\), without mentioning a
world. But the notion of a sentence's *being true at context* \(c\)
*and world* \(w\) is more fundamental than the notion of a
sentence's *being* (simply) *true at* \(c\), for the
latter notion is defined in terms of the previous notion. Now suppose
that the two contexts mentioned above, \(c\_1\) and
\(c\_2\), have the same associated world
\(w\_1\) (in which, recall, Mary is a philosopher but
John is not). Then the sentence 'I am a philosopher' is
true at context \(c\_1\) and false at context
\(c\_2\).




The content of a sentence, at a context, can also be evaluated for
truth at a world other than the world of the context. This is how the
truth-values of sentences that contain modal operators, such as
'possible', are determined. For example, the content of
'I am a philosopher', with respect to
\(c\_1\), is the singular proposition that Mary is a
philosopher. This proposition is true at \(w\_1\), the
world of context \(c\_1\). But this proposition is false
at world, \(w\_2\), in which Mary goes into mathematics
rather than philosophy. So, the *sentence* is true with respect
to \(c\_1\) and \(w\_1\), but false
with respect to \(c\_1\) and \(w\_2\).
Therefore, the *modal* sentence 'It is *possible*
that I am *not* a philosopher' is true with respect to our
original context and its associated world, \(c\_1\) and
\(w\_1\). Therefore, the modal sentence 'It is
*possible* that I am *not* a philosopher' is simply
true with respect to \(c\_1\). (Notice that this last
remark did not mention a world.)




We can similarly speak of the content of a *singular term*
with respect to a context, and the *extension* or
*referent* of that term, with respect to a context *and*
a world. For example, the definite description 'the person who
invented bifocals' has the same content with respect to all
contexts. (Its content is some type of structured entity that has
various properties and relations as constituents, such as the property
of being a person, the relation of inventing, and so on.) This content
determines different individuals at different worlds, because different
people invent bifocals at different worlds. So, the *referent*
of 'the person who invented bifocals', with respect to a
context *and* a world, varies from world to world, because the
person who invented bifocals varies from world to world. (We assume
here, with Kaplan, that definite descriptions are singular terms rather
than quantifier phrases.)




The situation is reversed for 'I'. The content of
'I' varies from context to context: its content is Mary in
\(c\_1\), John in \(c\_2\), someone
else in \(c\_3\), and so on. But given a single context
\(c\), the referent of 'I' with respect to \(c\)
and world \(w\) is the same for any world \(w\) whatsoever.
For example, if Mary is the content of 'I' with respect to
\(c\_1\), then Mary is the referent of 'I'
with respect to \(c\_1\) and any world whatsoever. That
is why, for any world \(w\), 'I am a philosopher' is
true at \(c\_1\) and \(w\) if and only if
*Mary* is a philosopher in \(w\).




When a singular term refers to object \(o\) with respect to
context \(c\) and *the world of c*, we can simply say that
it refers to \(o\) in \(c\), without separately mentioning a
world. So, 'I' refers to Mary in context
\(c\_1\) above. But once again, the notion of referring
with respect to (or in) \(c\) is the less fundamental notion, and
is defined in terms of the more fundamental relation of referring with
respect to a context \(c\) and a world \(w\).




The content of a linguistic expression, at a context, determines a
corresponding *intension*, which is a function from possible
worlds (circumstances of evaluation, really) to extensions. For
example, the content of 'I' with respect to the context
\(c\_1\) described above is Mary, and the extension of
'I' with respect to \(c\_1\) and any world
\(w\) whatsoever is Mary. The corresponding intension of
'I' with respect to \(c\_1\) is the function
whose value at any world \(w\) is the extension of
'Mary' with respect to \(c\_1\) and
\(w\), which is just Mary herself. The intension of
'I' varies from context to context, just as the content
does; for instance, in context \(c\_2\), the intension of
'I' is the function on worlds whose value at any world is
John.




Two expressions may have different contents in \(c\) and yet
have the same intension in that context. For instance, the contents of
the sentences 'I am a philosopher' and 'I am a
philosopher and either I smoke or I do not smoke' with respect to
\(c\_1\) are distinct structured propositions, for the
content of the second sentence in \(c\_1\) has the
property of smoking as a constituent, whereas the content of the first
one does not. Yet these propositions have the same truth-values at all
worlds, and so they have the same intension in
\(c\_1\). Though contents and intensions are
distinct, we can use intensions to *represent* contents, when we
are willing to ignore fine-grained differences in content. This is what
Kaplan does when he sets out his logic for indexicals (see section
3.7).


### 3.3 True Demonstratives in Kaplan's Theory




Kaplan contemplates two ways of extending his theory to true
demonstratives. In his1989a, he uses *dthat-terms* to do so. A
dthat-term is a term of the form "dthat[\(t\)]", where
\(t\) is a singular term, such as a definite description or proper
name. The content of 'dthat[\(t\)]' in a context
\(c\) is the object to which the term \(t\) refers in
\(c\). For example, the content of 'dthat[the dog I see
now]', in a context \(c\), is Fido iff: there is exactly one
dog in the world of \(c\) whom the agent of \(c\) sees at the
time of \(c\) in the world of \(c\), and that dog is Fido.
Kaplan (1989a) uses dthat-terms to represent the demonstrative
'that' together with a type of demonstration. Kaplan holds
that a type of demonstration presents a demonstratum in a particular
way, and a definite description (that may contain indexicals) can
capture the way in which the demonstration presents the demonstratum.
Thus, Kaplan (1989a) might use the dthat-term 'dthat[the dog I
see to my left]' to represent Mary's use of the word
'that' together with the type of demonstration that she
uses to present a dog to her left. If Mary utters 'That is larger
than that' while pointing first to a dog to her left and then to
a dog to her right, then Kaplan might use the formal sentence (12) to
represent Mary's sentence-plus-demonstrations.


* (12)

Dthat[the dog I see to my left] is larger than dthat[the dog I see to my right].




If \(c\) is a context in which the agent of \(c\) sees
Fido to her left and Rover to her right, then the content in \(c\)
of the first dthat-term is Fido and the content of the second
dthat-term in \(c\) is Rover. Kaplan anticipates treating other
true demonstratives, such as 'you', in similar ways. (For
critical discussion, see Salmon 2002.)




Kaplan presents a different treatment of true demonstratives in his
1989b. Kaplan adds to each context an addressee and a demonstratum, and
stipulates that the content of 'you' in any context
\(c\) is the addressee of \(c\) and the content of
'that' in any context \(c\) is the demonstratum of
\(c\). Contexts may have sequences of multiple addressees and
sequences of multiple demonstrata. Corresponding subscripts can be
added to 'you' and 'that'. If so, the content
of 'you1' with respect to \(c\) is the
first addressee of \(c\), the content of
'you2' in \(c\) is the second addressee of
\(c\), and so on; similarly, the content of
'that1' is the first demonstratum of \(c\),
the content of 'that2' is the second
demonstratum, and so on. (See section 5.3 for more on multiple
occurrences of demonstratives.)


### 3.4 Character




Kaplan (1989a, p. 505) says that he represents the character of an
expression with a function on contexts whose value at any context is
the expression's content at that context. For example, the
content of 'I' at any context \(c\) is the agent
character of \(c\). So the character of 'I' is a
function on contexts whose value at any context \(c\) is the agent
of \(c\). The value of the character of 'I' at a
context in which Mary is the agent is just Mary herself, and its value
at a context in which John is the agent is just John himself. The
character of a sentence is a function whose value at any context is the
structured propositional content of that sentence at that context. For
instance, the character of 'I am a philosopher' is a
function whose value at any context \(c\) in which \(A\) is
the agent of \(c\) is the proposition 
\(\langle A, \text{being a philosopher} \rangle\). 
If Mary is the agent of \(c\), then the value of this function
at \(c\) is 
\(\langle \text{Mary}, \text{being a philosopher} \rangle\).


### 3.5 Direct Reference and Rigid Designation




Kaplan (1989a) claims that indexicals are devices of *direct
reference*. By this he means that the *content* of an
indexical, with respect to a context \(c\), is the object to which
it refers in \(c\); its content is not a property or descriptive
condition that determines the referent. For example, the content of
'I' in \(c\) is the agent of \(c\); its content
in \(c\) is not the property or descriptive condition of being the
agent of \(c\), or being the speaker of \(c\), or being the
person uttering 'I', or any other sort of property or
descriptive condition.




Kaplan (1989a) also says that indexicals are *rigid
designators*. The notion of a rigid designator comes from Kripke
(1980), who (roughly speaking) defines a rigid designator to be an
expression that designates the same thing with respect to all possible
worlds. When Kaplan claims that indexicals are rigid designators, he
means that if object \(o\) is the referent of expression
\(E\) with respect to context \(c\) and the world of
\(c\), then \(o\) is also the referent of \(E\) with
respect to \(c\) and any other world. For example, if Mary is the
referent of 'I' with respect to \(c\) and the world of
\(c\), then Mary is also the referent of 'I' with
respect to \(c\) and any other world.


### 3.6 Utterances and Expressions in Kaplan's Theory




Linguistic expressions should be distinguished from utterances.
Linguistic expressions are abstract objects. Utterances are events in
which an agent utters a linguistic expression. The word
'the' is a single linguistic expression, but two utterances
of it occur in every utterance of the sentence 'The philosopher
saw the linguist'.




Kaplan's theory does not ascribe characters or contents to
utterances. Rather, it ascribes characters to linguistic expressions,
and contents to expressions *with respect to* contexts. In fact,
Kaplan's theory ascribes contents to expressions with respect to
contexts in which no one utters those expressions. For example, on
Kaplan's theory, the sentence 'I exist' has a content
with respect to every context, and is true in every context, including
contexts in which the agent does not utter that sentence, and including
contexts in which no one in the world of the context speaks English.
The sentence 'I utter nothing' is true in some contexts, on
Kaplan's theory, for there are contexts \(c\) in which the
agent \(A\) of \(c\) utters nothing in the world of
\(c\), and the content of the sentence in \(c\) is the
proposition that \(A\) utters nothing, which is true in the world
of \(c\). This is why Kaplan speaks of the *agent* of a
context rather than the *speaker* of a context.




Nevertheless, Kaplan's theory still has implications for
utterances and speech acts. Suppose that Mary utters the sentence
'I am a philosopher' in world \(w\). Mary's
utterance has an agent in \(w\), namely Mary, and it occurs at a
certain location and time in \(w\). So, her utterance in
\(w\) determines a Kaplanian context. Call this context
'Mary's context'. On Kaplan's theory, the
sentence Mary utters has a content in Mary's context, namely the
singular proposition that Mary is a philosopher. If Mary utters the
sentence assertively, then she (probably) asserts the content of that
sentence in her context. So, Kaplan's theory, together with other
plausible assumptions, has important implications for what Mary asserts
in her utterance.




For further discussion of utterances and expressions, see
Reichenbach 1947, Garcia-Carpintero 1998, Kaplan 1999, Perry 2000, and
section 5.3 below.


### 3.7 Kaplan's Logic for Indexicals: A Few Formal Details




Kaplan (1989a) presents an elaborate logic of indexicals. We shall
concentrate here on aspects of this logic that can be understood
without going deeply into formal details.




The language of Kaplan's logic is that of modal first-order
predicate logic with tense operators and other additions. The additions
include a distinguished predicate 'Exists', a distinguished
binary predicate 'Located', a distinguished constant
'I', a distinguished constant 'Here', and a
function-term 'dthat'.




In standard first-order predicate logic, validity is defined as
truth in all structures (sometimes called 'models') of a
certain sort. In modal logic, validity is typically defined as truth at
every world in every structure of a certain (different) sort. Kaplan
similarly defines validity as truth at every *context* in every
*LD structure*. ('LD' stands for 'the Logic of
Demonstratives'.) Each LD structure contains a set of
contexts, a set of worlds, a set of individuals, a set of positions
(common to all worlds), a set of times (common to all worlds), and a
function that assigns to each predicate and individual constant an
intension, which is a function from time-world pairs to extensions.
(Thus Kaplan's LD structures do not assign structured contents to
expressions in contexts. LD structures use intensions to
*represent* contents.) Each context has an associated agent,
time, position, and world. Various stipulations about structures and
contexts together ensure that, for every context \(c\) in every
structure *M*: (i) the agent of \(c\) is a member of the extension of
'Exist' at the time and world of \(c\), and (ii) the
ordered pair 
\(\langle \text{the agent of } c, \text{the position of } c \rangle\) 
is a member of the extension of 'Located' at
the time and world of \(c\).




Kaplan uses standard methods to define *truth* for a formula,
and *denotation* for a term, with respect to any given
structure, context, time, world and assignment of values to variables.
(Assignments will not be mentioned from here on.) Kaplan defines the
notions of Content and Character for formulas and terms in terms of
truth and denotation. The Content of a formula, with respect to a
structure and context, is a function whose value at any time-world pair
is the truth-value of the formula with respect to the preceding
structure, context, time, and world. In short, the Content of an
expression, with respect to a structure and context, is an intension.
The Content of a singular term, with respect to a structure and
context, is also an appropriate intension. Finally, the Character of a
formula or term is the function from structures and contexts to
Contents whose value, for any structure and context, is the Content of
that expression with respect to that structure and context.




A formula is *true at a context* \(c\) in a structure \(M\)
iff: the formula is true with respect to \(c\) and the time and
world of \(c\) in \(M\). A formula is *valid* iff: for
every structure \(M\), and every context \(c\) of \(M\),
the formula is true at \(c\) in \(M\). Kaplan says that the
notion of logical consequence can be defined in any of the usual
ways.


### 3.8 More on Kaplan's Logic for Indexicals: Contingent Validities, *A Priority*, and Valid Arguments




Sentences that are valid in standard (modal) first-order predicate
logic are also valid in Kaplan's logic of indexicals. But there
are also valid sentences peculiar to Kaplan's logic of
indexicals. For instance, the formal analogs of 'I exist'
and 'I am here now' are true in every context in every
structure, and so are valid. This result is due to Kaplan's
stipulations that the agent of a context \(c\) exists at the time
and world of \(c\), and that the agent of \(c\) is located at
the position of \(c\) at the time and world of \(c\). In
addition, every (formal) sentence of the form "\(S\) if and
only if actually \(S\)" is valid. This is so because
\(S\) is true at a context (in a structure) if and only if
"Actually \(S\)" is.




A striking feature of Kaplan's logic is that some valid
sentences are *contingently* true, at some contexts in some LD
structures. One example is 'I exist'. We saw above that it
is valid. Now consider an LD structure \(M\) in which Mary exists
at some of the worlds in \(M\) but fails to exist at others. (More
exactly, Mary is in the extension of 'Exist' at some pairs
\(\langle t, w \rangle\) but is not in the extension of
'Exist' at some other pairs 
\(\langle t, w' \rangle\).) Next, consider a context \(c\) in which
Mary is the agent. The formal analog of the sentence 'I
exist' is true with respect to \(c\) and the time and world
of \(c\) in \(M\), and so is true at \(c\) in
\(M\). But that sentence is false with respect to \(c\),
\(t\), and other worlds in \(M\). Therefore,
'Necessarily, I exist' (or its formal analog) is false at
\(c\) in \(M\). Thus, 'I exist' is only
contingently true at some contexts in some LD structures. Parallel
points holds for 'I am here now': it is valid, but only
contingently true at some contexts in some structures. Similarly, every
sentence of the form "\(S\) if and only if actually
\(S\)" is valid, but some sentences of this form are only
contingently true at some contexts in some structures.




Kaplan holds that since 'I exist' is valid, one could
know *a priori* the proposition that it expresses, in a context.
For example, if Mary considers and understands the sentence 'I
exist', then she can know *a priori* the proposition that
it expresses in her context. Thus Kaplan concludes that she can know
*a priori* the proposition that she exists. But this proposition
is contingent, so Mary can have *a priori* knowledge of a
contingent proposition. Thus Kaplan claims that his logic of indexicals
provides examples of Kripke's (1980) contingent *a priori*
truths. (For discussion, see Salmon 1991, Forbes 1989)




Using a standard definition of validity for arguments,
Kaplan's formal analogs of arguments (13)-(15) are valid.


* (13)

I think. Therefore, I exist.
* (14)

Every human is mortal. I am human. Therefore, I am mortal.
* (15)

This is a hand. If this is a hand, then I am not a brain in a
vat. Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat.




Thus, Kaplan's logic of indexicals may aid in understanding
the logic of some philosophically interesting arguments.


### 3.9 Some Criticisms of Kaplan's Theory




Kaplan's theory of indexicals is influential, and so has been
subject to much critical scrutiny. A few criticisms will be described
immediately below. Others criticisms will emerge later in this
article.




Kaplan sometimes argues for his theory by appealing to intuitions
about *what is said*. For instance, Kaplan claims that if John
utters 'I am hungry' and Mary utters 'I am
hungry' then *what they say* is different, whereas if John
utters 'I am hungry' and Mary utters 'You are
hungry' while addressing John, then *what they say* is the
same. David Lewis (1980) says that Kaplan's appeals to judgments
about what is said are unpersuasive. Lewis also maintains that Kaplan
fails to justify his claim that Kaplanian contents have a distinctive
role to play in semantics. Lewis (1980) claims that the primary task of
semantics is to describe how *semantic values* of sentences
determine truth-values at contexts and circumstances of evaluation, the
latter of which Lewis calls 'indices'. Lewis holds that
this can be done in (at least) two equally good ways. First, we can
(like Kaplan) allow the semantic value of a sentence to vary from
context to context, and design these varying semantic values so that
they determine truth-values with respect to indices. Second, we can
instead once-and-for-all assign to a sentence a single semantic value
that determines a truth-value given both a context and an index. On
views of this latter sort, semantic values are functions from pairs of
contexts and indices to truth-values. Lewis claims that there is no
theoretical reason to prefer one sort of theory over the other.




Kaplan's semantics entails that that propositions can vary in
truth-value from one time to another. He also assumes that propositions
are the things that agents assert and believe. But he admits (1989a,
503, n. 28) that the objects of assertion and belief are traditionally
thought to be *eternal*, that is, not to vary in truth-value
from time to time. Salmon (1989) argues that Kaplan's theory
needs to be amended so as to make contents eternal. Salmon argues that
once this amendment is made, it becomes evident that to deal adequately
with tense, a semantic theory needs *both* (a) content-like
meanings that vary in extension from time to time in the way that
Kaplan's contents do and (b) content-like meanings that are
eternal. Jeffrey King (2003) also criticizes Kaplan for allowing
contents (propositions) to be non-eternal. See Cappelen and Hawthorne
(2009) for related discussion.




Bach (2005) says that the only indexicals that have contents with
respect to contexts are the pure indexicals, such as 'I'
and 'today'. True demonstratives, such as
'she' and 'that', have no content in any
context, and so the contents (in contexts) of sentences that contain
them are propositional radicals (incomplete structured
propositions). However, a speaker who utters such a sentence typically
asserts a full proposition that completes the propositional radical
that the sentence semantically expresses. (In this paragraph, and in
most of the rest of section 4, we use 'belief' for events
or states of believing propositions, rather than for propositions that
are believed. We also use 'desire',
'intention', and 'attitude' similarly.) 




Braun (1995) argues that the functions that Kaplan uses to represent
characters in his formal logic (functions from *structures* and
contexts to contents) misrepresent the more interesting notion of
character described in the less formal parts of Kaplan's theory
(where Kaplan seemingly uses functions from contexts to contents in the intended structure to
represent characters). Richard (2003) and Braun (1994) argue that
structured *characters*, in addition to structured contents, are
needed to distinguish between the linguistic meanings of certain pairs
of expressions.




Kaplan maintains that 'I am here now' is logically
valid, and yet he admits that the sentence 'I am *not*
here now' is commonly used for answering-machine messages (1989a,
491, n. 12). For discussion of this "answering-machine
puzzle," see Predelli 1998a, 1998b; Corazza et al. 2002;
Romdenh-Romluc 2002; and Cohen 2013.




For further criticisms of Kaplan's theory (other than those
that will emerge below), and for presentations of alternative theories,
see Burge 1974, Weinstein 1974, Roberts 2002, and Elbourne 2008.


## 4. Indexical Belief and Indexical Semantics




Indexical beliefs are, roughly speaking, beliefs that agents are
disposed to express by uttering sentences that contain indexicals. If
Mary utters 'I am a philosopher', 'You are a
philosopher', 'She is a philosopher' (while
demonstrating someone), 'The weather is good today', or
'John is here', then she expresses an indexical belief.
Indexical *desires* and indexical *intentions* are,
roughly speaking, desires and intentions that agents can express by
uttering sentences containing indexicals, such as 'I want you to
win the game' and 'I shall follow you'. Thus, we can
speak more generally of indexical *attitudes*. (In this
paragraph, and for most of the rest of section 4, we use
'belief' as a term for events or states of believing
propositions, rather than for propositions that are believed. We use
'desire', 'intention', and
'attitude' similarly.)




Indexical beliefs are sometimes called *self-locating*
beliefs (Perry 1977), because the beliefs that one has when one knows
who one is, where one is, and when one is, are often expressed by
uttering sentences containing 'I', 'here',
'now', and other indexicals. Indexical beliefs that can be
expressed with 'I' are sometimes (following Lewis 1979)
called '*de se* beliefs'. ('*De
se*' is Latin for 'of oneself'.) Those expressed
with 'now' are sometimes called '*de nunc*
beliefs'. ('*De nunc*' is Latin for 'of
now'.) Some philosophers hold that indexical beliefs are *de
re* *beliefs*, which are beliefs *of* objects.
('*De re*' is Latin for *of objects*.) For
example, some would say that the belief that Mary expresses by uttering
'You are a philosopher' to Bill is a *de re* belief
concerning Bill.




Some philosophers hold that indexical attitudes, and so indexicals
themselves, are important to understanding philosophically significant
phenomena such as the following: Agency and explanation of action
(Castaneda 1975; Perry 1979, 2000; McGinn 1983; and the
entry on 
 action);
self-consciousness, subjectivity, and the first-person perspective
(Nagel 1986, McDowell 1998); consciousness and qualia (Perry 1999; 
and the entries on 
 consciousness and 
 qualia);
perceptual content (Egan 2006; and the entry on 
 the contents of perception);
 immunity to error
through misidentification (Shoemaker 1968); secondary qualities (McGinn
1983; Egan 2006); and various issues in moral philosophy (Velleman
1999; Hare 2007). For skepticism about the importance of indexicals to
one or more of these topics, see Millikan 1990, Cappelen and Dever
2013, and Magidor forthcoming.




We shall concentrate here on the seeming implications that the
theory of indexical semantics has for the theory of indexical belief,
and vice versa. To grasp these seeming mutual implications, consider
sentence (16) below.


* (16)

You are a philosopher.




Suppose that John understands sentence (16) and assertively utters
(16) while addressing Mary and intending to refer to her. Then,
plausibly, John asserts the proposition that (16) semantically
expresses in his context. Moreover, if John is sincere, then he
*believes* the proposition that (16) expresses in his context.
Thus a semantic theory that describes the content of sentence (16) in
John's context also describes a proposition that he believes.
Hence the theory of indexical semantics has implications for the theory
of indexical belief. Theories of indexical belief can also have
important implications for the semantics of indexicals. If, for
instance, speakers do not believe the propositions that a semantic
theory assigns to indexical sentences, relative to contexts, then that
is *prima facie* reason to reject that semantic theory.




The remainder of this section will be dedicated to considering
indexical belief and its implications for indexical semantics. (We
shall, however, try to avoid discussing the semantics of belief
ascriptions. See instead the entry on 
 propositional attitude reports.)


### 4.1 Direct Reference Theories of Indexicals, Singular Propositions, and Indexical Belief



*Direct reference theories of indexicals* (such as
Kaplan's) say that the contents of 'I',
'he', 'she', 'you',
'that', and similar indexicals, in contexts, are the
individuals to which those terms refer, in those contexts. Further, the
contents (in contexts) of sentences containing such indexicals
sentences are *singular propositions* (structured propositions
that have individuals as constituents). Thus direct reference theories,
together with the earlier assumptions about the connection of semantics
with belief, imply that agents with indexical beliefs believe singular
propositions. But various examples suggest that there is something
wrong with, or at least something missing from, theories that say that
agents with indexical beliefs believe singular propositions. Here is
one famous example of this sort.



*The messy shopper (Perry 1979)*




John is in a grocery store, pushing a shopping cart. At the end of
each row in the store there is a large mirror mounted near the ceiling.
John notices a reflection of a shopper in one of these mirrors. He
cannot see the shopper's face, but he can see that the
shopper's cart contains a leaking bag of sugar. John utters
'He is making a mess' and sets off to find the messy
shopper. But in fact, John saw a reflection of himself, and the leaking
bag of sugar that he saw was in his own cart. After circling the store,
John returns to the spot where he first spotted the messy shopper. He
encounters the trail of sugar that he left behind. He then says
'I am making a mess', stops his cart, and adjusts the
leaking bag of sugar in his cart.




Let \(t\_0\) be the time at which John first saw the
messy shopper and uttered 'He is making a mess'. Let
\(t\_1\) be the later time at which John uttered 'I
am making a mess' and stopped pushing his cart. It seems that
John began to believe something at time \(t\_1\) that he
did not believe at \(t\_0\). One proposition he seemingly
began to believe for the first time at \(t\_1\) is the
proposition that the sentence 'I am making a mess'
expressed in his context at \(t\_1\). However, according
to direct reference theories, that sentence expressed, in John's
context at \(t\_1\), the singular proposition that John
is making a mess. But John already believed the proposition that
'He is making a mess' expressed in his context at the
earlier time \(t\_0\), and he continued to believe
that proposition through time \(t\_1\). If direct
reference theories are true, that proposition is also the singular
proposition that John is making a mess. So, direct reference theories
entail that John already believed, before time \(t\_1\),
the singular proposition that John is making a mess. So, if direct
reference theories are correct, then it is not the case that John began
to believe a proposition at \(t\_1\) that he did not
previously believe. But he did. Therefore, direct reference theories of
indexicals are incorrect.




We can extract a simpler argument against direct reference theories
from the messy shopper example by adding one more element to it.
Consider the earlier time \(t\_0\) when John first looked
in the mirror and uttered 'He is making a mess', and now
suppose he also uttered 'I am not making a mess' at that
time. Then he believed the propositions expressed by both 'He is
making a mess' and 'I am not making a mess' in his
context at \(t\_0\). But according to direct reference
theories, 'He is making a mess' expresses, in John's
context at \(t\_0\), the singular proposition that John
is making a mess and the sentence 'I am not making a mess'
expresses, in that same context, the singular proposition that John is
not making a mess. So, if direct reference theories are true, then at
\(t\_0\), John believed both a proposition and its
negation. But John is rational, and no rational person believes a
proposition and its negation. Therefore, direct reference theories of
indexicals are incorrect.




Both of the above objections to direct reference theories of
indexicals can easily be modified to target theories that say that the
contents of expressions containing indexicals, in contexts, are merely
intensions, rather than structured contents.




Before considering replies from direct-reference theorists, let us
consider an alternative semantics for indexicals, and an alternative
theory of indexical belief, that may avoid the apparent problems with
direct-reference theories.


### 4.2 A Descriptivist Theory of Indexicals and Indexical Belief




The above objections resemble Frege's puzzles of cognitive
significance for proper names. (See the entries on 
 Gottlob Frege and
 propositional attitude reports.) 
One traditional response to problems of cognitive significance for
proper names is to adopt a *descriptivist* theory of proper
names. There are parallel descriptivist theories of indexicals.




On some traditional descriptivist theories of proper names, the
content of a proper name can be expressed by a *purely
qualitative* definite description, which is a definite description
that does not contain any directly-referential terms (such as proper
names and indexicals, if these are directly-referential). For example,
on some views of this type, the content of the name 'Benjamin
Franklin', in some speakers' idiolects, is the same as that
of the definite description 'the person who invented
bifocals'.




Similarly, according to some descriptivist theories of indexicals,
every indexical, in every context, has a purely qualitative descriptive
content. This content determines the indexical's referent with
respect to the world of the context (and any other world). A single
indexical can have different descriptive contents in different
contexts, and so can have different referents in different contexts.
The descriptive content expressed by an indexical in a context is
determined by the thoughts and intentions of the agent/speaker of the
context. For example, when John utters 'he', he may mean
the man who is \(F\), where the property of being a man and
\(F\) is a purely qualitative property that suffices to determine
a particular man independently of any context. The object determined by
this descriptive content is the object to which 'he'
refers, with respect to John's context. If John utters 'He
is making a mess', then the proposition that John believes and
asserts is the proposition that the man who is \(F\) is making a
mess.




An advocate of this purely qualitative descriptivist theory of
indexicals could analyze the example of the messy shopper, in outline,
as follows. When John first spots the messy shopper at
\(t\_0\), and utters 'He is making a mess',
he begins to believe the descriptive proposition that the man who is
\(F\) is making a mess, where \(F\) is a purely qualitative
property. Later, at \(t\_1\), when John utters 'I
am making a mess', he begins to believe that the man who is
\(G\) is making a mess, where \(G\) is a purely qualitative
property different from \(F\). Therefore, John begins to believe a
proposition that he did not previously believe, contrary to what
direct-reference theories entail. Consider also the slightly modified
case in which John utters both 'He is making a mess' and
'I am *not* making a mess' when he first looks in
the mirror at \(t\_0\). On a descriptivist analysis, John
at that moment believes both the proposition that the man who is
\(F\) is making a mess and the proposition that the man who is
\(G\) is *not* making a mess. The second proposition is not
the negation of the first, so John is perfectly rational to believe
both. Thus the purely qualitative descriptivist theory seems to avoid
the above problems for direct reference theories.




But Hector-Neri Castaneda (1966, 1967), John Perry (1977,
1979), and Kaplan (1989a) have presented a number of compelling
objections to purely qualitative descriptivist theories. Versions of
some of these objections appear below.




On the above descriptivist theory, John contemplates a purely
qualitative descriptive content when he utters 'He is making a
mess'. Yet if John were asked to whom he was referring with
'he', it is unlikely that he would respond with a purely
qualitative definite description. Rather, he would probably respond
with a description like 'the man I see in that mirror',
which is not purely qualitative unless John is contemplating purely
qualitative properties when he utters 'I' and 'that
mirror'. Perhaps if John thought very hard, he could formulate a
purely qualitative description that he thinks refers to the man he
sees, such as the description 'the man wearing a green shirt, red
trousers, and white shoes who is pushing a shopping cart'. But if
he has to think hard to find such a description, then he probably did
not entertain the content of that description when he first uttered
'He is making a mess'.




Waiving that objection, suppose that John does answer with a purely
qualitative description, such as 'the man wearing a green shirt,
red trousers, and white shoes who is pushing a shopping cart'.
Still, the description he uses may fail to refer to the person to whom
John referred when he uttered 'he'. Imagine that the mirror
has distorted the color of the trousers that John sees: the trousers he
sees (namely, his own trousers) appear red to him in the mirror, but
they are in fact purple. So the preceding description does not pick out
John. Now suppose further that there is a man who does fit the
description perfectly, but he is in a grocery store far from John, and
is not making a mess. Then the purely qualitative descriptivist theory
entails that 'He is making a mess' is false in John's
context. But the sentence John utters is true in his context, contrary
to the theory.




Kaplan (1989a) gives modal arguments against purely qualitative
descriptivist theories of indexicals. Here is a modified version of one
of his objections. Suppose, again, that the descriptive content of
'he' in John's context is the content of 'the
man wearing a green shirt, red trousers, and white shoes who is pushing
a shopping cart'. Then the following sentence expresses a
necessary truth in John's context: 'He is wearing a green
shirt, if he exists'. But that sentence expresses a contingent
truth, not a necessary truth, in John's context.


### 4.3 Direct-Reference Responses to Arguments against Their Views




We will soon consider other theories of indexical belief, and
alternative semantic theories for indexicals, that are motivated by the
above examples of indexical belief. But before doing so, let us
consider how direct-reference theorists have responded to the earlier
objections to their views.




Perry (1977, 1979) and Kaplan (1989a), claim that belief is a
*binary relation* that agents can bear to propositions. But they
say that this relation is *mediated* by a third entity. (Compare
with assertion: assertion is a binary relation between agents and
propositions, but it is mediated by sentences, or their characters.)
Thus Perry and Kaplan claim that agents can believe a singular
proposition *in different ways*. (Compare again with assertion:
John can assert the singular proposition that he is shopping in at
least two ways, by uttering either 'John is shopping' or
'I am shopping'.) Moreover, a rational agent can rationally
believe both a proposition and its negation, as long as he does so in
suitably different ways.




Perry (1977) and Kaplan (1989a) take the relevant mediators of belief to be
characters (Perry calls them 'roles'). An agent can believe
a proposition *under* one character, but fail to believe it
under another character. This is John's state when he first sees
the messy shopper at \(t\_0\), and he is willing to utter
'He is making a mess' but is not willing to utter 'I
am making a mess'. Perry and Kaplan also hold that a rational
agent can believe a proposition under one character and also believe
the negation of that proposition under a suitably different character.
This is what happens when John utters 'He is making a mess'
and 'I am not making a mess' in the slightly modified
example: John believes the singular proposition that John is making
mess under the character of 'He is making a mess' but
believes the negation of that proposition under the character of
'I am not making mess'. He is rational because the second
character is not the negation of the first character (roughly speaking).




The claim that agents believe propositions *under characters*
is reasonably clear when agents utter sentences to express their
indexical beliefs. But agents believe many propositions that they do
not express with sentences. Perhaps for this reason, Perry (1979)
modifies the ways-of-believing theory by distinguishing between (i) the
proposition that an agent believes and (ii) the *belief state*
in virtue of which the agent believes that proposition. Perry holds
that for any one proposition, there are many belief states that would
enable an agent to believe that proposition. An agent can be in one of
these belief states while failing to be in another. Belief states can
be classified into types by the characters of the sentences that they
dispose agents to utter. For instance, a belief state that would cause
John to utter 'He is making a mess' can be classified with
the character of that sentence, whereas a belief state that disposes
John to utter 'I am making mess' can be classified with the
character of that sentence. John can rationally be in a belief state of
the first sort while failing to be in a belief state of the second
sort. He can, in addition, be in a belief state of the first sort while
also being in a belief state that disposes him to utter the negation of
the second. For further discussion and criticisms, see Wettstein
(1986), Taschek (1987), and Crimmins (1992, chapter 1).




Perry's subsequent theories replace belief states with more
elaborate systems of mental representation, and replace classification
of belief states by characters with classifications of mental
representations by cognitive roles and various types of semantic
values. For details, see the papers that appear in Perry (1997,
2001).


### 4.4 Lewis and Chisholm on Indexical Belief




David Lewis (1979a) and Roderick Chisholm (1981) independently
developed theories of indexical belief according to which the things
that agents believe are *properties* rather than propositions.
The primary differences between Lewis's view and Chisholm's
view are ontological. Chisholm's primitive ontology includes
properties and relations. Lewis's does not. It instead includes sets of
possible objects, such as possible worlds and other individuals. Lewis reduces properties to
sets of possible objects and relations to sets of \(n\)-tuples of possible
objects. Lewis's variant has been more influential, and so we
concentrate on his theory below.




On Lewis's view, believing is self-ascribing. Agents
self-ascribe properties, so the things they believe are properties. If
John sincerely utters 'I am making a mess', then he
self-ascribes the property of making a mess, and therefore he believes
that property. An agent who seemingly believes a purely general
qualitative proposition \(P\) in fact believes the corresponding
property of being such that \(P\). For example, if John sincerely
utters 'Some dogs are brown', he believes (self-ascribes)
the property of being such that some dogs are brown.




Some presentations of Lewis's view replace properties with
sets of *centered worlds* (Egan 2006, Ninan 2013). Centered
worlds are ordered pairs \(\langle o, w \rangle\) where
\(o\) is an object and \(w\) is a world. Suppose, as Lewis
does, that properties are sets of possible objects; alternatively,
suppose that a property \(F\) is an intension, namely a function
whose value at any world \(w\) is the set of objects that have
\(F\) at \(w\). Then, as Lewis (1979a) points out, believing
a property \(F\) is, in a certain sense, equivalent to believing
the set of centered worlds \(\langle o, w \rangle\) such that
\(o\) has \(F\) in \(w\).




Agents cannot directly ascribe properties to individuals other than
themselves, for all ascription of properties is self-ascription. But
under the right conditions, agents can *indirectly* ascribe
properties to objects other than themselves by self-ascribing
properties that (roughly speaking) uniquely describe those other
objects. For example, suppose that Mary sees Bill and only Bill. She
may then self-ascribe the property of seeing exactly one man such that
he is hungry. (More precisely, she may self-ascribe the property of
being an \(x\) such that there is exactly one \(y\) such that
\(y\) is a man and \(x\) sees \(y\) and \(y\) is
hungry.) If she does so, then she indirectly ascribes the property of
being hungry to Bill, under the relation of being a man uniquely seen.
Lewis counts the relation of being a man uniquely seen as an
*acquaintance* relation. According to Lewis, believing a
property that uniquely determines an object under an acquaintance
relation is sufficient for having a *de re* belief about that
object. So, Lewis would say that Mary *de re* believes of Bill
that he is hungry. But Lewis (1979a) also says "Beliefs *de
re* are not really beliefs," for he thinks that *de
re* belief is too extrinsic a matter to count as genuine
belief.




Lewis would analyze the messy shopper case as follows. When John
looks into the mirror and utters 'He is making a mess', he
begins to believe (to self-ascribe) the property of uniquely seeing a
man in a mirror that is making a mess. However, John does *not*,
at that point, believe (self-ascribe) the property of making a mess.
John starts to believe that property only after he has searched for the
messy shopper. So, when John utters 'I am making a mess',
he begins to believe something (the property of making a mess) that he
did not previously believe.




Lewis and Chisholm do not extend their views of indexical belief to
the semantics of indexicals. That is, neither of them claims that the
content of a sentence containing an indexical, in a context, is a
property. Lewis (1980) mentions various semantic values that a semantic
theory might assign to a sentence containing an indexical, but none of
these semantic values are properties of the sort mentioned by his
theory of indexical belief.




Turning now to criticisms, Lewis's and Chisholm's views
say that agents believe properties. Properties are neither true nor
false. But agents, one might object, often believe things that are true
and false. Neither Lewis nor Chisholm addresses this objection
directly. But Lewis sometimes says that an agent can be right to
believe a property, or that an agent can believe a property truly, and
he says this when the relevant agent believes a property that the agent
has. This suggests that Lewis would analyze the notion of *believing
something that is true* with some notion like that of *believing
something truly*.




Both Lewis and Chisholm hold that whenever an agent has a belief
about an object other than herself, she grasps a property that
descriptively determines that object. The relevant property need not be
purely qualitative, for it may relate the object to herself.
Nevertheless, this is a strong form of descriptivism. David Austin
(1990) presents detailed, putative counterexamples to their views that
focus on this descriptivist aspect of their theories.




Stalnaker (1981, 2008) argues that Lewis's view entails an
implausible incommunicability of belief. Suppose that Mary believes
that she is hungry and utters 'I am hungry'. On
Lewis's view, she believes the property of being hungry. Suppose
Bill hears her and agrees with her. He cannot agree with her by
believing what she believes, for if he did, he would believe the
property of being hungry, and so ascribe that property to himself, not
to Mary. The best that Bill can do is self-ascribe a property that
relates himself uniquely to her, such as the property of speaking
uniquely to a person who is hungry.




For further discussion of Lewis's view, and modifications of
it, see Stalnaker 1981, 2008; Ninan 2013; Cappelen and Dever 2013; and
Magidor forthcoming.


### 4.5 Other Views of Indexical Belief (and Indexical Semantics)




Many philosophers have presented alternative theories of indexical
belief, sometimes along with alternative theories of indexical
semantics.




Gottlob Frege (1997b) holds that each agent can think of himself or
herself via a sense that no other agent can grasp. Other aspects of
Frege's views on indexicals are the subjects of interpretive
controversy. For discussion, see Perry (1977, 1979), Evans (1985),
Kripke (2011), and Burge (2012).




Schiffer (1978, 1981) holds that each agent can believe a singular
proposition about herself, but cannot believe a singular proposition about
any other object. All belief that is seemingly about other objects
reduces to descriptive belief. Nevertheless, he holds that the correct
semantics for indexicals is a direct-reference theory. Schiffer's
view of indexical belief is quite similar to Lewis's and
Chisholm's, as Austin (1990) points out. Austin offers criticisms
of Schiffer's view that parallel his criticisms of Lewis's
and Chisholm's views.




Evans (1985) holds (roughly) that agents with indexical beliefs
believe singular propositions that have the characters of indexicals as
constituents. For example, a person who utters 'He is making a
mess', while pointing at John, believes a proposition that has as
constituents John, the relation of demonstrating, and the property of
making a mess. For discussion, see Perry 2000.




For other views on indexical belief, see Castaneda 1966,
1967; Stalnaker 1981, 2008; and Ninan 2013.


## 5. Other Topics Concerning Indexicals


### 5.1 Quasi-Indicators and Attitude Ascriptions that Seemingly Attribute First-Person Indexical Attitudes




Castaneda (1966, 1967) argues that 'he himself' and
'she herself' can be used to ascribe first-person
indexical beliefs and cannot be used to ascribe beliefs that are not
first-person indexical. Consider again the messy shopper, and let
\(t\_0\) be the time at which John first utters 'He is making a
mess'. Castaneda would hold that ascription (18) is true
but ascription (19) is false.


* (17)

John [at \(t\_0\)]: "He is making a mess."
* (18)

John believed at
\(t\_0\) that he was making a mess.
* (19)

John believed at \(t\_0\) that he himself was making a mess.




Castaneda uses the term *quasi-indicator* for
expressions such as 'he himself' and 'she
herself' that he claims can be used to ascribe (only) indexical
beliefs that the subject would express with a first-person pronoun such
as 'I'. Castaneda uses 'he\*' and
'she\*' as abbreviations for 'he himself' and
'she herself'.




Perry (2000, Chapter 5) argues that belief attributions containing
'he himself' in their 'that'-clauses do not
semantically require that the subject have a first-person belief.
Instead, utterances of such belief attributions merely suggest that the
subject has a first-person belief. Schlenker (2003), however, claims
that some languages other than English contain lexical items that are
quasi-indicators in Castaneda's sense.




There are other attitude ascriptions that do not contain 'he
himself' or 'she herself', but which also seem to
require, or at least strongly suggest, that their subjects have
first-person attitudes. Suppose that John is in a pizza parlor, and
observes a customer in a mirror who appears to be too thin to be
healthy. John points at him in the mirror and sincerely utters 'I
want him to eat a large slice of pizza'. John, however, is not
feeling hungry, and so he says 'I do not want to eat a large
slice of pizza'. In fact, however, the person that John sees in
the mirror is himself. Attribution (20) seems to be true in this
situation, whereas attribution (21) seems to be false.


* (20)

John wants him to eat a large slice of pizza [pointing at John in the mirror].
* (21)

John wants to eat a slice of pizza.




Some theorists would claim that (21) is true only if John has a first-person desire, that is,
a desire that he would naturally express with 'I want to eat a
large slice of pizza'. Some of these theorists would attribute
the seemingly mandatory first-person reading of (21) to the presence of
a silent, pronoun-like expression that serves as a subject for the
embedded infinitival phrase 'to eat a slice of pizza'. This
sort of pronominal expression is often called 'PRO'. For
discussion, see Dowty 1985, Chierchia 1989, and Cappelen and Dever
2013.


### 5.2 Complex Demonstratives




Complex demonstratives are expressions of the form *that* \(N\)
or *this* \(N\), where \(N\) is a common noun phrase. Examples
include 'this man', 'that red car', and
'that woman who is wearing a blue coat'. One major question
about complex demonstratives is whether they are *singular
terms* or *quantifier phrases*. Singular terms are
expressions that refer, with respect to contexts, to individuals. Most
semantic theories of the *simple* demonstratives
'this' and 'that' treat them as singular terms.
Speakers seem to use *complex* demonstratives to refer to
individuals in much the way that they use simple demonstratives. That
is some reason to think that complex demonstratives are singular terms.
However, complex demonstratives syntactically resemble paradigmatic
quantifier phrases, such as 'some woman' and 'every
man'. That is some reason to think that complex demonstratives
are quantifier phrases. But quantifier phrases are not singular terms;
they do not refer, with respect to contexts, to individuals. Their
references, or extensions, with respect to contexts, are usually taken
to be sets of sets.




Singular-term theories of complex demonstratives must deal with two
major issues. First, do the common noun phrases that appear in complex
demonstratives play a role in determining their referents in contexts?
Second, do the contents of those common noun phrases contribute to the
contents of complex demonstratives, in contexts? (Does, for instance,
the content of 'philosopher' appear as a constituent of
the content of 'that philosopher', in a context?)
*Minimal* theories assign minimal, or no, semantic role to
common noun phrases in complex demonstratives. The common noun phrase
merely gives an auditor a clue as to the speaker's intended
referent. Since the predicate 'philosopher' plays no role
in determining the referent of 'that philosopher' in a
context, its referent, in a context, need not be a philosopher.
Furthermore, the content of 'philosopher' is not a
constituent of the content of 'that philosopher' in a
context; its content simply is its referent in that context. Larson
and Segal (1995) endorse a minimal theory (but they do not accept the
existence of Kaplan-style contents). *Intermediate* theories
say that the common noun phrase helps determine the referent. So, an
individual must be a philosopher to be the referent of 'that
philosopher' in a context. But the common noun phrase does not
contribute its content to the complex demonstrative's content.
Instead, the content of the complex demonstrative is simply its
referent. Kaplan (1989a) hints that he accepts an intermediate theory.
Braun (1994, 2008), Borg (2000), and Salmon (2002) explicitly argue
for intermediate theories. *Maximal* theories say that the
common noun phrase helps determine the referent, and its content
appears as a constituent of the content, in a context. Richard (1993)
endorses a maximal theory.




The arguments for and against these views are complicated. To take
one example: intermediate theorists might claim that (22) is false in
some contexts, and argue that this is incompatible with maximal
theories.


* (22)

It is a necessary truth that if that philosopher exists, then something is a philosopher.




But maximal theorists, if they agree with this judgment about (22),
can add rigidifying devices, such as 'actually', to obtain
this result.




Taylor (1981), King (2001), and Neale (2004) endorse
quantificational theories of complex demonstratives. For example, on
King's view, the content of (23), in some contexts in which the
agent perceives Mary and believes Mary to be a philosopher, is
necessarily equivalent to the content of (24) in that same context
(assuming that definite descriptions are quantifier phrases, not
singular terms).


* (23)

That philosopher was born in Boise.
* (24)

The individual that is actually a philosopher and is identical with
Mary was born in Boise.




The arguments for and against singular-term theories and quantifier
phrase theories are (again) complicated. For example, King argues that
intermediate singular-term theories of complex demonstratives have
difficulties dealing with cases of quantifying into complex
demonstratives, as in examples like (25) below.


* (25)

Every university professor cherishes that first publication of hers.




Borg (2000), Lepore and Johnson (2002), Salmon (2002), and Braun
(2008) respond to King's argument, and criticize his view. King
defends his argument, and his view, in King 2008a and 2008b.




See Lepore and Ludwig 2000, Dever 2001, Roberts 2002, and Elbourne
2008 for views of complex demonstratives that do not fit easily into
the above classification scheme.


### 5.3 Multiple Occurrences of Demonstratives




Multiple occurrences of demonstratives present difficulties for some
theories. Sentence (26) below contains multiple occurrences of the
demonstrative 'that'.


* (26)

That is not identical with that.




In the right circumstances, a speaker could use (26) to assert a
true proposition. This strongly suggests that (26) is true in some
contexts. But 'that' is unambiguous, and so has a single
linguistic meaning. If linguistic meaning determines reference in a
context (in the way that Kaplan's characters do), then all
occurrences of 'that' in (26) have the same reference with
respect to any given context. So, (26) should be false in all
contexts.




Kaplan's theories of true demonstratives allow sentences that
resemble (26) to be false in some contexts, but at the cost of
attributing a type of ambiguity to 'that'. For example, on
his later indexical theory of demonstratives, some formal analogs of
(26), such as (27), are true in contexts in which the first
demonstratum of the context is distinct from the second.


* (27)

That1 is not identical with that2.




But on this theory each subscripted 'that' has a
different character. So this theory does not identify a reasonable
candidate for the single linguistic meaning of the unsubscripted
English word 'that'. This may be why Kaplan (1989b) speaks
of the "exotic ambiguity" of demonstratives.




There are various options for responding to the problem of finding a
single meaning for 'that'. One could stipulate that each
context has only one demonstratum, and say that the content of
'that' in a context is *the* demonstratum of the
context, but then insist that the content of a sentence containing
multiple occurrences of demonstratives is determined not by a single
context but by a sequence of contexts. Then (26) is true with respect
to certain sequences of contexts that have different demonstrata.
Second, one could distinguish linguistic meaning and character.
'That' has a single linguistic meaning, but this meaning
does not determine reference in a context; linguistic meaning instead
determines the characters of occurrences, and these characters
determine reference in a context. Third, one could move to a theory
that assigns contents to *utterances* rather than expressions.
This might help because every utterance of (26) contains two utterances
of 'that'. There are other possibilities. For discussion, see Kaplan 1989a, 1999;
Wettstein 1986; Taschek 1987; Braun 1996; Garcia-Carpintero 1998;
Salmon 2002; Richard 2003.