## 1. A Brief Discussion on Philosophy of Biology



We will begin with a few words about philosophy of biology before
diving into a more detailed discussion. As in all regions, there are
many ways of working within philosophy of biology in Latin America.
Various authors (Griffiths 2008 [2018]; Odenbaugh & Griffiths
2020; and Kitcher 2005) have identified four distinct kinds of
philosophical inquiry that fall under the general heading of
philosophy of biology, and we could add a fifth.



First, there is the reassessment of some problems, theses, and
solutions developed in general philosophy of science or in other
special philosophy of science, within the context of biology. Second,
we have the analysis of logical, semantic, pragmatic, epistemological,
methodological, ontological, praxiological, axiological, ethical, and
aesthetic aspects of biology. Third, specific conceptual problems in
biology are analyzed philosophically. Fourth, biology, or its
philosophical analysis, contributes to the development of new
approaches and answers to traditional philosophical questions (e.g.,
the topic of abortion in ethics, or evolutionary epistemology and
naturalized epistemologies). Fifth, ethical and social implications of
biological knowledge and the technological applications of biology are
analyzed.



*Ethics* and *epistemology in general*, mentioned in the
fourth kind of philosophy of biology above, constitute specific areas
in themselves. As such, they have their own philosophical
sub-communities, as well as conferences, journals, and associations,
and deserve a specific and separate treatment beyond this entry. In
the fifth kind of doing philosophy of biology, analysis of the ethical
and social implications of *biological knowledge* takes place
within *bioethics*, and analysis of the ethical and social
implications of *technological applications of biological
knowledge* takes place within philosophy of technology in general
and *philosophy of biotechnology* in particular. Therefore,
although we will mention them, these ways of working within philosophy
of biology will not be discussed in detail here.



With regards to the first type of philosophy of biology, it is
important to mention that science makes philosophical presuppositions
of different kinds. Moreover, in the presentation of results,
empirical scientists use a variety of types of languages: the
technical language of the science in question, natural language(s),
the language(s) of logic(s) and mathematics, and a language to talk
about science. The first three types of languages could be called
*scientific-language-in-use*. This is different from what might
be called *metascientific-language-in-use*, that is,
expressions used to talk about science, such as scientific
"concepts", "hypotheses", "laws",
"models", "theories", or
"mechanisms". The precision and clarification of concepts
is called conceptual analysis or *explication* (Carnap 1950)
and constitutes a fundamental task for philosophers. The explication
of scientific and meta-scientific concepts may be carried out by
philosophers of science and by scientists themselves. Though generally
scientists explicate meta-scientific concepts in a more introductory
and informal manner.



The re-ordering, or *reconstruction*, of the conceptual systems
produced by science is also carried out by trained philosophers and
scientists themselves. Regarding issues of foundations or of
theoretical science, studies executed by philosophers of science and
by scientists may coincide, with results published in journals or
books either in the field of philosophy or science. And what holds
true for science in general also holds true for biology in particular.
The scope of this entry allows us to consider only a few of the most
significant of these attempts.



Finally, philosophy of biology can also be subdivided according to the
particular areas of biology with which it is concerned (Griffiths 2008
[2018]; Odenbaugh & Griffiths 2020). Biology contains a diverse
set of sub-disciplines, including evolution, systematics, genetics,
and ecology. Each area produces its own philosophical challenges,
which could be linked to any of the aforementioned ways of working
within philosophy of biology. The following review considers all these
areas, including some related disciplines such as biochemistry and
biomedical sciences.


## 2. Historical Background and General Characteristics of Philosophy of Biology in Latin America



The professionalization and institutionalization of philosophy as it
is understood today took place first in Europe, in the second half of
the eighteenth century (Rabossi 2008). This process also first began
in Europe for philosophy of science in the so-called Vienna Circle
(1929) and became consolidated after the main Central-European
philosophers of science arrived in the United States in the late 1930s
(Moulines 2008).



The professionalization of philosophy (Gracia & Vargas 2013
[2018]; Romero 1944; Rabossi 2003, 2008) and philosophy of science
took place between the 1940s and 1960s in most Latin American
countries, or as late as the 1970s in others (Cordero 2010, 2015
[2016]; Gomez 2011; Marcos & Perez Ransanz 2015;
Lombardi, Cordero, & Perez Ransanz 2020). However, during
those years and the following two decades, less effort was dedicated
to philosophical reflections on biology compared to physics. Following
professionalization and institutionalization of philosophy of biology
as a sub-discipline within philosophy of science in regions like the
US, Canada, and Europe during the 1970s-1980s, the situation
slowly but consistently changed in Latin America.



Leaving aside the Indigenous Period, three main periods can be
distinguished *cum grano salis* in the philosophy of biology in
Latin America. The first took place before the professionalization of
philosophy of science in the region, the colonial period to the
mid-twentieth century. The second period, from the mid-twentieth
century to the 1980s and 1990s, came after the professionalization of
philosophy of science but before the professionalization of philosophy
of biology as its own sub-discipline. Finally, the third period began
in the 1990s and continues today.


### 2.1 First Period. Early History of "Philosophy of Biology" in Latin America



From a variety of perspectives, reflections on the philosophical
aspects of what would later come to be called biology have been made
in Latin American throughout its history. As in other areas of
philosophy in Latin America, until well into the twentieth century the
philosophical discussion of topics involving biology was characterized
by the "ideological" use of biological theories, theses,
and experimental results for ethical, political, and social goals.



For instance, during the colonial period, an early debate took place
between Bartolome de las Casas (1484-1566) and Juan
Gines de Sepulveda (1490-1573) at the Council of
Valladolid (1550-1551) and was then taken back up by Alonso de
la Veracruz (c.1507-1584). This debate was over the supposed
rights of the Spanish monarchy over the Indigenous peoples of the
Americas with the ideological use of a category from natural
philosophy, that of race, which would later be established as a
biological category (Casas 1552; Veracruz 1553-1554). Indeed, a
new social hierarchy or caste system based on race was developed as a
consequence of European conquest and colonization. Moreover, the
ideological use of the category of race has been a constant throughout
the history of Latin America, continuing in the present day (see
 Section 3).



The ideological use of biological knowledge continued after most areas
of Latin America gained their independence from European colonial
powers early in the nineteenth century. Although reception differed
from country to country, versions of positivism and Darwinism were
instrumental for the dominant classes to create a project of
nation-building, usually in conjunction with an educational project
and sometimes with policies of "civilizing" the Indigenous
populations and encouraging more immigration from Europe. The
political and ideological use of positivism and Darwinism, or of
"scientific ideologies" such as Spencer's
evolutionism or social Darwinism, and their philosophical discussion
characterize the Nationalist period from the mid-nineteenth century to
the early twentieth century.



In addition to Latin American contributions to philosophy of biology
from Comtian and Spencerian positivism, as well as Darwinian,
Haeckelian, and Bergsonian evolutionism, there were also advances in
relation to biological causality (J. Blanco 1917) and Kant's
teleological ideas (J. Blanco 1918) (see Bermudez Barrera
2001). These ran counter to the then contemporary currents of
vitalism, as did those that claimed the legitimacy of a mechanical or
mechanicist biology (Laclau 1931; Braier 1931; Neuschlosz 1944) and
analyzed the nature and methodology of biological sciences and their
relationships with physical-chemical sciences or historical social
sciences (Neuschlosz 1939, 1944, 1945).


### 2.2 Second and Third Periods. Some General Characteristics of Philosophy of Biology in Latin America



During the second period, from the mid-twentieth century to the
1980s-1990s, the professionalization and institutionalization or
"normalcy" of philosophy and philosophy of science was
achieved in Latin America. However, although there were many
philosophers of physics, logic, and mathematics, as well as
philosophers of science in general, there were very few professional
philosophers of biology. In this period, some philosophy of biology
was done by the first generation of Latin American professional
philosophers of science, as well as by some biologists or biomedical
researchers who undertook the philosophy of their disciplines.



This was the case of the Mexican physician and physiologist Arturo
Rosenblueth. Together with US mathematician Norbert Wiener and US
electronics engineer Julian Bigelow, Rosenblueth made an important
contribution to the discussion of teleology, advancing the cybernetic,
or non-functional, analysis of teleology in terms of *purpose
control* through negative *feedback*, with hopes of
application to machines and living organisms (Rosenblueth, Wiener,
& Bigelow 1943). Another example is Argentine paleontologist
Osvaldo Reig with his discussion on the reality of biological species
(Reig 1979).



In the third period, from the 1990s to the present day, although there
still are professionally active biologists engaged in philosophical
reflection on biology, there is an increasing professionalization of
philosophy of biology and therefore of people engaged in it,
regardless of whether their initial education was in philosophy or
biology. It is worth mentioning the early work of perhaps the first
professional philosophers of biology in Latin America: Mexicans
Margarita Ponce and Jorge Martinez-Contreras. Ponce's
work centered on functional analysis and attributions and on teleology
and teleological explanation in biology (Ponce 1987), while
Martinez-Contreras focused on philosophical history of biology
(Martinez-Contreras 1985a,b, 1989, 1992).



Despite some significant differences between countries, we can
identify a similarity regarding the impact that political and economic
conditions have had on philosophy of biology, that is, on scholars and
their institutions, in the region. Latin America has and continues to
suffer from political and institutional instability, with Mexico being
perhaps stabler than the rest of the region. Most other Latin American
countries have been characterized by repeated military coups
d'etat (Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1955, 1966, and
1976, and Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia in 1973, to mention only some of
the most significant) and more or less authoritarian governments
engaged in oppression and proscription, including physical
disappearance. This context has necessarily truncated individual,
group, or institutional projects and promising lines of research.



The most difficult political conditions pushed some philosophers into
exile in countries and universities both outside and within Latin
America. Although in a forced and unintended way, this situation
increased academic dialogue in the region. In addition, scientific
funding in Latin America comes from the public sector, and the region
has experienced recurrent economic crises. Political agendas and
public policies also heavily affect research funding and lead to
variable support for undergraduate and graduate education, whether at
home or abroad, and also impact research programs through diverse
funding sources, such as councils or research agencies and
universities.



In many Latin American countries, financial support was relatively
scarce until recent democratic governments began increasing investment
in research in the 1980s. Education and research in sciences,
humanities, and technology became a state policy in the region,
especially for the governments of Brazil and Argentina as of the turn
of the millennium. This contributed decisively to broadening the
critical mass of people trained in philosophy of science and biology
who could acquire relatively stable university positions and become
researchers with access to both classical and current bibliography.
They also enjoyed the possibility of continuous academic exchange
through attendance of academic events around the world, thus improving
research productivity.



However, with extraordinary cutbacks in science and education since
2016 in countries like Brazil and Argentina, Latin American is
currently undergoing a concerning setback. Given the change of
government in 2019, however, Argentina is slowly recovering from these
challenges. Furthermore, the social, political, economic, and
financial crisis triggered worldwide by the COVID-19 pandemic, which
revealed inequalities both between and within countries, has also had
an effect, the consequences of which are still difficult to predict
for the region. In any case, we can state that philosophy of biology
in Latin America has been and still is often carried out in spite of
political and economic conditions, rather than thanks to them.



Nevertheless, it is possible today to distinguish at least two
generations of professional philosophers of biology in Latin America,
with the usual relationships of professor and student or advisor and
advisee. We can even begin to glimpse the emergence of a younger third
generation. Most professionals who philosophically reflect on biology
in Latin America have written and published in either Spanish or
Portuguese. This may be one reason why the visibility and influence of
Latin American philosophy of biology, like Latin American philosophy
in general, has been relatively low outside the region. However, there
are an increasing number of texts written and published in other
languages, principally English and to a lesser extent German and
French.



But the "internationalization" of Latin American academic
production, essentially publishing in English, does not come without a
price, as Wolters (2014) argues for the case of European philosophy of
science. And while traditional geographical, ideological, or personal
barriers are gradually being overcome, Latin American philosophers
tend to adopt the agendas and methods established by international
publications and cite authors they publish. Furthermore, even those
who still write in Spanish tend to "dialogue" with
internationally established authors, even if that dialogue only flows
one way, more than with philosophers who publish in Spanish. English
to Spanish translations of authoritative philosophers of science and
biology, with the subsequent accessibility of those texts for Latin
Americans, have also contributed to this trend.



However, the creation of national or regional societies constitutes a
growing effort to build genuine community. Some examples include the
Brazilian Association of Philosophy and History of Biology ABFHiB
(*Associacao Brasileira de Filosofia e
Historia da Biologia*) and regional societies like the
Association for Philosophy and History of Science of the Southern Cone
AFHIC (*Asociacion de Filosofia e Historia de la
Ciencia del Cono Sur*) or the Ibero-American Association for
Philosophy of Biology AIFIBI (*Asociacion Iberoamericana de
Filosofia de la Biologia*). These are not simply
groups of philosophers of biology living in the same region; they also
work on related topics or have shared methodologies, influences, and
interests and associate in particular advisor-student and
colleague-colleague relationships. They also tend to publish in the
same journals or publishing houses and establish rigorous, critical,
and fruitful dialogues on topics that constitute a common framework.
In this sense, we might also mention *Ludus Vitalis: Revista de
Filosofia de las Ciencias de la Vida* (*Ludus
Vitalis*: Philosophy of Life Sciences Journal), one of the first
journals specialized in philosophy. It has been published biannually
since 1999 by the *Centro de Estudios Filosoficos,
Politicos y Sociales Vicente Lombardo Toledano* (CEFPSVLT,
*Center for Philosophical, Political, and Social Studies Vicente
Lombardo Toledano*), a public Mexican institution that has played
an important role in the professionalization, institutionalization,
and consolidation of philosophy of biology, particularly of evolution,
in Latin America.



There is also growing insertion of Latin American philosophers of
biology, and of the community as a whole, into central international
circles of philosophy of science in general and philosophy of biology
in particular. This insertion is due in part to the fact that some
members of the first generation of professional philosophers of
biology carried out doctoral studies in the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Spain, or Germany, while the second generation carry
out mainly postdoctoral studies in these countries. Another
contributing factor is the organization of international conferences
of philosophy of biology in Latin America, such as the Meeting of the
*International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social
Studies of Biology*, ISHPSSB, hosted in Mexico in 1999 and Brazil
in 2017. As occurred in other geographical regions, philosophers of
biology in Latin America initially concentrated more on the problem of
evolution and related issues, such as the species problem. Although
these themes are still prevalent, other areas like genetics, ecology,
and developmental biology or evolutionary developmental biology are
now being worked on, as well as on a social agenda that includes
science education. The scope of this entry allows only for an overview
of the main topics in philosophy of biology and, within these, the
most significant contributions made in Latin America in recent
decades.



Section 3
 explores analysis of the concept of race,
 Section 4
 the analysis of biological theories, and
 Section 5
 the different ways of connecting philosophy of biology with history
of biology. While these topics constitute common themes that have been
explored and can be considered representative of the work that has
been done throughout Latin America, they do not do justice to the rich
variety of work produced by a large and ever-increasing number of
researchers who make significant contributions to the development of
philosophy of biology in the region.


## 3. The Problem of Race



Due to the persistent occurrence of the term "race" in
different fields, as well as the consequent social presence of
racialized expressions and thought, the discussion around human races
remains current in philosophy of biology in Latin American. The
so-called "problem of race" persists due to the continued
existence of racial discrimination, such that there is an intertwining
between the social problem of domination by the elites, most of whom
are white or "whitened", and the behavior of racial
contempt by these elites that becomes hegemonic, regardless of whether
these elites discursively deny such behavior.



Philosophical reflection is aware of the moral, political, and legal
implications of the concept(s) of race and their analysis, as well as
of other issues such as ethnicity (Gracia 2000, 2005, 2008;
Jaksic 2015). This discussion is carried out through
philosophical reflection on biology and from the point of view of
history, biological and social anthropology, ethnography, sociology,
political science, and law (Wade et al. 2014a, 2015).



Contemporary philosophical reflections on race are mainly carried out
in two closely related fields: first, the analysis of the concept(s)
of race, with emphasis on their ontological aspects; and second, the
analysis of the theoretical and empirical aspects of certain
biological practices, especially genomics and genetic ancestry, as
well as genomic medicine and, to a lesser extent forensic genetics,
which would appear to the non-expert to reintroduce race-like
categories.


### 3.1 Ontological Issues



In the previous section, we discussed the concept of race, sometimes
considered to be biological or scientific, in the history of thought
in Latin America. This concept remained influential during the early
decades of the twentieth century in the form of a *scientific
racism*. However, similarly to what occurred in the discussion of
the concept of race more generally (James & Burgos 2020 [2022]), a
consensus has also been reached among biologists and philosophers in
Latin America that rejects the traditional biological concept of race
and *racial naturalism*, leading to acceptance of *racial
skepticism*. This has been argued at length by biologists, such as
Brazilian Sergio D. J. Pena (2002, 2005, 2008; Pena &
Birchal 2005-2006) and philosophers like Mexican Carlos
Lopez Beltran (2000-2001) and Argentine Gustavo
Caponi (2020), who resides in Brazil.



Nonetheless, denying the biological or natural existence of races does
not imply denying the existence of a social use of racialized
categories and thinking. Indeed, academics accept a kind of *racial
constructivism*, either by affirming that races remain real social
objects that were created and exist by means of human culture and
human decisions, or accepting race as an idea that people use to
categorize themselves and others through classic racial traits, which
are typically essentialist in character and refer back to familiar
racial categories (Wade et al. 2014b).



The socially attested existence of this idea, which we can call the
*folk concept of race*, and its social use are, of course,
compatible with *thin constructivism*, that is, the idea that
superficial properties are prototypically linked with race. However,
given the real social consequences of the resulting racialization and
the enduring presence of racialized categories in government
institutions and public policies, this idea is also compatible with
so-called *interactive constructivism*, or individuals who are
labeled according to their ascription to a certain racial category and
have certain common experiences, and *institutional
constructivism*, which describes race as specific to the society
in which it is embedded and inapplicable to all cultures or historical
epochs.



Caponi (2020) analyzes possible explications of the *folk concept
of race* made from the population perspective, such as races as
species, subspecies (geographic race) or lineages of populations, and
as populations (ecological race or ecotype) or sub-lineages of
subspecies, and discards them as inadequate. He points out that the
fundamental difficulty of these attempts lies in the differences
between the typological perspective, which is proper to the notion of
human race, and the population perspective.



Many authors stress the centrality of an individual's physical
appearance in racial classification in Latin America, both regarding
self-identification and hetero-classification (Wade 2017; Kent &
Wade 2015; Nieves Delgado, Garcia Deister, & Lopez
Beltran 2017). Caponi aims to refine this idea by explicating
the concept expressed by racial typologies, that is, the folk concept
of race, and the term "race" itself, through the notion of
*physiognomic type*. Caponi argues that this concept should not
be explicated by phenotypes considered in their totality but rather by
superficial morphological aspects and details identifiable to the
naked eye, though they may also be detectable by a device or
measurement system. Physiognomic differences exist (e.g., skin color,
which is perhaps socially considered more important in the use of
racialized categories and racialized thinking), and individuals are
thereby differentiated from each other, but this does not mean that
there are natural or biological races. This demarcation is associated
with differences of other kinds, such as class or socioeconomic
position, "cultural" or educational level, socially
acceptable or punishable behaviors, etc. It also entails the social
prejudices, suspicions, and discriminations that are greater when
these physiognomic differences are close to those that were supposed
to be characteristic of traditional biological or natural racial
categories. Thus, even though human races are mere taxonomic fictions
and, phylogenetically speaking, human races are a myth, the folk
concept of race and racialized categories and thinking are not a
social myth; they exist and have very real effects. The question then
arises, entering the normative realm: how socially useful is this
method of classifying humans?



The answer Caponi (2020) gives contrasts with that given by authors
like Lopez Beltran (2000-2001) or Pena (Pena &
Birchal 2005-2006). The latter argue for a *normative racial
eliminativism*, recommending the complete abolishment of any
concept of race or racialized typologies and thinking given that they
reinforce biological misconceptions and categories on which racism is
based. Although Caponi partially share's Pena's social
context of Brazil, similar to Lopez Beltran's
context of Mexico, he adopts a stance of *normative racial
conservationism*. Even though he rejects all forms of racism, as
do Pena and Lopez Beltran, Caponi maintains that in
certain contexts, racial categories understood as mere physiognomic
types are functional and may have some epistemic value. One context,
though limited, is that of forensic anthropology. Another possible
context, also limited and requiring caution, is that of medicine.
However, physiognomic types do not have the greatest cognitive
relevance regarding biological processes but rather social ones. The
fact that an individual corresponds to one physiognomic type or
another may influence the way they insert themself and function within
certain contexts and social spaces. In Brazil, for example, given the
existence of structural inequalities usually correlated with
physiognomic type, some public policies have been proposed and
implemented to correct these injustices. As a result, affirmative
action or the quota system in Brazilian public universities have been
the subject of public debate, with the participation of various
geneticists, sociologists, anthropologists, educators, and jurists,
among others (see Kent & Wade 2015; Wade 2017).



For instance, the geneticist Pena gave evidence on the genetic
nonexistence of race in the 2010 Supreme Court hearings on the
constitutionality of such quotas. This evidence was drawn from his own
research, in which he emphasizes the high levels of genetic diversity
in Brazil (Pena, Carvalho-Silva, et al; 2000, Parra et al. 2003;
Ventura Santos et al. 2009). In relation to affirmative action
policies in general, Pena argues that although they are
well-intentioned in promoting necessary social changes, governments
should be careful not to provoke artificial and arbitrary tensions and
divisions among the people of Brazil (Pena & Birchal
2005-2006). In particular, regarding the system of racial quotas
in Brazilian public universities, he argues that modern genetics can
provide inputs for policy decisions but cannot claim an explicit
prescriptive role (Pena 2005; Pena & Bortolini 2004; Pena &
Birchal 2005-2006; Birchal & Pena 2011). However, moving
from the field of biological science to the social field, Pena himself
opposes such a system (which, by the way, was declared constitutional
by the Brazilian Supreme Court in 2012).



In contrast, Caponi (2020) considers that, given the fact that races
do not exist but individuals with some differentiated physiognomic
traits do exist and are thereby discriminated against, affirmative
action or "positive discrimination" programs will tend to
diminish discrimination against these individuals with these traits by
promoting them to positions of prestige and power, eroding the very
condition of possibility for such discrimination.


### 3.2 Mestizo Genomics



Despite the majority consensus among scientists and philosophers on
racial skepticism, certain theoretical, empirical, technical, and
technological developments in genetics in recent decades may appear to
the layperson to reintroduce racial or race-like categories. Moreover,
independent of the position and personal intentions of scientists with
regards to the subject of race, genetics has transformed common sense
notions of race, despite also partially reinforcing some of them.



Here, we must consider developments that involve theoretical,
empirical, and technical aspects of genomics and genetic ancestry
studies on the one hand, and two of their respective technological
applications, namely genomic medicine and forensic genetics, on the
other. Because of their presence in Latin America, all these areas
have been the subject of philosophical reflection.



In relation to genomics research, Wade, Lopez Beltran,
Restrepo and Ventura-Santos (2014b) have noted that, given the iconic
status of the fact that all humans share 99.9% of their genomes, the
development of new technologies has made it possible to explore the
remaining 0.1% that, in principle, causes much of the obvious physical
diversity of humans. As in other regions of the world, some
laboratories in Latin America, particularly in Mexico, Brazil, and
Colombia, have been mapping the genomes of local populations with the
goal of tracing population histories and locating the genetic basis of
disease, in addition to establishing their genomes. This has given
rise to the respective Mexican and Brazilian genome mapping projects
and the Mexican *mestizo* and *Homo brasilis* genome
projects.



As has been pointed out by Kent, Garcia-Deister, Lopez
Beltran, Ventura-Santos, Schwartz-Marin and Wade (2015)
in their comparison of both cases from the point of view of social
studies of science, these projects have been developed in different
national contexts with distinct scientific and social trajectories.
While in Mexico, mapping the genomic *mestizo* is driven mainly
in relation to health, in Brazil, the main issue is that of race, as
we saw in the previous section.



The very notion of *mestizo*, including *Mexican
mestizo* in particular, was the subject of criticism in genomic
studies not only from philosophy but also from cultural anthropology,
sociology, biological anthropology, history of science, and the social
studies of science (Wade et al. 2015). With regards to philosophy,
several authors agree with this criticism connected to both the
ontological problem of race and the story of the birth of a nation and
the genetic reification of the Mexican national identity (Lopez
Beltran, Garcia-Deister, & Rios Sandoval
2014; Wade 2014; Wade et al. 2014b, 2015). In this regard, some
authors point out that a variety of *mestizaje* (interbreeding)
has taken place, as opposed to a single process (Wade et al. 2014b),
while others focus on methodological problems (Winther 2011; Pascacio
Montijo 2011, Arroyo Santos 2011; Schwartz Marin 2011;
Lopez Beltran & Vergara Silva 2011; Lopez
Beltran & Garcia Deister 2013).



In relation to these methodological issues, Danish philosopher of
biology Rasmus Gronfeldt Winther, who grew up in Venezuela and
completed postdoctoral studies in Mexico, analyzes the two
mathematical methods used in the genetic classifications of human
groups: *diversity partitioning* and *clustering
analysis*. He argues that although both are legitimate and
consistent methodologies, neither implies anything specific with
regards to the reality of these groups. In fact, the results of these
two methods point in opposite ontological directions. While models
partitioning diversity indicate that the abstraction of race is not
grounded in genetic data, those that assign particular individuals to
robust clustering could be taken as evidence of a strong sense of the
reality of these human groups. However, both the results and inputs of
these methodologies are subject to interpretation and bias, in
addition to being theory-laden. Thus, both diversity partitioning and
cluster analysis genetically reify the concept of race due to their
sensitivity to highly questionable assumptions of various kinds
(Winther 2011).



Going deeper into the criticism of the methodology of clustering
analysis, Mexican biologist and philosopher of biology Yuriditzi
Pascacio Montijo points out that the classification and population
partitioning on which Mexico's National Institute of Genomic
Medicine (*Instituto Nacional de Medicina Genomica* or
INMEGEN in the original Spanish) bases its analysis and
characterization of the genetic structure of a population corresponds
to various pre-established categorizations. The problem lies in the
fact that these classifying categories, e.g., *Zapotec*, are
not natural classes but rather are established based on interests and
objectives that could be relevant in a particular context, for example
Mexico's National Commission for the Development of Indigenous
Peoples (*Comision Nacional para el Desarrollo de los
Pueblos Indigenas* or CDI in the original Spanish) or
Mexico's National Indigenous Languages Institute (*Instituto
Nacional de Lenguas Indigenas* or INALI in the original
Spanish) but not necessarily in others, like that of INMEGEN, whose
genotyping is neither useful nor representative of the complexity and
dynamics of populations in Mexico (Pascacio-Montijo 2011).



In a similar vein, Mexican Alfonso Arroyo Santos, first trained as a
biomedical researcher and later as a philosopher, argues against
INMEGEN's genomic diversity project. He maintains that it is
impossible to appeal to objective variables that allow for both the
creation of a particular class for Mexican *mestizos* and the
identification of genes that cause common multifactorial and polygenic
diseases in Mexico, such as type 2 diabetes, obesity, or certain types
of cancer. For him, the central problem lies in the fact that
multivariate diseases can only be studied by means of *surrogate
variables*, and it is a mistake to reify a surrogate variable in
the context of causal claims that, at best, only have some probability
of occurrence. In the case of the study of genetic diseases, the
surrogate variable is known as the *risk gene* or
*haplotype*. To discover genetic risk factors, a
*genome-wide association study* (GWAS) or *whole genome
association study* (WGAS) is usually carried out. However, these
studies have known limitations. It is clear that correlating a
chromosomal region with the occurrence of a disease is not the same as
stating that a genetic element, or causal gene, has been identified.
Thus, INMEGEN's analyses only account for surrogate variables,
and any historical attribution of racial origin and population
morbidity due to ethnicity is incorrect. In order to support their
genetic findings, then, researchers must appeal to history,
anthropology, geography, and other disciplines in which the notion of
*mestizo* has been constructed. According to Arroyo-Santos
(2011), a tautological dialectic is thus created between the
molecularized humanities and genetics since one field becomes the
theoretical basis of the other or, in other words, one takes
*epistemic credit* from the other, reifying theories that never
received empirical support.


### 3.3 Genomic Medicine and Forensic Genetics



The flagbearer of the promises of genomic medicine in Mexico is the
INMEGEN (Schwartz Marin 2011; Lopez Beltran &
Vergara Silva 2011). In addition to the aforementioned problematic
situations that genomic medicine must still overcome in order to
fulfill its promises, Arroyo-Santos (2011), Garcia-Deister and
Lopez-Beltran (2015), and Lopez Beltran
(2018) have emphasized that the relevant correlation in terms of
prevention and improvement of the health of Mexicans is not between
obesity or diabetes and certain genetic variants but rather between
obesity or diabetes and the country's socioeconomic
deterioration and the associated growing malnutrition.



Finally, we will refer to the analysis that has been made of forensic
genetics. In addition to the distinct degrees of development, the
different roles it plays in different countries have been pointed out
by Garcia-Deister and Lopez-Beltran (2015, 2017).
Thus, whereas in Argentina forensic genetics was organized around
social movements like *Las Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo*, it has
played a key role in the process of returning the remains of
disappeared persons to their families and in the search for children
appropriated during the last military dictatorship (Penchaszadeh 2011,
Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team
 [Other Internet Resources]).
 In Colombia, although forensic technicians are aware of disputes
among population geneticists, they use and endorse the relations
established between genetics, race, and geography because they fit
with common-sense notions of visible bodily difference and the
regionalization of race in the Colombian nation
(Schwartz-Marin, Wade, Cruz-Santiago, & Cardenas
2015).


## 4. Theories



The five different kinds of philosophical inquiry that fall under the
general heading of philosophy of biology distinguished in
 Section 1
 are often interrelated. This can be clearly seen when a philosophical
analysis is made of a biological theory. In this section, we will
focus on the first three types mentioned above: the reassessment of
some problems, theses, and solutions developed in general philosophy
of science or in other special philosophy of science in the context of
biology; the analysis of logical, semantic, pragmatic,
epistemological, methodological, ontological, praxiological,
axiological, ethical, and aesthetical aspects of biology; and the
philosophical analysis of specific conceptual problems in biology.



The first of these, a topic within general philosophy of science, is
the problem of the nature, structure, and function of scientific
theories. In various specific philosophies, such as that of biology,
the question arises as to whether theories exist as such and whether
they are of the same type as those found in other scientific
disciplines. Of course, the answer to be given depends centrally on
the explication of the metascientific concept of theory, to which we
will return later, and on the successful application of that concept
in the realm of biology. Furthermore, the explication of the concept
of theory is linked and contributes to the explication of other
metascientific concepts, such as scientific concept, statement, law,
principle, or explanation, and of other philosophical issues of
science, such as hypothesis and theory testing and evaluation,
conceptual change, theory-change, scientific progress, and scientific
rationality.



In relation to the second kind of philosophical research, the analysis
of theories entails the analysis of some logical, semantic, pragmatic,
epistemological, methodological, ontological, praxiological, and,
eventually, axiological aspects of biology, and makes possible the
subsequent analysis of some ethical and aesthetic aspects of biology.
And regarding the third kind of philosophical inquiry, the analysis of
theories includes and contributes to the explication of all the
concepts occurring in them (see
 Section 4.3).



Throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, three main
general explications of the metascientific concept of theory, or
conceptions of scientific theories, can be identified: the
*classical* or *received* view, the *historical*
or *historicist* view, and the *semantic* or
*model-theoretic* view. It is worth noting that despite the use
of the singular definite article to refer to the three previous
metatheoretical conceptions, we ought to clarify that each groups
together a number of versions, variants, or approaches that share
certain basic ideas but differ from each other in the particular way
they understand or elaborate these ideas. We will now refer to some of
the most significant discussions and contributions made in Latin
America in this field, appealing to the three major metatheoretical
conceptions mentioned above.


### 4.1 Discussions and Contributions from and on the Classical View



One theory that has been the subject of philosophical analysis in
Latin America, as in other regions of the world, is the theory of
evolution. Two of the foundational and most influential figures of the
philosophy of science in Argentina and Latin America, Mario Bunge and
Gregorio Klimovsky, discussed the nature of evolutionary theory in
terms of the classical view (Carnap 1956), understanding theories as
hypothetico-deductive systems consisting of a set of starting
hypotheses, fundamental hypotheses, or principles, along with all
their logical consequences, including derived hypotheses and
observational consequences (Klimovsky 1994), or as sets of
propositions closed under deduction (Mahner & Bunge 1997).



Klimovsky presents an analysis of the theory of evolution (following
Julian Huxley 1942) standard to *Darwin's argument*,
which distinguishes two parts. One of these corresponds to the
*short argument* or core of the argument, of which natural
selection is the conclusion. In the other part, the explanatory power
of natural selection and its evidential support are tested. In basic
agreement with several authors (Wallace 1891; Huxley 1942; Flew 1959;
Ghiselin 1969; Lewontin 1978; Ruse 1979; Ospovat 1981 and Mayr 1982,
1991, 2001; among others), Klimovsky reconstructs the *short
argument* as a hypothetico-deductive argument with the principle
of natural selection as its conclusion. He (1971, 1994) distinguishes
three levels of statements of a scientific theory. Level 1: basic or
singular empirical statements, containing only observational terms;
level 2: general empirical statements or empirical generalizations;
and level 3: general theoretical statements with theoretical terms.
According to Klimovsky (1994), the theory of evolution is
characterized by not including level 3 statements, in accordance with
what Putnam (1962) pointed out with regards to Darwin's original
formulation.



Anna Carolina K.P. Regner, who transitioned from initially working as
a general philosopher of science to becoming a professional
philosopher of biology and played a significant role in the
introduction and consolidation of philosophy of biology in Brazil,
criticizes hypothetico-deductive reconstructions of Darwin's
*short argument*. She claims that by virtue of the meaning of
the concepts that appear in the premises and conclusion, this argument
fails to satisfy at least two basic requirements for a deductive
argument: independence of the premises from each other and
independence of the premises from the conclusion (Regner 2010).
Regarding the constructive part of her analysis, Regner maintains that
the *Origin of Species* as a whole presents *one long
argument* as a narrative without a linear structure, as a network
made up of successive steps that take the form of chapters or partial
arguments, each of which summarizes the preceding step and introduces
the subsequent ones, such that the parts sustain the whole. On the
other hand, it is from the complete argument that each part derives
its support and meaning. She emphasizes that Darwin makes use of
different resources throughout his work, including metaphors and
dialectical and rhetorical arguments, in addition to more traditional
logical arguments and procedures (Regner 2010; see also
 Section 5.4).



In his book, written in conjunction with German biologist and
philosopher of science Martin Mahner (Mahner & Bunge 1997), Bunge
argues that there is no unified hyper-general theory of evolution.
Rather, evolutionary theory is not a proper theory but, as Lewis
(1980) states, a *system of theories* with different degrees of
generality, with the theory of natural selection being the most
conspicuous example of a *hypergeneral theory* in evolutionary
biology (Mahner & Bunge 1997: Section 9.3.3). Mahner and Bunge
argue that there is no reason to abandon the view of scientific
theories as hypothetico-deductive systems and instead adopt the
semantic view of theories given that there is nothing in mathematical
structures and state spaces that cannot be expressed by propositions.
However, these authors propose considering the theory of natural
selection in terms of models: either as the family of all their
theoretical models or as their union (Mahner & Bunge 1997: Section
9.3.3), which actually constitutes the core of the semantic view, as
we will see in
 Section 4.3.



Before moving on, we must mention the analysis of medical theories
made from the classical view of theories by Argentine physician,
philosopher and historian of science Cesar Lorenzano. As early
as 1977, during his Mexican exile, he published an analysis of Hans
Selye's stress theory, or General Adaptation Syndrome (Selye
1952), following Klimovsky's teachings of the classical view.
Lorenzano's intention was to show that, first, medicine has
theories in several of its subdisciplines, such as anatomic pathology,
pharmacology, and therapeutics, but at its very core, physiopathology,
the theories possess theoretical terms, that statements from level 3.
This contrasts with to Klimovsky's analysis of the theory of
natural selection. Second, Lorenzano argued that medicine should be
studied independently of biology, though the two fields are related.
Finally, he stated that medicine should not be considered a craft or
an applied science, that is, a biological technique, but rather a
science in its own right, reducible neither to biology nor to a small
part of all theoretical and practical medical knowledge, namely, the
medical clinic (C. Lorenzano 1977). This argument runs counter to Kuhn
(1962 [1970]) and Bunge (1967).


### 4.2 Discussions and Contributions from the Historicist View



One kind of general criticism to the classical view came mainly from
scholars interested in history of science, once referred to as *new
philosophers*, such as Thomas S. Kuhn (1962 [1970]) and Imre
Lakatos (1970). The majority of diachronic studies and analyses
typical of these authors is supposed to be closer to scientific
practice as history presents it to us. Besides, underlying them is a
new conception of the nature and synchronic structure of scientific
theories. The point is often merely implied and is not always
systematically developed, and in
 Section 5
 we will refer to the more general problem of the relations between
synchronic and diachronic studies and between philosophy and history
of science/biology. These historicist philosophers of science conceive
this new notion of theory in different ways, referring to them by
different terms, e.g., *paradigm* or *disciplinary
matrix* in Kuhn (1962 [1970\) and *scientific research
program* in Lakatos (1970).



As Kuhn (1970) recognizes, he had been using the term
"paradigm" in 1962 in two different though related senses:
(1) as the global set of commitments shared by the members of a given
scientific community, which he later called the *disciplinary
matrix* and which contains exemplars as one of its components; and
(2) as concrete solutions to problems, which he then called
*exemplars*.



As for the application of Kuhnian views to the field of biology, we
have not identified a systematic use or application of the notion of
paradigm as disciplinary matrix in the analysis of particular cases
pertaining to the field of biology. A notable exception in the field
of biochemistry is the analysis made by Cesar Lorenzano (1994),
after coming into contact with the philosopher C. Ulises Moulines, a
disciple of the German philosopher Wolfgang Stegmuller and one
the main figures of the structuralist view of theories (Sneed 1971
[1979]; Stegmuller 1973; Balzer, Moulines, & Sneed 1987), who
lived in Mexico from 1976 to 1984. Lorenzano developed his own
"structuralized", though informal, version of Kuhn's
conceptions: a Kuhnian perspective passed through the sieve of a
version of the semantic view to which we will refer later.



The sense of paradigm that philosophers of biology have found most
fruitful in carrying out their analyses is that of the
*exemplar*, either arguing that the theories of the biological
and/or biomedical sciences possess a particular structure distinct
from that of physical theories (Schaffner 1980, 1986; Darden 1991) or
considering that this is not the case, if they are analyzed within the
framework of some version of the semantic view of theories (Schaffner
1993). Argentine philosopher and historian of science Pablo Lorenzano,
who first studied in Mexico with his father, Cesar, and with C.
Ulises Moulines, then with the latter and Wolfgang Balzer in Germany,
argues along the same lines as Schaffner (1993). However, he also
maintains that the theories of the biological and/or biomedical
sciences can be analyzed without developing a new variant of the
semantic view of theories. Instead this can be plausibly carried out
using the structuralist version of the semantic view of theories (P.
Lorenzano 2007a, 2012).



Although it has not been central to the field, the Lakatosian
perspective has not been entirely absent from analysis in biology.
However, there are only a few analyses that systematically use
Lakatos's concept of a scientific research program, that is,
that clearly identify the components of such a program, including its
irrefutable hard core, its protective belt, and its (negative and
positive) heuristics. Nevertheless, we find some examples in Latin
America where these components are clearly identified. For instance,
analyses carried out by Argentine philosopher Juan Manuel Torres
(1996) on the competing research programs on the origin of life, the
Oparin-Fox "phenotype program", and the Muller-Haldane
"genotype program"; those made by the Argentine
philosopher and historian Hector A. Palma and biologist,
science teacher, and communicator Eduardo Wolovelsky (Palma &
Wolovelsky 1997) on Darwin's theory of natural selection; those
conducted by Brazilian biologists and philosophers Nei F. Nunes-Neto,
Ricardo Santos do Carmo, and Charbel N. El-Hani (2009) on
Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis; and those performed by Argentine
helminthologist and philosopher Guillermo Denegri (2008; Cabaret &
Denegri 2008) in parasitology. The latter, together with Argentine
philosopher Gisela Lamas and Argentine biologist Vicente Dressino,
also use Lakatos' approach, modifying it by substituting the
notion of hard core for that of conservative nucleus, the difference
being that the latter allows slight changes with regards to the
initial proposal in the course of its development, focusing on the
study of the facial component in mammals (Dressino, Denegri, &
Lamas 1998). In turn, Pablo Lorenzano (2013d) also uses the Lakatosian
notions of hard core, protective belt, and positive and negative
heuristics to analyze the first research program in genetics,
Bateson's Mendelism. However, he more precisely applies
Lakatosian analysis through use of the structuralist concepts of
fundamental law/guiding principle, specializations, and the way of
obtaining and testing specializations (see
 Section 4.3
 below), which explicate the notions of hard core, protective belt,
and positive and negative heuristics, respectively.


### 4.3 Discussions and Contributions from the Semantic View



The distinctive feature of the semantic view is the centrality of
models in the philosophical analysis of the concept of theory (Lloyd
2006; Moulines 2008; P. Lorenzano 2013a). This does not rule out that
models, in some of their many senses, play a role in other aspects of
science. It also does not deny that scientific theories, in some
plausible sense of the concept, can be identified in different areas
of science, including biology, and are relevant in many contexts, even
if they do not constitute the totality of science or exhaust all
philosophically relevant things that can be said about science.



According to the semantic view, concepts relative to models are much
more fruitful for the philosophical analysis of theories than concepts
relative to statements. The nature, structure, and function of
theories can be better understood when their metatheoretical
characterization, analysis, or reconstruction is centered on the
models they determine, rather than on a particular set of axioms,
understood either as linguistic formulations or as propositions, or on
other resources and devices through which they fulfill this function,
such as diagrams or graphs. For this conception, the most fundamental
component for the identity of a theory is a *class* (set,
population, collection, family) *of models*, which is not the
same as stating that a scientific theory should be identified with a
class of models. Some misrepresentations or sloppy presentations of
the semantic view do make this assertion. It is also not the same to
say that the class of models is the only one component of the
theory.



It is within the framework of the semantic conception that the largest
number and most significant contributions made from Latin America to
the analysis of biological theories are to be found. One of the
versions of the semantic view used is that of Patrick Suppes (1957),
especially how he identifies the class of models by the definition a
set-theoretical predicate, shared by other variants of the semantic
view, such as the partial structures approach (Da Costa & French
1990) and the standard presentation of the structuralist view of
theories (Balzer, Moulines, & Sneed 1987). We find this in some
works by Brazilian biologist Nelson Papavero, who also worked in
philosophy and history of biology with the group led by Brazilian
logician and philosopher Newton da Costa, one of the founders of the
partial structures approach. Papavero, together with Brazilian
mathematician Jair Minoro Abe, combined some of the fundamentals of
set theory with mathematical logic to create a classification system
that is isomorphic with phylogenetic systematics (Papavero & Abe
1992). We also find a Suppesian analysis in the work of Brazilian
biologist and philosopher Joao Carlos Marques Magalhaes,
together with his advisor Decio Krause, a mathematician by
training who later became a philosopher of physics advised by Newton
da Costa. Magalhaes and Krause make use of axiomatization
*a la* Suppes in an attempt to identify the class of
models of the theory of evolution by natural selection and of
population genetics, extending the axiomatic treatment of the
evolutionary theory presented by Mary Williams (1970) to encompass
aspects of genetics (Magalhaes & Krause 2001) and to deal
with the concept of Darwinian fitness so as to explore the
relationships between Darwinian theory and population genetics
(Magalhaes & Krause 2006).



However, it is the structuralist view of theories, or Sneedian or
metatheoretical structuralism, that has produced the largest number of
analyses of particular theories from the biological sciences in Latin
America, as well as from the biochemical and biomedical sciences.
However, this fact has gone largely unnoticed by the international
audience, perhaps because most of the relevant works have been
published in Spanish or German, rather than in English.



These analyses have been carried out in Mexico, after C. Ulises
Moulines's time there, mainly by biologist turned philosopher
Mario Casanueva, who obtained a doctorate in Barcelona under
Moulines's direction, and by biologist and philosopher Diego
Mendez, first a student and then a colleague of Casanueva.
Other relevant analyses have been done in Argentina, largely due to
the formative work of Cesar and Pablo Lorenzano and the
collaborative work they promote among philosophers Santiago Ginnobili,
Mercedes O'Lery, and Federico Bernabe, biologists and
philosophers Lucia Federico, Daniel Blanco, and Martin
Diaz, and biochemist and philosopher Karina Alleva, as well as
to Ginnobili's later formative work with a younger generation of
philosophers such as Ariel Roffe and Andrea Olmos, and the
teamwork among all these scholars.



Among the theories analyzed, in the field of evolutionary biology we
can find the theory of evolution by natural selection (Ginnobili 2010,
2016, 2018; Diez & Lorenzano 2013; Ginnobili & Blanco
2019), the theory of common descent (D. Blanco 2012), the theory of
functions (Ginnobili 2011), and the niche construction theory
(Casanueva & Madrigal 2021; Mendez 2021); in the field of
systematics, cladistics (Roffe 2020); in the field of
inheritance and genetics, theories of classical, molecular, and
population genetics (Balzer & Lorenzano 2000; Casanueva 1997,
2002, 2003; Casanueva & Mendez 2005, 2012; P. Lorenzano
1995, 2000, 2002, 2013b,c, 2014; and O'Lery 2016); in the field
of ecology, population dynamics theory (P. Lorenzano & Diaz
2020); in the field of cytology and histology, cellular and tissue
theories (Asua & Klimovsky 1987, 1990); in the field of
neurosciences and of neuroendocrinology, organizational-activational
theory (Bernabe 2019); in the field of biochemistry, enzyme and
metabolic theories (Donolo, Federico, & Lorenzano 2006, 2007,
2016; Federico 2009; C. Lorenzano 2002, 2007), allosteric theory
(Alleva, Diez, & Federico 2017), and free-radical theory of
aging and the model of oxidation-reduction reactions (O'Lery
2012a, b); and in the field of biomedical sciences, physiology (C.
Lorenzano 2010), clinical medical theory (C. Lorenzano 2011), the
humoral theory of immunity (C. Lorenzano 2012), and the theory of the
circular motion of the blood (Barutta & Lorenzano 2012).



In all these theories, and in accordance with the methodology of
metatheoretical structuralism, all the main concepts that occur in
them are identified, distinguishing those that refer to empirical
objects from those that refer to mathematical objects. Concentrating
on concepts of the first kind, the descriptive ones, their formal
structure is pointed out, making explicit whether they are
qualitative, comparative, or quantitative concepts, as is their
logical type, stating whether they represent sets, relations, or
functions, whether numerical or not. Finally, the relations they have
with each other are specified, in the case that some of them should be
considered to be basic or primitive and others could be considered to
be defined.



In addition, descriptive concepts are distinguished by the function
they fulfill within each theory. On the one hand, we have the concepts
that constitute the empirical, applicative, or testing part of the
theory and are used to identify and represent empirical systems. The
theory's users intend to account for "portions of the
world" conceived by means of this kind of descriptive concepts.
This specific domain of application of the theory depends strongly on
pragmatic and historical factors. On the other hand, we have the
concepts that constitute the "theoretical" part of the
theory and are used to identify and represent the theoretical models,
and how they relate to each other and to the concepts of the previous
kind to say something about the world, i.e., to identify and represent
the "laws" of the theory.



All the theories analyzed have been shown to have a strongly
hierarchical structure, forming a kind of net or *theory-net*
with laws of very different degrees of generality, significance, and
scope within the same conceptual setting. These theories or
theory-nets usually have a single fundamental law or guiding principle
at the top of the hierarchy and a vast array of more special laws
which apply to specific situations and not obtained by deduction but
by *specialization* or specification.



Two remarks are pertinent here. The first is that since models are the
semantic or model-theoretic counterpart of laws, the above is
equivalent to distinguishing different levels of generality between
models of a single theory. The other is to realize the implications of
acceptance of at least a minimal characterization of laws as
counterfactual-supporting regularities within the structuralist view,
regardless of whether they are context-sensitive or domain-restricted.
There are also implications identifying "fundamental" laws
for the general philosophical problem of laws and the specific problem
regarding about the existence of laws in biology. Here, we use
"fundamental" in the sense of the scope and role played
within the theories, and not in the sense of belonging to a supposed
"fundamental theory or science", even if some of them are
implicit. Furthermore, all these analyses of particular theories make
it possible to deal with some of the philosophical issues arising in
the various biological subdisciplines to which they belong, some of
which have been explicitly addressed in the analyses of the particular
theories referred to above or in relevant works that develop the
implications of such analyses for these issues.



Some examples are the following. In relation to evolution, these
issues include the structure of the theory, the nature and role of
certain concepts such as adaptation, fitness, and functional
attributions; the scope of the theory, its refutability, and the
nature of the principle of natural selection; and the unity of
selection and its relation to population genetics. Regarding classical
and population genetics and population dynamics, issues include the
status of Mendel's laws, the Hardy-Weinberg law, and the
Lotka-Volterra model, within their respective theories. Relative to
cladistics, we can identify the issue of their empirical character,
and, in relation to neuroendocrinology, the discussion of
androcentrism, particularly in its form of neurosexism, pointing out
where values play a role.


## 5. Philosophy and History of Biology



The discussion of the relationships between philosophy of science and
history of science has a long tradition, as well as distinct
metascientific practices that link philosophy of science and history
of science in various ways. The interrelations between these two
metascientific disciplines are ever-changing and are not free of
tensions. Some of the main authors of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, such as William Whewell, Ernst Mach, and Pierre
Duhem maintained that there was a close relationship between the two,
in the sense that they understood their philosophical positions were
based on reflections made in the history of science, and in order to
carry out historical analyses of science one had to possess some
philosophical concept of science.



However, despite the work of the aforementioned authors, as well as
that of Emile Meyerson and his "Circle", which
included Alexandre Koyre, Leon Brunschvicg, and
Helene Metzger, and of Edouard Le Roy, Ernst
Cassirer, Edgar Zilsel, Ludwik Fleck, Abel Rey, Gaston Bachelard, and
Georges Canguilhem, among others towards the mid-twentieth century,
the conception that philosophy and the history of science are
different disciplines with little or no mutual influence became
crystallized in the *received view* in the philosophy of
science.



At the same time, however, some philosophers of science, including
Norwood Russell Hanson, Mary Hesse, and Stephen Toulmin, acknowledged
the relevance of history of science for philosophical reflection on
science, giving rise to what would become known as the *historical
turn*, which was continued in the 1960s, 1970s, and even 1980s by
Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos, and Larry Laudan. The work
of these historicist philosophers of science, as well as the attempts
of other more formalist authors, such as Joseph Sneed, Wolfgang
Stegmuller, and C. Ulises Moulines, along with the popularization
of the paraphrasing of Kant's *dictum*, contributed to
rethinking the relationship between the philosophy of science and the
history of science. This dictum was first formulated in two sentences
by Hanson (1962) and then put together in a single sentence by Lakatos
(1970): 



> 
> 
> Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of
> science without philosophy of science is blind.
> 
> 
> 



The discussion of such relationships continued with a questioning of
the link developed between the two metascientific subdisciplines,
whether it was not more a marriage of convenience than an intimate
relationship (Giere 1973), the adoption of the *naturalistic
turn*, and the proposal of the so-called *confrontation
model* (Laudan et al. 1986; Donovan, Laudan, & Laudan 1988)
and, more recently, the development of the *new historical
epistemology* (Lorraine Daston, Hans-Jorg Rheinberger,
Jurgen Renn; see Feest & Sturm 2011; Braunstein 2012) and the
so-called *integrated history and philosophy of science* (Jean
Gayon, Hasok Chang, Jutta Schickore, Theodore Arabatzis, Friedrich
Steinle; see Arabatzis & Howard 2015).



Linked to these different authors and positions, as well as to those
in the philosophy of history, such as the dispute of historicism in
Germany since the second half of the nineteenth century and approaches
grounded in conceptual and intellectual history, in Latin America we
find historically-minded philosophers of science and
philosophically-minded historians of science. Therefore, the region is
characterized by diverse and plural ways of doing research that
relates philosophy of biology to history of biology. These approaches
range, on a continuum, from those that erroneously do not seem to be
linked or relevant to the history of science to those that, also
erroneously, seem unrelated to philosophy in general and of science in
particular. This continuum begins at one extreme with synchronic
philosophical analyses of episodes in the history of biology, moves
through diachronic philosophical analyses and
historico-epistemological analyses, and ends at the other extreme with
conceptual analyses of episodes in the history of biology.



On the one hand, synchrony and diachrony represent two sides of the
same coin. Every synchronic analysis presupposes a rupture within
temporal becoming, and every diachronic analysis presupposes
synchronic analysis of successive events in time. Analogous to de
Saussure's introduction of the synchronic/diachronic
distinction, if a historian creates a picture of an event, one does
not have the impression of leaving history, and if a philosopher of
science carries out a synchronic analysis, they likewise do not leave
history. Thus, even synchronic philosophical analyses are based on
history, namely, on what the philosopher might consider the best
history available, even though they might be incorrect and later
revise their decision. Given the inextricable link between synchrony,
diachrony, and history, it is not only true that diachronic
philosophical analyses of science can contribute to a better
understanding of the history of science; synchronic philosophical
analyses can also shed light on some historiographical problems raised
in the history of science. On the other hand, every historiographic
narrative has theoretical presuppositions, even if it claims to be
"merely" descriptive or consists of the narrative
criticized by Kuhn of a repository of anecdotes or chronology, and of
which historians may or may not be aware.



Thus, it is clear that theoretical-philosophical presuppositions play
an important role in choosing the type of history of science to be
carried out, within a range that includes the following: biographical,
autobiographical, prosopographical, fictional, thematic,
institutional, national, disciplinary, comparative, hypothetical
(counterfactual), anachronic (Whig or presentist), diachronic,
experimental, scientometrical, and conceptual (theoretical,
philosophical). The various types of historiographic analyses always
presuppose some sort of theory about science, though it may be a poor
or murky one. And in some of the different types of historiographic
analyses, e.g., in the conceptual history of science, some general
philosophical concept of science and some metascientific concepts
usually explicated by philosophy, such as scientific concept,
hypothesis, law and theory, are also presupposed.



Finally, we must bear in mind that there are no clear-cut boundaries
in the continuum formed by the different modes of doing research
relating the philosophy of science to the history of science:
synchronic philosophical, diachronic philosophical,
historico-epistemological, and conceptual analyses of episodes in the
history of science. We must also emphasize that even when these
approaches explicitly adopt different perspectives or conceptions,
they may be linked together or combined in various ways. Consider, for
example, a classical, historicist, or semantic view of theories, in
the case of synchronic philosophical analyses; or a Fleckian,
Popperian, Kuhnian, Lakatosian, Laudanian, or structuralist approach,
in the case of diachronic philosophical analyses; or a Duhemian,
Bachelardian, Canguilhemian, Dastonian, Rennian, or Rheinbergerian
view, in the case of the historical epistemology, both old and
new.


### 5.1 Synchronic Philosophical Analyses



Within synchronic philosophical analyses, equally linked to the
history of science for the reasons given above, we can refer to those
already mentioned in
 Section 4,
 where, from different conceptions of scientific theories, distinct
biological theories were analyzed at different moments of their
historical development. For instance, the theory of evolution by
natural selection in Darwin's time, by using a Lakatosian (Palma
& Wolovelsky 1997) or a structuralist analysis (Ginnobili 2010;
Ginnobili & Blanco 2019); or for an analysis of the same theory at
the time of the "synthesis" (Klimovsky 1994), or at a
later time (Mahner & Bunge 1997) by using the classical view of
theories. On the other hand, given the relations between synchrony and
diachrony, some of the works mentioned in Section 4 provide a natural
basis for the diachronic analyses referred to in the next section.



In addition, some of the works mentioned in
 Section 4
 made it possible to address specific problems raised by historians
about the theories analyzed. For example, historians of biology have
wondered to what extent Darwin and Wallace proposed the same theory or
whether Mendel, with his work, mainly tried to solve the problem of
heredity, introducing the basic concepts of genetics and the laws that
bear his name. With their synchronic philosophical analysis of the
theory of evolution by natural selection, Ginnobili & Blanco
(2019) show that Darwin's and Wallace's theories coincide
in many ways. However, Darwin's proposal should be considered
more general, encompassing, and unifying than Wallace's, such
that Wallace's would constitute a part, more precisely a
*specialization* in the sense of metatheoretical structuralism,
of Darwin's theory. In contrast, synchronic philosophical
analyses of Mendel's work (Casanueva 1997, 2002; P. Lorenzano
2022) show the difficulty in stating that Mendel proposed a theory of
heredity in identical terms to what is usually presented under the
label of classical or even Mendelian genetics.


### 5.2 Diachronic Philosophical Analyses



As far as diachronic philosophical analyses are concerned, Mercedes
O'Lery (2016) carries out a Kuhnian examination of the
controversy generated around Rebeca Gerschman and Denham Harman
regarding the priority of the free radical hypothesis in living
systems. She shows that this "empirical novelty" demanded
a change of the paradigm/disciplinary-matrix for chemical reactions.
This would later be articulated in the Leonor Michaelis's work
on partial reduction of molecular oxygen. On the other hand,
Cesar Lorenzano (1994) also provides a Kuhnian analysis of the
work of Argentine Nobel Prize winner Luis Federico Leloir, but in
terms of a "structuralized Kuhnian normal science", that
is, an "improved" version of Kuhn's normal science
with the tools of Sneedian or metatheoretical structuralism, but used
in an informal way.



Juan Manuel Torres (1996), in turn, assesses the various stages in the
evolution of the competing phenotype and genotype research programs on
the origin of life with respect to the crucial Lakatosian notions of
*progressivity* and *regressivity*. He establishes
internal reasons why the RNA version of the *genotype program*
(developed in particular by L. Orgel and S. Spiegelman) has taken on a
progressive character and enjoys recognition by the international
scientific community.



Also appealing to Lakatos, Martin Orensanz and Guillermo
Denegri (2017) examine the possibility of using the methodology of
scientific research programs for reconstructing the history of
helminthology and the comparison between the two rival programs in
helminthology, the internalist and the externalist, from the
seventeenth century to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In
their analysis of the Gaia research program, Nei F. Nunes-Neto,
Ricardo Santos do Carmo, and Charbel N. El-Hani (2009) hold that the
success of the CLAW hypothesis, named after R.J. Charlson, J.E.
Lovelock, M.O. Andreae, S.G. Warren, can be qualified as a
"progressive problem shift" in the understanding of the
sulphur cycle.



Several episodes of biological science are analyzed within the
framework of structuralist view of theories, Sneedian or
metatheoretical structuralism, accepting from the outset that
*interpretation* takes place in philosophy of science and
history of science, as well as in science itself, both in natural and
social and human science (Stegmuller 1979), and that the working
process in philosophy of science, as well as with its link to history
of science, can be conceived as one of feedback or *reflective
equilibrium* (Stegmuller 1973, 1986, 1987). Both aspects, the
hermeneutic and that of understanding the process as one of reflective
equilibrium, was later emphasized by Schickore (2011).



Although the diachronic philosophical analyses made by Santiago
Ginnobili and Daniel Blanco concentrate on the history of evolutionary
biology, those carried out by Mario Casanueva, Diego Mendez,
and Pablo Lorenzano do the same with the history of genetics.
Ginnobili (2014) analyzes the relationship between the Darwinian
theory of natural selection and the intelligent design of natural
theology not only in terms of theoretical incommensurability but also
of empirical incommensurability, with both concepts of
incommensurability understood in a structuralist way. Daniel Blanco
(2016) analyzes the peripheral or accidental changes in the
development of the theory of natural selection, and Ginnobili and
Blanco (2019) analyze the relationship between Darwin's and
Wallace's elaborations of the theory of natural selection,
showing that the diachronic modification of the set of intended
applications of the theory of natural selection does not affect its
identity. They further analyze the incorporation of some previous
Owenian components into Darwin's theory of natural selection (D.
Blanco & Ginnobili 2020).



In addition, based on his own historiographic research (P. Lorenzano
1995), Pablo Lorenzano (2007b, 2008) carries out a structuralist
analysis of the different theories proposed by the scientists usually
mentioned in the "official story" or "orthodox
image" of classical genetics (Mendel, the rediscoverers De
Vries, Correns and Tschermak, Bateson and Morgan) as forming a
continuous, cumulative and linear process. His analysis shows that
among these theoretical developments, there are both continuities and
ruptures, which are best conceptualized in terms of the explicated
concepts of theoretical incommensurability and empirical
comparability. Moreover, by making more precise some concepts of the
problem-solving approach, Lorenzano analyzes the interrogative aspects
of Mendel's hybridist theories, the theory of the
development/evolution of hybrids and the theory on the cellular
foundation of the development/evolution of hybrids (2013b), and the
change from Bateson's Mendelism to Morgan's Classical
Genetics (2013c).



Complementary to Lorenzano's analyses, Mendez and
Casanueva (2012) combine aspects of the structuralist program's
apparatus with the ordination technique of *formal concept
analysis* (Wille 2005) to reconstruct the domain of biological
heredity theories from the period of 1865-1902. In addition to
Mendel's proposal, this period includes Brooks's theory,
Galton's and Darwin's pangenesis, De Vries'
intracellular pangenesis, Weismann's germ-plasm theory,
Pearson's law of ancestral heredity, and Bateson's and
Yule's proposals around 1902.


### 5.3 Historico-epistemological Analyses



One of the most important and influential proposals for a
philosophical history of science or a historical epistemology in Latin
America is that of Mexican biologist, philosopher, and historian of
science Carlos Lopez Beltran, already mentioned in
 Section 3.
 Good examples of his work in this direction are provided by his
series of publications (Lopez Beltran 1994, 1995, 2004a,
2004b, 2007), in which he carries out a conceptual history
*a la* Canguilhem by analyzing the historical
structuration of the concept of biological heredity, stressing in
particular the role played by the medical and alienist tradition, and
not only the significance of the traditions of hybridists, breeders,
Mendelians, and biometricians.



Studies within the historico-epistemological tradition are also
conducted by Mexican biologist, philosopher, and historian of science
Edna Suarez-Diaz. Significant contributions include her
1960s-1970s analysis of the case of molecular evolution as a
process of integration of different types of traditions, including
theoretical, experimental, and descriptive, that share a scientific
domain, in which the concepts of molecular clock and informational
molecules played a central role (Suarez-Diaz 1995,
2009); and her Rheinbergerian study of the construction of
satellite-DNA and the evolution of nucleic acid hybridization, which
illustrates the close relationship existing between the evolution of
techniques and the stabilization of phenomena in experimental biology
(Suarez-Diaz 2001).



From a perspective that combines history, philosophy, and sociology of
science, Mexican Vivette Garcia-Deister, mentioned in
 Section 3,
 argues that models of genetic regulation do not replace each other as
they solve problems but rather are provisional answers to questions
posed by scientists in a given context, attending to the establishment
and use of the three types of technologies distinguished by Shapin and
Schaffer (1985) in their study of Boyle: the material, the literary,
and the social technological (Garcia-Deister 2013).



Taking his interest in evolutionary biology as a starting point and
convinced of the relevance of epistemological history as an
indispensable form of philosophical analysis of scientific discourse,
Argentine-born and Brazil-based philosopher and historian of biology
Gustavo Caponi, mentioned in
 Section 3,
 has developed one of the most prolific bodies of work in Latin
America from this approach. In an attempt to better understand the
process of naturalization of teleology operated by the theory of
natural selection, and to have a point of comparison with the
Darwinian formulation of the idea of adaptation, he begins a series of
historico-epistemological analyses *a la* Canguilhem
aimed at understanding the way in which organic teleology was
considered in pre-Darwinian Natural History. He also aims to correct
certain historiographical myths, such as Cuvier's or
Lamarck's supposed adaptationism and Alfred Russel
Wallace's putative discovery of the theory of natural selection.
Some of the most significant results of his historico-epistemological
research are found in his books on Cuvier (Caponi 2008), on Buffon
(Caponi 2010), and in his epistemological history of the adaptationist
program (Caponi 2011), in the account of which he uses Toulmin's
concept of ideal of natural order.



Moreover, in a kind of historical epistemology from a
conceptual-philosophical point of view, Brazilian Mauricio de
Carvalho Ramos addresses history of biology. He published several
papers of this type of analysis, especially applied to cases taken
from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in particular the
natural philosophy of Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, regarding
which Ramos analyzes the trajectory of his natural philosophy linked
to Newtonianism, showing that he formulated the principle of minimum
action and that his theory of organic generation brought a new
approach to issues related to crossbreeding and hybridization, the
production of malformations, and the transformation of races and
species (Ramos 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009).



After a historical review of the gene as an instrumental concept and
the advent of a realist view and genes as units in Mendelian genetics
to the classical concept of the molecular gene, Charbel El-Hani
(2007), mentioned in
 Section 4.3
 and
 Section 5.2
 and known for his work at the intersections between philosophy,
history, and education of biology and his important contributions to
biosemantics, calls attention to the crossroads at which the concept
of gene finds itself: on the one hand, being at risk of being erased
from the genetic vocabulary and, on the other, benefiting from efforts
to save it from this fate. El-Hani advocates maintaining this concept,
but considers that the unit concept should be dispensed with, and
that, regarding the generality of biological concepts, gene included,
it should be considered on a restricted domain of application
similarly to what Weber (1999) argues for biological laws, paving the
way for a new and possibly pluralistic understanding of what a gene
is.



Following another line of research within the
historico-epistemological analyses, Brazilian biologist and historian
Maria Elice Brzezinski Prestes, who also works at the intersections
between philosophy, history, and education of biology, focuses her
work on methodological and philosophical aspects of observation and
experimentation in the history of biology, especially on the
development of the experimental method in the modern age. Her research
on Lazzaro Spallanzani tends to correlate methodological, empirical,
and conceptual considerations of Spallanzani's studies on plant
and animal reproduction, striving to offer an epistemological
foundation that shows the autonomy of research on living beings in the
eighteenth century, as well as to provide new evidence of the
consolidation of the experimental method developed by the Italian
naturalist, whose perspective of tracing analogies allowed the
unification of these two "great groups of organized
beings" (Prestes 2006; Prestes & Russo 2008).


### 5.4 Conceptual Historical Analyses



To conclude this section, among the many conceptual analyses of
history of biology linked to the philosophy of that discipline
developed in Latin America, we will mention below only a few of them,
carried out in Mexico and Brazil. One of the central themes addressed
in Mexico in this kind of history is evolutionary biology, in
particular the history of the reception and development of Darwinism
in Mexico and its connection with positivism. This has been analyzed
by biologists, historians, and philosophers of biology Rosaura Ruiz
and Ana Barahona, two of the most influential and best-known promoters
not only of the conceptual history of biology but also of the history
of biology in general, including its institutional history, as well as
the philosophy of biology in Mexico.



Following Ivette Conry's (1974) argument that the introduction
of Darwinism in a country implies that it becomes operative within
biology and is applied to the interpretation of biological facts, and
not only to their mention or discussion, Ruiz (1987, 1996) analyzes
Darwinism in Mexico. She points out that the first known discussion of
Darwinism in Mexico, starting with the lecture given in February 1877
by Pedro Noriega at the *Gabino Barreda Methodofile Society*,
was mainly concerned with philosophical issues, such that the
introduction of evolutionism to biology did not occur in Mexico at the
end of the nineteenth century, when biology was still in its
beginnings.



Among Ana Barahona's numerous publications on the history of
biology, especially on the history of genetics in Mexico (Barahona
& Gaona 2001; Barahona, Pinar & Ayala 2003, 2005; Barahona
& Ayala 2005; Barahona 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013; Barahona &
Richmond 2020; Alonso-Pavon et al. 2021), are those in which
she takes up Ruiz's analysis and complements it by pointing out
that it was Justo Sierra who first made Darwin's ideas known in
Mexico in 1875, triggering the debate that took place both in
scientific societies and the press (Barahona & Ledesma 2002;
Ledesma & Barahona 2003; Barahona 2009). The analysis of visual
representations in the history of biology constitutes another
Barahona's lines of research (Barahona 2007), which is followed
by Mexican biologist and historian of science Erica Torrens in
relation to representation through diagrams, such as those used in
natural history and evolutionary biology (Torrens & Barahona 2012,
2013, 2014), or through images and pictures to represent *Homo
sapiens* and racial hierarchies (Torrens 2019).



In
 Section 4.1,
 we mentioned one of Brazil's most prominent Darwin specialists,
Anna Carolina K. P. Regner, in connection with her critique of the
conception of Darwin's theory in terms of the classical view,
particularly her critique of the hypothetico-deductive reconstructions
of Darwin's *short argument* and her analysis of his
*one long argument*. Expanding on the latter, Regner makes a
very detailed analysis of the structure and the functioning of
Darwinian argumentation. As an analytical too, she adopts
Dascal's typology of polemic interactions, in particular his
analyses of controversies and their role in scientific argumentation,
and his concept of *soft rationality* (Regner 2014): one that
weighs reasons for and against, whose logic is non-monotonic and
cannot be reduced to standard deductive logic, and that unlike
deduction, in Leibniz's words, "inclines without
necessitating" (Dascal 1998, 2005). Regner also adopts
Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a tool of analysis. She then
systematically reconstructs Darwin's argumentative strategies in
*Origin*, showing a juxtaposition between the rhetorical
procedures recommended by Aristotle and those adopted by Darwin, which
"persuade without demonstrating". She describes the
particular whole-part movement, Darwin's appeal to the
explanatory power as a whole, the comparison of his view with those of
his opponents, the treatment of difficulties/objections, the interplay
of the actual and the possible, and the weight of reasons (Regner
2007, 2014) and also explores the interactions that took place in the
scientific controversy between Darwin and Mivart, in particular the
argumentative strategies employed by them (Regner 2008).



Another detailed analysis of Darwin's argumentation,
particularly of the one he developed in relation to the origin of
domestic pigeons (Darwin 1859: Chap. 1; 1868: Vol. I, Chaps.
5-6), is carried out by Brazilian physicist, historian, and
philosopher of science Roberto de Andrade Martins (2012). Andrade
Martins is mainly a historian and philosopher of physics but has also
made contributions in the field of the history of biology, where he
stresses methodological, foundational and dynamical aspects of
scientific work (L. Martins & R. Martins 1996; R. Martins 2005)
and contributes to the education of new generations of philosophers
and historians of science in Brazil, including in the field of
biology. In his analysis of Darwin's study of pigeons, Martins
highlights the relevance of Darwin's claim that all known breeds
were produced from a single species, *Columba livia* or the
rock pigeon, since the differences between the several domestic breeds
is so large that, if they were found in the wild, they could be
classified as different species or genera, as well as the relevance of
an experiment crossing widely different breeds, which led Darwin to
obtain pigeons similar to wild species. Andrade Martins's
analysis shows the extreme care Darwin took in his attempt to provide
strong arguments for his theory.



However, not all conceptual analyses of history of biology are limited
to evolutionary biology. There are also analyses of theories of
heredity and genetics, both in their relation to evolutionary biology
and in their independent treatment. To the analyses on heredity and
genetics already mentioned in
 Sections 5.1-5.3,
 we would like to add those by Brazilians Luzia Castaneda and
Lilian Al-Chueyr Pereira Martins, both of whom trained with Roberto de
Andrade Martins. Whereas biologist and historian of science Luzia
Castaneda analyzes Buffon's and Bonnet's ideas on
reproduction and heredity (Castaneda 1995) and the idea of
acquired characters in Lamarck, Darwin, and Weismann (Castaneda
1997), biologist, historian, and philosopher of science Lilian
Al-Chueyr Pereira Martins carries out numerous and very careful
analyses linked to conceptual and methodological aspects, in addition
to the history of evolution, particularly of Lamarck's work (L.
Martins 2007) and early genetics, mainly Bateson's work and the
chromosomal theory of inheritance (L. Martins 1998, 1999a, b, 2006,
2010, 2013, 2020; L. Martins & Prestes 2013).


## 6. Concluding Remarks



Philosophy of biology in Latin America has come a long way from its
early history. It has been developed through changing and challenging
circumstances involving social, political, economic, academic, and
cultural shifts. However, in recent decades the community of
philosophers of biology in the region has experienced exponential
growth, a trend that is repeated with regards to the amount and
diversification of its production. The originality and depth of work
has increased significantly through dialogue both within Latin America
and with other regions. This production deserves and is beginning to
attain international visibility.



The work of Latin American philosophers of biology of the first and
even second generation presented here are now studied by new
generations, and many more scholars are trained in this approach to
the philosophy of science, laying the foundations for an emerging
tradition. Philosophy of biology at present plays an important role in
Latin American developments in philosophy of science. In addition, the
work done in this area may contribute to teaching, education, and
communication of science, and to science policy and management. It may
even contribute to the development of a socially sensitive and
ethically responsible scientific community and society. Although the
future of philosophy of biology in Latin America is difficult to
predict, we can state that, given appropriate political and economic
conditions, it will further develop and continue to flourish.