## 1. Life



Jacques Maritain was born on November 18, 1882 in Paris. The son of
Paul Maritain, a prominent lawyer, and Genevieve Favre,
daughter of the French statesman, Jules Favre, Jacques Maritain
studied at the Lycee Henri IV (1898-99) and at the
Sorbonne, where he prepared a *licence* in philosophy
(1900-01) and in the natural sciences (1901-02). He was
initially attracted to the philosophy of Spinoza. 



In 1901, Maritain met Raissa Oumansoff, a fellow student at the
Sorbonne and the daughter of Russian Jewish immigrants. Both were
struck by the spiritual aridity of French intellectual life and made a
vow to commit suicide within a year should they not find some answer
to the apparent meaninglessness of life. Largely at the suggestion of
his friend, the poet and religious thinker Charles Peguy,
Maritain attended lectures by Henri Bergson at the College de
France (1903-04). Bergson's challenges to the
then-dominant positivism sufficed to lead Jacques and Raissa to
give up their thoughts of suicide, and they married in 1904. Soon
thereafter, through the influence of the writer Leon Bloy, both
Maritains, as well as Raissa's sister, Vera, sought baptism
in the Roman Catholic Church (1906). (Vera would live with Jacques and
Raissa for the rest of her life.)



Maritain received his *agregation* in philosophy in 1905
and, late in 1906, Jacques and Raissa left for Heidelberg, where
Jacques continued his studies in the natural sciences. They returned
to France in the summer of 1908, and it was at this time that the
Maritains explicitly abandoned *bergsonisme* and Jacques began
an intensive study of the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Recent studies
have argued that the influence of Bergson can nevertheless be found
throughout Maritain's writings (Nelson 2007; Gwozdz 2010)



In 1912, Maritain became professor of philosophy at the Lycee
Stanislaus, though he also gave courses at the Institut Catholique de
Paris. He was named Assistant Professor at the Institut Catholique
(attached to the Chair of the History of Modern Philosophy) in 1914.
He became full Professor in 1921 and, in 1928, was appointed to the
Chair of Logic and Cosmology, which he held until 1939.



In his early philosophical work (e.g., "La science moderne et la
raison", 1910, and
*La philosophie bergsonienne*, 1914), Maritain sought to defend
Thomistic philosophy from its Bergsonian and secular opponents.
Following brief service in the first world war, Maritain returned to
teaching and research. The focus of his philosophical work continued
to be the defense of Thomist and, more generally, Catholic thought
(e.g., *Antimoderne* [1922], *Trois reformateurs:
Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* [1925], and *Clairvoyance de Rome
par les auteurs du 'Pourquoi Rome a parle' (J.
Maritain et D. Lallement)* [1929]), but Maritain also authored
some introductory philosophical texts (e.g.,
*Elements de philosophie* [2 volumes,
1920-23]) and his interests expanded to include aesthetics
(e.g., *Art et scholastique*, 1920; 2nd ed.
1927).



By the late 1920s, Maritain's attention began to turn to social
issues. Although he had some contact with the Catholic social action
movement, *Action Francaise*, he abandoned it in 1926
when it was condemned by Pope Pius XI for its nationalistic and
anti-democratic tendencies. Nevertheless, encouraged through his
friendships with the Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdiaev (beginning
in 1924) and Emmanuel Mounier (from 1928), Maritain began to develop
the principles of a liberal Christian humanism and defense of natural
rights.



Maritain's philosophical work came to be more eclectic, with the
publication of books on Thomas Aquinas (1930), on religion and culture
(1930), on Christian philosophy (1933), on Descartes (1932), on the
philosophy of science and epistemology (*Distinguer pour unir; ou,
les degres du savoir*, 1932) and, perhaps most importantly,
on political philosophy. Beginning in 1936, he produced a number of
texts, including *Humanisme integral* (1936), *De la
justice politique* (1940), *Les droits de l'homme et la
loi naturelle* (1942), *Christianisme et democratie*
(1943), *Principes d'une politique humaniste* (1944),
*La personne et le bien commun* (1947), *Man and the
State* (written in 1949, but published in 1951), and the
posthumously published *La loi naturelle ou loi
non-ecrite* (based on lectures delivered in August
1950).



Maritain's ideas were especially influential in Latin America
and, largely as a result of the 'liberal' character of his
political philosophy, he increasingly came under attack from both the
left and the right, in France and abroad. Lectures in Latin America in
1936 led to him being named as a corresponding member of the Brazilian
Academy of Letters, but also to being the object of a campaign of
vilification in Chile as "a man of the left" (Compagnon
2003: 167).



From the early 1930s Maritain was an established figure in Catholic
thought. He visited North and South America and, beginning in January
1933, came periodically to the Institute of Mediaeval Studies and to
St Michael's College in Toronto (Canada) to give courses of
lectures. Following his lectures in Toronto at the beginning of 1940,
he moved to New York. With the occupation of France by the German
military in June 1940, the Maritains decided not to return to France;
Jacques taught at Columbia University (1941-44) as well as at
Princeton (1941-42).



While in the United States during the war, Maritain was active in the
war effort, recording broadcasts destined for occupied France and
contributing to the Voice of America. He continued to lecture and
publish on a wide range of subjects--not only in political
philosophy, but in aesthetics (e.g., *Art and Poetry*, 1943
[French original 1935]), philosophy of education, and metaphysics
(*De Bergson a St Thomas d'Aquin*, 1944).
Following the liberation of France in the summer of 1944, he was named
French ambassador to the Holy See, serving until 1948, but was also a
member of (and, for a time, Head) of the French delegation to UNESCO,
and was importantly involved in the promotion and, indirectly, in the
drafting of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948).



In the spring of 1948, Maritain returned to Princeton as Professor of
Philosophy; he also lectured at a number of American universities
(particularly at the University of Notre Dame and the University of
Chicago), but frequently returned to France to give short courses in
philosophy--notably at 'L'Eau vive', in the
town of Soisy, near Paris. During this time, in addition to his work
in political philosophy (cf. above, as well as *Le philosophe dans
la cite*, 1960), Maritain published on aesthetics
(*Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*, 1953), religion
(*Approches de Dieu*, 1953), moral philosophy (*Neuf
lecons sur les notions premieres de la philosophie
morale,* 1951; *La philosophie morale*, 1960), and the
philosophy of history (*On the Philosophy of History*,
1957).



In 1952, at the age of seventy, Maritain retired from Princeton, but
continued living and periodically lecturing there as Professor
Emeritus. After the death of Raissa's sister Vera in
Princeton in December, 1959, the Maritains returned to France.
Following Raissa's death in November 1960, Jacques moved to
Toulouse, where he decided to live with a religious order, the Little
Brothers of Jesus. During this time he wrote a number of books, the
best-known of which was *Le paysan de la Garonne* (a work
sharply critical of post-Vatican Council reforms), published in late
1966. In 1970, he petitioned to join the order, and died in Toulouse
on April 28, 1973. He is buried alongside Raissa in Kolbsheim
(Alsace) France.


## 2. General Background



Maritain saw himself as working in continuity with the thought of
Thomas Aquinas, and his writings frequently contain quotations from
and references to Aquinas' texts. While his turn to Catholicism
was largely due to personal reasons and to the influence of friends,
his intellectual itinerary and his defense of Catholic thought and
Thomistic philosophy were undoubtedly determined by events affecting
his adopted church. 



One such series of events was the attack on (principally Catholic)
religious organisations by secular and humanist forces within the
French state in the early twentieth century, culminating in a number
of laws affecting the taxation and ownership of church property and
the place of religion in public affairs. Another, at about the same
time, were those reflecting the tensions within
Catholicism--particularly in France--in reaction to
theological modernism. The writings of George Tyrell in England and
Ernest Renan and Alfred Loisy in France were condemned for such
'errors' as claiming that conscience is the primary source
of religious truth and that all knowledge--including
dogma--has a historical and contingent character, and so
challenging the authoritative character of magisterial pronouncements.
Further, the major philosophical traditions in France were seen as
incompatible with Catholic theology. The dominant schools were the
spiritualism or intuitionism of Bergson (which held that the emphasis
in metaphysics on 'being' should be replaced by one on
*duree* or pure change), the idealism of Leon
Brunschvicg, the spiritualism of Andre Lalande, and the
materialism of Edmond Goblot; each challenged claims that were seen as
essential to Catholicism. Given this turmoil, there was a call for a
defence of the philosophies and the theological teachings of the
Catholic Church.



Maritain's early writings, then, sought to address some of the
concerns arising out of these events. Having been attracted initially
to Spinoza's idealism and, later, to Bergson's vitalist
intuitionism, he was able to come to the defense of Catholic thought
with a knowledge of its critics that surpassed many of his
contemporaries. Maritain rejected
'modernity'--Cartesian and post-Cartesian
thought--for what he saw as its emphasis on epistemology over
metaphysics, and found an alternative in the 'pre-modern'
views of Aquinas. Nevertheless, he saw that philosophy had to do more
than merely repeat Thomas' views, and he took it upon himself to
develop some aspects of Thomistic philosophy to address the problems
of the contemporary world. Thus, though the most profound inspiration
for many of Maritain's ideas was the work of Thomas Aquinas, his
epistemology and aesthetics show also the influence of Christian
mysticism, particularly that of St John of the Cross, and his social
and political philosophy clearly reflects many of the ideals of
European liberalism.


## 3. Principal Contributions


### 3.1 Metaphysics



Although Maritain did not produce a text that provided a comprehensive
statement of his metaphysics, his major contributions to the area are
found in *Sept lecons sur l'etre et les premiers
principes de la raison speculative* (1934, *A Preface to
Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being*), the *Court
traite de l'existence et de l'existant* (1947,
*Existence and the Existent*) , and *De Bergson a
Thomas d'Aquin, essais de metaphysique et de morale*
(1944). Discussion of his metaphysics are also found in other works,
such as *Distinguer pour unir; ou, les degres du savoir*
(1932, *The Degrees of Knowledge*), *Science et sagesse*
(1935, *Science and Wisdom*), *Ransoming the Time*
(1941), and *Raison et raisons* (1948, *The Range of
Reason*).



As one might expect, Maritain's metaphysics follows in the
tradition of Aquinas, but it is far from a restatement of
Aquinas's views. For Maritain, metaphysics in general is always
in need of renewal and defense (see Dewan 2009), and Maritain saw his
task--and the task of Thomism in general--as being "to
renovate" Aquinas's thought, "a task whose novelty
may well be greater than [Thomists] themselves realise"
(*Preface to Metaphysics*, 1934 [1939: 12-13]). 



Following Aquinas, Maritain holds that metaphysics deals with being as
being (*ens inquantum ens*), i.e., it "investigates the
first principles of things and their highest causes"
(*Preface to Metaphysics*, 1934 [1939: 27]). And Maritain also
holds that there are certain fundamental metaphysical questions to
which Aquinas's responses are largely correct, though they may
not be complete as they stand. Maritain adopts, against John Duns
Scotus, Aquinas's general position on analogy, being, and on the
need for analogical terms and concepts. Again, in answer to the
problem of unity and plurality--e.g., how can a thing be
individual and distinct and yet a member of a class of things of the
same kind?--Maritain follows Aquinas: that we have to distinguish
*what* a thing is (its nature or essence, which it shares with
things of the same kind) from the fact *that* it is (i.e., that
it has its own 'act of existing'). When it comes to the
analysis of the nature and the unity of sensible beings, including
human beings, Maritain employs Aquinas's distinction between the
form and the matter of a thing; nature or essence reflects the form,
whereas the individuality is determined by the matter.



Maritain's distinctive contribution is not, however, to the
details of Thomistic metaphysics, but to bringing it into relation
with modern science and philosophy, and to explaining its foundations.




For Maritain, all human enquiry has 'being' as its object;
being, in other words, is the formal object of the intellect
(*Preface to Metaphysics*, 1934 [1939: 25]). But
'being' can be grasped in different ways, and Maritain
distinguishes, for example, between sensible being ("the object
first attained by the human intellect") and being as being
(which is the object of metaphysics). The way in which he does so
distinguishes him from several of the other leading twentieth-century
Thomists, such as Gilson and Fabro (Contat 2008). It is because of
this difference in object that Maritain distinguishes (as he notes in
his epistemology and his philosophy of nature, discussed below) among
the activities of the empirical scientist, the mathematician, the
philosopher, the theologian, and the mystic.



Metaphysical enquiry--the enquiry into being as being--is,
Maritain says, a mystery; being is, for example, something that is
"pregnant with intelligibility" and too "pure for
our intellect" (*Preface to Metaphysics*, 1934 [1939:
4]). Nevertheless, the mystery of being is an "intelligible
mystery" (1934 [1939: 83]), and Maritain holds that, unless one
does metaphysics, one cannot be a philosopher; "a philosopher is
not a philosopher unless he is a metaphysician" (*Existence
and the Existent*, 1947 [1948: 29]).



Philosophical reflection on being begins with the intuition of being,
and Maritain insists that one needs this "eidetic"
intuition for any genuine metaphysical knowledge to be possible. The
intuition of being that lies at the root of metaphysical enquiry is
not that of "the vague being of common sense" (see
*Preface to Metaphysics*, 1934 [1939: 78]), but an
"intellectual intuition" (*Existence and the
Existent*, 1947 [1948: 28]) or grasp of "the act of
existing". (This emphasis by Maritain on the intuition of being
goes beyond what we find in Aquinas--some have argued that it is
altogether foreign to him [Wippel 2014, Knasas 1992]--and
arguably reflects Bergson's account of the intuition of
duration. As noted earlier, some have argued that Maritain's
debt to Bergson overall is much greater than he himself held [Gwozdz
2010].) 



This intuition of being 



> 
> 
> is a perception direct and immediate .... It is a very simple
> sight, superior to any discursive reasoning or demonstration [...
> of] a reality which it touches and which takes hold of it;
> (*Preface to Metaphysics*, 1934 [1939: 50-51]) 
> 
> 
> 



it is, Maritain says, an awareness of the reality of one's
being--one which is decisive and has a dominant character. This
view of intuition is not, then, that of a hunch or quick insight;
neither is it (Maritain continues) the same as Bergson's. It has
an intellectual character, is a grasp of something that is
intelligible, and requires "a certain level of intellectual
spirituality" (1934 [1939: 49]). Maritain claims that this
intuition of being is something which escaped Kant (1934 [1939: 48])
and many subsequent philosophers until, perhaps, the arrival of the
existentialists. 



There are approaches that one may adopt in order to acquire this grasp
or intuition, but there is no method that one may follow that
definitely produces it. This grasp may, for example, be acquired by
focusing on something real and then reflecting on what lies behind it.
Thus, this "eidetic intuition" or "ideating
visualisation" is one where we "look ... reality
... in the face", in which "reality [is] stripped of
its real existence outside the mind" and discloses "the
conditions of ... an existence of intelligibility in act"
(*Preface to Metaphysics*, 1934 [1939: 58]). This metaphysical
intuition is, then, an "ideating intuition" of things in
the perspective of their "intelligible values", rather
than in terms of the actual conditions of their "contingence and
singularity" (*Science and Wisdom*, 1935 [1940: 108]).




Also distinctive in Maritain's account of metaphysics is the
emphasis on "the act of existing". It is because of this
that Maritain has been called an 'existentialist'; indeed,
his *Existence and the Existent*, is subtitled "an essay
on Christian existentialism", and he describes his view as an
"existential intellectualism" (*Existence and the
Existent*, 1947 [1948: 70]). Maritain believes that such an
emphasis is characteristic of any consistent Thomism; 



> 
> 
> What distinguishes authentic Thomism ... is precisely the primacy
> which [it] accords to existence and the intuition of existential
> being. (1947 [1948: 12]) 
> 
> 
> 



This 'existentialism', however, is quite distinct from the
existentialisms of Kierkegaard, Gabriel Marcel, or Jean-Paul Sartre.
An "authentic existentialism", Maritain writes, 



> 
> 
> affirm[s] the primacy of existence, but as implying and preserving
> essences or natures, and as manifesting the supreme victory of the
> intellect and intelligibility. (1947 [1948: 13]) 
> 
> 
> 



It stands against the position of his contemporaries who abandoned
talk of natures or essences or of their intelligibility, but also
against those who imagine that essences were created and then came to
exist. (For Maritain, essences do not preexist existence; essences
might be better seen as "capacities to exist" [1947 [1948:
34]].)



As one has the intuition of being and pursues this investigation into
being, one is led into the traditional questions of metaphysics and
natural theology. There are, Maritain holds, four basic principles of
metaphysics: the principles of identity, of sufficient reason, of
efficient causality, and of finality (i.e., every agent acts for an
end). Though the truth or the applicability of these principles does
not admit of direct proof, they are consistently confirmed by
experience and, Maritain holds, cannot be denied without contradiction
(*Preface to Metaphysics*, 1934 [1939: 90]).



Metaphysics, then, properly includes an investigation into the
*cause* of being--i.e., God, in whom the act of existing
is subsistent. Some sympathetic scholars (e.g., Yves Floucat) have
nevertheless questioned whether Maritain ultimately had a consistent,
Thomistic view of what was the core of metaphysics (Floucat 1996). In
any case, since Maritain holds that being is something that is grasped
through intuition, one is not surprised to see that he will argue that
one can attain knowledge of the existence of God not only through the
Thomistic five ways, but also through intuition. (This is discussed in
 section 3.4, 'Natural Theology and Philosophy of Religion', below.)


### 3.2 Epistemology



Maritain's primary work in epistemology is *Distinguer pour
unir; ou, les degres du savoir* (1932, *Distinguish to
Unite: or, The Degrees of Knowledge*), though some see
Maritain's 1936 essay, "Science et philosophie" (in
*Quatre essais sur l'esprit*, 1939), in which Maritain
addresses arguments of the Vienna Circle, as completing his account of
knowledge (Malquori 2009). One also finds a number of important essays
on the topic in *Raison et raisons, essais
detaches* (1948, *The Range of Reason*).
Maritain, again, largely follows the realist view of Thomas
Aquinas--though he was significantly influenced by John of St
Thomas (John Poinsot), St John of the Cross, and St Augustine, and the
structure of *Les degres du savoir* is similar to the
procedure traced in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* [*Journey of the Soul into God*, 1259 [1938, 2002] of St Bonaventure.



Against 'modern philosophy', Maritain insisted on the
priority of metaphysics over epistemology--in fact, he held that
"the critique of knowledge is part of metaphysics"
(*The Range of Reason*, 1948 [1952: 25])--and also
maintained that the structure and method of the various sciences were
determined by the nature of the object to be known.



Maritain called his view "critical realism", and argued
particularly against the then-dominant rationalist and empiricist
accounts of knowledge. He maintained that, despite the differences
among them, Kantianism, idealism, pragmatism, and positivism all
reflected the influence of nominalism--that universal notions are
creations of the human mind and have no foundation in reality.
Maritain's critical realism holds that what the mind knows is
identical with what exists. To know a thing is for its
'essence' to exist immaterially in the mind. This is not
to say that the mind mirrors or copies that which it knows, but that,
in virtue of the properties apprehended, it 'becomes' the
things it knows. Maritain held that our knowledge of reality was
through the 'concept'--the *esse
intentionale*--which was immaterial and universal, though the
concept itself was something known only by reflection. Thus, when it
comes to knowledge of sensible objects, for example, the mind has both
a passive role (receiving sense impressions) and an active one
(constructing knowledge from these impressions) (see Deely 1997, Munoz
2012).



Maritain's epistemology sought to explain the nature of
knowledge found not just in science and philosophy, but in religious
faith and mysticism, and one of his aims was to show the different
'kinds' of knowledge and their relations to one another.
He argued that there were different 'orders' of knowledge
and, within them, different 'degrees' determined by the
nature of the object to be known and the 'degree of
abstraction' involved.



First, in the order of rational knowledge, one can speak of the
knowledge of sensible nature (i.e., of the objects of experimental
science), which is different from the knowledge of mathematics or of
'physico-mathematical' objects (which is limited because
its objects do not have a direct relation to the actual), which is, in
turn, distinct from the knowledge of trans-sensible or metaphysical
nature.



These 'degrees of knowledge' are not, however, independent
of one another, and they have in common the requirement that to know
something is to know *why* it is 



> 
> 
> the mind is not satisfied when it merely attains a thing [...],
> but only when it grasps that upon which that datum is founded in being
> and intelligibility. (*Degrees of Knowledge*, 1932 [1959: 23])
> 
> 
> 
> 



For example, natural science, which is based on sense perception, aims
at formulating laws which reflect certain features of the objects
perceived. The scientist, then, is primarily concerned with looking
for regularities in nature, employing what Maritain calls an
"empiriological" approach (see *Degrees of
Knowledge*, 1932 [1959: 178-180]; *Philosophy of
Nature*, 1935 [1951: 49]). (An empiriological analysis is a
non-philosophical and, specifically, non-ontological approach to
understanding natural beings that does not seek to know them "in
terms of their type of being or reality", but only "in
terms of their empirical manifestations" (Carlson 2012: 37).
Such an analysis does not provide knowledge of the essence of natural
beings. Maritain offers mathematical physics as an illustration of
this approach.) The product of this method is what Maritain calls
"perinoetical" knowledge.



But for natural science to achieve the status of a science, it
presupposes the capacity of human beings to know things apart from
their particular individuating characteristics (though not apart from
the existence of matter), i.e., natural philosophy. Natural philosophy
'gets behind' phenomena in order to discover essential
connections and causes. Thus, from that which is presented in sense
perception, the mind constructs an object (the essence) which is
universal. (This is possible because, Maritain maintains, there are
essences or natures of things.) This process of 'thinking
through' to the nature of the thing is called by Maritain
*dianoetical* knowledge. So, while natural science and natural
philosophy both focus on the physical, the natural
philosopher--unlike the scientist--is concerned with the
essence of the object and its definition (or, at the very least, an
account of its various properties). This is knowledge at the level of
the first 'degree of abstraction'.



Physico-mathematical objects (e.g., quantity, number, and extension)
stand at a second 'degree' of abstraction. While they
cannot exist without the existence of material things, once known,
they can be conceived of without any reference to such objects.
Finally, metaphysical or speculative knowledge deals with objects
existing at a third degree of abstraction (i.e., independently of
matter), such as substance, quality, goodness, and the divine. Because
of the nature of the objects of metaphysics, this latter kind of
knowledge does not involve logical inference as much as reasoning by
analogy or what Maritain calls *ananoetic* knowledge. Such
knowledge (e.g., of the divine) is not through any direct
apprehension, but indirectly, through creatures.



There is a hierarchy among these 'degrees of knowledge'.
Those objects which are highest in intelligibility, immateriality, and
potential to be known are the objects of the highest degree of
knowledge. Maritain writes, 



> 
> 
> [t]he metaphysician considers an object of knowing of a specifically
> higher nature and intelligibility, and from it he acquires a proper
> knowledge, a scientific knowledge, by means that absolutely transcend
> those of the physicist or the mathematician. (*Degrees of
> Knowledge*, 1932 [1959: 37]) 
> 
> 
> 



Nevertheless, while there are different 'orders' and
'degrees' of knowledge, one should not conclude that there
are different 'knowledges'.



Maritain points out that philosophical demonstration is different from
natural scientific or mathematical demonstrations: 



> 
> 
> philosophy is concerned with an objectively distinct field of
> knowledge and constitutes a really autonomous discipline, possessing
> its own adequate means of explaining this field of knowledge.
> (*Range of Reason*, 1948 [1952: 5]) 
> 
> 
> 



Thus, Maritain writes, natural philosophy penetrates to the nature of
its object. Metaphysics--which is also a kind of philosophic
knowing--is concerned with purely intelligible being. Science,
however, is at best 'empiriological'--it does not
lead us to being itself, but only to the observable and measurable.
Consequently, to employ a method of scientific demonstration to
establish or to criticize claims about the object of metaphysical
knowledge is, to use Ryle's classic term, a category mistake. It
is precisely because he holds that empiricist and rationalist
epistemologies do this, that Maritain takes issue with them.



Just as there is an order of rational knowledge with its
'degrees', there is another order and degrees of
suprarational knowledge--of a higher wisdom--that is beyond
'natural knowledge'. These are, on the one hand,
'the science of revealed mysteries' or 'theological
wisdom' and, on the other, 'mystical theology'.
Here, Maritain's debt to Augustine and John of the Cross is
particularly evident (see Barreiro 2008). According to Maritain, in
theological wisdom, the divine is known by drawing not just on reason
but on faith. (This is distinct from metaphysical knowledge which, so
to speak, approaches the divine from the 'outside'.)
Mystical knowledge stands one level higher still--where there is
no mediation by concepts--and "consists in knowing
[...] Deity as such--*according to a mode that is
suprahuman and supernatural*" (*The Degrees of
Knowledge*, 1932 [1959: 253]). This is a knowledge by
connaturality, but also a knowledge that can be pursued through the
practical discipline of 'mystical contemplation'. In this
way, human beings acquire a kind of knowledge that makes them more
loving and more spiritual. (It is worth noting that, for Maritain,
this mysticism extended beyond the Christian tradition. Not only did
he refer to the example of Ramanuja, but he encouraged the future
Indologist Olivier Lacombe to direct his "philosophical work
towards the study of Indian mysticism" [Lardinois 2017: 314].)




The development of the notion of 'knowledge by
connaturality' (or 'connatural knowledge' or
'knowledge by inclination'), latent in Aquinas (*Summa
theologiae*, II-II, q. 45, a 2), is one of Maritain's major
contributions to epistemology. Maritain places this knowledge at the
level of the preconscious intellect. It is "non-conceptual and
non-rational", (*Natural Law*, 2001: 18); he describes it
as 



> 
> 
> obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge, by means of instinct or
> sympathy, and in which the intellect, in order to make its judgments,
> consults the inner leanings of the subject. (*Man and the
> State*, 1951: 91) 
> 
> 
> 



Nor is it, as much knowledge is, a knowledge of essences.
Nevertheless, it is still connected to "intellectual act"
and is a genuine knowledge of reality. This kind of knowledge lies at
the basis, not only of mystical experience, but of artistic activity
and morality; it provides a knowledge of God, of the first principles
of morality, and a knowledge of one's own subjectivity. 



A number of questions have been raised concerning Maritain's
epistemology, particularly concerning his characterization of
philosophical knowledge. Moreover, while Maritain claims that there is
a difference in method between the sciences and philosophy, some have
argued that it is not clear what exactly that difference is (Vitoria
2011). For example, Maritain would follow Aquinas in holding that
metaphysics uses *demonstratio quia*--demonstration from
effects. But it would seem that science also sometimes uses such a
method of demonstration. Thus, it is not clear what it is in the
*method* (as distinct from the content of the premises) that
differentiates a metaphysical proof (e.g., of God's existence)
from a scientific argument establishing the existence of a cause of a
natural object.



Second, Maritain holds that scientific knowledge is distinguished from
philosophical knowledge in terms of their different methods and
different objects. But if scientific knowledge and philosophical
knowledge are, as it were, incommensurable, it is not clear how
philosophy can judge, or be corrective of, the sciences.



Some Thomist scholars have been reluctant to adopt Maritain's
development of Aquinas' notion of 'knowledge by
connaturality', preferring instead to speak of "knowledge
relative to inclination" (Dewan 2010). Yet others have argued
that this development is of far-reaching significance, as
Maritain's notion of the intuition of being led him, in the
years following the publication of *The Degrees of Knowledge*,
to recognise a greater role to be played by "the unconscious and
preconscious life of the mind" (*The Range of Reason*,
1948 [1952: 80]; Arraj 2006). 



Finally, it would seem that the model of demonstration that Maritain
employs is foundationalist and, thus, has to answer to those
criticisms that modern anti-foundationalism draws attention
to--e.g., that a foundationalist theory sets a standard for
knowledge that is not only without justification, but is a standard
that it cannot itself satisfy. Some defences of Thomistic epistemology
(e.g., Veatch 1990),
however, suggest ways in which such a concern might be addressed.


### 3.3 Philosophy of Nature



Maritain's work in the philosophy of nature appears throughout
his work--in his *Elements de philosophie*
(Vol. 1, 1920, *Introduction to Philosophy*) and in an essay in
*Science et sagesse* (1935, *Science and Wisdom*), but
particularly in *Les degres du savoir* (1932, *The
Degrees of Knowledge*) and *La philosophie de la nature*
(1935, *The Philosophy of Nature*). Again, Maritain's
account is based on Aristotle, Aquinas, and John Poinsot, though he
clearly extends his predecessors' views. 



As noted earlier, Maritain's early education and university
studies were in the natural sciences. His disillusionment with the
positivistic approach to the sciences taken by his teachers in Paris,
and his interest (following his conversion) in bringing Thomistic
philosophy to bear on the contemporary world led him to review the
relation between philosophy and the sciences and, particularly, to
develop a philosophy of nature. 



For Maritain, the philosophy of nature is a branch of speculative
philosophy. It seeks to provide an ontological analysis of corporeal,
sensible 'moving being' (*ens mobile*);
specifically, it involves a search for the first principles of
physical things--i.e., principles that transcend sense. It is
concerned with, then, 



> 
> 
> a knowledge whose object, present in all things of corporeal nature,
> is mobile being as such and the ontological principles which account
> for its mutability. (*Degrees of Knowledge*, 1932 [1959: 197])
> 
> 
> 
> 



Among the--and at the summit of--natural objects is
humanity, and thus psychology is the highest category of the
philosophy of nature.



The philosophy of nature lies, therefore, between the sciences and
metaphysics; it is to be distinguished from metaphysics, which deals
with all being qua being, but also from the (empiriological) sciences,
which deal with sensible being qua observable or measurable. Because
it seeks principles that underlie all physical objects, it follows
from reflections on and goes beyond science; because it still refers
to such objects and acknowledges that its conclusions need to be
consistent with verification by the senses, however, it is not
metaphysics.



According to Maritain, the investigations of natural science fall
short of a philosophy of nature because the objective of a philosophy
of nature is not merely to reflect on the methods and conclusions of
the physical sciences, but to provide the underlying principles.
Moreover, the philosophy of nature understands that reality is not
reducible to the physical (physical reality). It focuses on the
essences of things and the (natural) classes to which those things
belong. 



Maritain's account supposes that there is a metaphysical and
epistemological hierarchy: of sensible, observable things as known
through the senses, to "the intelligible necessities immersed in
the reality of this world of existence" which are known through
the intellect disengaged from the senses (*Degrees of
Knowledge*, 1932 [1959: 145]), to the "universe of quantity
as such" (mathematics), to metaphysics and, ultimately, to
mystical experience (see 1932 [1959: 145-6]). The levels in this
hierarchy are determined, then, by how and the extent to which what is
known is abstracted from matter. The philosophy of nature, then, is a
deductive science that lies at the first level of abstraction. It is
close to metaphysics in that it addresses general issues concerning
the universe, such as its relation to principles of necessity and
contingency, and to a first cause. But it also needs to be completed
by a knowledge of the natural sciences, and so is at the same level of
abstraction.



What are the principles that such an approach seeks? The philosophy of
nature is specifically concerned with the nature of movement, of
corporeal substance (i.e., matter and form), of life, and of the
constitutive principles of organisms. Maritain writes, 



> 
> 
> it belongs to the philosophy of nature to instruct us about the nature
> of the continuum and of number, of quantity, of space, of motion, of
> time, of corporeal substance, of transitive action, of vegetative and
> sensitive life, of the soul and its operative powers, etc. (1932
> [1959: 186]) 
> 
> 
> 



and so is at the same level of abstraction as the natural
sciences.



Maritain's position here contrasts sharply with that of his
colleague, Etienne Gilson, who was more favourable to Bergson and who
wrote little on the philosophy of nature throughout his life, arguably
because he believed that the underlying Aristotelianism of the
Thomistic position had been rendered irrelevant by modern science
(Nelson 2007). Even sympathetic critics, such as Gerald McCool, argue
that Maritain's account of the three different degrees of
abstraction that underlie this view is a distortion of Aquinas's
own view (McCool 1989: 254). More ardent critics have objected to
Maritain's account of what he calls 'positivism',
and some, such as George Boas, argued at the time that Maritain
depends on a theory of the existence of natural classes that have
essences--a philosophical theory which may not, in fact, be
presupposed by most scientists (Boas 1952). (Maritain, of course,
would reply that this is precisely his point; such essences are not
the object of empiriological sciences.)


### 3.4 Natural Theology and Philosophy of Religion



Like Aquinas, Maritain held that there was no conflict between true
faith and true reason, that religious belief was open to rational
discussion, and that the existence of God and certain fundamental
religious beliefs could be philosophically demonstrated. (Maritain
held, however, that 'Russellian mathematical logic' was
"inferior to traditional Aristotelian logic", and that any
demonstration of religious belief needed to follow Aristotelian
syllogistic; *Introduction to Logic*, 1923 [1937a:
222-232]; Kraal 2013: 357.) Religious belief, then, was not an
attitude or a matter of private opinion--an option that could be
embraced or not according to one's private preferences; it was a
matter of 'truth'. For Maritain, one must choose between
"the true God or radical irrationality" (*Introduction
to Philosophy*, 1920 [1944: 259]). 



Maritain held that philosophy was an *ancilla theologiae*
("handmaid of theology"), and that philosophy, under the
rubric of metaphysical knowledge, allows for the demonstration of a
number of basic religious beliefs. Like Aquinas, Maritain accepted the
classical foundationalist position that these beliefs could be
established by rational deduction from self-evident principles and
constituted genuine knowledge. Specifically, he held that, by the use
of natural reason, one can come to know certain truths about God, and
that the 'five ways' of Thomas Aquinas provided sure
knowledge of God's existence. But Maritain also argued that
there could be other 'proofs' of the existence of the
divine and, in *Approches de Dieu* (1953), he developed what he
called a "sixth way".



There is, Maritain writes, an intuition that is awakened in persons
when they are engaged in thought--that is, that it seems
impossible that they, as thinking beings, should at some time have not
been. As a thinking being, one seems to be free from the vicissitudes
of time and space; there is no coming to be or ceasing to be--I
cannot think what it is not to be. Nevertheless, we all know very well
that we were born--we came into existence. We are confronted,
then, with a contradiction--not a logical contradiction, but a
lived contradiction. The only solution to this is that one has always
existed, but not through oneself, but within "a Being of
transcendent personality" and from whom "the self which is
thinking now proceeded into temporal existence" (*Approches
de Dieu*, in *Oeuvres completes*, Vol. X, p. 64 [Engl. tr., pp. 71-72]). This being 



> 
> 
> must contain all things in itself in an eminent mode and be
> itself--in an absolutely transcendent way--being, thought
> and personality. This implies that the first existence is the infinite
> plenitude of being, separate by essence from all diversity of
> existents. (*ibid.*, p. 66 [Engl. tr., p. 74])
> 
> 
> 



Maritain also acknowledges the possibility of a natural,
pre-philosophical, but still rational knowledge of God (see
*Approches de Dieu*, pp. 13-22).
This is, Maritain claims, a
'knowledge' that is necessary to--and, in fact leads
to--a philosophical demonstration of God's existence. (In
this way, then, one can know that some religious beliefs are true,
even without being able to demonstrate them.) Maritain's
argument, which resembles the Thomistic argument from contingent
being, is that, in one's intuition of being, one is aware,
first, of a reality separate from oneself; second, of oneself as
finite and limited; and, third, of the necessity that there is
something "completely free from nothingness and death"
(*ibid.*, p. 15 [Engl. tr., p. 19]).
This is concurrent with a "spontaneous reasoning" that
follows the same course to the conclusion that there is 



> 
> 
> another Whole [...] another Being, transcendent and
> self-sufficient and unknown in itself and activating all beings
> [...] that is, self-subsisting Being, Being existing through
> itself. (*ibid.*, p. 16 [Engl. tr., p. 20])
> 
> 
> 
> 



This knowledge of God, Maritain admits, is not demonstrative but is,
nevertheless, "rich in certitude" (*ibid.*, p.
19 [Engl. tr., p. 23]) and is both presupposed
by, and is the underlying force for, philosophical demonstrations of
God's existence.



The difference between the pre-philosophical and the philosophical
knowledge of God is that the latter is one which is based on a
"scientific demonstration" (*Approches de Dieu*, p.
19 [Engl. tr., p. 23])--on empirical
facts--and involving analogy, from which we have terms that can
be properly predicated of the divine. On the other hand,
pre-philosophical knowledge is "intuition"--an
*approach* to knowledge, though not a "way",
(*ibid.*, p. 20 [Engl. tr., p. 24]) a proof, or a
demonstration. This knowledge is based on a natural reasoning which
cannot be expressed in words. Yet, it is important also to realize
that while Maritain allows that certain truths "are grasped by
the common sense before being the object of philosophical
concern" (*ibid.*, p. 24 [Engl. tr., p. 30]),
philosophical proofs of the existence of God are not only
"established and justified philosophically" at the level
of philosophy itself, but are already "valid and
efficacious" at the level of this "incohative and
spontaneous" philosophy. (*ibid.*, p. 24 [Engl. tr.,
p. 30]), and that what one arrives at by means of such an approach is
(as it is in philosophical demonstrations) knowledge of the truth of a
proposition.



It has been argued, however, that there are some difficulties with
Maritain's position here. For example, even if it is true that
people may 'naturally' affirm the proposition that there
is a God, it is not obvious how they can claim that they *know*
it. In other words, even if the proposition is true, it is not clear
how we can say that we know or believe it to be true. What Maritain
seems to give us here is an explanation of how one arrives at a
certain proposition and of one's certainty, but nothing more.
But, since the state of certainty of an individual is not the same as
the assertion that that person knows something to be true, it is not
clear that the pre-philosophical approach provides one with an
adequate basis to say that a religious belief is true, only that one
is convinced of it. And, one might argue, parallel conclusions can be
drawn if one examines the other ways that Maritain suggests will lead
to a putative knowledge of God.



(Interestingly, Maritain was a critic of a number of arguments
proposed in defence of religious belief. He argued that such defenses
fail because they do not recognise that there are different types of
knowledge, that these different types are hierarchically arranged, and
that the methods they employ are, by definition, unsuited to
demonstrate certain things. Thus, Maritain holds that while
'reason', as "intelligence moving in a progressive
way towards its term, the real", can attain knowledge of God by
means of demonstration, if we take 'reason' to be a purely
discursive method--one which Maritain identifies with the
"physical-mathematical sciences" and which he also calls
"the 'reason' of rationalism"
(*Antimoderne*, 1922: 64, my translation)--it
can know or say
nothing at all about God. Because reason must be ordered to its
object, reason (in this second sense) can neither demonstrate nor even
encounter revealed truths.)



In addition to the possibility of the demonstration of the existence
of God and of the coherence of the divine attributes, Maritain allows
that there are a number of other ways in which one might come to know
religious beliefs to be true. Besides knowing God
'naturally', there is a "non-conscious knowledge of
God" in the first act of human freedom (see *Range of
Reason*, 1948 [1952: 69-71]), "connatural
knowledge", "abstract intuition" (by which one knows
"primary principles" such as the laws of identity and of
non-contradiction and the principle of causality), the "ways of
the practical intellect" (i.e., through moral or
aesthetic experience--though these do not provide a strict
demonstration; see *Approches de Dieu*, ch.
IV) and, of course, divine revelation.



For Maritain, to say that one can attain, by reason, some knowledge of
God is not to say that everyone can do this. Moreover, Maritain also
held that it can be reasonable to believe, even in the absence of such
arguments or evidence, though what one believes must not contradict
the results of 'true reason'. For example, Maritain argues
that, even if one holds that a belief is capable of a rational
demonstration, it does not follow that one must be able to provide it;
thus, one's knowledge of 'revealed truths' is
reasonable, though Maritain (like Aquinas) would never claim that one
must be able to produce a philosophical demonstration of them.
Further, Maritain allows that theology can "reject as false any
philosophic affirmation which contradicts a theological truth"
(*Introduction to Philosophy*, 1920 [1944: 126]).



Maritain writes that there can be knowledge of the divine attributes.
As with all natural knowledge of the divine, this knowledge is
basically analogical, and it is often the result of a *via
negativa*. Thus, he insists that we know some things about God. We
can know that God is (*quia est*), though not what God is in
himself (*quid est*) (*Degrees of Knowledge*, Appendix
III, 1932 [1959: 423]). Moreover, against A.G. Sertillanges and
Etienne Gilson, Maritain maintains that we can have affirmative
knowledge about God--i.e., know in a more or less imperfect but,
nevertheless, true way what God is. Besides, Maritain holds, knowledge
through negation presupposes positive knowledge. (Mary Daly notes,
however, that Maritain is not clear about the extent to which our
affirmative knowledge of God is arrived at by means of philosophical
argument [Daly 1966: 53.].) Nevertheless, Maritain acknowledges that
the knowledge of God that philosophy provides is incomplete and
imperfect; the *analogical* knowledge that we have of God falls
short of a complete description of what God is.



It is not clear that Maritain avoids many of the concerns expressed by
critics of 'analogical knowledge'. For example, if the
term 'cause' is used analogously when applied to God, then
when one utters the proposition 'God is the cause of the
universe' after examining Aquinas's 'second
way', it would seem that one has to be using this term in
exactly the same sense as it has been used throughout the preceding
argument. If it is not being used in exactly the same sense, then how
can one claim that Aquinas has *demonstrated* this conclusion?
The problem is not whether analogical predication is possible but,
first, whether one can understand the analogical predicate and,
second, whether one can employ such a predicate in a demonstration
without committing the fallacy of equivocation.



Given Maritain's account of faith and of suprarational
knowledge, it would seem that he would see religious beliefs as
'trusts' and, hence, as having more than a purely
cognitive character. He would, no doubt, follow Aquinas who spoke of
faith as a 'disposition' or virtue (*habitus*). A
*habitus* is, of course, not merely the product of action, but
itself is ordered to action. Thus, to say that religious beliefs are
propositional in form is not to say that their function is only
descriptive. Nevertheless, Maritain's account of religious
belief and its relation to argument and proof is not complete.
Moreover, given that Maritain does employ
'foundationalism' as a standard of sufficient evidence for
claiming that some propositions expressing religious belief are true,
as noted above, there is some debate whether he can directly address
the challenges of 'postmodern' critics of foundationalist
epistemology.


### 3.5 Moral and Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law



Maritain's moral and political philosophy lies within what may
be called the Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law tradition. Maritain
held, however, that Aristotelian ethics, by itself, was inadequate
because it lacked knowledge of humanity's ultimate end. The
Thomistic view--that there is a law in human nature that is
derivative of (though knowable separately from) a divine or eternal
law, and that humanity's 'end' goes beyond anything
attainable in this life--was, Maritain thought, a significant
advance on what Aristotle had provided. 



Following Aquinas, Maritain maintained that there is a natural law
that is "unwritten" but immanent in nature. Specifically,
given that nature has a teleological character, one can know what a
thing should do or how it should be used by examining its
"end" and the "normality of its functioning".
Maritain therefore defines 'natural law' as 



> 
> 
> an order or a disposition that the human reason may discover and
> according to which the human will must act to accord itself with the
> necessary ends of the human being. (*La loi naturelle*, 1986:
> 21, my translation; see *Man and the
> State*, 1951: 86) 
> 
> 
> 



This law "prescribes our most fundamental duties" (*Man
and the State*, 1951: 95) and is coextensive with morality.



There is, Maritain holds, a single natural law governing all beings
with a human nature. The first principles of this law are known
*connaturally*, not rationally or through concepts, by an
activity that Maritain, following Aquinas, called *synderesis*.
Thus, natural law is 'natural' because it not only
reflects human nature, but is known naturally. Maritain acknowledges,
however, that knowledge of the natural law varies throughout humanity
and according to individuals' capacities and abilities, and he
speaks of growth in an individual's or a collectivity's
moral awareness. This allows him to reply to the challenge that there
cannot be a universal, natural law because no such law is known or
respected universally. Again, though this law is progressively known,
it is never known completely, and so the natural law is never
exhausted in any particular articulation of it (*La loi
naturelle*, see Sweet 1998). This recognition of the historical
element in human consciousness did not, however, prevent Maritain from
holding that this law is objective and binding. (Critics have argued,
however, that to speak of 'connatural knowledge' is
obscure; it is quite unlike what we ordinarily call
'knowledge' and is, therefore, inadequate as a basis for
knowledge of law. [see, for example, Nielsen 1959 [1991].)



A key notion in Maritain's moral philosophy is that of human
freedom. He says that the 'end' of humanity is to be free
but, by 'freedom', he does not mean license or pure
rational autonomy, but the realisation of the human person in accord
with his or her nature--specifically, the achievement of moral
and spiritual perfection. Maritain's moral philosophy, then,
cannot be considered independently of his analysis of human nature.
Maritain distinguishes between the human being as an individual and as
a person. Human beings are 'individuals' who are related
to a common, social order of which they are parts. But they are also
persons. The person is a 'whole', is an object of dignity,
"must be treated as an end" (*Les droits de
l'homme*, 1942 [1943: 84]), and has a transcendent destiny.
In both the material and the spiritual order, however, human beings
participate in a common good (see D'Souza 2011). One is an
individual in virtue of being a material being; one is a person so far
as one is capable of intellectual activity and freedom. Still, while
distinct, both elements are equally necessary to being a human being.
It is in virtue of their individuality that human beings have
obligations to the social order, but it is in virtue of their
personality that they cannot be subordinated to that order. Moreover,
it is through free choice and action that a person defines himself
(see Toromczak 2008). Maritain's emphasis on the value of the
human person has been described as a form of *personalism*,
which he saw as a *via media* between individualism and
socialism.



Though some critics have challenged Maritain's distinction
between the person and the individual as, for example, lacking
metaphysical rigour (Floucat 1996), many Maritain scholars regard it
as a useful way of founding a liberal, but non-individualist political
philosophy (D'Souza 2008) or grounding an applied ethics
(Acevedo 2012). 



Maritain's moral philosophy is clearly related to his political
philosophy and his philosophy of law. The personalist position that he
defended had antecedents in the nineteenth century, but it was perhaps
the first to be part of an account of a new model of civilization (De
Tavernier 2009). In one of his earliest political works, Maritain
described his view as "integral Christian
Humanism"--'integral', because it considers the
human being, an entity that has both material and spiritual
dimensions, as a unified whole and because it sees human beings in
society as participants in a common good. The object of
Maritain's political philosophy was to outline the conditions
necessary to making the individual fully human. His integral humanism,
then, seeks to bring the different dimensions of the human person
together, without ignoring or diminishing the value of either, and it
has been regarded by some as superior to Charles Taylor's
"exclusive humanism" (Klassen 2011) or, at least, as a
completion of it (Doyle 2009). While one's private good as an
individual is subordinate to the (temporal) common good of the
community, as a person with a supernatural end, one's
'spiritual good' is superior to society--and this is
something that Maritain believed all political communities should
recognize.



For Maritain, the best political order is one which recognizes the
sovereignty of God. He rejects, therefore, not only fascism and
communism, but all secular humanisms. Maritain objects that such
views--particularly fascism and communism--are not only
secular religions, but dehumanizing (Kinsella 2012) and, while he was
a defender of American-style democracy, he is clearly not interested
in combining his attachment to Christianity with capitalism. A
theocentric humanism, Maritain would argue, has its philosophical
foundation in the recognition of the nature of the human person as a
spiritual and material being--a being that has a relation to
God--and social and political institutions must therefore reflect
this.



Maritain envisages a political society under the rule of law--and
he distinguishes four types of law: the eternal, the natural, the
'common law of civilisation' (*droit des gens* or
*jus gentium*), and the positive (*droit positif*).



The natural law is "universal and invariable" and deals
with "the rights and duties which follow [necessarily] from the
first principle" (see *La loi naturelle*; *Man and the
State*, 1951: 97-98) or precept of law--that good is to
be done and evil avoided. Nevertheless, while the natural law is
"self-evident" (see *Man and the State*, 1951: 90)
and consistent with and confirmed by experience--something which
many critics have challenged--Maritain holds that it is not
founded on human nature. It is rooted in divine reason and in a
transcendent order (i.e., in the eternal law), and is 'written
into' human nature by God. At times, Maritain appears to hold
that natural law acquires its obligatory character only because of its
relation to the eternal law; he writes that "natural law is law
only because it is participation in Eternal Law" (see *Man
and the State*, 1951: 96). (Some have concluded--perhaps too
hastily--that a theory that refers to an Eternal Law must be
ultimately theological and cannot be purely philosophical.)



The *droit des gens* or 'common law of
civilisation' is an extension of the natural law to the
circumstances of life in society, and thus it is concerned with human
beings as social beings (e.g., as citizens or as members of families).
The 'positive law' is the system of rules and regulations
involved in assuring general order within a particular society. It
varies according to the stage of social or economic development within
that community and according to the specific activities of individuals
within it. Neither the positive law nor the *droit des gens*
is, however, deducible from the natural law alone. Neither is known
connaturally and, therefore, is not part of the natural law.
Nevertheless, it is in virtue of their relation to natural law that
they "have the force of law and impose themselves on
conscience" (*Les droits de l'homme*, 1942 [1943:
90-1]). When a positive law acts against the natural law, it is,
strictly speaking, not a law. Thus, Maritain clearly rejects legal
positivism.



The term 'natural law' and its relations both to
'eternal law' and to positive law have, however, been the
focus of much controversy. Maritain's account of natural law
both presupposes a metaphysical view of the nature of human beings and
a realistic epistemology, and critics have argued that there are a
number of tensions or inconsistencies internal to it. Some of the
principal criticisms of this account are i) that it is inconsistent
because it sets forth a naturalistic theory of what is good and bad
and yet claims that only a supernatural sanction will serve to explain
moral obligation, ii) that connatural knowledge is not only inadequate
for what we normally count as knowledge, but it is, in fact, also
incapable of establishing that something is a natural moral law, iii)
that the first principle of moral law is vacuous, and iv) that
Maritain glosses over the fact/value distinction.



Maritain held that natural law theory entailed an account of human
rights. Since the natural end of each person is to achieve moral and
spiritual perfection, it is necessary to have the means to do so,
i.e., to have rights which, since they serve to realise his or her
nature, are called 'natural'. This respects the
Aristotelian-Thomistic principle of justice, that we should distribute
to each 'what is truly his or hers'. Maritain replies to
the criticism that there are no such rights, since they are not
universally recognised, by reminding his readers that, just as the
natural law comes to be recognised gradually and over time, so also is
there a gradual recognition of rights. Indeed, Maritain held that
certain basic natural rights can be recognised by all, without there
having to be agreement on their foundation and, as an illustration of
this, he pointed to the general agreement on those rights found in the
1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Nevertheless, he did insist that an adequate account of human rights
required a foundation in natural law (see *Man and the State*,
1951: Ch. IV)--a position rejected by many authors in the
Anglo-American tradition, such as Rawls (Clark 2012).



Maritain held that natural rights are fundamental and inalienable, and
antecedent in nature, and superior, to society. Still, they should not
be understood as 'antecedent' in a temporal sense and do
not form the basis of the state or of the civil law. Rights are
grounded in the natural law, and specifically in relation to the
common good. It is this good, and not individual rights, that is the
basis of the state, and it is because of this that Maritain held that
there can be a hierarchical ordering of these rights (*Man and the
State*, 1951: 106-7).



One consequence of his natural law and natural rights theory is that
Maritain favoured a democratic and liberal view of the state, and
argued for a political society that is both personalist, pluralist,
and Christianly-inspired. He held that the authority to rule derives
from the people--for people have a natural right to govern
themselves. Still, this is consistent with a commitment to
Christianity, Maritain thought, because the ideals of democracy are
themselves inspired by a belief in God's rule, and that the
primary source of all authority is God (*Man and the State*,
1951: 127).



Maritain also favoured a number of liberal ideals, and the list of
rights that he recognises extends significantly beyond that found in
many liberal theories, and includes the rights of workers as well as
those of the human and the civic person. He was, in particular, a
defender of freedom of conscience--and not simply freedom of
religion or freedom of worship--which he saw as fundamental to
the full development of human personality and to the common good of
society (Sweet 2006, Coulter 2012).



Furthermore, the ideal of freedom or liberty to be found in the state
is close to that which is now generally called positive
freedom--i.e., one that reflects a view of the person as sharing
in a common good. As a polity that attempts to provide the conditions
for the realisation of the human person as an individual who is,
thereby, a member of a temporal community, it recognises that the use
of goods by individuals must serve the good of all (*Integral
Humanism*, 1936 [1968: 184]), and that individuals can be required
to serve the community. Moreover, in such a state, political leaders
would be more than just spokespersons for the people (*Man and the
State*, 1951: 140), and Maritain recognises that they can
represent the 'hidden will' of the people. Their
aim--and the aim of the state as a whole--is, however,
always the common good. Since minorities may themselves reflect this
'hidden will', Maritain also recognised the important role
to be played by dissenting minorities.



(Maritain does not discuss in any detail how his model
'Christian' polity might be realised, but suggests that it
is the only one that takes account of each person's spiritual
worth and that recognises the importance of providing the means to
foster one's growth as a person. It recognises differences of
religious conscience and is, in this way, fundamentally pluralistic.
Such a polity, Maritain believed, would exhibit not just tolerance,
but friendship and fellowship [see D'Souza 2011, Zunic 2005],
and would thereby have social cohesion. Whether it would indeed be
able to accommodate plurality while remaining a unified community has,
however, been a subject of some debate [Armour 2005].)



In such an ideal polity, Maritain imagines that a leadership role
would be played by a multiplicity of 'civic fraternities',
founded on freedom, inspired by the virtues of Christianity,
reflecting a moral and spiritual discipline, and which are
fundamentally democratic. While such groups would not necessarily
exercise political power, the society as a whole would reflect
Christian values--not just because these values are part of a
privileged religion or faith (a matter that Maritain would be wary
of), but because these are necessary to the temporal community. In
such a polity one would, of course, find a church and a state, though
Maritain would see them as cooperative entities, with the state
occupying itself with those matters that, while focusing on temporal
concerns, addressed the needs of the whole of the human person, and
with the church focussing on spiritual matters.



It is, perhaps, evident that such a polity could not survive within a
single nation state that existed among a plurality of states with
different ideals, and so Maritain supported the ideal of a world
federation of political societies (see Goedert 2010). While the
realisation of such an ideal was something that lay in a distant
future, Maritain nevertheless thought that such a federation was
possible, providing that the individual states retained a fair degree
of autonomy and that persons could be found from each state who would
voluntarily distance themselves from the particular interests of their
home country.



Maritain had a significant influence in the development of and
advocacy for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and his
political philosophy had a substantial impact on 'Christian
Democratic' parties in Western Europe, Chile, and Argentina
(Saranyana, 1999-2002: 205), as well as on constitutional
thinking in Latin America and, later, in Canada. His defence of
natural rights, developed beginning in the late 1930s and provided in
detail in *Les droits de l'homme et la loi naturelle*
(1942), was arguably present in the articulation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted by the Ninth
International Conference of American States, in Bogota,
Colombia, in 1948) that, in turn, influenced several of the members of
the Drafting Committee of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Moreover,
not only were some of Maritain's key writings read in advance by
the Drafting Committee, but one of its key members, Charles Malik,
followed Maritain's political thought closely in several
respects. It is not surprising, then, that the Declaration has close
parallels with the rights enumerated earlier in the *Les droits de
l'homme et la loi naturelle*, and Maritain was a major
advocate for such a text within UNESCO, in 1947-48, before its
adoption by the UN General Assembly, and also in its later
advancement.


### 3.6 Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art



Maritain had a long-standing interest in art and the arts. From one of
his earliest books, *Art et scolastique* (1920, *Art and
Scholasticism*), through work addressing the painter Georges
Rouault and the author, Jean Cocteau (e.g., *Art and Faith: Letters
Between Jacques Maritain and Jean Cocteau*, 1926 [1948]), to
*Frontieres de la poesie* (1935, *Art and
Poetry*), *Situation de la poesie* (1938, *The
Situation of Poetry*), *Creative Intuition in Art and
Poetry* (1953) and *The Responsibility of the Artist*
(1960), one finds sustained attention given to the topic, and
references to art appear throughout his work, particularly in his
epistemology. This should be no surprise. Maritain's wife,
Raissa, was a poet, and Maritain counted among his friends and
acquaintances the artists, Marc Chagall and Georges Rouault, the
authors Georges Bernanos, Jean Cocteau, and Julien Green, and the
composer Arthur Lourie.



The focus of Maritain's writing is not aesthetic theory or even
aesthetic experience, but art and the nature of beauty. Maritain
sought to engage the world of the contemporary arts, but he was also
critical of much of the aesthetics that was implied by it; he proposed
to uncover principles of art at a time at which talk of such
principles had already become somewhat suspect. His familiarity with
the arts made his work relevant and accessible to those who engaged in
them, and although his early work drew from his knowledge of western
art, in his later work he also wrote about that found in Asian and
Indian cultures.



Of the arts, poetry is often singled out in Maritain's
discussions of beauty and contemplation. Yet Maritain's
definition of 'poetry' is unique; it is, he writes,
"that intercommunication between the inner being things of and
the inner being of the human self which is a kind of divination"
(*Creative Intuition*, 1953: 3)--though some critics
remain uncertain of what Maritain means by this. Through poetry, then,
Maritain held that there can be a contemplation of "the inner
being of things" and, thereby, of beauty (Trapani 2011: 163).
Thus, there is a close relation between the understanding of being in
philosophy, and poetry (see Chenet 2012). 



A distinctive feature of Maritain's discussion of art is his
account of what art is. For Maritain, art is "a virtue of the
practical intellect that aims at making" (*Art and
Scholasticism*, 1920 [1962: 13]; *Creative Intuition*,
1953: 49); it is, then, a virtue that is found in artisans and artists
alike (see Storck 2010). The virtue or *habitus* of art,
Maritain writes, is not simply an "interior growth of
spontaneous life", but has an intellectual character and
involves cultivation and practice. As a characteristic of the
practical intellect, art is not a speculative or a theoretical
activity; it aims not just at knowing, but at doing. Moreover, it can
be taught (Trutty-Coohill 2008). Finally, Maritain writes that the
'making' at which art aims is something that is demanded
by the end of the activity itself, not the particular interest of the
artist.



On Maritain's view, what distinguishes the fine arts from the
work of artisans is that the fine arts are primarily concerned with
beauty--i.e., "that which upon being seen pleases"
(*Art and Scholasticism*, 1920 [1962: 23]; *Creative
Intuition*, 1953: 160); this classical view, again adapted from
Aquinas, runs counter to some of the principal trends in aesthetics
and art since the eighteenth century. Maritain insisted, however, that
his view of the place of beauty in art was more consistent with the
practice of artistic activity. For example, even though a work of art
is an end in itself, the general end of art is beauty. Thus, since art
is a virtue that aims at making, to be an artist requires aiming at
making beautiful things (*Art and Scholasticism*, 1920 [1962:
33]).



Beauty can be found in nature as well as in art. While beauty affects
human beings through the senses, and while the awareness of beauty
does not involve abstraction (as does knowledge in the sciences),
nevertheless, beauty is an object of the intellect. Maritain,
following Aquinas, says that beauty "delights the
understanding"; the appreciation of art, on the part of the
spectator, then, involves awakening the intelligence.



Art has both subjective and objective dimensions. The activity of
artistic creation is clearly something that is carried out by a
subject. Moreover, Maritain acknowledges that beauty is
analogical--just as 'good' is; just as each thing is
good in its own way, so each thing is beautiful in its own way. Still,
beauty is not something purely subjective or relative.
Beauty--and, by extension, art--is something that involves
integrity, proportion, and splendour or clarity, which are objective
qualities. More broadly, art has a relation to the world; it can be a
response to the world, but its expression is also determined by the
world and by the work itself. (This also serves to put the ambitions
and pretensions of the artist into perspective.) Finally, beauty and
art have a connection to the spiritual and spiritual experience
(*Creative Intuition*, 1953: 178). As a creative activity, art
is ultimately dependent upon (and Maritain says that it is
"ordained to") the creator and, therefore, its end,
beauty, has a relation to the divine and to the transcendentals of
goodness, truth, and unity. 



A second key feature of Maritain's views on art is that art is
related to freedom; his views here not only reflect his metaphysics,
but bear on his political philosophy. Artistic activity is, for
Maritain, part of the basic drive in humans to create and make. This
requires freedom--and, thus, the artist must be free. Indeed, for
Maritain, freedom is a fundamental characteristic of the human person.
But this freedom is not absolute. Maritain reminds his readers that
freedom is not license to do whatever one chooses. Freedom in all its
forms is ultimately subject to truth and, for the artist, it is also
subject to "the spiritual conditions of honest work"
(*Art and Scholasticism*, 1920 [1962: 4]). Maritain would say
that artistic activity is analogous to divine free creative activity
(see his letters to Cocteau); it is "the highest natural
resemblance to God's activity" (*Art and Faith*,
1926 [1948: 89]). 



While Maritain rejects the subordination of the artist to politics and
to religious authority, he also denies that artists are answerable
only to themselves. The creative self, he writes, "dies to
itself in order to live in [its] work" (*Creative
Intuition*, 1953: 144). Moreover, Maritain writes that art
'perfects' the artist; that by engaging in this activity
there is "a perfecting of the spirit" (*Art and
Scholasticism*, 1920 [1962: 62]). The freedom that Maritain
ascribes to artists, then, is not a lawless freedom.



A third distinctive feature of Maritain's philosophy of art is
his account of artistic (or what he sometimes calls
'poetic') knowledge. Maritain notes the focus on the
awareness of the self as a characteristic of art from the time of the
German romantics, and he recognises its value so far as it challenges
the emphasis by some artists of the 17th century on reason and
mechanical technique--perhaps having in mind figures such as Paul
Freart de Chantelou. Artistic knowledge is an instance of what
Maritain calls, in general, knowledge though connaturality; it is a
kind of 'creative intuition' that arises out of "the
free creativity of the spirit" (*Creative Intuition*,
1953: 112; *Natural Law*, 2001: 18; see Bellusci 2013, Klein
2010). Maritain also describes artistic activity as a "grasping,
by the poet, of his own subjectivity in order to create"
(*Creative Intuition*, 1953: 113). As noted earlier, in the
discussion of Maritain's epistemology, this knowledge through
connaturality is found at the level of the preconscious intellect.
While it is non-conceptual and "obscure" (*Creative
Intuition*, 1953: 18; see *Natural Law*, 2001: 18), it is,
nevertheless, a knowledge of a "concrete
reality"--albeit one that "tends and extends to the
infinite" (*Creative Intuition*, 1953: 126). 



Maritain's views on art had a significant influence on a number
of artists, writers, and composers of his time, not only on his
interlocutors. The American writer, Flannery O'Connor; regarded
*Art and Scholasticism* as the book that she "cut [her]
aesthetic teeth on" (O'Connor 1979: 216), and the Canadian
writer Morley Callaghan commented that, in the early part of the
twentieth century, "Christian artists were finding new dignity
and spiritual adventure" in Maritain's work (Callaghan
1963 [2006: 76]). While no longer central in contemporary debate in
aesthetics, Maritain's views continue to have a broad audience.



## 4. General Assessment



At the time of his death, Maritain was arguably the best known
Catholic philosopher in the world. The breadth of his philosophical
work, his influence in the social philosophy of the Catholic Church,
and his ardent defenses of human rights made him one of the central
figures of his times. His writings influenced a range of figures, from
Thomas Merton, Yves Simon, and Gabriel Marcel (with whom, however, he
was later estranged), to Saul Alinksy, Martin Luther King, Paul
Martin, and Eduardo Frei in politics, to artists such as Bernanos,
Julien Green, and Lourie, and to Popes John XXIII and Paul VI
(the latter having translated two of Maritain's books into
Italian, and who honored Maritain by presenting the "Message to
Men of Thought and Science" to him at the close of the Second
Vatican Council, in 1965).



Maritain's philosophical work has been translated into some
twenty languages. As is evident from the preceding remarks, it covers
a wide range of areas--though much of it was written for a
general, rather than a professional academic, audience. Still, some of
Maritain's writings are polemical and, because much of his
concern (especially in the history of philosophy) was to address very
specific philosophical and theological issues of his time, these texts
may have a rather dated character.



Maritain's most enduring legacy is undoubtedly his moral and
political philosophy, and the influence of his work on human rights
can be seen, not only in the United Nations Declaration of 1948 but,
it has been claimed, in a number of national declarations, such as the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the preamble to the
Constitution of the Fourth French Republic (1946)--this last was
likely a reflection of Maritain's lengthy correspondence with
the French war hero and, later, President, General Charles DeGaulle.
Maritain's Christian humanism and personalism have also had a
significant influence in the social encyclicals of Pope Paul VI and in
the thought of Pope John Paul II. Interestingly, since the end of the
Cold War, there has been a revival of Maritain's political ideas
in Central and Eastern Europe.



Two other areas in which Maritain's thought has been influential
are his aesthetics and his philosophy of education. Although no longer
as strong as they once were, they were particularly significant in
Latin America and French-speaking Africa from the 1930s until recent
years. Maritain's work in epistemology, though clearly essential
to his political and religious thought and to his aesthetics, has not,
however, had the reception Maritain would have held it deserved.



It is not easy to place Maritain's work within the history of
philosophy in the twentieth century. Clearly, his influence was
strongest in those countries where Thomistic philosophy had pride of
place. While his political philosophy led him, at least in his time,
to be considered a liberal and even a social democrat, he eschewed
socialism and, in *Le paysan de la Garonne*, was an early
critic of many of the religious reforms that followed the Second
Vatican Council. One can say, then, that he would be considered by
present-day liberals as too conservative, and by many conservatives as
too liberal. Again, though generally considered to be a Thomist, the
extent to which he was is a matter of some debate. Indeed, according
to Etienne Gilson, Maritain's 'Thomism' was really
an epistemology and, hence, not a real Thomism at all. There is, not
surprisingly, no generally shared view of the precise character of
Maritain's philosophy.



Maritain's work nevertheless remains influential. Since 1958
there has been a Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre
Dame in the United States, there are journals devoted to his work,
such as *Etudes maritainiennes / Maritain Studies*,
*Notes et documents*, and the *Cahiers Jacques et
Raissa Maritain*, and there are currently some twenty
national associations which meet regularly, in addition to the
*Institut International Jacques Maritain*. The continuity of
interest in his thought in the English-speaking world led, in the mid
1990s, the University of Notre Dame Press to undertake the publication
of a *Collected Works* of the English-language editions of
Maritain's writings.