## 1. The General Idea of Human Rights



This section attempts to explain the general idea of human rights by
identifying four defining features. The goal is to answer the question
of what human rights are with a description of the core concept rather
than a list of specific rights. Two people can have the same general
idea of human rights even though they disagree about which rights
belong on a list of such rights and even about whether universal moral
rights exist. The four-part explanation below attempts to cover all
kinds of human rights including both moral and legal human rights and
both old and new human rights (e.g., both Lockean natural rights and
contemporary human rights). The explanation anticipates, however, that
particular kinds of human rights will have additional features.
Starting with this general concept does not commit us to treating all
kinds of human rights in a single unified theory (see Buchanan 2013
for an argument that we should not attempt to theorize together
universal moral rights and international legal human rights).



(1) *Human rights are rights*. Lest we miss the obvious, human
rights are *rights* (see Cruft 2012 and the entry on
 rights
 ). Most if not all human rights are claim rights that impose duties
or responsibilities on their addressees or dutybearers. Rights focus
on a freedom, protection, status, or benefit for the rightholders
(Beitz 2009). The duties associated with human rights often require
actions involving respect, protection, facilitation, and provision.
Rights are usually mandatory in the sense of imposing duties on their
addressees, but some legal human rights seem to do little more than
declare high-priority goals and assign responsibility for their
progressive realization. One can argue, of course, that goal-like
rights are not real rights, but it may be better to recognize that
they comprise a weak but useful notion of a right (See Beitz 2009 for
a defense of the view that not all human rights are rights in a strong
sense. And see Feinberg 1973 for the idea of "manifesto
rights"). A human rights norm might exist as (a) a shared norm
of actual human moralities, (b) a justified moral norm supported by
strong reasons, (c) a legal right at the national level (where it
might be referred to as a "civil" or
"constitutional" right), or (d) a legal right within
international law. A human rights advocate might wish to see human
rights exist in all four ways (See Section 2.1 How Can Human Rights
Exist?). 



(2) *Human rights are plural*. If someone accepted that there
are human rights but held that there is only one of them, this might
make sense if she meant that there is one abstract underlying right
that generates a list of specific rights (See Dworkin 2011 for a view
of this sort). But if this person meant that there is just one
specific right such as the right to peaceful assembly this would be a
highly revisionary view. Human rights address a variety of specific
problems such as guaranteeing fair trials, ending slavery, ensuring
the availability of education, and preventing genocide. Some
philosophers advocate very short lists of human rights but
nevertheless accept plurality (see Cohen 2004, Ignatieff 2004).



(3) *Human rights are universal*. All living humans--or
perhaps all living *persons*--have human rights. One does
not have to be a particular kind of person or a member of some
specific nation or religion to have human rights. Included in the idea
of universality is some conception of *independent existence*.
People have human rights independently of whether they are found in
the practices, morality, or law of their country or culture. This idea
of universality needs several qualifications, however. First, some
rights, such as the right to vote, are held only by adult citizens or
residents and apply only to voting in one's own country. Second,
the human right to freedom of movement may be taken away temporarily
from a person who is convicted of committing a serious crime. And
third, some human rights treaties focus on the rights of vulnerable
groups such as minorities, women, indigenous peoples, and
children.



(4) *Human rights have high-priority*. Maurice Cranston held
that human rights are matters of "paramount importance"
and their violation "a grave affront to justice" (Cranston
1967). If human rights did not have high priority they would not have
the ability to compete with other powerful considerations such as
national stability and security, individual and national
self-determination, and national and global prosperity. High priority
does not mean, however, that human rights are absolute. As James
Griffin says, human rights should be understood as "resistant to
trade-offs, but not too resistant" (Griffin 2008). Further,
there seems to be priority variation within human rights. For example,
when the right to life conflicts with the right to privacy, the latter
will generally be outweighed. 



Let's now consider five other features or functions that might
be added. 



*Should human rights be defined as inalienable?* Inalienability
does not mean that rights are absolute or can never be overridden by
other considerations. Rather it means that its holder cannot lose it
temporarily or permanently by bad conduct or by voluntarily giving it
up. It is doubtful that all human rights are inalienable in this
sense. One who endorses both human rights and imprisonment as
punishment for serious crimes must hold that people's rights to
freedom of movement can be forfeited temporarily or permanently by
just convictions of serious crimes. Perhaps it is sufficient to say
that human rights are very hard to lose. (For a stronger view of
inalienability, see Donnelly 2003, Meyers 1985).



*Should human rights be defined as minimal rights?* A number of
philosophers have proposed the view that human rights are minimal in
the sense of not being too numerous (a few dozen rights rather than
hundreds or thousands), and not being too demanding (See Joshua Cohen
2004, Ignatieff 2005, and Rawls 1999). Their views suggest that human
rights are--or should be--more concerned with avoiding the
worst than with achieving the best. Henry Shue suggests that human
rights concern the "lower limits on tolerable human
conduct" rather than "great aspirations and exalted
ideals" (Shue 1996). When human rights are modest standards they
leave most legal and policy matters open to democratic decision-making
at the national and local levels. This allows human rights to have
high priority, to accommodate a great deal of cultural and
institutional variation among countries, and to leave open a large
space for democratic decision-making at the national level. Still,
there is no contradiction in the idea of an extremely expansive list
of human rights and hence minimalism is not a defining feature of
human rights (for criticism of the view that human rights are minimal
standards see Brems 2009 and Raz 2010). Minimalism is best seen as a
normative prescription for what *international* human rights
should be. Moderate forms of minimalism have considerable appeal, but
not as part of the definition of human rights. 



*Should human rights be defined as always being or
"mirroring" moral rights?* Philosophers coming to
human rights theory from moral philosophy sometimes assume that human
rights must be, at bottom, moral rather than legal rights. There is no
contradiction, however, in people saying that they believe in human
rights, but only when they are legal rights at the national or
international levels. As Louis Henkin observed, "Political
forces have mooted the principal philosophical objections, bridging
the chasm between natural and positive law by converting natural human
rights into positive legal rights" (Henkin 1978). Theorists who
insist that the only human rights are legal rights may find, however,
that the interpretations they can give of universality, independent
existence, and high priority are weak.



*Should human rights be defined in terms of serving some sort of
political function?* Instead of seeing human rights as grounded in
some sort of independently existing moral reality, a theorist might
see them as the norms of a highly useful political practice that
humans have constructed or evolved. Such a view would see the idea of
human rights as playing various political roles at the national and
international levels and as serving thereby to protect urgent human
and national interests. These political roles might include providing
standards for international evaluations of how governments treat their
people and specifying when use of economic sanctions or military
intervention is permissible (see
 Section 2.3 Political Conceptions of Human Rights
 below). 



Political theorists would add to the four defining elements suggested
above some set of political roles or functions. This kind of view may
be plausible for the very salient *international* human rights
that have emerged in international law and politics in the last fifty
years. But human rights can exist and function in contexts not
involving international scrutiny and intervention such as a world with
only one state. Imagine, for example, that an asteroid strike had
killed everyone in all countries except New Zealand, leaving it the
only state in existence. Surely the idea of human rights as well as
many dimensions of human rights practice could continue in New
Zealand, even though there would be no international relations, law,
or politics (for an argument of this sort see Tasioulas 2012). And if
in the same scenario a few people were discovered to have survived in
Iceland and were living without a government or state, New Zealanders
would know that human rights governed how these people should be
treated even though they were stateless. How deeply the idea of human
rights must be rooted in international law and practice should not be
settled by definitional fiat. We can allow, however, that the sorts of
political functions that Rawls and Beitz describe are
*typically* served by international human rights today. 


## 2. The Existence and Grounds of Human Rights


### 2.1 How Can Human Rights Exist?



A philosophical question about human rights that occurs to many people
is how it is possible for such rights to exist. Several possible ways
are explored in this section.



The most obvious way in which human rights come into existence is as
norms of national and international law that are created by enactment,
custom, and judicial decisions. At the international level, human
rights norms exist because of treaties that have turned them into
international law. For example, the human right not to be held in
slavery or servitude in Article 4 of the
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
 (Council of Europe, 1950) and in Article 8 of the
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
 (UN 1966) exists because these treaties establish it. At the national
level, human rights norms exist because they have through legislative
enactment, judicial decision, or custom become part of a
country's law. For example, the right against slavery exists in
the United States because the
 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
 prohibits slavery and servitude. When rights are embedded in
international law we speak of them as human rights; but when they are
enacted in national law we more frequently describe them as civil or
constitutional rights. 



Enactment in national and international law is clearly one of the ways
in which human rights exist. But many have suggested that this cannot
be the only way. If human rights exist only because of enactment,
their availability is contingent on domestic and international
political developments. Many people have looked for a way to support
the idea that human rights have roots that are deeper and less subject
to human decisions than legal enactment. One version of this idea is
that people are born with rights, that human rights are somehow innate
or inherent in human beings (see Morsink 2009). One way that a
normative status could be inherent in humans is by being God-given.
The
 U.S. Declaration of Independence
 (1776) claims that people are "endowed by their Creator"
with natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. On
this view, God, the supreme lawmaker, enacted some basic human
rights.



Rights plausibly attributed to divine decree must be very general and
abstract (life, liberty, etc.) so that they can apply to thousands of
years of human history, not just to recent centuries. But contemporary
human rights are specific and many of them presuppose contemporary
institutions (e.g., the right to a fair trial and the right to
education). Even if people are born with God-given natural rights, we
need to explain how to get from those general and abstract rights to
the specific rights found in contemporary declarations and
treaties.



Attributing human rights to God's commands may give them a
secure status at the metaphysical level, but in a very diverse world
it does not make them practically secure. Billions of people do not
believe in the God of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. If people do
not believe in God, or in the sort of god that prescribes rights, and
if you want to base human rights on theological beliefs you must
persuade these people of a rights-supporting theological view. This is
likely to be even harder than persuading them of human rights. Legal
enactment at the national and international levels provides a far more
secure status for practical purposes.



Human rights could also exist independently of legal enactment by
being part of actual human moralities. All human groups seem to have
moralities in the sense of imperative norms of interpersonal behavior
backed by reasons and values. These moralities contain specific norms
(for example, a prohibition of the intentional murder of an innocent
person) and specific values (for example, valuing human life.) If
almost all human groups have moralities containing norms prohibiting
murder, these norms could partially constitute the human right to
life.



The view that human rights are norms found in all human moralities is
attractive but has serious difficulties. Although worldwide acceptance
of human rights has been increasing rapidly in recent decades (see
 4. Universal Human Rights in a World of Diverse Beliefs and Practices),
 worldwide moral unanimity about human rights does not exist. Human
rights declarations and treaties are intended to change existing
norms, not just describe the existing moral consensus. 



Yet another way of explaining the existence of human rights is to say
that they exist most basically in true or justified ethical outlooks.
On this account, to say that there is a human right against torture is
mainly to assert that there are strong reasons for believing that it
is always morally wrong to engage in torture and that protections
should be provided against it. This approach would view the Universal
Declaration as attempting to formulate a justified political morality
for the whole planet. It was not merely trying to identify a
preexisting moral consensus; it was rather trying to create a
consensus that could be supported by very plausible moral and
practical reasons. This approach requires commitment to the
objectivity of such reasons. It holds that just as there are reliable
ways of finding out how the physical world works, or what makes
buildings sturdy and durable, there are ways of finding out what
individuals may justifiably demand of each other and of governments.
Even if unanimity about human rights is currently lacking, rational
agreement is available to humans if they will commit themselves to
open-minded and serious moral and political inquiry. If moral reasons
exist independently of human construction, they can--when
combined with true premises about current institutions, problems, and
resources--generate moral norms different from those currently
accepted or enacted. The Universal Declaration seems to proceed on
exactly this assumption (see Morsink 2009). One problem with this view
is that existence as good reasons seems a rather thin form of
existence for human rights. But perhaps we can view this thinness as a
practical rather than a theoretical problem, as something to be
remedied by the formulation and enactment of legal norms. The best
form of existence for human rights would combine robust legal
existence with the sort of moral existence that comes from widespread
acceptance based on strong moral and practical reasons.


### 2.2 Normative Justifications for Human Rights



Justifications for human rights should defend their main features
including their character as rights, their universality, and their
high priority. Such justifications should also be capable of providing
starting points for justifying a plausible list of specific rights (on
starting points and making the transition to specific rights see
Nickel 2007; see also
 Section 3 Which Rights are Human Rights?
 below). Further, justifying *international* human rights is
likely to require additional steps (Buchanan 2012). These requirements
make the construction of a good justification for human rights a
daunting task.



Approaches to justification include grounding human rights in
prudential reasons, practical reasons, moral rights (Thomson 1990),
human well-being (Sumner 1987, Talbott 2010), fundamental interests
(Beitz 2015), human needs (Miller 2012), agency and autonomy (Gewirth
1996, Griffin 2008) dignity (Gilabert 2018, Kateb 2011, Tasioulas
2015), fairness (Nickel 2007), equality, and positive freedom (Gould
2004, Nussbaum 2000, Sen 2004). Justifications can be based on just
one of these types of reasons or they can be eclectic and appeal to
several (Tasioulas. 2015).



Grounding human rights in human agency and autonomy has had strong
advocates in recent decades. For example, in *Human Rights: Essays
on Justification and Application* (1982) Alan Gewirth offered an
agency-based justification for human rights. He argued that denying
the value of successful agency and action is not an option for a human
being; having a life requires regarding the indispensable conditions
of agency and action as necessary goods. Abstractly described, these
conditions of successful agency are freedom and well-being. A prudent
rational agent who must have freedom and well-being will assert a
"prudential right claim" to them. Having demanded that
others respect her freedom and well-being, consistency requires her to
recognize and respect the freedom and well-being of other persons.
Since all other agents are in exactly the same position as she is of
needing freedom and well-being, consistency requires her to recognize
and respect their claims to freedom and well-being. She
"logically must accept" that other people as agents have
equal rights to freedom and well-being. These two abstract rights work
alone and together to generate equal specific human rights of familiar
sorts (Gewirth 1978, 1982, 1996). Gewirth's aspiration was to
provide an argument for human rights that applies to all human agents
and that is inescapable. From a few hard-to-dispute facts and a
principle of consistency he thinks we can derive two generic human
rights--and from them, a list of more determinate rights.
Gewirth's views have generated a large critical literature (see
Beyleveld 1991, Boylan 1999).



A more recent attempt to base human rights on agency and autonomy is
found in James Griffin's book, *On Human Rights* (2008).
Griffin does not share Gewirth's goal of providing a logically
inescapable argument for human rights, but his overall view shares key
structural features with Gewirth's. These include starting the
justification with the unique value of human agency and autonomy
(which Griffin calls "normative agency"), postulating some
abstract rights (autonomy, freedom, and well-being), and making a
place for a right to well-being within an agency-based approach.



In the current dispute between "moral" (or
"orthodox") and "political" conceptions of
human rights, Griffin strongly sides with those who see human rights
as fundamentally moral rights. Their defining role, in Griffin's
view, is protecting people's ability to form and pursue
conceptions of a worthwhile life--a capacity that Griffin
variously refers to as "autonomy," "normative
agency," and "personhood." This ability to form,
revise, and pursue conceptions of a worthwhile life is taken to be of
paramount value, the exclusive source of human dignity, and thereby
the basis of human rights (Griffin 2008). Griffin holds that people
value this capacity "especially highly, often more highly than
even their happiness."



"Practicalities" also shape human rights in
Griffin's view. He describes practicalities as "a second
ground" of human rights. They prescribe making the boundaries of
rights clear by avoiding "too many complicated bends,"
enlarging rights a little to give them safety margins, and consulting
facts about human nature and the nature of society. Accordingly, the
justifying generic function that Griffin assigns to human rights is
protecting normative agency while taking account of
practicalities.



Griffin claims that human rights suffer even more than other normative
concepts from an "indeterminacy of sense" that makes them
vulnerable to proliferation (Griffin 2008). He thinks that tying all
human rights to the single value of normative agency while taking
account of practicalities is the best way to remedy this malady. He
criticizes the frequent invention of new human rights and the
"ballooning of the content" of established rights. Still,
Griffin is friendly towards most of the rights in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Beyond this, Griffin takes human rights
to include many rights in interpersonal morality. For example, Griffin
thinks that a child's human right to education applies not just
against governments but also against the child's parents.



Griffin's thesis that all human rights are grounded in normative
agency is put forward not so much as a description but as a proposal,
as the best way of giving human rights unity, coherence, and limits.
Unfortunately, accepting and following this proposal is unlikely to
yield effective barriers to proliferation or a sharp line between
human rights and other moral norms. The main reason is one that
Griffin himself recognizes: the "generative capacities" of
normative agency are "quite great." Providing adequate
protections of the three components of normative agency (autonomy,
freedom, and minimal well-being) will encounter a lot of threats to
these values and hence will require lots of rights. 


### 2.3 Political Conceptions of Human Rights



Views that explain human rights in terms of the practical political
roles that they play have had prominent advocates in recent decades.
These "political" conceptions of human rights explain what
human rights *are* by describing the things that they
*do*. Two philosophers who have developed political conceptions
are discussed in this section, namely, John Rawls and Charles Beitz
(for helpful discussions of political conceptions and their
alternatives see the collections of essays in Etinson 2018 and Maliks
and Schaffer 2017). 



Advocates of political conceptions of human rights are often agnostic
or skeptical about universal *moral* rights while rejecting
wholesale moral skepticism and thinking possible the provision of
sound normative justifications for the content, normativity, and roles
of human rights (for challenges to purely political views see Gilabert
2011, Liao and Etinson 2012, Sangiovanni 2017, and Waldron 2018).



John Rawls introduced the idea of a political conception of human
rights in his book,  *The Law of Peoples* (Rawls 1999). The
basic idea is that we can understand what human rights are and what
their justification requires by identifying the main roles they play
in some political sphere. In *The Law of Peoples* this sphere
is international relations (and, secondarily, national politics).
Rawls was attempting a normative reconstruction of international law
and politics within today's international system, and this helps
explain Rawls's focus on how human rights function within this
system.



Rawls says that human rights are *a special class of urgent
rights*. He seems to accept the definition of human rights given
in Section 1 above. Besides saying that human rights are rights that
are high priority or "urgent," Rawls also accepts that
they are plural and universal. But Rawls was working on a narrower
project than Gewirth and Griffin. The *international* human
rights he was concerned with are also defined by their roles in
helping define in various ways the normative structure of the global
system. They provide content to other normative concepts such as
legitimacy, sovereignty, permissible intervention, and membership in
good standing in the international community.



According to Rawls the justificatory process for human rights is
analogous to the one for principles of justice at the national level
that he described in *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls 1971).
Instead of asking about the terms of cooperation that free and equal
citizens would agree to under fair conditions, we ask about the terms
of cooperation that free and equal *peoples* or countries would
agree to under fair conditions. We imagine representatives of the
world's countries meeting to choose the normative principles
that constitute the basic international structure. These
representatives are imagined to see the countries they represent as
free (rightfully independent) and equal (equally worthy of respect and
fair treatment). These representatives are also imagined to be
choosing rationally in light of the fundamental interests of their
country, to be reasonable in seeking to find and respect fair terms of
cooperation, and impartial because they are behind a "veil of
ignorance"--they lack information about the country they
represent such as its size, wealth, and power. Rawls holds that under
these conditions these representatives will unanimously choose
principles for the global order that include some basic human rights
(for further explanation of the global original position see the
entries on
 John Rawls
 and
 original position).



Rawls advocated a limited list of human rights, one that leaves out
many fundamental freedoms, rights of political participation, and
equality rights. He did this for two reasons. One is that he wanted a
list that is plausible for all reasonable countries, not just liberal
democracies. The second reason is that he viewed serious violations of
human rights as triggering permissible intervention by other
countries, and only the most important rights can play this role.



Leaving out protections for equality and democracy is a high price to
pay for assigning human rights the role of making international
intervention permissible when they are seriously violated. We can
accommodate Rawls'underlying idea without paying that price. To
accept the idea that countries engaging in massive violations of the
most important human rights are not to be tolerated we do not need to
follow Rawls in equating international human rights with a
heavily-pruned list. Instead we can work up a view--which is
needed for other purposes anyway--of which human rights are the
weightiest and then assign the intervention-permitting role to this
subset.



Charles Beitz's account of human rights in *The Idea of Human
Rights* (Beitz 2009) shares many similarities with Rawls's
but is much more fully developed. Like Rawls, Beitz deals with human
rights only as they have developed in contemporary international human
rights practice. Beitz suggests that we can develop an understanding
of human rights by attending to "the practical inferences that
would be drawn by competent participants in the practice from what
they regard as valid claims of human rights." Observations of
what competent participants say and do inform the account of what
human rights are. The focus is not on what human rights are at some
deep philosophical level; it is rather on how they work by guiding
actions within a recently emerged and still evolving discursive
practice. The norms of the practice guide the interpretation and
application of human rights, the appropriateness of criticism in terms
of human rights, adjudication in human rights courts,
and--perhaps most importantly--responding to serious
violations of human rights. Beitz says that human rights are
"matters of international concern" and that they are
"potential triggers of transnational protective and remedial
action."



Beitz does not agree with Rawls's view that these roles require
an abbreviated list of human rights. He accepts that the requirements
of human rights are weaker than the requirements of social justice at
the national level, but denies that human rights are minimal or highly
modest in other respects.



Beitz rightly suggests that a reasonable person can accept and use the
idea of human rights without accepting any particular view about their
foundations. It is less clear that he is right in suggesting that good
justifications of human rights should avoid as far as possible
controversial assumptions about religion, metaphysics, ideology, and
intrinsic value (see the entry
 public reason).
 Beitz emphasizes the practical good that human rights do, not their
grounds in some underlying moral reality. This helps make human rights
attractive to people from around the world with their diverse
religious and philosophical traditions. The broad justification for
human rights and their normativity that Beitz offers is that they
protect "urgent individual interests against predictable dangers
("standard threats") to which they are vulnerable under
typical circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of
independent states."


## 3. Which Rights are Human Rights?



This section discusses the question of which rights belong on lists of
human rights. The Universal Declaration's list, which has had
great influence, consists of six families: (1) Security rights that
protect people against murder, torture, and genocide; (2) Due process
rights that protect people against arbitrary and excessively harsh
punishments and require fair and public trials for those accused of
crimes; (3) Liberty rights that protect people's fundamental
freedoms in areas such as belief, expression, association, and
movement; (4) Political rights that protect people's liberty to
participate in politics by assembling, protesting, voting, and serving
in public office; (5) Equality rights that guarantee equal
citizenship, equality before the law, and freedom from discrimination;
and (6) Social rights that require that governments ensure to all the
availability of work, education, health services, and an adequate
standard of living. A seventh category, minority and group rights, has
been created by subsequent treaties. These rights protect women,
racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, children, migrant
workers, and the disabled.



Not every question of social justice or wise governance is a human
rights issue. For example, a country could have too many lawyers or
inadequate provision for graduate-level education without violating
any human rights. Deciding which norms should be counted as human
rights is a matter of considerable difficulty. And there is continuing
pressure to expand lists of human rights to include new areas. Many
political movements would like to see their main concerns categorized
as matters of human rights, since this would publicize, promote, and
legitimize their concerns at the international level. A possible
result of this is "human rights inflation," the
devaluation of human rights caused by producing too much bad human
rights currency (See Cranston 1973, Orend 2002, Wellman 1999, Griffin
2008). 



One way to avoid rights inflation is to follow Cranston in insisting
that human rights only deal with extremely important goods,
protections, and freedoms. A supplementary approach is to impose
several justificatory tests for specific human rights. For example, it
could be required that a proposed human right not only protect some
very important good but also respond to one or more common and serious
threats to that good (Dershowitz 2004, Donnelly 2003, Shue 1996,
Talbott 2005), impose burdens on the addressees that are justifiable
and no larger than necessary, and be feasible in most of the
world's countries (on feasibility see Gilabert 2009 and Nickel
2007). This approach restrains rights inflation with several tests,
not just one master test.



In deciding which specific rights are human rights it is possible to
make either too little or too much of international documents such as
the Universal Declaration and the European Convention. One makes too
little of them by proceeding as if drawing up a list of important
rights were a new question, never before addressed, and as if there
were no practical wisdom to be found in the choices of rights that
went into the historic documents. And one makes too much of them by
presuming that those documents tell us everything we need to know
about human rights. This approach involves a kind of fundamentalism:
it holds that when a right is on the official lists of human rights
that settles its status as a human right ("If it's in the
book that's all I need to know.") But the process of
identifying human rights in the United Nations and elsewhere was a
political process with plenty of imperfections. There is little reason
to take international diplomats as the most authoritative guides to
which human rights there are. Further, even if a treaty's
ratification by most countries can settle the question of whether a
certain right is a human right within international law, such a treaty
cannot settle its weight. The treaty may suggest that the right is
supported by weighty considerations, but it cannot make this so. If an
international treaty enacted a right to visit national parks without
charge as a human right, the ratification of that treaty would make
free access to national parks a human right within international law.
But it would not be able to make us believe that the right to visit
national parks without charge was sufficiently important to be a real
human right (see Luban 2015).


### 3.1 Civil and Political Rights



The least controversial family of human rights is civil and political
rights. These rights are familiar from historic bills of rights such
as the
 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
 (1789) and the
 U.S. Bill of Rights
 (1791, with subsequent amendments). Contemporary sources include the
first 21 Articles of the
 Universal Declaration,
 and treaties such as the
 European Convention,
 the
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
 the
 American Convention on Human Rights,
 and the
 African Charter on Human and People's Rights.
 Some representative formulations follow: 



> 
> Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This
> right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and
> ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
> writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of
> one's choice. (American Convention on Human Rights, Article
> 13.1)
> 



> 
> Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom
> of association with others, including the right to form and to join
> trade unions for the protection of his interests (European Convention,
> Article 11).
> 



> 
> Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the
> government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen
> representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law. 2. Every
> citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of
> his country. 3. Every individual shall have the right of access to
> public property and services in strict equality of all persons before
> the law (African Charter, Article 13).
> 



Most civil and political rights are not absolute--they can in
some cases be overridden by other considerations. For example, the
right to freedom of movement can be restricted by public and private
property rights, by restraining orders related to domestic violence,
and by legal punishments. Further, after a disaster such as a
hurricane or earthquake free movement is often appropriately suspended
to keep out the curious, permit access of emergency vehicles and
equipment, and prevent looting. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights permits rights to be suspended during times
"of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation" (Article 4). But it excludes some rights from suspension
including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the
prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of ex post facto criminal
laws, and freedom of thought and religion.


### 3.2 Social Rights



The Universal Declaration included social (or "welfare")
rights that address matters such as education, food, health services,
and employment. Their inclusion has been the source of much
controversy (see Beetham 1995). The European Convention did not
include them (although it was later amended to include the right to
education). Instead they were put into a separate treaty, the
 European Social Charter.
 When the United Nations began the process of putting the rights of
the Universal Declaration into international law, it followed the same
pattern by treating economic and social standards in a treaty separate
from the one dealing with civil and political rights. This treaty, the
 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
 (the "Social Covenant," 1966), treated these standards as
rights--albeit rights to be progressively realized.



The Social Covenant's list of rights includes nondiscrimination
and equality for women in economic and social life (Articles 2 and 3),
freedom to work and opportunities to work (Article 4), fair pay and
decent conditions of work (Article 7), the right to form trade unions
and to strike (Article 8), social security (Article 9), special
protections for mothers and children (Article 10), the right to
adequate food, clothing, and housing (Article 11), the right to basic
health services (Article 12), the right to education (Article 13), and
the right to participate in cultural life and scientific progress
(Article 15).



Article 2.1 of the Social Covenant sets out what each of the parties
commits itself to do about this list, namely to "take steps,
individually and through international assistance and
co-operation...to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant." In contrast, the Civil and
Political Covenant commits its signatories to immediate compliance, to
"respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
the rights recognized in the present Covenant" (Article 2.1).
The contrast between these two levels of commitment has led some
people to suspect that economic and social rights are really just
valuable goals. Why did the Social Covenant opt for progressive
implementation and thereby treat its rights as being somewhat like
goals? The main reason is that many of the world's countries
lacked the economic, institutional, and human resources to realize
these standards fully or even largely. For many countries,
noncompliance due to inability would have been certain if these
standards had been treated as immediately binding.



Social rights have often been defended with linkage arguments that
show the support they provide to adequate realization of civil and
political rights. This approach was first developed philosophically by
Henry Shue (Shue 1996; see also Nickel 2007 and 2016). Linkage
arguments defend controversial rights by showing the indispensable or
highly useful support they provide to uncontroversial rights. For
example, if a government succeeds in eliminating hunger and providing
education to everyone this promotes people's abilities to know,
use, and enjoy their liberties, due process rights, and rights of
political participation. Lack of education is frequently a barrier to
the realization of civil and political rights because uneducated
people often do not know what rights they have and what they can do to
use and defend them. Lack of education is also a common barrier to
democratic participation. Education and a minimum income make it
easier for people near the bottom economically to follow politics,
participate in political campaigns, and to spend the time and money
needed to go to the polls and vote.



*Do social rights yield a sufficient commitment to equality?*
Objections to social rights as human rights have come from both the
political right and the political left. A common objection from the
left, including liberal egalitarians and socialists, is that social
rights as enumerated in human rights documents and treaties provide
too weak of a commitment to material equality (Moyn 2018; Gilabert
2015). Realizing social rights requires a state that ensures to
everyone an adequate minimum of resources in some key areas but that
does not necessarily have strong commitments to equality of
opportunity, to strong redistributive taxation, and to ceilings on
wealth (see the entries
 equality,
 equality of opportunity,
 distributive justice,
 and
 liberal feminism).



The egalitarian objection cannot be that human rights documents and
treaties showed no concern for people living in poverty and misery.
That would be wildly false. One of the main purposes of including
social rights in human rights documents and treaties was to promote
serious efforts to combat poverty, lack of education, and unhealthy
living conditions in countries all around the world (see also Langford
2013 on the UN Millennium Development Goals). The objection also cannot
be that human rights facilitated the hollowing out of systems of
welfare rights in many developed countries that occurred after 1980.
Those cuts in welfare programs were often in violation of the
requirements of adequately realizing social rights.



Perhaps it should be conceded that human rights documents and treaties
have not said enough about positive measures to promote equal
opportunity in education and work. A positive right to equal
opportunity, like the one Rawls proposed, would require countries to
take serious measures to reduce disparities between the opportunities
effectively available to children of high-income and low-income
parents (Rawls 1971).



A strongly egalitarian political program is best pursued partially
within but mostly beyond the human rights framework. One reason for
this is that the human rights movement will have better future
prospects for acceptance and realization if it has widespread
political support. That requires that the rights it endorses appeal to
people with a variety of political views ranging from center-left to
center-right. Support from the broad political center will not emerge
and survive if the human rights platform is perceived as mostly a
leftist program.



*Do social rights protect sufficiently important human
interests?* Maurice Cranston opposed social rights by suggesting
that social rights are mainly concerned with matters such as holidays
with pay that are not matters of deep and universal human interests
(Cranston 1967, 1973. Treatments of objections to social rights
include Beetham 1995; Howard 1987; and Nickel 2007). It is far from
the case, however, that most social rights pertain only to superficial
interests. Consider two examples: the right to an adequate standard of
living and the right to free public education. These rights require
governments to try to remedy widespread and serious evils such as
severe poverty, starvation and malnutrition, and ignorance. The
importance of food and other basic material conditions of life is easy
to show. These goods are essential to people's ability to live,
function, and flourish. Without adequate access to these goods,
interests in life, health, and liberty are endangered and serious
illness and death are probable. Lack of access to educational
opportunities typically limits (both absolutely and comparatively)
people's abilities to participate fully and effectively in the
political and economic life of their country. 



*Are social rights too burdensome?* Another objection to social
rights is that they are too burdensome on their dutybearers. It is
very expensive to guarantee to everyone basic education and minimal
material conditions of life. Frequently the claim that social rights
are too burdensome uses other, less controversial human rights as a
standard of comparison, and suggests that social rights are
substantially more burdensome or expensive than liberty rights.
Suppose that we use as a basis of comparison liberty rights such as
freedom of communication, association, and movement. These rights
require both respect and protection from governments. And people
cannot be adequately protected in their enjoyment of liberties such as
these unless they also have security and due process rights. The costs
of liberty, as it were, include the costs of law and criminal justice.
Once we see this, liberty rights start to look a lot more costly. 



Further, we should not generally think of social rights as simply
giving everyone a free supply of the goods they protect. Guarantees of
things like food and housing will be intolerably expensive and will
undermine productivity if everyone simply receives a free supply. A
viable system of social rights will require most people to provide
these goods for themselves and their families through work as long as
they are given the necessary opportunities, education, and
infrastructure. Government-implemented social rights provide
guarantees of availability (or "secure access"), but
governments should have to supply the requisite goods in only a small
fraction of cases. Note that education is often an exception to this
since many countries provide free public education irrespective of
ability to pay.



Countries that do not accept and implement social rights still have to
bear somehow the costs of providing for the needy since these
countries--particularly if they recognize democratic rights of
political participation--are unlikely to find it tolerable to
allow sizeable parts of the population to starve and be homeless. If
government does not supply food, clothing, and shelter to those unable
to provide for themselves, then families, friends, and communities
will have to shoulder this burden. It is only in the last hundred or
so years that government-sponsored social rights have taken over a
substantial part of the burden of providing for the needy. The taxes
associated with social rights are partial replacements for other
burdensome duties, namely the duties of families and communities to
provide adequate care for the unemployed, sick, disabled, and aged.
Deciding whether to implement social rights is not a matter of
deciding whether to bear such burdens, but rather of deciding whether
to continue with total reliance on a system of informal provision that
distributes assistance in a very spotty way and whose costs fall very
unevenly on families, friends, and communities.



*Are social rights feasible worldwide?* Another objection to
social rights alleges that they are not feasible in many countries (on
how to understand feasibility see Gilabert 2009). It is very expensive
to provide guarantees of subsistence, measures to protect and restore
people's health, and education. Many governments will be unable
to provide these guarantees while meeting other important
responsibilities. Rights are not magical sources of supply (Holmes and
Sunstein 1999).



As we saw earlier, the Social Covenant dealt with the issue of
feasibility by calling for progressive implementation, that is,
implementation as financial and other resources permit. Does this view
of implementation turn social rights into high-priority goals? And if
so, is that a bad thing?



Standards that outrun the abilities of many of their addressees are
good candidates for treatment as goals. Viewing them as largely
aspirational rather than as imposing immediate duties avoids problems
of inability-based noncompliance. One may worry, however, that this is
too much of a demotion for social rights because goals seem much
weaker than rights. But goals can be formulated in ways that make them
more like rights. They can be assigned addressees (the parties who are
to pursue the goal), beneficiaries, scopes that define the objective
to be pursued, and a high level of priority (see Langford 2013 and
Nickel 2013; see also
 UN Human Rights and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals).
 Strong reasons for the importance of these goals can be provided. And
supervisory bodies can monitor levels of progress and pressure
low-performing addressees to attend to and work on their goals.



Treating very demanding rights as goals has several advantages. One is
that proposed goals that greatly exceed our abilities are not so
farcical as proposed duties that do so. Creating grand lists of social
rights that many countries cannot presently realize seems farcical to
many people. Perhaps this perceived lack of realism is reduced if we
understand that these "rights" are really goals that
countries should seriously promote. Goals coexist easily with low
levels of ability to achieve them. Another advantage is that goals are
flexible: addressees with different levels of ability can choose ways
of pursuing the goals that suit their circumstances and means. Because
of these attractions it may be worth exploring sophisticated ways to
transform very demanding human rights into goals. The transformation
may be full or partial. It is possible to create right-goal mixtures
that contain some mandatory elements and that therefore seem more like
real rights (see Brems 2009). A right-goal mixture might include some
rights-like goals, some mandatory steps to be taken immediately, and
duties to realize the rights-like goals as quickly as possible. 


### 3.3 Rights of Women, Minorities, and Groups



Equality of rights for historically disadvantaged or subordinated
groups is a longstanding concern of the human rights movement. Human
rights documents repeatedly emphasize that *all* people,
including women and members of minority ethnic and religious groups,
have equal human rights and should be able to enjoy them without
discrimination. The right to freedom from discrimination figures
prominently in the Universal Declaration and subsequent treaties. The
Civil and Political Covenant, for example, commits participating
states to respect and protect their people's rights
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth, or social status" (on minority and group rights
see Kymlicka 1995, Nickel 2007).



A number of standard individual rights are especially important to
ethnic and religious minorities, including rights to freedom of
association, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom
from discrimination. Human rights documents also include rights that
refer to minorities explicitly and give them special protections. For
example, the Civil and Political Covenant in Article 27 says that
persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities
"shall not be denied the right, in community with other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language."



Feminists have often protested that standard lists of human rights do
not sufficiently take into account the different risks faced by women
and men. For example, issues like domestic violence, reproductive
choice, and trafficking of women and girls for sex work did not have a
prominent place in early human rights documents and treaties. Lists of
human rights have had to be expanded "to include the degradation
and violation of women" (Bunch 2006, 58; see also Lockwood 2006
and Okin 1998). Violations of women's human rights often occur
in the home at the hands of other family members, not in the street at
the hands of the police. Most violence against women occurs in the
"private" sphere. This has meant that governments cannot
be seen as the only addressees of human rights and that the right to
privacy of home and family needs qualifications to allow police to
protect women within the home.



The issue of how formulations of human rights should respond to
variations in the sorts of risks and dangers that different people
face is difficult and arises not just in relation to gender but also
in relation to age, profession, political affiliation, religion, and
personal interests. Due process rights, for example, are much more
useful to young people (and particularly young men) than they are to
older people since the latter are far less likely to run afoul of the
criminal law.



Since 1964 the United Nations has mainly dealt with the rights of
women and minorities through specialized treaties such as the
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
 (1965); the
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
 (1979); the
 Convention on the Rights of the Child
 (1989), and the
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
 (2007). See also the
 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
 (2007). Specialized treaties allow international norms to address
unique problems of particular groups such as assistance and care
during pregnancy and childbearing in the case of women, custody issues
in the case of children, and the loss of historic territories by
indigenous peoples.



Minority groups are often targets of violence. Human rights norms call
upon governments to refrain from such violence and to provide
protections against it. This work is partly done by the right to life,
which is a standard individual right. It is also done by the right
against genocide which protects some *groups* from attempts to
destroy or decimate them. The Genocide Convention was one of
the first human rights treaties after World War II. The right against
genocide is clearly a group right. It is held by both individuals and
groups and provides protection to groups as groups. It is largely
negative in the sense that it requires governments and other agencies
to refrain from destroying groups; but it also requires that legal and
other protections against genocide be created at the national
level.



Can the right against genocide be a human right? More generally, can a
group right fit the general idea of human rights proposed earlier? On
that conception, human rights are rights of all *persons*.
Perhaps it can, however, if we broaden our conception of who can hold
human rights to include important groups that people form and cherish
(see the entry on
 group rights).
 This can be made more palatable, perhaps, by recognizing that the
beneficiaries of the right against genocide are individual humans who
enjoy greater security against attempts to destroy the group to which
they belong (Kymlicka 1989).


### 3.4 Environmental Rights



In spite of the danger of rights inflation, there are doubtless norms
that should be counted as human rights but are not generally
recognized as such. After all, there are lots of areas in which
people's dignity and fundamental interests are threatened by the
actions and omissions of individuals and governments. Consider
environmental rights, which are often defined to include rights of
animals or even of nature itself (see the entry on
 environmental ethics).
 Conceived in this broad way environmental rights don't have a
good fit with the general idea of human rights because the
rightholders are not humans or human groups. 



Alternative formulations are possible, however. A basic environmental
human right can be understood as requiring maintenance and restoration
of an environment that is safe for human life and health. Many
countries have environmental rights of this sort in their
constitutional bills of rights (Hayward 2005). And the European
Union's Bill of Rights, the
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
 includes in Article 37 an environmental protection norm: "A high
level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality
of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union
and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable
development." 



A human right to a safe environment or to environmental protection
does not directly address issues such as the claims of animals or
biodiversity, although it might do so indirectly using the idea of
ecosystem services to humans (see
 Biodiversity and Human Rights.
 A justification for a human right to a safe environment should show
that environmental problems pose serious threats to fundamental human
interests, values, or norms; that governments may appropriately be
burdened with the responsibility of protecting people against these
threats; and that most governments actually have the ability to do
this. 



Climate change is currently a major environmental threat to many
people's lives and health, and hence it is unsurprising that
human rights approaches to climate change have been developed and
advocated in recent decades (see Bodansky 2011, Gardiner 2013, and
 UN Human Rights and Climate Change).
 One approach, advocated by Steve Vanderheiden accepts the idea of a
human right to an environment that is adequate for human life and
health and derives from this broad right a more specific right to a
stable climate (Vanderheiden 2008). Another approach, advocated by
Simon Caney, does not require introducing a new environmental right.
It suggests instead that serious action to reduce and mitigate climate
change is required by already well-established human rights because
severe climate change will violate many people's rights to life,
food, and health (Caney 2010). One could expand this approach by
arguing that severe climate change should be reduced and mitigated
because it will cause massive human migrations and other crises that
will undermine the abilities of many governments to uphold human
rights (for evaluation of these arguments see Bell 2013). 


## 4. Universal Human Rights in a World of Diverse Beliefs and Practices



Two familiar philosophical worries about human rights are that they
are based on moral beliefs that are culturally relative and that their
creation and advocacy involves ethnocentrism. Human rights prescribe
universal standards in areas such as security, law enforcement,
equality, political participation, and education. The peoples and
countries of planet Earth are, however, enormously varied in their
practices, traditions, religions, and levels of economic and political
development. Putting these two propositions together may be enough to
justify the worry that universal human rights do not sufficiently
accommodate the diversity of Earth's peoples. A theoretical
expression of this worry is "relativism," the idea that
ethical, political, and legal standards for a particular country or
region are mostly shaped by the traditions, beliefs, and conditions of
that country or region (see the entry on
 moral relativism).
 The anthropologist William G. Sumner, writing in 1906, asserted that
"the mores can make anything right and prevent condemnation of
anything" (Sumner 1906).



Relativists sometimes accuse human rights advocates of ethnocentrism,
arrogance, and cultural imperialism (Talbott 2005). Ethnocentrism is
the assumption, usually unconscious, that "one's own group
is the center of everything" and that its beliefs, practices,
and norms provide the standards by which other groups are
"scaled and rated" (Sumner 1906; see also Etinson 2018 who
argues that ethnocentrism is best understood as a kind of cultural
bias rather than as a belief in cultural superiority). Ethnocentrism
can lead to arrogance and intolerance in dealings with other
countries, ethical systems, and religions. Finally, cultural
imperialism occurs when the economically, technologically, and
militarily strongest countries impose their beliefs, values, and
institutions on the rest of the world. Relativists often combine these
charges with a prescription, namely that tolerance of varied practices
and traditions ought to be instilled and practiced through measures
that include extended learning about other cultures.



The conflict between relativists and human rights advocates may be
partially based on differences in their underlying philosophical
beliefs, particularly in metaethics. Relativists are often
subjectivists or noncognitivists and think of morality as entirely
socially constructed and transmitted. In contrast,
philosophically-inclined human rights advocates are more likely to
adhere to or presuppose cognitivism,
 moral realism,
 and
 intuitionism.



During the drafting in 1947 of the Universal Declaration, the
Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association warned of
the danger that the Declaration would be "a statement of rights
conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in Western Europe and
America." Perhaps the main concern of the AAA Board in the
period right after World War II was to condemn the intolerant
colonialist attitudes of the day and to advocate cultural and
political self-determination. But the Board also made the stronger
assertion that "standards and values are relative to the culture
from which they derive" and thus "what is held to be a
human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another
people"
 (American Anthropological Association Statement on Human Rights 1947).



This is not, of course, the stance of most anthropologists today.
Currently the American Anthropological Association has a
 Committee on Human Rights
 whose objectives include promoting and protecting human rights and
developing an anthropological perspective on human rights. While still
emphasizing the importance of cultural differences, anthropologists
now often support cultural survival and the protection of vulnerable
cultures, non-discrimination, and the rights and land claims of
indigenous peoples.



The idea that relativism and exposure to other cultures promote
tolerance may be correct from a psychological perspective. People who
are sensitive to differences in beliefs, practices, and traditions,
and who are suspicious of the grounds for extending norms across
borders, may be more inclined to be tolerant of other countries and
peoples than those who believe in an objective universal morality.
Still, philosophers have been generally critical of attempts to argue
from relativism to a prescription of tolerance (Talbott 2005). If the
culture and religion of one country has long fostered intolerant
attitudes and practices, and if its citizens and officials act
intolerantly towards people from other countries, they are simply
following their own traditions and cultural norms. They are just doing
what relativists think people mostly do. Accordingly, a relativist
from a tolerant country will be hard-pressed to find a basis for
criticizing the citizens and officials of the intolerant country. To
do so the relativist will have to endorse a transcultural principle of
tolerance and to advocate as an outsider cultural change in the
direction of greater tolerance. Because of this, relativists who are
deeply committed to tolerance may find themselves attracted to a
qualified commitment to human rights.



East Asia is the region of the world that participates least in the
international human rights system--even though some important
East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea do participate. In
the 1990s Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and others
argued that international human rights as found in United Nations
declarations and treaties were insensitive to distinctive "Asian
values" such as prizing families and community (in contrast to
strong individualism); putting social harmony over personal freedom;
respect for political leaders and institutions; and emphasizing
responsibility, hard work, and thriftiness as means of social progress
(on the Asian Values debate see Bauer and Bell 1999; Bell 2000; Sen
1997; and Twining 2009). Proponents of the Asian values idea did not
wish to abolish all human rights; they rather wanted to deemphasize
some families of human rights, particularly the fundamental freedoms
and rights of democratic participation (and in some cases the rights
of women). They also wanted Western governments and NGOs to stop
criticizing them for human rights violations in these areas.



At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, countries
including Singapore, Malaysia, China, and Iran advocated
accommodations within human rights practice for cultural and economic
differences. Western representatives tended to view the position of
these countries as excuses for repression and authoritarianism. The
Conference responded by approving the
 Vienna Declaration.
 It included in Article 5 the assertion that countries should not pick
and choose among human rights: "All human rights are universal,
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner,
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the
significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind,
it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms."



Perhaps the debate about relativism and human rights has become
obsolete. In recent decades widespread acceptance of human rights has
occurred in most parts of the world. Three quarters of the
world's countries have ratified the major human rights treaties,
and many countries in Africa, the Americas, and Europe participate in
regional human rights regimes that have international courts (see
Georgetown University Human Rights Law Research Guide in the Other
Internet Resources below). Further, all of the world's countries
now use similar political institutions (law, courts, legislatures,
executives, militaries, bureaucracies, police, prisons, taxation, and
public schools) and these institutions carry with them characteristic
problems and abuses (Donnelly 2003). Finally, globalization has
diminished the differences among peoples. Today's world is not
the one that early anthropologists and missionaries found. National
and cultural boundaries are breached not just by international trade
but also by millions of travelers and migrants, electronic
communications, international law covering many areas, and the efforts
of international governmental and non-governmental organizations.
International influences and organizations are everywhere and
countries borrow freely and regularly from each other's
inventions and practices.



Worldwide polls on attitudes towards human rights are now available
and they show broad support for human rights and international efforts
to promote them. Empirical research can now replace or supplement
theoretical speculations about how much disagreement on human rights
exists worldwide. A December 2011 report by the
 Council on Foreign Relations
 surveyed recent international opinion polls on human rights that
probe agreement and disagreement with propositions such as
"People have the right to express any opinion,"
"People of all faiths can practice their religion freely,"
"Women should have the same rights as men," "People
of different races [should be] treated equally," and governments
"should be responsible for ensuring that [their] citizens can
meet their basic need for food." Big majorities of those polled
in countries such as Argentina, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran,
Kenya, Nigeria, China, India, and Indonesia gave affirmative answers.
Further, large majorities (on average 70%) in all the countries polled
supported UN efforts to promote the human rights set out in the
Universal Declaration. Unfortunately, popular acceptance of human
rights ideas has not, however, prevented a recent slide in many of
these same countries towards authoritarianism.