## 1. Biography




Francis Bacon was born January, 22, 1561, the second child of Sir
Nicholas Bacon (Lord Keeper of the Seal) and his second wife Lady Anne
Cooke Bacon, daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, tutor to Edward VI and one
of the leading humanists of the age. Lady Anne was highly erudite: she
not only had a perfect command of Greek and Latin, but was also
competent in Italian and French. Together with his older brother
Anthony, Francis grew up in a context determined by political power,
humanist learning, and Calvinist zeal. His father had built a new house
in Gorhambury in the 1560s, and Bacon was educated there for some seven
years; later, along with Anthony, he went to Trinity College, Cambridge
(1573-5), where he sharply criticized the scholastic methods of
academic training. Their tutor was John Whitgift, in later life
Archbishop of Canterbury. Whitgift provided the brothers with classical
texts for their studies: Cicero, Demosthenes, Hermogenes, Livy,
Sallust, and Xenophon (Peltonen 2007). Bacon began his studies
at Gray's Inn in London in 1576; but from 1577 to 1578 he
accompanied Sir Amias Paulet, the English ambassador, on his mission in
Paris. According to Peltonen (2007): 



>  During his stay in France, perhaps in autumn 1577,
> Bacon once visited England as the bearer of diplomatic post,
> delivering letters to Walsingham, Burghley, Leicester, and to the
> Queen herself.
> 
> 



When his father died in 1579, he returned to England. Bacon's small
inheritance brought him into financial difficulties and since his
maternal uncle, Lord Burghley, did not help him to get a lucrative
post as a government official, he embarked on a political career in
the House of Commons, after resuming his studies in Gray's Inn. In
1581 he entered the Commons as a member for Cornwall, and he remained
a Member of Parliament for thirty-seven years. He was admitted to the
bar in 1582 and in 1587 was elected as a reader at Gray's Inn. His
involvement in high politics started in 1584, when he wrote his first
political memorandum,
*A Letter of Advice to Queen Elizabeth*. Right from the
beginning of his adult life, Bacon aimed at a revision of natural
philosophy and--following his father's example--also tried
to secure high political office. Very early on he tried to formulate
outlines for a new system of the sciences, emphasizing empirical
methods and laying the foundation for an applied science (*scientia
operativa*). This twofold task, however, proved to be too
ambitious to be realized in practice. Bacon's ideas concerning a
reform of the sciences did not meet with much sympathy from Queen
Elizabeth or from Lord Burghley. Small expectations on this front led
him to become a successful lawyer and Parliamentarian. From 1584 to
1617 (the year he entered the House of Lords) he was an active member
in the Commons. Supported by Walsingham's patronage, Bacon played a
role in the investigation of English Catholics and argued for stern
action against Mary Queen of Scots. He served on many committees,
including one in 1588 which examined recusants; later he was a member
of a committee to revise the laws of England. He was involved in the
political aspects of religious questions, especially concerning the
conflict between the Church of England and nonconformists. In a tract
of 1591, he tried to steer a middle course in religious politics; but
one year later he was commissioned to write against the Jesuit Robert
Parson (Jardine and Stewart 1999, p. 125), who had attacked English
sovereignty.




From the late 1580s onwards, Bacon turned to the Earl of Essex as
his patron. During this phase of his life, he particularly devoted
himself to natural philosophy. He clearly expressed his position in a
famous letter of 1592 to his uncle, Lord Burghley:



>  I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends, as I
> have moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be my
> province; and if I could purge it of two sorts of rovers, whereof the
> one with frivolous disputations, confutations, and verbosities, the
> other with blind experiments and auricular traditions and impostures,
> hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in industrious
> observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions and
> discoveries; the best state of that province. This, whether it be
> curiosity, or vain glory, or nature, or (if one take it favourably)
> philanthropia, is so fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed. And I
> do easily see, that place of any reasonable countenance doth bring
> commandment of more wits than of a man's own; which is the thing I
> greatly affect. (Bacon 1857-74, VIII, 109)
> 
> 




In 1593 Bacon fell out favor with the queen on account of his
refusal to comply with her request for funds from Parliament. Although
he did not vote against granting three subsidies to the government, he
demanded that these should be paid over a period six, rather than
three, years. This led Sir Robert Cecil and Sir Walter Raleigh to argue
against him in Parliament. Bacon's patron, the Earl of Essex, for
whom he had already served as a close political advisor and informer,
was not able to mollify the queen's anger over the subsidies; and
all Essex's attempts to secure a high post for Bacon
(attorney-general or solicitor-general) came to nothing. Nevertheless,
the queen valued Bacon's competence as a man of law. He was
involved in the treason trial of Roderigo Lopez and later on in the
proceedings against the Earl of Essex. In his contribution to the
*Gesta Grayorum* (the traditional Christmas revels held in
Gray's Inn) of 1594-5, Bacon had emphasized the necessity of
scientific improvement and progress. Since he failed to secure for
himself a position in the government, he considered the
possibility of giving up politics and concentrating on natural
philosophy. It is no wonder, then, that Bacon engaged in many scholarly
and literary pursuits in the 1590s. His letters of advice to the Earl
of Rutland and to the Earl of Essex should be mentioned in this
context. The advice given to Essex is of particular importance because
Bacon recommended that he should behave in a careful and intelligent
manner in public, above all abstaining from aspiring to military
commands. Bacon also worked in this phase of his career for the
reform of English law. In 1597 his first book was published, the
seminal version of his *Essays*, which contained only ten pieces
(Klein 2004b). His financial situation was still insecure; but his
plan to marry the rich widow Lady Hatton failed because she was
successfully courted by Sir Edward Coke. In 1598 Bacon was unable to
sell his reversion of the Star Chamber clerkship, so that he was
imprisoned for a short time on account of his debts. His parliamentary
activities in 1597-98, mainly involving committee work, were
impressive; but when the Earl of Essex in 1599 took command of the
attempt to pacify the Irish rebels, Bacon's hopes sank. Essex did
not solve the Irish question, returned to court and fell from grace, as
Bacon had anticipated he would. He therefore lost a valuable patron and
spokesman for his projects. Bacon tried to reconcile the queen and
Essex; but when the earl rebelled against the crown in 1601, he could
do nothing to help him. The queen ordered Bacon to participate in the
treason trial against Essex. In 1601 Bacon sat in Elizabeth's
last parliament, playing an extremely active role.




 
Bacon looked forward to the next reign and tried to get in contact with
James VI of Scotland, Elizabeth's successor. During James'
reign Bacon rose to power. He was knighted in 1603 and was created a
learned counsel a year later. He took up the political issues of the
union of England and Scotland, and he worked on a conception of
religious toleration, endorsing a middle course in dealing with
Catholics and nonconformists. Bacon married Alice Barnhem, the
young daughter of a rich London alderman in 1606. One year later he was
appointed Solicitor General. He was also dealing with theories of the
state and developed the idea, in accordance with Machiavelli, of a
politically active and armed citizenry. In 1608 Bacon became clerk of
the Star Chamber; and at this time, he made a review of his life,
jotting down his achievements and failures. Though he still was not
free from money problems, his career progressed step by step. In the
period from 1603 to 1613 Bacon was not only busy within English
politics. He also created the foundations of his philosophical work by
writing seminal treatises which prepared the path for the
*Novum Organum* and for the *Instauratio Magna*.
In 1613 he became Attorney General and began the rise to the peak of
his political career: he became a member of the Privy Council in 1616,
was appointed Lord Keeper of the Great Seal the following year--thus achieving the same position as his father--and was granted
the title of Lord Chancellor and created Baron of Verulam in 1618. In
1621, however, Bacon, after being created Viscount of St Alban, was
impeached by Parliament for corruption. He fell victim to an intrigue
in Parliament because he had argued against the abuse of monopolies,
indirectly attacking his friend, the Duke of Buckingham, who was the
king's favorite. In order to protect Buckingham, the king
sacrificed Bacon, whose enemies had accused him of taking bribes in
connection with his position as a judge. Bacon saw no way out for
himself and declared himself guilty. His fall was contrived by
his adversaries in Parliament and by the court faction, for which he
was a scapegoat to save the Duke of Buckingham not only from public
anger but also from open aggression (Mathews 1996). He lost all his
offices and his seat in Parliament, but retained his titles and his
personal property. Bacon devoted the last five years of his life--the famous quinquennium--entirely to his philosophical
work. He tried to go ahead with his huge project, the *Instauratio
Magna Scientiarum*; but the task was too big for him to accomplish
in only a few years. Though he was able to finish important parts of
the *Instauratio*, the proverb, often quoted in his works,
proved true for himself: *Vita brevis, ars longa*. He died in
April 1626 of pneumonia after experiments with ice.


## 2. Natural Philosophy: Struggle with Tradition




Bacon's struggle to overcome intellectual blockades and the
dogmatic slumber of his age and of earlier periods had to be fought on
many fronts. Very early on he criticized not only Plato, Aristotle and
the Aristotelians, but also humanists and Renaissance scholars such as
Paracelsus and Bernardino Telesio.




Although Aristotle provided specific axioms for every scientific
discipline, what Bacon found lacking in the Greek philosopher's
work was a master principle or general theory of science, which could
be applied to all branches of natural history and philosophy (Klein
2003a). For Bacon, Aristotle's cosmology, as well as his theory
of science, had become obsolete and consequently so too had many of the
medieval thinkers who followed his lead. He does not repudiate
Aristotle completely, but he opposes the humanistic interpretation of
him, with its emphasis on syllogism and dialectics (*scientia*
*operativa* versus textual hermeneutics) and the metaphysical
treatment of natural philosophy in favor of natural forms (or
nature's effects as structured modes of action, not artifacts),
the stages of which correspond--in the shape of a pyramid of
knowledge--to the structural order of nature itself.




If any
 'modern' Aristotelians came near to Bacon, it was
the Venetian or Paduan branch, represented by Jacopo Zabarella. On the
other hand, Bacon criticized Telesio, who--in his view--had only halfway succeeded in overcoming Aristotle's
deficiencies. Although we find the debate with Telesio in an
unpublished text of his middle period (*De Principiis atque
Originibus, secundum fabulas Cupidinis et Coelum* or *On
Principles and Origins According to the Fables of Cupid and
Coelum*, written in 1612; Bacon V [1889], 461-500), Bacon
began to struggle with tradition as early as 1603. In *Valerius*
*Terminus* (1603?) he already repudiates any mixture of natural
philosophy and divinity; he provides an outline of his new method and
determines that the end of knowledge was 
 "a discovery of all
operations and possibilities of operations from immortality (if it were
possible) to the meanest mechanical practice" (Bacon III [1887],
222). He opposes Aristotelian *anticipatio naturae*, which
favored the inquiry of causes to satisfy the mind instead of those
 "as will direct him and give him light to new experiences and
inventions" (Bacon III [1887], 232).




When Bacon introduces his new systematic structure of the
disciplines in *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), he
continues his struggle with tradition, primarily with classical
antiquity, rejecting the book learning of the humanists, on the grounds
that they "hunt more after words than matter" (Bacon III
[1887], 283). Accordingly, he criticizes the Cambridge University
curriculum for placing too much emphasis on dialectical and sophistical
training asked of "minds empty and unfraught with matter"
(Bacon III [1887], 326). He reformulates and functionally transforms
Aristotle's conception of science as knowledge of necessary
causes. He rejects Aristotle's logic, which is based on his
metaphysical theory, whereby the false doctrine is implied that the
experience which comes to us by means of our senses (things as they
*appear*) automatically presents to our understanding things as
they *are*. Simultaneously Aristotle favors the application of
general and abstract conceptual distinctions, which do not conform to
things as they exist. Bacon, however, introduces his new conception of
*philosophia prima* as a meta-level for all scientific
disciplines.




From 1606 to 1612 Bacon pursued his work on natural philosophy,
still under the auspices of a struggle with tradition. This tendency is
exemplified in the unpublished tracts *Temporis partus
masculus*, 1603/1608 (Bacon III [1887], 521-31),
*Cogitata et Visa*, 1607 (Bacon III, 591-620),
*Redargutio Philosophiarum*, 1608 (III, 557-85), and
*De Principiis atque Originibus*..., 1612 (Bacon V [1889],
461-500). Bacon rediscovers the Pre-Socratic philosophers for
himself, especially the atomists and among them Democritus as the
leading figure. He gives preference to Democritus' natural philosophy
in contrast to the scholastic--and thus Aristotelian--focus
on deductive logic and belief in authorities. Bacon does not expect
any approach based on tradition to start with a direct investigation
of nature and then to ascend to empirical and general knowledge. This
criticism is extended to Renaissance alchemy, magic, and astrology
(*Temporis partus masculus*), because the 'methods'
of these 'disciplines' are based on occasional insights,
but do not command strategies to reproduce the natural effects under
investigation. His criticism also concerns contemporary technical
literature, in so far as it lacks a new view of nature and an
innovative methodological program. Bacon takes to task the ancients,
the scholastics and also the moderns. He not only criticizes Plato,
Aristotle, and Galen for these failings, but also Jean Fernel,
Paracelsus, and Telesio, while praising the Greek atomists and Roger
Bacon.




Bacon's manuscripts already mention the doctrine of the idols
as a necessary condition for constituting *scientia operativa*.
In *Cogitata et Visa* he compares deductive logic as used by the
scholastics to a spider's web, which is drawn out of its own
entrails, whereas the bee is introduced as an image of *scientia
operativa*. Like a bee, the empiricist, by means of his inductive
method, collects the natural matter or products and then works them up
into knowledge in order to produce honey, which is useful for healthy
nutrition.




In Bacon's follow-up paper, *Redargutio
Philosophiarum*, he carries on his empiricist project by referring
to the doctrine of twofold truth, while in *De Principiis atque
Originibus* he rejects alchemical theories concerning the
transformation of substances in favor of Greek atomism. But in the same
text he sharply criticizes his contemporary Telesio for propagating a
non-experimental halfway house empiricism. Though Telesio proves to be
a moderate 'modern', he clings to the Aristotelian
framework by continuing to believe in the *quinta essentia* and
in the doctrine of the two worlds, which presupposes two modes of
natural law (one mode for the sublunary and another for the superlunary
sphere).


## 3. Natural Philosophy: Theory of the Idols and the System of Sciences


### 3.1 The Idols




Bacon's doctrine of the idols not only represents a stage in
the history of theories of error (Brandt 1979) but also functions as
an important theoretical element within the rise of modern empiricism.
According to Bacon, the human mind is not a *tabula rasa*.
Instead of an ideal plane for receiving an image of the world in toto,
it is a crooked mirror, on account of implicit distortions (Bacon IV
[1901], 428-34). He does not sketch a basic epistemology but
underlines that the images in our mind right from the beginning do not
render an objective picture of the true objects. Consequently, we have
to improve our mind, i.e., free it from the idols, before we start any
knowledge acquisition.




As early as *Temporis partus masculus*, Bacon warns the
student of empirical science not to tackle the complexities of his
subject without purging the mind of its idols: 



> 
> On waxen tablets
> you cannot write anything new until you rub out the old. With the mind
> it is not so; there you cannot rub out the old till you have written in
> the new. (Farrington 1964, 72)
> 
> 




In *Redargutio Philosophiarum* Bacon reflects on his method,
but he also criticizes prejudices and false opinions, especially the
system of speculation established by theologians, as an obstacle to the
progress of science (Farrington 1964, 107), together with any
authoritarian stance in scholarly matters.




Bacon deals with the idols in the Second Book of *The Advancement
of Learning*, where he discusses *Arts intellectual*
(Invention, Judgment, Memory, Tradition). In his paragraph on judgment
he refers to proofs and demonstrations, especially to induction and
invention. When he comes to Aristotle's treatment of the
syllogism, he reflects on the relation between sophistical fallacies
(Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*) and the idols (Bacon III
[1887], 392-6). Whereas induction, invention, and judgment
presuppose "the same action of the mind", this is not true
for proof in the syllogism. Bacon, therefore, prefers his own
*interpretatio naturae*, repudiating *elenches*
as modes of sophistical 'juggling' in order to persuade
others in *redargutions* ("degenerate and corrupt use
... for caption and contradiction"). There is no finding
without proof and no proof without finding. But this is not true for
the syllogism, in which proof (syllogism: judgment of the consequent)
and invention (of the 'mean' or middle term) are distinct.
The caution he suggests in relation to the ambiguities in
*elenches* is also recommended in face of the *idols*:



> 
> there is yet a much more important and profound kind of
> fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or enquired at
> all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others
> appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it
> doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but
> doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof.
> For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass,
> wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true
> incidence, nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of
> superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For
> this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed
> upon us by the general nature of the mind .... (Bacon III
> [1887], 394-5)
> 
> 




Bacon still presents a similar line of argument to his reader in
1623, namely in *De Augmentis* (Book V, Chap. 4; see Bacon IV
[1901], 428-34). Judgment by syllogism presupposes--in a
mode agreeable to the human mind--mediated proof, which, unlike
in induction, does not start from sense in primary objects. In order to
control the workings of the mind, syllogistic judgment refers to a
fixed frame of reference or principle of knowledge as the basis for
"all the variety of disputations" (Bacon IV [1901], 491).
The reduction of propositions to principles leads to the middle term.
Bacon deals here with the art of judgment in order to assign a
systematic position to the idols. Within this art he distinguishes the
'Analytic' from the detection of fallacies (sophistical
syllogisms). Analytic works with "true forms of consequences in
argument" (Bacon IV [1901], 429), which become faulty by variation and
deflection. The complete doctrine of detection of fallacies, according
to Bacon, contains three segments:


1. Sophistical fallacies,
2. Fallacies of interpretation, and
3. False appearances or Idols.



Concerning (1) Bacon praises Aristotle for his excellent handling of
the matter, but he also mentions Plato honorably. Fallacies of
interpretation (2) refer to "Adventitious Conditions or Adjuncts
of Essences", similar to the predicaments, open to physical or
logical inquiry. He focuses his attention on the logical handling when
he relates the detection of fallacies of interpretation to the wrong
use of common and general notions, which leads to sophisms. In the last
section (3) Bacon finds a place for his idols, when he refers to the
detection of false appearances as 



> 
> the deepest fallacies of the
> human mind: For they do not deceive in particulars, as the others do,
> by clouding and snaring the judgment; but by a corrupt and ill-ordered
> predisposition of mind, which as it were perverts and infects all the
> anticipations of the intellect. (IV, 431)
> 
> 



Idols are productions of the human imagination (caused by the crooked
mirror of the human mind) and thus are nothing more than
"untested generalities" (Malherbe 1996, 80).




In his Preface to the *Novum Organum* Bacon promises the
introduction of a new method, which will restore the senses to their
former rank (Bacon IV [1901], 17f.), begin the whole labor of the mind
again, and open two sources and two distributions of learning,
consisting of a method of cultivating the sciences and another of
discovering them. This new beginning presupposes the discovery of the
natural obstacles to efficient scientific analysis, namely seeing
through the idols, so that the mind's function as the subject of
knowledge acquisition comes into focus (Brandt 1979, 19).




According to Aphorism XXIII of the First Book, Bacon makes a
distinction between the Idols of the human mind and the Ideas of the
divine mind: whereas the former are for him nothing more than
"certain empty dogmas", the latter show "the true
signatures and marks set upon the works of creation as they are found
in nature" (Bacon IV [1901], 51).


#### 3.1.1 Idols of the Tribe




The Idols of the Tribe have their origin in the production of false
concepts due to human nature, because the structure of human
understanding is like a crooked mirror, which causes distorted
reflections (of things in the external world).


#### 3.1.2 Idols of the Cave




The Idols of the Cave consist of conceptions or doctrines which are
dear to the individual who cherishes them, without possessing any
evidence of their truth. These idols are due to the preconditioned
system of every individual, comprising education, custom, or accidental
or contingent experiences.


#### 3.1.3 Idols of the Market Place




These idols are based on false conceptions which are derived from
public human communication. They enter our minds quietly by a
combination of words and names, so that it comes to pass that not only
does reason govern words, but words react on our understanding.


#### 3.1.4 Idols of the Theatre




According to the insight that the world is a stage, the Idols of the
Theatre are prejudices stemming from received or traditional
philosophical systems. These systems resemble plays in so far as they
render fictional worlds, which were never exposed to an experimental
check or to a test by experience. The idols of the theatre thus have
their origin in dogmatic philosophy or in wrong laws of
demonstration.




Bacon ends his presentation of the idols in *Novum Organum*,
Book I, Aphorism LXVIII, with the remark that men should abjure and
renounce the qualities of idols, "and the understanding [must be]
thoroughly freed and cleansed" (Bacon IV [1901], 69). He
discusses the idols together with the problem of information gained
through the senses, which must be corrected by the use of experiments
(Bacon IV [1901], 27).


### 3.2 System of Sciences




Within the history of occidental philosophy and science, Bacon
identifies only three revolutions or periods of learning: the heyday of
the Greeks and that of the Romans and Western Europe in his own time
(Bacon IV [1901], 70ff.). This meager result stimulated his ambition
to establish a new system of the sciences. This tendency can already be
seen in his early manuscripts, but is also apparent in his first major
book, *The Advancement of Learning*. In this work Bacon presents
a systematic survey of the extant realms of knowledge, combined with
meticulous descriptions of deficiencies, leading to his new
classification of knowledge. In *The Advancement* (Bacon III
[1887], 282f.) a new function is given to *philosophia prima*,
the necessity of which he had indicated in the *Novum Organum*,
I, Aphorisms LXXIX-LXXX (Bacon IV [1901], 78-9). In both
texts this function is attributed to *philosophia naturalis*,
the basis for his concept of the unity of the sciences and thus of
materialism.




Natural science is divided by Bacon into physics and metaphysics.
The former investigates variable and particular causes, the latter
reflects on general and constant ones, for which the term *form*
is used. *Forms* are more general than the four Aristotelian
causes and that is why Bacon's discussion of the forms of
substances as the most general properties of matter is the last step
for the human mind when investigating nature. Metaphysics is distinct
from *philosophia prima*. The latter marks the position in the
system where general categories of a general theory of science are
treated as (1) universal categories of thought, (2) relevant for all
disciplines. Final causes are discredited, since they lead to
difficulties in science and tempt us to amalgamate theological and
teleological points of doctrine. At the summit of Bacon's pyramid
of knowledge are the laws of nature (the most general principles). At
its base the pyramid starts with observations, moves on to invariant
relations and then to more inclusive correlations until it reaches the
stage of forms. The process of generalization ascends from natural
history via physics towards metaphysics, whereas accidental
correlations and relations are eliminated by the method of exclusion.
It must be emphasized that *metaphysics* has a special meaning
for Bacon. This concept (1) excludes the infinity of individual
experience by generalization with a teleological focus and (2) opens
our mind to generate more possibilities for the efficient application
of general laws.


### 3.3 Matter Theory and Cosmology




According to Bacon, man would be able to explain all the processes
in nature if he could acquire full insight into the hidden structure
and the secret workings of matter (Perez-Ramos 1988, 101).
Bacon's conception of structures in nature, functioning according
to its own working method, concentrates on the question of how natural
order is produced, namely by the interplay of matter and motion. In
*De Principiis atque Originibus*, his materialistic stance with
regard to his conception of natural law becomes evident. The
*Summary Law of Nature* is a *virtus*
(matter-cum-motion) or power in accordance with matter theory, or



> 
> the force implanted by God in these first particles, form the
> multiplication thereof of all the variety of things proceeds and is
> made up. (Bacon V [1889], 463)
> 
> 



Similarly, in *De Sapientia Veterum* he attributes to this
force an 



>  appetite or instinct of primal matter; or to speak
> more plainly, the natural motion of the atom; which is indeed the
> original and unique force that constitutes and fashions all things out
> of matter. (Bacon VI [1890], 729)
> 
> 



Suffice it to say here that Bacon, who did not reject mathematics in
science, was influenced by the early mathematical version of chemistry
developed in the 16th century, so that the term
'instinct' must be seen as a keyword for his theory of
nature. The natural philosopher is urged to inquire into the



>  appetites and inclination of things by which all that
> variety of effects and changes which we see in the works of nature and
> art is brought about. (Bacon III [1887], 17-22; V [1889],
> 422-6 and 510ff.: *Descriptio Globi Intellectualis*; cf.
> IV [1901], 349)
> 
> 



Bacon's theory of active or even vivid force in matter accounts for
what he calls Cupid in *De Principiis atque Originibus* (Bacon
V [1889], 463-5). Since his theory of matter aims at an
explanation of the reality which is the substratum of appearances, he
digs deeper than did the mechanistic physics of the 17th
century (Gaukroger 2001, 132-7). Bacon's ideas concerning
the *quid facti* of reality presuppose the distinction 



>  between understanding how things are made up and of
> what they consist, ... and by what force and in what manner they
> come together, and how they are transformed. (Gaukroger 2001,
> 137)
> 
> 




This is the point in his work where it becomes obvious that he tries
to develop an explanatory pattern in which his theory of matter, and
thus his atomism, are related to his cosmology, magic, and
alchemy.



In *De Augmentis*, Bacon not only refers to Pan and his
nymphs in order to illustrate the permanent atomic movement in matter
but in addition revives the idea of magic in a 
'honourable meaning' as 



> 
> the knowledge of the universal consents of
> things .... I ... understand [magic] as the science which
> applies the knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderful
> operations; and by uniting (as they say) actives with passives,
> displays the wonderful works of nature. (Bacon IV [1901],
> 366-7: *De Augmentis* III.5)
> 
> 




Bacon's notion of form is made possible by integration into
his matter theory, which (ideally) reduces the world of appearances to
some minimal parts accessible and open to manipulation by the
knower/maker. In contrast to Aristotle, Bacon's knowing-why type
of definition points towards the formulation of an efficient
knowing-how type (Perez-Ramos 1988, 119). In this sense a
convergence between the scope of definition and that of causation takes
place according to a 'constructivist epistemology'. The
fundamental research of Graham Rees has shown that Bacon's
special mode of cosmology is deeply influenced by magic and
semi-Paracelsian doctrine. For Bacon, matter theory is the basic
doctrine, not classical mechanics as it is with Galileo. Consequently,
Bacon's purified and modified versions of chemistry, alchemy, and
physiology remain primary disciplines for his explanation of the
world.




According to Rees, the *Instauratio Magna* comprises two
branches: (1) Bacon's famous scientific method, and (2) his
semi-Paracelsian world system as "a vast, comprehensive system
of speculative physics" (Rees 1986, 418). For (2) Bacon conjoins
his specific version of Paracelsian cosmic chemistry to Islamic
celestial kinematics (especially in Alpetragius [al-Bitruji]; see Zinner 1988, 71). The chemical
world system is used to support Bacon's explanation of celestial
motion in the face of contemporary astronomical problems (Rees 1975b,
161f.). There are thus two sections in Bacon's *Instauratio*,
which imply the modes of their own explanation.




Bacon's speculative cosmology and matter theory had been
planned to constitute Part 5 of *Instauratio Magna*. The theory
put forward refers in an eclectic vein to atomism, criticizes
Aristotelians and Copernicans, but also touches on Galileo, Paracelsus,
William Gilbert, Telesio, and Arabic astronomy.




For Bacon, 'magic' is classified as applied science,
while he generally subsumes under 'science' pure science
and technology. It is never identified with black magic, since it
represents the "ultimate legitimate power over nature"
(Rees 2000, 66). Whereas *magia* was connected to crafts in the
16th and 17th centuries, Bacon's science
remains the knowledge of forms in order to transform them into
operations. Knowledge in this context, however, is no longer
exclusively based on formal proof.




Bacon's cosmological system--a result of thought
experiments and speculation, but not proven in accordance with the
inductive method--presupposes a finite universe, a geocentric
plenum, which means that the earth is passive and consists of
*tangible* matter. The remaining universe is composed of active
or *pneumatic* matter. Whereas the interior and tangible matter
of the earth is covered by a crust which separates it from the
pneumatic heaven, the zone between earth and the "middle region
of the air" allows a mixture of pneumatic and tangible matter,
which is the origin of organic and non-organic phenomena. Bacon speaks
here of "attached spirit" (Rees 1986, 418-20), while
otherwise he assumes four kinds of free spirit: air and terrestrial
fire, which refer to the sublunary realm; ether and sidereal fire,
which are relevant to the celestial realm. Ether is explained as the
medium in which planets move around the central earth. Air and ether,
as well as watery non-inflammable bodies, belong to Bacon's first
group of *substances* or to the *Mercury Quaternion*.




Terrestrial fire is presented as the weak variant of sidereal fire;
it joins with oily substances and sulphur, for all of which Bacon
introduces the *Sulphur Quaternion.* These quaternions comprise
antithetical qualities: air and ether versus fire and sidereal fire.
The struggle between these qualities is determined by the distance from
the earth as the absolute center of the world system. Air and ether
become progressively weaker as the terrestrial and sidereal fire grow
stronger. The quaternion theory functions in Bacon's thought as a
constructive element for constituting his own theory of planetary
movement and a general theory of physics. This theory differs from all
other contemporary approaches, even though Bacon states that
"many theories of the heavens may be supposed which agree well
enough with the phenomena and yet differ with each other" (Bacon
IV [1901], 104). The diurnal motion of the world system (9th
sphere) is driven by sympathy; it carries the heavens westward around
the earth. The sidereal fire is powerful and, accordingly, sidereal
motion is swift (the stars complete their revolution in 24 hours).
Since the sidereal fire becomes weaker if it burns nearer to the earth,
the lower planets move more slowly and unevenly than the higher ones
(in this way Bacon, like Alpetragius, accounts for irregular planetary
movement without reference to Ptolemy's epicycle theory). He
applies his theory of consensual motion to physics generally (e.g.,
wind and tides) and thus comes into conflict with Gilbert's
doctrine of the interstellar vacuum and Galileo's theory of the
tides (for Bacon, the cycle of tides depends on the diurnal motion of
the heavens but, for Galileo, on the earth's motion).




With quaternion theory we see that, in the final analysis, Bacon was
not a mechanist philosopher. His theory of matter underwent an
important transformation, moving in the direction of
'forms', which we would nowadays subsume under biology or
the life sciences rather than under physics. Bacon distinguishes
between non-spiritual matter and spiritual matter. The latter, also
called 'subtle matter' or 'spirit', is more
reminiscent of Leibniz' 'monads' than of mechanically
defined and materially, as well as spatially, determined atoms. The
spirits are seen as active agents of phenomena; they are endowed with
'appetition' and 'perception' (Bacon I [1889],
320-21: *Historia Vitae et Mortis*; see also V, 63:
*Sylva Sylvarum*, Century IX:
"It is certain that
all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have
perception: for when one body is applied to another, there is a kind of
election to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude or expel
that which is ingrate").




These spirits are never at rest. In the *Novum Organum*,
then, Bacon rejected the "existence of eternal and
immutable atoms and the reality of the void" (Kargon 1966, 47).
His new conception of matter was therefore "close to that of the
chemists" in the sense of Bacon's semi-Paracelsian
cosmology (Rees 2000, 65-69). The careful natural philosopher
tries to disclose the secrets of nature step by step; and therefore
 he says of his method: "I propose to establish
progressive stages of certainty" (Bacon IV [1901], 40: *Novum
Organum*, Preface). This points towards his inductive procedure and
his method of tables, which is a complicated mode of induction by
exclusion. It is necessary because nature hides her secrets. In
Aphorism XIX of Book I in his *Novum Organum* Bacon writes:



> 
> There are and can be only two ways of searching into and
> discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the
> most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it
> takes for settled and immoveable, proceeds to judgment and to the
> discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other
> derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by gradual and
> unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of
> all. This is the true way, but as yet untried. (Bacon IV [1901],
> 50)
> 
> 




The laws of nature, which Bacon intended to discover by means of his
new method, were expressed in the 'forms', in which
the 'unbroken ascent' culminates. Through these forms the
natural philosopher understands the general causes of phenomena
(Kargon 1966, 48). In his endeavor to learn more about the secret
workings of nature, Bacon came to the conclusion that the atomist
theory could not provide sufficient explanations for the "real
particles, such as really exist" (Bacon IV [1901], 126:
*Novum Organum*, II.viii), because he thought that the
immutability of matter and the void (both necessary assumptions for
atomism) were untenable. His language turned from that of Greek physics
to the usage of contemporary chemists. This is due to his insight that
"subtlety of investigation" is needed, since our senses are
too gross for the complexity and fineness of nature, so that method has
to compensate for the shortcomings of our direct comprehension. Only
method leads to the knowledge of nature: in *Sylva Sylvarum*,
Century I.98 Bacon deals explicitly with the question of the
asymmetrical relationship between man's natural instrument (i.e.,
the senses) and the intricacy of nature's structures and
workings.




Bacon distinguishes 'animate' or vital spirits, which
are continuous and composed of a substance similar to fire, from
lifeless or inanimate spirits, which are cut off and resemble air: the
spirits interact with gross matter through chemical processes (Bacon
IV, 195-6 (*Novum Organum*, II.xl)). These spirits
have two different desires: self-multiplication and attraction of like
spirits. According to Kargon (1966, 51):



> 
>  Bacon's later
> theory of matter is one of the interaction of gross, visible parts of
> matter and invisible material spirits, both of which are physically
> mixed.
> 
> 



Spirits interact with matter by means of concoction, colliquation and
other non-mechanical chemical processes, so that Bacon's scientific
paradigm differs from Descartes' mechanist theory of matter in
his *Principia Philosophiae* (1644), which presupposes *res
extensa* moving in space. Bacon's theory of matter is thus
closely related to his speculative philosophy:



> 
>  The distinction between tangible and
> pneumatic matter is the hinge on which the entire speculative system
> turns. (Rees 1996, 125; Paracelsus had already stated that
> knowledge inheres in the object: see Shell 2004, 32)
> 
> 




Bacon's theory of matter in its final version was more
corpuscular than atomist (Clericuzio 2000, 78). Bacon's
particles are *semina rerum*: they are endowed with
powers, which make a variety of motions possible and allow the
production of all possible forms. These spirits are constitutive for
Bacon's theory of matter. As material, fine substances,
composed of particles, combined from air and fire, they can, as we have
seen, be either inanimate or animate. Bacon thus suggests a corpuscular
and chemical chain of being:




|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| inanimate objects | - | inaugurate spirits |
| vegetables | - | inanimate + vital spirits |
| animals | - | vital spirits |




Small wonder, then, that Bacon's spirits are indispensable for
his conception of physiology: 



>  the vital spirits regulate all vegetative functions of
> plants and animals. Organs responsible for these functions, for
> digestion, assimilation, etc., seem to act by perception, mere
> reaction to local stimuli, but these reactions are coordinated by the
> vital spirit. These functions flow from the spirit's airy-flamy
> constitution. The spirit has the softness of air to receive
> impressions and the vigour of fire to propagate its actions. (Rees in
> OFB VI, 202-3) 
> 
> 



This physiological stratum of Bacon's natural philosophy was
influenced by his semi-Paracelsian cosmology (on Paracelsus see
Muller-Jahncke 1985, 67-88), which Graham Rees (Rees and
Upton 1984, 20-1) has reconstructed from the extant parts of the
*Instauratio Magna*. Detailed consideration therefore has to be
given to Bacon's theory of the 'quaternions'.




Bacon's speculative system is a hybrid based on different sources
which provided him with seminal ideas: e.g., atomism, Aristotelianism,
Arabic astronomy, Copernican theory, Galileo's discoveries, the works
of Paracelsus, and Gilbert. In his theory he combines astronomy,
referring to Alpetragius (see Dijksterhuis 1956, 237-43; Rees
and Upton 1984, 26; Gaukroger, 2001, 172-5; and see Grant
1994, 533-66, for discussion of the cosmology of Alpetragius),
and chemistry (Rees 1975a, 84-5): 



> [i]t was partly designed to fit a kinematic skeleton
> and explain, in general terms, the irregularities of planetary motion
> as consequences of the chemical constitution of the universe. (Rees
> 1975b, 94) 
> 
> 



Bacon had no explanation for the planetary retrogressions and saw the
universe as a finite and geocentric plenum, in which the earth
consists of the two forms of matter (tangible and pneumatic). The
earth has a tangible inside and is in touch with the surrounding
universe, but through an intermediate zone. This zone exists between
the earth's crust and the pure pneumatic heavens; it reaches some
miles into the crust and some miles into air. In this zone, pneumatic
matter mixes with tangible matter, thus producing 'attached
spirits', which must be distinguished from 'free
spirits' outside tangible bodies. Bacon's four kinds of free
spirits are relevant for his 'quaternion theory':




|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| - air |  | - ether |  |
|  | sublunary |  | celestial |
| - terrestrial fire |  | - sidereal fire |  |



The planets move around the earth in the ether (a tenuous kind of
air), which belongs to the 'mercury quaternion': it
includes watery bodies and mercury. Terrestrial fire is a weakened
form of sidereal fire. It is related to oily substances and sulphur,
and constitutes the 'sulphur quaternion'. The two
quaternions oppose each other: air/ether vs. fire/sidereal fire. Air
and ether loose power when terrestrial and sidereal fires grow more
energetic--Bacon's sulphur and mercury are not principles in the
sense of Paracelsus, but simply natural substances. The Paracelsian
principle of salt is excluded by Bacon and the substance, which plays
a role only in the sublunary realm, is for him a compound of natural
sulphur and mercury (Rees and Upton 1984, 25).




 
Bacon used his quaternion theory for his cosmology, which differs
greatly from other contemporary systems (Rees 2000, 68):


* the diurnal motion turns
the heavens about the earth towards the west;
* under powerful sidereal
fire (i.e., principle of celestial motion) the motion is swift: the
revolution of the stars takes place in twenty-four hours;
* under weaker sidereal
fire--nearer to the earth--planets move more slowly and
more erratic.




Bacon, who tried to conceive of a unified physics, rejected
different modes of motion in the superlunary and in the sublunary world
(Bacon I [1889], 329). He did not believe in the existence of
the (crystalline) spheres nor in the macrocosm-microcosm analogy. He
revised Paracelsian ideas thoroughly. He rejected the grounding of his
theories in Scripture and paid no attention at all to Cabbalistic and
Hermetic tendencies (Rees 1975b, 90-1). But he extended the
explanatory powers of the quaternions to earthly phenomena such as wind
and tides.



Bacon's two systems were closely connected:



System 1: (The Two Quaternions) explained and comprised the
cosmological aspect of his natural philosophy.
System 2: (Theory of Matter) explained terrestrial nature, that is,
it "dealt with the manifold changes in the 
animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms of the frontier zone between
the celestial heavens and the Earth's interior" (Rees
1996, 130; the two tables are taken from Rees). 



System 2 depends on System 1, since explanations for terrestrial
things were subordinated to explanations of the cosmological level. The
table of System 2 shows Bacon's matter theory. His quaternion
theory is relevant for System 1. System 2 is explained in terms of
'intermediates', which combine the qualities of the items
in one quaternion with their opposites in the other.




Bacon's system is built in a clear symmetrical way: each
quaternion has four segments, together eight and there are four types
of intermediates. Thus, the system distinguishes twelve segments in
all. He wanted to explain all natural phenomena by means of this
apparatus:





The Two Quaternions|  |  Sulphur Quaternion  | Mercury Quaternion |
| 
Tangible
Substances 
(With Attached Spirits) 
 | Sulphur (subterranean)  | Mercury (subterranean) |
| Oil and oily
inflammable 
substances
(terrestrial) 
 | Water and 'crude'
non-inflammable
substances (terrestrial)
 |
| 
Pneumatic Substances
  | 
Terrestrial fire
(sublunary)  |  Air
(sublunary) |
| Sidereal fire
(planets)  | Ether (medium of the planets)  |




The Theory of Matter|  | Sulphur Quaternion | Intermediates | Mercury Quaternion |
| Tangible Substances (with attached spirits) | Sulphur (subterranean) |  Salts (subterranean and in organic beings) | Mercury (subterranean) |
| Oil and oily inflammable substances (terrestrial)  | Juices of animals and plants  | Water and 'crude' non-inflammable substances (terrestrial) |
| Pneumatic substances |  Terrestrial fire (sublunary)  |  Attached animate and inanimate spirits (in tangible bodies) |  Air (sublunary) |
| Sidereal fire (planets)  |  Heaven of the fixed stars  | Ether (medium of planets) |




There are two principal intermediates:





|  |
| --- |
|  
The fire-air intermediates |
| | | | |
| 'attached' animate spirits | inanimate spirits |
| | | | |
|  only in living bodies |  in all tangible bodies (including living bodies) |




Bacon's bi-quaternion theory necessarily refers to the
sublunary as well as to the superlunary world. Although the quaternion
theory is first mentioned in *Thema Coeli* (1612; see Bacon V
[1889], 547-59), he provides a summary in his *Novum*
*Organum* (Bacon II [1887], 50):



>  it has not been ill observed by the chemists in their
> triad of first principles, that sulphur and mercury run through the
> whole universe ... in these two one of the most general consents
> in nature does seem to be observable. For there is consent between
> sulphur, oil and greasy exhalation, flame, and perhaps the body of a
> star. So is there between mercury, water and watery vapors, air, and
> perhaps the pure and intersiderial ether. Yet these two quaternions or
> great tribes of things (each within its own limits) differ immensely
> in quantity of matter and density, but agree very well in
> configuration. (Bacon IV [1901], 242-3; see also V [1889],
> 205-6; for tables of the two quaternions and Bacon's theory of
> matter see Rees 1996, 126, 137; Rees 2000, 68-9) 
> 
> 



Bacon regarded his cosmological
worldview as a system of anticipations, which was open to revision in
light of further scientific results based on the inductive method
(Rees 1975b, 171). It was primarily a qualitative system, standing
aside from both mathematical astronomers and Paracelsian chemists. It
thus emphasized the priority which he gave to physics over mathematics
in his general system of the sciences.




Bacon's two quaternions and his matter theory provide a
speculative framework for his thought, which was open to the future
acquisition of knowledge and its technical application. His *Nova
Atlantis* can be understood as a text which occupies an
intermediate position between his theory of induction and his
speculative philosophy (Klein 2003c; Price 2002).




It is important to bear in mind that Bacon's speculative
system was his way out of a dilemma which had made it impossible for
him to finish his *Instauratio Magna*. His turn towards
speculation can only be interpreted as an intellectual anticipation
during an intermediate phase of the history of science, when a gigantic
amount of research work was still to be accomplished, so that empirical
theories could neither be established nor sufficiently guaranteed.
Speculation in Bacon's sense can therefore be seen as a
preliminary means of explaining the secrets of nature until methodical
research has caught up with our speculations. The speculative stance
remains a relative and intermediate procedure for the 'man of
science'.


## 4. Scientific Method: The Project of the *Instauratio Magna*



*The Great Instauration*, Bacon's main work, was
published in 1620 under the title: *Franciscus de Verulamio Summi
Angliae Cancellaris Instauratio magna*. This great work remained a
fragment, since Bacon was only able to finish parts of the planned
outline. The volume was introduced by a *Prooemium*, which gives
a general statement of the purpose, followed by a *Dedication*
to the King (James I) and a *Preface*, which is a summary of all
"directions, motifs, and significance of his life-work"
(Sessions 1996, 71). After that, Bacon printed the plan of the
*Instauratio*, before he turned to the strategy of his research
program, which is known as *Novum Organum Scientiarum*.
Altogether the 1620 book constitutes the second part of Part II of the
*Instauratio*, the first part of which is represented by *De
Augmentis* and Book I of *The Advancement of Learning*. When
Bacon organized his *Instauratio*, he divided it into six parts,
which reminded contemporary readers of God's work of the six days
(the creation), already used by writers like Guillaume Du Bartas
(*La Sepmaine, ou Creation du Monde*, 1579, transl. by
Joshua Sylvester, *Bartas His Devine Weekes &
Workes*, 1605) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola
(*Heptaplus*, 1489).




Bacon sees nature as a labyrinth, whose workings cannot be
exclusively explained by reference to "excellence of wit"
and "repetition of chance experiments": 



> 
> Our steps
> must be guided by a clue, and see what way from the first perception of
> the sense must be laid out upon a sure plan. (Bacon IV [1901],
> 18)
> 
> 




Bacon's *Plan of the Work* runs as follows (Bacon IV
[1901], 22):


1. *The Divisions of the Sciences.*
2. *The New Organon; or Directions concerning the Interpretation of
Nature.*
3. *The Phenomena of the Universe; or a Natural and Experimental
History for the foundation of Philosophy.*
4. *The Ladder of Intellect.*
5. *The Forerunners; or Anticipations of the New
Philosophy.*
6. *The New Philosophy; or Active Science*.




Part 1 contains the general description of the sciences including
their divisions as they presented themselves in Bacon's time.
Here he aimed at a distinction between what was already invented and
known in contrast to "things omitted which ought be there"
(Bacon IV [1901], 23). This part could be taken from *The
Advancement of Learning* (1605) and from the revised and enlarged
version *De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum* (1623).




Part 2 develops Bacon's new method for scientific
investigation, the *Novum Organum*, equipping the intellect to
pass beyond ancient arts and thus producing a radical revision of the
methods of knowledge; but it also introduces a new epistemology and a
new ontology. Bacon calls his new art *Interpretatio Naturae*,
which is a logic of research going beyond ordinary logic, since his
science aims at three inventions: of arts (not arguments), of
principles (not of things in accordance to principles), and of
designations and directions for works (not of probable reasons). The
effect Bacon looks for is to command nature in action, not to overcome
an opponent in argument. The *Novum Organum* is the only part of
the *Instauratio Magna* which was brought near to
completion.




Part 3 was going to contain natural and experimental history or the
record of the phenomena of the universe. According to *De Augmentis
Scientarum* (Bacon IV [1901], 275), natural history is split up
into narrative and inductive, the latter of which is supposed "to
minister and be in order to the *building up of
Philosophy*". These functional histories support human memory
and provide the *material for research*, or the factual
knowledge of nature, which must be certain and reliable. Natural
history starts from and emphasizes the subtlety of nature or her
structural intricacy, but not the complexity of philosophical systems,
since they have been produced by the human mind. Bacon sees this part
of *Instauratio Magna* as a foundation for the reconstruction of
the sciences in order to produce physical and metaphysical knowledge.
Nature in this context is studied under experimental conditions, not
only in the sense of the history of bodies, but also as a history of
virtues or original passions, which refer to the desires of matter
(Rees 1975a). This knowledge was regarded by Bacon as a preparation
for Part 6, the *Second Philosophy* or *Active Science*,
for which he gave only the one example of *Historia Ventorum*
(1622); but--following his plan to compose six prototypical
natural histories--he also wrote *Historia vitae et
mortis*(1623) and the *Historia densi*, which was left in
manuscript. The text, which develops the idea of Part 3, is called
*Parasceve ad Historiam Naturalem et Experimentalem.*




Part 4, which Bacon called *The Ladder of Intellect* or
*Scala Intellectus*, was intended to function as a link between
the method of natural history and that of Second Philosophy/Active
Science. It consists not only of the fragment *Filum labyrinthi*
(Bacon III [1887], 493-504), but also includes the
*Abecedarium nouum naturae* (OFB XIII, xxi), which was
planned as a preface to all of section 4 "[to] demonstrate the
whole process of the mind" (OFB XIII, xxii). *Filum
labyrinthi* is similar to, but not identical with, *Cogitata et
Visa*. Speaking of himself in an authorial voice, Bacon reflects on
the state of science and derives his construction of a research program
from the gaps and deficiencies within the system of disciplines:
sciences of the future should be examined and further ones should be
discovered. Emphasis must be laid on new matter (not on controversies).
It is necessary to repudiate superstition, zealous religion, and false
authorities. Just as the Fall was not caused by knowledge of nature,
but rather by moral knowledge of good and evil, so knowledge of natural
philosophy is for Bacon a contribution to the magnifying of God's
glory, and, in this way, his plea for the growth of scientific
knowledge becomes evident.




Part 5 deals with the forerunners or anticipations of the new
philosophy, and Bacon emphasizes that the 'big machinery'
of the *Instauratio Magna* needs a good deal of time to be
completed. Anticipations are ways to come to scientific inferences
without recourse to the method presented in the *Novum Organum*.
Meanwhile, he has worked on his speculative system, so that portions of
his Second Philosophy are treated and finished: *De Fluxu et Refluxu
Maris* and *Thema Coeli*. For this part of the *Great
Instauration*, texts are planned that draw philosophical
conclusions from collections of facts which are not yet sufficient for
the use or application of Bacon's inductive method.




Part 6 was scheduled to contain Bacon's description of the new
philosophy, as the last part of his *Great Instauration*; but
nothing came of this plan, so that there is no extant text at all from
this part of the project.


## 5. Scientific Method: Novum Organum and the Theory of Induction




Already in his early text *Cogitata et Visa* (1607) Bacon
dealt with his scientific method, which became famous under the name of
*induction*. He repudiates the syllogistic method and defines
his alternative procedure as one "which by slow and faithful toil
gathers information from things and brings it into understanding"
(Farrington 1964, 89). When later on he developed his method in
detail, namely in his *Novum Organum* (1620), he still noted
that 



> 
> [of] induction the logicians seem hardly to have taken any
> serious thought, but they pass it by with a slight notice, and hasten
> to the formulae of disputation. I on the contrary reject demonstration
> by syllogism .... (Bacon IV [1901], 24)
> 
> 




Bacon's method appears as his conceptual plot, 



>  applied to all stages of knowledge, and at every phase
> the whole process has to be kept in mind. (Malherbe 1996, 76)
> 
> 



Induction implies ascending to axioms, as well as a descending to
works, so that from axioms new particulars are gained and from these
new axioms. The inductive method starts from sensible experience and
moves via natural history (providing sense-data as guarantees) to
lower axioms or propositions, which are derived from the tables of
presentation or from the abstraction of notions. Bacon does not
identify experience with everyday experience, but presupposes that
method corrects and extends sense-data into facts, which go together
with his setting up of tables (tables of presence and of absence and
tables of comparison or of degrees, i.e., degrees of absence or
presence). "Bacon's antipathy to simple enumeration as the
universal method of science derived, first of all, from his preference
for theories that deal with interior physical causes, which are not
immediately observable" (Urbach 1987, 30; see: sect. 2). The
last type can be supplemented by tables of counter-instances, which
may suggest experiments: 



>  To move from the sensible to the real requires the
> correction of the senses, the tables of natural history, the
> abstraction of propositions and the induction of notions. In other
> words, the full carrying out of the inductive method is
> needed. (Malherbe 1996, 85)
> 
> 




The sequence of methodical steps does not, however, end here,
because Bacon assumes that from lower axioms more general ones can be
derived (by induction). The complete process must be understood as the
joining of the parts into a systematic chain. From the more general
axioms Bacon strives to reach more fundamental laws of nature
(knowledge of forms), which lead to practical deductions as new
experiments or works (IV, 24-5). The decisive instruments in this
process are the middle or 'living axioms,' which mediate
between particulars and general axioms. For Bacon, induction can only
be efficient if it is eliminative by exclusion, which goes beyond the
remit of induction by simple enumeration. The inductive method helps
the human mind to find a way to ascertain truthful knowledge.



*Novum Organum*, I, Aphorism CXV (Bacon IV [1901], 103) ends
the "pulling down" of "the signs and causes of the
errors" within the sciences, achieved by means of three
refutations, which constituted the condition for a rational
introduction of method: refutation of 'natural human
reason' (idols); refutation of 'demonstrations'
(syllogisms) and refutation of 'theories' (traditional
philosophical systems).




The Second Part of the *Novum Organum* deals with
Bacon's rule for interpreting nature, even if he provides no
complete or universal theory. He contributes to the new philosophy by
introducing his *tables of discovery* (*Inst.
Magna*, IV), by presenting an example of particulars
(*Inst. Magna*, II), and by observations on history
(*Inst. Magna*, III). It is well known that he worked
hard in the last five years of his life to make progress on his natural
history, knowing that he could not always come up to the standards of
legitimate interpretation.




Bacon's method presupposes a double starting-point: empirical
and rational. True knowledge is acquired if we want to proceed from a
lower certainty to a higher liberty and from a lower liberty to a
higher certainty. The rule of certainty and liberty in Bacon converges
with his repudiation of the old logic of Aristotle, which determined
true propositions by the criteria of generality, essentiality, and
universality. Bacon rejects *anticipatio naturae*
("anticipation of nature") in favor of *interpretatio
naturae* ("interpretation of nature"), which starts
with the collecting of facts and their methodical (inductive)
investigation, shunning entanglement in pure taxonomy (as in Ramism),
which establishes the order of things (Urbach 1987, 26; see also 
Foucault 1966 [1970]), but does not produce knowledge. For
Bacon, making is knowing and knowing is making (Bacon IV [1901],
109-10). In accordance with the maxim "command nature
... by obeying her" (Sessions 1996, 136; Gaukroger 2001,
139ff.), the exclusion of superstition, imposture, error, and
confusion are obligatory. Bacon introduces variations into "the
maker's knowledge tradition" as the discovery of the forms
of a given nature lead him to develop his method for acquiring factual
and proven knowledge.




Bacon argues against "anticipation of nature", which he
regards as a conservative method, leading to theories that recapitulate
the data without producing new ones conducive to the growth of
knowledge. Moreover, such theories are considered to be final, so that
they are never replaced.




"Anticipation of nature" resembles
"conventionalism" (Urbach 1987, 30-41), according to
which theories refer to unobservable entities (e.g., atoms, epicycles).
The theories are "computation rules" or "inference
licences" within this given framework, which give explanations
and predictions of particular kinds of *observable* events. The
conventionalist acceptance of making predictions concerning future
events cannot be separated from the question of probability.
Bacon's procedure of knowledge acquisition goes against
"conventionalism", because "anticipation of
nature" does not reject authoritative and final speculations
concerning "unobservables" and because it permits "ad
hoc adjustments". Nowadays, however,



>  philosophers would not accept the idea that just
> because we can't observe something directly ... it follows that
> there is no such thing. (Huggett 2010, 82. See also Von
> Weizsacker and Juilfs 1958, pp.67-70; Rae 1986 [2000], 1-27
> and passim)
> 
> 




Conventionalist deep-level theories of the world are chosen from among
alternative ways of observing phenomena. Although theories revealing
the world structure are not directly provable or disprovable by means
of observation or experiment, conventionalists might maintain their
chosen theory even in the face of counter-evidence. They therefore
avoid changes of theory. Any move to a new theory is not taken on the
basis of new evidence, but because a new theory seems to be simpler,
more applicable or more beautiful. Laws of nature are generally
understood as being unrevisable (O'Hear 1995, 165). The famous
debate, sparked by Thomas Kuhn, on paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic
science and theory is relevant here. Bacon's position--open to
scientific progress--is nearer to Kuhn than to Duhem or
Poincare. For Bacon, "anticipation of nature" (as
a mode of "conventionalism") produces obstacles to the
progress of knowledge. Traditional methods shun speculation concerning
things which are not immediately visible; Bacon's speculation,
however, is an element of "interpretation of nature". He
presupposes hypothetical theories, but these do not go beyond the
collected data. His acceptance of hypotheses is connected with his
rejection of
*"*anticipation of nature". Thus, hypotheses are
related to the axioms of "interpretation of nature", which
go beyond the original data. The amount of established facts is not
identical with that of possible data (Gillies 1998, 307).
Anticipation is rejected, only if it "flies from the senses and
particulars to the most general axioms" (OFB XI, xxv). 
Because of the dangers of premature generalization, Bacon is careful
about speculations and rigorously rejects any dogmatic defense of them
and the tendency to declare them infallible.



> 
> 
> ...the philosophy that we now possess clutches to its breast
> certain tenets with which (if we look into it carefully) they want
> wholly to conceive men that nothing difficult, nothing with real power
> and influence over nature, should be expected from art or human
> effort; [...] These things, if we examine them minutely, tend
> wholly towards a wicked circumscription of human power and an
> intentional and unnatural despair which not only confounds the
> presages of hope but breaks every nerve and spur of industry, and
> throws away the chances afforded by experience itself--while all
> they care about is that their art be considered perfect, expending
> their effort to achieve the most foolish and bankrupt glory of having
> it believed that whatever has not been found out or understood so far
> cannot be found out or understood in the future. (OFB XI,
> 141) 
> 
> 



Bacon sees nature as an extremely subtle complexity, which affords all
the energy of the natural philosopher to disclose her secrets.




For him, *new* axioms must be larger and wider than the
material from which they are taken. At the same time,
"interpretation of nature" must not leap to remote axioms.
In terms of his method, he rejects general ideas as simple
abstractions from very few sense perceptions. Such abstract words may
function as conventions for organizing "new observations",
but only in the sense of means for taxonomical order. Such a sterile
procedure is irrelevant for "interpretation of nature",
which is not final or infallible and is based on the insight that
confirming hypotheses do not provide strict proofs. Bacon's method is
therefore characterized by openness: 



> 
> Nevertheless, I do not
> affirm that nothing can be added to what I prescribe; on the contrary,
> as one who observes the mind not only in its innate capacity but also
> insofar as it gets to grips with things, it is my conviction that the
> art of discovering will grow as the number of things discovered will
> grow. (OFB, XI, 197)
> 
> 



Peter Urbach's commentary exactly underlines Bacon's openness:



> 
>  He believed that theories
> should be advanced to explain whatever data were available in a
> particular domain. These theories should preferably concern the
> underlying physical, causal mechanisms and ought, in any case, to go
> beyond the data which generated them. They are then tested by drawing
> out new predictions, which, if verified in experience, may confirm the
> theory and may eventually render it certain, at least in the sense that
> it becomes very difficult to deny. (Urbach 1987, 49) 
> 
> 



Bacon was no seventeenth-century Popperian. Rather, on account of his
theory of induction, he was:



> 
> the first great theorist of experimentalism": "the
> function of experiment was both to test theories and to establish
> facts" (Rees, in OFB XI, xli). 
> 
> 
> 
> Encyclopaedic repetition with an Aristotelian slant is being displaced
> by original compilation in which deference to authority plays no part
> whatever. Individual erudition is being dumped in favour of collective
> research. Conservation of traditional knowledge is being discarded in
> the interest of a new, *functional* realization of natural
> history, which demands that
> *legenda*--things worth reading--be supplanted by
> materials which will form the basis of a thoroughgoing attempt to
> improve the material conditions of the human race. (Rees, in OFB
> XI, xlii)
> 
> 
> 




Form is for Bacon a structural constituent of a natural entity or a
key to its truth and operation, so that it comes near to natural law,
without being reducible to causality. This appears all the more
important, since Bacon--who seeks out exclusively causes which
are necessary and sufficient for their effects--rejects
Aristotle's four causes (his four types of explanation for a complete
understanding of a phenomenon) on the grounds that the distribution
into material, formal, efficient, and final causes does not work well
and that they fail to advance the sciences (especially the final,
efficient, and material causes). Consider again the passage
quoted in Section 3.3: 



>  There are and can be only two ways of searching into
> and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars
> to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of
> which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to
> the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The
> other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a
> gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general
> axioms at last. This is the true way, but as yet untried. (Bacon IV
> [1901], 50: *Novum Organum*, I, Aphorism XIX).
> 
> 




Since for Bacon the formal necessity of the syllogism does not
suffice to set up first principles, his method comprises two basic
tasks: (1) the discovery of forms, and (2) the transformation of
concrete bodies. The discovery from every case of generation and motion
refers to a latent process according to which efficient and material
causes lead to forms; but there is also the discovery of latent
configurations of bodies at rest and not in motion (Bacon IV [1901],
119-20).




Bacon's new mode of using human understanding implies a
parallelism between striving towards human power and constituting human
knowledge. Technical know-how leads to successful operations, which
converge with the discovery of forms (Perez-Ramos 1988, 108;
Bacon IV [1901], 121). To understand the workings of nature
presupposes an arrangement of facts which makes the investigative
analysis of cause and effect possible, especially by means of new
experiments. At this point the idea of *scientia*
*operativa* comes in again, since the direction for a true and
perfect rule of operation is parallel to the discovery of a true form.
Bacon's specific non-Aristotelian Aristotelianism
(Perez-Ramos 1988, 113, 115) is one of the main features of his
theory. Other indispensable influences on Bacon, apart from a modified
version of Aristotle, are critically assessed Hermeticism, rhetoric
(Vickers) and alchemy (Rees).




Two kinds of axioms correspond to the following division of
philosophy and the sciences: the investigation of forms or
*metaphysics*; and the investigation of efficient cause and
matter, which leads to the latent process and configuration in
*physics*. Physics itself is split up by Bacon into
*Mechanics*, i.e., the practical, and *Magic*, i.e., the
metaphysical.




Nowadays the view that Bacon "made little first-hand
contribution to science" (Hesse 1964, 152) no longer coincides
with the opinion that we have to assume an underestimation of the
"place of hypothesis and mathematics" in his work (Urban
1987; Sessions 1999, 139; Rees 1986). But there were few doubts in
the past that Bacon "encouraged detailed and methodical
experimentation" (Hesse 1964, 152); and he did this on account
of his new inductive method, which implied the need for negative
instances and refuting experiments. Bacon saw that confirming instances
could not suffice to analyze the structure of scientific laws, since
this task presupposed a hypothetical-deductive system, which, according
to Lisa Jardine, is closely connected to "the logical and
linguistic backgrounds from which Bacon's New Logic proceeds
..." (Sessions 1999, 140; Jardine 1974, 69ff.).




Bacon's *interpretation of nature* uses "Tables
and Arrangements of Instances" concerning the natural phenomena
under investigation, which function as a necessary condition for
cracking the code of efficient causation. His *prerogative
instances* are not examples or phenomena simply taken from nature
but rather imply information with inductive potential which show
priority conducive to knowledge or to methodological relevance when
inserted into tables. The instances do not represent the order of
sensible things, but instead express the order of qualities (natures).
These qualities provide the working basis for the order of abstract
natures. Bacon's tables have a double function: they are
important for *natural history*, collecting the data on bodies
and virtues in nature; and they are also indispensable for
*induction*, which makes use of these data.




Already in *Temporis Partus Masculus* (1603) Bacon had
displayed a "facility of shrewd observation" (Sessions
1999, 60) concerning his ideas on induction. In his *Novum
Organum* the nature of all human science and knowledge was seen by
him as proceeding most safely by negation and exclusion, as opposed to
affirmation and inclusion. Even in his early tracts it was clear to
Bacon that he had to seek a method of discovering the right forms, the
most well known of which was *heat* (*Novum Organum* II,
Aph. XI-XII) or "the famous trial investigation of the form
of heat" (Rees 2000, 66; see Bacon IV [1901], 154-5).




In his "[m]ethod of analysis by exclusion" (Sessions
1999, 141), negation proved to be "one of Bacon's strongest
contributions to modern scientific method" (Wright 1951, 152).
Most important were his tables of degrees and of exclusion. They were
needed for the discovery of causes, especially for supreme causes,
which were called forms. The method of induction works in two
stages:


1. Learned experience from the known to the unknown has to be
acquired, and the tables (of presence, absence, degrees) have to be set
up before their interpretation can take place according to the
principle of exclusion. After the three tables of the first
presentation have been judged and analyzed, Bacon declares the
*First Vintage* or the first version of the interpretation of
nature to be concluded.
2. The second phase of the method concentrates on the process of
exclusion. The aim of this procedure is the reduction of the empirical
character of experience, so that the analysis converges with an anatomy
of things. Here, too, tables of presence and of absence are set up. The
research work proper consists of finding the relationship of the two
natures of qualities. Here exclusion functions as the process of
determination. Bacon's method starts from material determination
in order to establish the formal determination of real causes, but does
not stop there, because it aims at the progressive generalization of
causes. Here, again, the central element of the inductive method is the
procedure of exclusion.




Forms, as the final result of the methodical procedure, are:



> 
> nothing more than those laws and determinations of absolute
> actuality which govern and constitute any simple nature, as heat,
> light, weight, in every kind of matter and subject that is susceptible
> of them (Bacon IV [1901], 145-6);
> 
> 


They are not identical with natural law, but with definitions of
simple natures (elements) or ultimate ingredients of things from which
the basic material structure has been built (Gaukroger 2001,
140). Forms are the structures constituted by the elements in nature
(microphysics). This evokes a cross-reference to Bacon's atomism,
which has been called the "constructivist component"
(Perez-Ramos 1988, 116) of his system, including an alchemical
theory about basic kinds of matter. He aims at "understanding
the basic structures of things ... as a means to transforming
nature for human purposes" (Gaukroger 2001, 140; Clericuzio
2000, 78ff.); and thus he "ends" the unfinished *Novum
Organum* with a list of things which still have to be achieved or
with a catalogue of phenomena which are important and indispensable
for a future natural history.




Historians of science, with their predilection for mathematical
physics, used to criticize Bacon's approach, stating that
"the Baconian concept of science, as an inductive science, has
nothing to do with and even contradicts today's form of
science" (Malherbe 1996, 75). In reaching this verdict, however,
they overlooked the fact that a natural philosophy based on a theory of
matter cannot be assessed on the grounds of a natural philosophy or
science based on mechanics as the fundamental discipline. One can
account for this chronic mode of misunderstanding as a specimen of the
paradigmatic fallacy (Gaukroger 2001, 134ff.; see Rees 1986).




Bacon came to the fundamental insight that *facts* cannot be
collected from nature, but must be constituted by methodical
procedures, which have to be put into practice by scientists in order
to ascertain the empirical basis for inductive generalizations. His
induction, founded on collection, comparison, and exclusion of factual
qualities in things and their interior structure, proved to be a
revolutionary achievement within natural philosophy, for which no
example in classical antiquity existed. His *scala intellectus*
has two contrary movements "upwards and downwards: from
*axiomata* to *experimenta* and *opera* and back
again" (Perez-Ramos 1988, 236). Bacon's induction
was construed and conceived as an instrument or method of discovery.
Above all, his emphasis on negative instances for the procedure of
induction itself can claim a high importance with regard to knowledge
acquisition and has been acclaimed as an innovation by scholars of our
time. Some have detected in Bacon a forerunner of Karl Popper in
respect of the method of falsification. Finally, it cannot be denied
that Bacon's methodological program of induction includes aspects
of deduction and abstraction on the basis of negation and exclusion.
Contemporary scholars have praised his inauguration of the theory of
induction. This theory has been held in higher esteem since the 1970s
than it was for a long period before (see the work of Rees, Gaukroger
and Perez-Ramos 1988, 201-85). Nevertheless, it is
doubtful that Bacon's critics, who were associated with the
traditions of positivism and analytical philosophy, acquired sufficient
knowledge of his writings to produce solid warrants for their
criticisms (Cohen 1970, 124-34; Cohen 1985, 58ff.; on the
general problem of induction see, e.g., Hempel 1966; Swinburne
(ed.) 1974; Lambert and Brittan 1979 [1987]). In comparison to the
neglect of Bacon in the twentieth century, a more recent and deeper
assessment of his work has arisen in connection with the "Oxford
Francis Bacon" project, which was launched in the late 1990s by
Graham Rees, who directed it until his death in 2009; it is now under
the general editorship of Brian Vickers.


## 6. Science and Social Philosophy




In Bacon's thought we encounter a relation between science and
social philosophy, since his ideas concerning a utopian transformation
of society presuppose an integration into the social framework of his
program concerning natural philosophy and technology as the two forms
of the maker's knowledge. From his point of view, which was
influenced by Puritan conceptions, early modern society has to make
sure that losses caused by the Fall are compensated for, primarily by
man's enlargement of knowledge, providing the preconditions for a
new form of society which combines *scientia nova* and
the millennium, according to the prophecy of Daniel 12:4 (Hill 1971,
85-130). Science as a social endeavor is seen as a collective
project for the improvement of social structures. On the other hand, a
strong collective spirit in society may function as a *conditio sine
qua non* for reforming natural philosophy. Bacon's famous
argument that it is wise not to confound the Book of Nature with the
Book of God comes into focus, since the latter deals with God's
will (inscrutable for man) and the former with God's work, the
scientific explanation or appreciation of which is a form of Christian
divine service. Successful operations in natural philosophy and
technology help to improve the human lot in a way which makes the
hardships of life after the Fall obsolete. It is important to note that
Bacon's idea of a--to a certain extent--Christian
society by no means conveys Christian pessimism in the vein of
patristic thinkers but rather displays a clear optimism as the result
of compounding the problem of truth with the scope of human freedom and
sovereignty (Brandt 1979, 21).




With regard to Bacon's Two Books--the Book of God and
the Book of Nature--one has to keep in mind that man, when given
free access to the Book of Nature, should not content himself with
merely reading it. He also has to find out the names by which things
are called. If man does so, not only will he be restored to his status
a noble and powerful being, but the Book of God will also lose
importance, from a traditional point of view, in comparison to the Book
of Nature. This is what Blumenberg referred to as the "asymmetry
of readability" (Blumenberg 1981, 86-107). But the process
of reading is an open-ended activity, so that new knowledge and the
expansion of the system of disciplines can no longer be restricted by
concepts such as the completeness and eternity of knowledge (Klein
2004a, 73).




According to Bacon, the Book of God refers to his will, the Book of
Nature to his works. He never gives a hint in his works that he has
concealed any message of unbelief for the sophisticated reader; but he
emphasized: (1) that religion and science should be kept separate
and, (2) that they were nevertheless complementary to each other.
For Bacon, the attack of theologians on human curiosity cannot be
founded on a rational basis. His statement that "all knowledge is
to be limited by religion, and to be referred to use and action"
(Bacon III [1887], 218) does not express a general verdict on
theoretical curiosity, but instead provides a normative framework for
the tasks of science in a universal sense. Already in the dedicatory
letter to James I in his *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon
attacks "the zeal and jealousy of divines" (Bacon III, 
264) and in his manuscript *Filum Labyrinthi* of 1607, he
"thought ... how great opposition and prejudice
natural philosophy had received by superstition, and the immoderate and
blind zeal of religion" (Bacon VI [1863], 421). As Calvin
had done long before him in the *Institutes*, Bacon stated that
since God created the physical world, it was a legitimate object of
man's knowledge, a conviction which he illustrated with the
famous example of King Solomon in *The Advancement of Learning*
(Zagorin 1999, 49-50; see also Kocher 1953,
27-8). Bacon praises Solomon's wisdom, which seems to
be more like a game than an example of man's God-given thirst for
knowledge: 



> 
> The glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the
> glory of the king is to find it out; as if, according to the innocent
> play of children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide his works, to
> the end to have them found out; and as if kings could not obtain a
> greater honour than to be God's playfellows in that game,
> considering the great commandment of wits and means, whereby nothing
> needeth to be hidden from them. (Bacon III [1887], 299;
> Blumenberg, 1973, 196-200)
> 
> 



From this perspective, the punishment of mankind on account of the
very first disobedience by Adam and Eve can be seen in a different
light from that of theological interpretations. In Bacon's view, this
disobedience and its consequences can be remedied in two ways: (1) by
religion and moral imperatives, and (2) by advancement in the arts and
sciences: "the purpose in advancing arts and sciences is the
glory of God and the relief of man's estate" (Wormald 1993,
82).




The two remedies, which are interconnected with the moral dimension,
refer to the advancement of learning and religion. All three together
(the advancement of learning, religion, and morality) are combined in
such a way that they promote each other mutually; consequently, limited
outlooks on coping with life and knowledge are ruled out completely in
these three fields.


## 7. The Ethical Dimension in Bacon's Thought




The ethical dimension of Bacon's thought has been underrated
by generations of scholars. Time and again a crude utilitarianism has
been derived from Book I, Aphorism 1 of the *Novum Organum*;
this cannot, however, withstand a closer analysis of his thought. Since
Bacon's philosophy of science tries to answer the question of how
man can overcome the deficiencies of earthly life resulting from the
Fall, he enters the realm of ethical reflection. The improvement of
mankind's lot by means of philosophy and science does not start
from a narrow utilitarian point of view, involving sheer striving for
profit and supporting the power or influence of select groups of men,
but instead emphasizes the construction of a better world for mankind,
which might come into existence through the ascertaining of truths
about nature's workings (Bacon III [1887], 242). Thus, the
perspective of the universal in Bacon's ethical thought is given
predominance. The range of science and technology in their ethical
meaning transcends the realm of the application of tools and/or
instruments, in so far as the aim is the transformation of whole
systems. Since causality and finality can interact on the basis of
human will and knowledge, a plurality of worlds becomes feasible
(Bacon V [1889], 506-7). Moral philosophy is closely connected
to ethical reflections on the relationship between the nature of
virtues--habitual or innate?--and their use in life,
privately and collectively. Any application of the principles of virtue
presupposes for Bacon the education of the mind, so that we learn what
is good and what should be attained (Gaukroger 2006, 204-5 and
passim):



> 
> 
> The main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to
> be into the Exemplar or Platform of Good, and the Regimen of Culture of
> the Mind; the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing
> rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man
> thereunto (Bacon III [1887], 419).
> 
> 
> 




So, already in his *Advancement of Learning* Bacon
studied the nature of good and distinguished various kinds of good. He
insisted on the individual's duty to the public. Private moral
self-control and the concomitant obligations are relevant for behavior
and action in society. One's ethical *persona* is
connected to morality by reference to acceptable behaviour. Though what
we can do may be limited, we have to muster our psychological powers
and control our passions when dealing with ourselves and with
others. We need to apply self-discipline and rational assessment, as
well as restraining our passions, in order to lead an active moral life
in society.




Thus, for Bacon, the acquisition of knowledge does not simply
coincide with the possibility of exerting power. Scientific knowledge
is a condition for the expansion and development of civilization.
Therefore, knowledge and charity cannot be kept separate:



> 
> 
> I humbly pray ... that knowledge being now discharged of
> that venom which the serpent infused into it, and which makes the mind
> of man to swell, we may not be wise above measure and sobriety, but
> cultivate truth in charity.... Lastly, I would address one general
> admonition to all; that they consider what are the true ends of
> knowledge, and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind,
> or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or
> fame, or power, or any of these inferior things; but for the benefit
> and use of life; and that they perfect and govern it in charity. For it
> was from the lust of power that the angels fell, from lust of knowledge
> that man fell; but of charity there can be no excess, neither did angel
> or man ever come in danger by it (Bacon IV [1901], 20f.:
> *Instauratio Magna*, Preface).
> 
> 
> 




Finally, the view that Bacon's *Nova Atlantis*
"concerns a utopian society that is carefully organized for the
purposes of scientific research and virtuous living" (Urbach
1988, 10) holds true for his entire life's work. In Nova
Atlantis, social, political, and scholarly life are all organized
according to the maxim of efficiency; but the House of Solomon is a
separate and highly esteemed institution for research, which
nevertheless is closely connected to the overall system of Bensalem. In
his utopian state, Bacon presents a thoroughgoing collective life in
society and science, both of which are based on revealed religion.
Religion--Christian in essence--is not dogmatic, but it
instills into the people of Bensalem veneration for the wise and
morally exemplary members of society, and--which is of the utmost
importance--the strictest sense of discipline (Gaukroger 2001,
128-30). Discipline is indispensable for those involved in the
religious life as well as for the researchers, since both must proceed
methodically. The isomorphic structures of nature and science, on the
one hand, society and religion, on the other, prescribe patterns of
political procedure, social processes, and religious attitudes, which
overcome any craving for individuality. If religion and scientific
research are both shown as truthful in Bensalem, then, according to
Bacon, the imagination functions as a means of illustrating scientific
revelation: "Bacon's purpose is ... to show that
scientific research properly pursued is not inconsonant with religious
propriety and social stability..." (Bierman 1963, 497). The
scientists in Bensalem are sacred searchers for truth: ethics,
religion, and science merge. Bacon's parabolic strategy, which we
should not separate from the power of the idols, enables him to make
much of his trick of introducing new ideas like a smuggler: his colored
wares are smuggled into the minds of his readers by being visualized in
terms of sacred and highly symbolic rituals (Peltonen 1996, 175).
Science and religion are separated in Nova Atlantis, but they are also
interrelated through the offices of the society of Bensalem. What Bacon
obviously wants to make clear to his readers is that the example of
Bensalem should free them from any fear that scientific progress will
lead to chaos and upheaval. This crucial point has made by Jurgen
Mittelstrass, who understands Bacon's *Nova Atlantis* as a
utopia and regards utopias as 



> 
> blueprints of practical reason,
> not of theoretical, that is: they set in exactly there, where the early
> modern idea of progress appears meagre with regards to the
> contents: within ethics and political theory. (Mittelstrass
> 1960, 369)
> 
>