## 1. Life and Works



Isaac
 Polqar[1]
 was a Jewish philosopher who was a member of the Jewish Averroist
School. He lived from the second half of the thirteenth century to the
first half of the fourteenth century in northern
 Spain.[2]
 Little is known about Polqar's life and family. A short poem,
written in his honor by a contemporary poet, Samuel Ibn Sasson,
reveals that Polqar was known for his philosophical knowledge as well
as for his expertise in the study of the Bible and the Mishnah. In
addition, Sasson indicates that Polqar was also a poet, a physician,
and a respected figure in his community (Baer 1938: 200).



Polqar wrote several books, most of which are lost. He mentions some
of these books in his main work *'Ezer ha-Dat* (*In
Support of the Law*): *Peirush le-Sefer Bereshit*
(*Commentary on Genesis*) [*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 39];
*Peirush le-Sefer Kohelet* (*Commentary on
Ecclesiastes*) [*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 121, 123]; *Sefer
Peirush le-Tehillot* (*Commentary on the Book of Psalms*)
[*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 131]; and *Musar ha-Banim*
(*Instruction of the Sons*) [*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 158].
Two of Polqar's works--*Iggeret ha-Tiqvah*
(*Epistle on Hope*) and *Sefer be-Hakhashat
ha-'iztagninot* (*Refutation of
Astrology*)--are mentioned by Abner of Burgos, the famous
convert to Christianity and polemicist against Judaism, in his
*Teshuvot la-Meharef* (*Response to the
 Blasphemer*)[3]
 and *Minhat Qenaot* (*A
 Jealousy-Offering*).[4]
 Two of Polqar's works are extant: *Teshuvat Apikoros*
(*A Response to the
 Heretic*),[5]
 a letter he addressed to
 Abner,[6]
 and his major corpus, *'Ezer ha-Dat* (*In Support of
the Law*). In addition, Polqar completed Isaac Albalag's
work *Tiqqun De'ot ha-Philosophim* (*Rectifying the
Opinions of the Philosophers*), a free paraphrase of
al-Ghazali's *Maqasid al-Falasifa*
(*The Opinions of the Philosophers*), most of which consists of
Albalag's own ideas and of a critique of
al-Ghazali's presentation of philosophical ideas (see
Vajda 1960: 268).



Polqar's main work *'Ezer ha-Dat* is comprised of
five treatises. In the opening treatise, Polqar argues for the primacy
of Jewish Law over other existing religious laws. For him, the Torah
is the best law, and Moses, the lawgiver, is the paramount leader.
Together, they provide Jewish believers with the necessary groundwork
for attaining their ultimate purpose: the world to come. In this
treatise Polqar highlights particular themes, such as the exile and
its meaning, faith in the messiah's ultimate arrival, Talmudic
methodology and its authority, and how to interpret the words of the
Sages. The choice of these themes seems to have been motivated by the
Christians having made use of them in order to argue for the
superiority of Christianity over Judaism.



The second treatise is composed of several different dialogues. The
main dialogue depicts a lively debate between two men with disparate
worldviews: one is an old man who represents a traditional and
anti-philosophical approach, while the other is a young man who is
strongly drawn to philosophy. The debate between these two figures
reflects a well-known controversy between traditionalist Jews who were
suspicious of philosophy and Jewish philosophers who aimed to
reconcile the study of philosophy with revelation. In this dialogue,
the traditionalist, as we shall see below, accuses the philosophers of
holding heretical views such as denying God's unity, His
omnipotence, His omniscience, and so forth, as a result of following
Greek philosophy. The young philosopher, on the other hand, claims
that there is no contradiction between the Jewish faith and
Aristotelian philosophy.



The third treatise of the book is most likely based on the
correspondence between Polqar and his former teacher Abner regarding
astrology. The dialogue in this treatise is between a
 philosopher[7]
 (*haver*) and an astrologer (*hover*). Whereas
the latter holds an extreme view of determinism, the former believes
in man's free will.



The fourth treatise of the book presents a typology of four different
groups of people, who, according to Polqar, constitute the greatest
enemies of Judaism and, as a consequence, of philosophy. The first
group consists of those who reject science while claiming to be true
believers. The second includes the Kabbalists, who claim to have
access to esoteric knowledge reaching back to the prophets, and who
reject the philosopher's methods (such as syllogism) as
legitimate tools for evaluating knowledge claims. The third group
comprises those who accuse philosophers of holding radical
naturalistic views. According to this group, philosophers assert that
everything is governed by nature and that even God cannot change its
course. For these traditionalists, then, philosophers have turned
nature into God's rival, not His intermediary. The fourth group
includes people who believe in magic, witchcraft, and the like.



The fifth treatise ends the book and describes a conversation between
a spirit and a man who lives in the material world. These two figures
debate the question of which is preferable: to be alive, when one can
fully enjoy bodily and intellectual pleasures, or to be dead, when
one's soul is free from bodily desire. Polqar concludes this
section with a revelation: the two interlocutors hear the voice of the
angel Gabriel, who supports the spirit's position according to
which the soul's detachment from the body is preferable.


## 2. Polqar and Abner of Burgos: Judaism vs. Christianity



Polqar's objection to Abner's decision to abandon the
faith of his birth and to accept Christianity stems from his view that
a true religion cannot, under any circumstances, contradict basic
philosophical principles. Christianity, for Polqar, does contradict
those principles, and so it follows that Christianity is not a true
 religion:[8]



> 
> 
> The essential principle and purpose of all knowledge in the view of
> all nations is the knowledge of the existence of God, may He be
> blessed, through whose power the encompassing sphere is moved. This
> was first explained by our religion in the verse "I am the
> Lord" [Exod. 20:2]. The second principle is His unity. This is
> explained in the verse "you shall have no other gods before
> me" [Exod. 20:3] and in the verse "Hear O Israel! The Lord
> is our God, the Lord is One" [Deut. 6:4]. The third principle is
> that He has no body, which is also known and revealed in the verse
> "Take therefore good heed to yourself: for you saw no manner of
> form" [Deut. 4:15], and also that He is not a force within a
> body, in the sense that nothing that happens to dark bodies can be
> verified of Him, which is known and evident from the verse "I
> the Lord have not changed" [Mal. 3:6]. It is known by every
> intelligent person that these beliefs are explained with firm proofs
> and full demonstration in the books about physics and metaphysics
> written by Aristotle, as is obvious to those who make the effort to
> study them, so that no one will reject them and deny them unless he is
> a denier of the first principle, which the ancient sages considered to
> be punishable by stoning. (*Teshuvat Apikoros*: 2b; cf.
> *'Ezer ha-Dat*: 35-36)
> 
> 
> 



The philosophers, Polqar claims, have already demonstrated
"these beliefs", that is, the three philosophical
principles: the existence of God, His Unity, and His being neither a
body nor a force in a body, principles that were fully maintained by
Jews. While Christians sought to reconcile these principles with their
theological doctrines, their attempts to do so were unsuccessful in
Polqar's view.



Polqar's fundamental objection to Christianity as contradicting
philosophical principles is reflected in his disputes with Abner
regarding (1) monotheism vs. the Trinity, and (2) God's
incorporeality vs. the Incarnation.



While Christianity, as perceived by Polqar, accepts the existence of
God, it rejects the other two principles--God's unity and
incorporeality--because of its acceptance of the doctrines of the
Trinity and the Incarnation. Hence, Christianity cannot be a true
religion. Polqar presents his critique chiefly in the second chapter
of *Teshuvat Apikoros* and in the second section of treatise
one of *'Ezer ha-Dat*, where he enumerates the three
principles that should form the foundation of any true religion.
Although he does not explicitly mention Christianity, we can
confidently assume, based on Abner's reference to this chapter
in his *Teshuvot la-Meharef*, that the object of this
critique is the Christian believer.


### 2.1 Monotheism vs. the Trinity and God's Incorporeality vs. the Incarnation


#### 2.1.1 Monotheism vs. the Trinity



For Polqar, since the philosophers have already demonstrated that God
exists and that He is neither a body nor a force in a body, there is
no need to repeat these arguments. For Abner, on the other hand,
justifying the Trinity and the Incarnation and showing that these two
doctrines are in agreement with philosophical interpretations is the
basis upon which he wished to show the validity of Christianity and to
convince as many Jews as possible to convert. To achieve this purpose,
he quotes biblical verses and midrashim. One particularly interesting
text he uses is the midrash on Psalms 50:1, and he writes:



> 
> 
> This is what is written in the midrash on the verse which says:
> "God (*El*), the Lord [*YHVH*] God
> (*Elohim*) spoke and summoned the world" [Psalms 50:1].
> Why did it mention the Name three times? To teach you that the Holy
> One, blessed be He, created the world with these three names which
> stand for the three attributes with which He created the world. And
> these are they: Wisdom [*Hokhma*], Understanding
> [*Tevunah*], and Knowledge (*Da'at*). Wisdom from
> whence? Because it is said
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> > 
> > the Lord founded the earth by wisdom, etc.... Understanding?
> > Because it is said "He established the heavens by
> > understanding". Knowledge? Because it is said "by His
> > knowledge the depths burst
> >  apart..."[9]
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 
> 
> One must conclude from this passage that the world could not have been
> created unless the Creator possessed these three attributes which are
> indicated by His three names, "God (*El*), God
> (*Elohim*), and the Lord (*YHVH*)", because they
> are three (parts) of the one divine substance. They are indicated by
> those three names ("Wisdom" (*Hokhma*),
> "understanding" (*Tevunah*), and
> "knowledge" (*Da'at*) because of their
> essential characteristics. For it would not be fitting to say that the
> Holy One, blessed be He, created the world by means of the power of
> "names", as the fools think, or by means of any other
> thing other than Himself and His truth. Indeed, He Himself is His
> wisdom, and He Himself is His understanding, and He Himself is His
> knowledge. (*Teshuvotla-Meharef*: 15b-16a)
> 
> 
> 



God created the world with three divine attributes: *Wisdom*
(*Hokhma*), denoted by His name *YHVH* (Lord);
*Understanding* [*Tevunah*], denoted by His name
*El* (God); and *Knowledge* [*Da'at*],
denoted by His name *Elohim* (God). Abner identifies
*Hokhma* with universal wisdom, which is eternal and
separate from matter. Christians call this characteristic the
"Father". God's wisdom, which is "the cause of
everything" (*sibbat ha-kol*), is the primary
"source" of all created beings. *Tevunah* is the
particular knowledge that is "born" from the universal
wisdom and is acknowledged by Christians as the
 "Son".[10]
*Da'at* is placed between the two attributes: it is the
intermediary between *Hokhma* and *Tevunah*,
between universal and particular wisdom. It has a role similar to the
syllogistic middle term, which connects the major term and the minor
term; without a middle term, there is no valid syllogism and without
Da'at there is no particular knowledge. Abner continues to argue
that *Da'at* denotes *Elohim* because of its
grammatically plural appearance: exactly



> 
> 
> Since "knowledge" (*Da'at*) is between the two
> names, God (*El*) and Lord (*YHVH*), in the verse,
> "For the Lord is an all-knowing God"--and since it is
> the "Holy Spirit", as has been mentioned, it is fitting
> that the name "God" (*Elohim*) is related to
> knowledge, since it is between the two other names--*El*
> and *YHVH*--in the verse "God (*El*), God
> (*Elohim*), and the Lord (*YHVH*)". For this
> reason, it is in the plural, like the words "God" and
> "knowledge". It teaches us about itself and the other two,
> just as the relationship teaches us about itself and the two related
> things altogether. For this reason, the name "God"
> (Elohim) by itself teaches us about the three attributes together.
> (*Teshuvot la-Meharef*: 17a)
> 
> 
> 



The plural form *Elohim* indicates a relation which is derived
from the other two divine names, *El* and *YHVH*.
*Da'at*, which denotes God's name *Elohim*,
is what the Christians refer to as the "Holy Spirit".
Using this midrash serves Abner's goal: demonstrating the
existence of the Trinity from rabbinic sources. He argues that the
Sages' purpose in this midrash is to demonstrate that the names
of God parallel the existence of three aspects in Him, without
damaging His unity. He reinforces this claim by using Aristotelian
notions such as the "Active Intellect" and syllogism, thus
supporting his argument from a philosophical point of view as well.
Abner reinforces his claim by suggesting that the justification for
the Trinity--intellect (*sekhel*), the intellectually
cognizing subject (*maskil*), and the thing that is
intellectually cognized (*muskal*)--is accepted by
Aristotelians and that therefore, the Trinity does not imply
multiplicity in God.


#### 2.1.2 God's Incorporeality vs. the Incarnation



For Maimonides and Polqar, the belief in the unity of God is the
fundamental principle of any true religion. For Abner, on the other
hand, the Incarnation is the most important doctrine in Christianity:
the belief in the Trinity being not an independent doctrine, but
merely a prerequisite for believing in the Incarnation:



> 
> 
> First of all, the Christians are not required to maintain the belief
> in the Trinity except that it is necessary for belief in the
> Incarnation of God in human form because of the attribute
> "Son" which creates particulars in the existence, as has
> been explained. For without this, neither the immortality of the soul
> after death nor their receipt of reward and punishment in the world to
> come could be established. In this way the Torah, which gives
> existence and permanence to the existence of the human species and
> individual personalities according to what is possible, is
> established. Furthermore, as I proved above, the beliefs which cause
> the performance of the commandments are (the ones which are) incumbent
> upon us to believe in. (*Teshuvot la-Meharef*: 21b)
> 
> 
> 



This statement emphasizes two things, the first of which is the
Incarnation's key role in the existence of particulars in the
world. In other words, if there were no Incarnation, there would be no
created things. Belief in the three substantive attributes is
essential for existence because it explains the becoming of the world
and the existence of multiplicity through the "Son".
Secondly, Abner stipulates that the fulfillment of two important
theological principles--retribution in the form of rewards and
punishments and the immortality of the soul, two Jewish
principles--is dependent on belief in the Incarnation. God as an
active force in the world governs individuals: namely, each person is
rewarded or punished according to his deeds. Thus, only acceptance of
the doctrine of God's Incarnation in the Son can make it
possible to believe in the immortality of the soul and the redemption
of human beings (cf. Hecht 1993: 494).


### 2.2 The Authority of the Talmud and the Jewish Sages



In *Teshuvot la-Meharef*, Abner consistently uses Jewish
sources in order to prove that the doctrines of the Christian faith
are true. He aims to show that although the Jews of his own time
reject Christianity altogether, the Talmudic Sages, upon whom they
rely, tacitly accepted Christianity's fundamental beliefs. Once
again, this topic is omitted in *Teshuvat Apikoros*; however,
Polqar devotes two different chapters in *'Ezer ha-Dat* to
illustrating the erroneous use the Christians made of these texts.



In his *Teshuvot la-Meharef*, Abner discusses rabbinic
texts in extensive detail. When it suits his purposes, he cites
rabbinic texts to show that the Talmudic Sages did, in fact, accept
Christian doctrines; however, they could not disclose them to the
people, who were not ready to accept these beliefs (cf. *Teshuvot
la-Meharef*: 15b; 16b; 17a; 18ab). In other cases, Abner
accuses the Jewish Sages of behaving unethically (Ibid: 33b; 34b). In
*'Ezer ha-Dat*, Polqar does not offer a detailed response
to Abner's hermeneutical attacks. Instead, he proposes a general
solution that clarifies the role of the Talmud and the significance of
the rabbinic texts.



The closing sections of treatise one in *'Ezerha-Dat*
exemplifies Polqar's threefold method. Firstly, he sets forth
the importance of the Oral Law, which is necessary for filling out the
written law. While the Written Torah only sketches out the general
features of the law, the Oral Law explains in detail how man should
interpret and apply that law. Secondly, he narrates the historical
events that led Rabina and Rav Ashi, the two Amoraic sages who
compiled and revised the Babylonian Talmud, to write down the Oral
Law: the exile and the great risk of losing Talmudic foundations,
rulings, and
 interpretations.[11]
 Thirdly, Polqar proclaims that the Talmud has many layers of meaning;
some assertions must be taken at face value, while other must be
understood in an esoteric sense.



In addition to the Talmud, Polqar lists other texts that were written
by the Jewish Sages but cannot be considered "Talmud",
since this word refers only to the rabbinic interpretations of the
commandments. Because these texts are only of an aggadic and not a
halakhic nature, they do not possess any intrinsic authority, but have
value only if they accord with or can be interpreted to accord with
fundamental philosophical
 principles.[12]



Polqar argues forcefully, in a general fashion, that all of
Abner's allegations are, in principle, invalid. Polqar lists two
main justifications for his wholesale rejection of Abner's
allegations. Firstly, according to Polqar, if rabbinic passages
contradict fundamental philosophical principles, then they should be
viewed as non-halakhic midrashic texts. Insofar as all the quotations
that Abner uses in *Teshuvot la-Meharef* are not
considered "Law", we need not accept the conclusions drawn
from them. He writes:



> 
> 
> Moreover, look at the confusion of your thought in your dependence
> upon a few legends of the Talmud that one cannot explain and take in
> any manner one wishes. Even if they are elucidated and explained
> correctly according to your opinion, they are (just) the teachings of
> individuals, on account of which we will not turn aside or deviate in
> any direction from the belief in the Torah of Moses, may peace be upon
> him. They do not suffice for Jews, since he [Moses] was the master of
> all the prophets and the Sages, according to the belief of all the
> nations. All the more so (they do not suffice) for negating and
> overturning [the Torah]. (*Teshuvat Apikoros*: 6b)
> 
> 
> 



Not only are we not obliged to accept the sources cited by Abner,
but--and this is Polqar's second reason for dismissing
Abner's claims--Abner's reading of these sources,
according to Polqar, is tendentious. Abner deliberately reads these
passages so that they cohere with his line of thought, without
considering the possibility of other interpretations.



In the process of invalidating Abner's use of the Talmudic
passages, Polqar reveals his view of the hierarchy of Jewish sources.
Naturally, he ranks the "Torah of Moses" as the highest
source. Unlike the Sages of the Talmud, whose legal teachings are
incumbent only upon Jews, the Torah of Moses offers fundamental
universal truths accepted by both Judaism and Christianity.



Polqar concludes his discussion regarding the Talmudic Sages by
rejecting the opinions of the heretics (*epikursin*) who mock
and deny the veracity of some of the Talmudic stories,
interpretations, and rulings [*'Ezerha-Dat*: 65-67].
The Talmud is a source of knowledge for two types of students: the
first is intelligent, perceptive, and a quick learner, while the
second has a limited understanding, and therefore depends on
traditional knowledge without developing the urge to discover its
profound meanings. The Talmudic Sages, Polqar maintains, deliberately
included popular knowledge in their teachings as a pathway for the
second type of student, so that he, too, could have a part in true
knowledge.



The Sages' goal was to provide each student with knowledge that
suited his abilities. The perceptive disciple grasps the true meaning
that will, eventually, lead him to the ultimate goal: the eternity of
his soul. The other disciple remains at a lower level of attaining
knowledge, and is guided by the Sages for educational purposes
only.


### 2.3 The Messiah: has he already come?



Determining whether or not the messiah to whom Hebrew sources refer
has already come, as Christians maintain, could not be demonstrated
through philosophical investigation. It could only be demonstrated by
interpreting scriptural verses and rabbinic texts well known to both
Abner and Polqar, and by examining how the picture of the messiah and
the messianic era that emerges from that interpretation coheres or
does not cohere with past empirical events. In other words, Polqar
chose prophetic verses that show that Jesus did not bring about the
messianic era described by the prophets. On the other hand, Abner, who
sought to prove just the opposite, used the same verses, as well as
others, to demonstrate that Jesus and the messianic era he inaugurated
did in fact correspond precisely to what the prophets had
described.



One of the main differences between Judaism and Christianity is rooted
in each religion's approach to the messiah. While Christianity
considers the messiah to be both divine and human, Judaism sees in the
messiah a human being of extraordinary character. Christian dogma
educates its believers to live their lives as if the messiah has
already come; their way of living is a preparation for the world to
come. In Judaism, the messianic era is located in the future, and it
features the restoration of Jewish sovereignty over the land of Israel
and a world in which all nations dwell in peace with one another.
Thus, if the Jews accept the view that Jesus is the messiah, it
follows that any hope they maintain for that restoration is only folly
and illusion.



Polqar presents his theory regarding the messiah in the fifth chapter
of his *Teshuvat Apikoros* and in the sixth chapter
(*sha'ar*) of treatise one of *'Ezer ha-Dat*.
The texts presented in both works are almost identical, and differ in
only two places. The first difference is that the first paragraph in
*'Ezer ha-Dat* contains a reference to Bil'am that is
omitted from *Teshuvat
 Apikoros*,[13]
 while the second difference is that it is only in *Teshuvat
Apikoros* that Polqar refers to the Muslims
(*Ishma'elim*); this reference is absent from
*'Ezer
 ha-Dat*.[14]



Rejecting the claim that the messianic era has already begun, Polqar
focuses on three prophetic predictions concerning the nature of the
messianic era; none of these, Polqar maintains, have come to pass. The
first is Ezekiel's prophecy that the Israelites will reside in
the land of Israel. Ezekiel foresaw that



> 
> 
> they [the Israelites] shall remain in the land which I gave to my
> servant Jacob...they and their children and their
> children's children shall dwell there forever, with my servant
> David as their prince for all time.
> 
> 
> 



Reality, however, shows that the Jews do not reside in the land of
Israel. On the contrary, they have suffered a long and painful exile,
while foreigners settled in the land.



The second prediction concerns the war between Gog and Magog. Ezekiel
prophesized that only after that war "I [LORD] will be zealous
for My holy name" [Ezek. 39:25], and "I will never again
hide my face from them" [Ezek. 39:29]. The Jews' dreadful
condition proves that the war has not yet occurred, and therefore that
the messiah cannot have come. Finally, the third prediction concerns
the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the holy temple; as Amos states,
"In that day I will set up again the fallen booth of
David" [Amos 9:11]. He also predicts the third ingathering of
the Jews: "And I will plant them upon their soil nevermore to be
uprooted from the soil I have given them, says the Lord your
God" [Amos 9:15]. The first ingathering was connected with the
building of the First Temple; the second was connected with the Second
Temple; the third is to occur upon the building of the Third Temple.
Polqar cites these verses to indicate that Jerusalem and the Temple
have not yet been rebuilt; it follows that this third ingathering has
not yet occurred.



Before quoting the relevant verses from the prophetic books, Polqar
sets forth two principles that must be taken into account when
examining the prophecies. Firstly, he declares that any prophecy
stating that the Jews will never again be exiled cannot be applied to
the Second Temple period, especially if the word "forever"
[*le'olam*] appears in it, insofar as the current
situation shows that the Second Temple period was followed by exile.
Secondly, Polqar states that all of the prophecies concerning the
Second Temple period which predict the building of Zion and Jerusalem
cannot be applied to Jesus, for "those who believe in him
[Jesus] are further from him than they are from ruling over that
land" [*Teshuvat Apikoros*: 4b]. Merging these two
principles with his interpretation of the prophetic message serves
Polqar's goal: rejecting Christianity as a true religion. Abner,
not surprisingly, applies these very prophecies to the Second Temple
period and to Jesus (cf. Joseph Shalom in Rosenthal 1961: 44).
According to him, the arrival of the messiah was the final stage in
establishing the correct beliefs, which is to say the fundamental
Christian theological doctrines, in the hearts of human beings. The
Trinity, he states, was originally concealed from the people of Israel
due to its complexity and to the risk it posed: if it were
misunderstood, it might lead the Jews to worship idols. The final
Incarnation, namely the Incarnation in Jesus, would guarantee the
people's belief in reward and punishment in this world and the
next.


## 3. Determinism and Free Will



It would appear that a religious person, especially one who belongs to
the Jewish faith, which stresses praxis, must affirm the position that
human beings have free will; for if free will were denied, it would
necessarily follow that the commandments have no meaning. But how can
this religious affirmation co-exist with the fundamental religious
affirmation of God's omniscience?



According to the theory of radical determinism, any action we take
only appears to be the result of our choosing that particular action
over others. In truth, however, our choice is the outcome of various
predetermined factors that cause it to happen in a certain time and
place. Unlike radical determinists, the non-radical determinists, such
as Polqar rejected the view according to which man's actions are
determined and only appear to be the result of one's free
choice. The non-radical determinists admit that there is a connection
between the upper-lunar world and the sublunary world, however this
connection is restricted merely to natural events; for example, an
occurrence of an eclipse is determined and therefore can be known and
predicted, unlike man's decision to act in a certain way. For
Abner, determinism is entailed by God's omniscience, His
absolute knowledge of past, present, and future. Any affirmation of
one's liberty in making decisions and choosing specific actions
is incompatible with this idea of God's perfect knowledge. In
sum, for Abner, ascribing free will to human beings denies God's
omniscience. In opposition to Abner, Polqar attempts to reconcile the
idea of man's ability to choose with the concept of God's
perfect knowledge. Polqar rejects Abner's view and contends that
allowing man's free will alongside God's omniscience is
the *only* way to defend God's perfection.



In his *Minhat Qenaot*, Abner raises several arguments
which support his radical determinism. One of these arguments is
directly concerned with the question of man's free will. He
writes:



> 
> 
> The third argument, particular to man, is from the aspect of the
> intellectual soul. He [Isaac] said that the intellectual soul is
> separate and distinct from matter, and that the heavenly bodies,
> insofar as they are material, lack the power to act upon it through
> anything. And because one could object that a *separate* power
> can act upon the intellectual soul by compelling it to act or to
> receive an action, and to will at times or not to will at times, he
> bolstered his utterances in this third argument by saying that if
> human accidents came about through necessitation and decree, then the
> propositions of our Holy Law would be destroyed; and all its
> commandments and prohibitions would be in vain; and it would not be
> proper for the righteous man to receive reward for his good deeds, nor
> would it be proper to punish the wicked, since all their actions would
> be necessitated. Isaac took this support from the statements of Moses
> the Egyptian and the other early theologians who spoke about this
> matter. (*Minhat Qenaot*, Chapter 2)
> 
> 
> 



Material objects cannot influence things that are separate from
matter. Since the intellectual soul is separate from matter, material
objects--and here Abner is referring to the heavenly
bodies--cannot act upon it. However, Abner responds, while
Polqar's argument explains why material bodies cannot act upon
man's intellectual soul, it fails to explain why the separate
intellects cannot act upon it. Abner stated that due to the weakness
of his argument, Polqar needed to strengthen it from a theological
point of view; therefore, he supplemented his original argument with
the claim that the Mosaic commandments have no validity unless we
assume that humans have free choice. Therefore, Abner concludes
that:



> 
> 
> Isaac not only wished to do away with astral decrees, but he also
> wished to do away with God's knowledge and His decrees
> concerning all accidental and possible things. Because of this, he
> said in his book that we ought not to believe in any way that such
> things can be known, or observed by any knower, before they exist.
> Hence he implied that they cannot be known nor observed by God.
> (*Minhat Qenaot*, Chapter 2)
> 
> 
> 



To support his contrary conclusion, Abner quotes verses from the Old
and New Testaments that in his view clearly show that God, with His
eternal knowledge, governs things in a particular manner. For example,
Job 34:21-22 states: *for His eyes are upon a man's
ways; He observes his every step. Neither darkness nor gloom offers a
hiding-place for evildoers*; and Psalms 33:13-15, *The
Lord looks down from heaven; He sees all mankind. From His
dwelling-pace He gazes on all the inhabitants of the earth--He
who fashions the hearts of the all, who discerns all their
doings*. Presumably, since Polqar's last point here is in
Abner's view purely theological, it is sufficient for Abner to
respond to it by citing biblical proof texts.



Polqar's response to Abner leans first on Maimonides'
argument according to which God's knowledge and human knowledge
have nothing in common [*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 136-137;
*Guide of the Perplexed* 3:20]. Therefore, we cannot even ask
what God knows, or in what way He knows it. After establishing that
the knowledge of God is essentially different from that of humans,
Polqar seems to contradict his own view that God's knowledge
does not change. According to one passage, God



> 
> 
> desires (*hafez*) possibility as long as [the
> possible] exists, and then He produces things from this absolute
> potentiality and possibility when He so desires
> (*yahfoz*). (*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 137).
> 
> 
> 



How can Polqar claim that God "desires" something, when
desiring something implies an external need? Here it seems as if
Polqar uses the word "desire" to indicate the laws of
nature: natural, accidental, and voluntary causes are within the
natural laws. Just as there are natural causes in the natural order,
similarly, Polqar claims, the natural order contains possibility.
Thus, asking why possibility exists is similar to asking why a stone
falls down when we throw it: it falls because that is its nature.



After establishing that God's knowledge is essentially different
from human knowledge, Polqar turns to answer the following question:
if God's knowledge is eternal, unchangeable, and complete, how
is it possible to argue that men are free to choose their actions? In
one of his arguments, Polqar claims that men do have the liberty of
choosing, but that this ability is restricted to intellectuals. If a
man does not actualize his intellect, he is no different from an
animal which acts on instinct alone:



> 
> 
> The second argument is that it has been demonstrated that the
> existence of something separate and distinct from matter is more
> excellent and worthy than something material. Similarly, actions that
> are separate from matter are greater and more powerful than material
> actions. Also, the regression of the series of all agents terminates
> at a thing that is utterly separate from matter, so that we truly say
> that [only] separate things are truly agents, and material things are
> acted upon. Now man's rational soul, from which desire and volition
> are produced, is separate from matter, and is analogous to the
> supernal agents. Hence it is impossible for a material body to act
> upon it [man's rational soul]. This is what the rabbis meant
> when they said (Talmud Sab. 156a): "Israel is not subject to
> fate" and "The gentiles are intimidated, but Israel is not
> intimidated", as I explained above [*'Ezer ha-Dat*:
> 124]. Hence those who maintain that the qualities of the soul proceed
> from, and are decreed by, the heavenly bodies simply err and are
> mistaken. (*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 139-140)
> 
> 
> 



"Israel", Polqar's term for intellectuals, refers to
those people who use their intellectual faculty, the non-material part
of their soul, in order to know God. According to Polqar, most human
beings are like animals, enslaved to their desires, and consequently
lack freedom of choice; controlled by their desires, they differ from
the intellectuals, who live in accordance with the intellectual soul
and who therefore are capable of choosing proper actions.
Paradoxically, however, if the intellectuals constantly follow their
rational faculty, they, similar to the separate intellects, are
prevented from choosing how to act because they are constantly
directed by the rational force. It would then follow that living
according to the intellect does not guarantee unconditional freedom,
as intellectuals are still subject to reason. That said, it seems
likely that Polqar would agree that following the intellect
necessarily leads one to make rational decisions in one's life,
which is the proper way to live.



Abner alleged that Polqar



> 
> 
> not only wished to do away with astral decrees, but also wished to do
> away with God's knowledge and His decrees concerning all
> accidental and possible things. (*Minhat Qenaot*, Chapter
> 2)
> 
> 
> 



Polqar certainly did away with astral decrees, insofar as he
demonstrated that the heavenly bodies do not influence man's
intellectual soul, because heavenly bodies are material bodies, and
material bodies cannot act upon man's non-material soul.
Abner's additional argument, that the separate intellects can
act upon one's soul even if we accept that the heavenly bodies
do not, is presented by Polqar himself as follows:



> 
> 
> The activities of the rational soul are not generated from it by
> virtue of its being rational. Therefore, I can reply to my critic that
> a material agent may act upon it from the aspect of its not being
> rational, *a fortiori* that an immaterial agent may act upon
> it. Moreover, the human soul is not entirely separate from matter, but
> only the acquired intellect, which is the agent intellect. Its
> activity takes place only through the intermediary of the intellect
> that is acted upon, which Aristotle considered to be subject to
> generation and destruction. (*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 140)
> 
> 
> 



Interestingly, the astrologer's objection, as presented by
Polqar, includes activities (*pe'ulot ha-Nefesh*) which
clearly belong to the practical part of the soul in the intellectual
part of the soul (*ha-nefesh ha-hoga*). In his view,
one's activities, since they do not derive from the intellectual
soul, are subject to being changed by a material agent, here the
heavenly bodies. These activities are even more subject to an
immaterial agent: the separate intellect. The human soul, argues the
astrologer, is not entirely separate from matter, and therefore the
claim that heavenly bodies can act upon it stands.



Polqar, well aware of Abner's objection in *Minhat
Qenaot*, replies to the astrologer as follows:



> 
> 
> From what you have written in your astrology, the activity of wisdom
> in the human soul is decreed from the heavens. Now will you say of
> *this* activity that it is not generated and originated in the
> soul by virtue of the latter's being rational? As for your
> remark in your answer that "*a fortiori* an immaterial
> agent can act upon it", you know well that our only disagreement
> concerns the activity of the heavenly bodies, and not the activities
> of the separate entities. (*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 140)
> 
> 
> 



Polqar clearly considers Abner's objection to be valid, and
therefore he narrows his argument. Here he makes it clear that he
rejects *only* the idea that the heavenly bodies, or any other
material body, act upon one's intellectual soul. In contrast,
the Active Intellect acts upon one's intellectual soul; indeed,
separate intellects are the *only* entities that can act upon
man's intellectual soul. The Active Intellect acts upon
one's soul according to one's level of study of the
theoretical sciences: the more one occupies oneself with studying the
sciences, the more the Active Intellect acts upon one's
intellectual soul. Therefore, Polqar argues, his argument rejecting
astrology is valid.


### *Man's will vs. Natural will*



In the last argument, the scholar clarifies to the astrologer the main
differences between human will and the will of "natural
things":



> 
> 
> The third argument: It is known that natural things behave in one
> manner without the possibility of their being able to change their
> function and to act in a manner opposite to that to which they are
> accustomed. The soul's actions [*mif'alei
> ha-nafshyyim*] are those that occasionally effect one thing and
> occasionally effect its opposite, according to their choice. If the
> acts of the soul were necessitated and compelled and decreed, then
> they would be similar to natural acts, with absolutely no difference
> between them. If this were so, then how could the soul be considered
> to be the perfection of a natural body? For then the perfection of a
> body would only be through its natural deeds, which would abolish the
> existence of every soul. All these are sophistries, calumnies, and
> follies. (*'Ezer ha-Dat*: 140)
> 
> 
> 



Polqar argues that depriving humans of free choice, as Abner suggests,
would entail that natural things and things endowed with souls would
operate in a similar manner. This would mean that human actions would
not only be similar to natural actions, such as the occurrence of an
eclipse or the rising of the sun, but that human actions would also be
essentially similar to the actions of the separate intellects. In
other words, there would be no difference between the actions of
perfect beings, such as the separate intellects, and the actions of
imperfect beings, such as humans, who are comprised of material and
non-material parts. Moreover, if man's "voluntary"
actions were determined in the same way as the actions of natural
things, there would be no essential difference between man's
perfect part, his soul, and his imperfect part, his body; for if all
actions of man's soul, bodily and intellectual, happened
necessarily, such a distinction would no longer exist.



In sum, Polqar's discussion of God's foreknowledge and
man's free will is a direct reply to the arguments raised by
Abner in *Minhat Qenaot*. Polqar clearly modified his
arguments so as to make them more efficient against Abner's
objections. Polqar concludes the debate between the scholar,
presumably presenting his own view, and the astrologer, presumably
representing Abner, as follows: firstly, possible and accidental
things are not predestined and cannot be known by any knower
(including God) before they happen. Secondly, man's intellectual
soul is free from determinism. Finally, natural things are essentially
different from psychic things: the former act in a necessary way,
while the latter act in a contingent manner.


## 4. Conclusions



Polqar's project is threefold. Firstly, he seeks to defend
Judaism as a true religion against Christianity. For Polqar, true
religion coincides with philosophical principles. His defense of
Judaism against the Christian convert Abner of Burgos essentially
consists of the claim that while Judaism coincides with true
philosophy and hence is a true religion, Christianity contains
doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation that contradict true
philosophy and hence is not a true religion. In addition to his
critique of Christianity, Polqar uses hermeneutical arguments to
reinforce his position that Judaism is a true religion. Secondly,
Polqar, similarly to his fellow Jewish Averroists, wishes to defend
the discipline of philosophy. By philosophy, Polqar means
Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle. As a consequence, he
offers an Averroistic interpretation of Judaism and becomes one of the
main representatives of Jewish Averroism. His Averroistic commitments
also determine his interpretation of Maimonides: his preference for
Maimonides' radical views over his harmonizing views, as well as
his occasional deviation from Maimonides. Polqar's third aim is
to defend his philosophical interpretation of Judaism. From a social
and political point of view, Polqar's unreserved embrace of
philosophy raised problems within the Jewish community: he had to
refute the Jewish traditionalists' charge that he was a heretic,
led astray by philosophy, to avoid weakening a community already under
considerable pressure in its Christian environment through internal
conflict stemming from views perceived as unorthodox. This explains
his use of an "esoteric" writing practice through which he
conceals some of his more radical views from the non-philosophers
among his readers. This strategy is explicitly highlighted in the
introduction to *'Ezer ha-Dat*, where he declares that due
to political and social circumstances he must conceal his genuine
opinion in order to avoid being accused of heresy by those who are
incapable of understanding his philosophical approach. Polqar's
identification of Judaism and true philosophy, moreover, requires a
clarification of the difference between true science and
pseudo-science (for example, astrology and divination), and between
correct and incorrect interpretations of Judaism (among the latter,
for example, those of the Kabbalists). The major claim guiding my
interpretation is that Polqar advances a systematic naturalistic
interpretation of Judaism, which in many cases does not agree with
traditional Jewish views.



Polqar's philosophy should thus be seen as part of the Jewish
Averroist school and as one of several attempts made by
post-Maimonidean Jewish thinkers to use Maimonides' ideas and
methods to bring the Aristotelian philosophy taught by Averroes and
the principles of the Jewish faith more closely together.