## 1. Preliminaries



The nature of philosophy in Latin America first drew the attention of
philosophically-minded thinkers in the early nineteenth century, when
the region began to develop into nations independent from Spain. But
it acquired greater significance with the birth of contemporary
academic philosophy in the following century, ultimately taking center
stage in Latin American philosophy during the second half of the
20th century, where we still find it today. Often motivated
by discomfort with mainstream conceptions of philosophy, inquiry into
the nature of Latin American philosophy has involved a number of
sub-questions about its existence, originality, authenticity,
significance, and role in culture and society. The search for answers
has led to reflection on *what philosophy is* (or should be),
as a practice, and as an academic discipline. Thus many Latin American
philosophers have devoted their attention to the philosophy of Latin
American philosophy, and therefore, to metaphilosophy (understood as
in Williamson 2007, p. ix). Somewhat paradoxically, many of those
engaged in such metaphilosophical inquiry have shown skepticism about
whether there is a philosophy that can rightly be called 'Latin
American.' Others have recast an old, reductive conception of
Latin American philosophy that ascribes to it a certain limited
socio-political role. But as discussed in what follows, there is also
a third group made up of philosophers whose views about the nature and
quality of Latin American philosophy turns out to be neither skeptical
nor reductionist in any of the ways to be considered here.


### 1.1 Two Types of Philosophy



Academic philosophy, or *autonomous philosophy as practiced in the
West since the Enlightenment*, did not begin in Latin America
until the first half of the twentieth century. Initially, the reigning
philosophical paradigm in the region was Scholasticism. That medieval
style of philosophy prevailed during the colonial period, which
extended roughly from the early sixteenth century to the early
nineteenth century. Mainly confined to rehearsing the doctrines of
classical and medieval European philosophers, Latin American
Scholasticism was not to be challenged until the eighteenth century,
when the theories of the Enlightenment and the rise of modern
philosophy began to be known in the American colonies of Spain and
Portugal.



Parallel to these philosophical developments, a non-academic type of
philosophy consistently prospered in Latin America from the sixteenth
century to the present. It comprises philosophical positions expressed
in essay format, a hybrid genre cultivated by political and religious
leaders, scientists, and literary figures among others. Interested in
the intersection of philosophy with literature, religion, and
politics, non-academic philosophical thinkers made significant
contributions to the intellectual history of Latin America. As may be
expected, however, the line separating academic and non-academic
philosophy is not always sharp. Although it's clear that a work
such as the *Labyrinth of Solitude*, by the Mexican writer and
diplomat Octavio Paz 
 (1914-1998)[1]
 falls within the latter, and *Logica viva (Living
Logic)*, by Uruguayan philosopher Carlos Vaz Ferreira
(1872-1958) falls within the former, there are many borderline
cases. Consider Lascasianism: first developed by the Dominican friar
and theologian Bartolome de las Casas (Spanish-born,
1474-1566) in colonial times, the doctrine is still influential
in the work of Peruvian Gustavo Guttierrez and other
contemporary liberation theologians. It advocates a perfectionist
version of Roman Catholic ethics according to which the ways of life
that should be promoted are those that make people *more
human*--a thesis consistent with las Casas' 1552
vindication of the *humanity* of Amerindians (i.e., their
personhood). Since Lascasianism has philosophical grounds and
implications but is a product of amateur philosophers, it stands out
as a prime borderline case between academic and non-academic
philosophy.


### 1.2 Origins



When did philosophy begin in Latin America? Any answer to this
question would depend in part to whether one is asking about the
beginning of academic or non-academic philosophy. There is consensus
that some form of academic philosophy, mostly connected with teaching,
existed during the colonial period. An example of a successful work
from this early period is *Logica mexicana*, a textbook
by the Mexican Antonio Rubio (1548-1615) widely used at the
time, even in Spain. But it was not until the early twentieth century
that philosophy acquired contemporary scholarly dimensions, including
standard institutional manifestations.



An interesting metaphilosophical issue related to the origin of Latin
American philosophy is whether the philosophical thought of
Pre-Colombian cultures also belongs in the non-academic tradition.
Needless to say, pre-Columbian thought unfolds in ways that seem
utterly alien to our current standards about the form, content, or
method method typical of philosophical work. But compliance with any
such standards falls short of being a necessary condition for a work
to count as philosophical. After all, the works of Pythagoras and the
other Pre-Socratics are quite unorthodox in those respects yet
considered philosophical. And contemporary examples too are not far to
seek. Wittgenstein immediately comes to mind. A number of Latin
American philosophers are now prepared to agree with Peruvian
Francisco Miro Quesada that "[i]n a broad sense,
philosophy has always existed in Latin America. The Maya and the Inca
had thought that, without abusing the terms, may be considered of
philosophical character...." (1978, p. 75, my translation).
Textual evidence of the existence of philosophical thought among the
Aztecs has been provided and analyzed by a number of experts. For
example, Bernardino de Sahagun (1499-1590), a Spanish
friar turned into amateur ethnologist, and contemporary philosophers
such as Mexican Miguel Leon Portilla (1963) and American James
Maffie (2009, 2014).



Nuccetelli (2011) considers pre-Columbian works of philosophical
import to be part of Latin American *proto*-philosophy of the
non-academic variety. Gracia's (2008) understanding of Latin
American philosophy as ethnic philosophy (more on this later) can also
accommodate pre-Columbian philosophical works within that discipline.
But Gracia (especially in his 2010) defers taking a position on
whether works such as the Maya folk-cosmology in the *Popol
Vuh* count as Latin American philosophy until proper historical
work can provide more stable and widely accepted answers about what
falls within that ethnic philosophy and what doesn't.


## 2. What Is Latin American Philosophy?



As noted above, in contemporary Latin American philosophy lively
metaphilosophical debates, recognized as such by its participants, are
a frequent occurrence. The Peruvian Augusto Salazar Bondy
(1925-1974) held that such debates belong to "the
philosophy of philosophy" (1968, p. 13). He also divided the
issues at stake into three categories, descriptive, prescriptive, or
identity issues (1968, p. 11), a classification that is for the most
part still current. One exception is that, today, questions about
whether a philosophy is "original, genuine, or peculiar"
are not strictly descriptive. For these predicates seem both
descriptive and evaluative, and therefore analogous to others now
considered *thick* moral predicates, such as
'cruel,' 'loyal,' and the like.


### 2.1 Some Main Descriptive Questions



The principal purely descriptive question in those debates concerns
whether philosophy exists as a practice or discipline *in*
Latin America. When answered in the affirmative, a related question is
when did it begin? There is consensus that the practice of philosophy
*sin mas* (*as such*--i.e., for its own
sake, autonomous of non-philosophical interests) is an early
twentieth-century phenomenon. But, understood in a broader sense, it
dates from the colonial period. Thus, some take Latin American
philosophy to be a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., Miro Quesada
1974, p. 75), while others trace it back to the sixteenth century
(e.g., Gracia *et al*. 1995, p. 462; Hurtado 2007, p. 47). The
disagreement, however, is only apparent, since as noted by Francisco
Romero one can acknowledge the colonial origins of (broad) philosophy
while noting "the prevalence [then] of pedagogical over
philosophical concerns with regard to creativity and even the
re-thinking of one's ideas and doctrines" (1941, p. 12,
see also his 1943, p. 127).



The descriptive question about the existence of a Latin American
(academic) philosophy can be sharpened by breaking it down into
smaller questions concerning the truth of each of the following
claims:


1. Philosophy exists in Latin America as a practice or discipline
autonomous from the sciences, theology, literature, politics, and
education.
2. There are stable philosophical traditions and communities in the
region, of the sort commonly found in major centers of Western
philosophy.
3. Philosophy has acquired professional and institutional status
according to current Western standards (i.e., it is properly
represented in educational systems, learned societies, associations,
journals, presses, etc.).


#### 2.1.1 Philosophy's Autonomy and "Normalcy"



Since the early twentieth century, there has been a strong endorsement
of claim (I) (Alberini 1927; Romero 1943; Miro Quesada 1978;
Moulines 2010). But critics are more cautious about previous periods,
pointing out that during the colonial period Latin American philosophy
was not autonomous from education. During the nineteenth century, as
clearly evident in the work of Latin American positivists,
philosophical concerns had close connections to political and social
interests. In fact, up to about the 1910s, there was room for
skepticism about all three claims. Between the 1910s and the 40s, a
generation of philosophers known as the *fundadores*
('Founders') strove to develop philosophy in Latin America
as an autonomous discipline within academia, with the usual
professional organizations and institutions. It was clearly owing to
their efforts that philosophy became a practice in their universities
analogous to what their peers were doing at the time in major Western
centers of scholarship. For the first time since the Wars of
Independence and the national organization that followed (roughly,
l810-1898), philosophy began to be studied for its own sake.
Moreover, it became a professional activity with recognition in the
wider community. Through all of these developments, the
Founders' efforts bore fruit in establishing philosophical
"normalcy" (maturity). Philosophers of the next generation
strove to make the transformations stable. The Argentine Eduardo
Rabossi (1930-2005) observes that Latin American philosophy
developed relatively quickly compared to philosophy in Europe, since
although Latin America followed European models, it was not until the
nineteenth century that Europe itself acquired its own philosophical
"normalcy" (1994, p. 36).



Be that as it may, by the 1940s not only (I) but also (III) above
seemed true, as suggested by Rabossi's 1994 vivid narrative of
the vicissitudes faced by Alejandro Korn (1860-1936) and other
Argentinean Founders in their effort to create a *Facultad de
Filosofia y Letras* (*College of Liberal Arts*) at
the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires.


#### 2.1.2 The New Skeptics



Given a current view that we may call 'new skepticism,'
however, claim (II) is false: Latin American philosophy still lacks
inner and outer dialogue of the sort needed to develop stable
philosophical traditions and communities. Ezcurdia (2003),
Garcia-Ramirez (2011), Hurtado (2006, 2007), Pereda
(2006), and Rabossi (1994, 2008) are all new skeptics committed to
denying some version of (II) on the grounds that Latin American
philosophy faces what some of them refer to as an
"invisibility" problem. Latin American philosophy is
invisible because it has these problems


* Internal Dialogue Problem (IDP): There is no regular philosophical
dialogue among Latin American philosophers, and
* External Dialogue Problem (EDP): There is no regular philosophical
dialogue between Latin American philosophers and their Western
peers.



The new skeptics mostly take the occurrence of an IDP for granted,
devoting little effort to providing reliable evidence for it. And when
available, the evidence is often difficult to test. A notable
exception is Pereda 2006, which points out the lack of sufficient
reference to Latin American publications in the numerous contributions
by Latin Americans to the *Enciclopedia iberoamericana de
filosofia* (a multi-volume reference work whose first
volume appeared in 1987). Other adduced evidence is anecdotal,
generally appealing to widespread occurrence of an IDP observed at
conferences, learned societies, etc. Narratives to this effect
commonly describe Latin American philosophers as intellectuals who
fail to engage in the study and discussion of their own traditions,
which they perceive as uninteresting, of poor quality, or
disenfranchising. For example, adopting Enrique Dussel's 1998
center/periphery distinction, Rabossi (2008, pp. 102ff.; see also his
1994) tells us that the Latin American philosopher is a
"periphery philosopher," with the self-image of a
'guacho' (slang for 'orphan,' or even
'street urchin'). The *guacho* not only fails to
acknowledge his own "philosophical parents," but
doesn't want to know about them at all: "he doesn't
take them into account, he doesn't read them, he is not even
interested in criticizing their defects or limitations; for him, his
own philosophical past doesn't exist" (2008, p. 103, my
translation). Without awareness of his own philosophical past and
dialog with regional peers, the Latin American philosopher can have
neither philosophical traditions nor genuine philosophical
communities. A related claim is made by Hurtado (2006, pp. 206ff.;
2007. pp. 24ff.), for whom the IDP arises for Mexican philosophy, and
by extension for Latin American philosophy, owing to the fact that
many of its practitioners have followed a "modernizing
model." Among the numerous unwelcome traits of this model are
the tendencies of its followers to form small groups and spend most of
their time trying to learn some imported philosophy, citing only
foreign philosophers without paying much attention to regional peers.
Those who adopt this model proceed to study the latest modern
tradition, which uncritically replaces previous ones. At the end of
the day, in Latin American philosophy "...each modernizing
movement got lost for the upcoming movement..." (Hurtado
2006, p. 206), and there are neither traditions nor stable communities
of dialogue. "But the foreign philosophers," laments
Hurtado, "even those who visit our countries to deliver talks,
very rarely quote us in their work. There is therefore no genuine
dialogue..." (Hurtado 2006, p. 205). For Hurtado, in
addition to the IDP, Latin American philosophy faces the EDP. And of
the two problems, the IDP is the "central" one, thus the
EDP appears to depend on the IDP (see also
Garcia-Ramirez 2011, and compare Ezcurdia 2003). In any
event, on this view, Latin American philosophers will continue to face
the IDP "unless we create a genuine critical dialogue among
ourselves and simultaneously exercise a constantly renewed memory of
past dialogues" (2006, p. 210). Until then, claim (II) is
false.



But the new skeptics, confident that both problems, the IDP and EDP,
can be resolved invariably offer a list of suggestions about how to do
that. There is, however, considerable unacknowledged overlap in such
"repair manuals," which suggests that the new skeptics
fail to establish among themselves an internal philosophical dialogue
whose very absence from Latin American philosophy they see as a
problem. If this ad hominem is strong, then the new skeptics'
challenge to claim (II) is not without problems of its own. For the
argument charges that new skepticism appears itself to suffer from the
very flaw it criticizes in Latin American philosophy: namely, the new
skeptic omits not just establishing a dialogue with, but even
acknowledging, the works by other Latin American philosophers on the
topic at issue. And although some new skeptics do make some such
references (e.g., Garcia-Ramirez 2011), these are
limited to the work of those who are also new skeptics. But not all
Latin American philosophers face the IDP, since as we shall see next
there is abundant textual evidence that the metaphilosophical
questions of concern here have generated intense dialogue and
discernible skeptical and anti-skeptical traditions. For this reason,
claim (II)--viz., that there are stable philosophical traditions
and communities in the region, of the sort commonly found in major
centers of Western philosophy-- has not yet been shown false.


### 2.2 Some Main Normative Questions



Answers to the *normative* questions concerning whether there
is, or could be, a Latin American philosophy that is original,
authentic, peculiar, or in some other ways distinctive constitute a
wide philosophical spectrum, with what may be called 'strong
universalism' at one extreme, 'strong distinctivism'
at the other, and 'middle-way theories' in between.


#### 2.2.1 Universalism vs. Distinctivism



Strong universalism is the view that all philosophical theories,
methods, and topics have an import that is universal rather than
relative to regions, persons, groups, or cultures. It conflicts with
strong distinctivism, the view that all of philosophy's
theories, methods, and topics represent the point of view of a region,
person, group, or culture. The contemporary representatives of
universalism in Latin American philosophy are many and have different
philosophical orientations (for an overview of classic universalism,
see Salazar Bondy 1968, pp. 45ff.). Universalism appears to be what
Argentinean Pablo Navarro has in mind when he asserts "Legal
philosophy in Latin America does not differ significantly from
philosophical studies of the law in the United States, Germany, the
UK, or Sweden" (2009, p.
 439).[2]
 Gracia 2000 and Montemayor 2011 associate being a
scientifically-minded philosopher with favoring universalism. Perhaps
the connection is grounded in some such philosophers' previous
commitment to the objectivity of science, together with their thesis
that science is the model for philosophy.



For a classic representative of universalism we need to look no
further than the work of the Argentine Risieri Frondizi
(1910-1983), who by combining universalism with originalism was
led to the skeptical conclusion that, in the late 1940s, only a very
small part of philosophy in Latin America deserved to be considered
philosophy at all. But as pointed out earlier by his compatriot
Jose Ingenieros (1887-1925), not everything needs to be
(indeed we might say, 'can be') original in the work of
"a true philosopher" (Ingenieros 1914, p. 7). Furthermore,
not only is originality a matter of degree but the term
'original' is itself ambiguous. It has been used with
connotations such as


* Being creative, novel, and autochthonous (Ingenieros 1914).
* Being creative and non-imitative (Cannabrava 1949; Frondizi
1949).
* Being a philosophical product that "makes some degree of
contribution to ideas or approaches, with respect to previous works,
and is sufficiently discernible as a creation and not a repetition in
content. In this sense, an original philosophy is identified by its
new conceptual constructions of recognized value" (Salazar
Bondy168, p. 100, my translation).
* Being tradition-originating (Hurtado 2007).



Putting aside Hurtado's more idiosyncratic understanding of the
term and Ingenieros's too permissive understanding as a
synonymous of 'autochthonous,' we have:



> 
> A philosophical work is original just in case it makes some degree of
> contribution to philosophy by being creative, non-imitative, or novel
> with respect to previous works.
> 


#### 2.2.2 The Originality Problem



We'll now consider two positions, Frondizi 1949 and Pereda 2000,
each committed to holding that Latin American academic philosophy
fails to be sufficiently original in the above sense. Frondizi's
commitment to this thesis is explicit: he concludes that based on the
evidence, only 10% of philosophy 'as such' in Latin
America is original. Since the works of non-academic philosophers are
excluded from this evidence, as a result Latin American philosophy is
devoid of significant history, theories, methods, and number of
creative practitioners. Nuccetelli 2003 responds to this skeptical
view by arguing that by contrast with academic philosophers in Latin
America, the non-academic philosophers have offered the more original
philosophical positions. Furthermore, in other parts of the world
contributions by non-academics who did not practice philosophy for its
own sake are often counted as philosophy, as exemplified by works of
Hume, Bentham, Mill, Saint Simon, Marx and many others. If this is
correct, then Frondizi's criterion turns out to be too
demanding. In addition, Gracia (2003) notes that in no other
*ethnic* philosophy (more on this later) is originality
considered a necessary condition for having philosophy



Pereda's recent work also shows he thinks that there is an
originality problem facing Latin American philosophy, an skeptical
view presupposed by his claim that philosophy in the region is
"invisible" (i.e., suffers from the IDP and EDP mentioned
above). Like Frondizi, Pereda first praises the work of Latin American
essayists, and even takes it to be a model that philosophy must
emulate in order to overcome its invisibility problems. But to be a
model that needs emulation is one thing, to count as Latin American
philosophy quite another. Since Pereda also locates non-academic
philosophy somewhere else, as a result, he runs head-on into a
conclusion similar to Frondizi's skepticism about the features
of Latin American philosophy. Such skepticism is inevitable because on
Pereda's view, Latin American philosophy suffers from the
"arrogant reasoning" of its practitioners, which fuels the
epistemic vices of "nationalist enthusiasm" (in the case
of distinctivists) or "subaltern fervor" and
"craving for novelty" (in the case of universalists). Such
vices, and ultimately arrogant reasoning itself, are to be blamed for
the internal and external invisibility of Latin American
philosophy.



It can now be shown that these alleged vices of universalists, if
substantiated, would raise an originality challenge to Latin America
philosophy. After all, universalism has many representatives of a
great variety of persuasions (Gracia and Jaksic 1986, p. 214;
Miro Quesada 1978, p. 76; Salazar Bondy 1968, pp. 49ff.). If
universalists are driven by subaltern fervor and a craving for
novelty, then they need *perforce* to devote considerable time
and effort to assimilating the latest fads (something they have done,
according to Hurtado's 2006 critique of the modernizing model).
Since producing work that is to a significant degree original requires
considerable time and effort, there would be empirical constraints on
those philosophers' capability to produce original work.



Therefore, it seems that the invisibility problem is closely connected
with the originality problem. But although all new skeptics think
there is an invisibility problem for Latin American philosophy, they
disagree about what to make of the originality problem. For new
skeptic Maite Ezcurdia (2003), it does arise. On her view, of four
kinds of originality she identifies as desirable in philosophy (viz.,
interpretative, argumentative, problem-making, and problem-solving),
Latin American philosophy comes out as having interpretative
originality, yet lacking originality of the other three kinds. In
particular, Ezcurdia contends that an improvement in problem-solving
originality is needed for fixing the EDP, which would in turn lead to
a solution to the IDP. On the other hand, Eduardo
Garcia-Ramirez (2011, p. 13) dismisses the originality
problem but writes: "even though there is enough originality,
most Latin American philosophy is haunted by the two proceedings of
arrogant reasoning: internal visibility is a function of the external
partly because Latin American philosophy is not used to thinking on
its own." Questions arise, however, as to how could there be
enough originality in a philosophy that's not used to thinking
on its own?


#### 2.2.3 The Authenticity Problem



According to distinctivists, a chief distinguishing characteristic of
Latin American philosophy is--or should be--authenticity, a
feature of any "philosophical product that, like any other
cultural product has integrity and is devoid of falsity or pretense.
In this sense, we say, for example, that Kant's philosophy is
authentic, but spiritism is pseudo-philosophy" (Salazar Bondy
1968, pp. 100-101, my translation). Salazar (1968, p. 101) and
(Hurtado 2006, p. 209) distinguish authenticity from
*peculiarity*, the regional coloring of a philosophical product
that is characteristically Latin American. A philosophical work may be
peculiar by virtue of discussing a Latin American theme or by virtue
of being the product of a Latin American author, even when it could
lack authenticity, originality, or both. At the same time, it could be
original and/or authentic without being peculiar. Since a full account
of such conceptual inter-relations goes beyond our present purpose,
let's stipulate that a Latin American philosophy is


1. *Original* just in case it is creative, non-imitative, or
novel;
2. *Authentic* just in case it is genuine or non-spurious;
and
3. *Peculiar* just in case it is characteristically Latin
American.



As pointed out by Salazar, feature (3) is the cheapest of all: it can
easily be obtained by a work whose topic, or even author, is
relevantly related to Latin America. Although, as we'll soon
see, peculiarity may be what some distinctivists actually have in
mind, more often they care most about authenticity--holding that
originality will come 'for anadidura' (as an
addition).



An early proposal to develop a peculiar Latin American philosophy is
that of the Argentine Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884) in his
"Ideas...." This short newspaper article, published
in Montevideo in 1840, offers advice about how to develop a high
school course in philosophy to be taught at the Colegio de Humanidades
(School of Humanities). It recommends that the course be aimed at
"instruct[ing] the youth in the principles that reside in the
conscience of our societies" (1840, p. 97, my translation). On
this view, Latin American philosophy should be devoted, not to
abstract metaphysics, but rather to applied philosophy, focusing on
the social and political issues of the day in the newly independent
nations of the region. But Alberdi's article also ventures into
metaphilosophical issues that were far beyond politics and diplomacy,
his areas of expertise--notoriously opining, among other things,
that it was for Europe, not Latin America, to do the theoretical
philosophical thinking (1840, p. 95). Not to be reprinted until the
following century, this article is unlikely to have had the influence
ascribed to it by some distinctivists of the 1940s and their
followers. The point is made forcefully by the Uruguayan Arturo Ardao
(1912-2003), a well-known historian of Latin American philosophy
who contends that the article "came to have influence in Latin
America in the context of the philosophical innovations of the 1940s,
precisely a year after its centennial. Its most decisive apologist
turned out to be the magisterial philosopher Gaos in Mexico "
(1991, p. xxiii, my translation). Arturo Roig also regards the
twentieth-century fascination with Alberdi's "Ideas"
as an ideological coincidence. He writes:



> 
> Gaos's opinions and theses conferred on Alberdi's text a
> significance more vast [than its actual one], which goes beyond the
> topic of a 'national philosophy' that was the framework
> within which the text was evaluated in Argentina. It also ascribed to
> it a scope unimagined by Alberdi. It appears, rather, that Alberdian
> historicist circumstantialism ended up coinciding with Mexican
> circumstantialism... (Roig 1981b, p. 1, my translation)
> 



For a more contemporary vindication of features of Latin American
philosophy akin to peculiarity, we'll need to turn to some of
the middle-way theories below. But first, let's consider the two
main strands of extreme distinctivism in Latin American philosophy,
the 'the critical theory' and
'circumstantialism' (also known as 'critical
view,' and 'culturalism' respectively; see e.g.,
Gracia and Jaksic 1986).



The critical theory is a hybrid that includes theses from early
twentieth century Marxists as well as the views of contemporary
'liberation philosophers,' who in turn combine Marxist
ideas with European doctrines from French structuralism, the Frankfurt
School, and other sources. Abundant textual evidence suggests that,
for the critical theorist, Latin America philosophy commonly lacks
originality, authenticity, and/or peculiarity. Thus, an early
representative of the view laments that:



> 
> All the thinkers of our America have been educated in European
> schools. The spirit of the race is not felt in their work. The
> continent's intellectual production lacks its distinguishing
> traits. It does not have an original profile. Hispanic-American
> thought is generally only a rhapsody composed from the motifs and
> elements of European thought. To prove this, one needs only review the
> work of the highest representatives of the Indo-Iberian intellect.
> (Mariategui 1925, p. 113, my translation)
> 



Similarly, a critical theorist of the 1940s regards Brazilian (and, by
extension, Latin American) philosophy as lacking originality,
authenticity and peculiarity by virtue of its creators'
"colonial mentality," a situation that would persist until
Latin America has won "complete independence--economic, and
cultural--from the imperialistic powers" (Coutinho 1943,
pp. 187-188). Analogous arguments were offered later by Salazar,
for whom Latin American philosophy had been, from its colonial
beginnings, only "a thought of the upper class or of a refined
oligarchical elite, when it has not corresponded openly to waves of
foreign economic and political influence. In all these cases
underdevelopment and domination are influential" (1969, p. 241).
Endorsing this line of reasoning, Roig declares that the work of
Founders such as the Peruvian Alejandro Deustua (1849-1945) is
"a prime example of the uprooting and the alienation in Latin
American thought denounced so vehemently by Augusto Salazar
Bondy" (1976, p. 251).



But it seems reductionist at best to hold that cultural dependence and
economic underdevelopment always determine a philosophy's
shortcomings in the features relevant here. A prime counterexample is
the ethics of las Casas mentioned above, which is original, authentic,
and peculiar, though developed under extreme cultural and economic
dependence (for more on this, see Nuccetelli 2013). Furthermore, the
critical theory also faces the following ad hominem objections:


* Since the critical theorist usually belongs to the upper class in
Latin American societies, which on her own view are incapable of
producing a philosophy with features (1)-(3), the critical
theory itself lacks (1)-(3) and should be rejected.
* The critical theorist usually borrows from European traditions
such as Marxism, existentialism, structuralism, and the Frankfurt
School. But borrowed traditions are, on her own view, incapable of
generating an authentic Latin American philosophy. It follows that the
critical theory is not authentic and should be rejected.



Objections along these lines (e.g., Gracia 2003 and Hurtado 2007),
together with its vulnerability to counterexamples, make the critical
theory implausible.



There is, however, another distinctivist theory that might be
plausible: circumstantialism. Famously expounded by the Mexican
Leopoldo Zea (1912-2004), its main concern is authenticity.
Putting aside its contention that an authentic philosophy is bound to
acquire originality and peculiarity at some point, here is
circumstantialism's main argument:


1. All philosophical works are authentic in that they invariably show
the cultural circumstance of their production.
2. *Therefore*, all Latin American philosophical works show
the cultural circumstance of their production.
3. *Therefore*, all Latin American philosophical works are
authentic.



Consistent with this argument, the circumstantialist maintains,



> 
> The abstract issues [of philosophy] will have to be seen from the
> Latin American man's own circumstance. Each man will see in such
> issues what is closest to his own circumstance. He will look at these
> issues from the standpoint of his own interests, and those interests
> will be determined by his way of life, his abilities and inabilities,
> in a word, by his own circumstance. In the case of Latin America, his
> contribution to the philosophy of such issues will be permeated by the
> Latin American circumstance. Hence, when we [Latin Americans] address
> abstract issues, we shall formulate them as issues of our own. Even
> though being, God, etc., are issues appropriate for every man, the
> solution to them will be given from a Latin American standpoint. (Zea
> 1948, p. 226)
> 



In this way, the circumstantialist appears to have dissolved the
alleged conflict between universalism and distinctivism. For, given
the above argument, the following claims are all compatible:


* There is an authentic Latin American philosophy.
* The problems and methods of philosophy are universal.
* Philosophers' 'circumstances' always shape their
theories and methods.



But the soundness of the cirumstantialist argument hinges on its
premise 1. This is a very strong claim which entails not only that (a)
the context of discovery (or creation) is to some degree apparent in
any philosophical theory, so that all theories are peculiar in the
above sense, but also that (b) such context renders them authentic.
Yet (a) is at the very least controversial, given that it is not
obvious what is Greek about Aristotle's theory of the syllogism
or German about Kant's categorical imperative (see Nuccetelli
2003, but compare Monahan 2005). Moreover, (a) may entail peculiarity,
not authenticity. For the latter, the circumstantialist needs (b), a
claim for which no sound argument is in the offing. In addition, as
argued in Gracia 2003, there is an irresolvable problem for anyone
attempting to specify what's necessary and sufficient for being
a Latin American cultural circumstance, as opposed to the
circumstances of other cultures. And no less difficult would be the
task of tracing the connections between philosophical theories and
culture in Latin America, given the bewildering diversity of cultures
that have flourished there.


#### 2.2.4 Reductionism about Latin American Philosophy



A number of recent contributors to the debate about the nature of
Latin American philosophy have contended that philosophical inquiry in
the discipline should focus on some historical, social, and/or
economic issues relevant to Latin Americans and their descendants in
the USA. For instance, according to Jose Antonio Orosco (2016)
Mexican American philosophy and Latin American philosophy as practice
in the United States should focus on developing the perspective of the
Mexican people and the Latin American people respectively. On his
view, the success of these disciplines hinges on their ability to deal
with "questions about [Mexican or Latino] identity, power, and
citizenship in the United States," which may have an impact on
"U.S. American political and social life" (Orosco 2016:
27). Since such issues belong to applied ethics and political
philosophy, his recommendation has direct reductionist connotations
assuming that he thinks that they are the *only* issues that
matter, or should matter, to practitioners of Mexican/Latin American
philosophy in the USA. But perhaps that connotation is not what Orosco
has in mind since that would defeat his own inquiry into the nature of
Mexican American and Latin American philosophy, both issues of
metaphilosophy. Silva Grant's 2015 proposal is analogously
reductionist. Elizabeth Millan Brusslan (2015) has objected to
it on the grounds that it is too exclusionary. After all, many
philosophical works that are content-related to Latin American
philosophy but do not engage in such social, historical, and/or
economic issues would be left out of Latin American philosophy. For
Grant, the sole task of this field is conducting inquiry into the
struggle of Latin Americans against colonialism. Nuccetelli (2018)
rejects any such proposal as a kind of thorough-going relativism
because different theorists would disagree about the issues that need
be the focus of Latin American philosophy. In addition, she argues
that such metaphilosophical reductionism has bad practical
consequences because it may contribute to an existing bias against
Latin American philosophers in the USA according to which they
commonly make either false or unsupported empirical claims about
issues that belong to other humanities or the social sciences. Susanna
Siegel (2014) recommends against contributing to this bias while
suggesting that philosophical questions are distinct from questions of
other humanities or the social sciences. On different grounds, many
practitioners of Latin American philosophers have noted the existence
of such a widespread bias (e.g., Covarrubias 2015, Gracia 2000,
Mendieta 1999, Sanchez 2011, and Vargas 2007, 2010).


### 2.3 Middle-Way Theories



Middle-way theories reject both strong universalism and strong
distinctivism. If successful, they would avoid the problems facing
each of those extremes--which, as we saw above, are skepticism
about Latin American philosophy (in strong universalism) and
ungrounded assumptions (in strong distinctivism). Here we'll
briefly consider three recent middle-way positions. The first two
agree that it would be possible to provide examples of sufficient
conditions for a work to count as Latin American philosophy. The
position discussed last undertakes the more ambitious project of
proposing a set of conditions that are necessary and jointly
sufficient.



2.3.1 Gracia's Ethnic-Philosophy Account



What we may call 'the ethnic-philosophy account'
(Gracia's 2003, 2008) is a neo-Wittgensteinian view holding that
Latin American philosophy (and more broadly, Hispanic and Latino/a
philosophy) is



> 
> [T]he philosophy of an ethnos, and insofar as it is so, and members of
> ethne do not necessarily share features in common, then what the
> philosophy of a particular ethnos is exactly will not require any
> features in common with other philosophies outside the ethnos or even
> within the ethnos throughout its history. This, I claim, is the best
> way of understanding the unity of Latin American philosophy. (Gracia
> 2008, p. 140)
> 



On this account, being the philosophy of the Latin American ethnos is
sufficient for counting as Latin American philosophy. At the same
time, the account holds that it is not possible to provide conditions
that are *necessary and jointly sufficient* for being an
instance of this ethnic philosophy. No such conditions are to be had,
even in the case of 'Spanish philosophy,' another ethnic
philosophy for which no necessary and sufficient conditions of
inclusion can be offered, even though it appears identifiable in
nationality terms--a conclusion suggested by the fact that
'Spanish philosophy' commonly includes figures such as
"Seneca and Averroes, philosophers who lived long before the
Spanish nation was constituted as a political reality, and whose
relationship to this nation, as we have known it since the sixteenth
century, is less than tenuous" (Gracia 2003, p. 57).



This conception of Latin American philosophy as an ethnic philosophy
is inspired by Wittgenstein's 'family resemblances'
theory for concepts such as 'game' and
'funny.' For example, there is no distinguishing feature
that all games have in common in virtue of which they are games.
Rather, there are resemblances between activities we call
'games' that are like the resemblances between members of
a single family. Similarly, there are no distinguishing properties of
an ethnic philosophy but numerous properties that would each be a
sufficient condition for belonging to it. This seems to entail that
that an ethnic philosophy can be categorized in a variety of ways,
given that its identity hinges at least in part on the adopted
"selective point of view" with regard to its properties.
Some cases illustrating the claim come readily to mind. Consider
Picasso's works. They may be legitimately categorized as French
under one selective point of view, and as Spanish under another. Thus,
whether they fall under one or the other is at least in part
contingent upon a selective point of view (Gracia 2003, p. 65).
Likewise, it is possible that certain philosophical works belong to
Latin American philosophy under one selective point of view, but not
under another. Thus, whether Latin American philosophy turns out to be
thin or robust would then itself be contingent, at least in part, upon
*which* selective point of view one were to adopt. In short,
since the concept 'Latin American philosophy' is
relevantly analogous to concepts such as 'game' or
'funny,' there are no necessary and sufficient conditions
for individuating Latin American philosophy; but a variety of
selective criteria are possible. Each such criterion would be
legitimate, provided that it captured a contextually determined,
sufficient condition for being an instance of Latin American
philosophy. Here is how the ethnic-philosophy theorist spells out his
view on this matter



> 
> In a context in which all texts are in English and have American
> authors except for one, who is Uruguayan, the origin of the author
> could be sufficient to identify the text as belonging to Latin
> American philosophy. In a situation in which we have a series of Latin
> texts published in Spain, but one of which was written by an author
> who spent the greatest part of his life in Mexico, we could identify
> this text as Latin American. (Gracia 2003, p. 64)
> 



One of the advantages of this account is its flexibility. For it
entails that Latin American philosophy can accommodate whatever works
meet an appropriate contextually determined condition, whether they be
nonstandard works such as those of las Casas and Guttierrez, or
mainstream ones such as those of Newton da Costa or C. Ulises Moulines
(more on this below). The account is also capable of accommodating the
fact that some works seem characteristically Latin American while
others have a universal import. Furthermore, it allows one to
classify, e.g., Kant's categorical imperative as German
philosophy in a context where an author's place of origin is
relevant, and as universal deontology in a context where birthplace is
not relevant.



The main challenge for this view is how to avoid an anything-goes form
of metaphilosophical relativism. Gracia (2003, p. 66) has sought to
eliminate this threat by emphasizing that it is not only a
contextually determined, selective point of view that matters for
individuating ethnic philosophies. Reality also has a role, possibly
in connection with history, which Gracia invokes to explain the nature
of "philosophical texts." On his view, these are
"historical entities, the product of historical beings in
particular times and places whose identities are linked to the context
in which they were produced and which, for that reason, depend on
them" (2003, p. 65). Metaphilosophical relativists can, however,
welcome this appeal to history, though they would further insist that
it is not only philosophical texts but also the truth of philosophical
theories that's similarly contingent upon historical context. In
fact, more than a mere logical possibility, relativism of this sort is
by now a strong twentieth century tradition in the philosophy of
science (see, e.g., Kuhn 1962, especially chapter 10).



2.3.2 Moulines's Compromise Account



Also a middle way between universalism and distinctivism is
Moulines's 2010 position. Like Gracia's account, it
vindicates only sufficient conditions for being an instance of Latin
American philosophy. But unlike Gracia's account,
Moulines's does not argue against the possibility of conditions
that are both necessary and jointly sufficient. His positive proposal
consists of four sufficient conditions that, on his view, a number of
recent works meet--namely, they are universal in the sense that
they use concepts and provide arguments that are intended to be
universally valid; (2) they have been developed by Latin American
authors; (3) they have been originally devised, at least partially, in
some Latin American countries; and (4) they have found widespread
interest both *in* and *outside* Latin America.



Satisfying (1) through (4) is considered sufficient for a work to be
"an instantiation of 'Latin American
philosophy'" (Moulines 2010, p. 460). Moulines's
sample of such instances includes several brands of theories and/or
methods developed by contemporary Latin American philosophers such as
paraconsistent logic (by Brazilian Newton da Costa and his
collaborators), formal deontic logic (by Argentinean Carlos
Alchourron and Eugenio Bulygin), belief revision (in part by
Alchourron), scientific realism (by Argentinean Mario Bunge), a
historical approach to the foundations of physics (by Chilean Roberto
Torreti), and structuralist theory of science (by Venezuelan Moulines
and his collaborators).



According to Moulines, conditions (1) through (4) express an
understanding of Latin American philosophy that is
"'universalist' as much as
'distinctivist'" (2010, p. 460). A quick look at
them suggests that (1) is relevant to universalism, (2) and (3) to
distinctivism, and (4) to neither because it is neutral, though it
bears on the external invisibility problem mentioned above. But note
that(2) and (3) are distinctivist only in terms of
'peculiarity'--which, as pointed out earlier, is the
cheapest of the distinctive properties at issue on this debate.



2.3.3 Nuccetelli's Applied-Philosophy Account



Another mid-way position to be considered here was developed in
Nuccetelli 2002 and 2009. It proposes a set of conditions that are
taken to be both necessary and jointly sufficient for being an
instance of a *characteristically* Latin American
philosophy--namely, that any qualifying work must


1. Contain philosophical arguments or methods that are sufficiently
original, and
2. Be sensitive to a Latin America context.



Any work satisfying (1) and (2) would count as characteristically
Latin American in Nuccetelli's sense. She further contends that
there is a robust body of philosophical work in Latin America that
satisfies these conditions. It is mostly devoted to issues of moral,
social, and political philosophy and includes the works of both,
non-academic and academic philosophers. Thus construed, Latin American
philosophy comes out as a branch of applied philosophy and its
existence is consistent with that of universal philosophy--which
is grounded in a variety of traditions of Western philosophy and
devoted to problems that have universal import such as knowledge and
skepticism, the nature of consciousness, moral reasoning, and the
existence and attributes of God. A Latin American philosopher may
cultivate either universal philosophy or some branch of applied
philosophy, including Latin American philosophy. From the time of the
Founders to the present, there has been a long list of those who in
fact did both.


## 3. The Issue of the Name



A final note on the issue of the name: Latin American philosophers
have expressed a number of different preferences about what to call
the field. The standard name preferred here has been 'Latin
American philosophy.' But there are other options, depending on
whether 'thought' takes the place of
'philosophy,' and/or 'Iberoamerican,'
'Hispanic,' 'Hispanic-American' or
'Latino/a' (among other qualifiers) takes the place of
'Latin American.' Keeping in mind that not all
replacements would be semantically equivalent (a topic revisited
later), note that the rationale for using 'thought' in
lieu of 'philosophy' is to do justice to the breadth of
philosophical developments in Latin America--which, as
we've seen, includes a vast corpus of non-standard, non-academic
philosophical works. There is no common rationale for substituting any
of the above qualifiers for 'Latin American.' But each
proposed qualifier (including 'Latin American') inherits a
problem faced by the proper name from which it derives. The problem
may be semantic or pragmatic, where


* A *semantic problem* arises for the use of a term in the
absence of satisfactory criteria for determining its meaning or
reference, and
* A *pragmatic problem* arises for the use of a term in the
presence of morally, politically, or socially unacceptable
connotations associated with that term.



As an illustration, let's consider the term preferred here,
'Latin American philosophy.' Its qualifier derives from
'Latin America,' which appears to suffer from both types
of problem. With few exceptions (e.g., Oliver 1998), those who have
recently reflected on this term go beyond geography and politics to
consider also factors such as culture and history in order to
determine this term's meaning and reference. But it has proved
difficult to find criteria that avoid semantic problems such as


* The term is too broad since 'Latin America,' when used
literally and directly, refers to certain people and territories which
are not ordinarily taken to be Latin American (e.g., the
Quebecois).
* The term is too narrow since 'Latin America,' when
used literally and directly, does *not* refer to peoples and
territories that are ordinarily taken to be Latin American (e.g., the
indigenous peoples of Latin America).
* The term is both too broad and too narrow since 'Latin
America' faces both of the previous problems.



Jorge Gracia (2011a, p. 8) offers a way around these problems by
taking 'Latin America' to refer to "everything in
the Americas that is not American (U.S.) or Canadian." This
extensional, negative criterion gets things right provided it assumes
a cultural understanding of 'American (U.S.)' and
'Canadian.' Without that assumption, the criterion would
be both too narrow and too broad, for it would exclude Puerto Rico,
which is politically part of the U.S., and include St. Pierre and
Miquelon, which are French islands off the coast of Canada. But Gracia
(2011a, p. 8) seems to have in mind the relevant cultural
understanding of the term, because he notes that "those parts of
the Caribbean and South America that were French, Dutch, or English
colonies, such as Haiti and Jamaica" are not part of Latin
America (i.e., *culturally* understood).



On the other hand, Eduardo Rabossi (2003) explicitly provides a set of
intensional criteria, which he appears to consider necessary and
sufficient for falling under the reference of 'Latin
America.' According to them, the term denotes certain
"states" of North, Central, and South America by virtue of
their sharing "a common political origin (Spanish/Portuguese
conquest), a similar linguistic heritage (Spanish/Portuguese), a
dominant religion (Catholicism), and comparable predicaments *vis
a vis* local, regional, and international affairs"
(Rabossi 2003, p. 507). Rabossi's criteria, which are more
restrictive, avoid being too broad, but face the problem of being too
narrow, which makes them unsatisfactory.



Guillermo Hurtado's (2010) reflection on the adequacy of the
qualifier 'Latin American' illustrates the pragmatic
problem mentioned above. First, Hurtado too takes 'Latin
America' to denote a culturally specific region of the Americas,
one individuated by appeal to language: viz., being a region of the
Americas that mostly speaks Spanish, Portuguese or French. Perhaps
aware of the problem of being too broad, Hurtado attempts to avoid it
by excluding Quebec from the designation of 'Latin
America' on the seemingly *ad hoc* ground that the region
is surrounded by mostly 'Anglo-Saxon' Canada. In any case,
his account of 'Latin American' and 'the Latin
American' appears to point to a pragmatic problem arising from
some facts about those terms' introduction into public
discourse. According to Hurtado, there is historical evidence that
they were introduced into public discourse in the late nineteenth
century by the French, who did so in order to advance their national
interest in dealing with the Latin and Catholic nations of the
Americas (as opposed to the Protestant and 'Anglo-Saxon'
nations). Once these terms had caught on in thought and language,
their role in discourse was unaffected by the defeat of the French in
the region, except for the fact that 'Latin America' came
instead to be just "an *ideal* of union among the nations
that compose it" (Hurtado 2010, p. 11, my translation and
emphasis). At the end of the day, however, Hurtado continues to use
these terms without explaining why we should do so, given that,
according to his own story, they were introduced for colonialist
purposes--and therefore face the pragmatic
 problem.[3]
 In addition, given this account, it would seem that those terms now
refer to nothing objective at all.



Be that as it may, let's now consider some of the other options.
'Iberoamerican' and 'Hispanic American' are
the closest relatives of 'Latin American.' Neither of
these alternatives is problem free, since they inherit the pragmatic
problem facing the nouns from whence they derive, 'Iberia'
and 'Hispania.' Each of these ancient proper names
designates the European peninsula today divided into Spain and
Portugal. Thus, taken literally, each has connotations unacceptable to
the descendants of the victims of these countries' colonial
policies in the Americas.



On the other hand, 'Hispanic philosophy' and
'Latino/a philosophy' are more recent terms whose semantic
features are not yet fully settled by usage. Roughly, 'Hispanic
philosophy' may include Iberian philosophy too (Gracia 2000),
while 'Latino/a philosophy' is the philosophy of or about
the descendants of Latin Americans abroad, especially in the United
States (Gracia 2011b). As noted above in the cases of
'Iberoamerican' and 'Hispanic American,' both
'Hispanic' and 'Latino/a' also appear to have
inherited the pragmatic problem for the proper nouns from which each
derives (it should now be obvious to the reader what those problems
are).



But it may be that no such pragmatic problem matters after all for
justifying the current use of 'Latin American' or some of
the alternative terms. That would be so if the reference of the proper
name from which any such term derives is direct, in the sense that it
is not mediated by the term's descriptive
 meaning.[4]
 On this account, the justification for using the term needs only
appeal to linguistic convention.