## 1. Varieties of Anarchism



There are various forms of anarchism. Uniting this variety is the
general critique of centralized, hierarchical power and authority.
Given that authority, centralization, and hierarchy show up in various
ways and in different discourses, institutions, and practices, it is
not surprising that the anarchist critique has been applied in diverse
ways.


### 1.1 Political Anarchism



Anarchism is primarily understood as a skeptical theory of political
legitimation. The term anarchism is derived from the negation of the
Greek term *arche*, which means first principle,
foundation, or ruling power. Anarchy is thus rule by no one or
non-rule. Some argue that non-ruling occurs when there is rule by
all--with consensus or unanimity providing an optimistic goal
(see Depuis-Deri 2010).



Political anarchists focus their critique on state power, viewing
centralized, monopolistic coercive power as illegitimate. Anarchists
thus criticize "the state". Bakunin provides a paradigm
historical example, saying:



> 
> 
> If there is a State, there must be domination of one class by another
> and, as a result, slavery; the State without slavery is
> unthinkable--and this is why we are the enemies of the State.
> (Bakunin 1873 [1990: 178])
> 
> 
> 



A more recent example comes from Gerard Casey who writes,
"states are criminal organizations. All states, not just the
obviously totalitarian or repressive ones" (Casey 2012: 1).



Such sweeping generalizations are difficult to support. Thus anarchism
as political philosophy faces the challenge of specificity. States
have been organized in various ways. Political power is not
monolithic. Sovereignty is a complicated matter that includes
divisions and distributions of power (see Fiala 2015). Moreover, the
historical and ideological context of a given anarchist's
critique makes a difference in the content of the political
anarchist's critique. Bakunin was responding primarily to a
Marxist and Hegelian view of the state, offering his critique from
within the global socialist movement; Casey is writing in the
Twenty-First Century in the era of liberalism and globalization,
offering his critique from within the movement of contemporary
libertarianism. Some anarchists engage in broad generalizations,
aiming for a total critique of political power. Others will present a
localized critique of a given political entity. An ongoing challenge
for those who would seek to understand anarchism is to realize how
historically and ideologically diverse approaches fit under the
general anarchist umbrella. We look at political anarchism in detail
below.


### 1.2 Religious Anarchism



The anarchist critique has been extended toward the rejection of
non-political centralization and authority. Bakunin extended his
critique to include religion, arguing against both God and the State.
Bakunin rejected God as the absolute master, saying famously,
"if God really existed, it would be necessary to abolish
him" (Bakunin 1882 [1970: 28]).



There are, however, religious versions of anarchism, which critique
political authority from a standpoint that takes religion seriously.
Rapp (2012) has shown how anarchism can be found in Taoism. And
Ramnath (2011) has identified anarchist threads in Islamic Sufism, in
Hindu *bhakti* movements, in Sikhism's anti-caste
efforts, and in Buddhism. We consider anarchism in connection with
Gandhi below. But we focus here on Christian anarchism.



Christian anarchist theology views the kingdom of God as lying beyond
any human principle of structure or order. Christian anarchists offer
an anti-clerical critique of ecclesiastical and political power.
Tolstoy provides an influential example. Tolstoy claims that
Christians have a duty not to obey political power and to refuse to
swear allegiance to political authority (see Tolstoy 1894). Tolstoy
was also a pacifist. Christian anarcho-pacifism views the state as
immoral and unsupportable because of its connection with military
power (see Christoyannopoulos 2011). But there are also non-pacifist
Christian anarchists. Berdyaev, for example, builds upon Tolstoy and
in his own interpretation of Christian theology. Berdyaev concludes:
"The Kingdom of God is anarchy" (Berdyaev 1940 [1944:
148]).



Christian anarchists have gone so far as to found separatist
communities where they live apart from the structures of the state.
Notable examples include New England transcendentalists such as
William Garrison and Adin Ballou. These transcendentalists had an
influence on Tolstoy (see Perry 1973 [1995]).



Other notable Christians with anarchist sympathies include Peter
Maurin and Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker movement. In more recent
years, Christian anarchism has been defended by Jacques Ellul who
links Christian anarchism to a broad social critique. In addition to
being pacifistic, Ellul says, Christian anarchism should also be
"antinationalist, anticapitalist, moral, and
antidemocratic" (Ellul 1988 [1991: 13]). The Christian anarchist
ought to be committed to "a true overturning of authorities of
all kinds" (Ellul 1988 [1991: 14]). When asked whether a
Christian anarchist should vote, Ellul says no. He states,
"anarchy first implies conscientious objection" (Ellul
1988 [1991: 15]).


### 1.3 Theoretical Anarchism



Anarchist rejection of authority has application in epistemology and
in philosophical and literary theory. One significant usage of the
term shows up in American pragmatism. William James described his
pragmatist philosophical theory as a kind of anarchism: "A
radical pragmatist is a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of
creature" (James 1907 [1981: 116]). James had anarchist
sympathies, connected to a general critique of systematic philosophy
(see Fiala 2013b). Pragmatism, like other anti-systematic and
post-Hegelian philosophies, gives up on the search for an
*arche* or foundation.



Anarchism thus shows up as a general critique of prevailing methods.
An influential example is found in the work of Paul Feyerabend, whose
*Against Method* provides an example of "theoretical
anarchism" in epistemology and philosophy of science (Feyerabend
1975 [1993]). Feyerabend explains:



> 
> 
> Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism
> is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its
> law-and-order alternatives. (Feyerabend 1975 [1993: 9])
> 
> 
> 



His point is that science ought not be constrained by hierarchically
imposed principles and strict rule following.



Post-structuralism and trends in post-modernism and Continental
philosophy can also be anarchistic (see May 1994). So-called
"post-anarchism" is a decentered and free-flowing
discourse that deconstructs power, questions essentialism, and
undermines systems of authority. Following upon the deconstructive and
critical work of authors such as Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, and
others, this critique of the *arche* goes all the way
down. If there is no *arche* or foundation, then we are
left with a proliferation of possibilities. Emerging trends in
globalization, cyber-space, and post-humanism make the anarchist
critique of "the state" more complicated, since
anarchism's traditional celebration of liberty and autonomy can
be critically scrutinized and deconstructed (see Newman 2016).



Traditional anarchists were primarily interested in sustained and
focused political activism that led toward the abolition of the state.
The difference between free-flowing post-anarchism and traditional
anarchism can be seen in the realm of morality. Anarchism has
traditionally been critical of centralized moral authority--but
this critique was often based upon fundamental principles and
traditional values, such as autonomy or liberty. But
post-structuralism--along with critiques articulated by some
feminists, critical race theorists, and critics of
Eurocentrism--calls these values and principles into
question.


### 1.4 Applied Anarchism



The broad critical framework provided by the anarchist critique of
authority provides a useful theory or methodology for social critique.
In more recent iterations, anarchism has been used to critique gender
hierarchies, racial hierarchies, and the like--also including a
critique of human domination over nature. Thus anarchism also
includes, to name a few varieties: anarcha-feminism or feminist
anarchism (see Kornegger 1975), queer anarchism or anarchist queer
theory (see Daring et al. 2010), green anarchism or eco-anarchism also
associated with anarchist social ecology (see Bookchin 1971 [1986]),
Black and indigenous anarchisms and other anarchist critiques of white
supremacy and Eurocentrism (to be discussed below); and even
anarcho-veganism or "veganarchism" (see Nocella, White,
& Cudworth 2015). In the anarcho-vegan literature we find the
following description of a broad and inclusive anarchism:



> 
> 
> Anarchism is a socio-political theory which opposes all systems of
> domination and oppression such as racism, ableism, sexism,
> anti-LGBTTQIA, ageism, sizeism, government, competition, capitalism,
> colonialism, imperialism and punitive justice, and promotes direct
> democracy, collaboration, interdependence, mutual aid, diversity,
> peace, transformative justice and equity. (Nocella et al. 2015: 7)
> 
> 
> 



A thorough-going anarchism would thus offer a critique of anything and
everything that smacks of hierarchy, domination, centralization, and
unjustified authority.



Anarchists who share these various commitments often act upon their
critique of authority by engaging in nonconformist practices (free
love, nudism, gender disruption, and so on) or by forming intentional
communities that live "off the grid" and outside of the
norms of mainstream culture. In extreme forms this becomes
anarcho-primitivism or anti-civilizational anarchism (see Zerzan 2008,
2010; Jensen 2006). Alternative anarchist societies have existed in
religious communes in post-Reformation Europe and in the early United
States, in Nineteenth Century American utopian communities, the hippy
communes of the Twentieth Century, anarchist squats, temporary
autonomous zones (see Bey 1985), and occasional gatherings of
like-minded people.



Given this sort of antinomianism and non-conformism it is easy to see
that anarchism also often includes a radical critique of traditional
ethical norms and principles. Thus radical ethical anarchism can be
contrasted with what we might call bourgeois anarchism (with radical
anarchism seeking to disrupt traditional social norms and bourgeois
anarchism seeking freedom from the state that does not seek such
disruption). And although some argue that anarchists are deeply
ethical--committed to liberty and solidarity--others will
argue that anarchists are moral nihilists who reject morality entirely
or who at least reject the idea that there could be a single source of
moral authority (see essays in Franks & Wilson 2010).



In more recent explorations and applications of anarchist thought, the
anarchist critique has been related and connected to a variety of
emerging theoretical issues and applied concerns. Hilary Lazar (2018)
for example, explores how anarchism connects to intersectionality and
issues related to multiculturalism. And Sky Croeser (2019) explores
how anarchism is connected to the emerging technologies including the
Internet. And there are anarchist elements in the development of
shared technological and information, as for example in the
development of cryptocurrencies, which create economies that outside
of traditional state-based economic systems.


### 1.5 Black, Indigenous, and Decolonizing Anarchism



As mentioned above, among the varieties of applied anarchism we find
anarchism associated with various liberation movements and critiques
of white supremacy, Eurocentrism, and colonialism. This could be
connected with feminist anarchism, women's liberation movements,
and an anarchist critique of patriarchy. We'll focus here on the
anarchist critique found in Black and indigenous liberation movements.
Gandhi's movement in India could be included here (as discussed
below). 



One focal point here is a claim about anarchist characteristics
thought to be found in the social structures of indigenous peoples.
Sometimes this is a romantic projection of anti-civilizational
anarchists such as John Zerzan, who echoes Rousseau's naive and
ill-informed ideal of the "noble savage." One must be careful to avoid
essentializing claims made about indigenous cultures and political
societies. The Inca and the Aztec empires were obviously not utopian
anarchist collectives. Nonetheless, scholars of indigeneity affirm the
anarchist critique of dominant hegemonies as part of the effort of
liberation that would allow indigenous people a degree of
self-determination (see Johnson and Ferguson 2019).



Black and indigenous anarchisms provide a radical critique, which
holds that the global history of genocide, slavery, colonization, and
exploitation rest upon the assumption of white supremacy. White
supremacy is thus understood, from this point of view, as a
presupposition of statism, centralization, hierarchy, and authority.
The anarchist critique of white supremacy is thus linked to a critique
of social and political systems that evolved out of the history of
slavery and native genocide to include apartheid, inequality,
caste/racial hierarchies, and other forms of structural racism. Some
defenders of Black anarchism go so far as to suggest that when
"Blackness" is defined in opposition to structures of white supremacy,
there is a kind of anarchism woven into the concept. Anderson and
Samudzi write, 



> 
> 
> While bound to the laws of the land, Black America can be understood
> as an extra-state entity because of Black exclusion from the liberal
> social contract. Due to this extra-state location, Blackness is, in so
> many ways, anarchistic. (Anderson and Samudzi 2017: no page
> numbers)
> 
> 
> 



This implies that the experience of Black people unfolds in a social
and political world that its defined by its exclusion from power. A
similar implication holds for indigenous people, who have been
subjugated and dominated by colonial power. Liberation movements thus
spring from a social experience that is in a sense anarchic (i.e.,
developed in exclusion from and opposition to structures of power).
It is not surprising, then, that some liberatory activists espouse and
affirm anarchism. The American activist Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin,
for example, affirms anarchism in pursuit of Black liberation (Ervin
1997 [2016]). He explains that Black anarchism is different from what
he describes as the more authoritarian hierarchy of the Black Panther
party. He also argues against the authoritarian structure of
religiously oriented Black liberation movements, such as that led by
Martin Luther King, Jr. 



A significant issue in Black and indigenous anarchisms is the effort
to decolonize anarchism itself. Many of the key figures in the
anarchist tradition are white, male, and European. The concerns of
anarchists such as Kropotkin or Bakunin may be different from the
concerns of African Americans or from the concerns of indigenous
people in Latin America or elsewhere around the globe. One solution to
this problem is to retrieve forgotten voices from within the
tradition. In this regard, we might consider Lucy Parsons (also known
as Lucy Gonzalez), a former slave who espoused anarchism. Parsons
explained that she affirmed anarchism because the political status quo
produced nothing but misery and starvation for the masses of humanity.
To resolve this an anarchist revolution was needed. Parsons said,



> 
> 
> Most anarchists believe the coming change can only come through a
> revolution, because the possessing class will not allow a peaceful
> change to take place; still we are willing to work for peace at any
> price, except at the price of liberty. (Parsons 1905 [2010])
> 
> 
> 


## 2. Anarchism in Political Philosophy



Anarchism in political philosophy maintains that there is no
legitimate political or governmental authority. In political
philosophy anarchy is an important topic for consideration--even
for those who are not anarchists--as the a-political background
condition against which various forms of political organization are
arrayed, compared, and justified. Anarchy is often viewed by
non-anarchists as the unhappy or unstable condition in which there is
no legitimate authority. Anarchism as a philosophical idea is not
necessarily connected to practical activism. There are political
anarchists who take action in order to destroy what they see as
illegitimate states. The popular imagination often views anarchists as
bomb-throwing nihilists. But philosophical anarchism is a theoretical
standpoint. In order to decide who (and whether) one should act upon
anarchist insight, we require a further theory of political action,
obligation, and obedience grounded in further ethical reflection.
Simmons explains that philosophical anarchists "do not take the
illegitimacy of states to entail a strong moral imperative to oppose
or eliminate states" (Simmons 2001: 104). Some anarchists remain
obedient to ruling authorities; others revolt or resist in various
ways. The question of action depends upon a theory of what sort of
political obligation follows from our philosophical, moral, political,
religious, and aesthetic commitments.


### 2.1 Anarchism in the History of Political Philosophy



There is a long history of political anarchism. In the ancient world,
anarchism of a sort can be found in the ideas of the Epicureans and
Cynics. Kropotkin makes this point in his 1910 encyclopedia article.
Although they did not employ the term anarchism, the Epicureans and
Cynics avoided political activity, advising retreat from political
life in pursuit of tranquility (*ataraxia*) and self-control
(*autarkeai*). The Cynics are also known for advocating
cosmopolitanism: living without allegiance to any particular state or
legal system, while associating with human beings based upon moral
principle outside of traditional state structures. Diogenes the Cynic
had little respect for political or religious authority. One of his
guiding ideas was to "deface the currency". This meant not
only devaluing or destroying monetary currency but also a general
rejection of the norms of civilized society (see Marshall 2010: 69).
Diogenes often mocked political authorities and failed to offer signs
of respect. While Diogenes actively disrespected established norms,
Epicurus counseled retreat. He advised living unnoticed and avoiding
political life (under the phrase *me politeuesthai*--which
can be understood as an anti-political admonition).



The assumption that anarchy would be unhappy or unstable leads to
justifications of political power. In Hobbes' famous phrase, in
the stateless--anarchic--condition of "the state
nature" human life would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short. Hobbes' social contract--as well as other versions
of the social contract theory as found for example in Locke or
Rousseau--are attempts to explain how and why the political state
emerges from out of the anarchic state of nature.



Anarchists respond by claiming that the state tends to produce its own
sort of unhappiness: as oppressive, violent, corrupt, and inimical to
liberty. Discussions about the social contract thus revolve around the
question of whether the state is better than anarchy--or whether
states and state-like entities naturally and inevitably emerge from
out of the original condition of anarchy. One version of this argument
about the inevitable emergence of states (by way of something like an
"invisible hand") is found in Nozick's influential
*Anarchy, State, Utopia* (1974). While Nozick and other
political philosophers take anarchy seriously as a starting point,
anarchists will argue that invisible hand arguments of this sort
ignore the historical actuality of states, which develop out of a long
history of domination, inequality, and oppression. Murray Rothbard has
argued against Nozick and social contract theory, saying, "no
existing state has been immaculately conceived" (Rothbard 1977:
46). Different versions of the social contract theory, such as we find
in John Rawls's work, view the contract situation as a heuristic
device allowing us to consider justice from under "the veil of
ignorance". But anarchists will argue that the idea of the
original position does not necessarily lead to the justification of
the state--especially given background knowledge about the
tendency of states to be oppressive. Crispin Sartwell concludes:



> 
> 
> Even accepting more or less all of the assumptions Rawls packs into
> the original position, it is not clear that the contractors would not
> choose anarchy. (Sartwell 2008: 83)
> 
> 
> 



The author of the present essay has described anarchism that results
from a critique of the social contract tradition as "liberal
social contract anarchism" (Fiala 2013a).



An important historical touchstone is William Godwin. Unlike Locke and
Hobbes who turned to the social contract to lead us out of the
anarchic state of nature, Godwin argued that the resulting
governmental power was not necessarily better than anarchy. Locke, of
course, allows for revolution when the state becomes despotic. Godwin
builds upon that insight. He explained, "we must not hastily
conclude that the mischiefs of anarchy are worse than those which
government is qualified to produce" (Godwin 1793: bk VII, chap.
V, p. 736). He claimed,



> 
> 
> It is earnestly to be desired that each man should be wise enough to
> govern himself, without the intervention of any compulsory restraint;
> and, since government, even in its best state, is an evil, the object
> principally to be aimed at is that we should have as little of it as
> the general peace of human society will permit. (Godwin 1793: bk III,
> chap. VII, p. 185-6)
> 
> 
> 



Like Rousseau, who praised the noble savage, who was free from social
chains until forced into society, Godwin imagined original anarchy
developing into the political state, which tended on his view to
become despotic. Once the state comes into being, Godwin suggests that
despotism is the primary problem since "despotism is as
perennial as anarchy is transitory" (Godwin 1793: bk VII, chap.
V, p. 736).



Anarchism is often taken to mean that individuals ought to be left
alone without any unifying principle or governing power. In some cases
anarchism is related to libertarianism (or what is sometimes called
"anarcho-capitalism"). But non-rule may also occur when
there is unanimity or consensus--and hence no need for external
authority or a governing structure of command and obedience. If there
were unanimity among individuals, there would be no need for
"ruling", authority, or government. The ideas of unanimity
and consensus are associated with the positive conception of anarchism
as a voluntary association of autonomous human beings, which promotes
communal values. One version of the anarchist ideal imagines the
devolution of centralized political authority, leaving us with
communes whose organizational structure is open-ended and
consensual.



Given this emphasis on communal organization it is not surprising that
political anarchism has a close historical association with communism,
despite the connection mentioned above with free market capitalism.
Authors such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Goldman developed their
anarchism as a response to Marx and Marxism. One of the first authors
to explicitly affirm anarchism, Pierre Proudhon, defended a kind of
"communism", which he understood as being grounded in
decentralized associations, communes, and mutual-aid societies.
Proudhon thought that private property created despotism. He argued
that liberty required anarchy, concluding,



> 
> 
> The government of man by man (under whatever name it be disguised) is
> oppression. Society finds its highest perfection in the union of order
> with anarchy. (Proudhon 1840 [1876: 286])
> 
> 
> 



Following Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and the other so-called
"classical anarchists", anarchism comes to be seen as a
focal point for political philosophy and activism.



Let's turn to a conceptual analysis of different arguments made
in defense of anarchism.


### 2.2 Absolute, Deontological, and *a priori* Anarchism



Anarchists often make categorical claims to the effect that no state
is legitimate or that there can no such thing as a justifiable
political state. As an absolute or *a priori* claim, anarchism
holds that all states always and everywhere are illegitimate and
unjust. The term "*a priori* anarchism" is found in
Simmons 2001; but it is employed already by Kropotkin in his
influential 1910 article on anarchism, where he claims that anarchists
are not utopians who argue against the state in *a priori*
fashion (Kropotkin 1927 [2002: 285]). Despite Kropotkin's claim,
some anarchists do offer *a priori* arguments against the
state. This sort of claim rests upon an account of the justification
of authority that is usually grounded in some form of deontological
moral claim about the importance of individual liberty and a logical
claim about the nature of state authority.



One typical and well-known example of this argument is found in the
work of Robert Paul Wolff. Wolff indicates that legitimate authority
rests upon a claim about the right to command obedience (Wolff 1970).
Correlative to this is a duty to obey: one has a duty to obey
legitimate authority. As Wolff explains, by appealing to ideas found
in Kant and Rousseau, the duty to obey is linked to notions about
autonomy, responsibility, and rationality. But for Wolff and other
anarchists, the problem is that the state does not have legitimate
authority. As Wolff says of the anarchist, "he will never view
the commands of the state as legitimate, as having a binding moral
force" (Wolff 1970: 16). The categorical nature of this claim
indicates a version of absolute anarchism. If the state's
commands are never legitimate and create no moral duty of obedience,
then there can never be a legitimate state. Wolff imagines that there
could be a legitimate state grounded in "unanimous direct
democracy"--but he indicates that unanimous direct
democracy would be "so restricted in its application that it
offers no serious hope of ever being embodied in an actual
state" (Wolff 1970: 55). Wolff concludes:



> 
> 
> If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree
> of autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose
> subjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the
> concept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous, and
> philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political
> belief for an enlightened man. (Wolff 1970: 17)
> 
> 
> 



As Wolff puts it here, there appears to be "no state" that
is legitimate. This claim is stated in absolute and *a priori*
fashion, a point made by Reiman in his critique of Wolff (Reiman
1972). Wolff does not deny, by the way, that there are de facto
legitimate states: governments often do have the approval and support
of the people they govern. But this approval and support is merely
conventional and not grounded in a moral duty; and approval and
support are manufactured and manipulated by the coercive power and
propaganda and ideology of the state.



We noted here that Wolff's anarchism is connected to Kant. But
Kant is no anarchist: he defended the idea of enlightened republican
government in which autonomy would be preserved. Rousseau may be
closer to espousing anarchism in some of his remarks--although
these are far from systematic (see McLaughlin 2007). Some authors view
Rousseau as espousing something close to "*a posteriori*
philosophical anarchism" (see Bertram 2010 [2017])--which
we will define in the next section. Among classical political
philosophers, we might also consider Locke in connection with
"libertarian anarchism" (see Varden 2015) or Locke as
offering a theory "on the edge of anarchism", as Simmons
has put it (Simmons 1993). But despite his strong defense of
individual rights, the stringent way he describes voluntary consent,
and his advocacy of revolution, Locke believes that states can be
defended based upon the social contract theory.



Leaving the canonical authors of Western political philosophy aside,
the most likely place to find deontological and *a priori*
anarchism is among the Christian anarchists. Of course, most
Christians are not anarchists. But those Christians who espouse
anarchism usually do so with the absolute, deontological, and *a
priori* claims of the sort made by Tolstoy, Berdyaev, and
Ellul--as noted above.


### 2.3 Contingent, Consequentialist, and *a posteriori* Anarchism



A less stringent form of anarchism will argue that states could be
justified in theory--even though, in practice, no state or very
few states are actually legitimate. Contingent anarchism will hold
that states in the present configuration of things fail to live up to
the standards of their own justification. This is an *a
posteriori* argument (see Simmons 2001) based both in a
theoretical account of the justification of the state (for example,
the social contract theory of liberal-democratic theory) and in an
empirical account of how and why concrete states fail to be justified
based upon this theory. The author of the present article has offered
a version of this argument based upon the social contract theory,
holding that the liberal-democratic social contract theory provides
the best theory of the justification of the state, while arguing that
very few states actually live up to the promise of the social contract
theory (Fiala 2013a).



One version of the contingent anarchist argument focuses on the
question of the burden of proof for accounts that would justify
political authority. This approach has been articulated by Noam
Chomsky, who explains:



> 
> 
> [This] is what I have always understood to be the essence of
> anarchism: the conviction that the burden of proof has to be placed on
> authority, and that it should be dismantled if that burden cannot be
> met. Sometimes the burden can be met. (Chomsky 2005: 178)
> 
> 
> 



Chomsky accepts legitimate authority based in ordinary experience: for
example, when a grandfather prevents a child from darting out into the
street. But state authority is a much more complicated affair.
Political relationships are attenuated; there is the likelihood of
corruption and self-interest infecting political reality; there are
levels and degrees of mediation, which alienate us from the source of
political authority; and the rational autonomy of adults is important
and fundamental. By focusing on the burden of proof, Chomsky
acknowledges that there may be ways to meet the burden of proof for
the justification of the state. But he points out that there is a
prima facie argument against the state--which is based in a
complex historical and empirical account of the role of power,
economics, and historical inertia in creating political institutions.
He explains:



> 
> 
> Such institutions face a heavy burden of proof: it must be shown that
> under existing conditions, perhaps because of some overriding
> consideration of deprivation or threat, some form of authority,
> hierarchy, and domination is justified, despite the prima facie case
> against it--a burden that can rarely be met. (Chomsky 2005:
> 174)
> 
> 
> 



Chomsky does not deny that the burden of proof could be met. Rather,
his point is that there is a prima facie case against the state, since
the burden of proof for the justification of the state is rarely
met.



Contingent anarchism is based in consequentialist reasoning, focused
on details of historical actuality. Consequentialist anarchism will
appeal to utilitarian considerations, arguing that states generally
fail to deliver in terms of promoting the happiness of the greater
number of people--and more strongly that state power tends to
produce unhappiness. The actuality of inequality, classism, elitism,
racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression can be used to support
an anarchist argument, holding that even though a few people benefit
from state power, a larger majority suffers under it.



There is a significant difference between anarchism that is offered in
pursuit of utilitarianism's greater happiness ideal and
anarchism that is offered in defense of the minority against the
tyranny of the majority. As we shall see in the next section,
individualist anarchists are primarily concerned with the tendency of
utilitarian politics to sacrifice the rights of individuals in the
name of the greater good.



Before turning to that conception of anarchism, let's note two
classical authors who offer insight into utilitarian anarchism. Godwin
articulated a form of anarchism that is connected to a utilitarian
concern. Godwin's general moral thought is utilitarian in basic
conception, even though he also argues based upon fundamental
principles such as the importance of liberty. But Godwin's
arguments are *a posteriori*, based upon generalizations from
history and with an eye toward the future development of happiness and
liberty. He writes:



> 
> 
> Above all we should not forget, that government is an evil, an
> usurpation upon the private judgment and individual conscience of
> mankind; and that, however we may be obliged to admit it as a
> necessary evil for the present. (Godwin 1793: bk V, ch. I, p. 380)
> 
> 
> 



This claim is similar to Chomsky's insofar as it recognizes the
complicated nature of the historical dialectic. The goal of political
development should be in a direction that goes beyond the state (and
toward the development of individual reason and morality). But in our
present condition, some form of government may be "a necessary
evil", which we ought to strive to overcome. The point here is
that our judgments about the justification of the state are
contingent: they depend upon present circumstances and our current
form of development. And while states may be necessary features of the
current human world, as human beings develop further, it is possible
that the state might outlive its usefulness.



We should note that utilitarian arguments are often used to support
state structures in the name of the greater good. Utilitarian
anarchists will argue that states fail to do this. But utilitarian
conclusions are not usually based upon a fundamental appeal to moral
principles such as liberty or the rights of the individual. Thus
Bentham described claims about human rights as "anarchical
fallacies" because they tended to lead toward anarchy, which he
rejected. Bentham described the difference between a moderate
utilitarian effort at reform and the anarchist's revolutionary
doctrine of human rights, saying that



> 
> 
> the anarchist setting up his will and fancy for a law before which all
> mankind are called upon to bow down at the first word--the
> anarchist, trampling on truth and decency, denies the validity of the
> law in question,--denies the existence of it in the character of
> a law, and calls upon all mankind to rise up in a mass, and resist the
> execution of it. (Bentham 1843: 498)
> 
> 
> 



More principled deontological anarchism will maintain that states
violate fundamental rights and so are not justified. But utilitarian
anarchism will not primarily be worried about the violation of a few
people's rights (although that is obviously a relevant
consideration). Rather, the complaint for a utilitarian anarchist is
that state structures tend to produce disadvantages for the greater
number of people. Furthermore what Oren Ben-Dor calls
"utilitarian-based anarchism" is based upon the idea that
there is no *a priori* justification of the state (Ben-Dor
2000: 101-2). For the utilitarian, this all depends upon the
circumstances and conditions. Ben-Dor calls this anarchism because it
rejects any *a priori* notion of state justification. In other
words, the utilitarian anarchist does not presume that states are
justifiable; rather a utilitarian anarchist will hold that the burden
of proof rests upon the defender of states to show that state
authority is justifiable on utilitarian grounds, by bringing in
historical and empirical data about human nature, human flourishing,
and successful social organization.


### 2.4 Individualism, Libertarianism, and Socialist Anarchism



Forms of anarchism also differ in terms of the content of the theory,
the focal point of the anarchist critique, and the imagined practical
impact of anarchism. Socialist forms of anarchism include communist
anarchism associated with Kropotkin and communitarian anarchism (see
Clark 2013). The socialist approach focuses on the development of
social and communal groups, which are supposed to thrive outside of
hierarchical and centralized political structures. Individualist forms
of anarchism include some forms of libertarianism or
anarcho-capitalism as well as egoistically oriented antinomianism and
non-conformism. The individualistic focus rejects group identity and
ideas about social/communal good, while remaining firmly rooted in
moral claims about the autonomy of the individual (see Casey
2012).



Individualistic anarchism is historically associated with ideas found
in Stirner who said, "every state is a despotism" (Stirner
1844 [1995: 175]). He argued that there was no duty to obey the state
and the law because the law and the state impair self-development and
self-will. The state seeks to tame our desires and along with the
church it undermines self-enjoyment and the development of unique
individuality. Stirner is even critical of social organizations and
political parties. While not denying that an individual could
affiliate with such organizations, he maintains that the individual
retains rights and identity against the party or social organization:
he embraces the party; but he ought not allow himself to be
"embraced and taken up by the party" (Stirner 1844 [1995:
211]). Individualist anarchism has often been attributed to a variety
of thinkers including Josiah Warren, Benjamin Tucker, and Thoreau.



Individualist anarchism also seems to have something in common with
egoism of the sort associated with Ayn Rand. But Rand dismissed
anarchism as "a naive floating abstraction" that
could not exist in reality; and she argued that governments properly
existed to defend people's rights (Rand 1964). A more robust
sort of pro-capitalist anarchism has been defended by Murray Rothbard,
who rejects "left-wing anarchism" of the sort he
associates with communism, while applauding the individualist
anarchism of Tucker (Rothbard 2008). Rothbard continues to explain
that since anarchism has usually been considered as being primarily a
left-wing communist phenomenon, libertarianism should be distinguished
from anarchism by calling it "non-archism" (Rothbard
2008). A related term has been employed in the literature,
"min-archism", which has been used to describe the minimal
state that libertarians allow (see Machan 2002). Libertarians are
still individualists, who emphasize the importance of individual
liberty, even though they disagree with full-blown anarchists about
the degree to which state power can be justified.



It is worth considering here, the complexity of the notion of liberty
under consideration by appealing to Isaiah Berlin's well-known
distinction between negative and positive liberty (Berlin 1969). Some
individualist anarchists appear to focus on negative liberty, i.e.,
freedom from constraint, authority, and domination. But anarchism has
also been concerned with community and the social good. In this sense,
anarchists are focused on something like positive liberty and concerned
with creating and sustaining the social conditions necessary for
actualizing human flourishing. In this regard, anarchists have also
offered theories of institutional rules and social structures that are
non-authoritarian. This may sound paradoxical (i.e., that anarchists
espouse rules and structures at all). But Prichard has argued that
anarchists are also interested in "freedom within" institutions and
social structures. According to Prichard rather than focusing on
state-authority, anarchist institutions will be be open-ended
processes that are complex and non-linear (Prichard 2018).



We see then, that individualist anarchism that focuses only on
negative liberty is often rejected by anarchists who are interested in
reconceiving community and restructuring society along more
egalitarian lines. Indeed, individualistic anarchism has been
criticized as merely a matter of "lifestyle" (criticized
in Bookchin 1995), which focuses on dress, behavior, and other
individualistic choices and preferences. Bookchin and other critics of
lifestyle individualism will argue that mere non-conformism does very
little to change the status quo and overturn structures of domination
and authority. Nor does non-conformism and lifestyle anarchism work to
create and sustain systems that affirm liberty and equality. But
defenders of lifestyle non-conformism will argue that there is value
in opting out of cultural norms and demonstrating contempt for
conformity through individual lifestyle choices.



A more robust form of individualist anarchism will focus on key values
such as autonomy and self-determination, asserting the primacy of the
individual over and against social groups as a matter of rights.
Individualist anarchists can admit that collective action is important
and that voluntary cooperation among individuals can result in
beneficial and autonomy preserving community. Remaining disputes will
consider whether what results from individual cooperation is a form of
capitalism or a form of social sharing or communism. Libertarian
anarchists or anarcho-capitalists will defend free market ideas based
upon individual choices in trading and producing goods for market.



On the other hand, socialist or communistically oriented anarchism
will focus more on a sharing economy. This could be a large form of
mutualism or something local and concrete like the sharing of family
life or the traditional potlatch. But these ideas remain anarchist to
the extent that they want to avoid centralized control and the
development of hierarchical structures of domination. Unlike
state-centered communism of the sort developed by Marxists, anarchist
communism advocates decentralization. The motto of this approach comes
from Kropotkin: "all for all". In *The Conquest of
Bread* (1892) Kropotkin criticizes monopolistic centralization
that prevents people from gaining access to socially generated wealth.
The solution is "all for all": "What we proclaim is
the Right to Well-Being: Well-Being for All!" (Kropotkin 1892
[1995: 20]). The communist idea that all humans should enjoy the
fruits of the collective human product shares something with the
Marxist idea of "to each according to his need" (Marx
1875). But Kropotkin argues for the need to evolve beyond centralized
communist control--what he criticizes as mere
"collectivism"--and toward anarchist communism:



> 
> 
> Anarchy leads to communism, and communism to anarchy, both alike being
> expressions of the predominant tendency in modern societies, the
> pursuit of equality. (Kropotkin 1892 [1995: 31])
> 
> 
> 



Kropotkin argues that the communal impulse already exists and that the
advances in social wealth made possible by the development of
individualistic capitalism make it likely that we will develop in the
direction of communal sharing. He argues that the tendency of history
is away from centralized power and toward equality and
liberty--and toward the abolition of the state. Kropotkin's
communist anarchism is based upon some historical and empirical
claims: about whether things can actually be arranged more
satisfactorily without state intervention; and about whether states
really do personify injustice and oppression. Libertarianism and
anarcho-capitalism also think that the free market will work to
adequately maximize human well-being and help individuals to realize
their own autonomy. But for the socialist and communist anarchists,
the question of individual self-realization is less important than the
idea of social development. Kropotkin's "all for
all" indicates a moral and ontological focus that is different
from what we find among the individualists.



Socialist and communally focused forms of anarchism emphasize the
importance of social groups. For example, families can be viewed as
anarchic structures of social cooperation and solidarity. A social
anarchist would be critical of hierarchical and domineering forms of
family organization (for example, patriarchal family structure). But
social anarchists will emphasize the point that human identity and
flourishing occur within extended social structures--so long as
it remains a free and self-determining community.



The tension between individualist and socialist anarchism comes to a
head when considering the question of the degree to which an
individual ought to be subordinated to the community. One problem for
so-called "communitarian" theories of social and political
life is that they can result in the submergence of individuals into
the communal identity. Individualists will want to struggle against
this assault upon autonomy and individual identity. Communalists may
respond, as Clark does, by claiming that the ideal of a genuine
community of autonomous individuals remains a hoped for dream of an
"impossible community" (Clark 2013). On the other hand
communally focused theorists will point out that individual human
beings cannot exist outside of communal structures: we are social
animals who flourish and survive in communities. Thus radical
individualism also remains a dream--and as more politically
oriented anarchists will point out, individualism undermines the
possibility of organized political action, which implies that
individualist anarchists will be unable to successfully resist
political structures of domination.


## 3. Anarchism and Political Activity



Anarchism forces us to re-evaluate political activity. Ancient Greek
philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato held that human beings
flourished within just political communities and that there was a
virtue in serving the polis. Modern political philosophy tended to
hold, as well, that political action--including obedience to the
law and the ideal of a rule of law--was noble and enlightened. In
Hegelian political philosophy, these ideas combine in a way that
celebrates citizenship and service to the state. And in contemporary
liberal political philosophy, it is often presumed that obedience to
the law is required as a *prima facie* duty (see Reiman 1972;
Gans 1992). Anarchists, of course, call this all into question.



The crucial question for anarchists is thus whether one ought to
disengage from political life, whether one ought to submit to
political authority and obey the law, or whether one ought to engage
in active efforts to actively abolish the state. Those who opt to work
actively for the abolition of the state often understand this as a
form of "direct action" or "propaganda of the
deed". The idea of direct action is often viewed as typical of
anarchists, who believe that something ought to be done to actively
abolish the state including: graffiti, street theater, organized
occupations, boycotts, and even violence. There are disputes among
anarchists about what ought to be done, with an important dividing
line occurring with regard to the question of violence and criminal
behavior.



Before turning to that discussion, let's note one further
important theoretical distinction with regard to the question of
taking action, connected to the typology offered above: whether action
should be justified in consequentialist or non-consequentialist terms.
Franks has argued that anarchist direct action ought to exemplify a
unity of means and ends (Franks 2003). On this view, if liberation and
autonomy are what anarchists are pursuing, then the methods used to
obtain these goods must be liberationist and celebrate
autonomy--and embody this within direct action. Franks argues
that the idea that "the end justifies the means" is more
typical of state-centered movements, such as Bolshevism--and of
right-wing movements. While some may think that anarchists are willing
to engage in action "by any means necessary", that
phraseology and the crass consequentialism underlying it is more
typical of radical movements which are not anarchist. Coercive
imposition of the anarchist ideal re-inscribes the problem of
domination, hierarchy, centralization, and monopolistic power that the
anarchist was originally opposed to.


### 3.1 Nonviolence, Violence, and Criminality



One significant philosophical and ethical problem for politically
engaged anarchists is the question of how to avoid ongoing cycles of
power and violence that are likely to erupt in the absence of
centralized political power. One suggestion, mentioned above, is that
anarchists will often want to emphasize the unity of means and ends.
This idea shows why there is some substantial overlap and conjunction
between anarchism and pacifism. Pacifist typically emphasize the unity
of means and ends. But not all pacifists are anarchists. However, we
mentioned above that there is a connection between anarchism and
Christian pacifism, as found in Tolstoy, for example. Gandhi was
influenced by Tolstoy and the anarchists. Although Gandhi is better
known as an anti-colonial activist, Marshall includes Gandhi among the
anarchists (Marshall 2010: chapter 26). It is possible to reconstruct
anti-colonial movements and arguments about self-determination and
home rule as a kind of anarchism (aimed at destroying colonial power
and imperial states). Gandhi noted that there were many anarchists
working in India in his time. In saying this, Gandhi uses the term
anarchism to characterize bomb-throwing advocates of violence. He
says: "I myself am an anarchist, but of another type"
(Gandhi 1916 [1956: 134]). Gandhian anarchism, if there is such a
thing, embraces nonviolence. In general nonviolent resistance as
developed in the Tolstoy-Gandhi-King tradition fits with an approach
that turns away from political power and views the state as a purveyor
of war and an impediment to equality and human development.



Objecting to this anarcho-pacifist approach are more militant
activists who advocate direct action that can include sabotage and
other forms of political violence including terrorism. Emma Goldman
explains, for example, that anti-capitalist sabotage undermines the
idea of private possession. While the legal system considers this to
be criminal, Goldman contends it is not. She explains,



> 
> 
> it is ethical in the best sense, since it helps society to get rid of
> its worst foe, the most detrimental factor of social life. Sabotage is
> mainly concerned with obstructing, by every possible method, the
> regular process of production, thereby demonstrating the determination
> of the workers to give according to what they receive, and no more.
> (Goldman 1913 [1998: 94])
> 
> 
> 



Goldman struggled with the question of violence through the course of
her career. Early on she was a more vocal proponent of revolutionary
violence. She began to rethink this later. Nonetheless, like other
anarchists of her generation, she attributed violence to the state,
which she opposed. She writes:



> 
> 
> I believe that Anarchism is the only philosophy of peace, the only
> theory of the social relationship that values human life above
> everything else. I know that some Anarchists have committed acts of
> violence, but it is the terrible economic inequality and great
> political injustice that prompt such acts, not Anarchism. Every
> institution today rests on violence; our very atmosphere is saturated
> with it. (Goldman 1913 [1998: 59])
> 
> 
> 



Goldman views anarchist violence as merely reactive. In response to
state violence, the anarchists often argued that they were merely
using violence in self-defense. Another defender of violence is
Malatesta who wrote that the revolution against the violence of the
ruling class must be violent. He explained:



> 
> 
> I think that a regime which is born of violence and which continues to
> exist by violence cannot be overthrown except by a corresponding and
> proportionate violence. (Malatesta 1925 [2015: 48])
> 
> 
> 



Like Goldman, Malatesta warned against violence becoming an end in
itself and giving way to brutality and ferocity for its own sake. He
also described anarchists as preachers of love and advocates of peace.
He said,



> 
> 
> what distinguishes the anarchists from all others is in fact their
> horror of violence, their desire and intention to eliminate physical
> violence from human relations. (Malatesta 1924 [2015: 46])
> 
> 
> 



But despite this rejection of violence, Malatesta advocates violence
as a necessary evil.



Anarchist violence appears as the violence of an individual against
the state. It is easy to see why such violence would be characterized
as terroristic and criminal. For an individual to declare war against
the state and take action to disrupt the state is criminal. And thus
anarchists have also been interested in a critique of crime and
criminality--arguing that it is the law and the legal system that
creates and produces crime and criminality. This critique was advanced
by Kropotkin as early as the 1870s, when he called prisons
"schools for crime". Similar ideas are found in Foucault
and in more recent criticisms of mass incarceration. Contemporary
anarchists will argue that mass incarceration is an example of state
power run amok.


### 3.2 Disobedience, Revolution, and Reform



The question of violence leads us to a further issue: the question of
obedience, disobedience, resistance, and political obligation. Much
could be said here about the nature of political obligation and
obedience: including whether obedience is merely pragmatic and
strategic or based upon notions about loyalty and claims about
identification with the nation and its laws. But it is clear that
anarchists have no principled reason for political obedience. If the
anarchist views the state as illegitimate, then obedience and
participation are merely a matter of choice, preference, and
pragmatism--and not a matter of loyalty or duty.



Christian anarchists will look, for example, to the case of Jesus and
his idea of rendering unto Caesar what is due to Caesar (Matthew
22:15-22). The anarchist interpretation of this passage claims
that this is an indication both of Jesus's disaffection with the
state and with his grudging acquiescence to political authority.
Christoyannopoulos argues, "Jesus' political subversion is
carried out through submission rather than revolt"
(Christoyannopoulos 2010: 156). The crucifixion, on this
interpretation, is a subversive event, which "unmasks"
political power as "demonic" and illegitimate. Jesus does
not recognize the ultimate moral and religious authority of Caesar or
Pilate. But he goes along with the political regime. Thus some
anarchists may simply be compliant and submissive.



But politically motivated anarchists encourage resistance to state
power, including strategic and principled disobedience. Such
disobedience could involve symbolic actions--graffiti and the
like--or acts of civil resistance, protests, tax resistance and
so on--up to, and possibly including, sabotage, property crime,
and outright violence. Again, there is overlap with the discussion of
violence here, but let's set that question aside and focus on
the notion of civil disobedience.



One important example is found in Thoreau, who famously explained his
act of disobedience by tax resistance as follows:



> 
> 
> In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion,
> though I will still make what use and get what advantage of her I can,
> as is usual in such cases. (Thoreau 1849 [1937: 687])
> 
> 
> 



Thoreau's disobedience is principled. He recognizes that a
declaration of war against the state is a criminal act. He willingly
goes to jail. But he also admits that he will cooperate with the state
in other cases--since there is something advantageous about
cooperation. This indicates the complexity of the question of
cooperation, protest, and disobedience. Thoreau's essay,
"Civil Disobedience" (1849), is often viewed as an
anarchist manifesto. Kropotkin discussed him as an anarchist
(Kropotkin 1927 [2002]). And Tolstoy admired his act of civil
disobedience--as did Gandhi.



Anarchists continue to discuss strategies and tactics of disobedience.
One problem throughout this discussion is the degree to which
disobedience is effective. If there were to be successful anarchist
campaigns of disobedience they would have to be organized and
widespread. Whether such campaigns would actually work to disassemble
the state apparatus remains an open question.



Until their dreamed-of revolution comes, anarchist must consider the
degree to which cooperation with the state involves "selling
out" to the political status quo. Perhaps there are reforms and
short-term gains that can be obtained through traditional political
means: voting, lobbying legislators, etc. But anarchists have often
held to an all-or-nothing kind of approach to political participation.
We noted above that the Christian anarchist Jacques Ellul has said
that he does not vote because anarchy implies conscientious objection.
But herein lies a strategic conundrum. If progressively minded
anarchists opt out of the political system, this means that less
enlightened policies will prevail. By not voting or otherwise engaging
in ordinary politics, the anarchist ends up with a system that he or
she will be even less happy with than if he or she had actively
participated in the system.



This is, really, a problem of revolution versus reform. The
revolutionary wants revolution now, believing that it will occur by
way of direct action of various sorts. Perhaps the revolutionary is
also thinking that the psychological, cultural, and spiritual
evolution toward revolutionary consciousness can only occur when
direct action is taken: in order for anarchism to emerge, the
anarchist may think, one ought to behave and think like an anarchist.
But without a concerted and nation-wide revolution, revolutionary
action begins to look like mere selfishness, Epicurean opting out, or
what Bookchin criticized as "lifestyle anarchism".
Meanwhile those reform-minded folks who work within the system of
political power and legality can end up supporting a system that they
have doubts about. This philosophical problem of reform vs. revolution
exists for all radical political agendas. But the problem is
especially acute for anarchists, since anarchism is often an
all-or-none proposition: if the state is justified then gradualism and
reformism make sense; but if no state can be justified, then what is
sometimes called "reformist anarchism" is a non-starter
(see L. Davis 2012).


### 3.3. Utopian Communities and Non-Revolutionary Anarchism



Many anarchists are revolutionaries who want change to be created
through direct action. But given our preceding discussion of violence,
disobedience, and the potential for success of revolutionary activity,
the question arises about opting-out of political life. The Epicureans
and Cynics pointed in this direction. The history of anarchism is
replete with efforts to construct anarchist communes that are
independent and separated from the rest of state centered political
life.



We might pick up the history here with the Christian anarchists and
pacifists of the Reformation: the Mennonites, for example; or the
Quakers who refused to doff their hats for political authorities and
who sought a refuge in Pennsylvania. Indeed, there is an anarchist
thread to the colonization of North America, as those who were
disgruntled with European political and religious hierarchy left for
the "new world" or were forced out by the European
authorities. In the Seventeenth Century, Anne Hutchinson was cast out
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and forced to found a new community,
when she concluded that the idea of government was flawed. Hutchinson
is considered as one of the first anarchists of North America (see
Stringham 2007). Separatist communities were founded by the New
England abolitionists and transcendentalists, by Josiah Warren, and by
others.



Anarchist communes were formed in Europe during the Nineteenth Century
and in Spain during the 1930s. There have been ongoing movements and
organizations of indigenous peoples and others who inhabit the margins
of mainstream political life. In the 1960s and 70s, anarchist
separatism was reiterated in the Hippy communes and attempts to live
off the grid and get back to nature. Alternative communes, squats, and
spontaneous gatherings continue to occur.



Separatist communities have to consider: the degree to which they give
up on anarchist direct action against dominant political forces, the
extent to which they have to accommodate themselves to political
reality, and the risk that customary hierarchies will be reinstated
within the commune. For the revolutionary anarchist, separatism is a
strategy of avoidance that impedes political action. Separatist
communes must often obey the rules of the dominant political
organization in order to trade and get connected to the rest of the
world. Finally, a complaint made about separatist communes is that
they can end up being structured by sexist, classist, and other
hierarchical organizing principles. One might argue that until the
dominant culture is revolutionized, separatism will only be a pale
reflection of the anarchist ideal. And yet, on the other hand,
advocates of separatism will argue that the best way for anarchist
ideals to take hold is to demonstrate that they work and to provide an
inspiration and experimental proving ground for anarchism.



If revolutionary activity is taken off the table, then anarchists are
left with various forms of gradualism and reformism. One way this
might occur is through the creation of "temporary autonomous
zones" such as those described by Bey. Along these lines David
Graeber provides a description of the cultural and spiritual work that
would be required in order to prepare the way for anarchist
revolution. Graeber says that this would require "liberation in
the imaginary", by which he means that through activism, utopian
communities, and the like there can be a gradual change in the way
political power is imagined and understood (Graeber 2004).
Revolutionary anarchists will respond to this by arguing that
liberation in the imaginary is simply imaginary liberation: without
actual change in the status quo, oppression and inequality continue to
be a problem.


## 4. Objections and Replies



Let's conclude by considering some standard objections to
anarchism and typical replies.


### 4.1 Anarchism is Nihilistic and Destructive



**Objection:** This objection holds that anarchism is
merely another name for chaos and for a rejection of order. This
objection holds that anarchists are violent and destructive and that
they are intent on destroying everything, including morality
itself.



**Reply:** This objection does not seem to recognize that
anarchists come in many varieties. Many anarchists are also
pacifists--and so do not advocate violent revolution. Many other
anarchists are firmly committed to moral principles such as autonomy,
liberty, solidarity, and equality. Some anarchists do take their
critique of *arche* in a nihilistic direction that
denies ethical principles. But one can be committed to anarchism,
while advocating for caring communities. Indeed, many of the main
authors in the anarchist tradition believed that the state and the
other hierarchical and authoritarian structures of contemporary
society prevented human flourishing.


### 4.2 Anarchy Will Always Evolve Back into the State



**Objection**: This objection holds that anarchism is
inherently unstable. Hobbes and other early modern social contract
theories maintain that the state emerges as a necessary response to
natural anarchy which keeps order and protects our interests. A
different theory comes from Nozick, who argues that the
"night-watchman state" would emerge out of anarchy by an
invisible hand process: as people will exercise their liberty and
purchase protection from a protection agency, which would eventually
evolve into something like a minimal state.



**Reply**: Anarchists may argue that the state of nature
is simply not a state of war and so that Hobbes's description is
false. Some anarcho-primitivists will argue that things were much
better for human beings in the original state of nature in small
communities living close to the land. Other anarchists might argue
that the disadvantages of state organizations--the creation of
hierarchies, monopolies, inequalities, and the like--simply
outweigh the benefits of state structures; and that rational agents
would choose to remain in anarchy rather than allow the state to
evolve. Some anarchists may argue that each time a state emerges, it
would have to be destroyed. But others will argue that education and
human development (including technological development) would prevent
the reemergence of the state.


### 4.3 Anarchism is Utopian



**Objection**: This objection holds that there simply is
no way to destroy or deconstruct the state. So exercises in anarchist
political theory are fruitless. It would be better, from this point of
view to focus on critiques of hierarchy, inequality, and threats to
liberty from within liberal or libertarian political theory--and
to engage in reforms that occur within the status quo and mainstream
political organization.



**Reply**: Ideal theory is always in opposition to
non-ideal theory. But utopian speculation can be useful for clarifying
values. Thus philosophical anarchism may be a useful exercise that
helps us understand our values and commitment, even though political
anarchism has no hope of succeeding. Furthermore, there are examples
of successful anarchist communities on a small local scale (for
example, in the separatist communities discussed above). These
concrete examples can be viewed as experiments in anarchist theory and
practice.


### 4.4 Anarchism is Incoherent



**Objection**: This objection holds that a political
theory that abolishes political structures makes no sense. A related
concern arises when anarchism is taken to be a critique of authority
in every case and in all senses. If anarchists deny then that there
can be any *arche* whatsoever, then the claim
contradicts itself: we would have a ruling theory that states that
there is no ruling theory. This sort of criticism is related to
standard criticisms of relativism and nihilism. Related to this is a
more concrete and mundane objection that holds that there can be no
anarchist movement or collective action, since anarchism is
constitutionally opposed to the idea of a movement or collective
(since under anarchism there can be no authoritative ruler or set of
rules).



**Reply**: This objection only holds if anarchism is
taken to be an all-or-nothing theory of the absolutist variety.
Political anarchists do not necessarily agree with the skeptical
post-foundationalist critique which holds that there can be no ruling
principle or authority whatsoever. Rather, political anarchists hold
that there are legitimate authorities but that political power quickly
loses its authoritativeness and legitimacy. Furthermore, anarchists
tend to advocate for a principle and procedure for organization based
upon voluntarism and mutual aid, as well as unanimity and/or
consensus. From this point of view anarchist communities can work very
well, provided that they avoid coercive authority. To support this
point anarchists will point to historical examples of successful
anarchist communes. They will also point to ordinary human
relations--in families and civil society relationship--which
operate quite well apart form coercive and hierarchical political
authority


### 4.5 Philosophical Anarchism is "Toothless"



**Objection**: One objection to philosophical anarchism
of the sort discussed throughout this essay is that it remains merely
theoretical. Some political anarchists have little patience for
abstract discourses that do not engage in direct action. One worry
about philosophical anarchism is that in failing to act--and in
failing to take responsibility for the actions that ought to follow
from thought--philosophical anarchism remains a bourgeois
convenience that actually serves the status quo. Thus when
philosophical anarchists remain uncommitted in terms of the concrete
questions raised by anarchism--whether they should obey the law,
whether they should vote, and so on--they tend to support the
interests of defenders of the status quo.



**Reply**: In response to this objection, one might
defend the importance of philosophical reflection. It is important to
be clear about principles and ideas before taking action. And with
anarchism the stakes are quite high. The puzzles created by
philosophical anarchism are profound. They lead us to question
traditional notions of sovereignty, political obligation, and so on.
They lead us to wonder about cultural and ethical conventions,
including also our first principles regarding the theory and
organization of social life. Given the difficulty of resolving many of
these questions, the philosophical anarchist may hold that caution is
in order. Moreover, the philosophical anarchist might also defend the
importance of wonder. The anarchist critique gives us reason to wonder
about much that we take for granted. Wonder may not change the world
in immediate ways or lead to direct action. But wonder is an important
step in the direction of thoughtful, ethical action.