## 1. Basic Sign Structure



In one of his many definitions of a sign, Peirce writes:



> 
> I define a sign as anything which is so determined by something else,
> called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which
> effect I call its interpretant, that the later is thereby mediately
> determined by the former. (EP2, 478)
> 



What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of three
inter-related parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant. For the
sake of simplicity, we can think of the sign as the signifier, for
example, a written word, an utterance, smoke as a sign for fire etc.
The object, on the other hand, is best thought of as whatever is
signified, for example, the object to which the written or uttered
word attaches, or the fire signified by the smoke. The interpretant,
the most innovative and distinctive feature of Peirce's account, is
best thought of as the understanding that we have of the sign/object
relation. The importance of the interpretant for Peirce is that
signification is not a simple dyadic relationship between sign and
object: a sign signifies only in being interpreted. This makes the
interpretant central to the content of the sign, in that, the meaning
of a sign is manifest in the interpretation that it generates in sign
users. Things are, however, slightly more complex than this and we
shall look at these three elements in more detail.


### 1.1 The Signifying Element of Signs



The very first thing to note is that there are some potential
terminological difficulties here. We appear to be saying that there
are three elements of a sign, one of which is the sign. This is
confusing and does not fully capture Peirce's idea. Strictly speaking,
for Peirce, we are interested in the *signifying element*, and
it is not the sign as a whole that signifies. In speaking of the sign
as the signifying element, then, he is more properly speaking of the
sign refined to those elements most crucial to its functioning as a
signifier. Peirce uses numerous terms for the signifying element
including "sign", "representamen",
"representation", and "ground". Here we shall
refer to that element of the sign responsible for signification as the
"sign-vehicle".



Peirce's idea that a sign does not signify in all respects and has
some particular signifying element is perhaps best made clear with an
example. Consider, for instance, a molehill in my lawn taken as a sign
of moles. Not every characteristic of the molehill plays a part in
signifying the presence of moles. The color of the molehill plays a
secondary role since it will vary according to the soil from which it
is composed. Similarly, the sizes of molehills vary according to the
size of the mole that makes them, so again, this feature is not
primary in the molehill's ability to signify. What is central here is
the causal connection that exists between the type of mound in my lawn
and moles: since moles make molehills, molehills signify moles.
Consequently, primary to the molehill's ability to signify the mole is
the brute physical connection between it and a mole. This is the
sign-vehicle of the sign. For Peirce, then, it is only some element of
a sign that enables it to signify its object, and when speaking of the
signifying element of the sign, or rather, the sign-vehicle, it is
this qualified sign that he means.


### 1.2 The Object



Just as with the sign, not every characteristic of the object is
relevant to signification: only certain features of an object enable a
sign to signify it. For Peirce, the relationship between the object of
a sign and the sign that represents it is one of determination: the
object determines the sign. Peirce's notion of determination is by no
means clear and it is open to interpretation, but for our purposes, it
is perhaps best understood as the *placing of constraints* or
conditions on successful signification by the object, rather than the
object *causing* or *generating* the sign. The idea is
that the object imposes certain parameters that a sign must fall
within if it is to represent that object. However, only certain
characteristics of an object are relevant to this process of
determination. To see this in terms of an example, consider again the
case of the molehill.



The sign is the molehill, and the object of this sign is the mole. The
mole determines the sign, in as much as, if the molehill is to succeed
as a sign for the mole it must show the physical presence of the mole.
If it fails to do this, it fails to be a sign of that object. Other
signs for this object, apart from the molehill, might include the
presence of mole droppings, or a particular pattern of ground
subsidence on my lawns, but all such signs are constrained by the need
to show the physical presence of the mole. Clearly, not everything
about the mole is relevant to this constraining process: the mole
might be a conventional black color or an albino, it might be male or
female, it might be young or old. None of these features, however, are
essential to the constraints placed upon the sign. Rather, the causal
connection between it and the mole is the characteristic that it
imposes upon its sign, and it is this connection that the sign must
represent if it is to succeed in signifying the mole.


### 1.3 The Interpretant



Although there are many features of the interpretant that bear further
comment, here we shall mention just two. First, although we have
characterized the interpretant as the understanding we reach of some
sign/object relation, it is perhaps more properly thought of as the
translation or development of the original sign. The idea is that the
interpretant provides a translation of the sign, allowing us a more
complex understanding of the sign's object. Indeed, Liszka (1996) and
Savan (1988) both emphasize the need to treat interpretants as
translations, with Savan even suggesting Peirce should have called it
the translatant (Savan 1988, 41). Second, just as with the sign/object
relation, Peirce believes the sign/interpretant relation to be one of
determination: the sign determines an interpretant. Further, this
determination is not determination in any causal sense, rather, the
sign determines an interpretant by using certain features of the way
the sign signifies its object to generate and shape our understanding.
So, the way that smoke generates or determines an interpretant sign of
its object, fire, is by focusing our attention upon the physical
connection between smoke and fire.



For Peirce, then, any instance of signification contains a
sign-vehicle, an object and interpretant. Moreover, the object
determines the sign by placing constraints which any sign must meet if
it is to signify the object. Consequently, the sign signifies its
object only in virtue of some of its features. Additionally, the sign
determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding on certain
features of the signifying relation between sign and object. This
enables us to understand the object of the sign more fully.



Although this is a general picture of Peirce's ideas about sign
structure, and certain features are more or less present, or given
greater or lesser emphasis at various points in Peirce's development
of his theory of signs, this triadic structure and the relation
between the elements is present in all of Peirce's accounts. In what
follows, we shall see three of Peirce's attempts at giving a full
account of signs and signification, the corresponding sign typologies,
look at the transitions between these accounts, and examine some of
the issues that arise from them.


## 2. Peirce's Early Account: 1867-8.



Peirce's earliest significant attempt at an account of signs comes in
his 1867 paper "On A New List of Categories" (W2
.49-58). In that account, we find the same basic sign structure
outlined above: any sign, or representation as Peirce calls it at this
early stage, will have a sign-vehicle, an object, and an interpretant.
An important difference here though is how he thinks of the relation
between signs and interpretants. In particular, Peirce thought that
whilst our interpreting the signifying relation between sign and
object relied upon understanding the basis of signification in any
given case, he also thought that the generated interpretant itself
functioned as a further, more developed sign of the object in
question. And of course, as a further sign, it will also signify that
object through some features, which again, we must interpret, and
generate a further interpretant. As will be obvious, this leads to an
infinite chain of signs. If any sign must generate an interpretant in
order to be a sign, and any sign is itself the interpretant of some
further sign, then clearly, there must be an infinity of signs both
proceeding and preceding from any given instance of signification.
Some scholars (for example, Short 2004; 2007) think that
infinite semiosis is a characteristic only of Peirce's early account.
Others, (Liszka 1996, Savan 1988) treat infinite semiosis as present
in all of Peirce's accounts. We shall return to the issue of infinite
semiosis in the early account below. First, we shall look at the types
of sign to which Peirce's early account gives rise.



Peirce thought that "representations" generate further
interpretants in one of three possible ways. First, via "a mere
community in some quality" (W2 .56). These he calls likenesses,
but they are more familiarly known as *icons*. Second, those
"whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in
fact" (W2 .56) are termed *indices*. And finally, those
"whose relation to their objects is an imputed character"
(W2. 56) are called *symbols*. Put simply, if we come to
interpret a sign as standing for its object in virtue of some shared
quality, then the sign is an icon. Peirce's early examples of icons
are portraits and noted similarities between the letters p and b (W2.
53-4). If on the other hand, our interpretation comes in virtue
of some brute, existential fact, causal connections say, then the sign
is an index. Early examples include the weathercock, and the
relationship between the murderer and his victim (W2. 53-4). And
finally, if we generate an interpretant in virtue of some observed
general or conventional connection between sign and object, then the
sign is a symbol. Early examples include the words "homme"
and "man" sharing a reference. (W2. 53-4).



This, then, is the very first outing for Peirce's famous division of
signs into Icons, Indexes, and Symbols. Although Peirce's precise
thoughts about the nature of this division were to change at various
points in his development of sign theory, the division nonetheless
remains throughout his work. There are, however, some important
features to this early account that mark it out from the later
developments. We shall look at two of these features here: the
importance of thought-signs; and infinite semiosis.


### 2.1 Thought-Signs



An interesting feature of Peirce's early account is that he is keen to
associate signs with cognition. In particular, Peirce claims that all
thought is in signs (W2. 213). We can see this from Peirce's early
idea that every interpretant is itself a further sign of the signified
object. Since interpretants are the interpreting thoughts we have of
signifying relations, and these interpreting thoughts are themselves
signs, it seems to be a straight-forward consequence that all thoughts
are signs, or as Peirce calls them "thought-signs". One
interesting consequence of this is that in the early account, Peirce
is quick to dismiss the importance and relevance of icons and
indices.



> 
> The objects of the understanding, considered as representations, are
> symbols, that is, signs which are at least potentially general. But
> the rules of logic hold good of any symbols, of those which are
> written or spoken as well as those which are thought. They have no
> immediate application to likeness [icons] or indices, because no
> arguments can be constructed of these alone, but do apply to all
> symbols. (W2. 56)
> 



This gives Peirce's early account of signs a rather narrow scope; it
is concerned primarily with the general and conventional signs of
which our language and cognition consist. The reason for this narrow
focus is simple: for Peirce, since symbols are "potentially
general" and fall under the remit of general rules, they are a
fit subject of study for his primary focus, logic. This early account,
then, focuses mainly on general and conventional signs, those signs
identified by Peirce as symbols. Icons and indices, although noted at
this early stage, are considered of secondary philosophical
importance. As we shall see later, this narrow focus is something that
Peirce was later to revise.


### 2.2 Infinite Semiosis



As previously noted, part and parcel of Peirce's early account of
signs is that an infinity of further signs both proceed and precede
from any given sign. This is a consequence of the way Peirce thinks of
the elements of signs at this early stage and seems to stem from his
idea that interpretants are to count as further signs, and signs are
interpretants of earlier signs. Since any sign must determine an
interpretant in order to count as a sign, and interpretants are
themselves signs, infinite chains of signs seem to become conceptually
necessary.



To see this, imagine a chain of signs with either a first or a last
sign. The final sign that terminates the semiotic process will have no
interpretant; if it did, that interpretant would function as a further
sign and generate a further interpretant, and the final sign would, in
fact, not terminate the process. However, since any sign must
determine an interpretant to count as a sign, the final sign would not
be a sign unless it had an interpretant. Similarly, a first sign could
not be the interpretant of a preceding sign. If it were, that previous
sign would be the first sign. However, since any sign must be an
interpretant of a previous sign, a first sign would not be a sign
unless it was also an interpretant of a previous sign. The problem is
that if we allow a final sign with no interpretant, or a first sign
which is not the interpretant or some earlier sign, then we have
failed signs in the semiotic process. This affects the rest of the
semiotic chain causing something like a collapse of dominoes. For
example, if the final sign fails to be a sign in virtue of generating
no interpretant, then since that failed sign is supposed to act as the
interpretant of the previous sign and function as a further sign in
its own right, it has also failed to be an interpretant. The
consequence of this is that the previous sign has failed to generate a
proper interpretant and so failed to be a sign. The consequence of
this is that...and so on. The alternative is not to countenance
terminating signs. And obviously, if we cannot end the semiotic
process then signs continue generating signs ad infinitum.



Peirce was both aware and untroubled by infinite semiosis. In part,
this is due to the anti-Cartesian project carried out in Peirce's work
in the 1860s. A significant part of this project for Peirce is the
denial of intuitions, something that Peirce took as a key assumption
of Cartesian philosophical method. Given that Peirce defines
"intuition" as "a cognition not determined by a
previous cognition of the same object" (W2. 193), it seems clear
that the infinite procession of thought-signs generated by earlier
thought-signs and in turn generating further thought-signs is part and
parcel of the denial of intuitions. However, in later developments to
his sign theory, despite never explicitly relinquishing infinite
semiosis, many of the concepts that lead to it are replaced or
revised, and the concept becomes less prominent in Peirce's
work. (See Atkin 2015, 132-135) for more on the anti-Cartesian
motivation of Peirce's early account of signs).


## 3. The Interim Account: 1903



In 1903, Peirce gave a series of lectures at Harvard, and at The
Lowell Institute. Part of these lectures was an account of signs.
However, the 1903 account of signs showed considerable developments to
the early account of the 1860s. First, where the early account
suggested three classes of sign, the 1903 account suggests ten classes
of sign. Second, where the account the 1860s treats the general sign,
or symbol, as the main focus of sign theory, the 1903 account counts
many more sign types as within the focus of philosophy and logic.
Third, Peirce dropped the claim that an infinite chain of signs
precedes any given sign (see Short 2004, 221-2).



These changes seem to be partly a consequence of developments in
symbolic logic made by Peirce and his Johns Hopkins student, Oscar
Mitchell, in the early 1880s. As is well known, during this time, and
independently of Frege, Peirce and Mitchell developed quantification
theory (see Peirce 1883, and W5. 162-191). An essential part
of this development was the inclusion of singular propositions and
individual variables for objects that cannot be picked out be definite
descriptions. Peirce treated these non-general signs as indices, which
in turn led him to identify the index as an essential part of logic.
This made his earlier account of signs seem underdeveloped. (See, for
instance, Short 2004, 219-222; Hookway 2000, 127-131;
and Murphey 1961, 299-300). This appears to have led Peirce to
take signs other than the symbol more seriously. In particular, it led
Peirce to realize that some symbolic signs had distinctly indexical
(that is non-general) features. Similarly, symbols with heavily iconic
features, especially in mathematics (see Hookway 1985 Ch 6), were more
important than he thought. What this meant, of course, was that the
account of the 1860s was now woefully inadequate to the task of
capturing the range of signs and signification that Peirce thought
important for philosophy and logic.



A further point worth noting about Peirce's developing
sign theory is that by 1903, he had begun to think of his overall
philosophy in architectonic terms, and this included a broadening of
his view of semiotics (see Atkin 2015, 15-20). Put simply, Peirce
thought that all domains of thought were connected and structured
hierarchically, and that logic, "in its general sense, is
... only another name for semiotic" (CP2.227 1897).
Logic, construed as extensive with semiotic, in Peirce's
hierarchy contained three domains - *Speculative
Grammar* (which is the study of sign classifications);
*Critical Logic* (which is the study of the form and evaluation
of arguments); and *Methodeutic* (which is the student of
scientific inquiry). The discussion of Peirce's sign theory here
is placed firmly in the domain of speculative grammar, however, in the
later developments of his work, Peirce began to think of these
three areas of "logic" as involving semiotics. (See
Bellucci 2017 for a discussion of speculative grammar and its
development in Peirce's thought).



Peirce's 1903 account of signs, then, is notable for its broader
scope, relative neatness, and completeness. In it Peirce returns to
the basic sign structure we gave above and by paying close attention
to those elements of signs and the various interactions between them
gives what seems to be an extensive account of signification, and an
exhaustive typology of signs far beyond the range of his early account
of the 1860s. To understand Peirce's 1903 account, we must return to
the three elements of signification, namely, the sign-vehicle, the
object, and the interpretant and see how Peirce thinks their function
in signification leads to an exhaustive classification of sign
types.


### 3.1 Sign-Vehicles



Recall that Peirce thought signs signify their objects not through all
their features, but in virtue of some particular feature. By 1903, for
reasons related to his work on phenomenology, Peirce thought the
central features of sign-vehicles could be divided into three broad
areas, and consequently, that signs could be classified accordingly.
This division depends upon whether sign-vehicles signify in virtue of
qualities, existential facts, or conventions and laws. Further, signs
with these sign-vehicles are classified as *qualisigns*,
*sinsigns*, and *legisigns* respectively.



Examples of signs whose sign-vehicle relies upon a quality are
difficult to imagine, but a particularly clear example, used by David
Savan, is this:



> 
> [...] I use a color chip to identify the color of some paint I
> want to buy. The color chip is perhaps made of cardboard, rectangular,
> resting on a wooden table etc., etc. But it is only the color of the
> chip that is essential to it as a sign of the color of the paint.
> (Savan 1988, 20)
> 



There are many elements to the colored chip as a sign, but it is only
its color that matters to its ability to signify. Any sign whose
sign-vehicle relies, as with this example, on simple abstracted
qualities is called a qualisign.



An example of a sign whose sign-vehicle uses existential facts is
smoke as a sign for fire; the causal relation between the fire and
smoke allows the smoke to act as a signifier. Other cases are the
molehill example used earlier, and temperature as a sign for a fever.
Any sign whose sign-vehicle relies upon existential connections with
its object is named, by Peirce, a sinsign.



And finally, the third kind of sign is one whose crucial signifying
element is primarily due to convention, habit or law. Typical examples
would be traffic lights as sign of priority, and the signifying
capability of words; these sign-vehicles signify in virtue of the
conventions surrounding their use. Peirce calls signs whose
sign-vehicles function in this way legisigns.


### 3.2 Objects



Just as Peirce thought signs could be classified according to whether
their sign-vehicles function in virtue of qualities, existential
facts, or conventions and laws, he thought signs were similarly
classifiable according to how their object functioned in
signification. Recall that, for Peirce, objects
"determine" their signs. That is to say, the nature of the
object constrains the nature of the sign in terms of what successful
signification requires. Again, Peirce thought the nature of these
constraints fell into three broad classes: qualitative, existential or
physical, and conventional and law-like. Further, if the constraints
of successful signification require that the sign reflect qualitative
features of the object, then the sign is an *icon*. If the
constraints of successful signification require that the sign utilize
some existential or physical connection between it and its object,
then the sign is an *index*. And finally, if successful
signification of the object requires that the sign utilize some
convention, habit, or social rule or law that connects it with its
object, then the sign is a *symbol*.



This is a trichotomy with which we are already familiar from the early
account, and indeed, the examples of icons, indices, and symbols are
largely the same as before: icons are portraits and paintings, indices
are natural and causal signs, symbols are words and so on. There are,
however, additional instances, for example, icons include diagrams
used in geometrical reasoning, indices include pointing fingers and
proper names, and symbols including broad speech acts like assertion
and judgment, all of which suggests a considerable broadening of this
trichotomy. It is well worth noting, though, that by 1903 Peirce was
aware that it would be hard, if not impossible, to find any pure
instances of icons and indices. Rather, he began to suspect that icons
and indices were always partly symbolic or conventional. To try to
capture this, Peirce experimented with some additional terminology and
types of icon and index. These he called the hypo-icon (see CP2 .276
1903) and the sub-index (see CP 2.330 1903) respectively. We shall not
explore these signs further here (see (Goudge 1965) and (Atkin 2005)
for more on Peirce's view of indices, and (Legg 2008) for more on
icons), but it is worth noting that by 1903, the simple
icon/index/symbol trichotomy was something of an abstraction, and
Peirce was aware that any single sign may display some combination of
iconic, indexical and symbolic characteristics.


### 3.3 Interpretants



As with the sign-vehicle and the object, Peirce thought we could
classify signs in terms of their relation with their interpretant.
Again, he identifies three categories according to which feature of
the relationship with its object a sign uses in generating an
interpretant. Further, as with the classification of the sign in terms
of the sign-vehicle and the object, Peirce identifies qualities,
existential facts, or conventional features as the basis for
classifying the sign in terms of its interpretant.



If the sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding
of the sign upon the qualitative features it employs in signifying its
object, then the sign is classified as a *rheme*. Examples are
not straightforward, but one way of understanding rhemes, is to think
of them as unsaturated predicates like, "-- is a
dog", "-- is happy", "-- loves
--" or "-- gives -- to --", and so
on. Whenever we understand a sign in terms of qualities it suggests
its object may have, we generate an interpretant that qualifies its
sign as a rheme. If, on the other hand, a sign determines an
interpretant by focusing our understanding of the sign upon the
existential features it employs in signifying an object, then the sign
is a *dicent*. We can think of dicents is as saturated
predicates, or propositions, like "Fido is a dog",
"Larry is happy", "Fido loves Larry",
"Larry gives food to Fido", and so on. And finally, if a
sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding on some
conventional or law-like features employed in signifying the object,
then the sign is a *delome*, or as Peirce most frequently, but
confusingly, calls them, *arguments*. Further, just as we can
think of a rheme as an unsaturated predicate, and a dicent as a
proposition, we can think of the delome as an argument or rule of
inference. Our ability to understand a sign in terms of its place in
some pattern of reasoning and system of signs enables us to derive
information from it (by deductive reasoning) or make conjectures about
it (by inductive and abductive reasoning). So, whenever we come to
understand a sign as focusing our attention upon some conventional
feature of its relationship with object, that is, enabling us to
understand the sign as part of a rule governed system of knowledge and
signs etc., we have an interpretant that qualifies a sign as a delome
(or argument).


### 3.4 The Ten Classes of Signs



Peirce believed that the three elements, and the respective
classifications they imposed upon signs, could be combined to give a
complete list of sign types. That is, since a sign has a sign-vehicle
it can be classified as either a qualisign, a sinsign, or legisign.
Additionally, since that sign has an object it can be classified as
either an icon, an index, or a symbol. And finally, since that sign
will also determine an interpretant it can be classified as either a
rheme, a dicent, or a delome. Each sign is then classifiable as some
combination of each of its three elements, that is, as either one of
the three types of sign-vehicle, plus one of the three types of
object, plus one of the three types of interpretant. Initially, this
seems to yield twenty-seven possible classificatory combinations, but,
because of certain of Peirce's phenomenological theories, there are
restrictions on how we can combine the different elements that mean
there are, in fact, only ten types of sign. (For more on the relation
between Peirce's phenomenological categories, and his sign typology,
see Lizska 1996, Farias and Queiroz 2014, and Savan 1988.)



The rules for the permissible combinations are actually quite simple
so long as we bear two things in mind. First, types of each element
are classifiable as either a quality, an existential fact, or a
convention. That is, across the three elements of a sign, there are
three types deriving from qualities (the qualisign, the icon, and the
rheme), three deriving from existential facts, (the sinsign, the
index, and the dicent), and three deriving from conventions (the
legisign, the symbol, and the delome). Second, the classification of
the interpretant depends upon the classification of the object, which
in turn depends upon the classification of the sign-vehicle. The rules
that determine permissible classifications, then, are that if an
element is classified as a quality, then its dependent element may
only be a classified as a quality. If an element is classified as an
existential fact, then its dependent element may be classified as
either an existential fact, or a quality. And if an element is
classified as a convention, then its dependent element may be
classified as either a convention, an existential fact, or a quality.
This leaves us with ten permissible combinations between a
sign-vehicle, object and interpretant, and so ten possible kinds of
signs. They look something like this:




| *Interpretant* | *Object* | *Sign-Vehicle* | *Examples* (from CP2.254-263 1903) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Rheme | Icon | Qualisign | "A feeling of red" |
| Rheme | Icon | Sinsign; | "An Individual Diagram" |
| Rheme | Index | Sinsign | "A spontaneous cry" |
| Dicent | Index | Sinsign | "A Weather Cock" |
| Rheme | Icon | Legisign | "A diagram [type]" |
| Rheme | Index | Legisign | "A demonstrative pronoun" |
| Dicent | Index | Legisign | "A street cry" |
| Rheme | Symbol | Legisign | "A common noun" |
| Dicent | Symbol | Legisign | "Ordinary proposition" |
| Delome | Symbol | Legisign | "An argument" |



These ten types of sign are simply called after the combination of
their elements: an ordinary proposition is a
*dicentic-symbolic-legisign*, a spontaneous cry a
*rhematic-indexical-sinsign*, and so on.



Despite its apparent completeness and complexity, however, Peirce soon
began rethinking his 1903 account of signs. Over the final years of
his life, he introduced further complexities and nuance to his
semiotics.


## 4. The Final Account: 1906-10



During the last part of his life the majority of Peirce's
philosophical output concerned semiotic, and he developed his account
of signs far beyond the 1903 theory. There seem to be two reasons for
this. First, Peirce was geographically and intellectually isolated and
his main outlet was correspondence with the English woman, Lady
Victoria Welby. Welby wrote on various philosophical topics and shared
Peirce's interests in signs and meaning. This seems to have given
Peirce a willing and sympathetic audience for his developing ideas on
signs. (See Hardwick 1977 and Borges 2013 for more on the
Peirce/Welby correspondence). The second reason seems to have
been his growing appreciation of the connections between the semiotic
process and the process of inquiry. Peirce always thought of his
philosophy in a systematic and architectonic way. However, around
1902, an application for funding to the Carnegie Institute saw him
express more clearly the connections between different aspects of his
philosophy. The application failed, but Peirce had returned to
thinking about the place of sign theory in his broader philosophy. As
noted above, part of Peirce's understanding of philosophy in an
architectonic system was to treat "logic" as containing
three branches - *Speculative Grammar*, *Critical
Logic*, and *Methodeutic*. The main impact here was that he
came to see sign theory (speculative grammar) as more clearly
connected to the logic of scientific discovery (methodeutic) and
consequently, as being more central to his account of inquiry. We
shall not review Peirce's account of inquiry here, but as an end
directed process leading from doubt-prone to doubt-proof beliefs,
Peirce began to see a similar end-directedness running through the
semiotic process. This kind of thinking lead Peirce to reassess his
account of signs and sign structure: the connection between the
process of inquiry and sign chains led Peirce to notice subtleties and
nuances that had previously been transparent to him. In particular, it
led him to see chains of signs as tending towards a definite but
idealized end rather than progressing ad infinitum. Since at the
idealized end of inquiry we have a complete understanding of some
object, there need be no further interpretant of that object; our
understanding cannot be developed any further. (See Ransdell 1977
and Short 2004; 2007 for more on the connections between
Peirce's later account and the end-directed process of inquiry.
Indeed, Short (2007) represents the fullest and best developed account
of 'telic' interpretations of Peirce's semiotic to date).


### 4.1 Dividing The Object



The first effect of Peirce's greater appreciation of the parallels
between inquiry and his sign theory is a distinction between the
object of the sign as it we understand at some given point in the
semiotic process, and the object of the sign as it stands at the end
of that process. The former he calls the *immediate object*,
and the later he calls the *dynamic object*. A neat way of
capturing this distinction is as the different objects arising from
the "two answers to the question: what object does this sign
refer to? One is the answer that could be given when the sign was
used; and the other is the one we could give when our scientific
knowledge is complete". (Hookway 1985, 139).


#### 4.1.1 The Dynamic Object



The dynamic object is, in some senses, the object that generates a
chain of signs. The aim of a sign chain is to arrive at a full
understanding of an object and so assimilate that object into the
system of signs. Using slightly more simplistic terms, Ransdell (1977,
169) describes the dynamic object as the "object as it really
is", and Hookway (1985, 139) describes it as "the object
as it is known to be [at the end of inquiry]". Indeed, Hookway's
description shows an acute awareness of the connection between the
dynamic object and the process of inquiry in Peirce's later sign
theory. An example, from Liszka (1996, 23), captures Peirce's idea
quite clearly: taking a petroleum tank half full with fuel, a variety
of signs for this half-full state are available. Perhaps there is a
fuel gauge attached to the tank, or perhaps the tank makes a
distinctive sound when we strike it and so on. But, despite these
various signs, the object underlying them all is the actual level of
fuel in the petroleum tank; this is the dynamic object.


#### 4.1.2 The Immediate Object



Ransdell (1977, 169) describes the immediate object as "what we,
at any time, suppose the object to be", and Hookway (1985, 139)
describes it as "the object at the time it is first used and
interpreted". The immediate object, then, is not some additional
object distinct from the dynamic object but is merely some
informationally incomplete facsimile of the dynamic object generated
at some interim stage in a chain of signs. Returning to the petroleum
tank example, when we strike the tank, the tone that it emits (which
functions as the sign-vehicle) represents to us that the tank is not
full (but it does not tell us the precise level of fuel). The
immediate object, then, is a less-than-full-tank.



Clearly, the immediate and dynamic objects of a sign are intimately
linked and Peirce consistently describes and introduces the two
together. (See CP 4. 536 1896). However, the connection between
the two is most clear when we consider the connections between sign
chains and inquiry. The dynamic object is, as we have suggested, the
goal and end point that drives the semiotic process, and the immediate
object is our grasp of that object at any point in that process.
Ransdell, for instance, says:



> 
> [T]he immediate object is the object as it appears at any point in the
> inquiry or semiotic process. The [dynamic] object, however, is the
> object as it really is. These must be distinguished, first, because
> the immediate object may involve some erroneous interpretation and
> thus be to that extent falsely representative of the object as it
> really is, and, second, because it may fail to include something that
> is true of the real object. In other words, the immediate object is
> simply what we at any time suppose the real object to be. (Ransdell
> 1977, 169)
> 



Put this way, it is clear how Peirce's growing concern to capture the
parallels between semiosis and the process of inquiry leads him to
identify two objects for the sign.


### 4.2 Dividing the Interpretant



Just as with the object(s) of the sign, the parallels between semiotic
and inquiry result in a similar division of interpretants. As a chain
of signs moves towards a final end there are different interpretants
playing different but important roles. Peirce identifies three
different ways in which we grasp the way a sign stands for an object.
He calls these three types of interpretant, the *immediate
interpretant*, the *dynamic interpretant* and the *final
interpretant* and describes them like this.



> 
> The [Dynamic] Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind
> actually makes of a sign. [...]The Final Interpretant does not
> consist in the way in which any mind does act but in the way in which
> every mind would act. That is, it consists in a truth which might be
> expressed in a conditional proposition of this type: "If so and
> so were to happen to any mind this sign would determine that mind to
> such and such conduct." [...] The Immediate Interpretant
> consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to
> produce, not to any actual reaction. [...] [I]f there be any
> fourth kind of Interpretant on the same footing as those three, there
> must be a dreadful rupture of my mental retina, for I can't see it at
> all. (CP8 .315 1909).
> 



We shall examine each of these in turn, but to get a clearer
understanding of the three interpretants it is helpful to look, very
briefly, at Peirce's three grades of clarity, or understanding since
Peirce took these to inform his division of interpretants.



In his 1878 paper, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" (W3,
257-275) Peirce introduces three grades of clarity, or levels of
understanding. In this paper, he introduces his famous pragmatic maxim
as a development of rationalist notions of "clear and distinct
ideas". Combining his pragmatic maxim with notions of clarity
from Descartes and Leibniz, Peirce identifies three grades of
understanding. The first grade of clarity is to have an unreflective
grasp of some concept in everyday experience. The second grade of
clarity is to have, or be capable of providing, a general definition
of that concept. The third grade of clarity, though, comes from
Peirce's famous statement of the pragmatic maxim:



> 
> Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical
> bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
> conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the
> object. (W3, 266)
> 



A full understanding of some concept, then, involves familiarity with
it in day-to-day encounters, the ability to offer some general
definition of it, and knowing what effects to expect from holding that
concept to be true.



Although these grades of clarity are part of Peirce's pragmatism, his
greater understanding of the interconnectedness of his thought led him
to realize that they were also crucial to his work on semiotic. In
particular, he saw the three grades of clarity or understanding as
reflected in his notion of the interpretant and of course felt that
the interpretant also had three grades or divisions. Peirce himself
says:



> 
> In the Second Part of my ["How To Make Our Ideas Clear"],
> I made three grades of clearness of Interpretation. The first was such
> Familiarity as gave a person familiarity with a sign and readiness in
> using it or interpreting it. In his consciousness he seemed to himself
> to be quite at home with the Sign. [...] The second was Logical
> Analysis [and is equivalent to] Lady Welby's Sense. The third was
> Pragmatistic Analysis [and is] identified with the Final Interpretant.
> (CP8 .185 1909).
> 



Here, then, Peirce identifies the first grade of clarity with the
dynamic interpretant, the second grade with the immediate
interpretant, and the third grade with the final interpretant.


#### 4.2.1 The Immediate Interpretant



As its identification with the second grade of clarity suggests, the
immediate interpretant is a general definitional understanding of the
relationship between the sign and dynamic object. In an extended
example, where the dynamic object is the weather on a stormy day,
Peirce describes the immediate interpretant as "the schema in
[our] imagination, i.e. the vague Image of what there is in common to
the different images of a stormy day" (CP8 .314 1907). The
immediate interpretant, then, is something like recognition of the
syntax of the sign and the more general features of its meaning.
Indeed, Peirce seems to take the immediate interpretant to be
"all that is explicit in the sign apart from its context and
circumstances of utterance" (CP5 .473 1907). Also instructive
is David Savan's description of the immediate interpretant as the:



> 
> explicit content of the sign which would enable a person to say
> whether or not the sign was applicable to anything concerning which
> that person had sufficient acquaintance. It is the total unanalyzed
> impression which the sign might be expected to produce, prior to any
> critical reflection upon it. (Savan 1988, 53).
> 



In terms of an example where ordinary sentences are the signs, the
immediate interpretant will involve something like our recognition of
grammatical categories, syntactic structures and conventional rules of
use. For instance, without knowing anything about its context of
utterance, we can surmise certain things about the sentence, "we
don't want to hurt him, do we?". We know it is a question, we
know it concerns doing harm to some person, a male, and so on. These
things are part of the immediate interpretant of the sign.


#### 4.2.2 The Dynamic Interpretant



The second type of interpretant that any sign must have is the dynamic
interpretant. This is our understanding of the sign/dynamic object
relationship at some actual instance in the chain of signs. Peirce
describes the dynamic interpretant as the "effect actually
produced on the mind" (CP8 .343 1908), or as the "actual
effect which the sign, as a sign, really determines" (CP4 .536
1906). The dynamic interpretant, then, is the understanding we
reach, or which the sign determines, at any particular semiotic
stage.



To continue with linguistic examples, we know that the dynamic
interpretant is the actual interpretation we make, or understanding we
reach, in the first instance of interpretation. For instance, when you
say to me whilst pointing at some cowardly woman we know, "I saw
her duck under the table", the dynamic interpretant is my
understanding that you are the utterer, that I am the addressee, and
that you saw our cowardly acquaintance hide beneath a table.



There is also an interesting connection between the dynamic
interpretant and the immediate object. As the understanding we
actually reach at any particular point in the sign chain, the dynamic
interpretant represents an incomplete understanding, or
interpretation, of the dynamic object. More important, though, is that
the immediate object of some sign in a sign chain consists of the
actual interpretations made previously, that is, it consists of the
dynamic interpretants from earlier stages in the sign chain. As
Ransdell (1977, 169) puts it, the "immediate object is, in other
words, the funded result of all interpretation prior to the
interpretation of the given sign". The dynamic interpretant
then, is the actual interpretation or understanding we make at some
point in the semiotic process, and also constitutes, along with
previous dynamic interpretants, the immediate object, or partial
understanding we have of the dynamic object at any particular point in
the semiotic process.


#### 4.2.3 The Final Interpretant



Peirce describes the final interpretant as, "that which would
finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of
the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were
reached" (CP8 .184 1909). Elsewhere he describes it as the
"effect that would be produced on the mind by the sign after
sufficient development of thought" (CP8 .343 1908). The final
interpretant, then, seems to be what our understanding of the dynamic
object would be at the end of inquiry, that is, if we had a reached a
true understanding of the dynamic object. Peirce's notion of inquiry
is clearly central here. As Hookway points out, we might best define
the final interpretant as the understanding:



> 
> which would be reached if a process of enriching the interpretant
> through scientific enquiry were to proceed indefinitely. It
> incorporates a complete and true conception of the objects of the
> sign; it is the interpretant we should all agree on in the long run.
> (Hookway 1985, 139).
> 



As an example, consider again the kinds of utterance that we have
already looked at. In such a case as your uttering, "I saw her
duck under the table", the final interpretant would be the
understanding where there is "no latitude of interpretation at
all" (CP5 .447 1905), that is, where the meanings of the
words, the identity of the agents involved and so on, are absolutely
determinate. So, the final interpretant of your utterance of "I
saw her duck under the table" is my coming to a determinate
understanding of what you mean. We can envisage how this would come
about, by my asking a variety of questions, like "are you using
'duck' as a verb or a noun?", or even "are you
talking to me?" and developing a series of dynamic interpretants
that get us closer and closer to the final interpretant.



Just as the dynamic interpretant has clear connections with other
elements of Peirce's semiotic, so too does the final interpretant. As
should be clear, from the connections that emerge from the notion of
inquiry, the final interpretant interacts strongly with the dynamic
object. The final interpretant, then, is important to our
understanding of the dynamic object in a couple of ways. First, it is
the point where our grasp of the dynamic object would be complete and,
according to Ransdell (1977, 169-170), is where the immediate
object and the dynamic object coincide. This represents the full
assimilation or integration of the dynamic object into our system of
signs. Second, the final interpretant functions as an exemplar or
normative standard by which we can judge our actual interpretative
responses to the sign. As David Savan puts it, "Peirce's
intention was to identify the third type of interpretant as providing
a norm or standard by which particular stages (Dynamical
Interpretants) of an historical process may be judged." (Savan
1988, 62).



From the point of view of Peirce scholars, an interesting element of
this division of objects and interpretants is how it might be used to
inform accounts of meaning raised in analytic philosophy of
language. Risto Hilpinen (2019), for instance, argues that we can see
clear parallels between Peirce's immediate object and
Frege's notion of "sense". Atkin (2008a) suggests a
range of connections between Peirce's later division of objects
and interpretants and analytic accounts of meaning and reference, and
even identifies a historical connection between Peirce's
accounts of signs and recent work on meaning by John Perry (Atkin
2008b). (For other related work on Peirce's sign
theories as accounts of reference and meaning see Bellucci
2021, Agler 2010, and Hilpinen 2015).


### 4.3 Issues with the Final Account



This identification of the six elements of a sign is the clearest and
least controversial part of Peirce's final sign theories. Most of what
we know about Peirce's final account is gleaned from letters,
partially worked out manuscripts and other miscellaneous items.
Consequently, there is much to the final account that is still
unclear, unsatisfactory, incomplete, and controversial. In this final
section, we shall look at two of the most interesting issues
surrounding the final account: Peirce's projected Final Classification
of sixty-six signs; and what appears to be his identification of
additional interpretants.


#### 4.3.1 The Final Classification



Just as the Early and Interim Accounts include a corresponding
classification of sign types, Peirce's final account holds similar
typological ambitions. Peirce states explicitly that there are
sixty-six classes of sign in his final typology. (See EP2. 481).
Strictly speaking, the six elements that we have detailed yield only
twenty eight sign types, but we are interested in Peirce's very final
typology. He believes that we can obtain these sixty-six classes,
rather in the manner of the 1903 typology, by identifying ten elements
of signs and signification, each of which has three qualifying
classes, and then working out their permissible combinations. These
ten elements include the six sign elements identified above, plus four
other elements that focus on the relation between signs, objects and
interpretants. The ten elements and their respective sign types, taken
from Peirce's 1908 letters to Lady Welby (EP2 483-491), then,
are as follows:


1. In respect of the Sign itself (what we have been calling the
Sign-Vehicle), a sign may be either a (i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or
(iii) a Famisign.


> 
> (By the time of the final accounts, Peirce was experimenting with
> terminology so these types are perhaps more familiar as Qualisigns,
> Sinsigns and Legisigns).
>
2. In respect of the Immediate Object, a sign may be either i)
Descriptive (ii) Designative or (iii) a Copulant.
3. In respect of the Dynamic Object, a sign may be either (i)
Abstractive (ii) Concretive or (iii) Collective.
4. In respect of relation between the Sign and the Dynamic Object, a
sign may be either, (i) an Icon (ii) an Index or (iii) a Symbol.
5. In respect of the Immediate Interpretant, a sign may be either (i)
Ejaculative, (ii) Imperative or (iii) Significative.
6. In respect of the Dynamic Interpretant, a sign may be either (i)
Sympathetic (ii) Shocking or (iii) Usual.
7. In respect of the relationship between the Sign and Dynamic
Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) Suggestive (ii) Imperative or
(iii) Indicative.
8. In respect of the Final Interpretant, a sign may be either, (i)
Gratiffic (ii) Action Producing or iii) Self-Control Producing.
9. In respect of the relation between the Sign and the Final
Interpretant, a sign may be either a (i) Seme (ii) Pheme or (iii) a
Delome.
10. In respect of the relation between the Sign, Dynamic Object and
Final Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) an Assurance of Instinct
(ii) an Assurance of Experience or (iii) an Assurance of Form.



The reason that Peirce believes these ten elements will yield
sixty-six classes is clear enough, the same combinatorial
considerations given for the interim typology (outlined above in 3.4)
apply here. However, the precise manner and order in which these
elements interact will determine what the sixty-six classes of signs
will look like in the final typology. Unfortunately, these ten
divisions and their classes represent a baffling array of
under-explained terminology, and there is little to indicate precisely
how we should set about the task of combining them. Even though we may
be confident on the number of signs in the final typology, other
details are sketchy and underdeveloped, and there still exists no
fully satisfactory account of the sixty-six classes. As Nathan Houser
points out, "a sound and detailed extension of Peirce's analysis
of signs to his full set of ten divisions and sixty-six classes is
perhaps the most pressing problem for Peircian semiotics".
(Houser 1992, 502).



There is, of course, good work on the final typology (see (Burks and
Weiss 1949), (Sanders 1970), (Savan 1988), (Jappy 1989), (Jappy 2017),
(Short 2007), (Muller 1994), and (Farias and Queiroz 2003) for the
best of this work), but ultimately, it is not clear that any account
will overcome the problems posed by the incomplete and cursory nature
of the final account. Indeed, it is not clear that Peirce himself was
fully at ease with his final typology and how its elements should hang
together. As he himself said:



> 
> The ten divisions appear to me to be all Trichotomies; but it is
> possible that none of them are properly so. Of these ten Trichotomies,
> I have a clear apprehension of some, an unsatisfactory and doubtful
> notion of others, and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception
> of others. (EP2. 483)
> 



Despite Peirce's own admission of doubts here, there is an
ongoing concern among Peirce scholars to determine the
importance of the later account and typology. Amongst the more
positive positions in this debate, we see arguments that
Peirce's later typology is crucial to a full understanding and
application of semiotics (see Quieroz 2012), or claims that it
whilst underdeveloped, it holds promise and deserves serious effort
and attention (see Houser 1992 and Jappy 2017). More pessimistic
Peirce scholars hold that the typology is either incoherent (see
Short 2007), or that as an increasingly narrow classificatory
project, it runs counter to the more emergent and systemic properties
of Peirce's semiotics (see Lizska 2019).


#### 4.3.2 Additional Interpretants



As is common with all of Peirce's work in philosophy, various changes
in terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from
one piece of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no
different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce
describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic
and final; or as emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naive,
rogate and normal; or as intentional, effective and communicational;
or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes,
"the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the
divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are
archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these
categories." There are, however, some dissenters from this
view.



In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the
trichotomies above as follows:



> 
> In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at
> least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it
> includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It
> may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely
> called "thought". I term these three kinds of interpretant
> the "emotional", the "energetic", and the
> "logical" interpretants. (EP2. 409)
> 



For some scholars, this describes a division distinct from the
immediate/dynamic/final trichotomy. Fitzgerald (1966, 78) claims that
since emotional, energetic and logical interpretants are actual
effects, they must be seen as three sub-types of the dynamic
interpretant. This is because dynamic interpretants are described by
Peirce as the effect actually produced on the mind. Short (1981, 1996,
and 2004) thinks that each of the immediate, dynamic and final
interpretants may be further sub-divided into emotional, energetic and
logical. In particular, Short thinks that the immediate/dynamic/final
trichotomy describes the interpretant at some stage of an end-directed
semiotic process, whereas the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy
describes the types of interpretant possible at any given stage.



There are simple textual reasons that count against Fitzgerald's
claims. For instance, Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as
deriving its character from action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says,
"action cannot be a logical interpretant" (CP5 .491
1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990,
21) for more on the problems with Fitzgerald's claim). Moreover, this
inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short's view since his
account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the
logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short,
however, claims textual support for his own view from instances where
Peirce mentions the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside
the apparently separate claim that signs have three interpretants.
(Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes this
as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct
trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235).



How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is
unclear, especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce's final
work on signs. However, one or two things militate in favor of the
"received view". First, Peirce is notorious for
experimenting with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his
own ideas, or describe the same phenomenon from different angles.
Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the
intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological
experiments whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a
distinct division. And finally, there is little provision in Peirce's
projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of additional
classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant.
(For more on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald
1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981, 1996, and 2004).