## 1. Democracy Defined



The term "democracy", as we will use it in this entry,
refers very generally to a method of collective decision making
characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an
essential stage of the decision-making process. Four aspects of this
definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective
decision making, by which we mean decisions that are made for groups
and are meant to be binding on all the members of the group. Second,
we intend for this definition to cover many different kinds of groups
and decision-making procedures that may be called democratic. So there
can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms,
as well as states and transnational and global organizations. The
definition is also consistent with different electoral systems, for
example first-past-the-post voting and proportional representation.
Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight.
It is compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not
desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the
definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions.
Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be
more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person
one-vote in an election for representatives to a parliament where
there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be
more robust, including substantive equality in the processes of
deliberation and coalition building leading up to the vote.
"Democracy" may refer to any of these political
arrangements. It may involve direct referenda of the members of a
society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may
involve the participation of those members in selecting
representatives to make the decisions.



The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions
of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy
may take are morally desirable and when and how. To evaluate different
moral justifications of democracy, we must decide on the merits of the
different principles and conceptions of human beings and society from
which they proceed.


## 2. The Justification of Democracy



In this section, we examine different views concerning the
justification of democracy. Proposed justifications of democracy
identify values or reasons that support democracy over alternative
forms of decision-making, such as oligarchy or dictatorship. It is
important to distinguish views concerning the *justification*
of democracy from views concerning the *authority* of
democracy, which we examine in
 section 3.
 Attempts to establish democratic authority identify values or reasons
in virtue of which subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions.
Justification and authority can come apart (Simmons 2001: ch.
7)--it is possible to hold that the balance of values or reasons
supports democracy over alternative forms of decision-making while
denying that subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions.



We can evaluate the justification of democracy along at least two
different dimensions: instrumentally, by reference to the outcomes of
using it compared with other methods of political decision; or
intrinsically, by reference to values that are inherent in the
method.


### 2.1 Instrumentalism


#### 2.1.1 Instrumental arguments in favor of democracy



Two kinds of in instrumental benefits are commonly attributed to
democracy: (1) the production of relatively good laws and policies and
(2) improvements in the characters of the participants.


##### 2.1.1.1 The production of relatively good laws and policies: responsiveness theories



It is often argued that democratic decision-making best protects
subjects' rights or interests because it is more responsive to
their judgments or preferences than competing forms of government.
John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that since democracy gives each
subject a share of political power, democracy forces decision-makers
to take into account the rights and interests of a wider range of
subjects than are taken into account under aristocracy or monarchy
(Mill 1861: ch. 3). There is some evidence that as groups are included
in the democratic process, their interests are better advanced by the
political system. For example, when African Americans regained the
right to vote in the United States in 1965, they were able to secure
many more benefits from the state than previously (Wright 2013).
Economists argue that democracy promotes economic growth (Acemoglu et
al. 2019). Several contemporary authors defend versions of this
instrumental argument by pointing to the robust empirical correlation
between well-functioning democratic institutions and the strong
protection of core liberal rights, such as rights to a fair trial,
bodily integrity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression
(Gaus 1996: ch. 13; Christiano 2011; Gaus 2011: ch. 22).



A related instrumental argument for democracy is provided by Amartya
Sen, who argues that 



> 
> 
> no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country
> with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. (Sen
> 1999: 152) 
> 
> 
> 



The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty
democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to
respond to the expressions of needs of the poor.


##### 2.1.1.2 The production of relatively good laws and policies: epistemic theories



Epistemic justifications of democracy argue that, under the right
conditions, democracy is generally more reliable than alternative
methods at producing political decisions that are correct according to
procedure-independent standards. While there are many different
explanations for the reliability of democratic decision-making, we
outline three of the most prominent explanations here: (1)
Condorcet's Jury Theorem, (2) the effects of cognitive
diversity, and (3) information gathering and sharing. 



The most prominent explanation for democracy's epistemic
reliability rests on Condorcet's Jury Theorem (CJT), a
mathematical theorem developed by eighteenth-century mathematician the
Marquis de Condorcet that builds on the so-called "law of large
numbers". CJT states that, when certain assumptions hold, the
probability that a majority of voters support the correct decision
increases and approaches one as the number of voters increases. The
assumptions are (Condorcet 1785): 


1. each voter is more likely than not to identify the correct
decision (the *competence assumption*);
2. voters vote for what they believe is the correct decision (the
*sincerity assumption*);
3. votes are statistically independent of one another (the
*independence assumption*).



While Condorcet's original proof was restricted to decisions
with only two choices, more recent work argues that CJT can be
extended to decisions with three or more choices (List & Goodin
2001). The use of CJT to explain democracy's reliability
is often thought to originate with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's claim
that 



> 
> 
> [i]f, when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the citizens
> were to have no communication among themselves, the general will would
> always result from the large number of small differences, and the
> deliberation would always be good. (Rousseau 1762: Book III, ch. IV)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Contemporary theorists continue to rely on CJT, or variants of it, to
justify democracy (Barry 1965; Cohen 1986; Grofman and Feld 1988; Goodin & Spiekermann 2019).



The appeal of CJT for epistemic democrats derives from the fact that,
if its underlying assumptions are satisfied, decisions produced by
even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to be correct.
For example, if the assumptions of CJT hold for an electorate of
10,000 voters, and if each voter is 51 percent likely to identify the
correct decision of two options, then the probability that a majority
will select the correct decision is 99.97 percent. The formal
mathematics of CJT are not subject to dispute. However, critics of
CJT-based arguments for democracy argue that the assumptions
underlying CJT are rarely, if ever, satisfied in actual democracies
(see Black 1963: 159-65; Ladha 1992; Estlund 1997b; 2008: ch.
XII; Anderson 2006). First, many have remarked that
voters' opinions are not independent of each other. Indeed, the
democratic process seems to emphasize persuasion and coalition
building. Second, the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in which
the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which
they make their judgments, is segmented in various ways. Segmentation
occurs when some sectors of the society do not have the relevant
information while others do have it. Modern societies and politics
seem to instantiate this kind of segmentation in terms of class, race,
ethnic groupings, religion, occupational position, geographical place
and so on. Finally, all voters approach issues they have to make
decisions on with strong ideological biases that undermine the claim
that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the
nature of the common good to the vote.



Advocates of CJT-based justifications of democracy generally respond
to these sorts of criticisms by attempting to develop variations of
CJT with weaker assumptions. These assumptions are more easily
satisfied in democracies and so the revised theorems may show that
even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to produce
correct decisions (Grofman & Feld 1988; Austen-Smith 1992;
Austen-Smith & Banks 1996).



A second common epistemic justification for democracy--which is
often traced to Aristotle (*Politics*, Book II, Ch. 11; see
Waldron 1995)--argues that democratic procedures are best able to
exploit the underlying cognitive diversity of large groups of citizens
to solve collective problems. Since democracy brings a lot of people
into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many
sources of information and perspectives in assessing proposed laws and
policies. More recently, Helene Landemore (2013) has
drawn on the "diversity-trumps-ability" theorem of Scott
Page and Lu Hong (Hong & Page 2004; Page 2007)--which states
that a random collection of agents drawn from a large set of
limited-ability agents typically outperforms a collection of the very
best agents from that same set--to argue that democracy can be
expected to produce better decisions than rule by experts. Both Page
and Hong's original theorem and Landemore's use of it to
justify democracy are subject to dispute (see Quirk 2014; Brennan
2014; Thompson 2014; Bajaj 2014).



A third common epistemic justification for democracy relies on the
idea that democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than
other forms of decision-making about the interests of citizens and the
causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. John Dewey
argues that democracy involves "a consultation and a discussion
which uncovers social needs and troubles". Even if experts know
how best to solve collective problems, they need input from the masses
to correct their biases tell them where the problems lie (Dewey 1927
[2012: 154-155]; see also Anderson 2006; Knight & Johnson
2011).


##### 2.1.1.3 Character-based arguments



Many have endorsed democracy on the grounds that democracy has
beneficial effects on the characters of subjects. Many agree with Mill
and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for
themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes
collective decisions depend on their input more than monarchy or
aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are
encouraged to be more autonomous. Relatedly, by giving citizens a
share of control over political-decision-making, democracy cultivates
citizens with active and productive characters rather than passive
characters. In addition, it has been argued that democracy tends to
get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of
rule because it makes a difference to political outcomes whether they
do or not. Finally, some argue that democracy tends to enhance the
moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making
decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to
justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in
terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people
find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they can be expected
genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence,
some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the
autonomy, rationality, activity, and morality of participants. Since
these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves,
they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill
1861 [1991: 74]; Elster 1986 [2003: 152]; Hannon 2020).



Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to
enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous,
rational, active, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce
good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or a
small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective
subjects. Of course, the soundness of any of the above arguments
depends on the truth of the causal theories of the consequences of
different institutions.


#### 2.1.2 Instrumental arguments against democracy



Not all instrumental arguments favor democracy. Plato argues that
democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and
even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the
expertise necessary to the proper governance of societies (Plato 1974,
Book VI). Most people do not have the kinds of intellectual talents
that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that
politics involves. But in order to win office or get a piece of
legislation passed, politicians must appeal to these people's
sense of what is right or not right. Hence, the state will be guided
by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass
appeal use to help themselves win office. Plato argues instead that
the state should be ruled by philosopher-kings who have the wisdom and
moral character required for good rule. He thus defends a version of
what David Estlund calls "epistocracy", a form of
oligarchy that involves rule by experts (Estlund 2003).



Mill defends a form of epistocracy that is sometimes referred to as
the "plural voting" scheme (1861: ch. 4). While all
rational adults get at least one vote under this scheme, some citizens
get a greater number of votes based on satisfying some measure of
political expertise. While Mill identifies the relevant measure of
expertise in terms of formal education, the plural voting scheme is
consistent with other measures. This scheme might be thought to
combine the instrumental value of political expertise with the
intrinsic value of broad inclusion.



One objection to any form of epistocracy--the *demographic
objection*--holds that any criterion of expertise is likely
to select demographically homogeneous individuals who are be biased in
ways that undermine their ability to produce political outcomes that
promote the general welfare (Estlund 2003).



Hobbes argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy
fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects (Hobbes 1651: chap.
XIX). On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt
not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation
because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of
decision making. As a consequence, citizens' concerns are not
focused on politics and politicians succeed only by making loud and
manipulative appeals to citizens in order to gain more power, but all
lack incentives to consider views that are genuinely for the common
good. Hence the sense of lack of responsibility for outcomes
undermines politicians' concern for the common good and inclines
them to make sectarian and divisive appeals to citizens.



Many contemporary theorists expand on these Platonic and Hobbesian
criticisms. A good deal of empirical data shows that citizens of
large-scale democracies are ill-informed and apathetic about politics.
This makes room for special interests to control the behavior of
politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the
while spreading the costs to everyone. Moreover, there is empirical
evidence that democratic citizens often engage in motivated reasoning
that unconsciously aims to affirm their existing political identities
rather than arrive at correct judgments (Lord, Ross, & Lepper
1979; Bartels 2002; Kahan 2013; Achen & Bartels 2016). Some
theorists argue that these considerations justify abandoning democracy
altogether, while modest versions of these arguments have been used to
justify modification of democratic institutions (Caplan 2007; Somin
2013; Brennan 2016). Relatedly, some theorists argue that rather than
having beneficial effects on the characters of subjects as Mill and
others argue, democracy actually has deleterious effects on the
subjects' characters and relationships (Brennan 2016: ch.
3).


#### 2.1.3 Grounds for instrumentalism



*Pure instrumentalists* argue that these instrumental arguments
for and against the democratic process are the only bases on which to
evaluate the justification of democracy or compare it with other forms
of political decision-making. There are a number of different kinds of
argument for pure instrumentalism. One kind of argument proceeds from
a more general moral theory. For example, classical utilitarianism has
no room in its monistic axiology for the intrinsic values of fairness
and liberty or the intrinsic importance of an egalitarian distribution
of political power. Its sole concern with maximizing
utility--understood as pleasure or desire
satisfaction--guarantees that it can provide only instrumental
arguments for and against democracy. 



But one need not be a thoroughgoing utilitarian to argue for
instrumentalism in democratic theory. There are arguments in favor of
instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and
collective decision making generally. One argument states that
political power involves the exercise of power of some over others.
And it argues that the exercise of power of one person over another
can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests
or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no
distribution of political power could ever be justified except by
reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process
(Arneson 1993 [2002: 96-97]; 2003; 2004; 2009). Another sort of
argument for instrumentalism proceeds negatively, attempting to show
that the non-instrumental values most commonly used in attempted
justifications for democracy do not actually justify democracy, and
that an instrumental justification for democracy is therefore the only
available sort of justification (Wall 2007).



Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically
fair collective decision making processes. For instance, social choice
theory questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making
function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a
rational collective preference. The core objection is that no general
rule satisfying reasonable constraints can be devised that can
transform any set of individual preferences into a rational social
preference. And this is taken to show that democratic procedures
cannot be intrinsically fair (Riker 1982: 116). Ronald Dworkin argues that the idea of equality,
which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a
coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the
distribution of political power among members of the society. The
relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to
inequality; the process of democratic deliberation inevitably gives
those with superior argument making abilities and greater willingness
to participate more influence and therefore more power, than others,
so equality of political power cannot be intrinsically fair or just
(Dworkin 2000). In later
work, Dworkin has pulled back from this originally thoroughgoing
instrumentalism (Dworkin 1996).


### 2.2 Non-instrumentalism



Few theorists deny that political institutions must be at least in
part evaluated in terms of the outcomes of having those institutions.
Some argue in addition, that some forms of decision making are morally
desirable independent of the consequences of having them. A variety of
different approaches have been used to show that democracy has this
kind of intrinsic value.


#### 2.2.1 Liberty



One prominent justification for democracy appeals to the value of
liberty. According to one version of the view, democracy is grounded
in the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life. Each
person's life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and
cultural environment in which he or she lives. Only when each person
has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective
decision-making will each have equal control over this larger
environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould conclude that only when some
kind of democracy is implemented, will individuals have a chance at
self-government (Gould 1988: 45-85). Since individuals have a
right of self-government, they have a right to democratic
participation. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one
a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right
to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of
individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for
themselves regarding those activities they share.



One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to
require that the basic rule of decision-making be consensus or
unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind
him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing.
They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when
all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision (Wolff
1970: ch. 2). The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major
issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons
for having political decision making procedures is that they can
settle matters despite disagreement.



One liberty-based argument that might seem to escape this worry
appeals to an irreducibly collective right to self-determination. It
is often argued that political communities have a right as a community
to organize themselves politically in accordance with their values,
principles, or commitments. Some argue that the right to collective
self-determination requires democratic institutions that give citizens
collective control over their political and legal structure (Cassese
1995). However, many
argue democratic institutions are sufficient but not necessary to
realize the right to collective self-determination because political
communities might exercise this right to implement non-democratic
institutions (Altman & Wellman 2009; Stilz
2016).


#### 2.2.2 Democracy as public justification



Another non-instrumental justification of democracy appeals to the
ideal of public justification. The idea behind this approach is that
laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are publicly
justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is
justification to each citizen as a result of free and reasoned debate
among equals.



Jurgen Habermas's discourse theory of deliberative
democracy has been highly influential in the development of this
approach. Habermas analyses the form and function of modern legal
systems through the lens of his theory of communicative action. This
analysis yields the Democratic Principle: 



> 
> 
> [O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the
> assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in
> turn has been legally constituted. (Habermas 1992 [1996: 110]) 
> 
> 
> 



Habermas advances a conception of democratic legitimacy according to
which law is legitimate only if it results from a free and inclusive
democratic process of "opinion and will-formation". What
might such a process look like in a complex and differentiated
society? Habermas answers by advancing a "two-track" model
that understands democratic legitimation in terms of the relationship
between institutionalized deliberative bodies (e.g legislatures,
agencies, courts) and informal communication in the public sphere,
which is "wild", and not centrally coordinated.



One possible objection to this view is that free and inclusive
democratic procedures are insufficient to satisfy the demand for
deliberative consensus embodied in the Democratic Principle. This
demand is unlikely to be satisfied in diverse societies, since deep
disagreements about which laws ought to be enacted is likely to remain
after the relevant process of opinion and will-formation. The
Democratic Principle might thus be thought to embody an overly
idealistic conception of democratic legitimacy (Estlund 2008: ch.10).
Another possible worry is that the Discourse Principle is not a
genuine moral principle, but a principle that embodies the felicity
conditions of practical discourse. As such, the Discourse Principle
cannot ground a conception of democratic legitimacy that yields robust
moral prescriptions (Forst 2016).



Drawing on Habermas and John Rawls, among others, Joshua Cohen (1996
[2003]) develops a conception of democracy in which citizens justify
laws and policies on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons.
Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals
freely engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on
an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines
for structuring democratic institutions.



The aim of Cohen's conception of democracy as public
justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious
problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement
remains. Two possible replies have been suggested. It has been urged
that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for
public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in
many societies. For instance, there may be consensus on the list of
reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of
the different reasons. Or there may be agreement on general reasons
abstractly understood but disagreement about particular
interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is
that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the
disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of
public justification.



The basic principle seems to be the principle of reasonableness
according to which reasonable persons will only offer principles for
the regulation of their society that other reasonable persons can
reasonably accept. One only offers principles that others, who
restrain themselves in the same way, can accept. Such a principle
implies a kind of principle of restraint which requires that
reasonable persons avoid proposing laws and policies on the basis of
controversial moral or philosophical principles. When individuals
offer proposals for the regulation of their society, they ought not to
appeal to the whole truth as they see it but only to that part of the
whole truth that others can reasonably accept. To put the matter in
the way Rawls puts it: political society must be regulated by
principles on which there is an overlapping consensus (Rawls 2005:
Lecture IV). This is meant to obviate the need for a complete
consensus on the principles that regulate society.



However, it is hard to see how this approach avoids the need for a
complete consensus, which is highly unlikely to occur in any even
moderately diverse society. The reason for this is that it is not
clear why it is any less of an imposition on me when I propose
legislation or policies for the society that I must restrain myself to
considerations that other reasonable people accept than it is an
imposition on others when I attempt to pass legislation on the basis
of reasons they reasonably reject. For if I do restrain myself in this
way, then the society I live in will not live up to the standards that
I believe are essential to evaluating the society. I must then live in
and support a society that does not accord with my conception of how
it ought to be organized. It is not clear why this is any less of a
loss of control over society than for those who must live in a society
that is partly regulated by principles they do not accept. If one is a
problem, then so is the other, and complete consensus is the only
solution (Christiano 2009).


#### 2.2.3 Equality



Many democratic theorists have argued that democracy is a way of
treating persons as equals when there is good reason to impose some
kind of organization on their shared lives but they disagree about how
best to do it. Peter Singer argues that when people insist on
different ways of arranging matters properly, each person in a sense
claims a right to be dictator over their shared lives (Singer 1973:
30-41). But these claims to dictatorship cannot all hold up.
Democracy embodies a kind of peaceful and fair compromise among these
conflicting claims to rule. Each compromises equally on what he claims
as long as the others do, resulting in each having an equal say over
decision making. In effect, democratic decision making respects each
person's point of view on matters of common concern by giving
each an equal say about what to do in cases of disagreement (Singer
1973; Waldron 1999: chap. 5).



What if people disagree on the democratic method or on the particular
form democracy is to take? Are we to decide these latter questions by
means of a higher order procedure? And if there is disagreement on the
higher order procedure, must we also democratically decide that
question? The view seems to lead to an infinite regress.



An alternative way of justifying democracy on the basis of equality is
to ground democracy in public equality. Public equality is a principle
of equality which ensures that people can see that they are being
treated as equals. This view arises from three ideas. First, there is
the basic egalitarian idea that people's interests ought to be
equally advanced, or at least that they ought to have equal
opportunities to advance them. Second, human beings generally have
highly fallible and biased understandings of their own and other
people's interests. Third, persons have fundamental interests in
being able to see that they are being treated as equals. Public
equality is an egalitarian principle that can be seen to be realized
among persons despite the dramatically incomplete forms of knowledge
people have. It is not all of justice, but it is essential that the
principle be realized in a pluralistic society. 



Democracy is a uniquely publicly egalitarian way to make collective
decisions when there is substantial disagreement and conflict of
interest among persons about how to shape the society they share. Each
can see that the only plausible way of overcoming persistent
disagreement over how to shape the society they all live in, while
still publicly treating all persons as equals in the face of bias and
fallibility, is to give each person an equal say in the process of
shaping that society. Thus, democracy is necessary to the realization
of public equality in a political society. Within the framework
determined by this publicly realized equality, persons are permitted
to attempt to bring about their more particular ideas about justice
and the common good that they think are right.



The idea of public equality also grounds limits to democratic decision
making. The thought is that a society cannot democratically decide to
abolish the democratic rights of some of its members. Public equality
also requires that basic liberal and civil rights be respected as
well, by the democratic process and so serves as a limit to democratic
decision making (Christiano 2008; Valentini 2013).



A number of worries attend this kind of view. First, it is generally
thought that majority rule is required for treating persons as equals
in collective decision making. This is because only majority rule is
neutral towards alternatives in decision making. Unanimity tends to
favor the status quo as do various forms of supermajority rule. But if
this is so, the above view raises the twin dangers of majority tyranny
and of persistent minorities, i.e., groups of persons who find
themselves always losing in majority decisions. Surely these latter
phenomena must be incompatible with public equality. Second, the kind
of view defended above is susceptible to the worry that political
equality is not a coherent ideal in any modern state with a complex
division of labor and the need for representation. This last worry
will be discussed in more detail in the next sections on democratic
citizenship and legislative representation. The first worry will be
discussed more in the discussion on the limits to democratic
authority.



A related approach grounds democracy in the ideal of *relational
equality*. A concern with relational equality is a concern for




> 
> 
> human relationships that are, in certain crucial respects at least,
> unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status. (Scheffler
> 2010: 225) 
> 
> 
> 



Niko Kolodny argues that democratic institutions are an essential
component of relational equality (Kolodny 2014a,b). One line of
Kolodny's argument holds that political decisions involve the
use of coercive force. Inequalities in the power to use force
undermine equal social status at least in part because the power to
use force is "the power that usually determines the distribution
of other powers" (Kolodny 2014b: 307). Individuals who have
superior power to use force on others have a superior social status.
An egalitarian distribution of political power is thus essential for
realizing social equality. And only democratic institutions provide an
egalitarian distribution of political power. We will discuss the
relationship between relational equality and democracy further when we
discuss the authority of democracy in Part 3 below.


## 3. The Authority of Democracy



Since democracy is a collective decision process, the question
naturally arises about whether there is any duty of citizens to obey
democratic decisions when they disagree with it.



There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the
state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that it
is morally justified in coercively imposing its rule on the members.
Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications
concerning the obligations or duties that citizens may hold toward
that state. It simply says that if the state is morally justified in
doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state
has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate
duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be
owed to the state but they are real duties to obey. The third is that
the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the
citizens' duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of
authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of
the state. The idea is that when citizens disagree about law and
policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the
right to choose?


### 3.1 Instrumentalist Conceptions of Democratic Authority



Instrumental arguments for democracy give some reason for why one
ought to respect the democracy when one disagrees with its decisions.
There may be many instrumental considerations that play a role in
deciding on the question of whether one ought to obey. And these
instrumental considerations are pretty much the same whether one is
considering obedience to democracy or some other form of rule.



There is one instrumentalist approach which is quite unique to
democracy and that seems to ground a strong conception of democratic
authority. That is the epistemic approach inspired by the Condorcet
Jury Theorem, which we discussed in
 section 2.1.1.2
 above. There, we discussed a number of difficulties with the
application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the case of voting in
elections and referenda in large-scale democracies, including lack of
independence, informational segmentation, and the existence of
ideological biases.



One further worry about the Jury Theorem's epistemic conceptions
of authority is that it would prove too much since it undermines the
common practice of the loyal opposition in democracies. If the
background conditions of the Jury Theorem are met, a large-scale
democracy majority is practically certain to produce the right
decisions. On what basis can citizens in a political minority
rationally hold on to their competing views? The members of the
minority have a powerful reason for shifting their allegiance to the
majority position, since each has very good reason to think that the
majority is right. The epistemic conception of authority based on the
Jury Theorem thus threatens to be objectionably authoritarian, since
it looks like it demands not only obedience of action but obedience of
thought as well. Even in scientific communities the fact that a
majority of scientists favor a particular view does not make the
minority scientists think that they are wrong, though it does perhaps
give them pause (Goodin 2003: ch. 7).



Some theories of democratic authority combine instrumental and
non-instrumental considerations. David Estlund argues that democratic
procedures have legitimate authority because they are better than
random and epistemically the best of the political systems that are
acceptable to all reasonable citizens (Estlund 2008). They must be better
than random because, otherwise, why wouldn't we use a fair
random procedure like a lottery or coin flip? Democratic authority
must have an epistemic element. And the justification of democratic
procedure must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to
respect their freedom and equality. Estlund's conception of
democratic authority--which he calls "epistemic
proceduralism"-- thus combines the ideal of public
justification with a concern for the tendency of democracies to
produce good decisions.


### 3.2 Intrinsic Conceptions of Democratic Authority


#### 3.2.1 Democracy as collective self-rule



Some theorists argue that there is a special relation between
democracy and legitimate authority grounded in the value of collective
self-rule. John Locke argues that when a person consents to the
creation of a political society, they necessarily consent to the use
of majority rule in deciding how the political society is to be
organized (Locke 1690: sec. 96). Locke thinks that majority rule is
the natural decision rule when there is disagreement. He argues that a
society is a kind of collective body that must move in the direction
of the greater force. One way to understand this argument is as
follows. If we think of each member of society as an equal and if we
think that there is likely to be disagreement beyond the question of
whether to join society or not, then we must accept majority rule as
the appropriate decision rule. This interpretation of the greater
force argument assumes that the expression "greater force"
is to be understood in terms of the equal worth of each person's
interests and rights, so the society must go in the direction in which
the greater number of persons wants it to go.



Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals who consent
to be members, could choose a monarchy by means of majority rule and
so this argument by itself does not give us an argument for democracy.
But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement
of representative institutions for deciding when property may be
regulated and taxes levied. He argues that a person must consent to
the regulation or taxation of his property by the state. But he says
that this requirement of consent is satisfied when a majority of the
representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and
taxation of property (Locke, 1690: sec. 140). This does seem to be
moving towards a genuinely democratic conception of legitimate
authority.



Rousseau argues that when individuals consent to form a political
community, they agree to put themselves under the direction of the
"general will" (Rousseau 1762). The general will is not a
mere aggregation of individuals' private wills. It is, rather,
the will of the political community as a whole. And since the general
will can only emerge as the product of a properly organized democratic
procedure, individuals consent to put themselves under the direction
of a properly organized democratic procedure. On one interpretation of
Rousseau, democratic procedures are properly organized only when they
(1) define rights that apply equally to all, (2) via a procedure that
considers everyone's interests equally, and (3) everyone who is
coerced to obey the laws has a voice in that procedure.



There are at least two ways of understanding the idea of the general
will. On what might be called the *constitutive*
interpretation, the general will is constituted by the results of a
properly organized democratic procedure. That is, the results of a
properly organized democratic procedure are the general will in virtue
of the fact that they emerge from a properly organized democratic
procedure, and not because they reflect some procedure-independent
truth about the common good. On what might be called the
*epistemic* interpretation, the results of a properly organized
democratic procedure are the way of tracking the procedure-independent
truth about the common good. As we discussed in
 section 3.1,
 Rousseau is often interpreted as appealing to Condorcet's Jury
Theorem to support the epistemic credentials of a properly organized
democratic procedure.


#### 3.2.2 Freedom and democratic authority



Anna Stilz develops an account of democratic authority that appeals to
the value of "freedom as independence" (Stilz 2009).
Freedom as independence is freedom from being subject to the will of
another. In order not to be subject to the will of others, individuals
need property rights and a protected sphere of autonomy to pursue
one's plans. Drawing on Kant, Stilz argues that attempts by
particular individuals, no matter how conscientious, to define and
secure rights to property and autonomy in a state of nature will be
inconsistent with freedom as independence. Such attempts unilaterally
impose new obligations on others through acts of private will in the
face of competing claims. But even if individuals in a state of nature
do agree to a resolution of their competing claims, they are dependent
on the will of others to honor this agreement. Stilz thus argues that
justice must be administered by an authoritative legal system which
can coercively impose one set of objective rules--rules we must
respect even when we disagree--to adjudicate our conflicting
claims. But if such a system is to be consistent with the freedom of
subjects, it cannot be imposed by the private wills of rulers. The
solution, Stilz argues, lies in Rousseau's idea of the general
will. When subjects obey the general will, they are not obeying the
private will of any individual; they are obeying a will that arises
from all and applies to all.



One worry with this account is that those who oppose
democratically-enacted laws or policies can complain that those laws
or policies are imposed against their will. Perhaps they are not
subject to the will of a particular individual, but they are subject
to the will of a majority. This might be thought to constitute a
significant threat to individuals' freedom as independence.
Another worry, which Stilz's view arguably inherits from
Rousseau, is that the conditions for the general will to emerge are so
demanding that the view implies that no state that exists or has
existed has legitimate political authority. Stilz's view might
thus be thought to entail what A.J. Simmons calls "a posteriori
anarchism" (Simmons 2001). 


#### 3.2.3 Equality and authority



Another approach to democratic authority asserts that failing to obey
the decisions of a democratic assembly amounts to treating one's
fellow citizens as inferiors (Christiano 2008:
ch. 6). In the face of disagreement about substantive law and policy,
democracy realizes a kind of public equality by giving each individual
an equal say in determining which laws or policies will be enacted.
Citizens who skirt laws made by suitably egalitarian procedures act
contrary to the equal right of all citizens to have a say in making
laws. Those who refuse to pay taxes or respect property laws on the
grounds that they are unjust are affirming a superior right to that of
others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to
be arranged. Thus, they violate the duty to treat others publicly as
equals. And there is reason to think this duty must normally have some
pre-eminence. Public equality is the most important form of equality
and democracy is required by public equality. The other forms of
equality in play in substantive disputes about law and policy are ones
about which people can have reasonable disagreements (within limits
specified by the principle of public equality). Citizens thus have
obligations to abide by the democratic process even if their favored
conceptions of justice or equality are passed by in the decision
making process.



Daniel Viehoff develops an egalitarian conception of democratic
authority based on the ideal of relational equality (Viehoff 2014; see
 section 2.2.3
 above for more on relational equality). Viehoff argues that
relational equality is threatened by "subjection" in a
relationship, which occurs when individuals have significantly
different power over how they interact with and relate to one another.
According to Viehoff, obeying the outcomes of egalitarian democratic
procedures is necessary and sufficient for citizens to achieve
coordination on common rules without subjection. It is sufficient
because democratic procedures distribute decision-making power
equally, which ensures that coordination is not determined by unequal
power advantages. It is necessary because parties must set aside the
considerations of greater and lesser power to realize non-subjection
in their relationship.



Fabienne Peter develops a fairness-based conception of democratic
authority that incorporates epistemic considerations (Peter 2008;
2009). Drawing on insights from proceduralist epistemology,
Peter's "pure epistemic proceduralism" holds that
suitably egalitarian democratic decisions are binding at least in part
because they result from a fair procedure of knowledge-production.
This account differs from Estlund's epistemic proceduralism (see
 section 5.1
 above) because it does not condition the authority of democratic
procedures on their ability to produce decisions that track the
procedure-independent truth. Rather, the authority of democratic
procedures is grounded in their fairness. And it differs from pure
procedural accounts because the relevant notion of fairness is
fairness in knowledge-production.


### 3.3 Limits to the Authority of Democracy



What are the limits to democratic authority? A limit to democratic
authority is a principle violation of which defeats democratic
authority. When the principle is violated by the democratic assembly,
the assembly loses its authority in that instance or the moral weight
of the authority is overridden. A number of different views have been
offered on this issue. We can distinguish between *internal*
and *external* limits to democratic authority. An internal
limit arises from the constitutive requirements of the democratic
process or from the principles that ground democracy. An external
limit arises from principles that are independent of the values or
requirements that ground democracy.



External limits to democratic authority are rebutting limits, which
are principles that weigh against--and may sometimes outweigh the
principles that ground democracy. So in a particular case, an
individual may see that there are reasons to obey the assembly and
some reasons against obeying the assembly and in the case at hand the
reasons against obedience outweigh the reasons in favor of obedience.
Internal limits to democratic authority are undercutting limits. These
limits function not by weighing against the considerations in favor of
authority, they undercut the considerations in favor of authority
altogether; they simply short circuit the authority. When an
undercutting limit is in play, it is not as if the principles which
ground the limit outweigh the reasons for obeying the democratic
assembly, it is rather that the reasons for obeying the democratic
assembly are undermined altogether; they cease to exist or at least
they are severely weakened.


#### 3.3.1 Internal limits to democratic authority



Some have argued that the democratic process ought to be limited to
decisions that are not incompatible with the proper functioning of the
democratic process. So they argue that the democratic process may not
legitimately take away the political rights of its citizens in good
standing. It may not take away rights that are necessary to the
democratic process such as freedom of association or freedom of
speech. But these limits do not extend beyond the requirements for
proper democratic functioning. They do not protect non political
artistic speech or freedom of association in the case of non political
activities (Ely 1980: chap. 4).



Another kind of internal limit is a limit that arises from the
principles that underpin democracy. And the presence of this limit
would seem to be necessary to making sense of the first limit because
in order for the first limit to be morally important we need to know
why a democracy ought to protect the democratic process.



Locke gives an account of the internal limits of democracy in his idea
that there are certain things to which a citizen may not consent
(Locke 1690: ch. XI). She may not consent to arbitrary rule or the
violation of fundamental rights including democratic and liberal
rights. Since consent is the basis of democratic authority for Locke,
this account provides an explanation of the idea behind the first
internal limit, that democracy may not be suspended by democratic
means but it goes beyond that limit to suggest that rights that are
not essentially connected with the exercise of the franchise may also
not be violated because one may not consent to their violation.



More recently, Ronald Dworkin has defended an account of the limits of
democratic authority (Dworkin 1996). He argues that democracy is
justified by appeal to a principle of self-government. He argues that
self-government cannot be realized unless all citizens are treated as
full members of the political community, because, otherwise, they are
not able to identify as members of the community. Among the conditions
of full membership, he argues, are rights to be treated as equals and
rights to have one's moral independence respected. These
principles support robust requirements of non-discrimination and
of basic liberal rights. 



The conception of democratic authority that grounds it in public
equality also provides an account of the limits of that authority
(Christiano 2008: ch. 6). Since democracy is founded in public
equality, it may not violate public equality in any of its decisions.
The basic idea is that overt violation of public equality by a
democratic assembly undermines the claim that the democratic assembly
embodies public equality. Democracy's embodiment of public
equality is conditional on its protecting public equality. To the
extent that liberal rights are grounded in public equality and the
provision of an economic minimum is also so grounded, this suggests
that democratic rights and liberal rights and rights to an economic
minimum create a limit to democratic authority. This account also
provides a deep grounding for the kinds of limits to democratic
authority defended in the first internal limit and it goes beyond
these to the extent that protection of rights that are not connected
with the exercise of the franchise is also necessary to public
equality.


#### 3.3.2 The problem of persistent minorities



This account of the authority of democracy also provides some help
with a vexing problem of democratic theory. This problem is the
difficulty of persistent minorities. There is a persistent minority in
a democratic society when that minority always loses in the voting.
This is always a possibility in democracies because of the use of
majority rule. If the society is divided into two or more highly
unified voting blocks in which the members of each group votes in the
same ways as all the other members of that group, then the group in
the minority will find itself always on the losing end of the votes.
This problem has plagued some societies, particularly those with
indigenous peoples who live within developed societies. Though this
problem is often connected with majority tyranny it is distinct from
the problem of majority tyranny because it may be the case that the
majority attempts to treat the minority well, in accordance with its
conception of good treatment. It is just that the minority never
agrees with the majority on what constitutes proper treatment. Being a
persistent minority can be highly oppressive even if the majority does
not try to act oppressively. This can be understood with the help of
the very ideas that underpin democracy. Persons have interests in
being able to correct for the cognitive biases of others and to be
able to make the world in such a way that it makes sense to them.
These interests are set back for a persistent minority since they
never get their way.



The conception of democracy as grounded in public equality can shed
light on this problem. It can say that the existence of a persistent
minority violates public equality (Christiano 2008: chap. 7). In
effect, a society in which there is a persistent minority is one in
which that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because
it is clear that its fundamental interests are being set back. Hence
to the extent that violations of public equality undercut the
authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a persistent
minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with
respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought
to be constructed so that the minority is not persistent.


#### 3.3.3 External limits to democratic authority



One natural kind of limit to democratic authority is the external kind
of limit. Here the idea is that there are certain considerations that
favor democratic decision making and there are certain values that are
independent of democracy that may be at issue in democratic decisions.
For example, many theories recognize core liberal rights--such as
rights to property, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought and
expression--as external limits to democratic authority. Locke is
often interpreted as arguing that individuals have natural rights to
property in themselves and the external world that democratic laws
must respect in order to have legitimate authority (Locke 1690).



Some views may assert that there are only external limits to
democratic authority. But it is possible to think that there are both
internal and external limits. Such an issue may arise in decisions to
go to war, for example. In such decisions, one may have a duty to obey
the decision of the democratic assembly on the grounds that this is
how one treats one's fellow citizens as equals but one may also
have a duty to oppose the war on the grounds that the war is an unjust
aggression against other people. To the extent that this consideration
is sufficiently serious it may outweigh the considerations of equality
that underpin democratic authority. Thus one may have an overall duty
not to obey in this context. Issues of foreign policy in general seem
to give rise to possible external limits to democracy.


## 4. The Demands of Democratic Participation



In this section, we examine the demands of participation in
large-scale democracies. We begin by examining a core challenge to the
idea that democratic citizens are capable of governing a large and
complex society. We then explore different proposed solutions to the
core challenge. Finally, we examine the moral duties of democratic
citizens in large-scale democracies in light of the core
challenge.


### 4.1 The Problem of Democratic Participation



A vexing problem of democratic theory has been to determine whether
ordinary citizens are up to the task of governing a large and complex
society. There are three distinct problems here:


1. 1. First, Plato argued that some people are more intelligent and
informed about political matters than others and have a superior moral
character, and that those persons ought to rule (*The
Republic*, Book VI)
2. 2. Second, others have argued that a society must have a division
of labor. If everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task
of politics, little time or energy would be left for the other
essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people to
engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we expect them to
have the time and resources sufficient to devote themselves
intelligently to politics?
3. 3. Third, since individuals have so little impact on the outcomes
of political decision making in large societies, they have little
sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have argued that it is
not rational to vote since the chances that an individual's vote
will a decide the outcome of an election (i.e., will determine whether
a candidate gets elected or not) are nearly indistinguishable from
zero. For example, one widely accepted estimate puts the odds of an
individual casting the deciding vote in a United States presidential
election at 1 in 100 million. Many estimates put the odds much lower.
Worse still, Anthony Downs has argued that almost all of those who do
vote have little reason to become informed about how best to vote
(Downs 1957: ch.13). On the assumption that citizens reason and behave
roughly according to the Downsian model, either the society must in
fact be run by a relatively small group of people with minimal input
from the rest or it will be very poorly run. As we can see these
criticisms are echoes of the sorts of criticisms Plato and Hobbes
made.



These observations pose challenges for any robustly egalitarian or
deliberative conception of democracy. Without the ability to
participate intelligently in politics one cannot use one's votes
to advance one's aims nor can one be said to participate in a
process of reasoned deliberation among equals. So, either equality of
political power implies a kind of self-defeating equal participation
of citizens in politics or a reasonable division of labor seems to
undermine equality of power. And either substantial participation of
citizens in public deliberation entails the relative neglect of other
tasks or the proper functioning of the other sectors of the society
requires that most people do not participate intelligently in public
deliberation.


### 4.2 Proposed Solutions to the Problem of Democratic Participation


#### 4.2.1 Elite theory of democracy



Some modern theorists of democracy, called elite theorists, have
argued against any robustly egalitarian or deliberative forms of
democracy in light of the problem of democratic participation. They
argue that high levels of citizen participation tend to produce bad
legislation designed by demagogues to appeal to poorly informed and
overly emotional citizens. They look upon the alleged uninformedness
of citizens evidenced in many empirical studies in the 1950s and 1960s
as perfectly reasonable and predictable. Indeed they regard the
alleged apathy of citizens in modern states as highly desirable social
phenomena.



Political leaders are to avoid divisive and emotionally charged issues
and make policy and law with little regard for the fickle and diffuse
demands made by ordinary citizens. Citizens participate by voting but
since they know very little they are not effectively the ruling part
of the society. The process of election is usually just a fairly
peaceful way of maintaining or changing those who rule (Schumpeter
1942 [1950: 269]).



On Schumpeter's view, however, citizens do have a role to play
in avoiding serious disasters. When politicians act in ways that
nearly anyone can see is problematic, the citizens can throw the bums
out.



So the elite theory of democracy does seem compatible with some of the
instrumentalist arguments given above but it is strongly opposed to
the intrinsic arguments from liberty, public justification and
equality. To be sure, there can be an elite deliberative democracy
wherein elites deliberate, perhaps even out of sight of the population
at large, on how to run the society.



A view akin to the elite theory but less pessimistic about
citizens' political agency and competence argues that a
well-functioning representative democracy can function as a kind of
"defensible epistocracy" (Landa & Pevnick 2020). This view holds that, under
the right conditions, elected officials can be expected to exercise
political power more responsibly than citizens in a direct democracy
because each official is far more likely to cast the deciding vote in
legislative assemblies (the "pivotality effect") and
officials have more incentive to exercise power with due regard for
the general welfare (the "accountability effect").
Moreover, under the right conditions, representative democracy allows
individuals to assess the competence of candidates for office and to
select candidates who are best able to help the community pursue its
commitments.


#### 4.2.2 Interest group pluralism



One approach that is in part motivated by the problem of democratic
citizenship but which attempts to preserve some elements of equality
against the elitist criticism is the interest group pluralist account
of politics. Robert Dahl's early statement of the view is very
powerful. 



> 
> 
> In a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is bribery
> of the electorate by politicians... The farmer... supports a
> candidate committed to high price supports, the
> businessman...supports an advocate of low corporation
> taxes... the consumer...votes for candidates opposed to a
> sales tax. (Dahl 1959: 69) 
> 
> 
> 



In this conception of the democratic process, each citizen is a member
of an interest group with narrowly defined interests that are closely
connected to their everyday lives. On these subjects citizens are
supposed to be quite well informed and interested in having an
influence. Or at least, elites from each of the interest groups that
are relatively close in perspective to the ordinary members are the
principal agents in the process. On this account, democracy is not
rule by the majority but rather rule by coalitions of minorities.
Policy and law in a democratic society are decided by means of
bargaining among the different groups.



This approach is conceivably compatible with the more egalitarian
approach to democracy. This is because it attempts to reconcile
equality with collective decision making by limiting the tasks of
citizens to ones which they are able to perform reasonably well. It is
not particularly compatible with the deliberative public justification
approach because it takes the democratic process to be concerned
essentially with bargaining among the different interest groups where
the preferences are not subject to further debate in the society as a
whole.


#### 4.2.3 Neo-liberalism



A third approach inspired by the problem of participation may be
called the neo-liberal approach to politics favored by public choice
theorists such as James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock (1962). Against
elite theories, they contend that elites and their allies will tend to
expand the powers of government and bureaucracy for their own
interests and that this expansion will occur at the expense of a
largely inattentive public. For this reason, they argue for severe
restrictions on the powers of elites. They argue against the interest
group pluralist theorists that the problem of participation occurs
within interest groups more or less as much as among the citizenry at
large. Only powerful economic interests are likely to succeed in
organizing to influence the government and they will do so largely for
their own benefit. Since economic elites will advance their own
interests in politics while spreading the costs to others, policies
will tend to be more costly (because imposed on everyone in society)
than they are beneficial (because they benefit only the elites in the
interest group.)



Neo-liberals infer that one ought to transfer many of the current
functions of the state to the market and limit the state to the
enforcement of basic property rights and liberties. These can be more
easily understood and brought under the control of ordinary
citizens.



But the neo-liberal account of democracy must answer to two large
worries. First, citizens in modern societies have more ambitious
conceptions of social justice and the common good than are realizable
by the minimal state. The neo-liberal account thus implies a very
serious curtailment of democracy of its own. More evidence is needed
to support the contention that these aspirations cannot be achieved by
the modern state. Second, the neo-liberal approach ignores the problem
of large private concentrations of wealth and power that are capable
of pushing small states around for their own benefit and imposing
their wills on populations without their consent.



Somin (2013) also argues that government be significantly reduced in
size so that citizens have a lesser knowledge burden to carry. But he
calls for government decentralization so that citizens can vote with
their feet in favor of or against competing units of government, in
effect creating a kind of market in governments among which citizens
can choose.


#### 4.2.4 The self-interest assumption



A considerable amount of the literature in political science and the
economic theory of the state are grounded in the assumption that
individuals act primarily and perhaps even exclusively in their
self-interest narrowly construed. The problem of participation and the
accounts of the democratic process described above are in large part
dependent on this assumption. When the preferences of voters are not
assumed to be self-interested the calculations of the value of
participation change. For example, if a person is a motivated
utilitarian, the small chance of making a difference is coupled with a
huge accumulated return to many people if there is a significant
difference between alternatives. It may be worth it in this case to
become reasonably well informed (Parfit 1984: 74). Even more weakly
altruistic moral preferences could make a big difference to the
rationality of becoming informed, for example if one had a preference
to comply with perceived civic duty to vote responsibly (see
 section 4.3.1 for discussion of the duty to
vote). Any moral preference can be formulated in consistent utility
functions.



Moreover, defenders of deliberative democracy often claim that
concerns for the common good and justice are not merely given prior to
politics but that they can evolve and improve through the process of
discussion and debate in politics (Elster 1986 [2003]; Gutmann &
Thompson 2004; Cohen 1989 [2009]). They assert that much debate and
discussion in politics would not be intelligible were it not for the
fact that citizens are willing to engage in open minded discussion
with those who have distinct morally informed points of view.
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals are motivated by moral
considerations in politics in addition to their interests (Mansbridge
1990).


#### 4.2.5 The Division of Democratic Labor



Public deliberation in any large-scale democracy will occur within a
complex and differentiated "deliberative system", a 



> 
> 
> wide variety of institutions, associations, and sites of contestation
> accomplish political work. (Mansbridge et. al. 2012) 
> 
> 
> 



Moreover, the deliberative system of a complex democracy will be
characterized by a *division of democratic labor*, with
different parts of the system making different contributions to the
overall system. The question arises: what is the appropriate role for
a citizen in this division of labor? Philosophically, we should ask
two questions. What ought citizens have knowledge about in order to
fulfill their role? What standards ought citizens' beliefs live
up to in order to be adequately supported? One promising view is that
citizens must think about what ends the society ought to aim at and
leave the question of how to achieve those aims to experts (Christiano
1996: ch 5). The rationale for this division of labor is that
expertise is not as fundamental to the choice of aims as it is to the
development of legislation and policy. Citizens are capable in their
everyday lives of understanding and cultivating deep understandings of
values and of their interests. And if citizens genuinely do choose the
aims and others faithfully pursue the means to achieving those aims,
then citizens are in the driver's seat in society and they can
play this role as equals.



To be sure, citizens need to know who to vote for and whether those
they vote for are genuinely advancing their aims. This would appear to
require some basic knowledge of about how best to achieve their
political aims. How is this possible without extensive knowledge? In
addition, there is empirical evidence that those who are better
informed have more influence on representatives (Erikson 2015). So, if this task requires
some kind of knowledge to do well, how can this be compatible with
equality?



One promising response is that ordinary citizens do not need
individually to have a lot of knowledge of social science and
particular facts in order to make political decisions based on such
knowledge. Recent research in cognitive science indicates the
individuals use "cognitive shortcuts" to save on time in
acquiring information about the world they live in (Lupia &
McCubbins 1998). This use of shortcuts is common and essential
throughout economic and political life. In political life, we see part
of the rationale for the many intermediate institutions between
government and citizens (Downs 1957: 221-229). Citizens save
time by making use of institutions such as the press, unions and other
interest group associations, political parties, and opinion leaders to
get information about politics. They also rely on interactions in the
workplace as well as conversations with friends and families.
Political parties can connect ordinary citizens in various ways to
expertise because each one contains a division of labor within them
that mirrors that in the state. Experts in parties have incentives to
make their expertise intelligible to other members (Christiano 2012).
In addition, under favorable conditions, political parties stimulate
the development of citizens' normative perspectives and
facilitate a healthy public competition of political justifications
based on those perspectives (White & Ypi 2016).



People are dependent on social networks in other ways in a democracy.
People receive "free" information (which they do not
deliberately seek out) about politics and law in school, through their
jobs, in discussion with friends, colleagues and family and
incidentally through the media. And this can form a better or worse
basis on which to pursue other information. Institutions can make a
difference to the stream of free information individuals receive.
Education can be distributed in a more or less egalitarian way. The
circumstances of work can provide more or less free information about
politics and law. People who have jobs with a significant amount of
power such as lawyers, business persons, government officials will be
beneficiaries of very high quality free information. They need to know
about law and politics to do their jobs properly. Those who hold low
skilled and non-unionized jobs will receive much less free information
about politics at work. To the extent that we can alter the economic
division of labor by for example giving more place to unions or having
greater worker participation, we might be able to reduce inequalities
of information among citizens.


### 4.3 The Moral Duties of Democratic Citizens



What are the moral duties of democratic citizens in complex
democracies? In this section, we discuss three important democratic
duties: (1) the duty to vote, (2) the duty to promote justice through
principled disobedience of the law, and (3) duties to accommodate
disagreement through compromise and consensus.


#### 4.3.1 The Duty to Vote



It is often thought that democratic citizens have a moral duty to vote
in elections. But this is not obvious. Individual votes are a causally
insignificant contribution to the democratic process. In large-scale
democracies, the chance that any particular citizen's vote will
decide the outcome of an election is minuscule. What moral reason do
democratic citizens have to participate in politics even though
they're almost certain not to make the difference to who gets
elected? Why shouldn't they seek to promote the good or justice
in other ways?



Parfit develops an act-utilitarian answer to this question (Parfit
1984: 73-75). Act-utilitarians hold that morally right actions
maximize the total expected sum of the utilities of all persons in the
society. Parfit argues that voting might nonetheless maximize expected
utility if one candidate is significantly superior to the other(s). If
we add the benefits to each member of the society of having the
superior candidate win, we get a very large difference in value. So
when we multiply that value by the probability of casting the deciding
vote, which is often thought to be about 1/100,000,000 in a United
States presidential election, we might still get a reasonably high
expected value. When we subtract the cost to the voter and others of
voting, which is often quite low, from this number, we may still have
a good reason to vote. 



One worry with Parfit's view is that it faces a version of what
Jason Brennan calls "the particularity problem" (Brennan
2011). This is the problem of explaining why citizens ought to promote
value through political participation as opposed to through
non-political acts. Voting is just one way of promoting overall
utility; we need to know the expected utility of the different acts
they might perform instead. Even if the argument above is correct, it
might be the case that many individuals maximize expected utility by
not voting and doing something even more beneficial with their
time.



Alex Guerrero argues that citizens have moral reasons to vote because
candidates who win by a larger proportion of votes can claim a greater
"normative mandate" to govern (Guerrero 2010). Still each
individual vote makes only a tiny contribution to the proportion of
votes a candidate receives. So, we might doubt the strength of the
reason to vote that Guerrero identifies. 



Some theorists argue that individuals have a moral duty to vote in
order to absolve themselves of complicity in state injustices
(Beerbohm 2012; Zakaras 2018). All states commit injustices--they
make and enforce unjust laws, wage unjust wars, and much else. And
citizens of large-scale democracies have a kind of standing
responsibility, by paying taxes and obeying laws, for their
state's injustices of which they must actively absolve
themselves The complicity account argues that citizens avoid shared
responsibility for their state's injustices if they oppose those
injustices through voting and of public advocacy (Beerbohm 2012).



One worry is that it is unclear why voting and publicly advocating
against injustice should be thought to absolve responsibility that is
established by paying taxes and obeying laws. Another worry is that
one's concern to oppose injustice should derive from a more
direct concern for the wrongs suffered by victims of injustice rather
than a concern with keeping one's hands clean.



One sort of account that avoids this worry grounds the moral duty to
vote in the importance of doing one's fair share of the demands
of political justice consistent with public equality. The demands of
creating and sustaining just institutions distribute fairly among all
citizens (Maskivker 2019). If one fails to do one's fair share
of these demands, then one fails to show due regard for the eventual
victims of injustice. Furthermore, voting provides citizens with a
mechanism for doing their fair shares of the demands of making their
institutions just in a way that is consistent with respecting the
public equality of fellow citizens. By showing up and casting a vote,
citizens can contribute to the collective achievement of justice while
maintaining equal decision-making power with fellow citizens.


#### 4.3.2 Principled Disobedience of the Law



Civil disobedience has long been recognized as a central mechanism
through which democratic citizens may legitimately promote political
justice in their society. According to the standard view, civil
disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law
that aims to change laws or government policies. People who engage in
civil disobedience are willing to accept the legal consequences of
their actions in order to show fidelity to the law (Bedau 1961; Rawls
1971: ch. 55). The standard definition of civil disobedience has been
subjected to challenge. For example, some argue that the private acts
in which the disobedient seeks to evade legal consequences can count
as instances of civil disobedience (Raz 1979; Brownlee 2004, 2007,
2012).



Perhaps the most common way of justifying civil disobedience argues
that the same considerations that ground the *pro tanto* duty
to obey the law sometimes make it appropriate to engage in civil
disobedience of the law (see, e.g., Rawls 1971: ch. 57; Sabl 2001;
Markovits 2005; Smith 2011). For example, Rawls argues that while
citizens of a "nearly just" society have a *pro
tanto* duty to obey its laws in virtue of it being nearly just,
civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant
society more just (Rawls 1971: ch. 57). Similarly, Daniel Markovits
argues that members of a society with suitably egalitarian and
inclusive democratic procedures have a general duty to obey its laws
because they are produced by procedures that are suitably egalitarian
and inclusive, but that civil disobedience can be justified as a way
of making the relevant procedures more egalitarian or inclusive
(Markovits 2005).



It is easy to see why this constitutes an attractive way of justifying
civil disobedience, since it justifies it by appeal to the same values
that ground the *pro tanto* duty to obey the law. On the other
hand, as Simmons notes, if there is no general duty to obey the law,
there would seem to be no presumption in favor of obedience and thus
no special need for a justification of civil disobedience; obedience
and disobedience would stand equally in need of justification (Simmons
2007: ch 4).



Advocates of the standard approach generally assume that only
*civil* disobedience can be justified in this way. However,
some argue civil disobedience does not enjoy a special normative
presumption over *uncivil* disobedience. The core idea that
insofar as the values that ground a *pro tanto* duty to obey
the law--for example, justice or democratic equality--are
sometimes best served by civil disobedience of the law, they are
sometimes best served by covert, evasive, anonymous, or even violent
disobedience of the law (Delmas 2018; Lai 2019; Pasternak 2018).


#### 4.3.3 Accommodate Disagreement Through Compromise and Consensus



Disagreement about what laws, policies, or principles ought to be
implemented is a persistent feature of democratic societies. It is
often argued that citizens and officials have duties to moderate their
political activity in order to accommodate the competing views of
fellow citizens or officials. Two duties of accommodation are widely
discussed in the literature: duties of compromise and duties of public
justification.



A compromise can be understood as an agreement between parties to
advance laws or policies that all regard as suboptimal because they
disagree about which laws or policies are optimal (May 2005). While it
is widely accepted that there are sometimes compelling instrumental
reasons to compromise, whether there are intrinsic moral reasons to
compromise is more controversial. Some defend intrinsic reasons to
compromise based on democratic values like inclusion, mutual respect,
and reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 2014; Wendt 2016; Weinstock
2013). However, Simon May argues that such arguments fail and that all
reasons to compromise are pragmatic (May 2005).



Advocates of the public justification approach to democracy (see
section 2.2.2) often argue that democratic
citizens and officials have
individual moral duties of public justification. John Rawls argues for
a "duty of civility" that requires citizens and officials
to be prepared to give mutually acceptable justifications for
important laws when voting and engaged in public advocacy. Given the
inevitability of disagreement about comprehensive moral and
philosophical truth in free democracies, the duty of civility requires
citizens to appeal to a reasonable "political" conception
of justice that can be the object of an "overlapping
consensus" between different comprehensive doctrines. While
different theorists motivate duties of public justification in
different ways, many appeal to the need for exercises of coercive
political authority to respect citizens' freedom and
equality.


## 5. Democratic Representation



Representation is an essential part of the division of labor of
large-scale democracies. In this section, we examine two moral
questions concerning representation. First, what sort of
representative system is best? Second, by what moral principles are
representatives bound?


### 5.1 What Sort of Representative System is Best?



A number of debates have centered on the question of what kinds of
representative systems are best for a democratic society. What choice
we make here will depend heavily on our underlying moral justification
of democracy, our conception of citizenship as well as on our
empirical understanding of political institutions and how they
function. The most basic types of formal political representation
available are single member district representation, proportional
representation and group representation. In addition, many societies
have opted for multicameral legislative institutions. In some cases,
combinations of the above forms have been tried.



Single member district representation returns single representatives
of geographically defined areas containing roughly equal populations
to the legislature and is prominent in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and India, among other places. The most common form of
proportional representation is party list proportional representation.
In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of parties compete for
election to a legislature that is not divided into geographical
districts. Parties acquire seats in the legislature as a proportion of
the total number of votes they receive in the voting population as a
whole. Group representation occurs when the society is divided into
non-geographically defined groups such as ethnic or linguistic groups
or even functional groups such as workers, farmers and capitalists and
returns representatives to a legislature from each of them.



Many have argued in favor of single member district legislation on the
grounds that it has appeared to them to lead to more stable government
than other forms of representation. The thought is that proportional
representation tends to fragment the citizenry into opposing
homogeneous camps that rigidly adhere to their party lines and that
are continually vying for control over the government. Since there are
many parties and they are unwilling to compromise with each other,
governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall apart
rather quickly. The post war experience of governments in Italy
appears to confirm this hypothesis. Single member district
representation, in contrast, is said to enhance the stability of
governments by virtue of its favoring a two party system of
government. Each election cycle then determines which party is to stay
in power for some length of time.



Charles Beitz argues that single member district representation
encourages moderation in party programs offered for citizens to
consider (Beitz 1989: ch. 7). This results from the tendency of this
kind of representation towards two party systems. In a two party
system with majority rule, it is argued, each party must appeal to the
median voter in the political spectrum. Hence, they must moderate
their programs to appeal to the median voter. Furthermore, they
encourage compromise among groups since they must try to appeal to a
lot of other groups in order to become part of one of the two leading
parties. These tendencies encourage moderation and compromise in
citizens to the extent that political parties, and interest groups,
hold these qualities up as necessary to functioning well in a
democracy.



In criticism, advocates of proportional and group representation have
argued that single member district representation tends to muffle the
voices and ignore the interests of minority groups in the society
(Mill 1861; Christiano 1996). Minority interests and views tend to be
articulated in background negotiations and in ways that muffle their
distinctiveness. Furthermore, representatives of minority interests
and views often have a difficult time getting elected at all in single
member district systems so it has been charged that minority views and
interests are often systematically underrepresented. Sometimes these
problems are dealt with by redrawing the boundaries of districts in a
way that ensures greater minority representation. The efforts are
invariably quite controversial since there is considerable
disagreement about the criteria for apportionment.



In proportional representation, by contrast, representatives of
different groups are seated in the legislature in proportion to
citizens' choices. Minorities need not make their demands
conform to the basic dichotomy of views and interests that
characterize single member district systems so their views are more
articulated and distinctive as well as better represented.



Advocates of group representation, like Iris Marion Young, have argued
that some historically disenfranchised groups may still not do very
well under proportional representation (Young 1990: ch. 6). They may
not be able to organize and articulate their views as easily as other
groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in
the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even
if they do have some representation. For these groups, some have
argued that the only way to protect their interests is legally to
ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate
representation.



One worry about group representation is that it tends to freeze some
aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of
citizens. For instance, consider a population that is divided into
linguistic groups for a long time. And suppose that only some citizens
continue to think of linguistic conflict as important. In the
circumstances a group representation scheme may tend to be biased in
an arbitrary way that favors the views or interests of those who do
think of linguistic conflict as important.


### 5.2 The Ethics of Representation



What moral norms apply to representatives carrying out their official
duties? We can get a better handle on possible answers by introducing
Hannah Pitkin's famous distinction between *trustees* and
*delegates* (Pitkin 1967). Representatives who act as trustees
rely on their own independent judgments in carrying out their duties.
Norms of trusteeship are supported in recognition that, given a
natural division of democratic labor, officials are in a much better
position to make well-reasoned and well-informed political decisions
than ordinary citizens.



Representatives who act as delegates defer to the judgments of their
citizens. These norms might be thought to reflect the value of
democratic accountability. Because the people authorize
representatives to govern, it is natural to think that representatives
are accountable to the people to enact their judgments. If
representatives are not accountable in this way, citizens lose
democratic control over their representatives' actions.



Which norms should win out when they conflict? Pitkin argues that the
answer varies by context. This seems plausible. For example, if we
take the view that citizens primarily have the role of determining the
aims of the society, we might think that representatives ought to be
delegates with regard to the aims, but trustees with regard to the
ways of realizing the aims (Christiano 1996). See Suzanne Dovi's
discussion of representation for a deeper and more nuanced discussion
of these issues.


## 6. Social Choice and Democracy



Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem is thought by some to
provide a major set of difficulties for democratic theory (Arrow
1951). William Riker, Russell Hardin, and others have thought that the
impossibility theorem shows that there are deep problems with
democratic ideals (Riker 1982; Hardin 1999). Neither of these thinkers
are opposed to democracy itself, they both think that there are good
instrumental reasons for having democracy. 



The basic results of social choice theory are laid out in detail
elsewhere in the encyclopedia (List 2013). Here we will simply
articulate the basic result and an illustration. The question of
Arrowian social choice theory is: how do we determine a social
preference for a society overall on the basis of the set of the
individual preferences of the members? Arrow shows that a social
choice function that satisfies a number of plausible constraints
cannot be defined when there are three or more alternatives to be
chosen by the group. He lays out a number of conditions to be imposed
on a social choice function. *Unlimited domain*: The social
choice function must be able to give us a social preference no matter
what the preferences of the individuals over alternatives are. *Non
dictatorship*: the social choice function must not select the
preference of one particular member regardless of others'
preferences. *Transitivity and completeness*: The individual
preferences orderings must be transitive and complete orderings and
the social preference derived from them must be transitive and
complete. *Independence of irrelevant alternatives*: the social
preference between two alternatives must be the result only of the
individual orderings between those two alternatives. *Pareto
condition*: if all the members prefer an alternative *x* over
*y*, then *x* must be ranked above *y* in the social
preference. The theorem says that no social choice function over more
than two alternatives can satisfy all of these conditions.



A useful illustration of this idea involves an extension of majority
rule to cases of more than two alternatives. The Condorcet rule says
that an alternative *x* wins when, for every other alternative, a
majority prefers *x* over that alternative. For example, suppose
we have three persons *A*, *B* and *C* and three
alternatives *x*, *y* and *z*. *A* prefers
*x* over *y*, *y* over *z*; *B* prefers
*y* over *z* and *z* over *x*; *C* prefers
*x* over *z* and *z* over *y*. In this case,
*x* is the Condorcet winner since it beats *y*, and it beats
*z*. The problem with this plausible sounding rule is the case of
a majority cycle. Suppose you have three persons *A*, *B*
and *C*, and three alternatives, *x*, *y* and *z*.
In the case in which A prefers *x* over *y* and *y*
over *z*, while *B* prefers *y* over *z* and
*z* over *x*, and *C* prefers *z* over *x*
and *x* over *y*, the Condorcet rule will yield a social
preference of *x* over *y*, *y* over *z* and
*z* over *x*. One can see here that the Condorcet rule
satisfies all the conditions except transitivity of social preference.
One way to avoid intransitivity is to restrict the domain of
preferences from which the social preference arises. Another is to
introduce cardinal information that compares the how much people
prefer alternatives (violating independence). Another might be to make
one person a dictator. So, this case nicely illustrates that one
cannot satisfy all of the constraints simultaneously.



Riker argues that the theorem shows that the idea that the popular
will can be the governing element in a society is false. If an
existence condition for a popular will is a restricted set of
preferences the question naturally arises as to whether such a
condition is always or normally met in a moderately complex society.
We might wonder whether a highly pluralistic society with a very
complex division of labor is likely to satisfy the restricted
preference set condition necessary to avoid cycles or other
pathologies of social choice. Some have argued that we have empirical
evidence to the effect that modern societies do normally satisfy such
conditions (Mackie 2003). Others have argued that this seems unlikely
(Riker 1982; Ingham 2019). This is not merely a defense of unlimited
domain. It is a defense of the thesis that normally the collections of
preferences in modern societies are not likely to have the properties
that enable them to avoid cycles.



The fairness critique from social choice theory is based on the idea
that when a voting process meets requirements of fairness, the
fairness of the process and the preferences may not generate
determinate outcomes. If cycles are pervasive, the outcomes of
democratic processes may be determined by clever strategies and not by
the fairness of the procedures (Riker 1982). Three remarks are in
order here. First, it is compatible with the process being completely
fair that the outcomes of the process are indeterminate. After all,
coin flips are fair. Second, there is some question as to how
prominent the cycles are. Third, one might think that if the
conditions which enable opposing sides to strategize effectively are
themselves roughly equal, then the concerns for fairness are fully
met. If resources for persuasion and organization are distributed in
an egalitarian way, perhaps the fairness account is vindicated after
all. This point can be made more compelling when we consider Sean
Ingham's account of political equality. He includes intensity of
preference in his account of fairness. This is a departure from the
Arrowian approach, but it is in many ways a realistic one. The idea is
that majorities have equal control over policy areas when they are
able to get what they want with the same amount of intensity of
preferences. And equality holds generally when all groups of the same
size have the same control (Ingham 2019). There remains an extreme
case in which all majorities have equal intensity of preference and
are caught in a majority cycle. But the chances of this happening are
very slim, even if the chances of majority cycles more generally are
not as small. Even if there are a lot of majority cycles, if the
issues are resolved in such a way that those majorities that have most
at stake in the conflict are the ones that get their way, then we can
have fairness in a quite robust sense even while having pervasive
majority cycles. 


## 7. The Boundary Problem: Constituting the Demos



If democratic societies allow members to participate as equals in
collective decision making, a natural question arises: who has the
right to participate in making collective decisions? We can ask this
question within a particular jurisdiction (ought all adults have the
right to participation? Ought children have the right to
participation? Ought all residents have such rights?). But we can also
ask what the extent of the jurisdiction ought to be. How many of the
people in the world ought to be included in the collective
decision-making? An easy, though slightly misleading, way of asking
this question is, what ought the physical boundaries of a particular
institution of collective decision-making be? We see partially
democratic societies within the confines of the modern nation-state.
But we might ask, why should we restrict the set of persons who
participate in making decisions of the modern state just to those who
happen to be the physical inhabitants of those states? Surely there
are many other persons affected by decisions made by democratic states
aside from those persons. For example, activities in one society
*A* can pollute another society *B*. Why shouldn't the
members of *B* have a say in the decisions regarding the
polluting activities in *A*? And there can be many other effects
that activities in *A* can have on *B*.



Some have suggested that the boundaries of a state ought to be
determined through a principle of national self-determination. We
identify a nation as an ongoing group of persons who share certain
cultural, historical and political norms and who identify with each
other and with a piece of land. Then we determine the boundaries of
the territory by appeal to the size of the group of people and the
land they cherish (Miller 1995; Song 2012). This is an appealing idea
in many ways: shared nationality breeds a willingness to share the
sacrifices that arise from collective decision making; it generates a
sense of at-homeness for people. But it is hard to use as a general
principle for dividing land among persons when one of the central
facts for many societies is that a diversity of nations, ethnic groups
and cultures co-mingle on the very same land. 



Is there a democratic solution to the boundary problem? A number of
ideas have been suggested. The first idea is that the people ought to
decide what the boundaries are. But this suggestion, while it may be a
pragmatic resolution to the problem, seems to beg the question about
who the members are and who are not (Whelan 1983).



A second theoretical solution that has some democratic credentials is
to invoke the principle that all who are subjected to decision making,
in the sense of who are coerced or have duties imposed upon them,
ought to have a say in the decision making (Abizadeh 2008). This
principle is plausible enough, but it doesn't get at enough
cases. The pollution case above is not a case of subjection.



A third proposed theoretical solution is the all-affected principle.
One formulation is "all affected persons ought to have a say in
the decisions that affect them". This does suggest that when the
activities in one state affect those of another state, the people of
the other state ought to have a say in those activities. Some have
thought that this principle tends to lead to a kind of politically
cosmopolitan principle in support of world government (Goodin 2007).




But the all-affected principle is conceptually quite uncertain and
morally deeply problematic, and it provides very little, if anything,
in the way of a solution to the boundary problem. 



First, "having a say" is not clear. Does it require having
a vote in collective decision-making? Or is it also satisfied by a
person's being able to modify another's action by
negotiating with them, as we see when there is bargaining over an
externality? This latter version would undermine the idea that the
all-affected principle has direct implications for the boundary
problem. When the United States permits activities that produce acid
rain in Canada, Canada can negotiate with the United States to lessen
the production of acid rain and/or to compensate Canada for the harm.
As long as there is a fair and effective system of negotiation, this
would seem to satisfy the all-affected principle without giving
Canadians a vote in American politics or Americans a vote in Canadian
politics.



Second, it is not clear what "being affected" means. One,
does a person being affected just mean that there is a change in the
person's situation or must the effect involve the setting back
of one's preferences, or interests, or legitimate interests, or
exercise of one's capacities or one's good? Two, are
one's interests affected by a decision only when they are
advanced or set back relative to some baseline (either the present
state of affairs or some morally defined baseline like what you have
promised me), or am I affected by decisions that could be to my
advantage or disadvantage but end up making no difference? For
example, if I am drowning in a pool and you are deciding whether to
save me or go buy yourself a candy bar, am I affected by your buying
the candy bar? If I am not affected when no change occurs, then who is
affected by a decision often depends on who participates in the
decision and we have no solution to the problem of inclusion. If I am
affected, then the principle has some quite extraordinary
implications. Now it turns out that impoverished persons in South Asia
are affected by my buying a candy bar, since I could have sent the
money to them (Goodin 2007).



The all-affected principle is a merely suggestive and rhetorically
effective phrase. It is a conversation starter and a list of topics to
be discussed, not a genuine principle. For example, if I must include
everyone possibly affected by my decision for every decision I make, I
will not be able to make many decisions and my decision making will no
longer enable me to give a shape to my own life and my relations with
others. My life becomes fragmented and lacks integrity (Williams
1973). An analog of this problem would arise for political societies,
presumably. Each society would have to include a variety of different
persons in each decision. It is hard to see how any society could take
on any particular character if this is the case. 



A more plausible principle that encompasses some of the suggestions of
the all-affected principle is that a framework of institutions should
be set up so that people have power to advance and protect their
legitimate interests in life. 



But if we understand the principle in this way, it is not clear that
it helps us much with the boundary problem. First of all, there are
different ways in which people can be said to possess power over their
lives. One kind of power is the power to participate as an equal in a
collective decision-making process. Another kind is to be able to
advance one's interests in a decentralized process like a market
or a system of agreement making like international law. Recalling our
pollution problem above, we could give the state of which they are
members power to negotiate with the polluting state terms that are
mutually agreeable. Only the power to participate as an equal in
collective decision-making involves the boundaries of collective
decision-making. 



Another solution to the boundary problem is a conservative one. The
basic idea is to keep the boundaries of states roughly as they are
except if there is a pressing need to change them. Trying to alter the
boundaries of political societies is a recipe for serious conflict
because there is no institution that has the legitimacy or power
actually to resolve problems at an international level and there is
likely to be a lot of disagreement on how to do it. States as we know
them, are by far the most powerful political entities in the
international system. They have developed more effective practices of
accountability of power than any other entity in the system. They have
created unified societies with highly interdependent populations.
Finally, states and the individuals in them can be made accountable to
some degree to other individuals and states through the process of
negotiation and international law making. The origin of these
boundaries may be arbitrary, but it is not, for all that, irrelevant.
To be sure, there are clear cases where borders can be changed. One
source of pressing need is serious injustice within a country. Another
might be the existence of permanent minorities that are sectionally
defined. Here, we ask only how to revise boundaries and the basis of
such revision is that it is a remedy for serious injustice (Buchanan
1991).