## 1. The Nyaya-Vaisesika account of the emotions



The discussion of this account will focus on the
*Nyaya-sutras*, Vatsyayana's
*Nyaya-bhasya*, Uddyotakara's
*Nyaya-varttika* and Jayanta
Bhatta's *Nyaya-manjari*. In
addition, the *Vaisesika-sutras* together with
Sankara Misra's
*Vaisesika-sutra-upaskara* will be
mentioned. The Nyaya-Vaisesika account of the emotions
involves a strict division into cognition (*jnana*)
and mental phenomena that include a feeling aspect, such as love or
attraction (*raga*) and aversion (*dvesa*).
One of the main reasons for this is the acceptance of the existence of
a permanent immaterial self (*atman*) by the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. According to their
arguments, the *atman* is a substance (*dravya*)
which possesses several qualities (*gunas*), such as
cognition, desire, effort, aversion, pleasure and pain. This
enumeration shows that there is no common Sanskrit term for the
concept "emotion" in the Nyaya-Vaisesika
texts. One general term used is *samvedana* which
translates as "feeling", for example
*sukha-samvedana* (feeling of pleasure).



The important aspect of the Nyaya-Vaisesika account is
that the individual emotions, such as attachment and aversion are
regarded as defects (*dosas*) [NB 1.1.18] or impurities
(*upadha*) [VS and VSU 6.2.4]. These defects are the
result of ignorance (*mithyajnana*) and they
give rise to actions that lead to the feeling of pleasure or pain. The
reason why this is regarded as negative is that the feeling of
pleasure and pain is responsible for our attachment to the world and,
more importantly, for our attachment to the self and therefore
presents an obstacle to liberation. For this reason, any emotion is
deemed to have a negative influence on the individual. However, NV
1.1.22 mentions one exception, namely the desire for eternal pleasure
and absence from pain which is final liberation. While, strictly
speaking, a desire is not an emotion, it usually has the same negative
effect because it results in attachment to the object of desire. The
desire for eternal pleasure, however, is not detrimental to
liberation; in fact it is a precondition for liberation.



The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers clearly distinguish
between pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duhkha*) on
the one hand and the experience of pleasure (*sukha-pratyaya*)
and pain (*duhkha-pratyaya*) on the other hand. Pain and
pleasure are qualities of the soul but they need to be cognized by the
self in order to be experienced. This means that cognition has a
special status among the qualities of self: no other quality can be
experienced without cognition.



Another reason why cognition is an important quality is that it is not
necessarily a defect whereas the other qualities are always defects.
The defects fall into 3 groups: i) attraction (*raga*),
ii) aversion (*dvesa*) and iii) illusion (*moha*)
[NS 4.1.3]. Among the first group we find love, selfishness and greed.
The second group includes anger, jealousy, envy, malice and
resentment. The Third group encompasses error, suspicion, pride and
negligence. These groupings show that, according to the
Nyaya-Vaisesika account, there are no positive
emotions. Even love, which is regarded as a positive emotion in many
cultures, is ultimately a defect because all emotions lead to
attachment and error.



The opposite of all three types of defect is described in NB 4.1.4 as
knowledge of truth (*tattvajnana*), right knowledge
(*samyanmati*), truthful cognition
(*aryaprajna*) and right apprehension
(*sambodha*). This shows that, according to the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers, emotions are defects
because they prevent our thinking from turning into right knowledge.
This knowledge can thus only be had if we eliminate these defects and
thereby our emotions.



According to NS 4.1.6, illusion is the worst defect because without it
the others are not going to appear. This means that one has to be
under an illusion already in order to think that the object of
one's attraction provides pleasure and the object of one's
aversion pain. In fact, NS and NB 4.1.58 state that ordinary pleasure
should be regarded as pain:



> 
> The ordinary man, addicted to pleasure, regards pleasure as the
> highest end of man, and feels that there is nothing better than
> pleasure; and hence when pleasure has been attained, he feels happy
> and contented, feeling that all he had to attain had been attained;
> and under the influence of illusion, he becomes attached to the
> pleasure, as also to the things that bring about its accomplishment;
> becoming so attached, he makes an attempt to obtain the pleasure; and
> while he is trying for it, there come down on him several kinds of
> pain, in the form of birth, old age, disease, death, the contact of
> disagreeable things, separation from agreeable things, the
> non-fulfilment of desires and so forth; and yet all these several
> kinds of pain he regards as 'pleasure.' In fact pain is a
> necessary factor in pleasure; without suffering some pain no pleasure
> can be obtained; hence as leading to pleasure, this pain is regarded
> by the man as pleasure; and such a man, having his mind obsessed by
> this notion of 'pleasure', never escapes from
> metempsychosis, which consists of a running series of births and
> deaths. And it is as an antidote of this notion of pleasure that we
> have the teaching that all this should be looked upon as
> 'pain.' [NB 4.1.58, p. 1553]
> 



This quote shows that ultimately the feeling of pleasure is an
illusion and that our ordinary existence is necessarily beset with
pain. This demonstrates the link between feeling and error, according
to the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. Both pleasure and
pain are two factors that are responsible for our notion of
"I" that prevents us from attaining final liberation.
Therefore, the pursuit of pleasure is futile and ought to be abandoned
in favour of final liberation.



For the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers, pleasure and
pain are not forms of cognition because they have different causes
than cognitions [VS and VSU 10.1.5-6]. This means that we can
have a cognition without a feeling and we can also have a feeling
without a cognition. In addition, they are experienced differently
[NM, vol. 1, p. 118]. This separation between cognitions and feelings,
together with the view that feelings are defects that disturb
cognitions, means that feelings are regarded as purely negative. They
lead to an attachment to the world which causes a sense of self and
this sense of self provides an obstacle to liberation.



The Nyaya-Vaisesika view shows similarities with the
received view of the emotions in Western philosophy with regard to the
point that feelings are a disturbance of cognition. However, in many
Western accounts cognition is regarded as an end in itself because it
coincides with the ideal of rational thinking, whereas according to
the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers cognition is not an
end in itself. Rather, it is supposed to lead to the conclusion that
final liberation is the ultimate aim and final liberation means the
end of cognition.


## 2. The Vedanta account of the emotions



In his commentary on the *Brahma-sutras*,
Samkara makes the well-known argument that the self
(*atman*) exists because its existence is the only way to
account for the idea of a subject of experience. This argument relies
on the idea that the self has certain mental qualities, which are
termed *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intellect),
*vijnana* (cognition) or *citta*
(consciousness), depending on what mental function is ascribed to
them. Different mental functions are doubt, resolution, egoism or
recollection [BSBh 2.4.6]. These mental functions, regardless of how
they are referred to, have several qualities or modifications,
including desire, imagination, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory,
forgetfulness, shame, reflection and fear [BSBh 2.3.32] as well as
love, aversion, pleasure and pain [BSBh 2.3.29]. This means that,
according to Samkara, the mind's cognitive and
emotional abilities are the qualities of our mental functioning which
is different from the self.



At the heart of Samkara's teaching lies the notion
that the true knowledge of the *atman* is knowledge that
is devoid of any of the above-mentioned qualities. In this respect one
can find a similarity between the Nyaya school and
Samkara because for both of them cognitive and emotional
qualities are due to false knowledge or ignorance of the true self.
This means that the removal of ignorance results in a removal of
emotions as well as cognitions. However, it is clear that the emotions
present the main obstacle for the realization of the true self because
desire and aversion lead to attachment and clinging which cause us to
neglect the search for liberation that is crucial to Vedanta
teaching. So, while Samkara distinguishes between what
Western philosophers would call cognitions and emotions, he does not
present a purely cognitive state of mind without emotions as the ideal
state of mind because such a state would be impossible. By definition,
any purely cognitive state of mind presupposes the existence of a mind
or intellect. For Samkara, however, the problem is that a
mind will always have certain qualities that would be called emotive
in Western philosophy, such as desire, aversion, hatred, pleasure or
pain. So, as long there are cognitions, there will also be emotions.
Therefore, both must be eliminated in order for the self to attain
liberation. On this point, Samkara agrees with the
Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. While Samkara
distinguishes between emotions and cognitions, his distinction is not
as pronounced as that of the Nyaya-Vaisesika
philosophers. He regards both as qualities of the mind or
intellect.


## 3. The Samkhya-Yoga account of the emotions



Unlike the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Vedanta accounts
of the emotions, the Samkhya-Yoga account does not draw a
fundamental distinction between feelings and cognitions. The reason
for this is that the Samkhya account rests on the division
between *purusa* and *prakrti*. The former
is pure consciousness and does not contain any cognitions or feelings
whereas *prakrti* is primordial matter and has the three
qualities (*gunas*) *sattva*, *rajas* and
*tamas*, which are aligned with different feelings:
*sattva* with pleasure (*sukha*), *rajas* with
pain (*duhkha*) and *tamas* with confusion or
illusion (*moha*). The terms *sattva*, *rajas*
and *tamas* are difficult to translate but are sometimes
rendered as "reflection", "activity" and
"inertia". The important point about this dualist
structure for the emotions is that, according to the
Samkhya account, both cognition and feeling belong to the
realm of *prakrti* which means that they are material.
This stands in contrast to many dualist accounts in the history of
Western philosophy, for example that of Descartes, according to which
cognitions are immaterial whereas emotions or passions are material,
thus making it easier to oppose the two. Larson and Bhattacharya
(1987) summarize the difference between Western and Samkhya
dualism in the following way:



> 
> [A]ccording to Samkhya philosophy, the experiences of
> intellect, egoity, and mind, and the "raw feels" such as
> frustration or satisfaction--or, in other words, what
> conventional dualists would consider to be "inherently
> private"--are simply subtle reflections of primordial
> materiality, a primordial materiality undergoing continuous
> transformation by means of its constituent unfolding as spontaneous
> activity, reflective discerning, and determinate formulation. Thus,
> the modern reductive materialists' claim that "sensations
> are identical with certain brain processes" would have a
> peculiar counterpart in the Samkhya claim that
> "awarenesses" [Sanskrit terms omitted] are identical with
> certain *guna* modalities. (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987,
> p. 76)
> 



The relationship between *purusa* and
*prakrti* in Samkhya philosophy is complex:
*purusa* as pure consciousness is characterized by
inaction (*akartrbhava*) and pure presence
(*saksitva*). It does not stand in any relation with
*prakrti*, which comprises the material world, including
mental processes. Nevertheless, *purusa* forms the
foundation of *prakrti*. This means that
*purusa* provides the meaning for all material processes.
Thus *prakrti* exists for *purusa* and it is
only because of this that the world is not simply a collection of
meaningless physical processes. In addition, the intellect as part of
*prakrti* is supposed to realize that it is not
consciousness and it is to become aware of pure consciousness as the
way to liberation. This means that the intellect is supposed to
understand the contentless pure consciousness but of course in order
to do so it would have to become contentless itself, which seems
impossible. Therefore, the intellect can only achieve this in an
indirect way without cognition. Instead, we require meditative or
yogic exercises to understand the difference between
*purusa* and *prakrti*.



In spite of the fact that cognition and emotion are both material,
emotions have a negative connotation in Samkhya philosophy.
In this regard the account is similar to that of many Western
philosophers. However, in Western philosophy the idea is to have
cognition free from emotion. By contrast, the Samkhya
philosophers do not think of cognition as a desirable end in itself.
Rather, their idea is that ultimate liberation lies in the recognition
of *purusa* by *prakrti*. This means that
our everyday experience of ourselves as conscious intellects with
cognitions and emotions is an obstacle on the way to realizing what
pure contentless consciousness is. In fact, Samkhya
philosophers argue that our experience of ourselves as conscious
beings is a mistake that needs to be rectified in order to achieve
liberation. This realization is extremely difficult to achieve and
therefore Samkhya proposes first of all to clear the mind
of the passions [SSu 2.15] by separating them from cognition and then
to free the mind from cognition in order to comprehend contentless
consciousness. So emotions or passions are regarded as negative but
they are not contrasted with cognitions because cognitions themselves
are supposed to be overcome in order to understand
*purusa*.



In the *Yogasutras*, Patanjali provides a method
for understanding the difference between *purusa* and
*prakrti* via a series of exercises that aim at stripping
away all of the disturbing influences from the mind, including what
Western philosophers would classify as emotions. In fact,
Patanjali argues that the mind is affected by afflictions
(*klesas*) that keep it from becoming clear about the
difference between *purusa* and *prakrti*.
In YS 2.3, Patanjali lists the afflictions:



> 
> Ignorance (*avidya*), egoism (*asmita*),
> attachment (*raga*), aversion (*dvesa*) and
> adherence [to mundane existence] (*abhinivesa*) are
> afflictions. [YS 2.3]
> 



These afflictions need to be removed in order to achieve liberation.
Unlike in many Western accounts of the emotions, the removal of the
afflictions is not supposed to lead to a form of rational thinking
that is divorced from any emotion. Rather, rational thinking itself
needs to be overcome, in order to achieve true liberation by
separating *purusa* from *prakrti*.



The main reason why emotions such as attachment and aversion are
regarded as afflictions is that they lead to a desire to change our
circumstances and therefore to an attachment to the world. This
attachment, however, is precisely what is to be given up in order to
achieve liberation. So, Patanjali and his commentators argue
that emotions lead to desire and therefore have to be given up as one
of the root causes of ignorance that causes attachment to the world.
Only then can the mind discriminate between *purusa* and
*prakrti*.



One interesting parallel between Western accounts of the emotions and
Patanjali is the use of the "colouring"
(*uparaga*) or "coloured" (*uparaktam*)
metaphor with regard to the mind [e.g., in YS 4.23]. Patanjali
claims that the mind is "coloured" by all of the objects
it knows, including cognitions and emotions. This means that in order
to understand the difference between itself and pure consciousness
(*purusa*), it has to free itself from these colourings
and become pure. Only then can it recognize that it is different from
the *purusa* which cannot be known in itself because it
cannot become an object of the mind. Vyasa, in his commentary on
YS 4.23, explains that the mind itself is an object that appears as a
conscious subject which is why many philosophers mistake it for the
subject. However, once the mind becomes empty of all objects the
difference between the mind and *purusa* reveals itself.
Vyasa makes the argument that a mind which is empty of all
objects can still know itself and thus it would have to become an
object in the mind, i.e., itself. In other words, cognition would have
to be cognized by itself. This, however, is impossible, according to
him. Instead, *purusa* shows itself as that which makes
cognition possible. In this sense, *purusa* can be
compared to Husserl's idea of the "transcendental
ego". So, *purusa* can only reveal itself
indirectly by emptying the mind of all cognitions, including emotions.
This means that emotions are regarded as an obstacle to liberation but
at the same time, they share this designation with other cognitions of
the world.



The Samkhya-Yoga account of the emotions thus shows some
similarities with the Nyaya-Vaisesika account in that
both regard the emotions as the first obstacle to liberation. Both
accounts differ from many Western views in that they regard
emotion-free thinking not as an end in itself but as the next obstacle
to be removed. For the Samkhya-Yoga philosophers there is a
distinction between veridical and non-veridical cognition
(*vijnana*). The latter is classified as ignorance
(*avidya*), which, together with certain emotions, forms
the afflictions (*klesas*). The *Yoga-sutras*
[YS 2.4] emphasize that ignorance is the most fundamental affliction
that is the root of all other afflictions. In his commentary on YS
2.3, Vyasa states that "the afflictions are the five forms
of unreal cognition." So, as Sinha points out:



> 
> All afflictions (*klesa*) are due to false knowledge
> (*avidya*) and can be destroyed by right knowledge. The
> Yoga, like Spinoza, regards emotions as intellectual disorders which
> can be cured by true knowledge. [Footnote omitted] (Sinha 1985, p. 97)
> 



We therefore see similarities between a cognitive account of the
emotions and the Samkhya-Yoga account because both claim
that emotions have mental objects but at the same time there is a
difference in how emotions can relate to knowledge, with the
Samkhya-Yoga philosophers claiming that knowledge and
emotions are incompatible.


## 4. The Buddhist account of the emotions



While there are many nuances in the accounts of the emotions among
Buddhist writers, there are also certain key ideas that are common to
all of them. This section, tries to bring out these key ideas by
analyzing some of the writings of the Buddhist philosophers
Dharmakirti, Santaraksita and
Kamalasila.


### 4.1 Buddhist cognition



As with other Indian accounts of the emotions, the Buddhist conception
of emotion appears in the context of the discussion about the role of
cognition (*vijnana*). Buddhist philosophers argue
against the existence of a self (*atman*). At the same
time, they acknowledge the existence of a non-physical momentary
consciousness or chain of cognitions (*santana
vijnana*) which carries over from former births into
the present and future rebirths. Thus, Buddhists try to find a middle
ground between a permanent non-physical self and the materialism of
the Lokayata school (materialist school of philosophy) which
argues that the self is purely the result of bodily processes.
According to the materialists, the self comes into existence with the
body and ceases to exist when the body ceases to exist.



In the *Pramana-siddhi*-chapter of the
*Pramana-varttika*, Dharmakirti argues
that past lives exist. We can know this because of the authority of
the Buddha and we have reason to accept his authority because of his
infinite compassion. This compassion can only be the result of
practice over many life times [PV 36]. The Lokayata philosophers
argue that cognitions require the support of a body and therefore
cease to exist when the body ceases to exist. Dharmakirti objects
to this by arguing that mental cognitions do not derive from any
physical support [PV 49]. Santaraksita and
Kamalasila state that the relationship between the support
and what is supported can be analyzed either as a causal relationship
or as the relationship between an object and its capacity [TS and TSP
1858-1859]. In this respect they do not deviate from
Dharmakirti who rejects this position of the Lokayata
philosophers by arguing that the body could be neither the cause of
cognition nor could it have the capacity of cognition. Franco explains
Dharmakirti's argument in the following way:



> 
> If the body were one lasting and changeless entity from birth to
> death, it could not produce cognitions gradually, and thus all the
> cognitions one has throughout one's life would be produced at
> once. If the body were the material cause of the cognition, the
> cognition would last as long as the body, and thus there could be no
> dead body (v. 51). If the breaths are considered the cause of
> cognition, the same inadmissible consequence applies: Because the body
> is the material cause of the breaths, the breaths would last as long
> as the body and the cognition as long as the breaths (v. 53). All
> these inadmissible consequences do not apply if one admits that
> cognition is the cause of cognition. (Franco 1997, pp. 134-135)
> 



Of course, there is no reason why the Lokayata philosophers
should say that the body is changeless. It might precisely be the
changes that appear in the body, for example in the brain, which are
responsible for cognition. Dharmakirti argues that if cognition
required the support of the body, there is no reason why it should not
arise everywhere where there exists a body or matter [PV 37-38].
The obvious objection to this argument is that not any form of matter
supports cognition. It has to be a particular kind of matter, ordered
in a particular way, as is the case in human beings and many
animals.



According to Buddhist "psychology", love and hatred are
two of the afflictions (*klesas*) that befall human beings
and that need to be removed in order to attain liberation. There are a
number of sections in the *Yogacara-bhumi*,
possibly written by either Asanga or Maitreya, that discuss
these *klesas*. The text provides several lists, most of
which include love (*raga)* and hatred or enmity
(*pratigha*). Other *klesas* are:
*satkaya-drsti* (false view with regard
to the *satkaya* (five *skandhas*)), attachment to
extreme views, attachment to unwholesome views, attachment to
practices and observances, pride, ignorance and doubt. These
*klesas* could be associated with one or more of the five
possible feelings: pleasant feeling (*sukha*), unpleasant
feeling (*duhkha*), neutral feeling
(*upeksa*), happy mood (*sau-manasya*) or
unhappy mood (*daur-manasya*). A translation of the
psychological categories of the *Yogacara-bhumi*
into the categories of Western philosophy of mind would render the
following distinctions: a *klesa* is a mental phenomenon
that consists of a representation of an object plus a certain feeling,
sensation or affect. For example, in the case of love, the
*Yogacara-bhumi* states that we have the object
of love plus either a pleasant sensation or a happy mood or
indifference (neutral feeling). It is interesting to note that the
mental phenomenon of love can be connected with indifference. In
general, this suggests that a sensation is comparable to a
psychological attitude and that we always have to have one attitude or
another towards a mental object. This means that our thinking is never
without a feeling, even if it is a "neutral" feeling. It
is unclear, however, in what way we could experience the emotion of
love with the sensation of indifference. It seems that love always
requires a positive feeling. The
*Yogacara-bhumi* allows for a mental phenomenon
to count as the experience of love, as long as it does not involve a
"negative", i.e., unhappy or unpleasant, feeling.



In addition, the text acknowledges that a representation can be about
a real object or an imagined object. In the latter case, the question
arises in what way we can distinguish between an object and its
representation. This suggests that at least some Buddhist traditions
distinguish between a cognition, the object of a cognition and the
feeling accompanying a cognition. Santaraksita
mentions *klesas* in TS 1955 and it is obvious that he
operates within the context of this psychological distinction which
becomes clear in his discussion of love (*raga*) and
hatred (*dvesa*).


### 4.2 Santaraksita on love and hatred



Santaraksita argues that love and hatred exist due to
habit and repetition which is ascertained by confirming and
disconfirming concomitance. This means that they are learned through
experience. For example, love is learned by a person being confronted
with objects to which this feeling is attributed and thus reinforced
the more of these objects a person encounters. However, we can observe
the existence of love and hatred in babies who have not had the
repeated experience of these objects in this life.
Santaraksita claims that the existence of love and
hatred cannot be due to the first encounter with the object of love or
hatred because it would be possible, as indeed happens according to
him, to encounter this object without the respective feelings of love
or hatred or to encounter it with another feeling, such as disgust. As
an example, Santaraksita mentions the attraction a man
might feel towards a woman. He claims that men are attracted to women
if they also attribute "goodness" and
"devotedness" to them, even though a particular woman
might not possess these qualities. So the qualities that make, for
example, a woman "lovable" do not have to exist in the
woman and therefore, according to Santaraksita, the
woman cannot be said to be the cause of the feeling of love in the
man. Love, then is not an object of the senses
(*visaya*). Therefore, the reason why these feelings
exist is through force of habit in previous lives. We have learned
over time that women are "lovable". This argument is meant
to demonstrate that love and hatred could not exist if the
materialists were right and mental life was simply the result of
bodily processes.



Kamalasila explains this argument in his commentary on TS
1948-1953 in a rather straightforward way and adds a very
helpful example:



> 
> For the following reason also, the feelings of Love, etc. cannot be
> due to presence of the excitants:-Because, if the feelings
> appeared exactly in accordance with the excitants, they would proceed
> from the excitant exactly in the same manner as the Cognition of Blue
> and other things (which always proceeds in accordance with these
> things);-the feelings however do not proceed in this way; on the
> contrary, the said feelings appear in regard to the Woman and other
> things, in men who attribute to the woman the form of their own
> lasting pleasure, etc. which have not been experienced at all; and yet
> the objects (woman, etc.) are not actually possessed of the said form
> of goodness, etc.;-and when a thing is devoid of a certain form,
> it cannot be the excitant or basis of the Cognition of that form;
> otherwise it would lead to absurdity. (TSP: 931)
> 



In this passage, Kamalasila draws a distinction between the
cognition of blue and the feeling of love. His point is that the
cognition of blue is a perception and therefore requires an object
whereas a feeling of love does not. There is no basis for love in the
way that there is a basis for our perception of blue. So,
Santaraksita's argument, as explained by
Kamalasila, consists of two parts: a) love, hatred etc. are
learned through experience and reinforced by repetition and b) love,
hatred etc. are not perceptions.



In TS 1958, Santaraksita provides a similar example of
male animals that become "perturbed" by the touch of
female animals even though they do not know anything about any
"doings" (*vrttanta*) or sexual
intercourse, yet. His argument is that this feeling must be due to
experiences in previous lives. He does not account for the possibility
of instinctual behaviour. If Santaraksita allowed for
the existence of instinctual behaviour then his observation of babies
and animals might have let him to believe that love and hatred are
mental phenomena that are not learned through experience.



Santaraksita clearly believes that there is something
fundamental about the feelings of love and hatred. They are so
fundamental that even babies feel them. At the same time, they require
experience. So the question is how was the first feeling of love (or
hatred) acquired? There might have been a time when humans did not
have the feeling of love and they only acquired it at some point in
their lives through experience and subsequent repetition of the
experience. This sounds like a strange idea precisely because love and
hatred are so fundamental to our unenlightened lives that the
existence of a time when they did not exist seems impossible. Yet,
Santaraksita's view implies either that there
must have been such a time or that there is an infinite chain of these
feelings stretching backwards. In TS 1872,
Santaraksita makes it clear that he believes in the
latter option:



> 
> As regards the "other world", there is no such
> "other world", apart from the "chain of causes and
> effects, in the form of cognition and the rest". What is spoken
> of as "the other world" or "this world", that
> is only by way of a certain limit placed upon the said
> "chain" which is beginningless and endless. (TS 1872)
> 



So, Santaraksita might argue that love and hatred are
just as much part of a "chain of cognitions" that is
without beginning and end as all other cognitions. The reason why he
postulates the existence of this eternal "chain of
cognitions" is the argument that no cognition could be caused by
anything other than a previous cognition and hence there cannot be a
first cognition for anything we call a particular being. If there was
a first cognition for a particular being then, according to
Santaraksita (TS 1878-1885), there would be five
options: i) the first cognition does not have a cause; ii) it is
produced by an eternal cause; iii) it is eternal and unchanging; iv)
it is caused by another substance; and v) it is caused by a cognition
"from another chain".



Santaraksita rejects the first option because he
argues that according to this idea the foetus would somehow receive
the first cognition without any cause. This means that the cognition
would be eternal, rather than momentary. Santaraksita
rejects the second option because if the cognition is produced by an
eternal non-material cause then it should itself be eternal. The
argument is that if something which exists eternally can bring about a
cognition then there is no point in time at which this cause could
have brought about the effect. So the effect is eternal in the same
way as the cause. But an eternal effect cannot exist because something
which is eternal does not have a cause. The third option that the
cognition is eternal runs counter to our experience which tells us
that cognitions are momentary. Santaraksita also
dismisses the Lokayata position that cognitions are produced by
physical substances because the Lokayata philosophers argue that
material substances are eternal. So, Santaraksita
makes a similar argument to the rejection of option two. An eternal
cause has to have an eternal effect but cognitions are not eternal.
Option five is rejected in TS 1893-1896 where
Santaraksita argues that the first cognition of one
chain cannot be solely caused by a cognition from another chain
because in that case we would expect the knowledge of parents to carry
over into their babies.



The second part (b) of Santaraksita's argument,
that love and hatred are different from perception, is intriguing in
that he claims that there cannot be an external cause for love and
hatred because whatever we might want to postulate as this external
object can elicit different feelings in different people. The object
of one person's love might be the object of another
person's aversion. For this reason, love and hatred cannot be
acquired in this life, like perceptions. So the love and hatred that
exist in a baby or young animal must be carried over from another
life. This argument assumes that there could not be non-perceptual
cognition that can arise without previous experience and therefore
faces the same challenges as the claim that all feelings have to be
learned through repeated experience. But it goes beyond this
discussion in that it raises the question of what the object of love
and hatred is. Kamalasila uses the term *vasa*
(desire, love) rather than *raga* in his commentary on TS
1948-1953 which suggests that he does not clearly distinguish
between desire and love. If it is true that *raga* is a
*klesa* then it is plausible that there is no distinction
between love and craving. So he could be making the obvious point that
we can desire something without a basis in the external world, i.e.,
what I desire might not exist, or that I might desire something for
the wrong reasons. Love, hatred and desire all require the existence
of an object. However, unlike a perceptual object, the objects of love
and desire can be "merely" mental. I can love the idea of
equality or I can desire something which does not exist. This
"non-existence" can be two-fold: i) I can desire something
which cannot exist either logically or physically, for example, I can
desire that I had wings; ii) if I desire something to be the case,
then what I desire does not exist, yet. For example, if I desire an
ice-cream then the state of affairs in which I have an ice-cream does
not exist, yet. In contrast with love and desire, perception, at least
on a realist account, requires its object to exist in the external
world.


### 4.3 Cognitions, emotions and klesas



While the argument about the difference between perception and love
does not show that love requires previous experience, it raises, (at
least) two interesting questions about the Buddhist account of the
emotions: i) why does Santaraksita draw a distinction
between perception and feeling on the basis of the non-existence of
external objects in the case of love, hatred and desire? ii) why does
he make a specific argument about love and hatred when he has already
argued in previous verses of the
*Lokayata-pariksa* that all cognitions
require other cognitions as their causes?



In what follows, these questions are addressed briefly in reverse
order. The second question raises the general problem of the
translatability of the concept of feeling or emotion into Sanskrit. As
mentioned in the introduction, there is no general term in Sanskrit
for emotion and Santaraksita uses the expression
"love and hatred etc." (*raga-dvesa* +
*adi*). In the translation, Jha has taken the
"etc." as referring to other feelings, assuming that
Santaraksita was operating with a psychological
category such as "feeling". However, there is no single
word in the text which would translate as feeling every time it
appears in the translation. In fact, it is clear that
Santaraksita does not mean "feelings" in
the sense of non-representational attitudes towards objects because
love and hatred have objects according to him, albeit mental objects.
Since Santaraksita remains within the context of
Buddhist psychology and clearly refers to Dharmakirti, it is
plausible that he means "other *klesas*"
instead of "other feelings" because love and hatred are
*klesas* and have objects.



In this context, it is also important to discuss the translation of
the term *vijnana* as "cognition". Both
terms refer to a mental phenomenon that provides knowledge. This means
that they refer to a state of affairs that pertains in the world. Both
terms presuppose an external or mental object they are directed
towards. One important difference between these two terms, which shows
the difficulty with translating *vijnana* as
cognition, is that, according to Santaraksita, a
*vijnana* always has an object but it does not have
to have conceptual content. In this sense, even a sensation or
feeling, such as the sensation of pleasure, is a
*vijnana* because it has an object but lacks
conceptual content, according to Santaraksita. The
sensation has an object because it provides knowledge about mental
states and therefore has to have an object of knowledge. However, this
object is not conceptual. So, according to
Santaraksita, a *vijnana* includes
affective mental states, such as feelings, sensations and emotions and
therefore *klesas*. The Western term
"cognition", by contrast, excludes affective mental
states.



The whole of the *Lokayata-pariksa* of the
*Tattva-samgraha* is one argument for the existence of an
infinite chain of *vijnanas* that is independent of
its physical manifestation. For Santaraksita,
"love, hatred and the rest" are examples of
*vijnanas.* These *vijnanas* are
also *klesas* but not all *vijnanas*
are *klesas*. Love and hatred are especially useful for
his argument because they are fundamental to our experience and
emphasize the continuity of the "chain of
*vijnanas*".



According to Santaraksita,
*vijnanas* can include feelings and emotions
whereas in Western psychology and philosophy cognitions are distinct
from emotions and feelings. This means that the role of
*vijnanas* in Santaraksita's
system is different from the role of cognitions in Western psychology
and philosophy. As I mentioned above, in the history of Western
philosophy the distinction between feeling and cognition has often
been used as the demarcation between feeling and rational thought with
the ideal of affectless thought. For Santaraksita and
other Buddhist philosophers the ideal is not necessarily that of
affectless thought. Instead, their ideal is that of an existence free
from afflictions (*klesas*). So, they try to extinguish
one kind of mental phenomenon but their distinction is different from
the distinction between feeling and thought. For them, all mental
phenomena that provide an obstacle to liberation should be eliminated.
This includes what Western psychologists would call emotions or
feelings. However, it also includes many affectless cognitions. This
means that the Western psychological category "emotions"
does not feature prominently in Santaraksita's
account of the mind. In fact, it is not clear that he would even
recognize such a category. According to Buddhist psychology, some
*klesas* straddle the Western divide between feeling and
thought. They involve both feeling and thought and they are a mental
phenomenon, called a *vijnana*. Whereas for many
philosophers in the history of Western philosophy, the ideal has been
to purge feeling from thought, in order to attain a standard of
rationality, the ideal for Santaraksita and other
Buddhist philosophers is to free our mental life from those
*vijnanas* which are *klesas*. The
reason is not to attain some standard of rationality because, for
Buddhists, most *vijnanas* are suspect in that they
involve an attachment to the present life and therefore pose an
obstacle to liberation.



One question that arises in this context is "why does
Santaraksita single out love and hatred, instead of
discussing *klesas* in general?". One answer might
be that they are fundamental to our human experience and therefore
lend themselves to Santaraksita's argument that
cognitions in general do not come into existence with the body.



In Western discussions of this topic, feelings are very often
associated with some physical change, such as a quicker heartbeat or a
change in the chemical make up of the brain. For this reason, emotions
are very often regarded as providing some link between the mental and
the physical. Santaraksita mentions this link between
feeling and physical changes in TS 1960. He claims that phlegm
(*balasa*) and other bodily changes are not responsible
for love, hatred or perturbations through sexual arousal because there
is no observed concomitance between them. While this claim might be
true with regard to phlegm, it is obviously false with regard to other
physical changes, especially changes in the brain. However, it would
be wrong to completely dismiss Santaraksita's
argument simply because he turned out to be wrong about this empirical
claim. After all, the argument raises important questions about the
status of mental phenomena, such as love and hatred. This becomes
clear when we think about the other question mentioned earlier: why
does Santaraksita distinguish between perceptions on
the one hand and love and hatred on the other hand based on the
existence or non-existence of external objects? While
Santaraksita often adopts an idealist position
compatible with the Yogacara standpoint in the
*Tattva-samgraha*, he seems to switch to a realist
position in this case which is compatible with a
*Sautantrika* standpoint. The best explanation for this
switch is that Santaraksita and Kamalasila
are arguing against Lokayata philosophers (materialists), who do
not share the Yogacara outlook on reality. This means that
Santaraksita and Kamalasila try to find
common ground with these philosophers and therefore share their
assumptions about the mind-independent existence of an external world.
Santaraksita's and Kamalasila's
argument then is that even with this assumption in place, it does not
follow that all cognitions are dependent on or even identical with the
body. According to them, the Lokayata philosophers would have to
draw a distinction between perceptions on the one hand and love and
hatred on the other hand, and while they might be able to account for
perceptions they are not able to account for love and hatred.


### 4.4 Buddhist emotions



From the preceding arguments by the Buddhist philosophers
Dharmakirti, Santaraksita and
Kamalasila it becomes clear that Buddhist philosophers do
not operate with the psychological category "emotion"; at
least not in the way that other Indian (and Western) philosophers do.
For example, Santaraksita and Kamalasila do
not consider love and hatred to be irrational because they involve
non-cognitive feelings that do not represent an external reality.
Kamalasila in particular makes it clear that for him love
and hatred do not require a relationship to objects in the external
world. He argues that not having an external object is a salient
feature of love and hatred. In Western philosophy of mind we often use
the presence or absence of an object of love in order to distinguish
between rational and irrational love. Santaraksita and
Kamalasila, however, do not use this distinction in order to
argue that love and hatred should be eliminated. As Buddhists, their
concern lies with the afflictions that prevent the mind from becoming
liberated and whatever mental state is an affliction ought to be
eliminated. Emotions then are *vijnanas* and as
such they always have an object. This position stands in contrast to
philosophical traditions, be they Indian or Western, in which feelings
and emotions are often distinguished from cognitions because they lack
an object.


## 5. Conclusion



A number of themes emerge from this overview: 1) The Western
categories of "cognition" and "emotion" do not
have equivalents in classical Indian philosophy. This is interesting
because it suggests that these concepts are not psychological
categories but perhaps social categories. While there has been some
anthropological work done by, for example, Catherine Lutz on the
differences in the categorization of specific emotions across
cultures, there is the possibility that the category as a whole might
not translate into all cultures (see Danziger 1997). 2) One common
theme in classical Indian philosophy is that the phenomena that would
be labelled as "emotions" in Western philosophy are to be
eradicated because they prevent liberation. 3) None of the Indian
philosophical schools aim at "emotion-free" cognitions as
an end in itself. In fact, those states that would be labelled
"cognitions" in Western philosophy are also to be
eradicated because they also prevent liberation. 4) Indian schools
differ over the inclusion of feeling states under the concept of
*vijnana* (cognition). Some schools distinguish
between feeling states and *vijnana* whereas
others, most notably Buddhists, do not. This last point suggests that
there is an interesting comparison to be made between Buddhist
accounts and cognitive accounts of the emotions. However, any
comparison must be sensitive to the difficulties in translating the
concepts involved.