## 1. Arguments for Closed Borders


### 1.1 Preserving Culture




The most popular argument for the permissibility and importance of
closing borders to outsiders is that this exclusion is necessary in
order to preserve a state's distinctive culture. The appeal
of cultural continuity is easy to appreciate. As David Miller
explains, "the public culture of their country is something that
people have an interest in controlling: they want to be able to shape
the way that their nation develops, including the values that are
contained in the public culture. They may not of course succeed:
valued cultural features can be eroded by economic and other forces
that evade political control. But they may certainly have good
reason to try, and in particular to try to maintain cultural continuity
over time, so that they can see themselves as the bearers of an
identifiable cultural tradition that stretches backward
historically." (Miller 2005: 200) Think of the United
States, for instance. If the US placed no limits on immigration
from Canada, it is clear neither how many Canadians would move south,
nor whether their migration would have a discernible affect upon
American culture. If the United States did not limit immigration
from Mexico, on the other hand, it seems almost certain that much
larger numbers of Mexicans would migrate north and that the changes to
American culture would be regarded by many as rapid and dramatic.
(Huntington 2005) If so, it seems likely that open borders would
quickly lead to changes that would leave many Americans less
comfortable in their own homeland. Given this, the concern to
preserve one's native culture seems to provide a reasonable
justification for restricting immigration.




This line of argument invites a number of empirical and moral
questions. Among the empirical questions, we might ask how
confident we can be about the numbers and influence of the potential
immigrants. Is the immigrants' culture really that
distinctive? And are we sure that these newcomers will resist
assimilation? Also, how can we be sure that the cultural changes
will be rapid and detrimental? Skeptics of this line of argument
often object that people tend to (1) exaggerate how
distinctive--and distinctively valuable--their existing
cultures are (it is notoriously difficult to characterize
"American" culture, for instance), (2) irrationally fear
change, and (3) underestimate how much their culture is changing
anyway, in the absence of immigration. Even if all of these
descriptive objections can be definitively answered, important moral
challenges remain. In particular, even if citizens have an
understandable *interest* in maintaining cultural continuity, it
remains an open question as to whether they have a corresponding moral
right (and, if so, one might wonder about how weighty this right
is). These questions matter, because outsiders may also have
competing interests in, and/or rights to, enter the country in
question, and thus they may permissibly be excluded only if the rights
of insiders to preserve their cultural continuity outweigh any rights
of foreigners to enter the political territory.




Finally, even if each of these moral challenges could also be
conclusively answered, this approach would not justify excluding all
outsiders. At most, it could explain only why countries would be
entitled to *limit the flow* of *culturally distinct*
immigrants. To put this point in terms of the United States, for
instance, even if the aim of preserving American culture would justify
placing limits on Mexican immigration, it would not seem to justify
excluding all Mexicans, let alone all Canadians.


### 1.2 Sustaining the Economy




Another popular argument against open borders is that the influx of
newcomers will hurt the economy. In its most straightforward
version, this argument simply assumes that the domestic economy can
support only a certain number of workers, but more nuanced renditions
allege more specifically that at least some types of foreigners should
be excluded because, given the cultural differences between insiders
and these particular outsiders, the inclusion of the latter would not
be conducive to economic growth (perhaps because these outsiders lack
the requisite work ethic, for instance).




The most common response to this argument is simply to contest that
allowing immigrants will have negative economic consequences. It
seems clear that some in the domestic economy may be harmed (typically
the less skilled workers disproportionately bear the brunt of the
costs, since they must now compete with immigrants whose presence
drives down wages), but the economy as a whole often benefits as (1)
firms are able to hire cheaper labor (and pass along correspondingly
lower prices to consumers), and (2) there is an increased demand for
various goods and services. More generally, even if a given
domestic economy might suffer if it did not restrict immigration,
economists tend to agree that the global economy as a whole would
profit from fewer restrictions on who can work where. (From an
purely economic perspective, the inefficiencies of barring Africans
from competing for work in European countries are costly, just as those
which resulted from prohibiting women from working in a
'man's' job were.) This recognition that there
will inevitably be net winners and losers whenever a market restriction
is lifted points toward the important moral question as to whether
anyone has a moral right to the economic benefits of the status
quo. For example, let us suppose that less skilled American
laborers would be harmed, whereas American firms and consumers along
with Mexican immigrants would benefit if the current restriction on
Mexican immigration were lifted. If so, then immigration would be
impermissible in this case only if the potentially displaced American
workers have a right not to face the increased competition for their
jobs (Macedo 2007).




We cannot presume that these domestic workers necessarily lack such
a right, but neither should we assume that they have it. What is
more, even if these workers have a right not to be harmed, it does not
follow that opening the economy to foreign workers must be
impermissible, at least if there were some way the workers could be
adequately compensated for the costs that they disproportionately
bear. (Think, for instance, of how the US government routinely
provides special unemployment and educational benefits to displaced
workers, like those in the textile industry, who lose their jobs as a
consequence of new legislation liberalizing trade with foreign
countries.) To be successful, then, the economic argument must be
much more sophisticated than it might initially appear; in addition to
establishing that at least some people will incur economic losses,
proponents of this approach must demonstrate that these victims have a
moral right to be spared these costs, a right for which they cannot be
adequately compensated in other ways.


### 1.3 Distributing State Benefits




A related but distinct argument for closed borders focuses on the
distribution of state benefits like welfare payments and health
insurance. The basic idea here is that countries like Sweden and
Canada, for instance, must limit immigration in order to sustain
anything like their current provision of state benefits. If an
affluent welfare state placed no restrictions on who could enter, then
masses of poor people from around the world would flock to this country
in order to take advantage of its provision of health and welfare
benefits. Indeed, presumably so many would immigrate that there
would be no way for this state to continue distributing these benefits
at anything like their current rate. Thus, given the existing
levels of global poverty, it appears as though you can have open
borders or welfare states, but you cannot have both.




It seems hard to deny that rich welfare states like the Scandinavian
countries would be inundated with migrants if they lifted all
restrictions on immigration, but not everyone agrees that this fact
necessarily justifies keeping people out. A libertarian, for
instance, would likely regard this as just one more reason to abandon
the welfare state. That is, faced with the choice between either
respecting everyone's right to freedom of movement or designing
states that can effectively guarantee ample levels of health coverage
and welfare transfers to their citizens, the libertarian would favor
the former. It is important to recognize, though, that these are
not the only two options; the best answer may lie in some middle ground
between these two stark alternatives. In particular, perhaps
existing welfare states could open their borders to everyone and then
provide no, or at least delayed, welfare benefits to newcomers.
Imagine, for instance, if Sweden stipulated that immigrants would have
their income and wealth taxed from the moment they entered the country,
but they would not become vested until they had contributed to the
state coffers for something like five years. If immigrants were
forced to contribute during a waiting period, such an arrangement would
presumably strengthen rather than jeopardize the host state's
capacity to provide state benefits. Thus, while some would no
doubt object to newcomers facing a period in which they were net
losers, this proposal at least shows that welfare states need not be
incompatible with open borders.




Finally, even if all attempts to square open borders with wealthy
welfare states are problematic, this argument does not support the
right of all countries to design and enforce their own immigration
policies. More modestly, it would show only that wealthy welfare
states may do so as long as the world is characterized by profound
international inequality.


### 1.4 Political Functioning




One of the most sophisticated arguments on behalf of a state's
right to close its borders is the liberal nationalist approach, which
suggests that liberal welfare states must exclude outsiders in order to
function properly. This account emphasizes that states of this
kind are able to operate as they do only because their citizens are
willing to make the enormous political sacrifices necessary to sustain
a vibrant democracy and equitable welfare state. What is more,
these citizens are inclined to freely sacrifice in these ways only
because they identify with one another. Were it not for this
fellow feeling among compatriots, far fewer would be motivated to
invest their personal energy in the democratic process or to give up a
portion of their wealth in order to assist less fortunate fellow
citizens. And finally, this identification among compatriots
depends upon the existence of a shared culture (Miller 2014). 




This liberal nationalist account invites all the usual
questions: Do liberal democracies really depend upon sufficient
trust and fellow-feeling among their compatriots, and, if so, is a
common culture genuinely necessary to secure this trust and mutual
concern? Just how homogenous must such a culture be?
Liberal democracies like the United States and Canada seem to operate
just fine despite a great deal of cultural diversity, for
instance. In light of this, why worry that outsiders pose a
substantial threat? Is it plausible to think that immigrants will
not assimilate to the requisite degree once they have settled in their
new state? And even if this account can in some cases justify
excluding culturally distinct foreigners, it would appear to provide no
grounds for limiting outsiders who share the requisite cultural
attributes. Assuming that the answers to these empirical questions
ultimately vindicate the liberal nationalist account, tricky moral
questions remain. For instance, do the inhabitants of well-oiled
liberal democracies have not only an interest, but a *moral
right* to the exclusive protection afforded by their enviable
political regimes? Finally, even if each of these questions can
be satisfactorily answered, this account applies solely to democratic
welfare states, and thus other types of states could not invoke this
line of reasoning in defense of excluding outsiders.


### 1.5 Establishing Security




Since 9/11, an increasingly popular justification for limiting
immigration is the need to secure the safety of one's
citizens. After all, given the presence of international
terrorists, one can hardly question the threat posed by at least some
foreigners.




No one can deny the moral importance of protecting innocent
civilians from terrorist attack, but critics have questioned whether
restricting immigration is in fact likely to provide the desired
security. Chandran Kukathas (2014), for instance, raises two
important concerns. First, he notes that, while laws to limit
immigration may well decrease legal immigration, they will not
realistically be able to eliminate all illegal immigrants. And
this point is relevant, of course, because foreign terrorists who feel
so passionately about their causes so as to be willing to carry out
terrorist missions are not likely to be dissuaded from doing so by the
illegality of entering the country whose citizens they seek to
attack. Second, even if a state could somehow eliminate all legal
and illegal immigration, this would not be enough because foreigners
routinely enter countries, not as immigrants, but for shorter periods
as tourists, guest workers, visiting students, or for short business
trips. Thus, even if a country somehow managed to preclude all
immigration, it could not reasonably hope to exclude all foreign
terrorists unless it also restricted the flow of temporary
visitors.


### 1.6 Political Self-Determination




Another account of a country's right to close its borders
alleges that this right is merely one component of a state's more
general right to political self-determination (Walzer 1983; Pevnick 2011).
Specifically, some contend that a legitimate state's right
to freedom of association entitles it to choose whether or not to admit
any given immigrants (Wellman 2008). This type of argument
involves three basic premises (1) legitimate states have a right to
political self-determination, (2) freedom of association is an
essential component of self-determination, and (3) freedom of
association entitles one to refuse to associate with others.
Thus, just as we would consider it an egregious violation of an
individual's personal self-determination if she had no choice but
to marry the suitor of her father's choice, for instance, we
should recognize that no political community is fully self-determining
unless it has discretion over which potential immigrants to invite into
its political community. According to this line of argument,
then, there is nothing mysterious or complicated about a
country's right to screen applicants for admission: it is
merely a standard component of a state's more general right to
self-determination.




There are a number of ways in which one might contest this line of
argument (Fine 2010; Wellman and Cole 2011). Most obviously, one might
question whether corporate political entities are even eligible for
moral rights. Value-individualists, for instance, contend that only
individual persons ultimately matter morally, and thus, while
political states may be extremely valuable instruments, they are
merely instruments and, as such, are not the type of entities to which
we can sensibly ascribe moral rights. Secondly, even if countries can
somehow qualify for moral rights, it seems far-fetched to liken a
country's freedom of association with respect to immigrants to an
individual's right to refuse a marriage proposal, since presumably
marital freedom of association is incalculably more important to an
individual than her right to exclude potential compatriots. What is
more, it is not clear that the analogy between personal and political
freedom of association is even apt, because states that deny
immigrants do not merely refuse to politically associate with those
who seek to migrate, they also forcibly exclude them from the state's
territory. Finally, even if all of these concerns could somehow be
addressed, notice both that this argument purports to establish only
that *legitimate* states have a *presumptive* right to
exclude outsiders. Both of these qualifications are important. The
condition that only legitimate states are morally entitled to be
self-determining is significant because, given the plausible
assumption that many existing states are illegitimate, this argument
would not justify the immigration policies of many current states. And
the fact that this argument would at best ground only a presumptive
right to exclude outsiders is noteworthy, because it leaves open the
possibility that this right could be over-ridden by the weightier
rights various foreigners may have to be admitted. If a refugee needs
to gain entrance in order to escape persecution or a child needs to be
admitted in order to reunite with her mother, for instance, then
defenders of political self-determination cannot antecedently assume
that the legitimate state's right to freedom of association
necessarily trumps these individuals' claims.


### 1.7 Democracy




Democratic governance provides another potential link between
self-determination and controls on immigration. Given that
democracy's principal virtue is thought to be its connection to
self-determination, democrats often favor bounded groups which enjoy
dominion over their own affairs. As Frederick Whelan puts it,
"democracy requires that *people* be divided into
*peoples* (each people hopefully enjoying its own democratic
institutions), with each unit distinguishing between its own
citizens--understood in a political sense as those eligible to
exercise democratic political rights *here*--and others,
who are regarded as aliens *here*, although (hopefully) citizens
somewhere else." (Whelan 1988: 28) The basic idea here is
that, in order for democracies to function, there must be rule
*by* the same people upon whom the rule is imposed. But
this is possible only if the same group of individuals who first vote
are subsequently bound by the outcome. If membership constantly
fluctuated, however, then self-determination would not occur, because
the "self" that votes would not match the
"self" which is then bound by the results.




In response, theorists like Phillip Cole (2000) have suggested at
least two grounds on which we might question whether democracy requires
closed borders. First, even if Whelan is right that democracy
cannot function properly unless we sort people into territorially
defined groups (What is wrong with a democratic world state, for
instance?), why does it follow that the constituents within any given
set of territorial boundaries must have control over admissions?
Citing local and regional democratic units within larger federal
structures as counterexamples, Coles suggests that "[i]t seems
clear that democratic rights can be confined to a region, with people
entering and leaving that region freely and exercising the local
democratic rights during their residency." (Cole 2000: 184)
Second, Cole suggests that one of the chief reasons to insist upon
democracy in the first place is presumably the belief that coercive
political institutions could not permissibly be imposed unless those
coerced are given an equal say in how the political arrangements are
ordered. But if so, this makes extending suffrage to only those
already within the territorial boundaries objectionable, because, as
Cole reminds us, "there are two groups subjected to the laws of
the state: its own members, and those non-members who are
applying for inclusion." (Cole 2000: 186) Thus, because
exclusive immigration laws are coercively imposed upon foreigners who
seek to enter, democratic principles suggest that these outsiders
should also have a say in immigration laws. So if Cole is right,
the democratic case for closed borders is doubly problematic. Not
only is it false that open borders is inconsistent with a functioning
democracy, democratic principles may even prohibit a state's
coercively excluding disenfranchised foreigners from entering its
territory.


### 1.8 Jurisdiction




The jurisdictional theory of immigration emphasizes that, while
political states are morally required to respect everyone's human
rights, they are obligated to *protect* the rights of only those
within their territory. Given this, whenever someone moves to a new
state, the citizens of the receiving country become responsible for
this newcomer in a way that they were not before her arrival. It
would thus seem weird to suppose that everyone should be free to move
to whatever country they like, because this would entitle each of us
to unilaterally impose moral responsibilities upon others. If we
value individual liberty, then we should begin with at least a
presumption against others being at liberty to unilaterally foist
these responsibilities on us (Blake 2013). Our immunity against
unwelcome obligations may not be absolute, but it would presumably
require a compelling competing consideration to outweigh it. If
someone could not enjoy sufficient protection of her human rights
unless she moved to Canada, for instance, then this vulnerable person
may be entitled to immigrate without permission even though this move
will saddle Canadian citizens with moral duties to which they did not
consent. But if someone whose rights are adequately respected
elsewhere sought to move to Canada merely because she thinks she would
be happier there, Canadians would be well within their rights to
forcibly exclude her if they would prefer not to be responsible for
protecting her human rights. 




Those who think that there is a natural duty to support just
institutions may question the pivotal premise in this approach: that
we should be skeptical of political obligations to which we have not
consented. After all, if each of us was really immune from political
duties to which we did not consent, then many of us would not have
duties to protect the human rights of our compatriots. But if we must
do our part of the collective chore of protecting the human rights of
our fellow citizens despite the fact that we never agreed to do so,
why think that there is anything distinctively problematic about our
similarly having such duties to newcomers who have recently
immigrated? Indeed, given that we are already morally encumbered with
duties to protect the human rights of those within our state's
territorial boundaries, an influx of newcomers does not create any new
types of duties, at most it creates additional tokens which would make
fulfilling these responsibilities more costly (Kates and Pevnick
2014). 




In response, an advocate of the jurisdictional approach might counter
that prospective immigrants have no right to unilaterally act in ways
that make our natural duties more demanding. But retreating to this
position raises new questions. Given that immigrants also contribute
to the state's performance of its political functions, it is not
obvious why an influx of prospective immigrants would necessarily make
it more difficult for those already present to fulfill their political
obligations. (Indeed, given economies of scale, the newcomers may
often lighten the load of the native population.) And even if there
are instances in which the arrival of immigrants would create net
costs for a state's existing population, this fact would generate a
right to forcibly exclude outsiders only if the increased demands upon
those already present should be given moral precedence over the costs
imposed upon prospective immigrants who are denied entry. Because
prospective immigrants often have pressing interests in entering a
country (even if their human rights are satisfactorily protected),
however, there may be many cases in which the interests of those who
want to enter would prevail over a native population's desire to avoid
more costly political responsibilities (Kates and Pevnick 2014). 


### 1.9 Realism




Though less popular than it once was, international relations was
once dominated by realists who argued that political states are not
constrained by morality in their dealings with foreign states and
individuals. The basic idea motivating this approach was most
often the Hobbesian presumption that morality consists solely of
contracts which are binding only in the presence of a sovereign who
could enforce them. And since there is no world sovereign capable
of punishing states, the latter cannot be morally bound by any putative
contracts which purport to apply to them. As a consequence,
realists have traditionally supposed that states will and should orient
their dealings with foreigners in whatever fashion maximally suits
their national interests. And if this is correct, there can be no
duties of any kind owed to foreign states or individuals, and thus no
duty to open one's borders to foreigners.




Many are reluctant today to endorse realism, in part because they
reject the Hobbesian approach to morality, but also because they
believe that states can be held accountable even in the absence of a
single, global sovereign. Given this, theorists typically feel no
need to defeat the realist case for closed borders. It is worth
noting, however, that the permissibility of closed borders does not
automatically follow from realism, because (more) open borders may be
in a country's national interest. It is not just that any
given country might stand to benefit in various ways from immigration,
it may also be that a country's own citizens have rights which
require the state's borders to be porous. If individuals
have property rights which entitle them to invite foreigners onto their
land or rights to freedom of association which entitle them to
associate domestically with foreigners, for instance, then a country
may well be duty-bound to allow open immigration *even if it owes no
moral duties to outsiders*.


### 1.10 Indirect Cosmopolitanism




Because cosmopolitans value all people equally, they often argue in
favor of (more) open borders. Given that the life of a Western
European is no more valuable than that of a sub-Saharan African, for
instance, how can we justify a geo-political arrangement in which
people are effectively forced to remain in their country of birth when
sorting humans according to this (morally arbitrary) criterion has such
a profound effect upon their chances of living a minimally decent
life? After all, it is a matter of brute luck where one is born,
so neither the Europeans nor the Africans can plausibly be said to
deserve their relatively good/bad life prospects.




It is important to recognize, however, that embracing
cosmopolitanism does not necessarily require one to endorse open
borders, because one might develop an 'indirect
cosmopolitan' defense for protecting a state's right to
exclude outsiders. Such an account might take any number of
forms, but one particularly interesting version is to suggest that
wealthy liberal democratic states must be allowed to exclude foreigners
(for the time being, at least) so as to be better able (and more
willing) to build the international institutions which are most likely
to put the world's poor in a better position to live minimally
decent lives (Christiano, 2008).




This approach begins with the plausible premise that people like
those currently enduring absolute poverty in sub-Saharan Africa will
likely continue to be vulnerable to horrifically corrupt and
incompetent domestic governance until the larger geo-political context
is dramatically improved via the construction of international
institutions, like the International Criminal Court. And if these
international institutions are going to be created/reformed/made more
effective in the foreseeable future, it will be predominantly by
wealthy, liberal democracies. These states will be able and
willing to undertake this task, however, only if their domestic
economies, cultures and political environments are relatively safe and
secure, and this requires that they be free from worries about massive
unwanted immigration. Thus, for the indefinite future we should
grant states the right to design and enforce their own immigration
policies, not because the constituents of wealthy liberal democratic
countries are necessarily morally entitled to their current high levels
of wealth and security, but because denying states such a right will
almost surely undermine the prospects that these regimes will be able
and willing to construct the larger, international mechanisms which, in
turn, will provide the best long term chances of substantially
improving the lot of the world's poorest denizens.




An argument as elaborate as this one obviously depends upon a number
of controversial premises about the best, most realistic way to help
the world's poor and the likely future conduct of wealthy liberal
democracies. It is also important to recognize that, even if each
of these claims is accurate, this argument does not establish the type
of conclusion that many defenders of closed borders might want.
This is for two reasons. First, rather than establish a
state's moral right to exclude outsiders, it would seem to show
at most that we should treat states *as if* they had this moral
right by, for instance, respecting their international legal right to
design and enforce their own immigration policies. Second, this
argument's conclusion would not hold indefinitely; rather, the
argument would apply only until the desired international institutions
were constructed. Once the geo-political environment was suitably
repaired, this particular argument would no longer provide any reasons
to resist open borders. Of course, most cosmopolitans will regret
neither of these features of this argument, but many who seek to defend
a state's right to exclude outsiders may well be considerably
less sanguine about such limitations.


## 2. Arguments for Open Borders


### 2.1 Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism




The cosmopolitan egalitarian case for open borders combines the core
moral insight that all human beings, whether they are compatriots or
foreigners, are equally deserving of moral consideration with the
central empirical observation that one's country of birth often
has a profound impact upon one's life prospects. The
staggering levels of international inequality would not be so
objectionable if the typical Swede had done something to deserve a
better life than the typical Chadian, for instance, but the truth, of course, is that
Swedes were merely lucky to have been born in Sweden rather than
Chad. And given this, what justification could the Swedes have
for putting guns at their borders to deter Chadians from trying to move
north and take advantage of the preferable social, political and
economic environment? In the eyes of cosmopolitan egalitarians,
they have none. As Joseph Carens puts it, "Citizenship in
Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent to feudal
privilege--an inherited status that greatly enhances one's
life chances. Like feudal birthrights privileges, restrictive
citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about it closely."
(Carens 1987: 252) In other words, egalitarians regard open
borders as the requisite response to the enormous economic inequalities
which currently exist between countries.




This case for open borders presumes a specific, highly contentious
version of cosmopolitan egalitarianism. Thus, if one were not an
egalitarian (or, more specifically, if one were not a so-called
"luck" egalitarian who believes that justice requires that
we correct for all inequalities which stem merely from luck), or if
one denied that egalitarian (or at least luck egalitarian)
considerations extend beyond one's political borders, then one would
be unmoved by this argument. More importantly, even if one accepts all
of the cosmopolitan egalitarian's moral premises, it is not clear that
the desired conclusion follows. This is because wealthy states seem to
have other ways to fulfill their duties of distributive justice. Even
if Sweden has demanding duties of distributive justice to Chad, for
instance, why may Sweden not keep its borders closed as long as it
transfers the requisite amount to Chad? That is certainly how we
handle duties of distributive justice in the domestic realm. Consider
Jeff Bezos, for instance. While there are various accounts of Bezos's
duties to share his wealth with those who are less fortunate, no one
supposes that he must remarry, adopt or otherwise open his family to a
poor person. Rather, whatever he must transfer to others, everyone
agrees that he can exclude others from his home life as long as he
fulfills his duties of distributive justice. And if duties of
distributive justice do not undermine an individual's right to freedom
of association in the domestic realm, why need they do so for a state
in the international arena? If Jeff Bezos need not open his home to
those who are less fortunate, then why must Sweden welcome poor
foreigners into their political community?


### 2.2 Libertarianism




When one thinks of the individual rights which conflict with a
state's control over immigration, an outsider's right to
freedom of movement is likely to come to mind. As Joseph Carens
reminds us, though, the rights of insiders are also limited when the
political community as a whole has dominion over immigration. As
he explains, "Suppose a farmer from the United States wanted to
hire workers from Mexico. The government would have no right to
prohibit him from doing this. To prevent the Mexicans from coming
would violate the rights of both the American farmer and the Mexican
workers to engage in voluntary transactions." (Carens 1987:
253) Thus, a state's exclusive immigration policy is doubly
disrespectful of individual rights, because it interferes with both an
outsider's freedom of movement and an insider's property
right to unilaterally invite foreigners onto her land.




The libertarian is right to suggest that a state's dominion over
immigration is inconsistent with individuals having unlimited rights
in this domain, but it is not clear why we should presume that the
individual's right must always prevail. Certainly the
state's right would be over-ridden if individual rights were
always perfectly general and absolute, but this construal of moral
rights is implausible. A person's right to freedom of movement
does not give her the right to enter my house without my permission,
for instance, so why must we assume that it gives her a right to enter
my country's territory without first getting the permission of
the political community as a whole? One could make a similar point
about a property owner's rights over her land. A property owner
would have the right to unilaterally invite foreigners onto her land
if property rights were general and absolute, but most eschew this
account of property. Few would say that each property owner has a
right to unilaterally enforce the criminal law on her own land, for
instance, and if property owners must defer to the state as a whole
when it comes to the enforcement of criminal law, why must it be any
different for the immigration of foreigners?


### 2.3 Democracy




As was explained above, Phillip Cole has offered reasons to question
the view that democratic governance depends upon there being closed
borders. More recently, though, Arash Abizadeh (2008) has
extended this reasoning to argue that democratic principles are
actually incompatible with a state's right to unilaterally
exclude outsiders. As he puts it, "anyone who accepts a
genuinely democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is
thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control
and close the state's boundaries..." (Abizadeh 2008:
38) His argument involves two core premises, one moral and the
second descriptive. The moral premise is his construal of the
democratic justification thesis, which stipulates that a state's
coercive presence is illegitimate unless it is democratically justified
to everyone coerced. The second premise is merely the descriptive
observation that a state coerces foreigners when it forcibly prevents
unwelcome immigrants from entering the state's territory.
In light of these two points, Abizadeh concludes that a state may not
unilaterally exclude outsiders; it can permissibly adopt an exclusive
immigration policy only if it democratically justifies this practice to
outsiders. In other words, it would be impermissible for a state
to forcibly restrict outsiders without first giving these outsiders a
vote in the referendum which decided whether or not to adopt this
restrictive immigration policy.




Corresponding to the two central premises, there are two ways to
contest this line of reasoning. First and most obviously, one
might follow David Miller's lead and deny that forcibly
restricting immigration actually coerces outsiders in the morally
relevant sense (Miller 2010). Even if one concedes that
potential immigrants are coerced, though, one might doubt that coercion
cannot be permissible in the absence of democratic justification.
To appreciate the appeal of this second strategy, imagine that two
criminals want to enter my house and help themselves to my copy of
Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice*. It seems
crazy to think that I may not take proportionate steps to coercively
repel them without first putting my planned resistance up to a vote
among the three of us. And if I do not need to democratically
justify my coercively protecting my right to keep strangers out of my
house, why think that a state must democratically justify its attempts
to keep uninvited foreigners out of its political community? Of
course, a defender of this type of democratic case for open borders
might counter that, unlike a legitimate owner of private property, the
constituents of a state have no dominion over the state's
territory, but this response would be available only if it could be
shown that a state's constituents lack the relevant moral
standing over the political territory in question.


### 2.4 Utilitarianism




Finally, the utilitarian case for open borders stresses that
restricting freedom of movement leads to obvious inefficiencies and is
therefore impermissible. There are any number of ways in which it
is suboptimal to forcibly restrain people within territorial
boundaries, but one of the most obvious worries is that it is
economically inefficient. Restricting Mexicans from fully
developing and capitalizing upon their talents in the United States
economy, for instance, makes no more sense than relegating men and
women into separate spheres. Just as a system in which only men
may be doctors and only women may work as nurses unjustifiably deprives
the world of countless excellent female doctors and male nurses, a
geo-political system in which countries are entitled to exclude
outsiders regrettably fails to capitalize upon the talents and work
ethic of foreigners who are denied access to the world's most
robust labor markets. Given this, it seems reasonable to believe
that people would on average be much better off if there were no
restrictions on immigration.




This argument can be contested on either empirical or moral
grounds. For instance, without questioning whether restricting
immigration is in some ways inefficient, one might still defend the
merits of dividing the globe into separate states, each of which has
sovereign control over its territory. This view seems plausible
if the advantages to such a state system outweigh the inefficiencies in
question. For instance, David Miller (2005) argues that
restrictions on immigration improve our ability effectively to address
population control. As Miller recognizes, we will make progress
in this regard only if leaders in countries like India and China are
able and willing to enact the relatively unpopular laws necessary to
limit population growth. And these laws would be met with much
more resistance than they already are if there were no restrictions on
migration, because the costs of population growth would not be wholly
internalized. If a country's exploding population were free
to move anywhere in the world, for instance, then its citizens would
not bear the full costs of population growth and would therefore be
that much more resistant to laws designed to limit the number of
children born. If Miller is right, the advantages of restricting
immigration may more than compensate for the costs involved.




For the sake of argument, though, let us suppose that the gains of
open borders would be greater than the costs. Even so, it is
not clear that the utilitarian case for open borders is decisive,
since, as a moral matter, it may be that states have the right to
organize their affairs in a suboptimal fashion. Most believe that
parents would retain the right to raise their natural children in
exclusive, nuclear families even if Plato were right that it would be
preferable if a community's children were raised together by the
community as a whole. And if we think, contra utilitarianism,
that individuals are entitled to arrange their lives in suboptimal ways
in the domestic sphere, why presume that political states lack the
analogous right to organize themselves as they see fit in the
geo-political context? Even if it were true that Norway and the
European Union would be better off if the former joined this regional
body as a full member, for instance, it seems to many that Norway
should have the right to refrain from joining this Union. And if
Norway has the right to (inefficiently) refuse to associate fully with
the European Union, it might also be entitled to (inefficiently) refuse
to associate with various individuals who would like to join
Norway's political community.


## 3. Applied Questions in Immigration




As the preceding discussion shows, there are a variety of promising
arguments in favor of a state's right to control immigration and many
strong considerations which suggest that countries are obligated to
maintain open borders. While some arguments are more popular than
others, critical questions can be raised about each of them. Rather
than try to decisively defend either side here, let us conclude by
briefly surveying some of the more engaging applied issues related to
the morality of immigration. These include the definition and moral
claims of refugees, the conditions under which one may hire guest
workers, the permissibility of recruiting skilled professionals from
poor countries where individuals with these talents are already in
short supply, the rights of irregular migrants, and what kinds of
selection criteria a country may use to distinguish among applicants
for immigration


### 3.1 Refugees




The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a
refugee as someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."
(Article 1A[2]) Critics like Andrew Shacknove (1985) have
questioned this definition on at least three grounds. First, why
focus exclusively on victims of group-based persecution? And even
if we do think in terms of groups, why restrict ourselves to these
particular groups? What if someone is persecuted *qua*
woman or *qua* homosexual, for instance? Second, given the
variety of threats to living a minimally decent human life, why insist
that only those vulnerable to persecution can qualify as
refugees? What about so-called "economic refugees" or
people fleeing a civil war, for instance? Third, why stipulate
that someone who is not "outside the country of his
nationality" cannot be a refugee? What if an individual is
being detained at the border or simply lacks the means to migrate
without assistance, for example?




Shacknove speculates that this narrow understanding of refugees is
likely the consequence of real-world political pressures from leaders
who are wary of the international legal obligations that would follow
from a more expansive definition. As he puts it,
"...states reason in reverse from their fear that they will
be forced to shoulder the burden of assisting refugees unilaterally to
a narrow conception of refugeehood which limits the number of
claimants." (Shacknove 1985: 277) Whether one accepts the
international legal definition or lobbies on behalf of a more expansive
conception, however, there is broad-based support for the view that
refugees constitute a special category of potential immigrants who
possess particularly urgent claims to admittance. Thus, while
theorists may vehemently disagree as to whether a country has a right
to design and enforce its own immigration policies, even those who
affirm a state's general right to exclude foreigners typically
make an exception in the case of refugees. It is one thing for
the United States to refuse to admit a Russian ballerina who would like
to study and perform in New York, for instance, but is another thing
altogether for it to turn away a political dissident who rightly fears
persecution by the oppressive regime in her home state. In the
latter case, the dire nature of the refugee's circumstances are
thought to give her a pressing claim which trumps whatever presumptive
right a state generally has to reject hopeful immigrants. More
recently, however, some have come to question this line of
thinking. Few suggest that a state has no duties to imperiled
foreigners, but theorists increasingly question whether a state's
duty to assist refugees must come in the form of admitting them.
Consider the Kurds in Northern Iraq, for instance. Given the
abuses they suffered under Saddam Hussein's rule, many would
argue they should have qualified as refugees. One way to offer
assistance would have been to provide them refuge in various foreign
countries. But as history shows, this was not the only way to
help. Another option was to protect the Kurds where they lived,
by securing a safe-haven fortified by a no-fly zone in Northern
Iraq. (A third possible option might be for rich countries to pay
poorer countries to admit the refugees.) Of course, for a variety
of reasons, countries might prefer not to intervene in the affairs of a
foreign state, but the important point is the more general lesson that,
even if we take for granted that stable, wealthy countries can have
stringent duties to refugees, it does not follow that these duties must
be paid in the currency of open borders.


### 3.2 Guest Workers




The classic analysis of guest workers is Michael Walzer's
discussion of Western European countries' former practice of
hiring laborers from nearby states such as Turkey. This practice
was a sensible solution for all, since it enabled a country like West
Germany to hire foreign workers to do various relatively onerous jobs
for considerably less than it would have had to pay its domestic labor
force, and the imported laborers also profited, as they were able to
earn considerably more than they could have in their own
countries. Walzer objects to this practice, however, because
these workers were not given equal political status in their host
countries. Even when Turkish workers lived in West Germany with
their families for many years, for instance, they would have no chance
of acquiring German citizenship. For understandable reasons,
Walzer is deeply troubled by the creation of this political
underclass. As he puts it, "These guests experience the
state as a pervasive and frightening power that shapes their lives and
regulates their every move--and never asks for their
opinion. Departure is only a formal option; deportation, a
continuous practical threat. As a group, they constitute a
disenfranchised class. They are typically exploited or oppressed
as a class as well, and they are exploited or oppressed at least in
part because they are disenfranchised, incapable of organizing
effectively for self-defense." (Walzer 1983: 59) As a
consequence, Walzer insists that, while countries are perfectly within
their rights to either hire or exclude foreign workers, they are not
free to bring in outsiders without according them all the standard
rights and privileges of equal citizenship. Thus, if a country is
willing to embrace foreign workers as political equals, it may invite
in as many as it would like. If a political community is
unwilling to treat guest workers as equals, on the other hand, then it
may not hire them and must pay the higher wages demanded by the
domestic labor market.




Political theorists typically take for granted that states must
treat all of their constituents as free and equal, so it is no wonder
that so many are attracted to Walzer's analysis of guest
workers. (And it should be noted that countries like Germany have
since dramatically revised their guest worker policies, so that they
are now much more in accord with Walzer's recommendations.)
Still, at least two big questions present themselves. First, even
if we assume that Walzer is correct that long-term visitors like those
employed in Western European countries must eventually be given the
opportunity to become citizens, it does not follow that all guest
workers must be treated as equal citizens. What if Walzer were to
spend a year as a Visiting Professor at the Sorbonne, for
example? Would this arrangement be morally impermissible if the
offer did not give Walzer full voting rights in France for that
year? Presumably not. If so, then there are interesting and
difficult questions about how long and under what conditions one can
work in a foreign country without the standard rights and privileges of
equal citizenship before one becomes objectionably treated as a
political subordinate.




Second and more important, even if we presume that political states
must *generally* treat their constituents as free and equal
citizens, it is controversial whether this requirement should apply in
the case of guest workers. Because most accept the principle of
*volenti non fit injuria*, it is typically presumed that a
relationship among unequals need not be unjust, especially if both
parties freely consent to the relationship. There need not be
anything unjust about an arrangement in which an employee has a much
less desirable set of powers, privileges and responsibilities than her
employer, for instance, as long as the employee freely and with full
information accepted these terms of employment. Of course,
political states are still required to treat their constituents as free
and equal citizens precisely because the *volenti* principle is
generally irrelevant to relations among compatriots. In other
words, states coerce all those within their territorial boundaries
whether or not these constituents have consented to this imposition;
and, given this, they cannot invoke *volenti* and thus have no
choice but to treat everyone coerced as equals. Importantly,
though, guest workers are an exception to this general rule precisely
because they *do* give their consent to the relationship.
Unlike most of the state's constituents, guest workers are not
coerced by the adoptive state unless they decide that they would like
to accept the terms of employment and move to the new country. As a
consequence, it is not clear that the *volenti* principle should
not apply in the case of guest workers.


### 3.3 Recruiting Immigrants




The vast bulk of the discussion concerning the morality of
immigration concerns the exclusion of outsiders, but some also worry
about the way in which wealthy countries currently admit skilled
workers from poorer states, especially when the specialists are
actively recruited away from their native lands. This practice
would not garner the attention of moral theorists if it were restricted
to countries like the United States targeting the most talented
long-distance runners from Kenya, for instance, but it is thought to
rise to the level of injustice when the wealthiest countries actively
recruit professionals from developing countries where people with their
skill sets are already in terribly short supply. Perhaps the most
noteworthy and worrisome instance of this is the manner in which
wealthy, western states actively recruit medical professionals away
from Africa. As Gillian Brock comments, "Arguably, it is
not the total number of health care professionals that exist in the
world today that is a problem, but rather their distribution.
Consider how, for instance, while only 21 per cent of the world's
population resides in Europe and North America, it commands 45 per cent
of the world's doctors and 61 of its nurses. Africa, which
contains 13 per cent of the world's population, has only 3 per
cent of its doctors and 5 per cent of its nurses. An estimated
1.3 per cent of the world's health care workers provide services
to 13.8 per cent of the world's population in a region suffering
25 per cent of the world's disease burden." (Brock 2009:
200)




Given both the relative shortage of health care professionals in
Africa and the fact that many posit a human right to a decent minimum
level of health care, the recruitment (if not the mere admission) of
doctors and nurses from developing countries would seem to raise human
rights issues. An obvious response, then, would be to issue a
blanket prohibition on the emigration of health care professionals from
countries where they are in desperately short supply. This
extreme measure strikes many as problematic, though, for the way in
which it curtails the individual liberty of the skilled workers in the
poor countries. A more subtle response, then, would be to insist
only that the adoptive countries provide adequate compensation to the
states from which the talented individuals emigrate. Thus, just
as those who worry about deforestation urge that all those who chop
down mature trees should be held responsible for planting even more
young trees in their place, authors like Brock (2009) suggest that it
would not be too much to ask those countries who admit skilled workers
from countries where they are already in short supply to provide
compensatory resources which will assist these poor countries in their
future efforts to train and retain the next generation of such
professionals.


### 3.4 Irregular Migrants




Following Joseph Carens (2013), I call those who have settled in a
foreign country without authorization (who some label
"undocumented" or "illegal" immigrants) *irregular* migrants. Irregular migrants pose vexing moral
questions even for those who are convinced that states have the right
to control immigration, because many believe that over time an
irregular migrant can gradually acquire a moral right to stay (and
perhaps even to full and equal citizenship), despite the fact that she
had no right to migrate without authorization in the first place. 
Carens articulates this sentiment nicely when he writes:



> 
> 
> The moral right of states to apprehend and deport irregular migrants
> erodes with the passage of time. As irregular migrants become
> more and more settled, their membership in society grows in moral
> importance, and the fact that they have settled without authorization
> becomes correspondingly less relevant. At some point a threshold
> is crossed, and they acquire a moral claim to have their actual social
> membership legally recognized. They should acquire a legal right
> of permanent residence and all the rights that go with that, including
> eventual access to citizenship. (Carens 2013: 150)




Given the psychological importance of social membership and the fact
that (authorized or not) a migrant will typically become deeply
socially imbedded in her new society after a prolonged period, the
appeal of this judgment is easy to appreciate. Critics might counter,
however, that this account wrongly presumes that psychological
attachment is sufficient to generate moral entitlement. To see why one
might doubt this, imagine that I grow incredibly attached to the Mona
Lisa during the ten years that it takes for the authorities to
discover that I am the one who stole it from the Louvre. No matter how
attached I become to the painting (and regardless of how
psychologically difficult it will be for me to find happiness in my
new life without it), most would presumably deny that I have therefore
acquired a right to retain the stolen painting. And given that we are
so resistant to suppose that the right of authorities to reclaim the
Mona Lisa and return it to the Louvre erodes with the passage of time,
perhaps we should similarly be suspicious of the notion that the
"moral right of states to apprehend and deport irregular migrants
erodes with the passage of time" (as in the quote from Carens
above). 




One exception to this line of thought may be the children of irregular
migrants who were brought to the new country at a very young
age. After all, because they had no choice in their migration, they
have no culpability which needs to erode over time. Critics have room
to resist even this case, however, because the crucial issue is
*entitlement*, not *culpability*. Suppose that I pass
the Mona Lisa on to my son, Jackson (who has no idea that I stole it),
and that he becomes incredibly attached to it over the course of
several years. Despite the twin facts that (1) Jackson is in no way
culpable for possessing the Mona Lisa and (2) he has gradually become
very attached to it, he does not seem entitled to keep the
painting. And if we think the authorities would violate none of
Jackson's rights if they took the Mona Lisa from him and returned it
to the Louvre, then why think that the authorities would violate the
rights of an irregular migrant who at a young age had settled without
authorization in a foreign country with her parents? Just as Jackson
should not be punished for his possession of the painting, the child
should clearly not be punished for having entered a foreign country
without authorization. But Jackson's right against being punished is
distinct from his right to retain the Mona Lisa, and the child's right
not to be punished for her family's migration is distinct from her
right to remain in the new country. These objections do not show that
irregular migrants do not gradually acquire a right to stay, but they
do suggest that advocates of this position who also believe in the
state's right to control immigration must do more than merely point to
the psychological costs to those who might be deported.


### 3.5 Selection Criteria




Finally, one of the most complex and controversial issues within the
literature on the morality of immigration is what criteria a state may
permissibly employ to distinguish among applicants for admission.
Countries might use either a lottery or a first-come, first-admitted
waitlist, but they might also screen the applicants and give preference
to those whose language, culture and/or skill sets make them most
likely to assimilate in the host state's economy and political
culture. But what if a country's immigration policies
differentiate among applicants on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion or
country of origin? What if a country flatly refused to even
consider applications for immigration from Asians or Africans, for
instance?




As with so many issues in this area, Walzer's (1983) treatment
of this question is seminal. In this case, though, many have
recoiled at his conclusions. To see why, consider his take on
"White Australia," Australia's erstwhile practice of
recruiting immigration from England while explicitly prohibiting
immigration from non-European countries. Walzer writes,
"Assuming, then, that there actually is superfluous land, the
claim of necessity would force a political community like that of White
Australia to confront a radical choice. Its members could yield
land for the sake of homogeneity, or they could give up homogeneity
(agree to the creation of a multiracial society) for the sake of the
land. And those would be their only two choices. White
Australia could survive only as Little Australia." (Walzer 1983:
47) Walzer may well be right that Australia had a duty to share
its vast land with those who needed it, but it is striking that he had
no principled objection aimed specifically at Australia's
racism. If Australia did not have so much territory, then Walzer
apparently would not object to their excluding immigrants on the basis
of their race or ethnicity.




A number of critics agree that Walzer's analysis is misguided,
but there has been no consensus as to precisely where and why it goes
off the tracks. Consider, for instance, the conflicting accounts
offered by David Miller, Joseph Carens and Michael Blake.
Miller's take is interesting, because he accepts Walzer's
arguments and conclusion that political communities enjoy a general
right to design and enforce their own immigration policies.
Unlike Walzer, though, Miller stops short of concluding that states can
exclude potential immigrants on whatever grounds they like. As he
puts it,



> I have tried to hold a balance between the interest that
> migrants have in entering the country they want to live in, and the
> interest that political communities have in determining their
> own character. Although the first of these interests is not strong
> enough to justify a right of migration, it is still substantial, and
> so the immigrants who are refused entry are owed an explanation. To be
> told that they belong to the wrong race, or sex (or have the wrong
> color) is insulting, given that these features do not connect to
> anything of real significance to the society they want to join. Even
> tennis clubs are not entitled to discriminate among applicants on
> grounds such as these. (Miller 2014: 373-374)


Miller's analysis will be attractive to many, but some may worry
that it is too quick. What would we say about a white woman who
refused to even consider marrying someone outside of her race, for
instance? We might well condemn her racism as deplorable, and we
should not be the least bit surprised if non-whites were sorely
offended by her attitudes, but presumably we would stop short of
saying that she had a duty to marry a black person. And if a white
person is within her rights to refuse to marry anyone who is not
white, then why is a predominantly white political community not
equally entitled to reject potential immigrants on the basis of their
race?




Joseph Carens offers an answer to this question by invoking the
standard distinction between public and private spheres. He
writes, "There is a deep tension between the right of freedom of
association and the right to equal treatment. One way to address
this tension is to say that in the private sphere freedom of
association prevails and in the public sphere equal treatment
does. You can pick your friends on the basis of whatever criteria
you wish, but in selecting people for offices you must treat all
candidates fairly....So, the fact that private clubs may admit or
exclude whomever they choose says nothing about the appropriate
admission standards for states. When the state acts it must treat
individuals equally." (Carens 1987: 267-8) This answer is
promising, but even if one is generally sympathetic to the
public/private distinction, it is not obvious that it applies to
admissions *into* a country in the same way that it applies to
decisions regarding those already *within* this state.
This is because, many presume that in order to be legitimate, states
must treat all of their constituents as free and equal, and one way to
pursue this freedom and equality is to ensure that individuals are not
excluded from various spheres of power and prestige on the basis of
their membership in historically disadvantaged groups. But
because states need not ensure that their constituents are free and
equal to all outsiders, it does not have the same reason to protect
against foreigners being excluded on the basis of characteristics that
would rightly be ruled out if used by public groups within the
state.




Finally, Michael Blake (2003) has offered an account which promises
to avoid all of these pitfalls. His view is striking because it
explains the impermissibility of excluding outsiders on the basis of
racist criteria in terms of how it mistreats insiders. If
Australia refuses to allow Asians to enter the country, for instance,
then this is an affront to all Asian Australians who are thereby
treated as second class citizens. As he says, "To identify
the purpose of the state with the preservation of a cultural group is
inevitably to draw an invidious distinction against those citizens who
do not happen to belong to that community. In all cases in which
there are national or ethnic minorities--which is to say, the vast
majority of actual cases--to restrict immigration for national or
ethnic reasons is to make some citizens politically inferior to
others.... Seeking to eliminate the presence of a given group from
your society by selective immigration is insulting to the members of that group
already present." (Blake 2003: 232-3) Thus, Blake is able
to explain what is objectionable about racist selection criteria by
invoking the requirement that states treat all of their own
constituents as free and equal, since these criteria clearly treat
those insiders in the dispreferred group as inferior and
subordinate.




Blake's account has much to offer, but it has at least one
major drawback: it appears unable to explain the impermissibility of a
racially or culturally homogenous political community excluding
potential immigrants on the basis of their race or culture. If
Australia had no Asian citizens, for instance, then there would be no
insiders who would be wronged by a policy excluding Asian immigrants,
and thus Blake's argument would provide us with no grounds to
criticize it.