## 1. Overview



The impression through the twentieth century of Kant as a
fundamentally secular philosopher was due in part to various
interpretative conventions (such as Strawson's "principle
of significance" - Strawson 1966, 16) whereby the
meaningfulness and/or thinkability of the supersensible is denied, as
well as through an artifact of how Kant's philosophy religion is
introduced to most, namely through the widespread anthologization of
his objections to the traditional proofs for God's
existence.



Kant's philosophy in the pre-Critical period has been
characterized variously as a progression from rationalism to
empiricism to criticism (Paulsen 1963), the continued search for a
more proper method for metaphysics (De Vleeschauwer 1962), a
reconciliation of Newtonian and Leibnizian-Wolffian ideas (Friedman
1994) or of natural science and metaphysics (Schonfeld 2000; cf.
Anderson 2015), and as an attempted articulation of a metaphysical
alternative to Leibnizian "logicism" (i.e., the view that
"anything that is not logically contradictory is possible"
(Stang 2016). But what nearly all of Kant's pre-Critical
writings have in common is the desire to frame a more adequate concept
of God and of the relation of this being to the created universe. Thus
among his earliest reflections we find a detailed sketch of a
religious outlook extracted from Alexander Pope's "An
Essay on Man" (1734) and a discussion, among other things, of
why this position is philosophically superior to that of Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff
(1679-1754).



Within Kant's Critical period, not only do we find powerful
defenses of religious belief in all three Critiques {1781, 1788,
1790}, but a considerable share of Kant's work in the 1790s is
also devoted to the positive side of his philosophy of religion. This
includes his 1791 "Theodicy" essay, *Religion within
the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793), "The End of All
Things" (1794), and the *Conflict of the Faculties*
(1798). Moreover, his lectures on logic, *Reflexionen* and the
Jasche Logic present a robust account of the nature of religious
belief/faith [*Glaube*]. So, while Kant does deny the
possibility of religious knowledge (as well as opinion), he
characterizes this denial as necessary to safeguard faith, which he
endorses as the proper mode of religious assent. One must, therefore,
understand the negative elements in his philosophy of religion, such
as his infamous objections to the traditional proofs for God's
existence, in this context. As stated in the B-Preface to the
*Critique of Pure Reason*, a central goal of the Critical
project is to establish the limits to knowledge "in order to
make room for faith" (Bxxx).



Throughout Kant's writings, we find ample discussions of
religious issues. These are, in many instances, clearly affirmative,
though they are often framed within objections to theoretical
reason's encroachments into the domain that is instead proper to
faith. Although his discussions of God and immortality are familiar to
most Kantians, the Critical corpus moves well beyond just these.
Especially in the 1790s, we find detailed treatments of biblical
hermeneutics, miracles, revelation, as well as many distinctively
Christian doctrines such as Original Sin, the Incarnation, Vicarious
Atonement, and the Trinity.



Unfortunately, however, the many positive elements of Kant's
philosophy of religion have been eclipsed by its initial negative
moments, moments not meant to oppose religion, but rather reflective
of the Lutheranism (or more precisely, the anti-liturgical Lutheran
Pietism) of his youth. Just as with Luther's own negative
polemics against religious despotism and scholastic arcana, we see in
Kant a parallel dialectic, where he, rather than opposing religion,
sought to free it from the "monopoly of the schools" and
set it on a footing suitable to "the common human
understanding" (Bxxxii). Hence, as we will discuss through this
entry, the statement that Kant sought out the limits to knowledge
[*Wissen*] in order to "make room for faith
[*Glaube*]" (Bxxx), is not an empty bromide, but rather
the key anthem for his overall philosophy of religion.


## 2. Kant's Pre-Critical Religious Thought


### 2.1 Context and Influences



The influences on Kant's pre-Critical religious thought can be
divided under three general headings, namely, the personal, the
scientific and the philosophical.


#### 2.1.1 Personal



Among the most important influences on Kant's understanding of
religion is no doubt his experience of Pietism, a reform movement
within German Lutheranism which aimed to fulfill what it saw as the
original intention of Martin Luther. According to the founders of
Pietism, such as Philip Jacob Spener (1635-1705), this original
intention required a more scrupulous religious and moral outlook, a
deep personal devotion to increasing one's own piety and that of
others (through *collegia pietatis*, i.e., through private
meetings among lay persons for development of personal holiness), and
consequently exacting self-examination as well as the creation of a
general culture of supporting progress in these matters. Pietists saw
Orthodox Lutheranism, by contrast, as having become frozen in vain
intellectualism, an adherence to over-subtle and lifeless formalisms,
and ecclesiastical politics. As a consequence, Pietists sought a
return what Spener referred to as "apostolic simplicity"
in theological matters.



Kant lived his entire life in the city of Konigsberg, the second
largest center of Pietism after Halle. His parents were Pietists and
he was educated at the Collegium Fridericianum, a Pietist gymnasium
directed by Franz Albert Schultz (1692-1763). Although the
positive influence of Protestantism in general, and Pietism in
particular, has been strongly disputed (Wood 1970: 197n.; Kuehn 2001),
the majority of scholars have argued otherwise. Kant's use of
Pietist terminology such as the "change of heart"
(*Herzensanderung*), classic theological language such as
"radical evil" (*radix malorum*), his detailed
engagement with Augustinian themes throughout the *Religion*,
and focus on Pietist and Moravian models of grace (AK 7:54-57
[1798]), which were prevalent in his region, all indicate the lasting
influence of his religious upbringing.



Like all of his German contemporaries, Kant could not have avoided
being affected by memory of the acrimonious conflict that had occurred
between the Pietists and Christian Wolff (1679-1754) at the
University of Halle just a generation prior. However, by the time Kant
arrived at the Collegium Fridericianum, Pietism--particularly in
Konigsberg--had taken on a milder form, one which often
sought to adopt but also revise the teachings of Wolff in accordance
with Pietist principles (De Vleeschauwer 1962; Kuehn 2001). The most
significant example of this is found in Kant's influential
teacher at the University of Konigsberg, Martin Knutzen
(1713-1751), whose *Philosophical Proof of the Truth of the
Christian Religion* (1740) argues that the core of Christianity
lies in "presenting us with a genuine means of atonement"
(Knutzen 1740: SS39) and that the necessary revelation of such a
means can be rationally demonstrated using largely, but not
exclusively, Wolffian principles.



Finally, among the personal influences on Kant's view of
religion, whether positive or negative, there must be numbered his
long associations with Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) and
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). Hamann, who at points was
part of Kant's small circle of friends, fiercely defended a
mystical fideism and railed against the Enlightenment's
confidence in reason. Through both his published writings and his
direct personal contacts, Hamann continually challenged Kant to
develop and defend his own views regarding the relation between faith
and reason, often drawing support from the skepticism of David Hume
(see e.g., Hamann's letters to Kant dated 27 July 1759 [AK
10:7-17; C 47-54] and December 1759 [AK 10:26-31; C
61-66; also Kuehn 2001: 118-126). Although less radical in
outlook, Herder played a similar role, particularly later in
Kant's life.


#### 2.1.2 Scientific



As with many philosophers of the modern period, Kant's religious
views are deeply influenced by the scientific picture of nature that
took root in the wake of Copernicus. Most significant during the
pre-Critical period are the ideas that the universe is a centerless,
ceaselessly expanding, totality of things, which evolves towards ever
greater perfection according to physical (Newtonian) and spiritual
laws. Kant draws support for this view as well as inspiration for
interpreting its religious significance from the writings of, among
others, Alexander Pope (1688-1744), Thomas Wright
(1711-1786), Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis
(1698-1759), Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777), and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) (see Kant's important
note on Newton and Rousseau justifying God and so proving Pope's
"theorem" that "Whatever is, is right" AK
20:58-59). Consequently, much of Kant's thinking about God
during this period is focused on framing a conception of God and of
this being's relation to nature that adequately takes into
account this revised picture of the universe.


#### 2.1.3 Philosophical



The third set of influences on Kant's early religious views were
philosophical in the sense that he mainly encountered them in
published philosophical treatises and textbooks. To these chiefly
belong the writings of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school and those of
what is sometimes referred to as the Thomasian-Pietistic school.



The Leibnizian-Wolffian School. As noted above, Kant had already
developed some criticisms of Leibniz's *Theodicy* (1710)
in 1753. He also studied the works of Wolff--most notably the
two-volume *Natural Theology* (1736-1737)--as well
as the theological writings of most of Wolff's many followers.
The most important of these latter are Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten
(1714-1762) and Johann August Eberhard (1739-1809). Kant
used Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* (1739) in his courses on
metaphysics for over forty years, and late in his career adopted its
section on natural theology alongside Eberhard's *Preparation
for Natural Theology* (1781) for his lectures on philosophical
theology. Although there are many differences, sometimes major,
between these figures, they all agree generally in maintaining that
the Principle of Non-Contradiction is the first principle of
metaphysics, that human actions are free but still subject to the
Principle of Sufficient Reason, that truths in the divine intellect
place limits on the divine will, and that physical and moral laws are
dependent on divine choice but can also be known as necessary from
nature alone. They also all defend some version of the Ontological
Argument.



The Thomasian-Pietistic School. Under this heading falls a group of
philosophers that perhaps should not be called a school, but
nevertheless arise from two common sources, namely the writings of
Christian Thomasius and also often from Pietism, and generally share
one common opponent, namely Christian Wolff. In terms of his influence
on Kant, the most important of these is undoubtedly Christian August
Crusius (1715-1775). Although Kant is never an uncritical
follower of Crusius, it is clear that Kant studied his works intensely
from the late 1750s until the middle of the 1760s, often taking his
side against that of Leibniz and Wolff. Like others in this group,
Crusius argues that the Principle of Non-Contradiction is an empty
principle and thus is insufficient for founding metaphysics, that
human actions are radically free and so not subject to the Principle
of Sufficient Reason, and that moral laws can only be known through
the revelation of the divine will (in scripture or in conscience).
Nearly all of these disagreements with Wolff stem from the contention
that his system is inconsistent with the real significance of such
religious concepts as the duty and obedience to God, guilt, and
conscience.



Crusius also rejected the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the
Ontological Argument in terms that are very close to what we find in
Kant's writings of this period. Philosophers of this school
developed a far more robust account of rational faith than is found in
the writings of Wolff. Thus, in a way reminiscent of the later Kant,
Crusius argues that we are necessitated to believe something if its
denial would undermine or render impossible the pursuit of an end
towards which we have a duty (Crusius 1751: SS339), the most
important of which is our obligation to God (Crusius 1751: SS345).
This obligation, according to Crusius, necessitates, among other
things, a belief in freedom, immortality and even in the reliability
of reason itself (see Chance 2019).



Finally, any account of the philosophical influences on Kant's
early religious thought must include mention of the "Profession
of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar" from Rousseau's *Emile,
or Education* (1762), a book that is thought to have had a
profound impact on Kant's intellectual development in the second
half of the 1760s. In many respects, the Vicar's expression of a
humble and common sense religious outlook has parallels in
Kant's own development in the later 1760s as mentioned in
 section 2.2 below.


### 2.2 Kant's Pre-Critical Religious Thought



An mentioned above, Kant earliest reflections on religious themes
include a comparison between Alexander Pope's *Essay on
Man* (1733-4) and the theologies advanced by Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff
(1679-1754). According to the pre-Critical Kant, the Leibnizian
position rests on an inconsistent and limited view of the divine
being, one in which the eternal essences of things retain a degree of
independence, whereas Pope



> 
> 
> subjects every possibility to the dominion of an all-sufficient Being;
> under this Being things can have no other properties, not even those
> which are called essentially necessary, apart from those which
> harmonise together to give complete expression to His perfection. (AK
> 2:233-234, note 3704)
> 
> 
> 



Already in these passages we find hints of the main features of
Kant's pre-Critical metaphysics, all of which point back to this
religious context, namely:


1. his framing of the concept of God in terms of the single
all-sufficient (*allgenugsam*) being,
2. his rejection of the Ontological argument,
3. his own proof of the existence of such a being based upon its
status as the absolutely necessary ground of all real
possibility,
4. the derivation of the further properties of the divine being,
i.e., unity and wisdom, from this concept,
5. the subjection of the inner possibility of things and so also the
necessary and contingent laws of physical nature to a being with such
properties, and finally
6. the carving out of a new and more consistent method for
reflecting on the design of nature and its relation to God.



Kant's engagement with this last point in particular relates to
his lifelong preference for, and interest in, the Physico-Theological
Argument (see
 section 3.1.2.3 below).



Kant's initial attempt to articulate a metaphysics that could
justify all these views is found in two works of 1755, *A New
Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition* and
*Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, Or Essay on
the Constitution of the Mechanical Origin of the Whole Universe
according to Newtonian Principles*. The former focuses on the
laying the foundation of a metaphysical system including points
 (i-v)
 above. The latter then focuses on
 (vi)
 by purporting to show that even just the Newtonian laws of nature
exhibit such a tendency to bring about order and perfection in nature
as can only be explained by a conception of God as the all-sufficient
ground of the essences of things. The continued influence of the
religious outlook of Pope's *Essay on Man* (and hence
also of the specific brand of Deism, similar to Shaftesbury's
and Lord Bolingbroke's, to which it is related) is evidenced in
the fact that the *Universal Natural History* contains no less
than six separate passages from this work, three of which Kant uses to
introduce the three divisions of his book.



For whatever reasons, Kant seems to have been unsatisfied by this
initial attempt, and so set out in the 1760s to better defend and
explain this same general system of thought in his *Only Possible
Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*
(1763b). This time, however, he is much more concerned with
articulating a firm methodological basis for his metaphysics, as is
evident in the work itself as well as in the key essays of the period,
*Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into
Philosophy* (1763a) and *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of
the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* (1764).



Despite retaining this commitment to his earlier metaphysics, it seems
clear that at this time Kant also becomes convinced that there exists
a common sense religious standpoint that is not dependent upon the
proof of metaphysical doctrines, but which is equivalent or perhaps
even stronger in its practical import (see, e.g., AK 2:65 [1763b]).
With the eventual abandonment of his pre-Critical project in the late
1760s it is this alternative source of religious conviction that will
blossom into the re-founding of his religious thought in moral
theology (see
 sections 3.3-3.7 below).



Through the remainder of this section, we will focus on three
particular religious topics discussed by Kant during the Pre-Critical
period: his treatment of God as an all-sufficient being, his critique
of the ontological argument, and his own early argument for
God's existence.


#### 2.2.1 God as the all-sufficient (*allgenugsam*) being



As noted above, this idea first makes its appearance in Kant's
early notes. Kant does not attempt to justify the concept, but instead
uses it in order to argue that the view that evil has its source in
restrictions placed on the divine will by the truths of the divine
intellect--a view he attributed to Leibniz--is
incomprehensible. The primary significance of divine all-sufficiency
here is that it means that there can be no necessity prior to the
divine will. Since Leibniz and Wolff identified truths in the divine
intellect with the natures or essences of things, as well as with
their inner possibility, all-sufficiency for Kant also means that
these too must be dependent on the plan of the divine will. In
*Universal Natural History*, Kant argues from the perfect order
of the physical universe to the existence of an all-sufficient being,
asking whether it does



> 
> 
> not provide an undeniable proof of their [i.e., all physical things]
> common first origin, which must be an all-sufficient highest mind in
> which the natures of things were designed in accordance with unified
> purposes? (AK 1:228-229 [1755b])
> 
> 
> 



For Kant this means that the divine will not only orders what is
contingent in nature--a view held equally by Leibniz and
Wolff--but also that it brings about order and perfection through
being the ground of the inner possibilities of all things (i.e., their
natures or essences), indeed even the most basic laws of matter (see
AK 2:151-154 [1763b]).



In *The Only Possible Argument*, Kant claims that the thought
of God as the all-sufficient is "of all thoughts the most
sublime, [but] is still widely neglected, and mostly not considered at
all" (AK 2:151), and declares that if



> 
> 
> expanded to include all that is possible or real, is a far more
> appropriate expression for designating the supreme perfection of the
> Divine Being than the concept of the infinite, which is commonly
> employed. (AK 2:154)
> 
> 
> 


#### 2.2.2 Rejection of the ontological argument



In connection with
 section 3.1.2.1
 below, it is important to note that Kant rejects the Ontological
Argument in both the *New Elucidation* and in *The Only
Possible Argument*, though for different reasons in each case. In
the former, Kant employs a version of the objection formulated by
Johannes Caterus (1590-1655) in his response to Descartes'
*Meditations* (AK 1:395 [1755a]). In essence, the objection is
that although the Ontological Argument proves that the concept of
existence is necessarily contained in the concept of God, this is only
a connection among concepts. For the argument to work, then, one would
first have to show that it is a concept of something actual. By the
time of *The Only Possible Argument*, however, Kant seems to no
longer accept this criticism. Instead, he mainly rejects the argument
based upon his analysis of concept of existence, which purportedly
shows that it is not a real predicate (AK 2:72-77, AK
2:156-157 [1763b]). His preferred pre-Critical reason for
rejecting the Ontological Argument is basically the same as will be
discussed in
 section 3.1.2.1.
 Nevertheless, at this time Kant also articulates a version the
objection used by Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (eleventh century) in
response to Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) (AK 2:156-157
[1763b]).


#### 2.2.3 Kant's own argument for God's existence



Kant's own argument for God's existence is closely
connected to his conception of God as all-sufficient and the ground of
all real possibility. In the *New Elucidation*, the argument is
extremely brief with its core consisting in the claim that
"nothing can be conceived as possible unless whatever is real in
every possible concept exists and indeed exists absolutely
necessarily"; "for if this be denied, nothing at all would
be possible; in other words, there would be nothing but the
impossible" (AK 1:395). A very similar argument features later
in *The Only Possible Argument* where it is presented in much
greater detail. Here again the central idea is that possibility
presupposes something actual, and so there is a being which, if it did
not exist, then nothing would be possible; but such a being is
absolutely necessary (AK 2:83).


#### 2.2.4 Derivation of the divine properties



In both the *New Elucidation* and in *The Only Possible
Argument*, though more fully, Kant immediately proceeds to derive
from the above proof the further properties of what is absolutely
necessary. This ground of all possibility must be found in one being,
which is unique, simple, immutable and eternal, containing supreme
reality, and hence possessing both intellect and will. Consistent with
his criticism of Leibniz mentioned in
 section 2.2.1
 Kant rejects both theological voluntarism and intellectualism,
arguing that neither God's intellect nor will takes precedence
over and so limits the other, but instead they must stand in absolute
harmony. For this reason, "the possibilities of things
themselves, which are given through the divine nature, harmonise with
his great desire" so that "unity, harmony and order are
themselves to be found in the possibilities of things" (AK
2:91-92 [1763b]).


## 3. Kant's Philosophy of Religion during the Critical Period



With the introduction of Transcendental Idealism's epistemic
strictures, Kant came to the conclusion that religion must fall
outside the scope of theoretical reason. However, instead of atheism
or agnosticism, Kant advanced a novel philosophical theology that
grounds religion on the "needs" of practical reason. In
the B-Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he in fact
intimates that his interest in religion is part of what motivated
Transcendental Idealism. That is, as quoted earlier, Kant sought to
establish the limits to knowledge "in order to make room for
faith" (Bxxx). Such a faith has its source in the needs of pure
practical reason (AK 8:137 [1785a], AK 5:142 [1788], AK 6:139 [1793]),
and it is through these needs that Kant maintains that we can extend
our cognition for practical purposes, allowing us to form a warranted
conception of God and the afterlife in the service of the highest good
(A814/B843-A819/B847). Kant coins the term "pure rational
faith" (AK 8:142) in *What does it mean to Orient oneself in
Thinking* (1785a) and later uses this term as well as the
"pure philosophical doctrine of religion" (AK 6:10
[1793]), "pure religion of reason" (AK 6:12), "pure
rational system of religion" (AK 6:12) and simply "pure
rationalism" to refer to his positive philosophy of religion.
Note, however, that Kant always intends by these terms specifically
*practical* rather than theoretical reason, as the
"needs" which serve as the basis for faith pertain to our
practical, moral lives.



We will here begin with a discussion of Kant's critique of the
traditional proofs for God's existence before moving on to the
positive side of his philosophy of religion. Although the fame of this
critique has been taken as indicative of his philosophy of religion as
a whole, it is instead representative of his distinction in the
Critical period between the illicit attempts at a positive philosophy
of religion driven by theoretical reason, versus a philosophy of
religion that has its ground in practical philosophy.


### 3.1 God in the *Critique of Pure Reason*'s Transcendental Dialectic



The Transcendental Dialectic's "Ideal of Reason"
contains the best known and most frequently anthologized components of
Kant's philosophy of religion. In addition to its portrayal of
the *ens realissimum*, one finds within it Kant's
objections to the Ontological, Cosmological and Physico-theological
(Design) arguments. It is thus the text most central to the negative
elements of Kant's philosophy of religion and is integral to the
widely held view that Kant is hostile to religion.


#### 3.1.1 The *Ens Realissimum*



Kant maintains that underlying all the traditional proofs for
God's existence is the concept of the *ens realissimum*,
the most real being. Reason comes to the idea of this being through
the principle that every individuated object is subject to the
"principle of *complete* determination". While the
generality of concepts allows them to be less than fully determined
(e.g., our concept of a horse extends over horses that are different
colors, heights, etc.), individuated objects must be completely
determined (e.g., an individual horse must have specific colors, a
specific height, etc.).



Hence, where the particular determinations of actual objects are
discovered through experience, our concepts, which in themselves are
not objects of experience, remain partly indeterminate. Nevertheless,
reason can construct for itself what is on the one hand still an
abstraction but yet also an individuated entity. Kant refers to such
entities as "ideals" and in most instances they are used
by us regulatively as archetypes for reflection. For example, when
considering whether or not to get a pet, one might envision an ideal
pet, a pet with the optimal set of desirable attributes. Such an
archetype for thought, however, is still not completely determined,
for the ideal can still be neutral between various attributes that are
not regarded as relevant to one's interests (for example, one
may not consider any specific nostril width salient to one's
choice of pet).



By contrast, the *ens realissimum* is the concept of an
individual object that is completely determined, and is such through
reason alone. In the case of most ideals, their determinations are the
result of various empirical concepts as well as various subjective
interests (such as what one believes a pet would bring to one's
daily life). However, in the *ens realissimum*, all its
determinations are set solely through reason's formal
application of the principle of complete determination, aggregating
together all possible predicates and selecting from these predicates
all those which have a fully positive reality (no negative predicates,
no derivative predicates). That is, following the concept of
"the most real being", reason brings together all possible
predicates and eliminates those which involve some limitation or
deficiency.



In doing this, the faculty does not violate any of the standards Kant
sets out within Transcendental Idealism, for reason is merely applying
the formal principle of complete determination to all possible
predicates and constructing an idea (or more precisely, an ideal)
thereby. This construction can then be entertained by the intellect,
or perhaps, used as a regulative principle, as one does with other
less grand ideals. Transcendental error comes in, however, if reason
also then tenders the *ens realissimum* as not merely a formal
construct but as the metaphysical ground of all that is: since it (in
principle) contains all determinations, and these determinations are
of actual entities, a "transcendental subreption" may
occur that transforms the *ens realissimum* from just an
intellectual construct into a metaphysical reality as the sum total of
all actuality.



As with other transcendental errors, we can subreptively conflate a
subjective principle generated by our intellects and of only
regulative use to one that is objective, a real being not constructed
in thought, but discovered through thought. Such, we may say, is the
source of error in Spinoza's use of substance and in other
monistic metaphysics. Our construction of the *ens realissimum*
has the appearance of an actual unity since it is the concept of the
sum total of all positive predicates. This appearance then casts an
illusion unrecognized by the metaphysicians, leading them into the
subreptive error.


#### 3.1.2 Kant's critique of the traditional arguments for God's existence


##### 3.1.2.1 Ontological argument



According to the Ontological Argument, it is self-evident from the
idea of the most real being that that being exists. Whatever it is
that is this most real being, it must include all predicates that
contribute to its greatness or reality; and given that actual
existence is (allegedly) one such predicate, whatever it is that is
the most real being is therefore a being who by definition must exist.
Hence, if one were to compare two beings, both equally great in all
respects except that one exists and one does not, the one that does
not exist, by virtue of its non-existence, is lacking a predicate that
contributes to the greatness of the other. The correct conception of
*that than which nothing greater can be conceived* must,
therefore, include existence.



The *Critique of Pure Reason* contains four distinct objections
to the Ontological Argument. The first two of these follow what may be
thought of as the standard assumption by the proponents of this
argument that "God exists" is to be treated as an analytic
judgment (A594/B622-A597/B625). Though rarely mentioned in the
literature, these arguments are salient to the common objection that
Kant's critique of the Ontological Argument doesn't impact
the Anselmian version (Plantinga 1966, Forgie 1975).



The second two objections arise as a result of the defeat of the
analytic rendering, and turn to a reading of "God exists"
as synthetic (A597/B625-A602/B630). By far, the most famous of
these objections is that existence is not a predicate. What, however,
Kant means by "predicate" requires some examination.



Of key significance here is Kant's distinction between
"logical" versus "real" predicates. The former
is best understood as a syntactic notion: the second term, along with
the subject term, of a complete and well-formed proposition. A real
predicate, by contrast, is distinguished by its semantic function. As
Kant describes it, a real predicate "goes beyond the concept of
the subject and enlarges it" (A598/B626). Hence, logical and
real predicates involve two different orders of analysis, one
syntactic, one semantic. They are neither mutually exclusive (Abaci
2008), nor exhaustive (Pasternack 2018). They instead distinguish
between two different roles that one and the same term can have.



To help Kant make his case that existence is not a real predicate,
i.e., a predicate that "enlarges" the subject term, he
appeals to the distinction between an actual and non-actual unit of
currency, say one hundred dollars. Between the two, there is no
difference in the concepts of each: existence adds nothing to the
concept of one hundred dollars. So, when one claims that "one
hundred dollars exist", one is not picking out one of its
predicates, part of the nature of a hundred dollars, but rather one is
just "positing" (A598/B626) its existence. Likewise, to
claim that "God exists" is merely to posit God's
existence. It is not a statement which attributes the property of
existence to the subject term, *God*.



Underlying this analysis is Kant's contention that existence
does not add anything to the subject concept; for it if did, then, he
contends, a hundred dollars actualized would be different from it as
merely possible: "my concept would not express the entire object
and thus would not be the suitable concept for it" (A599/B627).
That is, the hundred dollars as possible would not be the same as what
is actualized in the actual hundred dollars.



There are, unsurprisingly, many different interpretations as to what
Kant means when he claims that existence does not
"enlarge" or add to the subject term. Let us here consider
three.



The first comes from James Van Cleve's *Problems from
Kant* (1999), where he offers an analysis of real predication that
renders conceptual enlargement (i.e., a predicate that "goes
beyond" its subject) in terms of logical non-entailment. He
writes:



> 
> 
> A predicate *P* *enlarges* a concept \(C =\_{df} \Diamond
> \exists x (Cx \amp {\sim}Px)\).
> 
> 
> 



If *C* = triangle and *P* = red, *P* would be,
following this definition, a real predicate, since it is possible that
there exists an *x* which is a triangle and is not red. By
contrast, if *P* = three-sidedness, then we do not, by this
definition, have a real predicate of *C*, since there are no
triangles that are not three-sided. In other words, where *C* =
triangle and *P* = three-sidedness, since \(\forall x (Cx \supset
Px)\), *P* fails to meet the test for conceptual enlargement of
*C*. Likewise, existence will fail to meet the definition above
since for any concept *C*, \(\exists x (Cx \supset
\langle\textrm{exists}\rangle x)\). That is, if there exists some
*x* such that *x* is a *C*, then *x* exists.
Hence, Van Cleve treats existence as not an enlarging concept since,
per his analysis, he is "letting the existential quantifier
express existence" (Van Cleve 1999: 188).



Nick Stang follows Van Cleve in "letting the existential
quantifier express existence" and further argues that Kant
subscribes to an "actualism" whereby there are no
non-existing objects (i.e., if unicorns do not exist,
"unicorn" does not name an object, but rather references a
string of predicates). As such, Stang asserts that since
"*exists* applies to every object, it does not
distinguish some objects from other objects" (Stang 2015: 599).
Notice, however, that Stang's rationale for why existence is not
a predicate is that it is actually a "predicate that applies to
every object there is". That is, Stang interprets existence as
an internal mark of our concept of objecthood itself (Stang 2015:
599).



A third recent analysis can be found in R. Lanier Anderson's
*The Poverty of Conceptual Thought* (2015). Anderson seeks to
show that philosophers need to follow Kant's treatment of
existence in order to preserve our contemporary use of modal terms.
For if our modal terms (existence, possibility, necessity) were
predicates, then a change in modal terms would demand a change in the
contents of our concepts of objects.



Accordingly, Anderson's argument is intended to reflect
Kant's conclusion from his hundred dollars example: "what
would exist would not be the same as what I had thought in my
concept" (A600/B628). More specifically, Anderson argues that if
our modal terms were predicates, then the non-actual possible would
have as one of its marks, non-actual possibility; whereas the actual
would have existence as one of its marks. As a result, if one were to
consider the actualization of some non-actual possible *P*,
*P*-*actualized* would no longer be the same *P* as
the *P* of *P**-non-actual possible*. As Anderson
explains:



> 
> 
> the supposition that <existence> would determine the concept of
> a thing is incompatible with its logical function of a modal category,
> which is to separate the actual objects from the merely possible ones
> *without altering the contents of the things' concepts*.
> (Anderson 2015: 322)
> 
> 
> 


##### 3.1.2.2 Cosmological argument



Kant further contends that the Cosmological Argument is parasitic on
the Ontological. He demonstrates this by taking Leibniz's Modal
Argument as emblematic of all other Cosmological Arguments and then
contends that a being posited as necessary in order to explain the
contingency of creation has built into it the same error as discussed
above. According to Leibniz's Modal Argument, the existence of a
contingent reality can only be ultimately explained through a cause
whose existence is in itself necessary. However, something whose
existence is in itself necessary is something whose existence cannot
depend upon anything else but itself, its own nature. This returns us
to the Ontological Argument, or at least the objectionable idea at its
heart, for the necessary being that the Cosmological Argument proposes
is also the idea of a being whose essence involves existence. So, as
before, since existence is not a predicate, Kant rejects the coherence
of the idea of a being whose existence depends upon nothing but its
own nature.


##### 3.1.2.3 Physico-theological argument



Kant's assessment of the Physico-Theological (Design) Argument
is substantially different from his treatment of the other two classic
proofs. While he still contends that it, like the Cosmological
argument, remains ultimately grounded upon the Ontological
Argument's assumption that existence is a predicate, this
objection does not fully undo the force of the Physico-Theological
Argument. Kant in fact expresses sympathy for this argument, writing,
for instance, that it "always deserves to be mentioned with
respect" (A623/B651) and that it is "the oldest, the
clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason of
mankind" (A623/B651). He further claims that the argument
*succeeds* in at least establishing "an
*architect* of the world" and a cause
"proportioned" to the order of nature. So, up to this
point in the argument, he writes, "we have nothing to bring
against the rationality and utility of this procedure, but have rather
to commend it further" (A624/B652). What Kant cannot accept,
however, is its advance from a "Wise Author of Nature" to
an infinite creator. When it moves from architect to creator, it
proposes an "original" and "supreme" cause,
and in so doing, it calls for a being whose existence depends upon
nothing but itself. This returns us to the Cosmological/Modal
argument, and thus to its dependency on the Ontological. Despite,
however, the failure of the argument to establish the existence of an
infinite creator, Kant does not abandon the relevance, particularly
the regulative relevance of the idea of a "Wise Author of
Nature" for the natural sciences, a point he repeats in both the
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and in the Canon of Pure
Reason.


### 3.2 Kant on Deism and Theism



Kant's distinction between Deism and Theism is intertwined with
his distinction between Transcendental Theology and Natural Theology
(A631/B659-A632/B660). The meaning of these terms, however, are
not what some have assumed (e.g., Wood 1991).



In his *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion*,
Kant defines "Transcendental Theology" as the
"recognition [*Kenntniss*] of God by means of concepts of
pure reason" (AK 28:596 [1821]). These concepts are not,
however, the pure concepts of the understanding, but rather what he
calls the four "classes of concepts" (B110): namely,
quantity, quality, relation and modality. More precisely, Kant sees
Transcendental Theology as a consequence of reason's quest for
the unconditioned condition, with its concepts of God corresponding to
the unconditioned for each of the "classes of concepts",
namely: *ens summum* (quality), *ens entium* (quantity),
*ens originarium* (modality), and *ens realissimum*
(relation).



As Transcendental Theology employs no "information" about
the conditioned (i.e., the created world), it is without the resources
needed to develop a concept of God "*in concreto*"
(AK 28:1020 [1817]). Absent the "materials for the concept of
God from empirical principles and empirical information" (AK
28:1020 [1817]), Transcendental Theology can do no more than attribute
to God "what is true of him as a thing in general" (AK
28:1020 [1817]). That is, its concept of God is just that of
unconditioned quality, quantity, modality, and relation.



Absent all "information" about the conditioned,
Transcendental Theology is thus without the resources to develop the
concept of God used in either Natural or Moral Theology, i.e, the
"wise author of nature" or the judge and
"ruler" of nature, respectively (AK 28:452 [1968], AK
28:596 [1821], AK 28:1002 [1817]). Consequently, Kant claims that
Transcendental Theology is inadequate, yielding "only a
silhouette of a theology" (AK 28:605, AK 28:452 [1968]). Its
conception of God is "useless" (AK 28:596 [1821]),
"unusable" (AK 28:452 [1968]), and "quite
superfluous to us" (AK 28:1020 [1817]). For it provides us only
with the god of Deism, and according to the lectures, this God is
"useless" and "unusable".



Hence, despite the familiar-seeming term, Kant does not mean by
"Deism" how it was typically used by the British. Their
Deism is rather much more akin to what Kant means by
"Theism", as the outcome of Natural (vs. Transcendental)
Theology. That is, Kant maintains in the *Critique of Pure
Reason* that our picture of nature as having systematic unity
commits us to seeing nature "as if" it were created by a
"Wise Author" (A644/B672-A645/B673).



This is not, however, a new twist on the Argument from Design. While
Kant turns to Theism to explain how we make the ground of the natural
order "comprehensible" (AK 6:65n [1793]) to ourselves,
this is not a proof for God's existence but rather an appeal to
the idea of a Wise Author varyingly described as
"symbolic" (AK 4:437 [1785b]), "heuristic"
(A671/B699), a "*focus imaginarius*" (A645/B673),
or a supposition to be taken



> 
> 
> only problematically [vs assertorically] ... so as to regard all
> the connection of things in the world of sense as if they had their
> ground in this being of reason. (A681/B709)
> 
> 
> 



It is nonetheless a supposition that (at least from the later 1770
through most of the 1780s) Kant believes we cannot do without.
"[W]e must presuppose such a being" (A697/B725), for in
its absence, reason would be at odds with itself, at once intending a
systematic unity to nature and at the same time without a principle to
ground that systematicity.



Lastly, note that despite Allen Wood's claim in
"Kant's Deism" that Kant's account of Deism is
disconnected from the "common seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century usage" and thus is
"idiosyncratic" (Wood 1991), Wood has mistaken the more
familiar British use of the term with how the term was used by German
Rationalism. For example, Wolff, in his *Theologia Naturalis*
highlights the areas of agreement between Deism and atheism, arguing
that Deism can easily devolve into a "practical atheism".
(*Theologia Naturalis*, SS547). Baumgarten as well, in the
*Metaphysica*, the textbook that Kant used in his courses on
Metaphysics and Natural Theology, follows Wolff in this, describing
Deism as "the doctrine [which] maintains that almost nothing is
conceivable about God, except perhaps his existence"
(SS862). Hence, however idiosyncratic this use of
"Deism" may seem to the modern reader, it would not have
been so for Kant's contemporary audience. In short, Kant uses
"Deism" in a manner reflective of Wolff and
Baumgarten's approach rather than how the British employed
it.


### 3.3 Religion and Theoretical Knowledge



Despite Kant's explicit claim that one of the underlying drivers
of Transcendental Idealism is to defend faith against theoretical
reason, it is widely believed that his philosophical system powerfully
challenges, if not outright bars, religious belief. His criticisms of
the traditional arguments for God's existence are taken as
illustrative of his opposition to religion, and the so-called
"Restriction Thesis" of Transcendental Idealism is
regarded as a barrier against all legitimate religious assent
(Wolterstorff 1998, Rawls 2000, DiCenso 2012).



According to Kant, we can have no knowledge of anything outside of
experience, outside the scope of the spatio-temporal-causal order.
Hence, there can be no knowledge of God, of the soul, of the
afterlife, or anything else beyond that order. To compound this
restriction, Kant further asserts that we also can have no
"cognition" [*Erkenntnis*] of objects outside the
scope of experience. While the former is less ambiguous, the latter
has generated more debate, hanging very much on what it is to have a
"cognition" (e.g., Watkins & Willaschek 2017, Chignell
2017).



Many have taken "cognition" to be a semantic notion, and
so have taken Kant's denial of the cognizability of the
supersensible as a denial of even the intelligibility of religious
concepts. Thus, it is not merely that we cannot prove whether or not
God exists, but the concept of God itself, like all other concepts of
supersensible entities and properties, (allegedly) cannot even have
meaning for us.



The former position, that we can have no knowledge of the
supersensible, is textually well supported. Knowledge
[*Wissen*], for Kant, follows its traditional tripartite model
as justified-true-belief, and if there is neither experience nor
rational proof of any supersensible claim, no such claim can meet with
suitable justification.



The latter position, that we can have no cognition of supersensible
objects, is likewise correct. However, the alleged implication that
this makes meaningful thought about them impossible is false. Kant
does not reject the thinkability of the supersensible, and, in fact,
the body of arguments in the Transcendental Dialectic show this to be
clearly the case. If, for example, propositions about the
supersensible were incoherent according to Kant, then he would not
need his Antinomies or Paralogisms. Rather, he could sweep them all
away quite simply through the charge that they fall short of the
conditions for meaning.



The problem, thus, is not that we cannot coherently think the
supersensible. It is, rather, that we can think about it in too many
ways. Absent experience, reason is without a touchstone through which
hypotheses can be refuted. Instead, so long as the ideas of reason are
internally consistent, it can construct a multitude of theses and
antitheses about the supersensible. It can, moreover, argue quite
robustly in favor of each, something we see both in the Antinomies and
all the more grandly in the great tomes of the metaphysicians. The
problem, for Kant, is thus not about meaning, but rather it is
epistemic: having no possible experience of the supersensible, we lack
the theoretical resources to adjudicate between competing claims.
Accordingly, to cognize, for Kant, is to think an object or
proposition in relation to the order of nature and the material
conditions that govern whether or not it obtains--what Kant calls
the cognition's "real possibility". The conditions
for real possibility, in turn, provide the investigational framework
through which we can verify or falsify what is being cognized.



"Cognition", thus, is not a semantic notion, but
epistemic. It is a mode of thinking that is not just fanciful
imagining but is directed to objects whose reality can be determined.
Thinking requires merely the logical possibility of what is being
entertained. So long as it is not self-contradictory, it can be
thought. Cognition, by contrast, embeds the thought in the material
conditions for, or the Real Possibility of, the object of thought,
something that is not possible once one steps beyond the scope of
possible experience.



Hence, we cannot have a cognition of God because, as Kant argues in
the Transcendental Dialectic's Ideal of Reason, there is no
viable argument for God's existence. Likewise, we cannot prove
or disprove a miracle, for its alleged supersensible cause is not
something whose conditions are determinable for us. Even if we
experience some event whose cause is supersensible, we have no way
whatsoever to establish that this is so, and have nothing to guide our
hypotheses about how to test for miracles or how they come to be.



None of this challenges the intelligibility of religious doctrines. So
long as they are not self-contradictory, they are thinkable. It is
just that their truth or falsehood cannot possibly be known. Moreover,
since they are not within the spectrum of epistemic evaluation, we
cannot opine regarding them, for opinion [*Meinung*], as Kant
understands the term, is a mode of assent based upon the weighing of
theoretical grounds (evidence and argument) for and against truth.



Yet, this does not leave us with agnosticism either. Along with
knowledge and opinion, Kant identifies faith as our third legitimate
mode of holding-to-be-true [*Furwahrhalten*]. Faith is,
for Kant, a mode of justified assent, though the nature of its
justification is quite different from opinion and knowledge. It is not
rooted in experience or argument, but rather in what he characterizes
as the "needs" of practical reason. Hence, for Kant,
religious belief finds its proper seat not in intellectual reflection
but in our practical lives.



Moreover, Kant sees faith, unlike knowledge, as engaging with our
will, calling it a "free assent". This is important for
the practical function of faith, since our commitment to morality does
not so simply depend on our affirmation of the postulates, but in our
free act of faith through which we more completely bind ourselves to
morality. Morality, thus "inevitably leads to religion"
(AK 6:6 [1793]), since we need the latter in order to sustain or fully
realize our commitment to the former. This, however, must not be
interpreted as "theological ethics", as if the authority
of the moral law depended upon God. It is not its authority that is in
question (perhaps with the exception of the argument at AK 5:114 in
the *Critique of Practical Reason* [1788]). Rather, this
advance from morality to religion concerns how we bind ourselves to
the former (cf. A632/B660, AK 5:481 [1788], AK 6:3 [1793]).


#### 3.3.1 Competing interpretations of Kant on religious assent



Although Kant's presentation of faith as legitimate mode of
"holding-to-be-true", is consistently maintained through
the Critical period's published corpus, some Kantians have opted
to develop interpretations which dismiss or overlook such discussions.
We will here briefly compare four different stances on religious
assent in Kant.


##### 3.3.1.1 A mistake for Kant



Some scholars hold that we should mostly ignore what Kant has to say
about the postulates, and, consequently, the positive part of his
religious philosophy. This is either because the postulates are taken
as hold-overs from Kant's pre-Critical period that are
incompatible with his Critical philosophy (Allison 1990), or because
the philosophical reasoning involving them is so bad as to be
irrelevant to what makes Kant an important philosopher (Rawls 2000).
Regardless of whether the postulates are a hold-over or simply poorly
supported, the result is the same: for scholars who take this view, it
is not important to have a detailed understanding of the attitudes
involved in postulation, as they aren't key to understanding
what is valuable about Kant's philosophy.


##### 3.3.1.2 Only as symbol (useful representation but no assent)



A second position that may be understood as an attempt to reconcile
Transcendental Idealism with Kant's philosophy of religion is to
replace what he says about assent with a non-doxic attitude where
religious concepts, rather than objects of belief, are instead taken
as regulative ideals or representations of moral principles
(Davidovich 1993, Henrich 1999, DiCenso 2012). While there are many
passages in the Critical period where Kant promotes assent, this is a
view in line with some fasciles of the *Opus Postumum*. Guyer
(2005), for example, maintains that rather than the *Opus
Postumum* reflecting a break from Kant's Critical stance on
religious assent, it instead finally brings the true character of his
position to light.


##### 3.3.1.3 Needed assent on practical grounds



The most widespread view in recent scholarship is one that corresponds
with the works of Stevenson (2003), Chignell (2007), and Pasternack
(2011). It also has earlier adherents including Beck (1960) and Wood
(1970). Although there are interpretative differences among these
figures, there is a shared recognition that Kant does regard actual
assent (holding-to-be-true) as having its ground in our moral
interests, as driven by a "need" or the
"needs" of practical reason.



Wood (1970), for example, bases his view upon the "*Absurdum
Practicum*" argument where Kant states that anyone who
renounces the postulates would become "contemptible" in
their own eyes (A828/B856, AK 28:1083 [1817]). Chignell and Pasternack
develop their interpretations primarily by way of an analysis of texts
where Kant discusses the relationship between belief, knowledge and
opinion. What is emphasized among these interpreters is the moral
significance of religious assent rather than ontological commitment.
Such may be taken as the spirit of Kant's comment that "I
must not even say 'It is morally certain that there is a
God', but rather 'I am morally certain'"
(A829/B857).



Note that while there are a considerable number of texts where Kant
endorses the need for religious assent, we may nevertheless
distinguish between a number of positions. One holds that the adoption
of a belief-state that is more akin to the symbolic use of the
postulates, adopting them only in the form of an "as if",
without a commitment to their objective reality (Ferreira 2014). The
most famous indication of the "as if" attitude appears at
4:448. Another position (Pasternack 2011, Insole 2016) is that Kant
regarded faith as including a commitment to the objective reality of
its objects. Passages in support of this view include AK 5:4 &
5:134 [1788], AK 5:456 & 5:469 [1790], AK 8:139 [1785a], AK
20:299. Note further that the spirit behind the "as if"
attitude may be reemerging in a new form within the recent interest in
Kant's conception of moral hope.


#### 3.3.2 Hope



In the Canon of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant writes
that



> 
> 
> all interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical)
> is united in the following three questions: 1. What can I know? 2.
> What should I do? 3. What may I hope.
> 
> 
> 



Kant then goes on to explain that hope is



> 
> 
> simultaneously practical and theoretical, so that the practical leads
> like a clue to a reply to the theoretical question and, in its highest
> form, the speculative question.
> 
> 
> 



Kant further describes hope in relation to our interest in happiness
(A805/B833). The latter point perhaps connects more specifically with
how Kant frames the highest good in the *Critique of Pure
Reason* versus later work. Nevertheless, despite how Kant
highlights the question of hope in this text, it does not receive the
same level of exposition as knowledge, opinion or faith. For further
discussion of Kant on hope, see the section on Kant in the entry on
 hope.


### 3.4 The Highest Good



Kant's doctrine of the highest good is the foundation of his
positive philosophy of religion. With the exception of some musings
(esp. in the *Critique of Pure Reason*) about an assent driven
by our regulative employment of purposiveness (cf. B426, A670/B698 and
A826/B854), the path to religion is through the highest good. It is
through this doctrine that Kant endorses belief in God's
existence as well as the immortality of the soul. It is also through
this doctrine that Kant sets out what in the *Religion* he
calls the Pure Rational System of Religion. Therein, Kant appraises
Christian doctrines to determine whether or not they are conducive to
our duty to pursue the highest good (see
 section 3.6.4
 and
 section 3.7
 below).



In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant distinguishes
between the "supreme", the "complete", and
"highest" good. By "supreme good", he means
the good that is "not subordinate to any other" (AK 5:110
[1788]). That is, if there are a plurality of values, the supreme good
is the one that overrides the rest. Hence, if pleasure were taken as a
value, its value would be subordinate to morality, and thus its value
would be defeated or overridden if the pleasure comes through a
violation of the moral law.



The "complete good" is one that "is not part of a
still greater whole of the same kind" (AK 5:110 [1788). Kant
then explains that while morality is the supreme good, it is not the
complete good "as the object of the faculty of desire of
rational finite beings" (AK 5:110). This is because in addition
to morality, finite rational beings also desire happiness. So,
although happiness is subordinate to morality, morality is not the
"complete good" because it does not encompass all that we
desire.



Kant then presents the highest good as a synthesis of morality and
happiness in order to meet the axiological principles of supremacy and
completeness. More specifically, he presents the highest good as an
ideal state of affairs in which there is a proportional distribution
of happiness in accordance with moral worth (A809/B837, AK 5:110 &
5:145 [1788]; AK 5:471 [1790]; AK 6:8n & 6:99 [1793]; AK 8:139
[1785a]; AK 8:281 [1764]). Nevertheless, some interpreters have
proposed that Kant withdrew this formulation in later years,
supporting instead the notion that the highest good reflects the idea
of maximal happiness and maximal morality as two independent variables
(Reath 1988, Guyer 2011, Moran 2012). However, Pasternack (2017a)
argues at length that the corpus neither supports this nor the
putative abandonment of one or both of the postulates of God and
immortality (see
 section 3.5.2
 below).


### 3.5 The Practical Postulates



Although Kant enumerates three postulates, freedom, God, and
immortality, their etiologies differ. In contrast to the latter two,
the postulate of freedom is more directly tied to the fact of reason,
taken as a necessary condition for the bindingness of the moral law
upon us. By contrast, the postulates of God and Immortality are rooted
in the highest good. As such, we will here only be concerned with the
latter two "religious" postulates.


#### 3.5.1 The postulate of God



While the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows some sympathy for the
Argument from Design, Kant remarks that it can only get us to a
"Wise Author of Nature", a being who is responsible for
the order of nature, rather than a creator, a being with infinite
capacities, or a moral being. By contrast, the Canon of the First
*Critique* advances a conception of God as omnipotent,
omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Hence, as there argued, in order for
the highest good to obtain, there must be a being capable of arranging
the world such that happiness is exactly proportioned to moral worth.
This being must further have the cognitive powers necessary to judge
or moral worth, and, presumably, a will aligned with morality.



Kant explains that our construction of the classic conception of God
as omnipotent, omniscient and all good gains its validity through the
need for this being as the agent responsible for the distribution of
happiness in proportion to moral worth (A816/B845-A819/B847). It
is through morality and the highest good that we "produced a
concept of the divine being that we now hold to be correct"
(A818/B846). Likewise, "What does it Mean to Orient Oneself in
Thinking", Kant explains that the very "*concept*
of God and even the conviction of his *existence*" arises
through our practical needs and that these needs operate as the
"signpost or compass by means of which the speculative thinker
orients himself in his rational excursions into the field of
supersensible objects" (AK 8:142 [1785a]). In other words, while
theoretical reason on its own ventures into this field without any
valid warrants, the needs of practical reason, from which we form both
our concepts of the postulates and the basis for our assent, is, Kant
maintains, the sole basis by which we may extend our cognition (i.e.,
valid construction of concepts) into the supersensible.


#### 3.5.2 The postulate of immortality



The postulate of immortality is typically found alongside Kant's
discussions of the postulate of God. He regards both as necessary
conditions for the realization of the highest good, though the
function of this postulate undergoes a number of revisions through the
Critical period.



In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant presents two distinct
arguments for it. The first is a non-moral argument and is found in
the B-Paralogism, after his rejection of Mendelssohn's argument
for the same. Mendelssohn's argument builds off the thesis that
the soul is a simple entity and cessation of existence involves a
dissolution of one part and then another. He thus concludes that since
the soul is simple, it is impossible for it to cease to exist. Kant
rejects this argument on the grounds that even simple beings can have
a degree of reality (an intensive magnitude) that can diminish to
zero, he shortly thereafter presents his own argument for the
soul's immortality, one that has a similar metaphysical bent:
(a) since throughout nature there is a proportionality between
purposes and the conditions for the realization of those purposes,
there should be a similar proportionality between our capacities and
the conditions for their realization, and (b) since the grandeur of
our capacities, including both our natural talents and moral vocation,
exceeds what can be realized in this life, it follows (c) that we are
justified in affirming a "future life". This argument, or
one very similar to it, is also present in the Canon's
discussion of "doctrinal belief" [*doctrinale
Glaube*]. However, this is not an argument that endures beyond the
1780s. It is absent in later works, and in the *Critique of
Judgment*, Kant explicitly dismisses it along with all other
non-moral arguments for the afterlife (cf. AK 5:460 & 5:468
[1790]).



The other and better known argument for this postulate is first found
in the *Critique of Pure Reason*'s Canon. Like his
argument for the postulate of God, Kant also argues that we must
postulate the immortality of the soul as a necessary condition for the
distribution of happiness in the highest good. Given the exigencies of
the natural order, this distribution cannot be secured within this
order. We must therefore posit a "future life", a
"Kingdom of Grace" where "every happiness awaits us
as long as we do not ourselves limit our share of it through the
unworthiness to be happy" (A812/B840). Hence, in the First
*Critique*, the purpose of the afterlife is to provide a domain
for the highest good's distribution of happiness.



Before moving forward, let us discuss the belief found in some
quarters (Reath 1989, Rawls 2000, Guyer 2005) that Kant abandoned the
postulate of immortality in the 1790s.



The most common claim used to support this assertion is that
Kant's uses the phrase "highest good in the world"
(AK 5:450 [1790]) in the *Critique of Judgment* in order to
signal a shift away from an afterlife ideal distribution of happiness
in proportion to moral worth to the ideal of the highest good as
connected with our ordinary corporeal existence. What, however, Kant
means by "in the world" requires some investigation before
any such conclusions can be drawn.



First, Kant directly discusses what he intends by "world"
in the *Critique of Pure Reason* where he explains to readers
that he will be using "nature" to refer to "the
unity in the existence of appearances" (A419/B447) versus
"world", which has a "transcendental sense",
such that when dealing with cosmological ideas, "world"
goes beyond just the phenomenal to the "sum total of existing
things" (A419/B447).



Second, we see "world" used in this manner throughout the
corpus, including passages where it is quite clear that Kant uses
"world" in its "transcendental sense",
extending beyond just the realm of nature (e.g., A811/B839, A813/B839,
AK 5:143 [1788], AK 8:139 [1785a], 20:298. In fact, Kant even
describes the postulate of immortality as obtaining "in the
world" at the opening of his discussion of this postulate in the
*Critique of Practical Reason* (AK 5:122--see also 5:143
[1788]).



Third, the highest good is linked with the immortality of the soul
continually through the texts of the 1790s, including the Critique of
Judgment, where it can be found more than a dozen times through its
final section. It is mentioned briefly in the "Theodicy"
essay of 1791 (AK 8:262 & 8:269n), in multiple passages throughout
the *Religion*, in "The End of All Things" (AK
8:328-330 [1794]) in the *Conflict of the Faculties* (AK
7:40, 7:44, etc. [1798]), the 1796 "Proclamation" Essay
(AK 8:418-419), as well as in "Real Progress" (AK
20:298). Accordingly, despite the stature of those who put forward the
claim that Kant abandoned the postulate of immortality circa 1790, it
is a claim that does not attend to either how Kant uses
"world" versus "nature", nor the surfeit of
affirmative discussions about the afterlife through the 1790s.



Fourth, supporters of the abandonment thesis assert that Kant no
longer needs the postulate of immortality (and perhaps God) because in
the 1790s he further abandons his earlier picture of the highest good
as a distribution of happiness in proportion to moral worth, adopting
instead the idea that this ideal is composed of maximal happiness and
maximal morality as two independent variables. The basis for this
claim is his 1793 essay "On the Common Saying: 'That may
be Correct in Theory, but it is of no use in Practice'"
where Kant describes the highest good as "universal happiness
combined with and in conformity with the purest morality throughout
the world" (AK 8:279). Yet the interpretative merits of this
claim built upon this passage are greatly diminished once one attends
to the footnote Kant attaches to it, where he explains that he does
not mean happiness on its own, "but only of a proportion between
it and the worthiness of a subject" (AK 8:280n).



The abandonment thesis is further defended by Guyer (2016) where in
addition to building his case for this thesis based upon the
aforementioned depiction of the highest good at AK 8:279, he also
argues that in the *Religion* Kant has given up the Second
*Critique*'s rationale for the postulate of immortality,
namely, immortality as required for the sake of an eternal striving
for perfection. Rather than being tied to (striving for) perfection,
we find in the *Religion* that our moral worthiness is instead
tied to our supreme maxim or "change of heart".



That is, Guyer proposes that the standard for moral worthiness offered
by Kant in the *Religion* no longer itself requires the
postulation of immortality. This is a view likewise advanced by
Pasternack (2014: 142-146) in his discussion of the
"change of heart" in the *Religion*. Unlike what is
found in the Second *Critique*, in both the *Religion*
and "The End of All Things" (1794), Kant presents our
afterlife fate as solely dependent upon (or should be viewed as solely
dependent upon) what we can morally achieve in this life (AK
6:69n-71n [1793], AK 8:328-330 [1794]). Hence, once our
moral worthiness is understood as something to be achieved in this
life, how one interprets Kant's commitment to the postulate
centrally turns on how one interprets his views on the distribution of
happiness within the highest good.



As discussed through this subsection, Kant's views on the
postulate of immortality through the Critical period involve these
three core issues: (a) the standard for moral worth articulated by
Kant in various texts; (b) whether Kant continues to regard the
highest good as a distribution of happiness in proportion to moral
worth versus as maximal happiness and maximal morality as two
independent variables; and (c) whether or not the distribution of
happiness (especially if taken as proportionate to moral worth)
depends upon the postulate of immortality (i.e., cannot take place
within the causal order of nature). Beyond these three core issues,
further issues include: (d) the limitations to and relevance of our
speculations about the nature of the afterlife (see AK
6:69n-6:71n [1793] and AK 8:328-332 [1794]) and (e) the
historical backdrop for Kant's engagement with various models of
the afterlife (see Bunch 2010).


### 3.6 Kant as Philosophical Theologian



In October 1794, Kant received a royal rescript from the court of
Frederick William II reprimanding him for his heterodox writings on
Christianity and prohibiting him from further publication which
"distort and disparage" Christianity (cf. AK 7:6
[1798]). In his official response (unknown date, but late October 1794
is most likely), Kant agreed to "hereafter refrain altogether
from discoursing publicly, in lectures or writing, on religion,"
but also protested that his writings nevertheless have made
"no *appraisal* of Christianity" (AK 7:8
[1798]).



Putting aside the question as to whether Kant might have prevaricated
in his response, the question remains: to what extent does Kant engage
with Christian doctrine and to what extent is his philosophical
theology compatible with it? On the one hand, there are
epistemological questions which we have addressed elsewhere in this
entry. But there is also the question of whether or not Kant saw his
work as compatible or at odds with such core Christian doctrines as
Original Sin, Grace, the Incarnation, and Vicarious Atonement. We will
here consider four interpretative positions.


#### 3.6.1 A successful Christian apologist



Some interpreters have claimed that the *Religion* serves as
Kant's philosophical defense of traditional Christian doctrines,
and that it succeeds in this regard. This is a view advanced by Chris
Firestone and Nathan Jacobs in their *In Defense of Kant's
Religion*. For example, these authors hold that Kant's
portrayal of moral evil in Part One is shaped by an "Augustinian
metaphysic" (Firestone & Jacobs 2008: 136), that in Part Two
Kant promotes the idea of the Incarnation, utilizing a
"Scotistic understanding of divine being" (Firestone &
Jacobs 2008: 161) and that Part Four not only concludes with an
argument for the "priority of belief in Christianity" but
defends the necessity of special revelation which, as they earlier
claim, is necessary for Kant's critical philosophy as a whole
(Firestone & Jacobs 2008: 115).



A similar position is advanced by Stephen Palmquist who finds in the
*Religion* not only an examination of those aspects of rational
religion which conform with Christian doctrine, but also a
philosophical defense of the need for revelation. Palmquist claims,
for example, that *Religion's* treatment of Original Sin
is used by Kant to articulate "what we might call a Christ-sized
'hole' in the heart of humanity's rational
capacity" (Palmquist 2016: 165), that Kant "regarded the
Christian Gospel as a genuine revelation" (Palmquist 2016: 166)
and that an otherwise deficient "bare reason" requires
revelatory content in order that we may "believe" in our
own capacity to imitate the "archetype of perfection"
(Palmquist 2016: 166). That is, Palmquist contends that, in line with
traditional Christianity, Kant regards our salvation as dependent upon
having faith in the historical reality of the Incarnation.


#### 3.6.2 A Failed Christian apologist



A second school of interpretation likewise maintains that Kant wrote
the *Religion* for the purposes of offering a philosophical
defense of traditional Christian doctrines. This school, however,
holds that he was ultimately unsuccessful. This is a view which
principally flows from Karl Barth's 1947 *Die protestantische
Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert*, and is adopted by a group of later
philosophers of religion including members of the school of
"Reformed Epistemology", including Philip Quinn, Nicholas
Wolterstorff and John Hare.



Within Kant circles, they are best known for the so-called
"Conundrum" interpretation of Kant's
*Religion,* where these authors protest that Kant's
venture into philosophical theology is not only inconsistent with the
epistemic strictures of Transcendental Idealism (Wolterstorff 1998),
but also is internally inconsistent in virtue of the fact that its
understanding of Original Sin is essentially Augustinian while its
understanding of moral restoration is Pelagian. Wolterstorff goes so
far as to claim that Kant's philosophical theology suffers from
"not just implausibility or tension, but internal
contradiction" (Wolterstorff 1991: 49). Likewise, John Hare
(1996) declares it an outright "failure" and Gordon
Michalson (1990) contends that the *Religion* contains a litany
of "wobbles" between incompatible Christian and
Enlightenment commitments.



Although there are a number of other targets of criticism, their main
contention is that Kant inconsistently accepts (a) the Augustinian
conception of Original Sin which holds that our moral capacities have
through the Fall been damaged in such a way that we are incapable of
moral improvement without Sanctifying Grace; and yet (b) Kant
subscribes to what they call his "Stoic Maxim" that
"a person's moral worth is determined entirely by that
person himself" (Wolterstorff 1991: 48). Recently, Andrew
Chignell has accepted the essence of the "Conundrum"
objection, relying upon it as a reason why Kant must appeal to hope:
since Kant's alleged "Stoic Maxim" leaves no room
for divine aid, and yet divine aid seems to be needed, it can be (at
best) an object of hope, since unlike other propositional attitudes,
hope is rationally permissible in the face of a (seeming)
impossibility so long as it does not rise to an impossibility of
"the most fundamental modal level" (Chignell 2014:
114-115).


#### 3.6.3 Non-doxic theologian



A third school holds that despite appearances to the contrary, the
*Religion* does not engage in "theological speculation
concerning the doctrine of grace in any form" (DiCenso 2012:
117). This view is advanced by James DiCenso in his 2012 commentary on
the *Religion*, and more recently by Allen Wood in his *Kant
and Religion* (2020). The former's 2012 commentary
advises that we avoid any literal reading of religious doctrines in
the text, and that we should instead interpret Kant's treatment
of them as presenting no more than our moral ideals in
"imaginatively enhanced or pictorial form" (2012:
28). Likewise, in the latter's *Kant and
Religion* (2020), the author presents
the *Religion* as a study of how we can understand
Christianity's presentation of a "second-person relationship
between myself and God" (Wood 2020: 137) as instead symbols
for a first-person "self-relation" (Wood 2020: 137,
143) through which we gain "a meaningful and
emotionally enriched way of relating to our own past" (Wood
2020: 145). Interestingly, these interpretations
cohere with certain interpretations of Kant's philosophical
theology in the *Opus Postumum* (see Section 4 below), with
both extending not only the thesis that God, for Kant, is nothing but
a symbol of our moral ideals, but that all religious doctrines
involving the supersensible should likewise be interpreted as
such.



Further, both interpretations pick up on a number of comments in
the *Religion* where Kant associates the historical side of
religion with our need for symbols to help us with the "highest
concepts and grounds of reason" (AK 6:109 [1793]) and hopes for
a future time where we will no longer need "all statutes that
rest on history" (AK 6:121 [1793]). Nevertheless, this aspect
of Kant's treatment of religion does not apply to the
postulates, nor does it pertain to the underlying moral/theological
issues which are symbolized in specific doctrines (e.g., our innate
propensity to evil as represented in the story of Genesis, or our hope
for divine as represented in the Crucifixion).



What principally differentiates DiCenso (2012) and Wood (2020),
however, is that the former's hermeneutic denies outright that Kant
ever engages with any doctrine in its literal form, whereas the latter
sees the core goal of the *Religion* to "interpret
revealed Christianity in such a way ... [to] show that reason and
Christianity are allies, not enemies" (Wood 2020: 20). But in
order to realize that goal, doctrines have to be rendered as just
symbols. So, while Wood recognizes that Kant rejects various doctrines
(e.g. the story of Abraham and Isaac on Wood 2020: 14; and the
inheritability of sin on Wood 2020: 62), such rejections occur only
when doctrines are understood literally. Accordingly, Wood would have
us look past Kant's engagements with literal doctrines and take Kant
as claiming that they need to be understood just as symbols. This
would then allow for the thesis that "everything in revealed
(Christian) faith is compatible with rational faith" (Wood 2020:
20), which Wood asserts is the aim of the so-called "Second
Experiment" of the
*Religion*, i.e. the goal of the Second Experiment is
to "disprove the hypothesis... [that] there are parts
of revealed Christianity that are demonstrably and permanently
incompatible with rational religion" (Wood 2020: 20). 


#### 3.6.4 Pure rational system of religion



A fourth interpretative position is that the aim of *Religion*
is to (a) examine the scope of "unity" or
"compatibility" between rational religion and historical
faith and (b) evaluate which aspects of historical faith (with
Christianity being the primary focus) are apt vehicles for rational
religion versus those which are incompatible with it (Pasternack
2014). Hence, the *Religion* was not written as a Christian
apologetic, but rather is Kant's inquiry into the relationship
between natural theology and revealed religion. However, unlike the
many other such inquiries written during the era, Kant's own
version of natural theology is one that shaped by moral rather than
theoretical reason.



By way of this interpretative framework, Pasternack (2014) maintains
that the *Religion* is both compatible with the epistemic
strictures of Transcendental Idealism (contrary the interpretations
summarized above) as well as internally consistent. As for the
discussions where Kant appears to be guided by an "Augustinian
metaphysic" (Firestone & Jacobs 2008: 136), "firmly
ensconced within the Augustinian tradition" (Quinn 1988: 91) or
"accommodating" (Wood 1970: 246) tenets "fundamental
to Augustine" (Beiser 2006: 594), he is rather examining such
tenets in order to determine whether or not they have
"unity" or "compatibility" with rational
religion. Such doctrines as Original Sin, Grace, the Incarnation,
Vicarious Atonement and so forth are thus examined by Kant in the
*Religion* in order to, in each case, assess whether or not
they cohere with his moral anthropology and doctrine of the highest
good.


### 3.7 The Aims and Structure of the Religion



Until the recent spate of commentaries on the *Religion*,
little work has been done on its overall aims and structure. Although
Part One of the text has long been mined for insights into
Kant's picture of the moral agency, such studies did not
consider how the overall text might inform the passages minded
therefrom. The last decade, however, has seen the publication of a
number of commentaries on the *Religion*, each with their own
distinctive interpretations (Firestone & Jacobs 2008, DiCenso
2012, Pasternack 2014, Miller 2015, Palmquist 2016), most of whose
authors are mentioned in this entry. The above section also provides a
brief overview of their respective positions with regards to the
relationship between Kant's *Religion* and core Christian
doctrines. In this section, we will briefly review what Kant himself
says about his project and how it unfolds through its four parts.


#### 3.7.1 The two prefaces



To begin, the publication of the *Religion* (1793) has a
complicated history. Kant initially planned to write a series of
essays on Christian doctrines, but that was frustrated when the second
of these essays was denied official imprimatur. Because the Prussian
Censorship Commission had different rules for the publication of
articles versus books, Kant chose to combine the planned essays into a
single volume, and to avoid further scrutiny by the Commission, he
made sure that it was assessed as a work of philosophy rather than
theology. Although such maneuvers ultimately led to his censorship
during the reign of Frederick William II, Kant nevertheless was able
to publish the *Religion*, whose First Preface includes, after
an initial discussion of how through the highest good "morality
leads inevitably to religion" (AK 6:8n), a defense of his
rationale for treating the work as one of philosophical theology
rather than "biblical theology" (AK 6:7-6:11). The
Preface then ends with Kant's characterization of the
*Religion* as an "attempt" or
"experiment" (*Versuch*) at determining the scope
of overlap between the "pure *philosophical* doctrine of
religion" (AK 6:10) and the contents of historical faith
(especially Christianity).



The Preface to the second edition begins with a discussion of the
*Religion*'s title, which as Kant explains, is meant to
depict two overlapping domains, the "wider sphere of
faith" and the "narrower" sphere of the "pure
*religion of reason*" (AK 6:12). Kant then writes that
from "this standpoint I can also make this second
experiment" (*zweiten Versuch*), without, however,
explicitly enumerating a "first experiment".



Some have proposed (Hare 1996, Reardon 1988) that the unstated
"first experiment" pertains to the domain of overlap
between Biblical Theology and the Pure Rational System of Religion.
The Second Experiment then seeks



> 
> 
> to show that certain items in the outer circle lead back within the
> inner circle when looked at in the light of, or translated in terms of
> moral concepts. (Hare 1996: 40)
> 
> 
> 



Others have proposed that the First Experiment pertains to the
*Religion*'s "transcendental elements" while
the Second Experiment "aims at assessing one particular
empirical religion", namely Christianity (Palmquist 2000: 143),
or serves as a philosophical apologetic for Christianity (Firestone
& Jacobs 2008).



Pasternack (2017b), however, argues that the interpretative debate
over the first/second experiment distinction rests on a simple
mistake. Normally, *Versuch* would be translated as
"attempt", but early Anglophone translators of the
*Religion* chose instead "experiment". That choice
has passed along through contemporary translations and has led
interpreters to make far too much of this passage. The passage appears
towards the opening of the Preface to the *second* edition of
the *Religion* and is, as argued by Pasternack, merely meant by
Kant to indicate that he is issuing his *second* attempt
[*zweiten Versuch*] at the very same non-enumerated
"experiment" [*Versuch*] similarly described in the
Preface to the *first* edition (compare the language at AK 6:10
in the First Preface to AK 6:12 in the Second). In other words,
Pasternack asserts that the many attempts to divide out the
*Religion* into two distinct "experiments" is an
unfortunate byproduct of the secondary literature, unrelated to the
actual structure of the text.



What both Prefaces ultimately explain is that Kant's goal in the
*Religion* is to (a) provide an inquiry into the scope of
overlap between historical faith (especially in the form of
Christianity) and pure rational religion; and (b) use the latter as a
guide for distinguishing between which elements of the former are
matters of "genuine religion" rather than
"cult" (AK 6:12-13). Each of the
*Religion*'s four parts then take on core issues with
Christian doctrine.


#### 3.7.2 Part one



In Part One, Kant's aim is to examine the Christian doctrine of
Original Sin, especially as he would have been exposed to it through
his Lutheran Pietist upbringing. His interest is in finding out
whether there is any overlap between this historical doctrine and pure
rational religion. More specifically, his goal is to assess the
doctrine of Original Sin so as to determine what (if any) overlap it
has with rational religion. He thus considers such matters as: how can
our moral condition be innate and yet we can remain responsible for
it; whether, as would have been held by the Augustinian tradition,
Original Sin involves such a fundamental corruption of our faculties
that we lose the cognitive and volitional capacities needed to will
the good; and then in the "General Remark" or first
*Parergon*, whether or not our corrupted moral condition is
such that divine aid is required for us to overcome it. Throughout, we
see Kant taking up these and other themes within the Augustinian
conception of Original Sin, sometimes finding places of overlap with
rational religion, sometimes finding the two in conflict.


#### 3.7.3 Part two



The Second Part of the *Religion* moves on to Christology and
the alleged role of Christ in our salvation. Kant begins with a
discussion of the Incarnation and whether it can be interpreted in
such a way that is compatible with pure rational religion (AK
6:60-6:66). He then moves on to three
"difficulties:" how to understand the doctrine of
Sanctifying Grace (the "change of heart" or moral
regeneration) in relation to pure rational religion; whether an
individual can know his/her moral status as having undergone a
"change of heart", and how this relates to the challenge
of moral perseverance; how to understand the "debt of sin"
or the issue of "Justifying Grace". On this issue, we
again see Kant opposing the prevailing doctrines of his day,
explicitly rejecting the idea of "vicarious atonement" (AK
6:72-73) as anathema to pure rational religion.


#### 3.7.4 Part three



The Third Part of the *Religion* considers religion from a
historical standpoint, including the need for the founding of a
universal church, the importance of that church for the moral
improvement of society (the "ethical community"),
questions of divine providence, and eschatology.



Kant's focus in this part is the social dimension of moral evil,
where he draws from the Predisposition to Humanity discussed in Part
One (see Wood 1999), and argues that we "mutually corrupt each
other's moral dispositions and make one another evil" (AK
6:94). The goal of the universal church is to promote a new sort of
social exchange guided by our collective "duty *sui
generis*" of human beings to work cooperatively towards
"a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good"
(AK 6:97). The ethical community is then presented as an ideal state
of affairs reflecting the realization of the highest good.


#### 3.7.5 Part four



The final part of the *Religion* focuses on ecclesiology. After
an initial discussion of the religious framework for the ethical
community, Kant offers an important discussion of Christianity as a
natural versus a "learned" religion. The point of the
former is that "genuine religion", is one that can be
"comprehensibly and convincingly" communicated to all
human beings "through their own reason" (AK 6:162) without
any necessary role for revelation. The latter, by contrast, turns to
the "dogmas of faith" (AK 6:163) and its dangers. This
begins Kant's discussion of "counterfeit service",
"priestcraft" and the "delusions of religion"
he sees in ecclesiastical practice. While rational religion maintains
that nothing apart from "good life-conduct" is required to
"become well-pleasing to God" (AK 6:170), historical faith
routinely claims that God's judgment is based instead on our
doctrinal commitments and liturgical observances.



Therein, Kant examines the ultimate "subjective ground of
religious delusion" (AK 6:168), how the artificies of organized
religion let us "slip back into evil" (AK 6:184) and then
finally how practices including prayer, church attendance, and rituals
could nevertheless still be reconstituted for the genuine moral
religion of a universal church and "cosmopolitan *moral
community*" (AK 6:194-200).


#### 3.7.6 The *Parerga* or General Remarks



Each of the four parts of the *Religion* close with a section
entitled "General Remark" or "Parergon"
(Supplement or Appendix) to its main body. In the Second Edition to
the *Religion*, Kant adds a brief explanation of the function
of the *Parerga*, describing them as concerned with matters
which are at the "border" of the "boundaries of pure
reason". He lists these as: (1) the effects of grace; (2)
miracles; (3) the holy mysteries; (4) the means of grace. Kant
explains that reason



> 
> 
> does not contest the possibility or actuality of the objects of these
> ideas; it just cannot incorporate them into its maxims of thought or
> action. (AK 6:52)
> 
> 
> 



They are topics to which we are lead given the issues under discussion
through the main body of each part, but are all matters of caution for
us for while they each pertain to a need that seems unfulfilled
through what pure reason can allow for genuine religion, and in some
manner may invigorate our moral lives, they are all also paths to
"dogmatic faith" (6:52).



Hence, each part of the *Religion* ends with a caution somewhat
akin to the cautions which shape the *Critique of Pure
Reason*'s Dialectic: though the needs of reason drive us to
speculation, we must not fall into error thereby. For example, while
the logic of *ought implies can* warrants our belief that a
"change of heart" is possible, we cannot either affirm or
deny a role for divine aid/grace. Likewise, while Transcendental
Idealism leaves room for the possibility of a "supernatural
intervention" (AK 6:191), we are not epistemically situated so
that we can ever justifiably claim that some particular effect was in
fact due to such intervention.



The *parerga* thus are used by Kant to separate out what
doctrines of historical faith the pure rational system of religion can
assess versus what doctrines that--while we are compelled to
speculate about them--require our agnosticism. As such, the
*parerga* reflect limit issues, at the "border" of
rational religion, for which there is both a theoretical interest and
moral need to visit, but also where the dangers that we stray into
dogmatism are the greatest (Palmquist 2016, Muchnik 2019).


## 4. Religion in the *Opus Postumum*



In the mid-1790s, Kant began to explore what he saw as a "gap...
in the critical philosophy" (Kant to Garve, September 21, 1798
AK 12:257), namely, how to transition from what he established about
natural science in general in the *Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science* to physics in particular. However, his notes on
this "gap" exceeded his original plan, as they came to
cover not only how to transition from the foundations of natural
science to physics, but also self-positing, God, and the nature of
transcendental philosophy. These notes, which were composed during a
roughly seventeen-year period, and came to be assembled under the
title, *Opus Postumum*, prompt questions as to whether or not
Kant's views on God during this period represent a break from or
continuity with the philosophy of religion he presented in his
previous works. And further, if there is continuity, in what way might
its contents help to illuminate Kant's overall Critical
philosophy of religion?



For instance, there are many passages in the *Opus Postumum*
which present God not as a substance or a being outside of us, but
rather an ideal or thought-object. For some, this is taken as an
indication that in Kant's final years, he withdrew from his more
affirmative religious views seen up through the mid-1790s
(Forster 2000). While for others, it finally articulates the view
that Kant held throughout the Critical period, namely that despite
textual evidence to the contrary, Kant never advanced any argument,
moral or otherwise, for belief in God (W. Sullivan 1971, Guyer 2000,
Byrne 2007).



Nevertheless, amidst the passages in the *Opus Postumum* which
present God as merely an ideal or thought-object, there are others
which are not so deflationary, presenting God in a manner similar to
the more familiar works of the Critical period (AK 21:13-14 [OP
220-222], AK 22:126-127 [OP 206-207]).



One way to understand these discrepancies is to recognize that the
*Opus Postumum* is a collection of notes written over more than
a decade, unedited, and possibly different from what would have been
the final version of the treatise. Hence, Kant might have been
rethinking his philosophy of religion, exploring possibilities, or
working through some ideas which could fill his perceived "gap
in the critical philosophy", ideas that neither undercut the
epistemic strictures of the *Critique of Pure Reason* nor the
religiously affirmative language in his practical philosophy.



Further, though Kant sometimes describes God as an ideal or
thought-object, he also says the same about the world and
man-in-the-world, raising the possibility that his discussions of God
took place in two separate spheres: transcendental philosophy proper,
which provides the purely formal conditions of metaphysics and so
includes only the ideals we must construct in order to posit ourselves
in the world (namely, God, the world, and man-in-the-world); and
metaphysics, which is transcendental philosophy applied to certain
objects ("[the transcendental philosopher] addresses merely what
is formal, [the metaphysician] what is material (the object, the
material)" [AK 21:79 [OP: 246]]). If this is right, then it
could be that Kant does not repudiate or deflate his prior philosophy
of religion, but merely adds a new layer to it. Unfortunately, the
*Opus Postumum*'s unfinished state makes it difficult to
come to a secure conclusion about where Kant's thinking on
religion stood in his final years.