## 1. Is Morality Unified Enough to Define?



An assumption suggested by the very existence of this encyclopedia
entry is that there is some unifying set of features in virtue of
which all moral systems count as moral systems. But Sinnott-Armstrong
(2016) directly argues against an analogous hypothesis in connection
with moral judgments, and also seems to take this view to suggest that
morality itself is not a unified domain. He points out that moral
judgments cannot be unified by any appeal to the notion of harm to
others, since there are such things as moral ideals, and there are
harmless behaviors that a significant number of people regard as
morally wrong: Sinnott-Armstrong gives example such as cannibalism and
flag-burning. Whether people who condemn such behaviors morally are
correct in those judgments is largely irrelevant to the question of
whether they count as moral in the first place.



Sinnott-Armstrong seems right in holding that moral judgments cannot
be delimited from other judgments simply by appeal to their content.
It seems quite possible for someone to have been raised in such a way
as to hold that it is morally wrong for adult men to wear shorts. And
it also seems plausible that, as he also argues, moral judgments
cannot be identified by reference to any sort of neurological feature
common and peculiar to them and them alone. A third strategy might be
to claim that moral judgments are those one makes as a result of
having been inducted into a social practice that has a certain
function. However, this function cannot simply be to help facilitate
the sorts of social interactions that enable societies to flourish and
persist, since too many obviously non-moral judgments do this.



Beyond the problem just described, attempts to pick out moral codes in
the descriptive sense by appeal to their function often seem to be
specifying the function that the theorist thinks morality, in the
normative sense, would serve, rather than the function that actual
moralities do serve. For example, Greene claims that 



> 
> 
> morality is a set of psychological adaptations that allow otherwise
> selfish individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation, (2013: 23)
> 
> 
> 
> 



and Haidt claims that 



> 
> 
> moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms,
> practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved
> psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate
> self-interest and make cooperative societies possible. (2011: 270)
> 
> 
> 
> 



But these claims need to deal with the existence of dysfunctional
moralities that do not in fact serve these functions. Perhaps this
problem could be alleviated by pointing out that many instances of a
kind that have a function--for example, an actual human
heart--fail to fulfill that function.



Even if Sinnott-Armstrong's position is correct with regard to
morality in the descriptive sense, there might nevertheless be a code
of conduct that, given certain specified conditions, would be put
forward by all rational agents. That is, even if the descriptive sense
of morality is a family-resemblance notion, vaguely bordered and
open-textured, or even if it is significantly disjunctive and
disunified, the normative sense might not be. By way of comparison, we
might think of the notion of food in two ways: as what people regard
as food, and as what they would regard as food if they were rational and
fully informed. Certainly there is not much that unifies the first
category: not even being digestible or nutritious, since people regard
various indigestible and non-nutritious substances as food, and forego
much that is digestible and nutritious. But that does not mean that we
cannot theorize about what it would be rational to regard as food.


## 2. Descriptive Definitions of "Morality"



An initial naive attempt at a descriptive definition of
"morality" might take it to refer to the most important
code of conduct put forward by a society and accepted by the members
of that society. But the existence of large and heterogeneous
societies raises conceptual problems for such a descriptive
definition, since there may not be any such society-wide code that is
regarded as most important. As a result, a definition might be offered
in which "morality" refers to the most important code of
conduct put forward and accepted by any group, or even by an
individual. Apart from containing some prohibitions on harming
(certain) others, different moralities--when
"morality" is understood in this way--can vary in
content quite substantially.



Etiquette is sometimes included as a part of morality, applying to
norms that are considered less serious than the kinds of norms for
behavior that are more central to morality. Hobbes expresses this sort
of view when he uses the term "small morals" to describe
"decency of behavior, as how one man should salute another, or
how a man should wash his mouth or pick his teeth before
company", and distinguishes these from "those qualities of
mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity"
(1660 [1994]: Chapter XI, paragraph 1). When etiquette is included as
part of morality, morality is almost always being understood in the
descriptive sense. One reason for this is that it is clear that the
rules of etiquette are relative to a society or group. Moreover, there
are no plausible conditions under which we could pick out the
"correct" rules of etiquette as those that would be
accepted by all rational beings.



Law is distinguished from morality by having explicit written rules,
penalties, and officials who interpret the laws and apply the
penalties. Although there is often considerable overlap in the conduct
governed by morality and that governed by law, laws are often
evaluated--and changed--on moral grounds. Some theorists,
including Ronald Dworkin (1986), have even maintained that the
interpretation of law must make use of morality.



Although the morality of a group or society may derive from its
religion, morality and religion are not the same thing, even in that
case. Morality is only a guide to conduct, whereas religion is always
more than this. For example, religion includes stories about events in
the past, usually about supernatural beings, that are used to explain
or justify the behavior that it prohibits or requires. Although there
is often a considerable overlap in the conduct prohibited or required
by religion and that prohibited or required by morality, religions may
prohibit or require more than is prohibited or required by guides to
behavior that are explicitly labeled as moral guides, and may
recommend some behavior that is prohibited by morality. Even when
morality is not regarded as the code of conduct that is put forward by
a formal religion, it is often thought to require some religious
explanation and justification. However, just as with law, some
religious practices and precepts are criticized on moral grounds,
e.g., that the practice or precept involves discrimination on the
basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation.



When "morality" is used simply to refer to a code of
conduct put forward by an actual group, including a society, even if
it is distinguished from etiquette, law, and religion, it is being
used in a descriptive sense. It is also being used in the descriptive
sense when it refers to important attitudes of individuals. Just as
one can refer to the morality of the Greeks, so one can refer to the
morality of a particular person. This descriptive use of
"morality" is now becoming more prominent because of the
work of psychologists such as Jonathan Haidt (2006), who have been
influenced by the views of David Hume (1751), including his attempt to
present a naturalistic account of moral judgments.



Guides to behavior that are regarded as moralities normally involve
avoiding and preventing harm to others (Frankena 1980), and perhaps
some norm of honesty (Strawson 1961). But all of them involve other
matters as well, and Hare's view of morality as that which is
most important allows that these other matters may be more important
than avoiding and preventing harm to others (Hare 1952, 1963, 1981).
This view of morality as concerning that which is most important to a
person or group allows matters related to religious practices and
precepts, or matters related to customs and traditions, e.g., purity
and sanctity, to be more important than avoiding and preventing
harm.



When "morality" is used in a descriptive sense, moralities
can differ from each other quite extensively in their content and in
the foundation that members of the society claim their morality to
have. Some societies may claim that their morality, which is more
concerned with purity and sanctity, is based on the commands of God.
The descriptive sense of "morality", which allows for the
view that morality is based on religion in this way, picks out codes
of conduct that are often in significant conflict with all normative
accounts of morality.



A society might have a morality that takes accepting its traditions
and customs, including accepting the authority of certain people and
emphasizing loyalty to the group, as more important than avoiding and
preventing harm. Such a morality might not count as immoral any
behavior that shows loyalty to the preferred group, even if that
behavior causes significant harm to innocent people who are not in
that group. The familiarity of this kind of morality, which makes
in-group loyalty almost equivalent to morality, seems to allow some
comparative and evolutionary psychologists, including Frans De Waal
(1996), to regard non-human animals to be acting in ways very similar
to those that are regarded as moral.



Although all societies include more than just a concern for minimizing
harm to (some) human beings in their moralities, this feature of
morality, unlike purity and sanctity, or accepting authority and
emphasizing loyalty, is included in everything that is regarded as a
morality by any society. Because minimizing harm can conflict with
accepting authority and emphasizing loyalty, there can be fundamental
disagreements within a society about the morally right way to behave
in particular kinds of situations. Philosophers such as Bentham (1789)
and Mill (1861), who accept a normative account of morality that takes
the avoiding and preventing harm element of morality to be most
important, criticize all actual moralities (referred to by
"morality" in the descriptive sense) that give precedence
to purity and loyalty when they are in conflict with avoiding and
preventing harm.



Some psychologists, such as Haidt, take morality to include concern
with, at least, all three of the triad of (1) harm, (2) purity, and
(3) loyalty, and hold that different members of a society can and do
take different features of morality to be most important. But beyond a
concern with avoiding and preventing such harms to members of certain
groups, there may be no common content shared by all moralities in the
descriptive sense. Nor may there be any common justification that
those who accept morality claim for it; some may appeal to religion,
others to tradition, and others to rational human nature. Beyond the
concern with harm, the only other feature that all descriptive
moralities have in common is that they are put forward by an
individual or a group, usually a society, in which case they provide a
guide for the behavior of the people in that group or society. In the
descriptive sense of "morality", morality may not even
incorporate impartiality with regard to all moral agents, and it may
not be universalizable in any significant way (compare MacIntyre
1957).



Although most philosophers do not use "morality" in any of
the above descriptive senses, some philosophers do. Ethical
relativists such as Harman (1975), Westermarck (1960), and Prinz
(2007), deny that there is any universal normative morality and claim
that the actual moralities of societies or individuals are the only
moralities there are. These relativists hold that only when the term
"morality" is used in this descriptive sense is there
something that "morality" actually refers to. They claim
that it is a mistake to take "morality" to refer to a
universal code of conduct that, under certain conditions, would be
endorsed by all rational persons. Although ethical relativists admit
that many speakers of English use "morality" to refer to
such a universal code of conduct, they claim such persons are mistaken
in thinking that there is anything that is the referent of the word
"morality" taken in that sense.



Wong (1984, 2006, 2014) claims to be an ethical relativist because he
denies that there is any universal moral code that would be endorsed
by all rational people. But what seems to stand behind this claim is
the idea that there are cultural variations in the relative weights
given to, for example, considerations of justice and considerations of
interpersonal responsibility. And he assumes that those who believe in
a universal morality are committed to the idea that "if there is
fundamental disagreement, someone has got it wrong" (2014: 339).
But Gert (2005) is certainly not a relativist, and it is central to
his moral theory that there are fundamental disagreements in the
rankings of various harms and benefits, and with regard to who is
protected by morality, and no unique right answer in such cases. Wong
himself is willing to say that some moralities are better than others,
because he thinks that the moral domain is delimited by a functional
criterion: among the functions of a morality are that it promote and
regulate social cooperation, help individuals rank their own
motivations, and reduce harm.



When used with its descriptive sense, "morality" can refer
to codes of conduct with widely differing content, and still be used
unambiguously. This parallels the way in which "law" is
used unambiguously even though different societies have laws with
widely differing content. However, when "morality" is used
in its descriptive sense, it sometimes does not refer to the code of a
society, but to the code of a group or an individual. As a result,
when the guide to conduct put forward by, for example, a religious
group conflicts with the guide to conduct put forward by a society, it
is not clear whether to say that there are conflicting moralities,
conflicting elements within morality, or that the code of the
religious group conflicts with morality.



In small homogeneous societies there may be a guide to behavior that
is put forward by the society and that is accepted by (almost) all
members of the society. For such societies there is (almost) no
ambiguity about which guide "morality" refers to. However,
in larger societies people often belong to groups that put forward
guides to behavior that conflict with the guide put forward by their
society, and members of the society do not always accept the guide put
forward by their society. If they accept the conflicting guide of some
other group to which they belong (often a religious group) rather than
the guide put forward by their society, in cases of conflict they will
regard those who follow the guide put forward by their society as
acting immorally.



In the descriptive sense of "morality", a person's
own morality cannot be a guide to behavior that that person would
prefer others not to follow. However, that fact that an individual
adopts a moral code of conduct for his own use does not entail that
the person *requires* it to be adopted by anyone else. An
individual may adopt for himself a very demanding moral guide that he
thinks may be too difficult for most others to follow. He may judge
people who do not adopt his code of conduct as not being as morally
good as he is, without judging them to be immoral if they do not adopt
it. However, such cases do not undermine the restriction; a guide is
plausibly referred to as a morality only when the individual would be
*willing* for others to follow it, at least if
"follow" is taken to mean "successfully
follow". For it may be that the individual would not be willing
for others to *try* to follow that code, because of worries
about the bad effects of predictable failures due to partiality or
lack of sufficient foresight or intelligence.


## 3. Implicit and Explicit Definitions in Allied Fields



Philosophers, because they do not need to produce operational tests or
criteria in the way that psychologists, biologists, and
anthropologists do, often simply take for granted that everyone knows
what belongs, and does not belong, to the moral domain. This attitude
finds expression in the philosopher's common appeal to
intuition, or to what everyone agrees about. For example, Michael
Smith (1994) provides a very detailed analysis of normative reasons,
but in distinguishing specifically moral reasons from other sorts of
reasons, he says only that they are picked out by appeal to a number
of platitudes. And he makes no effort to provide anything like a
comprehensive list of such platitudes. Moreover, it is very likely
that there will be disagreement as to what counts as
platitudinous. Or, if it is definitional of "platitude"
that it be uncontroversial, it may be that what is platitudinous about
morality will be so thin as to fail to separate morality from other
domains. Failing to specify which particular criteria one takes to
govern one's own theorizing, and consequently tacitly relying on
the idea that everyone already knows what counts as moral, can lead to
a number of problems. One, of course, is a conflation of morality with
other things (see Machery 2012 on Churchland 2011). Another is that
one mistakes one's own cultural biases for universal truths
(Haidt and Kesiber 2010).



Because theorists in psychology and anthropology often need to design
questionnaires and other sorts of probes of the attitudes of subjects,
they might be expected to be more sensitive to the need for a
reasonably clear means of separating moral judgments from other sorts
of judgments. After all, examining the specifically moral judgments of
individuals is one of the most direct means of determining what the
moral code of a person or group might be. But despite this
expectation, and roughly half a century ago, Abraham Edel (1962: 56)
decried the lack of an explicit concern to delimit the domain of
morality among anthropologists, writing that "morality...is
taken for granted, in the sense that one can invoke it or refer to it
at will; but it is not explained, depicted, or analysed". One
explanation for this that Edel suggested is the same as the
explanation for the same phenomenon in Philosophy: "it is
assumed that we all know what morality is and no explicit account need
be given". But the danger for those making this assumption, he
points out, is that of "merging the morality concept with social
control concepts". Reinforcing this tendency was the influence,
in anthropology, of the sociologist Emile Durkheim (1906
[2009]), for whom morality was simply a matter of how a given society
enforces whatever social rules it happens to have.



The failure to offer an operational definition of morality or moral
judgment may help explain the widespread but dubious assumption in
contemporary anthropology, noted by James Laidlaw (2016: 456), that
altruism is the essential and irreducible core of ethics. But Laidlaw
also notes that many of the features of what Bernard Williams (1985)
described as "the morality system"--features that
Williams himself criticized as the parochial result of a
secularization of Christian values--are in fact widely shared
outside of the West. This state of affairs leads Laidlaw to ask the
crucial question: 



> 
> 
> Which features, formal or substantive, are shared by the
> "morality system" of the modern West and those of the
> other major agrarian civilizations and literate religions? 
> 
> 
> 



This is, to a very close approximation, a request for the definition
of morality in the descriptive sense.



Klenk (2019) notes that in recent years anthropology has taken what he
terms an "ethical turn", recognizing moral systems, and
ethics more generally, as a distinct object of anthropological study.
This is a move away from the Durkheimian paradigm, and includes the
study of self-development, virtues, habits, and the role of explicit
deliberation when moral breakdowns occur. However, Klenk's
survey of attempts by anthropologists to study morality as an
independent domain lead him to conclude that, so far, their efforts do




> 
> 
> not readily allow a distinction between moral considerations and other
> normative considerations such as prudential, epistemic, or aesthetic
> ones. (2019: 342)
> 
> 
> 



In light of Edel's worry about a conflation of moral systems
with systems of social control, it is interesting to consider Curry
(2016), who defends the hypothesis that 



> 
> 
> morality turns out to be a collection of biological and cultural
> solutions to the problems of cooperation and conflict recurrent in
> human social life. (2016: 29) 
> 
> 
> 



Curry notes that rules related to kinship, mutualism, exchange, and
various forms of conflict resolution appear in virtually all
societies. And he argues that many of them have precursors in animal
behavior, and can be explained by appeal to his central hypothesis of
morality as a solution to problems of cooperation and conflict
resolution. He also notes that philosophers, from Aristotle through
Hume, Russell, and Rawls, all took cooperation and conflict resolution
to be central ideas in understanding morality. It is unclear, however,
whether Curry's view can adequately distinguish morality from
law and from other systems that aim to reduce conflict by providing
solutions to coordination problems.



Turning from anthropology to psychology, one significant topic of
investigation is the existence and nature of a distinction between the
moral and the conventional. More specifically, the distinction at
issue is between (a) acts that are judged wrong only because of a
contingent convention or because they go against the dictates of some
relevant authority, and (b) those that are judged to be wrong quite
independently of these things, that have a seriousness to them, and
that are justified by appeal to the notions of harm, rights, or
justice. Elliot Turiel emphasized this distinction, and drew attention
to the danger, if one overlooks it, of lumping together moral rules
with non-moral "conventions that further the coordination of
social interactions within social systems" (1983:
109-111). Those who accept this distinction are implicitly
offering a definition of morality in the descriptive sense. Not
everyone does accept the distinction, however. Edouard Machery and Ron
Mallon (2010) for example, are suspicious of the idea that
authority-independence, universality, justification by appeal to harm,
justice, or rights, and seriousness form a cluster found together with
sufficient regularity to be used to set moral norms apart from other
norms. Kelly et al. (2007) are similarly skeptical, and bring
empirical evidence to bear on the question.



The psychologist Kurt Gray might be seen as offering an account of
moral judgment that would allow us to determine the morality of an
individual or group. He and his co-authors suggest that 



> 
> 
> morality is essentially represented by a cognitive template that
> combines a perceived intentional agent with a perceived suffering
> patient. (Gray, Young, & Waytz 2012: 102) 
> 
> 
> 



This claim, while quite strong, is nevertheless not as implausibly
strong as it might seem, since the thesis is directly concerned with
the *template* we use when thinking about moral matters; it is
not directly concerned with the nature of morality itself. In the
sense of "template" at issue here, the template we use
when thinking about dogs might include having four legs, a tail, and
fur, among other things. But that does not mean that an animal must
have these features to count as a dog, or even that we believe
this.



Given the way that Gray et al. think of templates, even if their
hypothesis is correct, it would not mean that our psychology requires
us to think of the moral as always involving intentional agents and
perceiving patients. In line with this, and despite some lapses in
which they suggest that "moral acts can be *defined* in
terms of intention and suffering", (2012: 109) their considered
view seems to be only that the dyadic template fits the
*majority* of moral situations, as we conceive them. Moreover,
the link between immoral behavior and suffering to which they appeal
in defending their general view is sometimes so indirect as to
undermine its significance. For example, they fit authority violations
into their suffering-based template by noting that "authority
structures provide a way of peacefully resolving conflict" and
that "violence results when social structures are
threatened". In a similar stretch, they account for judgments
that promiscuity is wrong by gesturing at the suffering involved in
sexually transmitted diseases (2012: 107).



Another position in cognitive psychology that has relevance for the
definition of morality in the descriptive sense takes moral judgment
to be a natural kind: the product of an innate moral grammar (Mikhail
2007). If moral judgment is a natural kind in this way, then a
person's moral code might simply consist in the moral judgments
that person is disposed to make. One piece of evidence that there is
such a grammar is to be found in the relative universality of certain
moral concepts in human cultures: concepts such as obligation,
permission, and prohibition. Another is an argument similar to
Chomsky's famous "poverty of the stimulus" argument
for a universal human grammar (Dwyer et al. 2010; see also Roedder and
Harman 2010).



In evolutionary biology, morality is sometimes simply equated with
fairness (Baumard et al. 2013: 60, 77) or reciprocal altruism
(Alexander 1987: 77). But it is also sometimes identified by reference
to an evolved capacity to make a certain sort of judgment and perhaps
also to signal that one has made it (Hauser 2006). This also makes
morality into something very much like a natural kind, that can be
identified by reference to causal/historical processes. In that case,
a content-based definition of morality isn't required: certain
central features are all that one needs to begin one's
theorizing, since they will be enough to draw attention to certain
psychologically and biologically individuated mechanisms, and the
study of morality will be a detailed inquiry into the nature and
evolutionary history of these mechanisms.


## 4. Normative Definitions of "Morality"



Those who use "morality" normatively hold that morality is
(or would be) the behavioral code that meets the following condition:
all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, would
endorse it. Indeed, this is a plausible basic schema for definitions
of "morality" in the normative sense. Although some hold
that no code could meet the condition, many theorists hold that there
is one that does; we can call the former "moral skeptics"
and the latter "moral realists" (see entries on LINK:
moral skepticism and moral realism).



Many moral skeptics would reject the claim that there are any
universal ethical truths, where the ethical is a broader category than
the moral. But another interesting class of moral skeptics includes
those who think that we should only abandon the narrower category of
the moral--partly because of the notion of *a code* that
is central to that category. These moral skeptics hold that we should
do our ethical theorizing in terms of the good life, or the virtues.
Elizabeth Anscombe (1958) gave expression to this kind of view, which
also finds echoes in the work of Bernard Williams (1985). On the other
hand, some virtue theorists might take perfect rationality to entail
virtue, and might understand morality to be something like the code
that such a person would implicitly endorse by acting in virtuous
ways. In that case, even a virtue theorist might count as a moral
realist in the sense above.



Consequentialist views might not seem to fit the basic schema for
definitions of "morality" in the normative sense, since
they do not appear to make reference to the notions of endorsement or
rationality. But this appearance is deceptive. Mill himself explicitly
defines morality as



> 
> 
> the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which
> [a happy existence] might be, to the greatest extent possible,
> secured. (1861 [2002: 12])
> 
> 
> 



And he thinks that the mind is not in a "right state"
unless it is in "the state most conducive to the general
happiness"--in which case it would certainly favor morality
as just characterized. And the act-consequentialist J.J.C. Smart
(1956) is also explicit that he is thinking of ethics as the study of
how it is most rational to behave. His embrace of utilitarianism is
the result of his belief that maximizing utility is always the
rational thing to do. On reflection it is not surprising that many
moral theorists implicitly hold that the codes they offer would be
endorsed by all rational people, at least under certain conditions.
Unless one holds this, one will have to admit that, having been shown
that a certain behavior is morally required, a rational person might
simply shrug and ask "So what? What is that to me?" And,
though some exceptions are mentioned below, very few moral realists
think that their arguments leave this option open. Even fewer think
this option remains open if we are allowed to add some additional
conditions beyond mere rationality: a restriction on beliefs, for
example (similar to Rawls' (1971: 118) veil of ignorance), or
impartiality.



Definitions of morality in the normative sense--and,
consequently, moral theories--differ in their accounts of
rationality, and in their specifications of the conditions under which
all rational persons would necessarily endorse the code of conduct
that therefore would count as morality. These definitions and theories
also differ in how they understand what it is to endorse a code in the
relevant way. Related to these differences, definitions of
"morality"--and moral theories--differ with
regard to those to whom morality applies: that is, those whose
behavior is subject to moral judgment. Some hold that morality applies
only to those rational beings that have certain specific features of
human beings: features that make it rational for them to endorse
morality. These features might, for example, include fallibility and
vulnerability. Other moral theories claim to put forward an account of
morality that provides a guide to all rational beings, even if these
beings do not have these human characteristics, e.g., God.



Among those who use "morality" normatively, virtually all
hold that "morality" refers to a code of conduct that
*applies to* all who can understand it and can govern their
behavior by it, though many hold that it *protects* a larger
group. Among such theorists it is also common to hold that morality
should never be overridden. That is, it is common to hold that no one
should ever violate a moral prohibition or requirement for non-moral
reasons. This claim is trivial if "should" is taken to
mean "morally should". So the claim about moral
overridingness is typically understood with "should"
meaning "rationally should", with the result that moral
requirements are asserted to be rational requirements. Though common,
this view is by no means always taken as definitional. Sidgwick (1874)
despaired of showing that rationality *required* us to choose
morality over egoism, though he certainly did not think rationality
required egoism either. More explicitly, Gert (2005) held that though
moral behavior is always rationally *permissible*, it is not
always rationally *required*. Foot (1972) seems to have held
that any reason--and therefore any rational requirement--to
act morally would have to stem from a contingent commitment or an
objective interest. And she also seems to have held that sometimes
neither of these sorts of reasons might be available, so that moral
behavior might not be rationally required for some agents. Finally,
moral realists who hold desire-based theories of reasons and formal,
means/end theories of rationality sometimes explicitly deny that moral
behavior is always even rationally *permissible* (Goldman
2009), and in fact this seems to be a consequence of Foot's view
as well, though she does not emphasize it.



Despite the fact that theorists such as Sidgwick, Gert, Foot, and
Goldman do not hold that moral behavior is rationally required, they
are by no means precluded from using "morality" in the
normative sense. Using "morality" in the normative sense,
and holding that there is such a thing, only entails holding that
rational people would put a certain system forward; it does not entail
holding that rational people would always be motivated to follow that
system themselves. But to the degree that a theorist would deny even
the claim about endorsement, and hold instead that rational people
might not only fail to act morally, but might even reject it as a
public system, that theorist is either not using
"morality" in a normative sense, or is denying the
existence of morality in that sense. Such a theorist may also be using
"morality" in a descriptive sense, or may not have any
particular sense in mind.



When "morality" is used in its normative sense, it need
not have either of the two formal features that are essential to
moralities referred to by the descriptive sense: that it be a code of
conduct that is put forward by a society, group, or individual, or
that it be accepted as a guide to behavior by the members of that
society or group, or by that individual. Indeed, it is possible that
morality, in the normative sense, has never been put forward by any
particular society, by any group at all, or even by any individual.
This is partly a consequence of the fact that "morality"
in the normative sense is understood in terms of a conditional that is
likely to be counterfactual: it is the code that would be endorsed by
any fully rational person under certain conditions.



If one is a moral realist, and one also acknowledges the descriptive
sense of "morality", one may require that descriptive
moralities at least approximate, in some ways, morality in the
normative sense. That is, one might claim that the guides to behavior
of some societies lack so many of the essential features of morality
in the normative sense, that it is incorrect to say that these
societies even have a morality in a descriptive sense. This is an
extreme view, however. A more moderate position would hold that all
societies have something that can be regarded as their morality, but
that many of these moralities--perhaps, indeed, all of
them--are defective. That is, a moral realist might hold that
although these actual guides to behavior have enough of the features
of normative morality to be classified as descriptive moralities, they
would not be endorsed in their entirety by all moral agents.



While moral realists do not claim that any actual society has or has
ever had morality as its actual guide to conduct, "natural
law" theories of morality claim that any rational person in any
society, even one that has a defective morality, is capable of knowing
what general kinds of actions morality prohibits, requires,
discourages, encourages, and allows. In the theological version of
natural law theories, such as that put forward by Aquinas, this is
because God implanted this knowledge in the reason of all persons. In
the secular version of natural law theories, such as that put forward
by Hobbes (1660), natural reason is sufficient to allow all rational
persons to know what morality prohibits, requires, etc. Natural law
theorists also claim that morality applies to all rational persons,
not only those now living, but also those who lived in the past.



In contrast to natural law theories, other moral theories do not hold
quite so strong a view about the universality of knowledge of
morality. Still, many hold that morality is known to all who can
legitimately be judged by it. Baier (1958), Rawls (1971) and
contractarians deny that there can be an *esoteric* morality:
one that judges people even though they cannot know what it prohibits,
requires, etc. For all of the above theorists, morality is what we can
call a *public system*: a system of norms (1) that is knowable
by all those to whom it applies and (2) that is not irrational for any
of those to whom it applies to follow (Gert 2005: 10). Moral judgments
of blame thus differ from legal or religious judgments of blame in
that they cannot be made about persons who are legitimately ignorant
of what they are required to do. Act consequentialists seem to hold
that everyone should know that they are morally required to act so as
to bring about the best consequences, but even they do not seem to
think judgments of moral blame are appropriate if a person is
legitimately ignorant of what action would bring about the best
consequences (Singer 1993: 228). Parallel views seem to be held by
rule consequentialists (Hooker 2001: 72).



The ideal situation for a legal system would be that it be a public
system. But in any large society this is not possible. Games are
closer to being public systems and most adults playing a game know its
rules, or they know that there are judges whose interpretation
determines what behavior the game prohibits, requires, etc. Although a
game is often a public system, its rules apply only to those playing
the game. If a person does not care enough about the game to abide by
the rules, she can usually quit. Morality is the one public system
that no rational person can quit. The fact that one cannot quit
morality means that one can do nothing to escape being legitimately
liable to sanction for violating its norms, except by ceasing to be a
moral agent. Morality applies to people simply by virtue of their
being rational persons who know what morality prohibits, requires,
etc., and being able to guide their behavior accordingly.



Public systems can be *formal* or *informal*. To say a
public system is informal is to say that it has no authoritative
judges and no decision procedure that provides a unique guide to
action in all situations, or that resolves all disagreements. To say
that a public system is formal is to say that it has one or both of
these things (Gert 2005: 9). Professional basketball is a formal
public system; all the players know that what the referees call a foul
determines what is a foul. Pickup basketball is an informal public
system. The existence of persistent moral disagreements shows that
morality is most plausibly regarded as an informal public system. This
is true even for such moral theories as the Divine Command theory and
act utilitarianism, inasmuch as there are no authoritative judges of
God's will, or of which act will maximize utility, and there are
no decision procedures for determining these things (Scanlon 2011:
261-2). When persistent moral disagreement is recognized, those
who understand that morality is an informal public system admit that
how one should act is morally unresolvable, and if some resolution is
required, the political or legal system can be used to resolve it.
These formal systems have the means to provide unique guides, but they
do not provide the uniquely correct moral guide to the action that
should be performed.



An important example of a moral problem left unsettled by the informal
public system of morality is whether fetuses are impartially protected
by morality and so whether or under what conditions abortions are
allowed. There is continuing disagreement among fully informed moral
agents about this moral question, even though the legal and political
system in the United States has provided fairly clear guidelines about
the conditions under which abortion is legally allowed. Despite this
important and controversial issue, morality, like all informal public
systems, presupposes agreement on how to act in most moral situations,
e.g., all agree that killing or seriously harming any moral agent
requires strong justification in order to be morally allowed. No one
thinks it is morally justified to cheat, deceive, injure, or kill a
moral agent simply in order to gain sufficient money to take a
fantastic vacation. Moral matters are often thought to be
controversial because everyday decisions, about which there is no
controversy, are rarely discussed. The amount of agreement concerning
what rules are moral rules, and on when it is justified to violate one
of these rules, explains why morality can be a public system even
though it is an informal system.



By using the notion of an informal public system, we can improve the
basic schema for definitions of "morality" in the
normative sense. The old schema was that morality is the *code*
that all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, would
endorse. The improved schema is that morality is the *informal
public system* that all rational persons, under certain specified
conditions, would endorse. Some theorists might not regard the
informal nature of the moral system as definitional, holding that
morality might give knowable precise answers to every question. This
would have the result that conscientious moral agents often cannot
know what morality permits, requires, or allows. Some philosophers
deny that this is a genuine possibility.



On any definition of "morality", whether descriptive or
normative, it is a code of conduct. However, on ethical- or
group-relativist accounts or on individualistic accounts--all of
which are best regarded as accounts of morality in the descriptive
sense--morality often has no special content that distinguishes
it from nonmoral codes of conduct, such as law or religion. Just as a
legal code of conduct can have almost any content, as long as it is
capable of guiding behavior, and a religious code of conduct has no
limits on content, most relativist and individualist accounts of
morality place few limits on the content of a moral code. Of course,
actual codes do have certain minimal limits--otherwise the
societies they characterize would lack the minimum required degree of
social cooperation required to sustain their existence over time. On
the other hand, for moral realists who explicitly hold that morality
is an informal public system that all rational persons would put
forward for governing the behavior of all moral agents, it has a
fairly definite content. Hobbes (1660), Mill (1861), and most other
non-religiously influenced philosophers in the Anglo-American
tradition limit morality to behavior that, directly or indirectly,
affects others.



The claim that morality only governs behavior that affects others is
somewhat controversial, and so probably should not be counted as
definitional of morality, even if it turns out to be entailed by the
correct moral theory. Some have claimed that morality also governs
behavior that affects only the agent herself, such as taking
recreational drugs, masturbation, and not developing one's
talents. Kant (1785) may provide an account of this wide concept of
morality. Interpreted this way, Kant's theory still fits the
basic schema, but includes these self-regarding moral requirements
because of the particular account of rationality he employs. However,
*pace* Kant, it is doubtful that all moral agents would put
forward a universal guide to behavior that governs behavior that does
not affect them at all. Indeed, when the concept of morality is
completely distinguished from religion, moral rules do seem to limit
their content to behavior that directly or indirectly causes or risks
harm to others. Some behavior that seems to affect only oneself, e.g.,
taking recreational drugs, may have a significant indirect harmful
effect on others by supporting the illegal and harmful activity of
those who benefit from the sale of those drugs.



Confusion about the content of morality sometimes arises because
morality is not distinguished sufficiently from religion. Regarding
self-affecting behavior as governed by morality is supported by the
idea that we are created by God and are obliged to obey God's
commands, and so may be a holdover from the time when morality was not
clearly distinguished from religion. This religious holdover might
also affect the claim that some sexual practices such as homosexuality
are immoral. Those who clearly distinguish morality from religion
typically do not regard sexual orientation as a moral matter.



It is possible to hold that having a certain sort of social goal is
definitional of morality (Frankena 1963). Stephen Toulmin (1950) took
it to be the harmony of society. Baier (1958) took it to be "the
good of everyone alike". Utilitarians sometimes claim it is the
production of the greatest good. Gert (2005) took it to be the
lessening of evil or harm. This latter goal may seem to be a
significant narrowing of the utilitarian claim, but utilitarians
always include the lessening of harm as essential to producing the
greatest good and almost all of their examples involve the avoiding or
preventing of harm. It is notable that the paradigm cases of moral
rules are those that prohibit causing harm directly or indirectly,
such as rules prohibiting killing, causing pain, deceiving, and
breaking promises. Even those precepts that require or encourage
positive action, such as helping the needy, are almost always related
to preventing or relieving harms, rather than promoting goods such as
pleasure.



Among the views of moral realists, differences in content are less
significant than similarities. For all such philosophers, morality
prohibits actions such as killing, causing pain, deceiving, and
breaking promises. For some, morality also requires charitable
actions, but failure to act charitably on every possible occasion does
not require justification in the same way that any act of killing,
causing pain, deceiving, and breaking promises requires justification.
Both Kant (1785) and Mill (1861) distinguish between duties of perfect
obligation and duties of imperfect obligation and regard not harming
as the former kind of duty and helping as the latter kind of duty. For
Gert (2005), morality encourages charitable action, but does not
require it; it is always morally good to be charitable, but it is not
immoral not to be charitable.



Even if the plausible basic schema for definitions of
"morality" in the normative sense is accepted, one's
understanding of what morality is, in this sense, will still depend
very significantly on how one understands rationality. As has already
been mentioned, morality, in the normative sense, is sometimes taken
to prohibit certain forms of consensual sexual activity, or the use of
recreational drugs. But including such prohibitions in an account of
morality as a universal guide that all rational persons would put
forward requires a very particular view of rationality. After all,
many will deny that it is irrational to favor harmless consensual
sexual activities, or to favor the use of certain drugs for purely
recreational purposes.



One concept of rationality that supports the exclusion of sexual
matters, at least at the basic level, from the norms of morality, is
that for an action to count as irrational it must be an act that harms
oneself without producing a compensating benefit for
someone--perhaps oneself, perhaps someone else. Such an account
of rationality might be called "hybrid", since it gives
different roles to self-interest and to altruism. An account of
morality based on the hybrid concept of rationality could agree with
Hobbes (1660) that morality is concerned with promoting people living
together in peace and harmony, which includes obeying the rules
prohibiting causing harm to others. Although moral prohibitions
against actions that cause harm or significantly increase the risk of
harm are not absolute, in order to avoid acting immorally,
justification is always needed when violating these prohibitions. Kant
(1797) seems to hold that it is never justified to violate some of
these prohibitions, e.g., the prohibition against lying. This is
largely a result of the fact that Kant's (1785) concept of
rationality is purely formal, in contrast with the hybrid concept of
rationality described above.



Most moral realists who offer moral theories do not bother to offer
anything like a definition of morality. Instead, what these
philosophers offer is a theory of the nature and justification of a
set of norms with which they take their audience already to be
acquainted. In effect, they tacitly pick morality out by reference to
certain salient and relative uncontroversial bits of its content: that
it prohibits killing, stealing, deceiving, cheating, and so on. In
fact, this would not be a bad way of defining morality, if the point
of such a definition were only to be relatively theory-neutral, and to
allow theorizing to begin. We could call it "the
reference-fixing definition" or "the substantive
definition" (see Prinz and Nichols 2010: 122).



Some, including Hare (1952, 1963), have been tempted to argue against
the possibility of a substantive definition of morality, on the basis
of the claim that moral disapproval is an attitude that can be
directed at anything whatsoever. Foot (1958a, 1958b), argued against
this idea, but the substantive definition still has the drawback is
that it does not, somehow, seem to get at the essence of morality. One
might suggest that the substantive definition has the advantage of
including Divine Command theories of morality, while such theories
might seem to make trouble for definitions based on the plausible
schema given above. But it is plausible to hold that Divine Command
theories rest on Natural Law theories, which do in fact fit the
schema. Divine Command theories that do not rest on Natural Law might
make trouble for the schema, but one might also think that such
theories rest instead on a confusion, since they seem to entail that
God might have made it immoral to act beneficently.


## 5. Variations



As one gives more substance and detail to the general notions of
endorsement, rationality, and the relevant conditions under which
rational people would endorse morality, one moves further from
providing a definition of morality in the normative sense, and closer
to providing an actual moral theory. And a similar claim is true for
definitions of morality in the descriptive sense, as one specifies in
more detail what one means in claiming that a person or group endorses
a system or code. In the following four subsections, four broad ways
of making the definitions of morality more precise are presented. They
are all sufficiently schematic to be regarded as varieties of
definition, rather than as theories.


### 5.1 Morality as linked to norms for responses to behavior



Expressivists about morality do not take there to be any objective
content to morality that could underwrite what we above called
"the substantive definition". Rather, they explicitly
recognize the existence of significant variation in what rules and
ideals different people put forward as morality in the normative
sense. And they doubt that this variation is compatible with moral
realism. Consequently, they need to offer some unifying features of
these different sets of rules and ideals, despite variation in their
content. As a result of this pressure, some expressivists end up
offering explicit accounts of a *distinctively* moral attitude
one might hold towards an act token or type. These accounts can of
course be taken to underwrite various forms of morality in the
descriptive sense. But they can also be taken to provide the basis of
one form of moral realism.



To see how an expressivist view can be co-opted by a moral realist of
a certain sort, consider Allan Gibbard's (1990) moral
expressivism. Gibbard holds that moral judgments are expressions of
the acceptance of norms for feeling the emotions of guilt and anger.
One can accept Gibbard's view of what it is to endorse a moral
claim without accepting the view that, in conflicts, all disagreements
are faultless. That is, even a moral realist can use Gibbard's
view of the nature of moral judgment, and extract from it a definition
of morality. Used by such a theorist, Gibbard's view entails
that morality, in the normative sense, is the code that is picked out
by the *correct* set of norms for feeling guilt and anger: that
is, the norms a *rational* person would endorse. This is
equivalent to accepting the plausible general schema for a definition
of "morality" given above, and understanding endorsement
in a special sense. To endorse a code in the relevant way, on this
definition, is to think that violations of its norms make guilt and
anger appropriate.



Closely related to Gibbard's account is one according to which
the norms of relevance are not norms for the emotions, but are norms
for other reactions to behavior. For example, a person's
morality might be the set of rules and ideals they regard as picked
out by appropriate norms for praise and blame, and other social
sanctions (Sprigge 1964: 317). In fact, reference to praise and blame
may be more adequate than reference to guilt and anger, since the
latter seem only to pick out moral prohibitions, and not to make room
for the idea that morality also recommends or encourages certain
behaviors even if it does not require them. For example, it is
plausible that there is such a thing as supererogatory action, and
that the specification of what counts as supererogatory is part of
morality--whether in the descriptive or normative sense. But it
does not seem likely that we can account for this part of morality by
appeal to norms for guilt and anger, and it is not at all clear that
there are emotions that are as closely linked to supererogation as
guilt and anger are to moral transgression. On the other hand, it
seems plausible that norms for praising action might help to pick out
what counts as supererogatory.



Another version of the present strategy would replace talk of praise
and blame with talk of reward and punishment. This view would take
morality to be a system that explained what kinds of actions are
appropriately rewarded and--more centrally--punished. This
sort of view, which remains closely related to Gibbard's
suggestion, can also be regarded as fitting the general schema given
above. On this view, the notion of endorsing a code is unpacked in
terms of the acceptance of norms for reward and punishment. Skorupski
(1993), following Mill (1861), advocates a definition of morality
along these lines, though he then understands punishment primarily in
terms of blame, and understands blame as very closely linked to
emotion--indeed, merely having the emotion can count as
blaming--so that the resulting view is similar to Gibbard's
in one important way, at least when one focuses on moral
wrongness.



It is certainly plausible that it is appropriate to feel guilt when
one acts immorally, and to feel anger at those who act immorally
towards those one cares about. It is even plausible that it is
*only* appropriate, in some particular sense of
"appropriate", to feel guilt and anger in connection with
moral transgressions. So norms for guilt and anger may well uniquely
pick out certain moral norms. And similar claims might be made about
norms for praise and blame. However, it is not equally clear that
morality is properly *defined* in terms of emotions or other
reactions to behavior. For it may be, as Skorupski emphasizes, that we
need to understand guilt and anger, and praise and blame, in terms of
moral concepts. This worry about direction of explanation seems less
pressing for the notions of reward and punishment. These responses to
behavior, at least *in themselves*, might simply be understood
in terms of the meting out of benefits and harms. Of course they will
only *count as reward and punishment* when they are linked to
someone's having followed or violated a rule that all rational
people would want to see enforced by such responses.


### 5.2 Morality as linked to advocacy of a code



One way of understanding the notion of endorsement is as advocacy.
Advocating a code is a second- or third-personal matter, since one
advocates a code to others. Moreover, it is consistent with advocating
a code, that one does not plan on following that code oneself. Just as
asserting something one believes to be false still counts as asserting
it, hypocritical advocacy of a code still counts as advocacy of that
code. When endorsement is understood as advocacy, it can be used in
definitions of morality, in the descriptive sense, as long as it is
the morality of a group or society. And advocacy can also be used as
an interpretation of endorsement when providing a definition of
morality in the normative sense. Of course those who accept a
definition of morality in any of these senses--as the code that a
group or society endorses, or as the code that would be universally
advocated by all rational agents under certain conditions--do not
hold that the advocacy would necessarily, or even probably, be
hypocritical. But they do hold that the important thing about a moral
code--what picks it out as a moral code--is that it would be
*put forward* by all the relevant agents, not that it would be
*followed* by all of them. The notion of advocacy has less of a
place in a descriptive account of a single person's morality,
since when someone is hypocritical we often deny that they really hold
the moral view that they advocate.



Mill (1861), in addition to offering a moral theory, takes pains to
explain how morality differs from other normative systems. For him,
norms that simply promote utility are norms of expediency. In order to
qualify as morally wrong, an act must be one that ought to be
punished. Thinking that an act of a certain kind ought to be punished
is a third-personal matter, so it seems plausible to put Mill's
view of what is definitional of morality into the category being
discussed in this section. It is worth noting that hypocrisy is, for
Mill, not only a possibility, but--given the present sorry state
of moral education--virtually unavoidable. That is because being
motivated to advocate punishment for a certain kind of act is quite
different from being motivated to refrain from that same kind of act.
Advocating punishment for a certain kind of act might be one's
utility-maximizing choice, while actually performing that kind of act
(trying, of course, to avoid detection) might also be
utility-maximizing. And for Mill what determines what a person will
advocate, and how a person will act, are the foreseeable consequences
*for that person*.



Bernard Gert's (2005) moral view also operates with a definition
of morality that understands endorsement as advocacy, in the sense of
putting forward as a guide for all rational agents. Gert offers the
following two conditions as those under which all rational persons
would put forward a universal guide for governing the behavior of all
moral agents. The first condition is that they are seeking agreement
with all other rational persons or moral agents. The second condition
is that they use only those beliefs that are shared by all rational
persons: for example, that they themselves are fallible and vulnerable
and that all those to whom morality applies are also fallible and
vulnerable. The second condition rules out both religious beliefs and
scientific beliefs since there are no religious beliefs or scientific
beliefs that all rational persons share. This condition is plausible
because no universal guide to behavior that applies to all rational
persons can be based on beliefs that some of these rational persons do
not share.


### 5.3 Morality as linked to acceptance of a code



Another way of understanding the notion of endorsement is as
acceptance. Unlike advocating a code, accepting a code is a
first-personal matter. It might include intending to conform
one's own behavior to that code, feeling guilty when one does
not, and so on. One cannot hypocritically accept a code. Indeed,
hypocrisy is simply a matter of advocating a code one does not accept.
So this notion of endorsement is available to someone who is trying to
provide a definition of morality in the descriptive sense, even when
considering a single person's morality.



Paradigmatic views in the natural law tradition starting with Aquinas
hold both that the laws of morality have their source in God, and that
these laws constitute the principles of human practical rationality
(Finnis 1980; MacIntyre 1999). Views in this tradition may be seen as
using the basic schema for definitions of morality in the normative
sense, understanding endorsement as acceptance. Members of this
tradition typically hold that all rational persons know what kinds of
actions morality prohibits, requires, discourages, encourages, and
allows. It is central to Aquinas's view that morality is known
to all those whose behavior is subject to moral judgment, even if they
do not know of the revelations of Christianity. This is why Aquinas
holds that knowing what morality prohibits and requires does not
involve knowing why morality prohibits and requires what it does.



Those who belong to the natural law tradition also hold that reason
endorses acting morally. This sort of endorsement of course has a
cognitive component. But it is also motivational. Aquinas does not
hold that knowledge of morality is always effective: it can be blotted
out by evil persuasions or corrupt habits. But if reason is not
opposed by such forces, any rational person would not only know what
was prohibited and required by morality, but would follow those
prohibitions and requirements. So, for natural law theorists,
endorsement amounts to acceptance.


### 5.4 Morality as linked to justification to others



The lack of an explicit and widely accepted definition of morality may
partially explain the resilience of act-consequentialist accounts of
morality. Without an explicit definition, it may be easier to ignore
the fact that act-consequentialist theories are not particularly
concerned with interpersonal interactions, but typically apply just as
well to desert island scenarios as to individuals who live in
societies. In any case, it has been recognized that in order to combat
consequentialism, it would be helpful to have something like a
plausible definition of morality that made it clear that the subject
matter of morality is something different from simply the goodness and
badness of consequences. T.M. Scanlon (1982, 1998), applying this
strategy, suggests that the subject matter of morality--what we
are talking about, when we talk about morality--is a system of
rules for the regulation of behavior that is not reasonably rejectable
based on a desire for informed unforced general agreement.



Scanlon's suggestion regarding the subject matter of morality
can easily be seen as an instance of the general schema given above.
His "system of rules" is a specific kind of informal
public system; he understands endorsement by all rational people as
non-rejection by all reasonable people; and he offers a specific
account of the conditions under which moral agents would reach the
relevant agreement. But Scanlon also places very heavy emphasis on the
fact that if he is right about the subject matter of morality, then
what compliance with moral norms allows us to do is to justify our
behavior to others in ways that they cannot reasonably reject. Indeed,
the ability to justify ourselves to reasonable people is a primary
source of moral motivation for Scanlon (see also Sprigge 1964: 319).
This might seem to suggest a somewhat different definitional claim
about morality: that morality consists in the most basic norms in
terms of which we justify ourselves to others. But it is plausible
that this purportedly definitional claim is better thought of as a
corollary of Scanlon's particular version of the general schema,
with endorsement understood as non-rejection. For, if morality is the
system of norms that would be endorsed in this way, we can justify our
actions to others by pointing out that even they, were they
reasonable, would have endorsed rules that allowed our behavior.



Stephen Darwall's (2006) moral view can also be seen as flowing
from a version of the general schema, and yielding claims about
justifiability to others. Darwall claims that morality is a matter of equal accountability among free and rational beings. On his view, I
behave morally towards you to the degree that I respect the claims you
have authority to make on me. Darwall also holds that I will respect
those claims if I acknowledge certain assumptions to which I am
committed simply in virtue of being a rational, deliberating agent. As
a result, his view is that morality--or at least the morality of
obligation--is a "scheme of accountability" (a
certain sort of informal public system) that all rational people will
endorse. Unlike Scanlon's view, however, Darwall's view
makes use of a stronger sense of endorsement than non-rejection.
Specifically, it includes the recognition of the reasons provided by
the authoritative demands of other people. And that recognition is
positively motivational.



Both Scanlon's and Darwall's views emphasize the social
nature of morality, taken in the normative sense: Scanlon, by
reference to justification to others; Darwall, by appeal to the
relevance of second-personal reasons. But Darwall builds a
responsiveness to second-personal reasons into the relevant notion of
rationality, while Scanlon simply makes the empirical claim that many
people are motivated by a desire to justify themselves to others, and
notes that his definition of morality will yield rules that will allow
one to do this, if one follows them. The sort of definition described
in
 section 5.1
 also makes the social nature of morality essential to it, since it
centrally features the notion of a response to the behavior of others.
The definitions described in sections
 5.2
 and
 5.3
 do not *entail* the social nature of morality, since it is
possible to accept, and even to advocate, a code that concerns only
self-regarding behavior. But on any plausible account of rationality a
code that would be advocated by all moral agents will govern
interpersonal interactions, and will include rules that prohibit
causing harm without sufficient reason. Only the definition offered in
 section 5.3
 therefore can be taken as realistically compatible with an egoistic
morality.