## 1. Terminology



The English word "character" is derived from the Greek
*charakter,* which was originally used of a mark
impressed upon a coin. Later and more generally,
"character" came to mean a distinctive mark by which one
thing was distinguished from others, and then primarily to mean the
assemblage of qualities that distinguish one individual from another.
In modern usage, this emphasis on distinctiveness or individuality
tends to merge "character" with "personality."
We might say, for example, when thinking of a person's
idiosyncratic mannerisms, social gestures, or habits of dress, that
"he has personality" or that "he's quite a
character."



As the Introduction above has suggested, however, the philosophical
use of the word "character" has a different linguistic
history. At the beginning of Book II of the *Nicomachean
Ethics*, Aristotle tells us that there are two different kinds of
human excellences, excellences of thought and excellences of
character. His phrase for excellences of character -
*ethikai aretai* - we usually translate as
"moral virtue(s)" or "moral excellence(s)."
The Greek *ethikos* (ethical) is the adjective cognate
with *ethos* (character). When we speak of a moral virtue
or an excellence of character, the emphasis is not on mere
distinctiveness or individuality, but on the combination of qualities
that make an individual the sort of ethically admirable person he
is.



This entry will discuss "moral character" in the Greek
sense of having or lacking moral virtue. If someone lacks virtue, she
may have any of several moral vices, or she may be characterized by a
condition somewhere in between virtue and vice, such as continence or
incontinence.


## 2. Some ancient Greek views


### 2.1 Why character matters



The views of moral character held by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and
the Stoics are the starting point for most other philosophical
discussions of character. Although these ancient moralists differed on
some issues about virtue, it makes sense to begin with some points of
similarity. These points of similarity will show why the Greek
moralists thought it was important to discuss character.



Many of Plato's dialogues (especially the early or so-called
"Socratic" dialogues) examine the nature of virtue and the
character of a virtuous person. They often begin by having Socrates
ask his interlocutors to explain what a particular virtue is. In
reply, the interlocutors usually offer behavioral accounts of the
virtues. For example, at the beginning of Plato's
*Laches* the character Laches suggests that courage consists of
standing one's ground in battle. In the *Charmides*,
Charmides suggests that temperance consists in acting quietly. In the
*Republic*, Cephalus suggests that justice consists in giving
back what one has borrowed. In each of these cases, Plato has Socrates
reply in the same way. In the *Republic* Socrates explains that
giving back what one has borrowed cannot be what justice is, for there
are cases where giving back what one has borrowed would be foolish,
and the just person recognizes that it is foolish. If the person from
whom you have borrowed a sword goes mad, it would be foolish for you
to return the sword, for you are then putting yourself and others in
danger. The implication is that the just person can recognize when it
is reasonable to return what he has borrowed. Similarly, as Socrates
explains in the *Laches*, standing firm in battle cannot be
courage, for sometimes standing firm in battle is simply a foolish
endurance that puts oneself and others at needless risk. The
courageous person can recognize when it is reasonable to stand his
ground in battle and when it isn't.



The trouble one encounters in trying to give a purely behavioral
account of virtue explains why the Greek moralists turn to character
to explain what virtue is. It may be true that most of us can
recognize that it would be foolish to risk our lives and the lives of
others to secure a trivial benefit, and that most of us can see that
it is unjust to harm others to secure power and wealth for our own
comfort. We don't have to be virtuous to recognize these things.
But the Greek moralists think it takes someone of good moral character
to determine with regularity and reliability what actions are
appropriate and reasonable in fearful situations and that it takes
someone of good moral character to determine with regularity and
reliability how and when to secure goods and resources for himself and
others. This is why Aristotle states in *Nicomachean Ethics*
II.9 that it is not easy to define in rules which actions deserve
moral praise and blame, and that these matters require the judgment of
the virtuous person.


### 2.2 Virtue and happiness



Most of the Greek moralists think that, if we are rational, we aim at
living well (*eu zen*) or happiness
(*eudaimonia*). Living well or happiness is our ultimate end in
that a conception of happiness serves to organize our various
subordinate ends, by indicating the relative importance of our ends
and by indicating how they should fit together into some rational
overall scheme. So the Stoics identify happiness with "living
coherently" (*homologoumenos zen*), and
Aristotle says that happiness is "perfect" or
"complete" (*teleios*) and something distinctively
human. When we are living well, our life is worthy of imitation and
praise. For, according to the Greek moralists, that we are happy says
something about us and about what we have achieved, not simply about
the fortunate circumstances in which we find ourselves. So they argue
that happiness cannot consist simply in "external goods"
or "goods of fortune," for these goods are external to our
own choosing and deciding. Whatever happiness is, it must take account
of the fact that a happy life is one lived by rational agents who act
and who are not simply victims of their circumstances.



The Greek moralists conclude that a happy life must give a prominent
place to the exercise of virtue, for virtuous traits of character are
stable and enduring and are not products of fortune, but of learning
or cultivation. Moreover, virtuous traits of character are excellences
of the human being in that they are the best exercise of reason, which
is the activity characteristic of human beings. In this way, the Greek
philosophers claim, virtuous activity completes or perfects human
life.


### 2.3 Some Greek disagreements about virtue



Although the Greek philosophers agree that happiness requires virtue
and hence that a happy person must have virtuous traits of character
such as wisdom, bravery, temperance, and justice, they disagree about
how to understand these traits. As explained in Section 2.1 above,
several of Plato's dialogues criticize the view that virtues are
merely tendencies to act in particular ways. Bravery requires more
than standing up against threats to oneself and others. Bravery also
requires recognizing when standing up to these threats is reasonable
and appropriate, and it requires acting on one's recognition.
This led the Greek moralists to conclude that virtuous traits of
character have two aspects: (a) a behavioral aspect - doing
particular kinds of action and (b) a psychological aspect -
having the right motives, aims, concerns, and perspective. The Greek
philosophers disagree mostly about what (b) involves. In particular,
they differ about the role played in virtuous traits of character by
cognitive states (e.g., knowledge and belief) on the one hand and
affective states (e.g., desires, feelings, and emotions) on the other.
Socrates and the Stoics argued that only cognitive states were
necessary for virtue, whereas Plato and Aristotle argued that both
cognitive and affective states were necessary.


#### Socrates (469-399 BCE)



In Plato's *Protagoras*, Socrates seems to identify
happiness with pleasure and to explain the various virtues as
instrumental means to pleasure. On this view (later revived by
Epicurus, 341-271 BCE), having a virtuous character is purely a
matter of being knowledgeable of what brings us more pleasure rather
than less. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates recognizes that most
people object to this view. The "many" suppose that having
a virtuous character requires more than knowledge, because knowledge
does not guarantee that one will act on one's knowledge and do
the virtuous action. Someone may be overcome by anger, fear, lust, and
other desires, and act against what he believes will bring him more
pleasure rather than less. He can, in other words, be incontinent or
weak-willed. Socrates replies that such cases should be understood
differently. When, for example, a cowardly person flees from battle
rather than endanger his life, even though he may seem to be pursuing
the more pleasant action, he is really just ignorant of the greater
pleasure to be achieved by entering battle and acting bravely. In
other words, incontinence is not possible, according to Socrates. 


#### Plato (428-347 BCE)



The "many"'s worry about the inadequacy of knowledge
to ensure virtuous action suggests that virtuous character includes
not only a cognitive element, but also some affective element. Both
Plato and Aristotle argue that virtuous character requires a
distinctive combination of cognitive and affective elements. In the
*Republic*, Plato divides the soul into three parts and gives
to each a different kind of desire (rational, appetitive, or
spirited). As types of non-rational desire, appetitive and spirited
desires can conflict with our rational desires about what contributes
to our overall good, and they will sometimes move us to act in ways we
recognize to be against our greater good. When that happens, we are
incontinent. To be virtuous, then, we must both understand what
contributes to our overall good and have our spirited and appetitive
desires educated properly, so that they agree with the guidance
provided by the rational part of the soul. Plato describes the
education of the non-rational parts of the soul in Books II and III of
the *Republic*. A potentially virtuous person learns when young
to love and take pleasure in virtuous actions, but must wait until
late in life to develop the understanding that explains why what he
loves is good. Once he has learned what the good is, his informed love
of the good explains why he acts as he does and why his actions are
virtuous. 


### 2.4 Aristotle (384-322 BCE)



Aristotle accepts Plato's division of the soul into two basic
parts (rational and non-rational) and agrees that both parts
contribute to virtuous character. Of all the Greek moralists,
Aristotle provides the most psychologically insightful account of
virtuous character. Because many modern philosophical treatments of
character (see Sections 3 and 4 below) are indebted to
Aristotle's analysis, it is best to discuss his position in some
detail.


#### Aristotle's definition of good moral character



Aristotle defines virtuous character in *Nicomachean Ethics*
II.6: 



> 
> Excellence [of character], then, is a state concerned with choice,
> lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in
> the way in which the man of practical wisdom (*phronimos*)
> would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which
> depends on excess and that which depends on defect.
> (1106b36-1107a3)
> 



By calling excellence of character a state, Aristotle means that it is
neither a feeling nor a capacity nor a mere tendency to behave in
specific ways. Rather it is the settled condition we are in when we
are well off in relation to feelings and actions. We are well off in
relation to our feelings and actions when we are in a mean or
intermediate state in regard to them. If, on the other hand, we have a
vicious character, we are badly off in relation to feelings and
actions, and we fail to hit the mean in regard to them.



So it is not easy to hit the mean. "Anyone can get angry -
that is easy - or give or spend money; but to do this to the
right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right
aim, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it
easy." That is why goodness is praiseworthy (*epaineton*)
and fine (*kalon*) (*Nicomachean Ethics*
1109a26-30).


#### Virtue as a mean state



Aristotle emphasizes that the mean state is not an arithmetic mean,
but one relative to the situation. The different particular virtues
provide illustrations of what Aristotle means. Each virtue is set over
or concerned with specific feelings or actions. The virtue of mildness
or good temper, for example, is concerned with anger. Aristotle thinks
that a mild person ought to be angry about some things (e.g.,
injustice and other forms of mistreatment) and should be willing to
stand up for himself and those he cares about. Not to do so would, in
Aristotle's view, indicate the morally deficient character of
the inirascible person. It would also be inappropriate to take offense
and get angry if there is nothing worth getting angry about. That
response would indicate the morally excessive character of the
irascible person. The mild person's reactions are appropriate to
the situation. Sometimes intense anger is appropriate; at other times
calm detachment is. 


#### The psychological unity of the virtuous person and the disunity of non-virtuous conditions



That the virtuous person's emotional responses are appropriate
to the situation indicates that her emotional responses are in harmony
with her correct reasoning about what to do. Aristotle says that the
non-rational part of a virtuous person's soul "speaks with
the same voice" (*homophonei*, *Nicomachean
Ethics* 1102b28) as the rational part. That the virtuous
person's soul is unified and not torn by conflict distinguishes
the state of being virtuous from various non-virtuous conditions such
as continence (*enkrateia*), incontinence (*akrasia*),
and vice (*kakia*) in general. 



Aristotle seems to think that, at bottom, any non-virtuous person is
plagued by inner doubt or conflict, even if on the surface she appears
to be as psychologically unified as virtuous people. Although a
vicious person may appear to be single-minded about her disdain for
justice and her pursuit of material goods and power, she must seek out
others' company to forget or ignore her own actions. Aristotle
seems to have this point in mind when he says of vicious people in
*Nicomachean Ethics* IX.4 that they are at odds with themselves
and do not love themselves. Virtuous persons, on the other hand, enjoy
who they are and take pleasure in acting virtuously.



Like the morally vicious person, the continent and incontinent persons
are internally conflicted, but they are more aware of their inner
turmoil than the morally vicious person. Continence is essentially a
kind of self-mastery: the continent person recognizes what she should
do and does it, but to do so she must struggle against the pull of
recalcitrant feelings. The incontinent person also in some way knows
what she should do, but she fails to do it because of recalcitrant
feelings.



Aristotle's position on incontinence seems to incorporate both
Socratic and Platonic elements. Recall that Socrates had explained
apparently incontinent behavior as the result of ignorance of what
leads to the good. Since, he thought, everyone desires the good and
aims at it in his actions, no one would intentionally choose a course
of action believed to yield less good overall. Plato, on the other
hand, argued that incontinence can occur when a person's
non-rational desires move him to act in ways not endorsed by his
rational desire for the greater good. Aristotle seems to agree with
Socrates that the cognitive state of the incontinent person is
defective at the moment of incontinent behavior, but he also agrees
with Plato that a person's non-rational desires cause the
incontinent action. This may be what Aristotle means when he writes
that "the position that Socrates sought to establish actually
seems to result; for it is not what is thought to be knowledge proper
that the passion overcomes ... but perceptual knowledge"
(*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1147b14-17).


#### Moral education and the human function



Because Aristotle thinks that virtue is a unified, unconflicted state
where emotional responses and rational assessments speak with the same
voice, he, like Plato, thinks that the education of our emotional
responses is crucial for the development of virtuous character. If our
emotional responses are educated properly, we will learn to take
pleasure or pain in the right things. Like Plato, Aristotle thinks
that we can take a person's pleasures and pains to be a sign of
his state of character. 



To explain what the virtuous person's pleasures are like,
Aristotle returns to the idea that virtue is an excellent state of the
person. Virtue is the state that makes a human being good and makes
him perform his function well (*Nicomachean Ethics*
1106a15-24). His function (his *ergon* or characteristic
activity) is rational activity, so when we exercise our fully
developed rational powers well, when we realize our nature as rational
beings, we are good (virtuous) human beings and live well (we are
happy) (*Nicomachean Ethics*, I.7). 



According to Aristotle, human beings can reason in ways that non-human
animals cannot. They can deliberate about what to do, about what kind
of lives to live, about what sort of persons to be. They can look for
reasons to act or live one way rather than another. In other words,
they can engage in practical reasoning. They can also think about the
nature of the world and why it seems to behave as it does. They can
consider scientific and metaphysical truths about the universe. This
is to engage in theoretical reasoning ("contemplation" or
*theoria*). There is no agreement among scholars as to
whether, and how, these types of reasoning can be distinguished. (For
a discussion of theoretical and practical reason in Aristotle, see the
related entry on
 Aristotle's ethics.)
 But as we shall see when we discuss Aristotle's
*Politics*, we can assume, for the purposes of this discussion,
that theoretical and practical rational activity are at least related
types of rational activity, in that each involves exercising
one's abilities to think and to know and to consider truths that
one has figured out.



How do one realize these powers fully? Not by becoming adept at every
kind of activity in which deliberating and judging on the basis of
reason is called for. For then one would have to master every kind of
cultural, scientific, and philosophical activity. Rather,
Aristotle's idea is that an individual develops these abilities
to the extent that he enjoys and values the exercise of his realized
rational powers in a wide variety of different and even seemingly
unconnected activities. When that happens, his exercise of these
abilities is a continuing source of self-esteem and enjoyment. He
comes to like his life and himself and is now a genuine self-lover
(*Nicomachean Ethics* 1168b28-1169a3).



In *Nicomachean Ethics*) IX.8, Aristotle clarifies the motives
and reasoning of virtuous people by contrasting genuine self-love with
a defective type that is reproachable. People with reproachable
self-love want most to have the biggest share of money, honors, and
bodily pleasures (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* I.5). Because one
person cannot have a big share without denying these goods to others,
these are the goods that are contested and fought over. This
competitive approach to these external goods leads to all sorts of
morally vicious behavior, for example, overreaching
(*pleonexia*), aggression, wasteful luxury, intemperance,
boastfulness, and vanity. In contrast to reproachable self-lovers,
genuine self-lovers will take pleasure in the right things (they will
enjoy the exercise of their deliberative and decision-making powers
rather than the accumulation of wealth or power). As a result, they
will avoid many of the actions, and will be unattracted to many of the
pleasures, of the common vices. Because they have the proper attitude
toward external goods, they will be ready to sacrifice such goods if
by doing so they achieve what is fine. They recognize that when
everyone concentrates on doing what is fine, their actions promote the
common good (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1169a6). The virtuous
person's reasoning reflects his correct conception of how to
live (he has *phronesis* or practical wisdom) and his
concern for the fine: he sees that his own good is included in the
good of the community (*Nicomachean Ethics*
1169a3-6).


#### The need for relationships and community



Because an individual's good is included in the good of
community, the full realization of an individual's rational
powers is not something he can achieve or maintain on his own. It is
hard, Aristotle says in *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9, for a
solitary person to be continuously active, but it is easier with
others. To realize our powers fully we need at least a group of
companions who share our interests and with whom we can cooperate to
achieve our mutually recognized goals. In this kind of cooperative
activity, we are parts of a larger enterprise, so that when others
act, it is as though we are acting, too. In this way, these activities
expand our conception of who "we" are, and they make the
use of our powers more continuous and more stable. Examples listed by
Aristotle include sailors on a ship, soldiers on an expedition,
members of families, business relationships, religious associations,
citizens of a political community, and colleagues engaged in
contemplative activity. As Aristotle explains in *Rhetoric*
II.4, if we and our cooperative partners do their parts responsibly,
each will develop feelings of friendship for the others involved. In
this way, successful cooperative activity transforms persons'
desires and motivations. Although we may have initiated activity for
self-interested reasons, the psychological result is that we come to
like our cooperative partners and to develop a concern for their good
for their own sakes. This change, Aristotle indicates, is caused to
occur in us. It is not chosen. Once bonds of friendship are formed, it
is natural for us to exhibit the social virtues Aristotle describes in
*Nicomachean Ethics* IV.6-8, which include generosity,
friendliness, and mildness of temper. 



Aristotle thinks that, in addition to friendships, wider social
relations are required for the full development of our rational
powers. He says in *Nicomachean Ethics* I.7 that we are by
nature political beings, whose capacities are fully realized in a
specific kind of political community (a *polis* or city-state).
Aristotle's ideal political community is led by citizens who
recognize the value of living fully active lives and whose aim is to
make the best life possible for their fellow citizens, thereby
promoting the common good (*Politics* 1278b19-26, cf.
1280b8-12). When citizens deliberate and legislate about the
community's educational, office-holding, and economic policies,
their goal is to determine and promote the conditions under which
citizens can fully develop their deliberative and decision-making
powers (*Politics* 1332b12-41).



Thus Aristotle recommends in *Politics* VII-VIII that the city
provide a system of public education for all citizens, a
recommendation that was radical for his time. He envisions that young
people will learn not simply to read and write, but also to appreciate
the beauty of the world around them and to gain some understanding of
how the universe works. If education is successful, young people will
want to use their powers in deciding, judging, and discriminating.
They will then be well-positioned to take their place as
decision-makers in the citizen assembly and judicial system and,
because of sortition and a system of office rotation, as eventual
holders of public office. The city's economic policies support
the aim of the political and educational institutions. Because
Aristotle sees that citizens need material resources if they are to
participate fully in public life, he recommends that the state
distribute parcels of land to all. Yet there is no need, in his view,
to establish economic equality, as long as existing inequalities are
not large enough to promote the formation of elite groups or to
provoke justified anger or envy. These various policies -
educational, political, economic - make it possible for a sense
of justice to pervade the city, as they serve to confirm that all
citizens are valued as equal practical deliberators and
policy-makers.



Aristotle's criticisms of deviant political states take a
related line: states that encourage the consumption and accumulation
of external goods for their own sake, or states that promote warfare
and military supremacy as an end in itself, mistake the nature of the
best human life. Citizens of such states will grow up to love most
something other than the exercise of realized human rational powers,
and as a result they will be prone to such traditional vices as
injustice, lack of generosity, and intemperance. 



That living well requires active political deliberation and
policy-making explains why Aristotle excludes natural slaves, women,
and manual workers from citizenship, and helps to clarify his view
that citizens should be private property-owners. In Aristotle's
view, natural slaves lack the capacity for deliberation and
decision-making that is required for living well. Women have a
deliberative capacity, but it is not "authoritative."
Manual laborers are occupied with the production of necessities. They
have decision-making powers, but their exercise is limited by the
laborer's need to survive, for he must conform to the demands of
his working conditions. Moreover, manual work is often dull and
repetitive, making little demand on workers' rational powers.
As private property-owners, citizens are not vulnerable to these
problems. With private property, an individual has a supply of
resources that is under his control; his decision determines what
happens to it. Thus he is able to take pleasure from generous action
- from helping his friends, guests, and companions.



For more detailed discussion of the relation between Aristotle's
ethical and political views, see Irwin (1985, 1996, 2007), Kraut
(2002) and Schofield (2006). On Aristotle's discussions of
friendship, see Cooper (1980). 


#### Summary



Plato and Aristotle agree that excellent moral character involves more
than a Socratic understanding of the good. They think that virtue
requires a harmony between cognitive and affective elements of the
person. Aristotle tries to explain what this harmony consists in by
exploring the psychological foundations of moral character. He thinks
that the virtuous person is characterized by a nonstereotypical
self-love that he understands as a love of the exercise of fully
realized rational activity. Yet this self-love is not an individual
achievement. Its development and preservation require (a) friendships
in which individuals desire the good of others for others' own
sakes and (b) a political community where citizens are equal and
similar, and where political and economic arrangements promote the
conditions under which self-love and friendship flourish. 


### 2.5 Stoic views of character



The Stoic school of philosophy existed for about five centuries, from
its founding around 300 BCE to the second century CE. Like Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle, the Stoic philosophers differed on some issues
about the virtues, but they seemed also to have shared a common core
of views. This section of the entry on character will briefly discuss
their common views.



The Stoic philosophers have a view of character that is close to
Socrates', but they reach it through agreement with Aristotle.
The Stoics assume that the good life for human beings is a life in
accord with nature. They agree with Aristotle that the human
being's essence is a life in accord with reason. So to find what
accords with nature, they look to the development of the human
being's rational powers. They think that as a person begins to
use reason instrumentally to satisfy and organize his desires and
appetites, he comes to value the exercise of reason for its own sake.
He realizes that conduct that exhibits a rational order is far more
valuable than any of the natural advantages (such as health,
friendship, or community) pursued by his individual actions. Human
good, after all, as Aristotle argued, should be stable, under our
control, and hard to take from us. The Stoics conclude that human good
consists in excellent rational activity, for a person can guide his
actions by rational choice, no matter what misfortunes he may
encounter. The virtuous person becomes the sage (*sophos*) who
has and acts on knowledge of the good. His actions are informed by his
insights about the advantages of perfecting one's rationality by
acting in agreement with the rational order of nature. Like Socrates,
the Stoic view of virtue focuses on the virtuous person's
cognitive state: it is his knowledge of the rational order of the
universe and his desire to accord with that rational order that leads
him to act as he does.



To be virtuous, there is no need to develop any capacities other than
cognitive capacities, for the Stoics claim against Plato and Aristotle
that there is really no non-rational part of the soul. Although the
Stoics admit that there are passions such as anger, fear, and so on,
they treat them as mistaken judgments about what is good and evil.
Since the sage or virtuous person is wise and has no mistaken
judgments about the good, he has no passions. So if the sage loses any
natural advantages in misfortune, he has no emotion about them.
Rather, he views them as "indifferents"
(*adiaphora*). One might wonder, then, how the sage can truly
be said to be virtuous. For if he views the health and welfare of
himself and others as indifferents, why would he act to secure or
protect his or others' welfare, as presumably a virtuous person
would? The Stoics reply that natural advantages are still pursued, but
only to achieve agreement with nature and to realize fully one's
rational powers. They are "preferred indifferents."



Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics did not think virtue was
developed and sustained by any particular kind of community. Granted,
social relationships and community are among the preferred
indifferents in that they are to be preferred to the opposite
conditions of hostility, war, and enmity. But they are not necessary
for anyone's happiness. If we lose them, it is not a loss of a
genuine good. So the Stoic Epictetus (c. 55-c.135), a freed slave,
argued that the death of one's family members is no real loss
and is no worse than the breaking of a cup. The community that did
matter to the Stoics was cosmic. When persons achieve perfect
rationality, they accord with the rational order of a universe ruled
by divine reason. This shows that all of us, virtuous or not, are
ruled by one law and so belong to one universal community. As rational
beings, we recognize this for we recognize that we share reason with
other human beings. The Stoic Marcus Aurelius (121-180), a Roman
emperor, makes the connections in this way: "If this be so
[i.e., that reason is shared], then also the reason which enjoins what
is to be done or left undone is common. If this be so, law also is
common; if this be so, we are citizens; if this be so, we are
partakers in one constitution; if this be so, the Universe is a kind
of Commonwealth" (Marcus Aurelius, *The Meditations*,
iv.4). The Stoics concluded that, as rational beings, we have no
reason not to extend our concern beyond our family, friends, and
immediate community to our fellow-citizens of the world community.



The Stoics came to represent a way of life according to which someone
might strive for the well-being of others, whether friend or stranger,
without caring about material rewards or worldly success. Because
their view of virtue was independent of any particular social or
political structure, their message held an appeal for all sorts of
people, Greek or non-Greek, slave or free, rich or poor.



For more detailed discussion of Greek views of character, see Dent
(1975), Irwin (1989, 1996), and Sherman (1989).


## 3. Virtue and moral character after the Greeks



Since the publication of Anscombe's "Modern Moral
Philosophy" in 1958 (see Introduction above), it has become
routine to say that virtue and moral character have been neglected
topics in the development of western moral philosophy since the
Greeks. Rather than thinking about what it is to flourish and live
well, moral philosophers, it is argued, became focused on a different
set of notions: obligation, duty, and law.



Anscombe and others have suggested how such a move might have taken
place. The Stoic ideas outlined above may have influenced early
Christians such as St. Paul to develop the idea of a natural law that
applies to all human beings. Once Christianity became more widespread,
natural law could be understood in terms of God's directives in
the Bible. Still later, after the European political revolutions of
the 17th and 18th centuries, there was
intellectual room for secularized versions of the same idea to take
hold: duty or obligation was understood in terms of obedience to moral
law(s) or principles that do not come from God but are devised by
human beings. Morally right action was action in accord with moral
law(s) or principles. On such a view, where the central focus is on
obedience to moral law, the virtues and moral character are secondary
to action in accordance with law. Someone who acts rightly may develop
standing habits or dispositions of doing so, and these habits then
constitute the virtues or good character.



This section of the entry on moral character will provide a brief
summary of some important developments both in this
"modern" approach to moral character and in what appear to
be revivals of the pre-Christian Greek interest in the psychological
foundations of character.


### 3.1 Early natural law theorists



In the writings of the early natural law theorists, Greek views of
virtue sometimes came under strong criticism. Hugo Grotius
(1583-1645), for example, objected to Aristotle's approach
to virtue and especially to his attempts to find a mean in terms of
which to understand justice. It does not matter, Grotius complained,
what moves someone to act unjustly - the only thing that matters
is that unjust action violates the rights of others. Grotius
acknowledged that one may develop emotional habits that support right
action, but he thought this was a matter of having reason control
passions and emotions so that they do not interfere with right action.
That reason should control passions indicates that the desired state
is for one part of us to rule the other, not for both parts, in
Aristotle's words, to speak with the same voice. On this view,
moral character is a state closer to what the Greeks considered
self-mastery or continence than it is to what they considered virtue.




Even though the natural law theorists tended to assimilate virtue to
continence, they still admitted that that there was an area of moral
life in which motive and character mattered. That was the area of
"imperfect duty" (as contrasted with "perfect
duty"). Under a perfect duty what is owed is specific and
legally enforceable by political society or courts; but action in
accord with imperfect duty cannot be compelled, and what is owed under
an imperfect duty is imprecise. Generosity is an example of the
latter, justice of the former. In the case of generosity, one has a
duty to be generous, but one cannot be legally compelled to be
generous, and when or how generosity is shown is not precisely
specifiable. But in the case of generosity, the motive of the agent
counts. For if I give money to a poor person I encounter on the street
and do so because I want others to think well of me, I have not acted
generously and performed my imperfect duty. When I give generously, I
must do so out of concern for the good of the person to whom I give
the money.



For more detailed discussion of Grotius and the natural law theorists,
and of the modern developments Anscombe attacked, see Schneewind
(1990, 1998). For a discussion of the persistence of Aristotelian
ethics in the early modern period and a response to Schneewind, see
Frede (2013).


### 3.2 Kant



The tendencies to find room for motive and character in the area of
imperfect duty, and to assimilate virtue with continence, resurface in
the writings of several moral philosophers of the 17th and
18th centuries. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is an
illustrative case. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant divides
moral philosophy into two domains, that of justice or law on the one
hand (the *Doctrine of Right*), and that of ethics or virtue on
the other (the *Doctrine of Virtue*). The duties that form the
subject matter of the *Doctrine of Right* are like the natural
law theorists' perfect duties: they are precise, owed to
specifiable others, and can be legally enforced. They require that we
take or forego certain actions. Other duties (which form the subject
matter of the *Doctrine of Virtue*) are duties to adopt certain
ends. Many of them are imperfect, in that they do not specify how,
when, or for whom (in the case of duties to others) they should be
achieved. Examples are the duty not to let one's talents rust or
the duty not to deny help to others. Because we cannot be compelled to
adopt ends, but must do so from free choice, these duties are not
legally enforceable. They require inner, not outer, legislation, so we
must impose them on ourselves. Because, according to Kant, we are
always fighting against the impulses and dispositions that oppose the
moral law, we need strength of will and self-mastery to fulfill our
imperfect duties. This self-mastery Kant calls courage. 



That virtue is a form of continence for Kant is also suggested by his
treatment of other traits such as gratitude and sympathy. Although
Kant thinks that feelings cannot be required of anyone, some feelings
are nevertheless associated with the moral ends we adopt. If we adopt
others' happiness as an end, we will not take malicious pleasure
in their downfall. On the contrary, we will naturally feel gratitude
for their benevolence and sympathy for their happiness. These feelings
will make it easier for us to perform our duties and are a sign that
we are disposed to do so. Kant remarks of sympathy that "it is
one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the
representation of duty alone would not accomplish" (Kant,
*Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. 457).



Thus it matters to Kant that we perform the duties of virtue with the
properly cultivated emotions. But to do so is not to develop our
nature so that the two parts of us, reason and passion, are unified
and speak with the same voice. Rather, if we perform our duties of
virtue in the right spirit, one part of us, reason, retains control
over the other part, passion. Kant writes that virtue "contains
a positive command to a man, namely to bring all his capacities and
inclinations under his (reason's) control and so to rule over
himself ... for unless reason holds the reins of government in
its own hands, man's feelings and inclinations play the master
over him" (Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. 408).



For more detailed discussion of Kant's views on virtue, see
O'Neill (1996).



Yet there are other philosophers for whom an interest in virtue or
good character takes a turn more reminiscent of the Greeks. This
revival of Greek ideas can be seen in philosophers who show an
interest in the psychological foundations of good character.


### 3.3 Hume



David Hume (1711-1776) explicitly professes a preference for
ancient ethics (Hume, *Enquiries*, 318), claiming that morals
are the one science in which the ancients are not surpassed by the
moderns (Hume, *Enquiries*, 330). Like some of the Greek
moralists, Hume thought morality must be rooted in our passional
nature. For morality moves us to action whereas reason alone, Hume
thought, does not. His preference for ancient ethics is most obviously
seen in his focus on the nature of the virtues and in his efforts to
explain how virtues arise from our feelings and desires.



Hume divides the virtues into two types: artificial and natural.
Artificial virtues include justice, promise-keeping, and allegiance to
legitimate government. Natural virtues include courage, magnanimity,
ambition, friendship, generosity, fidelity, and gratitude, among many
others. Whereas each exercise of the natural virtues normally produces
good results, the good of artificial virtues is indirect in that it
comes about only as a result of there being an accepted practice of
exercising these virtues.



Hume's discussion of justice illustrates how the artificial
virtues emerge from our feelings and desires. Hume notes that
following the rules of justice does not always produce good results.
Consider the judges who "bestow on the dissolute the labour of
the industrious; and put into the hands of the vicious the means of
harming both themselves and others" (Hume, *Treatise*,
579). Hume thinks that as persons become aware that stability of
possessions is advantageous to each individually, they also realize
that stability is not possible unless everyone refrains from
disturbing others' possessions. As this awareness becomes more
widespread and effective in people's behaviors, there arises a
convention to respect the possessions of others. This redirection of
self-interest, aided by our natural tendency to sympathize with the
feelings of others who benefit from stability of possession, gives
rise to our approval of justice. In this way, Hume argues, the virtue
of obeying laws arises naturally from our feelings and desires.



Hume's indebtedness to Greek ethics can be seen even more
clearly in his discussion of the natural virtues. Of these, one
important group (consisting of courage, magnanimity, ambition, and
others) is based on, or may even be a form of, self-esteem:
"[W]hatever we call heroic virtue, and admire under the
character of greatness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a
steady and well-established pride and self-esteem, or partakes largely
of that passion. Courage ... and all the other shining virtues of
that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and
derive a great part of their merit from that origin" (Hume,
*Treatise*, 599-600). Yet these virtues based on
self-esteem must be tempered by a second group that includes
generosity, compassion, fidelity, and friendship; otherwise traits
like courage are "fit only to make a tyrant and public
robber" (Hume, *Treatise*, 603). This second group of
virtues is based on broadly-based feelings of good will, affection,
and concern for others.



Hume acknowledges that his second group of natural virtues owes a debt
to the Stoic view that a virtuous person ought to be concerned with
the welfare of all human beings, whether they be intimate or stranger;
and in describing the first group of natural virtues, Hume looks to
Socrates as someone who has achieved a kind of inner calm and
self-esteem. In addition, his general approach to the natural virtues,
that some are based on self-esteem and others on friendly feelings and
good will, is reminiscent of Aristotle's exploration of the
psychological foundations of virtue.



Hume believes that we develop self-esteem from what we do well, if
what we do well expresses something distinctive and durable about us,
and he seems to recognize that realized deliberative abilities are
among the most durable features of ourselves. As we gain a facility at
deliberation, we come to develop self-esteem and enjoy who we are,
like Aristotle's virtuous person who enjoys most the exercise of
his developed deliberative powers. Moreover, Hume's recognition
that self-esteem must be tempered by benevolence is reflected in
Aristotle's argument that the development and preservation of
proper self-love requires friendships in which persons come to care
for others for others' own sakes.



In addition to exploring these psychological foundations of virtue,
Hume seems to accord them a role that is reminiscent of the
Aristotelian view that virtue is a state in which reason and passion
speak with the same voice. Instead of making virtue and good character
subordinate to the requirements of reason, as we saw in the natural
law theorists and in Kant, Hume appears to give virtue and good
character room to guide and constrain the deliberations of agents so
as to affect what they determine to be best to do. By doing so, Hume
goes some way toward indicating how good character is different from
continence.



Hume's account of how we determine what is right and wrong
illuminates the role character plays. When Hume's
"judicious spectator" determines what is right and wrong,
she fixes on some "steady and general" point of view and
"loosens" herself from her actual feelings and interests.
It appears that someone who has developed an enjoyment in the
activities of deliberating and reflecting, and whose self-esteem is
based on that enjoyment, will be more likely to take up the point of
view of the judicious spectator and to perform the subtle corrections
in response that may be necessary to loosen oneself from one's
own perspective and specific passions. Someone whose self-esteem is
based on an enjoyment taken in deliberation will be attuned to wider
complications and will have the wider imaginative powers needed for
correct deliberation from a steady and general point of view.
Hume's view of the relation between passion and deliberation is
reminiscent of the Aristotelian view that someone with proper
self-love will also be practically wise, in that his self-love will
enable him to size up practical situations correctly and determine
correctly what it is best to do.



For more detailed discussion of Hume's view of the virtues, see
Baier (1991). On Hume's indebtedness to Greek ethics, see Homiak
(2000). 


### 3.4 Marx and Mill



Another illustration of the use of Greek views of character can be
found in the writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and John Stuart
Mill (1806-1873). Although Marx is best known for his virulent
criticism of capitalism and Mill for his exposition and defense of
liberal utilitarianism, these philosophers are treated together here
because their approach to character is at crucial points deeply
Aristotelian. Both Marx and Mill accept Aristotle's insight that
virtue and good character are based on a self-esteem and
self-confidence that arises from a satisfaction taken in the fully
realized expression of the rational powers characteristic of human
beings. They also accept Aristotle's recognition that the
production and preservation of this type of self-esteem require that
individuals be part of specific socio-political structures. Aristotle
emphasized the need for a special type of political community. Marx
attended to smaller democratic workplaces. Mill's focus, still
different, was on political equality and equality in the family. 



Marx's early *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844* is famous for the discussion of how the organization of work
under capitalism alienates workers and encourages them to accept the
values of capitalist society. Workers who are committed to capitalist
values are characterized primarily by self-interested attitudes. They
are most interested in material advancement for themselves, they are
distrustful of others' seemingly good intentions, and they view
others primarily as competitors for scarce positions. Given these
attitudes, they are prone to a number of vices, including cowardice,
intemperance, and lack of generosity.



Marx's discussion of alienated labor suggests how work can be
re-organized to eliminate alienation, undermine commitment to
traditional capitalist values and goals, and produce attitudes more
characteristic of Aristotle's virtuous person. The key to this
transformation lies in re-organizing the nature of work so that
workers can express what Marx calls their "species-being"
or those features of the self that are characteristically human. Very
much like Aristotle, Marx seems to mean by this an individual's
ability to reason, and in particular his powers of choosing, deciding,
discriminating, and judging. If work is re-organized to enable workers
to express their rational powers, then each worker will perform tasks
that are interesting and mentally challenging (no worker will perform
strictly monotonous, routine, unskilled tasks). In addition, workers
will participate in deliberations about the ends to be achieved by the
work they do and how to achieve those ends. And, finally, these
deliberations will be organized democratically so that the opinions of
each worker are fairly taken into account. When these conditions are
put into place, labor is no longer "divided" between
skilled and unskilled or between managerial and non-managerial. Marx
suggests that if work is reorganized in these ways, it will promote
feelings of solidarity and camaraderie among workers and eventually
between these workers and those in similar situations elsewhere. For
the fact that workers can express their characteristic human powers in
action, coupled with the egalitarian conditions in the workplace, can
upset competitive feelings and promote respect by removing the bases
for inferiority and superiority. Workers then come to exhibit some of
the more traditional virtues such as generosity and trustfulness, and
avoid some of the more traditional vices such as cowardice,
stinginess, and self-indulgence.



That Marx's views seem derivative of Aristotle's in
important ways is not surprising, for, unlike Hume whose knowledge of
Aristotle is not fully known, Marx explicitly drew upon
Aristotle's works. For further discussion of the extent to which
Marx drew on Aristotle, see DeGolyer (1985).



John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) defended a version of liberal
utilitarianism, but scholars disagree about what kind of
utilitarianism that was. We can safely say that, as a utilitarian,
Mill thought human conduct should promote the happiness or welfare of
those affected. But was Mill an act-utilitarian, who thought that
right acts are those that promote as much happiness as can be done on
the particular occasion, given the alternatives available to the
agent? Or was he a rule-utilitarian, who thought that right conduct
was conduct permitted by rules that, when publicly known to be
generally accepted or followed, would maximize happiness or welfare?
Or was he a motive-utilitarian, who thought that one should act as the
person with the motives or virtues most productive of happiness should
act? (For a discussion of these interpretive questions, see the
related entry on
 Mill's moral and political philosophy.)
 Although this entry will steer clear of these interpretive hurdles
and will concentrate on Mill's discussion of the nature of
happiness and of some of the institutional structures that can promote
happiness, these questions of interpretation will be relevant to a
final assessment of Mill in Section 4, below.



In his essay *On Liberty* Mill claims that his version of
utilitarianism rests on a conception of happiness that is appropriate
to people as "progressive" beings (Mill 1975, 12). And in
*Utilitarianism* he suggests that this conception is focused on
the "higher pleasures" that serve to distinguish humans
from animals (Mill 1979, 7-11). These higher pleasures turn out
to be the activities and pursuits that exercise what in
Aristotle's view are our powers of practical deliberation
- of choosing, judging, deciding, and discriminating. In *On
Liberty*, Mill writes: "He who lets the world ...
choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than
the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself
employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning
and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision,
discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and
self-control to hold his deliberate decision" (Mill 1975, 56).
As a person develops his powers of practical deliberation and comes to
enjoy their exercise, he gains the self-esteem that is the basis of a
virtuous and well-lived life.



For further discussion of Mill's view of happiness, see Brink
(1992).



Mill argued that seriously unequal societies, by preventing
individuals from developing their deliberative powers, mold
individuals' character in unhealthy ways and impede their
ability to live virtuous lives. For example, Mill argued, in deep
disagreement with the views of his own time, that societies that have
systematically subordinated women have harmed both men and women,
making it almost impossible for men and women to form relationships of
genuine intimacy and understanding. In *The Subjection of
Women*, Mill wrote that the family, as constituted at his time,
was a "school of despotism," which taught those who
benefited from it the vices of selfishness, self-indulgence, and
injustice. Among working class men, the fact that wives were
excessively dependent on their husbands inspired meanness and
savagery. In chapter IV of *The Subjection of Women*, Mill goes
so far as to claim that "[a]ll the selfish propensities, the
self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind,
have their source and root in, and derive their principal nourishment
from, the present constitution of the relation between men and
women" (Mill 1988, 86). Women who have been legally and socially
subordinated to men become meek, submissive, self-sacrificing, and
manipulative. In brief, men evidence the vices of the slave master,
while women evidence the vices of the slave. For moral lives and
psychologically healthy relationships to be possible, Mill called for
altered marital arrangements, supported by changes in law, that would
promote the development and exercise of women's deliberative
powers along with men's. Only under such conditions could women
and men acquire feelings of real self-esteem rather than feelings of
false inferiority and superiority.



Like Aristotle, Mill recognized the power of political institutions to
transform individuals' desires and aims and to improve them
morally. In chapter III of *Considerations on Representative
Government*, Mill writes approvingly of the democratic
institutions of ancient Athens. He believed that by participating in
these institutions, Athenians were called upon to rise above their
individual partialities and to consider the general good. By
co-operating with others in governing their community, he wrote, each
citizen "is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever
is their interest to be his interest" (Mill 1991, 79).



And like Marx, Mill recognized the morally disturbing effects of a
life limited to routine and unskilled labor. In *Principles of
Political Economy*, he recommended that relations of economic
dependence between capitalists and workers be eliminated in favor of
cooperatives either of workers with capitalists or of workers alone.
In these associations members were to be roughly equal owners of
tools, raw materials, and capital. They worked as skilled
craftspersons under self-imposed rules. They elected and removed their
own managers. By elevating the dignity of labor, Mill thought such
cooperatives could convert "each human being's daily
occupation into a school of the social sympathies and the practical
intelligence" and bring people as close to social justice as
could be imagined (Mill 1900, vol. 2, 295).


### 3.5 T. H. Green



T. H. Green (1836-1882) began as a student and teacher of
classics before turning to philosophy. He knew Plato's and
Aristotle's Greek texts well. In developing his view of a
person's good in Book III of his *Prolegomena to Ethics*,
Green finds his own views anticipated in Plato and Aristotle and
especially in Aristotle's treatment of happiness, the human
good, and the particular virtues. Green aims to show that a
person's good consists in his "self-satisfaction" or
"self-realization." To realize the self requires that one
fully develop his capacities as a rational agent. And that requires
aiming at the good of others for their own sake. Green thought
Aristotle was right about the nature of the virtuous person's
motive. In *Prolegomena* 263 he notes Aristotle's view
that the virtuous person acts *tou kalou heneka* (for the sake
of the fine), and he recognizes that acting in this way requires that
the agent have concern for the good of the community. So the
agent's good is connected to the good of others. 



To illustrate his reading of Aristotle, Green discusses two of
Aristotle's virtues: courage and temperance. He notes that both
virtues appear to be more restricted in scope than commonsense would
suggest. In discussing courage, Aristotle limits courage to facing
fear in danger of death in defense of one's city
(*Nicomachean Ethics* 1115a25-29). A man who faces death
by drowning or disease is not courageous. Courage is restricted to
facing death in battle for one's city because such action aims
at the common good and is the finest form of death. Green uses these
points in Aristotle's discussion to show that Aristotle's
view rests on a general principle that can widen the circumstances of
courage in a way that Green accepts. In Green's view, courage is
a matter of facing the danger of death "in the service of the
highest public cause which the agent can conceive" (1969, 260).




Green explains Aristotle's restrictions on temperance in a
similar way. Not every form of restraint counts as temperance for
Aristotle. It is limited to restraint of the pleasures of appetitive
desires for food, drink, and sex, the pleasures we share with
non-human animals. The intemperate person is like the gourmand who
prayed that his throat might become longer than a crane's: he is
interested in sensation and does not value the exercise of his
rational capacities. Green recognizes that Aristotle needs to check
these appetitive desires because intemperance is a danger to the
common good. He writes: "such a check should be kept on the
lusts of the flesh as might prevent them from issuing in what a Greek
knew as *hubris* - a kind of self-assertion and
aggression upon the rights of others ... which was looked upon as
the antithesis of the civil spirit" (1969, 263). 



Green was right to find his views anticipated in the Greeks. He saw,
as Aristotle did, that living well requires the exercise of
one's developed rational powers, and that persons who have
realized their powers and have formed virtuous traits of character aim
at the common good, which is a part of their own good. Like Aristotle,
Green thought that such development required that one be a participant
in a special kind of political community - one "where the
free combination of mutually respecting citizens" enact equal
law and the common good (1969, 263). 



For further discussion of Green's interpretation and use of
Aristotle's views, see Irwin (2009).


### 3.6 Rawls



As indicated in the introduction to this entry, a renewed
philosophical interest in questions of virtue and character was
indirectly the result of the publication in 1971 of John Rawls's
*A Theory of Justice*. In contrast to many of his
contemporaries who focused on meta-ethical questions and the meaning
of moral terms, Rawls (1921-2002) moved moral and political
philosophy in a practical direction and stimulated modern philosophers
to explore the psychological grounding of good moral character. Early
in Part II of *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls makes what he calls
a "perfectly obvious" point - that the social system
shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens come to have. It
determines "in part the sort of persons they want to be as well
as the sort of persons they are" (1999a, 229). These points,
Rawls claims, have always been recognized. 



How do just institutions shape our wants and aims and affect the sort
of people we become? The institutions of interest to Rawls are those
that make up a society's "basic structure". These
are the institutions that make social cooperation possible and
productive. They include the political constitution, the structure of
the economy, legalized forms of property ownership, the family in some
form, and others. Rawls defends two principles of justice as
regulations for the basic structure of his just society: (1) the equal
liberties principle, according to which each person has the same claim
to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties. (2) and a second
principle that specifies two conditions that must be satisfied in
order for socio-economic inequalities to be permissible. These
conditions are fair equality of opportunity and the difference
principle.



Consider Rawls's discussion of the guarantee of equal liberties
under the first principle of justice. This principle covers two types
of liberties, personal liberties and political liberties. Under this
principle, each person is entitled to liberties of both kinds as a
basic right. But Rawls goes further to argue that political liberties
must be assured their "fair value" (1999a, 243). This
means that chances to hold office and to exercise political influence
must be independent of socio-economic position. Otherwise,
"political power rapidly accumulates and becomes unequal"
(1999a, 199). To preserve fair value, Rawls does not follow
Aristotle's strategy of making political participation a
requirement of all citizens. Yet he shares with Aristotle the view
that the guarantee of fair value has the aim of promoting and
sustaining citizens' common status as equal citizens (1999a,
205-206). Moreover, Rawls agrees with Mill that political
participation contributes to the moral development of citizens. As
noted in Section 3.4 above, when praising Athenian democracy, Mill
writes that when a citizen participates in public deliberation,
"he is called upon ... to weigh interests not his own, to
be guided, in case of conflicting claims by another rule than his
private partialities; to apply at every turn principles and maxims
which have for their reason of existence the general good ... .
He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is their
interest to be his interest" (1991, 79). The guarantee of
political liberty both strengthens citizens' sense of their own
value and enlarges their moral sensibilities.



In part III, Rawls turns to the question of how individuals acquire a
desire to act justly, and to do so for the right reasons, when they
have lived under and benefited from just institutions (1999a, 399).
Rawls's account is indebted to Aristotle's views in
several ways. First, Rawls holds, as Aristotle did, that if proper
institutions are in place, then the attitudes and behaviors associated
with the desire to act justly will emerge naturally, as a result of
psychological tendencies persons experience in ordinary life. For,
other things being equal, it is part of human psychology to enjoy most
the exercise of one's realized powers (see Rawls's
discussion of what he calls the Aristotelian Principle), to enjoy the
realization of others' powers (see his discussion of the
"companion effect" to the Aristotelian principle), and to
form ties of attachment and friendship to persons and institutions who
promote one's good. Second, and again like Aristotle, Rawls
argues that if citizens are fortunate to live in a community that
provides the basic goods they need for realizing their powers and that
offers them opportunities to develop and use their abilities in shared
activities with others, then they will develop a stable sense of their
own value that is based on their own accomplishments and their status
as equal citizens, rather than on a position more advantaged relative
to others. With a stable sense of their own value and a reasonable
hope of achieving their aims, citizens will want to act justly for the
right reasons. They will not be prone to rancor, jealousy, and hostile
envy, "one of the vices of hating mankind" (1999a,
466).



Only a brief discussion of these points of coincidence is possible
here. Consider, first, sections 72-75 of *A Theory of
Justice*, where Rawls outlines what he calls the three stages of
moral development, governed by three psychological laws. These laws
explain how individuals come to have new, non-derivative, final ends
as they acquire ties of love, friendship, affection, and trust. As
Aristotle recognized, these ties are caused to occur in individuals as
they come to recognize others' evident intention to act for
their good, and to enjoy what they and others can do.



At the first stage of moral development, on the assumption that family
institutions are just, children come to love their parents as a result
of their parents' demonstrating clearly that their children are
enjoyed and valued. At the second stage, on the assumption that
cooperative associations are fairly arranged and known to be so,
members of reasonably successful cooperative associations
(Rawls's "social unions") come to enjoy and value
their cooperative partners. This happens when members do their parts
responsibly, each contributing to a mutually recognized goal, and
where all participants display appropriate abilities. Under these
conditions, participants come to enjoy their own participation, to
enjoy the display of others' skills and abilities, and to form
ties of friendship and trust with their cooperative partners. Because
the activities are complementary, individuals can see themselves in
what others do. In this way, individuals' sense of what they are
doing is worthwhile. Their self-love, to use Aristotelian language,
becomes a group achievement.



Finally, at the third stage, as individuals come to realize how the
institutions regulated by the principles of justice promote their good
and the good of their fellow citizens, they become attached to these
principles and develop a desire to apply and to act in accordance with
them. Like the major institutions of Aristotle's ideal
*polis*, the institutions regulated by Rawls's two
principles of justice have as their aim to promote citizens'
good by providing the social bases of individuals' self-worth
(Rawls's primary good of "self-respect"). The
provision of equal liberties in accordance with the first principle of
justice enables citizens to form the associations in which their
common aims and ideals can be pursued. As we have seen, these
associations are necessary for self-respect to be produced and
maintained. The guarantee of the fair value of political liberty,
along with fair equality of opportunity under Rawls's second
principle of justice, prevent excessive accumulation of property and
wealth and maintain equal opportunity of education for all, enabling
everyone with similar motivation and ability to have roughly equal
prospects of culture and achievement (1999a, 63). Taken together,
these two principles ensure that persons have reasonable hopes of
achieving their aims. Finally, the difference principle serves to
ensure everyone a decent standard of living, no matter what individual
citizens' social position, natural talents, or fortune may be.
The difference principle, Rawls writes, corresponds to the "idea
of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the
benefit of others who are less well off" (1999a, 90). In these
various ways, the two principles, in combination, amount to a publicly
acknowledged recognition that each citizen has equal worth.



Once these just institutions are in place, Rawls thinks that the worst
aspects of the social division of labor can be overcome. No one, he
writes, "need be servilely dependent on others and made to
choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are deadening
to human thought and sensibility" (1999a, 464). Here Rawls notes
the same problems with many types of paid labor that so disturbed
Aristotle. Paid labor often limits the worker's exercise of her
decision-making powers and requires her to conform to the direction of
others. Of course, Rawls does not suggest solving these problems as
Aristotle did. But he thinks that they need to be solved, and that a
just society can solve them, perhaps by adopting Mill's proposal
(see Section 3.4 above) to restructure workplaces to become
worker-managed cooperatives (2001, 178).



For further discussion of Rawls's views on how institutions
shape our characters, see Freeman (2007, ch. 6) and Edmundson (2017,
ch. 3).


## 4. Contemporary Questions About Character



Marx, Mill, and Rawls suggest how character can be molded by
antecedent circumstances - Marx by economic structures; Mill by
paid work, political life, and family relationships; Rawls by the
institutions regulated by the two principles of justice. Yet these
insights about the effect of institutions on character seem to raise
other, more troubling questions: if our character is the result of
social and political institutions beyond our control, then perhaps we
are not in control of our characters at all and becoming decent is not
a real possibility. 



Among contemporary philosophers, Susan Wolf is one of several who
address these worries. In her *Freedom Within Reason* Wolf
argues that almost any morally problematic upbringing could be
coercive and could render a person unable to see what he ought morally
to do or render him unable to act on that recognition. As examples,
Wolf cites ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany, white children of slave
owners in the 1850s, and persons brought up to embrace conventional
sex roles. Wolf thinks that there is no method for determining which
upbringings and influences are consistent with an ability to see what
should be done and to act accordingly, and hence she thinks there is
always the risk that we are less responsible for our actions than we
may hope. 



Such skepticism may be misplaced. For if good character is based on
naturally occurring psychological responses that most people
(including persons brought up to embrace racist and sexist beliefs)
experience without difficulty, then most people should be able to
become better and to be responsible for actions that express (or could
express) their character. 



Still, this is not to say that changing one's character is easy,
straightforward, or quickly achieved. If character is formed or
malformed by the structures of political, economic, and family life,
then changing one's character may require access to the
appropriate transforming forces, which may not be available. In modern
societies, for example, many adults still work at alienating jobs that
do not afford opportunity to realize the human powers and to
experience the pleasures of self-expression. Women in particular,
because of unequal domestic arrangements, nearly total responsibility
for childcare, and sex segregation in the workplace, often endure
low-paying, dead-end jobs that encourage feelings of self-hatred. In a
family where economic, and hence psychological, power is unequal
between women and men, affection, as Mill recognized, may harm both
parties. Thus many women and men today may not be well-positioned to
develop fully the psychological capacities Aristotle, Marx, Mill, and
Rawls considered foundational to virtuous character.



These considerations indicate why character has become a central issue
not only in ethics, but also in feminist philosophy, political
philosophy, philosophy of education, and philosophy of literature. If
developing good moral character requires being members of a community
in which citizens can fully realize their human powers and ties of
friendship, then one needs to ask how educational, economic,
political, and social institutions should be structured to make that
development possible. Some contemporary philosophers are now
addressing these issues. For example, Martha Nussbaum uses
Aristotelian virtues to outline a democratic ideal in (1990b). In
(1996) Andrew Mason explores how capitalist market forces make it
difficult for virtues to flourish. In (1987) Jon Elster interprets
Marx as offering a conception of the good life that consists in active
self-realization, which can be promoted or blocked by economic and
political institutions. In (1993) John Bernard Murphy reconstructs
Aristotle's views on practical deliberation and decision-making
to show how they can yield a theory of productive labor that helps us
see what is wrong with work in the contemporary world and how to
re-organize it. Rosalind Hursthouse applies an Aristotelian view of
the emotions to an investigation of racist attitudes in (2001). In
(2010) Marcia Homiak develops Aristotle's and Mill's views
on the transformative power of institutions to explore the
possibilities for living virtuously in an imperfect world. Laurence
Thomas (1989) uses Aristotle's discussions of self-love and
friendship to argue that friendship helps to develop and maintain good
moral character. And if one is interested in understanding what the
nature of moral character is and the extent to which it can be
altered, one will find useful examples of both good and bad moral
character in literary writers. For philosophical discussion of
literary writers' use of character, see Taylor (1996) and
Nussbaum (1990a).



Finally, it might be useful to note that this brief discussion of the
history of philosophical views of character indicates that character
has played, or can play, an important role in a variety of western
ethical traditions, from Greek virtue-centered views to Kantianism to
utilitarianism to Marxism. So Anscombe's provocative claim with
which this entry began - that the two major traditions in modern
moral theory (Kantianism and utilitarianism) have ignored questions of
virtue and character to their detriment - does not seem
altogether true. Nevertheless, some of the views surveyed here seem to
give a more prominent role to character and virtue than do others. It
is not easy to explain precisely what this prominence consists in.
Although a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this
essay, a preliminary indication of how they might be addressed can be
provided. For further discussion of these questions, see Trianosky
(1990), Watson (1990), Homiak (1997), and Hursthouse (2001).



As this entry has indicated, Kant's views do provide a role for
virtue, for it matters to Kant that we perform our imperfect duties
with the right spirit. The virtuous person has the properly cultivated
tendencies to feel that make it easier for her to perform her
imperfect duties. These feelings support her recognition of what is
right and are a sign that she is disposed to perform her duties.
Because Kant views the emotions as recalcitrant and in continual need
of reason's control, virtue amounts to a kind of self-mastery or
continence. One might put this point by saying that, for Kant,
virtuous character is subordinate to the claims of practical
reason.



Aristotle's view, on the other hand, is usually considered a
paradigm example of a "virtue ethics", an ethical theory
that gives priority to virtuous character. To see what this might
mean, recall that Aristotle's virtuous person is a genuine
self-lover who enjoys most the exercise of her abilities to think and
know. This enjoyment guides her practical determinations of what
actions are appropriate in what circumstances and renders her
unattracted to the pleasures associated with the common vices. Her
properly cultivated emotional tendencies are not viewed as
recalcitrant aspects of her being that need to be controlled by
reason. Rather, her practical decisions are informed and guided by the
enjoyment she takes in her rational powers. One might put this point
by saying that, in Aristotle's view, practical deliberation is
subordinate to character.



One might then ask of other ethical views whether they take practical
deliberation to be subordinate to character or vice versa. As this
entry has indicated, Hume appears to side with Aristotle and to give
character priority over practical deliberation. For he suggests that
someone with the natural virtues based on self-esteem will have the
wider imaginative powers needed for correct deliberation from the
standpoint of the judicious spectator. Whether character is
subordinate to reason for Mill may depend on what sort of
utilitarianism Mill can be shown to espouse. If he is a
motive-utilitarian who thinks that one should act as the person with
the motives or virtues most productive of happiness would act, then a
case could be made for his giving character priority over practical
reason. If, on the other hand, he is an act- or rule-utilitarian, he
would seem to give character a role that is subordinate to reason.
These brief remarks indicate that the question of whether an ethical
theorist gives priority to character can only be determined by a
thorough analysis of the various critical elements of that
philosopher's view.


## 5. Moral Character and Empirical Studies


### 5.1 The challenge posed by situationism



This section will begin with a brief discussion of some recent
philosophical work on character that relies on results in experimental
social psychology. This philosophical work calls into question the
conceptions of character and virtue that are of concern especially to
the ancient Greek moralists and to contemporary philosophers whose
work derives from ancient views. Philosophers impressed by this
tradition in experimental social psychology - which is often
labeled "situationism"- have denied that traits of
character are stable, consistent, or evaluatively integrated in the
way that ancient or contemporary philosophers suggest. The ancient
moralists assumed that virtues are, in John Doris's description,
"*robust* traits: if a person has a robust trait, they
can be confidently expected to display trait-relevant behavior across
a wide variety of trait-relevant situations, even where some or all of
these situations are not optimally conducive to such behavior"
(2002, 18). Doris and others argue that traits are not robust in this
sense. They are not stable or consistent and are wrongly invoked to
explain why people act as they do. Rather, these philosophers argue,
and as the experimental tradition indicates, much of human behavior is
attributable to seemingly trivial features of the situations in which
persons find themselves. Hence the appropriateness of the label
"situationist" for the philosophers espousing these views.
For variations on this view, see Harman (1999, 2000), Doris (2002),
and Vranas (2005). 



It is beyond the scope of this entry to discuss this work in detail.
Some summary remarks, however, are in order. (For a detailed
discussion, see the entries on
 empirical approaches to moral character,
 section 1, and
 moral psychology: empirical approaches,
 section 4.)



Skepticism about robust traits of character emerges from some famous
experiments in social psychology. For example, in one experiment
persons who found a dime in a phone booth were far more likely to help
a confederate who dropped some papers than were those who did not find
a dime. Another experiment involved seminary students who agreed to
give a talk on the importance of helping those in need. On the way to
the building where their talks were to be given, they encountered a
confederate slumped over and groaning. Those who were told they were
already late were much less likely to help than those who were told
they had time to spare. These experiments are taken to show that minor
factors without moral significance (finding a dime, being in a hurry)
are strongly correlated with people's helping behavior.



Perhaps most damning for the robust view of character are the results
of the experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram in the 1960s. In these
experiments the great majority of subjects, when politely though
firmly requested by an experimenter, were willing to administer what
they thought were increasingly severe electric shocks to a screaming
"victim." These experiments are taken to show that if
subjects did have compassionate tendencies, these tendencies cannot
have been of the type that robust traits require.



Philosophers influenced by the experimental tradition in social
psychology conclude that people do not have the broadly based, stable,
consistent traits of character that were of interest to the ancient
and modern moralists, or to contemporary philosophers working with
some version of those views. Rather, the psychological studies are
taken to show that persons generally have only narrow,
"local" traits that are not unified with other traits into
a wider behavioral pattern. Persons are helpful when in a good mood,
say, but not helpful when in a hurry, or they are honest at home but
not honest at work. This skepticism about robust traits thus poses a
challenge to contemporary philosophers, especially those who work with
some version of the ancient views, to develop an account of character
that is consistent with empirical results.


### 5.2 Some replies to situationism



These interpretations of the experiments in social psychology have
been challenged by both psychologists and philosophers, especially by
philosophers working in the tradition of virtue ethics (see related
entry on
 virtue ethics),
 who claim that the character traits criticized by situationists have
little to do with the conception of character associated with the
ancient and modern moralists. The objectors say that the situationists
rely on an understanding of character traits as isolated and often
non-reflective dispositions to behave in stereotypical ways. They
wrongly assume that traits can be determined from a single type of
behavior stereotypically associated with that trait.



Consider again the payphone and seminarian studies. It may seem
obvious that one cannot respond to all appeals for help, and it may
seem doubtful that any reflective person thinks one should. This
suggests that being a helpful person requires some thinking about what
is most important in one's life, for calls of help can
justifiably go unanswered if the individual believes that responding
will interfere with her doing something else that she takes to be of
higher moral importance. So we should not expect helping behavior to
be wholly consistent, given the complex situations in which persons
find themselves. Some of the philosophers discussed in this entry,
such as the natural law theorists (in section 3.1) and Kant (in
section 3.2), might make this point by reminding us of the distinction
between perfect and imperfect duties. Unlike perfect duties, which
require that we take or forego certain actions, the duty to assist
others in need is imperfect, in that how, when, and whom we assist is
not precisely specifiable and so is within the individual's
discretion. The general point, on which most of the ancient and modern
moralists would agree, is that being helpful cannot be understood in
isolation from other values, aims, and traits that the individual has.
(For discussion of how values can be unified, see Wolf 2007.)



Or consider the Milgram experiments. During the experiments, many of
the subjects protested even while continuing to obey the
experimenter's commands. In post-experiment interviews with
subjects, Milgram noted that many were completely convinced of the
wrongness of what they were doing. But the presence of conflict need
not indicate an absence, or loss, of character. On a traditional
conception of character, as examined in this entry, many of
Milgram's subjects are best described as incontinent. They have
character, but it is neither virtuous nor vicious. Many of us seem to
fall into this category. We often recognize what it is right to do but
we nevertheless do not do it.



In short, the objectors say that the situationists rely on a
simplified view of character. They assume that behavior is often
sufficient to indicate the presence of a trait of character, and they
ignore the other psychological aspects of character (both cognitive
and affective) that, for most of the philosophers discussed in this
entry, form a more or less consistent and integrated set of beliefs
and desires. In particular, the objectors say, the situationists
ignore the role of practical deliberation (or, in the case of virtuous
character, practical wisdom).



For variations on these replies to the situationists, see Kupperman
(2001), Kamtekar (2004), Radcliffe (2007), Sabini and Silver (2005),
Sreenivasan (2013), and cf. von Wright (1963,136-154).


### 5.3 Some empirical approaches to Aristotelian views of character



Some recent philosophical work on character aims to meet the
skepticism of the situationist challenge directly, by developing a
theory of virtue grounded in psychological studies that are compatible
with the existence of robust traits. This section provides a brief
summary of two such approaches to virtue.



For extensive and nuanced discussion, see Miller (2013, 2014) and
Section 2 of the entry on
 empirical approaches to moral character,
 section 2. 



One approach is inspired by the "cognitive-affective personality
system" (the so-called CAPS model) that has been developed by
social and cognitive psychologists. Rather than looking for empirical
evidence of robust traits in behavioral regularities across different
types of situations, the CAPS model (and philosophers impressed by
this model) focus on the importance of how agents understand the
situations they are in. The model views the structure of personality
as the organization of relationships among "cognitive-affective
units". These units are clusters of dispositions to feel,
desire, believe, and plan that, once activated, cause various
thoughts, feelings, and behavior to be formed. Philosophers who ground
their understanding of virtue in this type of psychological theory
extend the CAPS model to cover robust virtuous traits of character.
These traits are viewed as enduring dispositions that include the
appropriate clusters of thinking (practical reason), desire, and
feeling, manifested in cross-situational behavior.



For detailed discussion of the CAPS model and its possible value to
philosophers, see Miller (2003, 2014), Russell (2009) and Snow
(2010).



Other philosophers do not find the extension of the CAPS model
especially helpful, for it does not seem to move us past what we
commonsenically recognize as virtue. We are prepared to begin with the
idea that being virtuous is not just being disposed to act, but also
to feel, respond, and to reason. And not simply to reason, but to
reason well. For this approach to be helpful, we need some account of
what excellent practical reasoning consists in.



Some philosophers aim to provide what is needed by looking to
psychological studies of enjoyment. They propose that virtues are
analogous to (some) skills, in that the kind of habituation involved
in developing and acting from virtuous character is like the sort of
intelligent habituation typical of the development and exercise of
(some) complex skills. The empirical studies of enjoyment show that,
other things being equal, we enjoy the exercise of developed
abilities, and the more complex the ability, the more we enjoy its
exercise. If the acquisition and exercise of virtue is analogous to
the development and exercise of complex ability, we can, this approach
suggests, explain a variety of central points about virtuous activity
- for example, that, like (some) skills, virtuous activity is
experienced as being its own end, as being enjoyable in itself, and
thus as valued for its own sake. For discussion of virtue as similar
to complex skill, see Annas (2011), Bloomfield (2014), Stichter (2007,
2011), and cf. Sherman (1989).



Situationists might nevertheless reply that to emphasize the role of
expertise in practical reasoning is to make good moral character an
ideal that too few of us, if any, can achieve. On some conceptions of
moral knowledge, such as that proposed by Plato in the
*Republic*, acquiring the knowledge necessary for virtue takes
over 50 years of psychological and intellectual training. And on
Aristotle's view, as this entry has indicated in Section 2.4
above, the full realization of our rational powers that is required
for good moral character is not something that we can achieve on our
own. The development and preservation of good moral character requires
political institutions that promote the conditions under which
self-love and friendship flourish. The situationist might wonder how
useful traditional conceptions of good character can be, if acquiring
virtuous character is a long and difficult process made possible by
social institutions that do not yet exist. The situationist may take
these problems as support for his view that we are better off thinking
in terms of local traits rather than robust traits.



In ending, it is appropriate to recall the discussion in Section 4,
above. On the one hand, on a view of character such as
Aristotle's, which relies on ordinary capacities to experience
the pleasures of self-expression and to respond with friendly feelings
to others' efforts to help, almost everyone is capable of
becoming *better*. On the other hand, if Aristotle and others
(such as Marx, Mill, T. H. Green, and Rawls) are correct that
character is shaped by the institutions of political, economic, and
family life, then becoming *good* will require access to the
appropriate institutions. Yet this is not to suggest that becoming
good is out of our reach. It may be helpful here to recall
Rawls's description of a "realistic utopia" in
*The Law of Peoples* when, following Rousseau in *The Social
Contract*, he writes that just institutions take "men as
they are" and "laws as they might be." (Rawls,
1999b, 7) Our psychological natures and the institutions that promote
good qualities of character are, in his view and in the views of
others discussed throughout this entry, congruent.