## 1. Introduction


### 1.1 Architecture as Relatively Neglected by Philosophy


Over the course of Western philosophy, including the history of
aesthetics, architecture has largely failed to attract sustained,
detailed attention--particularly as compared with other
artforms. Neither philosophical issues prompted by architecture, nor
the fit of architectural phenomena into larger philosophical debates,
have captured the philosophical imagination as have, for example,
literature or painting. Some contributions across the span of Western
philosophy--including those of Wolff and Schopenhauer--rank
as historically significant; other, more recent accounts are
broad-ranging and gravid with conceptual concerns, including those of
Scruton and Harries. Further, some philosophers have even dabbled in
architectural projects: Dewey contributed to plans for the Chicago
Laboratory School, Wittgenstein collaborated on designing a house for
his sister, and Bentham sketched the Panopticon design as a plan for
prison reform. Yet the overall state of philosophical reflection on
architecture--even in the present day--is less lively than
like discussions focused on artforms of far more recent origin, such
as film or comics. Some philosophers working in the Continental
tradition have offered accounts of the experience of architecture or
its social ramifications; a deficiency is more marked in analytic
aesthetics.


For more on the background and context of conceptual explorations
of architecture, see the supplementary documents:



> 
> Philosophy of Architecture in Historical Perspective  
> 
> Philosophy and the Tradition of Architectural Theory
> 


### 1.2 A Word on Terminology


 This essay refers generally to the basic creative output of
architects, in any (unspecified) form, as "architectural
objects". This is in parallel with the term "art
objects" in use, across aesthetics and philosophy of art, to
refer to objects created by artists independent of the artform and
without regard to ontological or other discussions where other terms
may evoke one or another particular stance. It may turn out that
"architectural object" proves value-laden. Yet this is
less likely than with common alternatives in the literature:
"architectural works", perhaps wedded to creator intent,
status as extant or integral whole, or aesthetic ranking; or
"buildings", certainly wedded to built, hence concrete,
structures. "Built structures" is used here (except in
historical reference) to refer to the generic built output resulting
from architectural design, in recognition of a domain some view as
broader than buildings *per se*.


## 2. What is Architecture?


Fundamental questions about the nature of architecture motivate
much of contemporary philosophy of architecture: what sort of
enterprise architecture is; whether architecture has essential
features; what kinds of things architecture makes--yielding the
further issue as to whether architecture always, only sometimes, or
never is an artform; what renders architecture distinct from other
artforms (if it is one); and whether architecture includes all built
structures.


### 2.1 The Sort of Enterprise Architecture Is


One approach to grasping the true nature of architecture is to
define it in terms of the discipline. We may embrace the disciplinary
determinism of the British architect Cedric Price: "Architecture
is what architects do". Defining the discipline or practice of
architecture may seem a simple empirical affair. Even if we have
difficulty assessing what architectural objects or products are, we
can point to thousands of architects over several millennia around the
world engaged in one or another sets of activities that conventionally
have been associated with architectural practice, and generate a long
disjunctive claim about what architects do. An empirically rooted
approach has a long history: Vitruvius devises his normative account
of the virtuous architect on the basis of his familiarity with
then-contemporary practice. The same is true of other traditional
accounts of virtue in architects or builders, as in the sixth to
eighth century Indian *Manasara*
(maansaar) (Acharya 1928) and
eleventh century Chinese *Yingzao fashi*
(Ying Zao Fa Shi ) (Feng 2012). In the present-day,
sociology of the architectural profession offers a detailed empirical
perspective (Gutman 1988), and this can be extended to a sociology of
architectural worlds, modeled on Becker's sociology of art
worlds. 


A problem arises, though, if we look to history or sociology for a
unified account with common features of an architectural
discipline. While architectural practice has remained stable in
certain respects, change over its history greatly limits common
features, perhaps, to a core set of basic tools and rudimentary
principles of structural engineering. This suggests that, at root, the
practice of architecture must involve engineering or related
design. But architecture can't be reduced to a form of
engineering, if we think architectural ideals, taste, and expertise
contribute something over and above engineering facts, rules, and
practical knowledge. These further contributions suggest an art or
art-like role for architectural practice. However, the historical
record is mixed on the matter of whether architects are at the same
time pursuing art (or what we now consider as art) or should be
thought of as artists. Moreover, the historical record and resulting
disjunctive claim do not address cases where even the most basic tools
or structural principles are not deployed. Some such cases of not
observing basic structural principles, as fantasy architecture, may be
deemed marginal; other such cases, as landscape architecture, are
not.


Another dimension of defining architecture as a practice is
specifying the sorts of structures that architects design. At a bare
minimum, we can say that they feature some connection to human
use. But attempts to render this as non-trivial introduce further
puzzles (see SS2.3).


### 2.2 Architecture and Essential Features


A contrasting definitional approach suggests that, as a matter of
reasoned judgment, we can attribute to architectural practice--or
to the domain of architectural objects--core or even essential
features. A dominant reading of the Vitruvian tradition has it that
architecture embodies and is best understood through the three aspects
of beauty, structural integrity, and utility. An essentialist variant
suggests that architects must observe all three aspects or that any
structure aspiring to architectural status features all three. Other
prominent views advance a single aspect, generally function or form,
as primary. Thus, functionalist architectural doctrine places function
or utility at the heart of the architectural enterprise, with other
aspects of architecture subordinate thereto.


A hard-line functional essentialist holds that, if a built
structure has no function, then it is not architecture. As a modest
dissent, Graham (1989) proposes that such a structure *is* an
architectural work--but a *failure* at such. One brand of
more radical rejection suggests that some architectural
objects--perhaps including follies, memorials, or
monuments--need have no function at all. As a competing
essentialism, formalist architectural doctrine suggests that an object
is architectural just in case it features forms proper to the
domain. A common interpretation says that forms proper to architecture
can be chosen off a stylistic menu (or combination of menus), leaving
architects great latitude while upholding the possibility of
contrasting, non-architectural forms (this is difficult to square,
however, with some experimental architecture).


In weighting architecture's aspects as essential, core, or
some lesser status, a related question is whether one or another
aspect is primary or necessary to any of the others. As Graham notes
(1989), the traditional question in architectural theory of whether
form trumps or precedes function may be cast in such terms.


Against these traditional brands of essentialism, two further kinds
of doubt may be cast. First, it may be that the Vitruvian triad, or
some single aspect thereof, does not represent the right list--we
should include either further aspects or different aspects
altogether. Alternatives might include dimensions such as context,
relations among architectural objects, systemic features,
sustainability, and psychological or social features. Some theorists
propose other candidates as essential architectural aspects, including
space (Zevi 1978) or the organizing concept of the *parti*
(Malo 1999).


Second, it may be that essentialism represents a false start. On
one non-essentialist view, the nature of an architectural object is as
we experience it, a matter upon which we may agree but which depends
in part on subjective perception and reception of, and interaction
with, the work (Scruton 1979/2013). This leaves open the possibility
that architecture has essential aspects but we simply don't
experience them as such. A more determined nominalist has it that
diversity among architectural objects is sufficient to quash the
prospect that they share any *essential* aspects.


### 2.3 The Kinds of Things Architecture Makes


Yet another way to pose the question of what architecture is
focuses on the sorts of things architectural objects are. In
particular, and relative to architecture's possible status as
artform, architecture as a domain may be defined variously in terms of
its objects being art objects (or not), being distinctive sorts of art
objects, or belonging exhaustively to a *special* class of
built structures (rather than including all such structures). 


**Whether architecture always, only sometimes, or never is an
artform.** At the negative extreme, architecture may be viewed
like any engineered artifact that only incidentally bears aesthetic
value. Any view of even slightly more positive valence bows in the
direction of intent to generate aesthetic value. The classic Vitruvian
view, for example, has it that engineered design and aesthetic design
are conjoint intentional elements of architectural objects. At the
positive extreme, that is, the suggestion that architecture is always
and in all ways an art, we may lose any means of discriminating among
built structures as art or not. This is a troubling prospect to
exclusivists who see architecture as a high art only (see below). 


In the negative camp, S. Davies (1994) argues that mere production
of occasional artworks does not suffice to constitute an
artform--crafts being a notable example--and the aim of
architecture is frequently, or even typically, not the production of
art but useful items that do not aim at artistic value. In the
positive camp, Stecker (2010) responds that we can carve out a
subclass of architectural objects that are art even if not all are. He
adds, by way of historical argument, that architecture was included
among the artforms, by early agreement among aestheticians. We might
have grounds for dismissing architecture from the canonical list if
the nature of architecture has changed, and in this vein Stecker notes
a rising tide of building design that is functionally oriented without
significant aesthetic investment. A further alternative is to say that
architectural objects are all art works, or at least intended as such,
within bounds. To make sense of the term "vernacular
architecture" requires that we see architectural objects as
typically art objects, while we make allowance for a broad class of
architectural objects that are low-art rather than high-art. 


If the negative view is correct, then we need at least a workable
set of criteria by which to discriminate architectural objects as
art. To this end, we may draw on our intuitions, norms, or socially
expressed views. Further considerations may include the pertinent
cultural tradition in which an architectural object is created,
whether particular sorts of aesthetic qualities count more towards
artwork status, or whether there is instrumental benefit in
considering the object as art.


**What renders architecture distinct from other artforms (if
it is one).** If architecture counts among the artforms, we may
think that it has distinctive features as such. For example, Scruton
(1979/2013) suggests that architecture is a
*non-representational* artform since it need not--and
generally does not--represent any content. Despite
architecture's non-representational status, Scruton agrees with
Langer (1953) (and anticipates Goodman (1985)) that architectural
objects can express or refer; in his view, to thoughts associated with
expressed properties. Others focus on architecture's distinctive
commitments to creator or user engagement. Winters (2011) sees
architecture as a "critical" artform, requiring the
creator's engagement in the environment where other artforms may
tolerate a creator's detached stance. Another distinctive mark
of architecture among the artforms is its nontraditional status as a
narrative medium: the design of circulatory pathways allows
architectural objects to communicate a sequence of events through the
movement of visitors or inhabitants.


**Whether architecture includes all built
structures.** Among the issues noted here, that of the greatest
consequence is the question of what counts among architectural
objects. On an *inclusivist* or expansive conception,
architectural objects are those designed objects ranging over the
whole of the built environment; on an *exclusivist* conception,
the range describes only some coherent subset of the whole of the
built environment. Examples of exclusivist subsets include (a) only
built structures that people can occupy (typically: houses, temples,
office buildings, factories, etc.), or (b) only built structures
designed in primarily aesthetic (rather than purely functional)
terms. An inclusivist conception entails a vastly larger architectural
domain of objects--and areas of practice and inquiry.


Proponents of exclusivity (S. Davies 1994, Scruton 1979/2013) are
eager to protect architecture as the preserve of just those objects in
the built environment with abundant, apparent, and appreciable
aesthetic qualities; clear creator's intentions to generate art;
or the panache of high art and engagement with art historical
trajectories. Stecker (2010) offers a putative variation, allowing
that as a broader creative medium architecture has an inclusivist
character--though, as an *artform*, architecture is
exclusivist. Scruton, for his part, identifies a specific intent to
*exalt*: architecture as a pursuit has lofty goals or purposes,
such that architectural objects do as well. One commonsense
justification for exclusivity overlaps with an institutionalist
perspective: laymen and connoisseurs alike can differentiate between
the striking work of an architect and the humdrum, cookie-cutter
building design of a draftsman.


Arguments for inclusivity include Carlson's appeal (1999) to
consider the class of architectural objects as of a continuum with the
broader class of everyday designed objects, where everything admits of
possible aesthetic appreciation. Then, *contra* Stecker, we can
effortlessly count all built structures as architecture, though some
such things--like garage doors or drainage ditches--will
neither look like, nor be, art. Another line of attack is to respond
to exclusivists that architects simply have intentions to create
objects that are, in one aspect, art--and that they may fail as
art is beside the point. Further, it may be that recognizing
intentions is irrelevant to judging a built structure as architecture,
as when we judge as architecture the vernacular structures of foreign
cultures. In response to Scruton's exaltation criterion, the
inclusivist may note that for all artforms, there are typically
innumerable objects in the domain with no such goals--and
possibly no goals at all. Finally, inclusivism has its own commonsense
justification: we standardly refer to a creator of a mundane built
structure as the architect, which seems less a linguistic shortcut
than recognition of the training and ethos attached to the creator of
architectural objects.


It is not clear how to craft intermediary positions between
inclusivism and exclusivism, given that the various brands of
exclusivism are not absolute and test cases are instead subject to
judgment along any number of parameters. Stecker's exclusivism
for only architecture as art represents one such relativized
stance. Inclusivism, by contrast--along with any attached views
on, for example, architectural appreciation or the nature of aesthetic
success in architecture--is an absolutist doctrine. All elements
of the built environment--and much else besides--must count
as architectural objects, or else the view fails. 


## 3. Metaphysics


The metaphysics of architecture covers a surprising range of
questions for those who see in architecture no more than
metaphysically mundane built structures or stones, wood, metal, and
concrete arranged in a pleasing fashion: the nature of architectural
objects and their properties and types, the relations of architectural
parts and wholes, and the prospect of architectural causality.


### 3.1 Ontology


Given the familiarity of architecture in, and as constitutive of,
our physical surroundings, it is strongly intuitive to think of
architectural objects simply as buildings, in the way we think of the
objects of the sculpture artform as sculptures, or the objects of
cutlery as forks, knives, and spoons. Yet such intuitions may be
misguided. For one, though some built structures--including
roadways, bazaars, and newspaper kiosks--are not buildings
*per se*, we may take them to have architectural properties and
thereby consider them as architectural objects. For another, the
outputs of architecture are not limited to built structures but
include as well models, sketches, and plans, and this variety prompts
questions as to whether these are all reasonably considered
architectural objects and which, if any, such form of output
represents a primary sort of object in architecture. A third
consideration is the focus in architecture, not solely on whole or
individual buildings, but also on parts of buildings and buildings
considered in context, among other buildings and in landscapes
(downwards and upwards compositionality or modularity). A fourth
consideration is that--as with music and photography--where
multiple instantiations of a given work are possible, we may dispute
whether the work is identical to the instancing built objects or else
to the common entity (e.g., plan) on which those instances are
modeled. In addition to such challenges, the intuitive view must best
alternative views.


**Instantiating architectural objects.** To address
one sort of question about the identity of an architectural object, we
seek *kind-wise* criteria that establish when an object is
*architectural*, instead of being non-architectural altogether
or only derivatively so. To address another sort of identity question,
we look for *instance-wise* criteria that establish when an
object is this or that singular object, or an instance of a multiple
object. Ready criteria for identifying object instances in
architecture include historical, environmental, stylistic, and formal
features--all of which may be read as signaling intentions to
design particular, self-contained architectural objects. One issue,
however, is whether traditional criteria (or others as may be posed)
are sufficiently specific so as to skirt vagueness problems that all
such artifacts may face (Thomasson 2005) and provide markers of being
a *bona fide* instance of a multiple work or a replica of all
other *bona fide* instances (Goodman 1968/1976). 


**Architectural objects as ontologically
distinctive.** Yet another way to pick out architectural
objects is to set them apart from other art objects or artifacts.
Assuming there is more than one art ontology (*see*
Livingston 2013), we might look to define a distinctive architectural
ontology by reference to specifically architectural qualities, such as
"mass" (degrees of heaviness and lightness) or
directedness (in circulatory pathways); or utility considerations,
such as functional design, use, and change; or everyday artifactual
features. An inclusivist may add features special to the built
environment beyond the realm of buildings.


**Kinds of architectural ontologies.**
Architecture's distinctive qualities may help sort among
candidate ontologies. One option is concretism, which--in keeping
with standard causal efficacy claims and expressed intentions of
architects, clients, and users--suggests that architectural
objects are either built structures or, on one variant, otherwise
physically instantiated designs for such structures (such as
models). Concretism is supported by an artifactual ontology that
subsumes architectural objects into the class of objects that are the
product of intentions, designs, and choices (on the view that
*all* art objects are best so understood, see Dutton 1979,
S. Davies 1991, Thomasson 1999, and Levinson 2007.) One version of
architectural artifactualism identifies buildings as systems (Handler
1970). As against concretism, intentionality may be the mark of
materially constituted, designed architectural objects but that need
not commit us to their existence alone or their primacy among such
objects. Moreover, taking intentions as determinative leaves the
concretist with the problem of shifting intentions and unintended
goals attached to built structures over time.


Abstractist alternatives follow a well-worn path in aesthetics
(Kivy 1983; Dodd 2007; critics include S. Davies 1991; Trivedi 2002;
Kania 2008; D. Davies 2009) and accommodate an expansive architectural
domain that includes historical, fantasy, and unbuilt works. Per
classic Platonism, abstractism allows identification of an
architectural object and concrete counterparts--including
multiple replicas--by reference to a single, fixed, and
unchanging background source of what real world structures (or fantasy
structures) are and should look like.


Against abstractism, some architectural objects are apparently
singular because historically and geographically contingent (Ingarden
1962); it is unclear what an experiential account of
architectural abstracta looks like; and abstracta are not created
whereas architectural objects are. De Clercq (2012) further proposes
that, even if there were abstract architectural objects, we
don't refer to them. If I refer to "10 Downing
Street", my expression picks out the built structure, not the
plan, nor any other abstract representation or entity to which the
built structure at 10 Downing Street corresponds. However, a plausible
alternate interpretation of the referent is as "the abstract
object physically instantiated by the structure I am perceiving (or
have perceived)".


As an alternative to an abstractist-concretist divide, a pluralist
ontology (*per* Danto 1993), allows "material
bases" and "aesthetic ideas" as different sorts of
architectural objects. Goodman's account (1968/1976) lends
itself to a pluralist, or at least aspectual, reading. He suggests
that, but for certain conditions unmet, an architectural object could
be identified as those structures that perfectly realize a
corresponding plan or other suitable architectural notation (see SS4). On his nominalist view, the
objects turn out to be the built structures but an available realist
interpretation--which may better accommodate the multiples that
are key to his story--takes the objects to be the class of such
structures. 


Another alternative suggests that architecture consists in actions
or performances (*per* Currie 1989; D. Davies 2004), rendering
derivative any concrete structures or "traditional"
abstract entities. Lopes (2007) proposes the possibility of an events
or temporal parts ontology for a kind of built structure that passes
in and out of existence, though De Clercq (2008, 2012) counters that
such can be rendered in a material objects ontology through temporal
indexing. Yet other ontologies are contextual or social
constructivist, proposing that architectural objects exist, beyond
their status as structured materials, in virtue of ways our reality is
framed, psychologically, socially, or culturally (*per*
Hartmann 1953, Margolis 1958). A shift in any such frame may bring
about shifting identity in an architectural object, in the manner of
Borgesian art indiscernibles (Danto 1964), and it may count in favor of
those ontologies that architectural indiscernibles are all around, in
the form of repurposed built structures.


Picking an ontology has wide-ranging significance, relative to
questions of material constitution, composition, part-whole relations,
properties, and relations in architecture, as well as the character of
architectural notation, language, cognition, or behavior; there are
also ramifications for simplicity and complexity, and the nature of
ornament, proportion, context, and style. In architectural practice,
the ontology of choice also colors perspectives on such matters as
intellectual property rights, collaborative work, and preservation of
architectural structures. 


### 3.2 Part-Whole Relations


On one customary view of architectural objects, individual built
structures (or their abstract counterparts) represent the primary unit
of our aesthetic or, for that matter, any architectural, concern; all
other ways of carving up the architectural world are derivative. This
view is consonant with an equally customary perspective identifying
architectural objects with architectural works. Alternative views
include a "mereology", in which parts of built structures
(or their abstract counterparts) constitute independent architectural
objects; and an environmental contextualism, in which collections of
built structures (or their abstract counterparts) constitute
independent objects. Both alternatives share a commitment to some form
of compositionality among architectural objects, that putting bits
together yields aesthetically meaningful and utility-bearing
composites, and taking them apart yields like results. In this, the
mereological view represents a *downward*-compositionalism,
suggesting that architectural aesthetics demands our focus on
structural or other elements that can be meaningfully
distinguished. Environmental contextualism represents an
*upward*-compositionalism, suggesting that architectural
aesthetics cannot be pursued entirely separately from the aesthetics
of cities or towns (*per* Scruton 1979/2013).


### 3.3 Causality


Questions about causality may seem out of place in discussions of
immobile objects, such as most architecture represents. Yet
architectural objects appear to have a role in causing events to
happen or other things to come into being. For example,
socio-psychological evidence suggests that architectural objects cause
behavior, and much of architectural design is predicated on this
claim. A further question is whether one architectural object may
"cause" another. Thus, the presence of one or more
architectural objects might have a causal effect on the genesis or
character of one or more further works by dint of social utility,
planning needs, or aesthetic drivers. If true, then--as with
consequentialism in ethics--further questions arise regarding the
range of causal possibilities. Where ethicists ask whether a bad may
generate a good, we may ask whether the presence or construction of a
functionally or aesthetically impoverished architectural object might
occasion the presence or construction of a more useful or pleasing
architectural object.


## 4. Architectural Language and Notation


The notion that there is or should be an architectural
language--or more than one--has a provenance dating to
ancient times. In classic form, the architecture-as-language thesis
runs from the Vitruvian suggestion that the orders present rules for
combination and ordering of architectural parts, through
Alberti's rhetoric-inspired model for architectural description
(van Eck 2000), and an analogy common among Renaissance and early
modern authors (such as Wren) of architectural rules and expressive
capacity with the Latin language. Lavin (1992) suggests that
Quatremere de Quincy (1803) develops the thesis, from a
traditional view of the classical orders as grammatical building
blocks directly representing primitive structures, to a modern view of
structural elements broadly representing social and moral ideas and
principles. Variations of the thesis range over elements of an
architectural language, how it may be used, and from whence it may be
derived.


The core idea, in its most prominent form, is that architecture as
a corpus of design ideas (realized or otherwise) features a set of
fundamental design and style elements which can be combined and
related according to a set of rules (syntax), capable of constituting
or parlaying meaning (semantics), and subject to contextual
sensitivity and internal or relational constraints on deployment and
realization (pragmatics). Beyond these structural parallels with basic
facets of natural language, it is held that the purposes and
possibilities of architecture *qua* language yield further
parallels, best explained by the notion that architecture has, or even
*is*, a language.


Proponents of such views tend to subscribe, however, to defenses
rooted in one or another feature of language. On
syntactically-inspired views--the perspectives most indebted to
the Vitruvian account--there is at least one architectural
grammar or set of rules for guiding proper assemblage of parts and
orientation, relation, and combination of whole architectural
objects. Some late twentieth century architectural theory embraced a
grammar framework (Alexander et al. 1977; Hillier and Hanson 1984);
such a view also underwrites a formalist vision for CAAD (Mitchell
1990). Adherents of the
view (Summerson 1966) assign themselves the central task of
identifying such rules. Even if this is achieved, though, a greater
puzzle is whether there are identifiably *preferable*
syntaxes--and what the criteria should look like. 


On a semantics-inspired view, architectural objects or their
component parts bear meanings. A primary motivation for this view is
that, like objects of other artforms, architectural objects are
expressive, which suggests that what they express is meaning (Donougho
1987). Proponents point to an array of architectural meanings,
internal or external to the object. The former tells us something
about the architectural object (its function or internal composition)
or how it relates to other architectural objects (stylistic
conventions); the latter tells us something about the world, as for
example, national or cultural associations (*per*
geographically variant design vocabularies), theological or spiritual
significance (*per* religious design vocabularies), or
*per* Hegel (1826), the Absolute Spirit. A more ambitious
proposal (Baird 1969) has it that architectural objects exhibit such
semantic phenomena as metaphor, metonymy, or ambiguity.


Goodman (1985) proposes that buildings have meaning in that they
function symbolically relative to properties, feelings, or ideas,
sometimes through "standard" denotation, as when
representing symbolically (whether as building part or whole) some
other object in the world. Primarily, though, buildings function
symbolically through exemplification (literal or explicit denotation)
or expression (metaphorical exemplification) of properties of ideas,
sentiments, or objects in the world. Buildings only constitute
architecture *per se*, in Goodman's view, if they bear
meaning in one or more of these ways. While Goodman may have
identified a denotative role for buildings, this is not clearly a
semantic role. 


A third approach, rooted in semiotics, emphasizes the role of
architectural objects as signs that prompt spectator behavior (Koenig
1964, 1970) or indicate aspects of themselves, such as function (Eco
1968). In either case, architectural objects are taken to operate
as communicative systems (Donougho 1987). A semiotics program was
embraced by the late 20th century postmodernist movement in
architecture (Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour, 1972/1977; Jencks
1977).


The architectural language thesis, in its various forms, is widely
discredited in recent philosophy of architecture. To begin with,
architecture features some qualities and exhibits some phenomena
resembling those of natural language, but the parallels are neither
comprehensive nor fully compelling. On the syntactic side,
architecture may feature some brand of compositionality but different
parts of architectural objects do not appear to function as do phrases
or clauses (Donougho 1987). Syntactic "wholes" do no
better, as there are no architectural assertions (Scruton
1979/2013). As regards semantics, no likely candidate for an
architectural vocabulary regularly yields any specific class or
instance of meaning. Whereas for Vitruvius the Ionic order connotes
female sensibility, it has a scholarly or deliberative meaning for
Renaissance architects, "*gravitas*" for Blondel
(1675-1683), and good governance for the architects of New
York's City Hall. Nor are there truth conditions such as might
supply the meaning of a well-defined architectural sequence (Taurens
2008). It's not even clear that architectural communication is
best understood as *sequential*; Langer (1967), for example,
suggests that the symbolic communication of architectural objects is
instead holistic. As for pragmatics, there is no clear parallel with
implicature or related phenomena, hence architecture is incapable of
the accuracy or concision of expression we associate with language
(Clarke and Crossley 2000). Finally, relative to semiotics, not
all--or even many--buildings signify and we would only
*want* some to do so. 


On the bright side, it's not clear that we should want
architecture to be more language-like. Regarding semantics, whatever
we gain in fixing particular meanings to architectural objects, we
stand to lose in fungibility of their forms. Regarding syntax,
adherence to grammars brings the utility of standards and,
*per* Scruton and Harries, a template for the community's
voice--but for some may represent stifling constraints on the
aesthetic imagination.


In the end, it is useful to ask what work we expect the
architecture-as-language thesis to do. One view (Alexander et
al. 1977; Alexander 1979) takes the thesis to underscore the robust
nature of design patterns and known design solutions and, for a given
culture, a common vocabulary (Donougho 1987). However, it may be
sufficient to highlight ways in which architecture is *like* a
language, though they do not add up to an architectural language
(Forty 2000). If so, then the thesis works best as a powerful metaphor
rather than as literal truth. 


An alternate take on linguistic phenomena in architecture appears
in Goodman's proposal (1968) that we think of notational systems
or schemes for the arts as symbolic systems with potentially
language-like features. Goodman suggests that architecture is a
borderline case of an *allographic* artform, as its notational
schemes--in the form of plans--are intended to guarantee
that all objects as are compliant are genuine instances of the
work. (Said intention, Goodman proposes, is not fulfilled.) That an
object instance the work just when compliant with the notation would
indicate the notation's satisfaction of syntactic and semantic
criteria providing requisite grounds for identity across instances,
and signal a corresponding insignificance of historical context and
conditions of production to the object's identity. Goodman, for
his part, balks at taking architecture to be truly allographic given
the core role of history and context in generating particular
structures, and notational ambiguity that marks the analog medium of
traditional plans. Digital design may well resolve the ambiguity
problem, however, and allow indexing for history and context,
rendering architecture allographic *per* Goodmanian criteria
(S. Fisher 2000b). The term
"architectural language" then takes on a
different--and more plausible--sense.


## 5. Formalism and Anti-formalism


### 5.1 Formalism


In its most general sense, formalism works in architecture as it
does (or doesn't) in other artforms. Thus, architectural
formalism suggests that the sum total of aesthetic properties of an
architectural object are or arise from formal properties, such that
our aesthetic judgments are warranted based on experience and
assessment of just those properties. As architectural objects are
typically non-representational and designed with manipulation and
relation of forms as a primary task, it is natural that their formal
properties be seen as playing a central role in our aesthetic
appreciation of them. The question posed to the traditional
("hard") formalist is whether those properties are
*unique* or at least dominant drivers of aesthetic properties
and judgment, a question underlined by important roles of history,
styles, and other contexts in our grasp of the architectural
enterprise and individual architectural objects. Our aesthetic
judgment of I. M. Pei's Louvre Pyramids is surely to some degree
in reaction to their "pure" form but--for the aware
spectator--perhaps just as much in reaction to their relationship
to historical context (the Giza pyramids as emblematic of pyramidal
form in architecture, and of monumental architecture altogether) or
setting (in contrast to the ornate neo-Baroque Louvre buildings that
surround them, but in keeping with traditional French emphasis on
geometric form in design).


Variants of architectural formalism take formal properties as the
properties of (or arising from) the material or physical properties of
built structures (as consonant with concretism), or as the properties
of (or arising from) the total properties specified by a set of formal
parameters we identify with the architectural object (as consonant
with abstractism). Further architectural strains are characterized by
moderation (*per* Zangwill 2001), suggesting that some
architectural objects are best understood by appealing to their formal
properties, others not; or by assimilation of canonically non-formal
properties to a formalist scheme (in the manner of Levinson's
"indicated structures"; see S. Fisher 2000b); or by a
"mereological" view wherein some *parts* of a given
architectural object may be best understood and judged by their formal
properties, others not. For the merelogico-formalist, it might count
in favor of considering such parts as independent architectural
objects that we can judge those parts on a formal basis alone.


Formalism appears in some traditional architectural theories as a
normative practical or critical guideline, namely, that our best
design thinking takes as central an architectural object's
shape, color, and other formal elements. Other, non-formal aspects of
an architectural object are discounted as contributing to its
success. Mitrovic (2011, 2013) embraces a normative formalist approach
to criticism, on the grounds that the deeply visual nature of much
cognition militates against basing appreciation or evaluation of
architectural objects exclusively or primarily on features we
understand through non-visual means (such as context or history
provide). 


### 5.2 Anti-Formalism and Functional Beauty


The anti-formalist traditionally focuses on the importance to
aesthetic judgment about non-formal properties, including historical
context; other, categorial forms of context (Walton 1970); or
non-cognitive properties. As an architectural application would have
it, we likely judge Jefferson's University of Virginia campus as
stately or dignified or evocative of democratic ideals because of the
neo-classical design, the campus' place in histories of American
architecture and university architecture, and its continuous
rededication through the everyday functioning of an enduring, living
university. None of this judgment appears to have particular roots in
*forms* Jefferson deployed, except as befit a neo-classical
style--which style may be best grasped in historicist terms.


Aside from historicism, a principal variant of architectural
anti-formalism derives from functional beauty theory, which has its
roots in (a) a late modern tradition of judging an object beautiful if
fit for its intended function (Parsons and Carlson (2008) find this
tradition in Berkeley's *Alciphron* (1732) and Hume's related
suggestion (*Treatise* (1739-40)) that beauty of artifacts consists in
their appearing to bear utility), and (b) Kant's proposal that
architecture is an artform capable of generating dependent beauty. (In
the latter case, beauty stands in relation to concepts with which we
associate architectural objects, which for such objects are typically
the ends towards which they are created.) One modern version proposes
gauging the beauty of a designed object by reference to
designer's intent in crafting a functional solution; for
S. Davies (2006), where an object displays functional beauty,
aesthetic considerations and the object's primary function each
act to shape the other. *Per* Parsons and Carlson (2008), the
problem with such intentionalist accounts in architecture (or
elsewhere where functional beauty pertains) is that functions
*change*. To work around this difficulty, they suggest, we need
a theory focused on "proper functions" for the artifacts
in question. This view is modeled on a selected effects account of
biological functions, as translated into a marketplace-driven scheme,
where evolution of design solutions is driven by demand over time.


Functional beauty faces several challenges. Even in their advocacy,
Parsons and Carlson caution against the suggestion that function
*solely* determines form, as that would neglect other features
of artifacts not possibly highlighted by their functions. Such
features include cultural significance or *aspects* of
non-dependent beauty as may be found in, for example, architectural
ornament. (In Davies' picture, there is no such neglect because
the functioning of artifacts--including art and architectural
objects--may have a cultural, spiritual, or otherwise
non-mechanical cast.) In the architectural realm, another challenge is
posed by ruins, which may be beautiful but have no functions. To the
charge that these represent counterexamples to functional beauty
theory, one tack is to answer that if ruins represent architectural
objects, they are dysfunctional and their beauty is manifest in
non-functional ways (Parsons and Carlson). Functional beauty theory is
saved on the whole but not as universally characteristic of
architectural objects.


A further challenge casts doubt on seeing functional beauty as the
only variant of dependent beauty, or beauty as the sole aesthetic
valence of interest to a viable notion of dependent aesthetic
properties. In an architectural vein, those variants may include
spiritual, emotional, or conceptual frameworks we bring to our grasp
of such built structures as houses of worship, memorials, or triumphal
arches. We can tell functional stories about these sorts of structures
in sociological or psychological analyses but not (or not only), as
functional beauty accounts would have it, in terms of their mechanical
or system-wise functioning. 


Looking beyond functional beauty--or more broadly, dependent
beauty--accounts of architecture, an inclusivist will seek the
thread that ties together architectural objects with aesthetic
properties of all description, be they functional, otherwise
dependent, or freely (independently) endowed with beauty or other such
properties. Thus, a modernist gas station and a Tschumi *folie*
may share an elegance unrelated to functional ascription *or*
the lack thereof. A general theory of architectural objects, along
inclusivist lines, suggests at least a moderate formalism.


## 6. Architectural Experience, Knowledge, and Appreciation


### 6.1 Experience of Architecture


A staple of philosophy of art is that our experience of art
objects--direct or otherwise--is central to basic belief
formation about them (first and foremost, aesthetic belief and
appreciation of art objects). The philosophy of architecture is
generally in agreement, though architectural objects may be of special
character in this regard, as our experiences of them gives rise to or
influences an extended range of psychological states. Beyond pleasure
in architectural beauty or other "positive" aesthetic
properties, experience of built structures also contributes to neutral
and less positive states of mind, and shapes how we broadly take in
our environment. A piece of that environmental understanding is local
to the built structure itself: the ways we experience architectural
objects may contribute to how we comprehend, and interact with, those
objects.


In addition to facilitating understanding, appreciation, or use of
architectural objects, experience might also play--or
reflect--a constitutive role. On Scruton's view, experience
constitutes for us the architectural object as an *aesthetic*
object (1979/2013). For Ingarden (1962), architectural experience
entails not only our cognitive grasp of the built structure's
physicality but as well our grasp of its designation as a specifically
*architectural* object rather than, say, as an arrangement of
bricks that happens to have the structure of a house.


The content and corresponding faculties of architectural experience
likely include some mix of the cognitive, emotive, and sensual.
Whereas an abstractist may claim that experience of architectural
objects is solely a matter of intellectual grasp, even an
anti-abstractist formalist needs the sensory as well to account for
experience of concrete shapes. Abstractist intellectualism
notwithstanding, accounts of architectural experience typically focus
on multiple content modalities. Sauchelli (2012a) proposes the use of
cognition in grasping pleasure ("intellectual pleasure")
as a central feature of architectural experience. The idea is that
fully comprehending the pleasure of the experience and thereby
establishing its aesthetic value requires cognition, in the form of
attention to details and understanding of the architectural
object. 


A blend of the cognitive and sensual is also characteristic of
Scruton's proposed "imaginative
perception"--the notion that we *may* perceive the
details of built structures in various ways, depending on directions
that our imagination takes us. Scruton (1979/2013) takes this
cognitive act--reminiscent of seeing-as and free play of the
imagination--as crucial to architectural experience. We are at
all turns required to make interpretative choices in parsing ambiguous
or multiform aspects of the built environment. Scruton focuses on
voluntary deployment of the imagination in perception at a
macro-level, concerning such matters as whether we see a sequence of
columns as grouped one way or another, or see pilasters as ornamental
or structural. The voluntary aspect of this account is critical to
Scruton's emphasis on the importance of taste and discrimination
to architectural aesthetics. In this, he loosely tracks Geoffrey
Scott's view of architectural experience as "sensuous
perception" interpreted through attendant values
(1914/1924).


A generalized version of this account looks to perceptual tasks at
a more granular level. Our experiences of space and spatial
positioning, depth, edge detection, color, and light yield multiple
interpretative possibilities across architectural objects, including
the simplest forms and smallest or largest parts of objects. These
perceptual tasks are pervasive and constant; sometimes involuntary and
in the background, and other times as shaped by our willful
imagining. If the involuntary tasks also represent or shape
interpretative acts, architectural experience by Scruton's
measure is that much less subject to aesthetic taste or
discrimination.


The dimensions of architectural experience are even larger when
taking into account the full breadth of the sensual. Following a long
tradition of viewing architecture through art historical lenses,
Scruton focuses on architectural experience as primarily visual and
static. In addition, though, other sensory modalities are factors:
changes in aesthetic judgments follow changes in those other sensory
experiences (Sauchelli 2012a). Such modalities among the non-visual
include the tactile, aural, and olfactory. Moreover, much
architectural experience is proprioceptive, incorporating visual
information into a broader set of stimuli to grasp bodily position and
movement in relation to the built environment.


Sensation of movement might seem irrelevant to experiencing an
immobile object, save for the fact that, in architecture (as in
sculpture) not all facets of a given whole work, or many other
architectural objects, can be perceived at the same time. The
spectator or user must move around or within the object to perceive
any significant percentage of it, much less the whole. Experience of
movement around architectural objects highlights for us the design
feature of circulatory paths and contributes to grasping an
object's formal features (such as rhythm in spatial patterns)
and perhaps, at least derivatively, its aesthetic features (such as
somberness) (Sauchelli 2012a; Rasmussen 1959). These aspects of
architectural experience capture the immersive nature of a
spectator's or user's relationship to a built
structure. Further aspects of our experience may capture the
architectural object's immersion in *its* larger
environment and surroundings, its "localized nature" or
context and "sense of location" (Carlson 1994). As
architectural objects standardly shape our actual, imagined, or
remembered bodily engagement, so are our richest experiences of
architecture informed by such engagement (J. Robinson 2012).


Central as bodily experience may be, it cannot be the only source
of architectural beliefs. Considering the great breadth of the
architectural enterprise, it may not even be the best source. Other
sources include access to beliefs about works through standard
representational modes that are not the works themselves, transmission
of tacit working knowledge through apprenticeship learning, and
collective belief formation through client briefings and studio group
critical assessment ("crits"). On these and other bases an
architectural knowledge of special character is built.


### 6.2 Architectural Knowledge


Knowledge of a building or other architectural objects follows
well-worn paths in some aspects of general knowledge of art. In
particular, architectural beliefs encompass judgments of aesthetic
properties of the built environment, are norm-governed in some
fashion, and may be transmissible via testimony. Yet other aspects of
knowing architectural objects diverge from the well-worn path, as
reflective of special characteristics of the architectural enterprise
and its products and consumption.


One traditional division of architectural knowledge promoted by
architectural historians, theorists, and practitioners--and
focusing squarely on creator's knowledge--has it that there
are two basic kinds: the theoretical/historical and the practical
(J. W. Robinson 2001). *Theoretical* and *historical*
brands of architectural knowledge encompass viable beliefs about
familiar core concerns of architecture, including basic design
elements of the built environment; their combinations, relations, and
properties; their style; external factors (social, economic, cultural,
etc.) which shape design; and historical contexts into which they
fit. Some such beliefs are empirically supported; others
not. *Practical* brands of architectural knowledge encompass
viable beliefs about the engineering and technical means of
constructing architectural objects, ensuring structural integrity, and
guaranteeing mechanical function, socially, industrially, or
ecologically beneficial use. Such beliefs--particularly as
hitched to formalized, experimental, or predictive dimensions of the
enterprise--are sometimes seen as constituting an
*architectural science*. They are typically (though not
exclusively) empirical in character and, to some tastes, relegated to
a status of *adjunct* architectural knowledge, that is, useful
for architecture but outside the domain proper. What counts as
practical knowledge in architecture is often seen as encompassing
beliefs of a largely non-aesthetic nature.


Yet other categories reflect a range of types and sources of
architectural knowledge. Another division distinguishes between
architectural beliefs associated with creators and users. My
experience of a built structure *qua* creator is perforce
different than my experience of the same structure *qua* user,
and the sorts of beliefs I arrive at may differ accordingly. As
architect, Jones believes that an arch of one design but not another
will keep the bridge up; as someone strolling underneath the bridge,
Smith believes that an arch of a different design would have been a
greater aesthetic success. This much accords with other artforms
featuring practical functions. Further, architectural beliefs may
differ by their technical or non-technical nature; by perspective and
role of the belief-holder; or by facts about physical experience of
the work or other modalities of belief acquisition.


**Architectural knowledge in broader context.** To see
how architectural knowledge may be similar to, or differ from,
aesthetic knowledge generally, consider two dimensions of aesthetic
knowledge, knowing *through* art and knowing *about* art
(Kieran and Lopes 2006). As concerns knowing *through*
architecture, cognitive content arises in reflecting--to varying
degrees--taste and style sensibilities of its creators,
structural properties *per* engineering principles deployed;
and cultural and social values of historical, communal, and economic
contexts. To know a built structure in this regard is to know such
matters as the tradition in which it is built; design aspirations of
the architect and initial occupants; and intentions relative to
contributing to the built or natural landscape. The success of this
thesis is predicated on successful communication through architectural
objects, whether as symbols or otherwise. 


Architectural belief and knowledge have as well wholly distinctive
features, reflective of special characteristics of the domain, its
practice, and its objects. These include:


*Beliefs about systems.* Architectural objects (as wholes)
are systems or system-like, in that they constitute sets of
interrelated structural components, with characteristic behavior or
processes yielding outputs from inputs, and where the parts are
connected by distinctive structural and behavioral relations (Boyce
1969). That we take whole architectural objects to be (or to be
represented as) systems or system-like suggests how architectural
beliefs are distinctive among beliefs about artworks. In particular,
we have beliefs about architectural objects that reflect functions and
interactions of (1) components individually and as parts of systemic
wholes, (2) systems as parts of broader environmental contexts, and
(3) persons' behaviors within the systems. Whereas the first
two functional and interactional features are typical to all design,
the third feature marks architecture as an artform that, in providing
an immersive and systemic physical environment, intensely draws on and
shapes social, psychological, and economic features of experience. Our
beliefs about architectural objects and interactions with and in them
are shaped correspondingly, in ways that do not arise in engagement
with other artforms. 


*Partial and full information.*  Representation in
architecture encompasses multiple modes, including built objects,
physical models, virtual models, data arrays, plans, sketches,
photographs, and drawings. Each such mode may be *viable* as
representing an architectural object just in case *some*
features of the object are adequately, accurately, regularly, and
optimally represented through the mode. This view of viable
representation in architecture is at odds with the standards for such
in other artforms. Consider a representation of the Mona Lisa. If you
do not have complete visual access through the representation (from
any acceptable angle) to the full tableau, you may be said to lack
full acquaintance with the work through the representation, and your
consequent aesthetic beliefs about the Mona Lisa may be discounted
accordingly. By contrast, if architectural beliefs required anything
like *full* acquaintance with the object or *fully
informed* testimony to be viable, our architectural beliefs would
not typically or frequently be viable. Rare is the case where
acquaintance is full or testimony fully informed--even among
those whom we might expect to have the greatest acquaintance, such as
a built structure's architect or developer.


*Socially constructed knowledge.* In architecture, as in
other design fields, design problems are not thoroughly or fully
articulated all at once or by any particular individual. The primary
components of design knowledge--problems and their possible
solutions--are instead distributed across persons. This fact
about architectural production--and, to a degree, its
use--suggests that beliefs we form about architectural objects
are formed amidst, and influenced by, such social relations (see SS8.1). Art and architecture worlds
*per se* are undoubtedly not a sole source of epistemic
norms. Yet social relations and circumstances among
architecture's stakeholders present constitutive conditions for
a wide swath of architectural beliefs, suggesting at least a moderate
social constructivism.


It may be thought that qualities of architecture such as
systematicity and the deeply social character of the discipline are
immaterial to *aesthetic* beliefs. However, architecture is a
holistic enterprise: a design decision to cantilever a terrace is at
once of aesthetic and engineering significance. In like fashion, that
architectural objects constitute systems is pertinent in shaping
aesthetic beliefs because there are more and less attractive ways to
shape the flow of persons, or even electricity, through a built
structure. And that architectural objects are designed through social
processes has import for corresponding aesthetic beliefs. For example,
aesthetic properties of a given design are subject to crits, the very
purpose of which is to influence the creator's further aesthetic
beliefs about the same design.


### 6.3 Architectural Appreciation


As distinct from mere *experience* of architectural objects,
*appreciation* of architectural objects brings to bear
cognition and other inputs, such as history and context. Appreciation
goes beyond *knowledge*, too, insofar as we may know an
architectural object and its qualities without appreciating it. Thus,
Winters (2007) proposes that appreciating architecture consists in
*enjoyment* of architectural objects (from experience, *tout
court*), as wed to *understanding* them, where the latter
consists in grasping their aesthetic significance in specifically
visual fashion, and critically assessing the judgment of architects in
addressing design challenges. Architectural appreciation may be built
on the judgment of others; it is essential to *rendering*
judgment. Accordingly, learning to appreciate architectural objects is
a cornerstone of architectural education. A key contributing feature
in this last regard is acquiring agility with classifying in the
domain (Leder et al. 2004).


The appreciation and judgment of architectural objects are
typically thought to reflect aesthetic *and* utility-wise
considerations, and engage individual perspective, experience,
reasoning, and reflection such as we associate with appreciating and
judging in other artforms. Drivers in appreciation and judgment
*special* to architecture include social framing and
environmental psychological factors that are a consequence of
architecture's intensely public nature.


**Exceptionalism.** One question regarding
appreciation is whether there is a special mode attached to
architectural objects. We might think this is so given that, unlike
most arts (though very like other design forms), appreciation in
architecture is aesthetic *and* utility-oriented. A resulting
puzzle is whether, and under what circumstances, we might have one
without the other. We might think as much if, say, it is possible to
appreciate the Roman Coliseum's stately and antique features
without any appreciation of its intended function or actual use. On
the other hand, a view of appreciation embracing functional beauty
theory may suggest that the Coliseum's functional and free
beauty are on at least equal footing--or that the
Coliseum's stately aesthetic and its role as amphitheater for
staging spectacles (for example) cannot be separated altogether.


Further questions regarding appreciation concern the relative roles
in appreciation of individual experience of architecture, as against
the social or the environmental.


**Individual Appreciation.** The prevailing
philosophical view of architectural appreciation is a psychological
account with debts to the Kantian tradition: direct, immediate
aesthetic experiences of architectural objects among individuals
constitute the basis of appreciation. (Iseminger 1981 provides a
general aesthetics account in this vein.) A primary variant has it
that architectural appreciation is the product of individual cognition
of the content, form, properties, and relations of architectural
objects. A recent variation suggests that, in addition to (or *in
lieu* of) cognitive response, physiological experience
(proprioception) is a central source of beliefs associated with
architectural appreciation. On either model, it is experience of
individuals that feeds and influences appreciation.


**Social and Environmental Role in Architectural
Appreciation.** Direct, immediate individual experience is not
the only source of information shaping architectural
appreciation. Considering the breadth of the architectural enterprise,
it may not even be the best source. Others include access to
information about works through standard representational modes that
are not the works themselves (for example, drawings or photographs),
transmission of tacit working knowledge through apprenticeship
learning, and collective belief formation through client briefings and
studio crits.


Architectural appreciation is *social* in building on our
understanding of architectural objects as it develops, and matures, in
experience of a built structure with and in relation to other
individuals and groups of people. It is also social in that we learn
markers of appreciation among those with whom we share such
experiences or (*per* Scruton 1979/2013) imagine ourselves to
do so. Indeed, a central goal of architectural education is structured
imparting of collective wisdom as to how to best classify
architectural objects and, relatedly, what the markers of appreciation
have looked like, or should look like--as well as how they
articulate with practical knowledge.


Further, architectural appreciation is *environmental* in
building on our understanding of architectural objects based on
experiences in relation to their natural and built surroundings. On
one view, an architectural object may be more difficult to appreciate
if we find that relation unexpected, or contrary to normative
sensibility (Carlson 1999). If, however, appreciation does not require
enjoyment or satisfaction of any sort--and instead engages our
understanding of, for example, what was intended and why--we may
well appreciate in its own right an architectural object that has a
surprising, even obnoxious relation to its surroundings.


## 7. Architectural Ethics


Some problems of architectural ethics are characteristic of a range
of typical moral dilemmas--agent-centered, norms-oriented
concerns--as may arise for architects. In addition to a
traditional set of questions applied to the architectural domain,
architectural ethics also addresses problems special to the discipline
and practice--as shaped by its social, public, practical, and
artistic nature. 


As conceptually prior to a normative ethics of architectural
practice, a meta-ethics of architecture assesses alternate ethical
modalities, such as whether architecture might be considered moral or
immoral relative to its objects (built structures) or to its practices
as a set of institutions or social phenomena. Another meta-ethical
issue concerns whether moralism or autonomism best characterizes the
relationship of aesthetics to ethics, as that plays out in
architecture.


**Ethical modalities of architecture.** There are
three typical candidate modalities of ethics in architecture. For one,
there is the establishment of criteria for ethical norms of the
enterprise such as architects in practice may observe. For example,
architects can craft designs in ways that lower the likelihood of cost
overruns and enhance safety. In an interpersonal vein, architects can
represent their work honestly to clients or contractors. Another
modality--beyond enterprise-defined ethical norms--is
pursuit of criteria to gauge architects as moral agents broadly
producing or doing good or bad in the world. For example, architects
may create objects that uplift or constrain individual users and
inhabitants; other architects may promote social utility by designing
housing for those in need of shelter. Finally, there is the modality
of seeking criteria to judge architectural objects as morally good or
bad insofar as they *directly* produce pleasure or pain. As an
*indirect* example, a hospital design is intended to facilitate
the minimizing of pain, by fostering environmental conditions
conducive to excellence in health care and patient well-being. As a
more direct case, a bus shelter is intended to reduce exposure to the
elements and corresponding discomfort. This last candidate may be
attractive if we see architecture primarily as a product rather than
as a practice; it is noxious if we are unwilling to assign moral
values to artifacts as we do to actions or their properties. A built
structure might be inhumane in that it is bleak or uninhabitable,
though it does not follow that the structure itself bears inhumane
values. 


**Value Interaction.** Vitruvian principles underlying
much of architectural theory suggest a tendency to link the aesthetic
and the utility-promoting. So, too, functional beauty theory
recommends that aesthetic and ethical considerations are linked in
architecture. To crystallize the matter, we may ask if it is possible
for a built structure to be good though not aesthetically so. The
question as to how aesthetic and ethical value might be related is a
subject of broader concern, with a "moralist" stance that
says the two sorts of value are or should be connected (Carroll 1996,
Gaut 1998) and an "autonomist" stance that takes the two
as (or better off as) independent (Anderson and Dean 1998, Kieran
2001).


In this debate, architecture would seem a promising domain in which
to find robust relations. At a moralist extreme, there is the
suggestion--supported by some traditions in architectural theory
(Pugin 1841, Ruskin 1849)--that aesthetic tasks in architecture
simply *are* ethical tasks, reflecting ethical choices. One
prominent moralist perspective locates the ethical element of
aesthetic architectural choice in obligations to a sort of honesty, in
designing works that accurately represent underlying structural
principles or operational capacities. Harries (1997) and Scruton
(1979/2013) arrive at similar ethical commitments to architectural
design as expressive in a particular fashion, though of shared
community values, rather than of function or structural features.
From another angle, moralists point to the emotional impact of built
environments as indicative of a union of the aesthetically gripping
and morally compelling (Ginsburg 1994), though it may be noted that
even where we detect such a union we need not judge the aesthetics of
the architectural object on the basis of any ethical import so
communicated.


At the other extreme, autonomists propose that problems of ethics
and aesthetics neither need arise at once, nor need be resolved at
once, in architectural design. If we see a correlation in some
architectural objects of ethically and aesthetically compelling design
solutions, we see in other objects no correlation at all. Thus, the
modern city is replete with instances of built structures that are
well-functioning, high-utility, and facilitate much good in the world
yet meet no one's standards of aesthetically worthy design.
There is good reason to uncouple these values just in case they
*must* conflict. Suppose there is an ethical premium, for
example, on the need to create environmentally sustaining structures,
and that we identify resolutions of that problem as generally bearing
the greatest mark of moral worth. Suppose further that crafting the
optimal moral solution (*vis-a-vis* the environment)
always generates the most unattractive design--and that the
inverse holds as well (the better the design aesthetically, the worse
the design for the environment). Then a connection between ethics and
aesthetics in architecture seems improbable.


A third position altogether proposes a pluralism. Sometimes ethical
and aesthetic value march hand-in-hand, other times not--and
their ways of matching up are diverse and run in various
directions. So one architectural design may be aesthetically
compelling as it reflects its ethically upstanding character, whereas
another design may be aesthetically compelling as it reflects its
ethically deficient character. What is required for cases of this last
sort is that the evaluator can identify the aesthetic success as
grounded, *per* functional beauty theory, in effective
expression of the structure's ethically deficient function
(Sauchelli 2012b). An even more generalized pluralism would suggest
that a wide range of aesthetic and ethical valences can be matched up
in different ways; we might value a war memorial for the way it grimly
expresses the horrors of war.


**Traditional questions of architectural ethics.** One
reason that architectural ethics is central to philosophy of
architecture is that architects' actions bear great influence
over other people's moral lives. Architects design structures
and environments for people, with concomitant effects on personal
behavior, capacity to choose courses of action, and ability to satisfy
preferences, visit harm, generate benefit, or exercise rights. As
architects' acts shape spaces, boundaries, and pathways that
structure individual behaviors and social acts, they prompt normative
ethical exploration along traditional lines.


To begin with, a traditional architectural ethics requires an
account of architectural *responsibilities.* Any such account
should outline architects' obligations to other persons, ethical
standards on which such obligations may be based, how to ensure such
standards might be met, and any other sorts of obligations architects
might have, as for example, to historic preservation or environmental
protection. As concerns obligations to persons, the range of
stakeholders in architecture is great, hence ethical responsibility is
diffuse.


A further set of questions concerns *rights*. It is
relatively novel to speak of authorial or community rights in
architecture; owner or client rights are historically parasitic on
property or sovereign rights. Other possibilities include rights of
developers, builders, engineers, environments, and societies. As that
list grows, two further questions concern the sorts of rights that can
be attributed to such parties or entities, and the criteria for
distributing and prioritizing them given aesthetic as well as moral
considerations.


Architectural *utility* is familiar as a Vitruvian concept
but has a wholly other sense in an agent-centered normative ethics,
with a possible moral weighting not found in classic architectural
theory*.* Guidelines are needed to determine the usefulness of
architectural goods such as built structures, restorations,
reconstructions, or plans. These might include their social character,
or individual preferences of the architect, owner, end-users, or
public. A utilitarian approach to architectural ethics is attractive
in capturing the aims of architecture to promote well-being, and
relying on a ready marker of architectural value. However, it also
discounts other traditional architectural imperatives such as a
Vitruvian-style pluralist may honor, including beauty and structural
integrity (Spector 2001). 


Finally, a traditionalist picture of architectural ethics requires
an account of *virtues* in the domain (though these may be
orthogonal to normative ethics). Here is potential consonance with the
Vitruvian tradition (and similarly virtue-oriented non-Western
traditions)--if we see the "good", morally educated
architect's virtue and character as our best guarantee of proper
and productive weighting of values under differing circumstances
(Spector 2001).


**Future-Focused Architectural Ethics.** The focus of
ethical rights and responsibilities in architecture is typically taken
as relative to present or past. Thus, we speak of obligations to
design and build in ethically responsible fashion, or preserve past
architectural objects. There are future-focused obligations, as
well. Sustainable design is forward-looking even as it is centered on
what we design and build today. Further ethical issues may arise
relative to future architectural objects. As to obligations to future
architectural *objects*, we see as much in the short-term
instance of planning around near-future buildings. More puzzling is
whether we might have "long-haul" future-facing
obligations--apart from utility or prudential
considerations--in planning, for example, new cities or
accommodations to climate change.


**Special ethical questions of architecture.**
Architectural practice generates special moral issues as befit its
proper, idiosyncratic features, distinctive among the arts, the
professions, and social practices. Most notably, an array of ethical
issues of social import arises from architecture's commitments
to creation of a socially beneficial and functional art. Such issues
include the nature of "better" housing (and under varying
conditions), what (if anything) makes housing an obligation, and ways
that such an obligation may accrue to, or be satisfied by,
architects. Yet other ethical issues special to architecture range
over matters of personal and social spaces and the articulations
thereof, including criteria for designing around concerns related to
privacy, accessibility (for the public generally and handicapped in
particular), respecting community and neighborly preferences, and
promoting civic values.


Other ethical matters special to architecture are particularly
visible in global perspective. For example, there is inequitable
distribution of housing across the developed and developing nations,
and part of the solution may be architectural (Caicco 2005). Further,
architecture incurs special environmental obligations given that waste
and degradation affect, and are affected by, architectural design. One
conceptual challenge of sustainability facing architects is to
determine whether development is, in principle, a countervailing
interest. This is to ask, once environmental obligations are defined,
how they may be factored into or weighed against infrastructural and
design interests and preferences.


**Professional Ethics.** Architectural professional
ethics focuses on architects' moral choices in the context of
practice (Wasserman, Sullivan, and Palermo 2000; T. Fisher
2010). Professional ethical codes govern conduct in (and thereby
protect) the architectural profession and avert problems related to
business, fiduciary, insurance, or liability functions; the design
function is an ethical focus relative to disability. Architectural law
highlights professional ethics matters as concern property, liability,
and honesty. The law clarifies responsibilities among parties to
architectural practice; defines who or what in commercial
architectural interactions has moral agency--hence rights; and
describes utility-wise or financial measures of distribution in
architecture. Legal regulations and judgments prompt conceptual
questions regarding such issues as intellectual property in
architecture, architects as arbitrators, and architects'
responsibilities to others (S. Fisher 2000a).


*Intellectual Property*. One conceptual issue concerning
architectural intellectual property is how such rights are to be
weighed against other sorts of property rights, such as domestic or
commercial rights. A further issue is determined on the basis of
judging architecture to be a service or product. Taking architecture
as *service* means that architects do not have a stake on
copyright, as they would then be creators-by-contract; tradition has
it that rights to expression of ideas so created accrue to the
contracting party. Taking architecture as *product* supports
architects' claim to copyright, given that expression is their
creation--whatever services are performed (Greenstreet 1998;
Cushman and Hedemann 1995). Copyright raises other concerns. Even as
the law may license creation of an architectural object reflecting
core design aspects found in another object created by a different
architect, we may find morally blameworthy any cognizant
"borrowing" without attribution or
permission. Alternatively, we might view this as a routine episode in
the history of architectural copying without attribution or
permission. The challenge is to define relevant obligations of one
architect to others, present or past.


*Architect as judge in owner-contractor disputes*.
Architects have a dual role, serving as designer and administrator of
architectural projects, and in this capacity may adjudicate between
owner and contractor in matters of dispute. Standard issues concern
conflicts of interest, grounds for adjudication, and criteria of
fairness. Ethical issues of a particularly *architectural*
stripe include the degree to which specifications are poorly satisfied
such as warrants reckoning; maintenance of fealty to owners'
interests alongside fairness to contractors and to satisfactory
realization of one's own design; and identification of virtues
appropriate to judgment in design-related disputes, along with facets
of being an architect that promote (or limit) such virtues.


*Responsibility to others' design*. Architectural
objects often develop over time in cumulative and mutable fashion,
through additions and alterations that--perhaps more frequently
than not--change the design of a different, original architect
(or that of a prior alteration). For any particular changes, or in
consideration of design changes overall, we may stipulate obligations
to respect original or prior intent and execution. One brand of such
obligations, recognized in historic preservation and landmark laws,
requires that aesthetic concerns in the public interest trump private
interests. Key conceptual questions concern how to determine the
source and conditions of any such obligations--and the sorts of
responsibilities architects should have to existing structures. Those
responsibilities may extend to commitment to the integrity of work by
fellow architects.


## 8. Architecture and Social and Political Philosophy


### 8.1 Socially Constitutive Features of Architecture


While all artforms admit of a certain social character,
architecture enjoys a particularly social nature, and may even be said
to be an *intrinsically* social artform. There are two
prominent candidate reasons as to why this is so. For one, a central
aim of architecture is to design shelter and so meet a variety of
social needs. For another, architecture as practice is a social
process or activity as it engages people in interpersonal relations of
a social cast.


The first candidate reason stands or falls on whether, in
fulfilling social needs, architecture is thereby rendered a social
art. For an artform to be intrinsically social, any such need
fulfilled should be critical rather than discretionary or
extravagant. Thus, for example, addressing housing demands overall
meets the criticality test--though addressing design demands for
a third home does not. The first reason looks right because architects
often integrate social needs into design thinking. Armed with socially
minded intentions, they create built structures which serve myriad
social ends. A difficulty arises, however, in consistently upholding
such intentions as a mark of the social if (a) such intentions are
unclear from experiencing architectural objects, instantiations, or
representations thereof, (b) built structures are repurposed, or (c)
there are architectural objects with no corresponding relevant
intentions. (As an instance, we might consider "found"
architectural objects like inhabited caves.)


A second candidate reason that architecture is a social art is that
processes of making architecture are thoroughly and ineluctably social
phenomena, constituted by interactions of social groupings created and
governed by social conventions and arrangements. On this view, the
social nature of architecture consists in the status of the discipline
as shaped by social convention--where such convention is
designated by, and guides actions of, architects and other relevant
agents. (This reason directly links the social nature of architecture
to its social impact--hence to sociology of architecture; see SS8.2.) Architectural phenomena are
social, then, because they occur as a result of contracts, meetings,
firms, charettes, crits, juries, projects, competitions, exhibitions,
partnerships, professional organizations, negotiations, workflow
organization, division of labor, and myriad other conventional and
agreement-bound purposive actions and groupings of architects and
other architectural stakeholders. One might object that, on an
institutional theory, *all* artforms are social in just these
ways. However, as played out in art worlds, institutional theories
tell us what counts as an art object rather than how such objects are
constituted to begin with. Proponents of this candidate must rule out
a *naive architecture* scenario, the possibility of a lone
architect who has no socially significant engagements such as shape
her creations.


Either view is temporally sensitive. These parameters and how they
constitute architecture's sociality will change over time, along
with vicissitudes in social needs, conventions, and relations.


### 8.2 Socially Efficacious Features on, and of, Architecture


Architecture as object and pursuit produces a great range of
effects on social structures and phenomena, in particularly acute
fashion in relation to housing, land use, and urban planning. In turn,
architecture is shaped by such social concerns as scarcity, justice,
and social relations and obligations. Some of this shaping results
from social group and institution requirements for space and the
structured organization thereof, to promote group or institutional
function and identity (Halbwachs 1938). In addition, other social
requirements stem from architecture's roles in meeting concerns
and needs for society as a whole.


**Causal direction.** We might see social forces as
primarily shaping architecture or else architecture as primarily
shaping social forces. Proponents of architecture as
"shaper" suggest that architecture provides a means of
organizing society, a core Modernist claim but also a thesis of
broader currency. Detractors counter that we cannot shape society
through the built environment--or we ought not do so. What rests
on directionality is how we parse not only theoretical relations but
also practical consequences and perspectives concerning a host of
social phenomena. To take one example, how we gauge and address the
possibilities that architecture offers relative to social inequality
is likely a function of whether architecture contributes to, or
instead reflects, social classes and social hierarchies. We might
wonder whether architects can design so as to promote class
equality--or solidarity, justice, autonomy, or other social
phenomena as we might foster.


On a third, holistic option, causality runs in both directions. Two
examples of such are (a) systems analyses, which take built structures
as *social systems* that contribute to social function, and (b)
urban sociology, which takes the city *en gros* as social
structuring of space which shapes its habitants, who in turn shape the
city (Simmel 1903). As expanded to *environmental* sociology,
the suggestion is that built environments promote patterns of living,
working, shopping, and otherwise conducting commerce among groups and
in relation to other individuals.


Other social science domains suggest attendant conceptual
issues. For example, one sociological perspective takes relations of
individuals and groups to built structures to be analogous to
consumption (Essbach 2004); we may ask whether architectural objects
enjoy a reception of this particular social sort, a range of such
sorts (perhaps as context-dependent), or perhaps, on an individualist
read, no sort we would call "social". For another,
sociology of architecture also studies the profession: the backgrounds
and relations of architects and other stakeholders, norms governing
behavior, and social structures of an architecture world constitute a
species of artworld. This last suggestion prompts the question as to
what influence we should attribute to an architecture world on the
status of architectural objects. The *architecture* world
raises issues beyond those motivating Danto or Dickie, engaging many
parties whose interests and preferences are not primarily aesthetic or
even economic but driven by social, commercial, engineering, planning,
and various other factors. For a third, a Science and Technology
Studies perspective (Gieryn 2002) investigates how
architecture--primarily in its optimization focus, *qua*
engineered technology--shapes knowledge formation (for example,
in laboratory or university design) and organizes social behavior (for
example, in architecture for tourism or retail sales). Conceptual
issues here include whether there are *global* principles of
optimization of architectural design for social advancement, and what
sorts of moral constraints are appropriate to such optimization.


### 8.3 Architecture and the Political


That architecture has *some* political aspects is a widely
held, if not entirely uncontested thesis, with weaker and stronger
variants. One weak version suggests that designing built structures
entails political engagement through interactions of architects and
the public. For example, architects solicit political support of
government officials for development projects, governments engage
architects to design built structures that express political
programmatic messages, and citizens do political battle amongst
themselves over architectural designs or preservation decisions. A
stronger version highlights a possible role for architecture as an
instrument of politics. Thus, Sparshott (1994) characterizes
architecture as "...above all the coercive organization of
social space". In other words, designing built structures
entails political engagement through the control by force of behaviors
and attitudes of people who interact with those structures.


That architecture might have any significant role in politics, or
the other way around, calls for explanation. One account stresses that
the two domains are oriented around utility-maximization. Utility
criteria deployed to judge the worth of architectural objects are
exemplary subjects of democratic debate, policy analysis, or community
consensus. The appeal to utility is an advocacy strategy for
architectural design that dates to Bentham's Panopticon
(1787) or before. Further, traditional architectural promotion of
urban and social planning may be linked to social utility criteria for
architectural quality; that relationship might run in either
direction. In distinct progressive and utopian traditions in
architectural thought (Eaton 2002), advancement of social utility is a
central motivation in architectural attempts to realize idealistic
visions of modes of living and societal organization. (For a critique,
see Harries 1997.)


**Power, control, and change.** Architecture's
political cast is also manifest in use as a means of social
control. This is not an obvious use in societies where individuals
freely choose dwellings or other structures with which they
interact. The less choice available in this regard, the greater the
possibility of defining people's choices (a) concerning the
built environment they occupy and (b) as a function of that
environment. Prominent such architectural types include prisons and
refugee camps. Some see potential in architecture for more globally
promoting maintenance of power through behavior regulating norms that
such built structures *represent* (Foucault 1975).


Even in generally free or open social settings, though, at the
level of urban planning architecture indirectly determines behavior in
politically shaped ways. Architects and others planning urban or other
densely settled environments take into account such political aims as
honoring community values, promoting civic virtues, maximizing social
utility, fulfilling professional or public responsibilities, and
respecting citizen or leadership preferences (Haldane 1990, Paden
2001, Thompson 2012). The politically hued results of such planning
and design efforts, whether pursued in authoritative, consultative, or
participatory processes, are architectural objects that change,
encourage, or reward particular behaviors.


**Ideology and agency.** Architecture is also used to
promote political views, culture, or control, by conveying symbolic
messages of power, nationalism, liberation, cooperation, justice, or
other political themes or notions (Wren c1670s). One issue concerns
the architect's agency in promoting an official political
ideology. In government commissions, the architect generally cedes
design control, at a certain point, to the government. Yet the
architect is the creator of record. This leaves open whether
architects so engaged are promoting the given ideology--or else
merely acting as proxies for such promotion. It may seem odd to
suggest that, from an aesthetic standpoint the design is of architect
*X* but from a political standpoint the same design is not
attributable to *X*.


Political agency among architects is a special version of the more
general issue of architect agency relative to clients, including as
well corporate and individual clients. Architects have obligations to
the client's aesthetic and utility concerns, and in virtue of
those obligations, the responsibility, blame, and praise for a given
architectural object cannot be wholly attached to the architect
alone. One question is what scenarios or conditions would need to
pertain to justify apportioning more or less agency--and,
correspondingly, political or moral responsibility--to the
architect or to the client, in design and build phases of realizing an
architectural object. The phases matter. The design phase appears, at
least initially, to be the agency-wise province of the architect, and
any post-build phase appears to be generally the province of the
client and any relevant user-base (until any such renovation or
repurposing as may occur). What happens in phases *en route* to
post-build is murkier, though.


## 9. Further Issues in Philosophy of Architecture


**Architectural Failure.** Failed architecture is not
a straightforward subspecies of failed art or failed
artifacts. Architectural objects may rate as aesthetic disasters yet
in some overall sense as successes, unlike non-architecture art
objects. And architectural objects may cease to function--or
never have functioned at all--yet count as overall successes,
unlike a range of (though not all) non-architecture artifacts. Another
feature of architectural failure--in keeping with general design
phenomena--is that architectural objects may count as successes
or failures depending on different states of affairs, context, or
remarkably small differences. Thus, a given architectural object may
be a failure as an active and integral built structure but not as a
ruin (or *vice-versa*). This suggests that background
intentions may matter at one early stage, and less so at later stages
in the life of a built structure--and that failure may have one
criterion for architectural abstracta and other criteria for
counterpart concreta. Further, among architectural objects with
standard, closely related variants, some may fail while others
succeed--perhaps because of a minor distinction such as a
garishly painted exterior. A viable account of architectural failure
accommodates such features or else devolves failure to the level of
some single dimension of architectural objects, such as their putative
nature as art objects (failed or otherwise).


**Corruption, Ruins, and Preservation.** Architectural
objects as physically instantiated are corrupted or fall apart over
time, and may develop new forms in disrepair or as ruins. From an
inclusivist, concretist standpoint, a ruin is not any lesser an
architectural object than its corresponding newly built structure. An
inclusivism is available to the abstractist, too, though she will not
see them as the same object--and will rate them both as somehow
lesser than the originary object. If we take them as the same
architectural objects, we need an account as to how they relate to one
another--apparently not by reference to intentions. Even if an
architect designed a path to a ruin state, the actual ruin-state would
likely take on a wholly different shape. Some may take this as an
argument against inclusivism.


Architects typically embrace the Vitruvian premium on
*firmitas* and reasonably assume that built objects should
endure--and that they serve intended functions for as long as is
desirable. That pair of assumptions in design thinking is at odds with
concretism, given corruption and decay of physical constructions as
well as routine repurposing in the lives of built structures. The
first assumption is consistent with an abstractist vision of
everlasting architectural objects. Endurance of serving intended
functions is another story: for architectural abstracta, stipulation
of repurposing may not change the nature of a given, selfsame
object. Depending on degrees of stringency in defining an
object's parameters, corresponding changes in design may bring
about an entirely new object or nearby counterpart.


Corruption brings not only total destruction and absence of
previously intact built structures, but also enduring ruins or flawed,
damaged structures. There is a longstanding premium on ruins in
architectural culture as promoting historical perspective, nostalgia,
and at least one style (Romanticism). Yet ruins fit awkwardly, if at
all, into standard architectural ontologies. The cultural premium is
hard to explain for the abstractist, for whom ruins represent
defective physical instantiations, which are already substandard in
the abstractist worldview. They are even harder to match up with a
concretist account as there aren't underlying creative
intentions to build (except in ironic or kitsch building of "new
ruins"). Corresponding intentions instead typically concern
preservation, restoration, or elimination. Alternatively, Bicknell
(2014) suggests we think of ruins as part-objects that, along with
full-blown "architectural ghosts", represent past objects
in their intact, built glory and as corresponded to creator
intent. 


Preservation and conservation possibilities prompt additional
considerations, such as whether restoration or maintenance of a built
structure sustains it as an authentic architectural whole--and if
this is independent of functional integrity, or holds for wholesale
reconstructions (Wicks 1994); what conditions warrant preserving or
conserving a built structure; and what principles guide warranted
alterations or completions of built structures--and whether other
considerations may include creativity, fancy, or sensitivity to
contemporary needs and context (Capdevila-Werning 2013). As concerns
completing unfinished structures, one issue is whether it is possible
to discern original design intent altogether. Taken together with
contemporary norms that shape our understanding of past architecture
(Spector 2001), preservation and conservation are at least partly
bound to present-day design conceptions.


**Built Versus Natural Environment.** We typically
take built and natural environments to be clearly distinct. This
distinction does at least two kinds of work in philosophy of
architecture. For one, it helps establish what sorts of things we
would discount as architecture even on an inclusivist
conception--and even there, we might accept lived-in caves as
*found* architecture but reject most other elements of the
natural environment as non-architecture (because neither built nor
found). For another, we get a defined sense of natural contexts into
which built environments fit (or not), without which any such notions
of fit are incoherent. If this is a viable (and desirable)
distinction, it is perhaps less clear in what it consists. One
candidate view is that we may distinguish the kinds of environments by
their different sorts of objects and properties: we find columns in
built environments and trees in natural environments and never the
other way around. Alternatives highlight the ascribable functions and
intent that mark built environments but not natural environments; or
different sorts of behavior and obligations attached to the two kinds
of environments. While an artifact-centered view of architecture
weighs in favor of functions and intent as the most relevant
distinction, decaying value of design intent over the life of a built
structure may give pause.


**Human and Non-Human Architecture.** What we
typically refer to as "architecture" is *human*
architecture. This raises the question as to whether human
architecture is assimilable to a larger class of animal-built
structures. That would suggest, in turn, that we could assess human
architecture--including settlement patterns, individual
structures, and built community environments--in ecological,
animal behavioral, and evolutionary terms (Hansell 2007). If these are
fundamental vantage points for understanding human architecture, that
would suggest a need to translate all going accounts--whether
focused on aesthetics, utility, or other concerns--into
corresponding biological terms. One way to resist this move is to mark
human architecture as a particularly human endeavor and
creation--likely by reference to intentionality, as flows into
aesthetic focus. However, this may just forestall the question as to
how to account for *that* wrinkle--a particularly talented
animal builder with notable design intent--in the larger story of
animal builders most of whom have less or no such intent.


**Environmental Psychology as Magic Pill.** Another
scientific challenge to traditional philosophy of architecture emerges
in environmental psychology, which identifies ways that environmental
factors such as color, shape, light, and circulatory pattern shape our
visual reactions and behavioral patterns within and around the built
environment. From such empirical insights, we can fashion constraints
on architectural design principles that guide architectural creation,
and devise corresponding solutions to particular design problems. As
architects learn to exploit this information to advance design, we may
ask whether an architectural object may be optimized by the lights of
environmental psychology yet--and even
*consequently*--deficient in some other, architecturally
central respect. Satisfying an architectural object's intended
function or maximizing its utility may well include, or be advanced
by, keen attention to environmental factors that influence attitudes
to and use of that object. By contrast, moral or aesthetic
deficiencies where environmental conditions are optimal seem real
possibilities. A resulting question is whether, and to what degree, we
could or should abandon moral or aesthetic drivers in architectural
design if in the future we could design architectural objects to
optimize environmental factors and so meet cognitive and emotional
needs, thereby enhancing an architectural object's reception but
at moral or aesthetic expense.