## 1. Life and Works



Little is known about Isaac Albalag. All that we know about him is
that he lived in the second half of the thirteenth century either in
Catalonia or Provence (Sirat 1985: 238). References to Albalag in the
medieval Jewish literature indicate that he was not a figure of
favorable reputation. His name appears in a number of Jewish writings
usually in association with humiliating accusations of heresy. The
Kabbalist Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov (d.1440), for instance,
accuses Albalag of heresy for advocating a heretical view regarding
the fate of the human soul (*Sefer ha `emunot* [the Book
of Beliefs], I:1). In *Sefer Neveh Shalom* (Indwelling of
Peace), the fifteenth-century Spanish thinker Abraham Shalom
attacks Albalag for eliminating the doctrine of creation by radically
naturalizing the account for celestial motion (Vajda 1960: 271).
Albalag's worth as a philosopher did not go unnoticed,
notwithstanding. Isaac Polqar (14th century), the author of
*'Ezer ha-dat* (The Support of Faith) holds Albalag in
great esteem and cites him approvingly in dealing with the
controversial issue of the origin of the world (*'Ezer
ha-dat*: part II: p.46).



Albalag wrote only one treatise, *Sefer Tiqqun ha de'ot*
(The Emendation of the Opinions)--I here employ Manekin's
translation of the title (Manekin 2007: 140)--which is a
translation with commentarial notes on the first two sections of Abu
Hamid al-Ghazali's encyclopedic treatise *kitab
Maqasid al-Falasifah* (The Opinions of the
Philosophers), Logic and Metaphysics. The third section, Natural
Philosophy, was completed by Isaac Polqar (Vajda 1960: 268).



Two goals stand behind the composition of the *Tiqqun*. The
primary one, as the title reveals (Emendation of the Opinions), is
corrective. Motivated by confidence in Aristotelianism, Albalag adopts
a critical stance towards any doctrine that deviates from Aristotelian
teachings and rules. For him, most errors in the philosophical
discourse are instances of deviation from Aristotle or
misunderstandings of his teachings. The cumulative literature of
commentaries on Aristotle, excluding Averroes' commentaries, is
replete with such instances. Avicenna is particularly regarded by
Albalag as a major source of error and thus the process of
"emendation" (*Tiqqun*) largely consists in
systematic critiques of Avicennian philosophy. But Avicenna is not the
sole target of criticism, though he is the central one. Albalag also
criticizes other philosophers such as al-Farabi, Maimonides, and
al-Ghazali--it is not unlikely that Albalag thought, like
Medieval Latin philosophers, that *Maqasid
al-Falasifah* was a genuine representation of
al-Ghazali's philosophical view (for al-Ghazali's
philosophical image in Latin literature see Salman 1999; Shihadeh
2011).[1]
*Maqasid al-Falasifah* encompasses a concise
presentation of the opinions of the philosophers, and as a result it
furnishes Albalag with an ideal framework for pursuing the announced
process of "emendation" (*Tiqqun*). In most of his
discussions, critiques, and corrections Albalag derives what he
regards as the correct understanding of Aristotle from Averroes'
writings. 



The second goal of the *Tiqqun* is pedagogical. Here, again,
al-Ghazali's *Maqasid al-Falasifah*
serves as an adequate vehicle. Thanks to al-Ghazali's style
which is free of complexities and accords with "popular
beliefs", the *Maqasid* provides a suitable
medium for instructing students who have little training in philosophy
(*Tiqqun* preface: 4). By translating and commenting on
al-Ghazali's *Maqasid*, Albalag hopes to offer
a piecemeal instruction in philosophy, starting with a presentation of
Ghazali's summary of the doctrines of the philosophers and
culminating in the establishment of Aristotelian demonstrative
doctrines. Overall, the *Tiqqun* follows the structure of the
*Maqasid* except on some occasions where Albalag
engages in large digressions.


## 2. Logic



The first part of the *Tiqqun* (Logic) is, more or less, a
faithful translation of the *Maqasid.* Although this
part is generally unoriginal, it may still be credited with a specific
contribution. Manuscripts of the *Tiqqun* include a sympathetic
discussion of the fourth figure of syllogism. This figure was
attributed by most Medieval logicians to Galen, though this
attribution remains disputed in modern scholarship (Rescher 1965;
Sabra 1965), and was dismissed as lacking utility and
"naturalness" (see Gersonides *Sefer ha-heqqesh
ha-Yashar*  [The Book of the Correct Syllogism]: 147). It is not
clear, however, whether Albalag himself wrote this discussion or
whether it was written by Abner of Burgos, a thirteenth-century
Jewish-convert-to-Christianity philosopher, as suggested by some
textual evidence (Vajda 1960: 275-276). In any case, the
inclusion of this discussion in the *Tiqqun* independently of
any explicit criticism indicates that Albalag agrees with its positive
attitude towards the fourth figure of syllogism.



The Aristotelian syllogism does not determine a specific order for the
major and minor premises. Hence, the terms comprising the premises,
the "unique major" and "minor" terms and the
shared middle term, may be arranged in three possible figures as
follows: 


* in the first figure, the middle term is subject in one premise
and predicate in the other,
* in the second, it is subject in both premises, and
* in the third, it is predicate in both (Manekin 1996: 50).



Some later logicians distinguished the order of the major and minor
premises with the result that the first figure was divided into two
figures: 


* in the first, the middle term is the subject in the minor and
predicate in the major premises, and
* in the second, it is the subject in the major and the predicate
in the minor premises (*ibid*, 1996: 50).



The additional fourth figure "is sometimes placed after the
first figure, rather than the third" (*ibid*, 1996: 50).



The *Tiqqun* provides a quasi-defense of the fourth figure as a
"valuable" form of reasoning (*Tiqqun* n.5:12).
This interrupts Albalag's overall adherence to Averroes who,
like the majority of Medieval logicians, rejects the fourth figure due
to considerations that have to do with "naturalness."
According to Averroes, "the form of reasoning embodied in the
fourth figure of syllogism does not exist in us by nature" and
involves "absurd self-predication" (Manekin 1996: 56). In
Hebrew logical writings, limited attempts were advanced to establish
the validity of that figure, most famously by Gersonides. The
discussion in the *Tiqqun* is another attempt to this effect
where the author, interestingly, subjects even Aristotle to criticism
for omitting this form of reasoning (*Tiqqun* n.5: 12).


## 3. Epistemology


### 3.1 Knowledge, Belief and Intellectual Perfection



Like most Medieval Aristotelians, Albalag understands the ultimate
goal of man in terms of intellectual perfection (*Tiqqun*
preface: 2-3, n.30: 42; cf. Maimonides,
*Guide* III:54; Farabi, *Selected Aphorisms*: 61;
Averroes, *Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction*: 103). To
fulfill this goal one has to attain knowledge of existents in a manner
"that dispels doubt" (*Tiqqun* preface: 3). The
formula of "dispelling doubt" points to the conception
of certainty (*yaqin)*, which is defined in the Arab
Aristotelian tradition as a cognitive state in which the cognizer
acquiesces that what she perceived is necessarily true and cannot be
otherwise (see Black 2006: 15-25). In line with this tradition,
Albalag specifies the logical tool of demonstration as *the*
means for fulfilling the criterion of dispelling doubt (i.e.,
attaining certainty).



This, however, raises a difficulty, for the ultimate goal of man would
seem to be exclusively tied to philosophy, while the role of religion
would be meager. Although this difficulty is not peculiar to Albalag,
it is particularly strong in the *Tiqqun* where a notable
dichotomy between *`emunah* (belief) and
*yedi'ah* (scientific knowledge) serves to confine
religion/Scripture to a domain of knowledge that is quantitatively and
qualitatively different from demonstrative knowledge (i.e., prophetic
knowledge). Whether this knowledge qualifies as an alternative or a
parallel means to philosophy in fulfilling the epistemic requirement
of intellectual perfection is a complex question. Insofar as the
*Tiqqun* is concerned, *`emunah* can rightly be
equated with fideism (see *Tiqqun* n.30: 38, 51), unlike the
philosophical conception of belief (for which
*`i'tiqad* and *tasdiq* were
the basic technical terms in Arabic) advocated by many Jewish and
Muslim philosophers and theologians (see, for instance, al-Farabi 
*Book of Demonstration*: 63-4; Sa'adia Ga`on 
*Book of Beliefs*: 14; Maimonides *Guide*
I:50). In view of the latter, belief consists in judgment or
affirmation, following from cognitive processes and syllogistic
reasoning, that a given perceived object is true. In this way, belief
is said to be associated with certainty or approximation of certainty
depending on the form of reasoning.



The *Tiqqun*, by contrast, points to a traditional conception
of belief; one that amounts to simple acceptance of a given Scriptural
doctrine or a set of doctrines as true without prior rational
justification (*Tiqqun* n.30: 51). Simple belief can always be
regarded as a source of certainty on account of prophetic authority
and this appears to be the basic standpoint of the *Tiqqun*
(for background on the conception of belief in Jewish thought see
Wolfson 1942: 213-261; Kellner 1986; Rosenberg 1984:
273-307). Yet it is important to consider the implications that
the *Tiqqun's* extreme skeptical stance in regard to
prophetic knowledge raises for this standpoint. The *Tiqqun*
encompasses a number of significant remarks stressing the
inaccessibility of the Torah's prophetic secrets to non-prophets
--we will see below that the Torah has two layers of esoteric
knowledge, prophetic and philosophical. What remains is the layer of
philosophical knowledge to which philosophers, as Albalag points out,
could have access. Accessing this layer of knowledge essentially
depends on allegorical interpretation of Scripture in terms of what
was learned from demonstrative sciences (see below). This means that
whatever assent Scripture evokes in a person who is well-trained in
demonstrative sciences (i.e., a philosopher) will be of the type of
reason-based, namely demonstrative, assent (cf. Averroes *Decisive
Treatise*: 17-18). It would, thus, be beside the point to
speak of "simple belief" (*`emunah pashotah*),
unless we grant that simple faith attaches to the surface layer of
Scripture. But this, again, would be implausible, since Albalag admits
that this layer is addressed to the multitude of people who,
"like animals", lack rationality, rather than philosophers
(*Tiqqun* n.30: 45; for further discussion see Guttmann
1945).


### 3.2 Human Knowledge: Means and Limits

 

Although Albalag does not devote a specific discussion to the theory
of knowledge, many questions pertaining to the limit, means, and
features of human knowledge recur throughout the *Tiqqun*. His
treatment of these questions show indebtedness to Aristotelian
epistemological theories as expounded by Arab Aristotelians, in
particular Averroes. Following the framework of the theory of
representational knowledge, standard among Arab Aristotelians, Albalag
divides knowledge into representation and assent. The former, which is
a prerequisite for the latter, is acquired by definition, while assent
is acquired by a proof (*Tiqqun* [Logic]: 98; cf.
*Maqasid*: 12). As noted previously, Albalag adopts
the Aristotelian theory of syllogism, assigning a primary significance
to demonstrative syllogisms in evoking certain assent. Moreover,
like Averroes, Albalag places conspicuous emphasis on the empirical
foundation of human knowledge (for Averroes' epistemology see
Black 2019). Intelligible thoughts arise in the soul through the
cognitive process of abstraction and syllogistic reasoning. Without
external images, Albalag affirms, it would be impossible for the soul
to apprehend the intelligible forms, just as it is impossible for a
person who is deprived of visual data to apprehend the quiddity of
colors (*Tiqqun*, n.11: 16, n.44: 71; cf. Aristotle 
*De Anima* III, 7, 431a, 14-17).



Although the *Tiqqun* is generally characterized by confident
rationalism, it involves skeptical elements that echo
Maimonides' critiques of the limitation of the human intellect
in regard to metaphysical knowledge (for these critiques in Maimonides
see Pines 1979; Stern 2013). Albalag admits, like Maimonides,
that attaining *complete* knowledge of immaterial beings lies
beyond the capacity of the human intellect. The reason for this
limitation is, first and foremost, the material component of human
beings (*homer*) which acts as both a constant impediment
to the pursuit of knowledge and a cause of intellectual deficiency
(*Tiqqun* n.11: 16, n.38: 58; cf. *Guide*
III:9).


## 4. Conception of Being and God's Existence



Avicenna's proof of God's existence, famously known as
"*Burhan al-sidiqin*", Demonstration of
the Truthful (Mayer 2001), occupies a good deal of Albalag's critical
discussion. The proof is meant to be a metaphysical proof, one that
takes place in the science of Metaphysics and proceeds from analyses
of the conception of existence qua existence.



Avicenna divides "actual" beings, as opposed to impossible
things, into necessary in itself and possible in itself but necessary
through another (Davidson 1987: 292-3; McGinnis 2010:
159-164). The necessary in itself is that which has existence in
its essence and an impossibility arises whenever it is assumed not to
exist. By contrast, the possible in itself but necessary through
another is that which "has no existence in essence" and
"no impossibility" arises whether it is assumed to exist
or not (Avicenna *al-Najat*: 546; cf.
*al-`isharat*: 122; cf. al-Ghazali
*Maqasid*: 100-101). In other words, both
existence and non-existence are equal states with respect to it. This
latter point is crucial to Avicenna's proof, for it stipulates
that there must be an external cause that ultimately preponderates
existence over non-existence in things that are possible. This cause
must be necessary in itself. Considering all possible things as an
"aggregate" (*jumlah)*, two alternatives arise in
regard to the cause of that aggregate (Avicenna,
*al-Najat*: 567-8): either the aggregate of possible
things is self-caused or caused by something external. Avicenna
dismisses the former alternative as impossible because the nature of
what is possible in itself does not change independently of a cause;
possible things become necessary only through other causes. Hence, an
aggregate of possible things is also possible in itself and cannot be
self-caused. Furthermore, "a chain" (*silsilah)* of
possible things cannot continue *ad infinitum* and it must end
to a being that is necessary in itself. The trait of "necessary
existence" further entails a number of divine attributes such as
oneness, simplicity and goodness, which permits identifying the
Necessary Existent with the deity (Adamson 2013: 172).



To Albalag, Avicenna's proof of God as Necessary Existent
appeared to involve flagrant deviations from Aristotle. Firstly,
Avicenna's procedure for establishing the existence of the First
Principle in the science of metaphysics is methodologically incorrect.
(*Tiqqun* n.8: 13-14). Appealing to Averroes, Albalag
argues that the existence of the prime mover must be accepted from
natural philosophy--not insofar as it is the deity--while
metaphysicians proceed therefrom in examining its states and
attributes. Obviously, the theoretical basis for this argument is
Aristotle's rule that "no master of any art can
demonstrate the proper principles of his art"
(*Metaphysics* IV 1003a21-22), which, according to
Averroes, means that a given science does not demonstrate the
existence of its subject, but must concede to their existence either
as something which is "self-evident" or as
"something that has been demonstrated in another science"
(Wolfson 1950-1 : 691). Since the First
Principle is the subject matter of metaphysics, its existence cannot
be established in that specific science.



Secondly, Avicenna breaks away from Aristotle in that he proceeds in
establishing the existence of the First Principle from analyses of the
conception of being rather than motion and moved objects (for
Aristotle's argument see *Physics* 7 & 8). In order
to establish the Necessary Existent, Avicenna proceeds from a
conception of being that Albalag, following Averroes, dismisses as
spurious (for Averroes see *al-kashf*: 14). His discomfort with
this conception has to do primarily with the fact that it is alien to
Aristotle. But Albalag additionally speaks of errors and absurd implications,
especially in the science of metaphysics, that follow from
Avicenna's method of distinguishing two types of necessary
existents, i.e., that which is necessary in itself and that which is
necessary by another. One implication pertains to the nature of
separate intellects. Assuming that anything which is *not*
necessary in itself involves two modes, necessity and possibility, as
Avicenna holds, then separate intellects would also involve both
necessity and possibility. This, however, absurdly clashes with the
essential nature of separate intellects as immaterial beings, since
possibility must reside in a substratum (*Tiqqun* n.8: 14, 
n.29: 27).



These deviations from Aristotle provided Albalag with sufficient
reason to reject the metaphysical proof of God. Moreover,
Avicenna's supplementary arguments, as reproduced by al-Ghazali
in the *Maqasid*, to the effect that the Necessary
Existent is one, simple and incorporeal fall short of satisfying the
epistemic criterion of dispelling doubt (i.e., certainty), unlike
Aristotle's argument from motion which, as Albalag asserts,
"dispels doubt" (*Tiqqun* n.33: 53). But although
Albalag only trusts Aristotle's argument, he points to a subtle
problem whose origin goes back to ancient commentaries on Aristotle:
the problem of the relation of the Prime Mover to the deity (for this
problem see Avicenna *Shifa`*
[*Metaphysics*]: 13). Aristotle's argument from motion
arrives at the existence of a mover that is not a body or a force in a
body. But whether that mover is the First Principle/Cause, i.e., the
deity, or a first effect remains an open question (*Tiqqun*
n.8: 14, n.38: 61). Philosophers hold no unanimous answer to this
question. While Avicenna concludes that the deity is ontologically
superior to the Prime Mover known from Aristotle's analyses of
motion (*Tiqqun* n.38: 61), Averroes identifies the Prime Mover
with the deity in all his writings (see for instance the
*Commentary on Metaphysics*: 172)--the exclusion being, as
Albalag correctly notes, the *Epitome of Metaphysics* (see
*Talhis ma ba'd
al-tabi'ah*: 149) where Averroes follows
Avicenna's standpoint (*Tiqqun* n.69: 96).



Curiously, Albalag does not immediately side with either camp.
However, his discussions of the relation of the Prime Mover to the
celestial and sublunary realms confirm Averroes' standpoint by
establishing the primacy of the Prime Mover as a cause of all
sublunary and celestial entities, and Its absolute unity and
simplicity, two essential specifications of the deity (see below).


## 5. God-world Relationship



To reconstruct a rough picture of Albalag's understanding of the
God-world relationship, we consider three interrelated themes: the
origin of the world, divine will, and divine wisdom.


### 5.1 The Origin of the World



On scientific grounds, Albalag dismisses the doctrine of temporal
origination as "defective" and accepts the eternal
existence of the universe as an indisputable truth (we will see below
that he accepts the former on the authority of Scripture). Albalag,
however, attempts to present the Aristotelian theory of eternity and
its fundamental premises in a theologically appealing fashion. Thus,
he introduces the theory of "eternal origination"
(*hidush nesahi*) which maintains that
"there was no moment at which the universe was not
originated" (*Tiqqun* n.30: 30; cf. *Tahafut
al-Tahafut*, Third Discussion). That the universe has no
temporal beginning is a premise that Albalag accepts based on
Aristotle's demonstration of the eternal existence of spheres
and celestial motion (see for instance *Tiqqun*, n.30: 30,
60:84-97; cf. *De Caelo* I: 2-3). What remains is
to show that the universe is not self-sufficient. This procedure is
necessary in order to avoid confusing the philosophical doctrine of
eternity with that of Epicurus which maintains that "the
universe has no cause" (*Tiqqun* n.30: 45). More
specifically, it shows that the philosophical conception of eternal
causation is not heretical and does by no means eliminate the idea of
origination.



For this purpose, Albalag engages in a philosophical discussion in
which he sets out to demonstrate the consistency of the theory of
eternal origination--in addition, he offers interpretive notes to
show that the doctrine of eternal origination is not offensive to
Scripture (for the interpretive notes see Feldman 2000: 19-30).
His discussion indirectly links to some elements of al-Ghazali's
refutation of philosophers in *Tahafut al-Falasifah*
concerning their conceptions of God and the universe.
Al-Ghazali's central point of contention is that the
philosophers' exposition of the relation of God to the universe
dwells on two premises that form an oxymoron, namely that the universe
is eternal and that it has an Agent and Maker (see *Tahafut
al-Falasifah* third and tenth discussions). Contrary to
al-Ghazali, Albalag holds these premises to be absolutely consistent.
What is more, he introduces the theory of eternal origination as a
more adequate way for articulating the universe and divine causation
than the doctrine of temporal origination, the "defective"
doctrine of the multitude which confines divine causation to
temporality. If perfection indicates absoluteness, then the term
"perfect" (*shalem*) applies to both "the
absolute" (*muhlat*) universe, which
eternally and immutably exists, and "the absolute" Creator
whose act of creation is free from temporal or circumstantial
limitations.



The doctrine of eternal origination rests on a conception of the
universe as a moving entity in which the cause-effect relationship is
a relation between a mover and a moved object (see *Tiqqun*
n.30: 29; cf. *Tahafut al-Tahafut*: third discussion,
101). In the natural realm, all processes of generation and corruption
consist in motion--for instance the movement from potential to
actual existence--and occurs through motion. All natural changes
depend on the movements of the celestial spheres, which in turn depend
on the Mover of the outermost sphere, the Prime Mover (*Tiqqun*
n.30: 29, n.39: 62).



Beyond this well-known Aristotelian conception of the Prime Mover as
the ultimate cause of motion in the universe, Albalag seeks to prove
that the very act of producing motion is sufficient to make the Prime
Mover a cause/creator of the universe. To this end, he differentiates
between two classes of existents in terms of their dependence on
motion: 


1. existents whose subsistence requires motion, and
2. existents whose subsistence *do not* require motion; only
their coming-to-be requires motion.



Things belonging to the latter class continue to exist after their
causes perish--for instance, a house continues to exist after the
death of its builder. By contrast, things belonging to the former
class perish as soon as motion ceases--for instance wind does not
continue to exist as soon as the motion of air ceases (*Tiqqun*
30: 30; cf. Averroes *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, fourth
discussion: 156-8). These things are said to be more in need of
a cause than things belonging to the former class are, for should the
cause disappear from existence "for a twinkling of an
eye", they would necessarily perish (*Tiqqun* n.30: 30).
The universe as a whole belongs to this class. Both the natural and
celestial realms subsist because their constituent "parts are
eternally originated" through the motion produced by the Prime
Mover; the parts of the natural and celestial realms referring to
sublunary existents and the "successive" stages of
celestial motion respectively (*Tiqqun*, n.30: 30). 


### 5.2 Divine Will



Within the framework of the theory of eternal creation, Albalag deals
with another problematic issue, which also links to al-Ghazali's
refutations of philosophers in *Tahafut
al-Falasifah*: the nature of divine causation, whether it is
voluntary or involuntary. In this treatise, Al-Ghazali maintains that
volition is a fundamental characteristic of acting causes; "the
agent must be willing, choosing and knowing what he wills "
(*Tahafut al-Falasifah*, third discussion:
135). Causes that act by necessity, that is, without willing or
choosing, fall in the category of natural involuntary
causes. Proceeding from this conception of agency, Al-Ghazali asserts
that the conception of divine causation that philosophers espouse
deprives the deity of volition. Again, the theory of eternity is
brought into focus. Necessity is a key postulation of the scheme of
eternity. Philosophers, according to al-Ghazali, hold the perpetual
procession of the universe from God to be necessary in the same manner
that the connection between "the sun and light" is
necessary (*Tahafut*, third discussion: 135;
cf. *Tiqqun* n.23: 24). In opposition to al-Ghazali, Albalag
broadens the conception of agency to include both involuntary natural
and voluntary causes. However, he emphasizes that a natural cause is
insufficient to produce an effect. It must primarily be moved by a
voluntary agent. In the empirical world, natural causes bring forth
effects inasmuch as they are being moved by close or remote voluntary
agents. In this connection, Albalag states that "in this way all
material effects are related to God and it is said of Him that He is
their Maker", vaguely indicating that God is the ultimate
voluntary cause in the universe. Other than articulating the God-world
causal relationship in terms of motion, Albalag barely explains the
nature of divine will or the manner in which it causes the perpetual
production of the universe.



In other contexts, Albalag argues, in opposition to al-Ghazali, that
divine agency is neither natural nor voluntary, but an intermediary
type that lies beyond human understanding. This, however, does not
mean that God has no will. The truth is that God has a capacity that
constitutes for Him what will constitutes for human beings. The exact
nature of this capacity, which human beings call will, is obscure,
even though demonstration establishes that it exists. Nonetheless,
considering the defining criteria of the conception of divine
perfection, it is inferred that this capacity shares no features with
empirical will. Unlike empirical will which follows from a stimulus
and seeks to fulfill a desire, divine will is self-sufficient. While
empirical will is temporal, originates with a stimulus and perishes as
soon as the desire is fulfilled, divine will, consistently with the
eternal and immutable nature of God, is eternal and immutable, being
characterized as a benevolent and immutable capacity to eternally
"choose" the best of two opposite things: 



> 
> 
> Even though He possesses power over everything, the manner of His will
> is such that it constantly attaches itself to a single object, the
> best among two opposites. Certainly, if He willed evil He would be
> capable of doing it, but His will desires nothing but what is good
> only. (*Tiqqun* n.23: 24 [my translation]; cf. *Guide*
> III:25 where Maimonides states that God acts in the best way) 
> 
> 
> 



On this basis, the universe maintains a fixed natural order such that
"nothing can be added to or reduced from it"
(*Tiqqun* n.30: 39), since God's will continuously and
immutably chooses this order.


### 5.3 Divine Knowledge



If God possesses will, then He must also possess wisdom, since
deliberation and choosing assume knowledge of the thing that is
willed. That is to say, the God-world relationship is based on will
and wisdom. In discussing the nature of divine knowledge, Albalag
displays an obsession with divine perfection. Thus, he differentiates
between divine and human knowledge on the basis of type rather than
rank, removing any ground for comparing them or inferring premises
about God's mode of apprehension and knowledge from the
characteristics of human knowledge and cognition. This idea of the
distinctiveness of divine knowledge, and, indeed all divine
attributes, is best expressed in terms of Maimonides' theory of
equivocation. According to Maimonides, terms such as wisdom, power and
will are predicated of God and creatures only equivocally. When
predicated of God and other creatures, these terms are semantically
dissimilar, sharing only the names rather than meaning (*Guide*
I:56; cf. *Tiqqun* n.23: 24). Epistemologically speaking,
moreover, they are not informative; constituting an artificial
language, which we predicate of God owing to our inability to fathom
and signify the corresponding characteristics in Him (Benor 1995;
Stern 2013: 198-204).



On this conception of divine attributes, Albalag examines
Avicenna's theory of divine knowledge, as reproduced by
al-Ghazali in the *Maqasid*, according to which
"God knows particulars in a universal fashion"
(*Maqasid*: 118). Avicenna's theory of divine
knowledge has been subject to different interpretations (Marmura 1962:
299-312; Adamson 2005: 257-278; Belo 2006: 177-199).
For Albalag, it simply means that God's knowledge is universal.
Since this way of articulating divine knowledge implies a
correspondence between divine and human knowledge, Albalag naturally
rejects it and scolds al-Ghazali for diffusing improper doctrines
about God. In opposition, he insists that God's knowledge is
opposite in characteristics, not merely superior in rank, to human
knowledge: it is neither particular nor universal, it is atemporal,
indivisible, absolutely actual and self-sufficient, being exclusively
dependent on the mode of self-intellection which is peculiar to God
and separate intellects (*Tiqqun* n.42: 76).



Given this radical notion of transcendency, it would seem that the
celestial realm and sublunary species and individuals lie beyond the
domain of God's knowledge. But Albalag insists that God's
knowledge is all-encompassing. To establish this, he appropriates
Averroes' conception of the divine essence as a unified Form of
the forms of all existents (Averroes *Commentary on
Metaphysics*: 197). Through the very act of self-intellection,
God, as Albalag concludes, apprehends all existents, including
sublunary existents (*Tiqqun* n.42: 66). This conclusion is
accompanied by an important clarification for the sake of maintaining
divine perfection and transcendence unimpaired: forms contained in the
essence of God do not exactly correspond to the forms of sublunary
things insofar as they are material objects, but exist in the divine
essence in the noblest possible manner, being absolutely simple,
indivisible and independent of accidents.


### 5.4 The Problem of Determinism



In the *Maqasid*, al-Ghazali restates the basic
elements of Avicenna's deterministic metaphysics and its
implication for the nature and domain of divine knowledge. He
explains, in light of Avicenna's conception of being, the manner
in which God knows future events. Possible things are necessitated by
their causes; when a cause exists, the effect must necessarily follow.
As such, knowledge of a cause allows one to predict, beyond doubt, the
occurrence of the associated effect or event. Inasmuch as God has
complete knowledge of the hierarchy of the causes, He has knowledge of
all future events (*Maqasid*: 118; cf. Avicenna 
*al-Najat*: 587-599)



For Albalag, this deterministic worldview on which al-Ghazali's
account of God's knowledge of future events dwells follows from
a narrow understanding of the cause-effect relationship. Possible
things, according to Albalag, are realized by either material or
efficient causes, or both. Some of these causes are either volitional
or natural. Volitional causes, "hinge solely on the power of the
chooser", which means that effects are not necessary and cannot
be predicted. Effects arising from natural causes are necessary, only
when the natural causes are necessary, that is, when they maintain a
fixed order and cannot be hindered by other accidental or voluntary
causes. An example of this is a solar eclipse. Foreknowledge of this
event and ones like it are correspondingly necessary with respect to
the knower. By contrast, some natural causes, despite having an
order, can be impeded by voluntary or accidental causes. In such
cases, the effects are not necessary, and hence it is not possible to
make certain predictions about their occurrence. 



> 
> 
> I maintain that for any possible thing, if all its proximate an remote
> causes succeed each other essentially and maintain order in their
> actions, and no hindrance can prevent any of them, then it is to be
> judged the same as a necessary thing with respect to knower. However,
> regarding other possible things one cannot know with certain knowledge
> the fact or the time of their occurrence before their occurrence.
> (quotation from Manekin 2007: 141)
> 
> 
> 



Albalag is aware that this note entails a denial of God's
knowledge of every future event. For this reason, he clarifies that
his intention is not to propose that God is ignorant of future events,
for, indeed, he thinks that God knows them, but in a manner that is
different from human knowledge.



Although Albalag is critical, overall, of al-Ghazali's account
of God's foreknowledge, he recommends teaching it to the
multitude because it is easy for them to comprehend. Albalag still
points to the theological implication associated with it. 



> 
> 
> When you examine al-Ghazali's statements carefully you will find
> that they entail the annulment of man's choice and the
> conclusion that his actions are compelled, as well as the annulment of
> the nature of the possible altogether. These opinions not only
> constitute repudiation of philosophy but also heresy with respect the
> Torah. (Quotation from Manekin 2007: 142)
> 
> 
> 


## 6. Cosmology



In discussing the fundamental traits of the Necessary Existent,
al-Ghazali considers the implications of the divine attribute of
absolute simplicity to the scope of divine causation and conception of
the universe. Al-Ghazali explains, following Avicenna, that from what
is one and simple (i.e., the Necessary Existent) only one thing may
proceed (*Maqasid*: 157;
cf. *al-Shifa`* [Metaphysics]:
326-334; *al-Najat*: 649-657). Underlying this
understanding of the scope of divine causation is a conception of the
relationship between cause and effect as one of correspondence;
"the action must be consistent with the essential nature of its
cause" (Kogan 1984: 249). Thus, a single cause has one act and
produces only a single effect. In keeping with this conception, and
considering the absolute simplicity of the First Principle,
al-Ghazali, describes an emanationist cosmology in which the First
Principle causes multiplicity *not* directly, but through a
chain of emanative intermediaries that successively proceed from one
another. The First Principle produces only one entity, the first
intellect, by thinking Itself. In turn, the first intellect produces,
by thinking its Cause and itself, the second intellect and the first
celestial sphere (*Maqasid*: 157). The reason for
this multiplicity is that the first intellect is not absolutely simple
like the First Principle, but complex: in addition to thinking its
Principle, it thinks itself insofar as it is possible and insofar as
it is necessary by virtue of the First Principle. The process of
emanation continues in a descending manner, terminating with the
Active Intellect, the intellect of the sphere of the moon which is the
immediate source of the forms of sublunary entities.



Convinced that the scheme of emanation constitutes an unsatisfactory
deviation from Aristotle, Albalag devotes extensive discussions to
elucidating its inconsistency and fallacies, and alternatively
establishing what he regards as the correct Aristotelian scheme.
Unlike the scheme of emanation, this scheme ascribes the
universe's manifold existents to God's direct causation:
"from what is one and simple many things can come to be"
(*Tiqqun* n.96:
 69).[2]
 Albalag describes a hierarchical cosmological scheme of separate
intellects and celestial spheres in which each separate intellect
relates to the corresponding sphere as a cause of motion while the
First Principle/Intellect relates to all separate intellects as a
direct formal
 cause.[3]
 Two theories account for this cosmological scheme: 


1. the theory of divine knowledge, which, as illustrated formerly,
maintains that the First Intellect apprehends the forms of all
existents by thinking Its essence, and
2. the Aristotelian theory of "cognitive identification"
according to which the knowing subject, the known object and thinking
are identical in actual thinking (for further details about this
theory see Black 1999).



By definition, separate intellects are intellects *in actu*
whose substantiation *is* the very act of thinking. Without
knowledge, the essence of the separate intellect would be nullified.
Thus, separate intellects, just like the First Intellect, have actual
knowledge of the forms of all existents. In actual thinking, the
knower, the known object, and the act of thinking are identical
(*Tiqqun* n.42: 65), the relationship of identity being
particularly formal as Aristotle's dictum of cognitive
identification establishes (*De Anima* 3.8 431b21). This means
that in separate intellects "essence/form", the known
object and the act of thinking are the same. In this way, the First
Intellect is said to be "the formal cause" of the separate
intellects on the grounds that It provides them with "their
forms", i.e., the intelligible forms which they apprehend and by
means of which they are what they are, intellects *in actu*
(*Tiqqun* n.69:
 98).[4]



This cosmological account, however, calls for explaining how separate
intellects are differentiated. After all, separate intellects share
the feature of immateriality, hence they cannot be numbered.
Furthermore, considering the fact that separate intellects share the
same epistemological content (i.e., the forms of all existents derived
from the First Intellect) and that the knower is identical with the
object known, according to the Aristotelian dictum of "cognitive
identity", separate intellects should all be identical. In the
Avicennian-emanative scheme, intellects are numbered on account of the
causal relation between them, each intellect being the cause of an
intellect emanating from it and "only God, who is at the top of
the series is an uncaused caused" (Wolfson 1958 : 244). By
rejecting the conception of an emanative causal relationship between
intellects, Albalag, however, could not speak of a distinction in
terms of causal relation. Alternatively, he follows Averroes in
positing ontological hierarchy as the differentiating factor between
intellects (*Tahafut al-Tahafut*: fifth discussion:
173). While each separate intellect derives its knowledge directly
from the First Intellect, each stands in a specific hierarchical
relation to the First Intellect, the ranking of each intellect being
in accordance with the extent of purity of its mode of apprehension;
the purer and simpler the mode of apprehension the closer the
intellect in rank to the First Intellect. Overlap between these modes
is not possible, which ensures that separate intellects remain
differentiated.



Beyond this cosmological account, Albalag indicates that multiplicity
in the sublunary realm also comes forth from the deity; the First is
said to be the cause of multiplicity inasmuch as It is the ultimate
cause of the cosmic unity. Were it not for the unifying force that
holds the parts together, the universe as a totality and its
parts--each of which comes to be by virtue of a unifying force
that conjoins its constituent parts like matter and form and the
elements--would not exist (*Tiqqun* n.69: 97; cf.
Averroes *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, third discussion:
108).


## 7. Celestial Motion



In the Avicennian-emanative scheme celestial motion is ascribed to two
principles: 


1. proximate movers (internal souls), and
2. the separate unmoved intellects corresponding to the concentric
spheres.



Whereas the soul functions as the efficient cause of motion, the
separate unmoved movers function as the final cause of motion insofar
as they represent an object of love and desire. The point is that
since celestial souls are corporeal and finite, they are insufficient
to account for the spheres' perpetual activities. The
perpetuation of motion, accordingly, must be the function of
immaterial and incorruptible principles. These are the unmoved
separate intellects of which the mover of the outermost spheres is the
highest in rank (Avicenna *Shifa`*
[Metaphysics]: 308; cf. *Maqasid*:
149).



As with many of Avicenna's theories, Albalag raises a number of
objections to this account of celestial motion. Firstly, Albalag
dismisses the conception of complementary efficient-final causation as
unwarranted, since, in his understanding, a final cause could hardly
continue the activity of a terminated efficient cause. Secondly,
Albalag rejects the theory of the spheres' animation by souls
(For background on this theory see Wolfson 1962: 65- 93;
Freudenthal 2002: 111-137). His argument against that theory
proceeds from the eternity premise as follows. Forces inhering in
bodies (including celestial bodies) are finite. As such, they could
hardly move the body in which they inhere infinitely. But we know that
the nature of spheres is such that they move eternally and this means
that celestial souls are superfluous in this regard. That Nature
(*ha teva'*) "does nothing in vain"
(cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1252b30-1253a1;
Averroes *Commentary on Metaphysics*: 178) prompts the
conclusion that spheres do not have souls (*Tiqqun* n.61: 87).
Although the basic lines of this argument are derived from Averroes,
Albalag seems to adopt a firmer position than Averroes in denying the
animation of spheres by souls. While Averroes rejects Avicenna's
twofold account of celestial motion and argues in some of his works
(especially *De Substantia Orbis*: 71; cf. *Commentary on
Metaphysics*: 164) that celestial motion could hardly be dependent
on a finite force inhering in the celestial body, he uses the term
soul interchangeably with form in reference to the principles of
motion in celestial spheres: the immaterial separate intellects. In
other works, we still find indications that spheres are ensouled
(e.g., *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, fourth discussion).
These variations in Averroes' standpoint in regard to the theory
of the spheres' animation by souls have invited different
interpretations (see Donati 2015; Kogan 1984: 190-201).



As for Albalag, his account of celestial motion consistently
attributes celestial motion to the efficient, formal and final
causation of separate intellects. Relaying on Averroes, while giving
the credit to Aristotle, Albalag argues that the three modes of
causation are one in the divine realm (cf. Averroes *Commentary on
Metaphysics*: 149). While separate intellects are themselves
invariable, they produce motion in the spheres in three different
manners (*Tiqqun* n.64: 92).


## 8. The Relationship Between Religion and Philosophy



Albalag is most famous in modern scholarship for his view of the
relationship between religion and philosophy. In the context of
medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy, he stands out as perhaps the only
philosopher to straightforwardly stress, accept and account for the
tension between philosophy and prophetic knowledge. His name is
usually connected with the doctrine of the "double truth",
which maintains that the truth of prophecy and the truth of philosophy
may contradict each other while at the same time remaining
simultaneously true (Sirat 1985: 238; Zinberg 1973:
107]; Vajda 1960: 264-265). The origin of this doctrine had long
been attributed to Averroes and Latin Averroists until recent studies
challenged this attribution. Some scholars have argued that the double
truth doctrine never existed as an actual dogma (Dales 1984).
Similarly, some scholars question the attribution of the double truth
doctrine to Albalag (Guttmann 1966: 227-229) and Elijah
Delmedigo, another Jewish Averroist whose treatment of the question in
discussion involves some elements alluding to the double truth
doctrine (for Delmedigo, see Fraenkel 2013).



The discussion of the question of the relationship between religion
and philosophy in the *Tiqqun* is complex and spans a number of
contexts. On the one hand, Albalag states in the preface to the
*Tiqqun* that there is no essential distinction between
philosophy and the Torah except that the former, addressing the select
few, conveys the truth in a demonstrative manner, while the latter,
addressing the multitude, conveys the truth in a figurative language
in accordance with their limited comprehension. By this means, Albalag
seems to align with the understanding of religion as an imitation of
philosophy which was founded by al-Farabi and adopted by many Muslim
and Jewish philosophers, most significantly Averroes and arguably
Maimonides (see al-Farabi *The Book of Letters*: 19-26;
Maimonides *Guide*: preface; Averroes *Decisive
Treatise*: 1-3, 7-10). Both philosophers not only
maintain that religion and philosophy are compatible, but also accord
philosophy a crucial role in arriving at the true meaning of Scripture
(Maimonides *Guide*: preface; Averroes *Decisive
Treatise*: 1-3, 7-10). Furthermore, Averroes sets
forth a religious epistemology based on the principle that
"truth does not oppose truth; rather, it agrees with and bears
witness to it" (*Decisive*: 9). On this principle,
contradictions between *al-Shari'ah* (Religious Law) and
philosophy are viewed as mere apparent, rather than essential,
contradictions that result from the literary form of
Scripture--consisting in similes, metaphors and
stories--which is directed to the multitude. Since
*al-Shari'ah* cares for all people, "the red and
black", it conveys the truth in different methods in accordance
with the diverse intellectual capacities of people and types of assent
they are fit for (*ibid*, 8). Only those who are adept in science
(*al-rasihuna fi-l'ilm*) can have access to the
internal meaning of Scripture, which is designed according to the
truth as it is, thereby attaining certain, demonstrative, assent to
Scripture. Drawing on Averroes' religious epistemology,
post-Maimonidean philosophers, continuing Maimonides'
philosophical-religious 
enterprise,[5] 
undertook to interpret Judaism as "a philosophical
religion" by giving principles of Judaism that appeared to be in
conflict with philosophy naturalistic interpretations (for the concept
of philosophical religion see Fraenkel 2012: 5). In a similar vein,
Albalag engages in allegorical interpretations of some elements of the
Account of the Beginning, stating, in an obviously apologetic tone,
that "it is possible to extract the philosophical doctrine of
eternal creation from the Torah" (*Tiqqun* n.30,
33). 



On the other hand, Albalag reveals ambivalence about the feasibility
of the philosophical approach to religion. His main stated concern is
that the true meaning of Scripture is not readily accessible. The
reason is that prophetic knowledge, as Albalag repeatedly affirms, is
exclusive to prophets and even the ablest philosopher has no access to
the "intention" of the prophet. Thus, when philosophers
assign philosophical meanings to verses of the Torah they may just be
swerving away from their actual tenor. Albalag finds Maimonides to be
particularly at fault in this regard and therefore he labels him as
one of the "hasty" people (*nemharim*) of our time
who did harm not only to "faith", but also to
"wisdom" (*Tiqqun* n.1: 5; *Tiqqun* n.30:
44). In their attempts to rationally support religious doctrines they
acted "with ignorance" as they 


1. denied demonstrative philosophical doctrines, advocating,
instead, weak speculative arguments, and
2. unhesitatingly ascribed meanings to Scripture in terms of these
arguments and based on their understanding of Scripture.



Two points of contention seem to underlie this critique. The first is
that those "hasty" people tend to compromise philosophy in
order to satisfy theological considerations. The second is sceptical.
While many philosophers confidently interpret Scripture allegorically
on the assumption that the internal meaning of Scripture accords with
philosophy, Albalag merges his interpretive notes on the Account of
the Beginning--the sole context where he offers interpretations
of that sort--with remarks emphasizing the inaccessibility of
prophetic knowledge to non-prophets.



In response, Albalag offers what may be characterized as a restrictive
scheme for interpreting the Jewish Scripture in terms of philosophy.
This scheme regards demonstration as *the* means for attaining
the truth and Scripture as a divine source for the truth. Scripture
contains two layers of secrets: philosophical and prophetic. A
philosopher arrives at the former layer by engaging in allegorical
interpretation after he has obtained knowledge through demonstrative
reasoning: 



> 
> 
> for one who seeks the truth, it is not proper [for him] to seek its
> premises from what he apprehends from Scripture by his own effort
> without primarily [engaging in] demonstrative reasoning. Rather, he
> has to learn the truth first through demonstration and thereafter seek
> support from Scripture. (*Tiqqun* n.30: 37; cf. Averroes 
> *Decisive Treatise*: 7) 
> 
> 
> 



When Scripture does not agree with demonstrative knowledge, this
points to the presence of a deeper layer of secrets, prophetic secrets
to which only a prophet has access. On this occasion, the disharmony
between demonstrative and prophetic knowledge is treated with fideism,
by accepting the Scriptural doctrine on the basis of simple faith. One
should not, however, abandon the demonstrative doctrine. Both
doctrines remain "true" (*`emet*) to the
philosopher-believer.



These claims lie behind the attribution of the double truth doctrine
to Albalag in modern scholarship. It should be noted, however, that
the scope of application of the double truth doctrine in the
*Tiqqun* is meagre, being limited to the tension between
religion and philosophy in regard to the issue of the origin of the
world. Towards the end of his discussion of this issue Albalag
declares that he accepts as "true" both the philosophical
doctrine of eternal creation and the biblical doctrine of temporal
creation, the former based on analysis of "nature" and by
means of "demonstration" and the latter based on
"the authority of the prophet by way of miracle"
(*Tiqqun* n.30: 52). This peculiar way of treating the question
of the relationship between religion and philosophy draws a parting
line between Albalag and the tradition of Arab Aristotelians and
Jewish Averroists in which religion and philosophy are held to be
seemingly different representations of the same truth. 


## 9. Theory of Prophecy



Underlying the double truth doctrine is a unique theory of prophecy
that credits Albalag with novelty. Deviating from the widely accepted
conception of prophecy in medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy,
which views prophets as accomplished philosophers and qualitatively
equates prophetic knowledge with philosophy, this theory links
prophets and prophetic knowledge to the divine realm (i.e., the realm
of separate intellects) while at the same time stressing the absolute
transcendence and unknowability of that realm. It correspondingly
stresses essential distinctions between philosophical reasoning and
knowledge, on the one hand, and prophecy and prophetic knowledge, on
the other. Prophets, according to Albalag, are extraordinary human
beings endowed with a special mode of apprehension. Thanks to this
mode of apprehension prophets have access to knowledge that differs
from philosophical knowledge in both content and type. Not only do
prophets arrive at answers to questions that lie beyond the capacity
of human reason, but they also grasp the truth in a transcendent
manner, independently of physical tools and the cognitive processes
necessary for rational knowledge (Guttmann 1945: 86).



> 
> 
> Their [the philosopher's and prophet's] modes of
> apprehension are distinct. Not only that, but they are [like two]
> opposites, since this [the philosopher] perceives intelligible [forms]
> through sensory objects, whereas the latter [the prophet] perceives
> sensory objects through intelligible [forms]. (*Tiqqun* n.30:
> 44 [my translation])
> 
> 
> 



This note suggests that the prophetic mode of apprehension is similar
to that of separate intellects which is described in the
*Tiqqun* in similar terms: "if there exists a separate
intellect in the universe whose knowledge is not obtained through
physical tools", its "grasp of things would be completely
*opposite* to that of the human [intellect]"
(*Tiqqun* n.11: 16; cf. n.42: 67). The distinction in the mode
of apprehension entails fundamental distinctions in the
characteristics of the perceived knowledge. Human knowledge passes
from potentiality to actuality. It is either universal or particular.
It is temporal and involves features of multiplicity, compositeness
and materiality. By contrast, divine knowledge is transcendent; it is
"neither particular nor universal." It is constantly
actual and absolutely indivisible, simple and atemporal
(*Tiqqun* n.42: 67). In this way, prophetic knowledge, like
knowledge of the separate intellects, is said to be qualitatively
distinct from philosophical knowledge. Radically maximizing the
distinction between prophecy and philosophy, Albalag emphasizes the
possibility of contradiction. 



> 
> 
> Just as the ways through which they [the philosopher and the prophet]
> apprehend things are so distinct, their respective grasps of things
> are so distinct that it is possible for the former [the philosopher]
> to perceive from below [based on nature and reasoning] the opposite
> (*hefekh*) of what the latter [the prophet] perceives from
> above. (*Tiqqun* n.30: 45 [my translation])
> 
> 
> 



This theory of prophecy parts ways with the standard contemporary
theory of prophecy according to which prophets are accomplished
philosophers endowed with a strong imaginative faculty. By virtue of
this faculty, prophets, unlike philosophers, are able to carry out the
necessary political role of establishing laws conducive to the welfare
of society, and reformulate theoretical knowledge in a language easy
for the multitude to understand. Whatever theoretical knowledge a
prophet attains through emanation from the Active Intellect--the
intellect of the sphere of the moon to which philosophers variably
ascribed epistemological and ontological roles in the sublunary
realm--accords with philosophical knowledge; the difference being
particularly quantitative (Macy 1986; Rahman 1958). Even the
Avicennian theory of prophecy, which links the prophetic mind to the
divine realm, does not ascribe to prophetic knowledge a specific
qualitative merit above philosophical knowledge; prophets apprehend
the principles of all existents, the middle term of every syllogism
and intelligible forms instantaneously and effortlessly through divine
intuition (*hads*). (Rahman, 1958: 32; Marmura 1963:
49-51; Morris 1992: 84). That is, there are no grounds for
contradiction, as Albalag's theory of prophecy suggests.


## 10. Political Thought



In the context of medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy, political
thought was largely concerned with investigating the connection
between social good and human happiness, on the one hand, and
philosophy and religion on the other. In the last section of the
Metaphysics of the *Maqasid*, al-Ghazali
recapitulates Avicenna's view of the relationship between social
welfare and religion. Proceeding from the Aristotelian dictum that
"man is political by nature" (Aristotle *Politics*
1252b30-1253a1), al-Ghazali stresses that human beings cannot
dispense with social interaction and cooperation for fulfilling their
basic needs and for the sake of attaining the highest good of man.
This, however, is not possible unless society is stable and justly
governed. The realization of these conditions is tied to the existence
of a lawgiver that enacts laws and promotes doctrines that are
conducive to the social and spiritual well-being.



Remarkably, Albalag starts the *Tiqqun* with the political
theme with which al-Ghazali concludes the *Maqasid*.
The preface to the *Tiqqun* offers a gloss on the political
nature of human beings, emphasizing the essentiality of society to the
individual's well-being and human survival in general. But,
again, society can be conducive to well-being only under specific
circumstances. From the point of view of a Medievalist like Albalag,
pluralism stands as a major enemy to social stability. The more
diversified the society the less stable and more conflict-fraught it
is. Pluralism may result in constant warring among people to such an
extent as to threaten human existence. Thus comes the need for a
lawgiver who promotes social harmony by unifying people in creed and
praxis.



Albalag accommodates the Torah into this political theme, assigning it
a crucial role in establishing social and political order and
maintaining the divinely ordained perpetual existence of the human
species. Nothing in this outlook deviates from the view of Medieval
Aristotelians regarding the socio-political benefit of Divine Law.
Maimonides, for instances, deems the Torah a key factor in the
establishment and preservation of social well-being. Still Albalag
departs from Maimonides, as well as prominent Muslim philosophers such
as al-Farabi and Averroes, in that he confines the Torah to this
specific socio-political purpose. These philosophers define divine Law
in terms of its goal: unlike man-made laws which care only for the
welfare of society, divine Law cares for both the welfare of society
and welfare of the soul (Fraenkel 2012: 175; Z. Harvey 1980:
199-200). Maimonides particularly emphasizes that the
Torah's goal does not exclusively focus on the practical domain
and that it concerns itself with theoretical virtues. Even practical
actions prescribed in the Torah are conducive to the fulfillment of
the commandment to "love the Lord" (Deuteronomy
6:4-5), which in Maimonides' interpretation is an
injunction for the true worship of God: intellectual worship. The
Torah, accordingly, calls upon people to seek knowledge of all
existents by virtue of which man attains intellectual perfection,
truly worshiping God (*Eight Chapters*: 78; cf. *Guide*
III:53).



Unlike Maimonides, Albalag scarcely associates the Torah with any
explicit role in promoting theoretical virtues. Indeed, he
differentiates between philosophy and the Torah in terms of their
respective final goals. While philosophy aims for the happiness of the
select few, the Torah aims for the happiness of the multitude, the
former type of happiness is intellectual whereas the latter is
exclusively civic. In this connection, Albalag defines four basic
principles of the Torah, which, as he states, are also foundational to
philosophy and religious systems. These principles are: 


1. reward and punishment,
2. the survival of the soul after death,
3. the existence of a deity that rewards and punishes, and
4. the existence of a divine providence that watches over human
beings, each according to his deeds.



As many scholars noted, these four principles belong to the category
of principles that are necessary for social well-being (Touati 1962:
44-47; Schweid 2008: 320-321; Guttmann 1945:
90-91). Furthermore, Albalag explains that the Torah adopts a
strategy of concealment. Revealing or concealing doctrines is
determined on the basis of their respective benefits to society and
social well-being. All in all, the preface to the *Tiqqun*
stresses the value of the Torah as a political treatise that is
necessary for the establishment of justice and social well-being.


## 11. Conclusion



*Sefer Tiqqun ha de'ot* represents a significant
development in the domain of Jewish thought in particular and
philosophy in general. In a time when post-Maimonidean philosophers
exerted efforts to enhance the philosophical-religious
enterprise of Maimonides (as they understood Maimonides'
enterprise to be), Albalag highlights the shortcomings of that
enterprise, advocating as an alternative the double truth doctrine. In
application, however, this doctrine is strikingly restricted to a very
narrow scope, while the superiority of philosophy as a source of true
knowledge and certainty is made noticeable throughout the
*Tiqqun*. Unlike the religious domain in which truth is
qualified by degrees, the ultimate of which being exclusively
accessible to prophets, and subject to human interpretations, truth in
the philosophical domain is absolute. It can be obtained through
demonstrative reasoning and learned from Aristotelian sciences. It is
this understanding of philosophical truth that motivated Albalag to
undertake scrutiny of the philosophical discourse in order to purge it
from errors and reinstate correct Aristotelianism, as he understands
it through the writings of Averroes, the Commentator. On the whole,
Albalag's enterprise marks an attempt to break away from
some of the major Neo-Platonic trends that had characterized the
Avicennian-Farabian interpretation of Aristotle.