## 1. Hegel's description of his dialectical method



Hegel provides the most extensive, general account of his dialectical
method in Part I of his *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical
Sciences*, which is often called the *Encyclopaedia Logic*
[EL]. The form or presentation of logic, he says, has three sides or
moments (EL SS79). These sides are not parts of logic, but,
rather, moments of "every concept", as well as "of
everything true in general" (EL Remark to SS79; we will see
why Hegel thought dialectics is in everything in
 section 3).
 The first moment--the moment of the understanding--is the
moment of fixity, in which concepts or forms have a seemingly stable
definition or determination (EL SS80).



The second moment--the "*dialectical*" (EL
SSSS79, 81) or "*negatively rational*" (EL
SS79) moment--is the moment of instability. In this moment, a
one-sidedness or restrictedness (EL Remark to SS81) in the
determination from the moment of understanding comes to the fore, and
the determination that was fixed in the first moment passes into its
opposite (EL SS81). Hegel describes this process as a process of
"self-sublation" (EL SS81). The English verb "to
sublate" translates Hegel's technical use of the German
verb *aufheben*, which is a crucial concept in his dialectical
method. Hegel says that *aufheben* has a doubled meaning: it
means both to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time (PhG
SS113; SL-M 107; SL-dG 81-2; cf. EL the Addition to
SS95). The moment of understanding sublates *itself*
because its own character or nature--its one-sidedness or
restrictedness--destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass
into its opposite. The dialectical moment thus involves a process of
*self*-sublation, or a process in which the determination from
the moment of understanding sublates *itself*, or both cancels
and preserves *itself*, as it pushes on to or passes into its
opposite.



The third moment--the "*speculative*" or
"*positively rational*" (EL SSSS79, 82)
moment--grasps the unity of the opposition between the first two
determinations, or is the positive result of the dissolution or
transition of those determinations (EL SS82 and Remark to
SS82). Here, Hegel rejects the traditional, *reductio ad
absurdum* argument, which says that when the premises of an
argument lead to a contradiction, then the premises must be discarded
altogether, leaving nothing. As Hegel suggests in the
*Phenomenology*, such an argument 



> 
> 
> is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its
> result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is
> specifically the nothingness of that *from which it results*.
> (PhG-M SS79) 
> 
> 
> 



Although the speculative moment negates the contradiction, it is a
determinate or defined nothingness because it is the result of a
specific process. There is something particular about the
determination in the moment of understanding--a specific
weakness, or some specific aspect that was ignored in its
one-sidedness or restrictedness--that leads it to fall apart in
the dialectical moment. The speculative moment has a definition,
determination or content because it grows out of and unifies the
particular character of those earlier determinations, or is "a
*unity of distinct determinations*" (EL Remark to
SS82). The speculative moment is thus "truly not *empty,
abstract nothing*, but the negation of *certain
determinations*" (EL-GSH SS82). When the result
"is taken as the result of that from which it emerges",
Hegel says, then it is "in fact, the true result; in that case
it is itself a *determinate* nothingness, one which has a
content" (PhG-M SS79). As he also puts it, "the result
is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a *determinate*
negation [*bestimmte* Negation]; a new form has thereby
immediately arisen" (PhG-M SS79). Or, as he says,
"[b]ecause the result, the negation, is a *determinate*
negation [bestimmte *Negation*], it has a
*content*" (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54). Hegel's claim
in both the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*
that his philosophy relies on a process of "*determinate*
negation [*bestimmte* Negation]" has sometimes led
scholars to describe his dialectics as a method or doctrine of
"determinate negation" (see entry on
 Hegel, section on *Science of Logic*;
 cf. Rosen 1982: 30; Stewart 1996, 2000: 41-3; Winfield 1990:
56).



There are several features of this account that Hegel thinks raise his
dialectical method above the arbitrariness of Plato's dialectics
to the level of a genuine science. First, because the determinations
in the moment of understanding sublate *themselves*,
Hegel's dialectics does not require some new idea to show up
arbitrarily. Instead, the movement to new determinations is driven by
the nature of the earlier determinations and so "comes about on
its own accord" (PhG-P SS79). Indeed, for Hegel, the
movement is driven *by necessity* (see, e.g., EL Remarks to
SSSS12, 42, 81, 87, 88; PhG SS79). The natures of the
determinations themselves *drive or force* them to pass into
their opposites. This sense of *necessity*--the idea that
the method involves being forced from earlier moments to later
ones--leads Hegel to regard his dialectics as a kind of
*logic*. As he says in the *Phenomenology*, the
method's "proper exposition belongs to logic" (PhG-M
SS48). Necessity--the sense of being driven or forced to
conclusions--is the hallmark of "logic" in Western
philosophy.



Second, because the form or determination that arises is the
*result* of the self-sublation of the determination from the
moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up
from the outside. Instead, the transition to the new determination or
form is necessitated by earlier moments and hence grows out of the
process itself. Unlike in Plato's arbitrary dialectics,
then--which must wait around until some other idea comes in from
the outside--in Hegel's dialectics "nothing
extraneous is introduced", as he says (SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33).
His dialectics is driven by the nature, immanence or
"inwardness" of its own content (SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33;
cf. PR SS31). As he puts it, dialectics is "the principle
through which alone *immanent coherence and necessity* enter
into the content of science" (EL-GSH Remark to SS81).



Third, because later determinations "sublate" earlier
determinations, the earlier determinations are not completely
cancelled or negated. On the contrary, the earlier determinations are
*preserved* in the sense that they remain in effect within the
later determinations. When Being-for-itself, for instance, is
introduced in the logic as the first concept of ideality or
universality and is defined by embracing a set of
"something-others", Being-for-itself replaces the
something-others as the new concept, but those something-others remain
active within the definition of the concept of Being-for-itself. The
something-others must continue to do the work of picking out
individual somethings before the concept of Being-for-itself can have
its own definition as the concept that gathers them up.
Being-for-itself replaces the something-others, but it also preserves
them, because its definition still requires them to do their work of
picking out individual somethings (EL SSSS95-6).



The concept of "apple", for example, as a
Being-for-itself, would be defined by gathering up individual
"somethings" that are the same as one another (as apples).
Each individual apple can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation
to an "other" that is the same "something"
that it is (i.e., an apple). That is the one-sidedness or
restrictedness that leads each "something" to pass into
its "other" or opposite. The "somethings" are
thus both "something-others". Moreover, their defining
processes lead to an endless process of passing back and forth into
one another: one "something" can be what it is (as an
apple) only in relation to another "something" that is the
same as it is, which, in turn, can be what it is (an apple) only in
relation to the other "something" that is the same as it
is, and so on, back and forth, endlessly (cf. EL SS95). The
concept of "apple", as a Being-for-itself, stops that
endless, passing-over process by embracing or including the individual
something-others (the apples) in its content. It grasps or captures
their character or quality *as apples*. But the
"something-others" must do their work of picking out and
separating those individual items (the apples) *before* the
concept of "apple"--as the Being-for-itself--can
gather them up for its own definition. We can picture the concept of
Being-for-itself like this:



![an oval enclosing two circles, left and right; an arrow goes from the interior of each circle to the interior of the other. The oval has the statement 'Being-for-itself embraces the something-others in its content'. The circles have the statement 'the something-others'. The arrows have the statement 'the process of passing back-and-forth between the something-others'.](1_Being-for-itself.png)

Figure 1




Later concepts thus replace, but also preserve, earlier concepts.



Fourth, later concepts both determine and also surpass the limits or
finitude of earlier concepts. Earlier determinations sublate
*themselves*--they pass into their others because of some
weakness, one-sidedness or restrictedness in their own definitions.
There are thus limitations in each of the determinations that lead
them to pass into their opposites. As Hegel says, "that is what
everything finite is: its own sublation" (EL-GSH Remark to
SS81). Later determinations define the finiteness of the earlier
determinations. From the point of view of the concept of
Being-for-itself, for instance, the concept of a
"something-other" is limited or finite: although the
something-others are supposed to be the same as one another, the
character of their sameness (e.g., as apples) is captured only from
above, by the higher-level, more universal concept of
Being-for-itself. Being-for-itself reveals the limitations of the
concept of a "something-other". It also rises above those
limitations, since it can do something that the concept of a
something-other cannot do. Dialectics thus allows us to get beyond the
finite to the universal. As Hegel puts it, "all genuine,
nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this
principle [of dialectics]" (EL-GSH Remark to SS81).



Fifth, because the determination in the speculative moment grasps the
*unity* of the first two moments, Hegel's dialectical
method leads to concepts or forms that are increasingly comprehensive
and universal. As Hegel puts it, the result of the dialectical process




> 
> 
> is a new concept but one higher and richer than the
> preceding--richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and
> therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is
> the unity of itself and its opposite. (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54) 
> 
> 
> 



Like Being-for-itself, later concepts are more universal because they
unify or are built *out of* earlier determinations, and include
those earlier determinations as part of their definitions. Indeed,
many other concepts or determinations can also be depicted as
literally surrounding earlier ones (cf. Maybee 2009: 73, 100, 112,
156, 193, 214, 221, 235, 458).



Finally, because the dialectical process leads to increasing
comprehensiveness and universality, it ultimately produces a complete
series, or drives "to completion" (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54;
PhG SS79). Dialectics drives to the "Absolute", to use
Hegel's term, which is the last, final, and completely
all-encompassing or unconditioned concept or form in the relevant
subject matter under discussion (logic, phenomenology, ethics/politics
and so on). The "Absolute" concept or form is
unconditioned because its definition or determination contains all the
other concepts or forms that were developed earlier in the dialectical
process for that subject matter. Moreover, because the process
develops necessarily and comprehensively through each concept, form or
determination, there are no determinations that are left out of the
process. There are therefore no left-over concepts or
forms--concepts or forms outside of the
"Absolute"--that might "condition" or
define it. The "Absolute" is thus unconditioned because it
contains all of the conditions in its content, and is not conditioned
by anything else outside of it. This Absolute is the highest concept
or form of universality for that subject matter. It is the thought or
concept of the whole conceptual system for the relevant subject
matter. We can picture the Absolute Idea (EL SS236), for
instance--which is the "Absolute" for logic--as
an oval that is filled up with and surrounds numerous, embedded rings
of smaller ovals and circles, which represent all of the earlier and
less universal determinations from the logical development (cf. Maybee
2009: 30, 600):



![Five concentric ovals; the outermost one is labeled 'The Absolute Idea'.](2_The_Absolute.png)

Figure 2




Since the "Absolute" concepts for each subject matter lead
into one another, when they are taken together, they constitute
Hegel's entire philosophical system, which, as Hegel says,
"presents itself therefore as a circle of circles" (EL-GSH
SS15). We can picture the entire system like this (cf. Maybee
2009: 29):



![A circle enclosing enclosing 10 ovals. One oval is labeled 'Phenomenology', another 'Logic', and two others 'Other philosophical subject matters'. The enclosing circle is labeled: the whole philosophical system as a 'circle of circles'](3_Phil_System.png)

Figure 3




Together, Hegel believes, these characteristics make his dialectical
method genuinely scientific. As he says, "the dialectical
constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression" (EL-GSH
Remark to SS81). He acknowledges that a description of the method
can be more or less complete and detailed, but because the method or
progression is driven only by the subject matter itself, this
dialectical method is the "only true method" (SL-M 54;
SL-dG 33).


## 2. Applying Hegel's dialectical method to his arguments



So far, we have seen how Hegel describes his dialectical method, but
we have yet to see how we might read this method into the arguments he
offers in his works. Scholars often use the first three stages of the
logic as the "textbook example" (Forster 1993: 133) to
illustrate how Hegel's dialectical method should be applied to
his arguments. The logic begins with the simple and immediate concept
of pure Being, which is said to illustrate the moment of the
understanding. We can think of Being here as a concept of pure
presence. It is not mediated by any other concept--or is not
defined in relation to any other concept--and so is undetermined
or has no further determination (EL SS86; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). It
asserts bare presence, but what that presence is like has no further
determination. Because the thought of pure Being is undetermined and
so is a pure abstraction, however, it is really no different from the
assertion of pure negation or the absolutely negative (EL SS87).
It is therefore equally a Nothing (SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). Being's
lack of determination thus leads it to sublate itself and pass into
the concept of Nothing (EL SS87; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59), which
illustrates the dialectical moment.



But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing
themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are
undetermined, so they have the same kind of undefined content. The
only difference between them is "something merely
*meant*" (EL-GSH Remark to SS87), namely, that Being is
an undefined content, taken as or meant to be presence, while Nothing
is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be absence. The third
concept of the logic--which is used to illustrate the speculative
moment--unifies the first two moments by capturing the positive
result of--or the conclusion that we can draw from--the
opposition between the first two moments. The concept of Becoming is
the thought of an undefined content, taken as presence (Being) and
then taken as absence (Nothing), or taken as absence (Nothing) and
then taken as presence (Being). To Become is to go from Being to
Nothing or from Nothing to Being, or is, as Hegel puts it, "the
immediate vanishing of the one in the other" (SL-M 83; cf. SL-dG
60). The contradiction between Being and Nothing thus is not a
*reductio ad absurdum*, or does not lead to the rejection of
both concepts and hence to nothingness--as Hegel had said
Plato's dialectics does (SL-M 55-6; SL-dG
34-5)--but leads to a positive result, namely, to the
introduction of a new concept--the synthesis--which unifies
the two, earlier, opposed concepts.



We can also use the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example to
illustrate Hegel's concept of *aufheben* (to sublate),
which, as we saw, means to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the
same time. Hegel says that the concept of Becoming sublates the
concepts of Being and Nothing (SL-M 105; SL-dG 80). Becoming cancels
or negates Being and Nothing because it is a new concept that replaces
the earlier concepts; but it also preserves Being and Nothing because
it relies on those earlier concepts for its own definition. Indeed, it
is the first concrete concept in the logic. Unlike Being and Nothing,
which had no definition or determination as concepts themselves and so
were merely abstract (SL-M 82-3; SL-dG 59-60; cf. EL
Addition to SS88), Becoming is a "*determinate* unity
in which there *is* both Being and Nothing" (SL-M 105;
cf. SL-dG 80). Becoming succeeds in having a definition or
determination because it is defined by, or piggy-backs on, the
concepts of Being and Nothing.



This "textbook" Being-Nothing-Becoming example is closely
connected to the traditional idea that Hegel's dialectics
follows a thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, which, when applied to
the logic, means that one concept is introduced as a
"thesis" or positive concept, which then develops into a
second concept that negates or is opposed to the first or is its
"antithesis", which in turn leads to a third concept, the
"synthesis", that unifies the first two (see, e.g.,
McTaggert 1964 [1910]: 3-4; Mure 1950: 302; Stace, 1955 [1924]:
90-3, 125-6; Kosek 1972: 243; E. Harris 1983: 93-7;
Singer 1983: 77-79). Versions of this interpretation of
Hegel's dialectics continue to have currency (e.g., Forster
1993: 131; Stewart 2000: 39, 55; Fritzman 2014: 3-5). On this
reading, Being is the positive moment or thesis, Nothing is the
negative moment or antithesis, and Becoming is the moment of
*aufheben* or synthesis--the concept that cancels and
preserves, or unifies and combines, Being and Nothing.



We must be careful, however, not to apply this textbook example too
dogmatically to the rest of Hegel's logic or to his dialectical
method more generally (for a classic criticism of the
thesis-antithesis-synthesis reading of Hegel's dialectics, see
Mueller 1958). There are other places where this general pattern might
describe some of the transitions from stage to stage, but there are
many more places where the development does not seem to fit this
pattern very well. One place where the pattern seems to hold, for
instance, is where the Measure (EL SS107)--as the combination
of Quality and Quantity--transitions into the Measureless (EL
SS107), which is opposed to it, which then in turn transitions
into Essence, which is the unity or combination of the two earlier
sides (EL SS111). This series of transitions could be said to
follow the general pattern captured by the "textbook
example": Measure would be the moment of the understanding or
thesis, the Measureless would be the dialectical moment or antithesis,
and Essence would be the speculative moment or synthesis that unifies
the two earlier moments. However, before the transition to Essence
takes place, the Measureless itself is redefined as a Measure (EL
SS109)--undercutting a precise parallel with the textbook
Being-Nothing-Becoming example, since the transition from Measure to
Essence would not follow a Measure-Measureless-Essence pattern, but
rather a Measure-(Measureless?)-Measure-Essence pattern.



Other sections of Hegel's philosophy do not fit the triadic,
textbook example of Being-Nothing-Becoming at all, as even
interpreters who have supported the traditional reading of
Hegel's dialectics have noted. After using the
Being-Nothing-Becoming example to argue that Hegel's dialectical
method consists of "triads" whose members "are
called the thesis, antithesis, synthesis" (Stace 1955 [1924]:
93), W.T. Stace, for instance, goes on to warn us that Hegel does not
succeed in applying this pattern throughout the philosophical system.
It is hard to see, Stace says, how the middle term of some of
Hegel's triads are the opposites or antitheses of the first
term, "and there are even 'triads' which contain
four terms!" (Stace 1955 [1924]: 97). As a matter of fact, one
section of Hegel's logic--the section on
Cognition--violates the thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern
because it has only two sub-divisions, rather than three. "The
triad is incomplete", Stace complains. "There is no third.
Hegel here abandons the triadic method. Nor is any explanation of his
having done so forthcoming" (Stace 1955 [1924]: 286; cf.
McTaggart 1964 [1910]: 292).



Interpreters have offered various solutions to the complaint that
Hegel's dialectics sometimes seems to violate the triadic form.
Some scholars apply the triadic form fairly loosely across several
stages (e.g. Burbidge 1981: 43-5; Taylor 1975: 229-30).
Others have applied Hegel's triadic method to whole sections of
his philosophy, rather than to individual stages. For G.R.G. Mure, for
instance, the section on Cognition fits neatly into a triadic,
thesis-antithesis-synthesis account of dialectics because the whole
section is itself the antithesis of the previous section of
Hegel's logic, the section on Life (Mure 1950: 270). Mure argues
that Hegel's triadic form is easier to discern the more broadly
we apply it. "The triadic form appears on many scales", he
says, "and the larger the scale we consider the more obvious it
is" (Mure 1950: 302).



Scholars who interpret Hegel's description of dialectics on a
smaller scale--as an account of how to get from stage to
stage--have also tried to explain why some sections seem to
violate the triadic form. J.N. Findlay, for instance--who, like
Stace, associates dialectics "with the *triad*, or with
*triplicity*"--argues that stages can fit into that
form in "more than one sense" (Findlay 1962: 66). The
first sense of triplicity echoes the textbook, Being-Nothing-Becoming
example. In a second sense, however, Findlay says, the dialectical
moment or "contradictory breakdown" is not itself a
separate stage, or "does not count as one of the stages",
but is a transition between opposed, "but complementary",
abstract stages that "are developed more or less
concurrently" (Findlay 1962: 66). This second sort of triplicity
could involve any number of stages: it "could readily have been
expanded into a quadruplicity, a quintuplicity and so forth"
(Findlay 1962: 66). Still, like Stace, he goes on to complain that
many of the transitions in Hegel's philosophy do not seem to fit
the triadic pattern very well. In some triads, the second term is
"the direct and obvious contrary of the first"--as in
the case of Being and Nothing. In other cases, however, the opposition
is, as Findlay puts it, "of a much less extreme character"
(Findlay 1962: 69). In some triads, the third term obviously mediates
between the first two terms. In other cases, however, he says, the
third term is just one possible mediator or unity among other possible
ones; and, in yet other cases, "the reconciling functions of the
third member are not at all obvious" (Findlay 1962: 70).



Let us look more closely at one place where the "textbook
example" of Being-Nothing-Becoming does not seem to describe the
dialectical development of Hegel's logic very well. In a later
stage of the logic, the concept of Purpose goes through several
iterations, from Abstract Purpose (EL SS204), to Finite or
Immediate Purpose (EL SS205), and then through several stages of a
syllogism (EL SS206) to Realized Purpose (EL SS210). Abstract
Purpose is the thought of any kind of purposiveness, where the purpose
has not been further determined or defined. It includes not just the
kinds of purposes that occur in consciousness, such as needs or
drives, but also the "internal purposiveness" or
teleological view proposed by the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle
(see entry on
 Aristotle;
 EL Remark to SS204), according to which things in the world have
essences and aim to achieve (or have the purpose of living up to)
their essences. Finite Purpose is the moment in which an Abstract
Purpose begins to have a determination by fixing on some particular
material or content through which it will be realized (EL SS205).
The Finite Purpose then goes through a process in which it, as the
Universality, comes to realize itself as the Purpose over the
particular material or content (and hence becomes Realized Purpose) by
pushing out into Particularity, then into Singularity (the syllogism
U-P-S), and ultimately into 'out-thereness,' or into
individual objects out there in the world (EL SS210; cf. Maybee
2009: 466-493).



Hegel's description of the development of Purpose does not seem
to fit the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example or the
thesis-antithesis-synthesis model. According to the example and model,
Abstract Purpose would be the moment of understanding or thesis,
Finite Purpose would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and
Realized Purpose would be the speculative moment or synthesis.
Although Finite Purpose has a *different* determination from
Abstract Purpose (it refines the definition of Abstract Purpose), it
is hard to see how it would qualify as strictly "opposed"
to or as the "antithesis" of Abstract Purpose in the way
that Nothing is opposed to or is the antithesis of Being.



There is an answer, however, to the criticism that many of the
determinations are not "opposites" in a strict sense. The
German term that is translated as "opposite" in
Hegel's description of the moments of dialectics (EL
SSSS81, 82)--*entgegensetzen*--has three root
words: *setzen* ("to posit or set"),
*gegen*, ("against"), and the prefix *ent*-,
which indicates that something has entered into a new state. The verb
*entgegensetzen* can therefore literally be translated as
"to set over against". The
"*engegengesetzte*" into which determinations pass,
then, do not need to be the strict "opposites" of the
first, but can be determinations that are merely "set
against" or are different from the first ones. And the prefix
*ent*-, which suggests that the first determinations are put
into a new state, can be explained by Hegel's claim that the
finite determinations from the moment of understanding sublate (cancel
but also preserve) themselves (EL SS81): later determinations put
earlier determinations into a new state by *preserving*
them.



At the same time, there is a technical sense in which a later
determination would still be the "opposite" of the earlier
determination. Since the second determination is different from the
first one, it is the logical negation of the first one, or is
*not*-the-first-determination. If the first determination is
"e", for instance, because the new determination is
different from that one, the new one is "not-e" (Kosek
1972: 240). Since Finite Purpose, for instance, has a definition or
determination that is different from the definition that Abstract
Purpose has, it is *not*-Abstract-Purpose, or is the negation
or opposite of Abstract Purpose in that sense. There is therefore a
technical, logical sense in which the second concept or form is the
"opposite" or negation of--or is
"not"--the first one--though, again, it need not
be the "opposite" of the first one in a strict sense.



Other problems remain, however. Because the concept of Realized
Purpose is defined through a syllogistic process, it is itself the
product of several stages of development (at least four, by my count,
if Realized Purpose counts as a separate determination), which would
seem to violate a triadic model. Moreover, the concept of Realized
Purpose does not, strictly speaking, seem to be the unity or
combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose. Realized Purpose
is the result of (and so unifies) the syllogistic process of Finite
Purpose, through which Finite Purpose focuses on and is realized in a
particular material or content. Realized Purpose thus seems to be a
development of Finite Purpose, rather than a unity or combination of
Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose, in the way that Becoming can be
said to be the unity or combination of Being and Nothing.



These sorts of considerations have led some scholars to interpret
Hegel's dialectics in a way that is implied by a more literal
reading of his claim, in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, that the
three "sides" of the form of logic--namely, the
moment of understanding, the dialectical moment, and the speculative
moment--"are *moments of each* [or every;
*jedes*] *logically-real*, that is each [or every;
*jedes*] concept" (EL Remark to SS79; this is an
alternative translation). The quotation suggests that *each
concept* goes through all three moments of the dialectical
process--a suggestion reinforced by Hegel's claim, in the
*Phenomenology*, that the result of the process of determinate
negation is that "a new form has thereby immediately
arisen" (PhG-M SS79). According to this interpretation, the
three "sides" are not three different concepts or forms
that are related to one another in a triad--as the textbook
Being-Nothing-Becoming example suggests--but rather different
momentary sides or "determinations" in the life, so to
speak, of *each* concept or form as it transitions to the next
one. The three moments thus involve only two concepts or forms: the
one that comes first, and the one that comes next (examples of
philosophers who interpret Hegel's dialectics in this second way
include Maybee 2009; Priest 1989: 402; Rosen 2014: 122, 132; and
Winfield 1990: 56).



For the concept of Being, for example, its moment of understanding is
its moment of stability, in which it is asserted to be pure presence.
This determination is one-sided or restricted however, because, as we
saw, it ignores another aspect of Being's definition, namely,
that Being has no content or determination, which is how Being is
defined in its dialectical moment. Being thus sublates *itself*
because the one-sidedness of its moment of understanding undermines
that determination and leads to the definition it has in the
dialectical moment. The speculative moment draws out the implications
of these moments: it asserts that Being (as pure presence) implies
nothing. It is also the "unity of the determinations in their
comparison [*Entgegensetzung*]" (EL SS82; alternative
translation): since it captures a process from one to the other, it
includes Being's moment of understanding (as pure presence) and
dialectical moment (as nothing or undetermined), but also
*compares* those two determinations, or sets (-*setzen*)
them up against (-*gegen*) each other. It even puts Being into
a new state (as the prefix *ent*- suggests) because the next
concept, Nothing, will *sublate* (cancel and preserve)
Being.



The concept of Nothing also has all three moments. When it is asserted
to be the speculative result of the concept of Being, it has its
moment of understanding or stability: it is Nothing, defined as pure
absence, as the absence of determination. But Nothing's moment
of understanding is also one-sided or restricted: like Being, Nothing
is also an undefined content, which is its determination in its
dialectical moment. Nothing thus sublates *itself*: since it is
an undefined *content*, it is not pure absence after all, but
has the same *presence* that Being did. It is *present*
as an undefined *content*. Nothing thus *sublates*
Being: it replaces (cancels) Being, but also preserves Being insofar
as it has the same definition (as an undefined content) and presence
that Being had. We can picture Being and Nothing like this (the
circles have dashed outlines to indicate that, as concepts, they are
each undefined; cf. Maybee 2009: 51):



![two circles with dashed outlines, one labeled 'Being' and one 'Nothing'.](4_Being_and_Nothing.png)

Figure 4




In its speculative moment, then, Nothing implies presence or Being,
which is the "unity of the determinations in their comparison
[*Entgegensetzung*]" (EL SS82; alternative
translation), since it both *includes* but--as a process
from one to the other--also *compares* the two earlier
determinations of Nothing, first, as pure absence and, second, as just
as much presence.



The dialectical process is driven to the next concept or
form--Becoming--not by a triadic,
thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, but by the one-sidedness of
Nothing--which leads Nothing to sublate itself--and by the
implications of the process so far. Since Being and Nothing have each
been exhaustively analyzed as separate concepts, and since they are
the only concepts in play, there is only one way for the dialectical
process to move forward: whatever concept comes next will have to take
account of both Being and Nothing at the same time. Moreover, the
process revealed that an undefined content taken to be presence (i.e.,
Being) implies Nothing (or absence), and that an undefined content
taken to be absence (i.e., Nothing) implies presence (i.e., Being).
The next concept, then, takes Being and Nothing together and draws out
those implications--namely, that Being implies Nothing, and that
Nothing implies Being. It is therefore Becoming, defined as two
separate processes: one in which Being becomes Nothing, and one in
which Nothing becomes Being. We can picture Becoming this way (cf.
Maybee 2009: 53):



![Same as the previous figure except arched arrows from the Nothing circle to the Being circle and vice versa. The arrows are labeled 'Becoming'. ](5_Becoming.png)

Figure 5




In a similar way, a one-sidedness or restrictedness in the
determination of Finite Purpose together with the implications of
earlier stages leads to Realized Purpose. In its moment of
understanding, Finite Purpose particularizes into (or presents) its
content as "*something-presupposed*" or as a
pre-given object (EL SS205). I go to a restaurant for the purpose
of having dinner, for instance, and order a salad. My purpose of
having dinner particularizes as a pre-given object--the salad.
But this object or particularity--e.g. the salad--is
"inwardly reflected" (EL SS205): it has its own
content--developed in earlier stages--which the definition
of Finite Purpose ignores. We can picture Finite Purpose this way:



![4 concentric ovals with the innermost one enclosing an oval and a circle; an arrow points inward from the outermost oval and is labeled 'Presents into or particularizes as'. The outermost oval is labeled 'Finite Purpose (the universality; e.g. 'dinner')'. The next most oval is labeled 'A pre-given object (e.g., 'salad')'. The next oval and the circle and oval in the center are labeled 'The content of the object, developed in earlier stages, that Finite Purpose is ignoring'.](6_Finite_Purpose.png)

Figure 6




In the dialectical moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the
previously ignored content, or by that other content. The
one-sidedness of Finite Purpose requires the dialectical process to
continue through a series of syllogisms that determines Finite Purpose
in relation to the ignored content. The first syllogism links the
Finite Purpose to the first layer of content in the object: the
Purpose or universality (e.g., dinner) goes through the particularity
(e.g., the salad) to its content, the singularity (e.g., lettuce as a
type of thing)--the syllogism U-P-S (EL SS206). But the
particularity (e.g., the salad) is itself a universality or purpose,
"which at the same time is a syllogism within itself [*in
sich*]" (EL Remark to SS208; alternative translation),
in relation to its own content. The salad is a universality/purpose
that particularizes as lettuce (as a type of thing) and has its
singularity in this lettuce here--a second syllogism, U-P-S.
Thus, the first singularity (e.g., "lettuce" as a type of
thing)--which, in this second syllogism, is the particularity or
*P*--"*judges*" (EL SS207) or asserts
that "*U* is *S*": it says that
"lettuce" as a universality (*U*) or type of thing is
a singularity (*S*), or is "this lettuce here", for
instance. This new singularity (e.g. "this lettuce here")
is itself a combination of subjectivity and objectivity (EL
SS207): it is an Inner or identifying concept
("lettuce") that is in a mutually-defining relationship
(the circular arrow) with an Outer or out-thereness ("this
here") as its content. In the speculative moment, Finite Purpose
is determined by the whole process of development from the moment of
understanding--when it is defined by particularizing into a
pre-given object with a content that it ignores--to its
dialectical moment--when it is also defined by the previously
ignored content. We can picture the speculative moment of Finite
Purpose this way:



![4 concentric ovals with the innermost one enclosing an oval and a circle; arrows point inward from the outermost 3 ovals to the next one in. The outermost oval is labeled 'Finite Purpose (the universality; e.g. 'dinner')'. The nextmost oval is labeled both 'The Particularity or object (e.g., 'salad')' and 'The object (e.g., 'salad') is also a Purpose or universality with its own syllogism'. The next oval is labeled both 'The Singularity (e.g., 'lettuce' as a type)' and 'The Particularity (e.g., 'lettuce' as type)'. And the 4th oval is labeled both 'Inner' and 'The Singularity (e.g., 'this lettuce is here')'. The circle in the middle is labeled 'Outer' and the oval in the middle 'Mutually-defining relationship'. The 3 interior ovals (not including the innermost) are also labeled 'The second syllogism U-P-S'. The 3 outer ovals are also labeled 'The first syllogism U-P-S'.](7_Finite_Purpose_Realizing_Itself.png)

Figure 7




Finite Purpose's speculative moment leads to Realized Purpose.
As soon as Finite Purpose presents all the content, there is a return
process (a series of return arrows) that establishes each layer and
redefines Finite Purpose as Realized Purpose. The presence of
"this lettuce here" establishes the actuality of
"lettuce" as a type of thing (an Actuality is a concept
that captures a mutually-defining relationship between an Inner and an
Outer [EL SS142]), which establishes the "salad",
which establishes "dinner" as the Realized Purpose over
the whole process. We can picture Realized Purpose this way:



![4 concentric ovals with the innermost one enclosing an oval and a circle; arrows point inward from the outermost 3 ovals to the next one in and arrows also point in the reverse direction. The outermost oval is labeled 'Realized Purpose: the Purpose (e.g., 'dinner') is established as the Purpose or universality over the whole content'. The outward pointing arrows are labeled 'The return process established the Purpose (e.g., 'dinner') as the Purpose or universality over the whole content'. The nextmost oval is labeled 'The object and second Purpose (e.g., 'salad')'. The one next in is labeled 'The Singularity/Particularity (e.g., 'lettuce' as a type)'. The 3rd inward oval is labeled 'The second Singularity (e.g., 'this lettuce is here')'.](8_Realized_Purpose.png)

Figure 8




If Hegel's account of dialectics is a general description of the
life of each concept or form, then any section can include as many or
as few stages as the development requires. Instead of trying to
squeeze the stages into a triadic form (cf. Solomon 1983: 22)--a
technique Hegel himself rejects (PhG SS50; cf.
 section 3)--we
 can see the process as driven by each determination on its own
account: what it succeeds in grasping (which allows it to be stable,
for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or capture (in
its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment)
to a new concept or form that tries to correct for the one-sidedness
of the moment of understanding. This sort of process might reveal a
kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a
comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or
determination in each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics
above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level
of a genuine science.


## 3. Why does Hegel use dialectics?



We can begin to see why Hegel was motivated to use a dialectical
method by examining the project he set for himself, particularly in
relation to the work of David Hume and Immanuel Kant (see entries on
 Hume
 and
 Kant).
 Hume had argued against what we can think of as the naive view
of how we come to have scientific knowledge. According to the
naive view, we gain knowledge of the world by using our senses to
pull the world into our heads, so to speak. Although we may have to
use careful observations and do experiments, our knowledge of the
world is basically a mirror or copy of what the world is like. Hume
argued, however, that naive science's claim that our
knowledge corresponds to or copies what the world is like does not
work. Take the scientific concept of cause, for instance. According to
that concept of cause, to say that one event causes another is to say
that there is a necessary connection between the first event (the
cause) and the second event (the effect), such that, when the first
event happens, the second event must also happen. According to
naive science, when we claim (or know) that some event
*causes* some other event, our claim mirrors or copies what the
world is like. It follows that the necessary, causal connection
between the two events must itself be out there in the world. However,
Hume argued, we never observe any such necessary causal connection in
our experience of the world, nor can we infer that one exists based on
our reasoning (see Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*,
Book I, Part III, Section II; *Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding*, Section VII, Part I). There is nothing in the
world itself that our idea of cause mirrors or copies.



Kant thought Hume's argument led to an unacceptable, skeptical
conclusion, and he rejected Hume's own solution to the
skepticism (see Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, B5,
B19-20). Hume suggested that our idea of causal necessity is
grounded merely in custom or habit, since it is generated by our own
imaginations after repeated observations of one sort of event
following another sort of event (see Hume's *A Treatise of
Human Nature*, Book I, Section VI; Hegel also rejected
Hume's solution, see EL SS39). For Kant, science and
knowledge should be grounded in reason, and he proposed a solution
that aimed to reestablish the connection between reason and knowledge
that was broken by Hume's skeptical argument. Kant's
solution involved proposing a Copernican revolution in philosophy
(*Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxvi). Nicholas Copernicus was the
Polish astronomer who said that the earth revolves around the sun,
rather than the other way around. Kant proposed a similar solution to
Hume's skepticism. Naive science assumes that our knowledge
revolves around what the world is like, but, Hume's criticism
argued, this view entails that we cannot then have knowledge of
scientific causes through reason. We can reestablish a connection
between reason and knowledge, however, Kant suggested, if we
say--not that knowledge revolves around what the world is
like--but that knowledge revolves around what *we are
like*. For the purposes of our knowledge, Kant said, we do not
revolve around the world--the world revolves around us. Because
we are rational creatures, we share a cognitive structure with one
another that regularizes our experiences of the world. This
intersubjectively shared structure of rationality--and not the
world itself--grounds our knowledge.



However, Kant's solution to Hume's skepticism led to a
skeptical conclusion of its own that Hegel rejected. While the
intersubjectively shared structure of our reason might allow us to
have knowledge of the world from our perspective, so to speak, we
cannot get outside of our mental, rational structures to see what the
world might be like in itself. As Kant had to admit, according to his
theory, there is still a world in itself or
"Thing-in-itself" (*Ding an sich*) about which we
can know nothing (see, e.g., *Critique of Pure Reason*,
Bxxv-xxvi). Hegel rejected Kant's skeptical conclusion
that we can know nothing about the world- or Thing-in-itself, and he
intended his own philosophy to be a response to this view (see, e.g.,
EL SS44 and the Remark to SS44).



How did Hegel respond to Kant's skepticism--especially
since Hegel accepted Kant's Copernican revolution, or
Kant's claim that we have knowledge of the world because of what
we are like, because of our reason? How, for Hegel, can we get out of
our heads to see the world as it is in itself? Hegel's answer is
very close to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle's response
to Plato. Plato argued that we have knowledge of the world only
through the Forms. The Forms are perfectly universal, rational
concepts or ideas. Because the world is imperfect, however, Plato
exiled the Forms to their own realm. Although things in the world get
their definitions by participating in the Forms, those things are, at
best, imperfect copies of the universal Forms (see, e.g.,
*Parmenides* 131-135a). The Forms are therefore not in
this world, but in a separate realm of their own. Aristotle argued,
however, that the world is knowable not because things in the world
are imperfect copies of the Forms, but because the Forms are in things
themselves as the defining essences of those things (see, e.g., *De
Anima* [*On the Soul*], Book I, Chapter 1
[403a26-403b18]; *Metaphysics*, Book VII, Chapter 6
[1031b6-1032a5] and Chapter 8 [1033b20-1034a8]).



In a similar way, Hegel's answer to Kant is that we can get out
of our heads to see what the world is like in itself--and hence
can have knowledge of the world in itself--because the very same
rationality or reason that is in our heads is *in the world
itself*. As Hegel apparently put it in a lecture, the opposition
or antithesis between the subjective and objective disappears by
saying, as the Ancients did, 



> 
> 
> that *nous* governs the world, or by our own saying that there
> is reason in the world, by which we mean that reason is the soul of
> the world, inhabits it, and is immanent in it, as it own, innermost
> nature, its universal. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to SS24) 
> 
> 
> 



Hegel used an example familiar from Aristotle's work to
illustrate this view: 



> 
> 
> "to be an animal", the kind considered as the universal,
> pertains to the determinate animal and constitutes its determinate
> essentiality. If we were to deprive a dog of its animality we could
> not say what it is. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to SS24; cf. SL-dG
> 16-17, SL-M 36-37)
> 
> 
> 



Kant's mistake, then, was that he regarded reason or rationality
as only in our heads, Hegel suggests (EL SSSS43-44),
rather than in both us and the world itself (see also below in this
section and
 section 4).
 We can use our reason to have knowledge of the world because the very
same reason that is in us, is in the world itself as it own defining
principle. The rationality or reason in the world makes reality
understandable, and that is why we can have knowledge of, or can
understand, reality with our rationality. Dialectics--which is
Hegel's account of reason--characterizes not only logic,
but also "everything true in general" (EL Remark to
SS79).



But why does Hegel come to define reason in terms of dialectics, and
hence adopt a dialectical method? We can begin to see what drove Hegel
to adopt a dialectical method by returning once again to Plato's
philosophy. Plato argued that we can have knowledge of the world only
by grasping the Forms, which are perfectly universal, rational
concepts or ideas. Because things in the world are so imperfect,
however, Plato concluded that the Forms are not in this world, but in
a realm of their own. After all, if a human being were perfectly
beautiful, for instance, then he or she would never become
not-beautiful. But human beings change, get old, and die, and so can
be, at best, imperfect copies of the Form of beauty--though they
get whatever beauty they have by participating in that Form. Moreover,
for Plato, things in the world are such imperfect copies that we
cannot gain knowledge of the Forms by studying things in the world,
but only through reason, that is, only by using our rationality to
access the separate realm of the Forms (as Plato argued in the
well-known parable of the cave; *Republic*, Book 7,
514-516b).



Notice, however, that Plato's conclusion that the Forms cannot
be in this world and so must be exiled to a separate realm rests on
two claims. First, it rests on the claim that the world is an
imperfect and messy place--a claim that is hard to deny. But it
also rests on the assumption that the Forms--the universal,
rational concepts or ideas of reason itself--are static and
fixed, and so cannot grasp the messiness within the imperfect world.
Hegel is able to link reason back to our messy world by changing the
definition of reason. Instead of saying that reason consists of static
universals, concepts or ideas, Hegel says that the universal concepts
or forms are themselves *messy*. Against Plato, Hegel's
dialectical method allows him to argue that universal concepts can
"overgrasp" (from the German verb
*ubergreifen*) the messy, dialectical nature of the world
because they, themselves, are *dialectical*. Moreover, because
later concepts build on or sublate (cancel, but also preserve) earlier
concepts, the later, more universal concepts grasp the dialectical
processes of earlier concepts. As a result, higher-level concepts can
grasp not only the dialectical nature of earlier concepts or forms,
but also the dialectical processes that make the world itself a messy
place. The highest definition of the concept of beauty, for instance,
would not take beauty to be fixed and static, but would include within
it the dialectical nature or finiteness of beauty, the idea that
beauty becomes, on its own account, not-beauty. This dialectical
understanding of the concept of beauty can then overgrasp the
dialectical and finite nature of beauty in the world, and hence the
truth that, in the world, beautiful things themselves become
not-beautiful, or might be beautiful in one respect and not another.
Similarly, the highest determination of the concept of
"tree" will include within its definition the dialectical
process of development and change from seed to sapling to tree. As
Hegel says, dialectics is "the principle of all natural and
spiritual life" (SL-M 56; SL-dG 35), or "the moving soul
of scientific progression" (EL SS81). Dialectics is what
drives the development of both reason as well as of things in the
world. A dialectical reason can overgrasp a dialectical world.



Two further journeys into the history of philosophy will help to show
why Hegel chose dialectics as his method of argument. As we saw, Hegel
argues against Kant's skepticism by suggesting that reason is
not only in our heads, but in the world itself. To show that reason is
in the world itself, however, Hegel has to show that reason can be
what it is without us human beings to help it. He has to show that
reason can develop on its own, and does not need us to do the
developing for it (at least for those things in the world that are not
human-created). As we saw (cf.
 section 1),
 central to Hegel's dialectics is the idea that concepts or
forms develop on their own because they "self-sublate", or
sublate (cancel and preserve) *themselves*, and so pass into
subsequent concepts or forms on their own accounts, because of their
own, dialectical natures. Thus reason, as it were, drives itself, and
hence does not need our heads to develop it. Hegel needs an account of
self-driving reason to get beyond Kant's skepticism.



Ironically, Hegel derives the basic outlines of his account of
self-driving reason from Kant. Kant divided human rationality into two
faculties: the faculty of the understanding and the faculty of reason.
The understanding uses concepts to organize and regularize our
experiences of the world. Reason's job is to coordinate the
concepts and categories of the understanding by developing a
completely unified, conceptual system, and it does this work, Kant
thought, on its own, independently of how those concepts might apply
to the world. Reason coordinates the concepts of the understanding by
following out necessary chains of syllogisms to produce concepts that
achieve higher and higher levels of conceptual unity. Indeed, this
process will lead reason to produce its own transcendental ideas, or
concepts that go beyond the world of experience. Kant calls this
necessary, concept-creating reason "speculative" reason
(cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxx-xxi, A327/B384).
Reason creates its own concepts or ideas--it
"speculates"--by generating new and increasingly
comprehensive concepts of its own, independently of the understanding.
In the end, Kant thought, reason will follow out such chains of
syllogisms until it develops completely comprehensive or unconditioned
universals--universals that contain all of the conditions or all
of the less-comprehensive concepts that help to define them. As we saw
(cf.
 section 1),
 Hegel's dialectics adopts Kant's notion of a self-driving
and concept-creating "speculative" reason, as well as
Kant's idea that reason aims toward unconditioned universality
or absolute concepts.



Ultimately, Kant thought, reasons' necessary, self-driving
activity will lead it to produce contradictions--what he called
the "antinomies", which consist of a thesis and
antithesis. Once reason has generated the unconditioned concept of the
whole world, for instance, Kant argued, it can look at the world in
two, contradictory ways. In the first antinomy, reason can see the
world (1) as the whole totality or as the unconditioned, or (2) as the
series of syllogisms that led up to that totality. If reason sees the
world as the unconditioned or as a complete whole that is not
conditioned by anything else, then it will see the world as having a
beginning and end in terms of space and time, and so will conclude
(the thesis) that the world has a beginning and end or limit. But if
reason sees the world as the series, in which each member of the
series is conditioned by the previous member, then the world will
appear to be without a beginning and infinite, and reason will
conclude (the antithesis) that the world does not have a limit in
terms of space and time (cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*,
A417-18/B445-6). Reason thus leads to a contradiction: it
holds both that the world has a limit and that it does not have a
limit at the same time. Because reason's own process of
self-development will lead it to develop contradictions or to be
dialectical in this way, Kant thought that reason must be kept in
check by the understanding. Any conclusions that reason draws that do
not fall within the purview of the understanding cannot be applied to
the world of experience, Kant said, and so cannot be considered
genuine knowledge (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A506/B534).



Hegel adopts Kant's dialectical conception of reason, but he
liberates reason for knowledge from the tyranny of the understanding.
Kant was right that reason speculatively generates concepts on its
own, and that this speculative process is driven by necessity and
leads to concepts of increasing universality or comprehensiveness.
Kant was even right to suggest--as he had shown in the discussion
of the antinomies--that reason is dialectical, or necessarily
produces contradictions on its own. Again, Kant's mistake was
that he fell short of saying that these contradictions are in the
world itself. He failed to apply the insights of his discussion of the
antinomies to "*things in themselves*" (SL-M 56;
SL-dG 35; see also
 section 4).
 Indeed, Kant's own argument proves that the dialectical nature
of reason can be applied to things themselves. The fact that reason
develops those contradictions *on its own, without our heads to
help it*, shows that those contradictions are not just in our
heads, but are objective, or in the world itself. Kant, however,
failed to draw this conclusion, and continued to regard reason's
conclusions as illusions. Still, Kant's philosophy vindicated
the general idea that the contradictions he took to be illusions are
both objective--or out there in the world--and necessary. As
Hegel puts it, Kant vindicates the general idea of "the
*objectivity of the illusion* and the *necessity of the
contradiction* which belongs to the nature of thought
determinations" (SL-M 56; cf. SL-dG 35), or to the nature of
concepts themselves.



The work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (see entry on
 Fichte)
 showed Hegel how dialectics can get beyond Kant--beyond the
contradictions that, as Kant had shown, reason (necessarily) develops
on its own, beyond the *reductio ad absurdum* argument (which,
as we saw above, holds that a contradiction leads to nothingness), and
beyond Kant's skepticism, or Kant's claim that
reason's contradictions must be reined in by the understanding
and cannot count as knowledge. Fichte argued that the task of
discovering the foundation of all human knowledge leads to a
contradiction or opposition between the self and the not-self (it is
not important, for our purposes, why Fichte held this view). The kind
of reasoning that leads to this contradiction, Fichte said, is the
analytical or antithetical method of reasoning, which involves drawing
out an opposition between elements (in this case, the self and
not-self) that are being compared to, or equated with, one another.
While the traditional *reductio ad absurdum* argument would
lead us to reject both sides of the contradiction and start from
scratch, Fichte argued that the contradiction or opposition between
the self and not-self can be resolved. In particular, the
contradiction is resolved by positing a third concept--the
concept of divisibility--which unites the two sides (*The
Science of Knowledge*, I: 110-11; Fichte 1982:
108-110). The concept of divisibility is produced by a synthetic
procedure of reasoning, which involves "discovering in opposites
the respect in which they are *alike*" (*The Science
of Knowledge*, I: 112-13; Fichte 1982: 111). Indeed, Fichte
argued, not only is the move to resolve contradictions with synthetic
concepts or judgments possible, it is *necessary*. As he says
of the move from the contradiction between self and not-self to the
synthetic concept of divisibility, 



> 
> 
> there can be no further question as to the possibility of this
> [synthesis], nor can any ground for it be given; it is absolutely
> possible, and we are entitled to it without further grounds of any
> kind. (*The Science of Knowledge*, I: 114; Fichte 1982: 112)
> 
> 
> 
> 



Since the analytical method leads to oppositions or contradictions, he
argued, if we use only analytic judgments, "we not only do not
get very far, as *Kant* says; we do not get anywhere at
all" (*The Science of Knowledge*, I: 113; Fichte 1982:
112). Without the synthetic concepts or judgments, we are left, as the
classic *reductio ad absurdum* argument suggests, with nothing
at all. The synthetic concepts or judgments are thus necessary to get
beyond contradiction without leaving us with nothing.



Fichte's account of the synthetic method provides Hegel with the
key to moving beyond Kant. Fichte suggested that a synthetic concept
that unifies the results of a dialectically-generated contradiction
does not completely cancel the contradictory sides, but only limits
them. As he said, in general, "[t]o *limit* something is
to abolish its reality, not *wholly*, but in *part*
only" (*The Science of Knowledge*, I: 108; Fichte 1982:
108). Instead of concluding, as a *reductio ad absurdum*
requires, that the two sides of a contradiction must be dismissed
altogether, the synthetic concept or judgment retroactively justifies
the opposing sides by demonstrating their limit, by showing which part
of reality they attach to and which they do not (*The Science of
Knowledge*, I: 108-10; Fichte 1982: 108-9), or by
determining in what respect and to what degree they are each true. For
Hegel, as we saw (cf.
 section 1),
 later concepts and forms sublate--both cancel and
*preserve*--earlier concepts and forms in the sense that
they include earlier concepts and forms in their own definitions. From
the point of view of the later concepts or forms, the earlier ones
still have some validity, that is, they have a limited validity or
truth defined by the higher-level concept or form.



Dialectically generated contradictions are therefore not a defect to
be reigned in by the understanding, as Kant had said, but invitations
for reason to "speculate", that is, for reason to generate
precisely the sort of increasingly comprehensive and universal
concepts and forms that Kant had said reason aims to develop.
Ultimately, Hegel thought, as we saw (cf.
 section 1),
 the dialectical process leads to a completely unconditioned concept
or form for each subject matter--the Absolute Idea (logic),
Absolute Spirit (phenomenology), Absolute Idea of right and law
(*Philosophy of Right*), and so on--which, taken together,
form the "circle of circles" (EL SS15) that
constitutes the whole philosophical system or "Idea" (EL
SS15) that both overgrasps the world and *makes it
understandable* (for us). 



Note that, while Hegel was clearly influenced by Fichte's work,
he never adopted Fichte's triadic
"thesis--antithesis--synthesis" language in his
descriptions of his own philosophy (Mueller 1958: 411-2; Solomon
1983: 23), though he did apparently use it in his lectures to describe
Kant's philosophy (LHP III: 477). Indeed, Hegel criticized
formalistic uses of the method of "*triplicity*
[Triplizitat]" (PhG-P SS50) inspired by Kant--a
criticism that could well have been aimed at Fichte. Hegel argued that
Kantian-inspired uses of triadic form had been reduced to "a
lifeless schema" and "an actual semblance
[*eigentlichen Scheinen*]" (PhG SS50; alternative
translation) that, like a formula in mathematics, was simply imposed
on top of subject matters. Instead, a properly scientific use of
Kant's "triplicity" should flow--as he said his
own dialectical method did (see
 section 1)--out
 of "the inner life and self-movement" (PhG SS51) of
the content. 


## 4. Is Hegel's dialectical method logical?



Scholars have often questioned whether Hegel's dialectical
method is logical. Some of their skepticism grows out of the role that
contradiction plays in his thought and argument. While many of the
oppositions embedded in the dialectical development and the
definitions of concepts or forms are not contradictions in the strict
sense, as we saw
 (section 2,
 above), scholars such as Graham Priest have suggested that some of
them arguably are (Priest 1989: 391). Hegel even holds, against Kant
(cf.
 section 3
 above), that there are contradictions, not only in thought, but also
in the world. Motion, for instance, Hegel says, is an
"*existent* contradiction". As he describes it:



> 
> 
> Something moves, not because now it is here and there at another now,
> but because in one and the same now it is here and not here, because
> in this here, it is and is not at the same time. (SL-dG 382; cf. SL-M
> 440) 
> 
> 
> 



Kant's sorts of antinomies (cf.
 section 3
 above) or contradictions more generally are therefore, as Hegel puts
it in one place, "in *all* objects of all kinds, in
*all* representations, concepts and ideas" (EL-GSH Remark
to SS48). Hegel thus seems to reject, as he himself explicitly
claims (SL-M 439-40; SL-dG 381-82), the law of
non-contradiction, which is a fundamental principle of formal
logic--the classical, Aristotelian logic (see entries on
 Aristotle's Logic
 and
 Contradiction)
 that dominated during Hegel's lifetime as well as the dominant
systems of symbolic logic today (cf. Priest 1989: 391; Dusing
2010: 97-103). According to the law of non-contradiction,
something cannot be both true and false at the same time or, put
another way, "x" and "not-x" cannot both be
true at the same time.



Hegel's apparent rejection of the law of non-contradiction has
led some interpreters to regard his dialectics as illogical, even
"absurd" (Popper 1940: 420; 1962: 330; 2002: 443). Karl R.
Popper, for instance, argued that accepting Hegel's and other
dialecticians' rejection of the law of non-contradiction as part
of both a logical theory and a general theory of the world
"would mean a complete breakdown of science" (Popper 1940:
408; 1962: 317; 2002: 426). Since, according to today's systems
of symbolic logic, he suggested, the truth of a contradiction leads
logically to any claim (any claim can logically be inferred from two
contradictory claims), if we allow contradictory claims to be valid or
true together, then we would have no reason to rule out any claim
whatsoever (Popper 1940: 408-410; 1962: 317-319; 2002:
426-429).



Popper was notoriously hostile toward Hegel's work (cf. Popper
2013: 242-289; for a scathing criticism of Popper's
analysis see Kaufmann 1976 [1972]), but, as Priest has noted (Priest
1989: 389-91), even some sympathetic interpreters have been
inspired by today's dominant systems of symbolic logic to hold
that the kind of contradiction that is embedded in Hegel's
dialectics cannot be genuine contradiction in the strict sense. While
Dieter Wandschneider, for instance, grants that his sympathetic theory
of dialectic "is not presented as a faithful interpretation of
the Hegelian text" (Wandschneider 2010: 32), he uses the same
logical argument that Popper offered in defense of the claim that
"dialectical contradiction is not a 'normal'
contradiction, but one that is actually only an *apparent*
contradiction" (Wandschneider 2010: 37). The suggestion (by the
traditional, triadic account of Hegel's dialectics, cf.
 section 2,
 above) that Being and Nothing (or non-being) is a contradiction, for
instance, he says, rests on an ambiguity. Being is an undefined
content, taken to mean being or presence, while Nothing is an
undefined content, taken to mean nothing or absence
 (section 2,
 above; cf. Wandschneider 2010: 34-35). Being *is* Nothing
(or non-being) with respect to the *property* they have as
concepts, namely, that they both have an undefined content. But Being
*is not* Nothing (or non-being) with respect to their
*meaning* (Wandschneider 2010: 34-38). The supposed
contradiction between them, then, Wandschneider suggests, takes place
"in *different respects*". It is therefore only an
apparent contradiction. "Rightly understood", he
concludes, "there can be no talk of *contradiction*"
(Wandschneider 2010: 38).



Inoue Kazumi also argues that dialectical contradiction in the
Hegelian sense does not violate the law of non-contradiction (Inoue
2014: 121-123), and he rejects Popper's claim that
Hegel's dialectical method is incompatible with good science. A
dialectical contradiction, Inoue says, is a contradiction that arises
when the same topic is considered from different vantage points, but
each vantage point by itself does not violate the law of
non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 120). The understanding leads to
contradictions, as Hegel said (cf.
 section 3
 above), because it examines a topic from a fixed point of view;
reason embraces contradictions because it examines a topic from
multiple points of view (Inoue 2014: 121). The geocentric theory that
the sun revolves around the Earth and the heliocentric theory that the
Earth revolves around the sun, for instance, Inoue suggests, are both
correct from certain points of view. We live our everyday lives from a
vantage point in which the sun makes a periodic rotation around the
Earth roughly every 24 hours. Astronomers make their observations from
a geocentric point of view and then translate those observations into
a heliocentric one. From these points of view, the geocentric account
is not incorrect. But physics, particularly in its concepts of mass
and force, requires the heliocentric account. For science--which
takes all these points of view into consideration--both theories
are valid: they are dialectically contradictory, though neither
theory, by itself, violates the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014:
126-127). To insist that the Earth *really* revolves around
the sun is merely an irrational, reductive prejudice, theoretically
and practically (Inoue 2014: 126). Dialectical contradictions, Inoue
says, are, as Hegel said, constructive: they lead to concepts or
points of view that grasp the world from ever wider and more
encompassing perspectives, culminating ultimately in the
"Absolute" (Inoue 2014: 121; cf.
 section 1,
 above). Hegel's claim that motion violates the law of
non-contradiction, Inoue suggests, is an expression of the idea that
contradictory claims can be true when motion is described from more
than one point of view (Inoue 2014: 123). (For a similar reading of
Hegel's conception of dialectical contradiction, which
influenced Inoue's account [Inoue 2014: 121], see Dusing
2010: 102-103.)



Other interpreters, however, have been inspired by Hegel's
dialectics to develop alternative systems of logic that do not
subscribe to the law of non-contradiction. Priest, for instance, has
defended Hegel's rejection of the law of non-contradiction (cf.
Priest 1989; 1997 [2006: 4]). The acceptance of *some*
contradictions, he has suggested, does not require the acceptance of
*all* contradictions (Priest 1989: 392). Popper's logical
argument is also unconvincing. Contradictions lead logically to any
claim whatsoever, as Popper said, only if we *presuppose* that
nothing can be both true and false at the same time (i.e. only if we
presuppose that the law of non-contradiction is correct), which is
just what Hegel denies. Popper's logical argument thus assumes
what it is supposed to prove or begs the question (Priest 1989: 392;
1997 [2006: 5-6]), and so is not convincing. Moreover,
consistency (not allowing contradictions), Priest suggests, is
actually "a very weak constraint" (Priest 1997 [2006:
104]) on what counts as a rational inference. Other principles or
criteria--such as being strongly disproved (or supported) by the
data--are more important for determining whether a claim or
inference is rational (Priest 1997 [2006: 105]). And, as Hegel pointed
out, Priest says, the data--namely, "the world *as it
appears*" (as Hegel puts it in EL) or "ordinary
experience itself" (as Hegel puts it in SL)--suggest that
there are indeed contradictions (EL Remark to SS48; SL-dG 382; cf.
SL-M 440; Priest 1989: 389, 399-400). Hegel is right, for
instance, Priest argues, that change, and motion in particular, are
examples of real or existing contradictions (Priest 1985; 1989:
396-97; 1997 [2006: 172-181, 213-15]). What
distinguishes motion, as a process, from a situation in which
something is simply here at one time and then some other place at some
other time is the embodiment of contradiction: that, in a process of
motion, there is one (span of) time in which something is both here
and not here at the same time (in that span of time) (Priest 1985:
340-341; 1997 [2006: 172-175, 213-214]). A system of
logic, Priest suggests, is always just a *theory* about what good
reasoning should be like (Priest 1989: 392). A dialectical logic that
admits that there are "dialetheia" or true contradictions
(Priest 1989: 388), he says, is a broader theory or version of logic
than traditional, formal logics that subscribe to the law of
non-contradiction. Those traditional logics apply only to topics or
domains that are consistent, primarily domains that are "static
and changeless" (Priest 1989: 391; cf. 395);
dialectical/dialetheic logic handles consistent domains, but also
applies to domains in which there are dialetheia. Thus Priest,
extending Hegel's own concept of *aufheben* ("to
sublate"; cf.
 section 1,
 above), suggests that traditional "formal logic is perfectly
valid in its domain, but dialectical (dialetheic) logic is more
general" (Priest 1989: 395). (For an earlier example of a
logical system that allows contradiction and was inspired in part by
Hegel [and Marx], see Jaskowski 1999: 36 [1969: 143] [cf. Inoue
2014: 128-129]. For more on dialetheic logic generally, see the
entry on
 Dialetheism.)



Worries that Hegel's arguments fail to fit his account of
dialectics (see
 section 2,
 above) have led some interpreters to conclude that his method is
arbitrary or that his works have no single dialectical method at all
(Findlay 1962: 93; Solomon 1983: 21). These interpreters reject the
idea that there is any *logical* necessity to the moves from
stage to stage. "[T]he important point to make here, and again
and again", Robert C. Solomon writes, for instance, 



> 
> 
> is that the transition from the first form to the second, or the
> transition from the first form of the *Phenomenology* all the
> way to the last, is not in any way a deductive necessity. The
> connections are anything but entailments, and the
> *Phenomenology* could *always* take another route and
> other starting points. (Solomon 1983: 230) 
> 
> 
> 



In a footnote to this passage, Solomon adds "that a
formalization of Hegel's logic, however ingenious, is
impossible" (Solomon 1983: 230).



Some scholars have argued that Hegel's necessity is not intended
to be logical necessity. Walter Kaufmann suggested, for instance, that
the necessity at work in Hegel's dialectic is a kind of organic
necessity. The moves in the *Phenomenology*, he said, follow
one another "in the way in which, to use a Hegelian image from
the preface, bud, blossom and fruit succeed each other"
(Kaufmann 1965: 148; 1966: 132). Findlay argued that later stages
provide what he called a "*higher-order comment*"
on earlier stages, even if later stages do not follow from earlier
ones in a trivial way (Findlay 1966: 367). Solomon suggested that the
necessity that Hegel wants is not "'necessity' in
the modern sense of 'logical necessity,'" (Solomon
1983: 209), but a kind of progression (Solomon 1983: 207), or a
"necessity within a context *for some purpose*"
(Solomon 1983: 209). John Burbidge defines Hegel's necessity in
terms of three senses of the relationship between actuality and
possibility, only the last of which is logical necessity (Burbidge
1981: 195-6).



Other scholars have defined the necessity of Hegel's dialectics
in terms of a transcendental argument. A transcendental argument
begins with uncontroversial facts of experience and tries to show that
other conditions must be present--or are necessary--for
those facts to be possible. Jon Stewart argues, for instance, that
"Hegel's dialectic in the *Phenomenology* is a
transcendental account" in this sense, and thus has the
necessity of that form of argument (Stewart 2000: 23; cf. Taylor 1975:
97, 226-7; for a critique of this view, see Pinkard 1988: 7,
15).



Some scholars have avoided these debates by interpreting Hegel's
dialectics in a literary way. In his examination of the
epistemological theory of the *Phenomenology*, for instance,
Kenneth R. Westphal offers "a literary model" of
Hegel's dialectics based on the story of Sophocles' play
*Antigone* (Westphal 2003: 14, 16). Ermanno Bencivenga offers
an interpretation that combines a narrative approach with a concept of
necessity. For him, the necessity of Hegel's dialectical logic
can be captured by the notion of telling a good story--where
"good" implies that the story is both creative and correct
at the same time (Bencivenga 2000: 43-65).



Debate over whether Hegel's dialectical logic is logical may
also be fueled in part by discomfort with his particular brand of
logic. Unlike today's symbolic logics, Hegel's logic is
not only syntactic, but also semantic (cf. Berto 2007; Maybee 2009:
xx-xxv; Margolis 2010: 193-94). Hegel's interest in
semantics appears, for instance, in the very first stages of his
logic, where the difference between Being and Nothing is
"something merely *meant*" (EL-GSH Remark to
SS87; cf.
 section 2
 above). While some of the moves from stage to stage are driven by
syntactic necessity, other moves are driven by the *meanings*
of the concepts in play. Indeed, Hegel rejected what he regarded as
the overly formalistic logics that dominated the field during his day
(EL Remark to SS162; SL-M 43-44; SL-dG 24). A logic that
deals only with the forms of logical arguments and not the meanings of
the concepts used in those argument forms will do no better in terms
of preserving truth than the old joke about computer programs
suggests: garbage in, garbage out. In those logics, if we (using
today's versions of formal, symbolic logic) plug in something
for the *P* or *Q* (in the proposition "if *P*
then *Q*" or "*P* - *Q*", for
instance) or for the "*F*", "*G*",
or "*x*" (in the proposition "if *F* is
*x*, then *G* is *x*" or "*F**x*
- *G**x*", for instance) that means something
true, then the syntax of formal logics will preserve that truth. But
if we plug in something for those terms that is untrue or meaningless
(garbage in), then the syntax of formal logic will lead to an untrue
or meaningless conclusion (garbage out). Today's versions of
prepositional logic also assume that we know what the meaning of
"is" is. Against these sorts of logics, Hegel wanted to
develop a logic that not only preserved truth, but also determined how
to construct truthful claims in the first place. A logic that defines
concepts (semantics) as well as their relationships with one another
(syntax) will show, Hegel thought, how concepts can be combined into
meaningful forms. Because interpreters are familiar with modern logics
focused on syntax, however, they may regard Hegel's syntactic
and semantic logic as not really logical (cf. Maybee 2009:
xvii-xxv).



In Hegel's other works, the moves from stage to stage are often
driven, not only by syntax and semantics--that is, by logic
(given his account of logic)--but also by considerations that
grow out of the relevant subject matter. In the
*Phenomenology*, for instance, the moves are driven by syntax,
semantics, and by *phenomenological* factors. Sometimes a move
from one stage to the next is driven by a *syntactic*
need--the need to stop an endless, back-and-forth process, for
instance, or to take a new path after all the current options have
been exhausted (cf.
 section 5).
 Sometimes, a move is driven by the *meaning* of a concept,
such as the concept of a "This" or "Thing".
And sometimes a move is driven by a *phenomenological* need or
necessity--by requirements of *consciousness*, or by the
fact that the *Phenomenology* is about a *consciousness*
that claims to be aware of (or to know) something. The logic of the
*Phenomenology* is thus a *phenomeno*-logic, or a logic
driven by logic--syntax and semantics--and by
phenomenological considerations. Still, interpreters such as Quentin
Lauer have suggested that, for Hegel, 



> 
> 
> phenomeno-logy is a logic of appearing, a logic of implication, like
> any other logic, even though not of the formal entailment with which
> logicians and mathematicians are familiar. (Lauer 1976: 3) 
> 
> 
> 



Lauer warns us against dismissing the idea that there is any
implication or necessity in Hegel's method at all (Lauer 1976:
3). (Other scholars who also believe there is a logical necessity to
the dialectics of the *Phenomenology* include Hyppolite 1974:
78-9 and H.S. Harris 1997: xii.)



We should also be careful not to exaggerate the
"necessity" of formal, symbolic logics. Even in these
logics, there can often be more than one path from some premises to
the same conclusion, logical operators can be dealt with in different
orders, and different sets of operations can be used to reach the same
conclusions. There is therefore often no strict, necessary
"entailment" from one step to the next, even though the
conclusion might be entailed by the whole series of steps, taken
together. As in today's logics, then, whether Hegel's
dialectics counts as logical depends on the degree to which he shows
that we are forced--necessarily--from earlier stages or
series of stages to later stages (see also
 section 5).


## 5. Syntactic patterns and special terminology in Hegel's dialectics



Although Hegel's dialectics is driven by syntax, semantics and
considerations specific to the different subject matters
 (section 4
 above), several important syntactic patterns appear repeatedly
throughout his works. In many places, the dialectical process is
driven by a syntactic necessity that is really a kind of exhaustion:
when the current strategy has been exhausted, the process is forced,
necessarily, to employ a new strategy. As we saw
 (section 2),
 once the strategy of treating Being and Nothing as separate concepts
is exhausted, the dialectical process must, necessarily, adopt a
different strategy, namely, one that takes the two concepts together.
The concept of Becoming captures the first way in which Being and
Nothing are taken together. In the stages of Quantum through Number,
the concepts of One and Many take turns defining the whole quantity as
well as the quantitative bits inside that make it up: first, the One
is the whole, while the Many are the bits; then the whole and the bits
are all Ones; then the Many is the whole, while the bits are each a
One; and finally the whole and the bits are all a Many. We can picture
the development like this (cf. Maybee 2009, xviii-xix):



![4 figures each contains a rounded corner rectangle bisected by a vertical rod. In #1 the rectangle boundary is labeled 'One' and each half is labeled 'Many'; the caption reads:'Quantum: 'one' refers to the outer boundary, 'many' within. #2 has the boundary also labeled 'One' but the halves labeled 'ones'; the caption reads: Number: 'one' on all sides. #3 has the boundary labeled 'Many' and the halves labeled 'Each a one'; the caption reads: Extensive and Intensive Magnitude: 'many' on the outer boundary, 'one' within'. #4 the rounded rectangle is enclosed by a box; the two halves are labeled 'Many (within)' and the space between the rectangle and the box is labeled 'Many (without)'; the caption reads: Degree: 'many' on all sides. ](9_Intro_Quick_Sketches_copy.png)

Figure 9




Since One and Many have been exhausted, the next stage, Ratio, must,
necessarily, employ a different strategy to grasp the elements in
play. Just as Being-for-itself is a concept of universality for
Quality and captures the character of a set of something-others in its
content (see
 section 1),
 so Ratio (the whole rectangle with rounded corners) is a concept of
universality for Quantity and captures the character of a set of
quantities in its content (EL SS105-6; cf. Maybee 2009,
xviii-xix, 95-7). In another version of syntactic
necessity driven by exhaustion, the dialectical development will take
account of every aspect or layer, so to speak, of a concept or
form--as we saw in the stages of Purpose outlined above, for
instance
 (section 2).
 Once all the aspects or layers of a concept or form have been taken
account of and so exhausted, the dialectical development must also,
necessarily, employ a different strategy in the next stage to grasp
the elements in play.



In a second, common syntactic pattern, the dialectical development
leads to an endless, back-and-forth process--a "bad"
(EL-BD SS94) or "spurious" (EL-GSH SS94)
infinity--between two concepts or forms. Hegel's dialectics
cannot rest with spurious infinities. So long as the dialectical
process is passing endlessly back and forth between two elements, it
is never finished, and the concept or form in play cannot be
determined. Spurious infinities must therefore be resolved or stopped,
and they are always resolved by a higher-level, more universal
concept. In some cases, a new, higher-level concept is introduced that
stops the spurious infinity by grasping the whole, back-and-forth
process. Being-for-itself (cf.
 section 1),
 for instance, is introduced as a new, more universal concept that
embraces--and hence stops--the whole, back-and-forth process
between "something-others". However, if the back-and-forth
process takes place between a concept and its own content--in
which case the concept already embraces the content--then that
embracing concept is redefined in a new way that grasps the whole,
back-and-forth process. The new definition raises the embracing
concept to a higher level of universality--as a totality (an
"all") or as a complete and completed concept. Examples
from logic include the redefinition of Appearance as the whole World
of Appearance (EL SS132; cf. SL-M 505-7, SL-dG 443-4),
the move in which the endless, back-and-forth process of Real
Possibility redefines the Condition as a totality (EL SS147; cf.
SL-M 547, SL-dG 483), and the move in which a back-and-forth process
created by finite Cognition and finite Willing redefines the
Subjective Idea as Absolute Idea (EL SSSS234-5; cf. SL-M
822-3, SL-dG 733-4).



Some of the most famous terms in Hegel's works--"in
itself [*an sich*]", "for itself [*fur
sich*]" and "in and for itself [*an und fur
sich*]"--capture other, common, syntactic patterns. A
concept or form is "in itself" when it has a determination
that it gets by being defined *against* its "other"
(cf. Being-in-itself, EL SS91). A concept or form is "for
itself" when it is defined only in relation to its own content,
so that, while it is technically defined in relation to an
"other", the "other" is not really an
"other" for it. As a result, it is really defined only in
relation to itself. Unlike an "in itself" concept or form,
then, a "for itself" concept or form seems to have its
definition on its own, or does not need a genuine "other"
to be defined (like other concepts or forms, however, "for
itself" concepts or forms turn out to be dialectical too, and
hence push on to new concepts or forms). In the logic,
Being-for-itself (cf.
 section 1),
 which is defined by embracing the "something others" in
its content, is the first, "for itself" concept or
form.



A concept or form is "in and for itself" when it is doubly
"for itself", or "for itself" not only in
terms of *content*--insofar as it embraces its
content--but also in terms of *form* or presentation,
insofar as it also has the activity of *presenting* its
content. It is "for itself" (embraces its content) *for
itself* (through its own activity), or not only embraces its
content (the "for itself" of content) but also
*presents* its content through its own activity (the "for
itself" of form). The second "for itself" of form
provides the concept with a logical activity (i.e., presenting its
content) and hence a definition that goes beyond--and so is
separate from--the definition that its content has. Since it has
a definition of its own that is separate from the definition of its
content, it comes to be defined--in the "in itself"
sense--*against* its content, which has become its
"other". Because this "other" is still its own
content, however, the concept or form is both "in itself"
but also still "for itself" at the same time, or is
"in and for itself" (EL SSSS148-9; cf.
Maybee 2009: 244-6). The "in and for itself"
relationship is the hallmark of a genuine Concept (EL SS160), and
captures the idea that a genuine concept is defined not only from the
bottom up by its content, but also from the top down through its own
activity of presenting its content. The genuine concept of animal, for
instance, is not only defined by embracing its content (namely, all
animals) from the bottom up, but also has a definition of its own,
separate from that content, that leads it to determine (and so
present), from the top down, what counts as an animal.



Other technical, syntactic terms include *aufheben* ("to
sublate"), which we already saw
 (section 1),
 and "abstract". To say that a concept or form is
"abstract" is to say that it is only a partial definition.
Hegel describes the moment of understanding, for instance, as abstract
(EL SSSS79, 80) because it is a one-sided or restricted
definition or determination
 (section 1).
 Conversely, a concept or form is "concrete" in the most
basic sense when it has a content or definition that it gets from
being built out of other concepts or forms. As we saw
 (section 2),
 Hegel regarded Becoming as the first concrete concept in the
logic.



Although Hegel's writing and his use of technical terms can make
his philosophy notoriously difficult, his work can also be very
rewarding. In spite of--or perhaps because of--the
difficulty, there are a surprising number of fresh ideas in his work
that have not yet been fully explored in philosophy.