## 1. Background and Scope



The Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), in which China
suffered defeat at the hands of Britain and France, marked the
beginning of greater interest in Western knowledge, initially to catch
up to their superior military technology. Toward the latter part of
the nineteenth century, Chinese reformers began to look deeper into
the scientific and technological advantages of the Western countries,
becoming convinced that their political and economic systems laid the
groundwork for them. Yan Fu was influential in translating scientific,
economic, and philosophical works into Chinese. Interest in Western
knowledge led to sending students overseas to study, and eventually
the establishment of universities in China. The major figures of
contemporary Confucianism were part of this educational reform, either
teaching or studying at universities established on the European
model, which no Confucian philosopher had before. Modern Confucianism
is characterized in part by this transformation into an academic
field.



In the early twentieth century, Chinese scholars began to publish
their own histories of Chinese philosophy and analyses of Chinese
culture, which may be considered the initial works of contemporary
Confucianism. Some of the significant milestones were Liang
Shuming's *Eastern and Western Cultures and Their
Philosophies* (1921) and Feng Youlan's *History of
Chinese Philosophy* (1931 and 1934). Xiong Shili's *New
Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness* (1932) is sometimes
considered the first work of modern Confucianism proper.



The great interest in Western knowledge in China was often accompanied
by a degree of disdain for tradition, and there was a camp that felt
that all of traditional Chinese culture was an impediment to
modernization and should be discarded. Modern Confucianism developed
in response to this, defending the value of Chinese tradition,
Confucianism especially, and arguing that it can support modernization
rather than obstruct it (Van den Stock 2016: 143; Yao 2000:
268-73). In particular, it can accommodate science and
democracy, which many in China had latched onto as the roots of
Western dominance. Modern Confucianism is thus somewhat conservative,
as it is inherently a defense of aspects of Chinese tradition, but
also recognizes the need for adaptation and evolution.



This entry focuses on a group of scholars who exemplify these features
and developed the most influential Confucian philosophies of the
twentieth century: Xiong Shili Xiong Shi Li 
(1885-1968) and his followers Mou Zongsan
Mou Zong San  (1909-1995), Tang Junyi
Tang Jun Yi  (1909-1978), and Xu Fuguan
Xu Fu Guan  (1903-1982). The latter three (along
with Zhang Junmai) were involved in writing what has become known as
the New Confucian Manifesto. Originally drafted by Tang with comments
from the others, this document is retrospectively identified as a
watershed in modern Confucian thought (Makeham 2003a: 27-29;
Sole-Farras 2014). They are often called disciples of
Xiong (Ng Yu-kwan 2003: 219), but that is a little misleading. Mou and
Tang attended classes with Xiong while students, and Mou does call
Xiong his teacher while also not shying from critical judgment of
Xiong's philosophy (Mou 1991 [2014: 47-48]). Tang admitted
he didn't understand Xiong very well and chose not to follow him
closely (TJCW 26: 2.363; Frohlich 2017: 36-37). At one
point, he said his teacher was Fang Dongmei, not Xiong (Chiu 2016: 5,
15). Xu met Xiong much later in life during WWII when he was an army
officer. None followed Xiong very precisely in their scholarship, as
Xiong himself said (TJCW 26: 2.362). They were inspired by his
character and sense of cultural mission more than they adhered to his
ideas or methods.



What they did share with Xiong is a strong preference for the Wang
Yangming wing of Confucian thought, a focus on intuitive and
experiential moral knowledge, and the belief that firm moral values
are critical for the health of a culture (N. S. Chan 2011:
25-64). New Confucianism specifically usually refers to this
group and their followers. They identify as defenders of Chinese
thought and culture, especially as Confucians. They are concerned with
the relevance of Chinese thought when the institutions and cultural
circumstances that supported it no longer existed. While differing in
numerous respects that will become clear throughout the entry, they
had enough in common to constitute an identifiable group. Their
historical work on Chinese philosophy, significant as it is, will not
be a major focus. Rather, this entry will emphasize their distinct
projects relating to the ideas of Confucian and Chinese modernity, and
what they believed Chinese philosophy could contribute to world
philosophy.



Xiong Shili was born into a poor family in rural Hubei. His parents
died when he was young, leaving little opportunity for formal
schooling. He joined in various revolutionary activities in his
twenties, but in the years after the 1911 Revolution, abandoned
political action and turned to study. In 1920 Xiong went to study
Yogacara Buddhism at the China Institute for Inner Learning. Two years
later, he was invited by Cai Yuanpei to teach at Beijing University.
There he initially taught Yogacara thought, but gradually became
dissatisfied with aspects of it. He began to make a critique of
traditional Yogacara, moving toward a form blended with more Confucian
elements that he published in 1932 as *New Treatise on the
Uniqueness of Consciousness*. This was a seminal event and made
Xiong's reputation. While he published other works, it remains
what he is best known for. Xiong suffered from poor health for much of
his life, often taking extended leaves from teaching. Already in his
sixties at the time of the Communist revolution in 1949, he chose to
remain in China. He suffered from attacks during the Cultural
Revolution and died in Shanghai in 1968 at the age of 84.



Mou Zongsan was born in rural Shandong province in 1909. In 1927, he
moved to Beijing, enrolling at Beijing University. After finishing his
degree in philosophy, he moved around China, struggling to support
himself and his family in a series of editing and teaching posts. In
1949, Mou fled to Taiwan, where he began to reflect on how the history
of China had led to the failure of democracy and subsequent Communist
takeover, and articulating a Confucian theory of democracy. He later
had to move to Hong Kong, where he produced one of his major works,
the three-volume *Heart-mind and Human Nature as Reality*
(1968-69). His last philosophical phase was a sustained
engagement with Kant in which he attempts to show that Kant's
philosophical project was doomed and could only be reconstructed and
realized through Chinese philosophy (Mou 1991 [2014: 56]). His goal
was to give morality a stable foundation by demonstrating the reality
of the free autonomous will. In addition to translating Kant's
three *Critiques*, he wrote *Intellectual Intuition and
Chinese Philosophy* (1971), *Appearances and Things in
Themselves* (1975), and *On the Highest Good* (1985). These
made him widely acclaimed as the greatest Chinese philosopher of the
twentieth century. Mou died in Taiwan in 1995.



Tang Junyi was born in Sichuan province in 1909. He studied philosophy
initially at Beijing University, then National Southeast University
(subsequently National Central University), graduating in 1932. Like
Mou Zongsan, he moved around frequently during the war with Japan and
subsequent Chinese civil war, also choosing to leave in 1949 when he
went to Hong Kong, where he remained until the end of his life in
1978. He became one of the founders of New Asia College, one of the
first Chinese-language institutes of higher education in the British
colony. Tang was also extraordinarily prolific, writing extensively on
the moral self, Chinese and Western cultures, the history of Chinese
philosophy, knowledge, ethics, metaphysics, and political thought. His
regular themes were articulating the essential connections between
individuals and between the mind and world that are the basis for
existence, human nature and morality, and knowledge. Among his most
frequently cited works are *Cultural Consciousness and Moral
Reason* (1958), his multi-volume *Origins of Chinese
Philosophy* (1966-1973), and his last book, the two-volume
*Life Existence and the Horizons of Mind* (1977).



Also born into a rural family, in Hubei province (the native place of
Xiong Shili) in 1903, Xu Fuguan followed a very different path than
his slightly younger contemporaries Mou and Tang. After finishing
school in China, he joined the Nationalist army for a stable income.
He went to Japan in 1928 to study economics, but had to return to
China after a year due to financial difficulties. He went back to
Japan in 1930 to attend army officers' school, leaving in 1931
after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. He spent the next fifteen
years as an army officer, rising to the rank of general and for a time
serving as the personal aide to President Jiang Jieshi (Chiang
Kai-shek), retiring in 1946. He too fled China in 1949 and settled in
Taiwan to pursue a second career as a teacher. Xu eventually took a
position in the Chinese department at the newly established Donghai
(Tunghai) University, and wrote extensively on Chinese intellectual
history, culture, literature, and art. He is perhaps best known for
*A History of Chinese Theories of Human Nature* (1963), its
sequel *Intellectual History of the Two Han Dynasties*
(1975-76), and *The Spirit of Chinese Art* (1966), along
with several collections of essays on intellectual history, culture,
and politics. He was forced out of his teaching job in 1969 due to
criticisms of the government and had to move to Hong Kong. Although he
did not reside in Taiwan again, he died there in 1982.


## 2. Modernity and Tradition



The questions of how China should approach modernization and what
remains valuable in Chinese tradition were crucial ones for modern
Confucian philosophers. All of them lived through massive upheavals in
their world: the fall of the imperial government, the failure of the
first Republican government, the Japanese invasion, and the Communist
takeover of China. The worlds of their formative and later years were
wildly different. Attacks on traditional culture increased over the
early twentieth century, spearheaded by intellectuals such as Chen
Duxiu (a founder of the Chinese Communist Party) and Hu Shi (Republic
of China ambassador to the US and an influential figure in Chinese
liberalism). All of these four figures address to some extent the
question of how to modernize while preserving the valuable features of
Chinese traditions, and further, to justify the positive aspects of
modernity through autochthonic values (Marchal 2016: 221; Schmidt
2011: 275-83). They were also strongly critical of aspects of
Western culture, which they tended to identify with modernity.



The relatively greater success of Japan to modernize while the Chinese
revolution failed to produce a stable government or a strong state led
to serious reflection. Mou, Tang, and Xu all wrote on where things
went wrong, and why Chinese culture had failed to develop some of the
key features of modernity such as science and democracy. They were
great admirers of these achievements, as well as other aspects of
modern life such as specialized academic fields, equality and human
rights, and greater individual freedoms. At the same time, they did
not endorse all of Western modernity. They understandably condemned
imperialism and colonialism (even as all three resided at times in the
British colony of Hong Kong), and they found modern Western culture
spiritually and morally lacking. While attempting to understand where
Chinese culture had gone wrong, they also diagnosed what they saw as
the ills of Western culture (which they often discussed without much
regard to the distinctions between different nations or cultures).


### 2.1 Cultural Differences



The common analysis was that Western culture excelled in knowledge,
analysis, and the employment of reason, tendencies inherited from
ancient Greek philosophy. Mou Zongsan put it this way: Western culture
was defined by the "analytic spirit of the fulfillment of
reason", by which he meant the tendency toward abstraction, the
search for underlying concepts and general laws, and separating the
subject and object of investigation (MZCW 9b: 194-96). He also
calls the Western mode of thought "the constructive presentation
of reason", because of its focus on constructing consistent
practices, institutions, and structures (democratic bodies, scientific
institutes) which are assessed on procedural grounds (following
democratic practice or adhering to the scientific method and standards
of evidence) rather than directly on whether their results are good
for the society (MZCW 10: 54-61). Chinese culture lacked this
focus on objectivity and structures, which impeded developing these
modern institutions.



Xu Fuguan analyzed Chinese and Western cultures in very similar ways.
Although recognizing the vast gulf between ancient Greece and modern
Europe and America, he saw the Greek focus on knowledge as the key
feature of the modern Western mind. Greek investigation took nature as
its primary object, and in ancient Greek society,



> 
> 
> they still felt the most capable, most useful, and most successful
> person was the "knower".... For the Greeks, knowledge
> was beauty and truth. (Xu 1952 [2022: 99])
> 
> 
> 



The major difference between the ancients and moderns was that in
Greece, the ancients pursued knowledge simply for education, while



> 
> 
> moderns use it to pursue power. Francis Bacon said, "Knowledge
> is power". This one sentence lays bare the spiritual core of
> modern Western culture. (Xu 1952 [2022: 100])
> 
> 
> 



In China, learning was not fundamentally about knowledge, but for the
purpose of improving moral practice. Even moral philosophy was not
about perfecting moral theory, but realizing morality in one's
actions (Xu 1952 [2022: 104]). With its focus on improving moral life,
knowledge that did not have an obvious relation to moral practice was
slighted and so the kind of value-neutral, disinterested investigation
of nature that led to science did not develop in China.


### 2.2 Chinese Humanistic Culture and Western Materialist Culture



Tang Junyi was the most preoccupied with cultural questions and
carried out the most thorough analysis of the cultural differences
between China and the West, though even he was not immune from
simplifying "the West" into one. His views on the starting
points of Chinese and Greek philosophy are very similar, but he was
more thoughtful about what constitutes culture and why an
understanding of culture is important. Culture is what separate humans
from other animals. He writes,



> 
> 
> Culture is the manifestation or creation of human spiritual
> activity.... By spiritual activity, I mean activity which is led
> by a self-conscious ideal or purpose, and which self-consciously seeks
> to realize this ideal or purpose. (TJCW 12: 1)
> 
> 
> 



Animals have awareness and perhaps form concepts, but do not
self-consciously guide their behavior in order to realize particular
ideals in the world: this is uniquely human (TJCW 12: 379). This is
precisely what Tang means by spirit and spiritual activity:



> 
> 
> What makes spirit become spirit is that the mind must self-consciously
> affirm or uphold an ideal, and make realizing this ideal and value its
> aspiration. (TJCW 12: 3)
> 
> 
> 



Various cultural practices and institutions, which for Tang
encompasses everything from the family to the economy, art, the
sciences, and more, are products of action to realize some ideal (Tan
2009: 548). Chinese culture is the result of attempts to realize
Chinese ideals.



A conclusion he draws from this, that he never makes fully explicit,
is that we can use this concept as a standard to evaluate at least
certain aspects of a culture. A culture may fail to realize its ideals
or pursue them through inefficient means. It might have conflicting
ideals which cannot be simultaneously realized. More controversially,
Tang believes we can evaluate the ideals themselves according to
whether they are reasonable or not. One aspect of this is logical
consistency, but it also includes cohering with human nature and the
judgments of moral intuition (*liangzhi* Liang Zhi )
(Frohlich 2017: 143). Ideals that are not reflective of human
nature will not lead to a good culture even if realized fully. Mou and
Xu would certainly agree. While all found much to admire in modern
Western culture, they were also strongly critical of excessive
individualism, social alienation, undue focus on satisfying desires,
and attenuated moral and spiritual life. While others in China at the
time favored complete Westernization to sweep away the old culture,
they were convinced that this would be a mistake (Rosker
2016: 110). What they wanted were the aspects of modernity that would
better realize traditional Chinese ideals.



Tang Junyi's examination of Western culture illustrates these
criticisms in more detail. Since culture is a human creation, the
spirit underlying all culture (*wenhua* Wen Hua ) is
the humanistic (*renwen* Ren Wen ) spirit (TJCW 11: 1).
True humanism for Tang affirms and respects the existence and value of
human nature, personality, human relationships, culture, and history
(TJCW 11: 2). Western culture excelled at non-humanism (science and
mathematics) and trans-humanism (religion), but not humanism (TJCW 11:
25). Western humanism ended up turning to either God or nature and
failed to affirm properly the existence of the virtuous person. It
either treated people as objects to be investigated like other parts
of nature (as in science) or as essentially flawed products of
original sin. It was always caught between science and religion (TJCW
11: 63). It failed to put the person as subject first. The basis of
humanism has to be the value of the individual, and the unlimited
value of the individual and basis for the ultimate dignity of
individual is the moral mind inherent in everyone (TJCW 11: 185). This
is precisely the strength of Chinese humanism, and why Chinese culture
must be the basis of a healthy humanistic tradition.



Tang was critical of monotheistic religions (Christianity in
particular) for being overly focused on the transcendent and not
enough on this world, but the modern world is even worse because it
disregards the transcendent aspect of humanity entirely. Tang credited
Christianity with recognizing the absolute significance and highest
dignity of the person, which made it the origin of modern Western
humanism (TJCW 11: 34-35). However, religion centered on a
transcendent god cannot be a stable foundation for humanism.
Christianity does not affirm the ultimate value of the person. What
has ultimate value is God, the creator of the person, not the person,
and the person can never become God (TJCW 26: 2.201, 265). As a result
Christianity did not sufficiently affirm the value of the person or
action in this world, instead seeking transcendence. Still, it
affirmed the importance of morality and spirituality in a way that was
lost in the transition to modernity.



Modern Western culture has the opposite problem, treating people as
objects of study and losing the importance of the subject and
spiritual aspect of humanity. In Tang's scheme, a life that
recognizes the moral and spiritual qualities of human beings and the
world, recognizing that these have a transcendent aspect beyond the
material, is on a higher level than one that focuses only on the
material world (Chiu 2016:
 133).[1]
 And that turn away from the higher level of transcendence toward the
sensible is precisely what happened during the modern period, in his
view (Metzger 2005: 248-51; Van den Stock 2021: 233).
Enlightenment developments in mathematics and science treated the
world as an object for study and increasingly such study was
abstracted in general laws and mathematical formulas. The British
empirical tradition strongly emphasized that sensory experience is the
foundation of all knowledge. Art and literature turned from spiritual
to worldly themes as well. This focus on the sensible led to
utilitarianism, which focused on satisfying felt desires, and the
development of modern economics which treats people as independent
individuals pursuing their personal preferences (TJCW 26:
2.345-46). Individualism emphasized uniqueness of personality,
not common humanity (Metzger 1977: 42-45). This reduced people
to animals who just follow their desires (TJCW 9: 328-29;
Frohlich 2017: 83-84). The dignity of being human was lost,
and that is the fundamental cause of cultural problems. Morality needs
to be built on spiritual value, not instrumental or utilitarian value
(Chiu 2023: 4-5; Van den Stock 2016: 253). This is why
preserving Chinese culture is critical, because it properly recognizes
the inner spiritual value of humanity.



The distaste for utilitarianism and treating desires as central is
common in modern Confucianism, as is the belief that the strength of
Chinese culture is that it recognizes that people have values beyond
desire satisfaction. Xu Fuguan said that Western utilitarian
individualism has nothing to do with Chinese culture (Xu 1952 [2022:
133]). The distinctive feature of Chinese culture is valuing the
heart-mind which is distinct from and above desires (Xu 1953 [2022:
174-76]). Mou Zongsan similarly distinguished moral values from
desires based on biology, which are fundamentally different categories
(MZCW 22: 5-6). Xiong Shili did not discuss utilitarianism in
any detail, but like Tang, condemned treating people as objects for
study and making objective analysis the basis for all knowledge (Xiong
1932 [2015: 181-82]). Chinese culture correctly emphasized
seeking wisdom in oneself and one's fundamental nature. This is
the wisdom worth having (Xiong 1932 [2015: 298-99]). The common
thread is that while modern Western culture ("modern" and
"Western" are virtually synonyms in this discourse)
(Rosker 2016: 16) has great achievements worth learning from,
morally it is completely deficient. They have been aptly called
cultural nationalists because of their commitment to certain Chinese
cultural values, inspired by Xiong Shili (N. S. Chan 2011:
65-94; Frohlich 2017: 85-86; Xu 1980b). The strength
of Chinese culture, and why it must be preserved and indeed spread, is
that it values the person correctly, as a subject with ultimate value.
Modernity can help realize this value by improving people's
material lives, but the humanistic values must be preserved.


## 3. Knowledge



Modern Confucian epistemic thought typically divides knowledge into
two broad kinds: knowledge of the world or things and knowledge of
morality or the person. This is often discussed in terms from
Song-Ming Confucianism, knowledge from seeing and hearing (*jianwen
zhi zhi* Jian Wen Zhi Zhi ) and knowledge of the
virtuous nature (*dexing zhi zhi*
De Xing Zhi Zhi ). Each of the philosophers examined
here approaches this distinction in a slightly different way, while
sharing the insistence that morality and values cannot be approached
objectively and empirically, but are still realities that can be
known. They admired the achievements of science in increasing
knowledge about the world, but held that science could not be the
route to understand morality (Rosker 2016: 101). However, this
does not mean there are no moral truths or that human beings cannot
grasp them: relativism or skepticism were never seriously entertained.
It means that moral knowledge has to be understood in a different way.
A common philosophical problem is interpreting and defending the
Confucian way of acquiring moral knowledge, especially the intuitive
approach of Wang Yangming.



Xiong Shili established the basic distinction which Mou, Tang, and Xu
followed. In Xiong's thought, wisdom (*zhi* Zhi ) is
the cognition of fundamental reality, which he also identifies as the
true mind. Discernment (*hui* Hui ) is cognition of mundane
things and what is ordinarily called knowledge. Wisdom is non-dual,
without separation of self and other (Xiong 1932 [2015: 21-22]).
He also employed the terms "derivative knowledge" and
"direct knowledge" (Guo 2021: 100-103). Throughout
the *New Treatise*, Xiong emphasizes the interdependence and
unity of the mind and cognitive objects, and the importance of wisdom
over discernment. Knowledge (discernment) is useful for navigating the
world of phenomena, but useless for understanding fundamental reality,
which has to be sought within one's own mind (Xiong 1932 [2015:
25-26]; Ng Yu-kwan 2003: 231; Tan 2009: 544). Treating it as an
object will get nowhere:



> 
> 
> The absolute [quality] of principle does not belong to the realm of
> the conceivable. It can be known only through internal
> self-realization. (Xiong 1932 [2015: 159])
> 
> 
> 



This focus on the internal and knowing in a non-conceptual manner was
picked up by each of his followers.


### 3.1 Moral Knowing and Cognitive Knowing



Xu Fuguan called this direct awareness embodied recognition
(*tiren* Ti Ren ), a term employed by Xiong that goes
back to Wang Yangming. It is a direct, irrefutable feeling, which Xu
identifies with the basic moral feelings described by Mengzi. It has
nothing to do with science:



> 
> 
> The development of contemporary science is unable to deny the Chinese
> culture of the heart-mind. This is because the question is not whether
> this function is located in the
>  heart[2]
>  or the brain, but rather whether the function described in Chinese
> culture exists in the physiology of humanity. That is, whether there
> are the functions described by Mengzi: the feelings of alarm and
> compassion, shame and dislike, approval and disapproval, declining and
> yielding, and so on. If this kind of function does not exist in life,
> then there is nothing more to say. If, on the other hand, we can have
> embodied recognition of the feelings of alarm and compassion, shame
> and dislike, approval and disapproval, declining and yielding, then
> this proves that *there is some part of our body that possesses
> this function*.
> 
> 
> 
> It is just like how some people believe contemporary psychology cannot
> confirm the activity of the soul described in literature. But if the
> activity of the soul cannot be confirmed by doing psychology
> experiments, then this *is a* *problem with psychology
> itself*. The key is whether there is this activity of the soul in
> people's lives. (Xu 1953 [2022: 168])
> 
> 
> 



The reality of the experienced feeling is enough for Xu. If science
cannot confirm it or explain it, that is a problem with science, not
evidence that the feelings are not real.



Xu distinguishes the moral nature and the cognitive nature of the
heart-mind. The moral nature (*dexing* De Xing ) is
constituted by the four basic moral responses described by Mengzi. The
cognitive nature (*zhixing* Zhi Xing ) of the heart-mind
is important, but it belongs to a fundamentally distinct category and
cannot generate moral responses. The cognitive nature generates
knowledge of the external world, but accumulating facts cannot by
itself elicit a moral response (Xu 1963 [1990, 240]). While Xu remains
a realist about value, he agrees that values are a different sort of
thing than facts about the world. Which is not to say that knowledge
is not important or should be neglected. Knowledge plays two critical
roles in Xu's thought. The first is to "clarify the object
of morality"; the second is to "provide rational means for
[realizing] morality" (Xu 1963 [1990: 287]). The second role is
the function of instrumental reason. Greater knowledge of the world
means a better chance of selecting the right means that will lead to
successful action and not violating one's good intentions
inadvertently. The first function is a little murkier as Xu did not
give a clear example of what he meant. An illustration might be
*Mengzi* 1A7, where King Xuan is humane to the ox that he saves
from being sacrificed, but not to his people. The king's
humaneness is misplaced: he is concerned about the ox's
suffering but not about his people's. It is not that he used the
wrong means, but that he is mistaken about what merits his compassion.
Knowledge can rectify this type of misconception. Knowledge is still
instrumental, as what has intrinsic value is moral practice, not
knowledge in itself.


### 3.2 Knowledge through Affective Connection



Tang Junyi's views on knowledge and cognition are complex. His
last book, *Life Existence and the Horizons of Mind*, is an
attempt to classify all possible ways of cognizing the world into nine
broad horizons (on "horizon" see Wu 2002). A full
examination of these is not possible here (see Van den Stock 2021),
but we can identify some key themes. Like Xiong and Xu, Tang
distinguished different kinds of knowledge. Moral knowledge, knowledge
of the virtuous nature in Confucianism, is self-awareness of the
humane (*ren* Ren ) heart-mind and nature, which must
spontaneously come from oneself. Empirical knowledge, knowledge from
seeing and hearing, is knowledge of the phenomenal world learned from
external study. This empirical knowledge is useful, and its
development is where Western culture excelled, but it must be
controlled by moral knowledge, not the other way around.



> 
> 
> This knowledge of the virtuous nature, which illuminates the internal,
> is knowledge of persons' existence in themselves. People
> absolutely cannot have knowledge of the virtuous nature through
> knowledge of society or nature, which illuminates the external. (TJCW
> 11: 65-66)
> 
> 
> 



In his schema of nine horizons, science for the most part is placed in
the third horizon of functioning in order, which cognizes cause-effect
relations (TJCW 25: 1.29). Broadly construed, it could also include
logic and mathematics, which Tang places in the fifth horizon of
detached observation because they focus on pure connections of thought
(TJCW 25: 1.30-31). Both are lower than the horizon of moral
practice (the sixth). Detached observation is about observing and
understanding, not changing things, and remaining here is morally
repugnant for Tang: we must go onto the horizon of morality which
attempts to realize ideals in the world to improve it (TJCW 25:
1.445-46). This is another way of expressing that morality is on
a higher level than scientific knowledge.



The concept of affective connection (*gantong*
Gan Tong ) occupies a central role in Tang's thought. The
Chinese term combines the words for "to stimulate or
affect" (*gan*) and "to connect or be
connected", with the further sense of lacking impediment or
obstruction (*tong*). "Affective" must be
understood in this sense: not necessarily related to feelings, but
more simply one thing affecting another. Tang defines it thusly:



> 
> 
> This affective connection itself is [the heart-mind] directly meeting
> with the objects of a cognitive horizon, and directly being aware of
> and observing them. (TJCW 26: 2.235)
> 
> 
> 



Critically, this is connection to a wider objective reality, not
merely a subjective awareness (Metzger 1977: 35). Affective connection
is, among other things, the essential capacity of the heart-mind to
cognize and interact with any other existent. One implication Tang
wants to draw from this is that that mind and world are essentially
connected and interdependent (TJCW 25: 1.3-4; Tan 2009: 547).
Human life is constituted by connecting with and cognizing other
existents, including other people (further discussed in the section on
human nature). Through cognizing other objects, we also become aware
of the subject, and eventually to what Tang calls the
trans-subjective/objective horizons (the last three). Understanding
the subject cannot be done objectively: it must be approached through
personal experience and realization of the lived existence of the
subject (TJCW 26: 2.318).


### 3.3 The Reality of Intellectual Intuition and Free Will



Mou Zongsan held similar views on the limits of science (MZCW 22: 50),
but as that topic was covered already, here the focus is Mou's
justification of knowledge of the free will. His later philosophy
focused on demonstrating the reality of autonomy and morality, which
he felt Kant failed to do (Schmidt 2011). For Kant, because knowledge
is limited to the world of appearances, free will remains something
beyond the bounds of human knowledge. Freedom remains a postulate, or
a mere idea, but can never be known (Kant 1785 [1997: 63], 4:459). Mou
criticized Kant for precisely this point and argued that Chinese
philosophy could provide what Kant could not: knowledge of free
will.



According to Mou, Confucian philosophers also wanted to establish the
a priori conditions of morality. As in Kant, this a priori condition
is freedom or autonomy (MZCW 5: 1.11; Lee 2017: 15). Mou concedes that
theoretical knowledge of the free will is not possible; however, he
criticizes Kant for not understanding that the truth of the free will
has to be grasped and known practically rather than theoretically.
This is what Confucianism achieved, and how it confirms that the free,
autonomous will is a reality and not merely a postulate: it is
realized and verified through moral activity in the world.



Autonomy for Mou requires independence from interests, inclinations,
and external control. Morality has to be founded on a principle that
the will gives to itself. A will that is decided or controlled by
anything external is not a free, autonomous will (MZCW 5: 1.136). Free
will cannot be an effect brought about by something else; it can only
be a cause (MZCW 20: 247). In addition, he writes,



> 
> 
> If it requires a lower interest from something external to stimulate
> it, then it is not the fundamental heart-mind; it is not the true,
> autonomous will that gives the law to itself. (MZCW 5: 1.171)
> 
> 
> 



Morality requires the will to determine itself, free from the
influence, control, or stimulation of an external object.



This describes autonomy, but is not an argument for it; for that, we
have to look elsewhere. One way Mou argues for the reality of autonomy
can be sketched out like this:


1. Autonomy is necessary for morality to be possible.
2. Morality is a reality
3. Therefore, autonomy is a reality



Mou turns around Kant's argument that because we cannot know
that we are free, we cannot know that morality is real. We know that
morality is real, and therefore we know that autonomy is real (see
Fung 2021: 617-18; Schmidt 2011: 265). After discussing why the
fundamental heart-mind has to be unlimited in order for morality to be
possible, Mou gives a theoretical account of intellectual intuition
(non-sensible intuition of the autonomous self) and says,



> 
> 
> Intellectual intuition must not only be affirmed theoretically, it
> must emerge in reality.... When we speak of the fundamental
> heart-mind, it is as a concrete presence, such as the feelings of
> alarm and compassion or shame and disgust that emerge at any time as
> Mengzi spoke about. When it sees one's father it naturally knows
> filiality; when it sees one's older brother it naturally knows
> brotherly respect (these are not biological instincts, but the
> fundamental heart-mind). When it should feel alarm and compassion, it
> feels alarm and compassion. When it should feel shame and dislike, it
> feels shame and dislike, and so on. (MZCW 20: 249)
> 
> 
> 



These moral responses are real presences, and they require the
fundamental heart-mind (one of the terms Mou uses for self as a thing
in itself, not appearance) to be possible. Kant only approached
morality theoretically, but Chinese philosophy makes practical
knowledge of morality possible (Billioud 2012: 79-81; Tan 2009:
559). Morality is a fact because we feel it: the moral responses are a
definite presence which cannot be denied.



As knowledge through understanding requires sensible intuition,
intellectual knowledge requires intellectual intuition: intuition of
things in themselves and not mere appearances. Kant attributed
intellectual intuition only to God, denying that humans had that
capacity (Bunnin 2008; N. S. Chan 2011: 142). For Mou, humans have
intellectual intuition of a limited sort, and that is how knowledge of
the true self (also called fundamental heart-mind or nature in itself,
not different from the creative power of the universe) is possible
(Billioud 2012: 75-76). Intellectual intuition is
non-discursive, direct knowledge of the self unmediated by the
categories of the understanding (MZCW 10: 204). Thus, the content of
the intuition itself cannot be put into words, but he does say it is
intuition of the fundamental heart-mind and humaneness in itself (MZCW
10: 249-50). A moment of awareness of what is morally right is
an instance of intellectual intuition. It is in the process of moral
response that the fundamental mind intuits itself, and the mind
becomes aware of its own infinite moral responsiveness.



Mou here brings together these themes: distinguishing theoretical and
practical knowledge, and insisting that practical (moral) knowledge
has to be approached in an experiential, intuitive way that focuses on
uncovering the true self. He calls these intensional truths, in that
they are subject-dependent, unlike extensional truths (MZCW 29:
19-27; Rosker 2016: 118). This approach of course raises
questions. One problem with this intuitive method is that it can
hardly avoid reflecting culturally learned responses and may take them
to be a priori and necessary, believing them to be representative of
human nature as a whole. Tang Junyi, for example, insists,



> 
> 
> Filiality should be constructed on moral reason, and this means that
> it has absolute significance. This is to say that I should be filial
> even if my parents do not love me. (TJCW 12: 43)
> 
> 
> 



People from other cultures might dispute that strongly. Mou also does
not explain how to distinguish true intellectual intuition from what
may feel like intellectual intuition, but not intuit its object
correctly (Fung 2021: 616). Furthermore, his argument relies on
accepting the Kantian view of morality that requires autonomy. If one
does not accept that premise, this argument does not persuade.


## 4. Human Nature and the Person



Modern Confucianism has been strongly influenced by Western
philosophy. It is therefore not surprising that many modern Confucian
philosophical problems can fit tidily in the typical Western
philosophy categories. Their concept of the person, however, does not.
Their discourses on the person range across metaphysics, philosophy of
mind, epistemology, and metaethics. The previous section demonstrated
how their views on knowledge center around defending knowledge of
value. Here we get deeper into questions of what defines human beings,
what reason means, the source of value, how we know ethical action is
possible, and more.



Before looking at the modern Confucians themselves, a few words about
why this issue is so central would be useful. The question of human
nature has a long history in Chinese philosophy, and as self-conscious
inheritors of this tradition, modern Confucians wanted to relate their
views to major figures of the past, especially the classical thinkers
Kongzi (Confucius) and Mengzi (Mencius), and the Ming Confucian Wang
Yangming. They demoted Zhu Xi, the most influential Song Confucian,
and had no tolerance for the evidential learning scholarship of the
Qing period. The true Confucian tradition (in their minds) follows
Mengzi in affirming that human nature is good, and Wang Yangming in
asserting that moral values and motivation must be uncovered in
oneself, not in phenomena. This wing of the Confucian tradition
asserted that people have not just a potential but tendency toward
moral action, and this tendency is definitive of being human. Anyone
can become a sage, the paragon of moral excellence. It is what being
fully human means. This is how these Confucians answer the questions
of why and how to be moral: it is what is natural for us, and we have
the knowledge and motivations in the mind already.



In the modern period, Confucians had two main concerns. One was the
explicit attacks on Chinese culture as well as the general upheaval
and sense of value instability brought about by the events of the
time. What had been a reasonably stable (if inequitable) political and
social structure had collapsed without a clear replacement. Many
people were fascinated by novelty and turned away from traditional
values. The other, not unrelated, concern was the reductionism and
lack of true moral value that they found in Western culture. Xiong
Shili never left China, but Mou, Tang, and Xu all spent time in Hong
Kong and traveled to Europe and the US as well. They were not pleased
with what they found. Utilitarianism and related reductionist
approaches that did not distinguish moral value from happiness, desire
satisfaction, survival, or any other non-moral value were entirely
unacceptable to them. Tang Junyi wrote,



> 
> 
> The most important point for our affirming the value of a kind of
> cultural activity is that it directly reveals the value of the human
> spirit itself, and not its instrumental or utilitarian value....
> We must strictly adhere to the standpoint of the Chinese cultural
> tradition which emphasizes the distinction between human beings and
> animals and between right and utility, and apply this in cultural
> choices. Therefore, for decades we have needed to eliminate by their
> roots utilitarianism, materialism, and any form of naturalism that
> does not distinguish between human beings and animals. (TJCW 9:
> 328)
> 
> 
> 



These naturalistic approaches are not only philosophically misguided,
but extremely harmful to moral practice as well.


### 4.1 Rejection of Buddhist and Darwinian Views on Human Nature



Xiong Shili focused on reality and phenomena, but he does have a few
remarks on human nature that leave some important clues. One reason
Xiong began to criticize orthodox Yogacara is that he was dissatisfied
with how they categorized cognitions, but he also wanted to assert the
essential goodness of human nature. One of his criticisms of Buddhists
is that they treated evil as an innate part of human nature, which
would imply that it cannot (and perhaps should not) be eradicated.



> 
> 
> [The Yogacara monk Dharmapala] presumed that of the various
> productive powers, there are those that are contaminated and those
> that are uncontaminated, and hence he used "productive
> power" to refer to both. This is to hold living beings in
> disdain, and resolutely to uphold [the existence of] the root of evil.
> His stupidity and boorishness were great indeed. He agreed that there
> has always been contaminated productive power--that the root of
> evil in humans is innately endowed. (Xiong 1932 [2015: 141])
> 
> 
> 



The correct view is that human nature is undefiled. Habituated
tendencies can be good or bad, accord with human nature or not, but
they are adventitious and do not affect the pure inherent nature
(Xiong 1932 [2015: 144-46]). In short, evil is not part of human
nature and the human task is to remove defiled habituated tendencies
and return to that fundamental nature (Major 2021: 941-42).
Xiong returned to the classic Song-Ming Confucian position on human
nature.



Xiong simultaneously rejected Darwinism, partly on the grounds
described by Tang Junyi above, failing to distinguish between human
beings and animals, and partly because the picture of organisms
competing for individual survival did not comport with his worldview.
Evolutionary ideas had been introduced into China with Yan Fu's
heavily edited translation of Thomas Henry Huxley (1898), which could
be better described as a reworking of the text than a translation as
Yan freely rearranged it and added much of his own commentary (Sun
2022). The potential consequences of Darwin's view of survival
of the fittest are described precisely by a hypothetical interlocutor
in Xiong's text:



> 
> 
> The myriad life forms are fond of antipathy and like to kill. World
> history reads largely as a book of mutual annihilation....
> Someone asked, "It is certain that antipathy is something that
> appears late [among sentient beings.] This can be verified by
> Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest, according to
> which it should be that antipathy also arises from the need to
> survive. There is no need to deem it to be an affliction". I
> replied, "The facts discovered by those who endorse the theory
> of mutualism are clearly at odds with Darwin's thesis....
> [Cheng] Yichuan also said: 'It is only by closely helping one
> another that all living things between heaven and earth are able to
> live.' Everything he said was verified. It is thus understood
> that living existence requires close help and not competition".
> (Xiong 1932 [2015: 259-60])
> 
> 
> 



The moral consequences of evolution (as he understood them) were
unacceptable to Xiong. Although he of course knew the history of
violence between human beings, this is not how life has to be or
should be. Treating hate and competition as part of human nature
implies accepting it. That would fundamentally contradict
Xiong's picture not just of human nature, but of how the world
works. What Xiong did not do was expand much on what human nature is,
or, aside from reliance on personal experience (Xiong 1932 [2015:
204-5]; Major 2021: 947-48), how we know it and realize
it. Mou, Tang, and Xu all developed theories about this.


### 4.2 The Two-Tier Self: Transcendental and Empirical



The broad picture is shared by all three. As elucidated above, all
accepted that knowledge of human nature and moral values has to be
subjective and intuitive, not empirical. Following the Mengzi-Wang
Yangming strand of Confucianism, the goodness of human nature consists
of a set of basic moral responses which everyone feels and, when not
obstructed by selfishness, do not err. The questions of what the
goodness of human nature means, how we know it, and how we can realize
it in life are fundamental to most of Mou Zongsan's and Tang
Junyi's philosophical work, so their answers require some
detail. These will be followed by some examination of Xu
Fuguan's less metaphysical approach.



The issue of desires had loomed large in Buddhist and Neo-Confucian
thought, and one task for Mou and Tang was to distinguish
self-centered desires from the moral responses. The feeling of wanting
to eat a favorite food and the feeling of wanting to save a stranger
from harm are not the same category of thing. The challenge for them
is that both the former and latter seem to be part of human nature, if
that means universal, unlearned feelings and behaviors. If anything,
the self-centered desires seem more universal. And yet, for Tang,
following Mengzi, it is important to distinguish human beings and
animals. Mou put it slightly differently: "People have an animal
nature and a human nature" (MZCW 9a: 71). The point is much the
same: being human means controlling and overcoming desires. What they
want to do is to demonstrate that everyone has the category of moral
responses, even if they rarely act on them. That is human nature
properly understood.



Mou and Tang both address this challenge by appealing to two levels of
the person: an empirical self which experiences desires, and a true or
transcendent self constituted by the moral responses. Since that true
self belongs to a higher ontological level, it represents what the
person truly is, and that is what we should follow. The model here is
recognizably Kantian, distinguishing moral responses which proceed
from free will and the true self from inclinations or desires which
are part of appearances. It is not surprising that Kant made such an
impact on modern Confucian philosophers, Mou and Tang especially. The
experience of moral responses is also critical for both of them, as
the reality of the true self has to be grasped practically rather than
theoretically (Wong 2021).



We saw earlier how Mou argued that intellectual intuition is a reality
for human beings and so knowledge of the free will is possible and
morality is real. Mou develops this view into what he calls moral
metaphysics (in contrast to Kant's metaphysics of morals),
because morality is the basis for metaphysical truths, namely the
reality of the autonomous self (Billioud 2012: 49-50; Lee 2013:
24). The true self for Mou cannot be an appearance but must be a thing
in itself, belonging to the intelligible world. Only then is free will
possible. If it were part of the world of appearances, it would be
subject to causal laws and be determined or affected by things
external to it. Then morality would not exist. The source of
morality--which Mou calls free will, the fundamental mind
(*benxin* Ben Xin ), or human nature as reality
(*xingti* Xing Ti )--has to be absolute and
unconditional, not an appearance (MZCW 20: 245-47). The primary
difference between Mou and Kant concerns the nature and role of
feelings (Lee 1990: 37-42). For Kant, feelings were appearances
and could not be the basis of morality. For Mou, ordinary feelings
(such as desires) belong to the world of appearances and are
heteronomous motivations. But there is another category of moral
feelings which are different.



Mou claims that there is another type of feeling entirely which
belongs to (or is) the true self, the autonomous person as a thing in
itself. These are rational feelings, not sensible (MZCW 22: 14). He
created several terms for these feelings, such as "moral
feelings of illuminating awareness" (*mingjue jueqing*
Ming Jue Jue Qing ) or "ontological moral
feelings" (*bentilun de jueqing*
Ben Ti Lun De Jue Qing ) (Billioud 2012:
170-76; Lee 2021: 259-60). The moral responses identified
by Mengzi belong to this category. Mengzi illustrated these feelings
by considering the situation of a person seeing a child about to fall
into a well. In such a case, he claimed, anyone would have a feeling
of alarm and compassion toward the child (*Mengzi* 2A6). For
Mou, this sort of situation is the way we become aware of the true
self through the moral reaction, a process that he calls reflective
verification (one aspect of intellectual intuition [MZCW 20:
252]):



> 
> 
> This awakening due to astonishment is like the red sun rising out of
> bottom of the sea; it is not at all sensible. Therefore, the
> reflective verification in question is the illuminating awareness of
> intellect itself reflecting its own light back onto itself and not a
> phenomenal mind different from itself sensibly and passively coming to
> cognize it, which could never reach it in itself. So this reflective
> understanding is purely intellectual and not the passivity of
> sensibility. (MZCW 21: 105)
> 
> 
> 



One key point here is that this reflective verification has both
epistemic and moral significance. It is a way we come to realize the
true self, in both the senses of knowing it and making it real and
active (Billioud 2012: 198-207; Shi & Lin 2015: 553). When
we have such a response, we know the true self (the fundamental mind,
nature in itself) *and* are prompted to act on it. Because the
moral responses come from the true self as a thing in itself and are
not part of the sensible world, they are not heteronomous and
autonomous morality is possible. The important moral distinction for
Mou is not between reason and inclination, as in Kant, but between two
different kinds of feeling: intellectual or ontological feeling (from
the true self) and sensible feeling (from the empirical self).



Granting Mou's claim that the moral feelings belong to the true
self and are categorically different from empirical feelings, what he
does not explain is how an agent can reliably discern which is which.
Morality is not a matter of acting on a rational, universalizable
principle, which an agent could deliberate about, but acting on the
prompting of the fundamental mind. It is not a biological instinct,
but subjectively can feel similar as something the agent is compelled
to do in a non-rational way (Shi & Lin 2015: 547-48). From
the agent's internal perspective then, it may be difficult or
impossible to tell what is a moral response belonging to the
fundamental mind and what is a desire or instinct from the empirical
self (Suter 2018: 229). As there is no further objective criterion to
judge what is right or wrong, whether Mou's moral metaphysics
can adequately guide action is a concern (Shi & Lin 2015: 559).
This is not to deny that the true self may be a reality in the way
that he describes, but to raise the question of whether we can
reliably tell when we're accessing the fundamental mind and when
we're not.


### 4.3 The Transcendental Self Manifested in Affective Connection



Although he is not typically considered a Kantian, Tang Junyi also
distinguishes two selves. There is a true self, which he usually calls
the transcendental self (*chaoyue ziwo*
Chao Yue Zi Wo ) (or transcendent; Tang did not
consistently distinguish "transcendent" and
"transcendental", using *chaoyue* Chao Yue 
for both) or moral self (*daode ziwo*
Dao De Zi Wo ). Then there is an empirical self
(*jingyan ziwo* Jing Yan Zi Wo  or *xianshi
ziwo* Xian Shi Zi Wo ) (Pong 2008; Rosker
2016: 94). Human nature is to be identified with the transcendental
self, not the empirical self of desires (S. Y. Chan 2002:
306-7). However, his route to demonstrating the reality of the
moral self is very different.



The overarching theme of Tang's philosophy is interdependence in
the form of affective connection. The primary way he supports the
existence of the transcendental self is the reality of affective
connection with other existents, especially people. It is the basis of
morality for Tang (Chiu 2016: 155; Van den Stock 2016: 250). The
empirical self of desires is self-centered: it attempts to use the
world to fulfill its desires. Insofar as our actions recognize the
equal subjectivity of other people, we transcend the narrow self and
realize the transcendental self (TJCW 9: 38). This is not a universal
self (Metzger 2005: 220). Tang was clear that he departed from Fichte
in *not* merging people into a great self (TJCW 25: 1.506).
People have desires, but they have other sorts of feelings and
motives, what Tang calls the feelings from human nature
(*xingqing*
 Xing Qing ):[3]



> 
> 
> People truly have a kind of feeling from human nature that surpasses
> individual life and finds completion in affective connection with
> people and things. (TJCW 9: 97)
> 
> 
> 



This is what the goodness of human nature means.



One of the main ways that Tang illustrates the reality of the
transcendental self that connects to others is through pointing out
how human practice presupposes the reality and value of other people
as subjects. Cultural activities--including economy, politics,
science, philosophy, art, and much more--are all ways in which,
usually unconsciously, the moral self manifests through affective
connection which treats other people as subjects (Rosker 2016:
156; Van den Stock 2016: 339). Put somewhat differently, culture is
about establishing the world of moral personality, which is
Kant's kingdom of ends (TJCW 12: Preface, 13). Here he was
inspired by Fichte and British idealism (Metzger 2005: 215-16;
Tseng 2019: 838). Culture is an attempt to realize certain ideals in
the world in a conscious way, and Tang asserts that anyone who
consciously holds and tries to realize an ideal reveals their
transcendental self. Having an ideal involves a notion of how one
wants oneself and the world to be, and assumes that one has the
freedom and ability to try to bring this about. It means transcending
existing reality and thinking about and working toward how to make it
better, and this reveals the transcendental self mastering the
empirical self (TJCW 12: 3-9). As Tang's method for
demonstrating this is the same for all cultural activities, one
example will suffice to illustrate it, the example of science.



The usual belief in modern Confucianism is that science is
instrumentally valuable, because scientific discoveries can lead to
improvements in people's lives (Xu 1952 [2022: 117-23]).
Tang recognizes that science can be a moral good in this instrumental
way, but insists that the practice of science itself manifests the
transcendental self. The possibility of searching for truth cannot be
separated from moral reason and embodies moral value. The common view
is that science aims at truth, which is distinct from goodness, but
for him science is not value-neutral (TJCW 12: 223-24).
Scientific understanding involves grasping common properties or
patterns in the world through formation of a concept connecting past
and future events, which follow the same principle. To search for
these principles requires transcending one's natural instincts
and desires for the sake of abstract truth which has no immediate
relation to one's desires. This ability to transcend these
manifests moral goodness and the possibility of reason controlling
desires (TJCW 12: 226-27). Furthermore, scientific laws are
universal and objective. The possibility of shared understanding of
them means minds have similar cognitive abilities. And as a matter of
practice, scientists seek to have their findings published,
recognized, and understood by other people. This is an implicit
acknowledgment that being understood by other people is important, and
that people have independent minds that can reach similar
understanding (TJCW 12: 233-36). This shared understanding is a
form of affective connection.



At this juncture we may ask what Tang has demonstrated: does this
affective connection he describes constitute *knowledge* of
other people's subjectivity and shared moral reason? Or is it an
assumption of cultural practices such as science, philosophy, and art,
but remains short of knowledge? This is a complicated question on
which Tang equivocated in his writings. In one related discussion,
Tang examines the Confucian belief in the universal moral mind, and
says that through reason one can universalize the humane nature and
heart-mind and know that all people have them. Immediately following
he calls this belief a kind of faith and says,



> 
> 
> This faith that the humane nature and heart-mind must exist can
> likewise not be proved positively by the use of pure reason and
> argument. At most, we can use a negative argument that it is
> impossible to assert that it does not exist, and so show that it must
> exist. That it exists is revealed negatively in the fact that people
> feel uneasy about evil and suffering. If you feel uneasy about yours
> and others' evil and suffering, this is negative proof that you
> have the humane nature and heart-mind of perfect goodness that [wants
> to] remove evil and suffering.... If you say that you have no
> uneasiness toward evil and suffering at all, then I do not believe
> you. How do I know that you feel uneasy? Because I do.... Even if
> you do not reveal this humane nature and heart-mind for now and
> yourself feel you don't have it, I still affirm that you must
> have it. The reason is because in the end, I cannot accept that you do
> not have it, so I affirm that you do: there is no other reason. (TJCW
> 11: 247-49)
> 
> 
> 



This evidently falls short of knowledge.



Even in his last work, it is difficult to pin down precisely what Tang
thinks, whether affective connection with other minds is a known
reality or whether it is a matter of faith or an assumption to make
sense of our practices in life. Perhaps his final word on the subject
is in the postscript to *Life Existence and the Horizons of
Mind*, an extended discussion on faith, meaning, and the role of
philosophy. People must have ideals, and he says the objective
existence of a universal human way and universal human nature is a
conviction based on the possibility of shared rational ideas (TJCW 26:
2.370). Ultimately, he seems to conclude that we need this sort of
conviction for life to have meaning and to support moral practice.



> 
> 
> A belief in the metaphysical origin of the light of perfect goodness
> as an absolute truth then makes possible the action of making the
> irrational into the rational. (TJCW 26: 2.381)
> 
> 
> 



Here Tang's deep interest in religion bears brief mention (for
more see Tang 1955 [1981]; Frohlich 2017: chap. 5; W. Ng 1998;
Van den Stock 2021: 226-35). Religion is critical for Tang,
meaning belief in an absolute spiritual reality (TJCW 9: 354). The
fundamental demand of religion is to affirm a transcendent absolute
that can preserve all values. In Confucianism, this is faith in the
fundamental mind and nature themselves (TJCW 11: 319-20, 335).
It might be best to conclude that for Tang, whether this was knowledge
or not in a theoretical way was beside the point (Chiu 2016:
157-58; 2023: 296). It is a postulate, in Kant's sense: an
idea we must apply to ourselves (Schmidt 2011: 291 n31). We must have
faith in the possibility of goodness in ourselves and others to go on
living.


### 4.4 The Single Self Model



Xu Fuguan took a simpler approach to the question of knowing human
nature and the source of values. He felt that the model of Western
metaphysics should not be applied to Chinese philosophy, so he
rejected the metaphysical orientation of Xiong, Mou, and Tang (Huang
2018 [2019: 56-57]; Ni 2002: 291). He did not distinguish two
levels of self as Tang and Mou did. He refers to morality as
supra-empirical (*chao jingyan* Chao Jing Yan ) (Xu
1963 [1990: 86]), but not transcendental or metaphysical. He agreed
that moral facts cannot be uncovered by investigation of the external
world. However, Xu denies that Confucian is a form of idealism, or
that the heart-mind is something beyond the physiology of the body (Ni
2002: 286-87). Xu refers to his view as "embodied
learning" (*xing er zhong xue*
Xing Er Zhong Xue ) rather than metaphysics (*xing er
shang xue* Xing Er Shang Xue ) (Xu 1953 [2022:
168]). He agrees with Tang and Mou that we have inherent moral
responses, but they are not indications of a transcendental self. He
does not seem very concerned with pinning down precisely where the
moral responses come from; the reality of experiencing them is
enough.



At the same time, Xu insists that morality cannot be known through
investigation of world: science cannot confirm or disprove morality.
Although he rarely mentioned Kant, he did apparently accept that
morality could not be empirical if it were to be universal (Xu 1963
[1990: 86]). What defines human beings is that they can control their
desires and they have the capacity for self-mastery (*zizhu*
Zi Zhu ) (Xu 1963 [1990: 161, 165-66]). He
distinguishes two categories of motives. There are the physiological
desires associated with the body, and there are the responses of the
heart-mind (Elstein 2021a: 205). In Mengzi's paradigm case of
seeing a child about to fall into a well, the feeling of alarm and
compassion is not a response of the desires, but the direct
manifesting of the heart-mind (Xu 1963 [1990: 172]). Unfortunately, he
never explained how we discern the difference between desires and the
moral responses of the heart-mind, when it seems these can be easily
confused.



Perhaps the most reliable guide is to look at what we prefer from
others. Xu believes, following Mengzi, that people have a universal
preference for virtue. But when we look at ourselves, we all too
readily rationalize desires as moral responses or make excuses for our
conduct. Xu instead looks at what people prefer in others, especially
in rulers. This is what makes the Confucian ideal of rule by virtue
possible: the fact that people respond to the virtue of rulers and
prefer humane rule (Xu 1966 [2022: 244-45]). The suggestion is
that we can avoid the complications of self-interest better by looking
not at what people do or what they want to do, but what they expect
and want from other people. Xu does not go as far as to suggest a
universalizing test (as Tang Junyi did), but he did say, "The
Way is what is accepted by each person, or slightly different, what
everyone accepts from a position of equality" (Xu 1954 [2022:
181]). It is not a great leap from here to a universalizing test to
distinguish moral and immoral (or amoral) motives.



We find in these thinkers a characteristic not only of modern
Confucianism, but most Confucianism. They are not very concerned with
defining or determining what is good or right (which they believe is
usually obvious) or with offering a decision procedure. Even Mou
Zongsan, who said ethics must be based on a categorical imperative
(MZCW 20: 447), did not discuss how to apply it in practice. Their
main concern is to show that morality is part of human nature, and to
demonstrate how we can know this. Humans are fundamentally moral
beings for them, and so moral practice is a matter of accessing or
developing what we already have in us. Ideally, skill in moral
practice should get a point of being effortless. There is no necessary
conflict between reason and inclination, between what one desires and
what is right. The ideal of the sage, who knows and does what is right
without thought or effort, remained real in modern Confucian thought,
even if they also recognized that it was a distant goal (TJCW 26:
2.216-17). The goal is to reveal what persons are, such that
moral practice is part of who we are and becoming a sage is at least a
possibility.


## 5. Political Thought



Political thought was and remains a critical area in modern
Confucianism. Mou, Tang, and Xu all responded to the failure of
initial efforts toward democracy in China with arguments for why
democracy was not only compatible with Confucianism, but a necessary
evolution for it (Elstein 2014; Frohlich 2017). (Xiong had less
to say about politics (Van den Stock 2016: 222-25).) Strong
opposition to Communism led them to leave China, but they were also
disappointed by the Nationalist dictatorship on Taiwan.



Their support of a Confucian justification for democracy was a way of
responding to three alternative views: two critical of Confucianism
and one supportive of Confucianism but critical of democracy. The
first two were Chinese Communism and liberalism. The Communist
insistence on materialism and reduction of morality to class interest
was unacceptable to all three as it amounted to a rejection of the
moral self. Liberals in Taiwan supported democracy but insisted
Chinese culture was an obstacle to it that had to be swept away.
Modern Confucians agreed with democracy as an end, but the means could
not be giving up Chinese culture. The last, anti-democratic group was
the Nationalist government and its supporters in Taiwan. They
supported traditional culture, including Confucianism, but used it,
along with the need to fight Communism, to justify their one-party
rule (Huang 2018 [2019: 94-95]). A fourth view opposed to
democracy, Confucian meritocracy (Bai 2020; Bell 2015; Jiang 2012),
did not exist at the time, but they would have rejected it, too. The
modern Confucianism position contains these common elements: due to
historical limitations earlier Confucian thinkers had not advocated
democracy, Confucianism is not only not antithetical to democracy but
in reality democracy is the way to realize Confucian ideals, and
democracy in fact needs Confucianism or something like it to be
stable.


### 5.1 Democracy through Self-Restriction of Morality



Mou Zongsan's political thought features two important
innovations. The first is his idea of an indirect or dialectical
connection between Confucian ethical thought and democracy. The
second, closely related, is the belief that objective, democratic
institutions are necessary to make possible the Confucian ideal of
sagely rulership. This is how Mou addresses the complete absence of
democratic institutions in the history of Confucian thought while
still arguing for their importance.



Mou argued that traditional Confucianism failed by assuming too tight
a relationship between ethics and politics. He distinguishes two types
of connections between them: direct (*zhitong*
Zhi Tong ) and indirect (*qutong* Qu Tong ).
Developing democracy requires an indirect connection (MZCW 10:
61-62). In politics, direct connection is between a virtuous
leader and moral politics: the belief that a morally good ruler is
necessary and sufficient for good government. Politics cannot be
linked so closely to morality and needs to have some independence (Lee
2017: 85). The way Mou justifies this is through his famous concept of
self-restriction (or self-negation) (*ziwo kanxian*
Zi Wo Kan Xian ) (MZCW 10: 64). Morality has to limit
itself to allow for the development of amoral political
structures.



The moral reasoning at the foundation of Confucian thought must
restrict itself to allow for the development of theoretical or
constructive reason so politics can be partly separated from morality.
Democracy is not a moral system. Elections are not limited to the
virtuous. In the traditional ideal of sagely rulers and worthy
ministers, government is not independent from morality, as the
possibility of good government depends on moral rulers and officials.
However, traditional Confucian thought had no system to transmit power
reliably only to sages and worthies. That system was inherently
unstable. In democracy, political virtue is embodied in objective
structures, not individuals. Realizing morality in politics thus
demands moral reason restrict itself so theoretical reason can
develop, as only theoretical reason can produce value-neutral
democratic institutions (MZCW 10: 65, 151-52). This indirect
connection between morality and politics realizes moral goals better
than a direct connection can.



The philosophical foundation for democracy is Mengzi's doctrine
that human nature is good. Mou argues that democracy is in fact
necessary to realize the goal of Confucian morality, to allow each
person to realize their good nature. However, we must be precise about
the kind of necessity this is. It is not logical necessity. There is
no logical contradiction in an autocratic government allowing people
to realize the goodness of human nature. It simply does not often work
out. The necessity Mou talks about is dialectical or practical. It is
a question of what kind of government is most likely to make possible
the goal of realizing Confucian morality.


### 5.2 Political Equality from Equal Subjectivity



Tang's arguments for democracy proceed along similar lines,
basing democracy on the equality of persons and the need for objective
institutions. However, he employs his characteristic focus on
affective connection and recognizing the subjectivity of other people
to support democracy. It is critical for Tang that democracy is not
just a *modus vivendi* that simply recognizes practically that
people won't accept giving up their rights. It must be based on
equality of personality, exactly what Chinese culture puts at the
foundation (TJCW 9: 325). The basis of this is the universal moral
heart-mind:



> 
> 
> We say that the infinite value of the individual and highest dignity
> of the person are founded on possession of the heart-mind of moral
> reason. (TJCW 11: 195)
> 
> 
> 



As covered previously, Tang thinks this heart-mind (he also calls it
the humane heart-mind) is minimally a presupposition of most activity
in life. It is something we feel in ourselves and believe it is a
universal characteristic of humanity.



One of Tang's innovations is to illustrate how political
activity is itself a way of experiencing affective connection with
others. Tang starts with the bare desire for power, something humans
share with animals. The difference is that people are necessarily
self-aware, and so someone desiring power knows they cannot pursue it
blindly without it being self-defeating. They will have to regulate
this desire and consider how to realize it most effectively, and when
they do so, they already begin to transcend the desire for power
itself (TJCW 12: 123). The desire for power is a desire for other
people to submit to me and follow my will, and that itself recognizes
that other people have a will of their own (TJCW 12: 125). We do not
seek submission from things, but simply use them. Going further, the
way to get people to submit is provide something they value (such as
their continued life). Then satisfying my desire for power depends on
being able to provide something that other people value, and I tacitly
recognize that they have their own values, which I must understand.
Through this process, recognizing that others have values and seeking
to persuade them to submit, the selfish heart-mind can transform into
a public-spirited heart-mind, though Tang admits this won't
necessarily happen (TJCW 12: 132-35; Frohlich 2017:
168-75). Still, even here affective connection has been
established. Tang wants to show that even the bare desire of power
must recognize the existence of other minds with wills and values of
their own.



The route to democracy is based on recognition of others' minds
and applying moral reason which demands universality. As I wish for my
own rights and the ability to participate in government, rational
consistency requires that I respect others' rights and desire to
participate in government. I must begin to see my own political
activity as something that could be approved by others. "Then on
the basis of reason, we set up a form of participating in government
that is publicly accepted and universally approved". This is
democracy (TJCW 11: 187). In contrast to Hobbes, Tang holds the belief
that people are not absolutely selfish, though of course they act
selfishly at times. The state is not formed by a social contract among
individuals. Communities are an inherent part of human life even
before there were states. (TJCW 12: 169-74). Communities are
required by universal reason. Democracy is of course not perfect, but
realizes the requirements of reason better than alternative forms of
government. The flaws of democracy cannot be rectified by laws alone.
Elevating people's moral consciousness is necessary (TJCW 12:
200-205). This is why Tang thinks strictly political liberalism
is fatally flawed. Democracy needs a vision of persons as moral
beings.


### 5.3 Realizing Rule by Virtue in Democracy



According to Xu Fuguan, the highest value in Confucianism and the
ultimate source of its democratic ideals is life (*sheng*
Sheng ). Valuing life above all is the true spirit of humanism, and
it must come before all other political ideals (Xu 1953 [2022: 157]).
Xu means a biological notion of life primarily, so caring for the
physical self takes priority over caring for the moral self. Xu
further emphasizes that respecting life means respecting individual
persons. The primary duty of government is providing for
people's material needs; education and pursuit of the good come
after that (Xu 1979 [1988]: 198), so a Confucian government can never
justify harming individuals in the name of either their own good or
the good of society as a whole.



Xu claims Confucianism is democratic in spirit. Ideas of human dignity
and equality that are foundational for liberal democracy were part of
Chinese culture, by which he means Confucian thought (Xu 1966 [2022:
235]). Universal human nature implies a certain kind of equality, and
as Mengzi emphasizes it is the moral potential which makes people
different from beasts, it is not a great leap to an idea of human
dignity in virtue of this nature (Gao 2010). However, these ideals can
be the basis for democracy, but ideals are not enough. What is
necessary are objective institutions to guarantee the realization of
these ideals (Xu 1953 [2022: 149-50]). What required a sage
ruler in earlier Confucian political theory is routinized in
democracy; the rulers respect the dignity of the people because they
have no choice. Virtue is objectified so it no longer relies on
caprice.



Xu considers rule by virtue and non-action the foundations of
traditional Confucian political thought and still apply in a Confucian
democracy. For Xu, non-action means "not using one's
personal preferences to rule the people, and not using coercive means
to rule the people" (Xu 1966 [2022: 237]). Instead, virtue
operates through rituals (Xu 1951 [2022: 72]). In his analysis, the
sage rulers of the past reflected and implemented the people's
preferences; they did not impose their own ideas (Xu 1953 [2022:
143-44]). But getting rid of one's own preferences is very
difficult to do, and the value of democracy is putting structural
limits on governors' ability to rule according to their desires.
Where traditional Confucian politics depended on the ruler being
willing to set aside his own preferences, democracy removes the
subjective element: the governors must follow the people's
preferences whether they want to or not. By removing the uncertainty
of relying on individual virtue, democracy is actually the full
realization of the ideal of rule by virtue (Xie 2008: 183-85).
This is why Xu believes democracy is the natural path for Confucianism
to take.



Where Xu is most Confucian is that he does not see law as sufficient
for good government. Law is necessary, but so is virtue and providing
a moral basis for government (Xu 1959 [2022: 229-30]). Xu
believes the problem with Western democracy is it just treats people
as physical beings acting to satisfy desires (what he sometimes
criticizes as the utilitarian view) (Xu 1980a: 241; 2022: 96). Western
politics is inadequate because it ignores the moral self, assuming
people are merely self-interested. The common interest is just a
result of individual interests limiting and controlling each other; it
is not based on awareness of shared morality and respect for human
dignity. What needs to be added is the concept of people as moral
beings, the virtue dimension (Xu 1951 [2022: 73-74]). Xu makes a
moral argument for democracy: it allows better realization of the
potential of human nature than all other systems. His faith in human
nature manifests in trusting people to allow them to develop their own
moral selves.


## 6. Recent Developments



Modern Confucian philosophy is of course not limited to these four
scholars, nor did its development stop with the twentieth century. Mou
Zongsan and Tang Junyi in particular were instrumental in training the
following generations of Chinese philosophers in Taiwan and Hong Kong,
where their thought remains very influential. When mainland China
began opening in the 1980s, scholars there initiated major projects on
the study of modern Confucianism. New editions of their works were
published, including those who had lived outside of China (usually
excising their criticisms of the Communist Party). Scholarly exchanges
between Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China also picked up, with the result
that these once-separate scholarly communities are now intertwined,
with some mainland scholars now developing their own modern Confucian
philosophies (sometimes explicitly in opposition to Mou, Tang, and Xu)
(Chen 2006 [2009]; Li Zehou 2015 [2018]; Y. Li 2021).



The fundamentals of modern Confucianism can be found in these other
philosophers: interest in modernity and what it means for China, and
influence from Western philosophy, in vocabulary or ideas or both. Any
Chinese philosopher in East Asia now has to know Western philosophy as
well as Chinese, and comparisons are everywhere. For the most part,
the influence goes in one direction still. East Asian philosophers
know Western philosophy much better than Western philosophers know any
Asian philosophy. Fortunately, some translations have become available
recently, and with luck this will continue. Modern Confucian
philosophers believed they had something important to offer the world,
and their views are beginning to get some interest outside of East
Asia.