## 1. Life and Work


### 1.1 Some Biographical Notes on A.W. Schlegel



August Wilhelm Schlegel was son of Johanna Christiane Erdmuthe
Schlegel (nee Hubsh) and Johann Adolf Schlegel, who was a
Lutheran clergyman and poet. He was born in September of 1767, in
Hanover. He initiated his studies at the University of Gottingen
in 1786, first in theology and later in classical philology and
aesthetics. It is also in Gottingen that he first met Wilhelm von
Humboldt and Caroline Michaelis (Caroline Bohmer after 1784), an
intellectual and scholar who encouraged him and also participated in
his Shakespeare translations. His youngest brother, Friedrich
Schlegel, joined him in 1790. During this period, he was influenced by
some of his lecturers, such as Heyne, Burger, and Eschenburg, and
the works of authors such as Johann Gottfried Herder (cf. Ewton 1972
and Holter 2010: 16-18). August Schlegel finished his
studies in 1791 and moved to Amsterdam where he worked until 1795 as a
private teacher of Willem Ferdinand Mogge Muilman. In 1796 he moved to
Jena to work as a literary critic. His brother Friedrich also followed
him to Jena, and they both joined important artists and philosophers
such as Novalis, Ludwig Tieck, Dorothea Schlozer, and
F.W.J. Schelling, thus forming the 'heart' of the so
called *Jena Romantik*. In this same year, he married the widow
Caroline Bohmer, whose role in A.W. Schlegel's translations
of Shakespeare as well as other writings attributed solely to him
(such as the dialogue *Die Gemalde*, first published in
the *Athenaeum* in 1799) was much more
important than has been acknowledged. In fact, as Ernst Behler claims,
Caroline "had a decisive influence upon the formulation of early
Romantic theory" (Behler 1993: 40).



In 1798, tired of the publishing difficulties endured within the
existing literary journals, A.W. Schlegel and his brother Friedrich
Schlegel founded the famous periodical *Athenaeum*. They were
both the editors and the main writers of this journal, which would
offer an alternative to mainstream classicist approaches in literary
criticism and which was soon to become one of the main outlets of the
German Early Romantic Movement. The *Athenaeum* was devoted
primarily to literary criticism with a philological and historical
perspective, and a large section of it featured the review of
contemporary literature. It contained critical essays, fragments,
letters, announcements, and dialogues and appeared twice a year in the
period between 1798 and 1800. Most importantly, though, the
*Athenaeum* became the "leading publication of the early
Romantics" (Behler 1993: 36).



In that same year, 1798, A.W. Schlegel started giving Lectures at the
University of Jena. He also continued his translation of the works of
Shakespeare (1797-1810), but on the whole his new involvement
with the university meant that his presence in the *Athenaeum*
would suffer, as did his marriage (Paulin 2016: 126). In 1801 Schlegel
moved alone to Berlin, where he also lectured on literature and art at
the University. Both his Jena (1798-1799) and his Berlin
Lectures (1801-1804) were highly didactic while at the same time
interspersed with important philosophical insights. So, as well as
providing a comprehensive vision of the history of European
literature, poetry, and mythology, Schlegel presented a new critical
and philosophical (i.e., systematic) approach to art and its history.
Some of these lectures were published in literary journals, until 1884
when they were posthumously collected as *Vorlesungen uber
philosophische Kunstlehere* (*Lectures on Philosophical Art
Education*) and *Vorlesungen uber schone Literatur
und Kunst* (*Lectures on Fine Art and Literature*)
respectively. Four years later, in Vienna, Schlegel delivered another
series of lectures elaborating upon some of the ideas he had developed
in his previous work. A literal transcription of these lectures was
published between 1809 and 1811 as *Vorlesungen uber
dramatische Kunst und Literatur* (*A Course of Lectures on
Dramatic Art and Literature*). A more extended version of his
*Course of Lectures* was published in an 1816 edition: by that
time, they had already been translated into English, French, Dutch,
and Italian and had obtained a wide circulation. Later Schlegel shows
awareness of the fact that he was read "not only from Cadiz to
St. Petersburg, but in North America as well and even as far as
Asia" (Paulin 2016: 561). Indeed, the successful circulation of
his Vienna Lectures facilitated the dissemination of the fundamental
ideas underlying the Romantic Movement throughout Europe, and helped
to solidify Schlegel's influence and reputation as a critic.



After his divorce from Caroline Michaelis, who left him for his friend
the philosopher F.W.J. Schelling, Schlegel became Mme. de
Stael's constant companion on her travels in Germany,
Italy, France, and Sweden until her death in 1817. He also was tutor
of her children. In August 1818 he married Sophie Paulus in
Heidelberg, but they only remained together for a few weeks. Sophie
never accompanied him to Bonn, where Schlegel was appointed Professor
of Literature and Art History and lectured until 1844, a year before
his death.



Alongside his academic work, A.W. Schlegel was a remarkably talented
translator; he translated over 16 Shakespearean plays, five plays by
Calderon de la Barca, and selected pieces by Dante, Petrarch,
Giovanni Boccaccio, Miguel de Cervantes, Torquato Tasso, and
Luis de Camoes, published in 1804 as
*Blumenstrausse italianischer, spanischer, und
portugiesischer Poesie*, (*Bouquets of Italian, Spanish, and
Portuguese Poetry*). He also made the first complete translation
of the *Bhagavadgita* from Sanskrit into Latin, which
helped to promote and popularize the book in Germany (cf. Adluri and
Bagche 2014: 33f.).



A.W. Schlegel can rightly be regarded as one of the first and most
significant founders of Indology in Western Europe. Apart from his
translations of Sanskrit texts, and the publishing the scholarly
journal *Indische Bibliothek* (1820-1830), he set up a
Sanskrit printing press with which he provided the first printed
editions of the *Bhagavadgita* (1823) and
*Ramayana* (1829) in continental Europe.


### 1.2 A.W. Schlegel's Writings and Their Reception


 An anthology of some of A.W. Schlegel's critical essays,
selected by the author himself, was published in Berlin in 1828.
Despite his opposition to the publication of the rest of his essays,
A.W. Schlegel's 'collected works' were edited by E.
Bocking and published in 16 volumes between 1846 and 1848 (the
collection is not complete). Since then, there has been no standard,
critical edition of his works. A critical edition of his Vienna
lectures was edited by E. Behler in 1989 (the edition of his complete
lectures is still in progress), and (some of his) his letters were
edited by J. Korner and published in 1930. All in all, the
situation of A.W. Schlegel's texts leaves much to be
desired.



Especially during the *Athenaeum* period, Schlegel's
writings are witty, original, and sagacious in both form and content
(e.g., *Die Sprachen*, *Die Gemalde*). After this
period, i.e., once he started lecturing at the University, his style
seems to lose its boldness and wit, gaining perhaps in depth and
erudition. Some scholars suggest that these two developments are not
unconnected (cf. Paulin 2016: 126). Thus, while stressing their
formal perfection, critics of his literary writings
(*Gedichte*, 1800;
*Ion*, 1803; *Poetische Werke*, 1811) tend to justify
his lack of success as a poet. It is as if A.W. Schlegel was not able
to follow the aesthetics standards that he himself had developed
theoretically. Other scholars, however, consider his play *Ion*
a great success. But, on the whole, Heinrich Heine's view that
both Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel "were critics and
interpreters rather than poets" (Heine [1833] 1985: 2) seems to be
widely accepted (cf. Craig 2000: 863; Ziolkowski 2016: 270), even by
those who are critical towards Heine's extremely negative and
sarcastic outbursts against the Schlegels.



By contrast, Schlegel's lectures as well as his translations
(some of which are still used today) were very successful and
influential. It was indeed A.W. Schlegel's lectures, with their
particular view of world literature as an organic whole, that were to
influence many authors. F.W.J. Schelling (the most Romantic of the
German idealist philosophers) and G.W. Hegel, for instance, used
Schlegel's Jena lectures as a basis for the elaboration of
their *Lectures on the Philosophy of Art* (1802-1804)
and *Lectures on Aesthetics* (1818) respectively. But
A.W. Schlegel's influence was not restricted to Germany
alone. His lectures, having been translated into many languages and
successfully promoted by authors such as Mme de Stael (Grundmann
2005: 40), were also extremely influential abroad--S.T. Coleridge
being perhaps the most notable example (cf. Helmholtz-Phelan 1907). In
the preface to his critical essays (*Kritische Schriften*,
Berlin, 1828), Schlegel explains how many of the
'revolutionary' ideas he had formerly defended in his
essays and lectures had been internalized and normalized by those very
critics who had once rejected them with
contempt. A.W. Schlegel's response to this was modest: he said,
he had just been able to foresee the coming shift of taste and
evaluative parameters in the understanding and the interpretation of
works of art (KS: I, vi).



Some critics have argued that, as a literary critic, A.W. Schlegel is
more empirical and less philosophical than his brother Friedrich
(cf. Welleck 1955: 72-73). And it has even been questioned
whether A.W. Schlegel is the genuine creator of the ideas laid out in
his writings and lectures (Heine [1833] 1985: 47). Yet, however convincing
the distinction between 'having
*created*' the ideas as opposed to merely 'having
*disseminated*' them may seem, this claim is quite
disputable. Schlegel's philosophical analyses of art and the
artist were undoubtedly inspired by his reading of and/or encounters
with Herder, Kant, Fichte, Goethe, Schiller, and Schelling among
others, but he developed his own poetology. A.W. Schlegel's
lectures had a unique dialectic character (Schlegel himself suggest
that his lectures are to be understood as a dialogue), combining high
theoretical standards with an appealing, empirical approach, thus
offering "one of the first narratives of the historical and
philosophical interrelation of all art forms" (Franzel 2014:
351). In the development and presentation of his theoretical position,
he was indeed less speculative than other German philosophers (such as
Hegel). But as Walter Benjamin notes, this is the result of a
conscious decision to make room for a more critical approach, which
renders Schlegel's position surprisingly modern (Benjamin [1920]
1996: 118). In a mixture of pride and censure, Schlegel frequently
notes how German authors are more speculative than practical (LDA: 16
and 440). Moreover, his aesthetical essays can be seen as a comment on
and criticism of those more speculative Germanic approaches in which
the particular work of art and the artist seem to be relegated to a
secondary level and are treated like the piece of a theoretical
'whole'. *Die Gemalde*, a dialogue on painting
as well as a fictive visit through the gallery of Dresden (cf. Penzel
2007: 77ff.) that he co-wrote with Caroline Michaelis, is a good
example of this, precisely for the attentive way in which it
approaches and engages with the individual paintings (Paulin 2016:
160). Overall, though, A.W. Schlegel's writings are prolific,
but remain somewhat unfocused and repetitive. As Schlegel himself had
often regretted, by taking too many different topics into
consideration, his work lost the intensity of its philosophical and
critical insights.



Although Schlegel's lectures were "avidly devoured by
intellectuals from all of the European countries" (Engel and
Lehmann 2004: 84) and in spite of what could be regarded as quite a
success during his lifetime--Schlegel himself was proud to have
been read "from Cadiz to Edinburgh, Stockholm and St.
Petersburg" (Schirmer 1986: 233) -, the works of A.W.
Schlegel have suffered from an arguably unfair and prejudiced neglect.
A first full-scale biography was only published in 2016 (!). In this
biography, Roger Paulin argues that Schlegel's reputation
"never quite recovered from Heine's devastating attack in
*Die Romantische Schule* of 1835" (Paulin 2016: 3).
"Apart from the Vienna Lectures and the Shakespeare
translations", he writes, "it is Heine's attack that
remains in the general consciousness", so that in the end the
image that pervades is one of "decline,
*decheance*, decrepitude, impotence"
(Paulin 2016: 542). Nonetheless, the recent rising number of
dissertations, articles, and even monographies (such as
Paulin's) dedicated to different aspects A.W. Schlegel's
writings, seem to suggest that there is a slow but steady change of
attitude towards his work.


## 2. A.W. Schlegel's Influence in German and European Romanticism: The *Athenaeum* and the *Lectures*



Despite the emphasis the 'Romantics' laid on the
individual artist, the figure of the genius, originality, and
individuality in general (cf. Schulte-Sasse [1985] 1988:
136-137), the conceptualization of the Romantic Movement itself
needs to be understood essentially as a *collective* process.
And yet, as problematic as it may be to ascribe the original
conception of the romantic aesthetical and philosophical precepts to
one author alone, A.W. Schlegel's influence in the
conceptualization as well as the dissemination of some of the most
characteristic and informing principles of German
Romanticism--including the term 'Romantic'
(*romantisch*) itself (cf. Ferber 2005)--is by no means
trivial. Indeed, if the periodical *Athenaeum* (which A.W.
Schlegel co-edited and co-created with his brother Friedrich) was to
become the 'organ' of the Romantic Movement, it is
undisputable that A.W. Schlegel's popular lectures in Jena
(1798), Berlin (1801-1804), and Vienna (1808-1812)
"disseminated the aesthetics of German Romanticism across
Europe" (Engel and Lehmann 2004: 84).



The Romantic Movement emerged, on the one hand, as a reaction against
Classicist and Neoclassicist aesthetical ideals (largely based on
mimesis and representation, Behler 1993: ix), and on the other, as a
critique from the somewhat blind faith in reason set up by the
Enlightenment and which had proved to be unsatisfactory. Until the
creation of the *Athenaeum*, A.W. Schlegel had published some
of his writings in Friedrich Schiller's periodical *Die
Horen* (which was to Weimar Classicism what the Athenaeum would be
to German Romanticism). Both he and his brother, Friedrich, however
soon realized that their particular aesthetic views, philosophical
insights, and literary criticisms (which they shared or thought to
share with a number of authors such as Novalis, Tieck, Fichte, and
Schleiermacher) needed a new, adequate space to be published without
constraints. The *Athenaeum* was created with precisely this
view in mind and was to provide an alternative space that was open to
new aesthetic ideas. And although it was conceived as a collective
work with an intended and welcomed diversity of positions, styles, and
literary forms (letters, aphorisms, dialogues, literary criticism,
etc.), their main idea was that they would publish only those pieces
that they could consider as "their own" (A: I, iv). In
effect: there were two editors, several writers, and a diversity of
opinions, but one unifying principle (A: I, vi). The
*Athenaeum* thus became the hotbed for powerful, original and
philosophically revolutionary ideas and insights about poetry,
literature, and art in general (cf. Paulin 2016: 118). 



But, in order for these ideas to have the transformative effect that
the German Romantic movement actually had within and beyond Germany,
they needed to be not only systematized and organized into a more
tangible unit, but also disseminated to broader audiences. This is
precisely the role that A.W. Schlegel's lectures played (cf.
Franzel 2014). As Jochen Schulte-Sasse, argues: Schlegel's
Berlin *Vorlesungen uber schohne Kunst und Literatur*
('Lectures on Fine Arts and Literature'), which he gave
between 1801 and 1804, "have to be seen as a programmatic
attempt to explain early Romantic theories of art in a relatively
'popular' and accessible form" (Schulte-Sasse [1985]
1988: 136). Indeed, the last series of these lectures
(1803-1804) were dedicated entirely to the 'History of
Romantic Literature'. These Berlin lectures, however, were not
published until 1884 (and to my knowledge never translated into
English), but Schlegel made an effort to circulate them; for instance
he sent them to Schelling, who then used them for his own Jena
lectures on art. To be sure, Schlegel's later Vienna lectures,
which were translated into several languages and rapidly disseminated
across Europe, were largely based on his Berlin lectures.



Throughout his lectures and essays, A.W. Schlegel praised the plays of
Shakespeare and Calderon to the detriment of French
Neoclassical theatre. This criticism was not arbitrary, but was part
of a systematic and organic comprehension of art and art history.
However, his harsh attack on classical rules considered
'sacred' by French critics predisposed the latter to react
with hostility (especially to the publication of the polemical
*Comparaison entre la Phedre de Racine et celle
d'Euripide*, in 1807), whilst being favored by English
reviewers. In fact, the rediscovery of Shakespeare's greatness
in the 19th century was due, not only to Schlegel's
translations, but most importantly to his special approach to
Shakespearean theatre: instead of comparing Shakespeare to ancient
Tragedy, as if it were a bad copy, Schlegel claimed it should be
analyzed on the grounds of constituting a necessary and historical
*difference*. This difference--the difference between the
ancients and the modern--was the cornerstone of Schlegel's
critique and set the basis for his theoretical use of the concept
*Romantic*, which became the key-concept in his comprehension
and reevaluation of modernity.



In effect, most commentators credit A.W. Schlegel for having given the
word 'romantic' a systematic significance and affirmative
tone from the very beginning (Furst 1969: 84). In contrast with other
literary critics who used the term in contradictory and erratic ways
(or avoided it altogether, such as Schelling, even if he based his
aesthetics on the difference between the Ancient and the Modern),
Schlegel believed it was important to transmit a clear-cut
understanding of the term and "to elevate it again to its true
signification" (LDA: 441). Indeed, his purpose was to foster a
solid movement that should become the symbol of modernity and Germany
as well as Europe, as he clearly indicates in the introduction to his
Berlin lectures: 



> 
> 
> I say, I hope to fully dispel the doubt that still arises here and
> there as to whether there really is a romantic, i.e., specifically
> modern art: an art that does not follow the model of the Ancient and
> is nevertheless appreciated as fulfilling the highest principles
> [...], a perfectly achieved art; in other words, I hope to dispel
> the doubt that there is a poetry that is not merely nationally and
> temporarily interesting, but universal and eternal. (VLK: III, 7)
> 
> 
> 



Although subject to scholarly debate (Esterhammer 2002a: 153),
Schlegel's profound influence on English Romanticism through
Coleridge is widely accepted. Some authors even claim that Coleridge
found in Schlegel's lectures the lucidity and sharpness
regarding some of the main romantic principles and criticisms that he
had lacked until his encounter with the *Vorlesungen uber
dramatische Kunst* (Helmholtz-Phelan 1907: 361). Schlegel's
writings made Shakespeare one of the most universally known and
revered authors, not only in Germany arguably in England too. In the
end, however, Schlegel was quite pessimistic about the actual
influence he had had in his time, and lamented that his efforts had
fallen so far short of his desire to inspire an artistic movement and
define an epoch.


## 3. Philosophy of Art


### 3.1 Art and Nature



Art is not a mere 'imitation' or
'representation' of nature; art is the product of a
*creative force*. This sentence, crystallizing one of the
fundamental ideas of German Romantic aesthetics, constitutes the core
of one of A.W. Schlegel's most well-known Berlin lectures. It
was published in the Viennese journal, *Prometheus* in 1808 and
re-collected in his *Kritische Schriften* (1828) as
*Uber das Verhaltniss der schonen Kunst zur Natur;
Uber Tauschung und Wahrscheinlichkeit; Uber Manier und
Stil* (*On the Relationship of Art to Nature; On Illusion and
Probability; On Style and Manner*). The importance of this essay
lies not only in this thesis (an idea that we also find in other texts
of that period, such as Schelling's 1807 essay *Uber das
Verhaltniss der bildenden Kunsten zu der Natur (On the
Relationship of Visual Arts to Nature*), but rather in the way
Schlegel developed his argument.



In this text, Schlegel argues in favor of a Modern (i.e., Romantic)
art theory, in opposition to the representationalist and mimetic
doctrines that go back to Aristotle's *Poetics* and
conceive the work of the artist as that of a craftsman copying the
beauty of nature (Abrams 1953: 48). But his critique of the classicist
formula 'art imitates nature' was accompanied by a careful
analysis of the different meanings the term 'nature' had
come to assume within aesthetic discourses. This philological and
historical approach is distinctive of Schlegel's writings and
lends intelligibility and clarity to the texts without eroding their
philosophical sharpness. Undoubtedly, the Romantic notion of art goes
hand in hand with a reevaluation of the concept of nature. Similar to
other authors who also were inspired by Spinoza's distinction
between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*,
Schlegel argues that, from a philosophical point of view, everything
participates in an ongoing process of creation, whereas, from an
empirical point of view, natural things are conceived as if they were
dead, fixed and independent from the whole. This means that, in its
purest and philosophical sense, nature is not perceptible in the same
way the worldly objects are. However, unlike Schelling with his
'intellectual intuition' or *intellektuelle
Anschauung*, Schlegel did not develop an elaborate theory to give
account of this different form of perception; he succinctly argued
that the comprehension of nature's true essence is more like a
*presentiment* (*ahnen*) or an aesthetic contemplation,
than like scientific knowledge. In order to realize this
'Romantic' notion of nature, one needs to comprehend or
rather feel oneself as an organic whole. One needs to achieve
self-awareness and to recognize oneself as forming part of a larger
unity. This resort to a non-theoretical or non-discursive plane as an
essential constituent of human knowledge was also important in
Schlegel's philosophy of language, which he already expounded in
his *Letters on Poetry, Meter and Language* (*Briefe
uber Poesie, Sylbenmass und Sprache*) in 1795. 



In any case, the philosophical or Romantic notion of nature as an
unfathomable unity and creative force that cannot be seen nor touched,
and which is obviously a direct response to some of the many questions
raised by Kant's three *Critiques*, is not to be
understood as a mere intellection, an empty chimera: Nature is the
productive force pulsing in all living beings. For Schlegel, nature is
organic in the sense that it is an organized and organizing principle,
granting intelligence to the totality of existing beings. It is a
creative force that produces independent living things, the life of
which does not need any external mechanism to keep its autonomy, for
it only depends on its inner, natural power to live (as is the case
with Leibniz' *vis activa*). At this point Schlegel
mentions the astrological doctrines that claim that even the tiniest
atom is a mirror of the universe. The idea of Nature mirroring itself
in each and every living organism is characteristic both of German
Idealism and German Romanticism. The difference between human beings
and other animals, plants, or mineral structures is that, (1) human
beings are able to understand the fact that they, as an organism,
mirror Nature's organic structure; and furthermore, (2) that
they are capable of reproducing nature's creativity through art,
as well as reflecting upon this fact. This reasoning induced Schlegel
to define human genius and his/her poetical creativity as a whole
(i.e., art and language) as the capability of producing a world within
a world (Muller-Vollmer 2000 [2002]: 317); a definition which is
most tangible in dramatic literature.



Schlegel's criticism of the physicalists' conception of
nature is surely the result of a very specific aesthetic and
philosophical perspective. But this particular viewpoint enabled him
to reinterpret and give a new meaning to the old and criticized
formula 'art imitates nature'. Indeed, once we conceive of
nature as an organic whole, constantly becoming and transforming
itself, then the sentence is quite different and seems to capture not
only the true essence of (Romantic) art, but also its most fundamental
principle. It is in this sense that Schlegel polemically will say that
"art *should* imitate nature" (SW: III, 306). The
deficiency of the formula does not lie in the idea itself, but in the
meaning we give to its components. In a very precise sense, art
imitates nature, because in his or her creativity, the
*genuine* artist (i.e., the Romantic artist) also seeks to
produce an organic whole and thereby embody an eternal truth. For
Schlegel, it is only through art and through everything that art
signifies, that man is capable of attaining that seemingly
*lost* unity.


### 3.2 Romantic Art and the Longing for a Lost Unity



To be sure, if art is seen as the embodiment of an eternal truth, of
absolute beauty, this implies that art is not Beauty *itself*.
This is also why, according to Schlegel, each work of art is the
expression of a certain longing, a craving for the recreation of that
very unity experienced through the "spiritual feeling or
intuition (*geistige Anschauung*) of Nature" (SW: III,
307). For Schlegel, it is only through art and through everything that
art signifies, that man is capable of attaining (even if not
absolutely) such a wholeness, i.e., to recover what is felt as a
'lost' unity. The idea of longing or *Sehnsucht* is
indeed essential in Schlegel's account of Romanticism and must
be understood in relation to the difference between ancient and modern
art, which also was the structuring principle and, in a sense,
constituted the real object of Schlegel's analysis in his
*Lectures on Dramatic Art*. This opposition may be summarized
as follows: whereas ancient poetry is plastic, sensual, harmonious,
and, overall, a poetry of enjoyment of the present; modern poetry is a
poetry of desire and longing (*Sehnsucht*), hovering between
the idealizations of a remote past and an unknown future (LDA: 9).
According to Schlegel, these differences encompass every sphere of
reality and every form of art, and are on the whole the result of a
historical event, namely the establishment of Christianity.



As F.W.J. Schelling had done in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of
Art* of 1803, what Schlegel emphasizes about the transition from
paganism to Christianity is that it involved the realization of an
insurmountable breach between subject and object, between the I and
the World, i.e., between consciousness and nature. Christianity, he
argues, awakened the consciousness of the internal rupture or
fundamental discord between the finite and the infinite which, in
Schlegel's analysis, is constitutive of modernity. In other
words, for Schlegel, modernity arises from the painful realization of
an insurmountable fissure, and the subsequent insight that real
happiness can never be attained, i.e., "that no external object
can ever entirely fill our souls; and that every mortal enjoyment is
but a fleeting and momentary deception" (LDA: 9). As a result,
in Schlegel's view, to understand modern and especially Romantic
literature means to understand art as the eternal longing for the
reconciliation of this fissure between the subject and the universe,
the finite and the infinite or the divine. Both the realization of the
insurmountable fissure as well as the longing for its reconciliation
are part of a particular way of experiencing nature, the self, and the
infinite.



In their attempts at finding alternative ways of understanding reason
and its relation to life, art and feelings, the Romantics also tried
to recuperate or rediscover elements from what had been regarded as
the irrational and mythical spirit of the Middle Ages. Schlegel uses
the term 'Romantic' to denote the very specific historical
and stylistic discrepancy between German and Modern art, on the one
hand, and Ancient and Classicist art, on the other. Schlegel argued
that German culture, which he defined as having a natural inclination
toward the Romantic (LDA: 439), was indebted to all the cultures which
preceded it. But he specifically laid the roots of the so-called
'Romantic spirit' in chivalry, i.e., in the union of the
heroism of the northern conquerors with the humanistic principles of
Christianity. Schlegel associated chivalry and the Middle Ages in
general with a certain form of purity that manifests itself (1) in a
more spiritual understanding of love and female worth, to the extent
that one could talk of a fusion between the metaphysical longing for
the infinite (or God) and the erotic longing for a woman; and (2) in a
'heroic' morality. It is a morality "that never
calculated consequences, but consecrated unconditionally certain
principles of action" (LDA: 8). On the other hand, though,
Schlegel's genealogy of the 'romantic' would be
incomprehensible without paying attention to his openness to and
interest in other cultures and languages. Thus, the 'Romantic
spirit' is also found in the works of Shakespeare, and sought in
the spirit of romance cultures and languages, which, for Schlegel, are
the result of a fusion between Latin and Teutonic languages, in a
similar way as German Romanticism "is the fruit of the union of
the peculiarities of the North with fragments of antiquity"
(LDA: 5).


### 3.3 The Poetical and the Critique of Art



For Schlegel, in the same way as nature--the true
*experience* of nature-- cannot be reduced to its mere
physical or external manifestations, both the work of art and the
experience it evokes are more than just the simple perception or the
analysis of its forms. Thus, he argues, the true work of art, in order
to endure the shifting modes and fashions of time, must have something
more profound than just a beautiful form, in the same way a flower
needs its roots and cannot survive long without them. For Schlegel, as
for Schelling or Novalis, the attempt to understand the work of art as
the result of the conscious decisions of the artist alone would be
misleading, because there is always an unconscious element in every
artistic creation. The work of art is a result of both conscious and
unconscious forces. In other words, the artist's
*intention* is, to a great extent, *irrelevant* for the
artistic product, and hence, cannot play a major role in the
evaluation of the work itself. In his *Lectures on Dramatic
Art*, Schlegel defines genius as someone being capable of the
"almost unconscious choice of the highest degree of
excellence" (LDA: 5), and in an *Athenaeum* fragment he
claimed that "it is a distinguishable mark of poetical genius to
know a great deal more than he knows he knows" (SW: VIII, 15).
This does not mean that any sign of an 'unconscious'
choice in the production of art is a sign of genius; what is
characteristic about the great artist is that his/her
'unconscious' choices seem attributable to a higher,
divine *and conscious* force. The extent to which the artist is
capable of transcending his/her more or less involuntary
particularities, i.e., the extent to which his/her choices seem to
derive from an unconscious ability to select always the highest degree
of excellence, determines the difference between *style* and
*mannerism*. When the work of art appears *as if* all
its elements had been consciously chosen by a power above and beyond
the artist, it has *style*; when the artist has not transcended
his/her individuality, then s/he is categorized as *mannerist*
(SW: III, 309-312).



The essence of a work of art, the principle that all *real*
works of art have in common and what makes them more than a mere
accumulation of particular elements, is what Schlegel called the
'poetical'. Consequently, the ability to grasp whatever
is *truly poetical* in a specific work of art set the basis for
his methodological procedure in his art criticism. For Schlegel, a
criterion for evaluating a work of art is its capacity to extend
itself "beyond the limits of reality into the region of a
creative fancy" (LDA: 107-108). On the other hand, the
poetical aspect of a work of art depends on its capacity to mirror and
to present (*darstellen*) eternally true *ideas* (LDA:
18). But, as in many aesthetic texts from this period, it is not
always obvious which 'ideas' the work of art must seek to
mirror. It seems these 'ideas' should be understood in a
Platonic sense, as they generally refer to great values or great
ideals such as beauty, greatness, and goodness.



However, and partly due to his reluctance to consider the
artist's intentionality as being decisive in the comprehension
of the work of art (which in some way prefigures the late Romantic
ideal of *l'art pour l'art*), Schlegel did not
underline a necessary moral purpose in aesthetic objects. And yet, for
Schlegel, this did not imply that the contemplation and understanding
of art should lose its moral aura. Quite to the contrary, for
Schlegel, art has the power to elevate us above our ordinary
encounters with the world, above the sorrows and daily troubles of
life. This is why he argued that the purpose of art could not be a
mere imitation or reduplication of the world *as it is*,
because in this case, apart from the fact that music, dance,
architecture, and so many other art forms become totally inexplicable,
the best works of art would be the ones that deceive the most, in the
sense that the viewer would find himself prevented from contemplating
the work of art *as a work of art*. Clearly, if the purpose of
art were to replicate nature (understood as an object rather than a
subject) the aesthetic objects would evoke no particular interest
beyond mere ornamentation. But, for Schlegel, both the
contemplation/critique and the production of art should be seen as the
result of creative activity. 



In accordance with these theoretical assumptions, Schlegel was very
negative about naturalistic neo-classicist tendencies in art. He
praised wholeness and poetical unity as well as originality in a work
of art. For Schlegel, similarly as for Baumgarten, the magic of a work
of art is that it creates and hence brings us into a different world,
with all its own internal coherence. It is in this sense that a work
of art is organic and complete. The purpose of a work of art should
therefore not be to reflect the real world with naturalism, but rather
to create its own world, which could never be a question of applying a
set of rules and principles to a particular matter (paintings, words,
marble), such as classicist aesthetics seemed to suggest. The search
for naturalism and plausibility, in an attempt at producing the most
true and real representation of reality, makes art lose its greatness,
beauty, and wonder.



In his *Lectures on Dramatic Art*, Schlegel praised the use of
masks in theatrical representations as well as those performers who
managed to create an emotional distance between themselves, the
audience and the role they were playing. Once more, art is not about
deceiving or hiding, but about the production or the creation of a
world within a world. This also explains Schlegel's admiration
of Old Comedy, because in this case the spectator is constantly forced
to remain aware of the experience in which s/he is partaking, namely
the experience of the difference between reality and illusion. A
similar reconsideration of comedy was also the basis for other
contemporary authors in Schlegel's circle, such as Ludwig Tieck
with his version of the 17th century fairy tale *Der
gestiefelte Kater* (*Puss in Boots*). Schlegel stresses
that, in contrast to tragedy (where the author needs to remain
invisible to guarantee the integrity of his/her fictional world); in
comedy, the gap between the different levels of reality and illusion,
or rather, the very disintegration of the unity of the story becomes
the center of the play. As Schlegel puts it, in Old Comedy: "the
whole production was one entire jest within itself" (LDA: 108).
In Aristophanes' plays, the chorus, which regularly interrupts
the course of the play to address the audience with reference to the
story (*parabisis*), the author and the people from the
audience alike, virtually destroys all the elements and
characteristics of tragedy: its seriousness as well as its harmonious
unity is systematically parodied. Not only the scenes, not only the
poetry, but also the tragic composition, the music, acting, and
dancing, were object of a hilarious distortion. For Schlegel, this did
not mean that comedy should be understood as a derivative of tragedy;
on the contrary, he affirms it to be "a species of poetry as
independent and original as tragedy itself" (LDA: 108). In fact,
A.W. Schlegel's characterization of the distinction between the
character of Old Comedy and Greek tragedy would become a central
reference in literary criticism.



Among all the different artistic manifestations, Schlegel considered
dramatic poetry to be "the most entertaining of all
diversions" (LDA: 12). The fundamental reason for dramatic
poetry's being so engaging, as Schlegel points out, lies in the
mimicry that is always involved in theatrical representations.
Schlegel maintained that all works of art, and in particular, all
theatrical representations, are expression of the idiosyncrasies of
the country where they are produced. And although he succinctly
suggested that the existence of a theatrical tradition may be seen as
a symbol of a special intellectual and political environment, he also
indicated that the enjoyment of mimicry per se is somehow constitutive
of human beings (Flaherty 1994: 195). For Schlegel, children's
delight in imitating their relatives is also expressive of man's
basic psychological predisposition to mimicry (LDA: 18); a disposition
without which man would not be able to enter the linguistic, let alone
the poetical and creative phases of his development (SW: VII, 117).
Dramatic poetry, he argued, is the representation of an
"important" action, namely an action that has been purged
of the petty and unnecessary details of real life; it is the
performance of a morally and intellectually exemplary action through
dialogue. Schlegel's placing of dramatic poetry in the highest
rank amongst the arts hardly makes his position unique. What does
render him quite distinctive, rather, is the argument he gives, namely
that it produces the maximum enjoyment. This certainly contrasts with
Schiller's moralizing views. Schlegel was very aware of the
necessity for a play to be interesting and exciting for the audience:
the greatness of a play has to do with the way in which it creates a
certain tension or conflict that involves the audience. But, what
makes dramatic poetry different from a mere pantomime, what really
elevates it above other human activities is, once again, its poetical
element, i.e., its capacity to mirror an idea or eternal truth.
Ultimately, this is also what determines the difference between
tragedy and comedy. The tragic tone is given through a sincere
melancholy, a longing for and accepting of a "destiny soaring
above this earthly life", whereas the main characteristic of
comedy is its "forgetfulness of all discouraging
considerations" (LDA: 24). For Schlegel, the aim of tragedy is
not "to purify the passions by pity and terror" (LDA: 43),
as Aristotle had said, but to elevate us "to the most dignified
view of humanity" (LDA: 112). In fact, Schlegel's analysis
of Greek tragedy and his sharp rejection of Aristotle's theory
of tragedy were extremely influential. 



In his *Lectures on Dramatic Art* Schlegel was very critical
towards the present state of German theatre (LDA: 438). However, apart
from Shakespeare, Calderon with their ironic way of mixing the
tragic with the comic (LDA: 175), and the ancient Greek, Schlegel also
praised Lessing, Schiller, and Goethe for having "redeemed the
German theatre from its long continued mediocrity" (LDA:
424).


## 4. Philosophy of Language



In his *Letters on Poetry...* from 1795, addressed to a
fictional *Amalie*, Schlegel discusses the origins of language;
a theme, to which he would later return in his Jena and Berlin
lectures. Schlegel was thus resuming an old philosophical debate which
had formed two opposite hypotheses (Behler 2002: 124-128). The
two basic and mutually exclusive positions maintained, on the one
hand, as Schlegel portrays them, that human language must have
originated as a transcription, representation, or imitation of
external objects; and, on the other, that *in its origin*
language must have been purely sensual, i.e., a mere form of
expression of emotions through sounds. Thus, either directly or
indirectly, Schlegel was referring to authors such as Condillac,
Hemsterhuys, Karl Phillip Moritz, August Ferdinand Bernhardi, Fichte,
Herder, and Rousseau. However, in contrast to Herder (and even his own
brother Friedrich) for whom the debate about the origin of language
was primarily a debate about whether its origin was natural or divine,
for Schlegel, the real question at stake was the extent to which the
nature of language could be reduced to and explained in pure
rationalistic terms. Furthermore, in these letters Schlegel implicitly
questions the possibility of attaining absolute knowledge solely
through theory, i.e., attending only to a scientific rationale that
necessarily excludes more metaphorical and intuitive approaches, which
attempt to understand and grasp things "under the mysterious
light of twilight" (SW: VII, 110). For Schlegel, in any case,
the real problem lay in the assumed exclusivity of both alternatives
(cf. Behler 2000: 126). 



Schlegel's decision to present his position in an epistolary
form, mixing different styles of argumentation, is an almost necessary
consequence of his approach to the debate: a lively debate, which he
aimed to dissolve by reconciling both perspectives but without
negating any of them. In a way, these letters are a clear example of
the fusion between content and form. In fact, Schlegel actually
modified his last *Letter* after having received a commentary,
through a missive, from Friedrich Schiller (Behler 2002: 126). For
Schlegel, the only plausible theory on the origin of language had to
take into account both its irrational elements (i.e., the purely
emotional, imaginative, sensual, and most radically communicative
aspects of language) and its rational characteristic (i.e., a system
of signs based on convention), while admitting that on the whole, the
origin of language remains as secret and inexplicable as the origin of
humanity itself (SW: VII, 111). In brief: for Schlegel, as for Novalis
or Schleiermacher, language could not be reduced to a mere system of
signs and any account of the origin of language had to be able to
integrate the two apparently opposite aspects of it.



For Schlegel, language, in its most elementary conception, constitutes
the basic means of communication of immediate feelings, and therefore
represents a dimension that is also present in other animals. Children
learn to move their tongues, Schlegel notes, even before they learn to
use their feet (SW: VII, 117). But in human language, this
communicative capability is also the tool that enables man to surpass
a pure naturalistic or animalistic sphere. Indeed, for Schlegel, as
for Herder, language is the quintessence of human beings. Language, on
the one hand, represents our rupture with nature, but, on the other,
it constitutes our first and most fundamental contact with the world:
(1) it is the true condition of possibility of our orientation in the
world; and (2) it provides us with the unique opportunity of
communicating with other people and of developing subjectivity.
Moreover, for Schlegel, the world as such only makes sense through or
within language. It is through language that we tear ourselves away
from nature and constitute ourselves as a subject. Language is what
takes us beyond ourselves; it is the "magical power" that
leaves room for the incorporeal, unphysical in us (SW: VII, 139).



Schlegel accepts the idea that, in its beginning, language was
probably a direct expression of feelings and emotions through sounds.
The origin of language, he argues, must have been very close to the
cry of animals and the singing of birds, an idea that he reinforces
through the fact that we all began to use our voices by screaming (SW:
VII, 115). But to this basic point, Schlegel also adds the idea of
rhythm. In his letters, he suggests that the rhythmic character of
language is as old as poetry, and moreover, as old as human life. The
oldest or the *first* language, he argues, must have been
indivisible from tones, rhythms, music, and dance. Poetry, or rather
rhythm, he affirms, is thus essential to language itself. Indeed, it
would be impossible to eliminate rhythm from language (SW: VII, 108).
In other words, Schlegel claims that, in its origin, language was
poetry (SW: VII, 104). Most important, though, is that Schlegel
"does not limit the realm of sensuality and feeling to an early
stage in the formation of language" (Behler 2000: 81). For
Schlegel, this more sensual aspect of language is always present:
however *civilized* a people may be, they cannot avoid using
different tones and rhythms to express themselves (SW: VII, 115). Each
utterance, each sentence is spoken with a certain rhythm, each word
also carries the *way* in which it is said, the way in which it
refers to the world, and all these elements constitute an aspect of
language, for they help to establish the ultimate meaning of the
words. This, as Schlegel points out, becomes most obvious once we
realize that, in order to comprehend the emotions that are being
transmitted through a particular speech, one does not need to
understand the words literally (SW: VII, 114).



Thus, for Schlegel, language not only was poetry in its origin:
*language is essentially poetry*. Or as he would later claim in
his Berlin lectures: "language is an ongoing becoming and
continually changing, never ending poem of human kind" (VLK: I,
388). Thus, the nature of language should be understood, not as a more
or less automatic response to the necessities the world imposes upon
us, but as a creative, *poetical* ability. For Schlegel, the
characterization of language as poetry is the only way a theory of
language could give account of language's inherent spontaneity
and creativity. In a certain way, Schlegel was reinterpreting Herder
through Fichte, emphasizing Fichte's idea of man's
self-possession and his relation to the world as an active and not a
passive one. This also explains the importance Schlegel gave to the
role of the poet (and to the literature translator) in the development
of the language of a nation. For Schlegel, as for Wilhelm von
Humboldt, the task of the poet and also that of the translator is to
broaden the signifying and expressive capacity of a language. The
poet, Schlegel says in his 1796 text *The Works of Homer by
Voss*, is the force that renders language alive, which
nevertheless does not mean that s/he may introduce any kind of
changes: language's malleability also has its grammatical and
philological limits (KS: I, 75-76 and 116-117).



In his philosophical account of the fact that language is constantly
changing and moving from lower to higher stages, Schlegel operates
with two very different ways of approaching language, which, at the
same time, reveal the co-existence of two opposite but equally
constitutive forces in the development of a language: the
artist's language-shaping efforts and the grammarian's
judicial function (SW: VII, 117). In this way, Schlegel is somehow
anticipating Saussure's extremely influential distinction
between *langue* and *parole*. For Schlegel, as for
Saussure or Deleuze, the tension between language as an ordered and
stable whole, and language as the subject of a more or less arbitrary,
free and creative development, is what makes language something
alive.



In a similar way, Schlegel affirms that our encounters with the world
are always poetical, in the sense that they are not be merely
receptive, but also creative. Reality exists through language, or, in
other words, we always relate to the world metaphorically. This also
means that there cannot be an 'absolute' (i.e., an
absolutely true) way of referring to the external world, for we do not
see the world as it is, but always in relation to ourselves.
Schlegel's theory of language is thus intrinsically connected to
his theory of mythology. Both in his Jena and in his Berlin lectures,
Schlegel stressed the fact the experience of an existing totality has
a mythological basis without which the experience itself would be
impossible (Behler 1992: 77-78). Once again, Schlegel stressed
the idea that mythology is not merely a phase of human rationality,
but is part of our being in the world. It is a structural principle of
human intellectual activity, the purest rational activity being a
mythological one: be it in art, sciences, or in our daily activities,
we *always* relate to the world metaphorically.



In his letters, Schlegel claims that language is the "most
wonderful creation of human being's poetical talent",
because it is through language that human nature is able to reflect
upon itself (SW: VII, 104). Thus, Schlegel's theory of language
is at the same time a theory of the origin of poetry, which also
explains his predilection for poetry among all the different artistic
manifestations. Thanks to this comprehension of the poetical nature of
language, Schlegel can explain poetry as the highest and freest of all
arts, because it creates its own objects. Indeed, if language is
defined as poetry, then poetry itself becomes "poetry in
poetry" (Behler 1992: 125). The only difference between language
and poetry, he argued, is that the poet is aware of his/her poetical
creativity: s/he consciously decides to create a dream; whereas in
ordinary speech, the subject is unaware of his/her poetical and
imaginative activity (VLK: I, 275). In this way, Schlegel was
anticipating some of Nietzsche's most interesting theses in
*On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* and *The Birth of
Tragedy*


## 5. Translation Theory



Although Schlegel himself denied that he had developed a translation
theory (IB: I, 256), many of his texts are devoted to the analysis of
existing translations (such as Voss's and Burger's
translations of Homer) as well as to the commentary on his own work as
translator. Schlegel was almost certainly influenced by the work of
Johann Gottfried von Herder, but his decision to avoid the elaboration
of a systematic translation theory can be interpreted as the result of
a very precise theoretical position, namely that each text requires a
different procedure for its translation. As he affirmed in the
commentary to his Bhagavad-Gita translation, it all depends on the
relation between the two languages (IB: I, 256). In other words, for
Schlegel, a translation theory as such is uninteresting unless it
involves the exposition of the actual work undertaken with the texts,
i.e., with the original text as well as with all the existing
translations. Consequently, Schlegel's commentary and his
suggestions concerning Voss's translation of Homer are
accompanied by a very detailed analysis of the Greek text together
with a comparative study of Voss's and Burger's
versions. Likewise, in his *Uber die Bhagavad-Gita*,
Schlegel analyzes all the different ways in which a particular word
(such as 'yoga' or 'dharma') has been
translated, creating thus a history of the translation. And although
his commentaries appear as a work in progress, they show a very
precise and carefully conceived methodology which was mostly valuable
for other translators and translation theorists. Very much as a
critique and response to Voss, Schlegel's translations need to
be understood as an example of the so called "paradigm
shift" (cf. Robinson 1991 and Bernofsky 1997) that was taking
place within translation theories.



For Schlegel, a good translation is not necessarily a literal
translation; the translator must be able to translate the spirit of
the text. He must follow the letter, but he must also be able to
"capture some of the innumerable, indescribable marvels that do
not reside in the letter, but float above it like a breath of
spirit!" (SW: VII, 39). Thus, in an 1838 letter to Herrn Reimen,
Schlegel explains that the aim of a translator should be to
"provide those who have no access to the original with as pure
and uninterrupted appreciation of the work as possible" (SW:
VII, 287). Anticipating Humboldt's distinction between the
'foreign' (*das Fremde*) and
'strangeness' (*die Fremdheit*)--which he
introduced in the preface of his translation of the *Agamemnon*
from 1816 -, Schlegel also emphasizes that all translations
should avoid converting foreign texts into strange texts (Berman
1992a: 154). As he had said in his *Works of Homer by Voss*, in
order to translate a text from a different culture, the translator
needs to maintain the text's naturalness; s/he cannot convert it
into something strange, there is no necessity in violating the
language, in inventing a new language (SW: VII, 116). Indeed, what
Schlegel reproached in Voss's translation of Homer was precisely
"to have created a much too 'strange' pidgin of
Greek and German" (Berman 1992a: 154). On the other hand,
though, as a translator and art-critic Schlegel was also concerned
with enabling the assimilation and comprehension of otherness, and
criticized strongly the way in which - especially French translations
- tended to paraphrase passages from foreign texts in order to make
them seem *more French* (KS: I, 75-76, cf. Berman 1992a:
36). Moreover, Schlegel believed that German culture and language (as
opposed to other languages) provided much better conditions for good
translations, i.e., translations that were able to assimilate a
certain foreignization, without becoming too
'strange'.



Although many of Schlegel's remarks may seem self-evident and
elementary to translators today, they did not appear so at the time.
In fact they are the result of a very precise way of understanding
language. Schlegel's translation theories are very much
connected to his philosophy of language. It is within his explanatory
observations about the difficulty of translating Sanskrit terms that
we find a philosophical theory about the genealogy of abstract
significance. All abstract concepts, he argues, are the result of a
progressive growing apart between an original sensual denotation and
its future abstract meanings (IB: II, 248-258). Therefore, the
translator needs to make a decision between (a) finding a more or less
neutral term in his own language that has a similar meaning to the
original, sensual meaning (in this case he needs to explain the
particular use of this word); and (b) using all the meanings that the
original word has been attached to. The problem in the latter case is
that one meaning does not relate to the other, and, what is worse, the
translation loses the cohesion between all the different meanings, so
the reader is not always able to know in which way these different
meanings are bound.



Schlegel describes the task of the translator as a voluntary and
embarrassing slavery (IB: II, 254). It is never gratifying, because
the more he tries to make the best translation, the more he realizes
how impossible his task is: 



> 
> 
> I have come to the conviction that translation is, though freely
> chosen, nevertheless a laborious bondage, an art without substance, a
> thankless craft; thankless not just because the best translation is
> never esteemed as equal to an original, but also because the
> translator, the more he gains insight, must feel even more the
> inevitable imperfection of his work. (IB: II, 255) 
> 
> 
> 



In effect, Heine, criticized Schlegel's translations for
"polishing his words ever so sweetly and fastidiously"
(Heine [1833] 1985: 25), Voss argued that Schlegel's Shakespeare
"was not Shakespeare but Schlegel" (quoted in Larson 1989,
124) and there is an ongoing debate as to the extent to which Schlegel
*romanticizes* Shakespeare (Bernofsky 1997: 180f.). And yet,
there also seems to be a consensus regarding the fact that his
translations into German of the works of Shakespeare are still and by
far the best.


## 6. The Role of the Critic and Schlegel's Romantic Nationalism


### 6.1 Between Enlightenment and Romanticism



The Romantic vision of the great artist as an exceptional individual,
an unrepeatable genius, creator of his own rules, of his own style,
leaves the figure of the philosopher and essayist in a rather
difficult position. The art critic has a very different task from that
of the artist. As a critic, Schlegel conceives his activity as an
educational and moral one, something which he definitely does not
demand from the artist. "Art needs the discourse of art history
for its artistry to become visible" (Schulte-Sasse [1985] 1988:
137). Certainly, in order to appreciate correctly the work of the
artist, in order to avoid being dazed by superficialities, the art
critic also has to have an inner feeling, a certain genius. But his
task is not to create, but to comprehend and to educate the public in
their taste, to enable them to value the new, modern artistic
productions with a profound understanding of their significance. For,




> 
> 
> what ennobles human nature [is] to recognize and respect whatever is
> beautiful and grand under those external modifications which are
> necessary to their existence, and which sometimes even seem to
> disguise them. There is no monopoly of poetry for certain ages and
> nations. (LDA: 2) 
> 
> 
> 



Throughout Schlegel's entire work the Romantic ideals are in
fact embedded in an enlightenment project.



Thus in the 1809 preface to the publication of his *Lectures on
Dramatic Art*, Schlegel argued that his main purpose was not so
much to transmit an indifferent account of the history of dramatic
poetry, but most importantly to "develop those ideas which ought
to guide us in our estimate" (LDA: vii). His objective was to
*liberate* his listeners and readers from what he calls a
"despotism in taste" (LDA: 2), that is, to release them,
both from their provincial prejudices towards unknown cultures and
from the new tendencies developing in German literature. He wanted to
prepare the German public for a (future) German Romantic theatre.



In a similar fashion, Schlegel argued that in order to appreciate art
productions from past cultures and remote nations, an acquaintance not
only with the actual work of art is indispensable, but also with its
historical and cultural background: it is imperative to understand the
peculiarities of their culture and history as a whole. The profound
comprehension of History is the basis for any comprehension of art and
languages, which necessarily bears a direct relationship with the
historical conditions circumscribing it (KS: I, x). As a consequence,
Schlegel introduced in all of his lectures historical, social, and
cultural observations; because for him, the aim of the critic is,
primarily, to reconcile the division between theory and experience,
i.e., between a philosophical and a historical approach. Such was the
balance Schlegel sought to achieve in his lectures between what would
be a purely theoretical comprehension of tragedy and the consideration
of the theatre as such, with all the historical, architectural and
cultural characteristics that conditioned the actual performance of
the play.



The critic of art and history needs to be a *connoisseur* in
the strictest sense of the word, for he must be able to explain the
actual state of humanity from its most remote past. He needs to
distance himself sufficiently from his own time in order to be able to
understand and judge it. The true critic must have a
"universality of mind" so that he may leave aside his
"personal predilections" (LDA: 5). Schlegel conceived his
lectures as a true *critique*, and many years later, he still
considered that this is what made his approach in his *Lectures on
Dramatic Art and Literature* unique (KS: I, xiii).



In the preface to the publication of his critical writings from 1828,
Schlegel explains that the difficulty of his task as an art critic
lies not so much in the critique or the judgment itself, or in the
laying out of the proper argument in demonstration of his views, as in
finding, i.e., *creating* the right concepts with which to
express the effect and the impressions generated by a specific work of
art (KS: I, xii). The genius of the critic is that he is able to use
the word 'romantic' in such a way that it may express the
essence of an epoch. And, although Schlegel did not believe he
actually had a big influence on the German public, by 1828 he did
remark that a shift of taste had taken place in Europe, a shift that
showed how the Romantic ideals had in fact widely pervaded European
audiences.


### 6.2 Nationalism versus Cosmopolitanism



Through his translations and essays A.W. Schlegel intended to make
foreign literary traditions and literary works accessible to the
German public, but he also thought that the opposite was necessary.
That is, Schlegel understood that his task as an art critic was also
to defend and disseminate German culture, within Germany and
throughout Europe. Indeed, Schlegel's preoccupation with the
historical and cultural diversities had two different, even opposite,
consequences. On the one hand it made Schlegel's approach to
different cultures and their artistic production much more tolerant,
because he was aware of the fact that one needs to immerse oneself in
their culture in order to grasp the universal or poetical nature of
the particular work of art and avoid a provincial attitude. In fact,
Schlegel liked to think of himself as a citizen of the world. But, on
the other hand, it led him to harbor a certain nationalistic
sentiment, which he projected both abroad and to the German literati.
So, as well as restoring German culture (many of his writings can be
regarded as a manifesto of German Romanticism and German philosophy),
he also encouraged his fellow countrymen, in a highly patriotic tone,
to become deeply national and historical and to depict "what
Germans of olden times were and what they should become again",
lest they should lose their "unity as Germans" (LDA: 441).
Schlegel believed that for the true potential of Romantic literature
to be realized in Germany, Germans needed to regain an interest in the
great events of their history and in their identity as an independent
nation (Carlson 1994: 143).



In his late essay *Abriss von den Europaischen
Verhaltnissen der Deutschen Literatur* (1825), written for an
English audience, he repeats an idea he had also defended in his
*Lectures on Dramatic Art*, namely that German literature was
young because of the historical evolution of the German language, and
not because of its qualities (LDA: 421, SW: VIII, 207). Schlegel
fervently defended German authors (such as Klopstock, Lessing,
Winkelmann, Wieland, Goethe, or Herder) as well as German
philosophers, from the English accusations of being abstract and
obscure (SW: VIII, 212). He also claimed that Germans were the most
cosmopolitan and intellectual leaders of European culture, and that
Germany had reached its maturity, its autonomy, and hence its freedom
(SW: VIII, 214). This is why, for Schlegel, Germany had a central role
in the development of European culture: in the recuperation of the
Roman and Greek cultures, which were the very foundations of Europe.
The evidence of this 'superiority' would lie in the
development of natural sciences, philosophy, and the critical
interpretation of classical texts (SW: VII, 214-217). In short,
A.W. Schlegel's concern became more and more a problem of
national identity (Schmelling 1994: 35-36). But, at the same
time, these assertions must be seen against the background of his
statements from earlier texts, such as the *Wettstreit der
Sprachen* (*The Contest of Languages*) from 1798, in which
Schlegel develops his idea of a "cosmopolitan literature"
(Albrecht 2005: 307) and seems to criticize and make fun of all forms
of nationalism. As Andrea Albrecht argues, Schlegel's engagement
with translations, investigation, and dissemination of European and
non-European literature, must be seen as a sign and proof of his
*cosmopolitanism*. In the third part of his Berlin lectures
from 1803, Schlegel expresses his desire that all different
nationalities be united. But, again, this desire to transcend national
boarders seems to go hand in hand with the necessity of establishing
Germany as the new "center for the human spirit" (quoted
in Albrecht 2005: 308, my translation), the rationale behind this
being, that "universality, cosmopolitanism, is the real German
characteristic" (VLK: III, 36). Undoubtedly, Schlegel's
cosmopolitanism is uncannily mixed up with a strange form of blind,
romantic nationalism.



After the disastrous consequences of German nationalism during the
20th century, and the fact that 



> 
> 
> it is also a common view that "political romanticism", in
> its regard for organic community, was a precursor to Nazism, (Black
> 1964: 32) 
> 
> 
> 



such 'romantic' nationalistic statements are not received
without a certain apprehension. However, without trying to solve the
ambivalent character of the Romantic political program, it is
important to note how these very statements show that Schlegel was not
an impartial critic. He too was in some way trapped in what he called
the Romantic spirit, despite his efforts to contemplate art, history,
and society from a neutral perspective. In explaining *the spirit
of the Romantic*, Schlegel himself is being very
*romantic*. The very division he made between the ancient and
the modern, as well as his views of Shakespeare, Aristophanes, or the
Greeks as a people who were 



> 
> 
> conscious of no wants, and aspired at no higher perfection than that
> which they could actually attain by the exercise of their own
> faculties, (LDA: 9) 
> 
> 
> 



were inevitably influenced by his own time.


## 7. A.W. Schlegel: A Thinker of Difference



A.W. Schlegel's writings show a great preoccupation and interest
in the perspective of the 'other': women, children, and,
above all, other cultures. He constantly reminds the reader about the
necessity, in critical thought, of creating a link between theory and
practical experience or historical knowledge. This enables him to
defend the idea that two totally different works of art can be great
and admirable, not only in spite of their differences, but *because
of them*. It was indeed this affirmation of difference that
enabled him to use the notion 'Romantic' in the way that
he did. In fact, although Schlegel's *Lectures on Dramatic
Art* can be seen as a plea for modern or Romantic poetry and
culture in general ("the feeling of the moderns is, upon the
whole, more intense, their fancy more incorporeal, and their thoughts
more contemplative", LDA: 9), in contrast to other authors, he
is always very careful not to judge modern works of art according to
their similarities or dissimilarities with ancient ones. It was not by
chance that Schlegel should be the first to introduce the idea of a
comparative literature.



The emphasis on the opposition between ancient and modern art, and its
parallel to the antagonism between Christianity and Greek pagan
mythology, are recurring assumptions in 19th century
aesthetics. But Schlegel's aim is not to conceptualize a
particular canon of beauty, but much more, as a means of elevating
oneself above all partial views, to find an approach that may enable
the comprehension and enjoyment of the different ways in which art is
manifested throughout history. Thus, Schlegel is taking to its highest
point the 19th century idealist principle according to
which art is the "power of creating what is beautiful and
representing (*darstellen*) it to the human eye and ear"
(LDA: 3) as well as the idea that "poetry, as the fervid
expression of our whole being, must assume a new and peculiar form in
different ages" (LDA: 29).



The experience of difference also becomes an important element in his
critique of art. Schlegel clearly positions himself against modern
critics, who consider the mixture of reality and imitation
"destructive of theatrical illusion" (LDA: 34). Although
not always explicit in his writings, Schlegel constantly stresses the
idea that in the contemplation of a work of art, the spectator must
still perceive the craftedness of the whole; i.e., the difference
between reality and illusion. This is a fundamental element of his
criticism of naturalism and his defense of the use of verse and masks
in theatre. What is more interesting, though, is that the constant
awareness of the difference between reality and illusion (for instance
through irony) also shows the fundamental fragility of difference
itself in a much more compelling way than a rigorous classicist work
of art does. Reality is also an illusion; it also is the result of
creative forces, such as language is. 



In this specific sense, Schlegel could be understood as a thinker of
difference in a much more radical way than other philosophers of his
time. Although Schlegel's writings have not been considered as
philosophical as those of other 19th century German
philosophers, his approach to art and its history, and his reflections
on language and cultural differences are much closer to what is
sometimes called a *postmodern* comprehension of aesthetics
than that of his contemporaries. Indeed, in his characteristically
unpresumptuous style, Schlegel anticipates philosophers such as
Nietzsche, Blumenberg, or Deleuze.