## 1. Life and Works



Marsilius of Inghen was born around 1340 in Nijmegen, a city in the
eastern part of the Low Countries
 (Netherlands).[1]
 In the older literature it is often said that he came from one of the
villages in the vicinity of Nijmegen (Inghen), but this view is
mistaken. It was based on a confused reading of the *Oratio
Funebris* held in 1396 by Nicholas Prowin at the funeral of
Marsilius and published in 1499 at
 Mainz.[2]
 From 1362 on, Marsilius was master at the Faculty of Arts at the
University of Paris, where he was also rector (1367 and 1371), and a
student of theology. As a teacher at Paris, Marsilius was much
esteemed and his lectures drew large audiences. Among his students
were many compatriots, some of whom came from Nijmegen and surrounding
villages. In 1378, Marsilius found himself the University's
delegate at the court of Pope Urban VI in Tivoli. In 1379, he
instructed one of his colleagues, Hugh of Hervort, to look after his
interests in Paris. After 1379, Marsilius's name is no longer
mentioned in the acts of the University of Paris. He probably turned
away from Paris because of the imbroglio surrounding the Great Schism
of 1378. Meanwhile, he kept in touch with his native city. In 1382 the
town council of Nijmegen treated him to a banquet. From 1386 on,
Marsilius was master at the University of Heidelberg. There, as in
Paris, he held a number of administrative offices. He was one of the
founders of the University of Heidelberg, of which he was rector no
fewer than nine times, from 1386-1392 and also in 1396. In
1389-1390, as the University's *nuncio* together
with Conrad of Soltau, he was responsible for transferring the
University register to Rome (Boniface IX). At the beginning of the
1390s, Marsilius again took up the study of theology. The masters who
taught theology were by then Conrad of Soltau (since 1387) and Matthew
of Krakow (since 1394), both from the University of Prague. In
1395/1396 Marsilius finished his lectures on the *Sentences*
and so became the first theologian to obtain the doctorate at
Heidelberg. He died a short time later, on August 20, 1396.



Marsilius was a prolific writer. His work was the fruit of his
teachings in Paris and Heidelberg. Many of his writings have been
preserved in manuscripts or early printed editions, although recently
some have appeared in modern critical editions. His most important
writings
 include:[3]



**Works on Logic and Epistemology**
1. *Exposition of the Old Logic*
2. Various *Questions* on the Old and New Logic
3. *Summary* [Abbreviationes] *of the Old and New
Logic*
4. Treatises on the Properties of Terms: *On Supposition,
Ampliation, Appellation, Restriction, Obligation, Insolubles, and
Consequences*.

 **Works on Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics**
1. *Summary* [Abbreviationes] *of Aristotle's
'Physics'*
2. *Questions on Aristotle's 'On Generation and
Corruption'*
3. *Questions on Aristotle's 'De
anima'*
4. *Questions on Aristotle's
'Metaphysics'*

 **Works on Ethics**
* *Questions on Aristotle's 'Nicomachean
Ethics'*

 **Works on Theology**
* *Questions on the 'Sentences' of Peter
Lombard*



## 2. Teachings


### 2.1 Logic and Epistemology



In his logic and epistemology, Marsilius followed the nominalist
tradition of the fourteenth century as exemplified by William of
Ockham and John Buridan. Yet Marsilius never qualified himself as a
nominalist or follower of Ockham. He was an independent thinker who
sometimes went back to the older tradition of the thirteenth century
(e.g., in Peter of Spain), or advocated theories which were more in
line with ordinary speech, as against the highly specialized views of
his contemporaries. Marsilius employed logical methods and discussed
logical and epistemological issues in almost all of his writings,
including his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard,
which, in addition to his works specifically dedicated to logic, were
also used as a source for late medieval and early modern treatises on
logic.



Marsilius's nominalism comes to the fore in his views on the
object of scientific knowledge, the nature of universals, and the
logical doctrine of supposition. His basic assumption is that there
are only individuals and no universals outside the human mind.


#### 2.1.1 The Object of Scientific Knowledge



According to the Aristotelian standard accepted by Marsilius, the
object of scientific knowledge must be universal and necessarily true.
This is not the case with individual things in the external world,
since they are subject to change. Only the conclusion of a true and
necessary syllogism can meet the standard. Hence, for Marsilius, the
object of scientific knowledge is not anything outside the mind, but
the mental proposition which refers to individual things and their
qualities. More specifically, the proper object of scientific
knowledge is a proposition in the form of a conclusion that has been
deduced from necessary
 premises.[4]


#### 2.1.2 Universals



Marsilius argued that universal concepts such as
'humanity' do not refer to real universals outside the
human mind. Accordingly, there is no universal essence in singular
individuals. Individuals of one genus or species do resemble each
other, however, and this resemblance is the foundation of universal
concepts in the human mind. The generation of universal concepts is a
natural process, which Marsilius described as follows: suppose
individual *A* of species *S* evokes concept *X*
in the human mind. This concept is similar to concept *Y* which
has been evoked by *B* of the same species *S*. By
abstracting from all the differences between *X* and
*Y*, the human mind is able to produce another concept,
*Z*, which stands for both *A* and *B*.
Universality is then taken to be a quality of concept *Z*, the
product of the epistemological operation of abstraction on concepts
*X* and *Y* by the human
 mind.[5]


#### 2.1.3 Supposition



In line with his account of the nature of universals, Marsilius
rejected simple supposition. Logicians such as Peter of Spain had used
the notion to indicate that a term stood not for an individual but for
a universal or common nature in the external world, like the term
'man' in the proposition, 'Man is a species'.
Since Marsilius rejected the idea of universals existing outside the
mind, he eliminated simple supposition from the list of different
types of supposition. He was critical of some of his contemporaries
(e.g., Albert of Saxony) who likewise dismissed the concept of real
universals, yet kept on using the notion of simple supposition. They
had changed the meaning of the term, he said, by claiming that a
written or spoken term had simple supposition if it was used to refer
to a concept in the human mind. Marsilius wondered whether young
students would be able to understand this new meaning of simple
supposition, since they would hardly know what concepts are. To avoid
confusion, Marsilius decided not to deal with simple supposition at
all in his
 logic.[6]


#### 2.1.4 Categories



In his commentary on the *Categories*, Marsilius
adheres to William of Ockham's and John Buridan's view
that the ten Aristotelian categories are distinguished by the way they
refer to things in extra-mental reality. The emphasis here is on the
'way they refer to' things, i.e., their *modus
significandi*, and not on the things themselves, he argues, since
distinct categories like 'quantity' and
'quality', while doing so in different manners, may still
refer to one and the same individual thing in the outside world, e.g.,
Socrates. Different categories, therefore, do not represent different
things but stand for distinct and unique ways of signifying
 things.[7]
 Together, the ten categories cover all possible ways of speaking
about things. Like Buridan, however, Marsilius emphasizes that it is
impossible to prove that their precise number is and must be ten, as
some philosophers like Albert the Great had claimed. It is only
lengthy experience that has led philosophers to acknowledge their
number to be
 ten.[8]
 If an additional mode of signifying things was discovered in the
future, Marsilius states, he would readily accept there to be more
than ten Aristotelian categories, even though he does not consider
such a discovery to be very
 likely.[9]




According to Marsilius, the ten Aristotelian categories refer to
things in reality which themselves are not signs of other things.
These categories are names or concepts of primary intention, as he
calls them. However, since there are also names which are used to
refer to signs or to names of things and not to things themselves
-- such as the terms 'genus' and
'species', which are called names of secondary intention
-- there needs to be an additional category of secondary
intention, beside the ten Aristotelian categories of primary
intention. This category may be called the 'category of
signs' (*praedicamentum signi*) or the 'category of
terms' (*praedicamentum termini*), Marsilius
 says.[10]
 The existence of such a category does not refute the traditional
number of ten categories, since the traditional categories, even
though they are names or concepts themselves, do not refer to names or
concepts, but to things in reality. In claiming such a category,
Marsilius goes beyond John Buridan, who does not recognize it, and
further elaborates a position already mentioned by Duns Scotus.
Accordingly, for the metaphysician who considers 'being as
being' (*ens inquantum ens*) there are only ten
categories, whereas for the logician who deals with 'concepts as
concepts' (*intentiones per se* ) there are more than
ten. In the late Middle Ages, philosophers like John Eck attributed
the view that there is an additional category called
*praedicamentum signi* to Marsilius of Inghen and his
followers, among whom was the Nominalist John
 Parreut.[11]


#### 2.1.5 Some Specific Views



Marsilius was his own person when it came to assessing the views of
others. In his analysis of the proposition 'Socrates is not a
chimera' he followed what he called 'the Parisian
method', according to which the proposition is false because the
term 'chimera' supposits for nothing, there being no real
chimeras to which it can refer. Others, however, considered the
proposition to be
 true.[12]



Elsewhere, he departed from the opinions of the Parisian School
(*scola Parisiensis*) and opted for the perspective of ordinary
language or common way of speaking (*communis modus loquendi*).
This was the case with his analysis of the proposition 'The
Antichrist is not, but he will be'. According to the Parisian
School, the term 'he' refers to the thing referred to by
the term 'Antichrist'. Since there is no Antichrist,
neither term has reference. But in ordinary language it is different,
for there the term 'he' is meant to refer to the future
Antichrist. Marsilius accepted the latter analysis as sound, despite
the authority of the
 former.[13]



In the definition of ampliation, Marsilius went back to logicians of
the thirteenth century such as Peter of Spain, who had defined
ampliation as an extension of supposition, whereas fourteenth-century
logicians such as Albert of Saxony did not consider ampliation to be a
kind of supposition. Marsilius reinterpreted their definition so that
it fit better with the older tradition. Such efforts to harmonize
older and newer positions were typical of the late fourteenth
 century.[14]



Regarding the theory of consequences, Marsilius was in line with John
Buridan and Albert of Saxony. However, unlike them, he considers the
consequence as an *oratio*, not as a hypothetical proposition,
properly speaking. As such, consequences also include statements that
have no truth value. Crucial for a consequence is the so-called
*nota illationis*, which signifies the necessary connection
between the antecedent and the consequent. This connection is
understood as a relationship of semantic entailment. Similar to Albert
of Saxony but unlike Buridan, for Marsilius there are no invalid
consequences. A consequence is either valid or it is no
 consequence.[15]



In the context is his theory of consequence, Marsilius treats the
well-known issue of coming to be (*incipit*) and passing away
(*desinit*). Here he likewise follows John Buridan, although once
again in an independent way. His logical point of view, intentionally
ignoring specific features of physical reality, is striking. For
example, he considers the physical distinction between permanent and
successive things irrelevant to the validity of consequences that
imply notions of coming to be and passing away. Also, in dealing with
such consequences, he accepts indivisible instances of time for
methodological reasons, though physically speaking time is infinitely
divisible for him. Here, he joins Albert of
 Saxony.[16]



Finally, Marsilius's understanding of *per se* predication
provides a similar picture. His point of departure again is Buridan.
Yet, he includes some remarkable new elements. For example, he defines
*per se* predication not as a necessary predication, as Buridan
and most contemporary authors do, but as a predication which excludes
any contingency. Thus *per se* predication covers both necessary
propositions like 'Man is a living being' and impossible
ones such as 'Man is a donkey'. Also, he widens the realm
of *per se* predications by allowing not only the traditional
categorical affirmative *per se* predication, but also
hypothetical and negative ones, like 'If there are humans, all
humans are living beings, and 'Man is not a donkey'. Here,
his probable sources of inspiration were William of Ockham and Albert
of
 Saxony.[17]


### 2.2 Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics



In natural philosophy and metaphysics Marsilius was an empiricist,
meaning that he thought all scientific knowledge must be based on
either sense data or self-evident propositions, i.e., propositions in
which the meaning of the predicate is included in the subject.
Everyone who knows the meaning of the terms of such propositions
judges them to be evidently
 true.[18]
 This has far-reaching consequences for the relationship between
philosophy and theology. Since the philosopher uses only sense data
and self-evident propositions, his inquiry may come to different
conclusion than that of the theologian, who has additional knowledge
from Scripture. The philosopher makes judgments about the world from a
limited human perspective, whereas the theologian is helped by divine
 revelation.[19]
 Yet Marsilius took the task of the philosopher seriously because he
thought the human mind has a natural tendency to search for truth,
which is satisfied (although not ultimately satisfied) in natural
philosophy and
 metaphysics.[20]


#### 2.2.1 Creation



According to the principles of natural philosophy, creation from
nothing is impossible. The senses show that things always come from
other things. Because there is no serious reason to doubt the
information given by the senses, the human mind legitimately jumps to
the universal principle that nothing can come from nothing, driven by
the natural tendency to search for truth. Consequently, for the human
mind creation from nothing is impossible. It contradicts the universal
principle that nothing comes from nothing. That God has created the
world from nothing is therefore only a matter of faith (*sola fide
est creditum*). Revelation shows that human knowledge of creation
is limited, but it cannot be aided by natural philosophy at this
 point.[21]


#### 2.2.2 Theory of the Human Soul



In the later Middle Ages the study of the soul was part of natural
philosophy. Marsilius treated the human soul in his commentary on
Aristotle's *De anima*, in which he followed the Parisian
tradition of Buridan and Oresme concerning the particular questions
addressed. Following Buridan, he argued that there is no natural proof
of the immortality of the human soul. For the human natural mind,
unaided by revelation, the theory of Alexander of Aphrodisias that the
human soul is corruptible is the most probable. That Alexander of
Aphrodisias is mistaken and that the soul continues to exist after the
death of the body is known through revelation alone. Faith has more
authority than human reason and must be accepted in all cases where
the two conflict since the things we believe on faith come from God,
who cannot
 err.[22]


### 2.3 Metaphysics



Although metaphysics cannot surpass the limits of human knowledge,
Marsilius considered it to be the entry point to theology. Natural
reason is capable of forming some adequate and true concepts of God,
and also of forming true propositions about God. It is able to prove
that God exists and possesses knowledge and will. But it cannot
demonstrate that God has free will or infinite power. This, Marsilius
claimed, was also true for philosophers such as Aristotle, whose
teachings equal those of natural reason
 itself.[23]



From Buridan, Marsilius took the idea that God according to Aristotle
and Averroes is not only the final cause of the heavens and separate
substances, but also their efficient cause. On this point Buridan and
Marsilius were following the view of Scotus and Ockham against that of
John of Jandun, Johannes Baconis, and Gregory of Rimini. It is worth
noting in this connection that in the *Puncta super libros
Metaphysicae* (i.e., brief abstracts of Aristotle's
*Metaphysics* for teaching purposes) attributed to Johannes de
Slupcza and written in Krakow in 1433, some of the views that
Marsilius adopted from Buridan, including the one just mentioned, are
attributed to Marsilius instead of Buridan -- notwithstanding the
fact that the author was familiar with both Marsilius's and
Buridan's commentaries. This illustrates the strong influence
Marsilius's work exerted on fifteenth-century students and
 commentators.[24]



On other points, however, Marsilius was critical of Buridan. For
example, Marsilius considered Buridan's solution to the problem
of the possible separation of accidents from their substance as not in
accordance with the teachings of Aristotle, and therefore not truly
metaphysical (*metaphysicaliter*), but rather in line with
theological concerns. Only miraculously could God take over the
supporting power of the substance, thus separating the accident from
its natural bearer. According to Marsilius, however, such possible
divine intervention should not be taken into account in metaphysics,
where the philosopher must use natural reason
 alone.[25]



Marsilius was the first rector of the University of Heidelberg.
According to the oldest Statutes of the Arts Faculty of this
university, every master must inform the students that whenever
Aristotle contradicts faith, e.g. in his claim that the world is
eternal, he is following natural reason and although his arguments in
these cases are wrong and faith must be accepted, natural reason
cannot help but follow Aristotle and therefore cannot prove the
conclusions of
 faith.[26]
 This paragraph clearly echos Marsilius's view on the issue.
Other contemporary universities, like that of Vienna, were less
rigorous and prescribed a more harmonious procedure, stipulating that
whenever there was a conflict with faith, the masters had to argue in
favor of faith against Aristotle to the best of their
 possibilities.[27]


### 2.4 Theology



Marsilius expressed his theological views in a voluminous commentary
on the *Sentences*. He quoted and often adopted views that were
put forward by fourteenth-century theologians such as Adam Wodeham and
Gregory of Rimini, but was also influenced by earlier thinkers such as
Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. He has serious reservations about the
use of logic in theology.


#### 2.4.1 Attributes and Ideas



In his discussion of the divine attributes he followed mainly the
teachings of Adam Wodeham. God is perfectly one. Divine wisdom and all
other perfections attributed to God are in reality as identical to the
divine essence as the divine essence is identical to itself. In the
divine essence itself there is no distinction or non-identity
whatsoever between the attributes of God. Any distinctions between
divine attributes are necessarily of a rational (rather than real)
nature and are made by
 us.[28]



A similarly radical stance on the unity of God was assumed in his
treatment of divine ideas. Ideas are not formally distinct in God, as
some Scotists would argue, but only extrinsically and objectively
distinct. Their distinction is a consequence of the differences
between the creatures produced by God (which is why Marsilius spoke of
extrinsic distinction), and of the fact that they are known by God as
different (which accounts for their objective distinction). God knows
that he is the cause of infinitely many differences between creatures.
That is why his mind contains infinitely many different
 ideas.[29]



Marsilius criticized Ockham's view that God's idea
coincides with creation. If this were true, Marsilius argued, the idea
of producing a stone must be identical with either the stone itself,
or the stone insofar as it is known by God. If the former, then God
must look outside of himself in his idea, which contradicts the
position of Augustine, who is quoted by Ockham. If the latter, then
the idea of its production is not the stone itself, but rather
God's foreknowledge of the
 stone.[30]


#### 2.4.2 Theology and Logic



Marsilius advanced his criticism of the use of logic in theology in
his discussion of the position of Robert Holcot. Holcot had argued
that logically, God can be called the cause of evil. If God is the
cause of every thing (*entitas*) and moral evil (*malum
culpae*) is a thing, then God is the cause of evil. Marsilius
acknowledged that the argument is based on true premises, yet the
conclusion should not be defended as true because it contradicts faith
and therefore might cause confusion among believers. Theologians
should not flaunt their personal skills in logic, but always write out
of reverence for the divine. Their writings should not erode the
beliefs of ordinary people, who are not skilled in logic, but rather
aim to strengthen them
 spiritually.[31]



Marsilius was anxious, however, to avoid the implication that
God's foreknowledge is somehow dependent upon human beings. In
his discussion of Adam Wodeham on the causality of the human will, he
complained that Adam had not been emphatic enough on this point, since
he allowed the following argument: if an event *E* will happen
in the future, then God knows *E* from eternity; but if
not-*E* will happen, then God knows not-*E* form
eternity; since man is free, he can choose between *E* and
not-*E*; therefore, he can change God's foreknowledge.
This argument is logically sound, Marsilius argued, but it easily
leads to the false conclusion that God's knowledge depends on
the free will of man, which is absurd. The eternal cannot fall under
the power of that which is created by it. Therefore, this argument
should not be used. It is better to remain on the safe side by
maintaining what has always been maintained, namely that God through
his absolute omniscience knows the future activities of human beings,
but without being dependent on
 them.[32]



Also in his discussion of trinitarian and Christological issues he
warns theologians not to naively follow the rules of logic without
bearing possible misunderstandings in mind. Although the sentence
'Christ is only God' is logically true because Christ is
God and no other person born on earth but Christ is God, it is
dangerous to accept this sentence without further qualifications,
Marsilius argues, because it seems to confirm the view of those
heretics who claim that Christ was without a human nature, as the word
'only' can be understood to exclude humanity when added to
the word
 'God'.[33]


#### 2.4.3 The Sacraments



In his treatment of the sacraments at the end of his commentary on the
*Sentences*, Marsilius drew heavily on the writings of Thomas
Aquinas and Bonaventure. He defended Thomas's view that the word
'this' pronounced by Christ at the Last Supper in uttering
'This is my body' (Mk. 14:22) refers to what the bread and
body have in common. Thomas of Strasbourg had attacked this view, but
Marsilius showed that the earlier Thomas was right and the later
 wrong.[34]



In his discussion of the causality of the sacraments, Marsilius
followed the exposition of Bonaventure, according to whom the
sacraments have no causality of their own. It is God who acts whenever
the sacraments are administered correctly. Only in a broad sense is it
true to say that the sacraments have the power to
 act.[35]


## 3. Influence



The influence of Marsilius has been considerable, particularly through
his logical works and commentaries on Aristotle. This may be gathered
not only from the large number of manuscripts that have been
preserved, but also from several other
 considerations.[36]
 Marsilius's commentary on Aristotle's *Prior
analytics* was used in Prague in the 1380s. His logical works,
including the *Obligationes* and the *Consequentiae*,
were used as textbooks in Vienna in the 1390s. His commentaries on
Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Physics* were read
in Krakow during the first sixty years of the fifteenth century. At
the universities of Heidelberg, Erfurt, Basle, and Freiburg, his works
were studied throughout the fifteenth century, in particular as part
of the university curriculum. In 1499, the doctors and masters of the
*Via Moderna* at the University of Heidelberg published a
volume that included epigrams on Marsilius by well-known humanists
such as Jacob Wimpfeling, as well as a defense of Nominalism in the
style of Marsilius (*Via Marsiliana*). Praise in the form of
epigrams can also be found in the 1501 Strasbourg edition of
Marsilius's commentary on the *Sentences*. The
*Obligationes*, printed in 1489 under the name of Peter of
Ailly, were used by Thomas Bricot, John Major, and Domingo de Soto.
The commentary on the *Prior Analytics* was quoted by Agostino
Nifo. Jodocus Trutvetter and Bartholomew of Usingen, who consolidated
nominalism in Erfurt, repeatedly mentioned Marsilius in their works.
Both Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo Galilei referred to
Marsilius's commentary on *De Generatione et
Corruptione*.



The theological views of Marsilius appear to have had some circulation
as well. His commentary on the *Sentences* was known in Krakow
in the first half of the fifteenth century, and was used by Thomas de
Strampino in his *Principia* (1441-1442). The University
of Salamanca had a theological chair (Catedra de Nominales) for
commentary on the works of Marsilius of Inghen and Gabriel Biel. His
commentary on the *Sentences* was quoted by Spanish theologians
such as Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Luis de Molina, and
Francisco Suarez, usually in connection with questions about
divine foreknowledge and grace.



There are nine extant manuscripts of Marsilius's commentary on
the *Sentences*. Among the former owners of these manuscripts
were two libraries for preachers (Ansbach and Isny), and two libraries
of faculties of arts (Erfurt and Leipzig). The education in Erfurt and
Leipzig included the reading of nominalist authors. In all
probability, the artists became interested in Marsilius's
theological work after studying his writings on logic and physics. The
presence of Marsilius's commentary on the *Sentences* in
preachers' libraries bears witness to the fact that the impact
of his work was felt beyond university
 circles.[37]