## 1. Historical Origins of the Debate


### 1.1 Some Background Assumptions



For contingent historical reasons, this debate has unfolded in such a
way that the following background assumptions are made in the
literature. First, likely for ease of exposition, everyone writes as
if counterfactual determinism is true (Goldman 1976: 469; Greenspan
1978: 77). That is, it is assumed that there are facts about how an
agent *would* (not simply *might*) act in any given
situation. This assumption, however, is not necessary for the purposes
of the debate (Portmore 2011: 56 fn. 1). Second, since everyone writes
as if both counterfactual determinism is true and as if agents can act
in a way in which they do not in fact act, those in the debate seem to
assume compatibilism. Interestingly, the concerns raised by the
actualism/possibilism debate still arise even if libertarianism about
free will is assumed (Portmore 2011: 167 fn. 21). Describing the
debate in libertarian terms, however, does add an extra layer of
complexity to the discussion. Third, some form of maximizing
consequentialism is generally assumed, again, likely for ease of
exposition. The debate actually arises for any normative ethical
theory that holds that there are at least *pro tanto* reasons
to bring about the good, and so the importance of this debate extends
far beyond forms of maximizing consequentialism (Bales 1972; Goldman
1976: 458 fn. 13). Fourth, the various positions in the debate are
understood in terms of *objective*, rather than
*subjective*, obligations, though the same issues arise with
respect to both. Objective obligations are those determined by all of
the normatively relevant facts, which include facts of which the agent
may be unaware. By contrast, subjective obligations are determined by
the agent's epistemic state (such as her beliefs, or beliefs
that would be supported by her evidence) concerning the normatively
relevant facts (cf. Zimmerman 1996: 10-20; Portmore 2011:
12-23). Following the norms of the literature, these assumptions
operate in the background of this encyclopedia entry as well. However,
none actually need to be made in order for the debate to get off the
ground.


### 1.2 An Argument that Utilitarianism is Formally Incoherent



The historical origins of the debate may be traced back to work by
Lars Bergstrom and Hector-Neri Castaneda. In his *A
Problem for Utilitarianism* (1968), Castaneda argues that,
given a few standard assumptions, utilitarianism is formally
incoherent. His argument may be stated rather straightforwardly.
First, Castaneda assumes a principle of deontic logic known as
"ought distributes through conjunction". This principle
holds that if an agent *S* ought to do both *A* and
*B*, then *S* ought to do *A* and *S* ought to do
*B* (1968: 141). The term "ought" is used in a
variety of different ways in the ethics literature. However, when it
is used in the formulation of views in the actualism/possibilism
literature, it should be understood as denoting the ought of moral
obligation. This idea may be represented more formally as 
*Ought Distributes Through Conjuction*:




(ODC)\(\rO(A \lamp B) \rightarrow \rO(A) \lamp \rO(B)\)

In other words, if an agent is obligated to perform a set of acts, then
that agent is obligated to perform each of the acts in that set. 



Second, Castaneda considers a principle he refers to as (U),
which he takes to be a basic commitment of all existing forms of
utilitarianism.



(U)*S* is morally obligated to do *x*
in circumstances *C* if and only if *S*'s
doing *x* in *C* will bring about a greater balance of good
over bad than her performing any other alternative action open to her
in *C* (1968: 142).


Some who have responded to Castaneda, such as Zellner (1972:
125), took (U) not only to be a commitment of utilitarianism, but a
formulation of act-utilitarianism itself. Now, here's the
supposed problem. According to Castaneda, (ODC) and (U)
generate contradictory prescriptions. To see why he believed this,
suppose that an agent *S*'s performing the conjunctive
act-set \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\) brings about a greater balance of
good over bad than any alternative act-set (singleton or plural)
that *S* can perform. It is supposed to follow from (U)
that *S* is obligated to perform \(\langle A \lamp
B\rangle\). Now, given (ODC), it follows that *S* is obligated to
perform \(\langle A\rangle\) and that
*S* is obligated to perform \(\langle B\rangle\). But,
Castaneda claims, given (U), performing \(\langle A\rangle\)
would result in more net good than performing any alternative,
including \(\langle B\rangle\). Moreover, given (U), performing
\(\langle B\rangle\) would *also* result in more net good than
performing any alternative, including \(\langle A\rangle\). Hence the
supposed contradiction. Performing \(\langle A\rangle\) cannot result
in both more good and less good than performing \(\langle B\rangle\).
This consequence may be illustrated with an example, drawn from
Westphal (1972: 83-84). 


* ***School Fire*:** Tom is a teacher at a
school that burned down. Prior to the disaster, when the weather was
warm at the beginning of the first class, he was told to [?]open
the window & shut the door[?]. The opened window would foster
good ventilation and the closed door would cut down on noise and
distractions in the hallway. Both would significantly help the
students to learn.



Naturally, the act-set of [?]opening the window & shutting
the door[?] is the best that Tom can do in the circumstances he
is in at the start on the warm day in question. Given
Castaneda's argument, Tom is obligated to [?]open
the window[?] and he is obligated to [?]shut the
door[?]. But if he is obligated to do each of them, then
[?]opening the window[?] must produce more net good than any
alternative and [?]shutting the door[?] must produce more
net good than any alternative. But, Castaneda claims, each of
these acts cannot be uniquely optimific.


### 1.3 Replies and the Rise of the Actualism/Possibilism Debate



Castaneda's short article spawned a number of replies
with various proposed solutions. Castaneda himself argued that
the problem stemmed from the "only if" clause in
 (U)
 and concluded that it should be removed. However, he believed that,
even once this clause has been removed, it remains an open question
whether utilitarianism could identify necessary conditions for
obligatory actions (1968: 142).



The most numerous, and influential, replies were written by Lars
Bergstrom, who argued that the contradiction arises only if it is
assumed that \(\langle A\rangle\) and \(\langle B\rangle\) are
*alternatives* in the relevant sense. He argued that \(\langle
A\rangle\) and \(\langle B\rangle\) are not, in fact, alternatives
since they are compatible (Bergstrom 1968b: 43). Notably, this is
an issue of which Bergstrom was clearly aware of in his (1966:
ch. 2) book in which he argued that "two actions can reasonably
be regarded as alternatives (in the morally relevant sense) only if
they are incompatible or mutually exclusive". If, by hypothesis,
*S* is obligated to perform \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\), then
\(\langle A\rangle\) and \(\langle B\rangle\) must be compatible and
so are not alternatives (1968b: 44). The subsequent literature
consisted of a back-and-forth between Bergstrom and
Castaneda that primarily revolved around identifying the
morally relevant set of alternatives and Bergstrom's
attempts to formulate a utilitarian principle that avoids
Castaneda's objection (Bergstrom 1968a,b, 1971,
1973, 1976; Castaneda 1968, 1969, 1972). As will be shown in
the subsequent sections, the issue of identifying the morally relevant
set of alternatives forms the crux of the actualism/possibilism
debate.



Dag Prawitz (1970) and Fred Westphal (1972) both suggested revising
 (U)
 by indexing actions to the time they would need to be performed in
order to bring about the uniquely optimific outcome. So, if performing
the joint act \(\langle A \at t\_1 \lamp B \at t\_2\rangle\) would
result in the greatest net amount of good, then *S* is obligated
to perform \(\langle A \at t\_1\rangle\) and to perform \(\langle B \at
t\_2\rangle\) and, Westphal claims, this avoids the contradiction. At
\(t\_1\), \(\langle A\rangle\) supposedly is *the* act that
would produce the greatest net amount of good in comparison to any
other act performable at \(t\_1\). At \(t\_2\), \(\langle B\rangle\)
supposedly is *the* act that would produce the greatest net
amount of good in comparison to any other act performable at \(t\_2\).
Finally, from among the performable act-sets that might occur from
\(t\_1\)-\(t\_2\), \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\) is *the*
act-set that would produce the greatest net amount of good. Thus, each
act is the uniquely optimific act at the time it is performed, or so
Westphal claims. Notably, Prawitz (1968, 1970) and Westphal (1972)
each argue that an act is permissible if and only if it is part of an
act-set that, if performed, would bring about the greatest net good of
any of the acts available to the agent. In making this argument,
Prawitz and Westphal were giving what may be considered the earliest
defenses of possibilism. However, they did not yet refer to this view
as possibilism. 



While possibilism itself remains a viable view in the literature,
Harold Zellner demonstrated that Prawitz's and Westphal's
responses did not solve the specific problem Castaneda
identified for utilitarianism. This is because, while performing
\(\langle A \at t\_1 \lamp B \at t\_2\rangle\) may be uniquely
optimific, it does not follow that performing either of these
individual acts at their respective times would be uniquely optimific.
For instance, performing \(\langle A \at t\_1\rangle\) may not be
uniquely optimific if the agent would *not* perform \(\langle B
\at t\_2\rangle\)if she first performs \(\langle A \at t\_1\rangle\).
Zellner (1972: 125)
illustrates this with the following case. 


* **Teach, Play Cupid, or Skip Class:** Suppose that
the best act-set Tom can perform is \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\),
where \(\langle A\rangle\) = commute to campus and \(\langle
B\rangle\) = teach his classes. Tom can also \(\langle C\rangle\),
where \(\langle C\rangle\) = play Cupid by loaning his car to two
people so they can go on a date. Finally, suppose that if Tom were to
\(\langle A\rangle\) commute to campus, he would
\(\langle{\sim}B\rangle\) skip teaching class. This is the worst
act-set Tom can perform.



Again, it would be best if Tom [?]commutes to campus &
teaches[?], second best if he [?]plays Cupid[?], and
worst if he [?]commutes to campus & skips class[?].
Thus, the value of the act-sets may be ranked from best to worst as
follows.


1. \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\)
2. \(\langle C\rangle\)
3. \(\langle A \lamp {\sim}B\rangle\)



Zellner points out that, since Tom would \(\langle{\sim}B\rangle\) if
he were to \(\langle A\rangle\), the value of performing \(\langle
A\rangle\) is not uniquely optimific even though the value of
performing \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\) is uniquely optimific. Thus,
in such cases,
 (U)
 combined with
 (ODC)
 still generates contradictions, even if each act is indexed to their
respective times. Zellner argued that, to solve the problem, (U)
should be rejected because it is inconsistent with a supposedly basic
principle of inference, referred to as (NI), which holds that if an
agent is obligated to perform \(\langle A\rangle\) and her performing
\(\langle A\rangle\) entails her performing \(\langle B\rangle\), then
she is obligated to perform \(\langle B\rangle\) (1972: 125). This
rule is sometimes referred to as *Normative Inheritance* or as
*Permissibility is Closed Under Implication*. It may be
represented more formally in the Standard Deontic Logic system as
(Feldman 1986: 41):



(NI)
If \({\vdash} A \rightarrow B\) then \({\vdash} O(A) \rightarrow O(B)\)


This literature on the coherence of utilitarianism directly gave rise
to the actualism/possibilism literature. Most importantly, (i) it made
salient the importance of determining the relevant act-alternatives
available to the agent and (ii) cases such as *Teach*, *Play
Cupid*, or *Skip Class* raised questions about the
relationship between an agent's free actions and her moral
obligations. As will be illustrated in the next section, actualists
and possibilists are divided over cases with this exact structure.


## 2. Possibilism


### 2.1 The Crux of the Debate



Suppose someone is trying to determine whether she is obligated to
teach a summer school course that students would greatly benefit from,
but only if taught well. Do facts about how an agent would teach the
course (e.g., well or poorly) have any role in determining whether she
is morally obligated to teach the course? Actualists answer in the
affirmative and possibilists in the negative. Possibilists hold that
the deontic status of an act \(\phi\) depends on facts about how an
agent *could* act were she to \(\phi\). So, according to
possibilists, what determines whether she should teach the summer
school course is whether she *could* teach it well,
irrespective of whether she *would* teach it well. Actualists,
by contrast, hold that the deontic status of an act \(\phi\) depends,
in part, on facts about how an agent *would* act (under certain
conditions) were she to \(\phi\). So, according to actualists, roughly
what matters in determining whether one should teach the summer school
course is whether she *would* teach it well, irrespective of
whether she *could* teach it well.


### 2.2 Professor Procrastinate



These views, and their differences, can best be understood by
considering the standard case in the literature, viz. *Professor
Procrastinate*. Holly M. Smith (formerly Holly S. Goldman)
provides the original version of this case in her (1978:
185-186) essay, and variations of it appear throughout the
literature (Jackson & Pargetter 1986: 235; Carlson 1995: 124;
Vorobej 2000: 131-132; Portmore 2011: 180, 2019: ch. 5;
Timmerman 2015: 1512; Timmerman & Cohen 2016: 673-674;
Cariani 2016: 400). 


* ***Professor Procrastinate*:** Professor
Procrastinate is asked to review a graduate student's paper,
soon to be given as a job talk. Procrastinate can [?]agree to
review the paper & review the paper[?], which would result in
the student receiving a first-rate job offer. Procrastinate can also
[?]agree to review the paper & not review the paper[?],
which would result in the student receiving no job offer. Finally,
Procrastinate can [?]decline to review the paper & not review
the paper[?], which would result in the student asking someone
else, getting mediocre comments, and receiving a second-rate job
offer. Now, if Procrastinate were to [?]agree to review the
paper[?], she would later freely [?]*not* review
it[?].



The value of the act-sets that Procrastinate can perform are ranked
from best to worst as follows.



*X*. \(\langle
a\rangle\) agree to review the paper and \(\langle b\rangle\) review
the paper
*Y*.
\(\langle{\sim} a\rangle\) decline to review the paper and
\(\langle{\sim}b\rangle\) not review the paper
*Z*.\(\langle
a\rangle\) agree to review the paper and \(\langle{\sim}b\rangle\)
not review the paper


Furthermore, Procrastinate would \(\langle{\sim}b\rangle\) regardless
of whether she would \(\langle a\rangle\). In other words, the
following counterfactuals are true.



(1)
If Procrastinate
were to \(\langle a\rangle\), she would \(\langle
Z\rangle\).
(2)
If Procrastinate
were to \(\langle{\sim} a\rangle\), she would \(\langle
Y\rangle\).


On a rough definition, according to actualism, Procrastinate is
obligated to decline to review the paper because what would
*actually* happen if she were to decline is better than what
would *actually* happen if she were to agree to review the
paper. By contrast, according to possibilism, Procrastinate is
obligated to agree to review the paper because doing so is part of the
best series of *possible* actions that Procrastinate can
perform over her life. Now that we've covered how these views
generally come apart, we will focus on the more precise formulations
of these views in subsequent sections. It should also be noted that
counterfactuals like (1) and (2) are assumed to be true at least
partly in virtue of Procrastinate's imperfect moral character.
However, such counterfactuals can also be true as a result of an
agent's ignorance, as a result of lacking the dexterity to
perform an act, and as a result of an agent's inability to
comprehend some future act (Goldman 1978:198; Bykvist 2002: 50). For
the purposes of this entry, we will focus on an agent's
imperfect moral character since this factor seems to be the driving
force behind many points of disagreement between actualists and
possibilists.


### 2.3 Possibilism (and Actualism) Defined




In its simplest form, possibilism is the view that an agent is
obligated to perform an act just in case it is part of the best series
of acts she can perform over the course of her life. It may be defined
more formally as follows.


* **Possibilism:** At *t* an agent *S* is
obligated to \(\phi\) at \(t'\) iff *S* can \(\phi\) at \(t'\)
and \(\phi\)-ing at \(t'\) is part of the best act-set that *S*
can perform from \(t'\) until the last time she can perform an act.



According to possibilism, the act-sets that have their deontic status
directly (i.e., they do not have their deontic status in virtue of the
deontic status of any other act-set) are the act-sets that agents can
perform over the course of their entire lives, which we will refer to
as maximal act-sets (Aqvist 1969). Moreover, any non-maximal
act-set has its deontic status indirectly (i.e., its deontic status is
determined by the deontic status of a maximal act-set of which it is a
part). In *Professor Procrastinate*, assuming that
Procrastinate cannot perform any acts after doing either \(\langle
X\rangle\), \(\langle Y\rangle\), or \(\langle Z\rangle\),
possibilists hold that Procrastinate is obligated to \(\langle
a\rangle\) because the best maximal act-set she can perform over the
course of her life includes \(\langle X\rangle \), and \(\langle
X\rangle \)-ing requires \(\langle a\rangle\)-ing.




Possibilism has been given slightly different definitions in the
literature. However, unlike the different definitions of actualism
discussed in the next section, typical definitions of possibilism are
essentially synonymous. Patricia Greenspan (1978) does not offer a
formal definition of possibilism, but defends the view by way of
rejecting Holly Goldman's actualist principle, referred to as
(G\*1). Greenspan does so in the process of defending her (1975) view
in a related debate concerning whether ought-statements should be
dated differently from their objects and about whether they hold from
different temporal standpoints. Fred Feldman defines possibilism in
terms of possible worlds. Feldman refers to his theory as (MO). As he
characterizes (MO), what *S* is morally obligated to do,
"as of a time, *t*", is 



> 
> 
> to see to the occurrence of a state of affairs, *p*, iff *p*
> occurs in some world accessible to *S* at *t*, and it is not
> the case that \({\sim}p\) occurs in any accessible world as good as
> (or better than) that one. (Feldman 1986: 38)
> 
> 
> 




Michael Zimmerman defines possibilism in the simpler, standard sense
given above (2006: 153; 2017: 119). However, he also develops and
defends (MO)-inspired formulations of possibilism. In his (1996) book,
he provides a formulation of what he refers to as "world
possibilism" (WP) that invokes the notion of "deontic
value" instead of "intrinsic value", so as to
prevent the formulation of possibilism from assuming impartial
consequentialism. In his (2006: 166) essay, he defends a prospective
version of (WP), where the value in question is the expected value of
all the acts an agent can intentionally perform, which he refers to as
"adjusted core prospective value".




There are other views that deviate from the above standard definitions
of possibilism. Carlson (1995: 99-109; 1999) defends a view that
bears resemblance to possibilism in which the sole obligatory act-set
is a unique minimally specific invariably optimal act-set. At *t*
an act-set is optimal for an agent *S* just in case its outcome
is at least as good as any other act-set that is performable for
*S* at *t*. An invariably optimal act-set is one which is
optimal no matter what *S* does at *t*. An invariably
optimal act-set is minimally specific just in case it is not a proper
part of some other invariably optimal act-set available to *S*. A
minimally specific invariably optimal act-set is unique just in case
there is no other minimally specific invariably optimal act-set
available to *S*. Thus, in contrast to standard formulations of
possibilism, no act-set that is a proper part of a unique minimally
specific invariably optimal act-set has a deontic status. Vorobej
(2000) defends a view he refers to as "prosaic
possibilism", which may be considered an intermediary between
possibilism and actualism. In his (2009) article, which contains an
argument against possibilism, Woodard defines the view in terms of
normative reasons for action rather than moral obligations. As a final
example, in his (2016) article, Vessel proposes what he takes to be a
"possibilist variant" of a view known as moral securitism,
which will be discussed in
 section 4.
 The first possibilist definition given in this section, however,
captures the standard understanding of possibilism and the commitments
of its proponents, including Greenspan (1978), Thomason (1981),
Humberstone (1983), Feldman (1986: 38), and Zimmerman (1990; 1996:
190; 2006; 2008: ch. 3; 2017). On this definition, Procrastinate is
obligated to agree to review the paper since it is part of the best
series of acts that she can perform over the course of her life.




In contrast to possibilism, standard forms of actualism hold that
Procrastinate is obligated to decline to review the paper because what
would actually happen if Procrastinate were to do this is better than
what would actually happen if she were to agree to review the paper.
For, what would happen if Procrastinate were to decline the invitation
is that the student would receive a second-rate job offer. However, if
she were to agree to review the paper then she would not review it and
the student would receive no job offer. A simple, but not
unproblematic, version of actualism holds the following:


* **Actualism:** At *t* an agent *S* is
obligated to \(\phi\) at \(t'\) iff *S* can \(\phi\) at \(t'\)
and what would happen if *S* were to \(\phi\) at \(t'\) is better
than what would happen if *S* were to perform any alternative act
at \(t'\).



One problem with this definition is that it blurs together the
intrinsic value of the consequences of an act and the deontic value of
that act. An actualist's stance with respect to the relationship
between these different types of value depends upon her preferred
normative ethical theory. We will discuss more precise and informative
definitions of actualism in
 section 3.
 However, the above definition suffices to illustrate the primary
difference between actualism and possibilism.


### 2.4 Possibilism, Actualism, and the Relevant Sense of "Ability"




It is natural to initially diagnose the disagreement between
actualists and possibilists as a disagreement about which act-sets
agents *can* perform. However, the actualism/possibilism debate
cuts across debates about the relevant sense(s) of "can".
Actualists and possibilists may agree with one another about which
act-sets agents can perform in any given case. At bottom, their
disagreement concerns which acts, from among the acts the agent can
perform, are normatively relevant *options* for the agent. Less
abstractly, actualists and possibilists may agree that Procrastinate
*can* \(\langle X\rangle\), \(\langle Y\rangle\), or \(\langle
Z\rangle\). After all, by stipulation, she can \(\langle a\rangle\)
and if she \(\langle a\textrm{-s}\rangle\), then by stipulation she
can \(\langle b\rangle\) and if she does that, then she will have
performed \(\langle X\rangle \). Procrastinate *can* \(\langle
X\rangle\), though one may still wonder whether she has the relevant
kind of *ability* to \(\langle X\rangle \). That is, one may
wonder whether \(\langle X\textrm{-ing}\rangle\) is a relevant
*option* for the agent. It is this question that divides
actualists and possibilists. Goldman (1976: 453 and 1978: 153)
initially suggested that \(\langle X\textrm{-ing}\rangle\) is a
relevant *option* for the agent, appealing to the following
account of ability.


* ***Ability 1*:** An agent has the ability at
\(t\_1\) to perform an act *A* at \(t\_1 +N\) just in case there is
a sequence of acts such that the agent has the ability at \(t\_1\) to
perform the first of these acts at \(t\_1\), and if he performs the
first act, then at a later time he will have the ability to perform
the second act at that time, and if he performs the first two acts at
their respective times, then at a still later time he will have the
ability to perform the third act at that time, and so forth, until
finally if he performs all the acts in the sequence at their
respective times, then at \(t\_1 +N\) he will have the ability to
perform act *A* at \(t\_1 +N\).




Interestingly, Goldman (1978) later rejects this account of ability
after considering cases where, at \(t\_1\), the agent can \(\langle
a\rangle\), but would not \(\langle b\rangle\) and thus would not
\(\langle X\rangle \), regardless of her intentions at \(t\_1\). Such
cases are ones where it's possible for the agent to \(\langle
X\rangle\), but Goldman argues that it would be "pointless to
use this account of ability when assessing the range of activities
which a moral principle should assess". This is because agents
"could not make practical use of" prescriptions to perform
such alternatives. These types of cases will be discussed in more
detail the next section. For now, the important takeaway is that while
an agent *can* perform such conjunctive act-sets in the sense
picked out by *Ability 1*, there may be times before the agent
acts during which she cannot ensure that she will perform these
act-sets. So, while it's possible for Procrastinate to \(\langle
X\rangle\) by intending to \(\langle a\rangle\) at \(t\_1\) and then
intending to \(\langle b\rangle\) at \(t\_2\), it may also be true
that, at \(t\_1\), Procrastinate would not \(\langle b\rangle\) at
\(t\_2\) no matter what she intends to do at \(t\_1\). In light of such
cases, Goldman proposes the following account of ability. 


* ***Ability 2*:** An agent has the ability at
\(t\_1\) to perform an act *A* at a later time \(t\_n\) if and only
if it is true that if the agent wanted at \(t\_1\) to perform *A*
at \(t\_n\), he would do so (Goldman 1978: 195).



So, for any given act-set, actualists and possibilists will agree
about whether an agent has *Ability 1*, *Ability 2*, or
both to perform that act-set and thus will agree about each sense in
which agents can perform these act-sets. Yet, they will disagree about
which sense of ability picks out the morally relevant set of options
for an agent. Possibilists (e.g., Feldman 1986; Zimmerman 1996),
hybridists (Timmerman & Cohen 2016), and some actualists (e.g.,
Jackson & Pargetter 1986; Jackson 2014) take *Ability 1* to
be a morally relevant sense of ability. Most actualists and all
securitists (e.g., Portmore 2011, 2018) will take *Ability 2*,
or something close to it, to be the morally relevant sense of
ability.


### 2.5 Objections to Possibilism



Possibilism has a lot going for it. Most notably, it generates the
intuitively correct moral verdicts in a wide range of cases. It
preserves
 (ODC),
 (S), and related, similarly attractive, principles in deontic
logic (Goldman 1978: 80; Feldman 1986: 41-44; Zimmerman 1990:
58-60; Zimmerman 2006: 154-155; Vessel 2009; Kiesewetter
2018). It is thought to avoid the main objection leveled against
actualism. That is, since possibilism requires agents to perform the
best act-set they can over the course of their lives, it is
*not* thought to let agents off the hook too easily. It also
avoids the other objections leveled against actualism discussed in the
next section. Also, see Zimmerman (1996: fn. 72 & fn. 122 and
2017: ch. 3) for a nice review of some of possibilism's
additional, lesser appreciated, virtues. While there is much to be
said in favor of possibilism, it also faces certain challenging
objections.


#### 2.5.1 The worst outcome objection



Perhaps the primary objection to possibilism is that it can generate
obligations that, if acted on, would result in the worst possible
outcome. Versions of this objection have been raised throughout the
literature, (Goldman 1976: 469-70; Sobel 1976: 202-203;
Feldman 1986: 52-57; Almeida 1992: 461-462; Woodard 2009:
219-221; Portmore 2011: 211; Ross 2012: 81-82; Gustafsson 2014: 593; Timmerman
& Cohen 2016: 674). Possibilism generates
this consequence because it implies that facts about how agents would
freely act play no role in determining deontic verdicts. So, this
potentially objectionable consequence of possibilism is a product of a
core commitment of the view.



To illustrate the issue, consider *Professor Procrastinate*
again. According to possibilism, Procrastinate is obligated to
[?]agree to review the paper & review the paper[?] and
thus is obligated to [?]agree to review the paper[?].
However, if Procrastinate were to act on her obligation to
[?]agree to review the paper[?], she would [?]not
review the paper[?], thereby bringing about the worst possible
outcome. This may not sound so counterintuitive in *Professor
Procrastinate* where the worst outcome isn't tragic. Yet,
this objection has more intuitive force in high-stakes variants.
Suppose that no matter what Procrastinate were to intend today, she
would freely [?]not review the paper[?] if she
[?]agrees to review the paper[?]. Suppose furthermore that
if Procrastinate were to [?]not review the paper[?], then
the student would not receive any job offers and commit suicide.
Possibilism still renders the verdict that Procrastinate is obligated
to [?]agree to review the paper[?] and it renders this
verdict no matter how terrible the consequences of [?]agreeing to
review the paper[?] happen to be. This objection to possibilism
may be stated more precisely as follows. 


* **Worst Outcome Objection:** Possibilism entails
that an agent *S* can have an obligation to \(\phi\) even when
\(\phi\)-ing entails that *S* would perform an act-set that is
deeply morally wrong (perhaps the worst act-set possible) and that is
worse than the act-set that *S* would perform if *S* were to
\({\sim}\phi\).




Possibilists have responded by suggesting that the intuitive force of
this objection stems from failing to appreciate the distinction
between conditional and unconditional obligations. The possibilist
obligation is meant to pick out agents' unconditional
obligations and it supposedly is not problematic for agents to have
unconditional obligations that, if acted upon, would result in the
worst possible outcome (Greenspan 1978: 81; Zimmerman 2017:
126-128). So, while it's true that possibilism entails
that Procrastinate has an unconditional obligation to [?]agree to
review the paper[?] in virtue of her unconditional obligation to
[?]agree to review the paper & review the paper[?], it
may also be true that she has a conditional obligation to
[?]decline to review the paper[?] given that she would
[?]not review the paper[?] if she were to [?]agree to
review the paper[?]. More generally, possibilists can respond by
holding that agents have an unconditional obligation to do the best
they can, but incur conditional obligations to bring about the next
best outcome *if* they won't bring about the best
outcome. The distinction between conditional and unconditional
obligations will be further explored in
 section 5.


#### 2.5.2 The advisor objection



A closely related objection appeals to considerations about moral
advice (Goldman 1976: 470; Greenspan 1978: 81; Feldman 1986:
55-57). Suppose that Procrastinate asks her friend whether she
should \(\langle a\rangle\). Knowing that Procrastinate would almost
certainly fail to \(\langle b\rangle\) if she were to \(\langle
a\rangle\), it seems that her advisor ought to advise Procrastinate to
\(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\). The basic idea is that since
Procrastinate's advisor ought to tell Procrastinate to
\(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\), Procrastinate is, contrary to what
possibilists claim, obligated to \(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\).




Possibilists who accept that one ought to advise Procrastinate to
\(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\) will deny that this suggests that
Procrastinate truly has an obligation to \(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\).
Rather, they'll hold that Procrastinate's advisor has an
obligation to advise Procrastinate to do something she is obligated to
refrain from doing. Possibilists will point out that
Procrastinate's advisor, just like Procrastinate, is obligated
to do the best she can. In this case, doing the best she can requires
advising Procrastinate to \(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\) since
Procrastinate won't \(\langle a \lamp b\rangle\) no matter what
Procrastinate's advisor says. Thus, the best
Procrastinate's advisor can do is to get Procrastinate to
\(\langle{\sim}a \lamp{\sim}b\rangle\) and that requires telling
Procrastinate that she ought to \(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\). Erik
Carlson gives this response in his (1995: 127) article. Fred Feldman
gives this response in his (1986: 57) book and puts the point
thusly.



> 
> 
> 
> When we give moral advice, we morally ought to advise in the best way
> we can. That is, we should advise in the way we advise in the best
> world open to us. When things go smoothly, our advice will be
> true...But when things go awry, we may find that to advise in the
> best possible way, we must give false advice. Reflection on a more
> extreme case should make this clear. Suppose an ornery child always
> does the opposite of what we tell him to do. Suppose we know that he
> ought to turn right, and that hundreds of lives depend upon it. Should
> we tell him to turn right? Obviously not.
> 
> 
> 


#### 2.5.3 The asymmetry objection



Both Holly Goldman (1976: 469-470) and Christopher Woodard
(2009) argue that possibilism is committed to an implausible asymmetry
between moral and prudential reasons, whereas actualism treats such
reasons symmetrically. To motivate this objection, Woodard asks one to
consider an intrapersonal case of prudence that is structurally
identical to typical actualist/possibilist cases.


* ***Plane Tickets*:** Suppose that the
prudentially best act-set Smith can perform is \(\langle A \lamp
B\rangle\), where \(\langle A \rangle\) = purchase a plane ticket and
\(\langle B\rangle\) = board the plan. Smith is a bit aviophobic,
however. If she were to \(\langle A\rangle\) purchase the plane
ticket, she would \(\langle{\sim}B\rangle\) not board the plane
(Woodard 2009: 221).



Suppose each option is equally *morally* good. However, the
*prudential* value of the act-sets may be ranked from best to
worst as follows.


1. \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\)
2. \(\langle{\sim}A \lamp {\sim}B\rangle\)
3. \(\langle A \lamp {\sim}B\rangle\)



Again, the following counterfactuals are true.


4. If Smith were to \(\langle A\rangle\), she would
\(\langle{\sim}B\rangle\).
5. If Smith were to \(\langle{\sim}A\rangle\), she would
\(\langle{\sim}B\rangle\).



Prudentially, what ought Smith to do? Woodard suggests that
intuitively Smith prudentially ought to \(\langle{\sim}A\rangle\),
writing that it's hard 



> 
> 
> to believe that the fact that [Smith] would choose \({\sim}B\) were
> [she] to choose *A* is irrelevant to whether [Smith] should
> choose *A* or not. (2009: 221) 
> 
> 
> 



However, if possibilists treat prudential reasons in the same way they
treat moral reasons, they would be committed to holding that Smith
prudentially ought to \(\langle A\rangle\) even though this would
result in her wasting her money on a plane ticket she wouldn't
use. In light of intuitive judgments about prudential cases, Woodard
concludes that unless 



> 
> 
> there is a sharp asymmetry between prudential and moral
> oughts...the parallel [case concerning moral reasons also]
> affects Smith's moral obligation to choose *A* or
> \({\sim}A\). 
> 
> 
> 



Woodard's thought is
that prudential cases support actualist judgments and, to avoid
positing an implausible asymmetry between moral and prudential
reasons, we should think actualism is true in moral cases as well.



It's worth noting that this sort of question about prudential
cases arises in the rational choice literature. The analogous question
concerns whether rationality requires one to choose suboptimal courses
of action by predicating one's present behavior on what will
seem most attractive to one at a later time (see McClennen 1990: ch.
8-9; Gauthier 1994). The subsequent literature suggests that
intuitions about prudential cases are at least mixed.



In response to Woodard, possibilists could again appeal to the
distinction between unconditional and conditional (prudential)
obligations. Perhaps what Smith is unconditionally prudentially
obligated to do is [?]purchase the plane ticket & board the
plane[?] and thus has an unconditional obligation to
[?]purchase the plane ticket[?]. However, given that she
wouldn't [?]board the plane[?] if she were to
[?]purchase the plane ticket[?], she may incur a conditional
(prudential) obligation to [?]not purchase the plane
ticket[?]. Given that she won't do what she prudentially
ought to do, she conditionally ought to do the next best thing.



Zimmerman's response is to deny that there is an asymmetry,
arguing that what "matters, according to possibilism, is what
one can control" (2017: 128). In other words, both prudential
cases and moral cases are treated symmetrically in the sense that what
matters for *any* case, according to possibilism, concerns what
is under an agent's control. To illustrate, in contrast to this
purely prudential case, consider a similar case in which Smith's
not boarding the plane will result in result in her friend, Fred,
being deeply disappointed that he and Smith will not get an
opportunity to catch up in person. In both of these cases,
Smith's control with respect to performing \(\langle A \lamp
B\rangle\) is exactly the same. So, according to Zimmerman, it
doesn't matter that, in either case, Smith would in fact
\(\langle{\sim}B\rangle\) if she were to \(\langle A\rangle\); Smith
is still obligated to perform \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\), and, *a
fortiori*, perform \(\langle A\rangle\). Zimmerman may be right
that possibilists are not committed to treating moral and prudential
reasons differently. However, by treating them symmetrically, it may
still be true (as Goldman and Woodard suggest) that possibilists are
committed to counterintuitive verdicts in certain prudential cases, as
illustrated in *Plane Tickets*. 



The objections considered in this section are some of the most
influential or instructive objections that apply to possibilism,
generally construed. However, they do not exhaust the objections that
may be levelled against the view. Even if possibilists are able to
provide adequate responses to these objections, other considerations
may count in favor of an alternative view. In the next section, we
turn to possibilism's main competitor: actualism.


## 3. Actualism




When it comes to cases concerning agents who are disposed to act
wrongly, actualists consider their possibilist counterparts to be
overly idealistic by theorizing about our moral obligations without
considering the moral imperfections that result in our failing to do
the best that we can. According to actualists, the specific way in
which our imperfections need to be considered is by taking into
account the truth-value of certain counterfactuals of freedom, i.e.,
certain facts about what we would freely do if we were in some
circumstances. The only counterfactuals that are relevant to our
objective obligations are ones in which the circumstances in the
antecedent are fully described (Jackson 1985: 178, 186; Jackson &
Pargetter 1986: 240). This is because strengthening the antecedent of
a counterfactual, i.e., adding information to the antecedent, can
alter the counterfactual's truth-value (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis
1973).




Most, if not all participants, in the actualist-possibilist debate
seem to assume that the agents have the ability at one time to perform
an act that they would not in fact perform at a later time if they
were in the relevant circumstances. For example, although Professor
Procrastinate can [?]agree to review the paper & write the
review[?], she would, as a matter of fact, [?]not write the
review[?] if she were to [?]agree to review the
paper[?]. In other words, she would do something (not write)
other than what she can do (write). By holding fixed the fact that
Procrastinate would [?]not write the review[?] even if she
were to [?]agree to review the paper[?], it follows from
actualism that Procrastinate ought to [?]decline to review the
paper[?], even though she can [?]agree to review the paper
& write the review[?]. This is because actualism roughly
states that an agent ought to \(\phi\) just in case \(\phi\)-ing would
result in a better outcome than any other alternative to \(\phi\)-ing.
Recall the generic definition offered in the previous section.


* **Actualism:** At *t* an agent *S* is
obligated to \(\phi\) at \(t'\) iff *S* can \(\phi\) at \(t'\)
and what would happen if *S* were to \(\phi\) at \(t'\) is better
than what would happen if *S* were to perform any alternative act
at \(t'\).




Now, what would happen if Procrastinate were to [?]decline to
review the paper[?] is better than what would happen if
Procrastinate were to [?]agree to review the paper[?]. As
this example illustrates, the value that actualists assign to an
option is determined by what *would* happen if that option were
performed, rather than by being a member of the best act-set that the
agent *can* perform over time. [?]Agreeing to review the
paper[?] is part of the best act-set that is presently available
to Procrastinate. But the value of [?]agreeing to review the
paper[?] is less than the value of [?]declining to review
the paper[?] because of what would happen if these respective
options were to be performed. 




Beyond this minimal agreement among all versions of actualism that
Professor Procrastinate ought (given certain descriptions of the case)
to [?]decline to review the paper[?], actualists diverge on
other substantial issues concerning the scope of our obligations.
Holly S. Goldman and Jordan Howard Sobel independently developed and
articulated the first versions of actualism. We will begin by
introducing Goldman's formulation which is motivated in part by
the need to avoid prescribing jointly unfulfillable obligations.


### 3.1 The Problem of Jointly Unfulfillable Obligations for Some Forms of Actualism




The above formulation of actualism is subject to the problem of
jointly unfulfillable obligations. That is, it generates multiple
obligations such that it is impossible for the agent to fulfill all of
them. For example, Procrastinate is obligated to [?]decline to
review the paper[?] because this would result in a better outcome
than the outcome that would follow [?]agreeing to review the
paper[?]. On the other hand, Procrastinate is obligated to
[?]agree to review the paper & write the review[?]
because doing so would have a better outcome than the outcome of
[?]declining to review the paper & not reviewing the
paper[?]. This is a problem for Jackson and Pargetter's
version of actualism, to be discussed below. Goldman's and
Sobel's versions of actualism are formulated precisely to avoid
this problem. To see how Goldman avoids this problem, consider the
following formulation of actualism that Goldman (1976: 471) considers
and rejects:



(G)*S* ought at
\(t\_1\), to perform \(A\_i\) at \(t\_i\) if and only if:


(1)
*S* has the
ability at \(t\_1\) to perform \(A\_i\), at \(t\_i\), and
(2)
 the sequence of acts
from \(t\_i\) which would follow \(A\_i\) is better than any sequence
from \(t\_i\) which would follow any act that would be an alternative
to \(A\_i\) relative to \(t\_i\).




The basic idea behind (G) is captured in the aforementioned rough
definition of actualism. Here are the details. "\(A\_i\)"
may apply to a single act or a sequence of acts over time. The main
problem that Goldman finds with (G) is that even if \(A\_i\) satisfies
(1) and (2), (G) does not take into account the following sort of
case: "\(A\_i\)" refers to a sequence of acts over time,
the following counterfactual is true: "if the agent were to
perform the first half of \(A\_i\), then the agent would not perform
the second half of \(A\_i\)", and the sequence of acts that would
follow the performance of the first half of \(A\_i\) would be worse
than the sequence of acts that would follow an alternative to the
first half of \(A\_i\). (G) implies that in this sort of case the agent
has jointly unfulfillable obligations at the same time *t*, viz.
an obligation at *t* to perform \(A\_i\) and an obligation at
*t* to refrain from performing the first half of \(A\_i\). For
example, according to (G) Procrastinate ought to [?]agree to
review the paper & write the review[?] from
\(t\_1\)-\(t\_2\) because the sequence of acts that would follow
this act sequence from \(t\_2\) is better than any sequence from
\(t\_2\) which would follow any alternative act sequence at
\(t\_1\)-\(t\_2\), including the alternative of [?]declining
to review the paper & not writing the review[?] from
\(t\_1\)-\(t\_2\). But, on the other hand, according to (G)
Procrastinate ought to [?]decline to review the paper[?] at
\(t\_1\) because the sequence of acts that would follow this from
\(t\_1\) is better than any sequence from \(t\_1\) which would follow
any alternative act at \(t\_1\), including the alternative of
[?]agreeing to review the paper[?]. Obviously, it cannot be
the case that both obligations are fulfilled.



Goldman (1976: 467) illustrates the possibility of jointly
unfulfillable obligations with the following example.


* ***Jones*:** Jones is deciding whether to go
to the office or to stay home. She can [?]go to the office,
attend the faculty meeting, and then vote for a language requirement
for undergraduates[?]. This is the best outcome available to
Jones over time. The worst outcome available to Jones is [?]going
to the office, talking to a student, and then discouraging the student
from seeking psychiatric aid[?]. The second-best outcome
available to Jones is [?]staying home, doing research for her
lectures, and then writing the lecture notes[?]. The critical
counterfactual that partly shapes the relative values of Jones'
options is this: "if Jones were to [?]go to the
office[?], then she would [?]talk to the student and then
freely discourage the student from seeking psychiatric
aid[?]".



Although [?]going to the office[?] is a prerequisite for the
best outcome (viz. the outcome that follows [?]voting for a
language requirement[?]), [?]going to the office[?]
would, in fact, result in the worst outcome (viz. the outcome that
follows [?]discouraging the student from seeking psychiatric
aid[?]). [?]Staying home[?] rather than [?]going to
the office[?] would result in a better outcome (viz. the outcome
of [?]writing lecture notes[?]). Here is Goldman's
chart, which summarizes Jones's predicament:



![a decision tree: link to extended description below](figure1.svg)

Figure 1: [An
 extended description of figure 1
 is in the supplement.]




As a matter of stipulation, the act-set which would follow the act-set
that terminates with [?]voting for the language
requirement[?] at \(t\_3\) is better than the act-set which would
follow any other \(t\_1\)-\(t\_3\) act-set available to Jones at
\(t\_1\). So
 (G)
 implies that, at \(t\_1\), Jones ought to do the best she can.
However, (G) also implies that, at \(t\_1\), Jones ought to
[?]stay home[?] at \(t\_1\) rather than [?]go to the
office[?] at \(t\_1\). This is because both acts are performable
for Jones at \(t\_1\), and the act sequence which would follow
[?]staying home[?] is better than the act sequence which
would follow [?]going to the office[?]. So, according to
(G), Jones has at least two obligations that are jointly
unfulfillable, *A*: [?]going to the office, then going to
the faculty meeting, then voting for the language requirement[?],
and *B*: [?]staying home[?]. Jones cannot perform both
\(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\). There is no possible scenario in which
both obligations are fulfilled.


### 3.2 Preliminary Formulations of Actualism




To avoid the problem of jointly unfulfillable obligations, Goldman
(1976: 473) proposes the following version of actualism:



(G\*1)

(A)
*S* ought at \(t\_1\) to perform \(A\_1\) at \(t\_1\) if and only if:
 
(1)
*S* has the ability at \(t\_1\), to perform \(A\_1\), and
(2)
the sequence from \(t\_1\) which would follow \(A\_1\) is
 better than any sequence from \(t\_1\) which would follow any
 alternative to \(A\_1\).
(B)
If *S* ought at \(t\_1\), to perform \(A\_i\) at \(t\_i\),
 then *S* ought at \(t\_1\), to perform an immediate successor
 \(B\_j\) to \(A\_i\) at \(t\_j\) if the sequence from \(t\_j\) which would
 follow \(B\_j\) is better than any sequence from \(t\_j\) which would
 follow any other immediate successor to \(A\_i\).


Unlike
 (G),
 (G\*1) assesses an act's deontic status in a procedural manner,
starting with the options that are immediately available to the agent,
and then proceeding to the next immediately available options. To
illustrate, part (A) of (G\*1) tells us to first evaluate all of the
options that are immediately performable for Jones at \(t\_1\), and
those options are either [?]going to the office[?] or
[?]staying home[?]. The latter option is obligatory because
it *would* result in a better act-set than the act-set that
would result if Jones were to [?]go to the office[?]. Part
(B) of (G\*1) tells us that, as of \(t\_1\), Jones ought to perform an
immediate successor to [?]staying home[?] at \(t\_1\) that
would result in a better sequence of acts than any alternative option
that is an immediate successor to [?]staying home[?] at
\(t\_1\). So, at \(t\_1\), Jones ought to [?]stay home and then do
research for lectures[?] from \(t\_1\)-\(t\_2\). Similarly,
at \(t\_1\), Jones ought to perform an act-set that terminates with
[?]writing lecture notes[?] at \(t\_3\), given the assumption
that the act-set that would follow [?]writing the lecture
notes[?] at \(t\_3\) is better than the act-set that would follow
[?]fixing lunch[?] at \(t\_3\).




The application of
 (G\*1)
 to the case of Jones explains why (G\*1) does not imply the
possibility of jointly unfulfillable obligations. Although what would
happen if Jones were to [?]go to the faculty meeting[?] at
\(t\_2\) is better than what would happen if she were to do anything
else at \(t\_2\) that, as of \(t\_1\), she can do, Jones is nevertheless
*not* obligated at \(t\_1\) to [?]go to the faculty
meeting[?] at \(t\_2\). This is because if Jones were to perform
one of the acts required for [?]going to the faculty
meeting[?], viz. [?]going to the office[?], then the
worst outcome would occur. As of \(t\_1\), any act that precludes
[?]staying home[?] at \(t\_1\) is impermissible.




Jordan Howard Sobel (1976: 196) similarly defends a version of
actualism that avoids jointly unfulfillable obligations:



(S)
An act *x* ought to take place if and only if (i) *x*
 is contained in a life optimum among lives securable by the agent
 of *x* at this act's first moment (that is, a life
 optimum among those lives each of which would be secured by some
 fully specific minimal act open to the agent of *x* at the
 first moment of *x*), and (ii) no agent-identical act
 incompatible with x satisfies (i).


A life *L* is a sequence of acts over time, or, in the
terminology of this article, an act-set over time, such that this
act-set is not contained in some other act-set that an agent *S*
can perform over time. Hence, a life is identical to the
possibilist's notion of a maximal act-set. A life *L* is
securable for *S* at time *t* if at \(t\) \(S\) can immediately
perform the first moment of *x*, *x* is in *L*, and if
*x* were to occur, then *L* would occur (Sobel 1976: 199).
An obligatory life is determined in part by the set of immediately
performable fully specific minimal acts available to the agent. A
minimal act is one whose completion cannot be stopped by the agent
once it is initiated. As such, all instantaneous acts are minimal acts
(if there are any such acts). Moreover, a minimal act is fully
specific just in case it is not entailed by two or more minimal acts
available to the agent.



Like
 (G\*1),
 and unlike
 (G),
 (S) does not imply that Jones ought to do the best she can over time
in the sense affirmed by possibilists. This is because, according to
(S), all lives that contain [?]voting for the language
requirement[?] are not securable for Jones at \(t\_1\). At
\(t\_1\), there is no fully specific minimal act that Jones can
immediately perform such that if Jones were to perform it then Jones
would perform a sequence of acts that includes [?]voting for the
language requirement[?]. Similarly, [?]writing the
review[?] is not securable for Procrastinate at \(t\_1\) because,
at \(t\_1\), there is no fully specific minimal act that Jones can
immediately perform such that, if Jones were to perform it, then Jones
would [?]write the review[?].


### 3.3 A Contextualist Formulation of Actualism



In contrast to the views of Goldman and Sobel, other forms of
actualism embrace the possibility of jointly unfulfillable obligations
while simultaneously resisting the claim that actualism implies the
possibility of obligation dilemmas, i.e., scenarios in which all of
the options available to an agent over time result in a failure to
fulfill at least one obligation. Consider Frank Jackson and Robert
Pargetter's (1986: 233) formulation of actualism.



> 
> 
> [T]he values that should figure in determining which option is best
> and so ought to be done out of a set of options are the values of what
> *would* be the case were the agent to adopt or carry out the
> option, where what would be the case includes of course what the agent
> would simultaneously or subsequently in fact do: the (relevant) value
> of an option is the value of what would in fact be the case were the
> agent to perform it.
> 
> 
> 



Jackson and Pargetter (1986: 244-245) maintain that there are
different sets of options out of which different obligations arise.
For instance, from the set of all \(t\_1\)-\(t\_3\) act-sets
available to Jones at \(t\_1\), the option with the highest value
consists of the act-set that includes [?]Jones's voting for
the language requirement[?] at \(t\_3\). Therefore, out of the
\(t\_1\)-\(t\_3\) act-set, at \(t\_1\) Jones is obligated to
[?]go to the office, then go to the faculty meeting, and then
vote for the language requirement[?]. This is because what would
happen if this act-set were to occur is better than what would happen
if some other \(t\_1\)-\(t\_3\) act-set were to occur. But on the
other hand, from the set of immediately performable acts available to
Jones at \(t\_1\), the option with the highest value consists of
Jones' [?]staying home[?] because what would happen if
Jones were to [?]stay home[?] is better than what would
happen if Jones were to [?]go to the office[?]. Therefore,
out of the performable \(t\_1\) acts, at \(t\_1\) Jones is obligated to
[?]stay home[?]. Like
 (G),
 Jackson and Pargetter's view does not assess an act's
deontic status in the procedural manner with which Goldman's
 (G\*1)
 or Sobel's
 (S)
 assesses an act's deontic status. Moreover, like (G), Jackson
and Pargetter's view implies the possibility of obligations that
cannot be jointly fulfilled. We will henceforth refer to their view as
contextualist actualism because what an agent is obligated to do
depends on the set of options being considered within a certain
context.


### 3.4 Objections to Contextualist Actualism


#### 3.4.1 Jointly unfulfillable obligations without obligation dilemmas



The possibility of jointly unfulfillable obligations initially seems
to imply the possibility of obligation dilemmas, i.e., scenarios in
which all of the options available to an agent over time result in a
failure to fulfill at least one obligation. But this is not the case
given the assumption taken for granted in the actualist-possibilist
debate: that agents have control over the truth-value of certain
counterfactuals. In other words, agents can perform certain acts, and
if they were to do so, then certain counterfactuals that are in fact
true would instead be false. For example, Procrastinate can
[?]agree to review the paper & then write the review[?].
If she were to do this, then the following counterfactual that is
false would be true instead: "If Procrastinate were to
[?]agree to review the paper[?], then she would
[?]write the review[?]". Moreover, if this
counterfactual were true, then Procrastinate would not be obligated to
[?]decline to review the paper[?]. This is because, in this
counterfactual scenario, what would follow from [?]declining to
review the paper[?] would be worse than what would follow from
[?]agreeing to review the paper[?]. 



Jackson and Pargetter rightly conclude from this that Procrastinate
can avoid violating *any* obligation because if Procrastinate
were to do something that she can do, viz. [?]agree to review the
paper & then write the review[?], then Procrastinate
wouldn't be obligated to [?]decline to review the
paper[?] in the first place, and thus there would be no
unfulfilled obligations (Jackson 1985: 194; Jackson & Pargetter
1986: 242-243; Louise 2009: 330; Jackson 2014: 636). In this
sense, according to contextualist actualism, the obligation to
[?]agree to review the paper & then write the review[?]
overrides the obligation to [?]decline to review the
paper[?]. More generally, at time *t* an agent can do
something over time such that, if it were done, then their primary
obligation would be fulfilled, and the agent would not have any
unfulfilled obligations from *t* onwards. Jackson and
Pargetter's view is more similar to possibilism in comparison to
standard formulations of actualism insofar as Jackson and Pargetter
agree with possibilists about an agent's obligation to perform
the same maximal act-set. The difference between contextualist
actualism and possibilism is that the former view affirms the
existence of additional obligations that arise from sets of options
that do not include this maximal act-set.



Jackson and Pargetter (1986: 246-249) believe that incompatible
prescriptions are objectionable only when they arise from the same set
of alternatives. But their view never generates incompatible
prescriptions out of the same set of alternatives. Out of the set of
alternatives of [?]agreeing to review the paper[?] at
\(t\_1\) or [?]declining to review the paper[?] at \(t\_1\),
[?]declining to review the paper[?] is obligatory. But out
of the \(t\_1\)-\(t\_2\) alternatives available to Procrastinate
at \(t\_1\), [?]agreeing to review the paper and then writing the
review[?] is the obligatory option. Hence, according to
contextualist actualism, as long as actualism does not prescribe
incompatible obligations from the same set of alternatives,
incompatible prescriptions are unproblematic. Still, one might object
that their view is not action-guiding in the sense that their theory
does not say whether the overriding obligation takes priority over the
other obligations (cf. Jackson 2014: 636).


#### 3.4.2 The lumping problem



By relativizing obligations to different sets of options,
contextualist actualism is subject to the so-called lumping problem.
This is the problem of lumping alternatives to an option *O* into
a single alternative (not-*O*) (Wedgwood 2009
 [Other Internet Resources, OIR];
 Ross 2012; Cariani 2016). Here is an example. Suppose that the
following increasingly worse options are available to an agent
*A*: [?]go to work[?], [?]gamble at home[?],
[?]kill someone at home[?]. Suppose furthermore that the
following four counterfactuals are true.


1. If *A* were to [?]not go to work[?], then *A*
would [?]kill someone at home[?].
2. If *A* were to [?]not gamble at home[?], then
*A* would [?]kill someone at home[?].
3. If *A* were to [?]gamble at home[?], then *A*
would [?]not kill someone at home[?].
4. If *A* were to [?]go to work[?], then *A*
would [?]not kill someone at home and would get valuable work
done[?].



In that case, what would happen if *A* were to [?]gamble at
home[?] is better than what would happen if *A* were to
[?]not gamble at home[?]. For, if *A* were to
[?]not gamble at home[?], then *A* would [?]kill
someone at home[?]. Now, when we consider *A*'s
options to be [?]gambling at home[?] or [?]not gambling
at home[?], contextualist actualism implies that *A* ought
to [?]gamble at home[?]. This should seem very implausible,
even by actualists' own lights, because what would actually
happen if *A* were to [?]go to work[?] is better than
what would happen if *A* were to make any other choice at the
time in question. Those who find this result counterintuitive have
suggested that an obligatory act *O* must have a higher value
than all of the non-supererogatory options available to the agent,
rather than only having a higher value than not-*O*. In response
to this worry, Jackson and Pargetter can remind us that it is also
true that *A* ought to [?]go to work[?] out of a
different set options, viz. [?]going to work[?],
[?]gambling at home[?], and [?]killing someone at
home[?]. 



The relativization of obligations to different sets of options has led
Jackson and Pargetter to reject the "ought distributes over
conjunction" (ODC) principle (1986: 247). Recall that ODC holds
that if an agent *S* ought to do both *A* and *B*, then
*S* ought to do *A* and *S* ought to do *B*
(Castaneda 1968: 141). While they accept that Procrastinate
ought to [?]agree to review the paper & then write the
review[?], they deny that Procrastinate ought to [?]agree to
review the paper[?]. Similarly, their view implies that Jones
ought to [?]go to the office, then go to the faculty meeting, and
then vote for the language requirement[?]. However, Jones ought
not to [?]go to the office[?] since Jones ought to
[?]stay home[?].


### 3.5 Objections to All Forms of Actualism


#### 3.5.1 Avoiding obligations merely by having a vicious moral character



Goldman's
 (G\*1)
 and Sobel's
 (S)
 enjoy the theoretical and practical virtue of simplicity by
prescribing a single obligatory act sequence at a time rather than
multiple, jointly unfulfillable prescriptions at a time. But this
theoretical virtue comes at the cost of a possibilist objection: their
views allow agents to avoid incurring moral obligations simply in
virtue of having an imperfect moral character, and this allows agents
to, morally speaking, get off the hook too easily (Jackson &
Pargetter 1986: 240; Zimmerman 1996: 193-194, 2006: 156;
Portmore 2011: 207; Baker 2012: 642-43; Timmerman 2015;
Timmerman & Cohen 2016; Cohen & Timmerman 2016). For example,

Procrastinate avoids incurring an obligation to comment on a
student's paper simply because she is disposed to behave badly.
Actualism is committed to this even in cases in which an agent is
disposed to behave badly just because they intend to behave badly.
But, possibilists claim, agents cannot avoid incurring an obligation to \(\phi\)
simply because they intend to \(\phi\) poorly. More generally,
possibilists claim that being disposed to do wrong does not allow one
to avoid incurring obligations to do good.



Proponents of
 (G\*1)
 or
 (S)
 may retort by reminding us that this apparently problematic
implication is the result of taking into account the relevant
counterfactuals, and that not taking them into account is too costly.
While Procrastinate's [?]agreeing to review the
paper[?] is part of the best act-set that she can perform over
time, it is also part of the worst act-set that she can perform over
time, and the worst act-set would be performed if Procrastinate were
to [?]agree to review the paper[?] (Jackson & Pargetter
1986: 237). Similarly, Jones' [?]going to the
office[?] is part of the best act-set that she can perform over
time, but it is also part of the worst act-set that she can perform
over time, and the worst act-set would be performed if Jones were to
[?]go to the office[?].



Contextualist actualism can, in a sense, sidestep this possibilist
objection since contextual actualists agree with possibilists that an
agent ought to do the best that she can over time, and, in addition,
they consider this obligation to override all other obligations in the
aforementioned sense (Jackson 1985: 194; Jackson & Pargetter 1986:
242-243; Jackson 2014: 636). Possibilists may not be satisfied
with this response. Since possibilists accept ODC, they infer that
Procrastinate is obligated to [?]agree to review the
paper[?] from the fact that Procrastinate is obligated to
[?]agree to review the paper & then write the review[?].
Contextualist actualism denies that Procrastinate is obligated to
[?]agree to review the paper[?] at the cost of rejecting
ODC.


#### 3.5.2 Sanctioning bad behavior



All of these versions of actualism face a second possibilist
objection: they prescribe bad behavior that the agent can easily avoid
(Wedgwood 2009
 [OIR];
 Ross 2012: 75-76). For example, Procrastinate can easily avoid
[?]declining to review the paper[?] by [?]agreeing to
review the paper[?] and, once Procrastinate [?]agrees to
review the paper[?], she can easily [?]write the
review[?]. Nevertheless, all of these versions of actualism
maintain that Procrastinate should [?]decline to review the
paper[?] rather than [?]agree to review the paper[?].
Other extreme actualist-possibilist scenarios highlight the force of
this objection. Suppose that the following act-set is the best one
available to a mass murderer *M* at \(t\_1\): [?]kill no

one[?] at \(t\_1\) and [?]kill no one[?] at \(t\_2\).

Suppose, however, that the best immediately available option for
*M* is [?]killing someone at \(t\_1\)[?] because of the
truth of the following two counterfactuals: "if *M* were to
[?]kill someone[?] at \(t\_1\), then *M* would
[?]kill no one[?] at \(t\_2\)", "if *M* were
to [?]kill no one[?] at \(t\_1\), then *M* would
[?]kill ten people[?] at \(t\_2\)". Possibilists claim
that *M* should [?]kill no one[?] from
\(t\_1\)-\(t\_2\) and thus that *M* should [?]kill no
one[?] at \(t\_1\). Actualists, however, claim that *M*
should [?]kill someone[?] at \(t\_1\). Contextualist
actualism at least allows one to say that although [?]killing
someone[?] at \(t\_1\) is obligatory, doing this violates
*M*'s obligation to [?]kill no one[?] from
\(t\_1\)-\(t\_2\). Goldman and Sobel's versions cannot
accommodate this appeasing judgment.



It is worth noting that possibilism is thought to be subject to a
related problem. While it doesn't allow agents to avoid incurring
moral obligations for having a vicious moral character, it does allow
agents to avoid incurring moral obligations to curtail their vicious
moral character (Timmerman and Swenson 2019). To illustrate the
problem, suppose that one of the optimific act-sets Apathetic Andy can
perform over time includes [?]playing video games tonight and
donating his expendable income to charity tomorrow[?]. Andy is,
however, quite apathetic. As such, he won't [?]donate his
expendable income to charity tomorrow[?] unless he first
[?]reads work by Peter Singer tonight[?]. If he
[?]plays video games tonight[?], he will merely reinforce
his selfish nature and [?]use his expendable income to purchase
more video games tomorrow[?]. Here's the catch. The other
optimific act-set Apathetic Andy can perform is to [?]read work
by Peter Singer tonight and donate his expendable income to charity
tomorrow[?]. Moreover, if Andy [?]reads work by Peter Singer
tonight[?], he would [?]donate his expendable income to
charity tomorrow[?]. Performing this optimific act-set won't be
pleasant for Andy, though, since he finds reading philosophy to be
tedious. Here's the problem. Possibilism renders the verdict that Andy
is permitted to [?]play video games tonight[?], which would
not only result in a suboptimal outcome, but also exacerbate (rather
than curtail) his bad moral character. By contrast, actualism entails
that Andy is obligated to improve his moral character by
[?]reading work by Peter Singer tonight[?], and actualism
thus ensures that Andy would [?]donate his expendable income to
charity tomorrow[?]. So, both possibilism and actualism seem to
let agents with vicious moral characters off the hook too easily,
albeit in different circumstances and in different ways.



In the next section we will consider an additional objection to
actualism that has led to the development of views that may be
considered intermediaries of actualism and possibilism. According to
these views, a counterfactual is relevant to an agent's present
obligation only if the agent presently lacks a specific kind of
control over the truth-value of that counterfactual.


## 4. Securitist Views



Recall that the kinds of actualist-possibilist scenarios that we have
been discussing--the cases of *Professor Procrastinate*
and the case of *Jones*--are diachronic cases in the sense
that they concern different acts that are performed across different
moments of time, rather than at the same time. For example, in the
case of *Professor Procrastinate*, one of the relevant
counterfactuals is that if she were to [?]agree to review the
paper[?] at \(t\_1\), then she would [?]not write the
review[?] at \(t\_2\). The act in the antecedent and the act in
the consequent are indexed to different times. On the surface, it may
appear that a diachronic case would yield the same results as a
synchronic case, i.e., a case that involves the performance of
different acts at the same time. But as Goldman (1978) shows, a
synchronic actualist-possibilist scenario yields new difficulties for
actualism, including Goldman's (1976)
 (G\*1),
 and the way to address these difficulties is by incorporating a
control condition over the truth-value of certain counterfactuals.


### 4.1 A Synchronic Actualist-Possibilist Case



Consider Goldman's (1978: 186) case, which we'll call
*Traffic 1*:


* ***Traffic 1*:** Jones is driving
through a tunnel behind a slow-moving truck. It is illegal to change
lanes in the tunnel, and Jones' doing so would disrupt traffic.
Nevertheless she is going to change lanes [at *t*]--perhaps
she doesn't realize it is illegal, or perhaps she is simply in a
hurry. If she changes lanes without accelerating [at *t*],
traffic will be disrupted more severely than if she accelerates. If
she accelerates without changing lanes [at *t*], her car will
collide with the back of a truck.



According to Goldman, it seems that Jones should
[?]accelerate[?] at *t* since Jones is going to
[?]change lanes[?] at *t*, and [?]accelerating
& changing lanes[?] at *t* would result in a better
outcome than that of [?]not accelerating & changing
lanes[?]. But now consider this case:


* ***Traffic 2***: Everything that is true in
*Traffic 1* is true in this case. Additionally, Jones would
[?]not accelerate[?] at *t* if Jones were to either
[?]change lanes[?] or [?]not change lanes[?] at
*t*.



In *Traffic 2* Jones [?]changes lanes and doesn't
accelerate[?] at *t*. It seems that Jones should [?]not
change lanes[?] at *t* since she is going to [?]not
accelerate[?] at *t*. But it also seems that Jones should
[?]accelerate[?] at *t* since she is going to
[?]change lanes[?]. We have arrived at the verdict that in
*Traffic 2* Jones should [?]not change lanes[?] and
that Jones should [?]accelerate[?]. This verdict is
extremely counterintuitive since this would result in colliding with
the back of the truck, which is the worst possible outcome. 



According to Goldman, the lesson to be gleamed from synchronic
actualist-possibilist cases is this: In determining what we are
obligated at *t* to do at *t*, we should not hold fixed
facts about what we are freely doing at t. Moreover, such synchronic
counterfactuals do not determine in any way what an agent is obligated
to do at any time. Consequently, the kind of immediate act-set that is
a candidate for being obligatory is the fully specific simultaneous
act-set that is immediately available to Jones. A performable fully
specific simultaneous act-set is one such that one cannot also perform
any other act-set at the relevant time. Goldman (1978: 190) calls such
act-sets maximal conjunctive acts, but this entry will stick with the
terminology of a *fully specific simultaneous act-set* in order
to avoid ambiguation with other notions of act-sets at issue in this
paper. Let's suppose that the (immediate) fully specific
simultaneous act-sets available to Jones are ranked from best to worst
as follows. 


1. [?]Don't change lanes & don't
accelerate[?]
2. [?]Change lanes & accelerate[?]
3. [?]Change lanes & don't accelerate[?]
4. [?]Don't change lanes & accelerate[?]



According to Goldman, given options (1)-(4), Jones should
obviously perform (1). Moreover, notice that *if* Jones were to
perform (1), then the following synchronic counterfactual that is in
fact true in *Traffic 2* would be false instead: "if
Jones were to [?]not accelerate[?] at *t*, then at
*t* Jones would [?]change lanes[?]". So, given
the intuition that Jones is obligated to perform (1) and that doing so
would alter the truth-value of certain synchronic counterfactuals, we
should not hold fixed the truth-value of such synchronic
counterfactuals when theorizing about an agent's obligation to
perform some immediate fully specific simultaneous act-set. To
accommodate this judgment, Goldman's (1978) revised view
incorporates a control condition over the truth-value of such
synchronic counterfactuals.


### 4.2 Fully Specified Immediate Options



Goldman's revised view still adopts the insight behind
 (G\*1)
 that, in order to avoid the possibility of jointly unfulfillable
obligations, an obligatory act-set (or, as Goldman calls it, a sequence
of acts) must be such that it would occur if the agent were to
immediately perform the first act of the act-set, and the agent can
perform this first act of the act-set. Goldman's revised view
(1978: 202) is referred to as "4", but we will refer to
it as (G+) here:




(G+)
*S* ought at
\(t\_1\) to perform maximal sequence *X* starting at \(t\_1\) if
and only if *S* has the ability at \(t\_1\) to perform *X*,
and *X* is better than any alternative maximal sequence starting
from \(t\_1\) which *S* also has the ability at \(t\_1\) to
 perform.




Unlike
 (G\*1) ,
 Goldman's revised view requires the first act to be a fully
specific simultaneous act-set. Moreover, the kind of act-set that
should be directly assessed is a *maximal* sequence. *S*
has the ability at \(t\_1\) to perform *X* only if *S* has
the ability at \(t\_1\) to immediately (at \(t\_1)\) perform the first
fully specific simultaneous act-set in \(X.\) Goldman's (1978:
201) notion of a maximal sequence is different from the
possibilist's aforementioned notion of a maximal act-set which
extends to the end of one's life. For, according to Goldman
(1978: 193-195), at *t* an agent can perform an act-set
over time if and only if, if at *t* the agent wanted to perform
this act-set, then the agent would do so over time. This implies that
the performable act-set over time must be such that the agent can, at
*t*, form an intention to perform this act-set over time that
would be causally efficacious if the intention were formed.
Goldman's notion of a maximal sequence is thus more restricted.
That is, a maximal sequence *X* is an act-set available to an
agent at *t* is such that, at *t*, the agent can form an
intention to perform *X*, and no other act-set that at *t*
the agent can intend to perform is a proper part of *X*. So,
henceforth, we will refer to Goldman's notion of a maximal
sequence as an *intentionally maximal act-set*, and this is to
be distinguished from a maximal act-set.



Recall that, according to *Ability 2*, an agent *S* has
the ability to immediately perform the first fully specific act-set in
an intentionally maximal act-set if and only if *S* would perform
this fully specific act-set if *S* wanted to do so, and by
extension we may assume Jones can perform each of (1)-(4). Under
this assumption,
 (G+)
 implies that although Jones would [?]change lanes[?] if she
were to [?]not accelerate[?], Jones nevertheless ought to do
something that requires her to [?]not accelerate[?], viz.
[?]not change lanes & not accelerate[?]. To see how (G+)
differs from the versions of actualism in
 section 3,
 consider the following version of *Professor
Procrastinate*:


* ***Professor Procrastinate\**:** If
Procrastinate were to [?]accept the request[?] at \(t\_1\),
then Procrastinate would do so by deciding at \(t\_1\) to harm the
student by falsely promising to review at \(t\_2\). So if Procrastinate
were to [?]accept the request[?] at \(t\_1\), then she would
[?]not comment[?] at \(t\_2\). However, Procrastinate can
[?]accept and comment[?] by deciding at \(t\_1\) to do so.
Moreover, if Procrastinate were to do this, then it would be true that
if Procrastinate were to [?]accept the request[?] at
\(t\_1\), then she would [?]comment[?] at \(t\_2\) (cf.
Portmore 2011: 204).



According to
 (G+)
 Procrastinate is obligated at \(t\_1\) to perform an intentionally
maximal act-set *M* that includes [?]accepting the request
and commenting[?] because there is an immediate fully specific
act-set available to Procrastinate at \(t\_1\) such that if it were
performed then *M* would occur, and *M* is the best
intentionally maximal act-set that is securable for Procrastinate at
\(t\_1\). By contrast, according to
 (G\*1)
 Procrastinate is obligated at \(t\_1\) to [?]not accept the
request[?] because this would result in the performance of
act-set *M*\* that includes [?]not commenting[?] at
\(t\_2\), and *M*\* is better than the act-set *M*\*\* that
would occur if Procrastinate were to [?]accept the
request[?] at \(t\_1\) because *M*\*\* includes
[?]accepting & not commenting[?].



One might suspect that a modified version of
 (G\*1)
 that focuses exclusively upon decisions rather than overt bodily acts
can handle synchronic actualist-possibilist cases, such as
*Professor Procrastinate\**. But this isn't so because it
is possible for the following two counterfactuals to be true:


1. If Procrastinate were to [?]decide to accept the
request[?] at \(t\_1\), then she would [?]decide to both
accept the request & not comment[?].
2. If Procrastinate were to [?]decide to both accept the
request & comment[?] at \(t\_1\), then she would
[?]accept the request & comment[?].



Even though (i) is true, the best thing that Procrastinate can do
involves [?]deciding to accept the request[?], viz.
[?]deciding to accept the request & commenting[?] at
\(t\_1\). This shows that whether we assess an agent's
obligations in terms of decisions or overt bodily acts, the acts that
are to be directly assessed are fully specific simultaneous act-sets,
which is precisely what
 (G+)
 accomplishes.



Contextualist actualism and Goldman's provisional but rejected
principle
 (G)
 similarly imply that Jones is obligated at \(t\_1\) to perform (1)
rather than any of (2)-(4) since these views *permit* a
candidate obligatory act to be fully specific. But these views do not
*require* a candidate obligatory act to be fully specific, and
thus these views also have the peculiar implication that in
*Traffic II* Jones is obligated to [?]accelerate[?]
and Jones is obligated to [?]not change lanes[?].


### 4.3 Kinds of Control Over Immediate Options



Thus far, we have seen that synchronic actualist-possibilist cases
suggest that, first and foremost, an agent has an obligation to
perform a fully specific immediate act rather than a
less-than-fully-specific immediate act. As a result, synchronic
counterfactuals do not even partly determine an agent's
obligation to perform some fully specific immediate act. This still
leaves open a question about the ability that an agent must possess in
order to be able to perform some immediate (fully specific) act in the
relevant sense. Goldman's (1978: 195, 204-205) *Ability
2*, for instance, is a version of the conditional analysis of
abilities. The conditional analysis of abilities remains suspect by
some on the grounds that an agent does not have direct control over
their desires. Given this, one may infer that facts about what an
agent would do if she had different desires is irrelevant to her
abilities (Lehrer 1968; Curran 1995: 82). Nevertheless, since many
participants in the actualist-possibilist debate take for granted that
the ability to do otherwise is compatible with facts about what an
agent will do or would do under certain circumstances, a number of
people have followed Goldman (1978) by taking the relevant kind of
control to be one that does not hold fixed all facts about the
agent's psychological makeup. See, for instance, the views of
Doug Portmore (2011) and Jacob Ross (2012).



Portmore (2011) understands the relevant kind of control an agent must
have over an option in terms of *scrupulous securability*. A
set of acts (i.e., an act-set) is scrupulously securable by an agent
only if there is some set of intentions and some set of permissible
background attitudes (including beliefs and desires), such that if the
agent had these intentions and attitudes, then the agent would perform
that act-set (2011: 165). The sorts of attitudes Portmore (2011: 167)
has in mind are judgment-sensitive attitudes, i.e., attitudes that are
sensitive to judgments about reasons (Scanlon 1998: 20). 



This form of control is similar to the conditional analysis insofar as
the agent does not need to possess the relevant intentions and
attitudes required to perform an act in order to have an ability to
perform that act. It just has to be the case that if the agent were to
have such intentions and attitudes, then the agent would perform the
relevant act. Portmore's (2011: 166-167) exact account of
control is as follows:



> 
> 
> A set of acts, \(a\_j\), is, as of \(t\_i\), scrupulously
> securable by *S* if and only if there is a time, \(t\_j\), that
> either immediately follows \(t\_i\) or is identical to \(t\_i\), a set
> of acts, \(a\_i\), (where \(a\_i\) may, or may not, be
> identical to \(a\_j\)), and a set of background attitudes,
> *B*, such that the following are all true: (1) *S* would
> perform \(a\_j\) if *S* were to have at \(t\_i\) both
> *B* and the intention to perform \(a\_i\); (2) *S* has
> at \(t\_i\) the capacity to continue, or to come, to have at \(t\_j\)
> both *B* and the intention to perform \(a\_i\); and (3)
> *S* would continue, or come, to have at \(t\_j\) *B* (and,
> where \(a\_i\) is not identical to \(a\_j\), the intention
> to perform \(a\_i\) as well) if *S* both were at \(t\_i\)
> aware of all the relevant reason-constituting facts and were at
> \(t\_j\) to respond to these facts/reasons in all and only the ways
> that they prescribe, thereby coming to have at \(t\_j\) all those
> attitudes that, given those facts, she has decisive reason to have and
> only those attitudes that she has, given those facts, sufficient
> reason to have.
> 
> 
> 



Portmore (2011: 177) understands a set of acts \(a\_j\) to be a
maximal act-set in a similar vein to both a possibilist's notion
of a maximal act-set and Sobel's notion of a life. The set of
acts "\(a\_i\)" is not identical to
"\(a\_j\)" when, e.g., one lacks the ability at
\(t\_j\) to form an intention to perform "\(a\_j\)",
although the agent would in fact perform \(a\_j\) if the agent
were to form at \(t\_j\) the intention to perform \(a\_i\). For
example, earning a PhD may be presently scrupulously securable for an
agent, although she is presently unable to form an intention to do all
of the things that are required to attain a PhD at least because she
cannot presently intend to write about an idea in her dissertation
that she has not yet studied (Portmore 2011: 169). So, whenever
\(a\_j\) and \(a\_i\) are not identical, part (1) says that
*S* would perform some act-set if *S* were to intend to
perform some other act-set (along with certain background
attitudes).



Part (2) of the above definition states that an agent must have a
capacity (or an ability) to have certain attitudes and intentions.
This allows one to sidestep the difficulties that have been posed for
the conditional analysis of abilities (cf. Portmore 2011: 168). Part
(3) states that the agent's attitudes must be permissible. To
illustrate, suppose that the only way in which Doug can ensure at 2 pm
that he will eat a healthy meal rather than pizza at 6 pm is by having
the irrational belief that his life depends upon eating a healthy meal
at 6 pm. Since it seems that he is not obligated to have such a
belief, it follows that, at 2 pm, Doug is not obligated to eat a
healthy meal at 6 pm since there is no combination of intentions and
permissible attitudes (as opposed to impermissible attitudes) that
Doug can have at 2 pm, such that if he were to have them at 2 pm then
he would eat a healthy meal at 6 pm (Portmore 2011:
164-165).



Portmore (2011: 222) pairs this notion of control with the following
account of rational permissibility that applies to moral
permissibility when there are moral reasons to act:


* **Securitism:** It is, as of \(t\_i\), objectively
rationally permissible for *S* to perform a non-maximal set of
acts, \(a\_j\), beginning at \(t\_j (t\_i \lt t\_j)\), if and only
if, and because, at least one of the objectively rationally
permissible maximal sets of acts that are, as of \(t\_i\), scrupulously
securable by *S* involves *S*'s performing
\(a\_j\).



Securitism employs a top-down approach by using normative principles
to directly assess the deontic status of maximal act-sets and then
extending the same deontic status to non-maximal act-sets that are
contained in the relevant maximal act-set (Portmore 2011: 179). This
approach reaps the benefits of Goldman's
 (G+)
 of avoiding jointly unfulfillable obligations and of denying that any
synchronic counterfactuals even partly determine an agent's
obligations.



Portmore's securitism--and by extension other views that
hold fixed facts that are not presently up to the agent in some
sense--has been criticized on the grounds that it does not
generate an obligation to do the best one can in the sense at issue in
*Ability 1*, and thus securitism sometimes requires agents to
perform terrible and vicious acts, and it allows one to avoid
incurring an obligation in light of vicious or immoral dispositions
(Timmerman 2015; Vessel 2016).



Ross (2012: 84) similarly maintains that an agent can immediately
perform an act that requires some attitude that the agent does not in
fact have, although Portmore's and Ross's views diverge in
certain cases. Here is Ross's view (2012: 91):


* **Momentwise Wide-scope Securitism
(MWSS):** For any *x* and *t*, at *t*, *x*
ought to be such that, for all \(t'\) from *t* forward, *x*
satisfies the following conditional: For all \(\Phi\), if whether
*x* \(\Phi\)s does not causally depend on the intentions *x*
has after \(t'\), and if every maximally preferable option that is
directly securable for *x* at \(t'\) involves \(\Phi\)-ing, then
*x* \(\Phi\)s.



In essence, MWSS is the view that "at any given time, an agent
is obligated, at every future time, to be currently satisfying a
wide-scope version" of Smith's
 (G+)
 or Portmore's securitism (Ross 2012: 91). Ross believes that
only MWSS can account for each of the four conditions of his core idea
(2012: 89, 91).


* **The Core Idea Broken Down:** What is obligatory
for an agent is that, (i) *at all times*, she does (ii) *the
best she can do* at that time, (iii) *holding fixed what is not
up to her at that time*, but (iv) *not holding fixed what is up
to her* at that time.



To see how these views diverge, consider the following case which is
similar to a case described by Ross (2012: 87-88): at \(t\_1\)
Sally has the ability to immediately form an intention to [?]not
kill anyone five years later at \(t\_5\)[?], although
[?]killing no one at \(t\_5\)[?] is not scrupulously
securable for Sally at \(t\_1\). On the other hand, killing exactly one
person or killing exactly two persons at \(t\_5\) are both scrupulously
securable for Sally at \(t\_1\). According to Portmore's
securitism, one of the objectively morally permissible maximal set of
acts that is scrupulously securable by Sally at \(t\_1\) involves
killing one person at \(t\_5\). However, at \(t\_5\), not killing anyone
is scrupulously securable for Sally, and thus at \(t\_5\) Sally is
obligated to not kill anyone at \(t\_5\). These stipulations in
Ross's case are derived from the fact that at \(t\_1\) Sally has
an impeccable moral character that will be corrupted through no fault
of her own (by being kidnapped by Satanists). But her moral character
is not corrupted to such an extent that she is unable at \(t\_5\) to
refrain from killing anyone. To emphasize, at \(t\_1\) the best
efficacious intention that Sally can form involves killing one person
at \(t\_5\) whereas at \(t\_5\) the best efficacious intention that
Sally can form involves killing no one at \(t\_5\). Portmore's
securitism thus prescribes an act at some future time, but then does
not prescribe that act once that time is present.



Ross (2012: 87-89) wishes to avoid this implication.
 MWSS
 does not imply that at \(t\_1\) Sally is obligated to kill exactly one
person at \(t\_5\) because whether Sally kills exactly one person at
\(t\_5\) causally depends upon her intentions at \(t\_1\). So, Sally
satisfies the following conditional by not satisfying the first part
of the antecedent: (if whether Sally refrains from killing exactly one
person at \(t\_5\) does not causally depend on the intentions she will
have after \(t\_1\), and if all her maximally preferable, directly
securable options involve killing exactly one person at \(t\_5\), then
she kills exactly one person at \(t\_5)\). Instead, MWSS implies that
at \(t\_1\) (and at \(t\_5)\) Sally is obligated not to kill anyone
because she satisfies the following conditional only by satisfying its
consequent: (if whether Sally kills no one at \(t\_5\) does not
causally depend on the intentions she will have after \(t\_5\), and if
all her maximally preferable, directly securable options involve not
killing anyone at \(t\_5\), then she kills no one at \(t\_5)\).



A proponent of securitism may reply that there's simply nothing
Sally can do at \(t\_1\) that allows her to secure not killing anyone
at \(t\_5\), and thus having an obligation at \(t\_1\) not to kill
anyone at \(t\_5\) concedes too much to possibilism. For, one of the
core intuitions driving securitist views is that we should treat our
non-securable futures in the same way we treat the futures of other
agents; we should hold such futures fixed when determining our present
moral obligations. This thought has led to an expansive discussion of
the way in which actualist-possibilist scenarios raise fundamental
questions about agency and how we are to conceive of our present
selves in relation to our future selves (Louise 2009; Baker 2012).


## 5. Non-Primary Obligations



The discussion up until this point has centered around making sense of
the general notion that an agent ought to do the (non-supererogatory)
best that she is able to do. But some theories hold that an
agent's moral life is more complex than this because an
agent's ability to do less than the (non-supererogatory) best is
also obligatory is some non-primary sense. This approach is motivated
in part by the thought that some wrong actions are better than others.
Michael McKinsey (1979: 391-392) develops this approach,
defending a view with multiple levels of obligation. His view may be
formulated as follows:


* **Levels of Obligation (LO):** \(\phi\_{x,t}\) is a life
sequence from *t* for *x*. Every \(\phi\_{x,t}\) has a rank
\(n (n \ge 1)\) relative to every other life-sequence from *t*
for *x*, where *n* is a positive integer. If \(\phi\_{x,t}\)
is among the optimum life sequences from *t* for *x*, then
the rank of \(\phi\_{x,t} = 1\); if \(\phi\_{x,t}\) is among the second
best such sequences, then the rank of \(\phi\_{x,t} = 2\); and so on.
*x* ought\(\_n\) at *t* to do \(A\_i\) *iff*:


	+ \(A\_i\) is contained in every
	\(\phi\_{x,t}\) of rank *n*.
	+ For every \(\phi\_{x,t}\) which has a
	rank *m* higher than *n* (i.e., where \(m \lt n)\), there is
	an \(A\_j\) such that \(\phi\_{x,t}\) contains \(A\_j\) and *x* will
	not do \(A\_j\).



While McKinsey's formulation of (LO) is rather complicated, the
basic idea is quite simple. According to (LO), an agent
*S*'s primary obligation is identical to the obligation
that possibilists believe *S* has. Additionally, for every
maximal act-set *M* (or a life) that, at *t*, *S* can
perform, if *M* is not identical to the best maximal act-set
that, at *t*, *S* can perform, but is better than the
maximal act-set that *S* will in fact perform, then at *t*
*S* has a moral obligation to perform *M*. To illustrate,
consider this case:


* ***The Buttons*:** At *t* Ben can both
press and refrain from pressing any of the three buttons in front of
him, and doing any of these things comes at little to no cost to Ben.
Pressing no button results in no deaths, pressing the first button
results in one death, pressing the second button results in two
deaths, and pressing the third button results in three deaths. Suppose
that Ben presses the third button, resulting in three deaths.



(LO)
 implies that there are three levels of obligations that Ben fails to
fulfill: his primary obligation to refrain from pressing any button,
his secondary obligation to press the first button, and his tertiary
obligation to press the second button. If Ben were to instead press
the second button, then Ben would have failed to fulfill only two
obligations, viz. the primary obligation to refrain from pressing a
button, and the secondary obligation to press the first button. 



McKinsey's
 (LO)
 is, in one sense, in agreement with possibilism because an
agent's primary obligation is identical to a possibilist
obligation. Moreover, even though (LO) can generate jointly
unfulfillable obligations, (LO) agrees with Jackson and
Pargetter's contextualist actualism that if, in the terminology
of (LO), an agent fulfills her primary obligation, then it's not
the case that the agent violates any non-primary obligations because
the agent simply does not have any non-primary obligations. For
example, if Ben refrains from pressing any button, then according to
(LO) it's not the case that Ben had a secondary obligation to
press the first button, and thus no non-primary obligations are
violated. McKinsey's (LO) is, in a sense, also in agreement with
(non-contextualist) versions of actualism. For example,
Procrastinate's obligation according to non-contextualist
versions of actualism is to [?]decline to review the paper &
not review the paper[?], and, according to McKinsey, this is
Procrastinate's secondary obligation because this act-sequence
is the second best maximal act-sequence (or a part of the second best
maximal act-sequence) that Procrastinate can perform over time. 



Goldman (1978: 205-208) holds that there are exactly two orders
of obligations, one primary and one secondary, and that it is better
to fulfill one's secondary obligation rather than to violate
both obligations. Primary obligations are governed by Goldman's
 (G+),
 and secondary obligations are governed by principles such as
Goldman's (1976)
 (G\*1)
 which, as we have seen in
 section 4,
 does not take into account an agent's moral character that
determines the truth-value of certain synchronic counterfactuals. For
example, in the case of *Professor Procrastinate\**,
Procrastinate's primary obligation is to [?]agree to review
the paper & review the paper[?] because there is an
immediately performable, fully specific simultaneous act-set such
that, if performed, would result in [?]agreeing & reviewing
the paper[?]. By contrast, Procrastinate's secondary
obligation is to [?]decline to review the paper & not review
the paper[?] because Procrastinate's moral character is
such that if Procrastinate were to [?]agree to review[?] at
\(t\_1\), then Procrastinate would harm the student by falsely
promising to review at \(t\_2\). Procrastinate's moral character
is taken into account by her secondary obligation, but not her primary
obligation. As Goldman (1986: 205) notes, it is sometimes useful to
reason in a way that holds fixed our actual moral character, and
positing secondary obligations allows us to reason in this way.
Zimmerman (1986: 70) also subscribes to non-primary obligations and
motivates this position in part on the basis of considerations about
detachment and conditional obligations.


## 6. The Maximalism/Omnism Debate



The issues raised by the actualist/possibilist debate are relevant for
a number of other debates in philosophy as well. As has already been
discussed, whether actualism, possibilism, or some intermediary view
is correct has direct import for various principles in deontic logic,
the correct formulation of act-consequentialism, and for analogous
questions in the philosophy of action. The actualism/possibilism
debate, however, is perhaps most closely connected to the
maximalism/omnism debate. These debates are deeply interrelated. While
both concern questions about the scope of the agent's options,
the maximalism/omnism debate focuses on certain questions about how to
assess these options. Maximalists and omnists disagree about whether
all options should be assessed in terms of their own goodness, or
whether some options should be assessed in relation to the goodness of
other options. Maximalists and omnists disagree about which facts
ground the reasons to perform the relevant options and, as will be
illustrated shortly, are concerned with a wider range of cases than
those in the actualism/possibilism debate.



The maximalism/omnism debate concerns cases where the performance of
one option entails (or implies) the performance of another. Cases such
as *Professor Procrastinate* are but one example.
Procrastinate's [?]accepting the invitation and writing the
review[?] entails [?]accepting the invitation[?]. Not
all examples share Procrastinate's structure, however. Many
examples concern different ways of performing the same option in
different (e.g., more or less precise, better or worse) ways. For
instance, [?]drinking a Coke[?] entails [?]drinking a
soda[?], [?]visiting Uppsala[?] entails
[?]visiting Sweden[?], and [?]kicking someone very
hard[?] entails [?]kicking someone[?].



Now, the central question in the debate concerns how the moral
properties of an option *O* are related to the moral properties
of the options entailed by performing *O*. This abstract question
can be made clearer by considering an example. Suppose that I have
good reason to [?]drink a soda[?] and good reason to
[?]drink a Coke[?]. Those in the maximalism/omnism debate
are interested in whether the reason I have for performing one these
options grounds the reason I have for performing the other. Is it the
case that I have reason to [?]drink a soda[?] in virtue of
my having reason to [?]drink a Coke[?] or vice versa? Or is
there no grounding relation between my reason(s) to perform these
options?



Omnists hold that all options should be directly assessed in terms of
their own goodness. Omnism may be defined more precisely as
follows.


* **Omnism:** All permissible options are permissible
in virtue of having right-making property *p*. The property
*p* is right-making not only for all maximal options, but also
for all non-maximal options. (Portmore 2017a: 431)



In this debate, a maximal option is simply understood as one that is
not entailed by any other option, aside from itself (Brown 2018: 752).
More precisely, a maximal option may be understood as "an option
that is maximally normatively specific in the sense that it is
entailed only by normatively equivalent options", where two
options are normatively equivalent if and only if they are equivalent
in terms of all of the normatively relevant considerations (Portmore
2017a: 428, 2017b: 2955). Any option that is not a maximal option will
be a non-maximal option.



To illustrate, suppose that hedonistic act-utilitarianism is true. To
keep things simple, suppose that the maximal options available to an
agent *S* are [?]drink a Coke[?], [?]drink nothing
while smiling[?], [?]drink nothing while frowning[?],
and [?]drink a Pepsi[?]. Suppose furthermore that
[?]drinking a Coke[?] would generate 5 hedons,
[?]drinking nothing while smiling[?] would generate 1 hedon,
[?]drinking nothing while frowning[?] would generate 0
hedons, and [?]drinking a Pepsi[?] would generate 10 dolors
(or [?]10 hedons). The non-maximal options available to *S*
include [?]drinking a soda[?] and [?]drinking
nothing[?]. Finally, suppose that the following counterfactuals
are true.


1. If *S* were to [?]drink a soda[?], *S* would
[?]drink a Pepsi[?].
2. If *S* were to [?]drink nothing[?], *S* would
[?]drink nothing while smiling[?].



According to omnism, whether it is permissible for *S* to
[?]drink a soda[?] depends on whether [?]drinking a
soda[?] would result in maximizing hedonic utility. Given the
truth of (1), it wouldn't, so omnism entails that
[?]drinking a soda[?] is wrong. Likewise, according to
omnism, whether it is permissible for *S* to [?]drink a
Coke[?] depends on whether *S*'s [?]drinking a
Coke[?] would result in maximizing hedonic utility. It does, so
omnism entails that [?]drinking a Coke[?] is permissible
(and obligatory).



Unlike omnists, maximalists hold that only maximal options should be
assessed in terms of their own goodness. They believe that all
non-maximal options should only be assessed in terms of the goodness
of the relevant maximal options of which they are a part. Maximalism
may be defined more precisely as follows.


* **Maximalism:** Not all permissible options are
permissible in virtue of having right-making property *p*.
(Max\(\_1\)) *p* is right-making for all and only maximal options,
but (Max\(\_2\)) the property of being entailed by a maximal option
that has *p* is right-making for all and only non-maximal options
(Portmore 2017a: 429).



Assuming hedonistic act-utilitarianism once again, according to
maximalism, the deontic status of the maximal options depends on the
outcome of performing each option. According to maximalism, then,
[?]drinking a Coke[?] would be obligatory and every other
maximal option would be impermissible. So, with respect to maximal
options, maximalism and omnism generate the same deontic verdicts. But
now consider what maximalists say about non-maximal options. This is
the point of contention between maximalists and omnists. By contrast
with the omnist's ascription of wrongness to [?]drinking a
soda[?], the maximalist holds that [?]drinking a
soda[?] is obligatory. This is because the obligatory maximal
option is [?]drink a Coke[?] and *S* cannot perform the
maximal option of [?]drinking a Coke[?] without performing
the non-maximal option of [?]drinking a soda[?]. The
non-maximal act [?]drink nothing[?], on the other hand, is
entailed by an impermissible act, namely [?]drink nothing while
smiling[?]. So, maximalism entails that [?]drinking
nothing[?] is impermissible.



Interestingly, omnism has typically been assumed in the literature. It
may have only operated as an unquestioned background assumption until
the groundbreaking work of Bergstrom (1966) and Castaneda
(1968). Goldman (1978) and Bykvist (2002) defend distinct variants of
maximalism. Since then, there have been a few arguments against
maximalism (cf. Gustafsson 2014). Omnism seems to be considered the
default position, though new arguments against omnism and in favor of
maximalism have started to appear in the literature recently (Portmore
2017a,b, forthcoming; Brown 2018). Much of the debate revolves around
the*Problem of Act Versions*. Following Brown (2018: 754) and
Portmore (forthcoming: ch. 4), this problem may be explained by
considering the following three jointly inconsistent principles.



(1)
An agent *S*
 ought to perform an act \(\phi\) if and only if \(\phi\)-ing is her
 best option.
(2)
Rule **(NI)** If \({\vdash} A \rightarrow B\) then
 \({\vdash} \rO(A) \rightarrow \rO(B)\)
(3)
Optimality is *not* closed under implication.



Each of these principles seems quite plausible when considered in
isolation. Principle (1) simply holds that an agent ought to perform
the best option available to her. Assuming hedonistic
act-utilitarianism, the best option(s) will be whichever one(s)
maximize(s) hedonic utility. Principle (2) holds that if an agent is
obligated to perform \(\langle A \rangle\) and her performing
\(\langle A \rangle\) entails her performing \(\langle B \rangle\),
then she is obligated to perform \(\langle B \rangle\). So, if an
agent is obligated to [?]drink a Coke[?] and
[?]drinking a Coke[?] entails [?]drinking a
soda[?], then that agent is obligated to [?]drink a
soda[?]. 



Principle (3) holds that there are cases where an agent
*S*'s obligatory option (e.g., a maximal option) entails
another option (e.g., a non-maximal option) that, if performed, would
*not* result in *S* performing the obligatory maximal
option. Performing the best option of [?]drinking a Coke[?]
entails that *S* [?]drink a soda[?]. But what would in
fact happen if *S* were to [?]drink a soda[?] is that
*S* would [?]drink a Pepsi[?] and [?]drinking a
Pepsi[?] is not *S*'s best option. That is, in fact,
the worst option.



Maximalists have objected to omnism on the grounds that it, in
conjunction with (2) and (3), entails a contradiction (Portmore
forthcoming: ch. 4). Given omnism, *S* is obligated to
[?]drink a Coke[?] because performing that act is
*S*'s best option. *S*'s [?]drinking a
Coke[?] entails *S*'s [?]drinking a soda[?].
So, given (2), *S* is also obligated to [?]drink a
soda[?]. However, recall that this case illustrates principle
(3). If *S* were to [?]drink a soda[?], *S* would
[?]drink a Pepsi[?]. Given this, [?]drinking a
soda[?] would not result in *S* performing her best option.
So, omnism also entails that it is impermissible for *S* to
[?]drink a soda[?]. Hence the contradiction. Omnism combined
with (2) and (3) entail both that *S* is obligated to
[?]drink a soda[?] and that it's impermissible for
*S* to [?]drink a soda[?]. To avoid this contradiction,
omnists must give up (2) or (3). Omnists such as Jackson and Pargetter
have given up (2).



Maximalists reject omnism, which allows them to consistently accept
(2) and (3), principles thought to have strong independent motivation.
Maximalists, then, give up (1) to avoid the contradiction. According
to the maximalist, sometimes agents are obligated to perform
non-maximal options (e.g., [?]drink a soda[?]) that are not
their best option in virtue of the fact that they are obligated to
perform their best maximal option (e.g., [?]drink a Coke[?])
and performing their best maximal option entails performing a
suboptimal non-maximal option. In short, the maximalist responds to
the *Problem of Act Versions* by giving up (1), while omnists
respond by giving up (2). As may already be clear, some motivations
for, and against, omnism parallel those of actualism, while some
motivations for, and against, maximalism parallel those of securitism
and possibilism. Whichever considerations settle one of these debates
will likely settle (or at least significantly bear on) the other.


## 7. Conclusion



The actualism/possibilism (and the maximalism/omnism) debate in ethics
grew out of a debate concerning the problem that identifying act
alternatives poses for act-consequentialism. The debate, in its
present form, may be traced back to the work of Holly Goldman's
and Jordan Howard Sobel's independent articulations, and
defenses of, actualism. Early forms of actualism held that whether an
agent is obligated to perform an act roughly depends on whether what
*would* happen if the agent performed that act is better than
what would happen if the agent were to perform any alternative act at
the time in question. Contrast this with possibilism, which holds that
whether an agent is obligated to perform an act depends on whether
that act is part of the best maximal act-set the agent *could*
(not *would*) perform over the course of her life. These are
the "extreme" versions of actualism and possibilism
respectively. To handle cases concerning synchronic acts, and to avoid
having her view prescribe incompatible obligations, Goldman amended
actualism by building a control condition into the definition in her
(1978) essay. This revised actualism,
 (G+),
 along with Sobel's
 (S),
 only holds fixed the acts of an agent that are not presently under
the agent's control. This change proved influential and inspired
various versions of this view, which came to be collectively referred
to as securitism. Securitist views occupy a middle ground between
"extreme" forms of actualism and possibilism. A variety of
other views do too, including McKinsey's (1979)
levels-of-obligation view and Carlson's (1995, 1999) view. There
is not yet a consensus about which view, if any, is the most
plausible. Of course, this should not be surprising since the
actualism/possibilism (and the maximalism/omnism) debate is,
relatively speaking, still quite new.