## 1. Life



Simon of Faversham was born circa 1260 in Faversham, a seaport town in
Kent,
 England.[1]
 He became master of arts at the University of Oxford, but he taught
at the Arts faculty of the University of Paris in the1280s, where
probably most of his works were produced, even if he may have revised
some of them after his return to Oxford in 1289. Later in his life
Simon became a Doctor of Theology at the University of Oxford. After
his return to England, he held several clerical offices: he became
sub-deacon at Croydon in 1289, and deacon at Bocking and rector of
Preston in 1290. Simon became chancellor of the University of Oxford
in 1304. In 1305, archbishop Winchelsey named him archdeacon of
Canterbury, the highest ecclesiastical appointment in England for
non-priests. After giving up this post, Simon was named rector of
Reculver, but soon after he lost his appointment to the candidate of
the Papal Curia. Simon died in 1306 in a trip to the Papal curia,
where he was going to fight the loss of his appointment as rector of
Reculver.


## 2. Writings



Simon's philosophical corpus consists mostly of commentaries on
the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. His logical works are undoubtedly
the most thoroughly studied, and consist of the following
commentaries:


* 1. *Quaestiones libri Porphyrii* (=*In Isag.*)
* 2. *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum* (=*In
Cat.*)
* 3. *Quaestiones libri Perihermenias* (=*In
Perih.*)
* 4. *Quaestiones super librum Priorum*
* 5. *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum* (two
redactions)
* 6. *Dicta super librum Topicorum*
* 7. *Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum* (two series of
questions)
* 8. *Sophisma 'Universale est intentio'*
* 9. *Quaestiones super universalia*



Most of these are edited. 4, 6 and 9 are only extant in manuscript
form, but there are partial editions of 4 and
 6.[2]



Simon's works on Aristotle's natural philosophy are
considerably less studied, and consist of the following
commentaries:


* 10. *Quaestiones super libro Physicorum* (two series of
questions)
* 11. *Quaestiones super librum De anima* (=*In De
an.*)
* 12. *Quaestiones super parva naturalia* herein
	+ 12.1 *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia;*
	+ 12.2 *Quaestiones super libro De longitudine et brevitate
	vitae;*
	+ 12.3 *Quaestiones super libro De iuventute et senectute;*
	+ 12.4 *Quaestiones super libro De inspiratione et
	respiratione*
* 13. *Recollectiones super librum Meteorum*
* 14. *In De generatione et corruptione* (doubtful)
* 15. *Quaestiones super librum De motu animalium*



Most of these are extant only in manuscript form. Only 12.1 has been
fully edited (Ebbesen 2013). The questions on *De anima* III
(Sharp 1934) are also edited, although only from one manuscript.
Finally, there are partial editions of 10 and
 15.[3]



## 3. Logic


### 3.1 The Subject Matter and the Division of Logic



Like most thirteenth-century commentators on the *Logica vetus*
(Boethius's Latin translations of Porphyry's
*Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories* and *De
interpretatione*, together with Boethius's commentaries on
these texts), Simon of Faversham begins his commentary with a
prologue, which treats of the subject matter of logic and the division
of logic, corresponding to the division of Aristotle's
*Organon* into eight(!)
 treatises.[4]



Simon belongs to the logical tradition of the last quarter of the
thirteenth-century, which considers the subject matter of logic to be
the methods of knowledge acquisition (*modi sciendi*): the
intellectual operations whereby we can proceed from something known to
the knowledge of something unknown. These methods are definition,
division, and, most importantly, syllogistic reasoning (*In
Isag*.: prologue). Accordingly, logic is neither a purely
theoretical science, as it does not consider essences or quiddities,
nor a purely practical science, as its aim is not practical action. As
a science, logic is rather instrumental to the proper functioning of
the theoretical sciences (*In Isag.*: q.1).



As it is commonly the case, Simon also holds that logic is about
logical intentions (cf. *In Isag.*: q.2). But Simon's
logic of intentions is not nearly as developed as what we find in
later masters such as Radulphus Brito. Logical intentions are notions
that can be applied to the knowledge of quiddities. According to
Simon, the intellect forms these intentions from the ways things
present themselves to it (i.e., from *apparentia*). Thereafter,
the intellect attributes different intentions to different things
according to different properties. For instance, after having noticed
that some ways of being are common to several things, the intellect
forms the logical intention of species, after which the intellect can
apply this intention to the concept of man and express this act with
the assertion 'man is a species'. Consequently, despite
not being a theoretical science, logic is ultimately grounded in the
properties of things from which logical intentions are taken (*In
Isag*.: q.2). 



As regards the division of logic, which is more precisely a division
of syllogistic reasoning, Simon's commentary is noteworthy in
one regard: following in the footsteps of Giles of Rome, Simon
considers rhetoric and poetics to be parts of logic, i.e., to function
by way of syllogisms. A syllogistic argument is divided based on the
varying degrees of certainty of its premises (*In Isag*.:
prologue). It is also remarkable that, in his commentary on the
*Sophistical Refutations*, Simon includes the alethic modality
of the conclusion as a further criterion for the division of
syllogistic reasoning (*In SE*: prologue). Hence, if the
starting point of reasoning is a mere suspicion
 (*suspicio),*[5]
 the syllogistic reasoning is rhetorical and the conclusion will also
be a suspicion (such reasoning is dealt with in the
*Rhetoric*). If it "proceeds from fictitious elements
that portray horror or pleasure" (*In Isag*.: prologue),
the reasoning is poetic and the conclusion will be an estimation
(*aestimatio*) (such reasoning is dealt with in the
*Poetics*). If it proceeds from probable knowledge, the
reasoning is dialectical and the conclusion will be an opinion or
belief (such reasoning is dealt with in the *Topics*). If it
proceeds from the knowledge of essential causes and proper attributes,
the reasoning is demonstrative and the conclusion will be certain and
infallible knowledge (such reasoning is dealt with in the
*Posterior Analytics*). Finally, if it proceeds from knowledge
that seems to be true, but is not, the reasoning is sophistical and
the conclusion will be an error (*deceptio*) (such reasoning is
dealt with in the *Sophistical Refutations*).



In addition to this division of syllogistic reasoning into five kinds,
logic also studies common aspects of syllogistic reasoning, the moods
and figures of the *Prior Analytics*.



Finally, logic is also concerned with the simple thoughts out of which
the premises of syllogistic reasoning are composed. In the
*Categories*, those simple thoughts are considered insofar as
they are related to a category of being. In the *De
interpretatione* those same concepts are considered insofar as
they are the subject and predicate of a mental composition or division
(*In Isag*.: prologue).


### 3.2 Signification



Simon also joins in the medieval discussion of the signification of
words--whether they signify things or thoughts--a discussion
prompted by Aristotle's claim in the first chapter of the *De
interpretatione* that words signify thoughts. Simon clearly
opposes the Boethian tradition, which defends the immediate
signification of thoughts, and sides with those who claim that words
signify
 things.[6]



Following a division first attested in Porphyry, Simon divides words
into first and second imposition. Words of first imposition are given
as names of quiddities, which have being independently of a knowing
subject. Words of second imposition are given as names of logical
intentions, the being of which depends on a knowing subject. Words of
second imposition clearly signify thoughts, so the controversy does
not concern them. Rather, it concerns words of first imposition, such
as 'man' and 'stone'.



For Simon, words of first imposition do not signify a thought but a
quiddity. His argument goes as follows:


1. 'x' signifies *x* if and only if
'x' provokes the thought of *x* in the listener
*and* expresses the thought of *x* in the speaker. (Cf.
*De int.* 1 and 3)
2. 'man' does not provoke the thought of the thought of
man in the listener, nor does it express the thought of the thought of
man in the speaker. If it did, real predicates such as
'run' could not be verified of any man because obviously
the act of running cannot be attributed to the thought of man.
3. Therefore, 'man' does not signify the thought of man;
and generally, 'x' does not signify the thought of
*x*.
4. On the contrary, 'man' provokes the thought of man in
the listener and expresses the thought of man in the speaker.
5. Therefore, 'man' signifies man; and generally,
'x' signifies *x*--a quiddity.



It is remarkable that, in Simon's view, 'x'
signifies *x* only if both the expression-condition for the
speaker and the comprehension-condition for the listener are met. This
double condition for signification, typical of the last quarter of the
thirteenth century, represents a break with respect to the more
expression-oriented notion of signification common in the second and
third quarters of the century (Marmo 1999). 



Now, following the Avicennian idea that being--mental or
actual--is an accident of essences, Simon also makes clear that
'x' does not signify quiddities according to their
existence in the external world. In other words, 'man'
does not signify a particular man, but man as a quiddity. This part of
the argument goes as follows:


1. 'x' signifies the same thing the definition of
'x' signifies.
2. The definition of 'x' does not signify a particular
thing, but a thing only with regard to its essential features and
regardless of accidents such as external or mental existence.
3. Therefore, 'x' does not signify a particular
*x*, but *x* with regard to its essential features and
regardless of accidents such as external or mental existence.



Consequently, Simon also holds that words of first imposition the
referents of which are all destroyed do not lose their signification,
because, for a word to signify, its significate--the
quiddity--simply needs to be thought, and a quiddity can continue
to be thought even after the destruction of all its instances.


### 3.3 Truth and Empty Reference



Simon also takes part in the medieval discussion of whether truth is a
property of thoughts or things. Simon gives a solution typical of the
period, according to which truth is above all a property of the
knowing subject who is in possession of a true thought (*In
Perih.*: q.6).



Simon accepts the common medieval definition of a true thought as one
that is in agreement (*adequatio*) with things, an agreement
determined by the way things are. However, unlike other
thirteenth-century masters of arts (e.g., Robert Kilwardby and
Radulphus Brito), Simon maintains that this agreement concerns the
second, and composite, operation of the intellect--composition
and division--as well as the first, and simple, one--the
apprehension of quiddities (*In Perih*.: q.6). Hence, while
other masters hold that truth can only obtain between composite
objects (i.e., composite thoughts and composite things), Simon holds
that, since the intellectual apprehension of a quiddity is naturally
in agreement with this quiddity, it is also susceptible of being true
(*In Perih*.: q.6). Regarding the truth of composite items,
however, Simon's position is remarkably elegant, as is evident
from his discussion of empty reference in his commentary on the
*Prior Analytics*.



Simon's position as regards empty reference is crucially
different from the one held by modists such as Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito,
who claim that the truth-makers of essential predications, as
'man is an animal', are real things in the external world,
so that 'man is an animal' would be false if no man
 existed.[7]
 Simon, however, claims that it is true, supporting his claim with a
careful account of truth-determination. According to him, for an
essential predication such as 'man is an animal' to be
true, it suffices that the quiddities expressed by the subject and the
predicate are understood and signified. They must be understood
because 'man is an animal' expresses the mental
composition of man and animal, which evidently requires man and animal
to be understood (Ebbesen 1987: 159). They must also be signified
because otherwise, 'man is an animal' would have no
content at all--it cannot simply express an empty thought.
However, 'man' and 'animal' do not need to
refer to or signify real things in the external world.



The latter claim is shown as follows: assertions of the form '*S*
is
 *P*'[8]
 involve the relevant mode of being of the significate of the
predicate (henceforth 'of the predicate'). In assertions
where real accidents are predicated (e.g., being white, running,
etc.), the relevant mode of being of the predicate is actual
existence; therefore, their truth-makers must be real things in the
external world (Ebbesen 1987: 160). Likewise, in assertions where
logical intentions are predicated (e.g., belonging to a species or
genus), the relevant mode of being of the predicate is mental
existence; therefore, their truth-makers are thoughts. But in
essential predication, the relevant mode of being is neither actual
nor mental existence, because essences are notionally independent of
any sort of existence; therefore, the truth-makers are simply the
quiddities understood and subsequently signified by the subject and
predicate (Ebbesen 1987: 160). Therefore, 'man is an
animal' is true even when no real man exists, simply because
being an animal is a definitional part of being a man. 


## 4. Psychology


### 4.1 Definition of the Soul and Body/Soul Relation



Simon's general psychology is standard Aristotelian doctrine, in
many aspects derived from Albert the Great's and Aquinas's
psychological teachings. However, as we shall see, Simon sometimes
conflates their views, suggesting he was not entirely aware of their
opposition. Thus, Simon holds that the rational soul is the
substantial form of the human body because it is that on account of
which humans can perform their proper operation, i.e., intellection.
However, unlike the substantial form of purely material things, the
substantial form of a human being does not emerge from a natural
arrangement of matter, but is given to the human body as its
perfection by an external source, i.e., by the first cause. Simon then
describes the soul both as the perfection (like Albert) and as the
substantial form (like Aquinas) of the human body, but seems unaware
of the conflict between Albert's and Aquinas's positions.
For Albert, who wants to avoid psychological materialism, the soul is
the perfection, and not the form, of the human body; a soul that is
given to it by God. For Aquinas, however, who wants to make the
rational soul the defining element in a human being, the soul must be
the *intrinsic* substantial form of the human body, which is
nonetheless separable after the body's death. It remains unclear
whether Simon intentionally conflated the two views, and if so,
whether he thought the two views could be somehow reconciled.



The rational soul has three faculties--vegetative, sensitive and
intellectual--of which the sensitive and the intellectual are
cognitive. The sensitive faculty is bodily because its operations
fully depend on bodily organs. It includes the external
senses--touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight--as well as
the so-called internal senses--common sense, *phantasia*
and memory. By contrast, the intellectual faculty is separate, i.e.,
with respect to the body, because it does not depend for its operation
on bodily organs, even though it is triggered by a representation
obtained from the senses. Accordingly, Simon, like Albert and Aquinas,
rejects the position of those who, like Avicenna and Averroes, posit
some kind of metaphysical separation of the intellect from the human
body.


### 4.2 Metaphysics of the Intellect



According to Simon, the intellect is the faculty of the rational soul
whereby it thinks. Simon, who follows the Aristotelian doctrine
closely, holds this faculty to be immaterial, passive, and separate.
It is separate because it does not need to use an organ in order to
perform its operation of intellection. It is also passive, but not in
the same sense matter is passive. In fact, there are two senses in
which something is passive: it can receive forms with or without
undergoing qualitative change. Like matter, the intellect receives
forms because it needs an intelligible object on which to perform its
proper operation. But matter is passive in a further and more
fundamental sense: when brought to act by a form, it suffers
qualitative change. The intellect, however, does not suffer
qualitative change, but is simply actualized. Accordingly, the
intellect is passive simply because it is potential with respect to
the act of intellection. And precisely because it does not suffer
qualitative change when it is brought to act, the intellect is also
said to be immaterial.



The intellectual faculty, i.e., the intellect, comprises a passive
capacity--the possible intellect--and an active
capacity--the agent intellect, which is the intrinsic active
principle of the act of intellection (*In De an*.: q.13). The
proper operation of the passive capacity is apprehension, i.e., the
assimilation of quiddities through the reception of intelligible
forms. In turn, the proper operation of the active capacity is
abstraction, i.e., the production of intelligible forms which trigger
the operation of the possible intellect (*In De an*.:
q.13).


### 4.3 Intellection as Abstraction and Apprehension



Intellection is the proper operation of an intellect that comprises
both a passive and an active capacity. Hence, the psychological
mechanisms of intellection include the abstraction performed by the
agent intellect and the apprehension produced in the possible
intellect (*In De an*.: q.16).



The primary object of intellection is a quiddity presented to the
intellect in the form of an intelligible species (*In De an*.:
q.10). Since forms are material and particular in both external things
and sensory representations (*phantasmata*), and since the
intelligible object must be immaterial and universal, the intellect
must produce an immaterial object to represent those forms under the
aspect of universality--the intelligible species. The intellect
does this through the act of abstraction performed by its active
capacity, the agent intellect (*In De an.*: q.12).



The agent intellect endows the quiddity with intelligibility: through
its act of abstraction it makes universal and immaterial the material
and particular quiddity in the sensory representation (*In De
an*.: q.12 and q.16). Simon, however, wavers between different
descriptions of the act of abstraction. On one hand, he describes it
as similar to the act of illumination, so that just as light enables
the eye to see and the visible object to be seen, so the agent
intellect enables the possible intellect to think and the quiddity in
the sensory representation to be thought (*In De an*.: q.12).
Consequently, he seems to consider intellection as similar to the act
of vision. Nonetheless, the similarity is not complete, because the
visible object is visible in itself, whereas the quiddity in the
sensory representation must be made intelligible by the agent
intellect. On the other hand, Simon describes the act of abstraction
as the extraction of an intelligible species from the sensory
representation, a species that is 're-positioned' in the
possible intellect, thus actualizing its act of apprehension (*In
De an*.: q.16). Later commentators would reject one or the other
model of abstraction depending on the extent of their realism about
essences. Thus, the Averroist master John of Jandun rejects the
illumination model because there is no way for something that exists
in a bodily organ to be made universal, whether by illumination or
otherwise, while remaining in that organ. Radulphus Brito, however,
rejects the 're-positioning' model because it fails to
explain the transfer of a form from the material to the immaterial
realm. Simon, it seems, is again unaware of the conflicts each model
faces, as well as of the difficulties that would arise from holding
both.


### 4.4 Dreams and Divination Through Dreams



Since Simon's commentary on the *Parva naturalia* does
not contain commentaries on *De sensu* and *De memoria*,
the best place to reconstruct his views on the physiological and
psychological mechanisms of sensory cognition is his commentary on
*De somno et vigilia*, which also covers *De insomniis*
and *De divinatione per somnum*. Question 13\* of this
commentary provides broad accounts of the physiological and
psychological mechanisms of dreams and divination in dreams (ed.
Ebbesen 2013). 



According to Simon, dreams are produced by the common sense from
images (*idola*) sent to it by the *phantasia*. Dreams,
however, have different origins, stemming either from the human being
himself or from celestial bodies. If from the human being, they either
stem from his body or soul. Dreams stem from someone's body when
the powers of a bodily organ are affected by the choleric or
phlegmatic humors (two of the four bodily fluids in Hippocratic
medical doctrine). When the organs are thus affected, the
*phantasia* forms images that are in agreement with those
fluids and sends them to the common sense. A person can then dream
that she is on fire, for example, if the choleric humor is dominant.
Dreams stem from someone's soul when during sleep the soul is
affected by a memory, e.g., of a friend who is far away. A person can
then have a melancholic dream about her friend.



Dreams with their origin in the celestial bodies explain the
possibility of divination in dreams. Such dreams originate from an
influx the human body receives from the celestial bodies. Thereafter,
the *phantasia* forms images in agreement with the influx and
sends them to the common sense. When the organ of the common sense is
affected by those images, the common sense produces likenesses of
things that will happen. Thus, thanks to the influx of the celestial
bodies, humans can foresee future things in dreams, for instance,
related to war or the fertility of the land. According to Simon, who
follows in Averroes's footsteps, this sort of dream is divinely
given to humans because they lack the cognitive insight to know future
things that are useful or harmful. The premonitory dream, however,
does not provide an exact sign of the future thing. In fact, the
diviner must interpret her dream in order to judge what the dream is
supposed to signify. Since divination is part of astrology, a good
interpretation requires that one understand properly both the
mechanisms of dreams and celestial bodies (Ebbesen 2013: 144). When
properly interpreted, divination in dreams provides accurate
information about the future:



> 
> 
> ... it is infallibly true that the images formed by the
> phantastic power [i.e., the *phantasia*] are signs of such
> effects, and that these effects occur by necessity unless a stronger
> motion supervenes, which ... hinders those effects ...
> (Ebbesen 2013:
>  145)[9]
> 
> 
> 



So, unless something unexpected happens that changes the course of
events, a properly interpreted dream originating from the celestial
bodies is an almost certain indication that a useful or harmful future
event will take place.


## 5. Metaphysics



Simon did not write a commentary on Aristotle's
*Metaphysics*, or, if he did, it did not survive. However, his
positions on some crucial metaphysical discussions can be found in his
commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on
Aristotle's *Categories*. Here we will sketch his views
on two related issues: universals and individuals, and essence and
being.


### 5.1 Universals and the Principle of Individuation



According to Simon, universality is a notion the intellect attributes
to some quiddities that exhibit the capacity to inform several
individuals. Take, for instance, Socrates. Socrates presents himself
as a being endowed with reason and sensation. The soul realizes that
reason and sensation are found in multiple individuals, so it takes
being a rational animal--being a man--as a unified thing
that is proper to many individuals. So, on one hand, *being a
man* really inheres in Socrates, and as such it exists only
particularly. On the other hand, the intellect considers *being a
man* as a unity that can occur in several individuals, and as such
*being a man* is a universal, and more specifically, a species.
Following in the footsteps of Avicenna, Simon considers two modes of
being of quiddities: a particular mode in individuals and a mental
mode as the content of concepts to which the notion of universality is
applied. In this sense, universals are merely notional or
intellectual, as everything that exists in the external world is
particular:



> 
> 
> ... man according to existence outside the soul is not a species,
> because according to external existence it is particular, but it is a
> species according to existence in the soul. In fact, the intellect
> grounds the intention of the species in the consideration of the
> nature of man as one in many. (*In Isag*.:
>  q.4)[10]
> 
> 
> 



In other words, universality is a mode of understanding such
quiddities as exhibit the capacity to inform several individuals:



> 
> 
> ... we must not posit a universal man because he exists
> universally. Rather, [man] is universal because it is understood
> universally, when [the intellect] sets aside all the individuating
> conditions. (*In Isag*.:
>  q.5)[11]
> 
> 
> 



It is also noteworthy that the quiddity need not actually inform
several individuals. Indeed, Simon also holds that the intellect can
apply the notion of species to a quiddity informing only one
individual, as in the case of the sun or the moon. Simon grounds his
position not only on the examples of these celestial bodies but also
with the following argument:


1. If a species required several actual instances, this would be
either as regards essence or as regards being.
2. Not as regards essence, because being instantiated in one or in
many is not included in the definition of a quiddity.
3. Nor as regards being, because from the example of celestial
bodies, it is evident that a quiddity can sufficiently be in only one
individual.
4. Therefore, a species does not require several actual instances of
the quiddity. (*In Isag*.: q.26)



In sublunary beings, however, the species is in fact always
instantiated in several individuals. Simon's explanation of this
fact also reveals his position on the principle of individuation.
According to him, in sublunary beings a single individual is never the
actualization of the whole matter that can be actualized by its
nature:



> 
> 
> Why are there several instances of sublunary beings? ... because
> all the matter pertaining to one species is not found in one
> individual. ... But in superior beings all the matter pertaining
> to one species is found in one individual. (*In Isag*.:
>  q.26)[12]
> 
> 
> 



The multiplication of individuals of the same kind is caused by the
existence of several chunks of matter that can be actualized by the
same nature through a quantitative division of matter (*In
Isag*.: q.26). But this is only the principle of individuation of
sublunary, material, beings. Superior, immaterial, beings are
fundamentally individual, as Simon tells us in his commentary on
*De anima*:



> 
> 
> ... particulars are twofold: some by matter, some by subsistence
> (the intelligences are particular in the latter way). Hence, I say
> that my intellect is particular, not by matter, but by subsistence,
> inasmuch as it is a power subsistent per se and not the act of a body.
> (*In De an*.:
>  q.8)[13]
> 
> 
> 



Simon seems to hold a twofold account of individuation: there is
individuation by a quantitative division of matter, which explains the
individuation of material beings; and individuation by subsistence,
which explains the individuation of immaterial beings such as
celestial bodies, intelligences and the human intellect. Simon
undoubtedly introduces his twofold account to circumvent the
Averroistic solution to the question of the individuation of superior
beings via the introduction of spiritual matter.


### 5.2 Essence and Being



In question 20 of his commentary on Aristotle's
*Categories*, Simon argues that substances are either compound
or simple. In addition, all created substances are a composition of
essence and being. Compound substances are also composed of matter and
form. The reason why all created substances are composed of essence
and being is that being is not part of their essence, but given to
them extrinsically by the first being. Thus, Simon strongly suggests
that he is committed to the real distinction between essence and
being.



However, as John Longeway pointed out in an earlier version of this
entry, Simon changes his mind about this. This change is evident in
question 49 of his second commentary on the *Posterior
Analytics*, where he addressed the question whether being is
something added to essence. Here, Simon objects Aquinas's claim
that being is something added to essence with the following argument:



1. If added being is something real, then it is actual.
2. So, it is either a first or a second actuality.
3. Not a first, because a first actuality is not different from the
essence.
4. Not a second, because a second actuality is an operation that
presupposes actual being.
5. Moreover, it cannot be a third actuality, because this is
contrary to Aristotelian doctrine (furthermore, it would lead to an
infinite regress, as Radulphus Brito would point out).
6. Therefore, added being is not something real. (Longeway 2000:
7-8)



Even so, Simon still holds that being is something added to created
beings. But how, if not as something real? Since we can understand
what a thing is without considering its possible modes of being (i.e.,
actual, mental etc.), it seems that there is indeed a distinction
between essence and being (cf. Longeway 2000: 9). So, the distinction
is either notional or real. It is not real, as was shown with the
argument above. Therefore, the distinction must be notional: since the
definition of an essence does not include being at all, being must be
a notion added to this definition, a notion that refers to the
relation of a substance to its cause (cf. Longeway 2000: 10-11).
Hence, we can think of a substance as some kind of thing (e.g., a man)
according to its essence (*esse essentiae*), but we can also
think of it as something that exists in a causally ordered reality,
according to its being in an effect (*esse in effectu*) (cf.
Longeway 2000: 13).


### 5.3 Predication of Being



Finally, in question 27 of his commentary on the *Categories*,
Simon straightforwardly opts for the analogy of the predication of
being across the ten Aristotelian categories. Being is not univocally
predicated as the genus of the categories because it is not univocally
predicated of substance and accident. In fact, accidents do not have
being without qualification because they only have quiddity in
relation to substances, and so their being depends on the being of
substances. But being is not purely equivocal with respect to
substance and accident either, because accidents have being in a
certain respect thanks to their relation to substances. Being, then,
is analogous to substance and accident: it is primarily predicated of
substances and secondarily predicated of accidents.