## 1. Interpretations of the Normativity Thesis


### 1.1 Metaphysical Questions



Normativism is a claim about the *nature* of meaning/content.
According to normativism, there cannot be meaning/content without
norms, where the impossibility is metaphysical, conceptual, or both. A
first question thus is: which is prior--norms or
meanings/contents?



Read metaphysically, the question is: Are certain norms valid, or in
force, *because* certain things such as linguistic expressions
and intentional states have certain meanings/contents? Or do such
things have meaning/content *because* some norms are in force?
We shall distinguish between meaning/content
"*engendered*" (ME/CE) normativity and
meaning/content *determining* (MD/CD) normativity (cf.
Gluer & Wikforss 2009). MD/CD norms are such that they
metaphysically determine, ground, or constitute meaning/content; here,
the norms are prior. ME/CE normativity is normativity engendered by,
or consequent upon, meaning/content, regardless of how the latter is
 determined.[1]



MD/CD normativism aims at answering "foundational"
questions and providing metaphysical explanation: In virtue of what do
linguistic expressions/intentional states have meaning/content?
Metaphysical explanation of \(X\) by means of \(Y\) requires that
\(X\) at least *supervenes* upon
 \(Y\).[2]
 Supervenience relations involve three elements: a set of supervenient
entities \(S\_E\), a set of entities forming the supervenience base
\(S\_B\), and a principle according to which what is in \(S\_B\)
determines what is in \(S\_E\) (a function from \(S\_B\) to \(S\_E)\).
Whether supervenience suffices for metaphysical explanation or not, an
explanation will therefore not be complete unless the principle of
determination is
 specified.[3]
 When it comes to meaning, this is arguably one of the most important
lessons of Wittgenstein's so-called rule-following
considerations; as long as only the supervenience base is specified,
its elements can be mapped onto meanings in any old way, thus leaving
meaning completely indeterminate (cf. Pagin 2002, Gluer
 2018).[4]


### 1.2 Varieties of Normativity



Normativism claims that nothing can have meaning/content unless norms
of a certain kind are valid, or in
 force.[5]
 A second basic question thus is: what kind of norm would that be?



The most basic distinction relevant here is that between *norms for
action* and *norms of
 being*.[6]
 Norms of being are often associated with evaluations; they tell us
that a certain state of affairs *ought to obtain*, i.e., is
valuable or good in a certain sense. Norms for action, on the other
hand, tell us *what to do.* Both can either be *prima
facie* (or *pro tanto*) or categorical (cf. Ross 1930
[1987]). *Prima facie* norms or evaluations can be overridden
or outweighed (by other norms, obligations or evaluations),
categorical ones cannot. Both norms of action and values can also be
categorized by provenance: There are the norms of morals, etiquette,
and prudence, the laws of the state, and the rules of games.
Analogously, values of different kinds can be distinguished. The
normativity of meaning/content typically is construed in terms of
norms for action.



Concerning norms for action, we can distinguish between instrumental
and non-instrumental norms. An instrumental norm tells us what to do
in order to reach a certain goal, where the relation between means and
end is contingent. Its normative force for an agent is contingent upon
the agent's goals. An example would be:



(D)
If you want to make the hut habitable, you ought to heat it (von
Wright 1963: 10).


Among non-instrumental norms we can further distinguish between
prescriptions and other norms for action, and thirdly between
constitutive and non-constitutive rules or
 norms.[7]



Prescriptions can typically be formulated in deontic vocabulary, i.e.,
in terms of what is prescribed, forbidden, or
 allowed/proscribed.[8]
 They can be conditional (CP) or unconditional (P). For conditional
prescriptions, we can distinguish between those where the deontic
operator ("ought", "should") takes wide scope
over the conditional \((\CP\_w )\), and those where it takes narrow
scope \((\CP\_n )\):



(P)
You ought to do \(X\).
\((\CP\_w )\)
You ought to (if \(C\) then do \(X)\).
\((\CP\_n )\)
If \(C\), you ought to (do \(X)\).


The main difference between \((\CP\_w )\) and \((\CP\_n )\) is that on
\((\CP\_w )\), there are two ways of discharging your obligation: by
doing \(X\) or by making it the case that \(C\) is not fulfilled. Not
so on \((\CP\_n )\): once \(C\) is fulfilled, you must do \(X\). Only
on \((\CP\_n )\), that is, can the consequent be detached.



For prescriptions, two principles are usually taken to hold
intuitively. These are the principle that *ought* implies
*can*, and the principle that *ought* implies the
possibility of violation. Both principles are somewhat controversial,
but have initial plausibility as there would not seem to be much point
to prescribing, forbidding, or allowing impossible things (cf.
Williamson 2000: 241).



Many norms or rules concern types of action or activities that exist
independently of them. Constitutive rules or norms, by contrast, in
some sense "create" the very actions or activities they
regulate. Rules of games are prime examples. According to Midgley
(1959) and Searle (1969; 33ff), constitutive rules typically, and
naturally, can be put into the following form:



(CR)
In \(C\), doing \(X\) counts as doing \(Y\).


According to this suggestion, constitutive rules tell us that, in a
certain context \(C\) (for instance, a game of soccer), an action of
type \(Y\) (for instance, scoring a goal) can be performed by means of
performing an action of a different type \(X\) (for instance, kicking
the ball into a netted box). According to Searle, constitutive rules
play an important role in social ontology: "institutional
facts" (facts concerning social statuses such as being money,
having meaning, or being an assertion) can be explained in terms of
collective acceptance of rules of this kind (cf. Searle 1995, 2010).
Other accounts of social institutions in terms of rules constitutive
of social statuses have stressed the normative consequences of having
a such a status (cf., e.g., Ransdell 1971, Hindriks 2009).



Despite its predominance in the literature, the characterization of
constitutive rules by means of forms like
 (CR)
 is too narrow, however. There are prescriptions that are constitutive
of certain games--for instance, that spearing is forbidden is
constitutive of ice-hockey--and these do not naturally fit the
(CR) form. It is better to characterize a set of rules or norms as
constitutive of a certain type of action/activity \(A\) iff \(A\)
cannot be performed, or engaged in, unless these norms are in force
(cf. Pagin 1987; Gluer & Pagin 1998; Kaluzinski 2018;
Reiland 2020; Garcia-Carpintero
 2022).[9]



With these distinctions in place, we can proceed to mapping the
debates concerning the normativity of meaning/content. Given that the
norms in question are supposed to be essential to meaning/content, we
can already now see that what we are looking for are non-instrumental
norms of purely semantic provenance. MD/CD norms will moreover have to
be of the constitutive kind.


## 2. Meaning



We have distinguished two ways in which normativism about meaning can
be understood: ME normativism and MD normativism. The difference
between the two, again, is that the MD normativist is committed to the
metaphysical priority of norms, since the norms are said to determine
meaning, while the ME normativist remains neutral on the issue of
meaning determination. Both versions of meaning normativism, however,
claim that the following is both necessary, and essential to, an
expression \(e\)'s having meaning (for a speaker, or group of
speakers, \(S\) at a time \(t)\):



(M)
\(e\) means \(M\) for \(S\) at \(t\) only if a norm for \(e\) is
in force for \(S\) at \(t\).


Historically, MD normativism is associated with Wittgenstein (in
particular the "Middle Period" writings) and the tradition
of appealing to linguistic conventions, prominent in the 1950s and
1960s (in the writings of Grice, Lewis, Searle, and Strawson for
instance). ME normativism appeared on the philosophical scene more
recently, and is associated with Saul Kripke's book on
Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations (Kripke 1982). In
the book Kripke presents us with a meaning skeptic who challenges the
very idea that there are facts in virtue of which our terms have a
meaning. Kripke's skeptic puts down certain constraints on the
range of facts that could serve to determine meaning, among these that
the essentially normative character of meaning has to be respected.
The meaning determining fact, Kripke argues, must be such that it
follows from it how the term *ought* to be applied (1982: 11).
Equipped with this normativity constraint the skeptic goes on to argue
against all theories that fail to accommodate the required normative
dimension of meaning, in particular dispositionalist theories
according to which meaning is determined by the speaker's
dispositions to apply her terms (1982: 22-37).



Kripke's discussion reignited interest in the question of the
relation between meaning and rules, and resulted in an enormous
literature both on the skeptical argument and the very idea that
meaning is essentially normative. Much of that discussion has been
carried out without reference to the earlier debate on meaning and
conventions, but attempts have also been made to relate the two
debates. In what follows we shall first discuss ME normativism, where
the discussion following Kripke's book plays a central role, and
then MD normativism.


### 2.1 Meaning Engendered Normativity



It is clear that the type of normativity Kripke has in mind is ME
normativity; i.e., the claim is that meaning statements such as
"expression \(e\) means \(M\) for \(S\)" have normative
consequences. Moreover, it is clear that the relevant normativity is
that of prescriptivity, concerning what \(S\) ought to
 do.[10]
 As noted above, arguments in support of the thesis that meaning is
essentially normative need to be based on *semantic*
premises--the normativity in question cannot derive from external
sources. In the case of ME normativity, the arguments may be more or
less direct, depending on more or less substantial assumptions about
meaning. On one end of the spectrum are arguments that turn on the
idea that there are direct conceptual entailments from meaning
statements to normative consequences; on the other end are arguments
that depend on substantial theoretical assumptions about meaning. In
the debate, direct arguments have played a prominent role since these
fit the idea, implicit in Kripke, that the claim that meaning is
normative provides a pre-theoretical constraint on any acceptable
theory of meaning; one that has to be accepted independently of
one's specific semantic theory. Let us begin with the most well
known direct argument in support of ME normativity, what we call
"the simple argument".


#### 2.1.1 The Simple Argument



The classic defense of ME normativity can be found in Paul Boghossian
(1989a). According to Boghossian the normativity of meaning derives
from the fact that meaningful expressions have correctness conditions.
If "green" means *green*, Boghossian argues, it
follows immediately that "green" applies correctly only to
green objects, and this, in turn, has immediate normative consequences
for how a speaker \(S\) should apply "green":



> 
> 
> The fact that the expression means something implies, that is, a whole
> set of *normative* truths about my behavior with that
> expression: namely, that my use is correct in application to certain
> objects and not in application to others. (1989a: 513; see also
> Blackburn 1984: 281; Miller 1998: 198; Whiting 2007 and 2009.)
> 
> 
> 



The strategy, therefore, is to move from (CM), to a normative
conclusion, \((\ME\_1)\):



(CM)
For any speaker \(S\), and any time \(t\): if "green"
means *green* for \(S\) at \(t\), then it is correct for \(S\)
to apply "green" to an object \(x\) iff \(x\) is green at
\(t\).
\((\ME\_1)\)
For any speaker \(S\), and any time \(t\): if "green"
means *green* for \(S\) at \(t\), then \(S\) ought to apply
"green" to an object \(x\) iff \(x\) is green at
\(t\).


(CM)
 can hardly be challenged: Meaningful expressions have semantic
correctness conditions. Of course, there is some controversy as to how
these correctness conditions are to be construed, whether the basic
notion of semantic correctness is that of truth or warranted
assertability, for instance. However, it cannot be questioned that
some notion of semantic correctness is required. This, indeed, seems
to be part of the very concept of meaning. If, therefore, the notion
of semantic correctness is an essentially normative notion, we would
have a very direct argument in support of ME normativity, based simply
on conceptual entailments. Before discussing the argument, let us make
some preliminary remarks concerning
 \((\ME\_1)\).



First, what is it to apply an expression? It should be clear that the
relevant notion of application is that of *predication*. For
instance, we apply a predicate such as "green" when we use
it in an assertion, to predicate a property of an object \(x\). In the
case of singular terms, similarly, what is of relevance is referential
 use.[11]
 The notion of application, hence, is more narrow than that of
*use*, since we use our terms in a wide variety of ways that do
not include the expression of judgments, as when we ask a question or
make a hypothetical statement (see Millar 2004: 162; Reiland
forthcominga).



Second, how should the deontic operator in
 \((\ME\_1)\)
 be construed? Since \((\ME\_1)\) involves an embedded conditional, we
may in fact distinguish between three readings, a narrow scope
reading, an intermediate and a wide scope reading:



\((\ME\_{1}')\)
If "green" means *green* for \(S\) at \(t\),
then (\(S\) ought to (apply "green" to \(x)\) iff \(x\) is
green).
\((\ME\_{1}'')\)
If "green" means *green* for \(S\) at \(t\),
then (\(S\) ought to (apply "green" to \(x\) iff \(x\) is
green)).
\((\ME\_{1}''')\)
\(S\) ought to (if "green" means *green* for
\(S\) at \(t\), apply "green" to \(x\) iff \(x\) is
green).


In the debate, all three construals can be found. Thus, it has been
suggested that the intermediate scope interpretation best captures the
intuition that if \(S\) means *green* by "green"
she is thereby obligated to use the term in certain ways (under
certain conditions), without (as on the narrow scope reading) implying
that the obligation is conditional on \(x\) being green (Hattiangadi
2006: 225, fn 4). Another issue concerns the possibility of detaching.
Some favor the narrow scope reading, since it allows one to detach the
"ought", and supports the intuition that the semantic
obligation can only be discharged one way: in this case, by applying
"green" to green objects (Bykvist & Hattiangadi 2007:
283). Others prefer the wide scope reading, precisely because it does
not allow one to detach "ought" and hence implies a more
disjunctive obligation: \(S\) ought either to apply
"green" to green objects, or not mean *green* by
"green" (Gampel 1997: 228; Millar 2004:
168-169).



A related question is whether
 \((\ME\_1)\)
 clashes with the widely endorsed principle that *ought*
implies *can*. As it stands, \((\ME\_1)\) can be read as
implying that \(S\) has an obligation to apply "green" to
all green objects, an obligation that cannot possibly be fulfilled
(Hattiangadi 2007: 180). One response to this is to endorse the wide
scope reading,
 \((\ME\_1 ''')\),
 since it allows the subject to discharge her obligation by not
meaning *green* by "green"--something that
does seem to be in her power. Another response consists in removing
the biconditional in \((\ME\_1)\), replacing it with a weaker principle
(Whiting 2007: 137):



\((\ME\_2)\)
For any speaker \(S\), and any time \(t\): if "green"
means *green* for \(S\) at \(t\), then \(S\) ought to apply
"green" to an object \(x\) only if \(x\) is green at
\(t\).


The question has been raised, however, whether \((\ME\_2)\) is
sufficiently strong to support ME normativity. The trouble is that
\((\ME\_2)\) does not seem to place any normative constraints on the
subject's behavior. If \(x\) is green, it no longer follows that
\(S\) ought to apply "green" to \(x\), whereas if \(x\) is
not green it just follows that it is not the case that \(S\) ought to
apply "green" to \(x\). The latter, it has been stressed,
is distinct from the claim that \(S\) ought not to apply
"green" to \(x\)--for instance, it is compatible with
it being permissible to apply "green" to \(x\) (Bykvist
& Hattiangadi 2007: 280). This means that \((\ME\_2)\) fails to
support the claim that when \(S\) applies a term in a way that is
semantically incorrect, then she has done what she ought not do:
"semantically incorrect" and "ought not" thus
come apart.



In response it has been suggested that "ought" in (ME1) is
replaced by a "may". This allows the normativist to retain
the biconditional and yet avoid the troubles caused by the principle
that *ought* implies *can*: That an action is correct
implies only that one *may* do it, not that one is
*obligated* to do it, and there is no principle that
*ought* implies *can*. If "green" is true of
green objects only then \(S\) may apply "green" to an
object if and only if it is green, and this is not in conflict with
the fact that the subject is not able to apply "green" to
every green object there is (Whiting 2009: 544 and 2010: 216; Peregrin
2012: 88).



There is therefore some initial unclarity as to precisely which
prescription is supposed to follow directly from
 (CM).
 A more fundamental question is whether the strategy of the simple
argument can succeed in the first place. Opponents of ME normativity
do not challenge (CM) which, again, seems trivially true. Rather, they
deny that (CM) has normative consequences just by itself. The crucial
claim here is that "correct" can be used both normatively
and non-normatively (cf. Gluer 2001; Gluer & Wikforss
2009: 36; 2015a). If that is true, the simple argument won't go
through: Rather, an additional premise will be required to the effect
that "correct" in (CM) is used normatively. And whether or
not that premise can be supplied, the argument won't be direct
 anymore.[12]



Anti-normativists usually go further and claim that the way
"correct" is used in
 (CM)
 in fact is non-normative. What the appeal to correctness conditions
gives us, it is claimed, is only a way of categorizing applications of
"green" into two basic kinds (the true and the false, for
instance), and this does not in itself entail that one ought to apply
the term in any particular way. The notion of semantic correctness is
non-normative in just this sense: That an application of \(e\) is
correct, does not entail that it ought to be made, and, conversely,
incorrect applications do not immediately imply that \(S\) has
violated any semantic prescription. If "green" means
*green* then \(S\) applying it to a red object implies that her
statement is false, but it does not thereby follow that she has failed
to do what she ought, semantically, to do (Fodor 1990; Horwich 1995;
Gluer 1999b; 2001; Wikforss 2001; Dretske 2000; Hattiangadi 2006;
 2009a).[13]
[14]



Proponents of the direct argument respond by insisting that the notion
of semantic correctness is a normative notion. To many, this seems a
simple conceptual truth holding for the notion of correctness in
general, and therefore also for that of semantic correctness (Gibbard
2005: 358; Whiting 2007: 135 and 2009:
 538).[15]
 Normativists also appeal to ordinary usage here, suggesting that
"correct" is normally used normatively and should
therefore be interpreted that way in semantics as well (Whiting 2009:
538; Peregrin 2012: 84). That hasn't convinced anti-normativists
who point out that dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster's
commonly list normative and non-normative usages for the adjective
"correct" (Gluer & Wikforss
 2015a).[16]



Normativists have also argued that even if the basic semantic concept
itself wasn't normative, the notion of semantic correctness
still would or could be. Semantic correctness, it is argued, is not
simply the same as, for instance, truth. Normativists here appeal to a
distinction stressed by Rosen (2001: 620) between correctness and the
"correctness making feature", the (non-normative) property
something must have in order to count as correct. According to Rosen,
correctness is a higher-order property. To say that something is
correct is not just to say that the correctness making features are in
place (as when someone plays the notes of the Moonlight Sonata) but to
make the higher-order claim that the action (the piano performance)
possesses the feature that makes for correctness in acts of that kind
(the act of playing the Moonlight Sonata). Similarly, it is argued, to
say that applying "green" to a green object is correct, is
to say that the application has a certain non-normative property (the
expression applies truly) but it is also to make the higher-order
statement that the application possesses the feature that makes it
correct in a normative sense. Even if the basic word-world relation is
non-normative, therefore, it does not follow that the property of
correctness does not have a normative dimension (Speaks 2009: 408;
Whiting 2009: 540; Fennell 2013: 58-59). It is difficult to see,
however, how something like "the correctness making
feature" could strictly speaking be a second-order property
(i.e., a property of a property). It is one and the same object that
both has the correctness making feature and is correct, after all.
Rather, Rosen-style correctness is a first-order, second-level
property (to use the terminology of Russell's ramified theory of
types). More importantly, even if that is the best way to construe the
intuitive general notion of correctness, all this means is that it
might be possible to provide arguments for the claim that the notion
of semantic correctness is normative even if we agree that the basic
semantic concept itself is not normative. But the basic
anti-normativist challenge applies to Rosen-style correctness just as
to any other construal of the intuitive, general notion of
correctness: Since "correct" can be used normatively and
non-normatively, there is no simple, direct implication from
correctness to normativity (cf. Gluer & Wikforss 2009: 37,
fn. 10; 2015a).



This strand in the debate might seem to suggest that behind the
discussion of the simple argument lies nothing but a basic clash of
intuitions. The anti-normativist denies what the normativist
asserts--that the concept of semantic correctness is an
essentially normative concept. A possible conclusion, therefore, is
that the normativist and the anti-normativist operate with different
concepts of semantic correctness. This raises the question, however,
whether there is nevertheless co-extensionality between the two
concepts. As long as
 (CM)
 is the common starting point this would seem to be the case; any
sorting effected by the normative distinction between correctness and
incorrectness will coincide with the sorting effected by the
non-normative distinction. If so, it would seem that further arguments
are required to resolve the dispute, beyond the appeal to intuitions:
The normativist would have to provide some reasons why the
non-normativist notion of correctness is not a notion of semantic
correctness. This poses a special challenge to normativists who appeal
to Rosen's distinction and grant that the basic semantic
relation is non-normative: If this relation is non-normative then the
question is not whether the concept of semantic correctness
*could* be given a normative construal but whether semantics
*needs* such a construal (Gluer & Wikforss 2015a).



Another strand in the discussion of the simple argument concerns the
status of the relevant semantic obligations. Here it is often
emphasized that semantic obligations are merely *prima facie*
and may be overridden by other obligations, such as the obligation (in
a certain context) to tell a lie. It is therefore not an objection to
ME normativity that there are situations in which "green"
means *green* for \(S\), without it being the case that \(S\)
ought to apply "green" to green objects only (Whiting
2007: 139 and 2009: 546).



This appeal to *prima facie* obligations has been challenged.
What is distinctive of a *prima facie* obligation, as opposed
to a mere instrumental means-end imperative, is that it cannot be
overridden by mere desires. However, it is argued, if \(S\) has no
desire to speak the truth, then \(S\) has no obligation to apply
"green" to green objects. For instance, if neither \(S\),
nor her audience, care whether \(S\) tells the truth, then there is no
obligation to apply "green" correctly. Hence,
 (CM)
 does not even yield *prima facie* obligations (Hattiangadi
2006: 232 and 2007:189). In response, the normativists suggest that in
such a situation the speaker's use would nevertheless be
semantically incorrect and involve a violation of her semantic
obligations. The violation would not be very serious, but it would
still be a violation (Whiting 2007: 139). This has been challenged,
too. Verheggen, for instance, argues that Whiting's attempt to
back this up by the possibility of criticising a speaker who
misapplies an expression out of mere desire is not convincing. After
all, the speaker acts as she does precisely because of what she means
by the expression--therefore, there is no semantic reason to
criticize her (Verheggen 2011: 562).



Nevertheless, it would be hasty to conclude that nothing but
instrumental norms can be derived from meaning facts in conjunction
with desires. As noted above, it is clear that an appeal to merely
instrumental norms, or means-ends norms, fails to support the idea
that meaning is essentially normative. Although facts about
correctness conditions may play a role in the generation of
instrumental norms such as "If you wish to communicate with ease
you ought to apply 'green' to \(x\) if and only if \(x\)
is green", the ought in question derives from the agent's
desires and intentions (given certain empirical facts, regularities,
or laws), not from the correctness conditions themselves. Indeed, very
many facts can play a role in the generation of instrumental norms
without thereby being intrinsically normative--for instance,
given the laws of nature, facts about the weather, taken together with
facts about my desires, have implications for how I should dress
(Coates 1986; Bilgrami 1993; Gluer 2001; Wikforss 2001;
Hattiangadi 2006, 2009b). Not all *hypothetical* norms are
instrumental, or based on contingent means-ends relations, however. An
example would be the following: If you want to castle in chess, you
should (or indeed: must) move your king and one of your rooks in a
certain way. Similarly, it has been suggested that there is an
important difference between hypothetical norms involving ordinary
non-normative facts (such as facts about the weather) and norms
involving meaning facts: Since meaning facts are *constituted*
by correctness conditions, meaning facts *always* dictate how I
should behave when I intend to produce a meaningful utterance. Even
though *what* they dictate depends on my particular desires in
the situation, the fact *that* they dictate something does not
depend on any desire--in contrast to the dictates derivable from
weather facts (Verheggen 2011: 563). One might wonder, though, whether
the cases ultimately really are disanalogous: Just as one might not
care whether one gets wet or stays dry, it might seem, one might just
not care whether what one says is semantically correct or not--do
correctness conditions really dictate anything if all I want to do is
say something
 meaningful?[17]



It is worth, in this context, to comment on the relation between
Kripke's normativity constraint and the so called "problem
of error". As noted above, Kripke takes his normativity
constraint to rule out dispositionalist accounts of meaning. Although
he formulates his objection to dispositionalism in various ways (1982:
29-37), in the debate the main focus has been on the question
whether the dispositionalist can account for the possibility of
mistake or error. For an expression meaning *green*, for
instance, it is just as much a platitude that mistaken or erroneous
application is (in principle) possible as that the expression has
correctness conditions. The question, then, is the following: If
meaning is determined by how \(S\) is disposed to use her term, then
how could she use the term incorrectly? It has been argued that she
couldn't--rather, every apparent error would just indicate
a difference in meaning (Boghossian 1989a:
 537-540).[18]
 It is much disputed whether the dispositionalist can solve this
problem. It should be noted, however, that the problem of error does
not seem to have much to do with semantic normativity (Fodor 1990:
135-136; Bilgrami 1992; Wikforss 2001: 208; Hattiangadi 2006:
229; 2007: 186). The error objection does not turn on the fact that
the dispositionalist cannot allow for semantic oughts but, rather, on
the fact that we must not construe the relation between the meaning
determining facts and meaning in such a way that mistake is ruled
out.



Of course, even provided with a solution to the problem of error
dispositionalism might come to grief with Kripke's skeptic.
Solving the problem of error requires showing that there is a
plausible principle \(P\) assigning meanings to expressions on the
basis of the speaker's dispositions to use them, a principle
underwriting plausible ascriptions of error. On a quite plausible
interpretation of the skeptic's main strategy--i.e., that
of "quussing" candidate facts--this strategy is as
applicable here as elsewhere. If, for instance, \(P\) assigns
*addition* to "plus" on the basis of disposition
\(D\), the skeptic will want to know why this is the right
principle--as opposed to some other principle \(P'\) assigning
*quaddition* to "plus" on the basis of \(D\). As
the mere fact of the speaker's having \(D\) does nothing to
determine which of these principles is the right one, dispositional
facts are as quussable as any of the other candidates--and this
remains the case even if your dispositionalism comes with a plausible
principle of meaning determination (cf. Pagin 2002:
 160f).[19]


#### 2.1.2 Using an Expression in Accordance with its Meaning



An alternative to the simple argument is to suggest that there is a
further notion of semantic correctness, one that is not co-extensional
with that of
 (CM)
 but that is both essential to meaning and normative. Thus, it has
been claimed that there is a crucial ambiguity in the notion of
correct use (Millar 2004: 160). On the one hand, there is the notion
of semantic correctness as in (CM); on the other hand there is the
notion of correct use as in "using an expression in accordance
with its meaning". That the two do not coincide is clear from
the fact that one may use an expression in accordance with its
meaning, and yet make a false statement, as when one has a false
belief about the world (McGinn 1984; Millar 2002; 2004: 160-175;
Moore 1954/1955: 308; Sellars 1956: 166; Buleandra 2008: 180; Fennell
2013: 69, Reiland forthcominga). We must distinguish empirical
mistakes from *linguistic* mistakes, it is argued, and it is
essential that we are able to allow for both. Moreover, it is said,
this further notion of semantic correctness is an essentially
normative notion, one that has implications for what \(S\) ought to do
or is obligated to do: if "green" means *green* for
\(S\), then \(S\) ought to use "green" in accordance with
its meaning. (This idea, too, goes back to Kripke who, at points,
speaks of what I should do, if my use of the term is to be "in
accordance with how it was meant" (1982: 30, 37).)



How is the notion of "using an expression in accordance with its
meaning" to be construed? According to one proposal, it concerns
which expressions are "appropriate" or
"suitable" for expressing a certain belief. The notion of
"suitability", in turn, is derived from the ordinary
semantic correctness conditions taken together with what I intend to
express by my expressions: If "green" applies correctly
only to green objects, and I mean to express my belief that \(x\) is
green, then I ought to use the term "green" and not, say,
"red". This allows for the possibility that my use is
correct in the sense of
 (CM),
 and yet linguistically incorrect (if \(x\) is red and I use the term
"red" to express my belief that \(x\) is green); and, vice
versa, that my use is incorrect in the sense of (CM), but
linguistically correct (if \(x\) is red and I use the term
"green" to express my belief that \(x\) is green) (McGinn
1984: 60; Millar 2004: 162-163). Hence, in the place of (CM) we
have:



(CM\*)
For any speaker \(S\), and any time \(t\): if "green"
means *green* for \(S\) at \(t\), then it is correct for \(S\)
at \(t\) to apply "green" to an object \(x\) iff \(S\)
intends to express the belief that \(x\) is green at
 \(t\).[20]


Possible misuses are said to include both performance errors (such as
slips of the tongue) and so-called meaning errors (as when the speaker
thinks "arcane" means *ancient*) (Millar 2004:
163).



This raises the question of what motivates this further notion of
correctness. While it is a platitude that meaningful expressions have
semantic correctness conditions, it is not a platitude that an
expression is meaningful only if there are these further correctness
conditions. If "green" means *green* for \(S\), and
\(S\) uses "red" to express her belief that \(x\) is
green, she may fail in her communicative intentions (although not
necessarily, consider the use of irony and metaphor), but does it
follow that she has used her expressions incorrectly in a semantically
relevant sense? The added notion of correctness, it may therefore be
argued, simply does no semantic work. This concern has been raised by
some normativists as well. For instance, Whiting (2016) argues that it
is a mistake to try to defend normativism on these grounds, and that
the normativist should stick to the orthodox interpretation that takes
as its starting point
 (CM).



In the literature, the most common route to the conclusion that we
need some such further notion of semantic correctness goes via
assumptions about the nature of *understanding* (Wright 1980:
20; McDowell 1984; McGinn 1984:109; Kotatko 1998; Millar
2004; Buleandra 2008; Fennell 2012). Understanding the meaning of a
term, it is argued, involves using it in accordance with its meaning
and, moreover, feeling obligated to thus using it. To learn the
meaning of an expression, McDowell writes for instance,



> 
> 
> is to acquire an understanding that obliges us subsequently ...
> to judge and speak in certain determinate ways, on pain of failure to
> obey the dictates of the meaning we have grasped. (1984: 45)
> 
> 
> 



This motivates the appeal to further correctness conditions, it is
held, since a speaker may fully understand a term while using it in a
false judgment and, conversely, use the term in a true judgment while
failing to understand the term properly.



The route via understanding depends on assumptions about the nature of
linguistic understanding that may be challenged. Thus, Timothy
Williamson has argued that there are no understanding-assent links of
the relevant sort, thereby rejecting the assumption that understanding
the meaning of an expression \(e\) involves using \(e\) in certain
ways (Williamson 2007). However, even if this assumption is accepted,
it is a further supposition that this brings with it any semantic
obligations. First, it might be held that the link between
understanding and use is constitutive, and that all that follows if
\(S\) fails to use e in accordance with a certain meaning \(M\), is
that e does not mean \(M\). For instance, if a speaker (regularly)
uses "arcane" in accordance with the standard meaning of
"ancient", then "arcane" means
*ancient* and not
 *arcane*.[21]
 Second, as in the case of the simple argument, it could be argued
that the appearance of an ought here derives from added normative
principles, such as instrumental norms concerning the ease of
communication, or pragmatic norms regulating speech
 acts.[22]



In response it has been suggested that the relevant normative
consequences should not be understood in terms of obligations but,
rather, in terms of commitments. This is the line taken by Alan Millar
(2002 and 2004). Meaning statements, such as
"'Green' means *green*", Millar argues,
are true in virtue of there being a rule-governed practice. If \(S\)
uses "green" to mean green, therefore, she becomes a
participant in this practice and incurs a commitment to use the term
accordingly. To be properly committed, Millar suggests, \(S\) has to
be disposed to adjust her use if she discovers that it is not in
keeping with the meaning of the expression (as when \(S\) uses
"arcane" to mean *ancient*). The commitment is not
dependent on one's desire to communicate, or on the intention to
speak the truth, but merely on \(S\) participating in the practice of
using "green" with a certain meaning. However, Millar
stresses, it does not follow that she ought to use her expressions a
certain way, since it does not follow that she ought to participate in
the practice--there may be reasons to withdraw from the practice
instead. Hence, one may participate in a practice without it following
that one ought to "carry out the performances associated with
one's role" (Millar 2004:
 173).[23]



This proposal illustrates how ME normativity might be derived from MD
normativity: Meaning statements have normative consequences, according
to Millar, because meaning is determined by the speaker following
certain rules. Metaphysically the rules come first and make meaning
possible. Before turning to a discussion of MD normativity, let us
briefly consider some other arguments put forth in support of ME
normativity.


#### 2.1.3 Alternative Arguments



The arguments above are all attempts to show that meaning statements
have normative implications. An alternative strategy is to suggest
that meaning statements simply *are* prescriptions. When we
state "'Green' means *green*" we may
appear to be making a descriptive statement whereas, in fact, we are
*prescribing* how "green" ought to be used (Gauker
2007, 2011; Lance & O'Leary Hawthorne 1997; Peregrin 2012:
96; Gibbard 2012). This proposal can either be construed as a claim
about the semantic *content* of meaning statements, or as a
claim about the typical *use* of meaning statements. Thus, a
statement may be used prescriptively, while having a descriptive,
factual content ("In this classroom we raise our hands before
speaking").



If the suggestion is that meaning statements have a prescriptive
content it would provide another very direct argument in support of ME
normativity, one that does not have to proceed via the controversial
claim that the notion of semantic correctness is an essentially
normative notion. This is an advantage over the simple argument.
However, there are also disadvantages. For instance, the question
arises whether the claim that meaning statements lack descriptive
content can accommodate the role of such statements in inferential
contexts (see Gauker 2007: 194-195 for a discussion). Another
question concerns the implications from "ought"-statements
to meaning statements. According to the simple argument,
"'Green' ought to be applied to \(x\) if and only if
\(x\) is green" follows immediately from
"'Green' means *green*". According to
this argument the converse also holds: "'Green'
means *green*" follows directly from
"'Green' ought to be applied to \(x\) if and only if
\(x\) is green" (cf. Gibbard 2012: 12 and 113-115). The
latter has been questioned on the grounds that even if it is true that
"green" ought to be applied this way, the
"ought" in question may not have anything to do with
semantics but, say, with religious practices (Byrne 2002: 207).



These difficulties are avoided if, instead, meaning statements are
simply construed as having a prescriptive use (while having a
descriptive content). On either construal, however, the question
arises why we should believe that meaning statements are prescriptive.
One suggestion is that the prescriptive function of meaning statements
follows from their role in coordinating our linguistic use (Gauker
2007 and 2012: 279). Meaning statements are proposals about how terms
*ought* to be used, and as such they serve to determine meaning
and remove an otherwise irresolvable indeterminacy (see also Gibbard
2012: 109-112). As a result, "we all think of meanings as
standards that we are obliged to conform to" (Gauker 2007: 185).
This defense of the normativity thesis therefore turns on
controversial issues concerning indeterminacy. Another proposal shuns
the metaphysical questions concerning the nature of meaning and
appeals to the *function* of meaning statements in our
practices (Lance & O'Leary Hawthorne 1997). Instead of
asking for the facts that constitute meaning, it is argued, we should
consider the role of meaning statements in our socio-linguistic
practices. It then emerges that such statements serve the regulative
function of licensing and censoring certain uses. It should be noted
that unless this proposal about the function of meaning statements is
said to have *some* metaphysical implications concerning the
nature of meaning, it will fall short of supporting the claim that
meaning is essentially
 normative.[24]
[25]



In addition, there are a variety of other arguments in support of ME
normativity. One such argument grants that correctness conditions are
not themselves normative, but suggests that we derive the normativity
of meaning from the idea that we ought to speak the truth (Ebbs 1997;
Haugeland 1998: Soames 1997: 221, 224). As noted above, this only
succeeds if the obligation in question can be said to derive purely
from semantic sources. The question, then, is whether there is any
reason to suppose that we have a semantic obligation to speak the
truth. The impression that there is, it has been suggested, is a
result of a conflation of semantics and pragmatics. Thus, it is
commonly held that there are rules of assertion, and some of these are
such that they are violated when the speaker makes a false judgment.
For instance, it has been proposed that there is a "knowledge
rule": "One must: assert \(p\) only if one knows
\(p\)" (Williamson 2000: 242). However, opponents of ME
normativity stress, these are pragmatic rules, regulating the
performance of speech acts, not semantic ones. If such rules are
essential for the possibility of assertion, then assertion is
essentially normative, but it does not follow that meaning is
(Gluer & Wikforss 2009: 37-38; Speaks 2009). For
discussion of the claim that assertion is normative, see the entry on
 assertion,
 for a suggestion as to how to connect norms of assertion to the
meanings of sentences by means of the Alstonian idea of meanings as
speech-act-potentials (Alston 2000), see Garcia-Carpintero
2012, 2021.



Another set of arguments reject the focus on correctness conditions
and appeal to other aspects of Kripke's normativity objection to
dispositionalist theories. For instance, it has been suggested that
the claim that meaning is essentially normative is primarily a claim
about the justificatory role of meaning. Facts about meaning are,
essentially, such that they are able to justify \(S\)'s use of
her terms, able to guide \(S\)'s usage. In this sense, meaning
facts are like prescriptive rules, such as the rules of
etiquette--it is of their essence that they guide action or give
directions. The reason dispositionalism fails, then, is not that the
dispositionalist cannot account for error, but that facts about what I
am disposed to do are not essentially capable of justifying (Gampel
1997: 225-231; Zalabardo 1997: 480-483; Kusch 2006:
50-94).



Whether this argument succeeds depends on whether it can be shown that
the role of meaning in motivating action is equivalent to that of
prescriptions. Thus, the fact that "green" means
*green* may of course guide the speaker's actions in the
sense that any facts do so--i.e., if \(S\) believes that
"green" means *green*. To show that meaning facts
play a normatively guiding role, therefore, it does not suffice to
appeal to the idea that meaning facts play a role in motivating
action; it also has to be shown that the motivating role is that of a
prescription rather than a belief (see
 section 2.2
 below).[26]



In the discussion of ME normativity so far it is assumed that the
relevant norms are norms for action, prescriptions for the
speaker's use of her expressions. This, again, is how Kripke
discusses the topic and how those writing on Kripke tend to construe
the relevant normativity. However, as far as ME normativity goes,
normative consequences might also be construed axiologically. Thus, it
might be argued that semantically correct applications, by themselves,
are *valuable*. This, too, would show that meaning is an
essentially normative notion, although in a different sense than the
standard one. And in this case too, the crucial question would be
whether the step from
 (CM)
 to normative consequences can be motivated. Does sorting
\(S\)'s applications into the semantically correct and the
semantically incorrect ones, by itself imply that actions of one or
the other of these kinds are valuable (Gluer 2001:
 60-61)?[27]



Another option would be to construe the rules or norms of meaning as
constitutive ones (cf.
 section 1.2
 above). Rules of meaning, the idea would be, are rules for the use of
expressions that determine the meaning of these expressions. Appealing
to constitutive rules thus would mean accepting what we call MD
normativism: It would mean accepting that expressions have meaning
because there are rules or norms in force for their use.


### 2.2 Meaning Determining Normativity



Meaning determining normativism (MD normativism) is the claim that
meaning is essentially such that it is (at least partially) determined
by norms. This is a claim in the metaphysics of meaning, more
precisely, in "foundational semantics" (Stalnaker 1997:
535). It is an answer to the question *in virtue of what*
linguistic expressions have their meanings: Linguistic expressions
cannot have meanings without norms, and the norms come first in the
order of metaphysical determination or explanation. Normative facts,
if you will, (at least partially) "ground" meaning
 facts.[28]
[29] Strong versions of MD normativism hold that
MD norms also determine *which* meanings the expressions
governed by them have.



Initial motivation for MD normativism is furnished by the arbitrary,
contingent, and "man-made" nature of the connection
between linguistic expressions and their meanings. Observed by
philosophers since ancient times, the nature of this connection
suggests that it might be established by *convention*. But
plausible as such conventionalism might seem, earlier discussions have
shown it to be quite controversial (cf. Davidson 1984a; Dummett 1986).
If conventions are to play a role in an informative account of
meaning, we cannot simply claim that it, for instance, is a convention
of English that "green" means green. Rather, the relevant
conventions would need to be specified in non-semantic terms (cf.
Davidson 1984a; Gluer 2013).



Moreover, the relation between conventionalism and MD normativism is
complicated. On David Lewis's influential account, for instance,
a convention is a regularity in the behavior of a community which is
arbitrary but perpetuates itself because it serves



> 
> 
> some sort of common purpose. Past conformity breeds future conformity
> because it gives one a reason to go on conforming. (Lewis 1975: 4)
> 
> 
> 



Arguably, a Lewisian convention is not normative; it does, for
instance, not seem to require any prescription to conform being in
force in the community. Yet another question concerns the requirement
of regularity. Even if regularity of use were required for meaning
(Davidson famously disputed this; cf. Davidson 1984a; 1986b), such
regularity might not need to be due to either norm or convention. A
relevant observation here is that people, upon reflection, usually can
provide at least rough formulations of the rules or conventions they
are following and cite them as reasons for their actions. But when it
comes to the semantic rules of natural language, this is far from
being the case; the question would be why.



The connection between meaning and *use* provides another
starting point for MD normativism, the thought being that it is not
how we are *disposed* to use an expression that determines its
meaning, but how we are *supposed* to use it (cf. Glock 2000;
Brandom 1994: 159). The most common form of MD normativism thus holds
that the meanings of linguistic expressions are (at least partially)
determined by *rules for their use*. At a minimum, such MD
normativism claims that the following is an essential truth about
meaning, or more precisely about a linguistic expression \(e\)'s
having a meaning \(M\) (for a speaker, or group of speakers, \(S\) at
a time \(t)\):



\((\MD\_R)\)
\(e\) means \(M\) for \(S\) at \(t\) only if there is a rule \(R\)
for the use of \(e\) in force for \(S\) at
 \(t\).[30]


This idea was famously formulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who wrote in
his so-called "Middle Period":



> 
> [W]ithout these rules the word has as yet no meaning; and if we change
> the rules, it now has another meaning (or none), and in that case we
> may just as well change the word, too. (PG 133)
> 



It is quite plausible to read Wittgenstein as here espousing a strong
version of MD normativism.



\((\MD\_R)\) is compatible with claiming that meaning is
*solely* a matter of the norms or rules governing the use of
linguistic expressions, no matter how they are *actually used*
(e.g., Hlobil 2015), but MD normativism can take less radical forms,
too. One might for instance think that speakers' dispositions to
use expressions do play a role in meaning determination, but argue
that only a certain kind of disposition is relevant, a kind that can
only be specified by means of its normative properties. In this vein,
Wedgwood argues more generally that it is only "rational"
dispositions that determine intentional content (where rationality is
taken to be a normative property; cf. Wedgwood 2007: 167ff; 2009).
Normative teleosemantics can be construed as making a similar move:
Here, it is those dispositions realizing the biological function of
the mechanism of using an expression that determine meaning (where
biological functions are taken to be something normative; cf. Millikan
1990, Neander 1995).



One might also think that meaning is determined on a non-normative
basis, but by a normative principle. Davidson (1970) famously used the
claim that meaning and intentional content are determined by the
"principle of charity" to argue for a kind of
non-reductive naturalism. According to Davidson, speakers essentially
are by and large rational and beliefs by their nature
"veridical", i.e., by and large true (Davidson 1986a).
According to the principle of charity, the best interpretation of a
speaker \(S\) therefore optimises overall coherence, or rationality,
and truth across \(S\)'s utterances, propositional attitudes,
and intentional actions (e.g., Davidson 1973, 1974, 1991; see also
Gluer 2011: ch. 3). Because of its appeal to rationality, the
principle of charity has been interpreted as a normative principle,
and Davidson as a normativist (see for instance, McDowell 1984;
Hornsby 1997: 87; Gampel 1997; Hurley 1998: 5; Glock 2000; Jackman
2004
 [Other Internet Resources];
 Wedgwood 2007: 161ff; Kriegel 2010; Liebesman 2018). This is
controversial, however; it has been argued that its constitutive role
in fact prevents the principle of charity from being normative: It
determines what meaningful utterances (contentful mental states)
*are*, not how anything *should be* or what anyone
*should do* (cf. Gluer 2001; Wikforss 2001; Schroeder
2003; Engel 2007: 187ff; for a different argument, see Bilgrami 1992:
102ff.). Quite independently, the claim that rationality is
essentially normative is of course itself controversial (cf.
Schnadelbach 1990; Kolodny 2005; Broome 2007; Gluer &
Wikforss 2013a, 2018).



Other influential ideas behind MD normativism include
Wittgenstein-inspired skepticism towards meanings as "Platonic
entities"; in this tradition, meanings and concepts themselves
are construed as products of our norms or conventions (cf. for
instance, Baker & Hacker 1985: 269ff). Another idea derives from
meaning's psychological role: It has been argued that, since
competent speakers are guided in their use of expressions by the
knowledge of their meanings, a knowledge that is general in form, such
guidance must be construed as guidance by rules (cf., for instance,
Boghossian 2008: 489).



In the next two sections we shall look a little closer at
\((\MD\_R)\).


#### 2.2.1 Meaning Determining Rules or Norms



Assume that meaning is determined by rules. How exactly does this
work? What kind of rule could do this job? What does it mean for such
rules to be "in force" for a speaker or group of speakers,
and in what relation do such rules stand to the actual use of the
expressions they govern?



Quite clearly, meaning determining rules would be *constitutive
rules* (see
 section 1.2
 above). Typically, they are taken to determine not only *that*
expressions have meaning, but also *which* meanings they have.
A rule \(R\) governing the use of an expression \(e\), the thought is,
divides possible uses of \(e\) into those that *accord with R*
and those that do *not*. On the assumption that the former are
the *semantically correct* uses of \(e, \ R\) thus endows \(e\)
with semantic correctness conditions, i.e., meaning. Ideas like this
are drawn on by a great number of philosophers, including Wittgenstein
scholars such as Baker and Hacker or Glock, as well as philosophers
such as von Wright, Sellars, and Searle.



Still, the question is how this exactly works. Constitutive rules
"create" new kinds of action. Actions of these kinds are
such that they cannot be performed if the rules are not in force.
Searle suggested that such rules typically can be brought into the
following form:



(CR)
In \(C\), doing \(X\) counts as doing \(Y\).


He also suggested that meaning is determined by such rules (1969:
42ff). But it is not easy to see how rules of form
 (CR)
 would endow expressions with semantic correctness conditions (cf.
Gluer & Pagin
 1998).[31]



It might be more promising to allow meaning determining rules to be
prescriptions (or proscriptions), endowing expressions with meanings
by distinguishing between semantically correct (pre- or proscribed)
and incorrect (forbidden) uses. They would be constitutive in the
sense of its being impossible to meaningfully use the expressions they
govern without their being in force for the speaker (cf. Gluer
& Pagin 1998; Kiesselbach 2014; Hlobil 2015; Reiland
forthcominga).



What, then, does it mean for a meaning determining rule \(R\) to be in
force for a speaker \(S\)'s use of an expression \(e\) (at a
time \(t)\)? Broadly, there are three main options for the MD
normativist. According to the first, using \(e\) (at \(t)\) has to be
*motivated by* or to *follow* \(R\) in the sense of
attempting to do what is in accordance with \(R\). On the second
construal, \(S\) has to *accept R* in some sense not requiring
(all) particular uses of \(e\) to be motivated by \(R\). Both of these
would plausibly seem to require \(S\) to have certain intentional
states. But, third, \(R\)'s being in force for \(S\) could also
be construed as independent of any of \(S\)'s intentional states
(with respect to \(R)\).



The laws of the state, for instance, would seem to fall into the third
category; they are in force even for those individual citizens who do
not accept them. Analogously, one might claim meaning determining
rules to be in force in a speech community quite independently of any
(or even all) of its member's acceptance of, or attitudes
towards, them. Construing MD (or CD) normativism along these lines has
recently gained some proponents (e.g., Tracy 2020; Hlobil 2015). Many
games are in the second category; they are such that even though
participation requires players to accept their rules, participants
nevertheless can intentionally violate these very rules within the
game. For instance, intentional spearing does occur in ice hockey
games, and will be punished precisely because the rule against
spearing is in force even for players who spear intentionally. Again,
in semantics the situation might seem analogous: Speakers can
intentionally say semantically incorrect things without their
expressions losing or changing their meanings (cf. Railton 2000;
Gluer & Pagin 1998; Gluer 1999b; 2001; Wikforss 2001,
Kiesselbach 2014, Reiland 2020;
 forthcomingb).[32]



The most common and traditional idea, however, is that expressions
"get" their meanings by speakers' following the
rules for their use (see, for instance, Baker & Hacker 1985:
154ff; Glock 1996a: 323ff); speaking meaningfully is conceived of as a
form of *rule-guided action*. Let's call this form of MD
normativism "guidance
 normativism".[33]



A crucial question for guidance normativism concerns the distinction
between *rule guided* and *merely regular behavior*. As
Quine classically noted, on pain of vicious regress, meaning
determining rules or conventions cannot be explicitly and deliberately
adopted; they must somehow be "implicit" in the behavior
of speakers. But then, Quine argued, we risk depriving the notion of a
linguistic rule "of any explanatory force and reducing it to an
idle label" (Quine 1935 [1976: 106]). We shall look at this
issue in the next section.


#### 2.2.3 Guidance by Meaning Determining Rules



It is quite natural to think that behavior guided by an (implicit or
explicit) rule \(R\) is behavior that can be *explained* by
means of \(R\). More precisely, many philosophers think, the
explanation needs to be a *reasons-explanation*. Therefore, the
thought is, there is an "intentional condition" on
rule-guidance, requiring, for instance, intentions to follow \(R\)
(e.g., Baker & Hacker 1985: 155; Glock 1996a: 325), or some other
state of accepting or internalizing \(R\) (Boghossian
 2008).[34]



If there is an intentional condition, even guidance by implicit rules
would seem to require prior mental states with intentional content. A
much-discussed question is whether this leads back into vicious
regress. This question would seem to arise not only for those who
think that thought depends on language, or that thought and language
are interdependent, but also for any kind of guidance normativism
about mental content (cf. Boghossian 1989a; 2008). For instance, if
having a contentful intentional state is itself a matter of being
guided by a content determining rule, then another intentional state
is required for having the first one, and so on *ad
 infinitum*.[35]
 It has therefore been argued that according to Wittgenstein there
must be a basic form of rule following that is not subject to any
intentional condition, but "blind" (Wright 2007; see also
Garcia-Carpintero 2012). Alternatively, it has been argued that
therefore the late Wittgenstein did not conceive of meaningful use of
language as rule guided anymore (Gluer & Wikforss 2010a).
Boghossian (2008: 493f) provides an independent, general argument
against an intentional condition on rule guidance. He argues that the
relevant intentional state would be a state with general
(prescriptive) content, and that acting under particular circumstances
on an intentional state with general content always involves some sort
of inference. Inference itself, however, essentially involves
following a rule, and thus a regress--reminiscent of that
familiar from Lewis Carroll (1895)--ensues. In response, the
assumption that inference is essentially rule guided has been
questioned (cf. Gluer & Wikforss 2010a). Miller (2015) offers
a different response; he contends that Wittgensteinian
"blindness" does not amount to giving up on the
intentional condition, but to denying that application of a general
rule to a particular case involves inference. Blind rule-following,
Miller suggests, is to be construed in terms of a causal connection
between rule-acceptance and application, where the former causes the
latter "in the right kind of way" (2015:
 411ff).[36]



Together with the observation recorded earlier--that speakers do
not usually seem to be able to formulate semantic rules or to cite
them as reasons--some philosophers have looked for alternative
ways of understanding the explanatory power of meaning determining
rules, for instance in terms of evolution. Ideas here range from using
evolutionary explanation as a mere analogy (as in Sellars 1954 or
Searle
 1995)[37]
 to normative construals of the idea of a biological function in
normative teleosemantics (cf., e.g., Jarvis 2012), possibly in
combination with computational ideas about sub-personal rule following
at the level of mental representation (cf. Jacob 2005: 200f;
Garcia-Carpintero 2012; for some critical discussion Boghossian
2008). There is a worry, though, that the basic question recurs: What
distinguishes a sub-personal regularity from a performance governed by
a sub-personal
 rule?[38]


#### 2.2.4 Primitive Normativity



Ginsborg (2011a,b; 2012; 2018a,b; 2020; forthcoming) suggests that the
normativity of meaning can be defended by interpreting the relevant
"ought" and distinguishing normativity and regularity in a
way that is quite radically different from the dominant view in most
of the normativity debates, i.e., by referring to a "primitive
ought". This speaks to the primitively normative attitudes
speakers must have towards their own uses of linguistic expressions.
For starters, having primitively normative attitudes does not require
prior grasp of rules, concepts, or meanings. Moreover, the norms
speakers need to be primitively conscious of do not guide or justify
them in their use of expressions (Ginsborg 2011b:
 170).[39]
 And finally, the primitive "ought" relevant to meaning
cannot be explicated in terms of, or equated with, truth--to be
primitively correct is more fundamental than being semantically
correct: Primitive normativity is not required to determine what is
semantically correct (and incorrect), but rather to "distinguish
the production of a term from mere noise" (Ginsborg 2012: 132,
quoting Blackburn 1984: 281), or, more generally, to determine which
behaviour is "subject to normative evaluation at all"
(2011a: 243, fn.
 21).[40]



Primitive normativity thus is what distinguishes the behaviour of the
speaker who uses her terms with *understanding* from that of
the parrot, or automaton. Using a term with understanding requires
more than just being disposed to use it a certain way, Ginsborg
argues; it requires understanding *that it has a certain
meaning*. If a speaker for instance uses "slab" to
mean *slab*, she needs to grasp or recognize that it means
*slab* (2012: 135). Ginsborg's ambition is precisely to
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for what it is to have
this understanding.



The account of meaning determination she arrives at has two
components. Since one of them is a requirement of primitive
normativity, primitive normativity qualifies as a (new) kind of
meaning determining normativity. In rough outline, the account looks
like this:



(G)
As used by a speaker \(S\), an expression \(e\) has a particular
meaning \(M\) iff


i.
\(S\) is disposed to use \(e\) in a certain way, and
ii.
\(S\) is disposed to adopt the attitude of
taking-to-be-appropriate to the set of uses to which she is disposed
(cf. 2011a: 244f; 2012: 138).
 


If \(e\) has meaning, the first disposition suffices to determine
which meaning it has. But \(e\) has meaning only if the second
disposition is in place. Moreover, if both conditions are fulfilled,
having the primitively normative attitude of taking the use one is
disposed to make of \(e\) amounts to understanding that \(e\) means
\(M\).



These conditions are not only necessary, but sufficient for meaning,
Ginsborg argues, because they allow us "to make sense of a given
response being correct or incorrect" (2011a: 245), where
correctness now is *semantic correctness*. Once these
conditions are fulfilled, a particular use of \(e\) might not only be
such that you "did not do what you were disposed to do, but also
did not do what you were disposed to regard as appropriate"
(2011a: 245). This, Ginsborg submits, is enough to make such a use of
\(e\) into a mistake. Once these conditions are fulfilled, that is,
the uses you are disposed to make of \(e\) "can retrospectively
be identified as the extension of [\(e\)]" (2012: 138). And
then, your primitively normative attitude amounts to understanding
that \(e\) means what it does.



Though Ginsborg's proposal is very interesting, and indeed
rather different from more established interpretations of the
normativity of meaning, it has not gone unchallenged. Miller (2019)
and Sultanescu (2021) both raise worries about Ginsborg's reply
to the skeptic. Miller (2019) argues against Ginsborg's defence
of reductive dispositionalism against Kripke's
Wittgenstein's "finitude" objection. Sultanescu
(2021) points out that Ginsborg's dispositionalism fails because
it faces an unsolvable dilemma when it comes to the two constraints
imposed by Kripke's skeptic, i.e., that



> 
> 
> the correctness of a particular use [of \(e\)] be constituted
> independently of the individual's perspective on it,
> 
> 
> 



and that



> 
> 
> the individual have a perspective on the use [of \(e\)], on pain of
> rendering the use an instance of arbitrary behaviour.
> 
> 
> 



Sultanescu points out that Ginsborg's dispositionalism is able
to meet the second constraint, but not the first. After proposing
amends to Ginsborg's proposal in order to make room for the
first constraint, Sultanescu points out that now, under this new
interpretation, Ginsborg fails to meet the skeptic's second
constraint.



Miller (2019) and Sorgiovanni (2018) also raise concerns about the
viability of Ginsborg's "primitive" rule-following.
In particular, Miller (2019) points out that her argument for why
rules do not guide agents, is based on the (mistaken, and disproven by
Wittgenstein himself) assumption that being guided by a rule
necessarily requires interpreting that rule (2019:
 746).[41]
 What's more, Miller takes issue with her primitive normativity
by claiming that the attitude of
"taking-to-be-appropriate" cannot really be made sense of
unless we expect the speaker to already take e "to have a
meaning or to be governed by a standard of correctness".
Finally, Miller (2019: 755-757) and Verheggen (2015) argue that
we have little reason to prefer Ginsborg's partial reductionism
over both non-reductionism and reductionism as Ginsborg's
proposal seems to face the same challenges raised against those two
opposing views.


## 3. Content



In the normativity debate the main focus has been on meaning: This is
true of the Kripke discussion as well as of earlier discussions
concerning the rulishness of language. However, parallel claims have
also been made about mental content and recently the thesis that
content is essentially normative has come into focus (McDowell &
Pettit 1986, Brandom 1994, Engel 2000, Boghossian 2003, Gibbard 2003,
Millar 2004, Jarvis 2012, Hlobil 2015, Miller 2015, Tracy 2020, Green
 2021).[42]



Content normativism claims that the following is both necessary, and
essential to, a mental state \(M\)'s having a content \(p\):



(C)
\(M\) has content \(p\) only if there is a rule, or system of
rules, \(R\) in force for
 \(M.\)[43]


The relevant notion of content is that of propositional content,
something that can be judged, and the norms in question govern the
"use" of concepts. We intend the talk of propositions and
concepts in this context to be uncontentious, and not depend on any
specific construals of these notions. A proposition, simply, is
anything that has truth conditions essentially; it is whatever the
propositional attitudes are attitudes towards. And talking of
"concepts" should not be understood as implying a
commitment to either structured contents or to a language-like,
syntactically structured medium of representation. In this sense, a
concept is "used" whenever a subject has an intentional
mental
 state.[44]



As in the case of meaning, we distinguish between CE normativity,
which is neutral on the question how content is determined, and CD
normativity which takes the norms to be metaphysically primary. We
shall begin by discussing CE normativity.


### 3.1 Content Engendered Normativity



According to CE normativity statements of the form "mental state
\(M\) has content \(p\)" have normative consequences. The norms
are typically construed as norms of action, most commonly as
prescriptions, but could also be construed axiologically. That is, the
claim need not be that the relevant norms guide our use of concepts,
but could just be that it is a property essential to their having
content that certain mental states (true beliefs, for instance) are
valuable.



As in the case of meaning, we may distinguish between more or less
direct arguments. One way to provide a direct argument for CE
normativity would be to proceed from the notion of correctness
conditions, in analogy with the simple argument (Boghossian 2003: 85).
Just as meaningful expressions have correctness conditions
essentially, along the lines of
 (CM),
 so do concepts: The concept *green*, for instance, applies to
an object \(x\) if and only if \(x\) is green. However, unlike in the
case of (CM), the application relation here is just that between a
concept and the objects that "fall under" it. For
normativity to enter some connection has to be made with the subject
who employs the concepts, with her mental states.



The standard normativist strategy consists in appealing to the use of
concepts in propositional attitudes, and to derive the normativity of
content from that of the propositional attitudes. We shall consider
two such common arguments: one that goes via the nature of belief, and
one that goes via ideas about concept grasp.


#### 3.1.1 The Argument from Belief



The argument from belief proceeds in two steps: It is argued, first,
that belief is essentially normative, and second, that there is an
essential connection between belief and content such that if belief is
essentially normative it follows that content is, too. Our main
concern here is not with the normativity of belief, but some comments
concerning the first step are required.



According to the most common proposal, the normativity of belief
derives from the connection between belief and truth. The proposal is
not merely that beliefs, essentially, have contents that are true or
false, but that beliefs, by their very nature, generate a normative
requirement that establishes that they are correct or incorrect as a
result of their content being true or false. Such a requirement is
distinctive of belief and provides a "decisive reason" for
having or not having a particular belief (Wedgwood, 2002: 268. See
also Velleman 2000; Engel 2001, 2013; Noordhof 2021; Wedgwood 2007,
2013; Boghossian 2003; Gibbard 2003, 2005, 2012; Shah 2003; Speaks
2009; Nolfi 2015; Fassio 2016).



In response, it has been argued that what is essential to belief is
merely that beliefs have contents that are true or false, not that one
ought to believe a content if and only if it is true. The appearance
of normativity, it is suggested, derives from other sources. For
instance, as epistemic agents, we seek truth. And having true beliefs
is essential to fulfilling our goals. This just shows that true
beliefs have an instrumental value, and fails to support the
normativity of belief thesis. Moreover, it is argued, even if it is
claimed that truth has a non-instrumental value, the value in question
is derived from moral or other values, not from the nature of belief
as such (Papineau & Tanney 1999, 2013; Dretske 2000; Davidson
2001a; Horwich 2013; Bergamaschi Ganapini 2021).



Questions have also been raised concerning how the norm of belief is
to be understood. With respect to meaning the question arose whether
 \((\ME\_1)\)
 violates the principle that *ought* implies *can*. In
the case of belief, a similar worry arises if the norm of belief is
formulated in a parallel fashion, by proceeding from the correctness
conditions of beliefs to normative consequences:



(CB)
The belief that \(p\) is correct if and only if \(p\).
\((\NB\_1)\)
\( S\) ought to believe that \(p\) if and only if \(p\).


The trouble is that
 \((\NB\_1)\)
 implies that \(S\) ought to believe everything that is true, an
impossible task. This difficulty, it has been argued, is not solved by
appealing to a wide-scope reading of "ought" since there
are values of \(p\) that are such that \(S\) could neither bring it
about that \(p\) is false, nor bring it about that she believes \(p\)
(Bykvist & Hattiangadi 2007:
 284).[45]
 The most common reaction, instead, is to weaken the norm (Boghossian
2003: 37):



\((\NB\_2)\)
\( S\) ought to believe that \(p\) only if \(p\).


This norm does not imply that \(S\) ought to believe everything that
is true, and hence does not put impossible demands on \(S\). However,
as noted in the discussion of
 \((\ME\_1)\)
 above, the question arises whether \((\NB\_2)\) suffices to provide
any real constraints on \(S\)'s belief formation. If \(p\) is
true it does not follow that \(S\) ought to believe \(p\), and if
\(p\) is false it merely follows that it is not the case that \(S\)
ought to believe \(p\)--not that \(S\) ought not to believe \(p\)
(Bykvist & Hattiangadi 2007:
 280).[46]
 In response, normativists have made the same move as in the case of
meaning, and suggested that the "ought" in
 \((\NB\_1)\)
 is replaced with a "may" (Whiting 2010: 216-217;
2013: 125). It has been objected that this is too weak since it
undermines the fundamental role of the norm of truth when it comes to
explaining other evidential and inferential norms (Bykvist &
Hattiangadi 2013: 113-114) and to accounting for some key
feature of doxastic deliberation (Sullivan-Bissett & Noordhof
 2020).[47]



Adopting a different tack the normativist could say that the relevant
norms should be understood in terms of the "telos" of
belief: Just as a map is a map (giving a correct or incorrect picture
of the world) only insofar as it is designed to represent the world,
and in this sense ought to represent the world correctly, so a belief
can be said to be correct or incorrect only insofar as representing
the world belongs to its telos, to what it ought to do. Since this
type of "ought" applies to the representing objects (such
as maps or beliefs) and not to agents, it is argued, they are not
action-guiding and the principle that *ought* implies
*can* does not apply (Jarvis
 2012).[48]



Another set of questions concerns the fact that
 \((\NB\_1)\)
 is an objective
 norm.[49]
 Unlike a subjective norm, such as "\(S\) ought to believe that
\(p\) only if \(S\) has evidence for \(p\)", \((\NB\_1)\) does
not engage with \(S\)'s reasons, her beliefs and desires, and
this raises the question of how \((\NB\_1)\) can serve to guide our
belief formation. Objective norms can guide only via our beliefs, and
it has been argued that this raises two worries for \((\NB\_1\)). In
order to be guided by \((\NB\_1\)), \(S\) would have to have a belief
about whether \(p\) is true. This means, first, that in order to be
guided by \((\NB\_1\)) the subject would already have had to form a
belief as to whether \(p\) and hence the guidance comes too late; and,
second, that whatever conclusion the subject comes to as to whether
\(p\), the norm tells her to hold that very belief (if she forms the
belief that \(p\) the norm gives her a reason to believe \(p\) and if
she forms the belief that not-\(p\) the norm gives her a reason to
believe not-\(p\)) (Gluer & Wikforss 2009:
 44).[50]
 It is therefore disputed whether \((\NB\_1)\) can be said to be a norm
of belief, regulating our belief
 formation.[51]



Another key challenge to the idea that belief is essentially normative
is that belief seems to be subject to multiple normative standards. In
addition to the idea that one should only believe what is true or
follow the evidence, there are now also several arguments for the
claim that at times pragmatic and moral norms govern belief as well
and these may be normatively heavier than any epistemic norm at play
(Marusic 2011; Reisner 2018; Basu 201; Leary 2017; Rinard
2019) . If so, then there are no essential or constitutive normative
requirements for belief: though there might be distinctive correctness
conditions for belief (as in CB) these do not appear to be genuinely
normative or do not seem to explain what "one just plain
ought" to believe such and such (Maguire & Woods 2020;
Bergamaschi Ganapini 2021).



Finally, assuming that belief *is* intrinsically normative,
however, the decisive question is whether this has any implications
for content. Why should the fact that belief is normative imply that
content is? Indeed, it has been suggested that the opposite is true
since if belief is normative the appearance of normativity of content
can simply be explained by appealing to the normativity of belief
(Speaks 2009: 409). According to Boghossian, the normativity of
content derives from the fact that there is a constitutive connection
between the notion of content and the notion of belief (Boghossian
2003). This is so, he argues, since we could not grasp the notion of
content without first grasping the role contents play in belief.
Moreover, Boghossian argues, although contents play a role in other
attitudes as well, there are reasons to think that the concept of
belief is conceptually primary: For instance, \(S\) could not have the
concept of desire without first having the concept of belief (2003:
42-43). If so, the normativity of belief supports CE
normativity.



The claim that the concept of belief is primary to that of desire can
be questioned. Thus, there is empirical evidence from developmental
psychology that children acquire the concept of desire prior to
acquiring that of belief (Wellman 1993). It has also been argued that
belief and desire are conceptually interdependent (Miller 2008). More
importantly, even if it can be shown that the concept of belief is
primary to that of desire, and of the other propositional attitudes,
the question arises whether indeed one could not grasp the concept of
content without grasping that of belief. *Prima facie*,
grasping the concept of a propositional attitude such as belief is
rather distinct from grasping the concept of content, since it
involves the idea of taking up an attitude towards
 content.[52]
 Moreover, Boghossian is committed to the strong claim that opponents
of content normativity fail to grasp the concept of content (or,
alternatively, that they operate with a different concept).



An alternative strategy would be to avoid the appeal to conceptual
entailments and argue that there is a metaphysical connection between
mental content and belief such that if belief is essentially
normative, content is. Such an argument may be more or less direct,
going via more or less contentious assumptions about mental
 content.[53]



For instance, versions of conceptual role semantics imply that there
is an essential link between mental content and belief as do versions
of informational theories of content (Dretske 1981; Fodor 1990),
although the latter are typically coupled with a non-normativist
account of belief. Another line of reasoning appeals to the idea that
there is a constitutive connection between grasping a concept,
understanding a content, and using it in the propositional
attitudes.


#### 3.1.2 Use in Keeping with Content



To possess a concept, it is sometimes suggested, is to have the
capacity to use the concept in various propositional attitudes. Since
it is essential to the propositional attitudes that they stand in
certain rational interconnections with one another, it is argued, this
essential normativity transfers to concepts and contents. Possessing a
concept, grasping it, incurs a commitment to use the concept "in
keeping with its content", in the various propositional
attitudes. If the speaker fails to do so, she has *misused* the
concept in question (Millar 2004; McDowell & Pettit 1986; Gibbard
2012: chapter 6).



This argument runs parallel to the argument from understanding in
support of ME normativity
 (section 2.1.2).
 Even if that argument is accepted, however, the question arises
whether it can be applied to concepts and content, since the notion of
failing to use a concept in "keeping with its content"
appears more problematic than the notion of failing to use a word in
accordance with its meaning (McGinn 1984: 146-147; Millar 2004:
180-181). It is relatively unproblematic to speak of
understanding the meaning of an expression (or misunderstanding it),
but in the case of concepts there is nothing corresponding to the
expression. To "understand" a concept is simply to possess
it, to use it in thoughts. Hence there seems to be little or no room
for the idea that \(S\) misunderstands a concept either. If \(S\)
reasons as if she possesses the concept *ancient* rather than
the concept *arcane*, it would seem to follow not that there is
any misuse of concepts but that she has another concept.



One strategy is to distinguish between possession conditions and
attribution conditions (Peacocke 1992: 27-33). This separates
the conditions that determine \(S\)'s concepts from conditions
for the attribution of the concept to \(S\). As a consequence, there
is a potential gap between how \(S\) uses the concept, her grasp of
it, and how it should be used if she were to use it in keeping with
its content. To illustrate the distinction, it is common to appeal to
Tyler Burge's discussion of how social factors, under certain
conditions, serve to determine content (Burge 1979; Peacocke 1992: 29;
Millar 2004: 181-188). Burge gives an account of concept
attribution that goes via word meaning. To be attributed the concept
*arcane*, on this view, it suffices that \(S\) uses the
expression "arcane" by and large correctly, "in
keeping with its content"--if she is committed to her
community practice of using the corresponding expression
"arcane". What determines her concept, thus, is not merely
facts about her use and dispositions to stand corrected, but facts
about the use of the term in the wider practice. It follows that
speakers typically have an incomplete grasp of the concepts they think
with and, as a result, tend to misuse these concepts.



Leaving aside the controversial question of whether we can separate
possession conditions of concepts from attribution conditions, it
might be asked whether Burge's social externalism can be
employed to support CE normativity. Burge's argument depends on
the (empirical) assumption that the individual is committed to the
community practice (Burge 1979: 94-95, 101-102; Millar
2004: 182). But if the normativity in question is made conditional on
the individual's commitment to the community, it does not follow
that content is essentially normative. After all, an individual who is
not thus committed would still have concepts. (Equally, in the case of
the experts, the suggested normative dimension would seem to drop
out.) What would be required, rather, is an argument to the effect
that the concept expressed is necessarily determined by the community
practice, independently of \(S\)'s commitments.



Arguments from concept grasp, again, typically appeal to the idea that
there are rationality constraints on concept attributions. As noted in
the discussion of ME normativity, the question has been raised whether
the idea that there are such constraints coheres with normativism. It
has been suggested that this question is particularly pressing in the
case of content. When it comes to meaning, there is the option of
attributing meaning errors and explaining the error by appealing to
the subject's mistaken *conception* of the meaning of an
expression, thereby rationalizing her reasoning and actions. In the
case of concepts, this option is not available, since the error is
said to occur at the level of content. It would either have to be
argued that the error can be rationalized some other way, or the claim
that there are rationality constraints on content attributions would
have to be rejected (see Brown 2004, Wikforss 2015 and 2017).


### 3.2 Content Determining Normativity



Like MD normativism, CD normativism is a foundational claim:
Intentional content is (at least partially) metaphysically determined
by rules or norms, content facts are, if you will, (at least
partially) "grounded" by normative facts. Since the
relevant norms or rules govern intentional mental states, the CD
normativist typically tries to find a particular kind of state
plausibly subject to rules or norms that by the same token (at least
partially) determine contents for states of this kind. As truth and
inference are intimately connected with both content and belief, the
debate focuses on norms for *belief*.



Besides *truth* norms like
 (\(\NB\_1)\)
 and \((\NB\_2)\) above, two further kinds of candidate norms of belief
have been discussed: *knowledge* norms, and norms of
*rationality, justification, or
 inference*.[54]
 CD normativism then is the claim that beliefs cannot have content
unless rules or norms of at least one of these kinds are in force for
them. Strong versions of CD normativism hold that CD norms also
determine which contents beliefs have. And again, being in force can
roughly be interpreted in three ways: As requiring the subject to
*follow* the relevant rule or norm \(R\), to *accept
\(R\)* in a sense not requiring (general) following, or as
independent of the subject's attitudes and intentional states
towards \(R\) (see above,
 section 2.2.1).



As in the case of meaning, CD normativism most often is a form of
*guidance normativism* construing belief formation as an
essentially rule-guided activity. Those inspired by pragmatism and/or
Wittgensteinian anti-platonism might also think of the relevant rules
as "of our own making" (Baker & Hacker 1985; Brandom
1994). A fairly common idea is that believers follow basic, objective
norms such as truth or knowledge norms *by means of* being
guided by subjective ones such as the rules of rationality (Boghossian
2003), but others take subjective rules as
 basic,[55]
 or argue that the nature of belief is given by subjective and
objective norms in combination (Wedgwood 2007: 162).



Unsurprisingly, norms or rules for (rational) *reasoning*
receive a lot of attention. Prime examples are inference rules such as
*modus ponens* or the law of non-contradiction. Purely formal
rules would arguably be too weak for the purposes of strong CD
normativism; normative inferentialists such as Brandom (1994; 2000) or
Peregrin (2008) therefore include norms governing material implication
among the content determining rules. In general, principles governing
epistemic rationality (as, for instance, formalized in Bayesian
epistemology) are further examples, and for those who hold that there
can be good practical reasons for belief, principles of practical
reasoning are also
 relevant.[56]



As we have already seen in
 section 2.2
 above, regress worries arise if CD normativism takes the form of
guidance normativism. Here, a pragmatic conception of rule guidance
such as Brandom's normative version of inferentialism (Brandom
1994) might help. To avoid regresses, Brandom takes norms implicitly
"instituted" by our practices to be basic and proposes a
*pragmatic phenomenalism* about such norms. Objective
"deontic statuses" are to be explained in terms of our
normative attitudes. Something's *being correct*, that
is, is to be explained in terms of the attitude of *taking it to be
correct*, making the norms in question "in some sense
creatures of ours" (1994: 626); yet, the goal is to secure and
explain the "objectivity of concepts" (1994:
 xvii).[57]
 As attitudes of taking something to be correct can themselves be
correct or incorrect, *being correct* ultimately has to be
explained in terms of *being correctly taken to be correct*. In
this sense, the normativity is irreducible--it is "norms
all the way down" (1994: 44; 625).



Questions that have been raised for pragmatic phenomenalism include
whether it in fact can account for contents the truth of which is
independent of our attitudes. Because it explains normative statuses
by means of further normative statuses, pragmatic phenomenalism might
not be able to tell us anything informative about how we make or
"institute" the basic norms implicit in our practices (cf.
Rosen 2001, Hattiangadi 2003) or to account for the difference between
instituting and merely being in accordance with a norm. Yet another
regress worry has also been raised: if for any normative status to be
instituted by an implicit norm a further normative status already
needs to be so instituted, an infinite regress of (implicit) norms
might ensue despite the pragmatist nature of the proposal (cf.
Hattiangadi 2007: 197; Gluer & Wikforss 2009: 60ff). This
regress might not be vicious if the project is interpreted as an
expressivist one, however.



Even if guidance normativism would inescapably lead to some form of
regress, one might still hold on to the claim that there are
contentful intentional states only if for instance the rules of
rationality are in force for them. As we noted already in the previous
version of this entry, such force might require acceptance, but not
(general) guidance, or it might be completely independent of the
attitudes of thinkers. Highlighting both these options, it has
recently been argued that guidance normativism is unnecessarily
demanding.



For one thing, even if the relevant rules require some sort of
acceptance to be in force, not every performance governed by them
needs to actually be guided by them (cf. Hlobil 2015; Tracy 2020).
Plausible as this might initially seem, especially when thinking along
the lines of the game analogy, a general observation of this kind does
not yet substantiate the claim that an account of constitutive
rules' being in force that implements this possibility would be
applicable to CD rules or
 norms.[58]
 Moreover, it should be noted that for CD rules or norms, making this
move might not just amount to acknowledging that not every instance of
belief formation has to be rule-guided. If the move is to stop an
intentional condition on rule-following from giving rise to a regress,
we might end up having to say that every instance of rule-guided
belief formation *requires* the unguided formation of at least
one other belief or intentional state. For every rule that is followed
(on a particular occasion), that is, there is another that governs,
but *cannot guide*, the formation of a further intentional
state of the rule-follower (on that
 occasion).[59]
 This is at least a surprising situation to end up in for a defender
of the view that belief is essentially governed by rules that can
guide belief
 formation.[60]
 CD normativism might thus prove viable only if the force of the
relevant rules or norms can plausibly be construed in complete
independence of the attitudes of the thinkers.


## 4. Concluding Remarks: Normativism and Naturalism



The idea that the normative in some sense is not part of nature goes
back at least to Kant (see, for instance, *Critique of Pure
Reason* [1781 [A 547]]). Already Hume (in the *Treatise*
[1739-1740]) argued against the metaethical naturalist that
*ought* cannot be derived from *is*--to try to do
so would be to commit a so-called "naturalistic fallacy".
With the "open question argument", Moore (in *Principia
Ethica* [1903]) added a weapon to the anti-naturalist's
arsenal also against giving naturalistic accounts of moral
evaluations: According to the open question argument, there is no
naturalistic (set of) concept(s) analytically equivalent to the moral
concept of goodness, since no matter what naturalistic definition is
given, the question whether all and only things satisfying it are good
still makes sense. Much of recent normativism about meaning/content
continues in this anti-naturalist tradition; many normativists about
meaning/content hold that the essential normativity of meaning/content
makes at least (fully) reductive naturalism untenable.



Many have construed Kripke's Wittgenstein as saying exactly
that: it is part of his skeptical campaign against semantic facts in
general that such facts cannot be reduced to whatever precisely is
allowed in a naturalistic supervenience base for meaning/content. An
argument for this could take a weaker, intensionalist, and a stronger,
extensionalist, form (cf. Boghossian 1989a: 532ff). The stronger
argument concludes that no reductive naturalist account of
meaning/content will be extensionally correct: For any
meaning/concept, such an account will either include objects in its
extension that, intuitively, do not belong there, or exclude objects
from its extension that, intuitively, do belong there, or both. As we
saw above
 (section 2.2.1),
 this "problem of error" is a problem for many
naturalistic accounts of meaning/content, but as such it does not yet
have anything to do with normativity. To that, the normativist could
respond that it is precisely because of their essential normativity
that no naturalistic account of meaning/content can be extensionally
correct. The weaker argument grants extensional correctness, but
argues that no naturalistic reduction will get the intension of the
notion of meaning/content right; it will inevitably miss the normative
character of what is semantically correct, its deontic or axiologic
characteristics.



Despite the normativists' argument, it seems fair to say that at
this point in time, the case from normativism against reductive
naturalism about meaning/content has not yet been fully made. To make
their case, the semantic normativist could resort to adopting a
metaethical approach: arguments in the tradition of Hume and Moore
might well be adaptable to their case (cf. Miller 1998, 188ff;
Hattiangadi 2007, 38ff; Gibbard 2012; Zalabardo 2012). As Hattiangadi
argues, though, the semantic normativist's case ends up being
hostage to whatever controversial assumptions these arguments rely on
(motivational internalism, for instance, might be such an issue), thus
removing normativism further from being the pre-theoretical constraint
on acceptable accounts of meaning/content that Kripke's skeptic
meant it to be. What's more, one might worry that the topic of
"reduction" is itself more nuanced than the normativist
makes it to be. As we have seen in
 section 2.2,
 it is still possible to argue that some (set of) dispositions might
play a role in meaning-determination. Alternatively, it is possible to
endorse partially reductive accounts construing meaning/content as
determined by a dispositional and a non-semantic, but normative,
component.



Furthermore, even if normativism about meaning/content might exclude
(fully) reductive naturalism about meaning/content, it should be noted
that adopting normativism would not seem to be the only option for the
anti-reductivist (cf. Mulligan 1999: 136f; Gluer & Wikforss
2009: 63ff). What the normativist construes as norms or rules of
meaning/content, principles such as
 (CM)
 or inferential rules such as modus ponens, might also be construed in
a very different way: As, or in analogy with what Frege called
"laws of truth" (Frege 1918 [1986: 30]). In the same vein,
Husserl called the "laws of logic" "ideal"
(Husserl 1913: 56)). These "laws" are neither
prescriptions for thinking, nor nomological generalities of our
psychology. Their "validity" or necessity is *sui
generis*; if anything, it is what we might today call
 metaphysical.[61]