## 1. Life and Intellectual Career



Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's life spanned an era of great
intellectual ferment in Germany. He witnessed or was engaged with some
of the most significant cultural developments, if not revolutions,
that the modern Western world experienced. His family did not lead him
to take up intellectual life, as was the case for his older brother,
the poet Johann Georg (1740-1814), Jacobi nonetheless arrived on
the central stage of the philosophical world thanks to his criticism
of the German Enlightenment and, perhaps primarily, for his work on
Spinoza's philosophy. His analysis of Spinoza's
'Ethics' was the main topic of his first philosophical
publication in 1785, and it made Spinoza a necessary point of
reference in the assessment of rationality as such. This factor,
together with his investigation of fundamental inconsistencies in
Kant's transcendental philosophy, made Jacobi into one of the
forefathers of the far-reaching turn in the history of thinking
now known as Classical German Philosophy.



While also writing political commentary, Jacobi held official
positions in few governing bodies, in the course of such work he
worked toward a more liberal administration of taxation. He married
Helene Elisabeth (Betty) von Clermont, a noblewoman, and together they
established a literary circle in Pempelfort, hosting some of the
greatest minds of the age.



Jacobi was born in Dusseldorf on January 25, 1743, in the family
of a prosperous merchant. He was intended to carry on his
father's business, and he was sent to a Frankfurt commercial
house for apprenticeship. This, however, merely revealed his true
vocation for a literary career, leading to his moving to Geneva (1759)
to study under Georges-Louis Le Sage. Le Sage exposed him to the
Enlightenment in the shape of the French Encyclopedists, as well as to
Charles de Bonnet's psychology: later, Jacobi's vast
library included a copy of the 'Essai analytique sur les
facultes de l'ame'. Together with
Bonnet's thinking, Jacobi encountered new ideas, from Voltaire
to Rousseau, that developed from eighteenth century rationalism the
cradle of lay criticism. In 1762 Jacobi returned to Dusseldorf,
married, and took charge of his father's trading house, but only
until 1772, when he took up a position in the administration of
Julich and Berg. During this period, essays by Mendelssohn and
Kant, submitted to a competition hosted by the Berlin Academy, caught
his attention, as he later confirmed in his 'David Hume
Dialogue': they had a long-lasting influence on his
interpretation of scientific reasoning and metaphysics (Pistilli
2007). Jacobi then began what became an extensive correspondence with
the thinkers of his age. If the salon that he hosted with his wife was
an outer sign of his literary ambitions, the number and notoriety of
those he corresponded with, from Johann Gottlieb Fichte to Friedrich
Gottlieb Klopstock and from Immanuel Kant to F.D.E. Schleiermacher,
confirmed the range of his intellectual facility.



In 1772, with Christoph Martin Wieland, Jacobi drafted a project to
launch a journal, the *Teutcher Merkur*, inspired by the French
gazette *Mercure de France*. Wieland began as editor of the
publication in 1773, and Jacobi used it to publish some of his
occasional writings. More important than his relationship with Wieland
was his interactions with Goethe in 1774 (Heinz, 1965). That encounter
catalyzed Jacobi's next efforts, 'Eduard Allwills
Papiere' (1775/6) and 'Woldemar. Eine Seltenheit aus der
Naturgeschichte' (1777/9) (Prantl, 1881: 579). These works were
to become paradigmatic instances of Jacobi's philosophical
novels, forming a reaction to the prevalent style of *Sturm und
Drang*. Jacobi's fresh and inspiring friendship with Goethe
did not last long, however. Goethe's reaction to the
'Woldemar' was a bitter eye-opener for Jacobi:
Goethe enacted a crucifixion of the book on a tree in 1779 (di
Giovanni, 1994: 52-53). In 1779, Jacobi left for Munich to
accept an appointment at a government office but then resigned the
same year due to the pressure of the controversies aroused by his
liberal reform proposals, following from his support for Adam
Smith's doctrines, as shown in his publications.



The next decade proved decisive for Jacobi. In 1780, he met Lessing in
Wolfenbuttel. During their conversations Lessing supposedly
confessed his Spinozism. When Lessing died in 1781, M. Mendelssohn
began drafting a laudatory portrait of this great champion of the
German Enlightenment. Jacobi felt obliged to inform Mendelssohn of
Lessing's true philosophical tendency, but Jacobi's report
shocked Mendelssohn: being a Spinozist entailed being an atheist and a
subversive who disregarded all morality and religion. Mendelssohn
engaged with Jacobi to assess Lessing's Spinozism and, more
importantly, Spinoza's own teaching. This exchange between the
two began in 1783 and eventually provided the basis of Jacobi's
1785 famous volume 'Uber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen
an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn'. In addition to
Mendelssohn's response of 1786, to which Jacobi replied the same
year, the extent and acrimony of the debate that Jacobi aroused led
this work to be a milestone in the prehistory of Classical German
Philosophy. Jacobi's controversy with Mendelssohn led to an
unearthing of the peculiar humanism and the distinct rationality that
were part of the vision of the Enlightenment, to which Jacobi proposed
a reasoned rejection, uncovering its Spinozian hidden soul. The
so-called *Spinozarenaissance* that followed this public
exchange between Jacobi and Mendelssohn made Spinoza's
'Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' a touchstone for
any philosophical system to come (Jaeschke and Sandkaulen, 2004). At
the same time, Spinoza's renaissance fostered the so-called
Spinoza controversy, or that of *Pantheismusstreit*, which
ignited passionate disputes around the nature of freedom, the reality
of final causes, and the actual existence of individual entities. For
Jacobi, finding a route through Spinoza's philosophy was the
best opportunity to thoroughly discuss the essence of rationalism,
which dismisses free human actions and puts in their place the pure
atheistic fatalism that a coherent system of knowledge implies.



As Goethe stressed, this controversy touched everyone in their deepest
convictions. Only two years after the 'Spinoza Briefen',
Jacobi published another book, 'David Hume uber den
Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Gesprach'. Its
main purpose was to shake off the traces of irrationalism that he was
accused of due to his use of the term *Glaube* (faith) in the
'Spinoza Briefen' (Jacobi, (1994 (2): 255 and JWA 2,1:
 9)[1].
 Jacobi confirmed that his notion of faith was reminiscent of the role
that this concept played in Hume's philosophy, though he
rejected the latter's skepticism. Jacobi's realism was in
fact tempered by a different interpretation of the pillars of human
knowledge, which allowed him to challenge the problematic positing of
the *Ding an sich* in Kant's transcendental philosophy.
His dictum that 'Without that presupposition [of the thing in
itself], I could not enter into [Kant's] system, but with it I
could not stay within it' (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 336 and JWA 2,1:
109) became a well-known summary of a diagnosis that concerned
both Kant's idealism as well as many of its heirs. Not least of
these was Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre' (Jacobi,
1994 (2): 501 and JWA 2,1: 194).



In 1789, Jacobi published a second, augmented edition of the
'Spinoza Briefen', putting forth a solution to the
dichotomy between nature and freedom (Sandkaulen, 2000: 64ff). The
additions marked Jacobi's explicit opposition to Kant's
recently published 'Critique of Practical Reason', but
they also helped announce the main topic of the last decade of
eighteenth century: freedom.



As the French troops marched toward Dusseldorf in 1794, Jacobi
fled his home and moved to safer locations, which included Hamburg and
Holstein. Eventually he settled in Eutin (1798). During this period,
Jacobi began to draft what later became 'Von den gottlichen
Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung', which was only published in 1811.
While in Eutin, he still did not experience peace, at least so far as
his intellectual output was concerned. Jacobi had become involved in
the dispute over Fichte's alleged atheism, the so-called
*Atheismusstreit*. His famous letter 'Jacobi an
Fichte' was written to clear Fichte of the accusation of
atheism: Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre' was no more
atheistic than geometry or arithmetic. Instead, it was nihilistic
(Jacobi, 1994 (2): 519 and JWA 2,1: 215). In Jacobi's eyes,
Fichte's philosophy was simply Spinozism but based upon
subjectivity: the systematic operation that Spinoza's substance
performs is achieved by Fichte's doctrine of science and shows
how the necessary connection between singular entities is achieved by
the activity of the absolute (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 502 and JWA 2,1: 195).
Thus, all existing actuality (in ethics as much as in epistemology)
must be considered the manifestation of a rational universality that
Fichte called 'the absolute I'. By contrast with this
widespread understanding of rationality, Jacobi re-drafted his
own notion of *Vernunft*. Initially, Jacobi was critical of the
idea of reason (e.g., Jacobi, 1994 (2): 230 and JWA 1,1: 115) due to
the terminological legacy advanced by the philosophical systems that
he was battling against. He moved slowly toward a different, more
refined understanding of the term, which bears traces of
Jacobi's own theoretical evolution. This first appears in the
second edition of the 'Spinoza Briefen' (Jacobi, 1994 (2):
375 and JWA 1,1: 259-260). The second supplement to 'Jacobi an
Fichte' shows further evidence of this evolution (Jacobi, 1994
(2): 529 and JWA 2,1: 229), as Jacobi's 1802 publication
'Uber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus, die Vernunft zu
Verstande zu bringen, und der Philosophie uberhaupt eine neue
Absicht zu geben' does.



In 1805, Jacobi moved to Munich to join the newly established
*Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, becoming its
president in 1807. Alerted by Schelling's early writings, Jacobi
had sensed an unequivocal Spinozian naturalism in his speech entitled
'Uber das Verhaltnis der bildenden Kunste zur
Natur', given at the *Akademie der Wissenschaften* on the
king's name day, October 10, 1807. His suspicion was confirmed
by Schelling's essay on human freedom (1809), reading which gave
Jacobi the impulse to finish his 'Von den gottlichen Dingen
und ihrer Offenbarung'. With this last book, Jacobi sought to
show that an unprecedented effort to reject the existence and
rationality of human beings' free activity animated Spinoza,
Kant, Fichte, and the youngest ('second') daughter of
transcendental thinking (as he referred to Schelling's
philosophy). As had happened with the 'Spinoza Briefen'
and the 'Jacobi an Fichte', the 'Von den
gottlichen Dingen' became the center of a dispute. This
third debate of the post-Kantian era, the so-called
*Theimusstreit*, broke out only to provide Jacobi with a
suitable spotlight to shine on his conclusive definitions of
rationality and God. In a sense, he here disclosed his philosophical
testament. He was forced to resign from his position at the
*Akademie* in 1812. As a retired but still prominent cultural
personality, Jacobi worked until his death at editing of his Collected
Works, assisted by his disciples J.F. Koppen and C.J.F. Roth.



After receiving Hegel's positive review of the third volume of
his Collected Works (Jacobi, 1825-27: vol. 2, 467-68), Jacobi
regretted being too old to study Hegel's thought; he was
convinced that Hegel had finally grasped his philosophy, at least
better than he had at the time of 'Glauben und
Wissen'.



He died in Munich on March 10, 1819.


## 2. Early Writings



From his occasional writings, Jacobi might seem to be an engaged
intellectual with some proclivity to disputing the tenets of the
Enlightenment. His 'Discours preliminaire zu Le
Noble' (1771) already hints at some of the ideas that he later
developed in his polemical writings, such as in his 1782 article
'Etwas dass Lessing gesagt hat', which presents the
despotism of the Medieval popes as preferable to that of enlightened
princes. Regardless, Jacobi did not agree with any authoritarian use
of the political power, as shown in his 1781 essay 'Uber
Recht und Gewalt, oder philosophische Erwagung eines Aufsatzes
von dem Herrn Hofrath Wieland uber das gottliche Recht der
Obrigkeit'. In this text Jacobi publicly denies Wieland's
claim that right comes from the ability to impose obedience through
the use of force.



Apart from these minor texts and two political essays published in
1779 ('Eine politische Rhapsodie. Aus einem Aktenstock
entwendet. Ein eingesandtes Stuck' and 'Noch eine
politische Rhapsodie, worinn sich verschiedene Plagia befinden;
betitelt: Es ist nicht recht, und es ist nicht klug'), in the
second half of the 1770s, Jacobi gained momentum toward earning a
wider audience, thanks to the publication of his two novels. Much in
debt to Goethe's blessing, which he had received during their
first meeting in 1774, Jacobi eventually provides a definite form to
his internal unrest concerning the existence of a personal God, the
endlessness of time, and the reasons for his ineffable and yet
visceral fervor.



The 'Eduard Allwills Papiere' is an epistolary novel and
first published in 1775 in the journal *Iris*, which was led by
Jacobi's brother Johann Georg. This initial edition included
only five of the 21 letters that made up the final novel. A second
edition appeared in 1776 in the journal *Teutscher Merkur*,
including seven more letters, plus one more that did not appear in the
final edition. A third edition, which was published in 1781, presented
minor changes and additions. The fourth edition, published in 1792,
contains major changes (for instance, here we can find the details of
Jacobi's criticism of idealism), as well as an important
supplement, the letter 'An Erhard O\*\*', which provides
clear insight into Jacobi's definition of the human being. In
this edition, we can see how much the 'Spinoza Briefen'
and the 'David Hume Dialogue', published during the 1780s,
influenced the content of the novel. The fifth and final edition,
published in 1812, does not differ much from the fourth. In this
novel, Jacobi blames the idea of the moral genius, as embodied by
Allwill, and takes distance from the movement of the
*Empfindsamkeit* and *Sturm und Drang* (Ivaldo, 2003:
31). Allwill is dominated by a limitless will (to will all), as will
is everything he is (all is will): he rejects law and truth, making
his own determination the only right. While Allwill approaches
Jacobi's own tendency toward a repudiation of a pharisaic
formality of life, Allwill makes the mistake of considering himself to
be the origin of morality, laws, and values. Thus, Jacobi seems to
praise him for prioritizing his own inner moral impulse but condemns
him for dismissing the universal rationality that an inner moral
impulse must reveal.



'Woldemar. Eine Seltenheit aus der Naturgeschichte'
appeared in the *Teutscher Merkur* in 1777 in the form of a
fragment with the title 'Freundschaft und Liebe. Eine wahre
Geschichte, von der Herausgeber von Eduard Allwills Papiere'. In
a more elaborate form, it is published in 1779, with the title
'Woldemar. Eine Seltenheit aus der Naturgeschichte'. In
1779, the philosophical part of the novel is published in the journal
*Deutsches Museum*, under the title 'Ein Stuck
Philosophie des Lebens und der Menschheit: Aus dem zweiten Bande von
Woldemar'. It is published again in 1781 with minor changes and
under the title 'Der Kunstgarten. Ein philosophisches
Gesprach'. In 1794, after Jacobi has published all of his
major philosophical texts, he publishes a new edition of
'Woldemar', including an analysis of Aristotle's
ethics and providing a different conclusion. This version is
eventually included in Jacobi's Complete Works in 1821. The text
introduces the figure of Woldemar, a passionate young man, melancholic
and impulsive, who will discover that his *beautiful soul* must
be amended through the recognition of higher values and universal
laws. Unlike Allwill, Woldemar eventually understands that those
universal values do not exclude the needs of his inner self; instead,
they bring his desires and passions to a higher, less egoistic
perspective on friendship and affection. This new ethical horizon
heals Woldemar's suffering and proves to be the only means of
attaining real love.


## 3. Main Philosophical Works


### 3.1 The 'Spinoza Letters' (1st edition, 1785)



The text of the 'Uber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an
den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn' is somewhat difficult to map out,
as it combined both Jacobi's and Mendelssohn's arguments
and counterarguments regarding Lessing's alleged Spinozism, two
poems by Goethe, a letter to Hemsterhuis, reports of Lessing's
claims, and digressions on Spinoza's philosophy. All things
considered, everything boils down to a few clear theoretical theses
that had far-reaching repercussions throughout both philosophy
and society. This work had three different editions: 1785, 1789, and
1819. The first edition opens with Goethe's poem 'das
Gottliche'. It proceeds to a short report of the
circumstances that led Jacobi to contact Mendelssohn, followed by the
presentation of the first letter Jacobi sent to him in 1783. A second
poem by Goethe, 'Prometheus', follows, suggesting that
here the first section of the book has come to an end, establishing
the core subject of the controversy: rationality displaying its
fundamental proposition with the principle a *nihilo nihil fit*
(Jacobi, 1994 (2): 187 and JWA 1,1: 16-17).



This principle offers a glimpse of an approach to knowledge, according
to which everything is necessarily and sufficiently determined by its
ground (*Grund*). For this, the principle of the ground
inscribes all instances within a system of references that supports
their determination (Sandkaulen, 2000; Della Rocca, 2015). Thus, the
principle of the ground may be a crucial topic in metaphysics, as it
provides the guidelines for both epistemology and ontology (Fine,
2012). Jacobi's critical view of systematic knowledge pivots
around this principle, although he does not imply that systematic
knowledge should be rejected without reservation. Systematic knowledge
meets a rational need, as it seems to pose a perfect balance between a
universal design and singular entities. Jacobi contends that a closer
reading, however, uncovers that those singular entities, when
inscribed in that universal design, lose their identity and substance.
Reality, as conceived through the principle of the ground, is merely
an all-devouring whole that does not provide any room for
individuals.



If we examine the arch that extends from the first poem to the second
(from 'das Gottliche' to 'Prometheus'),
it is easy to decipher Jacobi's twofold intention: on one side,
he celebrates the human capacity to transcend systematic determinism
('das Gottliche'); on the other, he faces the
appalling truth that rationality appears to call for a deterministic
universe that is dominated by a blind fate that disregards individuals
('Prometheus'). The only Promethean way out is to rise
against this systematic determination of reality in a rebellion that
should be based upon a different understanding of rationality and
reality. In fact, it must be stressed, Jacobi does not provide an
alternative to philosophical determinism out of a poetic illusion.
Instead, he calls for a rational, not poetic, alternative to
rationalism.



After being accused of defending Spinoza, due to his great regard for
Spinoza's philosophy, and then being blamed for not reading
Spinoza accurately enough, Jacobi provides to Mendelssohn a solid,
though synthetic, analysis of Spinoza's 'Ethics'. In
this text, Jacobi not only displays his accuracy in analysis (at least
taking into account the general framework of Spinoza's
'Ethics') but also his insight in interpretation (Jacobi,
1994 (2): 217-228 and JWA 1,1: 92-112). Spinoza should be
considered, according to Jacobi, the pinnacle of rationalism and the
ultimate outcome of a coherent evolutionary narrative of the
traditional metaphysics inaugurated by Aristotle (Jacobi, 1994 (2):
227 and JWA 1,1: 110-111). Nevertheless, Jacobi adds, that very
same rationalism is also the cause of a thorough disregard for the
existence of concrete individuals, which is grounded upon their
practical certitude (true freedom) (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 229 and 234 and
JWA 1,1: 113 and 120-125). Jacobi's critique of
rationalism implies his counterproposal, providing a new platform for
notions that could rationally support individual existence (Jacobi,
1994 (2): 233-234 and JWA 1,1: 120-125). Jacobi considers
that individuality must be conceived together with the profile of a
free human being, an existent that is precisely the prime victim of
Spinozism (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 193 and JWA 1,1: 27-28). However,
because Jacobi's notion of freedom represents a necessary basis
for all existence, the eradication of any rational justification of
free human beings not only erases the notion of true freedom but also
eradicates existence in general (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 212 and JWA 1,1:
78-79).



Jacobi urges philosophers embroiled in metaphysical rationalism to
perform a *salto mortale* (i.e., a somersault,
jumping-head-over-heels) to redress their position
in the face of reality (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 195 and JWA 1,1: 30).
Instead of an illusory purity of a self-contained system of
explanations, true knowledge must be grounded upon an immediate
recognition of an I that acts upon and reacts to a world that is
external to it (Sandkaulen, 2000: 11-22). Jacobi's
*Unphilosophie* does not merely contradict systematic
knowledge. More precisely, it intends to amend systematic knowledge by
providing its missing footing: only when we assume the concrete
existence are we justified with regard to any other claim concerning
reality. Explanations are thus not entirely a bad habit. It is only
that they come second, after the subject has assumed its own existence
as paradigm of existence as such. What Jacobi is really rejecting here
is the thesis according to which the system of explanations is
self-sufficient. The only issue here is that the first
assumption of our knowledge (existence) is and must be immediate; if
it were mediated and explained, then the basis for the mediation would
fall into the system of explanations that eradicates all true
existence. The *salto mortale* would thus be nothing more than
the logical act that any philosopher must perform, taking into account
the total annihilation of substantiality yielded by systematic
knowledge. Instead of pure discursive thinking, Jacobi combines the
logical act of the *salto mortale* with the epistemology of the
*Glaube* (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 234 and 270-303 and JWA 2,1:
27-67), referring to the immediate assumption of an existence
granted by a practical I. This higher knowledge, often associated with
specific faculties, such as *Gefuhl* and *Sinn*,
labels both Jacobi's fundamental contribution to epistemology
and his most controversial teaching (Bowman, 2021).



Notwithstanding that his notion of faith (*Glaube*) does not
have any religious underpinning, some unfortunate, final references to
J.K. Lavater and K.W. Jerusalem expose Jacobi's 'Spinoza
Briefen' to the charge of irrationalism and fideism. These
accusations were not arbitrary though. Jacobi's use of the terms
*Glaube* (faith) and *Offenbarung* (revelation) to
present his reformed epistemology did avert suspicion. The publication
of the 'David Hume Dialogue' was in fact a direct
consequence of his need to clear himself of both charges.


### 3.2 The 'Spinoza Letters' (2nd edition, 1789)



After the publication of the 'Spinoza Briefen', the
*Spinozismusstreit* erupted. This was not confined to private
letters but also appeared in publications, such as Mendelssohn's
immediate reaction 'An die Freunde Lessings' and
Jacobi's couterreaction 'Wider Mendelssohns
Beschuldigungen betreffend die Briefe uber die Lehre des
Spinoza' (1786) (JWA 1, 2: 376-377). If we interpret the
'David Hume Dialogue' as a concrete advance in
Jacobi's careful consideration of the specificity of the
terminology that he proposed in the first edition of the
'Spinoza Briefen', its second edition brings to the fore
the conclusive general outcome of the Spinoza controversy: freedom
becomes the main topic in light of the function it fulfills within the
epistemology of what is actually true (JWA 1, 2: 370).



The new materials provided include further documentation of
Mendelssohn's letters, eight supplements, mainly on
Spinoza's philosophy and its relation to Leibniz, a reasoned
petition in favor of a personal God, by contrast with pantheism, and
finally a list of theses (52) on human freedom. This list is
particularly interesting. It presents 23 theses in opposition to human
freedom and 29 in support of it. Contrary to any conjecture of a
possible convergence between Jacobi's argument in favor of human
freedom and Kant's practical principles, it must be stressed
that Jacobi's countervailing theses are not antinomic. They
rather show an evolution of his thesis in support of human freedom
from a critical assessment of fatalism (Homann, 1973). The distinct
division between the two realms of reality, one incorporating freedom
and the other disregarding it, is foreign to Jacobi's
intention.



Moreover, fatalism follows a mechanical understanding of the notion of
cause, which necessarily leads to the belief that the corporeal
(extended being) and the theoretical (representational being) realms
both consist of a sequence of conjoined instances. In opposition to
this picture, Jacobi places his *pharmakon*, made of an
interplay between the activity and passivity of the I and its opposing
*Thou*. As Jacobi shows in the 'David Hume
Dialogue' (Jacobi, 1994(2): 277-278 and JWA 2,1:
37-39) and broadly advances here, a total mechanization of
reality in the sense of an entire whole made of things properly
determined by their explanations reduces all things to nothing (JWA 1,
1: 263).



Systematically understood, explanations deprive what is explained of
its independent substance and make the whole (the enclosed system of
explanation) the only substance. So too, the same
all-encompassing substance is devoid of its existence, as
existence is and can only be based upon the active engagement of an
agent. (Jacobi, 1994(2): 370-372 and JWA 1,1: 247-249). If
we take a closer look at the 52 theses on human freedom, it can be
understood that the theory supporting human freedom presents a broader
conception of reality than the one in opposition to it. Jacobi does
not merely draft his idea of reality in contrast to the systematic
conception of reality but in adjusting its tenets and substituting its
core principle. According to the resulting picture, the unjustified
(that is, in a sense, disconnected and even unknown) autonomy of the
practical I must be preserved as the basis of any justified and
systematic knowledge of reality. The autonomy of the I is thus the
foundation of existence (Jacobi, 1994(2): 344 and JBW 12: 207).
Following out this line of reasoning, Jacobi addresses Kant's
practical philosophy as presented in the 'Critique of Practical
Reason', which came out just one year before the second edition
of the 'Spinoza Briefen', to make the paradigm of reality
from the spontaneous activity of a finite subject. As a paradigm,
then, the latter should not itself be subject to further explanation
by systematic philosophy. Instead, explanation must halt before it
(Jacobi, 1994(2): 345 and JWA 1,1: 163-164).



Apparently, Fichte followed Jacobi's logic concerning the
necessity of a practical basis for reality, but he did not respect the
final rule, unleashing the systematic approach upon the definition of
the foundation of existence. This encourages Jacobi's reaction:
the famous 'Jacobi an Fichte' thus reads as a further
evolution of issues raised in the 'Spinoza Briefen'.


### 3.3 The 'Spinoza Letters' (3rd edition, 1819)



The final version of the 'Spinoza Briefen' has only minor
changes. One important addition includes the *Vorbericht*,
where Jacobi contends that his original idea has merely become
clearer, not changed. It is apparent that his evolution as a thinker
has not included a change in perspective, only clarifications in its
delivery. Jacobi stresses how his notion of truth and the very
foundation of his theory of knowledge yield a philosophical
perspective that could save life. His antagonists, in contrast, seem
occupied with a form of thinking that would destroy it (JWA 1, 1:
339). He presents the theoretical tools for making of the practical
agent the unmovable foundation for all existence and all life, while
also revealing a way to connect to a living personal God: the same
notion of *Vernunft*, following a certain degree of evolution
between the first and the second edition of the 'Spinoza
Briefen', eventually becomes the 'Sinn fur das
Uebersinnliche', matching the way in which the senses perceive
natural phenomena (JWA 1, 1: 341 and JWA 1,1: 158). It can even be
claimed that in the 'Vorbericht', the religious
underpinning of Jacobi's arguments becomes more explicit.
However, Jacobi never surpasses the limits that he placed on
rationality itself: his thought never aspires to become a theological
or philosophical system. He rejects both forms of systematic knowledge
due to the anti-systematic character of the ground of reality
(JWA 1, 1: 347). Still, this approach does not translate into an
attraction to irrationalism. Rather, it implies a different conception
of rationality altogether.


### 3.4 The 'David Hume Dialogue' (1787)



First published in 1787 with the German title 'David Hume
uber den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein
Gesprach' ('David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and
Realism. A Dialogue'), this work includes three distinct
sections, although only two are named in the title. The first section
is dedicated to the need to clarify the controversial term
*Glaube* (which extends from Jacobi, 1994(2): 254 and JWA 2, 1:
8 up to Jacobi, 1994(2): 279 and JWA 2, 1: 40). An intermission
between the first and the second sections introduces an interesting
account of Jacobi's own philosophical education (up to Jacobi,
1994(2): 287 and JWA 2, 1: 49). The second section (up to Jacobi,
1994(2): 306 and JWA 2, 1: 71) criticizes the principle of the ground
(*Der Satz des Grundes*) (Jacobi, 1994(2): 288 and JWA 2, 1:
50) in contraposition to the principle of reason (*das Principium
der Vernunft*), which is intended as part of the principle of life
(*das Principium des Lebens*) (Jacobi, 1994(2): 301-302
and JWA 2, 1: 65) and ushers in the topic that dominates the third and
final section: the living being. Hence, the third section revolves
around the rationality of life, providing an analysis of
Leibniz's philosophy.



The theory of knowledge that the notion of *Glaube* inaugurates
relies on the immediate experience that the subject reports. As Jacobi
claims in the 'Spinoza Briefen': '[f]aith is the
element of all human cognition and activity' (Jacobi, 1994(2):
234 and JWA 1, 1: 125). This thesis follows after another paradigmatic
one, which integrates the former and states that '[w]e can only
demonstrate similarities. Every proof presupposes something already
proven, the principle of which is Revelation' (Jacobi, 1994(2):
234 and JWA 1, 1: 125). To the unexperienced reader, approaching
Jacobi's texts for the first time, the theological character of
these two assertions may look unequivocal, but that reader would be
mistaken. In general, in Jacobi's view, the notion of
*Glaube*, reminiscent of Hume's concept of belief (also
translated as 'Glaube') (di Giovanni, 1994: 90), must
conflict with the rationalistic foundation of knowledge endorsed by
systematic (or modern) philosophy. Nevertheless, Jacobi's
interpretation of the foundation of knowledge remains rational. We can
profit from a few lines in the 'Prefatory Note' to the
'David Hume Dialogue' to shed light on the use of the term
'Glaube' in Jacobi's vocabulary: 'as a realist
I am forced to say that all knowledge derives exclusively from faith,
for things must be given to me before I am in a position to enquire
about relations' (Jacobi, 1994(2): 256 and JWA 2, 1: 10). This
thesis, so straightforward, is the pivot upon which Jacobi's
realism will be built.



The first part of this claim entails the thesis that was already put
forth in the 'Spinoza Briefen', but the second,
explanatory part prompts the reader to recognize the real scope of
'Glaube': faith is not knowledge, as it does not include
or address relations; rather, it concerns the distinct cognition of
what is at the basis of all knowledge and relations. It is different
from any other epistemological faculty and from sensibility and
perception as well (Sandkaulen, 2019: 33-54) because it forms a
subjective response to what lies beyond any thinking process or
theoretical modeling. It refers instead to the apprehension
(*Vernehmen*) that is necessarily at the beginning of the
definition of reality. Faith, in general, is not even assent because
its content cannot be doubted, as the price for doubting its content
is idealism. One excerpt from the dialogue addresses precisely this
point: 'Hume himself grants in the same essay ['Essay on
Human Understanding'] that we only derive the representation of
power from the feeling of our own power, and specifically, from the
feeling of its use in overcoming an obstacle. He concedes, therefore,
that we have the feeling of a power, and that we perceive the results
of its application. But he does not take this to be a complete
experience of cause and effect, since we have no sensation of HOW the
power brings about this result. His doubts are after the manner of the
idealists, and are closely connected with these. In the same manner I
can of course doubt that it is I who (in virtue of what appears to me
to be a power in me) stretch out my hand, move my foot, follow the
thread of our present dialogue and control it from my side, since I
have no possible insight either into the nature of what I take to be
the cause of what happens, or into its connection with the result. I
can doubt this just as much as I can doubt that I perceive anything
outside me. If it's in you to be disturbed by such doubts, then
there is nothing that I can say to you. But I think that your faith
triumphs over them just as easily as mine' (Jacobi, 1994 (2):
292 and JWA 2, 1: 55-56).



Due to their common background in modern epistemology, the ideas
conveyed in this passage can easily find a place within contemporary
debates about the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and
 metaphysics.[2]
 However, contemporary readers may find Jacobi's response
unhelpful precisely because Jacobi does not explicitly respond to
idealists' doubts, although he repeatedly shows, from the
'David Hume Dialogue' to the 'Spinoza Briefen'
and from the 'Jacobi an Fichte' to the 'Von den
guttlichen Dingen', how idealism is destined to annihilate
the very basis for all knowledge, thus falling into an empty teaching
(Jacobi, 1994 (2): 291 and JWA 2, 1: 56-57). A critical reply to
what Jacobi calls idealism (that is, a consistent system of
explanations that proves self-sufficient) would require the
assumption that problems with idealism arise from a faulty explanation
or inference. It would, therefore, assume idealism's principal
thesis, i.e., that discursive thinking can be self-sufficient
and can accommodate a foundation of its own knowledge. Instead, Jacobi
formulates a sophisticated refutation of what he calls idealism, which
takes the concept of the cause (in the shape of the existence of a
free agent) as its center of gravity. He then progresses toward his
thesis that knowledge has its foundation outside of itself. Within
this new framework, Jacobi contends that the connection between the
system of knowledge and the foundation of knowledge necessarily falls
outside of thinking process. Here, Jacobi announces his motto:
'Ich erfahre, dass ich bin, und dass etwas ausser
mir ist, in demselben untheilbaren Augenblick' ('I
experience that I am, and that there is something outside me, in one
and the same indivisible moment') (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 277 and JWA
2, 1: 37). The self-consciousness of the I and its consciousness
are interdependent; however, they are not to be analyzed in the manner
of Fichte, to name a philosopher that, against all appearance, was
very close to Jacobi, both personally and intellectually (Ivaldo,
1996). Their interdependence is not granted in consideration of a
subtle and advanced dissection of the dialectic that proves their
shape and fundamental merging. Instead, Jacobi guides our attention to
the 'bin' and the 'ist' that the
'erfahre' necessitates. Experience, no matter its shape or
form, conceptually necessitates the existence of two sides, the
*I* and the *Thou* (as Jacobi calls any given that is
opposite to the I). Jacobi claims that existence forms a given before
and beyond any reasoning because it is the basis upon which all
reasoning can genuinely begin. In other terms, existence falls outside
of reasoning. Hence, it is important to assume that the human being
can have direct contact, not mediated by arguments or thinking
process, with what lies at the basis of all knowledge. This connection
is immediate, not irrational; in fact, the human being is rational,
precisely because he exhibits the ability to connect with what lies
before and beyond reasoning (JWA 3: 10-11).



The notion of 'Glaube' introduces us to the specificity of
Jacobi's epistemology through its implication of how an
immediate apprehension of existence does not keep us from describing
existence rationally. Still, rationality is not entirely overt, so
long as we do not assume its practical profile: that is, only free
actions exhibit the original way in which the I meets the Thou. In
different terms, it is only as a free agent that the I finds both
itself and the world around itself. This move makes the practical
horizon the only perimeter in which the ultimate foundation of what
gives content to our knowledge can actually be defined; existence, in
other terms, is a practical quality (Jacobi, 1994 (2): 194 and JWA 1,
1: 28).



As this picture takes on clearer contours, the magnitude of the role
that the notion of cause plays in Jacobi's philosophy can be
realized (Sandkaulen 2000: 171ff). The difference that this thesis
makes can be appreciated through an examination that the connection
between cause and effect (*Ursache*-*Wirkung*)
happens in time, while the connection between ground and consequence
(*Grund*-*Folge*) does not take account of time
(Sandkaulen, 2000: 133-170). As seen in Spinoza's system,
the principle of the ground presents a realty that is frozen in
eternity, while the determination of an item is not temporally given.
For Jacobi, instead, existence changes in time or, better said,
existence is precisely the what that a free agent defines in its time.
This distinction then allows a series of additional important
advancements in respect to Jacobi's realism, as the introduction
of the passing of time (in the form of irreversibility) into our
picture of reality makes things more difficult for a mechanistic
picture of reality (e.g., Prigogine, 1988: chapters 2 and 3).
Obviously, this is not to claim that a classical Newtonian dynamic
picture of reality does not consider time; it is only to show that the
same picture presents the problem of the reversibility of states,
while Jacobi's realism establishes that no distinct state of
reality is reversible. On the one hand, determinism presents a series
of interlaced determinations that complete a picture that is fixed in
eternity (*sub specie aeternitatis*). In contrast,
Jacobi's realism portrays a reality that takes the passing of
time as a foundational aspect. Ultimately, Jacobi's realism
prohibits the reversibility of states.


### 3.5 The Open Letter to Fichte (1799)



Written between March 3 and 21, 1799, the letter was published with
Fichte's consent, due to Jacobi's apparent intention to
clear Fichte's name of the charge of atheism. Although in truth,
Jacobi merely suggests that the charge of atheism be dropped, only to
replace it with the accusation of nihilism (JWA 2, 2: 471-473,
and Ivaldo, 2003: 94-99). In Jacobi's eyes, nihilism is
marked by distinct features specific to modern thinking (although
Jacobi then traces the same features back to Aristotle, see Jacobi,
1994(2): 541 and JWA 2, 1: 378-379) that are detrimental to
meaning as such. The core message of Jacobi's letter is that a
system of explanatory interconnections exhibits a perfectly harmonious
ground, which suppresses all individuality and makes existence
impossible (Jacobi, 1994(2): 508-509 and JWA 2, 1:
202-203). This letter became quite well-known due to its
simple and straightforward statement that Jacobi's own efforts
lead inevitably 'to my 'non-philosophy', that has
its essence in 'non-knowledge' just as your
[Fichte's] 'philosophy' has it solely in
knowledge' (Jacobi, 1994(2): 501 and JWA 2, 1: 194).



This makes Fichte the 'true Messiah of speculative reason, the
genuine son of the promise of a philosophy pure through and through,
existing in and through itself' (Jacobi, 1994(2): 501 and JWA 2,
1: 194). For the first time, the reader of Jacobi's texts finds
this astonishing equation. Nihilism and philosophy go hand in hand,
making Jacobi's non-philosophy and non-knowledge the
only remedy. The reason for Jacobi's use of qualifications such
as 'pure' (*rein*) and 'through and
through' (*durchaus*) with regard to Fichte's
speculative arguments for his doctrine of knowledge is that modern
philosophy is necessarily oblivious of the need to refer to what is
beyond reasoning when giving meaning to reasoning itself. To escape
delusion and anchor our thinking to existence, finding a theoretically
acceptable connection to the 'realm of beings' is needed
(Jacobi, 1994(2): 508 and JWA 2, 1: 202). If the original and
immediate duality of an I and a Thou is rejected, then one is destined
either to derive everything from the I or to derive everything from
brute matter: 'Nobody can deny that the spirit of speculative
philosophy [...] is to make unequal the equal certainty that
these two propositions have for the natural man: 'I am'
and 'There are things outside me'. Speculative philosophy
had to try to subordinate one of these propositions to the other; to
derive the former from the latter or the latter from the former
-- exhaustively, in the end -- so that there would be but
one being and one truth before its eye, the all-seeing
one!' (Jacobi, 1994(2): 501 and JWA 2, 1: 194).



The inevitable conclusion is that pure philosophy leads either to
materialism, explaining everything from a self-determining
matter, or to idealism, explaining everything from the
self-determining intelligence. At the center of all this lies
the notion of self-determination, which allows Spinoza and
Fichte to mirror one another without differences being detected. As
Jacobi summarizes this, idealism is just 'inverted'
materialism, pure *mathesis*, where the unity of reality simply
displays the operativity of a ground. Science thus forms an instance
of the activity of this ground, and our comprehension of reality turns
it into a sophisticated construction: '[w]e comprehend a thing
only in so far as we can construct it, i.e., let it arise before us in
thoughts, let it become. And in so far as we cannot construct it, or
produce it ourselves in thoughts, we do not comprehend it [...].
So if a being is to become for us a fully comprehended object, we must
cancel it in thought as something objective, as standing on its own;
we must annihilate it in order to let it become something thoroughly
subjective, our own creation, a mere schema' (Jacobi, 1994(2):
508 and JWA 2, 1: 201-202). Here, Jacobi identifies a
distinction between 'the true' (*das Wahre*) and
truth (*die Wahrheit*), between what is objective, given, i.e.,
a being in an I-independent reality (*the true*), and
what is constructed by the I according to the activity of its own
structure (*the truth*). Here again, Jacobi shows that he does
not wish to dismiss science altogether. Instead, he introduces a
different notion of truthfulness and a different understanding of the
function that our rationality must fulfill. The nihilistic outcome of
the science of truth is overcome by the necessity that the true be
presupposed for reasoning: 'I understand by 'the
true' something which is prior to and outside knowledge; that
which first gives a value to knowledge and to the faculty of
knowledge, to reason [*Vernunft*]. 'Taking hold of'
[*Vernehmen*] presupposes something capable of being taken hold
of; reason presupposes the true: it is the faculty of presupposing the
true' (Jacobi, 1994(2): 513 and JWA 2, 1: 208).



Now that the major features of Jacobi's realism have become
clearer, one must also stress a passage that announces his future
efforts and identifies the final destination of his
non-philosophy: '[a] reason that does not merely
per-ceive [the true] but produces all truth from itself alone; a
reason which is the very essence of truth and has the fullness of life
within itself -- a self-subsisting reason of this kind (the
fullness of the good and true) must of course be present, for
otherwise nowhere would there be the good and the true; the root of
nature and of all beings would be a pure nothingness, and the ultimate
aim of reason the discovery of this great mystery' (Jacobi,
1994(2): 514 and JWA 2, 1: 209). This final step in Jacobi's
endeavor foreshadows his philosophy of religion, which will be
developed in a text, 'On the Divine Things and their
Revelation', that he will publish only in 1811. In that text, a
mature account of Jacobi's realism is given, taking the form of
a sophisticated theism.


### 3.6 On Critique's Attempt to Reduce Reason to the Understanding (1802)



The German title of the 'On Critique's Attempt'
reads as 'Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus, die Vernunft zu
Verstande zu bringen, und der Philosophie uberhaupt eine neue
Absicht zu geben'. Motivated by the challenge to provide
philosophy a new objective, Jacobi asserts that Kant does not push
open the limits of transcendental philosophy to launch the quest for a
self-sufficient speculative thinking; rather, he holds that an
independent object should continue to be a necessity for
epistemology.



However, Jacobi remarks that the same independence of the object
cannot find a proper place in Kant's system of reason, as it
cannot really connect with the subject. In a sense, summarizes Jacobi,
the subject and the object are in mystical connection (*mystische
Verbindung*) (JWA 2, 1: 269) This is made more explicit here than
in the previous publications, although the idea had already been
clarified; see, for instance the Supplement 7 of the second edition of
the 'Spinoza Briefen' or the Supplement 2 of the
'Jacobi an Fichte', published in the Collected Works
(1812-1825) as an independent essay with the title 'On the
Inseparability of the Concept of Freedom and Providence from the
Concept of Reason'. Jacobi indicates that problems arise where
reason is deprived of the proper power that it must be accountable
for. On one side, reason (*Vernunft*) seeks the unconditioned,
while on the other, the understanding (*Verstand*) limits the
range of knowledge to the conditioned. This produces a conflict. This
conflict between reason and understanding appears to be resolved by
Kant, so Jacobi contends, as the understanding positively limits
reason, and reason negatively limits the understanding (JWA 2, 1:
272). Nevertheless, the calamitous outcome is clear: true
*authority* (Jacobi, 1994(2): 542 and JWA 2, 1: 380) is given
to the understanding, which uses the ideas of reason for its own
purposes and never gives jurisdiction over the definition of objective
reality to reason.



And yet, Kant's transcendental philosophy is neither decidedly
rejected nor unequivocally accepted. On the one hand, Jacobi
acknowledges that, beyond the conflict between reason and
understanding, Kant's system allows sense-perception
(*Sinnlichkeit*) to exercise power over understanding, *de
facto* limiting understanding to merely being the faculty that
elaborates upon content that it does not own or provide (JWA 2, 1:
272-273). On the other hand, Jacobi observes that the
imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) plays a crucial
epistemological role, mediating between the *a priori* and
*a posteriori* of sense-perception. As a result of this
investigation of the 'Critique of Pure Reason', which is
the most analytical of his publications (JWA 2, 1: 278ff), Jacobi
demonstrates how the imagination discloses what Kant's idealism
could lead to.


### 3.7 On the Divine Things and Their Revelation (1811)



The composition of 'On the Divine Things and Their
Revelation' ('Von den gottlichen Dingen und ihrer
Offenbarung') stretched between the last years of the eighteenth
century and the first decade of the nineteenth century (Jaeschke,
2000: 175-176). It includes three texts: 'Ueber eine
Weissagung Lichtenbergs', originally published in 1802; the
'Claudius-Rezension', which was scheduled to appear in
1798; and a final long essay on Idealism and Realism. The whole
project was described by Jacobi himself as being devoted to revelation
(Livieri, 2023). By contrast with the immediate interpretation of this
reference to revelation, the 'Preface' to the third volume
of the Complete Works (1816) states in clear terms that the 'Von
den guttlichen Dingen' manifests a thematic agreement with
both the 'Jacobi an Fichte' (1799) and 'Ueber das
Unternehmen' (1802). Hence, the idea of revelation takes shape
within a conceptual background that neither refers to Christian
theology nor explicitly addresses any topics of the philosophy of
religion. Instead, Jacobi uses the term (*Offenbarung*) as it
is used in plain German, which emphasizes the immediate apprehension
of real being. This linguistic strategy may appear hazardous at first
glance, but it fits well with Jacobi's critical stance in
opposition to Kant's philosophy and its heirs: the term
revelation announces the necessary duality in epistemology (an I in
front of a Thou) and demands that immediacy be a key factor.Moreover,
*Offenbarung* must be considered the major concept that
introduces us to Jacobi's epistemology in general, in fact it
must prove instrumental to the subtle connection that he establishes
between two realms of being: the finite and the divine (Koch, 2019:
XVIIIff).



To present the content schematically, it is necessary to begin with
the distinction that Jacobi draws between 'integral
externalists' and 'integral internalists' in matters
of religion. The first support the authority of externality in the
form of historical instances of the divine (the historical Jesus,
divine messengers, etc.), while the second privilege the inner voice
of the divine in the form of a conscience that is ingrained in the
rational nature of the human. Jacobi finds instances of truth in both
approaches, but a proper way to settle the issue would be to find a
third, more productive, stance, that would not be a simple mediation
between the two parties. Jacobi finds such a solution in his theism,
according to which God is clearly not the God of the Christian Bible,
notwithstanding the many references to the Old and New Testament and
Jacobi's explicit profession of faith, but a God that results
from an anthropomorphism that mirrors reciprocal theomorphism:
'I am who I am. This sovereign proclamation grounds everything.
Its echo in the human soul is the revelation of God in it: 'made
in His image, in the likeness of who is'. By creating the human
being God theomorphized it (*theomorphisirt*); necessarily then
the human being anthropomorphizes (*anthropomorphisirt*). What
makes the human being a human being, i.e., an image of God, is
reason' (JWA 3: 112. See Goretzki, 2021).



As it is stated in the essay 'On Critique's Attempt to
Reduce Reason to the Understanding', reason functions as the
real definition of humanity, thanks to which the divine things are
revealed, namely, God, freedom, virtue, and the immortality of the
soul. This mediation between the divine and finite things is the basic
operation executed by reason itself, which is embodied in the human
being and can thus be defined as a concrete free agent. In fact, as
moral agents make existence conceivable, the same agent concurrently
connects the finite world with the supramundane one by way of
connecting the finite world with its divine origin. The practical
dimension of the agent is thus key for connecting the
God-creator with existence in any fashion. Only God gives
nature, the finite world, a 'face', as much as our reason
gives our knowledge of nature its real footing in existence. In this
sense, one may claim that reason perceives what God creates: the order
of reality, intended in both the moral and ontological senses.



A re-evaluation of Kant's philosophy is therefore given in
this text, performed in view of the authority that practical reason
must exercise upon every aspect of our rationality, whether
epistemological or practical. Jacobi recognizes Kant's merit,
his 'spirit', in the fact that Kant did assume that there
is in human reason -- as the law of its truth immune to all error
-- an immediate cognition of both reality in general and of its
supreme ground, of a nature below that cognition and of a God above it
(JWA 3: 85). Kant needed to assume an immediate knowledge before
science to arise, and nevertheless he also 'considered it
necessary to transform this purely revealed and independent knowledge
into one dependent on demonstrating, and the immediately known into
one mediated. He wanted to build the understanding under reason as
foundation and then elevate reason above it. The supremacy of reason,
its eminent dignity as the unique and sole universal ground and source
of all principles, thus came to the fore only afterwards, and then
only validated on condition that it reach a settlement with the
understanding. But such a settlement could not be reached. Based as it
would have been, not on reserving space reciprocally, but on
reciprocal surrender -- on one side simply denying, the other
simply affirming -- it amounted to the neutralization and
dispossession of [any] supremacy. And since the understanding, with
its veto-power to which it in advance claimed to be entitled,
simply stood up against the unreasonable demands of reason, there was
no way out. Practical reason could not make good on behalf of faith,
outside the domain of science and cognition, what the theoretical (the
understanding) had destroyed on behalf of science and cognition. The
doctrines of God, immortality, and freedom had to be straight out
abandoned. There remained only a doctrine of nature, a philosophy of
nature' (JWA 3: 88).



In the end, Kant, against his own spirit, does not credit reason with
its proper place and function. However, Jacobi does not contend that
reason must be given free rein, but instead, reason must always
communicate with the understanding, although their functions and
relative hierarchy must be maintained and made productive (JWA 3: 79).
If their distinctions in rank and their synergy are not kept, then
either reason would lose itself in empty dreams or Schelling's
philosophy of nature would establish itself as the only coherent
outcome of an overpowering understanding. In the last section of the
text, Jacobi shows that, contrary to what one may suppose,
Schelling's doctrine of the *Unitotality* does not
represent the true form of a scientific approach to reality, for real
science respects Jacobi's theism: true science moves only within
the horizon of the conditioned. Instead, Schelling's doctrine
displays the paramount misstep of equating freedom with necessity, the
science of nature with the science of God, the doctrine of the
conditioned with knowledge of the unconditioned. In short,
Schelling's doctrine would make of the ground (in the form of
nature) the origin and reality of all being. In Jacobi's eyes,
his own theism proves its superiority against Schelling's
naturalism, as theism does not ban necessity, whereas
Schelling's naturalism bans real freedom (JWA 3: 110):
Jacobi's theism rejects naturalism's veto, while it allows
the science of the understanding to produce knowledge of the
conditioned and, at the same time, introduces a different logos for
the unconditioned.


## 4. Retrospect (1815-1819)



Jacobi retired from the Munich Academy of Sciences in 1812 and
dedicated himself to publishing his Collected Works, whose first
volume went out that same year. Beyond the many corrections and
additions he made to his past publications, Jacobi wrote two important
texts that must be considered here. These texts provide a clear
self-assessment and constitute an insightful summary of
Jacobi's own philosophical views. They include the general
'Introduction' to his *opera omnia*, which was
published in its second volume (1815), and the 'Foreword'
to the fourth volume (1819). They bring to light a much-needed
clarification of the relationship between reason and understanding,
namely that between the immediate apprehension of things (both finite
and divine) and the systematic determination of the conditioned. A
final word on the rationality of the connection between unconditioned
and conditioned was not only needed to clarify Jacobi's ideas,
which necessarily evolved over the years, but also to present his
contribution to a major debate in Classical German Philosophy. This
clarification also serves the purpose of mitigating his rejection of
idealism. Jacobi moves from a clear definition of a major portion of
the history of Western philosophy: ever since Aristotle, priority was
given to the understanding; hence, rationality has primarily been the
capacity used to reflect upon objects only to connect them or their
properties to other objects or other properties (Jacobi, 1994(2):
540-541 and JWA 2, 1: 378-379). As a consequence,
abstraction and reflection are the only operations that have qualified
thinking as a scientific endeavor. Jacobi stands against this
prioritization and gives Kant credit for having redressed the original
supremacy of reason, the faculty of revelation and perception.



Jacobi stresses the need for the understanding to acquire the content
of knowledge from two distinct faculties of perception, one
represented by the senses (for finite things) and the other
represented by reason (for divine things). If Jacobi seems to be
steering away somewhat from the theism theorized in the 'Von den
guttlichen Dingen', where reason plays a fundamental role
in both horizons (finite and divine) (JWA 3: 85), he eventually
confirms that reason is the faculty that oversees our capacity to
think and know. Still, this supremacy does not revoke the
epistemological function of the understanding, which, with its
mediating and connecting, gives knowledge its subject matter and, by
doing so, validates the identity of the Self. This text is significant
precisely because it gives the understanding a specific role in the
constitution of the self-consciousness, updating Jacobi's
analysis of the understanding (Jacobi, 1994(2): 547-548 and JWA
2, 1: 386. See Ivaldo, 2003: 122]. The same collaboration between
reason and understanding in the overall project of the definition of
the I is again at the center of the 1819 'Foreword', which
further elaborates this teamwork by defining the nature of science
itself. Science does not reject the idea of God or that of divine
things; rather, it limits its knowledge to finite objects, without
dismissing the knowledge of a higher and original being, which must
play the role of the presupposition for all cognition. Consequently,
the human being finds himself in the search for God, inasmuch as he
admits the limitations of his own knowledge. Recalling
Socrates's and Saint Paul's teachings, Jacobi concludes
his intellectual career with a Kantian admission of the essential
religious outcome of our self-discovery, eventually exhibiting
the necessity of a higher order of reality.