## 1. Santaraksita's Madhyamaka Thought



Santaraksita is probably best known as one of the
great Indian Madhyamaka commentators. His thought in this regard has
several features that make it unique including: his integration of
Yogacara thought, his integration of Buddhist
logico-epistemological (*pramana*) developments
(discussed below), and his dynamic engagement with other Buddhist and
non-Buddhist views (discussed below). His Madhyamaka view is most
clearly and succinctly articulated in his text
*Madhyamakalamkara* (*The Ornament of the
Middle Way,* hereafter, MA) and his own commentary on that text,
*Madhyamakalamkaravrtti* (*The
Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of the Middle Way*, hereafter,
 MAV).[5]


### 1.1 The Two Truths: Ultimate Truths



A presentation of the two truths is a standard way by which Madhyamaka
philosophers explain their views on the ontological status of
phenomena. It is seen as the most effective method for coursing a
"middle way" between the philosophical extremes of
asserting the absolute existence of phenomena on the one hand, and the
non-existence of them on the other. Thus, Madhyamikas will
routinely claim that phenomena lack a certain mode of existence
ultimately, but claim that such phenomena, or objects of knowledge,
maintain another mode conventionally. Virtually all Indian Madhyamaka
philosophers will claim, in some detail, that an ultimate truth is an
object's emptiness (*sunyata*), or lack of
having a truly existent essence or intrinsic nature. This claim, which
runs the danger of leading to nihilism, is then tempered to some
degree by claims about the conventional mode of existence of those
phenomena. Though phenomena do not ultimately exist, they do exist
conventionally. The precise way in which individual Madhyamaka
thinkers define and describe these two truths gets at the core of what
makes each of these important thinkers unique.
Santaraksita is famous for presenting his views on
ultimate truths by way of one of the most famous Buddhist
philosophical arguments on the ontological status of phenomena, the
neither-one-nor-many argument (Skt. *ekanekaviyogahetu,*
Tib. *gcig du bral gyi tan tshigs*).


### 1.2 The Two Truths: The Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument



The first two-thirds of MA comprise what is perhaps the most
well-known rendering of the neither-one-nor-many argument, one of the
key philosophical arguments used by Madhyamaka philosophers to
establish the emptiness, or lack of an inherent nature, in phenomena.
It is by way of this argument and his summary that
Santaraksita offers his presentation of the two
truths, ultimate truth (*paramarthasatya*) and
conventional truth (*samvrtisatya*). The two truths
are not only the primary means by which Madhyamika philosophers
present their positions on ontology, but form the ground upon which
issues of epistemology and logic are often discussed as well. The
neither-one-nor-many argument is most succinctly presented in the
first stanza of MA when he writes:



> 
> These entities, as asserted by our own [Buddhist schools] and other
> [non-Buddhist schools], have no inherent nature at all because in
> reality they have neither a singular nor manifold nature, like a
> reflection
>  (*pratibimbavat*).[6]
> 



The point that Santaraksita is attempting to make here
is that no phenomena, including those which his philosophical rivals
have claimed to have an inherently existent essence or nature, in fact
do have such a nature. The reason they cannot have such a nature,
according to the argument, is that they have neither a truly singular
nature (*ekasvabhava*), nor a truly manifold nature
(*anekasvabhava*), the two being exhaustive of all
possibilities for entities that have a real nature.



Over the course of the next sixty stanzas in his ninety-seven stanza
text, MA, and accompanying auto-commentary, MAV,
Santaraksita puts all those phenomena asserted by his
Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical opponents to the test of the
neither-one-nor-many reasoning. He begins by examining each instance
in which some phenomena is asserted to be of a truly singular nature.
Through an analysis that reveals that such phenomena must have parts
and thus could not be truly singular, he makes his way through all
such cases current in late eighth century Indian philosophical
discourse. For example, he begins his application of the argument with
an analysis of the claim made by the non-Buddhist Samkhya
school that there is a Fundamental Nature (*Prakrti*) or
creator god which is the permanent, uncaused, unobstructed absolute
cause of all phenomena and which is of a truly singular nature. He
argues in the second stanza of MA:



> 
> Permanent, efficacious entities are not themselves singular because
> they contribute to the production of successive effects. If each
> successive effect is distinct, then [the argument in favor of]
> permanent efficacious entities [that are truly singular]
>  degenerates.[7]
> 



According to Santaraksita, true singularity would be
an absurd quality to claim for something which is permanent and has
the ability to contribute to the periodic production of successive
effects. If that were the case, there must be a part of the causal
entity in moment #1 which contributes to the production of a seed, for
example, a part in moment #2 which contributes to the production of
the sprout, and a part in moment #3 which contributes to the
production of a flower. Since the Fundamental Nature is described as
the sole cause of the periodic arising of all effects, it must have
all these parts, and more. It must have parts related with every
entity for which it is a cause. The Fundamental Nature must include
parts that cause entities to exist in one moment and parts that cause
them to cease to exist or transform into something else in another.
That which causes a seed to exist in moment #1 must have at least some
quality or qualities that distinguish it from that which causes a
sprout to exist in moment #2. At a bare minimum, his opponent must be
forced to admit parts to such a Fundamental Nature. Something with
manifold parts cannot, by definition, be truly singular.
Santaraksita thus considers that the application of
this sort of reasoning undermines the existence of such a truly
singular Fundamental Nature, as described in the Samkhya
system since it is illogical for there to be a permanent, truly
singular, unobstructed cause of the successive effects of the manifold
world. Arguments regarding the irrationality of asserting its
permanence and those regarding its contradictions with our experience
of causality in the world, are supplied in his own MAV on the above
verse to strengthen his rejection of the notion of such a Fundamental
Nature.



Santaraksita is not only critical of his non-Buddhist
philosophical opponents however. The bulk of the argument is addressed
toward the views of philosophical opponents within in his own larger
Buddhist camp that he feels have made errors in interpretation and
logic. For example, he dedicates a lengthy portion of the
neither-one-nor-many argument to criticisms of a variety of Buddhist
claims about the true singularity of consciousness made by both
Buddhists associated with the Sautrantika schools and those
associated with the Yogacara/Cittamatra schools. In a
variety of ways, proponents of these schools claim that consciousness
is truly singular and yet can be a knower of a multiplicity of
objects. For Santaraksita, such claims are fraught
with errors in logic. If consciousness knows a multiplicity of
objects, then it must not be singular by definition. There must be a
part of the consciousness that knows object A and another than knows
object B. Various Buddhists who want to hold consciousness to be truly
singular, have attempted to avoid these faults in a variety of ways.
Some have attempted to claim they avoid the faults because they assert
that there are an equal number of consciousnesses as objects. Others
claim that they avoid these problems because they claim consciousness
exists in a non-dual relationship with its objects. Each of these
interpretive turns was met by Santaraksita with
logical analysis demonstrating what he considered to be the inevitable
contradictions that ensue by the various attempts at claiming that
consciousness is truly singular. In this manner,
Santaraksita analyzes a host of current claims of true
singularity over the course of the first sixty stanzas of the MA.



Having examined all those phenomena which his philosophical opponents
claim *have* or *are* of a truly singular nature and
determined through reasoned analysis that they in fact, could not
possibly have or be of a truly singular nature,
Santaraksita proceeds to consider the possibility of
there being a truly manifold nature in phenomena. Because a manifold
nature would depend upon the aggregation of true singularities, he
concludes that just as there can be no inherently singular nature,
there also can be no inherently manifold nature. And since there is no
third alternative for entities with an inherent nature, there must be
no phenomena that have an inherently existent nature at all. While
elaborated upon in greater detail in his auto-commentary, MAV, his
terse summary of the neither-one-nor many argument is found in the
sixty-first and sixty-second stanzas of MA as follows:



> 
> We have found with analysis that no entity, whatsoever, has an
> [inherently] single nature. Those that have no single nature must also
> not have a manifold nature (vs. 61). The existence of an entity
> belonging to a class other than that which has a single or manifold
> [nature] does not make sense because the two are exhaustive of all
> possible alternatives (vs.
>  62).[8]
> 



Thus, an object's lack of, or emptiness of having an inherently
existent nature is an ultimate truth for Santaraksita.
He considers that this position has been logically established by way
of the neither-one-nor-many argument.


### 1.3 The Two Truths: Conventional Truths



In a variety of ways, virtually all Madhyamika's reject the
existence of an ultimate, absolute, unchanging nature in things, as
Santaraksita demonstrates in the first sixty-two
stanzas of MA. This is a key component in their presentations of
ultimate truths. The anti-essentialist position of rejecting an
ultimate nature in phenomena enables a Madhyamika, such as
Santaraksita in this case, to avoid the
"extreme" of clinging to objects as permanent, or more
precisely, as enduring for more than a moment. Though the arguments
may vary, most Madhyamika thinkers are similar in their
descriptions of ultimate truths. Debates among Madhyamikas tend
to rise in relation to their presentations of conventional truths, the
means by which the "extreme" of non-existence is
avoided.



After concluding that phenomena do not ultimately exist,
Santaraksita offers his concise summation and
definition of a conventional truth in the sixty-third and sixty forth
stanzas of MA:



> 
> Therefore, these entities are characterized only by conventionality.
> If someone accepts them as ultimate, what can I do for that person?
> 



Those phenomena that are only agreeable when not put to the test
of



> 
> [ultimate] analysis, those phenomena that are generated and
> disintegrate and those that have the ability to function are known to
> be of a conventional nature.
> 



Santaraksita comments on these verses by clarifying that,
"This [kind of] conventional is not an entity of mere verbal
designation but since they are dependently arisen entities which are
perceived and wished for, they are authentic conventionalities
(*tathyasamvrti*)."
 [9]



In these stanzas and in his accompanying auto-commentary, MAV,
Santaraksita presents the parameters for his
definition of a conventional truth that is authentic
(Skt.*tathya*, Tib. *yang dag pa*). They are:


1. that which is known by a mind,
2. that which has the ability to function (*i.e.*, that it is
causally efficacious),
3. that which is impermanent, and
4. that which is unable to withstand analysis which searches for an
ultimate nature or essence in entities.



In addition, later in the text, Santaraksita describes
such objects in a manner previously only used by proponents of the
Yogacara/Cittamatra school, namely, that such objects
are "mere consciousness only". (This aspect will be
discussed below in the section entitled
"Yogacara-Madhyamaka Synthesis".)



Truths are objects of knowledge in Madhyamaka ontology, so the quality
of being known by a mind is an imperative and to some degree a
tautologous assertion. Being impermanent and causally efficacious
implies, in Buddhist thought, that they are dependently-arisen, that
they arise on the basis of impermanent causes and conditions that are
themselves, dependently-arisen. In his own commentary on these
stanzas, MAV, Santaraksita explicitly describes
conventional truths as dependently-arisen. He goes on to state that
conventional truths are known with conceptual thought and designated
by worldly convention (MAV, 88-93). Thus an object's lack
of an inherent nature is an ultimate truth. Those impermanent,
dependently arisen, causally efficacious objects of knowledge that are
known by conceptual thinking are conventional truths. This is how
Santaraksita presents his views on the ontological
status of phenomena in his texts MA and MAV.


### 1.4 The Two Truths: Yogacara-Madhyamaka Synthesis



In addition to presenting the two truths as described above, a
presentation that is not particularly out of the ordinary for a
Madhyamaka thinker, Santaraksita elaborates further,
in ways that must have made his presentation seem unorthodox to
mainline Madhyamikas in eighth century India. Although there were
other Indian Madhyamikas who attempted to incorporate dimensions
of Yogacara/Cittamatra (Mind-Only) thought into their
Madhyamaka perspective (including Santaraksita's
own disciples Kamalasila and Haribhadra, as well as
predecessors like Arya Vimuktisena, Srigupta,
Jnanagarbha), Santaraksita is undoubtedly
the most noteworthy and most famous Yogacara-Madhyamaka
 synthesizer.[10]
 There are two primary areas where we find Yogacara ideas
incorporated into Santaraksita's thought: his
presentation of conventional truths where he describes them as being
of the nature of consciousness, and his conventional acceptance of
self-cognizing consciousness or reflexive awareness
(*svasamvedana*).



One of the fundamental tenets of the
Yogacara/Cittamatra schools of Buddhist thought is the
assertion that phenomena are not of an utterly distinct nature from
consciousness. The pan-Mahayana idea of emptiness is in fact
described in this way Yogacaras/Cittamatras, by
claiming that emptiness refers to an object's lack of a nature
that is distinct from the consciousness perceiving it. This is
contrasted with the common Madhyamaka description of emptiness as
referring to an object's lack or emptiness of its own nature or
essence in and of itself. Santaraksita incorporates
this Yogacara line of thinking into his presentation of
conventional truths when he writes in the ninety-first stanza of
MA:



> 
> That which is cause and result is mere consciousness only. Whatever is
> established by itself abides in
>  consciousness.[11]
> 



This statement refers to his earlier descriptions of conventional
truths (cited above) where he describes conventional truths as
phenomena that have the ability to function and which generate and
disintegrate. In Madhyamika discourse, "That which is cause
and result," is simply another way of referring to conventional
truths. It refers to that which is impermanent, dependently-arisen,
and causally efficacious, the three being co-extensive with each other
and with conventional truths in general. Thus, by stating that,
"that which is cause and result is mere consciousness,"
Santaraksita is stating that conventional truths are
of the nature of consciousness. This is an ultimate description of
reality for proponents of the Yogacara/Cittamatra
systems, but for Santaraksita here, this is part of
his presentation of conventional truths, thus, incorporating a
Yogacara/Cittamatra orientation for his presentation of
conventional truths.



A further development of this philosophical synthesis that
Santaraksita is putting forth is described even more
explicitly in the next stanza, the ninety-second:



> 
> By relying on the Mind-Only (*Cittamatra, Sems tsam pa*)
> system, know that external entities do not exist. And by relying on
> this [Middle Way (*Madhyamaka, dbU ma*)] system, know that no
> self exists at all, even in that
>  [mind].[12]
> 



Here we find a particularly important and unique aspect of
Santaraksita's presentation of the two truths.
It is not merely that he incorporates aspects of Mind-Only thinking
into his presentation that makes it unique. It is unique because for
virtually all of Santaraksita's Madhyamaka
predecessors in India, the two truths are utilized solely as a vehicle
for presenting the ontological status of entities. It is done by way
of describing the mode of being for various objects of knowledge
(ultimate truths and conventional truths). This common Madhyamaka way
of approaching the two truths is present in
Santaraksita as well, but there is more here. In
addition to stating the ultimate truths exist in *x* way and
conventional truths exist in *y* way,
Santaraksita is also using his presentation of
conventional truths as a stepping stone for his readers. A proper
understanding of conventional truths takes a person part of the way
towards an understanding of the ultimate. Previous Madhyamaka
presentations of conventional truths do not incorporate this practical
dimension. For Santaraksita, conventional truths are
not completely mistaken. By properly understanding conventional truths
(*i.e.*, as a follower of Cittamatra tenets understands
the ultimate), one is well on the way to a proper understanding of the
ultimate from his Madhyamaka perspective--the most subtle and
accurate philosophical presentation of reality. There is a dynamic
step at work in Santaraksita's presentation of
the two truths; first one understands that entities are not of a
distinct nature from that of the mind (as Mind-Only proponents claim)
and then they progress to realize that nothing exists in and of itself
(the Madhyamaka perspective), even the mind. This dynamic engagement
with conventional truths is unique among Madhyamaka thinkers and a
critical innovation in the thought of
Santaraksita.


## 2. More Dynamic Aspects of Santaraksita's Philosophical Enterprise



Santaraksita was a towering figure in eighth century
Indian philosophy. It appears from the little evidence we have that he
was fully engaged in the philosophical arena of his day including the
composition of polemical tracts against his rivals. We can assume that
these were taken seriously by his opponents because some of his extant
writings are only known today because they were preserved in Jain
libraries. But Santaraksita's philosophical
style was richer than simple polemics. In texts like MA, he led his
readers through a dynamic engagement with competing views. Competing
views, particularly competing Buddhist philosophical views were
utilized in his texts in ways that encouraged his readers to
contemplate the full impact and import of those views. In other words,
he seems to encourage a provisional acceptance of competing Buddhist
views as he presents a philosophical hierarchy of tenets. This method
makes for a quite dynamic engagement with those competing views where
provisionally taking on the competing views serves to have a
transformative affect on the mind of the student as they ascend the
philosophical hierarchy. They were not simply used as vehicles for
illuminating his own view by contrasting it with those of his Buddhist
rivals, though he was certainly doing that as well.
Santaraksita was doing more than that; he was
encouraging his readers to take on those philosophical tenet systems
he considered to be hierarchically "lower" in order to
facilitate what seems to be a dynamic philosophical enterprise of
multi-tiered engagement with a host of philosophical positions and
views. In a tradition where philosophical inquiry is a form of
religious praxis, it appears that provisional acceptance of the tenets
of lower schools was used to ripen the mind for increasingly more
subtle and accurate philosophical descriptions of reality. In other
words, since the cultivation of experiential wisdom knowing reality is
at the heart of what facilitates the larger tradition's
soteriological goals, this dynamic method can be said to serve
soteriological
 aims.[13]



This process can be witnessed to a degree in
Santaraksita's encyclopedic tenets text,
*Tattvasamgraha*, but is most clearly presented in MA. In
his application of the neither-one-nor-many argument in MA (described
above), the careful reader is drawn to notice that as
Santaraksita proceeds through his examination of
competing views, he does so through the shifting lens of three
philosophical
 perspectives.[14]
 In the first fifteen stanzas of the text, he seems to be analyzing
non-Buddhist and Vaibhasika tenets as a holder of
Sautrantika tenets would. His criticisms of those views are of a
type that a Sautrantika would utilize and his forms of reasoning
are as well. It is as if he is encouraging his readers to adopt a
Sautrantika outlook and all that entails. Though there may be
polemics involved (If *x* view can even be refuted by
Sautrantikas, what need is there to discuss the superiority of
the Madhyamaka?), it appears that what is at work in an actual
encouragement of his readers to seriously take on a Sautrantika
position, at least provisionally.



When he begins to examine the various positions of Sautrantikas,
his perspective shifts and he starts to argue as a
Yogacara/Cittamatra would. He criticizes the varying
Sautrantika perspectives as a Yogacara/Cittamatra
would, by making criticisms about how knowledge of entities external
to consciousness could be known. And he makes these arguments both in
the context of the neither-one-nor-many framework and with the types
of reasoning Yogacara/Cittamatra thinkers such as
Dharmakirti, might utilize. One might think that the focus of his
criticisms would be solely on Madhyamaka issues about own-essences
(*svabhava*), but a major focus at this point is on the
separation of objects from consciousness. It is as if
Santaraksita is encouraging his readers to take on a
Yogacara/Cittamatra perspective, for at this point
Santaraksita seems to feign acceptance of a
Yogacara/Cittamatra perspective. He does not qualify
his acceptance as merely conventional. He argues against
Sautrantika positions, as a Yogacara/Cittamatra.
It is only later in the text, when he begins to discuss the two truths
that we come to learn that his acceptance of
Yogacara/Cittamatra tenets is qualified and
provisional. Finally, beginning in the forty-fifth stanza, when
Santaraksita begins to analyze various positions
asserted by proponents of Yogacara/Cittamatra tenet, he
takes on his final position as a Madhyamika. He then criticizes
such positions from a Madhyamika perspective and utilizes the
sorts of reasoning a Madhyamika would use to refute
Yogacara/Cittamatra tenets, focusing on a rejection of
essences. Thus, he has made his final shift in frames or scales of
analysis. As he concludes the neither-one-nor-many argument and
discusses a host of issues of great import in the remainder of the
text, he maintains his final position as a Madhyamika.



In the process of these shifting provisionalities, or scales of
analysis, Santaraksita has led his readers through a
dynamic engagement with a host of philosophical views. They are not
merely presented to be refuted (though that is certainly happening),
but through an apparent feigned acceptance of "lower"
tenets as he makes his way up a hierarchical ladder of philosophical
views, his readers are actively encouraged to engage fully by taking
on these other views that will ultimately be rejected. Rather than
refute and dismiss competing views, Santaraksita seems
to recognize a utility in their engagement, one that serves the
teleological function of leading the reader to (in his opinion) the
highest philosophical view, the Madhyamaka. For ultimately, the
purpose of Buddhist philosophical inquiry has a soteriological
function as well. Suffering, according to the Buddha, is caused by
confusion and ignorance, by a misunderstanding of the world and its
functions. Thus, the duty of the Buddhist philosopher is to attempt to
indicate for the suffering masses, as clearly as possible, the precise
nature of their confusions and misunderstandings that lay at the heart
of their suffering. For Santaraksita, it is attachment
to a fixed nature or essence in things which is at the root of the
problem. So a dynamic philosophical process that can skillfully lead
readers to the Madhyamaka perspective, the one that both understands
and undermines all clinging to fixed natures, is a critical and
creative part of ascending the spiritual path.


## 3. Santaraksita's Epistemological Thought



The spearheading of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition
(*pramanavada*
 )[15]
 by Dignaga and Dharmakirti, at first in response to Indian
thought in the area of philosophy of language and in dialogue with
non-Buddhist philosophers, resulted in a tremendous impact on many
dimensions of Buddhist philosophical discourse in the middle and late
periods of Indian Buddhism. Though its impact could be seen before
Santaraksita (in facets of Bhaviveka's
writings), he was the first major Madhyamaka thinker who was also a
commentator on Dharmakirti, a contributor to this discourse, and
who attempted to integrate its insights into a Madhyamaka framework.
(Both Dignaga and Dharmakirti are more closely associated
with the Mind-Only school). One can witness one dimension of the
profound influence Santaraksita had on Tibetan
Buddhist thought, even given the differences in the details, when
observing this integration of Madhyamaka and
*pramanavada* thought in towering Tibetan
thinkers such as Sakya Pandita and Tsongkhapa among others.
Santaraksita's thought on logico-epistemological
issues is primarily found in his encyclopedic doxography,
*Tattvasamgraha* and in his commentary on
Dharmakirti's *Vadanyaya* entitled
*Vipancitartha*. In order to properly situate
Santaraksita's thought on these issues, it is
necessary to briefly discuss that of his two most important
predecessors in this area: Dignaga and Dharmakirti.



Central to the logico-epistemological tradition in general and
Santaraksita in particular is the question of what
constitutes a means by which one accrues an instance of indubitable
knowing. In other words, how does one justify considering a moment of
awareness or cognitive episode as valid knowledge
(*pramana*)? What constitutes trustworthy awareness?
For Santaraksita, the *pramana* that
is the means of justifying an instant of valid knowing is
simultaneously indistinct from the instant of valid knowing itself
(McClintock 2002, 57).



As with Dharmakirti, Santaraksita describes valid
knowledge or valid cognitions as instants of new knowledge in the
sense that the cognizer knows newly something which to that point was
unknown. Generally speaking, Buddhist
*pramanavada* thinkers categorize two types of

*pramana*[16]:
 perception
 (*pratyaksa*)[17]
 and inference (*anumana*). Objects of perception are
causally efficacious particulars (*svalaksana*),
actual instance of things in the world with temporal and spatial
location. It is only particulars that are considered to be real.
Generally, it would be thought that words apply to universals
(*samanyalaksana*) which are conceptual
constructs that have no causal efficacy in the world. Thus the early
*pramanavada* thinkers like Dignaga and
Dharmakirti can be considered to hold a soft form of
connotationism in that they would reject a denotationist view that
considers words to apply directly to actual particulars. The intuition
that a word points to a particular would be very objectionable. A word
cannot express a particular because particulars are limitless and
words have limits. Yet they are soft connotationists in that via a
process of elimination or exclusion, they posit a way in which
language is both not arbitrary and not a reference to particulars.
Inferences are cognitions based on valid reasons that depend on this
non-arbitrary use of
 language.[18]



Among the philosophical issues that are important here is the
fundamental question of how, if the world is only directly accessibly
by perception, can one come to valid knowledge by means of inference
that relies on words that do not directly refer to particulars? How
does one link the ineffable world of particulars to language, and thus
to an inference that could produce valid knowledge? Since words do not
apply to actual objects or particulars which are ineffable,
Santaraksita, like his predecessors Dharmakirti
and Dignaga, needs to explain how it is that we are talking about
the world, while at the same time making it clear that we are not
talking about the world, but our conceptual scheme. Yet he also must
make clear that all conceptual schemes are not equal in that some can
produce valid knowledge and some fail to do so. There must be a degree
of non-arbitrariness to language if inference is to be considered as a
source of valid knowledge. There are true and false statements and
consequences for beliefs about them. So the challenge is: how does one
link the ineffable world of particulars to language?



Each of the *pramanavada* thinkers, including
Santaraksita, begin to address these questions with
variations on a theory initiated by Dignaga and fine-tuned by
Dharmakirti and his followers, known as exclusion
(*apoha*) theory. Dignaga's response to the problem
begins by claiming that language does not refer to universals, as one
might presume a Buddhist would argue, but rather, through a negative
process of exclusions or *apoha*, eliminates that which
contradicts the referred object. Words talk about entities in so far
as they are qualified by the negation of other things. Though nothing
affirmative is said about reality, by use of exclusions, there is a
relationship between concepts and particulars. *Apoha* or
exclusions typically involves a double negation. Because in Buddhism
the absence of something is a fiction in that absences are not caused
and do not function, exclusions can be used to explain away universals
as the referents of words. Because negations are fictions, this
lightens the ontological commitment. A distinction is drawn between
entities and pseudo-entities. Only particulars are real; negations are
not real, but they are also not universals. Universals are positive or
affirmative, whereas exclusions are negative. Dignaga's
position is explained quite succinctly by Bimal Matilal:



> 
> Each name, as Dignaga understands, dichotomizes the universe into
> two: those to which the name can be applied and those to which it
> cannot be applied. The function of a name is to exclude the object
> from the class of those objects to which it cannot be applied. One
> might say that the function of a name is to locate the object outside
> of the class of those to which it cannot be applied. (Matilal 1971,
> 45)
> 



Dignaga argues for a way in which language can be construed to
signify particulars, through a double negation that excludes that
which contradicts the referent object while eliminating the
philosophical commitment to universals. Though the process of
exclusion seems quite cumbersome, in actuality our language formation
and conceptual processes seem to engage in it quite naturally.



Dharmakirti adds several components to the thought of
Dignaga on these issues concerning valid knowledge. In defining
perception as a source or means of valid knowledge, Dharmakirti
describes it as that cognition that is free from conceptuality
*and* non-erroneous. The inclusion of the qualification of it
being non-erroneous eliminates erroneous non-conceptual cognitions,
such as mistakenly seeing two moons, from the category of valid
knowledge. Dharmakirti further distinguishes two ways of
apprehending objects: through perceptions which apprehend real objects
positively, as they are, through the mediation of images
(*akara*) which perfectly reflect them, and through
concepts which get at their objects negatively, through the
elimination of their opposites. Dharmakirti's insight is
found in the connection he draws between reality and the conceptual
realm of universals. For Dharmakirti, experience and
representations are the bridge. We construct concepts out of our
experiences and representations of functional resemblances of real
entities. In other words, we can validly group together
representations of actually unique entities on the basis that they can
be excluded from the class of things that do not perform a given
function. Georges Dreyfus put it well:



> 
> For Dharmakirti, the conceptual process is neither arbitrary nor
> groundless, even though it does not reflect reality. Conceptuality
> does not arise out of nothing but results from experience. As we may
> recall, things such as trees, for instance, have functional
> similarities. In dependence on our experiences in which the functional
> resemblances of things are registered, we construct concepts. Thus,
> conceptuality arises as a result of our experiences. In this way
> conceptual thoughts are connected indirectly to reality. (Dreyfus
> 1997, 226)
> 



In other words, there are several components to
Dharmakirti's exclusion theory: the entity or particular,
the image or representation, and the exclusion. First there are real
events of real entities. Then there is a perception that has the mark
of a real entity because it is caused by something real. It is a
mirror-like image of the real. This is followed by a conceptual
representation superimposed on a real image. This is part real, part
concept. Finally, after this is done, there is an assumption of
commonality with other conceptual representations. This assumption is
unreal and is the basis of the exclusion or universal. It derives not
from the reality of common characteristics, but judgments of
similarity. This is where concepts are conceived of as representing
properties that are thought to exist in the world, such as permanence,
which in fact do not. But it is through this process of exclusion that
one can utilize positive language with the understanding that that
language only refers to a common negation.



Santaraksita's treatment of these issues largely
revolves around a response to the criticisms found in such
non-Buddhist thinkers as Kumarila (*ca.* 600-660) and
Uddyotakara (*fl*. 525). Kumarila levels three criticisms
of *apoha* theory in particular: that it is circular, that it
is counter-intuitive, and that it is redundant.
Santaraksita's response to these criticisms
begins by describing three primary types of negations which he equates
with exclusions: non-implicative negations (Skt.
*prasajyapratisedha,* Tib. *med dgag*) and two
types of implicative negations (Skt.*paryudasapratisedha*, Tib. *ma yin dgag*):
mental exclusions and object exclusions. A non-implicative negation is
a negation that does not imply the existence of some other thing. For
example, the negation of the existence of flowers that grows in the
sky does not imply the existence of other plants that grow in the sky.
It is a mere negation with nothing implied. On the other hand,
implicative negations, while denying the existence of one thing, imply
the existence of another. An example of an implicative negation would
be if we were told that either my aunt or my uncle came over last
night. If my aunt did not come, it implies that my uncle did. Thus,
there is something implied by the negation. Among the types of
implicative negations, Santaraksita includes mental
exclusions. It is important to point out here that for
Santaraksita, negations and exclusions are virtually
synonymous. Mental exclusions are conceptual representations that
relate to the appearances or representations of entities, as discussed
by Dignaga. Object exclusions are not conceptual representations
of mere appearances or representations, but rather can relate to the
real world. Thus, this form of exclusion is a real thing for
Santaraksita. It is these three types of exclusions
that form the basis of Santaraksita's thought on
this topic, the basis of his psychological interpretation of
*apoha*, and the basis of his response to the critics of
Dharmakiriti's *apoha* theory, such as
Kumarila.



In addition to the three types of exclusions, central to
Santaraksita's thought on the topic is his
unique presentation of representations and the psychological
dimensions to his exclusion
 theory.[19]
 According to Santaraksita, it is our experiences of
unifying similarities among representations that gives rise to our
conceptual constructs. Mental representations of objects are
exclusions because they exclude other representations. These
conceptual representations are misconstrued to be the actual objects
since the actual objects do not exist in them. For
Santaraksita, both the exclusion of that which is
other than real particular and the exclusion of that which is other
than the representation are both *apoha*s or exclusions. The
psychological dimension to exclusion is particularly important in
Santaraksita's *apoha* theory in that he
emphasizes the role of negation in relation to mental representations
and mental events in the conceptualizing process. For
Dharmakirti, universals are the objects of concepts.
Santaraksita agrees with this point but stresses that
the concept is the mental representation or mental event and that is
an exclusion, whereas for Dharmakirti the representations are the
basis which supports the exclusions and concepts. For
Dharmakirti, exclusions are conceptual fictions, whereas for
Santaraksita they can be real entities.



Santaraksita considers that he is fully able to
respond to the criticisms of Kumarila with his presentation of
exclusions. For example, Kumarila charges that the Buddhist
*apoha* theories are counter-intuitive in that our intuition is
not that words and concepts refer to negations or exclusions.
Santaraksita argues that Kumarila misunderstands
*apoha* to always be non-implicative negations. He misses the
two types of implicative negations that Santaraksita
clearly specifies as included among forms of exclusions. For
Santaraksita, when we use words, the objects of such
conceptual thoughts are the real objects. They are the indirect object
of the exclusion that is a form of implicative negation, which
includes negative aspects by implication. Thus, words can be
indicative of positive elements. The external object implies the image
plus the exclusion of that which is other. The words or concepts thus
take external objects as their objects and imply the conceptual
exclusions. Thus when Kumarila mistakes all exclusions to be
non-implicative negations, he misses this key component to the
psychological functions at work and mistakes *apoha* theory to
be counter-intuitive.



Kumarila's charge of circularity in *apoha* theory
is one of the most critical for its defenders to answer. The main
thrust of the argument was already found in Uddyotakara's
*Nyayavarttika*, where he argues that *apoha*
entails the problems of circularity and denotationism (which
*apoha* theorists consider it is imperative to avoid). This is
the case because there must be an affirmative denotation between words
and particulars since the negation of an object implies that one first
have a positive understanding of the object. One must first have an
affirmative understanding before one can negate its exclusion. Dreyfus
summarizes Kumarila's presentation of the argument
succinctly as follows:



> 
> If conceptual understanding involves negation of *x*, then
> understanding of *x* will presuppose that of non-*x*,
> which in turn presupposes that of non-non-*x*. And this is
> nothing but an understanding of *x*. (Dreyfus 1997, 242)
> 



In other words, Kumarila argues that since a conceptual
understanding of a cow is simply an understanding of non-non-cow
according to *apoha* theory, that in order to understand
non-non-cow, one must already understand cow. Thus, *apoha*
theory must resort to circularity, or perhaps even more precisely, it
lacks a beginning point for the circle in the first place. Uddyotakara
emphasizes that the only way out is to resort to a linguistic
denotationism that *apoha* theorists want to avoid.
Kumarila stresses the interdependence of knowing cow and knowing
non-cow and not non-cow. Both question how a double negation is
something other than a positive universal.



The crux of Santaraksita's response, again,
relies on his presentation of three types of exclusions, specifically
the mental exclusion that is signified by words, a point he feels both
Uddyotakara and Kumarila fail to recognize. According to
Santaraksita, there is a conceptual image that is an
exclusion that is generated in the mind of one who hears the words,
"This animal is a cow," for example, but that this idea is
an implicative negation that only implies that this animal is not a
non-cow. According to Santaraksita, the problem of
circularity is thus avoided by a proper understanding of implicative
negations: to understand cow one need not understand non-cow, but
rather the mere idea of cow. Like Dharmakirti,
Santaraksita relies on a judgment of similarity in
functional efficacy among distinct particulars as conceptually
construed to generate the idea. For Santaraksita the
emphasis is on similarity among the mental representations of them.
Santaraksita and Dharmakirti both argue that
there is not a problem with grouping things as *x* and
non-*x*. The distinction between similar and dissimilar classes
is made and the word merely applied to indicate this understood
distinction. For Santaraksita, based on judgments of
similarity, the classes of cows and non-cows are established. It is
the word that is applied to them which is not established. It is the
word that is used to indicate this judgment of similarity at the
discretion of the speaker. Thus, for Santaraksita, the
perceived problem of circularity by Uddyotakara and Kumarila is
due to their misunderstanding of exclusions and negations.



Santaraksita's response to Hindu critics of
*apoha* and the interpretive innovations that spring from it
represent a critical juncture in Buddhist logico-epistemological
thought. Though we see examples of integration of
*pramanavada* thinking into the ideas of a
Madhyamika philosopher, most notably with Bhaviveka, it is
not until Santaraksita that we see this marriage of
ideas fully integrated and spelled out in a sophisticated way. It is
difficult to overstate the tremendous impact this marriage of two
major strands of late Indian philosophical thought in
Santaraksita had on the philosophical traditions of
Tibet.