## 1. Kant on sexuality and objectification



Immanuel Kant's views on sexual objectification have been
particularly influential for contemporary feminist discussions on this
topic. Kant thought that sexuality is extremely problematic when
exercised outside the context of monogamous marriage, arguing that in
such instances it leads to objectification. He characteristically
writes in the *Lectures on Ethics* that "sexual love
makes of the loved person an Object of appetite; as soon as that
appetite has been stilled, the person is cast aside as one casts away
a lemon which has been sucked dry. ... as soon as a person
becomes an Object of appetite for another, all motives of moral
relationship cease to function, because as an Object of appetite for
another a person becomes a thing and can be treated and used as such
by every one" (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*, 163).



Objectification, for Kant, involves the lowering of a person, a being
with humanity, to the status of an object. *Humanity*, for
Kant, is an individual's rational nature and capacity for
rational choice. The characteristic feature of humanity is an
individual's capacity for rationally setting and pursuing her
own ends. A being with humanity is capable of deciding what is
valuable, and of finding ways to realise and promote this value.
Humanity is what is special about human beings. It distinguishes them
from animals and inanimate objects. Because human beings are special
in this sense they, unlike animals and objects, have a
*dignity* (an 'inner worth', as opposed to a
'relative worth') (Kant 1785, 42). It is crucial, for
Kant, that each person respects humanity in others, as well as
humanity in their own person. Humanity must never be treated merely as
a means, but always at the same time as an end (Kant 1797, 209).



Kant is worried that when people exercise their sexuality outside the
context of monogamous marriage, they treat humanity merely as a means
for their sexual purposes. In the *Lectures on Ethics* Kant
often speaks about 'degradation',
'subordination', and 'dishonouring' of
humanity when exercise of sexuality is involved. He goes so far as to
say that sexual activity can lead to the loss or
'sacrifice' of humanity (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*,
163-4). The loved person loses what is special to her as a human
being, her humanity, and is reduced to a thing, a mere sexual
instrument. Kant's notion of objectification, therefore, focuses
largely on instrumentality: the treatment of a person as a mere tool
for the lover's purposes. Objectification, for Kant, involves
regarding someone "as an object, something for use"
(Herman 1993, 57). According to Alan Soble, for Kant, "both the
body and the compliant actions of the other person are tools (a means)
that one uses for one's sexual pleasure, and to that extent the
other person is a fungible, functional thing" (Soble 2002a,
226). The idea that within sexual relationships people are reduced to
objects, that they lose their rational nature, is an extreme one.
Halwani rightly points out that this reduction to the status of an
object rarely happens in sexual objectification. He explains that
"Outside rape, it is rare to treat our sexual partners as
objects: not only are we aware of their humanity; we are also mindful
of it." (Halwani 2010, 193) Halwani offers a more sensible
reading of Kant's claim here, in admitting that there is truth
to the idea that "Sexual desire is powerful enough to make
reason its own tool; it can subvert our rational capacity to set
ends" (Halwani 2010, 209). In this way, people can
"endanger their dignity by undermining their reason"
(Halwani 2010, 209). Therefore, even though the view that humanity is
completely destroyed when people exercise their sexuality is an
unappealing one, it is not unreasonable to think that, in some cases,
sexual desire and exercise of sexuality can undermine our
rationality.



Kant thought that in theory both men and women can be objectified, but
he was well aware that in practice women are the most common victims
of objectification. This is obvious in Kant's discussions of
prostitution and concubinage. Exercise of sexuality within these
morally problematic sexual contexts leads to the reduction of women
(prostitutes and concubines) to men's objects of appetite.



Kant defines *prostitution* as the offer for profit of
one's person for another's sexual gratification. A person,
Kant holds, cannot allow others to use her body sexually in exchange
for money without losing her humanity and becoming an object. He
explains that "... a man is not at his own disposal. He is
not entitled to sell a limb, not even one of his teeth. But to allow
one's person for profit to be used for the satisfaction of
sexual desire, to make of oneself an Object of demand, is to dispose
over oneself as over a thing" (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*,
165). The prostitute's commodification necessarily leads to her
objectification; she is reduced to "a thing on which another
satisfies his appetite" (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*, 165).
Kant states that "human beings are ... not entitled to
offer themselves, for profit, as things for the use of others in the
satisfaction of their sexual inclinations. In so doing, they would run
the risk of having their person used by all and sundry as an
instrument for the satisfaction of inclination" (Kant
*Lectures on Ethics*, 165). Kant blames the prostitute for her
objectification. He takes her to be responsible for sacrificing her
humanity, in offering herself as an object for the satisfaction of the
clients' sexual desires.



The other relationship in which objectification is, for Kant, clearly
present is *concubinage*. According to Kant, concubinage is the
non-commodified sexual relationship between a man and more than one
woman (the concubines). Kant takes concubinage to be a purely sexual
relationship in which all parties aim at the satisfaction of their
sexual desires (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*, 166). The inequality
that is involved in this relationship makes it problematic. Kant
explains that "the woman surrenders her sex completely to the
man, but the man does not completely surrender his sex to the
woman" (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*, 169). Since body and
self are for Kant inseparable and together they constitute the person,
in surrendering her body (her sex) exclusively to her male partner,
the woman surrenders her whole person to the man, allowing him to
possess it. The man, by contrast, who has more than one sexual
partner, does not exclusively surrender himself to the woman, and so
he does not allow her to possess his person. In allowing her male
partner to possess her person, without herself being able to similarly
possess his person, Kant believes that eventually the concubine (and
this also applies to the woman in any other polygamous relationship,
including polygamous marriage) loses her person and is made
'into a thing' (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*,
166).



The only relationship in which two people can exercise their sexuality
without the fear of reducing themselves to objects is *monogamous
marriage*. *Monogamy* is required to ensure that there is
equality and reciprocity in the surrender and ownership of the two
spouses' persons. The spouses exclusively surrender their
persons to one another, so neither of them is in danger of losing his
or her person and becoming an object. This perfect equality and
reciprocity between the spouses is described by Kant as follows:
"... if I yield myself completely to another and obtain the
person of the other in return, I win myself back; I have given myself
up as the property of another, but in turn I take that other as my
property, and so win myself back again in winning the person whose
property I have become. In this way, the two persons become a unity of
will" (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*, 167). Furthermore, this
mutual exchange of the two spouses' persons must, for Kant, be
*legally enforced*. Kant explains that marriage is
"sexual union in accordance with law" (Kant 1797, 62). He
wants something external, namely, the law, to guarantee this lifelong
ownership of the two parties' persons in marriage. He argues
that this legal obligation to surrender one's person to
one's spouses makes marriage different from a monogamous
relationship between two unmarried partners.


## 2. Pornography and objectification



Like Kant, anti-pornography feminists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin take inequality to be tightly linked to objectification. In
the eyes of both these feminists and Kant, there is the powerful
objectifier on the one hand, and on the other hand there exists his
powerless victim. Due to their unequal power, the former objectifies
the latter.



Kant is concerned with inequality taking place within polygamous
relationships. MacKinnon and Dworkin, on the other hand, believe that
inequality is a much more widespread and pervasive phenomenon. It
covers all aspects of our society. MacKinnon and Dworkin emphasise
that we live in a world of *gender inequality*. A
person's *gender* is, for MacKinnon, clearly
distinguished from a person's *sex*. Gender, being a man
or a woman, is socially constructed, whereas sex, being male or
female, is biologically defined. Within our patriarchal societies, men
and women have clearly defined roles: women (all women, women as a
group) are objectified, whereas men (all men, men as a group) are
their objectifiers (MacKinnon 1987, 6, 32-45, 50; MacKinnon
1989a, 113-4, 128, 137-40; Haslanger 1993, 98-101)
(For more on sex and gender, see also the entries
 feminist perspectives on sex and gender
 and
 feminist perspectives on power.)
 Even though MacKinnon does acknowledge that a female (sex) individual
can be an objectifier and a male (sex) individual can be objectified,
she takes it that the former is a man and the latter is a woman, since
in her view a man (gender) is by definition the objectifier and a
woman (gender) is by definition the objectified.



This situation of gender inequality which troubles our societies and
is so tightly linked to the objectification of women is, MacKinnon and
Dworkin believe, created and sustained by men's consumption of
pornography. MacKinnon defines pornography as "the graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures or words
that also includes women dehumanised as sexual objects, things, or
commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut
up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual
submission or servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated
by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation,
injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised, or
hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual" (MacKinnon
1987, 176).



In our society, MacKinnon holds, pornography defines women's
role as sexual objects available for men's consumption:
"Pornography defines women by how we look according to how we
can be sexually used. ... Pornography *participates* in
its audience's eroticism through creating an accessible sexual
object, the possession and consumption of which *is* male
sexuality, as socially constructed; to be consumed and possessed as
which, *is* female sexuality, as socially constructed"
(MacKinnon 1987, 173). According to MacKinnon, pornography is
responsible for both men's and women's conception of women
as objects available for men's consumption.



MacKinnon's and Dworkin's understanding of objectification
is similar to Kant's. For both of them, as for Kant,
objectification involves treating a person, someone with humanity, as
an object of merely instrumental worth, and consequently reducing this
person to the status of an object for use. The objectified individual
is made into a tool for others' sexual purposes.
Objectification, therefore, constitutes a serious harm to a
person's humanity.



Dworkin uses Kantian language to describe the phenomenon of sexual
objectification: "Objectification occurs when a human being,
through social means, is made less than human, turned into a thing or
commodity, bought and sold. When objectification occurs, a person is
depersonalised, so that no individuality or integrity is available
socially or in what is an extremely circumscribed privacy.
Objectification is an injury right at the heart of discrimination:
those who can be used as if they are not fully human are no longer
fully human in social terms; their humanity is hurt by being
diminished" (Dworkin 2000, 30-1). When a person is treated
as less than human, as merely an object for another's use, she
becomes, according to Dworkin, less than human. In this way, her
humanity is harmed by being diminished.



Hampton argues that Dworkin's view is upsetting, disturbing
and indeed quite similar to the the view held by those who defend
patriarchy. This is because, according to Dworkin, sex is necessarily
demeaning for the woman. Her humanity is denied altogether and she is
literally degraded and transformed into something less than
human. Thus sex destroys a woman's humanity. Hampton explains
that Dworkin mistakes the social degradation and inferiority that
women must endure in sexist societies with their real and equal value
as people, which can never be degraded and must always be acknowledged
no matter what wrongs have been inflicted on them. Consequently, for
Hampton, a distinction between degradation and diminishment would make
Dworkin's analysis more sound (Hampton 1999, 139-143).



MacKinnon describes objectification as follows. She writes:
"... A sex object is defined on the basis of its looks, in
terms of its usability for sexual pleasure, such that both the
looking--the quality of gaze, including its points of
view--and the definition according to use become eroticised as
part of the sex itself. This is what the feminist concept of
'sex object' means" (MacKinnon 1987, 173). She
furthermore holds: "A person, in one Kantian view, is a free and
rational agent whose existence is an end in itself, as opposed to
instrumental. In pornography women exist to the *end* of male
pleasure" (MacKinnon 1987, 173). Insofar as an individual has
only instrumental value, she is clearly not regarded as an end in
herself.



MacKinnon and Dworkin have argued that, even if women consent to their
being used as mere means for men's sexual purposes, this is not
sufficient to make such use permissible. For instance, these feminists
claim that women in the pornographic industry consent to be used as
objects simply out of lack of options available to them within our
patriarchal society. Women's consent, therefore, is not true
consent. MacKinnon writes: "The sex is not chosen for the sex.
Money is the medium of force and provides the cover of consent"
(MacKinnon 1993, 28). This does not only hold for women in
pornography. For MacKinnon and Dworkin, all women's consent to
be sexually used by men cannot be true consent under the existing
conditions of gender inequality. They hold that women are not truly
blameworthy for their reduction to things of merely instrumental
value. Women's objectification is demanded and inflicted by men
in our societies. It is men who want, and also, Dworkin claims, need
to use women as objects, and demand them to be object-like (Dworkin
1997, 142-3).



Kant compares the objectified individual to a lemon, used and
discarded afterwards, and elsewhere to a steak consumed by people for
the satisfaction of their hunger (Kant *Lectures on Ethics*,
163 and 165). In a similar manner, MacKinnon blames pornography for
teaching its consumers that women exist to be used by men. A woman,
according to MacKinnon, becomes comparable to a cup (a thing), and as
such she is valued only for how she looks and how she can be used
(MacKinnon 1987, 138). Similarly, Dworkin talks about men being the
only "human centre" of the world, surrounded by objects
for use, including women. A man experiences his power, according to
Dworkin, in using objects, both inanimate objects and "persons
who are not adult men" (Dworkin 1989, 104).



Kant took exercise of sexuality to be inherently problematic. For
Dworkin and MacKinnon, on the other hand, what is problematic is not
sexuality per se, but rather sexuality as constructed through
pornography. These feminists believe that objectification is a
consequence of gender inequality and it is created and sustained by
pornography's existence and consumption. Pornography, according
to MacKinnon, makes women's sexuality into "something any
man who wants to can buy and hold in his hands... She becomes
something to be used by him, specifically, an object of his sexual
use" (MacKinnon 1987, 138). MacKinnon fears that use can easily
be followed by violence and abuse. Since women are things (as opposed
to human beings), it seems to men that there is nothing problematic
with abusing them. The object status of women, then, is the cause of
men seeing nothing problematic with violent behaviour towards
women.



Moreover, MacKinnon notes, women in pornography are presented as
enjoying how they are being used and violated by men: "In
pornography, women desire disposition and cruelty. Men ... create
scenes in which women desperately want to be bound, battered,
tortured, humiliated, and killed. Or merely taken and used. Women are
there to be violated and possessed, men to violate and possess
us..." (MacKinnon 1987, 148). Dworkin similarly writes:
"Men do not believe that rape and battery are violations of
female will in part because men ... have consumed pornography in
the private world of men for centuries. ... The most enduring
sexual truth in pornography is that sexual violence is desired by the
normal female, needed by her, suggested or demanded by her"
(Dworkin 1989, 166). Pornography, then, teaches its consumers that,
not only is it permissible to treat women in these ways, but also that
women themselves enjoy being used, violated and abused by men. Watson
furthermore argues that use of pornography restricts the sexual
autonomy of boys and men, due to pornography's pervasiveness as
a tool of sex education. Pornography consumption powerfully shapes its
users' beliefs, attitudes, preferences and desires. Pornography,
she argues, distorts these and in this way undermines people's
sexual autonomy and restricts the development of authentic sexuality
for both women and men (Altman and Watson 284, 287-8).



The idea that pornography *causes* men to treat women as
objects to be used and abused has been defended by a number of
feminists. Alison Assiter argues that what is wrong with pornography
is that it reinforces desires on the part of men to treat women as
objects (as mere means to achieve their purposes) (Assiter 1988, 68).
Rae Langton also discusses the possibility of such a causal connection
between men's consumption of pornography and women's
objectification. She writes: "As a matter of human psychology,
when men sexually use objects, pornographic artifacts, as women, they
tend to use real woman as objects. One weaker variant of this causal
claim might be restricted to a subset of pornography... As a
matter of human psychology, when men sexually use objects as women,
and those objects are pornographic artifacts, *whose content is
violent or misogynistic*, then they will tend to use real women as
objects" (Langton 1995, 178).)



MacKinnon, however, holds that the connection between men's use
of pornography and women's objectification is not simply a
causal one. She has famously claimed that pornography involves
"sex between people and things, human beings and pieces of
paper, real men and unreal women". And, as a result for
MacKinnon, "the human [women, in particular] becomes a
thing" (MacKinnon 1993, 109 and 25). Men's consumption of
pornography, then, *is* (*constitutes*) women's
objectification. (This is admittedly a puzzling claim, but one which I
will not delve into further here. Detailed defenses of the claim have
been offered by Melinda Vadas (Vadas 2005) and Rae Langton (Langton
1995), and a criticism has been put forward by Jennifer Saul (Saul
2006).)



Kant thought that the solution to sexual objectification is marriage.
This is because he conceived this relationship as one of perfect
equality and reciprocity between the spouses. Each of them surrenders
his or her person to the other and receives the person of the other in
return. This way, Kant believed, neither of them is objectified by
losing his or her person. (For a detailed discussion of Kantian
marriage see Herman 1993 and Papadaki 2010b.) For Dworkin and
MacKinnon, however, Kant's suggested solution is inappropriate.
Objectification, according to these feminists, is present within all
heterosexual relationships in our society and harms women's
humanity. Marriage, or any other heterosexual relationship for that
matter, is clearly not regarded as an exception by them. According to
MacKinnon and Dworkin, the way to fight objectification is to fight
gender inequality, which is created and sustained by men's
consumption of pornography. They take it that pornography has power
and authority over its audience (men and boys). This view is also
defended by Langton, who argues that it does not matter that the
speech of pornographers is not generally held in high esteem. What
matters, rather, is that men and boys learn about sex primarily
through pornography. Pornography passes the message to its audience
that women are objects readily available for men's consumption
(Langton 1993, 312).



The view that pornography has this amount of influence over men and
plays such a central role in women's objectification has
received criticism. Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer question the
idea that men are conditioned to behave in certain ways as a
consequence of pornography consumption. What is problematic with this
idea, according to them, is that men are presented as incapable of
critically interpreting pornographic materials, and as simply
imitating what they see in pornography (Cameron & Frazer 2000,
248-251). In a similar spirit, Altman argues that pornography
consumption cannot alter a person's preferences and desires,
sexual or otherwise. He claims that men find women's
subordination arousing, not as a result of their having consumed
pornography. Rather, they enjoy pornography, which includes the
subordination of women, because they already find this subordination
arousing. Thus, pornography does not make anything sexy but it deals
with what its consumers already find sexy (Altman and Watson,
68-9).



Even assuming that pornography does indeed pass the message that women
are object-like to its consumers, however, it has been suggested that
pornography is not special with respect to sustaining gender
inequality and women's objectification. Leslie Green explains
that the idea that women are mere objects/tools is reinforced through
parental pressure, television, popular novels, music videos, and
fashion. What we need to do, Green says, is change our society, in a
way that women's subjectivity will be acknowledged (Green 2000,
43-52). Nussbaum too argues that we should not see pornography
as the primary cause of women's objectification. Sexual
objectification is, according to Nussbaum, often caused by social
inequality, but there is no reason to believe that pornography is the
core of such inequality (Nussbaum 1995, 286, 290).



A similar view has been put forward by Ronald Dworkin, according to
whom: "It might be odd that feminists have devoted such energy
to that campaign [the campaign for outlawing pornography]... No
doubt mass culture is in various ways an obstacle to sexual equality,
but the most popular forms of that culture--the view of women
presented in soap operas and commercials, for example--are much
greater obstacles to that equality than the dirty films watched by a
small minority" (R. Dworkin 1993, 36). (For further discussions
about pornography, see also the entries on
 feminist perspectives on sex markets
 and on
 pornography and censorship.)


## 3. Feminine appearance and objectification



It has been pointed out by some feminist thinkers that women in our
society are more identified and associated with their bodies than are
men, and, to a greater extent than men, they are valued for how they
look (Bartky 1990; Bordo 1993, 143). In order to gain social
acceptability, women are under constant pressure to correct their
bodies and appearance more generally, and to make them conform to the
ideals of feminine appearance of their time, the so-called
'norms of feminine appearance' (the standards of
appearance women feel they should be living up to) (Saul 2003, 144).
Some feminists have argued that, in being preoccupied with their
looks, women treat themselves as things to be decorated and gazed
upon.



In her book *Femininity and Domination*, Sandra Bartky uses
Marx's theory of alienation to explain the objectification that
results from women's preoccupation with their appearance. A
feature of Marx's theory of alienation is the
*fragmentation* of the human person, this "splintering of
human nature into a number of misbegotten parts". For Marx,
labour is the most distinctively human activity, and the product of
labour is the exteriorisation of the worker's being. Under
capitalism, however, workers are alienated from the products of their
labour, and consequently their person is fragmented (Bartky 1990,
128-9).



Bartky believes that women in patriarchal societies also undergo a
kind of fragmentation "by being too closely identified with
[their body]... [their] entire being is identified with the body,
a thing which... has been regarded as less inherently human than
the mind or personality" (Bartky 1990, 130). All the focus is
placed on a woman's body, in a way that her mind or personality
are not adequately acknowledged. A woman's person, then, is
fragmented. Bartky believes that through this fragmentation a woman is
objectified, since her body is separated from her person and is
thought as representing the woman (Bartky 1990, 130).



Bartky explains that, typically, objectification involves two persons,
one who objectifies and one who is objectified. (This is also the idea
of objectification put forward by Kant as well as by MacKinnon and
Dworkin.) However, as Bartky points out, objectifier and objectified
can be one and the same person. Women in patriarchal societies feel
constantly watched by men, much like the prisoners of the Panopticon
(model prison proposed by Bentham), and they feel the need to look
sensually pleasing to men (Bartky 1990, 65). According to Bartky:
"In the regime of institutionalised heterosexuality woman must
make herself 'object and prey' for the man. ... Woman
lives her body as seen by another, by an anonymous patriarchal
Other" (Bartky 1990, 73). This leads women to objectify their
own persons. Bartky argues that the woman "[takes] toward her
own person the attitude of the man. She will then take erotic
satisfaction in her physical self, revelling in her body as a
beautiful object to be gazed at and decorated". Such an attitude
is called 'narcissism', which is defined by Bartky as the
infatuation with one's bodily being (Bartky 1990,
131-2).



In being infatuated with their bodily beings, Bartky argues that women
learn to see and treat themselves as objects to be gazed at and
decorated, they learn to see themselves as though from the outside.
Narcissism, as Simone de Beauvoir also points out, "consists in
the setting up of the ego as a double 'stranger'"
(Beauvoir 1961, 375). The adolescent girl "becomes an object and
she sees herself as an object; she discovers this new aspect of her
being with surprise: it seems to her that she has been doubled;
instead of coinciding exactly with herself, she now begins to exist
outside" (Beauvoir 1961, 316) (See the entry on
 Simone de Beauvoir.)
 However, this 'stranger' who inhabits women's
consciousness, Bartky writes, is hardly a stranger; it is, rather, the
woman's own self (Bartky 1993, 134).



As Nancy Bauer holds, drawing on Beauvoir, women will always have
reasons to succumb to the temptation of objectifying themselves. Bauer
mentions the widespread recent phenomenon of female college students
who claim that they gain pleasure in performing unilateral oral sex on
male students. A woman who turns herself into an "object of the
helpless desire of a boy"in this way, Bauer explains,
experiences a sense of power and pleasure, which, however, are not
unadulterated (Bauer 2011, 124). A great theme of *The Second
Sex*, Bauer concludes, is that, in order to achieve full
personhood, it is necessary not only that men stop objectifying women,
but also that "women care about abjuring the temptation to
objectify themselves" (Bauer 2011, 128).



Bartky talks about the disciplinary practices that produce a feminine
body and are the practices through which women learn to see themselves
as objects. First of all, according to her, there are those practices
that aim to produce a body of a certain size and shape: women must
conform to the body ideal of their time (i.e. a slim body with large
breasts), which, Bartky holds, requires women to subject their bodies
to the 'tyranny of slenderness' (put themselves through
constant dieting and exercise) (Bartky 1990, 65-7). Susan Bordo
also emphasises the fact that women are more obsessed with dieting
than are men. This is linked to serious diseases such as anorexia and
bulimia. Ninety percent of all anorexics, Bordo points out, are women
(Bordo 1993, 143, 154). Furthermore, a large number of women have
plastic surgery, most commonly liposuction and breast enlargement, in
order to make their bodies conform to what is considered to be the
ideal body.



According to Bartky, the second category of these disciplinary
practices that produce a feminine body are those that aim to control
the body's gestures, postures, and movements. Women, she holds,
are more restricted than men in the way they move, and they try to
take up very little space as opposed to men, who tend to expand to the
space available. Women's movements are also restrained by their
uncomfortable clothes and shoes (Bartky 1990, 68-9). The final
category of the disciplinary practices, Bartky holds, are those that
are directed towards the display of a woman's body as an
'ornamented surface': women must take care of their skin
and make it soft, smooth, hairless and wrinkle-free, they must apply
make-up to disguise their skin's imperfections. Our culture
demands the 'infantilisation' of women's bodies and
faces (Bartky 1990, 71-2).



According to Bartky: "... whatever else she [a woman] may
become, she is importantly a body designed to please or to
excite" (Bartky 1990, 80). Iris Marion Young adds that
women's preoccupation with their appearance suppresses the body
potential of women: "Developing a sense of our bodies as
beautiful objects to be gazed at and decorated requires suppressing a
sense of our bodies as strong, active subjects..." (Young,
1979).



Who is responsible for women's situation? According to Bartky:
"The disciplinary power that inscribes femininity in the female
body is everywhere and it is nowhere; the disciplinarian is everyone
and yet no one in particular" (Bartky 1990, 74). The message
that women should look more feminine is everywhere: it is reinforced
by parents, teachers, male partners, and it is expressed in various
ways throughout the media. Men, then, are not the only ones to blame
for women's situation. Because of the pervasiveness of this
disciplinary power that inscribes femininity, women's constant
preoccupation with appearance has come to be regarded as something
natural and voluntary; it is something that women have internalised.
Therefore, it is far from easy for women, in Bartky's view, to
free themselves from their objectification.



Not all feminists, however, share the concern about the inevitability
of objectification involved in women's appearance-related
pursuits. Janet Richards takes women's preoccupation with their
looks to be a matter of personal preference, and not a feminist
matter. She claims that there is nothing inherently degrading or
objectifying about women trying to be sensually pleasing (Richards
1980, 184-204). Natasha Walter too takes it that women's
preoccupation with their appearance is not necessarily objectifying.
She also points to the fact that men in our society engage in
self-decoration and seek to be admired by women (Walter 1998,
86-102).



Bordo herself acknowledges the fact that men have increasingly started
to spend more time, money and effort on their appearance (Bordo 1999).
She emphasises the fact that men's magazines today, like
women's, are full of articles and advice on how men should look:
how to be more muscular, what clothes to wear, what creams and other
cosmetics to use, etc. Men feel the need to make their looks conform
to the prevailing ideals of masculinity. Bordo believes that it is
consumer capitalism that drives men to be increasingly concerned with
their appearance: "Why should [the cosmetics, diet, exercise,
and surgery industries] restrict themselves to female markets, if they
can convince men that their looks need constant improvement
too?," she asks (Bordo 1999, 220).



The fact that men too face pressure to look a certain way, and engage
in constant efforts to improve their appearance, however, is not on
its own sufficient to show that women's (and men's)
preoccupation with appearance is not objectifying. According to Saul,
"The increasing pressure on men to conform to unattainable
standards of beauty is far from a sign of progress: it is, instead, a
sign that the problem has grown" (Saul 2003, 168).


## 4. Objectivity and Objectification



MacKinnon introduces the idea that there are important connections
between objectivity and objectification. MacKinnon writes: "The
stance of the 'knower' ... is ... the neutral
posture, which I will be calling objectivity--that is the
nonsituated distanced standpoint... [This] is the male standpoint
socially ... [The] relationship between objectivity as the stance
from which the world is known and the world that is apprehended in
this way is the relationship of objectification. Objectivity is the
epistemological stance of which objectification is the social process,
of which male dominance is the politics, the acted out social
practice. That is, to look at the world objectively is to objectify
it" (MacKinnon 1987, 50). Her claim has become the focus of
recent feminist investigation. Drawing on MacKinnon's work, Rae
Langton and Sally Haslanger have explored the idea that
objectification is often hidden, and 'masked' as
objectivity.



According to Haslanger, in trying to be objective about our world and
function within it, we go about trying to discover things'
natures. An object's nature is essential to it, and any change
to it will inevitably destroy it. An object cannot exist without those
properties that constitute its nature. Discovering an object's
nature enables us to explain the behaviour of that object under normal
circumstances. This means that in practical decision-making, we must
be attentive to objects' natures (Haslanger 1993, 103, 105). She
writes: "It won't do to try to fry an egg on a paper
plate; there is no point in trying to teach a rock how to read.
Because the world is not infinitely malleable to our wants or needs,
reasonable decision making will accommodate 'how things
are', where this is understood as accommodating the natures of
things, the background conditions constraining our actions"
(Haslanger 1993, 105).



A plausible strategy for discovering a thing's nature is to look
for observed regularities. This is because natures are responsible for
the regular behaviour of things under normal circumstances. For
example, I observe that my ferns die if deprived of water. I therefore
come to believe that the nature of ferns is such that they cannot
survive without water. I adjust my decision-making in accordance with
this observed regularity, and so water my ferns to prevent them from
dying. In observing the regularity that ferns die when depraved of
water, I have concluded that this is due to ferns' nature.
Haslanger points out that this procedure of drawing on observed
regularities to set constraints on our practical decision making seems
to be "a paradigm of 'neutral,'
'objective,' or 'reasonable' procedure"
(Haslanger 1993, 105).



The above procedure, however, can be problematic. This becomes obvious
when moving to the social world. For example, aiming to discover
women's nature following the above procedure in patriarchal
societies (like ours, according to MacKinnon) is highly problematic.
MacKinnon believes that it is an observed regularity in our societies
that women are submissive and object-like (and men are women's
objectifiers). This means that one might be led to the belief that
women are by their *nature* submissive and object-like. (It
should be noted here that MacKinnon, and also Haslanger and Langton
following her, use 'men' and 'women' to refer
to gender categories, which are socially (not biologically) defined:
one is a woman or a man by virtue of one's social position; see
the entry on
 feminist perspectives on sex and gender.)
 However, the belief that women are naturally submissive and
object-like is false, since women have been *made* to be like
that.



Women's object-like status is not a natural fact, but rather a
consequence of gender inequality. In structuring our world in such a
way as to accommodate this allegedly natural fact about women, we
sustain the existing situation of gender inequality. As MacKinnon
vividly puts it: "if [we] look neutrally on the reality of
gender so produced, the harm that has been done will not be
perceptible as harm. It becomes just the way things are"
(MacKinnon 1987, 59). Haslanger adds: "Once we have cast women
as submissive and deferential 'by nature', then efforts to
change this role appear unmotivated, even pointless. ... These
reflections suggest that what appeared to be a 'neutral'
or 'objective' ideal, namely, the procedure of drawing on
observed regularities to set constraints on practical decision
making--is one which will, under conditions of gender hierarchy
reinforce the social arrangements on which such hierarchy
depends" (Haslanger 1993, 106).



Drawing on MacKinnon, Haslanger suggests that there are four
conditions that are necessary in order for person *A* to
objectify person *B*:


1. Person *A* *views and treats* person *B* as
an object for the satisfaction of *A*'s desire;
2. Where person *A* *desires* person *B* to have
some property, *A* *forces* *B* to have that
property;
3. Person *A* *believes* that person *B* has
that property;
4. Person *A* believes that person *B* has that
property *by nature* (Haslanger 1993, 102-3).



When it comes to women's sexual objectification by men, the
above conditions go as following:


1. Men *view* and *treat* women as objects of male
sexual desire;
2. Men *desire* women to be submissive and object-like and
*force* them to submit;
3. Men *believe* that women are in fact submissive and
object-like;
4. Men *believe* that women are in fact submissive and
object-like *by nature*.



According to Haslanger, in order for an objectifier to
'mask' his power and believe that the observed differences
between men and women are consequences of their natures, he must
resort to a *norm of aperspectivity*; he must believe that his
observations are not conditioned by his own social position, and that
he has no impact on the circumstances under observation. Haslanger
discusses a norm, which is often used by objectifiers, the norm of
*Assumed Objectivity*, which consists of the following four
sub-norms:


1. *Epistemic neutrality*: one must take a genuine regularity
in the behaviour of something to be a consequence of its nature.
2. *Practical neutrality*: one must constrain one's
decision making to accommodate things' natures.
3. *Absolute aperspectivity*: one must count observed
regularities as "genuine" when: (i) observations occur
under normal circumstances, (ii) observations are not conditioned by
the observer's social position, (iii) the observer has not
influenced the behaviour of items under observation.
4. *Assumed aperspectivity*: one must believe that any
regularity one observes is a "genuine" regularity, and so
reveals the nature of the things under observation (Haslanger 1993,
106-7).



Haslanger argues that, under conditions of social hierarchy, the Norm
of Assumed Objectivity would perpetuate the existing patterns of
women's objectification. Therefore, our efforts at social change
would become unmotivated. The norm in question should be rejected in
this case because it has bad practical consequences for women, while
serving the interests of men (it is *pragmatically* bad).
Furthermore, Haslanger argues that the norm of Assumed Objectivity
should be rejected because it yields false beliefs, like the belief
that women are submissive and object-like by their nature (it is
*epistemically* bad) (Haslanger 1993, 108-115).



Langton agrees with Haslanger that, under conditions of social
hierarchy, the norm of Assumed Objectivity is problematic and
therefore should be rejected. Her reasons are twofold: First of all,
(as Haslanger also noted) because it yields false beliefs; beliefs
which do not fit the world at all, like the belief that women are
object-like by nature. Secondly, because it yields *true but
unjustified* beliefs, beliefs that are true "for the wrong
reasons" (Langton 1993, 383); for example, the belief that women
are actually submissive and object-like. The belief is unjustified,
according to Langton, because of its direction of fit. In this case,
Langton explains, instead of men arranging their belief to fit the
world, the world arranges itself to fit the belief of men. Those
people who occupy a position of power and pursue the norm of Assumed
Objectivity will make the world conform to their belief (Langton 1993,
383).



Langton explains that *objectivity* is about the ways in which
the mind conforms to the world (the way in which our beliefs arrange
themselves to fit the world). When someone is objective, his or her
beliefs have the right direction of fit: the beliefs are arranged in
order to fit the way the world is. *Objectification*, on the
other hand, is about the ways in which the world conforms to mind
(conforms to our beliefs). An objectifier's beliefs have the
wrong direction of fit: the objectifier arranges the world in order to
fit his or her beliefs, which are influenced by his or her desires,
instead of arranging his or her beliefs to fit the way the world
actually is. Objectification, then, is a process in which the social
world comes to be shaped by desire and belief. An objectifier thinks
that her or his beliefs have come to fit the world, where in fact the
world has come to fit her or his beliefs.



When it comes to the objectification of women, Langton explains that
women become submissive and object-like because of men's desires
and beliefs. Men desire women to be this way, and, if they have power,
they force women to become this way. Following the norm of Assumed
Objectivity, then, men form the belief that women are in fact
submissive and object-like, and also that women are like that due to
their nature. So, when it comes to women's objectification, the
world conforms to men's minds. Men's beliefs, however,
have the wrong direction of fit because men arrange the world to fit
their beliefs and desires about women being submissive and
object-like. The norm of Assumed Objectivity, then, yields the belief
that women are submissive and object-like, which is true but has the
wrong direction of fit (Langton 2000, 138-142), along with the
false belief that women are naturally this way. (For a further
discussion about beliefs with an anomalous direction of fit, as well
as a discussion of the mechanisms that are responsible for generating
them, see also Langton's work on 'projection' and
its role in women's objectification in her 2004 article
"Projection and Objectification". For a criticism of
Langton's argument that the norm of Assumed Objectivity is
responsible for yielding beliefs that are true but have a wrong
direction of fit, see Papadaki 2008.)


## 5. The possibility of positive objectification



So far, we have looked at various concerns regarding the wrongness
involved in objectification. A number of thinkers, however, have
challenged the idea that objectification is always morally
problematic.



Alan Soble questions the widely held Kantian view according to which
human dignity is something that people have. He argues that
objectification is not inappropriate. Everyone is already only an
object and being only an object is not necessarily a bad thing. In one
sense, then, no one can be objectified because no one has the higher
ontological status that is required to be reduce-able by
objectification. In another sense, everyone is vulnerable to
objectification, and everyone can and may be objectified, because to
do so is to take them to their correct ontological level. He
writes:



> 
> The claim that we should treat people as 'persons' and not
> dehumanise them is to reify, is to anthropomorphise humans and
> consider them more than they are. Do not treat people as objects, we
> are told. Why not? Because, goes the answer, people qua persons
> deserve not to be treated as objects. What a nice bit of illusory
> chauvinism. People are not as grand as we make them out to be, would
> like them to be, or hope them to be. (Soble 2002b, 53-4)
> 



In the case of pornography, then, there is nothing wrong, according to
Soble, with treating pornographic actors and models as objects for
sexual pleasure and deny their humanity. That is because there is no
negative objectification that needs to be taken into moral account.
Soble adds that pornography's task is in fact a good one;
pornography takes these people (both men and women), who according to
him are good at sex, and makes sure that they do something with their
lives (Soble 2002b).



Leslie Green is another thinker who argues that it is permissible and
also required to treat people as objects. As Green explains, people
are embodied, extended in space, they exist in time, and they are
subject to the laws of nature. People, however, are clearly more than
objects. What is problematic therefore, according to Green, is to
treat a person *merely* as an object, merely as a means to
one's own ends. We can treat other people as means only if we at
the same time respect their integrity as agents with their own
purposes (Green 2000, 44).



Green points to Kant's Categorical Imperative, according to
which the prohibition is against treating a person *merely*
*as means*, and not at the same time as an end. As Green
emphasises, there is no prohibition against treating a person as *a
means* (as an instrument) (Green 2000, 44). In fact, Green holds,
"we must treat others as instruments, for we need their skills,
their company, and their bodies--in fact, there is little that we
social creatures can do on our own, and so little that is
fulfilling" (Green 2000, 45-6). According to Green, when
people are old, severely disabled, or chronically unemployed what they
fear the most is that they no longer are of use to others. As Green
puts it, "they miss not only their diminished agency, but also
their diminished objectivity. ... They become ...
*subjectified*" (Green 2000, 46).



Martha Nussbaum too aims to challenge the widely-held idea that
objectification is inconsistent with respect for a person's
humanity. She offers a systematic analysis of objectification, a
concept not at all easy to define and one that writers on the topic
have not sufficiently clarified, as she acknowledges (Nussbaum 1995,
251).



Objectification, for Nussbaum is the seeing and/or treating a person
as an object; it involves treating one thing as another: one is
treating as an object what in fact is not an object, but a human being
(Nussbaum 1995, 256-7). Nussbaum, then, disagrees with
Green's view that people are partly objects. According to
Nussbaum, there are seven features involved in the idea of
objectification: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness,
fungibility, violability, ownership, denial of subjectivity. A
detailed exposition of these seven features is provided in the
introduction of this entry.



According to Nussbaum, a person is objectified when they are seen
and/or treated in one or more of the above seven ways.
Instrumentality, then, Nussbaum points out, the core notion of
Kant's, MacKinnon's, Dworkin's, as well as
Green's conceptions of objectification, is only one of the ways
a person can be treated as an object. (Nussbaum does believe, however,
that, among these seven notions, instrumentality is especially
problematic, and is often linked to other forms of objectification
(Nussbaum 1995, 265)). Nussbaum's conception of objectification,
then, is broader than Kant/MacKinnon/Dworkin's because
objectification for Nussbaum is not merely defined in terms of
instrumentalisation, and also because it can take place when a person
is only *seen*, but not treated, as an object (seen in one or
more of the above seven ways that she mentions).



According to Nussbaum, objectification need not have devastating
consequences to a person's humanity. In fact, Nussbaum
criticises MacKinnon and Dworkin for conceiving of objectification as
a necessarily negative phenomenon (Nussbaum 1995, 273). Nussbaum
believes that it is possible that "some features of
objectification... may in fact in some circumstances... be
even wonderful features of sexual life", and so "the term
objectification can also be used... in a more positive spirit.
Seeing this will require ... seeing how the allegedly impossible
combination between (a form of) objectification and equality, respect,
and consent might after all be possible" (Nussbaum 1995,
251).



According to Nussbaum, then: "In the matter of objectification
context is everything. ... in many if not all cases, the
difference between an objectionable and a benign use of
objectification will be made by the overall context of the human
relationship" (Nussbaum 1995, 271); "...
objectification has features that may be either good or bad, depending
upon the overall context" (Nussbaum 1995, 251). Objectification
is *negative*, when it takes place in a context where equality,
respect and consent are absent. Among the negative objectification
cases she discusses in her article are Hankinson's *Isabelle
and Veronique*, the magazine *Playboy*, and James's
*The Golden Bowl*. And it is *benign/positive*, when it
is compatible with equality, respect and consent. Nussbaum gives an
example of benign objectification: "If I am lying around with my
lover on the bed, and use his stomach as a pillow there seems to be
nothing at all baneful about this, provided that I do so with his
consent (or, if he is asleep, with a reasonable belief that he would
not mind), and without causing him pain, provided as well, that I do
so in the context of a relationship in which he is generally treated
as more than a pillow" (Nussbaum 1995, 265).



Nussbaum believes that 'Lawrentian objectification'
(objectification occurring between the lovers in D. H.
Lawrence's novels) is a clear example of positive
objectification. The passage from *Lady Chatterley's
Lover* that she quotes in her article describes a sex scene
between two lovers. Connie and Mellors, in a context characterised by
rough social equality and respect, identify each other with their body
parts, they "... put aside their individuality and become
identified with their bodily organs. They see one another in terms of
those organs" (Nussbaum 1995, 275). Consequently, the two lovers
deny each other's autonomy and subjectivity, when engaging in
the sex act.



However, Nussbaum explains, "when there is loss of autonomy in
sex, the context is... one in which on the whole, autonomy is
respected and promoted. ... Again, when there is loss of
subjectivity in the moment of lovemaking, this can be and frequently
is accompanied by an intense concern for the subjectivity of the
partner at other moments..." (Nussbaum 1995, 274-6).
As Nussbaum also emphasises in her latest essay on objectification, a
person's "chosen resignation of autonomous self-direction,
or her willed passivity may be compatible with, and even a valued part
of, a relationship in which the woman is treated as an end for her own
sake... as a full fledged human being" (Nussbaum 2007, 51).
Furthermore, Connie and Mellors do not treat each other merely as
means for their purposes, according to Nussbaum. Even though they
treat each other as tools for sexual pleasure, they generally regard
each other as more than that. The two lovers, then, are equal and they
treat one another as objects in a way that is consistent with
respecting each other as human beings.



Nussbaum's list of the seven features involved in
objectification and the relations that exist between them provides
perhaps the most systematic analysis of the concept of objectification
to date. But Papadaki has argued that Nussbaum's conception is
too broad (Papadaki 2010a). A person is objectified, according to
Nussbaum, if they are seen and/or treated as an object (in one or more
of the seven ways that she mentions). If every time a person is
treated (or merely seen) by another, say, as an instrument (not a
*mere* instrument) for some further purpose, we take it that
the person in question is objectified, then it seems that in our daily
lives we objectify nearly everyone, including ourselves. Inevitably,
we use each other and ourselves instrumentally all the time (for
instance, I use a taxi driver as a means to get to my destination, I
use myself as a means to prepare a meal, etc). Papadaki argues that if
objectification is to be a meaningful concept, we need to restrict it.
Halwani is also in favor of a narrower conception of objectification.
He argues that we are better off with a definition of objectification
that includes "only treatment or behavior towards
someone". According to this view, if someone merely sees or
regards another in a sexual way, there is no objectification. Such a
definition, Halwani suggests, "...is less cluttered and
more accurately reflects the problem with objectification: its impact
on the objectified (often thought as *victims*)" (Halwani
2008, 342 and Halwani 2010, 187-8). He believes that we are
better off arguing that, in Nussbaum's positive objectification
cases, there is no objectification to begin with. This is better than
"engaging in mental gymnastics to try to show that there is
objectification but that it is okay or good" (Halwani 2010,
197). Nussbaum herself seems to be concerned, at times, about her
objectification category being too inclusive. For example, she states
that sometimes we do not treat the occurrence of only one of the seven
notions on her list as sufficient for objectification (Nussbaum 1995,
258). However, Papadaki suggests, she does not give us enough guidance
as to how we can decide whether objectification is present when a
person is treated in one of the seven ways she mentions. In addition,
she suggests that once objectification's association with the
morally problematic is weakened, there is the risk that the fight
against (negative) objectification might be undermined (Papadaki
2010a, 27-31).


## 6. The futility of specifying the marks and features of objectification



Recently, Nancy Bauer has expressed scepticism regarding the
possibility of laying out a set of criteria for what counts as sexual
objectification. She argues that it is difficult to specify the marks
and features of a term that plays a normative role in our mutually
shared worldview. And if the term in question is important to my
outlook, but not yours, she claims that it is impossible for me to
specify criteria for the term's application that pick out the
phenomenon from your point of view. She writes: "If the term
'sexual objectification' is critical in helping you make
sense of the world as you see it, then, more or less, you will know
sexual objectification when you see it. ... Insofar as the
philosophical literature sets out to delineate the marks and features
of sexual objectification, it is bound not only to fail but to miss
the very phenomenon it seeks to illuminate" (Bauer 2015, part
I).



Regarding the feminist concept of sexual objectification, Bauer
explains that it was coined as part of a feminist shift in how to
understand the world and one's experience in it. According to
the shift in question, in a context in which women experience
widespread, systematic, diachronic, and structural disadvantages,
certain ways of perceiving and representing women tend to cause them
material and psychological harm. Bauer argues that once someone
participates in this shift, the term 'sexual
objectification' will 'light up' the relevant
phenomena, and the person in question will see objectification
everywhere she looks in contemporary culture. This is the case even if
she is not in a position to specify exactly its marks and features.
Bauer explains that 'lighting up' in certain cases may
take the form of a conversion experience that consists in our seeing
things that we did not see before. For Bauer, the metaphor of
'lighting up' is crucial in thinking about sexual
objectification and other terms that make sense only in a context of a
systematic normative way of understanding the world (what she calls a
'worldview' (Bauer 2015, part II)).


## 7. Conclusion



Undoubtedly, objectification is a concept difficult to define, as
Nussbaum also acknowledges, since it turns out to be
'slippery' and 'multiple' (Nussbaum 1995,
251). How to best to define objectification, if we can define it at
all, and whether this notion should be restricted to describe the
morally objectionable, or expanded to cover benign and/or positive
aspects of the way we see and treat each other in our daily lives is
an ongoing debate. Much recent feminist work has been devoted to
comprehensive philosophical analyses of objectification, which will
hopefully lead to more complete and coherent understandings of this
notion.