## 1. Life



Recent studies have shed light on Kaspi's life such as his place
of birth and the dates of his death and marriage. We can distinguish
three periods in Kaspi's life:



1. *Kaspi's birth until his return from Egypt*. Joseph b.
Abba Mari ibn Kaspi was born circa 1280 in Arles in Provence (or in
Argentiere, in the Languedoc region). In 1314, he traveled to
Egypt in 1314 for five months:



> 
> Twenty years ago, I was exiled to a place reputed for learning...
> I crossed to Egypt, where I visited the College of that renowned and
> perfect sage, the Guide [=Maimonides]. I found there the fourth and
> fifth generations of his holy seed, all righteous, but none devoted to
> science. In all the Orient there were no scholars... (*Sefer
> HaMussar* p.98)
> 



As we see, his expectations--of delving into Maimonidean thought
through learning from Rabbi Abraham the Nagid--were not
met. However, his exegesis was enriched by the things he saw on the
journey.



We do not know of independent books by Kaspi from this period. He
wrote a supercommentary on Ibn Ezra's commentary on the Bible,
and a commentary on *Sefer HaRikma* by Ibn Janah.



2. *Kaspi's second Provencal period
(1314-1330)*, where he chiefly first in Arles, then
in Tarascon. During this period, Kaspi apparently married and his
two children, David, the eldest and Shlomo (1320), were born. In Arles
Kaspi completed his philosophical work *Tirat Kesef* (1317),
which was harshly criticized by the scholars of Salon through
Kalonymus (1318). 



3. *The Spanish period in Kaspi's life: 1330-1345.*
In 1330, Kaspi moved from Tarascon to Spain, living with his family
for several years in Perpignan (from 1336), followed by Barcelona,
Majorca, Valencia and Tudela. We know that Kaspi died in Majorca in
1345 but now how he lived there. It seems that he traveled there to be
alone and write, though this is uncertain. In the Spanish period Kaspi
wrote many books, including three books on logic and linguistics:
*Zeror HaKesef*, a brief summary of parts of
the *Organon* for his son; *Retuqot Kesef*, an
application of the rules of logic to Hebrew and Hebrew grammar;
*Sharshot Kesef*, a Hebrew dictionary. These three books
are among the most original and essential of Kaspi's work, and
none of them has been printed. Kaspi was well educated. Besides Hebrew
and Provencal, he was apparently also proficient in Arabic and
Latin. He was familiar with the classical Hebrew religious literature,
such as the Talmud and earlier Bible commentaries, and well-versed in
the works of Maimonides and his translator, Samuel ibn Tibbon. He was
probably also familiar with Falaquera's commentary on *The
Guide of the Perplexed*. However, his knowledge of Halakhic
literature was limited by his own admission. Among the philosophers,
he mentions Averroes, Avicenna, Boethius, al-Farabi, and
Galen, in addition to Plato and Aristotle.


## 2. Exegesis



Kaspi considered himself primarily a commentator. He distinguishes
between a "commentary" (*perush*) and an
independent work (*hibbur*), declaring, "I do not
define a work as a 'commentary' unless it brings us to the
real intention of the author of the book" (Commentary on the
Song of Songs, p. 184). Nevertheless, he sometimes admits his
inability to prove that his interpretation represents the
author's real meaning, particularly when that
"author" is the biblical one, i.e., God, Himself:



> 
> I do not assert that the intention of its Giver [= of the Torah] was
> those same purposes that I have assumed, for perhaps those were not
> intended, but he combined them with other intentions, presently hidden
> from us... For the same thing may have many purposes that do not
> necessarily contradict one another... Nevertheless what I
> say..., whether I prophesy their author's intentions or
> not, what I say is true, that we have learned such and such a matter
> from the subject of the narratives (*Tirat Kesef*, p. 64).
> 



Understanding the author's intention is thus seen as a kind of
prophecy ("whether I *prophesy* the
intention..."). Kaspi's interpretative truth, he
insists, is concerned not with the author and his intention, but with
the reader and his or her understanding: The commentator can speak for
himself alone. Such exegesis is subjective, dependent on each of the
work's innumerable readers. Nevertheless, Kaspi is sometimes
reasonably sure of the author's meaning:



> 
> I have revealed to you what the Lord revealed to us of His secrets,
> for I think that we have thereby arrived in this chapter at the
> author's intention; "the truth," as Aristotle says,
> "is its own witness, agreeing in every aspect." The
> meaning of "agreeing in every aspect" is in what he
> explained, saying, "that one aspect thereof attests to [another]
> aspect..."... Now our own Sages of blessed memory have
> already said, "words of truth are recognizable"
> [Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 9b] (*Tirat Kesef*, p. 83).
> 



Here, Kaspi boldly implies that God somehow informed
him of the secret hidden in the text. The criterion of his
certainty is coherence. However, given Kaspi's own theology (see
below), he was not claiming to have received a supernatural
revelation. Despite what some consider to be a radical adherence to
Aristotelian philosophy, Kaspi had a conservative outlook on
everything concerning the written word of the Bible and the way it is
read. He maintained that the written word, or its reading, has not
changed since the early sages of the Second Temple period . The way in
which Jews write the Torah scroll is the same as in the original
version. The square-like Assyrian lettering, known from the Torah
scrolls of today, was the same as that given to Moses at Sinai. Even
the division into the five books, including the weekly portions, were
all present from the early sages of the Second Temple period. Kaspi
differentiated between the early sages of the Second Temple period
(who held traditions received from Moses, and therefore reflect the
intent of the writer of the Torah), and later sages, the
Tanna'im and Amora'im of rabbinic writings, whose
interpretations of the biblical narrative may be disputed if they
disagree with the plain interpretation of the Bible.


## 3. Logic



Two definitions emerge for the role of Logic after looking at
Kaspi's comments:


1. Logic determines the correctness of our beliefs. It is not a
matter of psychological rules, but of regulative rules that serve as a
marker and a guide to the correct way of thinking.
2. Logic determines the proper use of the language. This is not a
matter of conventional rules that result from the structure of a
certain language, but of the rules of a universal syntax that
applies to all languages. The delineation of the work of logic is
nothing more than a match between "external" and
"internal" speech (*Sharshot Kesef*, p. 1), a
commonplace in his philosophical antecedents.



Kaspi accused his predecessors of misunderstanding Scripture because
they had not used logic:



> 
> The truth has evaded some of the commentators in this, and other
> matters, in many places, for they are ignorant of the science of
> logic, and even if some of them do know it, they do not remember its
> foundations when they comment (Commentary on Esther, p. 32).
> 



As noted above, Kaspi himself, wrote a brief compendium on logic
(Z*eror ha-Kesef*) in which he summarized what he
believed were important principles for a correct interpretation of
Scripture. He omitted discussion of dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics,
which he considered irrelevant to his task. His exegesis
applies various techniques: categorizing genera and species,
distinguishing between essential and non-essential qualities,
asserting the symmetry of relation, understanding the law of
contradiction, and recognizing valid and invalid syllogisms, in
addition to logical fallacies. For example, he criticizes commentators
who conclude from the truth of a proposition that its parts are also
true. To illustrate this, he cites the verse "There was no man
to till the soil" (Genesis 2:5). This verse does not imply that
there were no human beings at the time, a proposition at variance with
the Aristotelian thesis (to which Kaspi apparently subscribed) that
the world has always existed alongside God.


## 4. Logic and the Hebrew language



Kaspi was deeply concerned with the status of the Hebrew language.
While agreeing with Aristotle that languages are conventional rather
than natural, he places Hebrew on a higher level, arguing that its
combinations of letters into words are not accidental. A Hebrew word
denotes the qualities of the object designated, and there is a
one-to-one relation between words and their
*designata*. According to Kaspi, Hebrew is the ideal
language because its nouns attest to their characteristics,
whether essential or incidental. Man is called *adam* in
Hebrew because he originates [partly] from the earth (Hebrew:
*adama*); *ish* because he originates partly
from fire (Hebrew: *esh*) and *enosh* because of
his worthless and expendable nature (the Hebrew root
*a*-*n*-*sh*, claims Kaspi, designates
destruction and loss; *Retuqot Kesef*, p. 44).



Generalization is another critical principle derived from logic in
Kaspi's conception of language. Logic rests partly on the
division between the general and the specific. Genus is defined as the
most general and comprehensive set of all. A species constitutes a
subset of a genus with a specific difference, but its particulars also
possess non-essential properties. According to this principle,
claims Kaspi, a speaker is not obligated to reveal all particulars in
his choice of words. He thereby blurs boundaries in both language
morphology (such as differences in gender, number and time) and
syntax. Kaspi maintains that the grammatical means a speaker adopts to
express these differences constitute superfluous information.
Consequently, nothing is peculiar about a text that uses the male
instead of the female gender and so on. "It is not obligatory to
insist on gender consistency. A masculine name may well be accompanied
by a feminine adjective or verb and vice versa. We have been fortunate
to find textual gender consistency in a few places, but we should not
find it unusual if it is lacking in others" (*Retuqot
Kesef*, p. 15). In a similar vein, Kaspi writes about texts that
use the singular instead of the plural, past tense instead of the
future, or texts that lack the concept of a sentence or other
syntactic structures.


## 5. Philosophical principles in lexicographic methodology



In Kaspi's view, all Hebrew words are distinct; Hebrew has no
absolute synonyms or homonyms. In support of this view, he wrote a
kind of dictionary of the roots of biblical Hebrew (*Sharshot
Kesef*. The dictionary is based on two main assumptions:


1. There are no real homonyms. Kaspi determines the principle of the
common denominator a priori, an economic principle of logic according
to which the root has a chief meaning that includes all words derived
from the same root. In some cases, however, he was forced to adapt the
data to conform to the principle. Thus, for example, the root
*l-ch-m* denotes "opposition and resistance," and
from it are derived the Hebrew words for "war"
(*milchamah*) and "bread" (*lechem*). He
explains the use of this root for "bread" in light of
Aristotle's proposition in *On the Soul* 416 that
"Food is... the contrary of what is fed." Kaspi
expresses amazement that anyone should disagree with this principle:
"For how could a person think that the creators of the language,
who were great scholars, could have used one noun... for things
so unrelated" (*Sharshot Kesef*, ed. Last, p. 29).
2. There are no absolute synonyms. Kaspi, who claims that Hebrew has
no absolute synonyms for words, worked hard to differentiate among
synonyms throughout his dictionary.



Generally speaking, contemporary linguistics discerns two key types of
meaning differentiation: (a) between word *designata*, in which
each synonym is designated differently:
quantitatively--*rekhev* vs. *mekhonith* (motor
vehicle vs. automobile); qualitatively--*shikor* vs.
*mevusam* (inebriated vs. tipsy); (b) among registers or layers
of language (*layish* vs. *aryeh/*lion).



Kaspi also insists on an additional type of differentiation among
synonyms, maintaining that there is but one designatum and even the
designates do not differ. Differences among words are embodied in the
aspects of the designatum that they emphasize. For example, Kaspi
explains that the words *herev, sakkin, maakheleth* and
*shelah* (javelin) are not synonymous because each
designates a different aspect of the object. Kaspi maintains, that all
these objects are cutting instruments: knives. One is called
*herev* because it attests to the destruction
(*hurban*) of those struck by it; a *sakkin*
designates the stricken victim as subject to danger and then severed
from living creatures (according to Kaspi's interpretation of
the root *samekh-kaf-nun*). The instructive word
*maakhelet* informs us that the stricken one is slaughtered,
consumed (*neekhal*), terminated and so on. The words
*herev, sakkin, maakhelet*, and *shelah*
thus designate the same type of tool, a cutting instrument. Different
words indicate and describe different phenomena concerning the
designatum, but these are not synonyms.



Another significant difference between dictionaries produced before
and up to Kaspi's time and *Sharshoth Kesef* is the order
of discussion of lexical forms. Ibn Janah and Radaq, who
preceded Kaspi, begin by presenting the forms of the verbs derived
from a given Biblical root, followed by the noun forms. Unlike earlier
lexicographers of Hebrew and Arabic, Kaspi composed a dictionary in
which the nouns derived from the root were described first and the
relevant verb form system was only shown afterward. This change in
order is by no means coincidental. In *Retuqot Kesef*, Section
40, Kaspi analyzes the structure of the Hebrew language. First, its
founders agreed on the general meaning of each root. Then they coined
an abstract name designating its meaning that is not connected to any
particular object or occurrence. Subsequently, they coined the
verb's infinitive, thereby creating the reality to which the
noun refers. The infinitive is an abstract noun expressing an
occurrence. Subsequently, they formed adjectives that are concretely
connected with specific objects. After completing the nouns, they
invented a system that addresses tangible activity and occurrences. In
other words, Kaspi maintains that the formation of nouns and the
various weights accorded to them proceed from the most abstract to the
most tangible. As the verb system is the most tangible of all, it was
devised last.


## 6. Theology and anthropology



Kaspi bases his biblical exegesis on the conventional theological
assumptions of the Aristotelian philosophy prevalent among the Jews in
fourteenth century Southern France. of his times. God is a necessary
existent, the unmoved mover, the intellect that intellectually
cognizes itself. Kaspi's description of God as the
intellect borders on a certain conception of divine
immanence:



> 
> For we are our intellect *in actu*, we bring God into our
> minds, for the intellect is God and God is the intellect... For
> that reason, Moses was called "a Man of God" because God
> was always in his mind... I mean to say, "divine
> power," and there is no difference if one says "God"
> or "God's power," since that same power is the
> intellect and God is the intellect (*Maskiyot Kesef*, p. 98).
> 



Kaspi proposes another radical doctrine in connection with the
Aristotelian conception of God as the intellect, that which
intellects, and the intellectum: he compares this conception with the
Holy Trinity of Christian theology. He is even willing to accept a
moderate interpretation of the Trinity: "Some individuals among
them (the Christians) are similar to us (in opinions)"
(*Gevia' ha-Kesef*, p. 27).



Kaspi explains the relationship between God and the world in as
naturalistic a manner as possible. He agrees with the position
attributed to Aristotle and Plato, that the world was not created
*ex nihilo* at a certain point in time, arguing that this was
also Maimonides' position. In that spirit, Kaspi himself
proposes a systematic explanation of the creation as described in
Genesis.



Kaspi also understand God's continual providence of the world in
entirely naturalistic terms. He interprets biblical miracles as rare
but natural phenomena--an idea not dissimilar to Spinoza's
teachings. To say that a certain phenomenon is contrary to natural
law, Kaspi writes, is a subjective judgment, "for there is no
doubt that those ignorant of natural science believe many natural
things to be miraculous, not natural phenomena" (*Tirat
Kesef*, p. 12). This may be compared with Spinoza in his
*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (Chap. 6): "[S]ince
miracles were wrought according to the understanding of the masses,
who are wholly ignorant of the workings of nature... we cannot
doubt that the causes of many things, narrated in Scripture as
miracles could easily be explained by reference to established
workings of nature." Kaspi also holds that a wise prophet is
capable of performing miracles thanks to the possession of extensive
knowledge. Moses, the wisest of men, performed miracles in Egypt
because "he had acquired knowledge of the celestial body...
because he had captured the world of the [four sublunar]
elements" (*Menorat Kesef*, p. 93). This knowledge
enabled him to inflict the plagues upon the Egyptians: "With the
four [elements] Moses performed actions that would be impossible for
any [other] wise man" (Commentary on Proverbs B, p. 127).



Discussing the relationship between the prophet and the wise man,
Kaspi agrees with the Muslim thinker
al-Batalyusi that a person with a prophetic soul
is superior in level and essence to a wise man with a philosophical
soul. Nevertheless, prophecy is not a super-rational phenomenon. A
prophet's knowledge of the future is based on deductive
inference, since he or she is well acquainted with the world and all
details of natural causality.



The ability of God and the prophets to foresee the future, despite the
apparent contradiction with the principle of (free) choice, also
receives a rational explanation. Kaspi proposes an analogy between
their positive knowledge and the knowledge of wise men "with a
good sense of evaluation and estimation," who are capable of
foreseeing the probable behavior of a person based on their knowledge
of his or her character. Like most medieval theologians, Kaspi accepts
the concurrent validity of an omniscient God and human free
choice.



Not unrelated to this antinomy is the theological problem posed by the
human capacity for voluntary action. Maimonides stated the difficulty
as follows: "How is it possible that a person can do whatever he
pleases?... How can anything be done in the world without the
permission and will of its Creator?" (*Hilkhot Teshuvah*
5:4). Maimonides' solution was to define human choice as one
expression of the divine will, which is the cause of everything that
takes place in the world; accordingly, God "desired man to have
his own free will" (*ibid*.). Kaspi goes further,
however, suggesting the radical view that God is "the remote
mover," even when a person chooses to realize his free will by
sinning and worshiping idols; it was in that sense that the Bible
described God as hardening Pharaoh's heart (*Matsref
la-Kesef*, pp. 152-153).



Kaspi provides his readers with guidelines for a virtuous life. As a
rationalist through and through, he recommends that a person acquire
the best possible education. Every effort should be made to accumulate
the financial resources necessary to improve one's education, by
purchasing books and hiring teachers. Every man should set up a
family: His wife will support him, and his children will keep him in
his old age, "so that he should have time to acquire
wisdom... Moreover, his sons, if they are good, will join him in
his studies, all the more so if his eyes have become dimmed with
age" (Commentary on Proverbs, pp. 59-60). This is a wholly
utilitarian and egoistical philosophy, recommending the
self-realization of every human being. Kaspi enunciates these
guidelines in the context of his scriptural exegesis, relying
primarily on the literature of wisdom written, according to Jewish
tradition, by King Solomon, the wisest of men. He also derives his
rules from biblical stories, citing their heroes' behavior.



Kaspi's elitist principles, which create a disparity between the
wise and the masses, also imply a similarity between humans and other
creatures One application of this thesis may be found in his
commentary on Isaiah 41:14, referring to the phrase "worm of
Jacob":



> 
> For we are of the genus of the animals, similar to that of the lowest
> of the creeping insects. We are also their equal in every respect,
> unless we realize the potential of our intellect. All that is...
> so that we should be aroused to acquire intelligence and the
> intelligibles, for in them we differ from the worms... (*Adnei
> Kesef*, p. 151).
> 



In this context, Kaspi expressed compassion for animals, a tendency
toward vegetarianism and a profound disapproval of sacrifices. He even
expresses disapproval of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his
son.


## 6. Conclusion



If medieval philosophy from Philo to Spinoza may be understood as
being at the service of biblical exegesis, Joseph ibn Kaspi may
certainly be viewed as one of its most successful representatives. As
already mentioned, he also anticipated some of Spinoza's
controversial ideas in some contexts. In addition, both Kaspi and
Spinoza held that only man is capable of loving God, whereas God does
not love man (Kaspi, Commentary on Isaiah, p. 151; Spinoza,
*Ethics*, *On the Ability of the Intellect*, Theorem
17).



Despite his brilliance and original thought, Kaspi has never been
considered one of the most important medieval Jewish thinkers or
commentators. Only in the 19th century were some of his works
published for the first time, and others have yet to see the light of
day. There are several possible explanations for this. Perhaps his
controversial ideas weighed against his acceptance in the surrounding
society. Another explanation is implied by comparing Kaspi and his
more famous contemporary, Gersonides, a biblical exegete and
philosopher. Gersonides, despite his non-conservative ideas, earned
considerable fame among Jewish and non-Jewish thinkers. This was
primarily thanks to his systematic, profound, philosophical work
*Milhamot Adonay*, which placed him squarely in the realm
of philosophy, while his Bible commentaries were written mostly in the
spirit of plain interpretation, although there is much philosophy, as
well. Kaspi, however, was something of a philosopher among
commentators and a commentator among philosophers; perhaps that was
why he never attained prominence in either group. Kaspi's
writings on logic and Hebrew linguistics were indeed highly creative
and innovative, but he appeared to have lacked good fortune as far as
publication is concerned.