## 1. Ethics of renunciation: from self-sacrifice to non-violence and omniscience


### 1.1 Escaping rebirths through self-sacrifice



Jaina teaching firstly aims to promote a type of behavior, a method to
concretely modify an unsatisfying situation, not by modifying
one's environment, but by modifying oneself. More precisely,
individuals aim at freeing themselves from the infinite cycle of
painful rebirths. In order to achieve this, they are meant to progress
within a spiritual path thanks to an internal sacrifice based on
ascetic practices of renunciation. The Jain who aspires to final
emancipation abandons worldly life, notably all her possession. This
correct behavior (*samyak carita*) consists in an extreme
self-control. Jainism is an arduous path, in which the disciple needs
methods to assist her, as described in length notably in the *Later
Chapters* (*Uttaradhyayana*, 2nd century
BCE-1st century CE [Utt.]). One such method is an
incitement to cultivate a pessimistic attitude towards the world. For
example, the twelve contemplations (*anupreksa*),
which are pre-meditative states, are incitements towards the
contemplation of human beings and of their relation to the surrounding
world, which prompt the awareness that:


1. everything in the world is not enduring;
2. all beings are helpless;
3. when an individual is spiritually free, only she has been able to
achieve it, and only she can enjoy it, no other individual can assist
and share, each individual is isolated;
4. all the relationships of an embodied self are temporary, not
real;
5. empirical reality from life to death to life is endless and full
of calamities;
6. the empirical universe is an abode for selves that do not know
their real nature;
7. embodied selves are bound in impure, rotten and stinking
bodies;
8. the influx of karmic matter is the main cause of miseries;
9. the stoppage of the influx of karmic matter is possible by means
of penances;
10. the purification of karmic matter that is already bound is
possible by means of penances;
11. the doctrine (*dharma*) preached by the Jinas leads to
spiritual freedom;
12. human enlightenment is rare and difficult to obtain, it is an
essential duty of all humans to get it prior to their death
(*Treatise on What There Is*, TS 9.7).


### 1.2 Non-violence as a characteristic mark of Jainism



A peculiarity of Jainism is to essentially associate these
renunciatory liberating practices with the imperative of non-violence
(*ahimsa*) (Donaldson & Bajzelj 2021). More
precisely, at the heart of Jainism is the belief according to which
each living being is the transitory embodiment of a permanent
divine-like self (*jiva*), which is unobstructed
consciousness. In this conception, a human being can clear her self
from all the obstructions she currently experiences until she becomes
the unobstructed consciousness she essentially is. Now, this
conception also implies the non-harming (*ahimsa*)
of the other divine-like selves which, in turns, implies a constant
awareness of their presence and true nature, as well as self-mastery
and careful behavior. In one of the most ancient Jaina texts, the
*Canonical Text on Behavior*
(*Acarangasutra*, AS), written
in early Ardhamagadhi around the
4th-3rd centuries BCE, practices conducive
to liberation are presented in the following way:



> 
> * AS 1.1.21. For the sake of survival, for the sake of praise,
> honor, reverence, for the sake of birth, death, liberation, for the
> sake of prevention of miseries...
> * AS 1.1.22. ...some monk either indulges himself in
> action causing violence to the beings or earth-body through various
> kinds of weapons, makes others to cause violence to the beings of
> earth-body, or approve of others causing violence to the beings of
> earth-body.
> * AS 1.1.23. Such an act of violence proves baneful for him.
> Such an act of violence deprives him of enlightenment.
> * AS 1.1.24. He (the true ascetic), comprehending it, becomes
> vigilant over the practice of self-discipline.
> * AS 1.1.25. Hearing from the Venerable Mahavira
> himself or from the monks, one comes to know: it (i.e., causing
> violence to the beings of earth-body), in fact, is the knot of
> bondage; it, in fact, is the delusion; it, in fact, is the death; it,
> in fact, is the hell.
> 
> 
> 



Concretely, to get closer to the realization of our real nature
consists of being aware of the presence of other selves in living
beings around oneself and of acting in a non-harming way towards them.
This gave rise to practices of renunciation:


1. practices of non-violence, such as not eating meat, not drinking
non-filtered water containing microscopic forms of life, or walking
with extreme caution and restrictions;
2. practices towards self-control, like meditation or mortification
of the flesh;
3. practices of abstinence, in the line of no sexual intercourse, no
food for given periods of time, non-possession up to the nudity of
some monks; and
4. penances, today mainly consisting in fasts and recitation of
prayers.



One can only notice the strict character of these norms of action.
Jaina thinkers have developed thorough classifications as a backdrop
of these norms (Balbir 1999). First, classifications on the types of
violence to be avoided, that include not only direct harmful acts, but
also delegated ones, as well as the bare fact of permitting a harmful
act by letting it happen. Besides, acts can be physical, verbal or
mental ones. This forms the ground of a moral theory in which our
responsibility extends far beyond commonly shared conceptions.



Next to this, living beings are classified, from one-sensed beings,
like earth-beings, water beings or plants, to five-senses beings, like
humans, mammals, or gods. In this classification, only human beings
can get liberated. So even if gods have more felicity than human
beings, this is not the ultimately desired state. With such a
conception, Jainism propounds a type of reasoned anthropocentrism,
inasmuch as there is a unicity and rarity of the human life, without
it being central. Besides, one should avoid to harm even the
microscopic life forms present in the soil. This version of
non-violence is so extreme that one's restrained action is very
close to one's mere absence of act, since even breathing,
drinking water, or walking can prove harmful.



On a methodological level, one can also only notice the thorough use
of lists in this philosophical paradigm, the more striking example is
probably to be found in the *Canonical text on possibilities*
(*Sthanangasutra*,
3rd-2nd centuries BCE
[Than.]), in which philosophical considerations take
the form of ordered lists of items, starting with singletons in
chapter one (e.g., one Mahavira in this cosmic cycle),
continuing with lists of two items in chapter two (e.g., the self
*versus* non-self stuff), and so on up to the tenth chapter,
that presents lists of ten items (e.g., there are ten characteristics
of the Jaina path, namely patience, liberation, honesty, kindness,
humbleness, truth, self-discipline, austerity, detachment and
chastity).



The difficulty of following these norms of action gave rise to two
important changes in Jaina conceptions of the world (Johnson 1995).
First, in early canons, violent acts are the only direct factors of
bondage; while in later canonical texts, passions came to play an
important role, which means that one's intention to harm is
valued in the calculus of one's bondage. In this dynamic,
non-intentional harmful act can be forgiven. Second, the difficulty to
follow these norms is one of the fields in which the many-sided
perspectival stance of Jaina philosophers emerged, since an action can
be qualified as harmful from a given perspective, while qualified as
non-harmful--therefore permitted--from another
perspective.



Now, next to be able to determine whether an act is harmful or not is
the question to determine what is a self and what is not.


### 1.3 The categories of reality



The *Treatise on What There Is*
(*Tattvarthasutra*, TS), associated with the name of
Umasvamin and probably written by multiple authors around
150-400 CE, is traditionally considered as the first work and
main representative of classical Jaina philosophy. It is the oldest
extant Jaina treatise in Sanskrit. It aims to integrate themes tackled
in canonical literature in a coherent philosophical system. The
*Treatise on what there is*, opens with the following
verses:



> 
> * TS 1.1. The path to liberation is constituted by right view
> (*darsana*), right knowledge, and right conduct.
> * TS 1.2. Right view is confidence in the categories.
> * TS 1.4. The categories are self, non-self, inflow [of karmic
> matter], bondage [with karmic matter], stoppage [of the inflow],
> destruction [of the bondage], liberation.
> * TS 5.1. The inanimate entities (= non-self) are medium of motion
> (*dharma*), medium of rest, space and matter.
> * TS 5.2. [These] together with the selves are the substances.
> * TS 5.38. (exists only in some textual traditions). Time is also a
> substance.
> 
> 
> 



So, there are seven categories and six types of substance. The first
category consists in selves, which are a type of substance, while the
second category, the non-self stuff, encompasses the five remaining
types of substance. These two categories will be dealt with in more
depth in the section on metaphysics
 (SS2.1).
 Next to these, are the inflow of harmful and harmless karmic matter
into a sentient substance (*asrava*); the mutual
intermingling of sentient and non-sentient karmic matter caused by
wrong belief, non-renunciation, carelessness, passions and vibrations
set in the soul through mind, body and speech (*bandha*); the
stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter into a sentient substance that
results from right conduct (*samvara*); the gradual
dissociation of karmic matter from a sentient substance
(*nirjara*); and the state of complete annihilation of
karmic matter in the pure sentient substance (*moksa*).
For this section on ethics, what is important to keep in mind is that
five out of the seven elementary categories are not ontological ones,
but define the way by means of which the self, which is primarily
active consciousness, relates to things which are not conscious and
passive.



First, this means that the categories relevant in this metaphysics are
introduced inasmuch as a good understanding of their nature is
essential in characterizing the practice that will make one progress
in the path towards liberation.



Second,



> 
> 
> these categories (*tattva*) are essentially "facts"
> about the nature of existence which enable those who analyse them
> properly to plot their route to liberation. (Johnson 2014)
> 
> 
> 



As such, there is an inbuilt soteriological concern of Jaina ontology
and metaphysics.



Third, the core categorical differentiation distinguishes between what
is animate and conscious and what is not. Such an impermeable
distinction is especially essential in a conception in which one needs
to be able to know precisely how much her acts are correct,
respectively incorrect, because the harm done to others binds her.
This was an important part of the discussions concerning monastic
practices.


### 1.4 Liberation as unobstructed knowledge



Next to these considerations, epistemological concerns are likewise
prevalent in the shaping of the metaphysical and soteriological
edifices. This is due to the fact that Jaina practices aim at the
practitioner's liberation from wrong conceptions
(*mithyatva*). In the *Treatise on What There Is*,
the self is defined in the following way:



> 
> * TS 2.8. The defining characteristic of the self is experience
> (*upayoga*).
> 
> 
> 



This definition is further commented in the *Commentary on the
Treatise on What There Is*
(*Tattvarthasutrabhasya* [TSBh]), written
in Sanskrit by Umasvati (400-450 CE), by dividing this
experience into cognition (*jnana*) and
indeterminate perception (*darsana*) (TSBh 2.9.1).



This stress on epistemic abilities is not typical of Jainism. Indeed,
in most South Asian philosophico-religious traditions, the divine, the
absolute, is usually primarily knowledge (*jnana*),
consciousness (*cit*), insight (*prajna*),
the subject of experience (*purusa*) or the seer
(*drastr*). Therefore, Jaina conceptions of
the self (*atman*, *jiva*) as ultimately
unobstructed consciousness are no exception here.



Nor is the fact that our spiritual progress consists in a progress
which is virtuous and epistemic at the same time. To explain, karma is
in Jainism conceived as a subtle type of matter that fills all cosmic
space. Its specific property is to develop the consequences of our
virtuous, respectively unethical, acts. And then, due to passions
which act as a glue, karmic matter sticks to the self and obstructs
its potency. Let us think of someone's reflection in a mirror as
a type of expression of herself. Now, imagine that the mirror is red,
with the pun that the Sanskrit expression
"*raga*" means both "red object"
and "attachment, passion." In such a situation, the person
will have a red, therefore distorted, vision of herself. Jaina
thinkers teach us that karmic matter function likewise, it has the
shape of one's impetus towards objects and, doing so, it impedes
one's epistemic competence, as she approaches things as part of
a given limited project she has. From this, getting rid of specific
intentions, acting in an equanimous virtuous way is also burning karma
is also acquiring the means to see things in a less distorted way.
That is to say things *as they are* instead of things *as I
intend them to be*. This is this removal of wrong habits that
enables right knowledge and right sight to take place, and that
explains that the acquisition of higher faculties of knowledge is
ensured by renunciation from passions and the corresponding
destruction of karmic bondage.



In general, within a framework that admits the karma theory:


1. The acquisition of higher epistemic abilities is ensured by moral
behavior and the corresponding destruction of karma. In this dynamic,
theories of karma blur the distinction between epistemology and
soteriology.
2. Metaphysical investigations focus on the world *qua*
knowable. For example, Jainas derive the expression
"*loka*", "the universe", not from the
Sanskrit etymology "open space", but from the root
"*lok*-", "to see", inasmuch as the
universe is conceived as "that which is seen by the omniscient
one" (Dundas 2002). In general, theories of karma blur the
distinction between epistemology and metaphysics.
3. Even a clod of earth exists as earth *because* it has
earned its particular niche in the wider system of life processes due
to its previous deeds. In consequence, the world of nature cannot be
separated from the moral order. In general, theories of karma blur the
distinction between metaphysics and soteriology.


## 2. A complete worldview: metaphysics, taxonomies, cosmology


### 2.1 Six types of substances



We have just seen that the Jaina ethical effort is focused on
distinguishing what is the self from what it is not. This is what
explains that Jaina metaphysics is regularly presented as a dualism
that conceives the world a resulting from the activity of the elements
belonging to these two everlasting uncreated coexisting and
independent categories (Dixit 1971). This conception is close to that
of Samkhya philosophy, which admits of two irreducible
categories, namely the Experiencer (*purusa*) and the
Experienced (*prakrti*), and which considers philosophy
as the activity whose main goal is the disentanglement of these two
categories. Now, besides these shared fundamental conceptions, both
classifications deeply diverge (Bronkhorst 2007).



In Jainism, the self (*jiva*) is more precisely
unobstructed consciousness that concretely experiences cognition and
perception. It is also what desires pleasure, reads pain, acts
beneficially or harmfully and experiences the fruit thereof. In other
words, being an influential active self is a condition of possibility
for the individual to make or unmake herself in the world, which is
perceived by Jains as a condition of possibility for ethical
responsibility. Here, their conception differs from the one of
Samkhya philosophers, who consider that in deepest reality,
the self has never acted, and that all perceived activity is actually
performed by non-self stuff trying to imitate the self. From this,
selves have never genuinely been bound by karma, and realizing this
proper nature of things thanks to the yogic practice of meditation is
alone sufficient to free from rebirth and karmic retribution. For more
on yoga and meditative practices in Jainism, see the *Treatise on
yoga* (*Yogasastra* [YS]) by Hemacandra
(1089-1172) (Chapple 2016; Tatia 1951).



Despite the success of this conception and the fact that Jaina
philosophers share most of the necessary elements to also subscribe to
this conception, they will not take this direction. The reason for
this is that they need an active self, because moral distinctions lose
their value on the hypothesis of the passivity of the soul. On this
point, they are also severe critics of theories of the creation of the
world by God (*Isvara*), in which the intelligent
subject is the mere product of an external intelligent principle; or
of the fatalist theory according to which all things are fixed; to
indicate but a few interlocutors.



Besides, Jaina philosophers consider that there are as many selves as
there are living beings in the world. Each has a persisting
self-identity preserved even in the ultimate condition, which is a
condition of possibility for ethical responsibility. Concerning
one's responsibility for a series of acts, Jaina authors are
highly critical, both of the Buddhist conception according to which
there is no self, and of the Brahmanic conception according to which
the individual self is ultimately undifferentiated with the universal
self.



Finally, there is a fixed amount of selves in the universe. Not only
the non-liberated ones go from one birth to the other in this cosmic
cycle, but it will be the same ones who will continue to do so in the
next cosmic cycle, and so on. Besides, a self is fit, respectively
unfit, for liberation. When a self is unfit, no amount of good act can
change this fact.



Second, the category of non-self (*ajiva*) deals with the
matter and organisational principles thereof. To begin with, space
(*akasa*) is an all-pervading single indivisible
whole that includes both the part occupied by the world of things
(*loka*) and the void and empty part beyond it
(*aloka*). A point of space (*pradesa*) is
conceived as that which can be obstructed by one indivisible atom of
matter and which can give space to all types of particles.



Now, space by itself is not a sufficient condition of motion and of
rest. To avoid chaos, it is necessary to also postulate a medium of
motion (*dharma*), as well as a medium of rest
(*adharma*). The traditional metaphor is that, as water is the
condition of the motion of fish, *dharma* and *adharma*
are the condition of all motions. Here lies another specificity of
Jainism. While in other systems, *dharma* (etymologically
"what sustains") represents the only really sustainable
stream of acts, the virtuous way of life, the worthy behavior,
one's teaching or religion, here it stands for the medium of
motion, while meritorious behavior is
"*punya*" (respectively, non-meritorious
behavior is "*papa*"). This is an instance of
a Jaina tendency to physicalize the philosophical and ethical
concepts. If we understand *dharma* as the universal law
establishing what is fit and what is not, hereby accounting for
movements with an intention, we can understand that in the early Jaina
conceptions, in which the concrete acts, not the intention, are
foremost, *dharma* becomes what accounts for movements in
general.



Together, space, the medium of motion and the medium of rest are the
conditions of motion of things that can move, while they are
themselves unaffected by movement. They are devoid of the qualities of
taste, color, smell, sound, contact. They pervade the whole universe,
yet they are non-physical, non-atomic and non-discrete. These three
substances form a unity, they have the same all-embracing size and
continuous form. They are distinguished merely because of the
difference in their respective functions. They are the conditions for
the subsistence of all things, selves and matter, the connecting
environment which binds together the isolated phenomena into an
ordered whole.



As for matter (*pudgala*), it is the material cause of body,
speech, mind and breath. This means that in this conception, not only
bodies (*sarira*), but also the physical mind, words,
thoughts and breath, are types of subtle material substances. Matter
is especially what accounts for the existence of karma, a subtle type
of matter. To explain, there is a pan-Indian conception that what has
parts is impermanent. In Jainism, matter is the only type of substance
that can associate or dissociate and, therefore, that has parts.
Therefore, impermanence only comes from one's association with
matter. Contrarily to matter, (i) a self is a single atom devoid of
parts and totally independent from both other selves and other
substances; (ii) space, medium of motion and medium of rest are each a
single indivisible whole that occupies all cosmic space; and (iii)
time has no extension.



Furthermore, Jaina thinkers develop a complex system, with
calculations, to explain the practical effects of karma, for example
the precise mass of material particles assimilated after a given act,
or the duration and intensity of this assimilation. This resembles
physics, and one specificity of Jaina philosophy is to focus on
developing this complex system of the mechanisms of karma, as seen in
the *Essence of [the teachings of] Mahavira*
(*Gommatasara* [GS]) of Nemicandra (10th
century CE). There are eight types of karmic matter (see TS 8.5),
divided in four harming (*ghatiya*) and four
non-harming (*aghatiya*) types (Jaini 1979). The
harming types of karmic matter are:


* delusory karma (*mohaniya*), which reduces one's
innate bliss and brings about attachment to incorrect views. It
notably distorts one's appreciation of the categories of
reality;
* knowledge-obstructing karma
(*jnana-avaraniya*), which covers the
self, the mind and the senses, therefore impedes their natural
abilities;
* perception-obstructing karma
(*darsanavaraniya*), which impedes
one's intuitions;
* obstacle karma (*antaraya*), which reduces one's
innate energy.



And the four non-harming types of karmic matter are:


* feeling karma (*vedaniya*), which determines whether
the experiences of the self are pleasant or not;
* name karma (*naman*), which determines what sort of
rebirth is attained;
* life karma (*ayus*), which decides the duration of
one's life;
* clan karma (*gotra*), which determines one's status
within a species (Wiley 2011).



Finally, time is what accounts for becoming. Time is not treated with
other substances, because it has no extension. From this, it is not
considered as a substance properly speaking, only in some aspects.
Especially, its existence can only be extrapolated from our awareness
of phenomena. There is an absolute time (*kala*), which is
eternal, and a relative time (*samaya*), with a beginning and
variations, determined by the motion in things. Time is called the
destroyer, because all things are liable to dissolution of form in the
cyclic course of time.


### 2.2 An atomism



The whole physics of Jainism is an atomism. In this, Jaina conceptions
are close to those of the Nyaya-Vaisesika tradition.
An atom (*paramanu*) is infinitesimal, ultimate and
eternal. From this, it is neither created nor destroyed. Now,
contrarily to the conceptions of Nyaya-Vaisesika
philosophers, according to which God (*Isvara*) is
the one who presides over the association of these atoms and creates
the world as we experience it, Jaina philosophers hold that there is
no such entity. For them, atoms have always been there and their
association follows natural laws. Jaina philosophers are especially
critical of an attitude that does not favor ethical responsibility,
and the recognition that an external consciousness is responsible for
the state of the world risks to undermine this ethical responsibility
beyond repair. According to them, ethics especially requires that the
individual can make or unmake herself in this world. This is partly
what explains that there is a lengthy tradition of refutations by both
Jaina and Buddhist philosophers of the Naiyayika arguments in
favor of the fact that God is the sustainer of the world.



Next to this, an atom is not necessarily material. Indeed, selves are
a type of atom. Matter exists as atom or as aggregate
(*skandha*). The aggregates, produced out of a mutual
attraction of atoms, vary from binary to infinite compounds and every
perceivable object, that is to say every object endowed with a form,
is an aggregate. As such, atoms are the formless basis of all forms,
although sometimes it is said that it has form inasmuch as it can be
perceived by the omniscient ones. Furthermore, in contradistinction
with the conception of Nyaya-Vaisesika and in
agreement with Leucippus and Democritus, Jaina philosophers hold that
an atom of one type is first undifferentiated, similar to any other
atom of the same type, and then develops differentiated
characteristics so as to become an atom of earth, an atom of water,
etc. Atoms therefore acquire a kind of taste, color, smell, contact,
as well as weight, the heavier moving downwards and the lighter
upwards. An interesting characteristic of Jainism is that an atom may
develop a motion so swift that it traverses in one moment the whole
universe. This explains that some saints, who are well advanced in the
path that consists in realizing the proper nature of things, can
perform this miracle.



Finally, atoms can contract and expand. When in subtle state,
innumerable atoms occupy the space of one gross atom. Matter is an
eternal substance undetermined with regards to quantity and quality.
It is because the atoms in it can expand that matter may increase or
diminish in volume without addition or loss of particles. For a self,
which also is an atom and which has dimensions although it is not
material, this means that it is capable of expansion and contraction.
The self is actually co-extensive with the physical body it occupies.
This is what explains that we have sensations from the top of the head
to the tip of the toes. This means that the self is of a very small
size when it starts in the womb, then it expands and, at the end of
each earthly life, it contracts again into the seed of the next birth.
To explain how this works, Jaina philosophers use metaphors such as
that of a lamp: whether placed in a small pot or in a larger room, a
lamp illumines the whole space. In the same way, the self imparts
consciousness according to the dimensions of the body it occupies.
Another specificity of Jainism is the belief according to which, under
special circumstances, an embodied self can expand beyond its body, up
to the size of the universe, and act outside of it. This projection,
called "*samudghata*",
"extermination", enables her to annihilate specific karmic
matter (Pragya 2021).


### 2.3 A reasoned anthropocentrism



Jaina thinkers excel in developing lengthy and highly technical
classifications. A core classification is the taxonomy that
distinguishes the types of embodied selves according to the number of
senses they possess. This taxonomy has retained its importance for
contemporary practitioners, notably because it defines the extent of
demerit acquired when one actually harms a living being.



There, the first category gathers all the living beings possessing
only one sense, namely that of touch. This concerns either plants, or
the elemental selves which gets embodied in an atom of earth, of
water, of fire, or of air, either gross or subtle. In consequence,
there are souls also in things such as stones and metals. However, it
is not always the case that a self gets embodied in these atoms. When
there is no self in it, the atom is purely inanimate matter, unable to
suffer. In opposition to this, each plant or animal is necessarily the
host of a self, this is what makes it alive. Concerning plants, some
can also be the host of several selves, as in the case of moss. This
also concerns the most basic life form, called
"*nigoda*", "idle", and which consists
in clusters of minute beings with little hope for liberation. They can
be found everywhere, including in air, tissues of plants, or flesh of
animals. The offense must be strong for a self once embodied in a
human being to get embodied as a *nigoda*. One famous example
is that of Makkhali Gosala, leader of the heretic
Ajivika movement, who was disrespectful and challenged
Mahavira. Furthermore, if a plant dies, its self
transmigrates and gets re-embodied in another, more or less subtle,
body. In this case, the body of the plant is not alive anymore, but it
is still inhabited by the selves of the bacteria that work towards its
decomposition. To conclude on one-sensed beings, they possess the
sense of touch. This means that they cannot see, hear, smell, taste,
nor think, but they have a minimal conscious activity in the form of
the tactile experience. Besides, even in a crude not developed way,
they can already experience pleasure and pain.



Next to the one-sensed beings are all the animals. First, worms and
every being in their category, like leeches, mollusks, or a type of
phytophagous beetles, are two-sensed beings, possessing both touch and
taste. Then, ants and all the beings in their category, like
phytophagous insects, termites and millipedes, are three-sensed
beings, and are also able to smell. They are followed by the
four-sensed beings who can also see, like bees and similar beings as
flies, mosquitoes, butterflies or scorpions. Finally, human beings and
all the beings in their category, like fish, reptiles, birds,
quadrupeds, demons and gods, are five-sensed beings, enjoying touch,
taste, smell, sight, and hearing. Amongst them, some also have an
intellect (*manas*), considered by some authors as a sixth
sense.



It is interesting to note that the English expression
"animal" denotes what is animated, what has a soul. While
in Jainism, what is animated, what has a soul (*jiva*),
also includes the immobile plants and elemental beings. In this
conception, the Sanskrit expression for animal is
"*tiryanc*-", "what is able to cross a
spatial area".



It is hard to understand what is not alive in this system. Therefore,
acting in a non-harmful way is close to non-acting. In practice, while
the lay community should avoid harming the beings with two or more
senses, the monastic community is supposed to also avoid harming the
one-sensed beings. With such a norm of action, monks and nuns cannot
cook, nor perform a range of acts necessary for their survival. From
this, a system of redistribution of merit and demerit is developed for
the lay people, who perform some violent acts for their survival, but
are redeemed in providing the means to live to the monastic
community.


### 2.4 Of self and karma: which type of dualism for the Jaina philosopher



Each self is eternal and, as such, it has no beginning nor end. At the
same time, each self is constantly experiencing change, because it is
essentially active. This is a core teaching of Jainism to which we
will come back in the
 section 3.4
 on epistemology, namely, that every existing thing is at the same
time persistent and changing (Bajzelj 2013). This is one of the
doctrinal points that prompted Jaina thinkers to speak in terms of
many-sided objects of knowledge.



Now, this means that even the omniscient one who fully manifests the
qualities of consciousness still has modal variations on its
consciousness, like momentary and innately arising modes of absolute
knowledge and of absolute perception that continuously succeed to one
another being qualitatively identical, just as the innately produced
modes of time are qualitatively identical to one another (Bajzelj
2018).



Besides, this also means that contrarily to the Samkhya
view, modifications are not only in the realm of matter. Selves also
are experiencing states.



But this, in turns, entails that a change happens both at the level of
matter and at the radically distinct level of selves. A phenomenon
that helps us understand how this works in the Jaina view is the
functioning of "life karma". First, death is not an end,
but a reappraisal of the entanglement of one self with matter,
regulated by karma. The fact that the life karma decides the duration
of one's life means nothing less that when one dies, say,
because of a car accident, these external forces are only the material
cause of the death of the embodied self, while the fruition of her
life karma is the efficient cause of her death. In such a conception,
death happens as the fruit of the actions that one has herself
performed in a previous life.



Before we continue, it is worthy to note that one's acts do not
genuinely determine the moment of one's death in this life, but
in the next one. Besides, when death happens, the most recent
volitional activities have an impact. All in all, one's very
last breath can influence the specific outcome of the determination of
the life karma for one's next life. This is what explains that
the Jains seek a good death. Such a good death is a death without
strong volitions, free from fears and desires. This, in turn, is what
explains the popularity of the ritual fast to death, called
"*sallekhana*", and that has caused some legal and
cultural turmoil in recent years.



Second, since everything is already determined at the moment of death,
one's transition from death to the being in a womb or other type
of new type of life is considered instantaneous, there is no waiting
period, since everything is already decided.



To come back to our main discussion, and try to understand how
one's acts in the previous life also engender a duration
determination for this experience, a parallel with the process of
sedimentation is helpful. Take a muddy water, leave it without any
movement for a sufficient amount of time, and the different types of
substances involved in this mixture will separate, the more gross
particles being at the bottom. In this process, time differs for each
mixture, since the speed of the disentanglement depends upon the
nature of the substances involved. The same phenomenon happens with
the self and its bodies, since their type of entanglement in the
previous life mechanically has an effect on the lapse of time that the
next entanglement will last. And this has nothing to do with a
deserved punishment after some fault, nor with a deserved reward after
some good deed. This has to do with the laws of physics. In the
*Treatise on What There Is*, we can find calculations such as
this one:



> 
> * TS 8.15. Bondage to life karma lasts up to thirty-three
> ocean-measured periods (that is, 1/3 x 8,400,00 x 8,400,00
> x 107 years).
> 
> 
> 



With the sedimentation metaphor, it is still not clear why the
efficient cause of death, the exhaustion of one's life force, is
not enough, and why material factors are here also needed. This cannot
mean that Jainism is a type of occasionalism, since originated
aggregates are efficient causes in their own realm. But at least, such
a conception is only possible if one conceives the world as a rational
whole in which things make sense together, even though only the
omniscient ones can experience that.



The beginning of an answer to this question can be found in a second
tradition, next to that of the *Treatise on What There Is*.
This tradition is that of Kundakunda. "Kundakunda" is
actually not a single author, but the name that stands for the
collective authorship of a Jaina textual tradition composed in Prakrit
(Jaina Sauraseni) between the third and the eighth centuries
CE around Karnataka in the South of India (Balcerowicz 2017).
Kundakunda's textual tradition is as influent as the TS, and is
regularly revered as sacred texts in Jaina temples. This textual
tradition represents within Jainism a movement focused on the self, in
which the religious practice that matters is the inward experience
that is self-knowledge. The central teaching of Kundakunda in his
*Essence of the self* (*Samayasara* [SSa]) is
that karmic matter is never genuinely mixed with the self. Therefore,
it is close to Samkhya conceptions, while keeping the Jaina
specificity of an essentially active self (Bronkhorst 2010). There,
the self is modified by modifications of consciousness
(*adhyavasana*) and by states (*bhava*).
However, it is possible to distinguish between different types of
activities, some of them not bringing about karmic retribution. And
this is exactly Kundakunda's move when he redefines the self as
not the agent of what happens in the material world of karma. For him,
the self is active only in its own domain. Concretely, the self is the
material cause only of the modifications of consciousness, while
karmic matter is the indirect instrumental cause of wrong
modifications of it. In turn, the self is the indirect instrumental
cause of karmic modifications, but only as a king indirectly causes
the virtue in his subjects when he acts in a virtuous way and is taken
as a model.



To summarize, we have seen in the *Treatise on What There Is*
that karmic matter and the self intermingle in the same way some
liquids do, since their respective nature is not modified by this
mixture and can get separated. Indeed, in muddy water, water actually
stays water; while sedimentary dust actually stays sedimentary dust.
Then, we have seen that in the *Essence of the self*, the
association between the self and karmic matter can be though of in
terms of kings acting as models. Another metaphor is that of a
mirror-like crystal: if a flower reflected in a crystal is red, we see
the crystal as if it was red, while it is not. Likewise, the self sees
attachment and wrong notions superposed with it, not being it. All in
all, in both textual lineages, what really matters is that the
two--self and karmic matter--keep their essential distinct
natures. Besides, the world is a whole in which things are
mechanically combined together. Even though the types of substances
are radically separated, they co-exist within the same conditions and
so they experience synchronized modifications (Gorisse 2019).


### 2.5 The universe as seen by the omniscient ones



Furthermore, Jaina authors believe that the life of the universe is a
process without beginning nor end, that passes through an ongoing
series of cosmic cycles, each of which is billions of years in
duration. The question of an origin and end of the universe does not
arise, since the latter is eternal. What matters is the transition
between two types of periods. The universe goes through a series of
cycles, each of which lasts several billion years. The wheel of time
experiences one descending cycle, which passes through six periods
during which prosperity, happiness, and morality decline; and one
ascending cycle, which passes through six periods during which
prosperity, happiness, and morality increase. These periods are
characterized by the possibility--respectively the
impossibility--of individual liberation while they happen.
Indeed, on one hand, it takes a minimum of suffering to want to engage
in the path of liberation. and on the other hand, serenity must be
sufficiently accessible to be able to properly engage in ascetic
practices. On the day when Krsna left the earth, in
the third millennium BCE, after the great battle described in the
*The Great [Epic of the Dynasty] of the Bharatas*
(*Mahabharata*), we entered into the fifth descending
period of the cycle. It is therefore expected that things will go from
bad to worse in our world for a few millennia before they get better
again. This means that it is no longer possible to achieve
enlightenment in the current period, because the world order is too
unstable.



We started this entry by stating that the Jains are those who consider
that the teachings of the omniscient Jinas are the expression of the
eternal essential nature of the universe, and that the only extant
teaching is that of Mahavira "the Great Hero"
(traditional dates 599-527/510 BCE), the twenty-fourth and last
Jina of the current cosmic period. Mahavira is an older
contemporary of the Buddha and has a biography very close to that of
the latter. Notably, he left his royal family, became an ascetic and
founded a community made of mendicant ascetics and lay followers. One
notable difference being that he follows a tradition that was existing
long before him.



So, at every cosmic cycle, the doctrine is taught by 24 such
omniscient Jinas. These are also called
"*tirthankara*" (ford makers). Since
Vedic times, a *tirtha* refers to holy spots in shallow
waters, where people perform acts of devotion, especially bathing,
which is considered as purifying sins. These shallow waters can also
be a crossing place symbolizing the junction between mundane world and
sacred realm. In this line, a *tirthankara* is a
spiritual pioneer able to cross beyond the perpetual flow of earthly
life and, as such, he or she (they do not have a sexual identity at
this stage) acts as a model mediating the passage between a mundane
state of our selves and a state of unobstructed consciousness in act.
It is important to notice that these liberated beings know all, but
are by essence unable to influence the course of action of the world,
since they do not have intentions and that they are radically isolated
from anything else.



Besides, after Mahavira's liberation, liberation is
not possible anymore in our realm for cosmic reasons. However, there
are other realms, in which gods and demons notably live. Jainas have
developed a complex model of the universe (Dundas 2005). Canonical
literature (3rd century BCE--6th century
CE) already includes description of the universe, but it is between
the 3rd and the 13th centuries CE that
specialized texts specifically dedicated to cosmography are composed,
amongst them, the influential *Compendium of Middle Earth*
(*Jambudvipasamgrahani* [JDS]) of
Haribhadra Suri (770 CE). There, the universe is described as
being constituted of two parts. On one hand, the world
(*loka*), extremely vast, but finite, is occupied by living
beings and by things; on the other hand, the rest (*aloka*)
surrounds the world with its infinite and empty space.



The inhabited world is made of a succession of island-continents,
oceans, hells and paradises. It measures the distance traveled by a
god who flies for six months at a speed of sixteen million kilometers
per second. In this world, human beings live only in Middle-earth,
also called the Island-Continent of the Rose Apple Tree
(*Jambudvipa*). Middle Earth is, as its name
suggests, central. Its surface is extremely small compared to the rest
of the world. The different parts of the universe are defined in
relation to the possibility--respectively the
impossibility--of liberation therein and the region of Middle
Earth is the only region from which it is possible to achieve
liberation. Such a representation is conducive to remember the rare
and central character of human birth, which alone can lead to
liberation. Moreover, the extent and complexity of the whole is a
constant reminder of the skills of the omniscient Jinas who were able
to teach such a system.



Around the 16th c., the world is presented in the form of a
human being, thus emphasizing the similarities between the structure
of the world and the inner struggle faced by each individual.
Moreover, the extremely detailed depiction of the world provides a
backdrop, both for the initiation tales of pious Jains found in
narrative literature, and for meditative practices, some of which
involve the contemplation of a holy object. Ultimately, the precision
with which the authors describe the world allowed Jainism to stand out
more clearly from other worldviews. Indeed, only the values of Jainism
prevail in these descriptions of the universe. In this sense, the
universe thus represented becomes an emblem of religious identity, as
well as a guide to religious practice, because, above all else, the
Jaina world is the abode of beings on the path of liberation (Dundas
2005).


## 3. Epistemology


### 3.1 The main types of knowledge



It is now clear that Jaina philosophy is essentially directed at the
individual effort of distinguishing the self and non-self stuff, until
one reaches liberation. Besides, the self is traditionally defined as
experience of consciousness, which consists in cognition
(*jnana*) and indeterminate perception
(*darsana*). This will bring epistemological
considerations at the core of Jaina philosophical investigations.
First, there are many classifications of the different types of
knowledge recognized by Jaina philosophers. The *Treatise of What
There Is* attempts at collecting and organizing the types of
knowledge mentioned in earlier literature into four types of
indeterminate perception, whose study is not developed; and eight
types of cognition, namely ordinary cognition of the senses,
testimonial cognition, mental cognition, cosmic cognition, absolute
cognition, and their faulty counterparts, namely wrong ordinary
cognition of the senses, wrong testimonial cognition and wrong mental
cognition (Shastri 1990; Balcerowicz 2017; den Boer 2020).



A few remarks are in order. First, the distinction between cognition
and indeterminate perception is inherited from older canonical sources
and is discarded by most epistemologists after the seminal work of
Siddhasena Mahamati (710-780 CE), who indicates in his
*Guide of Logic* (*Nyayavatara* [NA])
that indeterminate perception collapses with cognition when perceptual
experience already retains some details. However, it gave the
opportunity for Jaina philosophers to assimilate a distinction that
was especially important for Buddhist philosophers between conceptual
and non-conceptual cognition.



Second, Jaina philosophers were influenced by the Nyaya
classification, which was the cornerstone of all the South Asian
epistemological edifice, and that recognizes five means of knowledge
(*pramana*), namely perception, inference, testimony
and analogy. Jainas assimilated this model by admitting these means of
knowledge either as subtypes of ordinary cognition, or as testimonial
cognition.



Third, whatever enters our cognitive apparatus is a result of a
contact with what exists. The senses, which include the mind, are an
intermediary between our self and the object of knowledge, but the
self can also know the object of knowledge directly. Mental, cosmic
and absolute cognitions are such direct types of knowledge, while
ordinary cognition and testimonial cognition are mediated ones. For
Jainas, direct knowledge of the soul is called
"*pratyaksa*" (directly present to the soul);
while in other systems, "*pratyaksa*"
(present before the eyes) is what stands for everyday life perception,
therefore mediated by the organs of senses. This leads to competitive
classifications by Jaina authors in their attempts at being understood
by their non-Jaina interlocutors (Clavel 2015).



Fourth, the material cause of cognitive error is wrong perception
(*mithyadarsana*), which is due to knowledge
obstructing karma. Therefore, error can only affect types of cognition
of selves who are still entangled with this type of karma. Conversely,
error cannot affect cosmic and absolute cognition, which can be
experienced only when all one's knowledge obscuring karma has
been removed.


### 3.2 Authoritative teaching



In this conception in which human beings are in principle able to
experience up to absolute cognition, it becomes possible even for
someone who is not yet liberated to have a share in this, by relying
on the teaching of liberated beings. Such a possibility is especially
valuable, since knowing the phenomena unknowable by ordinary
cognition, like the nature of the self, what happens after death, or
the primary cause and final end of the world, is essential inasmuch as
it conditions one's spiritual progress towards the realization
of a proper human life. In this dynamic, Jaina philosophers consider
that a discourse is authoritative if it is uttered by such a liberated
teacher, who is called "the one who has achieved, who is apt,
reliable" (*apta*).



First, Jaina philosophers are here not concerned with everyday life
testimony, but with soteriological testimony.



Second, with this definition of an authoritative discourse, they are
opposing the conceptions of the exegetes of the Veda, who consider
that an authoritative discourse is by definition non-human, whatever
one's spiritual advancement, since the universal validity of a
corpus can only come from the power of language itself.



Third, we said that liberated beings were absolutely isolated not
interacting life-monads. However, one reaches a state of experience of
absolute cognition before reaching liberation. More precisely, when
all knowledge obscuring karmas are removed, one still has to wait for
a long time for non-harming karmas to also be exhausted. This is
within this laps of time that the teaching of the Jinas happens.



Fourth, direct disciples of the liberated beings also experience extra
mundane types of cognition, although lesser ones. This make them the
perfect medium to interpret the sacred teaching and transmit it to us.
In such a way that "correct interpretation depends upon a
teacher-pupil lineage or upon one"s own seniority and
wisdom' (Jyvasjarvi 2010). Indeed, an advanced monk is
by definition both more knowledgeable and less deceptive (Flugel
2010 [2016]). The fact that one can access soteriological relevant
knowledge thanks to monks who are living members of a lineage of
interpretation is in part what explains the importance of theories of
interpretation in Jaina philosophy, as well as the fact that the
commentaries are regularly more important than the canon itself.



In the *Manual for the behavior of laymen which is casket of
jewel*
(*Ratna-karanda-sravakacara*
[RKSA]), Samantabhadra (530-590 CE) characterizes the
authoritative teacher in the following way:



> 
> * RKSA 1.6. This one is called the reliable one who has no
> hunger, thirst, old age, affliction (of body and of mind), birth,
> death, fear, pride, attachment, aversion, delusion.
> 
> 
> 



The fact that the authoritative speaker is presented as a God-like
entity who has moral aptitudes before he has intellectual ones, since,
as we have seen, this is a step to reach unobstructed, absolute,
knowledge, has a series of consequences on Jaina epistemology (Gorisse
2022a). Especially, since these liberated beings have no intention, an
authoritative teacher who gives instructions does good to the people
without being motivated by passions. He acts for the benefit of
humanity on account of his very nature, like a drum giving out sound
at the touch of a beater does not want anything for itself:



> 
> * RKSA 1.8. Un-egoistically and dispassionately a teacher
> instructs from truth what is suitable. What (else) does a
> *muraja*-drum require to sound but the touch of a skillful
> hand?
> 
> 
> 



One consequence is that in Jainism, testimonial cognition can be
considered as a proper means of knowledge, because knowledge acquired
thanks to the teaching of an authoritative person is proper knowledge
of what exists *as it is*, and not knowledge of what exists
*as intended*. Now, this holds only if he authoritative speaker
belongs to the very specific category of speakers that we have seen.
This has the consequence that what is recognized as an authoritative
discourse are the Jaina sacred Scriptures and their commentaries.



Finally, we should keep in mind that this is consistently within an
apologetic objective to defend one's own scriptural tradition
(Qvarnstrom 2006) and to attack the one of others that the
different philosophico-traditions of India aimed to rationally justify
a given set of claims and that they developed their logical frameworks
in the form of what can rightfully be called a "systematic
philosophy", as we will investigate in the next paragraph. One
issue in which the co-existence of a more systematic and a more
dogmatic approach is manifest is the shift that happened with notably
the Buddhist Dharmakirti (550-610) in his
*Considerations on knowledge*
(*Pramanavarttika* [PV]), when a transition was
made from external criteria for the reliability of a discourse, like
the existence of an authoritative utterer; to internal criteria, like
soundness of the assertions themselves, or ability of the proponent to
show a proof for these assertions. The Jaina tradition experiences
this shift especially with the author Samantabhadra in his
*Investigation on Authority*
(*Apta-mimamsa* [AMi])
(Balcerowicz 2016a).


### 3.3 Inferential reasoning and the debating hall



A type of cognition that has a particular importance in South Asian
philosophy is that of inference (*anumana*). Inference is
the type of cognition through which epistemic agents acquire new
knowledge by means of reasoning upon what can be concluded with
certainty from previously acquired knowledge. This is what is
expressed by the Sanskrit expression
"*anumana*", "the knowledge that follows
[another knowledge]". For example, when Devadatta wants to buy
mangos, he wants to know which ones taste juicy before he buys them.
At this point, he is not yet allowed to taste them, but he can reason
based upon the color of the mangos and upon his past experience of a
given color being associated with a given taste. In such a situation,
the regularity of Devadatta's past experience is not a
coincidence, the co-presence of the property of having a given taste
with the property of having a given color is guaranteed by the fact
that both occurrences rely on the same causal complex, namely, a given
stage of ripeness of the fruit at stake. This type of reasoning based
on a necessary relationship between two properties is what is called
"inference". In technical terms, there is a transmission
of certainty from the established knowledge that an
"evidence-property" (*hetu*) is ascribed to a given
object, to the new knowledge that a "target-property"
(*sadhya*) is ascribed to the same object. This
transmission of certainty is based on the "invariable
concomitance" (*vyapti*) between the two inferential
properties. *Vyapti* originally means
"pervasion" and is used in this technical sense, because
the pervasion of a property by another property, as in "whenever
there is a Sissoo tree, there is a tree", is the model for
situations of necessary co-presence of the evidence-property with the
target-property.



Inference has been thoroughly studied and its use strictly codified by
the different philosophico-religious traditions of South Asia, Jainism
included, because it provides the structure of scientific reasoning.
Indeed, the conclusion of an inferential reasoning is considered as a
scientific truth inasmuch as this type of reasoning relies on the
emancipation from contextual parameters and on the guarantee that the
isolated relations are necessary ones.



In concert, inferential reasoning has a strong argumentative
potential. To explain, by means of stating an inferential reasoning,
it is possible to bring somebody else to the awareness of these
truths. Such a series of statements, even though it is not properly
speaking a type of cognition by itself, is metaphorically called
"inference for others"
(*pararthanumana*), in opposition to the
"inference for oneself"
(*svarthanumana*), which is a genuine type of
cognition. An inference for others is traditionally used in a
philosophical debate in order to convince an interlocutor of a
different faith who has different beliefs concerning what there is. In
Jainism, there is an abundant literature of stories of conversion as
the outcome of such debates, as well as the development of debating
techniques to support one's inferential reasoning (Gorisse
2018). Furthermore, the different traditions share the belief that
from this truth-preserving argument, it is possible to define the
standards of an ideally organized rational discussion, the outcomes of
which are necessary true statements, and in the course of time, these
philosophers developed a common inter-doctrinal framework of
argumentation for philosophical discussions (Gorisse 2017).



From these observations, it comes as no surprise that the study of the
rules to attack and defend the statement of an inference constitutes
an important part of the logical investigations in Jainism. It also
comes as no surprise that these considerations developed in close
relationship with the logical investigations led by the other
traditions of classical Indian philosophy. More precisely, Jaina
authors routinely reference the *Treatise on Logic*
(*Nyayasutra* [NS]), the epistemological treatise of
the Naiyayika tradition, composed by Gautama in the second
century CE, which is the pan Indian inter-doctrinal reference work for
the characterization of inference. Next to this, later Jaina authors
consistently engaged in discussions with the Buddhists, in particular
with Dignaga and Dharmakirti, in the context of developing
their theories of inference. The deep influence of
Dharmakirti's epistemology and theories of argumentation on
Jain philosophers can for example be seen in Vidyanandin's
reuse of some of the latter's arguments in his *Investigation
into the True Teaching*
(*Satyasasanapariksa* [SSP])
(Trikha 2017).



The more systematic analysis of inference in Jainism begins with the
Svetambara philosopher Siddhasena Mahamati and his
younger Digambara contemporary Akalanka Bhatta
(720-780), author of the *Royal Commentary [to the Treatise
on What there is]* (*Rajavarttika* [RV])
(Balcerowicz 2016b; Shah 1967), and develops through a continued line
of commentaries until authors like Vadi Devasuri (1143 CE)
in his *Commentary on the explanation of the nature of modes of
knowledge and perspectives*
(*Pramananayatattvalokalamkara*
[PNT]) and later authors like Yasovijaya (1638-1688 CE) and
his *Manual of Jain Logic*
(*Jainatarkabhasa* [JTBh]) (Ganeri 2008). One
of the main inter-doctrinal line of discussions and controversies in
this conceptual framework is to bring the probative inferential
argument to its minimal form by reducing the number of necessary
statements. In these attempts, Jaina philosophers are traditionally
considered as the ones to go the furthest. More precisely, the
*Treatise on Logic* and its *Commentary to the Treatise on
Logic* (*Nyayasutra**bhasya*,
NSBh) by Vatsyayana (450-500 CE) had brought an old
model with explicit psychological conditions like doubt and desire to
know, to a model linked only with the structure of the argument.
There, the only good way to express a truth-preserving argument
consists of a group of five statements expressing the thesis, the
evidence, the account, the application and the conclusion in the
inference. Jaina authors acknowledge this model and use Naiyayika
traditional examples, like:



> 
> * [Thesis] Sound is impermanent,
> * [Evidence] Because it is a product.
> * [Account] Whatever is such is alike, like a pot.
> * [Application] And this is a product.
> * [Conclusion] Therefore it is impermanent.
> 
> 
> 



But for Jaina authors, only pedagogical reasons can motivate a
philosopher to fully state an argument in this way. To explain, only
the first two statements are necessary steps to ensure the adhesion of
the interlocutor. In his *Guide of logic*, Siddhasena makes it
clear, first, that the evidence is the central cog of the inferential
reasoning; second, that the statement of the thesis is also
indispensable, as it indicates the goal of the inference. Its absence
would be like observing an archer without knowing what his target is,
that is to say without the possibility to know whether he is skillful
or not.



A second major line of inter-doctrinal discussions and controversies
in this conceptual framework is to aim towards a theory of the proper
relationship between the target-property and the evidence-property. A
first attempt to distinguish between arbitrary and necessary
relationships is offered by the Buddhist Dignaga (480-540
CE), according to which the evidence-property is necessarily
concomitant with the target-property if and only if it is possible to
prove that the evidence-property is present in the case under
consideration, in similar cases and in no dissimilar cases. In our
example, it means that the property "being a product" has
to be present in impermanent things like sound and pots, and absent in
permanent things like the self. Jaina authors show that the three
conditions of Dignaga are neither necessary, nor sufficient, and
that what ultimately counts is that the evidence-property cannot be
thought of otherwise than in the presence of the target-property. To
explain, the only ultimately relevant criteria for the correctness of
an inference is that its evidence-property is known as being
"impossible otherwise" (*anyathanupapatti*)
than in the presence of the target-property. One specificity of the
Jaina tradition is to consider that this necessary concomitance
between the inferential properties is known thanks to another type of
cognition, "*tarka*" (here, not used in its
traditional technical sense of "suppositional reasoning"),
which functions as a direct discernment of universals. More precisely,
it is clear that necessary concomitance cannot be known by customary
perception, since perception deals only with particulars, and that
even the biggest list of particular instances would not suffice to
reach certainty. Yet, we can realize that if something with certain
properties exists, something else with certain properties must also
exist. It is not the same type of realization as the inferential one,
since it is linked with the Jaina epistemological theory of
particular-in-universal, according to which an object is a complex
having both an existent universal aspect and an existent particular
aspect (see next section on many-sidedness). Therefore, in the same
situation in which one grasps a particular Sissoo, one can also grasp
the common properties shared by all Sissoos.


### 3.4 Realism and many-sidedness


#### 3.4.1 On making distinctions



This complexity of the object of knowledge in Jaina philosophy has a
deeply ramified history. At the time of Mahavira around the
fifth-sixth centuries BCE, a practice was observed in the
numerous movements of wandering mendicants: instead of answering
philosophical questions in a one-sided way, the teacher was analyzing
(*vibhajya*) them, showing their different presuppositions and
possible meanings. Probably inherited from exegetical practices of
interpretation of sacred texts, which dominantly consisted in
analyzing the many perspectives that one could have on a single
sentence. In Jainism, one of the most famous examples of this practice
is to be found in the *Venerable Exposition of teaching*
(*Bhagavatisutra*, or
*Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra* [Viy.]; old parts
5th-2th centuries BCE, new 2nd
century BCE to 1st century CE), in which the disciple
Indrabhuti Gautama asks to the monk Jamali:



> 
> 
> > 
> > 
> > Is the "*loka*" (here meaning both
> > "world" and "self") eternal or is it,
> > Jamali, non-eternal?
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 
> 
> Being asked in this manner, Jamali was doubtful and wanted to
> know, but was overwhelmed with confusion. He was unable to speak in
> reply and remained silent. When Jamali was confused,
> Bhagavan Mahavira addressed him as follows:
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> > 
> > The world is, Jamali, eternal [...] it was, it is and it
> > will be [...].
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > The world is, Jamali, non-eternal. For it becomes progressive
> > after being regressive. And it becomes regressive after being
> > progressive.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > The soul is, Jamali, eternal. For it did not cease to exist at
> > any time.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > The soul is, Jamali, non-eternal. For it becomes animal after
> > being a hellish creature, becomes a man after becoming an animal and
> > it becomes a god after being a man.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 
> 



So in this example, the Jaina teacher insists on the fact that:


* with respect to its substance, the self is eternal, like atoms
are.
* but with respect to its modes, the self is non-eternal, like
combinations of atoms.



Here, Mahavira does not make contradictory predications, but
he refutes extremes views, which are considered as wrong, by making
explicit the parameters of the different predications. It is
interesting to notice that at the same period, the Buddha, who also
uses distinctions of the sort in his speech, is known to refuse to
answer questions of the sort (Matilal 1981).


#### 3.4.2 From the paradoxes of causation to accounting for change and persistence



Now, this way of making distinctions in predication should be thought
of in close connection with considerations about causation. Indeed,
the Jaina teacher also insists on the fact that one can give a proper
account of a causal process only when one acknowledges both
persistence and change.



To explain, it is not so obvious that we are legitimate in considering
ourselves as being the same individual in time, since after all, the
cells in our body are continuously replaced, none of the cells that
currently constitute me will exist in seven years, each will have been
renewed. Conversely, how are we to account for change? Any mechanical
explanation of it fails, like Zeno's arrow that has to travel
half the way before it meets its target, but before it meets the half,
it has to travel half the half, and before that, half of the half of
the half, and so, *ad infinitum*, without being able to even
start the movement. There is a problem with our way of accounting for
change. Noticing this state of affair, South Asian philosophers
engaged in raging debates around the paradoxes of causality at the
turn of the CE. In a nutshell, if someone says "the potter makes
the pot", there are several types of possible stance on
this:


* one can say that the effect "pot" already exists prior
to the fruition of its immediate cause;
* one can say that it does not, hence the relevance of the causation
process;
* some that it is neither existent, nor non-existent before the
causation process;
* and one can also say that it both exists and does not exist prior
to that.



While philosophers from different lineages have been variously
depicted as holding one or the other of these alternatives, Jainas are
consistently depicted as holding the last one and it is regularly
considered as a Jaina specificity to hold that something both exists
and does not exist prior to the causation process. But of course,
Jains are far from being the only ones to claim so. Besides, they
claim more precisely that what exists is at once originating, decaying
and persisting in an essential and simultaneous way:



> 
> * TS 5.29. Existence is endowed with production, decay and
> duration.
> 
> 
> 



Indeed, any existing entity is both made of permanent atoms, sometimes
including a permanent self; and partaking to the manifold and changing
world we experience (Soni 1991). Here, while it is produced:


* the pot is already existent with respect to its substance
(*dravya*), the clay;
* yet formerly non-existent with respect to its particular modes
(*paryaya*; *guna*): shape, function,
etc.



Jaina philosophers insist on the fact that none of these aspects is
more important than the other one. This means that substance and mode
co-exist not *in*, but *as* a single discrete entity in
Jainism. This single discrete entity is called a many-sided object of
knowledge (*prameya*, *vastu*). This is the famous
doctrine of the many-sidedness of things
(*anekantavada*). It notably goes against the
Vaisesika conception, according to which qualities, like
"being ochre", exist independently of substances like
"pots", and are linked with them thanks to a relation of
inherence. It also goes against the Buddhist conception, according to
which only what is a non-complex unity is real (Gorisse 2022b). By the
way, Jainas are realist philosophers who consider that human beings
know a world that exists in its particularity independently of their
knowledge of it, in such a way that the fact that our assertions can
be specified following many perspectives can only come from the fact
that the known object itself has many aspects.


#### 3.4.3 Existence, non-existence, and the modes of predication



Now, this conception led Jaina thinkers to claim that what surrounds
us is at the same time existent and non-existent. Because, this
complex object is existent as permanent with respect to its substance,
yet non-existent as permanent with respect to its states. The Jaina
author who spends the most time on elucidating in which sense
existence and non-existence can be predicated to an object is probably
Haribhadrasuri in his *Victory banner of the theory of
non-one-sidedness* (*Anekantajayapataka*
[AJP]) (Mundra 2022; Van Den Bossche 1995). Now, Jainas are known to
go further and to introduce not two, but seven modes of predication.
Haribhadra is deeply influenced by the *Investigation on
Authority* (*Aptamimamsa*
[Ami]) of Samantabhadra, which is amongst the first to teach
that:



> 
> * Ami 14. An entity is somehow possessed of the character
> "being", somehow possessed of the character
> "non-being", somehow possessed of both, and somehow
> indescribable--all these four features characterizing it in
> accordance with the speaker's intention and not in an absolute
> fashion.
> * Ami 15. Certainly, who will not allow that an entity is
> possessed of the character "being" so far as its own form
> etc. are concerned; while it is possessed of the character
> "non-being" so far as opposite is the case? For if that be
> not so, this entity will not be viewed as having a fixed nature of its
> own.
> 
> 
> 



This means that existence is a property of something, inasmuch as this
thing exists in relation to the substance, locus, time and state that
are its own. In this dynamic, existence is identity with oneself.
While non-existence is difference, and accounts for change. We need to
recognize the non-existence of the thing in relation with forms, etc.
which are alien to it. As such, the not-being blue is part of the
essence of the red pot. Only thanks to this can the thing have that
particular essence, because something is what it is *as opposed
to* what it is not. This is close to the
Mimamsa doctrine of identity in difference
(*bhedabheda*) (Uno 1997). Now, when we act in our every
day life, our decisions involve objects more complex than that, i.e.,
objects which are existent with respect to some parameters and
non-existent with respect to other parameters. Besides, also
inexpressibility is somehow a property of the thing, in the sense that
sometimes, existence and non-existence are considered simultaneously,
and that this is impossible to express. In my everyday life, I act
being surrounded by things which are all this, this is why existence,
non-existence and inexpressible combine into not two, but seven modes
of predication, namely, I can say that something exist; does not
exist; exist and does not exists; is inexpressible; exist and is
inexpressible; does not exist and is inexpressible; or exist, does not
exist and is inexpressible.


#### 3.4.4 The doctrine of perspectives



Trying to make sense of the fact that a substance is at the same time
persistent and subject to modification within a single coherent
metaphysical system is the old problem of the articulation of the one
and the many. The solution that Jaina philosophers brought to this
issue with all these doctrines linked with many-sidedness, is probably
their major contribution to philosophy (Radhakrishnan 1923;
Padmarajiah 1963; Shah 2000; Barbato 2018). The last doctrine which
will retain our attention here is the doctrine of perspectives
(*nayavada*). From Siddhasena Mahamati,
Akalanka, and their respective lineage of commentaries, see
especially Siddharsigani's *Commentary to the
Guide of Logic* (*Nyayavataravivrtti*
[NAv], 900 CE) and Prabhacandra's *Sun [that opens] the
lotus of the knowable*
(*Prameyakamalamartanda* [PKM],
980-1065 CE), the doctrine of perspective is a technical
apparatus that deals with our ways to know something, like a
meta-epistemology. It provides an exhaustive classification of the
main epistemic perspectives through which one can consider the
essentially complex knowable from the most inclusive to the most
particular perspective. Indeed, human epistemic faculties are such
that they subsume diversity under unity, otherwise nothing would be
intelligible nor communicable, and that from this, the fundamental
complexity of the object of knowledge is resolved. Now, there are
different ways to subsume diversity under unity or, to say it
differently, different types of epistemic attention and different
contexts of assertion. And the doctrine of perspective enables to
specify the main favored types of attention that are active during the
performance of a knowledge statement.



Building on this, Jaina philosophers came to explain the resisting
divergences between the different philosophical systems as resulting
from an initial choice of an epistemic perspective. In this dynamic,
they classify the historical philosophical systems with which they
interact as developed not within a perspective, but within the
erroneous radicalization of a perspective, because each tradition
depicted focuses on a given aspect of the knowable, since each also
refutes other unaddressed aspects. This will get clearer if we
introduce each perspective:


1. The first type of perspective, called the
"comprehensive" (*naigama*), is close to the Jaina
position. It is the attitude of the knowing subjects who focus on both
unity and difference, but not at the same time. The
Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers are representatives of its
erroneous developments, because they consider that what exists, the
reality robust to philosophical investigations, is either a substance
or a property. They excel in identifying the fundamental differences
between the types of objects of knowledge, but they fail to understand
that it is the very same object that is grasped under it substantial
or its modal aspect.
2. The second type of perspective, called the
"synthesizing" (*samgraha*) is the attitude
of the knowing subjects who focus on unity, either unity of all things
that exist, or unity of all things which are a given type of
substance. For Jaina philosophers, Advaita-vedanta and
Samkhya thinkers are representatives of its erroneous
developments, as they consider that the only robust reality is a
single permanent reality that includes everything. Hence, they excel
in identifying the imperceptible connections and the homogeneity
underlying the diversity of objects of knowledge, but they fail to
also understand the fundamental differences between them.
3. In contrast to this epistemic attitude, the third type of
perspective, called the "empirical", on worldly
transactions (*vyavahara*), is that of the knowing
subjects who focus on difference. Carvaka thinkers are
representatives of its erroneous developments, because they consider
that the robust reality is the one that human beings encounter every
day and that is useful to them. As such, they excel at identifying
modes and epistemic constructs active in the formulation of theses
that rely on more than just sense faculties, but they fail to see that
also metaphysical theses are relevant and that what we call
"substance", like selves, exists and are not entirely
similar with the modes that we encounter in every day life.
4. Besides, the fourth type of perspective, the "actual",
on what is directly present to the senses
(*rjusutra*) is the stance of the knowing subjects
who focus on what is present in front of us at the moment, that is to
say on difference that is currently manifested. Buddhist thinkers are
representatives of its erroneous developments, because they consider
that only what is grasped in experience exists, nothing beyond, and
that the only robust reality is an extremely transient and particular
reality. They therefore excel in identifying the epistemic
constructions active when operations of synthesis are performed on
objects of knowledge, but they fail to understand also the elements of
fundamental permanence that exist in them.
5. The three last perspectives are those of the knowing subjects who
focus on the word. Grammarians are representatives of their erroneous
developments, because they consider that the robust reality is the
linguistic element that expresses the world. They excel at identifying
the semantic distinctions relevant to denote a given referent. But
while they do so, they fail to also understand that only a plurality
of frames of reference could enable to cover the integrality of
referential situations that one might experience. The fifth type of
perspective, the "semantic" (*sabda*), deals
more precisely with grammatical rules. It is the perspective of the
knowing subjects who focus on the word as expressing difference based
on grammatical categories.
6. While the sixth, "etymological"
(*samabhirudha*) is concerned with difference based
on etymology.
7. And the seventh, the "actual etymological"
(*evambhuta*), with difference based on etymology
that is currently manifested.



In his *Establishment of all objects*
(*Sarvarthasiddhi* [SAS]), Pujyapada
(540-600 CE) explains that like a piece of cloth fulfils a
purpose only if its different threads are woven; in the same way, the
different perspectives fulfil a purpose only if they work together,
and that isolated, they do not convey even a little faith. The
doctrine of perspectives seems to be the Jaina reaction to
philosophical and religious pluralism in classical India. To explain,
there exist resisting divergences concerning the nature of the
ultimate constituent of the world, the ways in which they interact,
their origin; the position of human beings in all this and the
conception of the way in which we should act. No strictly regulated
philosophical debate has been able to overcome these differences.
Jaina thinkers are likewise not trying to flatten these irreducible
views within a single conception. Rather, they show how each could
contribute to the whole picture.


## Conclusion



To conclude, philosophy within Jainism is mainly the means to come to
know the categories that are the selves and karmic matter, which are
especially relevant for our liberation. Many tools help us within this
effort:


* the Scriptures--the teaching of beings experiencing absolute
knowledge--which, in turn, can be fully understood only by beings
with a similar mind. Here, the more advanced on the path, the more
senior the member of the monastic community, the better her
understanding. This explains the huge number of hermeneutics
techniques come from this faith in the Scriptures, which are
considered by some Jains as scientific treatises.
* our faculties of knowledge like perception, inference and the art
of debate, up to a range of super-natural faculties of knowledge. Here
too, a knowledge claim is to be analyzed through different types of
perspectives.
* an openness to this higher order of being within ourselves,
notably through meditation.