## CryptoDB

### Jian Weng

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2020
ASIACRYPT
We propose a generic construction of 2-pass authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme with explicit authentication from key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and signature (SIG) schemes. We improve the security model due to Gjosteen and Jager [Crypto2018] to a stronger one. In the strong model, if a replayed message is accepted by some user, the authentication of AKE is broken. We define a new security notion named ''IND-mCPA with adaptive reveals'' for KEM. When the underlying KEM has such a security and SIG has unforgeability with adaptive corruptions, our construction of AKE equipped with counters as states is secure in the strong model, and stateless AKE without counter is secure in the traditional model. We also present a KEM possessing tight ''IND-mCPA security with adaptive reveals'' from the Computation Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. When the generic construction of AKE is instantiated with the KEM and the available SIG by Gjosteen and Jager [Crypto2018], we obtain the first practical 2-pass AKE with tight security and explicit authentication. In addition, the integration of the tightly IND-mCCA secure KEM (derived from PKE by Han et al. [Crypto2019]) and the tightly secure SIG by Bader et al. [TCC2015] results in the first tightly secure 2-pass AKE with explicit authentication in the standard model.
2019
ASIACRYPT
The Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem has recently found many cryptographic applications such as authentication protocols, pseudorandom generators/functions and even asymmetric tasks including public-key encryption (PKE) schemes and oblivious transfer (OT) protocols. It however remains a long-standing open problem whether LPN implies collision resistant hash (CRH) functions. Inspired by the recent work of Applebaum et al. (ITCS 2017), we introduce a general construction of CRH from LPN for various parameter choices. We show that, just to mention a few notable ones, under any of the following hardness assumptions (for the two most common variants of LPN) 1.constant-noise LPN is $2^{n^{0.5+\varepsilon }}$-hard for any constant $\varepsilon >0$;2.constant-noise LPN is $2^{\varOmega (n/\log n)}$-hard given $q=\mathsf {poly}(n)$ samples;3.low-noise LPN (of noise rate $1/\sqrt{n}$) is $2^{\varOmega (\sqrt{n}/\log n)}$-hard given $q=\mathsf {poly}(n)$ samples. there exists CRH functions with constant (or even poly-logarithmic) shrinkage, which can be implemented using polynomial-size depth-3 circuits with NOT, (unbounded fan-in) AND and XOR gates. Our technical route LPN $\rightarrow$ bSVP $\rightarrow$ CRH is reminiscent of the known reductions for the large-modulus analogue, i.e., LWE $\rightarrow$ SIS $\rightarrow$ CRH, where the binary Shortest Vector Problem (bSVP) was recently introduced by Applebaum et al. (ITCS 2017) that enables CRH in a similar manner to Ajtai’s CRH functions based on the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem.Furthermore, under additional (arguably minimal) idealized assumptions such as small-domain random functions or random permutations (that trivially imply collision resistance), we still salvage a simple and elegant collision-resistance-preserving domain extender combining the best of the two worlds, namely, maximized (depth one) parallelizability and polynomial shrinkage. In particular, assume $2^{n^{0.5+\varepsilon }}$-hard constant-noise LPN or $2^{n^{0.25+\varepsilon }}$-hard low-noise LPN, we obtain a collision resistant hash function that evaluates in parallel only a single layer of small-domain random functions (or random permutations) and shrinks polynomially.
2017
PKC
2016
PKC
2015
EPRINT
2015
TCC
2015
CRYPTO
2014
EUROCRYPT
2014
EPRINT
2013
ASIACRYPT
2011
PKC
2010
EPRINT
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss in Eurocrypt'98, allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an encryption of the same message intended for Bob. PRE has recently drawn great interest, and many interesting PRE schemes have been proposed. However, up to now, it is still an important question to come up with a chosen-ciphertext secure unidirectional PRE in the adaptive corruption model. To address this problem, we propose a new unidirectional PRE scheme, and prove its chosen-ciphertext security in the adaptive corruption model without random oracles. Compared with the best known unidirectional PRE scheme proposed by Libert and Vergnaud in PKC'08, our schemes enjoys the advantages of both higher efficiency and stronger security.
2010
EPRINT
In PKC 2010, Matsuda, Nishimaki and Tanaka proposed a bidirectional proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme without bilinear maps, and claimed that their scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure in the standard model. However, by giving a concrete attack, in this paper we indicate that their PRE scheme fails to achieve the chosen-ciphertext security. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the fact that, it is still an open problem to come up with a chosen-ciphertext secure PRE scheme without bilinear maps in the standard model.
2010
EPRINT
In a proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme, a semi-trusted proxy can transform a ciphertext under Alice's public key into another ciphertext that Bob can decrypt. However, the proxy cannot access the plaintext. Due to its transformation property, PRE can be used in many applications, such as encrypted email forwarding. All the existing CCA-secure PRE schemes have a crucial property: the public verifiability of the original ciphertext, i.e., everyone can check the validity of the original ciphertext. In this paper, we propose a novel CCA-secure PRE scheme without public verifiability. This proposal is proven-secure based on the DDH assumption in the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first CCA-secure unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings in the standard model, which answers an open problem in the PRE field.
2007
EPRINT
This paper presents two fast digital signature schemes based on Diffie-Hellman assumptions. In the random oracle model, the first scheme S1 has a tight security reduction to the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem; and the second scheme S2 has a tight security reduction to the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. Comparing with existing signature schemes (whose security is tightly related to CDH problem) like EDL signature schemes, the signature generation of S1 is about 27% faster, and the verification is about 35% faster, if without considering the hash function evaluations. Comparing with existing signature schemes (whose security is tightly related to DDH problem) like KW-DDH signature scheme, the signing of S2 is about 40% faster and the verification is about 35% faster. The high efficiency of the proposed schemes is attributed to a new protocol EDL_mwz which implements the proof of equality of discrete logarithm. The EDL_mwz protocol outperforms its counterpart, the Chaum and Pedersen protocol, as its computation is about 38% faster and its bandwidth is |G| bits shorter. This new protocol may be of independent interests.
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