When the Space Shuttle Columbia crashed, the investigating board declared it was as much the result of human failure as of falling foam. As the shuttle program resumes under new NASA chief Michel Griffin, it faces more changes ahead.
ROBERT SIEGEL, host: This is ALL THINGS CONSIDERED from NPR News.  I'm Robert Siegel.</s>MICHELE NORRIS, host: And I'm Michele Norris.</s>MICHELE NORRIS, host: NASA now says the earliest possible launch time for the space shuttle      Discovery is late next week.  The shuttle was due to blast off two days      ago, but a faulty hydrogen fuel sensor forced NASA to cancel that launch      two hours before liftoff.  This is the first shuttle mission since the      2003 Columbia disaster, and no one wants to take chances.  The Discovery      has undergone a series of technical fixes, but the accident investigation      board noted that the underlying causes of the Columbia accident were      cultural and organizational. NASA, it said, was overconfident, under      pressure, and concerns weren't always heard.  Over the last two and a      half years, NASA has tried to change.  It's unclear how much has really      improved.  NPR's David Kestenbaum reports.</s>DAVID KESTENBAUM reporting: Sometime last year, John Young walked into the astronaut office at NASA.      Young is a veteran astronaut, he had walked on the moon and is sometimes      called NASA's conscience.  He asked how many people thought NASA had      changed its culture.  About 100 people were there, and he said nobody      raised their hand.  He told that story to the Associated Press.  Shortly      after, NASA's then administrator, Sean O'Keefe, responded.  He said the      real answer to whether NASA had changed was being measured by a      consultant.</s>DAVID KESTENBAUM reporting: Mr. SEAN O'KEEFE (NASA):  Rather than have me or anybody else assert that      it is or isn't properly focused or corrected or broke or whatever      else--those are neat bumper stickers, but they sure can't be assessed in      any way unless you have a metric and a measurement to do so.</s>KESTENBAUM: The measuring was being done by a company called Behavioral      Science Technology.  It's run by Thomas Krause, who has a PhD in      psychology. He says his company has worked with about half of the Fortune      100 companies. Their method of measuring culture?  Surveys asking      employees if they agreed or disagreed with various statements like, `I      feel free to speak up if I have a concern.'  Workers had to rate their      feelings on a scale from one to five. BST consultants also coached NASA      managers.</s>Dr. THOMAS KRAUSE (Behavioral Science Technology): We would teach      principles that underlie good decision-making.</s>KESTENBAUM: I mean, I think to a lot of people that seems sort of      obvious, right?</s>Dr. THOMAS KRAUSE (Behavioral Science Technology): Well, yeah.  I mean, that's the stuff--that's the thing      about culture stuff.  The things that are obvious aren't done.  It's one      thing to say something is obvious; it's another thing to get an      organization of 19,000 people to do that in the day to day.</s>KESTENBAUM: This February, BST published a 115-page report filled with      graphs showing improvement.  And then NASA terminated its agreement with      Behavioral Science Technology.  BST was about halfway through its $10      million contract. Krause says his company has had over 1,700 clients, and      that's only happened a few times.</s>Dr. THOMAS KRAUSE (Behavioral Science Technology): It's very unusual.  And it's--we've never had a situation      before where we were working with the seniormost leaders in the      organization and they canceled it.</s>KESTENBAUM: OK.  So can I give you a survey?</s>Dr. THOMAS KRAUSE (Behavioral Science Technology): Sure.</s>KESTENBAUM: NASA's culture is improving.</s>Dr. THOMAS KRAUSE (Behavioral Science Technology): Strongly disagree.</s>KESTENBAUM: Krause says NASA abandoned a process of reform that was      working. A NASA spokesman says the space agency simply decided to carry      on with the work internally and said BST had given NASA a good start.      But part of the reason for the change appears to be that NASA's new      chief, Michael Griffin, doesn't think culture change is something you can      graph.  Griffin was asked in a press conference in April if he thought      NASA's culture had improved.</s>Mr. MICHAEL GRIFFIN (NASA): I don't know because I don't know how to      measure cultural change.  You know, culture is something that you feel.</s>KESTENBAUM: Griffin later said that he felt fixing the safety culture      meant working on things that are taught in kindergarten.  Quote, "Listen      to what other people have to say, pay attention to their opinions," end      quote.  Since the Columbia accident, NASA has tried to address bigger      systematic problems. It set up a quasi-independent safety organization      that is supposed to be immune to budget pressures and schedules.</s>KESTENBAUM: Still, the track record for organizations trying to change their culture      is not good.  Most fail.  That's the perspective of Sidney Dekker.  He's      a professor of human factors in aviation safety at Lund University in      Sweden.</s>Professor SIDNEY DEKKER (Lund University): You can't just assign a      project manager and say, `Now, OK, your project for the next two years is      change our culture,' right?  Just like another project manager had to      solve the phone problem.  It doesn't work the same way at all.</s>KESTENBAUM: You need external help, he says, everybody has to be on      board, and it takes years, many years.  David Kestenbaum, NPR News,      Washington.