Public transit systems in urban areas usually require large state subsidies, primarily due to high fare evasion rates. In this paper, we study new models for optimizing fare inspection strategies in transit networks based on bilevel programming. In the first level, the leader (the network operator) determines probabilities for inspecting passengers at different locations, while in the second level, the followers (the fare-evading passengers) respond by optimizing their routes given the inspection probabilities and travel times. To model the followers' behavior we study both a non-adaptive variant, in which passengers select a path a priori and continue along it throughout their journey, and an adaptive variant, in which they gain information along the way and use it to update their route. For these problems, which are interesting in their own right, we design exact and approximation algorithms and we prove a tight bound of 3 4 on the ratio of the optimal cost between adaptive and non-adaptive strategies. For the leader's optimization problem, we study a fixed-fare and a flexible-fare variant, where ticket prices may or may not be set at the operator's will. For the latter variant, we design an LP based approximation algorithm. Finally, using a local search procedure that shifts inspection probabilities within an initially determined support set, we perform an extensive computational study for all variants of the problem on instances of the Dutch railway and the Amsterdam subway network. This study reveals that our solutions are within 95 of theoretical upper bounds drawn from the LP relaxation.
@cite_18: We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of m priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader’s decision one or more followers optimize a polynomial-time solvable combinatorial minimization problem and choose a minimum cost solution satisfying their requirements based on the fixed costs and the leader’s prices. The leader receives as revenue the total amount of prices paid by the followers for priceable edges in their solutions. Our model extends several known pricing problems, including single-minded and unit-demand pricing, as well as Stackelberg pricing for certain follower problems like shortest path or minimum spanning tree. Our first main result is a tight analysis of a single-price algorithm for the single follower game, which provides a (1+e)log m-approximation. This can be extended to provide a (1+e)(log k+log m)-approximation for the general problem and k followers. The problem is also shown to be hard to approximate within @math for some e>0. If followers have demands, the single-price algorithm provides an @math -approximation, and the problem is hard to approximate within @math for some e>0. Our second main result is a polynomial time algorithm for revenue maximization in the special case of Stackelberg bipartite vertex-cover, which is based on non-trivial max-flow and LP-duality techniques. This approach can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for any constant number of followers.
@cite_14: We consider the problem of determining a set of optimal tolls on the arcs of a multicommodity transportation network. The problem is formulated as a bilevel mathematical program where the upper level consists in a firm that raises revenues from tolls set on arcs of the network, while the lower level is represented by a group of users travelling on shortest paths with respect to a generalized travel cost.
@cite_4: To optimize revenue, service firms must integrate within their pricing policies the rational reaction of customers to their price schedules. In the airline or telecommunication industry, this process is all the more complex due to interactions resulting from the structure of the supply network. In this paper, we consider a streamlined version of this situation where a firm's decision variables involve both prices and investments. We model this situation as a joint design and pricing problem that we formulate as a mixed-integer bilevel program, and whose properties are investigated. In particular, we take advantage of a feature of the model that allows the development of an algorithmic framework based on Lagrangean relaxation. This approach is entirely novel, and numerical results show that it is capable of solving problems of significant sizes.
@cite_5: We consider a bilevel model where the leader wants to maximize revenues from a taxation scheme, while the follower rationally reacts to those tax levels. We focus our attention on the special case of a toll-setting problem defined on a multicommodity transportation network. We show that the general problem is NP-complete, while particular instances are polynomially solvable. Numerical examples are given.
@cite_20: We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue raised from tolls set on the arcs of a transportation network, under the constraint that users are assigned to toll-compatible shortest paths. We first prove that this problem is strongly NP-hard. We then provide a polynomial time algorithm with a worst-case precision guarantee of @math , where mT denotes the number of toll arcs. Finally, we show that the approximation is tight with respect to a natural relaxation by constructing a family of instances for which the relaxation gap is reached. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. NETWORKS, Vol. 46(1), 57–67 2005
@cite_17: We consider a pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tariffs must be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of @math arcs, the tariff arcs. Costs of all other arcs in the network are assumed to be given. There are @math clients, the followers, and after the tariffs have been determined, the clients route their demands independent of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to find tariffs that maximize the operator's revenue. Motivated by applications in telecommunication networks, we consider a restricted version of this problem, assuming that each client utilizes at most one of the operator's tariff arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river. We prove that this problem is APX-hard. Moreover, we analyze the effect of uniform pricing, proving that it yields both an @math approximation and a @math -approximation. Here, @math is upper bounded by the total demand of all clients. In addition, we consider the problem under the additional restriction that the operator must not reject any of the clients. We prove that this problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance guarantee, unless P = NP, and we prove the existence of an @math -approximation algorithm.
Bilevel network pricing problems have been considered extensively in the literature; see @cite_14 @cite_4 @cite_5 . In these works, the leader prices edges of some subgraph and the followers choose shortest paths with respect to edge costs defined as the sum of travel costs and prices. This problem has been proved to be NP-hard; see @cite_5 and @cite_17 @cite_18 @cite_20 for further hardness and approximability results.