The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a public log called the blockchain. Its security rests critically on the distributed protocol that maintains the blockchain, run by participants called miners. Conventional wisdom asserts that the protocol is incentive-compatible and secure against colluding minority groups, i.e., it incentivizes miners to follow the protocol as prescribed. We show that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. This attack can have significant consequences for Bitcoin: Rational miners will prefer to join the selfish miners, and the colluding group will increase in size until it becomes a majority. At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency. Selfish mining is feasible for any group size of colluding miners. We propose a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects against selfish mining pools that command less than 1 4 of the resources. This threshold is lower than the wrongly assumed 1 2 bound, but better than the current reality where a group of any size can compromise the system.
@cite_22: Bitcoin is the first e-cash system to see widespread adoption. While Bitcoin offers the potential for new types of financial interaction, it has significant limitations regarding privacy. Specifically, because the Bitcoin transaction log is completely public, users' privacy is protected only through the use of pseudonyms. In this paper we propose Zerocoin, a cryptographic extension to Bitcoin that augments the protocol to allow for fully anonymous currency transactions. Our system uses standard cryptographic assumptions and does not introduce new trusted parties or otherwise change the security model of Bitcoin. We detail Zerocoin's cryptographic construction, its integration into Bitcoin, and examine its performance both in terms of computation and impact on the Bitcoin protocol.
@cite_21: Automation of the way we pay for goods and services is already underway, as can be seen by the variety and growth of electronic banking services available to consumers. The ultimate structure of the new electronic payments system may have a substantial impact on personal privacy as well as on the nature and extent of criminal use of payments. Ideally a new payments system should address both of these seemingly conflicting sets of concerns.
@cite_6: Bitcoin is a distributed digital currency which has attracted a substantial number of users. We perform an in-depth investigation to understand what made Bitcoin so successful, while decades of research on cryptographic e-cash has not lead to a large-scale deployment. We ask also how Bitcoin could become a good candidate for a long-lived stable currency. In doing so, we identify several issues and attacks of Bitcoin, and propose suitable techniques to address them.
@cite_15: Emerging economic P2P applications share the common need for an efficient, secure payment mechanism. In this paper, we present PPay, a micropayment system that exploits unique characteristics of P2P systems to maximize efficiency while maintaining security properties. We show how the basic PPay protocol far outperforms existing micropayment schemes, while guaranteeing that all coin fraud is detectable, traceable and unprofitable. We also present and analyze several extensions to PPay that further improve efficiency.
@cite_13: Peer-to-peer systems are typically designed around the assumption that all peers will willingly contribute resources to a global pool. They thus suffer from freeloaders, that is, participants who consume many more resources than they contribute. In this paper, we propose a general economic framework for avoiding freeloaders in peer-to-peer systems. Our system works by keeping track of the resource consumption and resource contribution of each participant. The overall standing of each participant in the system is represented by a single scalar value, called their karma. A set of nodes, called a bankset, keeps track of each node’s karma, increasing it as resources are contributed, and decreasing it as they are consumed. Our framework is resistant to malicious attempts by the resource provider, consumer, and a fraction of the members of the bank set. We illustrate the application of this framework to a peer-to-peer filesharing
Decentralized digital currencies have been proposed before Bitcoin, starting with @cite_21 and followed by peer-to-peer currencies, e.g. @cite_13 @cite_15 ; see @cite_22 @cite_6 for short surveys. None of these are centered around a global log; therefore, their techniques and challenges are unrelated to this work.