Crowdsourcing can be applied to the Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems to provide more scalable and efficient services to support various tasks. As the driving force of crowdsourcing is the interaction among participants, various incentive mechanisms have been proposed to attract and retain a sufficient number of participants to provide a sustainable crowdsourcing service. However, there exist some gaps between the modeled entities or markets in the existing works and those in reality: 1) task valuation and workers' punctuality, and 2) crowdsourcing service market by a platform. To bridge those gaps of such impractical assumption, we model workers' heterogeneous punctuality behavior and task depreciation over time. Based on those models, we propose an Expected Social Welfare Maximizing (ESWM) mechanism that aims to maximize the expected social welfare by attracting and retaining more participants in the long-term, i.e., multiple rounds of crowdsourcing. In the evaluation, we modeled the continuous competition between the ESWM and one of the existing works in both short-term and long-term scenarios. Simulation results show that the ESWM mechanism achieves higher expected social welfare and platform utility than the benchmark by attracting and retaining more participants. Moreover, we prove that the ESWM mechanism achieves the desirable economic properties: individual rationality, budget-balance, computational efficiency, and truthfulness.
@cite_19: Mobile crowdsourced sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm which takes advantage of pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect data, enabling numerous novel applications. To achieve good service quality for a MCS application, incentive mechanisms are necessary to attract more user participation. Most of existing mechanisms apply only for the offline scenario where all users' information are known a priori. On the contrary, we focus on a more realistic scenario where users arrive one by one online in a random order. Based on the online auction model, we investigate the problem that users submit their private types to the crowdsourcer when arrive, and the crowdsourcer aims at selecting a subset of users before a specified deadline for maximizing the value of services (assumed to be a non-negative monotone submodular function) provided by selected users under a budget constraint. We design two online mechanisms, OMZ and OMG, satisfying the computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty and constant competitiveness under the zero arrival-departure interval case and a more general case, respectively. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our online mechanisms.
@cite_18: Stimulating both service users and service providers is of paramount importance to mobile crowdsourcing. A few incentive mechanisms have been proposed, but all of them have focused only on one-sided interactions either among service users or among service providers. For the first time, to the best of our knowledge, we investigate the important two-sided online interactions among service users and service providers in mobile crowdsourcing. We model such interactions as online double auctions, explicitly taking the dynamic nature of both users and providers into account We propose a general framework for the design of truthful online double auctions for dynamic mobile crowdsourcing. The framework is expressive and can work with different price schedules. We propose price-ranked online double auctions with four price schedules to implement the framework, which are suitable for different scenarios. With theoretical analysis and extensive simulations we demonstrate that the proposed auctions are strategy-proof, individual rational, and ensure budget balance.
Focusing on dynamic crowdsensing where participants arrive in an online manner, @cite_19 presented two online incentive mechanisms using a multiple-stage sampling-accepting process. Similarly, Y. @cite_18 proposed an online incentive mechanism to maximize the number of matched pairs of participants and crowdsourcing service users when participants and service users are dynamically changing.