This paper presents a simple local medium access control protocol, called , for multi-hop wireless networks with a single channel that is provably robust against adaptive adversarial jamming. The wireless network is modeled as a unit disk graph on a set of nodes distributed arbitrarily in the plane. In addition to these nodes, there are adversarial jammers that know the protocol and its entire history and that are allowed to jam the wireless channel at any node for an arbitrary @math -fraction of the time steps, where @math is an arbitrary constant. We assume that the nodes cannot distinguish between jammed transmissions and collisions of regular messages. Nevertheless, we show that achieves an asymptotically optimal throughput if there is a sufficiently dense distribution of nodes.
@cite_30: Radio jamming in wireless sensor networks is an effective means by which an attacker can disrupt communication between sensor nodes. The purpose of such an attack can be to delay or prevent nodes from reporting their readings to the basestation, to deplete vital network resources such as energy, or both. This paper presents MULEPRO (MULti-channel Exfiltration PROtocol), a fully distributed network based protocol designed to rapidly exfiltrate data from a jammed area. MULEPRO targets sensor network applications that require an immediate and robust response to radio jamming denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. It works by automatically and efficiently assigning nodes to different channels in the jammed area in order to defeat an attacker. We have extensively evaluated MULEPRO under avariety of attack configurations. These tests show that even when the attacker uses a channel hopping strategy MULEPRO can effectively exfiltrate data.
@cite_32: Mobile communication systems are often susceptible to high level of noise injected by adversaries, known as jamming attack. Jamming is difficult to prevent in broadcast networks because a user that can decode a transmission can also jam the transmission. In this paper, we describe a code tree system that helps the physical layer circumvent jammers. This system works with any spread-spectrum communications system. In our system, the transmitter has more information than any single receiver. Each receiver cooperates with the transmitter to detect any jamming that affects that receiver. Our scheme mitigates the jamming attack while allowing the transmitter to transmit on fewer codes than the number of users. We simulated our system in a theoretical setting using MATLAB. The result shows significant improvement over naively transmitting on a single shared code.
@cite_24: Jamming is a very effective denial-of-service attack that renders most higher-layer security mechanisms moot - yet it is often ignored in WSN design. We show that an interrupt jamming attack is simple to perpetrate in software using a MICAz mote, is energy efficient and stealthy for the jammer, and completely disrupts communication. Solutions are needed to mitigate this insider threat even if more powerful attackers are not thwarted. We present DEEJAM, a novel MAC-layer protocol for defeating stealthy jammers with IEEE 802.15.4-based hardware, to address this problematic area. It layers four defensive mechanisms to hide communication from a jammer, evade its search, and reduce its impact. Given the difficulty of modeling the physical layer accurately in simulation, we evaluate DEEJAM instead on the MICAz mote. We show the performance of the protocol against successively more complex attacks: interrupt jamming, activity jamming, scan jamming, and pulse jamming. Results show that DEEJAM defeats the otherwise devastating interrupt jammer, and achieves a packet delivery ratio of 88 in the presence of a pulse jammer. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to confront multiple types of jamming on common WSN hardware with solutions that are shown empirically to enable continued communication despite an ongoing attack.
@cite_39: Wireless networks are built upon a shared medium that makes it easy for adversaries to launch denial of service (DoS) attacks. One form of denial of service is targeted at preventing sources from communicating. These attacks can be easily accomplished by an adversary by either bypassing MAC-layer protocols, or emitting a radio signal targeted at jamming a particular channel. In this paper we present two strategies that may be employed by wireless devices to evade a MAC PHY-layer jamming-style wireless denial of service attack. The first strategy, channel surfing, is a form of spectral evasion that involves legitimate wireless devices changing the channel that they are operating on. The second strategy, spatial retreats, is a form of spatial evasion whereby legitimate mobile devices move away from the locality of the DoS emitter. We study both of these strategies for three broad wireless communication scenarios: two-party radio communication, an infrastructured wireless network, and an ad hoc wireless network. We evaluate several of our proposed strategies and protocols through ns-2 simulations and experiments on the Berkeley mote platform.
Recent work has also studied against jamming, including coding strategies @cite_32 , channel surfing and spatial retreat @cite_30 @cite_39 , or mechanisms to hide messages from a jammer, evade its search, and reduce the impact of corrupted messages @cite_24 . Unfortunately, these methods do not help against an adaptive jammer with full information about the history of the protocol, like the one considered in our work.