Inferring intent from observed behavior has been studied extensively within the frameworks of Bayesian inverse planning and inverse reinforcement learning. These methods infer a goal or reward function that best explains the actions of the observed agent, typically a human demonstrator. Another agent can use this inferred intent to predict, imitate, or assist the human user. However, a central assumption in inverse reinforcement learning is that the demonstrator is close to optimal. While models of suboptimal behavior exist, they typically assume that suboptimal actions are the result of some type of random noise or a known cognitive bias, like temporal inconsistency. In this paper, we take an alternative approach, and model suboptimal behavior as the result of internal model misspecification: the reason that user actions might deviate from near-optimal actions is that the user has an incorrect set of beliefs about the rules -- the dynamics -- governing how actions affect the environment. Our insight is that while demonstrated actions may be suboptimal in the real world, they may actually be near-optimal with respect to the user's internal model of the dynamics. By estimating these internal beliefs from observed behavior, we arrive at a new method for inferring intent. We demonstrate in simulation and in a user study with 12 participants that this approach enables us to more accurately model human intent, and can be used in a variety of applications, including offering assistance in a shared autonomy framework and inferring human preferences.
@cite_30: Objective—To evaluate the pharmacokinetics of a novel commercial formulation of ivermectin after administration to goats. Animals—6 healthy adult goats. Procedure—Ivermectin (200 μg kg) was initially administered IV to each goat, and plasma samples were obtained for 36 days. After a washout period of 3 weeks, each goat received a novel commercial formulation of ivermectin (200 μg kg) by SC injection. Plasma samples were then obtained for 42 days. Drug concentrations were quantified by use of high-performance liquid chromatography with fluorescence detection. Results—Pharmacokinetics of ivermectin after IV administration were best described by a 2-compartment open model; values for main compartmental variables included volume of distribution at a steady state (9.94 L kg), clearance (1.54 L kg d), and area under the plasma concentration-time curve (AUC; 143 [ng•d] mL). Values for the noncompartmental variables included mean residence time (7.37 days), AUC (153 [ng•d] mL), and clearance (1.43 L kg d). After ...
@cite_42: Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an ‘‘intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a ‘‘teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165–193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.
The closest prior work in intent inference and action understanding comes from inverse planning @cite_42 and inverse reinforcement learning @cite_30 , which use observations of a user's actions to estimate the user's goal or reward function. We take a fundamentally different approach to intent inference: using action observations to estimate the user's beliefs about the world dynamics.