Abstract In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed framework the decision-making entities are associated with individual transmission links, deciding on the way they split capacity among concurrent flows. An efficient decentralized algorithm is given for computing a strongly Pareto-optimal strategies, constituting a pure Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, we discuss the properties of the introduced game related to the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. The paper is concluded with an experimental study.
@cite_30: Abstract Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents. The audience for game theory has grown dramatically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professional interest in game theory is likely to require. Such a text would minimize notation, ruthlessly focus on essentials, and yet not sacrifice rigor. This Synthesis Lecture aims to fill this gap by providing a concise and accessible introduction to the field. It covers the main classes of games, their representations, and the main concepts used to analyze them."This introduction is just what a growing multidisciplinary audience needs: it is concise, authoritative, up to date, and clear on the important conceptual issues." --Robert Stalnaker, MIT, Linguistics and Phil...
@cite_57: We use the tools from game theory to understand the impacts of the inherent congestion pricing schemes in TCP Vegas as well as the problems of parameter setting of TCP Vegas on its performance. It is shown how these inherent pricing schemes result in a rate control equilibrium state that is a Nash equilibrium which is also a global optimum of the all-Vegas networks. On the other hand, if the TCP Vegas’ users are assumed to be selfish in terms of setting their desired number of backlogged packets in the buffers along their paths, then the network as a whole, in certain circumstances, would operate very inefficiently. This poses a serious threat to the possible deployment of Vegas-based TCP (such as FAST TCP) in the future Internet.
@cite_66: We study in this paper a noncooperative approach for sharing resources of a common pool among users, wherein each user strives to maximize its own utility. The optimality notion is then a Nash equilibrium. First, we present a general framework of systems wherein a Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, which are similar to the 'tragedy of the commons' in economics. As examples that fit in the above framework, we consider noncooperative flow-control problems in communication networks where each user decides its throughput to optimize its own utility. As such a utility, we first consider the power which is defined as the throughput divided by the expected end-to-end packet delay, and then consider another utility of additive costs. For both utilities, we establish the non-efficiency of the Nash equilibria.
Many interesting results in algorithmic game theory applied to computer networks have been obtained in the last ten years. In @cite_30 two TCP clients are interpreted as players in the prisoner dilemma game. Another game-theoretical analysis of TCP is given in @cite_57 , focusing on the Vegas version of this protocol. In @cite_66 it is shown that the noncooperative games for flow control problems have Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria.