Abstract In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed framework the decision-making entities are associated with individual transmission links, deciding on the way they split capacity among concurrent flows. An efficient decentralized algorithm is given for computing a strongly Pareto-optimal strategies, constituting a pure Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, we discuss the properties of the introduced game related to the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. The paper is concluded with an experimental study.
@cite_67: 
@cite_35: This paper analyses the stability and fairness of two classes of rate control algorithm for communication networks. The algorithms provide natural generalisations to large-scale networks of simple additive increase multiplicative decrease schemes, and are shown to be stable about a system optimum characterised by a proportional fairness criterion. Stability is established by showing that, with an appropriate formulation of the overall optimisation problem, the network's implicit objective function provides a Lyapunov function for the dynamical system defined by the rate control algorithm. The network's optimisation problem may be cast in primal or dual form: this leads naturally to two classes of algorithm, which may be interpreted in terms of either congestion indication feedback signals or explicit rates based on shadow prices. Both classes of algorithm may be generalised to include routing control, and provide natural implementations of proportionally fair pricing.
@cite_40: Network protocols in layered architectures have historically been obtained on an ad hoc basis, and many of the recent cross-layer designs are also conducted through piecemeal approaches. Network protocol stacks may instead be holistically analyzed and systematically designed as distributed solutions to some global optimization problems. This paper presents a survey of the recent efforts towards a systematic understanding of layering as optimization decomposition, where the overall communication network is modeled by a generalized network utility maximization problem, each layer corresponds to a decomposed subproblem, and the interfaces among layers are quantified as functions of the optimization variables coordinating the subproblems. There can be many alternative decompositions, leading to a choice of different layering architectures. This paper surveys the current status of horizontal decomposition into distributed computation, and vertical decomposition into functional modules such as congestion control, routing, scheduling, random access, power control, and channel coding. Key messages and methods arising from many recent works are summarized, and open issues discussed. Through case studies, it is illustrated how layering as Optimization Decomposition provides a common language to think about modularization in the face of complex, networked interactions, a unifying, top-down approach to design protocol stacks, and a mathematical theory of network architectures
The central network resource allocation problem is the network utility maximization problem (NUM), which is also discussed in this paper. As formulated in @cite_35 , it provides the basis for further considerations. An extensive survey of the utility-based approach applied to the analysis of network resource allocation can be found in @cite_40 . Moreover, in @cite_67 it was shown that the NUM framework suits well for developing a self-managing mechanism for the Internet.