Deep learning is currently the subject of intensive study. However, fundamental concepts such as representations are not formally defined -- researchers "know them when they see them" -- and there is no common language for describing and analyzing algorithms. This essay proposes an abstract framework that identifies the essential features of current practice and may provide a foundation for future developments. The backbone of almost all deep learning algorithms is backpropagation, which is simply a gradient computation distributed over a neural network. The main ingredients of the framework are thus, unsurprisingly: (i) game theory, to formalize distributed optimization; and (ii) communication protocols, to track the flow of zeroth and first-order information. The framework allows natural definitions of semantics (as the meaning encoded in functions), representations (as functions whose semantics is chosen to optimized a criterion) and grammars (as communication protocols equipped with first-order convergence guarantees). Much of the essay is spent discussing examples taken from the literature. The ultimate aim is to develop a graphical language for describing the structure of deep learning algorithms that backgrounds the details of the optimization procedure and foregrounds how the components interact. Inspiration is taken from probabilistic graphical models and factor graphs, which capture the essential structural features of multivariate distributions.
@cite_84: This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior." In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.
@cite_104: The field of artificial intelligence (AI) strives to build rational agents capable of perceiving the world around them and taking actions to advance specified goals. Put another way, AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating this new species of machine, machina economicus, and discuss some challenges in designing AIs that can reason effectively in economic contexts. Supposing that AI succeeds in this quest, or at least comes close enough that it is useful to think about AIs in rationalistic terms, we ask how to design the rules of interaction in multi-agent systems that come to represent an economy of AIs. Theories of normative design from economics may prove more relevant for artificial agents than human agents, with AIs that better respect idealized assumptions of rationality than people, interacting through novel rules and incentive systems quite distinct from those tailored for people.
@cite_89: Prediction markets are economic mechanisms for aggregating information about future events through sequential interactions with traders. The pricing mechanisms in these markets are known to be related to optimization algorithms in machine learning and through these connections we have some understanding of how equilibrium market prices relate to the beliefs of the traders in a market. However, little is known about rates and guarantees for the convergence of these sequential mechanisms, and two recent papers cite this as an important open question. In this paper we show how some previously studied prediction market trading models can be understood as a natural generalization of randomized coordinate descent which we call randomized subspace descent (RSD). We establish convergence rates for RSD and leverage them to prove rates for the two prediction market models above, answering the open questions. Our results extend beyond standard centralized markets to arbitrary trade networks.
@cite_79: Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential elections. In this work we introduce a mathematical theory for Artificial Prediction Markets for supervised classifier aggregation and probability estimation. We introduce the artificial prediction market as a novel way to aggregate classifiers. We derive the market equations to enforce total budget conservation, show the market price uniqueness and give efficient algorithms for computing it. We show how to train the market participants by updating their budgets using training examples. We introduce classifier specialization as a new differentiating characteristic between classifiers. Finally, we present experiments using random decision rules as specialized classifiers and show that the prediction market consistently outperforms Random Forest on real and synthetic data of varying degrees of difficulty.
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@cite_68: We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in a game uses an algorithm from our class, their individual regret decays at O(T-3 4), while the sum of utilities converges to an approximate optimum at O(T-1)-an improvement upon the worst case O(T-1 2) rates. We show a black-box reduction for any algorithm in the class to achieve O(T-1 2) rates against an adversary, while maintaining the faster rates against algorithms in the class. Our results extend those of Rakhlin and Shridharan [17] and [4], who only analyzed two-player zero-sum games for specific algorithms.
Although game theory was originally developed to model human interactions @cite_84 , it has been pointed out that it may be more directly applicable to interacting populations of algorithms, so-called @cite_79 @cite_5 @cite_71 @cite_104 @cite_89 @cite_68 . This paper goes one step further to propose that games played over first-order communication protocols are a key component of the foundations of deep learning.