Knowledge flow analysis offers a simple and flexible way to find flaws in security protocols. A protocol is described by a collection of rules constraining the propagation of knowledge amongst principals. Because this characterization corresponds closely to informal descriptions of protocols, it allows a succinct and natural formalization; because it abstracts away message ordering, and handles communications between principals and applications of cryptographic primitives uniformly, it is readily represented in a standard logic. A generic framework in the Alloy modelling language is presented, and instantiated for two standard protocols, and a new key management scheme.
@cite_30: A methodology is presented for using a general-purpose state enumeration tool, Mur spl phi , to analyze cryptographic and security-related protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the approach by analyzing the Needham-Schroeder (1978) protocol, finding a known bug in a few seconds of computation time, and analyzing variants of Kerberos and the faulty TMN protocol used in another comparative study. The efficiency of Mur spl phi also allows us to examine multiple terms of relatively short protocols, giving us the ability to detect replay attacks, or errors resulting from confusion between independent execution of a protocol by independent parties.
@cite_18: We study and further develop two language-based techniques for analyzing security protocols. One is based on a typed process calculus; the other, on untyped logic programs. Both focus on secrecy properties. We contribute to these two techniques, in particular by extending the former with a flexible, generic treatment of many cryptographic operations. We also establish an equivalence between the two techniques.
@cite_26: We describe a proof method for cryptographic protocols, based on a strong secrecy invariant that catalogues conditions under which messages can be published. For typical protocols, a suitable first-order invariant can be generated automatically from the program text, independent of the properties being verified, allowing safety properties to be proved by ordinary first-order reasoning. We have implemented the method in an automatic verifier, TAPS, that proves safety properties roughly equivalent to those in published Isabelle verifications, but does so much faster (usually within a few seconds) and with little or no guidance from the user. We have used TAPS to analyze about 60 protocols, including all but three protocols from the Clark and Jacob survey; on average, these verifications each require less than 4 seconds of CPU time and less than 4 bytes of hints from the user.
@cite_14: 
@cite_22: Due to the rapid growth of the “Internet” and the “World Wide Web” security has become a very important concern in the design and implementation of software systems. Since security has become an important issue, the number of protocols in this domain has become very large. These protocols are very diverse in nature. If a software architect wants to deploy some of these protocols in a system, they have to be sure that the protocol has the right properties as dictated by the requirements of the system. In this article we present BRUTUS, a tool for verifying properties of security protocols. This tool can be viewed as a special-purpose model checker for security protocols. We also present reduction techniques that make the tool efficient. Experimental results are provided to demonstrate the efficiency of BRUTUS.
@cite_37: Glossary Part I. Communicating Systems: 1. Introduction 2. Behaviour of automata 3. Sequential processes and bisimulation 4. Concurrent processes and reaction 5. Transitions and strong equivalence 6. Observation equivalence: theory 7. Observation equivalence: examples Part II. The pi-Calculus: 8. What is mobility? 9. The pi-calculus and reaction 10. Applications of the pi-calculus 11. Sorts, objects and functions 12. Commitments and strong bisimulation 13. Observation equivalence and examples 14. Discussion and related work Bibliography Index.
@cite_4: When formalizing security protocols, different specification languages support very different reasoning methodologies, whose results are not directly or easily comparable. Therefore, establishing clear mappings among different frameworks is highly desirable, as it permits various methodologies to cooperate by interpreting theoretical and practical results of one system in another. In this paper, we examine the non-trivial relationship between two general verification frameworks: multiset rewriting (MSR) and a process algebra (PA) inspired to CCS and the π-calculus. Although defining a simple and general bijection between MSR and PA appears difficult, we show that the sublanguages needed to specify a large class of cryptographic protocols (immediate decryption protocols) admits an effective translation that is not only bijective and trace-preserving, but also induces a weak form of bisimulation across the two languages. In particular, the correspondence sketched in this abstract permits transferring several important trace-based properties such as secrecy and many forms of authentication.
@cite_21: In recent years, a method for analyzing security protocols using the process algebra CSP (C.A.R. Hoare, 1985) and its model checker FDR (A.W Roscoe, 1994) has been developed. This technique has proved successful, and has been used to discover a number of attacks upon protocols. However the technique has required producing a CSP description of the protocol by hand; this has proved tedious and error prone. We describe Casper, a program that automatically produces the CSP description from a more abstract description, thus greatly simplifying the modelling and analysis process.
@cite_42: Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model. Two formalisms that state the basic assumptions of this model are related here: strand spaces and multiset rewriting with existential quantification. Strand spaces provide a simple and economical approach to analysis of completed protocol runs by emphasizing causal interactions among protocol participants. The multiset rewriting formalism provides a very precise way of specifying finite-length protocols with unboundedly many instances of each protocol role, such as client, server, initiator, or responder. A number of modifications to each system are required to produce a meaningful comparison. In particular, we extend the strand formalism with a way of incrementally growing bundles in order to emulate an execution of a protocol with parametric strands. The correspondence between the modified formalisms directly relates the intruder theory from the multiset rewriting formalism to the penetrator strands. The relationship we illustrate here between multiset rewriting specifications and strand spaces thus suggests refinements to both frameworks, and deepens our understanding of the Dolev-Yao model.
@cite_0: The spi calculus is an extension of the pi calculus with constructs for encryption and decryption. This paper develops the theory of the spi calculus, focusing on techniques for establishing testing equivalence, and applying these techniques to the proof of authenticity and secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols.
@cite_19: A strand is a sequence of events; it represents either the execution of an action by a legitimate party in a security protocol or else a sequence of actions by a penetrator. A strand space is a collection of strands, equipped with a graph structure generated by causal interaction. In this framework, protocol correctness claims may be expressed in terms of the connections between strands of different kinds. In this paper, we develop the notion of a strand space. We then prove a generally useful lemma, as a sample result giving a general bound on the abilities of the penetrator in any protocol. We apply the strand space formalism to prove the correctness of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol (G. Lowe, 1995, 1996). Our approach gives a detailed view of the conditions under which the protocol achieves authentication and protects the secrecy of the values exchanged. We also use our proof methods to explain why the original Needham-Schroeder (1978) protocol fails. We believe that our approach is distinguished from other work on protocol verification by the simplicity of the model and the ease of producing intelligible and reliable proofs of protocol correctness even without automated support.
@cite_23: We formalize the Dolev-Yao model of security protocols, using a notation based on multiset rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for describing security protocols, to formalize the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model using this notation, and to analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem under various restrictions. We prove that, even for the case where we restrict the size of messages and the depth of message encryption, the secrecy problem is undecidable for the case of an unrestricted number of protocol roles and an unbounded number of new nonces. We also identify several decidable classes, including a DEXP-complete class when the number of nonces is restricted, and an NP-complete class when both the number of nonces and the number of roles is restricted. We point out a remaining open complexity problem, and discuss the implications these results have on the general topic of protocol analysis.
@cite_12: We propose a new efficient automatic verification technique, Athena, for security protocol analysis. It uses a new efficient representation - our extension to the Strand Space Model, and utilizes techniques from both model checking and theorem proving approaches. Athena is fully automatic and is able to prove the correctness of many security protocols with arbitrary number of concurrent runs. The run time for a typical protocol from the literature, like the Needham-Schroeder protocol, is often a fraction of a second. Athena exploits several different techniques that enable it to analyze infinite sets of protocol runs and achieve such efficiency. Our extended Strand Space Model is a natural and efficient representation for the problem domain. The security properties are specified in a simple logic which permits both efficient proof search algorithms and has enough expressive power to specify interesting properties. The automatic proof search procedure borrows some efficient techniques from both model checking and theorem proving. We believe that it is the right combination of the new compact representation and all the techniques that actually makes Athena successful in fast and automatic verification of security protocols.
Specialized model checkers such as Casper @cite_21 , Mur @math @cite_30 , Brutus @cite_22 , TAPS @cite_26 , and ProVerif @cite_18 have been successfully used to analyze security protocols. Like knowledge flow analysis in Alloy, these tools are based on state space exploration which leads to an exponential complexity. Athena @cite_12 is based on a modification of the strand space model @cite_19 . Even though it reduces the state space explosion problem, it remains exponential. Multiset rewriting @cite_23 in combination with tree automata is used in Timbuk @cite_14 . The relation between multiset rewriting and strand spaces is analyzed in @cite_42 . The relation between multiset rewriting and process algebras @cite_37 @cite_0 is analyzed in @cite_4 .