Crowdsourcing can be applied to the Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems to provide more scalable and efficient services to support various tasks. As the driving force of crowdsourcing is the interaction among participants, various incentive mechanisms have been proposed to attract and retain a sufficient number of participants to provide a sustainable crowdsourcing service. However, there exist some gaps between the modeled entities or markets in the existing works and those in reality: 1) task valuation and workers' punctuality, and 2) crowdsourcing service market by a platform. To bridge those gaps of such impractical assumption, we model workers' heterogeneous punctuality behavior and task depreciation over time. Based on those models, we propose an Expected Social Welfare Maximizing (ESWM) mechanism that aims to maximize the expected social welfare by attracting and retaining more participants in the long-term, i.e., multiple rounds of crowdsourcing. In the evaluation, we modeled the continuous competition between the ESWM and one of the existing works in both short-term and long-term scenarios. Simulation results show that the ESWM mechanism achieves higher expected social welfare and platform utility than the benchmark by attracting and retaining more participants. Moreover, we prove that the ESWM mechanism achieves the desirable economic properties: individual rationality, budget-balance, computational efficiency, and truthfulness.
@cite_0: The recent paradigm of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) enables a broad range of mobile applications. A critical challenge for the paradigm is to incentivize phone users to be workers providing sensing services. While some theoretical incentive mechanisms for general-purpose crowdsourcing have been proposed, it is still an open issue as to how to incorporate the theoretical framework into the practical MCS system. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on a quality-driven auction (QDA). The mechanism is specifically for the MCS system, where the worker is paid off based on the quality of sensed data instead of working time, as adopted in the literature. We theoretically prove that the mechanism is truthful, individual rational, platform profitable, and social-welfare optimal. Moreover, we incorporate our incentive mechanism into a Wi-Fi fingerprint-based indoor localization system to incentivize the MCS-based fingerprint collection. We present a probabilistic model to evaluate the reliability of the submitted data, which resolves the issue that the ground truth for the data reliability is unavailable. We realize and deploy an indoor localization system to evaluate our proposed incentive mechanism and present extensive experimental results.
@cite_31: Participatory sensing is becoming more popular with the help of sensor-embedded smartphones to retrieve context-aware information for users. However, new challenges arise for the maintenance of the energy supply, the support of the quality-of-information (QoI) requirements, and the generation of maximum revenue for network operator, but with sparsely research exposure. This paper proposes a novel efficient network management framework to tackle the above challenges, where four key design elements are introduced. First is the QoI satisfaction index, where the QoI benefit the queries receive is quantified in relation to the level they require. Second is the credit satisfaction index, where the credits are used by the network operator to motivate the user participation, and this index is to quantify its degree of satisfaction. Third is the Gur Game-based distributed energy control, where the above two indexes are used as inputs to the mathematical framework of the Gur Game for distributed decision-making. Fourth is the dynamic pricing scheme, based on a constrained optimization problem to allocate credits to the participants while minimizing the necessary adaptation of the pricing scheme from the network operator. We finally evaluate the proposed scheme under an event occurrence detection scenario, where the proposed scheme successfully guarantees less than 7 detection outage, saves 80 of the energy reserve if compared with the lower bound solution, and achieves the suboptimum with only 4 gap if compared with optimal solution.
@cite_3: Mobile phone sensing is a new paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. In a mobile phone sensing system, the platform recruits smartphone users to provide sensing service. Existing mobile phone sensing applications and systems lack good incentive mechanisms that can attract more user participation. To address this issue, we design incentive mechanisms for mobile phone sensing. We consider two system models: the platform-centric model where the platform provides a reward shared by participating users, and the user-centric model where users have more control over the payment they will receive. For the platform-centric model, we design an incentive mechanism using a Stackelberg game, where the platform is the leader while the users are the followers. We show how to compute the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, at which the utility of the platform is maximized, and none of the users can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. For the user-centric model, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism, which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our incentive mechanisms.
@cite_8: In crowdsensing, appropriate rewards are always expected to compensate the participants for their consumptions of physical resources and involvements of manual efforts. While continuous low quality sensing data could do harm to the availability and preciseness of crowdsensing based services, few existing incentive mechanisms have ever addressed the issue of sensing data's quality. The design of quality based incentive mechanism is motivated by its potential to avoid inefficient sensing and unnecessary rewards. In this paper, we incorporate the consideration of data quality into the design of incentive mechanism for crowdsensing, and propose to pay the participants as how well they do, to motivate the rational participants to perform data sensing efficiently. This mechanism estimates the quality of sensing data, and offers each participant a reward based on her effective contribution. We also implement the mechanism and evaluate the improvements in terms of quality of service and profit of service provider. The evaluation results show that our mechanism achieves superior performance when compared to the uniform pricing scheme.
In this section, we review the state-of-the-art research works on incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. @cite_3 presented two general models of incentive mechanisms to motivate mobile users' participation: platform-centric model and user-centric model. D. @cite_8 proposed a quality-based incentive mechanism for crowdsensing by rewarding participants proportionally to their contribution. Y. @cite_0 presented a quality-driven auction-based incentive mechanism for a Wi-Fi fingerprint-based indoor localization system. In this direction, C. @cite_31 also proposed a Quality of Information (QoI)-aware incentive mechanism to maximize the quality of information.