We present an evolutionary game theoretic approach to study node cooperation behavior in wireless ad hoc networks. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been used to study the conditions governing the growth of cooperation behavior in biological and social networks. We propose a model of node cooperation behavior in dynamic wireless networks such as vehicular networks. Our work is motivated by the fact that, similar to existing EGT studies, node behavior in dynamic wireless networks is characterized by decision making that only depends on the immediate neighborhood. We adapt our model to study cooperation behavior in the context of information dissemination in wireless networks. We obtain conditions that determine whether a network evolves to a state of complete cooperation from all nodes. Finally, we use our model to study the evolution of cooperation behavior and its impact on content downloading in vehicular networks, taking into consideration realistic network conditions.
@cite_18: We consider a dynamic routing problem where the objective of each user is to obtain flow policy that minimizes its long term cost. The framework differs from other related works which consider collection of static one shot games with dynamic cost function. Instead, we motivate our problem from the two basic facts: i) the path cost may not be exactly known in advance in dynamic environment unlike static; ii) long term solution is important aspect to evaluate rather than obtaining one slot solution. Moreover, this constraint inhibits to apply traditional game theoretic approach to obtain equilibria, rather we discuss that it is not required to obtain equilibria at every slot to “cover” the dynamic environment. In this work we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach, we intend to learn the optimal strategy exploiting the past experiences (information) instead of cost function. Further, we characterize the dynamic equilibria of the long-term game using evolutionary variational inequalities. The dynamic equilibria so obtained, optimizes the long term cost, however it need not to be an equilibrium for intermediate epochs (games). As a byproduct, this reduces drastically the computation complexity. Under strictly monotone cost function, we prove that the dynamic equilibria are also dynamic evolutionarily stable strategies.
@cite_33: We consider a noncooperative interaction among a large population of mobiles that interfere with each other through many local interactions. The first objective of this paper is to extend the evolutionary game framework to allow an arbitrary number of mobiles that are involved in a local interaction. We allow for interactions between mobiles that are not necessarily reciprocal. We study 1) multiple-access control in a slotted Aloha-based wireless network and 2) power control in wideband code-division multiple-access wireless networks. We define and characterize the equilibrium (called evolutionarily stable strategy) for these games and study the influence of wireless channels and pricing on the evolution of dynamics and the equilibrium.
@cite_32: We develop an evolutionary approach for analyzing network formation between selfish users and collective users (coalition) who mutually adapt their membership. A dynamic process of coalition formation is described by coupled evolutionary game dynamics. We apply them to packet forwarding problem in multi-hop heterogeneous networks and opportunistic spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks.
@cite_19: The widespread use of heterogeneous wireless technologies, their integration, advent of multi-mode terminals, and the envisioned user (service) centricity enable users to get associated with the best available networks according to user preferences and application specific requirements. When it comes to user-centric network selection, operators with the view to increasing their user-pool may offer different incentives to the users to motivate them form coalitions. In this paper, we present a novel approach of coalition network selection. We use evolutionary game-theory to model this problem. We also examine fully distributed algorithms for global optima in network selection games. Then, the problem of dynamic network formation and evolutionary coalitional games in network selection networks are investigated. This article also points out the open research issues, new interests and developments in this interdisciplinary field.
@cite_31: The success of cognitive radio networks lies on whether secondary users (SUs) follow the sharing rule that do not disturb the existing primary users (PUs). However, SUs may not behave in the desirable way as long as their own transmissions are successful. In this case, PUs may suffer heavy interference and system is deteriorated. Via evolutionary game modeling, this letter studies the dynamics of cognitive radio ad hoc networks against misbehaved SUs due to sensing errors or selfish nature. Our study suggests that cognitive radio network is fragile to the misbehaved SUs if incentives for the successful secondary transmissions are high. Consequently, all other SUs evolve to dishonest behaviors leading to network collapse.
Sharing a similar motivation as ours, existing research on wireless networks has seen some focus on algorithm design and analysis based on evolutionary game theory. In @cite_32 , used evolutionary dynamics to analyze node behavior over time in the context of two problems, namely channel access in slotted ALOHA systems and decentralized power control. Evolutionary coalition games were used to study the problem of network formation in @cite_33 and @cite_19 while dynamic routing games were studied in @cite_18 . In their work in @cite_31 , studied the evolution of misbehavior among secondary users in a cognitive radio network.