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		52012DC0314

			Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on Belgium’s 2012 national reform programme and delivering a Council opinion on Belgium’s stability programme for 2012-2015 /* COM/2012/0314 final */

			   	Recommendation for a
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
on Belgium’s 2012 national reform
programme
and delivering a Council opinion on Belgium’s stability programme for 2012-2015
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 121(2) and 148(4)
thereof,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No
1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies[1], and in particular Article 5(2)
thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No
1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November on the
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances[2], and in particular Article 6(1)
thereof,
Having regard to the recommendation of the
European Commission[3],
Having regard to the resolutions of the
European Parliament,[4]
Having regard to the conclusions of the
European Council,
Having regard to the opinion of the
Employment Committee,
After consulting the Economic and Financial
Committee,
Whereas:
(1)       On 26 March 2010, the
European Council agreed to the European Commission’s proposal to launch a new
strategy for jobs and growth, Europe 2020, based on enhanced coordination of
economic policies, which will focus on the key areas where action is needed to
boost Europe’s potential for sustainable growth and competitiveness.
(2)       On 13 July 2010, the
Council adopted a recommendation on the broad guidelines for the economic
policies of the Member States and the Union (2010 to 2014) and, on 21 October
2010, adopted a decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the
Member States[5],
which together form the ‘integrated guidelines’. Member States were invited to
take the integrated guidelines into account in their national economic and
employment policies.
(3)       On 12 July 2011, the
Council adopted a recommendation on Belgium’s national reform programme for 2011
and delivered its opinion on Belgium’s updated stability programme for 2011-2014.
(4)       On 23 November 2011, the
Commission adopted the second Annual Growth Survey, marking the start of the second
European Semester of ex-ante and integrated policy coordination, which is
anchored in the Europe 2020 strategy. On 14 February 2012, the Commission, on
the basis of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, adopted the Alert Mechanism Report[6], in which it identified Belgium
as one of the Member States for which an in-depth review would be carried out.
(5)       On 2 March 2012, the
European Council endorsed the priorities for ensuring financial stability,
fiscal consolidation and action to foster growth. It underscored the need to
give priority to growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, to restore normal
lending conditions to the economy, to promote growth and competitiveness, to tackle
unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis, and to modernise public
administration.
(6)       On
2 March 2012, the European Council also invited the Member States participating
in the Euro Plus Pact to present their commitments in time for their inclusion
in their stability or convergence programmes and their national reform programmes.
(7)       On
30 April 2012, Belgium submitted its 2012 stability programme covering the
period 2012-2015 and its 2012 national reform programme. In order to take
account of their interlinkages, the two programmes have been assessed at the
same time. The Commission has also assessed in an in-depth review, under
Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, whether Belgium is affected by
macroeconomic imbalances. The Commission concluded in its in-depth review[7] that Belgium is experiencing an external imbalance, although not
excessive.
(8)       Based
on the assessment of the 2012 stability programme pursuant to Council
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the Council is of the opinion that the
macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme
is plausible for the years 2012 and 2013 and optimistic for the years 2014 and
2015 as it foresees GDP growth to be substantially higher than the latest
estimates of potential growth emerging from the Commission's 2012 spring
forecast. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is
to bring the deficit below 3% of GDP in 2012 (to 2.8% of GDP, down from 3.7% of
GDP in 2011) and to zero in 2015. The programme confirms the previous medium-term
budgetary objective (MTO) of a surplus of 0.5% of GDP in structural terms,
which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact The
planned 2012 headline deficit complies with the deadline set by the Council for
the correction of the excessive deficit and the planned fiscal effort complies
with the EDP recommendation of a minimal average annual effort of ¾% of GDP in
structural terms. The planned growth rate of government expenditure, taking
into account discretionary revenue measures, complies with the expenditure
benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2013 to 2015, but not in 2012. Based
on the (recalculated) structural budget balance[8], the
programme projects the structural balance to improve by 1.1 percentage point of
GDP in 2012 and by about 0.8% of GDP on average over the period 2013-2015. However,
there are risks stemming from the fact that the additional measures to be taken
from 2013 onwards are not yet specified and that the macroeconomic scenario
from 2014 onwards is too optimistic. The government debt, which at 98.0% of GDP
in 2011 is well above the 60% threshold, is planned by the programme to
stabilise and then to decline to 92.3% in 2015, which would imply sufficient
progress towards meeting the debt reduction benchmark of the Stability and
Growth Pact. Moreover, implicit liabilities stemming from the guarantees given
to the financial sector are particularly large. The
rules-based, multi-annual framework for general government, particularly with
regard to expenditure would benefit from enforcement mechanisms and/or
commitments from the regions and communities, as well as from the local level,
in order to meet their allocated deficit targets.
(9)       The
costs associated with ageing should be addressed and a structural decline in
the deficit should be achieved to reduce the high public debt. The new federal
government agreed in December 2011 on a reform of the Belgian old-age social
security system. An effective implementation and monitoring of the initiated
statutory reforms is now necessary, with a view to raising the effective
retirement age. Underpinning the reform of old-age social security by measures
that stimulate active ageing and longer working are crucial, while further
reforms, such as linking the statutory retirement age to life expectancy, would
also help to achieve this goal.
(10)     The Belgian financial
system still faces considerable challenges. Restructuring of the Belgian banks
is on-going, and state aid granted in 2008/2009 as a response to the financial
crisis has not yet been fully repaid. Moreover, given the high level of
guarantees, the risks of the banking and public sectors are interrelated.
(11)     The current account is gradually
deteriorating over time. The improvement of the services balance does not make
up for the deterioration in the trade balance for goods. Belgian exports of
goods have lost ground not only with respect to expanding world trade, but also
with respect to other euro area countries and the euro area on average pointing
to unfavourable domestic cost developments in unit labour costs compared to
Belgium's main trading partners (NL, FR, DE) and the euro area as a whole. Given
the existence of an automatic wage-indexation system, the efforts of the
government to limit real wage increases to no more than 0.3 % in the
period 2011-2012 may not have prevented nominal wage growth from exceeding that
in the neighbouring countries. Although productivity levels are high, its growth
is weak and also the costs of intermediary inputs, mainly energy, are high.
Retail gas and electricity prices have been frozen in order to limit inflation,
but no concrete measures have been taken with respect to reforming the wage-bargaining
and wage-indexation system itself. The R&D intensity of the private sector
has stagnated in recent years and shortage of skilled professionals,
particularly in sciences and engineering, could become a major barrier in terms
of further improving the innovation performance of the Belgian economy.
(12)     Some structural measures
have been taken to boost employment of younger and older workers and to bring
more of the unemployed into the work force. Belgium has engaged in a wide
reform of its unemployment-benefit system. However structural problems in the
labour market persist and more could be done to tackle them. Increasing the
lifelong-learning participation rate and pursuing the reforms in vocational
education and training (VET) are crucial to improving the effectiveness of
active labour market policies (ALMP), in particular for older workers and
disadvantaged groups, such as people with a migrant background. No significant
headway has been made on the reduction of the tax burden on labour. A new tax
credit for the lowest wages was introduced in June 2011 but it has not proved sufficient
to remedy the significant unemployment traps at the bottom of the pay scale. No
shift of the fiscal burden away from labour towards consumption and/or
eco-taxes has been undertaken.
(13)     Prices for many goods and
services are generally higher than in other Member States, reflecting weak
competitive pressures — especially in the retail sector and network industries
— and a weak supervisory framework. In the retail sector, barriers to entry and
operational restrictions remain high. In particular, competition-restricting
regulations still restrict opening hours, protect incumbents against new entry
and inhibit the spread of new business models and technologies. A common
competition problem in the network sectors in Belgium is the strong position of
the incumbent and the high entry barriers compared to other Member States,
meaning that former monopolists in these sectors can still charge higher prices
than a competitive market would allow. The Belgian Competition authority is
being reformed but it remains unclear whether the new authority will be
sufficiently independent and have adequate resources.
(14)     While Belgium is on track
to meet the target to increase the share of renewable energy in the economy,
progress towards reaching the 15 % reduction target for greenhouse gasses
(GHG) in the non-ETS[9]
sectors is forecast to be virtually non-existent. Belgium has not adopted
sufficient measures or policy initiatives in 2011 to address this situation.
(15)     Belgium has made a number
of commitments under the Euro Plus Pact. These commitments, and the
implementation of the commitments presented in 2011, relate to improving
competitiveness, raising the employment rate, boosting the sustainability of
public finances and strengthening financial stability. The Commission has
assessed the implementation of the Euro Plus Pact commitments. The results of
this assessment have been taken into account in the recommendations.
(16)     In the context of the
European Semester, the Commission has carried out a comprehensive analysis of Belgium’s
economic policy. It has assessed both the stability programme and national reform
programme and presented an in-depth review. It has taken into account not only
their relevance for sustainable fiscal and socio-economic policy in Belgium but
also their compliance with EU rules and guidance, given the need to reinforce
the overall economic governance of the European Union by providing EU-level
input to future national decisions. Its recommendations under the European
Semester are reflected in recommendations (1) to (7) below.
(17)     In the light of this
assessment, the Council has examined Belgium’s stability programme for 2012 and
its opinion[10]
is reflected in particular in recommendation (1) below.
(18)     In the light of the results
of the Commission’s in-depth review and this assessment, the Council has
examined Belgium’s national reform programme for 2012 and Belgium’s stability
programme. Its recommendations under Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011
are reflected in particular in recommendations (1), (4), (5) and (6) below,
HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Belgium
should take action within the period 2012-2013 to:
1.           Implement the budget for
the year 2012 to make sure the excessive deficit is corrected by 2012. Additionally,
specify the measures necessary to ensure implementation of the budgetary
strategy for the year 2013 and beyond, thereby ensuring that the excessive
deficit is corrected in a durable manner and that sufficient progress is made
towards the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO), including meeting the
expenditure benchmark, and ensure progress towards compliance with the debt
reduction benchmark. Adjust the fiscal framework to ensure that the budgetary
targets are binding at federal and sub-federal levels, and increase
transparency of burden-sharing and accountability across layers of government.
2.           Continue to improve the
long-term sustainability of public finances by curbing age-related expenditure,
including health expenditure. In particular, implement the reform of
pre-retirement and pension schemes and introduce measures linking the statutory
retirement age with increases in life expectancy.
3.           Further increase capital
of the weakest banks to underpin the strength of the banking sector so that it
can play its normal role in lending to the economy.
4.           To boost job creation and
competitiveness, take steps to reform, in consultation with the social partners
and in accordance with national practice, the system of wage bargaining and
wage indexation. As a first step, ensure that wage growth better reflects
developments in labour productivity and competitiveness, by (i) ensuring the implementation
of ex-post correction mechanisms foreseen in the 'wage norm' and promoting
all-in agreements to improve cost-competitiveness and (ii) facilitating the use
of opt-out clauses from sectoral collective agreements to better align wage
growth and labour productivity developments at local level.
5.           Significantly shift taxes
from labour to less growth-distortive taxes including for example environmental
taxes. Pursue the initiated reform of the unemployment benefit system to reduce
disincentives to work and strengthen the focus of employment support and
activation policies on vulnerable groups, in particular people with a migrant
background. Take advantage of the planned further regionalisation of labour
market competencies to boost interregional labour mobility and to strengthen
the coherence between education, life-long learning, vocational training and
employment policies. Extend existing activation efforts to all age groups.
6.           Continue to strengthen
competition in the retail sector by lowering barriers to entry and reducing
operational restrictions. Introduce measures to strengthen competition in the
network industries (electricity and gas, telecom, postal services and
transport) by revising regulatory barriers and reinforcing the institutional arrangements
for effective enforcement of state aid rules.
7.           Take measures to correct
the lack of progress towards reaching the targets for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions from non-ETS activities, in particular by ensuring a significant
contribution to this goal from transport.
Done at Brussels,
                                                                       For
the Council
                                                                       The
President
[1]               OJ L 209, 02.08.1997, p. 1
[2]               OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25
[3]               COM(2012)314 final
[4]               P7_TA(2012)0048 and P7_TA(2012)0047
[5]               Council Decision 2012/238/EU of 26 April 2012
[6]               COM(2012) 68 final.
[7]               SWD(2012)150 final
[8]               Cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and
temporary measures, recalculated by the Commission services on the basis of the information provided in the programme, using
the commonly agreed methodology.
[9]               In Belgium only 37.9 % of emissions come from
sectors included in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). Of the more important
non-ETS sectors, road transport (21.5 %) and energy use (38.9 %) are
the most important sources of GHG emissions in the country. .
[10]             Under Article 5(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No
1466/97.


title: Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Finland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Finland

text:
               18.8.2015

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 272/14

         COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
   of 14 July 2015
   on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Finland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Finland
   (2015/C 272/04)
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 121(2) and 148(4) thereof,
   Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (1), and in particular Article 5(2) thereof,
   Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (2), and in particular Article 6(1) thereof,
   Having regard to the recommendation of the European Commission,
   Having regard to the resolutions of the European Parliament,
   Having regard to the conclusions of the European Council,
   Having regard to the opinion of the Employment Committee,
   Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee,
   Having regard to the opinion of the Social Protection Committee,
   Having regard to the opinion of the Economic Policy Committee,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               On 26 March 2010, the European Council agreed to the Commission's proposal to launch a new strategy for growth and jobs, Europe 2020, based on enhanced coordination of economic policies. The strategy focuses on the key areas where action is needed to boost Europe's potential for sustainable growth and competitiveness.

               (2)

               On 14 July 2015, the Council, on the basis of the Commission's proposals, adopted a Recommendation on the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and the Union and, on 21 October 2010, it adopted a decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (3). Together these form the ‘integrated guidelines’ which Member States were invited to take into account in their national economic and employment policies.

               (3)

               On 8 July 2014, the Council adopted a Recommendation (4) on Finland's National Reform Programme for 2014 and delivered its opinion on Finland's updated Stability Programme for 2014. On 28 November 2014, in line with Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), the Commission presented its opinion on Finland's draft budgetary plan for 2015.

               (4)

               On 28 November 2014, the Commission adopted the Annual Growth Survey, marking the start of the 2015 European Semester for economic policy coordination. On the same day, on the basis of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, the Commission adopted the Alert Mechanism Report, in which Finland was identified as one of the Member States for which an in-depth review would be carried out.

               (5)

               On 18 December 2014, the European Council endorsed the priorities for fostering investment, intensifying structural reforms and pursuing responsible growth-friendly fiscal consolidation.

               (6)

               On 26 February 2015, the Commission published its 2015 country report for Finland. This assessed Finland's progress in addressing the country-specific recommendations adopted on 8 July 2014. The country report also includes the results of the in-depth review under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. The Commission's analysis leads it to conclude that Finland is experiencing macroeconomic imbalances which require policy action and monitoring. In particular, risks relating to weak export performance in a context of industrial restructuring deserve attention. While the decline in export market shares and electronic industry has largely come to an end, investment remains low and potential growth has declined. Private-sector debt has stabilised and does not appear to be a source of immediate concern, but its relatively high level calls for close monitoring.

               (7)

               On 2 April 2015, Finland submitted its 2015 National Reform Programme and its 2015 Stability Programme. To take account of their interlinkages, the two programmes have been assessed at the same time.

               (8)

               Finland is currently in the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. In the 2015 Stability Programme submitted by the outgoing government, which is based on a no-policy-change assumption and covers the period 2014-2019, the headline deficit, which was increased to 3,2 % of GDP in 2014 and thereby exceeded the reference value of 3 % of GDP, is projected to further deteriorate to 3,4 % of GDP in 2015, before gradually declining to 3,1 % in 2017 and further to 2,5 % of GDP in 2019. According to the 2015 Stability Programme, the Government debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase over the programme's forecast horizon and to reach 67,8 % by 2019. The medium-term objective — a structural deficit of 0,5 % of GDP — is not reached by the end of the programme period. The macroeconomic scenario underpinning these budgetary projections is plausible. Based on the Commission's 2015 spring forecast, Finland's general government deficit is forecast at 3,3 % of GDP in 2015 and 3,2 % of GDP in 2016, while the debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to increase to 64,4 % of GDP by 2016. The Commission published on 13 May 2015 a report in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty concluding that deficit and debt criteria were not considered to be complied with. However, on 27 May the incoming government published its Strategic Programme, including planned consolidation measures. According to an assessment by the Commission, if fully implemented, these measures are expected to reduce the headline deficit to well below 3 % of GDP in 2016. After a deterioration in 2014, there is another deviation from the required structural effort under the preventive arm in 2015. The expenditure benchmark is expected to be met by a wide margin in 2015. There may thus be a risk of a significant deviation from the required adjustment towards the MTO over 2014-2015, which will need to be reassessed ex post. In 2016, taking into account the measures announced by the incoming government there is a risk of some deviation. Therefore, further measures will be needed to reach the required structural adjustments. Based on its assessment of the Stability Programme and taking into account the Commission's 2015 spring forecast, as well as an assessment of the incoming government's consolidation measures as presented on 27 May, the Council is of the opinion that there is a risk that Finland will not comply with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Although Finland has made some progress in implementing administrative reforms, the efficiency of the Finnish public sector could be improved further, particularly in areas that face cost pressures in the future from ageing.
               Social partners reached agreement on the content of the pension reform in autumn 2014, but this has yet to be adopted. Increasing the participation of older workers in the labour force is crucial in view of the fiscal sustainability gap and the planned increase of the statutory retirement age. Early exits from the labour market are mainly due to disability or on the basis of extended unemployment benefits for older workers. The Government's bill on the reform of social and healthcare services was presented to Parliament in December 2014, but no solution was found to balance the administrative model of large municipal coalitions with the autonomy of single municipalities guaranteed by the Constitution before the parliamentary elections in April 2015, and the bill lapsed. Finnish municipalities are relatively small but carry out quite extensive tasks as compared with those in other European countries. The reform of municipal structures is proceeding with some delay and the municipalities are conducting studies on the benefits of mergers. According to the 2015 National Reform Programme, a new legislative proposal may be submitted to Parliament by the end of 2016.

               (9)

               In view of ageing population and the shrinking working-age population, it is important that the labour market has access to the full potential workforce. Finland has made some progress on this and taken several measures, including a better organisation of wage subsidies, with a particular focus on the elderly, and of the public employment service. The unemployment rate was 8,7 % in 2014 and is on the rise, particularly among young people and older workers. The moderate wage agreement of 2013 supports the restoration of cost and export competitiveness through lower growth in unit labour costs.

               (10)

               Finland has made some progress in boosting its capacity to deliver innovative products. The Government is implementing a comprehensive reform of research institutes and funding. Policy programmes for clean technology, biotechnology and digitisation are promising but relatively small scale. Although investment in R & D is among the highest in the Union, Finland still faces challenges in converting this into successful export products and services. The Government has sought to make support systems for businesses simpler and more efficient, increase financing for start-ups and promote their internationalisation. Nevertheless, investment in Finland has remained low, export difficulties have continued and employment has fallen. Efforts are also needed to enhance competition in product and service markets, especially in the retail sector, which remains highly concentrated.

               (11)

               In the context of the European Semester, the Commission has carried out a comprehensive analysis of Finland's economic policy and published it in the 2015 country report. It has also assessed the Stability Programme and the National Reform Programme and the follow-up given to the recommendations addressed to Finland in previous years. It has taken into account not only their relevance for sustainable fiscal and socioeconomic policy in Finland but also their compliance with EU rules and guidance, given the need to strengthen the overall economic governance of the Union by providing EU-level input into future national decisions. The recommendations under the European Semester are reflected in recommendations (1) to (4) below.

               (12)

               In the light of this assessment, the Council has examined the Stability Programme, and its opinion (6) is reflected in particular in recommendation (1) below.

               (13)

               In the light of the Commission's in-depth review and this assessment, the Council has examined the National Reform Programme and the Stability Programme. Its recommendations under Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 are reflected in recommendations (2) and (3) below.

               (14)

               In the context of the European Semester, the Commission has also carried out an analysis of the economic policy of the euro area as a whole. On the basis of this analysis, the Council has issued specific recommendations addressed to the Member States whose currency is the euro (7). As a country whose currency is the euro, Finland should also ensure the full and timely implementation of those recommendations,

         HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Finland take action in 2015 and 2016 to:

               1.

               Achieve a fiscal adjustment of at least 0,1 % of GDP towards the medium-term budgetary objective in 2015 and of 0,5 % of GDP in 2016. Continue efforts to reduce the fiscal sustainability gap and strengthen conditions for growth.

               2.

               Adopt the agreed pension reform and gradually eliminate early exit pathways. Ensure effective design and implementation of the administrative reforms concerning municipal structure and social and healthcare services, with a view to increasing productivity and cost-effectiveness in the provision of public services, while ensuring their quality.

               3.

               Pursue efforts to improve the employability of young people, older workers and the long-term unemployed, focusing particularly on developing job-relevant skills. Promote wage developments in line with productivity fully respecting the role of the social partners and in accordance with national practices.

               4.

               Take measures to open the retail sector to effective competition.

      Done at Brussels, 14 July 2015.

            For the Council

            The President

         P. GRAMEGNA

      (1)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

      (2)  OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25.

      (3)  Maintained by Council Decision 2014/322/EU of 6 May 2014 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States for 2014 (OJ L 165, 4.6.2014, p. 49).

      (4)  Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Finland and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Finland, 2014 (OJ C 247, 29.7.2014, p. 127).

      (5)  Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 11).

      (6)  Under Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.

      (7)  OJ C 272, 18.8.2015, p. 98.


Avis juridique important

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31998H0282

98/282/EC: Commission Recommendation of 21 April 1998 on the ways in which the Member States and the signatory States to the Agreement on the European Economic Area should protect intellectual property in connection with the development and manufacture of flavouring substances referred to in Regulation (EC) No 2232/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Text with EEA relevance)

Official Journal L 127 , 29/04/1998 P. 0032 - 0033

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 21 April 1998 on the ways in which the Member States and the signatory States to the Agreement on the European Economic Area should protect intellectual property in connection with the development and manufacture of flavouring substances referred to in Regulation (EC) No 2232/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Text with EEA relevance) (98/282/EC)THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the second indent of Article 155 thereof,Whereas pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2232/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 October 1996 laying down a Community procedure for flavouring substances used or intended for use in or on foodstuffs (1), the Member States (2) must notify the Commission of the list of flavouring substances which may be used in or on foodstuffs marketed on their territory; whereas these flavouring substances and the technical data relating to them are initially communicated to the competent authorities of the Member States by their manufacturer; whereas under the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) and Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2232/96 this information may be entered in a register and in an evaluation programme made public; whereas, moreover, a number of persons should have access to this information throughout the Community procedure set up by the Regulation;Whereas, however, the circulation of some of this information should be restricted; whereas the development of certain new flavouring substances and the manufacture of certain existing flavouring substances calls for heavy investment by manufacturers in research and production; whereas flavouring substances which are not inventions cannot be patented; whereas the development and manufacture of such flavouring substances nonetheless amount to trade secrets which have to be protected against acts of counterfeiting and unfair competition;Whereas the Community legislature has taken account of this fact by requiring in the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2232/96 that these flavouring substances be 'designated in such a way as to protect the intellectual property rights of their manufacturer`; whereas this need to protect intellectual property is also referred to in recital 14 of the preamble to that Regulation; whereas this requirement applies not only to flavouring substances notified pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Regulation but also in the future to new flavouring substances as referred to in Article 5(2) thereof; whereas this requirement applies at all stages of the Community procedure set up by the Regulation;Whereas intellectual property can be protected through the confidentiality of the technical data concerning the flavouring substances in question; whereas it is necessary to define the ways in which such confidential data should be protected by the Member States; whereas these ways can be defined by way of a Commission recommendation addressed to the Member States; whereas the ways in which confidential data is to be protected by the Commission are described in the communication of 21 April 1998 (3);Whereas the bodies representing the manufacturers of flavouring substances consider it sufficient to protect confidential data for a period of five years;Whereas the Member States have been consulted on this recommendation within the framework of the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs,HEREBY FORMULATES THIS RECOMMENDATION:1. Protection of the confidential data concerning a flavouring substance should be provided at the express request of the manufacturer of the flavouring substance in question, or his representative, made to the competent authorities of the Member State on whose territory the flavouring substance may be used. The Member State should examine each case to see whether or not such protection should be provided.2. This confidential information may cover:- the nature of the flavouring substances, their origin and the manufacturing process involved,- the conditions as to the use of the flavouring substances, including the names of the foodstuffs in or on which they may be used,- all the information which is not generally known to persons belonging to the circles normally dealing with the type of information in question or which is not easily accessible to them and has a commercial value.3. Where the Member State notifies to the Commission a list of flavouring substances which may be used on its territory, is should clearly indicate which substances on that list and/or which data have to be protected.4. The need to protect confidential data extends to all stages of the procedure set up by Regulation (EC) No 2232/96, and particularly in the following three areas: the possession of information, its dissemination and its processing. It is for the administrations concerned to provide such protection at their own level in each of these areas by the appropriate means (security of the premises where such data is held, security of document transmission, identification of copies made by whatever means and of the persons for whom those copies are intended, confidentiality of translations, etc.).5. At all stages of the procedure, the confidential data should be accessible only to those persons in charge or directly involved in the administrative, technical or scientific processing of the dossier, namely the officials, other employees and experts of the competent authorities of each Member State required to have a knowledge of dossiers from that Member State and possibly of dossiers from other Member States through meetings or exchanges of information. Such persons are bound by the obligation of professional secrecy under their national law or Article 214 of the EC Treaty. The confidential data should also be accessible to officials and other employees of the Member States responsible for the official control of foodstuffs and bound by the obligation of professional secrecy under their national law or Article 12 of Council Directive 89/397/EEC of 14 June 1989 on the official control of foodstuffs (4). Any other person having access to the confidential data but not bound by the obligation of professional secrecy under national or Community law should be required to sign a declaration of confidentiality.6. Confidential data relating to flavouring substances should be protected for a period of five years from the date of receipt by the Commission of the list notified by the Member State and containing the flavouring substance in question or of any dossier concerning a new flavouring substance.Done at Brussels, 21 April 1998.For the CommissionMartin BANGEMANNMember of the Commission(1) OJ L 299, 23. 11. 1996, p. 1.(2) In this recommendation, reference to the Member States also covers the signatories to the EEA Agreement.(3) OJ C 131, 29. 4. 1998, p. 3.(4) OJ L 186, 30. 6. 1989, p. 23.


Avis juridique important

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31996H0162

96/162/EC: Commission Recommendation of 8 February 1996 on a common aggregation for the purpose of making economic analyses (Text with EEA relevance)

Official Journal L 038 , 16/02/1996 P. 0020 - 0023

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 8 February 1996 on a common aggregation for the purpose of making economic analyses (Text with EEA relevance) (96/162/EC)THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,Whereas Council Regulation (EEC) No 3037/90 (1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761/93 (2), established a statistical classification of economic activities, hereinafter called 'NACE Rev. 1`;Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 3037/90 is not concerned with obligation as regards the degree of detail to be used in statistical analyses (Article 1 (3));Whereas the levels of detail for which information is available differ in various statistical fields and also from one Member State to another;Whereas there is the possibility of Member States developing for their own economic analysis needs different aggregations not comparable at the European Community level;Whereas, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the creation of common statistical standards is a task that can only be dealt with effectively at Community level; whereas such standards will be implemented in each Member State under the aegis of the organizations and institutions with responsibility for official statistics;Whereas it is essential to have harmonized aggregations available for economic analyses at the European Community level,HEREBY RECOMMENDS:Sole Article For the purposes of economic analyses, Member States are to take as far as possible the measures needed to be able to transmit to the Commission the aggregation of the economy in accordance with the 20 headings which are set out in the attached Annex and which are defined by reference to NACE Rev.1.Done at Brussels, 8 February 1996.For the CommissionYves-Thibault DE SILGUYMember of the Commission(1) OJ No L 293, 24. 10. 1990, p. 1.(2) OJ No L 83, 3. 4. 1993, p. 1.ANNEX Aggregations for economic analysis A20 >TABLE>


title: Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 15 December 2015 on the assessment of cross-border effects of and voluntary reciprocity for macroprudential policy measures (ESRB/2015/2)

text:
               12.3.2016

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 97/9

         RECOMMENDATION OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD
   of 15 December 2015
   on the assessment of cross-border effects of and voluntary reciprocity for macroprudential policy measures
   (ESRB/2015/2)
   (2016/C 97/02)
   THE GENERAL BOARD OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD,
   Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (1), and in particular Article 3 and Articles 16 to 18 thereof,
   Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (2), and in particular Article 458 thereof,
   Having regard to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (3), and in particular Section II of Chapter 4 of Title VII thereof,
   Having regard to Decision ESRB/2011/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 20 January 2011 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Systemic Risk Board (4), and in particular Article 15(3)(e) and Articles 18 to 20 thereof,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               In the Union, the financial system is highly integrated. This means that foreign entities often provide cross-border financial services. In the single market, financial service providers in a certain Member State can choose between providing financial services via subsidiaries or branches located in another Member State or providing cross-border financial services directly. This situation can lead to national macroprudential policy having sizeable cross-border effects.

               (2)

               Foreign financial service providers providing cross-border financial services, either directly or through their branches in other Member States, are not usually affected by the macroprudential policy measures that apply to national financial service providers in those Member States. As a result, financial service providers that would otherwise fall within the scope of such requirements, i.e. because they have a local subsidiary, have an incentive to route their activities through alternative channels to circumvent host country measures. The leakages and regulatory arbitrage that result from such behaviour could undermine the effectiveness of national macroprudential policy measures.

               (3)

               Furthermore, competition may be distorted if branches of foreign financial service providers and foreign financial service providers that provide cross-border financial services directly use their competitive advantage, such as lower capital requirements for exposures generated in the activating Member State, over domestic financial service providers and subsidiaries of foreign financial service providers in that Member State, in order to increase their market share.

               (4)

               Macroprudential policy measures taken in one country will have external effects on financial stability in other countries through cross-border linkages. In general, these effects will be positive, since macroprudential policy reduces systemic risk and the probability and impact of systemic crises, thereby also improving financial stability in other Member States. However, such effects may also be negative. For instance, despite being exposed to the same risks as domestic financial service providers and subsidiaries of foreign financial service providers, branches of foreign financial service providers and foreign financial service providers providing cross-border financial services directly will not usually be required to build-up resilience against these risks, for example by being subject to national capital measures in their home Member State. Moreover, to the extent that these financial service providers enjoy a competitive advantage over domestic financial service providers and the subsidiaries of foreign financial service providers, this might encourage them to increase their exposure to the relevant macroprudential risks in the activating Member State, thereby exposing the home Member State to greater risk. If these macroprudential risks relating to the provision of financial services were to materialise, the capital buffers of these financial service providers might prove to be insufficient, which would have negative consequences for their home financial systems.

               (5)

               Against this background and to ensure the effectiveness and consistency of macroprudential policy, macroprudential policy makers need to give due consideration to such cross-border effects and, when warranted, deploy suitable policy instruments to address them. To achieve this aim, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) recommends an approach that is based on two main pillars, namely: (a) the systematic assessment of the cross-border effects of macroprudential policy; and (b) a coordinated policy response in the form of voluntary reciprocity for macroprudential policy measures when needed. It is also important that these pillars are implemented as consistently as possible throughout the Union.

               (6)

               To date, the systematic assessment of the cross-border effects of macroprudential policy has not received the attention it deserves. This is partially due to the fact that knowledge relating to (potential) spillover channels remains limited and the available data has not been fully examined with a view to analysing cross-border effects. As a result, the ESRB considers it important for all available data to be used systematically to better understand and assess cross-border effects.

               (7)

               It is important to set out a procedure that targets the systematic assessment of the cross-border effects of macroprudential policy and aims to ensure that macroprudential policy makers make an ex ante assessment of any potential cross-border effects of their proposed measures. In addition, and considering the existing requirements of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), Directive 2013/36/EU and Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board (6), macroprudential policy makers should make ex post assessments of the actual cross-border effects of their policies. The analytical work conducted by the Member States will complement the analytical work conducted by the ESRB.

               (8)

               The coordinated policy response advocated by the ESRB takes the form of an arrangement for voluntary reciprocity for macroprudential policy measures. The voluntary nature of the arrangement, resulting from the nature of ESRB recommendations (7), differentiates such voluntary reciprocity from the mandatory recognition of certain macroprudential policy measures under Union law. This Recommendation, with the exception of recommendation A regarding the assessment of cross-border effects and recommendation B regarding the notification of macroprudential policy measures, is not intended to apply to macroprudential policy measures for which Union law already provides for mandatory recognition. Mandatory recognition is currently provided for with regard to measures taken pursuant to Articles 124(5) and 164(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and for the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) if it is set below the ceiling for mandatory recognition. The same exception applies to CCB rates that are above the ceiling for mandatory recognition, since Recommendation ESRB/2014/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board (8) already advocates the full reciprocation of CCB rates between Member States.

               (9)

               To ensure the effectiveness and consistency of national macroprudential policy measures, it is important to complement the mandatory recognition required under Union law with voluntary reciprocity, thereby also bringing branches of foreign financial service providers and foreign financial service providers providing cross-border financial services directly within the scope of national macroprudential policy measures. The ultimate objective is for the same set of macroprudential requirements to apply to the same type of risk exposure in a given Member State, irrespective of the legal status and location of the financial service provider. Hence exposure-based macroprudential policy measures, in particular those which target a specific risk exposure, should be reciprocated.

               (10)

               This Recommendation provides guidance to the relevant authorities with regard to adopting reciprocating measures in response to other relevant authorities' macroprudential policy measures. The listed macroprudential policy measures activated in one Member State should be reciprocated in all other Member States. Macroprudential policy measures will be listed in this Recommendation if the relevant activating authority requests reciprocation and if the ESRB regards the request for reciprocation as being justified. In order to ensure the efficiency of the voluntary reciprocity arrangement it is important that the ESRB is notified of such measures in a timely manner and in sufficient detail, using a standardised template.

               (11)

               In order to ensure the effectiveness of the voluntary reciprocity arrangement the relevant authorities will be expected to adopt reciprocating measures within a reasonable time frame. Longer time frames will be recommended for measures that are not available in all jurisdictions.

               (12)

               This Recommendation is intended to cover all macroprudential policy measures, irrespective of which part of the financial system they address. Based on the ESRB's mandate in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, the scope of this Recommendation goes beyond the application of macroprudential instruments provided for in Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. Hence, this Recommendation is intended to also cover measures that have not been harmonised under Union law. The scope of this Recommendation is subject to the respective jurisdiction of the relevant authorities and applies to macroprudential policy measures that the relevant authorities are mandated to adopt or activate.

               (13)

               National competent authorities, designated authorities as well as macroprudential authorities and the European Central Bank (ECB) (for Member States participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)) are considered relevant authorities, in particular if they are mandated to adopt or activate macroprudential policy measures. Moreover, Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (9) and Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank (10) assign specific supervisory tasks to the ECB. The ECB may apply higher requirements for capital buffers or more stringent measures than those applied by the national designated authorities. For this exclusive purpose, the ECB is considered, as appropriate, the competent or designated authority and has all the powers and obligations, which competent authorities and designated authorities have under the relevant Union law.

               (14)

               New macroprudential policy measures taken by the Member States participating in the SSM must go through the relevant SSM coordination procedures. The reciprocity arrangement, as defined by this Recommendation, is without prejudice to these internal SSM coordination procedures, and the ESRB's reciprocity assessment will only start once the internal SSM coordination procedures have been concluded.

               (15)

               Authorities may exempt financial service providers with non-material exposure to the identified macroprudential risk in the activating country (de minimis principle). This is a national discretion that authorities may also choose not to apply if reciprocity is considered a matter of principle.

               (16)

               To ensure the transparency and accountability of macroprudential policy measures, as well as their effective implementation, the relevant authorities should establish a communication strategy regarding reciprocation requests and any reciprocating measures, as part of their general communication strategy regarding macroprudential policy measures. With regard to reciprocation requests it is of particular importance that all authorities concerned are provided with any information that is relevant and necessary for their respective decision-making processes in a timely manner. Moreover, it is equally important that stakeholders (including, but not limited to, the direct addressees of macroprudential policy measures) are fully informed of any macroprudential policy measure that is relevant for them in a timely manner.

               (17)

               The process recommended by this Recommendation and Decision ESRB/2015/4 (11) is designed to be as efficient and effective as possible in order to achieve voluntary reciprocation. In the context of the forthcoming review of the Union's macroprudential policy framework and in line with possible amendments to the existing toolset, the European Commission should, however, consider whether and in what manner the voluntary reciprocity arrangement as set out in this Recommendation could best be anchored in Union law to foster the effectiveness of national macroprudential policies. Ideally, the European Commission's proposal should be based on the voluntary reciprocity arrangement as elaborated in this Recommendation and in Chapter 11 of the ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macroprudential Policy in the Banking Sector (hereinafter the ‘ESRB Handbook’) (12).

               (18)

               ESRB recommendations are published after informing the Council of the General Board's intention to do so and providing the Council with an opportunity to react,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:
   SECTION 1

      RECOMMENDATIONS

      Recommendation A – Assessment of cross-border effects of relevant authorities' own macroprudential policy measures

               1.

               The relevant activating authorities are recommended to assess, prior to their adoption, the cross-border effects of the implementation of their own macroprudential policy measures. At the very least, the spillover channels operating via risk adjustment and regulatory arbitrage should be assessed, using the methodology set out in Chapter 11 of the ESRB Handbook.

               2.

               The relevant activating authorities are recommended to assess the possible:

                           (a)

                           cross-border effects (leakages and regulatory arbitrage) of the implementation of macroprudential policy measures in their jurisdiction; and

                           (b)

                           cross-border effects on other Member States and on the Single Market of any proposed macroprudential policy measures.

               3.

               The relevant activating authorities are recommended to monitor at least once a year the materialisation and evolution of the cross-border effects of the macroprudential policy measures they have introduced.

      Recommendation B – Notification and reciprocation request with regard to relevant authorities' own macroprudential policy measures

               1.

               The relevant activating authorities are recommended to notify the ESRB of macroprudential policy measures as soon as they are adopted, and no later than two weeks after their adoption. Notifications should include an assessment of cross-border effects and of the necessity for reciprocation by other relevant authorities. The relevant activating authorities are requested to provide the information in English using the templates published on the ESRB's website.

               2.

               If reciprocation by other Member States is deemed necessary to ensure the effective functioning of the relevant measures, the relevant activating authorities are recommended to submit a request for reciprocation to the ESRB, together with the notification of the measure.

               3.

               If macroprudential policy measures were activated prior to the adoption of this Recommendation, or if reciprocation was not considered necessary when the measures were first introduced, but the relevant activating authority has subsequently decided that such reciprocation has become necessary, the relevant activating authorities are recommended to submit a request for reciprocation to the ESRB.

      Recommendation C – Reciprocation of other relevant authorities' macroprudential policy measures

               1.

               The relevant authorities are recommended to reciprocate the macroprudential policy measures adopted by other relevant authorities and recommended for reciprocation by the ESRB.

               2.

               The relevant authorities are recommended to reciprocate the macroprudential policy measures listed in this Recommendation by implementing the same macroprudential policy measure as the one that has been implemented by the activating authority. If the same macroprudential policy measure is not available in national legislation, the relevant authorities are recommended to reciprocate, following consultation with the ESRB, by adopting a macroprudential policy measure available in its jurisdiction that has the most equivalent effect to the activated macroprudential policy measure.

               3.

               Unless a specific deadline is recommended in relation to the reciprocation of a macroprudential policy measure, the relevant authorities are recommended to adopt reciprocating macroprudential policy measures no later than three months, following the publication of the latest amendment of this Recommendation in the Official Journal of the European Union. The adopted and reciprocating measures should have the same activation date insofar as possible.

      Recommendation D – Notification of the reciprocation of other relevant authorities' macroprudential policy measures

   The relevant authorities are recommended to notify the ESRB of their reciprocation of other relevant authorities' macroprudential policy measures. Notifications should be sent no later than one month after the reciprocating measure has been adopted. The notifying authorities are requested to provide the information in English, using the template published on the ESRB's website.
   SECTION 2

      IMPLEMENTATION

   1.   Interpretation

   For the purposes of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply:

               (a)

               ‘activation’ means the application of a macroprudential policy measure at national level;

               (b)

               ‘adoption’ means a decision taken by a relevant authority regarding the introduction, reciprocation or amendment of a macroprudential policy measure;

               (c)

               ‘financial service’ means any service of a banking, credit, insurance, personal pension, investment or payment nature;

               (d)

               ‘macroprudential policy measure’ means any measure that addresses the prevention and mitigation of systemic risk as defined in Article 2(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 and is adopted or activated by a relevant authority subject to Union or national law;

               (e)

               ‘notification’ means a written notice in English to the ESRB from the relevant authorities, including the ECB pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, regarding a macroprudential policy measure in accordance with, but not limited to, Article 133 of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article 458 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and which may be a reciprocation request from a Member State in accordance with, but not limited to, Article 134(4) of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article 458(8) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;

               (f)

               ‘reciprocity’ means an arrangement, whereby the relevant authority in one jurisdiction applies the same, or equivalent, macroprudential policy measure, as is set by the relevant activating authority in another jurisdiction, to any financial institutions under its jurisdiction, when they are exposed to the same risk in the latter jurisdiction;

               (g)

               ‘relevant activating authority’ means a relevant authority that is in charge of applying a macroprudential policy measure at national level;

               (h)

               ‘relevant authority’ means an authority entrusted with the adoption and/or activation of macroprudential policy measures, including but not limited to:

                           (i)

                           a designated authority in accordance with Chapter 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article 458 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, a competent authority as defined in Article 4(1)(40) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the ECB in accordance with Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013; or

                           (ii)

                           a macroprudential authority with the objectives, arrangements, powers, accountability requirements and other characteristics set out in Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 of the European Systemic Risk Board (13).

         2.   Exemptions

               1.

               The relevant authorities may exempt financial service providers under their jurisdiction from applying a particular reciprocating macroprudential policy measure, if these financial service providers have non-material exposures to the identified macroprudential risk in the jurisdiction where the relevant activating authority is applying the macroprudential policy measure in question (de minimis principle). Similar to the practice adopted for the CCB in Article 130 of Directive 2013/36/EU, authorities may choose to exempt financial service providers with exposures below a set threshold from reciprocating this macroprudential policy measure. The relevant authorities are requested to report to the ESRB on such exemptions, using the template for notifying reciprocating measures published on the ESRB's website. When applying a de minimis principle, authorities need to monitor closely whether leakages and regulatory arbitrage materialise and close the regulatory loophole if needed.

               2.

               If the relevant authorities have already reciprocated and disclosed the measure before the measure is recommended for reciprocation in this Recommendation, the reciprocating measure does not need to be amended even if it differs from the one implemented by the activating authority.

         3.   Timeline and reporting

               1.

               The relevant authorities are requested to report to the ESRB and the Council on the actions they take in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify any inaction. Reports shall be sent every two years, with the first report due by 30 June 2017. The reports should contain as a minimum:

                           (a)

                           information on the substance and timing of the actions taken;

                           (b)

                           an assessment of the functioning of the actions taken, from the perspective of the objectives of this Recommendation;

                           (c)

                           detailed justification of any exemptions granted pursuant to the de minimis principle, together with any inaction or departure from this Recommendation, including any delays.

               2.

               In the event of shared responsibilities, relevant authorities should coordinate with each other in order to provide the necessary information on time.

               3.

               The relevant authorities are encouraged to inform the ESRB at the earliest opportunity of any proposed macroprudential policy measures.

               4.

               A reciprocating macroprudential policy measure is deemed to be equivalent if it has, insofar as possible:

                           (a)

                           the same economic impact;

                           (b)

                           the same scope of application; and

                           (c)

                           the same consequences (sanctions) for non-compliance.

         4.   Amendments to the Recommendation

   The General Board will decide when this Recommendation needs to be amended. Such amendments include in particular any additional or modified macroprudential policy measures to be reciprocated as set out in Recommendation C and the related annexes containing measure-specific information. The General Board may also extend the deadlines set forth in the previous paragraphs where legislative initiatives are necessary to comply with one or more recommendations. In particular, the General Board may decide to amend this Recommendation following the European Commission's review of the mandatory recognition framework under Union law or on the basis of experience gained with the operation of the voluntary reciprocity arrangement established by this Recommendation.
   5.   Monitoring and assessment

               1.

               The ESRB Secretariat:

                           (a)

                           assists the relevant authorities by facilitating coordinated reporting, providing relevant templates and detailing where necessary the procedure and the timeline for compliance;

                           (b)

                           verifies compliance by the relevant authorities, including by assisting them at their request, and submits compliance reports to the General Board.

               2.

               The General Board assesses the actions and the justifications reported by the relevant authorities and, where appropriate, decides whether this Recommendation has not been followed and whether the relevant authorities have failed to adequately justify their inaction.

      Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 December 2015.

            The Chair of the ESRB

         Mario DRAGHI

      (1)  OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1.

      (2)  OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1.

      (3)  OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.

      (4)  OJ C 58, 24.2.2011, p. 4.

      (5)  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

      (6)  Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy (ESRB/2013/1) (OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1).

      (7)  Although ESRB recommendations are not legally binding, they are coupled with an ‘act or explain’ mechanism.

      (8)  Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 18 June 2014 on guidance for setting countercyclical buffer rates (ESRB/2014/1) (OJ C 293, 2.9.2014, p. 1).

      (9)  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

      (10)  Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ L 141, 14.5.2014, p. 1).

      (11)  The English version is available on the ESRB's website at www.esrb.europa.eu

      (12)  Published on the ESRB's website at www.esrb.europa.eu

      (13)  Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (ESRB/2011/3) (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1).


Avis juridique important

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31996Y0503(02)

Council Recommendation of 22 April 1996 on guidelines for preventing and restraining disorder connected with football matches

Official Journal C 131 , 03/05/1996 P. 0001 - 0011

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONof 22 April  1996on guidelines for preventing and restraining disorder connected with football matches(96/C  131/01)THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the recommendation of the Council of the European Union for the exchange of  information on the occasion of major events and meetings, adopted on 30 November 1994, Having regard to the initiative submitted by the United Kingdom on 21 June 1995, Having regard to the conclusion of the Council of the European Union on 21 June 1995, Whereas there have been instances of serious disorder at football matches in a number of Member  States including matches in international competitions, and whereas there is a need to ensure a  consistent, coordinated, and effective response on the part of the police and the football  authorities; Whereas the Council believes that techniques and procedures which have contributed to the  successful containment of disorder should be more widely and consistently applied in relation to  international high-risk matches; Whereas the Council considers that adoption of a more consistent approach to these problems would  be likely to lead to a reduction in the number and seriousness of incidents of disorder; Whereas some of the recent outbreaks of disorder can be linked to lax controls on ticket sales at  the grounds on the day of the match; Whereas recommendations have been adopted under the 1985 European Convention on Spectator Violence  and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches, for actions to be followed  whenever the threat of violent disorder is foreseen by the country in which a football match is to  be played, HEREBY RECOMMENDS TO MEMBER STATES: I. To draw on the recommendations of the Standing Committee of the aforementioned  Convention, contained in the checklist of measures to be taken by organizers and public authorities  concerning high-risk indoor sports events, in particular those that concern police cooperation  adopted by Recommendation No 1/94 at its 14th meeting on 1 and 2 June 1994, which it considers to  be particularly useful in preventing or containing disorder. II. To follow the recommendations set out hereafter, in addition to those made under the  Convention: Information exchange1. That Member States should use a common format for police intelligence  reports about known or suspected groups of troublemakers. The common format should include an  overall assessment of the potential for disorder, and detailed information in relation to travel by  air, coach, private vehicles and rail. A copy of the suggested format is attached in the Annex. 2. That Member States consider transmitting these reports quickly and effectively, possibly by  means of the 'football hooliganism` network of correspondents. Cooperation on trainingThat, with a view to exchanging and disseminating information between  Member States about techniques for preventing disorder at football matches, police officers should,  where appropriate, be encouraged to attend relevant training courses held for police officers in  other Member States. Police cooperationThat the host country should formally ask the appropriate responsible authority  of the other Member State or States for their police support, specifying the number of officers  that are considered appropriate. The request should be submitted as soon as possible and ideally no  later than four weeks prior to the match. Agreement can then be reached by the two authorities  about the number and background of the officers. Cooperation of supervisorsThat, while the football authorities or clubs are responsible for  appointing and training their stewards in those Member States where this role exists, the police  should contribute to training programmes in order to promote close cooperation between stewards and  police officers, recognizing the important role of stewards in supervising supporters and securing  their safety, and thus enabling any police officers present at football grounds to concentrate on  their main law enforcement duties. Done at Luxembourg, 22 April 1996. For the CouncilThe PresidentS. AGNELLI ANNEX STANDARD FORMAT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF POLICE INTELLIGENCE ON FOOTBALL HOOLIGANS  EUROPEAN COMPETITION FIXTURE >START OF GRAPHIC>. V. . COMPETITION . DATE . VENUE . KICK-OFF-TIME . ASSESSMENT AND CATEGORIZATION OF SUPPORTplease indicate estimated numbers of supporters in  bracketsA = peaceful []B = some potential for confrontation or disorder especially  alcohol-related []C = violent or organizers of violence []INTELLIGENCE: . . . . . . . >END OF GRAPHIC>TRAVEL INFORMATION >START OF GRAPHIC>. V. . PRIVATE CAR/MINIBUS/CAMPERS/VAN, ETC. OUTWARD/RETURN JOURNEY(Please delete as necessary)Description of vehicle: . . Make/colour: . Registration No: . Number of passengers: . Categorization of passengers: . . . Organized or independent travellers: . Date/time/place of departure: . . Ferry company/ferry crossing/date/time of crossing: . . Channel Tunnel/dates/times: . . Motorways or other routes: . . . Border crossing points/times: . . . Time of arrival at venue: . ACCOMMODATIONStopovers en route if applicable and name of hotel/pension/campsite:: . . . Hotel/pension/campsite at venue: . . . COMMENTS>END OF GRAPHIC>TRAVEL INFORMATION >START OF GRAPHIC>. V. . AIR TRAVELOUTWARD/RETURN JOURNEY(please delete as necessary)Scheduled or charter flight: . . Name of travel company: . . Name of airline or air operator and flight No: . . Date/time of departure: . Departure airport: . . Number of supporters on flight: . Categorization of supporters on flight: . . . Organized or independent travellers: . Date/time of arrival (show local time if appropriate): . . Arrival airport: . . ACCOMMODATIONName of hotel/pension/campsite, etc.: . . . . COMMENTS>END OF GRAPHIC>TRAVEL INFORMATION >START OF GRAPHIC>. V. . RAIL TRAVELOUTWARD/RETURN JOURNEY(Please delete as necessary)Date/time of train: . . Departure station: . . Number of supporters travelling: . . Organized or independent travellers: . . Ferry company/date/time of crossing: . . Channel Tunnel/date/time: . . Departure station after crossing: . . Date/time of train: . . Date/time of arrival: . . ACCOMMODATIONStopovers en route if applicable and name of hotel/pension/campsite: . . . Hotel/pension/campsite at venue: . . . COMMENTS>END OF GRAPHIC>TRAVEL INFORMATION >START OF GRAPHIC>. V. . COACH TRAVELOUTWARD/RETURN JOURNEY(Please delete as necessary)Name of company: . . Number of coaches: . Description of vehicles/livery: . . . Registration No: . Number of passengers on each vehicle: . Categorization of passengers on each vehicle: . . Organized or independent travellers: . Date/time/place of departure: . . Ferry company/date/time of crossing: . . Channel Tunnel/dates/times: . . Motorways or other routes showing border crossing points/dates/times: . . . Stops/locations/times: . . . Estimates time of arrival at venue: . . ACCOMMODATIONStopovers en route if applicable and name of hotel/pension/campsite: . . . Hotel/pension/campsite at venue: . . . COMMENTS>END OF GRAPHIC>


title: Council Recommendation of  14 February 2006  on the appointment of a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank

text:
               17.2.2006

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 47/58

      COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

   of 14 February 2006
   on the appointment of a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank
   (2006/108/EC)
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Articles 112(2)(b) and 122(4) thereof, and to Articles 11.2 and 43.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank,
   Whereas:
   The term of office of Mr Otmar ISSING expires on 31 May 2006. A member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank must be appointed,
   HEREBY RECOMMENDS THAT:
   Mr Jürgen STARK be appointed a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank for a term of office of eight years with effect from 1 June 2006.
   This Recommendation shall be submitted for a decision to the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Community whose currency is the euro, after consulting the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.
   This Recommendation shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

      Done at Brussels, 14 February 2006.

            For the Council

            The President

         K.-H. GRASSER