title: Council Recommendation of 11 July 2017 on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Croatia and delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 Convergence Programme of Croatia

text:
               9.8.2017

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 261/41

         COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
   of 11 July 2017
   on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Croatia and delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 Convergence Programme of Croatia
   (2017/C 261/10)
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 121(2) and 148(4) thereof,
   Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (1), and in particular Article 9(2) thereof,
   Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (2), and in particular Article 6(1) thereof,
   Having regard to the recommendation of the European Commission,
   Having regard to the resolutions of the European Parliament,
   Having regard to the conclusions of the European Council,
   Having regard to the opinion of the Employment Committee,
   Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee,
   Having regard to the opinion of the Social Protection Committee,
   Having regard to the opinion of the Economic Policy Committee,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               On 16 November 2016, the Commission adopted the Annual Growth Survey, marking the start of the 2017 European Semester for economic policy coordination. The priorities of the Annual Growth Survey were endorsed by the European Council on 9-10 March 2017. On 16 November 2016, on the basis of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, the Commission adopted the Alert Mechanism Report, in which it identified Croatia as one of the Member States for which an in-depth review would be carried out.

               (2)

               The 2017 country report for Croatia was published on 22 February 2017. It assessed Croatia’s progress in addressing the country-specific recommendations adopted by the Council on 12 July 2016, the follow-up given to the country-specific recommendations adopted in previous years and Croatia’s progress towards its national Europe 2020 targets. It also included an in-depth review under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, the results of which were also published on 22 February 2017. The Commission’s analysis led it to conclude that Croatia is experiencing excessive macroeconomic imbalances. In particular, in 2016, the general government debt ratio moved onto a declining path, but public debt is exposed to currency risk, and fiscal sustainability risks remain high in the medium term. Private-sector debt has been decreasing, but remains high, especially in the corporate sector, and is heavily exposed to currency risk. The financial sector is set to support the recovery, but remains exposed to currency-induced credit risk, and the non-performing loans ratio is still high. The unemployment rate is falling rapidly as a result of moderate job creation and a shrinking labour force. Finally, a cumbersome business environment depresses productive investment and productivity growth.

               (3)

               On 27 April 2017, Croatia submitted its 2017 National Reform Programme and its 2017 Convergence Programme. To take account of their interlinkages, the two programmes have been assessed at the same time.

               (4)

               Relevant country-specific recommendations have been addressed in the programming of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds) for the 2014-2020 period. As provided for in Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), where it is necessary to support the implementation of relevant Council recommendations, the Commission may request a Member State to review and propose amendments to its Partnership Agreement and relevant programmes. The Commission has provided further details on how it would make use of that provision in guidelines on the application of the measures linking effectiveness of the ESI Funds to sound economic governance.

               (5)

               Following the abrogation of the excessive deficit procedure, Croatia is in the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact and subject to the debt rule. In its 2017 Convergence Programme, the Government plans a gradual improvement of the general government balance from -0,8 % of GDP in 2016 to 0,5 % of GDP in 2020. The medium-term budgetary objective, set at -1,75 % of GDP in structural terms, was met with a wide margin in 2016, and the (recalculated (4)) structural balance is planned to be at the medium-term budgetary objective in 2017 and 2018, but with no margin. Thereafter, it is projected to slightly improve again. The Convergence Programme expects the general government debt-to-GDP ratio to continue declining to 72,1 % by 2020, after peaking at 86,7 % of GDP in 2015. The macroeconomic scenario underpinning those budgetary projections is favourable, in particular in view of the negative impact of the financial difficulties facing Croatia’s largest private company, Agrokor, which the programme projections do not consider. The Agrokor crisis also poses direct risks to the budgetary projections. Moreover, the measures needed to support the planned deficit targets from 2017 onwards have not yet been fully specified.

               (6)

               On 12 July 2016, the Council recommended Croatia to achieve an annual fiscal adjustment of at least 0,6 % of GDP towards the medium-term budgetary objective in 2017. Outturn data showing a sizeable improvement in the headline balance for 2016 indicate that Croatia already reached its medium-term budgetary objective in that year. The Commission 2017 spring forecast projects the structural balance to remain above the medium-term budgetary objective in 2017, in spite of its decline from -0,3 % of GDP in 2016 to -1,7 % of GDP in 2017. In 2018, Croatia is recommended to remain at the medium-term budgetary objective. The Commission 2017 spring forecast expects the structural balance to further decrease to -2,1 % of GDP, pointing to a risk of some deviation from the medium-term budgetary objective. Croatia is forecast to comply with the debt rule in 2017 and 2018. Overall, the Council is of the opinion that Croatia needs to stand ready to take further measures in 2018 to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact.

               (7)

               Croatia’s fiscal governance framework shows shortcomings. The new fiscal responsibility act, supposed to strengthen the budgetary framework as well as the independence and mandate of the Fiscal Policy Commission, has not yet been adopted. The amendment of the budget act, aimed at strengthening the medium-term budgetary framework and addressing the revisions of budgetary plans at both central and local levels, has been delayed. The reliability of the projections underlying the budgetary plans remains weak.

               (8)

               Croatia has relatively low revenue from recurrent taxation of immovable property. Revenue is collected by local authority units through charges linked to property, but with considerable variations in their calculation and coverage. It also relies on the less efficient taxation of property transfers. By way of follow-up to repeated country-specific recommendations, as part of the tax reform of late 2016, as of 2018 some local charges and taxes will be replaced by a recurrent property tax calculated on the basis of five parameters which approximate the value of the property. It is considered a first step to a fully-fledged value-based recurrent property tax.

               (9)

               Croatia’s sovereign financing needs and the exposure of sovereign debt to currency risk highlight the importance of reliable financing sources and prudent risk management. Addressing a country-specific recommendation, in early 2017 a debt management strategy for the central government was adopted, covering 2017-2019. It came three years after the expiry of the previous strategy. The institutional set-up for public debt management, including communication with the markets, risk management and the update of the strategy at regular intervals, is deficient. There is also insufficient consideration of off-budget transactions with potential impact on the debt.

               (10)

               The labour market has continued to recover recently, but unemployment is still high, with a high share of long-term jobseekers. Along with low and declining activity, this means there is a large untapped labour potential. The decline in activity in 2016 was particularly pronounced among prime-age low-skilled workers and was driven by a shrinking working-age population due to ageing and emigration, both of which have been increasing.

               (11)

               Inactivity is relatively high among cohorts eligible for early retirement. Short contribution periods result in low current and future pension adequacy and risks of old-age poverty. There are many pathways to early retirement, possible a full five years before the statutory retirement age. Financial incentives to work until that age are weak. Announced measures to encourage longer working lives have not been implemented. Care responsibilities contribute to low labour market participation, of older prime-age women in particular. There is a shortage of formal childcare and there are large regional disparities, with work contracts allowing little flexibility to balance work and care. To date, the statutory pensionable age is 61 years and 9 months for women and 65 years for men. The convergence and increase of the statutory retirement ages is slow, with both sexes to reach a pensionable age of 67 in 2038. Speeding this up is under consideration but has not yet been adopted. The pension system gives entitlement to more favourable conditions to specific categories of workers in occupations classified as arduous and hazardous, and in specific sectors. The Croatian authorities have completed a review of the arduous or hazardous professions, but the rules have not yet been streamlined.

               (12)

               According to the latest data, in 2015, almost 30 % of the population was exposed to the risk of poverty or social exclusion. The social protection system displays shortcomings in effectiveness and fairness, stemming from inconsistencies in eligibility criteria, fragmented geographical coverage, lack of coordination across authorities in charge, and low transparency. In 2016, only 0,6 % of GDP was spent on the minimum income scheme targeting the poorest households. Reform plans including the institutional reassignment of responsibilities and the harmonisation of eligibility criteria have stalled.

               (13)

               The acquisition of skills needed in the labour market is an important condition for employability. Participation in adult education is very low, as are expenditure and coverage of active labour market policies, retraining measures and lifelong learning. Training does not sufficiently focus on older and low-skilled workers and the long-term unemployed, who tend to face particular employability challenges. The preparation of legislation to improve the quality of the institutions, programmes and teaching for adult learning has been delayed.

               (14)

               Sufficient basic skills are essential for people to find and retain good, stable jobs and successfully participate in economic and social life. International survey information points to severe deficiencies in basic skills, applied science and mathematics among Croatian 15-year-old schoolchildren. Since 2015, as part of the implementation of the education, science and technology strategy, a reform of the school curricula was launched to improve on content and teaching of transferable skills. After ambivalent stakeholder reactions, the curricular reform was revised, and implementation has been significantly delayed. The process now needs to continue in line with the original objectives. Croatia recently adopted a vocational education and training (VET) strategy. This is expected to lead to an update of the VET curricula, an increased role of work-based learning, and improved VET teaching quality. The introduction of the system for recognising and validating non-formal and informal learning is pending.

               (15)

               The territorial and functional fragmentation of public administration weighs on service delivery and the efficiency of public expenditure. Current competences and fiscal relations between levels of government are not conducive to the efficient and fair delivery of public services, in particular in health, education, and social assistance. The comprehensive public administration reform faces delays. Legislation to reallocate tasks between the central and local authorities is pending, as is the streamlining of the system of state agencies. In early 2017 the Croatian authorities announced the establishment of a task force to draw up legislation on subnational government financing.

               (16)

               Fragmentation in wage setting in public administration continues to impede the transparency of wages and equality of treatment, as well as government control over the public wage bill, with risks of spillovers to the broader economy. In February 2017, the Government adopted common guidelines for negotiating and monitoring collective agreements in the public sector, but the streamlining of the wage-setting frameworks has been postponed to 2018.

               (17)

               State-owned enterprises are on average less productive than private firms, suggesting weaknesses in their governance. They exert a negative impact on allocative efficiency, and contribute to low productivity growth in the economy. In the past year, steps to open state-owned enterprises to private control advanced slowly. Better monitoring of their performance and boards’ accountability, including of firms owned by local government units, would help improve their management.

               (18)

               The Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development (HBOR) has a key role in implementing the Union financial instruments and the Investment Plan for Europe in particular. To play this role fully, it needs to comply with high standards of transparency and accountability. The Croatian authorities plan an independent asset quality review of its credit portfolio by independent auditors, to be concluded by the end of 2017. Based on the findings, its regulatory framework and governance structures will be revisited.

               (19)

               Businesses are burdened with high regulatory costs. A high number of parafiscal charges, many of which are statistically treated as taxes, complicate the business environment. Addressing a country-specific recommendation, in summer 2016 the Government decided to abolish 13 and reduce another 11 parafiscal charges, but implementation has been slow. Businesses continue to suffer from a high administrative burden. An action plan for reducing the administrative burden was adopted, covering eight regulatory areas, but implementation is pending.

               (20)

               Investment recovered in 2016, after a sharp decline during the crisis. But despite favourable macroeconomic and financing conditions, key bottlenecks weigh on a more sustained recovery in investment. The weaknesses of public administration, the cumbersome business environment, slow implementation of the anti-corruption strategy, restrictive regulation in key infrastructure sectors, and the strong presence of the State in the economy weigh on the business climate.

               (21)

               The modernisation of professional regulation can promote labour mobility and contribute to lower prices for professional services, thereby increasing the growth potential. Croatia’s regulation for service providers and regulated professions has been restrictive, for lawyers in particular. In summer 2016, the Government adopted an action plan to replace and modernise unfit regulation, which however was limited in scope and detail.

               (22)

               The quality and efficiency of the justice system is a key determinant of the business environment. Despite reduced backlogs, first instance court proceedings are long in commercial, civil and criminal cases. The electronic filing and delivery of court documents has the potential to significantly improve the justice system, but has not yet been rolled out. Commercial judges cannot access registers online: this weighs on the efficiency of insolvency proceedings. Court judgments are only rarely available online, and there is scope to upgrade business processes at first-instance commercial courts.

               (23)

               The banking sector remains well capitalised, and its profitability recovered in 2016 following the conversion of Swiss franc into euro loans in 2015. The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans has been declining lately but is still high, among non-financial corporations in particular. The decline appears to be driven by sales, as well as the progressive and automatic provisioning requirements introduced in 2013. As part of the recent tax reform, the Government also introduced a new tax treatment for write-offs of non-performing loans, in response to a country-specific recommendation. Its effects require close monitoring. The efficiency of the recently reformed insolvency framework in facilitating the resolution of non-performing loans also deserves close monitoring.

               (24)

               In the context of the 2017 European Semester, the Commission has carried out a comprehensive analysis of Croatia’s economic policy and published it in the 2017 country report. It has also assessed the 2017 Convergence Programme, the 2017 National Reform Programme and the follow-up given to the recommendations addressed to Croatia in previous years. It has taken into account not only their relevance for sustainable fiscal and socioeconomic policy in Croatia, but also their compliance with Union rules and guidance, given the need to strengthen the Union’s overall economic governance by providing Union-level input into future national decisions.

               (25)

               In the light of this assessment, the Council has examined the 2017 Convergence Programme and its opinion (5) is reflected in particular in recommendation (1) below.

               (26)

               In the light of the Commission’s in-depth review and this assessment, the Council has examined the 2017 National Reform Programme and the 2017 Convergence Programme. Its recommendations made under Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 are reflected in recommendations (1) to (5) below,

         HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Croatia take action in 2017 and 2018 to:

               1.

               Pursue its fiscal policy in line with the requirements of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, which entails remaining at its medium-term budgetary objective in 2018. By September 2017, reinforce budgetary planning and the multiannual budgetary framework, including by strengthening the independence and mandate of the Fiscal Policy Commission. Take the necessary steps for the introduction of the value-based property tax. Reinforce the framework for public debt management, including by ensuring annual updates of the debt management strategy.

               2.

               Discourage early retirement, accelerate the transition to the higher statutory retirement age and align pension provisions for specific categories with the rules of the general scheme. Improve coordination and transparency of social benefits.

               3.

               Improve adult education, in particular for older workers, the low-skilled and the long-term unemployed. Accelerate the reform of the education system.

               4.

               Reduce the fragmentation and improve the functional distribution of competencies in public administration, while enhancing the efficiency and reducing territorial disparities in the delivery of public services. In consultation with social partners, harmonise the wage-setting frameworks across the public administration and public services.

               5.

               Speed up the divestment of state-owned enterprises and other state assets, and improve corporate governance in the state-owned enterprise sector. Significantly reduce the burden on businesses stemming from costs of regulation and from administrative burdens. Remove regulatory restrictions hampering access to and the practice of regulated professions and professional and business services. Improve the quality and efficiency of the justice system, in particular by reducing the length of civil and commercial cases.

      Done at Brussels, 11 July 2017.

            For the Council

            The President

         T. TÕNISTE

      (1)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

      (2)  OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25.

      (3)  Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 320).

      (4)  Cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, recalculated by the Commission using the commonly agreed methodology.

      (5)  Under Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.


				|

		52013PC0544

			Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION on the approval of the conclusion by the Commission, on behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community, of a Protocol to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union /* COM/2013/0544 final - 2013/ () */

			   	EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
On 24 September 2012 the
Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations, on behalf of the
European Union and its Member States and the Republic of Croatia, with
Montenegro in order to conclude a Protocol to the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one
part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part, to take account of the
accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union.
These negotiations started
on 22 November 2012, following prior technical consultations with Montenegro on the issue. Further negotiating rounds took place on 25 January 2013 and 7
March 2013. The Protocol was initialled by the Commission and the Government of
Montenegro on 16 May 2013. The text of the initialled protocol is attached.
The
Commission proposes that the Council decides on the signature and provisional
application of the Protocol on behalf of the European Union and concludes the
Protocol on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) is also a Party to the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement. For the conclusion of the Protocol on behalf of the
European Atomic Energy Community, the Commission proposes that the Council
gives its approval, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 101 of the
Treaty establishing the EAEC.
In accordance with Article
101 EAEC Treaty, the decision to sign the agreement is adopted by the
Commission and the decision to conclude the agreement is adopted by the
Commission with the approval of the Council. It is therefore necessary to adopt
separate decisions for the signature and conclusion of the Protocol by the EU
and by the EAEC.
For the conclusion of the
Protocol on behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community, the Commission
proposes that the Council:
–
gives its approval, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 101 of the Treaty establishing the EAEC.
Recommendation for a
COUNCIL DECISION
on the approval of the conclusion by the
Commission, on behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community, of a Protocol to
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of
the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to
the European Union
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular the second paragraph of
Article 101 thereof,
Having regard to the recommendation from
Commission,
Whereas:
(1)
On 24 September 2012 the Council authorised the
Commission to open negotiations with Montenegro in order to conclude a Protocol
to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of
the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to
the European Union.
(2)
These negotiations have been successfully
completed.
(3)
The Protocol should therefore be concluded, also
on behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community as regards matters falling
under the Euratom Treaty.
(4)
The signature and conclusion of the Protocol is
subject to a separate procedure as regards matters falling under the Treaty on
European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
(5)
The conclusion of the Protocol by the
Commission, acting on behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community, should be
approved.
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
Sole Article
The conclusion by the Commission, on behalf
of the European Atomic Energy Community, of the Protocol to the Stabilisation
and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part, to
take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union
("the Protocol") is hereby approved.
The text of the Protocol is attached to the
Decision of the Council on the signing and provisional application of a
Protocol to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Montenegro, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic
of Croatia to the European Union.
Done at Brussels,
                                                                       For
the Council
                                                                       The
President


title: Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2011 on the definition of nanomaterial Text with EEA relevance

text:
               20.10.2011

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 275/38

         COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
   of 18 October 2011
   on the definition of nanomaterial
   (Text with EEA relevance)
   (2011/696/EU)
   THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 292 thereof,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               The Commission Communication of 7 June 2005‘Nanosciences and nanotechnologies: An action plan for Europe 2005-2009’ (1) defines a series of articulated and interconnected actions for the immediate implementation of a safe, integrated and responsible approach for nanosciences and nanotechnologies.

               (2)

               The Commission, in line with the commitments made in the Action Plan, carefully reviewed relevant Union legislation with a view to determine the applicability of the existing regulations to the potential risks of nanomaterials. The result of the review was contained in the Commission Communication of 17 June 2008‘Regulatory aspects of nanomaterials’ (2). The Communication concluded that the term ‘nanomaterials’ is not mentioned specifically in Union legislation but that existing legislation in principle covers the potential health, safety and environmental risks in relation to nanomaterials.

               (3)

               The European Parliament in its resolution of 24 April 2009 on regulatory aspects of nanomaterials (3) called, inter alia, for the introduction of a comprehensive science-based definition of nanomaterials in Union legislation.

               (4)

               The definition in this Recommendation should be used as a reference for determining whether a material should be considered as a ‘nanomaterial’ for legislative and policy purposes in the Union. The definition of the term ‘nanomaterial’ in Union legislation should be based solely on the size of the constituent particles of a material, without regard to hazard or risk. This definition, based only on the size of a material, covers natural, incidental or manufactured materials.

               (5)

               The definition of the term ‘nanomaterial’ should be based on available scientific knowledge.

               (6)

               Measuring size and size distributions in nanomaterials is challenging in many cases and different measurement methods may not provide comparable results. Harmonised measurement methods must be developed with a view to ensuring that the application of the definition leads to consistent results across materials and over time. Until harmonised measurement methods are available, best available alternative methods should be applied.

               (7)

               The European Commission Joint Research Centre Reference Report ‘Considerations on a Definition of Nanomaterial for Regulatory purposes’ (4) suggests that a definition of nanomaterials should address particulate nanomaterials, be broadly applicable in Union legislation and be in line with other approaches worldwide. Size should be the only defining property which necessitates a clear definition of the nanoscale limits.

               (8)

               The Commission mandated the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) to provide scientific input on elements to consider when developing a definition of the term ‘nanomaterial’ for regulatory purposes. The opinion ‘Scientific basis for the definition of the term “Nanomaterial” ’ was subject to a public consultation in 2010. In its opinion of 8 December 2010 (5), SCENIHR concluded that size is universally applicable to nanomaterials and the most suitable measurand. A defined size range would facilitate a uniform interpretation. The lower limit was proposed at 1 nm. An upper limit of 100 nm is commonly used by general consensus, but there is no scientific evidence to support the appropriateness of this value. The use of a single upper limit value might be too limiting for the classification of nanomaterials and a differentiated approach might be more appropriate. For regulatory purposes, the number size distribution should also be considered using the mean size and the standard deviation of the size to refine the definition. The size distribution of a material should be presented as size distribution based on the number concentration (i.e. the number of objects within a given size range divided by the number of objects in total) and not on the mass fraction of nanoscale particles in the nanomaterial as a small mass fraction may contain the largest number of particles. SCENIHR identified certain specific cases where the application of the definition can be facilitated by using the volume specific surface area as proxy to determine if a material falls within the defined nano size range.

               (9)

               The International Organisation for Standardisation defines the term ‘nanomaterial’ as ‘material with any external dimensions in the nanoscale or having internal structure or surface structure in the nanoscale’. The term ‘nanoscale’ is defined as size range from approximately 1 nm to 100 nm (6).

               (10)

               The number size distribution should cover for the fact that nanomaterials most typically consist of many particles present in different sizes in a particular distribution. Without specifying the number size distribution, it would be difficult to determine if a specific material complies with the definition where some particles are below 100 nm while others are not. This approach is in line with the opinion of SCENIHR that the particle distribution of a material should be presented as the distribution based on the number concentration (i.e. the particle number).

               (11)

               There is no unequivocal scientific basis to suggest a specific value for the size distribution below which materials containing particles in the size range 1 nm-100 nm are not expected to exhibit properties specific to nanomaterials. The scientific advice was to use a statistical approach based on standard deviation with a threshold value of 0,15 %. Given the widespread occurrence of materials that would be covered by such a threshold and the need to tailor the scope of the definition for use in a regulatory context, the threshold should be higher. A nanomaterial as defined in this recommendation should consist for 50 % or more of particles having a size between 1 nm-100 nm. In accordance with SCENIHR’s advice, even a small number of particles in the range between 1 nm-100 nm may in certain cases justify a targeted assessment. However, it would be misleading to categorise such materials as nanomaterials. Nevertheless there may be specific legislative cases where concerns for the environment, health, safety or competitiveness warrant the application of a threshold below 50 %.

               (12)

               Agglomerated or aggregated particles may exhibit the same properties as the unbound particles. Moreover, there can be cases during the life-cycle of a nanomaterial where the particles are released from the agglomerates or aggregates. The definition in this Recommendation should therefore also include particles in agglomerates or aggregates whenever the constituent particles are in the size range 1 nm-100 nm.

               (13)

               At present it is possible to measure the specific surface area by volume for dry solid materials or powders with the nitrogen adsorption method (‘BET-method’). In those cases the specific surface area can be used as a proxy to identify a potential nanomaterial. New scientific knowledge may expand the possibility to use this and other methods to other types of materials in the future. There can be a discrepancy between the measurement of the specific surface area and the number size distribution from one material to another. Therefore it should be specified that results for number size distribution should prevail and it should not be possible to use the specific surface area to demonstrate that a material is not a nanomaterial.

               (14)

               Technological development and scientific progress continue with great speed. The definition including descriptors should therefore be subject to a review by December 2014 to ensure that it corresponds to the needs. In particular, the review should assess whether the number size distribution threshold of 50 % should be increased or decreased and whether to include materials with internal structure or surface structure in the nanoscale such as complex nano-component nanomaterials including nano-porous and nano-composite materials that are used in some sectors.

               (15)

               Guidance and standardised measurement methods as well as knowledge about typical concentrations of nanoparticles in representative sets of materials should be developed where feasible and reliable to facilitate the application of the definition in a specific legislative context.

               (16)

               The definition set out in this Recommendation should not prejudge nor reflect the scope of application of any piece of Union legislation or of any provisions potentially establishing additional requirements for those materials, including those relating to risk management. It may in some cases be necessary to exclude certain materials from the scope of application of specific legislation or legislative provisions even if they fall within the definition. It may likewise be necessary to include additional materials, such as some materials with a size smaller than 1 nm or greater than 100 nm in the scope of application of specific legislation or legislative provisions suited for a nanomaterial.

               (17)

               Given the special circumstances prevailing in the pharmaceutical sector and the specialised nano-structured systems already in use, the definition in this Recommendation should not prejudice the use of the term ‘nano’ when defining certain pharmaceuticals and medical devices,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION

               1.

               Member States, the Union agencies and economic operators are invited to use the following definition of the term ‘nanomaterial’ in the adoption and implementation of legislation and policy and research programmes concerning products of nanotechnologies.

               2.

               ‘Nanomaterial’ means a natural, incidental or manufactured material containing particles, in an unbound state or as an aggregate or as an agglomerate and where, for 50 % or more of the particles in the number size distribution, one or more external dimensions is in the size range 1 nm-100 nm.
               In specific cases and where warranted by concerns for the environment, health, safety or competitiveness the number size distribution threshold of 50 % may be replaced by a threshold between 1 and 50 %.

               3.

               By derogation from point 2, fullerenes, graphene flakes and single wall carbon nanotubes with one or more external dimensions below 1 nm should be considered as nanomaterials.

               4.

               For the purposes of point 2, ‘particle’, ‘agglomerate’ and ‘aggregate’ are defined as follows:

                           (a)

                           ‘particle’ means a minute piece of matter with defined physical boundaries;

                           (b)

                           ‘agglomerate’ means a collection of weakly bound particles or aggregates where the resulting external surface area is similar to the sum of the surface areas of the individual components;

                           (c)

                           ‘aggregate’ means a particle comprising of strongly bound or fused particles.

               5.

               Where technically feasible and requested in specific legislation, compliance with the definition in point 2 may be determined on the basis of the specific surface area by volume. A material should be considered as falling under the definition in point 2 where the specific surface area by volume of the material is greater than 60 m2/cm3. However, a material which, based on its number size distribution, is a nanomaterial should be considered as complying with the definition in point 2 even if the material has a specific surface area lower than 60 m2/cm3.

               6.

               By December 2014, the definition set out in points 1 to 5 will be reviewed in the light of experience and of scientific and technological developments. The review should particularly focus on whether the number size distribution threshold of 50 % should be increased or decreased.

               7.

               This Recommendation is addressed to the Member States, Union agencies and economic operators.

      Done at Brussels, 18 October 2011.

            For the Commission

         Janez POTOČNIK

            Member of the Commission

      (1)  COM(2005) 243 final.

      (2)  COM(2008) 366 final.

      (3)  P6_TA(2009) 0328.

      (4)  EUR 24403 EN, June 2010.

      (5)  http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_032.pdf

      (6)  http://cdb.iso.org


title: Recommendation for COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) concerning the conclusion of a second Addditional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel (submitted to the Council by the Commission)

text:
ARCHIVES HISTORIQUES
DE LA COMMISSION
COLLECTION RELIEE DES
DOCUMENTS "COM"
COM (80) 835
Vol. 1980/0266
 ---pagebreak--- Disclaimer
Conformément au règlement (CEE, Euratom) n° 354/83 du Conseil du 1er février 1983
concernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communauté économique
européenne et de la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15.2.1983,
p. 1), tel que modifié par le règlement (CE, Euratom) n° 1700/2003 du 22 septembre 2003
(JO L 243 du 27.9.2003, p. 1), ce dossier est ouvert au public. Le cas échéant, les documents
classifiés présents dans ce dossier ont été déclassifiés conformément à l'article 5 dudit
règlement.
In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983
concerning the opening to the public of the historical archives of the European Economic
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ L 43, 15.2.1983, p. 1), as
amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243,
27.9.2003, p. 1), this file is open to the public. Where necessary, classified documents in this
file have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation.
In Übereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom 1.
Februar 1983 über die Freigabe der historischen Archive der Europäischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft (ABI. L 43 vom 15.2.1983,
S. 1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. September 2003
(ABI. L 243 vom 27.9.2003, S. 1), ist diese Datei der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich. Soweit
erforderlich, wurden die Verschlusssachen in dieser Datei in Übereinstimmung mit Artikel 5
der genannten Verordnung freigegeben.
 ---pagebreak--- COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
                                                     COM(80)835 final
                                                     Brussels , 9 December 1980
                         /u_ Recommendation for
                        | COUNCIL REGULATION ( EEC )
concerning the conclusion of a second Addditional Protocol to the
          Agreement between the European Economic Community
                             and the State of Israel
               ( submitted to the Council by the Commission )
C0M(80 ) 835 final
 ---pagebreak---        Ν
                                               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1.   It was Laid down in Article; 22 of the Agreement between the European       >
     Economic Community and the State of Israel that , from the beginning of
     1978 , the Contracting Parties were to carry out a first review of the
     results of the Agreement on the basis of experience 'and consider any
     improvements which could be made .                                 .
2.   Exploratory talks concerning the application of Article 22 were held
   , between the Commission and an Israeli Delegation on 25 September 1978 .
     After examining the Commission 's report on these exploratory talks ( 1 ),
     the Counci I . authorized , the Commission to open negotiations with the
     Israeli representatives in accordance with the following directives :
     -   A two-year deferment of the date of. the next reduction in the Israeli
         customs tariff for the products listed in Annex A to Protocol No 2
         to the Agreement .                                           ,   .
     -   A two-year deferment of the final date after which Israel is no
         longer authorized to introduce , increase br re-introduce customs
         duties to.gr,ot.ect its new industries ( Article 3 of Protocol No 2 )..
             "!.*■ " j ;" r- Sie ■ •• - ■; - '      " 3 -
3.   At an initial negotiating meeting held in March 1979 it emerged that        <
     the IsPael'F'rfegoti ators regarded the .Community' s offer-as far from adequate
     since it did not contain any concession for agricultural products , par
     ticularly citrus fruits
     When the Commission presented its report on the March negotiations ( 2 ) to
     the Counci I , therefore/ it proposed that the following two points be
     added to its directives          :
     (1)   COM ( 78 ) 662 final .
     (2)   COM ( 79 ) 288 final .
 ---pagebreak--- -  the reduction in the> Common Customs Tariff , for fresh oranges falling
   within subheading 08.02 ex A. would be changed from 60% to 70% ;
-  the level of voluntary restraint on exports to the Community of
   tomato concentrates originating in Israel Viould be re-evaluated
   on the basis of the trend of Israel's exports over the last few
   years , and also with reference to the figures for Community supplies
   of this product .                              ■ ,       -  –
The Councif 'was unable to accept the Commission 's proposals concerning the
addition of these points to its directives . However , at its meeting
of 18 March 1980 it authorized the Commission to present to the Israeli
Delegation the text of a Community statement on oranges .
The Commission was invited to reply without delay and to conclude the
negotiations on the basis of this statement and the poncessions already
offered by the Community in the first round of discussions .
At a further negotiating meeting held in Brussels on 22 September 1980
and in subsequent contacts between Commission officials and representatives
of Israel , agreement was reached at negotiator level on the following
points :                                                . .
-  the conclusion of an additional protocol to the EEC-Israel Agreement
   formally establishing the concessions offered by the Community on
.  the dismantling of tariffs by Israel and protection-for - new industries ;
    ' v 7                    .
   an exchange of letters containing     :                                  '
        in the letter from the Community negotiator , the text of the
        statement of 18 March 1980 on oranges ,
        in the reply from the Israeli negoti ator , in addition to an
        acknowledgement of receipt of the above letter , the text of
        the statement made in Luxembourg on 7 October 1980 by the
        President of the Council at the meeting of the Cooperation
        Ccunci 1 .                                    ,
 ---pagebreak---                                                                                3.
5. Accordingly , the purpose of this Communication is :
   a)   to obtain the Council 's approval concerning                                          :
        -  a proposal for a Council regulation approving a second Additional
           Protocol to the Agreement of 11 May 1975 ;
                                                                                f-
        –  the draft of a second' Additional: Protocol deferring by two years                                            :
                          „· . '·                           ο -Λ      ν ·'· ι ζ* '   ■ Ο' . ί   * .«     ■ -           *
                 •                 s- A -                                                              i     , \
           .    the next st3ges of tariff dismantling to, be undertaken
                by the State of Israel- under ' Article 1 .( 2 ) of Protocol No . 2 -
                                          1                   OfV ■' C; Op^T: ■ ' . CU't " . •: '                    '
              ■       . \ j ;>                   ;:.v         ct            h i.h -                              ■ 1
           .   the expiry of the provisions of Article 3 of Protocol No . 2 ;
                  . 'e-       r; .                               o ~ vth<~ nt <f
   b)   to notify the Council of the exchange of letters , which is not for
        publication, between the negotiators of the Community and Israel .
   Thris Communication replaces the one presented to the Council on 11 December
   1979 CC0MC79 ) 752 ).                                  '
                                          ■v < "     i. v      ; ' j~i f c         ~r ì ^          : »
 ---pagebreak---                                   RECOMMENDATION FOR
                          COUNCIL REGULATION ( EEC )
CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF A SECOND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT
         BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE . STATE OF ISRAEL
THE COUNCIL OF THE - EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ,                    ,
HAVING regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community ,
and in particular Article 113 thereof ,
       >           '•                                                !..
HAVING regard to the Recommendation from the Commission ,
WHEREAS the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European
Economic Community and the State of Israel , signed in Brussels on
should be concluded ,                                -
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION    :
                                   Article 1
The second Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic
Community and the State of Israel is hereby approved on behalf of the
Community .                _
The text referred to in the first paragraph is annexed to this Regulation .
                                   Article 2            -                     »
The President of the Council shall give t tie notifications provided for in
 Article 4 of the second Additional Protocol .
                 .    /            Arti cle 3
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication
in the Official Journal of the European Communities ( 1 ).
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in
all Member States .
Done at Brussels ,
                                                           For the Counci I
                                                            The President
(1)   The date of the entry into force of the second Additional Protocol will
      be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities by the
      General Secretariat of the Council .
 ---pagebreak---                           SECOND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY ,                                       "
                                                          of the one part , and
THE STATE OF ISRAEL , -
                                                          of the other part ,
HAVING regard to Article 22 of the Agreement between the European Economic
Community and the State of Israel ,
                                                                     •'     *
ANXIOUS to ensure the harmonious development of their trade and in particular
to take measures which could help reduce the State of Israel 's trade deficit
with the Community , .
Whereas Israel should have the option , for a further
period of two years , of taking the protective measures essential to its
industrialization and development , under the conditions laid down in
Article 3 of Protocol No 2 to the Agreement ,
HAVE DECIDED to conclude this Protocol      :
                                 Arti cle 1
The table in Article 1 ( 2 ) of Protocol No 2 to the Agreement is. hereby replaced
by the following :
           Timetable                          »         " Rate of reduction
from  1 July        1977                                           5
from  1 July .      1978                                          20
from  1 July        1981                                          30
from  1 January     1983                                       ' 50
from  1 January     1985                                      , 80
from  1 January     1987                                        .100
                                 Article 2
In Article 3 ( 1 ) of Protocol No 2 to the Agreement " 31 December 1983" is hereby
replaced by 31 December 1985 .         -
                                 Article 3
This Protocol shall form an integral part of the Agreement .
 ---pagebreak---                                                                                2.
                                 Article 4
This Protocol is drawn up in duplicate in the Danish , Dutch , English , French ,
German , Greek , Italian and Hebrew languages , each text being equally
authenti c .                                                     \
                             • \
This Protocol shall be approved by the Contracting Parties in accordance
with their own" procedures .
It shall enter into force on the first day of the first month following
the date on which the Contracting Parties notify each other that the
necessary procedures have been carried out'.     *
Done at Brussels ,
On behalf of, the European Economic Community            On behalf of the State of Israel
 ---pagebreak---                  COMMISSION
    OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUN.T.ES                                                ._.BpusseU~.~. ;                21~Nove«bec.-498G-.
     Directorate-General for Development              <
                                            Sir-
                                            As I had occasion to inform you-verbally in the ,
                                            negotiations on the application of Article 22 of
                                            the EEC-Israel Cooperation Agreement , the Commu
                                            nity has adopted the text of the following state
                                            ment :                        : /:                  v                        .      f .
                                                                .               t : . i ..-it                       -- 'ivv;.*' ■' '
                                            "    The Community notes the importance to Israel
                                          , of orange exports to the Community .
                                            It will take account of Israel 's concern                                      on this
                                            subject in its proceedings concerning the conse
                                            quences of the enlargement of the Community for
                                            third countries ."
                                            I should be obliged if you would acknowledge
                                            receipt of this letter .
                                                                                £ • . •. a- " { 1      » - .
                                            Please accept ,             Sir ,       the assurance of my highest
                                            consideration ,                                                                ; ' . -
                                                                                Klaus Meyer
                                                                                President of the Delegation
                                                                                of the European Economic Community
Mr Itzhak Minerbi
President of the Israeli                    Delegation
BRUSSELS .
     Provisional address : Rue de la Lof 200, B-1049 Brussels - Telephone 735 00 40 / 73580 40 - Telegraphic address : "COMEUR Brussels" -
                                                            Telex : " 21 877 COMEU B "
 ---pagebreak---     Mission of Israel
    . . To The  .                                             Brussels - 21 November 1980
  European Communities
                             Sir-
                             In your letter of 21 November 1980 you stated :            «
                                            ■■              ■ -                        f
                             " As I had occasion to inform you verbally in the
                             negotiations on the application of Article 22 of
                             the EEC-Israel Cooperation Agreement , the Commu
                             nity has adopted the text of the following state
                             ment    :                                            ■    -  .
                                 The Community notes the importance to Israel of
                                 orange exports to the Community .
                                 It will take account of Israel 's concern     on this
                                 subject in its proceedings concerning the -conse
                                 quences of the enlargement of the Community for
                                 third countries."'
                             I should be obliged if you would acknowledge receipt
                             of this letter . "
                             I have the honour to acknowledge -receipt of your letter .
                             The Government of Israel has also taken note of the follow
                             ing    statement by the President of the Council of the
                            'European Communities at the meeting of the EEC-Israel
                             Cooperation Council in Luxembourg on 7 October 1980 :
                             "   The Community   will endeavour to take the special
                             concerns of its Mediterranean partners , including Israel ,
                             into consideration in its proceedings on the implications,
                             for third countries of further enlargement ."
                             Please accept , Sir , the assurance of my highest
                             consideration ,                                        ..
                                                                      Itzhak Minerbi        I
                                                           President of the Israeli Delegatii
Mr. Klaus Meyer                   ;
President of the E.E.C. Delegation
BRUSSELS .    \


Avis juridique important

|

31979H0167

79/167/ECSC, EEC, Euratom: Council recommendation of 5 February 1979 on the reduction of energy requirements for buildings in the Community

Official Journal L 037 , 13/02/1979 P. 0025 - 0026 Spanish special edition: Chapter 12 Volume 3 P. 0134  Portuguese special edition Chapter 12 Volume 3 P. 0134

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION  of 5 February 1979  on the reduction of energy requirements for buildings in the Community  (79/167/ECSC, EEC, Euratom)  THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaties establishing the European Communities,  Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),  Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2),  Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (3),  Whereas the Council, in its resolution of 17 December 1974 concerning Community energy policy objectives for 1985 (4) approved the objective of reducing the rate of growth in energy consumption for the Community as a whole to a level of 15 % below the forecasts made in January 1973 ; whereas the Council adopted at the same time a Resolution on a Community action programme for the rational utilization of energy (5);  Whereas at the Council meeting on 6 and 7 July 1978, the Heads of State or of Government of the Member States adopted the objective of reducing to 0 78 the ratio between the rate of increase in energy consumption and the rate of increase in the gross domestic product in the Community by 1985;  Whereas it is estimated that substantial additional energy savings could be obtained by 1985 by investing in improved thermal insulation of buildings, in reductions in unnecessary air changes, and in the improved efficiency of heating and cooling systems;  Whereas such investments will benefit both society as a whole and the parties directly concerned by reducing energy requirements, by contributing to the protection and improvement of the environment, by providing additional employment and by contributing to a reduction in the foreign exchange cost of imports of energy;  Whereas, while some of the benefits may be enjoyed, in the short term, in the form of higher standards of comfort, future price increases for energy will be absorbed with less difficulty by the population and with fewer inflationary pressures provided that the whole of the building stock satisfies relatively high standards of thermal insulation by the end of this century;  Whereas a commitment by all Member States to immediate and full-scale programmes of action is necessary to obtain these benefits;  Whereas a permanent consultation procedure should be established to determine the relative contributions made by Member States' programmes towards the realization of the Community's objectives and to facilitate exchanges of experience,  (1)OJ No C 138, 11.6.1977, p. 4. (2)OJ No C 266, 7.11.1977, p. 55. (3)OJ No C 287, 30.11.1977, p. 3. (4)OJ No C 153, 9.7.1975, p. 2. (5)OJ No C 153, 9.7.1975, p. 5.   HEREBY RECOMMENDS THE MEMBER STATES:        1. To pursue, in the context of the programmes referred to in the second subparagraph, policies designed to save energy by reducing energy requirements through the improvement of the thermal efficiency of buildings.  These policies shall be decided in the context of a programme extending over at least four years, which takes account of variations in social, economic and climatic conditions. The implementation of this programme will depend upon the necessities of short-term economic management and the availability of public funds.  Member States, without prejudice to the division of responsibilities between central, federal, regional or local government, shall decide upon the categories of building to include in the programme of action, giving priority to a substantial improvement in buildings under the direct control and management of public authorities and buildings in residential use.       2. To adopt the programmes described in point 1 by 31 December 1979 and to inform the Commission thereof.    The Council shall periodically examine the application of this recommendation ; the first examination shall take place not later than 31 August 1980.  This examination will be based upon a report together with any necessary proposals which the Commission will send to the Council and to the European Parliament. This report will contain a cost-effectiveness analysis of investments aimed at reducing energy requirements for buildings in the Community and an analysis of the relative contributions of Member States' programmes to the realization of the Community's objectives, taking into account standards of comfort.  The Commission will organize appropriate consultations with the Member States within the context of the Energy Committee in order to:      - prepare the reports referred to in the preceding subparagraph;           - facilitate exchanges of information on matters relevant to the implementation of this recommendation which could prove helpful to Member States in the application of their programmes.               Done at Brussels, 5 February 1979.  For the Council  The President  P. MEHAIGNERIE


               14.5.2014

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 144/2

         Recommendation for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions
   (ECB/2014/19)

      (presented by the European Central Bank)

   (2014/C 144/02)
   EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
   I.   INTRODUCTION

   On 23 November 1998, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 (1). Taking account of the experience gained following several years of application of Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 in the various fields of competence of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the fact that the scope of the ECB’s powers to impose sanctions was extended by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (2), certain amendments to Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 should now be considered. For this purpose, the procedure provided for in Article 129(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union must be followed.
   II.   GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

   In order to carry out the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the ECB may, pursuant to Article 18 thereof, impose administrative pecuniary penalties ‘where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligently, breach a requirement under relevant directly applicable acts of Union law in relation to which administrative pecuniary penalties shall be made available to competent authorities under the relevant Union law’ (3), and sanctions ‘in case of a breach of its regulations or decisions’ (4) (hereinafter jointly referred to as ‘administrative penalties’). As regards breaches of national law in the context of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the national competent authorities remain competent to impose administrative penalties but are to only impose such penalties on credit institutions directly supervised by the ECB if the ECB requires them to initiate proceedings for this purpose.
   The principles and procedures applicable to the imposition of administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law under Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 are laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 and in Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/17) (5). Under Article 18(7) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 the ECB may impose sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations and decisions in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2532/98. Article 18(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 provides that the ECB shall apply Article 18 in accordance with the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, including the procedures contained in Regulation (EC) No 2532/98, as appropriate.
   Against this background, it is of particular importance to establish a coherent regime for the imposition by the ECB of all administrative penalties relating to the performance of its supervisory tasks under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
   Moreover, certain rules contained in Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 differ from those laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. These relate in particular to the upper limits of fines and periodic penalty payments, procedural rules, and the limitation periods laid down in Regulation (EC) No 2532/98.
   Therefore, the following amendments to Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 are recommended:

               (a)

               A new Article 1a should be inserted to define some general principles applying to administrative penalties imposed by the ECB in relation to its supervisory tasks and sanctions imposed in relation to its non-supervisory tasks and specify the scope of the different provisions applying to them.

               (b)

               New Articles 4a to 4c should be inserted concerning the regime applicable to administrative penalties imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks. The purpose of these new articles is to achieve a differentiation between the regime applying to the imposition of administrative penalties by the ECB in relation to its supervisory tasks and the provisions applicable to sanctions that the ECB may impose in relation to its non-supervisory tasks. This is to ensure that a single regime applies to all ECB administrative penalties imposed in the supervisory field, while also taking into account the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

               (c)

               Additional amendments should be made to ensure that the principles and procedures governing the imposition of sanctions laid down in Articles 2 to 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 are compatible with those governing the imposition by the ECB of administrative penalties in the exercise of its supervisory tasks under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

         III.   COMMENTS ON THE ARTICLES

   Article 1 — Definitions
   Definition of periodic penalty payments
   The definition of periodic penalty payments should be amended for two reasons. First, in line with other Union law provisions on this issue (6), it should be clearly spelled out that the ECB may use periodic penalty payments not only to punish a continued infringement, but also to compel undertakings to comply with an ECB regulation or decision. Second, the definition currently refers to the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 as regards the notification of a decision requiring the termination of an infringement. As a different decision-making procedure should apply to sanctions imposed in relation to the ECB’s supervisory tasks, reference to such procedure should be added in the definition.
   As a result, the definition of ‘sanctions’ should also be amended so that the reference to periodic penalty payments being imposed ‘as a consequence of an infringement’ is deleted.
   Article 1a – General principles and scope
   While Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 lays down, in accordance with Article 34.3 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, the conditions under which the ECB is entitled to impose sanctions on undertakings that fail to comply with obligations laid down in ECB regulations or decisions, due consideration needs to be given to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, which contains a wide range of provisions that are of direct relevance to the ECB’s powers to impose administrative penalties relating to the exercise of its supervisory tasks. Hence, while in principle the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 apply to any sanction that the ECB is entitled to impose for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 that conflict with Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 as regards the imposition of administrative penalties relating to the ECB’s supervisory tasks should be either disapplied or amended.
   The ECB shall be entitled to publish any decision to impose an administrative penalty in relation to its supervisory tasks or a sanction in relation to its non-supervisory tasks, whether such decision is subject to an appeal or not, so that all decisions taken by the ECB are subject to the same publication regime. The ECB shall apply relevant Union law, irrespective of any national law or regulation, as regards such publication, and must accordingly consider the proportionality of the publication of a decision with regard to the degree of severity of the sanction or administrative penalty imposed, as well as the impact of the publication on the stability of the financial system.
   Article 2 – Sanctions
   Article 2(4) refers to the procedure provided for in Article 3(4) of Regulation (EC) No 2532/98, which should not apply to the imposition of administrative penalties relating to the ECB’s supervisory tasks. A reference to the decision-making procedure set out in Article 4b should therefore be added.
   Article 3 – Procedural rules
   The reference in the first sentence of Article 3(1) to the Executive Board as the body that is competent to initiate an infringement procedure should be deleted to allow the ECB to determine, by means of a Regulation to be adopted pursuant to Article 6(2), which internal body should carry out the investigation of an alleged breach. The competence to adopt decisions imposing a sanction shall remain with the Executive Board, subject to the new Article 4b.
   Article 3(10) should be amended so that it does not only refer to tasks entrusted to the European System of Central Banks but also to tasks entrusted to the ECB pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. The last sentence of Article 3(10) should be amended to also reflect the ECB’s new supervisory competence.
   Article 4a – Specific rules regarding the upper limits of sanctions imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks
   The upper limit of administrative pecuniary penalties the ECB may impose under Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 for breaches of directly applicable Union law greatly exceeds that permissible under Regulation (EC) No 2532/98. This difference is not considered justifiable since an infringement of an ECB regulation or decision is not necessarily less serious than a breach of directly applicable Union law. Therefore, all administrative penalties imposed by the ECB on the credit institutions it supervises within the SSM should be subject to the same upper limits. The upper limit for periodic penalty payments imposed by the ECB in the supervisory field should also be amended in line with the above.
   As a result, Article 2(1) should not apply to administrative penalties imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks.
   Article 4b – Specific procedural rules for sanctions imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks
   Article 25(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 lays down the principle of separation, whereby tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 shall be exercised separately from the monetary policy tasks and any other tasks of the ECB. Pursuant to this article, Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 should be amended to provide for a decision-making procedure involving the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council of the ECB, in line with Article 26 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, as regards the imposition of administrative penalties in the supervisory field. This would also be in line with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (7) and the need to ensure that the authorities that impose sanctions on entities are also those which supervise them.
   A decision to impose an administrative penalty taken by the Governing Council in the supervisory field will be subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review, as provided for under Article 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, if a natural or legal person requests review of such decision, provided it is addressed to or is of direct and individual concern to that person. Consequently, Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 should be amended to provide for a review procedure involving the ECB’s Administrative Board of Review, in line with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, as regards the imposition of administrative penalties in the supervisory field.
   In view of the above, Article 3(1) to (8) should not apply to administrative penalties relating to the exercise by the ECB of its supervisory tasks.
   Article 4c – Specific time limits for administrative penalties imposed in the supervisory field
   The time limits applicable to the imposition and enforcement of sanctions relating to the non-supervisory tasks of the ECB have proven to work well, particularly due to the relative simplicity of the investigation required to ascertain whether an infringement has been committed, e.g. breach of minimum reserve requirements, rules on the eligibility of collateral, statistical reporting requirements. Given the fact that investigations of alleged infringements in the supervisory field are more complex, the power to impose and enforce administrative penalties in that field should be subject to longer time limits than those provided for sanctions relating to non-supervisory tasks. This is also in line with the time limits laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 for infringements of competition rules. As all administrative penalties that the ECB may impose on undertakings in the supervisory field should be subject to the same time limits, whether these administrative penalties refer to a breach of an ECB decision or regulation or a breach of directly applicable Union law, the time limits set out in Article 4c should apply to any administrative penalties imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks.
   The suspension and interruption of these time limits should be regulated accordingly, also taking into account that infringement procedures in the supervisory field could overlap with criminal investigations and criminal proceedings that are based on the same facts.
   In view of the above, Article 4 should not apply to administrative penalties relating to the exercise by the ECB of its supervisory tasks.

      Recommendation for a:

         ‘COUNCIL REGULATION
         amending Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions
         THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
         Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in particular to Article 132(3) thereof,
         Having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, and in particular Article 34.3 thereof,
         Having regard to the Recommendation of the European Central Bank,
         Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
         Having regard to the opinion of the European Commission,
         Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 129(4) of the Treaty and in Article 41 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank,
         Whereas:

                     (1)

                     Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 (8) specifies, in accordance with Article 34.3 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the “Statute of the ESCB”), the limits and conditions under which the European Central Bank (ECB) is entitled to impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with obligations under its regulations and decisions.

                     (2)

                     The ECB has applied Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 to impose sanctions in its various fields of competence, including in particular the implementation of the monetary policy of the Union, the operation of payment systems and the collection of statistical information.

                     (3)

                     Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (9) entitles the ECB to impose on the credit institutions it supervises: (a) administrative pecuniary penalties when these institutions breach a requirement under directly applicable Union law; and (b) sanctions in the event of a breach of an ECB regulation or decision (hereinafter jointly referred to as “administrative penalties”).

                     (4)

                     Article 18(7) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 provides that for the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this regulation in case of breach of ECB regulations and decisions, the ECB may impose sanctions in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2532/98.

                     (5)

                     Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 contains a wide range of provisions that are directly relevant to the ECB’s powers to impose administrative penalties relating to its supervisory tasks. In this regard, certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 conflict with Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. It is therefore necessary to identify the rules laid down in Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 that should be amended in order to establish a coherent regime governing the imposition of sanctions by the ECB in the exercise of the supervisory tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

                     (6)

                     The ECB should publish decisions imposing administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields, unless such publication would be disproportionate, considering the degree of severity of the administrative pecuniary penalty or sanction imposed on an undertaking, or jeopardise the stability of financial markets.

                     (7)

                     The upper limit of a fine that the ECB may impose on an undertaking for failure to comply with an ECB regulation or decision in the supervisory field should not differ from the upper limit of a fine that the ECB may impose on an undertaking for a breach of directly applicable Union law, in order to ensure consistency in the treatment of equally serious infringements. All fines imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks should therefore be subject to the same upper limits.

                     (8)

                     The ECB should be able to impose periodic penalty payments on undertakings in order to compel them to comply with ECB regulations or decisions in the supervisory field, or to put an end to a continued infringement thereof. The upper limit of periodic penalty payments should be commensurate with the upper limit of fines applicable in the supervisory field.

                     (9)

                     Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 lays down the principle of separation, whereby the ECB carries out the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. In order to bolster this principle of separation, a Supervisory Board has been established pursuant to Article 26, which, inter alia, is responsible for preparing draft decisions for the Governing Council of the ECB in the supervisory field. In addition, the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB are, under the conditions laid down in Article 24 thereof, subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review. Taking account of the principle of separation and the establishment of the Supervisory Board and the Administrative Board of Review, two distinct procedures should apply: (a) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of administrative penalties in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Governing Council of the ECB based on a complete draft decision from the Supervisory Board and subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review; and (b) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of sanctions in the exercise of its non-supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Executive Board of the ECB and subject to review by the Governing Council of the ECB.

                     (10)

                     Due to the complexity of the investigation of infringements in the supervisory field, the power to impose and enforce administrative penalties relating to the supervisory tasks of the ECB should be subject to longer time limits than those provided for sanctions relating to the non-supervisory tasks of the ECB. The suspension and interruption of these time limits should be regulated accordingly, also taking into account that infringement procedures in the supervisory field may overlap with criminal investigations and criminal proceedings that are based on the same facts.

                     (11)

                     Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 should be amended accordingly,

               HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
         Article 1
         Amendments
         Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 is amended as follows:

                     1.

                     Article 1 is amended as follows:

                                 (a)

                                 point 6 is replaced by the following:
                                 “‘periodic penalty payments’ shall mean amounts of money which, in the case of a continued infringement, an undertaking is obliged to pay either as a punishment, or with a view to forcing the persons concerned to comply with the ECB supervisory regulations and decisions. Periodic penalty payments shall be calculated for each day of continued infringement (a) following notification of the undertaking of a decision requiring the termination of such an infringement in accordance with the procedure laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1); or (b) when the continued infringement falls under the scope of Article 18(7) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (10) in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4b of this Regulation;

                                    (10)  OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63.”;"

                                 (b)

                                 point 7 is replaced by the following:
                                 “‘sanctions’ shall mean fines and periodic penalty payments.”;

                     2.

                     the following Article 1a is inserted:
                     “Article 1a
                     General principles and scope
                     1.   This Regulation shall apply to the imposition by the ECB of sanctions on undertakings for failure to comply with obligations arising from ECB decisions or regulations, unless otherwise expressly provided.
                     2.   The rules applying to the imposition by the ECB, in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, of administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and of sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations and decisions (hereinafter jointly referred to as ‘administrative penalties’) shall derogate from the rules laid down in Articles 2 to 4 to the extent laid down in Articles 4a to 4c.
                     3.   The ECB may publish any decision imposing on an undertaking administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields, whether such decision has been appealed or not. The ECB shall carry out such publication in accordance with relevant Union law, irrespective of any national law or regulation and, where relevant Union law is composed of Directives, of any national legislation transposing those Directives.”;

                     3.

                     in Article 2, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:
                     “4.   Whenever the infringement consists of a failure to perform a duty, the application of a sanction shall not exempt the undertaking from its performance, unless the decision adopted in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 4b explicitly states the contrary.”;

                     4.

                     Article 3 is amended as follows:

                                 (a)

                                 the first sentence of paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
                                 “The decision on whether to initiate an infringement procedure shall be taken by the ECB, acting on its own initiative or on the basis of a motion to that effect addressed to it by the national central bank of the Member State in whose jurisdiction the alleged infringement has occurred.”;

                                 (b)

                                 paragraph 10 is replaced by the following:
                                 “If an infringement relates exclusively to a task entrusted to the ESCB or the ECB under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, an infringement procedure may be initiated only on the basis of this Regulation, irrespective of the existence of any national law or regulation which may provide for a separate procedure. If an infringement also relates to one or more areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB, the right to initiate an infringement procedure on the basis of this Regulation shall be independent of any right of a competent national authority to initiate separate procedures in relation to such areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB. This provision shall be without prejudice to the application of criminal law and of national law relating to prudential supervisory competencies in participating Member States, in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.”;

                     5.

                     the following Articles 4a to 4c are inserted:
                     “Article 4a
                     Specific rules regarding the upper limits of sanctions imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks
                     1.   By way of derogation from Article 2(1), in the case of infringements relating to decisions and regulations adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, the limits within which the ECB may impose fines and periodic penalty payments shall be as follows.

                                 (a)

                                 Fines: the upper limit shall be twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the infringement where these can be determined, or 10 % of the total annual turnover of the undertaking.

                                 (b)

                                 Periodic penalty payments: the upper limit shall be 5 % of the average daily turnover per day of infringement. Periodic penalty payments may be imposed in respect of a maximum period of six months from the date stipulated in the decision imposing the periodic penalty payment.

                           2.   For the purpose of paragraph 1: (a) ‘annual turnover’ means the annual turnover of a legal person, as defined in relevant Union law, according to the most recently available annual financial accounts of such person. Where the undertaking is a subsidiary of a parent undertaking, the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover resulting from the most recently available consolidated annual financial accounts of the ultimate parent undertaking in the group supervised by the ECB; (b) ‘average daily turnover’ means the annual turnover, as defined under (a), divided by 365.
                     Article 4b
                     Specific procedural rules for sanctions imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks
                     1.   By way of derogation from Article 3(1) to (8), the rules laid down in this Article shall apply to infringements relating to decisions and regulations adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks.
                     2.   After the infringement procedure has been carried out pursuant to rules to be laid down by the ECB in accordance with Article 6(2), the Supervisory Board shall propose to the Governing Council a complete draft decision to impose a sanction on the undertaking concerned, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 26(8) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. A hearing with regard to the alleged infringement committed by the undertaking concerned shall precede the submission by the Supervisory Board of the complete draft decision to the Governing Council.
                     3.   The undertaking concerned shall have the right to request a review by the Administrative Board of Review of the decision taken by the Governing Council pursuant to paragraph 2, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
                     Article 4c
                     Specific time limits for administrative penalties imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks
                     1.   By way of derogation from Article 4, the right to take a decision to impose an administrative penalty, with regard to infringements relating to relevant directly applicable acts of Union law as well as to decisions and regulations adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, shall expire five years after the infringement occurred or, in the case of a continued infringement, five years after the infringement ceased.
                     2.   Any action taken by the ECB for the purposes of the investigation or proceedings with respect to an infringement shall cause the time limit laid down in paragraph 1 to be interrupted. The limitation period shall be interrupted with effect from the date on which the action is notified to the supervised entity concerned. Each interruption shall cause the time limit to recommence. However, the time limit shall not exceed a period of 10 years after the infringement occurred or, in the case of a continued infringement, 10 years after the infringement ceased.
                     3.   The time limits described in the preceding paragraphs can be extended if: (a) a decision of the Governing Council is subject to review before the Administrative Board of Review or appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union; or (b) criminal proceedings are pending against the concerned undertaking in connection with the same facts. In such a case, the time limits described in the previous paragraphs shall be extended for the period of time it takes for the Administrative Board of Review or the Court of Justice to review the decision or until conclusion of the criminal proceedings against the concerned undertaking.
                     4.   Any action of the ECB designed to enforce payment or payment terms and conditions under the imposed administrative penalty shall cause the limitation period for the enforcement to be interrupted. The right of the ECB to enforce a decision to impose an administrative penalty shall expire five years after such decision has been taken. The limitation period for the enforcement of administrative penalties shall be suspended:

                                 (a)

                                 until the deadline for payment of the imposed administrative penalty has passed;

                                 (b)

                                 if enforcement of payment of the imposed administrative penalty is suspended pursuant to a decision of the Governing Council or of the Court of Justice.”

               Article 2
         This Regulation shall enter into force on [date].

            This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the Treaty.’

      Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 April 2014.

            The President of the ECB

         Mario DRAGHI

      (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 4). The European Central Bank had previously submitted to the Council its Recommendation ECB/1998/9 for a Council Regulation (EC) concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (OJ C 246, 6.8.1998, p. 9).

      (2)  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

      (3)  Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

      (4)  Article 18(7) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

      (5)  Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ L 141, 14.5.2014, p. 1).

      (6)  See e.g. the second subparagraph of Article 4 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 946/2012 of 12 July 2012 supplementing Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to rules of procedure on fines imposed to credit rating agencies by the European Securities and Markets Authority, including rules on the right of defence and temporal provisions (OJ L 282, 16.10.2012, p. 23); Article 66(1) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1); Article 16(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 646/2012 of 16 July 2012 laying down detailed rules on fines and periodic penalty payments pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 29); Article 36b(1) of Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of 11 May 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (OJ L 145, 31.5.2011, p. 30); Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1); Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1); Article 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

      (7)  See Principle 1, and in particular Essential Criterion 6(b), and Principle 11, and in particular Essential Criterion 7 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, September 2012, both of which require an effective system of banking supervision to have clear responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks and banking groups, including the power for the supervisor to impose a range of sanctions, and also require the supervisor to have at its disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring about timely corrective actions, including imposing sanctions on banks. Available on the Bank for International Settlements’ website at www.bis.org

      (8)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 4).

      (9)  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).