Avis juridique important

|

31992H0295

92/295/EEC: Commission Recommendation of 7 April 1992 on codes of practice for the protection of consumers in respect of contracts negotiated at a distance (distance selling)

Official Journal L 156 , 10/06/1992 P. 0021 - 0022

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION  of 7 April 1992  on codes of practice for the protection of consumers in respect of contracts negotiated at a distance (distance selling)  (92/295/EEC)THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,  Whereas measures must be taken for the gradual establishment of the internal market, and cross-frontier distance selling may be one of the main tangible signs for consumers of completion of the market;  Whereas it has been decided to set out in the form of a Directive a basic set of minimum consumer protection rules which are necessary for the proper functioning of the market; whereas one of the reasons for this initiative is concern to avoid  fragmentation of the national legislation;  Whereas these mandatory basic rules should be supplemented by voluntary self-regulatory arrangements in the form of codes of practice;  Whereas firms engaging in transactions by means of contracts negotiated at a distance make use of certain particular methods of sales promotion; whereas these methods give rise to special problems as a result of the means of communication used; whereas  it is thus particularly necessary to ensure that the consumer is sufficiently informed;  Whereas payment in advance may pose a problem of financial security for the consumer; whereas such risk is particularly high where the supplier in question can be identified and located only with difficulty; whereas it is essential to give the consumer  the assurance that he will be reimbursed in case of non-execution of the contract;  Whereas a firm which subscribes to a code informs its customers of the fact; whereas the consumer must therefore be able to acquaint himself with the content of this code and must know what to do if he thinks it has not been complied with;  Whereas the Commission will in due course evaluate the putting into effect of this recommendation; whereas it will consider at that time whether other measures appear necessary,  HEREBY RECOMMENDS: That the trade associations of suppliers:  1. should adopt codes of practice, with the particular aim of stating precisely, for the sectors concerned and means of communication used, the minimum rules contained in the Directive on 'contracts negotiated at a distance';  2. should include the points listed in the Annex in such codes;  3. should ensure that their members comply with the codes;  4. should inform the Commission, one year after the publication of the Directive in the Official Journal of the European Communities, of the content of the codes and the response by their members. Done at Brussels, 7 April 1992. For the Commission  Karel VAN MIERT  Member of the Commission    ANNEX  Points which could be covered by codes of practice for contracts negotiated at a distance:  - Dissemination of solicitations for custom: means to enable consumers not to receive solicitations if they have made it clear that they do not wish to do so.  - Presentation: ethical principles to be respected in all solicitations for custom, especially as regards respect for human dignity and religious or political beliefs.  - Sales promotion: provisions covering sales promotion techniques (reductions, rebates, gifts, lotteries and competitions) to ensure that the principles of fair competition are respected and in particular that the consumer receives clear information.  - Financial security: arrangements to ensure the reimbursement of payments made by consumers at the time of placing an order.  - Right of withdrawal: if the consumer chooses to make use of the right of withdrawal, a period within which payments already made will be reimbursed.  - Knowledge of the code: information for consumers on the existence of the code, its content and the results of its application.


Important legal notice

|

52007SC0189

Recommendation for a Council opinion in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 On the updated convergence programme of Estonia, 2006-2010  /* SEC/2007/0189 final */

	[pic] | COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES |Brussels, 13.2.2007SEC(2007) 189 finalRecommendation for aCOUNCIL OPINIONin accordance with the third paragraph of Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 On the updated convergence programme of Estonia, 2006-2010(presented by the Commission)EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM1. GENERAL BACKGROUNDThe Stability and Growth Pact, which entered into force on 1 July 1998, is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation. The 2005 reform of the Pact acknowledged its usefulness in anchoring fiscal discipline but sought to strengthen its effectiveness and economic underpinnings as well as to safeguard the sustainability of the public finances in the long run.Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies[1], which is part of the Stability and Growth Pact, stipulates that Member States have to submit, to the Council and the Commission, stability or convergence programmes and annual updates thereof (Member States that have already adopted the single currency submit (updated) stability programmes and Member States that have not yet adopted it submit (updated) convergence programmes). The first convergence programme of Estonia was submitted in May 2004. In accordance with the Regulation, the Council delivered an opinion on it on 5 July 2004 on the basis of a recommendation from the Commission and after having consulted the Economic and Financial Committee. In accordance with the same procedure, updated stability and convergence programmes are assessed by the Commission and examined by the Committee mentioned above, while the Council may examine them.2. BACKGROUND FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE UPDATED PROGRAMMEThe Commission has examined the most recent update of the convergence programme of Estonia, submitted on 1 December 2006, and has adopted a recommendation for a Council opinion on it (see box for the main points covered by the assessment).In order to set the scene against which the budgetary strategy in the updated convergence programme is assessed, the following paragraphs summarise:1.  the economic and budgetary performance over the last ten years2.  the most recent assessment of the country’s position under the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (summary of the Council opinion on the previous update of the convergence programme) and3.  the Commission’s assessment of the October 2006 national reform programme.2.1. Recent economic and budgetary performanceEstonia successfully completed the transition to a functioning market economy and now enjoys the highest economic growth rate in the EU. Labour and product markets are highly flexible. The combination of high wage increases in tune with large productivity gains has enabled the country to rapidly catch up with the EU in terms of living standards. Along with a strong export performance, domestic demand has accelerated rapidly in the past years. More recently, Estonia's very success has been creating new challenges. After several years of rapid growth, the economy is facing capacity constraints, in particular in the labour market, which is drying out. The significant risk of overheating is indicated by rising core inflation, a large external deficit and strong credit growth feeding into a real estate boom.2.2. The assessment in the Council opinion on the previous programmeOn 14 February 2006, the Council adopted its opinion on the previous update of the convergence programme, covering the period 2005-2009. The Council was of the opinion that “overall the budgetary position is sound, and the budgetary strategy provides a good example of fiscal policy conducted in compliance with the Pact”. In view of “a budgetary outturn in 2005 significantly better than estimated in the programme and the need to avoid pro-cyclical policies”, the Council invited Estonia to “aim for a higher budgetary surplus in 2006 and in the subsequent years in order to continue supporting the correction of the external imbalance”.2.3. The Commission assessment of the October 2006 national reform programmeThe implementation report of the national reform programme of Estonia, provided in the context of the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs, was submitted on 12 October 2006. Estonia’s national reform programme identifies as key challenges/priorities: R&D and innovation, and employmentThe Commission’s assessment of this programme (adopted as part of its December 2006 Annual Progress Report[2]) showed that Estonia is making very good progress with the implementation of its National Reform Programme. It also makes impressive efforts to ensure coherence between the National Reform Programme and cohesion policy.Against the background of progress made, Estonia was encouraged to also focus on the areas of: education and lifelong learning; R&D and innovation; competition policy; labour market flexibility and active labour market policies.Box: Main points covered by the assessment As required by Article 5(1) (for stability programmes) and Article 9(1) (for convergence programmes) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the assessment covers the following points: whether the economic assumptions on which the programme is based are plausible; the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) presented by the Member State and whether the adjustment path towards it is appropriate; whether measures being taken and/or proposed to respect that adjustment path are sufficient to achieve the MTO over the cycle; when assessing the adjustment path towards the MTO, whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad times, and, for euro-area and ERM II Member States, whether the Member State pursues an annual improvement of the cyclically-adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, of 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark to meet its MTO; when defining the adjustment path to the MTO (for Member States that have not yet reached it) or allowing a temporary deviation from the MTO (for Member States that have), the implementation of major structural reforms which have direct long-term cost-saving effects (including by raising potential growth) and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances (subject to the condition that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value is preserved and that the budgetary position is expected to return to the MTO within the programme period), with special attention for pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully-funded pillar; whether the economic policies of the Member State are consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines. The plausibility of the programme’s macroeconomic assumptions is assessed by reference to the Commission services’ autumn 2006 forecast, using also the commonly agreed methodology for the estimation of potential output and cyclically-adjusted balances. The assessment of consistency with the broad economic policy guidelines is made against the broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances as included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008. The assessment also examines: the evolution of the debt ratio and the outlook for the long-term sustainability of the public finances, which should be given “sufficient attention in the surveillance of budgetary positions” according to the Council report of 20 March 2005 on “Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”. A Commission Communication of 12 October 2006 sets out the approach to the assessment of long-term sustainability[3]; the degree of integration with the national reform programme, submitted by Member States in the context of the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs. In its cover note of 7 June 2005 to the European Council on the broad economic policy guidelines for the period 2005-2008, the ECOFIN Council stated that the national reform programmes should be consistent with the stability and convergence programmes; compliance with the code of conduct[4], which inter alia prescribes a common structure and set of data tables for the stability and convergence programmes. |-  Recommendation for aCOUNCIL OPINIONin accordance with the third paragraph of Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 On the updated convergence programme of Estonia, 2006-2010THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies[5], and in particular Article 9(3) thereof,Having regard to the recommendation of the Commission,After consulting the Economic and Financial Committee,HAS DELIVERED THIS OPINION:4.  On [27 February 2007] the Council examined the updated convergence programme of Estonia, which covers the period 2006 to 2010.5.  The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages that real GDP growth abates from a peak of 11% in 2006 to 8¼% in 2008 and 7½% per year in the outer years. Assessed against currently available information, this scenario appears to be based on cautious growth assumptions. However, the projected medium-term path of a smooth deceleration of growth from the current pace prone to overheating is clearly surrounded by risks. The programme’s projections for inflation appear realistic.6.  For 2006, the general government surplus is estimated at 2.5% of GDP in the Commission services’ autumn 2006 forecast, against a target of 0.3% of GDP set in the previous update of the convergence programme. The much better outcome, also expected in the new update, arises from carry-over from the better-than-expected outcome in 2005 and from the growth surprise in 2006.7.  The main goals of the medium-term budgetary strategy embodied in the programme are keeping the general government finances at least in balance and securing long-term sustainability in the light of the budgetary impact of population ageing. The budgetary strategy foresees the headline general government surplus to decline from 2½% of GDP in 2006 to around 1¼% in 2007-2008 and rebound to around 1½% of GDP thereafter. The primary balance will follow a similar profile, given the negligible weight of interest expenditure. The drop in the surplus in 2007 is driven by a rise in the expenditure-to-GDP-ratio while the revenue ratio follows a declining trend. From 2008 onwards, the overall revenue and expenditure ratios decline in lock-step, reflecting notably the income tax cuts and expenditure growth remaining below the buoyant nominal GDP growth. The new programme departs from the past practice of always targeting zero balance for general government finances (which were as a rule overachieved over the last years) and targets instead a sizeable surplus over the entire programme period, which is a step forward in responding to the cyclical conditions of the economy. Compared to the previous update, the targets from 2007 onwards have been revised upwards by at least 1 percentage point of GDP against the background of a more favourable (and more realistic) macroeconomic scenario.8.  The structural balance (i.e. the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and other temporary measures) calculated according to the commonly agreed methodology is planned to drop by about 1 percentage point to reach ½% of GDP in 2007, and rebound to above 1% of GDP in 2008 and above 1½% of GDP in 2009 and 2010. As in the previous update of the convergence programme, the medium-term objective (MTO) for the budgetary position presented in the programme is a balanced position in structural terms which the programme plans to maintain throughout the programme period. As the MTO is more demanding than the minimum benchmark (estimated at a deficit of around 2% of GDP), achieving it should fulfil the aim of providing a safety margin against the occurrence of an excessive deficit. The MTO lies within the range indicated for euro-area and ERM II Member States in the Stability and Growth Pact and the code of conduct and is significantly more demanding than implied by the debt ratio and average potential output growth in the long term.9.  The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced. The programme's macroeconomic assumptions can be regarded as cautious over the programme period. The tax revenue projections appear overall plausible. However, the achievement of the envisaged moderation in expenditure growth would benefit from making the medium-term fiscal planning framework more binding.10.  In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to maintain the MTO by a large margin throughout the programme period, as envisaged in the programme. A fortiori, it provides a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3% of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations over the programme period. The fiscal policy stance implied by the programme is not fully in line with the Stability and Growth Pact in the sense that it is pro-cyclical in good times during 2007, when the structural balance is set to decline by around 1% of GDP.11.  Government gross debt is estimated to have fallen to 3.7% of GDP in 2006, far below the 60% of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to decline by a further 2 percentage points over the programme period.12.  The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Estonia is among the lowest in the EU, with age-related expenditure projected to fall as a share of GDP over the coming decades, influenced by the considerable expenditure-reducing impact of the reform of the pension system. The current level of gross debt is very low in Estonia and maintaining sound government finances, in line with the budgetary plans over the programme period, would contribute to containing the risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances. Overall, Estonia appears to be at low risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.13.  The convergence programme contains a qualitative assessment of the overall impact of the October 2006 Implementation Report of the National Reform Programme within the medium-term fiscal strategy. In addition, it provides some information on the direct budgetary costs or savings of the main reforms envisaged in the National Reform Programme and its budgetary projections explicitly take into account the public finance implications of the actions outlined in the National Reform Programme. The measures in the area of public finances envisaged in the convergence programme seem consistent with those foreseen in the National Reform Programme. In particular, both programmes emphasise prudent fiscal policies as a crucial element of macroeconomic stabilisation.14.  The budgetary strategy in the programme is broadly consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008.15.  As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme provides all required and most of the optional data[6].The overall conclusion is that the medium-term budgetary position is sound and the budgetary strategy provides a good example of fiscal policies conducted in compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, the planned weakening of the budgetary surplus in 2007 during good economic times implies a pro-cyclical stance of fiscal policy.In view of the above assessment, Estonia is invited to aim for a higher budgetary surplus in 2007 than planned in the programme so as to foster macroeconomic stability and to continue supporting the correction of the external imbalance.Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections2 Cyclically-adjusted balance (as in the previous rows) excluding one-off and other temporary measures. |3 One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.6% of GDP in 2006 and 0.4% in 2007; all deficit-reducing). |4 One-off and other temporary measures taken from the Commission services’ autumn 2006 forecast (0.2% of GDP in 2005, 0.6% of GDP in 2006, 0.4% of GDP in 2007 and 0.2% in 2008; all deficit-reducing). |5 Based on estimated potential growth of 9.1%, 9.6%, 9.9% and 9.9% respectively in the period 2005-2008. |[1] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1). All the documents referred to in this text can be found at the following website:http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm[2] Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council, “Implementing the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs - A year of delivery” - COM(2006) 816, 12.12.2006.[3] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “The long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU” - COM(2006) 574, 12.10.2006 - and European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2006), “The long-term sustainability of public finances in the European Union”, European Economy No 4/2006.[4] “Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and content of stability and convergence programmes”, endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005.[5] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1). The documents referred to in this text can be found at the following website:http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm[6] In particular, some labour market variables aand the data on net lending/borrowing of the private sector are missing.


				|

		52013PC0906

			Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Poland /* COM/2013/0906 final */

			   	Recommendation for a
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
with a view to bringing an end to the
situation of an excessive government deficit in Poland

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article
126(7) thereof,
Having regard to the
recommendation from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1)       According to Article 126
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Member States
shall avoid excessive government deficits.
(2)       The Stability and Growth
Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of
strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable
growth conducive to employment creation.
(3)       On 7 July 2009, the
Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing
the European Community (TEC), that an excessive deficit existed in Poland and
issued a recommendation to correct the excessive deficit by 2012 at the latest[1], in accordance with Article 104(7)
TEC and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit
procedure[2].
In order to bring the general government deficit at or below 3% of GDP in a
credible and sustainable manner, the Polish authorities were recommended to implement
the fiscal stimulus measures in 2009 as planned, ensure an average annual
structural budgetary adjustment of at least 1¼% percentage points of GDP
starting in 2010, spell out detailed measures that are necessary to bring the
deficit below the reference value by 2012 and introduce reforms to contain
primary current expenditure over the following years. The Council established a
deadline of 7 January 2010 for effective action to be taken.
(4)       On 3 February 2010, the
Commission concluded that based on the Commission 2009 autumn forecast, Poland had taken necessary action in compliance with the Council recommendation of 7 July
2009 to bring its government deficit within the Treaty reference value and
considered that no additional step in the excessive deficit procedure was
therefore necessary. On the basis of its 2011 autumn forecast, the Commission
considered that Poland was not on track and asked for additional measures,
which Poland adopted and publicly announced until 10 January 2012. Thus, on 11
January 2012 the Commission confirmed the Polish authorities had taken
effective action towards a timely and sustainable correction of the excessive
deficit and no further steps in the excessive deficit procedure of Poland were needed at the time[3].
(5)       On 21 June 2013, the
Council concluded that Poland had taken effective action but adverse economic
events with major implications on public finances had occurred, and issued
revised recommendations[4].
Thus, Poland fulfilled the conditions for the extension of the deadline for
correcting the excessive general government deficit as laid down in Article
3(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. The Council recommended that Poland should put an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2014. Poland should reach a headline general government deficit target of 3.6% of GDP in 2013 and
3.0% of GDP in 2014, which is consistent with an annual improvement of the
structural budget balance of at least 0.8% of GDP and 1.3% of GDP in 2013 and
2014, respectively, based on the Commission updated 2013 spring forecast. Poland should rigorously implement the measures already adopted, while complementing them
with additional measures sufficient to achieve a correction of the excessive deficit
by 2014. Poland should use all windfall gains for deficit reduction. The
Council established the deadline of 1 October 2013 for Poland to take effective action and, in accordance with Article 3(4a) of Regulation (EC) No
1467/97, to report in detail the consolidation strategy that is envisaged to
achieve the targets. On 2 October 2013, Poland submitted the report on
effective action, which was subsequently analysed by the Commission.
(6)       On [10 December 2013], the
Council established in accordance with Article 126(8) TFEU that Poland had not taken effective action in 2013 in response to the Council recommendation
according to Article 126(7) of the Treaty of 21 June 2013.
(7)       In accordance with Article
126(7) TFEU and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the Council is
required to make recommendations to the Member State concerned with a view to
bringing the situation of an excessive deficit to an end within a given period.
The recommendation has to establish a maximum deadline of six months for
effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned to correct the
excessive deficit. Furthermore, in a recommendation to correct an excessive
deficit the Council should request the achievement of annual budgetary targets
which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are
consistent with a minimum annual improvement in the structural balance, i.e.
the cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures,
of at least 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark.
(8)       After recording an an
average real GDP growth of 4% per year over 2001-2011, the pace of economic
activty slowed down in 2012 to 1.9%. The macroeconomic scenario underpinning
the report on effective action projects real GDP growth to slow down further in
2013 to 1.5% before rebounding in 2014 and 2015 with real GDP expanding by 2.5%
and 3.8%, respectively. According to the Commission 2013 autumn forecast, real
GDP is set to grow at 1.3% in 2013 and accelerate to 2.5% in 2014 and 2.9% in
2015. Compared to the Polish authorities, the Commission has a less optimistic
view on domestic demand growth over the forecast horizon, private consumption
and private investment in particular.
(9)       The Polish authorities
foresee a general government deficit of 4.8% of GDP in 2013, up from 3.9% of
GDP in 2012. Subsequently, the Polish Ministry of Finance projects a surplus of
4.5% of GDP in 2014 on the back of the planned pension reform, which in
particular results in a one-off transfer of assets worth 8.5% of GDP. In 2015,
the general government balance is expected to turn back into a deficit of 3% of
GDP.
(10)     For 2013 and 2014, the
Commission forecast is similar to the Polish authorities'. It also projects a
deficit of 4.8% of GDP in 2013. The deterioration compared to the 3.9% of GDP
in the EDP baseline scenario is mainly due to revenue shortfalls. In 2014, the
general government balance is projected to be in surplus (+4.6% of GDP) as a
consequence of the planned pension reform. For 2015 the Commission is less
optimistic than the Polish authorities and expect a general government deficit
of 3.3% of GDP. The 0.3 pp. of GDP difference is mainly due to lower current
revenues based on a lower projection for nominal GDP growth as well as higher
government expenditure on intermediate consumption. The deficit targets are
subject to implementation risks.
(11)     Moreover, it has to be
noted that the current deficit forecast is based on ESA-95. As of autumn 2014,
a new set of rules will be in place (ESA-2010). Under the new set of rules, a
transfer of assets would no longer count as general government revenue, thus,
the general government balance is expected to show a deficit of 4.2% of GDP in
2014 and 3.9% of GDP in 2015[5].
Since the Council will decide on an abrogation based on the EDP figures
assessed by Eurostat in spring 2015 under ESA2010, additional measures are required
to compensate for those elements of the pension reform, which will not reduce
the deficit any longer under ESA2010.
(12)     Both the Polish authorities
and the Commission projects the general government gross debt to remain below
the 60% threshold over the entire period under consideration. According to the
Commission 2013 autumn forecast, the debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to fall from
55.6% in 2012 to 51% in 2014, mainly as an effect of the announced transfer of
pension funds' assets of 8.5% of GDP, before edging up to 52.5% in 2015.
(13)     In order to correct the
excessive deficit by the 2014 deadline under the then prevailing ESA-2010 rules
and ensure its sustainability, the required additional structural effort for
2014 would amount to at least 1.6% of GDP, on top of the measures already
included in the Commission 2013 autumn forecast (which under ESA2010 would yield
an improvement in structural deficit of 0.6% of GDP in 2014). Since part of the
adjustment need is the result of the change from ESA-95 to ESA-2010 and in
addition, such an annual effort (higher than requested in the Council
Recommendation of 7 July 2009 (1¼ % of GDP) and higher than the 1.3% of GDP
requested in the Council Recommendation of 21 June 2013) would result in a
significant output loss at a time when the output gap is still negative, it is
appropriate to set the deadline of 2015.
(14)     Against the background of
high uncertainties regarding economic and budgetary developments, the budgetary
target recommended for the final year of the correction period should be set at
a level clearly below the reference value, in order to guarantee an effective
and lasting achievement of the correction within the requested deadline.
(15)     Therefore, correcting the
excessive deficit by 2015 would be commensurate with the intermediate headline
deficit target of 3.9% of GDP for 2014 (net of pension asset transfer) and the
final target of 2.8% of GDP in 2015. The underlying improvement in the
structural budget balance implied by these targets is 1% of GDP in 2014 and 1.2%
of GDP in 2015, taking into account the measures included in the Commission 2013
autumn forecast yielding an improvement in structural balance under ESA2010 of
0.6% of GDP in 2014 and 0.2% of GDP in 2015. This implies a need of additional
measures of 0.4% of GDP in 2014 and 1% of GDP in 2015, on top of those already
included in the Commission 2013 autumn forecast (excluding the asset transfers
of the pension reform),
HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:
(1)
Poland should bring an
end to the excessive deficit situation by 2015 in a credible and sustainable
manner.
(2)
Poland should reach a
headline deficit target of 4.8% of GDP in 2013, a deficit of 3.9% of GDP in 2014
and of 2.8% of GDP in 2015 (excluding the impact of the assets transfer of the
pension reform). For 2014 this is consistent with an improvement of the
structural balance of 1% of GDP and 1.2% of GDP for 2015, based on the
Commission 2013 autumn forecast.
(3)
Poland should rigorously
implement the measures already announced and adopted, while complementing them
with additional measures sufficient to achieve a correction of the excessive
deficit by 2015 in a sustainable manner. Poland should use all windfall gains for
deficit reduction.
(4)
The Council establishes the deadline of 15 April
2014 for Poland to take effective action and, in accordance with Article 3(4a)
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, to report in detail the consolidation
strategy that is envisaged to achieve the targets.
Furthermore, the Polish authorities should
(i) improve the quality of public finances, in particular through minimising
cuts in growth-enhancing infrastructure investments, a careful review of social
expenditures and their efficiency; (ii) improve tax compliance and increase the
efficiency of tax administration and (iii) make the institutional framework of
public finances more binding and transparent, including through adjusting the
definitions used in national accounting to ESA standards and ensuring
sufficiently broad coverage, improving intra-annual monitoring of budget
execution and ensuring an effective and timely monitoring of compliance with
the permanent expenditure rule, based on reliable and independent analysis
carried out by independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional autonomy
vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities. Finally, to ensure the success of the fiscal
consolidation strategy, it will be important to back the fiscal consolidation
by comprehensive structural reforms, in line with the Council recommendations
addressed to Poland in the context of the European Semester. Beyond the
report foreseen in recommendation (4), the Polish authorities should report on
progress made in the implementation of these recommendations at least every [six
months] as well as in a separate chapter in the convergence programmes, until
full correction of the excessive deficit has taken place.
This recommendation is addressed to the Republic of   Poland.
Done at Brussels,
                                                                       For
the Council
                                                                       The
President
[1]               All documents related to the
excessive deficit procedure of Poland can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/poland_en.htm
[2]               OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.
[3]               Communication from the
Commission to the Council on assessment of budgetary implementation in the
context of the ongoing Excessive Deficit Procedures after the Commission
services' 2011 autumn forecast - COM(2012) 4 final, 11.1.2012.
[4]               Council Recommendation with a
view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Poland, 21 June 2013.
[5]               Under ESA-2010 the following
effects of the planned pension reform would not result any longer in a deficit
reduction: one-off asset transfer of 8.5% of GDP in 2014, regular asset
transfer in 2014 (0.3% of GDP) and 2015 (cumulated effect of 0.6% of GDP). Only
the change in the number of contributors to the first pillar would remain under
the new rules (0.2% of GDP in 2014, cumulated effect of 0.4% of GDP in 2015).
While the switch to ESA2010 is estimated to have a positive impact on GDP
figures, the size of the impact of higher GDP on fiscal figures is expected to
be negligible.