Avis juridique important

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52004SC0485(01)

Recommendation for a Council Recommendation with a view to giving early warning to Italy in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit (presented by the Commission in accordance with Article 99(4) of the Treaty)  /* SEC/2004/0485 final */

Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION with a view to giving early warning to Italy in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit (presented by the Commission in accordance with Article 99(4) of the Treaty)EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUMCouncil Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-ordination of economic policies [1], includes an early warning system under which the Council will alert a Member State at an early stage to the need to take corrective budgetary action in order to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive. Article 6(2) of the regulation sets out for Member States participating in the single currency how the early warning system is applied. Regular monitoring of the implementation of stability programmes by the Council is carried out, in particular with a view to identifying actual or expected significant divergence of the budgetary position from the medium-term objective for the government balance, or the adjustment path towards it, as set in the programme. In the event that the Council identifies a significant divergence, with a view to giving early warning in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit, it addresses a recommendation to the Member State concerned to take the necessary adjustment measures. This early warning is made in accordance with the procedure of Article 99(4) of the Treaty and is based on a recommendation from the Commission.[1]  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997In deciding whether to activate the early warning mechanism, the Commission [2] considers the following elements: the size of the budgetary slippage, that is the extent to which budgetary position of a Member State diverges from the targets set down in stability or convergence programmes; the reason for the budgetary slippage, that is, whether or not the divergence of the actual balance from the target can be explained by purely cyclical factors; and the risk of an excessive deficit position, that is, whether there is a risk of breaching the 3% of GDP reference value.[2]  COM(2002) 668 final of 27.11.2002.Deficit targets and outturnsThe 2002 update of the stability programme of Italy, submitted to the Commission on 20 November 2002, covered the period from 2002 to 2006. It projected a general government deficit of 1.5% of GDP in 2003, under the assumption of an increase in real GDP of 2.3%, and a general government deficit of 0.6% of GDP in 2004, assuming an increase in real GDP of 2.9%. A series of revisions followed (outlined in the table below), ensuing from the worse than expected budgetary outturn in 2002, updated projections for economic growth and a reconsideration of budgetary targets. In the official forecast presented in September 2003 together with the budget, the deficit projection for 2003 was set at 2.5% of GDP, with real GDP growth of 0.5%. The 2004 deficit was targeted at 2.2% of GDP, assuming real GDP growth of 1.9%. These figures for both 2003 and 2004 were confirmed in the stability programme update submitted on 1 December 2003.>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>The successive downward revisions of economic growth and the upward revisions of the budget deficit reflect a pattern highlighted in the Commission services' technical assessments of the updated stability programmes [3] and in the Council opinions on the same programmes. [4] Budgetary plans were recurrently based on overoptimistic growth assumptions, especially as regards the medium term growth outlook. As a result, the budgetary outturns in percent of GDP were worse than targeted both in nominal and cyclically-adjusted terms, even without additional expansionary discretionary measures within the fiscal year. [5] The successive revisions of real GDP dragged down the level of potential output. What would have been, based on the official projection, a cyclical budgetary deterioration was revealed to be of a structural nature. While any growth forecast is intrinsically subject to errors, and the duration of the present cyclical slowdown was not anticipated by most forecasters, the degree and the persistency of optimism in Italy's official growth forecasts is not consistent with a prudent fiscal strategy.[3]  The assessments of the 2002 update and the 2003 update of the stability programme can be consulted on http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/ about/activities/sgp/cswd_en.htm.[4]  OJ C 26 , 4.2.2003; OJ C 51, 26.2.2002; OJ C 77, 9.3.2001.[5]  Based on the method for calculating potential output and the output gap adopted by the Council on 12 July 2002.The divergence from the budgetary target in 2003In 2003, according to the 1 March 2004 reporting of government deficit and debt levels (EDP notification), real GDP growth was 0.3%, and the deficit was 2.4% of GDP, 0.9 percentage point higher than the original deficit target, in spite of one-off measures the impact of which is estimated at over 2 percentage points of GDP. Without one-off measures, the deficit would have been over 4½ % of GDP. [6][6]  "One-off measures", are measures that lead to temporary (and hence fully reversible) deteriorations or improvements in the budget balance. The critical feature is a significant, transitory and identifiable impact on the public accounts, outweighing any possible lasting effect ensuing from the measure. In particular, although it cannot be excluded that tax amnesties may lead to a permanently broader tax base and hence would not be purely one-off, the impact effect in the year in which the tax amnesty receipts accrue can be certainly qualified as temporary.The slippage in 2003 compared to the 2002 updated stability programme is due to a higher than planned primary expenditure to GDP ratio in the order of 1.7 percentage points, including a shortfall in receipts from sales of real assets by around 0.4 percentage point of GDP. [7] An additional shortfall from plans, ensuing from an overoptimistic assessment of the tax content of economic growth, was fully compensated by windfall receipts from a tax amnesty. On the whole, the slippage compared to the 2002 updated stability programme in the primary budget balance amounted to 1.6% of GDP, confirming the declining trend in the primary balance after the high surpluses recorded in the late 1990s. Thanks to lower than officially projected interest payments in the order of 0.7% of GDP, the total budgetary overrun was, as indicated above, 0.9% of GDP.[7]  According to the European System of National Accounts (ESA95), sales of real assets are recorded as reducing gross fixed capital formation.Based on the commonly-agreed method for calculating potential output and the output gap, the Commission Spring 2004 forecast estimates the cyclically-adjusted deficit in 2003 at 1.9% of GDP, an improvement of 0.3 percentage point compared to the previous year. This result was achieved on the back of one-off measures, as recalled above, estimated at slightly above 2 percentage points of GDP, up from around 1.5 percentage points in 2002.The divergence from the budgetary target in 2004In 2004, according to the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, real GDP growth is expected to be 1.2% and in the absence of additional measures the general government deficit is projected at 3.2% of GDP, hence above the reference value established in the Treaty. Although decreasing compared to 2003, one-off measures, estimated at around one percentage point of GDP, are still substantial. Thus, net of one-off measures, the estimated deficit would stand at around 4¼ % of GDP.Based on the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, the slippage in 2004 is of 1.0 percentage point relative to the 2.2% of GDP revised objective set out in the 2003 updated stability programme and of 2.6 percentage points relative to the 0.6% deficit objective in the 2002 updated stability programme. The Commission Spring 2004 forecast estimates the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit to rise by 0.7 percentage points compared to 2003 to 2.6% of GDP, well above the level ensuring a safety margin against breaching the 3% of GDP reference value.The difference between the Commission Spring 2004 deficit forecast of 3.2% of GDP and the revised official target of 2.2% set out in the 2003 updated stability programme is due to the following elements taken into account in the former: (i) a worse 2003 outturn - excluding the contribution of one-off measures; (ii) lower economic growth in 2004; (iii) higher increases in compensation per employee in the public sector, based on recent contractual developments; (iv) a more cautious, but still optimistic, assessment of the sale of publicly owned real assets; and (v) ANAS, the agency charged with investment in and maintenance of the state road network, is prudentially considered to remain within the general government sector, unlike the official forecast. [8] The Commission Spring 2004 forecast nevertheless incorporates official estimates of the budgetary impact of a number of measures (extension of the terms of the tax amnesty for underdeclaration of past tax liabilities, amnesty for zoning code violations and tax settlement scheme) which, however, may not materialise as planned.[8]  ANAS was transformed into a joint-stock company in 2002. In 2002 and 2003 Istat and Eurostat considered that it did not satisfy the requirements for being classified outside the general government, notably that sales cover at least 50% of production costs (including depreciation of the existing assets), as can be drawn from the European system of national accounts (ESA95).The slow reduction in the government debt-to-GDP ratioThe still high level of the general government debt-to-GDP ratio remains of great concern. In the 2002 updated stability programme, the ratio was planned to decrease by 9.5 percentage points over the period between the end of 2001 and the end of 2004, to reach 100.4% of GDP. In the 2003 updated stability programme, the official target for the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of 2004 was revised to 105% of GDP. In March 2004 the debt at the end of 2003 was notified at 106.2% of GDP. [9] Without extraordinary operations such as a conversion of debt held by the Banca d'Italia in 2002 and the sale of government-owned stakes in ENEL, ENI and Poste SpA carried out in conjunction with the transformation of the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (the formerly public bank for deposits and loans) into a joint-stock company in 2003, the debt ratio would have barely decreased since 2001. In 2004, the Commission Spring 2004 forecast is 106% of GDP, virtually unchanged compared to the previous year despite privatisation receipts in the order of 1% of GDP (as set out in the 2003 updated stability programme).[9]  Beyond routine debt and GDP data revisions, with the EDP notification of 1 March 2004 the series of general government debt figures from 1999 was revised to incorporate data on postal deposits (current accounts) which had not been included. The figures were further revised to adjust consolidation items.The path of debt reduction was slowed by: (i) the successive slippages in the budget balance, (ii) lower than projected nominal GDP growth in the order of 0.5% in 2002-2003, resulting from optimistic assumptions for real GDP growth, partly counterbalanced by higher than projected increases in the GDP deflator; and (iii) as regards the stock-flow adjustment, a continued excess of the cash borrowing (the fabbisogno di cassa delle amministrazioni pubbliche - a deficit measure based on cash flows and including transactions with financial assets but excluding proceeds from privatisation) over the deficit according to the Maastricht definition (on an accruals basis and excluding financial transactions).The link between the fabbisogno and the Maastricht-definition deficit is not fully transparent. The discrepancy between the two aggregates results from: (i) the inexplicably persistent difference between cash and accruals accounts, which, by the nature of these aggregates, should cancel out over time, (ii) financial transactions and (iii) statistical adjustments. The cumulated excess of the fabbisogno over the Maastricht-definition deficit has weighed some 8 percentage points of GDP on the reduction of the debt ratio since 1999.Looking ahead, several factors endanger the long-term sustainability of public finances. Firstly, the primary surplus has steadily declined over the past several years and in 2003 stood at 2.9% of GDP, corresponding to a cyclically-adjusted primary surplus of 3.4% in the Commission services' estimate; both are expected to deteriorate further in 2004 (Spring 2004 forecasts). As highlighted in the Commission services' technical assessment of the 2003 updated stability programme and acknowledged in the programme itself, this level would not ensure sustainability of public finances in the long run, in view of the budgetary impact of an ageing population. [10] Secondly, the benefits from a declining implicit interest rate on the debt linked to the Maastricht convergence process are coming to an end: the margins for gains from refinancing older higher-rate bonds with new issues at much lower rates are almost exhausted. In fact, there is a risk that the interest burden on the debt may again start rising, as market interest rates are likely to increase from the historical lows reached in the past years. In addition, the future path of debt reduction will also be affected by a low rate of potential output growth, which cannot be expected to recover significantly unless Italy vigorously implements structural reforms in the context of the objectives of the Lisbon agenda. Finally, the difference between cash and accruals accounts constitutes an additional obstacle to the reduction of the debt.[10]  Assessment on the 2003 update of the Stability Programme of Italy (2003-2007), ECFIN/18/04-EN (http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/ about/activities/sgp/country/commwd/it/com_it20032004.pdf).Policy conclusionsThe Commission considers that the Commission Spring 2004 forecast signals: (1) a significant slippage in the budgetary position for 2004 in the order of one percentage point compared to the deficit target of the 2003 updated stability programme (2.2% of GDP), which in turn was increased from the 0.6% of GDP target in the 2002 updated stability programme; (2) that the significant divergence from the path towards a medium-term close to balance or in surplus position can be largely explained by a deceleration in GDP which, as highlighted in successive Council opinions on the stability programme updates, was repeatedly underestimated; (3) that the divergence emerges in spite of a sizeable contribution of one-off measures in the order of one percentage point of GDP; (4) that in the absence of additional corrective measures, the expected deficit in 2004 would exceed the 3% reference value established in the Treaty; (5) that the cyclically-adjusted budget balance estimate is well above the level of 1.5% of GDP ensuring a safety margin against breaching the 3% of GDP reference value; (6) that the deviation from the path towards a medium term close to balance or in surplus position is likely to widen further in 2005 in view of the planned progressive phasing out of one-off measures - the Commission projects a deficit based on existing legislation of 4% of GDP, alongside a recovery of the economy; and (7) that the path of debt reduction is equally at risk, despite sizeable privatisation plans of 1.1% of GDP.This calls for the activation of the early warning system in the case of Italy.In view of the above, the Italian authorities should take additional measures to ensure that the general government deficit does not breach the 3% of GDP reference value.A well-devised within-year adjustment, if framed as a first step of a credible multi-annual programme, would give rise to a positive confidence effect and therefore help offset short-term negative effects on demand. It should be centred on a sizeable reduction and re-composition of expenditure, creating room for lowering the tax burden, and on an acceleration in the reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This would enhance potential growth in the long run.Therefore, it would appear appropriate to implement additional measures of a permanent nature of at least EUR 7 billion or 0.5% of GDP in 2004 which, based on the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, would stem the deterioration of the cyclically-adjusted balance in 2004. This should provide a sufficient margin for bringing the budget below the 3% of GDP reference value, taking also into account possible risks that one-off measures may not yield the amounts projected in the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, which largely mirrors the official projections on the impact of transitory measures.In subsequent years Italy should aim at ensuring a 0.5 percentage point of GDP annual improvement in cyclically-adjusted terms, and continue to phase out one-off measures as set out in the 2003 update of the stability programme. In this context, given the Government's objective progressively to reduce the tax burden, it will prove crucial to rein in expenditure, in order to avoid the higher deficits which would result from uncompensated tax cuts. In order to maximise the medium-term benefits of fiscal consolidation the Government should also pay attention to the composition and quality of expenditure.Based on this assessment, the Commission has adopted the attached recommendation for a Council recommendation giving an early warning to Italy, and is passing it on to the Council for decision. The Commission considers that, in the interest of openness and transparency, the Council early warning should be made public and has also adopted a proposal for a Council decision to this effect, in accordance with the provision of Article 99(4) of the Treaty.Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION with a view to giving early warning to Italy in order to prevent the occurrence  of an excessive deficitTHE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 99(4) thereof,Having regard to the Council regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-ordination of economic policies [11], and in particular Article 6(2) thereof,[11]  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.Having regard to the recommendation of the Commission,Whereas:(1) Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 as part of the Stability and Growth Pact establishes an early warning system for alerting a Member State at an early stage to the need to make the necessary budgetary adjustment to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive. An early warning should be given when the Council identifies actual or expected significant divergence of the budgetary position in a Member State from the medium-term budgetary objective, or the adjustment path towards it, set in the Member State's stability programme for the government balance.(2) In deciding whether to activate the early warning mechanism, consideration should be given to the following elements: the size of the budgetary slippage, that is the extent to which budgetary position of a Member State diverges from the targets set down in stability or convergence programmes; the reason for the budgetary slippage, that is, whether or not the divergence of the actual balance from the target can be explained by purely cyclical factors; and the risk of an excessive deficit position, that is, whether there is a risk of breaching the 3% of GDP reference value.(3) In the Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact adopted in Amsterdam on 17 June 1997 [12] the European Council invited all parties to implement the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in a strict and timely manner.[12]  OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.(4) In the 2003 updated stability programme of Italy, on which the Council delivered an opinion on 10 February 2004 [13], the Italian authorities aimed at a 2.2% of GDP general government deficit in 2004, up from 0.6% of GDP in the 2002 updated stability programme.[13]  OJ C 43, 19.2.2004, p. 1-2.(5) In the Commission Spring 2004 forecast the general government deficit in Italy in 2004 is projected at 3.2% of GDP, thus 2.6 percentage points above the target set in the 2002 updated stability programme and 1.0 percentage points above the target set in the 2003 updated stability programme. If reference is made to the initial target of 0.6% of GDP, only a minor part of the projected slippage of 2.6 percentage points can be explained by a change in the cyclical position as measured by the output gap. If reference is made to the revised target of 2.2% of GDP, the projected slippage of 1.0 percentage point is entirely in cyclically-adjusted terms, as the output gap estimate is virtually unchanged. The strong reliance of the Government's fiscal adjustment strategy on measures of a transitory nature hides an even greater deterioration in the underlying budgetary position, which reflects the lack of adjustment of current primary expenditure.(6) The successive upward revisions of the budget deficit mainly reflect a pattern highlighted in the Commission services' technical assessment of the updated stability programmes [14] and in the Council opinions on the same programmes [15]. Budgetary plans were recurrently based on overoptimistic growth assumptions, which ex-post led to worse than targeted budgetary outturns in percent of GDP, both in nominal and cyclically-adjusted terms, even without additional expansionary discretionary measures within the fiscal year. While growth forecasts are intrinsically subject to errors, and the duration of the present cyclical slowdown was not anticipated by most forecasters, the degree and the persistency of optimism in Italy's official growth forecasts does not appear consistent with a prudent fiscal strategy.[14]  http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/ about/activities/sgp/cswd_en.htm.[15]  OJ C 26 , 4.2.2003; OJ C 51, 26.2.2002; OJ C 77, 9.3.2001.(7) As a result of successive slippages, the Italian budgetary position in 2004 is far from close to balance, both in nominal and cyclically adjusted terms. In particular, the Commission Spring 2004 forecast for the deficit outcome in 2004 is above the 3% of GDP reference value for the deficit established in the Treaty. Moreover, the slippage compared to the path towards a close to balance or in surplus position presented in the 2003 updated stability programme is likely to widen further in 2005. The Commission Spring 2004 forecast projects in 2005 a deficit based on existing legislation of 4% of GDP, with an expected pick-up in aggregate economic activity.(8) Italy's still high level of the debt to GDP ratio and its very slow reduction enhance the concerns about its public finances. In addition to successive budgetary slippages, the slowdown in the path of debt reduction was affected by the persisting difference between cash and accruals accounts, which, by the very nature of these aggregates, should cancel out over time. The cumulated excess of the fabbisogno di cassa delle amministrazioni pubbliche (a deficit measure based on cash flows and including transactions with financial assets but excluding proceeds from privatisation) over the Maastricht-definition deficit has weighed some 8 percentage points of GDP on the reduction of the debt ratio since 1999. Looking ahead, the Commission considers that the very high debt ratio represents a risk to the long run sustainability of public finances, considering the future budgetary impact of an ageing population, the erosion of the primary surplus, the vulnerability to adverse interest rate shocks, with margins for further decreases in the implicit interest on the debt now largely exhausted, and the low rate of potential output growth of the Italian economy.(9) In order to shed light on the government debt dynamics in recent years and in the medium-term, it is appropriate for Italy to provide information on the factors other than net borrowing which contribute to the change in debt level, such as the different kinds of financial transactions (specifically, increases in loans granted and equity acquired, the components of such aggregates, as well as the sources of such increases) and the difference between the cash and accruals based figures for the government deficit.(10) The projected public finance developments in 2004 constitute a significant divergence with respect to the plans of the 2003 updated stability programme and from the adjustment path towards the medium term objective of a close to balance or in surplus position. The significant divergence projected in 2004 would further postpone the medium-term commitment of attaining a close to balance position.(11) A well-devised within-year adjustment, if framed as a first step of a credible multi-annual programme would give rise to a positive confidence effect and therefore help offset short-term negative effects on demand. It should be centred on a sizeable reduction and re-composition of expenditure, creating room for lowering the tax burden, and on an acceleration in the reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This would enhance potential growth in the long run.(12) In view of the above, it would appear appropriate to implement in 2004 additional corrective measures of a permanent nature within the calendar year amounting to at least EUR 7 billion or 0.5% of GDP which, based on the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, would stem the deterioration of the cyclically-adjusted balance in 2004. This should address the danger of the general government deficit breaching the 3% of GDP reference value in 2004, taking also into account the risk that one-off measures may not yield the amounts projected in the Commission Spring 2004 forecast, which largely mirrors the official projection. In subsequent years Italy should aim at ensuring the 0.5 percentage point of GDP annual improvement in cyclically-adjusted terms until a close to balance position is reached, and continue to phase out one-off measures as set out in the 2003 updated stability programme.(13) On the basis of the assessment made by the Commission, the Council identifies a significant divergence in terms of Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.(14) There is a need for an early warning to be given alerting Italy to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit.HEREBY RECOMMENDS:1. The Italian authorities should take all the appropriate measures to ensure that the general government deficit does not breach the 3% of GDP reference value established in the Treaty in 2004. To this end, adopting additional measures of a permanent nature amounting to at least 0.5 percentage points of GDP in 2004 would not only reduce the risk of breaching the 3% of GDP threshold, but also contribute to resume fiscal consolidation.2. In subsequent years Italy should aim at ensuring a 0.5 percentage point of GDP annual improvement in cyclically-adjusted terms until a close to balance or in surplus position is achieved, and continue to phase out one-off measures as set out in the 2003 updated stability programme. Given the Government's objective progressively to reduce the tax burden, it will prove crucial to rein in current primary expenditure, while improving its quality and composition, in order to avoid the higher deficits which would result from uncompensated tax cuts. This would contribute to ensure a lasting fiscal consolidation and to enhance potential growth.3. Italy should take all steps to accelerate debt reduction. Italy is also invited to prepare a report by early July on the government debt dynamics in recent years and in the medium-term, with a particular attention to factors other than net borrowing which contribute to the change in debt level.This recommendation is addressed to the Republic of Italy.Done at Brussels, [...]For the CouncilThe President  [...]


title: Recommendation for a Council opinion in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the updated stability programme of the Netherlands, 2006-2009

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Important legal notice

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52007SC0068

Recommendation for a Council opinion in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 On the updated stability programme of the Netherlands, 2006-2009  /* SEC/2007/0068 final */

	[pic] | COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES |Brussels, 23.1.2007SEC(2007) 68 finalRecommendation for aCOUNCIL OPINIONin accordance with the third paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 On the updated stability programme of the Netherlands, 2006-2009(presented by the Commission)EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM1. GENERAL BACKGROUNDThe Stability and Growth Pact, which entered into force on 1 July 1998, is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation. The 2005 reform of the Pact acknowledged its usefulness in anchoring fiscal discipline but sought to strengthen its effectiveness and economic underpinnings as well as to safeguard the sustainability of the public finances in the long run.Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies[1], which is part of the Stability and Growth Pact, stipulates that Member States have to submit, to the Council and the Commission, stability or convergence programmes and annual updates thereof (Member States that have already adopted the single currency submit (updated) stability programmes and Member States that have not yet adopted it submit (updated) convergence programmes). The first stability programme of the Netherlands was submitted in November 1998. In accordance with the Regulation, the Council delivered an opinion on it on 1 December 1998 on the basis of a recommendation from the Commission and after having consulted the Economic and Financial Committee. In accordance with the same procedure, updated stability and convergence programmes are assessed by the Commission and examined by the Committee mentioned above, while the Council may examine them.2. BACKGROUND FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE UPDATED PROGRAMMEThe Commission has examined the most recent update of the stability programme of the Netherlands, submitted on 22 November 2006, and has adopted a recommendation for a Council opinion on it (see box for the main points covered by the assessment).In order to set the scene against which the budgetary strategy in the updated stability programme is assessed, the following paragraphs summarise:1.  the economic and budgetary performance over the last ten years2.  the most recent assessment of the country’s position under the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (summary of the Council opinion on the previous update of the stability programme) and3.  the Commission’s assessment of the September 2006 national reform programme.2.1. Recent economic and budgetary performanceDuring the second half of the 1990s, the Netherlands experienced a prolonged cyclical upswing and performed better on average than the euro area both in terms of economic growth and unemployment. It was followed by a downturn in the early 2000s. Over this entire cycle, Dutch economic performance was better than the euro area average. However, a more stable growth pattern would probably have been beneficiary for the economy. The current very high private financial debt levels risk unwinding in case of further interest rate increases, which could dampen private consumption and thereby bring about the next economic downturn.Furthermore, the strong developments in both housing and equity markets that played a large role in explaining the economic boom of the late 1990s also resulted in temporary increases in tax elasticities. The fiscal rules that were in place could not fully prevent the fiscal policy stance from turning out pro-cyclical. Following a comfortable surplus in 2000, the general government balance deteriorated sharply turning into a deficit in 2001 and 2002 and exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold in 2003. A substantial budgetary consolidation was achieved in 2004 and in 2005, which reduced the deficit to 1.9% and 0.3% of GDP in 2004 and 2005, respectively. In June 2005 the Council abrogated the excessive deficit procedure that had been launched in June 2004.2.2. The assessment in the Council opinion on the previous programmeOn 14 March 2006, the Council adopted its opinion on the previous update of the stability programme, covering the period 2005-2008. The Council welcomed "the efforts of the Dutch Government in 2005 to bring the deficit further below the 3 % of GDP reference value, after the prompt correction of the excessive deficit, as well as the fact that the authorities plan to respect the medium-term objective throughout the programme period". It invited the Netherlands "also in view of better-than-expected results in 2005, [to] maintain a strong budgetary position in 2006 and thereafter".2.3. The Commission assessment of the 2006 national reform programmeThe Implementation Report of the National Reform Programme of the Netherlands, provided in the context of the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs, was submitted on 16 October 2006. The Dutch National Reform Programme identifies as key challenges/priorities: improving labour supply; achieving faster growth in labour productivity, in particular by strengthening R&D, innovation and education; and improving price competitiveness, in particular by containing labour costs.The Commission’s assessment (adopted as part of its December 2006 Annual Progress Report[2]) showed that the Netherlands is making good progress with the implementation of its National Reform Programme. While there are certain risks in the macro area, notably with regard to household indebtedness and potential wage inflation due to the tightening of the labour market, overall the policy framework is appropriate. Despite only moderate progress on R&D, the Netherlands is generally moving ahead significantly in the micro-economic field. Notwithstanding high headline employment rates for most groups, the picture in the employment field is more mixed.Against the background of strengths and weaknesses identified, the Netherlands was recommended to take action to improve labour supply, notably of older workers, women and disadvantaged groups.Box: Main points covered by the assessment As required by Article 5(1) (for stability programmes) and Article 9(1) (for convergence programmes) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the assessment covers the following points: whether the economic assumptions on which the programme is based are plausible; the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) presented by the Member State and whether the adjustment path towards it is appropriate; whether measures being taken and/or proposed to respect that adjustment path are sufficient to achieve the MTO over the cycle; when assessing the adjustment path towards the MTO, whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad times, and, for euro-area and ERM II Member States, whether the Member State pursues an annual improvement of the cyclically-adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, of 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark to meet its MTO; when defining the adjustment path to the MTO (for Member States that have not yet reached it) or allowing a temporary deviation from the MTO (for Member States that have), the implementation of major structural reforms which have direct long-term cost-saving effects (including by raising potential growth) and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances (subject to the condition that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value is preserved and that the budgetary position is expected to return to the MTO within the programme period), with special attention for pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully-funded pillar; whether the economic policies of the Member State are consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines. The plausibility of the programme’s macroeconomic assumptions is assessed by reference to the Commission services’ autumn 2006 forecast, using also the commonly agreed methodology for the estimation of potential output and cyclically-adjusted balances. The assessment of consistency with the broad economic policy guidelines is made against the broad economic policy guidelines in the area of public finances as included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008. The assessment also examines: the evolution of the debt ratio and the outlook for the long-term sustainability of the public finances, which should be given “sufficient attention in the surveillance of budgetary positions” according to the Council report of 20 March 2005 on “Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”. A Commission Communication of 12 October 2006 sets out the approach to the assessment of long-term sustainability[3]; the degree of integration with the national reform programme, submitted by Member States in the context of the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs. In its cover note of 7 June 2005 to the European Council on the broad economic policy guidelines for the period 2005-2008, the ECOFIN Council stated that the national reform programmes should be consistent with the stability and convergence programmes; compliance with the code of conduct[4], which inter alia prescribes a common structure and set of data tables for the stability and convergence programmes. |-  Recommendation for aCOUNCIL OPINIONin accordance with the third paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 On the updated stability programme of the Netherlands, 2006-2009THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies[5], and in particular Article 5(3) thereof,Having regard to the recommendation of the Commission,After consulting the Economic and Financial Committee,HAS DELIVERED THIS OPINION:4.  On [27 February 2007] the Council examined the updated stability programme of the Netherlands, which covers the period 2006 to 2009.5.  The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme envisages that real GDP will grow by 3¼% in 2006, 3% in 2007 and 1¾% per year over the rest of the programme period. Assessed against currently available information, this scenario appears to be based on plausible growth assumptions for 2006 and 2007 and cautious ones thereafter. The programme’s projections for inflation appear realistic until 2007 and seem to be on the low side thereafter in light of the expected tightness of the labour market.6.  For 2006, the general government position is estimated to be balanced in the Commission services’ autumn 2006 forecast, against a target of -1.5% of GDP set in the previous update of the stability programme. This mainly reflects a strongly improved cyclical outlook resulting in higher tax revenues as well as higher receipts from the sale of natural gas. Information that has become available since the autumn forecast (monthly data on the general government balance) points to an even better budgetary outcome. The latest official estimate, contained in the Autumn 2006 memorandum, puts the outturn for 2006 at a surplus of 0.4% of GDP.7.  The medium-term budgetary strategy in the programme aims at addressing the challenge of the cost of ageing through further fiscal consolidation. To this end, the programme projects the general government surplus to improve from 0.1% of GDP in 2006 to 0.9% in 2009. The primary surplus is targeted to improve from 2.4% of GDP in 2006 to 2.9% in 2009, which is fully concentrated in the final year of the programme, reflecting in large part the expected refunding in that year of the EU own resources contribution paid over the period 2007-2009. The nominal adjustment is fully explained by a fall in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, which more than compensates a 0.2 percentage point decline in the revenue-to-GDP ratio. Compared to the previous update of the stability programme, the level of the general government balance is markedly higher throughout the programme period. This mainly reflects higher gas receipts, the improved macroeconomic situation in 2005 and outlook for 2006.8.  The structural balance (i.e. the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and other temporary measures) calculated according to the commonly agreed methodology is expected to deteriorate by around half a percentage point of GDP in 2007, stabilise in 2008 and improve by around half a percentage point of GDP in 2009. As in the previous update of the stability programme, the medium-term objective (MTO) for the budgetary position presented in the programme is a structural deficit ranging from 0.5 to 1% of GDP, which the programme plans to maintain throughout the programme period. As the lower bound of the MTO range is equal to the minimum benchmark (estimated at a deficit of around 1% of GDP), achieving the MTO should fulfil the aim of providing a safety margin against the occurrence of an excessive deficit. The MTO lies within the range indicated for euro-area and ERM II Member States in the Stability and Growth Pact and the code of conduct and adequately reflects the debt ratio and average potential output growth in the long term.9.  The risks to the budgetary projections in the programme appear broadly balanced from 2007 onwards. On the one hand, the possibility of a positive carry-over into 2007 of the higher tax receipts in 2006 constitutes a positive risk to the budgetary outcome in 2007. Furthermore, for 2008 and 2009, a positive risk to the budgetary position stems from the cautious macroeconomic scenario. On the other hand, gas receipts may turn out lower than currently anticipated throughout the period.10.  In view of this risk assessment, the budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to maintain the MTO throughout the programme period, as envisaged in the programme. In addition, it provides a sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3% of GDP deficit threshold with normal macroeconomic fluctuations throughout the programme period. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the fiscal policy stance implied by the programme may turn out to be pro-cyclical in 2007, when good times are expected. This would not be in line with the Stability and Growth Pact.11.  Thanks to the sharp reduction in the general government deficit in 2004 and 2005, government gross debt is estimated to have fallen to 50.2% of GDP in 2006, further below the 60% of GDP Treaty reference value. The programme projects the debt ratio to further decline by 6 percentage points over the programme period.12.  The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in the Netherlands is higher than the EU average, influenced notably by a relatively high increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming decades. The initial budgetary position, albeit not as strong as in 2005, contributes to easing the projected long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population, but it is not sufficient to fully cover it. The projected future rise of revenues as a share of GDP, mainly due to deferred taxation of pensions, would partly compensate for the increase in public expenditure over the long term. Ensuring high primary surpluses over the medium term and/or implementing reform measures that curb the projected increase in age-related expenditure would contribute to containing risks to the sustainability of public finances. Overall, the Netherlands appears to be at low risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.13.  The stability programme does not contain a qualitative assessment of the overall impact of the 2006 implementation report of the national reform programme within the medium-term fiscal strategy. In addition, it provides no systematic information on the direct budgetary costs or savings of the main reforms envisaged in the national reform programme, although its budgetary projections seem to take into account the public finance implications of the actions outlined in the national reform programme. The measures in the area of public finances envisaged in the stability programme seem consistent with those foreseen in the national reform programme. In particular, both programmes describe the recent health care reform, the modifications to the corporate tax system and planned extra outlays, for instance on infrastructure.14.  The budgetary strategy in the programme is broadly consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines included in the integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008.15.  As regards the data requirements specified in the code of conduct for stability and convergence programmes, the programme provides all required and most of the optional data[6].The overall conclusion is that the medium-term budgetary position is sound. An important risk is that the current high level of gas receipts may not persist but overall the risks attached to the achievement of the budgetary targets are broadly neutral.In view of the above assessment and the good growth prospects, the Netherlands is invited to maintain a strong structural position in 2007 and beyond, thereby avoiding pro-cyclical fiscal policies in good times.Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 |Real GDP (% change) | SP Nov 2006 | 1.5 | 3¼ | 3 | 1¾ | 1¾ |COM Nov 2006 | 1.5 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.6 | n.a. |SP Dec 2005 | ¾ | 2½ | 2½ | 2¼ | n.a. |HICP inflation (%) | SP Nov 2006 | 1.5 | 1½ | 1¾ | 1¾ | 1¾ |COM Nov 2006 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.3 | n.a. |SP Dec 2005 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.1 | n.a. | n.a. |Output gap (% of potential GDP) | SP Nov 20061 | -1.9 | -0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.3 |COM Nov 20065 | -2.0 | -1.2 | -0.4 | 0.0 | n.a. |SP Dec 20051 | -2.3 | -1.5 | -0.9 | -0.6 | n.a. |General government balance (% of GDP) | SP Nov 2006 | -0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.9 |COM Nov 2006 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | n.a. |SP Dec 2005 | -1.2 | -1.5 | -1.2 | -1.1 | n.a. |Primary balance (% of GDP) | SP Nov 2006 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.9 |COM Nov 2006 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | n.a. |SP Dec 2005 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.5 | n.a. |Cyclically-adjusted balance (% of GDP) | SP Nov 20061 | 0.8 | 0.4 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.7 |COM Nov 2006 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 | n.a. |SP Dec 20051 | 0.0 | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.6 | n.a. |Structural balance2 (% of GDP) | SP Nov 20063 | 0.8 | 0.4 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 |COM Nov 20064 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 | n.a. |SP Dec 2005 | 0.0 | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.6 | n.a. |Government gross debt (% of GDP) | SP Nov 2006 | 52.7 | 50.2 | 47.9 | 46.3 | 44.2 |COM Nov 2006 | 52.7 | 50.5 | 47.8 | 45.4 | n.a. |SP Dec 2005 | 54.4 | 54.5 | 53.9 | 53.1 | n.a. |Notes: 1 Commission services calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. 2 Cyclically-adjusted balance (as in the previous rows) excluding one-off and other temporary measures. 3 One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme (0.3% of GDP in 2009; deficit-reducing). 4 There are no one-offs and other temporary measures in the Commission services’ autumn 2006 forecast. 5Based on estimated potential growth of 1.9%, 2.1%, 2.2% and 2.1% respectively in the period 2005-2008. Source: Stability programme; Commission services’ autumn 2006 economic forecasts (COM); Commission services’ calculations |[1] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1). All the documents referred to in this text can be found at the following website:http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm[2] Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council, “Implementing the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs - A year of delivery” - COM(2006) 816, 12.12.2006 .[3] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “The long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU” - COM(2006) 574, 12.10.2006 - and European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2006), “The long-term sustainability of public finances in the European Union”, European Economy No 4/2006.[4] “Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and content of stability and convergence programmes”, endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005.[5] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1). The documents referred to in this text can be found at the following website:http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm[6] In particular, the functional breakdown of government expenditures for 2009 is missing.


Avis juridique important

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31984K0161

Commission Recommendation No 161/84/ECSC of 20 January 1984 on Community surveillance in respect of the importation of certain iron and steel products covered by the ECSC Treaty and originating in certain non-member countries

Official Journal L 019 , 24/01/1984 P. 0005 - 0010

*****COMMISSION  RECOMMENDATION No 161/84/ECSC  of 20 January 1984  on Community surveillance in respect of the importation of certain iron and steel products covered by the ECSC Treaty and originating in certain non-member countries  THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and in particular Article 74 thereof,  Whereas imports of certain iron and steel products covered by the ECSC Treaty and originating in non-member countries are subject to Community surveillance under recommendation No 1399/82/ECSC (1), as renewed by recommendation No 3419/82/ECSC (2);  Whereas, bearing in mind recent trends in the conditions under which the products concerned have been imported, it is advisable to amend and supplement the present provisions and, in view of the scale of earlier amendments, to revise the terms of that recommendation;  Whereas it is appropriate that the Member States be entrusted with the task of gathering from importers the information which the Commission needs to attain the objective pursued by the surveillance system,  MAKES THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION:  Article 1  1. The importation into the Community of iron and steel products covered by the ECSC Treaty, listed in Annexes III A and III B and originating in non-member countries shall be subject to the issue of an import licence.  2. The products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be considered as being of first-choice quality until proof to the contrary is supplied by the importer.  3. The import licence shall be issued or endorsed by the Member States, free of charge and for any quantities requested, upon receipt of the application and in any case within not more than 10 working days from the submission of the completed application and presentation of two duplicates of the relevant purchase contract(s) and the vendor's order confirmation(s). The originals of these documents must be produced if required by the licence-issuing authority. If the products in question are declared as being seconds or of substandard quality, the import licence shall indicate the precise characteristics which justify the said classification of the products.  4. Paragraph 1 shall apply without prejudice to the maintenance of existing quantitative restrictions imposed by certain Member States on certain iron and steel products in respect of certain non-member countries.  5. The period of validity of the import licence is hereby fixed at two months, without prejudice to possible changes in the import arrangements in force.  6. Completely used import licences shall be returned immediately to the issuing office. Licences not, or incompletely, used two months after their date of issue shall be returned to the issuing office within five working days of their date of expiry.  Article 2  1. The importer's application must state for goods listed in Annexes III A and III B of whatever origin:  (a) the country of origin and the country of consignment;  (b) a description of the goods and an indication of the Common Customs Tariff subheading and the NIMEXE code;  (c) the characteristics establishing any claim that the goods are seconds or of substandard quality;  (d) the quantity of the goods in tonnes, by individual lots;  (e) the name, address, telephone number and telex number of the vendor;  (f) the name, address, telephone number and telex number of the importer;  (g) the name, address, telephone number and telex number of any final purchaser, where known;  (h) the proposed date and place (customs office) of importation;  (i) the point of delivery used for the calculation of the invoiced price;  (j) the date of the contract for the purchase of the goods and the contract number or any other reference given by the vendor by which the delivery in question may be identified;  (k) where applicable, that the goods in question are intended for processing under contract and subsequent re-export outside the Community (country of re-export to be specified).  2. The following additional information shall also be supplied when a licence to import goods listed in Annex III A is applied for:  A. For goods originating in and consigned directly from one of the countries listed in Annex II (direct importation):  (a) a full commercial description of the goods, including exact specifications, sufficient to permit calculation of the delivered price according to the price lists selected;  (b) the delivered price per tonne, including customs duties, transport costs to point of delivery and all extras, rebates and any other factors relevant to calculation of the delivered price;  (c) details of:  (i) the Community producer's price lists chosen for calculating the delivered price, stating the date of the chosen lists; or  (ii) where appropriate, the non-member country offer on which the terms of the delivery have been aligned, giving details sufficient to identify the offer, including its date; or  (iii) where appropriate, other prices (to be justified);  (d) the date of issuance of the bill of lading, if available.  B. For goods originating in one of the countries listed in Annex II but consigned from any non-member country other than the country of origin (indirect importation), for products originating in Brazil, other than pig and cast iron falling within heading No 73.01 of the Common Customs Tariff, and for goods originating in a non-member country not listed in Annex I or II:  (a) a complete description corresponding to that appearing in the list of products subject to the basic prices in force;  (b) the cif price at the Community frontier, per tonne, in the currency of the contract, plus customs duties applicable and unloading costs.  C. For goods originating in one of the countries listed in Annex I, at the option of the importer:  either:  (a) a full description of the goods corresponding to that appearing in the list of products subject to the basic prices in force;  (b) the cif price at the Community frontier, per tonne, in the currency of the contract, and including unloading costs;  or:  (a) a full commercial description of the goods, including exact specifications, sufficient to permit calculation of the delivered price according to the price list selected;  (b) the delivered price per tonne, including transport costs to point of delivery and all extras, rebates and any other factors relevant to calculation of the delivered price;  (c) details of:  (i) the price lists of the producer in the non-member country in question, chosen for calculating the delivered price, stating the date of the chosen lists; or  (ii) the Community producer's price lists chosen for calculating the delivered price, stating the date of the chosen lists; or  (iii) where appropriate, the non-member country offer on which the terms of the delivery have been aligned, giving details sufficient to identify the offer, including its date; or  (iv) any other appropriate price (to be justified);  (d) if available, the date of issuance of the bill of lading.  3. The importer shall declare that neither he nor the purchaser will be granted any reduction, rebate or other form of refund not mentioned in the contract for the transaction, either at the time of the transaction or subsequently.  4. The importer shall certify that his application for an import licence is accurate.  5. The importer shall state whether his application is a repeat of a previous application concerning the same delivery.  Article 3  1. The Member States shall communicate to the Commission, as soon as such information is established by the competent authorities, any difference between:  - the delivered price calculated according to the provisions on prices applicable to the non-member countries listed in Annexes I and II on the date scheduled for importation, and - the price used on the basis of the chosen Community producer's price list pursuant to Article 2 (2) (A) (c) or justified otherwise.  They shall also furnish all necessary documents, notably the duplicates of licence applications, purchase contracts and vendor's order confirmations, whenever the price difference noted is considerable or relates to a large quantity.  2. The Member States shall communicate to the Commission, as soon as such information is established by the competent authorities, any difference between:  - the basic price as published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, plus any extras, and  - the cif price at the Community frontier, including customs duties applicable and unloading costs, in ECU per tonne, for the following goods:  (i) goods originating in one of the countries listed in Annexes I and II, but consigned from a non-member country other than the country of origin;  (ii) goods originating in non-member countries, other than those listed in Annexes I and II;  (iii) goods originating in Brazil, other than pig and cast iron falling within heading No 73.01 of the Common Customs Tariff.  3. Within the first 10 days of each month, Member States shall notify the Commission of the tonnage and amounts (calculated on the basis of the cif prices) for which import licences were issued during the preceding month.  4. The information supplied by Member States shall include:  (a) a breakdown by product (Common Customs Tariff subheading and NIMEXE code) with separate declaration of the quantities declared as being seconds or of substandard quality;  (b) a breakdown by country of origin;  (c) within the total of any one product originating in any one country, the quantities not imported directly from that country and, where appropriate, a breakdown by country or countries of consignment;  (d) the quantities of each product re-exported outside the Community after inward processing.  5. Within the first 10 days of each month, Member States shall communicate to the Commission the tonnage and the amounts (calculated on the basis of the cif price) for which import licences have expired during the preceding month without having been used by importers.  Article 4  For the purposes of this recommendation, the country of consignment is deemed to be the last intermediate non-member country in which the product in question was the subject of entrepôt operations or legal transactions not connected with its transportation.  Article 5  Recommendation No 1399/82/ECSC is hereby repealed.  Article 6  This recommendation shall enter into force for each Member State on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.  It shall apply until 31 December 1984.  Done at Brussels, 20 January 1984.  For the Commission  Wilhelm HAFERKAMP  Vice-President  (1) OJ No L 157, 8. 6. 1982, p. 5.  (2) OJ No L 360, 21. 12. 1982, p. 25.  ANNEX I  Austria  Finland  Norway  Sweden  ANNEX II  1.2 // Australia Brazil (1) Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Japan  // Korea Poland Romania South Africa Spain  (1) Only for pig and cast iron falling within heading No 73.01 of the Common Customs Tariff.  ANNEX III A  List of products the importation of which is subject to the issue of an import document  (quantity and price surveillance)  1.2.3 //   //   //   // CCT heading No  // NIMEXE code  // Description  //   //   //   //   //   //   // 73.01 B  // 73.01-21, 23, 25, 27  // Haematite pig iron and cast iron  // 73.01 C  // 73.01-31, 35  // Phosphoric pig iron and cast iron  // 73.01 D  // 73.01-41, 49  // Pig iron and cast iron other than spiegeleisen, haematite and phosphoric pig iron and cast iron  // 73.02 A I  // 73.02-01, 09  // Ferro-manganese containing more than 2 % by weight of carbon (high carbon ferro-manganese)  // 73.07 A I  // 73.07-12  // Blooms and billets, of iron or steel, rolled (1)  // 73.07 B I  // 73.07-21, 24  // Slabs and sheet bars, of iron or steel, rolled (1)  // 73.08  // 73.08-01, 03, 05, 07, 21, 25, 29, 41, 45, 49  // Iron or steel coils for re-rolling  // 73.10 A I  // 73.10-11  // Wire rod of iron or steel  // 73.10 A II  // 73.10-13  // Concrete reinforcing bars of iron or steel with minor indentations, flanges, grooves or other deformations produced during the rolling process, whether or not twisted after rolling  //   // 73.10-16  // Concrete reinforcing bars of iron or steel other than those with minor indentations, flanges, grooves or other deformations produced during the rolling process  //   //   // Bars and rods of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, other than concrete reinforcing bars  // 73.11 A I  // 73.11-11, 12, 14, 16, 19  // Angles, shapes and sections of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded  // 73.12 A II  // 73.12-19  // Hoop and strip of iron or steel, other than 'electrical', not further worked than hot-rolled  // 73.13 A II  // 73.13-16  // 'Electrical' sheets and plates of iron or steel, other than with a watt-loss, regardless of thickness, of 0,75 watt or less  // 73.13 B I a)  // 73.13-17, 19, 21, 23, 26  // Sheets and plates, other than 'electrical', not further worked than hot-rolled, of a thickness of 2 mm or more  // 73.13 B II a)  // 73.13-41  // Sheets and plates, other than 'electrical', not further worked than cold-rolled, of a thickness of 3 mm or more  // 73.13 B II b)  // 73.13-43, 45  // Sheets and plates, other than 'electrical', not further worked than cold-rolled, of a thickness of more than 1 mm but less than 3 mm  // 73.13 B II c)  // 73.13-47, 49  // Sheets and plates, other than 'electrical', not further worked than cold-rolled, of a thickness of 1 mm or less  // 73.13 B IV c) 1 and 2  // 73.13-67, 68, 72  // Sheets and plates, other than 'electrical', zinc-coated  // 73.15 B I b) 2 (aa)  // 73.71-53  // Blooms, billets, slabs, sheet bars, other than forged (1): - Stainless or heat-resisting steel  // 73.15 B V b) 1 (aa)  // 73.73-23  // Wire rod: - Stainless or heat-resisting steel  // 73.15 B V b) 1 (cc)  // 73.73-25  // Wire rod: - S, Pb and P steels  // 73.15 B V b) 1 (dd)  // 73.73-26  // Wire rod: - Mangano-silicon  // 73.15 B V b) 1 (ee)  // 73.73-29  // Wire rod: - Other (excluding high-speed)  // 73.15 B V b) 2 (aa)  // 73.73-33  // Hot-rolled or extruded bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections: - Stainless or heat-resisting steel  // 73.15 B V b) 2 (cc)  // 73.73-35  // Hot-rolled or extruded bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections: - S, Pb and P steels  // 73.15 B V b) 2 (dd)  // 73.73-36  // Hot-rolled or extruded bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections: - Mangano-silicon  //  //   //   //   //   //  (1) Includes products of the same form in continuous casting.  1.2.3 //   //   //  //   //   //   // CCT heading No  // NIMEXE code  // Description  //   //   //   //   // 73.15 B V b) 2 (ee)  // 73.73-39  // Hot-rolled or extruded bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections: - Other alloy (excluding high-speed)  // 73.15 B VII a) 2  // 73.75-19  // Electrical sheet and plate in alloy steel with a watt-loss, regardless of thickness of greater than 0,75 watt  // 73.15 B VII b) 1 (aa) 11  // 73.75-23  // Hot-rolled sheets and plates of a thickness more than 4,75 mm: - Stainless or heat-resisting  // 73.15 B VII b) 1 (bb) 11  // 73.75-33  // Hot-rolled sheets and plates of a thickness not less than 3 mm but not more than 4,75 mm: - Stainless or heat-resisting  // 73.15 B VII b) 1 (cc) 11  // 73.75-43  // Hot-rolled sheets and plates of a thickness less than 3 mm: - Stainless or heat-resisting  // 73.15 B VII b) 2 aa) 11  // 73.75-53  // Sheets and plates, other than electrical, not further worked than cold-rolled, of a thickness of 3 mm or more, stainless or heat-resisting  // 73.15 B VII b) 2 aa) 22  // 73.75-54  // Sheets and plates, other than electrical, not further worked than cold-rolled, of a thickness of 3 mm or more, high-speed steel  // 73.15 B VII b) 2 (bb) 11  // 73.75-63  // Cold-rolled sheet of a thickness less than 3 mm: - Stainless or heat-resisting  //   //   //  ANNEX III B  List of products for which import is subject to the issue of an import document (quantity monitoring)  1.2.3 //   //   //   // CCT heading No  //  NIMEXE code  // Description  //   //   //   // 73.15 A I b) 2  // 73.61-50  // Blooms, billets, slabs and sheet bars of high carbon steel, other than forged (1)  // 73.15 A V b) 1  // 73.63-21  // Wire rod of high carbon steel  // 73.15 A VII b) 1  // 73.65-53  // Sheets and plates, not further worked than cold-rolled of a thickness of 3 mm or more  // 73.15 B I b) 2 (cc)  // 73.71-55  // Blooms, billets, slabs and sheet bars: - S, Pb and P steels (1)  // 73.15 B I b) 2 (dd)  // 73.71-56  // Blooms, billets, slabs and sheet bars: - Mangano-silicon steel (1)  // 73.15 B I b) 2 (ee)  // 73.71-59  // Blooms, billets, slabs and sheet bars: - Other alloy steel (1)  // 73.15 B V b) 1 (bb)  // 73.73-24  // Wire rod of high-speed steel  // 73.15 B V b) 2 (bb)  // 73.73-34  // Hot-rolled or extruded bar, rod, angles, shapes and sections of high-speed steel  // 73.15 B VII b) 1 (aa) 33  // 73.75-29  // Hot-rolled plate and sheet of a thickness more than 4,75 mm: - Other alloy (excluding stainless)  // 73.15 B VII b) 1 (bb) 33  // 73.75-39  // Hot-rolled plate and sheet of a thickness not less than 3 mm but not more than 4,75 mm: - Other alloy (excluding stainless)  // 73.15 B VII b) 1 (cc) 22  // 73.75-44  // Hot-rolled sheet of a thickness less than 3 mm: - High-speed steel  // 73.15 B VII b) 1 (cc) 33  // 73.75-49  // Hot-rolled sheet of a thickness less than 3 mm: - Other alloy (excluding stainless)  // 73.15 B VII b) 2 (aa) 33  // 73.75-79  // Sheets and plates, other than 'electrical', not further worked than cold-rolled, of a thickness of 3 mm or more: - Other  // 73.15 B VII b) 2 (bb) 33  // 73.75-69  // Cold-rolled sheet of a thickness less than 3 mm: - Other alloy (excluding stainless)  //   //   //  (1) Includes products of the same form in continuous casting.HOT-ROLLED SHEET OF A THICKNESS LESS THAN 3 MM : - HIGH-SPEED STEEL  73.15 B VII B ) 1 ( CC ) 33  73.75-49  HOT-ROLLED SHEET OF A THICKNESS LESS THAN 3 MM : - OTHER ALLOY ( EXCLUDING STAINLESS )  73.15 B VII B ) 2 ( AA ) 33  73.75-79  SHEETS AND PLATES, OTHER THAN ELECTRICAL', NOT FURTHER WORKED THAN COLD-ROLLED, OF A THICKNESS OF 3 MM OR MORE : - OTHER  73.15 B VII B ) 2 ( BB ) 33  73.75-69  COLD-ROLLED SHEET OF A THICKNESS LESS THAN 3 MM : - OTHER ALLOY ( EXCLUDING STAINLESS )  //  //  //  ( 1 ) INCLUDES PRODUCTS OF THE SAME FORM IN CONTINUOUS CASTING .


title: Recommendations to national courts and tribunals, in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings

text:
               25.11.2016

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 439/1

         This text updates the recommendations to national courts and tribunals adopted following the entry into force on 1 November 2012 of the new Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (OJ C 338, 6.11.2012, p. 1). Based on experience gained in implementing those rules (1), and on the latest case-law, the present recommendations serve as a reminder of the essential characteristics of the preliminary ruling procedure and to provide courts and tribunals making references to the Court for a preliminary ruling with all the practical information required in order for the Court to be in a position to give a useful reply to the questions referred.
   RECOMMENDATIONS
   to national courts and tribunals, in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings
   (2016/C 439/01)

      Introduction

               1.

               The reference for a preliminary ruling, provided for in Article 19(3)(b) of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) and Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), is a fundamental mechanism of EU law. It is designed to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of that law within the European Union, by offering the courts and tribunals of the Member States a means of bringing before the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) for a preliminary ruling questions concerning the interpretation of EU law or the validity of acts adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union.

               2.

               The preliminary ruling procedure is based on close cooperation between the Court and the courts and tribunals of the Member States. In order to ensure that that procedure is fully effective, it is necessary to recall its essential characteristics and to provide further information to clarify the provisions of the rules of procedure relating, in particular, to the originator and scope of a request for a preliminary ruling, as well as to the form and content of such a request. That information — which applies to all requests for a preliminary ruling (I) — is supplemented by the provisions that apply to requests for a preliminary ruling requiring particularly expeditious handling (II) and by an annex which summarises the essential elements of any request for a preliminary ruling.

         I.   Provisions which apply to all requests for a preliminary ruling

      The originator of the request for a preliminary ruling

               3.

               The jurisdiction of the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU law is exercised exclusively on the initiative of the national courts and tribunals, whether or not the parties to the main proceedings have expressed the wish that a question be referred to the Court. In so far as it is called upon to assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, it is for the national court or tribunal before which a dispute has been brought — and for that court or tribunal alone — to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, both the need for a request for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.

               4.

               Status as a court or tribunal is interpreted by the Court as a self-standing concept of EU law, the Court taking account of a number of factors such as whether the body making the reference is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent.

               5.

               The courts and tribunals of the Member States may refer a question to the Court on the interpretation or validity of EU law where they consider that a decision of the Court on the question is necessary to enable them to give judgment (see second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU). A reference for a preliminary ruling may, inter alia, prove particularly useful when a question of interpretation is raised before the national court or tribunal that is new and of general interest for the uniform application of EU law, or where the existing case-law does not appear to provide the necessary guidance in a new legal context or set of facts.

               6.

               Where a question is raised in the context of a case that is pending before a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal is nonetheless required to bring a request for a preliminary ruling before the Court (see third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU), unless there is already well-established case-law on the point or unless the correct interpretation of the rule of law in question admits of no reasonable doubt.

               7.

               It follows, moreover, from settled case-law that although national courts and tribunals may reject pleas raised before them challenging the validity of acts of an institution, body, office or agency of the Union, the Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare such acts invalid. When it has doubts about the validity of such an act, a court or tribunal of a Member State must therefore refer the matter to the Court, stating the reasons for which it considers that the act is invalid.

      The subject matter and scope of the request for a preliminary ruling

               8.

               A request for a preliminary ruling must concern the interpretation or validity of EU law, not the interpretation of rules of national law or issues of fact raised in the main proceedings.

               9.

               The Court can give a preliminary ruling only if EU law applies to the case in the main proceedings. It is essential, in that respect, that the referring court or tribunal set out all the relevant matters of fact and of law that have prompted it to consider that any provisions of EU law may be applicable in the case.

               10.

               With regard to references for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it must be noted that, under Article 51(1) of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. While the circumstances of such implementation can vary, it must nevertheless be clearly and unequivocally apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that a rule of EU law other than the Charter is applicable to the case in the main proceedings. Since the Court has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, any provisions of the Charter that may be relied upon by the referring court or tribunal cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction.

               11.

               Lastly, although, in order to deliver its decision, the Court necessarily takes into account the legal and factual context of the dispute in the main proceedings, as defined by the referring court or tribunal in its request for a preliminary ruling, it does not itself apply EU law to that dispute. When ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU law, the Court makes every effort to give a reply which will be of assistance in resolving the dispute in the main proceedings, but it is for the referring court or tribunal to draw case-specific conclusions, if necessary by disapplying the rule of national law held incompatible with EU law.

      The appropriate stage at which to make a reference for a preliminary ruling

               12.

               A national court or tribunal may submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court as soon as it finds that a ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU law is necessary to enable it to give judgment. It is that court or tribunal which is in fact in the best position to decide at what stage of the proceedings such a request should be made.

               13.

               Since, however, that request will serve as the basis of the proceedings before the Court and the Court must therefore have available to it all the information that will enable it both to assess whether it has jurisdiction to give a reply to the questions raised and, if so, to give a useful reply to those questions, it is necessary that a decision to make a reference for a preliminary ruling be taken when the national proceedings have reached a stage at which the referring court or tribunal is able to define, in sufficient detail, the legal and factual context of the case in the main proceedings, and the legal issues which it raises. In the interests of the proper administration of justice, it may also be desirable for the reference to be made only after both sides have been heard.

      The form and content of the request for a preliminary ruling

               14.

               The request for a preliminary ruling may be in any form allowed by national law in respect of procedural issues, but it should be borne in mind that that request serves as the basis of the proceedings before the Court and is served on all the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court (‘the Statute’) and, in particular, on all the Member States, with a view to obtaining any observations they may wish to make. Owing to the consequential need to translate it into all the official languages of the European Union, the request for a preliminary ruling should therefore be drafted simply, clearly and precisely by the referring court or tribunal, avoiding superfluous detail. As experience has shown, about 10 pages are often sufficient to set out adequately the legal and factual context of a request for a preliminary ruling.

               15.

               The content of any request for a preliminary ruling is prescribed by Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court and is summarised in the annex hereto. In addition to the text of the questions referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the request for a preliminary ruling must contain:

                           —

                           a summary of the subject matter of the dispute and the relevant findings of fact as determined by the referring court or tribunal, or, at the very least, an account of the facts on which the questions referred are based,

                           —

                           the tenor of any national provisions applicable in the case and, where appropriate, the relevant national case-law, and

                           —

                           a statement of the reasons which prompted the referring court or tribunal to inquire about the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of EU law, and the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings.

                     In the absence of one or more of the above, the Court may have to decline jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the questions referred or dismiss the request for a preliminary ruling as inadmissible.

               16.

               In its request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court or tribunal must provide precise references for the national provisions applicable to the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings, and accurately identify the provisions of EU law whose interpretation is sought or whose validity is challenged. The request should include, if need be, a brief summary of the relevant arguments of the parties to the main proceedings. It is helpful to bear in mind in that context that it is only the request for a preliminary ruling that will be translated, not any annexes to that request.

               17.

               The referring court or tribunal may also briefly state its view on the answer to be given to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling. That information may be useful to the Court, particularly where it is called upon to give a preliminary ruling in an expedited or urgent procedure.

               18.

               Lastly, the questions referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling must appear in a separate and clearly identified section of the order for reference, preferably at the beginning or the end. It must be possible to understand them on their own terms, without it being necessary to refer to the statement of the grounds for the request.

               19.

               In order to make the request for a preliminary ruling easier to read, it is essential that the Court receive it in typewritten form and that the pages and paragraphs of the order for reference be numbered.

               20.

               The request for a preliminary ruling must be dated and signed, then sent, by registered post, to the Court Registry at the following address: Rue du Fort Niedergrünewald, 2925 Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG. The request must be accompanied by any relevant documents and, in particular, precise contact details for the parties to the main proceedings and their representatives, if any, as well as the file of the case in the main proceedings or a copy of it. The file (or copy file) will be retained at the Registry throughout the proceedings where, unless otherwise indicated by the referring court or tribunal, it may be consulted by the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute.

               21.

               Under the preliminary ruling procedure, the Court will, as a rule, use the information contained in the order for reference, including nominative or personal data. It is therefore for the referring court or tribunal itself, if it considers it necessary, to redact certain details in its request for a preliminary ruling or to render anonymous one or more persons or entities concerned by the dispute in the main proceedings.

               22.

               After the request for a preliminary ruling has been lodged, the Court may also render such persons or entities anonymous of its own motion, or at the request of the referring court or tribunal or of a party to the main proceedings. In order to maintain its effectiveness, such a request for anonymity must, however, be made at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings, and in any event prior to publication in the Official Journal of the European Union of the notice relating to the case concerned, and to service of the request for a preliminary ruling on the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute, which generally takes place about one month after the request for a preliminary ruling has been lodged. Given the increasing use of new information and communication technologies, any anonymisation after such publication and service would be devoid of practical purpose.

      Interaction between the reference for a preliminary ruling and the national proceedings

               23.

               Although the referring court or tribunal may still order protective measures, particularly in connection with a reference on determination of validity, the lodging of a request for a preliminary ruling nevertheless calls for the national proceedings to be stayed until the Court has given its ruling.

               24.

               While the Court, in principle, remains seised of a request for a preliminary ruling for so long as that request is not withdrawn, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the Court's role in the preliminary ruling procedure is to contribute to the effective administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or hypothetical questions. Since the preliminary ruling procedure is predicated on there being proceedings actually pending before the referring court or tribunal, it is incumbent on that court or tribunal to inform the Court of any procedural step that may affect the referral and, in particular, of any discontinuance or withdrawal, amicable settlement or other event leading to the termination of the proceedings. The referring court or tribunal must also inform the Court of any decision delivered in the context of an appeal against the order for reference and of the consequences of that decision for the request for a preliminary ruling.

               25.

               In the interests of the proper conduct of the preliminary ruling proceedings before the Court and in order to maintain their effectiveness, it is important, however, that such information is communicated to the Court with the minimum of delay. The national courts and tribunals should also note that the withdrawal of a request for a preliminary ruling may have an impact on the management of similar cases (or of a series of cases) by the referring court or tribunal. Where the outcome of a number of cases pending before the referring court or tribunal depends on the reply to be given by the Court to the questions submitted by that court or tribunal, it may be appropriate for that court or tribunal to join those cases in the request for a preliminary ruling in order to enable the Court to reply to the questions referred notwithstanding any withdrawal of one or more cases.

      Costs and legal aid

               26.

               Preliminary ruling proceedings before the Court are free of charge and the Court does not rule on the costs of the parties to the proceedings pending before the referring court or tribunal; it is for the referring court or tribunal to rule on those costs.

               27.

               If a party to the main proceedings has insufficient means and where it is possible under national rules, the referring court or tribunal may grant that party legal aid to cover the costs, including those of lawyers' fees, which it incurs before the Court. The Court itself may also grant legal aid where the party in question is not already in receipt of aid under national rules or to the extent to which that aid does not cover, or covers only partly, costs incurred before the Court.

      Communication between the Court and the national court or tribunal

               28.

               The Court Registry will remain in contact with the referring court or tribunal throughout the proceedings, and will send it copies of all procedural documents and any requests for information or clarification deemed necessary in order for a useful reply to be given to the questions referred by that court or tribunal.

               29.

               At the end of the proceedings, the Registry will send the Court's decision to the referring court or tribunal, which is invited to inform the Court of the action taken upon that decision in the case in the main proceedings and to communicate to the Court its final decision in that case.

         II.   Provisions applicable to requests for a preliminary ruling requiring particularly expeditious handling

               30.

               As provided in Article 23a of the Statute and Articles 105 to 114 of the Rules of Procedure, a reference for a preliminary ruling may, in certain circumstances, be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure or an urgent procedure. The Court will decide whether these procedures are to be applied, either on submission by the referring court or tribunal of a duly reasoned request setting out the matters of fact or of law which justify the application of such procedure(s), or, exceptionally, of its own motion, where that appears to be required by the nature or the particular circumstances of the case.

      Conditions for the application of the expedited and urgent procedures

               31.

               Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure provides that a reference for a preliminary ruling may thus be determined pursuant to an expedited procedure derogating from the provisions of those rules where the nature of the case requires that it be dealt with within a short time. Since that procedure imposes significant constraints on all those involved in it, and, in particular, on all the Member States called upon to lodge observations, whether written or oral, within much shorter time limits than would ordinarily apply, its application must be sought only in particular circumstances that warrant the Court giving its ruling quickly on the questions referred. According to settled case-law, the large number of persons or legal situations potentially affected by the decision that the referring court or tribunal has to deliver after bringing the matter before the Court for a preliminary ruling does not, in itself, constitute an exceptional circumstance that would justify the use of the expedited procedure.

               32.

               The same applies a fortiori to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, provided for in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure. That procedure, which applies only in the areas covered by Title V of Part Three of the TFEU, relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, imposes even greater constraints on those concerned, since it limits the number of parties authorised to lodge written observations and, in cases of extreme urgency, allows the written part of the procedure before the Court to be omitted altogether. The application of the urgent procedure must therefore be requested only where it is absolutely necessary for the Court to give its ruling very quickly on the questions submitted by the referring court or tribunal.

               33.

               Although it is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of such circumstances, particularly because of the varied and evolving nature of the rules of EU law governing the area of freedom, security and justice, a national court or tribunal may, for example, consider submitting a request for the urgent preliminary ruling procedure to be applied in the case, referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, of a person in custody or deprived of his liberty, where the answer to the question raised is decisive as to the assessment of that person's legal situation, or in proceedings concerning parental authority or custody of young children, where the identity of the court having jurisdiction under EU law depends on the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling.

      The request for application of the expedited procedure or the urgent procedure

               34.

               To enable the Court to decide quickly whether the expedited procedure or the urgent preliminary ruling procedure should be applied, the request must set out precisely the matters of fact and law which establish the urgency and, in particular, the risks involved in following the ordinary procedure. In so far as it is possible to do so, the referring court or tribunal must also briefly state its view on the answer to be given to the questions referred. Such a statement makes it easier for the parties to the main proceedings and the other interested persons participating in the procedure to define their positions, and therefore contributes to the rapidity of the procedure.

               35.

               The request for the application of the expedited procedure or the urgent procedure must in any event be submitted in an unambiguous form that enables the Registry to establish immediately that the file has to be dealt with in a particular way. Accordingly, the referring court or tribunal is requested to specify which of the two procedures is required in the particular case, and to mention in its request the relevant article of the Rules of Procedure (Article 105 for the expedited procedure or Article 107 for the urgent procedure). That mention must be included in a clearly identifiable place in its order for reference (for example, at the head of the page or in a separate judicial document). Where appropriate, it may be helpful for a covering letter from the referring court or tribunal to refer to that request.

               36.

               As regards the order for reference itself, it is particularly important that it should be concise where the matter is urgent, as this will help to ensure the rapidity of the procedure.

      Communication between the Court, the referring court or tribunal and the parties to the main proceedings

               37.

               In order to expedite and facilitate communication with the referring court or tribunal and the parties to the main proceedings, a court or tribunal submitting a request for the expedited procedure or the urgent procedure to be applied is requested to state the email address and any fax number which may be used by the Court, together with the email addresses and any fax numbers of the representatives of the parties to the proceedings.

               38.

               A copy of the signed order for reference together with a request for the expedited procedure or the urgent procedure to be applied can initially be sent to the Court by email (ECJ-Registry@curia.europa.eu) or by fax (+352 433766). Processing of the reference and of the request can then begin upon receipt of the emailed or faxed copy. The originals of those documents must, however, be sent to the Court Registry as soon as possible.

      (1)  OJ L 265, 29.9.2012, p. 1.

      ANNEX

         The essential elements of a request for a preliminary ruling

      1.   The referring court or tribunal

      A request for a preliminary ruling must specify the referring court or tribunal and, where appropriate, the chamber or formation of the court or tribunal making the reference, and must include full contact details for that court or tribunal, in order to facilitate subsequent contact between that court or tribunal and the Court of Justice.
      2.   The parties to the main proceedings and their representatives

      After specifying the referring court or tribunal, the request for a preliminary ruling should state the names of the parties to the main proceedings and anyone representing them before that court or tribunal. Those particulars must be as comprehensive as possible and must notably include, in the order for reference or in the covering letter, the exact postal address of the persons concerned, their telephone or fax number and, in so far as they have one, their email address.
      The attention of the national courts and tribunals is here drawn to Article 95 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, and to points 21 and 22 of these recommendations. If the referring court or tribunal considers it necessary, it must itself redact certain names or details in its request for a preliminary ruling, or send an anonymised version of that request in addition to the full request for a preliminary ruling, which will serve as the basis of the proceedings before the Court.
      3.   The subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings and the relevant facts

      The referring court or tribunal must briefly describe the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings and the relevant findings of fact, as determined by that court or tribunal.
      4.   The relevant legal provisions

      The request for a preliminary ruling must contain precise references to the national provisions applicable to the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings, including any relevant case-law, and the provisions of EU law whose interpretation is sought or whose validity is challenged. Those references must be comprehensive and must include the precise title of and citations for the provisions concerned, as well as their publication references. As far as possible, case-law citations, whether national or European, should also include the ECLI number (‘European Case Law Identifier’) of the decision concerned.
      5.   The grounds for the reference

      The Court can rule on the request for a preliminary ruling only if EU law is applicable to the case in the main proceedings. The referring court or tribunal must therefore set out the reasons which prompted it to inquire about the interpretation or validity of provisions of EU law, and the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings. If it considers it helpful for the purposes of understanding the case, the referring court or tribunal may set out here the arguments of the parties in that regard.
      6.   The questions referred for a preliminary ruling

      The referring court or tribunal should set out, clearly and distinctly, the questions it is submitting to the Court for a preliminary ruling. It must be possible to understand those questions on their own terms, without the need to refer to the statement of the grounds for the request for a preliminary ruling.
      In so far as it is able to do so, the referring court or tribunal should also briefly state its view on the answer to be given to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling.
      7.   Possible need for specific treatment

      Lastly, where the referring court or tribunal considers that the request it is submitting to the Court has to be dealt with in a particular way, both as regards the need to preserve the anonymity of the persons concerned by the dispute in the main proceedings and as regards the rapidity with which the request may have to be dealt with by the Court, the reasons for such treatment must be set out in detail in the request for a preliminary ruling and in any covering letter.

         Formal aspects of the request for a preliminary ruling

      Requests for a preliminary ruling must be submitted in a form that facilitates electronic processing by the Court and, in particular, that enables them to be scanned and optical character recognition to be applied. To that end:

                  —

                  the request should be typed on white, unlined, A4-size paper,

                  —

                  the text should be in a commonly used font (such as Times New Roman, Courier or Arial), in at least 12 point in the body of the text and at least 10 point in any footnotes, with 1,5 line spacing and horizontal and vertical margins of at least 2,5 cm (above, below, at the left and at the right of the page), and

                  —

                  all the pages of the request, and the paragraphs they contain, should be numbered consecutively.

            The request for a preliminary ruling must be dated and signed. It should be sent by registered post, together with the file of the case in the main proceedings, to the Registry of the Court of Justice, Rue du Fort Niedergrünewald, 2925 Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG.
      In the event of a request for the expedited procedure or the urgent procedure to be applied, it is recommended that a signed copy of the request for a preliminary ruling is first sent by email (ECJ-Registry@curia.europa.eu) or by fax (+352 433766), and that the original of that request is then sent by post.