               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 24.3.2021
            COM(2021) 136 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            authorising the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, amendments to the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention)

               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

               1.CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

               •Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

                  The Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural habitats ("the Convention") aims to conserve European wild flora and fauna and their natural habitats, especially those whose conservation requires the co-operation of several States. It is an intergovernmental treaty, concluded under the aegis of the Council of Europe. The Convention entered into force on 1 June 1982.

                  The European Union is a Contracting Party to this Convention since 1 September, 1982
                     1
                  . At present, there are 51 Contracting Parties to the Convention, including all EU Member States.

               The ordinary allocation of the Council of Europe to the Bern Convention has progressively decreased over the years to the point that the functions of the Bern Convention cannot be assured without substantial voluntary contributions by the parties, but they are also in decline.  It is therefore essential to establish a reliable source of finance for the Convention.

               In accordance with Resolution No. 9 (2019) of the thirty-ninth meeting of the Standing Committee, adopted on 6 December 2019, on the financing of the Bern Convention on initiating the establishment of a new system of obligatory financial contributions by Parties, an inter-sessional expert working group was established to assist the Secretariat to present proposals for the inclusion of financial clauses by amending the articles of the Bern Convention and for the establishment of an Enlarged Partial Agreement, for consideration at the fortieth meeting of the Standing Committee.

               Based on the outputs of the inter-sessional expert working group established at the 39th meeting of the Standing Committee, the 40th Standing Committee discussed two complementary proposals to address the financing issue.  That meeting adopted a decision to support the establishment of an Enlarged Partial Agreement.  With regard to the proposal to amend the Bern Convention to include financial clauses, following a statement by the Union and its Member States concerning the need for further internal discussions before it could take a decision
                  2
               , the Standing Committee agreed, with no objections, to postpone the decision on the possible amendment to the Convention until its 41st meeting.

                  As proposed to the 40th Standing Committee, the amendment to the Convention would introduce a mechanism to establish an obligatory contribution. However, the initial text did not make a distinction between the core budget and the programmatic budget, nor did it specify the scale of contributions to be applied.  A revised proposal for the amendment will be negotiated in an inter-sessional working group, working throughout 2021 in the run-up to a decision at the 41st meeting of the Standing Committee. The Union should contribute actively in these negotiations.

               •Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

                  Introducing a system of obligatory contributions to this Convention would be consistent with the policy followed in other areas. Indeed, the Union is party to numerous multilateral environmental agreements, in the context of which it makes obligatory financial contributions based on the requirements of the agreement and/or the financial regulations adopted on the basis of provisions in the agreement.  In the context of these agreements, a distinction is normally made between the core budget and the programmatic budget, with only the former subject to obligatory contributions.  However, the proposed amendment to the Convention does not clarify that the mechanism to be established would follow this precedent.  Neither does the proposed amendment specify the scale of contributions to be applied. In other multilateral environmental agreements, the Union contribution is normally set at not more than 2.5% of the overall contributions.

                  It is therefore appropriate that the Union ensure that Parties will not be obliged to make contributions to the programmatic budget, and that the Union contribution cannot be established at more than 2.5% of the budget.

                  This Recommendation is entirely aligned with and indeed flows from Council Decision 2020/1830, which established the Union position for the 40th Standing Committee of the Convention.
                     3

               •Consistency with other Union policies

                  This proposal is consistent with Union objectives related to the environment and to international relations.

               2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

               •Legal basis

                  Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that the Commission shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and nominate the Union negotiator. According to Article 218(4) of the TFEU, the Council may address directives to the negotiator.

                  Given that the negotiations will concern an act supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement, Article 218(9) TFEU cannot be applied in this context.

                  Therefore, the procedural legal basis for the proposed decision is Article 218(3) and (4) TFEU.

               The main objective and content of the envisaged act relate to environment.

                  Therefore, the substantive legal basis of the proposed decision is Article 192(1) TFEU.

               •Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

                  Environment is a shared competence under Article 192 TFEU. The financing of this environmental Convention involves a shared competence of the Union and the Member States for their respective contributions as Parties. Therefore, the Union needs to participate in this regard.

               •Proportionality

                  A Council Decision is necessary in order for the Union to participate in these negotiations, which are essential for establishing a predictable financial basis for the Convention to which the Union is a Party.

               •Choice of the instrument

                  The choice of the instrument is stipulated in Article 218(3) and (4) TFEU.

               3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

               •Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

                  Not applicable.

               •Stakeholder consultations

                  Not applicable.

               •Collection and use of expertise

                  Not applicable.

               •Impact assessment

                  Not applicable.

               •Regulatory fitness and simplification

                  Not applicable.

               •Fundamental rights

                  Not applicable.

               4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

                  The Union presently contributes a sum of 24 700 € per annum to the Bern Convention based on a suggested, voluntary scale of contributions.  An obligatory contribution of 2.5% of the core budget would be very unlikely to exceed this amount, so there are no budgetary implications of this initiative.

               5.OTHER ELEMENTS

               •Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

                  The negotiating directives should be made public immediately after their adoption.

               •Explanatory documents (for directives)

                  Not applicable.

               •Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

                  Not applicable.

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               authorising the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, amendments to the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention)

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 218(3) and (4) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

               WHEREAS it is proposed to amend the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats
                  4
                (Bern Convention) to include financial clauses,

               WHEREAS it is necessary to ensure that such amendment will be consistent with Union legislation and interest, notably not to oblige the Union to contribute more than 2.5% of the overall contributions,

               WHEREAS the Commission should be authorised to negotiate, on behalf of the European Union, amendments to the Convention,

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               (1)The Commission is hereby authorised to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, amendments to the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention) establishing a new system of obligatory financial contributions by Parties, at the meetings of the Standing Committee of the Convention and at the meetings of the relevant inter-sessional expert working group.

               (2)The Commission shall conduct the negotiations on behalf of the Union, in consultation with [name of the special committee to be inserted by the Council] and on the basis of the negotiating directives set out in the Annex to this Decision.

               (3)To the extent that the subject matter of the amendments referred to in paragraph 1 falls within the shared competence of the Union and of the Member States, the Commission and the Member States should cooperate closely during the negotiating process, with a view to ensuring unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member States.

               (4)The Commission shall report to the Council on the outcome of the negotiations and, where appropriate, on any problem that may arise during the negotiations.

               Article 2

               This Decision is addressed to the Commission.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        Council Decision 82/72/EEC of 3 December 1981 on the conclusion on behalf of the Community of the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, OJ L 38, 10.2.1982, p. 1.

                     (2)

                        See also Council Decision (EU) 2020/1830 of 27 November 2020 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union at the 40th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural habitats (Bern Convention), OJ 409, 4.12.2020, p. 34.

                     (3)

                        Ibid.

                     (4)

                        Council Decision 82/72/EEC of 3 December 1981 on the conclusion on behalf of the Community of the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, OJ L 38, 10.2.1982, p. 1.

    ---documentbreak---

               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 24.3.2021
            COM(2021) 136 final
            ANNEX
            to the
            Recommendation for a Council Decision
            authorising the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, amendments to the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention)

               ANNEX

               Directives for the negotiation of amendments to the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention)

               (1)The Commission should endeavour to ensure that an agreement leading to any revision of the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention) and its application is consistent with relevant European Union legislation and policies, and in particular Union legislation in the field of nature and biodiversity
                  1
                as well as Union commitments under other relevant multilateral environmental agreements.

               (2)With regard to proposals to amend the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention) to introduce an obligatory financial contribution, the Commission should engage in the negotiations on how to best address the issue of establishing a secure and predictable financial basis for the Convention and should endeavour to ensure, in accordance with the position of the Union, that the amendment:

               (a)should not impose an obligatory contribution with regards to the programmatic budget

               (b)should not result in a Union contribution of more than 2.5% of the total contributions

               (c)should not affect existing obligations of the Parties under this Convention.

               (3)The Commission should conduct negotiations in accordance with relevant European Union legislation in force or agreed positions of the Union established specifically for the purposes of these negotiations within the special committee of representatives of the Member States referred to in Article 1(2) of this Council Decision or within the Council.

               (4)The Commission should report to the Council on the outcome of the negotiations and, where appropriate, on any problem that may arise during the negotiations.

                     (1)

                        Notably Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora and Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 20.11.2019
            COM(2019) 912 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
            with a view to correcting the significant observed deviation from the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective in Romania
            {SWD(2019) 932 final}

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

               with a view to correcting the significant observed deviation from the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective

                  in Romania

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 121(4) thereof,

               Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies
                  1
               , and in particular the second subparagraph of Article 10(2) thereof,

               Having regard to the Recommendation from the European Commission,

               Whereas:

               (1)In accordance with Article 121 of the Treaty, Member States shall promote sound public finances over the medium term through the coordination of economic policies and multilateral surveillance in order to avoid the occurrence of excessive government deficits.

               (2)The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation.

               (3)In June 2017 and June 2018, the Council found in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty that in 2016 and 2017, respectively, there had been a significant observed deviation from Romania’s medium-term budgetary objective or from the adjustment path towards it. In view of those established significant deviations, the Council issued Recommendations on 16 June 2017
                  2
                and 22 June 2018
                  3
               , recommending that Romania take the policy measures necessary to address those deviations. The Council subsequently found that Romania had not taken effective action in response to those Recommendations and issued revised Recommendations on 5 December 2017
                  4
                and 4 December 2018
                  5
                respectively. The Council subsequently found that Romania had not taken effective action in response to those Recommendations either.

               (4)On 14 June 2019, the Council decided that in 2018 a significant observed deviation from the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective had again occurred in Romania and issued a Recommendation for Romania to take the necessary measures to ensure that the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure
                  6
                does not exceed 4.5% in 2019 and 5.1% in 2020, corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 and 0.75% of GDP in 2020.
                  7
                It also recommended that Romania uses any windfall gains for deficit reduction, while budgetary consolidation measures should secure a lasting improvement in the general government structural balance in a growth-friendly manner. The Council established a deadline of 15 October 2019 for Romania to report on the action taken in response to that Recommendation.

               (5)On 9 July 2019, the Council recommended Romania to ensure that, in 2019 and in 2020, it comply with the Council Recommendation of 14 June 2019 with a view to correcting the significant deviation from the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective.
                  8

               (6)On 25 September 2019, the Commission undertook an enhanced surveillance mission in Romania for the purpose of on-site monitoring under Article -11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. After having transmitted its provisional findings to the Romanian authorities for comments, the Commission reported its findings to the Council on [20 November] 2019. Those findings were made public.

               (7)On 15 October 2019, the Romanian authorities submitted the report on effective action in response to the Council Recommendation of 14 June 2019. Given the information provided by the authorities in their report and the overall assessment based on the Commission autumn 2019 forecast, the Council on 20 November 2019 concluded that Romania has not taken effective action in response to the Council Recommendation of 14 June 2019.

               (8)In light of the absence of effective action by Romania and the cumulated high deviation from the recommended adjustment path toward its medium-term budgetary objective, it is appropriate to address to Romania a revised Recommendation on the appropriate measures to be taken under Article 121(4) of the Treaty.

               (9)Based on the Commission 2019 autumn forecast, Romania's structural balance is set to deteriorate by 0.8% of GDP in 2019 and by a further 0.8% of GDP in 2020. As a result, the structural deficit is estimated to be 2.5% of GDP and 3.4% of GDP away from the medium-term budgetary objective of a structural deficit of 1.0% of GDP in 2019 and in 2020, respectively.

               (10)In order to correct for the cumulated deviations and to bring Romania back on an appropriate adjustment path following past slippages, an additional effort should complement the recommended annual structural adjustment of 0.75% of GDP for 2020 recommended by the Council on 14 June 2019. An additional effort of 0.25% of GDP seems appropriate given the magnitude of the cumulated deviations from the recommended adjustment path toward the medium term objective. It will accelerate the adjustment back towards the medium-term budgetary objective without putting economic growth at risk.

               (11)The Commission 2019 autumn forecast projects a general government deficit of 3.6% in 2019 and 4.4% in 2020, which is above the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value. The required structural adjustment seems also appropriate to ensure that Romania respects the 3%-of-GDP Treaty reference value in 2020.

               (12)Based on the Commission 2019 autumn forecast, the required improvement of the structural balance by 1.0% of GDP in 2020 is consistent with the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure not exceeding 4.4%.

               (13)The Commission 2019 autumn forecast projects a deterioration of the structural balance by 0.8% of GDP in 2020. Therefore, a structural improvement of 1.0 % of GDP translates into a need to adopt measures of a total yield of 1.8% of GDP in structural terms as compared to the current baseline of the Commission 2019 autumn forecast.

               (14)The failure to act upon earlier Recommendations to correct the observed significant deviation and the risk of exceeding the Treaty reference value call for urgent action to put Romania’s fiscal policy back on a prudent path.

               (15)In order to achieve the recommended budgetary targets, it is crucial that Romania adopts and strictly implements the necessary measures and monitors the development of current expenditure closely.

               (16)The requirements issued in this Recommendation supersede the corresponding elements set out in the Council Recommendation of 14 June 2019.

               (17)Romania should report to the Council on action taken in response to this Recommendation by 15 April 2020, possibly as part of its Convergence Programme submitted pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.

               (18)It is appropriate that this Recommendation should be made public,

               HEREBY RECOMMENDS THAT ROMANIA:

               (1)take the necessary measures to ensure that the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure does not exceed 4.4% in 2020, corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 1.0% of GDP, thereby putting the Member State on an appropriate adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective.

               (2)use any windfall gains for deficit reduction; budgetary consolidation measures should secure a lasting improvement in the general government structural balance in a growth-friendly manner;

               (3)report to the Council by 15 April 2020 on action taken in response to this Recommendation. The report should provide sufficiently specified and credibly announced measures, including the budgetary impact of each of them, with a view to complying with the required adjustment path, as well as updated and detailed budgetary projections for 2020.

               This Recommendation is addressed to Romania.

               Done at Brussels, 20.11.2019

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

                     (2)

                        OJ C 216, 6.7.2017, p. 1.

                     (3)

                        OJ C 223, 27.6.2018, p. 3.

                     (4)

                        OJ C 439, 20.12.2017, p. 1

                     (5)

                        OJ C 460, 21.12.2018, p. 1.

                     (6)

                        Net primary government expenditure is comprised of total government expenditure excluding interest expenditure, expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by Union funds revenue and non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit expenditure. Nationally financed gross fixed capital formation is smoothed over a four-year period. Discretionary revenue measures or revenue increases mandated by law are factored in. One-off measures on both the revenue and expenditure sides are netted out.

                     (7)

                        OJ C 210, 21.6.2019, p. 1.

                     (8)

                        OJ C 301, 5.9.2019, p. 135.


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Strasbourg, 17.12.2019
            COM(2019) 652 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
            on the economic policy of the euro area
            {SWD(2019) 631 final}

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

               on the economic policy of the euro area

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 136 in conjunction with Article 121(2) thereof,

               Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies
                  1
               , and in particular Article 5(2) thereof,

               Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances
                  2
               , and in particular Article 6(1) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation of the European Commission,

               Having regard to the conclusions of the European Council,

               Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee,

               Having regard to the opinion of the Economic Policy Committee,

                Whereas:

               (1)The euro area is continuing its expansion, but with interconnected risks to the outlook and uncertainty on the horizon. Moreover, the risk of a further prolonged period of low growth and inflation driven by anaemic productivity and ageing populations looms. While the output gap has turned positive since 2017 and stood at 0.7% of potential GDP in 2018, potential growth is set to remain below pre-crisis levels.
                  3
                Core inflation remained in the 1-1½ % range in 2018 and is forecast to remain at some 1½% in 2019, 2020 and 2021. Labour market indicators continue to improve, although at a slower pace, and employment growth is projected to slow further and challenges in terms of job quality remain. Nominal wage growth has firmed, having reached some 2¼ % growth in 2018, after several years below 2.0%, and is projected at some 2½ % in 2019 and back to 2¼% in 2020-21. In spite of good labour market conditions, real wage growth has increased only slowly and remains low, at below 1% in 2018 and 2019 and projected at 0.7% and 0.8% for 2020 and 2021 respectively. The euro area current account surplus is projected to narrow. Deficit Member States narrowed or reversed their current account deficits, even if they continue to record large negative NIIPs.
                  4
                At the same time, some Member States continue to run persistently high current account surpluses and therefore continue to increase their net international investment positions (NIIP). Current account balance dynamics in the euro area are affected by weakening external demand, especially for export-oriented Member States with high current account surpluses, which are highly dependent on foreign export demand.

               (2)Increasing the growth potential while ensuring environmental and social sustainability and driving real convergence among euro area Member States requires structural reforms to enhance sustainable growth and investment in tangible and intangible capital to increase productivity. This would help particularly those Member States whose growth potential is clearly lower than the euro area average. This would also be necessary in order to prevent the euro area economy from falling into a protracted period of low potential growth and productivity, low price inflation and wage growth as well as rising inequality. Reforms and investment remain crucial to ensure the euro area relaunches its growth momentum, overcomes stronger pressures over the medium to long-term stemming also from deteriorating demographics, and facilitates the transformation towards a sustainable economy, helping the euro area and its member states to achieve the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals.

               (3)The economic impact of climate change, one of the biggest systemic risks facing the world economy, financial systems and societies today, is beginning to be visible. Risks to the global economy from climate change and more broadly from environmental degradation are increasingly present, and these will have an impact on the most vulnerable in our societies. If not accompanied by appropriate measures, there could be negative consequences on the resilience of our economies, on inclusiveness and on the long-term growth potential. In that context, investment and creating the regulatory and financial conditions for an orderly transition towards a sustainable economy would be essential. If tackled in the right way, environmental and climate challenges are also an opportunity to revitalise the European economy towards sustainable development. In that direction, the Commission has put forward a European Green Deal, as Europe’s growth strategy which will include the first European Climate Law to enshrine the 2050 climate-neutrality target into law. At the same time, the green transition will need to take the impact on different parts of society into account. Investment to facilitate transformation towards a sustainable economy will need to be accompanied by investment in skills and support for job transitions to ensure that all citizens reap the benefits of technological change, particularly in the sectors and regions lagging behind in the digital and green transitions.

               (4)Mobilising public and private funds for investing in the green and digital transition can help to sustain growth in the short term and meet the long-term challenges facing our economies. While the digital revolution may entail opportunities in terms of productivity, growth and job creation, it may also raise challenges, in particular for less qualified workers, lacking skills to work with new technologies. Different speeds of transition to the digital economy among euro area Member States could prove a significant risk to convergence and macroeconomic stability. This could be reinforced by strong agglomeration effects, often benefiting large cities and winner-takes-all dynamics that are often present in the area of digital technologies, which can add to inequality and have adverse impact on convergence. Investments should be geared towards generating research and innovations but also towards wider diffusion of innovations across the economy.

               (5)A more coordinated investment strategy coupled with a stronger reform effort at euro area level would be instrumental to support growth and respond to the long-term challenges such as the climate transition and technology transformation. The Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness, to be included in the Reform Support Programme, would provide financial support to euro area Member States for the implementation of reform and investment packages. InvestEU, which will also contribute to the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, also aims to trigger at least EUR 650 billion in additional investment to further foster innovation and job creation in the EU, including by financing sustainable infrastructure. Cohesion policy funds, which play a crucial role in supporting our regions and rural areas, also play a role in the climate and technological transition by promoting sustainable development. The European Investment Bank already dedicates 25% of its total financing to climate investment, and has announced its intention to double this share. To achieve the Union’s sustainability objectives, it would be essential to carry out investment projects at national and sub-national level that cover climate adaptation and mitigation, energy transition, decarbonisation or the circular economy. Investment in network industries and infrastructure can help improve the euro area’s competitiveness and foster the transition to more sustainable transport. In addition, investments in intangible assets such as research and development and skills would be key to prepare the euro area labour market for the challenges ahead.

               (6)The effects of the economic expansion over the last years have not been felt evenly within Member States and across regions and countries. While disposable income levels have recently risen, they remain below pre-crisis levels in several euro area Member States. The number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion is declining in most Member States, and is now 5 million below the 2012 peak, but remains above 2008 levels in the euro area. Following a period of increased divergences, some Member States have converged towards the highest performers in GDP-per-capita over the past few years. However, the share of income held by the highest income levels has slowly increased in the past decade, and large divergences remain between Member States.  In order to promote upwards convergence within and across Member States, it would be important to promote policies that aim at increasing both efficiency and equity, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals. They result in better macroeconomic outcomes with more equally shared benefits for society at large, that also help boost the cohesion of the euro area.

               (7)Consistency and balance in the macroeconomic policy mix of the euro area, including monetary, fiscal and structural policies, are crucial to ensure robust, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and to respond effectively to persistent low inflation, a weakening outlook and risks to long-term growth. The European Central Bank is maintaining an accommodative monetary policy to help inflation edge towards its medium-term inflation objective, while supporting growth and job creation. Fiscal policy needs to complement the monetary policy stance, as are structural reforms across different sectors, including those necessary to complete the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

               (8)Coordination of national fiscal policies in full respect of the Stability and Growth Pact, while taking into account available fiscal space and spillovers across countries, supports the proper functioning of the EMU. The euro area fiscal stance is expected to be broadly neutral to slightly expansionary in 2020 and 2021. At the same time, national fiscal policies remain insufficiently differentiated in light of the available fiscal space in Member States. The pursuit of prudent fiscal policies by Member States with high levels of public debt would put public debt on a downward path, reduce vulnerability to shocks, and allow for the full functioning of automatic stabilisers in the event of an economic downturn. On the other hand, further boosting investment and other productive spending in Member States with a favourable budgetary situation would support growth in the short and medium term, while also helping to rebalance the euro area economy. In case of a worsening outlook, achieving a supportive fiscal stance at the aggregate level that focuses on productive spending, while pursuing policies in full respect of the Stability and Growth Pact, taking into account country-specific circumstances and avoiding pro-cyclicality to the extent possible, is important to sustain growth in the short term.

               (9)Fiscal structural reforms remain crucial for improving fiscal sustainability, strengthening growth potential and allowing for effective fiscal policies in the event of a downturn. Well-functioning national fiscal frameworks, together with regular and thorough spending reviews and effective and transparent public procurement can strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure and improve the credibility and quality of fiscal policies. Improving the composition of national budgets, on both the revenue and expenditure sides, including shifting resources towards investment by setting up public investment strategies, would increase the growth impact of public budgets, raise productivity and begin, meeting the urgent long-term challenges of the green and digital economies. Simplifying and modernising tax systems and addressing tax fraud, evasion, and avoidance namely through measures against Aggressive Tax Planning, are essential to making tax systems more efficient and fairer. The ease with which mobile resources can move within the euro area increases the scope for tax competition. Coordination among Member States is therefore essential to address profit-shifting, excessive tax competition and an overall race to the bottom in terms of corporate taxation. An agreement for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base as well as an agreement to review profit allocation among countries and ensure minimum effective taxation would be instrumental in this endeavour. The tax burden in the euro area is relatively high and skewed towards labour, with property or environmental taxes representing a very small share of tax revenues. The two latter, however, can be less detrimental to growth and labour supply and demand and can contribute to sustainable growth by incentivising “greener” behaviour by consumers and producers. Taxation would need to take better into account the climate dimension and address emissions and carbon leakage more consistently. Therefore, in order to help transitioning towards a green economy, fostering the design of budgetary policies conducive to environmental commitments and a review of the Energy Taxation Directive will be proposed, as well as a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism if needed to avoid carbon leakage and keep the level playing field with third countries firms.

               (10)Structural and institutional reforms that increase competition in product markets, promote resource efficiency, improve the business environment and the quality of public administrations, including the effectiveness of justice systems, are important for the resilience of euro-area Member States. Resilient economic structures prevent shocks from having significant and long-lasting effects on income and labour supply and can facilitate the operation of fiscal and monetary policy and contain divergences, particularly in downturns, creating more favourable conditions for sustainable and inclusive growth. Better coordination and implementation of structural reforms, in particular those prescribed in the country-specific recommendations, can create positive spillovers across Member States. In that respect, the National Productivity Boards can play an important role in increasing the reform ownership and improving implementation. Reforms are also needed to face urgent long-term challenges such as the climate transition and technological transformation. Deepening Single Market integration, which has proven to be a major engine of growth and convergence between Member States can also contribute to fostering productivity growth.

               (11)The European Pillar of Social Rights sets out twenty principles to foster equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions and social protection and inclusion. It is designed as a compass to promote upward convergence towards better working and living conditions. Stronger and more inclusive economies and societies can in turn foster the resilience of the Union and the euro area. Reforms and investment in skills, job transitions and more effective social protection are also important to accompany a just and fair transition towards a green and digital economy. The full implementation of the pillar at all levels with due regard for respective competences will be essential to promote upward convergence.

               (12)Reforms that increase labour market participation, promote quality job creation, support successful labour market transitions, reduce segmentation and promote social dialogue can help boost inclusive growth, improve economic resilience and automatic stabilisation, reduce inequalities, and address poverty and social exclusion. Individualised job transition support, training and requalification are key to promote the timely reinsertion of job-seekers. Access to high-quality education and training throughout the life cycle requires adequate investment in order to improve human capital and skills, also in light of the digital and green transition. This contributes to improving employability, productivity, innovation capacity and wages in the medium and longer term, increasing the resilience of the euro area. Employment protection legislation needs to provide for fair and decent working conditions for all workers, especially in view of emerging atypical forms of employment bringing along new opportunities but also challenges related to job security and social protection. Effective and sustainable social protection systems are also crucial to ensure adequate income and access to quality services. Pension reforms and work-life balance policies can importantly foster labour market participation, safeguarding the long-term sustainability of European welfare systems. A shift away from labour taxation could usefully focus in particular on low income and second earners. Social partners’ involvement in employment, social and economic reforms is crucial to strengthen ownership and support reform implementation.

               (13)The robustness of the euro area financial sector has increased since the crisis, though vulnerabilities remain. Corporate and household debt remains high in several countries, and in many cases, national tax systems still feature a debt bias. The need to adapt banks' business models, the low-interest-rate environment and increasing competition from other forms of finance continue to exert pressure on banks' competitiveness. There has been sustained progress in risk reduction, notably on non-performing loan (NPL) reduction. Nonetheless, where NPL ratios remain rather high they require further sustained efforts, and all Member States should put in place appropriate policies to prevent the build-up of NPLs. In March 2018, the Commission presented a risk-reduction package both to facilitate addressing legacy NPLs and to avoid their future build-up. As part of the legislative measures on NPLs, a Regulation was adopted in April 2019,
                  5
                which introduces a ‘statutory prudential backstop’ in order to prevent the risk of under-provisioning of future NPLs; further progress should be made to continue tackling the issue of NPLs, in particular by progressing with the draft Directive on NPLs secondary markets. As highlighted in the Commission reports on anti-money laundering issued in July 2019
                  6
               , a more comprehensive approach to fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities is needed in the Union to address structural shortcomings identified. This requires, in particular, a better enforcement of the rules and better supervision through more unified EU action.

               (14)The establishment of the Banking Union has progressed, including through the agreement on the operationalisation of a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund, but it remains unfinished. A High Level Working Group was set up to continue technical work towards the launching of the political negotiations for establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). This work needs to be completed given the significance of EDIS for the steady-state Banking Union and within the broader EMU architecture, which calls for addressing all the relevant elements to favour the stability and efficiency of the European banking sector. Finally, the Commission delivered on all of the actions announced in the Capital Markets Union. However, concrete support on specific legislative files has sometimes been lacking and renewed efforts are needed to remove the legal, tax and regulatory obstacles to the establishment of a Capital Markets Union, in particular as regards the rules on access to finance, insolvency, supervision and tax divergences, and to achieve a more effective EU supervision.  The role and functioning of national government bond markets needs to be assessed also to address the so-called bank-sovereign nexus.

               (15)Strengthening the architecture of the EMU requires delivering on the actions identified in the Statement of the Euro Summit of December 2019 as a matter of priority, but also on Commission proposals setting further steps towards completing the EMU. The June 2019 Communication on Deepening Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: Taking stock of four years after the Five Presidents’ Report presents the state of play and outline areas where reform efforts should focus in the short and medium term. There has been some progress on the economic union, with a political agreement on the Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness for the euro area. Discussions on improving the European Stability Mechanism’s toolkit and revising its Treaty are ongoing. However, there have been no discussions in the Council on a euro area fiscal stabilisation function nor reforming the governance of the euro area. The Commission intends to propose a European Unemployment Benefit Reinsurance Scheme in order to better protect citizens in cases of economic shocks.

               (16)Completing the EMU would result in better macroeconomic outcomes. An incomplete EMU impedes financial integration. This limits financing opportunities for much-needed investment to foster an inclusive, productive, sustainable and stable economy. An incomplete EMU also hinders the smooth transmission of monetary policy across the euro area and limits Europe’s ability to determine its economic destiny. In addition, the lack of a central fiscal stabilisation function significantly weakens the euro area’s counter-cyclical fiscal capacity. Additionally, the move towards intergovernmental solutions has not been matched by appropriate accountability at EU level. Therefore, improvements in the governance of the euro area bodies would be instrumental to increase democratic accountability. Strengthening the EMU is key to enhance the clout of Europe in the world, to develop the international role of the euro and to contribute to an open, multilateral and rules-based global economy. It is important that discussions continue to be held in an open and transparent manner towards non-euro area Member States, fully respecting the Union’s internal market.

               HEREBY RECOMMENDS that euro area Member States take action, individually and collectively within the Eurogroup, in the period 2020–2021 to:

               1.In euro area Member States with current account deficits or high external debt, pursue reforms to boost competitiveness and reduce external debt. In euro area Member States with large current account surpluses, strengthen the conditions that support wage growth, while respecting the role of social partners, and implement measures that foster public and private investment. In all Member States, foster productivity by improving the business environment and the quality of institutions, enhance resilience by improving the functioning of goods and services markets especially by deepening the Single Market. Support a fair and inclusive transition towards a competitive green and digital economy through tangible and intangible investment, both public and private.

               2.In Member States with high debt levels, pursue prudent policies to put public debt credibly on a sustainable downward path. In Member States with a favourable fiscal position, use it to further boost high-quality investments. In case of a worsening outlook, deliver a supportive fiscal stance at the aggregate level, while pursuing policies in full respect of the Stability and Growth Pact, taking into account country-specific circumstances and avoiding pro-cyclicality to the extent possible, and stand ready to coordinate policies in the Eurogroup. Improve the effectiveness of national fiscal frameworks and the quality of public finances and adopt growth-friendly tax and other relevant budgetary measures that foster a sustainable economy. Support and implement EU actions to combat Aggressive Tax Planning and address a race to the bottom in corporate taxation.

               3.Strengthen education and training systems and investment in skills. Increase the effectiveness of active labour market policies that support labour market integration and successful labour market transitions, including to more digital and green jobs. Promote participation in the labour market, including that of women, and shift taxes away from labour, in particular for low-income and second earners. Foster quality job creation, fair working conditions and address labour market segmentation. Improve access to adequate and sustainable social protection systems. Enhance the effectiveness of social dialogue and promote collective bargaining.

               4.Complete the Banking Union by starting political negotiations on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, taking steps to improve crisis management and making provisions for liquidity in resolution and the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund operational. Strengthen the European regulatory and supervisory framework, including by reinforcing the supervision and enforcement of anti-money laundering rules. Promote orderly deleveraging of large stocks of private debt including by removing debt bias in taxation. Continue to enable the swift reduction of the level of nonperforming loans by banks in the euro area and prevent their build up. Renew efforts to complete the Capital Markets Union.

               5.Make ambitious progress on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union, delivering swiftly on the actions identified in the Statement of the Euro Summit of December 2019 and advancing on all other aspects with the perspective to strengthen the international role of the euro and to project Europe’s economic interests globally. Deepen the Economic and Monetary Union and enhance its democratic accountability while fully respecting the Union’s internal market and in an open and transparent manner towards non-euro area Member States.

               Done at Strasbourg, 17.12.2019

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

                     (2)

                        OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25.

                     (3)

                        All forecast figures in this document are from the European Commission Autumn 2019 forecast.

                     (4)

                        European Commission (2019), Alert Mechanism Report 2020, COM(2019) 651 final.

                     (5)

                        Regulation (EU) 2019/630 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures OJ L 111, 25.4.2019, p.4.

                     (6)

                        Communication COM (2019) 360 final from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 24 July 2019 towards better implementation of the EU's anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism framework.


title: Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION authorising the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, amendments and adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer

text: ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 4.11.2019
            COM(2019) 576 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            to authorise the European Commission to open negotiations for a Customs Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement (CCMAA) with the Republic of Belarus

               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

               1.CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

               •Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

               Over the past years, there has been progress in EU-Belarus relations and EU-Belarus bilateral trade in goods has been growing steadily. The European Union is Belarus' second main trade partner with almost a one-third share in the country's overall trade. At the same time, Belarus factories account for a substantial share (estimated to exceed 15%) of the illicit tobacco products seized by customs authorities in the EU Member States. Illicit tobacco trade costs the budgets of Member States and the EU an

                  estimated

                €10 billion a year in revenue. The illicit tobacco trade also undermines the EU's and national public health policies, and thus contributes to the many smoking-related deaths every year. In 2013, the EU adopted a comprehensive strategy
                  1
                to fight the illicit tobacco trade, which remains relevant today
                  2
               . A key element in that strategy is to enhance cooperation with major source and transit countries. Therefore the proposal responds to the needs of EU Member States and their businesses for a legal framework for Customs Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance with Belarus.

               Due to the specific historic context, Belarus is the only country in the EU Eastern neighborhood, and the only country of the Eurasian Economic Union, without a formal legal basis for customs cooperation and mutual administrative assistance with the EU. An international agreement is therefore required to provide a legal basis for customs cooperation in particular in the areas of supply chain security and trade facilitation, and for mutual administrative assistance to prevent, investigate and combat breaches of customs legislation. The agreement with Belarus will be an appropriate tool in fighting customs fraud.

               As the EU's overall relations with Belarus are evolving, now is the right moment to plug this gap in the EU's external relations on customs matters in its neighborhood. This initiative is in line with the 2016 February Council Conclusions on Belarus, stating that the EU remains open to further development of EU-Belarus relations, and to taking further steps to enhance political relations and sectoral cooperation in the appropriate context. More recently, it follows up on political contacts in the context of the EU-Belarus Coordination Group meeting on 25 April 2019 and Commissioner Oettinger's visit to Minsk in February 2019. Strengthening our engagement with Belarus is also a key element in the Action Plan adopted by the Commission in December 2018 on fighting the illicit tobacco trade 2018-2022.
                  3

               This initiative is not within the Regulatory Fitness Programme (REFIT).

               •Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

                  The Commission has concluded agreements including Customs cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance provisions with all the countries in our Eastern Neighbourhood, as well as with all other Eurasian Economic Union Member countries: Russia
                     4
                  , Armenia
                     5
                  , Kazakhstan
                     6
                   and Kyrgyzstan
                     7
                  .

               •Consistency with other Union policies

                  The recommendation is consistent with other Union policies.

               2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

               •Legal basis

                  Article 218(3) and (4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) will be the procedural legal basis.

                  The subject matter of the agreement would be part of the Union's common commercial policy, therefore the substantive legal basis of the decisions on the signature and the conclusion of the agreement will be Article 207 TFEU.

               •Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

                  The initiative falls under the exclusive competence of the EU (common commercial policy) according to Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply.

               •Proportionality

                  The Commission recommendation is in line with the principle of proportionality.

                  An international agreement is the appropriate and the necessary instrument to provide a legal basis to perform customs cooperation and mutual administrative assistance with a third country, and in light of our objective to engage with Belarus in Customs cooperation, as it is the only remaining country on the EU Eastern border not yet covered with any Customs related agreement.

               •Choice of the instrument

                  Decision of the Council of the European Union.

               3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

               •Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

                  Not applicable

               •Stakeholder consultations

                  Not applicable

               •Collection and use of expertise

                  Not applicable

               •Impact assessment

                  The agreement aims to improve the application of customs legislation via cooperation and mutual administrative assistance between the customs authorities of the EU and of Belarus.

                  There will be a positive impact due to the alignment of the rules and opening the communication with Republic of Belarus.

                  An indirect positive impact is expected through improving the correct application of customs legislation, via mutual administrative assistance and customs cooperation, hence, inter alia, reducing customs fraud, especially tobacco smuggling, resulting in higher levels of customs and tax revenues in the EU.

                  The possible agreement text would, subject to negotiations, be similar to agreements reached with Belarus's neighbouring countries and with other countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, to which Belarus is a member and which share the same regional Customs Code.

                  In relation to mutual administrative assistance, a substantial part of its content is formal and procedural, so the draft text should not be substantially modified during the negotiations.

               •Regulatory fitness and simplification

                  This initiative is not within the Regulatory Fitness Programme (REFIT)

               •Fundamental rights

                  The recommendation is consistent with the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

               4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

               The Customs Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance agreement will not have a direct effect on the budget of the EU.

               The agreement will require financial and administrative resources in order to set and manage a joint committee and possible missions and discussions to implement the agreement.

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               to authorise the European Commission to open negotiations for a Customs Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement (CCMAA) with the Republic of Belarus

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 218(3) and (4) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               The Commission is hereby authorised to open negotiations, on behalf of the European Union, with the Republic of Belarus for an agreement on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance.

               Article 2

               The negotiations shall be conducted on the basis of the negotiating directives of the Council set out in the Annex.

               Article 3

               The Commission shall conduct negotiations in consultation with [name of the special committee to be inserted by the Council].

               Article 4

               This Decision is addressed to the Commission.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        COM(2013)324

                     (2)

                        COM(2017)235 Section E.

                     (3)

                        COM (2018)846, item A.2.7.

                     (4)

                        OJ L 327/1 of 28.11.1997

                     (5)

                        OJ L 239/1 of 9.9.1999

                     (6)

                        OJ L 29/1 of 4.2.2016.

                     (7)

                        OJ L 196/46 of 28.7.1999

    ---documentbreak---

               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 4.11.2019
            COM(2019) 576 final
            ANNEX
            to the
            Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION
            to authorise the European Commission to open negotiations for a Customs Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement (CCMAA) with the Republic of Belarus

               ANNEX

               Recommendation for a Council decision to authorise the European Commission to open negotiations for a Customs Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement (CCMAA) with the Republic of Belarus

               1.Nature of the envisaged Agreement

               The scope of the envisaged Agreement will be limited to matters of Union competence. The general objective of the envisaged Agreement will be to develop and intensify cooperation and mutual administrative assistance in customs matters with the Republic of Belarus; in particular, to establish the legal basis for a customs cooperation framework which aims at securing the supply chain and facilitating legitimate trade, while ensuring effective customs controls, as well as protecting the financial interests of the European Union by enabling information exchange to ensure the proper application of customs legislation. The envisaged Agreement will be concluded for an unlimited period of time.

               2.Content of the envisaged Agreement

               The envisaged Agreement will cover all provisions adopted by the European Union, and the Republic of Belarus, also referred to as the Contracting Parties, in their respective customs legislations governing the import, export and transit of goods and their placing under any other customs procedure. No field that is subject to Union jurisdiction and in which customs cooperation or mutual administrative assistance would be appropriate is excluded in principle.

               The envisaged Agreement should therefore cover elements such as:

               (1)Cooperation on improvement of customs legislation, harmonisation and simplification of customs procedures;

               (2)Establishment of modern customs systems, including modern customs clearance technologies, provisions for authorised economic operators, automated risk-based analysis and controls, simplified procedures for the release of goods, post-release audit, provisions for customs-to-business partnerships;

               (3)Facilitation and effective control of transhipment operations and transit movements through the respective territories; cooperation and coordination between all concerned authorities and agencies in their respective territories to facilitate traffic in transit; pursue, where relevant and appropriate, possibilities for compatibility of the respective customs transit systems;

               (4)Professional ethics;

               (5)Exchange, where appropriate and under modalities to be defined, relevant information and data whilst respecting the rules on the confidentiality of sensitive data and on personal data protection of the Contracting Parties;

               (6)Coordination of customs actions between the customs authorities of the Contracting Parties.

               (7)Mutual recognition of authorised economic operators programmes and customs controls including equivalent trade facilitation measures, where relevant and appropriate and under modalities to be defined.

               (8)Customs valuation

               (9)Mutual administrative assistance.

               3.Other provisions

               The applicable rules for confidentiality, data protection and use of information will be defined in accordance with the relevant EU legislation.

               The envisaged Agreement will contain the usual clauses concerning territorial application, entry into force, duration and the notice required for denouncement.

               4.Joint Customs Co-operation Committee

               The envisaged Agreement will provide for a Joint Customs Co-operation Committee, which will see to the proper functioning of the envisaged Agreement; it may take decisions and other measures necessary to implement the objectives of the Agreement.

               In accordance with Article 17 TUE, the Union will be represented within the Joint Customs Cooperation Committee by the Commission, assisted by representatives of the Member States.

               A Working Party may be set up to examine and to make recommendations to the Joint Customs Co-operation Committee on technical issues related to the implementation of the envisaged Agreement.

               The Working Party will consist of experts from both Contracting Parties.

               It will report to the Joint Customs Co-operation Committee, which will take the appropriate decisions by mutual consent.

               5.Negotiation

               The Commission should report to the Council on the outcome of negotiations and, where appropriate, on any problem that may arise during the negotiations.


                     RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
                             EUROPEAN
                             COMMISSION
                                                     Brussels, 11.3.2015
                                                     COM(2015) 119 final
   This document was downgraded/declassified
   Date            16.1.2020
   By              M .SHOTTER
   Authority       DG HOME
                                    Recommendation for a
                                   COUNCIL DECISION
    authorising the opening of negotiations on short-stay visa waiver agreements between
                         the European Union and Colombia and Peru
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                                  EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
   1.       INTRODUCTION
   1.1.     Background
   Council Regulation (EC) No 539/20011 lists the third countries whose nationals must be in
   possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States and those whose
   nationals are exempt from that requirement. Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 is applied by all
   Member States, with the exception of Ireland and the United Kingdom, and by Iceland,
   Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
   European Parliament and Council Regulation No 509/20142 amended Council Regulation
   539/2001 transferring 19 countries to Annex II, which lists the third countries whose
   nationals are exempt from the visa requirement. These 19 countries are: Colombia, Dominica,
   Grenada, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint
   Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and
   Tobago, Tuvalu, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. The reference to each of these
   countries in Annex II is accompanied by a footnote that specifies that "the exemption from the
   visa requirement shall apply from the date of entry into force of an agreement on visa
   exemption to be concluded with the European Union".
   On 17 July 2014 the Commission adopted a Recommendation to the Council for the opening
   of visa waiver negotiations with 17 of the countries listed above, i.e. all of them except
   Colombia and Peru. The latter two countries were, according to Recital 5 of European
   Parliament and Council Regulation No 509/2014 and the joint declaration issued at the time
   of adoption, subject to a specific procedure which required a further assessment of the
   fulfilment by them of the relevant criteria, before the Commission could present to the
   Council recommendations for decisions authorising the opening of negotiations on visa
   waiver agreements with these two countries. This assessment was contained in the reports3
   adopted by the Commission on 29 October 2014. The reports were discussed in the LIBE
   committee of the European Parliament on 5 November and in the visa working party of the
   Council on 21 November. The assessments were well received in both the committee and the
   working party, although some concerns were expressed related to the need to ensure that the
   visa-free regime be linked to the issuing of biometric passports in both countries and to
   improved cooperation on return of irregular migrants.
   As a consequence of the positive assessment of the fulfilment by Colombia and Peru of the
   relevant criteria, the Commission is now recommending to the Council to authorise it to start
   visa waiver negotiations with both countries.
   The legal provision that the visa waiver is subject to agreements between the European Union
   and Colombia and Peru is mainly intended to safeguard effectively the principle of reciprocity
   with regard to the visa waiver. The agreements between the European Union and Colombia
   and Peru should fully incorporate the principle of reciprocity by including failure to respect
   that principle among the grounds for suspension or termination.
   1
           OJ L 81, 21.03.2001, p. 1.
   2
           OJ L 149, 20.05.2014, p. 67
   3
           COM 2014 (663) for Peru and COM 2014 (665) for Colombia
EN                                                  2                                             EN
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   The principle of a visa waiver for nationals of Colombia and Peru having been established by
   European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 509/2014, and the Commission being
   satisfied that the two countries fulfil the criteria for the elimination of the visa requirement,
   the Commission is now seeking to give it practical effect by submitting to the Council a
   Recommendation to authorise the Commission to open negotiations for the conclusion of
   bilateral visa waiver agreements between the European Union and Colombia and Peru.
   1.2.      The negotiating directives
   The agreements with Colombia and Peru will closely follow the precedents set by the existing
   EU visa waiver agreements, in particular with Antigua and Barbuda4, the Bahamas5,
   Barbados6, Mauritius7, Saint Kitts and Nevis8 and Seychelles9, as well as the visa waiver
   agreements with the other 17 countries transferred to Annex II of Regulation 539/2001 by
   Regulation 509/2014.
   The agreements should provide for and determine the period of stay authorised under the visa
   waiver, taking into account the existence of the Schengen area without internal borders in
   which the free movement of persons is ensured. Each of the agreements should provide for
   the lifting of the visa requirement only for intended stays of no more than 90 days in any 180-
   day period. Admission and immigration would not be covered.
   In essence the agreements would confirm the lifting by the European Union of the visa
   requirement for Colombian and Peruvian citizens and the lifting by Colombia and Peru of the
   visa requirement for citizens of all the Member States.
   The agreements should define the categories of citizens benefiting from the visa waiver,
   namely ordinary passport holders, diplomatic, service, official and special passport holders.
   They should also define the purposes of travel (such as tourism or business) for which the visa
   waiver is to apply.
   Moreover, the agreements should also take into account the situation of the Member States
   that do not yet apply the Schengen acquis in full. As long as they are not part of the Schengen
   area without internal borders, the visa waiver should confer a right to stay for up to 90 days on
   the territory of each of those Member States, independently of the period calculated for the
   whole Schengen area.
   2.        PURPOSE AND LEGAL BASIS
   This recommendation is submitted to the Council in order to authorise the Commission to
   negotiate with Colombia and Peru short-stay visa waiver agreements that contain clear,
   unambiguous and legally binding rights and obligations ensuring the lifting of the visa
   requirement for citizens of the Member States and of Colombia and Peru entering the territory
   of the other contracting party for a stay of no more than 90 days.
   4
            OJ L 169, 30.06.2009, p. 3–8
   5
            OJ L 169, 30/06/2009, p. 24–29
   6
            OJ L 169, 30/06/2009, p. 10–15
   7
            OJ L 169, 30/06/2009, p. 17–22
   8
            OJ L 169, 30/06/2009, p. 38–43
   9
            OJ L 169, 30/06/2009, p. 31–36
EN                                                  3                                                EN
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   Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 is based on Article 77(2)(a) of the Treaty on the
   Functioning of the European Union. The negotiation of visa waiver agreements with third
   countries is within the exclusive competence of the Union.
   The Union should exercise its exclusive competence with a view to concluding
   comprehensive agreements with Colombia and Peru on a reciprocal visa waiver. These
   agreements should prevail over bilateral agreements concluded by Member States and
   Colombia and Peru to the extent that their provisions concern matters within the scope of the
   Union agreement.
   3.       APPLICABILITY TO THE ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES
   The Union has no power to conclude visa waiver agreements with Colombia and Peru that
   would bind the 4 countries associated with the implementation of the Schengen acquis,
   including the common visa policy.
   In order to ensure a common approach towards Colombia and Peru on the issues regulated in
   the agreement, it would be advisable for the parties to the agreement between the Union and
   Colombia and Peru to attach a joint declaration stating the desirability for Colombia and Peru,
   on the one hand, and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, on the other, to
   conclude separate bilateral visa waiver agreements, the provisions of which should be aligned
   on those of the agreement between the Union and Colombia and Peru.
EN                                               4                                                 EN
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                                        Recommendation for a
                                       COUNCIL DECISION
     authorising the opening of negotiations on short-stay visa waiver agreements between
                            the European Union and Colombia and Peru
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
   Article 218(3) and (4) thereof,
   Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission, following its positive
   assessment of the fulfilment of the relevant criteria by Colombia and Peru
   Whereas:
   (1)     European Parliament and Council Regulation 509/2014 has transferred from Annex I
           to Annex II of Council Regulation 539/2001 the references to Colombia and Peru.
   (2)     The references to these countries are accompanied by a footnote indicating that the
           exemption from the visa requirement shall apply from the date of entry into force of an
           agreement on visa exemption to be concluded with the European Union.
   (3)     The Commission has positively assessed the fulfilment by Colombia and Peru of the
           relevant criteria in view of the negotiation of visa waiver agreements between the
           European Union and both countries.
   (4)     Negotiations should be opened with a view to concluding such agreements with
           Colombia and Peru,
   HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
                                                Article 1
   The Commission is hereby authorised to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, visa waiver
   agreements with Colombia and Peru.
                                                Article 2
   The negotiating directives are set out in the Annex.
                                                Article 3
   The negotiations shall be conducted in consultation with the Visa Working Party of the
   Council.
EN                                                  5                                              EN
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                                            Article 4
   This Decision is addressed to the Commission.
   Done at Brussels, 11.3.2015
   For the Council
   The President
EN                                              6     EN
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                                                    RESTRICTED
                            EUROPEAN
                            COMMISSION
                                                     Brussels, 11.3.2015
                                                     COM(2015) 119 final
                                                     ANNEX 1
   This document was downgraded/declassified
   Date            16.1.2020
   By              M.SHOTTER
   Authority       DG HOME
                                           ANNEX
                                            to the
                          Recommendation for a Council Decision
    authorising the opening of negotiations on short-stay visa waiver agreements between
                        the European Union and Colombia and Peru
EN                                                                                EN
                     RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
 ---pagebreak---                            RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
                                              ANNEX […]
                                         Negotiating Directives
   In the course of the negotiations the Commission should aim to achieve the objectives set out
   in detail below.
   1.         PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENTS
   The purpose of the agreements should be to establish clear, unambiguous and legally binding
   rights and obligations ensuring exemption from the visa requirement for short stays both for
   citizens of Colombia and Peru crossing the external borders of the Member States and for
   citizens of the Member States crossing the borders of these countries.
   2.         SPECIFIC ISSUES
   The agreements should define the categories of EU citizens and nationals of Colombia and
       Peru concerned who are to benefit from the visa waiver, namely holders of ordinary
       passports and holders of diplomatic, service, official and special passports. Declarations
       attached to the agreements should recall the Colombian and Peruvian governments’ plans
       to start issuing biometric passports to their citizens in the course of the year 2015.
   The agreements should define the purpose of stay for which the visa waiver is established:
       tourism, family visits, business etc. The visa waiver should not apply to persons entering
       for a period of no more than 90 days in order to carry out a gainful economic activity.
   The agreements should also define the duration of the stay allowed under the visa waiver. In
       the case of an EU citizen this should be 90 days in any 180-day period in the territory of
       Colombia and Peru, and in the case of Colombian and Peruvian nationals it should be 90
       days in any 180-day period in the Schengen area.
   The agreements should provide that exceptionally, and for a transitional period, the stay in the
       Schengen area covered by the visa waiver of 90 days in any 180-day period is to be
       calculated independently of any stay in a Member State which does not yet implement the
       Schengen acquis in full.
   The agreements should make it clear that the visa waiver applies regardless of the mode of
       transport used to cross the border.
   The agreements should make it clear that matters outside the scope of the agreements
       continue to be governed by national and Union law. This would apply in particular to other
       entry conditions, refusals of entry, extension of stay beyond three months, etc.
   3.         MANAGEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT
   The agreements with Colombia and Peru should contain a provision setting up a committee of
   experts. The committees should be composed of representatives of the European Union and of
   Colombia and Peru respectively. The Union should be represented by the Commission.
   The committee of experts should in particular have the task of:
   –          monitoring the implementation of the agreement; and
   –          suggesting amendments and additions to it.
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   4.        RELATIONS WITH EXISTING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
             MEMBER STATES AND COLOMBIA AND PERU
   Each of the agreements should contain a clause whereby, from its entry into force, its
   provisions will take precedence over bilateral agreements or the provisions of any bilateral
   agreements or arrangements concluded between individual Member States and Colombia and
   Peru, in so far as their provisions concern matters within the scope of the agreement.
   5.        TERRITORIAL APPLICATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE,                                    DURATION,
             SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION OF THE AGREEEMENT
   The agreements should contain provisions related to their territorial application – in the case
   of France and the Netherlands, the visa waiver would entitle nationals of Colombia and Peru
   to stay only in those Member States’ European territories – and their entry into force and
   duration. They should be concluded for an indefinite period and should contain provisions
   which allow either contracting party to suspend and/or terminate all or part of the agreement.
   The grounds for suspension should include in particular threats to public policy and security,
   irregular immigration, and the reintroduction of a visa requirement by either party. On the
   specific issue of irregular migration, declarations attached to the agreements should recall that
   under Article 49 (3) of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement1 between the
   European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Andean Community
   and its member countries, of the other part, the parties agree to readmit their irregular
   migrants.
   Colombia and Peru should be entitled to suspend or terminate their respective agreement only
   in respect of the European Union as a whole, and not in respect of one or more Member States
   individually. The Union should be entitled to suspend or terminate the agreements only in
   respect of all of its Member States.
   1
           COM(2003) 695. The Agreement has not yet entered into force as the EU has not yet ratified it. It is
           however expected to enter into force in the course of 2015.
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