               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 2.4.2019
            COM(2019) 165 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            supplementing the negotiating directives for the Doha Development Agenda regarding the plurilateral negotiations of rules and commitments on electronic commerce

               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

               1.CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

               •Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

                  On 13 December 2017, at the Eleventh Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 70 WTO Members adopted a Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce
                     1
                   to initiate exploratory work towards future WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce.

                  The European Union (EU) strongly supported the exploratory work that was carried out during 2018 in the WTO. The exploratory work was transparent and open to all WTO Members, and discussed any trade-related aspect of electronic commerce put on the table by the participating Members.

                  After the successful conclusion of the exploratory work in December 2018, on 25 January 2019, 76 Members of the WTO, including the EU, confirmed their intention to commence WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce.
                     2
                   The participating Members have confirmed that they would seek to achieve a high standard outcome that builds on existing WTO agreements and frameworks with the participation of as many WTO Members as possible. They recognised and committed to take into account the unique opportunities and challenges faced by Members, including developing and least developed countries, as well as by micro, small and medium sized enterprises, in relation to electronic commerce. Finally, they confirmed their intention to continue to encourage all WTO Members to participate in order to further enhance the benefits of electronic commerce for businesses, consumers and the global economy.

                  Accordingly, the e-commerce negotiations should take place in a plurilateral setting within the WTO framework, and remain transparent and open to any WTO Member that decides to join. The participating Members may put on the table any negotiating proposal in the realm of the trade-related aspects of electronic commerce, at the beginning or at a later phase of the negotiating process in the WTO.

                  The Commission obtained authorisation from the Council under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), for negotiations in the WTO inter alia on trade in services and trade facilitation as well as on the progressive liberalisation of trade rules.
                     3
                   Given that electronic commerce forms an integral part of how services and goods are traded,
                     4
                   the new WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce are covered by the existing authorisation, as the negotiations on electronic commerce belong to the field of trade in services, trade facilitation and progressive liberalisation of trade rules.
                     5
                   Therefore, a new Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations pursuant to Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is not required.

                  Nonetheless, while electronic commerce is not a new issue on the agenda of the WTO,
                     6
                   the plurilateral negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce could potentially be broad and may address a number of topics on which the EU has internal legislation as well as specific concerns, in particular on cross-border data flows and audio-visual services, and specific priorities. Consequently, in order to frame more accurately the negotiations, the Commission recommends to the Council the adoption of negotiating directives specific to the WTO negotiations on electronic commerce.

                  The proposed negotiating directives aim to ensure that the EU is in a position to engage in the negotiation of any trade-related aspect of electronic commerce proposed by the participating WTO Members in the course of negotiations, in full respect of the acquis, including the framework for personal data protection, and the EU’s policy choices in trade negotiations.

                  For the EU, the objectives of the negotiations are to enhance global electronic commerce, facilitate the operations of businesses, including micro, small and medium enterprises, strengthen consumers’ trust in the on-line environment and create new opportunities to promote inclusive growth and development. In order to achieve a high-standard outcome with the participation of the largest possible number of WTO Members, the rules and commitments should provide for appropriate flexibility for Members.

                  The most probable outcome of the WTO negotiations on electronic commerce is a set of WTO rules that Members can subsequently and unilaterally decide to attach to their existing schedules of commitments in the WTO.

               •Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

                  The above objectives are consistent with the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) that provides that the EU should ‘encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade’.
                     7

                  The European Council of 28-29 June 2018 authorised the Commission to pursue WTO modernisation in pursuit of the objectives of (1) making the WTO more relevant and adaptive to a changing world, and (2) strengthening the WTO's effectiveness. Modernising the WTO’s rulemaking activities, which is one of the main objectives of the negotiations on electronic commerce, form the central pillar of this process.

                  On 18 September 2018, the Commission presented a concept paper
                     8
                   on the WTO modernisation. In the context of strengthening the WTO’s rulemaking function, the Commission inter alia underlined the need for the WTO to address barriers to digital trade. It emphasised that ‘[…] establishing disciplines covering digital trade is important to remove unjustified barriers to trade by electronic means, to bring legal certainly for companies, and to ensure a secure online environment for consumers. […] new disciplines should cover not only trade in services, but apply to all economic sectors.’

                  The EU systematically puts forward ambitious regulatory disciplines both on telecommunications services and on digital trade in its free trade negotiations. The negotiating directives proposed for the WTO electronic commerce negotiations follow the same approach as the one the EU follows in its FTAs (points 10-12 in the Annex).

               •Consistency with other Union policies

                  The disciplines proposed by the EU in bilateral negotiations as well as those that the EU may propose in the WTO build on, and are fully in line with, the EU’s internal market legislation in the areas of digital trade and telecommunications services.

                  The proposed negotiating directives confirm that any rule or commitment agreed upon by the EU should be in line with the EU legal framework (point 9 in the Annex).

               2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

               •Legal basis

                  Article 207(3) and (4) first subparagraph in conjunction with Article 218(3) and (4) of the TFEU.

                  Pursuant to Article 207(3), where agreements concerning the common commercial policy are to be negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council. The Commission shall conduct such negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may address to it.

                  Article 218(3) TFEU stipulates that the Commission shall submit recommendations to the Council. The Council is empowered to adopt decisions authorising the opening of negotiations and pursuant to Article 218(4) TFEU, it may address directives to the negotiator and designate a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted.

                  As regards the WTO negotiations on electronic commerce, the Council has already authorised the opening of negotiations, and issued directives to the Commission, on trade in services and trade facilitation as well as on the progressive liberalisation of trade rules in the WTO, which covers electronic commerce related trade rules and commitments (see Section 1). However, the adoption of supplementary negotiating directives is necessary to frame more accurately these negotiations. Accordingly, the Commission recommends to the Council to adopt a Decision on the basis of Article 207(3) and (4) first subparagraph in conjunction with Article 218(3) and (4) TFEU.

               •Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

                  The common commercial policy is an area of exclusive EU competence under Article 3 TFEU. Accordingly, the subsidiarity principle does not apply (Article 5(3) TEU).

               •Proportionality

                  . The recommendation of the Commission is in line with the principle of proportionality.

               •Choice of the instrument

                  Decision of the Council of the European Union on negotiating directives on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce to supplement the directives issued to the Commission on the Doha Development Agenda.

               3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

               •Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

                  Not applicable.

               •Stakeholder consultations

                  Public consultation has not been carried out, as the substantive elements of the WTO negotiations are not known yet.

                  The Commission regularly consults stakeholders inter alia in the Expert Group on Trade Agreements
                     9
                   and the Civil Society Dialogue.
                     10

               •Collection and use of expertise

                  Not applicable.

               •Impact assessment

                  An impact assessment is not required at this stage since the WTO negotiations on electronic commerce are based on the existing authorisation of the Commission by the Council for WTO negotiations (see Section 1). The substance of the negotiations does not represent a new policy area; they are the continuation of wider WTO negotiations that have been in progress for years.

               (a)Furthermore, it is key that the EU moves ahead quickly and takes part already in the early stages of the negotiations.

               (b)The impacts of possible new rules and commitments resulting from the plurilateral negotiations in the WTO cannot be identified ex ante. Firstly, because negotiating proposals have not been put on the table yet by the participating WTO Members. Secondly, because it is not known which Members will take commitments on all or some of the new WTO rules and obligations.

                  The need for an impact assessment will be reassessed at the conclusion of the WTO negotiations.

               •Regulatory fitness and simplification

                  Not applicable.

               •Fundamental rights

                  The initiative fully respects the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in particular Article 8 on the protection of personal data.

               4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

                  The initiative does not have budgetary implications.

               5.OTHER ELEMENTS

               •Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

                  Not applicable.

               •Explanatory documents (for directives)

                  Not applicable.

               •Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

                  Not applicable.

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               supplementing the negotiating directives for the Doha Development Agenda regarding the plurilateral negotiations of rules and commitments on electronic commerce

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(3) and (4) first subparagraph in conjunction with Article 218(3) and (4) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

               Whereas:

               (1)On 13 December 2017, at the Eleventh Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 70 Members of the WTO adopted a Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce
                  11
                to initiate exploratory work towards future WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce.

               (2)On 25 January 2019, 76 Members of the WTO confirmed their intention to commence WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce.
                  12

               (3)Under the Doha Development Agenda, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations in the World Trade Organisation, and addressed directives to the Commission, inter alia on trade in services, trade facilitation and the progressive liberalisation of trade rules.

               (4)The adoption of supplementary negotiating directives is necessary to further frame the position of the Union in the WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce.

               (5)Pursuant to Article 218(4), the Trade Policy Committee should continue to be designated as the committee in consultation with which the negotiations shall be conducted,

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               The negotiating directives addressed to the Commission on the Doha Development Agenda are supplemented by the negotiating directives for the plurilateral negotiations of rules and commitments on electronic commerce set out in the Annex.

               Article 2

               This Decision is addressed to the Commission.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        WT/MIN(17)/60

                     (2)

                        WT/L/1056

                     (3)

                        A set of Council conclusions form the DDA authorisation, which date from 25 October 1999 to 10 March 2008.

                     (4)

                        The Work Programme of 25 September 1998 provides that electronic commerce is understood to mean the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods or services by electronic means.

                     (5)

                        Reference is made in particular to the Council conclusions of 25 October 1999, 21 November 2001, 21 July 2003 (which specifically provides that the Singapore and Doha Ministerial Declarations and related texts adopted as Doha as well as the earlier Council conclusions constitute the basis for action by the Union in DDA negotiations), 5 December 2003, 6 October 2004, 19 July 2005, 18 October 2005, 21 November 2005, 12 June 2006 and 10 March 2008.

                     (6)

                        The WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce was launched in 1998.

                     (7)

                        Article 21(2)(e) TEU

                     (8)

                  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf

                     (9)

                  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/expert-groups/

                     (10)

                  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/meetdetails.cfm?meet=11531

                     (11)

                        WT/MIN(17)/60

                     (12)

                        WT/L/1056

    ---documentbreak---

               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 2.4.2019
            COM(2019) 165 final
            ANNEX
            to the
            Recommendation for a Council Decision
            supplementing the negotiating directives for the Doha Development Agenda regarding the plurilateral negotiations of rules and commitments on electronic commerce

               ANNEX

               1.NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RULES AND COMMITMENTS

               1.Based on the existing authorisation by the Council for negotiations in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) under the Doha Development Agenda, the aim of the plurilateral negotiations should be to establish disciplines in the WTO on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce with a view to enhancing global electronic commerce, facilitating the operations of businesses, including micro, small and medium enterprises, in particular, by strengthening consumers’ trust in the on-line environment and by creating new opportunities to promote inclusive and sustainable growth and development. The negotiations should also aim to liberalise trade in services and in goods in specific sectors that are directly relevant for enabling electronic commerce.

               2.The negotiations should be conducted and concluded with due regard to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO, respecting the principles of transparency and inclusiveness and building on existing WTO agreements, including the exceptions therein.

               3.The negotiations should aim to develop high-standard disciplines and commitments with the participation of the largest possible number of WTO Members. The negotiations should take into account the unique opportunities for, and challenges faced by, WTO Members in relation to electronic commerce. Accordingly, the rules and commitments should provide for appropriate flexibility.

               4.The rules and commitments agreed upon by the European Union (EU) should take account of the most-favoured-nation treatment obligation in existing WTO agreements, unless WTO Members can agree otherwise.

               2.PROPOSED CONTENT OF THE RULES AND COMMITMENTS

               5.The negotiations should develop new disciplines on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce in the WTO. These should aim to improve the conditions for global electronic commerce for the benefit of businesses and consumers in the European Union, and to increase the participation of micro, small and medium enterprises as well as developing and least developed countries in global value chains.

               6.The negotiations will be conducted in an open and inclusive manner. Therefore, they may cover any trade-related aspect of electronic commerce that is proposed by the participating Members. Recognising the crosscutting nature of electronic commerce, the negotiations may cover matters such as:

               –facilitation of electronic transactions (e.g. electronic signatures and other trust services, electronic authentication);

               –customs duties on electronic transmissions and the transmitted content;

               –consumer trust (e.g. online consumer protection, unsolicited electronic communications, access to redress);

               –regulatory disciplines on telecommunications services to ensure that there is a level playing field and effective competition in the telecommunications sector;

               –cross-border data flows, data localisation requirements and personal data protection;

               –business trust (e.g. protection of computer source code, forced technology transfer);

               –improved access to electronic commerce (e.g. access to the internet, online services and government data or the liability of and access to online intermediaries);

               –trade facilitation measures relevant for electronic commerce (e.g. paperless trading), taking due account of the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation;

               –electronic commerce-related aspects of intellectual property rights, including trade secrets;

               –development-related issues;

               –transparency; and

               –cooperation (e.g. between participating Members, consumer protection authorities).

               7.The European Union may also engage in negotiations on other trade-related aspects of electronic commerce, proposed by the participating Members, in line with these directives.

               8.The negotiations should also aim at the progressive liberalisation of trade in services and in goods by reducing restrictions to market access and national treatment in certain specific sectors that are directly relevant for enabling electronic commerce, notably telecommunications services and computer and related services, beyond Members’ existing WTO commitments.

               9.Any rule or commitment agreed upon by the European Union should be in line with the EU legal framework.

               10.In particular, the European Union shall not agree to disciplines or commitments that could affect its legal framework on cybersecurity, notably on a high common level of security of networks and information systems across the European Union.

               11.Furthermore, the European Union shall not agree to disciplines or commitments that could affect its legal framework on the protection of personal data. On cross-border data flows (data localisation requirements and personal data protection), the European Union shall follow the horizontal approach endorsed in relation to bilateral trade and investment agreements.

               12.Moreover, the European Union and its Member States shall maintain the possibility to preserve and develop their capacity to define and implement cultural and audio-visual policies for the purposes of preserving their cultural diversity. The European Union shall not agree to rules or commitments for audio-visual services. The European Union shall not take commitments on services supplied or activities performed in the exercise of governmental authority.

               13.The rules and commitments should not prevent the European Union, its Member States and their national, regional and local authorities from regulating economic activity in the public interest, to achieve legitimate public policy objectives such as the protection and promotion of public health, social services, public education, safety, the environment, public morals, social or consumer protection, privacy and personal data protection and the promotion and protection of cultural diversity. The high quality of the public services in the European Union should be preserved in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular, with Protocol No. 26 on Services of General Interest, and take into account the European Union’s reservations in this area, including pursuant to the GATS.


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 13.9.2019
            COM(2019) 417 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            authorising the opening of negotiations on an Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cabo Verde amending the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union

               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

               1.CONTEXT OF THE RECOMMENDATION

                  Cabo Verde and the EU have enjoyed a close and very constructive relationship for more than 35 years, based first of all on significant and continuing development cooperation. Since November 2007, relations between the EU and Cabo Verde are governed by the EU-Cabo Verde Special Partnership, which represents an ambitious tool in reinforcing  of the bilateral relations, and constitutes a unique case among the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). One of the objectives of the Special Partnership is to enhance mobility and people-to-people contacts between EU and Cabo Verdean citizens, as well as to increase cooperation in fighting irregular immigration. In the framework of this partnership, in 2008 Cabo Verde, as a first African country, concluded a Mobility Partnership with the EU. The objectives of the Mobility Partnership aim at strengthening cooperation with the EU in the area of migration, border management, fight against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings.

                  The Special Partnership paved the way for the negotiation and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issuing of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union
                     1
                   (hereinafter ‘the Agreement’), adopted in parallel with an Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation
                     2
                  . Both agreements entered into force on 1 December 2014.

                  On 2 February 2020, Regulation (EU) 2019/1155 of 20 June 2019 amending the Visa Code will become applicable
                     3
                  .  In case of contradiction between them, the Agreement, as an international agreement of the Union, would prevail over secondary Union legislation and would thus continue to apply. However, the Visa Code will also apply to matters that are not dealt with by the Agreement. Therefore, some of the provisions of the revised Visa Code will affect the procedures for the issuing of visas to Cabo Verdean citizens.

                  For instance, the revised Visa Code introduces a harmonised approach to the issuing of multiple entry visas to regular travellers with a positive visa history for a period that increases gradually from 1 to 5 years, and it will provide for the possibility to waive the visa fee to children from the age of six years and below the age of 18 years. It also increases the general level of the visa fee from EUR 60 to EUR 80, and introduces the possibility to suspend – by means of a Council implementing decision – some of the facilitations applicable to nationals of a third country (and/or certain categories of travellers of that country), such as visa fee waivers, length of validity of multiple-entry visas, reduced supporting documents to be provided – in case that country’s level of cooperation on readmission is assessed as insufficient.

                  Contrary to similar visa facilitation agreements concluded by the EU with other third countries, the Agreement with Cabo Verde does not include a provision reducing the visa fee level, nor does it provide for a harmonised list of supporting documents to be presented by the applicant for justifying the purpose of travel. Moreover, the Agreement does not allow for suspension, of all or some of its provisions, in case of insufficient cooperation on readmission.

                  In light of these developments, the European Commission considers it opportune to adapt the Agreement concluded with Cabo Verde.

                  Cabo Verde’s visa policy towards EU citizens

                  As of 1 January 2019, Cabo Verde exempted EU citizens from the visa requirement (for stays up to 30 days) when travelling to its territory.

               The EU citizens can benefit from the Agreement’s facilitations for stays longer than 30 days and up to 90 days per period of 180 days.

                  If Cabo Verde were to reintroduce the visa requirement for EU citizens, the provisions of the Agreement would fully apply, on the basis of reciprocity, to EU citizens.

               •Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

                  As explained in the previous section, the primary objective to be achieved through the negotiation and conclusion of an amended agreement is to align the facilitations granted to Cabo Verdean nationals with revised provisions of the Visa Code.

               2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

               •Legal basis

                  The legal basis for this recommendation is Article 218 (3) and (4) TFEU.

                  The subject matter of the amended agreement would be part of the Union's common visa policy for short stays of up to 90 days in any 180-day period. It can therefore be anticipated that the substantive legal basis of the decisions on the signature and the conclusion of the agreement will be Article 77(2) (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

               •Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

                  The Union has already exercised its competence in this field and has established rules in this respect by adopting the Visa Code, which defines the procedures and conditions for issuing short-stay visas that are binding for all the Member States of the European Union implementing the Schengen acquis.

               3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

                  The Joint Committee established to monitor the implementation of the Agreement was convened three times (5 October 2015, 19 October 2016 and 27 November 2017) and acknowledged the overall positive implementation, while identifying possible room for improvement in certain aspects of the visa processing procedure. In particular, the Joint Committee recommended that enhanced reach-out efforts be put in place by both sides in order to properly and comprehensively inform visa applicants of the requirements and scope for lodging and receiving a Schengen visa.

               The number of visa applications lodged at the Member States’ consulates in Cabo Verde has increased steadily since the entry into force of the Agreement. In 2014, 14,694 visa applications were lodged. This number increased to 20,158 in 2018 (+37.2 %). Although at a lower rate, the number of visas issued has also increased from 11,370 in 2014 to 13,343 in 2018 (+17.3%). The visa refusal rate amounted to 33.5% in 2018.

                  The Member States issuing visas in Cabo Verde (i.e. Spain and Portugal, with the latter representing 19 Member States at the Common Visa Centre in Praia) regularly gather in the format of the local Schengen cooperation (LSC) group in Praia. The EU Delegation to Cabo Verde chairs those meetings.

                  The LSC group concurred in ascertaining the overall good implementation of the Agreement, as well as of the applicable provisions of the Visa Code. At the same time, a number of difficulties were observed in the processing of visa applications lodged by Cabo Verdean nationals, notably as regards the documentary evidence justifying the purpose of travel and/or the fact of belonging to one of the facilitated categories of applicants, identified by the current Agreement.

                  The Council Visa Working Party discussed the state of play of the Agreement’s implementation five times (on 26 October 2015, 27 October 2016, 11 December 2017, 20 May 2019 and 10 July 2019). At the latter meeting, the Commission informed Member States on the exploratory talks that it had undertaken with the Cabo Verdean authorities regarding a possible amendment to the Agreement and its scope.

               4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

                  The envisaged amended agreement will have no implications for the EU budget.

               5.OTHER ELEMENTS

               •Negotiating Directives

               Visa fee and visa fee waivers

               In other visa facilitation agreements concluded by the EU with third countries, the general visa fee is set at EUR 35. This amount was included in previous negotiating directives, while taking into account the EUR 60 visa fee in the Visa Code. The Agreement with Cabo Verde does not contain a provision setting a reduction of the general visa fee.

               Since in the revised Visa Code the visa fee will increase from EUR 60 to EUR 80, this increased fee will also apply to Cabo Verdean applicants.

               It is thus proposed that the visa fee be reduced for Cabo Verdean applicants as it has been done for the nationals of all other third countries which have concluded a visa facilitation agreement with the EU. However, the level of the reduced fee should be proportinate to the revised visa fee. It is therefore proposed to set the reduced fee at half of the amount set by the Parties’ domestic legislation (for the EU, the Visa Code). This approach would enable the EU to adapt the level of the fee in light of changing circumstances.

               The inclusion of additional categories of applicants, whose visa fee should be waived, should be considered in the course of the negotiations.

               Multiple-entry visas with long validity

               The amending agreement will have to take into account the changes introduced by the revised Visa Code regarding the issuing of multiple-entry visas with long-validity.

               The Agreement currently in force grants access to five-year multiple-entry visas to a limited number of categories of regular travellers (e.g. members of national and regional governments, permanent members of official delegations, business people, close family members), while it provides for a "cascade" of multiple-entry visas with progressively increasing validity for other categories of regular travellers.

               However, the revised Visa Code (Article 24(2)) provides for a different "cascade" system for obtaining multiple-entry visas, that is not limited to specific categories.

               It is thus proposed that the amended agreement follows a similar approach, i.e. a "cascade" approach that would apply to all applicants other than those pertaining to the categories to which five-year multiple-entry visas shall already be granted in accordance with article 5(1) of the current Agreement.

               In addition, the amending Agreement should reduce the number of visas the lawful use of which is a pre-condition for obtaining a multiple-entry visa, and/or enlarge the reference periods during which the defined number of visas should be obtained and lawfully used.

               List of supporting documents for purpose of travel / proof of accomodation

               The existing visa facilitation agreements concluded by the EU with other third countries provide facilitations by reducing the number of supporting documents required to prove the purpose of travel to generally one single document for each category of applicants. The Agreement with Cabo Verde, on the contrary, does not include such a provision.

               The amending Agreement should establish a list of supporting documents to be submitted by applicants for proving their purpose of travel. Documentary evidence should be reduced to generally one supporting document per category. This would have the objectives to simplify the application procedure and facilitate the identification of the applicants belonging to one of the categories established by the Agreement.

               Moreover, the Visa Code provides for certain horizontal facilitations in terms of supporting documents to be provided by regular travellers. According to Article 14(6), the requirement of certain supporting documents ‘may be waived in the case of an applicant known to them for his integrity and reliability, in particular the lawful use of previous visas, if there is no doubt that he will fulfil the requirements of Article 6(1) of the Schengen Borders Code at the time of the crossing of the external borders of the Member States.’.

               In light of this principle, the amended agreement should contain a provision according to which once a person has obtained the first long-validity multiple-entry visas (of one, two or three years), i.e. reached the second step in the "cascade", s/he should in principle be exempted from presenting documents to prove the accommodation and/or the means for paying for such accommodation.

               Visa waiver for holders of EU Laissez-passer

               The amended agreement should exempt from the visa requirement the holders of EU Laissez-passer issued to certain servants of the institutions of the Union in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1417/2013.

               Suspension ground for lack of implementation of the Readmission Agreement

               The Agreement provides for the possibility to suspend it for an exhaustive list of grounds, i.e. for reasons of public order, protection of national security, protection of public health.

               In consistency with the revised Visa Code approach of linking cooperation on readmission with visa facilitations, the amending agreement should enlarge the suspension grounds to include the possibility for the EU to suspend it, in whole or in part, in case of lack of implementation of the Readmission Agreement concluded between the EU and Cabo Verde or insufficient level of cooperation in combating irregular migration.

               6.CONCLUSIONS

                  In light of the above-mentioned, the Commission recommends the Council to authorise the opening of negotiations on an Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Cabo Verde amending the Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union currently in force.

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               authorising the opening of negotiations on an Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cabo Verde amending the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 218(3) and (4) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

               Whereas negotiations should be opened with a view to concluding an Agreement with the Republic of Cabo Verde amending the Agreement between EU and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union,

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               The Commission is hereby authorised to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, an international agreement with the Republic of Cabo Verde amending the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union.

               Article 2

               The negotiating directives are set out in the annex to this decision.

               Article 3

               The negotiations shall be conducted in consultation with the Visa Working Party of the Council.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        OJ L 282, 24.10.2013, p. 3-12.

                     (2)

                        OJ L 282, 24.10.2013, p. 15-34.

                     (3)

                        Regulation (EU) 2019/1155 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 amending Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 25–54.

    ---documentbreak---

               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 13.9.2019
            COM(2019) 417 final
            ANNEX
            to the
            Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION
            authorising the opening of negotiations on an Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cabo Verde amending the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union

               ANNEX

               Negotiating directives

               The Commission should, in the course of the negotiations, aim to achieve the objectives which are set out in detail below.

               1.Purpose and scope of the agreement

               The purpose of the Agreement is to amend the existing Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of the European Union
                  1
                (hereinafter ‘current Agreement’). The latter, which entered into force on 1 December 2014, applies to the issuing of visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde (hereinafter ‘Cabo Verde’) for an intended stay in the Schengen area of no more than 90 days per any period of 180 days.

               Since 1 January 2019, Cabo Verde exempts EU citizens travelling to Cabo Verde for stays up to 30 days from the visa requirement. In principle, the EU citizens can benefit from the Agreement facilitations for stays longer than 30 days and up to 90 days per any period of 180 days.

               The amending Agreement would also fully apply, on a reciprocal basis, should Cabo Verde decide to re-impose the visa requirement on EU citizens.

               The amending Agreement should lay down clear, unambiguous and legally binding rights and obligations to facilitate visa application and issuing procedures for nationals of Cabo Verde, while taking into account the rules of the revised Visa Code
                  2
               .

               2.Specific issues

               The amending Agreement should take into account the current Agreement, previous visa facilitation agreements concluded by the Union with other third countries, as well as the particular situation of Cabo Verde, which was the first third country not located in the EU’s neighbourhood with which the EU concluded a Visa Facilitation Agreement, in parallel with a Readmission Agreement.

               Moreover, the amendment of the Visa Code, which has entered into force on 2 August 2019 and will be applicable as of 2 February 2020, provides for a number of changes in the general rules for the visa issuing procedures. The revised rules should be also taken into consideration in order to ensure that the facilitations offered to Cabo Verde in the amending agreement continue to go beyond the general rules as set out in the revised Visa Code.

               2.1.Visa fee

               The amending Agreement should set the fee for processing visa applications at half of the amount that is provided for by the Parties’ domestic legislation.

               In addition to the categories defined by article 5(1) of the current Agreement, the fee should be waived for applicants below the age 18 years. The inclusion of other categories of applicants, such as close relatives of EU citizens, could also be considered.

               2.2.
                     Multiple-entry visas with long validity

               The rules for granting five-year multiple-entry visas (MEV) to certain categories of applicants, established by article 4(1) of the current Agreement, should remain applicable.

               In addition, the amending Agreement should define the rules for the issuing of MEV to all other applicants, taking as a basis the provisions of article 24 of the revised Visa Code.

               Article 24 (2) of the revised Visa Code establishes a general ‘cascade’ issuing system for all applicants irrespective of their travel purpose. A similar approach should be established in the amending Agreement.

               The amending Agreement should facilitate the issuing of MEV by reducing the number of previously obtained and lawfully used visas and/or by enlarging the reference periods during which the defined number of visas should be obtained and lawfully used. Such a “cascade” system could, for instance, be the following:

               –following one or two visas obtained and lawfully used in the previous 24 months, applicants should obtain, when applying for the next visa, a MEV with a validity of one year;

               –after having lawfully used one 1-year MEV within the previous 30 or 36 months, the applicant should be granted a MEV with a longer validity (for instance, two or three years);

               –after having lawfully used one 2- or 3-year MEV within the previous 42 or 48 months, the applicant should be granted a MEV with a longer validity (for instance, three or maximum five years).

               2.3.
                     Supporting documents

               The amended agreement should provide for facilitations concerning the supporting documents to be submitted when applying for a visa.

               The documentary evidence to be submitted for proving the applicant’s purpose of travel should be reduced to generally one supporting document per category of applicant covered by the amending Agreement.

               Applicants who have already obtained and lawfully used a MEV (valid for at least one year) should in principle be exempted from presenting supporting documents in relation to accommodation, or proof of sufficient means to cover the accommodation.

               2.4.
                     Visa exemption for holders of EU Laissez-passer

               The amending Agreement should exempt from the visa requirement the holders of EU Laissez-passer issued to certain servants of the institutions of the Union in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1417/2013.

               2.5.
                     Suspension clause

               The amending Agreement should modify the final clauses of the current Agreement, by providing for the possibility for the Parties to suspend it, in whole or in part, for any reason and, explicitly, in case Cabo Verde were to be considered not to cooperate sufficiently in the field of readmission.

                     (1)

                        OJ L 282, 24.10.2013, p.3.

                     (2)

                        Regulation (EU) 2019/1155 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 amending Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p.25.


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 15.11.2019
            COM(2019) 595 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            authorising the opening of negotiations to amend the International Sugar Agreement 1992

               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

               The present recommendation concerns a decision authorising the Commission to engage on behalf of the Union in the negotiations to partially review the International Sugar Agreement (“ISA”) that the International Sugar Council (“ISC”) decided to launch, under the guidance of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In accordance with the decision of the ISC of 19 July 2019, those negotiations shall concern the administrative budget and member contributions as well as limited amendments relating to the objectives and work programme of the ISO.

               1.CONTEXT OF THE RECOMMENDATION

               •Reform of the International Sugar Agreement 1992

               The European Union is a party to the ISA.

               The ISA aims to ensure enhanced international cooperation in connection with world sugar matters and related issues, provide a forum for intergovernmental consultations on sugar and on ways to improve the world sugar economy, to facilitate trade by collecting and providing information on the world sugar market and other sweeteners and to encourage increased demand for sugar, particularly for non-traditional uses. The ISA entered into force on 1 January 1993 for a period of three years until 31 December 1995. Since then it has been regularly extended for further periods of two years. It was last extended by decision of the ISC in July 2019 and will remain in force until 31 December 2021.

               According to Article 8 of the ISA, the ISC is the responsible body for the performance of all functions necessary to carry out the provisions of the ISA. Article 13 of the ISA stipulates that all decisions of the ISC shall be taken in principle by consensus unless stipulated otherwise in the ISA. In the absence of consensus, decisions shall be made by simple majority vote unless the ISA provides for a special vote.

               According to Article 25 of the ISA, Members to the ISO hold 2000 votes in total. Each Member to the ISO holds a specified number of votes, which is annually adjusted following predefined criteria in the ISA.

               The Agreement, and especially the distribution of votes among Members which also determines a Member's contribution, no longer reflects the realities of the global sugar market. Currently, the Union is the largest contributor to the ISO budget by far. Since 2015, the ISO has been discussing at working group level possibilities to review the mechanism of distributing votes.

               In 2017, the Commission received a mandate from the Council, to enter into negotiations with the other parties to the ISA, within the ISC, with a view to modernising the ISA, in particular as regards the discrepancies between the influence number of votes and financial contributions of members of the ISO on the one hand and their relative position in the global sugar market on the other. That mandate remains valid until 31 December 2019. Based on this mandate, the Commission has taken the initiative to engage in negotiations with member countries of the ISO and presented concrete proposals for the amendment of Article 25 of the ISA, which governs the adoption of the administrative budget and contributions of Members.

               In its 55th session, on 19 July 2019, the ISC decided to open negotiations before the next Council meeting in November 2019, under UNCTAD guidance. These negotiations will concern a partial review of the ISA – focusing on Chapter I and Chapter VII, specifically in relation to matters of “administrative budget and contributions of Members”, as well as other limited amendments including Chapter IX and Chapter X that Members chose to bring forward. In accordance to the ISC decision, this process must be completed before 31 December 2021. This means that the envisaged modernisation of the Agreement, in addition to the distribution of votes and the financial contribution of members (Chapter VII), should now also involve:

               (1)the overall objectives of the ISO (Chapter I), specifically in order to include ethanol,

               (2)a broader view on “information and studies” (Chapter IX), essentially to allow for the inclusion of ethanol in such activities,

               (3)a broader view on “research and development” (Chapter X).

               The overall purpose of the ISO as outlined in Article 1 of the Agreement is not intended to change, even with the potential inclusion of ethanol.

               Bringing reform to the ISO to further align it with the practices the Union fosters in other international commodity boards, as well as with developments in the global sugar market since 1992, is clearly in the interest of the Union. At the very least, this reform should lead to transparency concerning the Members' responsibilities in voting as well as their financial contributions. The allocation of votes in the ISO should be measurable according to indicators such as trade, consumption, production and ability to pay. The latter indicator is used in the United Nations to allow for the recognition of the development aspect of sugar. Taking into account this indicator results in allotting a greater part of the financial responsibilities to those Members that have a greater ability to contribute to the ISO budget. The formal inclusion of ethanol in the objectives and work programme of the ISO is in line with the Union’s aim of modernising the ISA and aligns the content of the ISA with what is already existing practice.

               •Consistency with existing practice in International Commodity Boards

                  In international commodity boards such as the International Grains Council (IGC), and the International Olive Council (IOC), the Union has negotiated voting rights allocations and clear annual update mechanisms which reflect the Union's relative importance in the grains as well as the olive and olive oil markets. In the IGC the indicators are trade, consumption, and production. This is in contrast to the current ISO practice, where the Agreement, since 1992, has not allowed for adjustments reflecting the changing positions of Members in the international sugar economy. Furthermore, currently, the allocation of voting rights cannot be calculated in advance by Members, but results instead from an intransparent calculation. The partial review of the ISA should seek to bring ISO practices in line with those existing in the other international commodity boards.

               •Consistency with other Union policies

                  Sugar is a sensitive product under the Common Commercial Policy of the Union and the Common Agricultural Policy. In international trade negotiations for the Union, sugar plays a key role and both production and trade are carefully monitored by the Commission. Sugar is also an important commodity to many developing countries and the development aspect of sugar is of paramount importance in the Common Commercial Policy. The ISO provides for a neutral platform for discussing sugar related issues among a broad membership. At the same time, monitoring of developments in the world sugar market serves the interests of the market management possibilities under the Common Agricultural Policy.

               2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

               •Legal basis

                  Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating team. Article 218(4) TFEU provides for the Council to address directives to the negotiator and designate a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted.

               •Application to the present case

               The envisaged negotiating mandate should give the negotiators on behalf of the Union the means to achieve the overall objectives as set out under the first bullet of point 1.

                  The procedural legal basis for the proposed decision, therefore, is Article 218(3) and 218(4) TFEU.

               •Conclusion

               The legal basis of the proposed decision should be Article 218(3) and (4) TFEU.

               ·Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

               The Union is a party to the ISA and is represented by the Commission in the ISC. Member States are not a separate party to the ISA. The Union's negotiation of the partial review of the ISA pertains to the exclusive competence of the Union.

               ·Proportionality

                  Amending the ISA in order to achieve a voting structure that represents the relative importance of ISO Members in the global sugar economy, as well as other issues leading to the modernisation of the Agreement is in the interest of the Union. Currently, the EU's participation in the ISO is beneficial both to the Union and to other ISO Member states. However, since changes in the EU's relative importance have not been translated into less votes and as a consequence reduced financial contributions, this participation comes at too high a price. Other ISO Members, who have increased their presence on global sugar markets, have not seen their contribution rise to the same degree. Modernising the Agreement and broadening the scope of the Agreement would not lead to higher cost and is estimated to attract more interest in the ISO, potentially by attracting new members as well as increasing the relevance of its work.

               3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

               •Stakeholder consultations

                  The Union is a Member to the ISO and its Membership is generally supported since 1992 by the sugar sector in the EU as well as by most of the Member States. It is not deemed necessary to engage in stakeholder consultations regarding a process which merely aims to continue the Union's membership to the ISO albeit under a set of rules that are in line with those of other international commodity bodies of which the EU is a member. Ultimately, the reduced relative weight of the EU in the world sugar market should also lead to a modest reduction in contributions to the ISO.

               •Impact assessment

               A full-fledged impact assessment is not necessary, since the measure is not likely to have significant economic, environmental or social impacts. The successful amendment of the ISA would result in a lower financial contribution of the Union to the ISO. At the same time, a more transparent and equitable allocation of votes may even help attract new members to the ISO, which would result in further cost reductions.

                  Although a fair and equitable contribution of the EU to the ISO budget is certainly at the heart of the need to amend the ISA, there are more than budgetary reasons calling for reform. The need for ISO Members to carry their weight in terms of their contributions to the ISO administrative budget is a key starting point for the modernisation of the ISO and should also result in a more active participation in the ISO by its Members.

               4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

                  The opening of negotiations is not deemed to have a budgetary impact.

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               authorising the opening of negotiations to amend the International Sugar Agreement 1992

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 218(3) and (4) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

               Whereas:

               (1)The Union is a Party to the International Sugar Agreement 1992
                  1
                (“ISA”) and a member of the International Sugar Organisation (“ISO”).

               (2)The Union has since 1995 approved the extension of the ISA for two-year periods. On 19 July 2019, during the 55th Session of the International Sugar Council, the Commission, upon authorisation by the Council
                  2
               , expressed its position in favour of a further extension of the ISA for a period of up to two years, ending on 31 December 2021.

               (3)Pursuant to Article 8 of the ISA, the International Sugar Council (“ISC”) performs or arranges for the performance of all such functions as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the ISA. Pursuant to Article 13 of the ISA, all decisions of the ISC are taken in principle by consensus. In the absence of consensus, decisions are made by a simple majority vote, unless the ISA provides for a special vote.

               (4)Pursuant to Article 25 of the ISA, members of the ISO hold 2000 votes in total. Each member of the ISO holds a specified number of votes which is adjusted annually in accordance with the criteria set out in the ISA.

               (5)It is in the Union's interests to participate in an international agreement on sugar, considering the importance of that sector for a number of Member States and for the economy of the European sugar sector.

               (6)However, the institutional framework of the ISA, and especially the distribution of votes among members of the ISO that also determines the members' financial contribution to the ISO, no longer reflects the realities of the global sugar market.

               (7)Under the ISA rules on financial contributions to the ISO, the Union's share has remained the same since 1992, although the global sugar market, and notably the Union's relative position in it, has substantially changed since then. As a result, the Union has assumed a disproportionately large share of the budgetary costs and responsibility in the ISO in recent years.

               (8)By Council Decision (EU) 2017/2242
                  3
               , the Commission received a mandate from the Council, to enter into negotiations with the other parties to the ISA within the ISC with a view to modernising the ISA, in particular as regards the discrepancies between the number of votes and financial contributions of members of the ISO on the one hand and their relative position in the global sugar market on the other. That mandate remains valid until 31 December 2019.

               (9)Based on the mandate received by Decision (EU) 2017/2242, the Commission engaged in negotiations with member countries of the ISO and presented concrete proposals for the amendment of Article 25 of the ISA, which governs the adoption of the administrative budget and contributions of Members. In its 55th Session, on 19 July 2019, the ISC decided to open negotiations for a partial review of the ISA before its next meeting in November 2019, under the guidance of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Following requests of several ISO member countries, the ISC decided that, in addition to the review of Article 25 of the ISA, proposed by the Union, other areas of the ISA are to be the subject of formal negotiations. These other areas are in particular the objectives and the work priorities of the ISO.

               (10)In accordance with the ISC decision of 19 July 2019, these negotiations are to be concluded no later than on 31 December 2021. This timeframe means that the negotiations are not to be concluded before the end of validity of the mandate received by Decision (EU) 2017/2242. A new mandate from the Council is therefore required to cover for the extended timeframe and scope of the negotiations.

               (11)Any amendments agreed in these negotiations should be adopted in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 44 of the ISA. Pursuant to that Article, the ISC may, by special vote, recommend an amendment of the ISA to members of the ISO. As a member of the ISC, in accordance with Article 7 of the ISA, the Union should be able to participate in negotiations with a view to amending the institutional framework of the ISA.

               (12)It is therefore appropriate that the Commission be authorised to engage in negotiations within the ISC to amend the ISA, that negotiating guidelines be established and that the same special committee appointed by Decision (EU) 2017/2242 continue to be consulted by the Commission when conducting the negotiations,

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               The Commission is hereby authorised to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, to amend the International Sugar Agreement 1992.

               Article 2

               The negotiating directives are set out in the Annex.

               Article 3

               The negotiations shall be conducted in consultation with the Working Party on Commodities.

               Article 4

               This Decision shall apply until 31 December 2021.

               Article 5

               This Decision is addressed to the Commission.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        Council Decision 92/580/EEC of 13 November 1992 on the signing and conclusion of the International Sugar Agreement 1992 (OJ L 379, 23.12.1992, p. 15).

                     (2)

                        Council Decision (EU) 2019/1251 of 15 July 2019 on the position to be taken, on behalf of the European Union, within the International Sugar Council as regards the extension of the International Sugar Agreement 1992 (OJ L 195, 23.7.2019, p. 18).

                     (3)

                        Council Decision (EU) 2017/2242 of 30 November 2017 authorising the opening of negotiations to amend the International Sugar Agreement 1992 (OJ L 322, 7.12.2017, p.29).

    ---documentbreak---

               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 15.11.2019
            COM(2019) 595 final
            ANNEX
            to the
            Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION
            authorising the opening of negotiations to amend the International Sugar Agreement 1992

               ANNEX

               Directives for the negotiation of amendments to the International Sugar Agreement 1992.

               The Commission may engage in the negotiations that the International Sugar Council decided to open, to amend the International Sugar Agreement (“ISA”), concerning matters of administrative budget and contributions, objectives and the work programme of the International Sugar Organisation. The Commission shall engage in these negotiations with a view to modernising the ISA, and in particular to addressing the current discrepancies between the distribution of votes and financial contributions of Members of the International Sugar Organization, on the one hand, and their relative position in the global sugar market, on the other hand by taking into account the developments in the global sugar market.


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 4.6.2019
            COM(2019) 248 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            to authorise the Commission to open negotiations on behalf of the European Union for the conclusion of a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and protocol with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
            {SWD(2019) 195 final} - {SWD(2019) 196 final}

               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

               1.CONTEXT OF THE RECOMMENDATION

               •Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

               The Commission proposes to negotiate a new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and a new protocol with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania which both meet the needs of the Union fleet and are in line with Regulation (EU) No1380/2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the 19 March 2012 Council Conclusions on a Communication from the Commission on the External dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy.

               •Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

                  The current Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) between European Union and Mauritania
                     1
                   was signed on 4th August 2008
                     2
                  . It is hereby proposed to negotiate a new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement in order to integrate some provisions included in  Regulation (EU) No1380/2013
                     3
                  , which are not covered by the current FPA. The current 4-year Protocol
                     4
                   to the FPA entered into application on 16th November 2015
                     5
                   and will expire on 15th November 2019. This Protocol was amended by Commission Decision (EU) No 2017/451
                     6
                  , and by Commission Decision (EU) No 2017/1373
                     7
                  . It fixes the fishing opportunities provided to the Union fleet and the corresponding financial contribution paid by the Union and the ship-owners.

                  The annual EU public financial contribution due to Mauritania amounts to 61 625 000 EUR
                     8
                  , out of which 4 125 000 EUR are earmarked for sectoral support.

               The FPA with Mauritania provides fishing opportunities targeting demersal and pelagic species as well as tuna and highly migratory species for EU vessels from 10
                  9
                Member States ( Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland and Portugal). The European Union already has a developed network of bilateral Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) in the Atlantic Ocean facing West-Africa, namely with Morocco, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ivory Coast.

                  SFPAs contribute to promote the objectives of the CFP internationally, ensuring that Union fishing activities outside Union waters are based on the same principles and standards as those applicable under Union law. In addition, SFPAs foster scientific cooperation between the EU and its partner, promote transparency and sustainability for a better management of fishing resources and encourage governance by supporting monitoring, control and surveillance of national and foreign fleets' activities and providing funding to fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The SFPAs contribute to the sustainable development of local fishing industry and also to the promotion of growth and decent work linked to maritime activity. SFPAs strengthen the European Union’s position in international and regional fishing organisations: in the case of Mauritania, in particular, in the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
                     10
                   and in the Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF)
                     11
                  .

               •Consistency with other Union policies

                  The negotiation of a new Agreement and protocol  with Mauritania is in line with the EU’s external action towards African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and in particular with the Union objectives regarding the respect of democratic principles, human rights.

               2.LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE RECOMMENDATION

               •Legal basis

                  The legal basis for the decision is provided by Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in Part Five on the Union’s external action, Title V on international agreements, which sets out the procedure for negotiating and concluding agreements between the EU and third countries.

               •Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

                  Not applicable, exclusive competence.

               •Proportionality

                  The decision is proportional to the objective.

               •Choice of the instrument

                  The instrument is provided for under Article 218(3) and Article 218(4) of the TFEU.

               3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

               •Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

                  The Commission carried out in 2018-2019 an ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA Mauritania as well as an ex-ante evaluation of a possible renewal of the protocol. The conclusions of the evaluation are set out in a separate Staff Working Document.

                  The evaluation concluded that the EU fishing sectors are firmly interested in fishing in Mauritania and that a renewal of the Protocol would help strengthen monitoring, control and surveillance and contribute to improved governance of the fisheries in the region.

                  For the EU, it is important to maintain an instrument allowing a deep sectoral cooperation with a major player in ocean governance at the sub-regional level because of the extent of its fishing area under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, for the EU vessels, inter alia those based in outermost regions such as Canary Islands, targeting demersal, pelagic species, tuna seiners and long-liners, this means maintaining access to an important fishing area for the deployment of harvesting strategies under a multi-year international legal framework.

                  For Mauritanian authorities, the aim is to continue relations with the EU for strengthening ocean governance, benefiting from dedicated sectoral support that provides for multi-year funding opportunities

               •Stakeholder consultations

                  Member States, industry representatives, international civil society organisations, as well as Mauritania's fisheries administration and civil society were consulted as part of the evaluation. Consultations have also taken place in the framework of the Long Distance Advisory Council, notably at the occasion of its meeting on 27 March 2019.

               •Collection and use of expertise

                  Not applicable

               •Impact assessment

                  Not applicable

               •Regulatory fitness and simplification

                  Not applicable

               •Fundamental rights

                  The negotiating directives proposed as an annex to the decision recommend authorising the opening of negotiations including a clause on the consequences of violations of human rights and democratic principles.

               4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

               The budgetary implications connected with the new Protocol include the payment of a financial contribution to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. The related budgetary allocations in terms of commitment and payment appropriations need to be included each year in the budget line for Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (11 03 01) as well as being compatible  with the financial programming of the relevant Multiannual Financial Framework. The annual amounts for commitments and payments are established in the yearly budgetary procedure including the reserve line for protocols not entered into force in the beginning of the year.
                  12

               5.OTHER ELEMENTS

               •Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

                  Negotiations are expected to open in the second quarter of 2019.

               •Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

                  The Commission recommends that:

                  - The Council should authorise the Commission to open and conduct negotiations for the conclusion of a new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and a protocol with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania;

                  - The Commission should be nominated as the EU negotiator on this subject;

                  - The Commission should conduct the negotiations in consultation with the special committee, as set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

                  - The Council should approve the negotiating directives annexed to this recommendation.

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               to authorise the Commission to open negotiations on behalf of the European Union for the conclusion of a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and protocol with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 218 paragraphs 3 and 4,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

               Whereas negotiations should be opened with a view to concluding a new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and a protocol with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania,

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               The Commission is hereby authorised to open negotiations with Mauritania, with a view to conclude a new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and a protocol with Mauritania.

               Article 2

               The negotiations shall be conducted in consultation with the Council Working Party on External Fisheries Policy and on the basis of the negotiating directives set out in the annex to this Decision.

               Article 3

               This Decision is addressed to the Commission.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        OJ L 343 of 08.12.2006, p.4

                     (2)

                  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2006111&DocLanguage=en

                     (3)

                        Ref. Reg. (EU) No 1380/2013, Part VI, Title II.

                     (4)

                        JO L 315 of 01.12.2015, p.3

                     (5)

                  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2015063&DocLanguage=en

                     (6)

                        JO L 69 of 15.03.2017, p. 34.

                     (7)

                        JO L 193 of 25.07.2017, p. 4.

                     (8)

                        For the last 2 years of the Protocol.  For the two previous years it was 59 125 000 EUR. Ref. Article 2.1 and article 3.1 of the Protocol, as amended by Commission Decision (EU) 2017/451 of 14 March 2017. JO L 69 of 15.03.2017, p.34.

                     (9)

                        UK had fishing opportunities through the current FPA protocol until 2019.

                     (10)

                  http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/iccat/en
                   , the body set up under international law for conserving and managing highly migratory species in the region.

                     (11)

                  http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/cecaf/en
                   , for demersal and pelagic species.

                     (12)

                        Chapter 40 (reserve line 40 02 41) in line with the MFF interinstitutional agreement ((2013/C 373/01).

    ---documentbreak---

               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 4.6.2019
            COM(2019) 248 final
            ANNEX
            to the
            Recommendation
            for a Council decision to authorise the Commission to open negotiations on behalf of the European Union for the conclusion of a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and protocol with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
            {SWD(2019) 195 final} - {SWD(2019) 196 final}

               ANNEX

               Negotiation directives

               –The objective of the negotiations is the conclusion of a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and protocol between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania in line with Regulation (EU) N° 1380/2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy and with the Council Conclusions of 19 March 2012 on the Commission Communication of 13 July 2011 on the external dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy.

               –The Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement should therefore define the general framework, general principles and objectives that will form the basis for the partnership with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. It should contain a clause repealing the current Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
                  1
               .

               –To promote sustainable and responsible fishing while ensuring mutual benefits for the EU and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania through this new Agreement and Protocol, the Commission's negotiation objectives shall be based on the following:

               ·Ensuring access to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania's fishing zone and the necessary authorisations for vessels of the EU fleet to fish in that zone, thereby inter alia developing the network of Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements available to EU operators in West-Africa;

               ·Taking into account the best available scientific advice and relevant management plans adopted by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO), in order to ensure the environmental sustainability of fishing activities and to promote ocean governance at the international scale. The fishing activities should be directed exclusively at available resources, taking into account the local fleet's fishing capacity, while paying special attention to the highly migratory nature of the stocks concerned.

               ·Seeking an appropriate share of the surplus fisheries resources, fully commensurate with the EU fleets' interests, when they also interest other foreign fleets as well as the application of the same technical conditions to all foreign fleets;

               ·Ensuring that access to fisheries is based on the historical and the expected future activity of the EU fleet in the region, in the light of the most updated and best available scientific assessments and taking into consideration the interests of EU outermost regions;

               ·Establishing a dialogue to reinforce the sectoral policy with a view to encouraging the implementation of a responsible fisheries policy, in connection with the country's development objectives, in particular as regards the fisheries governance, the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, control, monitoring and surveillance of fishing activities and provision of scientific advice; fostering economic activity and addressing inter alia the causes of irregular departures of migrants from Mauritania.

               ·Ensuring that the Protocol will contribute to the promotion of growth and decent work linked to maritime activity, taking into account relevant International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions.

               ·Including a clause on the consequences of violations of human rights and democratic principles;

               –In particular, the protocol should define:

               ·the fishing opportunities, by category, to be granted to European Union vessels;

               ·the financial compensation and the conditions for its payment; and

               ·the mechanisms for implementing sectoral support.

               –In case the negotiations for a new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and protocol between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania would take more time than expected, and in order to avoid a long period of interruption of fishing activities, the Commission should have the possibility to agree with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on a prolongation of the current Agreement and protocol for a maximum period of one year, while continuing to try to reach an agreement for a new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and protocol in line with the above mentioned objectives.

                     (1)

                        OJ L 343 of 08.12.2006, p.4.


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 5.6.2019
            COM(2019) 539 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            establishing that no effective action has been taken by Hungary in response to the Council Recommendation of 4 December 2018
            {SWD(2019) 534 final}

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               establishing that no effective action has been taken by Hungary in response to the Council Recommendation of 4 December 2018

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

               Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
                  1
               , and in particular the fourth subparagraph of Article 10(2) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

               Whereas:

               (1)On 22 June 2018, the Council decided in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") that a significant observed deviation from the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective of -1.5 % of GDP existed in Hungary. In view of the established significant deviation, the Council on 22 June 2018 issued a recommendation
                  2
                for Hungary to take the necessary measures to ensure that the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure
                  3
                did not exceed 2.8 % in 2018, corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 1.0 % of GDP.

               (2)On 4 December 2018 the Council concluded that Hungary had not taken effective action in response to the Council Recommendation of 22 June 2018. On that basis, on 4 December 2018 the Council issued a revised Recommendation for Hungary to take the necessary measures to ensure that the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure does not exceed 3.3 % in 2019, corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 1.0 % of GDP
                  4
               . It also recommended Hungary to use any windfall gains for reduction of its deficit, while budgetary consolidation measures should ensure a lasting improvement in the general government structural balance in a growth-friendly manner. The Council established a deadline of 15 April 2019 for Hungary to report on the action taken in response to the recommendation.

               (3)On 20 March 2019, the Commission undertook an enhanced surveillance mission in Hungary for the purpose of on-site monitoring under the Article -11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. After having transmitted its provisional findings to the Hungarian authorities for comments, the Commission reported its findings to the Council on 5 June 2019. Those findings were subsequently made public. The Commission report finds that the Hungarian authorities do not plan to act upon the Council Recommendation of 4 December 2018. The authorities confirmed during the mission that their budgetary target for 2019 remains a headline deficit of 1.8 % as included in the 2019 budget adopted in July 2018, despite the more favourable macroeconomic scenario and the better-than-expected fiscal outturn in 2018.

               (4)On 15 April 2019, the Hungarian authorities submitted a report on action taken in response to Council Recommendation of 4 December 2018. In the report, the authorities reiterated that their target for 2019 remained a headline deficit of 1.8% of GDP in 2019, a 0.4 percentage points of GDP reduction compared to the 2018 outturn. The report does not contain any plan to comply with the fiscal adjustment recommended by the Council. In addition, the broad range of economic programmes with fiscal impact listed in the report remain largely unquantified; nor does the report include any budgetary projection for 2019. Thereby, the report does not comply with the reporting requirement of the Council. The improvement in the underlying structural deficit falls significantly short of the requirement stated in the Council Recommendation.

               (5)Based on the Commission 2019 spring forecast published on 7 May 2019, the growth of net primary expenditure is projected to amount to 6.5 % in 2019, well above the recommended rate of 3.3 %. The structural balance is set to improve by 0.4 % of GDP relative to 2018, falling short of the recommended adjustment of 1.0 % of GDP. Therefore, both indicators point to a deviation from the recommended adjustment. The gap to the expenditure benchmark amounts to 1.2 % of GDP. The gap of the structural balance is somewhat smaller, amounting to 0.6 % of GDP. The structural balance is negatively influenced by some revenue shortfalls. The reading of the expenditure benchmark is strongly negatively impacted by the medium-term potential GDP growth applied in its calculation, which includes very low potential GDP growth in the aftermath of the crisis. In addition, the GDP deflator underlying the expenditure benchmark does not seem to account properly for the increased cost pressures affecting government spending. After adjusting for those factors, the expenditure benchmark appears to adequately reflect the fiscal effort but it still points to a deviation from the recommended adjustment.

               (6)Since the Commission autumn 2018 forecast, which was the basis for the Council Recommendation of 4 December 2018, the Hungarian authorities have announced new expansionary measures on the expenditure side. In addition, following faster-than-expected public wage growth in 2018, new wage increases for some categories were announced since autumn 2018. Finally, higher reserves in the budget, with the government’s explicit intention to fully deplete them by the end of the year, have added to the expenditure projections for 2019. As a result, the deviation from the expenditure benchmark is expected to be significantly larger than the deviation found in the assessment performed in autumn 2018.

               (7)This leads to the conclusion that Hungary’s response to the Council Recommendation of 4 December 2018 has been insufficient. The fiscal effort falls short of ensuring that the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure does not exceed 3.3 % in 2019, which would correspond to an annual structural adjustment of 1.0 % of GDP,

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               Hungary has not taken effective action in response to the Council Recommendation of 4 December 2018.

               Article 2

               This Decision is addressed to Hungary.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)

                        OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

                     (2)

                        OJ C 223, 27.6.2018, p. 1.

                     (3)

                        Net primary government expenditure is comprised of total government expenditure excluding interest expenditure, expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by Union funds revenue and non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit expenditure. Nationally financed gross fixed capital formation is smoothed over a four-year period. Discretionary revenue measures or revenue increases mandated by law are factored in. One-off measures on both the revenue and expenditure sides are netted out.

                     (4)

                        OJ C 460, 21.12.2018, p. 4.