               21.1.2021

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 23/152

      P8_TA(2019)0187
      Follow up taken by the EEAS two years after the EP report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties
      European Parliament recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the EP report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties (2018/2115(INI))
      (2021/C 23/24)

         The European Parliament,

                  —

                  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 28 June and 18 October 2018,

                  —

                  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 April 2018 entitled ‘Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach’ (COM(2018)0236),

                  —

                  having regard to EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation published on 26 September 2018,

                  —

                  having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties (1),

                  —

                  having regard to the Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 6 April 2016 entitled ‘Joint framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response’ (JOIN(2016)0018),

                  —

                  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 April 2016 on delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union (COM(2016)0230),

                  —

                  having regard to the European Endowment for Democracy feasibility study on Russian Language Media Initiatives in the Eastern Partnership and Beyond, entitled ‘Bringing Plurality and Balance to the Russian Language Media Space’,

                  —

                  having regard to the report of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 18 May 2015 entitled ‘The European Union in a changing global environment — A more connected, contested and complex world’, and to the ongoing work on a new EU Global Security Strategy,

                  —

                  having regard to its recommendation of 15 November 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit (2),

                  —

                  having regard to the Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 13 September 2017 entitled ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ (JOIN(2017)0450),

                  —

                  having regard to the Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 7 June 2017 entitled ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action’ (JOIN(2017)0021),

                  —

                  having regard to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which protects the right of everyone to maintain an opinion without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers and through any media,

                  —

                  having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation of 10 July 2018,

                  —

                  having regard to the Joint Declaration of 3 March 2017 on Freedom of Expression and ‘Fake News’, Disinformation and Propaganda by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organisation of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,

                  —

                  having regard to the Report of 6 April 2018 of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,

                  —

                  having regard to its recommendation of 29 November 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Defence of academic freedom in the EU’s external action (3),

                  —

                  having regard to the most recent Europol ‘European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’ from 2018, which highlighted the increase in the activities of terrorist groups in cyberspace and their possible convergence with other criminal groups,

                  —

                  having regard to the Joint Communication of 5 December 2018 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Action Plan against Disinformation’ (JOIN(2018)0036) and the Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Communication ‘Tackling online disinformation: a European approach’ (COM(2018)0794) of the same date,

                  —

                  having regard to the work of the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity,

                  —

                  having regard to the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability of Content Moderation Practices,

                  —

                  having regard to the EU Action Plan on Strategic Communication of 22 June 2015,

                  —

                  having regard to Rule 113 of its Rules of Procedure,

                  —

                  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0031/2019),

                  1.

                  Recommends the following to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

            State of play 2018 — Tackling hybrid warfare

                  (a)

                  to stress that freedom of speech and expression as well as media pluralism are at the heart of resilient democratic societies, and provide the best safeguards against disinformation campaigns and hostile propaganda; expresses its concern about deteriorating media freedoms and cases of journalists being targeted; notes that further steps should be taken with all the relevant stakeholders to guarantee the transparency of media ownership and media pluralism without enforcing a censorship scheme and to protect an enabling environment for a wide variety of information, ideas, a diverse media and civil society landscape, as well as efforts aimed at identifying and raising awareness about disinformation and propaganda; to involve all of the relevant stakeholders including the main press, journalists’ and media associations in these processes; underlines the importance of a functioning system of public broadcasting, which sets the standard of how to provide impartial and objective information in compliance with the best practice and ethics of journalism;

                  (b)

                  to consider developing a legal framework both at EU and international level for tackling hybrid threats, including cyber and information warfare, that would allow for a robust response by the Union, also covering targeted sanctions against those responsible for orchestrating and implementing these campaigns, the need for which was demonstrated in particular by the hostile actions of state and non-state actors in these areas;

                  (c)

                  to consider that Daesh has been changing its tactics, shifting from websites to the encrypted messaging service popular with Islamist groups;

                  (d)

                  to support not only the growing number of state institutions, think tanks and NGOs dealing with propaganda and disinformation, but also grassroots cyber activities; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to become more closely involved in this area by preparing a thorough assessment of the new regulations, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the upcoming e-Privacy Regulation, as a safeguard against malicious use of social platforms; to ensure that EU strategic communication becomes a matter of high priority on the European agenda and that the EU institutions and Member States work hand in hand on preventing such phenomena, while bearing in mind that disinformation and propaganda thrive in a polarised environment with falling levels of trust in the media;

                  (e)

                  to urge the Member States that continue to deny the existence of disinformation and hostile propaganda, the main sources of disinformation in Europe and the impact disinformation and propaganda have on public opinion to recognise them, and to encourage these Member States to take proactive measures in order to counteract and debunk such propaganda, including the proven cases of espionage by third countries; to invite all Member States to evaluate the situation within their territory and make relevant investments in their own capacity to counter strategic communication by hostile third parties and to improve the ability of citizens to detect disinformation, as well as to encourage Member States to ensure an effective exchange of information on this matter; to call on European leaders who have still not devoted sufficient attention to this threat to recognise the imminent necessity of a strategic awakening in order to counter hostile information warfare;

                  (f)

                  to urge the Member States to invest proactively in educational measures that explain the different ways of producing and disseminating disinformation in order to improve citizens’ ability to detect and respond to disinformation;

                  (g)

                  to encourage the Member States to ensure an effective exchange of information between all of their relevant authorities for tackling propaganda, manipulation and disinformation, including the cyber and information warfare;

                  (h)

                  to raise awareness about Russia’s disinformation campaigns, as this constitutes the main source of disinformation in Europe;

            Types of misinformation, disinformation and propaganda targeting the EU and its neighbours

                  (i)

                  to recognise the work done at various levels to identify the types of influence and tools used against the EU and its neighbourhood; to raise awareness about ongoing disinformation campaigns and to shift attention to in-depth analysis and research of their impact and effectiveness in order to develop measures to counteract them in a proactive and swift manner; to encourage the Member States to establish permanent structures to identify, prevent and counteract disinformation; underlines that disinformation campaigns are part of a broader strategy and are usually accompanied by other hostile activities and that in particular information warfare accompanying military offensives should be taken seriously and counteracted with determination, unity and strength;

                  (j)

                  to warn about the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and its rapid development in the dissemination of fake news, and notes with concern that AI will soon be able to independently create further AI capabilities; to commit significant funding therefore to research and development at the intersection of AI and information warfare in view of the rapidly growing capabilities of AI in the area of spreading propaganda and disinformation, including by means of, inter alia, deep fake videos;

                  (k)

                  to focus on the ongoing use of disinformation by authoritarian actors such as Iran, whose dissemination of fake news instigates and inflames further tensions in volatile conflict zones while simultaneously targeting European populations to hide nefarious intent; to urge Member States to counteract such actions by enhancing cooperation and utilising lessons learned by like-minded countries and NGOs;

                  (l)

                  to focus on and adapt the EU’s and Member States’ response to the continuously growing sophistication of the tools used to create and to spread disinformation, including the new ways of spreading propaganda by using multiple low-level websites, private messaging apps, search engine optimisation, manipulated sound, images or video, AI, online news portals and TV stations to disseminate the main narratives, especially by opinion formers and state controlled or funded institutions that deliver key messages and narratives appealing to authoritarian actors; strongly condemns the increasingly aggressive actions of Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and others in this context, which seek to undermine or suspend the normative foundations and principles of European democracies and the sovereignty of all Eastern Partnership countries, as well as influence elections and support extremist movements, taking into account that the scale of cyberattacks is constantly growing;

                  (m)

                  to pay special attention to messages and content openly aimed at encouraging violence, racism, suicide attacks, recruitment of ‘foreign fighters’, various crimes or overt incitement to one or more of these activities;

            Industry and social media

                  (n)

                  while acknowledging a new investment of effort by social media companies to tackle disinformation, to pay special attention to the effective implementation of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, while also inviting EU neighbour and partner countries to sign up to the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, as well as paying special attention to the new tactic of using encrypted messaging services and social media which, in spite of their efforts to the contrary, are considered the most common tool for spreading disinformation, hostile propaganda and content that incites hatred and violence;

                  (o)

                  to regulate, together with the Member States, the actions of social media companies, messenger services and search engine providers and ensure their full transparency and, in particular, accountability, adopting an EU-wide approach, and making it possible to uncover the identity and location not only of the authors, but also of the sponsors of the submitted political content, and to hold the companies to account for the social impact of automated recommendation systems that promote disinformation, stressing that companies have a responsibility to speedily take down systemic fake news; urges Member States, candidate countries and associated countries to adopt effective and clear legislation that ensures the transparency of media ownership; to pay particular attention to the funding, transparency and objectives of NGOs with links to authoritarian states operating in the EU and within its partner countries;

                  (p)

                  to make sure the industry and online platforms deliver on the commitments undertaken in the Code of Practice on Disinformation and effectively tackle the disinformation problem by: (i) ensuring transparency of political advertising based on effective due diligence checks of the identity of sponsors, (ii) taking decisive action against fake accounts active on their services, (iii) identifying the misuse of automated bots, and (iv) cooperating effectively with independent fact-checkers;

                  (q)

                  to urge social media companies and messenger service providers to ensure full compliance with EU data protection law and other regulations, and to react in real time and cooperate closely with the competent authorities in all investigations into the alleged use of their platforms for hostile purposes, and to perform transparent audits of entities suspected of spreading misinformation; calls on technology companies to invest more in tools identifying propaganda, in improving online accountability and in ensuring better identity checks of users before joining the respective platforms in order to eliminate botnets, as well in reducing financial incentives for those who profit from disinformation; to urge social media companies to react urgently when suspicious content of a political nature is disseminated, particularly if it incites to hate or crime;

                  (r)

                  to bear in mind that the banning of suspicious accounts may be seen as censorship, and therefore make sure that such actions are justified if they are prescribed by law and carried out transparently, in cooperation with the competent authorities and civil society in Member States and partner countries, and with full insight into the reasons for doing so, including by urging social media companies to provide clear notice to all users about what types of content are prohibited, and clear notice to each affected user about the reason for the removal of their content or the suspension of their account; calls for alignment of internal set by social media for their users with legal order of the country they operate in;

            Best practices

                  (s)

                  to continue to develop greater resilience based on all-government and all-society approaches, and the ability to respond to threats in real time, develop pre-emptive and proactive measures and think one step ahead, rather than merely reacting to and analysing attacks that have already taken place in the cyber and information domains; to draw attention to the technical progress in this field and share examples of best practice in the form of measures already taken by individual Member States, including performing a review of the functioning of National Approaches introduced by the Member States, while developing ways of fostering close cooperation with the United Kingdom after Brexit, and to work in cooperation with the intelligence community and allies such as the US and Canada, NATO and the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN);

                  (t)

                  to pay special attention to enhancing investigatory efforts into the ongoing process of outsourcing propaganda and using a set of force multiplying tools by hostile third parties, as well as to the importance of not only debunking, exposing and enhancing attribution capabilities, but also ensuring the clear attribution of such attacks, including publicly naming the perpetrators, their sponsors and the goals they seek to achieve, as well as measuring the effects of these attacks on the targeted audience; to publicise all debunked cases of hostile propaganda accompanied by means of a detailed factsheet in an effort to alert the public in a manner that reaches the audience targeted by the given case of hostile propaganda;

                  (u)

                  to support and involve civil society, the expert community, private institutions, academia, grassroots cyber activists, the mainstream press, journalists’ and media associations and the growing number of actors targeted and affected in the further enhancement of measures aimed at fact-checking and the exposing of disinformation, deepening of research, including in-depth studies and sociological research, and more effectively analysing information manipulation; to support professional journalism, investigative reporting and projects that work on exposing disinformation as well as hi-tech start-ups that create digital tools arming the audience against disinformation attacks; to highlight the importance and need for providing funding and education, including seminars and training courses in cooperation with Member States and civil society, such as an online media literacy library and learning centre, aimed at awareness-raising and tackling disinformation and increasing media literacy;

                  (v)

                  to welcome the set of measures adopted by NATO aimed at countering new types of hybrid threat and a joint communication on EU-NATO cooperation on this matter; to call for the EU to ensure effective and swift implementation of these recommendations, also at Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) level;

            European approach

                  (w)

                  to welcome the establishment of the new EEAS Strategic Communication Task Forces consisting of experts with appropriate linguistic skills and knowledge, namely the Task Force for Western Balkans and the Task Force South for the countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa and the Gulf region, which have been tasked with ensuring coordinated and consistent EU communications in the regions and counteracting disinformation and propaganda against the EU;

                  (x)

                  to acknowledge the tangible results achieved by the East StratCom Task Force, including the creation of euvsdisinfo.eu and the @EUmythbuster account on Twitter; underlines that since its creation, it has debunked over 4 000 cases of disinformation campaigns on a wide variety of subjects; to continue to support the joint efforts of the Commission and the EEAS and the EU’s East StratCom Task Force after an analysis of its strengths, weaknesses and the improvements needed, including improving its capabilities to detect, analyse and expose disinformation by equipping the EEAS Strategic Communication Task Forces and EU Delegations in the neighbourhood with new staff, tools and skills, including new data analysis tools, the recruitment of additional data scientists and disinformation experts, as well as covering a wider range of sources and languages on the reach and impact of disinformation;

                  (y)

                  to urgently turn the East StratCom Task Force into a fully-fledged unit or even a bigger structure within EEAS, and to support, through the forthcoming allocation of funding by the European Parliament, all three EEAS Strategic Communication Task Forces by providing them with adequate financial and personnel resources, which are still required, aimed at the significant increase of their potential, effectiveness, professionalism, institutional continuity and quality of work, as well as safeguarding them against political meddling by officials and countries that back Russian disinformation;

                  (z)

                  to address the current deficiencies in the East StratCom Task Force, including lack of regional expertise, a large turnover of staff and lack of institutional continuity, and to ensure adequate financial resources and an adequate organisational structure, as this is the only way to ensure full professionalism, effectiveness and results;

                  (aa)

                  to invite Member States which have not done so already to assign their own seconded National Experts, ensuring that the experts engaged by the EU to counter disinformation are not politically biased or active participants in internal political disputes within the given country, to the three StratCom Task Forces; to also invite close partner countries to advise the task force on the tactics employed by common state and non-state adversaries, and to acknowledge the importance and necessity of better coordination within the EU;

                  (ab)

                  to intensify the cooperation between the East StratCom Task Force and all the EU institutions, Member States and like-minded partners; to encourage the EU Representations inside the EU, and the EU Delegations outside the EU, in supporting the work of the East StratCom Task Force, Task Force South and Task Force for Western Balkans, including by sharing international experiences and best practices and providing translations of their publications in local languages; calls for more dedicated staff to work on strategic communication, in particular in EU Delegations in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood and the Western Balkans;

                  (ac)

                  to focus on the accession countries and partners in the EU neighbourhood by assisting them in their efforts to counteract hostile propaganda and disinformation activities and including experts from the third countries in the EU neighbourhood that are subjected to the same threats, as well as giving priority to the development of a long-term strategic approach and outreach towards Eastern Partnership countries in particular; to strengthen the capabilities of the EU Delegations abroad and the Commission Representations and the European Parliament Liaison Offices in Member States to develop local capacity to detect and expose disinformation and to communicate the EU’s values and policies effectively and extend campaign-based communication and better coordinate and amplify positive narratives across the EU institutions and Member States; to consider the current proliferation and future threats of disinformation aiming to threaten the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Eastern Partnership countries within their internationally recognised borders; to give priority in particular to the development of a long-term strategic approach and outreach towards Eastern Partnership countries, focusing on people-to-people exchanges, and working with existing civil society networks that already represent a source of community-based resilience;

                  (ad)

                  to prioritise strategic communications, and to carry out a periodical review of EU policy on this issue; to continue support for the work of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) towards practical solutions to support and strengthen democratic, independent and diverse Russian-language media in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and beyond; to invite the Commission and all Member States and like-minded countries to positively engage in and support this project; to pay attention to any international actor that currently behaves in a similar way;

                  (ae)

                  to propose to the European Council that counteracting disinformation and hostile propaganda is given priority with sufficient resources and instruments to safeguard objective reporting and dissemination of information;

                  (af)

                  to link existing national and local specialised centres, news media, think tanks, NGOs and other actors and institutions, in particular NATO, dealing with hybrid warfare into an EU-wide network that would help coordinate their actions and gather their findings; to assign adequate resources to this undertaking; stresses that this network should be open to like-minded partners of the EU, which could share their experiences of being targeted by and countering disinformation and hostile propaganda; to ensure effective and swift implementation of EU-NATO recommendations on countering new types of hybrid threat, also at CSDP level, and to introduce the topic of countering strategic propaganda into the curriculum of the European Security and Defence College and its network;

            Safeguarding elections from hostile propaganda

                  (ag)

                  to strongly condemn the interference of third parties of any kind, including private companies, in elections and referenda, and the malicious use of bots, algorithms, artificial intelligence, trolls, deep fakes and fake accounts in political campaigns and to call on the affected Member States to urgently conduct thorough investigations into these hostile campaigns; is concerned about recent developments in the algorithms of large social networks and their potentially harmful role in highlighting content containing false information or hate speech; to stress the ability of independent democratic societies to make their own sovereign political choices which is legitimate;

                  (ah)

                  to invite the Member States and like-minded countries to share data about any foreign or internal interferences in electoral processes and exchange best practices on counteracting them in order to increase resilience to such interference;

                  (ai)

                  to invite Member States to ensure that electoral laws take into account possible threats stemming from disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, cybercrimes and violations of freedom of expression when voting, and stresses that these laws should be adequately amended to enable Member States to effectively and proactively counteract such threats; in this regard commends initiatives such as the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency; to support the EU-associated countries and the Western Balkans with best practices as well as human resources and technology to ensure robust defence of their electoral processes from malicious cyber, disinformation and propaganda activities emanating from Russia and other hostile actors;

                  (aj)

                  to invite Member States to adapt their electoral rules on online campaigning, and to monitor and evaluate the transparency features in relation to political advertising introduced by the online platforms;

                  (ak)

                  to propose legislation to address data use in election campaigning, following the exposure of data misuse by Cambridge Analytica in the 2016 UK referendum campaign, in order to further safeguard future election campaigns from undue influence;

                  (al)

                  to take stock of initiatives such as the bipartisan Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity, bringing together representatives from politics, technology, the media and business with the aim of securing electoral process from foreign interference;

                  2.

                  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, for information, to the EEAS and NATO, as well as the President, Government and Parliament of Russia.

         (1)  OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 58.

         (2)  OJ C 356, 4.10.2018, p. 130.

         (3)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0483.


               21.1.2021

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 23/159

      P8_TA(2019)0188
      Association Agreement between the EU and Monaco, Andorra and San Marino
      European Parliament recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council, to the Commission and to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the association agreement between the EU and Monaco, Andorra and San Marino (2018/2246(INI))
      (2021/C 23/25)

         The European Parliament,

                  —

                  having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2014/… of 22 December 2014 authorising the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Member States, the provisions of one or several Association Agreement(s) with the Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco and the Republic of San Marino that fall within the competences of the Member States,

                  —

                  having regard to Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

                  —

                  having regard to Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union and to the Declaration on Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that the Union will take into account the particular situation of small-sized countries which maintain specific relations of proximity with it,

                  —

                  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 November 2012 entitled ‘EU Relations with the Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco and the Republic of San Marino: Options for Closer Integration with the EU’ (COM(2012)0680),

                  —

                  having regard to the Commission staff working paper of 20 November 2012 entitled ‘Obstacles to access by Andorra, Monaco and San Marino to the EU’s Internal Market and Cooperation in other Areas’ (SWD(2012)0388),

                  —

                  having regard to the Commission report of 18 November 2013 entitled ‘EU Relations with the Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco and the Republic of San Marino: Options for their participation in the Internal Market’ (COM(2013)0793),

                  —

                  having regard to the Council conclusions of 11 December 2018 on a homogeneous extended internal market and EU relations with non-EU Western European countries,

                  —

                  having regard to Rule 113 of its Rules of Procedure,

                  —

                  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0074/2019),

                  A.

                  whereas the Principality of Andorra (Andorra), the Principality of Monaco (Monaco) and the Republic of San Marino (San Marino) have a long-standing history of statehood; whereas they have always been at the core of European history and have deep, long-standing political, economic, social and cultural relations with the Member States in their immediate proximity and with the EU at large; whereas the EU’s partnership with these countries is founded on our common set of political and cultural values;

                  B.

                  whereas Andorra, Monaco and San Marino have demonstrated a strong political, economic and cultural European vocation and a strong desire to pursue closer political, economic and cultural relations with the European Union; whereas in the interests of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, on the one hand, and the EU, on the other, it is important to respond positively to this vocation in a timely manner and to facilitate the rapid conclusion of negotiations on the new association agreement, which will form the new framework for relations between the EU and these countries;

                  C.

                  whereas it is also in the interests of the Member States that traditionally have close historical, political and economic ties with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino to foster the deepening and specification of the relations of these states with the European Union at large; whereas it is therefore essential that the special bilateral relationship that these Member States already enjoy with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino is taken into account, in particular for the purposes of legal certainty;

                  D.

                  whereas Andorra, Monaco and San Marino have a long-standing practice of supporting the European Union’s policy stance in the United Nations;

                  E.

                  whereas Andorra, Monaco and San Marino are, each in their own right, relevant economic partners for the Member States in their immediate proximity and provide employment opportunities for a considerable number of EU citizens; whereas a closer interface between Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and the EU would provide all parties with an important opportunity for further economic development, with a positive economic spillover effect on the Member State regions in immediate proximity, including through additional employment opportunities and the enhancement of international professional skills;

                  F.

                  whereas when conducting the negotiations on the association agreement, it is important to take full account of the specificities of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino as small-sized states, in line with Declaration 3 on Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union; whereas it is therefore important to recognise the small territorial dimensions and number of inhabitants of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and the relevant implications thereof in terms of preserving adequate socio-economic access and inclusion for the citizens of such states; whereas such access and inclusion are essential to preserving the culture, traditions and values specific to the three communities; whereas without such dedicated access and inclusion mechanisms, some citizens may struggle to find the means necessary to live in their country of origin; whereas it is therefore essential to preserve, including through adequate provisions in the association agreement, the political, socio-economic, cultural and identitarian fabric of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and adapt them to the realities of European Union integration;

                  G.

                  whereas Andorra, Monaco and San Marino each have long-standing bilateral agreements with their respective neighbouring countries, which address issues of mutual concern, take into account the specificities and sensitivities of the three countries and reflect the need to preserve the viability of such states; whereas such specificities and sensitivities have been acknowledged by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;

                  H.

                  whereas Andorra, Monaco and San Marino have, each in their own right, pursued important reforms and regulatory convergence with the EU, with particular regard to the regulation of the banking and financial sector;

                  I.

                  whereas at its meeting of 4 December 2018, the Council decided to remove Andorra and San Marino from Annex II to the Council conclusions of 5 December 2017, thus confirming that they have complied with all remaining commitments related to transparency, fair taxation and anti-BEPS (base erosion and profit shifting) measures; whereas Monaco was never included in this annex and the Council noted as far back as 5 December 2017 that Monaco was fully compliant with these commitments; whereas at its meetings of April and July 2018, the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes declared Andorra, Monaco and San Marino to be compliant with the international standard on the exchange of information on request;

                  J.

                  whereas Andorra’s important reforms and progressive alignment with EU legislation as regards financial regulation should be commended; whereas the EU and Andorra have reached a valuable agreement on tobacco and whereas Andorra will now be able to further intensify its move towards a more diversified economy; whereas this long-term process will present relevant challenges, and adequate protection will therefore be required for workers in Andorra as it shifts towards a more diversified economy; whereas broader access to the internal market will support economic development in the long term and will create new economic and employment opportunities in Andorra;

                  K.

                  whereas San Marino is currently experiencing difficulties in exporting to Member States other than Italy as a result of the additional VAT documentation required (T2); whereas the association agreement should provide the opportunity of a level playing field across the EU, which would be very valuable to San Marino exporters; whereas the association agreement should give Andorran and San Marino banks full access to the EU passporting system for banks and financial services companies;

                  L.

                  whereas citizens of Monaco are a minority in their own country and the housing and employment markets are such that active support to citizens of Monaco is essential to preserve their capacity to continue to reside in the country; whereas the provisions on facilitated access to employment apply equally to citizens of Monaco and residents of the towns in Monaco’s immediate surroundings; whereas 92 % of workers in Monaco are EU citizens;

                  M.

                  whereas the association agreement with the EU opens up the possibility of developing cooperation in areas of shared interest and participating in some of the EU’s horizontal policies on issues such as research, the environment and education (Erasmus+);

                  N.

                  whereas the association agreement will require Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

                  1.

                  Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

                              (a)

                              seize the opportunity presented by the negotiations on the association agreement to demonstrate the value of closer relations and integration with the EU — looking at public opinion both in Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and in the EU — and to further reaffirm the importance of inclusion in EU bodies and policies for such countries in the longer term;

                              (b)

                              prevent the risk of rejection of the association agreement once negotiations have been finalised, and engage in renewed efforts to provide those members of the public in Andorra, Monaco and San Marino who feel more vulnerable with information about the association agreement and to explain to them, in total transparency and in cooperation with the authorities of the three states, the scope, merits and possible shortcomings of the agreement, with a view to political unity and the broadest possible public support in each of the three states; encourage Andorra, Monaco and San Marino to do the same, and support them in such an endeavour;

                              (c)

                              take full account of the small territorial dimensions and limited administrative resources, in relative terms, of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and, in the negotiation process, adjust the required adoption and implementation of the acquis communautaire accordingly, so as to minimise excessive budgetary pressure, which would in turn have negative implications on public opinion and the budgetary resources available; provide assistance, where needed, to Andorra, Monaco and San Marino in providing for the necessary administrative capacity to ensure swift, dynamic and uniform transposition of the acquis communautaire;

                              (d)

                              call for the creation, in each of the three states, of a coherent, efficient and effective institutional framework through which to implement the association agreement, in order to ensure the dynamic transposition of the acquis communautaire by the three countries and the uniform application and consistent interpretation of the provisions of the agreement, which must include a forum for consultation and a dispute resolution mechanism;

                              (e)

                              emphasise to Andorra, Monaco and San Marino the importance of the overall integrity and homogeneity of the internal market and of respect for the fundamental aspects of all four freedoms of the internal market; recall the merits and economic benefits of full access, including for products and services, to the internal market and the need to preserve within it a level playing field and strong, resilient and effective institutional foundations to the benefit of all;

                              (f)

                              provide for adequate EU support to Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, as regards their capacity to fully adopt and implement the acquis communautaire on a longer-term basis, including through closer institutional cooperation with the Member States in the immediate proximity; provide for access to EU funding for targeted projects and for the possibility of relying on existing administrative bodies in the Member States dedicated to the implementation of the acquis communautaire;

                              (g)

                              foster increased capacity for adequate adoption and implementation of the acquis communautaire through the secondment of officials from the public administrations of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino to relevant EU institutions and bodies and those of its Member States;

                              (h)

                              consider, in the light of the need to reconcile the freedom of establishment envisaged under the association agreement and national provisions in Andorra, Monaco and San Marino seeking to preserve the socio-economic inclusion of their citizens, the possibility of temporary derogations, premised on an assessment of the real needs of the three states, subject to review clauses, anchored to specific socio-economic criteria for each negotiating state and adjusted to the timeframe required to ensure, in each state and through a gradual approach, a true level playing field and adequate competitive capacity for workers and companies; take note of the fact that the very small size of these countries is such that the impact of negotiated temporary derogations on the acquis communautaire would be negligible;

                              (i)

                              harness the opportunity of the Association Agreement to further cooperation with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino within the framework of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (1);

                              (j)

                              adjust the requirements related to the provision of statistical data under the association agreement to the size of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino;

                              (k)

                              explore the possibility and feasibility, in parallel with negotiations on the association agreement, of securing access to Eurosystem liquidity for Andorra and San Marino, with a view to fostering the resilience capacity and stability of their respective national banking systems in the case of an internal or external systemic shock, while ensuring proper oversight by the European Central Bank; encourage Andorra and Monaco to become members of the International Monetary Fund and provide them, if needed, with technical assistance to this effect; encourage Andorra, Monaco and San Marino to continue their good efforts vis-à-vis convergence with the EU as regards financial regulation, tax governance and the fight against money laundering;

                              (l)

                              advance negotiations on the association agreement with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and provide the negotiating parties with all necessary institutional and policy-specific support in a timely fashion, including assessments and expertise from the Commission’s competent Directorates-General, so that negotiations can be completed as soon as possible and, in any case, within the next two years;

                              (m)

                              conclude before the end of the current mandate a joint political declaration with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino on the framework of the association agreement, in order to take stock of and preserve the progress achieved in the negotiations thus far, so that the new Commission and the European External Action Service can take stock of and build on this common understanding and advance negotiations further;

                              (n)

                              consider the negotiations on the association agreement an opportunity to take measures for joint investments in infrastructure of common interest, as well as measures aiming to boost joint academic research among Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the EU Member States;

                  2.

                  Takes the view that the next legislature of the European Parliament could serve as a valuable opportunity to set up a new interparliamentary delegation devoted to interparliamentary dialogue and cooperation with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino; believes, furthermore, that Parliament should pursue close cooperation between its services and the relevant services of the Parliaments of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and regularly host young political, business and civil society leaders from these three countries in order to reinforce the positive narrative of a closer political, economic and policy interface with the EU within the framework of negotiations on the association agreement; takes the view that Parliament should foster periodic exchanges of views with the national parliamentary delegations of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino for the duration of the negotiations; believes that exchanges of views between the European Parliament and the national parliamentary delegations of Andorra, Monaco and San Marino should also be held on matters handled by Parliament that could have a direct effect on the economy of these countries, their relationship with the EU, or the effectiveness of the association agreement;

                  3.

                  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Co-Princes, Government and General Council of Andorra, the Prince, Minister of State and National Council of Monaco, and the Captains Regent, Congress of State, and Grand and General Council of San Marino.

         (1)  OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73.


title: Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/518 of 8 April 2020 on a common Union toolbox for the use of technology and data to combat and exit from the COVID-19 crisis, in particular concerning mobile applications and the use of anonymised mobility data

text:
               14.4.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 114/7

      COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2020/518
      of 8 April 2020
      on a common Union toolbox for the use of technology and data to combat and exit from the COVID-19 crisis, in particular concerning mobile applications and the use of anonymised mobility data
      THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
      Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 292 thereof,
      Whereas:

                  (1)

                  The public health crisis caused by the current COVID-19 pandemic (hereinafter, ‘COVID-19 crisis’) is compelling the Union and the Member States to face an unprecedented challenge to its health care systems, way of life, economic stability and values. No single Member State can succeed alone in combating the COVID-19 crisis. An exceptional crisis of such magnitude requires determined action of all Member States and EU institutions and bodies working together in a genuine spirit of solidarity.

                  (2)

                  Digital technologies and data have a valuable role to play in combating the COVID-19 crisis, given that many people in Europe are connected to the internet via mobile devices. Those technologies and data can offer an important tool for informing the public and helping relevant public authorities in their efforts to contain the spread of the virus or allowing healthcare organisations to exchange health data. However, a fragmented and uncoordinated approach risks hampering the effectiveness of measures aimed at combating the COVID-19 crisis, whilst also causing serious harm to the single market and to fundamental rights and freedoms.

                  (3)

                  It is therefore necessary to develop a common approach to the use of digital technologies and data in response to the current crisis. That approach should be effective in supporting competent national authorities, in particular health authorities and policy makers, by providing them with sufficient and accurate data to understand the evolution and spread of the COVID-19 virus as well as its effects. Similarly, these technologies may empower citizens to take effective and more targeted social distancing measures. At the same time, the proposed approach aims to uphold the integrity of the single market and protect fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly the rights to privacy and protection of personal data.

                  (4)

                  Mobile applications can support health authorities at national and EU level in monitoring and containing the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. They can provide guidance to citizens and facilitate the organisation of the medical follow-up of patients. Warning and tracing applications can play an important role in contact tracing, limiting the propagation of disease and interrupting transmission chains. Therefore, in combination with appropriate testing strategies and contact tracing, the applications can be particularly relevant in providing information on the level of virus circulation, in assessing the effectiveness of physical distancing and confinement measures, and in informing de-escalation strategies.

                  (5)

                  Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and the Council (1) lays down specific rules on epidemiological surveillance, monitoring, early warning of, and combating serious cross-border threats to health. Article 2(5) of the Decision requires the Commission, in liaison with the Member States, to ensure coordination and information exchange between the mechanisms and structures established under that Decision and similar mechanisms and structures established at Union level or under the Euratom Treaty whose activities are relevant for preparedness and response planning, monitoring, early warning of, and combating serious cross-border threats to health. The forum for coordination of efforts in the context of serious cross-border threats to health is the Health Security Committee, set up by the Article 17 of the aforementioned Decision. At the same time, Article 6(1) of the Decision sets up a network for the epidemiological surveillance of communicable diseases, operated and coordinated by the European Centre for Disease Control.

                  (6)

                  Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare requires the eHealth Network to work towards delivering sustainable economic and social benefits of European eHealth systems and services and interoperable applications, with a view to achieving a high level of trust and security, enhancing continuity of care and ensuring access to safe and high-quality healthcare.

                  (7)

                  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data lays down the conditions for processing personal data, including data concerning health. Such data may be processed inter alia when a data subject gives her explicit consent or when processing is in the public interest as specified in Member State or Union law, in particular for monitoring and alert purposes, the prevention or control of communicable diseases and other serious threats to health.

                  (8)

                  Several Member States have introduced specific legislation that allow them to process health data, based on public interest (Article 6(1)(c) or (e) and Article 9(2)(i) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679). In any case, the purposes and means of the data processing, what data are to be processed and by whom, should be clear and specific.

                  (9)

                  The Commission may consult the European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Data Protection Board, in accordance with Article 42 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) and Article 70 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

                  (10)

                  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) lays down the rules applicable to traffic and location data, and to the storing of information and the gaining of access to information stored in the terminal equipment, such as a mobile device, of a user or subscriber. Pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Directive, such storage or gaining of access is only permitted in narrowly defined circumstances or on the basis of consent of the user or subscriber, after having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. In addition, Article 15(1) of the Directive allows Member States to adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of certain rights and obligations established by the Directive, including those set out in Article 5, when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to achieve certain objectives.

                  (11)

                  The European Commission announced in its Communication, ‘A European strategy for data’ (6) that the EU would create a single market in which data can flow within the EU and across sectors, for the benefit of all, where European rules, in particular privacy and data protection, as well as competition law, are fully respected and where rules for access and use of data are fair, practical and clear. In particular, the Commission stated it would consider the need for legislative action to foster business-to-government data sharing for the public interest.

                  (12)

                  Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, a variety of mobile applications have been developed, some of them by public authorities, and there have been calls from Member States and the private sector for coordination at Union level, including to address cybersecurity, security and privacy concerns. These applications tend to serve three general functions: (i) informing and advising citizens and facilitating the organisation of medical follow-up of persons with symptoms, often combined with a self-diagnosis questionnaire; (ii) warning people who have been in proximity to an infected person in order to interrupt infection chains and preventing resurgence of infections in the reopening phase; and (iii) monitoring and enforcement of quarantine of infected persons, possibly combined with features assessing their health condition during the quarantine period. Certain applications are available to the general public, while others only to closed user groups directed at tracing contacts in the workplace. The effectiveness of these applications has generally not been evaluated. Information and symptom-checker apps may be useful to raise awareness of citizens. However, expert opinion suggests that applications aiming to inform and warn users seem to be the most promising to prevent the propagation of the virus, taking into account also their more limited impact on privacy, and several Member States are currently exploring their use.

                  (13)

                  Some of those mobile applications could be deemed medical devices where they are intended by the manufacturer to be used inter alia for diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, prediction, prognosis, treatment or alleviation of disease and would therefore fall within scope of under Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7), or Council Directive 93/42/EEC (8). For self-diagnosis and symptom-checker applications, where they provide information related to diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, prediction or prognosis, their potential qualification as medical devices according to the medical devices regulatory framework (Directive 93/42/EEC or Regulation (EU) 2017/745) should be assessed.

                  (14)

                  The effectiveness of these mobile applications depends on a number of factors. Such factors include user penetration, that is, the percentage of the population using a mobile device and, of those, the percentage, who have downloaded the application and consented to the processing of personal data concerning them and not withdrawn that consent. Other important factors are public trust that the data will be protected by appropriate security measures, used exclusively to alert individuals who may have been exposed to the virus, public health authorities’ endorsement, ability of the health authorities to take action based on the data generated by the application, integration and data sharing with other systems and applications, cross-border and cross-regional interoperability with other systems.

                  (15)

                  Warning and tracing applications are useful for Member States for contact tracing purposes and can play an important role in containment during de-escalation scenarios. They can also be a valuable tool for citizens to practise effective and better targeted social distancing. Their impact can be boosted by a strategy supporting wider testing. Contact tracing implies that public health authorities rapidly identify all contacts of a confirmed COVID-19 patient, ask them to self-isolate, and rapidly test and isolate them if they develop symptoms. In addition, anonymised and aggregated data derived from such applications, combined with information on disease incidence, could be used to assess the effectiveness of community and physical distancing measures. While these applications are of evident usefulness for Member States, they also potentially add value to the work of the ECDC.

                  (16)

                  Self-diagnoses and symptom checker applications could provide relevant information on the number of cases with COVID-19 compatible symptoms, by age and week, from well-defined areas where there is a high coverage of the application. If successful, national public health authorities can decide to use application data for COVID-19 syndromic primary care surveillance. These data could be provided to the ECDC weekly, in aggregated format (e.g. number of influenza-like illness (ILI) or acute respiratory infection (ARI) per week, by age group, out of the total population covered by the sentinel doctors). This would allow national authorities and the ECDC to estimate the positive predictive value of respiratory symptoms in a given community, thus providing information on the level of virus circulation based on the data from the application.

                  (17)

                  Given the functions of smartphone applications as described above, their use is capable of affecting the exercise of certain fundamental rights such as inter alia the right to respect for private and family life. As any interference with those rights should be in accordance with the law, Member States’ laws which would set out or permit limitations to the exercise of certain fundamental rights should be in line with the general principles of Union law as stated in Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union, their constitutional traditions and their obligations under international law.

                  (18)

                  For the acceptance of different types of applications (and underlying infection transmission chains information systems) and for ensuring that they fulfil the stated purpose of epidemiological surveillance, the underlying policies, requirements and controls must be aligned and implemented in a coordinated way by the responsible national health authorities. The experience of several Member States that started introducing contact tracing applications shows that, in order to increase the acceptance, an integrated governance is useful to prepare and implement the measures, involving not only health, but also other authorities (including data protection authorities), as well as the private sector, experts, academics and stakeholders such as patients groups. A wide communication concerning the application is also essential for its take-up and success.

                  (19)

                  In order to detect proximity encounters between users of different contact tracing applications (a scenario most likely to happen among people moving across national/regional borders), interoperability between applications should be envisaged. National health authorities supervising infection transmission chains should be able to exchange interoperable information about users that have tested positive with other Member States or regions in order to address cross-border transmission chains.

                  (20)

                  Certain companies including telecommunications providers and major technology platforms have published or made available to public authorities anonymised and aggregated location data. Such data is necessary for research to combat the virus, modelling to understand how the virus will spread and modelling of the economic effects of the crisis. In particular, the data will help to understand and model the spatial dynamics of the epidemic and to assess the impact of social distancing measures (travel limitations, non-essential activities closures, total lock-down etc.) on mobility. This is essential firstly to contain the effects of the virus and assess the needs notably in terms of Personal Protective Equipment and Intensive Care Units and, second, to support the exit strategy with data-driven models that indicate the potential effects of the relaxation of the social distancing measures.

                  (21)

                  The current crisis has shown that public health authorities and research institutions would benefit from further access to essential information to analyse the evolution of the virus and to assess the effectiveness of public health measures.

                  (22)

                  Certain Member States have taken measures to simplify access to necessary data. However, the EU’s common efforts combating the virus are hampered by the current fragmentation of approaches.

                  (23)

                  A common Union approach to the COVID-19 crisis has also become necessary since measures taken in certain countries, such as the geolocation-based tracking of individuals, the use of technology to rate an individual’s level of health risk and the centralisation of sensitive data, raise questions from the viewpoint of several fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in the EU legal order, including the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data. In any event, pursuant to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down therein must be justified and proportionate. Any such restrictions should, in particular, be temporary, in that they remain strictly limited to what is necessary to combat the crisis and do not continue to exist, without an adequate justification, after the crisis has passed.

                  (24)

                  Furthermore, the World Health Organisation and other bodies have warned of the risk that applications and inaccurate data could result in stigmatisation of persons who share certain characteristics because of a perceived link with the disease.

                  (25)

                  In accordance with the principle of data minimization, public health authorities and research institutions should process personal data only where adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary, and should apply appropriate safeguards such as pseudonymisation, aggregation, encryption and decentralization.

                  (26)

                  Effective cybersecurity and data security measures are essential to protect the availability, authenticity integrity and confidentiality of data.

                  (27)

                  Consultation with data protection authorities, in accordance with the requirements set out in Union law on the protection of personal data, is essential to ensure that personal data is processed lawfully and that the rights of the individuals concerned are respected.

                  (28)

                  Article 14 of Directive 2011/24/EU assigned the Union to support and facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information among Member States working within a voluntary network connecting national authorities responsible for eHealth designated by the Member States (‘the eHealth Network’). Its objectives include working towards delivering sustainable economic and social benefits of European eHealth systems and services and interoperable applications, with a view to achieving a high level of trust and security, enhancing continuity of care and ensuring access to safe and high-quality healthcare. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1765 (9), lays down the rules for the establishment, management and transparent functioning of the eHealth Network. Because of its composition and area of expertise, the eHealth Network should be the main forum for discussions on the data needs of the public health authorities and research institutions, whilst also involving officials from national regulatory authorities for electronic communications, ministries in charge of digital matters and data protection authorities.

                  (29)

                  The eHealth Network and the Commission should also closely co-operate with other bodies and networks that can provide the input necessary to give effect to this Recommendation, including the Health Security Committee, the network for the epidemiological surveillance of the communicable diseases, the ECDC, the European Data Protection Board, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications and the Network Information Systems Cooperation Group.

                  (30)

                  Transparency and clear and regular communication, and allowing for the input of persons and communities most affected, will be paramount to ensuring public trust when combating the COVID-19 crisis.

                  (31)

                  Considering the rapid evolution of the situation in the various Member States in respect of the COVID-19 crisis, it is essential that Member States report and the Commission reviews the approach embodied in this Recommendation, quickly and regularly for as long as the crisis persists.

                  (32)

                  This Recommendation should, where necessary, be complemented by additional guidance by the Commission, including on the data protection and privacy implications of the use of warn and prevent mobile applications,

            HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:

         PURPOSE OF THIS RECOMMENDATION

                  (1)

                  This recommendation sets up a process for developing a common approach, referred to as a Toolbox, to use digital means to address the crisis. The Toolbox will consist of practical measures for making effective use of technologies and data, with a focus on two areas in particular:

                              (1)

                              A pan-European approach for the use of mobile applications, coordinated at Union level, for empowering citizens to take effective and more targeted social distancing measures, and for warning, preventing and contact tracing to help limit the propagation of the COVID-19 disease. This will involve a methodology monitoring and sharing assessments of effectiveness of these applications, their interoperability and cross-border implications, and their respect for security, privacy and data protection; and

                              (2)

                              A common scheme for using anonymized and aggregated data on mobility of populations in order (i) to model and predict the evolution of the disease, (ii) to monitor the effectiveness of decision-making by Member States’ authorities on measures such as social distancing and confinement, and (iii) to inform a coordinated strategy for exiting from the COVID-19 crisis.

                  (2)

                  Member States should take these actions as a matter of urgency and in close coordination with other Member States, the Commission and other relevant stakeholders, and without prejudice to the competences of the Member States in the domain of public health. They should ensure that all actions are taken in accordance with Union law, in particular law on medical devices and the right to privacy and the protection of personal data along with other rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union. The Toolbox will be complemented by Commission guidance, including guidance on the data protection and privacy implications of the use of mobile warning and prevention applications.

         DEFINITIONS

                  (3)

                  For the purposes of this Recommendation:

                              (a)

                              ‘Mobile applications’ means software application running on smart devices, in particular smartphones, designed usually for wide-ranging and targeted interaction with web resources, which process proximity data and other contextual information collected by many sensors found in any smart device and which are able to exchange information via many network interfaces with other connected devices;

                              (b)

                              ‘eHealth Network’ means the network established by Article 14 of Directive 2011/24/EU and whose tasks have been clarified by the Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1765.

                              (c)

                              ‘Health Security Committee’ means the body composed of representatives of the Member States, established under the Article 17 of the Decision No 1082/2013/EU.

                              (d)

                              ‘Epidemiological Surveillance Network’ means the network for the epidemiological surveillance of communicable diseases and of related special health issues operated and coordinated by the ECDC and bringing into permanent communication the Commission, the ECDC, and the competent authorities responsible at national level for epidemiological surveillance, set up under the Article 6 of the Decision No 1082/2013/EU.

         PROCESS FOR DEVELOPING A TOOLBOX FOR USE OF TECHNOLOGY AND DATA

                  (4)

                  This process should facilitate the urgent development and adoption by Member States and the Commission of a toolbox of practical measures including a European approach for COVID-19 mobile applications and for the use of mobility data for modelling and predicting the evolution of the virus.

                  (5)

                  For the development of the toolbox, Member States, represented in the eHealth Network, should meet, together with representatives of the Commission and the European Centre for Disease Control, immediately and frequently thereafter. They should share views on how best to use data from various sources to tackle the COVID-19 crisis whilst achieving a high level of trust and security in a manner compatible with Union law, in particular on the protection of personal data and privacy, as well as to share best practices and facilitate common approaches in that respect.

                  (6)

                  The eHealth Network should meet immediately to operationalize this Recommendation.

                  (7)

                  The Member States, represented in the eHealth Network, should, as appropriate, inform and seek input from the Health Security Committee, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, the NIS Cooperation Group and relevant Commission agencies, including ENISA, Europol, and Council working groups, when giving effect to this Recommendation.

                  (8)

                  The European Data Protection Board and the European Data Protection Supervisor should also be closely involved to ensure the Toolbox integrates data protection and privacy-by-design principles.

                  (9)

                  Member States authorities and the Commission should ensure regular, clear and comprehensive communication to the public on the actions taken pursuant to this Recommendation and provide opportunities for the public to interact and participate in discussions.

                  (10)

                  Paramount throughout the process should be respect for all fundamental rights, notably privacy as well as data protection, the prevention of surveillance and stigmatization. On these specific issues, the Toolbox should therefore:

                              (1)

                              strictly limit the processing of personal data for the purposes of combating the COVID-19 crisis and ensure that the personal data are not used for any other purposes such as law enforcement or commercial purposes;

                              (2)

                              ensure regular review of the continued need for the processing of personal data for the purposes of combating the COVID-19 crisis and set appropriate sunset clauses, so as to ensure that the processing does not extend beyond what is strictly necessary for those purposes;

                              (3)

                              take measures to ensure that, once the processing is no longer strictly necessary, the processing is effectively terminated and the personal data concerned are irreversibly destroyed, unless, on the advice of ethics boards and data protection authorities, their scientific value in serving the public interest outweighs the impact on the rights concerned, subject to appropriate safeguards.

                  (11)

                  The Toolbox should be developed progressively in the light of discussions with all interested parties and monitoring of the situation, best practice, issues and solution concerning the sources and types of data necessary and available for public health authorities and public health research institutions for combating the COVID-19 pandemic.

                  (12)

                  The Toolbox should be shared with the European Union’s international partners to exchange best practices and help address the virus spread worldwide.

         A PAN-EUROPEAN APPROACH FOR COVID-19 MOBILE APPLICATIONS

                  (13)

                  The first priority for the Toolbox should be a pan-European approach for COVID-19 mobile applications, to be developed together by Member States and the Commission, by 15 April 2020. The European Data Protection Board and the European Data Protection supervisor will be associated to the process. This approach should consist of:

                              (1)

                              specifications to ensure the effectiveness of mobile information, warning and tracing applications for combating COVID-19 from the medical and technical point of view;

                              (2)

                              measures to prevent proliferation of applications that are not compatible with Union law, to support requirements for accessibility for persons with disabilities, and for interoperability and promotion of common solutions, not excluding a potential pan-European application;

                              (3)

                              governance mechanisms to be applied by public health authorities and cooperation with the ECDC;

                              (4)

                              the identification of good practices and mechanisms for exchange of information on the functioning of the applications; and

                              (5)

                              sharing data with relevant epidemiological public bodies and public health research institutions, including aggregated data to ECDC.

                  (14)

                  Member State authorities, represented in the eHealth Network, should establish a process of exchanging information and ensuring interoperability of applications when cross-border scenarios are foreseen.

         PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION ASPECTS OF USE OF THE MOBILE APPLICATIONS

                  (15)

                  The development of the Toolbox should be guided by privacy and data protection principles.

                  (16)

                  With particular regard the use of COVID-19 mobile warning and prevention applications, the following principles should be observed:

                              (1)

                              safeguards ensuring respect for fundamental rights and prevention of stigmatization, in particular applicable rules governing protection of personal data and confidentiality of communications;

                              (2)

                              preference for the least intrusive yet effective measures, including the use of proximity data and the avoidance of processing data on location or movements of individuals, and the use of anonymised and aggregated data where possible;

                              (3)

                              technical requirements concerning appropriate technologies (e.g. Bluetooth Low Energy) to establish device proximity, encryption, data security, storage of data on the mobile device, possible access by health authorities and data storage;

                              (4)

                              effective cybersecurity requirements to protect the availability, authenticity integrity, and confidentiality of data;

                              (5)

                              the expiration of measures taken and the deletion of personal data obtained through these measures when the pandemic is declared to be under control, at the latest;

                              (6)

                              uploading of proximity data in case of a confirmed infection and appropriate methods of warning persons who have been in close contact with the infected person, who shall remain anonymous; and

                              (7)

                              transparency requirements on the privacy settings to ensure trust into the applications.

                  (17)

                  The Commission will publish guidance further specifying privacy and data protection principles in the light of practical considerations arising from the development and implementation of the Toolbox.

         USE OF MOBILITY DATA TO INFORM MEASURES AND EXIT STRATEGY

                  (18)

                  The second priority for the Toolbox should be a common approach for the use of anonymised and aggregated mobility data necessary for:

                              (1)

                              modelling to map and predict the diffusion of the disease and the impact on needs in the health systems in Member States, such as, but not limited, to Intensive Care Units in Hospitals and Personal Protective Equipment; and

                              (2)

                              optimising the effectiveness of measures to contain the diffusion of the COVID-19 virus and to address its effects, including confinement (and de-confinement), and to obtain and use those data.

                  (19)

                  In developing this approach, Member States (represented in the eHealth Network, which will coordinate with the Health Security Committee, the Epidemiological Network the ECDC and, if necessary, ENISA), should exchange best practices on the use of mobility data, share and compare modelling and predictions of the diffusion of the virus, and monitor the impact of measures to limit its diffusion.

                  (20)

                  This deliverable should include:

                              (1)

                              the appropriate use of anonymous and aggregated mobility data for modelling to understand how the virus will spread and modelling of the economic effects of the crisis;

                              (2)

                              advice to public authorities on asking providers of the data for the methodology that they have applied for anonymising the data and to carry out a plausibility test of the methodology applied;

                              (3)

                              safeguards to be put in place to prevent de-anonymisation and avoid re-identifications of individuals, including guarantees of adequate levels of data and IT security, and assessment of re-identification risks when correlating the anonymised data with other data;

                              (4)

                              immediate and irreversible deletion of all accidentally processed data capable of identifying individuals and notifying the providers of the data as well as competent authorities of the accidental processing and deletion;

                              (5)

                              deletion of the data in principle after a period of 90 days, or in any event no later than when the pandemic is declared under control; and

                              (6)

                              restricting processing of the data exclusively for the purposes stated above and exclude sharing of the data with any third party.

         REPORTING AND REVIEW

                  (21)

                  The pan-European approach for COVID-19 mobile applications will be published on 15 April and will be complemented by Commission guidance on privacy and data protection.

                  (22)

                  Member States should, by 31 May 2020, report to the Commission on the actions taken pursuant to this Recommendation. Such reports should continue on regular basis for as long as the COVID-19 crisis persists.

                  (23)

                  As of 8 April 2020, Member States should make the measures applied in the areas covered by this Recommendation accessible to other Member States and to the Commission for peer review. Within one week, Member States and the Commission may submit observations on these measures. The Member State concerned should take utmost account of such observations.

                  (24)

                  The Commission will, starting in June 2020, on the basis of these Member States reports, assess the progress made and the effect of this Recommendation. The Commission may make further recommendations to Member States, including on the timing of the measures applied in the areas covered by this Recommendation.

         Done at Brussels, 8 April 2020.

               For the Commission

            Thierry BRETON

               Member of the Commission

         (1)  Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC (OJ L 293, 5.11.2013, p. 1).

         (2)  Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (OJ L 88, 4.4.2011, p. 45).

         (3)  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

         (4)  Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

         (5)  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37).

         (6)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European strategy for data, COM/2020/66 final.

         (7)  Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC (OJ L 117, 5.5.2017, p. 1).

         (8)  Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices (OJ L 169, 12.7.1993, p. 1).

         (9)  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1765 of 22 October 2019 providing the rules for the establishment, the management and the functioning of the network of national authorities responsible for eHealth, and repealing Implementing Decision 2011/890/EU (OJ L 270, 24.10.2019, p. 83).


title: Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/1186 of 7 August 2020 amending Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/912 on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction

text:
                  11.8.2020

                  EN

                  Official Journal of the European Union

                  L 261/83

         COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2020/1186
         of 7 August 2020
         amending Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/912 on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction
         THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
         Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article Article 77 (2) (b) and (e) and Article 292, first and second sentence thereof,
         Whereas:

                     (1)

                     On 30 June 2020, the Council adopted a Recommendation on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction (1) ("Council Recommendation"). On 16 July 2020, the Council adopted Recommendation (EU) 2020/1052 of 16 July 2020 amending Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/912 on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction (2). On 30 July 2020, the Council adopted Recommendation (EU) 2020/1144 of 30 July 2020 amending Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/912 on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction (3).

                     (2)

                     The Council Recommendation provides that Member States should gradually lift the temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU as from 1 July 2020 in a coordinated manner with regard to the residents of the third countries listed in Annex I to the Council Recommendation. Every two weeks, the list of third countries referred to in Annex I should be reviewed, and as the case may be updated, by the Council, after close consultation with the Commission and the relevant EU agencies and services following an overall assessment based on the methodology, criteria and information referred to in the Council Recommendation.

                     (3)

                     Discussions have since then taken place within the Council, in close consultation with the Commission and the relevant EU agencies and services, on the review of the list of third countries set out in Annex I to the Council Recommendation and in application of the criteria and methodology laid down in the Council Recommendation. As a result of these discussions, the list of third countries set out in Annex I should be amended. In particular, Morocco should be deleted from the list.

                     (4)

                     Border control is in the interest not only of the Member State at whose external borders it is carried out but of all Member States which have abolished internal border control. Member States should therefore ensure that measures taken at the external borders are coordinated in order to ensure a well functioning Schengen area. To that end, as of 8 August 2020, Member States should continue lifting the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU in a coordinated manner with regard to the residents of the third countries listed in Annex I of the Council Recommendation as amended by this Recommendation.

                     (5)

                     In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Recommendation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Recommendation builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark shall, in accordance with Article 4 of the said Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has decided on this Recommendation whether it will implement it.

                     (6)

                     This Recommendation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland does not take part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC (4); Ireland is therefore not taking part in its adoption and is not bound by it or subject to its application.

                     (7)

                     As regards Iceland and Norway, this Recommendation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (5).

                     (8)

                     As regards Switzerland, this Recommendation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A, of Decision 1999/437/EC (6) read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC (7).

                     (9)

                     As regards Liechtenstein, this Recommendation constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis which fall within the area referred to in Article 1 point A, of Decision 1999/437/EC (8) read in conjunction with Article 3 of Decision 2011/350/EU (9).

               HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:
         Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/912, as amended by Recommendation (EU) 2020/1052 and by Recommendation (EU) 2020/1144, on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction is amended as follows:

                     (1)

                     First paragraph of point 1 of the Council Recommendation is replaced by the following:

                                 ‘1.

                                 As from 8 August 2020, Member States should gradually lift the temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU in a coordinated manner with regard to the residents of the third countries listed in Annex I.’

                     (2)

                     Annex I to the Recommendation is replaced by the following:

                           ‘ANNEX I
                           Third countries whose residents should not be affected by temporary external borders restriction on non-essential travel into the EU

                                       1.

                                       AUSTRALIA

                                       2.

                                       CANADA

                                       3.

                                       GEORGIA

                                       4.

                                       JAPAN

                                       5.

                                       NEW ZEALAND

                                       6.

                                       RWANDA

                                       7.

                                       SOUTH KOREA

                                       8.

                                       THAILAND

                                       9.

                                       TUNISIA

                                       10.

                                       URUGUAY

                                       11.

                                       CHINA (*1)

                     .
                        (*1)  subject to confirmation of reciprocity"

            Done at Brussels, 7 August 2020.

                  For the Council

                  The President

               M. ROTH

            (1)  OJ L 208I, 1.7.2020, p .1.

            (2)  OJ L 230, 17.7.2020, p. 26.

            (3)  OJ L 248, 31.7.2020, p. 26.

            (4)  Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland’s request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20).

            (5)  OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36.

            (6)  OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52.

            (7)  Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 1).

            (8)  OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21.

            (9)  Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 19).