Important legal notice

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52004SC1622

Recommendation for a Council Decision establishing, in accordance with Article 104(8), whether effective action has been taken by Greece in response to recommendations of the Council according to Article 104(7) of the Treaty establishing the European Community  /* SEC/2004/1622 final */

	Brussels, 22.12.2004SEC(2004) 1622 finalRecommendation for aCOUNCIL DECISIONestablishing, in accordance with Article 104(8), whether effective action has been taken by Greece in response to recommendations of the Council according to Article 104(7) of the Treaty establishing the European Community(presented by the Commission)EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUMThe excessive deficit procedure (EDP) is governed by Article 104 of the Treaty and by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, which is part of the Stability and Growth Pact. It is completed by the political commitments enshrined in the Resolution of the Amsterdam European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact of 17 June 1997.The Greek authorities submitted on 4 May a revised EDP notification with a deficit of 3.2% of GDP for 2003. Although it was aware that this figure was provisional because it had not been certified by Eurostat, the Commission, taking into account its spring 2004 forecasts, published on 7 April 2004, considered that this notification provided prima facie evidence for the existence of an excessive deficit in Greece in the sense of Article 104 of the Treaty. The Commission initiated the Excessive Deficit Procedure for Greece on 19 May 2004, with the adoption of the report foreseen in Article 104(3) of the Treaty. The Commission, after examining the relevant factors taken into account in its report and regarding to the opinion formulated by Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) on 2 June 2004, adopted on 24 June 2004 an Opinion stating that an excessive deficit exists in Greece. The Council decided accordingly, in conformity with Article 104(6), on 5 July 2004. At the same time, the Council adopted a recommendation addressed to Greece with a view to bringing the excessive deficit situation to an end, according to Article 104(7) of the Treaty.The Council recommended the Greek authorities “ to put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible and by 2005 at the latest ”. The Council established “ the deadline of 5 November 2004 for the Greek government to take effective action to this end ”. The Council also recommended that “ the Greek authorities should take corrective measures mainly of a structural nature amounting to at least 1% of GDP, cumulated over 2004 and 2005, preferably equally distributed between the two years” . In addition, the Council recommended that “the Greek authorities should also ensure that the government gross debt ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the reference value at a satisfactory pace” , while “particular attention should be paid to factors other than net borrowing which contribute to the change in debt levels" . Finally, the Greek authorities were recommended to “ensure, as a matter of urgency, that the serious deficiencies revealed on budgetary statistics be corrected, through the improvement of the collection and processing of general government data” .According to Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its recommendations made in accordance with Article 104(7), shall base its decision on publicly announced decisions by the Government of the Member State concerned.1. Government data revisions of September 2004In assessing the action taken by the Greek authorities in response to the Council recommendations, account must be taken of the very substantial revision of the government deficit and debt data for the previous years set out in the September 2004 notification[1]. Specifically (Table 1), nominal deficit figures were revised upwards by 1.5 to 2 percentage points of GDP per year over 2000-2003, while debt figures were also increased by 7 to 9 percentage points of GDP. The change in the deficit figures from May to September 2004 was mainly due to revisions of expenditure on military equipment and interest payments, which had previously been under-recorded, and the social security surplus, which had been overestimated. The revision of the debt figures related to bonds with capitalised interest, which had previously been under-recorded, and consolidating assets of social security, which had been overestimated. In fact, the September EDP notification showed that Greece had been in excessive deficit at least since 2000. These issues have been analyses and discussed by the Commission and the Council.[2]Table 1. Statistical revisions between 2000-2003 published by EurostatGeneral Government Deficit (% of GDP) | General Government Debt (% of GDP) |Report 104(3) | EDP notification September 2004 | Report 104(3) | EDP notification September 2004 |2000 | -2.0 | -4.1 | 106.2 | 114 |2001 | -1.4 | -3.7 | 106.9 | 114.7 |2002 | -1.5 | -3.7 | 104.7 | 112.5 |2003 | -3.2 | -4.6 | 103.0 | 109.9 |According to the September EDP notification the effect of statistical revisions on the 2004 outturn will amount to 1.1% of GDP, distributed between lower social security fund surpluses (0.3% of GDP) and the correct recording of military spending (0.8%). The Greek authorities expect a deficit figure for 2004 of 5.3% of GDP. The expected debt ratio (112.1% of GDP) is significantly higher than in 2003 (109.9% of GDP).2. Measures announced in response of recommendation 104(7)Measures announced in 2004Before the deadline of 5 November set in the Council recommendation under Article 104(7), the Greek authorities announced a number of measures to be undertaken in 2004, namely: (i) a tax amnesty for pending tax returns for the fiscal years 1999-2002; (ii) instructions to all the ministries to restrain discretionary expenditure by 3%; (iii) measures to contain costs in the public sector and reduce government subsidies and guarantees[3].The nature of such measures makes it difficult to identify and isolate their budgetary impacts. Measures included in (ii) and (iii) are not linked to any particular budget item, but have across-the-board effects. Where measure (i) is concerned, in a letter addressed to Commissioner Almunia on 5 November the Greek Minister of Finances, Mr. Alogoskoufis, stated that the expected impact in 2004 was 0.2% of GDP. However, while this expected impact may have been included in the aggregate figures of tax revenues corresponding to the planned outturn notified in September, the actual impact will only be known at the moment of the EDP notification of March 2005 at the earliest.On top of these uncertainties, in order to assess the fiscal effort carried out by the Greek authorities in accordance with Council’s Article 104(7) recommendation the impact of statistical revisions needs to be considered. The final deficit outturn in 2004 will be higher than projected at the time of adopting the Article 104(7) recommendation, partly because of the statistical revisions agreed with Eurostat in September this year, which amount to 1.1% of GDP (Table 2). This factor, which was not known at the moment of adopting the recommendation under Article 104(7), might be considered as not being fully under the control of the Greek government when it was planning the fiscal adjustment for 2004. Therefore, the effectiveness of actions taken by the Greek authorities in 2004 in compliance with the Council recommendations needs to be assessed after netting out the effects of such statistical revisions, as well as those of possible growth surprises between spring and autumn 2004.Table 2. Major factors determining the deficit outturn in 2004 (*) |Effect on the deficit (°) | Deficit in 2004 |Original budget presented by the former government | 1.2 |Main corrections made by the new government before the end of March 2004 |Indirect taxes | +0.4 |Social contributions | -1.1 |Capital transfers received | +1.4 |Consumption (of which public wages) | +0.8 (+0.5) |Social transfers | +0.4 |End-March notification sent by the new government (1) | 3.0 |Statistical revisions (2)+(3) |Social security funds (2) | +0.3 |Military expenditures (3) | +0.8 |Intermediate outturn (4)=(1)+(2)+(3) | 4.1 |Notification September 2004 (5) | 5.3 |Overruns (6)=(5)-(4) | 1.2 |Discrepancies in interest payments (7) | +0.2 |Autumn Commission forecasts (5)+(7) | 5.5 |(*) The table summarises, in % of GDP, the main revisions, corrections and discrepancies in the 2004 budget since its adoption by the (former) Greek government at the end of 2003, and the Commission forecasts. (°) a ‘+’ indicates deficit-increasing, while a ‘–‘ means deficit-decreasing. |According to the September notification, the Greek authorities project a deficit outturn of 5.3% in 2004 (5.5% according to the Commission; see Table 2)[4], while between the end-March and September notifications the deficit increased from an estimated 3.0%[5] to 5.3% (from 3.2% to 5.5% according to the Commission Spring and Autumn forecasts). Therefore, the statistical revisions (1.1% of GDP) do not fully explain the budgetary deterioration of 2.3% of GDP. Furthermore, the remaining 1.2% cannot be attributed to the effect of lower growth. The difference in real growth projections between the spring (4.0%) and autumn (3.8%) figures is only 0.2%, which might increase the deficit, but by less than 0.1% of GDP. Overall, in nominal terms, the fiscal effort is negative by more than 1% of GDP.The fiscal effort in 2004 with respect to 2003, the year in which first appeared that the country had breached the 3% of GDP reference value, must be calculated by comparing the cyclically-adjusted balances (CAB) in the two years, after excluding the effects of statistical revisions. Also this approach shows that the fiscal effort is negative in cyclically-adjusted terms. With the exclusion of the unexpected statistical revisions, the CAB in 2003 would have been -3.7% of GDP (it was actually -5.1%), while that of 2004 would have been -5.1% of GDP (it was actually -6.2%). This indicates that the fiscal effort in 2004 amounts to -1.4%. In terms of the primary balance, the fiscal effort also results negative (-1.6%).Table 3. The fiscal effort in 2004 Netting out statistical revisions (% of GDP) |2003 | 2004 | ‘Effort’ (*) |Cyclically-adjusted balances (CAB) | -5.1 | -6.2 | -1.1 |CAB excluding revisions | -3.7 | -5.1 | -1.4 |Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) | 0.7 | -0.6 | -1.3 |CAPB excluding revisions | 2.0 | 0.4 | -1.6 |(*) The fiscal effort is the entry in column ‘2004’ minus the corresponding entry in column ‘2003’; figures rounded up to the first decimal.As a general principle, overruns in one or several items of the budget should be offset by compensatory measures. This also holds for events such as the organisation of the Olympic Games in Greece. Moreover, even allowing for such overruns, the fiscal effort would result negative in the current year. According to the information provided by the Greek authorities[6], the overruns linked to the organisation of the Olympic Games amount to 0.7% of GDP, distributed between public investment programmes (0.5% of GDP) and government consumption (0.2%).After excluding the effects of statistical revisions and the overruns linked to the Olympic Games, the CAB in 2004 would have been -4.4% of GDP (it was actually -6.2%), which, compared with the CAB in 2003, after netting out the effects of statistical revisions (-3.7%), leads to a fiscal effort of -0.7%. In terms of the primary balance, the fiscal effort would also be negative (-0.9%).In sum, the measures implemented in 2004 have not been effective in reducing the deficit in 2004. Over and above statistical revisions, the fiscal policy stance further worsened in a situation of buoyant economic activity and large, positive output gaps[7].The 2005 draft budgetThe specific measures to be implemented in 2005 were announced in the draft State budget presented in September, which set as its target a general government deficit of 2.8% for 2005. This would represent a nominal adjustment by 2.5% of GDP compared with the deficit figure of 5.3% planned by the Greek authorities for 2004.Table 4. Assessment of the adjustment in the 2005 budget% of GDP | Official (1) | Commission (2) | Difference (3)=(1)-(2) |Taxes | 23.20 | 23.19 | 0.01 |Contributions | 16.33 | 16.26 | 0.07 |Government consumption (of which public wages) | 16.18 (12.10) | 16.44 (12.34) | 0.26 (0.24) |Social transfers | 18.43 | 18.55 | 0.12 |Interest payments | 5.07 | 5.27 | 0.20 |Capital transfers received | 2.62 | 2.54 | 0.08 |Net borrowing | -2.8 | -3.6 | 0.8 |Debt ratio | 109.5 | 111.9 | 2.4 |memo items Real GDP growth (%) Nominal GDP growth (%) | 3.9 7.3 | 3.3 6.5 | 0.6 0.8 |The Commission autumn 2004 forecasts project a nominal deficit of 3.6% of GDP in 2005. The difference between the official target in the draft budget and the Commission forecasts is due to three factors (Table 4): First , according to the Commission, the initial level of interest payments in 2004 is 0.2% of GDP higher than assumed by the Greek authorities. Second , while the draft budget is built upon a macroeconomic scenario leading to real GDP growth at 3.9% in 2005, the Commission projects a much less optimistic growth rate of 3.3%. Third , the expected budgetary impact of some of the measures announced by the Greek authorities appears to have been overestimated. On the revenue side, this applies particularly to social contributions, owing to an over-optimistic projection of employment growth (2% compared with 1% in the Commission forecasts), and to capital transfers received, which are projected to remain at high levels, while the significant reduction of public investment will also lower the already low absorption capacity of EU funds by Greece. On the expenditure side, the draft budget projects a large decline of the wage bill and social transfers, in clear divergence with the recent past.According to the Commission Autumn 2004 Forecast, the fiscal effort in 2005, as measured by the change in the cyclically-adjusted balance, is 1.9% (2.5% according to the 2005 draft budget). Consequently, according to the Commission, the fiscal adjustment accumulated over 2004 and 2005 amounts to only 0.8% (1.6% according to the 2005 draft budget).[8]Overall, the measures presented in the draft budget appear insufficient to bring the nominal deficit below the 3% threshold in 2005 as recommended by the Council in July 2004.Debt developmentsTaking into account the revisions of debt levels included in the September EDP notification, the Commission forecasts do not project a significant fall of the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2005. After attaining 109.9% of GDP in 2003, debt is expected to increase further to 112.2% in 2004, while falling only marginally in 2005 to 111.9%. Leaving aside the effects of statistical revisions, debt developments in 2004 and 2005 are reflecting not only low primary balances, but also other factors. While such low primary surpluses, coupled with high nominal GDP growth, should result in a significant reduction of the debt ratio, projections for 2004 and 2005 indicate that debt levels are also driven by large stock-flow adjustments. This provides evidence that the government has taken no effective action on below-the-line operations.Collection and processing of government dataData revisions from May to September 2004 were mainly determined by corrections in transactions that had been identified by Eurostat as not being fully in line with the accounting rules. Greece has tackled a number of issues raised by Eurostat. However, as explained by the Commission in the letter giving formal notice of the infringement procedure No 2004/2234, open to Greece on 1 December, there are a number of elements which, in the view of the Commission, questioning the adequacy of the mechanisms to ensure the prompt and correct supply of the information required by the existing legal framework.* * *According to the provisions of Article 104(8) of the Treaty and of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, if the Council considers that no effective action has been taken in response to the recommendations addressed under Article 104(7) within the deadline of 5 November 2004, it shall decide accordingly immediately after the expiry of the deadline.In the light of these findings, the Commission is of the opinion that there has been no effective action in response to the Council recommendations according to Article 104(7) within the period laid down in the recommendation, and it recommends the Council to decide accordingly.Article 104(8) states that when the Council establishes that there has been no effective action in response to its recommendation according to Article 104(7), it may decide to make this recommendation public. However, Greece has already made this recommendation public in July, in line with Amsterdam Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact of 17 June 1997.[9]As to further steps of the procedure, if the Council is of the opinion that no effective action has been taken in response to the recommendations addressed under Article 104(7), it may according to Article 104(9) decide, on the basis of a Commission recommendation, to give notice to Greece to take, within a specified time-limit, measures for the deficit reduction which it judges necessary to remedy the situation. Any Council decision to give such a notice to Greece shall be taken within one month of its decision establishing that no effective action has been taken in accordance with Article 104(8).Recommendation for aCOUNCIL DECISIONEstablishing, in accordance with Article 104(8), whether effective action has been taken by Greece in response to recommendations of the Council according to Article 104(7) of the Treaty establishing the European CommunityTHE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNIONHaving regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 104(8) thereof;Having regard to the recommendation from the Commission;Whereas:In stage three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Member States according to Article 104 of the Treaty are to avoid excessive government deficits.The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation. The Stability and Growth Pact includes Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97[10] on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure set out in Article 104 in order to further the prompt correction of excessive general government deficits.The Amsterdam Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact of 17 June 1997[11] solemnly invites all parties, namely the Member States, the Council and the Commission, to implement the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in a strict and timely manner;By Decision 2004 / XXX / EC of 5 July 2004[12], the Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6), that an excessive deficit exists in Greece.The Council, in accordance with Article 104(7) of the Treaty and Article 3(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, has adopted a Recommendation establishing the deadline of 5 November 2004 for the Greek government to take measures to bring the existence of an excessive deficit to an end in 2005 at the latest. In the same document the Council recommended Greece to put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible and by 2005 at the latest in accordance and to take corrective measures mainly of a structural nature amounting to at least 1% of GDP, cumulated over 2004 and 2005, and preferably equally distributed between the two years. In addition, the Council recommended that Greece ensures that the government gross debt ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the reference value at a satisfactory pace, while paying particular attention to factors other than net borrowing which contribute to the change in debt levels. Finally, as a matter of urgency, the Council also recommended Greece to correct the serious deficiencies revealed on budgetary statistics, through the improvement of the collection and processing of general government data.According to Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its recommendations made in accordance with Article 104(7), shall base its decision on publicly announced decisions by the Government of the Member State concerned.An assessment of the publicly announced decisions taken by Greece since the Recommendation according to Article 104(7) was issued by the Council and until the deadline set in that Recommendation leads to the following conclusions:in spite of restraining measures announced for 2004, fiscal policy has been clearly expansionary, partly due to expenditure overruns associated to the organisation of the Olympic Games, in contrast with what was requested by the Council;the budgetary measures announced for 2005, while more than offsetting the slippage in 2004, do not ensure that the general government deficit is brought below 3% of GDP in 2005;not only is the general gross debt-to-GDP ratio not falling at a satisfactory pace, but the large stock-flow adjustment projected in 2004 also indicates that the government has taken no effective action on below-the-line operations contributing to further rises in the debt.Greece has improved the collection and processing of budgetary data, notably in relation to expenditure on military equipment, interest payments, and social security accounts. However, better mechanisms, to ensure the prompt and correct supply of the general government data required by the existing legal framework, are still necessary .Article 104(8) states that when the Council establishes that there has been no effective action in response to its recommendation according to Article 104(7), it may decide to make this recommendation public. However, in line with the Stability and Growth Pact Resolution of the European Council, Greece already made this recommendation public in July.HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:Article 1No effective action has been taken in response to the Council Recommendation according to Article 104(7) addressed to Greece on 5 July 2004 within the deadline set in that Recommendation.Article 2This decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.Done at Brussels, .For the Council [1] See Euro-Indicators News Release 117/2004 of 23 September 2004.[2] According to Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, which governs the EDP reporting, Member States should report data for years t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4. However, in response to a request by the Council, Eurostat also revised the accounts for years 1997, 1998 and 1999. In its report of 22 November on the ‘Revision of the Greek government deficit and debt figures’, Eurostat concluded that the actual deficits in those years had also been well above 3% (see also the Commission Communication ‘Report on the accountability issue related to the revision of Greek budgetary data’ - COM(2004) 784 of 1 December 2004).[3] These measures were announced in a letter by Mr. Alogoskoufis, Greek Minister of Finances, to Commissioner Almunia on 23 June 2004. No other measures for 2004 have been communicated to the Commission since then.[4] The figure is 0.2% of GDP lower than the Commission forecast (5.5%), in which a more realistic assessment of interest payments is made.[5] The exact figure was 2.95%, here rounded to 3%. It should be kept in mind that this figure of 2.95% was the result of a significant revision of the 2004 draft budget carried by the new government in March. This revision introduced more realistic projections of current revenues (lower direct taxes and EU transfers, but higher social contributions) and expenditure (higher public wages, social transfers) much more in line with the 2.4% projected by the Commission in its forecasts of autumn 2003. The revision was included in the end-March notification, which was not validated by Eurostat.[6] This information has been disclosed by the Greek authorities in their draft budget 2005. Compared with planned expenditures linked to the Olympic Games of 0.94% of GDP in 2004, the final outturn should be 1.6%.[7] Between the two 2004 forecasting exercises the output gap actually widened from 1.2% in spring to 1.5% in autumn, while potential output growth remained high at 3.4%.[8] The finalisation of the Games has an automatic effect on the fiscal position through savings worth of 1.2% (of which 0.7% 2004 overruns). The carry over effect in 2005 associated to the Olympic Games only amounts to ¬ 600 million (around 0.5% of GDP).[9] Council document 11216/04 of 6 July 2004, available in Council s public register of documents,The carry over effect in 2005 associated to the Olympic Games only amounts to €600 million (around 0.5% of GDP).[10] Council document 11216/04 of 6 July 2004, available in Council’s public register of documents, entitled “Council Recommendation to Greece with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit –Application of Article 104(7) of the Treaty”.[11] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p.6.[12] OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p.1.[13] Not yet published in the OJ.


Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the Member States, on behalf of the European Community, to approve unanimously the adoption of the recommendation for protection of privacy on the Internet by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe


RECOMMENDATION FOR A COUNCIL DECISION AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NORTH SEA WITH A VIEW TO SIGNING DOCUMENTS ARISING FROM THE CONFERENCE


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 2.10.2017
            COM(2017) 557 final
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            authorising the European Commission to negotiate an Agreement with the CARIFORUM States to protect geographic indications based on Article 145 of the CARIFORUM - EU Economic Partnership Agreement

               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

                  The CARIFORUM – EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), under Chapter 2, Section 2 ‘intellectual property’, Article 145
                     1
                  , establishes the level of protection of geographical indications, terms of protection and other parameters. However, no list of protected geographical indications has been established under this Agreement. For this reason, the EPA also contains in its Article 145 a rendezvous clause requiring the parties to complete the provisions on geographical indications and to establish the list of protected geographical indications.

               1.CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

               •Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

                  The CARIFORUM – EU EPA requires the parties to complete the regime of protection of geographical indications, including a list of protected names. Economic Partnership Agreements are in line with existing policy common commercial policy provisions of the Union.

               •Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

                  Not applicable.

               •Consistency with other Union policies

                  Not applicable.

               2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

               •Legal basis

                  The legal basis for the measure is Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

               •Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

                  Not applicable. Under Article 3 of the TFEU common commercial policy falls within the exclusive competences of the Union.

               •Proportionality

                  The recommendation for a Council decision will adhere to the provisions already laid down in the EPA. The substantive additions will be the list of names of protected geographical indications and provisions on cooperation procedures. This is the minimum necessary to meet the requirements of the EPA.

               •Choice of the instrument

                  The chosen instrument, international agreement, is the only appropriate instrument for the purpose.

               3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

               •Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

                  Not applicable.

               •Stakeholder consultations

                  Policy consultations took place with Member States and EP and through Council working groups and the relevant Committee of the EP. With CARIFORUM States and EU stakeholders consultation took place within the Consultative Committee of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and via workshops and other GI related events (fairs, producer groups meetings etc.).

               •Collection and use of expertise

               Not applicable.

               •Impact assessment

                  No Impact Assessment will be carried out for the initiative as there are no alternative policy options.

               •Regulatory fitness and simplification

                  Not applicable.

               •Fundamental rights

                  Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU provides that intellectual property shall be protected, to which this agreement will contribute.

               4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

                  No budgetary implications are foreseen.

               5.OTHER ELEMENTS

               •Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

                  The Agreement will be implemented within the existing EPA framework, using the committee and procedures already foreseen therein, details of which will be developed further in the Agreement.

               •Explanatory documents (for directives)

               Not applicable.

               •Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

                  Around 180 Union geographic indications will be protected against misuse and counterfeiting in CARIFORUM States and, up to 30 CARIFORUM States’ geographic indications will be protected in the Union. The Agreement will foresee regular updates of the list of the protected geographical indications, to ensure the reciprocal protection of new geographical indications.

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               authorising the European Commission to negotiate an Agreement with the CARIFORUM States to protect geographic indications based on Article 145 of the CARIFORUM - EU Economic Partnership Agreement

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 218(2) and (4) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

               Whereas:

               (1)Article 145 of the CARIFORUM – EU Economic Partnership Agreement provides that the parties shall establish a list of protected geographic indications as well as further details of the regime of their protection under the mentioned Agreement.

               (2)To achieve this and to give full effect to Article 145 of the CARIFORUM – EU Economic Partnership Agreement the Commission needs to conduct negotiations with the CARIFORUM States.

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               The European Commission is hereby authorised to negotiate with the CARIFORUM States an Agreement to protect geographical indications based on Article 145 of the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, including establishing a list of protected geographical indications, in line with the directives set out in the Annex.

               Article 2

               This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)
                  Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, oft he one part, and the European Community and ist Member States , of the other part, OJ L289/3, 30.10. 2008.

    ---documentbreak---

               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 2.10.2017
            COM(2017) 557 final
            ANNEX
            to the
            Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION
            authorising the European Commission to negotiate an Agreement with the CARIFORUM States to protect geographic indications based on Article 145 of the CARIFORUM - EU Economic Partnership Agreement

               ANNEX

               Directives for the negotiation of an agreement on geographical indications between the European Union and CARIFORUM States

               1.The Commission may enter into negotiations with CARIFORUM States with a view to concluding a balanced agreement on the protection of geographical indications that protects EU interests and takes account of the developing country status of the CARIFORUM States.

               2.Subject of negotiation is the protection of Geographical Indications (Gis) of  agricultural and fishery products, foodstuffs, wines, spirits and other alcoholic beverages in the respective territories of the parties to the agreement.

               3.Non agricultural products are not covered by these directives.

               4.The Commission shall conduct these negotiations on the basis of these negotiating directives, taking into account in particular the principles and mechanisms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the obligations arising from WTO rules.


Important legal notice

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52007SC0619

Recommendation for a Council Decision abrogating Decision 2003/89/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germany  /* SEC/2007/0619 final */

	[pic] | COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES |Brussels, 16.5.2007SEC(2007) 619 finalRecommendation for aCOUNCIL DECISIONabrogating Decision 2003/89/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germany(presented by the Commission)EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM1. BACKGROUNDArticle 104 of the Treaty establishes that Member States should avoid excessive deficits and lays down a procedure for their identification and correction. The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) is further specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on “speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure”[1], which is part of the Stability and Growth Pact. According to Article 104(2) of the Treaty, the Commission has to monitor compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of two criteria, namely: (a) whether the planned or actual government deficit exceeds the reference value of 3% of GDP (unless either the deficit ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value; or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value); and (b) whether government debt exceeds the reference value of 60 % of GDP (unless the debt ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace).In accordance with the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty, the Commission provides the data for the implementation of the EDP. As part of the application of this Protocol, Member States have to notify data on government deficits and debt and other associated variables twice a year, namely before 1 April and before 1 October, in accordance with Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93[2],[3].On 19 November 2002, the Commission initiated the EDP for Germany with the adoption of a report under Article 104(3), based on a planned general government deficit of 3.8 % of GDP and government debt of 60.9 % of GDP in 2002[4]. Based on a recommendation from the Commission, the Council decided on 21 January 2003 that an excessive deficit existed in Germany (Article 104(6) of the Treaty)[5]. At the same time, and also based on a Commission recommendation, the Council addressed recommendations under Article 104(7) to Germany with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit by 2004 at the latest[6].On 18 November 2003, the Commission considered that the measures taken by Germany had been insufficient and adopted a recommendation for the Council to decide accordingly and to give notice to Germany to take measures to correct the excessive deficit (under Articles 104(8) and 104(9) respectively). In this latter recommendation, the Commission proposed to extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit to 2005. On 25 November 2003, the Council decided not to endorse the Commission’s recommendations but instead adopted conclusions addressing recommendations to Germany for the correction of the excessive deficit by 2005 and stating that, in the light of the commitments made by Germany, the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) was held in abeyance. On 13 July 2004 these conclusions were annulled by the European Court of Justice[7].On 14 December 2004, the Commission adopted a Communication to the Council, which concluded that, in view of the unique circumstances created by the Council conclusions of 25 November 2003 and of the ruling of the European Court of Justice of 13 July 2004, the relevant deadline for the correction should be 2005. At the time, the Commission considered that Germany was on track to correct its excessive deficit by 2005 and that therefore no further steps under the EDP were necessary, although its budgetary situation remained vulnerable[8]. In its conclusions of 18 January 2005, the Council concurred with the Commission’s conclusions and confirmed that, in cooperation with the Commission, it stood “ready to take steps under the EDP, as appropriate”.Actual data provided by the Commission (Eurostat) following a provisional notification by Germany in February 2006 indicated that the general government deficit remained above 3 % of GDP in 2005. On 14 March 2006, according to Article 10(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the Council immediately decided, on the basis of recommendation from the Commission to give notice to Germany, in accordance with Article 104(9) of the Treaty[9], to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit " as rapidly as possible and at the latest by 2007 ". Specifically, the Council recommended that " in 2006 and 2007, Germany shall ensure a cumulative improvement in its cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures of at least one percentage point ". The Council requested Germany to submit a report outlining the measures taken to comply with its decision by the deadline of 14 July 2006 and further regular progress reports thereafter. It also urged Germany to " take the necessary measures to ensure that budgetary consolidation towards its medium-term objective of a balanced budget in structural terms is sustained through a reduction in the structural deficit of at least 0.5 % of GDP per year after the excessive deficit has been corrected ".Table 1: Adjustment endorsed by the Council on 14 March 2006% of GDP, unless indicated otherwise | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |General government balance | -3.3 | deficit slightly > 3 | deficit clearly < 3 |change in structural balance | Cumulative improvement of at least one percentage point |p.m.: Real GDP growth (%) | 0.9 | 1.5 | close to 1 |Note : structural balance = cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.Source : Council notice under Article 104(9) to Germany, quoting the Commission services’ autumn 2005 forecast and including subsequent evaluations (such as the Commission services’ interim forecast of 21 February 2006).Following the submission of the implementation report by Germany on 5 July 2006, the Commission adopted on 19 July 2006 a Communication informing the Council that Germany had taken action representing adequate progress towards the correction of the excessive deficit within the time limits set by the Council and that no further steps under the excessive deficit procedure were needed at that point[10]. In its meeting of 10 October 2006, the Council shared this view.According to Article 104(12), a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is to be abrogated, on the basis of a Commission recommendation, when the excessive deficit in the Member State concerned has, in the view of the Council, been corrected.2. DEFICIT DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL 2006The Council based its decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germany on the updated Stability Programme of December 2002, according to which the general government deficit amounted to 3.7 % of GDP in 2002. Its economic assessment led the Council to conclude that in the late 1990s, when Germany enjoyed relatively strong economic growth, progress in fiscal consolidation was limited, leaving little budgetary leeway to accommodate a cyclical slowdown. Government debt was projected to rise to 60.9 % of GDP by 2002, slightly above the reference value of 60 % of GDP.From 3.7 % of GDP in 2002, the deficit even rose to 4.0 % in 2003, and then fell to 3.2 % in 2005. There had not been enough budgetary leeway to accommodate average real GDP growth at 0.5 % per year over that period. Moreover, a series of tax cuts, adopted in 1999/2000 and carried out until 2005, burdened the budget. The revenue-to-GDP ratio fell from 44.4 % in 2002 to 43.5 % in 2005. Offsetting measures on the expenditure side were implemented only with some delay. Measures that particularly reduced the expenditure-to-GDP ratio from 48.1 to 46.8 % over the same period were the restraint in public sector wages, accompanied by a reduction in staff levels, the reform of the public health system in 2004, a reduction of subsidies and investment, but also the fact that low wage growth in the private sector dampened pension outlays. Germany made little recourse to one-off measures[11]. Even though the cyclically-adjusted balance had declined from 3½ % of GDP in 2002 to 2¼ % in 2005, the nominal budget deficit remained above 3 % of GDP in 2005 (see Table 2).Against the background of a forecast for real GDP growth of 1.4 % in 2006, the updated stability programme submitted in February 2006 aimed at a deficit of 3.3 % of GDP in 2006. While the German authorities had estimated the deficit at 2.1 % of GDP in the updated stability programme of November 2006, data provided by the Commission (Eurostat) following the reporting by Germany before 1 April 2007 in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 show that the deficit actually amounted to 1.7 % of GDP in 2006, i.e. much below the reference value[12],[13].About half of this unexpected improvement in the government balance is due to cyclical factors (real GDP actually grew by 2.7 %). Yet, also, the structural deficit improved, from 2½ % of GDP in 2005 to 1½ % of GDP in 2006. The principal contribution to the better structural outturn also comes from the revenue side. Direct taxes, especially those related to profits, yielded substantially stronger revenues than economic developments would have suggested. As a result, taxes as a percentage of GDP increased by more than ½ percentage point in 2006 compared with 2005. The higher tax ratio is therefore not the result of recent discretionary tax policy measures. Rather, it was partly driven by payments of tax arrears and early payments of direct taxes, to some extent the counterpart of the relatively low direct tax ratio of the past.In addition, general government expenditure has been kept under firm control in 2006, growing only by 0.6 % and thus slightly less than targeted. The expenditure restraint in 2006 is the result of the above-mentioned measures adopted since 2002, especially with regard to public sector wages and subsidies, which continued to show effect in 2006. Moreover, the strong economic recovery has led to a reduction in labour market expenditure. Since most of the expenditure restraint was included in the expenditure ratio at around 46 % of GDP as targeted in the updated stability programme of February 2006, the further decline to 45.7 % was mainly due to the higher-than-expected GDP.In sum, the nominal deficit has fallen well below the Treaty reference value, one year before the time limit set by the Council. In addition, the Council had requested an improvement in the structural balance of at least one percentage point in 2006 and 2007 in cumulative terms. Already in 2006, the structural balance improved by close to one percentage point.3. DEFICIT PROJECTIONS FOR 2007 AND BEYONDAgainst buoyant expected real GDP growth of 2.5 % in 2007, the Commission services' forecast of spring 2007 projects the deficit to decline further to 0.6 % of GDP on current policies. The German authorities had projected the deficit to amount to 1.6 % of GDP in their updated stability programme of November 2006. In view of the improving macroeconomic situation and the lower-than-expected 2006 deficit, the deficit projection was revised to 1.2 % of GDP in the April 2007 notification.As in the previous year, about half of the improvement in the government balance is structural, according to Commission services' calculations. Several measures, most of which were adopted in early 2006, contribute to the consolidation. The increase in the standard VAT rate from 16 % to 19 % should boost revenues by about 1 % of GDP. The pension contribution rate was raised from 19.5 % to 19.9 % and public health insurers are projected to increase contribution rates on average by ½ percentage point. On the other hand, the unemployment insurance contribution rate has been reduced from 6.5 % to 4.2 %, so that the overall social contribution burden will decline. As in 2006, profit-related taxes seem to continue their strong development. But notwithstanding the positive economic environment, revenue-rich tax bases like wages and salaries are expanding somewhat less dynamically than nominal GDP, so that – despite the increase in the VAT rate – the tax burden is expected to decline. The expenditure ratio should decline by more than one percentage point, once more reflecting public sector wage restraint and reduced labour-market-related spending, resulting from measures already implemented, such as the reduced benefit period for older recipients, and favourable labour market developments. However, public investment is projected to pick up, in view of better fiscal positions at all levels of government. Since there will be no recourse to one-off measures, the structural deficit is projected to decline by ¾ percentage point compared with the previous year.Under the assumption of unchanged policies, the general government deficit is projected by the Commission services to decline further to 0.3 % of GDP in 2008, albeit almost entirely due to persistent favourable cyclical conditions. Continuing consolidation effects of measures already in force will be more than offset by the budgetary impact from the planned reform of company taxation, for which the government presented a draft law in March 2007, amounting to more than 0.3 % of GDP in the initial year.In sum, the excessive deficit seems to have been corrected by 2006 in a permanent manner. The improvement in the structural balance as a percentage of GDP is projected to amount to ¾ percentage point in 2007, which would result in a cumulative improvement of 1½ percentage points in 2006 and 2007. Thus, Germany appears to comply with the Council's request for an improvement in the structural balance of at least one percentage point in 2006 and 2007 in cumulative terms.According to the Commission services' spring forecast for 2008, at unchanged policies by the German authorities there will be no further improvement in the structural balance, whereas in its notice under Article 104(9), the Council had invited Germany to ensure that the budgetary consolidation towards its medium-term objective (MTO) of a balanced budget in structural terms was sustained through a reduction in the structural deficit by at least 0.5 % of GDP per year after the excessive deficit has been corrected. In its opinion of 27 February 2007 on the November 2006 update of the stability programme[14], the Council noted that the programme did not plan to achieve the MTO within the programme period (which ends in 2010). It invited Germany to: " Benefiting from economic 'good times', strengthen the structural adjustment in 2008 including by using any extra revenues for deficit reduction, continue the fiscal consolidation towards the medium-term objective thereafter, by maintaining tight control over expenditures, while ensuring that the announced reform of the corporate tax system does not jeopardise the fiscal consolidation ".4. DEBT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROJECTIONSGovernment debt increased from 60.3 % of GDP in 2002 to 67.9 % in 2005 but stabilised in 2006. The fast increase in the debt ratio since the initiation of the excessive deficit procedure in 2002 can be mainly attributed to an unfavourable 'snow-ball' effect. This is the automatic increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio because of interest rates exceeding the growth rate of nominal GDP. Only in 2006, with high GDP growth, the increase in the primary surplus over-compensated the ‘snow-ball’ effect. Between 2002 and 2006, the increase in debt was contained through a reduction in financial assets – notably equity and loans granted by government to other sector – thus on average leading to a negative stock-flow adjustment.Because of GDP growth expected to remain buoyant, the Commission services' spring 2007 forecast projects the debt ratio to decline in 2007 to 65.4 % of GDP. In line with the deficit reduction, the debt ratio would fall further to 63.6 % of GDP by 2008. This decline is steeper than projected in the updated stability programme of November 2006, which foresees a debt ratio at 66½ % for 2008.5. CONCLUSIONSThe general government deficit decreased from its peak of 4.0 % of GDP in 2003 to 1.7 % in 2006, much below the 3 % of GDP reference value. The measures underlying the deficit reduction are mainly of a permanent nature, while the cyclical upswing has supported the budgetary consolidation. The structural balance (the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and other temporary measures) as a percentage of GDP improved by close to one percentage point in 2006. According to the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, the headline deficit is expected to narrow to 0.6 % of GDP in 2007, supported by an estimated improvement in the structural balance of ¾ percentage point in 2007. Therefore, the estimated structural improvement in 2006 and 2007 would be in line with a fiscal effort of at least one percentage point as recommended by the Council. On a no-policy change basis, the headline deficit is projected at 0.3 % in 2008. This indicates that the deficit has been brought below the 3 % of GDP ceiling in a credible and sustainable manner.General government gross debt rose from 60.3 % of GDP in 2002 to a peak of 67.9 % in 2005 but stabilised in 2006. According to the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, the debt ratio is expected to fall to 65.4 % of GDP in 2007 and then in line with the deficit reduction to around 63½ % of GDP by 2008 (on a no-policy change basis), thus coming closer to the reference value more rapidly than projected in the most recent update of the stability programme.From an overall assessment, it follows that the excessive deficit situation in Germany has been corrected. Accordingly, the Commission is recommending to the Council to abrogate its decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germany.Table 2: Budgetary developments, 2002-2008Recommendation for aCOUNCIL DECISIONabrogating Decision 2003/89/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in GermanyTHE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 104(12) thereof,Having regard to the recommendation from the Commission,Whereas:(1) By Council Decision 2003/89/EC[15], following a recommendation from the Commission in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty, it was decided that an excessive deficit existed in Germany. The Council noted that the general government deficit was 3.7 % of GDP in 2002, significantly exceeding the 3 % of GDP Treaty reference value, while general government gross debt was expected at 60.9 % of GDP, slightly above the 60 % of GDP Treaty reference value.(2) On 21 January 2003, in accordance with Article 104(7) of the Treaty and Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure[16] (EDP), the Council, based on a recommendation from the Commission, addressed a recommendation to Germany with a view to bringing the excessive deficit situation to an end as rapidly as possible and by 2004 at the latest. The recommendation was made public. As stated in the Commission Communication of 14 December 2004[17], in view of the unique circumstances created by the Council conclusions of 25 November 2003 and of the ruling of the European Court of Justice of 13 July 2004[18], the year 2005 should be considered to be the relevant deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. On 18 January 2005, the Council concurred with this statement.(3) In accordance with the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty, the Commission provides the data for the implementation of the procedure. As part of the application of this Protocol, Member States are to notify data on government deficits and debt and other associated variables twice a year, namely before 1 April and before 1 October, in accordance with Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community[19].(4) Actual data provided by the Commission (Eurostat) following a provisional notification by Germany in February 2006 indicated that the excessive deficit had not been corrected by 2005. According to Article 10(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and based on a recommendation from the Commission, the Council on 14 March 2006 immediately took a decision under Article 104(9) of the Treaty giving notice to Germany to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit as rapidly as possible and at the latest by 2007. Specifically, the Council requested that in 2006 and 2007, Germany should ensure a cumulative improvement in its cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures by at least one percentage point.(5) In accordance with Article 104(12) of the Treaty, a Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is to be abrogated when the excessive deficit in the Member State concerned has, in the view of the Council, been corrected.(6) Based on data provided by the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Article 8g(1) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 following the notification by Germany before 1 April 2007 and on the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, the following conclusions are warranted:-  the general government deficit, after rising from 3.7 % of GDP in 2002 to 4.0 % of GDP in 2003, was reduced to 3.7% of GDP in 2004, to 3.2 % of GDP in 2005, and finally to 1.7 % of GDP in 2006. This is lower than the target of 3.3 % of GDP set in the February 2006 update of the stability programme and well below the 3 % of GDP deficit reference value one year before the time limit set by the Council,-  in previous years of favourable cyclical conditions, Germany had not created enough budgetary leeway to accommodate the extended slow growth period between 2002 and 2005 with average real GDP growth at 0.5 % per year. A series of tax cuts, carried out until 2005, burdened the budget further, while offsetting measures on the expenditure side were implemented only with some delay. Consolidation measures included restraint in public sector wages, accompanied by a reduction in staff levels, the reform of the public health system in 2004, a reduction of subsidies and public investment, but also the fact that low wage growth in the private sector dampened pension outlays. Furthermore, in 2006, direct taxes, especially those related to profits, yielded stronger revenues than economic developments would have suggested. The cyclically-adjusted balance improved from 2002 onwards, without recourse to significant one-off measures. Particularly in 2006, the estimated structural balance (i.e. excluding one-off and other temporary measures) as a percentage of GDP improved by close to one percentage point,-  for 2007, the Commission services' spring 2007 forecast projects the deficit to be reduced further to 0.6 % of GDP, driven by continuing high GDP growth and, in particular, the increase in the standard VAT rate from 16 % to 19 % as of January 2007 (no one-offs are envisaged). In the spring 2007 notification, the German authorities estimated the 2007 deficit at 1.2 % of GDP. Moreover, the Commission services project an improvement in the structural balance as a percentage of GDP amounting to ¾ percentage point in 2007. Thus, Germany appears to comply with the recommended improvement in the structural balance of at least one percentage point in 2006 and 2007 in cumulative terms. For 2008, the spring forecast projects, with unchanged policies, a further decline in the deficit to 0.3 % of GDP. This indicates that the deficit has been brought below the 3 % of GDP ceiling in a credible and sustainable manner. With unchanged policies, the structural deficit is expected to decline only marginally in 2008. This has to be seen against the need to make progress towards the medium-term objective (MTO) for the budgetary position, which for Germany is a balanced budget in structural terms,-  after rising from 60.3 % of GDP in 2002 to a peak of 67.9 % of GDP in 2005, the debt ratio stabilised in 2006 and is projected to decline to 65.4 % of GDP in 2007 and to about 63½ % by 2008 (on a no-policy change basis) according to the Commission services' spring 2007 forecast, thus coming closer to the reference value more rapidly than projected in the most recent update of the stability programme.(7) In the view of the Council, the excessive deficit in Germany has been corrected and Decision 2003/89/EC should therefore be abrogated.HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:Article 1From an overall assessment it follows that the excessive deficit situation in Germany has been corrected.Article 2Decision 2003/89/EC is hereby abrogated.Article 3This Decision is addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany.Done at [], [].For the CouncilThe President [1] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5).[2] OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005 (OJ L 337, 22.12.2005, p. 1).[3] The most recent notification of Germany can be found at:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=2373,58110711&_dad=portal&_schema=portal.[4] SEC(2002) 1245.[5] OJ L 34, 11.2.2003, p. 16.[6] All documents pertaining to the excessive deficit procedure for Germany can be found on the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/edp/edpde_en.htm.[7] Case C-27/04, Commission vs Council, [2004] ECR I-6649 (OJ C 228, 11.9.2004, p. 16).[8] Communication from the Commission to the Council: “The situation of Germany and France in relation to their obligations under the excessive deficit procedure following the judgement of the Court of Justice” - COM(2004) 813, 14.12.2004.[9] OJ L 126, 13.5.2006, p. 20.[10] SEC(2006) 990.[11] In 2004, a tax amnesty was granted, which however raised little revenue. In 2004 and 2005, Landesbanken were ordered to repay subsidies, following Commission Decisions.[12] Eurostat News Release No 55 of 23 April 2007.[13] General government accounts are usually revised for 4 years before becoming final. Based on past experience, the statistics on the German general government deficit are highly reliable. Therefore, any future (upward or downward) revision in the deficit ratio is expected to be very small.[14] OJ C 70, 27.3.2007, p. 5.[15] OJ L 34 , 11.2.2003, p. 16.[16] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5).[17] Communication from the Commission to the Council: “The situation of Germany and France in relation to their obligations under the excessive deficit procedure following the judgement of the Court of Justice” - COM(2004) 813, 14.12.2004.[18] Case C-27/04, Commission vs Council, [2004] ECR I-6649 (OJ C 228, 11.9.2004, p. 16).[19] OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005 (OJ L 337, 22.12.2005, p. 1).


RECOMMENDATION FOR A COUNCIL DECISION ON DIRECTIVES FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN GATT ON ADJUSTMENTS TO TARIFF CONCESSIONS ON CERTAIN ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS


               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 16.9.2015
            COM(2015) 458 final
            2015/0210(NLE)
            Recommendation for a
            COUNCIL DECISION
            concerning the accession of Croatia to the Convention of 26 July 1995,drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protectionof the European Communities' financial interests, the Protocol of 27 September 1996,drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to theConvention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, theProtocol of 29 November 1996, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty onEuropean Union, on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, bythe Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protectionof the European Communities' financial interests and the Second Protocol of 19 June1997, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to theConvention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests

               EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

               1.CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

               The Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union
                  1
                has introduced a simplified system for the accession of Croatia to the conventions (and protocols) concluded by the Member States on the basis of Art. 34 TEU (previously Art. K.3 TEU). It is indeed not anymore necessary, as in the past, to negotiate and conclude specific accession protocols to these conventions (which would have implied ratification by 28 Member States): Article 3(4) and 3(5) of the Act provides simply that Croatia accedes to these conventions and protocols by virtue of the Act of Accession.

               Article 3(5) of the Act of Accession provides that, to that effect, the Council shall adopt a decision in order to determine the date on which these conventions shall enter into force for Croatia and to make all the necessary adjustments to these conventions required by reason of the accession of the new Member State (which would include, in any event, the adoption of the conventions in the Croatian language, so that these versions can be "equally authentic"). The Council shall act on a recommendation of the Commission, after consulting the European Parliament.

               Annex I to the Act of Accession gives the list of the conventions and protocols concerned. The list includes the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests of 26.7.1995,
                  2
                its Protocols of 27.9.1996
                  3
               , of 29.11.1996
                  4
                and the 2nd Protocol of 19.6.1997,
                  5
                all adopted under Title VI EU Treaty, set out to establish a common base for the criminal-law protection of the EC’s financial interests. The Convention and its Protocols of 27.9.1996 and of 29.11.1996 entered into force on 17 October 2002 following ratification by the then 15 Member States, the Protocol of 19. 6. 1997 entered into force on 19 May 2009 following ratification by the then 27 Member States.

               There is no need for this Commission Recommendation to make the adjustments required by reason of the accession of Croatia to the aforementioned Convention and its Protocols, in accordance with Article 3(5) of the Act of Accession.

               In view of the foregoing the Commission recommends that the Council takes a decision concerning the accession of Croatia to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests and its Protocols.

               2.RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

               Consultations and impact assessments are not applicable for this proposal since Croatia's accession to this Convention and its Protocols was agreed in the Articles 3(4) and 3(5) of the Act concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union.

               3.LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL

               The legal basis for this proposal is the Article 3.5 of the Act concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union.

               2015/0210 (NLE)

               Recommendation for a

               COUNCIL DECISION

               concerning the accession of Croatia to the Convention of 26 July 1995,
                  drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection
                  of the European Communities' financial interests, the Protocol of 27 September 1996,
                  drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the
                  Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, the
                  Protocol of 29 November 1996, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on
                  European Union, on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by
                  the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection
                  of the European Communities' financial interests and the Second Protocol of 19 June
                  1997, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the
                  Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests

               THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

               Having regard to the Treaty on European Union,

               Having regard to the Act of Accession of Croatia, and in particular Article 3(4) and 3(5) thereof,

               Having regard to the recommendation from the Commission
                  6
               ,

               Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament
                  7
               ,

               Whereas:

               1) The Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests
                  8
               , signed on 26 July 1995 and drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests”) entered into force on 17 October 2002.

               2) The Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests was complemented by the Protocol of 27 September 1996, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests
                  9
                (hereinafter referred to as “the Protocol of 27 September 1996”) and the Protocol of 29 November 1996, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests
                  10
                (hereinafter referred to as “the Protocol of 29 November 1996”), which both entered into force on 17 October 2002.

               3) The Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests was further complemented by the Second Protocol of 19 June 1997, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests
                  11
                (hereinafter referred to as “the Second Protocol of 19 June 1997”) which entered into force on 19 May 2009.

               4) Article 3 (4) of the Act of Accession of Croatia
                  12
                provides that Croatia accedes to the conventions and protocols concluded between the Member States, listed in Annex I to the Act of Accession. This comprises, inter alia, the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, including the Protocol of 27 September 1996, the Protocol of 29 November 1996 and the Second Protocol of 19 June 1997. It is necessary to determine the date on which that Convention and these Protocols are to enter into force in relation to Croatia.

               5) Furthermore, in accordance with Article 3(5) of the Act of Accession of Croatia, it is necessary to proceed to the adjustment required by reason of accession of Croatia and to that end, to draw up an authentic version of that Convention and these Protocols in the Croatian language.

               HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

               Article 1

               The texts of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, the Protocol of 27 September 1996, the Protocol of 29 November 1996 and the Second Protocol of 19 June 1997, annexed to this Decision, shall be authentic in the Croatian language.

               Article 2

               The Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, the Protocol of 27 September 1996, the Protocol of 29 November 1996 and the Protocol of 19 June 1997 shall enter into force for Croatia on the first day of the first month following the date of publication of this Decision.

               Article 3

               This Decision shall take effect on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

               Done at Brussels,

                     For the Council

                     The President

                     (1)
                  OJ L 112, 24.4.2012, p. 10.

                     (2)
                  Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 49.

                     (3)
                  Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 2.

                     (4)
                  Protocol on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, OJ C 151, 20.5.1997, p. 2.

                     (5)
                  Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, OJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 12.

                     (6)
                  OJ C […], […], p. […].

                     (7)
                  OJ C […], […], p. […].

                     (8)
                  OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 49

                     (9)
                  OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 2.

                     (10)
                  OJ C 151, 20.5.1997, p. 2.

                     (11)
                  OJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 12.

                     (12)
                  OJ L 112, 24.04.2012, p. 21.

    ---documentbreak---

               EUROPEAN COMMISSION
            Brussels, 16.9.2015
            COM(2015) 458 final
            ANNEXES
            to the
            Recommendation for aCOUNCIL DECISION
            concerning the accession of Croatia to the Convention of 26 July 1995,drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protectionof the European Communities' financial interests, the Protocol of 27 September 1996,drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to theConvention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, theProtocol of 29 November 1996, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty onEuropean Union, on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, bythe Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protectionof the European Communities' financial interests and the Second Protocol of 19 June1997, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to theConvention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests

               ANNEXES

               to the

               Recommendation for a
                  COUNCIL DECISION

               concerning the accession of Croatia to the Convention of 26 July 1995,
                  drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection
                  of the European Communities' financial interests, the Protocol of 27 September 1996,
                  drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the
                  Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, the
                  Protocol of 29 November 1996, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on
                  European Union, on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by
                  the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection
                  of the European Communities' financial interests and the Second Protocol of 19 June
                  1997, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the
                  Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests

               ANNEX 1

               Text of the Convention of 26 July 1995, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests in the Croatian language

               ANNEX 2

               Text of the Protocol of 27 September 1996, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests in the Croatian language

               ANNEX 3

               Text of the Protocol of 29 November 1996, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests in the Croatian language

               ANNEX 4

               Text of the Second Protocol of 19 June 1997, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests in the Croatian language


RECOMMENDATION FOR A COUNCIL DECISION CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF A PROTOCOL TO THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONSEQUENT ON THE ACCESSION OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN AND THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC TO THE COMMUNITY


RECOMMENDATION FOR A COUNCIL DECISION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTIVES FOR THE COMMISSION WITH A VIEW TO THE NEGOTIATION OF A FISHERIES AGREEMENT WITH THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA