Avis juridique important

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31992L0121

Council Directive 92/121/EEC of 21 December 1992 on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit institutions

Official Journal L 029 , 05/02/1993 P. 0001 - 0008 Finnish special edition: Chapter 6 Volume 3 P. 0208  Swedish special edition: Chapter 6 Volume 3 P. 0208

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92/121/EEC of 21 December 1992 on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit institutionsTHE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular the first and third sentences of Article 57 (2) thereof,  Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),  In cooperation with the European Parliament (2),  Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (3),  Whereas this Directive comes within the framework of the aims set out in the Commission's White Paper on completing the internal market;  Whereas the essential rules for monitoring large exposures of credit institutions should be harmonized; whereas Member States should still be able to adopt provisions more stringent than those provided for by this Directive;  Whereas this Directive has been the subject of consultation with the Banking Advisory Committee, which, under Article 6 (4) of Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions  relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (4), is responsible for making suggestions to the Commission with a view to coordinating the coefficients applicable in the Member States;  Whereas the monitoring and control of a credit institution's exposures is an integral part of its supervision; whereas an excessive concentration of exposures to a single client or group of connected clients may result in an unacceptable risk of loss;  whereas such a situation may be considered prejudicial to the solvency of a credit institution;  Whereas common guidelines for monitoring and controlling credit institutions' large exposures were initially introduced by Commission recommendation 87/62/EEC (5); whereas that instrument was chosen because it permitted the gradual adjustment of  existing systems and the establishment of new systems without dislocating the Community's banking system; whereas, now that that first phase is over, a binding instrument applicable to all Community credit institutions should be adopted;  Whereas in a unified banking market credit institutions are engaged in direct competition with one another and monitoring requirements throughout the Community should therefore be equivalent; whereas, to that end, the criteria applied to determining the  concentration of exposures must be the subject of legally binding rules at Community level and cannot be left entirely to the discretion of the Member States; whereas the adoption of common rules will therefore best serve the Communtiy's interests,  since it will prevent differences in the conditions of competition, while strengthening the Community's banking system;  Whereas, for the precise accounting technique to be used for the assessment of exposures reference is made to Council Directive 86/635/EEC of 8 December 1986 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions (6);   Whereas Council Directive 89/647/EEC of 18 December 1989 on a solvency ratio for credit institutions (7) includes a list of credit risks which may be incurred by credit institutions; whereas that list should therefore be used for the definition of  exposures for the purposes of this Directive; whereas it is not, however, appropriate to refer on principle to the weightings or degrees of risk laid down in that Directive; whereas those weightings and degrees of risk were devised for the purpose of  establishing a general solvency requirement to cover the credit risk of credit institutions; whereas, in the context of the regulation of large exposures, the aim is to limit the maximum loss that a credit institution may incur through any single client  or group of connected clients; whereas it is therefore appropriate to adopt a prudent approach in which, as a general rule, account is taken of the nominal value of exposures, but no weightings or degrees of risk are applied;  Whereas, when a credit institution incurs an exposure to its own parent undertaking or to other subsidiaries of tis parent undertaking, particular prudence is necessary; whereas the management of exposures incurred by credit institutions must by carried  out in a fully autonomous manner, in accordance with the principles of sound banking management, without regard to any considerations other than those principles; whereas the Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of  laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (8) requires that where the influence exercised by persons directly or indirectly holding a qualifying participation in a credit  institution is likely to operate to the detriment of the sound and prudent management of that institution, the competent authorities shall take appropriate measures to put an end to that situation; whereas, in the field of large exposures, specific  standards should also be laid down for exposures incurred by a credit institution to its own group and in such cases more stringent restrictions are justified than for other exposures; whereas more stringent restrictions need not, however, be applied  where the parent undertaking is a financial holding company or a credit institution or where the other subsidiaries are either credit or financial institutions or undertakings offering ancillary banking services, provided that all such undertakings are  covered by the supervision of the credit institution on a consolidated basis; whereas in such cases the consolidated monitoring of the group of undertakings allows for an adequate level of supervision, and does not require the imposition of more  stringent limits on exposure; whereas under this approach banking groups will also be encouraged to organize their structures in such a way as to allow consolidated monitoring, which is desirable because a more comprehensive level of monitoring is  possible;  Whereas, in order to ensure harmonious application of this Directive, Member States should be allowed to provide for the two-stage application of the new limits; whereas, for smaller credit institutions, a longer transitional period may be warranted  inasmuch as too rapid an application of the 25 % rule could reduce their lending activity too abruptly;  Whereas implementing powers of the same type as those which the Council reserved for itself in Directive 89/299/EEC on the own funds of credit institutions (9) were granted to the Commission in Directive 89/646/EEC;  Whereas, taking account of the specific characteristics of the sector in question, it is appropriate to give the Committee set up by Article 22 of Directive 89/646/EEC the role of assisting the Commission in exercising the powers conferred on it under  the procedure laid down in Article 2 (Procedure III, Variant (b)) of Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (10);  Whereas, with regard to the monitoring of large exposures concerning activities which are principally exposed to market risks, the necessary coordination of monitoring methods can be ensured under a Community act on the capital adequacy of investment  firms and credit institutions; whereas that implies that until Community legislation on the aforementioned large exposures is adopted the monitoring of large exposures relating to activities which are principally exposed to market risks, such as the  trading portfolio, underwriting commitments for the issue of securities and claims related to the settlement of securities transactions may be left to the competent authorities of each Member State,  HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1  Definitions For the purposes of this Directive:  (a)   credit institution shall mean a credit institution as defined in the first indent of Article 1 of Directive 77/780/EEC, including such a credit institution's branches in third countries, and any private or public undertaking, including its  branches, which satisfies the definition in the first indent of Article 1 of Directive 77/780/EEC and which has been authorized in a third country;  (b) competent authorities shall mean the competent authorities as defined in the ninth indent of Article 1 of Council Directive 92/30/EEC of 6 April 1992 on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis (11);  (c) parent undertaking shall mean a parent undertaking as defined in the seventh indent of Article 1 of Directive 92/30/EEC;  (d) subsidiary undertaking shall mean a subsidiary undertaking as defined in the eighth indent of Article 1 of Directive 92/30/EEC;  (e) financial holding company shall mean a financial holding company as defined in the third indent of Article 1 of Directive 92/30/EEC;  (f) financial institution shall mean a financial institution as defined in the second indent of Article 1 of Directive 92/30/EEC;  (g) ancillary banking-services undertaking shall mean an undertaking as defined in the fifth indent of Article 1 of Directive 92/30/EEC;  (h) exposures shall mean the assets and off-balance-sheet items referred to in Article 6 of Directive 89/647/EEC and in Annexes I and III thereto, without application of the weightings or degrees of risk there provided for; the risks referred to in the  aforementioned Annex III must be calculated in accordance with one of the methods set out in Annex II to that Directive, without application of the weightings for counter-party risk; all elements entirely covered by own funds may, with the agreement of  the competent authorities, be excluded from the definition of exposures provided that such own funds are not included in the calculation of the solvency ratio or of other monitoring ratios provided for in Community acts; exposures shall not include:  -  in the case of foreign exchange transactions, exposures incurred in the ordinary course of settlement during the 48 hours following payment, or  - in the case of transactions for the purchase or sale of securities, exposures incurred in the ordinary course of settlement during the five working days following payment or delivery of the securities, whichever is the earlier;  (i) Zone A shall mean the zone referred to in the second indent of Article 2 (1) of Directive 89/647/EEC;  (j) Zone B shall mean the zone referred to in the third indent of Article 2 (1) of Directive 89/647/EEC;  (k) own funds shall mean the own funds of a credit institution as defined in Directive 89/299/EEC;  (l) control shall mean the relationship between a parent undertaking and a subsidiary, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 83/349/EEC, or a similar relationship between any natural or legal person and an undertaking;  (m) group of connected clients shall mean:  - two or more natural or legal persons who, unless it is shown otherwise, constitute a single risk because one of them, directly or indirectly, has control over the other or others, or  - two or more natural or legal persons between whom there is no relationship of control as defined in the first indent but who are to be regarded as constituting a single risk because they are so interconnected that, if one of them were to experience  financial problems, the other or all of the others would be likely to encounter repayment difficulties. Article 2  Scope This Directive shall apply to credit institutions which have obtained the authorization referred to in Article 3 of Directive 77/780/EEC.  Member States need not, however, apply this Directive to:  (a)  the institutions listed in Article 2 (2) of Directive 77/780/EEC, or (b) the institutions in the same Member State which, as defined in Article 2 (4) (a) of Directive 77/780/EEC, are affiliated to a central body established in that Member State, provided that, without prejudice to the application of this Directive to the  central body, the whole as constituted by the central body and its affiliated institutions is subject to global monitoring. Article 3  Reporting of large exposures 1.  A credit institution's exposure to a client or group of connected clients shall be considered a large exposure where its value is equal to or exceeds 10 % of its own funds.  2.  A credit institution shall report every large exposure within the meaning of paragraph 1 to the competent authorities. Member States shall provide that that reporting is to be carried out, at their discretion, in accordance with one of the following  two methods:  -  reporting of all large exposures at least once a year, combined with reporting during the year of all new large exposures and any increases in existing large exposures of at least 20 % with respect to the previous communication,  - reporting of all large exposures at least four times a year.  3.  Exposures exempted under Article 4 (7) (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g) and (h) need not, however, be reported as laid down in paragraph 2. The reporting frequency laid down in the second indent of paragraph 2 may be reduced to twice a year for the  exposures referred to in Article 4 (7) (e) and (i) to (s), (8), (9) and (10).  4.  The competent authorities shall require that every credit institution have sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms for the purpose of identifying and recording all large exposures and subsequent  changes to them, as defined and required by this Directive, and for that of monitoring those exposures in the light of each credit institution's own exposure policies.  Where a credit institution invokes paragraph 3, it shall keep a record of the grounds advanced for at least one year after the event giving rise to the dispensation, so that the competent authorities may establish whether it is justified. Article 4  Limits on large exposures 1.  A credit institution may not incur an exposure to a client or group of connected clients the value of which exceeds 25 % of its own funds.  2.  Where that client or group of connected clients is the parent undertaking or subsidiary of the credit institution and/or one or more subsidiaries of that parent undertaking, the percentage laid down in paragraph 1 shall be reduced to 20 %. Member  States may, however, exempt the exposures incurred to such clients from the 20 % limit if they provide for specific monitoring of such exposures by other measures or procedures. They shall inform the Commission and the Banking Advisory Committee of the  content of such measures or procedures.  3.  A credit institution may not incur large exposures which in total exceed 800 % of its own funds.  4.  Member States may impose limits more stringent than those laid down in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.  5.  A credit institution shall at all times comply with the limits laid down in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 in respect of its exposures. If in an exceptional case exposures exceed those limits, that fact must be reported without delay to the competent  authorities which may, where the circumstances warrant it, allow the credit institution a limited period of time in which to comply with the limits.  6.  Member States may fully or partially exempt from the application of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 exposures incurred by a credit institution to its parent undertaking, to other subsidiaries of that parent undertaking or to its own subsidiaries, in so far as  those undertakings are covered by the supervision on a consolidated basis to which the credit institution itself is subject, in accordance with Directive 92/30/EEC or with equivalent standards in force in a third country.  7.  Member States may fully or partially exempt the following exposures from the application of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3:  (a)   asset items constituting claims on Zone A central governments or central banks;  (b) asset items constituting claims on the European Communities;  (c)  asset items constituting claims carrying the explicit guarantees of Zone A central governments or central banks or of the European Communities;  (d) other exposures attributable to, or guaranteed by, Zone A central governments or central banks or the European Communities;  (e) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to Zone B central governments or central banks which are denominated and, where applicable, funded in the national currencies of the borrowers;  (f) asset items and other exposures secured, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, by collateral in the form of Zone A central government or central bank securities, or securities issued by the European Communities or by Member State  regional or local authorities for which Article 7 of Directive 89/647/EEC lays down a zero weighting for solvency purposes;  (g) asset items and other exposures secured, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, by collateral in the form of cash deposits placed with the lending institution or with a credit institution which is the parent undertaking or a subsidiary of  the lending institution;  (h) asset items and other exposures secured, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, by collateral in the form of certificates of deposit issued by the lending institution or by a credit institution which is the parent undertaking or a  subsidiary of the lending institution and lodged with either of them;  (i) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to credit institutions, with a maturity of one year or less, but not constituting such institutions' own funds as defined in Directive 89/299/EEC;  (j) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to those institutions which are not credit institutions but which fulfil the conditions referred to in Article 8 (2) of Directive 89/647/EEC, with a maturity of one year or less, and secured in  accordance with the same paragraph;  (k) bills of trade and other similar bills, with a maturity of one year or less, bearing the signatures of other credit institutions;  (l) debt securities as defined in Article 22 (4) of Directive 85/611/EEC (12);  (m) pending subsequent coordination, holdings in the insurance companies referred to in Article 12 (3) of Directive 89/646/EEC up to 40 % of the own funds of the credit institution acquiring such a holding;  (n) asset items constituting claims on regional or central credit institutions with which the lending institution is associated in a network in accordance with legal or statutory provisions and which are responsible, under those provisions, for  cash-clearing operations within the network;  (o) exposures secured, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, by collateral in the form of securities other than those referred to in (f) provided that those securities are not issued by the credit institution itself, its parent company or  one of their subsidiaries, or by the client or group of connected clients in question. The securities used as collateral must be valued at market price, have a value that exceeds the exposures guaranteed and be either traded on a stock exchange or  effectively negotiable and regularly quoted on a market operated under the auspices of recognized professional operators and allowing, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities of the Member State of origin of the credit institution, for the  establishment of an objective price such that the excess value of the securities may be verified at any time. The excess value required shall be 100 %; it shall, however, be 150 % in the case of shares and 50 % in the case of debt securities issued by  credit institutions, Member State regional or local authorities other than those referred to in Article 7 of Directive 89/647/EEC, and in the case of debt securities issued by the European Investment Bank and multilateral development banks as defined in  Article 2 of Directive 89/647/EEC. Securities used as collateral may not constitute credit institutions' own funds as defined in Directive 89/229/EEC;  (p) loans secured, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, by mortgages on residential property and leasing transactions under which the lessor retains full ownership of the residential property leased for as long as the lessee has not  exercised his option to purchase, in both cases up to 50 % of the value of the residential property concerned. The value of the property shall be calculated, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, on the basis of strict valuation standards  laid down by law, regulation or administrative provisions. Valuation shall be carried out at least once a year. For the purposes of this subparagraph residential property shall mean a residence to be occupied or let by the borrower;  (q) 50 % of the medium/low-risk off-balance-sheet items referred to in Annex I to Directive 89/647/EEC;  (r) subject to the competent authorities' agreement, guarantees other than loan guarantees which have a legal or regulatory basis and are given for their members by mutual guarantee schemes possessing the status of credit institutions as defined in  Article 1 (a), subject to a weighting of 20 % of their amount.  Member States shall inform the Commission of the use they make of this option in order to ensure that it does not result in distortions of competition. Within five years of the adoption of this Directive, the Commission shall submit to the Council a  report accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals;  (s) the low-risk off-balance-sheet items referred to in Annex I to Directive 89/647/EEC, to the extent that an agreement has been concluded with the  client or group of connected clients under which the exposure may be incurred only if it has been  ascertained that it will not cause the limits applicable under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 to be exceeded.  8.  For the purposes of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, Member States may apply a weighting of 20 % to asset items constituting claims on Member State regional and local authorities and to other exposures to or guaranteed by such authorities; subject to the  conditions laid down in Article 7 of Directive 89/647/EEC, however, Member States may reduce that rate to 0 %.  9.  For the purposes of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, Member States may apply a weighting of 20 % to asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to credit institutions with a maturity of more than one but not more than three years and a weighting of  50 % to asset items constituting claims on credit institutions with a maturity of more than three years, provided that the latter are represented by debt instruments that were issued by a credit institution and that those debt instruments are, in the  opinion of the competent authorities, effectively negotiable on a market made up of professional operators and are subject to daily quotation on that market, or the issue of which was authorized by the competent authorities of the Member State of origin  of the issuing credit institution. In no case may any of these items constitute own funds within the meaning of Directive 89/299/EEC.  10.  By way of derogation from paragraphs 7 (i) and 9, Member States may apply a weighting of 20 % to asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to credit institutions, regardless of their maturity.  11.  Where an exposure to a client is guaranteed by a third party, or by collateral in the form of securities issued by a third party under the conditions laid down in paragraph 7 (o), Member States may:  -  treat the exposure as having been incurred to the third party rather than to the client, if the exposure is directly and unconditionally guaranteed by that third party, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities,  - treat the exposure as having been incurred to the third party rather than to the client, if the exposure defined in paragraph 7 (o) is guaranteed by collateral under the conditions there laid down.  12.  Within five years of the date referred to in Article 8 (1), the Council shall, on the basis of a report from the Commission, examine the treatment of interbank  exposures provided for in paragraphs 7 (i), 9 and 10. The Council shall decide on any  changes to be made on a proposal from the Commission. Article 5  Supervision on a consolidated or unconsolidated basis 1.  If the credit institution is neither a parent undertaking nor a subsidiary, compliance with the obligations imposed in Articles 3 and 4 or in any other Community provision applicable to this area shall be monitored on an unconsolidated basis.  2.  In the other cases, compliance with the obligations imposed in Articles 3 and 4 or in any other Community provision applicable to this area shall be monitored on a consolidated basis in accordance with Directive 92/30/EEC.  3.  Member States may waive monitoring on an individual or subconsolidated basis of compliance with the obligations imposed in Articles 3 and 4 or in any other Community provision applicable to this area by a credit institution which, as a parent  undertaking, is subject to monitoring on a consolidated basis and by any subsidiary of such a credit institution which is subject to their authorization and supervision and is covered by monitoring on a consolidated basis.  Member States may also waive such monitoring where the parent undertaking is a financial holding company established in the same Member State as the credit institution, provided that that company is subject to the same monitoring as credit institutions.   In the cases referred to in the first and second subparagraphs measures must be taken to ensure the satisfactory allocation of risks within the group.  4.  Where a credit institution the parent undertaking of which is a credit institution has been authorized and has its registered office in another Member State, the competent authorities which granted that authorization shall require compliance with  the obligations imposed in Articles 3 and 4 or in any other Community provision applicable to this area on an individual basis or, when appropriate, a subconsolidated basis.  5.  Notwithstanding paragraph 4, the competent authorities responsible for authorizing the subsidiary of a parent undertaking which is a credit institution which has been authorized by and has its registered office in another Member State may, by way of  bilateral  agreement, transfer responsibility for monitoring compliance with the obligations imposed in Articles 3 and 4 or in any other Community provision applicable to this area to the competent authorities which have authorized and which monitor the  parent undertaking. The Commission and the Banking Advisory Committee shall be kept informed of the existence and content of such agreements. Article 6  Transitional provisions relating to exposures in excess of the limits 1.  If, when this Directive is published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, a credit institution has already incurred an exposure or exposures exceeding either the large exposure limit or the aggregate large exposure limit laid down in  this Directive, the competent authorities shall require the credit institution concerned to take steps to have that exposure or those exposures brought within the limits laid down in this Directive.  2.  The process of having such an exposure or exposures brought within authorized limits shall be devised, adopted, implemented and completed within the period which the competent authorities consider consistent with the principle of sound  administration and fair competition. The competent authorities shall inform the Commission and the Banking Advisory Committee of the schedule for the general process adopted.  3.  A credit institution may not take any measure which would cause the exposures referred to in paragraph 1 to exceed their level on the date of the publication of this Directive in the Official Journal of the European Communities.  4.  The period applicable under paragraph 2 shall expire no later than 31 December 2001. Exposures with a longer maturity, for which the lending institution is bound to observe the contractual terms, may be continued until their maturity.  5.  Until 31 December 1998, Member States may increase the limit laid down in Article 4 (1) to 40 % and the limit laid down in Article 4 (2) to 30 %. In such cases and subject to paragraphs 1 to 4, the time limit for bringing the exposures existing at  the end of this period within the limits laid down in Article 4 shall expire on 31 December 2001.  6.  In the case of credit institutions the own funds of which, as defined in Article 2 (1) of Directive 89/299/EEC, do not exceed ECU 7 million, and only in the case of such institutions, Member States may extend the time limits laid down in paragraph 5  by five years.  Member States that avail themselves of the option provided for in this paragraph shall take steps to prevent distortions of competition and shall inform the Commission and the Banking Advisory Committee thereof.  7.  In the cases referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, an exposure may be considered a large exposure if its value is equal to or exceeds 15 % of own funds.  8.  Until 31 December 2001 Member States may substitute a frequency of at least twice a year for the frequency of notification of large exposures referred to in the second indent of Article 3 (2).  9.  Member States may fully or partially exempt from the application of Article 4 (1), (2) and (3) exposures incurred by a credit institution consisting of mortgage loans as defined in Article 11 (4) of Directive 89/647/EEC concluded within eight years  of the date laid down in Article 8 (1) of this Directive, as well as property leasing transactions as defined in Article 11 (5) of Directive 89/647/EEC concluded within eight years of the date laid down in Article 8 (1) of this Directive, in both cases  up to 50 % of the value of the property concerned.  10.  Without prejudice to paragraph 4, Portugal may, until 31 December 1998, fully or partially exempt from the application of Article 4 (1) and (3) exposures incurred by a credit institution to Electricidade de Portugal (EDP) and Petrogal. Article 7  Subsequent amendments 1.  Technical amendments to the following points shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph 2:  -  the clarification of definitions to take account of developments on financial markets,  - the clarification of definitions to ensure the uniform application of this Directive,  - the alignment of the terminology and of the wording of the definitions on those in subsequent instruments concerning credit institutions and related matters,  - the clarification of the exemptions provided for in Article 4 (5) to (10).  2.  The Commission shall be assisted by the committee provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 22 (2) of Directive 89/646/EEC.  The Commission representative shall submit to the committee a draft of the measures to be taken. The committee shall deliver its opinion on that draft within a time limit which the chairman may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. The  opinion shall be delivered by the majority laid down in Article 148 (2) of the Treaty in the case of decisions which the Council is required to adopt on a proposal from the Commission. The votes of the Member States' representatives on the committee  shall be weighted as laid down in that Article. The chairman shall not vote.  The Commission shall adopt the measures envisaged if they are in accordance with the committee's opinion.  If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the committee's opinion, or if no opinion is delivered, the Commission shall, without delay, submit to the Council a proposal concerning the measures to be taken. The Council shall act by a qualified  majority.  If the Council does not act within three months of the referral to it the Commission shall adopt the measures proposed unless the Council has decided against those measures by a simple majority. Article 8  Final provisions 1.  Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to  comply with this Directive by 1 January 1994. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.  When Member States adopt these measures, they shall include a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. The manner in which such a reference is to be made shall be laid down by the  Member States.  2.  Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive.  3.  Pending Community legislation on the monitoring on a consolidated or non-consolidated basis of large exposures concerning activities which are principally exposed to market risks the Member States shall deal with such large exposures in accordance  with methods which they shall determine, having regard to the particular nature of the risks involved. Article 9  This Directive is addressed to the Member States.  Done at Brussels, 21 December 1992.  For the Council The President D. HURD     (1) OJ No C 123, 9. 5. 1991, p. 18 and OJ No C 175, 11. 7. 1992, p 4.  (2) OJ No C 150, 15. 6. 1992, p. 74 and OJ No C 337, 21. 12. 1992.  (3) OJ No C 339, 31. 12. 1991, p 35.  (4) OJ No L 322, 17. 12. 1977, p. 30. Directive last amended by Directive 89/646/EEC (OJ No L 386, 30. 12. 1989, p. 1).  (5) OJ No L 33, 4. 2. 1987, p. 10.  (6) OJ No L 372, 31. 12. 1986, p 1.  (7) OJ No L 386, 30. 12. 1989, p. 14.  (8) OJ No L 386, 30. 12. 1989, p. 1. Directive amended by Directive 92/30/EEC (OJ No L 110, 28. 4. 1992, p. 52).  (9) OJ No L 124, 5. 5. 1989, p. 16.  (10) OJ No L 197, 18. 7. 1987, p. 33.  (11) OJ No L 110, 28. 4. 1992, p. 52.  (12) OJ No L 375, 31. 12. 1985, p. 3. Directive as amended by Directive 88/220/EEC (OJ No L 100, 19. 4. 1988, p. 31).


Avis juridique important

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31992L0031

Council Directive 92/31/EEC of 28 April 1992 amending Directive 89/336/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibility

Official Journal L 126 , 12/05/1992 P. 0011 - 0011 Finnish special edition: Chapter 13 Volume 22 P. 0040  Swedish special edition: Chapter 13 Volume 22 P. 0040

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92/31/EEC  of 28 April 1992  amending Directive 89/336/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibilityTHE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 100a thereof,  Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),  In cooperation with the European Parliament (2),  Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (3),  Whereas Directive 89/336/EEC (4) provides for complete harmonization relating to electromagnetic compatibility;  Whereas a uniform application of that Directive requires the availability of harmonized standards; whereas these standards will not be available by the date of application of that Directive;  Whereas that Directive has not provided for an adequate transitional period during which it would be permitted to place on the market apparatus manufactured in accordance with national regulations applicable before the date of application of the said  Directive;  Whereas manufacturers must have the time needed to allow apparatus in stock to be marketed;  Whereas Directive 89/336/EEC should accordingly be amended,  HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:  Article 1  Directive 89/336/EEC is hereby amended as follows:  1. Article 10 (3) shall be deleted.  2. Article 12 (1) shall be supplemented by the following paragraph:  'However, Member States shall, for the period up to 31 December 1995, authorize the placing on the market and/or the putting into service of apparatus referred to in this Directive conforming to the national regulations in force in their territory on 30  June 1992.'  Article 2  1. Member States shall adopt and publish the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive not later than three months after its adoption. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.  When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the Member  States.  Member States shall apply these provisions not later than six months after the adoption of this Directive.  2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of the main provisions of domestic law which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive.  Article 3  This Directive is addressed to the Member States. Done at Luxembourg, 28 April 1992. For the Council  The President  Arlindo MARQUES CUNHA   (1) OJ No C 126, 21. 6. 1991, p. 7. (2) OJ No C 13, 20. 1. 1992, p. 506 and OJ No C 94, 13. 4. 1992. (3) OJ No C 339, 31. 12. 1991, p. 1. (4) OJ No L 139, 23. 5. 1989, p. 19. Directive amended by Directive 91/263/EEC (OJ No L 128, 23. 5. 1991,  p. 1).


title: Commission Directive 2014/85/EU of 1 July 2014 amending Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on driving licences  Text with EEA relevance

text:
               2.7.2014

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 194/10

         COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2014/85/EU
   of 1 July 2014
   amending Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on driving licences
   (Text with EEA relevance)
   THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
   Having regard to Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (1), and in particular Article 8 thereof,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               Significant improvements have been brought to tunnel safety within the Union, including by virtue of Directive 2004/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2). In order to fully ensure the effectiveness of these improvements, it is necessary to ensure that drivers know and understand the principles of safe driving in tunnels and can apply them in their behaviour in traffic. The theoretical and practical test requirements in Council Directive 91/439/EEC (3) were therefore amended accordingly by Commission Directive 2008/65/EC (4) and so should those in the recast Directive 2006/126/EC.

               (2)

               Since the adoption of Directive 2006/126/EC, scientific knowledge on medical conditions which affect fitness to drive has progressed, particularly as regards the estimation of both the associated risks for road safety and the effectiveness of treatment in averting the said risks. Numerous studies and researches have recently become available which confirm that the obstructive sleep apnoea syndrome is one of the highest risk factors for motor vehicle accidents. Therefore this condition should no longer be ignored in the context of the Union driving licence legislation.

               (3)

               Directive 2006/126/EC should therefore be amended in order to adapt Annexe III to scientific and technical progress.

               (4)

               Editorial errors have been detected in Annex II to Directive 2006/126/EC following its amendment by Commission Directive 2012/36/EU (5). Those should be corrected.

               (5)

               In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of Member States and the Commission of 28 September 2011 on explanatory documents (6), Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments.

               (6)

               The measures provided for in this Directive are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on driving licences,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
   Article 1
   Annexes II and III to Directive 2006/126/EC are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Directive.
   Article 2
   1.   Member States shall adopt and publish, by 31 December 2015 at the latest, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions.
   They shall apply those provisions from 31 December 2015.
   When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.
   2.   Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
   Article 3
   This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
   Article 4
   This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

      Done at Brussels, 1 July 2014.

            For the Commission,

            On behalf of the President,

         Siim KALLAS

            The Vice-President

      (1)  OJ L 403, 30.12.2006, p. 18.

      (2)  Directive 2004/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road network (OJ L 167, 30.4.2004, p. 39).

      (3)  Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences (OJ L 237, 24.8.1991, p. 1).

      (4)  Commission Directive 2008/65/EC of 27 June 2008 amending Directive 91/439/EEC on driving licences (OJ L 168, 28.6.2008, p. 36).

      (5)  Commission Directive 2012/36/EU of 19 November 2012 amending Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on driving licences (OJ L 321, 20.11.2012, p. 54).

      (6)  OJ C 369, 17.12.2011, p. 14.

      ANNEX

                  1.

                  Annex II to Directive 2006/126/EC is amended as follows:

                              (a)

                              point 2.1.3 is replaced by the following:

                                          ‘2.1.3.

                                          The road:

                                                      —

                                                      the most important principles concerning the observance of a safe distance between vehicles, braking distances and road holding under various weather and road conditions,

                                                      —

                                                      driving risk factors related to various road conditions, in particular as they change with the weather and the time of day or night,

                                                      —

                                                      characteristics of various types of road and the related statutory requirements,

                                                      —

                                                      safe driving in road tunnels;’;

                              (b)

                              point 5.1.3 is replaced by the following:

                                          ‘5.1.3.

                                          Specific provisions concerning vehicles of category C, CE, D and DE
                                          Member States may decide that no restriction to vehicles with automatic transmission shall be recorded on the driving licence for a category C, CE, D or DE vehicle referred to in point 5.1.2, when the applicant already holds a driving licence obtained on a vehicle with manual transmission in at least one of the following categories: B, BE, C, CE, C1, C1E, D, DE, D1 or D1E, and has performed the actions described in point 8.4 during the test of skills and behaviour.’;

                              (c)

                              point 6.3.8 is replaced by the following:

                                          ‘6.3.8.

                                          Special road features (if available): roundabouts; railway level crossings; tram/bus stops; pedestrian crossings; riding up-/downhill on long slopes; tunnels;’;

                              (d)

                              point 7.4.8 is replaced by the following:

                                          ‘7.4.8.

                                          Special road features (if available): roundabouts; railway level crossings; tram/bus stops; pedestrian crossings; riding up-/downhill on long slopes; tunnels;’;

                              (e)

                              point 8.3.8 is replaced by the following:

                                          ‘8.3.8.

                                          Special road features (if available): roundabouts; railway level crossings; tram/bus stops; pedestrian crossings; riding up-/downhill on long slopes; tunnels;’.

                  2.

                  In Annex III to Directive 2006/126/EC, section 11 (‘NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES’) is replaced by the following:
                  ‘NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES AND OBSTRUCTIVE SLEEP APNOEA SYNDROME
                  NEUROLOGICAL DISEASES

                              11.1.

                              Driving licences shall not be issued to, or renewed for, applicants or drivers suffering from a serious neurological disease, unless the application is supported by authorised medical opinion.
                              Neurological disturbances associated with diseases or surgical intervention affecting the central or peripheral nervous system, which lead to sensory or motor deficiencies and affect balance and coordination, must accordingly be taken into account in relation to their functional effects and the risks of progression. In such cases, the issue or renewal of the licence may be subject to periodic assessment in the event of risk of deterioration.

                        OBSTRUCTIVE SLEEP APNOEA SYNDROME

                              11.2.

                              In the following paragraphs, a moderate obstructive sleep apnoea syndrome corresponds to a number of apnoeas and hypopnoeas per hour (Apnoea-Hypopnoea Index) between 15 and 29 and a severe obstructive sleep apnoea syndrome corresponds to an Apnoea-Hypopnoea Index of 30 or more, both associated with excessive daytime sleepiness.

                              11.3.

                              Applicants or drivers in whom a moderate or severe obstructive sleep apnoea syndrome is suspected shall be referred for further authorised medical advice before a driving licence is issued or renewed. They may be advised not to drive until confirmation of the diagnosis.

                              11.4.

                              Driving licences may be issued to applicants or drivers with moderate or severe obstructive sleep apnoea syndrome who show adequate control of their condition and compliance with appropriate treatment and improvement of sleepiness, if any, confirmed by authorised medical opinion.

                              11.5.

                              Applicants or drivers with moderate or severe obstructive sleep apnoea syndrome under treatment shall be subject to a periodic medical review, at intervals not exceeding three years for drivers of group 1 and one year for drivers of group 2, with a view to establish the level of compliance with the treatment, the need for continuing the treatment and continued good vigilance.’.


title: Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States

text:
               23.11.2011

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 306/41

         COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2011/85/EU
   of 8 November 2011
   on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 126(14) thereof,
   Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
   Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (1),
   Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank (2),
   Whereas:

               (1)

               There is a need to build upon the experience gained during the first decade of the economic and monetary union. Recent economic developments have posed new challenges to the conduct of fiscal policy across the Union and have in particular highlighted the need for strengthening national ownership and having uniform requirements as regards the rules and procedures forming the budgetary frameworks of the Member States. In particular, it is necessary to specify what national authorities must do to comply with the provisions of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular Article 3 thereof.

               (2)

               Member State governments and government sub-sectors maintain public accounting systems which include elements such as bookkeeping, internal control, financial reporting, and auditing. Those systems should be distinguished from statistical data which relate to the outcomes of government finances based on statistical methodologies, and from forecasts or budgeting actions which relate to future government finances.

               (3)

               Complete and reliable public accounting practices for all sub-sectors of general government are a precondition for the production of high-quality statistics that are comparable across Member States. Internal control should ensure that existing rules are enforced throughout the sub-sectors of general government. Independent audits conducted by public institutions such as courts of auditors or by private auditing bodies should encourage best international practices.

               (4)

               The availability of fiscal data is crucial to the proper functioning of the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union. The regular availability of timely and reliable fiscal data is the key to proper and well timed monitoring, which in turn allows prompt action in the event of unexpected budgetary developments. A crucial element in ensuring the quality of fiscal data is transparency, which must entail the regular public availability of such data.

               (5)

               With regard to statistics, Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics (3) established a legislative framework for the production of European statistics with a view to the formulation, application, monitoring and assessment of the policies of the Union. That Regulation also laid down the principles governing the development, production and dissemination of European statistics: professional independence, impartiality, objectivity, reliability, statistical confidentiality and cost-effectiveness, giving precise definitions of each of these principles. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (4), strengthened the Commission’s powers to verify statistical data used for the excessive deficit procedure.

               (6)

               The definitions of ‘government’, ‘deficit’ and ‘investment’ are laid down in the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure by reference to the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA), replaced by the European system of national and regional accounts in the Community, adopted by Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 of 25 June 1996 on the European system of national and regional accounts in the Community (5) (ESA 95).

               (7)

               The availability and quality of ESA 95 data is crucial to ensure the proper functioning of the Union’s fiscal surveillance framework. ESA 95 relies on information provided on an accrual basis. However, these accrual fiscal statistics rely on the previous compilation of cash data, or their equivalent. These can play a relevant role in enhancing timely budgetary monitoring, so as to avoid the late detection of significant budgetary errors. The availability of cash-data time series on budgetary developments can reveal patterns warranting closer surveillance. The cash-based fiscal data (or equivalent figures from public accounting if cash-based data are not available) to be published should at least include an overall balance, total revenue and total expenditure. Where justified, for example where there is a large number of local government bodies, timely publication of data could rely on suitable estimation techniques based on a sample of bodies, with a subsequent revision using complete data.

               (8)

               Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts can considerably hamper the effectiveness of fiscal planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline, while transparency and discussion of forecasting methodologies can significantly increase the quality of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for fiscal planning.

               (9)

               A crucial element in ensuring the use of realistic forecasts for the conduct of budgetary policy is transparency, which should entail the public availability not only of the official macroeconomic and budgetary forecast prepared for fiscal planning, but also of the methodologies, assumptions and relevant parameters on which such forecasts are based.

               (10)

               Sensitivity analysis and corresponding budgetary projections supplementing the most likely macrofiscal scenario allow the analysis of how main fiscal variables would evolve under various growth and interest rates assumptions, and thus greatly reduce the risk of budgetary discipline being jeopardised by forecast errors.

               (11)

               Forecasts by the Commission and information regarding the models on which they are based can provide Member States with a useful benchmark for their most likely macrofiscal scenario, enhancing the validity of the forecasts used for budgetary planning. However, the extent to which Member States can be expected to compare the forecasts used for budgetary planning with the Commission’s forecasts varies according to the timing of forecast preparation and the comparability of the forecast methodologies and assumptions. Forecasts from other independent bodies can also provide useful benchmarks.

               (12)

               Significant differences between the chosen macrofiscal scenario and the Commission’s forecast should be described and reasons therefor should be given, in particular if the level or growth of variables in external assumptions departs significantly from the values contained in the Commission’s forecasts.

               (13)

               Given the interdependence between Member States’ budgets and the Union’s budget, in order to support Member States in preparing their budgetary forecasts, the Commission should provide forecasts for the Union’s expenditure based on the level of expenditure programmed within the multiannual financial framework.

               (14)

               In order to facilitate the production of the forecasts used for budgetary planning and to clarify differences between the forecasts of the Member States and those of the Commission, each Member State should, on an annual basis, have the opportunity to discuss with the Commission the assumptions underpinning the preparation of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.

               (15)

               The quality of official macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts is critically enhanced by regular, unbiased and comprehensive evaluation based on objective criteria. Thorough evaluation includes scrutiny of the economic assumptions, comparison with forecasts prepared by other institutions, and evaluation of past forecast performance.

               (16)

               Considering the documented effectiveness of rules-based budgetary frameworks of the Member States in enhancing national ownership of the Union’s fiscal rules promoting budgetary discipline, strong country-specific numerical fiscal rules that are consistent with the budgetary objectives at the level of the Union should be a cornerstone of the strengthened budgetary surveillance framework of the Union. Strong numerical fiscal rules should be equipped with well-specified target definitions together with mechanisms for effective and timely monitoring. Those rules should be based on reliable and independent analysis carried out by independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member States. In addition, policy experience has shown that for numerical fiscal rules to work effectively, consequences must be attached to non-compliance, where the costs involved may be simply reputational.

               (17)

               By virtue of the Protocol (No 15) on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, the reference values mentioned in the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to those Treaties are not directly binding on the United Kingdom. The obligation to have in place numerical fiscal rules that effectively promote compliance with the specific reference values for the excessive deficit, and the related obligation for the multiannual objectives in medium-term budgetary frameworks to be consistent with such rules, should therefore not apply to the United Kingdom.

               (18)

               Member States should avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies, and fiscal consolidation efforts should be greater in economic good times. Well-specified numerical fiscal rules are conducive to these objectives and should be reflected in the annual budget legislation of the Member States.

               (19)

               National fiscal planning can be consistent with both the preventive and the corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) only if it adopts a multiannual perspective and pursues the achievement, in particular, of the medium-term budgetary objectives. Medium-term budgetary frameworks are strictly instrumental in ensuring that budgetary frameworks of the Member States are consistent with the legislation of the Union. In the spirit of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (6) and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (7), the preventive and corrective parts of the SGP should not be regarded in isolation.

               (20)

               Although the approval of annual budget legislation is the key step in the budget process in which important budgetary decisions are adopted in the Member States, most fiscal measures have budgetary implications that go well beyond the annual budgetary cycle. A single-year perspective therefore provides a poor basis for sound budgetary policies. In order to incorporate the multiannual budgetary perspective of the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union, planning of annual budget legislation should be based on multiannual fiscal planning stemming from the medium-term budgetary framework.

               (21)

               That medium-term budgetary framework should contain, inter alia, projections of each major expenditure and revenue item for the budget year and beyond, based on unchanged policies. Each Member State should be able appropriately to define unchanged policies and those definitions should be made public together with the assumptions involved, the methodologies and other relevant parameters.

               (22)

               This Directive should not prevent a Member State’s new government from updating its medium-term budgetary framework to reflect its new policy priorities. In this case, the new government should highlight the differences from the previous medium-term budgetary framework.

               (23)

               Provisions of the budgetary surveillance framework established by the TFEU and in particular the SGP apply to general government as a whole, which comprises the sub-sectors central government, state government, local government, and social security funds, as defined in Regulation (EC) No 2223/96.

               (24)

               A significant number of Member States have experienced a sizeable fiscal decentralisation with the devolution of budgetary powers to sub-national governments. The role of such sub-national governments in ensuring that the SGP is complied with has thereby increased considerably, and particular attention should be paid to ensuring that all general government sub-sectors are duly covered by the scope of the obligations and procedures laid down in domestic budgetary frameworks, in particular, but not exclusively, in those Member States.

               (25)

               To be effective in promoting budgetary discipline and the sustainability of public finance, budgetary frameworks should comprehensively cover public finances. For this reason, operations of those general government bodies and funds which do not form part of the regular budgets at sub-sector level and that have an immediate or medium-term impact on Member States’ budgetary positions should be given particular consideration. Their combined impact on general government balances and debts should be presented in the framework of the annual budgetary processes and in the medium-term budgetary plans.

               (26)

               Similarly, due attention should be paid to the existence of contingent liabilities. More specifically, contingent liabilities encompass possible obligations depending on whether some uncertain future event occurs, or present obligations where payment is not probable or the amount of the probable payment cannot be measured reliably. They comprise for instance relevant information on government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, including, where appropriate, the likelihood and potential due date of expenditure of contingent liabilities. Market sensitivities should be duly taken into account.

               (27)

               The Commission should regularly monitor the implementation of this Directive. Best practices concerning the provisions of this Directive dealing with the different aspects of national budgetary frameworks should be identified and shared.

               (28)

               Since the objective of this Directive, namely uniform compliance with budgetary discipline as required by the TFEU, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

               (29)

               In accordance with point 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making (8), Member States are encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the interests of the Union, their own tables illustrating, as far as possible, the correlation between this Directive and the transposition measures, and to make them public,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
   CHAPTER I

      SUBJECT MATTER AND DEFINITIONS

   Article 1
   This Directive lays down detailed rules concerning the characteristics of the budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Those rules are necessary to ensure Member States’ compliance with obligations under the TFEU with regard to avoiding excessive government deficits.
   Article 2
   For the purposes of this Directive, the definitions of ‘government’, ‘deficit’ and ‘investment’ set out in Article 2 of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU shall apply. The definition of sub-sectors of general government set out in point 2.70 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 shall also apply.
   In addition, the following definition shall apply:
   ‘budgetary framework’ means the set of arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions that underlie the conduct of budgetary policies of general government, in particular:

               (a)

               systems of budgetary accounting and statistical reporting;

               (b)

               rules and procedures governing the preparation of forecasts for budgetary planning;

               (c)

               country-specific numerical fiscal rules, which contribute to the consistency of Member States’ conduct of fiscal policy with their respective obligations under the TFEU, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of budgetary performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major component thereof;

               (d)

               budgetary procedures comprising procedural rules to underpin the budget process at all stages;

               (e)

               medium-term budgetary frameworks as a specific set of national budgetary procedures that extend the horizon for fiscal policy-making beyond the annual budgetary calendar, including the setting of policy priorities and of medium-term budgetary objectives;

               (f)

               arrangements for independent monitoring and analysis, to enhance the transparency of elements of the budget process;

               (g)

               mechanisms and rules that regulate fiscal relationships between public authorities across sub-sectors of general government.

         CHAPTER II

      ACCOUNTING AND STATISTICS

   Article 3
   1.   As concerns national systems of public accounting, Member States shall have in place public accounting systems comprehensively and consistently covering all sub-sectors of general government and containing the information needed to generate accrual data with a view to preparing data based on the ESA 95 standard. Those public accounting systems shall be subject to internal control and independent audits.
   2.   Member States shall ensure timely and regular public availability of fiscal data for all sub-sectors of general government as defined by Regulation (EC) No 2223/96. In particular Member States shall publish:

               (a)

               cash-based fiscal data (or the equivalent figure from public accounting if cash-based data are not available) at the following frequencies:

                           —

                           monthly for central government, state government and social security sub-sectors, before the end of the following month, and

                           —

                           quarterly, for the local government sub-sector, before the end of the following quarter;

               (b)

               a detailed reconciliation table showing the methodology of transition between cash-based data (or the equivalent figures from public accounting if cash-based data are not available) and data based on the ESA 95 standard.

         CHAPTER III

      FORECASTS

   Article 4
   1.   Member States shall ensure that fiscal planning is based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to-date information. Budgetary planning shall be based on the most likely macrofiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be compared with the most updated forecasts of the Commission and, if appropriate, those of other independent bodies. Significant differences between the chosen macrofiscal scenario and the Commission’s forecast shall be described with reasoning, in particular if the level or growth of variables in external assumptions departs significantly from the values contained in the Commission’s forecasts.
   2.   The Commission shall make public the methodologies, assumptions and relevant parameters that underpin its macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.
   3.   In order to support Member States in preparing their budgetary forecasts, the Commission shall provide forecasts for the expenditure of the Union based on the level of expenditure programmed within the multiannual financial framework.
   4.   Within the framework of a sensitivity analysis, the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall examine paths of main fiscal variables under different assumptions as to growth and interest rates. The range of alternative assumptions used in macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be guided by the performance of past forecasts and shall endeavour to take into account relevant risk scenarios.
   5.   Member States shall specify which institution is responsible for producing macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts and shall make public the official macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts prepared for fiscal planning, including the methodologies, assumptions and relevant parameters underpinning those forecasts. At least annually, the Member States and the Commission shall engage in a technical dialogue concerning the assumptions underpinning the preparation of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.
   6.   The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for fiscal planning shall be subject to regular, unbiased and comprehensive evaluation based on objective criteria, including ex post evaluation. The result of that evaluation shall be made public and taken into account appropriately in future macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. If the evaluation detects a significant bias affecting macroeconomic forecasts over a period of at least 4 consecutive years, the Member State concerned shall take the necessary action and make it public.
   7.   Member States’ quarterly debt and deficit levels shall be published by the Commission (Eurostat) every 3 months.
   CHAPTER IV

      NUMERICAL FISCAL RULES

   Article 5
   Each Member State shall have in place numerical fiscal rules which are specific to it and which effectively promote compliance with its obligations deriving from the TFEU in the area of budgetary policy over a multiannual horizon for the general government as a whole. Such rules shall promote in particular:

               (a)

               compliance with the reference values on deficit and debt set in accordance with the TFEU;

               (b)

               the adoption of a multiannual fiscal planning horizon, including adherence to the Member State’s medium-term budgetary objective.

         Article 6
   1.   Without prejudice to the provisions of the TFEU concerning the budgetary surveillance framework of the Union, country-specific numerical fiscal rules shall contain specifications as to the following elements:

               (a)

               the target definition and scope of the rules;

               (b)

               the effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, based on reliable and independent analysis carried out by independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member States;

               (c)

               the consequences in the event of non-compliance.

         2.   If numerical fiscal rules contain escape clauses, such clauses shall set out a limited number of specific circumstances consistent with the Member States’ obligations deriving from the TFEU in the area of budgetary policy, and stringent procedures in which temporary non-compliance with the rule is permitted.
   Article 7
   The annual budget legislation of the Member States shall reflect their country-specific numerical fiscal rules in force.
   Article 8
   Articles 5 to 7 shall not apply to the United Kingdom.
   CHAPTER V

      MEDIUM-TERM BUDGETARY FRAMEWORKS

   Article 9
   1.   Member States shall establish a credible, effective medium-term budgetary framework providing for the adoption of a fiscal planning horizon of at least 3 years, to ensure that national fiscal planning follows a multiannual fiscal planning perspective.
   2.   Medium-term budgetary frameworks shall include procedures for establishing the following items:

               (a)

               comprehensive and transparent multiannual budgetary objectives in terms of the general government deficit, debt and any other summary fiscal indicator such as expenditure, ensuring that these are consistent with any numerical fiscal rules as provided for in Chapter IV in force;

               (b)

               projections of each major expenditure and revenue item of the general government with more specifications on the central government and social security level, for the budget year and beyond, based on unchanged policies;

               (c)

               a description of medium-term policies envisaged with an impact on general government finances, broken down by major revenue and expenditure item, showing how the adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objectives is achieved compared to projections under unchanged policies;

               (d)

               an assessment as to how in the light of their direct long-term impact on general government finances, the policies envisaged are likely to affect the long-term sustainability of the public finances.

         3.   Projections adopted within medium-term budgetary frameworks shall be based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts in accordance with Chapter III.
   Article 10
   Annual budget legislation shall be consistent with the provisions of the medium-term budgetary framework. Specifically, revenue and expenditure projections and priorities resulting from the medium-term budgetary framework as set out in Article 9(2) shall constitute the basis for the preparation of the annual budget. Any departure from those provisions shall be duly explained.
   Article 11
   No provision of this Directive shall prevent a Member State’s new government from updating its medium-term budgetary framework to reflect its new policy priorities. In this case, the new government shall indicate the differences from the previous medium-term budgetary framework.
   CHAPTER VI

      TRANSPARENCY OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES AND COMPREHENSIVE SCOPE OF BUDGETARY FRAMEWORKS

   Article 12
   Member States shall ensure that any measures taken to comply with Chapters II, III and IV are consistent across, and comprehensive in coverage of, all sub-sectors of general government. This shall, in particular, require the consistency of accounting rules and procedures, and the integrity of their underlying data collection and processing systems.
   Article 13
   1.   Member States shall establish appropriate mechanisms of coordination across sub-sectors of general government to provide for comprehensive and consistent coverage of all sub-sectors of general government in fiscal planning, country-specific numerical fiscal rules, and in the preparation of budgetary forecasts and setting-up of multiannual planning as laid down, in particular, in the multiannual budgetary framework.
   2.   In order to promote fiscal accountability, the budgetary responsibilities of public authorities in the various sub-sectors of general government shall be clearly laid down.
   Article 14
   1.   Within the framework of the annual budgetary processes, Member States shall identify and present all general government bodies and funds which do not form part of the regular budgets at sub-sector level, together with other relevant information. The combined impact on general government balances and debts of those general government bodies and funds shall be presented in the framework of the annual budgetary processes and the medium-term budgetary plans.
   2.   Member States shall publish detailed information on the impact of tax expenditures on revenues.
   3.   For all sub-sectors of general government, Member States shall publish relevant information on contingent liabilities with potentially large impacts on public budgets, including government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, including the extent thereof. Member States shall also publish information on the participation of general government in the capital of private and public corporations in respect of economically significant amounts.
   CHAPTER VII

      FINAL PROVISIONS

   Article 15
   1.   Member States shall bring into force the provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December 2013. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions. The Council encourages the Member States to draw up, for themselves and in the interests of the Union, their own correlation tables which will, as far as possible, illustrate the correlation between this Directive and the transposition measures, and to make them public.
   2.   When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.
   3.   The Commission shall prepare an interim progress report on the implementation of the main provisions of this Directive on the basis of relevant information from Member States, which shall be submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council by 14 December 2012.
   4.   Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
   Article 16
   1.   By 14 December 2018 the Commission shall publish a review of the suitability of this Directive.
   2.   The review shall assess, inter alia, the suitability of:

               (a)

               the statistical requirements for all sub-sectors of government;

               (b)

               the design and effectiveness of numerical fiscal rules in the Member States;

               (c)

               the general level of transparency of public finances in the Member States.

         3.   By 31 December 2012, the Commission shall assess the suitability of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards for the Member States.
   Article 17
   This Directive shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
   Article 18
   This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

      Done at Brussels, 8 November 2011.

            For the Council

            The President

         J. VINCENT-ROSTOWSKI

      (1)  European Parliament opinion of 28 September 2011 (not yet published in the Official Journal).

      (2)  OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.

      (3)  OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164.

      (4)  OJ L 145, 10.6.2009, p. 1.

      (5)  OJ L 310, 30.11.1996, p. 1.

      (6)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

      (7)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

      (8)  OJ C 321, 31.12.2003, p. 1.