Lightweight cipher designs try to minimize the implementation complexity of the cipher while maintaining some specified security level. Using only a small number of AND gates lowers the implementation costs, and enables easier protections against side-channel attacks. In our paper we study the connection between the number of AND gates (multiplicative complexity) and the complexity of algebraic attacks. We model the encryption with multiple right-hand sides (MRHS) equations. The resulting equation system is transformed into a syndrome decoding problem. The complexity of the decoding problem depends on the number of AND gates, and on the relative number of known output bits with respect to the number of unknown key bits. This allows us to apply results from coding theory, and to explicitly connect the complexity of the algebraic cryptanalysis to the multiplicative complexity of the cipher. This means that we can provide asymptotic upper bounds on the complexity of algebraic attacks on selected families of ciphers based on the hardness of the decoding problem.