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+{"_id":"c0","text":"(\u201c[I]t is one of the essential properties of a lease that its duration shall be for a determinate period, shorter than the duration of the estate of the lessor, hence the estate demised is called a \u2018term\u2019, and necessarily implies a reversion. If the entire interest of the lessor is conveyed, in the whole or a portion of his land, the conveyance cannot therefore be properly regarded as a demise ...\u201d)."}
+{"_id":"c1","text":". . . [T]he Court will not consider a federal law issue on direct review from a state-court judgment if that judgment rests on a state-law ground that is both \u201cindependent\u201d of the federal claim's merits and an \u201cadequate\u201d basis for the court's decision."}
+{"_id":"c10","text":"A regulation is content neutral if it applies regardless of the speech's message. Content-neutral regulations are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, which is easier to satisfy than strict scrutiny.\nIntermediate scrutiny allows reasonable and content-neutral time, place, or manner regulations (Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, 655 (2d Cir. 1995)). Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must prove that:\nIt has a significant governmental interest.\nThe regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the significant interest. The tailoring does not need to be the least restrictive nor the least intrusive possible.\nThe regulation leaves open ample alternatives for communication."}
+{"_id":"c100","text":"[W]e have held that the right to publish is central to the First Amendment and basic to the existence of constitutional democracy. Grosjean, supra, at 250, 56 S.Ct. at 449; New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 720.\n \nA corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. The full flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by which news is assembled and disseminated. We have, therefore, recognized that there is a right to publish without prior governmental approval, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822, a right to distribute information, see, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S., 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313; Grosjean, supra, and a right to receive printed matter, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 14 L.Ed.2d 398."}
+{"_id":"c101","text":"a party must prove the existence of a contract by showing that: \u201c(1) there was a meeting of the minds; (2) there was an offer and acceptance; (3) there was consideration; and, (4) there was certainty in the terms of the agreement.\u201d See id. at *3 (citation omitted)."}
+{"_id":"c102","text":"anything may be used to refresh a witness' recollection, even inadmissible evidence. See United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir.1946). However, the court has the discretion to withhold any writing from a witness where the judge believes that the document will be a source of direct testimony rather than the key to refreshing the witness' independent recollection. See Strickland, 128 F.3d at 1430."}
+{"_id":"c103","text":"\u201c(g) If the definition of a crime prescribes a culpable mental state with regard to a particular element or elements of that crime, the prescribed culpable mental state shall be required only as to specified element or elements, and a culpable mental state shall not be required as to any other element of the crime unless otherwise provided.\n\u201c(h) A person acts \u2018intentionally,\u2019 or \u2018with intent,\u2019 with respect to the nature of such person's conduct or to a result of such person's conduct when it is such person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. All crimes defined in this code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as \u2018intentionally\u2019 or \u2018with intent\u2019 are specific intent crimes. A crime may provide that any other culpability requirement is a specific intent."}
+{"_id":"c104","text":"\u201cConversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.\u201d To establish a claim for conversion, the plaintiff must prove (1) that she had a possessory interest in the property; (2) that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's right to possess the property; (3) that the defendant intended to interfere with plaintiff's possession; and (4) that the defendant's act was the legal cause of the plaintiff's loss of the property.30 Where the plaintiff voluntarily places her property with the defendant, the \u201cdefendant ordinarily is not required to do more than permit the plaintiff to come and get the chattel.\u201d"}
+{"_id":"c105","text":"\u201cGenerally, the buyer in a requirements contract governed by UCC \u00a7 2-306(1) is required merely to exercise good faith in determining his requirements and the seller assumes the risk of all good faith variations in the buyer's requirements even to the extent of a determination to liquidate or discontinue the business.\u201d Id. at 1261. \u201cA requirements contract is one in which the purchaser agrees to buy all of its needs of a specified material exclusively from a particular supplier, and the supplier agrees, in turn, to fill all of the purchaser's needs during the period of the contract.\u201d Id. at 1259. The good faith requirement imposed under the UCC and Indiana Code section 26-1-2-306, prevents requirements contracts from being illusory or too indefinite to be enforced. Id. at 1260.\nFrom time-to-time, there will be variations in the buyer's requirements. \u201cThe essential ingredient of the buyer's good faith under such circumstances is that he not merely have had second thoughts about the terms of the contract and want to get out of it.\u201d Id. at 1261. On the other hand, if a buyer has a legitimate business reason for eliminating its requirements, instead of a desire to simply avoid the contract, then the buyer is acting in good faith. Id."}
+{"_id":"c106","text":"\u201cPersonal knowledge,\u201d as required for lay witness testimony to be admissible, is a present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise of the witness's own senses. Cal. Evid. Code \u00a7 702(a)."}
+{"_id":"c107","text":"\u201cSpecial damages are a particular type of damages which are a natural consequence of the injury caused but are not the type of damages that necessarily flow from the harmful act.\u201d Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991). Rule 9(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that \u201cwhen items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated.\u201d Special damages must be pleaded with enough specificity \u201cthat the opposing party has an adequate opportunity to defend against the plaintiff's claims.\u201d Hodges, 811 P.2d at 162.  However, the plaintiff need not plead a specific dollar amount, and our supreme court has held that a complaint seeking \u201cdamages for lost wages ... and severe emotional distress\u201d has sufficiently pleaded special damages. Id."}
+{"_id":"c108","text":"\u201cThe award of nominal damages is appropriate when there is a clear invasion of a legal right ... but no finding of a compensable injury.\u201d Id., at 769, 778 A.2d 246. \u201cNominal damages are awarded when the insignificant character of the defamatory matter, or the plaintiff's bad character, leads the jury to believe that no substantial harm has been done to his reputation, and there is no proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant's attack upon the plaintiff's character and reputation.\u201d"}
+{"_id":"c109","text":"\u201cThe elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the intent to cause, or the disregard of a substantial likelihood of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress\u201d (Klein v. Metropolitan Child Servs., Inc., 100 A.D.3d 708, 710, 954 N.Y.S.2d 559; see Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead: Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, 11 N.Y.3d 15, 22\u201323, 862 N.Y.S.2d 311, 892 N.E.2d 375; Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699; Taggart v. Costabile, 131 A.D.3d 243, 249\u2013250, 14 N.Y.S.3d 388)."}
+{"_id":"c11","text":"A strict liability crime is \u201c[a]n offense for which the action alone is enough to warrant a conviction, with no need to prove a mental state; specif[ically] a crime that does not require a mens rea element, such as traffic offenses....\u201d Crime, Strict-Liability Crime, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)."}
+{"_id":"c110","text":"\u201cThe express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.\u201d Id. s 490:1-205(4)."}
+{"_id":"c111","text":"\u201cWe afford the trial court wide latitude in sentencing and, generally, \u2018will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an abuse of the judge's discretion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,\u00b6 66, 52 P.3d 1210 (citation omitted). Trial courts abuse their discretion \u201cwhen [they] fail [ ] to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law.\u201d Id. Generally, a trial court's sentence \u201c \u2018should be overturned only when it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citation omitted)."}
+{"_id":"c112","text":"\u201cWhat constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy depends on the facts of the case and rests within the sound discretion of the court in which the writ is sought.\u201d \u201cWhether there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law is a question left to the discretion of the court in which the proceeding is instituted.\u201d Thus, appellate courts \u201cwill not disturb a decision regarding a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy on review unless the superior court's discretion was manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.\""}
+{"_id":"c113","text":"\u201c[A]n unsigned contract may be enforceable, provided there is objective evidence establishing that the parties intended to be bound.\u201d Id. at 369, 795 N.Y.S.2d 491, 828 N.E.2d at 597."}
+{"_id":"c114","text":"\u201c[F]ederal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, *1010 but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.\u201d Singh, 538 F.3d at 338."}
+{"_id":"c115","text":"\u201c[r]obbery is \u2018the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another from his person by the use of violence or by putting in fear.\u2019 \u201d Metheny, 359 Md. at 605, 755 A.2d 1088 (citation omitted); see Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 184, 699 A.2d 1170 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998). Put another way, robbery is a larceny or theft accompanied by violence or putting in fear. West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 202, 539 A.2d 231 (1988)."}
+{"_id":"c12","text":"A unilateral contract is a contract in which \u201cperformance is based on the wish, will, or pleasure of one of the parties.\u201d Cook v. Coldwell Banker, 967 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Mo.App. E.D.1998)."}
+{"_id":"c13","text":"Accordingly, tenants are necessary parties to a foreclosure action (see 6820 Ridge Realty v. Goldman, 263 A.D.2d 22, 25, 701 N.Y.S.2d 69; Polish Natl. Alliance of Brooklyn v. White Eagle Hall Co., 98 A.D.2d 400, 404, 470 N.Y.S.2d 642)."}
+{"_id":"c14","text":"An adoptive admission is one \u201cmade in the presence of the defendant to which the defendant's response\u2014whether by oral declaration, by gesture, or by revealing silence\u2014objectively denotes the defendant's acceptance of the statement.\u201d Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450 Mass. 25, 34, 875 N.E.2d 846 (2007), *795 quoting **64 Commonwealth v. Babbitt, 430 Mass. 700, 705, 723 N.E.2d 17 (2000)."}
+{"_id":"c15","text":"An easement is a limited, nonpossessory interest in the land of another that can be created expressly, see Cheever v. Graves, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 601, 605\u2013606, 592 N.E.2d 758 (1992), by prescription, see G.L. c. 187, \u00a7 2 (easement by prescription), or by implication, see Kitras I, 64 Mass.App.Ct. at 291, 833 N.E.2d 157."}
+{"_id":"c16","text":"An incidental beneficiary is one \u201cwho will be benefited by performance of a promise but who is neither a promisee nor an intended beneficiary.\u201d Only donee and creditor beneficiaries have enforceable rights under a contract."}
+{"_id":"c17","text":"An out-of-court identification should be suppressed if (1) \u201cpolice used an unnecessarily suggestive procedure to obtain the out-of-court identification; and (2) ... the suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.\u201d Rimmer v. State, 825 So.2d 304, 316 (Fla.2002). Lineup photographs \u201care not unduly suggestive if the suspect's picture does not stand out more than those of the others, and the people depicted all exhibit similar facial characteristics.\u201d State v. Francois, 863 So.2d 1288, 1289-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Here, the defendant does not suggest that his picture stood out more than the others. Rather, he argues that, because it was the only picture common to both lineups, the *149 second photo lineup was unduly suggestive."}
+{"_id":"c18","text":"An \u201cassault\u201d is an attempt or offer, with force or violence, to inflict bodily harm on another or engage in some offensive conduct. In re McGee, 278 S.C. 506, 507, 299 S.E.2d 334, 334 (1983); Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 230, 317 S.E.2d 748, 754\u2013755 (Ct.App.1984) ( \u201c[A]n assault occurs when a person has been placed in reasonable fear of bodily harm by the conduct of the defendant.\u201d).  The elements of assault are: (1) conduct of the defendant which places the plaintiff, (2) in reasonable fear of bodily harm. Herring v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 222 S.C. 226, 241, 72 S.E.2d 453, 458 (1952); Jones by Robinson v. Winn\u2013Dixie Greenville, Inc., 318 S.C. 171, 175, 456 S.E.2d 429, 432 (Ct.App.1995)."}
+{"_id":"c19","text":"Anti-assignment clauses, such as this one, are routinely enforced. Conoco, Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.1987); Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Gerdes, 880 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied). These clauses are enforceable unless rendered ineffective by an applicable statute, estoppel, waiver, or some other aspect of contract law. Johnson v. Structured Asset Servs., LLC, 148 S.W.3d 711, 721 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.); see Tex. Dev. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 119 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.).11 \u201cIn the absence of a successful attack upon an anti-assignment clause, a party is entitled to have the trial court enforce it.\u201d Johnson, 148 S.W.3d at 721 (citing Tex. Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 846 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied))."}
+{"_id":"c2","text":". . . the common-law doctrine of joint and several liability. This doctrine provides, as a general matter, \u201cthat when two or more defendants tortiously contribute to the same, indivisible injury, each defendant may be held jointly and severally liable for the entire injury.\u201d Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 423, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997)."}
+{"_id":"c20","text":"Appellant is not charged with any negligence which caused appellee to lose his balance and to jump from the car.  We cannot hold that his injury was of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen might probably occur as a result of the grain door being where it was. It was highly improbable that an injury of such a character as that sustained by appellee would have resulted. It was an extraordinary *197 occurrence and would not reasonably have been foreseen or expected by a reasonably prudent person. It is not sufficient, under the law, that the accident happened and appellee was injured. While it is very unfortunate for appellee, yet we are not warranted by the law and the evidence in holding that appellant should compensate him for the injuries sustained. The judgment is reversed with a finding of facts."}
+{"_id":"c21","text":"Application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to a particular instance of discrimination against out-of-state residents entails a two-step inquiry. As an initial matter, the court must decide whether the ordinance burdens one of those privileges and immunities protected by the Clause. Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 1860, 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). Not all forms of discrimination against citizens of other States are constitutionally suspect.\n\u201cSome distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of those States. Only with respect to those \u2018privileges' and \u2018immunities' bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.\u201d Ibid.\nAs a threshold matter, then, we must determine whether an out-of-state resident's **1028 interest in employment on public works contracts in another State is sufficiently \u201cfundamental\u201d to the promotion of interstate harmony so as to \u201cfall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.\u201d Id., at 388, 98 S.Ct., at 1862. See also *219 Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 560, 40 S.Ct. 402, 403, 64 L.Ed. 713 (1920); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 248, 19 S.Ct. 165, 169, 43 L.Ed. 432 (1898)."}
+{"_id":"c22","text":"Article III states that these judges \u201chold their office during good behavior,\u201d which means they have a lifetime appointment, except under very limited circumstances. Article III judges can be removed from office only through impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate."}
+{"_id":"c23","text":"As a general rule, in order for evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant to the issues in the case and tend either to establish or disprove them. Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 591, 762 A.2d 125 (2000); Conyers, 354 Md. at 176, 729 A.2d 910; Rosenberg v. State, 129 Md.App. 221, 252, 741 A.2d 533 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 382, 749 A.2d 173 (2000). Maryland Rule 5\u2013401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has \u201cany tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d See also Johnson v. State, 332 Md. 456, 472 n. 7, 632 A.2d 152 (1993) (\u201cEvidence is relevant (and\/or material) when it has a tendency to prove a proposition at issue in the case\u201d). \u201cClearly, the question of whether a given fact is \u2018material\u2019 and thus relevant, depends on the underlying facts of the case. \u2018Evidence is material if it tends to establish a proposition that has legal significance to the litigation.\u2019 \u201d Jackson v. State, 87 Md.App. 475, 484, 590 A.2d 177 (1991) (citation omitted)."}
+{"_id":"c24","text":"As stated, there is no dispute that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship was created.  Under New York law, a \u201cjoint tenancy is an estate held by two or more persons jointly, with equal rights to share in its enjoyment during their lives, and creating in each joint tenant a right of survivorship\u201d (24 NY Jur.2d, Cotenancy and Partition \u00a7 16, at 332, 333). \u201cThe continuance of the joint tenancy depends on the maintenance of the unities of title, interest and possession, and the destruction of any of these unities leads to a severance of the tenancy, and to the creation of a tenancy in common or of several tenancies\u201d (Loker v. Edmans, 204 App.Div.223, 226, 197 N.Y.S. 857 [3rd Dep't 1923] [internal quotation marks omitted]).\u201d Goetz v. Slobey, 76 A.D.3d 954, 956, 908 N.Y.S.2d 237 (2nd Dep't 2010)."}
+{"_id":"c25","text":"Compelling defendant to give handwriting sample did not violate his rights against self-incrimination under either Fifth Amendment or section of State Constitution providing that no person \u201cshall be compelled to give evidence against himself\u201d; handwriting sample is not communication by itself, but rather, is physical characteristic in itself. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; LSA-Const. Art. 1, \u00a7 16."}
+{"_id":"c26","text":"Cross-examination for accomplish impeachment is not limited to questions about prior crimes or like misconduct; rather, even where proof falls outside conventional category of immoral, vicious, or criminal acts, it may be proper subject for impeachment questioning where it demonstrates untruthful bent or significantly reveals willingness or disposition on part of particular defendant voluntarily to place advancement of his individual self-interest ahead of principle or of interest of society."}
+{"_id":"c27","text":"Every crime has a set of elements that the prosecuting attorney must prove in order to establish the defendant's guilt. One of these elements typically has to do with the defendant's mental state. Usually, prosecutors must show that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. But, with strict liability crimes, the prosecution doesn't need to prove that a defendant intended to do something that's illegal. The prosecution doesn't even need to establish that the defendant was reckless or negligent. It's enough for a conviction to prove that the act was committed and the defendant committed it.\n\nWhy Have Strict Liability Crimes?\n\"Strict liability\" is a concept mainly applicable to civil law. It's a way of holding someone accountable for behavior regardless of fault (such as in product liability cases). Because criminal punishment is usually reserved for those who act with a culpable (guilty) mental state, strict liability crimes are rare. But some acts produce outcomes that lawmakers want to criminally punish regardless of a defendant's state of mind.\n\nWhat Are Common Strict Liability Offenses?\nProbably the most well-known example of a strict liability crime is statutory rape. Most states make it a crime to have sex with a minor, even if the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that the sexual partner was old enough to give legal consent.\n\nSelling alcohol to a minor is another strict liability crime. In some states, a conviction is appropriate even if the seller honestly thought the buyer was 21 or older and tried to confirm as much.\n\nSome traffic offenses are strict liability crimes. In many places, it doesn't matter whether a driver knowingly went over the speed limit\u2014the plain act of speeding typically justifies a conviction."}
+{"_id":"c28","text":"Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) requires that a record be \"kept\" in the course of a regularly conducted business activity. This requirement ordinarily presents no problem. If the record sought to be introduced was found in the files of a business, then it was, obviously, kept by the business. If it pertains to the operation of the business, then it was presumably kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity.\nIt will usually suffice if the record is found in the possession of someone who is engaged in a business activity, and the record pertains thereto. See, e.g., Keogh v. C.I.R., 713 F.2d 496, 498-500, 83-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 9539, 13 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1594, 52 A.F.T.R.2d 83-5881 (9th Cir. 1983), in which the court approved admission of a diary kept by a blackjack dealer at the Dunes Hotel and Country Club in Las Vegas. He recorded the amounts of tips that he received in it.\nSometimes a record that is prepared by one business is forwarded to a second business that uses it and, in the ordinary course of business, keeps it. It then becomes the business record of the business that keeps it."}
+{"_id":"c29","text":"Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erroneously concluded that their nuisance claim was without merit.  To support their claim of private nuisance, plaintiffs were required to show that (1) defendants interfered with the use or enjoyment of their property rights and privileges; (2) defendants' invasion of those property interests caused plaintiffs significant harm; and (3) the invasion was either intentional and unreasonable or otherwise \u201cactionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous conduct.\u201d Capitol Properties Group, LLC v. 1247 Ctr St, LLC, 283 Mich. App. 422, 431-432; 770 N.W.2d 105 (2009)."}
+{"_id":"c3","text":"A bid is the equivalent of an offer to buy the property, and no contract is formed until the auctioneer manifests final acceptance of the bid."}
+{"_id":"c30","text":"For Rule 804(b)(3) to apply, the proponent of an inculpatory hearsay statement must show: (1) that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial; (2) that the statement was against the declarant's penal interest when made; and (3) that corroborating circumstances clearly suggest that the statement is trustworthy. United States v. Loggins, 486 F.3d 977, 981 (7th Cir.2007). At trial, Volpendesto invoked his right against self-incrimination; there is no dispute that, with respect to the first requirement, he was unavailable to testify."}
+{"_id":"c31","text":"For there to be a valid boundary-line agreement, certain factors must be present: (1) there must be an uncertainty or dispute about the boundary line; (2) the agreement must be between the adjoining landowners; (3) the line fixed by the agreement must be definite and certain; (4) there must be possession following the agreement. Fields v. Griffen, 60 Ark.App. 186, 959 S.W.2d 759 (1998)."}
+{"_id":"c32","text":"Hearsay is an out of court, unsworn, oral or written statement by a third person, which is offered for the truth of its content. Hearsay statements are inadmissible unless they fit into one of the recognized exceptions.\u201d **6 State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, 1077 (La.1989) (citation omitted). One such exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule applies to unavailable witnesses:\nA. Definition of unavailability. Except as otherwise provided by this Code, a declarant is \u201cunavailable as a witness\u201d when the declarant cannot or will not appear in court and testify to the substance of his statement made outside of court. This includes situations in which the declarant:\n....\n(2) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so;\n....\nB. Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:\n....\n(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.\nLa.Code Evid. art. 804."}
+{"_id":"c33","text":"However, prior inconsistent statements by a witness are generally admissible for impeachment purposes. People v. Johnson, 2012 IL App (1st) 091730, \u00b6 68, 373 Ill.Dec. 1, 993 N.E.2d 1."}
+{"_id":"c34","text":"If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government's power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive."}
+{"_id":"c35","text":"In general, \u201c[f]ederal preemption occurs when: (1) Congress enacts a statute that explicitly preempts state law; (2) state law actually conflicts with federal law; or (3) federal law occupies a legislative field to such an extent that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress left no room for state regulation in that field.\u201d Hendricks v. StarKist Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 917, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2010))."}
+{"_id":"c36","text":"In the law of evidence in the United States, public policy doctrines for the exclusion of relevant evidence encompass several types of evidence that would be relevant to prove facts at issue in a legal proceeding, but which are nonetheless excluded because of public policy concerns. There are five major areas of exclusion that arise out of the Federal Rules of Evidence (\"FRE\"): subsequent remedial measures, ownership of liability insurance, offers to plead guilty to a crime, offers to settle a claim, and offers to pay medical expenses. Many states have modified versions of the FRE under their own state evidence codes which widen or narrow the public policy exclusions in state courts."}
+{"_id":"c37","text":"In this case, petitioner alleges race discrimination in the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges.  Invoking the Equal Protection Clause and federal statutory law, and relying upon well-established principles of standing, we hold that a criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded juror share the same races."}
+{"_id":"c38","text":"In \u201creckless\u201d or \u201cuniversal malice\u201d murder, \u201cthe defendant evinces a culpable mind, determined to act no matter what the consequences to others. He must have determined to follow a course of action which he knows, or should know, will, in all probability, lead to harm to another.\u201d Napier v. State, 357 So.2d 1011, 1014 (Ala.1978). \u201cThe word \u2018determines' presupposes that some mental operation has taken place; the reasoning faculty must be called into play.\u201d Langford v. State, 354 So.2d 313, 315 (Ala.1977).\n\u201cIn providing that homicide committed \u2018recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life\u2019 constitutes murder, the drafters of the model code were attempting to define a degree of recklessness \u2018that cannot be fairly distinguished from homicides committed purposely or knowingly.\u2019 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, \u00a7 210.02, Comment, 4 (1980).\u201d\nEx parte Weems, 463 So.2d at 172. Consequently, a required element of \u201creckless\u201d or \u201cuniversal malice\u201d murder involving the use of a firearm is that the defendant \u201cdetermined\u201d or intended to use the firearm."}
+{"_id":"c39","text":"Instead, they argue that a South Bend ordinance required Radman to maintain the handrail and that Radman therefore owed them a duty under the doctrine of negligence per se. Under that doctrine, the unexcused violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se if the provision (1) \u201cprotect[s] the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included\u201d and (2) \u201cprotect[s] against the type of harm which has occurred as a result of the violation.\u201d City of Fort Wayne v. Parrish, 32 N.E.3d 275, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied."}
+{"_id":"c4","text":"A cause of action for defamation arises out of a violation of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and involves the invasion of a person's interest in his or her reputation and good name. See Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 98\u20132313 (La.6\/29\/99), 737 So.2d 706, 715.  In order to prevail on a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: \u201c(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d Id. \u201cIn other words, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other fault, published a false statement with defamatory words which caused plaintiff damages.\u201d Id. (citations and quotations omitted)."}
+{"_id":"c40","text":"It is a defense to a prosecution that an actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his or her mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense."}
+{"_id":"c41","text":"It may be pointed out that, in repudiating its sub-bid by its letter of September 14, 1955, Ahern did not rely upon any alleged infirmity in the school district's action on the heating and ventilating sub-bids. If this contention, never made until 1957 after the school building was completed, had been advanced in 1955, the school district could perhaps have avoided any risk of improper procedure. Instead, Ahern in its letter merely asserted that it had made an error in computation. The practical effect of Ahern's repudiation of its bid has been to increase, in an amount exceeding Ahern's deposit, the school district's costs in performing a contract which no person entitled to do so has questioned, by forcing employment of the next lowest painting sub-bidder."}
+{"_id":"c42","text":"Larceny is a common law crime and is defined as \u201cthe wrongful or fraudulent taking of another's property without his permission and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of that property.\u201d Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 574, 667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008). Grand larceny is a form of larceny that \u201cincludes **332 the taking, not from the person of another, of goods having a value of $200 or more.\u201d Id. (citing Code \u00a7 18.2\u201395)."}
+{"_id":"c43","text":"Mens rea is an essential element of a crime. See Ward v. State, 271 Ga. 648, 653, 520 S.E.2d 205 (1999); Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 263, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952). Thus, the commission of a crime requires \u201ca joint operation of an act or omission to act [or actus reus] and intention or criminal negligence [or mens rea].\u201d OCGA \u00a7 16\u20132\u20131(a)."}
+{"_id":"c44","text":"Mississippi follows the \u201ccomparative negligence doctrine,\u201d which measures negligence \u201cin terms of percentage, and any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is sought.\u201d Meka, 67 So.3d at 23 (\u00b6 15) (citations omitted)."}
+{"_id":"c45","text":"Moreover, when negotiating the terms, the acceptance of the final offer must be substantially as made; if the purported acceptance includes conditions or differing terms, it is not a valid acceptance\u2014it is a counteroffer and will not bind the parties. See Harper Bldg. Co. v. Kaplan, 332 Mich. 651, 655\u2013656, 52 N.W.2d 536 (1952)."}
+{"_id":"c46","text":"NRS\u200248.015\u2002\u2002\u201cRelevant evidence\u201d defined.\u2002\u2002As used in this chapter, \u201crelevant evidence\u201d means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence."}
+{"_id":"c47","text":"Nor do we know of any reason why Congress may not, if it deems it in the national interest, authorize the states to place similar restraints on movement of articles of commerce. And the provisions looking to state cooperation may be sufficient to warrant the state in imposing regulations approved by the federal authorities, even if they otherwise might run counter to the decisions that coincidence is as fatal as conflict when Congress acts. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234. It is, of course, a quite different thing if Congress through its agents find such restrictions upon interstate commerce advance the national welfare, than if a locality is held free to impose them because it, judging its own cause, finds them in the interest of local prosperity."}
+{"_id":"c48","text":"Principals are strictly liable for their agents' acts\u2014even if the agents are not employees\u2014if the principals authorize or ratify the acts or even just create an appearance that the acts are authorized."}
+{"_id":"c49","text":"Rebuttal evidence is within a trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Booze, 334 Md. 64, 68 [637 A.2d 1214] (1994).  Rebuttal evidence is admissible when it \u201c \u2018explains, or is a direct reply to, or a contradiction of, any new matter that has been brought into the case by the accused.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 70 [637 A.2d 1214] (citations omitted)."}
+{"_id":"c5","text":"A covenant against the assignment of a lease without the owner's consent applies to voluntary assignments and does not include transfers or assignments by operation of law, such as transfers in bankruptcy, execution sales, receiver's sales, and other transfers in the interests of creditors or lienholders."}
+{"_id":"c50","text":"Recording a deed perfects delivery. See Candlewood Lake Assn. v. Scott, 10th Dist. Franklin App. No. 01AP\u2013631, 2001-Ohio-8873 [2001 WL 1654288].  However, \u201ca deed does not have to be recorded to pass title. Whether or not recorded, a deed in Ohio passes title upon its proper execution and delivery, so far as the grantor is able to convey it.\u201d Wayne Bldg. & Loan of Wooster v. *873 Yarborough, 11 Ohio St.2d 195, 212, 228 N.E.2d 841 (1967)."}
+{"_id":"c51","text":"Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine addressed to those situations where the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury by their very nature raise a presumption of negligence on the part of [the] defendant.\u201d Bowlin v. Duke Univ., 108 N.C.App. 145, 149, 423 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1992). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, \u201c \u2018in its distinctive sense, permits negligence to be inferred from the physical cause of an [injury], without the aid of circumstances pointing to the responsible human cause. Where this rule applies, evidence of the physical cause or causes of the [injury] is sufficient to carry the case to the jury on the bare question of negligence.\u2019 \u201d Diehl v. Koffer, 140 N.C.App. 375, 377\u201378, 536 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2000) (quoting Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 237, 111 S.E. 177, 178 (1922))."}
+{"_id":"c52","text":"Scope and rationale. Historically, the law recognized three defeasible fee simple estates: (1) the fee simple determinable; (2) the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent; and (3) the fee simple subject to an executory limitation. Continued differentiation among these subcategories is no longer useful, because the future interests formerly recognized as taking effect on the occurrence of the stated event are now the same. See \u00a7 25.2. Consequently, this Restatement recognizes only one defeasible fee simple estate. A defeasible fee simple terminates on the happening of a stated event that might or might not occur. The probability that the event will or will not occur is irrelevant. An estate that terminates on the happening of an event that must occur (e.g., the death of an individual or the expiration of a term certain) cannot be a fee estate. To be a fee estate, the estate must be potentially unlimited in duration, except as its duration is limited by the Rule Against Perpetuities. On the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to a fee simple defeasible, see \u00a7 27.2, Comment d."}
+{"_id":"c53","text":"Scope of the Easement\nScope of the easement refers to how the easement can be used which is determined by the type of easement.\n\nThe scope of express easements are limited to the terms of the easement\nThe scope of an implied easement is determined by existing use is limited to how the land was used before that easement existed.\nAn easement by necessity is limited in scope by the degree of necessity.\nThe scope of a prescriptive easement is typically limited by the term how the land was initially used."}
+{"_id":"c54","text":"Sovereign immunity means that the United States may not be sued without its consent and the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983)."}
+{"_id":"c55","text":"Such relationships (those that impose a duty of care) may arise by operation of law (e.g. master-servant), by agreement, or may be imposed by law in particular fact circumstances. Each of these relationships involves the essential determination as a matter of policy that the claimed supervisor has some duty of care either to protect the one to be supervised from injury or to protect third persons from injuries caused by the one to be supervised. In some instances, as with children, the duty may be to protect the supervised individual from self-imposed injury. E.g., Rogger v. Voyles, 797 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo.App.1990)(13 year-old child drove automobile and lost control). In other instances, the duty may be to protect against harm to the child by instrumentalities or conditions of land or personal property. See Smith v. Archbishop of St. Louis, 632 S.W.2d 516, 518\u201319 (Mo.App.1982)(child injured when costume set afire by burning candle on teacher's desk). Finally the duty may be to protect the child under supervision against harm by third persons (whether negligent or intentional).  In each of these situations involving children, policy and decisional law has established that \u201cacceptance of the custody and control of a minor child creates a relationship sufficient to support a duty of care.\u201d A.R.H. v. W.H.S., 876 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Mo.App.1994). The duty imposed is to supervise the minor child. Id. at 689. Proof of the necessary predicate relationship, therefore, establishes the first element of a cause of action in negligence\u2014the existence of a duty of care."}
+{"_id":"c56","text":"The Code defines usage of trade as \u201cany practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.\u201d Id. s 490:1-205(2) (emphasis supplied). We understand the use of the word \u201cor\u201d to mean that parties can be bound by a usage common to the place they are in business, even if it is not the usage of their particular vocation or trade. That reading is borne out by the repetition of the disjunctive \u201cor\u201d in subsection 3, which provides that usages \u201cin the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.\u201d Id. s 490:1-205(3). The drafters' Comments say that trade usage is to be used to reach the \u201c.... commercial meaning of the agreement....\u201d by interpreting the language \u201cas meaning what it may fairly be expected to mean to parties involved in the particular transaction in a given locality or in a given vocation or trade.\u201d Id., Comment 4 (emphasis supplied)."}
+{"_id":"c57","text":"The Commerce Clause refers to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power \u201cto regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. Congress has often used the Commerce Clause to justify exercising legislative power over the activities of states and their citizens, leading to significant and ongoing controversy regarding the balance of power between the federal government and the states. The Commerce Clause has historically been viewed as both a grant of congressional authority and as a restriction on the regulatory authority of the States."}
+{"_id":"c58","text":"The Constitution gave the power of appointing federal officers, including ambassadors, judges, and other officials, to the President along with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President nominates the officials and the nominations move to the Senate for the confirmation process."}
+{"_id":"c59","text":"The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish. The same instrument, in the last clause of the same article, provides that in all cases other than those of original jurisdiction, \u2018the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.\u2019"}
+{"_id":"c6","text":"A criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose. United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 115 (1st Cir. 2011). To convict defendant of conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 846, the government was required to prove that \u201c(1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. Under the third element, the evidence must establish that the defendant both intended to join the conspiracy and intended to effectuate the objects of the conspiracy.\u201d Id."}
+{"_id":"c60","text":"The Equal Protection Clause is essentially a requirement that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."}
+{"_id":"c61","text":"The Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for many of the same reasons stated in the Washington decision. The provisions of Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7\u00a7 315, 319 and 320 (1977), were deemed applicable, and the discretionary function exception of the KTCA was held not to be applicable. The court stated the following general principles:\n\u201cOne who is required by law to take custody of another under circumstances which deprive that person of the normal opportunities for protection is under a duty to protect the person taken into custody against unreasonable risk of physical harm from others.\u201d\n \u201cOne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.\u201d \u201cOne who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of self-protection or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of the third persons and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d"}
+{"_id":"c62","text":"The collateral evidence doctrine forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness on a collateral matter. Frederick C. Moss, The Sweeping-Claims Exception and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1982 Duke Law Journal 61-112 (1982). Its purpose is to \u201climit the scope of impeachment to the introduction of evidence that is relevant to the important issues in dispute.\u201d Id. Therefore, it functions as a corollary to the relevancy requirement; it excludes evidence that is logically relevant to the credibility of witnesses. Id."}
+{"_id":"c63","text":"The concept of mutuality of obligation requires that both parties to a contract be bound by the terms of the contract. See, e.g., Floss, 211 F.3d at 315\u201316. It goes hand in hand with the concepts of \u201cconsideration\u201d and the \u201cillusory promise\u201d (which is basically an empty promise: promising to do one thing while, at the same time, expressly retaining the right to change one's mind). See id. at 316; 1 Samuel Williston, Contracts \u00a7 43, at 140 (3d ed.1957); 2 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts \u00a7 6.1 (Joseph M. Perillo, et al., eds., rev. ed.1995). Discussion of mutuality of obligations generally only arises in the context of a bilateral contract, where two parties bind themselves to an agreement by each promising to do one thing in exchange for the other's promise to do another thing. See Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App.3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765, 776 (1984) (\u201cStripped to its essence, the concept of \u2018mutuality of obligation\u2019 expresses the idea that \u2018both parties to the contract must be bound or neither is bound.\u2019 However, this formulation applies only to an analysis of bilateral contracts, in which reciprocal promises are exchanged.\u201d);  Corbin on Contracts, supra, \u00a7 6.1, at 203\u201304. Thus, to say a contract lacks mutuality of obligation is to say only that one party has failed to actually promise to do the thing he said he would do, or, stated yet a third way, has failed to give consideration."}
+{"_id":"c64","text":"The courts on this matter speak in terms of a parent being liable for the child's torts, which suggest vicarious liability based on the family relationship. This is not the case. The parent is actually being held liable for his own negligence which is the proximate cause of the injury. The parent-child relationship does not make the parent liable in and of itself. This distinction is well stated in 43 Yale Law Journal 893, as follows:\n\u2018The relationship of parent and minor child affords a sufficient basis for the affirmative duty on the part *202 of the parent to exercise his parental control **445 to prevent the child from intentionally or negligently harming others. Here again, the relationship does not make the parent liable as such. He is, however, liable for his own torts, and this liability may arise out of the failure to perform definite acts to control the child when, as a reasonable parent, he should recognize that such control is necessary to prevent the child's injuring third persons.\u2019 43 Yale L.J. at 893."}
+{"_id":"c65","text":"The defendant next argues that, even if the sketch is hearsay, the trial justice erred in excluding it because the sketch was admissible under Rule 804(b)(5) or the \u201ccatch-all\u201d exception. \u201cUnder Rule 804(b)(5)(B), an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable witness can be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, if, among other requirements, \u2018the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.\u2019 \u201d *1118 State v. Briggs, 886 A.2d 735, 750 (R.I.2005). As defendant correctly points out, we have held previously, \u201c[i]n each case where Rule 804(b)(5) is invoked, the court is essentially creating a new exception to the hearsay rule. If the hearsay rule is to retain any life, a demand for the creation of a new exception counsels caution and should be granted only where special \u2018trustworthiness' is shown.\u201d Estate of Sweeney v. Charpentier, 675 A.2d 824, 827 (R.I.1996) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wolfson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 455 F.Supp. 82, 88 (M.D.Pa.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.1978)). Although we have no reason to doubt that Capt. Eastman faithfully complied to the best of her ability with the instructions of Benitez when she created the sketch, we cannot accept that there is an indication of special trustworthiness that would justify a conclusion that the trial justice abused his discretion when he declined to admit the sketch under this exception."}
+{"_id":"c66","text":"The elements for a claim of intentional trespass are: \u201c(1) an invasion affecting an interest in the exclusive possession of property; (2) an intentional doing of the act *401 which results in the invasion; (3) reasonable foreseeability that the act done could result in an invasion of plaintiff's possessory interest; and (4) substantial damages to the res.\u201d Seal v. Naches\u2013Selah Irrigation Dist., 51 Wash.App. 1, 5, 751 P.2d 873 (1988) (citing Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 691, 709 P.2d 782 (1985))."}
+{"_id":"c67","text":"The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: 1) a false material representation; 2) the speaker's knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentation or ignorance of the truth; 3) the speaker's intent that the hearer act upon the misrepresentation in a manner reasonably contemplated; 4) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the misrepresentation; 5) the hearer's reliance on its truth; 6) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and 7) the hearer's consequent and proximately caused damages. Id. at 489\u201390; Roth v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 210 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Mo.App. E.D.2006); Urologic Surgeons, Inc. v. Bullock, 117 S.W.3d 722, 725\u201326 (Mo.App. E.D.2003). If a plaintiff fails to establish any one of these elements, his claim also will fail. Mprove, 135 S.W.3d at 490."}
+{"_id":"c68","text":"The elements of involuntary manslaughter are as follows: (i) the unlawful killing: (ii) of a human being; (iii) without malice; (iv) through either: (a) the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony; or (b) while committing a lawful act in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, which act might produce death. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1112(a); Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions Criminal \u00a7 2.54.1, at 185 (2011)(Involuntary Manslaughter). When the killing occurs outside of a situation involving the commission of an unlawful act not amount to a felony, the United States must prove to secure a conviction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1112(a) for involuntary manslaughter that defendant acted with \u201cgross negligence amounting to wanton and reckless disregard for human life.\u201d Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions Criminal \u00a7 2.54.1, at 185. This mens rea requirement is equivalent to \u201c \u2018gross' or \u2018criminal\u2019 negligence,\u201d and thus contains a similar mens rea requirement to an offense committed under N.M.S.A.1978, \u00a7 30\u20136\u20131(D)(1). United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 553 (5th Cir.1989)."}
+{"_id":"c69","text":"The elements of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. See Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex.1995). Cause in fact means that the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, and without it harm would not have occurred. See Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex.1992). Foreseeability means that the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated the dangers that his negligent act or omission created for others. See D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex.2002). This test requires \u201conly that the general danger, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm, be foreseeable.\u201d See Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.1998); Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996)."}
+{"_id":"c7","text":"A declarant\u2019s statement about past or current causes, symptoms, or conditions, when made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, is not barred by the hearsay rules."}
+{"_id":"c70","text":"The ideal would be for us to forge a hard and fast rule alerting litigants that, in all situations in which a settlement agreement is silent as to the date of performance, a \u201creasonable time\u201d for the completion of one's settlement obligations is \u201cx\u201d number of days. However, it is not that simple. If the terms of the settlement at hand are fairly routine, it may be that only 7 to 10 days are needed for all terms of the agreement to be accomplished. If the details of the agreement are more complex, more time may be required. Unfortunately, there is no way we can fashion a one-size-fits-all \u201creasonable time\u201d period that takes into account every variable or contingency a settlement agreement may incorporate. As this Court stated in Walters v. Getter (1988), 232 Mont. 196, 200, 755 P.2d 574, 576\u201377 (citing Henderson v. Daniels (1922), 62 Mont. 363, 373\u201374, 205 P. 964, 967): \u201c \u2018Reasonable time\u2019 is defined to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case.\u201d Further, \u201cWhen the facts are clearly established or are admitted or undisputed, the question of what is a reasonable time is one of law.\u201d Walters, 232 Mont. at 200, 755 P.2d at 577. Such is the case here."}
+{"_id":"c71","text":"The indictment alleged that appellant committed aggravated assault by making \u201can assault upon the person of Bruce Neave, with a shotgun, a deadly weapon.\u201d The evidence used to prove that appellant perpetrated the aggravated assault of Bruce Neave, that he assaulted him with the shotgun, was used to establish that appellant committed the crime of malice murder.  As the aggravated assault offense was established by the same but less than all of the facts required to establish the offense of murder, the aggravated assault was an offense included in the malice murder conviction, and the conviction for the aggravated assault of Bruce Neave merged by fact into **749 the malice murder conviction. See id.; Montes v. State, 262 Ga. 473, 474(1), 421 S.E.2d 710 (1992)."}
+{"_id":"c72","text":"The preference in Wisconsin is to enforce contracts agreed to by competent and intelligent parties.  Abbott v. Marker, 2006 WI App 174, \u00b6 6, 295 Wis.2d 636, 722 N.W.2d 162. However, if a contract violates a statute, a rule of law or public policy, courts will not enforce the contract. See id. \u201cA contract is considered illegal when its formation or performance is forbidden by civil or criminal statute or where a penalty is imposed for the action agreed to.\u201d Id. A court can only refuse to enforce a contract where it has no doubt that it violates a statute, a rule of law or public policy. See Northern States Power Co. v. National Gas Co., Inc., 2000 WI App 30, \u00b6 8, 232 Wis.2d 541, 606 N.W.2d 613."}
+{"_id":"c73","text":"The subsequent land contract omits the zoning ordinance exception contained in the preliminary purchase agreement.6 The preliminary purchase agreement was merged into, and superseded by, the land contract.7 Even if this were not so, such an exception ought not extend to a situation where as a result of the conveyance called for in the contract of purchase and sale the title would be unmarketable as a result of a zoning law violation which the purchaser would be powerless to remedy. Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts (3d ed.), sec. 450, states that equity will not compel specific performance where a defect in title is substantial and material. Similarily, 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed.), p. 1051, sec. 1407, states:\n\u2018It is therefore a familiar rule that the vendor cannot force performance upon the purchaser unless he is able to give a good title to the subject matter.\u2019\n Also in 49 Am.Jur., Specific Performance, p. 11, 112, sec. 95, it is said:\n\u2018If the vendor is unable to convey a clear and marketable title * * * specific performance will not be granted.\u2019"}
+{"_id":"c74","text":"The test of relevancy is whether it renders the claimed inference more probable than it would be without the evidence. Bush v. Jackson, 191 Colo. 249, 251, 552 P.2d 509, 511 (1976). According to this test, it does not matter that other inferences may be equally probable; it is for the jury to determine what motivated the behavior. Id."}
+{"_id":"c75","text":"This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). See, e. g. Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 596-597, 51 S.Ct. 608, 611-612, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931). See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124-125, 9 S.Ct. 231, 234, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889). The \u201cright to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.\u201d Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 646, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard \u201cat a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\u201d Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914).\n\nThese decisions underscore the truism that \u201c \u2018(d)ue process,\u2019 unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.\u201d Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961).  \u201c(D)ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.\u201d Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 416 U.S., at 167-168, 94 S.Ct., at 1650-1651 (Powell, J., concurring in part); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S., at 263-266, 90 S.Ct., at 1018-1020; **903 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, 367 U.S., at 895, 81 S.Ct., at 1748-1749. More precisely, our prior decisions *335 indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S., at 263-271, 90 S.Ct., at 1018-1022."}
+{"_id":"c76","text":"This court has noted \u201c[t]here is no more fundamental right in the United States than the right to a jury trial.\u201d State v. Larraco, 32 Kan.App.2d 996, 999, 93 P.3d 725 (2004). There can be little doubt, therefore, that the consideration of the denial of a right to a jury trial is necessary to prevent the denial of a fundamental right.\nA criminal defendant's right to a jury trial is guaranteed by constitution and statute. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights \u00a7\u00a7 5, 10. K.S.A. 22\u20133403(1) requires all felony cases be tried to a jury unless the defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the consent of the court, submit the matter to a bench trial.\nThe right to a jury trial may be waived if it is done so voluntarily and knowingly. State v. Irving, 216 Kan. 588, 589, 533 P.2d 1225 (1975). \u201cWhether this test is satisfied in any given case will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of that case, but a waiver of the right to a jury trial will not be presumed from a silent record. [Citations omitted.]\u201d 216 Kan. at 589, 533 P.2d 1225. Rather, a court may not accept a waiver unless the defendant, after being advised by the court of his or her right to a jury trial, personally waives that right, either in writing or in open court on the record. 216 Kan. at 590, 533 P.2d 1225."}
+{"_id":"c77","text":"Thus, in order to successfully assert a claim for detrimental reliance, a plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of the reliance.\u201d **11 Luther v. IOM Co. LLC, 13\u2013353, pp. 10\u201311 (La.10\/15\/13), 130 So.3d 817, 825. However, detrimental reliance is not favored in Louisiana, and the failure of the plaintiff to prove each element will bar recovery. Id."}
+{"_id":"c78","text":"Thus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174."}
+{"_id":"c79","text":"To constitute a valid tender under an executory contract for the sale of chattels, the law only requires such acts as are practicable according to he character of the thing tendered and the nature of the business; if the articles are ponderous and bulky, a manual delivery is unnecessary."}
+{"_id":"c8","text":"A design defect renders a product unreasonably dangerous as designed, thereby warranting strict liability, when taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. See General Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex.1999)."}
+{"_id":"c80","text":"To frame this issue, we begin with K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21\u20135402(a), which defines murder in the first degree as \u201cthe killing of a human being committed: (1) Intentionally, and with premeditation.\u201d The jury was properly instructed that to prove premeditation the State had to show Seba had \u201cthought the matter over beforehand, in other words, [had] formed the design or intent to kill before the act.\u201d See PIK Crim. 4th 54.150(d) (2013 Supp.). The State relied on the transferred intent doctrine to prove Seba acted intentionally and with premeditation.\nThis court has previously explained the transferred intent doctrine by stating:\n\u201cThe fact that the homicidal act was directed against one other than the person killed does not relieve the slayer of criminal responsibility. It is generally held that such a homicide partakes of the quality of the original act, so that the guilt of the perpetrator of the crime is exactly what it would have been had the assault followed upon the intended victim instead of another.\u201d State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 535, 431 P.2d 879 (1967), overruled on other grounds by State v. Underwood, 228 Kan. 294, 306, 615 P.2d 153 (1980).\nMore plainly stated, \u201c \u2018 \u201cthe malice or intent follows the bullet.\u201d 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide \u00a7 11, pp. 302\u201303.\u2019 \u201d State v. Jones, 257 Kan. 856, 860, 896 P.2d 1077 (1995); see State v. Garza, 259 Kan. 826, 829, 916 P.2d 9 (1996) (same)."}
+{"_id":"c81","text":"To prevail on an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) the representer's knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and (4) consequent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation.\u201d Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Venus, 66 So.3d 306, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)."}
+{"_id":"c82","text":"To properly plead breach of contract, \u201c[t]he complaint must identify the specific provision of the contract allegedly breached by the defendant.\u201d Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F.Supp.2d 913, 930 (N.D.Cal.2012) (citing Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 135 Cal.App.4th 263, 281, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 (2005))."}
+{"_id":"c83","text":"To prove a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: \u201cthat the defendant's conduct was (1) intentional or reckless, (2) so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society, and (3) resulted in serious mental injury to the plaintiff.\u201d Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 (Tenn.2012). This Court has observed that, \u201cA plaintiff's burden to demonstrate outrageous conduct \u2018is not an easy burden to meet.\u2019 \u201d Brown, 393 S.W.3d at 703 (quoting Weaver v. Pardue, No. M2010\u201300124\u2013COA\u2013R3\u2013CV, 2010 WL 4272687, at *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 28, 2010)) (further citation omitted)."}
+{"_id":"c84","text":"To prove assumption of risk, a defendant must show \u201c1) that the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the specific risk involved; 2) that the plaintiff appreciated the risk's character; and 3) that the plaintiff voluntarily *776 accepted the risk, having had the time, knowledge, and experience to make an intelligent choice.\u201d Carpenter v. City of Belle Fourche, 609 N.W.2d 751, 764 (S.D.2000) (quoting S.D. Pattern Jury Instruction 13\u201301)."}
+{"_id":"c85","text":"Under Ohio law, parol, or extrinsic, evidence is only admissible if the terms of a contract are ambiguous, and can only be used to interpret, not contradict, the express language of the contract."}
+{"_id":"c86","text":"Under the Appointments Clause, which prescribes the exclusive means of appointing Officers of the United States, only the President, a court of law, or a head of department can do so, and only the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, can appoint a principal officer, but Congress, instead of relying on that method, may authorize the President alone, a court, or a department head to appoint an inferior officer."}
+{"_id":"c87","text":"Under the California statute of frauds,52 a promise or agreement to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, such as a guaranty or surety, must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged. An oral modification of a contract subject to the statute of frauds is never permitted when it would materially alter the parties' written agreement.53 \u201cWere it possible to make an oral modification of a contract which by the statute of frauds is required to be in writing and enforce such oral modification, the door would be open for the perpetration of such frauds as the statute seeks to prevent.\u201d54"}
+{"_id":"c88","text":"Unjust enrichment is defined as the unjust retention of \u201c \u2018money or benefits *48 which in justice and equity belong to another.\u2019 \u201d McCreary v. Shields, 333 Mich. 290, 294, 52 N.W.2d 853 (1952) (citation omitted). \u201cNo person is unjustly enriched unless the retention of the benefit would be unjust.\u201d Buell v. Orion State Bank, 327 Mich. 43, 56, 41 N.W.2d 472 (1950). Buell also explained: \u201c \u2018One is not unjustly enriched ... by retaining benefits involuntarily acquired which law and equity give him absolutely without any obligation on his part to make restitution.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citation omitted)."}
+{"_id":"c89","text":"Unless a contract expressly states so, or unless there is otherwise shown to be a clear indication of intent, time is not ordinarily considered to be of the essence in the performance of a contract. Gault v. Branton, 222 Miss. 111, 75 So.2d 439, 445 (1954); Lee v. Schneider, 822 So.2d 311, 314 (Miss.Ct.App.2002). We note that in order for equity to regard contracts as \u201cof the essence,\u201d one of two conditions must be satisfied.  In the absence of either condition, time will not ordinarily be considered of the essence in contract performance."}
+{"_id":"c9","text":"A minor is responsible for his or her own torts. However, the court will often apply a more lenient standard. In determining tort liability for children, there are special rules, usually based on the age of the minor.  Historically, there was a bright-line test based on the child\u2019s age. Specifically:\n\nUnder age 7: A child could not be negligent.\nBetween age 7 and 14: There was a rebuttable presumption that the child could not be negligent.\nBetween age 14 and 21: There was a rebuttable presumption that the child was capable of negligence."}
+{"_id":"c90","text":"Unlike its original jurisdiction, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is subject to \u201cexceptions and regulations\u201d prescribed by Congress, and the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts is subject to congressional prescription. Additionally, Congress has power to regulate modes and practices of proceeding on the part of the inferior federal courts. Whether there are limitations to the exercise of these congressional powers, and what the limitations may be, are matters that have vexed scholarly and judicial interpretation over the years, inasmuch as congressional displeasure with judicial decisions has sometimes led to successful efforts to \u201ccurb\u201d the courts and more frequently to proposed but unsuccessful curbs."}
+{"_id":"c91","text":"We conclude that although a defendant can open the door with statements made during either direct or cross-examination, and a defense witness can open the door on direct-examination, a defense witness cannot inadvertently open the door on cross-examination. Under Rule 404(a)(1), M.R.Evid., only the accused can \u201copen the door\u201d for the prosecution to introduce rebuttal character evidence."}
+{"_id":"c92","text":"When a matter goes to trial, the specific training and experience of a potential expert witness can be explored on the record so that the trial court may ascertain whether that witness qualifies as an expert in the field at issue. See Rittenhouse v. Hanks, 2001 PA Super 153, 777 A.2d 1113 (2001) (qualification of expert witness at trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge). This also provides the jury with a basis on which to determine the expert's credibility. In the present case, the matter has not yet gone to trial. Therefore, the correct opportunity for the trial court to evaluate fully the training and experience of Dr. Merikangas and Dr. Gramlich has not yet arisen. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Urban Redevelopment Authority, 536 Pa. 219, 225, 638 A.2d 972, 975 (1994) (credibility of evidence is not a proper consideration at the summary judgment stage)."}
+{"_id":"c93","text":"When a retailer advertises an item for sale, it is implied that they ensure the product is safe and suitable for use. Even though a retailer may not have manufactured or distributed a defective product, they can be held liable for any injuries or losses caused by a product they sold. Similar to any personal injury case, there are specific elements that you must prove in a product liability lawsuit against a retailer. First, it must be shown that you used the product in the way that it was designed to be used and not for any other purpose. Second, it must be proven that the product was defective. Third, you must establish that you were injured and suffered losses. Lastly, you must prove that the defect in the product directly caused your injuries. Defective product claims against retailers can be challenging to prove and often require the expertise of medical and technical experts. It is always best to seek legal representation in these cases."}
+{"_id":"c94","text":"When the government expressly classifies persons on the basis of race or national origin, however, its action is \u201c \u2018immediately suspect.\u2019 \u201d Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1148, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993)). A plaintiff in such a lawsuit need not make an extrinsic showing of discriminatory animus or a discriminatory effect to trigger strict scrutiny. \u201cNo inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute.\u201d  Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642, 113 S.Ct. 2816. The burden of proof shifts, strict scrutiny applies, and \u201c[u]nder strict scrutiny, the government [defending the constitutionality of the law] has the burden of proving that racial classifications \u2018are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.\u2019 \u201d Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 1146 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097). As noted above, the Supreme Court has explained that we \u201c \u2018apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to \u201csmoke out\u201d illegitimate uses of race by assuring that government is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 109 S.Ct. 706 (plurality opinion)) (emphasis in Johnson; alteration incorporated)."}
+{"_id":"c95","text":"Where it appears by the record that the judgment of the State court might have been based either upon a law which would raise a question of repugnancy to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or upon some other independent ground; and it appears that the court did, in fact, base its judgment on such independent ground, and not on the law raising the Federal question, this court will not take jurisdiction of the case, even though it might think the position of the State court an unsound one. But where it does not appear on which of the two grounds the judgment was based, then, if the independent ground on which it might have been based was a good and valid one, sufficient of itself to sustain the judgment, this court will not assume jurisdiction of the case; but if such independent ground was not a good and valid one, it will be presumed that the State court based its judgment on the law raising the Federal question, and this court will then take jurisdiction"}
+{"_id":"c96","text":"While continuing to argue that the advice of defendant's civil attorney was irrelevant, the state conceded that good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel could be relevant to the issue of intent when intent is an element of the charged crime. The state did argue that if defendant's attorney's advice was, for instance, \u201cthis is breaking the law but you can go ahead and do it as I think you can get away with it,\u201d or something to that effect, the reliance would not be in good faith and not relevant on the issue of intent. The state conceded, however, that if defendant's attorney had made a good-faith determination that defendant's actions were legal and later it was determined that his research was flawed, his advice would be relevant on the issue of intent. However, the state still continues to claim that counsel's advice is irrelevant because the state argues that \u201cscienter\u201d is an element of conspiracy on the two counts against defendant, but insisted that scienter goes to the \u201cintent to commit the specific bad act that is an essential element of the crime,\u201d not the conspiracy itself. The defense argues that scienter is an essential element of conspiracy on the two counts against defendant and that the state is required to prove \u201cintent to conspire.\u201d We conclude the state is required to prove \u201cintent to conspire.\u201d Thus, the attorney's advice, if in good faith, is relevant on the issue of intent to conspire to procuring unlawful voting and to commit forgery.\nWe conclude that good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel is an available defense when intent is an element of the charged crime."}
+{"_id":"c97","text":"While revokable offer to bilateral contract may be revoked at any time prior to acceptance, that revocation or rejection is effective at moment of receipt, but acceptance is effective upon dispatch."}
+{"_id":"c98","text":"Witness' hearsay statements to his priest and his attorney, in which witness confessed to participating in the murder with which defendant and co-defendant were charged and absolved them of any involvement, were not declarations against penal interest; witness fully expected that priest and attorney would keep his conversations with them confidential."}
+{"_id":"c99","text":"[A] program violates the Establishment Clause when it allows or requires \u201cthe government itself ... through its own activities and influences\u201d to advance or inhibit religion. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987)). Accordingly, when striking a balance between the call of duty and the strictures of the Establishment Clause, state officers must maintain a position of \u201cbenevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.\u201d Amos, 483 U.S. at 334, 107 S.Ct. 2862."}

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